Title: Parfitt v. Parfitt

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ESTATE OF AUDREY JANE PARFITT, BY 
JANICE PARFITT CAUSEY, ADMINISTRATOR, CTA 
 
v.  Record No. 081100      OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
February 27, 2009 
JEFFREY E. PARFITT, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Gaylord L. Finch, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in dismissing a complaint filed by the administrator of the 
Estate of Audrey Jane Parfitt (“Estate”) against the 
decedent’s son, Jeffrey E. Parfitt, and his wife, Boyka S. 
Parfitt. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Before her 2004 cancer diagnosis, Audrey Jane Parfitt 
(known as “Jane”) executed a will leaving her entire estate in 
equal shares to her children and stepchildren.  Throughout her 
final illness, Jane required considerable physical assistance 
to complete even the most basic daily tasks.  During this 
time, she received help from hired caregivers, as well as from 
her son, Jeffrey E. Parfitt (“Jeff”), and his wife, Boyka S. 
Parfitt (“Boyka”). 
 
With the knowledge and assent of his brother Gordon Vance 
Parfitt (“Vance”), who lived out of state, Jeff was added as a 
joint owner of Jane’s bank account (“joint account”) in order 
to assist Jane in paying her bills.  Jane, Jeff, and Vance 
also agreed that Jeff would quit his construction job to care 
for Jane until care providers could be hired, and that Jeff 
would pay himself $500.00 per week from the joint account to 
make up for his lost income.  Although care providers were 
hired in July 2004, Jeff did not return to work until after 
Jane’s death in March 2006. 
 
During this period, Jeff liquidated a number of Jane’s 
assets and obtained various loans, depositing the proceeds 
into the joint account.  The sources of funds used in these 
transactions included an annuity from New York Life 
surrendered for $106,093.05, a certificate of deposit from 
BB&T Bank worth $14,675.66, a home equity loan also from BB&T 
Bank in the amount of $50,000, a certificate of deposit from 
USAA Federal Savings Bank worth $12,811.41, and a reverse 
mortgage obtained from Seattle Mortgage Company in the amount 
of $155,000.  The total value of assets deposited in the joint 
account as a result of these transactions was at least 
$338,580.12. 
 
During the period of Jane’s illness, Jeff transferred 
$305,591.00 from the joint account to an account he shared with 
Boyka.  Jeff also wrote checks to himself from the joint 
account totaling $67,500.  Additionally, Jeff wrote checks from 
the joint account to various payees in the amount of $9,013.37 
for his and Boyka’s benefit. 
 
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Jane died on March 7, 2006.  In July 2006, the Estate 
filed a complaint against Jeff, alleging breach of fiduciary 
duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and including a claim in 
detinue.  Boyka was added as a defendant on the same claims in 
a November 2006 amended complaint. 
 
After a three-day bench trial, the trial court entered an 
order holding that (i) the Estate had failed to establish the 
existence of undue influence; (ii) the evidence had not 
established a confidential relationship between Jeff and Jane; 
and, (iii) the Estate had failed to prove a claim in detinue, 
for conversion, or for unjust enrichment.  We awarded an appeal 
to the Estate on the following assignments of error: 
1. 
The court made an error of fact in determining that 
Plaintiff did not demonstrate that Jane Parfitt’s 
free agency was destroyed. 
 
2. 
The court made an error of law in determining that 
Plaintiff did not demonstrate a confidential 
relationship existed between Jeffrey Parfitt and 
Jane Parfitt. 
 
3. 
The court made an error of law in determining that 
Plaintiff did not demonstrate a prima facie claim of 
undue influence, thereby shifting the burden of 
proof to the Defendants. 
 
4. 
The court made an error of law in determining that 
Plaintiff did not prove a claim of conversion or 
unjust enrichment. 
 
5. 
The court made an error of fact and law in not 
determining that Defendants’ testimony should be 
struck for lack of corroboration pursuant to 
Virginia Code § 8.01-397. 
 
 
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6. 
The court made an error of law in not finding that 
Jeffrey Parfitt breached his fiduciary duty to Jane 
Parfitt. 
 
II.  Analysis 
 
A. 
Undue Influence 
1. 
Standard of Review 
 
In dismissing the Estate’s claims, the trial court 
rejected the Estate’s contention that it had introduced 
sufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, a prima 
facie case of undue influence.  Whether a plaintiff alleging 
undue influence has established a prima facie case is reviewed 
de novo, see Virginia Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Botetourt County, 
276 Va. 656, 663, 668 S.E.2d 119, 122 (2008); Quatannens v. 
Tyrrell, 268 Va. 360, 365, 601 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2004), with 
deference given to the factual findings of the trial court, 
see Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33, 597 
S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004). 
2. 
Personal Benefit and Confidential Relationship 
 
We recently reiterated the law of undue influence in 
Virginia: 
A court of equity will not set aside a 
contract because it is “rash, improvident or 
[a] hard bargain” but equity will act if the 
circumstances raise the inference that the 
contract was the result of imposition, 
deception, or undue influence.  To set aside a 
deed or contract on the basis of undue 
influence requires a showing that the free 
agency of the contracting party has been 
 
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destroyed.  Because undue influence is a 
species of fraud, the person seeking to set 
aside the contract must prove undue influence 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
Direct proof of undue influence is often 
difficult to produce.  In the seminal case of 
Fishburne v. Ferguson, 84 Va. 87, 111, 4 S.E. 
575, 582 (1887), however this Court identified 
two situations which we considered sufficient 
to show that a contracting party’s free agency 
was destroyed, and, once established, shift the 
burden of production to the proponent of the 
contract.  The first involved the mental state 
of the contracting party and the amount of 
consideration: 
 
[W]here great weakness of mind 
concurs with gross inadequacy of 
consideration, or circumstances of 
suspicion, the transaction will be 
presumed to have been brought about 
by undue influence. 
 
. . . . 
 
The second instance Fishburne 
identified arises when a confidential 
relationship exists between the grantor 
and proponent of the instrument: 
 
[W]here one person stands in a 
relationship of special confidence 
towards another, so as to acquire an 
habitual influence over him, he 
cannot accept from such person a 
personal benefit without exposing 
himself to the risk, in a degree 
proportioned to the nature of their 
connection, of having it set aside as 
unduly obtained. 
 
Bailey v. Turnbow, 273 Va. 262, 267, 639 S.E.2d 291, 293 
(2007) (quoting Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 268 Va. at 31-32, 
597 S.E.2d at 38-39 (internal citations omitted)).  “[T]he 
 
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presumption of undue influence arises and the burden of going 
forward with the evidence shifts when weakness of mind and 
grossly inadequate consideration or suspicious circumstances 
are shown or when a confidential relationship is established.”  
Friendly Ice Cream Corp.  268 Va. at 33, 597 S.E.2d at 39 
(emphases in original).  This presumption will satisfy the 
plaintiff’s burden of proving undue influence unless it is 
rebutted.  The defendant therefore has the burden of producing 
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. 
 
These principles apply to gratuitous transfers as well as 
contracts.  The Estate contends it demonstrated, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that both situations described in 
Fishburne were present here and that, under either analysis, 
the trial court should have shifted to Jeff and Boyka the 
burden of producing evidence sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of undue influence.  However, in this case we need 
not decide the issue of Jane’s weakness of mind, because a 
confidential relationship was established as a matter of law 
by Jeff’s joint ownership of the bank account through which 
all the assets at issue flowed. 
 
First, it is undisputed that by virtue of their actions 
with regard to Jane’s property, Jeff and Boyka received 
considerable personal benefit.  This is a necessary 
precondition for the burden to be shifted when a transaction 
 
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is challenged on the ground that it was procured by undue 
influence in a confidential relationship.  Friendly Ice Cream 
Corp., 268 Va. at 31-32, 597 S.E.2d at 38-39. 
 
We next turn to whether a confidential relationship was 
established.  We discussed the general outline of such 
relationships in Friendly Ice Cream Corp., which described a 
confidential relationship as 
not confined to any specific association of the 
parties; it is one wherein a party is bound to 
act for the benefit of another, and can take no 
advantage to himself.  It appears when the 
circumstances make it certain the parties do 
not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side, 
there is an overmastering influence, or, on the 
other, weakness, dependence, or trust, 
justifiably reposed; in both an unfair 
advantage is possible. 
 
 
Trust alone, however, is not sufficient.  We 
trust most men with whom we deal.  There must 
be something reciprocal in the relationship 
before the rule can be invoked.  Before 
liability can be fastened upon one there must 
have been something in the course of dealings 
for which he was in part responsible that 
induced another to lean upon him, and from 
which it can be inferred that the ordinary 
right to contract had been surrendered. 
 
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 268 Va. at 33-34, 597 S.E.2d at 39-
40 (quoting Hancock v. Anderson, 160 Va. 225, 240-41, 168 S.E. 
458, 463 (1933) (citation omitted)).  We have identified 
several particular classes of relationships that may give rise 
to a presumption of undue influence.  Among them, and most 
 
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relevant in this appeal, is when one person is an agent for 
the other.  Bailey, 273 Va. at 268, 639 S.E.2d at 293. 
 
In this case, Jeff was an agent for Jane by statute, as a 
joint owner of an account to which he had not contributed.  
Code § 6.1-125.15:1 provides that “[p]arties to a joint 
account in a financial institution occupy the relation of 
principal and agent as to each other, with each standing as a 
principal in regard to his ownership interest in the joint 
account and as agent in regard to the ownership interest of 
the other party.” (Emphasis added).  The transfers challenged 
in this case passed through an account that Jane and Jeff held 
as joint owners with right of survivorship.  The evidence at 
trial indicated that the proceeds from the New York Life 
annuity and the Certificates of Deposit from BB&T and USAA 
were deposited into the joint account.  Furthermore, proceeds 
from the home equity line of credit Jane obtained from BB&T 
were also deposited to the joint account as a “counter 
deposit.”  Likewise, $155,000 obtained under the reverse 
mortgage was deposited into the joint account.  These funds 
all belonged to Jane. 
 
Because Jeff did not contribute any funds to Jane’s 
account, he was, by operation of statute, an agent with regard 
to the entire account.  By statute, a confidential 
relationship was established creating a fiduciary duty.  Code 
 
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§ 6.1-125.15:1; Horne v. Holley, 167 Va. 234, 241, 188 S.E. 
169, 172 (1936) (“[A]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to 
the matters within the scope of his agency”).  The 
confidential relationship created a presumption that the self-
dealing transactions were “unduly obtained.”  Fishburne, 84 
Va. at 113, 4 S.E. at 582.  Accordingly, the trial court erred 
in holding that there was no confidential relationship, and 
therefore erred in failing to shift the burden of production 
to Jeff and Boyka to rebut the presumption of undue influence 
in the various transactions. 
B. 
Dead Man’s Statute 
 
The Estate also argues that the entire trial testimony of 
Jeff and Boyka should have been stricken in accordance with 
Code § 8.01-397, Virginia’s “dead man’s statute,” and that the 
trial court’s failure to do so constituted reversible error.  
In this case, the dead man’s statute requires corroboration of 
testimony of an adverse or interested party in an action 
concerning the decedent’s estate. 
1. 
Standard of Review 
 
“Whether or not corroboration exists and the degree and 
quality required are to be determined by the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.”  Nicholson v. Shockey, 
192 Va. 270, 283, 64 S.E.2d 813, 821 (1951).  However, if the 
trial court failed to identify the correct legal standard in 
 
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determining the level of corroboration required, then it is an 
issue of law that, like other issues of law, must be reviewed 
de novo. 
2. 
Level of Corroboration Required 
 
The statute relied on by the Estate reads in relevant 
part: 
In an action by or against a person who, from 
any cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or 
against the committee, trustee, executor, 
administrator, heir, or other representative of 
the person so incapable of testifying, no 
judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor 
of an adverse or interested party founded on 
his uncorroborated testimony. 
 
Code § 8.01-397.  We have often been called on to apply the 
statute, and have made it clear that 
[i]t is not necessary that the corroborative 
evidence should of itself be sufficient to 
support a verdict, for then there would be no 
need for the adverse or interested party’s 
testimony to be corroborated.  Corroborating 
evidence tends to confirm and strengthen the 
testimony of the witness[,] and it may come 
from other witnesses as well as from 
circumstantial evidence.  It is not essential 
that a survivor’s testimony be corroborated on 
all material points.  
 
 
The corroboration, to be sufficient under 
the statute, however, must at least tend, in 
some degree, of its own strength and 
independently, to support some essential 
allegation or issue raised by the pleadings 
[and] testified to by the [surviving] witness 
. . . which allegation or issue, if 
unsupported, would be fatal to the case. 
 
 
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Rice v. Charles, 260 Va. 157, 165-66, 532 S.E.2d 318, 323 
(2000) (citations, emphases by the Court, and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, “[w]here a 
confidential relationship existed between the parties at the 
time of the transaction relied on, a higher degree of 
corroboration is required than in ordinary transactions.”  
Clay v. Clay, 196 Va. 997, 1002, 86 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1955) 
(citing Nicholson, 192 Va. at 283, 64 S.E.2d at 821). 
 
Here, the trial court denied the Estate’s motion to 
strike Jeff and Boyka’s testimony based on the dead man’s 
statute.  In doing so, the trial court found that Jeff and 
Boyka’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the 
defendants’ witnesses and by the Estate’s own “exhibits and 
demonstrative preparations.”  However, given the trial court’s 
erroneous holding that no confidential relationship existed, 
we must conclude that the trial court did not apply the 
“higher degree of corroboration” as it was required to do. 
C. 
Conversion or Unjust Enrichment 
 
Finally, the Estate also contends the trial court erred 
in holding that it failed to prove either conversion or unjust 
enrichment by Jeff and Boyka.  However, the Estate failed to 
address either issue in its brief, and consequently has waived 
the argument on appeal. 
 
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Rule 5:27, titled “Opening Brief of Appellant,” requires 
that “[t]he form and contents of the opening brief of 
appellant shall conform in all respects to the requirements 
. . . set forth in Rule 5:17(c)”).  Rule 5:17(c), in turn, 
instructs that with respect to any assignments of error in the 
petition for appeal, the appellant shall include “[t]he 
principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relating 
to each assignment of error.”  Rule 5:17(c)(4).  Rule 5:27 
therefore requires that the same elements be included in the 
opening brief for each granted assignment of error.  The 
failure to comply with the requirements of Rules 5:27 and 
5:17(c)(4) results in waiver of the arguments the party failed 
to make.  Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 519, 659 S.E.2d 
311, 316 (2008).  The Estate has violated Rule 5:27 by failing 
to include any “principles of law,” “argument,” or 
“authorities” relating to this granted assignment of error.  
Consequently, the Estate has waived these arguments on appeal. 
III.  Conclusion 
The trial court erred in holding that a confidential 
relationship did not exist with respect to transactions 
involving the joint bank account.  Flowing from this error, 
the trial court then erred in application of evidentiary 
burdens regarding proof of undue influence and corroboration 
necessary under the dead man’s statute.  Accordingly, we will 
 
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reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter 
for a new trial consistent with this opinion.  At a new trial 
of this matter, the Estate is not precluded from offering 
proof of undue influence on any basis including the 
confidential relationship created by application of Code 
§ 6.1-125.15:1.  However, the failure to argue claims of 
conversion and unjust enrichment on appeal will preclude the 
Estate from presenting those claims upon retrial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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