Title: In re J.M. Juvenile

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re J.M., Juvenile (99-368); 172 Vt. 61; 769 A.2d 656

[Filed 09-Feb-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-368

                                                 Supreme Court

In re. J.M., Juvenile 
                                                 On Appeal from
 	                                         Caledonia Family Court
    
                                                 May Term, 2000

Alan W. Cook,  J.

Kyle C. Sipples, Caledonia County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Johnsbury, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee

Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney, Montpelier, 
  for Defendant-Appellant

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   J.M., a fourteen-year-old mentally retarded juvenile,
  appeals from a  competency finding and conditional plea entered in the
  Caledonia Family Court.  J.M. raises two  issues on appeal.  First, he
  claims that the court erred, in violation of V.R.Cr.P. 11 and his 
  constitutional right to due process of law, in accepting a plea without
  determining whether he  understood the nature of the charge, the penalties,
  and the rights he was waiving; whether the  admission was knowing and
  voluntary; and whether there was an underlying factual basis for the  plea. 
  The State concedes that the court failed to comply with Rule 11.  Second,
  he contends that the 

 

  court erred in finding him competent to stand trial, and that its findings
  do not support the  competency decision.  We agree that the family court
  did not satisfy its obligations under Rule 11,  and we reverse the judgment
  of guilt.  We also agree with J.M. that the family court's findings on the 
  issue of competency were inadequate.  We remand for a new competency
  determination, and if J.M.  is found competent, for a new plea and further
  proceedings consistent with that plea.  

       The Caledonia County State's Attorney filed four petitions against
  J.M. accusing him of  simple assault in violation of 13 V.S.A. §
  1023(a)(1), unlawful mischief in violation of 13 V.S.A. §  3701(c),
  disorderly conduct in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1026, and lewd and
  lascivious conduct with a  child in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2602.  The
  family court held a competency hearing over three days  and found J.M.
  competent to face a delinquency proceeding.  J.M. then entered into a
  conditional  plea agreement, pursuant to which he admitted the allegations
  of simple assault, and the State  dismissed the other charges.  J.M. was
  placed on juvenile probation.  This appeal followed. 

       We start with the issue of Rule 11 compliance.  Following the court's
  determination that J.M.  was competent to face a delinquency charge, the
  parties submitted an agreement to the court whereby  J.M. would enter a
  conditional plea to the charge of simple assault and be placed on
  probation, and  the State would dismiss the other charges against him.  The
  agreement also reserved to J.M. the right  to appeal the competency ruling. 
  The court approved this agreement.  It failed, however, to engage  in any
  Rule 11 colloquy, and J.M. made no admission on the record.  

       The Family Court Rules provide that V.R.Cr.P. 11 applies in juvenile
  delinquency  proceedings.  V.R.F.P. 1(a)(1) (Rules of Criminal Procedure
  apply to all delinquency proceedings  except as provided by this rule.);
  V.R.F.P. 1(a)(3) (Rule 11 applies, but is modified so that  admissions and
  denials replace pleas of guilty and not guilty).  Indeed, V.R.F.P. 6(d)(3)
  provides 

 

  specifically that the court may not accept a juvenile's waiver of
  constitutional rights or admission  unless it determines, among other
  things, that there is a factual and legal basis for the waiver or 
  admission, that the attorney has investigated the relevant facts and law
  and consulted with the  juvenile, and that the juvenile has entered into
  the waiver or admission knowingly and voluntarily.   While V.R.F.P. 6(d)(4)
  sets forth circumstances in which a waiver or admission may be approved if 
  the juvenile is unable, because of mental or emotional disability, to
  understand the nature and  consequences of the waiver or admission, or is
  unable to communicate with respect thereto, the Rule  expressly exempts
  cases in which it is alleged that a person has committed a crime or
  juvenile act.  In  such cases, regardless of disability, "that person's
  knowing and voluntary consent shall be required  with respect to the waiver
  or admission."  Id.

       In this case, the record reveals that the court failed to conduct any
  V.R.Cr.P. 11 colloquy  whatsoever.  The court failed to address J.M. and
  determine whether J.M.  understood the charges for  which the plea was
  offered, the penalties provided by law, the fact that he was waiving
  important  constitutional rights, and whether the admission was knowing and
  voluntary.  The brief exchange  that took place was between the court and
  the attorneys, and this exchange was more to ensure that  the paperwork was
  filled out properly than to fulfill the requirements of Rule 11.  It is not
  even clear  from the record whether J.M. was present in the courtroom for
  this exchange.  

       Thus, as the State conceded on appeal, the court committed plain error
  in failing to conduct a  Rule 11 colloquy with the minor.  See State v.
  Thompson, 167 Vt. 383, 387,