Title: Trefren v. Lewis

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Trefren v. Lewis1993 WY 72852 P.2d 323Case Number: 92-259Decided: 05/18/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Theodore G. TREFREN, 
Marjorie Ann Trefren, John A. Trefren, Matthew J. Trefren, David W. Trefren, 
Paul A. Trefren, Deborah A. Miller and Julie C. Swallow, as joint tenants, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Wayne A. LEWIS and 
Catherine J. Lewis, 

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellants.

John B. Rogers 
and Rachel R. Rouse, Blythe & Lewis, Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this action by 
real property owners against tax deed grantees to set aside a tax deed and 
determine title to real property, the initial question we must answer is whether 
the action is barred by the statute of limitations within which to contest the 
validity of a tax deed. If we determine that the action is not time barred, then 
we must further determine whether the district court at bench trial correctly 
decided that the tax deed grantees failed to comply with certain statutory 
notice provisions, which caused the tax deed to be void. Having determined that 
the district court correctly decided that the action to set aside the tax deed 
was not time barred and that the tax deed was void due to the tax deed grantees' 
failure to comply with the pertinent statutory notice provisions, we 
affirm.

[¶2]      Appellants, tax 
deed grantees, presented these issues:

1. Did the grantee of a 
tax deed comply with W.S. § 34-2-132(a) by exercising possession of the eal 
property for the required period of time so as to bar an action to set aside the 
deed?

2. Must a grantee of a 
tax deed physically occupy real property when the original owner is provided 
with actual notice of the grantee's adverse claim, is charged rent, and ordered 
off the property by the grantee?

3. Was the original owner 
prejudiced by any defect in the notice procedure utilized to notify interested 
parties of the application for a tax deed? 

4. Is the statute which 
sets forth the notice procedures for obtaining a tax deed 
constitutional?

[¶3]      Appellees, real 
property owners, succinctly rephrased the issues to be:

A. Did the appellants 
possess the Lewis property pursuant to a tax deed as required by Wyo. Stat. § 
34-2-132(a)?

B. Was there a failure on 
the part of the appellants properly to notify interested parties of their 
application for a tax deed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
39-3-108?

FACTS

[¶4]      In 1974, 
appellees, Mr. and Mrs. Wayne A. Lewis (owners), purchased from Charles Nixon 
(seller), under a contract for deed, the west eighty feet of lot 1 and all of 
lots 2, 3, 4, and 5, block 3, Longview Homesites, Laramie County, Wyoming. 
Neither the owners nor the seller caused any document evidencing the sale to be 
made of record. Under the contract, the seller and owners agreed that Rocky 
Mountain Federal Savings Bank (Bank) would pay the real estate taxes on the 
property. Owners have occupied the property continuously since 1974 to the 
present.

[¶5]      For some unknown 
reason, and without notice to or knowledge of the owners, Bank, which had paid 
the taxes from 1974 to 1982, discontinued paying the taxes in 1983 on lots 4 and 
5 of the property. Consequently, in 1983 the taxes on lots 4 and 5 became 
delinquent.

[¶6]      In 1984, 
appellants Mr. and Mrs. Theodore G. Trefren (tax deed grantees) paid the 
delinquent taxes on lots 4 and 5; they have continued to pay those taxes every 
year since. At a tax sale held on August 2, 1984, the county treasurer issued to 
Mrs. Trefren a certificate of sale.

[¶7]      On May 9, 1988, 
Mrs. Trefren sent a notice of application for tax deed by certified mail to 
seller, as holder of the lots. The tax deed grantees did not send to the owners 
any notice of the application for tax deed. The notice of application to the 
seller was returned because the forwarding order had expired. At Mrs. Trefren's 
direction, a notice of application for tax deed was published in the Wyoming 
State Tribune on May 6, 13, and 20, 1988. On or about May 18, 1988, the tax deed 
grantees physically located and viewed lots 4 and 5. They saw that a continuous 
fence made of split rail and wire enclosed the entire property, that is, the 
west eighty feet of lot 1 and all of lots 2, 3, 4, and 5. The lots are described 
as "semi-rural." On lots 2 and 3, the owners reside on a knoll in a house 
surrounded by a chain link fence. A gully runs between lots 3 and 4; a bridge 
traverses the gully. Prairie grass grows on lots 4 and 5; a horse stall or shed 
sits on those lots. Owners use the shed for storage.

[¶8]      On May 25, 1988, 
about a week after the tax deed grantees physically located and viewed lots 4 
and 5, they applied to the county treasurer for a tax deed. On August 25, 1988, 
the county treasurer issued a tax deed to them. They recorded that 
instrument.

[¶9]      In April, 1991, 
the owners learned of the tax deed grantees' claim to lots 4 and 5. One of the 
owners' neighbors saw the tax deed grantees near the gully area of the property 
and asked what they were doing there. The tax deed grantees replied they were 
measuring for a metal garage. The neighbor told them the property belonged to 
the owners, and the tax deed grantees said they had obtained the property for 
nonpayment of taxes. After leaving the tax deed grantees, the neighbor called 
one of the owners, relating what had happened. That evening the tax deed 
grantees called the owners and told them they had acquired a tax deed on lots 4 
and 5. The owners posted the entire tract with "no trespass" signs. The tax deed 
grantees honored the signs and refrained from again entering the 
property.

[¶10]   On May 31, 1991, the owners 
received the tax deed grantees' letter in which they asserted their possessory 
interest, a five-dollar a day storage charge, and a request that the owners 
remove their personal property and "no trespass" signs from the lots. In August, 
1991, the owners received the tax deed grantees' letter in which they demanded 
payment of $340 for rent. In reply, owners' attorney sent a letter to the tax 
deed grantees threatening litigation if they refused the owners' offer to 
reimburse them for the money paid on the delinquent taxes.

[¶11]   On December 6, 1991, the owners 
filed this action to set aside the tax deed. The tax deed grantees answered, 
pleading a general denial and an affirmative defense that the statute of 
limitations in WYO. STAT. § 34-2-132 (1990) barred the action; the tax deed 
grantees' answer also asserted a counterclaim seeking quiet title under WYO. 
STAT. § 1-32-201 (1988).

[¶12]   Following discovery, each party 
moved for summary judgment; the trial court denied each after a hearing and 
conducted a bench trial on August 28, 1992. On October 7, 1992, the trial court 
issued its decision letter announcing a decision in favor of the owners. 
Judgment was entered on October 19, 1992. The tax deed grantees timely filed 
their notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. Statute of 
Limitations.

[¶13]   The initial question we must answer 
is whether the owners' action to set aside the tax deed is barred under the 
language of WYO. STAT. § 34-2-132(a) (1990):

(a) No action, suit or 
other proceeding shall be commenced by the former owner to set aside, declare 
invalid or redeem from a tax deed or the sale, forfeiture, foreclosure or other 
proceeding upon which it is based or to recover possession, quiet title or 
otherwise litigate or contest the title of the grantee, 
if:

(i) Two (2) years or more 
have elapsed after the date of recording the deed in the office of the county 
clerk and ex officio register of deeds for the county in which the real estate 
described in the deed is situated; and

(ii) The grantee has been 
in possession of the real estate continuously for a period of at least six (6) 
months, at any time after one (1) year and six (6) months have elapsed since the 
date of recording of the tax deed.

The parties 
agree that the requirement of subparagraph (i) has been met since the owners 
filed the December, 1991 action more than two years after the tax deed grantees 
recorded the tax deed in August, 1988.

[¶14]   The parties' battle line is drawn 
at whether the requirement of subparagraph (ii) has been met. Specifically, they 
debate whether the tax deed grantees have "been in possession" of lots 4 and 5 
for a period of at least six months. The resolution of their debate depends upon 
the meaning of the statutory language "in possession." The tax deed grantees 
contend that those words do not mean actual physical entry upon and physical 
occupation of the lots in question. The owners assert, and the district court 
held, that those words mean exactly that. And so it is that the sharp point of 
this debate is a question of statutory construction which is, of course, a 
question of law. If the district court's conclusion of law is correct, we 
affirm; if it is incorrect, we correct it. Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶15]   In Parker this court 
comprehensively reviewed statutory construction methodology. That methodology 
shall be applied here to the extent necessary to achieve our primary objective 
of ascertaining and giving effect to the lawgiver's intent. Parker, at 
1040.

[¶16]   We begin with the words. The 
legislature has supplied its own dictionary. The word "possession" is defined as 
follows:

"Possession" refers to 
possession, and to the extent of possession, as determined by the 
rules applicable in determining the existence of adverse possession under a 
written instrument constituting color of title and includes possession by 
tenant or agent.

WYO. STAT. § 
34-2-131(a)(iv) (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, we must look to "the rules 
applicable in determining the existence of adverse possession under a written 
instrument constituting color of title." It is well settled Wyoming law that 
adverse possession of real property is 

an actual, visible, and 
exclusive appropriation of land, commenced and continued under a claim of right, 
with the intent to assert such claim against the true owner, and accompanied by 
such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as to give him a cause of 
action. The possession must be hostile and under a claim of right; it 
must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous. * * * [W]here 
color of title is not necessary to the acquisition of title by adverse 
possession, its absence has the effect of limiting the right acquired to the 
land actually occupied. But with color of title there may be in 
connection with actual possession of a part constructive possession of 
the entire tract described and purported to be conveyed. There is in this state 
no statute requiring adverse possession to be founded upon color of 
title.

Bryant v. Cadle, 
18 Wyo. 64, 86, 104 P. 23, 27 (1909) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see 
also, City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908 (1929); and 
Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Wyo. 
1981).

[¶17]   We have found no Wyoming decision 
in which we have said that adverse possession can exist without the claimant's 
physical entry onto the land followed by some kind of physical occupancy of the 
land. And, we have found no Wyoming decision in which we have said that adverse 
possession can exist even though another claiming an interest has physically 
entered and is physically occupying the land. The presence of such other 
claimant on the land destroys the requisite element of 
exclusivity.

[¶18]   The tax deed grantees rely on an 
excerpt from Sturm for their contention that physical entry onto and physical 
occupation of the land is not an element of "possession." That excerpt is as 
follows:

The prime object in 
prescribing how such adverse possession shall be made manifest, of what elements 
or requisites it shall be composed, is to advise the real owner that his 
ownership is in danger, and the law has deemed the time fixed as sufficiently 
long so as to give him ample opportunity to protect his right; and if he fails 
to do so, when thus advised, within the time fixed, he is considered as having 
acquiesced in the transfer of ownership.

Sturm, 39 Wyo. 
at 517, 273 P.  at 915 (citation omitted).

[¶19]   Relying on this passage, the tax 
deed grantees reason that the primary objective of requiring open, notorious, 
and hostile "possession" is not to physically occupy the land, but is to give 
"notice" to the real owner that the statute is running. From this, they conclude 
that it is "notice" that is at the heart of the requirement of "possession," not 
"occupancy."

[¶20]   The tax deed grantees are correct 
in noting that "notice" to the real owner that his or her ownership is in danger 
is the key. What they have lost sight of, however, is the manner in which the 
law requires such notice to be imparted. The law has prescribed rather 
precisely, in Chief Justice Blume's words in Sturm, "how such adverse possession 
shall be made manifest, of what elements or requisites it shall be composed." 
Sturm, 39 Wyo. at 517, 273 P.  at 915. It is in this particular regard that the 
passage relied upon by tax deed grantees continues and 
reads:

Bearing this in mind, it 
is a reasonable rule that when a man has occupied a piece of ground * * * 
for the period prescribed by law openly, notoriously, exclusively and in a 
manner plainly indicating that he acted as owner thereof, the presumption 
should be, in the absence of explanatory circumstances showing the contrary, 
that he occupied the land adversely and under a claim of right, casting 
the burden of explaining such possession upon the person who disputes his right. 
It may not always be plain whether the occupancy and use of the premises 
was as owner or not. * * * [T]he greater the use and the more complete the 
occupancy, the more convincing the acts as owner will 
be.

Sturm, 39 Wyo. 
at 517, 273 P.  at 915. (emphasis added).

[¶21]   Wyoming law on this particular 
point is in step with the law elsewhere: 

In order that the statute 
of limitations shall run against the right to recover land, it is necessary, not 
only that the person rightfully entitled be out of the actual possession, but 
also that there be an entry upon the land by another. The statute does 
not run as against the true owner in favor of one who, while having what 
purports to be a conveyance of the land, or the paper title, has never 
entered on the land. Nor is an entry upon the land sufficient in 
itself, but it must be followed by such acts of dominion over the land as 
will constitute what the law regards as actual possession of the 
land.

4 HERBERT T. 
TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1137 (3d ed. 1975) (emphasis 
added).

[¶22]   Our law is also in accord with this 
statement:

What is sufficient to 
constitute actual possession of the land depends upon the character and purposes 
for which it is adapted, the size and location of the land and all of the 
circumstances of the case. It involves, as a general rule, the doing of acts of 
dominion on the land, sufficiently pronounced and continuous in character to 
charge the owner with notice that an adverse claim to the land is 
asserted.

Tiffany, supra, 
§ 1138.

[¶23]   Although neither actual occupancy 
nor residence on the land for any definite time period is necessary to 
constitute actual possession, the claimant must engage in physical activity on 
the land which amounts to an assertion of dominion. Id. "The question whether, 
in any particular case, there was an actual possession of the land, is 
ordinarily one of fact * * * or * * * a mixed question of law and fact." 
Tiffany, supra, § 1139; accord, Sturm, 39 Wyo. at 518, 273 P.  at 
916.

[¶24]   From our review of the law, we hold 
that the words "in possession" as used in WYO. STAT. § 34-2-132(a)(ii) mean an 
actual physical entry on the land. Further, physical entry must be followed by 
the doing of acts of dominion on the land of such kind and in such manner as to 
indicate plainly that the entrant is acting as the owner thereof would act, 
considering the character of the land and the purposes for which it is adapted, 
the size and location of the land, and all of the attendant 
circumstances.

[¶25]   In light of the evidence of record, 
it is clear that although the tax deed grantees on one occasion briefly entered 
the lots to measure for a storage building, such entry was not followed by their 
doing acts of dominion on those lots of such kind and in such manner as to 
indicate plainly that they were acting as the owner. The district court, 
therefore, correctly decided that they had not been in possession of the lots 
for a period of at least six months and that the owners' action was not time 
barred.

2. Compliance 
with statutory notice provisions.

[¶26]   Having determined that the owners' 
action to set aside the tax deed was not time barred, we next consider whether 
the district court correctly decided that the tax deed grantees failed to comply 
with certain statutory notice provisions. The tax deed grantees challenge the 
district court's decision that they (1) failed to serve written or printed 
notice of the application to the county treasurer for a tax deed on the persons 
in actual possession or occupancy of the lots, namely, the owners; and (2) 
failed to include in the published notice a statement as to when they purchased 
the lots and when they would apply for a tax deed. The source of these notice 
requirements is WYO. STAT. § 39-3-108 (1990).1 

[¶27]   If we affirm the district court's 
decision that the tax deed grantees failed to serve notice on the owners who 
were in actual possession or occupancy of the lots, we need not address the 
sufficiency of the published notice. In WYO. STAT. § 39-3-108(d)(i) the 
legislature placed upon the shoulders of the tax deed grantee a duty of diligent 
inquiry to find and serve "each person in actual possession or occupancy of the 
real property" to be identified in the tax deed. The district court found from 
the evidence that the owners had been in actual possession or occupancy of lots 
4 and 5 continuously since 1974 and that the tax deed grantees had not made 
diligent inquiry to find them in the county. Consequently, the district court 
held that the tax deed grantees had failed to comply with this particular notice 
requirement. We agree.

[¶28]   Considering that the tax deed 
grantees paid the delinquent taxes and obtained a certificate of sale in 1984, 
they demonstrated a remarkable lack of curiosity about the lots for the next six 
years. By their own testimony, they did not locate and view the property until 
about a week before they made application for the tax deed. On that occasion 
they entered the property by way of the only entrance possible, the maintained 
driveway leading to the owners' residence. The tax deed grantees could plainly 
see that the entire property was enclosed by a split rail and wire fence. The 
shed situated on lots 4 and 5 contained the owners' wheelbarrows, spare windows, 
barrels, and horse troughs. During the summer months, the owners would regularly 
mow the prairie grass growing on the property, including lots 4 and 5. The 
record reveals that in the nearly six-year period from 1984 to 1990, just before 
the tax deed grantees applied for the tax deed, they never inquired of the 
residents of the house adjacent to lots 4 and 5, namely, the owners, about the 
lots. We find ample evidence to support the district court's decision. Having so 
decided, we need not address the question of the sufficiency of the published 
notice.

[¶29]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1

(d) 
Holders of certificates of purchase of real property sold for delinquent taxes, 
including a holder's or county's assigns, upon application for a treasurer's 
deed therefor shall furnish proof to the county 
treasurer:

(i) 
That at least three (3) months prior to the application a written or printed 
notice was served on each person in actual possession or occupancy of the real 
property and the person in whose name the property was taxed or assessed if upon 
diligent inquiry the persons can be found in the county; 
or

(ii) If no person is in actual possession or occupancy of the property 
and if the person in whose name the property was taxed or assessed cannot be 
found in the county, that notice was published in a newspaper printed in the 
county, or if no newspaper is printed in the county, then in a newspaper printed 
in Wyoming nearest to the county seat of the county in which the property is 
located. The notice shall be published once a week for three (3) weeks, the 
first publication not more than five (5) months and the last publication not 
more than three (3) months prior to the application; 
and

(iii) That notice was sent by certified or registered mail to the record 
owner and mortgagees, if any, of the real property if their addresses are known 
or disclosed by the public records.

(e) 
Notices required by this section shall contain the 
following:

(i) 
When the applicant purchased the real property;

(ii) In whose name the real property was 
taxed;

(iii) A description of the real property;

(iv) The year the property was taxed or 
assessed;

(v) 
When the time of redemption will expire;

(vi) When application for a tax deed will be 
made;

(vii) The amount of any special assessments for local or public 
improvements.