Title: Commonwealth v. Cherry

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

467 Pa. 160 (1976) 354 A.2d 894 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David CHERRY. Appeal of Harold L. RANDOLPH, Esq. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued January 12, 1976. Decided April 7, 1976. *161 Abraham J. Brem Levy, Philadelphia, for appellant. F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Abraham J. Gafni, Deputy Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY and MANDERINO, JJ. PER CURIAM. Mr. Chief Justice Jones, Mr. Justice Eagen and Mr. Justice Pomeroy would affirm the order of the trial court. Mr. Justice O'Brien, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Manderino would reverse the order of the trial court. This Court being equally divided, the order of the trial court remains in effect. Mr. Justice Pomeroy filed an Opinion in Support of Affirmance in which Mr. Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Eagen joined. Mr. Justice Manderino filed an Opinion in Support of Reversal in which Mr. Justice O'Brien and Mr. Justice Roberts joined. Mr. Justice Nix did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. POMEROY, Justice. In the trial below, appellant, Harold L. Randolph, Esquire, was held in contempt of court for remarks he made to the jury during his closing argument in disregard of a direction by the trial judge not to make such comments. It was the considered opinion of the trial judge and the court en banc that this conduct transcended the bounds of permissible advocacy. The opinion in opposition to affirmance of the lower court's order would reverse the finding of contempt and excuse appellant's comments as "injudicious" remarks uttered in the course of his attempt zealously to represent his client. I cannot agree, and would affirm the order of the court below. The Code of Professional Responsibility does impose upon a lawyer the duty to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law. See Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, 42 Pa.C.S. (Effective *163 February 27, 1974). Since the effectiveness of our adversary system depends in large measure upon the fulfillment of this duty, lawyers must be allowed broad latitude to engage in vigorous advocacy. This latitude does not, however, provide a lawyer with a license to ignore an equally fundamental duty owed to the court. A lawyer is an officer of the court as well as an advocate of his client's cause. As such he is duty bound not to "engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal." Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(C) (6), EC 7-36, 42 Pa.C.S. (Effective February 27, 1974). See also ABA Standards, The Defense Function § 7.1. (1971). Such degrading conduct tends to undermine the public's confidence in the capacity of our judicial system to render objective judgments based upon a rational evaluation of properly considered evidence. While the line between zealous advocacy and engaging in discourteous conduct may be a fine one, it is a line which nevertheless must be observed if courts are to continue to adjudicate disputes in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. In the instant case, this line has been clearly transgressed. The standards which must govern the issuance of a contempt order have been well summarized by Chief Justice Horace Stern: Levine Contempt Case, 372 Pa. 612, 619, 95 A.2d 222, 225 (1953). In my view, the remarks which appellant made to the jury during his closing argument clearly "tended to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect," and were therefore properly punished by the contempt order before us. These remarks called into question the fairness of the trial proceedings and were calculated to appeal to the jury, not on the basis of the evidence presented, but on the purported unfairness of the trial they had witnessed. Arguments to the jury based upon such an indictment of the trial proceedings are, in my mind, manifestly improper and cannot be said to fall within the scope of a lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client. A lawyer must, of course, vigorously pursue appropriate procedures to challenge errors in the proceedings; but to say that a lawyer must not allow perceived error to go uncontested is not to condone the misguided effort to argue the wisdom of the judge's rulings to the jury. ABA Standards, The Defense Function § 7.1 at 258 (Commentary) (Tentative Draft 1970). It is for these reasons that the order of contempt entered below should be affirmed. JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, J., join in this opinion. MANDERINO, Justice. This is an appeal from an order holding an attorney, appellant Harold L. Randolph, in contempt of court. The contempt citation resulted from remarks made on behalf of his client, a defendant on trial for murder, by appellant during his closing argument to the jury. Appellant was originally ordered to pay a fine of $2,000, and in default of payment, was sentenced to serve thirty days in prison. Subsequently, the trial court entered a new order sentencing the appellant to pay a fine of $1,000, and in default of payment, to serve thirty days imprisonment. The court en banc later reduced the sentence to $500. The court en banc's order said nothing concerning imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. This appeal followed. Just prior to appellant's closing argument in the murder trial of David Cherry, the assistant district attorney reported to the trial judge in the robing room that appellant intended to tell the jury that the trial court's legal rulings had been prejudicial to the defendant. The trial judge told appellant that he "should not do this." Appellant's *166 closing argument comprises sixty pages of the written transcript. The prosecution in its brief contends that the following remarks, interspersed throughout these sixty pages as indicated, are sufficient to sustain the contempt conviction: The prosecution also argues that appellant disobeyed an order of the court in the following colloquy: In Bloom Discipline Case, 423 Pa. 192, 223 A.2d 712 (1966), we pointed out that under the Canons of Professional Ethics: While appellant's remarks may have been injudicious at times, considered in the context of the entire closing, and in light of an attorney's duty to zealously advocate his client's cause, those remarks are not sufficient to sustain the contempt conviction. The order of the trial court should be reversed. O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ., join in this opinion.