Title: Hunter v. Broadway Overlook

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Shontel Hunter v. Broadway Overlook, No. 61, September Term, 2017. Opinion by Greene, J. 
 
REAL PROPERTY ARTICLE — SECTION 8-402.1 — NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
 
The Court of Appeals held that § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i) of the Real Property Article of the Maryland 
Code provides that before a landlord may file a breach of lease action, the tenant must breach 
the lease, the notice requirement must expire, and the tenant must refuse to comply with the 
notice to vacate.  The Court of Appeals held that a “Notice to Vacate” that failed to comply 
with the terms of the lease could not be subsequently cured by the Landlord’s Complaint for 
breach of lease.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 61 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
______________________________________ 
 
SHONTEL HUNTER 
 
v. 
BROADWAY OVERLOOK 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Greene, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 26, 2018 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-17-003110 
 
 
The present case provides us an opportunity to review the 14-day notice requirement 
contained in Real Property Article § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i) of the Maryland Code (1974, 2015 
Repl. Vol.) (“Real Prop.”).  The issue before us stems from a breach of lease action filed 
by Respondent Broadway Overlook (“Landlord”) against Petitioner Shontel Hunter 
(“Tenant”) in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
On February 28, 2017, Respondent-Landlord issued a “Notice to Vacate Property” 
to the Tenant.  The notice provided: 
This notice made the 28th day of February, 2017 is to notify the tenant Shontel 
Hunter that you have (14) days to vacate the property 129 N. Bond Street, 
Baltimore, Maryland 21231 Unit #129NB.  
 
You have until March 15th 2017 to surrender the property back to the 
Landlord.  This notice is in accordance, with the Breach of Lease filing 
requiring a 14 day notice to vacate the property.  
 
Winn: Broadway Overlook 
 
(Emphasis in original).  Two days later, on March 2, 2017, the Landlord filed a breach of 
lease complaint (“Complaint”) against the Tenant in the District Court of Maryland sitting 
in Baltimore City.  The complaint alleged that “the tenant has threatened bodily harm to 
leasing staff in front of Baltimore City Police.  The Tenant failed to maintain unit in 
accordance with lease.”  Under paragraph three of the Complaint, the Landlord checked 
the box for “14 days written notice” to complete the sentence: “The Landlord has given the 
Tenant [X] 14 days written notice (because the breach causes a clear and imminent danger 
of serious harm to others or the property of the landlord), that the Tenant is in violation of 
the lease, and that the Landlord desires to repossess the premises.” The Landlord indicated 
 
2 
 
that written notice was dated “Feb. 28th 2017” and attached a copy of the written notice to 
the Complaint.   
 
The District Court set the matter in for a trial on April 14, 2017.  Prior to the 
admission of evidence, the Tenant moved to dismiss the action on the basis that the 
Landlord had filed its Complaint prematurely.  The Tenant also argued that the “Notice to 
Vacate” did not specify why she needed to vacate, which, she argued, was a violation of 
section 23(E) of the lease.  The District Court denied Ms. Hunter’s motion.   After receiving 
evidence, the District Court ruled in favor of the Landlord.  The District Court determined 
that the Landlord had demonstrated a breach of lease with respect to an incident that 
occurred on January 23, 2017 between the Tenant and the Landlord’s staff.  The District 
Court further ruled that the Landlord gave adequate advance notice for the Tenant to vacate. 
 
The Tenant appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  Sitting as an appellate 
court, the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.  The Circuit Court 
concluded that Real Prop. § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i)(2)(b) is “devoid of any language that would 
suggest a waiting period of 14 days is a condition precedent to filing a [breach of lease] 
complaint[.]”  The Circuit Court reasoned that the statute requires a landlord to only 
provide notice to the tenant that he or she must vacate in 14 days, but does not require the 
landlord to “exhaust the 14 day period of notice before filing the action.”  The Circuit Court 
also held that because the Landlord’s Complaint explained the grounds for the relief 
sought, there was sufficient evidence to affirm the District Court. 
 
On November 3, 2017, we granted certiorari to consider two questions: 
 
3 
 
1. “Did the [C]ircuit [C]ourt err in finding that Real Prop. § 8-402.1 allows 
the landlord to file a complaint for possession without having first exhausted 
the statutory notice period?” 
 
2. “Did the [C]ircuit [C]ourt err in finding a notice of breach sufficient under 
Real Prop. § 8-402.1 where it failed to meet the content requirements 
expressly set forth in the lease?”  
 
456 Md. 252, 173 A.3d 153 (2017). Thereafter, on January 18, 2018, the Landlord filed in 
this Court a Motion to Dismiss, in which it argued that the matter before the Court was 
moot.  Specifically, the Landlord asserted that because it “has agreed to a reversal of the 
judgment of the Circuit Court – the sole relief requested by Appellant[,]” the appeal should 
be dismissed as moot.  Thus, we have before us the unusual situation in which both the 
Tenant and Landlord agree to the final disposition of the case.  The Tenant and Landlord 
agree that the Landlord failed to satisfy the 14-day statutory notice requirement before it 
filed its breach of lease action in the District Court.  The parties also agree that the Landlord 
did not follow the notice requirements outlined in its lease with Petitioner.  Accordingly, 
the Tenant and Landlord agree that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred and that the 
judgment must be reversed.1  For reasons we shall explain, we do not dismiss this appeal 
based on mootness.  
Discussion 
 
The first issue before us is purely one of statutory construction; therefore, “our goal 
is to discern and effectuate the intent of the legislature at the time it enacted the statute.”  
                                                          
 
1 In lieu of oral argument and with the permission of the Court, the parties submitted on 
brief.  See Maryland Rule 8-523(a)(2) (“In the Court of Appeals a party may not submit 
an appeal for consideration on brief except with the permission of the Court.”). 
 
4 
 
Brown v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n of Montgomery Cnty., 350 Md. 570, 575, 714 A.2d 
197, 199 (1998).  The General Assembly enacted § 8-402.1 with the intent to create a 
“separate, self-contained District Court procedure by which landlords could recover 
possession of leased premises based on breaches of covenants other than the payment of 
rent[.]”  Id. at 584, 714 A.2d at 203.  Real Prop. § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i) provides: 
Where an unexpired lease for a stated term provides that the landlord may 
repossess the premises prior to the expiration of the stated term if the tenant 
breaches the lease, the landlord may make complaint in writing to the District 
Court of the county where the premises is located if: 
1. The tenant breaches the lease; 
2. A. The landlord has given the tenant 30 days’ written notice that 
the tenant is in violation of the lease and the landlord desires to 
repossess the leased premises; or 
B. The breach of the lease involves behavior by a tenant or a person 
who is on the property with the tenant's consent, which demonstrates 
a clear and imminent danger of the tenant or person doing serious 
harm to themselves, other tenants, the landlord, the landlord's property 
or representatives, or any other person on the property and the 
landlord has given the tenant or person in possession 14 days’ written 
notice that the tenant or person in possession is in violation of the lease 
and the landlord desires to repossess the leased premises; and 
3. The tenant or person in actual possession of the premises refuses to 
comply. 
(Emphasis added). 
In Brown, we interpreted § 8-402.1(b) which provides, in part, that if a “‘court 
determines that the tenant breached the terms of the lease and that the breach was 
substantial and warrants an eviction, it shall give judgment.’”  Id. at 576, 714 A.2d at 199.  
(Emphasis in original).  We rejected the Circuit Court’s conclusion that the statute required 
a court to order an eviction if the court found that there had been a breach of lease and that 
 
5 
 
the breach had been substantial.  Id.  In that case, we reasoned that the Circuit Court’s 
reading of the statute 
would make the phrase ‘and warrants an eviction’ not only superfluous, but 
actually antithetical to the legislative intent the[] [Circuit Court] necessarily 
presume[d]. If the Legislature really meant to require an eviction upon the 
finding of a substantial breach and to leave no discretion in the court, there 
would have been no need to add that last phrase, which serves only to detract 
from that intent or, at the very least, make it ambiguous. 
 
Id.  (Emphasis in original). 
We reject the Circuit Court’s rationale in the case sub judice for reasons similar to 
those expressed in Brown.  If the General Assembly’s intent had been to permit a landlord 
to file a complaint before expiration of the notice period, there would have been no need 
to add the language contained in the last statutory prerequisite – “and [t]he tenant or person 
in actual possession of the premises refuses to comply[.]”  See id.  In other words, if the 
Legislature intended for a landlord to file a complaint prior to expiration of the notice 
period, the tenant’s possession of the property would be immaterial.  The landlord does not 
have a viable claim on which to base its complaint of breach of lease until the notice period 
has expired and the tenant has refused to comply with the notice to vacate.  Furthermore, 
“it is not appropriate to find that a defective notice became effective through the simple 
passage of time.  The obligation to provide advance notice is a forward-looking 
requirement intended to allow the tenant to plan for the future.”  Curtis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n, 427 Md. 526, 539, 50 A.3d 558, 566 (2012) (emphasis added) (holding that a motion 
for possession was filed prematurely when it was filed prior to expiration of the statutory 
notice period).  We, therefore, hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred in its 
 
6 
 
construction of Real Prop. § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i)(2)(b) when it concluded that the Landlord 
was not required to exhaust the 14-day notice requirement of the statute prior to filing a 
complaint for possession.   
To address the second issue, we examine the terms of the lease.  Pursuant to Section 
23(E) of the lease, the notice was defective for its failure to “state the specific grounds for 
the termination or eviction action[,]”  its failure to inform the Tenant of her right to make 
a reply, and its failure to inform the Tenant that the Landlord was required to provide, upon 
the Tenant’s request, a reasonable opportunity to examine the Landlord’s documents before 
a court trial concerning the termination of the tenancy or eviction action.  Additionally, 
pursuant to Section 23(K) of the lease, the Landlord’s notice of lease termination must also 
inform the Tenant that if she fails to vacate within the specified time an action may be 
brought against her and that she may be required to pay court costs and attorney’s fees.  
The Landlord’s notice to vacate merely stated that the Tenant had 14 days to vacate the 
property.  The Landlord’s Complaint filed in the District Court, in which the Landlord 
specified grounds for relief, did not and could not cure the defective notice to the Tenant 
because, procedurally, a complaint for possession of real property filed against the Tenant 
must be filed after the Landlord has given the Tenant the requisite notice.  See Curtis, 427 
Md. at 539, 50 A.3d at 566.  We, therefore, hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
erred in its conclusion that the complaint for breach of lease was sufficient to cure the 
Landlord’s notice of lease termination where the notice failed to meet the content 
requirements expressly set forth in the lease agreement. 
 
7 
 
Finally, Respondent suggests that this case is moot.  Respondent posits that because 
it agrees with the relief requested by Petitioner, this Court can dismiss the case as moot.  
We disagree.  “A case is not moot where it is ‘apparent that a party may suffer collateral 
consequences from a trial court’s judgment.’”  Cane v. EZ Rentals, 450 Md. 597, 611, 149 
A.3d 649, 657 (2016) (citation omitted).  Were we to dismiss the case on the basis of 
mootness, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City would stand against the 
Tenant, and we would never reach the merits of her complaint to correct the erroneous 
interpretations by the District Court and Circuit Court of Real Prop. § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i).  
Accordingly, we have decided on the merits that the Landlord failed to exhaust the 
applicable notice period prior to filing its Complaint.  The Landlord’s notice to the Tenant 
was deficient, and the complaint for breach of lease was filed prematurely in violation of 
Real Prop. § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i). 
Conclusion 
 
Real Prop. § 8-402.1(a)(1)(i) requires that before a landlord may file a breach of 
lease action, the tenant must breach the lease, the notice requirement must expire, and the 
tenant must refuse to comply with the notice to vacate.  We, therefore, hold that the Circuit 
Court erred in holding that the Landlord did not have to wait for the 14-day notice period 
to expire before it filed a complaint for breach of lease.  In addition, we hold that the notice 
to vacate was not issued in accordance with the terms of the lease and that it could not be 
cured by the subsequently filed Complaint.   
 
 
8 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED.  
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT 
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
DISTRICT 
COURT OF MARYLAND SITTING IN 
BALTIMORE CITY.  RESPONDENT TO 
PAY THE COSTS.