Title: State v. LaBounty

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. LaBounty  (96-180); 168 Vt. 129; 716 A.2d 1

[Opinion Filed 17-Apr-1998]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 29-Jun-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 96-180

State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

Aime LaBounty                                     September Term, 1997

Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, and Laurie LeClair, Special Assistant Attorney General,
  Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Charles S. Martin and Reggie Oh, Law Clerk (On the Brief), of Martin &
  Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:   Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J.
           (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       MORSE, J.   Defendant Aime LaBounty appeals his conviction of
  aggravated sexual assault against two pre-school girls in violation of 13
  V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8).  He contends the trial court erred by (1) denying his
  motion for severance; (2) admitting the victims' hearsay statements under
  V.R.E. 804a; (3) permitting the introduction of taped-recorded interviews
  of the victims; (4) not granting a mistrial based upon the prosecutor's
  improper questioning of a witness; (5) excluding an expert witness's
  testimony concerning sexual offenders; (6) denying a motion for acquittal
  based upon insufficient evidence; and (7) relying upon evidence of a prior
  uncharged sexual offense at sentencing.  We affirm.

       Defendant's wife, Lucy LaBounty, operated a day-care facility out of
  the home she shared with defendant in St. Johnsbury.  One day in February
  1995, Mrs. LaBounty left the daycare from 12:30 to 3:00 p.m. to deliver a
  cake to a "Home Dem" meeting, leaving four-year-old B.M.

 

  and two other children in the care of defendant.  Later that day, when
  B.M.'s mother Allison Bean picked her up, B.M. immediately exclaimed,
  "Mommy, don't tell my daddy or I'll never see him again."  When Ms. Bean
  asked what she meant, B.M. explained, "I sucked [defendant's] peepee
  today."  On further questioning the child elaborated as follows: "[H]e put
  it in my throat and it choked me and it hurt me."  Ms. Bean asked B.M.
  where Lucy LaBounty was at the time. She responded that Mrs. LaBounty was
  taking a cake to a friend's house.  B.M. also disclosed that defendant had
  told her not to tell, or she would never see her father again.

       Ms. Bean immediately took B.M to the house of a friend, Diane Bashaw. 
  B.M. recounted the same story she had told her mother, adding that the
  incident had occurred on the couch in the living room of defendant's house. 
  Later that evening, Ms. Bean related B.M.'s disclosures to her friend,
  Tammy Jones, whose four-year-old daughter S.J. had attended the LaBounty's
  daycare between May and October of 1994.  Alarmed, Ms. Jones asked S.J.
  whether defendant had ever showed her his "peepee."  She replied "no," then
  immediately stated, "he made me suck it."  S.J. told her mother that the
  other children were outside at the time of the incident, and that defendant
  had kept her inside because he didn't want her to catch a cold.  She
  explained that she had not said anything earlier because defendant told her
  not to.  The following morning, S.J. came into her mother's bedroom and
  told her that "yucky stuff" from defendant's peepee had "come out in her
  mouth."  Her mother had not asked S.J. any questions before this
  disclosure.

       The following day, B.M. was interviewed by an investigator for the
  Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Fran Neville, and an
  investigator for the State Police, Robert Van Damm.  B.M. recounted the
  same events to the investigators that she had spontaneously told her mother
  the day before, explaining that defendant had "stuffed his whole peepee" in
  her mouth. She recounted where the incident had occurred and where Lucy and
  the other children were at the time.  She also described the color of
  defendant's clothes at the time of the incident.  She denied that he had
  removed any of his clothes, but volunteered that he had "unzipped his
  pants."

       S.J. was also interviewed by an SRS caseworker, Katherine Bergeron,
  along with officer

 

  Van Damm.  Although hesitant and unresponsive to many of their initial
  questions, S.J. ultimately repeated the story she had earlier told her
  mother, adding that the incident had occurred in the LaBounty's bathroom,
  and that defendant had wiped the "yucky stuff" off with his shirt.

       Mrs. LaBounty testified that she regularly left the children in
  defendant's care when she went to meetings or appointments, and confirmed
  that she had left the house to deliver a cake at the time of the incident
  involving B.M.  Defendant also testified, acknowledging that he was with
  B.M. on the date in question, and that he had spent part of the time on the
  couch, with B.M.'s head on his lap while she slept.

       Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated sexual assault
  against B.M and S.J., in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8).  His first
  trial ended in a mistrial.  Upon retrial, he was found guilty by a jury of
  both counts and sentenced to two consecutive terms of five to twenty-five
  years, with all but 90 days of the sentence on the second count suspended. 
  This appeal followed.

                                     I.

       Before trial, defendant moved to sever the charged offenses, arguing:
  (1) that he was entitled to severance as a matter of right under V.R.Cr.P.
  14(b)(1)(A), and (2) that severance was necessary as a discretionary matter
  to achieve a "fair determination" of his guilt or innocence under V.R.Cr.P.
  14(b)(1)(B).  The trial court denied the motion.  Defendant thereafter
  reasserted the motion at the close of the evidence as required by V.R.Cr.P.
  14(b)(4)(C).  It was again denied.  He renews both claims on appeal.

       Two or more offenses may be joined for trial when the offenses "(1)
  are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme
  or plan; or (2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts
  connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan." 
  V.R.Cr.P. 8(a).  When the offenses have been joined solely on the ground
  that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant is entitled
  to severance as a matter of right under

 

  V.R.Cr.P. 14(b)(1)(A).  State v. Carter, 156 Vt. 437, 440, 593 A.2d 88, 91
  (1991).  When the joined offenses represent a series of acts constituting
  parts of a single scheme or plan, the right to severance is not absolute,
  but turns upon a showing that severance is necessary to "achieve a fair
  determination" of guilt or innocence.  V.R.Cr.P. 14(b)(1)(B); See State v.
  Johnson, 158 Vt. 344, 351, 612 A.2d 1114, 1118 (1992).

       Defendant was not entitled to severance as a matter of right because
  the charged offenses were properly joined as "acts .  .  . constituting
  parts of a single scheme or plan."  V.R.Cr.P. 8(a)(2).  Although separated
  by a period of months, the assaults evinced a common objective, plan, and
  method.  Each of the assaults was upon a victim of tender years attending
  the same day-care center; each was made possible by defendant's exploiting
  his position of trust at the center; each occurred at the day-care center
  when defendant's wife was not on the premises and defendant was assured of
  privacy; each was followed by a warning to the child not to tell; and each
  appeared to follow a common pattern of defendant forcing his penis into the
  victim's mouth without prelude or warning, and with little or no
  discussion.

       As the trial court observed, the similarities between this case and
  Johnson "are striking." There, as here, the defendant was accused of taking
  advantage of a position of trust (camp counselor) to sexually exploit
  several minors.  There, as here, the "offenses were connected to each other
  in time and space, the profile of the victims, the relationship of the
  victims to defendant, and the opportunity presented to, and exploited by,
  defendant."  Johnson, 158 Vt. at 351, 612 A.2d  at 1118.  Thus, we affirmed
  the trial court's refusal to sever the offenses under V.R.Cr.P. 14(b)(1)(A)
  as a matter of right, holding that they were "not only the same or similar
  in character but also .  .  . constitut[ed] parts of a single `scheme or
  plan.'"  Id.

       Defendant notes that unlike Johnson the charged offenses here were
  separated in time by about four to nine months.  We have held that
  "temporal proximity is a prerequisite to admission in plan or scheme cases"
  in the context of admitting evidence of prior bad acts under V.R.E. 404(b). 
  State v. Winter, 162 Vt. 388, 396,