Title: Taneceia Larry v. Derrick L. Harris

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2935 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Taneceia Larry, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Derrick L. Harris, 
          Defendant, 
 
Carlos Rutherford, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
ABC Insurance Corporation and Officer John Roe, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 132 
Reported: 301 Wis. 2d 243, 733 N.W.2d 911 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 17, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel A. Noonan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR & DISSENT 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part/dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert J. Kasieta and Kasieta Legal Group, LLC, Madison, and A. 
Steven Porter and A. Steven Porter, Madison, and oral argument 
by A. Steven Porter. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Jonathan 
Cermele, Rachel L. Pings, and Cermele & Associates, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Rachel L. Pings. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Anne Berleman Kearney, 
Joseph D. Kearny, Milwaukee, and Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of themselves as members of the Wisconsin 
State Bar. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2935  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV3620) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Taneceia Larry, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Derrick L. Harris, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
Carlos Rutherford, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
ABC Insurance Corporation and Officer John Roe, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part; reversed in part and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court's2 sua 
                     
1 Larry v. Harris, 2007 WI App 132, 301 Wis. 2d 243, 733 
N.W.2d 911. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
2 
 
sponte vacation of a default judgment against defendant Carlos 
Rutherford and the circuit court's sua sponte grant of judgment 
in Rutherford's favor.  We conclude that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion in vacating the default 
judgment because Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) (2005-06)3 permits a 
court to grant relief from a judgment or an order.  However, we 
also conclude that the circuit court did err when it sua sponte 
granted summary judgment in Rutherford's favor because it failed 
to give the prior notice required by Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  
Accordingly, we affirm in part; reverse in part and remand the 
cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The 
issues 
this 
case 
presents 
stem 
from 
law 
enforcement's entry into Taneceia Larry's home without a search 
warrant.  Three officers were alleged to be present during the 
entry:  Derrick Harris, M'Johno Foster and Carlos Rutherford.4  
Harris was named in the complaint, and the circuit court granted 
his motion for summary judgment dismissing Larry's claims, which 
                                                                  
2 The Honorable Daniel A. Noonan of Milwaukee County 
presided.   
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted. 
4 Harris and Rutherford are mentioned by name in Larry's 
complaint.  Foster is referred to as a third officer present, 
but not by name.  In contrast to the complaint, which alleges 
that three officers were present, the respective affidavits of 
Harris and Foster aver that they were the only two officers 
present during the search.   
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
3 
 
Larry did not appeal.  Foster was never sued.  Rutherford also 
was a named defendant, but he did not appear or otherwise answer 
in the circuit court.  The circuit court originally granted 
default judgment against Rutherford, but later vacated that 
order and granted judgment in his favor.  Larry appeals the 
vacating of the judgment against Rutherford and the entering of 
judgment in his favor.5   
¶3 
On the evening of August 26, 2002, while Larry was at 
a gas station, she met a man whom she knew.6  He requested a ride 
home, and Larry agreed to drive him as far as her house.  They 
proceeded to Larry's home, and as Larry pulled into the drive-
way, she noticed an unmarked police vehicle pull up behind her.  
Upon observing the presence of police, Larry's passenger fled 
                     
5 Many facts underlying this appeal are disputed, but their 
irresolution is inconsequential for purposes of this appeal, 
because we are not considering the merits of Larry's claims.  
Rather, we are considering only whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Nevertheless, in our 
presentation of the facts, we adhere to the law governing how 
they are to be viewed on a review of summary judgment.  As a 
review of a summary judgment requires, we consider the disputed 
"facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."  
See, e.g., DeHart v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 91, ¶7, 302 
Wis. 2d 
564, 
734 
N.W.2d 
394. 
 
However, 
because 
neither 
Rutherford nor Larry moved for summary judgment, this review 
lacks a non-moving party.       
6 The man has not been identified.   
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
4 
 
from her vehicle.  Two police officers7 exited their car and gave 
chase, but they did not catch him. 
¶4 
The officers returned to Larry's residence, where 
Larry awaited them outside.  Larry consented to a search of her 
car.  The officers found no contraband, but Larry alleges that 
the officers then placed her in handcuffs.  One of the officers 
said he intended to enter Larry's home.  Larry objected.  She 
said that her five children were in the house, some of whom were 
asleep, and that her niece was watching them.  Larry alleges 
that two of the officers entered her home over her objection.  
She also alleges that the officers conducted a search inside her 
home, which included waking and "interrogating" the children and 
their babysitter.  She further alleges that Rutherford "either 
participated in [the] search or was present" during the search, 
but failed to stop its occurrence.  
¶5 
For their part, Harris and Foster assert that only 
Foster, who was never a party to this suit, entered Larry's 
home.  He did so without a warrant.  Foster averred that he was 
in the home for less than five minutes, and that he entered only 
to ensure that someone of suitable age was there to look after 
the children because Larry was going to be taken to the police 
                     
7 The complaint implicates the actions of three officers, 
but does not make clear which two officers pursued Larry's 
passenger.  Nor does the complaint make clear which of the 
officers among the three alleged to be present performed the 
subsequent actions described. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
5 
 
station for questioning.8  The circuit court found that ensuring 
proper child supervision was the purpose of the entry.9  Foster 
additionally stated that he spoke to an individual whom he 
estimated to be 16 or 17 years old, but he did not say whether 
he spoke to any of the children.   
¶6 
Larry moved for default judgment when neither Harris 
nor Rutherford timely answered her complaint.  The circuit court 
denied the motion with respect to Harris after he objected and 
served an answer.  However, the circuit court granted Larry's 
motion for default judgment against Rutherford. 
¶7 
Harris then moved for summary judgment against Larry, 
contending that the entry into Larry's home was lawful and that 
qualified immunity protected him from liability.  In opposing 
Harris's motion for summary judgment, Larry argued that because 
her home was entered by police without either a warrant or 
reasonable suspicion, the entry was presumptively unlawful.  
                     
8 Apparently, a drug buy occurred when Larry was at the 
service station.  The officers' subsequent questioning of Larry 
caused them to believe she had no involvement in it. 
9 The court of appeals opinion appears to state as fact that 
"[t]he officer who entered [Larry's home], looked at pictures, 
opened doors, woke the children and asked them questions, and 
also questioned the babysitter."  Larry, 301 Wis. 2d 243, ¶2.  
We note, however, that the circuit court made no such finding of 
fact.  Although the circuit court, in its decision granting 
summary judgment, presented these events as allegations made by 
Larry, it did not find that they actually occurred.  In his 
affidavit, Foster contests Larry's allegation, asserting that he 
"did not touch anything in the home and I did not open any 
drawers or doors on any of the furnishings in the home."  Later 
in its opinion, the court of appeals acknowledges Foster's 
assertion in this respect.  Id., ¶5. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
6 
 
Moreover, she contended that Harris's affirmative defense of 
qualified immunity was frivolous.   
¶8 
The circuit court granted Harris's motion for summary 
judgment.  Because the circuit court concluded that actions on 
the part of Harris, Foster and Rutherford all fell within the 
scope of Harris's motion for summary judgment, the court 
"treated [them] in the same manner."  The court found that, 
although police officers entered Larry's home without her 
consent and without a warrant, they did so for the purpose of 
ensuring that her children were adequately supervised and not 
for the purpose of uncovering "evidence or . . . criminal 
activity."   
¶9 
However, in granting summary judgment to Harris and 
without giving prior notice to Larry, the circuit court also, 
sua sponte, vacated the default judgment against Rutherford and 
granted judgment dismissing Larry's claims against Rutherford.10  
Larry moved the circuit court to reconsider the vacation of the 
default judgment, as well as the dismissal of her claims against 
Rutherford.   
¶10 The circuit court invited briefing on Larry's motion 
to reconsider.  Larry's brief in support of her motion consisted 
                     
10 The nature of the dismissal of Larry's claim against 
Rutherford is not clear, i.e., the circuit court did not say it 
was 
granting 
"summary 
judgment" 
in 
favor 
of 
Rutherford.  
However, Larry characterizes the circuit court's action as 
granting Rutherford summary judgment.  Rutherford does not 
dispute that characterization.  Accordingly, we address it as 
though the circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing 
Larry's claims against Rutherford.     
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
7 
 
of a six-sentence letter, two sentences of which addressed her 
argument: 
The court will recall we are asking your Honor to 
reconsider an order in which the court, sua sponte, 
ordered 
the 
reopening 
of 
the 
previously-entered 
Default Judgment and Summary Judgment against the 
Plaintiff in favor of the defaulting Defendant, all 
without any argument from the defaulting Defendant. 
We can find no support for this procedure and 
respectfully request that it be reversed. 
Larry also subsequently submitted a reply brief, arguing, in 
essence, that the circuit court erred by ascribing the qualified 
immunity that it concluded Harris possessed to Rutherford as 
well.  
¶11 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Larry's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration.  The court explained its reasoning in vacating 
the default judgment against Rutherford and in dismissing 
Larry's complaint as to all officers: 
[T]he Court found that the default judgment should be 
vacated against Defendant Rutherford because no reason 
existed to hold any officer liable for violation of 
[Larry's] constitutional rights under her Complaint.  
. . .  The vacation occurred here within a reasonable 
time after default because the summary judgment was 
before the Court and the Court determined the claims 
by Plaintiff were improper.  . . . 
. . .  Plaintiff does not dispute the Court's 
findings that her rights under the constitution were 
not violated.  Clearly, the Court vacated the default 
because no officer could be held liable under the 
Complaint according to the Court's findings; as such, 
the interests of justice required the Court to vacate 
the default.   
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
8 
 
¶12 Larry did not further dispute the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment with respect to Harris, nor the basis 
for that decision, i.e., that Larry's constitutional rights were 
not violated and that the doctrine of qualified immunity 
applies.  Larry appealed the vacation of the default judgment, 
as well as the entry of judgment in Rutherford's favor based on 
Rutherford's failure to appear in the circuit court.    
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed.  It reasoned that a 
circuit court has statutory authority to grant relief from 
default judgments on its own motion, so long as it provides the 
party adversely affected with notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.  Larry v. Harris, 2007 WI App 132, ¶1, 301 Wis. 2d 243, 
733 N.W.2d 911.  The court of appeals also concluded that by 
inviting briefing on Larry's motion to reconsider, the circuit 
court gave Larry sufficient notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.  Id.  The court of appeals decision did not address the 
circuit court's summary judgment decision.  
¶14 Larry petitioned for review, which we granted.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶15 Whether to open a default judgment is committed to the 
discretion of the circuit court, which we review under the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  See, e.g., Edland v. 
Wis. Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp., 210 Wis. 2d 638, 643, 563 
N.W.2d 519 (1997); Dugenske v. Dugenske, 80 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 257 
N.W.2d 865 (1977).  A circuit court does not erroneously 
exercise its discretion if its decision is based on the facts of 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
9 
 
record and on the application of a correct legal standard.  
Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981). 
¶16 A circuit court's authority to vacate a default 
judgment and to grant summary judgment derives from Wisconsin 
statutes.  Wis. Stat. §§ 806.07 and 802.08.  We review questions 
of statutory interpretation independently, but benefiting from 
the discussions of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, 
¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.   
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07  
 
1. 
Opening the default judgment   
¶17 A circuit court's authority to open a default judgment 
is derived from statute.  Wis. Stat. § 806.07.  Section 
806.07(1) lists conditions under which a circuit court may 
exercise its discretion and open a default judgment.  It 
provides: 
Relief from judgment or order.  (1) On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court, subject to 
subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a party or legal 
representative from a judgment, order or stipulation 
for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, 
inadvertence, 
surprise, 
or 
excusable neglect; 
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a 
party to a new trial under s. 805.15(3); 
(c) Fraud, 
misrepresentation, 
or 
other 
misconduct of an adverse party; 
(d) The judgment is void; 
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged; 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
10 
 
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated; 
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or  
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
¶18 We have previously recognized that Wis. Stat. § 806.07 
seeks to strike a balance between the judiciary's interest in 
achieving fair resolutions of disputes and the policy favoring 
finality of judgments.  Edland, 210 Wis. 2d at 644.  Indeed, 
§ 806.07 serves both interests, enhancing "fairness in the 
administration of justice by authorizing a circuit court to 
vacate judgments on various equitable grounds."  Id.   
¶19 Here, the circuit court vacated the judgment against 
Rutherford on its own motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 on 
equitable grounds, but without prior notice to the parties that 
it was considering such relief from judgment.  Our first tasks 
are to determine whether:  (1) the court's sua sponte vacation 
of Rutherford's default judgment, and (2) the court's providing 
an opportunity for the parties to be heard after it had vacated 
the judgment, rather than before it did so, constituted proper 
exercises of discretion. 
a. 
Sua sponte vacation of default judgment 
¶20 The relief that may be accorded under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 need not be sought by one of the parties; a court may 
act on its own motion pursuant to § 806.07, as long as the court 
provides the parties notice of its action and an opportunity to 
be heard.  Gittel v. Abram, 2002 WI App 113, ¶27, 255 Wis. 2d 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
11 
 
767, 649 N.W.2d 661.  In Gittel, Nickolas Persha executed a will 
naming Ruth Abram, who was also Persha's personal representative 
in the probate proceedings, as his sole beneficiary.  Id., ¶1.  
Persha's sister, Mary Gittel, challenged the will, arguing in 
part that the will was invalid because it was the product of 
Abram's undue influence.  Id.  Because the circuit court 
concluded that the will was tainted by undue influence and that 
the testator was incompetent, it refused to probate the will.  
Id., ¶¶7-8.  
¶21 Abram objected to the court's award of costs and fees 
to Gittel, and the court held a hearing on Abram's motion.  Id., 
¶¶8, 10.  At the hearing and without prior notice to the parties 
that it planned to do so, the court vacated the portion of its 
order that declared the will the product of undue influence.  
Id., ¶11.  Gittel filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
court denied, indicating that it had the authority to vacate its 
original order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  Id., ¶13. 
¶22 The court of appeals held in Gittel that a circuit 
court is authorized to grant relief from its own orders sua 
sponte under the authority of Wis. Stat. § 806.07, but that the 
circuit court did not provide the parties with the requisite 
notice of its action.  Id., ¶¶24, 29.  The court of appeals 
explained, "Gittel did not have notice and the opportunity to be 
heard on the specific issue of the court's authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07, because the court did not refer to § 806.07 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
12 
 
until 
the 
written 
order 
denying 
Gittel's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration without a hearing."11  Id., ¶29.   
¶23 We agree with Gittel that circuit courts are vested 
with the authority to grant relief from their judgments, on 
their own motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.  We have recognized 
a wide swath of contexts in which Wisconsin courts are permitted 
to act on their own motion.  See, e.g., Howell v. Denomie, 2005 
WI 81, ¶19, 282 Wis. 2d 130, 698 N.W.2d 621 (concluding that the 
court of appeals may inquire, on its own motion, whether a 
frivolous claim has been filed); City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 
226 Wis. 2d 738, ¶19, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (recognizing the 
inherent power of courts to vacate void judgments); State v. 
Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d 616, 628, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981) (holding 
that a circuit court may amend pleadings on its own motion); 
State v. Hanson, 85 Wis. 2d 233, 237, 270 N.W.2d 212 (1978) 
(stating that a circuit court "may on its own motion reopen [a 
case] for further testimony in order to make a more complete 
record in the interests of equity and justice"); Behning v. Star 
Fireworks Mfg. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 183, 188, 203 N.W.2d 655 (1973) 
(concluding that circuit courts may, on their own motion, grant 
                     
11 The court ultimately concluded, however, that Gittel was 
not prejudiced by the circuit court's action.  It so concluded 
because Gittel did not identify any argument regarding the 
circuit court's authority that she could have made to the 
circuit court that she could not make on appeal.  Gittel v. 
Abram, 2002 WI App 113, ¶29, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661.   
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
13 
 
a new trial in the interests of justice).12  The wide recognition 
of courts' abilities to act sua sponte comports with the balance 
of the interests served by § 806.07, fairness and finality.  
Indeed, as we have stated, "Every court has inherent power, 
exercisable in its sound discretion, consistent within the 
Constitution and statutes, to control disposition of causes on 
its docket with economy of time and effort."  Neylan v. Vorwald, 
124 Wis. 2d 85, 94, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985).  "That a court should 
raise issues sua sponte is the natural outgrowth of the court's 
function to do justice between the parties."  State v. Holmes, 
106 Wis. 2d 31, 39, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).   
¶24 In 
addition, 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1) does not foreclose the court from acting sua sponte 
under the statute's authority.  When interpreting a statute, we 
look to its language, and if that language conveys a "plain, 
clear statutory meaning," we construe the statute according to 
that meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 
633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  Section 806.07(1) provides in part:  "On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court[] . . . may 
                     
12 We note, as well, that we have previously observed that a 
circuit court "apparently has authority to rescind at least part 
of its order and decision under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) as 
long as both parties have adequate notice."  State v. Morford, 
2004 WI 5, ¶55 n.45, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349.  Although 
this 
statement 
from 
Morford 
is 
not 
controlling, 
it 
is 
informative for purposes of our decision.  
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
14 
 
relieve a party . . . from a judgment . . . ."  Because the 
language of the statute provides that a court may relieve a 
party from judgment, without qualifying that the relief may be 
granted only upon a motion brought by one of the parties, the 
statute does not restrict the court from acting on its own 
motion. 
¶25 In sum, we reaffirm Gittel's conclusion that courts 
have the power to act sua sponte under the provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07.  The interests underlying § 806.07 parallel the 
interests that we have held permit courts to act sua sponte.  In 
addition, we construe the plain language of § 806.07 to permit a 
court to act sua sponte under its authority.   
b. 
Notice and hearing 
¶26 As 
we 
recounted 
above, 
sua 
sponte 
actions 
are 
permissible under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) if the court provides 
the parties notice of its action and an opportunity to be heard.  
Gittel, 255 Wis. 2d 767, ¶27.  The court in Gittel concluded 
that the circuit court had not provided the parties adequate 
notice when it vacated its initial order declaring that Persha's 
will was the product of undue influence.  Id., ¶29.  The circuit 
court withdrew that portion of its order during a hearing on 
Abram's objection to the circuit court's assignment of costs.  
Id., ¶¶8, 11.  Abram's motion was grounded in the theory that 
the circuit court had erred in allocating costs because the 
court had erred in concluding that the will was the product of 
undue influence.  Id., ¶9.  At the opening of the motion 
hearing, the circuit court asked Abram's attorney if he was 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
15 
 
requesting that the court reconsider the portion of its order 
relating 
to 
undue 
influence, 
and 
the 
attorney 
answered 
affirmatively.  Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals concluded that, 
although the circuit court's question to Abram's counsel about 
undue influence gave Gittel's attorney some notice that it was 
perhaps 
reconsidering 
its 
previous 
order, 
Gittel 
had 
insufficient notice that the circuit court may vacate a portion 
of its order.  Id., ¶29.  Gittel did not have notice that the 
circuit court was acting sua sponte pursuant to § 806.07 until 
the circuit court referred to § 806.07 in its denial of Gittel's 
motion for reconsideration.  Id.   
¶27 The facts here stand in sharp contrast to the facts in 
Gittel.  Even though the circuit court acted on its own motion 
without prior notice to Larry or any defendant, as the circuit 
court had in Gittel, the circuit court here, unlike the circuit 
court in Gittel, provided an opportunity for the parties to be 
heard by inviting briefing on the issues.  Although giving 
notice prior to a sua sponte action by a circuit court under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07 is preferable, Larry does not argue that she 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
16 
 
was prejudiced by the late notice.13  Furthermore, she did submit 
a letter brief objecting to vacating the default judgment, as 
well as a more complete reply brief.  The court considered her 
arguments and then issued a written opinion addressing them.  
Under these circumstances, the circuit court permitted Larry an 
opportunity to be heard. 
¶28 In vacating the default judgment, the circuit court 
related that all the officers were accused of substantially the 
same conduct under the complaint.  The court explained that 
given the summary judgment materials submitted in regard to 
Harris's motion for summary judgment, it was clear that Larry's 
rights had not been violated by the officers' conduct.  The 
court opined that its decision to vacate the default judgment 
was based on equity, as it further explained, "no officer could 
be held liable under the Complaint according to the Court's 
findings; as such, the interests of justice required the Court 
to vacate the default."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶29 We see no erroneous exercise of discretion.  The court 
had the power to act sua sponte under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, and 
                     
13 Contrary to the concurrence/dissent's suggestion, we do 
not depart from the rule in Gittel requiring notice of a sua 
sponte 
action 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07.  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶2.  Notice is required; prior notice is 
preferable.  Although the circuit court here did not give prior 
notice in regard to vacating the default judgment against 
Rutherford, the court did give an opportunity to fully address 
the vacation of the default judgment in regard to Rutherford 
upon Larry's motion for reconsideration.  In addition, the court 
provided Larry with notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
advance of its hearing Harris's motion for summary judgment 
based on the same conduct as was alleged against Rutherford.   
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
17 
 
it thoroughly explained the legal and equitable bases for its 
decision to vacate the default judgment.  In addition, Larry was 
given an opportunity to be heard and the written decision of the 
circuit court shows it carefully considered her arguments.  
Accordingly, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in sua sponte vacating the default judgment against 
Rutherford.   
2. 
Larry's position 
¶30 Larry advances two arguments in her opposition to the 
circuit court's vacation of the default judgment.  First, 
although Larry acknowledges that the court's grant of default 
judgment was interlocutory rather than final, Larry maintains 
that the default judgment amounted to a finding that Rutherford 
was liable, entitling Larry to damages.  Larry contends that she 
was entitled to rely on the court's order unless Rutherford 
appeared later and showed good cause or excusable neglect for 
failing to answer Larry's complaint.  Second, Larry argues that 
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity that the circuit 
court ascribed to Rutherford is insufficient to qualify as an 
"extraordinary circumstance" required for relief from judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  Accordingly, Larry contends 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
vacating a default judgment entered against a defendant who had 
not appeared and who had made no showing that extraordinary 
circumstances caused his failure to answer Larry's complaint.  
Neither argument is availing. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
18 
 
¶31 Larry's first argument is inherently contradictory.  
Because, as Larry concedes, the circuit court's order was 
interlocutory, Larry has no basis on which to claim that she was 
entitled to rely on the order of default judgment as one that 
would remain undisturbed unless Rutherford appeared to contest 
it.  An interlocutory order may remain in doubt until judgment 
is final.  See Maxcy v. Simonson, 130 Wis. 650, 658, 110 N.W. 
803 (1907).  For many years, Wisconsin law has defined an 
interlocutory order as one in which "the substantial rights of 
the parties involved in the action remain undetermined and [on 
occasion] when the cause is retained for further action."  Pasch 
v. DOR, 58 Wis. 2d 346, 354, 206 N.W.2d 157 (1973).   
¶32 Larry next argues that the affirmative defense of 
qualified immunity is insufficient to support relief from a 
default judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  Larry 
contends that, in the absence of any of the circumstances listed 
in subparts (a) through (f) of § 806.07(1) that permit relief to 
be 
granted, 
the 
circumstances 
here 
are 
not 
sufficiently 
"extraordinary" to permit Rutherford relief under subpart (h) 
alone.  Larry asserts that State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 
Wis. 2d 536, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985), requires courts reviewing 
decisions under subpart (h) to first determine whether the party 
seeking relief has asserted extraordinary circumstances, and, 
second, if so, to hold a hearing to determine whether the 
asserted extraordinary circumstances actually are present.   
¶33 Larry's arguments are misplaced.  She does not discern 
the difference between the order issued in M.L.B. and the order 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
19 
 
issued here.  The holding in M.L.B. was predicated on a final 
decision of the circuit court, not an interlocutory decision, as 
is the case here.14  Accordingly, the two-part process described 
in M.L.B. does not apply here.  Subpart (h) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1) permits a court to relieve a party from a judgment 
or an order for "[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment."  As we have explained, the circuit 
court fully set out the circumstances that justified equitable 
relief from the default judgment.   
¶34 Larry contests the circuit court's conclusion that 
Rutherford is protected by qualified immunity.  She contends 
that the circuit court could not determine that Rutherford is 
protected by qualified immunity without the development of facts 
relating to Rutherford's participation in the entry into her 
home.   
                     
14 In State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 537, 
363 N.W.2d 419 (1985), D.G.H. sought relief from an agreement 
that he had signed and that the court had accepted declaring him 
the father of M.L.B.'s child.  Id. at 537-38.  The court had 
submitted a final order adjudging D.G.H. as the father.  Id. at 
538, 544.  D.G.H. was 18 years old at the time, was unemployed, 
was not represented by counsel and had no blood test taken to 
confirm his parenthood.  Id. at 540-41.  Four years later, 
D.G.H. discovered that M.L.B. had provided a state agency false 
statements that cast doubt about D.G.H.'s parenthood of her 
child.  Id. at 541.  In addition, a blood test revealed that 
D.G.H. was not the father.  Id.  We held that the false 
statements, which had induced D.G.H. to agree to be designated 
the father, along with the collection of other circumstances, 
constituted extraordinary circumstances that justified granting 
D.G.H. relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  Id. at 553-54.   
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
20 
 
¶35 The circuit court concluded that the complaint alleged 
that all the officers were engaged in substantially the same 
conduct and that under the undisputed facts presented to the 
court at Harris's motion hearing, that conduct did not violate 
Larry's constitutional rights.  The circuit court concluded that 
all of the officers' actions were discretionary and taken in the 
course of their official duties as community caretakers.  
Therefore, all of the officers were entitled to immunity as a 
matter of law.  Accordingly, the facts were sufficiently 
established for the court to conclude that the doctrine of 
qualified immunity protected all of the officers from liability.   
¶36 Furthermore, Larry does not contest that the entry 
into her home was lawful; nor does she contest that Harris and 
Foster are protected from liability by qualified immunity and 
the conduct ascribed to Rutherford in the complaint largely 
mirrored the conduct ascribed to Harris.  Therefore, the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by vacating 
the default judgment against Rutherford, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(h), due to the common conduct from which the 
complaint arose.   
C. 
Summary Judgment 
¶37 We next consider whether the court properly granted 
judgment in favor of Rutherford dismissing Larry's complaint.  
We adhere to the very narrow formulation of this issue, as Larry 
presented it in her petition for review.  The question we are 
asked to answer is as follows: 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
21 
 
When a default judgment has been granted against a 
defendant, no evidence has been developed or submitted 
regarding the defaulting defendant, the defaulting 
party has not moved for summary judgment, and the 
defaulting party has raised no affirmative defenses, 
can a trial court enter summary judgment in that 
defendant's favor?  
¶38 Larry contends that the circuit court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Rutherford upon its own motion 
under these circumstances.  In response, the State contends that 
Larry did not object before the circuit court and therefore the 
issue is waived.15  In the alternative, the State contends that 
Rutherford's qualified immunity suffices to render the circuit 
court's grant of judgment in his favor appropriate.  Under the 
very narrow focus of our review of this issue, we agree with 
Larry. 
¶39 In Wisconsin, the availability of summary judgment is 
statutory.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  Statutory interpretation 
begins with the statute's language.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45.  If the language of the statute is clear and its meaning is 
plain, then we apply that meaning to the controversy before us.  
Id.  Section 802.08 provides in relevant part: 
                     
15 We disagree with the State's assertion that Larry waived 
the argument that the circuit court erred in issuing summary 
judgment in Rutherford's favor.  In support of her motion to 
reconsider, Larry wrote:  "The court will recall we are asking 
your Honor to reconsider an order in which the court, sua 
sponte, ordered the reopening of the previously-entered Default 
Judgment and Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff in favor of 
the defaulting Defendant . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Larry 
objected to the entry of summary judgment before the circuit 
court 
and 
briefed 
the 
issue 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals.  
Accordingly, Larry preserved the issue for our review. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
22 
 
(1) Availability.  A party may, within 8 months 
of the filing of a summons and complaint or within the 
time set in a scheduling order under s. 802.10, move 
for summary judgment on any claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or 3rd-party claim which is asserted by 
or against the party.  Amendment of pleadings is 
allowed as in cases where objection or defense is made 
by motion to dismiss.   
(2) Motion.  Unless earlier times are specified 
in the scheduling order, the motion shall be served at 
least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing 
and the adverse party shall serve opposing affidavits, 
if any, at least 5 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶40 It is significant that Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) sets 
forth the procedural conditions for granting summary judgment.  
Unless a scheduling order specifies otherwise, § 802.08(2) 
mandates that a motion for summary judgment be served at least 
20 days before a hearing on that motion.  In raising and 
granting summary judgment on its own motion, the circuit court 
did not provide the parties 20 days' advance notice of its 
motion, as required by § 802.08(2).16 
¶41 State courts outside our jurisdiction have held that a 
trial court may grant summary judgment sua sponte, but only if 
the court adheres to the conditions under which summary judgment 
may be granted.  See, e.g., Awada v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 173 
P.3d 707, 712 n.26 (Nev. 2007).  The Nevada Supreme Court has 
observed that, although trial courts have the "'inherent power 
to enter summary judgment sua sponte,' that power is subject to 
                     
16 This 20-day notice requirement is significantly different 
from Wis. Stat. § 806.07, which requires notice, but does not 
set a time prior to the hearing when notice must be given. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
23 
 
the requirements of [Nevada's rule for civil procedure governing 
summary judgment.]"  Id. (quoting Soebbing v. Carpet Barn, Inc., 
847 P.2d 731, 735 (Nev. 1993)).  Nevada's summary judgment civil 
procedure rule, Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c), sets forth procedural 
requirements that must be met before a court grants summary 
judgment.17  Those procedural requirements include "the service 
of a motion, a response, and a minimum amount of time that must 
pass before a hearing on that motion can be conducted."  Id.  
¶42 In Soebbing, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the 
trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting 
summary judgment sua sponte, because it did not give the parties 
the requisite notice contained in Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Id. at 
735-36.  After the defendant moved for summary judgment, the 
plaintiff moved to amend his first amended complaint.  Id. at 
733.  The court granted the plaintiff's motion.  Id.  However, 
immediately thereafter, the court granted the defendant's motion 
with respect to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, and it, 
sua sponte, granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's yet-to-
be-filed second amended complaint.  Id. at 735.  Because the 
                     
17 Rule 56(c) of Nev. R. Civ. P. provides in relevant part: 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.  The [summary 
judgment] motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing.  Motions for 
summary judgment and responses thereto shall include a 
concise statement setting forth each fact material to 
the disposition of the motion which the party claims 
is or is not genuinely in issue, citing the particular 
portions 
of 
any 
pleading, 
affidavit, 
deposition, 
interrogatory, answer, admission, or other evidence 
upon which the party relies. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
24 
 
trial court did not provide the plaintiff the full ten days' 
notice Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c) requires before summary judgment 
may be granted, its sua sponte grant of summary judgment 
dismissing the plaintiff's second amended complaint constituted 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See id. at 735-36. 
¶43 A court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment without 
complying with the statutory prior notice requirement deprives 
parties of an opportunity to bring forth all of their evidence.  
See, e.g., Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 230 N.W.2d 588, 
591-92 (Minn. 1975).  The circuit court in the case before us 
did not provide the parties 20 days prior notice, or otherwise 
provide the parties a scheduling order specifying a shorter time 
period within which it intended to decide whether to grant 
summary judgment, as Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) requires.  Instead, 
the circuit court granted summary judgment against Larry without 
prior notice.  As a result, Larry was not apprised that she had 
to come forward with all of her evidence.  Accordingly, because 
the circuit court's action in granting judgment in favor of 
Rutherford on its own motion was inconsistent with the 20-day 
prior notice required by Wisconsin's summary judgment statute, 
the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment for 
Rutherford.  Accord, Soebbing, 847 P.2d at 735-36. 
¶44 Our decision should not be read to leave the circuit 
court hamstrung on remand, without any authority to grant 
judgment in favor of Rutherford.  To the contrary, granting 
judgment in favor of Rutherford may be appropriate, given that 
Harris and Rutherford are the objects of substantially similar 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
25 
 
factual 
allegations 
invoking 
the 
same 
qualified 
immunity 
defense.  However, we stress that in granting summary judgment, 
circuit courts must adhere to either the procedural requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), for 20 days prior notice, or of a 
scheduling order specifying a shorter time period within which 
summary judgment may be granted.18  Provided they adhere to the 
strictures of § 802.08(2), circuit courts have wide discretion 
to determine whether a plaintiff's claim can survive as a matter 
of law.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶45 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in vacating the default 
judgment it had granted against Rutherford because Wisconsin's 
relief from judgment statute, Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1), permits 
such an action.  However, we also conclude that the circuit 
court did err when it sua sponte granted summary judgment in 
Rutherford's favor because it failed to give the notice required 
by Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
¶46 Accordingly, we affirm in part; reverse in part and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part; reversed in part and the cause is remanded to 
                     
18 Our decision does not prohibit Rutherford from filing a 
motion for summary judgment on remand. 
No. 
2005AP2935   
 
26 
 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2935.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶47 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that "a court may act on its own 
motion pursuant to [Wis. Stat.] § 806.07, as long as the court 
provides the parties notice of its action and an opportunity to 
be heard."1  I write separately because the majority opinion 
erroneously concludes that the circuit court in the instant case 
gave the plaintiff notice of its action and the opportunity to 
be heard when acting on its own motion under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
806.07. 
¶48 The circuit court in the instant case acted "on its 
own motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 . . . without prior notice 
to the parties that it was considering such" action.2  Because 
the circuit court did not give the plaintiff notice that the 
circuit court would act on its own motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 to vacate the order for a default judgment in the 
plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff obviously had no opportunity to 
be heard on the matter prior to the court's action.  The circuit 
court granted the motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 at the same 
time that it raised it.   
                     
1 Majority op., ¶20 (citing Gittel v. Abram, 2002 WI App 
113, ¶27, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661).   
I also agree with the majority opinion that the circuit 
court erroneously granted summary judgment on its own motion to 
the defendant Rutherford without complying with the procedural 
requirements under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  I do not address the 
summary judgment issue in this separate opinion.   
2 Majority op., ¶19.  See also majority op., ¶27 ("[T]he 
circuit court acted on its own motion without prior notice to 
Larry or any defendant[.]").   
No.  2005AP2935.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶49 Although acknowledging that the circuit court failed 
to provide notice to the plaintiff and an opportunity to be 
heard prior to acting on its own motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07, the majority opinion concludes that the circuit court 
(retroactively) supplied the requisite notice and opportunity to 
be heard when the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the 
circuit court's decision and the circuit court invited briefs 
from the parties.  Majority op., ¶27.   
¶50 The plaintiff's opportunity to be heard upon her 
motion for reconsideration cannot substitute for an opportunity 
to be heard prior to the decision which the plaintiff moved the 
circuit court to reconsider.  With respect to her motion for 
reconsideration, the plaintiff, as the moving party, carried a 
burden that she would not have carried if given a timely 
opportunity to be heard before the circuit court acted on its 
own motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.   
¶51 I concur in the mandate, however, because I conclude 
that the circuit court's error is not prejudicial under the 
circumstances of the instant case.  I would follow Gittel v. 
Abram, 2002 WI App 113, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661, in 
which the court of appeals held that although the circuit court 
erred in failing to provide Gittel with notice and the 
opportunity to be heard on the issue of the court's authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, the circuit court's error was not 
prejudicial because the court of appeals reviewed all of 
Gittel's arguments de novo and decided them against Gittel.3 
                     
3 See 
Gittel 
v. 
Abram, 
2002 
WI 
App 
113, 
¶29, 
255 
Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661. 
No.  2005AP2935.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶52 For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate but 
write separately.   
 
 
No.  2005AP2935.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶53 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that the circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
sua 
sponte 
granting 
summary 
judgment 
in 
Rutherford's favor because it failed to give the notice required 
by Wis. Stat. §§  806.07(1) and 802.08(2) before granting 
summary judgment to a defaulting party who never appeared in the 
action.  See majority op., ¶¶22-26, 44.  However, I disagree 
with the majority's holding that the circuit court did not also 
err in sua sponte vacating the default judgment against 
Rutherford pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1), despite the lack 
of prior notice to the parties before vacating the default 
judgment.  See id., ¶¶19-29.  With Rutherford never appearing as 
a party and no advance notice being given by the court prior to 
vacating the default judgment, I find the court's order vacating 
default judgment without prior notice to be just as erroneous as 
its order granting summary judgment without prior notice.  
¶54 The majority correctly cites Gittel v. Abram, 2002 WI 
App 113, ¶27, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661, as holding that 
before a circuit court grants relief from its own orders sua 
sponte under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, it must provide parties with 
requisite notice of its actions, along with an opportunity to be 
heard.  Majority op., ¶¶20, 22.  However, I cannot go along with 
the majority's attempt to distinguish Gittel by contending that 
because in the case at hand Larry had an opportunity to be heard 
ex post facto, the requirements identified in Gittel were met.  
See majority op., ¶¶27-29.   
No.  2005AP2935.lbb 
 
2 
 
¶55 The majority glosses over the fact that notice was not 
given by the judge before sua sponte vacating the default 
judgment.  The majority states that "[a]lthough giving prior 
notice to a sua sponte action by a circuit court under Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07 is preferable, Larry does not argue that she was 
prejudiced by the late notice."  Majority op., ¶27.  This 
description of prior notice as merely "preferable" contradicts 
the majority's acknowledgement that notice is a requirement, 
with Gittel stating that "a court has the authority to raise an 
issue sua sponte if it gives the litigants notice that it is 
considering the issue and an opportunity to argue."  Gittel, 255 
Wis. 2d 767, ¶24 (citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 40-41, 
315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)).  A requirement is not just "preferred."  
A requirement is required.    
¶56 Furthermore, Gittel establishes that when a court acts 
on its own motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, "parties must have 
[both] notice and the opportunity to be heard."  Gittel, 255 
Wis. 2d 767, ¶27 (emphasis added).  The majority incorrectly 
collapses these two requirements into one, arguing that because 
the parties in this case had what the majority describes as 
"opportunity to be heard," then the notice requirement was 
satisfied as well.   
¶57 Not only is this an incorrect articulation of the rule 
described in Gittel, but in attempting to distinguish Gittel, 
the majority misportrays the facts of both Gittel and the 
present case.  The majority suggests that in this case, but not 
in Gittel, the parties were given the opportunity to brief the 
No.  2005AP2935.lbb 
 
3 
 
issue, which then sufficed as notice.  Majority op., ¶27 & n.13.  
However, a careful reading of Gittel leads to a different 
conclusion.  In both this case and in Gittel, any "opportunity 
to be heard" took place only after the parties filed motions for 
reconsideration objecting to the court's sua sponte order that 
had already been issued without notice or opportunity to be 
heard at that point in time. 
¶58 In Gittel, the court held that the specific reason 
Gittel's right to notice was violated was "because the court did 
not refer to [Wis. Stat.] § 806.07 until the written order 
denying Gittel's motion for reconsideration without a hearing."  
Gittel, 255 Wis. 2d 767, ¶29.  Similarly, in this case, it was 
not until after the order had already been vacated and Larry 
herself brought the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 806.07 to the 
attention of the circuit court through her letter brief and 
reconsideration motion that the court denied Larry's motion for 
reconsideration without a hearing. 
¶59 Finally, the majority treats the individual parties in 
this case as interchangeable, implying that because advance 
notice was given by the circuit court that it was considering 
summary judgment against Harris, then such notice included 
vacating default judgment as to Rutherford as well, even though 
the notice did not mention Rutherford.  Although the alleged 
conduct of two parties may be the same, that does not mean that 
every legal filing, notice or order mentioning one automatically 
incorporates another party not named, particularly when the 
unnamed individual has never made a single appearance in court.  
No.  2005AP2935.lbb 
 
4 
 
See Estate of Otto v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2008 WI ___, ¶¶9, 13, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ____ N.W.2d ___.  If notice is given that 
summary judgment will be considered as to Harris, but the notice 
is silent as to vacating default judgment with respect to 
Rutherford, requiring Larry to assume that the notice was also 
meant to refer to others not mentioned hardly constitutes 
"adequate notice." 
¶60 The majority's statement that "Larry does not argue 
that she was prejudiced by the late notice," majority op., ¶27, 
does not remedy the problem.  Whether or not Larry has 
specifically argued that any prejudice resulted from the late 
notice, this court should not undermine the legal requirements 
of prior notice along with an opportunity to be heard as 
prerequisites for a court to sua sponte vacate a default 
judgment order, or any other order under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.   
¶61 For the above reasons, although I agree the majority's 
mandate reversing the court of appeals, rather than remand for 
further proceedings consistent with the default judgment against 
Rutherford being vacated, this court should instead reinstate 
the default judgment.  I therefore respectfully concur in part, 
and dissent in part. 
 
No.  2005AP2935.lbb 
 
1