Title: Board of County Com'rs of Fremont County, Wyo. v. Memorial Hosp. of Natrona County, Wyo.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Board of County Com'rs of Fremont County, Wyo. v. Memorial Hosp. of Natrona County, Wyo.1984 WY 60682 P.2d 334Case Number: 83-116Decided: 06/18/1984BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FREMONT COUNTY, WYOMING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING, CARDIOPULMONARY SERVICES, P.C., AND WYOMING NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C., APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
BOARD OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF FREMONT COUNTY, WYOMING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF NATRONA 
COUNTY, WYOMING, CARDIOPULMONARY 
SERVICES, P.C., AND WYOMING NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C., 
APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Judith Anne 
Patton, DeputyCountyAtty., 
FremontCounty, Lander, for appellant.

Richard L. 
Williams, of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A prisoner in the 
FremontCounty jail sustained a 
head injury from a fall. He received emergency medical care in a FremontCounty hospital, but was transferred to 
appellee hospital where he received extensive treatment. Appellant refused to 
pay appellees for such treatment, and appellees brought this action to force 
payment. The parties stipulated as to some of the facts, and both sides filed 
motions for summary judgment. Affidavits of representatives of each appellee and 
of the treating physician were filed in support of appellees' motion. 
Appellant's motion was denied, and appellees' motion was granted. Appellant 
contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of § 18-6-303, W.S. 
19771 and in its findings of 
fact.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant contends that 
the words "necessary medical attendance" in § 18-6-303 are ambiguous and 
that

"* * * the statute only 
comtemplates emergency care and that additional or prolonged care is not and was 
not contemplated by the legislature."

It argues 
that

"* * * the legislature 
intended that the sheriff provide emergency care; follow-up care being the 
responsibility of the patient or prisoner. * * *"

It hypothesizes 
that otherwise the county may have to pay for medical services indefinitely and 
that such may extend over years.

[¶4.]     The word "shall" in the 
statute mandates the designated action inasmuch as the context does not indicate 
otherwise. Mayland v. State, 
Wyo., 568 P.2d 897, 899 (1977). In the absence of ambiguity, the plain language of a statute 
controls its meaning. Matter of Parental 
Rights of SCN, NAN, Wyo., 659 P.2d 568, 573 
(1983); People v. Fremont Energy 
Corporation, Wyo., 651 P.2d 802, 807 (1982). As recognized 
by appellant:

"`In construing statutes, 
the presumption is that the legislature aims to enact legislation that is 
reasonable and logical. Department of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Irvin[e], 589 P.2d 1295, 1298 (WY. 1979) * * 
*.'"

[¶5.]     The words "necessary 
medical attendance" are not ambiguous as contended by appellant. To be ambiguous 
they must be "`obscure in [their] meaning, because of indefiniteness of 
expression, or because a double meaning is present.'" Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980), quoting from Bulis v. Wells, Wyo., 565 P.2d 487, 490 
(1977). The word "necessary" is a relative word, but its meaning is not obscure. 
The determination of that which is necessary is one of fact. The factual 
situation in any given case may designate that which is necessary, and that 
which is necessary may vary from case to case. However, the word does not have a 
double meaning. A 300-pound rabbit may be described as big, and a 10-ton 
elephant may also be described as big. Thus, the word "big" is relative, but it 
cannot be said to be ambiguous in its characterization of the rabbit or of the 
elephant.

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
it was not the legislative intent to place such a large onus for medical 
attention on the county. We repeat: we can look only to the plain words of the 
statute for legislative intent absent ambiguity. If a change is warranted, it 
should be accomplished legislatively and not judicially.

[¶7.]     Although not argued by 
appellant in so many words, in truth, it is urging us to find a summary judgment 
to be improper inasmuch as there is an issue of a material fact, i.e., was the 
medical attention and nursing afforded to the prisoner reasonably 
necessary?

[¶8.]     We would accede to such 
urging and find a material fact issue in the determination of whether or not the 
treatment was "reasonable" if appellant had demonstrated the potential for 
submitting evidence to counter the potential evidence which appellees set forth 
in the affidavits in support of their motion for a summary 
judgment.

[¶9.]     Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part that:

"* * * The judgment 
sought [by a motion for summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. * * *"

We have held 
that a party cannot rely on the allegations of his pleadings to demonstrate a 
genuine issue of fact, Apperson v. 
Kay, Wyo., 546 P.2d 995, 996 (1976), and where there is competent evidence 
presenting a prima facie case, the party opposing a summary judgment motion must 
affirmatively set forth competent and material opposing facts, Cantonwine v. Fehling, Wyo., 582 P.2d 592, 598 (1978).

"* * * [I]f allegations 
of the complaint are controverted by affidavits and other evidence tending to 
show the allegations are not true, it thereupon becomes incumbent upon plaintiff 
to set forth `specific facts' in opposition, if plaintiff's contention (or 
allegations of the complaint) are to remain a genuine issue of fact for trial. * 
* *" In re Wilson's Estate, Wyo., 399 P.2d 1008, 1009 
(1965).

Conversely, if 
allegations of the complaint are supported by affidavits or other evidence, it 
thereupon becomes incumbent upon the defendant to set forth in affidavit, 
deposition, etc., "specific facts" in opposition thereto in order to prevent a 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.

[¶10.]  In this case, the only affidavits, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions on file were the 
affidavits filed by appellees. The affidavit of the treating physician, Dr. 
Philip P. Gordy, a neurosurgeon, recites the injury to the prisoner, the extent 
of the injury, and the critical nature of the injury. A hospital discharge 
summary was an exhibit to the affidavit. It reflected the injury to consist of 
"a massive right epidural hematoma with hemorrhage extending under the right 
temporal lobe and involving also the right parietal occipital region." A right 
frontoparietal craniotomy was performed with evacuation of the hematoma. The 
affidavit recited that, in the medical opinion of Dr. Gordy, all of the care 
supplied to Mr. Frazier and the length of stay in the hospital were absolutely 
necessary to the treatment and survival of the patient.

[¶11.]  Since there was no other information in 
the record relative to the necessity of the medical attention and nursing, the 
trial court could properly find that there was no genuine issue as to the 
fact.

[¶12.]  Appellant suggests that Dr. Gordy's 
statements in this respect are only "conclusions." The recitation of the injury 
and its treatment are not conclusions. These basic facts are those upon which 
the ultimate fact of reasonable necessity must be decided. Appellant did not 
counter such with affidavits, etc., to indicate the potential of evidence to the 
contrary. In other words, the court was not properly informed that there would 
be an issue over the necessity of the medical attention and 
nursing.

[¶13.]  The purpose of a motion for summary 
judgment is not to decide the facts but to determine if any real issue exists. 
Kimbley v. City of 
Green River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443, 
446 (1982); Timmons v. Reed, 
Wyo., 569 P.2d 112, 116 (1977).

[¶14.]  In summary, § 18-6-303 is plain in 
directing payment by the county commissioners for necessary medical attendance 
and nursing for prisoners. That which is necessary is a question of fact. The 
affidavits in support of appellees' motion for summary judgment reflected that 
evidence would be submitted to support the reasonable necessity of the medical 
attention and nursing furnished to the prisoner in this instance. Appellant did 
not submit any affidavits, etc., to indicate the existence of potential evidence 
to the contrary. The summary judgment was proper.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 18-6-303, W.S. 
1977, provides in pertinent part:

"The sheriff shall provide * * * necessary medical 
attendance and nursing and such other necessities for the welfare of the 
prisoners as the grand jury may recommend. Expenses thereof shall be audited and 
settled by the county commissioners as other general county expenses." (Emphasis 
added.)