Title: Wonnum v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JONATHAN M. WONNUM, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 271, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 30206697DI (N) 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 31, 2022 
Decided: 
January 19, 2023 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Jonathan M. Wonnum, appeals from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his third motion for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a 
motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on 
the face of Wonnum’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
(2) 
In 1993, following an earlier jury trial that ended in a hung jury on a 
murder charge and a determination of guilt on a weapon charge, Wonnum pleaded 
guilty to non-capital first-degree murder.  In exchange for the guilty plea, the State 
 
2 
agreed to set aside the verdict on the weapon conviction.  After pleading guilty but 
before sentencing, Wonnum sent a letter to the Superior Court seeking to withdraw 
his guilty plea.  In the letter, Wonnum stated that he had “made the wrong decision” 
when he pleaded guilty.1  He requested new counsel, “stating that his trial counsel 
‘did not perform up to his satisfaction’ and ‘forced’ him into pleading guilty.”2  The 
Superior Court “considered Wonnum’s letter as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.”3  
“In deciding the motion, the Superior Court reviewed the transcript of the guilty plea 
proceeding, held an office conference with counsel, and reviewed the guilty plea 
form executed by Wonnum.”4  The court determined that the motion to withdraw the 
plea “amount[ed] merely to a change of mind” and denied the motion on the basis 
that the plea was knowing and voluntary and that Wonnum had failed to establish 
any breach of performance by his trial counsel.”5  On September 15, 1993, the court 
sentenced Wonnum to life in prison, and Wonnum did not appeal.6 
(3) 
In August 1996, Wonnum filed a motion for postconviction relief in 
which he claimed, among other things, that the plea colloquy was defective and that 
 
1 Wonnum v. State, 1997 WL 588855, at *1 (Del. Sept. 16, 1997). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. (alteration in original). 
6 Id. 
 
3 
his counsel was ineffective.  The Superior Court denied the motion, and this Court 
affirmed.7   
(4) 
In 2013, Wonnum filed his second motion for postconviction relief.  He 
again asserted that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance and that he was 
“tricked” into pleading guilty.8  He also claimed that “the absence of counsel during 
his first motion [for postconviction relief] establishes its own ineffective assistance 
claim.”9  The Superior Court denied the motion,10 and this Court affirmed.11 
(5) 
On February 22, 2022, Wonnum filed his third motion for 
postconviction relief.  He again asserted that his counsel had provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea.  More specifically, Wonnum 
argued that he was “ill advised” to plead guilty to first-degree murder, subjecting 
him to a sentence of life in prison without parole, when he could have proceeded to 
trial and received the same sentence if found guilty.  The Superior Court summarily 
dismissed the motion as procedurally barred.  Wonnum has appealed to this Court. 
(6) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.12  We review legal or constitutional 
 
7 Id. at *1-2. 
8 State v. Wonnum, 2014 WL 3058464, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 3, 2014). 
9 Id.   
10 Id. 
11 Wonnum v. State, 2015 WL 3456633 (Del. May 28, 2015). 
12 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 
 
4 
questions de novo.13  The Court considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 
before addressing any substantive issues.14   
(7) 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2) provides that a “second or 
subsequent motion under this rule shall be summarily dismissed, unless the movant 
was convicted after a trial and the motion” pleads with particularity either that (i) 
“new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually 
innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted” or (ii) 
“a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the 
movant’s case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.”15  Wonnum 
asserts that his motion is not subject to summary dismissal because this Court’s 
decision in Reed v. State16 created a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law that 
renders his conviction invalid.  In Reed, the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty 
plea prior to sentencing, “but his counsel refused to file a motion to do so, apparently 
under the belief that no grounds justifying a plea withdrawal were present, and the 
Superior Court refused to consider his pro se motion because he was represented by 
 
13 Id. 
14 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 756-57 (Del. 2016). 
15 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(d)(2); see also id. R. 61(i)(1)-(5) (barring untimely motions, 
successive motions, and motions that assert grounds for relief that are procedurally defaulted or 
formerly adjudicated, unless they satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (ii)). 
16 258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021). 
 
5 
counsel.”17  The Court held that “a criminal defendant’s control of the objectives of 
the representation prior to sentencing requires that counsel either obey an instruction 
to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, or seek leave to withdraw so that the 
defendant can file the motion with other counsel or pro se.”18 
(8) 
We affirm the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of Wonnum’s 
successive motion for postconviction relief.  Wonnum cannot satisfy Rule 
61(d)(2)(ii) because he was not “convicted after a trial”19—rather, he pleaded 
guilty.20  Wonnum’s other arguments either were not presented to the Superior Court 
in the first instance or also fail to overcome Rule 61’s procedural bars. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
17 Id. at 812. 
18 Id. at 813. 
19 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(d)(2). 
20 See Grayson v. State, 2022 WL 16630776, at *1 (Del. Nov. 1, 2022) (“[T]he appellant cannot 
avail himself of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2)(ii) because he waived his right to a jury 
trial and chose to plead guilty.”); Cadiz v. State, 2022 WL 3366253, at *1 (Del. Aug. 15, 2022) 
(stating that the appellant “cannot avail himself of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2) because 
he waived his right to a jury trial and chose to plead guilty”).