Title: Evans v. Stamper

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Evans v. Stamper1992 WY 88835 P.2d 1145Case Number: 91-215Decided: 07/28/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Max T. EVANS and Lois 
Evans, husband and wife,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Pete STAMPER, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

William L. 
Miller of Miller and Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for appellants.

M.L. Barton of 
Hill, Young & Barton, P.C., Riverton, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
conference.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      The appellate 
issue we answer is whether a mortgagor's right of redemption was the twelve 
months established by statute for agricultural property or the shorter 
redemption time provided for small tracts and platted real estate. The contest 
develops between the redeeming debtor and foreclosure sale purchaser. The 
district court applied the twelve month redemption limit and this appeal 
results.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The pertinent 
facts are not in dispute. Prior to April 13, 1984, appellee Pete Stamper 
(Stamper) acquired title to a parcel of real property consisting of 
approximately forty-two acres. On April 13, 1984, in order to secure Stamper's 
promissory note in the sum of $25,450, the First Interstate Bank of Riverton, 
Wyoming (Bank) recorded a mortgage on the property. On September 25, 1986, 
Stamper conveyed somewhat less than five acres of this property to James T. and 
Gloria S. Edenfield (Edenfields). Stamper accepted a purchase money mortgage on 
that parcel from the Edenfields to secure the sale balance of 
$53,500.

[¶4]      On March 1, 1989, 
the Bank sued to foreclose its mortgage and, in turn, Stamper sought to 
foreclose on the Edenfield mortgage. On November 20, 1989, the district court 
entered a foreclosure decree judgment against the property Stamper had mortgaged 
to the Bank, including the entire forty-two acres. Now enter the appellants, Max 
T. and Lois Evans (Evans), who purchased the forty-two acres at the foreclosure 
sale held on December 27, 1989. On January 26, 1990, the Edenfields gave Stamper 
a quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure, thus settling that aspect of this 
foreclosure litigation and reunifying title for all of the land secured within 
the Bank's mortgage.

[¶5]      On December 26, 
1990, Stamper exercised his statutory right of redemption by tendering $22,477 
to the Fremont County, Wyoming Sheriff's Office. Although the amount tendered 
was correct, Evans refused to accept the redemption payment. Convinced that 
Stamper had only three months plus thirty days in which to redeem the five acre 
parcel sold to the Edenfields, Evans sought a declaration that Stamper could no 
longer redeem the five acre parcel, but could redeem the other thirty-seven 
acres. Further, Evans sought to establish that the overall value of the 
forty-two acre parcel was set by the price paid at the sheriff's sale, but that 
the five acre parcel represented eighty percent of the value of the whole 
forty-two acres and the remaining thirty-seven acres represented only twenty 
percent of the overall value.1

[¶6]      Stamper, of 
course, resisted this concept of his statutory redemption right and sought 
summary judgment, relying on Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-103 (1988):

     (a) Except as provided 
with respect to agricultural real estate, it is lawful for any person, his 
heirs, executors, administrators, assigns or guarantors whose real property has 
been sold by virtue of an execution, decree of foreclosure, or foreclosure by 
advertisement and sale within three (3) months from the date of sale, to redeem 
the real estate by paying to the purchaser, his heirs, executors, administrators 
or assigns, or to the sheriff or other officer who sold the property, for the 
benefit of the purchaser, the amount of the purchase price or the amount given 
or bid if purchased by the execution creditor or by the mortgagee under a 
mortgage, together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from 
the date of sale plus the amount of any assessments or taxes and the amount due 
on any prior lien which the purchaser paid after the purchase, with interest. On 
payment of this amount the sale and certificate granted are void.

     (b) In the case of any 
mortgage upon one (1) or more parcels of real estate any or all of which were 
agricultural real estate on the date of execution of the mortgage as stated in 
the mortgage, the period within which the owner, his heirs, executors, 
administrators, assigns or guarantors may redeem the premises sold is twelve 
(12) months from the date of the sale.

     (c) The term 
"agricultural real estate" means any parcel of land in excess of twenty (20) 
acres lying outside the exterior boundaries of any incorporated city, town or 
recorded subdivision. If the mortgage recites that the real estate involved is 
agricultural real estate, it is presumed the parties to the mortgage, their 
heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, guarantors or successors in interest 
have agreed to and are bound by all the provisions of law relative to the right 
of redemption.

[¶7]      Essentially, 
Evans contends the Edenfields would have had three months within which to redeem 
when their mortgage was foreclosed. If the Edenfields did not redeem within that 
time, then, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-104 (1988), Stamper would have had an 
additional thirty days within which to redeem. Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-104 states in 
part:

     (a) If no redemption 
is made within the redemption period provided in W.S. 1-18-103, any judgment 
creditor of the person whose real estate has been sold, or any grantee or 
mortgagee of the real estate or person holding a lien on the real estate is 
entitled to redeem the same on or before the thirtieth day after the expiration 
of the applicable redemption period provided in W.S. 1-18-103, by complying with 
subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

     (b) The redemptioner 
shall pay to the purchaser or to the officer conducting the sale, the amount bid 
with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of sale, and the 
amount of any assessments or taxes and the amount due on any prior lien which 
the purchaser may have paid after the purchase, with interest. If the purchaser 
also has a lien prior to that of the redemptioner, the redemptioner shall also 
pay the amount of the lien with interest.

     (c) The redemptioner 
must produce for the purchaser from whom redemption is sought or for the officer 
who conducted the sale:

     (i) A copy of the 
judgment under which the right of redemption is claimed, duly certified by the 
clerk of the court in which the judgment was entered, or if redemption is sought 
under a mortgage or other lien, a copy of the mortgage or other lien certified 
by the clerk of the county; or

     (ii) A copy of any 
assignment necessary to establish the claim; and

     (iii) An affidavit by 
himself or his agent showing the amount actually unpaid and due on the 
lien.

[¶8]      Neither of these 
statutes nor relevant authority support Evans' view. They confuse the facts 
somewhat in describing the Edenfields' mortgage to Stamper to be at that time a 
"second mortgage." It was junior in time but not necessarily a second mortgage 
to have been created between identical parties, when it did exist, but it was 
then ended by a mortgagee's release from Stamper after the reconveyance of the 
secured real estate from the Edenfields to Stamper. Cf. Gladstone Hotel, Inc. v. 
Smith, 487 P.2d 329 (Wyo. 1971). This case presents a foreclosure sale on a 
first mortgage, not a junior mortgage which is subject to the first mortgage. 
Turner v. Binninger, 57 Wyo. 26, 112 P.2d 568 (1941).

[¶9]      Rights to redeem 
are statutory. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Salem v. Gruber, 290 Or. 53, 
618 P.2d 1265 (1980). Within the Wyoming statute, the right to redeem arises 
because of the existence of a mortgage - the right to redeem can come into 
existence no other way. See E. George Rudolph, The Wyoming Law of Real 
Mortgages, ch. V (1969). Here, the foreclosed mortgage was on a single parcel of 
land and that parcel was agricultural either under the statute as it now stands 
or as it existed at the time the mortgage was assigned and recorded.2 Stamper's right to redeem accrued 
because the Bank foreclosed the mortgage which it held with him as the obligor 
thereon. Had Stamper actually foreclosed on the mortgage given him by the 
Edenfields, a different right to redeem would have been created by a different 
mortgage.

[¶10]   Evans incorrectly argues that 
Stamper could only acquire a right to redeem pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-104 
when his mortgagors failed to redeem after Stamper's foreclosure. This seriously 
misconstrues the statutes. We perceive to the contrary that Stamper was not 
required to redeem under Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-104 when proceeding as the redeeming 
mortgagor for the forty-two acre agricultural tract and emplaced only to be a 
junior lien holder on a subdivided tract. He redeemed as an owner whose property 
had been sold. Altman v. Schuneman, 39 Wyo. 414, 273 P. 173 (1929).

[¶11]   The only redemption possible was 
for the parcel sold at foreclosure which meant that if the Edenfields had 
attempted to protect their purchased real estate interest by redemption, the 
amount to have been paid would have been the total Stamper balance for which the 
foreclosure sale had been conducted. Rowe v. Tucker, 38 Colo. App. 532, 560 P.2d 843 (1977). Redemption by a partial interest holder requires payment of the 
entire bid price at the foreclosure sale. Rudolph, supra, ch. V at 
73.

[¶12]   The right to foreclose a mortgage 
and the right to redeem therefrom are reciprocal. Gould v. McKillip, 55 Wyo. 
251, 267, 99 P.2d 67, 72 (1940). The character of the property and not its use 
determines the statutory provisions to be applied in ascertaining the redemption 
period. Rowe, 560 P.2d 843. Under Wyoming law, that delineation is established 
by acreage size of the mortgaged parcel. Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-103(c). This case, in 
final result, involved only one mortgage and conceptually the maxim "once a 
mortgage, always a mortgage" could be applied. Cf. Gould, 55 Wyo. at 264-65, 99 P.2d  at 71-72. We liberally construe Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-18-103 and 1-18-104 in 
favor of the right to redeem so the real estate assets of the debtor pay as many 
debts as possible. Tomasko v. Cotton, 200 Minn. 69, 273 N.W. 628 (1937); 9 John 
S. Grimes, Thompson on Real Property § 4822 (1958); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 819(b) 
(1949).

[¶13]   We do not determine an issue not 
presented here of whether Stamper had to reacquire the legal title to the 
Edenfield tract in order to protect his mortgage interest in it and preserve the 
one year period of redemption. The reacquisition did occur.3 The district court was correct in 
its conclusion that Stamper, as owner, had twelve months in which to redeem the 
forty-two acre parcel after the sheriff's sale.

[¶14]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 There are some 
similarities but also essential differences from the course of transactions 
developed in Newman v. American Nat. Bank, 780 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989).

2 Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-103 
was amended twice after Stamper acquired title to the forty-two acres. At the 
time of his purchase, "agricultural real estate" needed only to be in excess of 
five acres. Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-103 (1977). In 1986, subsection (b) was amended to 
establish the period for redemption of agricultural real estate at twelve 
months. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 16, § 1. In 1988, subsection (c) was amended to 
redefine "agricultural real estate" to require the parcel be in excess of twenty 
acres. 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 61, § 1.

We 
do not find persuasive Evans' citations of authority which involve a statutory 
change in period of redemption after the mortgage was executed. No statutory 
change is presented here as an issue of reduced time. Brown v. Bateh, 362 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1978); Mount Morris Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Barber, 17 Ill. 2d 523, 162 N.E.2d 347 (1959).

3 See, however, the 
discussion of the right to purchase property under a superior lien. Carpenter 
& Carpenter, Inc. v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463, modified and reh'g 
denied 56 Wyo. 314, 350, 110 P.2d 824 (1941).