Title: Mills v. Reynolds

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mills v. Reynolds1991 WY 28807 P.2d 383Case Number: 89-193, 89-195Decided: 03/11/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Timothy L. MILLS, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Guy REYNOLDS and Sid 
Marks, Appellees (Defendants).

Levi Harry BUNKER, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Jim NIGGEMYER, Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

Gary L. Shockey and 
Phillip White, Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, for 
appellants.

William S. Bon, Schwartz, 
Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellees Reynolds and 
Marks.

Patrick J. Murphy, 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, and John T. Pappas, Western 
Law Associates, P.C., Lander, for appellee Niggemyer.

Rodger McDaniel, McDaniel 
& Tiedeken Law Offices, Cheyenne, for amicus curiae, Wyoming 
AFL-CIO.

Robert W. Tiedeken, 
McDaniel & Tiedeken Law Offices, and George Santini, Graves, Santini & 
Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for amicus 
curiae, Wyoming Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Larry M. Donovan, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
for amicus curiae, State of 
Wyo.

Patrick R. Day, Holland 
& Hart, Cheyenne, for amici curiae Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n, 
Wyoming Mining Ass'n, Wyoming Trucking Ass'n, Inc., and Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Wyoming, Inc.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary question 
that must be resolved in this case is whether Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 
forecloses the legislature from extending the immunity of employers to 
co-employees acting within the scope of their employment. Stated another way, is 
the legislature foreclosed by the constitution from eliminating a cause of 
action that had been earlier recognized in the law? In addition to challenging 
the authority to eliminate a cause of action, the primary issue also presents a 
question of interpretation of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4. Additional issues are 
presented by the alternative argument of the respective appellants that the 
accused statute, § 27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989)1, is contrary to Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§§ 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 34, as well as Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27. These 
additional claims of unconstitutionality strike more directly at the authority 
of the legislature to eliminate a cause of action. The district court, in 
granting summary judgments in favor of the respective defendants, ruled that § 
27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), is constitutional, contrary to all of 
the contentions of the appellants. We agree that the statute is constitutional 
and affirm the judgment of the district court.

[¶2.]     Timothy L. Mills 
(Mills) and Levi Harry Bunker (Bunker) filed separate briefs that state the 
issues identically:

"1. Does Wyo.Stats. 1977, 
as amended, Section 27-14-104, which grants immunity from suit to coemployees, 
violate Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution, which provides that 
`No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for 
causing the injury or death of any person?'

"2. Does Wyo.Stats. 1977, 
as amended, Section 27-14-104, which grants immunity from suit to coemployees, 
violate Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution, which limits the 
immunities which can be granted pursuant to Worker's Compensation laws to the 
`employer contributing as required by law' to the compensation fund?

"3. Does Wyo.Stats. 1977, 
as amended, Section 27-14-104, which grants immunity from suit to coemployees, 
violate Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 34, and Article 3, Section 27, 
which provide for equality among all members of the human race in the right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; equal political rights, equality in 
civil rights, and equal privileges among all citizens; due process of law; 
prohibit absolute and arbitrary uses of power, even by the greatest majority; 
provide for equal access to the courts for all citizens; provide that the right 
to a jury trial is inviolate; provide that all laws shall have a uniform 
operation; and which prohibit special legislation, especially special 
legislation which calls for the `limitation of civil actions,' and which 
grants `to any corporation, 
association or individual . . . any special exclusive privilege, 
immunity, or franchise whatever?'"

Guy Reynolds (Reynolds) 
and Sid Marks (Marks) state the only issue that they perceive in this 
way:

"The sole issue for 
review is whether in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the 
District Court correctly held that the part of § 27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977, 
prohibiting lawsuits between co-employees while acting in the course and scope 
of their employment was not unconstitutional."

Jim Niggemyer 
(Niggemyer), responding to the arguments of Bunker, presents this statement of 
the issue:

"Is the Wyoming 
Legislature's elimination of co-employee liability constitutional?"

[¶3.]     In addition to the 
briefs of the parties, the court was favored with briefs of amicus curiae 
from several interested groups, all filed with the permission of the court. In 
the Amicus curiae Brief of the Wyoming AFL-CIO, the issues in the appeal 
are articulated in this way:

"A. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 2 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which guarantees:

"In their inherent right 
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are 
equal.

"B. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 3 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which provides:

"Since equality in the 
enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political 
equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and privileges 
of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any 
circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or 
unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction.

"C. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 6 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which reads as follows:

"No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

"D. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which guarantees:

"Absolute, arbitrary 
power over the lives, liberty and property of free men exists nowhere in the 
republic, not even in the largest majority.

"E. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 8 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which assures access to the courts of this state as 
follows:

"All courts shall be open 
and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have 
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.

"F. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 9 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which reads in pertinent part as follows:

"The right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases, but a jury in civil cases in all 
courts or in criminal cases in courts not of record, may consist of less than 
twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.

"G. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 34 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which guarantees:

"All laws of a general 
nature shall have a uniform operation.

"H. Does W.S. 
27-14-104(a) violate the provisions of Article 10, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which reads in pertinent part as follows:

"No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death 
of any person.

* * * * * *

"The right of each 
employee to compensation from such fund (referring to this Constitutional 
section as providing for the maintenance of a fund for the payment of 
compensation to injured employees) shall be in lieu of and shall take the place 
of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required 
by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any such 
injuries or death. (Emphasis added.)"

[¶4.]     The Wyoming Trial 
Lawyers Association says that the issue is:

"Does absolute 
co-employee immunity under Section 27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977 (1987 Cum.Supp.), 
violate Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution?"

In the Amicus 
curiae Brief of the State of Wyoming, there is no statement of an issue, 
but the statement of the argument suffices in lieu of an issue statement. It 
is:

"Section 27-14-104(a), 
W.S. 1986, does not afford complete, absolute co-employee immunity but rather 
limits the available remedies to injured co-workers."

Lastly, in the Amicus 
curiae Brief of the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, the Wyoming 
Mining Association, the Wyoming Trucking Association, Inc., and the Associated 
General Contractors of Wyoming, Inc., the statement of the issue is:

"May the Legislature 
constitutionally grant coemployees immunity from suit, when acting within the 
scope of their employment, under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation 
Act?"

[¶5.]     These cases present a 
pure question of the constitutionality of the statute. Consequently, the 
operative facts may be very briefly stated. Mills was employed by Dunbar Well 
Service, Inc. and, early in March of 1988, Reynolds directed Mills to paint the 
hood of a truck using equipment and materials provided by Marks. Both Reynolds 
and Marks were co-employees of Mills. While Mills was engaged in the assigned 
task, and was following instructions given him by Reynolds, an underrated 
pressure regulator burst near his face. Mills received severe injuries that 
included the loss of his left eye. He was awarded worker's compensation benefits 
with respect to his injuries.

[¶6.]     In the companion case, 
Bunker was employed by Universal Equipment Co. and received instructions from 
Niggemyer, a supervisory co-employee, to remove some electrical equipment from 
the old concentrator area of the Atlantic City mine site. Niggemyer informed 
Bunker that the electricity had been shut off, but the electricity had not been 
shut off. When Bunker attempted to remove the equipment, as directed, he 
received severe electrical burns over 47% of his body and also suffered a broken 
hip when he fell from a ladder. Bunker also was awarded worker's compensation 
benefits.

[¶7.]     Mills filed suit naming 
Reynolds and Marks as defendants. Bunker filed his action naming Niggemyer as a 
defendant. In both cases, the defendants responded to the respective complaints 
and then filed motions for summary judgment asserting the contention that § 
27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), made the rights and remedies under the 
Worker's Compensation Act the only rights or remedies available against a 
co-employee acting within the scope of his employment. The defendants claimed 
they were immune from suit. The motions for summary judgment were contested in 
both cases by the respective plaintiffs, who asserted that the provision of the 
statute making benefits under the act the exclusive right or remedy against a 
co-employee acting within the scope of his employment is contrary to the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming and, for that reason, is void and of no 
effect. Although these cases had been filed separately, the district court, 
recognizing that the resolution in both cases would hinge on the 
constitutionality of § 27-14-104, ordered the hearings on the respective motions 
for summary judgment to be consolidated. After the hearing, the district court 
ruled that the provision was not unconstitutional, and it granted the motion for 
summary judgment of the respective defendants. When these appeals were filed, 
this court concluded to maintain the consolidation for consideration on 
appeal.

[¶8.]     The importance of the 
constitutional claims justifies an historical review. In Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 
1981), the court noted that worker's compensation laws developed during the end 
of the nineteenth century to provide social insurance for victims of industrial 
accidents. It was estimated that, at the time such laws were adopted, only 25% 
of injured workers were being compensated for injuries under common law 
remedies. Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal 
Company, 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 836, 100 S. Ct. 71, 
62 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1979). The opinion of the court suggested that the laws were not 
developed to abrogate existing common law remedies that protected injured 
workers, but to counter the lack of recovery that was attributed to assumption 
of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule. These doctrines, 
as well as other common law principles, had effectively shielded employers from 
liability. In order to provide compensation not based upon fault or the breach 
of a duty owed by the employer to the injured employee, the compromise was 
adopted that afforded immunity to the employer. Barnette.

[¶9.]     Earlier, in Zancanelli v. Central Coal and Coke 
Company, 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918), this court 
observed that many employees were required to waive their right to sue their 
employer as a condition of their employment. Even if the worker did not agree to 
such a condition, the economic realities of those times generally mandated that 
he simply could not afford to litigate so, ultimately, the final result became 
the same. It seemed clear that the traditional tort mechanisms and common law 
remedies were not adequate to address the needs of an increasingly larger 
working class in America.

[¶10.]  While, in many states, compensation 
legislation offered an appropriate solution, in Wyoming, the conclusion was that a 
constitutional amendment was necessary before such legislation could be adopted. 
At the time, Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, provided:

"No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death 
of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to 
recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be 
void."

Because the substitution 
of worker's compensation benefits was perceived as limiting the amount of 
damages to be recovered by an injured employee, it appeared to be necessary to 
amend the constitution. The process for accomplishing the amendment was 
completed in 1914. 1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 79; Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (1982). 
By the amendment, Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, was expanded to provide 
that:

"No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death 
of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to 
recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void. 
As to all extrahazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for 
the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid 
compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each 
person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as 
the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee. The fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each employee to compensation from the fund 
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action 
against any employer contributing as required by law to the fund in favor of any 
person or persons by reason of the injuries or death."

[¶11.]  Following this amendment, the legislature 
passed the original Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, 1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 124, § 8. The 
traditional tort recovery, with its essential elements and historical defenses, 
was replaced by a state-administered industrial insurance program that required 
no showing of fault. Matter of Injury to 
Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986); Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226 (1982); Kendig; Barnette, 622 P.2d 1349; Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel. Workmen's 
Compensation Department, 569 P.2d 95 (Wyo. 
1977); Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 
1974). The injured worker needed to prove only that he had sustained injuries 
under work-related circumstances while employed in an extrahazardous employment 
by a covered employer. The key provisions of the legislative program were that 
the employer paid into an earmarked fund, established for the sole purpose of 
paying benefits for any work-related injury to a covered employee, and the 
employee no longer had the common law right to sue his employer. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984); Kendig; Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 1982); Zancanelli.

[¶12.]  The philosophy justifying the change in 
the law was that the worker gained by being assured a quick and certain recovery 
while the employer benefited because the risk of large damage judgments was 
eliminated. Barnette, 622 P.2d 1349; 
Stephenson; Zancanelli. In Wyoming, this combination 
of benefit and detriment has long been described as a quid pro quo adjustment that resulted in 
a relationship very similar to a contractual arrangement. Spera; Baker; Cottonwood; Markle; Zancanelli. While that justification 
well may have been important in inducing the voters to adopt the constitutional 
amendment, the justification was not needed for its application after it was 
adopted.

[¶13.]  The worker's compensation approach was 
intended to substitute the statutory remedy for the common law remedy previously 
available to an injured worker against his employer, but it was not intended to 
provide exclusive relief under all circumstances and all situations. The injured 
worker, it was assumed, received a sufficient portion of his regular income to 
provide a minimum level of support for himself and his family without the 
necessity of public assistance. Because the benefits received by the employee 
were normally less than wages he earned by working and, certainly, significantly 
less than potentially recoverable damages in a court action, the worker often 
resorted to other avenues of compensation. See Boggs, 590 F.2d 655; Barnette.

[¶14.]  Even though neither the constitution nor 
the statute provided immunity for a co-employee, in 1939, this court held that 
the legislative intent supporting the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, because 
the overall purpose was to protect the worker, mandated that benefits under the 
act should be paid even though the circumstances of the injury or death created 
a legal liability in some person other than the employer. In re Byrne, 53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095 
(1939). The court ruled that Section 124-109, W.R.S. 1931, purporting to avoid 
worker's compensation benefits in such an instance, "must be held to be without 
operative force under circumstances such as are now at bar." Byrne, 53 Wyo. at 539, 86 P.2d  at 
1102. In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized such a situation to one 
in which the injury or death was caused by a co-employee, pointing out that 
awards had been repeatedly made in the latter situations. This decision 
apparently was perceived as a ruling that an employee's cause of action against 
a negligent co-employee was eliminated as a matter of law. This perception 
apparently was confirmed in the case of Blackwell v. Pickett, 490 P.2d 347 
(Wyo. 1971), 
in which the court, being equally divided, affirmed a summary judgment granted 
to a co-employee on the ground that a claim against a fellow-employee by an 
employee who had received worker's compensation benefits was barred.

[¶15.]  That was the law in Wyoming until 1974, when 
the court resurrected the common law right to sue a negligent co-employee. Markle, 518 P.2d 621. The rationale that 
led to the denial of Byrne, and the 
sub silentio overruling of Blackwell hinged on the absence of any 
language, either in the constitutional amendment or in the legislation 
subsequently adopted, that specifically indicated a co-employee was to be immune 
from suit. The legislature responded promptly to the Markle decision. In 1975, the original 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act was amended to extend immunity from suit to 
negligent co-employees unless they were found to be grossly negligent. 1975 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws Ch. 149, § 1; 
Cottonwood; Kendig. Under the amended statute, 
ordinary negligence by a co-employee in the workplace was no longer actionable. 
In 1977, the statute again was amended to substitute the word "culpably" for the 
word "grossly." 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 142, § 1, § 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977; Cottonwood; Abeyta v. Hensley, 595 P.2d 71 
(Wyo. 
1979).

[¶16.]  A case testing the constitutionality of 
the 1975 amendment to the Worker's Compensation Act soon came before the court. 
In Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, an injured 
truck driver brought an action for damages against a co-employee asserting 
theories of both ordinary negligence and culpable negligence. The trial court, 
in denying the defendant's motion to strike the claim of ordinary negligence 
submitted in reliance upon Section 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, declared the 
amendment to the statute unconstitutional. The district court invoked Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 34; art. 3, § 27; and Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4. The case was 
permitted to go to trial on the claim of ordinary negligence, and a verdict in 
the amount of $330,000 was returned. When the case was appealed, this court 
ruled that the statute was constitutional, as written and amended, and that 
co-employees were immune from suit unless "culpably negligent." The judgment of 
the lower court was reversed.

[¶17.]  In addressing the claims of 
unconstitutionality in Kendig, we 
held that Section 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, did not conflict with art. 10, § 4, 
because the statute "does not limit the amount of damages to be recovered" and, 
instead, it specifically "limits the cause of action available for a recovery." 
Kendig, 641 P.2d  at 1239. The court 
ruled that "a `limitation in amount' and a `right to recover' were regarded as 
separate issues and treated separately by the framers of the Wyoming 
Constitution." Kendig, 641 P.2d  at 
1239. The court also said that the argument advanced by Kendig would make legislative enactments 
impossible on such subjects as statutes of limitation and comparable negligence 
whenever they were asserted in cases involving injury or death. Kendig.

[¶18.]  The court further held in Kendig that the trial court had 
erroneously relied upon art. 3, § 27, prohibiting special and local laws, and 
art. 1, § 34, requiring that laws of a general nature have a uniform 
application. The court recognized that art. 3, § 27, "means only that the 
statute must operate alike upon all persons in the same circumstances * * *." Kendig, 641 P.2d  at 1240. The 
prohibition against special and local laws has never meant that legislation must 
affect all persons in exactly the same way when they confront a statute under 
differing circumstances. Classifications are constitutionally permissible, and 
the only restraint in this regard is that the classification is required to be 
reasonable. A classification concerning an ordinary interest is reasonable if it 
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective, and the court 
ruled that the state objectives sought to be obtained included harmony among 
employees, the maintenance of a sound compensation fund, and the continuance of 
the purpose and philosophy behind the Worker's Compensation Act. Kendig. See Ludwig v. Harston, 65 Wyo. 134, 197 P.2d 252 (1948); May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300 (1942). The same 
rationale was invoked to reject the claim of unconstitutionality under Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 34. Subsequent cases have maintained the justification set 
forth in Kendig. Paravecchio v. Memorial Hospital of Laramie 
County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 915, 108 S. Ct. 1088, 99 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1988); Baskin v. 
State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 151 (Wyo. 1986); O'Brien 
v. State, 711 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1986). See Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420 (Wyo. 1984), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 1224, 105 S. Ct. 1215, 84 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985).

[¶19.]  Subsequent to the Kendig decision, Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 
4, was amended, again, to add the last two sentences. The legislature then 
consistently amended the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act to provide that 
coverage under it could be extended to all employment, including nonhazardous 
employment, at the election of the employer. Section 27-14-103(g), W.S. 1977 
(June 1987 Repl.). SeeState, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. Hollister, 
794 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1990). At the same time, the employer's 
immunity was extended to a co-employee, acting within the scope of his 
employment, without regard to the degree of negligence. Essentially, so long as 
the co-employee is acting within the scope of employment, co-employee liability 
has been abolished. Section 27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989) These 
amendments represent the current state of the law with respect to worker's 
compensation in Wyoming so far as co-employee responsibility is 
concerned.

[¶20.]  It is against this background of legal 
history that these cases protesting the constitutionality of the amendment 
affording immunity to co-employees acting within the scope of employment are 
presented. There are several principles that we must apply in addressing 
constitutional issues. Our court recognizes that "statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional unless affirmatively shown to be otherwise, and one who would 
deny the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden. The alleged 
unconstitutionality must be clearly and exactly shown beyond any reasonable 
doubt." Stephenson, 569 P.2d  at 97. 
See Baskin; O'Brien; Budd v. Bishop, 543 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1975); State 
v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1974); Johnson v. Schrader, 507 P.2d 814 
(Wyo. 1973); 
Zancanelli. The duty of the court is 
"to uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted 
if that is at all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. [citations omitted]" Kendig, 641 P.2d  at 1239, citing Washakie County School District Number One 
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), reh. denied, cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 
101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980). See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 
(Wyo. 1990); Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community 
Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, reh. denied 577 P.2d 1386 (Wyo. 1978). A party 
attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must do more, if that party is to 
succeed, than merely make bald assertions of whatever is perceived to create a 
constitutional problem. Stephenson; 
Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924 (Wyo. 1963). It is 
incumbent upon the party asserting that legislative enactments are 
unconstitutional to provide facts and cogent argument in support of its 
contention. Phillips v. ABC Builders, 
Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶21.]  If, among the constitutional questions 
raised, there are concerns about classifications and equal rights, we also are 
cognizant of the principle that any fact that can be reasonably conceived to 
sustain the classification will be assumed and that the court applies the 
"rational basis" test, not the more rigid "strict scrutiny" test, when an 
ordinary interest is involved. Kendig. It is within the parameters of 
these fundamental principles that we consider the appellants' several issues and 
arguments.

[¶22.]  The appellants attack the latest version 
of § 27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), from several quarters, albeit each 
attack addresses constitutional ramifications. Mills and Bunker initially assert 
that the statute is contrary to the provision of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, that 
"[n]o law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for 
causing the injury or death of any person." In addition, they contend that the 
statute violates another phrase of the same constitutional provision by failing 
to restrict protection under the worker's compensation act to the "employer 
contributing as required by law." In a very broad constitutional condemnation, 
these appellants vigorously contend that § 27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1989), violates Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 34, and art. 3, § 
27, because it denies equality to all members of the human race in the right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; denies equal political rights, 
equality in civil rights, and equal privileges among all citizens; denies 
injured workers due process of law; allows for the absolute and arbitrary use of 
power; fails to allow equal access to the courts for all citizens; fails to 
accede to the constitutional principle that the right to a jury trial is 
inviolate; fails to accommodate the principle that all laws shall have a uniform 
operation; and fails to prohibit special legislation, especially special 
legislation calling for the "`limitation of civil actions' and which 
grants to any 
corporation, association or individual * * * any special exclusive 
privilege, immunity or franchise whatsoever (emphasis added by 
appellants)."

[¶23.]  We have considered these several 
contentions, and the arguments offered in support of them, in light of our 
standards for addressing the constitutionality of statutes. We have included not 
only the arguments of the appellants but those made by the amicus curiae who offered briefs in 
support of the appellants' position. We hold that § 27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum. 
Supp. 1989), meets the demands of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming in 
every respect and, more specifically, we rule that the legislature appropriately 
has the authority to eliminate any and all causes of action accruing against an 
injured worker's co-employee when, or if, that co-employee causes, or allegedly 
causes, an injury while acting within the scope of his employment for an 
employer covered in the act. This conclusion results in affirming the decision 
of the district court.

[¶24.]  The foregoing represents our decision in 
this case, but it is appropriate to develop our analysis so that it addresses 
each of the asserted issues. The first claim of the appellants is that this 
statute violates the provisions of art. 10, § 4, because it effectively limits 
the damages recoverable from a negligent co-employee to nothing. Wyo. Const. art. 10, 
Section 4; § 27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989). This contention culminates 
with the argument that, given this first sentence of art. 10, § 4, a 
constitutional amendment similar to that offered in 1914 is required to, in 
effect, abolish such a common law cause of action and that the statute must be 
held void and of no effect because no such amendment has been adopted. This 
contention is resolved by simply applying and extending the holding in Kendig. In affirming the 
constitutionality of the statute that restricted suits against co-employees to 
conduct involving "culpable negligence," the court also affirmed the requisite 
authority in the legislature to define the degree of negligence required for an 
injured worker to recover from a co-employee. Kendig. In the process, the court 
clearly articulated the proposition that a requirement of proof of the more 
stringent standard of culpable negligence over the standard of ordinary 
negligence did not have the effect of limiting the amount of damages but, 
instead, only restricted a cause of action. Kendig. The logical extension of that 
rationale leads to the same result in this case.

[¶25.]  The state legislature, in its enactment 
of the amendments represented in Section 27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), 
has done nothing more than further limit the cause of action against a 
co-employee. Given the acknowledged power of the legislature to restrict a cause 
of action as represented by the decision in Kendig, the constitution imposes no 
further restraints upon the authority of the legislature to restrict the cause 
of action even to the point of apparent extinction. The fallacy in the arguments 
presented by Mills and Bunker is that the distinction between limiting the 
amount of damages to be recovered and the restriction of a cause of action is 
ignored. See Kendig. Our precedent 
has established the authority of the legislature to grant a degree of immunity 
to co-employees, and that rationale establishes the authority of the legislature 
to offer full immunity to co-employees functioning within the scope of their 
employment. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge the Amicus 
Curiae Brief of the State of Wyoming in which the point is made that the 
statute does not abolish all claims against co-employees because, certainly, an 
action can be brought if the co-employee has removed himself from the scope of 
employment. The holding that the legislature is without authority to so limit a 
claim would require us to overrule the decision in Kendig, and we have not been presented 
with justification for that result. Furthermore, the court noted in Markle that the legislature could extend 
the immunity afforded in the statute by specifically so providing; the rationale 
of that case was that the legislature had not so provided.

[¶26.]  A plain reading of the first sentence of 
Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, considered in the context of the whole provision, 
serves to reinforce our refusal to find the statute unconstitutional and does 
not, contrary to the appellants' position, prove that the elimination of 
co-employee suits is unconstitutional. Cf. Parker v. Energy Development 
Company, 691 P.2d 981 (Wyo. 1984) (conflict between an earlier 
constitutional provision and an amended version resulting in preference being 
given to the amendment). A construction of the amended constitutional provision 
to the end that the foreclosure of employee actions against the employer would 
be the sole limitation permissible with respect to the amount of damages, as 
these appellants implicitly urge, would simply present an ambiguity that would 
render the first sentence meaningless. If that sentence were construed as these 
appellants urge, in light of the additional language, there would be a direct 
conflict that could make the first sentence superfluous. We do not interpret 
constitutional language in that way. Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304 (Wyo. 1990); Halliburton Company v. McAdams, Roux and 
Associates, 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1989); Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300 
(Wyo. 1988); Reliance Insurance Company v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 713 P.2d 766 (Wyo. 
1986). Instead, we follow the preferred rule of construction pursuant to which 
every word, clause, and sentence is given effect so that no part becomes 
inoperative. State of Wyoming ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation Division v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1990); Story 
v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1988), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 106, 112 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1990); 
Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812 
(Wyo. 
1984).

[¶27.]  Following our principle that all 
components of the constitution must be construed in pari materia, in that 
all words of the constitution must be understood in relation to one another so 
as to allow a meaningful interpretation of the constitutional purpose, we 
conclude that the only feasible construction of the amended portion of art. 10, 
§ 4, is that the limitation upon actions by an employee, as it is described 
within the section, must be a restraint on a cause of action and not a 
limitation upon the amount of damages. See Thomson v. Wyoming In-stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778 
(Wyo. 1982). 
See also Story; State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Company, 694 P.2d 97 
(Wyo. 1985); 
Kendig. If, in drafting the 
amendment, the foreclosure of employee actions had been described as an 
exception to the prohibition on the enactment of laws "limiting the amount of 
damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person," we then 
could consider that, even though it certainly restrains the cause of action as 
well, as being no more than a constitutionally established permissible 
limitation on damages. If the amendment had been so drawn, the contention of the 
appellants would not be without merit because all other non-enumerated 
limitations would be impermissible, and the first sentence would be afforded 
efficacy. The fact, however, is that the amendment contains no exception 
language, and the omission of those words must be considered intentional. Carroll By and Through Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit Association, 755 P.2d 869 
(Wyo. 
1988).

[¶28.]  The logical result then is that, to avoid 
an irreconcilable conflict and to give effect to all provisions of the 
constitution, we must construe the prohibition against lawsuits by an employee 
against his employer to be something different from a limitation on damages, 
even though a similar ultimate result may attach in some situations. Story; Attletweedt. The reasonable conclusion, 
we reiterate, is that it is a restriction on the cause of action. Kendig. See Thomson; Witzenburger, 575 P.2d 1100. Such a 
restriction is not prohibited by the constitution. Witzenburger. As to the first claim of 
the appellants, the preclusion of an action against the employer is not a 
limitation on damages and, thus, is not foreclosed by Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4. 
A similar restriction then, even though premised on some other ground as in this 
case, is likewise not foreclosed by this section. Given the constitution as it 
now stands, it is not necessary to amend it to foreclose a cause of action 
against the negligent co-employee.

[¶29.]  The second issue urged by the appellants 
is premised upon their contention that the amended statute must be held 
unconstitutional because it fails to narrowly limit the immunities granted under 
the act to an "employer contributing as required by law to such fund * * *." See Stratman v. Admiral Beverage 
Corporation, 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1988); Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 
742 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1987); Bence v. Pacific 
Power & Light Company, 631 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1981). Mills and Bunker argue that the 
amendment that enabled the adoption of the Worker's Compensation Act was framed 
with the express provision that it should be limited to such employers, and the 
result that must follow is that the immunity provisions are to be strictly 
construed and narrowly applied. Our understanding of the relevant provision, 
however, does not confirm the existence of such a limitation, and our research 
has not disclosed a legislative intent to establish such a limitation. It is 
true that the amended section specifically mandates that "[t]he right of each 
employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of * * * any and all 
rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to such 
fund * * *," but nothing in the section even implicitly demands that the 
restriction is limited only to such employers. The legislature in this state may 
permissibly enact any law that is neither expressly nor inferentially prohibited 
by the constitution. Witzenburger; Bulova Watch Company v. Zale Jewelry Company 
of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1962). There exists 
no readily apparent rationale to justify the claim of these appellants that the 
protections under the Worker's Compensation Act must be limited to only those 
employers "contributing as required by law to such fund."

[¶30.]  The appellants, however, strongly urge us 
to consider policy justifications hinging on fairness and due process that, in 
their view, would necessarily preclude any other application of the protections 
extending to the employer under the act. The argument is that "no one but the 
employer and the employee who gets the compensation benefits have given up 
anything in the bargain" and that a co-employee is, therefore, not entitled to 
immunity since "a co-employee has given up nothing and, under Section 27-14-104, 
gets everything." The argument in the briefs then relates this claim of inequity 
to a deprivation of due process under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, by asserting that 
to allow an immunity under the Worker's Compensation Act to a party not 
suffering a detriment is substantively unfair to those workers who suffer the 
injury and is inherently unconstitutional because fairness is the cornerstone of 
due process. See Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6. The detriment 
perceived to be suffered is the worker's loss of his fundamental right to sue. 
Relying on Zancanelli, Mills and 
Bunker argue that the absence of this quid pro quo, both because it is unfair 
and because it is a violation of the due process rights owed to the injured 
party, justifies a strict application of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, as they 
demand. See Zancanelli. We conclude 
that this argument must be rejected.

[¶31.]  First, we are not satisfied as to the 
absence of a quid pro quo between the injured employee and his 
co-employee. Instead, in a greater sense, both gain something and give up 
something under the statutory amendment. Every worker is a co-employee of any 
other worker and, even though he loses a right to sue his fellow worker, also is 
afforded protection from any action against him by his co-worker. This is a 
quid pro quo. More importantly, however, the appellants misconstrue our 
judicial powers relative to those of the legislature. Even if we were to agree 
with their contention, which we have said we do not, we are not justified in 
overruling a legislative enactment simply because we perceive it to be unfair. 
The only power possessed by the judicial department to negate legislative 
actions is found in the conclusion that the enactment is unconstitutional. Any 
lack of a quid pro quo, even though 
that has been a popular justification for the worker's compensation statute, 
whether fair or unfair, does not offer a proper ground to declare a statute 
unconstitutional. In our view, it is unnecessary for the draftsman to justify, 
or refute, constitutional amendments with policy arguments. See Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988). An amendment, 
once passed, exists and takes effect. Its existence is sufficient for our 
purposes. Once the constitutional provision is adopted, the duty of the court is 
to follow it, and our only power is to determine the unconstitutionality of 
subsequent enactments. The only time policy considerations are relevant to 
constitutional dictates is in the public debate leading to their adoption when 
those who favor the amendment are attempting to sway the political majority to 
their views.

[¶32.]  Neither can we perceive how the alleged 
lack of quid pro quo ties into due process, even though the appellants' 
arguments are creative and, to a degree, attractive. Due process presents both 
substantive and procedural facets. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6; Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1985), appeal dismissed, sub nom Rogers v. CheyenneAirport Board, 476 U.S. 1110, 106 S. Ct. 1961, 90 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1986). Substantive due process is infringed if a statute is arbitrary and 
fails to promote a legitimate state objective by reasonable means. Moreno v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 
775 P.2d 497 (Wyo. 1989). This particular application of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act does not meet those criteria so that a 
conclusion that substantive due process is violated is justified. Procedural due 
process is governed by fundamental fairness concepts, and the appellants do 
allege a denial of fundamental fairness because of a lack of quid pro quo, but there is no showing 
made of a procedural defect in this instance. See Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352 
(Wyo. 
1979).

[¶33.]  Mills and Bunker next argue, still in 
support of their second issue, that giving a negligent co-employee "something 
for nothing" violates the injured worker's rights to access to the courts and 
trial by jury. See Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8. They cite Hoem for the proposition that the 
short-lived medical review panel proceedings were deemed unconstitutional 
because they unjustifiably delayed bringing medical malpractice suits to court, 
and they then argue that the complete eradication of a cause of action certainly 
amounts to "a total denial of justice and access to court" and a similar denial 
of the right to trial by jury. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 8 and 9. Hoem is readily distinguishable from 
this case, and the propositions for which it stands do not offer authority for 
the argument now asserted by Mills and Bunker.

[¶34.]  While in effect, the Wyoming Medical 
Review Panel Act, §§ 9-2-1501 to -1511, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), mandated, 
by one of its key provisions, that no complaint alleging medical malpractice 
could be filed in court unless a claim had first been filed with a statutorily 
specified review panel and a decision rendered. Hoem. The decision by the Medical Review 
Panel was not subject to court review, was not binding on either party, and was 
not admissible at trial. Sections 9-2-1509 to -1511, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.) 
(since repealed). Among a number of contentions, including one alleging an 
impediment to free access to the courts, the plaintiff in Hoem had argued that the Medical Review 
Panel Act violated equal protection of the law in that it arbitrarily "singles 
out a limited class of health class providers for special protection while, on 
the other hand, it places an added burden on persons injured by health care 
providers." Hoem, 756 P.2d  at 782. 
See Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 34; art. 3, § 27. This court 
agreed.

[¶35.]  Because the Medical Review Panel Act was 
found to be unconstitutional on that basis, the court declined to address other 
contentions, including one that alleged a denial of free access to the courts. 
See K.N. Energy Corporation v. City of 
Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo. 1988); Nehring 
v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978). Had the court chosen to address 
that issue in Hoem, and had it held 
the Medical Review Panel Act was one that denied access to the courts, the case 
still would not be dispositive, in this instance, because the circumstances are 
significantly different. In Hoem, the 
Medical Review Panel Act created a situation in which the parties had to follow 
a unique process before proceeding to trial even though they may have possessed 
a viable cause of action. In a sense, that act did no more than establish an 
additional jurisdictional roadblock. Nothing in the Worker's Compensation Act, 
either before or after the 1986 amendment, delays or forecloses an injured 
worker from filing, and attempting to pursue, his claim, whatever it may be, 
through the courts. Even with the restrictions found in the act and the 
constitution, there is no barrier to the access of the worker to the courts. Our 
constitutional guarantee of access to the court means just that and no more. Mull v. Wienbarg, 66 Wyo. 410, 212 P.2d 380 
(1949).

[¶36.]  While the constitution also guarantees 
that justice shall be "administered without sale, denial, or delay," there is no 
guarantee that an unhappy litigant will maintain a viable claim once he finds 
himself in court. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8. See Kendig. The lack of an actionable claim, 
or even elimination of a cause of action, is not the same thing as denying a 
party access to the courts. "Where no right of action is given, however, or no 
remedy exists, under either the common law or some statute, those constitutional 
provisions create none." Mull, 212 P.2d  at 382. "The right and power, as well as the duty, of creating rights and 
to provide remedies, lies with the legislature, and not with the courts." Mull, 212 P.2d  at 382. The fact that the 
constitution guarantees access to the court, and that it is not permissible to 
deny access, does not guarantee a recovery, nor does it demand that a remedy be 
available. The absence of a right to recover does not equate to a denial of 
access to the courts. Section 27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), does not 
deny any injured worker access to the courts or a right to a jury 
trial.

[¶37.]  We move now to the third, and final, 
issue asserted by Mills and Bunker in which they assert a broad spectrum claim 
that the accused statute violates Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 
34, and art. 3, § 27. These appellants say that the several constitutional 
provisions:

"* * * [P]rovide for 
equality among all members of the human race in the right to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness; equal political rights, equality in civil rights, and 
equal privileges among all citizens; due process of law; prohibit absolute and 
arbitrary uses of power, even by the greatest majority; provide for equal access 
to the courts for all citizens; provide that the right to a jury trial is 
inviolate; provide that all laws shall have a uniform operation; and which 
prohibit special legislation, especially special legislation which calls for the 
`limitation of civil actions,' and which grants `to any corporation, 
association or individual . . . any special exclusive privilege, 
immunity, or franchise whatever'" (emphasis added by 
appellants).

[¶38.]  Earlier, we addressed the claim that this 
amended statute deprives these appellants of due process and their right of 
access to the courts in a trial by jury. There is no necessity to address those 
particular provisions any further. The remaining aspects of this very broad 
claim can be identified with two main contentions. The first of those is that § 
27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 1989), violates some workers' rights to equal 
protection; the second is that the statute amounts to special legislation. 
Although these two contentions address different areas of the constitution, they 
are sufficiently similar in the context of this case that we treat them 
together. We simply are unable to perceive any violation of art. 1, § 3, which 
articulates political rights.

[¶39.]  In support of their premise, Mills and 
Bunker argue that the grant of co-employee immunity is not extended to all 
Wyoming workers since it applies only to those workers involved in 
extrahazardous employments as identified by § 27-14-103, W.S. 1977. In their 
brief, the appellants concede that Section 27-14-103(g), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1989), permits any employer who is not engaged in extrahazardous employment to 
elect to be included in the system. Upon reflection, in the context of this 
case, we conclude that this extension of the benefit of the statute to 
nonhazardous employments is dispositive of that aspect of the claim made by the 
appellants. By its enactment, the legislature has provided a means whereby each 
and every Wyoming employer, and thus each and 
every Wyoming 
employee, can be covered under the Worker's Compensation Act. Because every 
worker in Wyoming now may receive an equal benefit under 
the act with respect to the protection afforded the co-employee, there seems no 
prospect of supporting the claim of a deprivation of equal protection. See 
Bell v. State, 693 P.2d 769 (Wyo. 1985). Cf. Small, 689 P.2d 420 (statute not 
violating equal protection merely because it could have included other 
persons).

[¶40.]  The difficulty of identifying special 
legislation is at least at the same level. See Kendig. If deficiencies in either area 
existed prior to 1986, § 27-14-103(g), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), has, contrary 
to the position asserted by the appellants, cured that defect. The appellants do 
not chose to acknowledge this universal application, however, and cite Phillips, 
611 P.2d 821, and Hoem to support 
their position. In Phillips, the 
constitutionality of a questionable statute of limitations shielding "any person 
performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, construction or 
supervision of construction for" improvements to real property was at issue. Phillips, 611 P.2d  at 822. Relying upon 
persuasive authority from a number of jurisdictions, this court held that the 
statute, § 1-3-111, W.S. 1977, was unconstitutional in that, instead of being a 
statute of limitations, it was a grant of immunity conferred on an extremely 
narrow band of defendants. See Phillips. Though that case certainly is 
the law, we do not find it applicable to the problems presented in this case 
because the provisions of the accused statute, now available to all Wyoming 
workers, is not limited to such an extremely narrow group.

[¶41.]  Similarly, we reject Hoem as authority for the appellants' 
arguments on the same reasoning. The protections in that case were also limited 
to an extremely narrow class of health providers. See Hoem. Moreover, we hold that a 
classification potentially consisting of all Wyoming workers to be sufficiently broad to 
defeat any and all allegations of special legislation. See Phillips; Kendig. The Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act operates alike on all employees functioning in the same, or 
similar, circumstances. See Kendig; 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. 
Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351 (Wyo. 1978). It is our conclusion, and we so 
hold, that Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, does not inhibit the legislature from 
extending the same tort immunities now granted to Wyoming employers to Wyoming 
employees acting within the scope of their employment. The provision that is 
claimed to be unconstitutional, § 27-14-104, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), does 
not violate the provisions of Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 34, 
and art. 3, § 27.

[¶42.]  The summary judgments granted by the 
district court are respectively affirmed.

CARDINE, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a 
dissenting opinion in which MACY, J., joined.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 27-14-104(a), 
W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1989), provides:

"(a) The rights and 
remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint employee, and 
his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu 
of all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint employer 
making contributions required by this act, or their employees acting within the 
scope of their employment, but do not supersede any rights and remedies 
available to an employee and his dependents against any other 
person."

CARDINE, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶43.]  I concur in the opinion of Justice 
Thomas. I have no doubt that the legislature can create or eliminate causes of 
action. I am reminded of the "Heart Balm" statutes passed to abolish the common 
law cause of action for breach of promise to marry. The original version of the 
current "Heart Balm" statutes, W.S. 1-23-101 through -104, was enacted in 1941. 
In passing the session law eliminating causes of action for alienation of 
affection, criminal conversation, seduction, etc., the legislature gave the 
following reason for their enactment:

"The remedies heretofore 
provided by law for the enforcement of actions based upon alleged alienation of 
affection, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, 
having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, 
humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of any 
wrong-doing, who were merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies 
having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and 
such remedies having furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted 
commission of crime and in many cases having resulted in the perpetration of 
frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy of the State that the best 
interests of the people of the State will be served by the abolition of such 
remedies. Consequently, in the public interest, the necessity for the enactment 
of this article is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination." 
1941 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 36 § 1.

One case presenting this 
cause of action was heard by the Wyoming Supreme Court before enactment of W.S. 
1-23-101 through -104. In that case, Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649, 103 A.L.R. 107 (1935), this court, based upon the trial court's failure to 
give instructions concerning a presumption of the good faith of parents and 
proof necessary to rebut it, reversed a $10,000 judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff against her in-laws. The constitutional power of the legislature to 
abolish this cause of action is so clear, it has never been 
questioned.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.

[¶44.]  Are workers in Wyoming to be essentially 
unprotected from injurious acts which are culpably, willfully or criminally 
inflicted against them by co-workers by the barrier which has been applied 
legislatively to deny to them rights for civil justice to properly recover for 
resulting personal injury? Believing that the Wyoming Constitution says what it 
says and means what it was intended to provide in protection for citizens 
against a statist government, I respectfully dissent.

I.

UNSAFE WORK PLACE - RIGHT 
TO INJURE OR KILL

[¶45.]  These cases come to this court to present 
a constitutional challenge to a statutory provision which deleted any rights of 
workers to recover for injury causing acts of co-employees. See Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 
1366, n. 3 (Wyo. 1988). As amended by the legislature in 
1986, W.S. 27-14-104(a), the Wyoming Worker's Compensation statutes eliminated 
an injured employee's cause of action against a co-employee acting within his 
scope of employment. Consequently, regardless of culpable negligence, criminal 
behavior or intentionally tortious conduct, the statute completely eliminates 
the possibility of recovering damages as explicitly protected by Wyo. Const. 
art. 10, § 4. W.S. 27-14-104(a) violates the constitutionally protected right of 
an injured person to redress a wrong, amounts to special legislation, and 
violates substantive due process. I do not accept this further denigration of 
guarantees of individual rights which the Wyoming Constitution was written to 
protect.

[¶46.]  Contrary to the majority opinion, in 
which this court again fails to recognize that, with limited exceptions,1 immunity is "an outmoded 
anachronism of [questionable] history and parentage," I would hold that the 
legislature is constitutionally foreclosed from extending absolute immunity to 
co-employees even when acting within the scope of their employment under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. White 
v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1360 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting. I 
write to express my unwavering conviction that the injured appellants in these 
cases are constitutionally entitled to their day in court. In addition, I write 
to continue my battle against the injustice which comes when liability is 
decoupled from criminal conduct, intentional misconduct or culpable negligence 
via legislative extension of absolute immunity in derogation of the Wyoming 
Constitution. See White, 784 P.2d  at 
1324, Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting and Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 
(Wyo. 1990), 
Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting. In effect, W.S. 27-14-104(a), as amended by the 
legislature in 1986 and as upheld by the majority of this court in this 
instance, creates a "right to kill" one's fellow employee without risk or threat 
of civil liability.

[¶47.]  In simplest terms, the end result of W.S. 
27-14-104(a) and the majority holding in these cases is that everyone loses 
except the wrongdoer. The injured employee loses because he is denied the 
opportunity to recover damages for injuries caused by a culpably negligent or 
intentionally tortious co-employee. The employer loses because he is unable to 
minimize his premium contributions to the Worker's Compensation fund and because 
employees protected with absolute immunity are less motivated to share 
responsibility for a safe work place. The Worker's Compensation fund loses 
because it is unable to recover benefit payments otherwise due through the Act's 
third-party recovery lien provision. Ultimately, the citizens of Wyoming lose because the 
legislature and the majority of this court abandon the Wyoming Constitution and 
extinguish protected rights. The only overt winner is a criminal, culpably 
negligent or intentionally tortious co-employee who escapes liability and 
receives opportunity carte blanche to act with impunity. The covert winner is 
the general insurance liability carrier whose claim costs are reduced and whose 
actual coverage is compressed.

[¶48.]  I would find W.S. 27-14-104(a) 
unconstitutional and would reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment. By so doing, I would open the courthouse doors to employees injured at 
the hands of culpably negligent, criminal or intentionally tortious 
co-employees. It is constitutionally impermissible, in my opinion, to legislate 
a more dangerous work place by eliminating rights to justice for the laborers. 
We reverse a century of industrial effort to accomplish work place health and 
safety.2 

II.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶49.]  While I agree with the general statement 
of this court's standard of review set forth in the majority opinion, I find the 
summary of applicable principles to be incomplete. I would add the following 
statutory and constitutionally determinative provisions previously adopted by 
this court for judicial review of Worker's Compensation legislation.

[¶50.]  In Seckman v. Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161 
(Wyo. 1989), 
we identified the underlying purpose and application of the Act. We 
stated:

Unlike most statutes that 
abrogate common law rights and must, for that reason, be strictly construed * * 
*, the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act * * *, is to be interpreted in a 
reasonably liberal fashion so that the legislative goals that obviously are 
intended may be accomplished * * *. Whenever possible, the Act should be applied 
in favor of the workman * * *, so that industry, and not the individual 
employee, bears the burden of accident and injury occurring within the 
industrial setting.

Id. at 165. I find the 
result reached by the majority in these cases to be counterproductive to the 
underlying purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act. In direct contrast to the 
stated legislative purpose, the majority does not apply the Act in favor of 
injured workmen. Instead, the majority reaches the result that a legislative 
grant of statutory immunity is a superior right to the constitutionally mandated 
right of an individual to recover damages for injuries. In recognition of an 
injured employee's eligibility to collect modest Worker's Compensation benefits 
and by upholding the constitutionality of W.S. 27-14-104(a), this court requires 
that an injured employee bear practically the full burden of his injuries 
without redress for damages.3

[¶51.]  For example, in Bence v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 
631 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1981), we held that immunity provisions 
in the Worker's Compensation Act must be narrowly construed. In deciding whether 
immunity extends to a non-employer, we ruled that a non-employer "should not 
enjoy an immunity that it has not paid for." Id. at 18. See also Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 
(Wyo. 1989); Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1988); and Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 742 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1987). In light of our unequivocal analysis in these cases, I find no 
legislative authority to extend absolute immunity to co-employees who do not 
"pay" for the privilege.

III.

WHOSE QUID PRO 
QUO

[¶52.]  I reject the majority's analysis of and 
conclusion that a quid pro quo relationship exists between co-workers.4 I would hold that when 
constitutionally protected rights are violated by legislative enactment, the 
underlying policy justification is always relevant to judicial review and 
particularly so when crafted as special interest legislation. See Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785, 787 
(Ala. 1978); Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1305 
(Colo. 1982); 
and see generally, Note, Massey v. 
Selensky: Workers' Compensation and Coemployee Immunity in Montana, 46 
Mont.L.Rev. 217, 224-28 (1985). Recognizing a legislative grant of absolute 
immunity to co-employees for culpably negligent or intentionally tortious 
conduct eviscerates the intent and clear language of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 as 
well as overrules sub silentio this court's holdings in Bence. Additionally, since this is 
purely special interest legislation, we now ignore the preclusion implicit in 
most sections of Wyo. Const. art. 1 and explicit in Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27, 
special and local laws prohibited.

[¶53.]  In Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 1982), a case decided the same 
day as Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 
(Wyo. 1982), 
we considered the quid pro quo 
relationship between an employer covered under the Act and his 
employees.

It is the employer who 
contributes to the fund and it is the employer's contributions which fund 
payment to workers for those injuries not occasioned by the employer's fault or 
negligence. In return for that contribution, the employer is granted immunity 
from suit. Neither the injured employee nor the co-employee contribute to the 
fund. A rational basis thus exists for treating the employer differently from 
his employees with respect to the extent of immunity.

Mauch, 641 P.2d  at 1251. In 
this case, this court recognized the existence of a rational basis for treating 
contributing employers and co-employees differently with regard to immunity. I 
find nothing has changed with the passage of time or over the course of events 
which now justifies treating contributing employers and co-employees 
identically.

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS

[¶54.]  "While it is our duty to give great 
deference to legislative pronouncements and uphold constitutionality when 
possible, it is likewise our equally imperative duty to declare a legislative 
enactment invalid if it transgresses the state constitution." Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, 1114, reh'g denied 577 P.2d 1386 (Wyo. 
1978). See Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 560 (Wyo. 1986). The majority 
decision in this case fails to recognize the constitutional transgressions of 
W.S. 27-14-104(a). "The State Constitution is a limitation, not a grant, of 
power, and, as a result, the legislature possesses all legislative authority 
except as restricted by the State Constitution, either expressly or by clear 
implication." Witzenburger, 575 P.2d  
at 1146 (citing State ex rel. Board of 
Commissioners of GoshenCounty v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 P. 771 
(1923) and 16 C.J.S. Constitutional 
Law § 70 (1984) and emphasis in original), Rose, Justice, dissenting. I 
would conclude, as Chief Justice Rose did in his dissent in Kendig, that Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, 
expressly precludes the legislature from extending immunity to 
co-employees.

[¶55.]  I would also hold that Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 8,5 when read in conjunction with Wyo. 
Const. art. 10, § 4, forbids unlimited legislative discretion to close the doors 
of the courts in this state to workers intentionally injured by co-employees.6 Similarly, I would apply Wyo. 
Const. art. 3, § 277 and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8 to assure citizens of 
Wyoming access to the state's courts as this court did in Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980). Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27 specifically limits 
legislative power, and I would construe this provision as evidence that the 
framers of the Wyoming Constitution intended this court to exercise a 
substantial checking function over legislative authority which infringes on 
constitutionally protected rights. See Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXILand & Water L.Rev. 527, 556 
(1986).

[¶56.]  The majority states that the test for 
whether or not substantive due process has been infringed is "if a statute is 
arbitrary and fails to promote a legitimate state objective by reasonable 
means." (Citing Moreno v. State, Dept. of 
Revenue and Taxation, 775 P.2d 497 (Wyo. 1989).) The majority opinion 
dismisses appellants' substantive due process arguments in a single sentence and 
concludes without analysis that, "this particular application of the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act does not meet those criteria so that a conclusion that 
substantive due process is violated is justified."

[¶57.]  I would conclude otherwise. I find that 
the legislative extension of immunity to co-employees, without regard to the 
degree of negligence or the qualitative distinction between negligence and 
intentionally tortious conduct, is an arbitrary deprivation of the appellant's 
right to recover damages for injuries. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 
(Ky. 1973). 
Legislation which limits damages cannot pass the rational basis test. Such 
legislation, on its face, discriminates against a more seriously injured victim 
since Worker's Compensation benefits will quite often fail to cover all economic 
losses, to say nothing of compensating for pain, suffering, and other related 
damages. More significantly, I recognize no state objective, legitimate or 
otherwise, which is promoted by the extension of immunity to 
co-employees.

V.

OUR HISTORY IN KENDIG

[¶58.]  In Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, this court found 
a rational relationship between the statute (which provided immunity to 
co-employees acting with less than culpable negligence) and the classification 
of immunized co-employees. The Kendig 
objectives, which are reiterated by the majority here, are: (1) harmony among 
employees; (2) maintenance of a sound compensation fund; and (3) continuance of 
the overall purpose and philosophy behind the Worker's Compensation Act. The 
same legislative objectives set forth by this court in Kendig are still applicable today. All 
are viewed in the context of the underlying legislative goal of "saving" the 
Worker's Compensation program when it underwent revision in 1986. Unfortunately, 
any realistic factual relevance of those "goals" to what the provision actually 
does exists somewhere between unrefined imagination and a total non 
sequitur.

[¶59.]  Relying on Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 
and Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 
1974), appellants contend that a constitutional amendment is required to extend 
absolute immunity to co-employees. Absent a constitutional amendment, appellants 
argue that the legislature is precluded from enacting legislation immunizing 
co-employees for their negligent and/or intentionally tortious acts.

[¶60.]  The majority agrees with appellees' 
response that this court's holding in Kendig recognizes legislative authority 
to immunize co-employees from liability so long as the co-employee allegedly 
causes an injury while acting within the scope of his employment. Thus, without 
specifically distinguishing between various types of intentional and negligent 
conduct, the legislature and the majority of this court provide absolute 
immunity from liability to all coemployees regardless of whether their conduct 
is negligent, grossly negligent, culpably negligent, intentionally tortious or 
abjectly criminal. Before the 1986 revision in W.S. 27-14-104(a), (i.e., when an 
employee could recover damages from a culpably negligent co-employee; see Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989); Wessel, 752 P.2d 1363; and Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 
(Wyo. 1987)), 
we imposed a heavy burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate a co-employee's culpable 
negligence.8 The line between culpable 
negligence and intentionally tortious conduct may not be great, but the 
qualitative distinction between the two is still significant.

[¶61.]  Intentionally tortious conduct is 
"different in kind" from other classifications of negligent behavior and the 
distinction is not simply a difference in the "degree" of knowledge.

The law of intentional 
torts constitutes a separate world of legal culpability. It is a system that 
balances specific rights and obligations, and imposes liability on the basis of 
a party's intent, rather than the moral blameworthiness of that party's conduct 
by societal standards. The real qualitative distinctions between intentional 
torts and other forms of culpable conduct share a single origin - the "duty" 
concept. Intentional torts are dignitary by nature. They are designed to protect 
one's right to be free from unpermitted intentional invasions of person or 
property. Alternatively, the duty underlying an action in negligence or strict 
products liability is to avoid causing, be it by conduct or by product, an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others within the range of proximate cause 
foreseeability. These distinct worlds of culpability cannot be reconciled.[9]

Gallub, Assessing Culpability in the Law of Torts: A 
Call for Judicial Scrutiny in Comparing "Culpable Conduct" Under New York's CPLR 1411, 37 Syracuse L.Rev. 1079, 1112 
(1987) (footnotes omitted). Thus, relying on Kendig for the proposition that the 
legislature has authority to abolish co-employee liability for all actions 
within the scope of employment is misplaced. It is not enough to assume that 
intentionally tortious co-employees will be held accountable for their 
misconduct based on a showing that they acted outside the scope of their 
employment. Rather, it is likely that many intentional tortfeasors will enjoy 
full immunity from liability.

[¶62.]  I believe the legislature and the 
majority of this court mistakenly blur the qualitative distinction between 
intentional misconduct and other types of negligent behavior. Extension of the 
holding in Kendig to immunize 
culpably negligent or intentionally tortious co-employee conduct is an invalid 
and unjustified violation of constitutionally protected rights within our 
state's constitution.

[¶63.]  While it is arguable that a higher level 
of scrutiny is mandated by the statutory infringement of constitutionally 
protected rights at stake in these cases, I find that W.S. 27-14-104(a) fails 
even the lowest level of scrutiny. See White, 784 P.2d  at 1332, 1335, Urbigkit, 
Justice, dissenting and Hoem v. 
State, 756 P.2d 780, 785 (Wyo. 1988), Thomas, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom Urbigkit, Justice, joined. The statute is not reasonably 
related to the legislative objectives. Extending absolute immunity to 
co-employees does not reduce injuries, promote safety or preserve the economic 
integrity of the Worker's Compensation fund.

[¶64.]  First, it is purely speculative, if not 
actually spurious, to opine justification for constitutionality on ascertainment 
of whether or not co-employee immunity creates a more harmonious work 
environment. I contend that both logic and statistical evidence reveal that a 
grant of absolute immunity to co-employees serves only to create a less-safe 
workplace. It follows that a less-safe workplace is, by its very nature, a 
less-harmonious workplace since employees must be more cautious of their 
co-workers. Since co-employees are no longer threatened with liability for their 
culpable negligence or intentionally tortious conduct, they are, unfortunately, 
more likely to endanger both themselves and their fellow employees in the 
workplace. This conclusion is supported by employment and work force injury data 
generated by various state agencies since the 1986 legislative revision of W.S. 
27-14-104(a). The data indicates that between 1987 and 1989 there have been 
approximately twenty-two percent more Worker's Compensation injuries reported by 
a Wyoming work 
force with approximately 12,000-15,000 fewer workers in 1988 than there were in 
1986. This is compelling support for the argument that workers and employers are 
exercising less caution in the workplace in part because they have less 
incentive to do so. This adverse workplace safety result was clearly illustrated 
by appendices attached to the amicus 
curiae brief of the Wyoming AFL-CIO.

[¶65.]  This case is illustrative of the analysis 
of thoughtful scholars and concerned jurors determining why immunities from 
responsibility for wrongful conduct are characterized as anachronistic and 
dinosaurs in this modern world in its complex and compressed society. Immunities 
by providing absolution from responsibility invite, approve and pamper harmful, 
slothful, malicious and just bad conduct. Protection from misconduct grows and 
cultivates that approved, invited and justified misconduct. The real quid pro quo from the legislative 
enactment, taking away rights of the employees, was that the something the 
worker lost from the immunity foreclosing rights was the doubtful benefit he 
achieves of exposure to harm, damage, and possible death caused by wrongful 
conduct.

[¶66.]  Similarly, in light of Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 22, Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 3410 and this court's decision in Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 
(Wyo. 1978), I 
find an abject flight from fact or logic in the "harmonious workplace" argument 
provided as justification for these loss of rights for injured workers. A 
negligently maintained or a culpably inflicted dangerous workplace is seldom 
found to be inclined to create harmony. Broken bones and dead bodies do not make 
good music. A more thoughtful thesis is found in Nehring, where this court found no 
rational relation between the state's "guest statute" and ascribed legislative 
purposes. Consequently, the "guest statute" was declared unconstitutional 
because, in effect, it eliminated a cause of action (the right of a non-paying 
passenger to recover for injuries inflicted by ordinary negligence). Comment, The Constitutionality of Automobile Guest 
Statutes: A Roadmap to the Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975 
B.Y.U.L.Rev. 99 (1975).

[¶67.]  Second, W.S. 27-14-104(a) eliminates a 
significant source of reimbursement for the coffers of the Worker's Compensation 
fund. Under W.S. 27-14-105(a),11 the Worker's Compensation fund is 
entitled to reimbursement for payments made to an injured employee covered under 
the Act (up to one-third of the total proceeds recovered from a third party). 
Since this source of potential revenue is no longer available under the 1986 
amendment to W.S. 27-14-104(a), it is obvious the legislature did not adopt W.S. 
27-14-104(a) to protect the financial solvency of the Worker's Compensation 
fund.

[¶68.]  Third, from the outset, Worker's 
Compensation has always been considered a form of industrial insurance rather 
than damages. Hotelling v. Fargo-Western 
Oil Co., 33 Wyo. 240, 238 P. 542 (1925).12 This court irrefutably established 
the proposition that Worker's Compensation stems from contract and not from 
tort. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235; Markle, 518 P.2d 621; Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 
Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918). "An insurance policy does not protect the policy holder from the 
consequences of his intentional tortious act. Indeed, it would be against public 
policy to permit insurance against the intentional tort." Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron 
Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, 577, cert. denied 459 U.S. 857, 103 S. Ct. 127, 74 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1982). By denying an injured employee the opportunity to 
recover damages from an intentionally tortious co-employee, the injured employee 
is forced to bear the brunt of his injuries while the intentionally tortious 
co-worker escapes liability. I fail to see how the elimination of co-employee 
liability in tort serves to enhance any public purpose premised on the concepts 
of insurance and contract.

[¶69.]  The only effective legislation to "save" 
the Worker's Compensation fund would involve imposing greater deterrent measures 
on the work force - not eliminating viable incentives for safe practices.13 Absolute immunity creates a 
less-safe workplace and allows a tortious wrongdoer to escape responsibility and 
to act with impunity.14 No valid state objective is 
promoted by such a misguided legislative act.

[¶70.]  Legislative extension of absolute 
immunity to co-employees absent an enabling constitutional amendment is an 
arbitrary limitation on an injured employee's right to recover damages and is 
thus in contravention of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4. The means employed by the 
legislature to "save" the Worker's Compensation program are patently 
unreasonable and fail even the lowest standard of constitutional judicial 
review.15

VI.

EVEN WITH KENDIG, THIS DECISION IS STILL 
WRONG

[¶71.]  We are first faced here with the 
consequences of this court's wrong decision in Kendig. I would overrule Kendig for, as Chief Justice Rose 
pointed out in his dissent, "it is a holding not supported by the law and in 
derogation of the limitations on legislative power found in Art. 10, § 4." 
Id. at 1246. 
Kendig should be overturned. If the 
majority of this court is unwilling to do so, then the legislature should, or in 
time a majority of this court will in another day be called to return to the 
application of basic constitutional protections which should be provided by the 
Wyoming Constitution and enforced by this tribunal.

[¶72.]  Regardless of the semantic manipulations 
applied by the majority to conclude that a "plain reading of the first sentence 
of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4," when read in conjunction with the whole provision, 
"does not, * * *, prove that the elimination of co-employee suits is 
unconstitutional," I strongly feel that the legislature cannot enact a statute 
that immunizes co-employees regardless of the degree or nature of their culpably 
negligent or intentionally tortious conduct without first amending Wyo. Const. 
art. 10, § 4. See, generally, Note, Worker's Compensation - Constitutionality of 
Wyoming's Co-Employee Immunity Statute Under 
Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982), XVIIILand & Water L.Rev. 355, 369-70 
(1983). While Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 has been amended on 
two previous occasions to accommodate Worker's Compensation legislation,16 no constitutional amendment has 
been enacted to allow the legislature to extend absolute immunity to 
co-employees and, consequently, to circumvent the clear language and intent of 
both the first sentence and the entire provision of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4. 
The legislature had the opportunity to "constitutionalize" extension of absolute 
immunity to co-employees when it submitted Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 to the 
voters in 1986. The legislature did not take advantage of this opportunity and I 
find no authority under which the legislature may unilaterally grant such 
immunity.

[¶73.]  Even though Kendig was wrongly decided and is again 
upheld against the Wyoming Constitution by this court, in consideration of that 
present state of Wyoming law, I would further argue that Kendig is also distinguishable from the 
present case. As a further step beyond where this court had previously gone, Kendig does not mandate legislative 
authority to extend absolute immunity to co-employees in the absence of an 
authenticating constitutional amendment or elimination of the beneficial 
amendments presently existent. Although that earlier case might be excused 
constitutionally under the specific terminology of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, 
this case simply and directly cannot.17

[¶74.]  Kendig held that co-employee immunity 
for acts of ordinary negligence was constitutional. However, in 1986, the 
legislature went far beyond the result in Kendig to eliminate culpable negligence 
or intentionally tortious acts from W.S. 27-14-104(a). While I struggle 
philosophically with the concept of granting immunity for any degree of 
negligence, I am willing to assume, arguendo, that immunity for acts of 
ordinary negligence may be justified. Ordinary negligence connotes acts of 
unconscious inadvertence, and allowing injured employees to sue co-workers for 
such "accidental" acts would not significantly reduce workplace injuries. Total 
basic rights are not squashed by the earlier legislation and the Kendig reasoning since only the standard 
for recovery was adjusted in the enactment.

[¶75.]  The same cannot be said for intentional 
acts of co-employees, supervisors and bosses where the totality of any 
responsibility for conduct or rights of justice to the injured are identically 
eliminated. Extending immunity to intentional tortfeasors removes liability from 
the shoulders of the responsible party and eviscerates all deterrent effect 
against future misconduct. "It would be a travesty of justice and logic to 
permit a worker to injure a co-employee through such conduct, and then compel 
the injured co-employee to accept moderate benefits under the Act." Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985). An employee should not be required to contemplate the 
risk of an intentional tort as a natural risk of employment. Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d  at 576. Not only 
should this court's majority but also the membership of the Wyoming legislature 
be called to re-examine rights of the worker for redress when injured by 
culpable, criminal or willful misconduct effectuated against him by any one 
whose "employee status" creates the danger and causes the resulting 
harm.

[¶76.]  Legislation which arbitrarily abolishes 
an entire cause of action and eliminates rights to redress for injury violates 
several constitutional guarantees.18 The legislature cannot actively or 
inactively "amend" the constitution by legislative action or inaction. As one 
court aptly observed, "`[s]ociety cannot escape its responsibility to provide 
justice by simply eliminating the rights of its citizens.'" Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980) (quoting Opinion of the 
Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 215, 304 A.2d 881, 888 (1973), Duncan and Grimes, 
Justices, dissenting).

[¶77.]  Former Chief Justice Robert R. Rose, Jr., 
who was principal counsel for the worker in Markle, 518 P.2d 621, came on this court 
and dissented in Kendig and now 
appears as appellate counsel in the present companion case of Rodabaugh v. Ross, 807 P.2d 380 (Wyo. 
1991). In Rodabaugh, Chief Justice 
Rose provides his wisdom and dedication to justice by effective analysis in his 
appellate brief:

     At common law, there 
was no prohibition against suit by one employee against a co-employee. This seed 
issue was resolved in Markle v. Williamson, [518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 
1974)], where it was urged by the employer that one employee could not sue a 
co-employee in tort and that, in any case, the immunity of the employer inured 
to the benefit of its coemployee. In holding that the co-employee enjoyed no 
such immunity and that co-employees were possessed of rights of action against 
one another, the court said:

"[1] There is a pervading 
rule that valuable common law rights shall not be deemed destroyed by a statute 
except by clear language. See Bosel v. 
State, Alaska, 398 P.2d 651, 654; Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144, 403 P.2d 400, 404; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Columbia Basin 
Steel & Iron Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 574, 548; Valdez v. State, 83 N.M. 720, 47 [497] 
P.2d 231, 133 [sic], aff'd. [83 N.M. 741], 497 P.2d 743; Smith v. United Properties, Inc., 2 
Ohio St.2d 310, 209 N.E.2d 142, 144; and Southern Railway Company v. Maples, 201 
Tenn. 85, 296 S.W.2d 870, 783 [sic].

"[2] We find nothing in . 
. . the 1914 constitutional amendment . . . which expressly says that a 
co-employee shall be immune from suit. Having said the employer shall be immune, 
the legislature surely would have used similar language to say co-employees were 
immune - if it had so intended.

"The general rule seems 
to be that where there is no expressed legislative mandate to the contrary, a 
co-employee or fellow servant is a third party tortfeasor within the meaning of 
a workmen's compensation act like ours. Annotation 21 A.L.R.3d, § 3, p. 850; 2 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, §§ 72 and 72.10, p. 174; 58 Am. Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 61, p. 617; 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation, § 
985(e), p. 481."

Id., at 623.

[¶78.]  Following Markle, supra, the legislature undertook 
to amend the statutes to adjust the degrees of negligence that would need to be 
proved against co-employees before recovery could be accomplished. These 
amendments were upheld as not violating Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution. The court held that, for the legislature to adjust the degree 
of proof from ordinary negligence to gross negligence to culpable 
negligence, was not to enact laws "limiting the amount of damages. . . ." Art. 
10, § 4, supra. In other words, the 
damages against co-employees always remained recoverable, provided the degrees 
of negligence and culpability established by the legislature were satisfied in 
the proof process. In Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982), the court 
held that § 27-12-103(a) granting immunity to all employees but the culpably 
negligent "does not limit the amount of damages to be recovered. It limits 
the cause of action available for recovery." (See p. 1239).

[¶79.]  The effect of this opinion is to 
establish that the first sentence places limitations upon causes of action, 
which the legislature has the power to do, providing the cause of action itself 
is preserved. The reasoning behind the holding seems corroborative of this 
conclusion where the court, in Kendig, supra, goes on to say that if the first 
sentence of Art. 10, § 4 of the Constitution were to be held to provide that the 
legislature did not have limitation powers to fix degrees of proof in causes of 
action involving injury and death, then it would also be without the authority 
to legislate in such areas as "comparable negligence, statutes of limitation, 
contribution among joint tortfeasors, etc." (see p. 1239).

[¶80.]  By observing that the legislature was 
indeed possessed with the power of adjustment in these areas, the court was not, 
of course, saying that the legislature would have the ultimate authority to use 
them to eradicate causes of action by, for example, adjusting statute of 
limitations timeframes down to zero, or adjusting comparable negligence statutes 
in such a burdensome way as to prevent parties from bringing tort actions under 
any circumstances.

[¶81.]  Again, in its Kendig opinion, the court reiterates the 
proposition which holds that the statute under consideration was not violate of 
Art. 10, § 4, supra, because it only 
sets a standard of proof which must be followed where one employee asserts his 
or her cause of action against a co-employee. In this context, the court was 
considering plaintiff's contention that Art. 1, § 8 was being abridged by reason 
of the legislature's adjustment of the degree of negligence in W.S. 1977, § 
27-12-103(a). In response to this contention, the court said: 

"Section 27-12-103(a) 
only sets a standard to be applied by the courts in an action by an employee 
against a co-employee for negligence resulting in a work-related injury. Such is 
not violative of Art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution."

Kendig, supra, at 1241.

[¶82.]  Therefore, it seems clear that when the 
court looked at the legislature's fixing of a degree of negligence or 
culpability proof, the court was simply fixing a standard of proof as between 
the parties, but it wasn't even intimating that this kind of authority extended 
to the legislature's ability to do away with the cause of action altogether. In 
fact, the court in Kendig used a 
comparison between the first and second sentences of Art. 10, § 4 of the 
Constitution to fortify its view when it observed that the second sentence spoke 
to "right to recover damages," which the court interpreted to mean no contract 
whatever could be entered into which would inhibit common-law rights of action, 
while the first sentence spoke to the legislature's inability to enact 
legislation "limiting the amount of damages" as being language which, while not 
permitting the doing away with a right to recover damages, did permit adjustment 
and control of the degrees of negligence. In this regard, the court 
said:

     "[4] Appellee argues that the first 
sentence of Art. 10, § 4, Wyoming Constitution, prohibits the legislature from 
granting immunity to co-employees for negligence, regardless of degree. She 
acknowledges the propriety of immunity granted to employers because of the 
subsequent language in Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Such first sentence 
states that `no law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be 
recovered * * *' (emphasis added). Section 27-12-103(a) does not limit the 
amount of damages to be recovered. It limits the cause of action available for a 
recovery. The fact that the first sentence of Art. 10, § 4 relates only to 
the amount of damages is exemplified by the second sentence which pertains to 
the `right to recover.' A `limitation in amount' and a `right to recovery' were 
regarded as separate issues and treated separately by the framers of the Wyoming 
Constitution. See Journal and Debate of the Constitutional Convention of the 
State of Wyoming, pp. 443-454 and 614-616 (1889). The 
plain language of such first sentence and its ordinary meaning reflects its 
prohibition to be against laws limiting the `amount of damages.' Section 
27-12-103(a) does not do that." (Emphasis [Rose].)

Kendig, supra, at 1239.

(Emphasis in original and 
footnote omitted.) With accuracy, the author concluded:

     We conclude this 
argument by allowing that Kendig does 
not address the constitutionality of a statute granting immunity to a 
co-employee in a worker's compensation case. It only holds that a worker's 
compensation statute which adjusts the degree of negligence or culpability which 
must be met in actions between co-employees is not in violation of Article 10, § 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution. We further urge that, since the legislature felt 
impelled to submit the Worker's Compensation Amendment for adoption before 
enacting worker's compensation statutes in the nature of industrial accident 
insurance, so that the first sentence of Article 10, § 4 would not be violated, 
it follows that a statute doing away with the common-law co-employee cause of 
action altogether must also fail in the face of the "limiting the amount of 
damages" language of the first sentence of Article 10, § 4, supra.

VII.

CONCLUSION

[¶83.]  An employee injured at the hands of his 
criminal, culpably negligent or intentionally tortious co-employee 
constitutionally should be given an opportunity to recover damages for his 
physical harm. Because W.S. 27-14-104(a) clearly violates protected rights 
within the Wyoming Constitution, I dissent in anguish for this compulsion 
exclusion of justice and near intentional invitation for death or serious injury 
to stand at the shoulder of employees who are engaged in service in the 
extrahazardous Wyoming work places.19

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 "Immunity beyond that necessary for 
ministerial, discretionary, legislative, or judicial functions is no more than a 
reincarnation of past mistakes * * *." White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1339 
(Wyo. 1989) 
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

2 The majority result in this case is 
reminiscent of the In re Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 U.S. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872). Such 
action emasculates the grandest ambitions of the framers of the Wyoming 
Constitution. See also White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307, 5 S. Ct. 923, 29 L. Ed. 199 (1885); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 5 S. Ct. 903, 29 L. Ed. 185 (1885); and Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of 
Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 
Vand.L.Rev. 409 (1990). The nullification of constitutional rights by 
legislative enactment and by judicial absolution is 
unconscionable.

3 It should not be forgotten that the 
basic law of Wyoming was stated by the drafters of our 
constitution in Wyo. Const. art. 19, § 7:

     It shall be unlawful 
for any person, company or corporation, to require of its servants or employes 
as a condition of their employment, or otherwise, any contract or agreement 
whereby such person, company or corporation shall be released or discharged from 
liability or responsibility, on account of personal injuries received by such 
servants or employes, while in the service of such person, company or 
corporation, by reason of the negligence of such person, company or corporation, 
or the agents or employees thereof, and such contracts shall be absolutely null 
and void.

and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
22:

     The rights of labor 
shall have just protection through laws calculated to secure to the laborer 
proper rewards for his service and to promote the industrial welfare of the 
state.

     The purpose of the 
1913 legislative resolution from which the Worker's Compensation amendment came 
was not to legitimize yellow dog contracts by state legislative enactment, which 
is now the effect of this legislation here under review. This court takes the 
carefully considered and presented progressive plan for compensation insurance 
involving employer and employee, see Governor Joseph M. Carey's Address to the 
Twelfth Wyoming State Legislature, 6 House Journal at 40 (1913), and, for 
political purposes of whatever persuasion, creates a kind of yellow dog contract 
between fellow employees by governmental fiat.

4 If there is a quid pro quo, it is that the worker 
gives up everything in return for nothing. If the idea presented by the majority 
is correct, we should give general immunity to the slothful criminal and 
intentionally harmful among our citizens and absolve all rights of recovery for 
damage sustained by the innocent victims. The quid pro quo in this case is enjoyed 
absolution of responsibility given to insurance companies who otherwise will be 
called to respond under insuring policies for wrongful conduct of those who are 
insured. The employee gains nothing and the law was in no way intended to 
provide employee benefits. It is an insurance company benefit enactment, except 
I am not so naive as to fail to recognize some benefit also in employer's 
reduced premiums paid for general liability insurance which may cover officers, 
management and supervisors who determine the safety of the 
workplace.

5 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8 states in part that 
"[a]ll courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, 
reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or 
delay."

6 I cite with approval Mattson v. 
City of Astoria, 
39 Or. 577, 65 P. 1066, 1067 (1901), a case interpreting Or. Const. art. 1, § 
10. The clause, which states in part that "`every man shall have remedy by due 
course of law for injury done him in person, property, or reputation,'" was 
dispositive in the court's holding that the constitutional provision 
guaranteeing a remedy for an injury allowed the legislature to change the 
remedy, attach conditions precedent to its exercise, and perhaps to abolish old 
and substitute new remedies, but it did not allow the legislature to deny a 
remedy entirely.

7 Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27 states in relevant 
part:

     The legislature shall 
not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is 
to say: * * * for limitations of civil actions; * * * [or] granting to any 
corporation, association or individual, the right to * * * any special or 
exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever * * *.

8 In Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 1136 (Wyo. 1990), this court defined "culpable 
negligence" as

"willful and serious misconduct." 
The term "willful" means "such as is done purposely, with knowledge - or 
misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard of 
consequences." We distinguish "willful misconduct" from "ordinary negligence" by 
the aggravating factor of the tort-feasor's state of mind. We require a 
plaintiff to prove the tort-feasor acted with a state of mind that approaches 
intent to do harm. Since we appreciate that a plaintiff faces a difficult task 
in trying to prove the tort-feasor's state of mind, we allow the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that a tort-feasor has intentionally committed an act of 
unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great 
as to make it highly probable that harm will follow.

9 Not all commentators accept the 
"different in kind" distinction. Cf. Dear and Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and 
Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1 
(1984).

10 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34 states that "[a]ll 
laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."

11 W.S. 27-14-105(a) 
states:

If an employee covered by this act 
receives an injury under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person 
other than the employer to pay damages, the employee if engaged in work for his 
employer at the time of the injury is not deprived of any compensation to which 
he is entitled under this act. He may also pursue his remedy at law against the 
third party or the coemployee to the extent permitted by W.S. 27-14-104(a). If 
the employee recovers from the third party or the coemployee in any manner 
including judgment, compromise, settlement or release, the state is entitled to 
be reimbursed for all payments made, or to be made, to or on behalf of the 
employee under this act but not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the total proceeds 
of the recovery without regard to the types of damages alleged in the 
third-party action. All money received by the state under this section shall be 
credited to the worker's compensation account and considered in computing the 
employer's experience rating.

12 Governor Joseph M. Carey in 1913, 
as the father of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation constitutional 
statutory law, enumerated the four important reasons for his 
recommendations:

     First, to furnish 
certain prompt and reasonable compensation to the injured 
employee;

     Second, to utilize for 
injured employees a large portion of the great amount of money wasted under the 
present system;

     Third, to provide a 
tribunal where disputes between employer and employee in regard to  compensation may be settled promptly, 
cheaply and summarily;

     Fourth, to provide a 
means for minimizing the number of accidents in industrial 
pursuits.

Governor Joseph M. Carey's Address 
to the Twelfth Wyoming State Legislature, supra, at 40.

13 See Grantham, 359 So. 2d  at 788, 
where the court estimated that the ever-present threat of suit by an injured 
worker for negligent acts of a co-employee had a deterrent value; immunity would 
result in workers being less careful on the job. See, generally, 81 Am.Jur.2d, 
Workmen's Compensation § 67 (1976); Annotation, Willful, Wanton, or Reckless 
Conduct of Coemployee as Ground of Liability Despite Bar of Workers' 
Compensation Law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888, 891 § 2 (1987). One law of nature is 
immutable and as old as "civilization" itself: Economic greed kills and maims. 
Society exists to limit or ameliorate uncontrolled greed of the individual, 
group or nation.

14 Public policy arguments against 
co-employee immunity for intentionally inflicted injuries were considered in 
Newby v. Gerry, 38 Wn. App. 812, 690 P.2d 603, 607-08 
(1984):

     Sound public policy 
demands that an intentional wrongdoer not use the workers' compensation laws as 
a shelter from liability. A number of courts in other jurisdictions have relied 
on this rationale in allowing such suits to proceed. * * * Forbidding suit would 
allow an employee to bludgeon a co-worker with civil impunity, and the injured 
worker might be required to accept less than full compensation for his injuries. 
* * *

     Moreover, barring suit would remove 
the deterrent effect of civil liability and damages. As the court noted in 
Bryan v. Utah Int'l, [533 P.2d 892 (Utah, 1975)] supra at 894:

     "The policy of our law 
has always been to allow one injured through the intentional act of another, to 
seek redress from the one intending harm. That policy has the salutary effect of 
deterring intentional injury. It would serve no social purpose to allow an 
employee to intentionally injure another employee engaged in the same 
employment, then use an otherwise socially beneficial, remedial, statute as a 
shield for such wrongdoing.

15 Two recent Utah Statute of Repose 
cases in a nature similar to this court's decision in Phillips, 611 P.2d 821 
demonstrates how far this court has strayed and how result-oriented this case 
becomes in constitutional protection and rights denigration terms. Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) and Sun Valley Water Beds of 
Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989) analyzed 
constitutional concepts when a statute, through a statute of repose, denied 
plaintiff's common law rights and remedies. In the two exhaustive opinions, the 
Utah court 
found legislative evisceration of an injured party's rights to be 
constitutionally foreclosed by legislative failure to provide a fair substitute 
remedy, an arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable means employed to achieve a 
questioned objective. Constitutional protection of equal protection, due process 
and open court was tested and the statute was found wanting in validity. Here, 
like there, the open court provision of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8 is clearly 
violated. A substitute remedy of equal value is clearly not provided and the 
right which has existed for centuries to recover for harm done becomes 
unavailable with denied remedy.

16 In Markle, 518 P.2d  at 625, this court 
recognized that a constitutional amendment was necessary in order to eliminate a 
cause of action against an employer when the original Worker's Compensation Act 
was passed in 1914. We stated:

     When Wyoming reached the time 
that it needed a workmen's compensation law, there was an obstacle. * * 
*

* * * * * *

     Hence, if the 
contemplated law was to provide for limited compensation benefits and make those 
benefits sole and exclusive remedies, an amendment to Art. 10, § 4, was 
necessary. Therefore, the legislature proposed and the voters ratified the 1914 
amendment. * * *

* * * It is entirely clear, however, 
that nothing was changed with respect to a fellow employee. The amendment being 
in 1914 when industrial suits were quite infrequent, it would appear the 
situation with respect to co-workers was not dealt with. The result is that 
common-law rights (such as the right of a worker to sue a fellow employee) 
remained unchanged; and that right continues to this time.

Id. at 625.

     Similarly, in 1986 
when the legislature sought to allow non-extrahazardous employers the option of 
participating in the Act, Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 (1986 amend.) was again 
amended to add the last two sentences which read:

Subject to conditions specified by 
law, the legislature may allow employments not designated extrahazardous to be 
covered by the state fund at the option of the employer. To the extent an 
employer elects to be covered by the state fund and contributes to the fund as 
required by law, the employer shall enjoy the same immunity as provided for 
extrahazardous employments.

17 Under the provisions of Wyo. Const. 
art. 10, § 4, the employee loses his rights to benefits when the injury is "due 
solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee." Consequently, as the 
structure of the law is now approved by the majority, the employee has no rights 
to benefits if that employee is guilty of culpable negligence, but even 
so, that employee has no general rights of injury recovery when culpable 
negligence is committed against him by fellow workers or administrative 
personnel of the employer. Again, the quid pro quo is a right to receive 
nothing as a price of giving up everything.

18 The specially concurring opinion 
relies on the Wyoming legislature's adoption of the "Heart 
Balm" statutes, W.S. 1-23-101 through 1-23-104, enacted in 1941, for the 
proposition that the legislature can create or eliminate causes of action. 
Justice Cardine concludes, "The constitutional power of the legislature to 
abolish this cause of action is so clear, it has never been 
questioned."

     I disagree both as to 
the power of the legislature and as to "unquestioned clarity" of the premise. 
While he is correct that the constitutionality of the "Heart Balm" statutes has 
not been litigated, and while the constitutionality of legislation is presumed 
unless affirmatively shown to be otherwise, there is no justification for the 
resulting conclusion that the absence of a constitutional challenge in that 
instance and in a completely different context supports the proposition that the 
legislature has the authority to abolish a cause of action in contravention of 
explicit language in the Wyoming Constitution. See Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 
and Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel. 
Workmen's Compensation Dept., 569 P.2d 95 (Wyo. 1977). The "Heart Balm" statutes were 
enacted to alleviate the effects of vexatious litigation, fraud and collusion. 
See Note, "Heart Balm" Legislation and the Constitution, 1 Wyo.L.J. 75, 81 
(1947). There is nothing to suggest that the same or similar factors motivated 
the Wyoming legislature in 1986 to extend 
absolute immunity to co-employees under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act; rather, 
the legislature acted in response to the perceived threat of insolvency of the 
compensation fund.

     The legislative 
reasoning cited by Justice Cardine to the effect that it is the public policy of 
Wyoming that the "`best interests of the people of the state will be served by 
the abolition of [the "Heart Balm"] remedies'" is distinguishable and, in fact, 
provides compelling argument in favor of reversal in the case now before this 
court. The interests of the people of Wyoming, and particularly all employees 
covered by Worker's Compensation, would be best served if co-employee immunity 
is abolished and intentionally tortious or culpably negligent wrongdoers are 
held responsible for their misconduct. Co-employee immunity discourages safety 
in the workplace and serves only to protect those who deserve no 
protection.

19 The front page headlines in the 
Sunday, March 3, 1991 Casper Star-Tribune, Wyoming's statewide newspaper states: 
"Workplace safety poor in Wyo - Job-related death, injury rate second worst in 
U.S." The story describes Wyoming as the second 
worst, better only than Alaska and about fifty 
percent higher than Montana which, with similar job 
characteristics, ranked third. Idaho, in fourth place, had only fifty percent 
of the number of fatalities per average number of workers. National statistics 
provided by the story by the National Institute for Occupational Health and 
Safety revealed deaths per 100,000 workers in a six year period were Alaska, 
34.2; Wyoming, 32.5; Montana, 22.6; and Idaho, 18.6. Forty-five states had 
job-related deaths less than half of Wyoming. It can be statutorily said that we in 
Wyoming 
legislate and adjudicate to accept death and injury in the work 
place.