Title: Commonwealth v. Clark

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11815 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TYRONE J. CLARK. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 2, 2015. - July 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Scientific test, Exculpatory, 
Relevancy and materiality.  Statute, Construction.  
Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, Discovery. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court on 
August 10, 1973. 
 
 
A postconviction motion for scientific or forensic 
analysis, filed on August 5, 2013, was heard by Thomas A. 
Connor, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Neil D. Raphael for Tyrone J. Clark. 
 
Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Lisa M. Kavanaugh & Ira L. Gant, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, & Denise McWilliams & Chauncey B. Wood, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services Innocence Program & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
SPINA, J.  On January 23, 1974, a Suffolk County jury 
convicted Tyrone J. Clark of rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22; unarmed 
robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 19; and kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26.  
The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions in a published 
opinion.  See Commonwealth v. Clark, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 481 
(1975).  On January 14, 2000, he filed a motion for a new trial, 
which was denied.  Clark was paroled in 2005, but his parole was 
revoked when he pleaded guilty on May 25, 2006, to larceny over 
$250, G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1). 
 
In 2012, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 278A, "An Act 
providing access to forensic and scientific analysis" (act).  
St. 2012, c. 38.  "The enactment, which occurred in the wake of 
national recognition that 'DNA testing has an unparalleled 
ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify 
the guilty,' District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial 
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009), permits access to 
forensic and scientific evidence on the filing of a motion by an 
individual who has been convicted of a criminal offense, who 
consequently has been incarcerated, and who asserts factual 
innocence."  Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 497 (2014).  
See G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  The purpose of the act was "to remedy 
the injustice of wrongful convictions of factually innocent 
persons by allowing access to analyses of biological material 
with newer forensic and scientific techniques . . . [that] 
3 
 
provide a more reliable basis for establishing a factually 
correct verdict than the evidence available at the time of the 
original conviction."  Wade, supra at 504, quoting 2011 Senate 
Doc. No. 753 and 2011 House Doc. No. 2165.  The act created a 
process, separate from the trial and any subsequent proceedings 
challenging an underlying conviction, that permits forensic and 
scientific analysis of evidence or biological material, the 
results of which could support a motion for a new trial.  See 
G. L. c. 278A, §§ 3, 6, 7; Wade, supra at 505. 
 
On August 5, 2013, Clark filed in the Superior Court a 
postconviction motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (§ 3 
motion), for forensic or scientific analysis of certain evidence 
presented at his trial, and for discovery regarding the location 
of other items that were referenced at trial but not admitted in 
evidence.  More specifically, he sought deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing of the handle of a kitchen knife that the victim 
purportedly grabbed from her assailant and stabbed into the 
assailant's shoulder.  He also sought discovery concerning the 
victim's bloody clothing, a bloody towel, and a pair of men's 
socks, all of which, in Clark's view, might contain DNA evidence 
and should be made available to him for potential testing under 
G. L. c. 278A.  In connection with his § 3 motion, Clark filed 
an affidavit stating that he is factually innocent of the crimes 
of which he was convicted.  The Commonwealth opposed Clark's 
4 
 
motion, contending that Clark had not shown how forensic testing 
of the knife handle would provide evidence material to the 
identification of the perpetrator of the crimes, that Clark had 
shown no chain of custody for the knife handle, that the jurors 
had based their verdicts on compelling identification evidence, 
and that the Commonwealth did not possess any of the items for 
which Clark sought discovery.  Following a hearing, a judge, who 
was not the trial judge, denied Clark's § 3 motion.1 
 
Clark appealed the judge's order,2 the case was entered in 
the Appeals Court, and we transferred it to this court on our 
own motion.  Clark contends on appeal that the judge 
misinterpreted the requirements for postconviction DNA analysis 
as set forth in the plain language of G. L. c. 278A and, 
consequently, erred in denying his motion for such testing and 
for related discovery.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude 
that Clark met the requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 3; that the 
judge erred in determining that Clark was required to establish 
the existence of biological material on the handle of the knife; 
that the judge properly denied Clark's request for discovery; 
                     
 
1 At the time the judge ruled on Tyrone J. Clark's motion 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, he did not have the benefit of our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496 (2014), which is 
discussed in the statutory framework portion of this opinion. 
 
 
2 General Laws c. 278A, § 18, provides that "[a]n order 
allowing or denying a motion for forensic or scientific analysis 
filed under this chapter shall be a final and appealable order." 
 
5 
 
and that the judge must make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law regarding whether Clark satisfied G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (2), (3), (5), and (6).  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judge's order denying Clark's § 3 motion, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.3 
 
1.  Statutory framework.  Before setting forth the 
underlying facts in this case, we begin with an overview of 
G. L. c. 278A, so as to put the present proceedings in context.  
In Wade, a case that raised issues of first impression regarding 
the proper interpretation of G. L. c. 278A, this court 
considered the threshold requirements that must be met by a 
party seeking forensic or scientific analysis pursuant to § 3, 
and articulated the standard of review for determining whether 
those requirements have been satisfied.  See Wade, 467 Mass. at 
501-506.  We stated that G. L. c. 278A "creates a two-step 
procedure for requesting DNA testing or analysis.  First, a 
threshold determination is made by the court in which the 
conviction was entered as to whether the motion meets the 
preliminary criteria set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 3.  If those 
criteria are met, a hearing 'shall' be conducted pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278A, §§ 6 and 7, to determine whether a petitioner has 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted in support of 
Clark by the Committee for Public Counsel Services Innocence 
Program, New England Innocence Project, Innocence Network, and 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
6 
 
established by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient facts 
for a judge to order DNA testing or further discovery."  Id. at 
501. 
 
With respect to the threshold inquiry, a person seeking 
relief under G. L. c. 278A shall file a motion that includes all 
of the information set forth in § 3 (b),4 and, "when relevant, 
shall include specific references to the record in the 
underlying case," or to supporting affidavits "signed by a 
                     
 
4 General Laws c. 278A, § 3 (b), provides that the motion 
shall include the following information: 
 
"(1) the name and a description of the requested forensic 
or scientific analysis; 
 
"(2) information demonstrating that the requested analysis 
is admissible as evidence in courts of the commonwealth; 
 
"(3) a description of the evidence or biological material 
that the moving party seeks to have analyzed or tested, 
including its location and chain of custody if known; 
 
"(4) information demonstrating that the analysis has the 
potential to result in evidence that is material to the 
moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the 
crime in the underlying case; and 
 
"(5) information demonstrating that the evidence or 
biological material has not been subjected to the requested 
analysis because [of one of five reasons enumerated in 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5)]." 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (c), "[i]f the moving party is 
unable to include for filing with the motion any of the items or 
information described in subsection (b), or if the moving party 
lacks items or information necessary to establish any of the 
factors listed in [§ 7 (b)], the moving party shall include a 
description of efforts made to obtain such items and information 
and may move for discovery of such items or information from the 
prosecuting attorney or any third party." 
7 
 
person with personal knowledge of the factual basis of the 
motion."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b).  Accompanying the motion shall 
be "an affidavit stating that the moving party is factually 
innocent of the offense of conviction and that the requested 
forensic or scientific analysis will support the claim of 
innocence."  Id. at § 3 (d).  The Commonwealth "may provide a 
response to the motion, to assist the court in considering 
whether the motion meets the requirements [of § 3]."  Id. at 
§ 3 (e).  Then, a judge shall review the motion expeditiously 
and "shall dismiss, without prejudice, any such motion without a 
hearing if the court determines, based on the information 
contained in the motion, that the motion does not meet the 
requirements set forth in [§ 3]."  Id.  The court "shall notify" 
the parties as to whether the motion is dismissed, or whether it 
is sufficient to proceed to the next level of review under § 7.  
Id. 
 
The threshold inquiry made pursuant to § 3 is "limited, 
based primarily on the moving party's filings, and . . . 
essentially nonadversarial."  Wade, 467 Mass. at 503.  At this 
first stage, "a moving party is not required to 'establish any 
of the [statutory] factors' alleged in the § 3 motion."  Id. at 
503-504, quoting G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (c).  See Commonwealth v. 
Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 41 (2014) ("a moving party is required 
only to point to the existence of specific information that 
8 
 
satisfies the statutory requirements").  "Viewed in light of the 
act as a whole, the Legislature clearly intended that, to 
proceed to a hearing, a § 3 motion requires only the limited 
showing set forth explicitly in G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) and (d), 
and review of the motion in order to determine whether a hearing 
will be conducted is confined to the assertions in the motion, 
the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, and 
any response that may be filed by the Commonwealth to assist the 
court."  Wade, supra at 504.  A judge conducting an inquiry 
under § 3 "is not called upon to make credibility 
determinations, or to consider the relative weight of the 
evidence or the strength of the case presented against the 
moving party at trial."  Id. at 505-506. 
 
If a motion meets the requirements of § 3, then a judge 
"shall order a hearing on the motion."  G. L. c. 278A, § 6 (a).  
The Commonwealth "shall file a response with the court within 
[sixty] days" after the court issues notice of further 
proceedings, id. at § 4 (b), and "shall include any specific 
legal or factual objections" it may have "to the requested 
analysis."  Id. at § 4 (c).  After reviewing the motion, 
together with the Commonwealth's response, and holding the 
requisite hearing, the judge shall determine whether the moving 
party has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, all 
9 
 
of the criteria set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).5  See id. at 
§ 7 (a), (b).  If the moving party has done so, then the judge 
"shall allow the requested forensic or scientific analysis."6  
Id. at § 7 (b).  The judge is required to "state findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on the record," or issue written 
findings and conclusions "that support the decision to allow or 
deny [the] motion brought under [§] 3."  Id. at § 7 (a).  In 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 278A, § 7 (b), provides that the moving 
party shall demonstrate the following criteria by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; 
 
"(2) that the evidence or biological material has been 
subject to a chain of custody that is sufficient to 
establish that it has not deteriorated, been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced, handled or altered such that the 
results of the requested analysis would lack any probative 
value; 
 
"(3) that the evidence or biological material has not been 
subjected to the requested analysis for any of the reasons 
in [§ 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v)]; 
 
"(4) that the requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case; 
 
"(5) that the purpose of the motion is not the obstruction 
of justice or delay; and  
 
"(6) that the results of the particular type of analysis 
being requested have been found to be admissible in courts 
of the commonwealth." 
 
 
6 Where forensic or scientific analysis is allowed, G. L. 
c. 278A, § 8, sets forth the conditions by which such analysis 
should proceed. 
10 
 
addition, the judge may authorize discovery, as appropriate, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c). 
 
2.  Factual and procedural background.  We rely on the 
facts set forth in Clark, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 482-484, and in 
the judge's memorandum of decision denying Clark's § 3 motion. 
 
On the afternoon of June 23, 1973, the victim, a twenty-
three year old woman, was returning to her apartment on Park 
Drive in Boston from a shopping trip.  As she approached the 
door to her building, an assailant grabbed her from behind, 
followed her into the vestibule, struck her, and demanded her 
money.  The assailant forced the victim upstairs to her 
apartment.  After entering the apartment, he pulled the victim 
into the kitchen, took a knife from a drawer, and then dragged 
her into the bedroom where he repeatedly struck her in the face, 
told her to undress, and brutally raped her.  At one point 
during this assault, the victim wrested the knife from her 
assailant's grip and "attempted to stab him in the back," 
striking him in the shoulder.  The blade of the knife broke off 
during the struggle.7 
 
After this initial attack, the assailant ordered the victim 
to get dressed and come with him.  The victim put on her clothes 
                     
 
7 Photographs of the knife show that a small portion of the 
base of the blade remains attached to the handle.  When we speak 
about the knife handle in this opinion, we are referring to the 
actual wooden handle plus the small portion of the blade that 
remains attached to it. 
11 
 
and used a towel from the kitchen to wash the blood from her 
face.  When she had finished, the assailant grabbed the towel 
and used it to wipe fingerprints off the wall where he had been 
leaning.  As they were leaving the apartment, the assailant told 
the victim, "I've got a gun and if you try to escape I will 
shoot you or anyone else that tries to help you." 
 
The assailant led the victim through the Fenway section of 
Boston and took her to a small Spanish restaurant on Tremont 
Street in an area that was unfamiliar to her.  They stayed for 
about fifteen minutes while the assailant had something to eat.  
The victim testified that she did not attempt to ask for help 
because she believed that none of the restaurant employees 
understood English. 
 
After leaving the restaurant, the assailant and the victim 
proceeded to board a bus.  She whispered to the driver for help, 
but he made no effort to come to her aid.  The assailant and the 
victim got off the bus at the next stop.  He led the victim to a 
secluded area, demanded that she undress again, forced her to 
perform oral sex, and threatened to kill her.  They then left 
the secluded area.  As they passed a fire station, the victim 
broke away from her assailant, ran into the station, and grabbed 
one of the fire fighters, screaming for help.  The assailant 
followed the victim into the fire station and said, "I want my 
woman."  When one of the fire fighters suggested that they call 
12 
 
the police, the assailant fled the scene.  The victim was taken 
to Boston City Hospital, where she was treated for sexual 
assault. 
 
The following day, Detective John Farrell recovered from 
the victim's apartment the handle of the knife and a pair of 
men's socks.8  The blade of the knife was not found.  It also 
appears that the bloody towel was never recovered by the police.  
That same day, the victim went to Boston police headquarters 
where she viewed numerous photographs based on her description 
of the assailant, but she was unable to make an identification. 
 
On June 25, Detective Farrell showed the victim a group of 
eleven photographs, from which she selected the photograph of 
Clark as her assailant.  The proprietor of the Spanish 
restaurant and four fire fighters also chose his photograph from 
the same array.  Clark was arrested on June 26 and taken to the 
police station, where he was told to remove his clothes.  
Detective Farrell examined Clark and did not observe any 
puncture marks or knife wounds on his back.  At trial, the 
victim and each of the five witnesses who had selected Clark's 
photograph from the array identified him as the assailant.  On 
January 23, 1974, a jury convicted Clark of rape, unarmed 
robbery, and kidnapping. 
                     
 
8 The socks were never introduced in evidence at trial. 
13 
 
 
In his memorandum of decision denying Clark's § 3 motion, 
the judge first concluded that, with respect to the request for 
DNA testing of the knife handle, Clark had not satisfied his 
burden of proving that such analysis had the potential to yield 
evidence that would be material to his identification as the 
perpetrator of the underlying offenses, as required by 
§ 7 (b) (4).  See note 5, supra.  The judge recognized that 
G. L. c. 278A should not be applied in "an overly stringent or a 
grudging fashion."  Nonetheless, he stated that the mere 
existence of the knife handle, without a reasonable possibility 
of biological material thereon, was insufficient to satisfy 
§ 7 (b) (4).  The judge pointed out that the victim's trial 
testimony provided no factual basis for a finding that the knife 
came in contact with Clark's skin, or that he ever bled as a 
consequence of the victim's effort to stab him.  The judge said 
that even though § 7 (b) (1) refers to the existence of 
"evidence or biological material," not both, § 7 (b) (4) 
implicitly requires a showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, of some biological material on the knife handle 
because the requested DNA analysis must have "the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator."  In the judge's view, there 
is always a theoretical possibility that the knife handle or any 
item seized from the crime scene could yield some biological 
14 
 
material tied to the victim's assailant, but this possibility 
did not relieve Clark of his burden of making a threshold 
showing that there exists some realistic potential, grounded in 
the facts of the case, that a particular item could yield 
exculpatory evidence. 
 
The judge next considered Clark's request for discovery 
regarding a pair of men's socks and a bloody towel.  With 
respect to the socks,9 the judge said that Clark's reliance on 
Detective Farrell's testimony that he recovered the socks from 
the victim's apartment was insufficient to satisfy the 
materiality requirement of § 7 (b) (4) where there was no 
evidence that the socks once belonged to, or were touched by, 
the victim's assailant.  The judge also took note of the 
Commonwealth's assertion that it did not possess the socks.  He 
concluded that Clark had not satisfied his burden of 
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
searching for and testing the socks would provide evidence 
material to the identification of the perpetrator of the 
underlying crimes.  With respect to the bloody towel, the judge 
said that there was no evidence in the record that the towel was 
                     
 
9 At the hearing, Clark's attorney clarified that he wanted 
to interview the keeper of the records of the Suffolk County 
district attorney's office and to inspect the premises of that 
office in an effort to ascertain the location and significance 
of the socks. 
 
15 
 
recovered by the police.  He again took note of the 
Commonwealth's assertion that it did not possess the towel.  The 
judge concluded that the record failed to establish a reasonable 
possibility that the towel had been preserved or that it would 
produce any evidence material to the identification of the 
perpetrator.  Accordingly, the judge declined to authorize 
discovery with respect to either the socks or the towel.10 
 
3.  Forensic and scientific analysis under G. L. c. 278A.  
Clark contends in this appeal that the judge interpreted the 
requirements of G. L. c. 278A in a manner that misconstrues the 
plain language and legislative intent of the act.  He asserts 
that, pursuant to § 7 (b) (1), he was required to demonstrate, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, "that the evidence or 
biological material exists" (emphasis added).  Clark argues that 
he satisfied this criterion by demonstrating the existence of 
the handle of the knife that was used by the assailant to 
threaten the victim and by the victim to stab her assailant.  He 
points out that he could not yet demonstrate the existence of 
biological material on the handle where such circumstance was 
                     
 
10 In the present appeal, Clark has not challenged the 
judge's decision as to discovery regarding the towel.  
Therefore, we do not consider the matter further.  Similarly, at 
the hearing, Clark's attorney did not discuss the victim's 
bloody clothing, and the judge made no mention of those clothes 
in his memorandum of decision.  Because Clark has not objected 
to this aspect of the judge's decision, it is not open to 
review. 
16 
 
the reason he sought DNA analysis in the first place.  Moreover, 
he continues, this additional proof was not required under 
§ 7 (b) (1).  Clark further claims that he satisfied § 7 (b) (4) 
because the requested DNA testing of the handle has the 
potential to identify the perpetrator of the underlying crimes.  
In his view, the judge's interpretation of the provisions of 
G. L. c. 278A thwarts the purpose of the act, which is to 
provide a mechanism for greater access to postconviction DNA 
analysis. 
 
"We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo."  
Wade, 467 Mass. at 501.  Our analysis of the provisions of G. L. 
c. 278A is guided by the familiar principle that "a statute must 
be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature 
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."  Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  See Wade, supra; Sullivan 
v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  Courts must ascertain 
the intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject 
matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as 
to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason 
and common sense.  See Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 
17 
 
251 (1996); Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. Rate Setting 
Comm'n, 394 Mass. 233, 240 (1985). 
 
As we have noted, at the time the judge ruled on Clark's 
§ 3 motion, he did not have the benefit of our decision in Wade.  
See note 1, supra.  Consequently, neither the judge's memorandum 
of decision nor the Superior Court docket indicates that the 
judge specifically considered whether the motion met the 
criteria set forth in § 3.  Instead, the judge proceeded to hold 
a hearing, as is statutorily mandated pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 6 (a), in those cases where a motion has satisfied the 
requirements of § 3, and to consider whether Clark had 
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
requirements of § 7 (b).  Given that the judge did not dismiss 
the motion prior to holding a hearing, we could infer that he 
implicitly determined that the information presented in the 
motion met the criteria of § 3.  However, as we explained in 
Wade, 467 Mass. at 501, the procedure for requesting DNA testing 
under G. L. c. 278A is a two-step process, the first step of 
which requires a judge to make a threshold determination whether 
a motion meets the requirements of § 3, and to notify the 
parties "as to whether the motion is sufficient to proceed under 
[G. L. c. 278A] or is dismissed."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e).  That 
did not happen in this case, and the Commonwealth argues on 
appeal that Clark's motion failed to meet the preliminary 
18 
 
criteria set forth in § 3.  Because the threshold inquiry under 
§ 3 does not require a judge "to make credibility 
determinations, or to consider the relative weight of the 
evidence or the strength of the case presented against the 
moving party at trial," Wade, supra at 505-506, but, rather, is 
based on documentary evidence (the motion and any response that 
may be provided by the Commonwealth), we stand in the same 
position as the judge in determining whether the information 
presented in the motion meets the requirements of § 3.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 148-149 (2011) 
(appellate court in same position as motion judge to evaluate 
documentary evidence); Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 
(2004).  Accordingly, we first shall consider whether Clark's 
motion met the preliminary criteria set forth in § 3.  If it 
did, we then shall proceed to determine whether the judge 
properly denied Clark's motion on the ground that Clark failed 
to satisfy § 7 (b) (4) where he did not show that some 
biological material exists on the knife handle.  Finally, we 
shall consider infra whether the judge properly denied Clark's 
request for discovery regarding the pair of men's socks.  See 
note 10, supra. 
 
We begin with an analysis of G. L. c. 278A, § 3, mindful of 
the fact that Clark is only required "to point to the existence 
of specific information that satisfies the statutory 
19 
 
requirements," Donald, 468 Mass. at 41, and need not make an 
evidentiary showing by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
Wade, 467 Mass. at 501, 503-504.  Compare G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3 (b), with G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).  First, Clark was required 
to set forth in his motion "the name and a description of the 
requested forensic or scientific analysis."  G. L. c. 278, 
§ 3 (b) (1).  He stated that he was seeking DNA testing, using 
the Y-chromosome short tandem repeat (Y-STR) method,11 on the 
handle of the knife that the victim grabbed from her assailant 
and attempted to stab into his back, striking the assailant in 
the shoulder.  We conclude that Clark met the requirements of 
§ 3 (b) (1). 
 
Second, Clark was required to set forth in his motion 
"information demonstrating that the requested analysis is 
admissible as evidence in courts of the commonwealth."  G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (2).  He correctly stated that the results of 
DNA testing using the Y-STR method are admissible in 
Massachusetts courts.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 
459 Mass. 400, 406-407 (2011).  We conclude that Clark met the 
requirement of § 3 (b) (2). 
                     
 
11 The Y-chromosome short tandem repeat (Y-STR) method looks 
at deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) on the Y-chromosome, found 
exclusively in males.  See Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 4 
(2013). 
20 
 
 
Third, Clark was required to set forth in his motion "a 
description of the evidence or biological material that [he] 
seeks to have analyzed or tested, including its location and 
chain of custody if known."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (3).  He 
stated that he was seeking to have DNA testing performed on any 
physical evidence ascertainable from the handle of the knife, 
including blood evidence.  Clark further stated that the handle 
was in the possession of the Suffolk County district attorney's 
office and that, as far as he and his attorney were aware, it 
had been in the custody of that office since 1973, when his case 
was tried.  In the Commonwealth's view, Clark failed to 
adequately describe the chain of custody of the knife handle.  
We disagree.  Section 3 (b) (3) provides that the location and 
chain of custody of evidence or biological material that a 
moving party seeks to have analyzed shall be described "if 
known."  This language plainly suggests that there may be 
instances when such information is not known to a moving party, 
and this circumstance will not be an impediment to satisfying 
§ 3 (b) (3).  Clark described the current location of the knife 
handle, as well as its chain of custody to the extent that he 
had knowledge of the matter.  We conclude that Clark met the 
requirements of § 3 (b) (3). 
 
Fourth, Clark was required to set forth in his motion 
"information demonstrating that the analysis has the potential 
21 
 
to result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
case."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4).  He stated that the knife 
handle was the only physical evidence introduced at trial, and 
he referred to the victim's testimony that she grabbed the knife 
from her assailant and attempted to stab him in the back, 
striking the assailant in the shoulder and causing the blade to 
break off.  Further, Clark denied knowing the victim or having 
committed the charged crimes, and he pointed out that he had no 
wounds on his body at the relevant time.  Clark stated that DNA 
analysis of any physical evidence on the knife handle would be 
material to his identification as the perpetrator of the crimes.  
In support of his motion, Clark submitted an affidavit from Dr. 
Robin W. Cotton, an associate professor in the department of 
anatomy and neurobiology and the director of the biomedical 
forensic sciences program at Boston University School of 
Medicine.12  She opined that "[w]hile the evidence in this case 
is old, it is possible that upon examination of the knife handle 
and partial blade by an accredited laboratory, . . . there may 
be biological material on the handle or the remaining portion of 
                     
 
12 Prior to her employment at Boston University School of 
Medicine, Dr. Robin W. Cotton was the forensic laboratory 
director of Cellmark Diagnostics (later Orchid Cellmark), a 
private laboratory that specializes in providing forensic DNA 
testing services. 
22 
 
the blade which is from the perpetrator and that could be tested 
utilizing Y-STR DNA testing."  See note 7, supra. 
 
We have said that the threshold requirement of § 3 (b) (4) 
is a "modest" one.  Wade, 467 Mass. at 507.  The moving party 
only needs to present information showing that the forensic or 
scientific analysis has "the potential to result in evidence 
that is material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3 (b) (4).  Doctor Cotton opined that, notwithstanding the age 
of the evidence in this case, it was possible that biological 
material from the perpetrator was present on the knife handle.13  
                     
 
13 The purported absence of visible biological material on 
the handle of the knife is of no import where such material may 
consist of skin cells or occult blood, which cannot be seen with 
the naked eye.  See Commonwealth v. Girouard, 436 Mass. 657, 660 
n.3 (2002).  Although the focus of Clark's § 3 motion is DNA 
analysis of potential blood evidence on the knife handle, we 
recognize the possibility that DNA from skin cells, so-called 
"touch DNA" or "trace DNA," may be present on the handle and 
could have the potential to yield material evidence regarding 
the perpetrator of the underlying crimes.  In 1997, a scientific 
journal "reported that DNA profiles could be generated from 
touched objects.  This opened up possibilities and led to the 
collection of DNA from a wider range of exhibits (including:   
tools, clothing, knives, vehicles, firearms, food, bedding, 
condoms, lip cosmetics, wallets, [jewelry], glass, skin, paper, 
cables, windows, doors, and stones)."  van Oorschot, Ballantyne, 
& Mitchell, Forensic Trace DNA:  A Review, 1:14 Investigative 
Genetics 1, 2 (2010) (Forensic Trace DNA), citing van Oorschot & 
Jones, DNA Fingerprints from Fingerprints, 387 Nature 767 (June 
1997).  "[T]ouched objects provide a wide scope for revealing 
[an] offender's DNA profile."  Forensic Trace DNA, supra.  
Although referring to a single term such as "touch DNA" or 
"trace DNA" may be "a misleading simplification of a series of 
complex processes," either term can be appropriate "when 
23 
 
The testimony of the victim, coupled with the apparent absence 
of wounds on Clark's body, could suggest that the victim stabbed 
someone other than Clark.  Testing of the knife handle has the 
potential to produce a DNA profile that does not match the 
profile of Clark and, therefore, would be material to the 
identification of Clark as the perpetrator of the underlying 
crimes.  Whether Clark is likely to obtain such a forensic 
result "is not relevant to the analysis."  Wade, supra at 508.  
Moreover, the Legislature "did not condition access to 
[scientific] testing on some degree of proof that the test 
results will raise doubt about the conviction."14  Id. at 509.  
We conclude that Clark met the requirement of § 3 (b) (4). 
 
Fifth, Clark was required to set forth in his motion 
"information demonstrating that the evidence or biological 
material has not been subjected to the requested analysis" for 
                                                                  
referring to the collection of minute biological samples at [a] 
crime scene or the process of collecting and extracting the tiny 
amounts of material within the sample in the forensic 
laboratory."  Id.  Generally speaking, "trace DNA" refers to 
either "very limited and/or invisible biological samples" or 
amounts of DNA that are less than a defined threshold limit.  
Id. at 3. 
 
 
14 We have recognized that "[t]he language of G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3 (b), sets a far lower bar for access to scientific testing 
than that required by similar statutes in other States."  Wade, 
467 Mass. at 509 & n.16. 
 
24 
 
one of five enumerated reasons.15  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5).  
He correctly stated, in accordance with § 3 (b) (5) (i), that 
when he was convicted of the underlying crimes in 1974, DNA 
analysis had not yet been developed.  See Commonwealth v. 
Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 221 (1991), and cases cited ("The use of 
DNA testing for forensic purposes is of very recent origin").  
We conclude that Clark met the requirement of § 3 (b) (5). 
 
Finally, Clark was required to file with his § 3 motion "an 
affidavit stating that [he] is factually innocent of the offense 
                     
 
15 General Laws c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5), requires a moving 
party to demonstrate that the requested forensic or scientific 
analysis has not been performed because 
 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at 
the time of the conviction; 
 
"(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of 
the conviction; 
 
"(iii) the moving party and the moving party's attorney 
were not aware of and did not have reason to be aware of 
the existence of the evidence or biological material at the 
time of the underlying case and conviction; 
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying case 
was aware at the time of the conviction of the existence of 
the evidence or biological material, the results of the 
requested analysis were admissible as evidence in courts of 
the commonwealth, a reasonably effective attorney would 
have sought the analysis and either the moving party's 
attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge denied 
the request; or 
 
"(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction." 
 
25 
 
of conviction and that the requested forensic or scientific 
analysis will support the claim of innocence."16  G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3 (d).  Clark did file such an affidavit in which he asserted 
that he "did not commit[] the offenses of Unarmed Robbery, Rape, 
and Kidnapping," and that he was "requesting forensic or 
scientific testing in this case because [he] believe[s] that the 
results of this testing will support [his] claim of factual 
innocence."  No more was required under the plain and 
unambiguous language of the statute.  We are cognizant of the 
fact that the affidavit from Dr. Cotton did not specifically 
aver that DNA analysis of the knife handle would support Clark's 
assertion.  However, nothing in § 3 (d) requires a moving party 
to submit with his or her affidavit supporting evidence to 
substantiate a claim of factual innocence.  We conclude that 
Clark met the requirements of § 3 (d). 
 
Based on our review of Clark's § 3 motion, together with 
his affidavit of factual innocence and the supporting affidavit 
of Dr. Cotton, as well as the response from the Commonwealth, we 
determine that Clark has met all of the threshold requirements 
set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 3, for DNA analysis.  Given that 
                     
 
16 General Laws c. 278A, § 1, defines "[f]actually innocent" 
as "a person convicted of a criminal offense who did not commit 
that offense."  Accordingly, "to assert factual innocence, a 
moving party must assert that he did not commit the offense of 
which he was convicted."  Wade, 467 Mass. at 512. 
 
26 
 
the judge already has held a hearing on the motion,17 we proceed 
to consider whether he properly denied Clark's motion under 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7, based on his conclusion that Clark did not 
satisfy § 7 (b) (4) because Clark failed to establish a 
reasonable possibility that some biological material exists on 
the knife handle. 
 
General Laws c. 278A, § 7 (b), provides that a judge "shall 
allow the requested forensic or scientific analysis" if all six 
enumerated criteria "ha[ve] been demonstrated by a preponderance 
of the evidence."  See note 5, supra.  Pursuant to § 7 (b) (1), 
Clark was required to show that "the evidence or biological 
material exists" (emphasis added).  The word "or" has "a 
disjunctive meaning unless the context and the main purpose of 
all the words demand otherwise."  Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 350 Mass. 340, 343 (1966).  The 
language of § 7 (b) does not demand, or even suggest, that the 
Legislature's use of the word "or" to distinguish between 
"evidence" and "biological material" should be construed as 
other than disjunctive, thereby identifying two alternative 
sources for forensic or scientific analysis.  Clark satisfied 
the terms of § 7 (b) (1) by showing that evidence -- the handle 
                     
 
17 No witnesses provided testimony at the hearing.  Counsel 
for Clark and the Commonwealth simply presented their arguments 
to the judge. 
 
27 
 
of the knife used to commit the underlying crimes -- exists.  He 
was not required to also demonstrate the presence of biological 
material on the knife handle.  Such a construction of the 
statutory language would undermine its plain and unambiguous 
terms.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 775 (2000) 
("When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it 
must be given its ordinary meaning"). 
 
In addition to demonstrating the existence of the knife 
handle, Clark was required to show that the requested DNA 
analysis "has the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to the moving party's identification as the perpetrator 
of the crime in the underlying case" (emphasis added).  G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  Given his lack of access to the knife 
handle since his convictions, Clark could not point to any 
visual evidence of biological material on the handle.  
Therefore, he had to rely on the victim's trial testimony where 
she stated that her assailant "found [a] kitchen knife," he 
"proceeded to rape [her] with the knife at [her] throat," she 
eventually "grabbed the knife," she "attempted to stab him in 
the back," and she struck him in the shoulder, at which point 
the blade broke off.  This testimony suggests that Clark's 
request for DNA analysis of the handle has the "potential" to 
result in evidence -- a DNA profile -- that is material to 
Clark's identification as the perpetrator of the underlying 
28 
 
crimes.  Where the assailant was holding onto the knife for a 
period of time and the victim believed that she stabbed the 
assailant in the shoulder, skin cells and blood may be present 
on the handle.  See note 13, supra.  The Legislature's use of 
the word "potential" in § 7 (b) (4) suggests an awareness of the 
fact that the requested forensic analysis may not produce the 
desired evidence, but such a consequence should not be an 
impediment to analysis in the first instance.  Given its 
compelling interest in remedying wrongful convictions of 
factually innocent persons, the Legislature intended to permit 
access to DNA testing "regardless of the presence of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt in the underlying trial."  Wade, 
467 Mass. at 511.  As such, it is entirely appropriate that we 
construe the language of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), in a manner 
that is generous to the moving party. 
 
We conclude that the judge erred in determining that Clark 
failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the requirements 
of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1) and (4).  Based on his decision 
regarding these two statutory provisions, the judge did not 
consider the remaining criteria of § 7 (b).  See note 5, supra.  
Pursuant to § 7 (a), a judge "shall state findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the record, or shall make written findings 
of fact and conclusions of law that support the decision to 
29 
 
allow or deny a motion brought under [§] 3."18  See Wade, 467 
Mass. at 503.  We have no such findings and conclusions 
concerning whether Clark satisfied his burden of proof with 
respect to § 7 (b) (2), (3), (5), and (6).  Mindful of our 
rationale for analyzing the criteria set forth in G. L. c. 278, 
§ 3, we similarly could consider whether Clark satisfied those 
particular requirements of § 7 (b) that can be demonstrated 
through documentary materials.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (3), (5), (6).  However, the matter of whether Clark 
satisfied § 7 (b) (2) stands on different footing.  A dispute 
exists between the parties as to whether "the evidence or 
biological material has been subject to a chain of custody that 
is sufficient to establish that it has not deteriorated, been 
substituted, tampered with, replaced, handled or altered such 
that the results of the requested analysis would lack any 
probative value," § 7 (b) (2), and the judge made no findings to 
                     
 
18 As we have stated, a judge shall allow forensic or 
scientific analysis only in those cases where a moving party has 
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, all six 
criteria set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).  We recognize that 
where a judge determines that a moving party has failed to 
satisfy one of these criteria, the language of § 7 (a) could be 
construed as only requiring findings of fact and conclusions of 
law relating to that one criterion.  In our view, however, 
§ 7 (a) is better read as requiring a judge to articulate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on all six criteria in 
every decision made on a motion filed pursuant to G. L. c. 278A.  
By so doing, a judge will facilitate proper appellate review, 
when sought, without the necessity of a remand for further 
proceedings, thereby promoting judicial economy and efficiency. 
 
30 
 
resolve the dispute.  He simply did not consider whether DNA 
analysis of the knife handle "would lack any probative value" 
due to deterioration or handling of the evidence over time 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (2).  We have said 
that "[a]ppellate courts may supplement a judge's finding of 
facts if the evidence is uncontroverted and undisputed and where 
the judge explicitly or implicitly credited the witness's 
testimony."  Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 
(2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).  However, that is not the 
situation presented here.  Accordingly, we remand this matter to 
the Superior Court for the requisite findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding whether Clark has demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence the requirements of § 7 (b) (2), 
(3), (5), and (6). 
 
4.  Discovery under G. L. c. 278A.  Finally, we consider 
whether the judge properly denied Clark's request for discovery 
regarding a pair of men's socks.  Clark contends that, contrary 
to the judge's conclusion, he was not required to demonstrate 
either that there was a causal connection between the socks and 
the assailant, or that such evidence would be exculpatory.  He 
further contends that the judge improperly and prematurely 
analyzed his request for discovery under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, 
rather than under G. L. c. 278A, § 3.  In Clark's view, the 
allowance of discovery pertaining to the socks is necessary 
31 
 
before he can satisfy any burden of proof as to their 
evidentiary value. 
 
General Laws c. 278A, § 3 (c), provides that if, at this 
threshold stage, a moving party is unable to file with the 
motion "any of the items or information" required under § 3 (b), 
or "lacks items or information necessary to establish any of the 
factors" set forth in § 7 (b), then the moving party may seek 
"discovery of such items or information from the prosecuting 
attorney or any third party" and "shall include a description of 
efforts made to obtain such items and information."  See Wade, 
467 Mass. at 504.  Here, Clark stated in his § 3 motion that 
Detective Farrell recovered from the victim's apartment a pair 
of men's socks.  He further stated that the current location of 
the socks was unclear, and that he was entitled to discovery to 
ascertain their location and then pursue DNA testing.  Because 
Clark failed to describe in his § 3 motion any efforts that he 
made to obtain the socks, we conclude that Clark did not meet 
the requirements of § 3 (c). 
 
Had he done so, then the judge would have considered 
whether to authorize discovery pursuant to § 7 (c).  "Such 
discovery may include items and biological materials from third 
parties, provided the party seeking discovery demonstrates that 
analysis of these items or biological material will, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, provide evidence material to the 
32 
 
identification of a perpetrator of the crime."  G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (c).  Further, if a judge finds "good cause" for a moving 
party's "inability to obtain items or information required 
under" §§ 3 (b) and 7 (b), then the judge can "order discovery 
to assist the moving party in identifying the location and 
condition of evidence or biological material that was obtained 
in relation to the underlying case, regardless of whether it was 
introduced at trial or would be admissible."  Id.  Here, in his 
memorandum of decision, the judge stated that the testimony of 
Detective Farrell, by itself, was insufficient to show that 
there was a connection between the socks and the perpetrator, 
much less that the evidence had the potential to exculpate 
Clark.  The judge pointed out that the record did not indicate 
that the socks once belonged to, or were ever touched by, the 
victim's assailant.  Consequently, the judge concluded that 
Clark failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that 
searching for and analyzing the socks would provide evidence 
material to the identification of the perpetrator of the 
underlying crimes.  We do not disagree with the judge's 
conclusion.  Clark's request for discovery pertaining to the 
socks was properly denied.19 
                     
 
19 In the event that Clark obtains new information about the 
location and evidentiary significance of the socks, he is not 
foreclosed from filing another motion for discovery pursuant to 
the terms of G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (c). 
33 
 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The judge's order denying Clark's § 3 
motion is reversed, except insofar as it denied Clark's request 
for discovery.  We remand this case to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.