Title: Isle of Wight County v. Nogiec

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY  
 
v. 
Record No. 091693 
 
 
ALAN NOGIEC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  January 13, 2011 
PATRICK SMALL 
 
v. 
Record No. 091731 
 
ALAN NOGIEC 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY 
Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 
 
 
Alan Nogiec, a former director of the Parks and Recreation 
Department of Isle of Wight County (County), sued the County 
for breach of contract and its assistant administrator, Patrick 
Small, for defamation.  A jury found for Nogiec on both claims, 
and the County and Small appealed.  We granted review to 
consider two questions:  first, whether the evidence on damages 
was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the breach of 
contract claim; and second, whether the statements giving rise 
to the defamation claim were absolutely privileged because they 
were made during a report to a subordinate legislative body, 
the County’s Board of Supervisors (Board). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
In March 2007, three months after being placed on 
administrative leave, Nogiec decided to retire early from his 
position as director of the County’s Parks and Recreation 
Department.  At the time of his retirement, he and the County 
entered into a severance agreement (Agreement).  The Agreement 
provided, among other things, that “Nogiec and the County agree 
to refrain from making any disparaging comments or statements, 
whether written or oral, about the other or any member of the 
County’s Board of Supervisors, administrators or employees.” 
 
In October 2006, roughly five months before Nogiec’s 
retirement, the County’s museum sustained flood damage after 
heavy rains.  On May 24, 2007, Small gave a report on the 
efforts being undertaken to repair the museum at a televised 
Board meeting.  The following exchange occurred during the 
course of that report: 
 
BOARD MEMBER:  . . . Did we not know that this 
was going to flood before? 
 
 
MR. SMALL:  To answer the question directly, 
yes.  The previous Parks & Recreation director had 
been advised by museum staff on more than one 
occasion . . . 
 
 
BOARD MEMBER:  Were you ever notified of that? 
 
 
MR. SMALL:  No, sir.  Nor was your County 
Administrator.  The information had been suppressed.  
Memos to the Director of Parks and Recreation go back 
ten years advising that individual that the museum 
could and likely would flood.  In fact, one of those 
memos mentions that specifically in the event of a 
sustained nor’easter, the museum would flood. 
 
 
BOARD MEMBER:  So was that written? 
 
 
MR. SMALL:  Yes, sir. 
 
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BOARD MEMBER:  And handed to him? 
 
 
MR. SMALL:  Yes, sir. 
 
 
BOARD MEMBER:  I’m not a civil engineer but I 
can look at that and tell there is a serious 
potential for damage. 
 
 
MR. SMALL:  The museum staff was aware of that. 
The Foundation was aware.  And it was brought to the 
attention of the previous Parks & Recreation director 
on more than one occasion. 
 
 
BOARD MEMBER:  The shame of it is the artifacts 
(inaudible) the cost of money to fix the artifacts 
involved (inaudible) has to be replaced 
(inaudible) . . . 
 
 
MR. SMALL:  It borders on negligence in my 
opinion. 
 
 
About a week after the Board meeting, the local newspaper, 
The Smithfield Times, ran a front-page story on Small’s report 
under the headline “Museum to be closed until 2008, Small 
accuses Nogiec of ‘suppressing’ problems.”  Among other things, 
the story reported that Small had told the Board that 
information on the museum’s potential for flooding had been 
“suppressed” by the previous director of the Parks and 
Recreation Department and that, in Small’s opinion, “it 
border[ed] on negligence.” 
 
In March 2008, Nogiec sued the County for breach of 
contract and Small for defamation.1  Nogiec alleged that Small’s 
                                                 
 
1 Nogiec also sued the County for defamation.  That claim 
was dismissed, however, when the circuit court sustained the 
County’s demurrer on sovereign immunity grounds. 
 
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statements that “[t]he information had been suppressed” and 
that “[i]t borders on negligence in my opinion” were “malicious 
and per se defamatory, slanderous and libelous.”  He alleged, 
moreover, that they violated the Agreement’s nondisparagement 
clause.  He demanded compensatory and punitive damages against 
the County and Small in the amount of $500,000. 
 
A jury trial commenced in March 2009.  At the close of 
Nogiec’s case in chief, the County and Small moved to strike 
the evidence on several grounds.  They argued, among other 
things, that Nogiec “ha[d] failed to introduce evidence of any 
damages he . . . suffered as a result of th[e] breach” and that 
Small’s allegedly defamatory statements were absolutely 
privileged because they were made during “a report to a 
legislative body.”  The circuit court denied the motions. 
 
The County and Small then presented their cases.  At the 
close of all evidence, they renewed their motions to strike, 
which the circuit court again denied.  The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Nogiec, awarding him $45,000 in 
compensatory damages on the breach of contract claim, and 
$50,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive 
damages on the defamation claim.  The County and Small then 
again renewed their motions to strike and moved to set aside 
the verdict.  The circuit court denied the motions and entered 
 
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judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.  These appeals 
followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The County’s Appeal 
 
The County asserts that the circuit court erred in denying 
its motions to strike and set aside the verdict because Nogiec 
failed to prove damages, an essential element of his breach of 
contract claim.  When considering whether a circuit court erred 
in declining to strike the evidence or set aside the verdict, 
we apply the following standard of review:  “ ‘whether the 
evidence presented, taken in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, was sufficient to support the jury verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff.’ ”  Sunrise Continuing Care, LLC v. Wright, 
277 Va. 148, 154, 671 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2009) (quoting Bitar v. 
Rahman, 272 Va. 130, 141, 630 S.E.2d 319, 325-26 (2006)). 
 
Nogiec, as the plaintiff below, had the “ ‘burden of 
proving with reasonable certainty the amount of damages and the 
cause from which they resulted; speculation and conjecture 
cannot form the basis of the recovery.’ ”  SunTrust Bank v. 
Farrar, 277 Va. 546, 554, 675 S.E.2d 187, 191 (2009) (quoting 
Shepherd v. Davis, 265 Va. 108, 125, 574 S.E.2d 514, 524 
(2003)).  “Damages based on uncertainties, contingencies, or 
speculation cannot be recovered.”  Shepherd, 265 Va. at 125, 
675 S.E.2d at 524 (citing Barnes v. Graham Va. Quarries, Inc., 
 
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204 Va. 414, 418, 132 S.E.2d 395, 397-98 (1963)).  The failure 
to establish damages with reasonable certainty warrants the 
dismissal of a breach of contract claim.  Sunrise Continuing 
Care, 277 Va. at 156, 671 S.E.2d at 136 (citing Filak v. 
George, 267 Va. 612, 619-20, 594 S.E.2d 610, 614-15 (2004)). 
 
The evidence Nogiec presented on the damages that resulted 
from the County’s breach consisted solely of his own testimony.  
He first testified, over the County’s objection, about the 
“financial ramifications” of his decision to retire early and 
enter the Agreement.  That decision, according to his own 
calculations, cost Nogiec approximately $154,000 in salary and 
retirement and health insurance benefits, based on his 
statutory life expectancy. 
 
Next, Nogiec testified about the significance of the 
Agreement’s nondisparagement clause.  He testified that it was 
important to him because he “spent a lot of time throughout 
[his] career creating a very positive reputation.”  Nogiec then 
testified that after his retirement, he started to look for new 
employment, submitting a few applications in “the Parks and 
Recreation field [and] a number of applications and resumes to 
hotels.” 
 
Lastly, Nogiec testified about the negative impact that 
Small’s statements had on his job search.  Specifically, he 
testified that they embarrassed him as well as “damaged [his] 
 
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reputation considerably in the community.”  Nogiec further 
testified that “about 124 people, 125 people” from the 
community approached him after hearing or reading the 
statements and inquired: “[W]hat is this?  What’s this all 
about? . . . [H]ow could that possibly be?”  When asked whether 
the statements had an effect on his ability to find new 
employment, Nogiec answered, “I believe [they] did.”  He also 
testified that after the statements were made, he continued to 
look for work for “a short period . . . probably two [months] 
maybe,” but did not “receive any interviews.”  Because of his 
lack of success in finding new employment, Nogiec testified 
that he “felt like [his] only alternative was to create a 
company . . . so that’s why [he] created” his own company. 
 
We agree with the County that Nogiec’s evidence on damages 
was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.  The evidence 
Nogiec presented on the costs of his decision to retire early 
and enter the Agreement was not relevant to the damages that 
were caused by the County’s breach.  As Nogiec conceded at 
trial, the roughly $154,000 in salary and benefits he forfeited 
was not damages flowing from the County’s breach, but rather 
his consideration for the Agreement.  Thus, because Nogiec sued 
the County seeking monetary damages for breach of contract, not 
rescission of the Agreement, the evidence on the costs of his 
 
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decision to retire early and enter the Agreement cannot support 
the jury’s verdict. 
 
The evidence that Nogiec presented on the embarrassment 
and humiliation he suffered as a result of the County’s breach 
likewise does not support the jury’s verdict.  “ ‘As a general 
rule,’ ” we have stated, “ ‘damages for breach of contracts are 
limited to the pecuniary loss sustained.’ ”  Sunrise Continuing 
Care, 277 Va. at 156, 671 S.E.2d at 136 (quoting Kamlar Corp. 
v. Haley, 224 Va. 699, 705, 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1983)).  We 
have also recognized that, “ ‘absent some tort,’ damages for 
‘humiliation or injury to feelings’ are not recoverable in an 
action for breach of contract.”  Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. 
O’Neal, 224 Va. 343, 354, 297 S.E.2d 647, 653 (1982) (quoting 
D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 12.25, at 927 
(1973)).  We are not alone in this view.  In fact, as the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
noted, “[c]ourts have universally rejected claims for damages 
to reputation in breach of contract actions reasoning that such 
damages are too speculative and could not reasonably be 
presumed to have been contemplated by the parties when they 
formed the contract.”  Rice v. Community Health Ass’n, 203 F.3d 
283, 288 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 
Nevertheless, Nogiec contends that it was proper for the 
jury to consider his humiliation and embarrassment in 
 
8
determining the amount of damages that resulted from the 
County’s breach because those were the very types of injuries 
that the Agreement was meant to guard against with the 
inclusion of the nondisparagement clause.  Indeed, he asserts, 
the Agreement would have no value to either party if 
humiliation and embarrassment could not be considered as 
consequential damages.  Nogiec further claims that he can 
recover for the humiliation and embarrassment caused by the 
County’s breach because there are exceptions to the general 
rule that tort damages are not recoverable in an action for 
breach of contract.  Those exceptions, he argues, apply where, 
as here, the nature of the contract is such that it is 
foreseeable that a breach would likely result in emotional 
disturbance. 
 
We decline Nogiec’s invitation to carve out an exception 
to the rule that tort damages are not recoverable for breach of 
contract under the circumstances of this case.  The distinction 
between the damages that are recoverable in contract and tort 
is made plain by the instructions given to the jury on Nogiec’s 
two claims.  On the breach of contract claim, the jury was 
instructed that, if it found for Nogiec, “he [was] entitled to 
recover as damages all of the losses he sustained that [were] a 
direct and natural result of the breach and that he . . . 
proved by the greater weight of the evidence.”  There is no 
 
9
doubt that this instruction contemplates only pecuniary losses.  
Thus, in order to recover on his breach of contract claim, 
Nogiec had to establish the actual pecuniary losses that flowed 
from the County’s breach. 
 
By contrast, on the defamation claim, the jury was 
instructed that, if it found for Nogiec, “injury to [his] 
personal and business reputation, humiliation, and 
embarrassment [was to be] presumed” and that its verdict should 
be for an amount that would fully compensate him for “any loss 
or injury to his business”; “any insult to him including any 
pain, embarrassment, humiliation, or mental suffering”; and 
“any injury to his reputation.”  To allow Nogiec to recover 
damages for humiliation and embarrassment on his breach of 
contract claim would not only let him recover damages based 
solely on speculation, see id. at 288, but it would also let 
him recover the same damages twice — once on a contract theory 
and once on a tort theory.  We refuse to permit such a 
recovery. 
 
The only other evidence that Nogiec presented on damages 
was his belief that Small’s statements affected his ability to 
find new employment and the fact that he was not invited to 
interview for any position he applied for during the two months 
that followed Small’s report.  The County claims that this 
evidence does not establish with reasonable certainty the 
 
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pecuniary losses Nogiec suffered because of its breach.  
Consequently, it argues, the jury was left to speculate as to 
the measure of his damages. 
 
Nogiec counters that his testimony on the salary and 
benefits he received while employed by the County and his lack 
of success in securing new employment after Small’s report 
“provided ample basis for a jury determination of the monetary 
value of his job opportunity losses resulting from the 
disparaging televised remarks.”  Moreover, he argues, the 
County’s contention that the jury’s verdict was based on 
speculation is without merit because, as we have stated, 
“[d]amages need not be established with mathematical 
certainty.”  Taylor v. Flair Property Assocs., 248 Va. 410, 
414, 448 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1994).  Indeed, since he “received no 
job offers,” he argues, he could not “calculate or testify to[] 
the exact value of the income and opportunity losses sustained 
as a consequence of the [County’s] breach.” 
 
We agree with the County that Nogiec failed to meet his 
burden of proving with reasonable certainty the damages that 
resulted from its breach.  Although it is true that Nogiec did 
not need to establish his damages with “mathematical 
certainty,” he was “required . . . to furnish evidence of 
sufficient facts to permit the trier of fact to make an 
intelligent and probable estimate of the damages sustained.”  
 
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Id.  The record reveals that Nogiec presented no evidence on 
the job opportunities he allegedly lost because of the County’s 
breach.  Rather, he merely testified that he “believe[d]” that 
Small’s statements had an effect on his ability to find new 
employment and that he received no job interviews during the 
two months after Small’s report.  And while Nogiec did testify 
as to the salary and benefits he received while employed by the 
County, he presented no evidence on the salaries and benefits 
of the jobs he applied for.  As a result, the jury had no way 
to measure the value of the job opportunities he allegedly lost 
due to the County’s breach. 
 
As we recently reiterated in SunTrust Bank, “[e]stimates 
of damages based entirely upon . . . assumptions ‘are too 
remote and speculative to permit “an intelligent and probable 
estimate of damages.” ’ ”  277 Va. at 555, 675 S.E.2d at 191 
(2009) (quoting Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 159, 606 S.E.2d 
809, 811 (2005)).  In that case, trust beneficiaries alleged 
that the trustee had breached its fiduciary duty when it sold 
trust property appraised at $1.1 million for $350,000.  Id. at 
551, 675 S.E.2d at 189.  After a bench trial, the circuit court 
determined that the trustee had breached its fiduciary duty and 
awarded damages to the beneficiaries.  Id. at 552-53, 675 
S.E.2d at 190.  We reversed, holding that the circuit court 
erred in awarding the beneficiaries damages because they failed 
 
12
to establish that there was a buyer willing to purchase the 
property for $1.1 million.  Id. at 556-57, 675 S.E.2d at 192. 
 
Just as the beneficiaries in SunTrust Bank failed to 
present evidence of a willing buyer, Nogiec failed to present 
evidence of a willing employer — that is, he failed to show an 
employer who would have hired or even interviewed him but for 
Small’s statements.  Without such evidence on the job 
opportunities Nogiec allegedly lost and their value (i.e., 
salaries and benefits), there was simply no way for the jury to 
make an “intelligent and probable estimate” of the damages he 
sustained as a result of the County’s breach.  Accordingly, the 
evidence Nogiec presented on the job opportunities he allegedly 
lost cannot support the jury’s verdict. 
 
Because the evidence Nogiec presented on the damages he 
sustained was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on his 
breach of contract claim, we hold that the circuit court erred 
in denying the County’s motions to strike and set aside the 
verdict on that claim. 
B.  Small’s Appeal 
 
Small claims that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motions to strike and set aside the verdict, since the 
statements giving rise to Nogiec’s defamation claim were 
absolutely privileged.  This is so, Small maintains, because 
they were made while he was a witness in a legislative 
 
13
proceeding, the Board meeting.  In response, Nogiec raises two 
principal arguments.  First, he contends that Small waived 
absolute privilege by failing to plead it as an affirmative 
defense in his responsive pleadings.  Second, Nogiec asserts 
that, even if Small did not waive absolute privilege, it does 
not apply here because the Board meeting was not a legislative 
proceeding, and because the statements were unrelated to the 
issue before the Board — the status of the museum repairs. 
 
In the law of defamation, there are two types of 
privileges — absolute and qualified.  “[T]he maker of an 
absolutely privileged communication is accorded complete 
immunity from liability even though the communication is made 
maliciously and with knowledge that it is false.”  Lindeman v. 
Lesnick, 268 Va. 532, 537, 604 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2004).  “Cases in 
which absolute privilege appl[ies] are not numerous and they 
may be divided into three classes, namely:  Proceedings of 
legislative bodies; judicial proceedings; and communications by 
military and naval officers.”  Story v. Norfolk-Portsmouth 
Newspapers, Inc., 202 Va. 588, 590, 118 S.E.2d 668, 669 (1961). 
 
“Qualified privilege,” on the other hand, “exists in a 
much larger number of cases.”  Id. at 590, 118 S.E.2d at 670 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, we have stated 
that 
 
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[i]t extends to all communications made bona fide 
upon any subject-matter in which the party 
communicating has an interest, or in reference to 
which he has a duty to a person having a 
corresponding interest or duty; and the privilege 
embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, but 
where it is of a moral or social character of 
imperfect obligation.  
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  If a communication is 
entitled to a qualified privilege, then there is no inference 
of malice arising from its publication, but rather “the onus is 
cast upon the person claiming to have been defamed to prove the 
existence of malice.”  Id. at 590-91, 118 S.E.2d at 670. 
 
In this case, the circuit court held that Small’s 
statements were entitled to a qualified privilege, since “[h]e 
[was] an administrator of the county who [was] reporting to the 
Board of Supervisors, the controlling authority for the 
county.”  Small submits that this ruling was in error because, 
as a witness at a legislative proceeding, his statements were 
entitled to an absolute privilege.  Whether an absolute or 
qualified privilege applies under the circumstances of this 
case “is a question of law that, like all questions of law, we 
review de novo.”  Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 
131, 670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 
Although we have discussed absolute privilege in the 
judicial context on numerous occasions, see, e.g., Lindeman, 
268 Va. at 538, 604 S.E.2d at 58-59 (declining to extend 
 
15
absolute privilege to mere potential litigation); Elder v. 
Holland, 208 Va. 15, 22, 155 S.E.2d 369, 374-75 (1967) (holding 
that a communication made by a witness at a hearing before the 
Superintendent of the State Police was not entitled to an 
absolute privilege because the safeguards that surround a 
judicial proceeding were not present), we have never done so in 
the legislative context.  Hence, whether a communication made 
by an assistant county administrator to a member of a county’s 
board of supervisors during a board meeting is absolutely 
privileged is a question of first impression in this Court. 
 
Small urges us to adopt the Restatement’s approach to 
applying absolute privilege in the legislative context.  Under 
that approach, “[a] witness is absolutely privileged to publish 
defamatory matter as part of a legislative proceeding in which 
he is testifying or in communications preliminary to the 
proceeding, if the matter has some relation to the proceeding.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590A (1977).  The Restatement 
clarifies that legislative proceedings include not only those 
held by the “highest legislative body of a State,” but also 
those held by “subordinate legislative bodies to which the 
State has delegated legislative power, such as a city council 
or county board.”  Id. § 590, cmt. c.  It also states that “the 
absolute privilege of witnesses in legislative hearings and 
other legislative proceedings is similar in all respects to 
 
16
that of witnesses in judicial proceedings.”  Id. § 590A, 
cmt. a. 
 
As Small notes, the Restatement’s approach to applying 
absolute privilege in the legislative context is similar to the 
approach we have taken to applying the privilege in the 
judicial context.  We have stated that if a “communication is 
made in . . . a judicial proceeding, it need only be relevant 
and pertinent to the case to be protected by the privilege.”  
Lindeman, 268 Va. at 537, 604 S.E.2d at 58.  “The reason for 
the rule of absolute privilege in judicial proceedings,” we 
have explained, “is to encourage unrestricted speech in 
litigation.”  Donohoe Construction Co. v. Mount Vernon Assocs., 
235 Va. 531, 537, 369 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1988) (citing Watt v. 
McKelvie, 219 Va. 645, 651, 248 S.E.2d 826, 829 (1978)).  We 
have also noted that “[t]he public interest is best served when 
individuals who participate in law suits are allowed to conduct 
the proceeding with freedom to speak fully on the issues 
relating to the controversy.”  Id. (quoting Watt, 219 Va. at 
651, 248 S.E.2d at 829)). 
 
Just as in judicial proceedings, we think that absolute 
privilege in legislative proceedings serves the public 
interest.  In particular, it encourages individuals who 
participate in such proceedings to speak freely on issues 
relating to “the operation of the government.”  Krueger v. 
 
17
Lewis, 834 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005).  That public 
interest, however, must be balanced against “the right of an 
individual to enjoy his reputation free from defamatory 
attacks.”  Id.  We therefore believe that application of the 
privilege should be limited to proceedings before a legislative 
body in which the public interest in free speech outweighs the 
potential harm to an individual’s reputation.  In our view, 
this only occurs when the legislative body is acting in its 
legislative capacity — i.e., when it is creating legislation — 
rather than in its supervisory or administrative capacity. 
 
The facts of this case present two central issues.  The 
first is whether absolute privilege should be afforded not only 
to the General Assembly, but also to subordinate legislative 
bodies to which it has delegated legislative power, such as 
boards of supervisors.  The second is whether all proceedings 
before subordinate legislative bodies fall under the umbrella 
of legislative proceedings to which the attachment of the 
privilege serves the public interest. 
 
Our resolution of the second issue determines the outcome 
of this case.  The General Assembly has granted certain powers 
to county boards of supervisors.2  The broadest of these powers 
                                                 
 
2 In discussing the powers conferred on the Isle of Wight 
County Board of Supervisors by the General Assembly, Small and 
Nogiec cite Code § 15.2-403.  That section, however, is not 
applicable here because the County has the traditional form of 
 
18
is a general police power.  Code § 15.2-1200.  In accordance 
with that power, a county, through its board of supervisors, 
“may adopt such measures as it deems expedient to secure and 
promote the health, safety and general welfare of its 
inhabitants which are not inconsistent with the general laws of 
the Commonwealth.”  Id.  Not all powers given to boards of 
supervisors, however, are legislative in nature; some are 
supervisory or administrative.  Under Code § 15.2-1409, for 
example, boards of supervisors “may make such investigations 
relating to its government affairs as it deems necessary.”  
And, pursuant to Code § 15.2-1230, they “may require monthly 
financial reports from any officer or office of the county.” 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that absolute privilege is 
afforded to subordinate legislative bodies, the creation of 
legislation is the nexus that supports the application of the 
privilege.  Absolute privilege therefore does not attach to 
communications made by participants in proceedings conducted by 
a board of supervisors that do not concern the creation of 
legislation. 
 
Absolute privilege is an affirmative defense.  See Chaves 
v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 121, 335 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1985); see 
                                                                                                                                                           
government, not the optional county board form.  Report of the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth 471, http://www.soc-apps.state. 
va.us/Bluebook/PDFs/10A_Counties.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 
2010). 
 
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also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 613(2) (“In an action for 
defamation the defendant has the burden of proving, when the 
issue is properly raised, the presence of the circumstances for 
the existence of a privilege to publish the defamatory 
communication.”).  Accordingly, Small bore the burden of 
establishing that the statements giving rise to Nogiec’s 
defamation claim were absolutely privileged.  The record 
reflects that Small presented no evidence to meet this burden, 
but rather relied on the evidence produced by Nogiec.  That 
evidence does not demonstrate that the Board was acting in a 
legislative capacity when Small gave his report.  On the 
contrary, it shows that the Board was acting in a supervisory 
or administrative capacity.  The Board had convened to receive 
a report on the efforts being undertaken to repair County 
property (i.e., the museum), not to create legislation.  Thus, 
because the Board was not acting in a legislative capacity when 
it received Small’s report, its meeting was not a legislative 
proceeding to which the public interest supports the attachment 
of an absolute privilege.  We therefore conclude that Small’s 
statements were not absolutely privileged. 
 
While Small’s statements were not entitled to an absolute 
privilege, they were entitled to a qualified privilege because, 
as an assistant administrator for the County, Small had a duty 
to report the status of the museum repairs to the Board.  We 
 
20
believe that under the circumstances of this case, a qualified 
privilege afforded Small sufficient protection from liability 
for defamation because the statements, whether compelled or 
volunteered, were only actionable if Nogiec was able to prove 
that they were made with malice.  Hence, the circuit court 
properly submitted to the jury the issue of whether the 
statements were made with malice.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the circuit court did not err in denying Small’s motions to 
strike and set aside the verdict on Nogiec’s defamation claim. 
 
Because we conclude that absolute privilege does not apply 
under the circumstances of this case, we need not address 
Nogiec’s argument that Small waived it by failing to plead it 
as an affirmative defense in his responsive pleadings. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The circuit court erred in denying the County’s motions to 
strike and set aside the verdict on Nogiec’s breach of contract 
claim.  We therefore reverse the circuit court’s judgment in 
favor of Nogiec and enter final judgment in favor of the County 
on that claim.  The circuit court, however, did not err in 
denying Small’s motions to strike and set aside the verdict on 
Nogiec’s defamation claim.  We therefore affirm the circuit 
court’s judgment in favor of Nogiec on that claim. 
Record No. 091693 – Reversed and final judgment. 
                Record No. 091731 — Affirmed. 
 
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