Title: Clapp v. Clapp

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

CLAPP_V_CLAPP.93-458; 163 Vt 15; 653 A.2d 72

[Filed 04-Nov-1994]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                           No. 93-458


Elizabeth W. Clapp                           Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                       Chittenden Family Court

Michael B. Clapp                             May Term, 1994


Alden T. Bryan, J.

Nancy Corsones of Corsones & Corsones, Rutland, for plaintiff-
 appellee

William H. Quinn of Pierson, Wadhams, Quinn & Yates, Burlington,
 for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
 Specially Assigned


     DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, Michael Clapp, appeals a decision of the
Chittenden Family Court in the divorce action between him and his former
wife, Elizabeth Clapp, challenging both property and maintenance orders
contained therein.  We order stricken paragraph 17 of the court's order
requiring that defendant pledge his interest in his law firm or purchase a
life insurance policy of equivalent value in order to secure his
maintenance obligation to plaintiff in the event of his death before age
sixty-five; in all other respects, we affirm. 

     The parties were married in 1967 following defendant's first year of
law school.  When defendant graduated in 1969, the parties returned to
Vermont and he began his legal practice that continues to this day.  The
parties' son was born in 1970 and their daughter in 1972.  Plaintiff
remained home to care for the children full time until 1975, at which time
she began pursuing her master's degree in education.  In 1977, having
received her degree, plaintiff began work as a junior high school guidance
counselor.  In 1981, she became a high school guidance counselor and has
continued in that job to the present.  In 1987, after twenty years of
marriage, the parties separated.  Plaintiff filed for divorce in 1989.  In
1991, her annual income before taxes was 

 

$45,237; defendant's annual income before taxes was $137,600. 

     The parties were divorced by final order of the Chittenden Family
Court entered in February 1993.  At that time, both parties were
forty-eight years old.  The court found that the parties' assets totalled
$1,257,577, and their liabilities $498,773.  Finding that the merits of the
situation favored plaintiff wife slightly, the court ordered the parties'
assets to be split 60% to wife and 40% to husband.  In so decreeing, the
court awarded each spouse the respective homes, but required that both
homes be sold and the equity divided 60/40. 

     The court ordered defendant to pay maintenance and set the amount
temporarily at $2,000 per month.  Thereafter, it required a calculation of
maintenance based on an equalization of the parties' after-tax income from
June 1987 to the date of the divorce.  This maintenance amount had not been
calculated at the time of the appeal, and the parties had widely divergent
claims about the result of the calculation.(FN1)  Once calculated, the base
maintenance amount would be adjusted annually based on changes in the
Consumer Price Index. 

     On appeal, husband raises five arguments:  (1) the family court erred
in its determination that wife had established grounds for maintenance; (2)
the court's maintenance order exceeds its authority and is therefore an
abuse of discretion; (3) the court had no evidence upon which to base its
maintenance award to compensate plaintiff for her monetary and nonmonetary
contributions to the marriage; (4) the court exceeded its authority in
ordering defendant to sell his residence; and (5) the court erred in
requiring defendant to pledge his law firm interest or alternatively to
purchase life insurance in the amount of that interest to secure main-
tenance payments to wife in the event of defendant's death before age sixty-
five.  We find no merit in the first four arguments; we do, however, agree
with defendant's final contention, and modify the court's order to strike
the paragraph requiring defendant to pledge his interest in his law firm 

 

or purchase a life insurance policy of equivalent value to secure
payment of maintenance to plaintiff should defendant die before he reaches
sixty-five years of age. 

     We can combine defendant's first three arguments for purposes of
analysis.  Relying on 15 V.S.A.  752(a), defendant argues that the court
could not award maintenance unless plaintiff's reasonable needs are not met
by her income, including the income available from any assets awarded to
her.  In this case, defendant argues, plaintiff's reasonable needs were met
by her income, and no maintenance should have been awarded. Alternatively,
he claims that any maintenance award cannot exceed the amount necessary to
enable the obligee to meet her reasonable needs.  Specifically, he argues
that the family court has no discretion to increase the award above that
reasonably needed in order to compensate her for past contributions as a
homemaker because the statute does not allow for restitutionary or
compensatory awards based on past events.  In this case, he claims the
award clearly exceeded the amount reasonably needed even if an award of
some maintenance was appropriate. 

     Much of defendant's argument is based on the statutory language, which
provides: 

      752.  Maintenance 

        (a) In an action under this chapter, the
     court may order either spouse to make
     maintenance payments, either rehabilitative
     or permanent in nature, to the other spouse
     if it finds that the spouse seeking
     maintenance:

          (1) lacks sufficient income, property,
     or both, including property apportioned in
     accordance with section 751 of this title, to
     provide for his or her reasonable needs, and

          (2) is unable to support himself or
     herself through appropriate employment at the
     standard of living established during the
     marriage or is the custodian of a child of
     the parties.

15 V.S.A.  752(a).  The argument specifically emphasizes  752(a)(1)
which requires a threshold finding that the prospective obligee lacks
income or property to meet "reasonable needs."  See Justis v. Rist, 159 Vt.
240, 245, 617 A.2d 148, 150-51 (1992) (court can award maintenance only
when  752(a) authorizes it). In defendant's view, the court must first
determine reasonable need without regard to the income available during the
marriage, or the 

 

obligor's current income, and award maintenance only if this need is not
met by the obligee's nonmaintenance income and property. 

     Defendant's argument involves an overly narrow reading of 
752(a)(1).  The statute is based on a concept of relative, not absolute,
need.  See Chaker v. Chaker, 155 Vt. 20, 25, 581 A.2d 737, 740 (1990)
(relying on Buttura v. Buttura, 143 Vt. 95, 99,