Title: SUVAL v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SUVAL v. STATE2000 WY 1396 P.3d 1272Case Number: 99-124Decided: 06/16/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Carolyn SUVAL, Appellant 
(Defendant), v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J. 

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.Representing 
Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

Before 
LEHMAN, CJ, and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and 
HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Carolyn 
Suval (appellant) contends that the sentence imposed for her conviction on one 
count of theft of services1 is disproportionate to the gravity 
of the crime. We disagree and affirm.

[¶2] Appellant 
raises a single issue for consideration:

Whether the district 
court abused its discretion in sentencing [appellant] to five to seven years for 
the crime of theft of services in [sic] pursuant to W.S. § 6-3-408 
(a)(i).

[¶3] The State 
rephrases the issue slightly:

Whether the district 
court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing 
Appellant.

FACTS

[¶4] In 1998, 
appellant and her friend Corey Mack took their vehicle into Automatic 
Transmission Specialists (ATS) for repairs. After the vehicle had been repaired, 
appellant entered ATS' closed lot and absconded with the vehicle without having 
paid the $811.42 for services rendered.

[¶5] Appellant 
was subsequently charged with felony theft of ATS' services. After her arrest, 
appellant posted bond. One of the conditions of her release was a prohibition 
against leaving Laramie County without the prior approval of the court. 
Appellant eventually reached a plea agreement wherein the prosecutor agreed to 
recommend probation, conditioned on a presentence investigation report 
(PSI).

[¶6] Appellant's 
sentencing was scheduled for October 9, but she did not appear. In blatant 
violation of the terms of her bond, appellant had left Laramie County for 
Sweetwater County, Wyoming without obtaining the prior approval of the court. 
Even more damaging to appellant, while in Green River appellant and Mack 
committed a felony, for which both Were subsequently 
convicted.

[¶7] Upon 
resolution of the proceedings in Sweetwater County, appellant was returned to 
Laramie County for sentencing on the subject offense. Meanwhile, appellant's PSI 
had revealed a significant criminal history, including outstanding warrants from 
no less than three other states. Based on this history and appellant's escapades 
while out on bond, the prosecutor recommended a term of incarceration. The 
district court judge apparently agreed, and a sentence of five to seven years, 
to run consecutively to appellant's sentence for the Sweetwater County incident, 
was imposed. Appellant now appeals her sentence. 

[¶8] When a 
criminal sentence is within the parameters set by the legislature, as it is 
here, that sentence will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Dodge v. State, 951 P.2d 383, 385 (Wyo. 1997). An abuse of 
discretion does not occur unless a court has acted in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 152 
(Wyo. 1998). The ultimate issue is whether or not the court could have 
reasonably concluded as it did, Id. In evaluating the reasonableness of a 
criminal sentence, we give consideration to the crime and its circumstances 
along with the character of the defendant. Dodge, 951 P.2d  at 
385.

[¶9] The United 
States Supreme Court set forth a test for proportionality analysis of criminal 
sentences in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3011, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983):

[A] court's 
proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by 
objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions.

[¶10] Dodge, 951 P.2d  at 385. We have stated, however, that this court will not engage in a 
lengthy analysis under all three of the Solem criteria except in those instances 
"where the mode of punishment is unusual or where the relative length of 
sentence to imprisonment is extreme when compared to the gravity of the 
offense." Dodge, 951 P.2d  at 385; Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Wyo. 
1986).

DISCUSSION

[¶11] Appellant 
complains that the trial court failed to take into account any mitigating 
factors. The mitigating factors appellant alleges were ignored in sentencing 
were: her crime was nonviolent; her stated desire to resume her nursing career 
and reunite with her estranged husband and child; her willingness to avoid the 
nefarious influences of her cohort in crime, Mr. Mack; and, the judge in the 
Sweetwater County case had recommended that her sentence in that case run 
concurrently to this one. Appellant also asserts that her sentence is one of 
those "rare case[s] in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and 
the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality." Dodge, 
951 P.2d  at 385 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991)). Appellant bases her contention of 
disproportionality on the nonviolent nature of her crime in comparison with her 
sentence of five to seven years running consecutively with the other sentence 
arising from the Sweetwater County incident.

[¶12] Our review 
of the sentencing record leads us to conclude that the trial court did, in fact, 
take all of the appropriate factors into consideration:

[Trial Judge]: All right. 
Thank you, counsel. Certainly the nature of the underlying offense is one of the 
principal considerations in sentencing. One always looks to the principle of 
proportionality. That is, there must be some proportionality between the offense 
and the sentence. Nevertheless, always one's prior record is taken heavily into 
consideration.

[¶13] I would 
agree with you, counsel, that ordinarily without a criminal history this offense 
would not warrant incarceration, it would probably be a probation case. But 
[appellant] is far from being here without a significant criminal history, and 
now we have the conviction in Sweetwater County on top of it, [appellant's] 
formidable record that is reflected in the pre-sentence investigation report. 
[Appellant] just seemed to be willful in her determination to keep committing 
criminal offenses. It is significant that she was outside of Laramie County in 
Sweetwater County in violation of her conditions of release when this occurred. 
That again shows a willfulness and a disregard for the order of the Court and 
the process. She just does not seem to take these things very seriously. And, I 
guess, looking at all of the past instances of which she has received extremely 
lenient treatment, she might have some reason to not take it terribly 
serious.

[¶14] But this 
is just not the kind of a record that would warrant a sentence as light as one 
to two [years]. It may not rise quite to the level of eight to ten [years] 
either. But the judgment and sentence of the Court * * * is no less than five 
years nor more than seven to the Women's Penitentiary at Lusk consecutive as to 
any other sentence she may be serving.

[¶15] It is 
quite clear from the foregoing that the trial judge considered the gravity of 
appellant's offense. It is also clear that the judge believed appellant's 
criminal history and behavior to outweigh any considerations of lenity. The 
record supports the judge's ruling. Appellant's criminal history demonstrates a 
progressive increase in the occurrence and severity of her crimes beginning with 
misdemeanor prostitution and disorderly conduct offenses to felony theft to the 
violent robbery in Sweetwater County. Furthermore, appellant has continually 
flaunted the authority of the courts and the law as evidenced by her outstanding 
warrants from several other states as well as by her actions in this case where 
she violated the terms of her release by leaving the county. Given her history, 
it was hardly unreasonable for the trial judge to discount appellant's 
after-the-fact, self-serving statements about self-rehabilitation. The trial 
court, appropriately we think under these circumstances, rated appellant's 
credibility at nil. We will not second guess such an assessment, especially one 
where the record supplies ample support for such a 
conclusion.

[¶16] For the 
same reasons noted above, we do not find this cash to be one of those rare 
"case[s] in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence 
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality." To the contrary, the 
record shows that appellant's sentence, which was entirely within the statutory 
limits, is eminently reasonable and proportionate under these 
circumstances.

CONCLUSION

[¶17] The 
sentence imposed on appellant is reasonable under the circumstances and 
proportionate thereto.

[¶18] 
Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-408 (a)(i) (Lexis 1999) provides:

(a) 
A person who, with intent to defraud, obtains services which he knows are 
available only for compensation, without paying for the services is guilty 
of:

(i) 
A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the 
services is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or 
more[.]