Title: Collection Bureau, Inc. v. John M. Dorsey Appeal from order granting summary judgment re criminal fine

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36734 
 
COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN M. DORSEY, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent.                            
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Lewiston, November 2010 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No.  40  
 
Filed:  March 21, 2011 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,  
Kootenai County.  Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge. 
 
The district court order granting summary judgment is reversed and the matter 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Hamilton, Michaelson & Hilty, LLP, Nampa, for appellant.  Kerry E. Michaelson  
argued. 
 
Redal & Redal, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent.  John E. Redal argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
 
This case relates to an effort to collect a fine in a criminal case.  Collection Bureau, Inc. 
(Collection Bureau) appeals the district court’s order granting John Dorsey’s (Dorsey) motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred recovery of the fine 
imposed upon conviction.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Dorsey was charged by information with trafficking in methamphetamine by 
manufacturing in Shoshone County.  At the conclusion of his trial, the jury found Dorsey guilty.  
On March 19, 2001, the district court entered a judgment of conviction, sentencing Dorsey to 
twenty years imprisonment, with five years fixed, and fining Dorsey $25,000, payable to the 
Shoshone County Clerk of the Court.   
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On August 8, 2005, Dorsey was released on parole.  On that date, he executed a notarized 
written instrument that set forth the conditions of his parole (Parole Agreement).  The Parole 
Agreement contained a special condition providing that Dorsey “must make payment to the 
sentencing court for fines and other assessments, which were ordered at the time of sentencing.  
Establish and follow a payment schedule as determined by the Parole Officer.”   
Shoshone County (the County) made unsuccessful oral and written demands of Dorsey 
for payment.  The County did not record or renew the judgment, nor did it seek to execute upon 
the judgment.  Instead, it assigned the debt to Collection Bureau.  By September 25, 2007, 
interest on Dorsey’s fine had increased the amount due to $33,325.  Collection Bureau filed a 
complaint seeking to collect that amount on January 28, 2008.  Dorsey answered, asserting that 
the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.   
Dorsey moved for summary judgment on those grounds.1  In response, Collection Bureau 
asserted that because the original judgment was in writing and benefited the state, it was 
excepted from the five-year statute of limitations by operation of I.C. § 5-216.2  In the 
alternative, Collection Bureau asserted that the Parole Agreement was an enforceable contract 
between Dorsey and the Department of Corrections that renewed Dorsey’s obligation to pay the 
debt.  Collection Bureau argued that the County, and Collection Bureau as its assignee, were 
                                                 
 
1 Dorsey’s motion for summary judgment was based upon I.C. §§ 11-101 and 11-105.  These are not statutes of 
limitation.  Rather, these statutes govern execution on judgments.  Idaho Code § 11-101 provides: 
Except as provided in section 5-245, Idaho Code, for execution on judgments for support of a 
child, the party in whose favor judgment is given may, at any time within five (5) years after the 
entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement, subject to the right of the court 
to stay execution as provided by the rules adopted by the supreme court. 
Read closely, I.C. § 11-101 does not purport to provide a limitation on an action based upon a judgment; rather, it 
limits the time within which one may obtain a writ of execution to enforce a judgment to five years from the date of 
the judgment’s entry.  Nor is I.C. § 11-105 applicable to this case.  Rather, this statute relates to execution on 
judgments providing other than monetary relief: 
In all cases other than for the recovery of money the judgment may be enforced or carried into 
execution after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry, by leave of the court, upon 
motion, or by judgment for that purpose, founded upon supplemental pleadings. 
 
2 Idaho Code § 5-216 provides as follows: 
Within five (5) years: 
An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing. 
The limitations prescribed by this section shall never apply to actions in the name or for 
the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted nor interposed as a defense to any action in the 
name or for the benefit of the state although such limitations may have become fully operative as a 
defense prior to the adoption of this amendment. 
 
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third-party beneficiaries of that contract and therefore had the right to enforce the contract.  
Collection Bureau asserted that because the Parole Agreement was a contract with the state, 
enforcement of the document’s terms was excepted from the statute of limitations provided by 
I.C. § 5-216, and therefore the cause of action was not barred.  Collection Bureau also contended 
that even if the Parole Agreement did not inure to the benefit of the state, the action was not 
barred because it was a new written contract and the action was commenced within five years of 
the date of the Parole Agreement. 
The district court found that the Parole Agreement could “potentially be construed as a 
contract between the State of Idaho Department of Correction and Mr. Dorsey.”  However, it 
held that the gravamen of that agreement was that Dorsey must engage in prosocial activities to 
maintain his release on parole.  It held that since the benefit that would inure to the County if 
Dorsey paid the fine was only incidental to this prosocial purpose, Collection Bureau was not a 
third-party beneficiary vested with the authority to enforce the Parole Agreement.  The district 
court thus granted Dorsey’s motion for summary judgment.3  Collection Bureau timely appealed, 
requesting attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, as well as Idaho 
Appellate Rules 35(a)(5) and 41. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from an order granting a party’s motion for summary judgment, we employ 
the same standard of review that the trial court used in ruling on the motion. Baxter v. Craney, 
135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents before the district court indicate that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
I.R.C.P. 56(c).  The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267.  This Court will liberally construe facts 
in favor of the non-moving party, together with all reasonable inferences from the evidence.  
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 400-01, 987 P.2d 300, 312-13 (1999).   
                                                 
 
3 Notably, the district court did not identify the statutory basis for its conclusion that Collection Bureau’s action was 
barred.  We infer that the district court adopted Dorsey’s contention that I.C. § 11-101 and/or I.C. § 11-105 operated 
as a statutory bar to the action. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Collection Bureau contends there are two avenues by which this Court may find its 
complaint was timely filed.  First, it argues that the March 19, 2001, judgment sentencing Dorsey 
to imprisonment and payment of a fine was a written instrument to which the state was a party, 
and therefore I.C. § 5-216, the statute of limitations governing liability upon written instruments, 
does not apply.  Collection Bureau also argues that if this Court finds I.C. § 5-216 to be 
inapplicable to the judgment, the statute applies to the August 8, 2005, Parole Agreement signed 
by Dorsey.  Collection Bureau asserts the Parole Agreement was a new written contract of which 
it is a third-party beneficiary.  Collection Bureau argues that Dorsey acknowledged the debt 
owed to the County by signing the Parole Agreement and thereby renewed his obligation to pay 
it.  Thus, Collection Bureau argues the I.C. § 5-216 five-year statute of limitations applicable to 
written instruments began to run on August 8, 2005, making the January 28, 2008 complaint 
timely.  Dorsey responds that this action is governed by I.C. § 5-215,4 providing a six year 
statute of limitations, and because this action was not initiated within six years of the entry of the 
criminal judgment, the action is barred.   
We find that Dorsey’s execution of the Parole Agreement constituted an 
acknowledgement of the debt.  For that reason, we do not decide which statute of limitations 
found within chapter 2, Title 5, Idaho Code applies.   
A.  By signing the Parole Agreement, Dorsey acknowledged the debt created by the 
judgment of conviction.   
 
Collection Bureau argues that Dorsey’s act of signing the August 8, 2005, Parole 
Agreement was an acknowledgment evidencing a new or continuing contract between Dorsey 
and the state, sufficient to renew Dorsey’s obligation to pay the fine.  This acknowledgment, 
Collection Bureau asserts, triggered a new five-year statute of limitations for bringing an action 
on a written instrument under I.C. § 5-216.  Since Collection Bureau’s present action to enforce 
the acknowledgment was brought within that period, it argues its complaint was timely filed.  
Collection Bureau further argues that Shoshone County was a third-party beneficiary to the 
                                                 
 
4 Idaho Code § 5-215 provides, in pertinent part:   
Within six (6) years: 
1.  An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state 
or territory within the United States. 
 
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Parole Agreement, and thus Collection Bureau as the County’s assignee has standing to enforce 
the agreement.   
For over a century, Idaho law has provided that one may reinitiate the statute of 
limitations on an unpaid debt for which the statute’s period has not yet expired by 
acknowledging the debt’s existence in writing.  E.g., Dern v. Olsen, 18 Idaho 358, 366, 110 P. 
164, 166 (1910).   
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing 
contract by which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the 
same is contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but 
any payment of principal or interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, 
duly signed, to pay the residue of the debt. 
 
Idaho Code § 5-238.  Where a debtor acknowledges a debt that has not yet been barred by the 
statute of limitations, a continuing contract is created because “the presumption is that he is an 
honest man, and means at some time in the future to pay [it].  The law, therefore, raises an 
implied promise to pay.”  Dern, 18 Idaho at 366, 110 P. at 167.  No additional consideration is 
necessary.  Id.; see also Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231, 235 (1887) (stating that the 
original debt “is a sufficient legal consideration for a subsequent new promise to pay it . . .”).   
The Idaho acknowledgment statute was originally borrowed verbatim from a preexisting 
California statute.  Woods v. Locke, 49 Idaho 486, 493, 289 P. 610, 612 (1930).  Thus, we 
presume that our legislature intended to adopt reasonable constructions of the statute that were 
established by California courts prior to its adoption in Idaho.  Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. 
Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 395, 405 P.2d 634, 637 (1965).  When this Court was long ago 
confronted with the question of whether the statute is applicable to judgments, we looked to the 
California Supreme Court for guidance.  Woods, 49 Idaho at 493, 289 P. at 612 (citing 
McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal. 180 (1868)).  McCormick included judgment debts within the 
statute, and this Court reasoned that “[a] valid judgment, while it is conclusive evidence of a 
debt, is vastly much more.  It is a living obligation potential of as much grief to the judgment 
debtor as any mortgage bond, signed, sealed, and delivered.  It is a debt.  It is a debt of record.”  
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Collection Bureau thus correctly argues that the debt created by 
Dorsey’s criminal judgment was capable of renewal by an acknowledgment.   
The question then is whether the statements contained in Dorsey’s Parole Agreement 
constitute an acknowledgment falling within the scope of I.C. § 5-238.  “[A] clear and definite 
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acknowledgment of the existence of the contract and liability, whether coupled with a direct 
promise to pay or not, carries with it an implied promise to pay.”  Dern, 18 Idaho at 366, 110 P. 
at 167.  Thus, if one requests the opportunity to pay an existing debt in a certain way, e.g., in 
labor, he acknowledges the debt and revives the running of the statute of limitations.  S. Pac. Co. 
v. Prosser, 55 P. 145, 146 (Cal. 1898).  Likewise, if he mentions a means by which he hopes to 
pay the debt, and does not condition payment on the viability of those means, he acknowledges 
the debt.  Dern, 18 Idaho at 368, 110 P. at 167.   
However, there is no acknowledgment in the absence of “an acknowledgement or 
admission of the debt in terms so distinct and unqualified that [a promise to pay] may be 
implied.”  Mahas v. Kasiska, 47 Idaho 179, 186, 276 P. 315, 317 (1928).  Thus, if a debtor 
demands release from the judgment in exchange for new terms of repayment, there is no 
acknowledgment.  McCormick, 36 Cal. at 186-87.  Likewise, if he agrees to be bound by the 
outcome of arbitration, he has not acknowledged the debt but instead has expressed an intention 
to limit his liability to the proceeding’s outcome.  Curtis v. City of Sacramento, 11 P. 748, 749 
(Cal. 1886).  Similarly, a jointly and severally liable debtor’s expression of willingness to assist 
in collecting payment from the other debtor is not an acknowledgment because it demonstrates 
the debtor’s own unwillingness to pay.  Mahas, 47 Idaho at 186, 276 P. at 317.  Thus, while the 
finding of an acknowledgment is precluded by a debtor’s statement or conduct suggesting any 
hesitancy regarding payment of the full debt, conduct that admits liability exists and imposes no 
qualification upon that liability is sufficient to renew the statute of limitations.   
Dorsey signed the Parole Agreement on August 8, 2005, within five years of the March 
19, 2001, entry of his criminal judgment.  Thus, if his signature on the Parole Agreement was an 
acknowledgment, Collection Bureau’s suit was timely filed, regardless of whether we were to 
apply the five year limitation provided by I.C. § 5-216 or the six year limitation provided by I.C. 
§ 5-215(1).  In order for Dorsey’s signed Parole Agreement to fall within the acknowledgment 
statute, he needed to unconditionally acknowledge the debt owed pursuant to the criminal 
judgment.   
Dorsey executed the Parole Agreement in order to secure parole from imprisonment for 
his methamphetamine trafficking sentence.  Therefore, the reference to the fine he owed the 
sentencing court was not “equivocal, vague, or indeterminate.”  Rather, the Parole Agreement’s 
statement that Dorsey “must make payment to the sentencing court for fines and other 
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assessments, which were ordered at the time of sentencing,” left no question as to which debt the 
document referred.  While the Parole Agreement required Dorsey to “[e]stablish and follow a 
payment schedule as determined by the Parole Officer,” Dorsey’s compliance with a payment 
schedule was not conditioned upon the County immediately releasing him from liability on the 
judgment, as was the case in McCormick, nor has Dorsey asserted that he was only liable for the 
debt according to the terms of that payment schedule.  Rather, as was the case in Southern 
Pacific Co., Dorsey’s agreement to comply with a payment schedule was a commitment to pay 
the full debt owed in a particular manner.  Unlike the debtor in Mahas, Dorsey’s execution of the 
Parole Agreement was not coupled with any expression susceptible of an interpretation that he 
was not obligated to pay the debt or intended to limit his liability for the debt.  We conclude that 
by executing the Parole Agreement on August 8, 2005, Dorsey unconditionally admitted that the 
March 19, 2001 judgment debt existed, and he thereby acknowledged the debt.   
Since either potentially applicable statute of limitations had not expired when Dorsey 
signed the Parole Agreement, we do not decide whether I.C. § 5-215(1) or I.C. § 5-216 governs 
proceedings arising from a criminal judgment,  Dorsey’s unconditional acknowledgment of the 
debt was sufficient to continue his obligation under the judgment.  As our decision in Dern 
makes clear, a new promise, accompanied by new consideration, was not necessary to renew the 
running of the statute of limitations.  Because there was no new contract, we need not discuss 
whether Collection Bureau was a third-party beneficiary.  Since Collection Bureau filed suit on 
January 28, 2008, less than three years after Dorsey’s acknowledgement of the judgment debt, its 
action is not barred. 
B.  Collection Bureau is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.   
Collection Bureau claims it is entitled to attorney fees and costs associated with this 
appeal under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, as well as Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5) and 41.  
Under I.C. § 12-120(3), the prevailing party in a civil action involving a commercial transaction 
is entitled to reasonable attorney fees.  Although I.C. § 19-2518 authorizes Collection Bureau to 
pursue the money judgment against Dorsey as though it were in a civil action, the basis for this 
action is a criminal judgment that resulted from a criminal proceeding, not a commercial 
transaction.  Thus, I.C. § 12-120(3) is inapplicable.  We do not view Dorsey’s position in this 
litigation to have been frivolous, therefore we do not award attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-
121.  Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5) and 41 merely set forth the procedural steps necessary for a 
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party to seek attorney fees on appeal and do not provide an independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees.  Accordingly, we do not award Collection Bureau attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court reverses the district court’s order granting summary judgment and remands to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Costs to Collection Bureau.   
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK and W. JONES CONCUR. 
 
J. JONES, Justice, specially concurring. 
 
I concur in the Court’s opinion, except to the extent it may suggest that proceedings to 
collect upon a fine imposed as part of the sentence in a judgment of conviction in a criminal case 
are subject to any statute of limitations. In my estimation, no statute of limitations applies to the 
collection of a fine, monetary penalty, or restitution provision contained in a judgment of 
conviction in a criminal case. The provisions of Idaho Code §§ 5-201 through 248 are contained 
in Title 5, which pertains to “Proceedings in Civil Actions in Courts of Record.” Those 
provisions do not apply to criminal judgments.