Title: Pollack v. Fournier

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 93 
Docket: 
Sag-19-260 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 4, 2020 
Decided: 
June 25, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
MATTHEW POLLACK et al. 
 
v. 
 
JESSICA FOURNIER 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Matthew Pollack and Jane Quirion appeal from a judgment of the 
Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Billings, J.) granting, in part, Jessica 
Fournier’s special motion to dismiss Pollack and Quirion’s amended complaint 
pursuant to Maine’s Anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2020), and 
authorizing an award of attorney fees to Fournier.1  They challenge the court’s 
authority to award attorney fees and the court’s application of the anti-SLAPP 
statute to one count of their amended four-count complaint.  We vacate the 
                                         
1  The court granted, in part, Fournier’s special motion to dismiss pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 556 
(2020) on June 12, 2019.  On that same day, the court also granted Fournier’s separate motion to 
dismiss, see M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which disposed of all counts of Pollack and Quirion’s amended 
complaint and constituted a final judgment.  Because Pollack and Quirion challenge only the 
anti-SLAPP motion and its award of attorney fees, we do not disturb the court’s separate judgment.   
 
2 
portion of the judgment granting the special motion to dismiss Count 1 of the 
amended complaint and otherwise affirm the judgment.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the amended complaint, the 
affidavits filed in conjunction with Fournier’s special motion to dismiss, and the 
procedural record.  See Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26, ¶ 3, 202 
A.3d 1189. 
[¶3]  Pollack and Quirion have a child who was a student in a Regional 
School Unit.  Between August 2010 and June 2012, Fournier was the child’s 
teacher.  On February 10, 2012, an incident occurred while the child was at 
school that resulted in the child acting “extremely distressed” at the end of the 
school day.   
[¶4]  Pollack and Quirion believed that Fournier may have caused some 
“physical or psychological harm” to the child that resulted in the distressed 
behavior and, on February 27, 2012, submitted to the school a form requesting 
that Fournier be replaced as the child’s teacher.  On March 5, 2012, Quirion 
reaffirmed the request to replace Fournier as the child’s teacher and sent a 
letter to the school’s principal challenging the school’s lack of response to the 
earlier request.   
 
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[¶5]  On March 6, 2012, an attorney for the school wrote a letter to 
Quirion, asserting that Quirion’s statements in her letter about Fournier were 
“defamation per se.”  On June 6, 2012, the school agreed to assign a new teacher 
to the child.   
[¶6]  On August 3, 2012, Fournier served Pollack and Quirion with a 
notice of claim pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B (2020), which allows for the 
accrual of prejudgment interest from the date of service of the notice of claim 
“until the date on which an order of judgment is entered,” id. § 1602-B(5).  The 
notice asserted claims of defamation, negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and interference with contractual relations, and stated that 
these claims arose from Pollack and Quirion’s “threats, intimidation, 
interference, and defamation” of Fournier while she was employed as a teacher.  
The record does not show that Fournier ever filed a complaint after serving the 
notice of claim.2   
[¶7]  In the present action, Pollack and Quirion filed a seven-count 
complaint against Fournier on July 27, 2018, in the Superior Court that included 
                                         
2  Although Fournier did not file a lawsuit against Pollack and Quirion, Fournier and some parents 
of students at the school sought, and served on Quirion, cease-harassment notices during 2014.  In 
connection with her special motion to dismiss, Fournier argued that these cease-harassment notices 
were protected petitioning activity, and Pollack and Quirion do not challenge on appeal the court’s 
dismissal of their complaint as it relates to these cease-harassment notices.   
 
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three counts arising under federal law.  On August 10, 2018, Fournier filed a 
notice of removal, and the case was removed to federal court.   
[¶8]  In federal court, Fournier filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on 
September 10, 2018.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On September 25, 2018, 
Pollack and Quirion amended their complaint to omit the three federal claims. 
As amended, their four-count complaint alleged (1) abuse of process in 
Fournier’s service of the 2012 notice of claim, (2) wrongful use of civil 
proceedings by Fournier in “procuring” a harassment action by the parent of 
another student against Quirion, (3) wrongful use of a civil proceeding by 
Fournier in initiating her own harassment action against Quirion, and (4) a 
violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4682 (2020).  On October 8, 
2018, Pollack and Quirion filed a motion to remand the case to state court.  
Fournier then filed a second motion to dismiss, as well as a special motion to 
dismiss pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 556.  The federal court (Torresen, J.) granted 
Pollack and Quirion’s motion to remand the case to state court on January 16, 
2019.  See Pollack v. Fournier, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7532 (D. Me. Jan. 16, 2019).   
[¶9]  Upon remand to the Superior Court, Fournier refiled her motion to 
dismiss and her special motion to dismiss.  See 14 M.R.S. § 556; M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On June 12, 2019, the court (Billings, J.) granted Fournier’s 
 
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special motion to dismiss as to two of the four counts in the amended complaint, 
concluding that her service of the notice of claim (Count 1) and her actions in 
seeking a harassment notice for herself (Count 3) were petitioning activity 
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.  See 14 M.R.S. § 556.  As to Count 1, the 
portion of the complaint at issue in this appeal, the court concluded that “[i]t is 
reasonably likely that the Notice could eventually lead to consideration or 
review by a judicial body.”  Additionally, the court granted in part and denied 
in part Fournier’s special motion as it related to the alleged violation of the 
Maine Civil Rights Act (Count 4), and denied her motion regarding the count 
alleging that Fournier “procured” a parent’s harassment action against Quirion 
(Count 2).  The court also authorized an award of costs and attorney fees to 
Fournier.  Pollack and Quirion timely appealed.  See  14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2020); 
M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶10]  Pollack and Quirion challenge (1) the court’s dismissal, pursuant 
to 14 M.R.S. § 556, of Count 1 of their complaint regarding Fournier’s service of 
the notice of claim and (2) the court’s authority to award attorney fees to 
Fournier.  We address each issue in turn. 
 
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A. 
Service of Notice of Claim 
[¶11]  Pollack and Quirion contend that Fournier’s service of the notice 
of claim was not “reasonably likely to encourage” consideration by a judicial 
body, arguing that a court could not take action on the notice until a complaint 
was filed and that Fournier never served them with a summons or filed a 
complaint with the court.   
[¶12]  We review the trial court’s ultimate decision on an anti-SLAPP 
special motion to dismiss de novo.  Gaudette v. Davis, 2017 ME 86, ¶ 18 n.8, 160 
A.3d 1190; see Nader v. Me. Democratic Party (Nader II), 2013 ME 51, ¶ 12, 
66 A.3d 571.  We also review de novo whether the claims asserted against the 
moving party are based on “petitioning activity.”  Gaudette, 2017 ME 86, ¶ 16, 
160 A.3d 1190. 
[¶13]  “A Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) refers to 
litigation instituted not to redress legitimate wrongs, but instead to dissuade or 
punish the defendant’s First Amendment exercise of rights through the delay, 
distraction, and financial burden of defending the suit.”  Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 
2019 ME 26, ¶ 9, 202 A.3d 1189 (quotation marks omitted).  Although Maine’s 
anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556, “purports to provide a means for the swift 
dismissal of such lawsuits early in the litigation as a safeguard on the 
 
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defendant’s First Amendment right to petition,” Gaudette, 2017 ME 86, ¶ 4, 160 
A.3d 1190, the application of section 556 “results in an inherent tension 
between the coexisting constitutional right to freedom of speech and the right 
to access the courts to seek redress for claimed injuries,” Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 
2019 ME 26, ¶ 10, 202 A.3d 1189.  Accordingly, when reviewing a special 
motion to dismiss pursuant to section 556, a trial court must apply the 
three-step procedure established in Gaudette, 2017 ME 86, ¶¶ 16-22, 160 A.3d 
1190.   
[¶14]  At issue in this appeal is the first step in this process: whether 
Fournier, as the moving party, has “demonstrate[d], as a matter of law, that the 
anti-SLAPP statute applies to the conduct that is the subject of the plaintiff’s 
complaint by establishing that the suit was based on some activity that would 
qualify as an exercise of the defendant’s First Amendment right to petition the 
government.”  Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 2019 ME 26, ¶ 11, 202 A.3d 1189 
(quotation marks omitted).  Further, “discrete claims within a single action may 
be individually dismissed pursuant to a special motion to dismiss, and only the 
claims specifically based on the moving party’s petitioning activity are properly 
considered for dismissal.”  Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 9, 
143 A.3d 788 (emphasis omitted).  “If the defendant fails to meet [this] initial 
 
8 
burden, the special motion to dismiss must be denied.”  Desjardins v. Reynolds, 
2017 ME 99, ¶ 8, 162 A.3d 228.   
[¶15]  “The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, 
and concerns to their government and their elected representatives . . . .  [It] is 
generally concerned with expression directed to the government seeking 
redress of a grievance.”  Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 
(2011).  Section 556, in relevant part, defines a party’s “exercise of its right of 
petition” as “any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration or 
review of an issue by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other 
governmental proceeding.”3  14 M.R.S. § 556 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
statute’s definition of petitioning activity “is informed by the First Amendment, 
and therefore, a petition conveys the special concerns of its author to the 
government and, in its usual form, requests action by the government to 
                                         
3  For purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, “a party’s exercise of its right of petition” is defined as 
any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive or 
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement 
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, 
executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement 
reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, 
executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement 
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such 
consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the 
right to petition government.   
14 M.R.S. § 556 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
9 
address those concerns.”  Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 2019 ME 26, ¶ 12, 202 A.3d 
1189 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶16]  Here, the petitioning activity asserted by Fournier in support of 
her special motion to dismiss included the service of the notice of claim on 
Pollack and Quirion in August 2012.  A notice of claim served pursuant to 
14 M.R.S. § 1602-B allows for the accrual of prejudgment interest “from the 
time of notice of claim setting forth under oath the cause of action . . . until the 
date on which an order of judgment is entered.”  14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5).  In 
general, the assessment of prejudgment interest serves two purposes: “first, it 
compensates an injured party for the inability to use money rightfully 
belonging to that party between the date suit is filed and the date judgment is 
entered, and second, it encourages the defendant to conclude a pretrial 
settlement of clearly meritorious suits.”  Jasch v. Anchorage Inn, 2002 ME 106, 
¶ 13, 799 A.2d 1216 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  Thus, a 
notice of claim “represents a procedural device to control the conduct of the 
litigation by penalizing delay.”  Purwin v. Robertson Enters., 506 A.2d 1152, 
1155 (Me. 1986). 
 
[¶17]  In this case, however, Fournier’s service of the notice of claim could 
not “control the conduct of the litigation,” id., because Fournier did not 
 
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thereafter file a complaint.  Even when considering section 556’s “broad 
definition” of petitioning activity, Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 18, 162 A.3d 228, 
a notice of claim for prejudgment interest cannot, by itself, “convey[] the special 
concerns of its author to the government” or “request[] action by the 
government to address those concerns,” Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 2019 ME 26, 
¶ 12, 202 A.3d 1189 (quotation marks omitted).  Here, the notice of claim was 
directed solely at Pollack and Quirion, not a governmental entity.   
[¶18]  Likewise, a notice of claim is not a “statement reasonably likely to 
encourage consideration or review of an issue by a . . . judicial body.”  14 M.R.S. 
§ 556.  Although such a notice “could eventually lead to consideration or review 
by a judicial body,” as the trial court concluded, this is not what section 556 
requires.  Rather, to be “a party’s exercise of its right to petition,” a party’s 
statement must “encourage consideration or review of an issue by a . . . judicial 
body.”  Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).  When analyzing the 
plain meaning of the statute, as we must, see Teele v. West-Harper, 2017 ME 196, 
¶ 10, 170 A.3d 803, the word “encourage” means “[to] help or stimulate 
(an activity, state, or view) to develop,” Encourage, New Oxford American 
Dictionary (3d ed. 2010).  Thus, just as a notice of claim cannot “convey[] the 
special concerns of its author to the government,” Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 
 
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2019 ME 26, ¶ 12, 202 A.3d 1189 (quotation marks omitted), when it is not 
accompanied by the subsequent filing of a complaint, a notice of claim cannot, 
by itself, “help or stimulate” the consideration of an issue by a judicial body. 
[¶19]  Fournier’s notice of claim is not petitioning activity as defined in 
Maine’s Anti-SLAPP statute.  See 14 M.R.S. § 556; Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 
2019 ME 26, ¶¶ 13, 15, 202 A.3d 1189.  Accordingly, we vacate that portion of 
the court’s judgment granting Fournier’s special motion to dismiss Count 1 of 
Pollack and Quirion’s amended complaint pursuant to Maine’s Anti-SLAPP 
statute.  
B. 
Authorizing Award of Attorney Fees 
[¶20]  We next address Pollack and Quirion’s contention that the court 
erred in authorizing an award of attorney fees to Fournier.  They argue that the 
court did not have the authority to award attorney fees because the special 
motion was granted only “in part” and because Fournier did not provide any 
reasons to support an award of attorney fees.4   
                                         
4  Fournier has not yet filed an application for attorney fees and, thus, the court has not calculated 
an amount to be awarded.  See M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(3).  We therefore address only the court’s authority 
to award attorney fees when reviewing a special motion to dismiss and its determination, in the 
circumstances of this case, that an award of such fees is warranted.  See 14 M.R.S. § 556.   
 
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[¶21]  We review a court’s authority to award attorney fees de novo, see 
True v. Harmon, 2015 ME 14, ¶ 7, 110 A.3d 650; Gibson v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 673 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Me. 1996) (stating that “the court’s authority to 
award attorney fees is a matter of law”), and review a court’s decision to award 
attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, see Estate of Gagnon, 2016 ME 129, 
¶ 15, 147 A.3d 356.  “To the extent that interpretation of a statute is required 
in conjunction with the award or denial, we review the statutory construction 
de novo.”  Kilroy v. Northeast Sunspaces, Inc., 2007 ME 119, ¶ 6, 930 A.2d 1060.  
[¶22]  A trial court’s authority “to award attorney fees may be based on 
(1) a contractual agreement between the parties; (2) a specific statutory 
authorization; or (3) the court’s inherent authority to sanction serious 
misconduct in a judicial proceeding.”  Sebra v. Wentworth, 2010 ME 21, ¶ 17, 
990 A.2d 538 (quotation marks omitted).  Section 556 provides that, “[i]f the 
court grants a special motion to dismiss, the court may award the moving party 
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, including those incurred for the special 
motion and any related discovery matters.”  
[¶23]  Here, Fournier requested an award of attorney fees in her special 
motion to dismiss, the court had the statutory authority to authorize an award 
of attorney fees pursuant to section 556, and the court did so only after 
 
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granting, in part, Fournier’s special motion to dismiss.  Because “discrete claims 
within a single action may be individually dismissed pursuant to a special 
motion to dismiss,” Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 9, 143 A.3d 788 (emphasis 
omitted), we are not persuaded by Pollack and Quirion’s contention that 
attorney fees may be awarded only when a court grants, in full, a special motion 
to dismiss.  Therefore, the court did not err in determining that it could award 
attorney fees to Fournier.  See 14 M.R.S. § 556; Sweet v. Breivogel, 2019 ME 18, 
¶ 23, 201 A.3d 1215 (“[T]he trial court is in the best position to observe the 
unique nature and tenor of the litigation as it relates to a request for attorney 
fees . . . .”). 
[¶24]  Having previously concluded that the court erred in determining 
that Fournier’s service of the notice of claim (Count 1) was petitioning activity, 
an award of attorney fees as to that count is not authorized by section 556.  
However, the trial court did not expressly articulate whether its decision to 
award attorney fees was based in whole or in part on Count 1.  Therefore, 
because the court was authorized to award attorney fees, and because the court 
did grant Fournier’s special motion to dismiss as to Count 3 and, in part, as to 
Count 4, we remand for the court to decide whether an award of attorney fees 
is warranted as to the two remaining counts and, if so, to determine an 
 
14 
appropriate award of attorney fees in proportion to them.  See Maietta Constr., 
Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, ¶ 12, 847 A.2d 1169 (holding that a court may 
use the merit of a case “as a measure of whether attorney fees are appropriate 
. . . because the anti-SLAPP statute is aimed at preventing litigation that has no 
chance of succeeding on the merits”). 
The entry is: 
Judgment granting special motion to dismiss 
Count 1 of amended complaint vacated.  
Judgment affirmed in all other respects.  
Remanded for the court to determine attorney 
fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthew Pollack, appellant pro se 
 
Jane Quirion, appellant pro se 
 
Daniel A. Nuzzi, Esq., and Nathaniel A. Bessey, Esq., Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, 
for appellee Jessica Fournier 
 
 
Sagadahoc County Superior Court docket number CV-2018-24 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY