Title: MT AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION v GREEL

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 8 1 - 4 5 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 1 MONTANA AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, BUFFALO MACHINERY COMPANY e t a l . , and MONTANA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, P l a i n t i f f s and R e s p o n d e n t s , MIKE GREELY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, and PEG KRIVEC, COMMISSIONER OF POLITICAL PRACTICES, D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s . ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t s : Hon. M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a R i c h a r d L a r s o n argued and M a r y B. T r o l a n d argued, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a $f-c..k &DL-: ".cCe0-, ~ T L ~ For spondents : D o n a l d g a r r i t y argued, H e l e n a , M o n t a n a For A m i c u s C u r i a e : J a m e s G o e t z , R.C.L.U.), B o z e m a n , M o n t a n a James W. Zion, (A. C . L L~U. ) Hklana , M o n t a n a K e l l y A l a n J e n k i n s , (Common C a u s e ) H e l e n a , M o n t a n a F i l e d : . a L S O 1980 - -- S u b m i t t e d : M a r c h 2 7 , 1 9 8 1 D e c i d e d : J u l y 30, 1 9 8 1 M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. I n i t i a t i v e No. 85'-, Lobbyist Disclosure, (herein c a l l e d "1-85" o r " t h e I n i t i a t i v e " ) was held t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l by the D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . Defendants, t h e s t a t e a t t o r n e y general and t h e commissioner of p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s of t h e S t a t e of Montana, w e r e perman- e n t l y enjoined from enforcement of 1-85. Defendants appeal- from t h e judgment. W e hold t h a t t h e I n i t i a t i v e i n p a r t is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and void, and t h a t t h e balance of 1-85 i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c a r r y o u t t h e purposes of t h e Act and, t h e r e f o r e , remains i n e f f e c t . This opinion does n o t r u l e upon t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of 1-85 t o lawyers, which w i l l be decided i n a s e p a r a t e opinion, S t a t e Bar of Montana v. Krivec, Supreme Court Docket No. 81-35. Chapter 157, L a w s of Montana (1959), e n t i t l e d "Lobbying", w a s enacted i n 1959 and codified a s s e c t i o n 43-801, e t seq., R.C.M., 1947, now Chapter 7, T i t l e 5, MCA. The Lobbying Act was enacted " t o promote a high standard of e t h i c s i n t h e p r a c t i c e of lobbying, t o prevent u n f a i r and u n e t h i c a l lobbying p r a c t i c e s , and t o provide f o r the l i c e n s i n g of l o b b y i s t s and t h e suspension o r revocation of the l i c e n s e s . " Section 5-7- 1 0 1 , MCA. L e g i s l a t i v e amendments i n 1965 and 1977 made minor changes i n t h e lobbying law b u t d i d n o t a l t e r i t s scope. Section 3 , Ch. 248, Laws of Montana (1965) ; s e c t i o n s 19, 20 and 21, Ch. 309, Laws of Montana (1977). House ill 49 and Senate B i l l 233, designed t o expand t h e Act t o r e q u i r e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e amounts of money spent f o r lobbying, were introduced during t h e 1979 l e g i s l a t i v e session, b u t were k i l l e d p r i o r t o t r a n s m i t t a l . House Journal, 46th ~ e g i s l a t u r e l ~ e e Appendix "A". ( ~ o n t a n a 1979) ; Senate Journal, 46th Legislature (Montana 1979). I n 1980, a successful p e t i t i o n e f f o r t r e s u l t e d i n t h e placement of 1-85 on t h e statewide November b a l l o t . The I n i t i a t i v e sought t o add 13 new s e c t i o n s and t o make numerous amendments t o t h e e x i s t i n g lobbying r e g u l a t i o n a c t . I t a l s o g r e a t l y expanded t h e "Definitions" s e c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l law i n an attempt t o c l a r i f y the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e law a s expanded and amended. Most of t h e 1959 law and a l l of t h e changes proposed by 1-85 were p r i n t e d i n t h e Voter Information Pamphlet f o r the November 4 , 1980, general e l e c t i o n . The of- f i c a l v o t e on 1-85 was 259,698 " f o r " and 76,358 "against". O n November 2 4 , 1980, a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n w a s brought i n t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . The p l a i n t i f f s a r e a s s o c i a t i o n s which employ l o b b y i s t s , s e v e r a l i n d i v i d u a l s , and one s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ; and t h e defendants a r e t h e a t - torney general and t h e commissioner of p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s of Montana. A n attempt by defendants t o remove t h e a c t i o n t o t h e United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court was unsuccessful. On January 2 2 , 1981, a f t e r submission of b r i e f s and a hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t Court decreed t h a t " I n i t i a t i v e No. 85 i s uncon- s t i t u t i o n a l , n u l l , and void, and t h a t defendants a r e permanently enjoined from enforcing i t s provisions." The finding of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y was based upon t h e I n i t i a t i v e ' s impact on numerous r i g h t s : privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of t h e p r e s s , freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n , freedom t o p e t i t i o n t h e government, equal p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws, and freedom from compelled self-incrimination. The I n i t i a t i v e was a l s o held t o be void f o r vagueness. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e S t a t e had n o t m e t i t s burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g a compelling i n t e r e s t t h a t j u s t i f i e d t h e infringements mentioned above, o r t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t could be achieved through less r e s t r i c t i v e means. F i n a l l y , t h e D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y o f f e n s i v e p o r t i o n s of t h e I n i t i a t i v e could n o t be severed because " t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e e n t i r e measure depends upon t h e showing of a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t and a determination t h a t such i n t e r e s t may n o t be s a t i s f i e d by l e g i s l a t i o n more narrowly drawn." W e a g r e e w i t h t h e District Court t h a t 1-85 c o n f l i c t s w i t h v a r i o u s c o n s t i t u t i - o n a l r i g h t s of t h o s e a f f e c t e d by i t s p r o v i s i o n s . However, w e do n o t a g r e e t h a t t h e r e has been a f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t f o r t h e passage of 1-85. While w e f i n d t h a t c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s of t h e I n i t i a t i v e a r e beyond redemption, t h e s t r i k i n g of t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s does n o t r e s u l t i n a law t h a t i s incomplete o r incapable of f u l f i l l i n g i t s s t a t e d purpose. Whether enacted by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r c r e a t e d by t h e people through i n i t i a t i v e , a l l s t a t u t e s c a r r y w i t h them a presumption of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . S t a t e v . Erickson (1926) , 75 Mont. 429, 438, 244 P. 287, 290. When a s t a t u t e i s challenged a s being u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e c h a l l e n g e r must show t h a t it does i n f a c t i n f r i n g e upon a r i g h t guaranteed by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958), 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. When it has been demonstrated t h a t a s t a t u t e i n f r i n g e s upon F i r s t Amendment freedoms, a presumption of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y i s no longer a v a i l a b l e . United S t a t e s v. C . I . O . (1948), 335 U.S. 106, 140, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1366, 92 L.Ed. 1849, 1870-71, (Rutledge, J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) . Nevertheless, r e s t r i c t i o n s of F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s may be allowed i f t h e s t a t e can show t h a t t h e chal- lenged s t a t u t e f u r t h e r s a compelling governmental i n t e r e s t . United S t a t e s v. O'Brien (1968), 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 679-80. Appellants a g r e e t h a t c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s of 1-85 have an impact upon t h e fundamental r i g h t s of those t o whom t h e law a p p l i e s . How- ever, they argue t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t no compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t had been demonstrated. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t " [ t l h e I n i t i a t i v e i t s e l f does n o t r e c i t e any 'compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t ' i n . . . d i s c l o s u r e . . . Defendants o f f e r e d no proof t o e s t a b l i s h such a need." The c o u r t a l s o found t h a t t h e "Montana Legis- l a t u r e has i n v e s t i g a t i v e o r ' f a c t - f i n d i n g ' c a p a b i l i t i e s while the Montana i n i t i a t i v e process has no such a b i l i t y . " The mere r e c i t a t i o n of a compelling state i n t e r e s t i n t h e A c t i t s e l f would n o t be conclusive. While t h e a p p e l l a n t s d i d n o t p r e s e n t evidence t o e s t a b l i s h a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t , t h e i r b r i e f s a t t h e hearing below c i t e d a u t h o r i t y from numerous j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n which a compelling i n t e r e s t f o r s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t i o n had been found t o be present. Laws r e g u l a t i n g o r monitoring t h e r a i s i n g and spending of money i n t h e p o l i t i c a l arena have been enacted throughout the country a s w e l l a s by the Congress. When these laws have been challenged, t h e c o u r t s have n o t had d i f f i c u l t y f i n d i n g a compelling i n t e r e s t as a b a s i s f o r enactment. United S t a t e s v. Harriss (1954), 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 816, 98 L.Ed. 989, 1 0 0 1 , (maintaining t h e i n t e g r i t y of a b a s i c governmental p r o c e s s ) ; Young Americans f o r Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton (1974), 83 Wash.2d 728, 522 P.2d 189, 192, (informing public o f f i c i a l s and t h e e l e c t o r a t e of t h e spon- s o r s of e f f o r t s t o influence governmental decision-making); P l a n t e v. Gonzalez ( 5 t h C i r . 1978), 575 F.2d 1119, 1135, cert.den., (1979), 439 U.S. 1129, 99 S.Ct. 1047, 59 ~ . ~ d . 2 d 90, ( p r o t e c t i n g c i t i z e n s from abuse of t h e t r u s t placed i n t h e hands of e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s ) ; Montgomery County v. Walsh / <-_, C 'A (1975), 274 Md. .4% 336 A.2d 97, 106, appeal dismissed (1976), 4 2 4 U.S. 901, 96 S.Ct. 1 0 9 1 , 47 L.Ed.2d 306, ( f o s t e r i n g a climate of honesty p e r c e p t i b l e by t h e p u b l i c a t l a r g e ) . P o l i t i c a l corruption i s a matter of common popular perception, which may o r may n o t r e f l e c t the a c t u a l i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . J u d i c i a l n o t i c e may be taken of t h e compelling need f o r d i s c l o s u r e laws which have a s t h e i r purpose t h e deterrence of a c t u a l corruption and t h e avoidance of appearances of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo (1976), 424 U.S. 1, 67, 96 S.Ct. 612, 657, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, 715. The absence of f a c t - finding c a p a b i l i t i e s i n the i n i t i a t i v e process is n o t proof of t h e absence of a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e enactment of 1-85. To so hold would r e s u l t i n t h e emasculation of t h e i n i t i a t i v e process i n Montana with a r e s u l t t h a t no i n i t i a t i v e could withstand a F i r s t Amendment challenge. W e f i n d t h a t t h e statewide vote on 1-85 i s a demonstration of a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e enactment of 1-85. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e compelling need f o r t h i s type of l e g i s l a t i o n i s demonstrated by both common understanding and j u d i c i a l precedent, s o no a d d i t i o n a l evidence need be presented. Because w e f i n d t h a t a compelling need f o r d i s c l o s u r e has been e s t a b l i s h e d , w e cannot agree with t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t 1-85 must f a l l i n i t s e n t i r e t y . W e w i l l now proceed t o apply t h e s e v e r a b i l i t y c l a u s e of t h e ~ n i t i a t i v e t o the end t h a t " a l l v a l i d p a r t s t h a t a r e severable from t h e i n v a l i d p a r t [may] remain i n e f f e c t . " Section 2 1 , 1-85. EXCEPTIONS F O R INDIVIDUAL MONTANA CITIZENS Section l(2) of 1-85 provides t h a t " [nlothing i n t h i s chapter s u b j e c t s any Montana c i t i z e n lobbying on his/her own behalf t o any r e p o r t i n g requirements nor deprives any such c i t i z e n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o communicate with p u b l i c o f f i c i a l - s . " Section 2 ( 5 ) (b) (i) s t a t e s t h a t " ' [llobby- i s t ' does n o t include (i) any individual Montana c i t i z e n a c t i n g s o l e l y on his/her own behalf . . ." W e f i n d the exemption provided f o r Montana c i t i z e n s cons ti t u t i o n a l l y impermissible. "The c i t i z e n s of each s t a t e s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o a l l p r i v i l e g e s and immunities of c i t i z e n s i n t h e s e v e r a l s t a t e s . " U.S. Const., a r t . I V , 52, c l . 1. W e can d i s c e r n no b a s i s f o r c r e a t i n g an exception s o l e l y f o r individual Montana c i t i z e n s . A c i t i z e n of North Dakota o r N e w J e r s e y may have an i n t e r e s t i n some o f f i c i a l a c t i o n i n Montana t h a t warrants h i s e f f o r t s t o influence the outcome of t h a t a c t i o n . I f the individual Montana c i t i z e n lobbying i n h i s own behalf i s immune from t h e reach of the I n i t i a t i v e , so too i s the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n of a sister s t a t e . J u s t a s the p r i v i l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e p r o t e c t s persons who e n t e r o t h e r s t a t e s t o earn a l i v i n g , Toomer v. Witsell (1948), 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460; Gordon v. Committee on Character and F i t n e s s (1979), 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 4 2 2 N.Y.S.2d 641, it must p r o t e c t persons who e n t e r t h i s s t a t e t o a s s e r t o r p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s before p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . The word "Montana" i s void and without e f f e c t i n both s e c t i o n s . DEFINITIONS O F "UNPROFESSIONAL C O N D U C T " Section 2(7) of 1-85 d e f i n e s "unprofessional conduct". A s amended and expanded by 1-85, "unprofessional conduct" now includes the following: " ( 7 ) 'Unprofessional conduct' means: " ( a ) a v i o l a t i o n of any of t h e provisions of t h i s chapter ; " (b) i n s t i g a t i n g a c t i o n by any public o f f i c i a l f o r the purpose of obtaining employment i n opposi- t i o n t h e r e t o ; " (c) attempting t o influence t h e a c t i o n of any public o f f i c i a l on any measure pending o r t o be proposed by " ( i ) t h e promise of support o r opposition a t any fu- t u r e e l e c t i o n , " ( i i ) promise of f i n a n c i a l support " (iii) making p u b l i c any unsubstantiated charges of improper conduct on the p a r t of any o t h e r l o b b y i s t , any p r i n c i p a l , o r any l e g i s l a t o r , " ( i v ) any improper economic r e p r i s a l o r o t h e r un- lawful r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , o r " (v) any means o t h e r than argument on t h e m e r i t s thereof ; " (d) attempting t o influence a d e c i s i o n o r v o t e by a hearing examiner o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r i n any contested case proceeding under P a r t 6, Chapter 4 , T i t l e 2, MCA except a s provided t h e r e i n ; " ( e ) attempting t o knowingly deceive any public o f f i - c i a l with regard t o the p e r t i n e n t f a c t s of an o f f i c i a l matter o r attempt t o knowingly misrepresent p e r t i n e n t f a c t s of an o f f i c i a l matter t o any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l ; o r " (f ) engaging i n p r a c t i c e s which r e f l e c t d i s c r e d i t on t h e p r a c t i c e of lobbying l e g i s l a t u r e . " 2 Section 5-7-305, MCA , makes it a misdemeanor t o v i o l a t e t h e provisions of t h e lobbying law. The punishment i s i m - prisonment i n t h e county j a i l f o r n o t more than s i x months o r a f i n e up t o $200, o r both. N o person should be held criminally responsible f o r conduct which he could n o t reason- ably understand t o be proscribed. Palmer v. City of Euclid, Ohio (1971), 402 U.S. 544, 546, 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564, 29 L.Ed.2d 98, 1 0 0 . A s t a t u t e i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague when it f a i l s t o give a person of ordinary i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i r n o t i c e t h a t h i s contemplated a c t i v i t y i s forbidden by t h e s t a t u t e . United S t a t e s v. Dupree ( 9 t h C i r . 1976), 544 F. 2d 1050, 1051. A number of t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of "unprofessional conduct" f a i l t o overcome t h i s b a s i c hurdle. Sections 2 (7) (c) ( i v ) and (v) p r o h i b i t attempting t o influence a c t i o n by any public o f f i c i a l through improper economic r e p r i s a l , 2 ~ e e Appendix "B". unlawful r e t a l i a t i o n , o r any means o t h e r than argument on t h e m e r i t s . Is t h e r e a form of "proper" economic r e p r i s a l ? H o w does a l o b b y i s t determine when he may r e t a l i a t e lawfully a g a i n s t a public o f f i c i a l ? And, i n subsection ( v ) , can conduct which i s p o t e n t i a l l y criminal be defined as "any means o t h e r than" the s i n g l e , permitted means of argument on t h e merits? Section 2 (7) (£1 p r o h i b i t s "engaging i n p r a c t i c e s which r e f l e c t d i s c r e d i t on t h e p r a c t i c e of lobbying l e g i s l a t u r e [ s i c ] " . W e need n o t d e a l with t h e apparent e r r o r i n amendment. The words "or the" w e r e formerly placed between "lobbying" and " l e g i s l a t u r e " . W e simply hold t h a t t o " r e f l e c t d i s c r e d i t " i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f i n i t e t o give a person of ordinary i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i r n o t i c e t h a t h i s conduct i s forbidden. Sections 2 (7) ( c ) ( i v ) and (v) and s e c t i o n 2 (7) ( f ) a r e impermis- s i b l y vague, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , and t h e r e f o r e , void. Section 2 (7) ( c ) (i) d e f i n e s "unprofessional conduct" a s "attempting t o influence t h e a c t i o n of any public o f f i c i a l on any measure pending o r t o be proposed by (i) t h e promise of support o r opposition a t any f u t u r e e l e c t i o n . " A s we read t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e prohibited conduct i s nothing more than a standard and accepted means of involvement i n t h e po- l i t i c a l process. The only r e a l influence t h a t most v o t e r s can e x e r t upon e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s i s t o g i v e o r withhold t h e i r vote. When an i s s u e comes before an e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l , it i s c e r t a i n l y permissible f o r the o f f i c i a l ' s c o n s t i t u e n t s t o express t h e i r d e s i r e s a s t o t h a t i s s u e . I f t h e i s s u e i s important enough t o a v o t e r , the o f f i c i a l may be t o l d t h a t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n on t h e measure would c r e a t e such d i s a f f e c t i o n t h a t the voter could not, i n good conscience, support t h a t o f f i c i a l i n any f u t u r e e l e c t i o n . This i s n o t a t h r e a t . I t i s a f r e e expression of t h e only r e a l power an e l e c t o r possesses. C r i t i c i s m of government i s a t t h e very c e n t e r of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of f r e e speech. Therefore, c r i t i c i s m of those responsible f o r government operations must be f r e e , l e s t c r i t i c i s m of government i t s e l f be penalized. Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966), 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 675-76, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 605. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guaranty of f r e e speech provides f o r the opportunity t o persuade t o a c t i o n , n o t merely t o describe f a c t s . Thomas v. C o l l i n s (1945), 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 326, 89 L.Ed. 430, 444. I t i s a fundamental p r i n c i p l e of our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system t h a t the opportunity f o r f r e e p o l i t i c a l expression has a s its end t h a t government may be responsive t o t h e w i l l of t h e people. New York T i m e s Co. v. S u l l i v a n (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 1 1 L.Ed.2d 686, 700, motion denied, 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 1130, 1 2 L.Ed.2d 83. N o law could stand which would prevent an e l e c t o r from voting f o r o r a g a i n s t an incumbent. Likewise, no law can stand which would prevent a voter from expressing t o an e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l an i n t e n t i o n t o vote f o r o r a g a i n s t t h a t o f f i c i a l i f c e r t a i n a c t i o n i s o r i s n o t taken. Such a r e s t r a i n t is impermissible under both t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e U.S. Constitution and a r t i c l e 11, S7 of t h e Montana Constitution. The r e s t r i c t i o n i s no l e s s o f f e n s i v e because, under 1-85, it a p p l i e s t o "principal s " and t h e i r advocates, " l o b b y i s t s " . The F i r s t Amendment a p p l i e s t o a s s o c i a t i o n s , as w e l l a s i n d i v i d u a l s , and p r o t e c t s t h e r i g h t of a s s o c i a t i o n s t o engage i n advocacy on behalf of t h e i r members. smith v. Arkansas S t a t e Highway Employees (1979), 4 4 1 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 1826, 60 L.Ed. 2d 360. Section 2 (7) ( c ) (i) i s an unconsti- t u t i o n a l infringement of t h e r i g h t of f r e e speech and i s , t h e r e f o r e , void. W e t u r n now t o the f i n a l problems presented by t h e "un- p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct" s e c t i o n s of t h e l a w . W e note t h a t "unprofessional conduct" embraces "a v i o l a t i o n of any of the provisions of t h i s chapter. " Section 2 (7) ( a ) , 1-85. The chapter, however, e s t a b l i s h e s c e r t a i n requirements f o r e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s a s well a s f o r l o b b y i s t s and p r i n c i p a l s . The law w a s , and s t i l l i s , a measure designed primarily t o r e g u l a t e the a c t i v i t i e s of t h e lobbying profession. The conduct prohibited by s e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) i s conduct t h a t could be engaged i n by l o b b y i s t s and possibly by p r i n c i p a l s , b u t w e do n o t f i n d t h a t t h e a c t i o n s of e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s w e r e intended t o be covered by t h i s subsection. We, t h e r e f o r e , construe s e c t i o n 2 (7) ( a ) t o l i m i t "unprofessional conduct" t o v i o l a t i o n s of any of t h e provisions of t h e chapter by a l o b b y i s t o r p r i n c i p a l . This brings us back t o the question of t h e scope of a c t i v i t i e s which may be found t o be "unprofessional." A "lobbyist" i s "any person who engages i n t h e p r a c t i c e of lobbying f o r h i r e . " Section 2 (5) ( a ) , 1-85. "Lobbying includes: . . . (b) t h e p r a c t i c e of promoting o r opposing o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by any public o f f i c i a l . . ." Section 2 ( 4 ) ( b ) , 1-85. " ' P u b l i c o f f i c i a l ' means any i n d i v i d u a l , e l e c t e d o r appointed, a c t i n g i n h i s o f f i c i a l capacity f o r t h e s t a t e o r l o c a l government o r any p o l i t i c a l subdivision t h e r e o f , --- b u t does n o t include those a c t i n g - i n - a j u d i c i a l - o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l capacity." Section 2 ( 3 ) , 1-85. (Emphasis added. ) So, i n an a c t e n t i t l e d "Lobbying", and d r a f t e d with t h e r e g u l a t i o n of lobbying i n mind, w e have a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t lobbying does n o t include the p r a c t i c e of promoting o r opposing o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by a j u d i c i a l o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l p u b l i c o f f i c i a l . Despite t h i s c l e a r exception, s e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) (d) makes it a crime t o attempt " t o influence a d e c i s i o n o r v o t e by a hearing examiner o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r i n any contested c a s e proceeding under P a r t 6, Chapter 4 , T i t l e 2 , MCA, except a s provided t h e r e i n . " I f p o s s i b l e , subsec- t i o n s of a s t a t u t e shou1.d be construed i n a manner t h a t w i l l g i v e e f f e c t t o them a l l . S t a t e v. District Court of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t (1963), 1 4 2 Mont. 328, 384 P.2d 501; Section 1-2-101, MCA. This Court must r e c o n c i l e c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s and make them o p e r a t i v e i n accordance with t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , i n s o f a r a s it i s p o s s i b l e t o do so. S t a t e ex rel. Bennick v. District Court of t h e 1 3 t h J. D. (1975), 167 Mont. 389, 391, 538 P.2d 1369, 1370. I t i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i n t e n t i o n of a law enacted t o r e g u l a t e lobbying t o a l s o r e g u l a t e conduct t h a t is, by t h e t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e , n o t lobbying. Criminal s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y construed. Shipman v. Todd (1957), 131 Mont. 365, 368, 310 P.2d 300, 302. W e construe 1-85, a s it a p p l i e s t o p r i n c i p a l s and l o b b y i s t s , t o r e g u l a t e only t h a t conduct which f a l l s under t h e d e f i n i t i o n of lobbying. Because "attempting t o i n f l u e n c e a d e c i s i o n o r v o t e by a hearing examiner o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " i s e x p r e s s l y excluded from t h e d e f i n i t i o n of lobbying a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , it i s i r r e c o n c i l a b l y i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e A c t . I t cannot be "unprofessional conduct", and no p e n a l t y may a t t a c h t o such conduct by a p p l i c a t i o n of 1-85. Section 2 ( 7 ) (d) i s void. DEFINITION O F "PRINCIPAL" W e next t u r n t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " p r i n c i p a l " a s con- t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n s 2 ( 8 ) (a) and (b) . " P r i n c i p a l " i s defined i n subsection ( a ) a s any person who makes payments i n excess of $1,000 per calendar year t o engage a l o b b y i s t . N o question i s r a i s e d with regard t o subsection ( a ) . " P r i n c i p a l " is f u r t h e r defined a s any person who makes those payments: " ( b ) i n t h e c a s e of a person o t h e r than an i n d i v i - dual, t o s o l i c i t , d i r e c t l y , i n d i r e c t l y o r by an ad- v e r t i s i n g campaign, t h e lobbying e f f o r t s of another person. " Subsection (b) i s attacked f o r vagueness and i n f r i n g e - ment upon F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s under the United S t a t e s Constitution and a r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n 6 , of t h e Montana Constitution, by which t h e people a r e given t h e r i g h t t o peaceably p r o t e s t governmental a c t i o n , and t h e following s e c t i o n 7 which provides t h a t no law s h a l l be passed impair- i n g t h e freedom of speech o r expression. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine what person o r groups of persons w e r e intended t o be included under subsection (b) a s " p r i n c i p a l s " . Following a r e f i v e examples of organizational a c t i o n s which m e e t t h e subsection (b) d e f i n i t i o n of " p r i n c i p a l " : (1) Action by union o f f i c e r s asking union members t o support o r oppose a right-to-work law. ( 2 ) Mailing of newsletters by an organized church t o members and nonmembers encouraging t h e reader t o c o n t a c t a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l on a n abortion law. (3) A c t i v i t y by a farm group which suggests t o farmers t h a t they should c o n t a c t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s i n order t o improve g r a i n o r c a t t l e p r i c e s . ( 4 ) Action by any business, l a b o r , farm, r e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l o r o t h e r group requesting people t o c o n t a c t t h e i r l e g i s l a t o r s t o a s s i s t i n passage o r r e p e a l of a law. (5) Publication o r broadcast by anyone, other than an i n d i v i d u a l , of a newspaper, pamphlet, newsletter, t e l e v i s i o n program, o r r a d i o program which encourages readers o r l i s t e n - e r s t o c o n t a c t a l e g i s l a t o r o r s t a t e o f f i c i a l . I n examples (1) t o ( 4 ) , subsection (b) i s challenged a s being u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague and overbroad. W e have n o t been a b l e t o construe subsection (b) i n a manner t h a t meets these challenges. I n United S t a t e s v. H a r r i s s , supra, 347 U.S. 612, t h e Supreme Court was a b l e t o narrowly construe provisions of t h e Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act and, t h e r e f o r e , f i n d it t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . This was done t o eliminate t h e vagueness i n the Act. I n substance, t h e Court narrowly construed t h e words " [ t l o influence, d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , the passage o r d e f e a t of any l e g i s l a t i o n by t h e Congress of the United S t a t e s " t o be l i m i t e d " d i r e c t communication with members of Congress on pending o r proposed f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n . " United S t a t e s v. H a r r i s s , supra, 347 U.S. a t 620. I n doing so, t h e Supreme Court r e l i e d upon United S t a t e s v. Rumely (1953), 345 U.S. 4 1 , 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770. I n t h e Rumely case, t h e Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Surely it cannot be denied t h a t giving t h e scope t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n f o r which the Government contends, t h a t i s , deriving from it the power t o i n q u i r e i n t o a l l e f f o r t s of p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s t o influence pub- l i c opinion through books and p e r i o d i c a l s , however remote the r a d i a t i o n s of influence which they may e x e r t upon t h e u l t i m a t e l e g i s l a t i v e process, r a i s e s doubts of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y i n view of the prohibi- t i o n of the F i r s t Amendment." United S t a t e s v. Rumely, supra, 345 U.S. a t 46. The Court then construed "lobbying a c t i v i t i e s " a s being l i m i t e d t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made d i r e c t l y t o the Congress, i t s members, o r i t s committees. Subsection (b) could n o t be construed i n t h i s manner, a s it s p e c i f i c a l l y covers s o l i c i t a - t i o n by a person seeking lobbying e f f o r t s by o t h e r s . The foregoing example (5) focuses on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of subsection (b) t o a newspaper, t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n , r a d i o s t a t i o n , pamphleteer o r o t h e r publishers. Such an applica- t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l infringement of t h e freedom of the press. A s s t a t e d by t h e Supreme Court i n M i l l s v. Alabama (1966), 384 U.S 2 1 4 , 218-20, 86 S.Ct. 1434, "Whatever d i f f e r e n c e s may e x i s t about i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e F i r s t Amendment, t h e r e i s p r a c t i c a l l y universal agreement t h a t a major purpose of t h a t Amendment was t o p r o t e c t the f r e e discussion of go- vernmental a f f a i r s . This of course includes d i s - cussions of candidates, s t r u c t u r e s and forms of go- vernment, t h e manner i n which government is operated o r should be operated, and a l l such m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o p o l i t i c a l processes. The C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y s e l e c t e d t h e p r e s s , which includes n o t only news- papers, books, and magazines, b u t a l s o humble l e a f - lets and c i r c u l a r s , [ci-tation] t o play an important r o l e i n the discussion of public a f f a i r s . Thus t h e p r e s s serves and was designed t o serve a s a powerful a n t i d o t e t o any abuses of power by governmental o f f i - c i a l s and a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y chosen means f o r keep- i n g o f f i c i a l s e l e c t e d by the people responsible t o a l l t h e people whom they were s e l e c t e d t o serve. Suppression of t h e r i g h t of the p r e s s t o p r a i s e o r c r i t i c i z e governmental agents and t o clamor and con- tend f o r o r a g a i n s t change, which i s a l l t h a t t h i s e d i t o r i a l d i d , muzzles one of the very agencies t h e Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and d e l i b e r - a t e l y s e l e c t e d t o improve our s o c i e t y and keep it f r e e . ". . . W e hold t h a t no test of reasonableness can save a s t a t e law from i n v a l i d a t i o n a s a v i o l a t i o n of t h e F i r s t Amendment when t h a t law makes it a crime f o r a newspaper e d i t o r t o do no more than urge people t o v o t e one way o r another i n a p u b l i c l y held e l e c t i o n . " Even newspaper e d i t o r i a l s , a s r e f e r r e d t o i n M i l l s v. Alabama, supra, would cons ti t u t e lobbying a c t i v i t y under subsection ( b ) . F a c i a l l y , subsection (b) c o n s t i t u t e s a more d r a s t i c infringement on freedom of t h e p r e s s and freedom of speech than was p r e s e n t i n M i l l s v. Alabama, supra. Because subsection (b) i n f r i n g e s on F i r s t Amendment freedoms, it w i l l be s u b j e c t t o c l o s e j u d i c i a l examination. Such s i g n i - f i c a n t i n t e r f e r e n c e s with those r i g h t s may be allowed only i f a compelling governmental i n t e r e s t i s shown. United S t a t e s v. OIBrien, supra, 391 U.S. 367. W e a r e unable t o f i n d any compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t which r e q u i r e s t h e i n c l u s i o n of subsection (b) i n t h e I n i t i - a t i v e . The fundamental purposes of t h e I n i t i a t i v e are accomplished by including, a s a p r i n c i p a l , t h e person who h i r e s a lobbyist. W e f i n d a l l of s e c t i o n 2 ( 8 ) (b) t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under the F i r s t Amendment t o the United S t a t e s Constitution, and a r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n s 6 and 7 of t h e Montana Constitution. I t is, t h e r e f o r e , void. PROHIBITED COMPENSATION Section 5-7-302, MCA, was amended by s e c t i o n 9 of t h e I n i t i a t i v e t o read: "No person may be employed a s a l o b b y i s t f o r a compensation dependent i n any manner upon t h e passage o r d e f e a t of any proposed o r pending o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l o r upon any other contingency connected with such action." I n t h e p a s t , contingent f e e agreements f o r lobbying s e r v i c e s w e r e seen as i n v i t i n g and inducing improper s o l i c i t a t i o n s of Congress. Hazelton v. Sheckells (1906) , 202 U.S. 71, 79, 26 S.Ct. 567, 568, 50 L.Ed. 939, 941. A contingent f e e agreement w a s considered strong evidence t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t improper means would be used. C. Sands, 1 S t a t u t e s and S t a t u t o r y Construction 513.20 ( 4 t h Ed. 1973). W e surmise t h a t t h i s was t h e public p o l i c y behind t h e o r i g i n a l i n c l u s i o n of s e c t i o n 5-7-302 i n t h e Lobbying Act, and t h e reason f o r i t s r e t e n t i o n and amendment by t h e I n i t i a t i v e . There i s , of course, no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n afforded improper lobbying a c t i v i t i e s , and the S t a t e may attempt t o r e g u l a t e and punish any improprieties. However, even when t h e S t a t e has t h e power t o r e g u l a t e an a c t i v i t y , t h e power "must be so exercised a s not, i n a t t a i n - i n g a permissible end, unduly t o i n f r i n g e [a] protected freedom." Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)r 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1218. The blanket p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t contingent compensation of l o b b y i s t s provided by s e c t i o n 9 i s overbroad because it precludes contingent f e e agreements t h a t a r e properly motivated a s w e l l a s those t h a t a r e improperly motivated. Section 9 thereby v i o l a t e s t h e r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n t h e government i n - cluded i n t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitu- t i o n and i n a r t i c l e 11, 56 of the Montana Constitution. The a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s and organizations t o f u l l y e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n the government may be severely c u r t a i l e d by t h i s broad prohibition. W e f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 9 unduly i n f r i n g e s t h e r i g h t s of those who, while contemplating n e i t h e r i l l e g a l nor unethical conduct, need o r d e s i r e t o employ a l o b b y i s t on a contingent f e e b a s i s i n order t o advance t h e i r i n t e r e s t s before a public o f f i c i a l . The S t a t e may n o t impose so broad a l i m i t a t i o n on t h e r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n . The objectionable q u a l i t y of overbreadth depends upon t h e danger of t o l e r a t i n g , i n t h e a r e a of F i r s t Amendment freedoms, t h e existence of a penal s t a t u t e s u s c e p t i b l e of sweeping and improper a p p l i c a t i o n . N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963), 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 418. s e c t i o n 5- 7-302, MCA, a s amended by s e c t i o n 9 of t h e ~ n i t i a t i v e i s void. ACCOUNTINGS I n order t o accomplish i t s purpose of revealing money s p e n t t o influence a c t i o n s of public o f f i c i a l s , t h e I n i t i a t i v e r e q u i r e s p r i n c i p a l s t o f i l e accountings which d e t a i l payments made t o influence o f f i c i a l a c t i o n and payments f o r lobbying. Section 11, 1-85. A number of t h e provisions of t h e accounting s e c t i o n give r i s e t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l con£ l i c t s which can only be resolved by our elimination of c e r t a i n of t h e accounting requirements. Section 1 1 (5) d i c t a t e s t h a t : " (5) Each accounting f i l e d under t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l : " ( a ) l i s t a l l payments f o r lobbying i n each of t h e f o l - lowing categories: " (i) o r i g i n a l and d e r i v a t i v e research ( f o r which t h e c o s t may be estimated i f necessary) done t o support I a lobbying argument o r presentation: " ( i i ) p u b l i c a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of each publica- t i o n , except t h a t the c o s t of a newsletter o r l e a f l e t d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e membership of a p r i n c i p a l need n o t be reported unless over one-half of t h a t newsletter o r l e a f l e t i s devoted t o lobbying matters; . . . I' ( i v ) news media; " A s we have noted, t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s a penal s t a t u t e . Its provisions must be s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f i n i t e t o g i v e a person of ordinary i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i r n o t i c e t h a t h i s conduct i s forbidden. W e f i n d t h a t the requirement of r e p o r t i n g payments f o r " o r i g i n a l and d e r i v a t i v e research" i s too i n d e f i n i t e f o r a p r i n c i p a l t o ever be assured t h a t he o r she has f u l l y complied with the section. The i n d e f i n i t e n e s s of /section 11(S) ( a ) (i) i s demonstrated by t h e f a c t t h a t the c o s t of research "may be estimated i f necessary." There a r e so many a s p e c t s t o t h e gathering of information f o r use i n a lobbying e f f o r t t h a t it would be impossible t o determine when research i s being done and what i t s c o s t is. Is t h e time spent making a phone c a l l t o an agency t o o b t a i n information "research"? Is it o r i g i n a l and d e r i v a t i v e ? I f an estimate f o r research c o s t s i s given, when i s t h a t estimate so inac- c u r a t e a s t o give rise t o criminal l i a b i l i t y ? W e believe t h a t a p r i n c i p a l cannot know f o r c e r t a i n i f he has complied with s e c t i o n l l ( 5 ) ( a ) (i.), and it i s , t h e r e f o r e , void f o r vagueness. The same i s t r u e of s e c t i o n l l ( 5 ) ( a ) ( i v ) , which r e q u i r e s r e p o r t i n g of payments f o r "news media". Publication of newsletters and l e a f l e t s , "other" p r i n t i n g , and a d v e r t i s i n g , including production c o s t s , a r e covered elsewhere i n s e c t i o n l l ( 5 ) ( a ) . W e a r e unable t o determine what a d d i t i o n a l informa- t i o n ought t o be disclosed under t h e subheading of "news media." I f a c t i v i t i e s of a p r i n c i p a l o r l o b b y i s t a r e news- worthy, would t h e p r i n c i p a l be required t o r e p o r t t h e c o s t of those a c t i v i t i e s ? W e think not, b u t w e cannot be c e r t a i n ; n e i t h e r could a p r i n c i p a l be c e r t a i n . Section 1 1 (5) ( a ) ( i v ) i s , t h e r e f o r e , void. Section 1 1 (5) ( a ) (ii) r e q u i r e s a p r i n c i p a l t o l i s t a l l payments f o r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of p u b l i c a t i o n s over one half of which a r e devoted t o lobbying matters. This requirement s e r i o u s l y i n f r i n g e s freedom of t h e press. U.S. Const. amend. I; Mont. Const. a r t . 11, s e c t i o n 7. "The Constitution s p e c i f i c a l l y s e l e c t e d t h e p r e s s , which includes n o t only newspapers, books, and magazines, b u t a l s o humble l e a f l e t s and c i r c u l a r s , [ c i t a t i o n ] , t o play an important r o l e i n t h e discussion of public a f f a i r s . " Mills v. Alabama, supra, 384 U.S. a t 219. "[Albove a l l else, t h e F i r s t Amendment means t h a t government has no power t o r e s t r i c t expression because of i t s message, i t s i d e a s , i t s s u b j e c t matter, o r i t s content." P o l i c e Department of Chicago v. Mosley (1972), 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212, 216. The requirement t h a t only p u b l i c a t i o n s which devote more than one half of t h e i r space t o lobbying m a t t e r s need be included i n accountings i s r e g u l a t i o n based upon content. I t i s t r u e t h a t it i s r e g u l a t i o n which does n o t amount t o d i r e c t censorship. Nevertheless, evidence was presented below t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l burden of r e p o r t i n g could cause c e r t a i n of the p l a i n t i f f s t o cease p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e i r newsletters. W e f i n d t h i s p o t e n t i a l f o r i n d i r e c t l i m i t a t i o n of freedom of t h e p r e s s i s a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r t h e elimination of s e c t i o n 1 1 (5) ( a ) (ii) . The f a c t t h a t advocacy may persuade t h e e l e c t o r a t e i s hardly a reason t o suppress it. F i r s t (1978) National Bank of Boston v. el lot ti/ 435 U . S . 765, 790, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1423, 55 L.Ed.2d 707, 727. The f a c t t h a t 51 percent of one p u b l i c a t i o n b u t only 50 percent of another p u b l i c a t i o n may persuade t h e e l e c t o r a t e i s no reason t o burden t h e former b u t n o t t h e l a t t e r . Section l l ( 5 ) ( a ) (ii) i s void. Section 1 1 (5) (c) r e q u i r e s p r i n c i p a l s t o include i n t h e i r accountings "each c o n t r i b u t i o n and membership f e e which amounts t o $250 o r more when aggregated over t h e per- iod of one calendar year paid t o t h e p r i n c i p a l , r e g a r d l e s s of whether it was paid s o l e l y f o r t h e purpose of lobbying, with t h e f u l l address of each payer and t h e i s s u e a r e a , i f any, f o r which such payment was earmarked." Required d i s - c l o s u r e of t h i s type of information does n o t automatically render a s t a t u t e unconstitutional. See Young Americans f o r Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, supra. However, t h e words "regard- l e s s of whether it was paid s o l e l y " cause s e c t i o n 1 1 (5) (c) t o apply s o broadly a s t o be v i o l a t i v e of t h e F i r s t Amendment r i g h t of a s s o c i a t i o n , which e x i s t s a s a necessary c o r o l l a r y t o t h e freedoms of speech and assembly. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S. a t 460. "[Elven though t h e govern- mental purpose be l e g i t i m a t e and s u b s t a n t i a l , t h a t purpose cannot be pursued by means t h a t broadly s t i f l e fundamental personal l i b e r t i e s when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker (1960), 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, 237. The forced d i s c l o s u r e of contribu- t i o n s and membership f e e s , "regardless of whether . . . paid s o l e l y f o r t h e purpose of lobbying", compels r e v e l a t i o n of information t h a t has no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e ends t h a t t h e Lobbying Act and t h e I n i t i a t i v e seek t o achieve. Lobbying i s what the S t a t e means t o regulate. This r e g u l a t i o n i s n o t more completely accomplished by r e q u i r i n g an organization which engages i n lobbying t o divulge t h e names of those c o n t r i b u t o r s and members whose monies were never intended t o be spent on s p e c i f i c lobbying e f f o r t s . That those monies a r e i n f a c t spent f o r lobbying does n o t l e s s e n t h e repug- nance of s e c t i o n 1 1 ( 5 ) ( c ) . The forced d i s c l o s u r e of the name of an i n d i v i d u a l who contributed $250, even though the i n d i v i d u a l had no s p e c i f i c d e s i r e t h a t t h e money be spent t o influence o f f i c i a l a c t i o n , reaches too broadly and too b l i n d l y i n t o an a r e a t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l t o the e x e r c i s e of our most b a s i c freedoms. "[Clompelled d i s c l o s u r e of a f f i l i a t i o n with groups engaged i n advocacy may c o n s t i t u t e [an] e f f e c t i v e . . . r e s t r a i n t on freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n . . . I n v i o l a b i l i t y of privacy i n group a s s o c i a t i o n may i n many circumstances be indispensable t o preservation of freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y where a group espouses d i s s i d e n t b e l i e f s . " N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S. a t 462. Unless a compelling i n t e r e s t e x i s t s , t h e S t a t e may n o t p u t a person i n t h e p o s i t i o n of having t o r e v e a l o r explain h i s a s s o c i a t i o n a l t i e s . A compelling i n t e r e s t e x i s t s under t h e I n i t i a t i v e when money i s contributed " f o r the purpose of lobbying." Absent t h a t purpose, t h e S t a t e may not, by the I n i t i a t i v e , cause an i n d i v i d u a l ' s a f f i l i a t i o n s t o be made public. The words " r e g a r d l e s s of whether it was paid s o l e l y " a s used i n s e c t i o n 1 1 ( 5 ) ( c ) a r e void. The f i n a l accounting requirement with which w e w i l l concern ourselves i s s e c t i o n 1 1 ( 5 ) ( d ) , which r e q u i r e s a p r i n c i p a l to: " l i s t each p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n , including any- thing of value, paid t o any candidate f o r e l e c t i v e p u b l i c o f f i c e , t o any committee e s t a b l i s h e d t o support o r oppose a candidate f o r e l e c t i v e p u b l i c o f f i c e , o r t o any committee t o support o r oppose any i n i t i a t i v e , referendum, o r o t h e r b a l l o t i s s u e , whether such payment i s made d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y by the p r i n c i p a l o r any l o b b y i s t who received com- pensation o r reimbursement f o r such payment from t h e p r i n c i p a l . " The t i t l e of t h e I n i t i a t i v e a s p r i n t e d i n t h e Voter Information Pamphlet, read a s follows: "THIS PROPOSED INITIATIVE REQUIRES PUBLIC DISCLOSURE O F MONEY SPENT TO INFLUENCE ACTION O F A PUBLIC OFFI- CIAL. ALL INDIVIDUALS OR BUSINESSES WHO E M P L O Y LOBBY- ISTS AND SPEND MORE THAN $1000 A YEAR TO P R O M O T E OR OPPOSE OFFICIAL ACTION O F A PUBLIC OFFICIAL M U S T GIVE A C O M P L E T E ACCOUNTING O F A L L MONEY SPENT. THE PROPOSAL D O E S NOT APPLY TO INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS LOBBYING ON THEIR OWN BEHALF. ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE REQUIRED TO PUBLICLY DISCLOSE THEIR BUSINESS INTERESTS. CRIMINAL AND C I V I L PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED F O R VIOLATIONS O F THE PROVISIONS O F THIS INITIATIVE." "Each b i l l , except general appropriation b i l l s and b i l l s f o r t h e c o d i f i c a t i o n and general r e v i s i o n of t h e laws, s h a l l contain only one s u b j e c t , c l e a r l y expressed i n its title. I f any s u b j e c t i s embraced i n any a c t and i s not expressed i n t h e title, only so much of the a c t n o t s o expressed is void." Mont. Const. a r t . V, 811, c l . 3. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirement t h a t a law should contain only one s u b j e c t has been s t r i c t l y construed. S t a t e v. Joyland Club (1950), 1 2 4 Mont. 122, 143, 220 P.2d 988, 998. The purpose of requiring singleness of s u b j e c t i s t o prevent t h e p r a c t i c e of embracing i n t h e same b i l l incongruous matters which have no r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r o r t o t h e s u b j e c t s p e c i f i e d i n the t i t l e , so t h a t measures may n o t be adopted without a t t r a c t i n g a t t e n t i o n t o them. Rosebud County v. Flinn (1940), 109 Mont. 537, 543-44, 98 P.2d 330, 334; Jobb v. Meagher County (1898), 20 Mont. 4 2 4 , 437, 51 P. 1034, 1038. The "one s u b j e c t " l i m i t a t i o n has been applied t o i n i t i a t i v e s a s w e l l as laws passed by t h e Legislature. Martin v. S t a t e Highway Commission (1939) , 107 Mont. 603, 88 P.2d 41. The test under t h i s provision of t h e Montana Constitution i s simply whether t h e t i t l e i s of such character a s t o mislead the p u b l i c a s t o the s u b j e c t s embraced. C i t y of Helena v. Omholt (1970), 155 Mont. 2 1 2 , W e f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 1 1 (5) (d) of t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s not embraced i n the t i t l e of t h e I n i t i a t i v e . Contributions t o support o r oppose candidates, i n i t i a t i v e s , referenda o r o t h e r b a l l o t i s s u e s , which must be reported under s e c t i o n 1 1 (5) (d) , a r e n o t t h e payments made t o "influence a c t i o n of a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l " r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e t i t l e . The f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s covered by s e c t i o n 1 1 (5) (d) a r e monies s p e n t i n an attempt t o achieve p o l i t i c a l influence i s an i n s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s t o c r e a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e t i t l e and t h e section. The I n i t i a t i v e i s an amendment and expansion of the Lobbying Act. I t is c l e a r from the t i t l e of the I n i t i a t i v e t h a t t h e Lobbying Act was n o t being t r a n s - formed i n t o a general campaign finances act. W e hold, there- f o r e , t h a t s e c t i o n 1 1 (5) (d) i s void. CONCLUSION I f an i n v a l i d p a r t of a s t a t u t e i s severable from t h e r e s t , t h e p o r t i o n which i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l may stand while t h a t which i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s t r i c k e n o u t and r e j e c t e d . S t a t e v. F i r e Department Relief Association, Etc. (1960) 138 Mont. 172, 178, 355 P.2d 670, 673. A s t a t u t e " i s n o t destroyed i n t o t o because of an improper provision, unless such provision i s necessary t o t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e s t a t u t e o r was the inducement t o i t s enactment." H i l l v. Rae (1916), 52 Mont. 378, 389-90, 158 P. 826, 831. I f , when an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o r t i o n of an a c t i s eliminated, the remainder i s complete i n i t s e l f and capable of being executed i n accordance with t h e apparent l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , it must be sustained. Gullickson v. Mitchell (1942), 113 Mont. 359, 375, 126 ~ . 2 d 1106, 1 1 1 4 . The i n c l u s i o n of a s e v e r a b i l i t y clause i n t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t s d r a f t e r s and t h e v o t e r s d e s i r e d t h i s j u d i c i a l policy t o be applied t o t h e ~ n i t i a t i v e . " I f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d , a l l v a l i d p a r t s t h a t a r e severable from t h e i n v a l i d p a r t remain i n e f f e c t . 1f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d i n one o r more of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s , t h e p a r t remains i n e f f e c t i n a l l v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s t h a t a r e severable from t h e i n v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s . " Section 21, 1-85. While our a p p l i c a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e s has l i m i t e d t h e I n i t i a t i v e i n a number of a r e a s , none of t h e provisions which w e have voided a r e necessary t o t h e i n t e g r i t y of the s t a t u t e and they w e r e not t h e inducement t o i t s enactment. The I n i t i a t i v e , while being lengthy, i s b a s i c a l l y amendatory i n nature. Its purpose was t o expand Chapter 7, T i t l e 5, of Montana's Lobbying Act, t o provide f o r t h e d i s c l o s u r e of money spent t o influence a c t i o n of public o f f i c i a l s and t o r e q u i r e e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t o d i s c l o s e t h e i r business i n t e r e s t s . This purpose i s n o t f r u s t r a t e d by our l i m i t a t i o n of t h e I n i t i a t i v e . Even a f t e r our excisions, Chapter 7, T i t l e 5, a s amended by t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s complete i n i t s e l f and capable of being executed i n accordance with t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e people of Montana. W e reverse t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court and d i s - solve t h e i n j u n c t i o n issued a g a i n s t t h e a t t o r n e y general and t h e commissioner of p o l k t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . W e hold t h a t those p o r t i o n s of t h e I n i t i a t i v e which we have declared void i n t h i s opinion3 have no f u r t h e r e f f e c t . With t h e exception of those void portions, we hold t h a t I n i t i a t i v e No. 85 s h a l l remain i n e f f e c t . 3 ~ e e Appendix "C". APPENDIX A THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PORTIONS O F I N I T I A T I V E NO. 85 WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THIS DECISION. W E HAVE LINED OUT T H O S E PARTS WHICH ARE VOID. Section 1. S5-7-101, MCA. i s amended t o read: 5-7-101. Purposes of chapter. (1) The purposes of t h i s chapter a r e t o promote a high standard of e t h i c s i n the p r a c t i c e of lobbying, t o prevent u n f a i r and unethical lobbying p r a c t i c e s , t o provide f o r t h e l i c e n s i n g of l o b b y i s t s and the suspension of revocation of t h e l i c e n s e s , t o r e q u i r e e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t o make p u b l i c t h e i r business i n t e r e s t s , and t o r e q u i r e d i s c l o s u r e of the amounts of money spent f o r lobbying. ( 2 ) Nothing i n t h i s chapter s u b j e c t s any Mentafia c i t i z e n lobbying on his/her own behalf t o any r e p o r t i n g requirements nor deprives any such c i t i z e n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o communicate with p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . Section 2. 85-7-102, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-7-102. Definitions. The following d e f i n i t i o n s apply i n t h i s chapter : (1) "Individual" means a human being. ( 2 ) "Person" means an i n d i v i d u a l , corporation, a s s o c i a t i o n , firm, partnership, s t a t e o r l o c a l government o r subdivision t h e r e o f , o r o t h e r organization o r group of persons. ( 3 ) "Public o f f i c i a l " means any i n d i v i d u a l , e l e c t e d o r ap- pointed, a c t i n g i n h i s o f f i c i a l capacity f o r the state o r l o c a l government o r any p o l i t i c a l subdivision thereof, b u t does n o t include those a c t i n g i n a j u d i c i a l o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l c a p a c i t y . ( 4 ) "Lobbying" includes : ( a ) t h e p r a c t i c e of promoting o r opposing t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o r enactment of ].egislation be£ o r e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r t h e members thereof by any person o t h e r than a member of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r a public o f f i c i a l a c t i n g i n h i s o f f i c i a l capacity ; and (b) t h e p r a c t i c e of promoting o r opposing o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l i n t h e event t h e person engaged i n such p r a c t i c e expends $1,000 per calendar year o r more exclusive of personal t r a v e l and l i v i n g expenses. (5) ( a ) "Lobbyist" means any person who engages i n t h e p r a c t i c e of lobbying f o r h i r e . (b) "Lobbyist" does n o t include (i) any i n d i v i d u a l Mentana c i t i z e n a c t i n g s o l e l y on his/her own behalf, o r (ii) any i n d i v i d u a l working f o r the same p r i n c i p a l a s a licensed l o b b y i s t , such individual having no personal c o n t a c t with any public o f f i c i a l on behalf of his/her p r i n c i p a l . ( c ) Nothing i n t h i s s e c t i o n deprives any c i t i z e n n o t lobbying f o r h i r e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o communicate with public o f f i c i a l s . (6) "Lobbying f o r h i r e " includes a c t i v i t i e s of any o f f i c e r s , agents, a t t o r n e y s , o r employees of any p r i n c i p a l who a r e paid, reimbursed, o r r e t a i n e d by such p r i n c i p a l and whose d u t i e s include lobbying. When an i n d i v i d u a l i s reimbursed only f o r h i s personal l i v i n g and t r a v e l expenses, which together do n o t exceed $1,000 per calendar year, t h a t in- d i v i d u a l s h a l l n o t be considered t o be lobbying f o r h i r e . (7) "Unprofessional conduct" means: ( a ) a v i o l a t i o n of any of the provisions of t h i s chapter; (b) i n s t i g a t i n g a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l f o r the purpose of obtaining employment i n opposition t h e r e t o ; ( c ) attempting t o influence the a c t i o n of any p u b l i c o f f i - c i a l on any measure pending o r t o be proposed by f ~ + - t ~ e - p r e m i s e - e + - 3 u p p e r t - e r - e p p 8 3 i t i e n - ~ t - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ t ~ ~ e eaeetien. (ii) promise of financial support, (iii) making public any unsubstantiated charges of improper conduct on the part of any other lobbyist, any principal, or any legislator, fiv+-any-imprege~-eeenemie-~eprisa&-e~-ether-un&aw~u3 rete3iutien-against-any-p~b3ie-e~~ieiu3~-er fv~-a~y-means-ether-than-argment-en-the-merits-theree~~ fd+-ettempting-te-i~~~uenee-e-deeisien-er-vete-by-a-hearin~ examiner-er-qaasi-~uditer~&-e~fPee~-in-uny-eentested-e~se-pre- eeedinq-ander-Part-6T-€hupter-4T-~it3e-27-~€~-exeept-us-pre- aided-therein? (e) attempting to knowingly deceive any public official with regard to the pertinent facts of an official matter or attempt to knowingly misrepresent pertinent facts of an official matter to any public official; or f~+-engagPng-in-praetiees-wkieh-re~3eet-di~eredit-en-the praetiee-eS-3ebbying-3eqis&ature~ (8) "Principal" means any person who makes payments in excess of $1,000 per calendar year for any of the following (a) to engage a lobbyist, or fb+-in-the-ease-e~-e-persen-etker-tkan-an-individu~3~-te ~e3ieit~-direet3~~-indi~eet~y-e~-by-an-adverti3inq-eampaiqn the-&ebbyL~g-effgerts-ef-anether-persen7 (9) "~ocket" means the register and reports of lobbyists and principals maintained by the commissioner pursuant to 5- 7-201. (10) "Payment" means distribution, transfer, loan, advance, deposit, gift, or other rendering made or to be made of money, property, or anything of value. (11) "Payment to influence official action" means any of the following types of payment: ( a ) d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t payment t o a l o b b y i s t by a p r i n c i p a l , as s a l a r y , f e e , o r compensation f o r expenses o r f o r any o t h e r purpose; (b) payment i n support of o r a s s i s t a n c e t o a l o b b y i s t o r lobbying a c t i v i t i e s , including, b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , t h e d i r e c t payment of expenses incurred a t t h e request o r sugges- t i o n of t h e lobbyist. (12) "Business" means any holding o r i n t e r e s t whose f a i r market value i s g r e a t e r than $1,000, i n any corporation, p a r t n e r s h i p , s o l e p r o p r i e t o r s h i p , firm, e n t e r p r i s e , f r a n c h i s e , a s s o c i a t i o n , self-employed i n d i v i d u a l , holding company, j o i n t stock company, receivership, t r u s t o r o t h e r e n t i t y o r property held i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of p r o f i t , b u t does n o t include non-profit organizations. (13) "Commissioner" means t h e commissioner of campaign f i - nances and p r a c t i c e s , created by 13-37-102, renamed i n [Section 191 the commissioner of p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . ( 1 4 ) "Elected o f f i c i a l " means a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l holding a s t a t e o f f i c e f i l l e d by a statewide vote of a l l the e l e c t o r s of Montana o r a s t a t e d i s t r i c t o f f i c e , including, b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o l e g i s l a t o r s , public s e r v i c e commissioners and d i s t r i c t c o u r t judges. The t e r m "off i c i a l - e l e c t " s h a l l a l s o apply only t o such o f f i c e s . Section 3. 85-7-103, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-7-103. ~icenses--fees--eligibility. (1) Any a d u l t of good moral character who i s a c i t i z e n of t h e United S t a t e s and who i s otherwise q u a l i f i e d under t h i s chapter may be licensed a s a lobbyist. The commissioner s h a l l provide a l i c e n s e a p p l i c a t i o n form. The a p p l i c a t i o n form may be obtained i n t h e o f f i c e of t h e commissioner and f i l e d t h e r e i n . Upon approval of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n by t h e [Commissioner] and r e c e i p t of the l i c e n s e f e e of $10 by t h e commissioner, a l i c e n s e s h a l l be issued which e n t i t l e s t h e l i c e n s e e t o p r a c t i c e lobbying on behalf of one o r more enumerated p r i n c i p a l s . Each l i c e n s e s h a l l e x p i r e on December 31 of each even-numbered year o r may be terminated a t t h e r e q u e s t of the l o b b y i s t . ( 2 ) N o a p p l i c a t i o n may be disapproved without a f f o r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a n t a hearing. The hearing s h a l l be held and t h e decision entered within 1 0 days of t h e d a t e of the f i l i n g of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . (3) The f i n e s and l i c e n s e f e e s c o l l e c t e d under t h i s chapter s h a l l be deposited i n the s t a t e treasury. Section 4. 85-7-105, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-7-105. Suspension of lobbying p r i v i l e g e s . N o l o b b y i s t whose l i c e n s e has been suspended and no person who has been adjudged g u i l t y of a v i o l a t i o n of any provision of t h i s chapter may engage i n lobbying f o r h i r e u n t i l t h a t person has been r e i n s t a t e d t o t h e p r a c t i c e and duly licensed. Section 5. 85-7-201, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-7-201. Docket--contents. The commissioner s h a l l make a v a i l a b l e t o the p u b l i c t h e information required by t h i s chapter, including b u t n o t limited t o the name and business address of each l o b b y i s t , the name and business address of his/her p r i n c i p a l , and t h e s u b j e c t o r s u b j e c t s t o which t h e employment r e l a t e s o r a statement t h a t t h e employment r e l a t e s t o a l l matters i n which t h e p r i n c i p a l has an i n t e r e s t . The docket e n t r y f o r each p r i n c i p a l s h a l l a l s o i n d i c a t e the p r i n c i p a l ' s required r e p o r t s of payments t o influence o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by a public o f f i c i a l . Section 6. 85-7-202, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-7-202. ~ o c k e t - - p u b l i c record. Such docket s h a l l be a p u b l i c record and open t o t h e inspection of any i n d i v i d u a l upon demand a t any time during t h e regular business hours of t h e o f f i c e of t h e commissioner. Section 7. 85-7-207, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-7-207. Report t o l e g i s l a t u r e . Beginning with t h e f i r s t Tuesday following t h e beginning of any r e g u l a r o r s p e c i a l s e s s i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e and on t h e f i r s t Tuesday of every month t h e r e a f t e r during which the l e g i s l a t u r e i s i n session, t h e commissioner s h a l l from his/her records r e p o r t t o each member of each house of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t h e names of l o b b y i s t s r e g i s t e r e d under t h i s chapter, n o t previously reported, t h e names of the p r i n c i p a l s whom they r e p r e s e n t a s l o b b y i s t s and t h e s u b j e c t s of l e g i s l a t i o n i n which each p r i n c i p a l i s i n t e r e s t e d . Section 8. 55-7-301, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-7-301. P r o h i b i t i o n of p r a c t i c e without l i c e n s e and r e g i s t r a - t i o n . (1) N o i n d i v i d u a l may p r a c t i c e a s a l o b b y i s t unless t h a t i n d i v i d u a l has been licensed under 5-7-103 and l i s t e d on t h e docket a s employed i n r e s p e c t t o a l l t h e m a t t e r s he/she i s promoting o r opposing. ( 2 ) N o p r i n c i p a l may d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y authorize o r permit any l o b b y i s t employed by t h a t p r i n c i p a l t o p r a c t i c e lobbying u n t i l the l o b b y i s t i s duly licensed and t h e names of t h e l o b b y i s t and t h e p r i n c i p a l a r e duly entered on t h e docket . Section 9. 55-7-302, MCA i s amended t o read: 5-?-382s-P~ekibited-eempe~satiens--We-ge~sen-may-be-emp%eyed es-a-%ebbyist-~er-a-eempe~satien-de~en+-in-any-manne~-upen tke-pessaqe-er-de~eat-e~-e~y-p~~epesed-er-pendinq-e~Sieiu%-aetie~ by-a-pab%ie-eGfieia%-e~-upen-any-etkeP-eentinqeney-eenneeted with-saek-aetiens Section 1 0 . E t h i c a l conduct. N o l o b b y i s t o r p r i n c i p a l s h a l l engage i n , o r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y authorize, any unprofessional conduct. Section 11. Principals to file accountings. (1) A principal subject to this chapter shall file with the commissioner an accounting of payments made to influence the official action of a public official. (2) If such payments are made solely to influence legisla- tive action, such accounting shall be made: (a) before February 16th of any year the legislature is in session and shall include all payments made in that calendar year prior to February 1st; (b) before the 16th day of the calendar month following any calendar month in which the principal spent $5,000 or more and shall include all payments made during the prior calendar month; and (c) within 60 days following adjournment of such session and shall include all payments made during such session, except as has previously been reported. (3) If such payments are made to influence any other official action by a public offical or made to influence such other action and legislative action, such accounting shall be made: (a) before February 16th of the calendar year following such payments and shall include all payments made during the prior calendar year; and (b) before the 16th day of the calendar month following any calendar month in which the principal spent $5,000 or more and shall include all payments made during the prior calendar month. (4) If no such payments are made during the reporting periods provided in subsections (2) (a) , (2) (c) I and (3) (a) above, the principal shall file a report stating such. (5) Each accounting f i l e d under t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l : ( a ) l i s t a l l payments f o r lobbying i n each of t h e following c a t e g o r i e s : fij-epig&na$-and-derPvetive-researek-f~er-whieh-the-eest m a y - b e - e s t ~ m a t e d - i ~ - n e e e s s a r ~ ~ - d e ~ e - t e - s u p p e ~ t - ~ - ~ e b b y ~ n ~ erqment-er-presentatienf f ~ ~ ~ - p u b & ~ e a t & e n - a n d - d & s t r ~ b ~ ~ & e n - e ~ - e a e ~ - p u b & ~ e a t & e n ~ - e ~ e tkat-tke-eest-e~-a-ne~s~etter-er-%ea~&et-d&st~&buted-te-t~e mcmbe~sh~p-e~-a-p~&~ei~a&-need-net-be-~eperted-un&ess-eve~-ene- ka~~-e~-that-news&ette~-e~-&e2tf&et-&s-deveted-te-&ebby&~q-met~ers (iii) o t h e r p r i n t i n g ; fivj-news-mediet (v) a d v e r t i s i n g , including production c o s t s ; ( v i ) postage; ( v i i ) t r a v e l and personal l i v i n g expenses; ( v i i i ) s a l a r i e s and f e e s , including allowances, rewards and contingency f e e s ; ( i x ) entertainment, including a l l foods and refreshments; (x) telephone and telegraph; and ( x i ) o t h e r off i c e expenses; (b) itemize, i d e n t i f y i n g t h e payee and t h e beneficiary, (i) each s e p a r a t e payment conferring $10 o r more b e n e f i t t o any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l and (ii) each s e p a r a t e payment conferring $100 o r more b e n e f i t t o more than one p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , r e g a r d l e s s of i n d i v i d u a l b e n e f i t , except t h a t i n regard t o a dinner o r o t h e r function t o which a l l senators o r a l l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s have been i n v i t e d , the beneficiary may be l i s t e d a s a l l members of t h a t group without l i s t i n g s e p a r a t e l y each person who attended; (c) list each c o n t r i b u t i o n and membership f e e which amounts t o $250 o r more when aggregated over t h e period of one calendar year paid t o the p r i n c i p a l , regard3ess-eS-whether it-was-paid-se3e3y f o r t h e purpose of lobbying, with t h e f u l l address of each payer and t h e i s s u e a r e a , i f any, f o r which such payment was earmarked; $d)-3ist-eaeh-pe3itiea%-eent~ibutien~-i~e3uding-un~thin~-eS va3ue~-peid-te-any-eendidete-5e~-e3eetiue-pub3&e-eSSⅇ~-te any-eemittee-estab3ished-te-~uppert-er-eppese-a-eandidute-~er e3eetive-pub3&e-eSSieeT-er-te-uny-eemittee-te-suppert-er eppese-eny-initietiveT-re~e~e~dumT-er-ether-ba33et-&ssuei wkether-saeh-payment-Ps-m~de-direet3y-er-&ndi~eet3y-by-the prineipa3-er-any-3ebbyist-whe-reeeeived-eempensatien-er-reim- bursement-~er-saeh-pa~me~t-5rem-the-pr≠~pa~~ (e) l i s t each o f f i c i a l a c t i o n which t h e p r i n c i p a l o r h i s agents exerted a major e f f e c t t o support, oppose, o r modify, together with a statement of the p r i n c i p a l ' s p o s i t i o n f o r o r a g a i n s t such a c t i o n ; and ( f ) be kept by t h e commissioner f o r a period of t e n years. Section 1 2 . P r i n c i p a l s required t o report--penalty f o r f a i l - u r e t o r e p o r t o r f o r f a l s e statement. A p r i n c i p a l may n o t make payments t o influence o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l unless t h a t p r i n c i p a l f i l e s t h e r e p o r t s required under t h i s chapter. A p r i n c i p a l who f a i l s t o f i l e a required r e p o r t i s s u b j e c t t o t h e penalty provided i n 5-7-305 a s well a s any c i v i l a c t i o n provided f o r i n t h i s chapter. A p r i n c i - p a l who knowingly f i l e s a f a l s e , erroneous, o r incomplete statement commits t h e offense of unsworn f a 1 . s i f i c a t i o n t o a u t h o r i t i e s . Section 13. Reimbursement. Whenever a l o b b y i s t i n v i t e s a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l t o a t t e n d a function which t h e l o b b y i s t o r his/her p r i n c i p a l have f u l l y o r p a r t i a l l y funded o r sponsored, o r whenever a l o b b y i s t o f f e r s a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l a g i f t , t h e l o b b y i s t must, upon request, supply t h e r e c i p i e n t p u b l i c o f f i c i a l with t h e b e n e f i t ' s t r u e o r estimated c o s t and allow t h e public o f f i c i a l t o reimburse. Such expenditures must be itemized i n the p r i n c i p a l ' s r e p o r t s with a n o t a t i o n "reim- bursed by benefactee". Section 1 4 . Governmental Reporting. Budget preparation o r response t o r e q u e s t s of a house o r committee of t h e l e g i s l a - t u r e by any governmental e n t i t y s h a l l not be considered lob- bying payments f o r t h e purposes of t h i s chapter. Section 15. Audit of f i n a l accounting statements. The commissioner s h a l l examine and may a u d i t t h e accountings f i l e d under [Section 1 1 1 and s h a l l i n v e s t i g a t e any i r r e g u l a r i - ties and r e p o r t any apparent v i o l a t i o n s of t h i s chapter t o t h e a t t o r n e y s having a u t h o r i t y t o prosecute. The l o b b y i s t i s required t o provide and the p r i n c i p a l i s required t o o b t a i n and keep f o r a period of seven years from t h e d a t e of f i l i n g a l l records supporting the accountings f i l e d under [Section 1 1 1 . A l l such records s h a l l be open t o i n s p e c t i o n on r e q u e s t of t h e commissioner o r an a t t o r n e y having a u t h o r i t y t o prosecute v i o l a t i o n s of t h i s chapter. The commissioner and such a t t o r n e y s are given the power t o subpoena and compel attendance; i s s u e enforceable c i v i l i n v e s t i g a t i v e demands; take evidence; and r e q u i r e t h e production of any books, correspondence, memoranda, bank account statements, o r o t h e r records which a r e r e l e v a n t o r m a t e r i a l f o r t h e purpose of conducting any i n v e s t i g a t i o n pursuant t o t h e provisions of t h i s chapter . Section 16. Disclosure by e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s . (1) P r i o r t o December 15 of each even-numbered year, each e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l o r o f f i c i a l - e l e c t s h a l l f i l e with t h e commissioner a business d i s c l o s u r e statement on a form provided by the commissioner. The statement s h a l l provide the following information: The name, address, and type of business of such individual and each member of such in- dividual's immediate family. For this purpose "immediate family" includes the individual's spouse and minor children only. (2) No such individual may assume or continue to exercise the powers and duties of the office to which that individual has been elected or appointed until such statement has been filed. ( 3 ) The commissioner shall make such business disclosure statements available to any individual upon request. Section 17. Commissioner to make rules--statements of intent. (1) The commissioner shall promulgate and publish rules necessary to carry out the provisions of [this act] in con- formance with the Montana Administrative Procedure Act and, in particular, shall provide rules necessary to allocate salary, expenses, and any other payments between lobbying activities and other activities not connected with lobbying for any person whose activities are not solely limited to lobbying. (2) Such rules shall be designed to effect and promote the purposes of this act, express or implied. Such rules shall be as simple and easily complied with as possible. Section 18. Civil penalties and enforcement. (1) Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to civil penalties of not less than $250 and not more than $7,500 according to the discretion of the district court, as court of original jurisdiction. A lobbyist who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall have his/her license suspended or revoked according to t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e court. Any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l holding e l e c t i v e o f f i c e adjudged i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e provisions of t h i s a c t is a d d i t i o n a l l y s u b j e c t t o r e c a l l under Montana Recall Act, 52-16-601, MCA e t seq, and such v i o l a t i o n s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e an a d d i t i o n a l b a s i s f o r r e c a l l t o those mentioned i n 52-16-603 ( 3 ) , MCA. ( 2 ) The a t t o r n e y general, commissioner, o r the county a t t o r n e y of the county i n which the v i o l a t i o n takes place may bring criminal o r c i v i l a c t i o n i n t h e name of t h e s t a t e f o r any appropriate criminal o r c i v i l remedy. (3) I f a prosecution i s undertaken by t h e commissioner o r any county a t t o r n e y , a l l c o s t s associated with t h e prosecution s h a l l be paid by the state of Montana. ( 4 ) ( a ) Any i n d i v i d u a l who has n o t i f i e d t h e commissioner, t h e a t t o r n e y general and the appropriate county a t t o r n e y i n w r i t i n g t h a t t h e r e i s reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t some p o r t i o n of t h i s chapter i s being v i o l a t e d may himself/herself bring i n t h e name of the s t a t e an a c t i o n ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s a c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n ) authorized under t h i s chapter i f : (i) t h e a t t o r n e y general and t h e appropriate county a t t o r n e y have f a i l e d t o commence an a c t i o n hereunder within 40 days a f t e r such n o t i c e , and (ii) s a i d a t t o r n e y s then f a i l t o commence an a c t i o n within 1 0 days a f t e r a w r i t t e n n o t i c e delivered t o them advising them t h a t a c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n w i l l be brought i f they do n o t bring an a c t i o n . (b) Each n o t i f i c a t i o n s h a l l t o l l t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s applicable u n t i l t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e waiting period. ( c ) I f the i n d i v i d u a l who brings t h e c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n pre- v a i l s , he/she s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o be reimbursed by the s t a t e of Montana f o r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s incurred: Provided t h a t i n the case of a c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n which is dismissed and which the c o u r t a l s o f i n d s was brought without reasonable cause, the c o u r t may order the individual commencing t h e a c t i o n t o pay a l l c o s t s of t r i a l and reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s incurred by the defendant. (5) N o c i v i l a c t i o n may be brought under t h i s s e c t i o n more than seven years a f t e r the occurrence of t h e f a c t s which g i v e rise t o the action. ( 6 ) A l l c i v i l p e n a l t i e s imposed pursuant t o t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be deposited i n the s t a t e general fund. (7) A hearing under t h i s chapter s h a l l be held by the c o u r t unless the defendant-licensee demands a jury t r i a l . The t r i a l s h a l l be held a s soon a s p o s s i b l e b u t a t l e a s t 20 days a f t e r the f i l i n g of the charges and s h a l l take precedence over a l l o t h e r matters pending before t h e court. (8) I f the c o u r t f i n d s f o r the p l a i n t i f f , judgment s h a l l be rendered revoking o r suspending t h e l i c e n s e and the c l e r k of c o u r t s h a l l f i l e a c e r t i f i e d copy of t h e judgment with the comrnissioner. Section 19. Recodification. The o f f i c e of t h e commissioner of campaign finances and p r a c t i c e s , c r e a t e d by 13-37-102, s h a l l be known a s t h e o f f i c e of the comrnissioner of p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . Section 20. Repealer. Sections 5-7-104, 5-7-205, 5-7-206, 5-7-303, and 5-7-304, MCA a r e repealed. Section 21. S e v e r a b i l i t y . I f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d , a l l v a l i d p a r t s t h a t a r e severable from the i n v a l i d p a r t re- main i n e f f e c t . I f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d i n one o r more of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s , the p a r t remains i n e f f e c t i n a l l v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s t h a t a r e severable from t h e i n v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s . Section 22. E f f e c t i v e d a t e . This a c t s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e upon passage and approval by t h e v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e of Montana. APPENDIX B Penalty. Any person v i o l a t i n g t h e provisions of t h i s chapter s h a l l be deemed g u i l t y of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof s h a l l be punished by imprisonment i n t h e county j a i l not more than 6 months o r by a f i n e n o t exceed- ing $200, o r both. (Section 5-7-305, MCA.) APPENDIX C The word "Montana" i s void i n s e c t i o n l ( 2 ) and i n s e c t i o n 2 ( 5 ) (b) (i). The following s e c t i o n s a r e void i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y : 2 (7) ( c ) (i) , 2 (7) (c) ( i v ) , 2 (7) ( c ) (v) , 2 (7) (dl , 2 ( 7 ) ( f ) , 2 ( 8 ) (b) I 9 , 1 1 (5) (a) (i) , 1 1 (5) ( a ) (ii) , 1 1 (5) ( a ) ( i v ) I 1 1 (5) (61). The words "regardless of whether it was paid s o l e l y " a r e void i n s e c t i o n 1 1 ( 5 ) ( c ) . W e concur: Chief ~ u s t i c e \ Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring: I concur with the opinion of the Court, even though I feel that we have strained considerably to uphold many of its provisions. But, as long as what we have done does not fly in the face of any constitutional provisions, I believe that we should give more leeway to initiatives passed by the electorate of this state. In addition, I feel it necessary to comment on the findings and conclusions adopted by the trial court. The plaintiff proposed eleven findings of fact and the trial court adopted verbatim all eleven of them. The trial court, did, however, add finding twelve. The plaintiff proposed nine conclusions of law and the trial court adopted verbatim all nine of them. This is hardly an indication that the trial court carefully studied the constitutional issues involved and carefully entered into the decision-making process. In Tomaskie v. Tomaskie (1981), - Mont. , 625 P.2d - 536, 38 St.Rep. 416, this Court disapproved of the practice of adopting verbatim the proposed findings and conclusions of the prevailing party. In Jensen v. Jensen (Decided July 17, 1981, Cause No. 80-389), I set out in detail the reasons why no trial court should adopt verbatim the proposed findings and conclusions presented by the prevailing party. It is sad that in such an important case as this, that the trial court has chosen to rubber-stamp the proposed findings and conclusions submitted by the plaintiffs in this case. This is particularly so when the preliminary orders of the court, made final by the trial court's decision, declared all of Initiative 85 to be unconstitutional. Matters of such importance are certainly deserving of more attention than was obviously given here by the trial court.