Title: State v. Richard A. Moeck

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 57 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Richard A. Moeck,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 47 
Reported at:  270 Wis. 2d 729, 677 N.W.2d 648 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 6, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
LaCrosse   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Kirchman   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins the dissent. 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by David D. 
Cook, Monroe, and oral argument by David D. Cook. 
 
 
2005 WI 57 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2-CR  
(L.C. No. 
97 CF 468) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard A. Moeck,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 6, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing 
a judgment of conviction and an order denying post-conviction 
relief of the Circuit Court for La Crosse County, Michael 
Kirchman, Judge.  The judgment and order stem from a fourth 
trial in which Richard Moeck, the defendant, was convicted of 
two counts of first degree sexual assault, one count of false 
imprisonment, 
one 
count 
of 
robbery, 
and 
one 
count 
of 
intimidation of a victim.  In denying the defendant's motion for 
                                                 
1 State v. Moeck, 2004 WI App 47, 270 Wis. 2d 729, 677 
N.W.2d 648. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
2 
 
post-conviction relief, the circuit court concluded that the 
defendant's fourth trial following a mistrial in the third trial 
did not violate double jeopardy protections. 
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
judgment of conviction and order denying post-conviction relief.  
The court of appeals concluded that there was not a manifest 
necessity caused by defense counsel's opening statement in the 
third trial sufficient to warrant a mistrial, and therefore the 
fourth trial violated the defendant's right to be free from 
double jeopardy.   
¶3 
Two issues are presented to this court.  First, did 
the court of appeals err as a matter of law in rejecting the 
State's argument that the "law of the case" doctrine applied 
because on two prior occasions the court of appeals rejected the 
defendant's challenge to the circuit court's order for a 
mistrial in the third trial?   Second, were the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions violated when 
the defendant was retried a fourth time following a mistrial in 
the third trial on the basis of defense counsel's opening 
statement?   
¶4 
We hold that the court of appeals did not err as a 
matter of law in holding that the "law of the case" doctrine did 
not apply to the defendant's most recent challenge in the court 
of appeals to the circuit court's order granting a mistrial in 
the defendant's third trial.  We further hold that because the 
State did not meet its burden of showing a manifest necessity 
for the termination of the third trial, the circuit court erred 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
3 
 
in granting the State's motion for a mistrial.  Accordingly we 
agree with the court of appeals that the fourth trial violated 
the defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy. We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
In addressing the first issue, the application of the 
law of the case doctrine, we set forth a brief narration of the 
procedural posture of the instant case and then examine whether 
the law of the case doctrine bars the court of appeals from 
overturning its two earlier decisions affirming the circuit 
court's order declaring a mistrial. 
A 
¶6 
The following facts are undisputed.  The defendant has 
been prosecuted four times for allegedly sexually assaulting and 
robbing the complainant, C.S., on August 2, 1997. 
¶7 
The defendant's first trial was in January 1998.  The 
defendant testified.  The trial ended in a hung jury. 
¶8 
The defendant's second trial was in March 1998.  The 
defendant testified.  The jury convicted the defendant.  The 
conviction was overturned by the court of appeals in October 
1999, on the ground that the circuit court committed reversible 
error in denying the defendant's request for a mistrial after 
the circuit court, during voir dire, inadvertently mentioned the 
defendant's repeat offender status three times.  The court of 
appeals held that the curative jury instruction was not 
sufficient to correct the error.  
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
4 
 
¶9 
The defendant's third trial was in March 2000.  The 
defendant did not testify.  The circuit court granted the 
State's motion for mistrial at the close of all the evidence.  
The defendant objected to the motion for mistrial. The events 
surrounding the mistrial are the subject of this review. 
¶10 The defendant's fourth trial was in November 2000 
before a different circuit court judge than the defendant's 
three prior trials.   
¶11 The defendant moved to dismiss the fourth trial on 
double jeopardy grounds, arguing that there was no manifest 
necessity for ordering the mistrial at the third trial.  The 
circuit court denied the motion; the court of appeals granted 
the defendant's leave to appeal the nonfinal order and affirmed 
the circuit court's order denying the defendant's motion to 
dismiss the fourth prosecution. 
¶12 The defendant did not testify at the fourth trial.  
The jury convicted the defendant on all counts.  
¶13 After the jury returned verdicts in the fourth trial 
finding him guilty, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas 
corpus 
in 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
challenging 
the 
effectiveness of counsel on the pretrial interlocutory appeal. 
The court of appeals concluded that, even assuming deficient 
performance, the defendant failed to prove prejudice because "no 
amount of advocacy would have convinced this court [of appeals] 
that the trial court unreasonably exercised its discretion [in 
granting a mistrial]."   
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
5 
 
¶14 The defendant then filed a postconviction motion in 
circuit court, again challenging the fourth trial on double 
jeopardy grounds.  The circuit court once again rejected the 
defendant's double jeopardy challenge.     
¶15 On the defendant's appeal of the conviction and order, 
raising his double jeopardy challenge for the third time, the 
court of appeals agreed with the defendant's double jeopardy 
argument, reversing the judgment of conviction and the order 
denying the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief.  We 
granted the State's petition for review. 
¶16 This review is a review of the court of appeals 
decision reversing a judgment of conviction and order entered in 
the defendant's fourth trial.2   With respect to the law of the 
case doctrine, we are reviewing the court of appeals' decision 
in the instant case to disregard its two prior rulings upholding 
the validity of the circuit court's declaring a mistrial in the 
third trial.  As we have explained, the court of appeals had 
twice ruled in the State's favor on the validity of the circuit 
court's declaring a mistrial.  On the defendant's third 
challenge to the mistrial on appeal from the judgment of 
conviction, the court of appeals ruled against the State.       
B 
¶17 We now determine whether the law of the case doctrine 
bars the court of appeals from overturning its earlier decisions 
affirming the circuit court's order declaring a mistrial.  
                                                 
2 Moeck, 270 Wis. 2d 729, ¶8. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
6 
 
¶18 The law of the case doctrine is a "longstanding rule 
that a decision on a legal issue by an appellate court 
establishes the law of the case, which must be followed in all 
subsequent proceedings in the trial court or on later appeal."3 
¶19 The State argues that because the court of appeals 
twice ruled that the circuit court's discretionary grant of a 
mistrial in the third trial was not violative of due process, 
the court of appeals violated the law of the case doctrine in 
the present case.  There is no question that the court of 
appeals "reversed itself" in the instant case when it ruled that 
the circuit court erred in granting a mistrial in the third 
trial.   
¶20 In response to the defendant's first double jeopardy 
challenge, the court of appeals declared in September 2000 that 
there was manifest necessity for the mistrial in the third trial 
and therefore there was no double jeopardy violation.     
¶21 In response to the defendant's second double jeopardy 
challenge, the court of appeals held in June 2002 that no double 
jeopardy violation resulted from the mistrial.     
¶22 In response to the defendant's third double jeopardy 
challenge, the court of appeals reversed course, holding for the 
defendant that the fourth trial was a violation of the 
prohibition against double jeopardy.   
                                                 
3 Univest Corp. v. Gen. Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38, 435 
N.W.2d 234 (1989). 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
7 
 
¶23 According to the State, when the issue of the validity 
of the mistrial arose a third time in the court of appeals, the 
court of appeals should have adhered to its two prior rulings 
that the circuit court did not err in granting the mistrial.  
The State argues that the defendant's double jeopardy challenge 
should have failed once again. 
¶24 The issue of whether the two prior decisions of the 
court of appeals establish the law of the case raises a question 
of law that this court determines independently of the court of 
appeals, benefiting from the analysis of the court of appeals.4 
¶25 The State recognizes, and we agree, that the law of 
the case doctrine is not an absolute rule that must be 
inexorably followed in every case.5  Courts have the power "to 
disregard the rule of 'law of the case' in the interests of 
justice" and to reconsider prior rulings in a case.6   We have 
recognized 
that "'cogent, 
substantial, 
and 
proper reasons 
                                                 
4 State v. Wurtz, 141 Wis. 2d 795, 799, 416 N.W.2d 623 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
5 "[T]he law of the case doctrine is not a rule to which 
this court is bound by any legislative enactment, nor it is a 
rule to be inexorably followed in every case."  Univest, 148 
Wis. 2d at 38-39. 
6 State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 448, 388 N.W.2d 151 
(1986) (quoting McGovern v. Eckhart, 200 Wis. 64, 75, 227 N.W. 
300 (1929)).  The United States Supreme Court has stated similar 
reasons.  See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 
U.S. 800, 817 (1988). 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
8 
 
exist'" under which a court may disregard the doctrine and 
reconsider prior rulings in a case.7   
¶26 The court of appeals' third review in the instant case 
of the defendant's double jeopardy challenge to the circuit 
court's declaration of the mistrial was apparently based on the 
same standard of review as were its first two reviews.8   It had 
determined 
twice 
before 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
had 
not 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting the mistrial.  
The difference warranting the court of appeals' reversing itself 
is that in the instant case the court of appeals examined all 
the facts, not just an incomplete version of the facts as it had 
before.  
¶27 The court of appeals had based its prior decision that 
the circuit court properly exercised its discretion only on the 
circuit court's written order.  In the instant case the court of 
appeals properly considered and based its decision on the 
transcript of the circuit court's oral decision.  The court of 
                                                 
7 Univest, 148 Wis. 2d at 39 (quoting Brady, 130 Wis. 2d at 
447 (citing McGovern, 200 Wis. at 78)).  
8 The parties debate whether State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, 
261 
Wis. 2d 383, 
661 
N.W.2d 822, 
changed 
the 
deferential 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard for review the court 
had previously adopted in double jeopardy cases.  The defendant 
argues that Seefeldt, issued after the two court of appeals 
decisions 
affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
denial 
of 
the 
defendant's double jeopardy challenge, changed the standard for 
review.  The State counters that Seefeldt was not a change in 
the law and therefore should not be the basis for departure from 
the law of the case doctrine.  We need not address this issue 
because the departure from the law of the case doctrine is 
justified on other grounds. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
9 
 
appeals candidly acknowledged in the instant case that its prior 
summary 
order 
rejecting 
the 
defendant's 
double 
jeopardy 
challenges erroneously failed to take into account the circuit 
court's oral decision to grant a mistrial.  Instead, the prior 
order relied on only the circuit court's later written decision.   
¶28 The 
oral 
decision, 
in 
contrast 
to 
the 
written 
decision, demonstrated that in declaring a mistrial the circuit 
court erred as a matter of law in failing to exercise its 
discretion and by abdicating its responsibility to the State.9 
¶29 At the State's request we examined the circuit court's 
oral and written decisions and conclude, as did the court of 
appeals, that they are different.  Thus, the facts upon which 
the court of appeals relied changed between its first two 
rulings on double jeopardy and its decision in the instant case.   
¶30 The court of appeals' failure to examine fully the 
circumstances surrounding the circuit court's grant of the 
mistrial in the third trial provides a cogent, substantial, and 
proper reason for the court of appeals' disregarding the law of 
the case doctrine in the instant case.  The court of appeals' 
admitted lapses in considering the defendant's double jeopardy 
challenge should not eviscerate the defendant's constitutional 
protections.  Although the court of appeals used the abdication 
issue, which was highlighted by the transcript of the oral 
proceedings, as grounds for disregarding the law of the case 
doctrine, we conclude, as will be discussed below, that the 
                                                 
9 Moeck, 270 Wis. 2d 729, ¶21. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
10 
 
circuit court's failure to consider fully the prosecutor's 
ability to countermand defense counsel's opening statement, as 
well as the court's ability to give a curative jury instruction, 
are cogent, substantial, and proper reasons for revisiting the 
double jeopardy challenge.   
¶31 We therefore conclude that the court of appeals 
properly disregarded the law of the case doctrine in the instant 
case.  The prudential law of the case doctrine is not a bar in 
the instant case to the court of appeals' reexamination of the 
defendant's double jeopardy challenge. 
II 
¶32 We turn now to the second issue presented, double 
jeopardy.  We must determine whether "the circuit court erred 
[in the third trial] when it determined that the State met its 
burden of showing the requisite manifest necessity to support 
the mistrial order that terminated" the defendant's third 
trial.10  We examine in turn: (A) the constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy and the manifest necessity standard used 
to determine whether a mistrial should be ordered; (B) the level 
of deference to be applied to a circuit court's mistrial order; 
(C) the circumstances leading up to the granting of the 
mistrial; 
and 
(D) 
our 
application 
of 
the 
constitutional 
principles and standard of review to the circumstances of the 
case. 
 
                                                 
10 Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶13. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
11 
 
A 
¶33 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution11 and 
Article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution12 provide that a 
defendant may not be put in jeopardy twice for the same 
offense.13  We recently explored the constitutional doctrine of 
double jeopardy in State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶¶15-19, 261 
Wis. 2d 383, 661 N.W.2d 822.  That decision guides this case.    
¶34 "Jeopardy" means exposure to the risk of determination 
of guilt.  It attaches when the selection of the jury has been 
completed and the jury is sworn.  The parties here do not 
dispute that jeopardy attached in all four trials.  The 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy "embraces the 
defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a 
particular tribunal."14  The protection against double jeopardy 
thus limits the State's ability to request that a trial be 
terminated and then restarted with a different jury.    
                                                 
11 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." 
12 Article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
"[N]o person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy 
of punishment . . . ."  This court has been guided by U.S. 
Supreme Court 
double jeopardy jurisprudence 
in 
construing 
Wisconsin's 
double 
jeopardy 
prohibition. 
 
Seefeldt, 
261 
Wis. 2d 383, ¶15 n.4 (citing State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 
181, 495 N.W.2d 341 (1993)). 
13 Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶15. 
14 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).  
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
12 
 
¶35 Underlying the protection against cumulative trials 
are the principles of fairness and finality.  "The underlying 
idea, one that is deeply ingrained . . . is that the State with 
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility 
that even though innocent he may be found guilty."15  Courts have 
recognized that the double jeopardy protection may be subverted 
if a circuit court terminates a trial prior to verdict, thereby 
taking from an accused the opportunity to gain an acquittal when 
the prosecution has been less persuasive than anticipated.16  
¶36 An accused's right to have a trial concluded by a 
particular 
tribunal 
can 
be, 
under 
certain 
circumstances, 
subordinated to the public interest in affording the State one 
full and fair opportunity to present its evidence to an 
impartial jury.17  
¶37 A mistrial is warranted if the mistrial is "manifestly 
necessary."  The State bears the burden to demonstrate that a 
"'manifest necessity' [exists] for any mistrial ordered over the 
                                                 
15 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).  See 
also State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 181-82, 459 N.W.2d 341 
(1993) (quoting Green); State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 937, 
485 N.W.2d 354 (1992).  
16 Green, 355 U.S. at 188. 
17 Washington, 434 U.S. at 505. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
13 
 
objection of the defendant."18  A "manifest necessity" warranting 
a mistrial is a high degree of necessity.19  The determination 
whether 
a 
manifest 
necessity 
exists 
is 
a 
fact-intensive 
question.  If the State does not meet this burden, the State is 
not permitted to commence another trial against the accused. 
¶38 The circuit court granted the State's motion for a 
mistrial in the third trial after the jury had been sworn, and 
the defendant objected to the State's motion.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court's granting the mistrial implicated the double 
jeopardy clause.  The State was thus required to demonstrate 
that there was a manifest necessity to terminate the third 
trial.     
¶39 The defendant asserts that his constitutional right 
against double jeopardy was violated by his fourth trial because 
no manifest necessity existed for a mistrial after the close of 
evidence during the third trial.   
B 
¶40  Before reviewing the record to determine whether the 
State has met its burden, we address the level of deference this 
                                                 
18 Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19. 
19 Id. (citing Washington, 434 U.S. at 505; Barthels, 174 
Wis. 2d at 183).  This court has also cited approvingly Justice 
Story's articulation of the manifest necessity test: "Courts of 
justice [may] discharge a jury from giving any verdict, 
whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into 
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the 
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated."  Barthels, 
174 Wis. 2d at 183 (citing State v. Copening, 100 Wis. 2d 700, 
709, 303 N.W.2d 821 (1981) (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheaton) 579, 580 (1824)). 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
14 
 
court 
must 
accord 
a 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
order 
declaring a mistrial.  
¶41 The level of deference we accord a circuit court's  
order for a mistrial depends on the particular facts of each 
case.20   There is a spectrum of deference to a circuit court's 
exercise of its discretion in granting a mistrial.21  In cases 
like the present one, in which a mistrial was ordered on the 
basis of defense counsel's opening statement, a circuit court's 
determination "is entitled to special respect."22   
¶42 The conclusion that a circuit court's exercise of 
discretion is entitled to special respect does not end the 
inquiry.  Because of the constitutional implications of double 
jeopardy, an appellate court must satisfy itself that a circuit 
court exercised "sound discretion" in declaring a mistrial.23  
¶43  This court has articulated various considerations that 
factor 
into 
determining 
whether 
a 
court 
exercised 
sound 
discretion.  We have described sound discretion as "acting in a 
rational and responsible manner."24  Sound discretion further 
                                                 
20 Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶13 (citing State v. Barthels, 
174 Wis. 2d 173, 184, 495 N.W.2d 341 (1993)). 
21 Id., ¶25 (citing Washington, 434 U.S. at 507-08).  
22 Id., ¶27 (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 510). 
23 Washington, 434 U.S. at 514.  "Regardless of the level of 
deference to be applied, an appellate court must, at a minimum, 
satisfy itself that the circuit court exercised sound discretion 
in ordering a mistrial."  Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶13 (citing 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 514 (1978)). 
24 Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶36. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
15 
 
includes "acting in a deliberate manner taking sufficient time 
in responding to a prosecutor's request for a mistrial."25  Sound 
discretion requires giving both parties a full opportunity to 
explain their positions and considering alternatives such as a 
curative instruction or sanctioning counsel.26  Sound discretion 
also requires that a circuit court ensure that the record 
reflects that there is an adequate basis for a finding of 
manifest 
necessity.27 
Finally, 
"[s]ound 
discretion 
is 
not 
exercised when the circuit court fails to consider the facts of 
record under the relevant law, bases its conclusion on an error 
of law or does not reason its way to a rational conclusion."28   
¶44 We conclude, as we did in Seefeldt, that "regardless 
of the level of deference to be applied in this case, the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
terminating 
[the 
defendant's 
prior trial]."29 
C 
¶45 We now examine the events at the third trial in the 
circuit court leading to the mistrial.   
¶46 The incident that gave rise to the mistrial occurred 
early in the defendant's third trial.  During opening arguments 
defense counsel discussed at length the defendant's anticipated 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id., ¶37. 
28 Id., ¶36. 
29 Id., ¶14. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
16 
 
trial testimony.  Defense counsel told the jury that the 
defendant would testify that the victim was lying, that no 
assault or robbery occurred, that the victim offered to sell 
drugs to the defendant, that the victim stole money out of the 
defendant's wallet, and that the victim went to the police with 
a false accusation of sexual assault and robbery.  The defense 
counsel thus painted the victim as a drug user and dealer, a 
liar, and 
a 
thief.  The 
defense 
counsel 
presented the 
defendant's version of the events of August 2, 1997, as follows: 
On this morning, ladies and gentlemen, what happened, 
Rich is asleep in his apartment.  [C.S.] knocks on the 
door.  Rich says it was 3:09 in the morning because 
there was a digital clock up on his refrigerator and 
he wakes up and he happens to notice the time.  He 
recognizes [C.S.] from a meeting that they had a month 
ago at Kenny's Pub here in La Crosse and at that time 
they discussed casual marijuana use and Rich said, you 
know, if you're ever looking to sell some, you know, 
stop by.  [C.S.] comes to Rich's apartment with 
marijuana looking to sell marijuana that night to 
Rich.  He also asks if he can crash at his place and, 
in 
fact, 
he 
does 
spend 
the 
evening 
at 
Rich's 
apartment.  The reason he stays there is 'cause he 
says he's tired and he's high at that point.  He tells 
Rich that he had taken a couple hits of LSD just prior 
to him getting to his apartment. 
The next morning they wake up and they discuss this 
marijuana and Rich says, well, I only want 20 or $30 
worth.  Rich then goes out into the hallway where the 
bathrooms are.  He doesn't have a bathroom in his 
apartment.  It's out in the hallway.  He goes out 
there.  He comes back in, and he notices that the 
money that was on the counter is now gone.  It's 
missing, and he asks [S.], well, where's the money, 
and [S.] denies, well, I don't have the money.  And he 
says, where's the money, and finally [S.] says, okay, 
I've got it, and he pulls it out of his sock and gives 
him his money.  At that point Rich is mad and he kicks 
and pushes him out of the apartment, kicks him out of 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
17 
 
the building, out the back fire door which is just 
outside of his apartment door. 
At that point [S.] is gone.  Rich goes back into his 
apartment, grabs something to eat, goes back to sleep, 
and then he's awakened at 11 or a little after 11 
o'clock by the police that morning and they execute a 
search warrant and Rich is arrested. 
And that story, ladies and gentlemen, is the only 
story that's been consistent throughout this case.  
 . . . (R.233:30-31.) 
¶47 The prosecuting attorney objected several times during 
defense counsel's opening statement, but not to this description 
of the defendant's version of the events of August 2, 1997.   
¶48 The victim and police officer testified and were 
subject to defense counsel's cross-examination.  The cross-
examination 
pointed 
out 
inconsistencies 
in 
the 
victim's 
statements 
and 
the 
weaknesses 
in 
the 
police 
officer's 
investigation, including failure to collect biological evidence 
and failure to interview neighbors or bar patrons who might 
corroborate the victim's story.    
¶49 Although the defendant had testified at his first two 
trials, the defendant did not testify during the third trial.30  
The defendant's decision not to testify was apparently made at 
the close of the State's evidence.  The defendant and his 
counsel apparently were confident that the State had failed to 
meet its burden of proof.  As a result, the defendant did not 
present any evidence to substantiate defense counsel's opening 
statement of the defendant's version of the events.  The 
defendant's version was thus presented to the jury through 
                                                 
30 The defendant also did not testify at his fourth trial.  
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
18 
 
defense 
counsel's 
opening 
statement. 
 
The 
State 
had 
no 
opportunity to cross-examine the defendant.  
 
¶50 During the jury instruction conference, the State 
requested a curative instruction to address defense counsel's 
opening statement.  The State presented its view as follows: 
Judge, and that's one that in this case [defense 
counsel] got up in his opening statement and he argued 
in the opening statement about facts that are in no 
way in evidence concerning the fact[s in that portion 
of the opening statement.] . . . I mean, he went 
through the whole scenario, and we have heard that 
scenario before when the defendant has testified at 
the previous trials.  Now, however, the defendant has 
opted not to testify and all of that evidence is in 
there from the opening statement.  There has been no 
evidence presented at all to corroborate that and now 
he doesn't put the defendant on to make any effort to 
corroborate 
it, 
so 
I 
think 
that's 
completely 
unethical, but aside from that, I think that there has 
to be an instruction to the jury that they are to 
disregard that and not consider any of that portion of 
the opening statement.  (R.233:300.) 
 
¶51 Defense counsel explained that he could not know when 
making his opening statement that the defendant would opt not to 
testify, especially given that the defendant had testified at 
two earlier trials conducted by another defense attorney.   
¶52 The State, defense counsel, and the circuit court 
discussed the wording of a curative instruction. 
 
¶53 The prosecuting attorney was concerned what, if any, 
argument she could make in response to defense counsel's 
unsubstantiated opening statement.  The prosecuting attorney did 
not want to run the risk of making improper comments on the 
defendant's failure to testify, an error that might necessitate 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
19 
 
yet 
another 
trial. 
 
The 
prosecuting 
attorney 
sought 
clarification of what she would be allowed to say in closing 
argument.  She explained: 
I would have every intention of not being very kind to 
[defense counsel] in that closing argument regarding 
that, and I think I should have the opportunity to, 
you know, at least make that statement, that a 
fictional tale was presented and there has been no 
effort to support that with any evidence.  He's 
basically slinging mud at a victim without any effort 
to support his statements.    
¶54 In response, defense counsel suggested a curative 
instruction and stated that he doubted the jurors are "gonna 
hang their hat on something that I said ten hours ago."  The 
circuit court reacted to defense counsel's remarks, saying: 
"It's not quite that simple . . . . "   
¶55 Although defense counsel was willing to waive any 
objection to the prosecuting attorney's reference to the 
defendant's failure to testify, the defendant was not.  
¶56 The circuit court acknowledged the State's dilemma:  
The defendant in effect put in his defense without testifying; 
the State was not able to cross-examine the defendant; and the 
extent to which the State could comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify without courting reversible error was 
unclear.31  The circuit court explained the dilemma as follows:  
Yeah, it seems to me the State is in a bind, you know, 
and might well be entitled to a mistrial.  This is the 
                                                 
31 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) 
(the right to remain silent is violated when during a criminal 
trial the State comments on an accused's silence). 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
20 
 
instruction I propose to try to correct that, but the 
State is gonna be in a bind in argument because they 
can't 
directly 
comment 
on 
the 
defendant 
not 
testifying . . . . (R.233:302.) 
 
¶57 After 
discussion 
among 
the 
prosecuting 
attorney, 
defense counsel, the defendant, and the circuit court, the 
circuit court explained that it was willing to give the jury an 
instruction that statements of the attorneys are not evidence.  
The circuit court also mentioned that the State might consider a 
motion for a mistrial.  The circuit court concluded that "the 
State under the circumstances now would be entitled to a 
mistrial if they wanted one."    
¶58 The circuit court then asked the State whether it 
wanted to proceed with a curative instruction or to seek a 
mistrial: 
Do you want to go ahead or not?  I mean, I told [the 
prosecutor], it's on the record, I'm not gonna take it 
back, I think under——the State under the circumstances 
now would be entitled to a mistrial if they wanted 
one.  My logic for that is that scenario is in the 
jury's mind without subject, as we do in trials, to 
cross-examination.  (R.233:306.) 
¶59 The 
prosecutor, 
an 
assistant 
district 
attorney, 
conferred with the district attorney regarding whether to ask 
for a mistrial.  The State then requested a mistrial, contending 
that a curative instruction would not erase the defendant's 
version of the events from the jurors' minds:  
I think I'm gonna ask for a mistrial, Judge.  I'm not 
gonna be able to erase those facts.  I can't argue 
them on——in my oral argument because I didn't have a 
chance to cross-examine him about it.  It's not even 
out there before the jury.  (R.233:307.)   
 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
21 
 
¶60 The circuit court then asked the State: "Is that your 
final answer . . . ?"  The State responded "Yes."  The circuit 
court declared a mistrial. 
D 
¶61 We 
now 
apply 
the 
principles 
of 
constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy and the standard of review to 
the facts of the case.  
¶62 We approach this part of the opinion bearing in mind a 
concern about "gamesmanship" in opening statements.  The 
trepidation is that a defense counsel or an accused will use an 
opening statement to furnish a defense unsupported by evidence.  
A savvy accused would then invoke his or her right not to 
testify.  This tactic would result in the jury having heard the 
accused's unchallenged theory of the case, denying the State the 
opportunity to cross-examine the accused.  The State does not 
contend that defense counsel was engaging in gamesmanship or 
sandbagging or acting in bad faith when defense counsel made 
opening statements at the defendant's third trial.  Therefore, 
gamesmanship, sandbagging and bad faith by the defendant or 
defense counsel are not at issue in the instant case.  
¶63 We agree with the State that defense counsel "should 
not allude to any evidence unless there is good faith and 
reasonable basis for believing such evidence will be tendered 
and admitted in evidence."32  The Rules of Professional Conduct 
                                                 
32 American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice—
Prosecution Function and Defense Function, § 4-7.4, at 218-19 
(3d ed. 1993).  
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
22 
 
for Attorneys also address this issue, providing that a lawyer 
shall not "in trial, allude to any matter that . . . will not be 
supported by admissible evidence."33  We also agree with the 
State that it is unfair to an opposing party to allow an 
attorney to present to the jury statements not susceptible to 
proof but that are intended to influence the jury in reaching a 
verdict.34 
¶64 The circuit court and the State take the position that 
defense counsel's opening statement was improper because the 
evidence did not support the opening statement.     
¶65 The State does not contend that defense counsel's 
opening statement was in bad faith, that is, the State does not 
contend that defense counsel had a reasonable basis to believe 
that his opening statement would not be supported by admissible 
evidence.  The defendant's position in the present case is that 
defense counsel's opening statement was offered with the 
reasonable expectation that the defendant would testify and that 
the opening statement conformed to the defendant's testimony in 
the prior trials.  Defense counsel asserted that he expected the 
defendant to testify (as the defendant had in prior trials), but 
he did not know in fact whether the defendant would testify.35  
                                                 
33 SCR 20:3.4(e). 
34 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring). 
35 The instant case can be compared with Arizona v. 
Washington, in which the defendant's opening argument referred 
to inadmissible evidence.  Washington, 434 U.S. at 499-500. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
23 
 
¶66 Because this case does not raise the issue of an 
attorney's making an opening statement in bad faith, we do not 
address that circumstance.    
¶67 The State understandably expresses irritation with 
defense counsel for not waiting until the outset of the defense 
case to present his opening statement.  This simple measure 
could have prevented the mistrial.  The circuit court expressed 
similar sentiments.  We must recognize, however, that defense 
counsel had the right to make an opening statement when he did, 
as long as it was made in good faith, and that nothing would 
have kept his client from opting not to testify at the last 
moment.    
¶68  We agree with the State that a circuit court may, in 
an appropriate case, declare a mistrial on the basis of an 
opening statement that summarizes evidence that is not produced.  
We disagree with the State, however, that the circuit court 
exercised sound discretion in granting the mistrial in the 
defendant's third trial.   
¶69  The circuit court did not exercise sound discretion, 
according to the defendant and the court of appeals, when the 
circuit court committed an error of law by abdicating its 
discretion to the State.  The defendant argues and the court of 
appeals held that the State, not the circuit court, decided 
whether to grant a mistrial.36  If this view of the record is 
accepted, the circuit court erred by not deciding the question 
                                                 
36 Moeck, 270 Wis. 2d 729, ¶13. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
24 
 
of a mistrial, instead allowing the State to choose between a 
curative jury instruction and a mistrial.37 
¶70 We need not determine whether the circuit court 
abdicated its responsibility to the State or whether the circuit 
court was merely asking the State and the defense counsel about 
their respective views of a mistrial.  
¶71 We conclude that the circuit court did not exercise 
sound discretion in declaring a mistrial when it failed to give 
adequate consideration to the State's ability to refer to the 
defendant's silence and to the effectiveness of a curative jury 
instruction.  Although the circuit court expressed its belief 
that the State's response and a curative jury instruction could 
not rectify any prejudice caused by defense counsel's opening 
statement, this belief is unfounded. 
¶72 We have described sound discretion as "acting in a 
rational and responsible manner."38  Sound discretion is not 
exercised when a circuit court bases its declaration of a 
mistrial on an error of law.  Sound discretion includes 
considering alternatives such as a curative jury instruction.  
¶73 The circuit court erred as a matter of law in its 
assessment of the State's inability in closing argument to rebut 
the defense counsel's opening statement.  The circuit court 
overstated the difficulty the prosecuting attorney would have in 
both commenting on the weakness of the opening statement and 
                                                 
37 Id., ¶23. 
38 Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶36. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
25 
 
avoiding error by referring to the defendant's failure to 
testify.   
¶74 The circuit court was correct that a prosecuting 
attorney ordinarily may not comment on an accused's decision not 
to testify.39  There are circumstances, however, when an accused 
"opens the door" to a measured response by the prosecuting 
attorney.40  The defendant opened the door in the instant case.  
It is impossible to draw "a bright line for all cases between 
permissible and impermissible comment;"41 whether a prosecutorial 
comment crosses over "into the forbidden area of comment on an 
accused's failure to testify"42 and "violates constitutional 
rights must be made case by case."43  We conclude, however, under 
the circumstances of the instant case, that the circuit court 
did not give adequate consideration to the State's response and 
to a curative instruction.  
¶75 The circuit court's error of law is evidenced by State 
v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984), in 
which the court of appeals addressed a prosecutor's ability to 
                                                 
39 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965).  
40 United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1988); 
State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 80-83, 573 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 
1997); State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 247-49, 358 N.W.2d 824 
(Ct. App. 1984).  
41 State v. Edwardsen, 146 Wis. 2d 198, 215, 430 N.W.2d 604 
(Ct. App. 1988). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
26 
 
comment on an accused's failure to testify after the accused 
gave his account of events during opening statements but later 
refused to testify.  In Johnson, the defendant gave his own 
opening statement, but later did not take the stand in his own 
defense.   
¶76 In closing remarks, the prosecutor in Johnson drew the 
jury's attention to the distinction between argument and 
evidence.44  The court of appeals in Johnson affirmed the circuit 
court's allowing the prosecutor's closing arguments.45  The court 
                                                 
44 In Johnson the relevant portion of the prosecutor's 
closing argument was as follows: 
Let's reflect first upon the opening statement that 
was given by [the defendant].  First of all just as in 
my 
opening 
statement 
you 
understand 
that 
[the 
defendant] was not testifying.  [The defendant] was 
not under oath, [the defendant] was not subjecting 
himself 
to 
cross 
examination 
in 
that 
opening 
statement.  What he said he was entitled to say just 
as I was entitled to tell you what I did during my 
opening statement but it was not evidence, not when I 
said what I said and when [the defendant] said what he 
said but remember some of the things he said in that 
prepared statement he read.  He said that the State 
would not be able to prove what he intended to do on 
that evening.  I submit to you that we have proved 
beyond any doubt whatsoever what he intended to do 
that evening and we will review that evidence and see 
whether you don't agree with me on that.   
Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d at 243-44 n.2. 
45 See also Edwardsen, 146 Wis. 2d at 214 (when the accused 
comments on his own silence and gives factual reasons for that 
silence, 
the 
State 
does 
not 
violate 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional right by presenting other explanations to the 
jury; the State is commenting on unsworn testimony and not on 
the accused's right to silence). 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
27 
 
of appeals explained the validity of the prosecutor's statements 
in Johnson as follows:  
The [prosecutor's closing] remarks were aimed at 
drawing the jury's 
attention to 
the 
distinction 
between arguments and evidence.  This is in precise 
keeping with the thrust of the standard instruction 
concerning arguments of counsel.  In both opening and 
closing 
statements, 
the 
prosecutor 
equated 
[the 
defendant's] statement with his own (the prosecutor's) 
and 
stressed 
that 
neither 
constituted 
evidence.  
Indeed, the prosecutor invited close juror attention 
to what both he and [the defendant] had to say.46 
 
¶77 The circuit court erred as a matter of law in the 
instant case by concluding that the prosecuting attorney could 
not 
effectively 
countermand 
defense 
counsel's 
opening 
statement.47       
¶78 The jury, after the prosecutor's closing argument and 
a curative jury instruction, could have been sufficiently 
admonished 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
that 
any 
unsubstantiated 
statements made by defense counsel in opening statements do not 
constitute evidence.  Any prejudice to the State by defense 
                                                 
46 Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d at 247-48.   
47 The State argues that the circuit court was reasonable in 
declaring a mistrial rather than giving a curative instruction 
in light of the procedural history of the case.  The court of 
appeals had held that a curative instruction was not sufficient 
in the second trial to correct the error caused by the circuit 
court's 
inadvertent 
reference 
during 
voir 
dire 
to 
the 
defendant's status as a repeat offender.  The State argues that 
with a curative instruction the State risked a reversal for 
violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Perhaps, but a reversal would enable the 
State to bring yet another prosecution.  A mistrial here means 
the State cannot bring another prosecution.        
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
28 
 
counsel's opening statement would be outweighed by defense 
counsel's 
loss 
of 
credibility 
with 
the 
jury 
for 
his 
unsubstantiated opening statement.   
¶79 We therefore conclude that in the instant case the 
prosecuting attorney's closing argument referring to defense 
counsel's opening statement as unsubstantiated, along with a 
curative jury instruction that opening and closing statements 
are arguments, not evidence, would have cured any possible 
prejudice resulting from defense counsel's opening statement.  
Accordingly, we conclude that it was unreasonable as a matter of 
law for the circuit court to conclude that there was a manifest 
necessity requiring a mistrial in the third trial.   
* * * * 
 
¶80 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the court of 
appeals did not err as a matter of law in holding that the "law 
of the case" doctrine did not apply to the defendant's third 
challenge in the court of appeals to the circuit court's 
granting a mistrial in the third trial.  We further hold that 
because the State did not meet its burden of showing a manifest 
necessity for the termination of the third trial, the circuit 
court erred in granting the State's motion for a mistrial.  
Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that the fourth 
trial 
violated 
the 
defendant's 
protection 
against 
double 
jeopardy.  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2003AP2-CR   
 
29 
 
¶81 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
No.  2003AP2-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶82 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I dissent.  In the 
words of the United States Supreme Court: 
Unless unscrupulous defense counsel are to be allowed 
an unfair advantage, the trial judge must have the 
power to declare a mistrial in appropriate cases.  The 
interest in orderly, impartial procedure would be 
impaired if he were deterred from exercising that 
power by a concern that any time a reviewing court 
disagreed with his assessment of the trial situation a 
retrial would automatically be barred.   
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513 (1978).  In Washington, 
the trial judge granted a mistrial after the jury was exposed to 
improper comments during defense counsel's opening statement.  
Id. at 499-501.  When reviewing the trial judge's decision to 
grant a mistrial, the Court concluded:  "[T]he overriding 
interest in the evenhanded administration of justice requires 
that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial 
judge's evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of 
one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper 
comment."  Id. at 511.  Further, the Court warned of the serious 
consequences that would follow if "retrial of the defendant were 
barred whenever an appellate court views the 'necessity' for a 
mistrial differently from the trial judge[.]"  Id. at 509-10.   
¶83 Following the deferential standard of review set forth 
in Washington and the standard for manifest necessity, I would 
uphold the circuit court's order granting a mistrial as a proper 
exercise of discretion.  Here, the main thrust of defense 
counsel's opening statement was that the victim was a liar and 
that the defendant would inform the jury as to what really 
happened the night in question.  Defense counsel then went on to 
No.  2003AP2-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
explain in great detail the defendant's version of events and 
relayed the testimony his client had provided in the previous 
trials.  In addition, counsel informed the jury as to the 
details of the defendant's personal and family life.  As the 
circuit court summarized:  "It was a detailed statement of dope 
and out the door and the money and everything else."  No other 
defense was presented during the opening statement.  However, 
the 
defendant 
never 
testified, 
and 
no 
other 
witness 
substantiated the version of events presented during the opening 
statement.  Further, defense counsel later admitted to the court 
that he was unsure if the defendant would take the stand at the 
time he made his opening remarks.    
¶84 Thus, the defense was able to fully present its theory 
of the case to the jury without presenting any evidence to 
support that theory or subjecting the defendant to cross-
examination.  Regardless of whether defense counsel's opening 
statement was made in good faith, the fact remains that the 
defendant was able to present his entire theory of the case 
without actually introducing any evidence.   
¶85 The circuit court considered these facts, the effect 
the opening statement may have had upon the jury, and the 
prosecution's ability to make an adequate closing statement in 
light of the defendant's refusal to testify.  The circuit court 
considered the possibility of issuing a curative instruction and 
gave both parties an opportunity to present their positions.  
See State v. Williams, 2004 WI App 56, ¶¶29-31 & n.3, 270 
Wis. 2d 761, 677 N.W.2d 691.  The circuit court was cognizant of 
No.  2003AP2-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
the prosecutor's inability to adequately counter the effects of 
defense counsel's opening statement during his closing, given 
the nature of the statement and the defendant's invocation of 
his Fifth Amendment rights.  Therefore, the circuit court 
concluded that a manifest necessity justified a mistrial.   
Defense counsel aired improper and highly prejudicial 
evidence before the jury, the possible impact of which 
the trial judge was in the best position to assess.  
The trial judge did not act precipitately in response 
to the prosecutor's request for a mistrial.  On the 
contrary, evincing a concern for the possible double 
jeopardy consequences of an erroneous ruling, he gave 
both 
defense 
counsel 
and 
the 
prosecutor 
full 
opportunity 
to 
explain 
their 
positions 
on 
the 
propriety of a mistrial.   
Washington, 434 U.S. at 514-16.   
¶86 Despite the fact that the circuit court could have 
issued a curative instruction informing the jury that statements 
of counsel are not evidence, I would not second-guess the 
decision of the circuit court to not do so.  Here, defense 
counsel did not simply allude to the testimony of a minor 
witness who never testified; he presented the entire defense 
theory of the case to the jury without actually presenting any 
evidence.  A curative instruction may be appropriate in some 
cases to remedy the effects of an improper comment during 
opening statements.  In this case, however, there is no possible 
way a curative instruction would have sufficed to remove the 
prejudice from the jury, given the nature and extensiveness of 
defense counsel's reference to the defendant's prior testimony 
and the prosecutor's inability to comment on the defendant's 
refusal to testify.  
No.  2003AP2-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
¶87 This case involves an allegation of a sexual assault 
of one man by another.  Defense counsel informed the jury that 
the defendant was a family man with children and a stable job as 
a construction worker.  He repeatedly referred to the testimony 
his client had previously provided.  He discussed at length the 
defendant's version of the events the night in question.  He 
discussed in detail how the defendant and victim allegedly met, 
as well as their subsequent activities, which included a sale of 
drugs at the defendant's apartment and a disagreement over 
money.  Defense counsel instructed the jurors:  "Remember, Rich 
says he pushes him out.  He kicks him out of the building."  
Defense counsel repeatedly referred to the defendant's version 
of events as "the only story that's been consistent throughout 
this case."  The only witness that was to substantiate this 
story was the defendant himself.  Yet, the defendant never 
testified and, consequently, none of these supposed facts were 
ever presented to the jury.   
¶88 While it may be possible to effectively inform a jury 
to disregard a minor statement or small piece of inappropriately 
admitted evidence, State v. Collier, 220 Wis. 2d 825, 838, 584 
N.W.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1998), instructing a jury to ignore the 
entire opening statement of defense counsel when the defense 
never puts on a case in chief is like asking a person to not 
think of the proverbial pink elephant.  As the circuit court 
explained, it was not sufficient to simply provide a curative 
instruction to the jury in this case because "[t]hey have a 
No.  2003AP2-CR.jpw 
 
5 
 
reasonable alternative in their minds now before them with no 
evidence." 
¶89 When an appellate court reviews a circuit court 
decision to grant a mistrial, the circuit court's failure to 
consider a curative instruction is relevant only if such an 
instruction was available and practical.  See id. at 837-38.  
Further, it is not the failure to provide a curative instruction 
that renders a mistrial an erroneous exercise of discretion; 
rather, it is the circuit court's failure to give reasoned 
consideration to the possibility of a curative instruction.  
Williams, 270 Wis. 2d 761, ¶31 n.3.   
¶90 If the facts of record reflect the uncertain utility 
and effectiveness of a curative instruction, this court has all 
the more reason to defer to the circuit court's ultimate 
decision on whether to grant a mistrial: 
[The trial judge] is the judge most familiar with the 
evidence and the background of the case on trial.  He 
[or she] has listened to the tone of the argument as 
it was delivered and has observed the apparent 
reaction of the jurors.  In short, he [or she] is far 
more "conversant with the factors relevant to the 
determination" than any reviewing court can possibly 
be. 
Id., ¶27 (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 514)(first alteration 
added).    
¶91 Moreover, I disagree with the majority's assertion 
that "[t]he circuit court erred as a matter of law in the 
instant case by concluding that the prosecuting attorney could 
not 
effectively 
countermand 
defense 
counsel's 
opening 
statement."  Majority op., ¶77.  The majority suggests that the 
No.  2003AP2-CR.jpw 
 
6 
 
prosecuting attorney had some leeway in commenting on the 
defendant's refusal to testify in light of defense counsel's 
opening statement and that the ability of the prosecutor to so 
comment is not susceptible to bright line rules.  Majority op., 
¶74.  However, I doubt that the State would receive the benefit 
of such latitude and uncertainty had it in fact chosen that 
course and the case was before the court on that very issue.  
See majority op., ¶77 n.47 ("The State argues that with a 
curative instruction the State risked a reversal for violation 
of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  Perhaps, but a reversal would enable the State 
to bring yet another prosecution.").  Therefore, I would affirm 
the circuit court's decision to grant a mistrial in this case.   
¶92 Finally, I wish to express my concern that the 
majority opinion opens the door to gamesmanship by unscrupulous 
and savvy defendants who, after assuring their counsel that they 
will testify, invoke their Fifth Amendment rights following 
counsel's full presentation of their version of events to the 
jury.  This court should not condone such sandbagging tactics.  
As the circuit court aptly stated, if defense counsel is unsure 
that his client is willing to testify at the time of opening 
statement, then he should wait until the end of the State's case 
to make his opening statement.   
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this opinion.   
 
 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶94 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The supreme 
court is a law-defining, law-developing court.  Cook v. Cook, 
208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (citing State ex 
rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229-
30, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983)).  In this capacity it is expected to 
address "real and significant" questions of federal and state 
constitutional law.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1)(a) (2003-
04).48  But the court acts only to resolve actual controversies.  
It was not designed to announce principles of law beyond the 
facts of a particular case or to render advisory opinions.  
State v. Robertson, 2003 WI App 84, ¶32, 263 Wis. 2d 349, 661 
N.W.2d 105 (citing State ex rel. Ellenburg v. Gagnon, 76 
Wis. 2d 532, 535, 251 N.W.2d 773 (1977)); State v. Witkowski, 
163 Wis. 2d 985, 988, 473 N.W.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1991).  Thus, the 
court's legal pronouncements must be tied to the facts in a case 
as they are, not as the court might like them to be. 
¶95 The present case is extremely troubling because the 
court appears more interested in announcing principles of 
constitutional law than in wrestling with inconvenient facts.  
As a result, the court ends up making unsupported assumptions, 
misconstruing facts, ignoring ugly realities, denigrating the 
work of honorable people, and ultimately reaching a flawed 
conclusion.  For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
                                                 
48 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶96 This case involves an alleged series of sexual 
assaults by Richard A. Moeck, then 49, against C.S., a 23-year-
old male, in the early morning hours of August 2, 1997.  C.S. 
claimed that Moeck induced him to come up to Moeck's apartment 
for a drink and then threatened to kill him with a 12-inch knife 
if he did not disrobe and submit to multiple degrading assaults.  
C.S. asserted that he was held hostage for more than four hours 
and was threatened, slapped, repeatedly assaulted, and robbed. 
¶97 Moeck was charged with a number of offenses, including 
two counts of first-degree sexual assault, one count of false 
imprisonment, 
one 
count 
of 
robbery, 
and 
one 
count 
of 
intimidation of a witness. 
¶98 The case has been tried four times.  The first trial 
in January 1998 ended in a hung jury.  The second trial in March 
1998 resulted in conviction on five counts.  These convictions 
were subsequently reversed by the court of appeals. 
¶99 The third trial in March 2000 is the subject of this 
review.  As the majority correctly states, the circuit court 
granted the State's motion for mistrial at the close of the 
evidence.  Majority op., ¶9.  The fourth trial in November 2000 
again resulted in conviction of the defendant on five counts.   
¶100 Moeck had a long criminal history dating back to 1960.  
He had numerous convictions including felonies.  Some of his 
prior offenses had similarity to the alleged offenses against 
C.S.  Thus, when Moeck testified in his own defense, he was 
subject to cross-examination and devastating impeachment. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶101 Moeck testified at the first trial and acknowledged in 
direct examination that he had been convicted of a crime six 
times.  The prosecutor did not refer to this admission in her 
cross-examination or her closing argument.  This is the trial 
that ended in a hung jury. 
¶102 Moeck also testified at his second trial.  Again he 
acknowledged in direct examination that he had been convicted of 
six crimes and also admitted that he had been less than truthful 
to a law enforcement officer during an incident in Green County.  
At this second trial, the prosecutor emphasized both of Moeck's 
admissions in cross-examination and in her closing argument.  In 
her closing, she said: "When you talk about a motive to lie, 
well, the defendant has been convicted of six crimes in the past 
and he also has admitted that he has given false information to 
police in the past."  
¶103 By the time of the third trial, the State had 
accumulated more damaging information about Moeck through a 
presentence 
investigation 
(PSI).49 
 
For 
example, 
District 
                                                 
 
49 This character evidence would not normally be admissible 
to 
prove 
conduct 
in 
conformance 
therewith.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  However, when the defendant chooses to 
place his character in issue, the defendant "opens the door" to 
rebuttal 
evidence 
about 
his 
character.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(a); State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 
658, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990); 7 Blinka Wisconsin Practice: 
Wisconsin Evidence § 404.4 at 133 (2d ed. 2001).  Defense 
counsel effectively put Moeck's character in issue during his 
opening argument by referring to Moeck's children and the length 
of time Moeck had been married.  Professor Blinka uses this 
precise example (the defendant's status as a "family man") as a 
situation in which the prosecution might be allowed to introduce 
responsive character evidence.  Id. 
 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
Attorney Scott Horne used information from the PSI at the 
sentencing hearing after the second trial.  He told the court 
that in one incident in Florida, Moeck had "assaulted a victim 
with a weapon, took his wallet and tied him to a tree."  In 
another incident in Illinois in 1993, Moeck invaded a home 
"while masked, slapped a woman, ultimately stabbed her in the 
hand and leg."  Moeck had threatened a range of people, from his 
former wife to police officers and court personnel. 
¶104 The case against Moeck was complicated by the fact 
that C.S. also had criminal convictions (five at the time of the 
third trial) as well as some inconsistencies in his prior 
testimony.  Thus, the pivotal issue for the jury was the 
credibility of the victim versus the credibility of the 
defendant.  Moeck's attorney at the third trial, Timothy 
Gaskell, acknowledged as much when he wrote: "The thrust of the 
case has always been whether the alleged victim . . . is a 
credible witness."  
¶105 These dynamics were fully understood by the defendant, 
his attorney, the prosecutor, and the court at the opening of 
the third trial.  Attorney Gaskell, who replaced Attorney Fabio 
Burgos after Moeck fired him, gave an opening statement in which 
he presented the defendant's entire account of events, but then 
offered no evidence to support his story.  The defendant did not 
testify, as he had before, and thereby escaped the cross-
examination and impeachment he had faced in the first two 
trials.  Gaskell also stressed in his opening that C.S. had  
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
been inconsistent in his prior testimony but that Moeck's 
account had not varied when he testified. 
¶106 The court granted the State's motion for a mistrial 
after the defendant failed to produce evidence to corroborate 
the opening statement and after the State contended that it 
could not neutralize the prejudice it had suffered by cautionary 
instructions and closing argument.  This discretionary decision 
by the circuit court was twice affirmed by the court of appeals, 
before it was reversed. 
¶107 The legal issues now before the court cannot be 
separated from these background facts.  The circuit court had a 
complete grasp of these background facts and was aware from 
personal observation that the defendant's personality changed 
dramatically when the jury was not present.50  
LAW OF THE CASE 
¶108 The first issue concerns the law of the case doctrine.  
The majority explains that the law of the case doctrine is a 
"longstanding rule that a decision on a legal issue by an 
appellate court establishes the law of the case, which must be 
followed in all subsequent proceedings in the trial court or on 
later appeal."  Majority op., ¶18 (quoting Univest Corp. v. Gen. 
Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989)).  
Nevertheless, the law of the case doctrine is not an absolute 
                                                 
50 For instance, the court removed the defendant from the 
courtroom because of his shouting and disruption during a 
sentencing hearing.  In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 
513-14 (1978), the Court noted that the trial judge "is the 
judge most familiar with the evidence and the background of the 
case on trial." 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
rule.  Majority op., ¶25.  It can be set aside in the interests 
of justice "whenever cogent, substantial, and proper reasons 
exist."  McGovern v. Eckhart, 200 Wis. 64, 75, 78, 227 N.W. 300 
(1929). 
¶109 The majority opinion conveys the impression that the 
court of appeals considered this issue only once prior to its 
decision in the present appeal.  Majority op., ¶¶26-28.  In 
reality, though, the court of appeals twice affirmed La Crosse 
County Circuit Judge Dennis Montabon's decision to grant the 
State a mistrial in Moeck's third trial.  The court of appeals 
initially considered Moeck's argument in September 2000 when, 
shortly before the fourth trial, the defendant moved to dismiss 
the case on double jeopardy grounds.  When his motion was denied 
by Judge Montabon, the defendant sought an appeal of the court's 
nonfinal order.  Majority op., ¶11.   
¶110 In his petition to the court of appeals, Attorney 
Gaskell attached several documents.  The documents included a 3-
page excerpt of his opening statement and the complete 11-page 
transcript 
of 
the 
instructions 
conference. 
 
This 
short 
transcript contained the entire discussion of the State's motion 
for mistrial. 
¶111 In this appeal, Assistant Attorney General James M. 
Freimuth 
repeatedly 
referred 
to 
the 
discussion 
at 
the 
instructions conference and cited pages from the defendant's 
petition and attached documents.  Freimuth concluded, on page 18 
of his Response to Petition For Leave to Appeal, that "the 
excerpt of the record provided by defendant in the present case 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
fully supports the trial court's exercise of discretion in 
granting the State's motion for mistrial based on defense 
misconduct."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶112 Upon reviewing these papers, a court of appeals panel 
consisting of Judges Charles Dykman, William Eich, and Patience 
Roggensack entered a summary order affirming the circuit court.  
The order read in part: 
[B]ased on our review of the petition and the attached 
documents, we conclude that the State's . . . proposal 
of granting leave to appeal and summarily affirming 
would best serve the interest of judicial economy.  We 
further conclude that the trial court's memorandum 
decision and order identifies and applies the proper 
legal standards to the relevant facts and reaches the 
correct 
conclusion. 
 
(Emphasis 
added; 
citation 
omitted.) 
The court of appeals then attached the circuit court's written 
decision to its order. 
 
¶113 The court of appeals reviewed the same issue again in 
June 2002.  After his conviction at the fourth trial, the 
defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
court of appeals.  The petition challenged the effectiveness of 
Moeck's counsel in the earlier pretrial interlocutory appeal.  
Majority op., ¶13.  Once again, the defendant's papers included 
the complete transcript of the instructions conference. 
¶114 A panel consisting of Judges Dykman, Roggensack, and 
Paul Lundsten entered an order denying the writ.  The order read 
in part: 
Moeck petitioned for leave to appeal from the 
trial court's order permitting a retrial and denying 
his motion to dismiss the charges, claiming double 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
jeopardy.  We granted the petition . . . but summarily 
affirmed the trial court's ruling on double jeopardy. 
 
. . . .  
 
In Moeck's present petition he contends that had 
appellate counsel adequately argued the issue [on the 
interlocutory appeal], he would have prevailed . . . .  
The trial court's decision to allow a retrial was 
discretionary.  This court will summarily affirm an 
exercise of discretion only if the record is clear 
that the discretion was properly exercised.  See 
Wisconsin 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
Internal 
Operating 
Procedures, Section VI, Sub. 1.  In short, no amount 
of advocacy would have convinced this court that the 
trial court unreasonably exercised its discretion.  It 
was clear that the court did not.51  (Emphasis added.) 
¶115 Moeck then pursued a direct appeal of his conviction 
and the denial of his post-conviction motion for relief, raising 
the same double jeopardy issue that the court had decided 
previously.  In this third "appeal," the panel consisted of 
Judges Dykman, Margaret Vergeront, and Paul Higginbotham.  In 
its opinion reversing Moeck's conviction on double jeopardy 
grounds, the court stated: 
Prior to his fourth trial, Moeck moved to dismiss 
the complaint on double jeopardy grounds.  The trial 
court denied the motion in a written opinion.  Moeck 
petitioned this court for leave to appeal.  We granted 
the petition and summarily affirmed, reasoning that 
the trial court's written opinion "applie[d] the 
proper legal standard to the relevant facts and 
reache[d] the correct conclusion."  However, we failed 
to review the transcript showing the trial court's 
reasoning when it granted the State's request for a 
mistrial. 
                                                 
51 Moeck petitioned for review in this court, but his 
petition was denied on September 26, 2002.  This petition also 
contained the relevant transcript. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
State v. Moeck, 2004 WI App 47, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 729, 677 
N.W.2d 648 (emphasis added).  The court of appeals added:  
When we reviewed Moeck's petition for review, we 
examined Judge Montabon's written order and not his 
oral decision on the State's motion for a mistrial.  
Though the two are similar in some respects, the oral 
decision makes clear that the trial court left the 
mistrial decision up to the State.  The trial court 
would have given a curative instruction had the State 
requested that instead of a mistrial.  And the court 
reasoned that the defense counsel's failure to produce 
evidence promised in opening statement necessitated a 
mistrial.  Had we reviewed the transcript, we would 
have observed this. 
Id., ¶21 (emphasis added). 
¶116 The court's assertion that it did not examine the 
transcript of the circuit court's oral decision in the first 
appeal in 2000 is extraordinary.  It is an assertion about what 
Judge Dykman, Judge Eich, and Judge Roggensack considered in 
reviewing Moeck's interlocutory appeal.   
¶117 Although 
the 
judge 
who 
wrote 
the 
decision 
was 
admittedly a member of all three panels, he was not empowered to 
write about what Judge Eich and Judge Roggensack thought and 
considered four years earlier.  The other two members of the 
third panel were not involved in the earlier cases. 
¶118 There is absolutely no evidence that either Judge Eich 
or Judge Roggensack has ever confirmed the court's statement 
that they never considered the short transcript that was before 
them.  The court's 2000 order contradicts the court's 2004 
statement because it asserts that the court reviewed the 
defendant's "petition and attached documents."  
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶119 Moving to this court, the majority opinion states that 
the cogent, substantial, and proper reason for disregarding the 
law of the case doctrine is that "[t]he court of appeals had 
based its prior decisions that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion only on the circuit court's written 
order."  Majority op., ¶27.  The texts of the two court of 
appeals orders demonstrate that this is not correct.  The 
majority 
goes 
on: 
"The 
court 
of 
appeals 
candidly 
acknowledged . . . that its prior summary order rejecting the 
defendant's double jeopardy challenges erroneously failed to 
take into account the circuit court's oral decision to grant a 
mistrial."  Id.  Again the majority is not correct.  The court 
of appeals did not make any such representation about its second 
order. 
¶120 It is astonishing for this court to assert that Judge 
Roggensack (twice), Judge Eich, and Judge Lundsten never 
considered a short transcript that was central to the issue in 
front of them before they made their decisions, particularly 
when the court of appeals' summary orders state otherwise and 
the defendant attached the relevant document to his filings on 
both occasions.  Judge Roggensack should have had an interest in 
the case because she wrote the opinion reversing Moeck's 
convictions in the second trial for failure to grant his request 
for a mistrial. 
¶121 By affirming the court of appeals, this court is 
ratifying a dangerous new procedure in which one judge's 
subjective memory of a transaction that occurred four years 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
earlier is permitted to override the plain language of a 
contemporary court order.  For us to conclude that this 
questionable procedure constitutes a cogent, substantial, and 
proper reason for setting aside the law of the case is nothing 
less than a lethal blow to finality in our courts.52 
¶122 The court of appeals gave an additional reason for 
disregarding the law of the case doctrine, namely, that "the 
oral decision makes clear that the trial court left the mistrial 
decision up to the State."  Moeck, 270 Wis. 2d 729, ¶21.  "The 
record shows that the trial court allowed the State to determine 
whether there was manifest necessity to terminate the third 
trial.  Such discretion resides only with the judiciary."  Id., 
¶13. 
¶123 My reading of the transcript is very different.  The 
third jury trial was conducted on March 15, 2000.  Evidence in 
that trial concluded about 5:30 p.m.  Thereafter, the court 
excused the jury and met in the courtroom with Assistant 
District Attorney Robyn Matousek, defense attorney Gaskell, and 
the defendant.  In this meeting, the defendant confirmed that he 
did not wish to testify, and defense counsel requested and was 
granted an instruction that the defendant had an absolute 
constitutional right not to testify.  This discussion was 
followed by a short recess. 
¶124 When the parties returned, the court furnished copies 
of proposed instructions.  The State requested an additional 
                                                 
52 The majority never satisfactorily explains why the second 
court of appeals order should be disregarded. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
instruction to deal with defense counsel's opening statement.  
The prosecutor complained vehemently that defense counsel "went 
through the whole scenario" [of the defendant's account] in his 
opening statement, including an assertion that the defendant had 
testified at the previous trials, then failed to present any 
evidence to corroborate what he had said.  "[S]o I think that's 
completely unethical," the prosecutor argued, "but aside from 
that, I think that there has to be an instruction to the jury 
that they are to disregard that and not consider any of that 
portion of the opening statement."  
¶125 Attorney Gaskell insisted that opening statements are 
not evidence, and that he had a right to tell a jury what he 
believed a defendant would say without losing the constitutional 
right not to put that defendant on the stand.   
¶126 Judge Montabon disagreed.  "You can't tell the jury 
what the evidence is gonna show and then don't show it," he 
said.  Moments later, the court added: "[I]t seems to me the 
State is in a bind . . . and might well be entitled to a 
mistrial.53  This is the instruction I propose to try to correct 
that, but the State is gonna be in a bind in argument because 
they can't directly comment on the defendant not testifying."  
Judge Montabon then suggested the following instruction: "The 
jury is not to consider any statement of certain facts made in 
                                                 
53 In 
State 
v. 
Copening, 
100 
Wis. 2d 700, 
709, 
303 
N.W.2d 821 (1981), the court observed: "[I]t is not infrequent 
that a trial court discerns sua sponte the necessity for a 
mistrial." 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
opening statements when such facts were not supported by 
evidence received during the course of this trial."  
¶127 The prosecutor immediately responded: "Can I have 
about five minutes?  I would like to confer with [District 
Attorney] Horne about whether or not I should be asking for a 
mistrial in this case."  Matousek took the judge's proposed 
instruction with her. 
¶128 When she returned, Matousek explained that she met 
with C.S. to determine whether he was willing to go through a 
fourth trial.  He was.  "I need to make clear, though, before I 
make [a] decision to request a mistrial . . . exactly how far 
would the Court be allowing me to go as far as statements in a 
closing argument commenting on . . . basically a fictional tale 
presented 
in 
the 
opening 
statement . . . and 
no 
evidence 
presented and no effort to present evidence to support that?"  
She emphasized that she had "every intention" of not being very 
kind to Attorney Gaskell.  "I think I should have the 
opportunity to . . . at least make [the] statement, that a 
fictional tale was presented . . . .  He's basically slinging 
mud at a victim without any effort to support his statements." 
¶129 Gaskell fought back.  "Opening statements are not 
evidence . . . .  If we actually in any way, shape, or form 
believe that the  jury is gonna hang their hat on something that 
I said ten hours ago, I think that's an absurd notion.  They're 
gonna base it on whether they believe [C.S.] or not."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
¶130 The court replied: "It's not quite that simple, Mr. 
Gaskell.  They [the jury] have a reasonable alternative in their 
minds . . . with 
no 
evidence 
whatsoever 
to 
support 
it.  
Reasonable or not, they have an alternative."  
¶131 "I haven't had a chance to do any cross-examination," 
the prosecutor complained.  "I can't include that in . . . any 
part of my closing argument as I have in the past two trials." 
¶132 In further discussion, the court opined that the 
prosecutor could say there was no proof of what defense counsel 
had said "as long as you don't say . . . the defendant didn't 
get up here and tell us that, or words to that effect . . .  
[I]f you say, the defendant didn't get up here and say this, we 
will likely be trying it again."  
¶133 The court added: "I read about [attorney] misconduct 
[in] opening statements.  It's clear[,] I think[,] that the 
Court can grant a mistrial." 
¶134 Attorney Gaskell then appeared to compromise: 
Mr. Gaskell: 
I think if Ms. Matousek -- if she wants 
to argue . . . that we didn't present 
any supporting evidence based on my 
opening statement, I mean, to move this 
thing along -- 
Ms. Matousek: Are you waiving any objection to that? 
The Defendant: No. 
Mr. Gaskell: 
As long as -- 
The Defendant: No.  Nope. 
Mr. Gaskell: 
Well, Your Honor, I think you're right, 
as 
long 
as 
she 
doesn't 
say, 
the 
defendant didn't get up on the stand 
and say that -- I mean, I think she can 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
say that I indicated that in opening 
statement and that I didn't present any 
testimony to back that up or evidence 
to back that up.  
¶135 At this point, the record shows open conflict between 
the defense counsel and the defendant.  The defense counsel 
appears to be making a concession that the defendant is 
unwilling to make. 
The Court: 
[to the prosecutor]  Do you want to go 
ahead or not? . . .  [T]he State under 
the circumstances now would be entitled 
to a mistrial if they wanted one. 
Ms. Matousek: I think I'm gonna ask for a mistrial, 
Judge.  I'm not gonna be able to erase 
those 
facts. 
 
I 
can't 
argue 
them . . . in my oral argument because 
I didn't have a chance to cross-examine 
[the defendant] about it.  It's not 
even out there before the jury. 
 
. . . .  
The Court: 
Motion for a mistrial is granted. 
¶136 The transcript shows that the court several times 
suggested that the State was entitled to a mistrial if the State 
wanted one.  Against this background, the question was whether 
the State wanted a mistrial or whether it wanted to proceed.  
Although 
the 
State 
took 
the position 
that 
it 
had 
been 
prejudiced, it unquestionably retained the option whether to go 
forward or seek a new trial.  As a result, it was meaningless 
for the court of appeals to conclude that "the trial court left 
the mistrial decision up to the State."  Moeck, 270 Wis. 2d 729, 
¶21.  Surely, this court is not holding that when the State has 
been prejudiced, the court may declare a mistrial even though 
the State does not want one. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶137 The court of appeals also said that "the trial court 
allowed the State to determine whether there was manifest 
necessity to terminate the third trial."  Id., ¶13.  That would 
be meaningful, but that conclusion is not supported by the 
record.  The State gave reasons why it wanted a mistrial and the 
court granted the mistrial. 
¶138 Whether the court made the correct ruling is a 
different 
question 
from 
whether 
the 
court 
abdicated 
its 
discretion to the prosecutor.  Two court of appeals decisions 
concluded that Judge Montabon made the correct decision in 
granting the State's motion for a mistrial.  I see no cogent, 
substantial, and proper reason based on facts why the court of 
appeals' prior rulings should not be considered the law of the 
case.  The circuit court did not abdicate its discretion; it 
recognized that the State had options and permitted the State to 
select an option. 
MANIFEST NECESSITY 
¶139 The majority's decision to disregard the law of the 
case doctrine makes it necessary to address the second issue, 
whether the fourth trial violated the defendant's right against 
double jeopardy because no "manifest necessity" for a mistrial 
existed after the close of evidence in the third trial.  The 
majority concludes that the State did not meet its burden of 
showing a "manifest necessity" for terminating the third trial, 
and, thus, the circuit court erred in granting a mistrial.  
Majority op., ¶80. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
17 
 
¶140 Justice Wilcox has authored a powerful dissent, which 
I join, but there are additional details about the evidence and  
the majority's opinion that deserve comment. 
¶141 This case involves a vulnerable victim.  At the time 
of the third trial, C.S. had five criminal convictions and a 
pattern of making misstatements to law enforcement.  His 
checkered 
history 
fully 
justified 
a 
challenge 
to 
his 
credibility, but it did not excuse assaults on his person.  The 
prosecutor acknowledged these problems in her opening statement, 
and explained that C.S. had to relive the incident in several 
different testimonies. 
¶142 The defendant's opening statement was 17 pages in 
length.  As the majority accurately states, the State did not 
object to the defendant's version of events because it was 
consistent with Moeck's prior testimony.  The State would likely 
have objected to the substance of the story had it known the 
defendant would offer no evidence to support his narrative.  The 
State's three objections actually reinforced the defendant's 
story because each one focused on the argumentative nature of 
counsel's remarks, not the substance of his allegations.  The 
court responded to the objections with comments such as "Tell 
them what your evidence will show" and "You will have ample 
opportunity to argue."  
¶143 The defendant's opening statement told the jury that 
"the evidence is gonna be significantly different" from the 
events described in the State's opening, and "here are some of 
the things that are gonna be significantly different."  
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
18 
 
¶144 Shortly 
thereafter, 
defense 
counsel 
stated 
that 
"[C.S.] has testified . . . at previous hearings in this matter.  
Rich has done the same thing, and the only person in this case 
that has been consistent with their story and with their 
testimony is Rich."  (Emphasis added.)  
¶145 This comment distinguishes the present case from most 
others in which defense counsel makes an improper opening.  The 
State could not dispute the fact that Moeck had testified twice 
before.  This fact, once revealed, was reinforced by every 
reference to previous trials.  It could not be erased by a 
cautionary instruction and could not be discussed in the 
prosecutor's closing argument without reminding the jury that 
the defendant had not testified at this trial.  Thus, when the 
defense attorney relayed Moeck's version of the encounter with 
C.S., it had much greater credibility than it would have had in 
an opening at a first trial. 
¶146 Attorney Gaskell also volunteered that Moeck is "a 
250-pound construction worker.  He's been married twice before.  
He's got three children and those marriages lasted approximately 
17 years."54  Moments later he skillfully contrasted this 
uncontested information with the statement that, "You're not 
gonna hear any evidence in regards to any kind of homosexual 
activity or any homosexual materials that were either found in 
Rich's apartment or nobody else is gonna come up here and say, 
                                                 
 
54 This evidence could easily be seen as character evidence.  
See supra n.2.  Because Moeck did not actually testify, the 
State had no opportunity to rebut this "evidence," further 
justifying the court's decision to grant a mistrial. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
19 
 
'yeah . . . Rich Moeck's a homosexual.'  There's . . . gonna be 
no evidence in regards to that."  
¶147 Attorney Gaskell's prediction proved to be correct.  
Because he was familiar with the first two trials, Gaskell was 
able to effectively demolish a straw man (which the jury would 
have noted), present the defendant's story of the incident, and 
avoid any cross-examination or impeachment of the defendant. 
¶148 When Gaskell repeatedly argued that "the only person 
in this case that has been consistent with their story and with 
their testimony is Rich," however, he was not being completely 
candid.  One example illustrates the point.   
¶149 At the first trial, Moeck contended that he met C.S. 
at Kenny's Pub, a tavern in La Crosse, that he and C.S. were 
drinking at the bar, that C.S. asked Moeck if he wanted to go 
outside in the back of the tavern and smoke a joint.  They did, 
according to the story, and Moeck told C.S. that he might want 
to buy some pot once in a while.  "After we got to talking, I 
told him where I lived and that's how he knew where I lived."  
Moeck provided this background as his explanation for how and 
why C.S. knocked on his apartment door at 3:09 on a Saturday 
morning. 
¶150 On cross-examination, the prosecutor attacked the 
plausibility of this story and obtained a concession that C.S. 
did not write down Moeck's address.  Moeck also said he lived in 
one of several apartments above Spanky's Tavern.  In closing 
argument, the prosecutor declared: 
[Y]ou hear from the defendant that he had met [C.S.] 
about a month before, [had a conversation with him] in 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
20 
 
a bar . . . told him that he lived up above Spanky's 
and a month later after having no other contact with 
him, [C.S.] comes to the defendant's apartment.  How 
[C.S.] knew which apartment it was when there are four 
or five different apartments on that particular floor 
is beyond me.  Maybe he went knocking at all different 
ones at 3 in the morning, but I think it's pretty 
farfetched to believe that [C.S.] knew exactly which 
apartment to go to to try to sell this marijuana to 
the defendant.  [C.S.] didn't even remember exactly 
what apartment number it was when he testified on the 
stand. . . .  [W]e're to believe that [C.S.] was able 
to remember, not only that but he was able to remember 
and locate the defendant after having had two hits of 
LSD and so he's supposed to be able to find his way to 
an apartment that he's never been to.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶151 In the second trial, Moeck headed off part of this 
attack on his credibility by "remembering" new facts: 
Q: 
And when you described where you lived, how did 
you put that to him? 
A: 
Well, I told him what door to go in.  He knew 
where Spanky's was, so I told him what door to go 
in, right next door to Spanky's, and to go up to 
the first floor and my apartment was the last one 
on the left.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶152 On cross-examination, he volunteered this information: 
Q: 
Did you see [C.S.] write down the information 
about where you lived? 
A: 
No, but I told him how to get to my apartment.  
¶153 If 
the 
defendant 
had 
been 
subject 
to 
cross-
examination, 
the 
implausibility 
and 
inconsistency 
in 
his 
testimony would have been exposed.  That, of course, never 
happened.  Instead, Attorney Gaskell was able to spend 13 pages 
of his opening statement on discrepancies and inconsistencies in 
the victim's testimony and then followed that up with vigorous 
cross-examination of the victim at trial. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
21 
 
¶154 Attacking the credibility of a victim's testimony is a 
legitimate trial tactic.  Telling the defendant's side of the 
story in an opening statement, then failing to corroborate a 
word of that story with testimony is not legitimate, especially 
when the story escapes all adversary challenge at trial. 
¶155 The "central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide 
the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."  
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).  "To this end 
it is important that both the defendant and the prosecutor have 
the opportunity to meet fairly the evidence and arguments of one 
another."  United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988). 
¶156 These principles were foreshadowed in Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978), a case involving an improper 
opening statement by defense counsel.  Washington is discussed 
extensively by the majority and the dissent of Justice Wilcox.  
However, the majority opinion downplays the deference the 
Washington Court said ought to be given to a circuit court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
in 
granting 
a 
mistrial 
in 
these 
circumstances.  The Washington Court said: 
[T]he trial judge ordered a mistrial because the 
defendant's 
lawyer 
made 
improper 
and 
prejudicial 
remarks during his opening statement to the jury. 
 
. . . .  
 
We recognize that the extent of the possible bias 
[affecting the impartiality of the jury] cannot be 
measured, and that the District Court was quite 
correct in believing that some trial judges might have 
proceeded with the trial after giving the jury 
appropriate cautionary instructions.  In a strict, 
literal sense, the mistrial was not "necessary."  
Nevertheless, 
the 
overriding 
interest 
in 
the 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
22 
 
evenhanded administration of justice requires that we 
accord the highest degree of respect to the trial 
judge's 
evaluation 
of 
the 
likelihood 
that 
the 
impartiality of one or more jurors may have been 
affected by the improper comment. 
 
. . . .  
 
An 
improper 
opening 
statement 
unquestionably 
tends to frustrate the public interest in having a 
just 
judgment 
reached 
by 
an impartial 
tribunal.  
Indeed, such statements create a risk, often not 
present in the individual juror bias situation, that 
the entire panel may be tainted.  The trial judge, of 
course, may instruct the jury to disregard the 
improper comment. . . .  [This] action[ ], however, 
will not necessarily remove the risk of bias that may 
be created by improper argument. . . .  [T]he trial 
judge must have the power to declare a mistrial in 
appropriate cases.  The interest in orderly, impartial 
procedure would be impaired if he were deterred from 
exercising that power by a concern that any time a 
reviewing court disagreed with his assessment of the 
trial situation a retrial would automatically be 
barred.  The adoption of a stringent standard of 
appellate review in this area . . . would seriously 
impede the trial judge in the proper performance of 
his "duty, in order to protect the integrity of the 
trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to 
stop . . . professional 
misconduct" 
(citing 
United 
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976)). 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 510-513 (emphasis added). 
 
¶157 The Court acknowledged that a trial judge was required 
to exercise sound discretion in declaring a mistrial, id. at 
514, but Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, indicated that 
this meant not acting "irrationally or irresponsibly," as 
opposed to going through a long checklist of inquiries and 
alternatives 
as 
the 
prerequisite 
for 
establishing 
sound 
discretion.  Id.  "Neither party has a right to have his case 
decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias."  Id. at 516.  
"The state trial judge's mistrial declaration is not subject to 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
23 
 
collateral 
attack . . . simply 
because 
he 
failed 
to 
find 
'manifest necessity' in those words or to articulate on the 
record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of 
his discretion."  Id. at 517 (emphasis added). 
¶158 The majority appears to interpret State v. Seefeldt, 
2003 WI 47, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 661 N.W.2d 822, as creating a 
checklist for establishing sound discretion and a stringent 
standard of review.  This is unwarranted.  Seefeldt was decided 
on less egregious facts than the present case, in circumstances 
more amenable to corrective action and cautionary instruction.  
Seefeldt was also grounded in Washington and State v. Barthels, 
174 Wis. 2d 173, 184, 495 N.W.2d 341 (1993).  It should not be 
reinterpreted here to establish new requirements that did not 
exist five years ago. 
¶159 In Washington, the Court started with the premise that 
defense counsel's comment in the opening statement was not 
proper.  Washington, 434 U.S. at 511.  By contrast, the majority 
in the present case starts with the proposition that the opening 
statement 
was 
proper 
when 
delivered. 
 
To 
support 
this 
proposition, the majority makes the following statements: 
1. 
"The defendant's decision not to testify was 
apparently made at the close of the State's evidence."  
Majority op., ¶49 (emphasis added). 
2. 
"The defendant and his counsel apparently 
were confident that the State had failed to meet its 
burden of proof."  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
3. 
"As a result, the defendant did not present 
any evidence to substantiate defense counsel's opening 
statement of the defendant's version of the events."  
Id. (emphasis added). 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
24 
 
 
4. 
"Defense counsel explained that he could not 
know when making his opening statement that the 
defendant would opt not to testify, especially given 
that the defendant had testified at two earlier trials 
conducted by another defense attorney."  Id., ¶51. 
 
5. 
"Defense counsel asserted that he expected 
the defendant to testify (as the defendant had in 
prior trials), but he did not know in fact whether the 
defendant would testify."  Id., ¶65. 
¶160 The problem with these statements is that the first 
three 
are 
pure 
speculation 
and 
the 
last 
two 
are 
not 
substantiated by the record.  At no point in the instructions 
conference did defense counsel make a statement that he expected 
the defendant to testify.  In fact, at no point in his 17-page 
opening statement did counsel say words such as "Rich Moeck will 
testify that . . . ," whereas he did make such statements about 
C.S. and about a La Crosse police officer.  The defendant's 
opening statement is so carefully constructed and so detailed in 
its recitation of the victim's inconsistencies that it is hard 
to imagine that defense counsel was oblivious to whether the 
defendant would testify.  When counsel was accused to his face 
by 
the 
prosecutor 
of 
being 
unethical, 
he 
answered 
with 
generalities, not specifics. 
¶161 If defense counsel actually expected the defendant to 
testify, he may have been misled by the defendant himself.  The 
defendant spoke up personally when the prosecutor asked if the 
defense was waiving any objection to a pointed closing argument 
about the failure of the defense to produce evidence. 
Ms. Matousek: Are you waiving any objection to that? 
The Defendant: No. 
Mr. Gaskell: 
As long as -- 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
25 
 
The defendant. No.  Nope. 
¶162 This blunt exchange is reminiscent of a colloquy that 
occurred at a sentencing hearing after the second trial when the 
defendant fired his first attorney: 
The Court: 
You don't wish to have Mr. Burgos 
represent you? 
The Defendant:  
Nope. 
The Court: 
 
Do you want another lawyer-- 
The Defendant:  
Nope. 
The Court: 
 
-- to represent you? 
The Defendant:  
Nope. 
¶163 Shortly thereafter, the defendant attempted to prevent 
the district attorney from speaking.  "Nope, he can't say 
nothing.  He ain't got nothing to say."  Eventually, the court 
removed 
the 
defendant 
from 
the 
courtroom 
for 
vulgarity, 
shouting, and disruption.55 
¶164 Thus, there is good reason to dispute the majority's 
position that the defendant's opening statement was proper when 
it was delivered.56  The State persuasively argues that the 
                                                 
55 At one point, the defendant said: "Yeah, I'm not going to 
sit here and listen to the State's bullshit so just take me 
out." 
56 The majority appears to draw a distinction between an 
opening statement that is proper when delivered and an opening 
statement that is made in bad faith.  In this case, the 
defendant's opening statement was prejudicial to the State 
irrespective of whether it was delivered in bad faith.  It was 
not less prejudicial because it was arguably proper when 
delivered.  In light of the defendant's failure to testify, the 
opening statement inflicted the same irreparable damage on the 
State's case regardless of when it became clear that the 
statement was impermissible. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
26 
 
defendant's opening was "a textbook example of how not to 
present an opening statement to the jury."  It quotes the late 
Chief Justice Warren Burger that: 
 
An opening statement has a narrow purpose and 
scope.  It is to state what evidence will be 
presented, to make it easier for the jurors to 
understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of 
the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is not an 
occasion for argument.  To make statements which will 
not or cannot be supported by proof is, if it relates 
to significant elements of the case, professional 
misconduct.  Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to 
an opposing party to allow an attorney, with the 
standing and prestige inherent in being an officer of 
the court, to present to the jury statements not 
susceptible of proof but intended to influence the 
jury in reaching a verdict. 
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). 
 
¶165 There is real danger that the court is rewriting the 
rules of what is acceptable comment in an opening statement and 
how a trial judge may respond to counsel error.  The majority 
concludes that "the circuit court did not exercise sound 
discretion in declaring a mistrial when it failed to give 
adequate consideration to the State's ability to refer to the 
defendant's silence and to the effectiveness of a curative jury 
instruction."  Majority op., ¶71.  It asserts that the circuit 
court's belief that a response in closing argument and a 
curative jury instruction would not rectify the prejudice to the 
state was "unfounded."  Id. 
¶166 Taking these points in reverse order, the court 
suggests that "a curative jury instruction that opening and 
closing statements are arguments, not evidence, would have cured 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
27 
 
any possible prejudice resulting from defense counsel's opening 
statement." 
 
Id., 
¶79. 
 
This 
determination 
seriously 
miscalculates the extraordinary circumstances of this case. 
¶167 The notion of a cautionary instruction must be put in 
context.  Before the State and defense counsel gave opening 
statements in this case, the court addressed the jury, saying: 
The State must prove every fact necessary to find the 
defendant guilty.  The State must prove those facts 
through evidence.  There are two kinds of evidence.  
First, there is what the witnesses say on the witness 
stand.  Second, there are exhibits which are received 
into evidence.  The arguments of the lawyers are not 
evidence. 
 
. . . .  
 
In considering your verdict, disregard everything 
except the evidence received during this trial and the 
law contained in my instructions.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶168 At the close of some trials, the court gives Wis JI——
Criminal 157, "Remarks of Counsel" which reads in part: "Remarks 
of the attorneys are not evidence.  If the remarks suggested 
certain facts not in evidence, disregard the suggestion."  
Attorney Gaskell argued that this instruction was the correct 
instruction to give the jury. 
¶169 There is presently a jury instruction on "Opening 
Statements," Wis JI——Criminal 101, which reads: "The lawyers 
will now make opening statements.  The purpose of an opening 
statement is to give the lawyers an opportunity to tell you what 
they expect the evidence will show so that you will better 
understand the evidence as it is introduced during the trial.  I 
must caution you, however, that the opening statements are not 
evidence."  This instruction was not given before opening 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
28 
 
argument.  The instruction did not read the same way in March 
2000, and an earlier version may not have been available to the 
court because it was relatively new. 
¶170 As noted above, the court proposed an instruction that 
read: "The jury is not to consider any statement of certain 
facts made in opening statements when such facts were not 
supported by evidence received during the course of this trial."  
This was the only proposed instruction under consideration in 
the conference that went beyond Wis JI——Criminal 157. 
¶171 The truth is, this instruction would not have undone 
the damage of defense counsel's opening statement.  First, as 
worded, it applied to both the defense and the State.  Second, 
it 
was 
not 
materially 
different 
from 
the 
boilerplate 
instructions cited above.  Third, it was highly unlikely to 
erase the jury's understanding that the defendant had been 
married, had three children, had testified before, and had a 
story that conflicted with the victim's story.  As the circuit 
court 
patiently 
explained, 
the 
jury 
had 
a 
"reasonable 
alternative in their minds."  Consequently, I do not see how any 
court 
could 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
judge 
was 
acting 
irrationally or irresponsibly in believing that this cautionary 
instruction would not solve the problem. 
¶172 The suggestion of a "measured response" in the State's 
closing argument is also problematic.  The court mysteriously 
pronounces that "[t]here are circumstances . . . when an accused 
'opens the door' to a measured response by the prosecuting 
attorney [and t]he defendant opened the door in the instant 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
29 
 
case."  Majority op., ¶74.  However, the majority provides no 
guidance for future cases as to when that "door" opens, or what 
a similarly situated prosecutor could permissibly say during her 
closing argument.57  In fact, the State could not have pointed to 
any explicit language in the defendant's opening statement in 
which defense counsel promised that the defendant would testify.  
Instead, the court hints at the possibility of a response on the 
defendant's silence, then pulls back with the observation that 
the propriety of prosecutorial comment must be decided "case by 
case."  Id.  This observation can only have a chilling effect on 
a prosecutor's rebuttal.58  The majority is more comfortable 
relying on prosecutorial remarks that draw "the jury's attention 
to the distinction between argument and evidence."  Id., ¶76.  
However, such comments would be far more effective in a case in 
which the defendant himself gave the opening statement (see 
State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 242, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 
                                                 
57 When relying on the "invited response doctrine," the 
prosecution treads on extremely thin ice.  Even when her 
response is invited, the prosecutor must take care not to 
"unfairly prejudice" the defendant under the totality of the 
circumstances.  United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).  
The Court has also advised prosecutors to request a curative 
instruction in lieu of an oral response to perceived impropriety 
on the part of the defense.  Id. at 13. 
58 Under any circumstances, the prosecutor must tightly 
circumscribe her comments during closing argument.  For example, 
the Supreme Court has held that a comment such as "[t]hese 
things [the defendant] has not seen fit to take the stand and 
deny or explain" is improper.  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609, 611 (1965).  Even a comment that the prosecution's case is 
unrebutted or undisputed may be seen as impermissible if, as 
here, the defendant is the only witness who could conceivably 
rebut or dispute the prosecution's case.  See United States v. 
Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 1996). 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
30 
 
1984)), than here, where the defense counsel was the culprit and 
had the assurance of an instruction stressing the defendant's 
absolute constitutional right not to testify. 
¶173 The prosecutor inquired what she could say about the 
defense attorney's fictional tale.  She declared that she had 
"every intention" not to be kind to Attorney Gaskell.  And the 
majority now asserts that, "Any prejudice to the State by 
defense counsel's opening statement would be outweighed by 
defense counsel's loss of credibility with the jury for his 
unsubstantiated opening statement."  Majority op., ¶78. 
¶174 However, 
the 
more 
effective 
the 
prosecutor's 
commentary, the more likely Moeck would have had a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel if he were convicted.  See 
Barrow v. Uchtman, 398 F.3d 597, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2005), and 
United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 257-60 
(7th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that unfulfilled promises 
by defense counsel to present personal testimony from a criminal 
defendant are highly suspect under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984). 
¶175 During the instructions conference, the court weighed 
cautionary 
instructions, 
the 
possibility 
of 
prosecutorial 
comment in the closing argument, and the nature of the prejudice 
to the State.  The court heard contrasting views from the two 
sides.  The court saw and heard the defendant refuse to waive 
objection to prosecutorial comment.  The court had read case law 
on improper comment in opening statements and had asked the 
court reporter to read back a portion of the opening statement. 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
31 
 
¶176 Against this background, the majority's conclusory 
determination that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in 
its exercise of discretion is a virtual repudiation of the sound 
policies outlined in Arizona v. Washington.  The Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the United States Constitution does not mandate this 
result. 
¶177 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶178 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No. 2003AP2-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
1