Title: Sanders v. Erp Operating Ltd. P’ship

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2416 
____________ 
 
SHANDALYN SANDERS, etc.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ERP OPERATING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[February 12, 2015] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
Shandalyn Sanders seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal in ERP Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Sanders, 96 So. 3d 929 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2012), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with this Court’s 
decision in Cox v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, 71 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2011), and the Third 
District’s decision in Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1980),1 regarding when a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict in 
                                          
 
1.   We acknowledge that following this Court’s acceptance of jurisdiction 
based on an alleged conflict with Cox, Sanders alleged express and direct conflict 
with various Florida appellate court cases.  However, we have determined that 
many of those cases are factually distinguishable, and do not warrant discussion.  
 
 
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a negligence action.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For 
the following reasons, we quash the decision of the Fourth District and remand for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
In late 2004, two young adults moved into an apartment 
complex marketed as a “gated community” with a gated front 
entrance.  Water surrounded approximately seventy percent of the 
complex, and a wall or fence surrounded the remainder.  The complex 
had a policy of providing reasonable lighting, locks, and peepholes.  
The apartments contained alarm systems, which the residents could 
activate. 
 
 
A year after they moved in, the victims were shot to death by 
unknown assailants inside their apartment.  Although there was no 
sign of forced entry, an engagement ring, cash, credit cards, and a 
computer modem were stolen from the apartment. 
 
 
Evidence revealed that in the three years prior to the murders, 
there were two criminal incidents where the gate had been broken and 
perpetrators followed the residents onto the premises.  One of these 
incidents resulted in an armed robbery; the other resulted in an assault.  
The entrance gate was broken for approximately two months prior to 
the murders. 
 
 
The defendant, a national company owning approximately one 
hundred properties, owned the complex.  It had a manual providing 
that a notice to residents is recommended when “a significant crime” 
occurs on the property, especially a violent crime or forced entry 
burglary.  The manual recommended that such notice be provided to 
residents on the same day that management becomes aware of the 
incident, and provided a form for such notices.  No notices were sent 
to the residents of the twenty criminal incidents (including seven 
apartment burglaries, two robberies, and ten motor vehicle thefts) that 
occurred in the three years prior to the murders. 
 
 
 
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The plaintiff, as personal representative of the decedents’ 
estate[s], filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging the 
defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the deaths.  The 
complaint alleged the defendant did not maintain the premises in a 
reasonably safe condition by failing to: (1) maintain the front gate; (2) 
have adequate security; (3) prevent dangerous persons from gaining 
access to the premises; and (4) protect and warn residents of 
dangerous conditions and criminal acts. 
 
 
During discovery, the defendant deposed the boyfriend of one 
of the decedents.  He testified that he was on the phone with the 
decedent prior to eleven o’clock in the evening.  The call ended when 
the decedent told him that two identified people known to the 
decedent were at the door.  When the boyfriend called back, no one 
answered. 
 
 
The case proceeded to trial.  The plaintiff moved in limine to 
exclude the boyfriend’s statement about who was at the door on the 
night of the murders.  The plaintiff argued that the statement 
constituted hearsay—in fact double hearsay—because the boyfriend 
did not testify at trial.  The defendant argued that the statements were 
admissible as spontaneous statements.  Alternatively, the statements 
were admissible because they did not fall within the definition of 
hearsay.  The trial court ruled the statements inadmissible . . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
 
Later in the trial, the plaintiff offered the testimony of a 
criminology expert.  He testified that most of the crimes at the 
complex in the three years prior to the murders were opportunistic in 
nature.  Opportunistic crimes are those committed by perpetrators who 
look for easy targets.  He further testified that such precursor crimes 
need to be monitored by the landowner because awareness is the 
cornerstone of crime prevention.  He also noted that the defendant’s 
training video informed its personnel that they needed to minimize 
such problems “through awareness.” 
 
 
The expert noted that the training video also addressed the 
importance of repairs to mechanical failures.  Yet, the evidence 
demonstrated the gate had been inoperable for four months during the 
 
 
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year of these murders.  The expert testified that it appeared the 
murders occurred in the course of another felony, such as a home 
invasion—an opportunistic crime.  However, the expert agreed that 
there had never been a murder, shooting, or rape at the complex.  The 
expert acknowledged there was no way of knowing precisely how the 
murders took place. 
 
 
The defense expert, a security consultant, testified that the 
murders were not foreseeable.  Of the twenty crimes which occurred 
on the premises in the three years leading up to the murders, none 
were violent crimes nor predicted homicide. 
 
 
The defense expert explained that crimes such as stabbings, 
shootings, murders, or rapes constitute “predictors” of future violent 
crimes, but none of those had occurred at the location so there was no 
reason to foresee these murders.  The defense expert opined that the 
security measures were “more than reasonable” and met or exceeded 
the industry standard of security for complexes in that location.  He 
did not believe the gate was necessary given the low level of crime 
reported at that location. In conclusion, the defense expert testified: 
 
The [complex] provided [the decedents] with a secure locked 
environment, an apartment with one entrance, a steel door, and 
a dead bolt lock.  There is no sign of forced entry.  The 
materials that I received lead me to believe that the door was 
opened to the person that committed this particular crime. 
 
The defendant moved for directed verdict, arguing the plaintiff had 
not established proximate cause or that the defendant had control over 
the apartment complex.  The trial court denied the motion.  The jury 
found the defendant forty percent comparatively negligent, and 
awarded damages of 4.5 million dollars apportioned to various 
survivors of the decedents.   
 
The defendant moved for a new trial and a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, which the trial court denied. 
 
ERP, 96 So. 3d at 930-32. 
 
 
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ERP appealed the judgment and orders to the Fourth District.  Id. at 932.  
The Fourth District reversed the trial court’s ruling on ERP’s motion for directed 
verdict, stating that “[w]ithout proof of how the assailants gained entry into the 
apartment, [Sanders] simply could not prove causation.”  Id. at 933.  Sanders seeks 
review in this Court, alleging that the Fourth District’s finding that she failed, as a 
matter of law, to present evidence sufficient to create a factual issue regarding 
causation conflicts with case law of this Court and other Florida district courts. 
THIS CASE 
 
 
This Court accepted jurisdiction in this case to determine whether the Fourth 
District erred in reversing the jury verdict and finding that Sanders did not present 
sufficient evidence to establish that ERP’s breach of duty was the proximate cause 
of the deaths of the decedents in this negligent security action, thereby warranting 
a directed verdict for ERP.   
PROXIMATE CAUSATION AND DIRECTED VERDICT 
Whether or not proximate causation exists is a question of fact, involving an 
inquiry into whether the respondent’s breach of duty foreseeably and substantially 
contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.  See McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 
500, 502 (Fla. 1992).  This Court has made clear that plaintiffs alleging negligence 
in Florida must meet “the more likely than not standard of causation” as Florida 
 
 
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courts “require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiff’s injury.”  
Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984).   
[A plaintiff] must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis 
for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the 
defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere 
possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter 
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are 
at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a 
verdict for the defendant. 
 
Id. (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts § 41 (4th ed. 1971)). 
In order for a court to remove the case from the trier of fact and grant a 
directed verdict, there must only be one reasonable inference from the plaintiff’s 
evidence. See Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 322 (Fla. 
2001).  Where the jury only has to draw one inference from direct evidence to 
reach a decision regarding the defendant’s negligence, the jury is entitled “to make 
the ultimate factual determination” regarding whether the defendant’s breach was 
the proximate cause of the harm suffered.  Id. at 329.  Thus, if the jury is forced to 
stack inferences to find that the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of the 
defendant’s negligence, then a directed verdict is warranted.  An appellate court 
reviewing the grant of a directed verdict must view the evidence and all inferences 
of fact in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and can affirm a 
directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict 
in favor of the non-moving party.  Id.   
 
 
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THE FOURTH DISTRICT’S DECISION 
ERP argued to the Fourth District that the trial court erred in denying its 
motion for directed verdict because Sanders failed to establish proximate cause for 
the deaths, based on the plaintiff’s inability to explain how the assailants gained 
entry into the apartment.  ERP, 96 So. 3d at 932.  ERP also argued that the murders 
were not reasonably foreseeable in light of the relatively small number of property 
crimes that occurred on the premises in the three years prior to the murders.  Id.  
Sanders responded that the murders were reasonably foreseeable and that the proof 
of gaps in security established the requisite causation.  Id.  The Fourth District 
determined that its previous decision in Brown v. Motel 6 Operating, L.P., Ltd., 
989 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), rev. denied, 1 So. 3d 171 (Fla. 2009), 
“dictate[d] the outcome of this case and reverse[d] the judgment.”  Id. at 930.   
In Brown, the decedent was murdered in his hotel room and his estate filed a 
wrongful death action against the motel, alleging that it should have taken greater 
security precautions in light of past criminal activity.  Brown, 989 So. 2d at 658.  
The motel in Brown was described as “an open type, with room access through 
outside stairways and balconies.”  Id. at 659.  There were two security cameras on 
the premises, one at the front door and one at the front desk.  Id.  There was a 
security guard on duty every day from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.  Id.  There had been a 
number of incidents reported to the sheriff during the two-year period preceding 
 
 
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this incident, but none were homicides; once, a guest was robbed after opening the 
door to an unknown person during the night.  Id.  The Fourth District decided that 
a jury could find that the motel breached its duty to provide adequate security.  Id.  
The problem with the plaintiff’s evidence, according to the Fourth District, was 
that it did not demonstrate that the injury resulted from the breach of duty.  Id. 
Plaintiff’s expert on security acknowledged that there was no 
evidence as to how the person or persons who killed the decedent 
entered the room. There was no evidence of a forced entry to the 
decedent’s room, nor any evidence as to any activity other than the 
shooting. The door had a steel frame, an electronic door lock that 
would automatically close, and a peep hole. The expert agreed that the 
door met minimum standards for protecting access to the room, and 
that the decedent could have been shot by someone he knew and had 
allowed into the room. 
 
Plaintiff’s expert based his opinion that security was lax on five police 
reports made during the previous two-year period: 1) a burglary to a 
room in which property was taken without force; 2) a sale of crack 
cocaine set up by a police informant; 3) an officer observing a person 
in a car with nine baggies of marijuana; 4) an armed robbery after a 
guest opened the door in response to a knock; and 5) an ex-employee 
jumping over the front desk in order to gain access to the area where 
the room keys were kept. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the 
motel and the Fourth District affirmed, finding that summary judgment was proper 
“[b]ecause there was no evidence of a forced entry, nor any evidence that the 
shooting could have been prevented with greater security.”  Id. at 658-59.  
In comparing Brown to this case, the Fourth District stated: “The victims 
were murdered inside their apartment.  There was no sign of a forced entry.  
 
 
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[Sanders’] expert acknowledged that it was unknown what happened on the night 
of the murders.  Without proof of how the assailants gained entry into the 
apartment, [Sanders] simply could not prove causation.”  ERP, 96 So. 3d at 933.  
This finding led the Fourth District to reverse the trial court’s judgment on the 
jury’s verdict and its ruling on ERP’s motion for directed verdict.  Id.  
ALLEGED CONFLICT CASES 
 
Sanders alleges that the Fourth District’s decision conflicts with this Court’s 
decision in Cox.  In that case, William Cox and his wife sued the hospital that 
treated him after a stroke, claiming that the conduct of the emergency room staff 
caused him to suffer devastating damages.  Id. at 796.  The key issue was “whether 
more likely than not, the administration of a tissue plasminogen activator (tPA), a 
drug that dissolves blood clots, would have prevented or mitigated the devastating 
consequences of the stroke.”  Id.  The plaintiffs’ expert and the defense expert 
specifically disagreed regarding whether a 1995 clinical study of tPA established 
that there was a “more likely than not” chance of improvement from the effects of 
the stroke.  Id. at 798.  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for directed 
verdict, and the jury awarded substantial damages to the plaintiffs.  Id.   
 
On appeal, the Second District reversed the jury award, determining that the 
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving causation “because the testimony 
of the expert witnesses was based only on speculation.”  Id.  “[T]he Second 
 
 
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District held the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs were distinguishable because in 
those cases, the expert testimony was not constrained by statistical evidence 
revealing a success rate of less than fifty percent.”  Id.  After accepting review 
based on express and direct conflict of decisions, this Court concluded that the 
Second District reweighed evidence regarding the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, 
thereby conflicting with prior decisions of this Court.  Id. at 796.  This Court 
acknowledged that the rule that “a plaintiff cannot sustain this burden of proof by 
relying on pure speculation . . . also applies to medical experts.”  Id. at 799-800.  
However, this Court determined that the plaintiffs’ medical expert  
did not simply provide a summary conclusion without a factual basis. 
She conducted a full review of Mr. Cox’s medical records, provided a 
detailed analysis as to why she believed that Mr. Cox would have 
been an excellent candidate for tPA therapy, and based her testimony 
on her experience, the relevant medical literature, and her knowledge 
about the facts and records involved in this case, including an in-depth 
analysis of Mr. Cox’s CT scan.  Defense counsel had the opportunity 
to cross-examine her as to the foundation of her opinion, which he 
did.  However, during cross-examination, Dr. Futrell expounded on 
the factual foundation for her opinion regarding the NINDS study.  In 
fact, Dr. Futrell explained during cross-examination that she disagreed 
with defense counsel’s characterization of the NINDS study and 
explained why she believed that defense counsel was inaccurate.  
Id. at 801 (footnote omitted).  This Court concluded that “[i]t was within the jury’s 
province to evaluate Dr. Futrell’s credibility and weigh her testimony [and] [t]he 
Second District misapplied our precedent by reweighing the evidence and rejecting 
Dr. Futrell’s explanation.”  Id. at 801-02. 
 
 
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Sanders also alleges that the Fourth District’s decision conflicts with Holley.  
In that case, the decedent was raped and murdered inside her apartment, while she 
was a tenant in the defendant’s apartment complex.  Id. at 99.  The “intruder, 
thought to have been a co-tenant . . . apparently gained access into [the] second 
story apartment through a window which fronted onto a common outside 
walkway.”  Id.  The decedent’s estate brought an action against the apartment 
complex alleging “negligent failure to provide reasonable security measures in the 
building’s common areas.”  Id.  After the trial judge entered summary judgment for 
the apartment complex, the plaintiff appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal.  
Id.   
The district court in Holley determined the record indicated that the landlord 
had “recognized the dangerous nature of its premises in at least two ways”: (a) by 
not accepting cash rental payments, and (b) by previously hiring uniformed armed 
guards to patrol and protect the complex and charging each tenant an additional 
five dollars a month for this service, a practice that had been abandoned by the 
time the decedent was killed.  Id.  The district court held that since “[t]he basis of 
the plaintiff’s case is the almost indisputed fact that the intruder could have entered 
the apartment only through the common walkway adjacent to the decedent’s 
window . . . it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant’s alleged breach 
of duty as to the areas outside the apartment was a legal cause of what happened 
 
 
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inside.”  Id. at 101.  As to the apartment complex’s argument that because the 
assailant was probably a co-tenant, reasonable security measures would not have 
prevented the tragedy, the Third District found that the apartment complex did not 
affirmatively demonstrate that the security measures would not have deterred the 
assailant, or that the security officers would not have seen and stopped the assailant 
from entering the apartment.  Id. at 101-02. 
 
Although not raised by the parties, even more recently than Cox, this Court 
has addressed the issue regarding when a district court may properly reverse a jury 
verdict and hold that a defendant’s motion for directed verdict should have been 
granted.  In Friedrich v. Fetterman & Associates, P.A., 137 So. 3d 362 (Fla. 2013), 
the plaintiff was injured when the chair he sat on, inside of the defendant’s law 
office, collapsed.  Id. at 363.  The plaintiff’s expert and the defendant’s expert 
disagreed as to whether the defendant “should have or could have discovered the 
defect of the chair upon reasonable inspection.”  Id. at 366.  The defendant moved 
for a directed verdict at various points during the trial, claiming that the plaintiff 
had not established duty or causation.  Id. at 364.  The trial court denied the 
motions and ultimately issued a final judgment against the defendant, in 
accordance with the jury verdict.  Id.  The defendant appealed.  See Fetterman & 
Assocs., P.A. v. Friedrich, 69 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).  The district court 
reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for entry of a directed 
 
 
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verdict in favor of the defendant.  Id. at 968.  Based on the plaintiff’s expert’s 
contradictory statements regarding when the dangerous condition of the chair 
could have been revealed, the district court determined that “the jury had no basis 
from which to conclude that Fetterman would have discovered the defect in the 
chair,” which the district court determined to be “an indispensable factor in 
determining liability.”  Id.  
 
After accepting the plaintiff’s petition for review, this Court reiterated the 
standard for granting a directed verdict:  
In Florida, “[a]n appellate court ... must view the evidence and all 
inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
and can affirm a directed verdict only where no proper view of the 
evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.”  
Owens, 802 So. 2d at 329.  A defendant is entitled to a directed 
verdict when “the plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that the 
negligent act more likely than not caused the injury,” but a directed 
verdict is improper “[i]f the plaintiff has presented evidence that could 
support a finding that the defendant more likely than not caused the 
injury.”  Cox, 71 So. 3d at 801 (emphasis in original).  A directed 
verdict “is not appropriate in cases where there is conflicting evidence 
as to the causation or the likelihood of causation.”  Id.  When 
determining whether a directed verdict is appropriate, the reviewing 
court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment 
concerning credibility of the witnesses for that of the trier of fact.  Id. 
at 801 (“It was within the jury’s province to evaluate [the witness’s] 
credibility and weigh her testimony.”). 
 
Friedrich, 137 So. 3d at 365.  This Court determined that the district court 
impermissibly reweighed the testimony of the expert witnesses during trial and 
quashed the district court’s decision. 
 
 
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PLAINTIFF’S PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY 
The Fourth District erred in directing a verdict for ERP.  The decedents lived 
on the property for approximately nine months before they were murdered.  At 
trial, the jury heard testimony regarding the criminal activity that occurred on the 
premises within the three-year period preceding the decedents’ deaths.  The 
evidence indicated twenty incidents on the premises of the apartment complex in 
that time: one armed robbery of a female victim who was robbed at gunpoint while 
walking from her car to her apartment; one strong-armed robbery of a pizza 
delivery man (where three supposed non-tenants exited a car and stole pizza and 
money from the delivery man, without a weapon); one domestic violence forced 
entry (where an ex-boyfriend confronted an ex-girlfriend in the common area and 
forced her to unlock the door to her apartment); nine car thefts; one attempted car 
theft; one criminal mischief incident involving teenagers who damaged the 
complex’s property; one burglary of a dwelling (which may or may not have been 
occupied); and five burglaries (four involving unoccupied dwellings and one 
involving a dispute between tenants where one broke into the other’s apartment to 
gain possession of a phone).   
Sanders’ expert witness, Dr. George Kirkham, testified regarding the five 
crimes that occurred on the property during the time that the victims lived there, 
one of those crimes being the burglary of an unoccupied apartment, and the others 
 
 
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being attempted and completed car thefts.  Kirkham admitted on cross-examination 
that there were no violent crimes on the property in the four months preceding this 
event, when the gate was inoperable.  He explained, however, that of the twenty 
crimes that occurred on the property within the previous three-year period, two 
were violent crimes, i.e. the robbery of a pizza man and the robbery of a female 
tenant, at gunpoint.  In the case of the female tenant who was robbed, she believed 
that a car had followed her into the complex but could not say with certainty 
whether the assailant came from that particular car.  Neither victims of the 
robberies were physically injured.   
Defense counsel implied that Dr. Kirkham’s theory that the female victim 
may have been accosted by someone in the parking lot while getting out of her 
Mercedes-Benz was pure speculation.  However, based on the history of car thefts 
in the complex that the residents were not notified about, the robbery of the pizza 
man by supposed unauthorized non-residents, the robbery of a different female 
tenant in the same manner approximately one year prior and the fact that on the 
night of the incident, the gate was not serving its purpose to limit access only to 
people authorized to be on the premises, this theory does not appear to be pure 
speculation, but a reasoned presumption based on the evidence.  Whether or not it 
was foreseeable that the residents were in danger of harm because of criminals 
being allowed on the premises and that ERP’s failure to limit the unauthorized 
 
 
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access caused the deaths of the decedents was an issue of fact for the jury to 
decide. 
  Similar to the Third District’s decision in Holley, it appears that Sanders 
raised a reasonable inference that the landlord’s breach on the outside of the 
apartment, the inoperable gate, may have contributed to what happened on the 
inside of the apartment.  382 So. 2d at 101.  Even considering ERP’s argument, 
and the Fourth District’s apparent conclusion, that the decedents opened the door 
for their assailants, this is something which should properly be considered by a 
jury in a comparative negligence analysis and is not a basis for a directed verdict.  
See generally Green Cos. v. Divincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). 
Sanders’ evidence created a question of fact as to whether ERP more likely 
than not caused the decedents’ deaths.  Sanders’ expert testified that the majority 
of the crimes that happened at the apartment complex were opportunistic crimes, 
including an armed robbery initiated when a resident was accosted in the parking 
lot of the complex.   
The fact that the apartment complex in this case had an inoperable security 
gate distinguishes this case from Brown, where the motel was described as “an 
open type, with room access through outside stairways and balconies.”  989 So. 2d 
at 659.  The gate in this case was purposed to limit access to the premises only to 
those authorized to be on the grounds.  A reasonable jury could have determined 
 
 
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that ERP’s failure to maintain the security gate and failure to have the courtesy 
officer visible probably allowed the assailant(s) to get to the decedents’ door more 
easily without being detected, which may not have been a consideration in Brown, 
where the motel only had two security cameras to observe what was happening on 
the premises, but not necessarily to limit the access to the resident’s door.  
Therefore, the lack of forced entry in both cases is not dispositive of the causation 
issue.   
CONCLUSION 
Because Sanders presented evidence that could support a finding that ERP 
more likely than not substantially contributed to the deaths in this case, we quash 
the Fourth District’s decision granting a directed verdict to the defendant and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.  
It is so ordered. 
 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
 
I would discharge this case because the decision of the Fourth District in 
ERP Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Sanders, 96 So. 3d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), 
does not expressly and directly conflict with this Court’s decision in Cox v. St. 
 
 
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Joseph’s Hospital, 71 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2011), or the Third District’s decision in 
Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).   
ERP is entirely consistent with Cox as both cases applied the same rule of 
law and only reached different conclusions due to the differing circumstances of 
the two cases.  Specifically, in Cox, 71 So. 3d at 801-02, this Court disapproved of 
the district court rejecting an expert’s explanation of why the negligent act 
probably caused the injury.  This Court in Cox explained that “a directed verdict is 
appropriate in cases where the plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that the 
negligent act more likely than not caused the injury,” although it is inappropriate 
“in cases where there is conflicting evidence as to the causation or the likelihood of 
causation.”  Id. at 801.  However, as opposed to Cox, where this Court held that a 
directed verdict was improper, Sanders did not present conflicting expert testimony 
that the apartment complex’s negligence caused the injuries in this case.  Instead, 
Sanders’ expert testified only that the crime appeared to be opportunistic in nature 
and that there was no way to know how the murders occurred.  ERP, 96 So. 3d at 
931-32.   
The majority opinion also states that ERP conflicts with Holley, a case the 
petitioner did not discuss during jurisdictional briefing and a case the majority 
admits this Court did not base its jurisdiction upon when granting review.  See 
majority op. at 1 n.1.  However, even if it were appropriate to base our conflict 
 
 
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jurisdiction on such a case, Holley is factually distinguishable.  As the Fourth 
District explained, in Holley (unlike in ERP), “the complex had been plagued with 
violent crime, and evidence established that an intruder entered the apartment 
through a second story window facing a common walkway.”  ERP, 96 So. 3d at 
933 n.2.     
Accordingly, because this Court does not have conflict jurisdiction in this 
case, I respectfully dissent. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D09-5188 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Jeffery Lee Allen of the Law Offices of Jeffery Allen, Miami, Florida; Thaddeus 
L. Hamilton of Thaddeus Hamilton, P.A., Plantation, Florida; and Philip Mead 
Burlington of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Richard A. Sherman, Sr., and James Warren Sherman of the Law Offices of 
Richard A. Sherman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Joel Richard Wolpe of 
Wolpe, Leibowitz, Alvarez & Fernandez, L.L.P., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent