Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Kathleen Anna Wagner

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2528-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Kathleen Anna Wagner, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Kathleen Anna Wagner, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WAGNER  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 21, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. withdrew from participation.       
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Kathleen A. Wagner, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Kathleen A. Wagner. 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
William J. Weigel and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison. 
There was an oral argument by William J. Weigel. 
 
 
2019 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2528-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Kathleen Anna Wagner, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kathleen Anna Wagner, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.   Professional misconduct 
found; no discipline imposed.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   Attorney 
Kathleen 
Anna 
Wagner 
has 
appealed a report filed by Referee James C. Boll, concluding 
that Attorney Wagner committed two counts of professional 
misconduct and recommending that she be privately reprimanded.  
The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has now that asked one of 
those counts be dismissed.  Thus, what is before the court is 
Attorney Wagner's challenge to the referee's conclusion that she 
violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.5(b)(3).  Attorney Wagner 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
2 
 
has also challenged the referee's recommendation that she be 
assessed the full costs of this proceeding. 
¶2 
Upon careful review of this matter, we conclude that 
although Attorney Wagner did violate SCR 20:1.5(b)(3), the 
violation does not warrant the imposition of any discipline.  In 
addition, we find it appropriate, under the unique facts of this 
case, to depart from our normal custom of imposing full costs, 
which are $40,639.72 as of March 4, 2019.  Instead, we deem it 
appropriate to require Attorney Wagner to pay $4,500 in costs. 
¶3 
Attorney Wagner was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1983.  She practices in Madison.  She has no prior 
disciplinary history.   
¶4 
On October 31, 2014, the OLR filed a complaint 
alleging three counts of misconduct with respect to Attorney 
Wagner's trust, estate, and tax work for the G. family.  W.G., 
the matriarch of the family, first met with Attorney Wagner on 
April 10, 2008 and asked Attorney Wagner to provide legal 
services regarding completing her late husband's estate, funding 
a living trust of which W.G. was the trustee, and completing her 
tax return.   
¶5 
During this initial meeting, W.G. executed a written 
representation agreement.  The agreement called for Attorney 
Wagner to bill W.G. on an hourly basis at a rate of $250 per 
hour.  The agreement also stated that it was Attorney Wagner's 
practice to bill for services "upon completion" of the matter, 
although she retained discretion to bill on a more frequent 
basis when the fees exceeded the amount of the initial payment.  
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
3 
 
In addition to signing the representation agreement, W.G. also 
gave Attorney Wagner a check for $500.   
¶6 
After meeting with W.G. for an hour on April 10, 2008, 
Attorney Wagner had a 90-minute conversation with W.G.'s prior 
attorney a few days later.  During that conversation, Attorney 
Wagner learned that numerous marital property assets had not 
been transferred into the living trust; no one completed the 
process of transferring those assets into the living trust prior 
to the death of W.G.'s husband in November 2006; and a number of 
sub-trusts needed to be created and funded. 
¶7 
Attorney 
Wagner 
contends 
that, 
based 
on 
her 
conversations with predecessor counsel, she learned that W.G. 
was attempting to transfer into the living trust two parcels of 
waterfront land in Adams county for which she did not have good 
title because of violations of the Statute of Frauds.  In 
addition, Attorney Wagner claims she learned that W.G. had not 
properly segregated income between herself and the living trust, 
nor had she filed proper tax returns.  As a result of these 
discoveries, Attorney Wagner claims that, at a July 30, 2008 
meeting, she offered to return to W.G. the uncashed $500 check 
and the files she had obtained from predecessor counsel.  W.G. 
refused to accept the check, and Attorney Wagner retained it.  
Attorney Wagner again met with W.G. on September 19, 2008, at 
which time Attorney Wagner submitted correspondence to W.G. 
laying out her proposed plan for the estate and trusts.  
Attorney Wagner deposited the $500 check into her client trust 
account on October 10, 2008. 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
4 
 
¶8 
According to Attorney Wagner, in late 2008 and early 
2009, while W.G. was experiencing health issues and learned that 
she had a short period of time left to live, W.G. was being 
pressured about who would be in control of the family assets and 
handle their disposition after her death.  Attorney Wagner 
states that W.G.'s third eldest child, T.G., a Virginia lawyer 
who practiced family law, was seeking to take over control of 
the family's finances.  W.G. resisted the pressure and obtained 
agreements from her four children that W.G. would remain in 
control of the finances.  
¶9 
On January 17, 2009, W.G. signed a new representation 
agreement.  W.G. authorized Attorney Wagner to transfer assets 
from the living trust to a family trust and a marital survivor's 
trust.  Attorney Wagner asserts there was a rush to transfer 
into the living trust the remaining marital assets that should 
have been transferred long before.  Attorney Wagner said she 
worked nights and weekends, including 16-hour or more days, to 
accomplish those transfers.   
¶10 W.G. passed away in February 2009.  Her son, J.G. 
became the successor trustee of the W.G. marital survivor's 
trust and the G. family trust.  At or after W.G.'s death, 
certain beneficiary trusts came into existence for W.G.'s 
children. 
¶11 At some point in 2009, J.G. and T.G. began to ask 
Attorney Wagner about her fees and the preparation of invoices.  
In November 2009, J.G. sent Attorney Wagner an email expressly 
requesting her to provide him with an invoice for her services.  
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
5 
 
On January 15, 2010, Attorney Wagner and J.G. entered into a 
"Fee Dispute Procedure" agreement.  On that same date, as part 
of the agreement, J.G. gave Attorney Wagner two checks.  The 
first check, for $113,000, was made payable to Wagner Law 
Offices S.C. and was apparently intended to be applied by 
Attorney Wagner toward her fees.  The second check, in the 
amount of $47,000, was made payable to Attorney Wagner's client 
trust account and carried the notation "disputed fee for court 
to decide."  Under the agreement, Attorney Wagner was to provide 
a detailed billing to J.G. by February 15, 2010.   
¶12 Attorney Wagner claims that during late 2009 and early 
2010, T.G. began to cause problems and interfere with her 
working relationship with J.G.  On January 5, 2010, T.G. sent 
Attorney Wagner an email saying he would be in Madison on 
January 16-18 and that he wanted her to provide an invoice and 
back-up receipts to J.G. by that date.  On January 8, 2010, T.G. 
filed a demand for fee arbitration with the State Bar of 
Wisconsin. 
¶13 In April 2010, T.G. filed a grievance against Attorney 
Wagner with the OLR.  In July 2010, T.G. filed a lawsuit in Dane 
County Circuit Court against Attorney Wagner and her law firm on 
behalf of himself, J.G., and his two other siblings.  The 
complaint asked for a declaratory judgment as to the amount of 
fees that Attorney Wagner was owed.   
¶14 In April 2011, in the course of the lawsuit, the G. 
siblings served a request asking Attorney Wagner to produce any 
documents identifying any compensable legal services provided to 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
6 
 
W.G., her agent, or her successor-death trustee, J.G.  The 
circuit court issued an order requiring Attorney Wagner to 
prepare and send her invoices to the plaintiffs by June 14, 
2011.  On June 6, 2011, Attorney Wagner filed a request for an 
extension of time, which the court denied.  Attorney Wagner did 
not submit the invoices by June 14, 2011.  Attorney Wagner later 
renewed her motion for an extension of time, this time including 
a supporting affidavit from her doctor.  The circuit court 
granted a stay of all discovery in the case from June 22, 2011 
to October 4, 2011, due to Attorney Wagner's health.  
¶15 When the stay expired, the circuit court issued an 
order scheduling Attorney Wagner's deposition for November 14, 
2011 and requiring her to submit to J.G. "an annotated bill for 
services provided by Wagner Law Offices, S.C."  Attorney Wagner 
did not provide the invoices by November 1, 2011.  The circuit 
court held another scheduling conference on November 30, 2011, 
and established a new deadline of January 3, 2012 for Attorney 
Wagner to provide her legal invoices.  Attorney Wagner met that 
deadline when she submitted her invoices on January 3, 2012.  
This was approximately 25 months after J.G. had made his initial 
written request, via email, for the invoices. 
¶16 The OLR acknowledged at oral argument that on April 
24, 2013, the circuit court found that Attorney Wagner did not 
overcharge the G. siblings for her legal services and in fact 
she had under billed.  Following the circuit court's ruling, the 
parties reached a settlement as to fees and the plaintiffs 
voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit. 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
7 
 
¶17 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct: 
Count 1:  By failing to deposit W.G.'s $500 check for 
advanced fees into her IOLTA trust account for six 
months, Attorney Wagner violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).1 
Count 2:  By failing to respond to her client's 
request for her billing invoice for at least 25 
months, 
Attorney 
Wagner 
violated 
former 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(3).2 
Count 3:  By initially asserting that she was entitled 
to legal fees of $167,000 for her services without 
providing any invoice, then by billing $85,575 for her 
services, all at $350 per hour despite a fee agreement 
to the contrary, when the reasonable fee for her 
services was $64,927.50 plus $102.30 for mileage, 
Attorney Wagner charged an excessive fee in violation 
of SCR 20:1.5(a).3 
                                                 
1 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See S. 
Ct. Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 
2016).  Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to 
July 1, 2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the 
supreme court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 
2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provided:   
Except as provided in par. (4m) unearned fees and 
advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust until 
earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to sub. 
(g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred.     
2 SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) provides:  "A lawyer shall promptly 
respond to a client's request for information concerning fees 
and expenses. 
3 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
8 
 
¶18 Attorney Wagner filed an answer to the complaint on 
December 8, 2014.  The referee was appointed on January 22, 
2015.   
¶19 After extensive litigation, both the OLR and Attorney 
Wagner moved for summary judgment.  On May 17, 2017, the referee 
issued his report granting summary judgment in favor of the OLR 
as to Counts 1 and 2 of the complaint.4  With respect to Count 1, 
                                                                                                                                                             
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
4 On August 16, 2016, the OLR voluntarily dismissed Count 3, 
saying its decision was based on the OLR's receipt of additional 
information from witnesses during litigation, a thorough review 
of the underlying Dane county proceeding, and consultation with 
its expert on the fee issue. 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
9 
 
the referee found that by failing to deposit W.G.'s $500 check 
into her trust account for six months Attorney Wagner violated 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(1), which states: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts.5  
¶20 With respect to Count 2, the referee noted that 
Attorney Wagner indicated she was unable to prepare an invoice 
for legal services because T.G. failed to provide her with 
certain documents.  The referee stated he did not find that 
argument to be credible since an attorney does not need 
ancillary documents in order to create legal invoices.  The 
referee also pointed out that Attorney Wagner did eventually 
produce legal invoices without the documents she claimed she 
needed.   
¶21 The referee noted that between August 2009 and January 
3, 2012, both T.G. and J.G. sought to obtain legal invoices from 
Attorney Wagner on numerous occasions, and they also sought to 
enter into a fee dispute procedure with the State Bar of 
Wisconsin.  In addition, the referee said the Dane County 
Circuit Court ordered Attorney Wagner to produce legal invoices, 
                                                 
5 Count 1 of the OLR's complaint alleged that Attorney 
Wagner's failure to deposit W.G.'s $500 check for advanced fees 
into her IOLTA trust account for six months constituted a 
violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(4), a different subsection of the 
rule than appeared in the summary judgment material. 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
10 
 
but Attorney Wagner failed to comply with those court orders.  
The referee said the record was clear, and there was no material 
issue of fact that Attorney Wagner failed to provide invoices 
for legal services for 25 months, despite requests from her 
client and his family and despite multiple court orders. 
¶22 The referee noted that Attorney Wagner offered a 
number of mitigating factors as to why she did not timely 
produce the invoices:  her hard drive crashed; she was unable to 
provide invoices because the G. family did not produce documents 
necessary to complete the invoices; and her failure to produce 
the invoices was due to ongoing serious medical issues.  The 
referee said if those statements were true, those reasons would 
go toward mitigation of discipline, not to whether a violation 
of a supreme court rule occurred.   
¶23 As to the appropriate sanction for the two counts of 
misconduct, the referee found that Attorney Wagner's violation 
of SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) was de minimis and that discipline was not 
appropriate.  As to Attorney Wagner's failure to respond to 
numerous requests to provide legal invoices, the referee took 
into account Attorney Wagner's medical condition and with that 
mitigating factor the referee concluded that a private reprimand 
was an appropriate sanction. 
¶24 In her appeal, Attorney Wagner argues that the referee 
wrongly concluded that she violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) because she 
was "blocked" by her client from access to the records she 
needed to finalize invoices for work she performed.  Attorney 
Wagner appears to argue that she would have been able to produce 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
11 
 
the invoices much sooner if T.G. had not interfered.  She also 
seems to assert that since she did not keep contemporaneous time 
records she needed all of the documents she prepared for W.G. in 
order to recreate accurate bills.  She also apparently believes 
she was not obligated to provide invoices for her services until 
those services were completed and there had been a court 
decision on how the advanced fees were to be allocated. 
¶25 As to Count 1 of the OLR's complaint concerning the 
failure to deposit the $500 check for six months, Attorney 
Wagner contends that she exercised her right to rescind the 
April 2008 representation agreement because she learned W.G. had 
withheld material information during their initial April 10, 
2008 meeting.  Attorney Wagner seems to imply that because she 
rescinded the representation agreement, she did not have an 
attorney-client relationship with W.G. during the period of 
April to October 2008 and, as a result, she had no obligation to 
deposit the $500 check into her client trust account.  She does 
not explain, however, why, if she rescinded the representation 
agreement, she was not immediately obligated to return the check 
to W.G.  Attorney Wagner also seems to advance the contradictory 
argument that because she "earned" the $500 fee by her 
"exploratory work," she did not have to place the $500 check 
into her client trust account.  She fails to explain why she had 
"earned" the fee if in fact she had rescinded the representation 
agreement, nor does she explain why she ultimately placed the 
$500 into her client trust account in October 2008 if she had 
already "earned" it. 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
12 
 
¶26 The OLR has asked this court to dismiss Count 1 of the 
complaint because the violation found by the referee, as 
requested by the OLR in its summary judgment motion, does not 
match the violation alleged in the complaint.  Count 1 of the 
complaint alleged that Attorney Wagner's failure to deposit the 
$500 check from W.G. for several months constituted a violation 
of SCR 20:1.15(b)(4), which requires that "unearned fees and 
advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust until earned by 
the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to sub. (g)."  The OLR's 
summary judgment motion asked the referee to find that the 
failure to deposit the check constituted a violation of 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(1), which provides that "a lawyer shall hold in 
trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, that property of 
clients and 3rd parties in the lawyer's possession in connection 
with a representation."  It was this rule that the referee found 
had been violated.  The OLR says the summary judgment motion 
inadvertently misstated which rule had been violated and while 
it continues to believe that Attorney Wagner violated both 
subsections of SCR 20:1.15, it suggests that the most fair 
result for Attorney Wagner is that Count 1 be dismissed. 
¶27 As to Count 2 of the complaint, the OLR says this is a 
straightforward matter of Attorney Wagner taking over two years 
to produce invoices after J.G. first asked for the preparation 
of final bills.  The OLR says during that two-year time frame, a 
circuit court issued multiple orders requiring Attorney Wagner 
to provide invoices for her work, but she failed to comply with 
those orders.  While Attorney Wagner said she was prevented from 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
13 
 
producing the invoices because T.G. would not produce certain 
documents to her, the OLR points out that Attorney Wagner was 
ultimately able to produce invoices without those requested 
documents.  Thus, the OLR argues it was not the lack of 
documents that delayed the production of the invoices.  The OLR 
says the undisputed facts as found by the referee support the 
conclusion that Attorney Wagner failed to promptly respond to 
her client's request for fee information, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(3).   
¶28 Attorney Wagner does not specifically address the 
issue of the appropriate sanction in her brief.  Instead, she 
argues that both Counts 1 and 2 should be dismissed so no 
discipline should be imposed. 
¶29 The OLR argues that, even with the dismissal of Count 
1, the proper level of discipline for Count 2 would be a private 
reprimand. 
¶30 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 
14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may impose 
whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶31 As an initial matter, we accede to the OLR's request 
to dismiss Count 1. 
¶32 Turning to Count 2, after careful review of the 
matter, we conclude there has been no showing that any of the 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
14 
 
referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, 
we adopt them.  We further agree with the referee's conclusion 
of law that Attorney Wagner violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) by 
failing, for more than two years, to prepare and submit invoices 
for legal work she performed on behalf of the G. family.  While 
T.G.'s actions no doubt irritated Attorney Wagner and some of 
his actions may have been without merit or justification, 
Attorney Wagner nonetheless had an obligation to promptly 
respond to requests for billing information.  In addition, 
Attorney Wagner failed to keep contemporaneous time records as 
she went along that would have enabled her to prepare an invoice 
in a timely fashion.  Although the referee concluded that 
Attorney Wagner's health problems were a mitigating factor, she 
has failed to present evidence to show that her health problems 
prevented her from preparing the invoices for the entire 25 
month period of the delay.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
referee that Attorney Wagner violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(3). 
¶33 In spite of the fact that we agree that the OLR met 
its burden of proof as to Count 2, we decline to impose any 
discipline.  Although there was an unacceptable delay in 
Attorney Wagner's producing the invoices, this case appears to 
present a unique set of circumstances that are unlikely to be 
repeated in Attorney Wagner's future practice of law.  For that 
reason, even though we agree that there was a violation of a 
supreme court rule, we opt not to impose any sanction. 
¶34 The OLR advises that it is not seeking a restitution 
award, and we do not order restitution.  The remaining issue to 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
15 
 
be resolved in this matter is the issue of costs.  The referee 
recommends that Attorney Wagner bear the full costs of the 
proceeding.  The OLR agrees.  Attorney Wagner believes no costs 
should be imposed.  Assessment of costs in OLR matters is 
governed by SCR 22.24.   
¶35 Our 
general 
policy 
is 
that 
upon 
a 
finding 
of 
misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs upon the 
respondent.  In some cases the court may, in the exercise of its 
discretion, 
reduce 
the 
amount 
of 
costs 
imposed 
upon 
a 
respondent. 
 
In 
exercising 
our 
discretion 
regarding 
the 
assessment of costs, we consider the statement of costs, any 
objection and reply, the recommendation of the referee, and all 
of the following factors:   
(a) 
The number of counts charged, contested, and 
proven. 
(b) 
The nature of the misconduct. 
(c) 
The level of discipline sought by the parties and 
recommended by the referee. 
(d) 
The 
respondent's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary process. 
(e) 
Prior discipline, if any. 
(f) 
Other relevant circumstances. 
See SCR 22.24(1m) 
¶36 The complaint in this matter alleged three counts of 
misconduct and originally sought a 60-day suspension of Attorney 
Wagner's license.  Although the Dane County Circuit Court issued 
a decision in April of 2013 concluding that Attorney Wagner may 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
16 
 
well have undercharged for the work she performed, in its 
October 31, 2014 complaint the OLR nevertheless alleged that 
Attorney Wagner had charged an excessive fee.  The OLR dismissed 
Count 3 of the complaint and changed the sanction it was seeking 
to a reprimand in August 2016.  After the referee issued his 
report, the OLR agreed to dismiss Count 1, leaving only Count 2, 
which arose out of Attorney Wagner's lengthy delay in submitting 
invoices for the legal work she performed. 
¶37 Count 3 of the complaint, which alleged that Attorney 
Wagner 
charged 
an 
excessive 
fee 
for 
her 
services, 
was 
undisputedly the most serious charge lodged by the OLR.  We 
conclude that if Count 3 had not been charged, the costs in this 
matter would have been far less.  We conclude that absent Count 
3 the costs would have been approximately $4,500.  Thus, under 
the extraordinary circumstances of this case, we deem it 
appropriate to assess $4,500 in costs. 
¶38 IT IS ORDERED that Count 1 of the OLR's complaint is 
hereby dismissed. 
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that we find Kathleen Anna 
Wagner 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.5(b)(3); 
however 
we 
impose 
no 
discipline. 
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Kathleen Anna Wagner shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation costs in the amount of $4,500. 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from participation 
prior to oral argument. 
 
No. 
2014AP2528-D   
 
 
 
1