Title: ROGER KARL POOLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROGER KARL POOLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 33152 P.3d 412Case Number: 05-209, 05-210Decided: 02/28/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROGER KARLPOOLE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Roger 
Karl Poole pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 
a felony, and one count of reckless endangerment, a misdemeanor.  On appeal, Poole challenges only the validity of his guilty plea on 
the firearm possession charge.1  We affirm.

 
 

STATEMENT 
OF THE ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Poole advances the following issues for our 
review:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court erred when it accepted Appellant's guilty plea 
without an adequate factual basis.

 
 
II.         
Whether Appellant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Zanetta May was 
staying at Poole's residence while her husband 
was incarcerated in the county jail.  
In the span of approximately one week, Ms. May accrued more than $300.00 
in telephone charges, which upset Poole and 
caused friction in their relationship.  
On December 19, 2004, Shannon Ramirez and Gary Sherard went to Poole's residence to remove Ms. May from the 
situation.  Poole's brother was present in the home at the time.  At some point, tensions flared and a 
fight ensued.  Poole went to his bedroom and returned with a .22 caliber 
pistol.  He then displayed the gun 
and told Ms. May, Ms. Ramirez, and Mr. Sherard to get out of his house.  They immediately exited the 
residence.  Poole and his brother followed closely behind, and the 
fight continued outside.  
Eventually, Ms. May, Ms. Ramirez, and Mr. Sherard found sanctuary inside 
Mr. Sherard's truck.  As they 
attempted to drive away, Poole fired his 
gun.  The bullet went through the 
truck's front driver's side fender and penetrated the front tire.  

 
 
[¶4]      In separate 
felony informations, the State charged Poole with the unlawful use or possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon, as proscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 
(LexisNexis 2005), and one count of felony aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon, as proscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2005).  Poole subsequently accepted a plea agreement, whereby he 
pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and a reduced charge of 
reckless endangering under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504 (LexisNexis 2005).  At the change of plea hearing, 
Poole assured the district court that his 
guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered with full understanding of 
the charges, his constitutional rights, and the consequences of his pleas.  Both Poole and the State supplied a factual basis for the 
pleas.  The district court accepted 
Poole's guilty pleas and, two months later, 
sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of one to three years on the firearm 
conviction and one year on the reckless endangering conviction.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Factual 
Basis

 
 
[¶5]      Rule 11(f) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a trial court should not enter a 
judgment upon a guilty plea without ensuring that there is a factual basis for 
the plea.  The purpose of the 
procedural requirement is to prevent a defendant from being misled into a waiver 
of substantial rights.  Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶ 9, 85 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Wyo. 2004).  Before 
accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must determine whether:  (1) the defendant's acts fell within the 
conduct prohibited by law; and (2) at the time of the plea, the defendant 
understood his conduct was criminal.  
CSC v. State, 2005 WY 106, ¶ 
10, 118 P.3d 970, 973 (Wyo. 2005); Sami, ¶ 9, 85 P.3d  at 1017.  We review the hearing in which a guilty 
plea is entered as a whole to ensure that all the procedural requirements are 
satisfied.  Id.

 
 
[¶6]      Poole contends 
the district court erred when it found that a sufficient factual basis existed 
for his plea of guilty to the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 (LexisNexis 2005).  Specifically, he argues that, as a 
matter of law, the statute requires that he have actual knowledge that he was a 
convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm.  According to Poole, because he 
reasonably believed the predicate felony conviction, a 1975 felony aggravated 
assault conviction in North 
Dakota, had been pardoned, he did not violate the 
statute.  We 
disagree.

            

[¶7]      Section 6-8-102 
states in pertinent part:

 
 
Any 
person who has previously pleaded guilty to or been convicted of committing . . 
. a violent felony . . . and has not been pardoned and who . . . knowingly 
possesses any firearm is guilty of a felony . . . .

 
 
By its 
plain language, § 6-8-102 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of two 
elements:  (1) the defendant was 
previously convicted of a violent felony which has not been pardoned; and (2) 
the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm.  The only mens rea requirement for a 
conviction is knowledge that the instrument possessed is a firearm.  Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 871 
(Wyo. 
1982).  No requirement exists that 
the defendant know his status as a convicted felon.  As an obvious consequence, the State is 
not required to prove, nor is the court required to find, that a defendant have 
such knowledge.  Poole has not provided any authority to the 
contrary.

 
 
[¶8]      It is undisputed 
that the factual basis provided by Poole and the State adequately supports the 
district court's findings that Poole knowingly 
possessed a firearm and that he was a convicted felon who had not been 
pardoned.  We hold that the 
requirement of Rule 11(f) was satisfied and the district court did not err by 
accepting Poole's guilty 
plea.

 
 
 
 

Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶9]      To warrant 
reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Poole must establish on the record that counsel's 
performance was deficient and prejudice resulted.  Reichert v. State, 2006 WY 62, ¶ 11, 134 P.3d 268, 272 (Wyo. 2006).  In other 
words, Poole must demonstrate that, in light of 
the circumstances, counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been 
offered by a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency 
prejudiced the defense of the case.  
Id.  To establish prejudice in the context of 
a guilty plea, Poole must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.  
Id.  We invoke a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Id.; Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, 1134 (Wyo. 2001).  The 
burden of overcoming this presumption rests with Poole.  Reichert, ¶ 11, 134 P.3d  at 
272.

 
 
[¶10]   Poole's argument that his counsel 
was ineffective is premised on Poole's 
misunderstanding of the elements of § 6-8-102.  He faults his attorney for not knowing 
that he had a viable defense to the firearm charge, i.e., that he believed he had been 
pardoned and was therefore not a convicted felon when he possessed the 
firearm.  We have already ruled that 
Poole's ignorance of his status as a convicted 
felon is not a defense.  Counsel's 
assistance therefore was not constitutionally ineffective as 
claimed.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   Despite Poole's argument to the contrary, there is no requirement 
that a defendant have knowledge of his status as a convicted felon in order to 
be convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm under § 6-8-102.  Poole's 
conviction on the firearm charge in Docket No. 05-209 is affirmed.  Poole's conviction for reckless 
endangering in Docket No. 05-210 is summarily affirmed because Poole did not present any argument challenging that 
conviction.

  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
convictions arose out of separate criminal actions in the district court.  Although Poole filed two notices of 
appeal and different docket numbers were assigned to each case, Poole filed only one appellate brief encompassing both 
cases.  His appellate complaints 
pertain solely to the conviction underlying the appeal in Docket No. 
05-209.