Title: Robinson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

1The Superior Court properly deemed Robinson’s motion, which was filed pursuant
to SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 41(e), a motion to reopen a judgment pursuant to SUPER. CT. CIV. R.
60(b).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GEORGE ROBINSON,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 654, 2002
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Kent County
§  C.A. No. 96M-01-004
§
§
Submitted: January 16, 2003
  Decided:   March 19, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices
O R D E R
This 19th day of March 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, George Robinson, filed an appeal from
the Superior Court’s October 31, 2002 order denying his motion to reopen a
judgment.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm
the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face
2SUPR. CT. R. 25(a).
3Robinson’s arrest was, at least in part, the basis for the finding of a VOP.
4The State concedes that notice was sent only to Robinson’s home address and not
to the Delaware Correctional Center, where he was serving his VOP sentence.  The State
further concedes that the notice sent to Robinson’s home address was returned unclaimed.
5The record indicates that Robinson was serving time in a federal prison at the time
the petition was filed. 
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of Robinson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and
AFFIRM.
(2)
On October 9, 1995, $12,809.00 was seized from Robinson’s
vehicle in connection with his arrest on a traffic charge.  On October 27, 1995,
Robinson was found to be in violation of probation (“VOP”)3 and was
sentenced to 3 years at Level V, to be suspended after 4 months to 2 years at
decreasing levels of probation.  On November 20, 1995, the State of Delaware
sent a notice of forfeiture to Robinson by mailing it via certified mail to his last
known address.4  On December 1, 1995, the State of Delaware published a
notice of forfeiture in one of the local newspapers.  On January 5, 1996, Charles
Spencer, Robinson’s grandfather, filed a petition for return of the $12,809.00.
The petition was filed approximately one month after the notice of forfeiture
was published.5  Spencer, however, took no further action to pursue the claim.
6Robinson agrees that he told Spencer’s lawyer that Spencer wanted to pursue the
claim.
7DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784.
8DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784(j); SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 71.3(a).
-3-
(3)
On May 4, 1998, the State of Delaware filed a motion to dismiss
Spencer’s petition for failure to prosecute.  On July 24, 1998, the Prothonotary
sent a notice to Spencer’s attorney informing him that Spencer had 10 days in
which to respond to the motion to dismiss.  On August 26, 1998, Spencer’s
attorney sent a letter to the Superior Court stating that he had not had contact
with Spencer for more than two years, but that Robinson had told him that
Spencer wanted to pursue the claim.6  At an office conference on September 10,
1998, Spencer’s attorney was given until September 25, 1998 to respond to the
motion to dismiss.  No response was filed.  On March 3, 1999, the Superior
Court dismissed Spencer’s petition and ordered the $12,809.00 to be forfeited
to the State of Delaware.7 
(4)
In his appeal, Robinson claims that the judgment of the Superior
Court forfeiting the $12,809.00 to the State of Delaware should be reopened
because the State of Delaware failed to provide him with proper notice of the
forfeiture proceeding as required by statute.8  He contends that the notice
provided was “not reasonably calculated” to apprise him of his rights and that
9SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 60(b) (3).
10In re $2,053.00 in United States Currency, Del. Supr., No. 416, 1995, Walsh, J.
(April 23, 1996) (citing Flood v. Flood, Del. Supr., No. 319, 1992, Holland, J. (Jan. 22,
1993)).
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he was entitled to “personal written notice” of the applicable statutory
procedures.  In essence Robinson argues that the State of Delaware engaged in
“misconduct”9 by failing to personally provide him with written notice of the
forfeiture proceedings at the Delaware Correctional Center, where he was
incarcerated, and, furthermore, that this failure, in and of itself, entitles him to
relief from the operation of the judgment.    
(5)
In order to succeed on his motion to reopen the judgment on the
basis of alleged misconduct by the State of Delaware, Robinson must
demonstrate that the State of Delaware acted in bad faith when it notified him
of the forfeiture proceedings.10  We have reviewed carefully the record in this
case, including the transcript of the October 4, 2002 motion hearing before the
Superior Court.  We find nothing in the record to support an allegation of bad
faith.  While the State of Delaware concedes that it did not send Robinson
notice of the forfeiture proceedings at the Delaware Correctional Center, it did
send a notice to Robinson’s home address and published a notice in the
11DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784(j); SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 71.3(a).
12Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972).
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newspaper.11  Moreover, a petition for return of the property was filed by Mr.
Spencer, Robinson’s grandfather, within a month of the notice being published
in the newspaper and Robinson later confirmed with Spencer’s attorney that
Spencer wanted to pursue the claim.  The Superior Court reasonably inferred
on the basis of these undisputed facts that Robinson knew of the forfeiture
proceedings at least by August 1998 and failed to take appropriate action to
protect his interest in the property.  The Superior Court, thus, acted within its
discretion in denying Robinson’s motion to reopen.12  
(6)
It is manifest on the face of Robinson’s opening brief that this
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated,
clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
s/Joseph T. Walsh
Justice