Title: State v. Perkins

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

178 So. 2d 255 (1965) 248 La. 293 STATE of Louisiana v. Jane Grigsby PERKINS. No. 47678. Supreme Court of Louisiana. July 2, 1965. Rehearing Denied September 30, 1965. Nathan A. Cormie, Lloyd E. Hennigan, Jr., Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., William P. Schuler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Bryan Forrest Gill, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. SANDERS, Justice. The Calcasieu Parish Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Jane Grigsby Perkins, *256 for negligent homicide in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:32. Upon trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial judge sentenced her to serve one year in the State Penitentiary. She has appealed to this Court, relying upon twenty-seven bills of exception reserved at the trial. The indictment charged: In response to a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, the State specified that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle in an easterly direction on Sale Street and failed to yield the right of way to vehicular traffic moving in a southerly direction on Lake Street.[1] Bill of Exception No. 3 was reserved to the overruling of a motion to quash the Indictment. The motion to quash alleged the City of Lake Charles had no ordinance granting the right of way to southbound traffic on Lake Street at its intersection with Sale Street, where the collision occurred. The motion to quash further alleged that, in the absence of such an ordinance, LSA-R.S. 32:121 granted the right of way to the traffic approaching the intersection from the right, that is, to the eastbound traffic on Sale Street. We find no merit in the motion to quash the Indictment. The motion relates to evidentiary matters only. The Indictment is legally sufficient to charge the crime of negligent homicide. Since we have concluded that the Indictment is valid, we now consider Bill of Exception No. 19, for it has given us great concern. The defendant reserved this Bill to the overruling of an objection to the following impeachment question of the State directed to the defendant on cross-examination: The defendant objected on the ground that evidence of traffic violations on other occasions was inadmissible. After argument of counsel, the court overruled the objection, stating: The question as to whether the defendant had ever run a stop sign before was clearly improper, and the objection to it should have been sustained. As phrased, the question had no reference to prior convictions. Instead, it inquired of specific traffic misconduct on other occasions. LSA-R.S. 15:495 provides: The statute is explicit that, in this type of impeachment, only evidence of convictions is admissible to attack the credibility of the defendant. The defendant can only be questioned as to such prior convictions. He cannot be asked about specific misconduct or the details of prior offenses. State v. Danna, 170 La. 755, 129 So. 154; 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 750, pp. 405-406; 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 245, pp. 608-610 (5th ed. 1956). Although an offense has resulted in the arrest or indictment of the defendant, he cannot be queried about the arrest or indictment. State v. Carite, 244 La. 928, 155 So. 2d 21; State v. Maney, 242 La. 223, 135 So. 2d 473. In his Per Curiam, the trial judge construes his ruling as restricting the interrogation and testimony to prior convictions. If, however, we so construe the ruling, the record reflects that the State violated the ruling. The State's interrogation, made part of the trial judge's Per Curiam, continued as follows: "A No. "Q You don't deny it. "A No. "Q It's the truth, isn't it? "A Yes, sir. "A It was at the same time. "A May I explain it. "Q Yes. "A May I tell you where it was, the corner? "Q I'm not interested in where it was. "Q Go ahead. "Q So you came to a rolling stop, is that right? "A Through that, yes, sir. There was a lot of traffic. "A Yes, sir, I do. "Q I will show you a copy of this for your own information. "(Argument of counsel) "A Yes, sir. "THE COURT: The objection is valid and is maintained. "A The same stop sign. [District Attorney]: She's going to admit the conviction. "A Convicted? "Q Did you pay a fine? "A I paid a fine, yes. "A Yes, sir. "A Yes. "THE COURT: The objection is maintained." (Italics ours.) That the State succeeded in placing the detail of the defendant's previous traffic offenses before the jury is evident. Furthermore, by the final, strongly communicative question, the State called the jury's attention to a specific reckless driving charge, pending against the defendant on a new trial. Although the court sustained an objection to the question, it gave no immediate instructions to the jury to disregard the forbidden information. As we stated in State v. Carite, supra, LSA-R.S. 15:495 sought to clothe the defendant with a mantle of protection against any evidence of prior arrests or charges for the reason that such information is prejudicial. It tends to destroy the defendant's credibility in the minds of the jurors. In the present case, we have concluded that the mantle of protection was pulled aside. In State v. Maney, supra, the State propounded the following general question to the defendant: After objection and before the defendant answered, the State withdrew the question, and the judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard it. Under those circumstances, we held that the error had been cured. See State v. Carite, supra. The present case, however, differs from State v. Maney. Here, the question was partially assertive, that is, it called to the jury's attention a specific reckless driving charge pending in another court against the defendant. The State propounded the question after the trial judge had cautioned it to interrogate as to convictions only. Although the trial judge sustained the objection, he gave no immediate instructions to the jury to disregard the information that it had received. The question was manifestly improper. Moreover, it came after the court had forewarned the State of the impropriety of such questions. The interrogation, in our opinion, was prejudicial and constituted a substantial violation of the statutory rights of the defendant. See LSA-R.S. 15:557; State v. Carite, supra; State v. Rhys, 40 Mont. 131, 105 P. 494; People v. Jones, 293 Mich. 409, 292 N.W. 350; Annotation, 109 A.L.R. 1089; 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1808 (3d ed. 1940); 19 Louisiana Law Review 881, 884; 23 Louisiana Law Review 410-411. The remaining Bills of Exception relate to matters that are unlikely to arise at a new trial. Hence, we need not consider them. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for a new trial. FOURNET, C. J., concurs and assigns written reasons. HAMLIN, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by FOURNET, C. J. HAWTHORNE, J., dissents in part and assigns written reasons. McCALEB, J., dissents as to Bill No. 19 being in accord with the views expressed by HAWTHORNE, J. FOURNET, Chief Justice (concurring). I am in full accord with the views expressed in the majority to the effect that the manner in which the district attorney, while interrogating the accused on the standnot only touching on her prior convictions for traffic violations but also bringing *260 out the details of the arrests forming the basis thereof, as well as the details forming the basis of the charge in the instant case, although she had not at that time been convicted of this violationwas highly prejudicial to the defendant's cause and constituted a substantial violation of her statutory and constitutional rights. Consequently, the conviction and sentence are properly being reversed. However, I do not agree that the case should be remanded to the lower court for a new trial, being of the opinion the motion to quash the indictment should have been sustained, for, in response to a motion for a bill of particulars, the district attorney declared the defendant was operating her car in an easterly direction on Sale street and failed to yield the right-of-way to traffic approaching the intersection moving in a southerly direction on Lake street, by which declaration the state is bound;[1] and in the motion to quash it is shown the city of Lake Charles has no ordinance granting the right-of-way to southbound traffic on Lake street at its intersection with Sale street, where the collision occurred, and in the absence of such an ordinance or other regulation, the right-of-way under the law universally obtaining in other states as well as this state[2] is given the motorist approaching the intersection from the right. Accordingly, the eastbound traffic on Sale street had the right-of-way over the southbound traffic on Lake street. From the foregoing it is obvious the accused is not guilty of any act constituting criminal negligence within the intendment of Article 32 of the Criminal Code (now R.S. 14:32). At best her action could only be likened to the ordinary negligence sufficient to support a civil action, and falls far short of the gross negligence and recklessness necessary to sustain a charge of criminal negligence, for, as was very aptly observed in the comments under R.S. 14:32, drafted by those entrusted with the codification of our criminal law, "The term `criminal negligence' is defined in Chapter 2 of Title I of the Code. Its meaning is similar to the terms `gross negligence or recklessness' which have been used often in criminal statutes. The ordinary negligence sufficient to support to (sic) civil action is not enough. * * * The Louisiana court in State v. Dean, 154 La. 671, 98 So. 82, 83 (1923), declared, `* * * "gross negligence" and recklessness should be interpreted to mean something more or a greater degree of negligence and recklessness than a mere omission of duty, or a rashly negligent, careless, and heedless act.'" HAWTHORNE, Justice (dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the ruling of the majority on Bill of Exception No. 19. The question of the State seeking to elicit an answer from the defendant as to a conviction against her was entirely proper. The objectionable matter which the court emphasizes by underlining was injected by the defense. The court was under no duty to instruct the jury to disregard the matter put before it by defense counsel. Moreover, the objection of defense counsel was maintained and the question was not answered. [1] The specific inquiry answered was "Where defendant failed to yield the right of way to motor vehicle traffic?" The court overruled the Motion for a Bill of Particulars as to all other items of information sought. [1] See, State v. Bienvenu, 207 La. 859, 22 So. 2d 196; State v. Pettifield, 210 La. 609, 27 So. 2d 424; State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So. 2d 785; State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38 So. 2d 622; State v. Kershaw, 234 La. 579, 100 So. 2d 873; State v. Picou, 236 La. 421, 107 So. 2d 691; State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So. 2d 530; and the concurring opinion of the author of this dissent and concurrence in State v. Peterson, 232 La. 931, 95 So. 2d 608. [2] The pertinent portion of R.S. 32:121 is to the effect that "When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left, shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right." It is obvious, therefore, that the vehicle travelling south on Lake street was, under this provision, compelled to yield the right-of-way to the vehicle driven by the defendant that was travelling in an easterly direction on Sale street.