Title: State v. Owens. ICA Opinion, filed 02/05/2007 [pdf], 113 Haw. 472. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 08/10/2007 [pdf], 115 Haw. 200.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘s++7OR PUBLICATION IN WES?’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*##

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

00.
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee

CHARLIE OWENS, JR., Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant

 

No. 27714

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEA|
(fC-cR. NO. O1-1-1261),

 

di

 

136 HY 61 AON Lone

NOVEMBER 19, 2007 /

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Charlie Owens, Jr.
(Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari on
guly 12, 2007, requesting that this court review the April 13,
2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA),
issued pursuant to its February $, 2007 opinion! that affirmed
the Decenber 20, 2008 Revocation of Probation; Order of
Resentencing of the Family Court of the First Circuit? (the

court), and its January 10, 2006 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

 

 

+ the published opinion was authored by Chief Judge James 3. Burns

and joined by Aesociate Judges Corinne K.A. Watanabe and Craig H. Nakamura,

+ the Honorable Russell S. Nagata presided.

gaz
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Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for
Violation of Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 9,

except that Conclusions of Law Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 5 were vacated
because they were wrong, State v. Ovens, 113 Hawai'i 472, 477,
155 P.3d 655, 660 (App. 2007). Petitioner's application wi

 

accepted on August 10, 2007, and oral argument was heard on
Cctober 31, 2007.

Petitioner presents the following question in his
application:

Whether, despite its recognition that under State v. Maaco,
78 Hawai'i 33, 689 P.20 1082 (App. 1995)(,) and State
Ugh, 95 Hevad's 278, 21 P34 860 (2001), Rule 9(e) SIT) of
the’ (HREP) clearly requires [Respondent /Plaintitt-Appeli
State of Hawaii (Respondent)) to serve a bench warrant of
probationer “without unnecessary delay,” the ICA gravely,
erred in affirming the order revoking (Petitioner's)
Probation based on the erroneous conclusions Ehst the

    

    

and in the absence of any factual record to support the
Conclusion that [Petitioner] had violated s substantial
Condition of probation.

 

(Emphasis added.)?
We hold, respectfully, that the ICA’s April 13, 2007
judgment issued pursuant to its February 5, 2007 opinion is

reversed, because (1) HRPP Rule 9 require

 

Respondent to serve
warrants in both pre-conviction and post-conviction contexts

without unnecessary delay, (2) Respondent's delay of n

 

rly five
years in serving Petitioner with a bench warrant for his arrest

amounted to an unnecessary delay under HRPP Rule 9 where

 

+ Respondent did not file 2 menorendum in opposition.

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Petitioner was available for service in the jurisdiction of this

state over the period of non-service, there w

 

no evidence that
Petitioner intentionally avoided service, and there was no

evidence that attempts had been made by Respondent to

 

Petitioner over the nearly five-year period, and (3) Respondent's
duty to comply with HRPP Rule 9 in the service of the bench
warrant is not excused by Petitioner's failure to obey a court
order that resulted in the issuance of the bench warrant.
1

on February 20, 2001, Petitioner was charged by
complaint with Abuse of Family and Household Members, Hawai'i
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906 (Supp. 2001). He pled guilty on
the same day and was sentenced to one year probation, inter alia,
and ordered to appear on February 21, 2001, for an intake
interview at the Adult Services Branch (ASB).

Petitioner failed to report to the ASB on February 21,
2001, for the intake interview. The ASB then mailed him a
Noncompliance Report, which said Petitioner was “hereby requested
to be present at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, the 13% day of March
2001” at the ASB. The ASB letter was returned, stamped “RETURN
TO SENDER,” and the phrase “no longer at this address” was
written on the envelope.

Respondent then filed a “Motion for Revocation of
Probation, Resentencing and Issuance of Bench Warrant” (MRP) on

March 27, 2002, when Petitioner did not appear at the ASB and did
 

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not notify his probation officer of any address change. on the
same day, the court issued a bench warrant for Petitioner's
arrest. The bench warrant was stamped “URGENT SERVICE NEEDED
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.” Despite this statement, no attempts were
nade to serve the bench warrant on Petitioner from March 27,
2001, to Novenber 28, 2005, The warrant was served on Petitioner

on November 28, 2005, on Maui, four years and eight months later.

On Decenber 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss for violation of HREP Rule 9.

According to Petitioner the following procedural
matters took place:

[tlwo separate matters concerning (Petitioner were] set for
hearing in the [flanily (clourt on becenber 20, 2006. The

Spcrant. “filed tareh 21. ani, “Theritioner's] moties fe

  

5 was heard first ‘because, if granted, it would have
Gismissed [Respondent's motion. « «
During the bearina on [Petitioner's Motion te
Entep andthe Sout aia Soe Pages ce pene teatincny
anvining,
(Emphases added.) Petitioner states that the court's decision
was rendered as follows:

in its decision th “1 ave ate

son revocsti
= the dates later reduced to written

findings were i) February 20, 2001, when [Petitione®] was

‘sentenced to one-year probation, 2) March 27, 2001, when

Respondent] filed a Motion fer Revocation of Frobstion,

Resentencing, and Issuance of Bench Warrant. end

3) Novenber 26, 2005, when [Petitioner] was finally served

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ees

with the warrant, In ita written [conclusions of Lay
sir eat ‘Ehee 1) Hae u
‘2bivietion context, 2) BAPE Rule 9's placement within the
REP indicates it only applies pre-conviction,

3) ner mt =: 7
4} THRs] § 106-€27's tolling of probation provision
Logleally dictates that HAPP Rule 9 does not apply to
prabation proceedings (,] and 5) {Maceol and {ueil. = .
hotapplyt-1

   

 

(Emphases added.)

on December 20, 2005, the court denied Petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss for violation of HRPP Rule 9. HRPP Rule 9
states in relevant part that “[t)he warrant shall be executed
without unnecessary delay by the arrest of the defendant.”

Petitioner relates that “[s]ubsequent to the first
matter, [Petitioner] did not contest [Respondent's MRP] .”
Petitioner declares he “waived his right to @ hearing on the
{MRP} because” as he stated at the MRP hearing, “To tell you the
truth, I don’t recall, It was so long ago I don’t remember what
was going on. It was -- I think it was eight years, five years.”
Petitioner stipulated to the MRP “provided that [he vas}
reserving [his] right to appeal [his] motion to dismiss for
violation of (HRPP] Rule 9.” Thus Petitioner waived his right to

+ WREP Role 9(c)(3) (4) in dts entirety states as follows:

aa eat of th nt
fave The warrant in the officer's possession at the tine of
arrest, but upon request, the officer shall show the warrant
fo the defendant as s00n as possible. If the officer does
het have the warrant in the officer’ a possession at the tine
Of the arrest, the officer shall then inform the defendant
Gf the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant has
Been issued, The officer executing the warrant shell Bring
the arrested person promptly before the court.

   

 

 

 

(emphasis added.)
 

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a MRP hearing. At sentencing Petitioner “informed the court

 

+ + that he had never absconded from the jurisdiction . . .

‘[a]nd I have been here and I have been working and I never left

 

the state.
qr.

In Petitioner's application for writ of certiorari he
argues the ICA’s affirmance of the court's judgment should be
overturned because (1) “HRPP Rule 9 requires [Respondent] to
serve a bench warrant on [Petitioner] with due diligence,” and
(2) “as HRPP Rule 9 applies, the [court’s] 1/10/06 Order must be
reversed and [Petitioner's] motion to dismiss [Respondent’s) MRE
must be granted” inasmuch as (a) “[u]nder the standard
articulated in Lei, [Respondent's] failure to attempt to serve
the warrant on [Petitioner] constitutes ‘unnecessary delay’ as it
clearly infringes on his basic constitutional due process
rights,” (b) “[t]he ICA gravely erred in affirming the 12/20/05
Revocation of Probation because the ICA’s determination that HREP
Rule 9 applied to [Petitioner’s] case and that there was no
evidence that [Respondent] exercised due diligence in attempting
to serve the warrant on [Petitioner] required that the MRP be
denied” and (c) “{t]he ICA gravely erred in making erroneous
conclusions that [Petitioner] violated his probation based on
unproven facts outside of the evidentiary record.”*

+ yy Tn Petitioner's opening brief, filed June 1, 2006,
alleges (1) “(e)he court erred by failing’ to grant [Petitioner

  

(continued...)
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In its answering brief filed July 19, 2006, Respondent
averred that (1) “[Respondent] agrees with [Petitioner], albeit
for different reasons, that HREP Rule 9 is applicable to the
bench warrant in the instant case,” and that (2) “(nJotwith-
standing the applicability of HREP Rule 9, the court did not
abuse its discretion by denying [Petitioner's] motion to disniss”
inasmuch as (a) “[Petitioner’s] ovn criminal conduct caused the
delay at issue, [and] his reliance on Mageo and Lei is
misguided,” and (b) “{blecause (Petitioner's) ovn criminal
conduct caused the delay at issue, his reliance on Nauven {v.

State, 109 $.W.3d 820 (Tex. App. 2003)] is misguided, "* and

 

“[olther jurisdictions [hold otherwise].
In reply, filed August 17, 2006, Petitioner argued
(2) “fals [Respondent] now concedes that its duty of due
diligence to serve warrant applies to the post-conviction bench
warrant served on [Petitioner] after nearly four years delay,

[Petitioner's] motion to dismiss must be granted,” and (2) “{t]he

 

 

continued)
diemias for Respondents’) failure to exercise due diligence in serving
{retitioner) fora period of four years, eight sonths in viclation of his due
process rights as enbodled by IIAP Rule 9” inasmuch as (a) "(t)he court
Erroneovely concluded, without ruling on the evidentiary issues, that HREP
Role 9 was Linited to a pre-conviction context,” and (b) “(t]he court erred in
Concluding thet Rule 9's application post-conviction would nullify HRS § 706~
G27," and that (2) “(plosteconviction due process, rights derived from the
{ieerey interest are guaranteed in U.S. and Hawel's Law" inasmuch
(a) "Iplost-conviction due process rights are well established in this
Jarisdiceion,” tb) *{d]ue process requires that probation revocation warrants
ved with due diligence,” and (e) “(t]he court erred in concluding that
‘provided ne due process protection once # determination of guilt was

 

 

 

 

      

   

      

    

     

      

spplication, Petitioner does not mention Nouven and so that

 

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record contains sufficient factual information to determine that
{Respondent} failed its duty to serve the bench warrant within
the time required by Rule 9” because “[a] thorough examination of
the case law cited by: [Respondent] reaffirms the fact that
{Respondent} failed to serve the warrant on [Petitioner] with due
diligence.”

qn.

As to the first argument in his application, Petitioner
maintains that “[t]he [court] clearly erred by concluding that
RPP Rule 9 has no application in the post-conviction context.”
In its order denying the motion to dismiss, the court stated in

pertinent part that HRPP Rule 9 only applied to post-conviction

 

proceedings as follow:

1, The language contained in Rule 9 of the (HRPP]
(rRuie 9") indicates that the rule applies ony to pre
conviction situations. . . ."{S]ubsection (a) (2) states[,)
cc {thle warrant shail issue upon a-complaint sss.
(udnmpnasis aaaeat-1)
Second, subsection (b) (2) sta
wthe warrant... shall |
iin” ((eimphaase Sesed(.1)
2. nar, Rule 9... ds preceded by Rule 7...
ile 7 and Rule 3 are’ contained in Section Tit,

 

   

 

in pertinent part:
be nse plies

 

    

“the charge."". «Role 9 is followed by
sgh 17-1 contained in’section IV, which

sed “arraigneent and preparation for trial." From a
Eva) standpoint, Rule 9... applies to obtaining the
appearance of the defendant prior to trial

  

4." Sectéon 706-627 of the [HRS] addresses the tolling
of probation... The exii
provision logically dictates
Probation proceedings.
see

 

= Mage and Lei dealt with... matters that
had not yet been adjudicateds

However, in its answering brief Respondent contends
that HRPP Rule 9, “when read in pari materia with HREP Rules 1,
2, and 49, is applicable to the bench warrant in the instant
 

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case{,]" and applies to both pre-conviction and post-conviction

proceedings. Sunmarized, Respondent's analysis is as follows:

REP Rule 1 provides that “(tJhese rules shall govern the
procedure in the courts of the State in

sedinas, with the exceptions stated in Rule $4." HRPP
Rule 1. “ROP Role 2 then provides that *(t]hese rules are
intended to provide for the just determination of avery
penal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure
Simplicity in procedure, fairness in adainistration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.

<_s « HREP Rule 49(b) (1) provides in relevant part

that sisjervice of the complaint, indictment, bench warrant,
Whe? Role 49(c) provides in relevant part that. “ip]foot of
Service of complaint, indictment,
Role 49(6)- A bench warrant 1s defined
issued by the court itself, oF ‘from t
attachment or arrest of a person). eithe
‘contempt, or where an indictment has been found, or to bring
ina withess who fale to obeys subpoena.” Black's Law
Dictionary 156 (6th ed. 1990),

‘Sourt issued a bench warrant for [Petitioner“al.
Sirest ss HNPP Rule 49 euslicitly provides that

sock, when Oi Ht

SAS HEPP ules 11—2,_and 49, MEP Rule 2 Te applicable to

wciltjne existence of # Tolling statute does not
logically dictate that HRPP Rule 9 4s inapplicable to
pecbation proceedings. .. - HRS § 706-62) tolls the period
bf probation becavse without a tolling provision, “it mas
possible for the period of probation s - . to run out before
fesmination of the hearing, relieving the defendant of any
further obligation even though the defendant
comitted acts Justitying change in the defendant” s
probation ..'.”." Conmentary.on HRS § 706-627. HRPP
Rule 9(e) (3) (4), "on the other hand, requires that o warrant
be executed "without unnecessary delay.”
nate Hes © 7062677

 

 

    

 

 

 

(Some emphases in original and some added.) As Respondent
concludes, then, “[the HRP] apply to all penal proceedings.
Thus, any distinction between pre-conviction proceedings and
post-conviction proceedings is irrelevant.” As set forth above,

Respondent's analysis is cogent and correct.
 

wv.

x.
With respect to Petitioner's second argunent, because
HREP Rule 9 applies, Respondent was obligated to serve Petitioner
the warrant without unnecessary delay. The paraneters of a
violation of HRPP Rule 9 were first discussed in Mageo. In
Maaeo, the defendant was cited for driving without proof of
insurance on July 12, 1989, October 9, 1989, and March @, 1991.
78 Hawai'l at 34, 889 P.2d at 1093. The defendant did not report
to court in response to the citations and penal sunnonses were
issued for him on August 1, 1989, Novenber 1, 1969, and April 5,
1991, for the citations, respectively. Id, There was no record
of the sunnonses being served, returned unserved, cancelled, or
reissued for service. Id, The sunmonses were not served until

over two years had passed. Id, The district court dismissed the

 

case and the ICA in Mageo upheld the dismissal. Id, at 35, 969
P.2d at 1094.

Mageo said the trial court must balance the “interest
of the state against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the

added ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court

 

system.'"" Id, at 37, 889 P.2d at 1096 (quoting State v.

Morivake, 65 Haw. 47, 56, 647 P.2d 70S, 712 (1962) (internal

?  waceo indicated that, [Jn the future, trial courts exercising
this power should sesue written factual findings setting forth their reasons
for dismissal with prejudice so that a reviewing court nay accurately assess
whether the trial court duly exercised its discretion.” 78 Hawai's at 38, 689
P.2d at 1097 (citation omitted)

 

 

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quotation marks and other citation omitted). Similar to the
court's reference to Petitioner being present in the
jurisdiction, the defendant in Maceo indicated to the court that
“he had been in Hawai‘i since 1989[, ive. the entire tine the
summonses were outstanding,] and had not left the State.” Id. at
34, 889 P.2d at 1093. Maceo noted that “[tJhe record indicates
the Defendant was available for service in the jurisdiction over
the period of non-prosecution and there is no evidence Defendant
intentionally avoided service.” Id, at 38-39, 889 P.2d at 1097-
98.

In Magee the ICA declared that, “under the facts, ve
fail to see any viable basis for holding that the State, after
‘the long unexplained delay, may be revarded with an opportunity
to reinstate the case, thus engendering further delay and the
usurpation of the orderly and prompt disposition of criminal

 

“ Id. at 38, 889 P.2d at 1097. That court explained that
the State’s interest was outweighed by its failure to tinely
prosecute and the orderly functioning of the court system:

Ii}e acknowledge the State’s interest in punishing criminal
conduct. Thst ie clearly ostweighed, however, by the

sxeerly fon ‘ourt-svatem. There was 6 delay

of over two yeors from the issvenen of the pened eumaonees
£0 the prosecution of the case.” No explanation for the

 

 

3 he
Gelay. am ei
in service of the sunmonses.

Id. (emphases added). Accordingly dismissal was affirmed.

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This court subsequently adopted the Maceo test in Lei.

In Lei this court sunmarized the ICA's analysis in Maceo as
“focus{ing] primarily upon whether the defendant was amenable to
service while the penal sunmonses were outstanding and whether
there vas a reason for the delay in serving the summonses." Lei,
98 Hawai'i at 285-86, 21 P.3d at 687-88.

There, the district court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss for unnecessary delay in serving arrest warrants that

extended more than two y

 

rs. On appeal by the defendant this

 

court reversed the district court for abuse of discretion. This
court reiterated that “[w]e acknowledge the State’s interest in
punishing criminal conduct. That is clearly outweighed, however,

by the State’s failure to timely prosecute,” id, at 285, 21 P.3d

 

at 887 (quoting Mageo, 78 Hawai'i at 38, 889 P.2d at 1097), under
the circumstances. As in Magee, no bright-line rule for what

constituted “unreasonable delay” was established in Lei."

 

However, in determining whether “unreasonable delay” had occurred
in violation of HRPP Rule 9, this court, as did Mageo, focused on

whether the defendant vas amenable to service of the warrants

+ nie Petitioner seens to posit thet a two-year delay is an
unnecessary Gelay per se) snd prior decisions have made nention of delays of
more than two years, this state has never adopted #uch @ Bright-1ine temporal
Yule. See Lei, 95 Howai'l ot 266, 21 Psd at O66; Ovens, 113 Hawaivt at 476,
155 P.3a at €5€; Skate v. Deryke, 113 Hevai'i 120, 126, 148 P.36 1222, 1228
(ipp. 2006) (Foley, J-, dissenting) (citing Led, ‘95 Mawai'd at 266 n.3, 22
P.sd at 868 1.7), cert, 116 Hewes 61, 158 P.36 278 (2007); Maceo,
‘To Mawat's at 38," Ge Fea at 1097)

 

   

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during the period they were outstanding and whether there was a

reason for delay in serving the warrants. Lei, 95 Hawai‘ at

 

286, 21 P.3d at 888. This determination involved inquiry into
whether the defendant was “available for service while the bench
warrants were outstanding[,]” whether there was “indication in
the record that [the defendant] intentionally avoided service(,]”
whether the prosecution could “adduce any evidence that it
attempted to serve [the defendant] during that time; and whether

the prosecution could

 

stablish that an attempt to serve [the
defendant) would have been futile.” Id. Accordingly this court
held “that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
dismiss the charges based on HRPP Rule 9.” Id. at 287, 21 P.3d
at 889.

v.

Petitioner's case is similar to Masco. First,
Petitioner maintained there was a violation of his due process
rights. According to Petitioner the five years’ passage
inhibited his ability to confront any witnesses against him and
the fading of memory that accompanies the passage of time made it
more difficult to defend himself.

Second, like the defendant in Maceo, Petitioner failed
to respond to a court order to appear. Subsequently in Maaso, @

‘summons was issued. In the instant ci

 

) @ bench warrant was

issued after a failure to report in accordance with a condition

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of probation, Similar to Mageo, in this case there is no record
of an attempt to serve the warrant and no record of any followup
attempts to serve over the nearly five-year period. In both

c the defendants were apparently present in the jurisdiction

 

during the time the warrants were outstanding, and there was no
evidence the defendants intentionally avoided service. As in
Mageo, here Respondent had no explanation for the delay in
service after the warrant was issued. Under Mageo, then, the
delay of nearly five years in serving Petitioner with a warrant
for his arrest amounts to an unnecessary delay in prosecution,
warranting disnissal,

vr.

In its answering brief, Respondent contends, however,
that “[Petitioner’s] failure to follow the terms and conditions
of his probation during February and March 2001 left {Respondent}
without the information needed to contact him causing the delay
at desue.” Specifically, Petitioner failed “to (1) appear in
Person at ASB on February 21, 2001, in violation of the court's
order and the terms and conditions of his probation, and
(2) notify his probation officer of any changes in his mailing
address before any such change, in violation of the terms and
conditions of his probation[.]” According to Respondent,

“[Petitioner’s] own criminal conduct ca

 

sd the delay in

executing the warrant for his arrest and any attempt to serve the

 

address on record would have been futile.” Thus, Respondent

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argues, “Because the delay was due to (Petitioner's) on criminal
behavior, there was no unnecessary delay on the part of the
[Respondent].

Tt may be observed that Respondent produced no facts to
support this allegation. Respondent failed to adduce any
evidence at all that Petitioner's failure to report to the
probation officer or the returned letter from the probation
department marked “return to sender” affected its ability to
serve Petitioner after the warrant was issued. Such matters, in
fact, preceded the issuance of the warrant. This court has never
held that delay in serving the warrant under HRPP Rule 9 because

of alleged pre-varrant issuance conduct is to be considered in

 

determining whether a warrant subsequently issued was served with

unnece:

 

ry delay. The reason is obvious, To hold otherwise
would render HRPP Rule 9 a nullity. The HREP Rule 9 requirement
that unnecessary delay be avoided refers to delay in serving the
warrant and, thus, such delay is measured after the warrant is
issued.

Significantly, Respondent does not contest the court's

statement that Petitioner w

 

present in the jurisdiction and
Respondent made no attenpt to serve him. Indeed, Respondent does
not indicate what, if any attempts it made to serve over the
nearly five year peried. Thus, Respondent only speculates that
“it would have been futile” to serve under these circumstances.

As in Lei, Respondent did not attempt to “adduce any evidence

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that it attempted to serve” Petitioner during the subject period.

 

98 Hawad's at 286, 21 P.3d at 888 (emphasis added). Under such
circumstances Respondent's interest in prosecution “[was] clearly
outweighed . . . by . . . [its] failure to timely prosecute and
by the impact on the orderly functioning of the court system.”
Maceo, 78 Hawai'i at 38, 689 P.2d at 1097.

vir.

‘The ICA apparently agreed with Respondent. Citing Lei,
the ICA declared that periods of necessary delay in serving a
bench warrant are: “(a) periods when the volume of outstanding
warrants is unusually high due to exceptional circumstances;

(b) periods when the defendant was not reasonably available for
service; and (c) periods when reasonable but unsuccessful
attempts were made to serve the bench warrant.” Ovens, 113
Hawai‘ at 476, 155 P.3d at 659,

‘As to (a) and (c), the ICA conceded that, “[i]n this
case, there is no evidence of any period when the volume of
outstanding warrants was unusually high due to exceptional
circumstances or the prosecution made reasonable but unsuccessful
attempts to serve the bench warrant.” Id, at 477, 155 P.3d at
660. As to (b), the ICA found, however, that “[Petitioner) would
have been timely served with the motion, and the bench warrant
would not have been necessary, had [Petitioner] not [violated
Probation]” and, thus, ruled that “the violation by [Petitioner]

of [his terms of probation] are periods of necessary delay in

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serving the bench warrant on him.” Id, (emphasis added). The

 

ICA's reasoning was purportedly based on a policy that
IA) person on probation should not be allowed to benefit
fron not being tinely served a bench warrant issued because

‘one of nore terms and conditions of the person’ s probation
were violeted unen, But ens

‘obstion and eareant baw

been necessary.
Id (emphasis added) .

‘AAs mentioned before, under the ICA’s theory, there
could never be unreasonable delay under HRPP Rule 9 if the
failure to obey a court order that resulted in the issuance of
the arrest warrant counts as a necessary period of delay. As in
this case, neither Mageo nor Lei responded to court orders to
appear. Thereafter, bench warrants were issued. Mageo, 78
Hawai'i at 34, 889 P.24 at 1093.

Mageo also considered whether the defendant was

available for

 

vice and whether he intentionally avoided
service, but never suggested the defendant’s failure to appear at
court, necessitating issuance of the warrant, started a necessary
period of delay running under HRPP Rule 9. Mageo, 78 Hawai'i at

38-39, 889 P.2d at 1097-9

 

‘That Petitioner failed to appear pursuant to court
order is not germane to the analysis under HRPP Rule 9, except as
‘the ground for initiating the summons or arrest warrant. It is

the reasons for the delay engendered after the arrest warrant is

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issued that are pertinent to whether “execut (ion]” of the warrant
was accomplished “without unnecesary delay by the arrest of the

defendant” under HRPP Rule 9. In both Maceo and Led, dismissal

 

vas upheld because there was an undue delay in failing to serve
the summons or warrant in a timely fashion in the absence of
evidence the defendants were avoiding service.
8

Additionally, if as the ICA contends, “but for” the
Probation violation, “the person would have been served with a”
revocation motion and the bench warrant would not have been
necessary, HREP Rule 9 would not have been in issue at all. as
Petitioner argues, the ICA blurs the difference between a HRPP
Rule 9 hearing and a hearing to revoke probation. Petitioner
maintains that “(i]n a HRPP Rule 9 hearing, the court’s inguiry
focuses on the state’s duty of due diligence . . . [whereas iJn a
MRP hearing, the court’s inguiry focuses on whether the Defendant
has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial term of
Probation.”

Petitioner contends that “[i]f [Respondent] had failed

its duty to serve the bench warrant according to the law, then

 

the MRP would have been dismissed . . . .” Secondly, if

Respondent proved the delay in service was not unfair, “then the

 

court could address (Respondent’s MRP] in a separate hearing to
determine if [Petitioner] had inexcusably failed to comply with

the terms and conditions of his probation.”

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SSeS

‘The probation violations cannot be denominated as
“periods when the defendant was not reasonably available for
service,” Qvens, 113 Hawai'l at 476, 155 P.3d at 659 (emphasis
added), for HRPP Rule 9 periods relate to the period after the
ssuance of the arrest warrant. As stated by Petitioner, the
faulty logic by the ICA “relieves [Respondent] of its burden of
due diligence for a period of time that is more than twice as
long as that contemplated in Lei despite an evidentiary record
where there are no attempts to serve and there was no reason to
believe [Petitioner] was not amenable to service.” Respondent's
lack of diligence in serving Petitioner for almost five years is
uncontested. Respondent had no explanation for the delay in
service. There is no evidence that Petitioner was not amenable
to service had an attempt at service been nade.
vitt.

As to the third argument, Petitioner argues that “(tJhe
ICA included a number of supposed factual findings in its opinion
that were never considered by the trial court, including many

that were never asserted in written argument by any of the

 

parties,” and further that “in the absence of an evidentiary
record, the ICA concluded that [Petitioner] didn’t have
permission to be in Maui and that he didn’t go to Maui after his

probationary term was already completed.” According to
Petitioner, “InJone of those facts had been decided or even

contemplated during the HRPP Rule 9 hearing.” While it appears

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Ss

Petitioner is generally correct, in light of the foregoing

 

 

analysis, further discussion of this argunent 4s not require
m.

Based on the foregoing, the ICA's April 13, 2007
Judgment, the court's December 20, 2005 order revoking probation
and order of resentencing, and its January 10, 2006 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant’ s Motion to
Dismiss for Violation of HRPP Rule 9 are reversed.
Nathan Kanale Sadowskt, Gor

Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner/defendant-

 

appellant. :.
anne K, Clarkin, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney Races Oreotee yore

(Sonja P. McCullen,

plaintift-appellee. Ren «. Busty be

 

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