Title: State ex rel. Brecksville v. Husted

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Brecksville v. Husted, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4530.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4530 
THE STATE EX REL. CITY OF BRECKSVILLE, OHIO v. HUSTED, SECY., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Brecksville v. Husted,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4530.] 
Elections—Initiative—Mandamus—Prohibition—Action 
by 
city 
to 
prevent 
certification of initiative petition and submission of issue to voters—Ohio 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1f—Mandamus action dismissed because 
it actually seeks declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction—Writ of 
prohibition denied—County board of elections and secretary of state did 
not abuse discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law by denying 
city’s protest—Initiative petition did not violate Article II, Section 1f by 
addressing question that city has no authority to control by legislative 
action. 
(No. 2012-1545—Submitted September 27, 2012—Decided October 1, 2012.) 
IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action in which relator, the city of 
Brecksville, Ohio, seeks writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevent 
respondents, Secretary of State Jon Husted and the Cuyahoga County Board of 
Elections, from certifying an initiative petition and submitting the initiative to 
electors at the November 6, 2012 general election.  We dismiss the purported 
mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction and deny the writ of prohibition. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In January 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310, __, 130 S.Ct. 876, 900, 
175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), in which it struck down certain provisions of federal 
campaign-finance law by holding that “political speech does not lose First 
Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’ ”  Quoting 
First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 
L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).  See also Am. Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, __ U.S. 
__, 132 S.Ct. 2490, 183 L.Ed.2d 448 (2012). 
{¶ 3} On July 25, 2012, petitioners, certain Brecksville electors, filed 
with the city’s finance director a signed initiative petition titled, “Brecksville 
Initiative in Support Of Movement to Amend the U.S. Constitution To Establish 
That Corporations Are Not People And Money Is Not Speech.”  In the petition, it 
is stated that because of their dissatisfaction with the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizens United, the petitioners proposed certain ordinances to 
city electors for their approval at the November 6, 2012 election. 
{¶ 4} On August 8, Brecksville submitted a written protest to the board 
of elections against the petitioners’ initiative.  The city claimed that the petition 
violated the Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1f, by addressing a question 
that the city lacks authority to control by legislative action, that the petition is 
merely a public-opinion poll outlining the views of the electorate, and that the 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
petition violates public policy by attempting to mandate the actions and support of 
the mayor and city council in opposition to the U.S. Constitution. 
{¶ 5} On August 28, the board of elections held a hearing on the city’s 
protest against the Brecksville initiative, and the board of elections deadlocked 
two-to-two on a motion to uphold the city’s protest against the initiative.  In 
accordance with R.C. 3501.11(X), the board of elections submitted the tie vote to 
respondent Secretary of State Jon Husted to summarily decide the question.  
Secretary Husted broke the tie by voting against the motion on September 11.  
The secretary determined that the Brecksville proposed ordinances involve 
activities that municipal legislative authorities can control by legislative action. 
{¶ 6} Two days later, Brecksville filed this expedited election action for 
writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevent respondents, Secretary of State 
Husted and the board of elections, from certifying the Brecksville initiative 
petition to the November 6 election ballot.  Respondents filed answers, and the 
parties submitted evidence and briefs pursuant to the accelerated schedule in 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9.  Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9, an alternative writ is unnecessary 
because the rule itself incorporates an expedited schedule for the presentation of 
evidence and briefs.  See Christy v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 
35, 36, 671 N.E.2d 1 (1996), noting that the rule, as amended effective April 1, 
1996, “incorporates a briefing and evidence schedule  in expedited election 
matters.” 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
city’s request for oral argument and of the merits of its claims. 
Analysis 
Oral Argument 
{¶ 8} We deny Brecksville’s request for oral argument in this expedited 
election case.  The parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve these issues, see State ex 
rel. Data Trace Info. Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer, 131 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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St.3d 255, 2012-Ohio-753, 963 N.E.2d 1288, ¶ 23, and the expedited nature of 
election cases supports denial.  See, e.g., Christy, at 40. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 9} Brecksville requests a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of 
state to sustain the city’s protest and to direct the board of elections to remove the 
petitioners’ initiative from the November 6 election ballot.  Although the city’s 
request is couched in terms of compelling affirmative duties, it actually seeks (1) 
a declaratory judgment that the city’s protest against the initiative has merit and 
(2) a prohibitory injunction preventing the secretary of state and the board of 
elections from submitting the initiative to electors at the November 6 election.  
We lack jurisdiction over these claims and therefore dismiss the mandamus claim.  
See generally State ex rel. Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 
24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 955 N.E.2d 379, ¶ 22. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 10} “In extraordinary actions challenging the decisions of the Secretary 
of State and boards of elections, the standard is whether they engaged in fraud, 
corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal 
provisions.” Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-
Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11.  Brecksville claims that the secretary of state and 
the board of elections abused their discretion and acted in clear disregard of 
applicable law by denying the city’s protest and submitting the initiative to the 
electors for their vote at the November 6 election.1 
Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1f 
{¶ 11} Brecksville first claims that the secretary of state and the board of 
elections abused their discretion and clearly disregarded the Ohio Constitution, 
                                          
 
1.  Notwithstanding the board’s argument to the contrary, it exercised quasi-judicial authority 
when it held a hearing on the city’s protest against the initiative.  R.C. 3501.39(A)(2); State ex rel. 
Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-Ohio-5093, 895 
N.E.2d 177, ¶ 16. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
Article II, Section 1f.  Article II, Section 1f authorizes initiative and referendum 
power only on those questions that municipalities “may now or hereafter be 
authorized by law to control by legislative action.”  (Emphasis added.)  “The test 
for determining whether the action of a legislative body is legislative or 
administrative is whether the action taken is one enacting a law, ordinance or 
regulation, or executing or administering a law, ordinance or regulation already in 
existence.”  Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968), 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 12} The ordinances proposed by the initiative petition do not require 
actions that execute or administer laws previously in existence.  Instead, they 
enact new laws requiring specific actions:  (1) the designation of “Democracy 
Day,” (2) the conduct of a public hearing to be held on that day to examine the 
impact of certain political contributions, (3) the issuance by the mayor of a letter 
to certain state and federal legislative leaders stating that Brecksville citizens in 
November 2012 voted in support of a constitutional amendment that would 
effectively overrule Citizens United, and (4) the recurrence of the public hearings 
biannually for up to ten years. 
{¶ 13} Brecksville also claims that the proposed ordinances are not the 
proper subject of legislative action because they include precatory language 
without legal effect that simply expresses the public opinion of the city’s electors 
regarding whether the Citizens United holding should be overturned.  This claim 
lacks merit because the proposed ordinances exceed the scope of any public-
opinion poll. They require action.  The proposed ordinances here do not simply 
request a third party to do something that the party has no obligation to do.  As the 
secretary of state determined in his tie-breaking decision, the Brecksville ballot 
issue requires municipal officials to perform specific acts like designating a 
specific day and requiring public hearings on the impact of specified political 
contributions.  The cases that the city cites are consequently inapposite.  See State 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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ex rel. Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 
2008-Ohio-5093, 895 N.E.2d 117; State ex rel. Rhodes v. Lake Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 12 Ohio St.2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967); and State ex rel. Gateway 
Green Alliance v. Welch, 23 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Mo.App.2000). 
{¶ 14} Finally, the city’s claim that public policy requires that the 
initiative be removed from the ballot because the electorate cannot force the 
mayor to speak in support of an issue that is contrary to the United States 
Constitution attacks the substance of the proposed ordinances, and this challenge 
is premature before the adoption of the proposed ordinances by the people.  See 
State ex rel. Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2012-Ohio-
4310, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 15} Therefore, because the initiative properly proposes legislative 
action, the secretary of state and the board of elections did not abuse their 
discretion or clearly disregard applicable law by denying Brecksville’s protest on 
that basis. 
Procedural Issues 
{¶ 16} We also find no error in Brecksville’s remaining contention that 
the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law 
by making what it claims to be two procedural errors in the matter.  The city did 
not timely object to the board’s holding a joint hearing on the Brecksville protest 
and a comparable Newburgh Heights village ordinance.  The city further cites the 
board’s error in omitting the first few pages of the transcribed protest hearing 
when submitting the matter to the secretary of state pursuant to R.C. 3501.11(X).  
This error was caused by a court reporter’s mistake, and the city cites no prejudice 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
from the omission—there is no evidence that the secretary of state’s decision 
would have changed if the missing pages had been submitted to him earlier.2   
{¶ 17} Therefore, the secretary of state and the board of elections neither 
abused their discretion nor clearly disregarded applicable law by denying 
Brecksville’s protest and submitting the initiative to the city’s electors.  
Brecksville has not established its entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief 
in prohibition. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, we deny the writ of prohibition and 
dismiss the city’s mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction.  Our holding that the 
ordinances proposed by the initiative constitute proper legislative action is 
“consistent with our duty to liberally construe municipal initiative provisions to 
permit the exercise of the power of initiative.”  State ex rel. N. Main St. Coalition 
v. Webb, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 47. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} I respectfully dissent. 
                                          
 
2.  Brecksville waived its claim for an order returning the matter to the secretary of state for a new 
determination based on the full transcript of the protest hearing because it did not include an 
argument about this request in its merit brief.  See State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 
125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 61 (court need not address claim that 
was raised in complaint but was not specifically argued in initial merit brief).  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 20} This case raises an important constitutional question regarding the 
scope of the right of initiative established by the Ohio Constitution, Article II, 
Section 1f, which provides:  
 
The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved 
to the people of each municipality on all questions which such 
municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to 
control by legislative action; such powers shall be exercised in the 
manner now or hereafter provided by law. 
 
Section 1f thus sets forth an important limitation on the people’s reserved power 
of initiative: the ballot issue must be one that the municipality has authority to 
control by legislative action. 
{¶ 21} The “Brecksville Initiative in Support Of Movement to Amend the 
U.S. Constitution To Establish That Corporations Are Not People And Money Is 
Not Speech” would enact new Chapter 129 of the Ordinances of the City of 
Brecksville as follows:  
 
 
Section 129.01.  Beginning in the year 2013, the Mayor and 
City Council shall designate one day in the month of February 
following the November federal elections, “Democracy Day.”  On 
this day, the Mayor and City Council shall sponsor a Public 
Hearing in a public space within the City.  The City shall publicize 
the Public Hearing on its website and through area media at least 
one (1) month in advance of the Hearing.  The Public Hearing will 
examine the impact of political contributions of corporations, 
unions, PACS and Super-PACS on the City.  The Mayor and at 
least one (1) City Councilperson shall submit testimony at the 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
public hearing.  In addition, all citizens of Brecksville will be 
permitted to submit oral testimony for a period of at least 5 
minutes per citizen. 
Section 129.02.  Within one (1) week following the Public 
Hearing, the Mayor shall send a letter to the leaders of the Ohio 
House and Senate, and Brecksville’s U.S. congressional 
representative, and both Ohio U.S. Senators stating that the citizens 
of Brecksville in November 2012 voted in support of a Citizens’ 
initiative calling for a constitutional amendment declaring: 
(A)  Only human beings, not corporations, are legal persons 
with constitutional rights. 
(B)  Money is not equivalent to speech, and therefore 
regulating political contributions and spending is not equivalent to 
limiting political speech. 
Section 129.03.  The bi-annual Public Hearings will 
continue for a period of ten (10) years through February, 2023, or 
until a constitutional amendment reflecting the principles set forth 
in Section 129.02 is ratified by ¾ of state legislatures. 
Section 129.04.  This initiative shall take effect and be 
included in the City Ordinances at the earliest date permitted by 
law. 
 
{¶ 22} In essence, the initiative would require the city of Brecksville to 
enact legislation in support of a movement to amend the United States 
Constitution to abrogate the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 913, 175 L.Ed.2d 
753 (2010), holding that government cannot prohibit independent expenditures for 
political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 23} In my view, the petition here does not initiate any new law that the 
municipality has power to enact; rather, it serves only as a nonbinding referendum 
on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment in Citizens United.  
The city plainly lacks authority to control the meaning of the First Amendment by 
local legislation or to overturn a decision of the United States Supreme Court.  
Furthermore, Article V of the United States Constitution vests Congress and state 
legislatures—not local municipalities—with the power to propose amendments to 
the Constitution.  Accordingly, at most, the initiative petition seeks to gauge 
public opinion on what the federal law on political contributions from 
corporations should be, and it therefore has nothing to do with local city 
government in Brecksville, Ohio. 
{¶ 24} This court’s decisions in State ex rel. Rhodes v. Lake Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 12 Ohio St.2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967), and State ex rel. Upper 
Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-Ohio-5093, 
895 N.E.2d 177, are instructive. 
{¶ 25} In Rhodes, the relators sought to compel the elections board to 
place an initiative measure on the ballot stating that the people of the village of 
Willoughby Hills resolve that “[t]he President of the United States should bring 
all American troops home from Vietnam now so that the Vietnamese people can 
settle their own affairs.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 4.  We held that “[t]he 
initiative petition in the instant case does not contain any question which a 
municipality is authorized by law to control by legislative action.”  Id.  Notably, a 
municipality has no authority to control the President’s decisions in the conduct of 
a war. 
{¶ 26} Similarly, in Upper Arlington, we held that a board of elections 
abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law when it placed a 
proposed ordinance on the ballot that would bar the city from entering into a 
contract with a private corporation to provide solid waste services.  We explained:  
January Term, 2012 
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[I]nsofar as the proposed ordinance included precatory language 
without legal effect that appeared to express the public opinion of 
the city's electors—that the city residents “do not desire” 
privatization of trash-collection services, “want” to continue the 
preexisting trash-collection method, and “don't want” the city to 
enter into a contract with Inland Service Corporation—its 
enactment would also not constitute a proper legislative action. 
 
Id.  at ¶ 26.  And we cited approvingly State ex rel. Gateway Green Alliance v. 
Welch, 23 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Mo.App.2000), for the proposition that a “proposed 
ordinance that merely constituted a ‘public opinion poll’ of the city’s electorate on 
an issue was administrative rather than legislative in character and was thus an 
inappropriate subject for initiative.”  Upper Arlington at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 27} Like the initiative measure in Rhodes, the Brecksville ordinances 
request that third parties do something—propose an amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  And like the initiative measure in Upper Arlington, the 
Brecksville ordinance amounts to a mere “public opinion poll” to determine 
whether or not a majority of the city’s voters want government restrictions on 
corporate campaign expenditures and would support amending the Constitution to 
eliminate the free-speech rights of corporations. 
{¶ 28} While I recognize that the initiative also seeks to establish 
Democracy Day and to provide a public forum to examine the impact of political 
contributions on the city, these are incidental to the real focus of the initiative.  
Regardless of the public sentiment expressed at a public forum on Democracy 
Day or at any other time, the outcome is always predetermined, because the 
proposed law directs the mayor to send letters to legislative leaders in state 
government and to state representatives in Congress declaring the views of a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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majority of city voters in the November 2012 election.  Any future public 
discourse generated by Democracy Day on the merits of campaign finance reform 
is ultimately irrelevant to the purpose of the initiative measure, because it cannot 
affect the results of a past election. 
{¶ 29} Accordingly, because I believe that this case raises an important 
constitutional question on the scope of the right of initiative afforded by the Ohio 
Constitution and has wider implications than the establishment of Democracy Day 
in the city of Brecksville, I would schedule oral argument and not rule on the writ 
at this time. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Rademaker, Matty, Henrikson & Greve, David J. Matty, and Shana A. 
Samson; and Sergio DiGeronimo, for relator. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Aaron D. Epstein and Damian 
W. Sikora, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Secretary of State Jon 
Husted. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections. 
_____________________