Title: STEER v CITY OF MISSOULA

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13129 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA M. J. STEER, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, CITY OF MISSOULA, MONTANA, a municipa 1 Corpora t i o n , THE POLICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY O F MISSOULA and the members thereof i n t h e i r o f f i c i a l capacity a s Police Commissioners e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : C. W. Leaphart argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Root and Valgenti, Missoula , Montana Victor F. Valgenti argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: March 3 , 1976 Decided : l ! I h l ? 2 6 1976 Filed : M&E 8 6 6916 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal i s from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula County, affirming t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Missoula P o l i c e Commission whereby p l a i n t i f f w a s dismissed from h i s employment as a p o l i c e o f f i c e r . O n September 27, 1971, t h e C i t y of Missoula h i r e d appel- l a n t , M. J. S t e e r , as a probationary patrolman. Upon successful completion of t h e probationary period, a p p e l l a n t w a s confirmed a s a patrolman on March 28, 1972. O n A p r i l 16, 1973, t h e then Chief of P o l i c e G i l b e r t Hansen, believing a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y of misconduct, gave him t h e choice of being f i r e d o u t r i g h t o r sub- m i t t i n g h i s r e s i g n a t i o n . Appellant submitted h i s r e s i g n a t i o n . Thereafter a p p e l l a n t f i l e d i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandate a l l e g i n g h i s d i s m i s s a l w a s c o n t r a r y t o t h e Metropolitan P o l i c e Law, Chap. 18, T i t l e 11, R.C.M. 1947, i n t h a t he was denied t h e r i g h t t o answer p r e f e r r e d charges i n a hearing before t h e p o l i c e commission p r i o r t o h i s d i s m i s s a l . Following a continuance, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t on April 8 , 1974, issued a w r i t of mandate ordering a p p e l l a n t ' s reinstatement. Whereupon t h e new Chief of P o l i c e Ray Roehl by l e t t e r t o a p p e l l a n t acknowledged h i s reinstatement, b u t announced h i s immediate suspension pending r e s u l t s of a hearing before t h e p o l i c e commission on charges of misconduct, dishonesty, and f a i l u r e t o obey a lawful order of a superior o f f i c e r . The state- ment of charges came on f o r hearing on May 2 , 1974, and a f t e r p r e s e n t a t i o n of evidence t h e hearing w a s continued without d a t e . O n J u l y 15, 1974, Chief Roehl s e n t another l e t t e r t o a p p e l l a n t containing a statement of two a d d i t i o n a l charges concerning f a l s e information i n h i s employment a p p l i c a t i o n and s t a t i n g t h a t s i n c e a p p e l l a n t w a s on vacation s t a t u s no suspension was deemed neces- sary. The p o l i c e commission reconvened on August 13, 1974, and after the presentation of further evidence, found appellant guilty of failure to obey a lawful order of a superior officer, one charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and falsification of his application for employment. Pursuant to sections 11-1805 and 11-1806(5), R.C.M. 1947, the police commission, with the approval of Mayor Robert E. Brown, ordered appellant's dismissal from the Missoula Police Department effective August 13, 1974. Until the time of his final dismissal, appellant received full salary and benefits. In October 1974, appellant filed the complaint involved in this proceeding seeking review of the police commission order, pursuant to section 11-1806(7), (8), R.C.M. 1947. On May 29, 1975, the district court affirmed the decision of the Missoula Police Commission. Steer appeals from that order and judgment. The one issue presented on appeal is whether or not in discharging appellant, the chief of police and the police commis- sion of the City of Missoula denied appellant procedural due process of law. Appellant's main argument in this regard centers around the contention that once he was summarily fired the first time, "the die had been cast" because the decision to fire had already been made final. Therefore, in appellant's view, all administra- tive actions subsequent to his reinstatement were mere ex post facto attempts to provide due process so as to justify his dis- charge and as such they were procedurally defective. Upon review of the facts and case law cited by appellant, we cannot agree with this contention. Appellant relies on several cases for his position that a procedurally improper firing cannot be cured by any kind of subsequent action of the dismissing authority. Opheim v. Fish & Game Comm., 133 Mont. 362, 323 P.2d 1116; State ex rel. Ford v. Fish & Game Cornm'n, 148 Mont. 151, 418 P.2d 300; S t a t e ex r e l . Lease v. Wilkinson, 59 Mont. 327, 196 P. 878; S t a t e ex r e l . Nagle v. S u l l i v a n , 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d 995. However we f i n d t h e cases so c i t e d a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e c a s e a t bar. I n those cases, none of t h e i l l e g a l l y dismissed employees a c t u a l l y received reinstatement and resti- t u t i o n of b e n e f i t s p r i o r t o i n s t i t u t i o n of formal charges through proper channels. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , following t h e procedurally improper d i s m i s s a l , a p p e l l a n t secured reinstatement and apparently enjoyed vacation with pay s t a t u s pending t h e outcome of a nearing on formal charges. Such reinstatement and r e s t i t u t i o n of b e n e f i t s is t h e c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t o r i n disposing of a p p e l l a n t ' s ex p o s t f a c t o argument because where such a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n has occurred t h e e f f e c t s of any p r i o r i l l e g a l procedure stand corrected and can have no influence on f u t u r e procedural a c t i o n s . Thus, t h e i n i t i a l i l l e g a l discharge becomes i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e a t hand. Turning t o t h e proceedings i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t a f t e r reinstatement, t h i s Court has recognized t h a t a d e c i s i o n favorable t o a discharged public employee because of procedural d e f i c i e n c i e s i n h i s dismissal w i l l n o t i n s u l a t e t h a t employee, a f t e r reinstatement, from f u r t h e r public employer a c t i o n i f ap- p r o p r i a t e s t a t u t o r y procedures a r e employed. This Court i n S t a t e ex rel. Ford v. F i s h & G a m e Comm'n, 148 Mont. 151, 165, 418 P.2d 300, s a i d : " * * * W e express no opinion a s t o whether cause e x i s t s o r does n o t e x i s t f o r r e l a t o r ' s removal and discharge. Our d e c i s i o n herein i s s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d t o t h e i l l e g a l manner i n which r e l a t o r ' s discharge w a s accomplished. Nor i s t h i s d e c i s i o n t o be i n t e r p r e t e d o r construed a s any l i m i t a t i o n whatever on any f u t u r e a c t i o n t h a t may be taken e i t h e r by t h e Director o r t h e Commission i n t h e premises concerning r e l a t o r and h i s employment s t a t u s with t h e Department s o long a s such f u t u r e a c t i o n i s taken i n t h e manner provided by law." Our f i n a l inquiry thus focuses on t h e question of whether a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t u t o r y procedures w e r e followed i n t h e f i n a l d i s m i s s a l of appellant. Appellant makes s e v e r a l a l l e g a t i o n s of due process v i o l a t i o n s during t h e proceedings which culminated i n h i s f i n a l discharge. These a l l e g a t i o n s w i l l be discussed i n t u r n . Appellant a l l e g e s t h e suspension immediately following reinstatement w a s contra t o t h e Metropolitan P o l i c e Law i n t h a t t h e chief of p o l i c e d i d n o t secure t h e approval of t h e mayor. Section 11-1806(10), R.C.M. 1947, states: "The mayor o r chief of p o l i c e , s u b j e c t t o t h e approval of t h e mayor, s h a l l have t h e power i n a l l c a s e s , t o suspend a policeman, o r any o f f i c e r , f o r a period of n o t exceeding t e n (10) days i n any one (1) month, such suspension t o be with o r without pay a s t h e order of suspension may determine." Nowhere i n its b r i e f o r o r a l argument d i d t h e respondent s p e c i f i c - a l l y answer t h i s a l l e g a t i o n . However, a f t e r examining t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e , it appears a p p e l l a n t was n o t on suspension, b u t r a t h e r paid vacation s t a t u s . True t h e letter of A p r i l 9, 1974 from t h e chief of p o l i c e t o a p p e l l a n t concerning reinstatement mentioned t h e word "suspension" and t h e a u t h o r i t y t o so suspend under sec- t i o n 11-1806. But a l a t e r letter from t h e c h i e f of p o l i c e t o a p p e l l a n t i n reference t o new charges, dated J u l y 15, 1974, s t a t e d a p p e l l a n t was " * * * c u r r e n t l y on vacation s t a t u s * * * . " and would n o t be suspended a t t h a t t i m e . Thus it would s e e m t h a t any v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t o r y d i r e c t i v e s was rendered harmless by subsequent placement on vacation s t a t u s with f u l l pay u n t i l t h e time of f i n a l discharge. Appellant next contends t h e p o l i c e commission should have been equitably estopped from p r e f e r r i n g charges i n r e f e r e n c e t o f a l s e statements on a p p e l l a n t ' s employment a p p l i c a t i o n t h r e e years a f t e r such a p p l i c a t i o n w a s submitted and two years t h r e e months a f t e r he had completed h i s probationary period. W e f i n d no m e r i t i n t h i s contention. Section 11-1805, R.C.M. 1947, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , states: "Any a p p l i c a n t who s h a l l make any f a l s e statement t o t h e p o l i c e commission a s t o h i s age o r o t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s required, a t h i s examination before t h e p o l i c e commission, s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o sus- pension o r d i s m i s s a l from t h e p o l i c e force, a f t e r t r i a l . " N o mention is made i n t h i s s e c t i o n of any s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a s t o a c t i o n s stemming from f a l s e information i n t h e employment a p p l i c a t i o n . F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t i n t h e i n t e r e s t of f a i r n e s s , r u l e s of criminal procedure should guide t h e f i l i n g of charges and under such r u l e s t h e p o l i c e commission should be precluded from f i l i n g a d d i t i o n a l charges concerning t h e employ- ment a p p l i c a t i o n , once proceedings a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t had been i n i t i a t e d . Helpful t o our consideration is Bailey v. Examining and T r i a l Board, 45 Mont. 197, 199, 122 P. 572. Though ~ a i l e y stands merely f o r t h e r u l e t h a t t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of charges a s t o d e t a i l s , designation of offenses, e t c . i n p o l i c e commission proceedings a r e not t o be t e s t e d by t h e r i g i d r u l e s of criminal procedure, w e b e l i e v e t h e r a t i o n a l e o f f e r e d i n t h a t d e c i s i o n i s of persuasive value i n t h e i n s t a n t case. I n Bailey t h i s Court s a i d : " * * * The only requirement of t h e s t a t u t e i s t h a t t h e charge s h a l l be reduced t o w r i t i n g * * * and i f i n substance it makes o u t any one of t h e t r i a b l e o f f e n s e s mentioned, it is s u f f i c i e n t . And even i n determining t h i s question t h e c o u r t s w i l l apply t h e most l i b e r a l r u l e s of construction, and n e c e s s a r i l y so. The members of t h e P o l i c e T r i a l Board a r e not required t o be learned i n t h e law of pleading and p r a c t i c e ; i n f a c t many board members a r e laymen e n t i r e l y unfamiliar with c o u r t procedure. Neither is it demanded nor contem- p l a t e d t h a t t h e person p r e f e r r i n g charges a g a i n s t a policeman s h a l l s p e c i f y t h e d e t a i l s of t h e charge, g i v e a p a r t i c u l a r designation t o t h e offense, o r employ an a t t o r n e y t o d r a f t t h e com- p l a i n t . To i n s i s t upon s t r i c t n e s s i n construing a w r i t t e n charge of t h i s c h a r a c t e r would d e f e a t t h e purpose of t h e l a w and render members of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e immune from d i s c i p l i n e . * * *." Recognizing t h e l i m i t e d , noncriminal n a t u r e of such p o l i c e commis- sion hearings and t h e understandable lack of l e g a l e x p e r t i s e on t h e p a r t of t h e members of t h e p o l i c e commission, t h i s Court does n o t impose r u l e s of criminal procedure t o a hearing of t h i s type. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s affirmed. n\We concur: J u s t i c e s s i t t i n g i n place of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.