Title: KAREN MCGARVEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KAREN MCGARVEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 8200 P.3d 785Case Number: No. S-08-0070Decided: 01/29/2009Modified: 01/30/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KAREN 
McGARVEY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and 
Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Interim Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Eric Thompson, Student 
Director; and Jill Cottle Garrett, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Garrett.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Karen 
McGarvey (McGarvey), entered conditional pleas of guilty to felony possession of 
marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of methamphetamines.  The condition attached to her plea was 
that she be permitted to pursue an appeal of the district court's order denying, 
in part, her motion to suppress the evidence seized by the State at the time she 
was briefly stopped and then arrested.  
We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      McGarvey raises 
this issue:

 
 
            
Did the district court err when it denied [McGarvey's] motion to suppress 
because the initial seizure of Ms. McGarvey was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity?

 
 
The 
State essentially agrees with that statement of the issue.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On June 22, 2007, 
at approximately 1:20 a.m., Casper Police Officer Derrick Dietz was working with 
several other officers in search of a fleeing domestic assault suspect who was 
reported to have jumped into the North Platte River.  Dietz was in the area of North Center 
Street near the Loaf N Jug, one block east of the river.  Dietz observed a 1989 Honda, which 
McGarvey was driving, pull out of the Loaf N Jug onto North Center Street, 
heading southbound.  He noticed the 
vehicle pulling out a little quickly, which caught his attention.  He also noted there were two individuals 
in the vehicle and decided that he needed to conduct further observation.  Officer Dietz followed the vehicle down 
North Center Street, trailing within a block of the vehicle.  While he was doing so, McGarvey made a 
left-hand turn into a parking lot, quickly turned the vehicle around, and 
returned back onto North Center Street -- all without stopping.  McGarvey then accelerated quickly until 
she abruptly turned onto E Street without using a turn signal.  Officer Dietz felt McGarvey's driving 
behavior was suspicious, in that it seemed she was trying to get away from his 
vehicle, which was a marked Casper City Police car.  After turning onto E Street, McGarvey 
pulled in front of the Parkway Plaza (Parkway), leaving her car in a "no 
parking" area just north of the Parkway's canopied 
entrance.

 
 
[¶4]      After the vehicle 
stopped, McGarvey and her passenger got of out the car and, although not quite 
running, they quickly began to walk inside the Parkway.  Officer Dietz believed they were trying 
to avoid contact with him.  He 
called in his location to dispatch and pulled his car up next to the Parkway's 
entrance so he could attempt to speak to the occupants of the vehicle.  McGarvey and her male passenger were 
walking into the Parkway when Officer Dietz asked them to stop.  It was conceivable that McGarvey did not 
hear Dietz, as she had by that time passed through the entrance door.  However, the male passenger had not yet 
gone through the entrance when Dietz called out to them, and he appeared to 
ignore Officer Dietz's request, continuing into the building behind McGarvey 
without acknowledging that request.

 
 
[¶5]      Officer Dietz 
entered the Parkway and noticed that McGarvey and the male passenger had started 
down a corridor located just past the front desk.  He again identified himself and asked 
them to stop.  They complied with 
this request.  Officer Dietz asked 
McGarvey and the male passenger for their identification.  While he was gathering information from the male passenger in the hallway, 
Dietz noticed that McGarvey appeared very nervous: sweating, stammering, and 
displaying nervous mannerisms.  He 
also observed that, when McGarvey was giving him her identification 
information, she appeared to be 
trying to deceive him about who she was. She told him her name was Kathy Barber, 
reported a birth date, but stated that she could not recall her Social Security 
Number.  Dietz noted that McGarvey's 
continued nervousness, twitching, and inability to "stand still and maintain a 
normal conversational contact position" was indicative of an individual under 
the influence of some type of controlled substance.  Dietz then asked her who owned the 
vehicle she had been driving, and she informed him that it belonged to a friend whose name 
she could not remember.  He also 
asked her about the insurance information for the vehicle, to which she responded 
that she did not know that information.

 
 
[¶6]      Dietz then asked 
McGarvey and the male passenger if they would walk over to the main lobby area 
with him, as he wanted to stand where he could be seen by an incoming back-up 
officer.  Both McGarvey and the male 
passenger went back to the main lobby with Officer Dietz.  As they arrived in the main lobby, 
McGarvey repeatedly attempted to put her hands into her pockets, and Officer 
Dietz asked her to stop two or three times.  However, she did not stop putting her 
hands in her pockets but, rather, put her left hand into her left front pants 
pocket. He continued to ask her several times to stop and, when she did not 
stop, he reached down, stopped her hand, and did a cursory feel of the pocket 
for possible weapons.  Officer Dietz 
felt what he thought was a cigarette lighter and a soft package.  He then saw a glass vial inside a black 
baggie that was protruding from McGarvey's upper left shirt pocket.  Officer Dietz recognized the glass vial 
as a "meth smoking pipe."  McGarvey 
tried to put her right hand into her right front pocket, whereupon Dietz grabbed 
that hand after telling her that she needed to stop or she would be handcuffed 
for his safety.  When she continued 
to put her hand in her pocket, the officer began to handcuff her and a struggle 
ensued.  Dietz put her in an arm bar 
and took her to the floor so he could continue to put handcuffs on her, but she 
continued to struggle, apparently trying to take something out of her pocket and 
stuff it up through the leg of her shorts into the crotch area.  As the struggle continued, the glass 
pipe and case in her shirt pocket fell to the floor.  Dietz also observed a small bindle in 
McGarvey's shirt pocket which he believed to contain a controlled substance. The 
bindle later field tested positive for methamphetamine.

 
 
[¶7]      After the 
struggle, Officer Dietz and McGarvey stood up, and another glass pipe fell out 
of her pant-leg and onto the floor. McGarvey told Dietz that this was what she 
had been trying to hide during their struggle.

 
 
[¶8]      Officer Dietz 
then spoke with the Parkway desk clerk, David Garner, who told the officer that 
he recognized McGarvey as a former employee at the Parkway and "that she had 
been trespassed from the Parkway Plaza."  
A backup policeman, Officer Schulte, soon arrived, and he noticed several 
things on the ground where the struggle between Officer Dietz and McGarvey had 
taken place: car keys, cigarettes, and a little bindled baggie.  Schulte pointed out these items to 
Officer Dietz, who seized the little bindled baggie.  Dietz observed that the little bindled 
baggie contained what appeared to be marijuana, and such was later confirmed by 
a field test.

 
 
[¶9]      McGarvey was then 
placed under arrest for the possession of controlled substances.  Pursuant to a search incident to that 
arrest, Dietz found a small cylinder-shaped container on McGarvey's person which 
appeared to contain residue from a controlled substance.  He took McGarvey outside and observed 
that she was walking with an unusual gait, apparently trying to hold her legs 
together as she walked.   Dietz 
believed that she still had something in the crotch area of her pants that she 
was trying to hide.  He placed her 
in the back of his patrol car and activated its audio and video recording 
devices.  At about this same time, 
Dietz was notified by dispatch that the owner of the car he had followed was 
Karen McGarvey, who had an active warrant for a parole violation and a suspended 
driver's license.  McGarvey heard 
this notification and, when asked her name by Officer Dietz, admitted that she 
indeed was Karen McGarvey and that she was on parole.  Dietz then gave her the Miranda 
warnings, after which she again confirmed her name and parole violation. She 
also admitted to being in possession of methamphetamine but denied the 
possession of marijuana.

 
 

[¶10]   Based upon the confirmation that 
the vehicle belonged to McGarvey, Dietz conducted a further investigation of the 
vehicle. Through the window of the vehicle, he observed a digital scale, which 
he recognized as the type of item commonly used for both using and/or selling 
controlled substances. He also observed that the scale had residue on it, which 
appeared consistent with a controlled substance.  During this time, Officer Dietz observed 
McGarvey moving around in the back of the patrol car.  Consequently, he spoke with her and she 
complained of pain in her upper 
back.  Dietz removed her from the 
patrol car to extend the handcuffs and make them more comfortable for her.  As Officer Dietz was placing her back 
into the patrol car, he noticed her make a small kicking motion.  When he closed the door and stepped back 
from the vehicle, he noticed a little blue container on the ground which had not 
been there before.  That item seemed 
consistent with the soft packet he had felt in McGarvey's left pants pocket 
during the initial frisk.  Inside 
the blue container were three additional bindles.

 
 
[¶11]   Officer Dietz then searched 
McGarvey's vehicle and found packaging material, similar to that type which 
contained the marijuana and methamphetamine he had found earlier. He also 
located a white towel that held four ounces of marijuana.  Furthermore, he found additional 
cylindrical containers, similar to the one McGarvey had in her right front 
pocket, as well as a clear glass vial, located in the glove box, that was later 
found to contain cocaine. Officer Dietz also located a mock soft air pistol 
under the passenger seat.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶12]   In this instance, the district 
court conducted a hearing and took evidence concerning the search and seizure at 
issue.  In reviewing a trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial 
court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court has an 
opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions.  The 
constitutionality of a particular search is a question of law that we review de novo.  Sam v. State, 2008 WY 25, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 1173, 176 (Wyo. 2008); Fenton v. 
State, 2007 WY 51, ¶ 5, 154 P.3d 974, 976 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Pe±a v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 25, 
98 P.3d 857, 869 (Wyo. 2004)).

 
 
Were 
the Searches and Seizures Lawful

 
 
[¶13]   At the outset, we take note that 
McGarvey's contentions are limited to improper searches and seizures under the 
United States Constitution.  She did 
not challenge them under the relevant provisions of the Wyoming Constitution in 
the district court, nor does she pursue such a theory in this Court.  See Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, 74 P.3d 1220, ¶¶ 11-12, 74 P.3d 1220, 1224-25 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶14]   At the conclusion of the 
suppression hearing, the district court made these brief 
findings:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  I'm going to take the matters under advisement.  My feeling is that we have very 
technical legal issues that are presented, at least as to the initial stop and 
the Terry detention that was involved 
with the initial stop and resulting pat-down of the defendant in this 
case.

            
I also think that as to the question of any suppression of the 
statements, the record as it's before me included an indication that there was 
an advisement of the warnings under Miranda.  I didn't hear much in the way of 
evidence as to the voluntary waiver of those rights as to the agreement to 
voluntarily answer questions or to waive those rights, but I didn't hear it 
really be developed as to the details of the facts that may attend to the 
post-Miranda statements.  So I feel 
like the record's a little bit deficient as to how to handle that particular 
issue.

            
As to the issue of the search of the vehicle, it did not appear to me 
that it was a search incident to arrest.  
The arrest was perfected in the Parkway Plaza hotel at a location 
independent from where the vehicle was.  
And under cases that have followed Coolidge versus New Hampshire, it would 
appear to me that when an arrest is made in one location and is not incident to 
arrest, then a search warrant needs to be obtained.  I don't think the officer has the 
ability to, on his own independent probable cause and what he has learned from 
contact with the defendant, to pursue a search of a vehicle that was not 
occupied and not in the possession of the defendant at the time of arrest.  But I'll sure take a look at additional 
case law that may impact that decision given Mr. Marken's argument in this 
case.

            
It also appears to me that as to the plain view argument, that would not 
apply to a noncontrband item under the circumstances presented.  But once again, I guess I'll have to 
take a look at that[.]

 
 
In 
the order filed of record on October 29, 2007, the district court 
wrote:

 
 
            
1.  The search and seizure of [McGarvey's] person by Casper 
Police Officer Derrick Dietz was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution or under Article I Section IV of the Wyoming 
Constitution and constituted an appropriate investigatory stop justified from 
its inception and reasonably related to the scope of the circumstances which 
justified the initial interference.  
See Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632 (Wyo. 2001); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and Wilson v. State, 
874 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1994).

            
2.  That the warrantless search of [McGarvey's] vehicle was not 
unreasonable and fell under the appropriate automobile exception in that Officer 
Dietz possessed probable cause to believe that the automobile contained evidence 
of a crime and/or contraband.  See 
Borgwardt v. State, 846 P.2d 805 
(Wyo. 1997).

 
 
            
3.  That the proof was insufficient to demonstrate that 
[McGarvey] had appropriately waived her Miranda rights in making any post-arrest 
inculpatory statements, and therefore, absent further confirmation of a valid 
waiver having occurred following [McGarvey's] Miranda rights being given, any 
such post-custodial statements should be suppressed.  See Lewis v. State [2002 WY 92, ¶¶ 17-18, 48 P.3d 1063, 1067-68 (Wyo. 2002)].

 
 
[¶15]   Our precedents on this subject are 
voluminous.  In Speten v. State, 2008 WY 63, ¶ 4, 
185 P.3d 25, 27-28 (Wyo. 2008) we described this analytical framework for 
evaluating issues such as those at hand:

 
 
            
The issue of the constitutionality of a search often focuses upon the 
question of whether or not the officer had probable cause to search, or the 
question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate an 
investigative detention.  These 
questions are resolved by resort to an objective test, taking into account the 
totality of the circumstances, rather than by analyzing the subjective thought 
process of the officer.  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 25, 
146 P.3d 492, 500 (Wyo.2006) (probable cause); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 17, 
65 P.3d 33, 37 (Wyo.2003) (investigative detention).  Probable cause to search exists "where 
the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable 
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found[.]" 
Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, 
¶ 17, 64 P.3d 700, 707 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
695-96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).  By contrast, reasonable suspicion is 
simply " 'a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity."  
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)).  Finally, while the test is objective, 
the officer's training, experience, and expertise are to be considered as part 
of the "totality of the circumstances."  
McKenney v. State, 2007 WY 
129, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 96, 98-99 (Wyo.2007); Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶ 24, 
142 P.3d 1155, 1167 (Wyo.2006); Vassar v. 
State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 18 n. 7, 99 P.3d 987, 994 n. 7 
(Wyo.2004).

 
 
[¶16]   We note that Officer Dietz had over 
19 years of experience in law enforcement work.  The district court did not make detailed 
findings of fact but the facts, as previously set out, are the raw material that 
we must parse in our analysis of this case.  Decisions such as those the district 
court made are unfailingly fact intensive.

 
 
[¶17]   In Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, 
¶¶ 14-15, 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007) we described the three tiers of 
interaction between police and citizens:

 
 
For 
Fourth Amendment purposes, we recognize three tiers of interaction between 
police and citizens.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 
624-25.  See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 
(Wyo.1993).  The least intrusive 
contact between a citizen and police is a consensual encounter.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 
624-25.  A consensual encounter is 
not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections.  The second tier is the investigatory or 
Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An 
investigatory detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 
624-25.  However, because of its 
limited nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show "the presence 
of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" 
in order to justify the detention.  
Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 
(Wyo.1994).  The most intrusive 
encounter between police and a citizen is an arrest.  An arrest "requires justification by 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.' 
"  Id. at 625, 135 P.3d 620 quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
219-20.

 
 
            
The case at bar is concerned with a traffic stop, which is analogous to 
an "investigatory detention."  Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d 828, 831 (Wyo.2004).  To 
determine whether the seizure was appropriate under the Fourth Amendment, we 
apply the two-step inquiry articulated in Terry: []  1) Was the initial stop justified? and 
2) Were the officer's actions during the detention " reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance 
[?]' "  O'Boyle, ¶ 46, 117 P.3d  at 414, 
quoting Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 
106, ¶ 11, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
Also 
see Wagner v. State, 2008 WY 51, 
¶¶ 10-14, 182 P.2d 506, 509-10 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶18]   Furthermore, in Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, 135 P.3d 620, ¶ 17, 135 P.3d 620, 626 (Wyo. 2006) we 
elaborated:

 
 
            
As we recognized in Rice v. 
State, 2004 WY 130, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 371, 379 (Wyo.2004), a seizure does 
not occur simply when a police officer walks up to a person in a public place 
and asks a question, provided there is no showing of force or indication the 
person is restrained from leaving.  
See also, Innis v. State, 2003 
WY 66, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 413, 419 (Wyo.2003); Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1163 
(Wyo.1996).  This principle is 
consistent with our ruling in Gompf, 
2005 WY 112, 120 P.3d 980, where we stated the Fourth Amendment was not 
implicated when officers approached a person's residence, knocked at the door, 
and asked questions.

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, in Sam, ¶¶ 12-13, 177 P.3d 1173 at 
1177, we held:

 
 
Recently, 
we applied Vasquez, for the first 
time, as the basis for reversing a district court's order denying a motion to 
suppress.  Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, 171 P.3d 525 (Wyo.2007).  The circumstances 
of this case, as set out above, differ markedly from those in Pierce.  In the proceedings below, and in the 
briefs in this appeal, both parties discuss several of the "exceptions" to the 
essential rule established by Vasquez.  
Those exceptions include:  
(1) That an officer may search the area immediately available to an 
arrested person for weapons or other contraband that might pose a threat to 
officer and/or public safety; (2) that the presence of a second passenger in the 
car who could present a threat to officer or public safety may justify a 
search;  (3) the possible need to 
secure an arrestee's automobile may justify a search;  and (4) that in such circumstances an 
automobile may be searched for evidence related to the crime which justified the 
arrest.

 
 
            
Because it is dispositive of this appeal, we will limit our consideration 
only to that exception which sanctions a search of the automobile for evidence 
which might relate to the crime for which Sam was arrested.  Sam was arrested for multiple reasons, 
but the record is clear that the initial stop and the initial arrest were for 
violations of a protection order.  
Our careful review of the record convinces us that Beck's search of Sam's 
car was reasonable under all of the circumstances detailed above.  That the cursory search of the car's 
interior uncovered evidence of the possession with intent to deliver proscribed 
narcotics, rather than evidence of the violation of the protection order, does 
not negate the admissibility of that evidence under our Vasquez rule.  We do not think it is a requirement that 
a police officer be able to recite a specific list of what sorts of evidence 
might be relevant in such a circumstance, but some items identified were cell 
phones (which Sam used to make harassing calls), or writings of any sort that 
indicated what Sam's intentions were with respect to the individuals protected 
by the protection order.  Other 
examples of evidence that might be pertinent would include instrumentalities 
that might be used to harass, harm or threaten protected individuals.  See deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, 
¶¶ 5-11, 74 P.3d 1240, 1243-44 (Wyo.2003).

 
 
[¶20]   This recitation of the underlying 
facts and the applicable authority leads us to the conclusion that the search 
and seizure of McGarvey's person was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  
The district court might well have reasoned that Officer Dietz's initial 
efforts were aimed at a consensual encounter when he followed McGarvey and her 
companion to the Parkway.  Of 
course, McGarvey's behavior quickly transformed the encounter into an 
investigatory stop, and segued equally as rapidly into an arrest for disobeying 
Officer Dietz's instructions and McGarvey's possession of controlled 
substances.  Thus, when we apply the 
governing standard of review to the district court's decision with respect to 
the search of McGarvey's person, we are compelled to hold that the district 
court's tacit findings are not clearly erroneous.  Officer Dietz had probable cause to 
arrest and to search McGarvey incident to that arrest.

 
 
[¶21]   The search of the automobile is a 
somewhat more complicated question.  
Clearly there is a very close temporal relationship between McGarvey's 
occupation of the car and her arrest.  
It appears that the time between her getting out of the car and the 
search of it was of quite short duration.  
Officer Dietz's initial action with respect to the automobile was to 
merely look through the windows and observe what was in plain view.  He could see a scales device that is 
commonly used in the marketing of controlled substances.  We conclude that these factors weigh 
heavily in favor of categorizing the search of McGarvey's automobile as being 
one incident to her arrest and that the search of it was for evidence of the 
crime for which she was arrested.  
See Generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, § 7.1(c), at 515-18 (Pocket Part 72-73, n.87) ("Occupant"/"recent 
occupant" arrests and the Belton "bright line.") (4th ed. 2004 and 
2008-2009 Pocket Part); United States v. 
Mapp, 476 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (search "which occurred around ten 
minutes after [defendant] was arrested, was not so separated in time or by 
intervening events that the [search] cannot be fairly said to have been incident 
to the [arrest].'"); United States v. 
Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(search "contemporaneous" under Belton where passenger arrested and 
placed in police car and then everyone waited 10-15 minutes before another 
police unit arrived before search undertaken).  Taking into account all of the relevant 
evidence which the district court was privy to, we conclude that its findings in 
this regard were not clearly erroneous and that the search did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   We hold that the district court 
properly denied McGarvey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained incident to 
a search of her person and of her car.  
The judgment and sentence of the district court are 
affirmed.