Title: Stephens v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ALPHONSO STEPHENS 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 010852 
January 11, 2002 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
I. 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant was 
subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense in  
contravention of the Double Jeopardy Clauses in the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 
I, § 8 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
A. 
 
Alphonso Stephens was tried by a jury in the County of 
Pittsylvania for two counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle 
in violation of Code § 18.2-154, and two counts of discharging 
a firearm while in a motor vehicle in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-286.1.  The jury found the defendant guilty of these 
crimes and fixed his punishment at a total of four years and 
12 months imprisonment plus $2,000 in fines. 
 
The defendant argued in the circuit court that his two 
convictions for shooting at an occupied vehicle and his two 
convictions for shooting from a vehicle constitute violations 
of his right not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same 
offense.  The circuit court disagreed with the defendant and 
entered a judgment confirming the verdicts.  The defendant 
appealed that judgment to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed 
the judgment.  Stephens v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 141, 543 
S.E.2d 609 (2001).  The defendant appeals the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
B. 
 
As required by established principles of appellate 
review, we will recite the evidence presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party 
in the circuit court, and we will accord the Commonwealth the 
benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.  
Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 338, 551 S.E.2d 620, 
624 (2001).  During the evening of May 7, 1999, Calvin Fitz 
was driving a Ford automobile on State Route 360 in 
Pittsylvania County.  Bernard Fitz, III, Calvin Fitz' cousin, 
was in the front passenger seat of the car.  Rontrell Petty 
was in the back seat of the car. 
 
As Calvin Fitz was driving his car, he saw a car with 
blinking lights approach him from the rear.  Calvin Fitz 
"slowed down a little bit," and the other car, driven by the 
defendant, "pulled beside" Fitz' car.  The defendant, who had 
problems in the past with Bernard Fitz, "yelled" and "waved 
his hands."  Bernard Fitz told Calvin Fitz to "hit the gas and 
 
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keep on going."  Calvin Fitz "hit the gas," and the defendant 
pursued Fitz' vehicle. 
 
During the ensuing chase, Calvin Fitz drove his car at 
speeds between 85 and 90 m.p.h.  The defendant turned his car 
lights off and began to shoot his pistol in the direction of 
Calvin Fitz' car.  Christopher Jones, a passenger in the 
defendant's car, testified that he saw the defendant shoot the 
pistol approximately twice at Calvin Fitz' car. 
 
Calvin Fitz testified that he saw the defendant shoot the 
pistol twice.  He stated: 
 
"Q:  Do you know whether or not any of these 
shots hit the car? 
 
 
"A:  Yes sir. 
 
 
"Q:  Was anyone in your car hit? 
 
 
"A:  No sir, but me. 
 
 
"Q:  Where were you hit? 
 
 
"A:  In my back twice. 
 
 
"Q:  Okay.  Do you know about how fast you were 
going when you saw the gun shots? 
 
 
"A:  Well, I was probably going 'bout maybe 85-
90.  I mean, the speeds varied at times 'cause we 
was going around curves, and I was going, I mean at 
one time I could have been going 80.  At one time I 
could have been going 85.  Another time I could have 
been going 90.  I mean, it depends on like if I was 
in a curve or not.  I mean, I really couldn't like, 
I could tell you, but I couldn't tell you. 
 
 
"Q:  Were you speeding?" 
 
 
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"A:  Yes sir, I was speeding.  I could tell you 
that much. 
 
 
"Q:  When the car, when the gun shots happened, 
did the car stay with you or did it fall back at any 
point? 
 
 
"A:  Every time he shot, every time I heard a 
shot and I looked back and I saw the shots the car 
would drop back a little bit.  Then it would speed 
back up and then shoots again to drop back a little 
bit." 
 
II. 
 
Code § 18.2-154 states in part: 
 
"Any person who maliciously shoots at . . . any 
motor vehicle or other vehicles . . . occupied by 
one or more persons, whereby the life of any person 
. . . in such motor vehicle . . . may be put in 
peril, shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. . . . 
 
"If any such act is committed unlawfully, but 
not maliciously, the person so offending shall be 
guilty of a Class 6 felony and, in the event of the 
death of any such person, resulting from such 
unlawful act, the person so offending shall be 
deemed guilty of involuntary manslaughter." 
 
 
Code § 18.2-286.1 states: 
 
"Any person who, while in or on a motor 
vehicle, intentionally discharges a firearm so as to 
create the risk of injury or death to another person 
or thereby cause another person to have a reasonable 
apprehension of injury or death shall be guilty of a 
Class 5 felony.  Nothing in this section shall apply 
to a law-enforcement officer in the performance of 
his duties." 
 
 
The defendant argues that his two separate convictions 
for shooting into an occupied vehicle and his two separate 
convictions for shooting from a vehicle violate his double 
jeopardy guarantees.  The defendant asserts that his acts of 
 
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firing a pistol repeatedly from his car constituted a single 
act and not a series of separate and distinct acts that would 
warrant separate indictments and separate punishments.  The 
defendant "maintains that in the absence of a showing that the 
shots constituted separate and distinct acts performed at 
separate times," he cannot be convicted of two counts of 
violating Code § 18.2-154 and two counts of violating Code 
§ 18.2-286.1.  We disagree with the defendant's contentions. 
 
The federal constitutional provision concerning double 
jeopardy embodies three guarantees:  "[i]t protects against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[; i]t 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction[; a]nd it protects against multiple 
punishments for the same offense."  North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted), overruled on 
other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); accord 
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Whalen v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 
165 (1977); Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 
S.E.2d 796, 797 (1981).  Virginia's constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy affords a defendant the same 
guarantees as the federal Double Jeopardy Clause.  Bennefield 
v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 729, 739-40, 467 S.E.2d 306, 311 
(1996); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 389, 394, 363 
 
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S.E.2d 440, 443 (1987); see, e.g., Walton v. City of Roanoke, 
204 Va. 678, 682, 133 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1963). 
 
The litigants agree that in this case the defendant's 
convictions occurred in a single trial and the only double 
jeopardy guarantee pertinent to this appeal is the guarantee 
against multiple punishments.* See Blythe, 222 Va. at 725, 284 
S.E.2d at 797-98.  We have stated:   
 
"In the single-trial setting, 'the role of the 
constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that 
the court does not exceed its legislative 
authorization by imposing multiple punishments for 
the same offense.'  Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 
(1977).  And, 'the question whether punishments 
imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction 
upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally 
multiple cannot be resolved without determining what 
punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized.'  
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980).  
Or, stated another way, 'the question of what 
punishments are constitutionally permissible is not 
different from the question of what punishments the 
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.'  Whalen, 
445 U.S. at 698 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  See 
also Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 413 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)." 
 
Blythe, 222 Va. at 725-26, 284 S.E.2d at 798.  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has stated that "[w]ith respect to 
                     
* The defendant does not dispute the established principle 
that "two or more distinct and separate offenses may grow out 
of a single incident or occurrence, warranting the prosecution 
and punishment of an offender for each."  Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 375, 157 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1967).  
We also note that the test in Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299 (1932) is not implicated in this appeal because 
the statutes at issue and the charged offenses require "proof 
of a fact which the other does not."  Id. at 304. 
 
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cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court 
from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature 
intended."  Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983); 
accord Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989). 
 
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the 
defendant did not receive multiple punishments for the same 
offense.  Instead, the record demonstrates that each shot that 
the defendant discharged from his firearm was a separate, 
identifiable act.  For example, as we have already stated, the 
victim testified that each time the defendant "shot" the 
pistol, the defendant's "car would drop back a little bit.  
Then [the car] would speed back up and then [the defendant] 
shoots again."  And, the defendant essentially concedes in his 
brief that his double jeopardy guarantees would not be 
abridged if his acts of discharging the firearm constituted 
"separate and distinct acts performed at separate times." 
 
The defendant also argues that our decision in Holly's 
Case, 113 Va. 769, 75 S.E. 88 (1912), supports his contention 
that his acts of firing a pistol constitute a single violation 
of Code §§ 18.2-154 and -286.1.  We disagree. 
 
In Holly's Case, we stated the following rule:  "The 
theft of several articles at one and the same time constitutes 
                                                                
 
 
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an indivisible offense, and a conviction or acquittal of any 
one or more of them is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for 
the larceny of the others."  Id. at 772, 75 S.E. at 89.  This 
rule is not applicable here because it "applies only to a case 
involving multiple larceny prosecutions predicated upon the 
theft of multiple articles stolen contemporaneously."  Jones 
v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 761, 240 S.E.2d 658, 661, cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978). 
III. 
 
We conclude that the defendant's right not to be placed 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense was not violated in 
this case.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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