Title: Southworth v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Southworth v. State1996 WY 44913 P.2d 444Case Number: 95-49Decided: 03/20/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

MARK SOUTHWORTH, 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

The STATE of WYOMING, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah 
Cornia, Assistant Public Defender; Gerald M. Gallivan, Director of the Defender 
Aid Program; and Frederick Dethlefsen and Delia Reeves, Student Interns for the 
Defender Aid Program.

Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Mark 
Southworth appeals from his conviction for possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellant did not 
include in his brief a statement of the issues which are being presented for our 
review as is required by W.R.A.P. 7.01(d). He does, however, make three 
arguments in his brief: 

 

ARGUMENT I

Evidence derived from the search of Appellant's 
residence should have been suppressed as the affidavit for a search warrant did 
not establish probable cause to search and the officer[]s could not have 
reasonably relied in good faith on the warrant, thus the police were not 
legitimately on the premises when the plain view search and seizure 
occurred.

 

ARGUMENT II

Testimonial and physical evidence derived from the 
custodial interrogation of Appellant should also have been suppressed as he was 
not informed of his rights against self incrimination prior to 
questioning.

 

ARGUMENT III

The Wyoming Supreme Court should decline to adopt a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under Article I § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 

FACTS

[¶4]      Computer 
equipment was taken from a Cheyenne elementary school in a burglary which was 
discovered on January 2, 1994. This burglary was featured on the "Silent 
Witness" television program during the week of January 10, 
1994.

 

[¶5]      An informant told 
a detective for the Laramie County sheriff's department that he had observed 
Appellant hooking up some computer equipment which appeared to match the 
description of the equipment featured on the "Silent Witness" program. He 
reported that he had learned from his and Appellant's mutual friend that the 
person who had stolen the computer equipment asked Appellant to get rid of it 
and that, instead of doing so, Appellant decided to keep the equipment. The 
informant said that the mutual friend had also mentioned that the school 
district identification tags were still attached to the computer 
equipment.

 

[¶6]      The detective 
prepared an affidavit to support the issuance of a search warrant. On the basis 
of this affidavit, the county court judge issued a search warrant for 
Appellant's residence, listing the items to be searched for 
as:

 

Two Apple IIe disc drives

 

Apple IIe monitor

 

Computer cables

 

Other stolen property belonging to the Laramie County 
School District

 

[¶7]      Five officers 
executed the warrant on January 18, 1994, at a mobile home which was Appellant's 
residence. When they arrived at the mobile home, one of the residents was in the 
front yard. The officers entered the mobile home with their weapons drawn in 
order to secure the premises. Another resident was in the living room, watching 
television. As two of the officers were proceeding down the hallway, they 
encountered Appellant, who apparently was leaving his bedroom. They advised him 
that they had a search warrant and asked him to wait in the living room until 
they secured the mobile home. Appellant informed the officers that he needed to 
take his dog outside, which he did. Appellant reentered the mobile home and 
proceeded to wander around.

 

[¶8]      When the officers 
had the premises secured, they holstered their weapons. One officer returned to 
Appellant's bedroom to begin his search. Almost immediately, he noticed a large 
plastic baggie of marijuana which was sitting on top of a cassette holder on a 
dresser. Appellant appeared in the doorway to his bedroom, and the officer asked 
him about the marijuana. Appellant replied that this baggie contained the stash 
which he kept for friends and that he had not had time to get rid of it. He 
further offered that he kept his personal stash in the headboard of his 
waterbed. He also told the officer that he sold only enough marijuana to allow 
him to smoke for free. When he was asked whether he had any scales, Appellant 
went to a dining room cabinet and retrieved a scale.

 

[¶9]      The officers 
discovered the computer equipment in another bedroom, but the school district 
identification tags were missing. The officers, therefore, conducted an 
intensive search of the entire mobile home, looking for the missing tags. A 
further search of the dining room cabinets revealed a larger scale as well as 
some other drug paraphernalia. The officers seized the marijuana, the scales, 
the drug paraphernalia, and the computer equipment.

 

[¶10]   After they completed the search of 
the mobile home, the officers asked the three residents to accompany them to the 
sheriff's department to answer some questions. The residents rode with the 
officers in separate vehicles and were interviewed in separate rooms. After the 
interviews were completed, an officer gave the residents a ride back to their 
mobile home.

 

[¶11]   On February 25, 1994, several weeks 
after the search had been made, a warrant for Appellant's arrest was issued, and 
a criminal information was filed which charged Appellant with possession with 
intent to deliver marijuana as defined in WYO. STAT. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 
35-7-1014(d)(xxi) (1985). Appellant was arrested, and, at his arraignment, he 
pleaded not guilty.

 

[¶12]   Appellant moved on Fourth Amendment 
and Fifth Amendment grounds to suppress the bags of marijuana, the scales, and 
the statements which he made to the officers. A hearing was held, and the 
district court denied Appellant's motion. Appellant subsequently entered a 
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal from the denial of his 
motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Appellant to serve a prison 
term of not less than two years nor more than four years but then suspended 
Appellant's jail sentence and placed him on supervised probation for a period of 
four years. Appellant appealed to this Court.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of Review

 

[¶13]   We do not disturb the findings on 
factual issues which the district court has made in considering a motion to 
suppress unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 
1994). Since the district court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress 
and has the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the 
evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's 
determination. Id. The 
constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is a question of law which 
we review de novo. DeLeon v. State, 
894 P.2d 608, 611 (Wyo. 1995).

 

B. Sufficiency of the 
Affidavit

 

[¶14]   Appellant contends that the 
information contained in the affidavit failed to satisfy the substantial basis 
test which is used in determining whether probable cause supported the issuance 
of the search warrant.

 

[¶15]   We have often addressed the issue 
of whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant contained sufficient 
information for the issuing judge to make an independent judgment that probable 
cause existed. Bland v. State, 803 P.2d 856 (Wyo. 1990); Roose v. State, 
759 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 1988); Bonsness v. 
State, 672 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1983). We have said:

 

"In order to issue a proper search warrant, a 
magistrate must have a `substantial basis' for concluding that probable cause 
exists. A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great 
deference.

 

"[Article 1, § 4 of t]he Wyoming Constitution 
requires that a search warrant be issued only upon a showing of probable cause. 
Probable cause must be supported by an affidavit which supplies the issuing 
officer with sufficient information to make an independent judgment that 
probable cause exists for the warrant. The affidavit in support of the warrant, 
therefore, must include more than bare conclusions of the affiant. Facts which 
lead the affiant to believe that a warrant is justified must be presented in the 
affidavit. The test for determining the existence of probable cause is whether a 
factual situation is sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man 
to believe that a crime was being committed or that one had been committed. This 
test requires that the issuing officer weigh and consider all of the 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of a warrant."

 

Roose, 
759 P.2d  at 485 (quoting Bonsness, 
672 P.2d  at 1292-93 (footnote and citations omitted)). See Bland, 803 P.2d at 859-60; see also Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 
455 (Wyo. 1995). While mere suspicion is not adequate, certainty is not 
required. Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶16]   "A magistrate's determination of 
probable cause is reviewable, under a `totality of the circumstances test.'" Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31, 
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-29, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Bonsness, 672 P.2d at 1293). An 
affidavit upon which a search warrant is issued carries a presumption of 
validity. Id.; see also Guerra, 897 P.2d  at 452.

 

[¶17]   In determining whether an affidavit 
establishes probable cause, a magistrate is entitled to rely upon practical 
considerations of everyday life. 897 P.2d  at 456. "The `affidavits of probable 
cause for search are to be tested by much less rigorous standards than those 
governing admissibility of evidence at the trial.'" Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 380 (Wyo. 
1989) (quoting Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68, 70 (Wyo. 1972)).

 

[¶18]   Applying the above rules to the 
affidavit in the case at bar and considering the totality of the circumstances, 
we conclude that sufficient probable cause supported the issuance of the 
warrant. The affidavit which was presented to the county court judge provided in 
pertinent part:

 

3. That affiant received information that a burglary 
occurred at Rossman Elementary School, Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming. The 
burglary was discovered on January 2, 1994, by a sheriff's deputy who saw signs 
of forced entry. Taken in the burglary were an Apple IIe computer, Apple IIe 
printer, two (2) Apple IIe computer disc drives, Apple IIe monitor and an RCA 
VCR.

 

4. That the crime was featured on Silent Witness 
during the week of January 10, 1994.

 

5. That on January 18, 1994, the affiant was 
approached by a citizen (hereinafter referred to as informant), whose father 
works at the Laramie County Sheriff's Department. The informant told affiant 
that on January 14, 1994, he had been at a residence located at 316 East 
Allison, Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming. The informant knew the occupants of 
the residence, through a friend of his. . . . While at the residence the 
informant noticed some computer equipment which [Appellant] was trying to hook 
up. The informant was aware that the occupants of the residence had low paying 
jobs and were receiving State aid and did not seem to have the financial ability 
to afford a computer system.

 

6. That on January 16, 1994, the informant's friend 
asked the informant how much trouble someone could get in for buying stolen 
property. The informant said to his friend, "The computer is stolen isn't it?" 
and the friend replied "yes[."] The friend indicated that the computer had been 
stolen and that the person who stole it wanted to get rid of it. The thief asked 
[Appellant] to get rid of the computer for him and [Appellant] decided to keep 
it. The informant's friend verified that the computer equipment had been stolen 
from an elementary school and that the crime had been featured on Silent 
Witness. The friend also verified that the computer equipment was stamped with 
school district identification and was upset that it had been stolen from an 
elementary school.

 

7. That affiant was told by the informant that he had 
observed two (2) Apple IIe disc drives, an Apple IIe monitor and various 
computer cables. The affiant took the informant to Rossman [S]chool to show the 
informant computer equipment similar to that which was stolen. The informant 
identified the equipment at Rossman School as being identical to that which he 
had seen at 316 East Allison, Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming. The informant 
indicated that the equipment was on a table in the 
livingroom.

 

8. That affiant learned that the informant's friend's 
mother was a frequent visitor at 316 East Allison, Cheyenne, Laramie County, 
Wyoming. The mother indicated that she frequently saw at the residence, property 
which she believed to be stolen.

 

9. That affiant has identified the occupants of 316 
East Allison, Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming, as [Appellant], . . . . That 
affiant is aware that [Appellant] has had frequent contact with law enforcement 
for suspicious behavior.

 

[¶19]   This information would lead a 
reasonably cautious and prudent magistrate to conclude that the computer 
equipment which had been stolen from the elementary school could probably be 
found at Appellant's mobile home. The informant's father worked for the Laramie 
County sheriff's department, which suggests that the informant had every reason 
to be truthful and accurate. The informant observed a suspicious possession of a 
valuable computer system. The informant's friend, whom Appellant had apparently 
confided in, told the informant that the computer equipment had been stolen from 
an elementary school and that the equipment had been the subject of a recent 
"Silent Witness" program. Furthermore, law enforcement officers corroborated the 
informant's report by confirming that the persons whom informant said lived in 
the mobile home were the actual residents of the premises. The officers also 
confirmed that the informant's description of the equipment matched some of the 
items which were stolen from the elementary school. Further corroboration was 
provided when the informant was taken to the elementary school where he 
identified from the remaining equipment what he had seen in Appellant's mobile 
home.

 

[¶20]   The affidavit did not contain "bare 
conclusions." Instead, the facts which were presented in the affidavit described 
verifiable particulars and were corroborated by the informant's report. The 
officer presented the affidavit to the county court judge, who, under a 
common-sense and realistic approach, weighed and considered all the 
circumstances which surrounded the issuance of the search warrant. See Bland, 803 P.2d  at 860. The 
affidavit contained sufficient facts to establish that the officers had probable 
cause to search the described premises, and the county court judge properly 
issued the search warrant.

 

[¶21]   Although the district court did not 
find the warrant to be defective, it concluded that, if the warrant were found 
to be defective, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply 
to sustain the admission of the evidence. Since the affidavit presented to the 
county court judge contained sufficient facts to establish that the officers had 
probable cause to search the described premises and the warrant was properly 
issued, we do not need to address the issue of whether we should adopt the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule formulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).

 

C. Requirement of Miranda Rights

 

[¶22]   Appellant contends that the 
officers violated the rule of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), when they 
questioned him in his bedroom after they found the marijuana. He maintains that 
his statements were the product of an interrogation and that the procedure the 
officers used to secure the premises deprived him of his freedom in a 
significant way. As a result, he argues, neither his responses to the officers' 
inquiries nor any physical evidence which was obtained from his responses should 
be allowed into evidence.

 

[¶23]   In addressing this issue, we have 
often quoted the United States Supreme Court's ruling:

 

[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we 
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.

 

Miranda, 
384 U.S.  at 444, 86 S. Ct.  at 1612. See 
Wunder v. State, 705 P.2d 333, 334 (Wyo. 1985); Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 96 (Wyo. 
1982); see also Roderick v. State, 
858 P.2d 538, 546 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶24]   The United States Supreme Court has 
also said in regard to its Miranda 
decision:

 

Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police 
officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the 
police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause 
the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to 
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the 
requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place 
in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police 
suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a 
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody." It was that 
sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, 
and to which it is limited.

 

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977).

 

[¶25]   We have previously been faced with 
a case which had a similar fact pattern as that presented in the case at bar, Bland, 803 P.2d 856. In Bland, approximately five police 
officers went to the appellant's residence to execute a search warrant. Id. at 858. They knocked on the door, 
and, when the appellant opened the door, they entered with their guns drawn and 
secured the premises. Id. After 
looking at the warrant, the appellant responded, "`[O]kay, I see what you're 
looking for. Don't tear my house up. What you're looking for is back there.'" Id. We held that the fact that the 
officers secured the premises before they conducted the search did not, in the 
absence of evidence that excessive force or threats were used, constitute 
interrogation because such a precaution is a standard police practice which is 
used to protect both the officers and the individual. 803 P.2d  at 860-61. We 
also held that, although the appellant was in custody and handcuffed, he gave 
his statements voluntarily rather than as a result of being interrogated. 803 P.2d  at 861.

 

[¶26]   In the case at bar, no showing was 
made that Appellant was in custody when the officers questioned him. Appellant 
does not make any claim of coercion, threats, promises, or deception. He had not 
been physically seized, he was not handcuffed, and no weapons were drawn when he 
made his remarks. The officers did not give any outward signs that they were 
restricting Appellant's ability to leave or any indication that Appellant was 
under arrest. In fact, Appellant was very friendly, polite, and talkative during 
the entire time that the officers were conducting their search. Additionally, 
Appellant was in his own home when he offered these statements. The other 
residents of the mobile home, whom Appellant had lived with on and off for about 
three and one-half years and whom he thought of as being family, were also 
present when this questioning took place. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 
425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 1616, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976) (holding that 
interrogation in the suspect's home was noncustodial); see also 1 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(e) (1984) (the view that 
at-home questioning is noncustodial is strengthened when the suspect's friends 
or family members are present at the time). Furthermore, even though Appellant 
had been asked to stay in the living room until the mobile home was secured, he 
took his dog outside. Upon reentering the mobile home, he followed the officers 
around as they conducted their search rather than staying in the living room 
area as he was asked to do.

 

[¶27]   An officer testified that he felt 
that, after the marijuana was found, Appellant was not free to leave; however, 
he never told Appellant that he was not free to leave, nor did he hear anyone 
else tell Appellant that he was not free to leave. "`A policeman's unarticulated 
plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was "in custody" at a 
particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the 
suspect's position would have understood his situation.'" Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 335 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)).

 

"`It was the compulsive aspect of custodial 
interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at 
the time the questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to 
custodial questioning[.]'" . . . United 
States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (CA2 1969) [, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 [90 S. Ct. 1358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 650] (1970)] [A]n objective, reasonable-man test 
is appropriate because, unlike a subjective test, it "is not solely dependent 
either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant 
nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or 
idiosyncracies of every person whom they question[." People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 230, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (N.Y. 1967).]

 

Id. 
(quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S.  at 442 n. 35, 104 S. Ct.  at 3151 n. 35). No objective 
manifestations of a custodial setting were present in this case; therefore, a 
reasonable man in Appellant's position would not have considered himself to be 
in police custody. See Glass v. 
State, 853 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 1993).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶28]   We hold that, because the affidavit 
contained sufficient facts to establish that the officers had probable cause to 
search the described premises, the county court judge properly issued the search 
warrant. We also hold that, because Appellant was not in custody when the 
officers inquired about the marijuana they found in his bedroom, the district 
court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress his statements as well as 
the marijuana, the scales, and the drug paraphernalia which were obtained from 
his mobile home.

 

[¶29]   Affirmed.

 

LEHMAN, Justice, concurring in result only. 

[¶30]   I am able to concur in the result 
because conviction was a foregone conclusion once the marijuana was properly 
admitted. However, it is inconceivable that one caught by police holding the 
bag, as it were, of marijuana could believe they were free to go. Such a belief 
would be tantamount to the burglar, caught by police busily collecting booty in 
a wheelbarrow, thinking he was free 
to go. See Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶31]   In this instance, rather than 
advising appellant of his constitutional rights via Miranda and assuring the use of any 
statements he made in court, the officers chose to question appellant first and 
transfer the responsibility of admissibility to the court. After hours of 
preparing motions, conducting evidentiary hearings, presenting briefs and 
arguments, the courts found appellant's rights were not violated, a function 
officers could have performed in 30 seconds by advising him of his rights after 
they found the marijuana and before they 
questioned appellant.