Title: Gray v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOHN J. GRAY,
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No. 55, 2006
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware in and
v.
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Sussex County in Cr. ID No.
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0411015528.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: May 11, 2006
Decided:
July 12, 2006
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 12  day of July 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief
th
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c) and his defense counsel’s motion to
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
On June 22, 2005, the appellant, John J. Gray, pleaded nolo
contendere to Attempted Assault in the First Degree and a related weapon
offense.  As part of the same agreement, Gray pleaded guilty to Assault in the
Second Degree and Endangering the Welfare of a Child.
(2)
After a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced
Gray to a total of twelve years at Level V, including six years mandatory
See Moore v. State, 887 A.2d 466 (Del. 2005) (vacating sentence that was imposed
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in part upon uncorroborated information not disclosed to the defendant).
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin,
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486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
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incarceration, followed by probation.  On November 10, 2005, Gray, through
his defense counsel (hereinafter “Counsel”), filed a motion for modification of
sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b).  Gray requested that
the Superior Court suspend the non-mandatory portion of his Level V sentences
upon his successful completion of court-ordered treatment and counseling
programs.
(3)
In a supplement to the motion, Gray expressed concern that the
Superior Court’s presentence report included unsubstantiated information that
was not disclosed to Gray prior to his sentencing.   By order dated January 6,
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2006, the Superior Court denied the motion for modification of sentence as
supplemented.
(4)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration
of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is
twofold.  First, the Court must be satisfied that Counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could
arguably support the appeal.   Second the Court must conduct its own review
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Id.
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of the record and determine whether the appeal is so devoid of at least arguably
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.3
(5)
Counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  Counsel
represents that she informed Gray in writing of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and
provided Gray with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief,
and the plea and sentencing transcripts.  Counsel also informed Gray of his
right to supplement her presentation.
(6)
Gray has  submitted several issues for this Court’s consideration.
By letter, Gray requests that Counsel amend the opening brief to explain why
Gray behaved as he did during the underlying incident, particularly with respect
to the attempted assault charge.  In a separate writing, Gray asserts that he
deserves a modification of sentence because he is a “model inmate” with no
disciplinary write-ups and has successfully participated in a number of
programs offered by the prison.  Gray also expresses remorse for his mistakes
and requests a chance to return to the community to resume his construction
business and support his young daughter.
Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992) (quoting Ward v. State, 567 A.2d
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1296, 1297 (Del. 1989)).
Melody v. State, 2003 WL 1747237 (Del. Supr.) (citing Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d
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839, 842-43 (Del. 1992)).
Id.
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Contrary to the State’s contention, it appears that Gray’s motion for modification
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was timely filed on November 10, 2005, ninety days after his August 12, 2005 sentencing.
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b) (providing that a motion for reduction of sentence must be
made within ninety days after the sentence is imposed). 
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(7)
“Delaware law is well established that appellate review of
sentences is extremely limited.  ‘Appellate review of a sentence generally ends
upon determination that the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by
the legislature.’”4
(8)
This Court will not interfere with the Superior Court’s denial of
a motion for modification of sentence unless it is demonstrated that the
sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by statute or resulted from an
abuse of discretion.   The Superior Court abuses its discretion if it imposes a
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sentence on the basis of inaccurate or unreliable information.6
(9)
In this case, the Superior Court did not err or abuse its discretion
when denying Gray’s timely motion for modification of sentence.   Gray does
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not argue, nor does the record reflect, that the Superior Court imposed a
sentence beyond the maximum allowed by law.  Nor does Gray demonstrate
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that the Superior Court imposed a sentence based on unreliable, inaccurate or
undisclosed information.
(10)
It appears from the record that Gray had access to the presentence
report and an opportunity to comment on the report prior to sentencing.  The
report included the applicable aggravating factors suggested by the presentence
investigator, a victim impact statement, and Gray’s explanation for his conduct.
(11)
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded
that Gray’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue. We also are satisfied that Gray’s counsel made a
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law, and that she properly
determined that Gray could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The
motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice