Title: PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN JAMES STONE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 30, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 114227  
BRIAN JAMES STONE,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CAVANAGH, J.  
This 
criminal 
prosecution 
under 
the 
Michigan  
eavesdropping statutes requires us to decide whether a  
conversation held on a cordless telephone is a “private  
conversation” as that term is used in the statutes.  We  
conclude that, although current technology may allow cordless  
telephone conversations to be intercepted, such conversations  
nonetheless 
can 
be 
private 
conversations 
under 
the  
eavesdropping statutes. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals.  
I  
The 
facts 
underlying this case occurred while the divorce  
of defendant Brian Stone from Joanne Stone was pending.  
During their marriage, the Stones lived next door to Ronald  
Pavlik.  In 1995, defendant became estranged from his wife and  
moved out of the couple’s home, though Joanne continued to  
live there.  After defendant moved from the couple’s home,  
Pavlik told defendant that he owned a police scanner, and that  
he could listen to, and had been recording, calls Joanne made  
on her cordless telephone.  Defendant asked for the tapes, and  
told Pavlik to “keep on top of things, tape and find out what  
was going on.”  
Joanne suspected that her calls were being monitored  
because certain people had information about her that they  
should not have had. In one instance, a friend of the court  
investigator told Joanne that defendant had told the  
investigator that he had a tape recording proving that Joanne  
was pregnant and planning to leave the state.  According to  
Joanne, she had only mentioned these matters in a telephone  
conversation with a friend.  Because of her suspicions, in  
1996, Joanne contacted the State Police.  
After interviewing several people, the police obtained  
search warrants for both defendant’s and Pavlik’s residences.  
2  
Between the two homes, they found approximately fifteen tapes  
containing 
recordings 
of 
Joanne’s 
telephone 
conversations 
with  
her family, her friends, and her attorney.  
Defendant was charged under the eavesdropping statutes  
and was bound over for trial.  He brought a motion to quash  
the information, which the circuit court granted because it  
believed that a person conversing on a cordless telephone  
could not reasonably expect her conversation to be a “private  
conversation.”  The people appealed, and the Court of Appeals  
reversed, reasoning that the circuit court erred by relying on  
the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  234 Mich  
App 117; 593 NW2d 680 (1999).  Initially, this Court held this  
case in abeyance, pending our resolution of Dickerson v  
Raphael, 461 Mich 851 (1999). Thereafter, we granted leave to  
appeal. 461 Mich 996 (2000).  
II  
Because this case arrives here on defendant’s motion to  
quash the information, we must review the magistrate’s  
decision to bind defendant over for trial. A magistrate has  
a duty to bind over a defendant for trial if it appears that  
a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to  
believe that the defendant committed that felony. MCL 766.13;  
MSA 28.931. Absent an abuse of discretion, reviewing courts  
should not disturb a magistrate’s determination.  People v  
3  
 
  
Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101; 276 NW2d 9 (1979). 
In the instant  
case, defendant argues that the magistrate’s decision to bind  
him over was an abuse of discretion because his alleged  
conduct does not fit within the scope of the eavesdropping  
statutes. Determining the scope of a criminal statute is a  
matter 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, subject to de novo review.  
People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).  
A. THE EAVESDROPPING STATUTES  
Defendant was charged under MCL 750.539c; MSA 28.807(3),  
which provides:  
Any person who is present or who is not 
present during a private conversation and who 
wilfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the 
conversation without the consent of all parties 
thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs, or  
procures another person to do the same in violation 
of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable 
by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than 
2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or 
both.  
The statutes define “eavesdrop” as “to overhear, record,  
amplify or transmit any part of the private discourse of  
others without the permission of all persons engaged in the  
discourse.”  MCL 750.539a(2); MSA 28.807(1)(2).  In the  
present case, the facts as alleged indicate that Joanne  
Stone’s cordless telephone conversations were wilfully  
recorded 
by 
Ronald 
Pavlik, without her consent, at defendant’s  
prompting.  Because this case involves such alleged wilful  
“record[ing],” the statutory prohibition against wilful  
4  
 
  
“overhear[ing]” is not before us.  Instead, the question  
before us is whether defendant is correct that the  
conversations 
eavesdropped 
on 
could 
not 
be 
“private  
conversations” 
because they were held on a cordless telephone.  
B. THE MEANING OF “PRIVATE CONVERSATION”  
To answer this question, we must first define “private  
conversation.”  Determining this phrase’s meaning requires us  
to construe the eavesdropping statutes, and the primary goal  
of statutory construction is to give effect to the  
Legislature’s intent.  People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603  
NW2d 250 (1999).  To ascertain that intent, this Court begins  
with the statute’s language. 
When that language is  
unambiguous, no further judicial construction is required or  
permitted, because the Legislature is presumed to have  
intended the meaning it plainly expressed. Id.  
Here, the plain language of the eavesdropping statutes  
does not define “private conversation.”  This Court may  
consult dictionaries to discern the meaning of statutorily  
undefined terms. 
Id.
 However, recourse to dictionary  
definitions is unnecessary when the Legislature’s intent can  
be determined from reading the statute itself. Renown Stove  
Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 328 Mich 436, 440; 44  
NW2d 1 (1950).  
5  
 
Despite the Legislature failing to define “private  
conversation” 
in 
the 
eavesdropping statutes, its intent can be  
determined from the eavesdropping statutes themselves. This  
is because the Legislature did define the term “private  
place.”
 A “private place” is “a place where one may  
reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion  
or surveillance.”  MCL 750.539a(1); MSA 28.807(1)(1).  By  
reading the statutes, the Legislature’s intent that private  
places are places where a person can reasonably expect privacy  
becomes clear.  Applying the same concepts the Legislature  
used to define those places that are private, we can define  
those conversations that are private. 
Thus, “private  
conversation” means a conversation that a person reasonably  
expects to be free from casual or hostile intrusion or  
surveillance. Additionally, this conclusion is supported by  
this Court’s decision in Dickerson v Raphael, in which we  
stated that whether a conversation is private depends on  
whether the person conversing “intended and reasonably  
expected 
that 
the 
conversation was private.”  Dickerson, supra  
at 851.  
Although this definition of “private conversation”  
facially resembles standards that the United States Supreme  
Court has used in Fourth Amendment cases, those standards  
developed in the context of law enforcement activity seeking  
6  
  
to detect criminal behavior. See Katz v United States, 389  
US 347, 360; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J.).  
However, our definition of “private conversation” emanates  
from our eavesdropping statutes, which, by their own terms, do  
not apply to law enforcement personnel acting within their  
lawful 
authority. 
 
MCL 750.539g(a); MSA 28.807(7)(a). Because  
of these differences, we do not rely on the Fourth Amendment  
jurisprudence, and do not incorporate it into our statute.  
Rather, we rely only on the eavesdropping statutes’ language  
to define the term “private conversation.”  
C. PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS ON CORDLESS TELEPHONES  
Defendant invites this Court to hold that, as a matter of  
law, a conversation held on a cordless telephone cannot be a  
private conversation. He relies on language in the Court of  
Appeals decision in Dickerson v Raphael, 222 Mich App 185,  
194; 564 NW2d 85 (1997), rev’d 461 Mich 851 (1999), to argue  
that a cordless telephone works by sending a radio-like signal  
from the telephone’s handset to its base, and that users of  
cordless 
telephones 
know that these signals can be intercepted  
by devices including other cordless telephones and police  
scanners. 
 
This 
knowledge, 
he 
concludes, 
“renders 
unreasonable  
an 
expectation 
of 
privacy” 
in 
a 
cordless 
telephone  
conversation. Id.  
7  
We decline defendant’s invitation because such an  
interpretation would negate an express protection in the  
eavesdropping statutes. 
Specifically, MCL 750.539c; MSA  
28.807(3) 
protects 
private 
conversations 
against 
eavesdropping  
accomplished through the wilful use of “any device.”  This  
protection indicates that the Legislature considered that a  
conversation can be private, yet can also be susceptible to  
eavesdropping through any device.  Otherwise, it would have  
had no need to protect private conversations against such an  
intrusion.  
Indeed, 
were defendant correct that a conversation  
that a person knows is susceptible to eavesdropping through  
any device is not private, then the statutory protection  
against 
eavesdropping 
accomplished 
through 
any 
device 
would 
be  
null.
 This is because a conversation susceptible to  
eavesdropping with any device would, because of that  
characteristic, fall outside the protected class of private  
conversations, leaving no “private conversation” to be  
protected from eavesdropping with any device.  Whenever  
possible, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and  
clause in a statute.  Morey, supra at 330. Therefore, to give  
effect to the statutory protection against eavesdropping  
accomplished through “any device,” we must reject defendant’s  
position.  
8  
 
 
 
 
Further, although a person who talks on a cordless  
telephone may know that technology makes it possible for  
others to overhear the conversation, that person also can  
presume that others will obey the criminal law.  See Papadimas  
v Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich App 40, 47; 439 NW2d 280 (1989);  
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed) § 33, p 201. Thus, although  
the victim may have known that her cordless telephone  
conversations 
could 
be wilfully intercepted with a device, she  
also could presume that others would not eavesdrop on her  
cordless telephone conversations using any device because  
doing so is a felony under the eavesdropping statutes, and is  
additionally prohibited by federal law.  See 47 USC 1001 et  
seq. As a matter of law, it was not unreasonable for her to  
expect 
that 
her 
cordless 
telephone 
conversations 
were 
private.  
We 
recognize 
that our holding differs with many decisions  
concluding 
that 
cordless 
telephone 
users 
cannot 
expect 
privacy  
in their telephone conversations.  See, e.g., People v Wilson,  
196 Ill App 3d 997, 1009-1010; 554 NE2d 545 (1990); Salmon v  
State, 206 Ga App 469, 470; 426 SE2d 160 (1993), superseded by  
statute, Ga Code Ann § 16-11-66.1; McKamey v Roach, 55 F3d  
1236, 1239-1241 (CA 6, 1995).  However, these cases were  
decided under statutes with language different from that of  
the Michigan eavesdropping statutes governing our decision in  
this case. 
Notably, other state courts have held that  
9  
cordless 
telephone 
users can expect privacy in their telephone  
conversations when those states’ governing statutes have so  
provided.  See, e.g., State v Faford, 128 Wash 2d 476, 486;  
910 P2d 447 (1996); State v Bidinost, 71 Ohio St 3d 449, 460;  
644 NE2d 318 (1994).  In addition, although certain federal  
decisions, 
including 
McKamey, supra, held that there cannot be  
an 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
cordless 
telephone 
conversations,  
federal law was subsequently amended to grant strict privacy  
protections to cordless telephone conversations. See 47 USC  
1001.  Thus, although our decision differs with several  
foreign authorities, it accords with current federal law, and  
accords full meaning to the Michigan eavesdropping statutes.  
Under those statutes, whether a person can reasonably  
expect privacy in a conversation generally will present a  
question of fact. See Dickerson, supra at 851. For example,  
although a person is not precluded from having a reasonable  
expectation of privacy in a conversation held on a cordless  
telephone, a person who converses on a party line may not  
reasonably expect the conversation to be private because  
perhaps that person should know that others will be able to  
listen to the conversation.  Many such conversations may be  
subject to “casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance,” MCL  
750.539a(1); MSA 28.807(1)(1), but the final determination  
will generally be for the factfinder.  
10  
  
 
D. THE INSTANT CASE  
In the instant case, we conclude that defendant was  
properly bound over for trial. Defendant argues that Joanne  
Stone could not have expected privacy in her cordless  
telephone 
conversations 
because 
of 
her 
particularized  
knowledge that Pavlik could intercept them.  He bases his  
argument on an averment in the warrant affidavit, which stated  
that Pavlik had told Joanne that his scanner could intercept  
cordless 
telephone 
conversations. 
 
However, 
Joanne’s 
testimony  
at the preliminary examination was that Pavlik had told her  
that he could listen to police signals, not cordless telephone  
conversations.
 Although this evidence is conflicting,  
Joanne’s testimony provided a sufficient basis for the  
magistrate 
to 
find 
probable cause that defendant committed the  
charged felony.  The conflicts in the evidence must be  
resolved by the trier of fact, not the magistrate.  See People  
v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). Because the  
eavesdropping statutes do not preclude cordless telephone  
conversations from being “private,” and because the evidence  
at the preliminary examination was sufficient for the  
magistrate to find probable cause of defendant’s guilt, the  
magistrate did not abuse his discretion by binding defendant  
over for trial.  
11  
 
III  
In conclusion, although technology provides a means for  
eavesdropping, 
the 
Michigan 
eavesdropping 
statutes  
specifically protect citizens against such intrusions.  
Therefore, a person is not unreasonable to expect privacy in  
a conversation although he knows that technology makes it  
possible for others to eavesdrop on such conversations. The  
judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN,  
JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
12