Title: Helgeson v. Locken

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

130 N.W.2d 573 (1964) Andrew HELGESON and Agnes C. Helgeson, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Engvald LOCKEN, Defendant and Appellant. No. 8157. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 1, 1964. Rehearing Denied October 22, 1964. Palda, Palda, Peterson & Anderson, Minot, for appellant. *574 Joseph P. Stevens, Minot, for respondents. ERICKSTAD, Judge. Engvald Locken, as defendant, appeals from the judgment which was rendered on the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiffs and from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. In their complaint the plaintiffs assert two causes of action. For their first cause of action they allege facts in support of their contention that they have suffered damages as a result of the unlawful and improper termination by Mr. Locken of a farm rental agreement. They conclude their first cause of action as follows: In the second cause of action they allege facts to support their contention that they are entitled to exemplary damages for the manner in which they were evicted from the premises by Mr. Locken on the termination of the contract. They conclude their second cause of action with the following: To this complaint Mr. Locken filed an answer denying the major allegations of the complaint and asserting a counterclaim for damages allegedly suffered by him. Both sides submitted testimony to support their allegations, and after each side had rested, the court instructed the jury. The instructions pertinent to the issue on appeal were to the effect that treble damages allowable for forcibly ejecting or excluding a person from the possession of real property are punitive damages. "The term `forcibly ejecting and excluding a tenant' means force of an *575 unusual kind which tends to bring about a breach of the peace, such as an injury with a strong arm, or a multitude of people, or in a riotous manner, or with personal violence, or with threat or menace to life or limb, or under circumstances which would naturally inspire fear. So to authorize a recovery of treble damages for a forcible eviction from real property, it is necessary that the entry shall be forcible, but it is not necessary that the force shall be actually applied. It is enough if it is present and threatened, and is justly to be feared. The damages which may be trebled are the actual or compensatory damages sustained by the plaintiffs, and nothing can be trebled but what the jury has found to be the actual, compensatory damages." In these instructions the court apparently had the provisions of Section 32-03-29, N.D.C.C., in mind: North Dakota Century Code. In line with the court's thinking that the provisions of said section involved punitive damages, the court submitted to the jury three forms of verdict. The first form was entitled "Verdict for Plaintiffs for Compensatory Damages Only"; the second was entitled "Verdict for Plaintiffs for Treble Damages"; and the third was entitled "Verdict of Dismissal." No challenge was made to these instructions nor to the jury forms which were made part of the instructions. The jury returned a verdict on the form entitled "Verdict for Plaintiffs for Compensatory Damages Only." The material portion of the verdict read as follows: The material portions of the verdict form entitled "Verdict for Plaintiffs for Treble Damages," which form was not used by the jury, read as follows: Instructions not objected to are the settled law of the case. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Johnston's Fuel Liners, N.D., 122 N.W.2d 140; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Hoerner, N.D., 81 N.W.2d 648. As the court in its instructions considered treble damages to be punitive damages and as these instructions were not challenged, they are the settled law of the case and prohibit recovery for treble damages unless punitive damages were found by the jury to be proper. Here the jury returned a verdict for compensatory damages only. The verdict, therefore, can stand only if supported by proof of actual damages. Mr. Locken contends that this verdict could not include items of compensatory damages not pleaded, nor could it exceed the amount of compensatory damages requested in the prayer for relief, unless the pleadings and the prayer for relief were amended to conform to the evidence. No motion was made to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, and no such amendment was made. Contrary to the defendant's views, the pleadings do not limit the amount of the verdict, where the amount is justified by the evidence admitted without objection during the trial of the case. North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In regard to the prayer for relief, it has been held that damages may be given in excess of the amount demanded. Couto v. United Fruit Co., 203 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.1953). It is interesting in this regard to compare the provisions of Rule 8(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure with Section 28-0702 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, which it superseded. It is to be noted that Subsection 3 of Section 28-0702 required that the amount be stated if recovery of money was demanded and that under Rule 8(a) there is no such requirement. Both of these rules must be considered in the light of Rule 54(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In the instant case the plaintiffs apparently initiated their action on the theory that they were entitled to compensatory damages for losses in cream and cattle only and for a period of merely one year. The theory of the case was changed and the scope of the action enlarged when the plaintiffs, without objection, offered evidence of losses in income from custom combining, from rental of the Eidet land, and from cream and cattle, all for a period of approximately three years, which was the balance of the term of the lease. As evidence beyond the scope of the pleadings was received without objection, the pleadings, including the prayer for relief, do not limit the amount of the verdict. The defendant further contends that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice of the jury and therefore should be set aside as excessive. In a decision rendered by this court in 1963, we said: When damages due to losses in income from custom combining, sales of cream, increase in livestock, and other miscellaneous items over a period of almost three years are considered, the amount of the verdict is amply supported by the evidence. Consequently, the verdict could not be said to be so excessive as to shock the *578 conscience of the court. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. It should be noted that the defendant assigned other specifications of error, but, as they were not supported by argument in his brief, they are deemed abandoned. Rule 8(b), Supreme Court of North Dakota, 76 N.D. xix; Mevorah v. Goodman, N.D., 68 N.W.2d 469; Regent Coop. Equity Exch. v. Johnston's Fuel Liners, N.D., 122 N.W.2d 151. The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed. MORRIS, C. J., and BURKE and TEIGEN, JJ., concur. STRUTZ, J., did not participate.