Title: Clagg v. Baycliffs Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CLAGG ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. BAYCLIFFS CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Clagg v. Baycliffs Corp. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Real property — R.C. Chapter 711 sets forth statutory framework for platting real 
property — R.C. 711.24 governs changes to a previously recorded plat — 
Implied easement in a private street may be unilaterally changed by an 
owner of land, when. 
An implied easement in a private street, created by reference to a subdivision plat 
depicting and dedicating the street to the lot owners of a subdivision, is 
statutorily limited so that an owner of land within the subdivision may 
unilaterally change the course of the street subject to the requirements set 
forth in R.C. 711.24. 
(No. 97-831 — Submitted March 25, 1998 — Decided July 1, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ottawa County, No. 96-OT-23. 
 
This appeal arises from a dispute between many of the current lot owners of 
Johnson’s Island and appellee Baycliffs Corporation (“Baycliffs”), a company that 
is developing property on the interior of the island for residential use.  The interior 
development area centers around an old quarry that Baycliffs intends to convert 
into a marina.  In order to accomplish this, Baycliffs would be required to dig a 
channel from Lake Erie to the quarry.  The channel cannot be created without 
severing Memorial Shoreway Drive (“Shoreway Drive”), a continuous private 
road that encircles the perimeter of the island.  The section of roadway that would 
be removed to create the channel traverses land owned by Baycliffs. Before 
severing the existing Shoreway Drive, Baycliffs plans to reroute the road around 
the quarry so that a continuous road around the island would continue to be 
available.  The proposed new route would be somewhat longer than the old one 
(approximately 0.85 miles), as it would cut inland through the new development 
 
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and around the quarry.  The added length of Shoreway Drive would not adversely 
affect the availability or response time of emergency services to any residents of 
the island. 
 
A group of Johnson’s Island residents, appellants herein, filed a class action 
suit in April 1994 against Baycliffs and its predecessor in interest, appellee 
Johnson’s Island, Inc., requesting a declaratory judgment and a permanent 
injunction enjoining Baycliffs from severing Shoreway Drive.  The certified class 
consists of those members of the Johnson’s Island Property Association and the 
association itself who own property in the Bay-Haven Estates subdivision 
development on Johnson’s Island. 
 
Memorial Shoreway Drive was dedicated to the lot owners, their heirs, and 
assigns in 1956, as indicated on the subdivision plat that was presented to lot 
purchasers.  The class members claim that this dedication created an implied 
easement over the entire length of Shoreway Drive, and consequently they believe 
that Baycliffs should not be allowed to sever Shoreway Drive without their 
unanimous consent. 
 
R.C. 711.24, which was in effect prior to the dedication of Shoreway Drive 
to the lot owners, modifies the common law by setting forth procedures by which 
an owner of land within a subdivision plat may change the layout of “lots and the 
streets and alleys bounding them.”  R.C. 711.24.  Such a change is allowed only if 
there is written consent from all the owners of any other lots bounded by the 
streets and alleys or in the plat itself who will be injuriously affected by the 
change. 
 
Baycliffs submitted a proposed plat change affecting a portion of Shoreway 
Drive that runs across Baycliffs’ land.  The Ottawa Regional Planning 
Commission (“ORPC”) reviewed the plan pursuant to R.C. 711.24 and approved it 
 
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on October 16, 1990, on the condition that one lot owner, determined to be 
injuriously affected by the proposed change, consent in writing.  The ORPC also 
required Baycliffs to complete construction of the rerouted road before any 
excavation of the boat channel could proceed, so that at all times, Shoreway Drive 
would run uninterrupted around the entire island. 
 
Some of the residents who are parties to this suit filed an appeal of the 
ORPC’s decision, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506.  The appeal was voluntarily 
dismissed three years later.  Subsequently the class action members filed the 
instant action for declaratory judgment seeking a definition of their rights in 
Shoreway Drive, and requested a permanent injunction preventing Baycliffs from 
severing Shoreway Drive and altering its route. 
 
The trial court held that R.C. 711.24 governs the proposed change to 
Shoreway Drive.  The court determined that the class members were required to 
exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing the ORPC’s decision to 
approve the replat, and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of appellees.  
The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Connelly, Soutar & Jackson, Steven R. Smith and Janine T. Avila; Wilber & 
Wilber and George C. Wilber, for appellants. 
 
Kelley, McCann & Livingstone, LLP, John D. Brown and Robert A. Brindza, 
for appellees. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  The two issues presented in this appeal are (1) whether 
implied easement rights in a private street, established by reference to a 
 
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subdivision plat depicting and dedicating the street, are subject to the replat 
procedures set forth in R.C. 711.24, which was in effect at the time the implied 
easement was created; and (2) whether R.C. 711.24 applies when a previously 
platted private street is altered, even if no existing lots are changed. 
 
We hold that R.C. 711.24 applies to the replat of a private street even when 
no existing lots are changed, and that an implied easement, established by 
reference to a subdivision plat depicting and dedicating a private street to the lot 
owners of the subdivision, may be limited so long as the requirements of R.C. 
711.24 are satisfied. 
 
There is no dispute that the 1956 subdivision plat of Johnson’s Island 
created an implied easement in Shoreway Drive, a private road, for the benefit of 
the owners of all lots on Johnson’s Island.  The extent of the easement and the 
effect of R.C. 711.24 on the easement are disputed, however.  The class members 
argue that the easement extends the full length of Shoreway Drive as depicted in 
the 1956 plat, and that R.C. 711.24 does not allow Baycliffs to unilaterally change 
the course of Shoreway Drive.  Baycliffs contends that each lot owner’s  easement 
is limited to ingress to and egress from the owner’s specific lot and that R.C. 
711.24 governs the proposed replat. 
 
The extent of the easement does not affect the outcome of this case.  The 
ingress and egress rights of all lot owners remain intact under the proposed 
change.  Furthermore, even if the implied easement extends to the full length of 
Shoreway Drive, the ORPC found that the proposed change to Shoreway Drive did 
not injuriously affect the rights of the easement holders.  Because the class 
members failed to appeal the ORPC decision, we will not pass upon the merits of 
that factual finding. 
 
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Implied easements are disfavored in the law and should extend only so far 
as both parties clearly intended.  See Tiller v. Hinton (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 66, 69, 
19 OBR 63, 66, 482 N.E.2d 946, 950.  R.C. 711.24 was enacted prior to the 1956 
plat and dedication of Shoreway Drive.  Thus, the statute was in effect prior to the 
creation of the implied easement in question.  As this implied easement is based 
upon dedication language in a recorded subdivision plat, the court may infer that 
the creator of the original plat was or should have been aware of the statutes 
concerning plats and changes to plats and that the implied easement is therefore 
limited by the platting provisions.  If the grantor of the implied easement had 
intended to protect the easement holders from the effect of the replat statute, the 
grantor could have done so by granting an express written easement defining the 
extent of the rights, by providing for joint ownership of the property over which 
Shoreway Drive runs, or by any other legal means of conveyance.  The grantor did 
not do so.  Therefore, the implied easements in Shoreway Drive, having no 
express terms, definitions, or duration, are limited by the application of the law in 
effect at the time they were created, including the provisions of R.C. 711.24. 
 
R.C. Chapter 711 sets forth the statutory framework for platting real 
property.  R.C. 711.24 governs changes to a previously recorded plat, setting forth 
the requirements for changing lots, and the streets and alleys bounding the lots. 
 
We affirm the holding and reasoning of the court of appeals, which 
interprets R.C. 711.24 to allow changes to streets and alleys bounding lots even 
when no change to preexisting lots is being made.  The court of appeals noted that 
although the word “and” is usually interpreted in the conjunctive, we are permitted 
to interpret it in the disjunctive “if the sense requires it.” R.C. 1.02. 
 
Using this principle of statutory interpretation, we can and do read R.C. 
711.24 to allow an owner to change “lots, [or] the streets [or] alleys bounding 
 
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them.”  To read the word “and” strictly in the conjunctive in this case would, as 
the trial court points out, be a hypertechnical reading of the statute and would lead 
to the conclusion that R.C. 711.24 is applicable only when lots, streets, and alleys 
are all changed at once.  Thus, R.C. 711.24 would govern changes to an existing 
lot only if a change to the bounding streets occurred as well, and then only if a 
change to alleys also occurred.  Clearly, not all lots will be bounded by both 
streets and alleys, and some lots may be changed without altering any streets or 
alleys in the process.  We do not agree that such a hypertechnical reading of  R.C. 
711.24 is required or that it would support the General Assembly’s intentions in 
enacting this statute. 
 
Baycliffs’ proposed replat divides its property into lots and changes a 
portion of Shoreway Drive, which is a street that bounds lots.  Therefore, R.C. 
711.24 applies to this proposed change. 
 
Contrary to appellants’ assertions that the application of R.C. 711.24 to 
limit their easement rights constitutes a denial of their constitutional rights to due 
process, we find no such constitutional violation.  R.C. 711.24 does not leave 
appellants unprotected.  In fact, the statute specifically protects the rights of lot 
owners affected by a proposed replat.  The statute requires that Baycliffs obtain 
written consent from all the owners of lots bounded by Shoreway Drive whose 
rights will be injuriously affected by the proposed change.  This includes any 
injury to easement rights.  The ORPC is the appropriate governing body to 
determine whether a proposed change satisfies the requirements of the statute and 
whether any owners will be injuriously affected by the change. 
 
In this case, the ORPC determined that appellants were not injuriously 
affected by the proposed change to Shoreway Drive.  The ORPC’s finding in this 
regard could have been appealed pursuant to R.C. 2506.01.  In fact, some members 
 
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of the class did file an appeal from the ORPC decision.  However, that appeal was 
voluntarily dismissed and was never refiled. 
 
When, as in this case, the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies is applicable and has been timely raised and maintained, a 
court will deny declaratory and injunctive relief.  See, e.g., Haught v. Dayton 
(1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 32, 35-36, 63 O.O.2d 49, 51, 295 N.E.2d 404, 406.  Thus, 
the court of appeals and the trial court did not err in denying injunctive relief to 
appellants because they failed to avail themselves of their legal remedies through 
the appeal provisions of R.C. 2506.01. 
 
We hold that an implied easement in a private street, created by reference to 
a subdivision plat depicting and dedicating the street to the lot owners of a 
subdivision, is statutorily limited so that an owner of land within the subdivision 
may unilaterally change the course of the street subject to the requirements set 
forth in R.C. 711.24.  Because R.C. 711.24 limits the easement rights of appellants 
and because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, we affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals denying declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.