Title: Philip Morris v. Angeletti

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Philip Morris Incorporated v. The Honorable Edward J. Angeletti, Misc. No. 2, September
Term, 1998. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW—MANDAMUS—The Court of Appeals has authority to issue a writ
of mandamus directing a Circuit Court to vacate its order of class certification in a case so
extraordinary because of the immense amount of time and expense that both the parties and
the Maryland judicial system will incur should the litigation proceed as a class action, as well
as the astronomical number of persons in Maryland whose lives will be affected by the
Court’s decision.
CLASS ACTIONS—PREREQUISITES FOR CERTIFICATION—The Circuit Court abused
its discretion in certifying for class action prosecution a mass tort tobacco lawsuit.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 96145050/CE212596
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. No. 2
September Term, 1998
PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, et al.
v.
THE HONORABLE
EDWARD J. ANGELETTI
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Filed:   May 16, 2000
  For purposes of this opinion, we shall use the term “Respondents” in reference to
1
the class action representatives named in the Circuit Court’s Class Certification Order.  The
Respondent officially designated in the petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition is The
Honorable Edward J. Angeletti, Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, who issued
the Class Certification Order in the case below, entitled Richardson v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. 96145050/CE212596.  The State, through the Attorney General, has filed a brief answer
to the present petition on behalf of Judge Angeletti.  Filing an extensive opposition to the
petition are the named class action representative plaintiffs, Mildred C. Richardson (acting
on behalf of herself and as the personal representative of her husband, James B. Richardson),
Karol Potter and Lonza B. Cutchin.
  Petitioners are tobacco manufacturers and distributors Philip Morris Inc., R. J.
2
Reynolds Tobacco Company, Lorillard Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation, individually and as successor in interest to The American Tobacco Company,
British-American Tobacco Company Limited, United States Tobacco Company, Crown
Service, Inc., George J. Falter Company, A & A Candy & Tobacco Company, Inc., and I. K.
Candy, Tobacco & Hosiery Company; industry trade groups and lobbyists The Council for
(continued...)
Petitioners, a host of tobacco manufacturers and related entities, have filed a petition
with this Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, asking that we direct the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City to vacate its certification of two classes of Maryland residents who, as
current or former users of tobacco products, have filed a suit against Petitioners claiming to
have been injured by tobacco use or addicted to nicotine.  We shall grant the extraordinary
relief of mandamus and order the Circuit Court to decertify the classes.
I.  The Case
On May 24, 1996, Respondents  filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
1
City against all manufacturers of tobacco and their Maryland distributors, as well as two
industry trade groups and a marketing and public relations firm, the majority of whom have
jointly filed the petition now before this Court.   Seeking both compensatory and punitive
2
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(...continued)
2
Tobacco Research-USA, Inc. and The Tobacco Institute, Inc.; and the advertising and public
relations firm of Hill & Knowlton, Inc.  Other defendants named in the case below yet not
directly party to the present petition are Petitioners’ parent corporations, sole shareholders,
alter egos, successors in interest, or like entities.  In addition, Liggett Group, Inc. and related
corporations were named defendants in the case below but, for reasons not explicitly made
known to this Court, have apparently not joined in this petition for writ of mandamus or
prohibition despite the fact that counsel for Respondents have “refused to dismiss Liggett
from this suit.”  (Opposition to Petition at 22) [hereinafter Opp’n to Pet.].
damages as well as injunctive relief, Respondents assert claims on behalf of themselves and
all similarly situated Maryland residents (a) who have suffered or continue to suffer from
physical injuries or disease caused by smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco
products, and/or (b) who are nicotine dependent and plead addiction as an injury.
Respondents’ Fourth Amended Complaint alleges ten counts, eight of which embody
traditional causes of action sounding in tort and contract:  fraud and deceit, negligent
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of express
and implied warranties, strict product liability, and conspiracy.  In addition, the complaint
avers that Petitioners have violated several provisions of the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act, codified at Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.) §§ 13-101 to 13-501 of the
Commercial Law Article.  Lastly, Respondents plead a cause of action heretofore
unrecognized in Maryland, requesting equitable/injunctive relief in the form of court-
supervised, defendant-funded “medical monitoring” of the classes, to detect, prevent and
treat future disease, and to treat addiction.
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Respondents filed a Motion for Class Certification on September 5, 1997.  Following
oral argument on the motion, the Circuit Court issued an Order and Memorandum Opinion
on January 28, 1998, granting the Motion for Class Certification.  More specifically, the
court approved for class action treatment, under Maryland Rule 2-231(b)(3), Respondents’
eight traditional tort and contract causes of action and single consumer protection claim.  In
addition, the trial judge found Respondents’ claim for medical monitoring appropriate for
prosecution as a class action, under Rule 2-231(b)(2).
Thereafter, on February 19, 1998, the Circuit Court issued the following order
certifying two classes:
Case No. 96145050/CE212596, styled Mildred C. Richardson,
et al., Plaintiffs v. Philip Morris Inc., et al., Defendants shall be
maintained as a class action on behalf of the following classes
of plaintiffs:
a)
Serious Injury and Death Claims:
All Maryland residents as of the date of class
notice who have suffered, presently suffer, or who
have died of diseases, medical conditions, and
injury (while a resident of Maryland) caused by
smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco
products that contain nicotine, and
1) The estates, representatives, and administrators
of these persons; and 
2) The spouses, children, relatives and significant
others of these persons as their heirs or survivors;
and
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  Respondents had also proposed the following subclasses to assist in managing the
3
litigation:
1.  Smokers with diagnosable symptoms of smoking related
diseases as defined in the Class Notice, such as Representative
Plaintiffs Mildred Richardson, Karol Potter, Lonza Cutchin and
other, additional, class representatives.
2.  Smokeless tobacco users with diagnosable symptoms of
disease.
3.  Smokers who are nicotine dependent but who have no
diagnosable symptoms of disease.
4.  Nicotine dependent users of smokeless tobacco products who
have no diagnosable symptoms of disease.
5.  Smokers who are nicotine dependent and commenced
(continued...)
b)
Nicotine Dependence Claims:
All nicotine dependent persons in Maryland who
have purchased and used cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products manufactured by the Defendant
Tobacco Companies.  For the purposes of
defining this class of claims, “nicotine dependent”
shall be defined as:
1)
All cigarette smokers or smokeless tobacco
users who have been diagnosed by a
medical practitioner as nicotine dependent,
and/or;
2)
All cigarette smokers who have regularly
smoked more than 15 cigarettes per day
for at least three years and who have made
at least one unsuccessful effort to quit
smoking, and/or;
3)
All regular daily users of smokeless
tobacco products for at least three years
and who have made at least one
unsuccessful effort to quit using smokeless
tobacco.[3]
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(...continued)
3
smoking prior to implementation of the 1969 Cigarette Labeling
Act.
6.  Smokers who are nicotine dependent and commenced
smoking after implementation of the 1969 Cigarette Labeling
Act.
(Circuit Court Memorandum Opinion at 3) [hereinafter (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op.)].  In addition,
the one subclass of persons claiming to be stricken with smoking-related diseases would be
further divided into subclasses for the twelve different diseases Respondents claim that
smoking causes.  See id. at 3 n. 3.
(Circuit Court Class Certification Order at 1-2).  The order excluded all past and present
officers, directors, and agents of the defendant corporations from the classes.  In addition,
the order named class representatives, designated counsel for the classes, approved a Class
Action Notice Plan, and provided for exclusion of class members.
By virtue of its orders in this case, the Circuit Court implicitly approved Respondents’
proposed trial plan, which consists of three phases.  Phase I would entail a class action jury
trial conducted principally to determine whether Petitioners are liable to the classes.  During
Phase I, the jury would make determinations as to factual and legal issues allegedly common
to all members of the classes, including, inter alia, whether the nicotine in Petitioners’
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are addictive; whether Petitioners have
manipulated nicotine levels of their products; whether Petitioners knew and intentionally
concealed information that tobacco causes disease; whether cigarettes are defectively
designed; whether the 1969 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts any
claims by Respondents or the class members; whether contributory negligence and
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assumption of the risk are applicable under Maryland law; and whether punitive damages are
applicable under Maryland law.
For any claims upon which Respondents prevail during Phase I, Phase II would enable
the named representative of each class or subclass to try the issues of causation and damages
before the class jury.  Finally, Phase III would involve trial of individual issues of class
membership, causation, smoking history and damages for each and every absent class
member.  During Phase III, after having established class membership, individual class
members could proceed in one of several ways:  (1) conduct a full jury trial on Phase III
issues; (2) accept the damages determined in Phase II; (3) conduct a summary jury trial on
Phase III issues; or (4) conduct proceedings before a magistrate or special master on all
Phase III issues.
On February 25, 1998, Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Class Notice
and to Stay Issuance of Class Notice.  The Circuit Court held a hearing on this motion on
March 27, 1998 and ultimately denied it.  On April 8, 1998, Petitioners filed the present
Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, urging this Court to issue a writ
commanding the Circuit Court to decertify the classes.  On the same day, Petitioners filed
a motion in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City requesting a stay of class notice pending this
Court’s consideration of the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition,
which motion the Circuit Court denied.  On May 7, 1998, Petitioners filed with this Court
a Motion for a Stay of Class Notice Pending Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of
Prohibition, oppositions to which Respondents and the Attorney General filed a week later.
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On May 15, 1998, this Court ordered that the Motion for Stay be granted pending this
Court’s decision on the present Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition.
II.  Arguments
We shall lay out the stated positions of the parties in this section, and discuss certain
arguments in more detail throughout the opinion.  Petitioners argue that this Court should
issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition because irreparable harm will result to the parties
and the judicial system if Petitioners are required to await end-of-the-case appeal.  According
to Petitioners, the opportunity to appeal the class certification might not arise until the Phase
III trials are well underway, which, if class certification is improper, would entail a
tremendous waste of judicial resources.  Hence, we are urged to compel the Circuit Court
to decertify the classes as an exercise in aid of our appellate jurisdiction or, in the alternative,
as an execution of this Court’s superintendency, whether inherent or bestowed, over the
lower courts of this State.
Petitioners contend that the Circuit Court grossly abused its discretion in certifying
the class action in violation of Maryland Rule 2-231 and Petitioners’ constitutional rights.
They maintain that because of the number of individual liability issues involved in this
litigation, the Circuit Court grossly abused its discretion in holding that Respondents met the
class action requirements of predominance, superiority and manageability.  Most notably,
the Circuit Court either ignored or glossed over several significant individual issues, such as
-8-
  In its answer to the present petition, see supra note 1, the State offers arguments on
4
behalf of Judge Angeletti that are essentially similar to those of the class representatives.
conflict-of-laws, contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, statutes of limitation, fraud
and reliance, and causation, the aggregation of some or all of which precludes certification.
Finally, Petitioners attribute four errors of law to the Circuit Court in rendering its
decision.  First, Petitioners argue that the splitting of interrelated issues, most notably general
liability to the classes and causation of injury to individual class members, violates their
federal and Maryland constitutional rights.  Petitioners additionally assert that the Circuit
Court erred in certifying a medical monitoring class, that it impermissibly separated punitive
damages from liability determinations, and that class counsel suffer from a conflict of
interest ethically disabling them from representing the classes, and thereby creating illicit,
fail-safe classes.
Respondents  counter that this Court lacks the power to issue writs of mandamus or
4
prohibition.  According to Respondents, our decision in In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition,
312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), in which we recognized that “mandamus or prohibition
may issue in aid of appellate jurisdiction,” id. at 302, 539 A.2d at 675, was superseded by
Title 8, which governs appellate procedure in the Court of Appeals and which does not
expressly provide for writs of mandamus or prohibition.  Even if appellate review is
appropriate at this time, Respondents assert that this Court cannot properly assert jurisdiction
without offending the “primary jurisdiction” of the Court of Special Appeals:  we must wait
until the matter, presumably in the form of a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition,
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is pending in the intermediate appellate court, at which point we would be free to exercise
our powers of certiorari.
Assuming that this Court does have the authority to issue such a writ, Respondents
exhort that we rule the present petition untimely because Petitioners did not file it with this
Court until seventy days after the Circuit Court’s January 28, 1998 order granting
Respondents’ Motion for Class Certification.  “To the extent that nonstatutory appellate
jurisdiction is recognized at all,” argue Respondents, “it must be invoked within the
prescribed time for obtaining review in any form,” which, Respondents posit, is thirty days
from the date of a decision.  Moreover, the writ requested by Petitioners would be ineffectual
if issued.  Petitioners have expressly requested only that this Court vacate the Circuit Court’s
Class Certification Order dated February 19, 1998.  Granting this mislabeled or under-
inclusive request arguably would leave the Circuit Court’s previous order of January 28,
1998 granting class certification intact and in effect.  Because the requested writ would
therefore be futile, assert Respondents, this Court ought not grant it. 
Respondents further argue that the appropriate standard for determining whether a
writ of mandamus or prohibition shall issue is whether there was a judicial “usurpation of
power,” not whether the Circuit Court’s ruling was “erroneous” or “an abuse of discretion.”
According to Respondents, the lower court’s judgment was consistent with the law applying
class certification requirements to long-term mass tort cases centered upon products liability
(as distinguishable, perhaps, from cases arising out of a single-event disaster), its decision
was carefully reasoned and supported, and its order effected an appropriate exercise of
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judicial power.  Specifically, Respondents contend that the Circuit Court correctly and
thoughtfully decided that the proposed classes complied with both the Rule 2-231(a)
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy, and the Rule 2-231(b)(3)
requirements of predominance, superiority and manageability.  Furthermore, Petitioners
possess an adequate legal remedy to correct any mistake on the Circuit Court’s part, namely
the right of appeal after a final judgment.  For this reason alone, a writ of mandamus or
prohibition at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings below is unnecessary and improper.
Respondents offer three final rebuttals to Petitioners’ arguments: first, the Seventh
Amendment and Maryland Constitution do not preclude bifurcation of common liability
issues from individual issues such as damages, specific causation, or reliance.  Secondly, the
Circuit Court properly concluded that total amounts of punitive damages or punitive damages
multipliers can be determined as a common issue prior to and separately from findings of
specific liability and actual damages.  Thirdly, the Circuit Court was correct in judging that
Respondents’ claim for medical monitoring was both cognizable in Maryland and
appropriate for class certification as equitable relief under Rule 2-231(b)(2).
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  In contrast to the writ of mandamus, the writ of prohibition has generally been
5
defined as a writ issuing to a party commanding that party to cease from performing a
particular act, duty, or function.  See In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280,
286, 539 A.2d 664, 667 (1988) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 112 (facsimile ed. 1768)).  Given the circumstances of In re Writ of
Prohibition, we observed in that case, “As to which writ should issue in a case of this sort,
we are not disposed to engage in common law quibbles about the differences between
mandamus and prohibition.”  Id. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676.  Nonetheless, within the context
of this case, we shall resolve Petitioners’ request for an extraordinary writ in terms of
mandamus.  Should we issue a writ in this case, we will be ordering the Circuit Court not to
refrain from action but rather to take action, i.e., to decertify the class action.  The writ
would therefore most aptly be couched as one of mandamus.  Moreover, previously reported
Maryland cases involving the writ of mandamus have been more numerous than cases
involving the writ of prohibition.  See generally 2 JOHN PRENTISS POE, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW §§ 708-13, at 664-77 (5th ed. Tiffany 1925).
Consequently, the legal principles with respect to mandamus have developed more
extensively and enjoy a clarity that is conducive to our resolution of the instant case.
III.  Mandamus
We shall first address the threshold question of whether this Court has the authority
to issue the extraordinary writ of mandamus or prohibition under the circumstances of the
present case.5
The common law writ of mandamus is an original action and not an appeal.  See
Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 145, 680 A.2d 1040, 1047 (1996).  Historically, this
extraordinary writ has been defined, in general, to be a prerogative writ,
containing a command in the King’s name, issuing from the
Court of King’s Bench, directed to persons, corporations or
inferior courts of judicature within the King’s dominions,
requiring them to do a certain specific act, as being the duty of
their office, agreeably to right and justice.
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  Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 3-8A-01 of the Courts and
6
Judicial Proceedings Article provides, “A court of law has jurisdiction in an action for
mandamus.”
2 JOHN PRENTISS POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 708, at 664
(5th ed. Tiffany 1925) [hereinafter POE].  It “is a summary remedy, for the want of a specific
one, where there would otherwise be a failure of justice.  It is based upon reasons of justice
and public policy, to preserve peace, order and good government.”  State v. Graves, 19 Md.
351, 374 (1863) (citations omitted).  See also Ipes v. Board of Fire Com’rs of Baltimore, 224
Md. 180, 183, 167 A.2d 337, 339 (1961); Upshur v. Baltimore City, 94 Md. 743, 746, 51 A.
953, 954 (1902); POE, supra, § 709, at 664.
As a prerogative writ, the authority to issue mandamus rests within the sound
discretion of the court, but that discretion must “be exercised under the rules long recognized
and established at common law.”  Hardcastle v. Md. & Del. R. R. Co., 32 Md. 32, 35 (1870)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In addition, Circuit Courts of this State have been
statutorily conferred with the power and discretion they enjoyed under the common law to
issue writs of mandamus.  See Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 3-8A-
01 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.   This case, however, does not involve the
6
correctness vel non of the issuance of a writ of mandamus by an inferior court.  Rather,
Petitioners have requested that this Court issue a writ of mandamus in the first instance.
Accordingly, we turn to the authority and role of this Court in ruling upon a petition for
mandamus.
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We initially reject Respondents’ contentions (1) that this Court’s promulgation of
Title 8 of the Maryland Rules, Appellate Review in the Court of Appeals and Court of
Special Appeals, effective July 1, 1988, forecloses the issuance of a writ of mandamus by
this Court because of the absence of an express provision in the Rules for such; (2) that any
appellate review of the present case, if conducted by this Court, must occur by way of a writ
of certiorari, necessitating that the case first be noted and pending in the Court of Special
Appeals; (3) that the present petition should be denied on the ground of untimeliness; and
(4) that a grant of the requested writ would be futile because Petitioners failed to specifically
include the Circuit Court’s initial order of class certification within their request for relief.
First, that Title 8’s lack of an express provision for this Court to issue a writ of
mandamus does not negate our mandamus authority is beyond debate.  As noted above, the
writ of mandamus is an original action, not an appeal.  See Goodwich, 343 Md. at 145, 680
A.2d at 1047.  Hence, Title 8’s governance of appellate procedure is simply not applicable.
Moreover, the extraordinary writ of mandamus in this State originated under the common
law and has several times been recognized to remain a common law prerogative of this
Court, even in cases subsequent to 1988.  See Doering v. Fader, 316 Md. 351, 558 A.2d 733
(1989) (confirming this Court’s authority under common law to issue writ of mandamus yet
ultimately determining writ unnecessary in that case); Keene Corp. v. Levin, 330 Md. 287,
623 A.2d 662 (1993) (acknowledging this Court’s common law power to issue writ of
mandamus but ruling such issuance improper under circumstances therein).  Even were Title
8 applicable, there exists a generally accepted principle in construing statutes and court rules
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that the legislative, or quasi-legislative, derogation of the common law must be made
expressly clear.  See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702 (1999);
Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934).
Second, for the very reason that a petition for writ of mandamus is not an appeal, any
notion that the Court of Special Appeals possesses “primary jurisdiction” in the present
matter is equally inapposite.  Third, the writ of mandamus is, again, by its very nature an
extraordinary form of relief, the request for which is likewise highly unusual, and, as such,
the writ is not ordinarily subject to specific time requirements or other like restrictions.  In
short, a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition stands on its own and, for the most part,
outside the bounds of time.  Fourth, the relief sought by Petitioners is made abundantly clear
throughout the numerous pages of the petition itself.  Denying the petition on the basis of its
failure to specify the Circuit Court’s initial order as the one to be vacated would allow the
proverbial—and long denigrated—triumph of form over substance.
Judge Adkins, writing for this Court in In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md.
280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), traced the history and nature of mandamus and prohibition at
common law, focusing particularly on whether this Court has the power to issue such
prerogative writs.  Quickly disposing of any notion of an express constitutional or statutory
grant of power in this Court to issue these extraordinary writs in Maryland, we held that “we
have jurisdiction to issue to an inferior court peremptory writs in aid of our appellate
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676.  In discussing the possible bases for this Court’s
power, we said:
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  Likewise, because we shall hold that the circumstances of the present case comprise
7
a sufficient basis for the invocation of this Court’s power to issue a writ of mandamus in aid
of our appellate jurisdiction, we need not decide the viability of other possible bases for the
exercise of such power and once again leave those questions open.
The Maryland Constitution is silent as to any mandamus or
prohibition power in this Court. The only general statutory
provision dealing with mandamus jurisdiction is Md.Code (1984
Repl.Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.) § 3-8A-01 of the Cts. & Jud.Proc.
Art.;  it relates only to the circuit courts.  Nor is there any
express grant of superintending power to this Court.  Whether
we have, as the highest court of this State, an inherent
superintending or supervisory power over the courts below us in
the judicial hierarchy, and whether any such power is implicit
in Article IV, § 18 of the Maryland Constitution, are questions
we reserve for another day.  We need not and do not address
them today because we hold that under the circumstances of this
case we have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ of
prohibition in aid of our appellate jurisdiction.
Id. at 292-93, 539 A.2d at 669-70 (footnotes omitted).7
As we made clear in In re Writ of Prohibition, this Court may utilize the writs of
mandamus and prohibition as an aid to appellate jurisdiction even though there is no appeal
pending in this Court, and even though no appeal is concurrently possible, see id. at 301, 539
A.2d at 674, at least where there is some “potentiality” of eventual appellate review by
appeal or certiorari, see id. at 302-03, 539 A.2d at 675.  We concluded that “[i]f the use of
a writ is ‘necessary to enable . . . [the Court] to exercise appellate jurisdiction’ it is in aid of
that jurisdiction.”  Id. at 304, 539 A.2d at 675 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
175, 2 L. Ed. 60, 73 (1803)) (all alterations but first in In re Writ of Prohibition).
In exploring what “in aid of” our appellate jurisdiction entails, we had stated: 
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“[I]t is manifestly necessary, to the ends of justice, that there
should be a power in special cases to suspend proceedings on
the matter appealed from . . . .  [This power] is necessarily
incident to this Court, to preserve the usefulness of its appellate
jurisdiction.  If it were otherwise, cases might arise in which the
appeal would be but as a shadow, pending which the substance
might be lost.”
Id. at 298, 539 A.2d at 672 (quoting Thompson v. M’Kim, 6 H. & J. 302, 333 (Md. 1823))
(ellipsis in In re Writ of Prohibition).  Thus, we recognized that “by making possible the
review of a potentially unreviewable question[, mandamus and] prohibition aided the
appellate process.”  Id. at 299, 539 A.2d at 673.  The exercise of this Court’s authority to
issue an extraordinary writ was justified by the potential irreparable harm to the moving
party and by the need to maintain the integrity of the legal system.  Id. at 298, 301, 539 A.2d
at 672, 674.  See Ipes, 224 Md. at 183, 167 A.2d at 339 (“[I]n approaching the question
concerning the issuance, vel non, of the writ, the courts invoke equitable principles to reach
the real merits of the controversy between the parties.”).
As we proclaimed more generally, 
In Maryland common law mandamus has been described
as a prerogative writ “grantable where the public justice of the
State is concerned.”  Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. [429,]
449 [(Gen. Ct. Oct. Term 1799)].  It is a writ “to prevent
disorder, from a failure of justice, where the law has established
no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government
there ought to be one. . . .”  Id. at 449.
In re Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. at 307, 539 A.2d at 677.
Writing further for the General Court in the case of Runkel v. Winemiller, Judge
Jeremiah Townley Chase, soon thereafter Chief Judge of the General Court and later Chief
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  There exist myriad cases from this Court discussing the final judgment rule, under
8
which a lower court’s judgment or order in a civil case is ordinarily appealable, or otherwise
subject to judicial review, only where it settles the rights of the parties involved and
concludes the cause of action, or where such review is allowed by statutory or common law
exception to the general rule.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 8-10,
612 A.2d 880, 883-84 (1992) and cases cited therein; Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.
(continued...)
Judge of this Court, summarized the purpose and propriety of an appellate court’s exercise
of mandamus as follows:
[W]hence the inference is plainly deducible, . . . this
Court may, and of right ought, for the sake of justice, to
interpose in a summary way to supply a remedy where, for the
want of a specific one, there would otherwise be a failure of
justice.
Id. at 449; accord Legg v. Annapolis, 42 Md. 203, 226 (1875).  Yet, we do recognize that
although mandamus allows a court to afford relief where otherwise none would be
forthcoming, the converse of that touchstone principle has likewise been generally
established:
It is well settled in this State that a writ of mandamus will
not be granted where the petitioner has a specific and adequate
legal remedy to meet the justice of the particular case and where
the law affords [another] adequate remedy.
Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90-91, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944); see also Gisriel v. Ocean City
Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 497, 693 A.2d 757, 767 (1997).
Furthermore, we believe that, given the procedural context of this case, the party
seeking the extraordinary writ must demonstrate a paramount public policy interest sufficient
to offset the strongly established preference for adherence to the final judgment rule.   In
8
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(...continued)
8
Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
  In addition to the exceptions codified in Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.,
9
1999 Supp.) § 12-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, this Court has
“‘adopted the so-called “collateral order doctrine,” which treats as final and appealable a
limited class of orders which do not terminate litigation in the trial court.’”  Dep’t of Social
Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 10, 612 A.2d 880, 884 (1992) (quoting Public Service Comm’n
v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 206, 477 A.2d 759, 762 (1984)).  See also id. at 10-12, 612
A.2d at 884-85 (discussing elements of collateral order doctrine).
Keene, 330 Md. 287, 623 A.2d 662, this Court recognized that only “extraordinary
circumstances” will justify the interlocutory issuance of a writ of mandamus in complex
litigation.  See id. at 291, 623 A.2d at 664.  Except for the limited category of exceptions
codified in Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 12-303 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, ordinarily an appeal will lie only from a final judgment and not
from an interlocutory order entered in a civil case.   “The underlying policy of the final
9
judgment rule is that piecemeal appeals are disfavored.”  Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 614,
440 A.2d 388, 389 (1982); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 349 Md. 294, 297, 708 A.2d 296,
298 (1998).  Generally barring appellate review until the entry of a final judgment results in
a single review of all claims of error throughout an entire proceeding, thus both expediting
litigation and conserving judicial and other resources.  See Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 356,
384 A.2d 91, 93 (1978); see also Huber v. Nationwide, 347 Md. 415, 423, 701 A.2d 415,
418-19 (1997) (“[P]iecemeal appeals . . . are not consistent with efficient judicial
administration.”).
-19-
In sum, in deciding whether the present circumstances warrant our exercise of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus in aid of our appellate jurisdiction, and in paying heed to
Maryland’s legal precedent in this area, we must consider the interests of justice and public
policy, the protection of the integrity of the judicial system, the general preferability of the
final judgment rule, and the adequacy of other available relief.  We conclude that in seeking
review by writ of mandamus of the Circuit Court’s order granting class certification of this
case, Petitioners have demonstrated the lack of other available, adequate relief as well as the
existence of a paramount public and judicial interest that, together, override the preference
for the final judgment rule and justify the issuance of mandamus, in order to protect the
integrity of the judicial system in this State.
The litigation plan approved by the Circuit Court in this case necessarily involves the
commitment of such an extraordinary amount of the judicial and other resources of  the
busiest trial court in this State that any subsequent appellate review of the lower court’s Class
Certification Order is rendered inadequate and ineffective.  The earliest possible point at
which Petitioners could initially challenge the class certification in ordinary fashion would
likely occur well into the future.  Judicial review would ordinarily arise only after a fully
litigated loss by Petitioners at the conclusion of one of the Phase II trials.  “Only when a final
judgment is entered, determining liability and assessing damages, will the case, including
interim rulings such as the certification of certain issues in the case for determination in a
class action, be appealable . . . .”  In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th
Cir. 1995).  See also 2 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS,
-20-
  Consistent with this principle, the Circuit Court, as already noted, see supra note
10
3, has indicated that, at the least, the “one subclass of people with smoking-related diseases
. . . would be further divided into subclasses for the [twelve] different diseases [Respondents]
claim are caused by smoking.”  (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 3 n. 3.)
§ 7.38, at 7-111 to 7-113 (3d ed. 1992) (“The question of appealability of initial class
determinations and denials is not entirely settled.  Generally, it may be said that appeals are
normally limited to final decisions on the merits.”); 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1802, at 464 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining that,
by application of “the final judgment rule, the class certification question can be reviewed
on appeal only after a final judgment on the merits has been entered” (citations omitted)).
Because of the various subclasses that may be required in the present litigation, the number
of Phase II trials may amount to a significant total:  the six subclasses already proposed to
the Circuit Court by Respondents may represent only the beginning of the amount eventually
needed to properly prosecute this case as a class action.  See Smith v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 174 F.R.D. 90, 97-98 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (indicating necessity of multiple
subclasses and corresponding representatives for each type of disease allegedly caused by
defendants’ various products as well as for each distinct product and for different time
periods).  Cf. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27, 117 S. Ct. 2231,
2251, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997) (in settlement-only asbestos class action context,
emphasizing need for discrete subclasses to ensure fair and adequate representation for
diverse groups and individuals affected).10
-21-
  No estimate of pinpoint accuracy as to the potential number of class members is
11
available, of course.  We nonetheless take note that according to the Class Action Notice
Plan, issued in conjunction with the Circuit Court’s Class Certification Order of February
19, 1998, the number of adult citizens in Maryland in 1993 totaled 3,619,227, 20.4% of
whom were estimated to be smokers, that is, 738,322.  The number of adult users of
smokeless tobacco in Maryland, on the other hand, was figured to be 0.7% of the total
population, or 25,335.  Similar figures for non-adults in Maryland, however, are not provided
within the record.
Moreover, appellate review of the class certification may actually have to await a trial
loss by Petitioners during Phase III.  Only then might the class certification itself constitute
an appealable issue because the named class plaintiffs’ representation of absent class
members under the proposed litigation plan is incomplete.  Even after a victory by the class
or subclass representative during Phase II, each respective class or subclass member must
still prevail during Phase III on his or her own individual issues related to specific liability
and compensatory damages.  The potential harm of this scenario is substantially exacerbated
by the possibly inordinate size of the class membership in this case:  Respondents have
averred that “[a]n estimated 732,000 Maryland adults smoke cigarettes,” that “[t]housands
of adolescents begin smoking for the first time every day” and that “[t]housands more
Maryland residents use smokeless [t]obacco [p]roducts.”  (Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended
Complaint at ¶ 44) [hereinafter Pls.’ 4th Am. Compl.].   It is not feasible at this point to
11
determine, from any numbers now—or made—available, what persons within these groups
would qualify as injured by or addicted to Petitioners’ tobacco products.  Suffice it to say,
however, that the potential number of Phase III trials, as these estimates now stand, is
daunting indeed.
-22-
In the interim, judicial and other resources would be expended upon the following:
discovery skirmishes, motions in limine, legal disputes over Maryland and probably foreign
law, preparation for litigation, litigation, and a host of other unforeseeable conflicts between
two well-represented, adverse and resourceful parties.  We emphasize this case does not
equate with garden variety class action litigation.  The waste of judicial and other resources,
should the Circuit Court’s Class Certification Order be overturned on appeal only after a
Phase II or Phase III verdict, would be without precedent in this State.
No citation to authority is required for us to note the crowded dockets in the Circuit
Courts of this State; this is especially true in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, where this
litigation is scheduled to occur.  We have explained before, albeit in a different context, that
an order which has the direct effect of terminating litigation is an important issue, even if that
order involves only a single litigant.  See Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213, 406 A.2d 922,
925 (1979).  See also CSR Limited v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (“The most
efficient use of the state’s judicial resources is another factor we consider in determining
whether an ordinary appeal would provide an adequate remedy.”).  That equation increases
exponentially when the litigation is as complex as that approved by the Class Certification
Order in this case.  As one California court has recognized, “Relief by mandamus is
appropriate where it will prevent a needless, expensive trial and an ultimate reversal.”  City
of Huntington Beach v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. Rptr. 236, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).  See
also Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755, 759 (Cal. 1976) (issuing writ of
mandamus to vacate class certification order where, as matter of law, proposed methods of
-23-
  Respondents urge that we view California cases regarding mandamus as wholly
12
distinguishable because of the fact that California appellate courts are explicitly granted, by
statute, broad authority to issue writs of mandamus, referred to as writs of “mandate,” to
inferior courts.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085(a) (West 2000).  We emphasize that our
citations to the California cases go not to the issue of whether this Court has authority to
issue a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court but whether we ought to issue the writ under
the present circumstances.
recovery by plaintiffs did not correspond to damages originally suffered); City of Glendale
v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).12
Given the judicial and other resources that would be irrevocably wasted should the
Circuit Court’s Class Certification Order not be overturned until after a Phase II or Phase III
judgment, we will not permit this case to proceed that far if we are convinced presently that
reversal of the Class Certification Order is mandated.  In ruling interlocutory judicial review
of a lower court’s class certification proper because of the existence of irreparable harm, a
Louisiana intermediate appellate court characterized that harm as follows:
“[I]f, at a later time, after trial on the merits and review, it is
determined that the trial judge erred in permitting the matter to
be tried as a class action, immeasurable expense and
innumerable wasted court days will have resulted.  Furthermore,
litigants in other matters will have been needlessly delayed.”
Hampton v. Illinois Central RR Co., 730 So. 2d 1091, 1093 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting
State ex rel Guste v. General Motors Corp., 354 So. 2d 770, 774 (La. Ct. App. 1978)).  The
same harm is portended in the present case as it now stands before us.
-24-
Both the public interest and our responsibility in exercising the supreme judicial
authority of this State thus compel the exercise of this Court’s discretion in this extraordinary
case.  As cogently stated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
[W]hile mandamus relief is rarely justified, there is ample
authority for the issuance of the writ to correct a class
certification upon a clear showing that the trial court has
committed legal errors or abused its discretion and no other
adequate remedy is available.  The conclusion is that in
extraordinary cases, including class actions, this Court may,
and properly should, issue a writ of mandamus if that action is
necessary to protect its jurisdiction or accomplish substantial
justice.
Meighan v. U. S. Sprint Communications Co., 942 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Tenn. 1997) (emphasis
added).
There is substantial public interest in a timely resolution of the issue central to
Petitioners’ request for a writ of mandamus.  The legal propriety of certifying a class action
in the present case, whose logistical magnitude alone is staggering and which concomitantly
may significantly impact or divert the public resources earmarked for the judiciary for the
next several years, calls for this Court’s earlier than usual attention.  In this regard, we credit
another court’s observation under similar circumstances:
The fact that it is in the public interest to resolve this
controversy as expeditiously as possible tends to weigh in favor
of the exercise of our discretion to consider the petition for writ
of mandate, rather than requiring the [plaintiff] to await a later
appeal.
City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see also
In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 307 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he sheer
-25-
  The Maryland class action rule, codified under Maryland Rule 2-231, is reproduced
13
and discussed at length infra Section IV.  As to the present issue, Maryland Rule 2-231(c)
provides that a class action certification order “may be conditional and may be altered or
amended before a decision on the merits.”
magnitude of the case makes the disposition of these issues crucial as several hundred
litigants are waiting for a decision before proceeding with their cases.”); City of Huntington
Beach, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 239.  Indeed it would seem more prudent to risk premature
intervention on our part rather than hedge our bets on involvement that may simply be too
late.  The truly extraordinary circumstances of the present case warrant our extraordinary
attention at this time, and would justify our grant of the extraordinary relief requested, should
we determine the Circuit Court’s judgment to be in error or an abuse of discretion.
Respondents, as well as the dissenters, would have us stay our hand and ignore our
authority on the basis that the Circuit Court’s Class Certification Order retains a full degree
of conditionality, revisibility, and reversibility.  See Maryland Rule 2-231(c).   It is urged
13
that the lower court be allowed to cure on its own any error embodied within the order or by
the order itself before being subjected to judicial review.  Again, we are not unaware of the
procedural posture of this case nor of the ordinary preferability of awaiting a final judgment
before commencing such review.  Nevertheless, we remain convinced that the extraordinary
circumstances of the instant litigation and its current status as a class action necessitate that
we conduct our review at this earlier than normal juncture, despite that the existing order
“may be conditional,” id.  Cf. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir.
1996) (indicating that the requirements for class certification are not relaxed or “lessened”
-26-
  The Ninth Circuit has characterized the insulation afforded to a trial court’s class
14
certification order by the conditionality thereof as rather limited:
Conditional certification is not a means whereby the
District Court can avoid deciding whether, at that time, the
requirements of the [federal class action] Rule have been
substantially met.  The purpose of conditional certification is to
preserve the Court’s power to revoke certification in those cases
wherein the magnitude or complexity of the litigation may
eventually reveal problems not theretofore apparent.
In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974).  We believe that whatever
problems the Circuit Court’s certification of the present litigation as a class action may
entail, they are hardly unrevealed; instead, they are readily apparent.
merely because the trial court declares the certification conditional); In re Hotel Tel.
Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974).   The writ of mandamus not only enables us to
14
exercise our prerogative under these circumstances, but it is indeed for such rare
circumstances as these that the writ grants us the authority to intervene in the first place.
Finally, Respondents have emphasized in contrast what we stated seven years ago,
Although the normal appellate process may not produce as swift
and inexpensive a result as would the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, we are not persuaded that the cost and delay
attendant to following normal procedures will so prejudice the
litigants as to justify the issuance of an extraordinary writ.
Keene, 330 Md. at 294, 623 A.2d at 666.  We, however, view the extraordinary
circumstances of the present case in a wholly different light.  Indeed, we recognize that the
parties will incur significant costs and delays if mandamus relief is not granted and appellate
review of the Circuit Court’s Class Certification Order is denied until the entry of a final
judgment either at the conclusion of Phase II or during Phase III of the proposed class
litigation.  Should such expenses have been endured on account of a judgment by the Circuit
-27-
Court that suffers from underlying legal error or an abuse of discretion, they would be losses
as monumental in their unfairness as in their sheer amount.  See Jackson v. Motel 6
Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1004 (11th Cir. 1997) (“‘The only conceivable alternative
[to mandamus relief]—inevitable reversal by this court after the defendants have been forced
to endure full discovery, full litigation, and a full trial— is scarcely adequate’ to redress this
injury.”  (Quoting In re Cooper, 971 F.2d 640, 641 (11th Cir. 1992)) (alteration in Jackson)).
See also Blue Chip Stamps, 556 P. 2d at 759 n. 4 (“Petitioners have no adequate remedy by
appeal from final judgment.  Delaying review until final judgment—while the trial court
attempts to manage the unmanageable—would mean that the parties could not obtain
appellate review until after they had paid the great costs which render the damage action
inappropriate.  Thus, appeal from a final judgment is not a practical remedy.”).
In similar vein, some courts have expressed concern that granting class certification
significantly increases the pressure on a risk-adverse defendant to settle pending class claims
rather than face the threat of an exceptional award of damages.  See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746
(in describing so-called “judicial blackmail settlements,” stating, “In addition to skewing trial
outcomes, class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas
individual trials would not.  The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a
risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.” (citation omitted)); Rhone-
Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1297 (“The reason that an appeal will come too late to provide effective
relief for these defendants is the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class action . . .
exposes them.”).  Cf. Jackson, 130 F.3d at 1004 (recognizing “the danger of abuse that
-28-
always attends class communications—the possibility that plaintiffs might use widespread
publication of their claims, disguised as class communications, to coerce defendants into
settlement”).  Should similar undue pressure be thrust upon Petitioners here, owing to a
determination by the Circuit Court that is erroneous or abusive of its discretion, the injustice
would be equally attributable to this Court for hesitating to exercise a discretion, however
extraordinary in nature, with which we are not so much empowered as we are charged.
For all the reasons discussed above, we hold that the extraordinary writ of mandamus
may appropriately issue under the circumstances of the present case.  In doing so, we
reaffirm our commitment to the principles underlying the final judgment rule and our
adherence, ordinarily, to the rule itself.  See In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d
1069, 1077 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that the writ of mandamus “provides some flexibility in
instances where rigid enforcement of the final judgement rule would result in injustice”).
Our holding is limited necessarily to the unique factual circumstances and procedural nature
of this case.  It will be the rare case indeed which justifies the issuance of interlocutory
mandamus relief, although we need not flesh out that framework today.  Writing for this
Court over a century ago, Chief Judge McSherry recognized the importance of an appellate
court’s speaking only to the controversy then before it:
[A]s we had no such question to decide we deemed it wholly
unnecessary to step aside a single pace from the straight path
before us, and declare what particular appointments were not
included within the scope of our decision.  The duty of a Court
is done, as we apprehend, when it decides the case before it, and
it is obviously no part of that duty to declare that the Court has
not decided something wholly different; or to enumerate, in
-29-
anticipation of possible future contests the instances in which,
by reason of a difference of facts, the opinion would not be
applicable.
Hooper v. New, 85 Md. 565, 573, 37 A. 424, 425 (1897).  We simply hold that, given the
irreparable harm that might otherwise be suffered by the legal system and by Petitioners, we
may issue a writ of mandamus in aid of our appellate jurisdiction in the present matter.  It
is appropriately within this Court’s prerogative to review the order of the Circuit Court
granting class certification in this case so extraordinary because of the immense amount of
time and expense that both the parties and the judicial system of this State will incur should
the litigation proceed as a class action, as well as the astronomical number of persons in
Maryland whose lives will be affected by our decision either way.
IV.  Merits of the Class Certification Order
A.  General Principles
We now turn to the merits of the Circuit Court’s decision to certify two classes of
Maryland residents injured by or addicted to tobacco products.  Maryland Rule 2-231
governs class certification and provides in pertinent parts as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a class action.  One or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
-30-
(b) Class actions maintainable.  Unless justice requires
otherwise, an action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of section (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class that would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.  The matters pertinent
to the findings include:  (A) the interest of members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class, (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
(c) Certification.  On motion of any party or on the
court's own initiative, the court shall determine by order as soon
as practicable after commencement of the action whether it is to
be maintained as a class action.  A hearing shall be granted if
requested by any party.  The order shall include the court’s
findings and reasons for certifying or refusing to certify the
action as a class action.  The order may be conditional and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
-31-
  The federal class action rule provides in pertinent part:
15
Rule 23.  Class Actions
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action.  One or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
(continued...)
(d) Partial class actions; subclasses.  When appropriate,
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class.
There is a dearth of authority in Maryland analyzing the specific requirements of
Maryland Rule 2-231.  We need not consider the application of these requirements in a void,
however, as there exists an abundance of cases from other jurisdictions, federal and state,
that have analyzed class action rules either identical to or similar to Maryland’s rule.  See
Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 716, 668 A.2d 8, 13-14 (1995) (noting that when federal rule
of evidence contains same language as Maryland rule of evidence, court may look to former
when interpreting latter); Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 355, 631 A.2d 429, 437 (1993)
(reiterating that where Maryland rule essentially tracks federal rule, interpretations of that
federal rule are persuasive as to meaning and proper applications of the Maryland rule);
Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 738 n. 8, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 n. 8 (1993).  See also
Pollokoff v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 44 Md. App. 188, 192, 407 A.2d 799, 801 (1979) (treating
federal rule on class actions as persuasive authority in interpreting Maryland rule on class
actions), aff’d, 288 Md. 485, 418 A.2d 1201 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court has reviewed the federal class action rule, namely,
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Federal Rule 23],  on a number
15
-32-
(...continued)
15
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable.  An action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
*          *          *          *          *          *
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.  The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3).  As can readily be seen, the federal class action rule is quite
similar to Maryland Rule 2-231.
of occasions, most recently in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct.
2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997).  See also General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.
Ct. 2364, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S. Ct.
2140, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1974).  Likewise, numerous federal appellate and trial courts have
applied the federal class action rule in a variety of contexts, including that of mass tort
tobacco litigation.  See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir. 1998);
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re American Medical
-33-
  The Court of Appeals of New York has stated that “New York’s class action statute
16
(CPLR 901-909) has much in common with Federal [R]ule 23.  The prerequisites to the
filing of a New York class action are virtually identical to those contained in [R]ule 23.”  In
re Colt Indus. Shareholder Litig., 566 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted).
Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293
(7th Cir. 1995); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535 (W.D. Wis. 1998); Emig v.
American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379 (D. Kan. 1998).  Finally, a small number of courts
in other States and the District of Columbia has also interpreted the same or similar class
action rules in contexts apposite to the present case.  See, e.g., Reed v. Philip Morris Inc.,
Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. (D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 1999) (Reed II); Reed v. Philip Morris
Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) (Reed I); Geiger
v. American Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).   We shall look to these
16
cases, and others, to aid our analysis in determining whether the Circuit Court abused its
discretion in certifying this case for class action treatment and whether the court applied the
correct legal standards in reaching its decision.  See Washington v. CSC Credit Services, Inc.,
199 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[w]e review the district court’s decision to
certify the class for an abuse of discretion” but that “we review de novo whether the district
court applied the correct legal standard to grant certification” (citing Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1998))), petition for cert. filed, No. 99-1623
(Apr. 6, 2000).
The plain language of Rule 2-231 sets forth several prerequisites that must be satisfied
before a Circuit Court may certify a class.  See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S. Ct. at 2372
-34-
(stating that, before certifying class, district court must conduct rigorous analysis of Federal
Rule 23 prerequisites).  The party moving for class certification bears the burden of proving
that the requirements for certification have been met.  See American Medical Systems, 75
F.3d at 1079.  A court should accept the putative class representative plaintiffs’ allegations
as true in making its decision on class certification, see Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 385, and the
determination may not be rested upon the merits of the underlying cause(s) of action, see
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78, 94 S. Ct. at 2152; Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 384.  Nevertheless, “the
court can go beyond the pleadings to the extent necessary to ‘understand the claims,
defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful
determination of the certification issues.’”  Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 384 (quoting Castano, 84
F.3d at 744 (in turn citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.11, at 214 (3d ed.
1995))).  See also Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160, 102 S. Ct. 2372 (indicating that trial court may
need to “probe behind the pleadings” to determine propriety of class certification).
In accordance with the procedure outlined in Rule 2-231, for any case properly to be
certified as a class action, four initial prerequisites must be satisfied:  numerosity (the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable); commonality (there are
questions of law or fact common to the class); typicality (the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class); and adequacy of
representation (the representative parties and counsel will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class).
-35-
  We shall discuss the Circuit Court’s certification of the medical monitoring claim
17
for treatment as a class action infra Section VI.
The prerequisites of Rule 2-231(a) are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a
class action.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee Note to 1966 Amendments,
reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 100 (1966) [hereinafter Federal Rule 23 Committee Note].
Besides meeting the four requirements thereunder, the proposed class or classes must also
satisfy one of the three subsections of Rule 2-231(b).  See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614, 117 S.
Ct. at 2245 (declaring that in addition to satisfying federal class action rule’s threshold
requirements, “parties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable
under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3)”).  The Circuit Court certified this class action under Rule
2-231(b)(3), with the exception of the medical monitoring claim, which the court certified
under Rule 2-231(b)(2).   Under Rule 2-231(b)(3), a court must find predominance
17
(questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members) and superiority (a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy), standards
which also comprise prerequisites to certifying a class action under Federal Rule 23(b)(3).
As the Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments of the federal rule indicates, these
standards jointly reflect a pragmatic goal: “Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in
which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness
or bringing about other undesirable results.”  Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39
-36-
F.R.D. at 102-103; see also Insolia, 186 F.R.D. at 545; Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175
F.R.D. 469, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  Accordingly, class action status should not be conferred
upon cases that “would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried,”
Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
Before we proceed to apply the specific requirements of Rule 2-231 to the case at
hand, we think it important to address another oft-cited comment that seems to shed some
doubt on the appropriateness of the class action vehicle for mass tort litigation, including,
perhaps, the sort involved here:
A “mass accident” resulting in injuries to numerous persons is
ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the
likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of
liability and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the
individuals in different ways.  In these circumstances an action
conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in
practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
Id.  Although some courts have adhered strictly to this commentary and refused to certify
mass tort class actions, many other courts have, when appropriate, certified classes in mass
tort litigation.  See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746 and 746-47 n. 23 (observing that “historically,
certification of mass tort litigation classes has been disfavored” and comparing cases granting
class certification in mass tort context with those denying such).  For its part, the United
States Supreme Court has placed some stock in the enduring vitality of the commentary,
explaining that the “Committee’s warning . . . continues to call for caution when individual
stakes are high and disparities among class members great.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117
S. Ct. at 2250.
-37-
More or less independently of the debate over the 1966 Advisory Committee Note,
the parties before this Court dispute the existence vel non of a recent trend, within the last
decade or so, disfavoring class actions in mass tort cases.  It is a dispute that we need not
directly weigh in on, however, as we shall abide by the view that courts should decide
whether to certify a class action in mass tort litigation on a case-by-case basis.  See Valentino
v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that the 1966
Advisory Committee Note “cast[s] doubt on the availability of class actions in mass tort
cases,” but also noting that courts have nevertheless “generally proceeded on a case-by-case
basis and considered the appropriateness of class action treatment under the particular
circumstances presented”); Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.
1986) (noting that courts have ordinarily avoided class actions in the mass tort setting, but
observing that “the courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by
the current volume of litigation and more frequent mass disasters”).  See also 3 HERBERT
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 17.05 (3d ed. 1992).
Although we shall not decide the propriety of the lower court’s class certification of
the present action on the basis of some generalized or proposed approach to mass tort
litigation, we are nonetheless cognizant of an irrefutable trend that is both more particular
and more closely related to the instant case.  A myriad of federal and state courts have shown
a predominant, indeed almost unanimous reluctance to certify, or, in the case of appellate
courts, to uphold the certification of class actions for mass tobacco litigation.  Moreover, this
aversion bears out regardless of (1) whether the plaintiffs represented a putative class
-38-
  Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 161 F.3d
18
127 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied,    U.S.    , 119 S. Ct. 1760 (1999), and Arch v. American
Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1997), actually involve the same litigation, just
at different stages.  After the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in
Arch, on June 3, 1997, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to incorporate only a claim for
medical monitoring, plaintiff Arch withdrew from the lawsuit, and plaintiff Barnes became
the lead plaintiff.  See Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 482 and 482 n. 1.  On August 22, 1997, the trial
court granted the Barnes plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for class certification.  See id. at 493.
Shortly thereafter, however, on October 17, 1997, the trial court decertified the class
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) after determining that “the individual
issues implicated by the [more fully developed] facts and circumstances of this case preclude
continuing this case as a class action.”  Id. at 502.  The Third Circuit then affirmed the trial
court’s decertification.  See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 149.
membership that was nationwide or one that was restricted to a singular forum state, (2)
whether the filed lawsuit presented multifaceted causes of action, more streamlined
complaints, or even a single claim, and (3) whether the relief sought was comprised of
compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive remedies, or a combination thereof.
See Castano, 84 F.3d 734; Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544 (D. Minn.
1999); Hansen v. American Tobacco Co., No. LR-C-96-881, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11277
(E.D. Ark. July 31, 1999); Clay v. American Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483 (S.D. Ill. 1999);
Chamberlain v. American Tobacco Co., Case No. 96 CV 2005, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12,
1999); Insolia, 186 F.R.D. 535; Emig, 184 F.R.D. 379; Barreras Ruiz v. American Tobacco
Co., 180 F.R.D. 194 (D.P.R. 1998); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.
Pa. 1997), aff’d, 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied,    U.S.    , 119 S. Ct. 1760
(1999); Lyons v. American Tobacco Co., Case No. Civ. A. 96-0881-BH-S, 1997 WL 809677,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18365 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 1997); Arch, 175 F.R.D. 469;  Walker
18
-39-
  The only other case of tobacco litigation that our research has uncovered in which
19
a court’s certification of the suit as a class action prevailed was that of Iron Workers Local
Union No. 17 Insurance Fund and Trustees v. Philip Morris Inc., 182 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. Ohio
(continued...)
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 1997); Smith v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 174 F.R.D. 90 (W.D. Mo. 1997);  In re Tobacco Cases II, No. JCCP-4042, slip
op. (San Diego County, Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2000); Reed II, Civil No. 96-5070, slip op.
(D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 1999); Reed I, Civil No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Aug. 18, 1997); Taylor v. American Tobacco Co., No. 97 715975 NP, slip op. (Wayne
County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000); Cosentino v. Philip Morris Inc., No. MID-L-5135-97,
slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1998, recon., Feb. 11, 1999); Small v. Lorillard6 Tobacco
Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 720 N.E.2d 892 (N.Y. 1999); Geiger,
696 N.Y.S.2d 345.  See also Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336, 1364-75 (1999) (arguing against certification of so-called “son of
Castano” suits as class actions in state or federal courts); Comment, Forcing Round Classes
Into Square Rules: Attempting Certification of Nicotine Addiction-As-Injury Class Actions
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(B)3, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 699, 718-26 (1998)
(contending that products liability class actions based upon nicotine addiction-as-injury
cannot qualify under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)).  But see R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle,
672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. denied, 682 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1996); Scott v.
American Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10 (La. Ct. App 1998), writ denied, 731 So. 2d 189 (La.
1999);  Mark C. Weber, Thanks for Not Suing: The Prospects for State Court Class Action
19
-40-
(...continued)
19
1998).  There the federal trial court certified as a class action a suit brought by a host of
employee health benefits funds against tobacco manufacturers and distributors, based upon
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Ohio
Pattern of Corrupt Activity Act, and federal and state antitrust laws, in which plaintiffs
sought recovery for extra medical costs incurred in treating insured patients with tobacco
disorders, and where classwide damages were to be proven through expert testimony using
a statistical computation model.  The trial court thereafter rejected defendants’ motion to
certify the class action ruling for interlocutory review, see Iron Workers Local Union No. 17
Insurance Fund and Trustees v. Philip Morris Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 825 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
Appellate review of the class certification, however, was rendered unnecessary by a jury
verdict in complete favor of the defendants.  See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance
Fund and Trustees v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 453, 454 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
Litigation Over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REV.979, 990-1020 (1999) (generally asserting
that “carefully framed” tobacco liability suits can properly be maintained as class actions in
state courts and, with “proper qualifications,” should be).
We shall now turn to the specific prerequisites for prosecuting a class action lawsuit
in Maryland, for purposes of assessing the appropriateness of the Circuit Court’s Class
Certification Order in the present matter.
B.  Numerosity
The first  requirement of Maryland Rule 2-231 is that the class be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable.  The purpose of the numerosity requirement is to
ensure that there is a need for the class action; if joinder of the actions is practicable, then
the class action device is unnecessary.  See 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 3.01, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1 NEWBERG].  This requirement
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helps to promote the objectives of judicial economy and access to the legal system,
particularly for persons with small individual claims.  See id. at 3-12 to 3-13.  Whether
numerosity is met depends on a court’s practical judgment, given the facts of a particular
case.  See General Telephone Co. of the Northwest v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.
Ct. 1698, 1706, 64 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1980) (“The numerosity requirement requires examination
of the specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.”); 1 NEWBERG, supra,
§ 3.05, at 3-26.  Plaintiffs need not state a number with specificity; a good faith estimate is
ordinarily sufficient.  See id. at 3-18 to 3-19; 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1762, at 153 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 7A
WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE].  Finally, a class consisting of hundreds, or thousands, of
members is likely to satisfy this requirement.  See 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.05, at 3-23 to 3-24.
When the Circuit Court for Baltimore City consolidated the cases involved in the
well-known asbestos litigation that inundated the City and State in the late 1980’s and early
1990’s, there were thousands of individual asbestos cases pending in that court, and
thousands more pending in other Circuit Courts throughout the State.  See ACandS, Inc. v.
Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 341-43, 667 A.2d 116, 119-20 (1995).  In the present litigation,
Petitioners have opined that, at the time the motion for certification was filed, the four class
representatives in this litigation represented the only pending tobacco litigation in Maryland.
Nevertheless, Respondents have estimated that if this class action were to proceed, the
number of people joining the litigation would far exceed the number of people involved in
the asbestos litigation and have offered a good faith estimate of “tens of thousands of
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  As to more specific estimates of the number of class action members who may
20
potentially be involved in the instant case, see supra note 11
  Without specifically finding each of them to be issues common to the class
21
members, the Circuit Court highlighted the following from Respondents’ list of fifty-three
arguably common questions as proffered in their Fourth Amended Complaint:
whether tobacco is addictive; whether [Petitioners] have
(continued...)
Maryland citizens.”  (Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 35).  Petitioners likewise
have stated that the litigation “will impact the claims of potentially hundreds of thousands
of Maryland residents.”  (Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Class Definition
at 7).   Moreover, Petitioners did not contest numerosity before the Circuit Court, nor do
20
they here.  We consequently agree with the trial judge that the numerosity requirement of
Rule 2-231(a) is satisfied in the present case.
C.  Commonality
We must next review the Circuit Court’s determination as to whether there are
questions of law or fact common to the classes.  The lower court found that Respondents’
case presents several common questions, including whether cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products are addictive; whether Petitioners have manipulated nicotine levels in their
products; whether Petitioners intentionally conspired to conceal and distort the results of
tobacco research; whether certain affirmative defenses are available to Petitioners; and
whether the conduct of Petitioners supports the imposition of punitive damages under
Maryland law.21
-43-
(...continued)
21
manipulated nicotine levels in their products; whether
[Petitioners] have concealed research showing nicotine to be
addictive; whether tobacco causes disease and if so, whether the
[Petitioners] have intentionally concealed and distorted research
data; whether prior to 1969 the industry failed to warn the
public of the dangers known to the industry regarding smoking;
whether the tobacco industry has produced a defective product
and if so, whether they are strictly liable; whether a safer
alternative design was and is available, and if so, whether the
industry has intentionally disregarded the alternative design to
continue marketing a defective, addictive product.
(Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 33 n. 13); see also (Pls.’ 4th Am. Compl. at ¶ 45).
The commonality requirement promotes “[c]onvenience, uniformity of decision, and
judicial economy,” because common issues are litigated “only once on behalf of all class
members.”  1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.01, at 3-4.  The threshold of commonality is not a high
one and is easily met in most cases.  See Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468,
472 (5th Cir. 1986); 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.10, at 3-50.  It “does not require that all, or even
most issues be common, nor that common issues predominate, but only that common issues
exist.”  Central Wesleyan College v. W. R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628, 636 (D.S.C. 1992),
aff’d, 6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3rd Cir.
1994) (requiring only that the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with
the grievances of the prospective class).  Although the standard for commonality varies
among jurisdictions, a common articulation requires that the lawsuit exhibit a “common
nucleus of operative facts.”  Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535, 542 (W.D. Wis.
-44-
1998); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992); cf. 7A WRIGHT, MILLER,
& KANE, supra, § 1778, at 528.
We had occasion to analyze a commonality requirement similar to that of Rule 2-
231(a)(2) during our review of the consolidated asbestos litigation.  In ACandS, Inc. v.
Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 116, we affirmed the trial court’s decision to hold a Phase
I trial on common issues.  Judge Rodowsky, writing for the Court, stated:
The defendants submit that the 8,555 plaintiffs in the
consolidation have different occupations, were exposed at
different times, at different workplaces, have different diseases,
and different medical histories.  But none of these factors
diminishes the commonality of the Phase I issues, and the Phase
I determinations are the only determinations that will be applied
against the defendants-appellants at mini-trials of the other
plaintiffs’ actions.
Issues involving a plaintiff’s burden on state of the art in
an asbestos products liability failure to warn case are
particularly appropriate for consolidation.  Absent unusual
circumstances, it is senseless to repeat the presentation of the
same evidence against the same defendants in successive,
individual trials or mini-consolidations.
Id. at 395, 667 A.2d at 146.
Although the instant lawsuit differs significantly from the asbestos litigation,  we
believe that the Godwin court’s analysis of common issues is relevant here.  The
commonality  requirement does not ask us to assess the common issues vis-à-vis individual
issues, but only to ask whether common issues exist.  Many of Respondents’ allegations
focus on fraudulent conduct and concealment, actions which vary little, if at all, from
plaintiff to plaintiff.  As in the asbestos litigation, “the same medical studies, medical journal
-45-
articles, workers’ compensation claims, third-party suits, depositions of witnesses, transcripts
of court testimony, minutes of meetings, correspondence, and other exhibits are produced
against the same defendants in [lawsuit] after [lawsuit] throughout the nation.”  Id. at 395-96,
667 A.2d at 146.  Indeed, as plaintiffs in any case alleging claims of fraudulent activity and
misrepresentation on the part of tobacco manufacturers as well as charges regarding the
harmfulness and addictiveness of tobacco usage, Respondents obviously have available for
their arsenal of evidence any number of now widely disseminated and widely discussed
documents and other materials.  See Pls.’ 4th Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 51-231; Appendix to Opp’n
to Pet. § 7, at 1-85.  See also, e.g., Insolia, 186 F.R.D. at 539-541 (relating the wealth of
evidence against tobacco manufacturers and industry trade groups with respect to the
potential harmful effects of tobacco usage and the addictive qualities of nicotine).
Yet, despite the Circuit Court’s confidence that such allegations suffice for purposes
of the class action commonality requirement, and despite Respondents’ conclusory argument
before this Court (simply reciting the Circuit Court’s listing of common issues, as outlined
above in the first paragraph of this section), we agree with Petitioners, and the Insolia court,
that an issue of law or fact should be deemed “common” only to the extent its resolution will
advance the litigation of the entire case.  See id. at 542.  Putting aside any skepticism that
resolution of the allegedly common issues would advance the litigation of the case at hand,
see Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997)
(explaining that individual issues in tobacco litigation are so inextricably entwined with
purportedly common issues that “certifying a class in order to obtain a global resolution of
-46-
  Of particular note is Petitioners’ persuasive argument that
22
an examination of defendants’ conduct in connection with
plaintiffs’ fraud claim achieves nothing because an individual
trial is still necessary to show whether each class member heard
and relied upon an allegedly fraudulent statement.  The [Circuit
C]ourt’s ultimate rationale for class certification -- that it would
be “senseless to relitigate these common [questions],” ([Cir. Ct.
Mem. Op.] at 36) -- is inapplicable to this case because the
common issues will have to be relitigated in each of the many
thousands of jury trials for individual class members that follow
the common issues trial.
(Petition at 21-22).  In addition, Petitioners note that a renowned academic authority directly
relied upon by the Circuit Court in making its decision to grant class certification in the
instant case,
Professor Charles Al[an] Wright, a member of the Advisory
Committee on the 1966 Amendment of Fed R. Civ. P. 23,
opined that certification of what purports to be a class action on
behalf of everyone who “has ever been ‘addicted’ to nicotine”
would be a “Frankenstein’s monster.”
Id. at 22 n. 19 (citing Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n. 19 (5th Cir.
1996) (in turn quoting Letter from Professor Wright to N. Reid Neureiter, Williams &
Connolly, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22,1994))).
these [common] issues will not advance the resolution of this case”),  we shall not on this
22
basis reverse the Circuit Court’s judgment that a common nucleus of operative facts exists
and that the commonality requirement has been satisfied.  Underlying our rationale for this
restraint is our mindfulness that the less demanding prerequisite of commonality in Rule 2-
231(a) is necessarily subsumed in the more exacting requirement of predominance of
common issues over individual questions, found in Rule 2-231(b)(3).  See Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2243, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997), (stating
that Federal “Rule 23(a)(2)’s ‘commonality’ requirement is subsumed under, or superseded
-47-
by, the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions common to the class
‘predominate over’ other questions”).
D.  Typicality
The typicality requirement seeks to make certain that “the representative part[ies] .
. . be ‘squarely aligned in interest’ with the class members.”  1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.01, at
3-4 to 3-5 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 387 n. 120
(1967)).  It is also “intended to ensure that class representatives will represent the best
interests of class members who take a less active part in managing the litigation.”  S.
BAICKER-MCKEE, W. JANSSEN, & J. CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK at 402
(Millennium edition 2000).  Professor Newberg characterizes the typicality requirement as
follows:
[A] plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or
practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of
other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the
same legal theory.  When it is alleged that the same unlawful
conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and
the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is
usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie
individual claims.
1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.13, at 3-76 to 3-77 (citations omitted).
This requirement demands a common-sense inquiry into whether the incentives of the
plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class, and is meant to ensure that representative parties
-48-
will adequately represent the class.  See Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3rd Cir. 1994);
7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, § 1764, at 232-233.  Representative claims need not
be identical to those of the rest of the class; instead, there must be similar legal and remedial
theories underlying the representative claims and the claims of the class.  See Jenkins v.
Raymark Industries, 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58
(stating that “even relatively pronounced factual differences will generally not preclude a
finding of typicality where there is a strong similarity of legal theories”).
Petitioners argue that where, as here, the crucial elements of each cause of action will
require widely varying individual proof, it is impossible for a plaintiff to be “typical” of the
class.  Respondents counter that the representative claims were typical because ‘[e]ach class
member has suffered from injuries, medical conditions, and diseases caused by their
addiction to or dependence upon nicotine contained in the cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products manufactured, promoted, distributed, and sold by the defendants.”  (Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification at 38-39).
In order to make a determination regarding typicality, we will discuss each of the class
plaintiffs.
Mildred C. Richardson
Mrs. Richardson began smoking when she was around fifteen years old.  She started
smoking on a regular basis when she was eighteen, “going on nineteen.”  She started smoking
because she “was trying to be grown up” and “keep up with the other crowd because they
smoked.”  She started smoking Camels and later smoked Salem 100’s.  She suffers from
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Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease [hereinafter COPD] and has been hospitalized and
undergone by-pass surgery.  She stopped smoking after having double bypass surgery, then
started smoking again.
Mildred C. Richardson, as personal representative of James B. Richardson
Mr. Richardson smoked Camel cigarettes and Salem 100’s.  Mr. Richardson had a
stroke and stopped smoking for a while, but then started smoking again.  Mr. Richardson was
told by a doctor to cut back on his smoking because it was not good for him; he did not stop
smoking.  He suffered from heart disease and COPD.  Mr. Richardson underwent several
surgeries prior to his death from a massive heart attack.
Karol Potter
Ms. Potter started smoking cigarettes at the age of thirteen.  She smoked her first
cigarette because “the other kids were smoking” and “it was a cool thing to do.”  She smoked
about a pack of cigarettes a day when she was sixteen in 1964, and by 1975 or 1980 was
smoking two packs a day.  She first smoked Parliaments for “maybe a week,” then smoked
Kents for “maybe a week,” then smoked Pall Malls and Winstons, each for a long time.  She
also smoked Lucky Strikes because her husband smoked them, after which she and her
husband switched to Viceroys, which she smoked for four or five years.  She then started
smoking Marlboros, which she currently smokes, averaging two packs a day.  She also
smoked Raleigh Lites for a period of two or three weeks.  She was told by a doctor around
1987 not to smoke because it was aggravating her ulcer, and also told not to smoke by a
-50-
doctor in 1992.  She was diagnosed with COPD and told that her lungs were half gone from
smoking.  She continues to suffer from COPD and is presently smoking.
Lonza B. Cutchin
Mr. Cutchin started smoking when he was fifteen or sixteen years old and living in
North Carolina.  He moved to Maryland before he was twenty-five years old.  He smoked
his first cigarette because “most of the time everybody else was smoking, the teenagers, I
thought it was a sport.”  He rolled his own cigarettes at that time, and later smoked Camels
and Chesterfields.  When he moved to Maryland, he was smoking Camels and possibly
Chesterfields.  He quit when he was diagnosed with cancer around 1994.  He tried to quit
smoking between 1948 and 1988.  He suffers from lung cancer and COPD.
Each of the plaintiffs’ cases is factually distinct.  This is not fatal to a finding of
typicality, however.  See Broin v. Philip Morris Companies, 641 So. 2d 888, 892 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the presence of factual differences will not defeat typicality).
Although we do have concerns with the degree of variance between each of the named
plaintiff’s claims, we feel that these differences are more properly addressed during our
predominance inquiry.  Importantly, Petitioners do not allege that class representatives would
be antagonistic to class members in any way.  At this stage in the litigation, Respondents
have sufficiently alleged that “the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both
the named plaintiff[s] and the class[es] sought to be represented,” 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.13,
at 3-77.  The Circuit Court’s ruling that the typicality requirement was satisfied was not an
abuse of discretion.
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E.  Adequacy of Representation
The adequacy of representation prerequisite actually addresses two related concerns,
ensuring that both the class representatives as well as class counsel are adequate to represent
the interests of all class members.  This last of the initial preconditions to class certification
thus requires first “ that the named plaintiff have no conflicts of interest with class members
and that he or she prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.”  1 NEWBERG,
supra, § 3.01, at 3-5.  As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997):
The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover
conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they
seek to represent.  “[A] class representative must be part of the
class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’
as the class members.”
Id. at 625-26, 117 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 1896, 52 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1977) (in turn quoting
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216, 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2930,
41 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1974))) (other citation omitted) (alteration in Amchem).  See also 7A
WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, § 1766, at 302-303 (stating that “the general standard is
that the representatives must be of such character as to assure the vigorous prosecution or
defense of the action so that the members’ rights are certain to be protected” (citations
omitted)).
In imposing the requirement of adequacy of representation, the class action rule seeks
secondly to verify that counsel is adequate to represent the class.  See Secretary of Labor v.
-52-
Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 697 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (stating that adequacy of
representation includes adequacy of attorneys representing class); 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, &
KANE, supra, § 1769.1, at 375 (observing that under adequacy requirement court will
consider not only character and quality of named representative party but also quality and
experience of attorneys for class).  Factors in this analysis include the vigor of counsel,
experience, and diligence.  See Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D.
628, 637 (D.S.C. 1992), aff’d, 6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1993).  See also In Re Northern Dist. of
Cal.,Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 855 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Adequacy
of representation depends on the qualifications of counsel for the representatives, an absence
of antagonism, a sharing of interests between representatives and absentees, and the
unlikelihood that the suit is collusive.”); Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3rd Cir. 1994)
(explaining that adequacy of representation assures “that the attorneys for the class
representatives are experienced and qualified to prosecute the claims on behalf of the entire
class”).  This precondition also necessitates that a court focus on conflict of interest
concerns, which represent “[b]y far the greatest difficulty for the courts in assessing whether
attorneys are adequate representatives”  7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, § 1769.1, at
383 (citations omitted).
Before this Court, Petitioners do not attack the adequacy of the class representatives.
Instead, they claim that class counsel have a conflict of interest and that the Circuit Court
erred in finding that class counsel’s concurrent representation of the classes in this case and
the State of Maryland in a separate lawsuit against Petitioners is not adverse to either party.
-53-
  Although Petitioners have not pressed before us any inadequacy on the part of the
23
named class representatives in representing the classes as a whole, we think the underlying
rationale of the adequacy requirement found in Rule 2-231(a)(4) compels a court to conduct
a review, even an independent one if necessary, of the class representatives’ adequacy.  In
order to protect the interests of absent class member plaintiffs,  it cannot fairly be left to the
class defendants to be sufficiently vigilant in contesting the adequacy of the named
representatives.  We note that the Circuit Court fully addressed the adequacy requirement
in the present case, and can find no obvious reason to question the trial judge’s declaration
that “the Court is satisfied that no named plaintiffs’ claim will be antagonistic to any class
member’s claim; indeed, this Court accepts that the claims will be vigorously prosecuted on
behalf of their class,” (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 25).
  In pronouncing class counsel adequate to prosecute the instant case as a class
24
action, the Circuit Court stated:  “Lawyers from the Law Offices of [class counsel] have
appeared before this Court on numerous occasions regarding asbestos litigation.  In light of
(continued...)
Because some class members’ and the State’s interests allegedly collide on the issue of
medicaid expense reimbursement, according to Petitioners, class counsel are ethically barred
from proceeding any further in the instant litigation and therefore cannot possibly provide
adequate representation.  We note that the State of Maryland has at this point already entered
into a finalized settlement agreement with the tobacco companies, thus rendering Petitioners’
objection on this point moot.  See Agreed Dismissal Order, State v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
96122201/CL211487 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 1998) (acknowledging existence of
“Master Settlement Agreement,” noting court’s entry of “Consent Decree and Final
Judgment,” and ordering “all of the [State]’s claims against all defendants . . . dismissed with
prejudice”).  In light of this development, in light of the fact that Petitioners have made no
other challenge before this Court as to the adequacy of the class representatives or their
attorneys,  and in light of the reputation and experience of Respondents’ counsel,  we
23
24
-54-
(...continued)
24
counsel’s vast experience with complex litigation, this Court is satisfied that counsel’s
representation will be more than adequate.”  (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 24.)
believe that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that counsel would
adequately represent the classes.
F.  Predominance 
We must next determine whether questions of law or fact common to the members
of the classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.  “It is only
where . . . predominance exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action
device.”  Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 103.  This requirement is
critical to “the notion that the adjudication of common issues will help achieve judicial
economy.”  Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996).  See also
7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, § 1777, at 518-19 (stating that “the predominance test
really involves an attempt to achieve a balance between the value of allowing individual
actions to be instituted so that each person can protect his own interests and the economy that
can be achieved by allowing a multiple party dispute to be resolved on a class action basis”
(citations omitted)).
The predominance test does not require that common issues be dispositive of the
action or determinative of the liability issues.  See 1 NEWBERG, supra,§ 4.25, at 4-82.
Instead, courts should inquire into “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
-55-
warrant adjudication by representation.”  Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
623, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997).  In order to satisfy the predominance
test, “common issues must constitute a significant part of the individual cases.”  Jenkins v.
Raymark Industries, 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986).  See also Watson v. Shell Oil Co.,
979 F.2d 1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g granted, 990 F.2d 805 (1993), dismissed on
reh’g, 53 F.3d 663 (1994); Harding v. Tambrands, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 623, 629 (D. Kan. 1996)
(noting that the Tenth Circuit “focuses on whether the claims involve a common nucleus of
operative facts and whether material variations in the claims exist”).
Conflict of Laws
The first potentially “individual” issue we shall address is conflict of laws.  Petitioners
argue that the Circuit Court erred in determining that because the definition of the two
classes in the present case is limited to Maryland residents who have experienced the effects
of their injury or dependence in Maryland, only Maryland law will apply to all class
members.  Contrary to the Circuit Court’s determination, Petitioners contend that this
litigation will require an individual choice-of-law analysis for every member of the two
classes.  Respondents retort that the Circuit Court properly determined that there will be no
variations in state law at issue, because “it is abundantly clear that only Maryland law will
apply to the class[es], which by definition involve[] only individuals who suffered injury in
Maryland.”  (Opp’n to Pet. at 28.)  Before the Circuit Court, Respondents asserted that:
-56-
the logical conclusion of [Petitioners’] argument will be that
plaintiffs, even in individual cases, will be prevented from
asserting their claims against defendants in any forum, unless
they coincidentally reside in the state in which the “magical
moment of addiction” suggested by [Petitioners] took place.
Identifying the moment and place of addiction is irrelevant for
purposes of choice of law so long as all the class members
currently reside in the [State of] Maryland and experience the
effects of their nicotine addiction [in] Maryland.
(Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 37).
Maryland adheres to the lex loci delicti rule in analyzing choice of law problems with
respect to causes of action sounding in torts.  See Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123-25,
453 A.2d 1207, 1209-10 (1983); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 352, 223 A.2d 763, 765
(1966).  See also Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1990) (observing that
“Maryland, against what may be the general trend of latter times toward ‘significant
relationships’ analysis, appears rather steadfastly to have adhered to lex loci as the ordering
principle in tort cases”).  Lex loci delicti dictates that “when an accident occurs in another
state substantive rights of the parties, even though they are domiciled in Maryland, are to be
determined by the law of the state in which the alleged tort took place.”  White, 244 Md. at
352, 223 A.2d at 765.
The rule is fairly easy to apply when all of the events giving rise to a suit have
occurred in one state, as in a typical negligence action arising from an automobile accident.
Maryland courts would apply the substantive law of the place of the wrong, i.e., the forum
where the accident occurred.  The more difficult situation arises when the events giving rise
-57-
  As once explained by the Court of Special Appeals,
25
Because Maryland is among the few states that continue
to adhere to the traditional conflict of laws principle of lex loci
delicti, the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, while of
merely historical interest elsewhere, continues to provide
guidance for the determination of lex loci delicti questions in
Maryland.
Black v. Leatherwood, 92 Md. App. 27, 41, 606 A.2d 295, 301, cert. denied, 327 Md. 626,
612 A.2d 257 (1992).
to a suit occur in a number of states.  As a general rule, the place of the tort is considered to
be the place of injury.  As set out in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
1.  Except in the case of harm from poison, when a
person sustains bodily harm, the place of wrong is the place
where the harmful force takes effect upon the body.
*          *          *          *          *          *
2.  When a person causes another voluntarily to take a
deleterious substance which takes effect within the body, the
place of wrong is where the deleterious substance takes effect
and not where it is administered.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377, Notes 1 and 2, at 455-56 (1934).25
This Court has acknowledged that “the tort doctrine of lex loci delicti . . . requires a
tort action to be governed by the substantive law of the state where the wrong occurred.”
Hauch, 295 Md. at 123, 453 A.2d at 1209 (quoted in In re Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine Prods.
Liab. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 952, 954 (D. Md. 1991), aff’d, 984 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1993)).  See
also Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 511 (4th Cir. 1986) (explaining that
under Maryland conflict of law jurisprudence, “the law of the place of injury applies.  The
place of injury is the place where the injury was suffered, not where the wrongful act took
place.”  (Citation omitted)); Trahan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 505, 507
-58-
(M.D. Tenn. 1983) (“If the tortious act and resulting injury occur in different jurisdictions,
the law in Tennessee, as in most jurisdictions, is that the law of the state where injury was
suffered controls—not the law of the state where the wrongful act took place.”); ROBERT A.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 133, at 267 (3rd ed. 1977) (“Some acts . . . produce
impacts across state lines.  The orthodox rule, with torts as with crimes, is that when an act
operates across a state line its legal character is determined by the law of the place where it
first takes harmful effect or produces the result complained of.” (Footnotes omitted)).
The place of injury is also referred to as the place where the last act required to
complete the tort occurred.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (stating
that the “place of wrong is the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable
for an alleged tort takes place”); Farwell, 902 F.2d at 286 (explaining that, under the doctrine
of lex loci delicti, “the locus of a tort for choice of law purposes is that where the last act
required to complete it occurred”); Alexander v. General Motors Corp., 466 S.E.2d 607, 609
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that, under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, “in torts of a transitory
nature the place of the wrong is the place where the last event occurred necessary to make
an actor liable for the alleged tort”), rev’d on other grounds, 478 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 1996);
Richard W. Bourne, Modern Maryland Conflicts:  Backing into the Twentieth Century One
Hauch at a Time, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 71, 77 (1993) (noting that “in tort cases, Maryland
applies lex loci delicti, which it construes as meaning the law of the place where the last
event giving rise to a right to recovery occurred” (footnotes omitted)); HERBERT F.
GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93, at 263-64 (3d ed. 1949) (“The tort
-59-
  In direct response to Petitioners’ contention that significant choice of law problems
26
militated against granting Respondents’ Motion for Class Certification, the Circuit Court
stated more fully:
In this case, [Petitioners] have substantial business
contacts in Maryland and [each] class is limited by the class
definition which provides that only Maryland residents who
have experienced the effects of their injury/dependence in this
state, may qualify as class members.  In any event, the state
where the initial exposure to [Petitioners]’ products took place
is of little significance in relation to the alleged harm suffered
by Maryland residents.  Therefore, only the law of Maryland
will apply to all class members.
(Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 42.)
is complete only when the harm takes place, for this is the last event necessary to make the
actor liable for the tort.”).
We now turn to the application of Maryland’s lex loci delicti rule to the litigation at
issue.  We cannot say, nor could the Circuit Court, that absent individualized inquiry on the
part of the trial court, Maryland law would apply to each entire class.  The Circuit Court
simply misapplied the law in determining in blanket fashion that “only the law of Maryland
will apply to all class members,” (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 42).   Quite the opposite, our
26
conflict of law principles necessitate that the Circuit Court engage in individualized
assessments for each class member.  Cf. Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610,
627 (3rd Cir. 1996) (recognizing that a federal court, considering a motion for a nationwide
class certification, “must apply an individualized choice of law analysis to each plaintiff’s
claims” (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2980,
-60-
86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985))), aff’d sub nom., Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997).
Unlike in perhaps most single-event disasters, in long term exposure cases such as
tobacco usage, events giving rise to a cause of action may occur in many different states.  See
 Geiger v. American Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 345, 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (stating that
a “tobacco case does not involve a mass tort arising from a single accident or catastrophic
event”).  Clearly, a person may be exposed to tobacco in one state, experience manifestations
of disease in another state, and be diagnosed with an illness in yet another state.  Take, for
example, the case of a person who used tobacco products in a particular state, initially
suffered the effects of illness in another state, was diagnosed with a tobacco-related disease
or diseases in a different state, and subsequently moved to Maryland.  That person would fall
within the class definition approved by the Circuit Court as a “Maryland resident[] as of the
date of class notice who [has] suffered, presently suffer[s], or who [has] died of diseases,
medical conditions, and injury (while a resident of Maryland) caused by smoking cigarettes
or using smokeless tobacco products that contain nicotine,” (Circuit Court Class Certification
Order at 1).  In that scenario, Maryland, however, could not qualify as the “place of wrong,”
“place of injury,” or the place where “the last act giving rise to the cause of action” occurred.
The only connection between that person and Maryland would be residency at the time of
class notice.
Respondents also claim nicotine dependence, or addiction, as an injury in and of
itself.  The second class certified by the Circuit Court includes “[a]ll nicotine dependent
-61-
  The verbatim definition of a “nicotine dependent” person, set out by the Circuit
27
Court in its Class Certification Order, is reproduced in the text supra accompanying note 3.
persons in Maryland who have purchased and used cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products manufactured by the Defendant Tobacco Companies,” (Circuit Court Class
Certification Order at 2).  As indicated earlier, for purposes of the present litigation, a
nicotine dependent person is one who either (1) has been medically diagnosed as such, (2)
has regularly smoked more than fifteen cigarettes per day for at least three years and has
made at least one unsuccessful effort to quit smoking, or (3) has been a regular daily user of
smokeless tobacco products for at least three years and has made at least one unsuccessful
effort to quit using smokeless tobacco.   Given these criteria, the alleged injury-in-fact,
27
nicotine dependence or addiction, clearly may have occurred in a state other than Maryland.
Simply because a person remains addicted in Maryland does not mean that such a person
suffers a “new” injury of addiction every day that person resides in Maryland.  Such an
interpretation, as in the previous hypothetical, would erroneously render “place of injury”
equivalent to “place of residency.”  In Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379 (D.
Kan. 1998), the United States District Court for the District of Kansas recognized such
difficulties in refusing to certify a class of Kansas smokers:
In order to avoid choice of law concerns that raised problems in
other actions involving certification of mass torts, plaintiffs
attempt to limit members of the class to persons whose claims
are properly disposed of under Kansas law. . . . Kansas adheres
to lex loci delicti which provides that the place of the law of the
state where the tort occurred applies.  A tort occurs where the
injury occurs.
-62-
  These difficulties are compounded by the fact that neither this court nor the Court
28
of Special Appeals has had occasion to discuss the impact of lex loci delicti on some of the
tort causes of action.  See Banca Cremi v. Brown, 955 F. Supp. 499, 522 (D. Md. 1997) (“It
appears that Maryland courts have not yet specifically spoken as to the issue of where the
‘wrong’ occurs in cases of pecuniary injury resulting from fraud [or] negligent
misrepresentation . . . when the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred in one jurisdiction
and the ‘loss’ by plaintiff in another jurisdiction.”), aff’d, 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997).
Further, lex loci delicti will apply only to the tort claims (fraud and deceit, negligent
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence).  Respondents
allege other causes of action that would implicate additional choice-of-law doctrine.  See
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976) (applying Maryland
law imposing secondary liability for design defect in breach of warranty claim where car was
sold in Maryland, although accident occurred in North Carolina); Volkswagen of America
v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220, 321 A.2d 737, 747 (1974) (reiterating that the “general rule, to
which we adhere, is that ‘the law of the place of the sale determines the extent and effect of
the warranties which attend the sale’” (quoting Schultz v. Tecumseh Products, 310 F.2d 426,
428 (6th Cir. 1962))).  See also Smith v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp, 174 F.R.D.
90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (“[I]t is possible that different [states’] laws will apply to the
(continued...)
Plaintiffs overlook the difficulty involved in determining
if class members’ injuries “occurred” in Kansas.  For instance,
plaintiffs’ broadest class injury alleged is addiction.  To
determine if this injury occurred in Kansas, a conclusion would
have to be reached as to each member that they [sic] became
addicted to cigarettes in Kansas.  Only after such consideration
is it possible to determine whether each person can be admitted
to the class.  The process would involve a hearing for every
potential plaintiff because defendants would have the right to
cross-examine each person about his or her smoking history.
This task is unimaginably difficult considering the individual
inquiry required to determine addiction.
Id. at 393-94 (citations and footnote omitted).  See also Smith v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (noting that even though plaintiff did
not seek certification of nationwide class, class of Missouri citizens allegedly injured by
Brown & Williamson cigarettes would “still be governed by a myriad of [states’] laws”).28
-63-
(...continued)
28
different claims asserted by a single claimant:  for instance, it may be that one state’s laws
will apply to a person’s breach of warranty claims while another state’s laws apply to that
individual’s strict liability claims.”).
Additional Individual Issues
Also tipping the scales of the predominance inquiry against Respondents is the legal
nature of their common law claims of fraud and deceit and negligent misrepresentation, and
their statutory cause of action under various provisions of the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act.  The unsuitability of such claims for class action treatment arises from the burden placed
on Respondents of proving individual reliance upon Petitioners’ alleged misrepresentations
and material omissions regarding (1) the addictive nature of nicotine; (2) the adverse health
effects of tobacco usage; (3) Petitioners’ knowledge of and research concerning the addictive
nature of nicotine and the adverse health effects of tobacco usage; (4) Petitioners’
manipulation of nicotine levels and the bio-availability of nicotine in tobacco products; and
(5) Petitioners’ intent to addict consumers to tobacco usage.
Concerning the propriety of prosecuting a civil fraud claim as a class action, the
Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments of Federal Rule 23 counsels as follows:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class
action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is
found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by
individuals within the class.  On the other hand, although having
some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment
as a class action if there was material variation in the
representations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by
the persons to whom they were addressed.
-64-
  Respondents appear to be pursuing two interrelated yet separate theories of fraud,
29
the first consisting of the allegation that Petitioners intentionally misrepresented the harmful
effects born from tobacco usage, the addictive nature of nicotine, and Petitioners’
manipulation of nicotine levels in their tobacco products.  The second charge of “fraud”
pleaded by Respondents involves not any misrepresentation by Petitioners per se but rather
a type of fraudulent behavior:
Defendants knew or acted with reckless indifference to
the fact that nicotine was addictive, defendants manipulated the
amount of nicotine levels and/or the bio-availability of nicotine
in the tobacco products, and defendants intended to addict
cigarette smokers but refrained from disclosing the facts to
cigarette smokers, for the purpose of inducing them to purchase
tobacco products, thus causing Plaintiffs to incur injury and
(continued...)
Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 103 (emphasis added).  In light of
these concerns, we conclude that reliance is another issue unique to each putative class
member, thus adding extra weight to the predominance of individual over common questions
and further rendering the present litigation unfit for class action treatment.
Success in Maryland on a civil claim of fraud requires proof of reliance.  As this
Court has frequently reiterated,
In order to recover damages in an action for fraud or
deceit, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant made a false
representation to the plaintiff, (2) that its falsity was either
known to the defendant or that the representation was made with
reckless indifference as to its truth, (3) that the
misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the
plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation
and had the right to rely on it, and (5) that the plaintiff suffered
compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation.
Nails v. S & R, Inc., 334 Md. 398, 415, 639 A.2d 660, 668 (1994) (emphasis added) (citing
eleven cases dating back to 1872).29
-65-
(...continued)
29
damages.
(Pls.’ 4th Am. Compl. at ¶ 243).  In apparent reference to this second type of “fraud,”
Respondents argue to this Court that the reliance element normally required of a civil claim
of fraud is essentially excused:
[I]n many cases, plaintiffs must prove reliance and/or specific
causation on an individual basis.  This case, however, includes
allegations of a far more insidious nature: that defendants’ acts
of manipulating and/or controlling nicotine in their cigarettes
through the secret use of additives such as ammonia and
acetaldehyde are a substantial -- though hidden factor -- in
causing nicotine addicted customers to continue to purchase
their cigarettes.  Therefore, it is . . . [un]necessary to prove that
each individual plaintiff purchased cigarettes in “reliance on” or
“because of” their nicotine addiction . . . .
*          *          *          *          *          *
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that the defendants
intentionally engineered their products to make them deliver
more nicotine “impact” without increasing the amounts of
nicotine in their products.  This is a fraudulent/deceptive act
common to all defendants, which physically affected all users.
Under these facts, reliance/causation need not be proven on an
individual basis: rather, it can be established for all smokers
based on scientific testimony on the effects on the human body
of nicotine enhanced by additives such as ammonia and
acetaldehyde. 
(Opp’n to Pet. at 25-26.)
Respondents, understandably, have cited no Maryland authority for their proposition
that proof of reliance is excused.  For, what Respondents ignore is that central not only to
the reliance element in a civil claim of fraud in this State but to the very tort itself is that
there have been some sort of misrepresentation by the defendant to the plaintiff, i.e. some
communication or material omission which the plaintiff relied upon and which caused him
or her injury.  It is incorrect, therefore, to refer to the reliance Respondents concede is
ordinarily required of a fraud claim as “‘reliance on’ . . . nicotine addiction.”  Id. at 25.
What Respondents have pleaded as an alternative basis for their claim of fraud, the
purposeful and undisclosed manipulation of nicotine levels resulting in (1) their addiction,
(2) their concomitant uncontrolled purchase and use of harmful tobacco products, or (3) their
suffering from disease or injury, may perhaps constitute instead an intentional personal tort
(continued...)
-66-
(...continued)
29
such as battery, a cause of action which truly does contain no required proof of any reliance
whatsoever on the part of the plaintiff(s).  See Saba v. Darling, 320 Md. 45, 49, 575 A.2d
1240, 1242 (1990) (“A battery has been defined as a harmful or offensive contact with a
person resulting from an act intended to cause the person such contact.” (Citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965))).  Even were such a claim cognizable and
properly pleaded, it can neither change nor cure the fact that several causes of action actually
asserted by Respondents, including their claim of fraud and deceit, require not only proof of
reliance but proof of such on an individual basis.
The common law tort of negligent misrepresentation likewise incorporates reliance
as an element of proof.  See Sheets v. Brethren Mutual, 342 Md. 634, 656-57, 679 A.2d 540,
551 (1996) (repeating that included within the prima facie elements of the tort of negligent
misrepresentation in Maryland are that “the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will
probably rely on the [defendant’s negligently asserted false] statement, which, if erroneous,
will cause loss or injury” and that “the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the
statement” (quoting Gross v. Sussex, 332 Md. 247, 259, 630 A.2d 1156, 1162 (1993))).
Reliance by consumers would also seem to be a necessary precondition to awarding
restitution or damages pursuant to the statutory consumer protection provisions pleaded by
Respondents.  See Luskin’s v. Consumer Protection, 353 Md. 335, 386, 726 A.2d 702, 727
(1999); Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304 Md. 731, 781, 501 A.2d 48, 74 (1985)
(holding in case of agency-initiated action that blanket order of automatic restitution to all
consumers was improper because restitution to particular purchasers was appropriate only
after verification of actual reliance by those purchasers on company’s misleading or
-67-
  See synopses of class representatives’ depositions supra pp. 49-51.
30
  The case law and academic authority cited by Respondents for the proposition that
31
the existence of the admittedly individual issue of reliance should not preclude class
certification, see Opp’n to Pet. at 23-24, while failing on their own to persuade us, are,
moreover, factually distinguishable and inapposite from the circumstances at hand.  Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977, 89 S. Ct. 2131
(1969), involved 2200 stockholders in a federal securities fraud class action lawsuit while
In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litig., 802 F. Supp. 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), likewise concerned
a securities fraud class action, for “at least thousands” of stock purchasers, see In re Crazy
Eddie Securities Litig., 135 F.R.D. 39, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).  These cases simply didn’t
involve the exorbitant size of the possible class membership in this case.
In re College Bound Consol. Litig., 93 Civ. 2348 (MBM), 1994 WL 236163, 1994
(continued...)
deceptive advertisements); Consumer Protection v. Outdoor World, 91 Md. App. 275, 291,
603 A.2d 1376, 1383 (1992) (stating that “actual restitution may not be ordered in the
absence of some evidence that the individual purchaser was deceived by and relied upon the
offending communication”).
One need only read the depositions of the named class representatives to recognize
that reliance will vary from plaintiff to plaintiff.   Prospective class members may have
30
heard or read some, all or none of the misrepresentations allegedly made by Petitioners.
Moreover, in making the decision to purchase and use Petitioners’ tobacco products, each
member may have relied heavily, slightly or not at all on the various, arguably deceitful
sales pitches, multimedia denials and assertions, and otherwise public claims of Petitioners
with respect to their tobacco products.  Such individual discrepancies obviously cannot be
glossed over at trial on a classwide basis but must be allowed to be delved into by
Petitioners, class member by class member.31
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(...continued)
31
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7074 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1994), was another securities fraud class action
lawsuit, yet of truly grand proportions as the putative plaintiffs numbered perhaps millions.
See id. at *2, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7074 at *7.  The case is distinguishable, nevertheless,
because the court explicitly refrained from determining whether the issue of reliance had to
be proven individually or could be tried en masse or by subclasses.  See id. at *4, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7074 at *13-14.  In the instant lawsuit, as we have explained, reliance is clearly
an individual issue given the undeniable diversity of the potential class pool with respect to
geographical distribution during various periods, time period of tobacco usage, age, receipt
of or attention to none or all of the alleged misrepresentations by Petitioners, among other
factors.  The case of In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3rd Cir. 1995), also encompassed an inordinate number of plaintiffs,
some six million truck owners nationwide, in a products liability class action settlement
approved by the trial court that the appellate court nevertheless ultimately rejected.  We do
not place much credence in the opinion’s declaration that “individualized issues such as
damages or reliance . . . do not ordinarily preclude the use of the class action device,” id. at
817.  The context of that statement embodied the appellate court’s outline of creative
approaches to class certification that might be considered on remand with respect to the
difficult yet solvable problem of the individualized nature of damages in that case.  The cited
principle, therefore, lacks probative value as to the distinct problem of reliance faced in this
case.
Finally, although a leading treatise on civil practice in another state asserts that “[i]f
there is a reasonable expectation that most members of the class relied on the [defendants’]
representations, then class-wide reliance may be presumed for purposes of class
certification,” 3 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ¶ 901.12,
at 9-56 (1999), such an expectation cannot reasonably be assigned to the putative class
members in the present case on account of the dissimilarities highlighted above.
Even more uncommon issues abound in this case.  For instance, whether an individual
is “dependent” on or “addicted” to nicotine, aside from the concomitant choice of law
problems discussed earlier, is an issue that would need to be evaluated on an individual basis.
See Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 161 F.3d
127 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied,    U.S.    , 119 S. Ct. 1760 (1999); see also Emig v.
American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 389 (D. Kan. 1998).  Furthermore, to establish a
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cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Respondents must establish
that emotional distress is “severe,” thus requiring individual assessments.  See Caldor v.
Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 625 A.2d 959 (1993).  Affirmative defenses will also come into play,
with Petitioners alleging assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and, where the
“place of wrong” for a particular plaintiff occurred in one of certain other states, comparative
negligence.  On the issue of causation, Respondents argue that “injury in fact” causation
focuses on the effects of Petitioners’ conduct on each class as a whole and may be proved
on a classwide basis.  We have serious doubts, given each of the legal claims of
Respondents, that the issue of causation will not need to be decided at some point as to each
individual class member.  See Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535, 546 (W.D. Wis.
1998) (“Causation remains one of the more formidable issues not subject to general proof.”);
Barnes, 161 F.3d at 135 (“The resolution of this ‘general causation question’ would
accomplish nothing for any of the individual plaintiffs.”); Smith v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (“‘[A] finding of “general causation”
would do little to advance this litigation.’  Liability will not turn on whether cigarettes are
generally capable of causing disease:  liability will depend upon whether cigarettes caused
a particular plaintiff’s disease.”  (Quoting Harding v. Tambrands Inc., 165 F.R.D. 623, 630
(D. Kan. 1996)) (other citations omitted)); In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d
145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The relevant question . . . is not whether Agent Orange has the
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  Petitioners argue that another individual issue is whether the statute of limitations
32
has run on particular class members’ claims.  Respondents reply that
this issue will be resolved in whole, or in significant part, by the
presentation of evidence regarding [Petitioners’] fraudulent
concealment of their knowledge regarding the addictiveness of
nicotine.  If [Respondents] prevail on this common claim,
[Petitioners] may be equitably estopped from relying on the
statute of limitations in all cases and individual issues relating
to this defense will not arise at all.
*          *          *          *          *          *
Furthermore, the class trial may also be able to determine
when -- if ever -- an ordinary Maryland consumer should have
been on notice of the existence of the claims alleged herein --
i.e. that [Petitioners] know nicotine is addictive and nevertheless
control and manipulate the nicotine in their cigarettes with the
known effect of causing and/or maintaining addiction, and that
[Petitioners] use chemical additives in their cigarettes in order
to enhance nicotine delivery -- thus establishing a common time
for the running of applicable statutes of limitation.
(Opp’n to Pet. at 27-28.)
On this issue, we agree with the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico that our decision to command the Circuit Court to decertify the classes “render[s] it
unnecessary to reach the contentious statute of limitations issue.”  Barreras Ruiz v. American
Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 199 (D.P.R. 1998).  For cases analyzing the effect of statute
of limitations issues on the predominance requirement in class action lawsuits, see Barnes
v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 149 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995); Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379,
391 (D. Kan. 1998); Dhamer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 183 F.R.D. 520, 532-33 (N.D. Ill.
1998); Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 694 N.E.2d 442, 457 (Ohio 1998); E & V Slack, Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 969 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
capacity to cause harm, the generic causation issue, but whether it did cause harm and to
whom.  That determination is highly individualistic . . . .”).32
Predominance case law in other jurisdictions
The predominance inquiry has proven to be the downfall of many mass tort class
actions.  Our concerns that individual issues would predominate over common issues in this
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litigation are mirrored in the United States Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on
class actions, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 689 (1997).  Amchem involved a national asbestos class action lawsuit in which the
Third Circuit had decertified the class because common issues did not predominate over
individual issues.  The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that “an overarching dispute about
the health consequences,” id. at 624, 117 S. Ct. at 2250, of exposure to a potentially harmful
product does not suffice for purposes of the predominance requirement of Federal Rule
23(b)(3) in the face of significant issues peculiar to individual class members:
“Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and
over different periods.  Some class members suffer no physical
injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others
suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from
mesothelioma . . . .  Each has a different history of cigarette
smoking, a factor that complicates the causation injury.”
Id., 117 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626-27
(3rd Cir. 1996)) (ellipsis in Supreme Court’s Amchem opinion).  See also Note,
Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336, 1344-45
(1999).  The Supreme Court went on to note that differences in state law compound these
disparities, and then observed:
No settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling
as this one.  Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases
alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the
antitrust laws.  Even mass tort cases arising from a common
cause or disaster may, depending upon the circumstances,
satisfy the predominance requirement.  The Advisory
Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that
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“mass accident” cases are likely to present “significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of
liability, . . . affecting the individuals in different ways.”  And
the Committee advised that such cases are “ordinarily not
appropriate” for class treatment.  But the text of the Rule does
not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class
certification, and District Courts, since the late 1970's, have
been certifying such cases in increasing number.  The
Committee’s warning, however, continues to call for caution
when individual stakes are high and disparities among class
members great.  As the Third Circuit’s opinion makes plain, the
certification in this case does not follow the counsel of caution.
That certification cannot be upheld, for it rests on a conception
of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement irreconcilable
with the Rule’s design.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25, 117 S. Ct. at 2250 (citations omitted) (ellipsis in Amchem).
The Fifth Circuit, in perhaps the seminal case involving mass tort tobacco litigation,
heralded a similar proclamation directly relevant to this same issue in the present case:
The class members were exposed to nicotine through different
products, for different amounts of time, and over different time
periods.  Each class member’s knowledge about the effects of
smoking differs, and each plaintiff began smoking for different
reasons.  Each of these factual differences impacts the
application of legal rules such as causation, reliance,
comparative fault, and other affirmative defenses.
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742-43 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1996).  See also
Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that “under
Texas law causation must be determined as to individuals, not groups” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).  Cf. Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 488-89
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that question of causation of actual rather than merely potential
addiction “is highly individualized and does not lend itself to Rule 23(b)(2) certification”).
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While both Castano and Amchem involved nationwide class actions, these same
problems of predominant individual issues have arisen in statewide class actions.  For
example, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri refused to certify a class of
Missouri smokers defined as “[a]ll persons in the State of Missouri who have suffered
personal injury as a result of smoking cigarettes designed, manufactured or sold by Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Company . . . .”  Smith v. Brown & Williamson, 174 F.R.D. 90, 92
(W.D. Mo. 1997).  That court stated that
a separate inquiry will be required to determine which state’s
substantive laws will govern.  In the case of a life-long Missouri
resident, it seems clear that Missouri law would apply.  In the
case of a resident of another state who stopped smoking before
moving to Missouri, it seems clear that Missouri law would not
apply.  In the case of a person (like Plaintiff) who began
smoking in another state and then moved to Missouri, the choice
of law inquiry will vary with the circumstances.  It is
inconceivable that [Missouri] law will apply to all members of
the class; in fact, it is possible that different [states’] laws will
apply to the different claims asserted by a single claimant: for
instance, it may be that one state’s laws will apply to a person’s
breach of warranty claims while another state’s laws apply to
that individual’s strict liability claims.
Ultimately, it is clear that Missouri law will not apply to
all of the class members’ claims.  Thus, although Plaintiff does
not seek certification of a nationwide class, the claims presented
by the proposed class will still be governed by a myriad of
[states’] laws.  The wide variety of state laws that must be
applied diminishes the common issues and prevents them from
predominating.
Id. at 95-96.  See Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) (Reed I) (refusing to certify a similar class of District of Columbia
tobacco users); see also Barreras Ruiz v. American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 197
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(D.P.R. 1998) (noting that “[a]lthough the proposed class would number in the hundreds of
thousands rather than Castano’s fifty million cigarette smokers, such a class nonetheless
would present unprecedented challenges to the fundamental notion of commonality
underlying a class action”); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 498 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (deciding to decertify class of Pennsylvania smokers because “it is obvious that this
action implicates far too many individual issues to proceed on a class-wide basis”), aff’d, 161
F.3d 127 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied,    U.S.    , 119 S. Ct. 1760 (1999); Reed v. Philip
Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. (D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 1999) (Reed II) (refusing
to certify reduced class of District of Columbia tobacco users).
Our analysis of the extent of the individual issues involved in this litigation leads us
to conclude that individual issues overwhelmingly predominate over common issues.  See
Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 94 (“Resolution of the common issues in this case will not promote
judicial economy; in fact, in light of the individual issues a class action in this case will
create judicial diseconomy.”).  We agree with the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, which, in rejecting class certification for Pennsylvania smokers,
held that “the individual issues raised not only predominate over the common issues but
overwhelm the common issues” Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 486.
The seeming collective lynchpin of the Circuit Court’s finding of predominance of
common issues in the instant litigation is “that the common questions regarding [Petitioners’]
conduct and knowledge . . . are at the core of all of [Respondents’] liability claims,” (Cir. Ct.
Mem. Op. at 37), that the jury’s assessment of “any one of these issues may potentially be
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dispositive of the entire [lawsuit],” id. at 32, and that “if [Petitioners] prevail in the
adjudication of the significant common questions, the case is concluded,” id. at 33 (footnote
omitted).  The crucial flaw with the Circuit Court’s narrowing of the predominance analysis
in this fashion was aptly explicated in a recent Michigan decision, Taylor v. American
Tobacco Co., No. 97 715975 NP, slip op. (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000).
There the trial court denied class certification of a tobacco lawsuit in which plaintiffs relied
in part on the Circuit Court’s opinion below, which the court discredited as follows:
[T]he rationale of courts that have certified tobacco personal
injury suits as class actions, such as Richardson . . . , relies
heavily on the premise that an adverse ruling on certain common
foundational issues would result in dismissal of the entire case.
But missing from their analysis is any detailed explanation
whether common questions would predominate if the common
questions are resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.  While
acknowledging that resolution of the common questions in
plaintiffs’ favor will not dispose of the case, it seems that they
give little attention to the predominance question as it would be
affected after the resolution of one or more common questions
in favor of the plaintiffs.
Id. at 10-11.
In a District of Columbia tobacco lawsuit strikingly similar to the present one, see
Reed I, after the trial court initially denied their motion for class certification, the
representative plaintiffs purposefully excised certain, problematic causes of action from their
complaint—claims that remain in the case now before this Court—in an effort to reduce the
number of individualized issues, satisfy the predominance requirement and therefore,
arguably, render their litigation suitable for class action treatment.  See Reed II, slip op. at
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  The Circuit Court found “that while the individual issues may quantitatively out
33
number the common issues, qualitatively, the common issues outweigh the individual issues
in terms of their scope and complexity.”  (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 32.)
4.  The trial court deemed the maneuver futile, however, and ruled that the absence of claims
of fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation and breach of express warranty was
insufficient to tip the scales in the favor of class action certification:
The Court concurs that a large portion of [Plaintiffs’]
claim is based upon the Defendants’ conduct in making and
marketing cigarettes.  Plaintiffs also are accurate that many
common issues exist.  Nonetheless, even with the changes to
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, too many individualized issues exist, such
as injury-in-fact, addiction, causation and reliance, and
individual defenses, which preclude this Court from finding that
common issues predominate over individual issues.
Reed II, slip op. at 30-31.  It is equally clear the Circuit Court should have come to a like
conclusion in the present case:  class certification is simply not appropriate in the face of so
many individualized, significant issues despite the purported “qualitative” force of the less
numerous common questions.33
G.  Superiority
In addition to predominance, the Circuit Court must find that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.  As the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia ruled within the past year, “[B]efore a class
maybe certified, it must be shown that a class action is the superior method for resolving the
conflict; in other words, it must be the most efficient means of adjudicating the matter.”
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Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. at 34 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 1999)
(Reed II).  See also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Where classwide litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote
greater efficiency, a class action may be superior to other methods of litigation.”).  In
accordance with Rule 2-231(b)(3), pertinent to the court’s findings are (1) the interests of
members of each class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions, (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of each class, (3) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and (4) the difficulties likely
to be encountered in the management of a class action.  This list is non-exhaustive.  See
Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 104; 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 4.28, at 4-
113.
As to the first factor, the greater the individuals’ stakes in the litigation, the greater
their interest in controlling their own actions in individual litigation.  See Emig v. American
Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 393 (D. Kan. 1998).  In this action, the representative
plaintiffs claim in excess of $500,000 in compensatory damages, as well as $1,000,000 in
punitive damages, for each class member.  See Johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 26 Md.
App. 122, 129, 337 A.2d 210, 214 (1975) (“Although in some circumstances the class action
may be an important public interest device, in others it contravenes the more traditional
notions of an individual’s jurisprudential rights.”).  We find it relevant and compelling that
individual plaintiffs historically have often been unable to finance a claim against the tobacco
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companies.  We note, however, that individuals may have enormous stakes in individual
tobacco litigation.  See, e.g., Charles Haddad, Why Big Tobacco Can’t Be Killed, BUSINESS
WEEK, Apr. 24, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7825958 (reporting on Florida jury’s finding
tobacco industry liable to three plaintiffs and their survivors for compensatory damages of
almost seven million dollars, and noting trial victories by three individual plaintiff smokers
in separate California and Oregon cases during previous eighteen months resulting in jury
awards totaling more than seventy million dollars).  We are also cognizant that several courts
have discredited prospective tobacco class action plaintiffs’ assertions that individual suits
are infeasible.  See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 n. 25 (5th Cir.
1996) (calling plaintiffs’ claims of resource disparity “overstated”); Reed v. Philip Morris
Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 at *12 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) (Reed I)
(commenting that “there does not appear to be any shortage of attorneys willing to undertake
tobacco litigation” and attributing lack of individual tobacco lawsuits to possibility that
“individuals are not filing claims because they feel they have no compensable injury, that
they have no desire to quit smoking, or that they feel personally responsible for any condition
from which they may suffer because they made a choice to smoke”).
The second factor focuses upon the extent and nature of litigation concerning the
controversy that has already been commenced.  This evaluation “is aimed at determining
whether there is so much pre-existing litigation that a class would be unproductive . . . .”
Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628, 640 (D.S.C. 1992), aff’d,
6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1993).  Similarly, reviewing whether other litigation of the same type
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is currently pending “is intended to serve the purpose of assuring judicial economy and
reducing the possibility of multiple lawsuits.”  7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, §1780,
at 568-69.  To our knowledge, and according to the parties, there are very few, if any,
individual tobacco cases currently pending in Maryland courts.  Hence, there hardly exists
any “risk of inconsistent adjudication or multiplicity of actions at this point.”  Emig, 184
F.R.D. at 393.  Nor does there appear to be any “impending explosion of injury-as-addiction
[or other tobacco-related] claims that would justify certification of the action.”  Id.
Third, a court considering class certification must appraise the desirability of
permitting the litigation concerning the present controversy to be concentrated in one forum.
Professors Wright, Miller and Kane explain this factor in the following way:
This factor embodies basically two considerations.  First, a court
must evaluate whether allowing a Rule 23(b)(3) action to
proceed will prevent the duplication of effort and the possibility
of inconsistent results. . . .
The other consideration . . . is whether the forum chosen
for the class action represents an appropriate place to settle the
controversy, given the location of the interested parties, the
availability of witnesses and evidence, and the condition of the
court’s calendar.
7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, §1780, at 572-73 (citations omitted).  The present
lawsuit was filed as a class action, on behalf of Maryland residents, in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, a court that has had extensive experience with mass tort lawsuits, namely in
the asbestos litigation.  See generally ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 116
(1995).  If this litigation were to proceed as a class action, the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City would be as able and appropriate a forum as any Maryland has to offer, especially in
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light of the large numbers of Maryland residents who might become involved as plaintiffs
and the geographically diverse roll of defendants.
Finally, the Circuit Court need assess the manageability of the lawsuit as a class
action.  In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2146, 40 L. Ed.
2d 732 (1974), the Supreme Court explained that “this consideration encompasses the whole
range of practical problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for a
particular suit.”  As previously discussed, the individual issues in this case would necessitate
potentially hundreds of thousands of somewhat extensive individual trials.  Such a trial plan
hardly promotes judicial economy.  Instead, it renders the presently proposed class litigation
unmanageable in much the same way as other courts have concluded.  See Emig, 184 F.R.D.
at 393 (ruling that plaintiffs’ proposed trifurcated trial plan, virtually identical to
Respondents’ plan approved by the Circuit Court, would “not further judicial economy
because it would necessarily require some type of individual trial for every class member and
would greatly complicate the management of the class action”); Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
160 F.R.D. 667, 681 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (“This action would very likely require an individual
hearing for each plaintiff regarding choice of law, another individual hearing regarding
causation, and still another regarding damages.  This scenario is hardly the picture of judicial
economy envisioned by Rule 23.”); In Re Northern Dist. of Cal.,Dalkon Shield IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The few issues that might be tried on a class
basis in this case, balanced against issues that must be tried individually, indicate that the
time saved by a class action may be relatively insignificant.”).
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We also note the difficulties of managing a class action when dealing with an
“immature tort.”  This notion, and its applicability to the instant case, can be no better
explicated than as by the court in Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa.
1997), a little less than three years ago:
Another compelling factor that militates against a finding
of superiority is that there does not exist “a prior track record of
trials from which [this Court] can draw the information
necessary to make the . . . superiority analysis required by Rule
23.”  [Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,] 747
[(5th Cir. 1996)].  The Castano court stated that “the
certification of an immature tort results in a higher than normal
risk that the class action may not be superior to individual
adjudication.”  Id.  As in Castano, this Court concludes that the
lack of a prior track record of trials in these types of cases
makes it practically impossible to draw information necessary
to make the superiority analysis.
Plaintiffs argue that the “immature tort” theory should
not apply in this case because they proceed on well-established
causes of action.  As an initial matter, the Court questions
plaintiffs’ characterization with respect to the maturity of the
causes of action on which they proceed.  Plaintiffs’ medical
monitoring claim and putative intentional exposure to a
hazardous substance claim are relatively new causes of action
if you consider the history of the development of tort law.
Based just on the relative “maturity” of these particular causes
of action, the Court could determine that these torts are
immature.  The concept of the immature tort however goes far
beyond this simplistic analysis.
In the context of Rule 23(b)(3), the immature tort theory
has a much broader meaning [than] its mere name would
suggest.  The immature tort can refer to a new cause of action,
or an old cause of action applied to a new situation.  See Id. at
737;  see also Recent Case, Class Certification of Mass
Torts—Fifth Circuit Decertifies Nationwide Tobacco Class :
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 110 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 980
(1997) (opining on the wide variety of meanings that “immature
tort” may encompass).  For example, in Castano, the cause of
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action was not novel;  indeed, the Castano plaintiffs proceeded
on the ordinary claim that a fraudulent failure to disclose
material information resulted in injury to plaintiffs.
The immature nature of the Castano plaintiffs’ claim
arose out of the fact that the plaintiffs were applying old causes
of action to a new situation.  The new situation was what the
Castano court called the “addiction-as-injury” theory of
liability.  In Castano, plaintiffs were claiming that defendants’
conduct caused them to become addicted to cigarettes, thus
exposing them to the enhanced risk of contracting smoking-
related diseases.  This theory of liability was “novel”.  Indeed,
at the time of Castano, no United States Court had ever tried a
tobacco suit based on plaintiffs’ theory of liability.  Because of
the novelty of this theory and the lack of prior track record, the
court was unable to draw on any information to make its
superiority analysis.
In this case, plaintiffs allege that they proceed on a
different theory of liability.  However, a close reading of
plaintiffs’ amended complaint indicates that plaintiffs proceed
on almost the same theory of liability as did the Castano
plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs’ theory of liability directly relies on
their being able to prove that cigarettes are addictive, that the
class members are addicted, that the defendants knew that the
cigarettes were addictive, that despite this knowledge defendants
targeted children with advertising for the sole purpose of
addicting them, and that defendants’ actions were undertaken
with the full knowledge that cigarettes contained carcinogens
which caused disease.  In sum, addiction is central to plaintiffs’
theory of liability.
Applying the immature tort theory to this case, the Court
finds that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate superiority in this case.
The superiority analysis requires a balancing of the merits of the
class action against those “alternative available methods,”
namely individual trials in this case.  See Georgine [v. Amchem
Products, Inc.], 83 F.3d [610,] 632 [(3rd Cir. 1996)].  Any
attempt to make a superiority determination in the absence of a
prior track record of individual trials is necessarily based on
speculation.  See Castano, 84 F.3d at 748.
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  We concur with the assessment of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
34
that the jury verdict for the plaintiffs at the conclusion of Phase I in the case of Engle v. R.
J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 (Dade County, Fla. Cir. Ct. 11th Jud. Ct. July 7,
1999), does not affect the immaturity of mass tobacco tort litigation.  See Reed v. Philip
Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. at 39 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 1999) (Reed II).  Nor
does the more recent jury award of compensatory damages to the Engle class plaintiffs alter
(continued...)
Id. at 494-95 (footnote omitted) (ellipsis in Arch).  See also Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 394 (“The
court’s concern would be lessened if there was a prior track record of individual litigation
in Kansas courts that establishes that a class action suit is superior to individual litigation of
plaintiffs’ claims; however, none is present.”).
Indeed, in Castano the Fifth Circuit emphasized,
Fairness may demand that mass torts with few prior
verdicts or judgments be litigated first in smaller units—even
single-plaintiff, single-defendant trials—until general causation,
typical injuries, and levels of damages become established.
Thus, “mature” mass torts like asbestos or Dalkon Shield may
call for procedures that are not appropriate for incipient mass
tort cases, such as those involving injuries arising from new
products, chemical substances, or pharmaceuticals.
Id., 84 F.3d at 748 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.26); see Francis E.
McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 1841-43 (1995)
(discussing the life cycle of a mass tort).  As we mentioned earlier, there appear to be few,
if any, individual tobacco cases currently pending in Maryland courts.  In consideration of
the contraindications of prosecuting immature torts as a class action, we concur with the
Arch and Castano courts, and similarly conclude that the manageability factor counsels
strongly against the maintenance of this litigation as a class action.   As succinctly stated by
34
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(...continued)
34
the fact that such trial success has yet to survive the full appellate process.  See In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (advocating preferability of
allowing “a final, authoritative determination of [defendants’] liability . . . to emerge from
a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries . . . in different
jurisdictions” and emphasizing that “the pattern that results will reflect a consensus, or at
least a pooling of judgment, of many different tribunals”).  There simply is no established
track record for the prosecution of the claims that have typically been pursued against the
tobacco companies following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castano v. American Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), other than the widespread failure to maintain them as class
actions.  See Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1336, 1354-55 (1999).
  Respondents rely heavily on the fact that, despite the clear trend disfavoring class
35
certification of mass tort lawsuits against tobacco companies, see supra Section IV.A., the
Circuit Court is not alone in certifying such a lawsuit for proceeding as a class action.  These
lone ebbs against the countervailing flow of class certification denials and class
decertifications confirm, if nothing else, according to Respondents, that judicial review, by
way of mandamus, of the Circuit Court’s Class Certification Order is unwarranted.
As for the two state cases allowing a tobacco class action to proceed, R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. denied, 682 So. 2d 1100
(Fla. 1996) and Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10 (La. Ct. App. 1998), writ
denied, 731 So. 2d 189 (La. 1999), we find their reasoning unpersuasive, for the same
reasons that two New York courts have discredited their authority.  First the New York
Appellate Division criticized the Engle decision on the ground that “[t]here was no analysis
of why the common issues predominated over the individual issues.”  Small v. Lorillard
Tobacco Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 94 N.Y.2d 43 (N.Y.
1999).  See also Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 485 n. 12 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(describing Engle opinion as “devoid of a thorough analysis of the requirements which must
be satisfied before a class is certified”).  In fact, the trial court in Engle itself, even after its
decision to grant class certification was affirmed by Florida’s intermediate appellate court,
(continued...)
the Fifth Circuit, “at this time, while the tort is immature, . . . class certification cannot be
found to be a superior method of adjudication.”  Castano, 84 F.3d at 740-41.  In tandem with
the lack of predominance of common issues, the Circuit Court’s certification of the classes
under Rule 2-231(b)(3) thus represents an abuse of discretion.35
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(...continued)
35
yet modified from nationwide membership to statewide membership, see Engle, 672 So. 2d
at 42, later acknowledged problems with treating the case as a class action.  Specifically, the
court conceded that “after three years of pretrial proceedings it has become evident that the
individual hearings for each class member may be more extensive than was originally
envisioned by the [intermediate appellate court],” Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
94-08273 CA-20, slip op. at 3 (Dade County, Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 1998), and
professed its “reservations about the manageability of this case as a result of increased
emphasis on individual issues,” id at 4.
Secondly, in denying a motion for class certification against several tobacco
manufacturers in a lawsuit pleading thirteen causes of action, the Supreme Court, Queens
County, New York disparaged and distinguished the Scott case as follows:
In Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725 So.2d 10 (1998),
the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, certified a
tobacco case brought on a claim of medical monitoring.  The
court said, “In the instant case we are concerned basically with
one substance only, nicotine, and one effect only, addiction.”
(Scott v. American Tobacco Co., supra, at 13.)  However, most
jurisdictions are of the view that addiction is a highly individual
issue and the Louisiana court’s impression that the tobacco case
involved a mass tort arising from a common cause finds no
support in other reported cases.  A tobacco case does not
involve a mass tort arising from a single accident or catastrophic
event.  Moreover, in the Louisiana medical monitoring case, a
plaintiff would have to prove that as a proximate result of
exposure to a substance he suffered a significantly increased risk
of contracting a serious latent disease.  This is a far less difficult
and far less individualistic burden of proof than that faced by a
plaintiff in the case at bar where proximate causation of his
specific disease must be proven.
Geiger v. American Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 345, 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (citations to
cases other than Scott omitted).
V.  Punitive Damages
Petitioners also take issue with the Circuit Court’s proposed treatment of punitive
damages under the class action scheme:  “In this case, the plaintiffs’ trial plan provides for
the common issues jury to determine defendants’ liability for punitive damages and an
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  Because of our resolution of other issues presented in the instant petition for writ
36
of mandamus, we need not decide any of the constitutional claims raised by Petitioners,
including their assertion that the Circuit Court’s proposed trial scheme violates their right to
a jury trial under the Maryland Constitution.  We note, however, that the possibility that the
Circuit Court’s trial plan may well portend problems in assuring Petitioners the full scope
of their jury trial right further militates against certification of the present case for class
action treatment.  See Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. at 41 (D.C.
Super. Ct. July 23, 1999) (Reed II) (while determining that a ruling on the Seventh
Amendment concerns presented by Plaintiffs’ proposed multi-phase trial plan was
unnecessary, stating that the plan’s “potential constitutional problems present an additional
reason to conclude that class certification is not warranted”).  As to the actual presence of
constitutional concerns in the instant case, it is true that the Seventh Amendment is
inapplicable against the States.  See Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 341, 335 A.2d 670, 673
(1975) (stating that “the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that the
Seventh Amendment is not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and consequently
is not applicable to state court proceedings”); see also Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 219-220, 36 S. Ct. 595, 597, 60 L. Ed. 961 (1916).  Nonetheless,
this Court has made clear that
Maryland’s Constitution, Article XV, section 6, which
provides that “[t]he right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in
civil proceedings . . . shall be inviolably preserved,” like the
seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
requires that “enjoyment of the right . . . be not obstructed, and
that the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be
not interfered with.”  In re Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 310, 40 S.
Ct. 543, 546, 64 L. Ed. 919 (1920) (Brandeis, J.).
Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 291, 385 A.2d 57, 67 (alteration and ellipses in
Johnson), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805, 99 S. Ct. 60 (1978), disapproved of on other
grounds, Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991).  The Supreme Court has
(continued...)
appropriate multiplier of any actual damages, which would be determined by other juries.”
(Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 56 (emphasis added)).  Petitioners contend that by artificially
separating, indeed splitting between different juries, the determinations of liability for
punitive damages from liability for actual damages, the Circuit Court’s Class Certification
Order contravenes Maryland law and violates their constitutional rights to due process.36
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(...continued)
36
held the Seventh Amendment to entitle parties in a civil suit to have related facts and issues
decided by a single jury, thus prohibiting a second jury from reexamining the same facts and
issues.  See Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-501, 51 S.
Ct. 513, 514-15, 75 L. Ed. 1188 (1931).  Multiphasic class action trial plans have been held
to run afoul of this constitutional principle.  See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734, 751 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302-03 (7th Cir.
1995).  Consequently, there exists cause for constitutional concerns where the trial plan
endorsed by the Circuit Court in this case would potentially bifurcate between two separate
juries such interrelated issues as negligence and contributory negligence; negligence and
assumption of the risk; strict liability and assumption of the risk; fraud and reliance; fraud
and statute of limitations; general causation and individual causation; addiction and
contributory negligence; addiction and assumption of the risk; compensatory damages and
punitive damages; and, finally, Petitioners’ conduct and proximate cause.
  Treatise authors Newberg and Conte describe punitive damages multipliers in the
37
following manner:
The imposition of punitive damages in a common issues
trial has been approved when the jury is permitted to assess
punitive damages not as an aggregate award to the class, but
rather as a ratio of any compensatory damage award made to
individual class members.  This is the so-called multiplier
award.
3 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 17.28A (Cum. Supp.
1999), at 205.
Further, Petitioners argue that Maryland law does not permit the use of multipliers for
calculating punitive damages awards.37
In recent years, this Court has on numerous occasions discussed the law of punitive
damages.  Yet we have not specifically analyzed the applicability of punitive damages to
class action suits where liability determinations are separated from the consideration of
punitive damages, nor have we addressed directly the use of punitive damages multipliers
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  While reviewing the consolidated asbestos litigation, we found it unnecessary to
38
decide the validity of punitive damages multipliers, yet noted as follows:
Phases III and IV [of the trial plan] were concerned with
liability for punitive damages and the punitive damages
multipliers.  Special attention has been directed by the
defendants to the validity of treating punitive damages as a
common issue, but we need not consider those arguments in
view of our holding that there was insufficient evidence for
punitive damages.20
*          *          *          *          *          *
          
The absence of any discussion of the use of multipliers does
20  
not indicate this Court’s approval of their use.
ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 392 and n. 20, 667 A.2d 116, 144 and n. 20 (1995).
  “The second condition required to support punitive damages is that the tort be
39
committed with malice.”  Caldor v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 661, 625 A.2d 959, 973 (1993).
in any setting.   Nonetheless, several of our opinions are instructive on the essential features
38
underlying an award of punitive damages as well as on the viability of utilizing punitive
damages multipliers in this State.
First, a jury must find compensatory damages as a foundation before it may award
punitive damages.  In Caldor v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 625 A.2d 959 (1993), this Court
stated:
There are two threshold conditions that parties must meet before
being entitled to receive an award of punitive damages.  The
first condition is that there be a compensatory damages award
underlying an award of punitive damages.[39]
*          *         *          *          *          *
Our prior decisions indicate that there must be a
compensatory damages award foundation for each count of a
complaint that provides a basis for punitive damages.
*          *         *          *          *          *
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[O]ne of the purposes of punitive damages is to punish the
wrongs of the defendant.  The requirement of a compensatory
damages foundation protects defendants from being punished
for acts that the trial court determines the defendant did not
commit.
Id. at 661-63, 625 A.2d at 973-74 (citation omitted).  See also Montgomery Ward v. Wilson,
339 Md. 701, 730, 664 A.2d 916, 930 (1995) (reconfirming that “an award of compensatory
damages must underlie any award of punitive damages in Maryland”); Shell Oil Co. v.
Parker, 265 Md. 631, 644, 291 A.2d 64, 71 (1972) (holding that “to support an award of
punitive damages in Maryland there must first be an award of at least nominal compensatory
damages”).
Second, even where the evidence warrants punitive damages, it is within the sound
discretion of the trier of fact to award or deny such damages.  In Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md.
21, 690 A.2d 1000 (1997), this Court stated that “unlike consequential damages, ‘the trier
of fact has . . . discretion to deny punitive damages even [where] the record would otherwise
support their award.’”  Id. at 36, 690 A.2d at 1007 (quoting Adams v. Coates, 331 Md. 1, 15,
626 A.2d 36, 43 (1993)).  Along the same lines, this Court has also repeated the “generally
accepted rule that punitive damages are not recovered as a matter of right, even though the
facts of the case may be such as to make their allowance proper, but rather, that their
allowance rests in the sound discretion of the trier of fact, be it court or jury.”  Nast v.
Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 349, 539 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1988) (internal quotation marks, brackets
and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds, Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420,
601 A.2d 633 (1992).
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Finally, in the case of Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121, 262 A.2d 518 (1970), we
characterized the nature of compensatory damages as an indispensable precondition to
punitive damages in a fashion more directly relevant to the issue of separating the
determinations of the two species of damages:  “It is well settled that in order to support an
award for punitive damages compensatory, or actual damages must first be found.  Thus
punitive damages are clearly dependent and can hardly be decided in a vacuum . . . .”  Id. at
125, 262 A.2d at 521 (citations omitted).
Respondents argue that because punitive damages are focused purely on the
defendants’ conduct, they may be determined in the Phase I class trial without regard to the
liability of Petitioners to any class member.  It is true, as Respondents suggest, that the
purpose of a punitive damages award is to punish the defendant, and that such an award does
not depend in any way upon the plaintiff’s conduct.  We reconfirmed this principle less than
a decade ago, stating that the “‘purposes of punitive damages relate entirely to the nature of
the defendant’s conduct’” and “the availability of a punitive damages award ought to depend
upon the heinous nature of the defendant’s tortious conduct.”  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454, 601
A.2d at 649 (emphasis added) (quoting Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. 297, 321, 587 A.2d 491,
503 (1991)).  We have also explained,
Rather than representing a specific monetary loss by the
plaintiff, punitive damages embody a public policy
determination that a particular defendant engaged in heinous and
malicious conduct sufficient to warrant the equivalent of a “civil
penalty.”  It has no necessary relation to the loss suffered by the
plaintiff, but rather depicts the degree of the defendant’s
culpability and his ability to pay.  
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Scott, 345 Md. at 36, 690 A.2d at 1007 (citation omitted).  Nonetheless, that the focus of
punitive damages lies upon defendants and their conduct does not change the fact that, as
demonstrated from the precedents excerpted above, there is clearly established Maryland law
prohibiting an award of punitive damages made without regard to the actual compensatory
damages to be awarded.
Respondents, however, would have us instead look to other jurisdictions that have
endorsed the use of punitive damages multipliers for complex tort litigation.  In particular,
they point to certain decisions within the Fifth Circuit, upon which the Circuit Court rested
its approval of the use of punitive multipliers in prosecuting the present case as a class
action.  In Jenkins v. Raymark Industrial, Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), the court stated:
Defendants contend that, under Texas law, punitive damages
cannot be determined separately from actual damages because
the culpability of their conduct must be evaluated relative to
each plaintiff.  We disagree.
The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate
the victim but to create a deterrence to the defendant, and to
protect the public interest . . . .  The focus is on the defendant’s
conduct, rather than on the plaintiff’s.  While no plaintiff may
receive an award of punitive damages without proving that he
suffered actual damages, the allocation need not be made
concurrently with an evaluation of the defendant’s conduct.  The
relative timing of these assessments is not critical.
Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
In the case of In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 593-94 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d
sub nom. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g en banc granted, 990
F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993), appeal dismissed, 53 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994), the trial court,
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guided by the rationale stated in Jenkins, adopted a class action trial plan for the prosecution
of claims arising out of a 1988 explosion whereby a common issues jury would determine
the defendants’ liability for punitive damages, if any, in terms of an amount of money for
each dollar of compensatory damages to be awarded individual plaintiffs by a later, separate
jury.  Hence, the common issues jury was to establish a punitive damages multiplier for the
Court to utilize in computing and ordering punitive damages for those plaintiffs ultimately
successful in proving actual damages.  See Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. at 593.  See also
Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 327 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on Jenkins,
acknowledging propriety of punitive damages award based upon multiplier yet holding that
one co-defendant could not be held jointly liable for punitive damages award separately
assigned to other co-defendant).
Respondents have also cited Day v. NLO, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994),
in which case the court stated:
The only other class wide verdict which we envision
allowing the jury to render, if appropriate, is for punitive
damages.  Of all the issues to be decided in this case, the issue
of punitive damages is the least dependent upon the individual
differences between Plaintiffs.  Punitive damages are not
compensation for injury.  Instead, they are private fines levied
by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its
future occurrence.  As one district court has stated:
Punitive damages are not measured solely by the
bodily injury suffered by a plaintiff, rather
imposition of punitive damages is determined
according to other factors such as the
outrageousness of the injurious act, the
defendant’s motives and intent, and the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff.
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The award of punitive damages focuses upon the conduct of the
Defendants.  In this case that proof, as we have noted, is very
similar to the issue of liability for intentional tort.  Therefore,
for the same reasons it is fitting that the question of punitive
damages be determined class wide.
Id. at 884-85 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  See also In Re Diamond
Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) (refusing to issue writ of
mandamus to compel trial court to vacate its certification of mandatory class under Federal
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) relating to punitive damages).
Finally, Respondents direct our attention to In Re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton
International Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Colo. 1988), where the court stated:
Consolidation of liability and punitive damage issues avoids the
potential that disparate liability verdicts will be imposed on
defendants . . . for the same conduct.  The liability phases of
individual trials would involve identical evidence and standards
of conduct.
Issues of liability and damages are bifurcated pursuant to
Rule 42(b).  Common issues of liability and punitive damages
are consolidated for an exemplar trial pursuant to Rule 42(a).
Id. at 1459 (footnotes omitted).
It is clear from these cases that other jurisdictions have approved of the use of punitive
damages multipliers, as well as the separation of the determination of punitive damages from
that of compensatory damages.  This does not change the fact that punitive damage
multipliers applied in the manner proposed are in direct contradiction to Maryland law for
the same reasons that considerations of compensatory and punitive damages may not be
bifurcated in wholesale fashion and across multiple juries.  Allowing a single jury to set
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irrevocably the amount of punitive damages to be imposed relative to and on behalf of
several, let alone thousands of individuals, whose actual damages are themselves determined
separately from each other, does not enable the jury to properly assess the amount of punitive
damages that are appropriate in specific relation to differing amounts of—and reasons
for—actual damages.  Mere widespread, identical proportionality between actual damages
and punitive damages for such a multitude of plaintiffs would not necessarily encapsulate
the relation between the two types of damages deemed requisite under this State’s common
law.  Consequently, the cases cited by Respondents in support of punitive damage multipliers
are inapposite in light of established Maryland law.
For all the reasons outlined above, we fully concur with Petitioners’ assessment that
the Circuit Court’s treatment of punitive damages was error:
Under the Circuit Court’s decision, . . . the punitive
damages determination would be made before any finding of
liability to any class member, in the absence of any evidence
that defendants’ conduct actually caused any class member’s
alleged injury, and without any knowledge of how much, if any,
compensatory damages would be awarded to any class member
by other juries who would never hear the Phase I evidence.
This procedure, therefore, contravenes the bedrock requirements
of Maryland substantive law.
(Petition at 41.)
VI.  Medical Monitoring
The Circuit Court certified Respondents’ medical monitoring claim under Rule 2-
231(b)(2), which provides for class certification as follows:
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(b)  Class actions maintainable.  Unless justice requires
otherwise, an action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of section (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
*          *         *          *          *          *
(2)  the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole . . . .
The corresponding federal rule has been characterized as instituted primarily for  civil rights
litigation, although it is not limited to such actions.  Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 614, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997); Baby Neal v. Casey, 43
F.3d 48, 58-59 (3rd Cir. 1994).
Noting that this Court has never addressed the question of whether medical
monitoring is cognizable in Maryland, (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 64), the Circuit Court
concluded that a cause of action for medical monitoring exists in Maryland, accepting “the
elements for the maintenance of a medical monitoring claim,” id. at 67, based upon the
reasoning set out in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1990) (Paoli
I), In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3rd Cir. 1994) (Paoli II), and Hansen v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).  The Circuit Court then determined
that the medical monitoring relief sought by the plaintiffs was within the scope of a Rule 2-
231(b)(2) class action.  Specifically, the court found:
For the purposes of class certification, the plaintiffs have
alleged systematic and continuous conduct by the defendants
which has exposed the plaintiffs to numerous toxic substances.
As a result of this alleged exposure, plaintiffs have an increased
risk of contracting serious disease and injury.  If the plaintiffs in
this case ultimately prove their allegations, the class members
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will be entitled to injunctive relief in the form of an extensive
court-supervised medical monitoring program.  Therefore,
because plaintiffs have alleged with particularity a common
course of conduct by the defendants against the entire putative
class, the Court concludes that the party opposing class
certification has allegedly acted on grounds generally applicable
to the class for which final injunctive relief with respect to the
class as a whole is warranted.
(Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 67-68 (footnote and citation omitted)).
This Court has never considered whether a demonstrated need for medical monitoring
creates a valid cause of action in Maryland or generates a permissible form of relief under
this State’s more traditional tort actions, although several courts around the country more
than a decade and a half ago began to consider this type of claim and permitted it to proceed.
See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).  Over the intervening
years, several state appellate courts have followed suit in recognizing medical monitoring as
a legitimate cause of action or form of relief under their respective tort law.  See, e.g., Burns
v. Jacquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Potter v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J.
1987); Hansen, 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).  Nonetheless, the embrace of medical monitoring
as a viable claim has not been universal.  See, e.g., Metro North Commuter Railroad Co. v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 439-440, 117 S. Ct. 2113, 2121-22, 138 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1997)
(rejecting particular plaintiff’s medical monitoring claim because of lack of compensable
-97-
injury under Federal Employers’ Liability Act and because intermediate court’s envisioned
potential award of medical monitoring to asymptomatic plaintiff in form of lump sum
damages went beyond bounds of “evolving common law” as it now stands); Ball v. Joy
Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991) (ruling that medical monitoring is not
cognizable claim under tort law of Virginia or West Virginia absent manifestation of physical
injury).
Medical monitoring has been defined as “one of a growing number of non-traditional
torts that have developed in the common law to compensate plaintiffs who have been
exposed to various toxic substances.”  Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 849.  See also Recovery of
Damages for Expense of Medical Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or
Condition, 17 A.L.R.5th 327, § 3 (stating that courts have “defined a medical monitoring
claim as a claim for the costs of periodic medical examinations to detect latent diseases or
disorders caused by a defendant’s culpable conduct, the object of which is to facilitate early
diagnosis and treatment of diseases or disorders”).  In a claim for medical monitoring, the
plaintiff seeks to recover only the quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations
necessary to monitor plaintiffs’ health and to facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of
disease(s) caused by exposure to chemicals, or as in the instant case, tobacco.  See Ayers,
525 A.2d at 308; see also Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 849 and 850.  The theory underlying the
recognition of this claim is that the diseases or injuries caused by various toxic substances
are often latent, leading to “problems when the claims are analyzed under traditional
common law tort doctrine because, traditionally, injury needed to be manifest before it could
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  A cause of action for medical monitoring differs from the cause of action
40
commonly referred to as “an enhanced risk claim.”  See Recovery of Damages for Expense
of Medical Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R.5th 327,
§ 3 (explaining that “an action for medical monitoring seeks to recover only the quantifiable
costs of periodic examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm, whereas an
enhanced risk claim seeks compensation for the anticipated harm itself, proportionately
reduced to reflect the chance that it will not occur”).  See also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3rd Cir. 1990) (Paoli I); Ayers v. Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 304 (N.J.
1987).
be compensable.”  Id. at 850.  Thus, some courts have recognized medical monitoring claims
that permit relief even in the absence of present manifestations of physical injury.  See id.
The injury in a medical monitoring case not being a physical one, it is instead construed as
“the ‘costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical
harm.’”  Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 139 (3rd Cir. 1998) (quoting
Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 144 (Pa. 1997)); see also
Hansen, 858 P.2d at 977.40
 
Whether this Court should, as a matter of Maryland common law, recognize medical
monitoring, either as a distinct cause of action or allowable form of relief, is a question not
easily answered, and one that no doubt will be recurring.  In the context of a toxic tort suit
involving claims for damages sustained because plaintiffs’ well water was contaminated by
toxic pollutants, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, noting the difficulty that both law and
science experience in attempting to deal with the emerging complexities of industrialized
society and the consequent implications for human health, observed:
Our evaluation of the enhanced risk and medical
surveillance claims requires that we focus on a critical issue in
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the management of toxic tort litigation: at what stage in the
evolution of a toxic injury should tort law intercede by requiring
the responsible party to pay damages?
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 298.
We need not resolve this matter today but shall instead leave for the future whether,
under Maryland law, plaintiffs could maintain a cause of action or claim to relief to recover
the expense of medical surveillance.  Whether medical monitoring is a cognizable claim
under the tort law of this State is in no way ripe for our consideration at this stage of the
litigation:  even should this novel tort theory constitute a valid cause of action or form of
relief in Maryland, an equitable relief class action should never have been certified on the
basis of such a claim under the circumstances of this case.
The claim for medical monitoring should not have been certified under Rule 2-
231(b)(2) for two significant reasons.  First, the claim as set out in Respondents’ Fourth
Amended Complaint is primarily for money damages and not for injunctive relief.
Certification under subsection (b)(2) is appropriate only where injunctive relief is the sole
or primary relief sought.  See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142; 1 NEWBERG, supra,§ 4.11, at 4-39.
It does not extend to cases in which the relief prayed relates exclusively or predominately
to money damages.  See Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 102
(explaining that Federal Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages”).  See also In re School
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3rd Cir. 1986); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
-100-
Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 99-100 (W.D. Mo. 1997); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160
F.R.D. 544, 551-52 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
In Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the court offered
the following rationale in analyzing plaintiffs’ claim for medical monitoring and rejecting
their motion for certification of a class action on behalf of Pennsylvania smokers against
tobacco companies under Federal Rule 23(b)(2):
The Court finds that it may properly certify a medical
monitoring claim under Rule 23(b)(2) when the plaintiffs seek
such specific relief which can be properly characterized as
invoking the court’s equitable powers.  In reaching this decision,
the Court perforce rejects defendants’ argument that a medical
monitoring claim can never be characterized as injunctive.
The dispositive factor that must be assessed to determine
whether a medical monitoring claim can be certified as a Rule
23(b)(2) class is-what type of relief do plaintiffs actually seek.
If plaintiffs seek relief that is a disguised request for
compensatory damages, then the medical monitoring claim can
only be characterized as a claim for monetary damages.  In
contrast, if plaintiffs seek the establishment of a court-
supervised medical monitoring program through which the class
members will receive periodic examinations, then plaintiffs’
medical monitoring claim can be properly characterized as a
claim seeking injunctive relief.
Id. at 483 (citations omitted).  See also Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142.  The court ultimately
concluded that the claim for medical monitoring could not “be properly certified under
[Federal] Rule 23(b)(2) but must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).”  Arch, 175
F.R.D. at 485.
In their Fourth Amended Complaint, Respondents demand that “Defendants be
ordered to create a medical monitoring fund, under the continuing jurisdiction and
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supervision of the Court, to monitor the health of Plaintiffs and Class members and to pay
or reimburse Class members for all medical expenses caused by Defendants’ wrongdoing,”
id. at ¶ 301(d) (emphasis added), seeking reimbursement for treatment of the disease as well
as detection.  Calling such payment “injunctive relief” does not change the status of the claim
from that of a fundamentally monetary nature.  The fact that what Respondent plaintiffs are
seeking in actuality is nothing more than money damages is likewise belied, first, by their
requests for relief within the medical monitoring claim itself, that the court award restitution
and disgorgement of profits in addition to the actual medical monitoring costs, see id. at ¶
301(c), and, second, by their final prayer for relief, for “medical monitoring, whether
denominated as damages or in the granting of equitable relief,” id. at 100.  Compounded with
these requests are the significant compensatory and punitive money damages being sought
under Respondents’ nine other causes of action.
It is therefore clear that notwithstanding the possibility that a medical monitoring
claim might legitimately be framed as one seeking equitable relief, see Day v. NLO, Inc., 144
F.R.D. 330, 336 (S.D. Ohio 1992), that possibility cannot be realized through the instant
lawsuit.  See Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 484 (ruling that Pennsylvania smokers’ medical monitoring
claim could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), first, because its inclusion of a request for
treatment rendered the claim “identical to a traditional damage claim for personal injury” that
illicitly attempted to “transform a legal claim into an equitable one merely by using a fund
as a repository for money damages” and, secondly, “because the overwhelming majority of
relief sought by plaintiffs in their entire complaint is monetary in nature”).  See also Smith,
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174 F.R.D. at 100 (rejecting motion for class certification of medical monitoring fund for
Missouri smokers because monetary relief was predominant relief being sought); Harding
v. Tambrands, 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that certification under Federal
Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome was
inappropriate because primary relief sought was money damages); Boughton v. Cotter Corp.,
65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court’s decision not to certify medical
monitoring class because relief sought was primarily money damages); Taylor v. American
Tobacco Co., No. 97 715975 NP, slip op. at 19 (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10,
2000) (in denying motion for class certification of tobacco lawsuit, ruling that “the medical
monitoring aspect of plaintiffs’ claims does not truly involve the award of injunctive relief”
but rather is “an element of damages”).
Class certification of Respondents’ medical monitoring claim under Rule 2-231(b)(2)
must fail for a second reason.  Unlike Rule 2-231(b)(3), Rule 2-231(b)(2) class members are
bound by any resulting judgment, given that they are not afforded any opt-out mechanism.
Courts have consequently mandated as a condition precedent to certifying an equitable relief
class action that it exhibit “cohesiveness,” a requirement similar to Rule 2-231(b)(3)’s
prerequisite of predominance, yet one that is even more demanding and difficult to satisfy.
See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142-43 (“[T]he cohesiveness requirement enunciated by both [the
Third Circuit] and the Supreme Court extends beyond Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.  Indeed,
a (b)(2) class may require more cohesiveness than a (b)(3) class.  This is so because in a
(b)(2) action, unnamed members are bound by the action without the opportunity to opt
-103-
out.”); Clay v. American Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 495 (S.D. Ill. 1999) (stating that a
“Rule 23(b)(2) class should actually have more cohesiveness than a Rule 23(b)(3) class”).
That the putative class members in this tobacco litigation have been “exposed to different .
. . products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods . . .
make[s] class treatment inappropriate.”  Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted) (first ellipsis in Barnes).  This is so because Respondents cannot escape
the burden of proving, individually, some injury, whether addiction alone or some other
medical problem, that was caused by Petitioners’ misconduct.  See id. at 144 (“In order to
prevail on their medical monitoring claim—under any of their three theories of liability
(negligence, strict products liability, and intentional exposure to a hazardous
substance)—plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants caused their exposure to tobacco.”).
Moreover, the medical monitoring claim may perhaps more accurately be deemed a
remedy rather than a distinct cause of action.  See Potter, 863 P.2d at 823 (“Recognition that
a defendant’s conduct has created the need for future medical monitoring does not create a
new tort.  It is simply a compensable item of damage when liability is established under
traditional tort theories of recovery.”); Cosentino v. Philip Morris Inc., No. MID-L-5135-97,
slip op. at 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1998, recon., Feb. 11, 1999).  But see Arch, 175
F.R.D. at 483-84 n. 11 (“[S]everal states have permitted recovery of damages for medical
monitoring as part of the relief.  In Pennsylvania, however, medical monitoring is an
independent cause of action, not a compensable item of damages.”  (Citation omitted));
-104-
  In Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 989 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the same
41
court that decided Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997),
explained that
there is a theoretical and practical distinction between a medical
monitoring fund and a medical monitoring claim.  The medical
monitoring claim is the plaintiffs’ actual cause of action;  in
order to have the right to a remedy, the plaintiffs must first
establish that they have satisfied the seven elements of a medical
monitoring fund.  In contrast, the medical monitoring fund is the
actual relief that will be awarded if the plaintiffs succeed in
establishing the claim.  The difference between the medical
monitoring claim and the medical monitoring fund is highlighted
by the fact that plaintiffs . . . can prevail on their medical
monitoring claim and request monetary damages in lieu of their
fund.  Indeed, the plaintiffs’ first motion for class certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) was initially denied because the relief
requested 
under 
its 
medical 
monitoring 
claim 
was
predominantly monetary damages, not a court-supervised fund.
Id. at 667 n. 6.
Redland, 696 A.2d 137; Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996).   Insofar as
41
medical monitoring constitutes only a form of relief, Respondents would still be required to
succeed in proving one of their other nine pleaded causes of action.  These we have already
deemed inappropriate for class action treatment on account of their lack of predominance of
common issues over individual ones, a test that is, again, even less stringent than the
“cohesiveness” requirement for equitable relief class actions.  A fortiori, the particular
medical monitoring claim pressed by Respondents in this case cannot be maintained as a
Rule 2-231(b)(2) class action.  The recently expressed sentiments of a trial court in the
District of Columbia would seem to apply with similar if not equal force here:
This Court has already stated that numerous issues, including
addiction, causation, reliance, statute of limitations and other
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defenses, will have to be addressed individually.  Those same
issues are just as central to a medical monitoring claim as to any
of the Plaintiffs[’] other claims.  Thus even if this Court were to
consider certifying this class for medical monitoring under Rule
23(b)(2), it would still fail to qualify under the cohesive
requirement.
Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. at 45 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 1999)
(Reed II).  Finally, for the already determined failure of predominance, the medical
monitoring claim could thus not be maintained as a class action even if recast under Rule 2-
231(b)(3).
In conclusion, although we do not rule out the possibility that this Court would, in an
appropriate case, recognize medical monitoring as a viable cause of action or as an element
of damages, we do not believe that a Rule 2-231(b)(2) class action may be certified in this
litigation on the basis of such a claim.  As in Arch and Smith, Respondents here primarily
are seeking monetary relief in asserting this novel claim.  As in Barnes and Reed II, the
causes of action underlying the medical monitoring claim lack the cohesiveness required for
the maintenance of a class action lawsuit seeking injunctive or equitable relief.
VII.  Conclusion
Because the Circuit Court’s order certifying the present litigation as a class action was
inappropriate for the numerous reasons discussed above, we conclude that the instant petition
for writ of mandamus should be, and hereby is, granted.  An order of mandamus shall issue
henceforth from this Court directing the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to vacate its order
-106-
  Our holding is necessarily limited to the procedural posture and facts before the
42
Circuit Court at the time the court ruled on the motion for class certification.  Of course, our
holding does not restrict the Circuit Court from addressing, consistent with the principles
expressed herein, a class certification motion at a future date.  See Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (while issuing writ of
mandate to decertify class, explaining that trial court could once again consider certification
of class after appropriate amendment of complaint).  Cf. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d
706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (after granting writ of mandamus precluding Phase II common trial
of over 3000 asbestos cases on issue of “omnibus” liability to certified class, inviting trial
court “to continue its imaginative and innovative efforts to confront these cases”).  We would
nonetheless encourage the Circuit Court to consider that the use of bellwether cases, whether
of the currently proposed representatives or of other well-chosen plaintiffs, may comprise
a superior method of adjudicating lawsuits filed by persons allegedly addicted to or injured
by the use of Petitioners’ tobacco products.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee
Note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (“[A]nother method of handling the litigious
situation may be available which has greater practical advantages.  Thus one or more actions
agreed to by the parties as test or model actions may be preferable to a class action . . . .”).
See also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (observing that
“a sample of trials” may make more sense than utilizing the class action device for mass tort
cases); Connecticut Cooling Total Air, Inc. v. Connecticut Natural Gas Corp., 738 A.2d
1167, 1171 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (in finding that class action form was not “superior to
all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,”
suggesting trial court’s “case management strategy involving trial of a ‘bellwether’ case . .
. as a potential means of achieving a more prompt trial of issues that may lead to negotiated
resolutions of all the cases”); Taylor v. American Tobacco Co., No. 97 715975 NP, slip op.
at 22 (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000) (in ruling class action inferior method
of adjudication for tobacco lawsuit, explaining that litigants with claims of sufficient gravity
“are probably better served by the more prompt adjudication of their claims that is possible
without the complexities attendant to class action, not the least of which is the possibility of
an appeal and reversal of a class action certification” (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997))).
of class certification in the case of Richardson v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
96145050/CE212596.42
CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
VACATED.  COSTS TO BE PAID IN THE
PROPORTION OF ONE-FOURTEENTH BY
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RESPONDENT STATE OF MARYLAND,
T H I R T E E N - F O U R T E E N T H S  
BY
RESPONDENT 
REPRESENTATIVE
PLAINTIFFS.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Dissenting opinion by Cathell, J.
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 I would deny the petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition. 
“[T]he writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for
extraordinary situations . . . [and] only ‘exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial
“usurpation of power”’ will justify issuance of the writ.”  Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289, 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1143, 99 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1988);
see Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 146, 680 A.2d 1040, 1048 (1996) (“[J]udicial
review is properly sought through a writ of mandamus ‘where there [is] no statutory
provision for hearing or review and where public officials [are] alleged to have abused
the discretionary powers reposed in them.’” (second and third alterations in original)
(quotation omitted)).   Maryland Rule 2-231 entrusts to the trial judge in the first instance
the decision to certify a class.  This, the trial judge has done in this case.  Moreover, that
decision has come early in the litigation process.
Under these circumstances, the granting of the petition, in my opinion, negatively
impacts the ability of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to manage its own docket.  Just
as important, by granting the writ of mandamus and rejecting the trial court’s class
certification at this early stage of the proceeding, this Court improperly substitutes its
discretion for that of the trial judge and, because it does not accord the trial judge the
proper deference, tends to undermine the judicial process, Maryland Rule 2-231, and the
finality doctrine.  In addition, if the circumstances sub judice justify issuance of an
extraordinary writ, then virtually every certification order will produce a petition for
issuance of an extraordinary writ, alleging perceived problems with the defining of the
 A writ of prohibition is inappropriate in this case.  The class action certification
1
order being challenged in this case has already been issued.   A writ of prohibition can only
be issued to prevent the lower court from entering an order.  Once an order, including an
order for class certification, is entered, the writ is no longer available. See, e.g., Bates v.
McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 767, 888 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ark. 1994); Sparkman v. McClure, 498
So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1986); State ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gaertner, 601 S.W.2d
295, 296 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State ex rel. Alfred v. Anderson, 87 N.M. 106, 107-08, 529
P.2d 1227, 1228 (N.M. 1974); Mor-Gran-Sou Elec. Coop. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 160
N.W.2d 521, 523 (N.D. 1968); State ex rel. Stefanick v. Municipal Ct. of Marietta, 21 Ohio
St. 2d 102, 104, 255 N.E.2d 634, 635 (1970).   
-2-
class.  That could, in turn, result in the creation of a “yo-yo” system of class action suits
in which no class action will be certified until this Court says it should be.
I.  Writ of Mandamus
As we have seen, the writs of mandamus and prohibition are “extraordinary” writs,
which are to be used in only the most extreme cases of discretionary abuse.   We
1
addressed the prerequisites of such writs in Goodwich, 343 Md. at 145, 680 A.2d at 1047:
[The writ of mandamus] is “not a substitute for appeal or writ of error.”  In
re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 306, 539 A.2d 664, 676
(1988).  It is, however, “an extraordinary remedy[,]” Ipes v. Board of Fire
Commissioners of Baltimore, 224 Md. 180, 183, 167 A.2d 337, 339 (1961),
“that . . . will not lie if [there is] any other adequate and convenient
remedy[.]” A.S. Abel Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715, 718, 337 A.2d 77, 79
(1975) (quoting Applestein v. Baltimore, 156 Md. 40, 45, 143 A. 666, 668
(1928)).  Mandamus is generally used “to compel inferior tribunals, public
officials or administrative agencies to perform their function, or perform
-3-
some particular duty imposed upon them which in its nature is imperative
and to the performance of which duty the party applying for the writ has a
clear legal right.”  Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273
Md. 486, 514, 331 A.2d 55, 72 (1975); see also George’s Creek Coal &
Iron Co. v. County Commissioners, 59 Md. 255, 259 (1883).  The writ
ordinarily does not lie where the action to be reviewed is discretionary or
depends on personal judgment.  [Second, third and fourth alterations in
original.]
See also Board of Supervisors v. County Comm’rs, 200 Md. 114, 116, 88 A.2d 462, 463
(1952) (“The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy afforded to prevent a failure
of justice and to preserve peace, order and good government.  Mandamus is not available
except where the petitioner has a clear legal right to compel performance of a certain
positive duty by the respondent and where the law affords no other adequate remedy.”
(citation omitted)); Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 451, 50 A.2d 560, 563 (1947)
(“[M]andamus . . . was issued only by exercise of the extraordinary power of the Crown
on proper cause shown.”).
Though the writ of mandamus traditionally has served an extremely limited role,
this Court has noted the expanded role of the writ in appellate supervisory review:
“Some commentators have said that under what they view as the
traditional approach, writs appropriately issue ‘only to control actions
beyond the jurisdiction of an inferior court, or to compel action that the
court lacked power to withhold.’  But, according to Wright, in recent times
the use of the extraordinary writ has ‘broadened to include use of the writs
-1-
to correct clear abuse of discretion, and more recently . . . to satisfy other
peculiar needs for interlocutory review.’”
“Earlier commentators, however, recognized that a prerogative writ
could issue to control actions of a lower court that were not jurisdictional in
nature.  As to mandamus, Blackstone asserts that it is designed to ‘enforce
the due exercise of those judicial . . . powers, with which [inferior courts
are invested] . . . not only by restraining their excesses, but also by
quickening their negligence, and obviating their denial of justice.’ . . .  The
same remedy is available ‘if, in handling of matters clearly within their
cognizance, they transgress the bounds proscribed to them by the laws of
England. . . .’”
In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 306-07, 539 A.2d 664, 676-77 (1988)
(citations omitted) (alteration in original).  
Thus, the law has evolved so that a writ may be issued by this Court to vacate an
order of a lower tribunal that constitutes an “abuse of discretion.”  In the context of
appeal, we have defined an abuse of discretion as an instance “where no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without
reference to any guiding rules or principles.  An abuse of discretion may also be found
where the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and
inferences before the court, or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic.”  In re
Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312, 701 A.2d 110, 118-19 (1997)
(internal quotations and alterations omitted).
“Abuse of discretion” sufficient to justify issuance of “extraordinary” writs means
more than making an erroneous or illogical decision, however; it is different in magnitude
than that required to be shown to obtain reversal on appeal.  In re Catawba Indian Tribe,
973 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1992); Banov v. Kennedy, 694 A.2d 850 (D.C. 1997).  In Banov,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that “[a]buse of discretion sufficient for
reversal in an appeal is not enough to warrant mandamus; for mandamus to issue, a
-2-
decision [(of the lower court)] must qualify as ‘usurpation of judicial power.’”  694 A.2d
at 858 (quotation omitted).  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has observed that a party seeking mandamus “must make the most difficult
showing, that of an abuse of discretion amounting to a usurpation of the judicial power,
before mandamus will lie to replace the district court’s decision.”   Catawba Tribe, 973
F.2d at 1136; see also Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1386 & n.23
(11th Cir. 1998) (referring to the “clear abuse of discretion” standard: “A district court’s
class certification decision, in and of itself, will constitute a ‘clear usurpation of power’
or a failure to carry out a ministerial task only in the most unusual of circumstances.”).
Thus, a trial court’s order granting class certification, even if incorrect and even if
the facts are as are alleged by petitioners, without more, should not trigger the granting of
an extraordinary writ.  Otherwise, there will be a significant further expansion of the
extremely limited use of extraordinary writs by appellate courts for regulatory purposes.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in State ex rel. Byrd v. Chadwick, 956 S.W.2d 369, 376
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997), stated: “In [issuing the writ], we do not direct the trial court as to
how it will exercise its discretion, but rather direct it as to what determinations it must
make, and then allow it to make those determinations following issuance of our writ.”
The Tennessee Supreme Court has agreed.   See Meighan v. United States Sprint
Communications Co., 942 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1997) [hereinafter Meighan II].  Quoting 2
Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, § 742, at 7-128 to 7-129
(3d ed. 1992)), the Meighan II court stated:
Mandamus is appropriate for abuses of discretion, rather than
misinterpretations of questions of law.  It may lie if the [trial] court, in
determining propriety of the class action, acts outside its jurisdiction,
without regard to applicable procedural safeguards, or applies or refuses to
apply the criteria of [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 23 in an arbitrary
 Maryland Rule 2-231 is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
2
-3-
manner.  However, if a district court has acted within its jurisdiction
[2]
according to procedural safeguards and applies the criteria of Rule 23 in a
nonarbitrary manner, mandamus is inappropriate to secure a de novo review
of the ruling on the class.
Meighan, 942 S.W.2d at 481; cf. In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 159-60 (6th Cir. 1993)
(“Assuming arguendo that the district court’s certification under [Federal] Rule [of Civil
Procedure] 23(b)(2) is erroneous, it is not so clearly erroneous . . . that mandamus is the
proper remedy.”).
Some of the cases relied upon by petitioners in this case provide examples of  trial
courts applying class action criteria in an arbitrary manner.  The class certification order
in In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1076-77 (6th Cir. 1996),
indicated that the plaintiffs had proven the “commonality” element because they had “a
common right to assert a claim against [d]efendants” and the “typicality” element because
“all plaintiffs allege[d] injury” by the defendants’ products.  The Sixth Circuit granted the
writ, holding that the trial court order was so vague as to constitute a “disregard of the
federal rules.”  Id. at 1088, 1090.
Ex Parte Green Tree Financial Corp., 684 So. 2d 1302, 1307 (Ala. 1996),
involved a class certification in which the trial court “entered an order based upon little or
no evidentiary underpinnings.”  The Alabama Supreme Court was concerned that the
order “merely parrot[ed]” the language of the class action rule and had illegally ordered
both a mandatory and an “opt-out” class.  Id.  It held, relying in part on its earlier
decision in Ex Parte Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 582 So. 2d 469, 476-77 (Ala. 1991), in
which mandamus was issued to vacate an order for certification when neither party
moved to proceed by way of class action or produced any evidence to justify so
-4-
proceeding, that such circumstances warranted the granting of a writ.  See Ex Parte Green
Tree, 684 So. 2d at 1305.
In these cases, there was a blatant disregard of the applicable rule.  Following their
teaching, this Court should issue the writ only upon a blatant disregard of Maryland Rule
2-231.  There was no blatant disregard of Maryland Rule 2-231 in this case.  On the
contrary, the circuit court reviewed, and applied, the procedural elements of that rule to
the circumstances of the multiple claims before it.  It simply did not abuse its discretion
to so extreme an extent as to constitute an usurpation of judicial power.  As I perceive it,
whether the trial court made the correct choice, which is, in part, what the majority
focuses on, is not yet properly before us.
II.  Trial Court Discretion
The only guidance provided to this State’s circuit court judges to assist them in
determining whether to certify a class is contained in Maryland Rule 2-231.  That Rule
requires trial judges to exercise independent judgment in making that decision.  It is not
in the interest of the Maryland judicial system to discourage trial judges from utilizing
discretion when applying basic procedural rules.  The wording of Rule 2-231, the history
of its adoption, and the relevant case law make it apparent that that is not what this Court
intended when it adopted the Rule.  Accordingly, striking of the trial court’s class
certification at this stage of the proceedings is inappropriate.  
Rules of practice and procedure are interpreted in the same manner as a statute,
that is, the same canons of construction apply in both cases. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 351
Md. 709, 717, 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998); New Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274,
627 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1993).  Thus,
“[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.”  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md.
-5-
24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995).  Legislative intent must be sought first
in the actual language of the statute.  Where the statutory language is
plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple
meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to
determine legislative intent.
 
Id. at 717-18, 720 A.2d at 315 (some citations omitted).   
Maryland Rule 2-231(c) states:
(c) Certification.  On motion of any party or on the court’s own
initiative, the court shall determine by order as soon as practicable after
commencement of the action whether it is to be maintained as a class
action.  A hearing shall be granted if requested by any party.  The order
shall include the court’s findings and reasons for certifying or refusing to
certify the action as a class action.  The order may be conditional and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
 
The rule is plain and unambiguous.  Rule 2-231 not only grants trial judges discretion to
certify class actions, but it directs them to: “determine by order as soon as practicable
after commencement of the action whether it is to be maintained as a class action.”  Id.
As worded, subsection (c) clearly demonstrates the intent of this Court to give trial judges
the discretion and authority to certify class actions.  Rule 2-231(c) also provides
guidelines for a trial judge to follow in ordering or denying class certification: the court’s
findings and reasons for certifying or refusing to certify the action as a class action must
be included in the court’s order.  Whether correct or not in this case, the trial judge’s
memorandum opinion concerning the class certification, clearly undertakes to address the
procedural aspects of this rule.
Maryland Rule 2-231(c), by providing that the “order may be conditional and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits,” also addresses concerns and
questions that may arise as to the size, limitations and management of the class.  It allows
a trial court to expedite litigation of a class action when the parameters of the class have
-6-
not yet been finalized.  The Rule contemplates, in other words, that the determination of
class certification be under the continued scrutiny of the trial judge.  Thus, the trial court
is given discretion, and is expected, to expand or whittle down the class as it sees fit; it is
given the ability to amend a certified class to more appropriate limits, as circumstances
occurring during the pre-trial proceedings dictate.  Therefore, rather than a petition for an
extraordinary writ, the better corrective measure for an oversized or inaccurate class is a
motion, directed to the trial judge, to amend the certification order.      
“The . . . language [of the Rule] is not read in isolation, but ‘in light of the full
context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general
purpose available through other evidence.’”  Stanford v. Maryland Police Training &
Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in
original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)).
Looking at it in light of the full context in which it appears, Title 2, “Civil Procedure -
Circuit Court,” reveals that Rule 2-231, by design, contemplates that the circuit court
exercise discretion in making the decision that the rule addresses.  Without any doubt, the
all-inclusive wording of Maryland Rule 2-231 places the determination, in the first
instance, of class certification with the circuit court judges.
“When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to
the words of the statute as they are printed . . . .  We may and often must
consider other ‘external manifestations’ or ‘persuasive evidence,’
including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that
occurred as it passed through the [enactment process], its relationship to
earlier and subsequent [rules], and other material that fairly bears on the
fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the
context within which we read the particular language before us in a given
case.”
  
-7-
Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987).
The history of Rule 2-231’s promulgation provides additional evidence of its
intended meaning.  In the early 1960's, this Court adopted Maryland Rule 209, thereby
addressing the need for a class action.  See generally Memorandum from Neil Tabor to
William E. Adkins and Clinton Bamburger on Class Actions (June 16, 1961) (on file with
the Rules Committee).  “[T]he primary purpose of this rule is to overcome the
impracticalities of overtly cumbersome joinder requirements.”  Kirkpatrick v. Gilchrist,
56 Md. App. 242, 249, 467 A.2d 562, 566 (1983); see also Tabor Memorandum, supra.
The Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the Rules
Committee) patterned Maryland Rule 209, not after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
but after a generally formatted proposal for a similar rule in New York.  See Minutes of
the Rules Committee, at 25 (May 11-12, 1979).  Rule 209 was adopted to codify the right
to maintain a class action, as the Rules Committee recommended, and, so, this Court used
general, rather than specific language.  See Md. Rule 209 (1982).  
In the early 1980’s, the Rules Committee proposed changes to the rule designed to
eliminate jurisdictional and statutory shortcomings, eventually resulting in the adoption of
the present rule.  Minutes of the Rules Committee, at 14-16 (Nov. 21, 1980).  The
overriding goal of the proposal was to ensure a class certification process “generally
requiring that a judge should give early consideration to the question of whether a class
action should be maintained.  The timing of this determination could be left to the trial
judge’s discretion.”  Id. at 19. 
It is apparent from this history that the rule was recommended and adopted as a
tool for the trial court to advance efficiency by (1) allowing class actions and (2) giving
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the trial courts the power to administer them.  It is clear that it was the intention that the
trial court’s class certification decision be given due deference.  Expedition of litigation is
an expected result of increased court efficiency.  Yet, granting the writ requested here
subjects the class certification decision to the possibility of being bogged down
immediately in a pretrial appellate process seeking mandamus review.  That is
counterproductive and inconsistent with the intent of Rule 2-231. 
This Court and the Court of Special Appeals both have previously interpreted the
rule as giving great deference, at least at the preliminary stages, to a trial judge’s class
certification decision.  In Bender v. Secretary, Maryland Department of Personnel, 290
Md. 345, 430 A.2d 66 (1981), the issue was whether certain parties were necessary
parties and, thus, had to be added by amendment or class certification.  Rather than
answering that question ourselves, we remanded the case to the trial court for a decision
as to whether a class certification was appropriate.  Id. at 356, 430 A.2d at 72-73.  This
Court then acknowledged that the determination whether class certification is appropriate
is a question better left, at least initially, to the trial judge’s discretion.  
The same rationale was later utilized by the Court of Special Appeals in
Kirkpatrick, supra.  That court held that a trial judge should not have dismissed an action
based on lack of necessary parties without also ruling on a motion for class action
certification.  “The message suggested to us by Bender apropos to our present concern, is
that the trial judge should have decided appellee[’s] renewed request for ruling on class
action before or concurrently with the ruling on the appellants’ motion for preliminary
relief predicated upon want of necessary parties.” 56 Md. App. at 250, 467 A.2d at 566.  
The Court of Special Appeals logically concluded that certification of a class is an
issue initially left to the trial judge.  Following Bender, the intermediate appellate court
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remanded the case, allowing the trial court to determine whether class certification was
appropriate.  Although, in that regard, the court suggested courses of action for the trial
judge to take after determining whether the certification was appropriate, id. at 250-51,
467 A.2d at 567, it was clear in stating that, on that score, it “by no means suggest[ed] the
conclusion to be reached . . . .”  Id.   
Bender and Kirkpatrick illustrate that Maryland’s appellate courts have resisted
treading, prior to finality, on territory generally left to the discretion of the trial court,
absent extraordinary circumstances amounting to a usurpation of power.  In both cases,
the appellate courts treated the class certification decision as a discretionary matter to be
decided by the trial judge.
Petitioners rely heavily on Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117
S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997), a case in which the Supreme Court overturned a
trial court order that hastily certified a class for settlement purposes without properly
analyzing and applying the class action rule.  That case, however, is distinguishable.  In
Amchem Products, the Supreme Court feared that the trial judge did not use any
discretion in certifying the class because “within the space of a single day . . . the settling
parties . . . presented to the District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement
agreement, and a joint motion for conditional class certification.”  Id. at 601-02, 117 S.
Ct. at 2239, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689.  The Supreme Court’s concern in Amchem Products was
the haste with which the certification determination was made.  We do not have the same
procedural concerns here.  The record clearly shows that, in the case sub judice, the trial
judge used discretion and seriously considered the certification issues; in a deliberate
manner, he exercised his discretion.  Indeed, the majority does not take issue with the
 The language of Maryland Rule 2-231 and D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 23 are nearly
3
identical.
-10-
manner in which the trial court exercised discretion, only the result of that exercise of
discretion.   
Whether his determinations are correct or not, the process the trial judge used to
arrive at them, was clearly correct.  When there is evidence, as in Amchem Products, that
a trial court did not take the proper steps to certify a class, then there may be some
evidence of an abuse of discretion and, therefore, justification for issuing mandamus. 
That is not the case here.    
The trial court’s exercise of discretion in formulating the issues and scope of class
actions is not final until, at least, the commencement of the trial on the merits.  In fact, it
may not achieve finality until final judgment is rendered.  As I see it, the view espoused
by the majority makes the trial court’s exercise of discretion, even at the very beginning
of the proceedings, a final exercise of discretion.  This is inconsistent with Rule 2-231
and with the view taken by courts in other jurisdictions.
In consolidated appeals after final judgment had been entered, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals recognized the importance of allowing a trial court wide
discretion in reviewing certifications of class actions: 
When seeking class certification, a plaintiff must meet each of the
four requirements of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 23(a). . . .
The party seeking
[3]  
certification has the burden of showing that the request for class
certification complies with the requirements of the rule.  Whether that
burden has been met is a matter entrusted to the trial court’s discretion, and
its decision will not be reversed unless that discretion has been abused.
Cowan v. Youssef, 687 A.2d 594, 602 (D.C. 1996) (footnote omitted) (citing Yarmolinsky
v. Perpetual Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 451 A.2d 92, 94 (D.C. 1982)); see also In re
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NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 157 (stating that trial courts “unquestionably have substantial
inherent power to manage their dockets.”); Ex Parte Gold Kist, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1339,
1341 (Ala. 1994) (noting that “class certification is generally left to the sound discretion
of the trial court.”). 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has also held that it is generally premature for an
appellate court to second guess a trial judge’s exercise of discretion in  certifying a class:
“the determination of whether an action should proceed as a class action is a matter which
is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  Only upon a finding of an abuse of that
discretion should the trial judge’s decision be modified on appeal.”  Meighan v. U.S.
Sprint Communications Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tenn. 1996) [hereinafter Meighan I]
(emphasis added) (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988)).  That court pointed out as well that “[i]t is well established that the existence of
separate issues of law and fact, particularly regarding damages, do not negate class action
certification.”  Id.; see also Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966) (noting that an act of fraud against numerous persons is an “appealing situation”
for a class action suit, despite the separate level of damages each party may have).
Reflecting on the trial judge’s ability to amend and change the limits of the class, the
Meighan I court stated: “it is properly the trial court’s prerogative to make the initial
determination of and any subsequent modifications to class certification.  The trial court
retains significant authority to redefine, modify, or clarify the class.”  Meighan I, 924
S.W.2d at 637. 
III.  Class Certification        
The prerequisites to a class action are outlined in Rule 2-231:  
(a) Prerequisites to a class action.  One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
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class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class actions maintainable.  Unless justice requires otherwise,
an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of section
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
. . . .
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.  The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class, (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum, (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
Subsection (a)(1) requires, for class certification, that the class be so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable.  In the case sub judice, the plaintiffs allege,
petitioners do not contest, and the trial judge determined, that the class consists of tens of
thousands of Maryland citizens.  Clearly, a class of that size would justify class
certification.  But, for our purposes, whether his determination is correct or not, the trial
judge did address this factor.  
To meet the requirements of Rule 2-231(a)(2), there must be found to be
questions of law or fact common to the class.  When initially considering the issue of
commonality, the standard is relatively low because the “‘commonality’ requirement is
subsumed under, or superseded by, the more stringent [Federal] Rule 23(b)(3)
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requirement that questions common to the class ‘predominate over’ other questions.”  See
Amchem Prod., 521 U.S. at 609, 117 S. Ct. at 2243, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689.  Generally,
therefore, this requirement is relatively easy to satisfy and “there need be only a single
issue common to all members of the class.”  1 Newberg, supra, § 3.10, at 3-50.  
In the case sub judice, the plaintiffs’ complaint and class certification motion
allege numerous questions of law and fact that may be common to the class, including
whether cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are addictive, whether the defendants
manipulated nicotine levels in their products, whether the defendants  conspired to
conceal and distort the results of their tobacco research, and whether affirmative defenses
are available.  It is the function, initially, of the trial judge to determine whether there are
significant “‘issues involved [that] are common to the class as a whole’ and . . . ‘turn on
questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class.’”  General
Tele. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2369, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982)
(quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 2557, 61 L. Ed. 2d
176 (1979)).  Again, whether correctly or not, these issues were addressed by the trial
judge.
Rule 2-231(a)(3) requires a factual finding that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.  “When it is
alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named
plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met
irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.”  1 Newberg,
supra, § 3.10 at 3-77.  The plaintiffs in the case sub judice, at the least, allege a common
course of deceptive conduct by defendants that was designed to create and sustain
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addiction to nicotine.  Again, regardless of the correctness of his ruling, the trial judge
addressed the issue. 
Rule 2-231(a)(4) requires the trial judge to find that the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.  Petitioners contend that this
requirement was not met because an impermissible conflict of interest prevents class
counsel from adequately representing the putative class.  The trial judge considered this
argument and ruled that there was no impermissible conflict of interest.  His rationale was
that the issue of this type of dual representation had been implicitly approved by this
Court.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harlan, 320 Md. 571, 578 A.2d 1196 (1990).
Additionally, “[a] possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation.”  Md. Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.7 cmt.  Whether ultimately determined on review to be correct
or not, this finding was neither an abuse of discretion nor an usurpation of power.
In addition to meeting the four requirements of subsection (a), a class action must
also fall within one of the four categories contained in subsection (b) of Maryland Rule 2-
231. The trial judge determined that the plaintiffs met the requirements of Maryland Rule
2-231(b)(3), which requires the court to find “that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.”  The judge, as required to do, considered both
whether the issues predominate and whether a class action is the superior way to handle
this case.  With respect to whether a class action was the superior method available for
the fair and efficient handling of the case, for example, the trial judge considered whether
the class members would be better off handling their own lawsuits, whether existing
litigation is so prolific that it would defeat the purpose of class action, whether all
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litigants should be forced into court, and whether the litigation is manageable as a class
action.  Whatever may be said as to the correctness of his conclusion, the trial judge
certainly did not ignore the issue.
 Had the trial judge not exercised discretion at all, I might perceive that issuance of
an extraordinary writ was in order.  Petitioners, however they couch the issue, ask us to
preliminarily assess the correctness of the judge’s exercise of discretion, not whether it
was exercised.  Correctness of the ruling, as I see it, is a matter for review in the normal
appellate process.  At that time, our review will be of the “final” class of litigants that
results from the trial judge’s continued supervision and modification of the class.
Nor is there a basis in this record for concluding that the trial judge usurped his
judicial authority.  The trial judge’s memorandum opinion, whether correct or not, is
comprehensive, detailed, and specific, demonstrating only a deliberate effort to comply
with Maryland Rule 2-231.  The only rationale for decertifying this class at this point is
that the majority would arrive at a different conclusion than the trial court on the set of
facts presented.  This, in my view, is neither a good nor a sufficient reason.   
By the time this case would arrive here in the normal course, the facts established
at trial may well be manifestly different, and the class may be different as well, as the
trial court modifies and narrows the class in accordance with the pretrial development of
the facts.  The trial court’s ultimate decision as to the size of the class might well be
satisfactory to the entire Court.  We will never know as the majority usurps the trial
court’s role in the process.  This Court, as I see it, should not substitute its discretion for
that of the trial judge, or determine that the trial judge has abused his discretion, at this
early stage of the proceeding, when the exercise of discretion is supposed to be
 The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari to the Third Circuit in two separate
4
appeals.  See National Gypsum Co. v. School Dist. Of Lancaster, 479 U. S. 915, 107 S. Ct.
315, 93 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. School Dist. Of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852, 107
S. Ct. 182, 93 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1986).
-16-
continuing, so that the final decision of the trial court may, or may not, be an abuse of
discretion.
To hold otherwise sets a dangerous precedent.  First, it improperly replaces the
trial court’s discretion with ours.  Second, the situation may, in the end, not warrant such
an extraordinary remedy.  It also might serve to deny to the trial judge the initial
deference in such matters to which the trial courts are entitled and might render the
application of Rule 2-231 subject to a “yo-yo” system of appeals from class action
certifications where the appellate courts, not trial courts, will end up certifying classes.  
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
867, 116 S. Ct. 184, 133 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1995), cited by petitioners as a leading case in
which mandamus was issued to vacate a class certification, provides an example of how
appellate courts become involved in this “yo-yo” pretrial appeal process, ultimately
weakening the final judgment rule.  On remand from the grant of the writ, the trial court
in that case apparently certified a new class.  The defendants, having tasted victory in the
first mandamus proceeding, challenged the plaintiffs’ schedule of expert witnesses by
again petitioning to the Seventh Circuit for the writ, which was refused.  See generally In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 138 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998).
In another example, In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.
1986),  the Third Circuit, hearing an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
4
upheld a mass tort class certification for compensatory damages only.  The defendants
later moved to decertify the class, which the trial court denied.  They petitioned the Third
-17-
Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate the order, but the writ was denied.  See
generally, In re School Asbestos Litigation, 921 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990).  Later, the trial
court denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.  The defendants for
the third time petitioned the Third Circuit for a writ to overturn the trial court’s order.
See generally In re Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d 1284 (3d Cir. 1994).
These examples reflect exactly what can happen in class action lawsuits if this
Court modifies the final judgment rule as it pertains to pretrial class action decisions.
Every defendant in major civil litigation who is disappointed by an important pretrial
ruling will contend that that defendant’s case presents extraordinary circumstances
justifying early appellate intercession.  Holding that the writ should issue here confers on
such defendants the power to stall.  In turn, plaintiffs and witnesses will die, become
impossible to locate, or their memories will fail.  Evidence will disappear or be destroyed
with time.  Plaintiffs will become discouraged and drop their suits or simply run out of
money to fund them.  At the same time, this Court will become more and more involved
with supervising pretrial matters in major civil litigation.  That is not the role we should
assume except in the most extraordinary circumstances.  
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Rodowsky have authorized me to state that they
concur with the views expressed herein.