Title: Northam v. Virginia State Bar

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
THOMAS LONG NORTHAM 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 121623 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
FEBRUARY 28, 2013 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
In this appeal of right from an order entered by the 
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (Board), we consider 
whether an attorney violated Rule 1.10(a) of the Virginia Rules 
of Professional Conduct. 
I. 
Background 
 
Thomas Long Northam is an attorney licensed to practice 
law in Virginia.  During the relevant time period, Northam was 
a partner in Poulson, Northam & Lewis, PLC (the Firm) in 
Accomac, Virginia.  On April 7, 2010, Laura Ashley Adams (Ms. 
Adams) visited the Firm with the intention of employing Lynwood 
W. Lewis, Jr., (Lewis) as her attorney to represent her 
regarding matters of custody, support, separation, and divorce 
from her husband, Thomas James Adams (Mr. Adams).  The Firm's 
receptionist arranged for an initial meeting between Ms. Adams 
and Lewis to be held on April 13, 2010. 
 
On April 9, 2010, Northam, Lewis's partner, received a 
phone call from Mr. Adams.  Mr. Adams indicated that he was 
seeking representation for a "domestic situation," which he 
 
2 
described in some detail.  Northam told Mr. Adams to "tell 
[him] when he got served and [they] would go from there." 
 
When Ms. Adams returned to the Firm on April 13, 2010, she 
met with Lewis, recounted the events leading up to the 
separation, and informed him of her goals in the divorce 
proceedings.  Lewis took approximately one page of notes during 
this initial interview before asking if Ms. Adams knew if Mr. 
Adams had retained an attorney.  Ms. Adams answered that he 
had, and his name was "Northam something."  Lewis stopped 
taking notes and terminated the interview. 
 
The following day, Lewis spoke with Northam to inquire 
about Northam's alleged representation of Mr. Adams and to 
inform Northam that he had met with Ms. Adams.  Following this 
conversation, the Firm's receptionist notified Ms. Adams that 
Lewis would not be able to represent her in her dispute with 
Mr. Adams.  The receptionist told Ms. Adams that Lewis could 
not serve as her attorney because Lewis's partner, Northam, had 
already agreed to represent Mr. Adams in the matter.  Ms. Adams 
sought alternative legal representation.  Northam continued to 
represent Mr. Adams. 
 
Ms. Adams filed a complaint with the Virginia State Bar 
(Bar).  After receiving the complaint and conducting an initial 
investigation, the Second District Committee of the Bar 
(District Committee) charged Northam with violations of Rules 
 
3 
1.7(a)(2) (Conflict of Interest), 1.10(a) (Imputed 
Disqualification), and 1.16(a)(1) (Declining or Terminating 
Representation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  At the 
conclusion of a hearing before the District Committee, Northam 
was held to have violated Rules 1.7(a)(2), 1.10(a), and 
1.16(a)(1), and the District Committee ordered a public 
admonition, with terms. 
 
Northam appealed the decision to the Board.  The Board 
reversed and dismissed the District Committee's determination 
that Northam had violated Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.16(a)(1), and 
affirmed the determination that Northam had violated Rule 
1.10(a).  The Board ordered an admonition, without terms. 
 
Northam made a timely appeal to this Court, assigning 
three errors to the decision of the Board: 
1) 
The Disciplinary Board erred when it failed 
to find that the District Committee 
misinterpreted and misapplied Rule 1.10 
because Rule 1.10 is not a strict liability 
rule of professional conduct and instead 
requires that Respondent have knowledge that 
his partner could not ethically represent 
Appellant's client before imputing the 
partner's knowledge to [the] Appellant. 
 
2) 
The Disciplinary Board erred because there 
was no finding of fact by the District 
Committee that Appellant knew that his 
partner had a conflict of interest and was 
prohibited from representing Appellant's 
client. 
 
3) 
The Disciplinary Board improperly upheld the 
District Committee's error as a matter of 
 
4 
law in limiting Appellant's right to examine 
Ms. Adams' attorney after Ms. Adams had 
already testified as to her version of 
communications with her attorney on the same 
subject.* 
 
II. 
Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
In reviewing the Board's decision in a disciplinary 
proceeding, the factual conclusions reached by the Board will 
                     
 
* We note that the language of the three assignments of 
error recited above and presented in the appellant's opening 
brief varies slightly from that appearing in the five 
assignments of error presented in the notice of appeal 
originally filed with the Disciplinary Board on August 31, 
2012.  It is well established that the Court will not consider 
assignments of error as modified by an appellant's opening 
brief, but only as granted by the Court.  White v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 96, 102-03, 591 S.E.2d 662, 665-66 
(2004).  Even so, we have previously held that "[w]hile it is 
improper for an appellant to alter the wording of a [granted] 
assignment of error . . . non-substantive changes to an 
assignment of error . . . do not default the issue raised."  
Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 577, 590 n.14, 686 S.E.2d 710, 
717 n.14 (2009) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gauthier, 273 Va. 
416, 418, 641 S.E.2d 101 n.* (2007)).  Because the changes 
involved here are non-substantive (substituting "Appellant's" 
for "Respondent's" and "Appellant" for "Respondent" in a few 
locations), and do not permit the appellant to argue a 
different issue on appeal, we may properly consider the 
modified assignments of error.  Id.; see also Hudson v. Pillow, 
261 Va. 296, 301-02, 541 S.E.2d 556, 560 (2001) (same).  In 
addition, while the two assignments of error filed but not 
appearing in this brief under the heading "Assignments of 
Error" are waived, Dowdy, 278 Va. at 590 n.14, 686 S.E.2d at 
717 n.14 (citing Rules 5:27 and 5:17(c)), we can nevertheless 
"reach the underlying issues raised in omitted assignments of 
error because [another] assignment of error encompasses the 
same issues and because [the appellant] briefed those issues."  
See id.  Thus, to the extent that issues pertaining to 
appellant's omitted assignments of error are encompassed by the 
presented assignments of error and are sufficiently briefed, we 
may properly consider them. 
 
5 
be given "substantial weight and [we] view those findings as 
prima facie correct."  Pilli v. Virginia State Bar, 269 Va. 
391, 396, 611 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2005).  These conclusions, 
"[w]hile not given the weight of a jury verdict, . . . will be 
sustained unless they are not justified by the evidence or are 
contrary to law."  Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 277 Va. 412, 
413, 675 S.E.2d 827, 828 (2009).  In conducting this review, we 
will conduct "an independent examination of the entire record[, 
viewing] all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from th[e] 
evidence" in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.  
Green v. Virginia State Bar, 278 Va. 162, 171, 677 S.E.2d 227, 
231 (2009). 
B. 
Whether Northam Had Knowledge of 
 Lewis's Disqualification 
 
 
Under Rule 1.10(a), "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a 
firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any 
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so 
by Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, or 2.10(e)."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Northam does not dispute that Lewis, his partner, was 
prohibited from representing Mr. Adams under Rules 1.6(a) and 
1.7(a)(2).  Rule 1.6(a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing 
"information protected by the attorney-client privilege under 
applicable law or other information gained in the professional 
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or 
 
6 
the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be 
likely to be detrimental to the client."  Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
prohibits a lawyer from representing "a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest[, 
which] exists if . . . there is significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to . . . a third 
person."  Lewis's disqualification under Rules 1.6(a) and 
1.7(a)(2) from representing Mr. Adams was established by clear 
and convincing evidence and is not questioned by Northam on 
appeal. 
 
Rather, Northam argues that the Board erred when it 
imputed Lewis's disqualification to him under Rule 1.10(a) 
without any evidence to support the conclusion Northam knew 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited Lewis from 
representing Mr. Adams.  Northam contends that, because no 
evidence was presented to establish his knowledge of Lewis's 
disqualification under either Rule 1.6(a) or 1.7(a)(2), the 
Bar's determination that he violated Rule 1.10(a) could only be 
based on an application of strict liability to the Rule's 
requirements. 
 
Additionally, Northam argues, because Rule 1.10(a) is not 
a strict liability rule, the Rule's requirement that the 
conduct be executed "knowingly" is essential to sustaining a 
 
7 
violation.  This requires a finding of fact establishing 
Northam's actual knowledge that Lewis was disqualified from 
representing Mr. Adams, thus imputing Lewis's disqualification 
to Northam. 
 
The Bar responds that the Board did not apply strict 
liability when it determined that Northam violated Rule 
1.10(a).  According to the Bar, the conflict in representing 
Mr. Adams because of Lewis's receipt of confidential 
information from Ms. Adams was imputed to all of Lewis's law 
partners, including Northam.  The Bar relies upon Comment [2] 
to Rule 1.10 that "a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer 
for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client." 
Thus, by imputing Lewis's knowledge that he had a conflict 
under Rules 1.6(a) and 1.7(a)(2) to Northam, Northam 
"knowingly" represented a client, Mr. Adams, who Lewis was 
prohibited from representing. 
 
The Bar further contends that the Board based its 
conclusion on facts that allowed the Board to infer, based on 
the circumstances, that Northam knew Lewis was prohibited from 
representing Mr. Adams.  The Bar argues that it did not err in 
imputing Lewis's disqualification to Northam because the only 
reasonable inference to draw from the Board's finding that 
Lewis "met" with Ms. Adams is that the meeting was for the 
purpose of representing her in legal proceedings involving her 
 
8 
domestic dispute with Mr. Adams.  Thus, the Bar contends that 
the factual finding that Lewis and Ms. Adams met was sufficient 
to impute Lewis's knowledge of his disqualification to Northam. 
 
Rule 1.10(a) is not a rule of strict liability.  The use 
of "knowingly" in Rule 1.10(a) is not without purpose, but is a 
separate and distinct element of the Rule that must be proven 
before a violation can be imposed.  Northam must have had 
knowledge at the time he represented Mr. Adams that Lewis, his 
partner, was prohibited from doing so. 
 
"Knowingly" is defined in Part 6 of the Rules of Court, 
Section II, Preamble, as "actual knowledge of the fact in 
question" and as encompassing knowledge that "may be inferred 
from the circumstances."  Based on this definition, we agree 
with the Bar that the Board may in appropriate circumstances 
infer knowledge of a partner's disqualification from the 
circumstances of a particular case.  We do not agree, however, 
that the findings of fact made upon the Board's review of the 
entire record, including the District Committee's findings of 
fact, support the Bar's argument that Northam had actual 
knowledge of Lewis's disqualification. 
 
We have previously refused to affirm findings that an 
attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct "because 
the Board's 'Findings of Fact' d[id] not prove the ethical 
misconduct charged by clear and convincing evidence."  Pappas 
 
9 
v. Virginia State Bar, 271 Va. 580, 587, 628 S.E.2d 534, 538 
(2006); see also Rice v. Virginia State Bar, 267 Va. 299, 300-
01, 592 S.E.2d 643, 644-45 (2004). 
 
The findings of fact included in the Board's disposition 
in the present matter state: 
2. There is substantial evidence to sustain a 
violation of Rule 1.10 (Imputed 
Disqualification).  The confidential 
information Ms. Adams provided to 
Respondent's partner, Lewis, was imputed to 
Respondent.  Respondent learned of his 
partner's meeting with Ms. Adams wherein she 
intended to engage his partner to represent 
her in a divorce, child custody and support 
matter, and her disclosure to Lewis of 
relevant confidential information was imputed 
to him.  Based on the confidential 
information Ms. Adams provided to Lewis, 
Lewis could not have represented Mr. Adams 
had Mr. Adams later sought his representation 
in the divorce.  Lewis's meeting with Ms. 
Adams without first determining whether there 
was any conflict that would bar his 
representation of Ms. Adams had the effect of 
disqualifying Respondent from likewise 
representing Mr. Adams because of what Lewis 
had learned from Ms. Adams was imputed to 
Respondent.  Respondent continued to 
represent Mr. Adams without requesting and 
obtaining an informed consent from Ms. Adams 
permitting his continued representation of 
her husband. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The finding that "Respondent learned of his partner's 
meeting with Ms. Adams" does not in itself support the 
conclusion that Northam knew that Lewis was disqualified from 
representing Mr. Adams in that Ms. Adams revealed information 
 
10 
to Lewis that falls under the protection of Rule 1.6(a), or 
that Lewis's ability to represent Mr. Adams would have been 
"materially limited by [Lewis's] responsibilities" to Ms. Adams 
under Rule 1.7(a)(2).  The Board's findings of fact leave out 
the crucial connection between Northam's knowledge of a meeting 
between Lewis and Ms. Adams and the inference that Northam 
"knew" of Lewis's disqualification. 
 
The Bar argues that a review of the record in its entirety 
supports the inference that Northam knew Lewis declined to 
represent Ms. Adams because he was disqualified from 
representing either party.  During the hearing before the 
District Committee, which the Board reviewed in its entirety, 
Lewis testified that he told Northam of his meeting with Ms. 
Adams and, after learning that Northam was representing Mr. 
Adams, stated "I think we have a problem and I'm getting out."  
Northam, however, testified before the District Committee as 
follows: 
Q. Did he ever tell you that . . . he had a 
meeting with Ms. Adams? 
 
A. [I w]as contacted, I recalled.  So, obviously, 
I knew [Lewis] had been contacted somehow by [Ms. 
Adams] because he wouldn't have asked the 
question unless there had been contact, but he 
didn't go into the details. 
 
Q. But he didn't tell you that he had 
[previously] had a meeting, in-office 
consultation with her? 
A. No. 
 
11 
 
. . . . 
 
Q. You heard your partner's testimony about that 
discussion he had with you following this meeting 
with Ms. Adams, and he said  
. . . something to the effect of either I've got 
a problem or we've got a problem and I've got to 
get out.  Do you recall whether he said I or we? 
 
A. The conversation concluded with my indicating 
that I was representing Mr. Adams.  If he had 
indicated that we had a problem, I would have 
asked more questions, but that was not done.  
That would have given me some indication that I 
have to follow up on something and ask something 
else, but when I indicated that I was 
representing Mr. Adams, that concluded the very 
brief encounter and he left my office. 
 
 
The District Committee could have resolved the factual 
inconsistency between the testimony of Lewis and that of 
Northam, or found that the context of the meetings or some 
other basis resulted in the inference that Northam knew about 
Lewis's disqualification, but it did not do so in its findings 
of fact.  The District Committee's findings include: 
4. On April 13, 2010, Ms. Adams returned to 
Respondent's firm and met with Mr. Lewis with 
the intention of hiring him to represent her 
in divorce, child custody and support 
matters.  Ms. Adams provided Mr. Lewis with 
confidential information related to her 
marriage to Mr. Adams and the events leading 
to their separation, including Mr. Adams' 
alleged anger management issues and adultery.  
Ms. Adams shared with Mr. Lewis information 
not known to Mr. Adams, specifically, that 
Ms. Adams had proof of Mr. Adams' alleged 
adultery. 
 
 
12 
. . . . 
 
6. On April 14, 2010, Respondent told Mr. Lewis 
that he was representing Mr. Adams and Mr. 
Lewis told Respondent that he had met with 
Respondent the day prior. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The District Committee's findings establish only that 
Lewis and Ms. Adams met, that Ms. Adams disclosed confidential 
information to Lewis during their meeting, and that Lewis 
subsequently communicated to Northam that he met with Ms. 
Adams.  While the Board could have concluded in its findings of 
fact that Northam had actual knowledge of Lewis's 
disqualification, or that such actual knowledge was inferred 
from the circumstances, that finding was not made.  Because of 
the different possible conclusions that could be derived from 
the evidence, we decline to draw a conclusion or inference that 
the Board did not. 
 
This analysis is wholly consistent with our holdings in 
Pappas and Rice.  Although in both Pappas and Rice we 
ultimately found the evidence insufficient to support the 
Board's finding by clear and convincing evidence, these 
holdings must be viewed in the context of the basis for the 
results. 
 
In Pappas, we concluded that only one of the Board's 
findings of fact could have been the basis for sustaining a 
 
13 
violation of Rule 8.4(c).  271 Va. at 588, 628 S.E.2d at 539.  
That finding considered conflicts in testimony between the 
respondent attorney and other witnesses considered by the 
Board.  We held that "this one finding is not sufficient to 
support the Board's determination that Pappas" violated Rule 
8.4(c) because he "engaged 'in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on 
[Pappas'] fitness to practice law' by clear and convincing 
evidence."  Id. at 588, 628 S.E.2d at 538-39. 
 
The facts in Rice involved an alleged violation of Rule 
8.1(c), which provides that an attorney "shall not fail to 
respond to a lawful demand for information from [a] 
disciplinary authority."  267 Va. at 300, 592 S.E.2d at 644.  
We recognized that, "[w]hile Rule 8.1(c) may be violated by 
failure to appear at a hearing before a disciplinary committee 
or Board, in this case, the Disciplinary Board's findings of 
fact do not support its conclusion that Rice violated the 
rule."  Id.  We explained that a summons to appear at a hearing 
may be considered a demand for information under Rule 8.1(c) if 
the Board finds that the hearing was for the purpose of 
gathering sworn testimony from the respondent, but because the 
Board failed to include a finding that the "committee was 
unable to gather information from Rice as a result of Rice's 
failure to appear," its determination was "by clear and 
 
14 
convincing evidence unsubstantiated."  Id. at 301, 592 S.E.2d 
at 644-45. 
 
Neither Pappas nor Rice contains any discussion of the 
record beyond the explication of the Board's insufficient 
findings of fact.  Both cases involved findings of fact that 
provided insufficient bases for the Board's conclusions that 
the respective rules were violated by clear and convincing 
evidence.  The Board is delegated with the responsibility to 
resolve often complex and detailed disputed fact situations 
that may or may not constitute violations of professional 
responsibility.  See Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § IV, ¶13-19(E).  
An attorney charged with a violation of professional 
responsibility is entitled to findings of fact that contain a 
clear statement of how the Board resolved disputed issues. 
 
In the present case, the issue in dispute was whether 
Northam continued representing Mr. Adams when he "knew" that 
Lewis, his partner, was disqualified.  Nothing in the Board's 
findings of fact resolves this issue.  The Board was not 
required to establish that Northam knew why Lewis was 
disqualified, but the Board was required by the language of the 
Rule to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
Northam's continued representation of Mr. Adams was with the 
knowledge that Lewis was disqualified from said representation.  
Had the Board made this determination, we would have reviewed 
 
15 
the entire record for reasonable inferences in support of its 
determination, and viewed conflicts in the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Bar as the prevailing party.  But 
lacking any factual determination by the Board as to Northam's 
knowledge of disqualification, we will not inspect the record 
to determine facts required to establish a violation of the 
rule. 
 
We therefore hold, based on the Board's findings of fact, 
that under the specific circumstances of this case we cannot 
affirm the Board's conclusion that Northam knew that Lewis was 
disqualified from representing Mr. Adams.  Without this element 
of knowledge, a material element of Rule 1.10(a), we will not 
impute Lewis's disqualification to Northam and the order of the 
Board will be reversed. 
C. 
Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
Northam also argues that the Board erred in upholding the 
District Committee's decision that permitted Ms. Adams' 
attorney to limit his testimony before the District Committee 
by exercising attorney-client privilege.  We will not reach 
this Assignment of Error because our disposition as to 
Assignments of Error One and Two is dispositive. 
III. Conclusion 
 
The Board's findings of fact do not support its conclusion 
by clear and convincing evidence that Northam knowingly 
 
16 
represented Mr. Adams when Lewis, his partner, was prohibited 
from doing so under the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Therefore, Lewis's disqualification could not be imputed to 
Northam under Rule 1.10(a).  We will reverse the order of the 
Board and dismiss the charge of misconduct. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
 
The majority holds that there is not enough evidence in 
the record for us to conclude that Northam knew that Lewis was 
disqualified from representing Mr. Adams.  I respectfully 
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the factual 
findings of the Board were insufficient.  Because the majority 
holds that the evidence is insufficient, it does not reach the 
issue of whether the trial court improperly excluded portions 
of Dix’s testimony.  I would further hold that any error in 
excluding the testimony of Ms. Adams’ counsel, Thomas B. Dix, 
Jr., was harmless.  Therefore, I would affirm the decision of 
the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Committee. 
A. Violation of Rule 1.10 
 
The review of the entirety of the record shows that Ms. 
Adams met with Lewis to retain him to represent her in a 
divorce proceeding.  While meeting with Lewis, she told him 
about evidence that she had that could be detrimental to Mr. 
 
 
17 
Adams.  After she told Lewis that evidence, he asked who was 
representing Mr. Adams.  Ms. Adams responded “I believe it was 
a Northam something. . . .  I don’t know offhand.”  Lewis asked 
her “[i]s it a Tommy Northam?” and Ms. Adams stated “that 
sounds about right.”  At that point, Lewis informed her that he 
could not talk with her any longer until he “check[ed] notes 
and [saw] if [Mr. Adams] had spoken with Mr. Northam.”  Lewis 
immediately exited his meeting with Ms. Adams and asked 
Northam’s secretary whether Northam had spoken with Mr. Adams.  
When the secretary indicated that Northam had, Lewis knew that 
he could not represent Ms. Adams.  The next day, Lewis told 
Northam that he had interviewed Ms. Adams and Northam indicated 
that he was representing Mr. Adams.  Lewis told Northam “I 
think we have or I have or I think we have a problem and I’m 
getting out.”  Lewis did not reveal anything that Ms. Adams 
told him to Northam or anyone.  Northam told the Bar 
investigator that he did not withdraw because he did not 
believe that there was a conflict as he did not know any 
details about Lewis’s meeting with Ms. Adams and because he 
felt that he had a duty to his client and the court to not 
withdraw.   
 
The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an 
attorney from representing a client if that representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  Rule 1.7(a).  The 
 
 
18 
Rule further states that a concurrent conflict of interest 
exists where “the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client” or “there is significant risk that 
the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of 
the lawyer.”  Rule 1.7(b)  This conflict may be waived by the 
written consent of all involved clients, if certain conditions 
are met.  Id.  “While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of 
them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them 
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by” Rule 
1.7, among others.  Rule 1.10(a). 
 
Here, it is clear that no attorney-client relationship had 
formed between Ms. Adams and Lewis, but I believe that the 
expectation of privacy did because Lewis did not provide a 
disclaimer about confidentiality and Ms. Adams shared 
information that she believed would be detrimental to her in 
the divorce proceeding were Mr. Adams to know that she 
possessed such information. 
 
The majority concludes that because the Disciplinary Board 
did not make a specific factual finding as to whether Lewis 
communicated to Northam that he had a conflict or whether he 
only stated that he met with Ms. Adams, the evidence is 
insufficient to conclude that Northam knew that a conflict 
 
 
19 
prevented Lewis from representing Mr. Adams.  This narrow view, 
however, results in a reinterpretation of the law.  Under this 
perspective, the majority is either saying 1) that this Court 
relies only on the specific factual findings made by the 
District Committee and no longer reviews the entire record for 
reasonable inferences, or 2) this Court continues to review the 
entire record but resolves conflicts in the evidence in favor 
of the losing party rather than the party that prevailed below.  
We have previously held that  
we conduct an independent examination of the 
record, considering the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party below, 
and we give the factual findings . . . 
substantial weight, viewing them as prima facie 
correct. 
 
Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 260, 268-69, 634 S.E.2d 
341, 345-46 (2006)(emphasis added).  Our review of the record 
is not only to determine whether the inferences support each 
specific factual finding made by the Board, but is conducted to 
determine whether the evidence in the record and all the 
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence support the 
result.  Thus, either interpretation of the majority’s position 
is a radical departure from the law. 
 
In support of their position, the majority relies upon, 
Pappas v. Virginia State Bar, 271 Va. 580, 628 S.E.2d 534 
(2006), and Rice v. Virginia State Bar, 267 Va. 299, 592 S.E.2d 
 
 
20 
643 (2004), two cases in which the record simply did not 
contain the evidence to support the findings or reasonable 
inferences therefrom.  See Pappas , 271 Va. at 588-89, 628 
S.E.2d at 539 ("the evidence was insufficient to find by clear 
and convincing evidence that [the attorney] violated [the] 
Rule"); Rice, 267 Va. at 301, 592 S.E.2d at 644-45 ("the 
Disciplinary  Board's determination that the Bar proved a 
violation of Rule 8.1(c) by clear and convincing evidence is 
unsubstantiated").  By contrast, upon reviewing the entire 
record in the present case, I believe that there is sufficient 
evidence from which the District Committee and Disciplinary 
Board could have concluded that Northam knew that a conflict 
prevented Lewis from representing either Laura or Thomas Adams.  
Therefore, the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable.  
Here, the testimony of Lewis, Northam, and Ms. Adams is 
sufficient to establish that she told Lewis confidential 
information about what she knew about Mr. Adams’ alleged 
affair, Lewis told Northam that he (Lewis) had met with Ms. 
Adams and believed that either he (Lewis) or both of them had a 
problem.  Thus, based on what he learned, Lewis would have a 
concurrent conflict and could not represent Mr. Adams.  Because 
Lewis and Northam were members of the same firm at that time, 
this conflict was imputed to Northam even though Northam was 
already representing Mr. Adams.  See Rule 1.10.  In light of 
 
 
21 
the clear inferences to be drawn from the record, the fact that 
the Bar did not make this specific factual finding is too thin 
a reed upon which to decide this case.  Therefore, I would 
affirm the Bar’s admonition without terms. 
B. Admissibility of Testimony from Wife’s Attorney 
 
Because I believe that the evidence was sufficient and 
would affirm the Bar as to Northam’s first four assignments of 
error, I would also reach his fifth assignment of error:  “The 
Disciplinary Board improperly upheld the District Committee’s 
error as a matter of law in limiting appellant’s right to 
examine [Ms. Adams’] attorney after [Ms. Adams] had already 
testified as to her version of communications with her 
attorney.”   
 
During direct examination, Northam asked Dix, who 
represented Ms. Adams in the divorce proceedings and in 
proceedings related to Northam’s representation of Mr. Adams, 
whether he had any discussions with Ms. Adams leading up to the 
mediation about Northam representing Mr. Adams.  Dix declined 
to answer on the grounds that the information was subject to 
attorney-client privilege.  Northam argued that Dix cannot now 
assert the privilege because Ms. Adams testified about her 
complaint against Northam and made representations about what 
Dix did or did not tell her, thus putting those matters in 
issue, and that it was up to Ms. Adams to assert the privilege.  
 
 
22 
Northam argued that Ms. Adams “opened the door” because her 
testimony materially relied on conversations between herself 
and Dix.  He maintained that this was the classic “sword and 
shield” situation, contending that permitting Dix to rely on 
the privilege as a basis to refuse to testify was "using the 
privilege as a shield" and was "not fair" given Ms. Adams' 
prior use of the privilege as a "sword" in her effort to 
establish a violation of the Rules.  When Ms. Adams was asked 
if she would waive the privilege to allow Dix to testify, she 
stated that if he did not want to answer it, she was not going 
to waive the privilege.  The committee ruled that Dix did not 
have to answer.  Dix then testified that before the mediation, 
he did not tell any third parties that Ms. Adams did not want 
Northam to represent Mr. Adams. 
 
“Under the doctrine of harmless error, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s judgment when we can conclude that the error at 
issue could not have affected the court’s result.”  Forbes v. 
Rapp, 269 Va. 374, 382, 611 S.E.2d 592, 597 (2005).  While the 
District Committee ruled that Dix did not have to testify, he 
testified with regard to every point covered with Ms. Adams on 
cross-examination.  Therefore, all of the evidence that related 
to statements made by Ms. Adams was covered in cross-
examination of Dix.  Thus, the Committee’s ruling did not 
affect the result. 
 
 
23 
 
Northam also sought to elicit testimony about Ms. Adams’ 
purpose for speaking with Lewis.  Ms. Adams, however, did not 
testify as to why she sought to retain Lewis as her attorney.  
Therefore, she did not waive the attorney-client privilege as 
to this topic and I would hold that the Bar did not err in not 
allowing Dix to testify on this subject.  
 
Thus, I believe there is sufficient evidence in the record 
to show that Northam violated Rule 1.10.  I would further hold 
that the Bar did not err in not allowing Dix to testify about 
why Ms. Adams sought to retain Lewis, and to the extent the Bar 
erred in not admitting testimony from Dix, that error was 
harmless.  Therefore, I would affirm Northam’s admonition 
without terms for violating Rule 1.10.