Title: JARRETT v JARRETT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N O . 8 2 - 6 2 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA 1983 F R A N C E S V . J A R R E T T , P l a i n t i f f a n d R e s p o n d e n t , V S . L E O R . J A R R E T T , ADA M . C A S S A D Y , J A C K J A R R E T T and DORA J A R R E T T , D e f e n d a n t s a n d A p p e l l a n t s . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e C o u n t y of M u s s e l s h e l l H o n o r a b l e N a t A l l e n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t s : R o b e r t W . H o l m s t r o m a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a F o r R e s p o n d e n t : J o h n L . P r a t t a r g u e d , R o u n d u p , M o n t a n a F i l e d : S u b m i t t e d : J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1983 D e c i d e d : F e b r u a r y 1 8 , 1983 FEB 1 8 5983 M r . J u s t i c e L . C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s a c t i o n is f o r p a r t i t i o n of a ranch by one of t h e t e n a n t s i n common. It was heard by t h e District Court of t h e F o u r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , M u s s e l s h e l l County, which decided t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t d i d have t h e r i g h t to p a r t i t i o n . Based on t h e s t i p u - l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s t h a t t h e ranch could not be p h y s i c a l l y d i v i d e d , t h e c o u r t ordered t h e p r o p e r t y s o l d , t h e proceeds to be d i v i d e d among t h e c o t e n a n t s . J a c k and Dora J a r r e t t owned t h e f a m i l y ranch i n M u s s e l s h e l l County. The ranch had been i n Mrs. J a r r e t t t s f a m i l y f o r approxi- m a t e l y 100 y e a r s . I n 1972, a s p a r t of an e s t a t e p l a n , they began g i f t i n g t h e ranch t o t h e i r c h i l d r e n , James L . J a r r e t t , Leo R. J a r r e t t , and Ada M. Cassady, a s t e n a n t s i n common. T h i s g i f t i n g program was completed i n 1976, t h e r e b y g i v i n g each c h i l d an undivided 1/3 i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y . I n 1973 t h e t h r e e c h i l d r e n e n t e r e d i n t o a one-year l e a s e of t h e p r o p e r t y w i t h t h e i r p a r e n t s . Under t h e l e a s e t h e p a r e n t s p a i d a l l t h e t a x e s and maintained t h e improvements. These d u t i e s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e i r r e n t a l payments. The l e a s e a l s o c o n t a i n e d a p r o v i s i o n t h a t it was to be a u t o m a t i c a l l y renewed a n n u a l l y u n l e s s t e r m i n a t e d i n w r i t i n g by e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s a t l e a s t t h i r t y d a y s p r i o r to t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e annual term. A l l t h e income from t h e ranch went to t h e p a r e n t s , i n c l u d i n g o i l and g a s l e a s e payments, which a l l t h e c h i l d r e n assigned to them. I n 1980, James L . J a r r e t t , one of t h e c h i l d r e n , d i e d . A t t h a t t i m e h i s w i f e , Frances V. J a r r e t t , i n h e r i t e d h i s 1/3 i n t e r e s t i n t h e ranch. I n J u n e 1981, Frances brought an a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n of t h e r a n c h , and t h e p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d s h e was t h e owner of an undivided 1/3 i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y . Three i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e : 1. Whether an implied agreement between the c o t e n a n t s and p a r e n t s waived t h e i r r i g h t to p a r t i t i o n ? 2. Whether t h e c o u r t should have imposed a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t upon t h e p a r t i e s to p r e v e n t p a r t i t i o n ? 3. Whether or n o t t h e sale of t h e ranch o r d e r e d by t h e District C o u r t , because it could n o t p h y s i c a l l y be p a r t i t i o n e d , s h o u l d be made s u b j e c t t o t h e l e a s e of 2/3 o f it to J a c k and Dora Jarre tt? S e c t i o n 70-29-101, MCA, a u t h o r i z e s p a r t i t i o n . T h a t s e c t i o n r e a d s as f o l l o w s : "Action - f o r p a r t i t i o n authorized--who may b r i n g . ~ K e x s e i e r a l c!Eenantsh7l1d and are i n - -- p o s s e s s i o n of r e a l p r o p e r t y as j o i n t t e n a n t s o r t e n a n t s i n common, i n which one or more of them have an estate of i n h e r i t a n c e o r f o r l i f e or l i v e s or f o r y e a r s , a n a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t by one o r more of such p e r s o n s f o r a p a r t i t i o n t h e r e o f , a c c o r d i n g to t h e r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s of t h e p e r s o n s i n t e r e s t e d t h e r e i n , and f o r a sale of such p r o p e r t y or a p a r t t h e r e o f i f it a p p e a r s t h a t a p a r t i t i o n cannot be made w i t h o u t a g r e a t p r e j u d i c e to t h e owners." From t h e wording of t h a t s e c t i o n , it may a p p e a r t h a t t h e r i g h t to p a r t i t i o n is a b s o l u t e . However, i n Lawrence v , Harvey (198O), Mon t . - - .- . . - -. - , 607 P.2d 551, 37 St.Rep. 370, t h i s Court h a s d e c l a r e d it is n o t , where it states: "Although t h e r e a r e no Montana c a s e s d i r e c t l y on p o i n t , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e is t h a t a c o t e n a n t is e n t i t l e d to p a r t i t i o n as a matter of r i g h t , and n o t m e r e l y as a matter of g r a c e w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . While t h e r i g h t is sometimes s a i d t o be a b s o l u t e , p a r t i t i o n may be denied where it would be a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y or l e g a l or e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s , and t h e r i g h t may i n a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s be waived by agreement of t h e p a r t i e s . 68 C. J.S. P a r t i t i o n S 21; 59 Arn.Jur.2d P a r t i t i o n S 30; 4 Thompson on Real P r o p e r t y S 1822 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; 2 T i f £any on Real P r o p e r t y S 474 ( 3 r d Ed. 1939) ; 4A Powell on Real P r o p e r t y S 611 (1949) ." 607 P.2d a t 555, 556. The a p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of an agreement waiving p a r t i t i o n is implied h e r e because of t h e f a m i l y u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o allow t h e p a r e n t s to l i v e on t h e land u n t i l t h e i r d e a t h s . W e do n o t a g r e e . The t e s t i m o n y of L e o R. J a r r e t t , t h e s u r v i v i n g son p o i n t s to t h e absence of any agreement, as he t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e was n e v e r any s p e c i f i c d i s c u s s i o n or agreement on whether t h e c o t e n a n t s could or could n o t p a r t i t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e t e s t i m o n y of Ada M . Cassady, t h e J a r r e t t l s d a u g h t e r , and one of t h e c o t e n a n t s , makes clear t h e l a c k of agreement, e x p r e s s or i m p l i e d , where s h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r b r o t h e r J i m , p r i o r to h i s d e a t h , s t a t e d t h a t he could l e g a l l y claim a p o r t i o n of t h e ranch. I t must be understood t h a t " [ c l o t e n a n t s have t h e r i g h t to e q u a l access and use of t h e p r o p e r t y h e l d i n common . . ." Toeckes v. Baker ( 1 9 8 0 ) , -- - - Mont . -- -- , 6 1 1 P.2d 609, 612, 37 St.Rep. 948. To imply an agreement waiving p a r t i t i o n under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s case would d e p r i v e Frances J a r r e t t , one of t h e c o t e n a n t s , of h e r r i g h t s to t h e p r o p e r t y . The n e x t i s s u e t h a t must be addressed is whether t h e r e w a s a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t i n f a v o r of t h e p a r e n t s . Both s i d e s raise t h e same case when speaking of r e s u l t i n g t r u s t . E c k a r t v. Hubbard (1979) , - - Mont . - - - - . . . 602 P.2d 988, 36 St.Rep. 2061. I n t h a t case we s t a t e d : "A r e s u l t i n g t r u s t o c c u r s where, as a r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n acts, a c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e is a n implied i n t e n t t o create a t r u s t and impo- ses a t r u s t t o a c h i e v e a n e q u i t a b l e r e s u l t . U s u a l l y r e s u l t i n g t r u s t s involve c a s e s where t h e p a r t i e s have used ambiguous language which t h e c o u r t c o n s t r u e s as showing a t r u s t i n t e n t , or where t h e p a r t i e s have e x p r e s s e d no i n t e n t t o c r e a t e a t r u s t by words, b u t have performed acts from which t h e c o u r t i n f e r s t h a t a t r u s t was i n t e n d e d . - - B o g e r t , s u p r a , 5 71, p. 262." 602 P.2d a t 991. I n t h e p r e s e n t case it is n o t contended t h a t t h e language used by t h e p a r t i e s was ambiguous. The deeds conveying t h e f e e t i t l e of t h e land t o t h e c h i l d r e n are c l e a r , as a r e t h e terms of t h e lease between t h e p a r e n t s and c h i l d r e n . I t is claimed t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' a c t i o n s show t h a t the p a r e n t s were t o have t h e bene- f i c i a l use of t h e l a n d . However, t h e s e a c t i o n s were based on t h e terms of t h e l e a s e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e is no r e s u l t i n g t r u s t . The f i n a l i s s u e t o be addressed is whether o r n o t t h e ranch p r o p e r t y should be s o l d s u b j e c t t o a lease on 2/3 o f it from Leo R. Jarrett and Ada M. Cassady to J a c k and Dora Jarrett. The District C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t it should n o t be s o l d s u b j e c t t o such a lease is c o r r e c t . I t is t r u e a t e n a n t i n common may l e a s e h i s i n t e r e s t i n pro- p e r t y to anyone he w i s h e s . Hochsprung v. Stevenson ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 82 Mont. 222, 266 P. 406; Arnundson v. Gordon ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 134 Mont. 142, 328 P.2d 630. However, t h e l e a s e i n q u e s t i o n h e r e is n o t a lease by each c o t e n a n t of h i s o r h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e ranch p r o p e r t y to t h e p a r e n t s , b u t is a lease by a l l of t h e c o t e n a n t s of t h e e n t i r e r a n c h p r o p e r t y . T h i s lease of t h e e n t i r e p r o p e r t y e x p i r e d J a n u a r y 3 , 1982, subsequent to the d a t e on which Frances s e n t h e r n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n , and p r i o r t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n a l judgment of J a n u a r y 28 1982. Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n o r d e r f o r t h e a u t o m a t i c renewal p r o v i s i o n i n t h e lease, which i n e f f e c t is a new lease of t h e e n t i r e p r o p e r t y each y e a r , to be e f f e c t i v e a l l t h e c o t e n a n t s must a g r e e t o or r a t i f y t h e lease, because it is a w e l l - s e t t l e d p r i n c i p a l of t h e l a w t h a t : " I n o r d e r t o make a b i n d i n g lease o f t h e - - - - - - -- - - -- e n t i r e common p r o p e r t y , a l l o£ t h e c o - o w n e r ~ --- - -- -- - - - must act, e i t h e r j o i n t l y or s e v e r a l l y , f o r it - . - - - -- -- - - -- - -- - 1s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t one c o t e n a n t h a s no power - - -- - - -- . - - to lease t h e e n t i r e estate, - o r - - - any s p e c i f i c p o r t i o n t h e r e o f , u n l e s s h e is d u l y a u t h o r i z e d -- - - - - -- - - - - t o d o so by t h e o t h e r c o t e n a n t s . I f one of - - - - - - - -- t h e c o - o w n e r ~ should purpose t o make a n u n a u t h o r i z e d lease of t h i s k i n d , it is i n no way b i n d i n g upon t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e o t h e r owners . " (Emphasis added. ) 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy o n J o i n t Ownership g 100. ( S e e also ---- Powell on ~ G l - ~ m e r t y , V O ~ . 4A, g 608.) F r a n c e s J a r r e t t ' s n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n , which would o n l y be e f f e c t i v e as to h e r 1/3 i n t e r e s t under c i r c u m s t a n c e s o t h e r t h a n a new l e a s e , 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and J o i n t Ownership g100, i n d i - - - - - - - - cates t h a t s h e n e i t h e r agreed to n o r i n any way r a t i f i e d t h e renewal of t h e l e a s e f o r 1982. T h e r e f o r e , t h e a u t o m a t i c renewal p r o v i s i o n cannot t a k e e f f e c t , because as p o i n t e d o u t above, it is i n e f f e c t a new lease of t h e e n t i r e p r o p e r t y and t h u s needs t h e agreement o r r a t i f i c a t i o n of a l l t h e c o t e n a n t s . For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e judgment of the? D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d . Justice : 4 e corcur: %&,$?" ~ I L . P Q Chief Jhgti e