Title: Scarborough v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

261 So. 2d 475 (1972) Charles T. SCARBOROUGH, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 46687. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 27, 1972. Rehearing Denied May 15, 1972. *476 Charles T. Scarborough, Jr., pro se. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Timmie Hancock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. SUGG, Justice: Appellant was convicted of DWI in justice of the peace court and on appeal and trial de novo in the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County was again convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $200 and serve thirty days in jail, the jail sentence being suspended. On the night of September 26, 1970 the appellant was arrested on a charge of driving while intoxicated. Highway Patrolman, Virgil Luke, noticed a line of cars driving slowly approximately 40 miles per hour on Highway 82 between Starkville and Mayhew Junction. By passing, he managed to get behind the lead car which was driven by appellant. He noticed it crossing the center line several times and decided appellant was not in sufficient control of the car. After causing appellant to stop his car the patrolman requested appellant to exhibit his drivers license. Appellant riffled through his wallet and dropped several papers onto the ground. When these were picked up, the patrolman called him to the back of the car to protect him from the flow of traffic and noticing that the appellant was not steady on his feet and smelled of alcohol, he placed him under arrest. Thereupon the appellant became upset, told the arresting officer he was crazy and in the words of the officer, "called me a lots of other names." Fearing that he might become unmanageable, the patrolman radioed for additional patrolmen to help if it proved necessary. No other highway patrol cars were in the vicinity so he asked a policeman to meet him at the city limits. When they arrived at the county jail three other officers met them. The appellant used profanity directed toward the arresting officer while being escorted from the patrol car to the jail, and threatened him with a charge of police brutality. Appellant was placed in jail and held there incommunicado until morning. At the trial in circuit court all four officers testified that the appellant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Appellant testified in his own behalf stating that he and his wife had a late supper about 8:30 p.m.; that about 10:00 p.m. he drove slowly to West Point and drank two eight ounce glasses of beer at the Southern Inn. He further testified that he went to Mize's Lounge around 11:00 p.m. and ordered a glass of beer which he sipped until about 11:30 p.m., which is closing time. Mrs. Ricks, an employee of Mize's Restaurant in West Point, testified that she served appellant one glass of beer and that he left about 11:30 p.m. and was sober at the time he left. The wife of appellant testified that her husband left home at approximately 10:00 p.m. and that he had not had any alcohol at the time he left. Appellant then introduced two character witnesses who testified that his general reputation in the community in which he lived was good. Appellant argues five assignments of error as follows: (1) The prosecution suppressed the evidence by not giving the appellant the opportunity to call disinterested witnesses of his choosing so that they could render a judgment as to appellant's sobriety; (2) The appellant was convicted on perjured testimony given by the police and known to be perjured by the prosecuting attorney; *477 (3) The trial court erred when it admitted a portion of Officer Williams' testimony in the evidence; (4) The prosecution suppressed evidence by not giving the appellant the opportunity to call a doctor so that a blood test could be made; and (5) The prosecution suppressed evidence by intimidating a defense witness and then releasing this witness from jail before his time was up without notifying the appellant or appellant's attorney. Assignments of error numbered (1) and (4) will be discussed later in the opinion. By his second assignment of error, appellant charges that perjured testimony was given by the police and such fact was known by the prosecuting attorney. Apparently, appellant is complaining about a variance in the testimony of Officers Williams and McLemore at the trial in justice of the peace court and trial in the circuit court. The record does not reflect what the testimony of the officers was at the first trial. No objection was made at the second trial based on a variance in the testimony; therefore, appellant has not preserved the assigned error for review on appeal. By his third assignment of error, appellant complains that the circuit judge was in error in overruling his objection to a question as leading. The record shows the following: The question objected to was leading, but it was harmless error, and was cured by appellant on cross-examination when he brought out the fact that the arresting officer did not need any help in handling the appellant on the night of the arrest. By his fifth assignment of error, the appellant claims that the prosecution intimidated a defense witness, William Estes, but has gone completely out of the record to argue this assignment of error. He had knowledge, at the time of the trial, of the facts he argues to this Court in support of his assignment of error. Appellant did not raise this question on his trial; therefore, it is not properly before this Court on appeal. Appellant's first and fourth assignments of error present the most serious questions. While being transported to jail by the arresting officer, appellant's request that a blood test be made was denied. After being placed in jail his request to use the telephone was ignored. It was shown that it was not the practice to force or allow any prisoner to have a blood test when arrested for driving while intoxicated. The evidence also shows it was the practice to hold persons charged with intoxication several hours before they were allowed to use a telephone. It is a matter of common knowledge that time sobers a drunk up since the level of alcohol in the blood decreases with each passing hour. The critical stage in proceedings against anyone charged with intoxication, is immediately after the arrest. To limit such a person's access to an attorney or friends until after a certain number of hours have passed is in effect denying him effective means to prepare a defense. *478 This practice will become particularly acute when the Mississippi Implied Consent Act goes into effect April 1, 1972. The Legislature included within the act a provision giving an accused the right to an additional test conducted by anyone of his choice who is qualified. Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated, section 8175-18 (Supp. 1971). If such a practice is allowed to continue, it would in fact nullify the statute and frustrate the intention of the Legislature. The question clearly presented is whether or not the action of the police officers amounted to a suppression of evidence that would constitute a denial of fundamental fairness and be shocking to the universal sense of justice. This case differs from Capler v. City of Greenville, 207 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1968), in that the appellant in Capler did not make a request to use a telephone. The Fifth Circuit held in Capler v. City of Greenville, Mississippi, 422 F.2d 299 (1970) that the appellant was not deprived of due process because there was no prosecutional suppression of evidence so as to bring into play Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Other states have held that holding a prisoner incommunicado and unreasonably ignoring his requests for assistance in procuring tests amounts to a denial of due process of law. In State v. Munsey, 152 Maine 198, 127 A.2d 79 (1956) the Maine Court stated: In State v. Reyna, 92 Idaho 669, 448 P.2d 762 (Idaho 1968), the Idaho Court stated: We announce as a constitutional rule that holding a prisoner incommunicado and unreasonably denying or ignoring his request for assistance to have tests made amounts to a denial of due process of law by thus suppressing possible evidence favorable to the defendant, provided the defendant can show: 1. Request to have a test made at his own expense. 2. Cooperation with officers so that no reasonable apprehension of difficulty in handling the prisoner exists so the test can be made consistent with safe custody. 3. Availability of facilities and personnel to make test at time and place requested which is reasonably accessible to the place of incarceration. 4. Refusal by officers to permit prisoner to communicate with an attorney or other person of his choice in an effort to have a requested test made. The next question is whether or not the ruling announced here will be applied retrospectively or prospectively. The constitutional rule announced in this case is new and in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965), the Supreme Court of the United States stated: The Court further stated that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. In Linkletter the court also stated: "A ruling which is purely prospective does not apply even to the parties before the court" and cites as authority England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S. Ct. 461, 11 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1964), where the rule was applied prospectively. In England, supra, the Supreme Court stated: After announcing the rule the court stated: In Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 92 S. Ct. 916, 31 L. Ed. 2d 202, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 6, 1972, the Court stated: The proof shows that the appellant in the instant case caused the arresting officer some trouble, and when asked why he did not take the appellant to the hospital and give him a blood test, the officer replied that he was having enough trouble to get him into the county jail, and he did not want to take any more chances of having to carry him to the hospital. There was sufficient justification shown by the record for the refusal of the officer to carry him to the hospital. The arrest of the defendant was made about midnight and it is recognized by the Court that it might have been difficult, if not impossible, to have a test made at such an hour. Appellant did not show at his trial that the requested blood test could have been made and this Court, in order to reverse his conviction, would be forced to speculate as to the availability of personnel and facilities at the time of his arrest and incarceration. Appellant should have presented proof of these facts at his trial, but instead of so doing, chose to present the question of his sobriety on the evidence shown in the record. There was ample evidence for the jury to find appellant guilty and the state was under no obligation to obtain for him what he speculates might have been more scientific evidence of his sobriety. This Court has carefully considered the criteria summarized in Adams, supra, and after weighing the prior justified reliance upon the old standard and the impact of retroactivity upon the administration of justice, we are of the opinion that the constitutional rule announced in this case should be prospective in its application. We do not think the authorities are to be faulted for not anticipating the rule herein announced because there has been no clear foreshadowing of this rule. The rule announced *481 will apply only to those persons arrested after the date of this decision. We are of the opinion that the rule will enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial and it is not limited to cases involving persons charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It shall extend to all cases where the time after arrest and detention is the controlling factor in the accuracy of chemical or other tests on the person of the accused, and where such tests will provide reliable scientific information as an aid in the search for truth. For the reasons stated, this case is affirmed. Affirmed. RODGERS, P.J., and BRADY, PATTERSON and SMITH, JJ., concur.