Title: State v. LaFountain

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_LAFOUNTAIN.92-574; 160 Vt. 313; 628 A.2d 1243


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-574


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Christopher J. Lafountain, et al.            December Term, 1992



 George T. Costes, J.

 Scot Kline, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson,
    Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, and Gary Kessler, Supervising
    Appellate Prosecutor, and Peter L. Potts, Legal Intern, Montpelier, for
    plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
 Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.    Defendant Lafountain brings this interlocutory appeal
 from an order denying his motion to dismiss a misdemeanor charge of driving
 with a suspended license (DLS) in violation of 23 V.S.A. { 674(b).
 Defendant's primary argument is that the State's use of his two prior
 uncounseled civil violations to enhance the penalty for a third charge
 violates his constitutional rights to counsel and due process.  Defendant
 also challenges the sufficiency of the information, the nature of proof
 required by { 674, and the non-bifurcated trial below.  We affirm.
      Prior to the charge at issue, defendant was twice found to have
 committed DLS violations under 23 V.S.A. { 676.  On June 3, 1992, defendant
 was charged with violating { 676 for the third time, which constitutes a
 criminal misdemeanor offense under 23 V.S.A. { 674.
      The only sanction for a first or second { 676 DLS violation is a civil
 penalty, carrying a maximum fine of $175.00.  23 V.S.A. { 2302 (c).  For
 further violations, however, 23 V.S.A. { 674(b) provides that "[a] person
 who violates section 676 of this title for the third or subsequent time
 shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of this
 section."  The penalty for violation of { 674 is imprisonment for not more
 than two years, with a mandatory minimum of two consecutive days to serve
 that may not be suspended or deferred, or a fine of not more than $5,000.00,
 or both.  23 V.S.A. { 674 (a).
      Defendant's primary contention is that { 674(b) violates his rights to
 counsel and due process.  Even though he was not entitled to counsel in his
 civil proceedings, see State v. O'Brien, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 609 A.2d 981,
 982 (1992) (license suspension proceeding under 23 V.S.A. { 1205 is not
 criminal, and therefore does not mandate a jury trial, appointed counsel,
 protection against self-incrimination, proof beyond a reasonable doubt or
 confrontation as protected by the Sixth Amendment);  Shaw v. Vermont
 District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 6-7, 563 A.2d 636, 639-640 (1989) (because
 summary suspension hearing is civil proceeding, not criminal, right under
 Vermont Constitution to trial by jury does not apply), defendant claims
 that the prior uncounseled violations cannot be used to enhance his penalty
 for the current violation.  He argues that the trial court erroneously based
 its decision on Lewis v. United States,