Title: Lemos v. Willis

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SONIA LEMOS,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 98, 2003 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   C.A. No. 01C-01-276 
WINSTON and GWENDOLYN 
§ 
WILLIS, 
 
 
 
 
§       
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  July 14, 2004 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  August 25, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
Arthur M. Krawitz, Esquire, Matthew R. Fogg, Esquire, Doroshow, 
Pasquale, Krawitz, Siegel & Bhaya, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.  
 
Robert K. Pearce, Esquire, Perry, Joseph & Pearce, P.A., Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
This is a direct appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court 
that dismissed the plaintiff-appellant Sonia Lemos’ (“Lemos”) claims.  
Lemos fell on ice and snow that had accumulated on the sidewalk abutting 
property owned by the defendant-appellees, Winston and Gwendolyn Willis  
(“Willises”).  Lemos filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking damages 
for her injuries.  The complaint named the Willises as the only defendants.  
The plaintiff’s allegations of liability were based upon two City of 
Wilmington ordinances that impose a duty on abutting landowners to 
remove snow and ice that accumulates on the sidewalk.  Both sides filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment.  The Superior Court granted the 
defendants’ motion, holding:  first, that this Court’s decision in Burns v. 
Boudwin1 protects abutting landowners from civil liability to third persons 
for violation of the two City of Wilmington ordinances; and second, that 
neither of the ordinances at issue created an actionable nuisance per se 
claim.   
Lemos filed an appeal with this Court.  During the pendency of 
Lemos’ appeal, this Court issued its opinion in Schadt v. Latchford.2  In 
Schadt, we determined that a City of Wilmington ordinance making property 
owners responsible for the maintenance and repair of abutting public 
                                                 
1 Burns v. Boudwin, 282 A.2d 620 (Del. 1971). 
2 Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d 689 (Del. 2004). 
 
3
sidewalks conflicted with the Home Rule Charter, which placed that duty on 
the City of Wilmington.  In Schadt, we held that the City of Wilmington 
“repair and maintenance” ordinance was invalid because that conflicting 
ordinance was not implemented in accordance with the procedures for 
amending the City of Wilmington’s Home Rule Charter.   
We directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing 
the implications of our holding in Schadt.  In the matter sub judice, we have 
concluded that Section 42-418 of the Wilmington City Code conflicts with 
Section 5-400(c) of the Wilmington Home Rule Charter.  We have also 
concluded that the ratio decidendi of our holding in Schadt is controlling.  
Because Section 42-418 in the Wilmington City Code attempts to impose 
upon an abutting property owner a duty that is specifically imposed upon the 
City of Wilmington by the Home Rule Charter, we hold that ordinance is 
invalid in the absence of an amendment to the Home Rule Charter pursuant 
to Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, §§ 811-815 
Facts 
 
For purposes of this appeal, the facts are not in dispute.  On December 
26, 1998, Lemos fell on snow and ice which had accumulated on the 
sidewalk abutting 1128 Read Street in Wilmington.  As a result of this fall, 
Lemos sustained injuries.  At the time of the incident, the property at 1128 
 
4
Read Street was owned by the Willises.  Weather reports indicated that the 
last snowfall was on December 24, 1998. 
Procedural History 
 
Lemos filed a complaint on December 26, 2000 seeking damages for 
her injuries.  The original complaint alleged common law negligence only.  
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed.  The Superior Court held 
oral argument on those motions on September 20, 2002.  At issue before the 
Superior Court was whether the Willises could be held liable under theories 
of negligence or strict liability for failing to remove ice and snow in 
violation of Sections 42-417 and 42-418 of the Wilmington City Code.  Also 
at issue was whether this failure constituted a nuisance. 
 
At the conclusion of the oral arguments, the Superior Court granted, 
in part, the Willises’ motion for summary judgment.  It determined that this 
Court’s decision in Burns v. Boudwin3 precluded recovery on the theory of 
common law negligence and, therefore, dismissed that negligence claim.  
The Superior Court reserved judgment with respect to the strict liability and 
nuisance claims, however, pending the filing of an amended complaint to 
specifically include those claims. 
                                                 
3 Burns v. Boudwin, 282 A.2d 620 (Del. 1971). 
 
 
5
 
On September 23, 2002, Lemos filed an amended complaint.  The 
amended complaint alleged a claim of strict liability “according to 1 Wilm. 
C. § 42-42, for committing and maintaining a nuisance . . . in violation of 1 
Wilm. C. § 42-417 and 1 Wilm C. § 42-418.”  The amended complaint 
alleged that the rationale applied by the Superior Court in Latchford v. 
Schadt4 - i.e., that Wilmington Code Section 42-42’s language made the 
failure to maintain a sidewalk a nuisance per se rendering an abutting 
landowner strictly liable – was applicable to the Lemos claim based upon the 
Willises alleged violations of Sections 42-417 and 42-418.     
 
On January 23, 2003, the Superior Court rendered its decision on the 
only remaining cross motion for summary judgment issue:  whether 
violations of Sections 42-417 and 42-418 constituted a nuisance per se.  The 
Superior Court concluded that the Superior Court’s holding of negligence 
per se in Latchford was distinguishable and that the Wilmington City 
Council had not expressed an intent to codify an actionable nuisance per se 
in either Section 42-417 or Section 42-418.  Accordingly, the Superior Court 
granted the Willises motion for summary judgment on that issue and denied 
Lemos’ motion for partial summary judgment.   Final judgment was entered 
in favor of the Willises. 
                                                 
4 Latchford v. Schadt, 2001 WL 392254 (Del. Super. Apr. 11, 2001). 
 
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Issues on Appeal 
 
In this direct appeal, Lemos sets forth two arguments.  First, she 
asserts that the Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, when it found that 
the Willises owed no duty to keep the sidewalk abutting their property clear 
from the accumulation of ice and snow.5  Second, Lemos contends that the 
Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that Sections 42-417 
and 42-418 of the Wilmington City Code do not codify a nuisance per se, 
necessitating the imposition of strict liability for violators.  We do not reach 
the merits of these issues.   Instead, we hold that Section 42-418 is invalid 
based on our recent decision in Schadt v. Latchford.6 
Schadt v. Latchford 
Subsequent to the submission of briefs in the matter sub judice, this 
Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision in Latchford v. Schadt.  In that 
decision, Schadt v. Latchford (“Schadt”),7 we concluded that Section 42-
42’s placement of maintenance responsibility of public sidewalks upon an 
abutting landowner conflicted with Section 5-400(a) in the City of 
                                                 
5 Lemos also raises, for the first time, the issue of whether the defendants’ violation of 
Sections 42-417 and 42-418 constitutes negligence per se.  We do not address that 
contention because it is well settled that this Court reviews only those arguments fairly 
presented to the trial court.  Supr. Ct. R. 8; Delaware Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Duphily, 703 
A.2d 1202, 1206 (Del. 1997).  
6 Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d 689 (Del. 2004). 
7 Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d 689 (Del. 2004). 
 
7
Wilmington’s Home Rule Charter.8  Section 5-400(a) placed the duty to 
repair and maintain sidewalks on the City of Wilmington “by itself, or by 
contract.”9  Because of this conflict, we held that Section 42-42’s shifting of 
repair and maintenance responsibility from the City of Wilmington to 
abutting landowners was improper, in the absence of an amendment to the 
Home Rule Charter.  In Schadt, we held that such an amendment could only 
“be made by Wilmington voters or the General Assembly in the form of a 
properly enacted Charter change and not by ordinance of the Wilmington 
City Council.”10 
Following our decision in Schadt, this Court directed the parties to 
submit supplemental memoranda.  Lemos acknowledges that “the 
applicability of Schadt v. Latchford to her case turns, in part, on the scope of 
the term “city streets” as used in [Section 5-400].”  In support of her effort to 
distinguish the Schadt decision, Lemos points out that, unlike Section 5-
400(a), the language of Section 5-400(c) does not include a specific 
reference to the duty of removing ice and snow from city “sidewalks.”11  
Conversely, the Willises assert that Section 5-400(c) does impose the duty of 
                                                 
8 Id. at 694. 
9 1 Wilm. C. §5-400(a). 
10 Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d at 694. 
11 Lemos contends that it can be inferred from the language of subsection (c) that it was 
never the intent of the Home Rule Charter to place the duty to keep public sidewalks free 
from ice and snow on the City of Wilmington. 
 
8
snow removal upon the City of Wilmington, notwithstanding the absence of 
a specific reference to “sidewalks” within that section, because the City of 
Wilmington Home Rule Charter’s general definition of “streets” includes 
sidewalks.  We have concluded that the Willises’ position is correct.      
Charter Section 5-400(c) 
In this case, unlike Schadt, the pertinent section of the Home Rule 
Charter is not Section 5-400(a).  Rather, it is Section 5-400(c).  
Nevertheless, the ratio decidendi of this Court’s holding in Schadt is 
applicable:  the City of Wilmington may not shift duties specifically 
imposed upon it by the Home Rule Charter unless it follows the procedures 
set forth in Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, §§ 811-815.12 
Section 5-400(c) of Wilmington’s Home Rule Charter provides that 
the Department of Public Works “shall itself, or . . . by contract . . . remove 
and dispose of ice and snow from city streets.”13  This language is similar to 
Section 4-500(a)’s language stating that the Department “shall itself, or by 
contract, . . . repair and maintain city streets, which shall include highways . 
. . footways . . ..”14  Both sections of the Home Rule Charter follow the 
                                                 
12 Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d 689, 691, 694 (Del. 2004).  
13 1 Wilm. C. §5-400(c). 
14 1 Wilm. C. § 5-400(a). 
 
9
common law rule that the duty to keep the sidewalk in a reasonably safe 
condition rests with the municipality, and not abutting landowners.15   
Lemos, however, argues that the definition of the term “city streets” in 
subsection (c) is narrower than the same term as used in subsection (a).   In 
Schadt, we held that the language describing “city streets” in Section 4-
500(a) included public sidewalks.16  Lemos correctly points out that, in 
contrast to subsection (a), subsection (c) “contains no specific definition of 
‘city streets’, and contains no direct reference to sidewalks or footways.”   
Although no specific definition of “street” is found in Section 4-
500(c), the City of Wilmington Charter does define that word.  In 1 Wilm. 
C. § 1-2, under the heading “Definitions and rules of construction 
generally”, the term streets is defined as follows:  “‘Street’ includes avenues, 
boulevards, highways, roads … and it shall be construed to include a 
sidewalk or footpath, unless the contrary is expressed or unless such 
                                                 
15 There is no common law duty on an abutting landowner to remove natural 
accumulations of snow and ice from sidewalks.  See 19 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations § 54.42.20 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2001).  Rather, it is generally held that this 
duty “is imposed upon the city to use reasonable care to keep its sidewalks safe for 
passage by its citizens.”  Burns v. Boudwin, 282 A.2d at 622 (citing M. C. Dransfield, 
Annotation, Municipal Liability For Injuries From Snow and Ice On Sidewalk, 39 
A.L.R.2d 782 (1955)).  Nevertheless, landowners may be made liable by statute, 
ordinance or charter.  19 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 54.42.20 (3d ed. 
1994 & Supp. 2001).  However, “an ordinance requiring abutting owners to maintain 
sidewalks fronting their property does not have the effect of rendering an abutter liable to 
a pedestrian who is injured by reason of the abutter’s violation of the ordinance, unless 
the ordinance expressly so provides.”  Id.  
16 Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d at 693. 
 
10
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the council.”17  
Consequently, in the absence of language in the Home Rule Charter to the 
contrary, the duty imposed upon the City of Wilmington in Section 5-400(c) 
to remove ice and snow from its streets includes the duty to remove ice and 
snow from the sidewalks.   
Ordinance Conflicts with Charter 
 
Section 42-418 places the duty of removing ice and snow from public 
sidewalks on abutting property owners.  Wilmington Code Section 42-418 
provides:  
(a) 
In case any snow shall fall or ice shall be formed on the 
sidewalk of any public street in the city, it shall be the duty of 
the occupant, lessee, owner or agent of the property which 
fronts or abuts upon any such sidewalk to remove, or cause to 
be removed, all such snow and ice from that one-half of the 
sidewalk of the property nearest the building line; and also, to 
make, or cause to be made, a pathway, no less than two feet in 
width, from such cleared portion of the sidewalk to the street 
gutter, by the removal of such snow and ice therefrom. The 
removal of such snow and ice shall be done within 24 hours 
after such snow may cease to fall or after the formation of such 
ice. 
 
Section 42-418 of the Wilmington City Code conflicts with Section 5-400(c) 
of the Home Rule Charter because it attempts to shift the burden of 
removing ice and snow from public sidewalks from the City of Wilmington 
to the abutting landowner.   
                                                 
17 1 Wilm. C. § 1-2. 
 
11
As this Court explained in Schadt, Section 5-400 of the Home Rule 
Charter limits the City of Wilmington’s ability to delegate the duty to keep 
safe public sidewalks to anyone other than by contract.18  Like Section 42-
42, the section of the Wilmington City Code invalidated in Schadt, Section 
42-418 “‘represents a wide and inconsistent departure’ from the home rule 
charter approved by a 1979 referendum of Wilmington voters.”19  Such a 
departure may only be made “by Wilmington voters or the General 
Assembly in the form of a properly enacted Charter change and not by 
ordinance of the Wilmington City Council.”20  
Conclusion 
 
This Court has the authority to affirm a judgment on the basis of a 
different rationale than the one that was relied upon by the trial court.21  In 
this case, we exercise that prerogative to hold that Wilmington City Code 
Section 42-418 is invalid on the basis of this Court’s recent decision in 
Schadt.  The final judgment of the Superior Court to dismiss Lemos’ claims 
is affirmed.   
 
 
                                                 
18 Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d 689, 694 (Del. 2004). 
19 Id. (citations omitted). 
20 Id.    
21 Accord Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995). 
 
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No. 98, 2003 
 
Arthur M. Krawitz, Esquire 
Matthew R. Fogg, Esquire 
Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz, Siegel & Bhaya 
1202 Kirkwood Highway 
Wilmington, DE   19805 
 
Robert K. Pearce, Esquire 
Ferry, Joseph & Pearce, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1351 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
 
Honorable Joseph R. Slights,III 
Superior Court of Delaware 
500 N. King Street, Suite 10400 
Wilmington, DE   19801