Title: Vermont v. Bol

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 99













State v. Bol (2010-009)
 
2011 VT 99
 
[Filed 09-Sept.-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 99 
 
No. 2010-009
 
State of Vermont
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
District Court of Vermont,
Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit 
 
 
Yai Bol
November Term, 2010
 
 
 
 
Michael
  S. Kupersmith, J.
 
 
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Ultan Doyle,
Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, 
  for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
 
Allison N. Fulcher of Martin &
Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and
Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
BURGESS, J.   Defendant Yai Bol appeals from his
conviction for giving false information to a police officer and possession of
cocaine.  He argues that the trial court erred by preventing his counsel
from using a peremptory challenge to strike a black member of the jury
pool.  He claims that this error should result in a new trial.  We
agree and reverse and remand. 
¶ 2.            
Defendant was arrested after police were called to the scene of a
reported fight in progress.  An officer asked defendant if he had any
identification and to identify himself.  He provided the officer with
someone else's identification documents and verbally identified himself as that
person.  Only later did he provide his actual identification in response
to the officer's request that he produce further credentials.  Defendant
was then arrested.  After defendant was placed in the back of a police
cruiser, driven to the police station, and removed from the car, officers
noticed a baggie containing white powder on the floor of the cruiser.  The
officers, who had earlier noted the car was clean and also observed defendant
with his pants pulled down while riding to the station, concluded that the powder
was defendant's.  It was later determined to be
cocaine.  Defendant was charged on four counts: two counts of assault, 13
V.S.A. 1023(a)(1); one count of providing false
information to a police officer, 13 V.S.A. 1754(a); and one count of possession
of cocaine, 18 V.S.A. 4231(a)(2).
¶ 3.            
At the jury draw, defendant's lawyer attempted to use one of his
peremptory challenges to block a black member of the jury pool.  The court
denied this.  Their exchange was as follows:
THE
COURT:  She's the only black person on this jury, and I need a good
reason; otherwise, I'm not going to let you challenge her.
 
THE
DEFENSE:  Why do I need a reason?  I don't think I need a good
reason, Judge.
 
THE
COURT:  Well, you certainly do.  When you talk about the only person
of African descent on a jury panel, you have to give me a reason for that,
that's what the U.S. Supreme Court says.  So if you don't have good
reason, you can forget it.
 
THE
DEFENSE:  What's thatyou told me that only because she's African-American
I'm not allowed to
 
THE
COURT:  You cannot discriminate on the basis of race.  She's the only
black person on this panel.
 
THE
DEFENSE: Okay, let
 
THE
COURT:  Unless you have a good reason, she's staying there.
 
THE
DEFENSE:  Judge, she's
 
THE
COURT:  Now can I make myself any more plain?
 
THE
DEFENSE:  For the record, I mean I don't
 
THE
COURT: Do you have a reason?
 
THE
DEFENSE: Yes, Judge, I don't think she's going to be looking favorable onto my
client.
 
THE
COURT:  And why are you saying that?
 
THE
DEFENSE:  That's just an instinct I have, what can I tell you?
 
THE
COURT:  It's not sufficient
 
THE
DEFENSE:  And, Judge, my
 
THE
COURT:  I am not going to let you challenge her, so move on.
 
THE
DEFENSE:  Okay, I
 
THE
COURT:  If you have another reason you want to put on the record, you go
ahead and do it.
 
THE
DEFENSE:  Well, I'm objecting to you not letting me strike her.  The
first person I struck was Caucasian.  
 
THE
COURT:  It doesn't matter.  She's the only one on this panel, you
need a reason.
 
THE
DEFENSE:  I justmy objection is noted for the record.
 
¶ 4.            
After this, the jury was seated, and the trial continued. 
Ultimately, the jury acquitted defendant of the assault charges but convicted
him of providing false information to a police officer and possession of
cocaine.  On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court misstated
federal constitutional jurisprudence in maintaining that the United States Supreme
Court had ruled it impermissible to strike the sole black juror from a venire
without stating a reason.  He concludes that the court's erroneous denial
of his peremptory challenge should result in a new trial because this ruling
denied him a fair trial.
¶ 5.            
We begin by determining whether the trial court's application of federal
constitutional law was correct.  In stating that the "U.S. Supreme Court"
requires an attorney wishing to make a peremptory challenge to the sole black
juror to articulate his reasons, the trial court is understood to allude to Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400 (1991), and its progeny.  Batson held that that under
the Fourteenth Amendment a prosecutor cannot exercise peremptory challenges on
the basis of race.  Id. at 89.  In
this case the peremptory challenge in question was made by a defense attorney,
rather than a prosecutor.  But, despite defendant's assertion to the
contrary, the United States Supreme Court has declared that Batson is
equally applicable to defendants' peremptory challenges.  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
¶ 6.            
Therefore, we look to Batson itself.  To determine if an
attorney has impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race in using
peremptory challenges, Batson established a three-part test.  The
first is that opposing counsel, or the trial court acting sua sponte, must
establish a prima facie case that discrimination has occurred.  Batson,
476 U.S.  at 96.  This is discussed further below.  Once such grounds
are established, the attorney making the peremptory challenge must provide the
court with a race-neutral justification for the challenge.  Id. at 97.  Third, the trial court must then
weigh the explanation in light of all relevant circumstances to determine if
the attorney, in fact, has a race-neutral reason for the challenge or if the
attorney's stated rationale is merely a pretext for discrimination.  Id. at 98.
¶
7.            
It is on the first step, in implicitly finding a prima facie case of
discrimination, that the trial court erred.  It is true, as the State
notes, that this Court's standard of review for trial courts' decisions in voir
dire is typically deferential.   See State v.
Bernier, 157 Vt. 265, 267, 597 A.2d 789, 790 (1991). 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
employing a deferential standard to review a trial court's prima facie Batson
determination, declared that "[w]hile one could fairly argue that the
determination of a Batson prima facie case could be subject to a
two-step reviewclear error for factual findings and de novo for rulings of
lawin this context the inquiries often are not clearly delineated."  United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109-10 (2d Cir.
2010).  There may be times, based on subtle inferences from facts,
where a trial court's prima facie conclusions should be reviewed deferentially,
but here no deference is required.  The trial court's prima facie determination
rested on nothing other than defense counsel's proposed strike of the sole
black juror from the venire, without any other reason, stated or apparent, for
the court's insistence on a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
challenge.  Thus, we review its determination de novo.  See, e.g., State
v. Delaoz, 2010 VT 65, ¶ 12, ___ Vt. ___, 22 A.3d 388 (explaining this
Court's general rule that, on appeal, "we review the court's legal conclusions
de novo and its findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard"). 
¶ 8.            
The legal threshold for establishing a prima facie case is modest and
may be satisfied in many ways.  See  Johnson
v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (holding that the first step does
not require a showing that a violation is "more likely than not"); Aspen v.
Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 574 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Our post-Batson
precedents reflect the understanding that the burden is not
substantial.").  Nonetheless, some evidence of potential bias or prejudice
is required.  Batson explained that the challenging party "must
show that [the opportunity to discriminate created by the system of peremptory
challenges] and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the
[attorney] used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race."  Id. at 96 (emphasis added).  More
recently, the Supreme Court reiterated this principle: "[A] defendant satisfies
the requirements of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient
to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has
occurred."  Johnson, 545 U.S.  at 170.  The burden to produce
"sufficient evidence" is with the party challenging the peremptory
strike.  See id. at 171 (noting that the
"burden of persuasion rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the
strike" (quotation omitted)).  Batson did not declare a set list of
criteria for trial courts to use to determine whether the burden had been
met.  Instead, it explained that trial courts should consider "all
relevant circumstances" and provided a non-exclusive list of what evidence
could be relevant.  476 U.S.  at 96-97.  The evidence, for example,
could consist of a pattern of peremptory strikes or the litigant's "questions
and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his
challenges," which could reveal discriminatory or non-discriminatory
intent.  Id. at 97.   
¶ 9.            
In this case, the record establishes only one fact in purported support
for the trial court's inference of discriminatory intent.  The prosecutor
did not object to defendant's attempted strike.  Instead, in response to
the challenge, the court stated, sua sponte: "When you talk about the only
person of African descent on a jury panel, you have to give me a reason for that,
that's what the U.S. Supreme Court says."  When defendant's attorney
questioned this, the court replied, "You cannot discriminate on the basis of
race.  She's the only black person on this panel."  Later, after
defense counsel failed to provide a reason for the challenge other than his
"instinct," he objected to the court's ruling, pointing out that he had
previously struck a white person from the jury.  The trial court
responded, "It doesn't matter.  She's the only [black person] on this panel,
you need a reason."  The court's statements demonstrate that it was
relying on nothing else than the fact that there was a peremptory challenge to
the single black juror to support its suspicion of discrimination.  Nor does the transcript of the voir dire yield any additional
evidence in support of the court's perception of a prima facie case of racial
motive.
¶ 10.         The
federal courts decline to provide more than vague guidance to trial courts,
instead leaving them wide latitude in their determinations.  See, e.g., id. ("We have confidence that trial
judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if
the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors."). 
Nevertheless, we can determine a minimum prima facie requirement.  The act
of excluding the sole minority juror from a jury panel need be accompanied, at
the least, by some surrounding fact or circumstance from which a motive to
strike based on bias or prejudice toward a person of that race can be
reasonably suspected.  The potential for discrimination need not be
certain, nor even probable.  For instance, the threshold for finding a
"pattern" of discrimination, one of the examples of sufficient prima facie
evidence provided in Batson, id., is a low one.  See, e.g., Johnson, 545 U.S.  at 173 (holding that where jury
venire's three minority jurors were peremptorily challenged, a prima facie case
existed).  Likewise, where, as here, the only minority juror or
jurors on a panel were stricken, that action was one of other factors
supporting an inference of discrimination, as illustrated by a Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals case, United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897,
904-07 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Esparza-Gonzalez case also illustrates
a variety of factors a trial court can consider.  The court found a prima
facie case where the only two Latino jurors were excluded, and a range of
contextual factors supported an inference of discrimination, such as: counsel's
waiver of voir dire; the similarity of the responses of the challenged juror
and other jurors to the trial court's voir dire; counsel's unusual waiver of
peremptory challenges to avoid seating the Latino jurors; and the fact that the
case involved illegal immigration, a potential ethnically charged issue.  Id. 
No particular constellation of facts is necessarily required; a single
accompanying circumstance, such as racial commonality between a party and the
juror sought to be excluded by the opposing party has been held prima facie
sufficient to demand a race-neutral explanation.  See United States v.
Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that excluding sole juror
of same race as defendant sufficient for prima facie case); see also United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
a prima facie case existed for a Native American defendant to challenge where
all four Native Americans in a jury pool were excluded based on for-cause
removals and peremptory challenges).[1]

¶ 11.         Today's
holding is narrow: the sole fact that a party moves to strike the only minority
juror from the venire is insufficient, by itself, to establish a prima facie
case of discriminatory motive.  Even a single additional circumstance
could, in a different case, suffice to trigger a legitimate Batson
inquiry.  Absent from the instant case was anything additionally
noted by the trial court, such as counsel's tone, demeanor, pattern, past
conduct, or other surrounding circumstance, suggestive of a discriminatory
motivation behind the peremptory challenge.  
¶ 12.         The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided an almost identical question
in Cousin v. Bennett, 511 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2008).  In Cousin,
the court wrote, "Petitioner argues that the fact of the prosecutor's challenge
to the only African-American prospective juror to be called for voir dire was
sufficient to establish a prima facie showing that the challenge was
racially motivated. We disagree."  Id. at 338.
 The few differences between the instant case and Cousin are
immaterial.   It was the prosecutor in Cousin, rather than the
defense attorney, who attempted the peremptory strike, but nothing in federal
jurisprudence suggests that the prima facie threshold to show a discriminatory
challenge is lower for prosecutors than for the defense.   While the
trial court in Cousin ruled that the defense failed to meet its prima
facie burden to support its claim against the prosecutor of discriminatory
peremptory challenge, the opposite posture here and the fact that the court
raised the issue sua sponte is of no moment.  As discussed above, the
burden of proof is the same, and the standard on review is de novo. 
Further, regardless of the trial court's ruling below, the appellate court's
holding in Cousin is an unambiguous statement of law that a peremptory
strike of the only black juror is, without more, not enough for a prima facie Batson
claim.
¶ 13.         The
Second Circuit is not unique in its holding.   See Crittenden v.
Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he prosecutor's use of a
peremptory strike against the only African-American prospective juror is a
relevant consideration, although it does not by itself raise an inference of
discrimination."); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st
Cir. 1994) ("[T]he mere fact that the prosecutor challenges the only juror of a
particular race, without more, does not automatically give rise to an inescapable
inference of discriminatory intent."); see also, United States v. Horsley,
864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (rejecting that striking the
sole minority juror by itself established a prima facie case of
discrimination).  
¶ 14.         Cases
cited by the State to the contrary are not persuasive.[2]  Roan Eagle and Chalan,
for example, and as discussed above, are not inconsistent with Cousin
and are distinguishable from the instant situation.  Both involved
prosecution peremptory strikes of sole minority jurors from a venire when the
jurors shared racial identity with the defendants.  The courts held that
that circumstance supplied the prima facie showing of possible discriminatory
intent sufficient to warrant a non-discriminatory explanation.  Roan
Eagle, 867 F.2d  at 441; Chalan, 812 F.2d  at
1314.  Conversely, in the present case, the defense sought to exclude a
juror whose race was the same as defendant's, and the trial court did not
explain how the congruence between defendant's and the juror's race led to an
inference of racial motivation in the defendant's challenge.
¶
15.        
Having found that the court erred in barring
defendant's peremptory challenge, the question of remedy remains. 
It is settled Vermont law that when a defendant is left with an undesired juror
after exhausting his peremptory challenges in response to the trial court's
failure to remove a juror properly challenged for cause, the court's error is
reversible error.  State v. Doleszny, 146 Vt.
621, 622, 508 A.2d 693, 694 (1986) (per curiam); State v. Holden, 136
Vt. 158, 161, 385 A.2d 1092, 1094 (1978).  Reversal applies even in
the absence of prejudice.  State v. Santelli, 159 Vt. 442, 446-47,
621 A.2d 222, 224-25 (1992) (declining to condition retrial on actual prejudice
"because the focus of the appellate inquiry would not be on the court's error,
but on the qualifications of the juror subject to the lost peremptory
challenge," rendering the court's error practically unreviewable).  The
situation is somewhat askew in the instant case where defendant was not wrongly
required to exhaust his peremptory challenges, but was still compelled to abide
a juror not to his liking when, but for the court's error, the juror should have
been excused.  We have long treated the peremptory opportunity to strike
some jurors without explanation as a "right essential to the full enjoyment of
a respondent's right to a jury trial" and, accordingly, reverse and remand for
retrial when that right is wrongfully denied.  Id.
at 446-47, 621 A.2d  at 225 (quotation omitted).[3]  The State posits no reason for a
different result here.  
Reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 

[1] 
Not explicitly disagreeing with these holdings, a recent Ninth Circuit opinion,
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010), diverges on whether a
peremptory strike, by itself, of a juror of the same racial or ethnic group as
an adverse party raises a prima facie need  to explain further.  In Ayers,
the defendant was black and the prosecution challenged the only black juror in
the venire.  The court found prima facie grounds to challenge the strike
under Batson, but only after comparative examination of voir dire and
the prosecutor's notes about each juror.  Id. at
955-57.  As explained earlier in Powers, 499 U.S.  at 415-16,
congruence between one party's race and the target of an adverse party's
peremptory strike is not a prerequisite to a Batson violation, but its
occurrence can trigger the inquiry in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, while its
occurrence alone could be insufficient to trigger the inquiry in the Ninth
Circuit.  In any event, there was no such congruence in the instant
case.         
[2] 
Nor is there any support for the State's suggestion that the small number of
minority citizens in Vermont recommends the trial court's approach. 
Whether or not discerning a pattern of discrimination is more difficult in
Vermont, patterns of discrimination are but one way of establishing a prima
facie case.  See Batson, 476 U.S.  at 96 (stating that "the
prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and
in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of
discriminatory purpose," but noting that this example is merely "illustrative"
and encouraging trial courts to judge the existence of a prima facie case on
all relevant circumstances); see also infra, ¶ 13.  Further, the
State cites neither authority nor reason for the proposition that the threshold
burden need be lower in a state with low minority populations, or a different
measure by which to presume or detect discriminatory motive.  Should a
party assert a credible threshold supporting a different analysis, we will
consider it then.  
 
[3] 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently held that a defendant's federal due
process rights are not violated when his attorney's peremptory challenge is
blocked by a trial court's good faith misapplication of Batson.  Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1455 (2009). 
The Court in Rivera, however, noted that states are free to consider
such errors reversible per se.  Id. at 1456.