Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Eric L. Crandall

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2058-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eric L. Crandall, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Eric L. Crandall, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CRANDALL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 4, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 14
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2058-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eric L. Crandall, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric L. Crandall, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 4, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee that Attorney Eric L. Crandall be publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct, that he pay 
restitution to a client, and that he pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding, which were $3,231.81 as of October 5, 
2007. 
¶2 
Attorney Crandall initially filed an answer that 
denied the substantive allegations of the complaint filed by the 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
2 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR).  He later stipulated, 
however, to the truthfulness of those factual allegations and to 
having committed each of the six counts of alleged professional 
misconduct.  The stipulation he executed acceded to the OLR's 
request that the referee, Attorney Stanley F. Hack, recommend 
the imposition of a public reprimand and the payment of costs.  
The referee issued a report that essentially tracked the OLR's 
complaint and the parties' stipulation, except that the referee 
also recommended that Attorney Crandall make a restitution 
payment to his former clients. 
¶3 
Attorney Crandall attempted to file an appeal from the 
referee's report and recommendation, but the court previously 
ruled that his appeal was untimely.  Thus, the court's review 
proceeds under SCR 22.17(2).1  In conducting our review, we 
uphold a referee's findings of fact unless they are shown to be 
clearly erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of 
law on a de novo basis.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 
718; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 
241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  Having established the proper 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  Review; appeal. 
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
3 
 
factual and legal setting, we determine the appropriate level of 
discipline to be imposed under the circumstances, independent of 
the 
referee's 
recommendation. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶4 
Attorney Crandall was admitted to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin in September 1991.  He has been the subject of 
professional discipline on one prior occasion.  In February 2006 
his license to practice law in Wisconsin was suspended for three 
months as discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 
2006 WI 6, 287 Wis. 2d 102, 708 N.W.2d 690.  The conduct leading 
to that suspension involved neglecting client matters, failing 
to communicate with clients and to appear at their court 
proceedings, failing to comply with discovery rules, and failing 
to cooperate with the investigation conducted by Minnesota's 
Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. 
¶5 
The current disciplinary proceeding grows out of 
Attorney Crandall's representation of M.J. and C.J., a married 
couple.  According to the factual findings in the referee's 
report, as stipulated by Attorney Crandall, M.J. and C.J. hired 
Attorney Crandall to help them remove inaccuracies from their 
credit report following their filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition. 
¶6 
When Attorney Crandall reviewed M.J. and C.J.'s credit 
report, he noted that M.J.'s credit report had been requested on 
several occasions by Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank (Direct 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
4 
 
Merchants).  M.J., however, did not believe that he had an 
account with Direct Merchants.   
¶7 
Attorney Crandall told M.J. and C.J. that Direct 
Merchants' actions constituted a violation of the federal Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).  In February and March 2002 he sent 
two 
letters 
to 
Direct 
Merchants 
requesting 
any 
credit 
application or authorization in which M.J. had authorized Direct 
Merchants to obtain access to his credit report. 
¶8 
On April 12, 2002, Direct Merchants sent a response to 
Attorney Crandall.  That letter asserted that in response to a 
telemarketing call in January 2001, M.J. had authorized Direct 
Merchants to review his credit report.  The letter also stated 
that Direct Merchants had subsequently ordered credit cards for 
M.J., which he should have received in February or March 2001. 
¶9 
Attorney Crandall then sent two letters to M.J. in 
which he asked M.J. to respond to the statements in Direct 
Merchants' 
response. 
 
M.J. 
did 
not 
respond 
to 
Attorney 
Crandall's letters. 
¶10 Despite not having heard from M.J., Attorney Crandall 
replied to Direct Merchants' April 12, 2002, letter.  Attorney 
Crandall's letter stated that M.J. had insisted that he had not 
given Direct Merchants permission to review his credit report, 
and that M.J. had never received any credit cards from Direct 
Merchants.  Attorney Crandall demanded that Direct Merchants 
provide copies of all records relating to its alleged telephone 
call with M.J.  If such records were not provided, Attorney 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
5 
 
Crandall threatened to bring an action against Direct Merchants.  
Attorney Crandall sent a copy of this letter to M.J. 
¶11 Although he still had not received any response from 
M.J., on June 28, 2002, Attorney Crandall proceeded to file an 
action against Direct Merchants in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.  The complaint 
alleged that Direct Merchants had violated the FCRA by accessing 
M.J.'s credit report on three occasions without having a lawful 
basis to do so. 
¶12 On August 8, 2002, Attorney Crandall sent a settlement 
letter to Direct Merchants.  Attorney Crandall asserted that 
Direct Merchants faced possible financial exposure of $389,000, 
which included $200,000 for potential punitive damages and 
$150,000 for attorney fees.  Attorney Crandall offered to settle 
the matter with Direct Merchants for a payment of $150,000.  
Attorney Crandall sent a copy of this letter to M.J. 
¶13 On August 13, 2002, counsel for Direct Merchants sent 
a letter to Attorney Crandall.  That letter indicated that 
Direct Merchants had a tape recording of the January 2001 
telemarketing call in which M.J. had applied for a credit card 
and had authorized Direct Merchants to review his credit report.  
The letter also stated that Direct Merchants had subsequently 
approved M.J.'s credit application and had ordered credit cards 
to be sent to him.  Enclosed with the letter was a copy of a 
March 2002 statement relating to M.J.'s account with Direct 
Merchants.  The letter further advised that if M.J. no longer 
wished to allow Direct Merchants to review his credit report, he 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
6 
 
could submit a written request to cancel his account.  Finally, 
the letter requested that M.J. voluntarily dismiss his federal 
court complaint. 
¶14 The 
next 
day 
Direct 
Merchants 
provided 
a 
tape 
recording of the telemarketing call.  Direct Merchants informed 
Attorney Crandall that the recording showed that his client had 
no valid basis for continuing the lawsuit.  It stated that if 
M.J. proceeded further with the action, it would "avail itself 
of all legal options." 
¶15 Attorney Crandall sent a copy of the letter and the 
tape recording to M.J. and C.J.  They have subsequently stated 
that they believed that the lawsuit would be terminated at that 
point.  Attorney Crandall, however, continued prosecuting the 
federal claim.  On August 26, 2002, Attorney Crandall wrote to 
Direct Merchants' counsel.  He acknowledged that it was M.J.'s 
voice on the recording of the telemarketing call, but denied 
that M.J. had ever received a credit card or a March 2002 
account statement from Direct Merchants.  Attorney Crandall 
alleged that the telemarketing call had authorized Direct 
Merchants to review M.J.'s credit report on only one occasion.  
Thus, he claimed that Direct Merchants' access of M.J.'s credit 
report on subsequent occasions had still constituted a FCRA 
violation. 
¶16 Because Attorney Crandall refused to dismiss the 
action, Direct Merchants filed a motion for summary judgment and 
for sanctions against M.J.  On December 12, 2002, M.J. signed an 
affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment motion.  In the 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
7 
 
affidavit, M.J. averred that he had initially told Attorney 
Crandall that he had not had direct contact with Direct 
Merchants and that he had believed that statement to be true at 
the time.  He now admitted that he had in fact applied for a 
Direct 
Merchants' 
credit 
card 
during 
a 
January 
2001 
telemarketing call and acknowledged that Direct Merchants had 
lawfully accessed his credit report on one occasion in response 
to his application.  The affidavit stated, however, that M.J. 
had never received any credit card from Direct Merchants, that 
Direct Merchants' access of his credit report on subsequent 
occasions had therefore been unlawful, and that on the day prior 
to executing the affidavit M.J. had tried to make two purchases 
with his Direct Merchants credit card number, but had been 
unsuccessful because the card number had been rejected. 
¶17 Although M.J.'s affidavit had been designed to oppose 
Direct Merchants' summary judgment motion, Attorney Crandall did 
not file it with the court.  Indeed, he filed nothing in 
opposition to the summary judgment motion.  The U.S. District 
Court scheduled the motion for a hearing, but Attorney Crandall 
failed to inform either M.J. or C.J. of that proceeding. 
¶18 Since no opposition to the motion had been filed, on 
December 31, 2002, the court granted summary judgment to Direct 
Merchants and dismissed M.J.'s claims.  The court, however, 
denied Direct Merchants' request for sanctions against M.J.  
Attorney Crandall failed to inform M.J. and C.J. of the 
dismissal of M.J.'s complaint. 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
8 
 
¶19 On January 8, 2003, Direct Merchants filed a motion 
for reconsideration of the denial of their motion for sanctions.  
Although he had filed nothing in opposition to the summary 
judgment motion, Attorney Crandall now filed a brief in 
opposition to the renewed request for sanctions and attached the 
summary judgment affidavit that M.J. had previously executed on 
December 12, 2002.  The court scheduled a hearing on the 
reconsideration motion, but Attorney Crandall again failed to 
inform M.J. and C.J. of that fact. 
¶20 On March 19, 2003, the U.S. District Court granted 
Direct Merchants' motion for reconsideration of the sanction 
request and entered a judgment against M.J. personally in the 
amount of $4,747.77.  Attorney Crandall failed to inform M.J. 
and C.J. of the judgment.  They first learned of the judgment 
against M.J. when they received a letter from counsel for Direct 
Merchants on July 18, 2003. 
¶21 Attorney 
Crandall 
subsequently 
forwarded 
correspondence to M.J. and C.J. informing them of the judgment 
and asking them to contact his office.  After several days of 
unsuccessful attempts, M.J. and C.J. were finally able to speak 
with Attorney Crandall, but did not receive a satisfactory 
explanation of what had transpired in the federal lawsuit.  
During this conversation, Attorney Crandall stated that he 
concluded from the tone of M.J. and C.J.'s voices that they were 
firing him. 
¶22 M.J. and C.J. reached an agreement with Direct 
Merchants whereby on November 13, 2003, they paid $1,600 to 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
9 
 
Direct Merchants.  In exchange for this discounted payment, 
Direct Merchants filed a satisfaction of the sanctions judgment 
against M.J. 
¶23 On three occasions beginning in January 2004, M.J. and 
C.J. requested Attorney Crandall to return their file.  Attorney 
Crandall failed to comply with their requests in a timely 
manner.  He did not return M.J. and C.J.'s file to them until 
August 16, 2004. 
¶24 In November 2003 M.J. and C.J. filed a grievance with 
the OLR.  They alleged that Attorney Crandall had continued to 
prosecute the action against Direct Merchants despite having 
received evidence that undermined any claim, that he had failed 
to return their calls or otherwise keep them informed, and that 
he had failed to return their file when asked to do so.   
¶25 In February and March 2004 the OLR sent letters to 
Attorney Crandall attaching M.J. and C.J.'s grievance and asking 
him to submit a written response.  Attorney Crandall did not 
respond within the time periods requested by the OLR.  On March 
30, 2004, Attorney Crandall did fax a letter to the OLR.  In his 
letter Attorney Crandall stated that his current workload 
prevented his timely response to the grievance and that he would 
submit a written response by April 5, 2004.  He did not, 
however, respond as promised.  The OLR then delivered yet 
another letter to Attorney Crandall, this time by personal 
service, but he still did not respond to the substance of the 
grievance. 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
10 
 
¶26 Ultimately, the OLR sought and this court granted a 
temporary suspension of Attorney Crandall's license to practice 
law in Wisconsin due to his failure to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation.  Almost a month after his license was temporarily 
suspended, Attorney Crandall finally submitted a response to the 
grievance.  On the OLR's motion, this court reinstated Attorney 
Crandall's license. 
¶27 The OLR asked Attorney Crandall on two additional 
occasions for further information.  On November 29, 2005, 
Attorney Crandall responded to the OLR, stating that he had 
already provided detailed and comprehensive documents and 
thought any additional response was unnecessary.  Attorney 
Crandall also asked for documents that had been identified as 
having been attached to the OLR's letters, but that he alleged 
had been missing.  Although the OLR sent the appended documents 
to Attorney Crandall, he did not provide any further response. 
¶28 On the basis of these facts, the referee concluded 
that 
by 
continuing 
to 
insist 
that 
M.J. 
had 
no 
credit 
relationship with Direct Merchants and to pursue a claim against 
it 
despite 
receiving 
evidence 
that 
M.J. 
had 
a 
credit 
relationship with Direct Merchants and had authorized Direct 
Merchants to access his credit report, Attorney Crandall had 
knowingly advanced a claim or defense that was unwarranted under 
existing law and had knowingly advanced a factual position 
without a basis for doing so, in violation of former SCR 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
11 
 
20:3.1(a)(1) and (2).2  The referee also determined that Attorney 
Crandall's failure to file M.J.'s December 12, 2002, affidavit 
or a brief in opposition to Direct Merchants' summary judgment 
motion had constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.3.3  The referee 
further concluded that Attorney Crandall had violated SCR 
20:1.4(a)4 by failing to keep his clients reasonably informed 
about their matter, as evidenced by the approximately four-month 
delay between the entry of the judgment against M.J. and 
Attorney Crandall's notification to M.J. and C.J. of that fact.  
                                                 
2 Effective July 1, 2007, substantial changes were made to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, SCR Chapter 20.  See S.Ct. Order No. 04-07, 2007 WI 
4, 293 Wis. 2d xv; and S.Ct. Order No. 06-04, 2007 WI 48, 297 
Wis. 2d xlvii.  Because the conduct underlying this case arose 
prior 
to 
July 
1, 
2007, 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
references to the supreme court rules will be to those in effect 
prior to July 1, 2007. 
Former SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) and (2) provides: 
 
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
not: 
 
(1) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is 
unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer 
may advance such claim or defense if it can be 
supported by good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law;  
 
(2) knowingly advance a factual position unless 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous; 
. . . . 
3 Former SCR 20:1.3 states, "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
4 Former SCR 20:1.4(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep 
a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
12 
 
The referee also found that Attorney Crandall's failure to 
return M.J. and C.J.'s file in a timely manner had constituted a 
failure to protect the interests of a client upon termination of 
a representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).5  Finally, the 
referee concluded that during two separate periods of time, 
before and after the temporary suspension of his license to 
practice law, Attorney Crandall had willfully failed to provide 
a written response to a grievance and to cooperate with the 
OLR's grievance investigation, in violation of SCRs 21.15(4)6 and 
22.03(2) and (6),7 all of which are actionable through SCR 
20:8.4(f).8 
                                                 
5 Former SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
6 SCR 21.15(4) provides as follows: 
 
Every attorney shall cooperate with the office of 
lawyer regulation in the investigation, prosecution 
and disposition of grievances, complaints filed with 
or by the director, and petitions for reinstatement.  
An attorney's wilful failure to cooperate with the 
office of lawyer regulation constitutes violation of 
the rules of professional conduct for attorneys. 
7 SCRs 22.03(2) and (6) state:  Investigation.   
 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
13 
 
¶29 Given the parties' stipulation to the facts described 
above and to the existence of violations of the Supreme Court 
Rules of Professional Conduct, we adopt the factual findings 
contained in the referee's report.  We also adopt the referee's 
legal conclusions that Attorney Crandall committed six separate 
violations. 
¶30 With respect to discipline, the referee recommended 
that Attorney Crandall be publicly reprimanded and that he be 
required to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.  This 
recommendation was consistent with the terms of the stipulation 
entered into by the OLR and Attorney Crandall. 
                                                                                                                                                             
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
 
. . .  
 
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
8 Former SCR 20:8.4(f) states that it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court 
rule, supreme court order or supreme court decision regulating 
the conduct of lawyers." 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
14 
 
¶31 Having 
reviewed 
the 
record, 
we 
agree 
that 
the 
seriousness 
of 
Attorney 
Crandall's 
professional 
misconduct 
requires a public reprimand.  His lack of communication with his 
clients, lack of diligence, failure to return a client's file in 
a timely manner and failure to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation are serious breaches of his ethical duties as a 
lawyer in this state.  In addition to the discipline imposed, we 
also agree that Attorney Crandall should be required to pay the 
full costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶32 Although the OLR did not request a restitution award 
in its complaint and the subject was not mentioned in the 
parties' stipulation, the issue was apparently raised in a 
telephone conference that the referee had with the parties 
following the filing of the stipulation.  Ultimately, Attorney 
Crandall 
submitted 
a 
short 
response 
arguing 
against 
the 
imposition of any restitution award in favor of M.J. and C.J.  
In addition to questioning the legal basis for a restitution 
award where there had been no such request affirmatively made by 
the OLR, Attorney Crandall asserted that M.J. had misled him by 
stating that he had never applied for credit from Direct 
Merchants, when in fact he had applied during a telephone 
marketing call.  Attorney Crandall argued that once he learned 
the truth about M.J.'s credit application, he focused not on the 
original credit review by Direct Merchants, but on Direct 
Merchants' subsequent reviews of M.J.'s credit report.  Attorney 
Crandall asserted that those subsequent reviews were unlawful 
under the FCRA because M.J. had never received or activated any 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
15 
 
Direct Merchants credit card, and therefore, there had been no 
credit relationship to authorize Direct Merchants' ongoing 
credit reviews. 
¶33 Attached 
to Attorney Crandall's response was an 
unsigned copy of M.J.'s affidavit in the federal action.  The 
affidavit, to which the OLR did not object, acknowledged that 
M.J. had initially told Attorney Crandall that he had never had 
any contact with Direct Merchants.  The affidavit stated that 
M.J.'s memory had been jarred by the recording of his call with 
a Direct Merchants' representative and that, given his request 
for a credit card during that telemarketing call, Direct 
Merchants' initial review of his credit report had been lawful.  
The affidavit disputed, however, Direct Merchants' claim that a 
welcome packet and credit card had been sent to M.J.  It also 
stated that although M.J. had received a March 2002 "statement," 
that document was merely intended to give notice of a class 
action settlement involving Direct Merchants.  The affidavit 
continued that M.J. had never activated any Direct Merchants' 
credit card.  As proof of that fact, the affidavit stated that 
M.J. had attempted to use the credit card number over the 
telephone to order items from two catalog clothing companies, 
but the card number had been rejected by both companies. 
¶34 The record does not show any response by the OLR to 
Attorney Crandall's filing.  Nonetheless, in his report the 
referee specifically recommended that Attorney Crandall pay 
restitution to M.J. and C.J. for the $1,600 payment that they 
had made to Direct Merchants as satisfaction of the sanctions 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
16 
 
judgment and for any legal fees that they had incurred to 
negotiate the settlement, plus interest until the restitution 
was paid in full.  The referee's reasoning for the restitution 
recommendation was that by the time the sanctions judgment was 
entered, M.J. and C.J. had no longer authorized Attorney 
Crandall to proceed with the action in light of the fact that 
Direct Merchants had proven that M.J. had in fact applied for a 
credit card during a telemarketing call.  Thus, the referee 
concluded that Attorney Crandall had continued to prosecute the 
action although M.J. and C.J. "thought it had been resolved."  
The referee also relied on what he believed was a contradiction 
in the affidavit signed by M.J., and therefore in Attorney 
Crandall's theory of the case.  The referee pointed out that 
M.J.'s affidavit stated in one paragraph that he had never 
received a credit card from Direct Merchants, but in a later 
paragraph stated that M.J. had unsuccessfully attempted to use 
his Direct Merchants credit card to make two purchases.  The 
referee implied that Attorney Crandall had to know that one or 
the other of these statements could not be true, and therefore, 
that his continued prosecution of the action against Direct 
Merchants had been frivolous. 
¶35 Although we agree that Attorney Crandall bears some 
responsibility for not keeping M.J. and C.J. fully informed and 
for the sanctions judgment that was entered against M.J., we do 
not believe that he alone should bear full responsibility for 
the outcome of that case.  It is undisputed that Attorney 
Crandall's initial position in negotiating with Direct Merchants 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
17 
 
and then in his federal court complaint was based on an 
inaccurate statement9 from M.J. that he had never applied for a 
Direct Merchants credit card.  There is no indication in the 
record that either M.J. or C.J. disagreed with the filing of 
that complaint. 
¶36 It is a fact that Direct Merchants subsequently 
provided proof that M.J. had applied for a credit card during a 
January 2001 telemarketing call.  Attorney Crandall forwarded 
Direct Merchants' letter on this subject and a tape recording of 
the call to M.J.  According to the OLR's complaint, to which 
Attorney Crandall stipulated, M.J. and C.J. then "believed the 
lawsuit would be ended."  This factual finding, however, does 
not mean that M.J. or C.J. directed Attorney Crandall to dismiss 
the lawsuit.  Indeed, there is no allegation or factual finding 
to that effect.  It also does not mean that M.J. and C.J. 
believed at that time, or at a later time, that the lawsuit had 
in fact been voluntarily dismissed.  Indeed, it is clear that 
M.J. knew at a later date that the lawsuit had not been 
dismissed.  He subsequently signed an affidavit in which he 
acknowledged 
applying 
for 
a 
credit 
card 
initially, 
but 
                                                 
9 M.J.'s affidavit implicitly stated that he had forgotten 
about 
the 
telemarketing 
call 
with 
the 
Direct 
Merchants' 
representative until he saw the transcript of the call.  We do 
not express an opinion on whether this was the case.  Even if 
the telemarketing call had been forgotten, M.J.'s statements 
that no call had been received were still inaccurate.  It was 
those statements by M.J. to Attorney Crandall that prompted the 
filing of the federal complaint.  Also, there is no indication 
in the record that either M.J. or C.J. objected to the filing of 
the complaint on the basis of those statements. 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
18 
 
explicitly denied ever receiving one or making another telephone 
call to Direct Merchants to activate it.   
¶37 One might argue that M.J. could simply have signed a 
document that his lawyer gave to him without understanding its 
contents or importance.  The affidavit, however, clearly showed 
on the top of the first page that it was intended to be part of 
the federal lawsuit.  In addition, the first paragraph of the 
affidavit stated that the affidavit was being submitted in 
opposition to Direct Merchants' motions for summary judgment and 
for sanctions.  M.J. signed this affidavit well after he had 
received the letter and tape recording from Direct Merchants.  
The fact that he signed such a document, even assuming an 
imperfect understanding of the document's relevance, shows that 
M.J. knew his lawsuit remained active to some degree.  His 
signature on the affidavit simply cannot be squared with the 
referee's implication that Attorney Crandall was continuing to 
pursue the federal case solely on his own. 
¶38 In addition, it is not clear that there is an internal 
contradiction in the position taken by Attorney Crandall or in 
the affidavit signed by M.J. after Direct Merchants had proven 
that M.J. had initially applied for a credit card.  Attorney 
Crandall's position after learning of the tape recording of the 
telemarketing call was that while M.J.'s initial application may 
have authorized Direct Merchants' first review of M.J.'s credit 
report, Direct Merchants had no authority to make continuing 
reviews of M.J.'s credit reports because M.J. never activated, 
or even received, a Direct Merchants credit card.  M.J.'s 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
19 
 
affidavit does not necessarily undercut this position.  Contrary 
to the conclusion drawn by the referee, the affidavit does not 
state that M.J. used a physical credit card to attempt to make 
purchases in December 2002.  Rather, the affidavit states that 
M.J. used the Direct Merchants credit card number, which the 
catalog companies rejected.  Moreover, M.J. never had to present 
a physical credit card because he attempted these purchases over 
the telephone.  In addition, it is entirely possible that M.J. 
obtained the credit card number allegedly assigned to him by 
Direct Merchants from the March 2002 statement that Direct 
Merchants allegedly sent to him or from materials that were 
filed or produced during the federal litigation.  In any event, 
it is not necessarily true that M.J.'s affidavit and Attorney 
Crandall's 
theory 
of the case were based on a logical 
contradiction that Attorney Crandall should have recognized, 
causing him to withdraw the federal complaint. 
¶39 The bottom line is that we concur with the referee 
that Attorney Crandall bears some responsibility for the 
sanction judgment entered against M.J., but we do not believe 
that the responsibility lies solely with him.  He did not keep 
his clients adequately informed and did not engage them 
sufficiently in decisions about whether and how to proceed with 
their claim.  On the other hand, there is no allegation in the 
record that M.J. or C.J. instructed Attorney Crandall to dismiss 
the 
lawsuit, 
and 
indeed 
M.J. 
indicated 
his 
approval 
of 
continuing the fight by executing an affidavit in opposition to 
Direct 
Merchants' 
summary 
judgment 
motion. 
 
Under 
these 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
20 
 
circumstances, we conclude that it would be equitable for 
Attorney Crandall to pay partial restitution to M.J. and C.J. in 
the flat amount of $1,000.  This will avoid any further 
litigation over possible attorney fees or interest, which would 
be more costly than any amounts at issue. 
¶40 IT IS ORDERED that Eric L. Crandall is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Eric L. Crandall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs are not 
paid within the time specified and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Eric L. Crandall to practice law in Wisconsin shall 
be suspended until further order of the court. 
¶42 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Eric L. Crandall shall pay restitution to clients 
M.J. and C.J. in the amount of $1,000.  If restitution to M.J. 
and C.J. is not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay the restitution 
amount within that time, the license of Eric L. Crandall to 
practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order 
of this court. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that restitution to clients M.J. 
and C.J. is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation. 
 
No. 
2006AP2058-D   
 
 
 
1