Title: State v. Wilson P. Anderson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP819-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wilson P. Anderson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 307 Wis. 2d 244, 959 N.W.2d 93 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 2, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 17, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
David A. Feiss   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
Per curiam. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by David J. Susens, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by David J. Susens, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James E. Goldschmidt, 
Ellen E. Anderson, Elise A. Ashley, and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Milwaukee, for the National Disability Rights Network.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 44 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP819-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2020CM939) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Wilson P. Anderson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 2, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Wilson P. Anderson petitioned for review 
of a court of appeals decision, State v. Anderson, No. 
2020AP819-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 
2021), that affirmed the circuit court's order authorizing the 
involuntary administration of medication to restore Anderson's 
competency.  In its briefing and arguments to this court, the 
State conceded that "it failed to meet its burden under Sell" at 
Anderson's competency hearing, and the circuit court had 
therefore erred when it ordered involuntary medication.  See 
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).  Accordingly, we 
summarily reverse the decision of the court of appeals, and 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
2 
 
remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to 
vacate the involuntary medication order. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
1 
 
¶2 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  Today 
this court fails to perform its obligation to declare the law.  
Instead, it sidesteps the significant legal questions parties 
brought to us to decide and we accepted when we granted Wilson 
P. Anderson's petition for review.  Because I would decide at 
least whether a psychiatrist is necessary to give an opinion on 
medicines that are sufficient to address Anderson's mental 
illness and bring him to competency, I respectfully dissent from 
this court's non-decision decision.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In March 2020, Anderson hit a stranger on the head 
unprovoked, causing her bodily harm.  Anderson was arrested, and 
the State filed criminal charges against him the following day.   
¶4 
The circuit court ordered a competency report,1 which 
Forensic Psychologist Dr. Debora L. Collins completed.  As part 
of her analysis, Dr. Collins reviewed the criminal complaint, 
Anderson's medical records, and a summary of his interactions 
with 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Behavioral 
Health 
Division.  
Dr. Collins also administered a competency evaluation through 
Anderson's cell door, due to Anderson's "level of agitation and 
erratic behavior."  Anderson "shouted and yelled comments" 
throughout the evaluation.  Dr. Collins was "not assured" that 
Anderson understood the purpose of the evaluation.  Anderson's 
responses frequently were "slurred, mumbled, and/or otherwise 
incoherent."2  Officers conveyed to Dr. Collins that Anderson 
                                                 
1 Honorable Dennis R. Cimpl of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court presided. 
2 R. 3 at 2, 3. 
 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
2 
 
fashioned his hand in the shape of a gun and pointed his hand at 
officers the day before the evaluation. 
¶5 
Dr. Collins filed a report in which she opined 
Anderson 
was 
not 
competent 
to 
understand 
the 
criminal 
proceedings against him or to aid in his defense.  She 
recommended psychiatric treatment at a state mental health 
institute 
to 
restore 
competency 
but 
did 
not 
make 
any 
recommendations for involuntary medication.  Anderson was not 
taking any medications at the time of his arrest, although he 
had had more than 35 episodes of county care since 2011.  His 
records reflect a major mental illness often identified as 
Schizoaffective disorder.3   
¶6 
Anderson requested a contested competency hearing, and 
the court4 ordered Dr. Collins to file an addendum to her report 
specifically outlining her opinion as to Anderson's need for 
involuntary medication.  Dr. Collins' addendum stated Anderson 
was "not competent to make treatment decisions, including with 
respect to psychotropic medications,"5 but Dr. Collins did not 
provide an opinion as to a course of treatment, medication 
dosages, or potential side effects that Anderson may experience.  
¶7 
On April 9, 2020, the court held a hearing regarding 
Anderson's competency to stand trial and whether to subject 
                                                 
3 Id. at 3, 4. 
4 Honorable Frederick C. Rosa of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided.  
5 R. 4 at 2. 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
3 
 
Anderson to an order for involuntary medication.6  Dr. Collins 
was the only witness to testify.  As part of her testimony, she 
answered various questions:   
Q  Dr. Collins, your degree is in psychology; is that 
right? 
A  Yes.   
Q  You have no medical training as a medical doctor; 
is that correct? 
A  I am not a medical doctor.  I'm a psychologist. 
Q  You are not able to prescribe medications to anyone 
at this time in the course of your present 
employment? 
A  That is correct.[7]   
¶8 
Anderson did not object to Dr. Collins' testimony 
regarding his competency, but he objected to Dr. Collins' 
"medication order testimony."8  The court overruled Anderson's 
objections and allowed Dr. Collins to testify "on both facets."9  
The court issued an involuntary medication and commitment order.  
The circuit court stayed the order for involuntary medication on 
April 16, 2020.10 
¶9 
Anderson appealed the order, asking the court of 
appeals "whether the State offered sufficient evidence to 
                                                 
6 Honorable David Feiss of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court presided.  
7 R. 18 at 5, 6. 
8 Id. at 7. 
9 Id. at 8. 
10 R. 12 at 1. 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
4 
 
support an order for involuntary medication under Sell v. United 
States."11  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
involuntary commitment order in an unpublished decision.  State 
v. Anderson, No. 2020AP160-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 16, 2021).  
¶10 Anderson petitioned this court for review, on the 
heels of State v. Green.  Because we granted Green's petition 
for review, we held Anderson's case in abeyance until we 
released our opinion in Green on May 13, 2022.  State v. Green, 
2022 WI 30, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770.  We ordered parties 
in State v. Anderson to submit simultaneous letter briefs as to 
whether our opinion in Green resolved their issues.   
¶11 Anderson's May 27, 2022 letter brief argued our 
decision in Green did not resolve his issues.  He clarified that 
"[he] 
objects 
only 
to 
the 
court's 
reliance 
on 
the 
unconstitutional portions of [Wis. Stat.] § 971.14 [(2021-22)]12 
and the state's failure to present a treatment plan and use 
evidence from a licensed physician to prove the second, third, 
and fourth Sell factors."  The State's letter brief of the same 
day clarified the State's position:  "[Anderson] contends that 
Green [396 Wis. 2d 658] requires the State to offer an 
individualized treatment plan to satisfy the Sell factors. . . .  
The State agrees with Anderson that the court of appeals here 
erred by not applying Green when determining whether the State 
                                                 
11 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
12 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
5 
 
proved the Sell factors."  We granted Anderson's petition for 
review on September 13, 2022, ordered full briefing, and heard 
oral argument on April 17, 2023.  Despite all of the above, 
today we disregard our constitutional function and we declare no 
law.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶12 We review whether the circuit court complied with the 
constitutional overlay of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 
(2003) to Wis. Stat. § 971.14 under the facts of this case as a 
question of constitutional fact.  As such, historic facts are 
upheld unless clearly erroneous, and whether those facts satisfy 
the constitutional standard in determination of the Sell factors 
is a question of law for our independent review.  State v. 
Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶18, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.   
B.  General Principles 
¶13 Wisconsin courts have a long history with criminal and 
civil commitment orders, as well as orders for involuntary 
medication in both contexts.  Despite this long history, many 
questions remain unresolved. 
¶14 In the criminal context (Wis. Stat. ch. 971), it is 
likely that the substantial number of cases that have come to us 
reflects the difficulty imposed on circuit courts that must 
balance a prisoner's significant liberty interest to avoid 
forced medication against the State's significant interest in 
prosecuting defendants for the commission of a serious crime.  
Sell, 539 U.S. at 178 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
6 
 
210, 236 (1990)).  See e.g., State v. Anderson, No. 2020AP819-
CR, Green, 401 Wis. 2d 542, State v. Yakich, 2022 WI 8, 400 
Wis. 2d 549, 970 N.W.2d 12, State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, 387 
Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165.   
¶15 The legal terrain reflects the complex reality of 
involuntary 
medication 
orders 
to 
regain 
competency. 
 
In 
Fitzgerald 
we 
comprehensively 
reviewed 
the 
constitutional 
foundation, as developed in case law.  Id., ¶¶13-18.  There, we 
underscored the root of an individual's "significant liberty 
interest" in avoiding antipsychotic drugs is secured by the Due 
Process Clause.  Id., ¶13, (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 221).  
We then summarized Sell, which announced a four-factor test "to 
determine 
whether 
such 
[involuntary] 
medication 
is 
constitutionally appropriate," and which also asserted that 
"administration 
of 
drugs 
solely 
for 
trial 
competence 
purposes . . . may be rare."  Fitzgerald, 387 Wis. 2d 384, ¶13 
(citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 179, 180).  
¶16 Accordingly, the four-factor test announced in Sell 
must be satisfied to meet the Constitution's high bar.  Id. at 
180-81.  First, the court "must find that important governmental 
interests are at stake."  Id. at 180.  Second, the court must 
conclude "that involuntary medication will significantly further 
those [] state interests," by rendering the defendant competent 
to stand trial, but also that the drugs are "substantially 
unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly 
with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a 
trial defense."  Id. at 181.  Third, the court must conclude 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
7 
 
that the involuntary medication is "necessary to further those 
interests" and that "any alternative, less intrusive treatments 
are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results."  Id.  
Fourth, the court must conclude that administration of the drugs 
"is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical 
interest in light of his medical condition."  Id.   
¶17 In Wisconsin, the court of appeals interpreted Sell as 
requiring an individualized treatment plan.  Green, 396 Wis. 2d 
658, ¶38.  We did not address this particular issue in our 
review of Green, nor did we disturb it.  Green, 401 Wis. 2d 542.  
Accordingly, Wisconsin appears to continue to require that the 
State provide an individual treatment plan when considering 
whether the second, third, and fourth Sell factors have been 
met.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997).   
¶18 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 971.14 provides for pre-
trial competency procedures.  In broad strokes, the statute 
requires examination of the defendant, a report, a hearing, and 
commitment, as well as outlining the process of discharge.  
However, 
in 
Fitzgerald, 
we 
held 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) 
is 
an 
insufficient standard upon which to base forced psychotropic 
medications.  Fitzgerald, 387 Wis. 2d 384, ¶25.   
¶19 We also reviewed each of the Sell factors in a way 
that demonstrates medical knowledge is required to provide 
relevant testimony for some of those factors.  For example, in 
regard to the second Sell factor, "administration of the drugs 
is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
8 
 
stand trial" and "unlikely to have side effects that will 
interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist 
counsel in conducting a trial defense."  Id., ¶27.  In regard to 
the fourth Sell factor, the circuit court must find that the 
medication is "medically appropriate," i.e., "in the patient's 
best medical interest in light of his medical condition."  Id., 
¶29 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181).   
C.  Anderson's Commitment 
¶20 Whether testimony from a psychologist satisfies Sell 
is a question we have not addressed.  Anderson brings this 
question to us squarely, as the circuit court ordered him to be 
involuntarily medicated based on the testimony of Dr. Collins, a 
psychologist.  He objected at the circuit court, claiming that 
the testimony of a psychiatrist was necessary, and he objected 
here for the same reason.   
¶21 In my view, a psychologist's testimony, while relevant 
to whether a defendant is incompetent to proceed to trial, is 
not sufficient to provide relevant testimony on at least the 
second and fourth Sell factors.  A medical doctor's testimony is 
necessary, i.e., a psychiatrist's testimony is needed to meet 
the standards in the second and fourth Sell factors.  
¶22 By declining to address Anderson's question regarding 
whether a psychologist is qualified to give testimony required 
by at least some of the Sell factors, this court shirks its duty 
to the parties and the public to declare what the law requires.  
We also disserve those closest to the mentally ill, those who 
seek help before an ill individual becomes more dangerous.  
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
9 
 
Today is another example of this court's increasing indifference 
to the obligations imposed upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court as 
an institution.  I dissent because I would fulfill our 
obligation in a deeply complicated legal terrain and of 
incredible personal significance to those seeking guidance from 
this court.   
¶23 Instead, the court chooses simply to vacate Anderson's 
involuntary medication order.  A curious exercise, as the 
circuit court stayed it April 16, 2020.  In addition, as the 
State informed this court in May 2022:  
According to CCAP, on August 14, 2020, the 
circuit court entered an Order of Conversion to Civil 
Commitment 
Proceedings 
[u]nder 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(6)(b).  Pursuant to that statute, a court 
that discharges a defendant from pretrial competency 
commitment 'may order that the defendant be taken 
immediately into custody by a law enforcement official 
and promptly delivered to a facility' for purposes of 
Chapter 51 or 55 proceedings. . . .  No action has 
been taken on the State's prosecution since that time. 
Section 
971.14(6)(a) 
establishes 
the 
requirements 
for 
proceedings pursuant to paragraph b, and states, "If the court 
determines that it is unlikely that the defendant will become 
competent within the remaining commitment period, it shall 
discharge the defendant from the commitment and release him or 
her, except as provided in par. (b)."   
¶24 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(6)(b) 
further 
provides, 
"Thereafter, detention of the defendant shall be governed by 
s. 51.15, 51.45(11), or 55.135, as appropriate."  Accordingly, 
Anderson was discharged from the ch. 971 commitment and the 
involuntary medication order he asked us to review.  Any 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
10 
 
subsequent civil commitment or involuntary medication order to 
which Anderson may currently be subject is not part of the 
record.   
D.  Choosing to Ignore This Court's Obligation 
¶25 Lastly, I address this court's per curiam decision.  
The court states, "In its briefing and arguments to this court, 
the State conceded that 'it failed to meet its burden under 
Sell,' at Anderson's competency hearing, and the circuit court 
had therefore erred when it ordered involuntary medication."  
That may be so, but the State made this concession in the very 
letter briefing upon which this court ordered full briefing and 
argument.   
¶26 In May 2022, the State informed this court it 
"agree[d] with Anderson that the court of appeals here erred by 
not applying Green when determining whether the State proved the 
Sell factors."  There was nothing new this court could have 
learned about the State's position from full briefing if the 
court intended to decide the case on the State's concession, as 
it does today.  But, by granting Anderson's petition for review 
with the issue "Did the involuntary medication order violate due 
process because the state failed to meet its burden to prove the 
second, third, and fourth Sell factors by clear and convincing 
evidence?" and ordering briefing, the parties likely understood 
an issue on review would be one of testimonial qualifications or 
of evidentiary sufficiency.   
¶27 Anderson's briefing focused on the sufficiency of the 
State's evidence, as he argued testimony from a licensed 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
11 
 
physician was required to meet Sell.  Why now has the court 
refused to address at least this question?  It is a recurring 
issue in commitment cases.   
¶28 I am deeply troubled by this court's increasing 
reluctance to fulfill its obligation as a court of law-
declaration.  There are circuit courts serving all 72 counties 
in this state.  Parties may exercise appellate rights in the 
courts of appeal, whose "primary function is error correcting."  
Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 188.  Wisconsin's four courts of appeal 
"function as a single court."  In re Court of Appeals, 82 
Wis. 2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149 (1978).   
¶29 But the Supreme Court is the only court in Wisconsin 
primarily tasked with "law defining."  Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 189.  
This is the only court with the purpose of "oversee[ing] and 
implement[ing] the statewide development of the law," and the 
"only state court with the power to overrule, modify, or 
withdraw language from a previous supreme court case."  Id.   
¶30 Today, this court elects to do nothing despite the 
awesome responsibility——the obligation——to oversee and implement 
law declaration in Wisconsin.  I regret that the parties' 
efforts to inform us of the legal issues presented fell on 
inattentive ears and that they have received no thoughtful 
response from this court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 Today this court disregards its obligation to declare 
the law.  Instead, it conveniently sidesteps the significant 
legal questions parties brought to us to decide and we accepted 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
12 
 
when we granted Anderson's petition for review.  Because I would 
decide at least whether a psychiatrist is necessary to give an 
opinion on medicines that are sufficient to address Anderson's 
mental illness, I respectfully dissent from this court's non-
decision decision.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2020AP819-CR   
 
1