Title: People v. Lopez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MARIA ELENA LOPEZ, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S238627 
 
Third Appellate District 
C078537 
 
Yolo County Superior Court 
CRF143400 
 
 
November 25, 2019 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Liu, Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Chin filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice 
Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Corrigan concurred. 
 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
S238627 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
Acting on an anonymous tip about a motorist’s erratic 
driving, a police officer approached defendant Maria Elena 
Lopez after she parked and exited her car.  When the officer 
asked if she had a driver’s license, she said she did not.  Police 
then detained her for unlicensed driving and, without asking 
her name, searched the car for Lopez’s personal identification.  
They found methamphetamine in a purse sitting on the front 
passenger’s seat. 
The trial court held the search was invalid under Arizona 
v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 (Gant), which narrowed the scope of 
permissible warrantless vehicle searches incident to a driver’s 
arrest.  The Court of Appeal reversed.  It held that the search 
was authorized under this court’s pre-Gant decision in In re 
Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60 (Arturo D.), which allowed police 
to 
conduct 
warrantless 
vehicle 
searches 
for 
personal 
identification documents at traffic stops when the driver failed 
to provide a license or other personal identification upon 
request. 
We granted review to consider the application and 
continuing validity of the Arturo D. rule in light of subsequent 
legal developments.  At the time Arturo D. was decided, no other 
state or federal court had recognized an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement for suspicionless traffic-stop 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
2 
vehicle searches.  The same holds true today; California remains 
the only state to have recognized such an exception.  
Considering the issue in light of more recent decisions from both 
the United States Supreme Court and our sister states, we now 
conclude that the desire to obtain a driver’s identification 
following a traffic stop does not constitute an independent, 
categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  To the extent Arturo D. held otherwise, we 
conclude that rule should no longer be followed.  We reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I. 
On the morning of July 4, 2014, City of Woodland Police 
Officer Jeff Moe responded to an anonymous tip concerning 
erratic driving.  The tip described the car, a dark-colored Toyota, 
and the area in which it was driving.  Unable to locate the 
vehicle, Officer Moe asked dispatch to run a computer search of 
the license plate, then drove by the address where the car was 
registered.  Not seeing the vehicle, he resumed his duties. 
Around 1:30 p.m., Officer Moe received a second 
anonymous report concerning the same car.  The tipster 
identified the car’s location and asserted the driver, whom the 
tipster identified as “Marlena,” “had been drinking all day.”  
Again unable to locate the car, Officer Moe returned to the 
address where the car was registered.  This time, he parked and 
waited.  A few minutes later, defendant Maria Elena Lopez 
drove up and parked in front of the house. 
Moe did not observe any traffic violations or erratic 
driving.  But believing the driver to be “Marlena,” Officer Moe 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
3 
approached the car.  Moe testified at the suppression hearing 
that Lopez saw him, looked nervous, got out of the car, and 
began walking away from him.  Moe did not smell alcohol or note 
any other signs of intoxication.  But because he “wanted to know 
what her driving status was based on the allegations earlier, 
plus [he] wanted to identify who she was,” Moe asked Lopez if 
she had a driver’s license.  Lopez said that she did not.  Without 
asking Lopez for her name or other identifying information, Moe 
detained her by placing her in a control hold.  When Lopez tried 
to pull away, Moe handcuffed her. 
Officer Moe then asked Lopez “if she had . . . any 
identification possibly within the vehicle.”  When Lopez 
responded “there might be,” a second officer on the scene opened 
the passenger door, retrieved a small purse from the passenger 
seat, and handed it to Moe.  Moe then searched the purse and 
found a baggie containing methamphetamine in a side pocket. 
 Lopez was charged with misdemeanor violations of 
possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, 
subd. (a)) and driving when her license to drive had been 
suspended or revoked (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)).  She filed 
a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)), 
arguing she had been unlawfully detained and her purse 
unlawfully searched. 
The trial court granted the suppression motion.  The court 
concluded the initial contact between Lopez and Officer Moe 
after she exited her vehicle was consensual.  Once Lopez told 
Moe she did not have a license, the officer also had probable 
cause to detain and arrest her for driving without a valid license.  
(See Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a) [“A person may not drive a 
motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person then holds a 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
4 
valid driver’s license issued under this code”].)  But the trial 
court concluded that the ensuing search of Lopez’s vehicle was 
invalid because neither of the justifications for conducting a 
vehicle search incident to arrest under Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 
332, was present.  Gant held that a vehicle search incident to 
arrest is justified only if it is reasonable to believe the suspect 
can gain access to weapons inside the vehicle or that evidence of 
the offense of arrest might be found inside the vehicle.  (Id. at 
p. 335.)  Here, Lopez was handcuffed at the rear of her car when 
the search took place and could not reach any weapons inside 
the car.  Nor was there any likelihood a search of the car would 
produce evidence of Lopez’s driving without a license in her 
possession.1  With the evidence suppressed, the trial court 
dismissed the case. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the suppression ruling.  The 
appellate court explained that Gant was not applicable because 
Lopez had not been formally arrested, only detained, at the time 
of the search.  (People v. Lopez (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 827–
828.)  The authority for the search was therefore not the search 
incident to arrest exception at issue in Gant, but the traffic-stop 
identification-search exception recognized in Arturo D., supra, 
27 Cal.4th 60.  (Lopez, at pp. 825–826.)  Once Lopez told Officer 
Moe that she did not have a driver’s license, Officer Moe had 
cause to believe Lopez had driven without a license in violation 
                                        
1  
The trial court also concluded the People had not supplied 
support for a search for evidence of driving under the influence.  
The first anonymous tip was remote in time, the second was 
vague and conclusory, Officer Moe observed nothing to indicate 
Lopez was under the influence, and the hearing testimony made 
clear the search was directed at finding identification. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
5 
of the Vehicle Code.  (Id. at p. 825; see Veh. Code, § 12500, 
subd. (a).)  Under Arturo D., the police were then permitted to 
search Lopez’s vehicle for other forms of identification in order 
to ensure that any citation and notice to appear for the Vehicle 
Code violation reflected Lopez’s true identity.  (Lopez, at p. 826.)  
If Arturo D. “is still good law,” the Court of Appeal concluded, 
“the search in this case was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”  (Lopez, at p. 825.)   
We granted review. 
II. 
A. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”  In general, a law 
enforcement officer is required to obtain a warrant before 
conducting a search.  (Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 
515 U.S. 646, 653.)  Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.”  (Katz v. United States 
(1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357, fns. omitted; accord, People v. Redd (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 691, 719 [“A warrantless search is presumed to be 
unreasonable”].)  Whether a particular kind of search is exempt 
from the warrant requirement ordinarily depends on whether, 
under the relevant circumstances, law enforcement’s need to 
search outweighs the invasion of individual privacy.  (Riley v. 
California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 385; Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 
U.S. 648, 654; Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 
536–537.) 
In Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, we considered the 
existence and scope of an exception permitting officers to 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
6 
conduct a warrantless vehicle search when a driver pulled over 
for a traffic infraction is unable to produce the required 
documentation in response to an officer’s request.  Arturo D. 
involved two consolidated cases in which law enforcement 
officers had detained drivers for traffic infractions and the 
drivers could produce neither a driver’s license nor the vehicle’s 
registration in response to the officers’ requests.  In one case, 
the officer entered the defendant’s truck and reached under the 
driver’s seat.  The officer did not locate any relevant documents 
but did discover a box that later was found to contain 
methamphetamine.  In the other case, the officer entered the 
defendant’s car and looked first in the glove compartment and 
then under the front passenger seat, finding a wallet that 
contained a baggie of methamphetamine.  (Arturo D., at pp. 65–
67.) 
Arturo D. upheld both searches.  The opinion concluded 
that when a driver has been detained for a traffic infraction and 
fails to produce vehicle registration or personal identification 
documentation upon request, the Fourth Amendment “permits 
limited warrantless searches of areas within a vehicle where 
such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.”  
(Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 65.) 
Although Arturo D. upheld warrantless searches for both 
vehicle registration and personal identification, its reasoning 
focused primarily on the former rather than the latter.  In 
explaining the basis for this exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, Arturo D. relied heavily on 
various California and out-of-state cases upholding warrantless 
searches of vehicles for the purpose of locating the vehicle 
registration.  (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 71 & fn. 7 [citing 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
7 
People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411 and various Court of 
Appeal cases]; see also Arturo D., at p. 76, fn. 16 [citing 
additional out-of-state cases concerning searches for vehicle 
registration].)2  Arturo D. did not identify any prior cases, either 
from California or elsewhere, that had concluded the need to 
locate a driver’s license or other form of personal identification 
could alone justify a warrantless search.  But Arturo D. reasoned 
that a similar balance of interests should yield the same result 
for both vehicle registration and personal identification 
searches.  On the one hand, the state has an important interest 
in identifying drivers so that it can properly cite them for traffic 
violations.  (Arturo D., at p. 67.)  And on the other hand, drivers 
have a “reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle 
on public thoroughfares.”  (Id. at p. 68, citing New York v. Class 
(1986) 475 U.S. 106, 112–113 (Class).)  While officers have the 
power to arrest drivers who violate the Vehicle Code by failing 
to keep their licenses in their possession while driving, an arrest 
“in most circumstances would subject the driver to considerably 
greater intrusion.”  (Arturo D., at p. 76, fn. 17.)  Arturo D. 
concluded it is therefore permissible for the officer to search 
those areas of the vehicle in which the necessary documentation 
“reasonably may be expected to be found.”  (Id. at p. 65; see also 
id. at pp. 78, 79, 84, 86.)3 
                                        
2  
The portion of Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, upholding 
a search for registration documents is not at issue in this case. 
3 
The dissent would reconceptualize Arturo D. as applying 
only to “places in the vehicle where a driver, slowing to a halt, 
might quickly put or toss a wallet or similar container.”  (Dis. 
opn. post, at p. 11; see id. at p. 10.)  The standard this court 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
8 
As Arturo D. acknowledged, the United States Supreme 
Court had previously held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
permit law enforcement to search the vehicle of a person who 
has been cited, but not arrested, for a traffic violation.  (Knowles 
v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113 (Knowles).)  Knowles had invalidated 
a vehicle search after the driver had been ticketed for speeding, 
a search conducted under what the court termed a putative 
“ ‘search incident to citation’ ” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.  (Knowles, at p. 115.)  
Knowles dismissed the state’s argument that “a ‘search incident 
to citation’ is justified because a suspect who is subject to a 
routine traffic stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence 
related to his identity (e.g., a driver’s license or vehicle 
registration).”  (Id. at p. 118.)  “[I]f a police officer is not satisfied 
with the identification furnished by the driver,” the court 
responded, “this may be a basis for arresting him rather than 
merely issuing a citation.”  (Ibid.) 
Arturo D. acknowledged the high court’s guidance on this 
point but distinguished Knowles on the ground that the case 
concerned a full search of the entire vehicle “following the 
issuance of a traffic citation,” not a search for documentation 
“prior to issuing a traffic citation,” limited to the areas in which 
                                        
actually embraced, directly quoted in the text above, is 
considerably broader.  It extends beyond places a driver might 
hide identification at the last second; it also includes other 
places where a driver, not trying to conceal identification, might 
“store” his or her identification as a matter of routine or habit.  
(Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 87.)  Thus, containers in 
which identification might be expected to be kept are subject to 
search even if they could not have been accessed in the moments 
when the driver was being pulled over. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
9 
such documentation might reasonably be found.  (Arturo D., 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 76, fn. omitted.) Because the high court 
had never considered whether the Fourth Amendment permits 
warrantless traffic-stop searches for documentation, as opposed 
to contraband (Arturo D., at p. 79), Arturo D. rejected the 
drivers’ arguments that Knowles foreclosed the recognition of 
such an exception to the warrant requirement.   
Arturo D. found reassurance in a second high court 
decision, Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, in which the court had 
upheld a traffic-stop search for a Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIN) that had been covered by papers on the car’s dashboard.  
(Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 71–74; see Class, at pp. 116–
119.)  Class had emphasized law enforcement’s important 
interest in tracking stolen vehicles and promoting highway 
safety, drivers’ decreased expectation of privacy when driving 
automobiles on public roads, and the relatively limited nature of 
the VIN search.  (Class, at pp. 111–114, 118–119; see Arturo D., 
at p. 72.)  Arturo D. concluded that this reasoning and approach 
was “not inconsistent” with approving a limited warrantless 
search for registration documents or driver identification.  
(Arturo D., at p. 73.) 
Three justices dissented from Arturo D.’s traffic-stop 
identification-search holding.  Although Justice Werdegar 
agreed with Arturo D.’s holding as to registration searches, she 
argued that the logic of the identification-search exception 
would take officers not only into glove compartments and visors, 
but also into drivers’ pockets and purses.  She saw no adequate 
justification for granting law enforcement such authority 
whenever a driver who has committed a traffic infraction fails 
to produce a license upon request.  (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
10 
at pp. 89–91 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  Justice 
Kennard, joined by Justice Brown, opined that granting officers 
such authority was inconsistent with Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 
113.  And despite the majority’s assurance that the 
identification-search authority was “limited”—and thus unlike 
the “full-scale” search invalidated in Knowles (Arturo D., at 
p. 75)—Justice Kennard opined that the exception “may well 
result in limitless searches throughout a vehicle whenever a 
driver cannot produce the requisite documentation.”  (Arturo D., 
at p. 91 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) 
B. 
In this case, police searched a driver’s purse after 
detaining her for a traffic violation.  This is not a scenario 
squarely addressed in Arturo D.  Although Justice Werdegar’s 
partial dissent had argued that this is where the logic of the 
identification-search rule would lead, the majority opinion 
neither responded to the point nor otherwise directly addressed 
the application of its rule to these circumstances. 
Nevertheless, although Lopez briefly argues otherwise, 
there is no real question that the search in this case was 
conducted in accordance with Arturo D.’s general guidance.  
Officer Moe approached Lopez as she got out of her car and 
asked whether she had a driver’s license.  Lopez concedes that 
by answering no, she admitted that she had committed, at a 
minimum, the traffic infraction of driving a car without physical 
possession of a license.  (Veh. Code, § 12951, subd. (a).)  That 
admission gave Officer Moe the authority to detain her for a 
reasonable period to determine whether to issue a traffic 
citation and to conduct the “ ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the 
traffic] stop,’ ” which generally include verifying the driver’s 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
11 
identity.  (Rodriguez v. U.S. (2015) 575 U.S. ___, ___ [135 S.Ct. 
1609, 1615]; see U.S. v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 683–686; cf. 
People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 585–587.)4  And 
under Arturo D., Lopez’s inability to produce a driver’s license 
also gave Officer Moe the authority to search her vehicle for the 
license or other forms of personal identification.5 
                                        
4 
The temporary detention may sometimes also include a 
“determin[ation] whether there are outstanding warrants 
against the driver” (Rodriguez v. U.S., supra, 135 S.Ct. at 
p. 1615) and a criminal history check (U.S. v. Purcell (11th Cir. 
2001) 236 F.3d 1274, 1278), which is done by consulting an in-
car computer terminal or radioing dispatch (see, e.g., People v. 
McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 584–585, fn. 6; 4 LaFave, 
Search and Seizure (5th ed. 2012) § 9.3(c), pp. 511–513). 
5 
Lopez argues in passing that Arturo D. does not apply 
because the incident was a consensual encounter.  This is a 
strange way to describe an interaction that ended with Lopez in 
handcuffs.  True, the encounter did begin consensually, as the 
trial court found.  But once Lopez indicated she had no license, 
the officer had grounds to detain Lopez and determine whether 
she indeed had been driving without a valid license.  At that 
point, Arturo D. authorized a warrantless search for 
identification if Lopez could not produce any. 
 
Lopez also takes a contradictory tack, urging she was 
already under arrest when the search was conducted and so only 
a search for weapons or evidence of the crime of arrest would 
have been permissible.  (See Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 342–
344.)  The record does not support this contention either.  At the 
time of the search, Lopez had been temporarily detained to 
enable Officer Moe to investigate and process her traffic 
violation.  The handcuffing did not transform the detention into 
an arrest.  (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 675 [“stopping 
a suspect at gunpoint, handcuffing him, and making him sit on 
the ground for a short period, as occurred here, do not convert a 
detention into an arrest”]; see ibid. [citing additional cases].) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
12 
The search in this case does, as mentioned, differ from the 
searches at issue in Arturo D. in that it focused on the driver’s 
purse.  But that the purse was within the scope of the officer’s 
search authority under Arturo D. is beyond reasonable dispute; 
a purse is, after all, “[t]he most ‘traditional repository’ of a 
driver’s license” for a certain class of drivers.  (Arturo D., supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 90 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  Lopez 
argues the search nonetheless violated Arturo D. because 
officers proceeded directly to searching her vehicle for 
identification instead of first asking her who she was, allowing 
her to retrieve identification herself, or arresting her.  Arturo D., 
however, does not require officers to do any of these things.  The 
rule adopted and applied in that case does not require officers to 
ask for oral identification before searching for physical 
documentation; to the contrary, Arturo D. upheld identification 
searches conducted even after each driver gave an officer 
truthful identifying information, including, in one case, his 
name, address, and date of birth.  (Id. at pp. 65–66, 83–84.)  Nor 
does Arturo D. require officers to allow persons detained outside 
the vehicle to reach into the vehicle to retrieve identification 
themselves—even where, as here, officers did not testify to 
particularized safety concerns.  (Id. at pp. 84–85.)  Finally, 
Arturo D. pointedly held it was not unreasonable for law 
enforcement to search the vehicle for personal identification 
instead of either asking for the driver’s consent to search or 
arresting 
the 
driver 
if 
unsatisfied 
with 
the 
driver’s 
identification, as the high court had suggested in Knowles.  
(Arturo D., at pp. 76–77, fn. 17; see Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. at 
p. 118.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
13 
As the Court of Appeal correctly surmised, the central 
issue in this case is not whether the search of Lopez’s car was 
consistent with the guidance given in Arturo D.  The issue, 
rather, is whether to continue to adhere to the rule of Arturo D., 
notwithstanding subsequent legal developments casting doubt 
on the validity of a categorical rule authorizing warrantless 
vehicle searches whenever a driver stopped for a traffic 
infraction fails to produce a license or other satisfactory 
identification documents upon request. 
III. 
A. 
Lopez’s primary argument concerns the effect of the 
United States Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Gant, supra, 
556 U.S. 332, on which the trial court relied in invalidating the 
search of Lopez’s car.  The Court of Appeal correctly held that 
Gant is not directly applicable here because it concerned a 
different exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  But Lopez contends that the reasoning of Gant 
nonetheless undermines the validity of the Arturo D. 
identification-search exception. 
The question in Gant concerned the scope of the exception 
governing vehicle searches incident to the arrest of the driver or 
another recent occupant.  In Chimel v. California (1969) 395 
U.S. 752, 762–763, the court had held that law enforcement may 
conduct a warrantless search incident to a person’s arrest for 
certain safety or evidentiary reasons:  specifically, to disarm the 
person or to prevent the person from destroying evidence.  Some 
years later, in New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, the high 
court applied Chimel in the context of a vehicle stop.  After 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
14 
pulling a driver over for speeding, an officer discerned evidence 
of marijuana use in the vehicle.  The officer ordered the 
occupants out of the car and arrested them for drug offenses, 
then searched the vehicle.  The high court upheld the search 
under Chimel, holding that when an officer lawfully arrests a 
person who has recently occupied a car, the officer may “search 
the passenger compartment of that automobile” and any interior 
containers as areas “ ‘into which an arrestee might reach in 
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’ ”  (Belton, at 
p. 460, quoting Chimel, at p. 763.) 
Belton was “[f]or years . . . widely understood to have set 
down a simple, bright-line rule” permitting vehicle “searches 
incident to arrests of recent occupants, regardless of whether 
the arrestee in any particular case was within reaching distance 
of the vehicle at the time of the search.”  (Davis v. United States 
(2011) 564 U.S. 229, 233.)  This trend was exemplified by the 
facts of Thornton v. United States (2004) 541 U.S. 615 
(Thornton), a case decided not long after our decision in Arturo 
D.  In Thornton, the court upheld a Belton search for weapons 
or evidence even though the driver had exited the vehicle before 
the police encounter and was handcuffed and in the back of a 
patrol car at the time of the search.  (Thornton, at pp. 617–618.)  
Rejecting a proposed rule that would limit Belton searches 
depending on whether police initiated contact with the suspect 
while he was still in the car or after, the majority opined that 
the “need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers 
. . . justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated.”  
(Thornton, at p. 623.)  But a number of justices—collectively 
representing a majority of the court—expressed dissatisfaction 
with the broad scope of the Belton rule and how it had been 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
15 
applied in the lower courts.  (See Thornton, at p. 624 (conc. opn. 
of O’Connor, J.); id. at pp. 625–632 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J., 
joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at pp. 633–636 (dis. opn. of Stevens, 
J., joined by Souter, J.).) 
The court revisited the issue in Gant and this time reached 
a different conclusion.  The defendant in that case had been 
arrested for driving with a suspended license.  While he was 
handcuffed in the back of a locked patrol car, police officers 
searched his vehicle and found drugs.  The United States 
Supreme Court invalidated the search.  The court held that a 
Belton search for weapons or destructible evidence is permitted 
only when an arrestee is actually capable of reaching the area 
to be searched.  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343 & fn. 4.)  
Drawing on Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence, the court 
also allowed searches for evidence “ ‘relevant to the crime of 
arrest’ ”—a justification rooted in historical practice.  (Gant, at 
p. 343, quoting Thornton, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 632 (conc. opn. of 
Scalia, J.).)  But in Gant, as in most cases involving arrests for 
traffic violations, there was no chance of finding relevant 
evidence inside the car.  (Gant, at p. 344; see Knowles, supra, 
525 U.S. at p. 118.) 
The high court rejected the state’s argument that a 
broader, more categorical rule authorizing vehicle searches 
incident to arrest “correctly balances law enforcement interests, 
including the interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s 
limited privacy interest in his vehicle.”  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 
at p. 344.)  On one side of the balance, the court noted, the 
argument “seriously undervalues the privacy interests at 
stake[:]  Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy 
interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, see 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
16 
. . . Class, [supra,] 475 U.S. [at pp.] 112–113 . . . , the former 
interest 
is 
nevertheless 
important 
and 
deserving 
of 
constitutional protection, see Knowles, [supra,] 525 U.S.[] at 
p. 117.  It is particularly significant that Belton searches 
authorize police officers to search not just the passenger 
compartment but every purse, briefcase, or other container 
within that space.  A rule that gives police the power to conduct 
such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a 
traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of 
the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and 
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.  Indeed, 
the character of that threat implicates the central concern 
underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving 
police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a 
person’s private effects.”  (Gant, at pp. 344–345, fn. omitted.) 
Turning to the law enforcement interests on the other side 
of the balance, the court found little to commend a rule that 
permits Belton searches regardless of the suspect’s ability to 
access the vehicle at the time of the search or the likelihood of 
finding offense-related evidence inside.  “Construing Belton 
broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would 
serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is 
anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless 
search on that basis.”  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 347.) 
B. 
In cutting back the prevailing understanding of 
permissible vehicle searches incident to arrest, Gant neither 
considered nor disapproved Arturo D.’s rule authorizing 
prearrest searches for driver identification.  That is hardly 
surprising:  as Arturo D. itself acknowledged, the high court has 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
17 
never approved a prearrest search for identification, either.  
(Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 79; see id. at p. 73.)  Nor is 
that the end of our inquiry today. 
It is important to remember that the question before us is 
a question of federal constitutional law, not one of state law.  In 
matters of federal law, the United States Supreme Court has the 
final word; we operate as an intermediate court and not as a 
court of last resort.  In such matters, although we recognize the 
importance of following precedent in our judicial system, we also 
recognize that our role in that system sometimes requires us to 
reevaluate our precedent in light of new guidance.  “When 
emergent [United States] Supreme Court case law calls into 
question a prior opinion of another court, that court should 
pause to consider its likely significance before giving effect to an 
earlier decision.”  (Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. (1st Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 136, 141.)  This is 
so even when the high court’s decision does not directly address 
the continuing validity of the rule in question; the high court’s 
guidance may nonetheless erode the analytical foundations of 
the old rule or make clear that the rule is substantially out of 
step with the broader body of relevant federal law.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138–1141; id. at 
p. 1141 [“it is our duty to reconsider” precedent when 
subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions cast doubt 
on our reading of that court’s earlier decisions]; see also, e.g., 
People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 134–135 [reconsidering 
precedent in light of reasoning of subsequent high court 
decisions].)  Of necessity, then, we retain “the flexibility to 
consider emerging United States Supreme Court case law when 
considering earlier decisions on federal issues . . . even when the 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
18 
newer cases have not directly overruled or superseded [our] 
prior cases.”  (W.G. Clark Const. Co. v. Pacific Northwest 
Regional Council of Carpenters (2014) 180 Wn.2d 54, 66.) 
Arturo D. itself had taken its cues from high court 
precedent concerning other types of vehicle searches, taking 
care to ensure the exception was “not inconsistent” with the 
reasoning and general approach of these cases.  (Arturo D., 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 73.)  In fashioning a new identification-
search exception to the warrant requirement, Arturo D. 
concluded, in light of then-available guidance, that the state’s 
interests in conducting such a search outweighed the degree of 
privacy intrusion.  (See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 
at p. 654.)  The reasoning of Gant offers additional, highly 
relevant guidance not available at the time of Arturo D.  Gant 
speaks clearly to the stakes on each side, and its reasoning calls 
for a reappraisal of the proper balance of interests to ensure 
consistency with the larger body of Fourth Amendment law. 
On the privacy side of the scales, Gant cautions against 
“undervalu[ing] the privacy interests at stake” in the context of 
vehicle searches.  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 344–345.)  The 
opinion in Arturo D. contained no discussion of the magnitude 
of the intrusion associated with a search for a driver’s license or 
other proof of identity.  Arturo D. found reassurance in the high 
court’s reasoning in Class, which held that an officer did not act 
unreasonably in shifting papers on a dashboard to read the car’s 
VIN, without ever acknowledging the very different privacy 
implications of permitting officers to look through drivers’ 
wallets and purses for their personal identification.  (See 
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 71–74, discussing Class, 
supra, 475 U.S. 106.)  Arturo D.’s discussion of privacy instead 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
19 
was limited to citing high court authority for the proposition 
that drivers “have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving 
a vehicle on public thoroughfares.”  (Arturo D., at p. 68, citing 
Class, at pp. 112–113.) 
Gant reaffirms this proposition, but clarifies that while a 
“motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than 
in his home [citation], the former interest is nevertheless 
important and deserving of constitutional protection.”  (Gant, 
supra, 556 U.S. at p. 345.)  It then goes on to explain that a rule 
that permits police officers to search vehicles (and the purses 
and other containers therein) “whenever an individual is caught 
committing a traffic offense” is not only a “serious and recurring 
threat to . . . privacy,” but a threat that “implicates the central 
concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about 
giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will 
among a person’s private effects.”  (Gant, at p. 345, fn. omitted.) 
Although Gant addresses a different exception to the 
warrant requirement, its relevance here is hard to miss.  The 
identification-search exception, after all, is also a rule that 
permits officers to search vehicles, including—especially 
including—purses, briefcases, and other personal effects 
contained therein.  It applies “whenever an individual is caught 
committing a traffic offense” (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 345)—
even one that will simply result in a traffic ticket, and not an 
arrest as in Gant—and  is unable to produce identification upon 
request.  Where Arturo D. had contained no explicit 
acknowledgment of this incursion on privacy, Gant makes clear 
that this qualifies as a “serious” privacy threat that goes to the 
very core of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.  (Gant, at 
p. 345.)  Indeed, the intrusion on privacy in the Arturo D. setting 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
20 
is arguably greater than the intrusion in Gant:  While the 
privacy interests of an arrestee are necessarily diminished to 
some extent by the very fact of having been arrested (see, e.g., 
Riley v. California, supra, 573 U.S. at pp. 391–392), Arturo D. 
applies to individuals who are merely detained for having 
committed a traffic violation.  Such individuals have at least an 
equal, if not greater interest in officers not “rummag[ing] at will” 
through their belongings.  (Gant, at p. 345.) 
The dissent suggests drivers’ privacy concerns are 
overblown because Arturo D. outlined a series of limits to the 
identification-search power.  Among other things, Arturo D. 
cautioned that the power is not to be used as a pretext to search 
for contraband and that the searches must be targeted to focus 
on the areas in which identification is likely to be found.  (Dis. 
opn. post, at pp. 9–10.)  As the dissent notes, these limitations 
were important to Arturo D.’s identification-search holding—
indeed, they were arguably crucial, given the high court’s 
disapproval of vehicle searches “ ‘incident to [traffic] citation’ ” 
in Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. at page 118.  But experience in the 
years since Arturo D. was decided has lent credence to Justice 
Kennard’s fear that its “new rule [might] well result in limitless 
searches throughout a vehicle” that are indistinguishable in 
effect from the kind of search disapproved in Knowles.  (Arturo 
D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 91 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  Arturo 
D. has been used as authority to uphold searches into purses, 
bags, center consoles, and glove compartments, under both 
driver and passenger seats, into backpacks in the bed of a truck, 
and up the sleeves of a jacket lying in the well behind the front 
seats of an SUV. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
21 
None of this is surprising.  As much as Arturo D. 
attempted to cordon off the authority it granted from the full-
scale vehicle searches disapproved in Knowles, the inevitable 
consequence of a categorical rule authorizing officers to look for 
identification in places where they might reasonably believe the 
identification is located, or where it might have been hidden, is 
that officers will look throughout the area “into which [the 
driver] might reach,” much as they would if they were 
conducting a vehicle search incident to arrest.  (Chimel v. 
California, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 763.)  Officers will naturally 
focus in particular on purses, wallets, briefcases, and other 
similar personal effects where identification is typically carried 
but the intrusion into privacy is also at its apex.  And given an 
officer’s authority to seize  any “ ‘evidence in plain view from a 
position where the officer has a right to be’ ” (Arturo D., supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 70), in practice the scope of the authority 
granted under Arturo D. has proved perilously close to the “full-
scale search for contraband” we acknowledged was expressly 
prohibited by Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113 (Arturo D., at p. 86).  
The privacy interests at stake in such a regime are weighty—
certainly weightier than Arturo D. had recognized. 
Although Gant speaks most clearly to the privacy side of 
the balance, it also offers by example important guidance about 
how to weigh the law enforcement interests on the other side of 
the scale.  The justification for the search incident to arrest 
exception, Gant emphasized, is ultimately only to permit law 
enforcement to respond to particular safety or evidentiary 
concerns that may arise during the course of the arrest of a 
driver or recent occupant of a vehicle.  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at 
pp. 335, 347.)  To ensure the scope of the exception did not 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
22 
become “untether[ed]” from its justifications, Gant insisted that 
the exception be limited to the subset of arrests in which 
genuine safety or evidentiary concerns are present—that is, 
cases in which officers reasonably believed the arrestee could 
have accessed a weapon or destructible evidence in the car at 
the time of the search, or that evidence of the offense for which 
the person was arrested might be found in the car.  (Id. at 
p. 343.)  In other words, courts must pay close attention to the 
presence or absence of the circumstances that justify breaching 
a person’s privacy by searching a vehicle and the personal effects 
contained therein.  (See also Riley v. California, supra, 573 U.S. 
at pp. 401–403 [confining any exception for warrantless 
cellphone searches to exigent circumstances or a like case-
specific showing of police necessity].) 
The justification for Arturo D.’s identification-search 
exception was the need to ensure that a law enforcement officer 
has the information necessary to issue a citation and notice to 
appear for a traffic infraction—despite drivers’ incentives to 
conceal that information, and notwithstanding safety concerns 
that might arise if officers were compelled to allow drivers to 
retrieve the relevant documents themselves.  (Arturo D., supra, 
27 Cal.4th at pp. 67, 70, fn. 6, 79.)  To give effect to these 
important interests, Arturo D. considered a limited warrantless 
search to be more reasonable than the alternative of subjecting 
the driver to full custodial arrest, which would impose 
substantially greater burdens on drivers and law enforcement 
alike.  (Id. at p. 76, fn. 17.) 
But Arturo D.’s discussion of the issue was not exhaustive.  
Indeed, experience and common sense suggest a range of options 
that are both less intrusive than a warrantless search and less 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
23 
burdensome than a full custodial arrest.  Closer attention to the 
presence or absence of circumstances justifying the invasion of 
privacy alters the appraisal of the law enforcement interests at 
stake:  To the extent there are adequate alternative avenues for 
obtaining the information needed by law enforcement, the 
interest in searching a vehicle without a warrant necessarily 
carries less weight. 
The first alternative is straightforward:  an officer can ask 
questions.  If a driver professes not to have a driver’s license or 
other identification, the officer can ask for identifying 
information such as the driver’s full name and its spelling, 
address, and date of birth.  The answers need not be accepted at 
face value.  Rather, they may be checked against Department of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) records—just as driver’s licenses 
themselves are routinely checked against such records to verify 
the driver’s identity and the validity of the license.  (See Gov. 
Code, §§ 15150–15167 [providing for statewide law enforcement 
telecommunications system]; Veh. Code, § 1810.5 [authorizing 
law enforcement telephone access to DMV records]; see also, 
e.g., People v. Boissard (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 972, 978–979 
[records check of individual who failed to produce identification 
at officer’s request]; see generally 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
supra, § 9.3(c), pp. 508–511 [noting that such records checks, 
which are typically conducted by computer or radio, are both 
routine and critical to the operation of any system of citation].)  
Similarly, the detainee’s size and physical appearance, such as 
height, weight, eye color, and hair color, may be subject to 
verification against such records.  (See People v. Hunt (1990) 225 
Cal.App.3d 498, 503.)  Officers may also check the name and 
address against the DMV’s registration record for the vehicle 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
24 
and explore any discrepancies.6  Officers have discretion to 
accept such oral evidence of identity for purposes of issuing a 
citation if they determine the information to be sufficiently 
reliable.  (People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 622 (McKay); 
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 4.)  If, instead, officers 
have reason to believe they have been lied to, they have other 
options at their disposal, as discussed below.7 
                                        
6  
It 
perhaps 
states 
the 
obvious 
to 
observe 
that 
telecommunications technology has advanced significantly since 
2002, when Arturo D. was decided, and will continue to evolve 
in ways that make remote verification of a detainee’s 
information and identity easier for law enforcement. 
7 
In addition, an officer can ask for and examine written 
forms of identification other than a driver’s license, such as a 
student identification or health insurance card.  As we 
acknowledged in Arturo D., the Vehicle Code “permits an officer 
who plans to issue a Vehicle Code citation to accept ‘other 
satisfactory evidence of [the driver’s] identity.’ ”  (Arturo D., 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 4, quoting Veh. Code, § 40302, 
subd. (a); cf., e.g., U.S. v. Zubia-Melendez (10th Cir. 2001) 263 
F.3d 1155, 1161; U.S. v. Reyes-Vencomo (D.N.M. 2012) 866 
F.Supp.2d 1304, 1338.) 
 
And as case law demonstrates, in some circumstances, an 
officer may be personally acquainted with the driver or may be 
able to obtain adequate identifying information from others who 
are.  (McKay, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 622; see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis 
(11th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 1259, 1261 [after detainee gave false 
name, bystanders supplied true name, which officer was then 
able to verify].) 
 
In the absence of other satisfactory identification, an 
officer “may require the arrestee to place a right thumbprint” on 
a notice to appear.  (Veh. Code, § 40500, subd. (a); accord, 
§§ 40303, subd. (a), 40504, subd. (a).)   
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
25 
The officer may also seek the driver’s consent to search the 
vehicle for identification.  (See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 
412 U.S. 218, 219 [“a search that is conducted pursuant to 
consent” is a well-established exception to the warrant and 
probable cause requirements].)  The driver can then decide 
whether to permit the officer to retrieve the identification, and 
if so, whether to limit the places within the vehicle where the 
officer may look for it. 
The Attorney General, echoing a suggestion in Arturo D., 
dismisses the value of consent in this context; he suggests that 
any consented-to search might later be challenged as the 
product of coercion.  (See Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 76, 
fn. 17.)  Perhaps so, but we are unwilling to assume that every 
such challenge would necessarily have merit.  “Police officers act 
in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent.  
It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of 
his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that 
understanding.  When this exchange takes place, it dispels 
inferences of coercion.”  (United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 
U.S. 194, 207.)  If an officer asks for permission to enter a car to 
retrieve the driver’s identification, we see no categorical reason 
why a driver may not validly consent to a full or limited search 
of the vehicle for that purpose, just as drivers regularly consent 
to other types of vehicle searches.  (See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno 
(1991) 500 U.S. 248, 249–250 [detained driver validly consented 
to search of his vehicle for narcotics]; People v. Grant (1990) 217 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
26 
Cal.App.3d 1451, 1456–1462 [search of vehicle for identification 
valid based on consent].)8 
Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement 
may also permit a vehicle search.  For example, exigent 
circumstances may be shown based on the particular situation 
an officer faces.  (U.S. v. Haley (8th Cir. 1978) 581 F.2d 723, 725–
726; see Riley v. California, supra, 573 U.S. at p. 402 [“Such 
exigencies could include the need to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing 
suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously injured or are 
threatened with imminent injury . . . [¶] . . . The critical point is 
that . . . the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to 
examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search 
in each particular case”].) 
In circumstances where an officer believes he or she has 
been given false identification information, other exceptions 
may come into play.  At that point, the officer is no longer solely 
concerned with issuing an enforceable traffic citation; lying to a 
police officer about one’s identity is a criminal offense 
punishable by imprisonment in county jail.  (Pen. Code, § 148.9; 
Veh. Code, §§ 31, 40000.5.)  Under the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement, an officer may search a vehicle if the 
                                        
8  
At oral argument, the Attorney General noted that the 
Supreme Court has placed limits on the extent to which a 
motorist may be implied to have consented to a search by virtue 
of choosing to drive on public roads.  (See Birchfield v. North 
Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. ___, ___–___ [136 S.Ct. 2160, 2185–
2186].)  We do not suggest consent could be implied here, only 
that express consent could be sought, and no reason appears as 
to why, if granted, it would be presumptively invalid. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
27 
officer has probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will 
be found inside.  (E.g., United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 
799.)  Ordinarily, a driver’s license or other identification will 
supply no evidence of a traffic violation.  (See State v. Scheer 
(1989) 99 Or.App. 80, 83 [781 P.2d 859, 860].)  But identification 
may well supply evidence of the crime of lying about one’s 
identity (see, e.g., State v. Fesler (1984) 68 Or.App. 609, 613 [685 
P.2d 1014, 1017]), and an officer may search a vehicle upon 
probable cause to believe evidence of such lying will be found 
therein (State v. Bauman (Minn.Ct.App. 1998) 586 N.W.2d 416, 
422).  Relatedly, some out-of-state courts have upheld vehicle 
searches for identification under the search incident to arrest 
exception, which authorizes searching an arrestee’s vehicle for 
evidence relevant to his or her crime when an officer has reason 
“ ‘to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle.’ ”  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343; see 
Deemer v. State (Alaska Ct.App. 2010) 244 P.3d 69, 75 [search 
incident to arrest for lying to officer]; State v. Gordon (1991) 110 
Or.App. 242, 245–246 [821 P.2d 442, 443–444] [same]; Armstead 
v. Com. (2010) 56 Va.App. 569, 577 [695 S.E.2d 561] [same].)9 
The permissibility of such searches depends in the first 
instance on the existence of probable cause to believe that a 
particular driver is, in fact, lying about his or her identity.  Thus, 
for example, in Armstead, the court explained that the officer 
                                        
9  
The automobile exception and the “evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest” exception overlap to some degree, but the 
former applies independent of any arrest.  To the extent the 
latter exception is contingent on an arrest, we express no view 
whether any search may come before, or only after, the arrest.  
(Cf. People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1216–1219.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
28 
had probable cause to believe the driver was lying about his 
identity based on computer checks, notified the driver he was 
under arrest, and therefore could search the vehicle for evidence 
of the crime of providing false identity information.  (Armstead 
v. Com., supra, 695 S.E.2d at pp. 563–566 [upholding search 
under Gant].)  Arturo D., in contrast, had authorized a search 
any time a detainee is unable to supply identification—without 
any requirement that the officer have probable cause or even a 
reasonable suspicion that the detainee has lied about his or her 
identity.10   
When an officer has obtained satisfactory evidence of a 
detainee’s identity, he or she may cite and release the detainee.  
(Pen. Code, § 853.5, subd. (a); Veh. Code, §§ 40303, 40500, 
40504; People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 
199.)11  The officer also has discretion to release the suspect with 
                                        
10  
In so doing, Arturo D. authorized a new sort of 
suspicionless search.  The high court has long held that 
“[e]xceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are 
generally appropriate only where the privacy interests 
implicated by a search are minimal and where ‘other safeguards’ 
are available ‘to assure that the individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not “subject to the discretion of the 
official in the field.” ’ ”  (New Jersey v. T. L. O. (1985) 469 U.S. 
325, 342, fn. 8, quoting Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 
pp. 654–655.)  After Gant, the privacy interests implicated by 
identification searches cannot be dismissed as minimal.  And 
the Attorney General has identified no “safeguards” that would 
limit an officer’s discretion to conduct such a search to facilitate 
writing a traffic citation. 
11  
Citation and release is employed in a wide range of 
nonvehicle circumstances, from jaywalking to fare evasion to 
cyclist moving violations, yet no one argues that failure to 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
29 
a warning against committing future violations.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 849, subd. (b)(1); People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at 
p. 584.)  And finally, if no other path seems prudent or 
permissible, the officer can arrest the detainee and take him or 
her to be booked into jail for the traffic violation.  (Veh. Code, 
§ 40302; Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 323; 
Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 118; McKay, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
pp. 620–625.)  In the end, arrest is one option—but it is certainly 
not the only alternative to a warrantless search.12 
                                        
produce identification upon request, without more, justifies a 
warrantless search through pockets or purses.  The idea that, 
without authority for a warrantless identification search unique 
to this context, officers will be forced to issue unenforceable 
citations and “traffic laws can be flouted with impunity” (dis. 
opn. post, at p. 14), is a fiction; an arrestee is eligible for citation 
and release only when the arrestee is “able to convince the 
officer—either by exhibiting his driver’s license or by ‘other 
satisfactory evidence’—that the name he is signing on the 
written promise to appear corresponds to his true identity” 
(People v. Superior Court (Simon), supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 201; see 
Veh. Code, § 40302, subd. (a)). 
12 
The dissent suggests that because custodial arrest is a 
possible outcome of such an encounter, authorizing officers to 
perform a warrantless, suspicionless, nonconsensual search of 
the driver’s belongings actually “serves to protect [the] privacy 
interests” the Fourth Amendment was intended to safeguard.  
(Dis. opn. post, at p. 13.)  This is a curious notion.  In the absence 
of a categorical traffic-stop identification-search exception, both 
driver and officer would have precisely the same range of options 
for locating and producing identification; the only difference is 
that it would be up to the driver, not the officer, to decide 
whether to allow in whole or in part a search of the vehicle to 
supply the necessary identification.  Stripping the driver of that 
choice cannot seriously be described as the option that better 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
30 
The Fourth Amendment does not, of course, require law 
enforcement to employ the least intrusive means of achieving its 
objectives.  (Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls (2002) 536 U.S. 822, 837.)  But the 
Fourth Amendment does require law enforcement to act 
reasonably.  If, as Gant instructs, a substantial intrusion on 
personal privacy must be adequately justified by genuine need, 
the availability of so many alternative means for achieving law 
enforcement ends tends to undermine the notion that the 
intrusion is reasonable.  (See Birchfield v. North Dakota, supra, 
579 U.S. at pp. ___–___ [136 S.Ct. at pp. 2184–2185] 
[warrantless blood test of person suspected of driving while 
intoxicated violates 4th Amend. because equally effective less 
intrusive alternative exists]; Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 
U.S. at p. 659 [striking down discretionary spot checks for 
driver’s licenses and registration in light of “the alternative 
mechanisms available, both those in use and those that might 
be adopted” to satisfy the government’s public safety interests].) 
The dissent insists that warrantless identification 
searches are a necessary tool for coping with drivers who seek 
to deceive officers concerning their identity but who have left 
evidence of that deception in their vehicles.  (Dis. opn. post, at 
pp. 4–7.)  (For those who have not, any search would of course 
be futile.)  This idea is belied by the great many cases in which 
officers have successfully ferreted out this sort of deception 
                                        
protects the constitutional right of the people to be secure in 
their persons and effects. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
31 
through the ordinary investigative techniques we have already 
described.13  And, as we have already explained, officers who 
have probable cause to believe a driver is lying about his or her 
identity already have search options at their disposal in 
appropriate circumstances.   (Ante, at pp. 26–28.)  But the 
warrant exception we are asked to apply here is not limited to 
cases of deception; it applies to honest drivers and dishonest 
drivers alike.  Indeed, it applies even when, as here, the driver 
has not so much as been given the chance to identify herself 
before having her vehicle, and the personal belongings 
contained therein, opened for official examination. 
The dissent worries that in the absence of a categorical 
authorization to search, officers may not be able to achieve 
                                        
13 
A small but representative sample includes:  People v. 
Casarez (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1178 (identification based 
on distinctive tattoos); Loveless v. State (2016) 337 Ga.App. 894, 
895 [789 S.E.2d 244, 245] (database search revealed driver had 
given false name; vehicle tag search revealed driver’s true 
identity; license search on vehicle’s registered owner provided 
driver’s photograph); State v. Cannady (Me. 2018) 190 A.3d 
1019, 1021 (officer transported driver to jail for fingerprinting 
after officer was unable to verify driver’s identity with name 
supplied and driver “had difficulty providing an address, phone 
number, and social security number”; driver confessed to true 
identity en route to jail); People v. Vasquez (2001) 465 Mich. 83, 
101–102 [631 N.W.2d 711, 722] (driver recognized by other 
officers during booking); State v. Ford (Mo.Ct.App.) 445 S.W.3d 
113, 117 (confession to true identity following record check and 
further questioning); cf. U.S. v. Pena-Montes (10th Cir. 2009) 
589 F.3d 1048, 1051 (database search revealed defendant had 
given false name and other identifying information; defendant’s 
true identity revealed through fingerprinting).  
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
32 
absolute certainty about the identity of some subset of traffic 
violators before issuing traffic tickets.  (Dis. opn. post, at pp. 4–
9; see id. at p. 7 [driver may give sibling’s name], p. 8, fn. 5 
[driver may conceal face with a tinted visor or niqab].)  But the 
same is true under the dissent’s own proposed rule.14  In the end, 
the test for whether an exception should be recognized is not 
whether, in its absence, there might be some cost in effective 
enforcement of the traffic laws; it is, instead, whether the 
tradeoff to lower that risk is worth the coin in diminished 
privacy.  The price of giving officers the “discretion to rummage 
at will among a person’s private effects” whenever that person 
has committed a traffic infraction is a high one.  (Gant, supra, 
556 U.S. at p. 345, fn. omitted.)  It is not a price we should lightly 
require California drivers to pay. 
Here, Officer Moe had a tip that provided the driver’s 
name, and he was able to locate the driver because she pulled 
her car up in front of the address where dispatch informed him 
the vehicle was registered.  He could have employed any one of 
several approaches to ascertain Lopez’s identity once she exited 
the car.  But Officer Moe never so much as asked Lopez her 
name.  Instead, after detaining Lopez for a suspected traffic 
infraction, the officer proceeded directly to searching the purse 
on the passenger’s seat.  Under Gant, Officer Moe could not have 
searched Lopez’s vehicle if he had arrested her for unlicensed 
                                        
14 
The dissent’s preferred rule would do nothing to assist in 
the apprehension of the wrongdoer who manages to slip his or 
her license into a crumpled fast-food bag (Arturo D., supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 86)—or, for that matter, who simply left his or her 
license at home. 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
33 
driving instead of simply detaining her.15  Searching Lopez’s 
vehicle for her personal identification before she was arrested 
was no less unreasonable. 
C. 
Although, as Lopez argues, Gant provides important 
guidance calling the identification-search exception into 
question, our consideration of the issue is not limited to that 
case.  Careful examination of the practices in other jurisdictions 
reinforces our conclusion that the search at issue here was not 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
As noted, Arturo D.’s identification-search rule was an 
outlier when the case was first decided:  At the time Arturo D. 
was handed down, neither the United States Supreme Court nor 
any other state embraced—or, so far as our research reveals, 
ever had embraced—a similar exception for traffic-stop 
identification searches.  It remains an outlier today.  Indeed, 17 
years after Arturo D. was decided, California still stands alone 
in authorizing warrantless vehicle searches for identification.  
                                        
15  
The Attorney General argues in passing that the search 
here would have been permissible under Gant because Officer 
Moe had probable cause to arrest Lopez for driving without a 
license.  But no reason appears to think evidence of that crime 
would be found in the car.  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343 [“In 
many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic 
violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle 
contains relevant evidence”].)  A license is not something police 
need to search for as evidence of driving without a license; at 
most, it might provide a defense to the charge.  (State v. Scheer, 
supra, 781 P.2d at p. 860; see State v. Conn (2004) 278 Kan. 387, 
392–394 [99 P.3d 1108, 1112–1113]; State v. Lark (App.Div. 
1999) 319 N.J.Super. 618, 626–627 [726 A.2d 294, 298–299], 
affd. (2000) 163 N.J. 294 [748 A.2d 1103].) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
34 
No federal or state court has seen fit to adopt the rule; some have 
expressly rejected it.  This, too, lends force to the argument for 
reevaluating whether such searches are permitted by the 
Fourth Amendment.  (See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 
Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 298 [reconsidering precedent 
when the “the clear consensus of . . . out-of-state cases” suggests 
it falls well outside the mainstream].) 
Arturo D. did rely on a handful of federal appellate 
decisions in support of its holding.  (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 
at p. 76, fn. 16.)  In particular, Arturo D. relied on a Ninth 
Circuit case, United States v. Brown (9th Cir. 1972) 470 F.2d 
1120, 1122, and cases that preceded or relied on Brown 
(Kendrick v. Nelson (9th Cir. 1971) 448 F.2d 25, 27–28 and U.S. 
v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency (9th Cir. 2000) 228 F.3d 1080, 
1088, fn. 47).  But none of these cases involved license or 
identification searches, and so none supports the identification-
search exception fashioned in Arturo D.16  Nor has the situation 
changed since we decided Arturo D.  A search of post-2002 
federal cases reveals none that approve the license-search 
exception we adopted in Arturo D.  What little authority there 
is supports the contrary rule.  (See, e.g., Crock v. City/Town 
(W.D.Pa., Dec. 3, 2010, Civ. A. No. 2:09-426) 2010 U.S.Dist. 
                                        
16  
Even as far as they go, these decisions have not been free 
from controversy.  Brown has been described by a leading 
commentator as flatly “in error” when compared with the full 
body of Fourth Amendment law.  (5 LaFave, Search and Seizure 
(5th ed. 2012) § 10.8(a), p. 401, fn. 33.)  Rather, according to 
LaFave, “[s]earch of the car should be permitted only when the 
failure to produce the registration and the other relevant 
circumstances establish probable cause that the car is stolen.”  
(Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
35 
Lexis 136442, *18–*25 [failure to provide valid, current 
identification does not justify warrantless vehicle search];  
United States v. Osborne (E.D.Tenn., May 25, 2007, No. 3:06-
CR-110) 2007 U.S.Dist. Lexis 38558, *12, *17 [after suspect 
detained and handcuffed, unreasonable to search vehicle for 
evidence of identity instead of asking suspect his name in order 
to perform records check].) 
A similar story emerges when examining the treatment of 
warrantless vehicle searches in our sister states.  It appears no 
other state has seen fit to vest its police with the power to 
conduct warrantless searches for licenses or identification.  As 
with federal cases, Arturo D. cited a handful of state court cases 
from elsewhere in support of its holding, but all involved 
searches for vehicle registration, not a license or identification.  
(See Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 76, fn. 16.)  A search 
through the reported decisions in other states has located none 
that approve a warrantless traffic-stop vehicle search, without 
consent or probable cause, for a driver’s license or identification. 
Perhaps particularly instructive in this vein is the 
experience of New Jersey—a state which, like California, has 
recognized an exception for warrantless vehicle searches to 
locate registration and proof of insurance documentation.  (E.g., 
State v. Keaton (2015) 222 N.J. 438, 448–449 [119 A.3d 906]; see 
State v. Bauder (2007) 181 Vt. 392, 407, fn. 8 [924 A.2d 38, 51, 
fn. 8] [highlighting New Jersey and California as the two 
principal jurisdictions permitting warrantless vehicle searches 
for documents].)  Indeed, New Jersey appears to be the first 
state to have carved out such an exception.  (See State v. Boykin 
(1967) 50 N.J. 73, 77 [232 A.2d 141].)  But, tellingly, New Jersey 
has not permitted the warrantless search of a vehicle, in the 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
36 
absence of consent or probable cause, solely to locate a driver’s 
license or identification. 
In State v. Lark, supra, 726 A.2d 294, a driver stopped for 
driving without a front license plate asserted he had a license 
but was unable to provide it, and a computer search of the name 
he gave produced no matches.  Even so, “the investigating police 
officer violated defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution [and the state Constitution] 
when, following a motor vehicle stop for a minor traffic violation, 
he opened the door of defendant’s vehicle to search for proof of 
defendant’s identity without probable cause” to think 
contraband was located therein or other criminal activity 
ongoing.  (Lark, at p. 296.)  Although the intrusion was 
“minimal,” no warrantless search for a license or proof of 
identity was permitted.  (Id. at p. 297.)  No recognized exception 
to the probable cause requirement supported the search, nor 
was the passenger compartment accessible to the driver after he 
had been removed and detained.  The crime of driving without 
a license was complete; a search for a license or identification 
could not supply additional evidence of that crime.  (Id. at 
pp. 298–299.) 
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, 
“substantially for the reasons expressed” in the intermediate 
court’s opinion.  (State v. Lark (2000) 163 N.J. 294, 296 [748 A.2d 
1103, 1104].)  The Supreme Court stressed the presence of 
alternatives that rendered a warrantless search unnecessary 
and thus unjustifiable:  in response to a driver’s failure to 
identify himself truthfully, an officer could detain the driver for 
further questioning and ultimately make a custodial arrest.  
(Ibid.)  What the officer could not do, however, was search the 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
37 
vehicle for identification absent some other existing exception to 
the warrant requirement.  (Ibid.; see State v. Carty (App.Div. 
2000) 332 N.J.Super. 200, 204 [753 A.2d 149, 151] [a “driver’s 
inability to produce credentials . . . , without more, does not 
justify a search of the vehicle”].) 
Last year, the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited its 
driving credentials exception.  (See State v. Terry (N.J. 2018) 179 
A.3d 378.)  And while a sharply divided court reaffirmed the 
state’s exception for proof-of-ownership searches, the majority 
distinguished State v. Lark, supra, 726 A.2d 294, as involving a 
different (and insufficient) rationale for a warrantless search.  
(Terry, at pp. 393–394; see id. at pp. 400–401 (dis. opn. of 
Rabner, C. J.) [arguing for three justices that Lark’s logic ought 
to foreclose a registration search as well].)17   
Appellate courts in other states have agreed as well.  (See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Pacheco (2001) 51 Mass.App.Ct. 736, 
740–743 [need to establish suspect’s identity does not justify 
warrantless vehicle search]; id. at p. 742 [to accept as sufficient 
the asserted “need for absolute certainty of the identification of 
the person arrested would be to sanction a principle having no 
apparent stopping place and could risk the possibility of a 
general exploratory search for evidence of criminal activity”]; 
State v. Green (1991) 103 N.C.App. 38, 41–45 [404 S.E.2d 363] 
[vehicle search for identification documents of driver stopped for 
weaving violates 4th Amend.]; State v. Smith (1986) 82 Or.App. 
                                        
17 
Indeed, virtually the only point of agreement among all 
the justices was that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a 
warrantless vehicle search solely for identification. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
38 
636, 639–640 [729 P.2d 10] [warrantless vehicle search for 
identification unlawful].) 
Casting the net slightly more broadly, we have identified 
limited authority allowing a warrantless search of a person solely 
for evidence of his or her identity.  (State v. Flynn (1979) 92 
Wis.2d 427, 441–448 [285 N.W.2d 710] [officer justified in 
removing and examining wallet of suspect who refuses to identify 
himself].)  Other states, however, have not sanctioned similar 
searches.  (People v. Williams (1975) 63 Mich.App. 398, 400–404 
[234 N.W.2d 541] [officer can request identification, but seizure 
of wallet to examine suspect’s driver’s license violates 4th 
Amend.]; State v. Varnado (Minn. 1998) 582 N.W.2d 886 
[warrantless frisk of driver after she failed to produce a license 
not within any exception to the warrant requirement]; State v. 
Webber (1997) 141 N.H. 817, 820 [694 A.2d 970] [refusing to 
create an “ ‘identification search’ exception” to the warrant 
requirement under the state Constitution]; State v. Scheer, supra, 
781 P.2d at p. 860 [search of driver who fails to present license in 
order to find license unlawful]; Baldwin v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 
2009) 278 S.W.3d 367, 372 [during investigative detention, officer 
may ask for identification but may not “search a defendant’s 
person to obtain or confirm his identity”]; Jones v. Com. (2010) 
279 Va. 665, 672 [691 S.E.2d 801] [seizure of driver’s wallet to 
examine for identification, even after the driver denies having 
any, violates 4th Amend.]; 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, 
§ 9.6(g), 
p. 944 
[expressing 
“considerable 
doubt” 
about 
Wisconsin’s rule and noting the absence of other authority 
nationally that would support it]; see id. at pp. 943–945.)  And the 
case-specific rationales the Wisconsin Supreme Court offered for 
approving such a search in Flynn—a burglary suspect stopped in 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
39 
the wee hours who repeatedly refused to give his name and whom 
the officer had no other means of identifying—have limited 
relevance in the context of a garden-variety traffic stop.18 
In sum, California remains in a distinct minority—indeed, 
a minority of one—when it comes to approving a warrantless 
vehicle search solely for personal identification.  “Although 
holdings from other states are not controlling, and we remain free 
to steer a contrary course,” this is a case in which “the near 
unanimity” of out-of-state authority “indicates we should 
question the advisability of continued allegiance to our minority 
approach.”  (Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies, 
supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 298.)  This is particularly true given the 
nature of the issue before us.  It is noteworthy that the vehicle 
search for a driver’s license anywhere “such documentation 
reasonably may be expected to be found” (Arturo D., supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 65) is authority the police of this state did without 
for quite some time after the invention of the automobile.  But it 
is especially telling that the police of all other states appear to do 
without that authority to this day, despite facing much the same 
need to identify traffic violators for purposes of issuing citations.  
                                        
18  
The Court of Appeal decision in People v. Loudermilk 
(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996 also does not suggest general 
authority to search for identification.  The court approved an 
officer examining a wallet found in a patdown for weapons, but 
only because the suspect first “lied to the officer and himself 
created the confusion as to his own identity” by falsely stating 
he had no identification.  (Id. at p. 1004.)  The court 
“emphasize[d] that we do not hold that a suspect may be 
detained and searched merely because he either refused to 
identify himself or refused to produce proof of identification.”  
(Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
40 
To reaffirm the exception now would leave California out of step 
not only with United States Supreme Court precedent, but also 
with every other jurisdiction in the nation. 
IV. 
Reconsidering the scope of Arturo D. is not a task we 
undertake lightly.  Adherence to precedent is always “ ‘the 
preferred 
course 
because 
it 
promotes 
the 
evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual 
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ”  (Johnson v. 
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 879, quoting Payne 
v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827.)  It is also “ ‘ “usually the 
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.” ’ ”  
(Johnson, at p. 879, quoting Payne, at p. 827.) 
But after considering both further guidance from the United 
States Supreme Court and the practices of every other state in 
the nation, we conclude the time has come to correct a 
misperception of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment in this 
context.  We recognize that law enforcement agencies have 
crafted policies in reliance on Arturo D., and our decision today 
will require them to adopt a different approach in scenarios like 
the one presented here.  But inasmuch as subsequent legal 
developments have called the validity of the traffic-stop 
identification-search exception into question, the change in 
approach is warranted.  
On this point, too, Gant is instructive.  In reaching its 
conclusion, Gant pointed to the “checkered history” of the law in 
the area of searches incident to arrest—the multiple shifts in 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
41 
direction the court’s doctrine had undergone over the last 80 
years.  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 350.)  Indeed, Gant itself 
represented a substantial shift in the prevailing understanding of 
the Belton rule, and the high court acknowledged the decision 
would require substantial revisions to police practice.  But Gant 
held this was an insufficient reason to avoid reexamining a rule 
that had proved, over time, to result in “routine constitutional 
violations.”  (Gant, at p. 351.)  Here, too, it must be acknowledged 
that the field of vehicle searches is one that has been the subject 
of considerable retilling over the years.  Given this history, 
reliance interests have less force.  And here, too, we conclude that 
the reliance interests at stake cannot justify continuation of a 
practice that results in recurring and unwarranted invasions of 
individual privacy.  (See id. at pp. 350–351.)19 
For these reasons, we now hold the Fourth Amendment 
does not contain an exception to the warrant requirement for 
searches to locate a driver’s identification following a traffic 
                                        
19  
The dissent urges that “[s]tare decisis alone should cause 
the court to” adhere to a precedent at odds with United States 
Supreme Court guidance and that finds no support anywhere 
else in the nation.  (Dis. opn. post, at p. 1.)  “But the policy [of 
stare decisis] is just that—a policy—and it admits of exceptions 
in rare and appropriate cases,” including in the face of a “ ‘tide 
of critical or contrary authority from other jurisdictions.’ ”  
(Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 336; see In re Jaime P. 
(2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 133 [“reexamination of precedent may 
become necessary when subsequent developments indicate an 
earlier decision was unsound, or has become ripe for 
reconsideration”].)  For reasons already explained, this is the 
rare case in which we consider it not only appropriate, but 
important, to correct an apparent misconception of the 
constraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment in this context. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
42 
stop.  To the extent it created such an exception, In re Arturo D., 
supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, is overruled and should no longer be 
followed. 
V. 
Although the warrantless search of Lopez’s vehicle 
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Attorney General argues 
the trial court should nevertheless have denied Lopez’s motion 
to suppress the fruits of the search because the officer acted in 
good faith based on the existing state of the law.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1220.)  Lopez, in turn, 
contends that the People have forfeited any such argument.  
Because the Court of Appeal did not have occasion to consider 
the issue, we express no views on it. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and this 
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
S238627 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Chin 
 
The majority today overrules our decision in In re 
Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60 (Arturo D.), which applied the 
Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution to uphold a 
limited vehicle search.  The majority does so first by giving 
Arturo D. an unnecessarily expansive reading that makes the 
decision into an easy target and then by claiming that Arturo D. 
is inconsistent with the high court’s intervening decision in 
Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 (Gant).  But Gant is a case 
that addressed a different issue and that did not change the 
applicable constitutional standard in any way.  In brief, the 
majority sets up a straw man and then knocks it down, relying 
on a decision that is not on point. 
Stare decisis alone should cause the court to reaffirm 
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60.  “It is, of course, a fundamental 
jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually 
must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, 
might be decided differently by the current justices.  This policy, 
known as the doctrine of stare decisis, ‘is based on the 
assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law 
are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties 
should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into 
relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules 
of law.’ ”  (Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.)  Thus, the failure of a court to adhere 
to its precedents undermines the court’s credibility as a judicial 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
2 
body.  But even if we were writing on a blank slate, there are 
sound reasons supporting our holding in Arturo D., reasons that 
should lead us to adopt the same rule today. 
Therefore, I dissent.1 
I. 
The Fourth Amendment provides:  “The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  (U.S. Const., 
4th Amend.)  The Amendment by its terms protects only against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” (italics added), and its 
warrant requirement is therefore not absolute.  (See Brigham 
City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403.)  Instead, application of 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches requires a 
balancing of individual and governmental interests:  “[T]here 
can be no ready test for determining reasonableness [under the 
Fourth Amendment] other than by balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails.”  (Camara v. 
Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 536–537; accord, Riley v. 
California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 385–386; Georgia v. Randolph 
(2006) 547 U.S. 103, 114–115; New York v. Class (1986) 475 U.S. 
106, 116; New Jersey v. T. L. O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 337; 
                                        
1  
I would reaffirm our core holding in Arturo D., supra, 27 
Cal.4th 60.  I note in passing, however, that a footnote in 
Arturo D. suggests an alternative basis for upholding the search 
at issue in this case.  (Id. at p. 87, fn. 28.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
3 
Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1046; Terry v. Ohio 
(1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21.) 
Consistent with that balancing approach, the high court 
has recognized many situations in which an entry and/or search 
without a warrant is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  (See, e.g., Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 U.S. 452 
[entry and search to prevent imminent destruction of evidence]; 
Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 332 [search of areas of vehicle accessible 
to recent occupant who has been arrested; holding of Belton, 
infra, narrowed]; Brigham City v. Stuart, supra, 547 U.S. 398 
[entry based on rendering emergency aid or protection]; 
Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 [inventory search of 
impounded vehicle]; United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798 
[search of containers within vehicle with probable cause to 
believe vehicle contains evidence of crime]; New York v. Belton 
(1981) 453 U.S. 454 (Belton) [search of passenger compartment 
of vehicle incident to arrest of occupant]; United States v. 
Santana (1976) 427 U.S. 38 [entry in hot pursuit of fleeing 
suspect]; United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [search 
incident to arrest]; Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433 
[vehicle search while officers are performing community 
caretaking functions unrelated to criminal investigation]; 
Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [search incident to 
arrest; rule narrowed to area immediately accessible to 
arrestee]; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [frisk search based on 
reasonable suspicion of criminal act and reasonable belief 
person might be armed]; Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 
132 [search of vehicle with probable cause to believe vehicle 
contains evidence of crime].)  The high court has also made clear 
that a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
4 
than in a residence, although the privacy rights in a vehicle are 
not insubstantial.  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 345; Knowles v. 
Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113, 117 (Knowles); New York v. Class, 
supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 112–113; Caldwell v. Lewis (1974) 417 
U.S. 583, 590–591; Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, 413 U.S. at pp. 
441–442.)  In Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, a case involving a 
limited search of a vehicle, this court recognized one more 
situation in which it is reasonable for law enforcement officers 
to proceed without first obtaining a warrant. 
II. 
Case law throughout the country establishes that a driver 
who is being pulled over for a traffic violation and who hopes to 
conceal his or her identity (and thus evade responsibility for the 
violation) will sometimes, while slowing to a halt, hide a wallet 
under the seat or elsewhere in the vehicle and then give law 
enforcement officers a false name.2  Because this method of 
                                        
2  
We cited numerous such cases in Arturo D., supra, at 
pages 80 to 81.  (See, e.g., Mallett v. Bowersox (8th Cir. 1998) 
160 F.3d 456, 457 [“Before Trooper Froemsdorf approached the 
vehicle, [driver Jerome] Mallett hid his wallet and identification 
under the front seat.  When Trooper Froemsdorf arrived at the 
side of the vehicle and requested Mallett’s driver’s license, 
Mallett replied that he did not have his license with him and 
falsely claimed to be Anthony Mallett, who is actually petitioner 
Jerome Mallett’s brother.”]; State v. Mitzlaff (Wn. 1995) 907 
P.2d 328, 329 [“[After a traffic stop,] Deputy Heinze contacted 
the driver of the pickup truck, Jerry Mitzlaff, who at first 
provided false identification. . . .  After Mitzlaff failed field 
sobriety tests, Heinze arrested him for driving under the 
influence.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Under the driver’s seat, Heinze found 
a . . . wallet containing Mitzlaff’s true identification.”].)  Indeed, 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
5 
                                        
we could have cited many more.  (See, e.g., Chest v. State 
(Ind.Ct.App. 2009) 922 N.E.2d 621, 622–623 [“[After a traffic 
stop,] Officer Reynolds . . . asked [Marcus] Chest for his driver’s 
license and registration.  Chest replied he had forgotten his 
license at home. . . . [¶] . . .  Officer Reynolds then handcuffed 
Chest and secured him in the back seat of the police car. . . .  At 
the trial, Officer Reynolds testified that in his experience, 
suspects who refuse to provide identification have often hidden 
their driver’s license ‘. . . somewhere in the vehicle.’ . . .  Officer 
Reynolds looked under the seat and discovered Chest’s wallet, 
including his driver’s license.”]; People v. Washington (Aug. 7, 
2007, F049975) [nonpub. opn.] [“[After a traffic stop,] [a]ppellant 
handed Sergeant Marmolejo a driver’s license bearing the name 
of Glenn Bernard Washington.  However, the photograph on the 
license did not resemble appellant. . . . [¶]  Officers arrested 
appellant for possession of a fraudulent driver’s license. . . . [¶]  
Police searched the Jeep and found a wallet with appellant’s 
identification under the driver’s seat.”]; 
State v. Lee 
(Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 9, 2004, No. M2003-01077-CCA-R3-CD) 
2004 WL 49108, p. *1 [“The defendant, who was driving, told 
Deputy Terns that he did not have a driver’s license and gave 
Terns a false name.  Upon conducting a search, Deputy Terns 
found a wallet under the driver’s seat containing what appeared 
to be a Department of Safety receipt with the defendant’s name 
on it.”]; State v. Vandergriff (Wn.Ct.App. June 1, 1999, No. 
16619-8-III) 1999 WL 360568, p. *1 [“The deputy requested a 
driver’s license, registration and proof of insurance.  Mr. 
Vandergriff responded that he had none of those documents.  
When asked his name, Mr. Vandergriff then gave his brother’s 
name . . . . [¶]  The deputy then placed Mr. Vandergriff under 
arrest for driving without a valid driver’s license. . . .  The 
deputy then . . . searched the car.  He discovered a wallet under 
the driver’s seat containing identification for Mr. Vandergriff.”]; 
U.S. v. Milton (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 1995, Nos. 93-1812 & 93-1876) 
1995 WL 106131, p. *1 [“After stopping the vehicle, Sergeant 
Sitar asked the driver of the car for his license.  The driver 
refused, and identified himself as Derek Johnson.  Other 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
6 
evading responsibility for a traffic violation poses such a 
persistent problem, it is to that extent reasonable for law 
enforcement officers to take measured steps to ensure that our 
traffic laws are duly enforced.  Therefore, our decision in 
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, recognized a narrow exception 
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  If a law 
enforcement officer pulls over a vehicle for a traffic violation and 
the driver, when asked, is unable to produce identification 
documents,3 despite state law requiring drivers to carry such 
documentation (see Veh. Code, §§ 12500, 12951), or if the driver 
produces documents that appear to be false or to belong to 
                                        
passengers in the vehicle, however, identified the driver as Day 
Day or Ade Milton, as did occupants of the house at which the 
car had stopped.  A wallet found under the driver’s seat 
contained Milton’s identification.”]; State v. Gordon (Or.Ct.App. 
1991) 821 P.2d 442, 442–443 [“[After a traffic stop, Officer] 
Olson . . . asked for identification, and defendant produced from 
a wallet six pieces of identification for a ‘Clark Blakely.’  Olson 
asked if he was Clark Blakley.  Defendant said that he was not 
and that his name was Kirk Gordon.  Olson then asked him for 
some identification to prove that he was Kirk Gordon.  
Defendant looked into his wallet, but could not find any 
identification. . . . [¶]  Olson testified that . . . it was his 
experience that persons trying to hide their identity will often 
put their wallets underneath the seat.”].)  Several of these 
decisions are not published in the official reports of the states in 
which they were decided, but we may nonetheless take judicial 
notice of their fact statements without contravening California 
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115.  (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
800, 847, fn. 9.) 
3  
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, also authorized a limited 
search for vehicle registration documentation.  That aspect of 
the decision is not at issue here. 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
7 
different person, then a limited search of places in the vehicle 
where the driver may have hidden a wallet while slowing to a 
halt is reasonable.  That was correct when we decided Arturo D., 
and it is correct today. 
If, after being pulled over for a traffic violation, a driver 
gives a false name and declines to provide adequate proof of 
identity, what options does an officer have?  If the officer writes 
a traffic citation using the false name that the driver has 
provided and then allows the driver to go, the driver has 
successfully gamed the system, because the citation will 
eventually be dismissed.  Of course, the officer can question the 
driver for details about his or her identity and check those 
details against state records that are available to the officer, but 
that approach might not adequately identify the driver, 
particularly if—as uncooperative drivers frequently do—the 
driver gives the name of a brother or sister.4  The officer can also 
ask the driver to consent to a search, but the driver, who may 
have just hidden or refused to provide identification documents, 
will be unlikely to grant such consent.  So, what more practical 
options does the officer have? 
First, the officer can require the driver to place a 
thumbprint on the notice to appear, and the officer can accept 
                                        
4  
In some cases, the officer’s questioning of the driver about 
his or her identity may demonstrate that the driver has lied to 
the officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 31 (giving false 
information to a peace officer), Penal Code section 148.9 (giving 
false identity to a peace officer), and perhaps in violation of 
Penal Code section 530.5 (false personation).  The officer may 
then arrest the driver and search the vehicle for evidence of 
those violations, including evidence of correct identity.  (Gant, 
supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 343–344.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
8 
that thumbprint as “satisfactory evidence” of identity.  (Veh. 
Code, §§ 40302, subd. (a), 40500, subd. (a); see § 40504.)  The 
thumbprint can later be used to track down the driver and hold 
him or her accountable for the traffic violation.  The problem, 
however, with the thumbprint solution is that the driver might 
refuse to give it.  (See Pen. Code, § 853.5, subd. (a) [“Only if the 
arrestee refuses to sign a written promise, has no satisfactory 
identification, or refuses to provide a thumbprint or fingerprint 
may the arrestee be taken into custody.”].)  Moreover, even if the 
driver agrees to give a thumbprint, the thumbprint is not 
necessarily 
a 
satisfactory 
substitute 
for 
documentary 
identification.  For example, a matching thumbprint might not 
be found in the database of the Department of Motor Vehicles.5 
Second, the officer can make a custodial arrest of the 
driver for failure to carry a driver’s license.  (Veh. Code, §§ 
                                        
5  
It might be supposed that with advances in technology, the 
officer can use face recognition software to identify the driver, 
assuming the Department of Motor Vehicles has access to a 
database containing an image of the driver’s face along with 
accurate identifying information.  But a driver is not obligated 
to expose his or her face to the officer.  It might happen, for 
example, that a driver refuses to remove a motorcycle helmet 
that has a tinted visor or that a driver is wearing niqab for 
religious reasons.  Moreover, there is at present no statutory 
authorization for the use of face recognition software to identify 
drivers who have committed traffic violations, and the possible 
constitutional questions that such a methodology would raise 
remain unresolved.  (Cf. People v. Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 
905 [defendant stipulated that the photographic evidence 
recorded by a red light camera proved that he was the driver of 
the car that allegedly failed to stop at the red traffic signal; the 
use of face recognition software was not at issue].) 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
9 
12500, 12951, 40302; People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 
618, 625.)  The officer can then search the person of the driver 
incident to that arrest.  (United States v. Robinson, supra, 414 
U.S. 218.)  Moreover, if the vehicle is illegally parked and no 
passenger in the vehicle is authorized to drive the vehicle, the 
officer can impound the vehicle and conduct a comprehensive 
inventory search.  (Colorado v. Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. 367.)  
Thus, by arresting the driver, the officer can (in many cases) 
search both the driver and the vehicle.  Of course, if the driver 
has hidden identification documents, that search will likely 
result in their discovery.6 
The second of these options would entail significant 
burden, and the officer might not choose to pursue it, but if the 
driver refuses to give an adequate thumbprint, the officer has it 
as an alternative. 
In light of the foregoing, our decision in Arturo D. 
recognized a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement, giving officers a third, considerably less 
intrusive option as compared to the option of custodial arrest.  
When an officer detains a driver for a traffic violation, and the 
driver declines to provide identification documents, the officer 
does not contravene Fourth Amendment protections by 
conducting a limited search of places in the vehicle where such 
                                        
6  
In this case, defendant’s vehicle was not illegally parked, 
and therefore an arrest of defendant for driving without a 
driver’s license would not have permitted the officers to 
impound the vehicle.  But the majority addresses the general 
validity of Arturo D.  It does not limit its holding to cases like 
this one in which the vehicle is legally parked at the time of the 
search. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
10 
documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.  
(Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 78.)  Contrary to the 
majority’s view, an Arturo D. search is not “perilously close to 
the ‘full-scale search for contraband’ we acknowledged was 
expressly prohibited by Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, p. 21.)  Actually, we cabined the search in several 
important ways.  The search may not be pretextual (Arturo D., 
at pp. 78, 86), which means of course that it must be limited to 
searching for identification documents and that it must 
terminate when those documents are found.  We also said that 
“the prospective reach of a driver in relation to the location 
searched is a factor that can be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of the search.”  (Id. at p. 82.)  In addition, our 
strongly emphasized concern about drivers who put or toss a 
wallet under the front seat in an effort to conceal identity (see 
id., at pp. 79–82) served to narrowly circumscribe the scope of 
the search we were authorizing.  We clearly had in mind places 
that a driver might easily access during the moments while he 
or she, having been signaled by an officer to stop, is slowing to a 
halt,7 and even then we said that we were not “condon[ing] 
                                        
7  
The majority asserts that the rule we adopted in Arturo D. 
was not limited to places that a driver might easily access while 
slowing to a halt.  Instead, the majority argues that our holding 
was broader, allowing officers to search any places in the vehicle 
where identification documents “ ‘reasonably may be expected 
to be found.’ ”  (See maj. opn., ante, p. 7, quoting Arturo D., 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 78.)  But any statement of a holding is 
necessarily summary in nature, and it must be construed in 
light of the opinion’s facts and reasoning.  Indeed, that is exactly 
what the high court did in Gant, when it construed Belton’s 
holding narrowly, relying on Belton’s facts and reasoning.  (See 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
11 
searches for required documentation of ‘virtually all areas in the 
physical proximity of the driver.’ ”  (Id. at p. 84.)  We noted, for 
example, that “an officer may not search in containers or 
locations in which such documents are not reasonably expected 
to be found,” and we gave as illustrations of that limitation a 
“crumpled fast-food bag under [the] seat” and an “enclosed ‘rear 
interior compartment.’ ”  (Id. at p. 86, fn. omitted.)  Finally, we 
“emphasize[d]” that we were not “condon[ing] the equivalent of 
the full-scale search for contraband prohibited by the high court 
in Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113.”  (Arturo D., at p. 86.)  In short, 
a search under Arturo D. is limited in both scope and objective, 
and it must terminate as soon as the officer has located 
identification. 
The facts of this case aptly illustrate the effective and 
limited application of Arturo D.’s rule.  Defendant’s car was 
searched only after she admitted that she did not have a driver’s 
license but that “ ‘there might be identification in the vehicle.’ ”  
Having been so advised, the officers were entitled to protect 
their own safety by retrieving the identification themselves 
rather than permitting defendant to do so.  (Arturo D., supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 87, fn. 28.)  One of the officers noticed an object on 
the front passenger seat that looked like a purse, and he seized 
it.  The other officer opened the purse, “[l]ooking for . . . 
identification,” which he found.  The officer discovered the 
                                        
Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 339–341, 343–344.)  In Arturo D., 
we emphasized the problem of drivers who conceal identification 
documents from police after being signaled to stop (see id. at pp. 
79–82), and our holding should be construed accordingly.  
Instead, the majority reads Arturo D. unnecessarily broadly, 
thus making it an easier target for criticism. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
12 
methamphetamine while searching for the identification 
documents, and no broader search of the purse or car occurred. 
If law enforcement officers have applied our decision in 
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, more broadly than its facts and 
reasoning warrant (see maj. opn., ante, pp. 20–21), then it is the 
task of reviewing courts to apply the decision correctly and 
invalidate those searches, but we need not construe Arturo D. to 
be something it is not and then reject it on that ground.  An 
officer conducting a search for identification documents in 
accordance with Arturo D. may only examine places in the 
vehicle where a driver, slowing to a halt, might quickly put or 
toss a wallet or similar container.  The officer may not open any 
closed containers other than those, such as a wallet, that 
typically contain identification documents, and because the 
search may not be pretextual, the officer may only examine the 
contents of a wallet (or comparable container) to the extent 
necessary to determine the driver’s identity.  There are 
relatively few places where a driver can hide a wallet while 
pulling to the side of the road during a traffic stop, and therefore 
the search we approved in Arturo D. is narrowly circumscribed.  
That limited search reflects an appropriate balancing of the 
relevant interests, and it is consistent with present-day views of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Of course, the officer also has the option of making a 
custodial arrest and then searching the person of the driver and, 
depending on the circumstances, searching the vehicle, too.8  
                                        
8 
The high court in Knowles expressly discussed the 
possibility of a driver concealing identification documents (i.e., 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
13 
But a search of the driver’s person incident to a custodial arrest 
of the driver is certainly more intrusive than the limited search 
of the driver’s vehicle that we approved in Arturo D. (see, e.g., 
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 U.S. 295, 303), and a 
comprehensive inventory search of a vehicle (in a case in which 
the vehicle must be impounded after the driver’s arrest) is also 
more intrusive than the Arturo D. search.  Therefore, far from 
encroaching on the privacy interests of drivers, the holding of 
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, serves to protect those privacy 
interests while still allowing officers to achieve the important 
purpose of adequately identifying the driver before issuing a 
citation.  If the Fourth Amendment permits the greater 
intrusion of a custodial arrest and a full search of the person 
(and perhaps the vehicle), then it should also permit the lesser 
intrusion of no arrest and a limited search of just a few places 
within the vehicle.9 
                                        
the problem we addressed in Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60), 
and the court proposed custodial arrest of the driver as one way 
of addressing that problem.  (Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 118.)  
But the court did not state that, in such circumstances, a very 
limited search of the vehicle for a hidden wallet was 
unconstitutional.  At issue in Knowles was a “full-blown” search 
incident to a citation that had already been issued (id. at p. 115), 
not a limited search for identification to facilitate the issuance 
of a citation.  On that ground, our opinion in Arturo D. 
reasonably distinguished Knowles.  (Arturo D., at p. 76.) 
9  
The majority rejects this reasoning, but it focuses its 
attention solely on the search of the vehicle (which would not 
necessarily result from an arrest of the driver) and ignores the 
inherently more intrusive search of the driver’s person (which 
would almost certainly result from an arrest of the driver).  (See 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
14 
As noted, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to weigh 
the relevant individual and governmental interests.  (See, e.g., 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. at pp. 536–537.)  In 
the circumstances presented in Arturo D., “the need to search” 
(Camara v. Municipal Court, at p. 537) is great.  The officer 
needs to identify the driver to ensure that the driver is held 
accountable.  Indeed, if law enforcement officers are prevented 
from issuing enforceable citations, then the traffic laws can be 
flouted with impunity, risking the lives of innocent people who 
use the public thoroughfares.  By contrast, “the invasion which 
the search entails” (id. at p. 537) is relatively minor, especially 
when compared to the alternative that would follow from a 
custodial arrest.10  The very limited search we approved in 
                                        
maj. opn., ante, p. 29, fn. 12.)  There can be no doubt that an 
arrest, followed by a search of one’s person and booking at a local 
police station, is more intrusive than having a police officer look 
under the front seats of one’s car (and in similar places) for a 
concealed wallet or purse.  At oral argument, the Attorney 
General made the same point.  When asked what the biggest 
danger would be if the court accepted defendant’s argument, the 
Attorney General said:  “[That] more persons who are guilty of 
mere infractions will be arrested and that the increased 
intrusions associated with arrest — embarrassing possible 
future admissions, being put in a cell with strangers accused of 
crime — will increase.”  Among those “increased intrusions,” the 
Attorney General might also have mentioned a full search of the 
driver’s person and, depending on the circumstances, a full 
search of the vehicle (instead of the limited search that 
Arturo D. approved). 
10  
The majority opinion criticizes our opinion in Arturo D. for 
not adequately discussing the magnitude of the intrusion on 
privacy that was at issue.  (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 18–19.)  The issue 
before us is not whether, with the aid of hindsight, Arturo D. is 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
15 
Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, involves some trespass upon a 
person’s privacy—it permits the search of areas within a vehicle 
that are accessible to a driver who might be hiding identification 
documents while slowing to a halt—but the search we approved 
does not “giv[e] police officers unbridled discretion to rummage 
at will among a person’s private effects.”  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 
at p. 345.)  Thus, it does not match the comprehensive vehicle 
search approved in Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, and disapproved 
in Gant.  The Arturo D. search is reasonable in that it is 
narrowly constrained, and it allows the officer to find the 
appropriate identification documents, confirm the driver’s 
identity, issue any appropriate citations, and release the driver 
without a custodial arrest and the more intrusive search that 
would ensue therefrom. 
III. 
Even though our decision in Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 
60, is consistent with the high court’s intervening decision in 
Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 332, the majority asserts that Gant casts 
doubt on Arturo D., justifying our reconsideration of that 
decision.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16–33.)  It does not.  Gant is 
simply not on point. 
Gant addressed the search-incident-to-arrest exception to 
the warrant requirement.  In Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, the 
high court had upheld a search of the passenger compartment 
of a vehicle incident to the arrest of the vehicle’s recent 
occupant.  (Id. at p. 460.)  Gant read Belton narrowly, limiting 
Belton’s holding to situations in which “the arrestee is within 
                                        
written in the manner the majority would prefer.  Rather, the 
issue is whether it is correct. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
16 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”  (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 
351.)  The court said that a broader reading of Belton “would . . . 
untether the rule from the justifications underlying the . . . 
exception” (Gant, at p. 343), which the court identified as officer 
safety and the preservation of evidence (id. at pp. 338–339). 
Our decision in Arturo D. did not rely on Belton, supra, 453 
U.S. 454, or on the rationale of a search incident to an arrest.  In 
fact, Arturo D. only cited Belton once, in passing, in the context 
of describing the basis of the lower court’s decision in Knowles, 
supra, 525 U.S. 113.  Thus, the high court’s narrow reading of 
Belton in Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at page 351, had no effect on 
Arturo D.  Rather, Arturo D. recognized a different exception to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, applying the 
balancing test that traditionally governs constitutional review 
of warrantless searches.  (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 83–
84.)  As noted, the Arturo D. exception is reasonable in light of 
the frequency with which drivers hide identification documents, 
the strong need to enforce traffic laws and thus maintain road 
safety, and the narrowly circumscribed nature of the search that 
we approved, which avoided the necessity of arresting the driver 
and conducting a more intrusive search. 
In Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 332, the high court did not 
repudiate the balancing test that we applied in Arturo D., supra, 
27 Cal.4th at pages 83 to 84.  On the contrary, it applied the 
balancing test.  (Gant, at pp. 344–347.)  Gant made only two 
points that might possibly be relevant to the question of 
Arturo D.’s continuing validity.  First, Gant noted that the 
courts sometimes undervalue the privacy interests that a person 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
17 
has in a vehicle.  (Gant, at pp. 344–345.)  In this regard, the high 
court noted in particular the undesirable possibility of police 
searching “every purse, briefcase, or other container” in the 
vehicle’s passenger compartment.  (Id. at p. 345.)  The court was 
“concern[ed] about giving police officers unbridled discretion to 
rummage at will among a person’s private effects.”  (Ibid.)  
Second, Gant reiterated the unremarkable rule that any 
exception to the warrant requirement must be tethered to the 
justifications that support it.  (Id. at p. 343.) 
As to the concern about “undervalu[ing]” privacy interests 
at issue in vehicular searches and the risk of “unbridled . . . 
rummag[ing]” through “every purse, briefcase, or other 
container” (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 344–345), our decision 
in Arturo D. did not take lightly the privacy concerns that the 
dissenting justices in that case emphasized, and the search 
Arturo D. approved does not come close to an “unbridled . . . 
rummag[ing]” every time a driver declines to provide proof of 
identification.  On the contrary, we expressly disapproved the 
search of any container the officer might find.  (Arturo D., supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 86.)  It is true that an Arturo D. search might 
involve the opening and search of a closed wallet or purse, but 
the wallet or purse would have to be found in a place where the 
driver might have put or tossed it while slowing to a halt, and 
the officer would only be permitted to examine its contents to 
the extent necessary to locate identifying documents.  Arturo D. 
expressly rejected the assertion that officers could rummage 
about at will.  (Ibid.) 
Regarding Gant’s rule that an exception to the warrant 
requirement must be tethered to the justifications that support 
it (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343), this rule is nothing new, and 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
18 
therefore it does not justify reconsideration of Arturo D., supra, 
27 Cal.4th 60.  In fact, the rationale of the high court’s decision 
in Knowles—a case we discussed at length in Arturo D. (id. at 
pp. 74–76)—was that the justifications that supported an 
exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident to an 
arrest do not support an exception for a search incident to the 
issuance of a citation.  (Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. at pp. 116–
118.)  Asserting that an exception must be tethered to the 
justifications that support it is merely another way of saying 
that the exception must be reasonable (reasonable both as a 
general matter and in the specific manner of its application).  
Putting the question in terms of the balancing of individual and 
governmental interests, one could say that Gant merely made 
the obvious point that the government has no interest in an 
exception to the warrant requirement that is not tethered in 
some way to the justifications offered in its defense.  (Gant, at p. 
347.)  But the exception we recognized in Arturo D. is very much 
tethered to the justifications that support it.  The search that we 
authorized in Arturo D. is a limited one that encroaches only a 
relatively small amount on privacy interests, and it is closely 
tethered to the governmental interest in identifying the 
offending driver in the least intrusive way, so the driver can be 
held accountable for his or her traffic violation and the safety of 
the public thoroughfares can be preserved.   
In summary, Gant addressed a different issue than the 
issue we addressed in Arturo D., and it changed nothing as 
regards the relevant standards that apply under the Fourth 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Chin, J., dissenting 
 
 
19 
Amendment.  Nonetheless, the majority uses it as a basis for 
ignoring stare decisis.11 
I respectfully dissent. 
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
                                        
11  
The majority also relies on the assertion that other states 
have not adopted the exception to the warrant requirement that 
we recognized in Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60.  (See maj. opn., 
ante, pp. 33–40.)  Considering that Gant’s significant narrowing 
of Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, is only a decade old, it is probably 
too early to tell if states will follow Arturo D. now that unbridled 
vehicle searches incident to an arrest of an occupant cannot be 
upheld.  (See Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 351.)  But even if the 
majority is correct that Arturo D. stands alone, we need not 
overrule it on that account.  Rather, if there is a split of 
authority, then it is appropriate for the high court to grant a 
writ of certiorari and resolve the question. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lopez 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 4 Cal.App.5th 815 
Rehearing Granted 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S238627 
Date Filed: November 25, 2019 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Yolo 
Judge: Samuel T. McAdam 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State 
Solicitor General, Catherine Chatman, Rachelle A. Newcomb, R. Todd Marshall and Larenda R. 
Delaini, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Solomon Wollack, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Emily A. Rehm, Michael M. Epstein and Rachel E. Vanlandingham as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
R. Todd Marshall 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-7747 
 
Solomon Wollack 
P.O. Box 23933 
Pleasant Hill, CA 94523 
(925) 671-2501