Title: FRANK GARCIA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRANK GARCIA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 117774 P.2d 623Case Number: 87-112Decided: 05/25/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
FRANK GARCIA, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Julie D. Naylor (argued), Appellate Counsel, 
for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Michelle Neves (argued), Legal 
Intern.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and GRANT, District Judge.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
judgment and sentence entered after a plea bargain in which appellant Frank 
Garcia pled guilty to one count of felony murder for the murder of Kathleen 
Bernard and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery for the 
aggravated robbery of Kathleen Bernard and Robert Bernard. In the plea bargain, 
the State dismissed a felony murder charge for the murder of Robert Bernard and 
agreed not to seek the death penalty for the murder of Kathleen Bernard. The 
trial court sentenced appellant to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment on 
the felony murder charge and not less than 20 nor more than 25 years on the 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.

[¶2.]     We affirm the judgment 
and sentence.

[¶3.]     Appellant, Frank 
Garcia, states a single issue for our review:

"Whether Appellant's 
consecutive sentences for felony murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated 
robbery violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States 
and Wyoming Constitutions."

[¶4.]     The court established a 
factual basis for the guilty pleas through Garcia's testimony. Garcia testified 
that he first discussed the robbery of Robert Bernard when he was approached by 
co-defendant Chuck Birr several weeks prior to March 1, 1985. In the succeeding 
weeks, Garcia, Birr, and another co-defendant Frank Schultz discussed the 
robbery and murder of both Robert Bernard and Kathleen Bernard. These 
discussions took place primarily in Casper, Wyoming, where Birr purchased some rope and 
tape necessary to execute the planned robbery and murder. The evening before the 
robbery and murder, Robin Koeneman drove the car carrying Garcia, Birr and 
Schultz to Gillette, 
Wyoming for the purpose of robbing 
and killing the Bernards. Upon arriving in Gillette, gloves and additional tape 
were purchased. The four then drove to a trailer court where the Bernards 
resided. Garcia armed himself with a .357 magnum pistol and a "buck" knife, and 
Schultz armed himself with a small derringer. As planned, Garcia and Schultz 
gained entry into the trailer house through a ruse of requesting permission to 
use the telephone to report an automobile accident. Upon entering the trailer, 
Garcia drew his .357 magnum pistol and ordered that the children, who were also 
in the room, be sent to bed. Mrs. Bernard, accompanied by Schultz, took the 
children into a back bedroom. Garcia then demanded that Mr. Bernard give him all 
of the money. Mr. Bernard produced a small amount of money. Garcia was not 
satisfied. He then took Mr. Bernard to a back bedroom and demanded additional 
money. Mr. Bernard said there was no additional money but admitted having a 
small quantity of drugs. After taking the drugs, Garcia instructed Schultz to 
bring Mrs. Bernard into the bedroom. At gunpoint, Garcia ordered the Bernards to 
lie down on the floor. Garcia and Schultz bound them with the rope. Schultz then 
handed a tire iron to Garcia, and Garcia struck each of the Bernards in the 
head. Thereupon, Garcia handed Schultz the buck knife, and Schultz cut Mr. 
Bernard's throat. Garcia then took the knife and cut Mrs. Bernard's throat. 
Shortly thereafter, the four returned to Birr's apartment in Casper where the drugs 
were given to Birr and the money was divided between Garcia and 
Schultz.

[¶5.]     In this case, the 
charged offenses - murder in the first degree, contrary to W.S. 6-2-101, and 
conspiracy, contrary to W.S. 6-1-303 - are separate and distinct by statutory 
definition, and different evidence is necessary to prove each charge. Garcia's 
testimony makes clear that the evidence necessary to support the conspiracy 
charge was not the same as the evidence necessary to support the felony murder 
charge. There was an agreement before-hand to commit aggravated robbery, and 
once one of the co-defendants took any action sufficient to constitute an overt 
act, the conspiracy was completed. See Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 
(Wyo. 1988). 
Birr's obtaining of rope and tape in Casper; the driving to Gillette before the 
murder; the purchase of the gloves and tape in Gillette; and the arming of 
Schultz and Garcia before entering the trailer demonstrate the conspiracy was 
completed prior to the robbery of the Bernards and the murder of Mrs. 
Bernard.

[¶6.]     Article 1, § 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution provides with respect to double jeopardy: "nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, extended to the State through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb * * *." The question here presented is 
whether conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and first degree murder are the 
"same offense" so as to violate double jeopardy.

[¶7.]     In Goodman v. State, 
601 P.2d 178, 185 (Wyo. 1979), we said:

"If the offenses charged 
are separate and distinct either with respect to statutory definition, or 
because they grow out of different transactions and different evidence is needed 
to prove each, the constitutional inhibition against double jeopardy is not 
applicable and, so long as the offenses charged are not factually inconsistent, 
a defendant may be found guilty and judgment and sentence entered thereon may be 
had as to each of the offenses charged."

[¶8.]     We have held that the 
legislature intended to punish separately the conspiracy and the substantive 
offense. Schultz, 751 P.2d 367. See also Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 
(Wyo. 1987). 
Our reasoning is articulated sufficiently in those decisions. A recitation of it 
a second time in this case is, therefore, unnecessary.

[¶9.]     Finding no merit in 
Garcia's contention that his sentence placed him in double jeopardy, we affirm 
the judgment and sentence.