Title: White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

White, Appellant, v. Clinton County Board of Commissioners et al., 
Appellees.[Cite as White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1996), __ Ohio St.3d 
___.]  
Public records -- R.C. 121.22, 149.43 and 305.10 impose a duty on all 
boards of county commissioners to maintain full and accurate 
records of their proceedings -- Required contents for minutes to 
be “full and accurate.” 
1. R.C. 121.22, 149.43 and 305.10, when read together, impose a duty on all 
 
boards of county commissioners to maintain a full and accurate record 
 
of their proceedings. 
2.  For public records maintained under R.C. 121.22 and 305.10, full and 
 
accurate minutes must contain sufficient facts and information to permit 
 
the public to understand and appreciate the rationale  behind the relevant 
 
public body’s decision.        
 
(No. 95-953 -- Submitted April 30, 1996 -- Decided August 21, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clinton County, No. CA94-08-20. 
 
On March 31, 1993, the Clinton County Board of Commissioners (“the 
Board”) informed the county building and electrical inspector, Michael 
 
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Richardson, that he could no longer perform joint inspections with agencies 
outside his department without the Board’s prior written approval, and that he 
would be fired if he violated this directive.  The Board also decided to bar 
building and electrical inspections unless a fire inspector and two township 
trustees requested the inspection. 
 
Concerned that these new policies would impact health department 
procedures and standards, Lizbeth White, the Director of the Clinton County 
Health Department’s Environmental Division, tried to obtain the specifics of the 
new policies.  White asked the Board to provide her with minutes of the Board’s 
discussions and adoption of the new policies.  White also requested copies of 
Richardson‘s personnel files.  The Board provided White with the minutes of the 
meeting at which the new policies were adopted, but the minutes did not 
mention the new policies and were missing a page.  In addition, the Board did 
not give Richardson’s personnel records to White.  The Board sought the county 
prosecutor’s opinion of the legality of the release of those records. 
 
3
 
In a letter dated April 25, 1993, White informed the clerk of the Board 
that a page was missing from the minutes, and that the minutes she had received 
did not mention the new policies.  On that date, White also asked the Board to 
provide her with advance notice of future Board meetings.  The Board did not 
respond to these letters.  On April 29, White repeated her request.  On May 5, 
the county prosecutor advised the Board that it had to provide White with 
Richardson’s personnel records, and issued a written opinion to the same effect 
on May 10.  Also on May 5, the Board asked each member of the Clinton 
County Board of Health for any personnel records on White and her supervisor, 
Health Commissioner Bob Derge.  In addition, the commissioners raised the 
price of photocopied public records from $.25 to $1 per page.  White withdrew 
her requests for the Board’s minutes on May 19. 
 
White revived her request for records on June 17, 1993, and the Board 
agreed to provide her with access to its records that same day.  In reviewing the 
Board’s journal, White found no mention of the policies which precipitated her 
records requests. 
 
4
 
On June 29, 1993, White filed a four-count complaint against the Board 
and its clerk, Brenda K. Woods, in the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas.1  
On the day of trial, White withdrew all counts but Count II from the complaint.  
Count II alleged that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to promptly and accurately record its 
policies, decisions, procedures and essential transactions [in violation of] R.C.. 
Sections 121.22 and 149.43.”  The complaint sought a writ of mandamus 
compelling the Board “to prepare complete and accurate minutes of all Board 
policies, decisions, procedures and essential transactions.” 
 
At the outset of trial, White conceded that the true question before the 
court was the interpretation of R.C. 305.10.  Both County Commissioner David 
Stewart and Brenda Woods testified at trial, and their testimony confirmed that, 
although the Board has a tape-recording system and Woods took notes at the 
Board’s meetings, the minutes did not memorialize any discussions that took 
place.  Rather, the minutes simply reflected the Board’s final roll call votes.  The 
trial court entered judgment for White on August 2, 1994, stating that “Section 
305.10 O.R.C., if read in conjunction with Section 121.22 O.R.C. (The Sunshine 
 
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Statute) and Section 149.43 O.R.C. (Ohio Public Records Act), clearly indicates 
that the intention of the legislature is to require the Board of County 
Commissioners to maintain a full record of its public meetings * * *.”  
Consequently, the court ruled that “[t]he record must reflect the decision making 
process leading up to the vote including debate and/or discussion of the subject 
matter,” and ordered the Board and Woods to “fully comply” with R.C. 305.10.  
The court also ordered the Board to reimburse White for her legal expenses. 
 
On appeal, the Board argued that R.C. 121.22, 149.43 and 305.10 did not 
adequately state a clear legal right entitling White to mandamus relief.  The 
court of appeals determined that, in its opinion, neither R.C. 121.22 nor 149.43 
was implicated in White’s action because the Board had complied with those 
statutes.  Turning to R.C. 305.10, the court of appeals concluded that the statute 
did not create a clear legal duty on the part of county boards to maintain detailed 
minutes of their proceedings.  Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the 
trial court’s grant of a writ of mandamus.  The court also ruled that the trial 
court’s grant of attorney fees was erroneous. 
 
6
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
 
Baker & Hostetler, David L. Marburger, Hilary W. Rule and Elizabeth 
McNellie, for appellant. 
 
Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Mark Landes and Terri B. Gregori; and 
William E. Peele, Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
 
Paul Moke, urging reversal for amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties 
Union of Ohio. 
 
Stephen W. Gard, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Investigative 
Reporters and Editors. 
 
Susan M. Giles, urging reversal for amicus curiae, League of Women 
Voters of Ohio. 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
 
STRATTON, J.  This case involves the interpretation of R.C. 305.10, and its 
interplay with R.C. 121.22 (the Sunshine Law) and 149.43 (Ohio Public Records 
 
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Act).  White argues that these statutes impose a duty on boards of county 
commissioners to prepare minutes which reflect the substance of their meetings 
and provide some indication of the nature and direction of their discussions.  A 
different reading, the appellant contends, would render R.C. 121.22 and 305.10 
meaningless.  The appellees, on the other hand, claim R.C. 305.10 does not 
require that minutes contain the type of specific information that White seeks, 
and that R.C. 121.22 is satisfied when any record is kept, regardless of how 
sparse the information is.  We agree with the appellant and conclude that these 
statutes, when read together, impose a duty on boards of county commissioners 
to maintain a full and accurate record of their proceedings.  Because we find that 
R.C. 121.22, 149.43, and 305.10 require the minutes of boards of county 
commissioners meetings to include more than a record of mere roll call votes, 
we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s grant of mandamus 
relief. 
 
One of the strengths of American government is the right of the public to 
know and understand the actions of their elected representatives.  This includes 
 
8
not merely the right to know a government body’s final decision on a matter, but 
the ways and means by which those decisions were reached.  There is great 
historical significance to this basic foundation of popular government, and our 
founding fathers keenly understood this principle.   
 
James Madison clearly laid out this strength of our government when he 
said that: 
 
“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps, both.  
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;  And a people who mean to be their 
own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”  
The Complete Madison, His Basic Writings (1988) 337 (Letter to W.T. Barry, 
August 4, 1822). 
 
Thomas Jefferson further expounded on this principle: 
 
“The way to prevent [errors of] the people, is to go give them full 
information of their affairs throu’ the channel of the public papers, and to 
contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The 
 
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basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object 
should be to keep that right * * *.”  11 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (1955) 
49 (Letter to Col. Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787).  
 
Ohio’s own history is replete with rich examples of detailed records 
dating back to the 1800s.  Amicus League of Women Voters of Ohio cites many 
rich examples of the long and illustrious record-keeping of our forebears.  In 
fact, when the Ohio legislature created the first boards of county commissioners, 
it included in that creation a requirement that accurate records be kept by the 
county commissioners.  See 2 Ohio Laws 150.  In 1804, in “An act establishing 
boards of commissioners,” the Ohio legislature required:  
 
“Sec. 9. * * * That the commissioners shall have a just and accurate record 
kept of all their corporate proceedings, and for that purpose they are hereby 
empowered to appoint a clerk * * * .” Id. at 153.  That mandate continues 
through today in R.C. 305.10, requiring that the clerk “keep a full record of the 
proceedings of the board.” 
 
10
 
The question arises as to what is meant by a “full record.”  To understand 
what is meant by “full record,” one must look at the purpose and meaning 
behind keeping records.  As several of the amici briefs point out, keeping an 
accurate record serves many useful functions.  First of all, such records provide 
rich detail as to the history and culture of our country, as our government 
officials embody the wishes and desires of the people in making their decisions.  
Sometimes, difficult decisions are reached which go against popular opinion, but 
which may be necessary for the common good as determined by the governing 
bodies.  Accurate minutes can reflect the difficult decision-making process 
involved, and hopefully bring the public to a better understanding of why 
unpopular decisions are sometimes necessary.  As the court stated in Dayton 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Dayton (1976), 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 109, 74 O.O.2d 209, 
211, 341 N.E. 2d 576, 577: 
 
“‘The rule in Ohio is that public records are the people’s records, and that 
the officials in whose custody they happen to be are merely trustees for the 
 
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people.’”  (Citing State ex rel. Patterson v. Ayers [1960], 171 Ohio St. 369, 371, 
14 O.O.2d 116, 117, 171 N.E.2d 508, 509.) 
 
Second, public scrutiny is necessary to enable the ordinary citizen to 
evaluate the workings of his or her government and to hold government 
accountable.  If the public can understand the rationale behind its government’s 
decisions, it can challenge or criticize those decisions as it finds necessary; the 
entire process thus allows for greater integrity and prevents important decisions 
from being made behind closed doors. 
 
Third, keeping full minutes allows members of the public who are unable 
to attend the meetings in person to obtain complete and accurate information 
about the decision-making process of their government.  In Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn (1975), 420 U.S. 469, 491, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1044, 43 L.Ed.2d 328, 
347, the United States Supreme Court noted that: 
 
“[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources 
with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies 
necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those 
 
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operations.”  Accord State ex rel. Dayton v. Phillips (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 
467, 75 O.O.2d 511, 516, 351 N.E.2d 127, 134. 
 
In addition to the media’s coverage, the interested citizen should also be 
able to examine personally those decisions and the decision-making process 
involved.  Most people’s day-to-day schedule leaves them with far too little time 
to attend government meetings.  Therefore, the opportunity to examine a full and 
complete copy of the minutes enables the citizens of Ohio to stay informed about 
the actions and thoughts of their elected officials. 
 
The ready availability of tape recorders, video cameras, and computers 
provides government bodies with simple means of recording their deliberations. 
Indeed, we note that detailed handwritten minutes were kept of early county 
commissioner meetings, and provided rich historical detail without the benefit of 
current technology.  However, the Clinton County Commissioners did not need 
to handwrite transcripts--they had purchased a recording system and simply 
neglected to use it. 
 
13
 
Having examined the principles embodied in these three statutes, we now 
direct ourselves to their application in the instant case.  The version of R.C. 
121.22 in effect at the time that White brought her mandamus action states that: 
 
“(C)  All meetings of any public body are declared to be public meetings 
open to the public at all times. *  *  *  
 
 
“The minutes of a regular or special meeting of any such public body shall 
be promptly recorded and open to public inspection.  The minutes need only 
reflect the general subject matter of discussions in executive sessions authorized 
under division (G) of this section.”  (144 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1855-1856.) 
 
Boards of county commissioners are “public bodies” within the meaning of R.C. 
121.22.2  Accordingly, such boards must prepare, file and maintain the minutes 
of their regular and special meetings in accordance with that statute.3   
 
This court analyzed the language of R.C. 121.22 in some depth in State ex 
rel. Fairfield Leader v. Ricketts (1990), 56 Ohio St. 3d 97, 564 N.E. 2d 486.  In 
that case, we held that a board of county commissioners has a clear legal duty to 
record descriptions of pre-arranged discussions in its minutes.  Majorities of the 
Fairfield County Board of Commissioners, the Board of Trustees of Violet 
 
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Township, and the Council of the village of Pickerington had met for a 
workshop to discuss traffic, sewer and water matters, but denied casting any 
votes or making any final decisions.  The court ruled that because the members 
of a public body had met as a majority group, i.e., the Fairfield County and 
Violet Township respondents, R.C. 121.22(C) applied, and minutes of the 
meeting were therefore necessary.4  However, the court in Fairfield Leader did 
not explain how detailed public records must be.  To gain such an understanding 
in the context of county commissioners meetings, we look to R.C. 305.10. 
 
R.C. 305.10 mandates that “[t]he clerk of the board of county 
commissioners shall keep a full record of the proceedings of the board, and a 
general index of such proceedings, entering each motion with the name of the 
person making it on the record.”  It is the appellees’ position that R.C. 305.10’s 
phrase “a full record of the proceedings of the board” is an umbrella phrase 
which simply encompasses the specific items mentioned in the later portions of 
R.C. 305.10.5  Consequently, the appellees argue, so long as the minutes of a 
board of county commissioners include those items, the minutes fully comply 
 
15
with R.C. 305.10.  In addition, the appellees claim that R.C. 121.22 has been 
satisfied, because that statute “simply requires that whatever minutes are 
maintained must be promptly recorded and made available to the public.” 
 
R.C. 305.10 does not contain a definition of “full record” or 
“proceedings.”  As a result, we give these words their plain and ordinary 
meaning.  Coventry Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 
18 OBR 151, 152, 480 N.E.2d 412, 414.  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1986) 918, 919, defines “full” as “containing all that can possibly be 
placed or put within”; “containing all details:  complete.”  Accordingly, a “full 
record” would be one in which the details of the recorded event are contained.  
“Proceedings” are defined as “an official record or account (as in a book of 
minutes) of things said or done (as at a meeting or convention of a society).”  Id. 
at 1807.  In light of these common definitions, as well as the reasons stated 
above and those which follow, we reject the appellees’ arguments as failing to 
satisfy the purpose and meaning of the three statutes.   
 
16
 
Although the appellees are correct that R.C. 305.10 does enumerate 
specific items which the clerk of a board of county commissioners must include 
in the minutes of the board’s proceedings, those items are not exhaustive.  
Rather, R.C. 305.10 operates simply as a statutory checklist of those items for 
which the clerk bears the initial responsibility of making available to the public 
for review.  It does not, however, excuse either the county commissioners or 
their clerk from observing the more fundamental requirements of R.C. 121.22, 
which are imposed upon all public bodies.  Indeed, we hold that R.C. 305.10’s 
requirement for the clerk of a board of county commissioners to keep a “full 
record” of the board’s proceedings implicitly includes a duty on the part of the 
clerk and the board to comply with the more comprehensive requirements of 
R.C. 121.22. 
 
Had the commissioners maintained a full record that included the rationale 
and decision-making process of the orders that they issued, White would have 
had a better understanding of these orders.  She could have challenged the 
rationale for those orders, or she could have understood the process and accepted 
 
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the commissioners’ decision.  But with no discussion of the decision-making 
process, or of the orders that were ultimately issued, White was unable to 
exercise her rights as a citizen to challenge the decision of those public bodies 
elected to represent her.  Full disclosure would have removed the process’s 
secretive nature and opened it to public scrutiny.  Unfortunately, the facts make 
it clear that this is precisely what the Clinton County Board of Commissioners 
did not do. 
 
As already noted, R. C. 121.22 requires the preparation, filing, and 
maintenance of a public body’s minutes.  Granted, the statute does not explicitly 
state what should be included in the minutes of a county board of 
commissioners’ meeting.  However, we can glean more about the requirements 
of R.C. 121.22(C) by examining the last sentence of that subsection, which 
states that the minutes of a public body’s executive sessions “need only reflect 
the general subject matter of discussions * * * .”  When one considers the 
sensitive nature of the topics examined in executive sessions, it follows from this 
language that it is only the minutes of an executive session which may be 
 
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properly limited to “the general subject matter of discussions.”  The minutes of 
any other meeting of a public body must contain a more substantial treatment of 
the items discussed, and certainly should not be limited to a mere recounting of 
the body’s roll call votes.   
 
The appellees also argue that mandamus relief is inappropriate in this 
matter because White has failed to satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a 
writ of mandamus.  For a writ of mandamus to issue, there must be (1) a clear 
legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the 
respondent to perform the requested act, and (3) no plain and adequate remedy at 
law.  State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 1, 3, 591 N.E.2d 1186, 
1188.  The appellees argue that because R.C. 121.22 does not explicitly mention 
the sort of information that should be included in the board’s minutes, and 
because R.C. 305.10 does not enumerate the same sort of information sought by 
White, neither the board nor its clerk had a clear legal duty to provide more 
copious minutes.  Consequently, the appellees argue, White does not have a 
clear legal right to such minutes. 
 
19
 
This argument is not persuasive.  As we have already noted, the “full 
record” required under R.C. 305.10 is not limited to the specific information 
enumerated under that section.  Rather, compliance with R.C. 305.10 also 
requires the clerk of a board of county commissioners to observe R.C. 121.22.  
The result of these two statutes being read together results in White’s clear legal 
right to the information she seeks, and the appellees’ clear legal duty to provide 
that information. 
 
We recognize that it is not the business of this court to micro-manage the 
public record-keeping procedures of local governments; public bodies should be 
trusted with a certain degree of latitude in the preparation of minutes and other 
records of their proceedings.  Accordingly, we resist the temptation to prescribe 
any particular means of satisfying R.C. 121.22 and 305.10.  Audio- or videotape 
recordings, word-for-word transcripts, even abstracts of the discussions 
indicating the identity of the speakers and the chronology and substance of their 
statements, are all legitimate means of satisfying the requirements of R.C. 
121.22 and 305.10.  Accordingly, we refrain from laying down specific 
 
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guidelines, other than the dictate that for public records maintained under R.C. 
121.22 and 305.10, full and accurate minutes must contain sufficient facts and 
information to permit the public to understand and appreciate the rationale 
behind the relevant public body’s decision.  In light of this holding, the 
mandamus relief ordered by the trial court in this matter, a preparation of 
minutes of the Board’s meetings, was proper. 
 
Finally, we address the issue of the trial court’s award of attorney fees.  
Former R.C. 121.22(I)(2) provided for an award of “all court costs and 
reasonable attorney’s fees.”  (144 Ohio laws, Part II, 1858.)  Similarly, R.C. 
149.43(C) states that a person aggrieved by a failure to observe R.C. 149.43 may 
commence a mandamus action and receive reasonable attorney fees for the 
successful prosecution of such an action.  The court of appeals improperly 
reversed the trial judge’s decision to award attorney fees after it mistakenly 
concluded that R.C. 121.22 and 149.43 were not implicated in this action.  Since 
we have determined that White’s action did rely on R.C. 121.22 and 149.43, we 
 
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award attorney fees and order the appellant to submit evidence in accordance 
with S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(4) to support her request for fees and costs. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and cause remanded.  
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
1  It should be noted that this action was brought by White as a private citizen,    
not as the director of a health department division. 
2   A “public body” is defined as “any board, commission, committee, or similar 
decision-making body of a state agency, institution, or authority, and any 
legislative authority, or board, commission, committee, agency, authority, or 
similar decision-making body of any county, township, municipal corporation, 
school district, or other political subdivision or local public institution.”  Former  
R.C. 121.22 (B)(1).  (144 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1855.) 
 
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3 The word “minutes” is not defined in the Revised Code.  Consequently, we 
impart to “minutes” its common definition: “a series of brief notes taken to 
provide a record of proceedings * * *:  an official record composed of such 
notes.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1440. 
4  The court also ruled against the village of Pickerington, but based that 
determination on portions of Pickerington’s charter and administrative code 
which required the village council to keep minutes of its regular and special 
meetings.  
5 Specifically, R.C. 305.10 states that the clerk of the board “shall call and 
record the yeas and nays on each motion which involves the levying of taxes or 
appropriation or payment of money * * * [,] shall state fully and clearly in the 
record any question relating to the powers and duties of the board which is 
raised for its consideration by any person having an interest therein, together 
with the decision on such question, and shall call and record the yeas and nays 
by which the decision is made.  When requested by a party interested in the 
proceedings or by his counsel, the clerk shall record any legal proposition 
 
23
decided by the board, the decision thereon and the votes by which the decision is 
reached.  If either party, in person or by counsel, except to such decision, the 
clerk shall record the exceptions with the record of the decision.” 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I dissent only from 
the majority’s holding that an award of attorney fees is proper in this case.