Title: State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-
4920.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. ELLIS SUPER VALU, INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 
 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920.] 
Workers’ compensation – Temporary total disability – Employer’s job offer 
within claimant’s medical restrictions – Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) 
– Job offer must be made in good faith – Factual question remains 
whether offer of work limited to shift for which claimant is unavailable 
was made in good faith – Limited writ granted. 
(No. 2006-1414 — Submitted May 24, 2007 — Decided September 27, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 05AP-531, 2006-Ohio-3014. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} No one disputes appellee Susan B. Hudgel’s inability to return to 
her former position of employment.  Her employer, appellant Ellis Super Valu, 
Inc. (“ESV”), offered her a light-duty position consistent with her medical 
restrictions, but Hudgel declined because the position required her to work 
evenings.  We must determine whether her refusal bars temporary total disability 
compensation under R.C. 4123.56(A). 
{¶ 2} Hudgel industrially injured her right shoulder on August 20, 2004, 
and a workers’ compensation claim was allowed.  She was unable to return to her 
former position of employment through September 22, 2004, but was able to do 
light-duty work.  On September 13, 2004, ESV offered her a position within her 
medical restrictions.  Her work schedule would be from 3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. six 
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days per week, which “would allow you to work your normal number of hours at 
your current salary.” 
{¶ 3} Hudgel normally worked the day shift five days per week, 
beginning at 6 a.m.  Hudgel informed ESV on September 23 that she could not 
work the proposed schedule.  She later explained that the night shift was 
unacceptable because she had two teenage children that would be home alone on 
the nights that her husband worked.  She asked ESV whether she could work 
three days and two nights instead, but received no reply. 
{¶ 4} On November 8, 2004, in response to Hudgel’s request for 
temporary total disability compensation, a district hearing officer for appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio ordered compensation from August 23, 2004, 
through September 23, 2004, but denied it after that date, finding that Hudgel’s 
refusal of ESV’s light-duty offer constituted a voluntary abandonment of 
employment.  A staff hearing officer reversed, finding that Hudgel had a valid 
reason for refusal and, hence, did not abandon her former position of 
employment.  Further appeal was denied. 
{¶ 5} ESV filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
awarding temporary total disability compensation despite Hudgel’s “voluntary 
abandonment.”  The court of appeals disagreed and denied the writ, resulting in 
ESV’s appeal to this court as of right. 
{¶ 6} We clarify at the outset that this is not a case of voluntary 
abandonment.  Rather, the facts of this case raise the possibility of a different 
defense: refusal of suitable alternate employment.  R.C. 4123.56(A) prohibits the 
payment of temporary total disability compensation “when work within the 
physical capabilities of the employee is made available by [an] employer.”  Both 
defenses affect a claimant’s eligibility for temporary total disability 
January Term, 2007 
3 
compensation, but they derive from different compensatory theories and involve 
distinct analyses. 
{¶ 7} Fundamental to receipt of any workers’ compensation benefits is a 
causal relationship between injury and disability.  Temporary total disability 
compensation is no exception and is designed to compensate for the temporary 
loss of earnings sustained while the claimant is unable to return to the former 
position of employment due to injury.  State ex. rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. 
(1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 517 N.E.2d 533.  For many years, there were three main 
defenses to the payment of temporary total disability compensation:  (1) the 
claimant is medically able to return to the former position, (2) the claimant’s 
condition is no longer temporary, and (3) the claimant’s inability to return to the 
former position of employment is not due to injury.  See State ex rel. Ramirez v. 
Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 632, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586; 
Ashcraft. 
{¶ 8} The defense of voluntary abandonment derives from the last of the 
three.  In a case of voluntary abandonment, the claimant’s inability to return to the 
former position of employment is never in dispute.  What is instead always at 
issue is the reason for that inability.  Common to every voluntary-abandonment 
controversy is the existence of two independent reasons for the claimant’s 
inability to return to the former position of employment.  One is medical and one 
is not, with the two most common nonmedical reasons being an employment 
termination or a voluntary refusal to return.  The issue in every voluntary-
abandonment case is which cause was primary and which was secondary. 
{¶ 9} That is not the case with the defense of refusal of suitable alternate 
employment.  This defense does not ask why the claimant has not returned to his 
former position of employment, because the answer is inherent in the mere fact of 
a job offer.  There is no need to propose alternate employment if the claimant’s 
inability to return to the former position is attributable to anything other than the 
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injury.  Instead, the relevant inquiry in this situation is why the claimant has 
rejected an offer to ameliorate the amount of wages lost.  This, in turn, can 
involve considerations of, for example, employment suitability, the legitimacy of 
the job offer, or whether the position was offered in good faith.  The causal-
relation question in this situation is different because it derives from a different 
compensatory intent, which is to facilitate the claimant’s return to the work force.  
As critical as compensating injured workers and their dependents is, it is not the 
only goal addressed by the workers’ compensations system.  Assisting a 
claimant’s return to gainful employment is also important, benefiting not only the 
employer and employee, but society at large. 
{¶ 10} Unfortunately, for many years, this latter goal was hampered by a 
major shortcoming in the temporary total disability scheme:  it did not 
accommodate claimants who could not return to the former position of 
employment but were medically capable of other work.  Unless other employment 
at least matched a claimant’s weekly temporary total disability benefits, claimants 
had no incentive to return to the work force and often remained unemployed 
rather than jeopardize temporary total disability. 
{¶ 11} The General Assembly addressed this problem in 1986 with major 
amendments to R.C. 4123.56.  Foremost was the creation of a new form of wage-
loss compensation that encouraged return to the work force by paying the 
difference between a claimant’s former wages and the earnings in the new job.  
R.C. 4123.56(B), now (B)(1), 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 767.  As a further incentive 
to return to the work force, R.C. 4123.56(A) was amended to provide that a 
claimant who was offered a job within his or her physical capacities could not 
receive temporary total disability compensation if he or she refused that job.  141 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 766. 
{¶ 12} Given these distinct inquiries, a finding that a claimant has 
unjustifiably refused an offer of suitable alternate employment does not translate 
January Term, 2007 
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into a finding that the claimant voluntarily abandoned the former position of 
employment.  In fact, they are mutually exclusive.  An offer of alternate 
employment would occur only when a claimant is medically unable to return to 
the former position of employment.  In such a case, a finding of voluntary 
abandonment could not be sustained, since a claimant cannot voluntarily abandon 
a position that he or she is medically incapable of performing.  State ex rel. 
OmniSource Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 113 Ohio St.3d 303, 2007-Ohio-1951, 865 
N.E.2d 41. 
{¶ 13} In this case, all agree that the light-duty job offered was within 
Hudgel’s medical ability.  This is all that R.C. 4123.56(A) expressly requires, but 
the statute must be read in pari materia with the Ohio Administrative Code 
provision that supplements it.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) defines “job 
offer” in this context as a proposal “made in good faith.”  The parties debate 
whether good faith existed, but contrary to their suggestion, the commission has 
not addressed this issue.  Whether Hudgel exercised good faith in refusing the job 
offer does not answer whether ESV exercised good faith in extending it, which 
must be addressed.  If ESV consciously crafted a job offer with work shifts that it 
knew Hudgel could not cover – as Hudgel alleges and ESV denies – then good 
faith may not exist.  That, however, is a factual determination for the commission. 
{¶ 14} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the 
commission is ordered to further consider the claim and issue an amended order. 
Judgment reversed  
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
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Beirne & Wirthlin Co., L.P.A., Michael J. Schutte, and J. Stephen 
Wirthlin, for appellant. 
Casper & Casper and Douglas W. Casper, for appellee Susan B. Hudgel. 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Eric C. Harrell and Sue A. Wetzel, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
______________________