Title: City of Casper v. Utech

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

City of Casper v. Utech1995 WY 68895 P.2d 449Case Number: 93-186Decided: 05/11/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

The 
CITY OF CASPER, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

Michael UTECH, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Natrona County, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Gayla Lou Daniels, Deputy 
City Atty., Casper, for 
appellant.

Harry G. Bondi, P.C., 
Casper, for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* 
MACY and TAYLOR, JJ.

* Retired July 6, 1994.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The controversy 
in this appeal centers upon the articulation of findings of fact by an 
administrative agency when the party holding the burden of proof fails to 
sustain that burden. In a post-termination hearing, the Personnel Review Panel 
(Board) ruled the City of Casper (Casper) had failed to establish the asserted 
grounds for discharge of its employee, Michael Utech (Utech) by admissible, 
relevant, and credible evidence. Its finding as to each ground was that there 
was insufficient evidence. Casper sought review in the district court where the 
Board's decision was affirmed. Complaining the Board failed to make findings of 
basic facts, and the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not 
supported by sufficient evidence, Casper appealed. We affirm the decision of the 
district court.

[¶2]      Casper, in its 
Brief of Appellant states the issues to be:

I.          
Whether the Personnel Review Panel made findings of basic facts upon 
which their ultimate findings of facts were based as required by WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-110?

II.          
Whether the Personnel Review Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are supported by substantial evidence?

The counterstatement of the 
issues by Utech is:

I.          
Did the panel make sufficient findings of basic fact to permit meaningful 
court review?

II.          
Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the panel's 
findings that the city did not prove just cause for the employee's 
termination?

[¶3]      At the time of 
his discharge, Utech had been employed for sixteen years by Casper and was 
superintendent of the city garage. The preceding October, the city manager had 
received a memo from Utech's supervisor in which termination of Utech's 
employment was recommended. The city manager conducted a pre-termination 
hearing, at which Utech was not allowed representation by counsel, to determine 
the basis for this recommendation. The city manager then addressed a letter of 
termination to Utech.

[¶4]      In that letter, 
which was given to Utech on January 24, 1992, Casper notified him his employment 
would be terminated because of his actions with respect to supervisory 
practices, personal problems brought to the job, and use of city-owned property. 
Specifically, the letter stated:

Supervisory Practices

1. Threatening employees, under your supervision, 
both verbally and physically.

2. Creating or allowing to exist, an atmosphere 
that's detrimental to the work site that you are responsible for 
supervising.

3. Inconsistent treatment of employees under your 
supervision.

Personal 
Problems Brought to the Job

1. Harassment of City Employees

A. 
06-10-91 Written reprimand.

B. 
08-26-91 Citizen complaint.

C. 
Criminal Action No. 91-17212.

Use of 
City-owned Property

1. Unauthorized use of City-owned property, by 
yourself and by employees under your supervision.

Utech's employment was 
terminated, according to the letter, the same day.

[¶5]      Utech requested, 
and received, a post-termination hearing before the Board. The parties 
stipulated that the structure of the hearing imposed the burden of proof upon 
Casper. We have defined the concept of burden of proof in this 
way:

The phrase "burden of proof" is often used as meaning 
the necessity of establishing a fact to a legally required extent, or the 
necessity of finally establishing a fact. 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 103, p. 
709.

Tench v. Weaver, 374 P.2d 27, 29 (Wyo. 1962).

The encyclopedia tells 
us:

The term burden of proof has been used to describe 
two related but distinct concepts: the burden of production and the burden of 
persuasion.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

The burden of persuasion aspect of the burden of 
proof describes the obligation of a party to introduce evidence that persuades 
the factfinder, to a requisite degree of belief, that a particular proposition 
of fact is true.

The burden of persuasion has two components; first, 
the facts a party must plead and prove in order to prevail on a particular 
issue, and second, how persuasively it must prove those 
facts.

29 AM.JUR.2D Evidence § 155, 
181-82 (1994) (footnotes omitted).

Casper was required to 
submit sufficient evidence of just cause to terminate Utech's employment, and it 
was charged with doing so by a preponderance of the 
evidence.

[¶6]      Following a 
lengthy hearing in which numerous witnesses testified and a number of exhibits 
were introduced, the Board made these conclusions of law pertinent to this 
appeal:

6.         The 
City has presented insufficient admissible, relevant and credible evidence to 
conclude that there was just cause to terminate the employment of Michael 
Utech.

7.         The 
Personnel Review Panel concludes, as a matter of law, that the City of Casper 
has not met its burden of proving that there was just cause for the termination 
of the employment of Michael Utech.

The Board's findings of fact 
with respect to these conclusions of law were:

11.       Insufficient 
evidence was received by the Panel to find that while Michael Utech was the 
Superintendent of the Garage he threatened employees under his 
supervision.

12.       Insufficient 
evidence was received by the Panel to find that Michael Utech created or allowed 
to exist an atmosphere detrimental to the work site.

13.       Insufficient 
evidence was received by the Panel to find that Michael Utech was responsible 
for inconsistent treatment of employees under his 
supervision.

14.       Insufficient 
evidence was received by the Panel to find that Michael Utech harassed City 
employees.

15.       Insufficient 
evidence was received by the Panel to find that Michael Utech used city property 
without authorization.

The Board ordered that the 
decision of the city manager be reversed.

[¶7]      Casper asserted 
the findings of fact did not comply with WYO. STAT. § 16-3-110 (1990), and it 
requested the Board to specify the basic facts which led to its findings of 
insufficient evidence on these points. While the Board's ruling was pending, 
Casper appealed the Board's decision to the district court, where Casper 
asserted the identical issue. The district court ruled the findings provided a 
reasonable basis for the decision of the Board, and it affirmed that decision. 
Casper has appealed from the Order Affirming entered in the district 
court.

[¶8]      Casper relies 
fiercely upon the decision of this court in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1968). We there 
articulated the requirement that an agency must encompass in its decision 
findings of basic facts sufficient to assist the court in applying the 
substantial evidence standard. Casper bolsters its reliance upon Pan American by 
citation to a number of other cases which have reiterated the requirement for 
findings of basic facts. Holding's Little America v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of 
Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983). See Campbell County v. Wyoming 
Community College Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1987); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1983); Larsen v. Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 569 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1977); Powell v. Bd. of Trustees 
of Crook County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 550 P.2d 1112 (Wyo. 1976); Geraud v. Schrader, 
531 P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Wind River Indian Educ. Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Ward, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1975). We cannot deny 
the rule of Pan American and its progeny with respect to the requirement that 
administrative agencies make specific findings of basic 
facts.

[¶9]      On the other 
hand, Utech insists Casper is demanding too much and beyond that which our cases 
require in asserting that the content of an agency's basic factual findings must 
summarize the evidence or detail how the agency weighed and evaluated that 
testimony. We agree mere summaries of evidence are insufficient to constitute 
findings. 2 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 471, 478 (1965). Our rule 
is that the agency, as the trier of fact, has the duty to weigh the evidence and 
determine the credibility of the evidence and the witnesses. E.g., Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873 (Wyo. 1994); Knight v. Envtl. Quality 
Council of State of Wyoming, 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); Story v. Wyoming State 
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 721 P.2d 1013 (Wyo. 1986); Westates Const. Co. v. 
Sheridan County Sch. Dist. No. 2, Bd. of Trustees, 719 P.2d 1366 (Wyo. 1986); W. 
Radio Communications, Inc. v. Two-Way Radio Serv., Inc., 718 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 
1986); Employment Security Comm'n of Wyoming v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311 (Wyo. 
1985); Gilmore v. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773 (1982); First 
Nat'l Bank of Worland v. Fin. Institutions Bd., 616 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1980); 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1974). Indeed, it is 
because of that duty we defer to the findings of fact made by administrative 
agencies. E.g., Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc.; L & H Welding and Machine Co. 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 876 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1994); 
Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1989); Trout v. Wyoming 
Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶10]   It is at this point we depart in 
this case from the argument of Casper and its reliance upon Pan American and its 
progeny. Those cases do not address the situation in which there is no finding 
of fact. Neither does WYO. STAT. § 16-3-110 speak to that situation. The cases 
and the statute are concerned with a requirement that is imposed when facts are 
found. Even accounting for the dichotomy articulated in Pan American with 
respect to whether the burden of proof encompasses the burden of establishing 
the case as a whole or the burden to establish a prima facie case at a certain 
stage of the hearing, we are satisfied that, when the agency concludes there is 
a failure of proof because "insufficient evidence was received by the panel" to 
permit the agency to find any of the allegations of the party charged with the 
burden of proof, Pan American does not apply.

[¶11]   It is clear Casper is demanding an 
explanation by the Board of why or how it reached the conclusion that, "[t]he 
City has presented insufficient admissible, relevant and credible evidence to 
conclude that there was just cause to terminate the employment of Michael 
Utech." Our difficulty with Casper's argument is that we discern no way in which 
the articulation of why or how the evidence was insufficient to establish facts 
will assist us in appellate review. Should that explanation be forthcoming, 
probably along the lines of Utech's brief, it would be of no assistance since we 
are not permitted to reweigh the evidence nor to tread upon the agency 
disposition of credibility.

[¶12]   We are satisfied, given some thirty 
years of additional experience with respect to administrative proceedings, a 
practical and pragmatic rule can be announced with respect to this issue. We 
hold, since we cannot reweigh the evidence nor redetermine the credibility of 
the evidence, no purpose is to be served by demanding the agency explain how it 
evaluated the evidence in arriving at a conclusion that a party failed to meet 
its burden of proof.

[¶13]   Instead, we are satisfied such 
cases come within the argument made by Casper with respect to its second issue 
addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, and the case must be considered 
under the arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law language of WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). In making this argument, Casper relies upon Mekss v. 
Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1992); FMC v. Lane, 773 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1989); and 
Mountain Fuel. An agency's decision totally contrary to the evidence in the 
record is subject to such a test. We would have no equivocation in reversing and 
remanding such a decision.

[¶14]   The decision to reverse and remand 
on the ground the agency decision is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law 
because it is totally contrary to the evidence could only be made based upon our 
examination of the entire record, a duty we are charged with under the statute. 
WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c). See, e.g., L & H Welding; Hohnholt; Trout. Our 
examination of this record satisfies us the decision of the Board was not 
arbitrary; was not capricious; was not an abuse of discretion; and there is no 
other justification for concluding it was not in accordance with law. It is 
plain to us that, having heard the evidence of the several witnesses, the Board, 
with justification, decided some witnesses were motivated by malice or ill will; 
some of the occurrences were exaggerated, if not fabricated; some information 
was simply presented to add weight to the proceedings; some of the witnesses 
were not truthful; and, indeed, the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the 
allegations made by Casper in the letter of dismissal given to Utech. 

[¶15]   The Order Affirming entered in the 
district court is affirmed.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, 
joins.

[¶16]   I respectfully dissent. Affirming 
an agency decision based upon conclusions unsupported by any factual findings 
ignores WYO. STAT. § 16-3-110 and effectively overrules our decision in Pan 
American Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1968).

[¶17]   Although the majority opinion 
states that it can "discern no way in which the articulation of why or how the 
evidence was insufficient to establish facts will assist us in appellate 
review," previous opinions of this court have consistently held that WYO. STAT. 
§ 16-3-110 imposes a duty on an agency to support its action with sufficient 
factual findings to further appellate review under WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990). Dept. of Employment v. Roberts Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 854, 858 (Wyo. 
1992); Application of Campbell County, 731 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Wyo. 1987); Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1983); Pan 
American, 446 P.2d  at 555. The rule from the statutes and our decisions is 
clear; this court must know what factual considerations led to a particular 
conclusion or this court's review is impeded.

[¶18]   In a number of cases, this court 
has considered the requirements of § 16-3-110; explained the statute's rationale 
for requiring basic facts; defined basic facts; defined ultimate facts; and 
demonstrated how the two are properly distinguished. Pan American, 446 P.2d  at 
555; Union Pacific Railroad v. Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 860 (Wyo. 
1990); FMC v. Lane, 773 P.2d 163, 165 (Wyo. 1989); Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1992). The insufficient evidence findings in this case are 
conclusory and, therefore, are ultimate facts to be supported by basic facts. 
See Pan American, 446 P.2d  at 555 (a finding of "insufficient evidence" was 
conclusory and an ultimate fact); Shenefield v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 544 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1976) (a finding of "has been discriminated against" 
is conclusory); and Powell v. Bd. of Trustees, Crook County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
550 P.2d 1112, 1120 (Wyo. 1976) (a finding of "unable to control conduct" is 
conclusory). A similar conclusory finding was considered in Pan American, where 
the petitioner was challenging, among other issues, an agency's finding that the 
evidence submitted to it did not establish sufficient cause for the agency's 
granting the petitioner's application for an exception to drill an oil well to 
protect the petitioner's correlative rights. Pan American, 446 P.2d  at 
553.

[¶19]   Examining that part of the agency's 
order entitled "FINDINGS," we looked at the matters stated there pertaining to 
the important factual issues concerning the necessity of an exception well to 
protect the petitioner's correlative rights. Id. at 555. In the agency's 
appellate brief, the agency said it found that the petitioner "`had failed to 
carry its burden of proof and to submit substantial evidence relating to [the] 
exception requested.'" Id. We characterized the agency's statement as "a 
conclusion, not a finding." Id. In particular, we criticized the agency for not 
showing "appropriately . . . wherein [petitioner] failed in its proof." Id. We 
admonished that "it is not incumbent upon [the reviewing court] to search the 
record to supply such an omission." Id. Those same criticisms apply to the 
conclusory findings of this case.

[¶20]   Although the limited review 
permitted this court for agency decisions does not allow us to weigh the 
evidence, determine credibility or substitute our judgment for the agency's, we 
rely on the agency's findings of basic fact to provide a rational basis for 
judicial review. Pan American, 446 P.2d  at 555. Ultimate facts can only be 
reached by a process of legal reasoning based on the legal significance of basic 
or evidentiary facts. Id. Basic facts must be settled before it can be 
determined that ultimate facts found by an agency conform to law. Id. A 
reviewing court defers to basic facts if supported by substantial evidence and 
affirms the agency's decision if the ultimate facts and legal conclusions 
logically and reasonably flow from those basic facts. Id. We must also examine 
the conflicting evidence to determine if the agency reasonably could have made 
its findings and order based upon all of the evidence before it. Gilmore v. 
Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773, 776 (Wyo. 
1982).

[¶21]   In its findings of basic fact, an 
agency may not merely summarize the evidence, see Roberts Constr. Co., 841 P.2d  
at 858, but must thoroughly explain each ultimate fact or conclusion in order 
for the reviewing court to determine the basis upon which the ultimate fact or 
conclusion was reached. FMC, 773 P.2d  at 165. It is clearly necessary, then, to 
find the proper middle ground "between a detailed reciting of the evidence on 
the one hand and a bare statement of the conclusions of fact or the ultimate 
facts on the other." COOPER, FRANK E., State Administrative Law, Vol. II, at 
470. As Pan American explains, an agency must make findings of basic fact on all 
material issues in the proceeding and upon which ultimate findings of fact or 
conclusions are based. Then the reviewing court can determine whether evidence 
was considered on a reasonable and proper basis. Pan American, 446 P.2d  at 
555.

[¶22]   In my opinion, had the agency's 
decision simply stated the evidence was sufficient to terminate for just cause, 
the majority would most certainly have reversed. There is no real difference 
between the facts of this case and the scenario presented, but the rule 
articulated by the majority will necessitate our approving agency decisions 
which merely find insufficient evidence or sufficient evidence. I would reverse 
and remand.