Title: CYNTHIA LOUISE DeJOHN V. KENNETH DAVID DeJOHN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CYNTHIA LOUISE DeJOHN V. KENNETH DAVID DeJOHN2005 WY 140121 P.3d 802Case Number: 05-36Decided: 10/26/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
CYNTHIA 
LOUISE DeJOHN,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
KENNETH 
DAVID DeJOHN,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
C. M. 
Aron of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Daniel 
E. White and Sasha M. Johnston of Woodard & White, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
C.J., files the majority opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Cynthia Louise DeJohn (Wife), contends that the district court abused its 
discretion in dividing the parties' marital property.  Appellee, Kenneth David DeJohn 
(Husband), asserts that the property division was well within the district 
court's broad discretion in such a matter.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Wife poses these 
issues for our consideration:

 
 
            
1.  In a marital dissolution, whether it is an abuse of 
discretion to treat marital joint property  including the parties' home  as 
the equivalent of Husband's pre-marital property holdings.

 
 
            
2.  In a marital dissolution, whether it is an abuse of 
discretion to disregard the Wife's share of ownership in the parties' marital 
home and other assets in joint names.

 
 
Husband 
simply contends that the distribution of property does not constitute an abuse 
of discretion.

 
 
[¶3]      In her reply 
brief, Wife asserts that Husband's brief raised these additional 
issues:

 
 
            
1.  Whether Husband was actually employed during the 
marriage.

            
2.  Whether Husband can assert a prenuptial 
agreement.

            
3.  Whether Husband can assert an estate plan to avoid gifts of 
joint property.

            
4.  Whether Wife operated the parties' mobile home 
park.

            
5.  Whether Husband has falsely attacked Wife's 
credibility.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      The parties do 
not dispute that they were married on July 30, 1993, and that they informally 
separated in January of 2003.  At 
the time of the divorce proceedings, Wife was 49 years old and Husband was 
56.  A decree of divorce was entered 
on November 24, 2004.

 
 
[¶5]      During the course 
of his working career, Husband earned several million dollars working in the 
high-tech industry.  Wife worked 
throughout her adult life prior to the marriage, and had both an undergraduate 
degree in business and a Masters of Business Administration from the University of Colorado, although she had never really 
been employed outside the marriage so as to make significant use of her college 
degrees.

 
 
[¶6]      The parties were 
first acquainted when both worked at Storage Technology, but became friends 
while Wife worked for the Mountain Man Fruit and Nut Company in the Boulder area, and Husband 
worked for Exobyte.  They dated for 
a time, and then in late 1991, Wife moved into Husband's home, and they lived 
together there until that house was sold shortly after their marriage.  Neither party held down formal "jobs" 
during much of the marriage.  
Husband's work was to invest and reinvest his retirement nest egg, and 
Wife assisted him to some extent (Husband says she helped very little and was 
just a "housewife," and Wife asserts that she helped quite a bit).  In the year 2000, Wife began working as 
a real estate agent, and during the four years 2000-2003, her gross income was 
$225,000.00.  During the course of 
the approximately 10-year marriage, the parties' gross income was over 
$2,000,000.00, and the parties expended about $900,000.00 of that on living 
expenses.

 
 
[¶7]      Husband came to 
the marriage with approximately $1,250,000.00, which he earned working in the 
high-tech manufacturing field and which he considered his retirement nest egg (this 
amount included his home which was valued at about $450,000.00).  Wife, on the other hand, came to the 
marriage with very few assets.  
Husband's position in these proceedings is best summed up by the 
following testimony given by him at trial:

 
 
Q.  Now, 
at the time you left high-tech manufacturing and you had this asset base that 
you described, what were your plans in terms of going forward with those 
assets?

A.  The 
plan on going forward was to utilize the assets by investing in property, 
primarily mountain property, doing some improvements and reselling the mountain 
property to earn a living off the increased value of that mountain 
property.  And to constantly 
reinvest the basis so that the amount of money never 
changed.

Q.  And 
why was it important for you to preserve the basis of the assets you started 
with when you left high-tech manufacturing?

A.  It 
was my total retirement.  It was 26 
years of a career.  It was the idea 
that I wanted to have a viable retirement, and I wanted to be relatively well 
provided for in that retirement through those resources.  I had no other retirement program at 
all.

 
 
[¶8]      Furthermore, 
Husband emphasized that the parties cohabited for quite a while, but he then 
reluctantly agreed to marry Wife because she wanted to have a child with him, 
and he agreed to "accommodate her with that."  No children were born of the marriage, 
however.  Husband also contended 
that the parties entered into an informal premarital understanding with respect 
to his retirement funds:

 
 
Q.  Okay, 
at the time you and Mrs. DeJohn got married, or rather prior to that time, did 
you have any discussions with her regarding your assets and your plans with 
regard to those assets that you just described?

A.  Absolutely.

Q.  What 
did you tell her regarding the assets that you had in your 
possession?

A.  That 
I wasn't willing to risk those assets and wasn't willing to start my life 
over.  That at 45 years old and 
after 26 years of earning those assets independently, I was not going to 
entertain a relationship whereby those assets would become community property or 
joint property.

Q.  What 
was her response when you made those comments to her?

A.  Completely 
affirmative.  Complete autonomy with 
regard to the assets.  Complete 
autonomy with regard to the usage of those assets, in that that was my way of 
earning a living.

Q.  Would 
it be fair to say that she assured you that she would not make any claims 
against your assets in the event of a divorce?

A.  Absolutely 
assured me of that, no claims at all on the assets, and no attempt to deal with 
those assets in the course of the marriage, other than to let me do what I was 
going to do with them and earn a living through them.

 
 
[¶9]      Husband conceded 
that several of his assets were titled in the parties' joint names at the time 
of the divorce, but he explained that as follows:

 
 
Q.  Did 
there subsequently come a time where you did in fact place certain assets in 
joint tenancy with Mrs. DeJohn?

A.  Beginning 
after the sale of the  well, there was discussion early in the marriage about 
the fact that if I died Cindy would inherit nothing, so what I did is I put some 
assets in joint tenancy, that would be the ones she would inherit if I 
died.  And that was probably around 
20 percent1 of the total assets.  It was a few assets and they tended to 
be long-term more life-style oriented than business oriented 
assets.

 
 
The 
bottom line was that Husband wanted to keep all assets that could be traced to 
his retirement funds, without regard for how those assets were titled at the 
time of the divorce.  Specifically, 
Wife asked that the following jointly held assets be divided equitably in 
accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2005):  (1)  The marital home at 58 Overlook Road; 
(2)  Notes receivable on the 
Vedauwoo Springs lots that were titled in their joint names; (3)  Rockaway Ranch Lots purchased with a line 
of credit for which Wife was also liable; and (4)  $155,000.00 in their joint bank 
account.

 
 
[¶10]   The district court issued the 
following decision letter:

 
 
The 
Plaintiff, Cynthia DeJohn and the Defendant, Kenneth DeJohn, were married to 
each other on July 30, 1993, in Boulder, Colorado.  No children have been born as a result 
of the marriage.  The parties have 
been separated since January of 2003.  
The Defendant worked in the high-tech industry until 1995.  At the time of the marriage, the 
Defendant had approximately $1.25 million dollars in assets.  Since 1995, the Defendant has been 
involved in the acquisition and resale of real property.

The 
Plaintiff, at the time of the marriage, had virtually no assets.  Since the year 2000, the Plaintiff has 
been employed as a real estate agent in Laramie, Wyoming, and has made as much as $70,000 in 
the year 2003.

During 
their marriage, the parties lived in Boulder, 
Colorado, and then moved to Kemmerer, Wyoming, in 1997.  The parties, thereafter, moved to 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, in 1998, and ultimately to what is known as the 
Overlook 
Road home in the Vedauwoo area between Laramie and Cheyenne.

The 
Plaintiff currently lives in a home that she is purchasing in Laramie.  The Defendant resides at the Overlook Road 
residence.

During 
the course of the marriage, the Defendant bought and sold various pieces of 
property, the profits of which the parties used for their living and 
enjoyment.

It is 
clear that during their married life together, the Plaintiff and Defendant 
enjoyed a prosperous lifestyle.

The 
parties have mutually agreed and divided a great deal of personal property.  The order, entered herein, should 
reflect that those items of personal and real property that have been mutually 
divided to the parties in satisfaction, should be set over to them as their sole 
and separate property.

At 
issue, however, is in excess of $1,000,000 in assets that include the marital 
home and adjoining lots, cash, and various mortgage notes.

The 
Plaintiff contends that these assets should generally be split equally since 
they were acquired during the marriage.  
The Defendant, however, believes that he should receive virtually all of 
the assets since they can be traced back to the 1.25 million dollars that he 
brought into the marriage.

 
 
Discussion

 
 
            
The Court generally agrees with the Defendant's analysis.  The Defendant brought in excess of 
$1,000,000 into the marriage, while the Plaintiff brought virtually 
nothing.  The Plaintiff and the 
Defendant have not been married a long time.  The Defendant explained to the 
Plaintiff, at the inception of the marriage, that it was his intention to use 
his money to invest and make a living.  
All of the properties and assets that the parties currently have can be 
traced back to Mr. DeJohn's original assets that he brought into the 
marriage.  The fact that the assets 
have turned over and that some are in the joint names of the parties, does not 
change the fact that the origin of the asset was with Mr. DeJohn.  This Court believes that there is a 
general exception to the foregoing.

            
The Plaintiff made substantial investments of time and effort regarding 
the development of a mobile [home] park in Kemmerer, Wyoming, that was originally bought by the 
Defendant.  In that regard, Mr. 
DeJohn initially invested $256,000 to purchase the mobile home park.  Additional outlays of capital by Mr. 
DeJohn resulted in an investment basis of $563,000.  The park was ultimately sold for 
$725,000, thus resulting in $162,000 profit to the DeJohns.  The Court believes that Ms. DeJohn is 
entitled to one-half of that profit, since it was attained in part through the 
Plaintiff's efforts.

            
The parties then took the proceeds from the sale of the mobile home park 
and ultimately used those proceeds to buy their home on Overlook Road.  That property was purchased for 
$285,000.  The parties have 
submitted evidence of differing current values for the Overlook Road 
residence.  The [Defendant's] 
testimony indicates the market value is $355,000, while the Plaintiff's 
evaluation of the property is $450,000.  
The Defendant's evaluation is based upon an appraisal, however, the Court 
finds that the Plaintiff's evaluation, given her real estate background, also 
has proper foundation.  The average 
between the two evaluations is approximately $400,000, which the Court finds to 
be the proper current valuation of the Overlook Road home.  This results in a $115,000 appreciation 
of the home since it was purchased.  
The Court believes that one-half of that amount should also be  set over to the 
Plaintiff.

            
Taking the two amounts together, attributable to the appreciation from 
the mobile home park and the marital home, the Court believes that the Plaintiff 
is entitled to $138,500.

            
The Court would also note, that the Plaintiff has placed a significant 
($60,000) down payment on her current home in Laramie.  
That home is also well furnished.  
The Plaintiff has an excellent vehicle and other personal 
belongings.  This taken together 
with $138,500 that the Court is awarding to the Plaintiff, places her in a 
substantially better position than she was at the time she entered the 
marriage.  The Defendant, however, 
will be in approximately the same position he was at the time the marriage 
began.

            
It is the order of the Court that by January 15, 2005, the Defendant 
shall pay to the Plaintiff, the sum of $138,500.  Failing that, the Court will be required 
to set over to the Plaintiff various assets worth $138,500.  The Plaintiff is also entitled to the 
four mounted elk heads that she harvested, one of the two freezers, and the 
remainder of her personal items stored in the basement of the Overlook Road 
residence.  The balance of the 
property, real and personal, shall be set over to the Defendant including the 
marital home, adjoining lots, mortgage notes and cash.  [Vol. I, 101-3]

 
 
The 
Decree of Divorce accurately reflected the district court's decision 
letter.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶11]                           
There are few rules more firmly established in our jurisprudence than the 
proposition that the disposition of marital property is committed to the sound 
discretion of the district court.  
Judicial discretion is made up of many things, including conclusions 
reached from objective criteria, as well as exercising sound judgment with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily 
or capriciously.  We are required to 
ask ourselves whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and 
whether or not any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  In accomplishing our review, we consider 
only the evidence in favor of the successful party, ignore the evidence of the 
unsuccessful party, and grant to the successful party every reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the record.  
Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 
113, ¶8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶8 (Wyo.2001).  
Moreover,

 
 
      We apply an abuse 
of discretion standard when reviewing divisions of marital property and, 
recognizing that property settlements present complex problems requiring the 
trial court to assess the respective merits and needs of the parties, we will 
not disturb the result absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.  France v. France, 902 P.2d 701, 703 
(Wyo.1995);  Neuman v. Neuman, 842 P.2d 575, 578 
(Wyo.1992);  Kennedy v. Kennedy, 456 P.2d 243, 247 
(Wyo.1964 [1969]).  We will find an 
abuse of discretion when the disposition shocks the conscience of the court and 
appears so unfair and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide 
it.  France, 
902 P.2d  at 703.

Mann v. 
Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo. 1999)

 
 

Odegard 
v. Odegard, 2003 
WY 67, ¶10, 69 P.3d 917, 920-21 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   In Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003), we articulated a slightly more expansive standard of 
review under circumstances not dissimilar to those presented by this 
case:

 
 
The 
division of marital property is within the trial court's sound discretion, and 
we will not disturb that division absent an abuse of discretion.  Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 
(Wyo.2000).  A just and equitable 
distribution is as likely as not to be unequal.  Id. 
We evaluate whether the trial court's property division is, in fact, equitable 
from the perspective of the overall distribution of marital assets and 
liabilities rather than from a narrow focus on the effects of any particular 
disposition.  Id. From that 
perspective, we afford the trial court considerable discretion to form a 
distributive scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of each individual 
case, and we will not disturb such a scheme absent a showing that the trial 
court clearly abused its discretion.  
Id. The division 
of property in a divorce case should not be disturbed except on clear grounds as 
the trial court is usually in a better position than the appellate court to 
judge the parties' respective merits and needs.  Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶6, 61 P.3d 383, ¶6 (Wyo.2003).  The trial court 
is also in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility and weigh 
their testimony.  Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 
(Wyo.1998).  We, therefore, give 
considerable deference to its findings.  
Id. The ultimate 
question in determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred is whether the 
trial court could reasonably conclude as it did.  Metz, 2003 WY 3, 
¶6.  In answering that question, we 
consider only the evidence of the successful party, ignore the evidence of the 
unsuccessful party, and grant the successful party every favorable inference 
that can be drawn from the record.  
Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 
113, ¶8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶8 (Wyo.2001).

 
 
[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party. 

 
 
[¶14]   With respect to those statutory 
factors we have said:

 
 
"There 
are no specific guidelines as to how much weight is given to each of the 
factors;" the "trial court has the discretion to determine what weight should be 
given each of these individual factors."  
Barney v. Barney, 705 P.2d 342, 346 (Wyo.1985);  Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶26, 88 P.3d 1022, 1030 (Wyo.2004).  There 
are " 'no hard and fast rules' governing property divisions."  Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 
(Wyo.1980) (quoting Young v. Young, 
472 P.2d 784, 785 (Wyo.1970)).

 
 

Stoker 
v. Stoker, 2005 
WY 39, ¶22, 109 P.3d 59, 65 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶15]   A primary question that must be 
answered in a review such as this is whether or not the evidence adduced at 
trial supports the property division as a whole, not necessarily each individual 
part of it.  Odegard, 69 P.3d  at 921; Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶9, 35 P.3d 409, 412 (Wyo. 2001).  Wife 
contends that the record does not support the district court's finding that all 
of the marital property traces back to Husband's retirement nest egg in two very 
important respects:  First, Wife's 
ownership interest in the property (in particular the marital home on Overlook 
Road); and her substantial contribution to the single most profitable investment 
venture during the marriage (the Kemmerer mobile home park).  However, Wife's summary of her argument 
hardly suggests that the trial court abused its discretion or that the district 
court's distribution should "shock the conscience" of this 
Court:

 
 
            
Under Wyoming law, absent an abuse of discretion the 
District Court was empowered to award virtually all the marital property to 
Husband, even if the Wife owned one-half of it.  The Court did not do that.  Instead, it found that the property all 
belonged to the Husband because it "traced back to" his premarital 
holdings.  In doing so, the District 
Court disregarded the evidence concerning the Wife's ownership and 
contribution.

 
 
Continuing, 
Wife contends that none of the assets held by the parties at the time of the 
divorce were "brought into the 
marriage."  Therefore, the district 
court's finding to that effect is an abuse of discretion because it is not 
supported by the evidence.  
Furthermore, Wife contends that none of the marital assets can be "traced 
back to" Husband's premarital property.  
We cannot agree with that proposition, because the evidence certainly 
supports the fact that virtually all of the assets of the parties, at the time 
of the marriage, were Husband's assets.  
Moreover, Husband's Exhibit 60 supports the district court's conclusion 
that the marital assets do "trace back to" Husband's initial economic stake in 
this marriage.

 
 
[¶16]   Wife focuses on this single 
sentence, quoted from France v. 
France, 902 P.2d 701, 704 (Wyo. 1995), as providing the framework for our 
standard of review:  "The property 
which is subject to division under our statute consists of property which is the 
product of the marital union and was acquired during the course of the marriage 
by the joint efforts of the parties."  
We include the entire paragraph from which that sentence is borrowed for 
the sake of clarity and completeness:

 
 
The 
property which is subject to division under our statute consists of property 
which is the product of the marital union and was acquired during the course of 
the marriage by the joint efforts of the parties.  The statute requires such property to be 
disposed of in a just and equitable manner between the parties in the exercise 
of judicial discretion.  We have 
held a just and equitable division is as likely as not to be unequal.  Blanchard v. Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227 
(Wyo.1989).  Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 
includes as a factor, the party through whom the property was acquired * * 
*.'   In Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525 
(Wyo.1961), we held property, which was inherited by or given to that party, can 
properly be awarded to the party by whom it was inherited or given.  In Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo.1980), 
we held it is not an abuse of discretion to award to a party the property he 
brought to the marriage.

 
 

France, 902 P.2d  at 704.

 
 
[¶17]   In many respects, Wife's argument 
amounts to a semantic quibble over whether "property brought to the marriage" 
means something totally unrelated to assets that are readily "traced to" 
property brought to the marriage.  
The language from the governing statute is "the party through whom the 
property was acquired."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-114.  Moreover, we are also 
mindful that the district court's action should be sustained on any basis 
apparent from the record.  Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 159, 
¶16, 57 P.3d 324, 331 (Wyo. 2002); Heyl 
v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 30 (Wyo. 1974).  It is apparent from the record that the 
gist of the district court's finding is that Husband was the "party through whom 
the property was acquired."

 
 
[¶18]   Wife contends that Husband made a 
gift to her by titling property in their joint names.  In Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 
2000), we said:

 
 
[T]hat 
when title to real estate was taken in the names of both spouses but only one 
spouse paid for it, there was a rebuttable presumption that a fifty percent 
interest was intended as a gift to the nonpaying spouse.  Tyler v. Tyler, 624 P.2d 784, 785-86 
(Wyo.1981).  It follows, then, that 
when a spouse pays for real property and titles it in the other spouse's name, 
there is a presumption that the entire property is intended as a 
gift.

 
 
In the 
instant circumstances, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Husband, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 
concluding that Husband's testimony surmounted that 
presumption.

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, we will briefly comment on 
the additional issues that Wife contends were raised by Husband's brief.  Whether or not Husband was "employed," 
as that term is commonly understood, is once again a semantic quibble.  During the marriage, Husband was engaged 
in various forms of investing, including the buying and selling of real estate 
for profit and holding mortgages for the interest they earned.  By means of that occupation, he earned 
over $2,000,000.00, and to call it "employment" does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion.  The district court did 
not conclude that there was a formal prenuptial agreement, but only that the 
parties had an "understanding" of some sort in that regard.  That conclusion is well supported by 
Husband's testimony.  The same can 
be said of the "estate plan."  
Husband referred to his placement of some assets in joint tenancy as a 
sort of "estate plan," and the district court's assessment of those facts does 
not constitute an abuse of discretion.  
The district court's decision letter credits Wife with her contribution 
to the success of the mobile home park and, although Husband may have "falsely 
attacked" Wife's credibility, we are unable to conclude that that somehow 
undermines the district court's exercise of its discretion with respect to the 
entirety of the property division scheme.  
It is understandable that Husband would want to secure his retirement 
nest egg, and apparently that rather strong motive prompted him to take a "no 
holds barred" approach to debasing and demeaning his wife, although there is 
nothing in this record that would support a conclusion that Wife's character was 
anything but worthy.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   We have carefully examined the 
record in this matter and conclude that the district court's distributive scheme 
was not an abuse of discretion.  The 
Decree of Divorce is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Husband was 
apparently unaware that he could not disinherit his wife.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101 (LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 
 
 
KITE, 
J., specially concurring.

 
 
[¶21]   I concur in the majority opinion, 
but write separately to express my concern that both the district court and the 
majority appear to have placed some reliance upon the husband's claim that he 
told his wife, prior to their marriage, that he considered the cash he brought 
into the marriage not to be marital property, but, instead, his personal 
retirement "nest egg."  The district 
court stated, in its decision letter, "[t]he Defendant explained to the 
Plaintiff, at the inception of the marriage, that it was his intention to use 
his money to invest and make a living."  
While recognizing no formal prenuptial agreement existed, the majority 
concludes the husband's testimony supported a finding of an "understanding' of 
some sort."  Without further factual 
development, this justice wonders whether any "understanding" existed, or 
whether husband's recollection of pre-nuptial discussions are colored by the 
self-interest of a party to a divorce.

 
 
[¶22]   We enter dangerous territory when 
we base divisions of marital property on one spouse's testimony that the other 
spouse had orally agreed at the time of the marriage that certain property, and 
apparently any increase in the value of that property, would be beyond the reach 
of this state's divorce statutes should the marriage fail.  Perhaps in no other arena is it more 
important to have the alleged agreement in writing.  Determining whether an oral pre-nuptial 
agreement, if found to exist, is enforceable raises further questions including 
the applicability of the statute of frauds.  Dewberry v. George, 
62 P.3d 525 (Wash. App. 2003).

 
 
[¶23]   However, I am convinced the record 
supports the district court's exercise of its discretion in the equitable 
division of the marital property and, therefore, concur in affirming the 
judgment of divorce.