Title: STATE v LA TRAY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 85-438 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1986 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- ALVIN LA TRAY, Defendant and Appell-an.t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Rosebud., The Honorable A l f r e d B. Coate, Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: Garry P. Bunke argued, Forsyth, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert F.W. Smith argued, A s s t . Atty. G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana John S. Forsythe argued, County Attorney, Forsyth, Montana Submitted: February 1 3 , 1 9 8 6 Decid.ed: Marc@ 13, 1986 F i l e d : MAR 1 J '1986 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Nil-liam E. Hunt, S r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant, Alvin J,a Tray, was o r i g i n a l l y charged w i t h attempted. d e l i b e r a t e homicide on November 2 3 , 1983. Approximately one month l a t e r , defendant e n t e r e d i n t o a p l e a bargain agreement and p l e d g u i l t y t o aggravated a s s a u l t i n t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, County o f Rosebud. H e was sentenced January 16, 1 9 8 4 , t o twenty y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , w i t h two y e a r s added f o r use o f a dangerous weapon. Over t h e n e x t y e a r , defendant f i l e d s e v e r a l motions seeking t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . The t r i a l judge t r e a t e d them as motions t o withdraw and a s a p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f . A h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h o s e motions May 2 5 , 1985. They w e r e denied from t h e bench. Defendant appeals. W e a f f i r m t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e t r i a l judge . The i s s u e s r a i s e d a r e : 1. Whether defendant was denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t o f e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel? 2 . Whether t h e District Court should have g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f and p e r m i t t e d t h e withdrawal of h i s g u i l t y p l e a ? The circumstances surrounding t h e crime a r e i n d i s p u t e . A t h i s p l e a b a r g a i n h e a r i n g , defendant admitted s h o o t i n g h i s roommate, H. D. Luloff on October 10, 1983. Defendant s t a t e d t h a t Tami Huehner had o f f e r e d t o l u r e Luloff t o t h e r i v e r w i t h promises of sex i f defendant would follow them and shoot Luloff. Defendant a p p a r e n t l y was angry with L u l o f f , s o agreed. Tami a l l e g e d l y smoked a c i g a r e t t e , al-lowing defendant t o f i n d them i n t h e dark. Next, according t o defendant, Tami and Luloff approached defendant and Luloff introduced defendant t o Tami, following which defendant shot Luloff. Tami and defendant then l e f t t h e scene. Tami has given a t l e a s t t h r e e c o n f l i c t i n g statements t o a u t h o r i t i e s . I n i t i a l l y , she claimed t o know nothing about t h e shooting. L a t e r , a t a deposition, she admitted t o a t l e a s t being a t t h e scene. (The deposition i s not included i n t h e record.) S t i l l l a t e r , she gave a statement t o Police O f f i c e r Odem a l l e g i n g t h a t Luloff had t r i e d t o rape h e r down by t h e r i v e r , La Tray had appeared a.nd prevented t h e rape. She claimed she d i d not know Luloff was s h o t till l a t e r t h a t evening. Luloff a l l e g e s i n h i s statement t h a t Tami approached him about going t o t h e r i v e r and "fooling around." Lulof f agreed. A t t h e r i v e r , Tami l e f t Luloff and wandered around. Luloff went down t o t h e water. O n r e t u r n i n g t o t h e v e h i c l e , Luloff saw someone i n a green O'Toolet s jacket and then was shot. He saw Tami walking o f f with t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e green jacket a s he was passing o u t . Defendant apparently owns a green O'Toole's jacket, but when confronted by Luloff s t a t e d it had been s t o l e n . A n information was f i l e d and served on defendant November 2 3 , 1983, charging him with attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The information was served while he was i n c a r c e r a t e d i n t h e Rosebud County J a i l on an unrelated charge. A t h i s i n i t i a l appearance, defendant requested t h a t counsel be appointed. John Houtz was appointed November 29, 1983. P r i o r t o t h i s p o i n t , s e v e r a l p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , and e s p e c i a l l y Officer Odem, discussed t h e case with defendant i n h i s c e l l . Defendant a l l e g e d l y signed a fourteen page confession a s a r e s u l t of those " t a l k s . " The confession is not i n t h e record. A plea bargain was a l s o discussed, a f t e r which O f f i c e r Odem t o l d defendant he would contact t h e County Attorney. Attorney Houtz' a c t i v i t i e s a s counsel f o r defendant were limited: 1) December 4 - 30 minute conference with d e f e n d a ~ t 2 ) December 1 0 - 15 minute t a l k with defendant and County Attorney 3 ) December 1 2 - 1 0 minute c a l l from defendant 4 ) December 1 2 - 2 - 15 minute conferen.ces with Tom Lofland, defendant's probation o f f i c e r 5 ) December 13 - Conference with defendant regarding S t a t e ' s o f f e r t o p l e a bargain 6 ) December 1 6 - Sent l e t t e r requesting discovery 7 ) December 22 - Wrote l e t t e r t o defendant recommending plea bargain; d i c t a t e d p l e a bargain agreement 8 ) December 2 7 - Sent copy of agreement t o County Attorney; picked up witness statements 9 ) December 29 - Entered change of p l e a - g u i l t y of aggravated a s s a u l t A t t h e hearing on defendant's p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f , Houtz t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had not attempted t o suppress defendant's confession, d e s p i t e defendant's request he do so, because he saw no grounds f o r suppression. H e l a t e r s t a t e d t h a t i n representing over one hundred defendants, he had only f i l e d a motion t o suppress once o r twice and never successfully. Houtz i n d i c a t e d t h a t he believed someone had "gott-en" t o defendant before he was appointed and had arranged t h e p l e a ba.rgain. Houtz f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t because of defendant ' s confession, he f e l t t h e p l e a bargain would be b e s t f o r defendant. When questioned about h i s e f f o r t s t o adequately represent defendant, Houtz admitted t h a t when he recommended to d.efendant that he plea bargain, he had only interviewed the defendant, his probation officer and the victim. Sixteen potential witnesses were provided to Houtz by the State. Houtz was unaware that Luloff had stated in his statement to police that he could not identify his assailant. Luloff had apparently told Houtz the assailant was La Tray. Nor did Houtz know that Tami Huebner had told three very inconsistent stories, one which could possibly have provided an excuse for the shooting. Even though Houtz learned of this information prior to defendan.tls plea, he never informed defendant. Defendant appeared before Judge Coate with his attorney on December 29, 1983, and plead guilty to aggravated assault. The Judge conducted an intensive interrogation of defenda.nt prior to the plea to ensure that it was made knowingly and without coercion. In his petition for post-conviction relief and at his subsequent hearing, defendant contended that he gave all the "right" answers because he knew that was the only way the judge would accept his plea. Defendant had been warned by either Officer Odem or the County Attorney that he would get 210 years on the attempted deliberate homicide charge. Defendant wanted to avoid that possibility at all costs. In Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, the United States Supreme Court adopted a two-prong test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 1. "Flhen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 2 . "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. We adopted this test in State v. Boyer (Mont. 1985), 695 P.2d There is no question but tha.t counsel's efforts in representing defendant could have been more diligent. However, the dispositive question is whether defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's lack of diligence. We find that he was not. For all intents and purposes, it appears defendant had his plea bargain practically guaranteed before Houtz was appointed as his attorney. Houtz, after reviewing the case against his client, determined the plea bargain to be reasonable and fair. He therefore pursued and achieved finalization of that bargain. Under the circumstances, we also find the plea bargain to be reasonable and fair. We are not persuaded that had defendant been advised of Huebner's and Luloff's inconsistent statements, he would have opted to proceed to trial on the attempted deliberate homicide charge. Thus, counsel ' s failure to advise his client of the complete case against him does not undermine our confidence in the eventual outcome, the plea bargain. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. We hold that defendant received the effective assistance of counsel. The rule for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea was recently set forth in State v. Laverdure (Mont. 1984), 685 P.2d 375, 377, 41 St.Rep. 1570, 1-572. Review of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea requires the consideration and. balancing of at least three relevant factors: "(1) the adequacy of the interrogation by the District Court of the defendant at the entry of the guilty plea as to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea, 12) the promptness with which the defendant attempts to withdraw the prior plea, and (3) the fact that the defendant's plea was apparently the result of plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dismissal of another charge . . . ." State v. Huttinger (1979), 182 Mont. 50, 54, 595 P.2d 363, 366. The trial judge's interrogation of defendant at the time he entered his guilty plea was adequate. Defendant does not dispute this conclusion. Furthermore, defendant's efforts to withdraw his plea were not timely. He requested. a transcript a year after pleading guilty. His first motion was filed in January of 1985. Finally, defendant's plea was clearly the result of a plea bargain. Defendant's reasons for wanting to withdraw his guilty plea center around his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For example, defendant contends that his lawyer's failure to accurately and fully advise him of the case against him resulted in his decision to plead guilty. However, our holding that defendant received effect-ive assistance of counsel significantly und.ermines this contention. Therefore, we affirm the trial judge's refusal to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Affirmed. We Concur: /