Title: Ries v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ries v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4545.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4545 
RIES, ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL 
CENTER, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Ries v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4545.] 
Governmental tort immunity—R.C. 9.86—Personal immunity of state employee—
Doctor employed by state university to provide clinical care to patients. 
(No. 2012-0954—Submitted April 10, 2013—Decided October 17, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 11AP-1004, 2012-Ohio-1766. 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Matthew Ries, administrator of the estate of Michael McNew, and 
Cyrelle McNew, McNew’s surviving spouse, appeal from a judgment of the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals affirming the determination that Syed G. Husain, 
M.D., is immune from personal liability for treatment provided to Michael 
McNew at the Ohio State University Medical Center.  At issue in this case is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
whether a faculty member of a state medical school who is also employed by the 
school’s nonprofit medical-practice corporation is immune from personal liability 
for providing clinical care to a patient with neither a medical student nor a 
resident present during the treatment or procedure. 
{¶ 2} R.C. 9.86 provides immunity to state employees unless the 
employee acts manifestly outside the scope of employment, with malicious 
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.  For purposes of this 
statute, a state employee acts within the scope of employment if the employee’s 
actions advance the interests of the state as defined by the duties of the state 
employee. 
{¶ 3} Here, Husain’s duties as a state employee included providing 
clinical care to patients, whether or not he was actively engaged in teaching at that 
time.  Thus, in treating McNew, Husain served the interests of the Ohio State 
University Medical Center and acted within the scope of employment.  He is 
therefore entitled to personal immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86, and we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} In September 2008, Dr. Syed G. Husain joined the faculty of the 
Ohio State University College of Medicine in the Department of Surgery.  As an 
assistant professor on the clinical track, he had the primary responsibilities of 
providing clinical care to patients and teaching medical students and residents.  
His letter offering employment stated that the Department of Surgery expected 
him to be an active teaching member of the full-time faculty, to engage in 
research, and to provide service to the institution, the community, and the 
profession as “measured by evidence of a high level of clinical competence.”  
Although his contract with the university guaranteed a base salary, it 
contemplated that he would “generate sufficient funds through clinical revenue, 
extramural funding, teaching activities, or administrative assignments to fund 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
[his] salary and benefits.”  It also required him to devote 100 percent of his 
professional efforts to the Department of Surgery, with patient-care revenue 
reverting to OSU Surgery, L.L.C. 
{¶ 5} The offer letter further specified that “[p]articipation in the College 
Central Practice Group is a requirement of employment.”  The Ohio State 
University Board of Trustees established the College Central Practice Group to 
manage income generated by faculty members from providing patient care and 
organized it as Ohio State University Physicians, Inc. (“OSUP”), a nonprofit 
corporation.  OSUP is “a tax-exempt medical practice plan corporation which was 
created to advance the purposes of the medical education program and related 
research and clinical service activities of the Ohio State University College of 
Medicine and Public Health (‘COMPH’).”  The board of trustees further required 
participation in this practice plan as “a condition of faculty employment.” 
{¶ 6} Husain separately contracted with OSUP to “permit OSUP or its 
designee to bill and collect professional fees for all faculty services including, but 
not limited to clinical services in the conduct of the COMPH mission.”  That 
employment agreement also provided that his “practice activities shall be 
rendered to patients in connection with the clinical practice activities of the 
medical education program of COMPH.”  Pursuant to this contract, the 
university’s senior vice president for health services approved all compensation, 
and “[s]ervices performed and compensation received by [Husain] under this 
Agreement are specifically recognized as being in fulfillment of obligations which 
are part of the concurrent faculty appointment and employment by COMPH.” 
{¶ 7} The Department of Surgery assigned Husain to staff the colorectal 
surgery clinic at University Hospital East.  Medical students and residents rotate 
through the clinic as part of their education and training, and members of the 
clinical faculty such as Husain generally teach by allowing students and residents 
to observe and participate in the treatment of patients; however, instruction also 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
occurs outside the presence of the patient when faculty members review charts 
and discuss cases with students and residents. 
{¶ 8} On September 15, 2009, Michael McNew consulted with Husain at 
the clinic, complaining of an acutely painful hemorrhoid in addition to nausea, 
diarrhea, sore throat, and fatigue. Husain diagnosed a blood clot in the 
hemorrhoid, incised it, removed the clot, and prescribed a narcotic for pain.  
Although a medical student or resident was present at the clinic that day, Husain 
could not remember whether one had observed this treatment, nor do McNew’s 
records indicate the presence of a student or resident. 
{¶ 9} Following McNew’s discharge, he called Husain more than once 
seeking help with pain management and allegedly complained of bleeding, 
bruising, and shortness of breath.  Husain could not recall whether a medical 
student or resident observed the telephone consultations. 
{¶ 10} McNew died on September 19, 2009, from an undiagnosed 
cerebral hemorrhage caused by thrombocytopenia, a hematological malignancy 
characterized by an abnormally small number of platelets in the circulating blood.  
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1808 (26th Ed.1995). 
{¶ 11} On September 3, 2010, Matthew Ries, the administrator of 
McNew’s estate, and Cyrelle McNew, his surviving spouse, brought this action in 
the Court of Claims against the Ohio State University Medical Center, asserting 
claims for negligence, medical malpractice, wrongful death, and loss of 
consortium.  They also filed a civil action against Husain and OSUP in the 
Franklin County Common Pleas Court, which the common pleas court stayed 
pending a determination by the Court of Claims regarding Husain’s immunity 
from suit. 
{¶ 12} The Court of Claims conducted a hearing on that issue, and the 
Ohio State University Medical Center presented the testimony of Dr. Robert Alan 
Bornstein, the vice dean for academic affairs in the College of Medicine.  
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
Bornstein testified that the focus of faculty members on the clinical track is 
patient care and education.  He noted that patient care is essential to the 
educational mission of the medical school because “in order for us to exercise our 
obligation to teach students, we have to have a range of patients, and we have to 
have physicians who are there to take care of those patients.”  He also explained 
that patient care furthers the university’s interests because its reputation in 
providing clinical care is a component in ranking medical centers nationally, and 
“the reputation of our faculty, whether it’s for research, for teaching or clinical 
service, is central to our interests.”  Moreover, the revenue generated by the 
faculty is contributed to the university to support its academic programs. 
{¶ 13} Bornstein clarified that the term “service” as used in the letter of 
offer means providing care to patients: “[C]linical service is * * * one of the 
components of faculty activity.  Some clinical activity is done with a student or 
resident; some is not.  It is still their responsibility as a faculty member to take 
care of patients.”  He also testified, “Faculty in the College of Medicine controls 
100 percent of the faculty member’s efforts: Teaching, service and scholarship.  
Everything that they do they are doing as a member of our faculty.”  In his view, 
the clinical care of patients is therefore within the scope of the duties of a faculty 
member, regardless of whether a student or resident is present at the time of the 
treatment. 
{¶ 14} The Court of Claims acknowledged that Husain’s duties as a 
member of the university faculty included teaching but found that “the evidence 
does not demonstrate that he was doing so when the alleged negligence occurred.”  
Nonetheless, it determined that Husain’s duties as a faculty member included 
providing clinical care to patients for the Ohio State University Medical Center 
and that he had been acting within the scope of his state employment while 
treating McNew.  The Court of Claims therefore concluded that Dr. Husain was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
immune and that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the civil action 
filed against him. 
{¶ 15} Ries appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the determination that Husain was immune from suit, holding that his 
employment with the state required him to care for patients at facilities operated 
by the Ohio State University Medical Center.  The appellate court explained: 
 
[P]hysicians with the employment contracts such as those provided 
to Dr. Husain wear two hats while treating patients. One hat says 
“[the Ohio State University Medical Center]” and the other says 
“OSUP.” Dr. Husain was wearing both while treating McNew. 
Since one of the hats involved employment duties with a 
governmental entity, he was entitled to governmental immunity 
under R.C. 9.86 and R.C. 2743.02(F). 
 
2012-Ohio-1766, ¶ 13. 
Arguments on Appeal 
{¶ 16} On appeal to this court, Ries contends that “[a] physician whose 
state employment duties are education-related must be shown to be engaging in 
education-related activity at the time he allegedly renders negligent care in order 
to qualify for civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and R.C. 2743.02(F).”  
According to Ries, Husain’s duties as a state employee were limited to conducting 
research and teaching medical students and residents, and here there is no 
evidence that he either engaged in research or taught at the time he treated 
McNew.  Further, he notes that Husain had two separate contracts: one as a 
faculty member of the College of Medicine that paid him a salary for research, 
teaching, and allowing medical students and residents to observe his clinical 
practice, and another contract governing his personal medical practice (i.e., when 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
no student or resident is present) with OSUP, a private corporation operating 
independently from the Ohio State University Medical Center.  Ries asserts that 
providing clinical care to patients, by itself, “is not a recognized function of a 
state university teaching hospital,” and because Husain treated McNew in the 
course of his personal medical practice, he is not immune in the circumstances. 
{¶ 17} The Ohio State University Medical Center urges that Dr. Husain 
acted within the scope of his state employment and is therefore immune from 
liability for claims arising from his treatment of McNew.  Relying on Theobald v. 
Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, 857 N.E.2d 573, it 
contends that the scope of state employment turns on the physician’s duties as a 
state employee.  Here, it explains, Dr. Husain’s contract as a member of the 
university faculty required him to provide clinical care to patients like McNew, 
whether or not a student or resident observed that treatment, the university 
controlled his clinical practice and his teaching, and OSUP functioned only as a 
billing and collections entity. 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, the issue here is whether a faculty member of a state 
medical school who is also employed by the school’s nonprofit medical-practice 
corporation acts within the scope of employment when treating a patient outside 
the presence of a medical student or resident. 
Immunity of State Employees 
{¶ 19} The personal immunity of a state employee is governed by R.C. 
9.86, which provides: 
 
Except for civil actions that arise out of the operation of a 
motor vehicle and civil actions in which the state is the plaintiff, no 
officer or employee shall be liable in any civil action that arises 
under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the 
performance of his duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
actions were manifestly outside the scope of his employment or 
official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted 
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless 
manner. 
 
{¶ 20} R.C. 2743.02(F) vests the Court of Claims with exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine whether a state employee is immune from personal 
liability in a civil action allowed by R.C. 9.86.  As we explained in Theobald v. 
Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, 857 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 14, 
“the Court of Claims’ analysis of personal immunity has two parts: Was the 
individual a state employee, and if so, was the individual acting within the scope 
of employment when the cause of action arose?”  We further stated: 
  
A health-care practitioner who has dual status as a private 
practitioner and as an employee of a state medical institution is 
potentially immune from liability for medical malpractice only 
when he or she is performing duties for the state.  Unless he or she 
acted “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
reckless manner” or manifestly outside the scope of employment, 
the state employee is not liable for injury caused in the 
performance of those duties. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Theobald at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 21} We noted that the Revised Code does not define “scope of 
employment,” but we observed that “[t]he concept generally denotes an agency 
relationship in which the agent or employee is engaged in an activity that is 
logically related to the business of the principal or employer.”  Theobald at ¶ 15.  
We held, “ ‘For purposes of personal immunity under R.C. 9.86, a state employee 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
acts within the scope of employment if the employee’s actions are “in furtherance 
of the interests of the state.’ Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 
595 N.E.2d 862. Thus, a state employee’s duties should define the scope of 
employment.”  Id. 
{¶ 22} Notably, in Theobald we rejected the argument that the use of 
private practice plans to bill and collect payments for the services that clinical 
faculty members provide as part of their practice of medicine shows that a 
physician has acted outside the scope of state employment.  Rather, we explained:  
 
The financial factors may be relevant to the practitioner’s status as 
a state employee; however, they do not necessarily establish 
whether he or she was within the scope of that employment at the 
time a cause of action arose. Instead, the question of scope of 
employment must turn on what the practitioner’s duties are as a 
state employee and whether the practitioner was engaged in those 
duties at the time of an injury. Thus, proof of the content of the 
practitioner’s duties is crucial. The Court of Claims must have 
evidence of those duties before it can be determined whether the 
actions allegedly causing a patient’s injury were “in furtherance of 
the interests of the state” or, in other words, within the scope of 
employment. 
 
Theobald, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, 857 N.E.2d 573, at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 23} Thus, Theobald did not establish a categorical rule that a physician 
who is a member of the faculty of a state medical college is immune for providing 
clinical care only while teaching a medical student or resident.  Rather, the scope 
of employment is a fact-based inquiry that turns on proof of the employee’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10
specific job description with the state and focuses on whether the employee’s 
conduct is related to and promotes the state’s interests. 
{¶ 24} In addition, the fact that a state employee is also employed by a 
private party is not determinative.  As the court in Theobald stated, “R.C. 9.86 is 
inclusive and makes no exception for persons who may simultaneously have other 
employment interests. It provides immunity for all state employees as long as they 
are acting within the scope of their employment when the injury occurs.”  
Theobald at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 25} And following Theobald, in State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 198, 2010-Ohio-3299, 931 N.E.2d 1082, 
we recognized that it is possible for a physician to be immune as an agent of the 
state when the physician simultaneously acted on behalf of a private practice 
group.  Id. at ¶ 20.  The court explained in Sawicki, “ ‘[A] single act may be done 
to effect the purposes of two independent employers. * * * He may be the servant 
of two masters, not joint employers as to the same act, if the act is within the 
scope of his employment for both.’ ” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting Restatement of the Law 
2d, Agency, Section 226, at comment a (1958). 
{¶ 26} In this case, it is not disputed that Husain is a state employee, and 
the evidence demonstrates that he acted on behalf of the state at the time he 
treated McNew.  The Department of Surgery, not OSUP, directed and controlled 
his clinical care of patients and assigned him to staff the university’s colorectal 
surgery clinic, where McNew presented.  Husain’s contract with the university 
required him to treat patients at that facility, to participate in OSUP, and to fund 
his own faculty salary and benefits through outside sources, including clinical 
revenue from his treatment of patients. 
{¶ 27} In addition, Husain’s employment agreement with OSUP provided 
that the corporation would bill and collect professional fees for “all faculty 
services” and specified that any compensation received pursuant to that agreement 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
fulfilled the duties of his faculty appointment and his employment with the 
College of Medicine.  Although the record does not detail the precise ownership 
structure of OSUP, it does establish that the board of trustees authorized its 
creation, that “it exists within the University structure,” and that revenue it 
generates is contributed back to the university to support academic programs. 
{¶ 28} Even if no medical student or resident observed the clinical 
services Husain rendered, and even though the university organized its medical-
practice plan as a private corporation, Husain’s clinical practice advanced the 
interests of the state because he staffed a faculty clinic and treated patients at the 
Ohio State University Medical Center, he contributed to its national ranking and 
reputation, and he generated revenue that supported the academic mission of the 
university. 
{¶ 29} Husain therefore provided clinical services at the Ohio State 
University Medical Center and its facilities within the scope of his employment as 
a faculty member of the university and a state employee.  Accordingly, because 
he treated McNew in that capacity, he is entitled to personal immunity. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} Pursuant to R.C. 9.86, a state employee is immune from personal 
liability unless the employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of his 
employment or unless the employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or 
in a wanton or reckless manner.  A state employee acts within the scope of 
employment if the employee’s actions advance the interests of the state as defined 
by the duties of the state employee. 
{¶ 31} Here, Husain’s duties as a state employee included providing 
clinical services to patients, and at the time he treated McNew, he acted within the 
scope of his state employment.  Accordingly, he is entitled to personal immunity 
pursuant to R.C. 9.86.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and HENDON, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
SYLVIA SIEVE HENDON, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for 
FRENCH, J. 
____________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 32} This case represents a very dangerous precedent, and I must, 
therefore, respectfully dissent. The majority has needlessly expanded on this 
court’s holding in Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-
Ohio-6208, 857 N.E.2d 573, and in the sweep of a pen has extended 
governmental tort immunity to private corporations that utilize state facilities for 
profit.  In Theobald, this court held that a doctor working for a university is 
immune from personal liability if he is, in fact, educating a student or resident 
when the negligence occurs.  Id. at ¶ 31.  That is an educational relationship that 
makes sense, and one that has withstood the test of time.  The taxpayers of Ohio 
are well served, and the doctors who educate our future physicians are well 
served, when there is an acknowledgement that they are doing the state’s business 
when they are teaching student doctors in a state-university setting. 
{¶ 33} But the majority abandons that rule and adopts a standard that 
allows the university to decide and declare by contract that all of a physician’s 
duties, no matter how far they may be removed from educating students, are 
entitled to state-sanctioned immunity.  That is the wrong approach, and it is 
simply illogical and contrary to statute to provide immunity for acts that are 
completely unrelated to the education of students.  The net result is that the 
burden of paying for negligent acts will transfer from private insurance companies 
to the taxpayers of Ohio. It will also diminish the role of juries in the Ohio justice 
system, as jury trials are not available in the Ohio Court of Claims for claims 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
against the state.  R.C. 2743.11.  Can we really say that is what the legislature 
intended? There is no good reason to extend immunity to physicians who are not 
actively training students in the practice of medicine. 
{¶ 34} Prior to Theobald, Ohio courts were consistent in their holdings 
that a student had to be present in order for there to be immunity for the doctor.  
For example, in Hopper v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-787, 
2000 WL 1059672 (Aug. 3, 2000), the court held that since the physician was 
supervising residents while treating the patient, the conduct was within the scope 
of his employment as a state employee.  See also Balson v. Ohio State Univ., 112 
Ohio App.3d 33, 677 N.E.2d 1216 (10th Dist.1996) (doctors not entitled to 
immunity, because a separate practice plan was the employer and no students 
were present for the procedure); Katko v. Balcerzak, 41 Ohio App.3d 375, 536 
N.E.2d 10 (10th Dist.1987) (doctor billing through his private medical partnership 
with no student present resulted in a finding of no immunity); Johnson v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-926, 2005-Ohio-2203 (even though 
physicians were employed by the medical school as faculty and conducted a 
clinical practice supervising residents, no students were present for the procedure, 
so there was no immunity); Harrison v. Univ. of Cincinnati Hosp., 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 96API01-81, 1996 WL 362055  (June 28, 1996) (doctor was a 
member of a practice plan as a faculty member but since no student was present 
for the procedure, he was outside the scope of his state employment); Hans v. 
Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2001-10140, 2005-Ohio-4457 (Court of 
Claims determined that because the physician performed the procedure while 
being observed by a student, he was acting within the scope of his employment 
and therefore entitled to immunity); Kaiser v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 02AP-316, 2002-Ohio-6030 (attending physician acted as a 
supervisor and, as such, was entitled to immunity, since he was acting within the 
scope of his employment). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14
{¶ 35} In Theobald, this court noted many of these cases and 
acknowledged that the focus of the analysis needed to be on the scope of 
employment with the state and on whether the physician was engaged in those 
duties at the time of the injury. Theobald, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, 
857 N.E.2d 573, at ¶ 23-27.  The bedrock principle that this court should uphold 
is that in the absence of a student, a procedure performed by a physician should 
not be protected by the doctrine of immunity.  State universities exist to educate.  
If education is not taking place, immunity does not apply.  Clearly, while 
educating is a legitimate function of the state, competing with private hospitals is 
not.  Providing universities and the doctors who operate in university hospitals 
with an economic edge is contrary to precedent and not a function of the 
judiciary. 
{¶ 36} Based upon the opinion by the majority, state university teaching 
hospitals can now provide independent medical care separate and apart from their 
status as a teaching institution, and while doing so, their physicians will enjoy the 
benefits of immunity.  All they should need from this point forward is the state 
university logo on the door and a contract calling everyone inside a faculty 
member.  The student doctors, while still welcome to attend, are no longer 
necessary for immunity to attach. 
{¶ 37} If the theory of the majority is truly the law of Ohio, the hospitals 
run by state universities and staffed by physicians who work for private for-profit 
corporations have a huge competitive advantage over private hospitals.  They are 
able to limit their damage exposure due to lower caps in the Court of Claims, 
while also eliminating jury trials, yet operate in all other ways like the private 
hospitals that they compete with.  Why is it necessary to give state hospitals this 
kind of economic advantage?  Unless those physicians are actively involved in 
training new physicians or researching new procedures, there is no justification 
for providing them with such special treatment.  While furthering a state 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
hospital’s societal contribution by providing medical care combined with 
education is a worthy accomplishment, merely advancing the state hospital’s 
competitive economic advantage is not.  Moreover, it is outside of the powers of 
the judiciary to make that kind of policy change. 
{¶ 38} Additionally, under the majority’s holding, once immunity 
attaches, mere negligence is no longer the standard that physicians will be held to 
in performing their important procedures.  These “state employee” doctors can 
now theoretically operate at a lower standard of care without fear of reprisal, 
provided that they do not go over the line  in a wanton or reckless manner, or with 
malicious purpose.  This decision sets a dangerous precedent.  Stated more 
precisely, a state-university doctor will no longer be held to the same standard of 
care that is applied to his colleagues down the street in a competing facility not 
owned by the state.  Simple negligence that arguably causes death, as is alleged 
herein, does not rise to the level of wanton misconduct.  I understand and embrace 
immunity for the purpose of training our doctors of the future.  That is a 
legitimate state activity.  Creating an insurance-friendly environment in which 
for-profit corporations can find a safe haven is not. 
{¶ 39} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Colley, Shroyer & Abraham Co., L.P.A., and David I. Shroyer, for 
appellants. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Peter K. Glenn-Applegate, Deputy 
Solicitor, and Karl W. Schedler and Daniel R. Forsythe, Assistant Attorneys 
General, for appellee. 
 
Giorgianni Law, L.L.C., Paul Giorgianni, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae the Ohio Association for Justice. 
________________________