Title: Robertson v. Mount Royal Towers

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/21/2013 
Notice: T h i s 
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r e v i s i o n b e f o r e 
p u b l i c a t i o n i n 
t h e advance 
s h e e t s o f 
Southern Reporter. 
R e a d e r s a r e 
r e q u e s t e d t o 
n o t i f y t h e 
Reporter of Decisions, 
Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229¬
0 6 4 9 ) , o f 
any 
t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n 
o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may 
be 
made b e f o r e 
t h e o p i n i o n i s 
p r i n t e d i n 
Southern Reporter. 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
1120291 
Joe Robertson 
v. 
Mount Royal Towers, a domestic nonprofit corporation 
Appeal from Jefferson C i r c u i t Court 
(CV-12-900669) 
STUART, J u s t i c e . 
Joe R o b e r t s o n a p p e a l s t h e 
o r d e r o f 
t h e J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t 
C o u r t h o l d i n g t h a t h i s c l a i m s a g a i n s t Mount R o y a l Towers, a 
d o m e s t i c 
n o n p r o f i t 
c o r p o r a t i o n 
t h a t 
owns and o p e r a t e s a 
s e n i o r - l i v i n g 
f a c i l i t y i n Birmingham known as Mount 
R o y a l 
1120291 
Towers, a r e s u b j e c t t o an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement and c o m p e l l i n g 
R o b e r t s o n t o a r b i t r a t e t h o s e c l a i m s . 
We 
a f f i r m . 
I . 
In November 2008, R o b e r t s o n was a d m i t t e d as a r e s i d e n t t o 
the s k i l l e d - n u r s i n g u n i t a t Mount R o y a l Towers. 
D u r i n g the 
a d m i s s i o n p r o c e s s , R o b e r t s o n 
e x e c u t e d a number o f documents, 
i n c l u d i n g two o p t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n agreements — one t o govern 
m e d i c a l - m a l p r a c t i c e 
d i s p u t e s and one t o govern a l l o t h e r 
d i s p u t e s . 
The 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement 
g o v e r n i n g 
m e d i c a l -
m a l p r a c t i c e d i s p u t e s p r o v i d e d , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : 
" I t 
i s u n d e r s t o o d 
t h a t any d i s p u t e as t o m e d i c a l 
m a l p r a c t i c e , 
t h a t 
i s as t o whether any 
m e d i c a l 
s e r v i c e s 
r e n d e r e d 
under 
t h i s 
c o n t r a c t 
were 
u n n e c e s s a r y 
or 
u n a u t h o r i z e d 
or were 
i m p r o p e r l y , 
n e g l i g e n t l y 
or 
i n c o m p e t e n t l y 
r e n d e r e d , 
w i l l 
be 
 
d e t e r m i n e d by s u b m i s s i o n t o a r b i t r a t i o n as p r o v i d e d  
by Alabama law and not by a l a w s u i t or c o u r t p r o c e s s 
e x c e p t as Alabama law p r o v i d e s f o r j u d i c i a l 
r e v i e w 
of a r b i t r a t i o n 
p r o c e e d i n g s . " 
(Emphasis added.) 
The 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement g o v e r n i n g a l l 
o t h e r d i s p u t e s p r o v i d e d , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : 
"The r e s i d e n t and the f a c i l i t y 
f u r t h e r agree t h a t 
any 
d i s p u t e 
a r i s i n g 
between 
them 
from 
t o r t s , 
c o n t r a c t s , o r o t h e r w i s e , 
i n c l u d i n g any c l a i m s f o r 
p u n i t i v e damages and any a c t i o n s b r o u g h t on b e h a l f 
of t h e r e s i d e n t by 
t h i r d - p a r t i e s , 
b u t 
e x c e p t i n g 
c l a i m s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e amount o f the 
f a c i l i t y ' s 
c h a r g e s , 
s h a l l be 
s u b m i t t e d 
upon t h e r e q u e s t 
of 
2 
1120291 
e i t h e r the r e s i d e n t or the 
f a c i l i t y t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n  
as p r o v i d e d by Alabama law." 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
N o t a b l y , 
b o t h 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements 
p r o v i d e d t h a t d i s p u t e s would be s u b m i t t e d " t o a r b i t r a t i o n as 
p r o v i d e d by Alabama law." 
On J u l y 26, 2010, R o b e r t s o n was t r a n s p o r t e d by ambulance 
to 
S t . 
V i n c e n t ' s 
H o s p i t a l 
i n Birmingham, 
where 
he 
was 
s u b s e q u e n t l y a d m i t t e d t o be 
t r e a t e d f o r an 
i n f e c t i o n . 
On 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y August 11, 2010, 
S t . V i n c e n t ' s n o t i f i e d Mount 
R o y a l Towers t h a t R o b e r t s o n was b e i n g r e l e a s e d ; however, Mount 
R o y a l Towers i n f o r m e d the h o s p i t a l t h a t i t no l o n g e r had a bed 
a v a i l a b l e f o r R o b e r t s o n and t h a t i t c o u l d not a c c e p t him back 
as a r e s i d e n t of the f a c i l i t y . 
Space was t h e r e a f t e r found i n 
a d i f f e r e n t 
f a c i l i t y 
i n the Birmingham a r e a , and 
R o b e r t s o n 
moved t o t h a t f a c i l i t y upon h i s r e l e a s e from S t . V i n c e n t ' s . 
On March 2, 
2012, 
R o b e r t s o n 
sued Mount R o y a l 
Towers, 
a s s e r t i n g v a r i o u s c l a i m s based on the f a i l u r e of Mount R o y a l 
Towers t o a c c e p t him back as a r e s i d e n t upon h i s d i s c h a r g e 
from S t . V i n c e n t ' s i n August 2010. 
On A p r i l 9, 2012, Mount 
R o y a l Towers moved the t r i a l c o u r t t o s t a y t h e a c t i o n and t o 
compel R o b e r t s o n t o submit h i s d i s p u t e t o a r b i t r a t i o n p u r s u a n t 
to the terms o f the a r b i t r a t i o n agreements he had s i g n e d . 
On 
3 
1120291 
May 
15, 
2012, 
R o b e r t s o n 
f i l e d 
a response 
t o t h a t 
m o t i o n , 
a r g u i n g t h a t the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t s h o u l d not compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
because: 
1) the a r b i t r a t i o n agreements
1 
s p e c i f i c a l l y 
s t a t e 
t h a t 
d i s p u t e s between 
the 
p a r t i e s 
would 
be 
s u b m i t t e d 
t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
"as 
p r o v i d e d by 
Alabama 
law" 
and, 
R o b e r t s o n 
a r g u e s , p r e d i s p u t e a r b i t r a t i o n agreements are not e n f o r c e a b l e 
under Alabama — 
as opposed 
t o f e d e r a l — 
law; and 2) 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements a r e t o o vague inasmuch as t h e y do not 
p r o v i d e d e t a i l s r e g a r d i n g the s e l e c t i o n of an a r b i t r a t o r 
and 
the 
a p p l i c a b l e 
r u l e s 
o f 
a r b i t r a t i o n . 
Mount R o y a l Towers 
t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d a r e p l y r e s p o n d i n g t o R o b e r t s o n ' s 
arguments, 
and a h e a r i n g on the i s s u e o f a r b i t r a b i l i t y was h e l d on 
May 
17, 2012. 
On October 26, 2012, 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t e n t e r e d an 
o r d e r g r a n t i n g Mount R o y a l Towers' motion t o s t a y the a c t i o n 
and c o m p e l l i n g R o b e r t s o n t o submit h i s c l a i m s t o a r b i t r a t i o n . 
R o b e r t s o n ' s subsequent motion t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e t h a t 
o r d e r was d e n i e d by the t r i a l c o u r t , and on December 7, 
2012, 
R o b e r t s o n 
f i l e d h i s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t . 
^The 
p a r t i e s d i s p u t e whether 
any or a l l of R o b e r t s o n ' s 
c l a i m s 
s h o u l d 
p r o p e r l y 
be 
c o n s i d e r e d m e d i c a l - m a l p r a c t i c e 
c l a i m s and, 
a c c o r d i n g l y , which 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement 
would 
govern t h o s e c l a i m s . 
However, because the language 
r e l e v a n t 
t o 
t h i s 
a p p e a l 
i s the 
same 
i n b o t h 
agreements, 
i t i s 
u n n e c e s s a r y f o r us t o d e c i d e t h a t 
i s s u e . 
4 
1120291 
I I . 
The 
s t a n d a r d 
by 
w h i c h we 
r e v i e w 
an 
o r d e r 
g r a n t i n g 
a 
m o t i o n t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n i s w e l l 
s e t t l e d : 
"We 
conduct a de novo r e v i e w of a t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s 
o r d e r c o m p e l l i n g 
a r b i t r a t i o n . 
Smith v. Mark Dodge,  
I n c . , 934 
So. 2d 375, 
378 
( A l a . 2006). 
"'The 
p a r t y s e e k i n g 
t o compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
must 
f i r s t 
p r o v e 
b o t h 
t h a t 
a 
c o n t r a c t 
c a l l i n g f o r a r b i t r a t i o n e x i s t s and t h a t the 
c o n t r a c t e v i d e n c e s a t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g 
i n t e r s t a t e commerce 
Once t h i s showing 
has been made, the burden then s h i f t s 
t o 
the nonmovant t o show t h a t the c o n t r a c t i s 
e i t h e r 
i n v a l i d 
or 
i n a p p l i c a b l e 
t o 
the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
p r e s e n t e d . ' 
"Smith, 934 
So. 2d a t 
378." 
R i t t e r v. Grady Auto. Group, I n c . , 973 
So. 
2d 1058, 
1060-61 
( A l a . 
2007). 
There 
i s no 
d i s p u t e 
i n 
t h i s 
case 
t h a t 
"a 
c o n t r a c t c a l l i n g f o r a r b i t r a t i o n e x i s t s and t h a t the 
c o n t r a c t 
e v i d e n c e s a t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g i n t e r s t a t e commerce." 
I d . 
The 
o n l y i s s u e b e f o r e 
us i s , a c c o r d i n g l y , whether R o b e r t s o n 
has met h i s burden of showing t h a t the a r b i t r a t i o n agreements 
he e x e c u t e d are " i n a p p l i c a b l e t o the c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
p r e s e n t e d . " 
I d . 
5 
1120291 
I I I . 
R o b e r t s o n 
f i r s t 
argues 
t h a t 
the 
language 
i n 
t h e 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements p r o v i d i n g t h a t any d i s p u t e s between him 
and 
Mount 
R o y a l Towers 
be 
s u b m i t t e d 
t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
"as 
p r o v i d e d by Alabama law" i s tantamount 
t o a 
c h o i c e - o f - l a w 
p r o v i s i o n d e c l a r i n g t h a t Alabama law, not f e d e r a l law, governs 
the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
and 
a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements. 
And, R o b e r t s o n c o n t i n u e s , because § 8-1-41(3), 
A l a . Code 1975, 
p r o v i d e s 
t h a t " [ a ] n agreement t o submit a 
c o n t r o v e r s y t o a r b i t r a t i o n " cannot be s p e c i f i c a l l y 
e n f o r c e d , 
i t was e r r o r f o r the t r i a l c o u r t t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n o f h i s 
c l a i m s . 
We 
d i s a g r e e . 
We 
f i r s t note t h a t t h i s C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t 
s i m i l a r 
c h o i c e - o f - l a w 
c l a u s e s 
a p p l y i n g t o a c o n t r a c t as a 
whole -- as opposed t o an a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n c o n t a i n i n g 
i t s 
own c h o i c e - o f - l a w c l a u s e — 
do not have the e f f e c t R o b e r t s o n 
u r g e s . 
For example, i n J i m W a l t e r Homes, I n c . v. Saxton, 880 
So. 2d 428, 433 ( A l a . 2003), we s t a t e d : 
"Saxton's 
... 
f i n a l 
argument 
i s 
t h a t 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement 
i s 
n e g a t e d 
by 
the 
c h o i c e - o f - l a w 
p r o v i s i o n 
i n 
the 
c o n t r a c t , 
which 
s t a t e s the c o n t r a c t i s t o be governed by the laws of 
the S t a t e of Alabama. 
Saxton argues t h a t 
because 
under 
§ 8-1-41(3), A l a . Code 1975, 
agreements 
t o 
6 
1120291 
submit f u t u r e c o n t r o v e r s i e s t o a r b i t r a t i o n 
cannot be 
s p e c i f i c a l l y 
e n f o r c e d , 
t h e 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement 
cannot 
be 
e n f o r c e d . 
However, 
i n 
A l l i e d - B r u c e  
T e r m i n i x [Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 
(1995)], 
the Supreme C o u r t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s h e l d t h a t t h e 
F e d e r a l A r b i t r a t i o n A c t preempts § 8-1-41(3) of t h e 
Alabama Code i n a c o n t r a c t , 
l i k e 
t h i s one, 
t h a t 
i n v o l v e s i n t e r s t a t e commerce." 
See a l s o Homes of Legend, I n c . v. M c C o l l o u g h , 776 So. 2d 741, 
747 n. 9 ( A l a . 
2000) ("Moreover, even i f t h e 
c h o i c e - o f - l a w 
c l a u s e were i n t e r p r e t e d as i n c l u d i n g Alabama s u b s t a n t i v e law, 
namely, A l a . 
Code 1975, § 8-1-41(3), and, t h e r e b y , t o c o n f l i c t 
w i t h 
t h e 
a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n , 
t h a t 
s t a t u t e 
would 
be 
preempted because i t c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e [ F e d e r a l A r b i t r a t i o n 
A c t ] . " ) . 
R o b e r t s o n , 
however, 
argues 
t h a t 
a 
s e p a r a t e 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement s p e c i f i c a l l y i n c o r p o r a t i n g Alabama law 
i s " c o m p l e t e l y 
d i f f e r e n t from an o r d i n a r y c h o i c e - o f - l a w 
c l a u s e 
t h a t appears i n t h e main body of a c o n t r a c t 
" 
R o b e r t s o n ' s 
b r i e f , p. 13. A l t h o u g h we do not agree t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s 
so v a s t or so m e a n i n g f u l , we g r a n t i t f u r t h e r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
because we have not s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e 
b e f o r e . 
The b a s i c p r e m i s e of R o b e r t s o n ' s argument — 
t h a t p a r t i e s 
t h a t have e n t e r e d 
i n t o an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement may 
e l e c t 
w i t h i n t h a t agreement t o p r o c e e d i n a r b i t r a t i o n s u b j e c t t o t h e 
law o f a d e s i g n a t e d 
s t a t e as opposed t o f e d e r a l law as s e t 
7 
1120291 
f o r t h i n 
t h e F e d e r a l A r b i t r a t i o n A c t ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 
e t 
seq. — 
i s g e n e r a l l y c o r r e c t . 
The U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f 
A p p e a l s f o r t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t e x p l a i n e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n F o r d  
v. NYLCare H e a l t h P l a n s o f G u l f C o a s t , I n c . , 
141 F.3d 243, 
247-49 (5th C i r . 1998): 
"We 
w i l l 
c o n s i d e r 
as a 
t h r e s h o l d 
m a t t e r , 
t h e r e f o r e , whether p a r t i e s may d e s i g n a t e 
s t a t e law 
to govern t h e scope o f an a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e i n 
an 
agreement o t h e r w i s e 
c o v e r e d by t h e FAA. 
C l e a r l y , 
t h e y can. 
The f e d e r a l p o l i c y u n d e r l y i n g t h e 
FAA ' i s 
s i m p l y t o ensure t h e e n f o r c e a b i l i t y , 
a c c o r d i n g t o  
t h e i r terms, o f p r i v a t e agreements t o a r b i t r a t e . ' 
V o l t I n f o r m a t i o n S c i e n c e s I n c . v. Board o f T r u s t e e s  
of L e l a n d S t a n f o r d J u n i o r U n i v . , 489 U.S. 468, 
476, 
109 
S.Ct. 1248, 1254, 103 L.Ed.2d 
488 
(1989) 
(emphasis added). 
Indeed, t h e FAA was s p e c i f i c a l l y 
d e s i g n e d t o p l a c e a r b i t r a t i o n agreements '"upon t h e 
same 
f o o t i n g as 
o t h e r 
c o n t r a c t s . " ' 
Scherk v.  
A l b e r t o - C u l v e r Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11, 94 
S.Ct. 
2449, 2453, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974) ( q u o t i n g H.R.Rep. 
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1 s t Sess., 1, 2 (1924)). 
And, 
'as w i t h any o t h e r c o n t r a c t , t h e 
p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t i o n s 
c o n t r o l ' 
t h e 
u l t i m a t e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f 
an 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
c l a u s e . 
M i t s u b i s h i [Motors 
Corp. v.  
S o l e r C h r y s l e r - P l y m o u t h , 
I n c . ] , 473 U.S. [614,] 626, 
105 S.Ct. [3346,] 3354 [ ( 1 9 8 5 ) ] . F o r ' [ a ] r b i t r a t i o n 
under 
t h e [FAA] i s a 
m a t t e r 
o f 
consent, 
n o t 
c o e r c i o n , 
and 
p a r t i e s 
a r e 
g e n e r a l l y 
f r e e 
t o 
s t r u c t u r e t h e i r a r b i t r a t i o n agreements as t h e y see 
f i t . ' 
V o l t , 489 U.S. a t 479, 109 S.Ct. 
a t 1256; 
see 
 
a l s o Drake B a k e r i e s , I n c . v. L o c a l 50, Am. B a k e r y &  
C o n f e c t i o n e r y Workers I n t ' l , AFL-CIO, 370 U.S. 254, 
256, 82 S.Ct. 
1346, 
1348, 
8 L.Ed.2d 474 (1962) ('the 
i s s u e o f a r b i t r a b i l i t y i s 
a q u e s t i o n f o r 
t h e c o u r t s 
and i s 
t o 
be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d 
i n t o 
by t h e p a r t i e s ' ); B a r a v a t i v. J o s e p h t h a l , Lyon &  
Ross, 
I n c . , 28 F.3d 704, 709 
( 7 t h C i r . 
1994) 
8 
1120291 
(Posner, 
C.J.) 
('short 
of 
a u t h o r i z i n g 
t r i a l 
by 
b a t t l e or o r d e a l o r , more d o u b t f u l l y , by a p a n e l of 
t h r e e monkeys, 
... 
p a r t i e s 
are 
as 
f r e e 
t o 
s p e c i f y 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c terms of 
a r b i t r a t i o n as t h e y are 
t o 
s p e c i f y any o t h e r terms i n t h e i r c o n t r a c t ' ) . 
" A p p l y i n g t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , the Supreme C o u r t 
has 
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t 
p a r t i e s may 
use 
c h o i c e - o f - l a w 
p r o v i s i o n s 
t o d e s i g n a t e 
s t a t e 
law 
t o p r o v i d e 
the 
p r o c e d u r a l 
r u l e s under w h i c h 
a r b i t r a t i o n w i l l 
be 
conducted. 
See V o l t , 489 
U.S. 
a t 476, 
109 
S.Ct. 
a t 
1254. 
In V o l t , 
the 
p a r t i e s 
had 
e n t e r e d 
i n t o 
an 
agreement 
w i t h 
a 
g e n e r a l 
c h o i c e - o f - l a w 
c l a u s e 
p r o v i d i n g 
t h a t the agreement be governed by the 
law 
of the p l a c e where the s u b j e c t 
of the agreement 
was 
l o c a t e d , w h i c h i n t h a t case was 
C a l i f o r n i a . See i d . 
a t 470, 
109 
S.Ct. 
a t 1251. 
The 
i s s u e was whether a 
p r o c e d u r a l r u l e i n the 
C a l i f o r n i a A r b i t r a t i o n A c t , 
not 
a v a i l a b l e under the 
FAA, 
s h o u l d be 
i n t e r p r e t e d 
t o a p p l y t o the 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement. 
The 
C o u r t 
h e l d t h a t i t s h o u l d , s t a t i n g : 
" ' J u s t 
as 
[the 
p a r t i e s ] 
may 
l i m i t 
by 
c o n t r a c t 
the 
i s s u e s 
which 
t h e y 
w i l l 
a r b i t r a t e , 
... 
so too may 
t h e y s p e c i f y 
the 
r u l e s under w h i c h t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n w i l l 
be 
conducted. 
Where, as 
h e r e , 
the 
p a r t i e s 
have a g r e e d 
t o 
a b i d e 
by 
s t a t e 
r u l e s 
of 
a r b i t r a t i o n , 
e n f o r c i n g 
t h o s e 
r u l e s 
a c c o r d i n g t o the terms of the agreement i s 
f u l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the g o a l s of the 
FAA, 
even i f the 
r e s u l t i s t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n i s 
s t a y e d where 
the 
[FAA] 
would 
o t h e r w i s e 
p e r m i t i t t o go 
f o r w a r d . ' 
" I d . a t 479, 
109 
S.Ct. 
a t 1256. 
As the above-quoted 
passage d e m o n s t r a t e s , the C o u r t e x p r e s s l y 
a n a l o g i z e d 
the 
p a r t i e s ' 
freedom 
t o 
l i m i t 
c o n t r a c t u a l l y 
the 
scope of the 
a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e 
w i t h 
t h e i r freedom 
t o s e l e c t the r u l e s under which a r b i t r a t i o n w i l l 
be 
conducted. 
I t f o l l o w s , t h e n , t h a t 
i f the 
p a r t i e s 
may 
s e l e c t the r u l e s of a r b i t r a t i o n t h r o u g h the 
use 
9 
1120291 
of c h o i c e - o f - l a w p r o v i s i o n s , 
so too may 
t h e y 
s p e c i f y 
the 
law g o v e r n i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the scope of 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
c l a u s e . 
Indeed, 
we 
t h i n k 
t h a t 
t o 
d i s r e g a r d the p a r t i e s ' c h o i c e of law 
i n t h i s r e s p e c t 
'would 
be 
q u i t e 
i n i m i c a l 
t o 
the 
FAA's 
p r i m a r y 
purpose 
of 
e n s u r i n g 
t h a t 
p r i v a t e 
agreements 
t o 
a r b i t r a t e 
are 
e n f o r c e d a c c o r d i n g 
t o 
t h e i r 
terms.' 
I d . 
" C o n s e q u e n t l y , the i s s u e we must address here i s 
whether the p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d s t a t e 
law 
t o govern 
the 
scope 
of 
t h e i r 
agreement 
t o 
a r b i t r a t e . 
I f 
the 
agreement between 
[the 
p a r t i e s ] 
demonstrates 
t h e i r 
i n t e n t 
t o have the 
scope of 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
c l a u s e 
d e t e r m i n e d 
by 
Texas 
law, 
we 
must 
r e s p e c t 
t h a t 
c h o i c e . 
Only by 
r i g o r o u s l y 
e n f o r c i n g 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements a c c o r d i n g 
t o 
t h e i r 
terms, 
do 
we 
' g i v e 
e f f e c t t o the c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t s and e x p e c t a t i o n s 
of 
the 
p a r t i e s , w i t h o u t d o i n g v i o l e n c e t o the 
p o l i c i e s 
b e h i n d the 
FAA.' 
V o l t , 
489 
U.S. 
a t 
479, 
109 
S.Ct. 
a t 1256." 
(Footnote o m i t t e d . ) 
As 
F o r d 
a r t i c u l a t e s , 
the 
fundamental 
r e a s o n i n g b e h i n d t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n agreements 
are 
e s s e n t i a l l y 
j u s t a s p e c i e s of c o n t r a c t and 
"'as 
w i t h 
any 
o t h e r c o n t r a c t , the 
p a r t i e s ' 
i n t e n t i o n s 
c o n t r o l . ' " 
141 
F.3d 
a t 
247 
( q u o t i n g M i t s u b i s h i 
Motors Corp. v. 
S o l e r 
C h r y s l e r - 
Plymouth, I n c . , 
473 
U.S. 
614, 
626 
(1985)). 
The Supreme C o u r t 
of the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e i t e r a t e d 
t h i s concept i n 
S t o l t - N i e l s e n 
 
S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Corp., 559 
U.S. 
662, 
, 
130 
S.Ct. 
1758, 
1774-75 (2010), when i t c a u t i o n e d c o u r t s 
and 
a r b i t r a t o r s 
i n t e r p r e t i n g 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
c l a u s e s 
not 
t o 
" l o s e 
10 
1120291 
s i g h t of the purpose of the e x e r c i s e : 
t o g i v e e f f e c t t o the 
i n t e n t of the 
p a r t i e s . " 
W i t h t h a t g o a l i n mind, i t i s e v i d e n t 
t h a t R o b e r t s o n ' s 
argument must 
f a i l . 
When i n t e r p r e t i n g 
a c o n t r a c t , a 
" c o u r t 
has a d u t y t o a c c e p t the c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t w i l l u p h o l d , r a t h e r 
than 
d e s t r o y , 
the 
c o n t r a c t 
and 
t h a t 
w i l l 
g i v e 
e f f e c t 
and 
meaning t o a l l of i t s terms." 
Homes of Legend, 776 So. 2d a t 
746. 
Were we t o a c c e p t R o b e r t s o n ' s argument t h a t he and Mount 
R o y a l 
Towers, 
i n 
a g r e e i n g 
t o 
submit 
any 
d i s p u t e s 
t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
"as 
p r o v i d e d 
by Alabama law," 
i n t e n d e d 
t o 
g i v e 
e f f e c t t o § 8-1-41(3), we would e f f e c t i v e l y be h o l d i n g t h a t , 
a t the time t h e y e x e c u t e d the 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements, 
t h e y 
k n o w i n g l y 
i n t e n d e d 
f o r t h o s e agreements t o have no 
e f f e c t 
w h a t s o e v e r .
2 
That i s u n l i k e l y ; 
i t i s f a r more l i k e l y 
t h a t 
2As 
A l a n S c o t t Rau 
s t a t e d i n Does S t a t e A r b i t r a t i o n 
Law 
 
M a t t e r 
A t 
A l l ? 
P a r t I : 
F e d e r a l P r e e m p t i o n , ADR 
C u r r e n t s , 
June 1998, 
a t 19-20: 
"Are we t o suppose t h a t the p a r t i e s t o t h i s c o n t r a c t 
a g r e e d 
t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n , 
w h i l e 
a t 
the 
same 
time 
i n t e n d i n g t o adopt a body of s t a t e law t h a t would i n 
a l l p o s s i b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
make t h e i r agreement t o 
a r b i t r a t e i n v a l i d ? 
One who b e l i e v e s t h a t i s c a p a b l e 
of b e l i e v i n g 
a n y t h i n g . " 
(Quoted i n C h r i s t o p h e r 
R. 
D r a h o z a l , 
F e d e r a l A r b i t r a t i o n 
A c t 
 
P r e e m p t i o n , 79 Ind. L . J . 393, 
413 n. 153 
( S p r i n g 2004).) 
11 
1120291 
R o b e r t s o n and Mount R o y a l Towers i n t e n d e d f o r t h e a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements t o 
be e n f o r c e d i n 
a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Alabama 
law because, a t t h a t t i m e , " t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f [§ 8-1-41(3)] 
had been r e l e g a t e d t o t h e r a r e case o f a p u r e l y 
i n t r a s t a t e 
t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t c o u l d n o t be s a i d t o ' i n v o l v e commerce' i n 
any way." 
Birmingham News v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 44 ( A l a . 
2004), 
o v e r r u l e d on o t h e r 
grounds, H o r t o n Homes, I n c . v. 
 
Shaner, 999 So. 2d 462 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) .
3 
3Our h o l d i n g i n t h i s 
r e g a r d 
e f f e c t i v e l y 
a d d r e s s e s t h e 
i s s u e p r e s e n t — 
b u t n o t r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s — 
i n 
J.L. 
 
Loper C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. v. F i n d o u t P a r t n e r s h i p , LLP, 
55 So. 3d 
1152, 
1153 ( A l a . 
2010), where t h e p a r t i e s had a g r e e d t o 
a r b i t r a t e 
any d i s p u t e s 
" i n a c c o r d a n c e 
w i t h 
t h e Alabama 
A r b i t r a t i o n A c t . " 
We s t a t e d t h e n : 
" P r e d i s p u t e 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements under t h e 
Alabama A r b i t r a t i o n A c t , §§ 6-6-1 t h r u -16, A l a . 
Code 1975, c o n t r a v e n e 
Alabama law and a r e not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y 
e n f o r c e a b l e . 
See § 8-1-41(3), A l a . 
Code 1975, w h i c h 
p r o v i d e s 
t h a t an agreement t o 
submit 
a 
c o n t r o v e r s y 
t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
cannot 
be 
s p e c i f i c a l l y e n f o r c e d . 
See a l s o A l a f a b c o , I n c . 
v. 
 
C i t i z e n s Bank, 872 So. 2d 798 ( A l a . 2002), 
r e v e r s e d 
on o t h e r grounds by C i t i z e n s Bank v. A l a f a b c o , 
I n c . , 
539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 
(2003). 
The 
i s s u e 
o f 
e n f o r c e a b i l i t y 
o f t h e 
p r e d i s p u t e 
a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n a g r e e d upon by t h e p a r t i e s 
i n 
A r t i c l e 
9 o f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
c o n t r a c t was n o t 
p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t , nor was i t 
a r g u e d i n 
b r i e f s t o t h i s 
C o u r t . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , we 
w i l l not 
a d d r e s s t h a t i s s u e on a p p e a l . " 
I d . a t 1153 n. 1. 
12 
1120291 
A c c o r d i n g l y , 
we 
r e j e c t 
R o b e r t s o n ' s argument 
t h a t 
the 
language 
i n the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements 
p r o v i d i n g 
t h a t 
any 
d i s p u t e between him and Mount R o y a l Towers be s u b m i t t e d t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n "as p r o v i d e d by Alabama law" r e i n c a r n a t e s § 8-1-
41(3) and thus r e n d e r s the a r b i t r a t i o n agreements m e a n i n g l e s s . 
R a t h e r , we agree w i t h the r a t i o n a l e e x p r e s s e d by the Supreme 
C o u r t of Texas 
i n In re Olshan F o u n d a t i o n R e p a i r Co., 
328 
S.W.3d 883, 890-91 (Tex. 2010), t h a t g e n e r i c language i n an 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d f o r 
t h e i r a r b i t r a t i o n t o be governed by "the laws of the s t a t e " or 
"Texas law" would not preempt the FAA because 
" [ t ] h e FAA i s 
p a r t of the a r b i t r a t i o n laws of Texas and can be a p p l i e d t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n a d m i n i s t e r e d 
p u r s u a n t t o the laws of Texas." 
T h i s 
r a t i o n a l e i s t r u e even more so i n Alabama, where, as a 
r e s u l t 
of 
§ 8-1-43(3), 
we 
have 
l a r g e l y 
"not d e v e l o p e d 
r u l e s 
of 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
f o r 
d e a l i n g 
w i t h 
p r e - d i s p u t e 
agreements 
independent from the law t h a t has d e v e l o p e d i n cases i n which 
the 
[FAA] a p p l i e d . " 
A l l i e d - B r u c e T e r m i n i x Cos. v. Dobson, 684 
So. 2d 102, 106 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) .
4 
I n sum, the FAA i s p a r t of the 
4 I n 
c o n t r a s t , 
Texas 
has 
adopted 
t h e 
Texas 
G e n e r a l 
A r b i t r a t i o n A c t ("TAA"), Tex C i v . P r a c . & Rem. Code, § 171.001 
e t 
seq., which c o n t a i n s p r o v i s i o n s 
a p p l y i n g t o p r e - d i s p u t e 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements, 
and I n r e Olshan F o u n d a t i o n R e p a i r , 
13 
1120291 
a r b i t r a t i o n laws o f Alabama and can 
be a p p l i e d t o a r b i t r a t i o n 
a d m i n i s t e r e d "as p r o v i d e d by Alabama 
l a w . " 
IV. 
R o b e r t s o n n e x t argues t h a t t h e a r b i t r a t i o n agreements 
a r e 
too vague t o 
be e n f o r c e d because t h e y make o n l y a g e n e r a l 
c a l l 
f o r a r b i t r a t i o n w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g any d e t a i l s r e g a r d i n g t h e 
s e l e c t i o n o f an a r b i t r a t o r o r a r b i t r a t o r s o r t h e a p p l i c a b l e 
r u l e s 
o f 
a r b i t r a t i o n . 
As 
e x p l a i n e d 
s u p r a , 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements a r e t o 
be t r e a t e d l i k e any o t h e r c o n t r a c t s and, 
as 
R o b e r t s o n argues, 
" i f a c o u r t cannot d i s c e r n t h e i n t e n t i o n s 
o f 
the p a r t i e s t o 
a c o n t r a c t because t h e c o n t r a c t i s 
so vague and 
i n d e f i n i t e , 
t h e 
c o n t r a c t 
i s 
v o i d 
on 
t h e 
ground 
o f 
u n c e r t a i n t y . " Drummond Co. v. W a l t e r Indus., I n c . , 962 So. 
2d 
753, 774 ( A l a . 2006). 
See a l s o Capmark Bank v. RGR, LLC, 81 
So. 3d 1258, 
1268 ( A l a . 2011) ( h o l d i n g e n f o r c e a b l e a c o n t r a c t 
t h a t 
f a i l e d 
t o e x p r e s s 
a l l 
t h e terms 
e s s e n t i a l 
t o t h e 
t r a n s a c t i o n ) . 
328 S.W.3d a t 891, a f f i r m e d t h e r i g h t o f p a r t i e s t o e l e c t t o 
a r b i t r a t e p u r s u a n t t o t h e TAA t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e FAA. 
However, t h e Alabama A r b i t r a t i o n A c t , § 6-6-1 e t seq., 
A l a . 
Code 1975, g e n e r a l l y a p p l i e s o n l y t o p o s t - d i s p u t e 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements. 
See, e.g., § 6-6-3 ("The p a r t i e s must c o n c i s e l y 
s t a t e i n w r i t i n g , 
s i g n e d by them, t h e m a t t e r 
i n d i s p u t e 
between them and t h a t t h e y d e s i r e t o l e a v e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t h e r e o f t o c e r t a i n p e r s o n s , naming them as a r b i t r a t o r s 
" ) . 
14 
1120291 
However, 
a l t h o u g h 
R o b e r t s o n 
i s 
c o r r e c t 
t h a t 
t h e 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements do n o t s e t f o r t h a l l t h e p r o c e d u r a l 
d e t a i l s 
o f any 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
t h a t 
might 
r e s u l t 
from t h e 
agreements, t h e y do c l e a r l y 
e v i n c e t h e p a r t i e s ' 
i n t e n t t o 
submit f u t u r e d i s p u t e s t o a r b i t r a t i o n ; t h a t much i s c l e a r . I n 
l i g h t o f t h a t f a c t , we t h i n k i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o l o o k t o t h e 
FAA 
t o 
f i l l i n t h e gaps i n t h e a r b i t r a t i o n agreements so as t o 
g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s as e x p r e s s e d by 
those agreements. 
S e c t i o n 5 o f t h e FAA, i n f a c t , 
p r o v i d e s : 
" I f i n t h e agreement p r o v i s i o n be made f o r 
a 
method o f naming o r a p p o i n t i n g an a r b i t r a t o r o r 
a r b i t r a t o r s 
o r an umpire, 
such method 
s h a l l 
be 
f o l l o w e d ; b u t i f 
no method be p r o v i d e d t h e r e i n , o r  
i f a method be p r o v i d e d and any p a r t y t h e r e t o 
s h a l l  
f a i l t o a v a i l h i m s e l f o f such method, o r i f 
f o r 
any 
 
o t h e r r e a s o n t h e r e s h a l l be a l a p s e i n 
t h e naming o f  
an 
a r b i t r a t o r 
o r 
a r b i t r a t o r s 
o r umpire, 
o r i n  
f i l l i n g 
a vacancy, 
then upon t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f  
e i t h e r 
p a r t y t o t h e c o n t r o v e r s y 
t h e c o u r t 
s h a l l 
 
d e s i g n a t e and a p p o i n t an a r b i t r a t o r o r a r b i t r a t o r s  
or umpire, as t h e case may r e q u i r e , who s h a l l a c t 
under t h e s a i d agreement w i t h t h e same f o r c e and 
e f f e c t as i f he o r t h e y had been s p e c i f i c a l l y named 
t h e r e i n ; 
and 
u n l e s s 
o t h e r w i s e 
p r o v i d e d 
i n t h e 
agreement t h e a r b i t r a t i o n 
s h a l l be by a s i n g l e 
a r b i t r a t o r . " 
(Emphasis added.) 
T h i s C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y condoned t h e 
use 
of § 5 f o r s e l e c t i n g an a r b i t r a t o r i n H a r o l d A l l e n ' s 
M o b i l e  
Home F a c t o r y 
O u t l e t , I n c . v. B u t l e r , 825 So. 2d 779 
( A l a . 
15 
1120291 
2002), summarized as f o l l o w s i n BankAmerica Housing 
S e r v i c e s 
v. Lee, 
833 
So. 2d 609, 
619 
( A l a . 2002): 
" I n 
B u t l e r , 
the 
p l a i n t i f f 
s i g n e d 
an 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement t h a t 
a c c o r d e d 
the 
d e f e n d a n t 
s e l l e r 
the 
s o l e 
r i g h t 
t o 
choose 
the 
a r b i t r a t o r , 
the 
o n l y 
l i m i t a t i o n on t h a t r i g h t b e i n g 
t h a t 
'no 
a r b i t r a t o r 
may 
be 
s e l e c t e d 
by 
the 
SELLER 
who 
s h a l l 
have 
p r o v i d e d l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e r v i c e s t o or f o r the 
SELLER a t any t i m e . ' 
825 So. 2d a t 781. 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
h e l d 
t h a t 
t h i s 
c l a u s e , 
which 
gave 
the 
d e f e n d a n t a l o n e the r i g h t t o s e l e c t the 
a r b i t r a t o r , 
w i t h no 
i n p u t from the b u y e r , was 
u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . 
Based 
on 
§ 
5 
of 
the 
F e d e r a l 
A r b i t r a t i o n 
A c t 
( h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o as 
'the FAA'), the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t a p p o i n t e d 
an a r b i t r a t o r f o r the p a r t i e s . 
In 
t h i s C o u r t ' s r e v i e w of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s a c t i o n s , we 
c o n c l u d e d t h a t the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t a c t e d p r o p e r l y when 
i t 
l o o k e d 
t o 
§ 
5 
of 
the 
FAA 
f o r 
g u i d a n c e 
i n 
f a s h i o n i n g a remedy. 
... 
" ' 
' 
"The 
t r i a l c o u r t s e l e c t e d an a r b i t r a t o r on 
the 
b a s i s 
t h a t 
the 
s e l e c t i o n method p r o v i d e d 
by 
the 
agreement was 
i n v a l i d and t h a t § 5 p r o v i d e d t h a t i t 
was 
the c o u r t ' s d u t y t o s e l e c t an a r b i t r a t o r i n the 
absence 
of 
v a l i d 
d i r e c t i o n 
i n 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement. 
Because the p o r t i o n of the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement p r o v i d i n g f o r the s e l e c t i o n of a r b i t r a t o r s 
was 
found 
t o 
be 
u n c o n s c i o n a b l e 
and 
t h e r e f o r e 
i n v a l i d , 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement 
no 
l o n g e r 
p r o v i d e d 
f o r the 
s e l e c t i o n of 
a r b i t r a t o r s . 
Under 
t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
t h i s C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
had 
a c t e d 
p r o p e r l y under 
the 
FAA 
by 
s e l e c t i n g an a r b i t r a t o r f o r the p a r t i e s . " 
The 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements e x e c u t e d by 
the p a r t i e s i n 
t h i s 
case 
c o n t a i n 
no 
p r o v i s i o n 
f o r 
s e l e c t i n g 
an 
a r b i t r a t o r . 
16 
1120291 
A c c o r d i n g l y , 
we 
r e a f f i r m the 
p r i n c i p l e s e t 
f o r t h i n B u t l e r 
t h a t i t i s p r o p e r f o r the 
t r i a l c o u r t t o a p p l y § 5 of the 
FAA 
t o 
a p p o i n t 
an 
a r b i t r a t o r when p a r t i e s 
t o 
a 
d i s p u t e 
have 
e n t e r e d 
i n t o an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement t h a t c o n t a i n s no 
v a l i d 
p r o v i s i o n f o r a p p o i n t i n g 
an a r b i t r a t o r . 
C i t i n g cases such as R i v e r a v. American G e n e r a l F i n a n c i a l  
S e r v i c e s , I n c . , 150 N.M. 
398, 
259 
P.3d 
803 
(2011), R o b e r t s o n 
argues t h a t 
a p p o i n t i n g 
an 
a r b i t r a t o r n e i t h e r 
he 
nor 
Mount 
R o y a l Towers a g r e e d t o i s an i m p e r m i s s i b l e 
e x p a n s i o n of 
t h e i r 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements. 
We d i s a g r e e . 
In R i v e r a , the Supreme 
C o u r t of New 
Mexico d e c l i n e d t o a p p o i n t an 
a r b i t r a t o r i n a 
case where t h e 
d e s i g n a t e d 
a r b i t r a l 
forum was 
u n a v a i l a b l e , 
h o l d i n g 
t h a t 
"the 
[ d e s i g n a t e d 
forum] 
was 
i n t e g r a l t o 
the 
agreement t o a r b i t r a t e and 
... 
§ 5 of the FAA does not 
a l l o w 
a c o u r t 
t o s e l e c t and 
impose on 
the 
c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s 
a 
s u b s t i t u t e 
a r b i t r a t o r i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
the terms of 
t h e i r 
c o n t r a c t . " 
150 N.M. 
a t 
, 259 
P.3d 
a t 815. 
However, 
t h i s 
C o u r t has a l s o spoken on t h i s t o p i c , and, 
i n Ex p a r t e Warren, 
718 
So. 
2d 45, 
49 
( A l a . 1998), we h e l d t h a t i t was p r o p e r t o 
f o l l o w the p r o c e d u r e s e t f o r t h i n § 5 of the FAA 
t o a p p o i n t a 
r e p l a c e m e n t a r b i t r a t o r i f the 
a r b i t r a t o r d e s i g n a t e d 
i n 
the 
17 
1120291 
agreement was u n a v a i l a b l e and t h e r e was "no e v i d e n c e t h a t [the 
p a r t i e s ] 
i n t e n d e d 
t h e i r 
c h o i c e 
of 
an 
a r b i t r a t o r 
t o be 
an 
e s s e n t i a l 
term of the c o n t r a c t . " 
In the 
i n s t a n t 
case, 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreements e x e c u t e d by R o b e r t s o n and Mount R o y a l 
Towers c o n t a i n e d no p r o v i s i o n s f o r s e l e c t i n g an a r b i t r a t o r 
or 
s p e c i f y i n g 
the p r o c e d u r e s t o be f o l l o w e d i n a r b i t r a t i o n . 
We 
may assume, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e s e m a t t e r s were not an 
i n t e g r a l 
and 
e s s e n t i a l 
p a r t 
of 
t h e i r 
agreements. 
T h i s 
case 
i s 
a c c o r d i n g l y more a k i n t o Ex p a r t e Warren than R i v e r a because, 
as i n Ex p a r t e Warren, we have " o n l y the i n f e r e n c e t h a t 
the 
p a r t i e s 
a g r e e d 
i n 
g e n e r a l 
t o 
submit 
t h e i r 
c l a i m s 
t o 
a r b i t r a t i o n . " 
718 So. 2d a t 49. 
That i n t e n t of the 
p a r t i e s 
i s paramount and can be g i v e n e f f e c t by a p p l y i n g § 5 of 
the 
FAA. 
R o b e r t s o n ' s argument t h a t the a r b i t r a t i o n agreements are 
too vague t o be e n f o r c e d i s w i t h o u t 
m e r i t . 
V. 
R o b e r t s o n a p p e a l e d the o r d e r of the 
t r i a l c o u r t h o l d i n g 
t h a t h i s c l a i m s a g a i n s t Mount R o y a l Towers are s u b j e c t t o an 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement and 
c o m p e l l i n g R o b e r t s o n t o 
a r b i t r a t e 
those 
c l a i m s . 
R o b e r t s o n 
argues 
t h a t 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements he e x e c u t e d w i t h Mount R o y a l Towers are not 
v a l i d 
18 
1120291 
under Alabama law and, i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , 
t h a t , i f t h e y a r e 
v a l i d , 
t h e y 
a r e t o o vague t o be 
e n f o r c e d . 
However, 
as 
e x p l a i n e d s u p r a , t h e a r b i t r a t i o n agreements a r e v a l i d under 
Alabama law, and t h e t r i a l c o u r t may p r o p e r l y f i l l i n "gaps" 
i n 
t h o s e 
agreements as 
n e c e s s a r y 
t o g i v e 
e f f e c t 
t o t h e 
p a r t i e s ' agreement t o a r b i t r a t e . 
For t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e o r d e r 
of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s hereby a f f i r m e d . 
AFFIRMED. 
B o l i n , P a r k e r , Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and B r y a n , 
J J . , 
c o n c u r . 
Moore, C.J., d i s s e n t s . 
19