Title: Commonwealth v. Spinucci

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-10018 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH SPINUCCI. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 10, 2015. - September 29, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Hearsay, Capital 
case.  Malice.  Evidence, Joint venturer, Hearsay.  Joint 
Enterprise.  Dangerous Weapon. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 9, 2004.  
 
 
The cases were tried before Paul A. Chernoff, J., and a 
motion for postconviction relief was heard by him. 
 
 
 
Joseph A. Hanofee for the defendant. 
 
Fawn D. Balliro Andersen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In June, 2006, a Middlesex County jury found 
the defendant guilty of the murder in the first degree of Ryan 
Sullivan on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty; he also 
was found guilty of four related offenses involving two other 
2 
 
victims, William Tighe and Jules Stevens.1  He appeals from these 
convictions and also appeals from the denial of his posttrial 
motion for relief.  He argues that the trial judge erred by 
declining to instruct the jury on manslaughter on a provocation 
theory; denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that a 
manslaughter instruction on this theory clearly was required; in 
connection with the murder charge, failing to instruct the jury 
that before they could infer malice from the intentional use of 
a dangerous weapon on the part of the defendant as a joint 
venturer with Van Gustave (see note 1, supra), the jury must 
find that the defendant knew Gustave was armed with a knife; 
allowing the jury to consider hearsay evidence to establish the 
defendant's knowledge that his alleged joint venturer Gustave 
possessed a knife; and denying the defendant's motion for a 
required finding of not guilty on the two charges relating to 
the victim Stevens.  He also claims that he is entitled to 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the defendant's 
convictions and decline to grant relief pursuant to c. 278, 
§ 33E.   
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury 
                     
 
1 The defendant's codefendant, Van Gustave, was not tried 
together with the defendant.  The Commonwealth's theory at trial 
was that the defendant and Gustave committed all of the crimes 
charged as participants in a joint venture, although the 
Commonwealth argued that the roles each played -- whether 
"principal" or "joint venturer" or both -- differed in relation 
to each crime.   
3 
 
could have found, reserving certain details for later discussion 
in connection with the issues raised.  On the night of July 1, 
2004, the city of Somerville put on a fireworks display in Trum 
Field.  The defendant, Gustave, and their respective girl 
friends, Claudine Dyer and Danielle Leblanc, met before the 
fireworks and went together to the event.  All four were 
drinking before and during the fireworks display; Gustave and 
Leblanc also had taken a number of Klonopin pills.  As they were 
walking together toward the fireworks, Leblanc asked Gustave if 
she could hold his knife in case they ran into "anybody that I 
had problems with."  Gustave answered, "No."  Dyer similarly 
asked the defendant whether he had a knife and whether she could 
hold it; the defendant also answered, "No."  The defendant heard 
the interchange between Gustave and Leblanc.   
 
The foursome watched the fireworks from a garage roof on 
Albion Street, where they drank beer and smoked marijuana; the 
defendant and Dyer each drank approximately six beers.  After 
the fireworks were over, the four began to walk on Cedar Street.  
William Tighe came running down the street from the bicycle path 
near them, and Leblanc confronted him with a statement or 
question about her brother and drugs.  A heated dispute between 
Leblanc and Tighe ensued, in the course of which Tighe came up 
very close to Leblanc, shouting and threatening her, Dyer then 
approached Tighe and punched him in the face, and Tighe 
4 
 
responded by pushing Dyer down against a fence.  As this 
confrontation was taking place, Sullivan and Stevens came 
walking down the street and were standing behind Tighe, whom 
they knew through Tighe's younger brother.  Neither Sullivan nor 
Stevens carried a weapon, and neither said anything or joined 
the dispute.  After Tighe pushed Dyer, the defendant and Gustave 
began to approach him, and they both took out their knives; 
Tighe did not have a weapon.  Tighe began to run down Warwick 
Street, and told Stevens and Sullivan to run; Gustave and the 
defendant ran after Tighe in pursuit.  Tighe stumbled as he ran; 
the defendant caught up to him, and stabbed him with a knife in 
the back, inflicting a superficial wound.  Tighe got up and 
continued to run.  The defendant and Gustave ran toward Stevens 
and Sullivan.  Gustave grabbed Stevens by the waist and stabbed 
him in the side; Stevens fell to the ground.  The defendant did 
not attack Stevens, but connected with Sullivan.  At this point, 
the entire group was on Warwick Street.  The defendant stood and 
then crouched over Sullivan, with his arm repeatedly stabbing 
him in the stomach area.  Gustave then joined the defendant in 
stabbing Sullivan; Sullivan appeared to be fighting against 
them.  Leblanc kicked Sullivan a few times in the head as he lay 
on the ground, and Dyer also may have kicked him.   
 
As these events were unfolding on Warwick Street, Michael 
McCormack, Tighe's stepfather, who was in the backyard of his 
5 
 
house on Warwick Street, heard a young male voice say, "Get off 
me.  Leave me alone," and came running out of his driveway.  He 
saw the defendant and Gustave bending over Sullivan and Stevens, 
who were both lying on the ground.  McCormack ran toward the 
defendant and Gustave, swearing at them, and "bowled them over."  
The defendant and Gustave ran away, as did Dyer and Leblanc.   
As they ran, Dyer stopped and asked Gustave and the 
defendant why "that kid" was bleeding, and Gustave responded, 
"Because we just stabbed them.  We just stabbed them."  The 
defendant said, three times, "I'm on probation."  He also said, 
"I can't believe this."  Dyer was running a little behind the 
defendant, and as they ran, a resident who was out on a porch 
heard the defendant say, "Hurry the fuck up.  I just stabbed 
three people, three guys, and I'm going to jail for three 
years."  The defendant, Gustave, Dyer, and Leblanc ultimately 
ended up at Leblanc's house in Somerville.   
In the meantime, McCormack and his wife, Elizabeth 
McCormack, who is Tighe's mother, tried to tend to the two prone 
victims; each recognized both Sullivan and Stevens.  A telephone 
call was made to 911.  Sullivan and Stevens were taken to the 
hospital.  Sullivan died within one hour, having received at 
least seven stab wounds; he was sixteen years of age.  Stevens 
lost his kidney and spent thirty days in the hospital; he was 
6 
 
seventeen years of age.2   
 
2.  Procedural history.  On September 9, 2004, a Middlesex 
County grand jury returned indictments against the defendant and 
Gustave, charging each of them with murder in the first degree 
of Sullivan (count one); armed assault with intent to murder 
Stevens and Tighe (counts two and three); assault and battery of 
Stevens by means of a dangerous weapon, causing serious bodily 
injury (count four); and assault and battery of Tighe by means 
of a dangerous weapon (count five).  The defendant's case was 
severed from Gustave's before trial.  See note 5, infra.  The 
jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree of 
Sullivan on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, as well 
as on counts four and five, charging assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon of Stevens and Tighe, respectively.3  
On the charges of armed assault with intent to murder Stevens 
and Tighe, the jury convicted the defendant of the lesser 
included offense of assault by means of a dangerous weapon.4  The 
                     
 
2 The defendant and Gustave were in their mid-twenties.   
 
3 The jury did not find the defendant guilty of deliberately 
premeditated murder.  
 
4 The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole on the murder indictment; a term of from nine to ten 
years on count four to be served concurrently with the life 
sentence; and, on count five, a term of from seven to eight 
years to be served concurrently with the life sentence and from 
and after the sentence on count four.  Counts two and three were 
placed on file with the defendant's consent.    
7 
 
defendant filed a timely appeal in this court.5    
 
In November, 2007, the defendant filed, pro se, his 
posttrial motion in the Superior Court.6  Thereafter, the 
defendant's appeal to this court was stayed while the defendant 
pursued his posttrial motion.  The trial judge heard the motion, 
taking evidence on the defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  After that evidentiary hearing, the 
judge denied the defendant's posttrial motion.  The defendant's 
appeal from the denial of that motion has been consolidated with 
his direct appeal of his convictions. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Manslaughter instruction.  The defendant 
argues that the judge committed reversible error in declining to 
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included 
offense of the murder charge.  He claims that, as the judge 
"found" in ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, 
                                                                  
 
5 The parties assert that, some months after the defendant's 
trial and convictions, Gustave pleaded guilty to murder in the 
second degree and to the other charges against him.   
 
 
 
6 The motion is entitled, "motion for required finding of 
not guilty, or guilty of a lesser included offense, or lesser 
degree of guilt pursuant to [Mass. R. Crim. P.] 25 (b) (2)[, 378 
Mass. 896 (1979),] and reversal of the imposition of sentence of 
first degree life pursuant to [Mass. R. Crim. P.] 28[, 378 Mass. 
898 (1979)]" (posttrial motion).  The trial judge treated the 
defendant's posttrial motion as a combined motion for a required 
finding of not guilty under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b), and a 
motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing 
in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  We consider the substance of the 
posttrial motion in the same manner. 
8 
 
there was evidence that Sullivan had jumped on the defendant's 
back and the defendant pushed him off.7  He then asserts that 
this evidence would permit the jury to find that the defendant, 
in stabbing Sullivan thereafter, was acting in a heat of passion 
on reasonable provocation or induced by sudden combat.  We 
disagree.8   
 
The defendant is correct that if any view of the evidence 
                     
 
7 The defendant contends that the judge found as a fact that 
Danielle Leblanc saw Ryan Sullivan jump on the defendant's back.  
The judge made no such finding.  In his posttrial ruling, the 
judge summarized and discussed Leblanc's trial testimony, and 
described Leblanc as having testified that she saw "a third man" 
jump on Spinucci's back.  The judge referred to Leblanc's 
"testimony that she saw Sullivan jump on Spinucci's back before 
Spinucci thr[e]w him off" (emphasis added).  However, in her 
testimony, Leblanc never identified the man.  Nor could the 
judge have made a finding that Leblanc saw Sullivan jump on the 
defendant's back, given that at the evidentiary hearing held on 
the defendant's posttrial motion, the only person who was sworn 
and testified as a witness was the defendant's trial counsel, 
whose testimony did not refer at any point to Leblanc's alleged 
observation.   
 
8 During the charge conference at trial, the judge rejected 
the defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction, stating 
that he did not think the evidence supported such an 
instruction.  In making the request for the instruction, 
however, the defendant's counsel did not mention Leblanc's 
testimony about seeing a person jump on the defendant's back; 
counsel focused only on the defendant's alleged heat of passion 
caused by William Tighe's attack on the defendant's girl friend, 
Claudine Dyer.  In his ruling on the defendant's posttrial 
motion, the judge concluded that no manslaughter instruction was 
called for because the physical contact between the defendant 
and Sullivan as described by Leblanc was not sufficient to 
warrant an instruction, even if the contact had been initiated 
by Sullivan.  We conclude that an instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter was not warranted but for different reasons. 
9 
 
would permit a finding of voluntary manslaughter, an instruction 
on this lesser offense must be given.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Garabedian, 399 Mass. 304, 313 (1987).  It is also the case 
that such an instruction cannot be refused even if the evidence 
on which the claim for a manslaughter instruction is based is 
not "of a character to inspire belief" (citation omitted).  See 
id.  But an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is only 
warranted "if there is evidence of provocation deemed adequate 
in law to cause the accused to lose his self-control in the heat 
of passion, and if the killing followed the provocation before 
sufficient time had elapsed for the accused's temper to cool."  
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 422 Mass. 236, 237 (1996).  The jury 
also must be able to infer from the evidence "that a reasonable 
person would have become sufficiently provoked and that, in 
fact, the defendant was provoked," and that "there is a causal 
connection between the provocation, the heat of passion, and the 
killing" (quotations and citations omitted).  Garabedian, supra.     
 
The defendant does not contend that Leblanc identified the 
person she saw jump on the defendant's back, but argues that by 
process of elimination, the unidentified person had to have been 
Sullivan, because Leblanc identified the person as a male and 
stated that the male was not McCormack; the person was not 
Tighe, because Tighe ran back to his home after being stabbed by 
10 
 
the defendant; and the person was not Stevens because, the jury 
could find, Gustave previously had "stabbed and disabled" 
Stevens.  To this, the defendant adds that he already was upset 
by Tighe's attack on his girl friend that had taken place only 
seconds before, and that if the jury were to find that the 
defendant had attacked Sullivan,9 Sullivan's physical assault of 
the defendant independently provoked his emotions so that when 
the defendant attacked Sullivan, he was acting in the heat of 
passion due to provocation or sudden combat.  See Commonwealth 
v. Hinds, 457 Mass. 83, 90-91 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 838-839 (2004) ("provocation must come from 
the victim"). 
 
The defendant's argument is defeated by an absence of 
evidentiary support.  The evidence from which the jury could 
find that the defendant stabbed Sullivan came from three 
witnesses:  Dyer, McCormack, and Stevens.  Each of the three 
testified to seeing the defendant standing or crouching next to 
or over Sullivan's body, inferably engaged in stabbing him.10  
                     
 
9 At trial, the defendant's theory of the case was that the 
defendant stabbed Tighe, but played no role in Gustave's attack 
on Stevens or Sullivan -- that Gustave was acting entirely on 
his own.  
 
 
10 Claudine Dyer testified that she saw the defendant and 
Gustave standing next to a person lying on the ground and 
repeatedly moving their hands downward toward the body -- 
testimony that permits the inference that the defendant and 
Gustave were engaged in stabbing the person -- but she did not 
11 
 
But none of them testified to seeing anyone jump on the 
defendant's back or indeed interact physically with the 
defendant before each saw the defendant standing over and 
stabbing Sullivan.  Leblanc was the sole source of evidence 
concerning someone jumping on the defendant's back.  She 
testified that she saw the person jump on the defendant's back 
and saw the defendant push the person off.  At no point did she 
testify to seeing any further interactions between the defendant 
and the person he had pushed off his back.  Rather, all she 
stated was that she had observed the person jump on the 
defendant's back either while or soon after she kicked the body 
of a male11 lying on the ground on Warwick Street, and that this 
incident had happened around the time that she began to run down 
Warwick Street away from the body on the ground and she saw 
McCormack running on Warwick Street toward her.12   
                                                                  
identify the person as Sullivan.  McCormack and Stevens both 
identified the defendant as the person they saw standing over 
and, inferably, stabbing Sullivan.     
 
11 Leblanc did not identify the male whom she saw lying on 
the street.   
 
 
12 Leblanc's testimony on direct examination suggested that 
she saw someone jump on the defendant's back right before 
Gustave ran by her and urged her to run and she saw Michael 
McCormack running towards her.  On cross-examination and 
redirect, Leblanc suggested that she witnessed the jumping 
incident after Gustave ran by and she saw McCormack.  In any 
event, the reasonable inference is that Leblanc saw the person 
jump on the defendant's back right around the time that she 
began to run and saw McCormack on Warwick Street.  
12 
 
 
The jury, of course, were free to believe or disbelieve, in 
whole or in part, the testimony of each witness.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Hawkesworth, 405 Mass. 664, 675 (1989).  
Accordingly, the jury in theory could have credited Leblanc's 
testimony that she saw the body of only one person lying on the 
ground, and that the body she was kicking was that of Stevens, 
not Sullivan, and infer that the person who jumped on the 
defendant's back was Sullivan.13  But the jury were not entitled 
to attribute to any witness, including Leblanc, a statement or 
statements that the witness did not make.  See Commonwealth v. 
McInerney, 373 Mass. 136, 144 (1977).  Given the state of the 
evidentiary record, with no evidence of contact between the 
defendant and Sullivan following the alleged jump on the 
defendant's back, there simply was no factual basis on which it 
could be found that the defendant stabbed Sullivan in an 
emotionally heated response to the physical interaction between 
the two.  Put another way, the evidence necessary to support the 
essential causal link between any heat of passion on the 
defendant's part resulting from Sullivan's jumping on his back, 
                     
 
 
 
13 If the jury were to make such findings, they would be 
required to reject the testimony of Dyer and McCormack that 
there were two bodies lying on Warwick Street at the time 
McCormack ran onto the scene, and the testimony of McCormack and 
Stevens that one of those prone bodies belonged to Sullivan -- 
because obviously, if Sullivan were then on the ground, he could 
not have been the person who jumped on the defendant's back.     
13 
 
and the defendant's stabbing of Sullivan, see Garabedian, 399 
Mass. at 313, was missing.  The judge did not err in declining 
to include the charge on voluntary manslaughter in his 
instructions to the jury.   
 
2.  Instruction on malice in connection with joint venture 
murder charge.  With respect to the charge of murder in the 
first degree, the Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the 
defendant and Gustave committed the crime as part of a joint 
venture.  More particularly, the Commonwealth argued that the 
defendant acted as a principal by stabbing Sullivan repeatedly 
with his knife, or as a joint venturer with Gustave who himself 
stabbed Sullivan repeatedly, or both.  The defendant's theory at 
trial, see note 9, supra, was that Gustave alone attacked 
Sullivan -- i.e., Gustave was the principal in the crime -- and 
that the defendant did not participate in that attack or share 
Gustave's intent, but actually tried to stop Gustave from 
continuing with that attack.  The judge instructed the jury that 
the Commonwealth's theory was that the defendant committed the 
crime of murder as part of a joint venture, and explained what 
the Commonwealth had to prove in order to establish that the 
defendant was guilty under this theory.  He also separately 
instructed on the elements of murder in the first degree.  In 
his instruction on the concept of malice in relation to murder 
under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, he told the 
14 
 
jury: 
 
"Malice, for this theory of murder, also includes an 
intent to do an act, that in the circumstances known to the 
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a 
plain and strong likelihood that death would follow. 
 
"Under this third meaning of malice, you must 
determine whether based on what the defendant actually knew 
at the time that he acted, a reasonable person would have 
recognized that such conduct created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would result. 
 
"In determining whether the Commonwealth has proven 
this third meaning of malice, you must consider the 
defendant's actual knowledge of the circumstances at the 
time that he acted.  Where there is evidence that a person 
brought a dangerous weapon to a scene and used the 
dangerous weapon on another, you may consider that evidence 
as relevant in proving malice" (emphasis added).   
 
 
The defendant's argument on appeal is not entirely clear, 
but appears to be that it was error for the judge to include 
this instruction concerning use of a dangerous weapon because, 
insofar as the Commonwealth was proceeding on a joint venture 
theory, the jury could infer the malice necessary for murder on 
the defendant's part from Gustave's use of a dangerous weapon, 
without any proof that the defendant knew Gustave was armed.  
Put another way, the defendant appears to claim that in the 
joint venture context presented by the Commonwealth, it was 
necessary to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth must prove 
that the defendant knew Gustave had a knife before they might 
infer malice on the defendant's part from Gustave's intentional 
use of that knife. 
15 
 
 
The argument fails.  First, the instruction that the judge 
gave is most reasonably understood as referring to defining 
malice directly only in connection with the defendant.  Thus, 
the reference in the quoted instruction to a "person" who brings 
and uses a dangerous weapon follows directly after the direction 
that the jury must consider the defendant's "actual knowledge" 
of the circumstances, suggesting that the "person" being 
referred to is the defendant.  It seems highly unlikely the jury 
would interpret this instruction as indicating that if they 
found that Gustave had brought and used a dangerous weapon, they 
might infer from that finding the existence of malice on the 
defendant's part.  Second, even if one were to conclude that the 
jury might understand the dangerous weapon reference in this 
instruction as meaning they could somehow consider Gustave's use 
of a dangerous weapon in considering the element of malice on 
the defendant's part, the judge's joint venture instructions -- 
given both as part of the judge's final charge and again in 
response to a jury question -- specifically told the jury that 
if the other person in the joint venture actually committed the 
substantive crime, the jury must find that the defendant himself 
had or shared the intent necessary for that crime, thus 
indicating that the jury must consider the defendant's intent on 
its own, not as an automatic transfer of the intent of the 
coventurer.  These instructions were correct. 
16 
 
 
The defendant contends that to prove joint venture first-
degree murder under a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
where a dangerous weapon is involved, the Commonwealth should be 
required to prove that the joint venturer both knew the 
principal had a dangerous weapon and shared the principal's 
intent to commit the murder in an atrocious or cruel way.  That 
is not the law.  Where use of a weapon is not an element of the 
crime -- and it is not an element of murder in the first degree 
-- there is no requirement for the Commonwealth to prove 
knowledge on the part of a joint venturer that the principal was 
armed.  See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 245 (2014), 
citing Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 100 (2013).  In 
addition, in a case of joint venture first-degree murder 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, malice alone defines 
the intent that the Commonwealth must prove.  See Commonwealth v 
Chaleumphong, 434 Mass. 70, 79-80 (2001) (intent necessary for 
murder in first degree under theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty is malice alone; "[i]f the Commonwealth has no burden to 
prove that a defendant who acted alone knew that his acts were 
extremely atrocious or cruel, then it has no such burden where 
the defendant acts in a joint venture"); Commonwealth v. 
Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983) (same); Commonwealth v. 
Monsen, 377 Mass. 245, 254-255 (1979) (same).  Although in 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 777-778 (2014) (Gants, J., 
17 
 
concurring), and Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 828 
(2014) (Duffly, J., concurring), the concurring opinions 
suggested that it may be time to revisit the intent element of 
murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, this is not the case in which to do so.  There was 
significant evidence indicating that the defendant himself was 
engaged in repeatedly stabbing the victim Sullivan, that 
Sullivan struggled to avoid the harm being inflicted, and that 
the stabbing wounds he received would have been painful.  The 
judge properly instructed the jury under the principles of law 
that governed at the time; we leave to another day the question 
whether to change or modify those governing legal principles. 
 
3.  Evidence of defendant's knowledge that his joint 
venturer was armed with knife.  Over the defendant's objection, 
the judge permitted Leblanc to testify that while she was 
walking with Dyer, Gustave, and the defendant to the fireworks, 
she asked Gustave for "the knife" in case she ran into anyone 
she "had problems with," and he said, "No."  She also testified 
that she did not ask whether Gustave had a knife at that time, 
but assumed that he did.  At the conclusion of Leblanc's 
testimony, the judge gave a limiting instruction to the jury to 
the effect that if they found that Gustave had stated that he 
possessed a knife and that the defendant had heard him make the 
statement, the jury could consider that evidence as relevant 
18 
 
only to the issue whether the defendant knew that Gustave was 
armed with a knife.14  The defendant argues that despite the 
limiting instruction, Leblanc's testimony about her exchange 
with Gustave was admitted for its truth, and constituted 
improper hearsay evidence. 
 
There was no error.  The issue whether the defendant knew 
Gustave was carrying a knife was clearly relevant in this case, 
if for no other reason than that the Commonwealth's theory was 
that the two men were acting together as part of a joint 
venture, and that the crimes charged relating to Stevens and 
Tighe included as an element the possession or use of a 
dangerous weapon.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee, 460 Mass. 64, 
69-70 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Claudio, 418 Mass. 103, 111 
(1994), overruled on another ground by Britt, 465 Mass. at 99 
(to convict defendant as joint venturer rather than principal of 
crime involving use or possession of dangerous weapon, 
Commonwealth must prove defendant knew his coventurer was armed 
                     
 
14 The limiting instruction was actually more favorable to 
the defendant than the evidence dictated, in that there was no 
evidence before the jury that Gustave said he had a knife:  
Leblanc testified that she did not ask Gustave (and 
inferentially he did not state) whether he had a knife, but 
rather that she assumed he did.  Accordingly, the jury, if they 
were following the judge's limiting instruction literally, could 
not have inferred from Leblanc's testimony that Gustave stated 
he had a knife, and therefore could not have inferred that the 
defendant had knowledge that Gustave was carrying a knife.  We 
will assume, however, that the jury may have understood Leblanc 
as indicating that Gustave (inferentially) stated he had a 
knife. 
19 
 
with dangerous weapon).  Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, 
however, the evidence was not admitted to prove that in fact 
Gustave had a knife.  Contrast, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lowe, 391 
Mass. 97, 104-105, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840 (1984) (victim's 
statements to others about facts of past events inadmissible 
under state of mind exception to hearsay rule).  Rather, the 
judge's limiting instruction specifically restricted the 
relevance and the jury's use of the statement to the defendant's 
state of knowledge and, as such, it was not hearsay.  See 
Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 Mass. 648, 652 n.5 (2013).  See also 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) note (2015).   
 
4.  Sufficiency of evidence of defendant's guilt on charges 
relating to Stevens.  The defendant was found guilty of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious 
bodily injury to the victim Stevens.  The verdict was 
necessarily premised on a determination by the jury that the 
defendant was acting solely as a joint venturer with Gustave, 
because the undisputed evidence was that Stevens was stabbed 
only by Gustave.   
As he did at the close of the Commonwealth's case when he 
moved for a required finding of not guilty, the defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he was guilty of 
this crime as a joint venturer.  We review the evidence to 
determine whether a rational juror could conclude beyond a 
20 
 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in 
the crime at issue with the requisite intent.  See Commonwealth 
v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 247 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 468 (2009).  See generally Commonwealth 
v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).   
The evidence permitted a reasonable juror to find that the 
defendant and Gustave were close friends; that the two had come 
to the scene together with their respective girl friends; that 
the two took out and displayed their knives at the same time to 
confront the victim Tighe; and that the two chased the three 
victims -- Tighe, Stevens, and Sullivan -- and they both joined 
in physically attacking Sullivan.  The attacks on all the 
victims took place in a very short period of time and at least 
the attacks on Sullivan and Stevens took place in a 
circumscribed physical area:  when the police arrived, Stevens 
and the victim Sullivan were lying on the ground within a few 
feet of each other.15  Considered as a whole, the evidence was 
sufficient to warrant the jury's guilty verdict on this charge.  
See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678.  The defendant's motion for 
a required finding of not guilty was properly denied.16  
                     
15 McCormack also testified that Sullivan and Stevens were 
lying on the ground one or two feet apart when McCormack first 
saw them.   
 
 
16 In connection with this charge relating to Stevens, the 
judge did not instruct the jury that the Commonwealth must prove 
21 
 
 
5.  Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant argues 
that relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is warranted here because 
of the prosecutor's closing argument -- the defendant claims 
improper appeals to emotion and that the prosecutor argued facts 
not in evidence, errors in the judge's instructions, and  
mitigating factors.  We have thoroughly reviewed the entire 
record of this case.  We conclude that the prosecutor's closing 
was not improper and find no reason that would warrant relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.  
                                                                  
the defendant knew that Gustave was armed with a knife.  The 
instruction should have been given.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Lee, 460 Mass. 64, 69-70 (2011).  There was no objection raised 
at trial, however, and the question therefore is whether the 
failure of the judge to give such an instruction created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 452 (2012).  We agree with the 
Commonwealth that there was no such likelihood.  There was 
strong circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew Gustave 
was armed with a knife at the time he stabbed Stevens, including 
the conversation between Leblanc and Gustave relating to 
Gustave's knife that the defendant could have overheard while 
they were all walking toward the fireworks; and evidence 
permitting the inference that the defendant saw Gustave holding 
a knife when they both confronted Tighe preceding Gustave's 
attack on Stevens.  See Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 
35 & n.7 (1997), S.C., 438 Mass. 356 (2003) (knowledge that 
accomplice had weapon may be shown from circumstantial 
evidence).