Title: Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd.1990 WY 94797 P.2d 1171Case Number: 89-251Decided: 09/14/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN R. NULLE AND JEANNE 
B. NULLE, AS PARENTS, NEXT FRIENDS, GUARDIANS, AND CO-CONSERVATORS OF KATHRYN 
DAWN NULLE, 

APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

GILLETTE-CAMPBELL COUNTY 
JOINT POWERS FIRE BOARD,

 APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Michael A. 
Maycock of Michael A. Maycock, P.C.; and S. Gregory Thomas of Banks, Johnson 
& Wolfe, Gillette, for appellants.

Paul J. Drew, 
Gillette, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Kathryn Dawn 
Nulle, by her natural parents, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of her 
claim for loss of parental consortium arising from her natural father's personal 
injury at the allegedly negligent hands of the Gillette-Campbell County Joint 
Powers Fire Board (Board).

[¶2]      Both parties 
agree that the sole question we must answer is whether under Wyoming law a child 
has a legally cognizable claim for loss of parental consortium against a 
third-party who negligently injures that child's parent. We hold that Wyoming 
recognizes the child's claim, reverse the trial court's dismissal of the 
complaint, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

FACTS

[¶3]      According to the 
complaint filed on behalf of Kathryn Dawn Nulle (Kathryn), she was seven years 
and three months old on July 27, 1987, when her natural father, John R. Nulle, 
an employee of Fire Fighters Equipment Company, Inc., was seriously injured by 
an explosion. The incident occurred when he was filling a tank with compressed 
air at the fire department operated by the Board in Gillette, Wyoming. Alleging 
the Board's negligence to have been the proximate cause of her father's 
injuries, Kathryn claimed she has sustained damages as a result of the injuries 
to her father, including the loss of her father's care, comfort and 
society.

[¶4]      The Board filed 
its motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. The trial court held a hearing on that motion and issued 
its order dismissing the complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). This appeal 
followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶5]      In reviewing a 
trial court's dismissal of a claim under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), we accept the facts 
alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable 
toward the party opposing the motion below. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Wyo. 1990). Here, Kathryn's complaint has satisfied the requirement 
that she plead only the operative facts giving rise to her claim in order to 
give fair notice to the Board. As recognized by the trial court and by the 
parties in their presentations below and here, the simple question is whether 
those operative facts constitute a legally cognizable claim in this 
state.

ANALYSIS

[¶6]      In support of its 
position urging this court to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the 
complaint, the Board relies upon the common law view, held by a majority of 
jurisdictions having decided the question whether a child's parental consortium 
claim is legally cognizable.1 The Board contends that some seven 
traditional arguments culled from the opinions of the courts that have decided 
this question present a compelling case for rejecting this claim in Wyoming. 
Those arguments are: lack of precedent, lack of the child's legal entitlement, 
multiplicity of suits, difficulty of assessing damages, double recovery, 
exposure to exorbitant liability, and increased insurance costs. Additionally, 
the Board notes that Kathryn's claim is not joined with her father's direct 
personal injury claim and her mother's spousal consortium claim and alleges no 
economic or special damages.

[¶7]      Kathryn 
challenges traditional argument by advocating a minority viewpoint that 
recognizes a child's claim to parental consortium. In addition to meeting the 
traditional opposing arguments, Kathryn finds major support for her position in 
Wyoming's wrongful death statute that allows the deceased's survivors, including 
spouse and children, to recover for loss of probable future companionship, 
society and comfort. W.S. 1-38-102(c) (Cum.Supp. 1987). She points to society's 
increasing recognition of children's rights, to Wyoming's legislative protection 
of children in the areas of domestic relations, education, criminal law, labor 
and employment. She also points to this court's recognition of a wife's claim 
for loss of her injured husband's consortium. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 
(Wyo. 1986). We note considerable commentary on this subject.2

[¶8]      Since the Board 
urges us to reject the child's claim based on the common law view, we begin our 
analysis by identifying our common law jurisprudential understanding. In an 
unwavering line of decisions over the last fifty years, this court has 
emphasized that

[A]lthough W.S. 8-1-101 
adopts the common law as the law of this state, we have held that we will 
recognize the common law as modified by judicial decisions and will adopt that 
interpretation which seems best. Krug v. Reissig, 488 P.2d 150, 152 (Wyo. 1971); 
In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677, 681 (1940). Moreover, we have 
previously expressed a reluctance to recognize, or continue a recognition of, a 
common law rule that had its genesis in a social, economic and political climate 
entirely foreign to Wyoming in current times. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 
1369 (Wyo. 1986).

Champion Well 
Service, Inc. v. NL Industries, 769 P.2d 382, 383 (Wyo. 1989). In Champion we 
concluded that, under current social circumstances, the common law rule that 
permitted an employer's recovery for the loss of an injured employee's services 
from a negligent third party is "neither well suited to the times nor accepted 
in modern jurisprudence." Id. 

[¶9]      The decision in 
Champion is consistent with this court's analysis in Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986) and Weaver. In Weaver, this court rejected the common law 
rule that a wife could not recover damages for the loss of consortium following 
the negligent injury of her husband:

     We have not hesitated 
to overrule cases that were based on what was perceived to be the common law at 
the time the decisions were handed down. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 
(Wyo. 1983); and Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339 
(Wyo. 1974). We are justified in overruling prior cases grounded on the common 
law if they stand for an unfair and improper rule or have outlived their 
usefulness, and do not meet changing needs.

Weaver, 715 P.2d  
at 1368. In Gates this court rejected the common law rule denying a family 
member recovery of damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The gradual elimination of outmoded principles becomes evident from these 
cases.

[¶10]   These decisions reflect Oliver 
Wendell Holmes' view of the development of the common law:

The life of the law has 
not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have 
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which 
men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development 
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the 
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we 
must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must alternately 
consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult 
labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new products at 
every stage.

O.W. Holmes, The 
Common Law 1 (1881).

[¶11]   With this understanding of the 
common law's dynamism, we continue our analysis by next considering the nature 
of the parent-child relationship in today's society. This court has observed 
that this relationship is "the earliest and most hallowed of the ties that bind 
humanity * * *." Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976). In 
1982, this court expressed the current belief, contrary to the thinking 
prevailing in Dickensian England, that "a child should not be viewed as piece of 
property. * * *." Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo. 1982). Perhaps 
the most telling recognition by this court of the nature of the parent-child 
relationship is found in this court's forcefully stated view that:

The right to associate 
with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the state and 
federal constitutions. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (integrity of the family unit protected by the due-process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 
89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (implication that liberties guaranteed by 
the federal constitution are fundamental) * * *. Analysis of the Wyoming 
Constitution and case law also leads to the conclusion that the right to 
associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty. Article 1, Sections 2, 6, 
7 and 36, Wyoming Constitution; Washakie County School District Number One v. 
Herschler, Wyo. 606 P.2d 310 (1980); Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976); and In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 
(1948).

DS v. Department 
of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo. 1980). Accord, 
TR v. Washakie County Department of Public Assistance, 736 P.2d 712, 715 (Wyo. 
1987); Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 990 (Wyo. 1984); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 
981-82 (Wyo. 1984). 

[¶12]   The United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652 (1944).3

[¶13]   Having examined the nature of the 
parent-child relationship at length, we note that most courts that have rejected 
the child's parental consortium claims have conceded the reality of the loss 
suffered when the socially important parent-child relationship is damaged 
because of the negligence of a third party directly injuring a parent. For 
example, in Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 168, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (1962), the 
court said:

     It is common knowledge 
that a parent who suffers serious physical or mental injury is unable to give 
his minor children the parental care, training, love and companionship in the 
same degree as he might have but for the injury. Hence, it is difficult for the 
court, on the basis of natural justice, to reach the conclusion that this type 
of action will not lie. Human tendencies and sympathies suggest otherwise. 
Normal home life for a child consists of complex incidences in which the sums 
constitute a nurturing environment. When the vitally important parent-child 
relationship is impaired and the child loses the love, guidance and close 
companionship of a parent, the child is deprived of something that is indeed 
valuable and precious. No one could seriously contend otherwise.

We agree. It is 
clear that a child suffers substantive injury when a parent is negligently 
injured and is unable to perform parental functions. Cooney & Conway, supra, 
at 351.

[¶14]   We now briefly address the 
traditional arguments distilled from the decisions of those courts that have 
either rejected or recognized the child's parental consortium claims. The Board 
contends those argu- ments weigh in its favor; Kathryn asserts they weigh in her 
favor. We find the analysis of those decisions which have recognized the child's 
claim more persuasive than the analysis of those decisions which have rejected 
the claim. In addressing traditional arguments we have kept in mind this court's 
common law heritage and the nature of the "parent-child relational interest" at 
risk, the loss suffered when that relational interest is damaged by a third 
party's negligence, the fundamental role of socialization played by the family 
unit in our society, and the fundamental liberty interest in family 
association.

[¶15]   The first traditional argument is 
that the claim is unsupported by precedent. More courts have rejected the claim 
than have recognized it, but the decisions of the last decade show movement 
toward recognition in other jurisdictions; legal commentators advocate 
recognition. Hibpshman, 734 P.2d  at 992 nn. 5, 6. This court has not hesitated 
to break new ground and adopt an interpretation that meets the changing needs of 
this state's citizens when a common law rule has outlived its usefulness or is 
incompatible with social policy. Such need for change was evidenced in Gates 
(recognition of the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress) and in 
Weaver (recognition of the wife's claim for loss of consortium).

[¶16]   The second argument on which the 
Board relies is the lack of the child's legal entitlement. We find that argument 
meritless. In the wrongful death statute, the Wyoming legislature has expressed 
a social policy that favors compensation to ameliorate the certain damage to 
relational interests resulting from the death of a family member. Under that 
statute a child has a legally cognizable claim for the permanent loss of a 
deceased parent's consortium. That statutorily recognized legal entitlement is 
compelling precedent upon which to base the child's legal entitlement to 
consortium damages in the case of a parent's serious injury. With a parent's 
death, the loss of consortium is permanent. With a parent's serious injury, the 
loss of consortium may be either temporary or permanent depending on the nature 
and extent of the injury. We trust the factfinder to sort that out according to 
the evidence. As we have also shown, the child's legal entitlement is based upon 
his or her fundamental liberty interest in familial association with his or her 
parent.

[¶17]   The Board further challenges the 
existence of the child's legal entitlement by appropriately pointing out that in 
Gates this court refused to recognize a parent's claim for loss of an injured 
child's consortium. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 201. Admittedly, that comparison has a 
certain surface appeal. On closer examination, however, that comparison is 
readily distinguished. In our society the minor child requires his or her 
parent's nurturing, guidance, and supervision. The child is uniquely dependent 
upon the parent for his or her socialization, that maturation process which 
turns a helpless infant into an independent, productive, responsible human being 
who has an opportunity to be a valuable, contributing member of our society. 
Without question, the child's relational interest with the parent is 
characterized by dependence. In contrast, the parent's relational interest with 
the child is not. In a real sense, the child is "becoming" and the parent "has 
become." Thus, the parent's loss of an injured child's consortium is different 
in kind from the child's loss of an injured parent's consortium. Viewed in this 
light, our refusal in Gates to recognize the parent's claim is inapposite to the 
legal problem whether we recognize the child's claim.

[¶18]   The third argument advanced by the 
Board is that recognition of the claim will foster a multiplicity of suits which 
have not been filed contemporaneously. Here, for example, Kathryn's claim was 
filed at a time when her parents had not yet filed theirs; however, she faced a 
statute of limitations problem.4 In Gates this court answered a 
similar argument, saying that suits for emotional injury limited to those 
arising from severe physical injury to another will most often be joined with 
the underlying actions based on the primary victim's physical injury. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 197. In Hibpshman, the Alaska Supreme Court found the practical and fair 
solution to the problem to be a requirement that the child's claim be joined 
with the injured parent's claim whenever feasible. Hibpshman, 734 P.2d  at 
997.

[¶19]   The Board next expresses concern 
about the difficulty of assessing damages, the danger of double recovery, and 
the tortfeasor's exposure to exorbitant liability. Even those courts that reject 
the child's claim recognize the real damage to the "parent-child relational 
interest" occasioned by serious injury to the parent. In Wyoming there is a 
"general policy in favor of imposing the loss on the negligent tortfeasor rather 
than the innocent victim * * *." Gates, 719 P.2d  at 198. Just because difficulty 
attends assessment of damages is no reason to deny damages altogether. A 
factfinder's calculation of damages for a child's loss of parental consortium is 
not any more difficult than that calculation necessary in other actions 
involving spousal consortium, wrongful death consortium, emotional distress 
whether inflicted negligently or intentionally, pain and suffering, or loss of 
enjoyment of life. The specter of double recovery can be easily eliminated by 
the trial court's distinctly specifying in proper jury instructions the 
respective elements of damages to which the parent and the child are each 
entitled. We presume the jury reads and follows its instructions. City of 
Cheyenne v. Simpson, 787 P.2d 580, 582 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶20]   Finally, the Board warns that this 
court's recognition of the child's claim will inevitably lead to increased 
insurance costs. In Gates this court rejected insurance costs arguments as a 
basis for denying recovery. Insurance is a loss-spreading device by design. 
Increases in premiums are unwarranted only when it is decided that the innocent 
victim will bear the loss rather than the guilty tortfeasor, his insurer, and 
the public. See Gates, 719 P.2d  at 197. This court agrees with Oregon's high 
court (denying recognition on other grounds):

A person's liability in 
our law still remains the same whether or not he has liability insurance; 
properly, the provision and cost of such insurance varies with potential 
liability under the law, not the law with the cost of insurance.

Norwest, By and 
Through Crain v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318, 323 (1982). See also Gates, 719 P.2d  at 206 (Rooney, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).

[¶21]   We hold that minor children have an 
independent claim for loss of parental consortium resulting from injuries 
tortiously inflicted on their parent by a third person. We further hold that 
this independent claim should be joined with the injured parent's claim whenever 
feasible.

[¶22]   Accordingly, the trial court's 
dismissal of Kathryn's independent claim for loss of her father's consortium is 
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶23]   I must dissent from the decision of 
the majority in this case. In Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 201 (Wyo. 
1986), we said:

"Johnny's [Gates] mother, 
Peggy Merryman, and his natural father, Stewart Gates, filed claims for loss of 
filial companionship, alleging that Richardson's negligence deprived them of the 
comfort and companionship of their son. Most courts hold that a parent cannot 
recover for the loss of a child's companionship, and we agree. See 67A C.J.S. 
Parent and Child § 152; Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 553. The district court's dismissal 
of the claims for loss of filial companionship is affirmed."

Most courts hold 
that a child cannot recover for the loss of parental consortium but, on this 
question, the majority of this court disagrees with the view of most 
courts.

[¶24]   I am convinced that filial 
consortium and parental consortium are opposite sides of the same coin, and loss 
of either should be treated identically to loss of the other. The precedential 
policy was articulated in Gates and should be faithfully pursued, or Gates 
should be overruled. If the policy found in Gates is not acceptable to Wyoming 
citizens, then wisdom, in my opinion, would justify deference to the legislative 
department to adjust the rights of citizens as it has done in adopting and 
amending the wrongful death statute. Sections 1-38-101 to -102, W.S. 1977 (June 
1988 Repl.). While the logic articulated in the majority opinion appears 
impressive, the rationale is a familiar one in such cases. I am troubled, 
however, because it does not account for the entire spectrum of parent-child 
relationships such as the child who is not a minor yet still 
dependent.

[¶25]   I find that most of my concerns 
have been aptly captured by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit:

"Courts favoring the new 
claim stress the similarity to spousal consortium, the inconsistency of 
recognizing loss of services of a deceased parent under wrongful death statutes 
but not permitting recovery when an injured parent survives, and an assumed need 
to compensate for an acknowledged loss to the children.

"Those courts brush aside 
such countervailing considerations as increased litigation and insurance costs, 
finding them speculative and insufficient to prevent creation of a new cause of 
action. They also point out that courts presently award monetary damages for 
such intangibles as emotional distress as well as pain and suffering. Declining 
to await legislative action, the courts that have adopted the new theory of 
recovery have relied on their duty, as they perceive it, to mold the common law 
to meet society's needs.

"The courts refusing to 
recognize the children's claims question the advisability of equating parental 
society with a monetary value. In addition, they point to the difficulties 
inherent in defining the limits of the new right (e.g., whether it would apply 
only to minor children, whether it would extend to those standing in loco 
parentis), and note the probable increased insurance costs and added burden 
on the courts. A number of the courts also believe that this issue, essentially 
one of policy, should be resolved by the legislature.

"There is room to 
question the desirability of a court's decision to create a new cause of action 
without adequate demonstration of both need and cost. Curiously, with respect to 
increased costs of administering the claims, both the courts which dismiss that 
factor as insubstantial, as well as those which use it as an argument against 
recognition of a new cause of action, do so without any empirical data or 
statistical projections. In a concurring opinion, one judge has acknowledged 
that legislatures possess superior resources with which to weigh all potentially 
affected interests, Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, 293 Or. 
543, 652 P.2d 318, 333 [(1982)] (Tanzer, J. concurring)." DeLoach v. Companhia 
de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 782 F.2d 438, 441 (3rd Cir. 1986).

In the course of 
its opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted 
that, at the time, five jurisdictions, following the lead of Massachusetts in 
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980), had 
allowed recovery for claims such as this. It also noted that eight 
jurisdictions, "among others (footnote omitted), continue to deny recovery, 
adhering to the rule previously announced by the courts in some twenty states." 
DeLoach, 782 F.2d  at 440.

[¶26]   Since 1986, Alaska, in Hibpshman v. 
Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987), and Arizona, in Villareal 
v. State Department of Transportation, 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989), have 
recognized such a claim. Hibpshman, 734 P.2d  at 992, incorporates lists of those 
jurisdictions that have addressed the question, pro and con. In addition, the 
attempted recognition of the claim by the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado, Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1078 
(D.Colo. 1985), has been nullified by Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986). A Court of Appeals in Indiana, in Dearborn Fabricating 
& Engineering Corporation, Inc. v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. App. 3 
Dist., 1988), also recognized this claim, but the Supreme Court of Indiana, upon 
review, reversed the Court of Appeals holding that "a child may not maintain an 
action for loss of parental consortium when the parent is negligently injured by 
a third person." Dearborn Fabricating & Engineering Corporation, Inc. v. 
Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ind. 1990). Maryland and North Carolina also 
aligned themselves with the majority in 1989. Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 324 N.C. 108, 376 S.E.2d 236 (1989). In 
both Connecticut and Tennessee, intermediate appellate courts have adopted the 
majority rule. Mahoney v. Lensink, 17 Conn. App. 130, 550 A.2d 1088 (1988); 
Still by Erlandson v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. App. 1988). 
The count of jurisdictions is perhaps somewhat imperfect when traced through 
those opinions that have made the attempt, but it is clear that, for every 
jurisdiction that has recognized this claim, three have rejected it.

[¶27]   Those courts that have recognized 
claims like the one in the instant case have, as has the majority in this case, 
noted the fascination of academia with this topic. In my judgment, those who 
actually occupy the role of rule and policy making in society need to be most 
cautious about delegating that function to those who do not serve in that 
capacity and who, in fact, serve an entirely different function. It appears, in 
this instance, that a claim of a growing trend toward the recognition of a claim 
for filial consortium since 1980 is at least an exaggeration, if not a 
myth.

[¶28]   In the exercise of judicial 
restraint, and in the interest of certainty in the law, I would follow the view 
of the majority of jurisdictions, the authority for which is aptly noted in the 
opinion of the majority of this court, until our legislature articulates a 
different policy. Consistency with our decision in Gates demands that we reject 
the arguments and contentions of the Appellants.

[¶29]   I would affirm the trial 
court.

 FOOTNOTES

1 See Dearborn Fabricating 
& Engineering Corp., Inc. v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 16 n. 2 (Ind. App. 3 Dist. 
1988) and Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 992 n. 4 (Alaska 
1987), for a list of jurisdictions rejecting the claim. See also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 707A (1977); and Annotation, Child's Right of Action for 
Loss of Support, Training, Parental Attention, or the Like, Against a Third 
Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 11 A.L.R.4th 549 (1982).

2 Pound, Individual 
Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich.L.Rev. 177, 185-86 (1916); Love, 
Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured 
Person's Society and Companionship, 51 Ind.L.J. 590 (1976); Note, The Child's 
Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and Companionship Caused by 
Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U. L.Rev. 722 (1976); Cooney and Conway, The 
Child's Right to Parental Consortium, 14 J. Marshall L.Rev. 341 (1981); and 
Note, Torts - Child May Recover for Loss of Parent's Society and Companionship, 
68 Marq.L.Rev. 174-88 (1984).

3 Margaret Mead tells 
us

[t]he family is * * * the 
institution * * * to which we owe our humanity. [W]e know no other way to bring 
children up to be human beings, able to act like men and women, and able to 
marry other men and women, and bring up children, except through the 
family.

M. 
Mead, "The Impact of Cultural Changes on the Family," The Family in the Urban 
Community, Detroit: The Merrill-Palmer School 4 (1953) (quoted in G.R. Leslie, 
The Family in Social Context 3 (1967)). Leslie further informs us that, "The 
family is the very cradle of human nature. Family experience is necessary to 
turn a newborn infant * * * into a fully human being with values and standards 
and the ability to live harmoniously with other people." Leslie, supra, at 
3.

Another commentator on 
family relations teaches:

The intense emotional 
meaning of family relations for almost all members of a society has been 
observable throughout man's history. Philosophers and social analysts have noted 
that society is a structure made up of families, and that the 
peculiarities of a given society can be described by outlining its family 
relations. The earliest moral and ethical writings suggest that a society loses 
its strength if people fail in their family obligations.

* * * * * *

The strategic 
significance of the family is to be found in its mediating function in 
the larger society. It links the individual to the larger social 
structure. A society will not survive unless its many needs are met, such as the 
production and distribution of food, protection of the young and old, the sick 
and the pregnant, conformity to the law, the socialization of the young, and so 
on. The formal agencies of social control (such as the police) are not enough to 
do more than force the extreme deviant to conform. Socialization makes most of 
us wish to conform, but throughout each day we are often tempted to deviate. 
Thus both the internal controls and the formal authorities are insufficient. 
What is needed is a set of social forces that responds to the individual 
whenever he does well or poorly, supporting his internal controls as well as the 
controls of the formal agencies. The family, by surrounding the individual 
through much of his social life, can furnish that set of forces.

* * * * * *

Thus it is through the 
family that the society is able to elicit from the individual his 
necessary contribution. The family, in turn, can continue to exist only if it is 
supported by the larger society.

W.J. Goode, The Family, 
1-3 (1964). As an instrument of the larger society, Goode says, the family's 
"failure to perform adequately means that the goals of the larger society may 
not be attained effectively." Id., at 5.

4 Kathryn's father was 
injured on July 27, 1987, when she was seven years old. Under W.S. 1-39-114 
(Cum.Supp. 1987), she had to file an action by July 27, 1989. In contrast, her 
father had two years to file his claim under W.S. 1-39-113(a) (Cum.Supp. 1987), 
and then had an additional years under W.S. 1-39-114 in which to file his 
action.