Title: Brown v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

534 S.W.2d 207 (1976) Calvin BROWN and Cecil Bettis, Jr., Appellants, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 75-52. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 8, 1976. Rehearing Denied April 12, 1976. *208 Pickens, Boyce, McLarty & Watson by James A. McLarty, Newport, McArthur, Lofton & Wilson, Little Rock, for appellants. Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen. by Gary Isbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leroy Blankenship, Pros. Atty., Walnut Ridge, for appellee. JONES, Justice. Calvin Brown and Cecil Bettis, Jr. were jointly tried and convicted of robbery at a jury trial in the Jackson County Circuit Court and they were each sentenced to the Department of Correction for a period of 21 years. Both Brown and Bettis were convicted of burglary in connection with the same incident. Appellant Brown's burglary conviction was reversed and appellant Bettis's conviction was affirmed by separate opinion being handed down today in case No. CR75-27, 259 Ark. ___, 534 S.W.2d 213. The pertinent background facts are set out in our opinion on the burglary convictions and will not be reiterated in this opinion. *209 As in the burglary cases, Brown and Bettis were represented by separate counsel and have filed separate briefs in this appeal from their convictions of robbery; and, as in their appeal from the burglary convictions, they have designated separate points on which they rely for reversal, some of which were designated in the burglary appeal and disposed of in our opinion in that case. On his appeal in the case at bar Bettis has designated the point he relies on as follows: We have thoroughly examined and treated this point in our opinion in the burglary case and found no merit in this contention. Brown has designated the following points on which he relies for reversal in the case at bar as follows: Appellant Brown's first two points relied on in the case at bar were also relied on by him in the appeal from the burglary conviction, and we deem it unnecessary to reiterate what we said in our opinion in that case. Appellant's third point that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance or continuance is without merit. He argues that in the burglary trial, some 40 days prior to his trial in the present case, antagonism between him and Bettis was apparent; that considerable publicity had been given to the previous trial and that he was prejudiced by being jointly tried in the case at bar with Bettis. He argues that his co-defendant used prejudicial tactics which prejudiced his case. We find no merit to this contention. In Finely v. State, 233 Ark. 232, 343 S.W.2d 787 (1961), this court said: We come to the same conclusion in the case at bar. The appellant argues that his motion for continuance should have been granted because the jury had been prejudiced by extensive media coverage of the burglary trial involving the same parties and circumstances, which trial had occurred only 40 days before his trial in the case at bar. The record before us does not contain *210 the voir dire of the jury and if any members of the jury had been prejudiced by the prior trial, such prejudice should have been revealed on voir dire. In Keith v. State, 218 Ark. 174, 235 S.W.2d 539 (1951), this court said: We find nothing in the record that would indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the appellant Brown's motion for severance or continuance. Under his fourth point Brown contends that the trial court erred in quashing a subpoena duces tecum for the tax records of the prosecuting witness Mr. Harper. The tax records were sought for the purpose of questioning the credibility of the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Harper, and the situation arose in the following manner: The appellant Bettis testified as to his long acquaintance and friendship with Mr. and Mrs. Harper, the prosecuting witnesses and victims of the robbery. His testimony indicated that he and Harper had engaged, or been associated together, in prior illegal activities. On direct examination Mr. and Mrs. Harper testified as to the treatment they received and the property taken in the course of the robbery and in answers to questions on cross-examination, they denied participating in any illegal activities with appellant Bettis. Subpoena duces tecum for Harper's tax records was issued on the appellant's motion but was then quashed on Harper's motion. The appellant Brown argues that Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-803 (Repl. 1962) provides the method for vacating an order requiring production of records, and that Harper did not state in his motion or prove either of the two grounds stated therein. The appellant then argues that from testimony brought out during the trial, there was indication that Mr. Harper had misappropriated funds from the county; that he had engaged in fraudulent insurance schemes and in activity of "fixing horse races." The appellant then argues that the tax records would have been relevant in going to the credibility of the prosecuting witness's testimony, and that the quashing of the subpoena deprived the appellant of evidence that could have been used at his trial. This same argument was advanced by Brown and rejected in our opinion on appeal from the burglary convictions. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-803 (Repl. 1962) was expressly repealed by Act 17 of the 1973 General Assembly which became effective on July 1, 1973. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-537 et seq. (Supp.1975). Be that as it may, the evidence sought through the subpoena duces tecum was for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of Mr. and Mrs. Harper's testimony brought out on cross-examination and the trial court was correct in holding that the evidence thus sought was collateral to the issues before the court and would be inadmissible for the purpose for which it was sought and intended. In addition to Fulwider v. Woods, 249 Ark. 776, 461 S.W.2d 581, and Spence v. State, 184 Ark. 139, 40 S.W.2d 986, cited in our opinion in the burglary case, see also McArthur v. State, 59 Ark. 431, 27 S.W. 628, and McAlister v. State, 99 Ark. 604, 139 S.W. 684. In McAlister we quoted with approval as follows: Under his fifth assignment appellant Brown contends that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing witness Tidwell to testify concerning a conversation between Tidwell and Brown which occurred approximately two weeks before the robbery. Tidwell's testimony appears as follows: The appellant made timely objection to this testimony as irrelevant, this testimony of Tidwell did not contain a fact that could have possibly aided in the conviction of the appellant. Under such circumstances the testimony was not prejudicial. Weber v. State, 250 Ark. 566, 466 S.W.2d 257 (1971). In Weber this court said: Under his sixth and seventh points appellant Brown assigns as error the trial court's refusal to allow him to question co-defendant Bettis and call two other witnesses concerning alleged horse race fixing done by Bettis and Harper, the prosecuting witness. Appellant's purpose in asking these questions and attempting to call these witnesses was to impeach the credibility of the prosecuting witnesses Mr. and Mrs. Harper. This effort to impeach the Harpers' testimony was in violation of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-707 (Repl. 1962), and is also covered in what we have said in relation to the appellant's fourth assignment, supra. The appellant Brown contends under his eighth assignment that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. This contention is without merit. In Perez v. State, 249 Ark. 1111, 463 S.W.2d 394 (1971), this court set out the rule for overturning a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial as follows: The allegedly prejudicial testimony occurred upon cross-examination of appellant Bettis and appears in the record as follows: The trial judge admonished the jury to disregard the questions which accused the appellant Brown of earlier wrongful acts, and the answers to these questions were actually favorable to the appellant. We find no abuse of discretion justifying a reversal in the case at bar. The appellant Brown's final contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is without merit. A directed verdict should be granted only when there is no factual issue to go to the jury. Parker v. State, 252 Ark. 1242, 482 S.W.2d 822 (1972); Fortner v. State, 258 Ark. ___, 528 S.W.2d 378 (1975). Certainly there were factual issues for jury determination in this case. The judgments as to both Bettis and Brown are affirmed. FOGLEMAN, J., concurs. FOGLEMAN, Justice (concurring). I concur in the majority holding relating to the suppression of evidence obtained by search for the same reasons given in my concurring opinion in Brown v. State, No. CR75-27, 259 Ark. ___, 534 S.W.2d 213 (8 Mar. 1976). I concur in the court's action on Brown's motion for severance only because the ground argued here, i. e., the antagonism of the co-defendant Bettis, was not asserted in the trial court. Since this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, we could not well say that the circuit judge abused his discretion in that respect.