Title: William A. Gregory v. State of Florida (with)

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-842 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM A. GREGORY,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 27, 2013] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
William A. Gregory appeals his convictions and death sentences for the 
August 2007 first-degree murders of Skyler Dawn Meekins and Daniel Arthur 
Dyer.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we affirm Gregory’s convictions and sentences. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Guilt Phase 
William A. Gregory, who was twenty-four years old when the murders were 
committed, was for a time involved in a romantic relationship with Skyler Dawn 
Meekins, who was seventeen at the time she was murdered.  Skyler and Gregory 
 
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had a child together, although their romantic relationship ended in June 2007.  
Skyler and Gregory both continued, however, to participate in raising their child.   
Around the time their relationship ended, Gregory was in jail and would 
often call Skyler’s house.  On several occasions, he spoke with Skyler’s brother, 
and the two would discuss Skyler’s whereabouts and activities.  During one call, 
Gregory said he was “stressing about Skyler” and asked for information regarding 
any other men who might be calling for Skyler.  Gregory stated that he knew 
Skyler was “trying to . . . get with dudes” and indicated that he would have to 
“kind of try to get over Skyler or something.”   
 
During another call, Gregory asked Skyler’s brother to check Skyler’s e-mail 
account and online profile for other men with whom she might be communicating.  
Gregory told Skyler’s brother that he had previously accessed Skyler’s e-mail 
account and “erased . . . all the dudes she had on there.”  Gregory also directed 
Skyler’s brother to delete a message Skyler had posted on her online profile about 
being newly single.  According to an individual who was incarcerated with 
Gregory during the period in which these calls were made, Gregory was jealous of 
Skyler, did not like the people she was spending time with, and stated that if he 
ever caught Skyler “cheating” on him, “he was going to blow her . . . head off.”   
Skyler began dating a new boyfriend, Daniel Arthur Dyer, on July 4, 2007.  
Gregory was aware of Skyler’s new relationship with Daniel, but Gregory would 
 
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continue to call for Skyler and, after his release from jail, would visit Skyler’s 
house several times per week.  According to Skyler’s brother, Gregory would call 
and stop by to see Skyler “[a]t least three times a week . . . [u]sually not invited.”  
Gregory and Skyler did, however, agree to go shopping together for their child’s 
birthday party, and, while he was still in jail, Gregory would discuss the child on 
the phone calls he placed. 
 
On August 20, the day before the murders, Gregory, who was out of jail and 
on probation, spent the day with his brother and a few friends.  While at one 
friend’s house, he test-fired a pistol that someone was trying to sell, possibly 
leaving gunshot residue on his hands, and while riding around with his brother and 
another friend, he used marijuana and crack cocaine and took pills.  Sometime that 
afternoon, Gregory called Daniel’s cell phone, asking to speak to Skyler, who 
spent the day with Daniel and Daniel’s friend at Daniel’s house. 
  
Starting at 10:19 p.m. that night, Gregory began making a number of 
outgoing phone calls, including several to Skyler’s house.  At 10:26 p.m., an 
incoming call was made from Skyler’s house to Gregory’s house number, and 
there were then six additional outgoing calls from Gregory to Skyler’s house after 
the incoming call to Gregory went unanswered.  At 11:31 and 11:32 p.m., Gregory 
called the number for a taxicab company that was no longer in business.   
 
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Gregory’s brother recalled seeing Gregory in their shared bedroom at 
approximately 3:00 or 3:30 a.m. in the early morning hours of August 21.  Gregory 
was wet and mumbling about being down by the beach.  Gregory later told his 
brother that he passed out at the beach and awoke with a wave washing up on him, 
that his shoes and wallet “got all soaked,” and that he then dove in the pool at a 
nearby condominium complex because he was “all . . . sandy.”   
 
At 4:17 a.m., Gregory called 911 to report himself for a probation violation 
as a result of his earlier drug use.  A law enforcement officer informed Gregory 
that Gregory would have to take the matter up with his probation officer.  
Gregory’s brother and a friend said that they had used drugs with Gregory in the 
past and had never known him to self-report a probation violation.   
 
Around 6 a.m. that morning, Skyler’s grandparents, who had been sleeping 
in the home during the murders, awoke to find Skyler and her boyfriend Daniel 
dead in Skyler’s bed.  Skyler and Daniel had each suffered heavy head trauma 
caused by the firing of a shotgun at close range while they slept.  Skyler’s father, 
who lived next door, called the authorities, and sheriff’s deputies were dispatched 
to the home.  On arrival, the deputies observed Skyler’s and Daniel’s bodies in a 
back bedroom, along with a shotgun and two shotgun shells lying on the floor in 
front of the bed.  Skyler’s grandfather kept a shotgun and rifles, along with 
ammunition, in a house closet, which was usually left unlocked.   
 
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Gregory had previously lived with Skyler in that house, and the guns were 
kept in the same location during that time.  A firearms analyst concluded that an 
individual would have to have been familiar with the particular shotgun used as the 
murder weapon in this case in order to load it because it was not a popular shotgun 
and was “quite different” in how it would be loaded.  Gregory’s fingerprints were 
found on this shotgun. 
 
After police had arrived at the home, Skyler’s brother called and left a 
message for Gregory at 7:26 a.m., stating, “You better run.”  Gregory placed a 911 
call at 8:24 a.m. to report this message to law enforcement and was taken by law 
enforcement to the Flagler County Sheriff’s Office as a result of calling in the 
threat.  Gregory was then arrested for a violation of probation based on his earlier 
admissions of using a controlled substance.   
While at the sheriff’s office, Gregory was tested for gunshot residue.  The 
results were negative, although Gregory apparently thought that he had tested 
positive based on test-firing a pistol the prior day.  Gregory subsequently placed a 
call to a friend from jail, telling her not to incriminate herself because the calls 
were recorded, and then explaining that law enforcement had taken magnet 
samples on his skin and reminding her that he “was popping off that pistol in the 
backyard” the previous day. 
 
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In subsequent phone calls, Gregory spoke to his mother and brother about 
the answers they were giving to law enforcement regarding his whereabouts at the 
time of the murders.  In particular, Gregory questioned his mother about why she 
told investigators that she did not see him on the morning of August 21, and told 
her, “nobody’s helping me out.”   
 
On August 25, Gregory was moved to a different housing facility.  During 
this time, he was in the same cell block as an inmate who had been certified as a 
paralegal, and Gregory discussed his situation with this inmate.  Gregory believed 
he had tested positive for gunshot residue and seemed very surprised about this 
because he said that was one of the reasons he had jumped in a pool after the 
incident.  Gregory told the inmate that he used a shotgun instead of a pistol, 
thinking there would be less gunshot residue, and figured he must have tested 
positive because of firing the pistol the day before the murders. 
 
According to this inmate, Gregory knew Daniel and Skyler were together in 
Skyler’s house on August 21 because Gregory “said he was outside the house, like 
watching the house.”  Gregory told the inmate that he “just couldn’t stand to see” 
Skyler with her new boyfriend and that the “worst part about it all was watching 
[Skyler] die.”  Gregory also stated to the inmate that he was “frustrated because he 
couldn’t talk to his family on the phone because he knew that it was being 
recorded” and stated that his family members “were going to be his alibi.” 
 
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Gregory later spoke to a different inmate about his case.  Gregory told this 
individual that it was “a joke” that the State was concerned about Gregory having 
walked to Skyler’s house on the night of the murders because it was “impossible 
for that to have happened.”  Gregory stated that he had a ride that night and that he 
“did what he had to do.”   
 
Gregory was subsequently indicted and tried for the murders of Skyler and 
Daniel.  The jury found Gregory guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, one 
count of burglary, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.      
The Penalty Phase 
 
During the penalty phase of Gregory’s trial, the State presented testimony 
from Gregory’s probation officer that Gregory was on felony probation at the time 
of the murders.  Gregory called his sister and mother to testify.  Gregory’s sister 
testified about Gregory’s history of drug use, lack of a relationship with his father, 
and his witnessing an incident during which she was raped when he was eight 
years old.  Gregory’s mother testified about two head injuries Gregory suffered as 
a child and about the effect her abusive relationships with men and the rape 
incident involving Gregory’s sister had on Gregory. 
 
By a vote of seven to five, the jury recommended that Gregory be sentenced 
to death for the murders of Skyler Dawn Meekins and Daniel Arthur Dyer.  A 
 
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Spencer1
In sentencing Gregory to death for both murders, the trial court found the 
following aggravating circumstances as to both victims: (1) the murders were 
committed by a person previously convicted of a felony who was on felony 
probation (moderate weight); (2) Gregory was previously convicted of a prior 
violent felony (very substantial weight);
 hearing was held thereafter, where the State presented victim impact 
testimony and Gregory’s sister briefly testified on his behalf.   
2 (3) the murders were committed during 
the course of a burglary (moderate weight); and (4) the murders were committed in 
a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (CCP) (great weight).  The trial court found one statutory mitigating 
circumstance—the murders were committed while Gregory was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (slight weight)—and six 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.3
                                         
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
  Finding that the aggravating 
 
2.  The trial court used the contemporaneous murders to support the prior 
violent felony aggravator. 
 
3.  The nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were: (1) Gregory had a 
longstanding drug problem (slight weight); (2) Gregory grew up without his father 
and was raised by his mother (slight weight); (3) in his childhood, Gregory was 
forced to witness sexual abuse (slight weight); (4) Gregory had a dysfunctional 
childhood (slight weight); (5) Gregory was impaired at the time of the crime due to 
the ingestion of drugs, alcohol, or both; and (6) Gregory was employed and was a 
good worker (slight weight). 
 
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circumstances far outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the trial court 
sentenced Gregory to death for both murders. 
ANALYSIS 
Gregory raises five issues on appeal,4
Disqualification of the Trial Judge 
 three of which are related to 
evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge during the guilt phase.  In addition to 
the issues raised by Gregory, this Court must consider whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support Gregory’s convictions and whether the death sentences are 
proportionate.  We now address each issue. 
 
The first issue Gregory raises is the trial court’s denial of his motion to 
disqualify the judge as legally insufficient.  “A motion to disqualify is governed 
substantively by section 38.10, Florida Statutes . . . and procedurally by Florida 
Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330.”  Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Fla. 
2007).  The moving party must file an affidavit in good faith “stating fear that he or 
she will not receive a fair trial . . . on account of the prejudice of the judge,” as well 
                                         
 
4.  Gregory argues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to disqualify the judge based on statements the judge made during a pretrial 
hearing; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence threatening statements 
directed toward the victims made eight months before the murders by Gregory to a 
co-worker; (3) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a witness who 
could not identify Gregory in court; (4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony 
about a statement Gregory made to one of the victims; and (5) the trial court erred 
in instructing the jury on and in finding CCP. 
 
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as “the facts and the reasons for the belief that any such bias or prejudice exists.”  
§ 38.10, Fla Stat. (2011).  “The judge against whom an initial motion to disqualify 
. . . is directed shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not 
pass on the truth of the facts alleged.”  Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f).  
“Whether the motion is legally sufficient requires a determination as to 
whether the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-
founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.”  Rodriguez v. State, 919 
So. 2d 1252, 1274 (Fla. 2005).  “A motion to disqualify a judge ‘must be well-
founded and contain facts germane to the judge’s undue bias, prejudice, or 
sympathy.’ ”  Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 873 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Jackson v. 
State, 599 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. 1992)).  “A mere ‘subjective fear[]’ of bias will 
not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable.”  Arbelaez 
v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 41 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 
242 (Fla. 1986)).   
“If the motion is legally sufficient, the judge shall immediately enter an 
order granting disqualification and proceed no further in the action.”  Fla. R. Jud. 
Admin. 2.330(f).  However, “[i]f any motion is legally insufficient, an order 
denying the motion shall immediately be entered.  No other reason for denial shall 
be stated, and an order of denial shall not take issue with the motion.”  Id.   
 
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Whether the motion is legally sufficient is a question of law, and the 
standard of review of a trial judge’s determination of a motion to disqualify is de 
novo.  Stein v. State, 995 So. 2d 329, 334 (Fla. 2008).  Gregory argues that his 
motion to disqualify was legally sufficient because several of the trial judge’s 
comments displayed a bias against him and furthered his belief that he would not 
receive a fair trial.  We conclude that Gregory’s argument is without merit.   
The alleged grounds for disqualification arose during a pretrial hearing 
regarding the admissibility of certain pieces of evidence the State intended to 
introduce at trial.  Gregory argued that a statement he made eight months before 
the murders about killing “both of them” if his girlfriend ever cheated on him was 
too remote to be relevant.  In response to this argument, the trial judge stated: 
My reaction here is that this is not remote at all, that it’s -- 
while there is some time delay -- and if he is, in fact, the one who 
committed the murder, it is quite prophetic in terms of what’s going to 
happen.  So, you know, we’re not talking about ten years or five years 
or three years.  We’re talking about just months before the breakup 
and then the alleged murder happened later on.   
Now, whether they can prove that he did this or not, that’s 
another matter
 
, but it seems to me they are entitled to the benefit of 
trying to prove all the elements of the crime when one is 
premeditation, and this goes to that issue.  So I’m going to . . . allow 
it. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Gregory argues that the trial judge’s use of the word “prophetic” to describe 
the statement indicates that the judge had already determined that Gregory was 
 
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guilty.  We conclude that this argument is unavailing because Gregory focuses on 
one word out of context without including the trial judge’s actual statement.  See 
generally Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1170-71 (Fla. 2005) (reading the 
trial judge’s statement in the context of the timing of a plea offer); Moore v. State, 
820 So. 2d 199, 206-07 (Fla. 2002) (viewing the trial court’s ruling in the context 
of the order entered by the trial judge); Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 917 (Fla. 
2000) (concluding, after a review of all the cited comments and the record as a 
whole, that the trial judge had not prejudged the case).  When read as a whole, it is 
clear that the judge used the word “prophetic” in relation to the State’s argument 
that Gregory’s statement was relevant to the issue of premeditation.  Indeed, the 
judge’s actual statement was that “if he [Gregory] is, in fact, the one who 
committed the murder, it is quite prophetic in terms of what’s going to happen.”  
(Emphasis supplied.)   
In addition to the “prophetic” comment, Gregory’s disqualification motion 
also alleged that the trial judge demonstrated bias against him during a part of the 
same pretrial hearing concerning the admissibility of recorded telephone calls 
between Gregory and Skyler.  Gregory alleged in his motion that the trial judge 
stated that hearing the victim’s voice would be “refreshing” because she “has now 
been silenced,” and that this constituted a legally sufficient basis for 
disqualification.   
 
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As it relates to this comment, we begin by noting that Gregory’s 
disqualification motion and accompanying affidavit misstated the judge’s 
remarks.5
Although trial counsel apparently did not intentionally misrepresent the 
judge’s comment but instead misheard the remarks, a motion made on a trial 
judge’s statement in open court that does not accurately represent what has actually 
been said cannot comply with the requirement that an affidavit be made “in good 
faith.”  See § 38.10, Fla Stat. (2011).  Further, for the motion to be legally 
sufficient, a movant cannot simply pluck one word from a full sentence made by 
the trial judge and omit the remainder of the statement.   
  At no point during the relevant part of the hearing did the judge use the 
word “refreshing.”  Instead, the trial judge stated that he found it “quite 
interesting” that the jury would be able to hear the victim’s voice.  The judge did 
not make any reference to Gregory being the one who “silenced” the victim, nor 
did he comment on Gregory’s guilt or innocence.  
 To the extent Gregory claims that the trial judge’s remarks may have 
produced an improper emotional response to prospective jurors, this argument is 
unavailing because the remarks were not made to the jury.  Gregory appears to 
argue that the publication of these comments in the press created a public prejudice 
                                         
 
5.  Apparently, the misstatement was not intentional, but the motion for 
disqualification was filed before counsel had obtained a copy of the actual 
transcript. 
 
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against him, and as support, he attached a newspaper article to his disqualification 
motion.  However, Gregory raises no challenge to jury selection or composition or 
to pretrial publicity, and he provides no factual basis beyond the comments and 
news report attached to the motion itself to substantiate these claims.   
Accordingly, because Gregory has not alleged any facts that “would create 
in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and 
impartial trial,”  Rodriguez, 919 So. 2d at 1274, we conclude that the trial court did 
not err as a matter of law in denying Gregory’s motion to disqualify. 
Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Gregory next raises three distinct challenges to evidentiary rulings made 
during the guilt phase of the trial.  We address each claim in turn. 
Admissibility of Statement Made by Gregory 
First, Gregory contends that the trial court improperly admitted a statement 
made by Gregory eight months before the murder to a former co-worker that, if 
Gregory ever caught his girlfriend cheating on him, he would kill them both.  The 
State contends that Gregory’s statement shows premeditation and intent to kill.  
We conclude that Gregory’s statement was relevant and that its probative value 
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and the trial 
court therefore did not err in admitting this statement. 
 
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“This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  A judge’s 
discretion is limited by the rules of evidence and by the principles of stare decisis.”  
Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 949 (Fla. 2007) (citation omitted).  “Relevant 
evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.”  § 90.401, Fla. 
Stat. (2011).  “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law.”  
§ 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2011).   
Relevant evidence “is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the 
jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2011).  
“The trial court is obligated to exclude evidence in which unfair prejudice 
outweighs the probative value in order to avoid the danger that a jury will convict a 
defendant based upon reasons other than evidence establishing his guilt.”  
McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 327 (Fla. 2007). 
The issue before the Court is whether the eight-month delay between 
Gregory’s statement and the murders lessens the statement’s relevance to the point 
that it should have been excluded from evidence in this case.  A review of Florida 
case law indicates that there is no bright-line rule regarding the point at which a 
prior statement is so remote as to become irrelevant.  However, this Court has 
previously upheld as relevant to the issue of premeditation a defendant’s statement, 
 
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made five months before the murder, that he intended to kill the victim.  See 
LaMarca v. State, 785 So. 2d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2001).   
Gregory relies on a Nevada Supreme Court case stating that “events remote 
in time from the charged incident have less relevance in proving later intent.”  
Walker v. State, 997 P.2d 803, 806-07 (Nev. 2000).  Although that observation is 
generally accurate, the statements in the Nevada case were made six and ten years 
prior to the murder.  Therefore, Walker is not helpful authority for Gregory, whose 
statement was made less than a year before the murders in this case.  As to 
Gregory’s additional suggestion that his prior statement did not indicate an intent 
to kill because the threat was not taken seriously, that argument goes to the weight 
of the evidence, not its admissibility.   
 
Even relevant evidence, though, must be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  § 90.403, Fla. Stat.  
Gregory contends that the prejudice of implying from his statement an intent to kill 
is unduly prejudicial.  However, this Court has previously upheld the admissibility 
of other relevant threatening statements similar to the one in this case.  See Floyd 
v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 448 (Fla. 2009); Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741, 762 (Fla. 
2002); Pittman v. State, 646 So. 2d 167, 170-71 (Fla. 1994).   
Because Gregory’s prior statement provides evidence of his motive and 
intent in murdering his former girlfriend and her new boyfriend, and because the 
 
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statement was not so remote in time as to have minimal probative value, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the applicable 
case law to the facts of this case to conclude that Gregory’s statement was 
admissible.   
Admissibility of Testimony from Tyrone Graves 
Gregory next argues that the trial court should have excluded testimony from 
Tyrone Graves, an individual who said he met and spoke with Gregory while the 
two were in jail at the same time, because Graves did not provide an in-court 
identification of Gregory.  The State contends that the information Graves 
provided, including a physical description of Gregory and Gregory’s independently 
verified phone number, was sufficient to identify Gregory and establish the 
relevance of the testimony.  We agree and conclude that there was no basis for 
excluding this testimony. 
The sole issue Gregory raises with respect to this claim is Graves’s failure to 
identify Gregory in court when asked whether he saw Gregory in the courtroom.  
However, aside from objecting on general relevancy grounds, Gregory provides no 
basis to support his claim that Graves’s testimony about comments attributed to 
Gregory should have been excluded.   
A review of the record shows that, even if an in-court identification was 
necessary under these circumstances, Graves provided a precise identification of 
 
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Gregory as the person who uttered the remarks about which Graves testified.  
During his testimony, Graves offered a physical description of Gregory, which 
Gregory does not challenge.  Further, Graves had previously given Gregory’s 
phone number, which Gregory provided to Graves during their time in jail 
together, to law enforcement, who independently verified its accuracy.  Graves had 
also previously called the phone number and testified that he recognized the voice 
as the inmate he knew as Gregory.   
In short, Gregory does not allege any facts, other than Graves’s failure to 
make an in-court identification, to indicate that the statements to which Graves 
testified were not made by Gregory and that this testimony was therefore not 
relevant.  In addition, even if there is any question regarding whether Graves 
correctly identified Gregory as the one who made the statements, that issue goes to 
the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility.   
Accordingly, this testimony was relevant and the trial court did not err in 
admitting the testimony. 
Double Hearsay 
In his third and final challenge to the evidentiary rulings made at trial, 
Gregory argues that testimony regarding a statement he allegedly made to Daniel 
Dyer, one of the victims, should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay 
evidence.  The State counters that the testimony was admissible based on an 
 
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exception to the hearsay rule or, alternatively, that a proper non-hearsay use 
existed.  The statement at issue, in which Gregory told Daniel either, “I want to 
personally thank you for ruining my life,” or “I personally want to thank you for 
ruining my family,” was presented at trial by two State witnesses, who testified 
that Daniel told them about a conversation during which Gregory made the 
statement.  Accordingly, this is an issue involving two levels of hearsay—the 
original statement made from Gregory to Daniel, and Daniel’s discussion of that 
statement to the two witnesses, who then relayed it at trial. 
We conclude that error, if any, in the admission of this testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 
(Fla. 1986).  In determining whether an error was harmful, the focus is on the 
effect that the error has upon the trier-of-fact.  Williams v. State, 863 So. 2d 1189, 
1190 (Fla. 2003).  In other words, “[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error affected the verdict.”  Id. (quoting DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 
1139).  “If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful.”  Id. (quoting 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139).  Critically, the test is not whether there is other 
evidence, or even overwhelming evidence, of guilt.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 
1139 (“The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly 
 
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wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or 
even an overwhelming evidence test.”). 
We conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that any error in the 
admission of this testimony affected either the verdict of guilt or the imposition of 
the death penalty in this case.  Unlike Gregory’s other statements, including his 
statement made months before the murder that if he ever found his girlfriend 
cheating on him, he would “kill both of them,” and his numerous statements made 
to Skyler’s brother showing an obsession about Skyler and any new relationship 
she might have, as well as Gregory’s constant phone calls and visits, Gregory’s 
alleged statement to the victim was not a threat of harm and at most is simply 
additional evidence that Gregory knew that the victim was dating his former 
girlfriend.  We conclude that under these circumstances, there is therefore no 
reasonable possibility that any error regarding this testimony affected the verdict in 
this case.   
CCP 
The fifth and final issue Gregory raises on appeal is the trial court’s finding 
of the CCP aggravator.  “The standard of review this Court applies to a claim 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravating circumstance is 
that of competent, substantial evidence.”  Guardado v. State, 965 So. 2d 108, 
115 (Fla. 2007).  “When reviewing a trial court’s finding of an aggravator, ‘it is not 
 
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this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the State 
proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is the trial 
court’s job.’ ” Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 608 (Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)).  Rather, it is this Court’s task 
on appeal “to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the 
right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent 
substantial evidence supports its finding.”  Id.  
To establish the CCP aggravator,  
the evidence must show: (1) “the killing was the product of cool and 
calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or 
a fit of rage (cold);” (2) “the defendant had a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident 
(calculated);” (3) “the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation 
(premeditated);” (4) “the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal 
justification.”   
Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 195 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. State, 965 
So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007)).  “ ‘CCP involves a much higher degree of 
premeditation’ than is required to prove first-degree murder.”  Deparvine v. State, 
995 So. 2d 351, 381-82 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 921 
(Fla. 2000)).  “Premeditation can be established by examining the circumstances of 
the killing and the conduct of the accused.”  Williams, 37 So. 3d at 195 (quoting 
Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98).  “The CCP aggravator can ‘be indicated by 
circumstances showing such facts as advance procurement of a weapon, lack of 
 
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resistance or provocation, and the appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of 
course.’ ”  Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98 (quoting Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 
277 (Fla. 1988)).  “Further, ‘the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant planned or prearranged to commit murder before the crime 
began.’ ”  Williams, 37 So. 3d at 195 (quoting Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 
1311, 1318 (Fla. 1990)).   
In finding that CCP had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial 
court stated in relevant part:  
In this case Mr. Gregory, on separate occasions, months before 
the murders . . . said he would blow her head off and he would kill 
both she and any new boyfriend she might have if Skyler Dawn 
Meekins cheated on him.  Consistent with this plan, Mr. Gregory 
became aware of Ms. Meekins’ new love interest, Daniel Arthur Dyer.  
Having been unsuccessful at winning her back, he put his plan in 
action. . . . 
 
Once at the residence he entered the house surreptitiously, 
located a 12-guage [sic] shotgun in a closet, located the shotgun shells 
on a shelf in the closet and loaded just two shells into the shotgun 
which was a weapon that was described as a difficult weapon to load.  
Mr. Gregory, at this point fully armed with a loaded weapon, passed 
by the separate rooms of Skyler Meekins’ grandmother and 
grandfather and went to the sleeping room which Skyler Meekins 
occupied where she and Daniel Dyer were cuddling while sleeping.  It 
has been clearly established, without refutation, that he placed the 
loaded weapon at point blank range and aimed at the heads of the 
respective victims where he killed each of them in execution style 
with devastating shots to the heads of both victims in an act that was 
totally consistent with his earlier announced plan. 
 
Gregory argues that there was not competent, substantial evidence to support 
the trial court’s finding of this aggravator.  We disagree. 
 
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This Court has previously explained, in describing the “cold,” “calculated,” 
and “premeditated” elements of CCP, that  
execution-style killing is by its very nature a “cold” crime.  As to the 
“calculated” element of CCP, this Court has held that where a 
defendant arms himself in advance, kills execution-style, and has time 
to coldly and calmly decide to kill, the element of calculated is 
supported.  This Court has “previously found the heightened 
premeditation required to sustain this aggravator where a defendant 
has the opportunity to leave the crime scene and not commit the 
murder but, instead, commits the murder.” 
Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 576 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Alston 
v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 162 (Fla. 1998)). 
Gregory contends that the murders in this case were not the product of cool 
and calm reflection because he did not bring a weapon to the home.  He also 
asserts that the evidence is devoid of any premeditated plan to kill and instead 
suggests that the murders were committed in a heat of passion after discovering the 
victims in bed together.  These arguments are unavailing. 
Although Gregory argues that the killings were committed in the heat of 
passion, inconsistent with the “cold” and “calculated” elements of CCP, the 
uncontested evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the victims were shot and 
killed execution-style from point blank range while sleeping and defenseless in the 
middle of the night.  As the Court stated in Pearce and has affirmed on numerous 
occasions, an execution-style killing is by nature a “cold” killing and can support a 
finding of “calculated” as well.  See, e.g., Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 299 (Fla. 
 
- 24 - 
2009) (“By their very nature, execution-style killings satisfy the cold element of 
CCP.”); Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 372-73 (Fla. 2003) (explaining that 
execution-style killings provide support for the “calculated” element of CCP).  
Further, we reject Gregory’s argument that because he did not bring a weapon to 
the home, he necessarily must not have had a heightened premeditated plan to kill.  
Having previously lived in the house, Gregory knew where the weapons were 
located, and this Court has never required as a prerequisite for finding CCP that the 
defendant bring a weapon to the crime scene.  See Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 
1215-16 (Fla. 2006).   
On the night of the crime, fully aware of Skyler’s new relationship with 
Daniel and having been unsuccessful at winning her back, Gregory traveled to 
Skyler’s house, obtained and loaded the specific murder weapon, and walked past 
other residents sleeping in the home in order to enter Skyler’s bedroom.  
Testimony presented at trial indicates that Gregory knew Skyler and Daniel were 
together that day and that he was outside watching the house before he entered.  
Competent, substantial evidence therefore supports the trial court’s finding that 
Gregory had a heightened premeditated plan, which was cold, calculated, and 
lacking in any moral or legal justification.   
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the CCP 
aggravator with respect to the murders of Skyler Meekins and Daniel Dyer.   
 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Although Gregory does not raise the issue, this Court has a mandatory 
obligation to review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a 
sentence of death has been imposed, even when not challenged.  See Jones v. State, 
963 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (“On direct appeal in 
death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality 
is an issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if 
necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.”).  “In determining the sufficiency of 
the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 
1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)). 
We conclude that the record in this case contains sufficient evidence to 
support Gregory’s convictions for the first-degree murders of Skyler Meekins and 
Daniel Dyer.  The State presented evidence that Gregory made statements in the 
months prior to the homicides in which he threatened to kill Skyler and anyone 
with whom she “cheated” on him, as well as testimony that Gregory knew Skyler 
had begun seeing Daniel.  In addition, the State demonstrated through the litany of 
recorded phone calls it published to the jury how jealous and obsessive Gregory 
 
- 26 - 
was about Skyler leaving him, and the State presented testimony that Gregory 
knew Daniel and Skyler were together on the night of the murders. 
Gregory’s fingerprints were found on the murder weapon.  He self-reported 
a probation violation, which was unusual for him and seemingly done in an attempt 
to create an alibi, and he attempted to remove traces of gunshot residue and DNA 
by going swimming after the crime.  The State also showed through inconsistent 
statements, recorded phone calls, and the testimony of a jailhouse witness that 
Gregory tried to influence his family’s statements to law enforcement about his 
whereabouts on the night of the crime.  He also admitted the murders to other 
inmates after the crime.      
Based on a review of the evidence presented in this case, a “rational trier of 
fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Simmons, 934 So. 2d at 1111.  Thus, we conclude that there 
was sufficient evidence to support Gregory’s convictions. 
Proportionality 
This Court also reviews a death sentence for proportionality “regardless of 
whether the issue is raised on appeal.”  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 407 (Fla. 
2006); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5).  “The death penalty is ‘reserved only 
for those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances 
exist.’ ”  Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 973 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Terry v. State, 668 
 
- 27 - 
So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996)).  “Therefore, in deciding whether death is a 
proportionate penalty, the Court makes a ‘comprehensive analysis in order to 
determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated 
and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application 
of the sentence.’ ”  Id. (quoting Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 
2003)).  Accordingly, the Court “consider[s] the totality of the circumstances of the 
case and compare[s] the case to other capital cases.”  Offord v. State, 959 So. 2d 
187, 191 (Fla. 2007).  “This analysis ‘is not a comparison between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.’ ”  Silvia, 60 So. 3d at 973 (quoting 
Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990)).  “Rather, this entails ‘a 
qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and 
mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.’ ”  Id. (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 
2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998)).  “In reviewing the sentence for proportionality, this Court 
will accept the jury’s recommendation and the weight assigned by the trial judge to 
the aggravating and mitigating factors.”  Id. 
In this case, the trial court found four aggravating circumstances as applied 
to both murders: (1) Gregory was on felony probation (assigned moderate weight); 
(2) Gregory was previously convicted of a prior violent felony (assigned very 
substantial weight); (3) the murders were committed during the course of a 
burglary (assigned moderate weight); and (4) Gregory committed the murders in a 
 
- 28 - 
CCP manner (assigned great weight).  The trial court found one statutory 
mitigating factor—extreme mental or emotional disturbance—and six nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances.   
We conclude that the death sentences in this case are proportionate.  The 
aggravating circumstances in this case and the small weight assigned to mitigation 
are similar to Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473, 477-78 (Fla. 2008), which is a case 
that, like this case, involved the shooting deaths of the defendant’s former 
girlfriend and her new boyfriend.  In Carter, the Court upheld the death sentences 
as proportionate in light of CCP, the prior violent felony aggravator for 
contemporaneous murders, and the additional aggravator of commission in the 
course of a burglary.  Id. at 485-86.  Further, the death sentences in this case are 
proportionate in relation to other cases with similar aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  See Deparvine, 995 So. 2d at 381-83 (upholding death sentence as 
proportionate in light of four aggravators (contemporaneous murder convictions, 
CCP, under sentence of imprisonment, and pecuniary gain) and little weight 
assigned to mitigating circumstances); Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 847-48 
(Fla. 2005) (upholding death sentences as proportionate in light of four aggravators 
(prior violent felony, CCP, avoiding arrest, and commission during a kidnapping) 
and four nonstatutory mitigators); Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741, 767 (Fla. 2002) 
(upholding death sentences as proportionate, in case involving the murders of the 
 
- 29 - 
defendant’s ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend, in light of four aggravators (prior 
violent felony for contemporaneous murders; CCP; commission during the course 
of a burglary; and heinous, atrocious, or cruel), the extreme emotional disturbance 
statutory mitigator, and no significant weight assigned to mitigation). 
Gregory nevertheless asserts that this case is identical to Farinas v. State, 
569 So. 2d 425, 431 (Fla. 1990), where the Court reversed the trial court’s finding 
of CCP and held that the death sentence was disproportionate.  However, this 
argument is unavailing for several reasons.  First, although the statutory mitigating 
circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance was applicable in 
Farinas, as it is in this case, part of the Court’s reasoning for finding the death 
penalty disproportionate in Farinas was its striking of the CCP aggravator.  See id.  
In this case, we have upheld the finding of CCP.   
Second, this case involves two of the most serious aggravators set forth in 
the statutory sentencing scheme—CCP and prior violent felony.  See Silvia, 60 So. 
3d at 974.  The prior violent felony in this case is the contemporaneous murder, 
and the trial court assigned this factor very substantial weight.   
Third, although Gregory points to the murder in Farinas being the result of a 
heated domestic confrontation, Farinas, 569 So. 2d at 431, this Court has 
repeatedly emphasized since Farinas that there is no special proportionality 
exception for domestic disputes.  See Silvia, 60 So. 3d at 974; Carter, 980 So. 2d at 
 
- 30 - 
485; Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 377 (Fla. 2003).  Further, there was no heated 
domestic confrontation in this case, but instead the execution-style killings of two 
sleeping victims.   
Accordingly, we conclude that Gregory’s death sentences are proportionate.   
CONCLUSION 
After a thorough review of all the issues raised by Gregory, and after an 
independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence and the proportionality of 
the sentences, we affirm Gregory’s convictions for first-degree murder, burglary, 
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and we also affirm the sentences 
of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,  
Raul Zambrano, Judge - Case No. 2007-CF-000866 
 
Richard R. Kuritz, Jacksonville, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Barbara C. Davis and Mitchell D. 
Bishop, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee