Title: Doe v. Department of Health & Human Services

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 164 
Docket: 
And-18-50 
Argued: 
October 24, 2018 
Decided: 
December 18, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JOHN DOE 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  In April of 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services 
denied John Doe’s request for a review of the Department’s 2003 
substantiation of him for sexual abuse of a minor.  Doe now appeals from a 
judgment 
entered 
by 
the 
Superior 
Court 
(Androscoggin 
County, 
MG Kennedy, J.) that affirmed the Department’s decision to deny Doe’s request.  
Doe challenges the Department’s denial as, inter alia, a violation of his 
procedural due process rights.  Given the unique timing of the substantiation 
at issue here, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The parties do not dispute the following facts. 
[¶3]  On October 1, 2003, the Department mailed a letter to Doe 
informing him that he had been substantiated for sexual abuse of a minor.1  
The letter explained the basis for the Department’s substantiation finding and 
stated that Doe had the right “to request a review of the assessment 
record . . . in writing within thirty [] calendar days.”  Doe acknowledges that he 
did not write the Department within thirty days after October 1, 2003, to 
request a review of his substantiation.   
[¶4]  When the Department substantiated Doe in October of 2003, a 
“paper review”—established by a 2000 Department policy (the 2000 
policy)—was the only appeal process available to an individual wishing to 
challenge a substantiation finding; there was no opportunity for any sort of 
hearing.  See Me. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Review of Substantiation 
Decisions of Child Abuse and Neglect, Child & Fam. Servs. Manual (2000) 
[hereinafter 2000 Policy].  The 2000 policy purportedly applied to “all official 
findings of child abuse or neglect [that were] substantiated on or after 
                                         
1  The Department used the term “indicated” in its 2003 letter, but both parties agree that the 
use of that term in 2003 is synonymous—for the purposes of an appeal—with the present-day 
meaning of “substantiated.”   
 
3 
February 1, 2000,” and it set forth the process by which the Department 
attempted to comply with the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act (CAPTA).2  Id.  As the Department conceded at oral argument, it did not 
adopt the 2000 policy pursuant to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).  5 M.R.S. §§ 8001-11008 (2017); 22 M.R.S. § 42(1) (2017).   
[¶5]  In November of 2003—a month after Doe received his 
substantiation 
letter—the 
Department 
adopted 
formal 
rules 
for 
substantiation appeals (the 2003 rules) pursuant to the APA’s emergency 
rulemaking provision.3  See 5 M.R.S. § 8054 (2017); 22 M.R.S. § 42(1); 
18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 § XI (effective Nov. 1, 2003).  The 2003 rules created the 
opportunity for a person whose substantiation was upheld after a paper 
review to request an administrative hearing in order to challenge the 
Department’s substantiation finding.4  18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 §§ IV(E), V(B) 
                                         
2  Originally enacted in 1974, CAPTA is the flagship piece of federal legislation addressing child 
abuse and neglect.  See generally Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 
Stat. 4 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.).  The Act requires that a 
state provide substantiated individuals the opportunity to appeal their substantiations.  Me. Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs., Review of Substantiation Decisions of Child Abuse and Neglect, Child & Fam. 
Servs. Manual (2000).   
3  In 2004, the Department promulgated, unchanged, the 2003 rules pursuant to standard APA 
rulemaking procedures.  See 5 M.R.S. §§ 8052, 8053, 8056 (2017); 22 M.R.S. § 42(1); 18 C.M.R. 
10 148 201 §§ I-XI (effective Feb. 3, 2004).   
4  These changes to the Department’s rules were spurred by the threat of litigation in the early 
2000s from several advocacy groups that were concerned that the Department was infringing on 
individuals’ due process rights.  See Me. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Emergency Rules for the 
Appeal Procedures for Individuals Substantiated as Perpetrators of Abuse or Neglect of Children, Basis 
 
4 
(effective Nov. 1, 2003).  Despite the promulgation of the formal rules in 
November of 2003, the Department’s 2000 policy was still in effect when Doe 
received his substantiation letter and thus it is that policy—and not the 2003 
rules—that apply here.  See 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 § XI (effective Nov. 1, 2003).   
[¶6]  One day after the Department mailed Doe his substantiation letter, 
a Sagadahoc County grand jury handed down an indictment charging him with 
eight counts of gross sexual assault (Class A),5 and eight counts of unlawful 
sexual contact (Class C).6  In January of 2004, a jury convicted Doe on all 
sixteen counts; we upheld the conviction but, after Doe’s successful 
post-conviction review and a subsequent retrial in 2009, a second jury 
acquitted Doe of all counts.   
                                                                                                                                   
Statement (2003) (“Several legal advocacy groups have threatened to sue the Department for its 
failure to provide hearings for persons who have been substantiated for abuse or neglect. . . .  The 
attached rules reflect an agreement between the Department and the groups, thus avoiding a 
lawsuit.”).   
5  Of those eight, six counts were based on 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B) (Supp. 2000), and two were 
based on 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B) (Supp. 2002).  Although there have been several amendments 
to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 since Doe’s indictment, the amendments do not affect this matter.  See, e.g., 
P.L. 2017, ch. 300, §§ 1-3 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(B) (2017)). 
6  Of those eight, six counts were based on 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C) (Supp. 2000), and two were 
based on 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255-A(1)(E) (Supp. 2002).  Although 17-A M.R.S.A. §255(1)(C) has been 
repealed and replaced, see P.L. 2001, ch. 383, §§ 22-23 (effective Jan. 31, 2003), and 17-A M.R.S.A. 
§ 255-A(1)(E) has been amended several times, see, e.g., P.L. 2015, ch. 509, § 2 (effective July 29, 
2016) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E) (2017)), these changes do not affect this matter. 
 
5 
[¶7]  In 2008, while Doe’s criminal case was unfolding, the Department 
promulgated yet another version of the substantiation-appeal rules.7  See 18 
C.M.R. 10 148 201 §§ I-XIV (effective Oct. 1, 2008).  The 2008 rules created 
procedures by which an individual could retroactively request an 
administrative hearing to review his substantiation, but only if (1) he had 
been substantiated before November of 2003 and (2) he had timely requested 
a paper review.  See 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 § XIV (effective Oct. 1, 2008).  There 
is no indication in the record that the Department notified any of the 
individuals substantiated before November of 2003 of the opportunity for a 
hearing. 
[¶8]  In January of 2017, the Department notified Doe that, based on his 
2003 substantiation, his presence in a home where children were residing 
could lead to the removal of those children.  On February 23, 2017, Doe 
requested a hearing to review his 2003 substantiation, and on April 21, 2017, 
the Department denied, as untimely, Doe’s request: 
Mr. [Doe]’s request has been denied due to his failure to request a 
review in a timely manner following his receipt of his notice that 
the Department had made a finding against him.  It is clearly 
stated in Mr. [Doe]’s letter that if he wished to request a review, 
he needed to make that request in writing within thirty calendar 
                                         
7  In 2008, the Department again complied with standard APA rulemaking procedures.  See 
5 M.R.S. §§ 8052, 8053, 8056; 22 M.R.S. § 42(1).   
 
6 
days of the date he received the notice.  Mr. [Doe] signed for the 
notice on October 4, 2003. 
 
[¶9]  Doe asked the Department to reconsider its denial.  The 
Department refused, prompting Doe to petition the Superior Court 
(Androscoggin County) for a review of the Department’s denial pursuant to 
Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80C; 5 M.R.S. 
§ 11002 (2017).  The Superior Court affirmed the Department’s decision.  Doe 
timely appealed.  See 5 M.R.S. § 11008(1) (2017); 14 M.R.S. 1851 (2017); M.R. 
App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶10]  Doe challenges the Department’s denial of his request for a 
hearing to review his 2003 substantiation.  Specifically, Doe asserts that the 
Department’s 2000 policy is judicially unenforceable and that the 
Department’s refusal to review his substantiation violated his procedural and 
substantive due process rights, as well as his equal protection rights.   
[¶11]  Generally, “[w]hen the Superior Court acts in an intermediate 
appellate capacity pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, we review the administrative 
agency’s decision directly for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Manirakiza v. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 2018 ME 10, ¶ 7, 177 A.3d 1264 (quotation marks 
 
7 
omitted).  Questions of law are subject to de novo review.  York Hosp. v. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 2008 ME 165, ¶ 32, 959 A.2d 67.  The party seeking 
to overturn the agency’s decision bears the burden of persuasion on appeal.  
Somerset Cty. v. Dep’t of Corr., 2016 ME 33, ¶ 14, 133 A.3d 1006.   
A. 
The Department’s 2000 Policy  
[¶12]  Doe first argues that the Department’s 2000 policy is not 
judicially enforceable because it was not promulgated according to the APA, 
and therefore Doe’s failure to request a paper review in 2003 cannot be used 
by the Department to bar his 2017 request for a review.  The APA provides 
that an agency rule “is not judicially enforceable unless it is adopted in a 
manner consistent with [the APA].”  5 M.R.S. § 8002(9) (2017).  There are 
certain procedures that an agency must follow when promulgating rules, such 
as, inter alia, providing public notice and submitting the proposed rules to the 
Attorney General for approval.  See 5 M.R.S. §§ 8052, 8053, 8056.  There are 
also APA requirements for emergency rulemaking.  See 5 M.R.S. § 8054.  
“Rules adopted in a manner other than that prescribed by [the APA] are void 
and of no legal effect . . . .”  5 M.R.S. § 8057(1) (2017). 
[¶13]  The Department’s letter notifying Doe that he had been 
substantiated stated that Doe had “thirty calendar days” to appeal the 
 
8 
substantiation finding, but no such thirty-day appeal period is found in the 
Department’s 2000 policy—the 2000 policy referenced an appeal period of 
only ten days.  See 2000 Policy (explaining that the Department must include 
the following statement in all letters to substantiated individuals: “[y]ou must 
request this review in writing with [sic] TEN days of receiving this notice”).  
Even if the letter had correctly quoted the appeal period in the 2000 policy—
ten days—that appeal period would be unenforceable because the 2000 
policy was not promulgated pursuant to the APA.  See 5 M.R.S. § 8057(1); 
22 M.R.S. § 42(1).  The thirty-day appeal period mentioned in the letter is 
unenforceable because the 2003 rules had not yet gone into effect.  See 18 
C.M.R. 10 148 201 § XI (effective Nov. 1, 2003).  Because there is no judicially 
enforceable appeal period that relates to Doe’s 2003 substantiation, Doe’s 
failure to request a paper review in 2003 cannot act as a bar to his request for 
a review in 2017.  The Department’s refusal to review Doe’s 2003 
substantiation because he failed to “request a review in a timely manner” is 
thus misguided.  See 5 M.R.S. § 8057(1). 
B. 
Procedural Due Process 
[¶14]  Doe also argues that the Department’s refusal to review his 2003 
substantiation violates his procedural due process rights pursuant to the 
 
9 
United States and Maine Constitutions.  See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. 
Const. art. I, § 6-A.  Specifically, Doe asserts that he was never provided an 
opportunity for a hearing before an impartial factfinder and that the 
Department’s 2003 letter did not provide him with notice of the collateral 
consequences of his substantiation.   
[¶15]  “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law.”  Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”).  In general, the fundamental requirement of due process 
is that a party must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.  
Kirkpatrick v. City of Bangor, 1999 ME 73, ¶ 15, 728 A.2d 1268; Martin v. 
Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 1998 ME 271, ¶ 15, 723 A.2d 412.  “The notice 
and opportunity for a hearing must be granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”  Kirkpatrick, 1999 ME 73, ¶ 15, 728 A.2d 1268 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶16]  Following precedent from the United States Supreme Court, we 
examine questions of procedural due process in two steps.  See Ky. Dep’t of 
Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Sparks v. Sparks, 2013 ME 41, 
¶ 28, 65 A.3d 1223.  “[W]e must first determine whether the governmental 
 
10 
action has resulted in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.  If a 
deprivation has occurred, we are next required to determine what process is 
due the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Sparks, 2013 ME 41, 
¶ 28, 65 A.3d 1223 (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also 
Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. 
[¶17]  The Supreme Court has developed, and we have embraced, a 
balancing test that augments the second step of the due process analysis.  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Balian v. Bd. of Licensure 
in Med., 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d 364.  That test requires us to consider 
three distinct factors to determine “whether the administrative procedures 
provided [] are constitutionally sufficient” to protect an individual’s due 
process rights:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. 
 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35; see also Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d 364. 
[¶18]  Here, under the first step of the procedural due process analysis, 
Doe’s liberty interest is at stake.  As we held in Kane v. Commissioner of the 
 
11 
Department of Health & Human Services, “serious consequences [] flow from a 
substantiation finding. . . .  The stigma of being listed as ‘substantiated’ for 
child abuse combined with the adverse professional and social consequences 
of being listed in the database implicates a fundamental liberty interest.”  
2008 ME 185, ¶¶ 22-23, 960 A.2d 1196.   
[¶19]  Next, we must determine whether the administrative procedures 
available to Doe adequately protect his due process rights.  See Sparks, 
2013 ME 41, ¶ 28, 65 A.3d 1223.  The Department’s 2003 letter to Doe did 
several things: (1) it informed him that he had been substantiated; (2) it 
explained why he had been substantiated—i.e., what evidence the Department  
reviewed in making its substantiation determination; (3) it stated that he had 
the right to request a review of the substantiation determination; (4) it stated 
that he had thirty calendar days to request such a review; and (5) it informed 
him how to request a review.  The letter, however, lacked two crucial pieces of 
information.  First, it failed to provide Doe with any notice of the 
consequences of a substantiation finding.8  Second, the letter—which reflected 
the Department’s then-existing policy—did not permit the opportunity for a 
                                         
8  The Department’s formal rules mandate that a substantiation letter contain notice of the 
collateral consequences of a substantiation finding.  See 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 § IV(B) (effective 
Nov. 1, 2003); 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 § VII(B) (effective Oct. 1, 2008); 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201-5 
§ VII(B) (2017).   
 
12 
hearing if the Department upheld its substantiation finding after a paper 
review.   
[¶20]  Reviewing the Department’s process as it applies to Doe pursuant 
to the three Mathews factors, it is clear that the Department did not have 
adequate predeprivation procedures with regard to Doe.  See Mathews, 
424 U.S. at 335; Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d 364.  First, the stigma and 
the adverse professional and social consequences of being listed in the 
database implicate a fundamental liberty interest.  See Kane, 2008 ME 185, 
¶ 23, 960 A.2d 1196.  
[¶21]  Second, under the 2000 policy, individuals substantiated by the 
Department were at a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of their liberty 
interests.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10, 
722 A.2d 364.  The nature of this risk is demonstrated by the effect hearings 
had on substantiation decisions.  Within the first two years after the 
Department implemented a hearing procedure for substantiation appeals, the 
Department reported that over half of the substantiation decisions that were 
appealed by a hearing were overturned.  See Littlefield v. Walsh, 
CUMSC-CV-03-056 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Feb. 4, 2005) (“DHS, by its own 
admission, points up a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation when it 
 
13 
concedes that over half of the substantiation decisions appealed under the 
new procedures are overturned.”).  The fact that so many hearings resulted in 
reversals suggests that there was not only probable value, but actual value, in 
adding procedural safeguards—such as hearings—to the appeal process.  
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d 364.  Further, 
and most importantly, a hearing is a fundamental pillar of due process.  
See Kirkpatrick, 1999 ME 73, ¶ 15, 728 A.2d 1268.   
[¶22]  Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the State has a 
substantial interest in maintaining an accurate list of perpetrators of child 
abuse; the “cost” associated with ensuring the accuracy of that list is relatively 
small.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d 364.  
Because the Department already has in place procedures to conduct an 
administrative appellate review, see 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201-6 §§ VIII-XI (2017), 
making that process available to Doe would create only a slight administrative 
burden.  Thus, all three Mathews factors, as applied to this case, weigh in favor 
of Doe and against the Department.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Balian, 
1999 ME 8, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d 364.   
[¶23]  The Department argues that its 2008 rules are adequate and that 
they should apply to Doe.  As mentioned earlier, the 2008 rules created a 
 
14 
process by which some individuals substantiated before November 2003 
could request administrative hearings.  See 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 
§§ XIV(B)(1)-(3) (effective Oct. 1, 2008).  The Department asserts that these 
rules are “unambiguous” and that “[s]ubsection [four] describes exactly 
Mr. Doe’s case.”  See 18 C.M.R. 10 148 201 § XIV(B)(4) (effective Oct. 1, 2008) 
(“If the substantiated person received a notice of the substantiation 
determination when it was made (or shortly thereafter), was notified of the 
opportunity to request a review of the substantiation, but failed to request a 
review, then the substantiated person is not entitled to any further review 
pursuant to these rules.”).   
[¶24]  Regardless of whether the rules are unambiguous or describe 
Doe’s case, they are unconstitutional as applied to Doe because they do not 
afford him due process.  In 2003, Doe had no notice of the consequences of his 
substantiation because the Department’s letter failed to include that notice.  
He did not become aware of these consequences until 2017, at which time he 
requested a hearing.  The 2008 rules—retroactively affording some 
substantiated individuals an opportunity for a hearing—presuppose that the 
substantiated individual had notice of the consequences facing him.9  Because 
                                         
9  There would be no due process violation if the Department had, after changing its appeal 
process in 2008, mailed a letter to Doe with: (1) notice of the consequences of his substantiation; 
 
15 
the Department failed to provide such notice to Doe, his procedural due 
process rights have been violated.  See Kirkpatrick, 1999 ME 73, ¶ 15, 728 
A.2d 1268 (explaining that “notice and opportunity for a hearing must be 
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” (emphasis added) 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
[¶25]  In summary, the Department’s 2000 policy is judicially 
unenforceable, the letter sent to Doe by the Department in October 2003 was 
constitutionally flawed, and the 2008 rules do not apply to Doe.  The 
Department’s denial of Doe’s request as untimely violates Doe’s procedural 
due process rights.10   
The entry is: 
Judgment of the Superior Court vacated.  
Remanded 
with 
instructions 
to 
enter 
a 
judgment vacating the Department’s decision 
and remanding to the Department for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion, 
starting 
with 
a 
paper 
review 
of 
Doe’s 
substantiation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
(2) an acknowledgment that there had been no process before November 1, 2003, available to 
appeal a paper review; and (3) notice that despite his “failure” to ask for a paper review in 2003, he 
now had a limited period of time to challenge his substantiation.  Such a mailing would serve to 
notify other similarly situated individuals of the consequences of a substantiation and the limited 
opportunity for administrative appeals. 
10  Because we conclude that Doe is entitled to a review of his substantiation on this basis, we do 
not consider the merits of Doe’s other contentions. 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joshua Klein-Golden, Esq. (orally), Clifford & Golden, PA, Lisbon Falls, for 
appellant John Doe 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
 
 
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number AP-2017-5 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY