Title: PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD A KIMBLE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 29, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122271 
RICHARD A. KIMBLE, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.   
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether 
defendant is entitled to resentencing where the trial court 
improperly 
scored 
offense 
variable 
16 
(OV 
16), 
MCL 
777.22(1). 
Defendant’s minimum sentence, as a result, 
exceeds the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, and 
the trial court did not articulate a substantial and 
compelling reason for this departure. 
Defendant did not 
argue that OV 16 should not be scored until filing his 
application for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant is entitled 
 
 
 
 
to resentencing because the scoring of OV 16 was plain 
error. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant shot and killed the victim so he could steal 
the car she was driving for its wheel rims. 
Following a 
bench trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree 
murder and possession of a firearm while committing or 
attempting to commit a felony (felony-firearm). 
The trial 
court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 
thirty to seventy years for the second-degree murder 
conviction and two years for the felony-firearm conviction. 
The issue here pertains only to defendant’s sentence for 
second-degree murder. 
At sentencing, defendant argued that OV 16, which 
considers 
the 
“property 
obtained, 
damaged, 
lost 
or 
destroyed,” should be scored at one point because the 
stolen car had a value of $200 or more, but not more than 
$1,000, while the prosecutor argued that OV 16 should be 
scored at five points because the stolen car had a value of 
$1,000 or more, but not more than $20,000. The trial court 
scored OV 16 at five points. 
Without the five points, the 
appropriate minimum sentence range would have been 180 to 
300 months, but, with the five points, the minimum sentence 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
range was 225 to 375 months.1
 The trial court sentenced 
defendant to a minimum term of 360 months for second-degree 
murder. 
Defendant appealed, arguing that OV 16 should not even 
have been scored because it is only to be scored in crimes 
against the person if the offense is home invasion. 
MCL 
777.22(1). 
The prosecutor agreed that it should not have 
been scored, but argued that defendant waived the error. 
The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed defendant’s 
convictions, but, in a split decision, remanded for 
resentencing.2  We granted the prosecutor’s application for 
leave to appeal and held defendant’s cross-application in 
abeyance.3 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This 
case 
presents 
an 
issue 
involving 
the 
interpretation of a statute and a court rule, which is a 
question of law that we review de novo. 
People v Petit, 
466 Mich 624, 627; 648 NW2d 193 (2002). 
1 If OV 16 were scored at one point, as defendant
argued at sentencing, the minimum sentence range would have
been 180 to 300 months. 
2 252 Mich App 269; 651 NW2d 798 (2002). 
3 468 Mich 870 (2003). 
3  
 
 
 
    
 
III. ANALYSIS 
Under the statutory sentencing guidelines, the trial 
court must score the applicable offense and prior record 
variables to determine the appropriate range for the 
minimum sentence. 
When the sentencing offense is a “crime 
against a person,” as in this case, OV 16 is to be scored 
only where the sentencing offense is home invasion or 
attempted home invasion. 
MCL 777.22(1). 
The sentencing 
offense in this case is second-degree murder. 
Therefore, 
the trial court clearly erred in scoring OV 16. 
Although 
defendant argued at sentencing that OV 16 should be scored 
at one point instead of five points, defendant did not 
raise the argument that OV 16 should not have been scored 
at all until he filed his application for leave to appeal 
with the Court of Appeals. 
An objection based on one 
ground is usually considered insufficient to preserve an 
appellate attack based on a different ground. 
People v 
Bushard, 444 Mich 384, 390 n 4; 508 NW2d 745 (1993). 
MCL 769.34(10) provides: 
If 
a 
minimum 
sentence 
is 
within 
the 
appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court
of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall
not remand for resentencing absent an error in 
scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate
information 
relied 
upon 
in 
determining 
the 
defendant’s sentence. A party shall not raise on
appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the 
sentencing guidelines or challenging the accuracy 
4  
 
 
 
of information relied upon in determining a 
sentence 
that 
is 
within 
the 
appropriate
guidelines sentence range unless the party has
raised the issue at sentencing, in a proper
motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to
remand filed in the court of appeals. 
The Court of Appeals majority concluded that § 34(10) 
precludes appellate review if the sentence is within the 
appropriate guidelines range and the party failed to raise 
the issue at sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or 
in a motion to remand. However, § 34(10) does not preclude 
appellate review if the sentence is outside the appropriate 
guidelines range, even if the party failed to raise the 
issue at sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or in a 
motion to remand. Accordingly, the majority concluded that 
appellate review is not precluded in this case because the 
sentence here is outside the appropriate guidelines range. 
The Court of Appeals dissent, on the other hand, 
concluded that a scoring error resulting in a sentence that 
is outside the appropriate guidelines sentence range is not 
appealable 
under 
§ 
34(10) 
unless 
it 
was 
raised 
at 
sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or in a motion to 
remand. 
By contrast, a sentence that is outside the 
appropriate guidelines sentence range because inaccurate 
information was relied upon is appealable even if it was 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
not raised at sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or 
in a motion to remand. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals majority that there 
is no basis in the statute for treating these two types of 
challenges differently. 
We also agree with the Court of 
Appeals majority that, pursuant to § 34(10), a sentence 
that is outside the appropriate guidelines sentence range, 
for whatever reason, is appealable regardless of whether 
the issue was raised at sentencing, in a motion for 
resentencing, or in a motion to remand. 
However, if the 
sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence 
range, it is only appealable if there was a scoring error 
or inaccurate information was relied upon in determining 
the sentence and the issue was raised at sentencing, in a 
motion for resentencing, or in a motion to remand. 
Under the Court of Appeals dissent’s view and the view 
of the dissenting justices of this Court, a scoring error 
that results in a sentence that is outside the appropriate 
guidelines sentence range would not be appealable unless it 
was preserved in one of the ways listed in the second 
sentence of § 34(10). We respectfully disagree. The first 
sentence of § 34(10) provides that a sentence that is 
within the appropriate guidelines sentence range is not 
appealable unless there was a scoring error or inaccurate 
6  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
information was relied upon. 
The necessary corollary of 
this statement is that a sentence that is outside the 
appropriate guidelines sentence range is appealable. 
The second sentence of § 34(10) provides that, even 
though a sentence that is within the appropriate guidelines 
sentence range can be appealed if there was a scoring error 
or inaccurate information was relied upon, it can only be 
appealed if the issue was raised at sentencing, in a motion 
for resentencing, or in a motion to remand. 
In other 
words, the second sentence simply describes how a party 
must preserve a challenge to a sentence that is within the 
appropriate guidelines sentence range; it says nothing 
about a challenge to a sentence that is outside the 
appropriate guidelines sentence range.4 
4 The dissenting justices argue that the first and
second sentences of the statute address two totally
different issues: the first sentence addresses under what 
circumstances 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
may 
remand 
for 
resentencing, while the second sentence addresses under
what circumstances a party may appeal. 
Post at 4. 
The 
first sentence states that “the court of appeals shall
affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing
. . . .” 
§ 34(10). 
The second sentence states that “[a]
party shall not raise on appeal . . . .” Id. If the Court 
of Appeals must affirm the sentence, pursuant to the first
sentence, the appellant will not enjoy relief. 
Likewise,
if the appellant is unable to raise appellate issues,
pursuant to the second sentence, the appellant will not
enjoy 
relief. 
Although 
these 
sentences 
are 
worded 
differently, they both pertain to the same issue, namely,
(continued…) 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Because 
defendant’s 
sentence 
is 
outside 
the 
appropriate guidelines sentence range, his sentence is 
appealable under § 34(10), even though his attorney failed 
to raise the precise issue at sentencing, in a motion for 
resentencing, or in a motion to remand. 
However, because 
defendant failed to raise the argument that OV 16 is not 
applicable at all until his application for leave to appeal 
with the Court of Appeals, defendant must satisfy the plain 
error standard set forth in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 
763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
That is, defendant must show 
that 
1) error . . . occurred, 2) the error was plain,
i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error
affected 
substantial 
rights. 
The 
third 
requirement 
generally 
requires 
a 
showing 
of 
prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the 
outcome of the lower court proceedings. 
[Id. at 
763.] 
In addition, defendant must show that the “error resulted 
in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant” or 
that 
the 
“error 
‘seriously 
affect[ed] 
the 
fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 
. . . .’” Id. (citation omitted). 
(…continued) 
the 
circumstances 
under 
which 
a 
person 
may 
obtain 
 
sentencing relief.  
8  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
First, as explained above, there was clearly error in 
this case and the prosecutor concedes that the trial court 
erred in scoring OV 16. 
Second, the error was plain and 
the prosecutor concedes that the error was plain. 
MCL 
777.22(1) could not be more clear that OV 16 is simply not 
to be scored where the sentencing offense is second-degree 
murder. 
Third, defendant was clearly prejudiced by this 
error. 
As a result of the error, defendant received a 
sentence five years in excess of that permitted by the 
properly scored sentencing guidelines. Finally, this error 
“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity [and] public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
Id. 
It is difficult 
to imagine what could affect the fairness, integrity and 
public reputation of judicial proceedings more than sending 
an individual to prison and depriving him of his liberty 
for 
a 
period 
longer 
than 
authorized 
by 
the 
law.5 
Accordingly, defendant is entitled to resentencing under § 
34 (10). 
5 The dissenting justices conclude that “the scoring
error does not qualify as plain error that seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings . . . .” 
Post at 5. We respectfully
disagree, and believe that sending a person to prison for a
term several years in excess of what is permitted by the
law sufficiently constitutes a plain error that seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of a
judicial proceeding. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Court of Appeals dissent concluded that even if § 
34(10) does not preclude relief, MCR 6.429(C) does. 
MCR 
6.429(C) provides: 
A party may not raise on appeal an issue
challenging 
the 
accuracy 
of 
the 
presentence
report 
or 
the 
scoring 
of 
the 
sentencing
guidelines unless the party has raised the issue
at or before sentencing or demonstrates that the
challenge was brought as soon as the inaccuracy
could reasonably have been discovered. Any other
challenge may be brought only by motion for 
relief from judgment under subchapter 6.500. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals dissent that, under this 
court rule, a scoring error is not appealable unless it was 
raised at or before sentencing, regardless of whether the 
resulting sentence is inside or outside the appropriate 
guidelines sentence range, except by way of a motion for 
relief from judgment under subchapter 6.500. 
Although defendant did not raise the precise scoring 
error at or before sentencing, defendant is clearly 
entitled to relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3). 
In order to be 
entitled to relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3), both “good cause” 
and “actual prejudice”6 must be established. 
“Good cause" 
6 Pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv), with reference to
a sentence, actual prejudice means that the sentence is
invalid. 
Here, the sentence is invalid because it is five 
years 
in 
excess 
of 
the 
properly 
scored 
sentencing
guidelines and devoid of any finding of substantial and
(continued…) 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
can be established by proving ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 378; 535 NW2d 496 
(1995). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance, it must be 
shown that defendant’s attorney’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and this performance 
prejudiced him. 
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 
NW2d 797 (1994). At oral argument, the prosecutor conceded 
that defendant would be entitled to relief on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and defendant’s appellate 
counsel, who was also his trial counsel, admitted that OV 
16 was scored where it obviously should not have been, that 
he failed to bring this error to the court’s attention, and 
that this failure ultimately resulted in a minimum sentence 
that exceeds the upper limit of the appropriate guidelines 
sentence range by five years. 
Under these circumstances, 
it is clear that both “good cause” and “actual prejudice” 
have been established. 
Because we find that defendant is entitled to relief 
under both the statute and the court rule, it is 
(…continued) 
compelling reasons to deviate from the properly scored 
guidelines range.  
11  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
unnecessary for us to decide whether the court rule or the 
statute controls.7 
IV. Conclusion 
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand this case to the circuit court for resentencing. 
Stephen J. Markman
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor 
7 Effective immediately, this Court has amended MCR
6.429(C) to conform with MCL 769.34(10). 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122271 
RICHARD A. KIMBLE, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that a scoring 
error is not appealable under MCR 6.429(C) as currently 
drafted unless it was raised at or before sentencing, 
regardless of whether the resulting sentence was inside or 
outside 
the 
appropriate 
guidelines 
sentence 
range. 
However, I dissent from the majority’s interpretation of 
MCL 769.34(10) and its order remanding this case for 
resentencing on the basis of MCR 6.508(D)(3). 
I agree with the Court of Appeals dissent by Judge 
GRIFFIN and would hold that MCL 769.34(10) requires that 
defendant preserve alleged errors in the scoring of offense 
variables and that the plain error doctrine does not 
justify reversal of defendant’s conviction in this case. I 
would affirm defendant’s sentence. 
 
 
 
It is undisputed that offense variable 16 (OV 16) is 
not applicable to this case. The question before the Court 
is whether defendant can challenge the scoring of the 
offense variable when he failed to raise the issue at 
sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or in a motion to 
remand filed in the Court of Appeals. 
Regarding this 
question, MCL 769.34(10) provides: 
If 
a 
minimum 
sentence 
is 
within 
the 
appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court
of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall
not remand for resentencing absent an error in 
scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate
information 
relied 
upon 
in 
determining 
the 
defendant’s sentence. A party shall not raise on
appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the 
sentencing guidelines or challenging the accuracy
of information relied upon in determining a 
sentence 
that 
is 
within 
the 
appropriate
guidelines sentence range unless the party has
raised the issue at sentencing, in a proper
motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to
remand filed in the court of appeals. 
The first sentence of the statute governs when the 
Court of Appeals may remand for resentencing when a minimum 
sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence 
range. 
Those circumstances are limited to where there is 
an 
“error 
in 
scoring 
the 
sentencing 
guidelines 
or 
inaccurate information relied upon in determining the 
defendant’s sentence.” 
2  
 
 
The second sentence of the statute shifts the focus to 
when a party is permitted under MCL 769.34(10) to raise on 
appeal an issue “challenging the scoring of the sentencing 
guidelines or the accuracy of information relied upon in 
determining a sentence that is within the appropriate 
guidelines sentence range . . . .” 
The second sentence 
provides that neither issue can be raised “unless the party 
has raised the issue at sentencing, in a proper motion for 
resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in the 
court of appeals.” 
This case involves a scoring error that caused a 
sentence 
to 
fall 
outside 
the 
appropriate 
guidelines 
sentence range. 
Thus, we consider whether the Legislature 
intended to limit appeals of scoring errors regardless of 
whether the sentence was within or outside the appropriate 
guidelines sentence range. 
The majority concludes that there is no basis in the 
statute to conclude that the Legislature intended to limit 
appeals of scoring errors differently from challenges to 
the accuracy of the information relied on in determining a 
sentence. 
The majority bases this conclusion, however, on 
its interpretation of the first sentence of the statute, 
not the second sentence at issue in this case. 
The 
majority reasons: 
3  
 
 
 
 
  
 
The first sentence of §34(10) provides that
a 
sentence 
that 
is 
within 
the 
appropriate
guidelines 
sentence 
range 
is 
not 
appealable
unless there is a scoring error or inaccurate
information is relied upon. 
The necessary
corollary of this statement is that a sentence
that 
is 
outside 
the 
appropriate 
range 
is 
appealable. [Ante at 6-7 (emphasis in original).] 
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s logic. As 
noted above, the first sentence of the statute addresses 
when the Court of Appeals may remand for resentencing, not 
when a party may appeal. 
The first sentence allows the 
Court of Appeals to remand for resentencing scoring errors 
if a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines 
sentence range. 
However, the plain language of the second 
sentence reveals that the only scoring errors that the 
Legislature intended the Court of Appeals to review at all 
are those that were preserved by a party “at sentencing, in 
a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to 
remand filed in the court of appeals.” 
As reasoned by 
Judge GRIFFIN’S Court of Appeals dissent in part: 
There 
are 
two 
disjunctive 
phrases—
“challenging 
the 
scoring 
of 
the 
sentencing
guidelines” and the “challenging the accuracy of
information relied upon in determining a sentence
that 
is 
within 
the 
appropriate 
guidelines
sentence range”—that establish two distinct and
separate situations to which the statute applies.
Only the former circumstances apply herein, where
defendant is “challenging the scoring of the 
sentencing guidelines . . . .” . . . 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the present case, the alleged scoring
error issue has been forfeited because defendant 
failed to “raise[] the issue at sentencing, in a
proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper
motion to remand filed in the court of appeals.”
MCL 769.34(10). [252 Mich App 285-286.] 
Thus, I would hold that pursuant to MCL 769.34(10), 
defendant cannot challenge the scoring of OV 16 because he 
did not raise the issue as required by the statute. I also 
agree with Judge GRIFFIN’S conclusion that the scoring error 
does not qualify as plain error that seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings under People v Carines, 460 Mich 750; 597 NW2d 
130 (1999). 
The majority also premises its decision to order 
resentencing on its conclusion sua sponte that defendant is 
entitled to relief from judgment under MCR 6.508(D)(3). 
The majority’s eagerness to serve as advocate, trial judge, 
and appellate court is unnecessary and inappropriate. 
First, it cannot be assumed that defendant will file a 
motion for relief from judgment. 
Second, there is no 
guarantee 
that 
defendant 
would 
carry 
the 
burden 
of 
establishing entitlement to the relief requested under MCR 
6.508(D). 
Without the benefit of argument and briefing, I 
would not step into the shoes of the trial court and decide 
an issue that has not even been raised by a party. Third, 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
the possibility that defendant could successfully file a 
motion for relief from judgment does not necessitate 
concluding that defendant would in this case, because the 
defendant is free to file such a motion regardless of how 
the question of statutory interpretation is resolved. 
In conclusion, I concur in the majority conclusion 
that a scoring error is not appealable under MCR 6.429(C) 
as currently drafted unless it was raised at or before 
sentencing, regardless whether the resulting sentence was 
inside or outside the appropriate guidelines sentence 
range. 
However, I dissent from the majority’s interpretation 
of MCL 769.34(10) and its order remanding this case for 
resentencing on the basis of MCR 6.508(D)(3) and Carines. 
I would hold that MCL 769.34(10) requires that defendants 
preserve alleged errors in the scoring of offense variables 
and that the plain error doctrine requires no other result. 
I would affirm defendant’s sentence. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
6