Title: Riverview Farm Assoc. v. Bd. of Supervisors

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
RIVERVIEW FARM ASSOCIATES 
VIRGINIA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 990853   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CHARLES 
CITY COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHARLES CITY COUNTY 
Thomas B. Hoover, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in sustaining a demurrer to a bill of complaint for declaratory 
judgment challenging a local governing body's decision approving 
a conditional rezoning application. 
 
Riverview Farm Associates Virginia General Partnership, 
Jearald D. Cable, Robert L. Waldrop, and Cardwell Ferguson 
Hannabass (collectively, the plaintiffs) filed a bill of 
complaint for declaratory judgment against the Charles City 
County Board of Supervisors (the Board) and Weanack Land, 
Limited Partnership (Weanack).  The plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that the Board's decision rezoning 41.27 riverfront 
acres owned by Weanack (the Weanack property) to an "Industrial 
M-2-C" classification was unreasonable, arbitrary, and void.  
All the plaintiffs owned property located within about 2,000 
                     
 
1Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
feet of either the Weanack property or the access road serving 
the Weanack property. 
 
The Weanack property is located next to the Shirley 
Plantation, an historical landmark, and includes a port on the 
James River used for the docking, loading, and unloading of 
barges.  In 1995, the Board changed the Weanack property's 
zoning classification from "A-1 Agricultural" to "Business 
Conditional B-1-C."  The purpose of the 1995 rezoning was to 
permit use of the Weanack property as a port to receive barges 
delivering containerized municipal waste destined for the 
Charles City County landfill, which is operated jointly by 
Charles City County (the County) and a private company.  These 
waste transportation operations on the Weanack property began in 
1996. 
 
A condition of the "B-1-C" rezoning prohibited truck 
traffic entering or leaving the Weanack property from using 
Route 5 or Route 608.  A second condition limited truck traffic 
from the dock facility to Route 106/156 to "[n]o more than 125 
truck loads per day."  This truck traffic reached Route 106/156 
by using an access road on an easement over property owned by T. 
Davis Copeland and Pamela P. Copeland (the Copelands).  At the 
time of the proceedings at issue, a lawsuit was pending between 
the Copelands and Weanack concerning Weanack's use of the 
easement. 
 
2
 
In October 1997, Weanack filed an application to rezone the 
Weanack property from the "Business B-1-C" classification to 
"Industrial M-2-C."  Weanack also requested that the Board amend 
the Charles City County zoning ordinance (zoning ordinance) to 
include in its "Industrial M-2" classification specified 
waterfront industrial uses, including "docks and areas for the 
receipt, storage and transhipment of waterborne commerce."  In 
December 1997, the Board voted to amend the zoning ordinance's 
"Industrial M-2" classification as requested, but deferred 
consideration of the application to rezone Weanack's property. 
 
Weanack's rezoning application included 11 detailed 
proffers.  Among these proffers, Weanack stated the hours during 
which its facility would be operated, and established different 
time restrictions for trucking, "land-based operations" such as 
loading and unloading barges, and "marine-based operations" such 
as docking barges.  Weanack further agreed in the proffers that 
its trucks would not travel on Routes 5 and 608. 
 
Weanack's proffers also addressed the volume of truck 
traffic that would be permitted for the transportation of waste 
to the County's landfill.  Weanack agreed to limit the number of 
truck trips per day entering or exiting Route 106/156 to 150, 
250, or 300 truckloads, depending on the improvements made to 
the access road that Weanack used to reach Route 106/156.  In 
 
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February 1998, the Board granted Weanack's rezoning application 
and accepted the above proffers as part of the rezoning. 
 
After the Board filed a demurrer to the plaintiffs' 
original bill of complaint, the plaintiffs sought to add the 
Copelands as plaintiffs in the case.  The Board and Weanack 
objected to the plaintiffs' request.  The trial court denied the 
request on the grounds that "the Copelands do not qualify as 
necessary parties to this case, and further that the Copelands 
should have filed their own case, or filed their requested 
amendment, within 30 days [of the Board's decision]."  The trial 
court also sustained the Board's demurrer to the bill of 
complaint, but granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended 
bill of complaint. 
 
In Count I of their second amended bill of complaint, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the Board's decision rezoning the 
Weanack property violated Code § 15.2-2297(A)(vii), which 
requires that proffers made as part of a rezoning application be 
in conformity with the local governing body's comprehensive 
plan.  They alleged that two of Weanack's proffers were not in 
conformity with the County's 1991 Comprehensive Plan.  First, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the use of an access road over the 
Copeland property for truck traffic leaving the Weanack facility 
created "an intensive industrial use area" on the Copelands' 
property, contrary to its agricultural designation in the 
 
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County's 1991 Comprehensive Plan.  Second, they alleged that 
Weanack's proffer concerning the facility's hours of operation 
also was not in conformity with the 1991 Plan. 
 
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that their use of their 
own properties would be adversely impacted by the trucking 
noise, litter, dust, odors, and exposure to disease from the 
garbage unloaded on the Weanack property and transported over 
the access road on the Copeland property.  They also alleged 
that the Board's acceptance of Weanack's proffers as part of the 
rezoning was "unreasonable and illegal." 
 
In Count II, the plaintiffs alleged that the rezoning 
violated the County's zoning ordinance because the rezoning 
permitted a private road in an area zoned for agricultural use 
to be part of an industrial use, when "there is no language 
authorizing the use of access roads in other zoned areas."  The 
plaintiffs also alleged that the rezoning imposed "intensive" 
industrial uses on the Copeland property and converted that 
property to an industrial use contrary to its agricultural use 
classification.  In Count V, the plaintiff alleged that the 
Board's decision granting the rezoning application constituted 
illegal "spot zoning."2
                     
 
2Counts III, IV, and VI of the second amended bill of 
complaint are not at issue in this appeal. 
 
5
 
The Board and Weanack filed demurrers to the second amended 
bill of complaint.  They also asked the trial court to strike 
the plaintiffs' pleading, arguing that the plaintiffs improperly 
attempted to assert claims that could only be brought by the 
Copelands, contrary to the trial court's earlier ruling 
precluding such claims. 
 
The trial court struck Count II and those parts of Counts I 
and V "setting forth . . . allegations concerning the Copeland 
property."  The court also ruled that Count II failed to state a 
valid claim, and alternatively held that it constituted an 
"impermissible new claim."  The trial court sustained the 
demurrer to the balance of Counts I and V and dismissed the case 
with prejudice. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred 
in denying their request to add the Copelands as plaintiffs.  
They assert that if an action challenging a local governing 
body's zoning decision has been brought within the 30-day time 
period following the decision, as required by Code § 15.2-
2285(F), additional plaintiffs may be added after the 30-day 
period has expired.  The plaintiffs contend that their second 
amended bill of complaint does not allege "impermissible new 
claims" concerning the Copelands' property because these claims 
were based on the same facts alleged in the original bill of 
complaint and sought the same relief. 
 
6
 
The plaintiffs also argue that Count I stated a valid cause 
of action in alleging that the Board improperly accepted certain 
proffers from Weanack that were contrary to the County's 1991 
Comprehensive Plan.  They contend that Count II stated a cause 
of action, irrespective whether the Copelands were added as 
parties, because the plaintiffs alleged that the Board violated 
the County's zoning ordinance by accepting proffers that "impose 
industrial uses" on property zoned for agricultural use.  The 
plaintiffs also assert that they properly alleged a claim of 
illegal spot zoning in Count V. 
 
In response, the Board and Weanack (collectively, Weanack) 
argue that the trial court properly denied the request to add 
the Copelands as plaintiffs, since the Copelands failed to file 
suit contesting the Board's decision within the 30-day period 
required by Code § 15.2-2285(F).  Weanack asserts that after 
denying this request, the trial court correctly sustained the 
demurrer to claims relating to the proffers addressing truck 
traffic on the access road, since these claims could only be 
brought by the Copelands.  Weanack further contends that the 
plaintiffs failed to allege any facts to support their 
allegation in Count I that the proffered conditions were 
inconsistent with the County's comprehensive plan. 
 
Weanack also contends that the plaintiffs failed to state a 
cause of action in Count II because they alleged no facts from 
 
7
which the court could conclude that the conditional rezoning of 
the Weanack property "imposed" an industrial use on the Copeland 
property.  Weanack argues that property zoned for agricultural 
use, which is adjacent to property zoned for industrial use, 
does not have to be rezoned to an industrial classification 
before being used to provide access for traffic travelling to 
and from the industrial site.  Finally, Weanack asserts that 
Count V is legally insufficient because it does not allege that 
the rezoning was intended solely to serve the interests of a 
private party. 
 
Initially, we consider the plaintiffs' claim that the trial 
court erred in denying their request to add the Copelands as 
plaintiffs in the case.  Code § 15.2-2285(F) requires that an 
action contesting a rezoning decision of a local governing body 
be filed in the circuit court within 30 days of the decision.  
The rezoning of the Weanack property occurred on February 10, 
1998, and the plaintiffs requested that the Copelands be added 
as parties to the appeal on May 29, 1998.  Thus, the plaintiffs' 
request to add the Copelands was made after the statutory period 
had expired for the Copelands to bring an action alleging the 
claims asserted in the original bill of complaint. 
 
We disagree with the plaintiffs' argument that the trial 
court's ruling was contrary to our decision in Friends of Clark 
Mountain Found., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 242 Va. 16, 406 
 
8
S.E.2d 19 (1991).  There, the plaintiffs, who were owners of 
land in the vicinity of a rezoned tract, filed suit against the 
local governing body seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
decision rezoning the tract and granting a special use permit 
was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.  The plaintiffs 
failed to join as defendants in the suit the owner of the 
rezoned tract and a person holding an option to purchase the 
tract.  242 Va. at 18-19, 406 S.E.2d at 20. 
 
The trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the 
owner of the tract and the option holder were necessary parties 
and had not been joined as defendants in the suit prior to the 
expiration of the 30-day appeal period.  We reversed the 
judgment, holding that under former Code § 15.1-493(G), the only 
required parties at the time of filing the appeal are the 
contestant and the local governing body.  Therefore, we 
concluded that the expiration of the 30-day appeal period did 
not preclude the contestant from seeking the joinder of other 
necessary parties to the suit.  242 Va. at 21-22, 406 S.E.2d at 
22. 
 
Our holding in Clark Mountain was based on the principle 
that when a contesting action has been initiated in conformance 
with statutory requirements, the action should not be 
adjudicated until any remaining necessary parties have 
intervened or been brought into the proceeding.  This approach 
 
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assures that the legislative body's decision will be reviewed in 
a fair, orderly, and prompt manner.  Id.  Here, however, these 
concerns were not present because the Copelands were not 
necessary parties to an adjudication of the counts contained in 
the original bill of complaint.  Thus, we conclude that the 
trial court did not err in denying the plaintiffs' request to 
add the Copelands as plaintiffs in the action. 
 
We next consider the trial court's decision sustaining the 
plaintiffs' demurrer to the second amended bill of complaint.  
The standard of review that we apply is well established.  We 
consider as true all material facts alleged in a bill of 
complaint, all facts impliedly alleged, and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from such facts.  Moore v. Maroney, 
258 Va. 21, 23, 516 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1999); Concerned Taxpayers of 
Brunswick County v. County of Brunswick, 249 Va. 320, 323, 455 
S.E.2d 712, 713 (1995); Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 
245 Va. 202, 204, 427 S.E.2d 326, 327 (1993).  However, a 
demurrer does not admit the correctness of the conclusions of 
law asserted in a bill of complaint.  Moore, 258 Va. at 23, 516 
S.E.2d at 10; Ward's Equip., Inc. v. New Holland N. America, 254 
Va. 379, 382, 493 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1997). 
 
The trial court is not permitted on demurrer to evaluate 
and decide the merits of the allegations set forth in a bill of 
complaint, but only may determine whether the factual 
 
10
allegations of the bill of complaint are sufficient to state a 
cause of action.  Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County, 249 
Va. at 327-28, 455 S.E.2d at 716; Fun v. Virginia Military 
Inst., 245 Va. 249, 252, 427 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1993).  Thus, the 
trial court errs in sustaining a demurrer if a bill of 
complaint, considered in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, states a cause of action.  W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board 
of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 384, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996); 
see Luckett v. Jennings, 246 Va. 303, 307, 435 S.E.2d 400, 402 
(1993). 
 
We conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the 
demurrer to Count I because it stated a cause of action that 
could be asserted by the plaintiffs independent of the 
Copelands.  Count I challenged the "off-site" proffers regarding 
truck traffic on the basis of the alleged impact of the 
proffered conditions on the plaintiffs' use of their own 
properties, not on the basis of any property right held by the 
Copelands.  The plaintiffs live within sufficiently close 
proximity to the property that is the subject of the rezoning to 
possess a "justiciable interest" in the litigation of Count I.  
See Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 
407, 411 (1984); Board of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 
222 Va. 218, 224, 278 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1981).  Thus, the absence 
of the Copelands as parties did not bar consideration of the 
 
11
issue whether the "off-site" proffers failed to conform to the 
County's comprehensive plan and rendered the zoning 
unreasonable. 
 
The plaintiffs also alleged that the proffer permitting 
marine-based operations "24 Hours [per day], 7 days a week" was 
inconsistent with the County's comprehensive plan.  Weanack 
argued on demurrer that the County's 1998 Comprehensive Plan, 
adopted three months after the Board's approval of the Weanack 
rezoning application, designates the Weanack property for 
industrial use.  Weanack's argument, however, does not resolve 
the plaintiffs' claim concerning the hours and days of 
operation, or their claim regarding the "off-site" proffers, as 
a matter of law.3
 
Proffered conditions are permitted as part of a rezoning 
"for the protection of the community" in which the property that 
is the subject of the proposed rezoning is located.  Code 
§ 15.2-2296; Gregory v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 530, 536, 
514 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1999).  Code § 15.2-2297(A) imposes several 
requirements that must be met before proffered conditions may be 
incorporated as part of a rezoning amendment.  Included among 
                     
 
3Since the parties agree that the Board adopted the proposed 
1998 Comprehensive Plan, we do not consider the differences in 
the provisions of the 1991 and 1998 Plans because, at a trial on 
remand, the court may consider the 1998 Comprehensive Plan.  See 
Barrick v. Board of Supervisors, 239 Va. 628, 635, 391 S.E.2d 
318, 322 (1990). 
 
12
these requirements are provisions that "the conditions shall 
have a reasonable relation to the rezoning," and that "all such 
conditions shall be in conformity with the [local governing 
body's] comprehensive plan."  Id.  The plaintiffs were entitled 
to present evidence supporting their allegations that the 
proffered conditions concerning truck traffic were not in 
conformity with the County's comprehensive plan and rendered the 
zoning unreasonable because they permitted heavy truck traffic 
to proceed near the plaintiff's property over property 
designated for agricultural use.  The plaintiffs also were 
entitled to present evidence to support their allegation that 
the proffered condition concerning the hours of operation of the 
port facility rendered the zoning unreasonable and was not in 
conformity with the County's comprehensive plan that designated 
the neighboring properties for agricultural use. 
 
We also conclude that the plaintiffs stated a cause of 
action in Count I, based on the facts set forth in their 
pleading, by alleging that the rezoning was "not consistent with 
the . . . [c]omprehensive [p]lan, and was arbitrary and 
capricious, unreasonable, and incompatible with surrounding land 
uses."  Although the 1998 Comprehensive Plan designated the 
Weanack property for industrial use, an issue remained whether 
this particular rezoning action, because of its proffered 
conditions, was a reasonable exercise of the Board's authority.  
 
13
This portion of the claim could not be resolved as a matter of 
law, but could only be determined after consideration of 
evidence presented by the parties. 
 
We next conclude that the trial court did not err in 
dismissing Count II of the second amended bill of complaint, 
which contained two basic allegations.  The first was that the 
proffered conditions regarding truck traffic constitute "a 
conversion of the privately owned access road to industrial use 
without proper rezoning."  The trial court did not err in 
dismissing this portion of Count II because it involves the 
property rights of the Copelands, who were not parties to this 
suit. 
 
The second allegation of Count II centered on the 
plaintiffs' assertion that the County's zoning ordinance does 
not allow "zoning proffers which impose an industrial use on a 
private access road which is not located within the industrial 
zone or district."  The trial court did not err in dismissing 
this portion of Count II because it fails to state a cause of 
action.  First, the proffered conditions do not impose any "use" 
on the access road over the easement on the Copeland property, 
but place restrictions on the number of truckloads entering or 
exiting Route 106/156, depending on the condition of the access 
road. 
 
14
 
Second, the relevant conditional zoning statutes and 
ordinance provisions do not require that "off-site" proffers be 
confined to properties having the same zoning classification as 
the property that is the subject of the rezoning.  Code § 15.2-
2297 and Charles City County Ordinance § 13.1-2, which contain 
the same substantive provisions, permit proffered conditions as 
part of a rezoning subject to the specific requirements stated 
in those provisions. 
 
We next conclude that the trial court did not err in 
dismissing Count V of the second amended bill of complaint, 
which alleged that the rezoning action constituted illegal spot 
zoning.  Count V also alleged that as part of the rezoning, 
Weanack agreed through proffers to send all the waste 
transported into its facility to the County's landfill "for the 
exclusive revenues of the County."  Finally, Count V alleged 
that the purpose of the rezoning was "to serve the special 
financial interests of Weanack and the County." 
 
Illegal spot zoning occurs when the purpose of a zoning 
ordinance or rezoning amendment is solely to serve the private 
interests of one or more landowners, rather than to further a 
locality's welfare as part of an overall zoning plan that may 
include a concurrent benefit to private interests.  Barrick v. 
Board of Supervisors, 239 Va. at 632-33, 391 S.E.2d at 320; 
Board of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 222 Va. at 226, 
 
15
278 S.E.2d at 863-64; Wilhelm v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 403-04, 
157 S.E.2d 920, 924 (1967).  The trial court properly dismissed 
the plaintiffs' claim in Count V because it alleged that the 
purpose of the rezoning was to benefit the interests of the 
County, as well as the interests of a private landowner. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the portion of the trial 
court's judgment dismissing Counts II and V of the second 
amended bill of complaint.  We will reverse the portion of the 
trial court's judgment dismissing Count I and remand Count I to 
the trial court for a trial on the merits consistent with the 
principles expressed in this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                             and remanded. 
 
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