Title: People v. Lawton

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 95802-Agenda 3-January 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GARY 							
LAWTON, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 7, 2004. 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	Gary Lawton was declared a sexually dangerous person and
committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections pursuant
to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq.
(West 2002)). He subsequently petitioned the circuit court of Pike
County to obtain relief from that judgment pursuant to section 2-1401
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)). As
grounds for his petition, Lawson argued, among other things, that he
had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. Following a
hearing, the circuit court granted Lawton's petition. The appellate
court reversed. 335 Ill. App. 3d 1085. We granted Lawton's petition
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that follow,
we now affirm the appellate court's judgment.
	The events giving rise to this appeal began in February of 1998,
when Lawton was charged in separate cases with predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child (see 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2002))
for allegedly molesting two four-year-old girls at his church.
Following preliminary hearings conducted the following month, the
trial court found probable cause to believe that Lawton had committed
those offenses.
	Lawton, through counsel, subsequently filed a series of pretrial
motions, including motions for discovery, a bill of particulars,
suppression of evidence, and determination of the competency of
witnesses to testify. While those motions were pending, the State
initiated civil proceedings against Lawton under the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act. That statute permits the State to seek an
involuntary, indeterminate commitment in lieu of a criminal
prosecution when a defendant is charged with a criminal offense and
is believed to be sexually dangerous. People v. Burns, 209 Ill. 2d 551,
553 (2004). "Sexually dangerous persons" are defined by the law as 			"[a]ll persons suffering from a mental disorder, which
mental disorder has existed for a period of not less than one
year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition hereinafter
provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the
commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated
propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual
molestation of children ***." 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West
2002).
	Where, as here, the State petitions to have a person declared
sexually dangerous, the trial court must appoint two psychiatrists to
examine that person. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 2002). In the case before
us, the court appointed Dr. Phillip Bornstein and Dr. Joseph Bolden.
Lawton, in turn, retained his own psychiatrist, Dr. Henry Lahmeyer.
Lawton waived his right to have the matter heard by a jury, and a
bench trial on the State's commitment petition followed.
	During the trial, Dr. Bornstein testified for the State. Dr.
Bornstein stated that Lawton did not suffer from any major
psychological illness, but diagnosed him with "a personality disorder
not otherwise specified" which first appeared when Lawton was 17
years old. Dr. Bornstein explained that, while Lawton did not exhibit
all the traits of any one disorder, he did display significant antisocial,
narcissistic, and histrionic traits which characterize "Cluster B"
personality disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders. According to Dr. Bornstein, Cluster B
disorders are consistent with sexual aggression and assault.
	Much of Dr. Bornstein's diagnosis was based upon responses
given by Lawton when Bornstein questioned him regarding his
conviction in 1987 for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. The abuse
underlying that conviction extended over several years, escalating
from mere fondling when the girl was 9 to intercourse by the time she
was 15. Dr. Bornstein found that Lawton minimized the extent of the
abuse, describing it simply as consensual sex when the girl was a teen.
Dr. Bornstein stated that Lawton's conduct and his subsequent
rationalizations showed a lack of empathy and a degree of selfishness,
as well as high levels of untruthfulness, deception, and denial. Dr.
Bornstein acknowledged that the trial court ultimately would decide
whether the defendant was a sexually dangerous person, but opined
that Lawton fit the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person.
Dr. Bornstein then clarified his position. "What I really say,"
Bornstein testified, "is he meets the criteria for having a psychiatric
disorder which is associated with the propensity to commit sexual
offenses."
	The State next called Dr. Bohlen. Dr. Bohlen testified that he
diagnosed Lawton with pedophilia, which appeared years earlier when
his stepdaughter was nine years old. This opinion was based partially
upon Lawton's prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter and
partially upon the fact that Lawton currently availed himself of
opportunities to be around young children at home while baby-sitting
and at church. According to Dr. Bohlen, Lawton was evasive about
his contact with young children at church, and he minimized and
rationalized the contact he had with these children. Dr. Bohlen
observed that Lawton initially denied being involved in any previous
incidents of sexual abuse of children and admitted the 1987 conviction
pertaining to his stepdaughter only after Dr. Bohlen advised him that
he knew about the case. Even then, Lawton described the sexual
abuse of his stepdaughter as a one-time occurrence.
	Dr. Bohlen stated that he had examined the reports of the
pending charges and found them highly credible. The specific
information imparted by the children "would be impossible for them
to dream up." Dr. Bohlen concluded that Lawton fit the statutory
definition of a sexually dangerous person.
	After Bohlen testified, the State asked the circuit court to take
judicial notice of Lawton's 1987 conviction for sexually abusing his
stepdaughter and of the two more recent charges of predatory criminal
sexual assault of children which precipitated the proceedings then
before the court. In response to the State's request, Lawton's attorney
conceded that "the law provides that [the court] can consider for
purposes of this hearing previous acts, previous convictions, so with
respect to the Court taking judicial notice of that I don't have any
objection." He then specified that he had no objection to the court
reading the charges, the guilty plea, the judgment on conviction, and
the sentence, but did not think it appropriate for the court to examine
the facts of that case. Lawton's attorney further stated that he "can't
quibble" with the court taking notice of the charges pending against
his client for predatory criminal sexual assault.
	The circuit court granted the State's motion to take judicial
notice.	Lawton then began presentation of his defense by calling as
a witness Dr. Lahmeyer. Dr. Lahmeyer forcefully disputed Dr.
Bornstein's diagnosis of a personality disorder not otherwise
specified. According to Dr. Lahmeyer, "if you get into a diagnosis like
NOS [not otherwise specified], approximately 50 percent of the
people in this room would qualify for that; so that has the lowest
validity and almost no clinical usefulness." Dr. Lahmeyer stated that
neither the clinical interview he conducted nor the tests he performed
on Lawton supported a diagnosis of a personality disorder. According
to Lahmeyer, "[t]here is not one shred of evidence that he is suffering
from [a] personality disorder of any type." Dr. Lahmeyer opined that
Lawton was simply suffering from an adjustment disorder with mixed
emotional features, "quite a lot of depression, quite a lot of anger and
some suspiciousness," resulting from his arrest on the underlying
charges and subsequent home confinement. Lahmeyer believed
Lawton's adjustment disorder would dissipate when this case was
resolved.
	In Dr. Lahmeyer's view, Lawton had not previously suffered
from any other mental disorder and did not meet the criteria for
pedophilia. His assaults on his stepdaughter were mere incest. He had
no sex offense convictions in the years following his abuse of his
stepdaughter, he has a stable marriage, and he has lived in a house
with several female minors without incident. Dr. Lahmeyer felt that
this displayed "an amazing level of social functioning" inconsistent
with pedophilia. Dr. Lahmeyer also questioned the veracity of the
current allegations against Lawton and concluded that he did not fit
the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person.
	Following Dr. Lahmeyer's testimony, Lawton also presented
testimony from three parents for whom Lawton and his wife baby-sat.
Those parents indicated that they had frequently left their children
with Lawton and his wife, that they had spoken with their children
regarding whether Lawton had ever done anything of a sexual nature
with them, and that they would still trust Lawton to baby-sit their
children without additional adult supervision.
	Based on the evidence presented, the trial court determined that
Dr. Bohlen's diagnosis of pedophilia was not supported. The court
found, however that Lawton suffered from a mental disorder, as
described by Dr. Bornstein; that the disorder had existed since at least
1987; and that the disorder was coupled with criminal propensities to
commit sex offenses. Based on those findings, the court declared
Lawton to be a sexually dangerous person and committed him to the
custody of the Department of Corrections.
	Lawton appealed. The appeal was brought by the same attorney
who had represented him in the trial court. The sole claim advanced
by the attorney was that the State had failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that Lawton suffered from a mental disorder.
	The appellate court rejected that claim. It concluded that the
testimony of Dr. Bornstein and Dr. Bohlen supported the trial court's
finding that Lawton had a mental disorder. Noting that Lawton had
not disputed and "basically concede[d] the presence of the other
statutory elements required to support the trial court's ruling," the
appellate court affirmed. People v. Lawton, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1123
(1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Lawton
subsequently petitioned this court for leave to appeal. His petition was
denied. People v. Lawton, 185 Ill. 2d 649 (1999).
	The following year, Lawton filed a petition in the circuit court of
Pike County under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
obtain relief from the judgment entered against him in the foregoing
case. Lawton proceeded pro se initially, but later retained an attorney
who filed an amended section 2-1401 petition on his behalf.
	Lawton's new lawyer, who was different than the one who had
represented him at trial and on direct appeal, argued, inter alia, that
Lawton's previous attorney had failed to provide him with effective
assistance. Specifically, the new lawyer contended that Lawton's prior
counsel had been ineffective for failing to properly challenge
assertions allegedly made by the State's Attorney and accepted by the
trial court "that proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or any proof at trial,
was not required with respect to the 'demonstrated propensities'
element of the State's cause of action."
	The State moved to dismiss Lawton's petition, arguing that the
issues raised by Lawton, including his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, could not be raised in proceedings brought under section
2-1401. The trial court denied that motion, stating:
		"I think there is a sufficient gist of a meritorious defense set
forth in the petition ***. The best argument [for the State] is
probably that under 1401 nowhere in the past has that section
allowed the Court to address ineffective counsel. Nowhere
has this Court found a case that says, however, if it is a 1401
petition that addresses a sexually dangerous person case is a
person denied the right to ask for [ ]effective counsel. *** I
agree with [defense counsel]'s arguments as it relates [sic] to
this issue, that a post conviction petition under the Post
Conviction Relief Act is not appropriate. *** That would be
the appropriate place to *** address ineffective counsel.
Since that's not available in this kind of a case because this
case does involve the loss of liberty by the defendant in his
housing for treatment under these 'civil proceedings,' then I
am perhaps making new law but I am determining that the
defendant in this case, Mr. Lawton, does have the right to
raise the issue of ineffective counsel in this section 2-1401
petition ***."
	Nearly a year after the State's motion to dismiss was denied, a
hearing was convened at which the court addressed the merits of
Lawton's section 2-1401 petition. The court initially reviewed the
elements of the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person. It
then turned to the record in this case. The court opined that the State
could not prove demonstrated propensities through the 1987
conviction. More was needed, and more should have been demanded
by Lawton's attorney. In the court's view, however, the attorney "did
not aggressively argue nor present evidence on the issue of
demonstrated propensities." Based on these considerations, the court
concluded that
		"Mr. Lawton's previous attorney *** did not provide him
with effective counsel, that he did not contest the issue at trial
of demonstrated propensities, that there was insufficient
evidence of demonstrated propensities that was presented by
competent evidence before this trial Court ***. I find that
*** ineffective assistance of counsel existed in the area of his
failure to object or to contest or to provide counsel involving
the issue of demonstrated propensities."
The court also held that Lawton would not have been found to be a
sexually dangerous person if his trial attorney had "taken issue with
the element of demonstrated propensities." The court therefore
granted Lawton's petition, terminated his commitment to the
Department of Corrections, and ordered that he be held in the Pike
County jail pending further proceedings.
	The appellate court reversed, holding that Lawton's petition
should not have been granted. 335 Ill. App. 3d 1085. The court first
stated that proceedings under section 2-1401 are not an appropriate
forum for a defendant to raise claims regarding competency of
counsel. The court then went on to reject defendant's ineffective-
assistance claim on the merits. As noted earlier in this opinion, we
subsequently granted Lawton's petition for leave to appeal from the
appellate court's judgment. The matter is now before us for review.
	In undertaking our review, we consider first whether it was
permissible for Lawton to utilize section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to challenge the competence of the attorney who
represented him in the proceedings under the Sexual Dangerous
Persons Act. Contrary to the appellate court, we believe that it was.
	Proceedings under the Sexual Dangerous Persons Act are civil in
nature. They may, however, result in deprivation of liberty and
incarceration in the penitentiary for psychiatric treatment. For that
reason, defendants subject to the Act must be accorded the same
essential protections available to defendants in a criminal prosecution.
People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 328 (2001). They have the right to
a speedy trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
testifying against them, and the right against self-incrimination.
Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 329. They are also entitled to be represented by
counsel. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2002).
	A defendant's right to counsel in proceedings under the Act not
only is conferred by the statute itself, it is required by the United
States Constitution. See People v. Bailey, 265 Ill. App. 3d 758, 762
(1994). Implicit in this right to counsel is the right to the assistance of
counsel who is effective. Whether a defendant has received effective
assistance of counsel is judged according to the same standards used
in criminal cases. See Bailey, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 763; People v.
Dinwiddie, 306 Ill. App. 3d 294, 300 (1999).
	The right to effective assistance of counsel has no meaning unless
a defendant has some means to assert it. Where a defendant in a
proceeding under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act contends that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial, he may raise that
issue on direct appeal from the circuit court's judgment. See, e.g.,
People v. Johnson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 117 (2001). When the defendant's
trial counsel goes on to represent him on appeal, however, that avenue
is likely to be foreclosed. An attorney cannot be expected to argue his
own ineffectiveness. That is why, for example, trial counsel's failure
to assert his own ineffective representation in a posttrial motion does
not waive the issue on appeal. See People v. Parker, 288 Ill. App. 3d
417, 421 (1997).
	That is the problem facing Lawton in the case before us here. As
we have indicated, the lawyer whose actions in the trial court are the
basis for Lawton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the
same lawyer who handled Lawton's appeal on direct review. To
advance Lawton's argument that he had mishandled the trial
proceedings would have required the lawyer to argue his own
incompetence on appeal. To avoid the criticism that he was
incompetent would have required that he compromise his obligation
as an attorney to represent Lawton zealously. The lawyer thus faced
an inherent conflict of interest.
	Defendants seeking to challenge the effectiveness of the
representation they received during their criminal trials have a
mechanism for avoiding this problem. If their trial counsel continues
to represent them on direct review and does not raise the issue of the
effectiveness of the representation he provided, notions of waiver will
yield to considerations of fundamental fairness and defendants will still
be permitted to challenge trial counsel's effectiveness through
proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)). See People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 458-59 (1995).
	Because the liberty interests of those subject to involuntary
commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are no less
significant than those of persons facing incarceration for criminal
conduct, the same principles of fundamental fairness dictate that we
provide them with comparable recourse where their claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel went unheard because the same
lawyers who represented them at trial handled their direct appeals.
The problem is that such defendants cannot invoke the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies
only to persons imprisoned pursuant to a criminal conviction.
Proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are civil in
nature. People v. Lindsey, 45 Ill. 2d 115, 117 (1970). Some other
remedy must therefore be found.
	The solution lies in section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In defining the relief available under that statute, the
General Assembly used the broadest possible terms. The statute states
that it abolishes various enumerated writs, legal and equitable, and
that
		"[a]ll relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such
relief heretofore available, whether by any of the foregoing
remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every case, by
proceedings hereunder ***." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West
2002).
	One of the guiding principles in the administration of section
2-1401 relief is that the petition invokes the equitable powers of the
circuit court to prevent enforcement of a judgment when doing so
would be unfair, unjust, or unconscionable. See Smith v. Airoom, Inc.,
114 Ill. 2d 209, 225 (1986). Although the statute is ordinarily used to
correct errors of fact, nothing in the language of section 2-1401 limits
its applicability to such matters. Accordingly, case law has recognized
that its functions extend beyond that. See Strader v. Chrysler Corp.,
9 Ill. App. 3d 793, 796 (1973). Our own court has held that petitions
filed under the statute may also be used to challenge judgments
claimed to be defective for legal reasons. See Sarkissian v. Chicago
Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95 (2002) (Chicago Board of
Education allowed to use section 2-1401 petition to challenge prior
judgment against it on the grounds that the manner in which it had
been served did not comply with statutory requirements); People v.
Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444 (2001) (criminal defendant permitted to
proceed under section 2-1401 in raising unsuccessful challenge to
extended-term sentence based on claim that it did not meet
requirements of the sentencing statute).
	In barring use of section 2-1401 by individuals such as the
defendant in this case, the appellate court cited People v. Anderson,
31 Ill. 2d 262 (1964), Putnam v. People, 408 Ill. 582 (1951), People
v. Sheppard, 405 Ill. 79 (1950), and Hall v. People, 402 Ill. 478
(1949). See 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1086-87. Those cases, however,
involved criminal defendants who had brought collateral challenges to
the judgments in the criminal proceedings against them. Such
defendants are entitled to seek relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act. As we have just noted, persons facing involuntary
commitment as sexually dangerous persons have no access to that
remedy.
	Our recent opinions in People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555
(2003), and People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437 (2000), are likewise
distinguishable. As with Anderson, Putnam, Sheppard, and Hall, the
decisions in Pinkonsly and Haynes both involved criminal defendants
who were attempting to bring collateral challenges to their criminal
convictions. Those defendants had recourse under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The defendant in this case does not. Haynes
is further distinguishable from the present case because the defendant
in Haynes did not attempt to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in a section 2-1401 petition. The section 2-1401 petition at
issue in Haynes sought to vacate the defendant's convictions and
death sentence based on newly discovered evidence.
	Relief should be granted under section 2-1401 when necessary
to achieve justice. To accomplish that goal, the statute is to be
construed liberally. See In re Marriage of Hoppe, 220 Ill. App. 3d
271, 282-83 (1991). The appellate court took the opposite approach.
In holding that section 2-1401 does not permit actions such as
defendant's, it imposed restrictions that the language of the statute
does not include and that the purposes of the statute cannot
accommodate.
	Doing justice under the law is this court's highest obligation.
Through section 2-1401, the General Assembly has provided us with
a versatile and effective means of pursing justice in cases such as this.
For reasons that will be discussed later in this opinion, Lawton's
claims are not meritorious. That Lawton's own claims lack merit
should not, however, deter us from recognizing the propriety of
allowing other defendants subject to the Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act to utilize section 2-1401 to assert claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Involuntary commitments under the Sexual Dangerous
Persons Act are occurring with increased frequency. As the number
of such cases grows, the mechanisms available for raising claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel will take on heightened importance.
While this defendant's constitutional claims may lack merit, other
defendants will have valid claims. It is incumbent on us, as this state's
highest court, to insure that such claims do not fall victim to
uncertainties in the law. Defendants need to know how to pursue their
claims. Trial courts need guidance in how to handle them. The
defendant in this case has litigated the matter zealously. The issues
have been framed sufficiently to enable us to make a reasoned
decision. Under these circumstances, there is no justification for
deferring resolution of the issue.
	As a general rule, we must be concerned about the need for
finality of judgments. We must also be guarded about when and under
what circumstances a party should be permitted to challenge an
otherwise valid judgment based on his attorney's negligence. If this
were a conventional civil case in which a litigant sought to collaterally
attack a judgment on the grounds that his lawyer was negligent, there
would be no question that relief would not lie under section 2-1401.
But this is not such a case. It is a proceeding under the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act in which the defendant has a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.
	To the extent that the right to counsel is guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States, its enforcement need not await
more explicit authorization by the General Assembly. The reason is
obvious. If implementation of federal constitutional guarantees were
dependent on action by state legislatures, states would have the power
to prevent citizens from asserting their federal constitutional rights in
state courts simply by sitting back and doing nothing. Under our
system of government, such a result is impermissible. Illinois may
choose the procedure it deems appropriate for the vindication of
federal rights. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238, 93 L. Ed. 1333,
1336, 69 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (1949). It may not, however, shut its
doors entirely to federal constitutional claims. The supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2) requires
state courts to enforce federal law and state court judges to be bound
by it. As the United States Supreme Court held more than a century
ago,
		"Upon the State Courts, equally with the Courts of the
Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce and protect
every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the
United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof,
whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding
before them; for, the Judges of the State Courts are required
to take an oath to support that Constitution, and they are
bound by it and the laws of the United States made in
pursuance thereof and all treaties made under their authority,
as the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the Constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' " Robb
v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637, 28 L. Ed. 542, 551, 4 S. Ct. 544, 551 (1884).
	Because of the courts' obligation to honor and protect federal
constitutional rights, we may grant relief from a constitutional
violation even where the legislature has not delineated a specific
mechanism for doing so. This is not a matter of improper "judicial
legislating." It is an intrinsic and essential function of the courts in our
federal constitutional system. The Constitution
			"does not 'partake of the prolixity of a legal code.'
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). It speaks
instead with a majestic simplicity. One of 'its important
objects,' ibid., is the designation of rights. And in 'its great
outlines,' ibid., the judiciary is clearly discernible as the
primary means through which these rights may be enforced.
***
			At least in the absence of 'a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate
political department,' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962), we presume that justiciable constitutional rights are
to be enforced through the courts. And, unless such rights are
to become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who
allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated,
and who at the same time have no effective means other than
the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke
the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of
their justiciable constitutional rights. 'The very essence of
civil liberty,' wrote Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), 'certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection.' " Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 241-42, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846, 860-61, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1979).
	The action taken by the trial judge in this case was fully
consistent with these principles. In no sense did he overstep the
bounds of his authority. To the contrary, he acted precisely as the
founding fathers hoped state judges would act in undertaking their
duties. He did not formulate public policy. He did not create new law.
He merely gave effect to a basic constitutional right, the right to
effective assistance of counsel. That was his job. It is our job too.
	Although we agree with the trial court that Lawton was entitled
to challenge the effectiveness of his attorney by means of a petition
under section 2-1401, the appellate court was correct in rejecting
Lawton's claim on the merits. As we have indicated, a defendant
subject to proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act has
a right to effective assistance of counsel. Claims that this right has
been denied are judged according to the two-prong, performance-prejudice test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must prove
that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused
prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, the trial result would have been different. People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 293 (1996). The performance of Lawton's trial counsel in
this case did meet the foregoing standards for ineffectiveness.
	Lawton's argument regarding the inadequacy of his trial
attorney's representation centers on Lawton's prior conviction in
1987, the purposes for which that conviction was admissible, and the
State's burden of proof under the Sexual Dangerous Persons Act. His
claim is twofold. First, he asserts that the attorney was ineffective for
acquiescing in the erroneous view, allegedly urged by the State and
adopted by the trial court, that the State was not required to prove the
that the defendant had "demonstrated propensities toward acts of
sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children," as required
by the Act. See 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2002). This argument is
easily disposed of. We have reviewed the record from the trial court,
and it is clear that from the time the State filed its initial petition under
the Act to the time judgment was rendered by the court, the case was
litigated on the theory that "demonstrated propensities" must be
proved and that it was the State's burden to prove them. Accordingly,
Lawton's trial counsel cannot be faulted for having acquiescing in an
erroneous legal standard.
	Lawton's second argument is that his attorney was ineffective
because he failed to assert that the State could not rely solely on his
1987 conviction to prove the demonstrated-propensities element
beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is also without merit. To
satisfy the demonstrated-propensities element under the Act, the State
must prove the defendant has committed or attempted at least one act
of sexual assault or molestation. See People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91,
105 (1985) ("the requirement that the defendant must have
'demonstrated' his propensities means only that the commitment order
cannot be based solely on psychological speculation" (emphasis
omitted)). The State may do this by introducing a record of a prior
conviction. People v. Hancock, 329 Ill. App. 3d 367, 380-81 (2002);
see People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305, 331 (2003) (commenting in
obiter dicta that the evidence presented at the defendant's original
commitment hearing, including a 14-year-old conviction relied upon
exclusively to show demonstrated propensities, was sufficient to
justify commitment under then-existing standards); People v. Cole,
299 Ill. App. 3d 229, 234 (1998) (holding that "[c]ourt records"
demonstrated the defendant committed prior sexual assaults against
minors); see also People v. Studdard, 82 Ill. App. 3d 736, 741 (1980)
("Evidence of a prior sex crime is clearly relevant as the State is
required to prove that the defendant has a propensity to commit sex
crimes and that his mental disorder had existed for more than one
year. *** [W]e suggest the use of a certified copy of [the]
conviction").
	In accordance with the foregoing authorities, the trial court
correctly took judicial notice of the Lawton's 1987 conviction, and
that conviction was sufficient to meet the State's burden of proving
the demonstrated-propensities element. Had Lawton's attorney
objected to the use and sufficiency of the conviction to prove that
element, the objection would properly have been denied. The attorney
therefore acted reasonably in refraining from asserting such an
objection. See People v. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 454 (1994) (holding
that an attorney's failure to make a futile objection does not constitute
substandard performance); In re Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3d 114, 118
(2002). We note, moreover, that admission of the conviction had a
strategic benefit for Lawton. It saved him from disclosure of the
embarrassing details behind the conviction. See People v. Thorpe, 52
Ill. App. 3d 576, 582 (1977). Lawton does not suggest that his
attorney was ineffective in any other respect. We therefore agree with
the appellate court that Lawton's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel fails on its merits. Accordingly, the appellate court was
correct when it reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting
Lawton's petition for relief under section 2-1401.
	One remaining matter requires our attention. On the date of oral
argument, Lawton filed a motion to cite and argue as additional
authority our recent opinion in Masterson. The State did not object,
and the motion was allowed. The argument advanced by Lawton in his
motion is that the State did not present sufficient evidence at trial to
satisfy the sexually dangerous person standard we announced in
Masterson. In response, the State contends that Masterson, decided
last year, does not apply to Lawton, whose case was tried nearly six
years ago and whose direct appeal has long since concluded.
	We agree with the State. Masterson involved a direct appeal of
a finding that the defendant was sexually dangerous. The case before
us involves an appeal from a ruling on a section 2-1401 petition.
Though we remanded in Masterson, we also limited the rule
announced in that case to prospective application. See Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d  at 330 ("a finding of sexual dangerousness premised upon the
elements of section 1.01 of the SDPA [citation] must hereafter be
accompanied by an explicit finding that it is 'substantially probable'
the person subject to the commitment proceeding will engage in the
commission of sex offenses in the future if not confined" (emphasis
added)); see also Miller v. Gupta, 174 Ill. 2d 120, 128 (1996) (stating
that this court's decisions apply retroactively only to pending cases
and cases on direct review). Masterson is therefore inapplicable to the
case before us today.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.


JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:
	I strongly agree with the majority that Lawton's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim lacks merit. I strongly disagree with the
majority that section 2-1401 provides a new procedural avenue for a
defendant committed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
(SDPA) to assert an abandoned ineffective-assistance claim.
	To obtain relief under section 2-1401, the defendant must show
both a meritorious defense to the charges against him and due
diligence in presenting it. See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555,
565 (2003). Generally, a meritorious defense under section 2-1401
involves errors of fact, not errors of law. See People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 461 (2000); see also Burns v. People, 9 Ill. 2d 477, 480
(1956) (noting that a motion to correct errors of fact "is not available
for the purpose of correcting errors at law," such as ineffective
assistance of counsel).
			"For this reason, a section 2-1401 petition differs from a
postconviction petition. A postconviction petition requires
the court to decide whether the defendant's constitutional
rights were violated at trial [citation]; a section 2-1401
petition, on the other hand, requires the court to determine
whether facts exist that were unknown to the court at the
time of trial and would have prevented entry of the judgment.
[Citation.] ***
			We have long held that section 2-1401 proceedings are
not an appropriate forum for ineffective-assistance claims
because such claims do not challenge the factual basis for the
judgment." Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d  at 566-67.
Accord People v. Anderson, 31 Ill. 2d 262, 264 (1964); Putnam v.
People, 408 Ill. 582, 585-86 (1951); People v. Sheppard, 405 Ill. 79,
85 (1950); Hall v. People, 402 Ill. 478, 481 (1949); see also In re
William M., 206 Ill. 2d 595, 604-05 (2003) (holding that a juvenile's
ineffective-assistance claim does not fall within the parameters of
section 2-1401).
	 Though the majority asserts that the relief in section 2-1401 is
phrased "in the broadest possible terms," those terms are certainly no
broader than the various common law writs abolished and replaced by
the statute. As the majority notes, section 2-1401 provides that "[a]ll
relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore
available, whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall
be available in every case, by proceedings hereunder." (Emphases
added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2002). Section 2-1401, thus,
is backwards looking. In order to determine whether the statute
affords any given relief, such as relief from purportedly ineffective
assistance of counsel, we must look to whether that relief was
"heretofore" available at common law. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110,
par. 2-1401, Historical & Practice Notes, at 608 (Smith-Hurd 1983)
("Occasionally an analysis of the nature and limits of the various writs
replaced by this section aids the court in evaluating the propriety of a
petition under this section"), citing Frandsen v. Anderson, 108 Ill.
App. 2d 194, 200-01 (1969).
	Section 2-1401 abolished the common law writs of coram nobis
and coram vobis, which served to correct errors of fact. Section
2-1401 also abolished bills of review, which were not limited to
factual matters.
			"Prior to the 1955 revision of the Civil Practice Act, there
was no statutory mode in Illinois for obtaining relief from a
decree of a court of equity, if the term at which the judgment
was entered had passed. Hence, Illinois lawyers utilized the
equitable remedies of a bill of review and a bill in the nature
of a bill of review. The courts held that these bills could be
used to bring matters to the attention of the court in three
situations: for error of law upon the face of the decree
[citation]; to establish newly discovered evidence [citation];
and to show fraud in the procurement of the decree
[citation]." Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2-1401, Historical &
Practice Notes, at 605-06 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
	Assuming, then, that the relief available under section 2-1401
extends as far as the relief available through bills of review and bills in
the nature of bills of review to correct law errors, the defendant is not
in one of the three situations where such relief is appropriate. The
defendant here does not contend that an error of law appears on the
face of the trial court's initial order. Further, the defendant does not
contend that newly discovered evidence would change the outcome
of his case. Finally, the defendant does not contend that the trial
court's initial order was obtained by fraud. The defendant simply
contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. At
common law, Illinois courts would not grant a bill of review "where
the party was prevented from proving important facts by the wrong
advice of his counsel" or "the attorney employed by the complainant
neglected the case." 1 S. Puterbaugh, Illinois Chancery Pleading and
Practice §328, at 490 (7th ed. 1930); see also P. Van Zile, Equity
Pleading and Practice §344, at 475 (1904) ("But mere carelessness or
unfaithfulness, or proceeding upon wrong advice, or where
documentary evidence was lost or mislaid by carelessness of counsel,
will not support a bill of review"). Thus, the defendant could not raise
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his section 2-1401
petition.
	The majority cites Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education,
201 Ill. 2d 95 (2002), and People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444 (2001),
as examples of cases where we have "held that petitions filed under
[section 2-1401] may also be used to challenge judgments claimed to
be defective for legal reasons." Slip op. at 9. In Sarkissian, the
Chicago Board of Education never filed a section 2-1401 petition; we
sua sponte labeled its motion to vacate a default judgment,
purportedly void because service of process violated statutory
requirements, as a petition under the statute. Historically, section
2-1401 and its predecessor, section 72 of the Civil Practice Law, have
been used to vacate default judgments entered without notice to the
defendant. See, e.g., Lusk v. Bluhm, 321 Ill. App. 349 (1944); Swiercz
v. Nalepka, 259 Ill. App. 262 (1930). In Harvey, the defendant filed
a section 2-1401 motion alleging that the trial court's sentencing
order was void because it ran afoul of statutory requirements. Section
2-1401(f) actually codifies a common law rule allowing litigants to
attack a void judgment at any time. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West
2002) ("Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to
relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing
method to procure that relief"). A litigant may (see Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 
at 454 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.)),
but need not (see Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d  at 457, Fitzgerald, J., specially
concurring, joined by Thomas and Garman, JJ.)), file a section 2-1401
motion to do so. Neither Sarkissian nor Harvey dictate that section
2-1401 should be available to prosecute ineffective-assistance claims.
	The defendant finds it ironic that he would have had an avenue of
collateral attack if he had been convicted on the underlying predatory
criminal sexual assault charges. He asks this court to apply "its
fundamental fairness concept" (see, e.g., People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992); People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 91 (1984)) and
devise a similar remedy for sexually dangerous persons. To the extent
that the defendant's fundamental-fairness argument implicates due
process, I note that there is simply no due process right to a collateral
attack on a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case. See United
States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323, 48 L. Ed. 2d 666, 674, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2090 (1976) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment does not establish any right to an appeal [citation] and
certainly does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final
judgment of conviction"), citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18,
100 L. Ed. 891, 898, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590 (1956) (plurality op.); see
generally 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §222 (1995).
Postconviction and other collateral proceedings remain a matter of
legislative grace. As the United States Supreme Court indicated in
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57, 95 L. Ed 2d 539, 547,
107 S. Ct. 1990, 1994 (1987):
		"Postconviction relief is even further removed from the
criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part
of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered
to be civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that normally
occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief
through direct review of his conviction. States have no
obligation to provide this avenue of relief ***."
If the state need not provide an avenue of postconviction relief to a
defendant convicted under the Criminal Code, it follows that the state
need not provide an avenue of collateral attack to a defendant
committed under the SDPA.(1)
	The General Assembly has not acted, and we should decline to
graft a layer of collateral proceedings onto the SDPA in the name of
fundamental fairness. Judicial legislation is never appropriate (Gordon
v. Department of Transportation, 99 Ill. 2d 44, 47 (1983) ("It is the
legislature's task to codify public policy; we refrain from undertaking
such impermissible judicial legislation")), and it is particularly
inappropriate in this case because the defendant did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel. In short, the majority opens a door
to the defendant's claim, only to slam it closed. "[S]uch analysis or
opinion is not necessary for the disposition" here. Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 470 (1997). We should save any
determination that section 2-1401 is a vehicle for constitutional claims
for a case in which the need to remedy a constitutional violation is
greater or, in fact, exists at all.
	I recognize the plight of the defendant and others prosecuted as
sexually dangerous or sexually violent persons, who seek to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings
after being represented by the same attorney at trial and on appeal.
But we should not disavow our section 2-1401 precedent and define
that statute a catch-all vehicle to assert constitutional claims when
necessary to achieve some vaguely sketched notion of justice. We
should not punch a hole in the statute, out of which will leak any sense
of finality in our criminal and civil law.
	A far more appropriate disposition, and one I enthusiastically
endorse, would be to follow the law as we find it, reject the
defendant's section 2-1401 petition, and focus the General
Assembly's attention on crafting an appropriate collateral proceeding
in which defendants under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and
the Sexually Violent Persons Act can assert constitutional claims of
this nature. Until the legislature acts, such defendants should find
recourse for their ineffective-assistance claims only in their direct
appeals.
	I dissent.
	JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.               
The defendant raises no equal protection argument in this regard.