Title: State ex rel. Flagner v. Arko

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. FLAGNER, APPELLANT, v. ARKO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Flagner v. Arko (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Mandamus to compel police detective to provide relator, who is seeking to vacate 
his conviction for kidnapping and murder and obtain a new trial, with 
exculpatory evidence in the detective’s possession — Writ denied, when. 
(No. 98-487 — Submitted July 15, 1998 — Decided September 23, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72779. 
 
In 1985, appellant, Hbrandon Flagner, was convicted of the kidnapping and 
murder of eight-year-old Tiffany Papesh and was sentenced accordingly.  
Flagner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.  State v. Flagner (Oct. 
16, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 50815, unreported, 1986 WL 11653. 
 
In 1995, a newspaper article raised questions about whether Flagner 
committed the crimes.  According to the article, appellee, Maple Heights Police 
Detective Ron Arko, who had worked on the Papesh case, stated that he did not 
believe that Flagner committed the crimes even though Flagner had confessed.  
The article also mentioned that Flagner’s alibi, that he was at work fifty-two miles 
away around the time of Papesh’s disappearance, was supported by his work time 
card. 
 
In July 1997, Flagner filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Cuyahoga County for a writ of mandamus to compel Detective Arko to provide 
him with exculpatory evidence in his possession pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B).  
Flagner attached the 1995 newspaper article to his complaint. 
 
Detective Arko filed an “objection and opposition” to Flagner’s complaint.  
Attached to Arko’s filing were his affidavit and the affidavit of Carmen Marino, 
the Cuyahoga County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney who had prosecuted Flagner.  
The affidavits established that before Flagner’s trial, Detective Arko had given 
 
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Marino all the documents and evidence he had obtained during his investigation, 
that Marino had provided all relevant and exculpatory evidence to Flagner during 
discovery, including the time card, which was presented at trial as part of 
Flagner’s defense, and that Detective Arko obtained no new, relevant, or 
exculpatory evidence regarding the case following his investigation. 
 
After the court of appeals converted Detective Arko’s filing into a motion 
for summary judgment and Flagner filed responses to the motion, the court of 
appeals granted the motion and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Hbrandon Flagner, pro se. 
 
Michael G. Ciaravino & Associates and Michael G. Ciaravino, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Flagner asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying the 
writ of mandamus.  For the following reasons, however, we find Flagner’s 
assertion meritless and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
Initially, Detective Arko had no duty under Crim.R. 16 to provide the 
requested evidence.  Crim.R. 16(B) requires the prosecuting attorney, not a police 
detective, to provide certain evidence in criminal discovery.  Crim.R. 16(D) 
imposes a continuing duty to disclose on the state “prior to or during trial.”  It had 
been over ten years after the conclusion of Flagner’s trial when he sought 
extraordinary relief in mandamus under Crim.R. 16. 
 
In addition, the summary judgment evidence introduced by Detective Arko 
established that the state, through the prosecuting attorney, fully complied with 
Crim.R. 16 by providing Flagner with all relevant and exculpatory evidence prior 
to his criminal trial.  When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
 
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as provided in Civ.R. 56, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere 
allegations of his pleading, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided 
in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine 
triable issue.  Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 
1197, 1199.  After Detective Arko’s filing and notice that the court had converted 
the filing into a motion for summary judgment, Flagner rested on the mere 
allegations of his pleading and failed to file Civ.R. 56 evidence setting forth 
specific facts to support his claim.  See, also, Salem v. Salem (1988), 61 Ohio 
App.3d 243, 246, 572 N.E.2d 726, 728, where the court noted that “[a] newspaper 
article alone is not evidence of operative facts which might support a Civ.R. 60(B) 
motion [for relief from judgment].”  In fact, the attachments to Flagner’s 
complaint include a defense attorney’s opinion that Flagner’s “evidence” was 
insufficient to vacate his conviction and obtain a new trial. 
 
Finally, Flagner erroneously relies on our decision in State ex rel. Carpenter 
v. Tubbs Jones (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 579, 651 N.E.2d 993, to support his 
contention that he is entitled to the records he claims are in Detective Arko’s 
possession.  Carpenter is a public records case brought under R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s 
Public Records Act, which Flagner does not rely on here.  See State ex rel. Fuqua 
v. Alexander (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 208, 680 N.E.2d 985, 987.  Further, 
following Carpenter, we held that records discoverable under Crim.R. 16 are not 
thereby subject to release as a public record under R.C. 149.43.  Id., citing State ex 
rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 673 N.E.2d 1360, syllabus. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied the writ.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
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Judgment affirmed 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.