Title: Bask, Inc. v. Municipal Council of Taunton

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13218 
 
BASK, INC.  vs.  MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF TAUNTON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2022. - July 21, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Marijuana, Recreational.  Land Court, Jurisdiction.  
Jurisdiction, Land Court.  Injunction.  Practice, Civil, 
Injunctive relief.  Municipal Corporations, Marijuana, City 
council.  Permit.  Zoning, Special permit.  Administrative 
Law, Decision. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
October 25, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Howard P. Speicher, J.; a posttrial 
motion for injunctive relief was heard by him; and a complaint 
for contempt, filed on January 12, 2021, also was heard by him. 
 
 
Proceedings for interlocutory review were heard in the 
Appeals Court by John C. Englander, J.  After consolidation, the 
Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the 
case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
George P. Field for the defendant. 
 
Richard E. Burke, Jr. (Lisa Raimondi also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Shawn M. McCormack, Nicholas P. Shapiro, & Daniel P. Dain, 
for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case presents the question of the 
permissible scope of a Land Court judge's authority.  
Specifically, in connection with an appeal from the denial of a 
special permit, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, a Land Court 
judge ordered the issuance of the special permit to the 
applicant; he also issued a second injunction that, in effect, 
enjoined a municipal licensing authority from conducting 
previously scheduled licensing proceedings to consider 
applications from nonparties themselves seeking licenses to 
operate a retail marijuana dispensary.  We conclude that the 
second injunction exceeded the permissible scope of the judge's 
authority.  Further concluding that the judge did not err in his 
factual findings or in his conclusion that the denial of the 
special permit was arbitrary and capricious, we affirm that 
portion of the judgment.1 
1.  Factual and procedural background.  We set forth the 
facts as found by the judge, leaving some disputed findings for 
later discussion.  See Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., 
Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Billerica, 454 Mass. 374, 375 (2009) 
(Wendy's). 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Real 
Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and the Abstract 
Club. 
3 
 
a.  Special permit.  In September 2018, the city of Taunton 
(city) adopted as part of its ordinances chapter 222, which 
permitted the city to issue five licenses to operate 
recreational marijuana establishments in its highway business or 
industrial districts.2  In August 2019, the plaintiff, Bask, Inc. 
(Bask), applied for a special permit (a predicate to receiving a 
license to operate a recreational marijuana establishment) for 
400 Winthrop Street in the city's highway business district.  In 
October 2019, the city's municipal council (city council), 
acting as a special permit granting authority under G. L. 
c. 94G, § 3, and city ordinance sections 222-1 and 440-304, 
denied Bask's special permit application.  The city council 
cited concerns about traffic, economic impact, utilities, health 
and safety, location of the proposed project, and the general 
welfare of inhabitants. 
Notably, in January 2020 (almost four months after denying 
Bask's application), the city council granted a special permit 
to a different applicant that proposed a site for a recreational 
 
2 "Chapter 94G gives municipalities the power to regulate 
the operation of recreational marijuana establishments within 
their borders, including the ability to adopt ordinances 
governing the total number of such establishments, as well as 
the time, place, and manner of marijuana sales (with certain 
exceptions) as long as the ordinances do not conflict with the 
provisions of c. 94G.  See G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a)."  Mederi, Inc. 
v. Salem, 488 Mass. 60, 62 (2021). 
4 
 
marijuana establishment approximately one-quarter mile away from 
Bask's proposed site.3 
Bask filed a single-count complaint in the Land Court under 
G. L. c. 40A, § 17,4 challenging the denial of its special permit 
application.  Following a trial in August 2020 and posttrial 
submissions, the Land Court judge took the case under 
advisement. 
b.  Preliminary injunction.  On October 30, 2020, with no 
decision from the judge and with hearings scheduled for 
November 4 and 10 to consider whether to issue any of the four 
remaining licenses to any of the five pending applicants, Bask 
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin 
the city council from holding the scheduled licensing hearings 
and from issuing any of the four licenses to any of the pending 
applicants.5  On November 4, 2020, the judge allowed Bask's 
requested injunction. 
 
3 Bask's expert at trial testified that the other 
applicant's proposed site had "more traffic" and roughly twice 
as many cars going in and out of the site. 
 
4 General Laws c. 40A, § 17, provides:  "Any person 
aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals or any special 
permit granting authority . . . may appeal to the land court 
department . . . by bringing an action within twenty days after 
the decision has been filed . . . ." 
 
5 One license had already been issued, and there were five 
pending applicants who had been granted special permits. 
5 
 
 
On December 4, 2020, with licensing procedures on hold, the 
city council filed an interlocutory appeal from the preliminary 
injunction to a single justice of the Appeals Court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 231, § 118.  On December 21, 2020, the single justice 
vacated the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the judge 
likely exceeded his jurisdiction.  With the injunction vacated, 
the city council rescheduled hearings on the then-pending 
applications of the five nonparty applicants to occur on 
December 28 and 29, 2020.  On January 5, 2021, Bask appealed 
from the single justice's decision vacating the preliminary 
injunction. 
c.  Merits decision and applications to stay injunction.  
Meanwhile, on December 23, 2020, the Land Court judge issued a 
decision in Bask's favor, finding that the city council's denial 
of Bask's special permit application was "pretext[ual]," 
arbitrary, capricious, and based on legally untenable grounds.  
He ordered that the city council issue the special permit; in 
addition, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17,6 which authorizes the 
Land Court to "make such other decree as justice and equity may 
 
6 General Laws c. 40A, § 17, provides:  "The court shall 
hear all evidence pertinent to the authority of the board [of 
appeals] or special permit granting authority and determine the 
facts, and, upon the facts as so determined, annul such decision 
if found to exceed the authority of such board or special permit 
granting authority or make such other decree as justice and 
equity may require." 
6 
 
require," he ordered specific licensing procedures that directly 
had an impact on the rescheduled licensing hearings for the 
nonparty applicants.  The judge ordered that 
"the special permit shall be issued in sufficient time for 
the plaintiff to apply for a license pursuant to Chapter 
222-1 of the Ordinances of the City of Taunton and to 
participate as an applicant in any hearing held by the 
Municipal Council with respect to the issuance of licenses 
pursuant to said Chapter 222-1, and that the Municipal 
Council shall consider such application by the plaintiff 
for a license pursuant to Chapter 222-1 at any such hearing 
along with all other duly filed applications." 
 
On December 24, 2020, the city council filed a notice of 
appeal.  That same day, the city council filed two applications 
to stay the above quoted portion of the judge's December 23 
order –- one in the Land Court, and one with the single justice 
of the Appeals Court.  The Land Court judge scheduled a hearing 
on the city council's application for stay for January 5, 2021. 
However, on December 28 and December 29, 2020 (the next 
business days after the judge's December 23 order),7 the city 
council held its previously scheduled hearings to consider the 
marijuana dispensary license applications of the five nonparty 
applicants.  The city council awarded three of the remaining 
four licenses to nonparty applicants, some of whom had been 
awaiting a licensing hearing for as long as fourteen months.  
 
7 The city's offices closed for the holidays on December 23, 
2020, the day the Land Court's order issued.  The next business 
day following the interim holidays was December 28, the first 
day of the previously scheduled licensing hearings. 
7 
 
Bask did not participate in the hearing, and, as of the time of 
the licensing hearings, the city council had not issued a 
special permit to Bask.8 
d.  Contempt proceedings.  On January 5, 2021, at the 
hearing on the city council's application to stay, the Land 
Court judge ordered Bask to file a complaint of contempt 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 65.3, as appearing in 386 Mass. 
1244 (1982), on the ground that the city council violated the 
judge's December 23 order.  Bask did so.  On January 15, 2021, 
the city council filed a third petition under G. L. c. 231, 
§ 118, before the single justice of the Appeals Court, seeking 
relief from the Land Court's December 23 order.9  On February 2, 
2021, the single justice ordered a partial stay pending appeal 
from the December 23 order, insofar as it enjoined the city's 
licensing proceedings.  On March 2, 2021, Bask appealed. 
e.  Consolidated appeal.  Bask's appeal from the single 
justice's December 21, 2020, decision vacating the preliminary 
 
8 Both applications for stay (before the Land Court judge 
and before the single justice, respectively) were denied in 
early January.  Each denied the application because, inter alia, 
the city council failed to show that it would suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of a stay. 
 
9 This petition also sought (i) relief from the Land Court's 
order that Bask file a complaint of contempt, (ii) dismissal of 
the contempt complaint because the underlying December 23 order 
was outside the Land Court's jurisdiction, and (iii) relief from 
summonses and hearing notices to nine individual members of the 
city council. 
8 
 
injunction, Bask's appeal from the single justice's February 2, 
2021, decision ordering the partial stay of the Land Court's 
December 23 order pending appeal, the city council's appeal from 
the merits of the Land Court judge's December 23 decision 
regarding its denial of Bask's special permit application, and 
the city council's appeal from the contempt proceeding were 
consolidated.10  We then transferred the case sua sponte to this 
court. 
2.  Discussion.  Because it concerns the Land Court's 
jurisdiction, we first address the Land Court judge's authority 
to enjoin the licensing proceedings in his December 23 order 
before turning to the merits of the judge's decision regarding 
the city council's denial of the special permit. 
a.  Land Court's jurisdiction.  Jurisdictional questions 
are questions of law, which we review de novo.  See Concord v. 
Water Dep't of Littleton, 487 Mass. 56, 60 (2021).  The Land 
Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, as prescribed by 
statute.  See G. L. c. 211B, § 1 (establishing Land Court as 
department of Trial Court).  See also Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 
 
10 In addition, the city council appealed from the Land 
Court judge's March 24, 2021, decision to sanction it for 
violating Mass. R. Civ. P. 11, as amended, 456 Mass. 1401 
(2010), because the city council's lawyer sought removal of the 
judge under an inapplicable statute.  The city council mentions 
this appeal in the background section of its brief, but does not 
substantively argue the issue; thus, it is waived.  See Goldman 
v. Dennis, 375 Mass. 197, 200 (1978). 
9 
 
460 Mass. 762, 766 (2011), quoting Riverbank Improvement Co. v. 
Chapman, 224 Mass. 424, 425 (1916) ("The Land Court is a 
statutory court, not of general but of strictly limited 
jurisdiction").  Over time, its jurisdiction has expanded, as 
set by statute.  See G. L. c. 185, § 1 (enumerating Land Court's 
jurisdiction). 
General Laws c. 40A, § 17, authorizes a court reviewing the 
denial of a special permit application to 
"hear all evidence pertinent to the authority of the board 
[of appeals] or special permit granting authority and 
determine the facts, and, upon the facts as so determined, 
annul such decision if found to exceed the authority of 
such board or special permit granting authority or make 
such other decree as justice and equity may require" 
(emphasis added). 
 
Bask contends that the emphasized language permitted the judge 
to order, as a matter of equity, that "the special permit shall 
be issued in sufficient time for the plaintiff to apply for a 
license . . . and to participate as an applicant in any hearing 
held by the Municipal Council," and "that the Municipal Council 
shall consider such application by the plaintiff for a license 
. . . at any such hearing along with all other duly filed 
applications."  We disagree. 
Our discussion in Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 
123, 127 (1981), is instructive.  In that case, we considered 
the argument that the grant of general equitable powers to the 
Probate Court allowed that court to review the licensing 
10 
 
decision of a town licensing authority.  Id. at 128.  We held 
that such review fell outside the Probate Court's subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 128-129.  We explained that "review of an 
action of an administrative board in suspending or revoking a 
license is not a matter cognizable under the general principles 
of equity jurisprudence" and that such review could be obtained 
through an action in the Superior Court.  Id. at 128.  Thus, we 
held that the Probate Court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to review the licensing procedure, despite the 
grant of "general equity jurisdiction" to that court.  Id. at 
128-129.  Probate courts, we explained, "remain courts of 
limited jurisdiction."  Id. at 127.  The scope of the Probate 
Court's equitable powers, albeit broad, was tied necessarily to 
its limited subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. 
We come to the same conclusion here.  The Land Court judge 
had before him an appeal from the denial of a special permit; 
jurisdiction over that appeal arose pursuant to G. L. c. 185, 
§ 1 (p), which grants the Land Court jurisdiction over 
"[a]ctions brought pursuant to the provisions of [G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17]," and G. L. c. 185, § 1 (k), which grants the Land Court 
jurisdiction over "[a]ll cases and matters cognizable under the 
general principles of equity jurisprudence where any right, 
title or interest in land is involved."  The language in G. L. 
c. 40A, § 17, authorizing the judge to "make such other decree 
11 
 
as justice and equity may require" does not grant to the Land 
Court general equitable powers; instead, it provides the court 
with limited equitable powers necessarily tethered to the 
court's specific jurisdictional grant over the denial of the 
special permit application.11 
There was no claim pending in the Land Court concerning the 
licensing procedure.  Yet, the relief ordered regards the city 
council's licensing procedure, in effect enjoining the city 
council from conducting any hearings for the four outstanding 
licenses12 on the five then-pending applications until Bask was 
able to apply for a license so as to require consideration of 
Bask's to-be-filed license application alongside those of each 
 
11 Thus, for example, if the city council refused to issue 
the special permit, the judge could hold the city council in 
contempt.  See G. L. c. 185, § 25 ("In all matters within its 
jurisdiction, the [Land Court] shall have all the powers which 
the [S]uperior [C]ourt has including power to grant injunctions 
and restraining orders in accordance with the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure as justice and equity may require 
. . ."). 
 
12 Indeed, Bask (at most) could obtain one license; yet, the 
order held each of the four licenses open pending Bask's yet-to-
be-filed application.  The Land Court's order essentially put 
the entire licensing procedure for all applicants in Bask's 
hands, as the five pending applicants and the city council would 
have been required to wait until Bask submitted its materials.  
While there is nothing in the record to suggest Bask abused the 
hold-up power ostensibly granted to it, such an order, and its 
potential chokehold on the entire licensing process, went beyond 
the Land Court judge's authority. 
12 
 
of the five nonparty applicants, some of whom had already been 
waiting over one year for consideration.13 
Notably, Bask could have sought relief regarding the denial 
of both the special permit and the licensing proceedings.  See 
Recinos v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 741 (2016) ("A fundamental 
maxim of general equity jurisprudence is that equity will not 
suffer a wrong to be without a remedy").  Because "'[a]ll cases 
and matters cognizable under the general principles of equity 
jurisprudence where any right, title or interest in land is 
involved, including actions for specific performance of 
contracts,' are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, the Superior Court, and the Land Court," 
O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 411-412 (2009), 
quoting G. L. c. 185, § 1 (k), Bask could have brought its 
action challenging the denial of its special permit application 
in the Superior Court, see G. L. c. 185, § 1 (p); G. L. c. 40A, 
 
13 Bask's appeal from the single justice's December 21, 
2020, order vacating the preliminary injunction is dismissed as 
moot.  See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of 
the Dep't of Mental Retardation (No. 2), 424 Mass. 471, 472 
(1997) ("A preliminary injunction lapses when a final decree is 
entered").  Furthermore, a party may not be held in contempt of 
an order that exceeded the jurisdiction of the issuing court.  
See Stow v. Marinelli, 352 Mass. 738, 744-745 (1967); Oakham 
Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Oakham, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 80, 87 (2002).  
Accordingly, we remand the case for consideration of the 
contempt complaint in light of our ruling that the December 23, 
2020, order with respect to the city council licensing procedure 
exceeded the Land Court judge's authority. 
13 
 
§ 17, which court also could have reviewed any challenges Bask 
may have raised related to the city council's licensing 
decisions.  See, e.g., Mederi, Inc. v. Salem, 488 Mass. 60, 64, 
67 (2021) (reviewing unsuccessful certiorari claim brought in 
Superior Court based on denial of license to retail marijuana 
establishment).  Alternatively, Bask could have commenced an 
action in the Land Court with respect to the special permit 
appeal, and brought a separate action in the Superior Court for 
relief regarding the licensing stage.14  Cf. Carstensen v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Cambridge, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 356-357 
(1981) (noting difference between zoning laws and related 
substantive laws -- there, building codes for safety and 
structure -- and that "[e]ach has its own appellate procedure").  
Bask also could have sought leave to amend its complaint in the 
Land Court to add a claim regarding the licensing proceedings, 
and then requested that the Chief Justice of the Trial Court 
assign the Land Court judge to sit as a Superior Court judge for 
the resolution of the claim, allowing both aspects -- the permit 
 
14 Thereafter, Bask could have urged the Land Court judge to 
seek interdepartmental judicial assignment under Massachusetts 
Trial Court Rule XII(1) (2005), which allows "interdepartmental 
assignment so that one judge may hear all related matters" in 
two separate actions "involving substantially the same or 
similar issues and parties" in order "to promote speedy 
disposition of cases" and "to afford complete and permanent 
relief." 
14 
 
and the licensing relief -- to be addressed in the single 
pending action.  See G. L. c. 211B, § 9 (xi).15 
b.  Arbitrary and capricious denial of special permit.  On 
an appeal from the denial of an application for a special 
permit, the reviewing court finds facts de novo and then, based 
on those facts, affirms the decision "unless it is based on a 
legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, 
capricious or arbitrary."  MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of 
Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970).  This judicial review 
"involves a highly deferential bow to local control over 
community planning."  Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board 
of Appeals of Shirley, 461 Mass. 469, 475 (2012), quoting 
Wendy's, 454 Mass. at 382.  "Even if the record reveals that a 
desired special permit could lawfully be granted by the board 
because the applicant's evidence satisfied the statutory and 
regulatory criteria, the board retains discretionary authority 
to deny the permit."  Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals of Salisbury, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (2018), 
quoting Buccaneer Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lenox, 
87 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 874 (2015).  However, that discretion is 
 
15 The Chief Justice of the Trial Court has "the power to 
assign a justice appointed to any department of the trial court 
to sit in any other department of the court, for such period or 
periods of time as he [or she] deems will best promote the 
speedy dispatch of judicial business."  G. L. c. 211B, § 9 (xi). 
15 
 
not unlimited; "the general deference afforded actions of a 
local [special permit granting authority] may yield to a court's 
sense of fairness when it appears that special permit granting 
authority has applied dramatically different standards to 
similarly situated applicants" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Wendy's, supra at 388.  Simply preferring one 
applicant to another is a legally untenable ground, because the 
special permit granting authority "injects criteria not found in 
the enabling act."  Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., supra at 599-
600, quoting Dowd v. Board of Appeals of Dover, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 
148, 156 (1977). 
On appeal, "the [lower court] judge's findings of fact will 
not be set aside unless they are 'clearly erroneous' or there is 
'no evidence to support them.'"  Wendy's, 454 Mass. at 383, 
quoting DiGiovanni v. Board of Appeals of Rockport, 19 Mass. 
App. Ct. 339, 343 (1985).  We review the judge's determination 
of the law de novo.  Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership, 461 Mass. 
at 475, citing Needham v. Winslow Nurseries, Inc., 330 Mass. 95, 
99 (1953).  Our review reveals no clear error in the eleven 
factual findings challenged by the city council on appeal.  Each 
of the challenged findings is supported by the record, including 
expert testimony, which the judge was able to hear and credit. 
We also have no trouble affirming the Land Court judge's 
decision that the denial of a permit was "legally untenable, 
16 
 
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and otherwise beyond the 
proper exercise of the Municipal Council's lawful authority."  
The city council denied Bask's special permit application 
principally on the basis of concerns regarding traffic.  Yet, 
almost four months after it denied Bask's special permit 
application, the city council approved a different applicant's 
special permit application for a site approximately one-quarter 
mile further down the same street.  Bask's expert at trial 
testified that the other applicant's proposed site had "more 
traffic" and roughly twice as many cars going in and out of the 
site. 
The city council's emphasis on traffic concerns when 
denying Bask's permit, while granting a different applicant a 
permit for a site on the same street with twice as much 
predicted traffic, without additional credible explanation for 
the distinction made between the two applicants, indicates that 
the decision was made for "reasons not related to the purposes 
of the zoning law."  Vazza Props., Inc. v. City Council of 
Woburn, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 312 (1973).  Thus, the judge did 
not err in determining that the city council's denial was 
arbitrary and legally untenable.  See Wendy's, 454 Mass. at 386, 
quoting Roberts v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 429 
Mass. 478, 486 (1999). 
17 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, so much of the 
Land Court judgment dated December 23, 2020, that concerns the 
city council's licensing hearings is vacated; in all other 
respects the judgment is affirmed, including the Land Court 
judge's finding that the city council's denial of Bask's special 
permit application was arbitrary, capricious, and legally 
untenable.  The Land Court judge's March 24, 2021, order 
sanctioning the city council is also affirmed.  The appeals from 
the single justice's December 21, 2020, and February 2, 2021, 
orders are dismissed as moot.  We remand for consideration of 
the contempt complaint in light of our ruling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.