Title: Gyronne Buckley v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 04-554 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION GYRONNE BUCKLEY Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered June 16, 2005 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARK COUNTY, CR 1999-13, HON. JOHN ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE REVERSED AND REMANDED PER CURIAM Gyronne Buckley was convicted in 1999 of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to two consecutive life terms. This court reversed and remanded for resentencing. Buckley v. State, 341 Ark. 864, 20 S.W.3d 331 (2000). Following resentencing, Buckley again appealed, and the new sentence, two consecutive terms of three hundred, thirty-six months' imprisonment, for a total term of six hundred, seventy-two months' imprisonment, was affirmed. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). Buckley then filed a timely petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, which was denied without a hearing by order entered February 14, 2004. Buckley now brings this appeal of the denial of postconviction relief by the trial court. Appellant raises fifteen points of error on appeal. Appellant asserts in a number of those points that an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted. The appellant's brief and the State's brief note and acknowledge that the trial court's order did not include findings of fact. The State asserts that the order may be affirmed in spite of the deficiency. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3(a) requires, "If the petition and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied upon to sustain the court's findings." The trial court has discretion pursuant to Ark. R. Cr. P. 37.3(a) to decide whether the files or records are sufficient to sustain the court's findings without a hearing. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). If the trial court fails to make findings as required by Ark. R. Cr. P. 37.3(a), it is reversible error, unless the record before this court conclusively shows that the petition was without merit. Carter v. State, 342 Ark. 535, 538, 29 S.W.3d 716, 718 (2000). The State argues that the record here does conclusively show that the petition was without merit, but we cannot agree. We note that portions of the trial records were abstracted, and as public record already filed with the appellate court in the earlier appeal, need not be incorporated to form a part of the record before us. Drymon v. State, 327 Ark. 375, 938 S.W.2d 825 (1997). While, as noted below, the trial court may have exercised its discretion to find that a hearing was not required on some of the issues, we find that as to at least some issues raised, the record does not conclusively show that the petition is without merit or that appellant is entitled to no relief. Appellant's first four points for reversal concern allegations of perjury, and cite to examples in another drug case reviewed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, where one of the drug task force officers whose testimony was used to convict appellant was found to have committed perjury. In his petition, appellant raised the issue of whether the prosecutor in his trial was aware of that perjury during appellant's trial. The State asserts that noneof these points should be addressed because they are freestanding constitutional claims challenging the credibility of witnesses and sufficiency of the evidence, citing Gunn v. State, 291 Ark. 548, 726 S.W.2d 278 (1987)(per curiam); Beulah v. State, 352 Ark. 472, 101 S.W.3d 802 (2003); Cigainero v. State, 321 Ark. 533, 906 S.W.2d 282 (1995); and Malone v. State, 294 Ark. 127, 741 S.W.2d 246 (1987). None of those cases are dispositive of the claims here. Each of the cases cited by the State deals with challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial or newly discovered evidence the defendant would offer to support a claim of innocence that are, indeed, direct attacks upon the verdict. It is true that even constitutional issues must be raised at trial or on direct appeal. Williams v. State, 346 Ark 54, 56 S.W.3d 360 (2001). But, we do not apply that rule in cases where the errors are so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999). Here, the appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, but alleges that the evidence consisted of perjury resulting from prosecutorial misconduct at the time of trial, and as such may be cognizable under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The State acknowledges that perjury claims may be cognizable under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, but asserts the present case is not supported by more than opinion testimony, citing us to Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 575, 572 S.W.2d 845 (1978). Again, appellant's claims focus on prosecutorial misconduct, and appellant has supported his allegation with his citation to Bragg v. Norris, 128 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. Ark. 2000). In Bragg, the prosecuting attorney at trial, who was also the prosecuting attorney in appellant's trial, indicated that, prior to the date of appellant's trial, he had at least become aware through a replevin action of evidence of misconduct by the police officer in the Bragg case. The misconduct by the officer was detailed by the district court, included knowingly giving false testimony against the defendant, and was found to constitute perjury. In Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001), the appellant also claimed that the State had withheld exculpatory evidence. There, as here, the State advanced the argument that the claim was not cognizable under the postconviction relief rules. But, in Andrews, we were able to affirm the trial court's holding that there was no showing of prosecutorial misconduct because the testimony at the postconviction relief hearing supported those findings. Here, we do not have the court's findings, and no hearing was conducted. An evidentiary hearing should be held in a postconviction proceeding unless the files and the records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. Sanders v. State, 352 Ark. 16, 98 S.W.3d 35 (2003). Without benefit of the trial court's findings in accord with Ark. R. Cr. P. 37.3(a), it is not clear to us how the court determined the record supports denial of the petition without a hearing. In fact, as to these first four points, it would appear on our review of the record that the appellant's petition raised more than the mere specter of improper conduct by the prosecutor and the police officers who were alleged to have provided perjured testimony. On the first four points, the files and records of the case do not support a finding that appellant is entitled to no relief. In Sanders, we discussed Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997), where the United States Supreme Court remanded for discovery and expressed concern over evidence that a trial judge had "fixed" other murder cases around the same time as the defendant's case was pending, even though there was no allegation the trial judge had tried to obtain a bribe from this particular defendant. The Supreme Court determined the defendant had shown cause for discovery concerning the judge's bias. Here, there are allegations that the police officer who falsified evidence against another defendant may have done the same in this case, as well as allegations that other members of the prosecution team participated in that process. Because we find appellant's first four points of error require us to reverse and remand the case to the trial court, we do not address appellant's remaining points of error. While we find appellant is entitled to a hearing on these first four points, the trial court may determine a hearing is not required on all issues presented in appellant's petition. See Sanders, 352 Ark. at 27, 98 S.W.3d at 42. If the trial court does determine upon remand, with benefit of our ruling on this appeal, that no hearing is necessary on any of those remaining points, then the order must reflect the trial court's findings on those points, and those parts of the record upon which the trial court has based its findings as required by Ark. R. Cr. P. 37.3(a). Reversed and remanded.