Title: Miller v. OH St. Hwy. Patrol

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3720.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3720 
THE STATE EX REL. MILLER, APPELLANT, v. OHIO STATE HIGHWAY  
PATROL ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 
it may be cited as State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3720.] 
Public records—R.C. 149.43—Mandamus—Clear and convincing evidence—
Action improperly dismissed by court of appeals for failure of proof—
Relator’s evidence established that public-records request was made and 
refused in part—Custodian must demonstrate that refusal was justified by 
statutory exemption from disclosure. 
(No. 2012-2132—Submitted June 4, 2013—Decided September 3, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA2012-05-034. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal of a public-records mandamus case filed initially 
in the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Clermont County.  Appellant, Mark 
Miller, asserts that he made a public-records request of appellees, the Ohio State 
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Highway Patrol and its employee Jeff Maute (collectively, “the Patrol”), seeking 
records related to traffic incidents involving a particular trooper.  The Patrol 
provided some records, but Miller asserts that it continues to withhold video and 
audio recordings and reports involving the traffic stop and arrest of a particular 
person on July 15 or 16, 2011.  The Patrol acknowledges that “information 
regarding open/pending criminal cases is being withheld” because of the 
investigatory-work-product exception to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 2} On motion by the Patrol, the Twelfth District dismissed the action.  
Although the court found that Miller’s evidence had not been presented in a 
timely manner or in the required form—a fact that mandates dismissal by local 
rule—it nevertheless considered the evidence, which includes a letter from the 
Patrol establishing on its face that the Patrol has refused to release certain 
documents requested by Miller.  Because the Patrol must support its contention 
that the withheld material falls under the “confidential law enforcement 
investigatory record” exception to the Public Records Act, we remand to the 
Twelfth District for that court to determine whether the documents fall within the 
asserted exception. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} Miller filed a mandamus action in the Twelfth District Court of 
Appeals alleging that he sent a public-records request to the Patrol on September 
9, 2011.  In support of this allegation, he attached to the complaint a copy of the 
letter making the request.  The letter is undated.  Miller also alleges that the letter 
was sent by certified mail, and as evidence attached a return receipt to the 
complaint. Miller asserts that the return receipt indicates that the public-records 
request “was received on September 19, 2011,” but the return receipt indicates 
that the item was delivered on June 3, 2011. 
{¶ 4} The letter requested a number of records, some of which relate to 
Trooper Joseph Westhoven during the summer of 2011.  Miller asserts that none 
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of the records sought in the letter are exempt from disclosure under the Public 
Records Act. 
{¶ 5} As of October 27, 2011, apparently because of a mix-up dealing 
with an e-mail address, Miller believed that the Patrol had not responded to his 
public-records request.  As a result, he filed a mandamus action in the Twelfth 
District.  The Patrol pointed out that it had provided responsive documents to the 
e-mail address in the letter, and Miller dropped the mandamus action. 
{¶ 6} Miller alleges that while it was true that the Patrol had provided 
some of the requested documents, it refused to produce several requested records 
that it claimed were not subject to disclosure.  The only records at issue in this 
action are video and audio recordings from Trooper Westhoven’s cruiser and 
impaired-driver reports dealing with the traffic stop, detention, arrest, and 
transport of Ashley Ruberg on July 15 or July 16, 2011. 
{¶ 7} In a letter addressed to Miller’s attorney on March 20, 2012, the 
Patrol confirmed its refusal to provide the records at issue and explained that the 
refusal was based on its belief that the documents were investigatory work 
product for an ongoing criminal investigation and were not subject to disclosure 
under the Public Records Act, specifically, R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) and (2).  The 
March 20, 2012 letter, rather than being a response to the undated request letter as 
Miller asserts, responded to a February 16, 2012 request that evidently asked 
more specifically for records regarding Ashley Ruberg.  Miller asserts that the 
records do not constitute investigatory work product, but are public records not 
subject to any exemption.  Miller’s complaint prays for a writ of mandamus 
compelling the release of these records, statutory damages, attorney fees, and 
costs. 
{¶ 8} Miller’s complaint was filed on May 10, 2012.  The Patrol’s 
answer was filed on June 6, 2012. Under local rules, all evidence must be 
presented and the relator’s brief filed within four months of the filing of an 
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original action; if these actions are not taken, the action “shall be dismissed” 
unless good cause is shown.  Loc.R. 20(N) of the Twelfth District Court of 
Appeals.  Under these rules, the evidence and Miller’s brief were due no later than 
September 10, 2012.  Loc.R. 20(G) and (H).  Counsel for Miller sent an e-mail to 
counsel for the Patrol on September 6, 2012, stating that he was planning on 
drafting an agreed statement of facts that day. Counsel for the Patrol responded 
that she would not be able to review the statement with her clients or agree to a 
statement by the September 10 deadline, less than three business days later.  
Counsel for the Patrol said that she would not agree to a joint motion for 
extension of time, but pointed out that counsel for Miller could file such a motion. 
Miller’s counsel responded that he would simply file the brief on September 10 
with no stipulations. 
{¶ 9} However, rather than filing a brief, counsel for Miller filed an 
affidavit with exhibits on September 10, 2012.  The exhibits are the same ones 
attached to the complaint—the undated letter, the certified-mail return, and the 
March 20, 2012 response.  The Patrol filed a motion to strike the affidavit and a 
motion to dismiss.  The Twelfth District then issued a show-cause order directing 
Miller to show why the action should not be dismissed.  The next day, Miller filed 
a brief on the merits and, a week later, a response to the motion and show-cause 
order.  The Patrol replied to Miller’s response and moved to strike his brief on the 
basis that Miller’s “entire case rests on information that does not comport” with 
the local rules. 
{¶ 10} The Twelfth District determined that although Miller failed to 
comply with the local rule requiring that evidence be presented in the form of an 
agreed statement of facts, stipulations, or depositions, see Loc.R. 20(G), it would 
nevertheless consider Miller’s affidavit and attachments “for whatever evidentiary 
value [they] may have.” 
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{¶ 11} The court of appeals then found that Miller had not established a 
clear legal right to relief.  In so finding, the court detailed numerous defects in 
Miller’s case, including procedural defaults, contradictory and unsupported 
factual claims, and a faulty timeline.  The court concluded that Miller had not 
established a clear legal right, by clear and convincing evidence, to the records 
involving Ashley Ruberg.  “No evidence, other than the statements in relator’s 
affidavit, has been submitted indicating that relator’s specific request, which did 
not even mention the name ‘Ashley Ruberg,’ was ever denied, improperly or 
otherwise.”  State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 12th Dist. Clermont 
No. CA2012-05-034, at 5 (Nov. 21, 2012). 
{¶ 12} Miller appealed to this court. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 13} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1). 
{¶ 14} Although “[w]e construe the Public Records Act liberally in favor 
of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of disclosure of public records,” 
State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-
Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6, the relator must still establish entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief by clear and convincing evidence.  State ex rel. 
Doner v. Zody, 130 Ohio St.3d 446, 2011-Ohio-6117, 958 N.E.2d 1235, 
paragraph three of the syllabus (“Relators in mandamus cases must prove their 
entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence”). 
 
Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree 
of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the 
evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required 
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‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will 
produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction 
as to the facts sought to be established.” 
 
State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 
1215, ¶ 18, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 15} In this case, the standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is 
especially problematic for Miller.  Miller’s evidence of his public-records request 
and of the Patrol’s response to it was incomplete and confusingly presented. 
{¶ 16} For example, Miller states that his request was sent on September 
9, 2011, but the letter attached as an exhibit is undated.  The exhibit purporting to 
be the return receipt for this letter shows a delivery date of June 3, 2011, which 
predates the creation of the records Miller claims he wants from the Patrol. The 
other exhibit attached to Miller’s affidavit is a letter from the Patrol dated March 
20, 2012, which is a response to a different records request, although one that 
pertains to similar subject matter. 
{¶ 17} The Patrol pointed out Miller’s failure to submit evidence and a 
brief in compliance with local rules.  Nevertheless, the Twelfth District—albeit 
reluctantly—considered the evidence and denied the Patrol’s motions to strike, 
stating, “While affidavits are not mentioned in the rule, [Miller’s] affidavit will be 
considered by the court for whatever evidentiary value it may have.”  12th Dist. 
Clermont No. CA2012-05-034, at 3. 
{¶ 18} However, given that the evidence was accepted, that court abused 
its discretion by deciding that Miller presented no evidence that his records 
request had ever been denied.  Regardless of the other contradictory and 
confusing evidence, the March 20, 2012 letter from the Patrol demonstrates on its 
face that Miller made a public-records request and that the Patrol partially 
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complied with that request but withheld some records.  The existence and 
authenticity of the letter are not contested by the Patrol. 
{¶ 19} Specifically, the heading of the March 20, 2012 letter reads, 
“February 16, 2012 Public Records Request.”  The letter also references a 
February 16, 2012 request and a follow-up e-mail on March 13, 2012.  It states 
that records “were previously provided to you on behalf of your client, Mark 
Miller.”  It quotes the public-records request as asking for:  
 
Any and all video and audio records from the police cruiser 
operated by Trooper Joseph Westhoven, Batavia Patrol Post, from 
the beginning of his shift on July 15, 2011 through the end of his 
shift on July 16, 2011.  This audio and video should specifically 
pertain to and include the stop, detention, arrest and transport of 
Ashley Ruberg. 
 
{¶ 20} A similar quote reflects a request for impaired-driver reports for 
the same dates, specifically those relating to Ashley Ruberg. 
{¶ 21} Thus, the letter shows that the February 16, 2012 public-records 
request specifically asked for records pertaining to Trooper Westhoven’s stop and 
arrest of Ashley Ruberg on July 15 through 16, 2011.  The letter states that discs 
containing the recordings and reports were enclosed, but also states that 
investigative work product “may be excluded” or “is being withheld.”  Miller 
claims that the portions of the records documenting the Ashley Ruberg incident 
were withheld, and the Patrol admitted in its answer that those records were not 
provided. 
{¶ 22} In other words, however maladroit Miller’s complaint and 
presentation of evidence, the letter from the Patrol is clear and convincing 
evidence that Miller has stated a claim for relief, in that he has requested public 
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records that have not been produced.  In particular, the March 20, 2012 letter is 
evidence that (1) Miller made, through counsel, a public-records request regarding 
recordings and impaired-driver reports from Trooper Westhoven for the dates of 
July 15 and 16, 2011, including those specifically regarding Ashley Ruberg, (2) 
the Patrol responded by providing most of the requested records, and (3) the 
Patrol withheld some records under the investigatory-work-product exception. 
{¶ 23} Having refused to provide requested records, the Patrol must show 
that the withheld records fall squarely within a statutory exception.  Exceptions to 
disclosure under the Public Records Act are strictly construed against the public-
records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability 
of an exception.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 
81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus, citing State 
ex rel. Carr v. Akron, 112 Ohio St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714, 859 N.E.2d 948, 
¶ 30; State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 
2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 25.  A custodian does not meet this burden 
if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely within the exception.  
Cincinnati Enquirer at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 24} The exception the Patrol invokes in the March 20 letter is 
“investigat[ory] work product,” which is not in and of itself an exception, but an 
element of a larger exception.  That exception is codified at R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h), 
which excludes “confidential law enforcement investigatory records” from the 
definition of “public record.”  A “confidential law enforcement investigatory 
record” is defined in R.C. 149.43(A)(2) as 
 
any record that pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal, 
quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, but only to the 
extent that the release of the record would create a high probability 
of disclosure of any of the following: 
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* * * 
(c) Specific confidential investigatory techniques or 
procedures or specific investigatory work product. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 25} Whether or not a particular record is a “confidential law 
enforcement investigatory record” is determined by a two-part test.  “ ‘ “First, is 
the record a confidential law enforcement record?  Second, would release of the 
record ‘create a high probability of disclosure’ of any one of the four kinds of 
information specified in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)?” ’ ” State ex rel. Musial v. N. 
Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 19, quoting 
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 741 
N.E.2d 511 (2001), quoting State ex rel. Polovischak v. Mayfield, 50 Ohio St.3d 
51, 52, 552 N.E.2d 635 (1990).  Thus, the Patrol needs to establish that the 
withheld records pertain to a “law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-
criminal, civil, or administrative nature” whose release would create a “high 
probability of disclosure” of “specific investigatory work product.” 
{¶ 26} “Specific investigatory work product” consists of “information, 
including notes, working papers, memoranda, or similar materials, assembled by 
law enforcement officials in connection with a probable or pending criminal 
proceeding.”  State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer at 56, citing  
State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 434, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994).  
However, “specific investigatory work product” does not include “ongoing 
routine offense and incident reports.”  Id., paragraph five of the syllabus.  See also 
Beacon Journal at 57; State ex rel. Logan Daily News v. Jones, 78 Ohio St.3d 
322, 323, 677 N.E.2d 1195 (1997).  Records “ ‘even further removed from the 
initiation of the criminal investigation than the form reports themselves,’ ” such as 
9-1-1 recordings, are also public records.  Beacon Journal, id., quoting State ex 
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rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 662 N.E.2d 
334 (1996). 
{¶ 27} Therefore, we remand the case to the Twelfth District to review the 
withheld records and determine whether they fall under the “confidential law 
enforcement investigatory record” exception to the Public Records Act, and 
specifically whether they would create a “high probability of disclosure” of 
“specific investigatory work product” as asserted by the Patrol. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
 
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman; and Finney, 
Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson, Christopher P. Finney, and Bradley M. Gibson, for 
appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Morgan A. Linn, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees. 
________________________