Title: DALE BURTON V REED CITY HOSPITAL CORP

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 26, 2005
JACK BURTON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Dale Burton, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
 
No. 124928 
REED CITY HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
DR. CHRISTOPHER J. JOHNSON, and
DR. JAMES JOHNSON 
Defendants-Appellants. 
PER CURIAM 
This case presents the question whether a complaint 
alleging medical malpractice that is filed before the 
expiration of the notice period provided by MCL 600.2912b 
tolls the period of limitations. The Court of Appeals held 
that a prematurely filed complaint invokes the tolling 
provisions 
of 
MCL 
600.5856(a). 
We 
disagree. 
MCL 
600.2912b(1) unambiguously states that a person "shall not" 
commence an action alleging medical malpractice until the 
expiration of the statutory notice period. 
A complaint 
filed before the expiration of the notice period violates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
MCL 600.2912b and is ineffective to toll the limitations 
period. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and reinstate the Osceola Circuit Court's grant of summary 
disposition for the defendants. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 17, 1998, plaintiff1 went to the emergency 
room of defendant Reed City Hospital complaining of 
abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. 
Tests revealed the 
presence of an ulcer. 
Plaintiff was hospitalized and 
treated with medications until January 23, 1998. 
On 
January 
26, 
1998, 
the 
individually 
named 
defendants 
performed stomach and gall bladder surgery on plaintiff. 
On February 10, 2000, plaintiff filed a medical 
malpractice complaint, alleging that his common bile duct 
and pancreatic duct were negligently transected during the 
surgery and that corrective surgery had to be performed in 
November 
1998. 
Plaintiff 
alleges 
that 
he 
suffered 
residual, permanent damage as a result of the individual 
defendants' negligence. 
1 
Plaintiff, 
Dale 
Burton, 
died 
following 
the 
proceedings 
in 
the 
trial 
court. 
The 
personal
representative of his estate, Jack Burton, was substituted
as plaintiff. 
For ease of reference, the term "plaintiff"
refers to the decedent. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The alleged malpractice occurred on January 26, 1998. 
The period of limitations for a medical malpractice action 
is two years. 
MCL 600.5805(6). 
Absent tolling, the 
statutory period of limitations would therefore have 
expired on January 26, 2000. 
Plaintiff's counsel sent defendants a notice of intent 
to file a claim on October 18, 1999. 
Under MCL 
600.5856(d), if the period of limitations would expire 
during the notice period, the period of limitations is 
tolled for 182 days and then resumes running after the 182­
day period. 
In this case, the limitations period was 
tolled until April 17, 2000, and then resumed running, 
expiring on July 26, 2000. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint and an affidavit of merit 
under MCL 600.2912d on February 10, 2000, 115 days after he 
provided his notice of intent. 
After receiving from 
plaintiff’s counsel two extensions of time in which to 
answer, defendants filed an answer to the complaint on May 
8, 2000. 
Defendants’ affirmative defenses included the 
following: 
5. 
That plaintiff's claim is barred by the
applicable Statute of Limitations. 
* * * 
12. 
That plaintiff has failed to comply
with the provisions of MCLA 600.2912b and MCLA 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
600.2912d, et seq[.], and plaintiff's complaint
must, therefore, be dismissed. 
A pretrial status conference was held on June 29, 
2000. 
The summary of that conference provides that 
"Counsel stated that the status of the pleadings is 
satisfactory, pending discovery." 
On August 24, 2000, defendants moved for summary 
disposition 
pursuant 
to 
MCR 
2.116(C)(8) 
or 
(C)(10), 
alleging that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice 
provisions of MCL 600.2912 et seq.2
 Defendants’ motion 
pointed out that plaintiff's complaint was filed only 115 
days after the date the notice of intent was sent. 
Defendants’ motion alleged that the prematurely filed 
complaint did not toll the limitations period, which 
expired on July 26, 2000. 
Plaintiff acknowledged that the complaint was filed 
before the expiration of the notice period, but argued that 
the filing of the complaint nevertheless tolled the period 
of limitations, such that the proper remedy was dismissal 
without prejudice. 
Plaintiff also asserted that defense 
counsel 
had 
engaged 
in 
misconduct 
by 
expressing 
2 Defendants also challenged the sufficiency of the
affidavit of merit filed with the complaint. 
The trial 
court 
held 
that 
the 
affidavit 
met 
the 
statutory
requirements. Defendants have not appealed that ruling. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
satisfaction with the state of the pleadings at the 
pretrial 
conference 
and 
by 
waiting 
until 
after 
the 
limitations period had run to bring the motion for summary 
disposition. 
Plaintiff argued that defense counsel’s 
misconduct resulted in a waiver, or that defendants were 
estopped from challenging the premature filing of the 
complaint. 
The trial court initially denied the motion for 
summary disposition. Although the trial court rejected the 
plaintiff's 
argument 
that 
defendants’ 
expression 
of 
satisfaction with the state of the pleadings at the 
pretrial conference waived the premature filing defense, it 
held that defendants’ failure to bring their motion for 
summary 
disposition 
before 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
limitations period resulted in a waiver. 
The court 
therefore 
denied 
defendants’ 
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition. 
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. 
On 
reconsideration, 
the 
trial 
court 
reversed 
its 
prior 
decision and granted summary disposition to defendants. 
The trial court concluded that the affirmative defenses 
were sufficiently pleaded to place plaintiff on notice of a 
problem before the expiration of the limitations period. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order to the 
Court of Appeals, which reversed in a published opinion. 
259 Mich App 74; 673 NW2d 135 (2003). 
While acknowledging 
that dismissal is an appropriate remedy for noncompliance 
with the provisions of MCL 600.2912b and that when a case 
is dismissed the plaintiff must still comply with the 
applicable statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals 
nevertheless concluded that MCL 600.5856(a) operated to 
toll the period of limitations. Burton, supra at 85. 
The Court of Appeals distinguished the present case 
from Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547; 607 NW2d 711 (2000), 
in which the plaintiff filed the complaint without also 
filing the affidavit of merit. 
The Court of Appeals 
determined that because the affidavit of merit was filed 
with the complaint in this case, the filing tolled the 
period of limitations. 
Burton, supra at 85–86. 
Finally, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that tolling is permissible 
where a complaint is filed prematurely because it does not 
result in unfair prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 87–89. 
It 
thus 
reversed 
the 
trial 
court’s 
order 
granting 
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. 
Defendants filed an application for leave to appeal to 
this Court. 
6  
 
 
 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We 
review 
the 
trial 
court’s 
grant 
of 
summary 
disposition de novo. 
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 
Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) (Roberts I). 
This case 
involves questions of statutory interpretation, which are 
also reviewed de novo. 
Id. 
The cardinal principle of 
statutory construction is that courts must give effect to 
legislative intent. 
Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After 
Remand), 469 Mich 487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 (2003). 
When 
reviewing a statute, courts necessarily must first examine 
the text of the statute. 
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 
557, 562; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). If the Legislature's intent 
is clearly expressed by the language of the statute, no 
further construction is permitted. 
Helder v Sruba, 462 
Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. RELEVANT STATUTES 
MCL 
600.2912b(1) 
precludes 
a 
medical 
malpractice 
claimant from commencing suit against a health professional 
or health facility unless written notice is provided to 
that 
professional 
or 
facility 
before 
the 
action 
is 
commenced. Section 2912b(1) provides: 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
in 
this 
section, a person shall not commence an action 
alleging medical malpractice against a health 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
professional or health facility unless the person
has given the health professional or health 
facility written notice under this section not
less 
than 
182 
days 
before 
the 
action 
is 
commenced. [Emphasis supplied.] 
After providing the written notice, the claimant is 
required to wait for the applicable notice period to pass 
before filing suit. 
The claimant generally must wait 182 
days after providing the notice of intent before commencing 
an action alleging medical malpractice. 
MCL 600.2912b(1). 
A claimant may file an action after 154 days if no response 
to 
the 
notice 
is 
received 
as 
contemplated 
by 
MCL 
600.2912b(7). 
MCL 600.5856(d) provides that the two-year period of 
limitations for medical malpractice actions is tolled 
during the notice period if notice is given in compliance 
with MCL 600.2912b. 
Defendants do not dispute that the 
notice given in this case tolled the period of limitations 
during the statutory notice period, so that the limitations 
period was extended through July 26, 2000. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the period of 
limitations was further tolled by plaintiff’s prematurely 
filed complaint. 
It relied on MCL 600.5856(a), which 
states that the period of limitations is also tolled “[a]t 
the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons 
and complaint are served on the defendant.” 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
B. PLAINTIFF’S PREMATURELY FILED 
COMPLAINT DID NOT TOLL THE PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS 
Section 2912b(1) unequivocally provides that a person 
“shall not” commence an action alleging medical malpractice 
against a health professional or health facility until the 
expiration of the statutory notice period. 
This Court has 
previously construed other such imperative language in the 
statutes governing medical malpractice actions. 
For 
example, in Scarsella, we held that a complaint alleging 
medical 
malpractice 
that 
is 
not 
accompanied 
by 
the 
statutorily required affidavit of merit is not effective to 
toll the limitations period because the Legislature clearly 
intended that an affidavit of merit “shall” be filed with 
the complaint. 
Id. at 549 (citing MCL 600.2912d[1]). 
In 
adopting the Court of Appeals opinion in Scarsella, we 
noted that the Legislature’s use of the word “shall” 
indicates a mandatory and imperative directive (citing 
Oakland Co v Michigan, 456 Mich 144, 154; 566 NW2d 616 
[1997]). 
Scarsella, supra at 549. 
We concluded that the 
filing of a complaint without the required affidavit of 
merit was insufficient to commence the lawsuit. Id. 
In Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567; 609 NW2d 
177 (2000), a case involving tolling during the notice 
period, we held that a plaintiff cannot file suit without 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
first 
giving 
the 
notice 
required 
by 
MCL 
600.2912b. 
Omelenchuk, supra at 572. 
We further held that the 
limitations period cannot be tolled unless a plaintiff 
complies with the provisions of MCL 600.2912b. Omelenchuk, 
supra at 576. 
In Roberts I,3 another case involving tolling during 
the notice period, we again emphasized that a plaintiff’s 
compliance with MCL 600.2912b is mandatory before tolling 
under MCL 600.5856(d) may occur. 
Roberts I, supra at 65, 
67. 
We also held that MCL 600.2912b clearly places the 
burden of complying with the notice of intent requirements 
on the plaintiff and that this clear, unambiguous statute 
requires full compliance with its provisions as written. 
Roberts I, supra at 66. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly 
determined that dismissal is an appropriate remedy for 
noncompliance with the notice provisions of MCL 600.2912b 
and that when a case is dismissed, the plaintiff must still 
comply with the applicable statute of limitations. 
See 
Gregory v Heritage Hosp, 460 Mich 26, 47-48; 594 NW2d 455 
(1999); Scarsella, supra at 552. 
The Court of Appeals 
3 The case was remanded for consideration of other 
issues. 
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (On Remand), 252
Mich App 664; 653 NW2d 441 (2002); (After Remand) 470 Mich 
679; 684 NW2d 711(2004). 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
erred, however, by basing its decision to reverse the 
decision of the trial court on the alleged lack of 
prejudice to the defendants, a factor that is not contained 
in the relevant statutes. 
The directive in § 2912b(1) that a person “shall not” 
commence a medical malpractice action until the expiration 
of the notice period is similar to the directive in § 
2912d(1) that a plaintiff’s attorney “shall file with the 
complaint an affidavit of merit . . . .” Each statute sets 
forth a prerequisite condition to the commencement of a 
medical malpractice lawsuit. 
The filing of a complaint 
before the expiration of the statutorily mandated notice 
period is no more effective to commence a lawsuit than the 
filing of a complaint without the required affidavit of 
merit. 
In each instance, the failure to comply with the 
statutory requirement renders the complaint insufficient to 
commence the action. 
The fact that defendants did not bring their motion 
for summary disposition until the period of limitations had 
run does not constitute a waiver of the defense.4
 MCL 
4 The 
assertion 
by 
the 
dissent 
that 
defendants 
implicitly waived their statute of limitations defense is
not supported by the evidence. 
We agree that a waiver
sometimes “'may be shown by a course of acts and conduct,
and in some cases will be implied therefrom.'” 
Klas v 
Pearce Hardware & Furniture Co, 202 Mich 334, 339; 168 NW 
11  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
600.2912b places the burden of complying with the notice 
provisions on the plaintiff. 
Roberts I, supra at 66. 
As 
we explained in Roberts I, the purpose of a tolling 
provision is to protect a plaintiff from a statute of 
limitations defense. 
Here, defendants specifically raised 
the statute of limitations and plaintiff’s compliance with 
MCL 600.2912b in their answer and affirmative defenses.5 
Such a direct assertion of these defenses by defendants can 
425 (1918) (citation omitted). 
However, neither of the
acts 
cited 
by 
the 
dissent 
implies 
an 
“intentional 
abandonment” of defendants’ right to assert a statute of
limitations defense. See Roberts I, supra at 64 n 4. 
First, the request for additional time to answer 
plaintiff's prematurely filed complaint was not, in fact,
“inconsistent with” their statute of limitations defense. 
Defendants did not, as a result of the extension granted
them, file their answer after the limitations period had
expired. 
Had they done so, the dissent’s theory would be
more compelling. 
Rather, defendants filed their answer 
more 
than 
two 
months 
before 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
limitations period. 
In addition, defendants’ express
incorporation of such a defense in their answer makes clear
that they were not intentionally abandoning that defense 
when they sought the extension. 
Second, 
defendants’ 
expression 
during 
a 
pretrial
conference 
that 
“the 
status 
of 
the 
pleadings 
is 
satisfactory” was also not “inconsistent with” their 
statute of limitations defense. This statement was offered 
only after defendants had filed their answer, which 
included the statute of limitations defense. 
There is 
nothing in the record to support an implication that 
defendants were willing to waive this defense on the basis 
of their “satisfaction” with the status of the pleadings. 
5 As noted earlier, the answer and affirmative defenses
were filed on May 8, 2000, more than two months before the
period of limitations expired. 
12  
 
 
 
by no means be considered a waiver. Roberts I, supra at 68­
70. 
To the contrary, it was a clear affirmation and 
invocation of such defenses. 
Defendants’ pleadings were 
more than sufficient to comply with the requirements of MCR 
2.116(D)(2) (requiring the statute of limitations to be 
raised in the first responsive pleading or in a motion 
filed before the responsive pleading). 
The dissent contends that defendants’ failure to 
comply with the pleading requirements of MCL 600.2912e(1) 
and MCR 2.108(A)(1) acts as a forfeiture of the statute of 
limitations defense. In Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 
Mich 57, 69; 642 NW2d 663 (2002), we stated that “a 
forfeiture necessarily requires that there be a specific 
point at which the right must be asserted or be considered 
forfeited.” 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
In this case, that 
specific point must have either occurred at defendants’ 
first responsive pleading or at a motion filed before that 
pleading. 
MCR 2.116(D)(2). 
Here, defendants asserted the 
statute of limitations argument in their May 8, 2000, 
answer to plaintiff’s complaint. 
The 
dissent 
concludes, 
however, 
that 
defendants’ 
failure to either answer or provide an affidavit of 
meritorious 
defense 
within 
the 
statutory 
time 
frame 
requires forfeiture. While the medical malpractice statute 
13  
 
 
 
is silent on the remedy for a violation of the pleading 
requirements, generally, the remedy against a party who 
“fail[s] to plead or otherwise defend” in an action is 
default. MCR 2.603(A)(1). But this remedy was unavailable 
to plaintiff, because he afforded defendants two extensions 
of time in which to answer and also agreed to extend the 
time for service of the affidavit of meritorious defense 
through May 28, 2000. 
In sum, a party that stipulates an 
extension of the time permitted for a filing may not be 
heard to complain that the filing, when submitted within 
that extended period, is untimely. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff did not fulfill his obligation under § 
2912b. 
Accordingly, the limitations period was not tolled 
by the prematurely filed complaint. 
We therefore reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court granting summary disposition to 
defendants. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JACK BURTON, personal
representative of the estate
of Dale Burton, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124928 
REED CITY HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
DR. CHIRSTOPHER J. JOHNSON, and
DR. JAMES JOHNSON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Defendants negotiated with plaintiff for extensions of the 
time in which to file their answer. 
They failed to obtain 
approval of any extension from the trial court. 
Moreover, 
they failed to file their affidavit of meritorious defense 
in conformance with the mandatory requirements for medical 
malpractice actions. 
I would hold that a party who requests a late answer 
and 
expresses 
no 
objection 
to 
the 
pleadings 
cannot 
challenge an early complaint. Defendants implicitly waived 
their statute of limitations defense predicated on the 
timing of plaintiff’s complaint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, under the Court’s interpretation of the 
statutes governing medical malpractice actions, defendants’ 
failure to conform to the mandatory pleading requirements 
should have rendered their answer a nullity. 
Accordingly, 
the statute of limitations defense should be deemed 
forfeited. 
Plaintiff's complaint, which was filed before the end 
of the statutory waiting period for medical malpractice 
claims, was timely in all other respects. I agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the trial court’s dismissal with 
prejudice was an unjust remedy in light of defendants’ 
conduct. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When presented with a motion for summary disposition 
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the court considers the pleadings, 
affidavits, and other documentary evidence. 
MCR 2.116(G). 
In this case, the facts needed to review defendants' motion 
for summary disposition are not in dispute. 
This case involves an issue of statutory construction. 
We review it de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v 
Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 
NW2d 
21 
(1991). 
The 
primary 
goal 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
Legislature. 
In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). The provisions of a statute must 
be read in the context of the entire statute in the 
interest of producing an harmonious whole. 
Macomb Co 
Prosecutor v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 159; 627 NW2d 247 
(2001). 
II. BACKGROUND 
On January 25, 1998, the defendant doctors at the 
defendant 
hospital 
performed 
exploratory 
surgery 
on 
plaintiff.1  Plaintiff has alleged that, during the surgery, 
they committed malpractice by negligently cutting his 
common bile and pancreatic ducts. 
In order to file a complaint for this malpractice, a 
Michigan statute required plaintiff to serve defendants 
with a notice of intent to sue. 
MCL 600.2912b. 
Plaintiff 
served this notice on October 18, 1999, well within the 
two-year statutory period of limitations for medical 
malpractice actions.2  MCL 600.5805(6). Defendants did not 
respond. 
Plaintiff’s counsel filed the complaint and 
affidavit of merit on February 10, 2000. 
Plaintiff’s 
1 
Plaintiff, 
Dale 
Burton, 
died 
following 
the 
proceedings 
in 
the 
trial 
court. 
The 
personal
representative of his estate, Jack Burton, was substituted
as plaintiff. 
For ease of reference, the term “plaintiff”
refers to the decedent. 
2 This tolled the running of the limitations period.
MCL 600.5856(d). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
counsel asserted that 154 days had elapsed since he filed 
the notice and that, since defendants had not responded, he 
believed that he was entitled to file the complaint early. 
MCL 600.2912b(8). 
In fact, defendants’ failure to respond 
did not entitle plaintiff to file his complaint until March 
20, 2000. 
Rather 
than 
comment 
on 
the 
premature 
filing, 
defendants told plaintiff that they intended to file an 
answer and received two extensions from him. 
On March 7, 
2000, defendants obtained from plaintiff an extension of 
the time in which to answer. 
On the date that extension 
expired, defendants obtained another extension through May 
4, 2000. 
They told plaintiff that they “looked forward to 
working with” him and “appreciate[d plaintiff’s] continued 
cooperation.” 
When ultimately defendants filed their answer on 
May 8, 2000, it was not timely under either the statutory 
pleading rules for medical malpractice claims or the court 
rules.3
 See MCL 600.2912e(1) and MCR 2.108(A)(1). 
It 
lacked supporting facts, as required by the Michigan court 
rules. 
MCR 2.111(F). 
Moreover, it lacked the requisite 
affidavit of meritorious defense, as required by statute. 
3 It was also after the expiration of the second
extension granted by plaintiff. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCL 600.2912e. 
This affidavit was not filed until May 15, 
2000, four days after the mandatory ninety-one-day deadline 
expired. MCL 600.2912e(1). 
Defendants’ answer included a statute of limitations 
defense. 
However, it did not indicate the basis for 
defendants’ assertion of the defense. 
On the date the 
answer was filed, the limitations period had not yet run. 
The defense was not yet viable and appeared to have been 
included in the answer as boilerplate. 
Plaintiff denied 
that the defense was applicable. 
At a pretrial conference on June 29, 2000, defendants 
expressed satisfaction with the pleadings. Then, on August 
24, 2000, defendants brought a motion to dismiss the claim 
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (C)(10), asserting that plaintiff 
had not complied with the timing provisions of MCL 
600.2912b 
and 
MCL 
600.2912d. 
Plaintiff 
challenged 
defendants’ motion on several grounds. 
Among the reasons 
was that defendants’ conduct had waived the statute of 
limitations defense. 
The trial court granted the motion. 
It held that the 
statute of limitations defense in defendants’ answer had 
placed plaintiff on notice of a problem with his pleadings 
before the expiration of the period of limitations. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary 
disposition. 
It opined that the statutory period of 
limitations 
had 
not 
elapsed, 
because 
plaintiff's 
prematurely filed complaint and affidavit had tolled the 
period of limitations. 
Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp, 259 
Mich App 74; 673 NW2d 135 (2003). 
Tolling should be found 
to have occurred, it reasoned, because defendants had not 
been prejudiced and because summary disposition with 
prejudice was an unnecessarily harsh remedy. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. DEFENDANTS WAIVED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
In 
the 
trial 
court, 
plaintiff 
argued 
that 
the 
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations had been 
waived. 
I 
agree. 
“'[W]aiver 
is 
the 
“intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”’” 
People 
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), 
quoting United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 733; 113 S Ct 
1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). It is an equitable doctrine 
applied judicially to avoid injustice. 
Roberts v Mecosta 
Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 76 n 9; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) 
(KELLY, J., dissenting). 
Waiver may be implied by conduct inconsistent with the 
intent to assert the right. 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and 
Waiver, § 209, pp 612-613. 
The party waiving the right 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
must have actual or constructive knowledge of facts that 
would create the right. Id., § 202, pp 607-608. 
Here, defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s notice 
of intent to sue. 
Defendants contacted plaintiff only 
after receiving his complaint. 
Defendants requested two 
extensions of the time in which to file their answer. They 
reserved no rights or defenses. 
Defendants’ answer raised the affirmative defense of 
the statute of limitations at a time when it was not 
viable. 
Plaintiff denied that the defense was applicable. 
At a pretrial conference, defendants expressed satisfaction 
with the pleadings. 
Defendants knew that the notice period had not 
elapsed. 
They also knew that plaintiff’s complaint was 
subject to a statute of limitations. 
Yet they made no 
mention that the complaint had been filed prematurely. 
They did not then assert, and have not yet asserted, any 
prejudice from receiving plaintiff’s complaint before the 
full notice period had elapsed. 
Defendants induced plaintiff to believe that they had 
no objection to the timing of his complaint. 
Defendants, 
who asked twice to file a late answer, cannot equitably 
7  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
harbor 
a 
challenge 
to 
plaintiff’s 
early 
complaint.4 
Plaintiff’s claim should not be subject to dismissal, with 
prejudice or otherwise. 
I would hold that defendants’ 
actions implied a knowing waiver of any affirmative defense 
that is based on the premature filing of plaintiff’s 
complaint. 
B. UNDER THE MAJORITY’S JURISPRUDENCE, DEFENDANTS FORFEITED 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
This Court has held that, in medical malpractice 
cases, pleading requirements must be strictly followed. 
For instance, an affidavit of merit “shall” accompany the 
complaint,5 unless the plaintiff obtains an extension from 
the trial court pursuant to MCL 600.2912d(2). 
In Scarsella v Pollak,6 this Court considered MCL 
600.2912d(1). 
There, the plaintiff failed to include an 
affidavit of merit with his complaint and neglected to 
obtain an extension. 
The statutory period of limitations 
had expired before the plaintiff filed the affidavit. 
The 
4 The majority contends that plaintiff is not entitled
to pursue his claim because “a party that stipulates [to]
an extension of the time permitted for a filing may not be
heard to complain that the filing, when submitted within
that extended period, is untimely.” 
Ante at 14. 
However,
plaintiff is not claiming that defendants’ answer was 
untimely. 
5 MCL 600.2912d(1). 
6 461 Mich 547, 553; 607 NW2d 711 (2000). 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court held that, because the plaintiff failed to comply 
with the mandatory requirement, he failed to commence the 
action. 
Thus, the filing of the complaint “‘was a 
nullity’” and did not toll the period of limitations. 
Scarsella, 
supra 
at 
549 
(citation 
omitted). 
This 
interpretation, it concluded, was necessary to effectuate 
“the Legislature’s clear statement that an affidavit of 
merit 
‘shall’ 
be 
filed 
with 
the 
complaint. 
MCL 
600.2912d(1).” Id. at 552. 
Similarly, this Court has held that “a plaintiff 
cannot file suit without giving the notice required by [MCL 
600.2912b(1)].” Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 
572; 609 NW2d 177 (2000), overruled in part on other 
grounds Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642, 655; 677 NW2d 813 
(2004). 
The failure to file a notice precludes the filing 
of a valid complaint. 
By contrast, defendants “must file 
an affidavit as provided in . . . [MCL] 600.2912e . . . .” 
MCR 2.112(L). 
The Legislature has mandated that medical 
malpractice defendants promptly respond to complaints with 
an affidavit of meritorious defense.  Unlike plaintiffs, 
defendants may not obtain “an additional 28 days in which 
to file the affidavit required . . . .” 
See MCL 
600.2912d(2) and MCL 600.2912e. 
The fact that, in this 
case, the parties had agreed to extend the time in which to 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
answer is of no moment. 
The parties may not rewrite 
statutes by extrajudicial agreement. 
See Harvey v Harvey, 
470 Mich 186, 193-194; 680 NW2d 835 (2004). 
Defendants’ 
answer 
and 
affidavit 
of 
meritorious 
defense failed to conform to the pleading requirements. 
Therefore, the trial court could have concluded, following 
the reasoning in Scarsella and Omelenchuk, that the answer 
was deficient.
 On motion by plaintiff or at the court’s 
own initiative, defendants’ nonconforming answer could then 
have been stricken. 
MCR 2.115(B). 
If this had occurred, 
plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment by default. 
MCR 2.603(A)(1). 
See Kowalski v Fiutowski, 247 Mich App 
156; 635 NW2d 502 (2001). 
However, plaintiff did not move to strike defendants’ 
answer or for a default judgment. 
Nevertheless, the court 
rules require that a statute of limitations defense be 
asserted in the first responsive pleading, or it is 
forfeited. 
MCR 2.116(D)(2). 
Forfeiture is the failure to 
timely assert a known right. 
Quality Products & Concepts 
Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 379; 666 NW2d 251 
(2003). 
If the reasoning of 
Scarsella 
were consistently 
applied to MCL 600.2912e(1) as it was to MCL 600.2912d(2), 
defendants’ answer would be deemed a nullity because 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
defendants failed to satisfy the mandatory statutory 
requirements. 
Thus, even assuming that the statute of 
limitations defense was a viable affirmative defense at the 
time it was raised, the defense would be deemed forfeited. 
This holding would effectuate “the Legislature’s clear 
statement”7 that without exception, after the plaintiff has 
filed a complaint and the requisite affidavit of merit, an 
answer shall be filed “within 21 days.” 
In addition, an 
affidavit of meritorious defense shall be filed within “91 
days.” 
MCL 600.2912e(1). 
Here, defendants did neither. 
Their statute of limitations defense should be deemed 
forfeited. 
C.  DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE UNDERMINES 
THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE 
The notice provision for medical malpractice suits 
requires a plaintiff to provide a sound basis for his 
claim. 
MCL 600.2912b(4).8
 The Legislature enacted these 
7 Scarsella, supra at 552. 
8 The notice given to a health professional or
health facility under this section shall contain
a statement of at least all of the following: 
(a) The factual basis for the claim. 
(b) The applicable standard of practice or
care alleged by the claimant. 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
requirements to discourage frivolous lawsuits and allow 
only meritorious claims to proceed. 
The Legislature also imposed a presuit requirement on 
defendants accused of medical malpractice. Defendants must 
provide the basis for their defense to the alleged 
malpractice. MCL 600.2912b(7).9 
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that 
the applicable standard of practice or care was
breached by the health professional or health
facility. 
(d) The alleged action that should have been
taken to achieve compliance with the alleged
standard of practice or care. 
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the
breach of the standard of practice or care was
the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the
notice. 
(f) The names of all health professionals
and health facilities the claimant is notifying
under this section in relation to the claim. 
9 Within 154 days after receipt of notice
under this section, the health professional or
health facility against whom the claim is made 
shall furnish to the claimant or his or her 
authorized representative a written response that
contains a statement of each of the following: 
(a) The factual basis for the defense to the 
claim. 
(b) The standard of practice or care that
the health professional or health facility claims
to be applicable to the action and that the
health professional or health facility complied
with that standard. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
When these subsections of § 2912b are read together it 
is apparent that the notice requirements were imposed also 
to facilitate settlement. 
They provide the parties with a 
mandatory period in which to investigate a pending claim 
and negotiate a settlement before suit is filed. 
See 
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679, 
707; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (KELLY, J., dissenting). If the 
defendant fails to respond to the notice of intent, 
indicating he does not wish to settle the case, the 
plaintiff is excused from the 182-day requirement. 
The 
plaintiff may file suit after 154 days. MCL 600.2912b(8). 
In this case, defendants did not take advantage of the 
statutory notice period. They did not attempt to negotiate 
a settlement. In fact, they did not respond to plaintiff's 
notice at all. 
Plaintiff was thus entitled to file his 
complaint after 154 days. 
However, he erroneously filed 
his complaint and affidavit of merit after 115 days. 
(c) The manner in which it is claimed by the
health professional or health facility that there
was compliance with the applicable standard of
practice or care. 
(d) 
The 
manner 
in 
which 
the 
health 
professional or health facility contends that the
alleged negligence of the health professional or
health facility was not the proximate cause of
the claimant's alleged injury or alleged damage. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants continued to violate the procedural rules. 
They did not timely file their answer. 
MCR 2.108(A)(1). 
Rather, they obtained two extensions from plaintiff. 
They 
asserted that they had difficulty obtaining the relevant 
records from each other and needed more time to prepare 
their answer. 
They did not seek an extension from the 
trial court as the court rules allow. 
MCR 2.108(E). 
Defendants also failed to timely file their mandatory 
affidavit of meritorious defense. 
MCL 600.2912e. 
When 
defendants ultimately answered, they included a statute of 
limitations defense. 
As the Court of Appeals noted: 
“Statutes 
of 
limitation 
are 
procedural
devices intended to promote judicial economy and
the rights of defendants. For instance, they 
protect defendants and the courts from having to
deal with cases in which the search for truth may
be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence.
They also prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on
their rights; a plaintiff who delays bringing an
action profits over an unsuspecting defendant who
must prepare a defense long after the event from
which the action arose.” 
[Burton, supra at 83,
quoting Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich 531, 534; 536
NW2d 755 (1995).] 
Defendants asserted the statute of limitations defense 
after inducing plaintiff to believe that they had no 
quarrel with the timing of his complaint. 
Defendants 
themselves failed to comply with procedural requirements. 
Allowing defendants to prevail here frustrates the purposes 
14  
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
of the requirements, does nothing to deter stale claims, 
and does not discourage frivolous litigation. 
Rather, it 
precludes valid suits from proceeding on their merits, 
encourages trial by ambush, and discourages cooperation 
between the parties.10
 It unjustly penalizes the innocent 
injured 
and 
allows 
negligent 
tortfeasors 
to 
avoid 
responsibility for their actions through gamesmanship.11 
Although, pursuant to MCL 600.2912b(1), plaintiff 
should not have been allowed to commence his suit, 
defendants are not entitled to summary disposition. 
Given 
that defendants' conduct constitutes waiver of the statute 
of limitations defense, dismissal of the complaint is 
contrary to the Legislature’s intent and the goals of the 
relevant court rules. 
10 Under the reasoning of today’s decision, any
deviation from a mandatory statutory deadline risks summary
disposition. 
Parties may now be required to object to any
requested accommodation. 
This is likely to diminish the
frequency of settlement. 
In the future, cooperation like
that by plaintiff’s counsel may even constitute legal
malpractice if it voids an otherwise valid claim or 
defense. 
11 Indeed, defendants could not, after two extensions, 
timely file an affidavit of meritorious defense. 
Despite
the misfeasance of defendants, the majority has chosen to
selectively apply the statute in lieu of invoking equitable
doctrines that ensure justice and fair play. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I disagree that defendants who have slept on their 
rights as in this case are entitled to raise the 
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. I would 
hold that the defendants here waived and then forfeited the 
defense. 
To hold that plaintiff’s complaint does not toll the 
period 
of 
limitations 
undermines 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature. It does not promote resolution of meritorious 
claims. 
It does not discourage frivolous claims. 
It 
encourages gamesmanship. 
The Court of Appeals properly reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants. 
would reinstate plaintiff’s claim and remand the case for 
trial on the merits. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
16  
I