Title: JRS v. GMS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JRS v. GMS2004 WY 6090 P.3d 718Case Number: 03-111Decided: 05/26/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
         

 

JRS,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff/Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

 

GMS,

 

Appellee(Defendant/Respondent) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Christopher 
M. Wages of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, WY

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Pro 
se

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, JRS 
(Father), seeks review of an order of the district court denying his petition to 
modify a divorce decree so as to grant him primary custody of all four of his 
minor children.  Appellee, GMS 
(Mother), did not file a brief in this appeal.  In the district court proceedings she 
also filed a petition seeking custody of all four children.  The district court found that neither 
party had demonstrated a material change of circumstances and maintained the 
status quo, continuing the parties' original stipulation that Father would have 
custody of the two older children, and Mother would have custody of the two 
younger children.  We will reverse 
and remand for additional proceedings.

 

 

[¶2]      Father poses this 
issue for our consideration:

 

            
Whether the district court erred when it found that there was no 
substantial and material change of circumstances as required by law to modify 
the Stipulated Decree of Divorce and denied [Father's] Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce.

 

 

[¶3]      The district 
court entered its stipulated decree of divorce on October 5, 2000.  Custody of the parties' four children 
was established in the stipulation.  
Father was awarded custody of the parties' two older children, born May 
9, 1990, and February 15, 1992.  
Mother was awarded custody of the parties' two younger children, born 
January 9, 1995, and May 1, 1997.  
Visitation rights were detailed in the decree.  The decree included a section devoted to 
"PARENTAL COOPERATION PROVISIONS:"

 

            
Each parent shall:

            
a.  Exercise discretion and cooperate with each other in 
exercising custodial and visitation rights so the best interest of the children 
is served.

            
b.  Make every reasonable effort to insure that the children 
have free access to and unhampered contact with both 
parents.

            
c.  Encourage the free and natural development of the 
children's love and respect for both parents and do nothing which may estrange 
the children from the other parent, or injure the opinion of the children as to 
the other parent.

            
d.  Keep each other informed as to the location and phone 
number of the children at all times.

            
e.  Promptly notify the other of any illness, accident or other 
circumstance seriously affecting the health or welfare of the children.  Both parents shall have unlimited 
visitation privileges, consistent with the circumstances, for so long as the 
emergency situation continues.

            
f.  Be entitled to complete information from any physician, 
dentist, psychologist or other specialist attending to the children for any 
reason whatsoever and shall be entitled to copies of any reports rendered by any 
such specialist.  Neither parent 
shall do anything to frustrate the other parent's access to any health care 
records relating to the children.

            
g.  Be entitled to complete detailed information from any 
teacher, school or college and shall be entitled to copies of all reports or 
records with respect to the children's education.

            
h.  Consult with each other with respect to all matters of 
major importance affecting the welfare of the children.

 

[¶4]      Initially, there 
were no difficulties with visitation because both parents continued to reside in 
Crook County.  Not long after the 
divorce, Mother moved from Crook County to Belle Fourche, South Dakota.  Father testified that Mother became 
uncooperative in allowing visitation.  In addition, after the divorce, Father 
was convicted of battery on his former wife, and traveling to South Dakota was 
difficult for him because he had to get permission from his probation officer to 
leave Wyoming and go into another state.  
Mother would not agree to bring the children to, and pick them up from, 
the border.  Mother denied parts of 
these assertions.  The record 
reflects that neither parent had a very good specific memory, nor any meaningful 
records, so as to clarify what visitation had or had not 
occurred.

 

[¶5]      On July 8, 2002, 
Father filed a petition to modify the divorce decree1 so as to give him primary custody 
of all four children.  He asserted 
that there had been a material change of circumstances and that it was in the 
best interests of the children to be in his primary custody.  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 
2003) provides:

 

(c) 
A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the 
modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-201(a).2  In any proceeding in which a parent 
seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or visitation, proof of 
repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to allow visitation to 
the other parent in violation of an order may be considered as evidence of a 
material change of circumstances.

 

On 
that same date, Father also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, 
seeking protection for the children in Mother's custody.  That motion was premised on allegations 
that the parties' youngest daughter had been sexually molested by both Mother's 
fiancé and her brother.  The 
district court issued a temporary restraining order on July 10, 2002.  From that date forward, Mother did not 
have custody of any of the children, and her visits with the children have been 
supervised.  On September 24, 2002, 
the district court continued the temporary restraining order pending further 
information being provided to the court.

 

[¶6]      On December 27, 
2002, Mother filed an answer to Father's amended petition for modification of 
the custody arrangements, and in that document also asked that custody be 
modified to award her custody of all four children.

 

[¶7]      In January of 
2003, all four children were removed from Father's home when substantiated 
allegations of child abuse were leveled against Father's new wife 
(Stepmother).  Although Father was 
not accused of inflicting any abuse on his children, he was found to have failed 
to protect his children from Stepmother.  
Father complied with the case plan put into effect by DFS and eventually 
he regained custody of all four children.  
Stepmother is not permitted to have any contact with the children, but 
Father continues to be married to her and has maintained a relationship with 
her.  In light of all these 
circumstances, a DFS professional who managed the child abuse case testified 
that placing the children in Mother's full-time care and control would not be in 
the best interests of the children and that the children expressed a preference 
to be with Father.  Her observations 
were that the relationship between Mother and the children was strained, and 
that the children preferred to live with Father.  It is a condition of the DFS case plan 
that Stepmother not be allowed near the children, and Father testified that he 
would honor that condition.

 

[¶8]      A guardian ad 
litem3 (GAL) was appointed to represent 
the children.  In a report received 
by the district court the day before trial on these matters began, the GAL 
summarized his investigation and offered some concrete suggestions to the 
district court:

 

Impressions

 

            
While all information received was dutifully weighed in preparing my 
report, I found the comments of and observations of Pam Andrews at CASA, the 
thoughts and observations of [RS  Father's brother] and the more candid 
comments of [Father] to be of particular importance in forming my impressions in 
this matter.  If this were a case of 
first impression with neither party having significant others in their lives 
complicating their current situations, I would be inclined to say that [Father] 
is the better parent.  But even 
then, I share [RS's] concern that given the number of children, their age's and 
[Father's] work schedule, for him to have primary custody of all the children 
could present problems.  More 
importantly, this is not a case of first impression.  The parties both have significant 
others, who to one extent or another continue to be a part of their lives, which 
cause me great concern.

 

            
I have no problem in concluding that [Stepmother] should be no where near 
the parties' children now or in the foreseeable future.  Unfortunately, this is easier said than 
done as [stepmother] appears to continue to be lurking in the shadows of 
[Father's] life and as I do not feel comfortable that [Father] is anywhere close 
to choosing his children's welfare over the presence and opinions of 
[stepmother].  While less is known 
about [BB  Mother's fiancé] and his interactions with the parties' children, I 
likewise feel, despite [Mother's] claims to the contrary, [BB] continues to be a 
significant part of [Mother's] life.  
Though the allegations of sexual impropriety initially leveled against 
[BB] may be inconclusive enough to prevent the filing of criminal charges, 
nevertheless I cannot completely ignore this concern.  Further, I find [RS's] observations of 
[BB] as having a quick temper and the admitted use of a cheese board to spank 
the parties' youngest child as indications that [BB] is not a positive aspect of 
the children's lives.

 

            
I find no easy or good solution to this case.  Neither parent before or since their 
divorce presents a picture of the other that does not raise with me concerns 
regarding the safety and well being of their children.  The parties originally chose, whatever 
the circumstances may have been, to enter into a split custody arrangement 
regarding their children.  With the 
notable exception of the problems involving weekend visitation, until the 
appearance of the parties' respective significant others this arrangement seemed 
to be working relatively well.  
Again, in stating this impression I rely on the comments and observations 
of [RS] as well as the comments of the parties themselves.  [Father] has expressed a concern 
regarding [Mother's] drinking both predating and since the parties' divorce, 
though he admits that he only has random comments of the parties' children since 
their divorce to support these concerns.  
[Mother] has denied drinking is a problem in her life or that she drinks 
around the children.  As [Mother] 
has volunteered she has no need to have alcohol in her home, and as there should 
be no circumstance where she would feel compelled to drink in the presence of 
the children, erring a little on the safe side, I would recommend that there be 
no alcohol in the home of [Mother] at any time and that she not consume or have 
alcohol still present in her system at any time that the children are with 
her.

 

            
My final impression as a matter of fact and law is that if we were able 
to consider the parties to this case without consideration of their significant 
others the change of circumstances in their lives would be insufficient to 
support a change one way or the other concerning primary custody of the parties' 
children.

 

Conclusion

 

            
In conclusion, I would recommend the following:

 

            
1.  That the split custody of the parties' children as set 
forth in the parties' Divorce Decree remain in place.

 

            
2.  That the exchange of the children for all visitation take 
place at a neutral location in Moorcroft, which is approximately half way 
between the parties' present locations.  
Any party refusing to cooperate or otherwise put their best efforts 
forward in insuring that visitation exchanges take place as order[ed] should be 
held in contempt of court and held responsible for the other party['s] cost, 
including reasonable attorney fees, in bringing any action to enforce such 
visitation exchanges.  Feeble 
excuses as to why an exchange did not take place should not be tolerated given 
the history of the problem regarding exchanges and the desire of the children to 
spend as much time as possible in each others company.

 

            
3.  [Stepmother] shall have no contact direct or indirect at 
any time with the children of the parties.

 

            
4.  [BB] should have no contact direct or indirect at any time 
with the parties' children.

 

            
5.  [TB - Mother's brother] should have no contact direct or 
indirect at any time with the parties' children.

 

            
6.  That [Mother] shall not use or consume alcohol at any time 
any of her children are in her presence.  
Further, that [Mother] shall at no time have alcohol in her 
residence.

 

            
7.  Each party shall be responsible for their own attorney fees 
in this matter and for paying their share of the Guardian Ad Litem fees as may 
be approved and directed by the court.

 

            
8.  That any order coming out of the Sheridan County Juvenile 
Court pending juvenile action directed towards the parties should constitute 
additional conditions to this court's order while the Sheridan County matter 
remains open.

 

            
9.  The parties should continue with and complete the parenting 
classes they are enrolled in, including any follow up recommendations that may 
come from this program.

 

[¶9]      The district 
court made oral findings to the effect that neither party had met the burden of 
demonstrating a material change of circumstances that justified altering the 
district court's original decree.  
In addition, the district court found that neither party had abused the 
children, but that both had been blind to what had been done by others.  The district court declined to adopt 
many of the recommendations made by the GAL, indicating that it would not, and 
could not, micro-manage this case.  
The order denying the petitions to modify the divorce decree provided 
this guidance:

 

            
4.  Since their divorce, both parties have moved increasing the 
distance between their homes.

 

            
5.  Since their divorce, both parties have brought new 
caretakers into the children's lives who have abused the children.  There is no evidence that either parent 
has abused the children, but that they have turned a blind eye to the abuse and 
excessive discipline dispersed by [Stepmother] and [Mother's] fiancé.  The parents now minimize or attempt to 
rationalize such behavior and are less than committed to making changes 
necessary to remove the abusers from the children's lives.

 

            
6.  These changes are not substantial and material as required 
by law for purposes of granting either party the relief they 
seek.

 

            
7.  The recommendations of the Guardian ad Litem which 
also finds there is no change of circumstance should be adopted.  However, the recommendations of the GAL 
regarding contacts with third parties and limitations on alcohol use would 
require the Court to micro-manage this case and the Court will not do 
so.

 

            
. . . .

 

9.  The 
terms and conditions of the Stipulated Decree of Divorce should not be 
modified.

 

10.  The 
Temporary Restraining Order entered in this matter on July 8, 2002 should 
be rescinded.

 

11.  Legal 
and physical custody of the two youngest children should be returned to [Mother] 
subject to final adjudication of Sheridan County Juvenile Case No. 
J-1-1-03.  Any supervision by the 
Department of Family Services in the on-going juvenile action in Sheridan 
County, Wyoming should focus on reunification of both families, not just 
[Father's] home.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]   In custody matters, the welfare and 
needs of the children must be given paramount consideration.  That which is in the best interests of 
the child is a question for the trier of fact, and we will not overturn the 
decision of a trial court unless we are persuaded that an abuse of discretion is 
present or that there has been a violation of some legal principle.  Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 
431 (Wyo. 1998).  When we are asked 
to review the action of a district court, in the context of the abuse of 
discretion standard, the core of the inquiry we must make is the question of the 
reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things.  Among these are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  
It means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  We must ask whether or not the district 
court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling 
was arbitrary or capricious.  
Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Thomas v. 
Thomas, 983 P.2d 717,719 (Wyo. 1999)).  
The party seeking to modify established child custody provisions of a 
divorce decree has the burden of showing that a material change in circumstances 
that affects the child's welfare occurred subsequent to the entry of the initial 
decree, that the change warrants modification of the decree, and that the 
modification will be in the best interests of the affected child.  Cobb, 2 P.3d  at 579-80 (quoting 
Sorenson v. May, 944 P.2d 429, 432 (Wyo. 1997)).

 

[¶11]   A child's preference as to custody 
may be considered by the trial court:

 

In 
determining the weight to be given a child's preference several factors should 
be considered:  the age of the 
child; the reason for the preference; the relative fitness of the preferred and 
non-preferred parent; the hostility, if any, of the child to the non-preferred 
parent; the preference of other siblings; and whether the child's preference has 
been tainted or influenced by one parent against the 
other.

 

            
Although custodial preference is not conclusive, the court here was 
entitled to give more consideration to a fifteen-year old girl's preference than 
say, the preference of a six-year old child.

 

Yates 
v. Yates, 
702 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wyo. 1985).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶12]   We are unable to agree with the 
district court that there was not a material change in circumstances in this 
case.  Mother's relocation to South 
Dakota might well have been viewed as a material change.  The testimony the district court heard 
was that the unusual custody arrangements to which these parents agreed (it was 
not fashioned by the district court), worked only so long as the parents both 
resided in Crook County and were close enough to each other to make it 
functional.  It did not work once 
Mother was in South Dakota, sometimes without a car to transport the children, 
and Father was not free, nor was he always able, to travel to South Dakota to 
facilitate visitation.  That 
Mother's fiancé, and her brother, were accused of sexually assaulting the 
parties' youngest daughter also might well have been viewed as a material change 
of circumstances.  There was another 
potential material change when the youngest children were uprooted from Mother's 
home, and sent to live in Sheridan County with Father's new wife, the parties' 
two other children, and Stepmother's three children.  There was likely a material change of 
circumstance when all four children were taken from their home and placed in DFS 
custody (in a group home) as a result of Stepmother's abusive acts against the 
children.  There were potential 
material changes of circumstance when the children were placed in the custody of 
Father's mother and stepfather, and when Father was finally accorded full 
custody again, with his mother and stepfather providing a backup for 
Father.  This list of changes in 
circumstances is not meant to be exhaustive.  While any one of them might well have 
served to require the district court to reconsider a more suitable custodial 
arrangement for the children, the totality of these circumstances requires a 
remand for the district court to fully address the needs of these children with 
respect to custody.  For a more 
complete discussion, see George A. Locke, Change in Circumstances 
Justifying Modification of Child Custody Order, 6 POF 2d 499 (1975 and Supp. 
2001).

 

[¶13]   However, a material change of 
circumstance does not automatically equate with a change in custody.  Custody must be arranged so as to be in 
the best interests of the child(ren) on an individualized basis.  Given all that has occurred since the 
divorce, the district court needs to reassess the wisdom of the divided custody 
arrangement in light of  the 
material changes in circumstances that have occurred.  Although the parties agreed to that 
arrangement, they did so under circumstances that no longer exist.  Moreover, the record does not reflect 
that the district court assessed the advisability of the arrangement at the 
outset.  We agree that the district 
court should not have to "micro-manage" the custody arrangement.  The district court adopted a "PARENTAL 
COOPERATION" standard in the initial decree and, in light of the rather serious 
problems faced by this family, some additional management, as suggested by the 
GAL, may well be in order.  It is 
evident from the record that the juvenile proceedings in Sheridan County had not 
yet ended when the district court entered the order now before us.  One gap in that process appeared to be 
an assessment of Mother's home.   
It is evident that the children have expressed a preference as to where 
they want to live, and the district court should take that into consideration as 
well.  It also appears that by now 
the juvenile matter in Sheridan may have developed additional information that 
is pertinent to the most desirable custody arrangement for the children and it 
is important for the district court to have all that information available to 
it.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶14]   We reverse the order of the 
district court because we conclude it erred in finding that no material change 
in circumstances had been demonstrated.  
The matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1The district 
court later allowed Father to amend his petition.

 

   2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-201(a) provides:

 

(a)  In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a 
marriage or upon the establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-4-401 
through 14-2-907, the court may make by decree or order any disposition of the 
children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the 
children.  In determining the best 
interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following factors:

                        
(i)  The quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

            
(ii)  The ability of each parent to provide adequate care for 
each child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for 
each child's care by others as needed;

                        
(iii)  The relative competency and fitness of each 
parent;

            
(iv)  Each parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities 
of parenting, including a willingness to accept care for each child at specified 
times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified 
times;

                        
(v)  How the parents and each child can best maintain and 
strengthen a relationship with e  ach 
other;

(vi)  How the parents and each child interact and communicate 
with each other and how such interaction and communication may be 
improved;

(vii)  The ability and willingness of each parent to allow the 
other to provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and 
responsibilities, including the right to privacy;

                        
(viii)  Geographic distance between the parents' 
residences;

                        
(ix)  The current physical and mental ability of each parent to 
care for each child;

                        
(x)  Any other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant.

 

   3The GAL is not a 
participant in this appeal.