Title: Montgomery v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 89
September Term, 2007
_________________________________________
NEIL MORANO MONTGOMERY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
                  JJ.
_________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   June 11, 2008
1
Maryland Rule 4-348 provides as follows (emphasis added):
“Rule 4-348.  Stay or execution of sentence.
  
(a) Sentence of death.  (1) Definition.  In this section, ‘state post conviction
review process’ has the meaning stated in Code, Correctional Services Article, § 3-
902.
(2)  Stay.  A sentence of death shall be stayed during the direct review process
and the state post conviction review process.
(b)  Sentence of imprisonment.  The filing of an appeal or a petition for writ of
certiorari in any appellate court, including the Supreme Court of the United States,
stays a sentence of imprisonment during any period that the defendant is released
pursuant to Rule 4-349, unless a court orders otherwise pursuant to section (d) of that
Rule.
(c)  Fine.  Upon the filing of an appeal or petition of writ of certiorari in any
appellate court, a sentence to pay a fine or a fine and costs may be stayed by the court
upon terms the court deems proper, but any bond required to stay the payment
pending appeal may not exceed the unpaid amount of the fine and costs, if any. 
(D)  Other sentences.  Any other sentence or any order or condition of probation
may be stayed upon terms the court deems proper.”
In this criminal case, the Circuit Court for Charles County convicted the
defendant Montgom ery of violating the conditions of a previously imposed period of
probation.  The court sentenced Montgom ery to ten years imprisonment for the
violation, with no new period of probation involved.  The court then deferred for three
years the date when the defendant was to report to the Division of Correction and begin
serving his sentence.  The reason given for the deferral, by the trial judge at sentencing,
was that, “if you [Montgomery] are of good behavior between now and three years from
now I will reconsider it and vacate it and not make you serve another day.”  The
dispositive issues before this Court are whether the deferred reporting date, based on
the reasons set forth by the Circuit Court, was authorized by Maryland Rule 4-348(d)1
and, if not authorized, whether the sentence amounted to an illegal sentence within the
-2-
2
Maryland Rule 4-345(a) states:
“Rule 4-345.  Sentencing – Revisory power of court.
(a)  Illegal sentence.  The court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time.”
meaning of Maryland Rule 4-345(a). 2  We shall hold that the deferred reporting date,
under the circumstances, was not authorized by Rule 4-348(d) and that it constituted
an illegal sentence.
I.
On April 20, 1993, in the Circuit Court for Charles County, Neil Morano
Montgomery pled guilty to a single count of arson and was sentenced to twenty-five
years of imprisonment.  The court suspended all but five years of imprisonment and
placed the defendant Montgom ery on probation for five years after his release from
incarceration.  Montgom ery served the unsuspended portion of his sentence and was
released on probation.
The State on June 9, 2000, filed in the Circuit Court for Charles County a
petition alleging that Montgomery had violated a condition of his probation.  The
alleged violation was that Montgom ery had been convicted of criminal contempt for
failure to pay child support.  The Circuit Court held a hearing on the State’s petition
on May 18, 2001, at which Montgom ery admitted that he had committed the violation
of probation.  After questioning Montgom ery about his employment with a home
improvement contractor in Charles County, about his place of residence, and whether
Montgom ery would have transportation from his home to his place of employment, the
-3-
Circuit Court at the May 18, 2001, hearing announced the sentence as follows
(emphasis added):
“The disposition Mr. Montgom ery is 10 years of the 20 year
balance of the sentence in this case is hereby ordered executed
effective at 9 a.m. on May 18th of 2004.  That is three years from
today.  You are entitled to credit against that for 55 days time
served prior to today in connection with this probation violation
matter.
“The interest of the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation
in this . . . case is closed.  Any uncollected fees are determined to
be uncollectible.”
* * *
“[Defense Counsel] will automatically file [a] reconsideration
motion.  I am automatically going to table it.  Mr. Montgomery, I
am attaching no particular strings to this.  I am telling you if you
are of good behavior between now and three years from now I will
reconsider it and vacate it and not make you serve another day.
“On the other hand [the Assistant State’s Attorney] is going to
see to it that the child support section of his office has the case
number, Criminal 92-468 stamped all over its child support files
down there.  And they are going to know if you miss a payment that
you get 10 years.
“I reserve the right to advance the date for execution of this 10
years . . . if I hear that you [have] run afoul of the law or run afoul
of any other order of court between now and that date.” 
The Commitment Record, issued on May 23, 2001, reflected that Montgom ery
was sentenced to ten years imprisonm ent, “concurrent with any other outstanding or
unserved sentence and [to] begin on 05/18/04.”  On May 29, 2001, defense counsel
-4-
3
Maryland Rule 4-345(e)(1) provides:
“(e)  Modification Upon Motion.  (1)  Generally.  Upon a
motion filed within 90 days after imposition of a sentence (A) in the
District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected or has been
dismissed, and (B) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has
been filed, the court has revisory power over the sentence except that
it may not revise the sentence after the expiration of five years from
the date the sentence originally was imposed on the defendant and it
may not increase the sentence.” 
The five-year limitation upon the Circuit Court’s authority to revise a sentence under Rule 4-
345(e)(1) was not in effect when the sentence in this case was imposed and when the motion under
the Rule was filed.  At that time, there was no time limitation upon a trial judge’s authority under
Rule 4-345(e)(1) to revise a sentence.
filed a motion to reconsider the sentence pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(e)(1). 3  The
record does not reflect that the Circuit Court ever ruled upon this motion.  A proposed
order attached to defense counsel’s reconsideration motion contains a handwritten
notation stating “No decision,” along with the trial judge’s signature and the date of
June 13, 2001.  Montgom ery neither sought leave to appeal from the Circuit Court’s
judgment of May 18, 2001, nor otherwise challenged the court’s action at that time.
When Montgom ery did not report to the Division of Correction on May 18, 2004,
he was “picked up” and incarcerated in the Maryland Correctional Institution,
Hagerstown, Maryland.  Montgom ery thereupon sent a letter to the trial judge who had
sentenced him, stating that a mistake had been made.  The judge responded as follows:
“Your letter received on May 21 suggests some mistake has
resulted in the Division of Correction’s considering you to be
serving a 10-year sentence in this case.
“Review of the file persuades me that there is no mistake.  On
May 18, 2001, for violating probation, I ordered into execution 10
-5-
4
The record shows that the Division of Correction also believed that a “mistake” had been made,
although in a different respect.  The Division requested that the trial judge amend the commitment
“because . . . the date of sentencing is incorrect” and should be “May 18, 2004.”  The trial judge
wrote to the Division that the original commitment was correct and that there was no need for
amendment.
years of the suspended sentence effective May 18, 2004.  You were
told then that I would consider vacating the sentence were you to
remain out of trouble during the 3 year interval.  The sentence has
not been reconsidered and modified and May 18, 2004 has come
and gone, so it would appear that the agency’s [Division of
Correction’s] assessment of your status is accurate.”4
There were further exchanges of letters, the filing of a petition for post conviction
relief, and the State’s answer, all of which concerned, inter alia, the performance of
Montgom ery’s trial counsel and the matter of Montgom ery’s “behavior” during the
three-year period.  
Thereafter, represented by new counsel from the Office of Public Defender,
Montgom ery filed in the Circuit Court for Charles County a “Motion To Correct An
Illegal Sentence.”  The motion asserted that the sentence imposed on May 18, 2001,
was an illegal sentence which, under Rule 4-345(a), could be corrected “at any time.”
Montgom ery argued that the three-year deferred reporting date, based on the trial
judge’s determination that Montgomery would not be imprisoned if he was “of good
behavior between now and three years from now,” was unauthorized and illegal.  The
State responded by arguing that the sentence was authorized by Maryland Rule 4-
348(d) which, according to the State, “explicitly permits the court to stay a sentence
‘upon terms the court deems proper.’”  Consequently, the State argued that the May 18,
-6-
2001, sentence was not “illegal.”
The Circuit Court, without a hearing and without giving reasons, by an order
filed on December 19, 2005, denied the motion.  Montgom ery then appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Montgom ery contended that the sentence was not authorized by any statute or rule and,
therefore, was illegal.  Montgom ery alternatively argued that the Circuit Court acted
illegally in ruling on the motion without a hearing to determine whether Montgom ery
had complied with the “good behavior” condition imposed on May 18, 2001.  The State
maintained that the sentence was authorized by Maryland Rule 4-348(d), and that, even
if it was not authorized, the Circuit Court’s error would be merely “procedural” and
would not constitute an illegal sentence.  The State also argued that the Circuit Court
was not required to hold a hearing on the motion.  The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed, Montgomery v. State, 175 Md. App. 639, 643, 931 A.2d 534, 536 (2007),
holding
“that by granting appellant (1) a deferred reporting date, and (2)
the opportunity to avoid serving ‘another day,’ the circuit court did
not impose an ‘illegal’ sentence.”
Montgom ery then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising
essentially two issues:  (1) whether the sentence imposed on May 18, 2001, in light of
the three-year deferred reporting date and the provision that the sentence would not be
served if Montgom ery was “of good behavior” for the three years, was unauthorized
-7-
5
The first issue, which we have re-worded, was actually framed as two separate issues in the
certiorari petition.
and constituted an illegal sentence; (2) whether Montgom ery was entitled to a hearing
on the question of whether he had complied with the condition set forth at the
sentencing on May 18, 2001.5  The State answered by arguing that the May 18, 2001,
sentence was authorized by Maryland Rule 4-348(d), that even if the sentence was not
authorized by Rule 4-348(d), it did not constitute an “illegal sentence” within the
meaning of Rule 4-345(a), and that Montgom ery was not entitled to a hearing on the
issue of whether he had complied with the “good behavior” condition delineated by the
trial court on May 18, 2001.
This Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, Montgomery v. State, 402
Md. 352, 936 A.2d 850 (2007).  As previously mentioned, we shall hold that the
May 18, 2001, sentence was not authorized by Maryland Rule 4-348(d) and that it
constituted an illegal sentence.  Con sequ ently, the Circuit Court’s judgment of
May 18, 2001, will be reversed.  The effect of this reversal renders moot the issue of
whether Montgom ery was entitled to a hearing to determine if he had complied with the
condition set forth by the trial court on May 18, 2001.  Therefore, the hearing issue
need not and will not be reached.
II.
We shall first address the State’s argument that, even if the deferred reporting
date, based upon the ground sent forth by the trial judge, was unauthorized, it would
not amount to an “illegal sentence” within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a).
-8-
This Court in Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278-279, 855  A.2d 291, 309 (2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1150, 125 S.Ct. 1325, 161 L.Ed.2d 113 (2005), explained the
scope of a motion to correct an illegal sentence as follows:
“[A]s a general rule, a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal
sentence is not appropriate where the alleged illegality ‘did not
inhere in [the defendant’s] sentence.’  State v. Kanaras, supra, 357
Md. [170,] at 185, 742 A.2d [508,] at 517 [1999].  A motion to
correct an illegal sentence ordinarily can be granted only where
there is some illegality in the sentence itself or where no sentence
should have been imposed.  See, e.g., Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md.
165, 171, 797 A.2d 1287, 1290 (2002); Holmes v. State, 362 Md.
190, 763 A.2d 737 (2000); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651, 662-
663, 736 A.2d 285, 291 (1999).  On the other hand, a trial court
error during the sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily cognizable
under Rule 4-345(a) where the resulting sentence or sanction is
itself lawful.  Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323, 558
A.2d 715, 719 (1989) . . . .”
Furthermore, failure to object to an allegedly illegal sentence at the time it was
imposed does not preclude a defendant from later raising the issue or later filing a
motion to correct an illegal sentence.  As held in Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427,
488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985),
“when the trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not
permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed . . . even
if no objection was made in the trial court.  Such review and
correction of an illegal sentence is especially appropriate in light
of the fact that Rule 4-345(a), formerly Rule 774 a, provides that
‘[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.’  Thus, a
defendant who fails to object to the imposition of an illegal
sentence does not waive forever his right to challenge that
sentence.”
-9-
See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 273, 900 A.2d 765, 767 (2006) (“The court
may correct an illegal sentence at any time.  Rule 4-345(a).  The denial of a motion to
correct an illegal sentence is appealable”); Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 463, 886 A.2d
562, 565 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1219, 126 S.Ct. 1442, 164 L.Ed.2d 141 (2006)
(“‘[A] motion to correct an illegal sentence historically was entertained only where the
alleged illegality was in the sentence itself or the sentence never should have been
imposed,’” quoting Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 133, 883 A.2d 916, 919 (2005)); Jones
v. State, 384 Md. 669, 678-679, 866 A.2d 151, 157-161 (2005); Coles v. State, 290 Md.
296, 303, 429 A.2d 1029, 1032 (1981) (“A trial court clearly has the authority and
responsibility to correct an illegal sentence at any time, . . . and the refusal to do so, no
matter when the correction request is made, is appealable”).
In the case at bar, the State argues that the deferred reporting date, based on and
contingent upon Montgom ery’s future “good behavio r,” was at most “only a
procedural error,” that “there is no inherent illegality in the sentence imposed,” and
that, therefore, “this is not an illegal sentence” for purposes of Rule 4-345(a).
(Respondent’s brief at 7-8).  We disagree.
The trial judge at sentencing set forth the sentence as follows:  “[t]he disposition
Mr. Montgom ery is 10 years of the 20 year balance of the sentence in this case is
hereby ordered executed effective at 9 a.m. on May 18th of 2004.  That is three years
from today.”  After terminating the “interest of the Maryland Division of Parole and
Probation” and stating that he would “table” defense counsel’s motion to revise the
-10-
sentence, the trial judge continued:  “if you are of good behavior between now and
three years from now I will reconsider it and vacate it and not make you serve another
day.”  The judge also “reserve[d] the right to advance the date for execution” if he
heard that Montgom ery had run “afoul of the law.”  The record contains no indication
that the trial judge committed a “procedu ral” error leading up to or during the course
of the sentencing.  Instead, the three-year deferred reporting date, and the
contingencies, were an integral part of the sentence itself.  This is confirmed by the
docket entries for May 18, 2001, which state in pertinent part:
“Court orders 10 years of sentence into execution to DOC to date
from 5/18/04 at 9:00 am; credit to be given for 55 days time served.
Court closes probation and refers outstanding costs to Central
Collection.
Court reserves right to accelerate sentence.”
The Commitment Record issued on May 23, 2001, also states that Montgom ery’s
imprisonment was to “begin on 05/18/04.”
Moreover, under this Court’s opinions, similar conditions or determinations
imposed at sentencing, which might qualify or modify the time and extent of
imprisonm ent, have been regarded as part of the sentence for purposes of Rule 4-345(a)
or its predecessor rules.  
Thus, in State Ex Rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 520-527, 325 A.2d 573
(1974), the Court held that an unauthorized suspension of part of an otherwise lawful
sentence constituted an “illegal sentence” under the predecessor to Rule 4-345(a), that
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the issue was properly raised by a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the time
for appeal expired, and that the trial court’s refusal to correct the illegal sentence was
appealable.  In State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 352 A.2d 829 (1976), the defendant was
convicted of first degree murder.  The trial judge sentenced the defendant to life
imprisonm ent, which was the only penalty authorized for the crime at that time, and
then suspended the serving of all except the first eight years.  This Court held that a
motion to correct an illegal sentence was the proper vehicle for the State’s challenge
of the trial judge’s authority to suspend all but eight years, and that the trial court’s
denial of the motion was appealable.  We affirmed on the merits, holding that the trial
judge’s action was authorized.
The defendant in Coles v. State, supra, 290 Md. 296, 429 A.2d 1029, was
convicted on seven counts of welfare fraud and was sentenced to serve ten years
imprisonment for each conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently.  The serving
of all but 179 days was suspended with the defendant being placed on probation for
four and one-half years upon certain conditions.  The defendant “acquiesced” in the
sentence and did not appeal.  About seven months later, the State filed a petition
seeking revocation of the defendant’s probation because he had violated a condition of
probation.  A hearing was held, and the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation,
ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence.  This Court held that the legality of
the original condition of probation could be raised by a motion to correct an illegal
sentence, and that the trial court’s denial of the motion was appealable.  See Benedict
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v. State, 377 Md. 1, 12, 831 A.2d 1060, 1066 (2003) (Holding that a court, in revoking
probation, “had no authority to direct execution of any part of the [original sentence]
that was previously unsuspended,” and “revers[ing] the order denying appellant’s
motion to correct [an] illegal sentence”).  See also Cathcart v. State, 397 Md. 320, 326-
330, 916 A.2d 1008, 1012-1014 (2007).
Therefore, if the deferred reporting date, with the announced contingencies
dependent upon Montgom ery’s “behavior,” was unauthorized, the sentence would
constitute an “illegal sentence” within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a).
III.
The petitioner Montgom ery argues that the May 18, 2001, sentence, which he
labels a “springing sentence,” was not authorized by Maryland’s “mere ‘deferred
reporting date’” under Rule 4-348(d), that the trial court “in effect, imposed a de facto
period of unsupervised probation, because it conditioned the continued execution of
sentence on Mr. Montgom ery’s continuing ‘good behavior,’” and that this “de facto”
probation violated the statutory provisions, rules and case law governing the suspension
of sentences and probation.  (Petitioner’s brief at 9-12).  The State, in the trial court,
the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court, has consistently maintained that, in
imposing the May 18, 2001, sentence, the trial judge “exercised his discretion pursuant
to Maryland Rule 4-348(d).”  (Respondent’s brief at 9).  The State seems to view the
trial court’s discretion under that Rule as “‘virtually boundless.’”  (Ibid.).
It is clear that the trial judge on May 18, 2001, neither placed Montgomery on
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probation nor purported to place him on any type of probation.  Furthermore, the trial
judge expressly terminated the probation that Montgom ery had been on.  No form of
probation, under the Maryland statutes and rules, is involved in this case.  Regardless
of how one might categorize or label the May 18, 2001, sentence, the issue in this case
is whether that sentence was authorized by Maryland Rule 4-348(d).  Neither the State
nor the courts below have ever relied on any ground other than Rule 4-348(d) as
authority for the sentence.
The State’s argument appears to place no limit on the number of years which a
defendant’s prison reporting date can be deferred by a trial court acting pursuant to
Rule 4-348(d).  Presumably a trial court may defer a convicted defendant’s prison
reporting date for 5, 10 or more years.  The State also places no limitations upon the
grounds or reasons for a trial court to defer for several years a prison reporting date.
In our view, a trial court’s authority under Rule 4-348(d) is not so sweeping.
Under the common law, trial judges had the authority to defer, for a limited
period of time and for limited reasons, the date when a defendant should begin serving
his or her sentence.  Some examples often given were when a female defendant was
pregnant or when a defendant desired an opportunity to apply for executive clemency.
See, e.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42-45, 37 S.Ct. 72, 74-75, 61 L.Ed. 129
(1916); Bk. 4, Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries On The Laws of England, Ch. 31
(6th ed. 1775); Lester Bernhart Orfeld, Criminal Procedure, at 528-529 (1947).  The
three-year sentence deferment by the trial judge in the instant case, for the reasons set
-14-
forth by the trial judge, would not be sanctioned under common law principles (see Ex
parte United States, supra, and United States v. Lynch, 259 F. 982 (S.D. Ala.1919)),
and the State makes no effort to do so.  Instead, as previously pointed out, the State
relies entirely on Maryland Rule 4-348(d).
Maryland Rule 4-348(d) was initially adopted by the Court of Appeals on
January 31, 1977, to be effective July 1, 1977.  It was part of a general revision of the
Criminal Procedure Rules.  What is now Rule 4-348(d), as adopted in 1977, was the
second sentence of former Rule 778a, which, like present Rule 4-348, dealt with the
staying of sentences pending appeal.  Former Rule 778 provided as follows (the
sentence constituting present Rule 4-348(d) is italicized):
“Rule 778.  Appeal – Stay of Execution of Sentence – Condition
of Appeal Bond.
“a.  Sentence Stayed by Appeal or Appellate Review.
An appeal or the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari to any
appellate court, including the Supreme Court of the United States,
stays a sentence of death, or a sentence of imprisonment if the
defendant is released pursuant to Rule 776 (Release After
Conviction).  Any other sentence or order or condition of
probation may be stayed upon terms the court deems proper.
“b.  Condition of Appeal Bond.
The condition of any bond taken pursuant to a condition
imposed under this Rule pending appeal shall be that the defendant
shall prosecute his appeal according to law and shall surrender
himself to serve any sentence imposed or appear for further
proceedings as directed; and that the bond shall continue until
discharged by order of the trial court.”
-15-
The new 1977 Criminal Rules were drafted by a Subcommittee of this Court’s
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the late Fred Warren
Bennett, a prominent member of the Maryland Bar, was a consultant to the
Subcommittee.  In a Maryland Bar Journal article on the new 1977 rules, Mr. Bennett
explained new Rule 778 as follows (Fred Warren Bennett, An Overview of the New
Maryland Criminal Rules, The Maryland Bar Journal 26, 34 (Summer 1977) (emphasis
added)):
“Appeal – Stay of Execution
“New Rule 778 replaces old Rule 781 which dealt with the
staying of a fine pending an appeal.
“New Rule 778a. provides that an appeal or the filing of a
petition for writ of certiorari to any appellate court or the Supreme
Court of the United States stays a sentence of death or a sentence
of imprisonment if the defendant is released on bond pending
appeal.  The Rule also provides that any other sentence or order of
condition of probation may be stayed upon terms that the court
deems proper.  Thus, new Rule 778a. specifically authorizes a
court to enter an order postponing the date on which a sentence is
to begin even if the defendant does not plan on filing an appeal or
if a defendant is not released on bond pending an appeal.  This
provision should not be overlooked in those cases in which a
defendant has personal, financial or other commitments that need
to be taken care of after a sentence of imprisonment is imposed.
This procedure is frequently followed in federal courts in those
cases involving white collar crime.”
Consequently, the purpose of the second sentence of former Rule 778 a, which
is now Rule 4-348(d), was to authorize a trial judge to defer a convicted defendant’s
prison reporting date so that the defendant could “take[] care of” his or her “personal,
financial or other commitments.”  This would include such things as winding up
-16-
business affairs, making arrangements for the care of children or other dependents, etc.
The original placement of the new provision, in the Rule dealing with stays pending
appeal, is a strong indication that the authorized deferral of the prison reporting date
was not intended to be for a multi-year or indefinite period.  The purpose of the
provision was not to allow a trial judge to monitor the defendant’s behavior for several
years.  
If a trial judge decides that a convicted defendant’s behavior should be
monitored or controlled, and that a period of good behavior should result in reduced
time or no time in prison, the judge may proceed under the statutes and rules relating
to suspension and probation.  See Maryland Code (2001), §§ 6-219 through 6-226 of
the Criminal Procedure Article; Maryland Rules 4-346 and 4-347.  The trial judge in
the present case, however, did not proceed under these provisions and did not place the
defendant on probation.
Since the trial judge’s action was not authorized by Rule 4-348(d), the sentence
imposed was illegal.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND
CASE 
REMANDED  
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCU IT COURT FOR CHARLES
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE
TO THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
NOT
I N C O N S I S T E N T  
W I T H  
T H I S
OPINION.  COSTS IN THE COURT
-17-
OF SPECIAL APPEALS AND IN THIS
COURT TO BE PAID BY CHARLES
COUNTY.