Title: Commonwealth v. Brown

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11669 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TIMOTHY BROWN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 10, 2017. - September 20, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, 
& Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Home Invasion.  Robbery.  
Firearms.  Joint Enterprise.  Accessory and Principal.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, 
Argument by prosecutor, Opening statement, Jury and jurors, 
Voir dire, Presumptions and burden of proof.  Evidence, 
Joint venturer, Prior misconduct. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 22, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamlin, J. 
 
 
 
David H. Mirsky for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  We address, in this opinion, the scope of 
criminal liability under the common-law felony-murder rule.  The 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
charges stem from an attempted armed robbery and home invasion 
into a Lowell townhouse shared by Hector and Tony Delgado.  Two 
armed gunmen fatally shot the brothers during the botched 
robbery.  The defendant was not present at the scene.  The 
Commonwealth alleged that the defendant was liable as an 
accomplice to felony-murder because he supplied one of the 
gunmen with a pistol and provided hooded sweatshirts to the 
intruders to help them conceal their identities.  A Superior 
Court jury convicted the defendant of two counts of felony-
murder in the first degree based on the predicate felonies of an 
attempted commission of armed robbery, home invasion, unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. 
 
The defendant raises the following claims on appeal:  (1) 
the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove 
that he was a knowing participant in the felony-murders; (2) the 
judge provided erroneous instructions on shared intent and 
accomplice liability; (3) portions of the prosecutor's opening 
statement and closing argument were improper; (4) the judge 
should have excluded prejudicial evidence of prior misconduct; 
(5) the judge asked improper voir dire questions of potential 
jurors; and (6) we should abolish the felony-murder rule.  The 
defendant also asks us to order a new trial under our 
extraordinary authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
3 
 
 
 
We conclude that the Commonwealth introduced sufficient 
evidence to prove that the defendant knowingly participated in 
the underlying felonies and, therefore, was an accomplice to 
felony-murder.  We conclude also that the defendant's other 
challenges do not raise error warranting reversal or a new trial 
as to any of the convictions.  Nonetheless, in the circumstances 
of this case, we are convinced that, pursuant to our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the interests of justice require that 
the degree of guilt be reduced to that of murder in the second 
degree. 
As to whether we should abolish the common-law felony-
murder rule, a unanimous court concludes that the felony-murder 
rule is constitutional.  However, a majority of Justices, 
through the concurrence of Chief Justice Gants, conclude that 
the scope of felony-murder liability should be prospectively 
narrowed, and hold that, in trials that commence after the date 
of the opinion in this case, a defendant may not be convicted of 
murder without proof of one of the three prongs of malice.  As a 
result, in the future, felony-murder is no longer an independent 
theory of liability for murder.  Rather, felony-murder is 
limited to its statutory role under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an 
aggravating element of murder, permitting a jury to find a 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree where the murder 
was committed in the course of a felony punishable by life 
4 
 
 
imprisonment even if it was not committed with deliberate 
premeditation or with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Because the 
majority holding as to common-law felony-murder liability is 
prospective in effect, it does not affect the judgment reached 
in this case.  Because I disagree with that holding, I write 
separately in a concurrence to explain my reasoning. 
1.  Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence of the extent of his involvement in 
the armed home invasion, and his shared intent to commit that 
crime, we recite the facts the jury could have found in some 
detail. 
a.  Facts.  On the evening of October 22, 2009, the 
defendant was a passenger in a green Honda Civic automobile that 
was being driven around the Pawtucketville section of Lowell.  
The other occupants of the vehicle were his friends Ariel 
Hernandez, Giovanni Hill, and Darien Doby.  Hernandez was the 
driver.  Hill was in the front passenger seat, and the defendant 
and Doby shared the rear passenger seat.  Hernandez drove past 
two men walking on the street and raised the possibility of 
robbing them.  The passengers convinced Hernandez not to do so. 
A short time later, Hill and Hernandez noticed two women 
walking down the street.  Hernandez pulled into a side street 
and parked.  Hill and Hernandez got out of the vehicle and 
Hernandez removed a firearm from the trunk.  The two rounded the 
5 
 
 
corner and confronted the women while the defendant and Doby 
waited in the vehicle.  Hill stood and watched from a few feet 
away as Hernandez, gun in hand, grabbed their purses.  The two 
men returned to the vehicle, and Hernandez drove away, with the 
purses and the handgun in his lap.  He stopped at a friend's 
house to exchange the green hooded sweatshirt he had been 
wearing for a black sweatshirt without a hood. 
The defendant, Doby, and Hill left the friend's house, 
while Hernandez stayed behind.  The four men later met at the 
defendant's one-bedroom apartment.  Hernandez stashed the 
handgun he had used in the robbery (a nine millimeter pistol) in 
a kitchen cabinet above the refrigerator.  He rifled through the 
purses, pulling out cash, driver's licenses, and automated 
teller machine (ATM) cards.  Hernandez found what appeared to be 
a passcode for one of the ATM cards written on a scrap of paper, 
and sent Hill to a bank to attempt to withdraw money with the 
card.  Before he left, Hill borrowed the defendant's black 
sweatshirt so he could change out of the jacket he had worn 
during the robbery.  When he returned, Hill reported that he had 
been unsuccessful in withdrawing any money. 
Later, at approximately 12:15 A.M., two cousins, Jamal and 
Karon McDougal, visited the defendant's apartment.2  They were 
                     
 
2 Because they share a last name, we refer to Jamal and 
Karon McDougal by their first names. 
6 
 
 
joined by one of their friends, Joshua Silva.  While gathered in 
the kitchen with the defendant, Jamal asked Hernandez if he 
wanted to participate in robbing someone who owed money to one 
of Jamal's friends.  Karon predicted that the robbery would be 
"pretty easy."  He warned the others, however, that they were 
going to rob two "pretty big guys" who worked in bars.3  
Hernandez agreed to participate in the robbery.  Silva joined 
them as the getaway driver. 
Once Silva agreed to participate, Hernandez urged, "If 
we're going to do it, let's go do it now."  Hernandez retrieved 
his gun from the kitchen cabinet, looked it over, and tucked it 
inside his waistband.  Still wearing the hoodless black 
sweatshirt he had changed into after the earlier robbery, 
Hernandez asked the defendant for a hooded sweatshirt so that he 
could "hide his face."  The defendant provided Hernandez with a 
hooded sweatshirt with a front zipper.  Hernandez complained 
that the zipper was broken and that some part of his shirt would 
be visible. The defendant then gave Hernandez a black and red 
pullover-style hooded sweatshirt with a white Red Sox "B" logo 
on the front.  Jamal and Karon also borrowed hooded sweatshirts 
                     
 
3 In addition to his full-time job, Hector, one of the 
victims, worked part time as a doorman at a local bar.  Tony, 
the other victim, managed that bar, and supplemented his income 
by selling small "dime bag" quantities of marijuana from the 
townhouse in Lowell where the brothers and their housemates 
lived. 
7 
 
 
from the defendant. 
Before leaving, Jamal asked to borrow the defendant's 
"burner" (gun).  At first, the defendant hesitated, stating his 
concern that something might happen to his gun.  Hernandez and 
Karon then urged the defendant to allow Jamal to borrow the gun, 
promising that "nothing's going to happen to it."  The defendant 
eventually gave Jamal a .380 pistol that had been stored 
underneath his bed. 
Jamal, Karon, Hernandez, and Silva left the defendant's 
apartment and drove in Silva's Toyota Camry automobile to the 
victims' townhouse.  Silva drove, and Jamal gave directions.  
After Silva parked on a nearby side street, Jamal, Karon, and 
Hernandez got out and approached the townhouse, while Silva 
waited in the vehicle.  Shortly after 1 A.M., the occupants of 
the townhouse heard loud banging on the front door.  From a 
fourth-floor window, Tony called out, "Who's there?"  A voice 
that sounded female responded "Nicole," or "Nicki."  Tony went 
downstairs and opened the front door.  His housemates heard a 
scuffle at the bottom of the stairs near the door, then Jamal 
and Hernandez chased Tony up the stairs into the second-floor 
living room. 
A visitor had been sleeping on the living room couch.  He 
saw Jamal threaten Tony with a gun, demanding, "Where's 
everything?"  Tony responded that "[a]ll [he] see[s] is dimes."  
8 
 
 
The visitor was unable to identify Jamal, whose face was 
obscured by a hooded sweatshirt.  Hector and one of his 
roommates, Brian Staples, headed downstairs from their third-
floor bedrooms and entered the living room.  At that point, 
Jamal had Tony in a headlock and was pointing the gun at his 
head.4  Hernandez rushed toward Staples, brandishing a gun, and 
ordered him upstairs.  Staples and Hector ran upstairs to hide.  
Tony managed to break free from Jamal and also ran up the 
stairs.  Jamal and Hernandez followed him. 
From his hiding place, Staples heard Hector's door being 
kicked in, followed by an argument, and then gunshots.  Once the 
shooting stopped, Hector was found lying face up on his bed, 
gasping for air.  He had been shot three times and shortly 
thereafter died of multiple gunshot wounds.  Tony, fatally shot 
in the abdomen, managed to stagger to the fourth floor, where he 
was treated at the scene before he died.  Police recovered five 
nine millimeter cartridge casings from Hector's bedroom. 
After the gunshots, Jamal and Hernandez ran outside, 
cheering and exchanging "high fives."  They met up with Karon 
and Silva, and drove back to the defendant's apartment.  En 
                     
 
4 Jamal and Hernandez told Silva, the getaway driver, that  
Staples had been unable to see the face of the person who 
grabbed Tony because the assailant "had the hood on."  Staples, 
however, had been able to see a portion of the other intruder's 
face.  He described the individual as dark skinned with a 
scruffy goatee, and later identified Hernandez from a 
photographic array. 
9 
 
 
route to the apartment, Jamal and Hernandez informed Karon that 
they had been unable to steal anything.  Jamal remarked that 
Hernandez was a good shot, and Hernandez responded, "Yeah, once 
I seen them jump on you, I just started shooting."  Jamal 
returned the defendant's gun to him.  Hernandez asked the 
defendant if he could leave his own gun at the defendant's 
apartment.  When the defendant said no, Hernandez gave the gun 
to Hill, and told him to put it in the trunk of the Honda Civic.  
Jamal, Karon, and Hernandez removed the borrowed sweatshirts and 
left them in the defendant's living room. 
Within an hour of the shootings, Lowell police spotted 
Hernandez driving the green Honda Civic that had been used in 
the earlier robbery.  They stopped the vehicle, arrested 
Hernandez and Hill, and found the gun Hernandez had used in the 
shooting hidden in the trunk. 
 
Detectives interviewed the defendant on October 24 and 
25, 2009.  He initially told police that he had purchased a .380 
handgun "for protection," which he kept under his mattress.  
Eventually, the defendant admitted to having given this gun to 
Hernandez and the other men on the evening of the shootings.  
The defendant first said that he did not know what Hernandez and 
the other men were going to do with the gun.  Eventually he 
stated that he believed they were going to rob someone, based on 
conversations that he overheard inside his apartment and the 
10 
 
 
fact that Hernandez had robbed two women earlier that evening. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on two 
counts charging murder in the first degree in the deaths of 
Hector and Tony Delgado, home invasion, unlawful possession of a 
firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition.  The defendant 
was tried before a Superior Court jury on the theory of felony-
murder with the underlying offenses of attempted armed robbery 
and home invasion as the predicate felonies.  The jury convicted 
the defendant on all charges. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant's primary argument on appeal 
is that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence 
to prove that he participated in the underlying felonies, i.e., 
that he shared the intent of the other participants to commit an 
armed robbery.  He also argues that the judge erroneously 
instructed the jury on the issues of shared intent and 
accomplice liability; portions of the prosecutor's opening 
statement and closing argument were improper; the judge abused 
her discretion by allowing the introduction of evidence of 
uncharged misconduct; and, during voir dire, the judge asked 
potential jurors an impermissible question.  The defendant 
contends also that this court should abolish the felony-murder 
rule.  In addition, he asks us to exercise our extraordinary 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reverse the murder 
convictions as against the weight of evidence.  We address each 
11 
 
 
argument in turn. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In reviewing the denial 
of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we apply the 
familiar Latimore standard.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  "[The] question is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. 
at 677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  
Under this standard of review, we resolve issues of witness 
credibility in favor of the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. 
Dilone, 385 Mass. 281, 286 (1982).  In determining whether a 
reasonable jury could find each element of the crime charged, we 
also do not weigh the supporting evidence against conflicting 
evidence.  Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005). 
 
To convict the defendant of felony-murder on a theory of 
accomplice liability, the Commonwealth was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly 
participated in the commission of one of the underlying 
felonies, alone or with others, with the intent required for 
that offense.5  Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 
                     
 
5 As for the substantive offenses, to support a finding of 
guilt of armed robbery requires proof that the defendant (or an 
accomplice) while armed with a dangerous weapon assaulted the 
victim and took money or property from the victim with the 
12 
 
 
(2009).  See Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 621 (2015) 
(Commonwealth required to prove defendant's "knowing 
participation in some manner in the commission of the offense" 
together with shared intent); Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 
245, 253 (2013) (court considers whether defendant actively 
participated in events leading to victims' deaths); Marshall v. 
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 536-537 (2012) (conduct that 
historically had been described as accessory before fact 
"plainly falls under the rubric of accomplice liability").  In 
this case, where the predicate felonies were attempted armed 
robbery and armed home invasion, the Commonwealth also was 
required to prove that the defendant knew that one of his 
accomplices possessed a firearm.  Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 
Mass. 24, 31 (2014). 
 
Knowing participation in a criminal offense "may take any 
of several forms," and includes providing "aid or assistance in 
committing the crime."  Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 470 (Appendix).  
To establish guilt on a theory of accomplice liability, the 
                                                                  
intent (or shared intent) to steal it.  Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 710 (2016).  An attempt is defined as: 
(1) an intent to commit the underlying crime; (2) an overt act 
towards its commission, and (3) nonachievement of the 
substantive crime.  Commonwealth v. Van Bell, 455 Mass. 408, 412 
(2009).  To prove armed home invasion, the Commonwealth must 
establish that the defendant (or his accomplice) entered a 
dwelling, while armed with a dangerous weapon, and "use[d] force 
or threaten[ed] the imminent use of force upon any person within 
such dwelling."  Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 29 (2016), 
quoting G. L. c. 265, § 18C. 
13 
 
 
Commonwealth is not required to prove that a defendant was 
physically present at the scene of the offense.  Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 424 Mass. 853, 858-859 (1997).  A defendant may be 
convicted as a coventurer when he or she is not present at the 
scene of a crime "so long as the jury [find] [that the 
defendant] had actually associated [himself or herself] with the 
criminal venture and assisted in making it a success."  
Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 690 n.13 (2001), 
quoting Ortiz, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 
303, 310 (2013) ("[C]omplicity in the underlying felony is 
sufficient to establish guilt of [felony-murder] if the homicide 
followed naturally and probably from the carrying out of the 
joint enterprise" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Benitez, 
464 Mass. 686, 690 n.6 (2013) ("a person need not be physically 
present at the scene of the crime in order to participate as a 
joint venturer"). 
 
We do not agree with the defendant's contention that the 
evidence, at best, established that he was present inside an 
apartment where others planned a robbery, and that his mere 
"acquiescence in a request to produce clothing or a firearm does 
not confer joint venture liability."  There was sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in 
the predicate felonies.  He was present in his apartment when 
14 
 
 
Jamal and Karon openly solicited others to help rob "the pretty 
big" "Puerto Rican guy."  Hernandez agreed to join the robbery, 
announced that he would use his own gun, and retrieved it from 
its hiding place inside the defendant's kitchen cabinet.  Jamal 
then asked to borrow the defendant's gun.  The defendant 
expressed concern over the possibility that something would 
happen to it.  Karon and Hernandez urged the defendant to lend 
the gun to Jamal, assuring him, "Nothing is going to happen to 
it."  The defendant agreed and gave Jamal the gun. 
In his statement to police, the defendant admitted that he 
gave the gun to Hernandez and the other men knowing that it was 
going to be used in a robbery.  See Benitez, 464 Mass. at 690 
(act of providing accomplice with gun supports finding that 
defendant knowingly and actively participated in armed robbery); 
Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 301 (2002) (defendant's 
participation in joint venture supported by evidence that he 
supplied firearm to shooter).  See also Commonwealth v. Gunter, 
427 Mass. 259, 261, 265 (1998) (defendant who remained in 
vehicle while his accomplices entered apartment and robbed rival 
drug dealers actively participated in felony-murder).  The jury 
also reasonably could have found that the defendant gave hooded 
sweatshirts to his accomplices to help them avoid detection.  
Prior to the robbery, Hernandez asked the defendant for a hooded 
sweatshirt so that he could "hide his face."  The defendant 
15 
 
 
provided Hernandez with a hooded sweatshirt with a front zipper.  
When Hernandez complained that the zipper was broken, and that 
some part of his shirt would be visible, the defendant gave him 
a pullover-style hooded sweatshirt.  Jamal and Karon also 
borrowed hooded sweatshirts from the defendant.  After the 
robbery, Hernandez, Karon, and Jamal drove directly to the 
defendant's apartment and returned the sweatshirts to him rather 
than wearing them in public. 
 
It is also reasonable to infer that the instruments 
supplied by the defendant played an important role in the 
underlying crimes of attempted armed robbery and home invasion.  
Jamal, armed with the defendant's pistol, forced his way into 
the Delgados' townhouse.  See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 
686, 702-703 (2003) (circumstances may dictate that weapon is 
necessary to overcome anticipated resistance from victims).  
Once inside, Jamal used the gun to threaten Tony and demand 
money and drugs.  Further, the hooded sweatshirts provided by 
the defendant hindered the ability of the other occupants of the 
townhouse to identify the intruders. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the jury reasonably could have 
found that the defendant was an active participant in the 
commission of the underlying felonies. 
 
b.  Jury instructions.  The defendant contends that three 
of the judge's instructions concerning shared intent and 
16 
 
 
accomplice liability were erroneous.  First, he argues that the 
judge's instruction on intent and shared intent shifted the 
burden of proof by imposing a "mandatory rebuttable 
presumption," which instructed the jury that the defendant's 
conduct "necessarily indicated [his] knowledge and support of 
every aspect of criminal conduct that occurred."  Second, he 
argues that it was error for the judge to refer to the theory of 
accomplice liability while instructing on the substantive felony 
charges.  Third, he argues that the judge misstated the burden 
of proof.  Because there was no objection to these instructions, 
we review these claims to determine whether there was error and, 
if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 
681 (1992). 
 
We turn first to the defendant's argument that the 
instruction on intent impermissibly shifted the Commonwealth's 
burden of proof to him.  The defendant characterizes the 
following jury instructions as having created an impermissible 
"mandatory rebuttable presumption": 
 
"[Y]ou may determine the defendant's intent from any 
statement or act committed or omitted and from all the 
other circumstances that indicate a state of mind provided 
first you find that any or all such circumstances occurred. 
 
 
"Now, the jury may but not need necessarily infer from 
the conduct of a person that he intended the natural and 
probabl[e] consequences of his own acts. 
 
17 
 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"[T]he Commonwealth must also prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that at the time the defendant knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime and, as I've 
indicated, the felonies involved are attempted armed 
robbery and home invasion, that he possessed or shared the 
intent required for that crime.  And when I define the 
essential elements, I'm going to be telling you what the 
intent is.  You're permitted but not required to infer the 
defendant's mental state or intent, from his knowledge of 
the circumstances and any subsequent participation in the 
crime.  The inferences you draw must be reasonable and you 
may rely upon your experience and common sense in 
determining the defendant's knowledge or intent." 
 
 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires the Commonwealth to prove 
every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  
"Instructions to the jury that would lead them to believe 
otherwise are constitutional error."  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 
Mass. 741, 752 (2010), citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510, 521 (1979).  See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 
(1985) (due process clause prohibits use of evidentiary 
presumption that relieves government of its burden).  An 
instruction that the jury reasonably could have interpreted as a 
mandatory presumption violates due process and cannot stand.  
See DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246, 252 (1980).  By 
contrast, there is no constitutional infirmity where a jury 
instruction creates only a permissive inference.  Id. at 253.  
See Commonwealth v. Ely, 388 Mass. 69, 76 (1983) (permissive 
18 
 
 
inference that allows jury to infer elemental fact from proof by 
prosecutor of another fact does not shift burden of proof). 
 
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Francis, 471 
U.S. at 313, the analysis is relatively straightforward -- a 
reviewing court must determine whether the challenged portion of 
an instruction created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption 
or merely a permissive inference.  In this case, we conclude 
that the instructions on intent created permissive inferences.  
The judge did not instruct the jury that they were to presume 
that certain facts were proved, or that they were required to 
reach a particular conclusion.  Compare id. at 316 (instruction 
that person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend 
natural and probable consequences of his or her actions is 
mandatory presumption "cast in the language of command"); 
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 217-218 (2007) 
(instruction that person is presumed to intend natural and 
probable consequences of his or her acts improperly shifts 
burden of proof to defendant). 
 
To the contrary, here, rather than being "cast in the 
language of command," the challenged instructions were 
permissive.  The judge instructed that intent and knowledge 
ordinarily cannot be proved by direct evidence, and then added, 
"[Y]ou may determine the defendant's intent from any statement 
or act committed or omitted and from all the other circumstances 
19 
 
 
that indicate a state of mind provided first you find that any 
or all such circumstances occurred" (emphasis supplied).  She 
then continued, "[T]he jury may but not need necessarily infer 
from the conduct of a person that he intended the natural and 
probabl[e] consequences of his own acts" (emphasis supplied).  
The judge instructed as follows on shared intent:  "You're 
permitted but not required to infer the defendant's mental state 
or intent, from his knowledge of the circumstances and any 
subsequent participation in the crime" (emphasis supplied).  See 
Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646, 651 (1st Cir. 1990) (words "you 
may infer" clearly indicated that inferences of malice and 
intent were permissive). 
 
Such permissive intent instructions do not run up against a 
defendant's right to due process.  See Commonwealth v. Van 
Winkle, 443 Mass. 230, 239 (2005) (no error in instruction that 
"jury may infer, though it is not required to do so, that a 
person intends the natural and probable consequences of an act 
that is knowingly done"); Ely, 388 Mass. at 76 (instruction that 
permits, but does not require, jury to infer intent does not 
violate due process).  Indeed, the inferences on permissive 
intent also are included in the model jury instructions on 
homicide, explaining shared intent:  "You are permitted, but not 
required, to infer the defendant's mental state or intent from 
his [or her] knowledge of the circumstances or any subsequent 
20 
 
 
participation in the crime."  Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide 15 (2013).  A similar instruction is included in the 
instruction concerning the intentional use of a dangerous 
weapon:  "As a general rule, you are permitted (but not 
required) to infer that a person who intentionally uses a 
dangerous weapon on another person intends to kill that person 
. . . ."  Id. at 92. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's instructions on 
attempted armed robbery and home invasion were erroneous because 
she improperly linked the phrase "aider and abettor" with the 
definition of the elements of the underlying offenses.  The 
defendant contends that "[t]hese instructions were confusing and 
implied that the jury should presume that the defendant was an 
aider and abettor, with the requisite knowledge and intent 
pertaining to home invasion and attempted armed robbery."  There 
was no error. 
 
Before defining the elements of each underlying offense, 
the judge explained, "[W]henever I say the defendant, I always 
mean as an aider or abettor or a joint venturer."6  In Zanetti, 
                     
 
6 For example, at the beginning of her instructions on home 
invasion, the judge explained: 
 
 
"To prove the defendant guilty of the crime of home 
invasion, the Commonwealth must convince you the jury of 
four elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  That the 
defendant as an aider and abettor unlawfully entered the 
dwelling house of another.  In other words, he doesn't have 
21 
 
 
454 Mass. at 468 n.22, we recommended that judges incorporate 
the concept of accessory liability within their instructions on 
substantive offenses.  Here, the judge properly and consistently 
instructed the jury that the Commonwealth bore the burden to 
prove that the defendant knowingly participated in the predicate 
offense, with the requisite shared intent. 
 
In his third claim of error in the instructions, the 
defendant argues that the judge made a misstatement at the end 
of her instructions on the predicate offenses, when she said, 
"If after your consideration of all the evidence you find the 
Commonwealth has not proven any one of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt you must find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree."  This misstatement was a clear slip of the 
tongue that went unnoticed by the judge and by the attorneys.  
Throughout her comprehensive charge, the judge properly 
instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and the 
Commonwealth's burden of proving each essential element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, the misstatement was 
isolated, and did not result in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 
837, 844-845 (2006). 
 
c.  Prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.  
                                                                  
to physically go there himself if he aided/abetted the 
entry." 
22 
 
 
The defendant maintains that the prosecutor misstated the 
evidence, both in her opening statement and in her closing 
argument.  For instance, the defendant points to the 
prosecutor's asserted improper argument that the defendant 
"planned and executed" the attempted armed robbery and the home 
invasion.  The defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated 
the evidence by arguing that "but for" the defendant's 
participation, the crimes would not have occurred. 
We begin with the prosecutor's opening statement.  Because 
defense counsel timely objected, we review for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997). 
The purpose of an opening statement is to "outline in a 
general way the nature of the case which the counsel expects to 
be able to prove or support by evidence" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 454 (1978).  Here, the 
prosecutor's opening statement did not exceed the bounds of 
propriety.  She used a sports analogy to explain the 
Commonwealth's theory of the case, stating that the defendant 
had been part of a team that planned and executed a botched home 
invasion.  She emphasized that each team member played a 
particular role, and that the defendant contributed to the team 
effort by supplying a firearm and some clothing needed for 
disguise.  The prosecutor also argued that the team effort 
ultimately resulted in the deaths of the Delgado brothers.  The 
23 
 
 
prosecutor's characterization of the defendant's role in the 
shootings as the person who allegedly provided "that .380 gun 
and hoodies to the team" did not misstate the evidence. 
 
The defendant raises a similar argument with respect to the 
prosecutor's closing, which carried on the sports analogy.  
Since trial counsel did not object, we consider whether any of 
the challenged statements was improper and, if so, whether it 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 626-627 (2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016). 
 
In closing, the prosecutor urged the jury to draw an 
inference, based on the evidence, that the defendant knew about 
the intended robbery and was an active participant in it.  She 
pointed out that the defendant was aware that Hernandez had 
robbed two women earlier in the evening, the defendant was 
present when the men discussed robbing the two victims, and he 
knew that Hernandez would be bringing his gun to the robbery.  
The prosecutor described the defendant's role as providing "the 
tools to the rest of the team to effectuate this armed robbery 
and home invasion."  This was not beyond the bounds of 
permissible advocacy. 
The defendant contends also that a portion of the 
prosecutor's closing argument misstated the evidence.  While 
discussing Hernandez's attempt to hide his gun in the 
24 
 
 
defendant's apartment after the attempted robbery, the 
prosecutor said the defendant "knew that that gun was just used 
in a crime.  The crime that he helped plan."  The defendant 
maintains that this statement "reiterated the false theme that 
[he] was a planner whose role was critical."  In the context of 
the closing argument as a whole, however, see Commonwealth v. 
Foxworth, 473 Mass. 149, 161 (2015), this isolated statement was 
unlikely to have prejudiced the defendant.  Throughout the 
trial, the prosecutor clearly proceeded on the theory that the 
defendant was liable because he had supplied necessary 
instruments that facilitated the commission of the underlying 
felonies, just as she presented his role on the "team" in her 
opening statement.7 
 
d.  Evidence of uncharged prior misconduct.  The defendant 
maintains that the judge abused her discretion in allowing the 
introduction of evidence of the prior armed robbery, as well as 
photographs showing the defendant and an accomplice brandishing 
handguns.  The defendant argues that this evidence "overwhelmed" 
the case with unfair prejudice.  This argument is unavailing. 
                     
 
7 The defendant also argues that the prosecutor misstated 
the evidence by arguing that Jamal entered the townhouse because 
he was armed with the defendant's pistol; Hernandez participated 
in the robbery because he wore a hoodie supplied by the 
defendant; and nobody would have entered the townhouse unless 
the defendant had supplied a firearm and disguises.  There was 
no error.  The Commonwealth was entitled to analyze the evidence 
and suggest reasonable inferences that the jury could draw from 
that evidence.  Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 333 (2015). 
25 
 
 
Evidence of a defendant's prior or subsequent bad acts is 
not admissible to show "bad character or criminal propensity."  
Commonwealth v. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 712 (2016).  It may be 
admissible, however, where it is relevant for another purpose, 
such as to establish a "common scheme, pattern of operation, 
absence of accident or mistake, identity, intent, or motive."  
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224-225 (1986).  We 
review questions of admissibility, probative value, and unfair 
prejudice for abuse of discretion, id. at 229, and do not 
disturb a trial judge's decision absent a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the relevant factors.  See L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  In deciding 
whether to allow the admission of such evidence, a judge must 
decide whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014). 
In the circumstances here, the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning 
the armed robbery earlier in the afternoon on the day of the 
killing, while the defendant waited in the vehicle; such 
evidence was probative of Hernandez's intent to rob the Delgado 
brothers, and the defendant's shared intent to participate in 
that crime by supplying the guns and the means for potential 
disguise.  Indeed, in his statement to police, the defendant 
26 
 
 
admitted that, as a result of the earlier robbery, he believed 
Hernandez and the others intended to commit another armed 
robbery at the time he handed them his gun. 
We also discern no error in the introduction of the 
photographs showing the defendant brandishing his gun.  The 
photographs were introduced to establish his access to a weapon 
that was used in the commission of the underlying felonies -- 
the armed home invasion and the attempted armed robbery.  See 
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450 (2015) (judge has 
discretion to admit evidence that defendant previously possessed 
weapon that could have been used to commit crime); Commonwealth 
v. Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 353 (2013) (information about 
defendant's possession of firearms admissible where connected to 
commission of crime).  The photographs, which were taken a few 
weeks before the shootings, showed the defendant and Hernandez 
displaying their respective weapons.  Because both guns were 
introduced in evidence, the prejudicial impact of the 
photographs was minimal. 
 
e.  Jury voir dire.  During a pretrial hearing, the judge 
informed counsel that she intended to ask the venire a question 
concerning joint venture liability.  Defense counsel responded, 
"Yes, I think that would be fine, Judge."  At trial, the judge 
asked potential jurors, "Is there anything about the concept of 
aiding and abetting that would prohibit your ability to listen 
27 
 
 
and apply the law as I will explain it to you at the conclusion 
of the trial and be a fair and impartial juror?"  The defendant 
did not object. 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that this question 
reduced the Commonwealth's burden of proof and "ensur[ed] a jury 
predisposed to find [him] guilty."  Because the issue is 
unpreserved, we review to determine whether asking the question 
was erroneous and, if so, whether it created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Wright, 411 Mass. at 
681. 
During jury selection, a judge is required to "examine 
jurors fully regarding possible bias or prejudice where 'it 
appears that there is a substantial risk that jurors may be 
influenced by factors extraneous to the evidence presented to 
them.'"  Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 688 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Garuti, 454 Mass. 48, 52 (2009).  The 
judge may ask questions designed to "determine whether jurors 
[can] set aside their own opinions, weigh the evidence . . . , 
and follow the instructions of the judge."  Commonwealth v. 
Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 501 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 495 (2005).  The scope of jury voir dire 
is committed to the judge's sound discretion, and we will uphold 
the judge's questioning "absent a clear showing of abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 338 (2013), 
28 
 
 
quoting Perez, supra at 689, and cases cited. 
 
We do not share the defendant's view that the disputed 
question predisposed the jury to convict the defendant.  A 
question may not be introduced if it "commit[ted] the jury to a 
verdict in advance" or "[had] the effect of identifying and 
selecting jurors who were predisposed to convicting the 
defendant based on evidence the Commonwealth would present."  
Gray, 465 Mass. at 339, quoting Perez, 460 Mass. at 691.  Here, 
the judge sought to identify jurors who were unwilling or unable 
to follow her instructions regarding accomplice liability.  
Indeed, one potential juror reported, "I have more qualms about 
aiding and abetting being charged as a murder case."  That juror 
was excused without objection. 
 
At the beginning of jury selection, the judge provided the 
members of the venire with a preliminary instruction that the 
Commonwealth was required to prove each essential element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  In addition, the judge 
instructed that it was the Commonwealth's burden to prove joint 
venture liability by establishing that the defendant knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime with the requisite 
intent to commit that crime.  After jury selection, the judge 
properly instructed the seated jury a number of times that, in 
order for them to find the defendant guilty of felony-murder, 
the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant aided 
29 
 
 
and abetted at least one of the underlying felonies.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. at 341 (court considers issues 
raised by question to venire in context with judge's conduct of 
entire empanelment and judge's legal instructions on topic).  We 
conclude that the judge had discretion to ask the venire a 
question regarding their ability to follow her legal 
instructions, and that the defendant has failed to demonstrate a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
f.  Abolition of the felony-murder rule.  The felony-murder 
rule "imposes criminal liability for homicide on all 
participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death 
occurred in the course of that enterprise."  Hanright, 466 Mass. 
at 307, quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 
(1982).  The defendant invites the court to abolish the felony-
murder rule, arguing that it is arbitrary and unjust, and in 
violation of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
According to the defendant, the imposition of felony-murder 
liability is contrary to the fundamental notion that an 
individual is culpable for his or her own misconduct. 
Felony-murder is a common-law crime.8  See Matchett, 386 
                     
 
8 Felony-murder also falls within the province of G. L. 
c. 265, § 1, which establishes two degrees of murder.  That 
statute provides:  "Murder committed with deliberately 
premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime 
punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the 
30 
 
 
Mass. at 502.  The felony-murder rule imposes criminal liability 
"on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if 
a death occurred in the course of that enterprise."  
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978).  "'The 
effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and 
accomplices, 'is to substitute the intent to commit the 
underlying felony for the malice aforethought required for 
murder.'"  Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307, quoting Matchett, supra. 
We consistently have rejected the argument that the felony-
murder rule is unconstitutional, see Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 
Mass. 644, 649-650 (1982), and Watkins, 375 Mass. at 486-487, or 
that it relieves the Commonwealth of its obligation to prove a 
defendant's own moral culpability.  See Hanright, 466 Mass. at 
307-310; Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 307 (1973) ("A 
broad conception of complicity is indeed at work in the special 
field of so called felony-murder . . ."). 
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 
277 (2015), we considered the continued viability of the common-
law felony-murder rule, but did not reach the issue.  Discussing 
the scope of vicarious liability, we noted that felony-murder is 
                                                                  
first degree.  Murder which does not appear to be in the first 
degree is murder in the second degree."  General Laws c. 265, 
§ 1, was enacted to "mitigate the harshness of the common law 
rule imposing a mandatory death penalty on all murderers." 
Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 8 (2002), discussing 
Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 803-805 (1977) 
(Quirico, J., concurring). 
31 
 
 
an exception to the general rule that "[o]ne is punished for his 
own blameworthy conduct, not that of others" (citation omitted).  
Id. at 276.  Under the felony-murder rule, "a person who 
knowingly participates in one crime as part of a joint venture 
is 'ipso facto also guilty' of [murder] committed by an 
accomplice in furtherance of the joint venture."  Id.  We 
discern no reason to deviate from our decisions in Moran and 
Watkins, and to accept the defendant's invitation that we 
abolish the felony-murder rule. 
 
g.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant asks 
also that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to grant him a new trial because the felony-murder verdicts, "as 
indicated by the prosecutor's reliance on innuendo and 
misrepresentation," were against the weight of the evidence.  We 
have carefully reviewed the entire record pursuant to our duty 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and conclude that the verdicts of 
felony-murder were neither contrary to our joint venture felony-
murder jurisprudence nor against the weight of the evidence. 
 
Our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, however, also 
requires us to consider whether the convictions of murder in the 
first degree are consonant with justice.  Commonwealth v. Gould, 
380 Mass. 672, 680 (1980).  "If upon our examination of the 
facts, we should, in our discretion, be of [the] opinion that 
there was a miscarriage of justice in convicting the defendant 
32 
 
 
of murder in the first degree, and that a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the second degree or of manslaughter would have been 
more consonant with justice, it is now our power and duty so to 
declare."  Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109 (1963).  
The authority granted us under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, includes the 
discretion to reduce a conviction of felony-murder in the first 
degree in circumstances where the jury do not have that option.  
Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 10 (2002) (it is left to 
court's authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and is not within 
jury's role in reaching verdict, to reduce felony-murder in 
first degree to felony-murder in second degree). 
 
We are cognizant that the court's authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, should be used sparingly and with restraint.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lannon, 364 Mass. 480, 486 (1974).  The court 
does not serve as a second jury.  Commonwealth v. Prendergast, 
385 Mass. 625, 638 (1982).  Moreover, the doctrines of felony-
murder and joint venture liability "are well established and 
should not be undermined on an ad hoc basis."  Commonwealth v. 
Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 298 (1978). 
 
Nonetheless, we have recognized that "the doctrines of 
felony-murder and joint venture may, on some hypothetical fact 
patterns, produce a conviction of murder in the first degree 
that would appear out of proportion to a defendant's 
culpability."  Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 (2003). 
33 
 
 
Here, by contrast, the defendant was involved in the "remote 
outer fringes" of the attempted armed robbery and armed home 
invasion.  See id.  As discussed, the defendant should be held 
liable for felony-murder as a supplier of a firearm and clothing 
utilized by his cohorts in the commission of the underlying 
felonies.  Having carefully reviewed the facts and circumstances 
of this case, we conclude that the defendant's conduct, as an 
individual who participated on the "remote outer fringes" of the 
joint venture, makes verdicts of murder in the second degree 
more consonant with justice. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The verdicts of murder in the first degree 
and the sentences imposed are vacated and set aside.  The matter 
is remanded to the Superior Court where verdicts of guilty of 
murder in the second degree are to be entered, and the defendant 
is to be sentenced accordingly.  The defendant's remaining 
convictions are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lenk, Hines, and Budd, 
JJ., join).  I agree with the court that, where the defendant's 
only participation in the crimes was to provide a firearm and 
hooded sweatshirts to his friends, knowing they intended to use 
them in the commission of an armed robbery, convictions of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder are 
not consonant with justice.  I write separately to explore how 
our common law of felony-murder led to convictions of murder in 
the first degree that are not consonant with justice, and to 
explain why it is time for us to narrow the scope of liability 
for that common-law crime.  I believe that, in the future, a 
defendant should not be convicted of murder without proof of one 
of the three prongs of malice:  that he or she intended to kill 
or to cause grievous bodily harm, or intended to do an act 
which, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable 
person would have known created a plain and strong likelihood 
that death would result.  I also believe that we should abandon 
the fiction of constructive malice -- that where a killing 
occurs in the commission of a felony, the intent to commit the 
felony is sufficient alone to establish malice. 
 
As noted in the opinion of the court, following the 
issuance of this concurring opinion, which is joined by three 
other Justices, a conviction of felony-murder will require a 
finding of actual malice, not merely constructive malice.  As a 
2 
 
 
result, felony-murder will no longer be an independent theory of 
liability for murder.  Rather, felony-murder will be limited to 
its statutory role under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating 
element of murder, permitting a jury to find a defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree where the murder was neither 
premeditated nor committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty but 
was committed in the course of a felony punishable by life 
imprisonment. 
 
The court correctly concludes that, under our existing 
common law, the defendant committed felony-murder in the first 
degree:  he knowingly aided and abetted the commission of a life 
felony (attempted armed robbery and home invasion), in which his 
accomplices killed two victims.  Under our existing common law 
of felony-murder, it is legally irrelevant that the defendant 
was not present at the scene of the attempted armed robbery; he 
is criminally responsible for every act resulting in death 
committed by his accomplices during the attempted commission of 
the armed robbery.  See Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 
272 (2015).  It is also legally irrelevant that he did not share 
his accomplices' intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm 
during the attempt; his intent to commit the armed robbery 
substitutes for the malice aforethought generally required for 
murder.  Id.  Because the underlying crimes were both felonies 
punishable by life in prison, the jury properly were not 
3 
 
 
instructed on felony-murder in the second degree, because the 
evidence did not permit such a verdict.  See Commonwealth v. 
Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 10 (2002).  In short, under our existing 
common law of felony-murder, the jury reached the correct 
verdicts.  Indeed, guilty verdicts of murder in the first degree 
on the theory of felony-murder are the only verdicts they 
reasonably could have reached on this evidence.  It is not the 
fault of the jury that the verdicts they reached are not 
consonant with justice; it is the fault of our common law of 
felony-murder.1 
                     
 
1 It should not escape notice that this is the first time we 
have exercised our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce a conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory 
of felony-murder to murder in the second degree where the 
evidence more than sufficed to support the verdict.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 n.19 (2003) ("This 
court has reduced convictions of murder in the first degree 
predicated on felony-murder only where the evidence suggested 
that the felony intended by the defendant would not suffice for 
felony-murder in the first degree").  Until now, "[t]his court's 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, has never been exercised to 
relieve a defendant of the consequences of participation in a 
felony that does qualify as the predicate for felony-murder in 
the first degree."  Id.  In Rolon, we declared: 
 
 
"We recognize that the doctrines of felony-murder and 
joint venture may, on some hypothetical fact patterns, 
produce a conviction of murder in the first degree that 
would appear out of proportion to a defendant's 
culpability.  It may in some circumstances seem harsh to 
convict a defendant of murder in the first degree if the 
defendant was on the remote outer fringes of a joint 
venture to commit some felony that satisfied the felony-
murder rule in only some hypertechnical way." 
 
4 
 
 
 
We have long recognized that "[t]he common law felony-
murder rule is of questionable origin."  Commonwealth v. 
Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12 (1982).  A look at the early 
English law reveals that there was no precedent in English cases 
for what we now refer to as "felony-murder."  Professor Guyora 
Binder, in an exhaustive analysis of the origins of American 
felony-murder rules, concluded: 
 
"By the time of the American Revolution, the rule that 
an accidental death in the course of any felony was murder 
had become a standard theme in scholarly writing about the 
common law of homicide . . . .  Yet no English court had 
ever actually applied such a rule. . . .  By the end of the 
eighteenth century, some judges thought cofelons were 
automatically implicated in any murder committed in attempt 
of a felony, but most judges required participation in or 
encouragement of the act causing death." 
 
Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 Stan. L. 
Rev. 59, 98 (2004).  An analysis of early American cases leads 
to a similar conclusion -- in most instances murder liability 
was imposed only where there was independent proof of malice.  
See id. at 193-194. 
                                                                  
Id. at 824.  But in Rolon we simply assumed, "without deciding, 
that reduction of a verdict in such circumstances could be 
appropriate under [Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 
Mass. 1502 (1995)]."  Id.  We did not need to decide that issue 
because we determined that the case did "not present such 
circumstances."  Id.  Here, it is not accurate to say that the 
defendant's conduct constituted felony-murder "in only some 
hypertechnical way."  However, the court correctly recognizes 
that a conviction of murder in the first degree, with its 
mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole, is not consonant with justice where the defendant's role 
was limited to providing a firearm and hooded sweatshirts to his 
accomplices for the commission of an armed robbery. 
5 
 
 
 
The absence of any clear preexisting concept of "felony-
murder" also becomes evident when examining the provenance of 
the Massachusetts murder statute.  In 1784, Massachusetts 
enacted a statute providing "[t]hat whosoever shall commit 
wilful murder, of malice aforethought, . . . shall suffer the 
pains of death."  St. 1784, c. 44.  It was only in 1858 that the 
Massachusetts Legislature established two degrees of murder, and 
provided that the degree of murder is to be found by the jury.  
St. 1858, c. 154, §§ 1, 2.  "The legislative documents that 
precede the enactment of St. 1858, c. 154, suggest that murder 
was divided into degrees largely to mitigate the harshness of 
the common law rule imposing a mandatory death penalty on all 
murderers."  Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 803 
(1977) (Quirico, J., concurring).  Murder in the first degree, 
punishable by death, was defined as "[m]urder, committed with 
deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or in the 
commission of an attempt to commit any crime punishable with 
imprisonment for life, or committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty."  St. 1858, c. 154, § 1.  This statute is described by 
Professor Binder as a "felony aggravator statute," in that it 
provided that where a defendant committed "murder" and where 
that murder was committed in the attempt to commit a life 
felony, the murder was murder in the first degree regardless of 
whether it was premeditated or committed with extreme atrocity 
6 
 
 
or cruelty.  See Binder, supra at 120.  The statute did not 
define "murder" and did not declare that a person is guilty of 
murder whenever a death occurs during the commission of a 
felony; the elements of murder liability continued to rest in 
the domain of the common law.  See People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 
672, 721 (1980) ("[t]he use of the term 'murder' in the first-
degree statute requires that a murder must first be established 
before the statute is applied to elevate the degree"). 
 
It is not surprising that the first Massachusetts statute 
that refers to murder in the commission of a felony treated it 
simply as an aggravating element that made the murder worthy of 
the death penalty.  In the vast majority of the cases where a 
victim was killed during the commission of a felony, the 
defendant had killed the victim in furtherance of the crime or 
to facilitate his or her escape, and intended to kill or to 
commit grievous bodily harm, so there was no need for a distinct 
theory of felony-murder that substituted the intent to commit 
the underlying felony for the malice necessary for a murder 
conviction.  In these cases, the killing already met the 
definition of murder.  See Binder, supra at 65-66.  Nor is it 
surprising that this statute included only "an attempt to commit 
any crime punishable with imprisonment for life," rather than 
7 
 
 
the commission of a completed crime.2  The law of attempt during 
this time period was still evolving, and felony-murder was a 
means to ensure that the attempt was appropriately punished 
where it resulted in death.  Id. at 92. 
 
The first Supreme Judicial Court case that specifically 
addressed the issue of liability for a death occurring during 
the commission of a felony (felony-murder liability3) was issued 
in 1863, five years after the enactment of the statute.  See 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 541 (1863).  In Campbell, a 
man was killed by a gun shot during a draft riot but it was not 
clear whether the shot was fired by a rioter or by a soldier who 
was defending the armory from the rioters.  Id. at 541, 543.  
The court considered the prosecutor's request for a jury 
instruction declaring that, if the defendant was a participant 
in the riot, and if the homicide occurred during the attack on 
the armory, the defendant "is in law guilty of manslaughter" 
even if the evidence fails to show whether the shot was fired by 
a rioter or a soldier.  Id. at 543.  The court held that the 
                     
 
2 The statute was revised in 1860 to include "[m]urder 
committed . . . in the commission of, or attempt to commit, any 
crime."  St. 1860, c. 160, § 1. 
 
 
3 In this opinion "felony-murder liability" refers to 
liability for murder absent independent proof of malice.  This 
is distinguishable from felony-murder as a statutory aggravator 
that merely elevates what would otherwise be murder in the 
second degree, based on proof of actual malice, to murder in the 
first degree where the killing occurred during the commission of 
a life felony -- the concept codified in G. L. c. 265, § 1. 
8 
 
 
jury should be instructed that the defendant is entitled to an 
acquittal unless the jury finds "beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the deceased was killed by means of a gun or other deadly weapon 
in the hands of the prisoner, or of one of the rioters with whom 
he was associated and acting."  Id. at 547-548.  The court 
reasoned that its conclusion flowed from the general rule of law 
"that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is 
legally responsible for all the consequences which may naturally 
or necessarily flow from it, and that, if he combines and 
confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose, he is 
liable [criminally] for the acts of each and all who participate 
with him in the execution of the unlawful design."  Id. at 543-
544.  But he is not criminally liable for acts that are not 
"committed by his own hand or by some one acting in concert with 
him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose."  Id. at 
544. 
 
The Campbell opinion identifies two principles of law on 
which our common law of felony-murder liability rests that we 
reject elsewhere in our criminal jurisprudence:  vicarious 
substantive criminal liability for every act committed by a 
joint venturer, and the conclusive presumption of malice from 
the intent to commit an inherently dangerous felony.  See 
Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 276 ("the common law of felony-murder is an 
9 
 
 
exception to two basic principles of our criminal 
jurisprudence").  I discuss each in turn. 
 
The first of these principles is the rule of law that a 
person engaged in a criminal joint venture is criminally liable 
for all of the acts of his or her accomplices committed in 
furtherance of the joint venture.  This rule was adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 
U.S. 640, 645-648 (1946), which held that a defendant may be 
found guilty of substantive offenses committed by his 
coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, even if he did 
not participate directly in the commission of those substantive 
offenses. 
 
We no longer adhere to this Pinkerton theory of accomplice 
liability.  See Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 47-49 
(1965) ("To be liable for the substantive offence, a 
coconspirator must participate or aid in the commission of it").  
We declared in Stasiun, supra at 48: 
 
"While it has been said that a conspiracy is a 
'partnership in crime' (United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 253 [(1940)]), that metaphor 
should not be pressed too far.  It does not follow that 
such a partnership is governed by the same principles of 
vicarious liability as would apply in civil cases.  Our 
criminal law is founded on the principle that guilt, for 
the more serious offences, is personal, not vicarious.  One 
is punished for his own blameworthy conduct, not that of 
others.  Perkins on Criminal Law, 550 [(1957)]. Sayre, 
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. 
L. Rev. 689 [(1930)]. . . .  To ignore the distinction 
between the crime of conspiracy and the substantive offence 
10 
 
 
would enable 'the government through the use of the 
conspiracy dragnet to convict a conspirator of every 
substantive offense committed by any other member of the 
group even though he had no part in it or even knowledge of 
it.'  United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 
[1940])." 
 
Under our common law of joint venture liability, a 
defendant is criminally responsible for a crime committed by an 
accomplice only where the defendant knowingly participates in 
the crime with the intent required to commit it.  See 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009).  But until 
now, we have retained one exception:  under our common law of 
felony-murder, a defendant was still vicariously responsible for 
all the acts of his or her accomplices that resulted in death 
committed during the course of the felony.  Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 
275-276.  The consequence of this exception was that, if an 
accomplice shot and killed a victim during the commission of an 
armed robbery, the defendant was guilty of felony-murder even if 
he or she sat outside in the getaway vehicle and had implored 
the accomplices to hurt no one in committing the crime.  
However, if the accomplice committed the same shooting but the 
victim survived, the defendant sitting in that getaway vehicle 
would have been guilty only of the underlying armed robbery, not 
of the shooting.  "Only where a dangerous felony result[ed] in 
death [did] we adopt a principle that we otherwise [had] 'firmly 
rejected' -- that a person who knowingly participates in one 
11 
 
 
crime as part of a joint venture is "ipso facto also guilty" of 
all other crimes committed by an accomplice in furtherance of 
the joint venture."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 
Mass. 299, 306 (1973).  See Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 
303, 307-310 (2013), quoting 2 W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal 
Law § 13.3 (b), at 362-363 (2d ed. 2003) ("we remain committed 
to the view that . . . A's guilt as an accomplice to one crime 
should not per se be a basis for holding A accountable for a 
related crime merely because the latter offense was carried out 
by A's principal"). 
 
The second principle set forth in Campbell, 7 Allen at 543 
-- "that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act 
is legally responsible for all the consequences which may 
naturally or necessarily flow from it" -- has evolved in our 
common law of felony-murder into a rule that, where a defendant 
commits an inherently dangerous felony, such as armed robbery, 
he or she is criminally responsible for the consequences of 
every act by a joint venturer during the commission of the 
felony where the consequence is death.  See Hanright, 466 Mass. 
at 307-310, citing Matchett, 386 Mass. at 502.  As a result of 
this rule, a defendant who participates in an armed robbery is 
guilty of felony-murder in the first degree if the defendant or 
an accomplice commits any act that results in death, even if the 
act is accidental and unintended.  As a result, although in 
12 
 
 
every other circumstance a killing constitutes murder only where 
it is committed with actual malice, where the killing occurs in 
the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, proof of 
actual malice is not required; a felony-murder conviction may 
rest on proof of constructive malice, which is defined simply as 
the intent to commit the underlying felony. 
 
We have noted that, in this regard, our common law of 
felony-murder is an exception to our general rule that "we 
require proof of a defendant's intent to commit the crime 
charged, and do not conclusively presume such intent from the 
intent to commit another crime."  Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 276.  In 
fact, we have said, "A felony-murder rule that punishes all 
homicides committed in the perpetration of a felony whether the 
death is intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the 
necessity of proving the relation of the perpetrator's state of 
mind to the homicide, violates the most fundamental principle of 
the criminal law -- 'criminal liability for causing a particular 
result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental 
state in respect to that result.'"  Matchett, 386 Mass. at 506-
507, quoting Aaron, 409 Mich. at 708. 
 
The consequence of this exception to "the most fundamental 
principle of the criminal law" is that, if a defendant drops his 
or her firearm and accidentally shoots someone during the 
commission of a felony, the defendant is guilty of both the 
13 
 
 
underlying felony and felony-murder if the shooting proves 
fatal.  But if the victim survives, the defendant is guilty only 
of the underlying felony, and is not criminally responsible for 
the shooting.  The defendant's liability for the shooting rests, 
not on the defendant's conduct, but on whether the victim lives 
or dies.  See, e.g., Hanright, 466 Mass. at 308-309 ("The intent 
to commit armed robbery, although sufficient to support 
liability for felony-murder on a theory of joint venture, is 
insufficient to support liability for" additional offenses 
against other, surviving police officers who attempted to 
apprehend accomplice); Richards, 363 Mass. at 302, 307-308 
(defendant who was waiting near getaway vehicle in armed robbery 
may be found guilty of assault with intent to murder police 
officer committed by accomplice only if defendant had specific 
intent to kill police officer). 
We have recognized that the application of the felony-
murder rule erodes "the relation between criminal liability and 
moral culpability."  Matchett, 386 Mass. at 507, quoting People 
v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783 (1965).  It is time for us to 
eliminate the last vestige of these two abandoned principles and 
end their application in our common law of felony-murder.  Doing 
so means that criminal liability for murder in the first or 
second degree will be predicated on proof that the defendant 
acted with malice or shared the intent of a joint venturer who 
14 
 
 
acted with malice.  The sole remaining function of felony-murder 
will be to elevate what would otherwise be murder in the second 
degree to murder in the first degree where the killing occurs 
during the commission of a life felony.4 
Thus, a defendant who commits an armed robbery as a joint 
venturer will be found guilty of murder where a killing was 
committed in the course of that robbery if he or she knowingly 
participated in the killing with the intent required to commit 
it -- that is, with the intent either to kill, to cause grievous 
bodily harm, or to do an act which, in the circumstances known 
to the defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a 
plain and strong likelihood that death would result.  Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 57 & n.131 (2013), citing Commonwealth 
v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 346-347 & n.9, 350 (2010), and 
Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 470 n.1, 472 n.4 (1987).  
Where a defendant participates in an armed robbery but does not 
have the requisite intent for murder, the defendant will be 
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he or she acted 
wantonly or recklessly.  Where a defendant does not participate 
in the killing or otherwise lacked the intent required to prove 
murder or manslaughter, the defendant will not go free because 
he or she can still be convicted of the underlying armed robbery 
                     
 
4 This will entirely eliminate the concept of "felony-murder 
in the second degree."  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
58-63 (2013). 
15 
 
 
he or she committed, and a judge in setting the sentence on that 
underlying felony can take into account the aggravating factor 
that the felony resulted in a victim's death.  Where the 
defendant is found guilty of murder and the murder is committed 
"in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable 
with . . . imprisonment for life," the defendant will be guilty 
of murder in the first degree, regardless of whether the murder 
was premeditated or committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
G. L. c. 265, § 1. 
We are not the first to do this.  Great Britain has 
abolished felony-murder liability by statute, providing that 
"[w]here a person kills another in the course or furtherance of 
some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder 
unless done with the same malice aforethought . . . as is 
required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the 
course or furtherance of another offence."  Homicide Act of 
1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1.  See Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 277 
n.9.  Michigan has abolished felony-murder liability under its 
common law, id., citing Aaron, 409 Mich. at 727-729, and Hawaii 
and Kentucky have abolished felony-murder liability by statute.  
Tejeda, supra, citing 7A Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 707-701 commentary, 
and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020, 1974 commentary.  Other 
States have not abolished the doctrine but have significantly 
departed from the traditional formulation.  See Tejeda, supra, 
16 
 
 
citing State v. Doucette, 143 Vt. 573, 582 (1983) (holding that 
felony-murder requires proof of malice, but that malice can be 
inferred "from evidence presented that the defendant 
intentionally set in motion a chain of events likely to cause 
death or great bodily injury, or acted with extreme indifference 
to the value of human life"), Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 635, 
636 (2007) (requiring defendant to act with recklessness, for 
murder in the first degree, or criminal negligence, for murder 
in the second degree), and N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.25(3), 125.27 
(McKinney 2009) (setting forth affirmative defense where joint 
venturer rather than defendant commits act causing death).  The 
Model Penal Code also has abandoned the traditional doctrine of 
felony-murder, requiring the homicide to be purposeful, knowing, 
or reckless in order to constitute murder, but providing for a 
rebuttable presumption of recklessness where the homicide 
occurred during the commission of certain felonies.  Model Penal 
Code §§ 1.12(5), 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985).  See Matchett, 386 Mass. at 503 n.12. 
Without felony-murder liability, our common law of murder 
will be spared much of the confusion that has arisen from 
applying legal principles we have otherwise abandoned.  General 
Laws c. 265, § 1, provides that "[t]he degree of murder shall be 
found by the jury," but we have held that this statutory 
directive cannot be met when a defendant is charged with felony-
17 
 
 
murder and the only underlying felony is a life felony, because 
in such a case "no reasonable view of the evidence supports a 
conviction of murder in the second degree."  See Paulding, 438 
Mass. at 3.  As a result, when a defendant fatally shoots a 
victim but does not do so during the commission of a felony, the 
jury must be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of 
murder in the second degree.  But when a defendant, as in this 
case, provides a weapon and hooded sweatshirts to friends to 
help them commit what turns out to be a botched armed robbery, 
the jury is denied that option. 
 
The abolition of felony-murder liability from our common 
law of murder is prospective, applying only to cases where trial 
begins after our adoption of the change.  It will have no effect 
on felony-murder cases already tried, including this case (which 
is why this is a concurrence rather than a dissent).  I 
recognize that a felony-murder case might have been tried very 
differently if the prosecutor had known that liability for 
murder would need to rest on proof of actual malice.  For 
instance, a prosecutor might have asked for an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction if he or she had known that the jury 
could not rest a finding of murder on felony-murder liability. 
 
Justice Gaziano's concurrence identifies various factual 
scenarios, some of which come from Massachusetts criminal cases, 
where a victim was killed during the commission of a felony.  
18 
 
 
See post at    .  Through these examples, that concurrence seeks 
to show, first, that a verdict of murder in the first degree 
would not be possible on these facts without felony-murder 
liability and, second, that any lesser conviction would not be 
consonant with justice.  See id.  In fact, the examples show 
that, without felony-murder liability, each of these cases could 
yields convictions that are entirely consonant with justice. 
 
Without felony-murder liability, the rapist who smothers 
the child rape victim could be found guilty of murder with 
actual malice if a jury found, either from the violence of the 
rape or the smothering of the child, that the defendant had an 
intent to commit grievous bodily harm or intended to do an act 
that, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable 
person would have known created a plain and strong likelihood 
that death would result.  See post at    .  Had the jury been so 
instructed, Robert Wade, too, could have been found guilty of 
murder without felony-murder liability based on his rape of the 
eighty-three year old woman, his dragging her along a dirt road, 
and his violent assault on her body, which would more than 
suffice to support a finding of those two prongs of malice.  See 
id. at    ; Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 148-149, 153 
(1998) (jury instructed only on felony-murder in first and 
second degree and manslaughter).  Had the jury found actual 
malice, each would have been convicted of murder in the first 
19 
 
 
degree under G. L. c. 265, § 1, because the murder was committed 
in the commission of a life felony. 
 
The armed robbers who accidently discharged a fatal shot 
while vaulting over the counter or when struck by the victim's 
baseball bat likely could not be found guilty of murder in the 
first degree because their intent with respect to the killing 
probably did not satisfy any of the three prongs of malice.  See 
id. at    ; Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 397 
(1998).  But they might be found guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter if the jury found that the death arose from their 
wanton or reckless conduct that created a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person.  
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 73 & n.158 (2013), 
citing Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 347 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 413 Mass. 387, 393-394 (1992).  And, even 
if the jury found that the death did not arise from their wanton 
or reckless conduct, they could still be sentenced to life in 
prison on the armed robbery conviction.  See G. L. c. 265, § 17.  
Convictions of both armed robbery and involuntary manslaughter, 
or of armed robbery alone, with a possible sentence of life in 
prison, should not be perceived as "getting off easy" for an 
accidental killing during an armed robbery.5 
                     
5 Justice Gaziano's concurrence correctly notes that this 
concurring opinion is in conflict with the reasoning in the 
20 
 
 
 
Felony-murder liability is a creation of our common law, 
and this court is responsible for the content of that common 
law.  When our experience with the common law of felony-murder 
liability demonstrates that it can yield a verdict of murder in 
the first degree that is not consonant with justice, and where 
we recognize that it was derived from legal principles we no 
longer accept and contravenes two fundamental principles of our 
                                                                  
court's unanimous opinion in Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 
303 (2013), where we reversed the judge's dismissal of 
indictments charging crimes related to an accomplice's attempted 
escape following an armed robbery and shooting and so much of an 
indictment charging murder in the first degree as included 
theories other than felony-murder.  Where that opinion discussed 
the distinction between joint venture liability for the escape-
related crimes and the joint venture principles in the common 
law of felony-murder, I agree that the reasoning differs, but 
that reasoning was premised on principles that this concurring 
opinion changes.  The reference to that case is apt, however, 
because its facts illustrate the need for this change in our 
jurisprudence if our law of homicide is to be more consonant 
with justice.  Under our current law of felony-murder, Scott 
Hanright, who was nineteen years old at the time, could have 
been convicted of murder in the first degree, with a mandatory 
life sentence without the possibility of parole, if he were 
found to have served as an unarmed lookout or getaway driver 
during a department store robbery committed by his accomplice, 
who was his grandmother's boyfriend.  Id. at 305-306.  The 
accomplice killed a police officer who responded to the robbery; 
Hanright never entered the department store and, when he saw 
police officers pursuing his accomplice before the shooting, 
walked away from the scene of the crime.  Id. at 306.  The 
prosecutor ultimately did not seek a conviction of murder in the 
first degree; Hanright pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree.  Man, 23, Guilty in Slaying of Officer, Boston Globe, 
May 28, 2015, at B1.  A conviction of murder in the second 
degree would not have been legally possible except through our 
review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, if Hanright had been found 
guilty of felony-murder in the first degree with armed robbery 
as the predicate felony. 
21 
 
 
criminal jurisprudence, we must revise that common law so that 
it accords with those fundamental principles and yields verdicts 
that are just and fair in light of the defendant's criminal 
conduct.  "And if not now, when?"  C. Taylor, Sayings of the 
Jewish Fathers 23 (2d ed. 1897) (quoting Hillel the Elder). 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J. (concurring, with whom Lowy and Cypher, JJ., 
join).  A rapist smothers a distraught child victim to silence 
her sobbing.  To his surprise, the child dies.  An armed robber 
enters a convenience store and threatens the store clerk with a 
handgun.  The store clerk, frozen in fear, fails to comply with 
his demands.  The frustrated armed robber vaults over the 
counter to empty the cash register, and in the process 
accidently discharges a fatal shot.  See Binder, The Culpability 
of Felony Murder, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 965, 966 (2008) (Binder 
I).  Neither of these offenders would be convicted of murder 
under Chief Justice Gants's abrogated version of felony-murder.  
In this view, charging the rapist and the armed robber with 
murder would be unfair and unjust because each's criminal 
liability is disconnected from moral culpability for the 
respective crimes.  This approach, which is predicated on an 
extremely narrow view of moral culpability (or blameworthiness), 
diminishes the seriousness of violent felonies that result in 
the deaths of innocent victims.1 
                     
 
1 The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Gants relies on 
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 507 (1982), in support 
of the proposition that application of the felony-murder rule 
erodes "the relation between criminal liability and moral 
culpability."  Ante at    .  Prior to the decision in that case, 
"a defendant could be found guilty of murder on a theory of 
felony-murder if he or she committed a homicide while engaged in 
the commission or attempted commission of a felony punishable by 
life in prison."  Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 95 
(2000).  In Matchett, supra, we addressed those concerns by 
2 
 
 
 
Although an offender's mental state is an important 
component of assessing blameworthiness, it is not "the only 
legitimate determinant of the grade of a homicide resulting from 
a felony."  Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder 
Doctrine, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 359, 366 (1985) (Crump).  
See Binder I, supra at 1059 (accurate assessment of culpability 
requires consideration of fatal result).  It is a fundamental 
tenet of criminal law that blameworthiness is premised on two 
factors, not just the offender's state of mind.  Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 433 Mass. 722, 725 (2001), citing Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).  A criminal defendant's 
blameworthiness depends on "a showing that the prohibited 
conduct (actus reus) was committed with the concomitant mental 
state (mens rea) prescribed for the offense."  Lopez, supra, 
citing Morissette, supra.  See Crump, supra at 362 ("Differences 
in result must be taken into account as part of actus reus if 
classification and grading are to be rational").  The actus reus 
component of a criminal offense refers to all of the physical 
elements of the crime, including the individual's offense 
conduct and the consequences of the act.  See Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 399 Mass. 60, 64-65 (1987).  See also Black's Law 
                                                                  
narrowing the scope of the felony-murder rule to require that 
the Commonwealth prove that the underlying felony is either 
inherently dangerous to human life or was committed with a 
conscious disregard of the risk to human life. 
3 
 
 
Dictionary 44 (10th ed. 2014) (actus reus includes attendant 
circumstances and societal harm caused by criminal act, all of 
which make up physical components of offense). 
 
The criminal law, in general, considers the harm caused by 
an individual in evaluating the severity of an offense.  Binder, 
Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 403, 427 
(2011) (Binder II) ("the evaluation of ends pervades American 
criminal law").  Chief Justice Gants's exclusive focus on the 
mens rea component of the crime ignores the human costs of an 
offender's actions, and overlooks numerous examples in the 
criminal law to the contrary.  For example, it is a misdemeanor 
to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  
See G. L. c. 90, § 24.  If one intoxicated driver strikes and 
kills a pedestrian, whereas another manages to avoid any 
accident, the former offense is elevated to the serious felony 
of motor vehicle homicide.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24G (a).  A 
defendant who shoots and kills his or her intended target, and 
an individual who attempts to shoot someone, but misses, may 
share the same intent to kill, yet it is clear that they are not 
equally blameworthy.  See Commonwealth v. LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754, 
760 (2016) (discussing mens rea of attempted murder). 
 
To provide needed context, I address several instances 
where blameworthy defendants, who did not kill intentionally or 
recklessly, were convicted of felony-murder in the first degree.  
4 
 
 
Each of these defendants would not be convicted of murder under 
Chief Justice Gants's reformulation of the felony-murder rule. 
In October, 1993, a farmhand named Robert Wade abducted the 
farm owner's eighty-three year old mother from her house.  Wade 
dragged the victim, who suffered from Alzheimer's disease, along 
a dirt road to the shack where he lived.  Commonwealth v. Wade, 
428 Mass. 147, 147-149 (1998).  In the process, the victim's 
shoulders, knees, and buttocks were badly scraped, and gravel 
was embedded in the torn tissue of her back.  Id. at 149.  Wade 
brutally raped her.  Id. at 148.  "The victim's clothing [was] 
torn and was covered with human blood.  She . . . suffered 
bruises to her eyes and to her neck . . . , her left wrist was 
fractured and there was evidence that she . . . suffered a blow 
to the head."  Id. at 148-149.  The farmer found his mother 
lying naked on the defendant's bed.  Id. at 148.  Her hip had 
been fractured during the sexual assault.  Id. at 149.  She had 
hip replacement surgery, but contracted pneumonia and died three 
weeks after the rape.  Id.  The court affirmed the defendant's 
conviction of felony-murder in the first degree with aggravated 
rape as the predicate felony.  Id. at 147-148.  The court also 
determined that there was no basis on which to grant relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for this "brutal attack on a 
5 
 
 
vulnerable, older woman."  Id. at 155.2,3 
 
On March 28, 1980, William Griffith spent the evening 
smoking marijuana, ingesting cocaine, and drinking alcohol.  
Commonwealth v. Griffith, 404 Mass. 256, 258 (1989).  
Thereafter, he announced that he was going to rob a convenience 
store located about a block away.  Id.  Griffith waited for the 
                     
2 The court's decision in Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 
147, 147-149 (1998), supports the position that a rapist whose 
actions result in death, regardless of whether the death is 
intended, is sufficiently blameworthy for the imposition of 
felony-murder liability due to the depraved nature of this 
crime. 
 
 
"To compel another by force to acquiesce in the 
violation of an important right is to express contempt for 
a victim's autonomy and status by asserting mastery over 
him or her.  The death of a victim under the offender's 
dominion and as a result of the offender's coercion, 
typifies the wrongfulness of assuming power over another's 
fate in order to wrong her.  Felony murder rules 
appropriately impose liability for negligently causing 
death for a very depraved motive, as long as the predicate 
felony involves coercion or destruction, and a felonious 
purpose independent of the fatal injury.  In evaluating the 
offender's motives, felony murder rules are compatible with 
other rules of American criminal law . . . ." 
 
Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev.  
965, 1059-1060 (2008) (Binder). 
 
 
3 According to Chief Justice Gants's concurrence, the 
factual scenarios discussed above, in which the victim was 
killed in the course of a sexual assault, would result in a 
conviction of murder.  This is a misreading of the fact 
patterns.  The rapist described in the hypothetical is intent on 
one "selfish aim[]," and does not recognize the obvious risks 
that his conduct imposes on the victim.  Binder I, supra at 966.  
Similarly, Robert Wade's intent was to abduct and rape the 
elderly victim; he dragged her out of the farmhouse and beat her 
to accomplish this purpose.  She died weeks later due to medical 
complications.  Wade, 428 Mass. at 147-149. 
6 
 
 
store to empty of customers, and entered armed with a revolver.  
Id.  He demanded money from the victim at gunpoint.  Id.  The 
victim managed to slip away during a chaotic moment when his 
wife confronted Griffith.  Id.  The victim then emerged from a 
back room armed with a baseball bat, and struck Griffith on the 
shoulder, head, and arm.  Id.  During this confrontation, 
Griffith accidently shot the victim in the head.  Id.  The 
defendant was convicted of felony-murder, and the court 
concluded that his claim that the shooting was an accident did 
not absolve him of liability.  Id. 257, 260-261.  "A defendant 
who kills a victim in the commission or attempted commission of 
a robbery, while the defendant is armed with a gun, is guilty of 
murder by application of the felony-murder rule. . . .  The fact 
that, according to the defendant, the gun was discharged 
accidently is of no consequence."  Id. at 261, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151-152 (1983).  See 
Commonwealth v. Neves, 474 Mass. 355, 371 (2016) (defendant 
convicted of felony-murder in death of taxicab driver 
notwithstanding defendant's claim that gun discharged accidently 
when victim accelerated and grabbed his hand). 
 
The second issue raised in Chief Justice Gants's 
concurrence involves the imposition of vicarious criminal 
liability for every act committed by an accomplice, in 
furtherance of the felony, that results in death.  See 
7 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 276 (2015).  Under this 
reformulation of felony-murder, an accomplice would be liable 
for a death resulting from the commission of a felony only if 
the Commonwealth were able to prove that he or she shared the 
intent of a joint venturer who acted with malice. 
Chief Justice Gants's concurrence repudiates the court's 
recent decision in Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 310 
(2013).  In that case, the nineteen year old defendant 
participated in a masked armed robbery of a department store by 
an acquaintance, Domenic Cinelli.  Id. at 304-305.  The 
defendant, who was unarmed, walked to the store with Cinelli, 
and waited outside while Cinelli entered.  Id. at 306.  He told 
the police that he did not act as a lookout.  Id.  He claimed 
that he merely went along because he was afraid of Cinelli, and 
because he hoped to share in some of the proceeds from the 
robbery.  Id.  Responding to a report of a robbery in progress, 
police observed the defendant standing outside, but focused on 
Cinelli, who left the store carrying a duffle bag.  Id.  Cinelli 
pointed a gun at the first responding officer, a chase ensued, 
and Cinelli fatally shot one of the officers.  Id.  The 
defendant had walked away from the store during the pursuit, and 
was not involved in the subsequent confrontation.  Id. 
Addressing joint venture liability for escape-related 
crimes, the court stated, "To establish liability for felony-
8 
 
 
murder on a theory of joint venture the Commonwealth must prove 
'that a homicide occurred in the commission or attempted 
commission of that felony[.]  [C]omplicity in the underlying 
felony is sufficient to establish guilt of murder in the first 
or second degree if the homicide . . . followed naturally and 
probably from the carrying out of the joint enterprise'" 
(emphasis in original; citation omitted).  Id. at 307.  
Recognizing that "the felony-murder rule operates according to a 
unique set of principles," the court concluded that the felony-
murder doctrine allowed a jury to find the defendant liable for 
the police officer's death by virtue of his complicity in the 
underlying armed robbery.  Id. at 308-309.  Thus, the jury were 
not required to find that the defendant specifically intended to 
harm the officer.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 256 Mass. 
387, 392 (1926) ("it is no defence for the associates engaged 
with others in the commission of a robbery, that they did not 
intend to take life in its perpetration, or that they forbade 
their companions to kill"). 
 
The conclusion reached by Chief Justice Gants is that 
revision of the common-law felony-murder rule is necessary to 
vanquish the "fiction of constructive malice," and yield 
"verdicts that are just and fair in light of the defendant's 
criminal conduct."  See ante at    .  Yet, under this narrowed 
version of felony-murder, the defendant in this case likely 
9 
 
 
would be convicted of murder in the first degree on the basis of 
his joint participation in an act of third prong malice. 
 
Chief Justice Gants describes joint venture felony-murder 
liability as follows:  "a defendant who commits an armed robbery 
as a joint venturer will be found guilty of murder where a 
killing was committed in the course of that robbery if he or she 
knowingly participated in the killing with the intent required 
to commit it -- that is, with the intent either to kill, to 
cause grievous bodily harm, or to do an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would result."  Ante at    . 
 
Here, the Commonwealth established that the defendant 
knowingly participated in the killing by supplying an accomplice 
with a loaded .380 handgun and other accomplices with hooded 
sweatshirts to be used to conceal their identities.  See 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 (2009) (Appendix) 
(knowing participation includes aid or assistance in committing 
the crime).  The evidence also would support a reasonable 
inference that the defendant had or shared the intent to carry 
out the crime of armed home invasion or armed robbery.  The 
defendant supplied the handgun and disguises knowing that his 
accomplices were planning to enter an occupied residence at 
night to rob two large men, both drug dealers, at gunpoint.  In 
10 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Selby, 426 Mass. 168, 172 (1997), the court 
concluded that a jury could infer third-prong malice from 
evidence that an individual entered an occupied house, carrying 
a loaded firearm, with the intent to commit a robbery.  See 
Commonwealth v. Childs, 445 Mass. 529, 533 (2005) (act of 
cocking and pointing loaded gun at three people creates plain 
and strong likelihood of death to one of them). 
 
In Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 (2003), the 
court noted that "the doctrines of felony-murder and joint 
venture may, on some hypothetical fact patterns, produce a 
conviction of murder in the first degree that would appear out 
of proportion to a defendant's culpability."  The reasonable and 
far simpler remedy to the problem of a disproportionate 
conviction of murder in the first degree is to exercise the 
court's statutory authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce 
the verdict in those extraordinary cases not consonant with 
justice.  See Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 466 ("All of this . . . 
might be tolerable if there were no reasonable alternative, but 
there is a reasonable, and far simpler, alternative . . .").  As 
Chief Justice Gants's concurrence points out, this is the first 
time that the court has exercised its authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce a conviction of felony-murder in the 
first degree in similar circumstances.  See ante at    . 
 
Thus, rather than abolish common-law felony-murder, Chief 
11 
 
 
Justice Gants's concurrence offers a muddled version of the same 
crime.  In the future, felony-murder liability will hinge on 
fine gradations between third-prong malice, wanton and reckless 
involuntary manslaughter, negligence, and accident -- with 
predictably unpredictable results.  See Crump, supra at 372 
(discussing disparity in verdicts created by ambiguous felony-
murder rule).  To be sure, there will be instances where morally 
culpable individuals will not be held responsible for the death 
of a rape victim, gasoline station attendant, or convenience 
store clerk.  Rather than create such confusion, I would, 
instead, rely on the existing mechanism under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to remedy those rare cases, such as the one presented 
here, where a verdict is not consonant with the interests of 
justice.  In my view, the abrogation of common-law felony-murder 
to address the perceived unfairness of this conviction, at the 
expense of innocent victims of violent crime, is not necessary.