Title: In re Guardianship of Spangler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Guardianship of Spangler, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2471.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2471 
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF SPANGLER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Guardianship of Spangler,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2471.] 
Guardianships — Removal of guardian — County boards of developmental 
disabilities have no authority to petition probate court for removal of 
guardian of incompetent adult — Probate court, under its plenary 
authority as superior guardian, may sua sponte conduct proceedings to 
remove guardian. 
(No. 2009-0121 — Submitted December 2, 2009 — Decided June 9, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, Nos. 2007-G-2800 and 
2007-G-2802, 2008-Ohio-6978. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
County boards of developmental disabilities have not been granted the express or 
implied authority to file a motion to remove the guardian of an 
incompetent adult; however, the probate court, with its plenary authority 
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as the superior guardian, may upon notice from a county board of 
developmental disabilities conduct proceedings to remove a guardian. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case we are asked to determine whether a county board of 
developmental disabilities has the statutory authority and standing to file a motion 
to remove a guardian of an incompetent adult.  We hold that county boards of 
developmental disabilities have not been granted the express or implied authority 
to file a motion to remove the guardian of an incompetent adult; however, the 
probate court, with its plenary authority as the superior guardian, may upon notice 
from a county board of developmental disabilities conduct proceedings to remove 
a guardian.  We, therefore, affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Case History 
{¶ 2} Appellee John Spangler is currently 22 years old and suffers from 
autism, mental retardation, and mitochondrial disease.  After John turned 18, his 
parents, appellees Gabriele and Joseph Spangler, filed an application to be 
appointed John’s permanent guardians.  Appellant Geauga County Board of 
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities1 (the “board”) participated in 
the hearings on the matter and supported the parents’ application.  At one of those 
hearings, the probate court warned the mother:  
{¶ 3} “I’m going to give some consideration to appointing a guardian ad 
litem to go out and do investigation as to whether you’re the most suitable 
guardians or not.  It’s very important that he has someone who cares a lot about 
him, and obviously you do. 
                                                 
1.  During the pendency of this cause, the General Assembly passed 2009 Sub.S.B. No. 79 
(effective October 6, 2009), which changed the name of county boards of mental retardation and 
developmental disabilities to county boards of developmental disabilities. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 4} “And I haven’t heard anything from your husband yet, but 
apparently from the interactions that others have had, they feel that he is a very 
caring individual, too. 
{¶ 5} “But you do have to be making good decisions.  And I will be 
attempting to judge the decisions that you’re making. 
{¶ 6} “If you’re not making decisions that are in your son’s best 
interests, in terms of placement, I would consider appointing someone other than 
you and your husband to be your son’s guardian.” 
{¶ 7} Ultimately, on July 18, 2006, as a result of John’s mental and 
physical conditions, the probate court appointed the parents unlimited guardians 
of John’s person. 
{¶ 8} Three months later, the board filed a motion to remove the parents 
as John’s guardians and to appoint Advocacy and Protective Services, Inc. 
(“APSI”) as successor guardian. The motion alleged that the mother had created 
conflict with John’s providers and threatened to remove him from their care.  The 
motion was supported by a letter from John’s current provider, who stated that 
there was “an immediate danger to the welfare and safety of John.”  The probate 
court granted the motion to remove on a temporary basis, appointed APSI as 
temporary guardian for John, and set the matter for hearing the following week.  
At that hearing, the board and the parents agreed to a six-month continuance of 
the hearing and the appointment of APSI as temporary guardian. 
{¶ 9} In January 2007, however, the parents moved for an emergency 
order removing APSI and appointing the father as guardian.  APSI responded 
with a motion to dismiss the parents’ emergency motion and requested joinder of 
the board as a necessary party and appointment of a guardian ad litem.  The 
parents opposed the motion to join the board as a party and later filed a motion to 
dismiss the board’s motion for removal of the parents as guardians, arguing that 
the board had no statutory authority or standing to file such a motion.  The 
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probate court denied the parents’ motion to remove APSI and set a hearing in 
April 2007 on whether the parents would be permitted to serve as John’s 
guardians. 
{¶ 10} Before the April 2007 hearing, the probate court joined the board 
as a party to the removal proceedings for purposes of prosecuting its motion to 
remove the parents as guardians and denied the parents’ motion to dismiss the 
board’s motion.  At a second hearing two months later, John filed his own motion 
to dismiss the board from the case, arguing that the board lacked statutory 
standing to be considered a party.  Acknowledging the motion, the court stated: 
{¶ 11} “That issue has previously been addressed. 
{¶ 12} “It’s my view that they are an interested party, that the Agency is 
required to provide services, they had information, that preserves this ward 
allowing them to participate as a party for purposes of assisting the Court in 
making a decision regarding this issue of who is going to be the guardian. 
{¶ 13} “In fact, I don’t know how this would have been brought to the 
Court if the Agency been notified [sic], so I’m the one that says they are going to 
be, continue a party at least as long [as] this issue is pending.” 
{¶ 14} After a third hearing and an in camera interview with John, the 
matter was submitted to the probate court.  In its entry, the trial court found that 
the statutory obligations imposed on the board for John’s benefit are fiduciary in 
nature and the board therefore had standing to file the motion to remove the 
parents.  The probate court then found that despite John’s need for structure and 
consistency in his life, his mother “repeatedly, impulsively sought changes in 
John’s placements and services without giving due consideration to the opinion of 
professionals working with John and without having first secured alternative more 
appropriate services.”  Moreover, John’s father “is either unable or unwilling to 
intercede objectively and assertively in disputes that have arisen between care 
providers and his wife.”  Finding that there was good cause and that it was in 
January Term, 2010 
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John’s best interest, the probate court removed the parents as John’s guardians 
and ordered that ASPI continue as the legal guardian for his person. 
{¶ 15} The parents and John separately appealed to the Eleventh District 
Court of Appeals.  In a split decision, the appellate court reversed.  The lead 
opinion concluded that the board had not been granted the statutory authority, 
express or implied, to file a motion to remove a guardian and thus lacked general 
standing to petition the court to remove the guardian.  The concurrence focused 
on R.C. Chapters 2109 and 2111 and determined that the board was not the real 
party in interest and thus lacked standing.  The dissent viewed the general duties 
of the board as sufficient to establish the board as an “interested party,” allowing 
the board to object to the guardian. 
{¶ 16} We accepted the board’s discretionary appeal to determine whether 
a board of mental retardation and developmental disabilities has the authority and 
standing to request that a probate court remove a guardian of an incompetent adult 
and whether the probate court has the authority to conduct proceedings to remove 
a guardian upon the board’s request. 
Legal Analysis 
Powers and Duties of County Boards of Developmental Disabilities 
{¶ 17} “Each county shall have its own county board of developmental 
disabilities.”  R.C. 5126.02(A).  County boards, being creatures of statute, have 
no more authority than that specifically conferred upon them or clearly implied 
from the statute.  See D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536; Burger Brewing Co. v. Thomas 
(1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 377, 379, 71 O.O.2d 366, 329 N.E.2d 693.  Implied powers 
are those that are incidental or ancillary to an expressly granted power; the 
express grant of power must be clear, and any doubt as to the extent of the grant 
must be resolved against it.  State ex rel. A. Bentley & Sons Co. v. Pierce (1917), 
96 Ohio St. 44, 47, 117 N.E. 6. 
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{¶ 18} The general powers and duties of county boards of developmental 
disabilities are set forth in R.C. 5126.05(A), which gives the boards authority to: 
{¶ 19} “(1) Administer and operate facilities, programs, and services as 
provided by this chapter and Chapter 3323. of the Revised Code and establish 
policies for their administration and operation; 
{¶ 20} “(2) Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate existing services and 
facilities available to individuals with mental retardation and developmental 
disabilities; 
{¶ 21} “(3) Provide early childhood services, supportive home services, 
and adult services, according to the plan and priorities developed under section 
5126.04 of the Revised Code; 
{¶ 22} “(4) Provide or contract for special education services pursuant to 
Chapters 3306., 3317., and 3323. of the Revised Code and ensure that related 
services, as defined in section 3323.01 of the Revised Code, are available 
according to the plan and priorities developed under section 5126.04 of the 
Revised Code; 
{¶ 23} “(5) Adopt a budget, authorize expenditures for the purposes 
specified in this chapter and do so in accordance with section 319.16 of the 
Revised Code, approve attendance of board members and employees at 
professional meetings and approve expenditures for attendance, and exercise such 
powers and duties as are prescribed by the director; 
{¶ 24} “(6) Submit annual reports of its work and expenditures, pursuant 
to sections 3323.09 and 5126.12 of the Revised Code, to the director, the 
superintendent of public instruction, and the board of county commissioners at the 
close of the fiscal year and at such other times as may reasonably be requested; 
{¶ 25} “(7) 
Authorize 
all 
positions 
of 
employment, 
establish 
compensation, including but not limited to salary schedules and fringe benefits for 
all board employees, approve contracts of employment for management 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
employees that are for a term of more than one year, employ legal counsel under 
section 309.10 of the Revised Code, and contract for employee benefits; 
{¶ 26} “(8) Provide service and support administration in accordance with 
section 5126.15 of the Revised Code; 
{¶ 27} “(9) Certify respite care homes pursuant to rules adopted under 
section 5123.171 of the Revised Code by the director of developmental 
disabilities.” 
{¶ 28} Nothing in R.C. 5126.05(A) grants the board either express or 
implied power to file a motion to remove a guardian.  The trial court, however, 
relied on another statute that it read as imposing fiduciary obligations on the 
board.  R.C. 5126.15(B) provides: 
{¶ 29} “The individuals employed by or under contract with a board to 
provide service and support administration shall do all of the following: 
{¶ 30} “(1) Establish an individual's eligibility for the services of the 
county board of developmental disabilities; 
{¶ 31} “(2) Assess individual needs for services; 
{¶ 32} “(3) Develop individual service plans with the active participation 
of the individual to be served, other persons selected by the individual, and, when 
applicable, the provider selected by the individual, and recommend the plans for 
approval by the department of developmental disabilities when services included 
in the plans are funded through medicaid; 
{¶ 33} “(4) Establish budgets for services based on the individual's 
assessed needs and preferred ways of meeting those needs; 
{¶ 34} “(5) Assist individuals in making selections from among the 
providers they have chosen; 
{¶ 35} “(6) Ensure that services are effectively coordinated and provided 
by appropriate providers; 
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{¶ 36} “(7) Establish and implement an ongoing system of monitoring the 
implementation of individual service plans to achieve consistent implementation 
and the desired outcomes for the individual; 
{¶ 37} “(8) Perform quality assurance reviews as a distinct function of 
service and support administration; 
{¶ 38} “(9) Incorporate the results of quality assurance reviews and 
identified trends and patterns of unusual incidents and major unusual incidents 
into amendments of an individual's service plan for the purpose of improving and 
enhancing the quality and appropriateness of services rendered to the individual; 
{¶ 39} “(10) Ensure that each individual receiving services has a 
designated person who is responsible on a continuing basis for providing the 
individual with representation, advocacy, advice, and assistance related to the 
day-to-day coordination of services in accordance with the individual's service 
plan. The service and support administrator shall give the individual receiving 
services an opportunity to designate the person to provide daily representation. If 
the individual declines to make a designation, the administrator shall make the 
designation. In either case, the individual receiving services may change at any 
time the person designated to provide daily representation.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 40} As noted above, both R.C. 5126.15(B)(6) and (10) would appear to 
require that county board of developmental disabilities employees work with 
appointed guardians to ensure that services are properly coordinated for 
individuals receiving their services.  In addition, employees are required to 
monitor the implementation of individual service plans.  R.C. 5126.15(B)(7).  
However, ensuring coordination of services and monitoring their implementation 
do not amount to an express or implied authority to initiate legal proceedings to 
seek the removal of an appointed guardian, even if that guardian interferes with 
service providers. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
{¶ 41} Furthermore, the General Assembly could have specifically 
included language granting a county board of developmental disabilities the 
authority to file a motion to remove an uncooperative guardian.  County boards of 
developmental disabilities have been granted authority to initiate legal 
proceedings for the protection of an adult with mental retardation or a 
developmental disability in other contexts.  For example, a county board of 
developmental disabilities may file a complaint with the probate court to provide 
protective services for an abused or neglected incompetent adult when the board 
cannot secure consent for such services from either the adult or the guardian and 
there is a substantial risk of immediate physical harm or death.  R.C. 5126.33(A) 
and (D).  A county board of developmental disabilities may also apply to the 
probate court for a temporary restraining order against anyone interfering with an 
investigation of reported abuse or neglect or with the provision of services 
designed to prevent or correct abuse or neglect of an adult with mental retardation 
or a developmental disability.  R.C. 5126.32.  But neither of these statutes applies 
because there has been no refusal of services and no allegation of abuse or 
neglect, or of substantial risk of immediate physical harm or death. 
{¶ 42} The board argues that no statute or rule limits a county board of 
developmental disabilities to the procedures in R.C. 5126.33 to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of individuals under its care and supervision.  Yet the absence 
of a limitation on the Board’s authority does not determine the question.  Because 
the board is governed by statute, there must be an express or implied grant of 
authority allowing county boards of developmental disabilities to file a motion to 
remove a guardian.  The general duty under R.C. 5126.055(A)(4) “to ensure the 
health, safety, and welfare of individuals receiving services from a county board 
of developmental disabilities” does not equate to or imply a grant of authority to 
interfere with the appointment of a guardian by the probate court. 
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{¶ 43} Similarly, the board’s reliance on R.C. 305.14(C) as authority to 
file such a motion is misplaced.  That statute allows the board to hire legal 
counsel without authorization from the common pleas court; it does not allow the 
board to initiate any legal action it so chooses. 
{¶ 44} We therefore hold that a county board of developmental 
disabilities does not have the statutory authority to file a motion in the probate 
court to remove a guardian. 
Probate Court is the Superior Guardian 
{¶ 45} Amicus curiae the state of Ohio and the board in its third 
proposition of law urge that, irrespective of the powers and duties of a county 
developmental disabilities board, the probate court has plenary authority to act 
upon the information brought before it and to remove the parents as guardians for 
their son.  We agree. 
{¶ 46} As we have previously stated, “It is a well-settled principle of law 
that probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are permitted to exercise 
only the authority granted to them by statute and by the Ohio Constitution. 
Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 531 N.E.2d 708.”  In re Hollins, 
114 Ohio St.3d 434, 2007-Ohio-4555, 872 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 11.  The general grant 
of jurisdiction to probate courts regarding guardians is comprehensive.  R.C. 
2101.24 states: 
{¶ 47} “(A)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the probate court has 
exclusive jurisdiction: 
{¶ 48} “* * * 
{¶ 49} “(e) To appoint and remove guardians, conservators, and 
testamentary trustees, direct and control their conduct, and settle their accounts. 
{¶ 50} “* * * 
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{¶ 51} “(C) The probate court has plenary power at law and in equity to 
dispose fully of any matter that is properly before the court, unless the power is 
expressly otherwise limited or denied by a section of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 52} In addition, the probate court is the “superior guardian,” and other 
guardians must obey all probate orders: “At all times, the probate court is the 
superior guardian of wards who are subject to its jurisdiction, and all guardians 
who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court shall obey all orders of the court 
that concern their wards or guardianships.”  R.C. 2111.50(A)(1). 
{¶ 53} Guardianship proceedings, including the removal of a guardian, are 
not adversarial but rather are in rem proceedings involving only the probate court 
and the ward.  In re Guardianship of Santrucek, 120 Ohio St.3d 67, 2008-Ohio-
4915, 896 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 5.  Because the probate court is the superior guardian, 
the appointed guardian is simply an officer of the court subject to the court’s 
control, direction, and supervision.  In re Guardianship of Daugherty (Mar. 9, 
1984), 7th Dist. Nos. 83-C-24 and 83-C-29, 1984 WL 7676.  The guardian, 
therefore, has no personal interest in his or her appointment or removal.  Id. 
{¶ 54} It is also clear that the probate court has the plenary authority to 
investigate guardians.  We agree with the analysis used in In re Guardianship of 
Herr (Sept. 2, 1998), 5th Dist. No. 98-CA-16-2, 1998 WL 666986.  In Herr, the 
attending physician and nursing staff at a nursing home contacted the probate 
court with concerns that a guardian was unreasonably denying treatment of 
emergency conditions to her ward due to the cost.  After the probate court 
summoned the guardian for a hearing and removed her, she appealed, arguing that 
the court did not have sua sponte authority to order her appearance in probate 
court.  The court of appeals held that the nursing home’s communication was 
sufficient cause to allow the probate court to conduct a hearing concerning the 
removal of the appellant as guardian.  The appellate court stated: “Without the 
inherent power to sua sponte consider removal, the court could find itself bound 
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to a guardian acting contrary to the interest of the ward, if no interested party is 
available to initiate the proceedings by motion or petition.”  Id. at *2. 
{¶ 55} The parents do not contest that had the board sent a letter to the 
probate court, the court could have sua sponte initiated a hearing on whether to 
remove them as guardians.  Instead, they seem to argue that because the 
information came in the form of a motion from the board, the probate court was 
barred from acting.  Form, however, should not be allowed to triumph over the 
substance of the issue involved. 
{¶ 56} We also do not agree that it is mere speculation that the probate 
court would have acted if the board had simply notified the court of what had 
occurred with John’s service providers.  The board had participated in the 
hearings on the parents’ request to be appointed guardians, and although the board 
ultimately supported the application, it expressed concern over several of the 
mother’s decisions regarding her son.  Information obtained from the board 
actually led the probate court to warn the mother that the court would not hesitate 
to appoint another guardian if she failed to make good decisions.  There was 
sufficient cause for the probate court to call the guardian in for a hearing after it 
heard allegations that, three months later, one of the guardians arrived 
unexpectedly late at night and intoxicated at the home of John’s service providers 
and threatening to remove him from a stable placement. 
{¶ 57} Because the court of appeals did not address the merits of the 
probate decision to remove the parents as guardians, this matter must be 
remanded to that court for resolution of the parents’ second through fourth 
assignments of error. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 58} We hold that the General Assembly has not granted a county board 
of developmental disabilities the express or implied power to file a motion to 
remove a guardian.  Nonetheless, the plenary power of the probate court as the 
January Term, 2010 
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superior guardian allows it to investigate whether a guardian should be removed 
upon receipt of sufficient information that the guardian is not acting in the ward’s 
best interest.  Thus, the court of appeals erred when, based on its holding that the 
board lacked standing, it summarily ruled that the trial court erred in removing the 
parents as guardians and when it mooted the assignment of error challenging the 
removal order as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.  We therefore 
affirm the judgment of the Eleventh District in part, vacate it in part, and remand 
the matter to the court of appeals for resolution of the parents’ second and third 
assignments of error. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and vacated in part, 
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 59} While I concur with the majority that a county board of 
developmental disabilities does not have the express or implied authority to file a 
motion to remove the guardian of an incompetent adult, I respectfully dissent 
from the majority’s holding that the probate court, with its plenary authority as the 
superior guardian, may, upon notice from a county board of developmental 
disabilities, conduct proceedings to remove a guardian. 
{¶ 60} The Geauga County Board of Developmental Disabilities filed a 
motion in the probate court to remove Joseph and Gabriele Spangler as guardians 
of their son, John.  The Spanglers moved to dismiss the motion, arguing that the 
board lacked statutory authority and standing to file such a motion.  The probate 
court joined the board as an interested party in the matter, denied the Spanglers’ 
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motion to dismiss, and then removed them as John’s guardians.  On appeal, the 
Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court, 
concluding that the board did not have the statutory authority to file a motion to 
remove a guardian and thus had no standing to seek removal of a guardian. 
{¶ 61} The board appealed that decision to this court, and we accepted for 
review three propositions of law: (1) a county board of developmental disabilities 
has the right and the ability to request the probate court to take action in the best 
interest of the ward, (2) the county board has standing to move the probate court 
to remove an unsuitable guardian, and (3) the county board has standing to 
participate in the probate court proceedings as an interested party. 
{¶ 62} In its merit brief, the board merged its third proposition of law into 
the second and added a third proposition of law focused on the authority of the 
probate court, not the standing of the county board: “A probate court has authority 
to initiate and conduct proceedings to remove a guardian based on a motion from 
a Board of Developmental Disabilities.”  As the board did not raise this issue in 
its memorandum in support of jurisdiction, it is not properly before us and we 
should decline to address it now.  See In re Timken Mercy Med. Ctr. (1991), 61 
Ohio St.3d 81, 87, 572 N.E.2d 673 (holding that an issue not raised or even 
alluded to in appellant’s memorandum in support of jurisdiction is not properly 
before the court); Estate of Ridley v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & 
Developmental Disabilities, 102 Ohio St.3d 230, 2004-Ohio-2629, 809 N.E.2d 2, 
¶ 18 (declining to address an argument not raised by appellant in its memorandum 
in support of jurisdiction). 
{¶ 63} Here, even if the issue were properly before us, I disagree with the 
majority’s conclusion that a probate court has plenary authority to act upon the 
information brought before it irrespective of the powers and duties of a county 
board.  As we stated in In re Guardianship of Hollins, 114 Ohio St.3d 434, 2007-
Ohio-4555, 872 N.E.2d 1214, “probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
and are permitted to exercise only the authority granted to them by statute and by 
the Ohio Constitution.”  Id. at ¶ 11, citing Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
75, 77, 531 N.E.2d 708.  R.C. 2101.24(C) grants the probate court “plenary power 
at law and in equity to dispose fully of any matter that is properly before [it].”  
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 64} The matter before the probate court in this case concerned a 
motion to remove John’s parents as his guardians filed by the Geauga County 
Board of Developmental Disabilities.  Thus, the question for this court’s 
determination would be whether the board’s motion was properly before the 
probate court.  Because a county board of developmental disabilities does not 
have the express or implied authority to file a motion to remove the guardian of 
an incompetent, its motion to remove the Spanglers as John’s guardians was never 
properly before the court.  Consequently, the court lacked the plenary power to 
remove John’s parents as his guardians, and in doing so, the court exceeded its 
limited statutory jurisdiction. 
{¶ 65} Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Eleventh District 
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
David P. Joyce, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, and J.A. Miedema, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; and Hickman & Lowder Co., L.P.A., Franklin J. 
Hickman, and Judith C. Saltzman, for appellant Geauga County Board of 
Developmental Disabilities. 
 
Ohio Legal Rights Service, Derek S. Hamalian, Jason C. Boylan, and 
Kerstin Sjoberg-Witt, for appellee John Spangler. 
 
Law Office of Pamela Walker Makowski and Pamela Walker Makowski, 
for appellees Joseph and Gabriele Spangler. 
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Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor General, and Elizabeth G. Hartnett, 
Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
 
Shane Egan, urging reversal for amicus curiae Advocacy and Protective 
Services, Inc. 
______________________