Title: Ex parte The City of Dothan. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: City of Dothan v. Rustin McCardle)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/13/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1080205
_________________________
Ex parte City of Dothan
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  City of Dothan
v.
Rustin McCardle)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-08-393)
LYONS, Justice.
The City of Dothan ("the City") has filed a petition for
a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct the
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2
Houston Circuit Court to vacate its order directing that the
criminal record of Rustin McCardle be purged.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.  
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
In December 2002, McCardle was charged with carrying a
pistol without a license, in violation of § 13A-11-73, Ala.
Code 1975.  That section provides: "No person shall carry a
pistol in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person,
except on his land, in his own abode or fixed place of
business, without a license therefor as hereinafter provided."
Violation of § 13A-11-73 is "punishable by imprisonment for
any term less than one year or by a fine of not more than
$500.00, or both."  § 13A-11-84, Ala. Code 1975.  
The arresting officer described the events underlying the
charge against McCardle in an offense report prepared for the
Dothan Police Department.  The officer stated that, during a
traffic stop of a vehicle McCardle was driving on December 29,
2002, he noticed a gun case partially under the front
passenger seat of McCardle's vehicle.  McCardle got out of the
vehicle, and the officer confirmed that the case contained a
pistol.  McCardle told the officer that the pistol belonged to
1080205
In his answer to the City's petition for a writ of
1
mandamus, McCardle states that he originally requested the
City to purge its records relating to his conviction on March
26, 2008, and that, when the City denied his request, he then
appealed to the circuit court.  However, McCardle does not
cite any document to support this statement, and the documents
McCardle does refer to in his recitation of the facts are not
attached to his brief.
3
his brother and that he had used it at a shooting range a few
days before.  It is undisputed that McCardle did not have a
license to carry the pistol in his vehicle as required by
§ 13A-11-73.  Accordingly, the officer arrested McCardle, and
McCardle was charged with "carrying a pistol without a
permit," in violation of § 13A-11-73.
McCardle pleaded guilty to the charge in the Dothan
Municipal Court.  The municipal court sentenced McCardle to 30
days in jail, imposed a $100 fine, and assessed court costs of
$146.  The municipal court then suspended the jail sentence
and placed McCardle on probation for two years.  It is
undisputed that McCardle has fulfilled the terms of his
sentence.  The record of McCardle's conviction shows that he
was represented by counsel when he entered the guilty plea.
On March 26, 2008, McCardle petitioned the Houston
Circuit Court to "expunge the record of his conviction,"
purportedly pursuant to § 41-9-646, Ala. Code 1975.   McCardle
1
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4
contended that the charge "carrying a pistol without a permit"
was 
inaccurate 
because, 
McCardle 
argued, 
a 
"clear
understanding of such language is that [he] had a pistol on
his person when in fact the pistol was in a case under the
passenger side of a vehicle which [he] was driving."  McCardle
argued that the language of the charge was so prejudicial that
it could not be corrected.  He also argued that his plea was
entered without counsel and without full knowledge of the
"civil consequences due to the wording of the charge."
According to McCardle, the conviction, as reported, has
jeopardized his employment as a driver of a hazardous-
materials tanker.
On March 28, 2008, the circuit court entered an order
granting McCardle's petition.  The  circuit court found that
McCardle's 
conviction 
was 
"inaccurate, 
incomplete, 
or
misleading [and that modification of the order of conviction]
would be a waste of judicial economy and be further
misleading."  The circuit court ordered that McCardle's record
"be purged, deleted and dissolved from the records of the
municipal court records to include any electronic and computer
generated records of said charge."  On April 15, 2008, the
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5
City filed a motion to reconsider; the City contends that it
did not know McCardle had filed a petition to expunge his
record until that date.  The circuit court denied the City's
motion on April 17, 2008, but on April 30, 2008, it set aside
its order denying the motion and scheduled a hearing on the
motion.  On July 30, 2008, the circuit court purported to
again deny the City's motion and confirmed its original ruling
on McCardle's petition.  On September 4, 2008, the City filed
a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil
Appeals.  The Court of Civil Appeals, without an opinion,
denied the petition as untimely filed, Ex parte City of Dothan
(No. 2071131, Oct. 29, 2008), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2008)(table), and, pursuant to Rule 21(e), Ala. R. App. P.,
the City filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this
Court on November 12, 2008.
II. Standard of Review
"'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"
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Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499
(Ala. 1995)).  "When we consider a mandamus petition, the
scope of our review is to determine whether the trial court
clearly exceeded its discretion."  State v Bui, 888 So. 2d
1227, 1229 (Ala. 2004).  In State v. Blane, 985 So. 2d 384,
386 (Ala. 2007), this Court determined that a writ of mandamus
was an appropriate remedy for relief from a trial court's
order regarding the expunging of criminal records (citing Ex
parte Burns, 261 Ala. 217, 222, 73 So. 2d 912, 916 (1954)).
III. Analysis
A.  The Timeliness of the Petition
Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a petition
for a writ of mandamus "shall be filed within a reasonable
time."  Rule 21(a)(3) further provides:
"The presumptively reasonable time for filing a
petition seeking review of an order of a trial court
or of a lower appellate court shall be the same as
the time for taking an appeal. If a petition is
filed outside this presumptively reasonable time, it
shall 
include 
a 
statement 
of 
circumstances
constituting good cause for the appellate court to
consider the petition, notwithstanding that it was
filed beyond the presumptively reasonable time."
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7
Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides that appeals permitted
by law as of right must be taken within 42 days from "the date
of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from."  The
City contends that its petition to the Court of Civil Appeals
was timely because the circuit court entered the order denying
its motion to reconsider and confirming the ruling on
McCardle's petition on July 30, 2008.  The City filed its
petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil
Appeals 36 days later, on September 4, 2008.
McCardle contends that the City's petition is untimely
because, he says, the City's motion to reconsider was denied
not by order of the court, but by operation of law pursuant to
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.  That rule provides: 
"No postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rules
50, 52, 55, or 59 shall remain pending in the trial
court for more than ninety (90) days .... A failure
by the trial court to dispose of any pending post-
judgment motion within the time permitted hereunder,
or any extension thereof, shall constitute a denial
of such motion as of the date of the expiration of
the period."
McCardle argues first that the City's motion to reconsider is,
in fact, a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment
under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., and second, that the 90-day
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See Wessex House of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Kelley, 908 So.
2
2d 226, 228-29 (Ala. 2005), in which this Court determined
that a party's motion to alter, amend, or vacate was not a
Rule 59 motion because the order to which it related was not
an appealable order and therefore Rule 59.1 did not apply.
8
period of Rule 59.1 began to run on April 15, 2008, the date
the City filed its motion to reconsider.
Assuming, without deciding, that Rule 59.1 applied to the
City's motion to reconsider,  that motion was not "pending"
2
within the meaning of Rule 59.1 for the entire 106-day period
from the April 15, 2008, filing of the motion to the circuit
court's July 30, 2008, ruling on the motion.  The motion was
pending for two days before the circuit court denied it on
April 17, 2008.  The circuit court then set aside that ruling
and reinstated the motion on April 30, 2008.  During the
intervening 13 days between the denial and the order setting
aside the denial, the motion to reconsider did not "remain
pending."  However, the circuit court's April 30, 2008, order
setting aside its denial of the motion and scheduling a
hearing on it revived the motion, and it was again "pending"
on that date.  The motion to reconsider was denied by
operation of law on July 29, 2008, 90 days from April 30,
2008, and before the circuit court purported to rule on it on
1080205
"Section 41-9-645 does not expressly refer to 'criminal
3
records'; rather, the first paragraph of § 41-9-645 refers to
'such information.' We assume that 'such information' means
criminal records, which are dealt with in § 41-9-643, Ala.
Code 1975, the section that immediately preceded § 41-9-645
when those sections were originally adopted."  Mobile Press
Register, Inc. v. Lackey, 938 So. 2d 398, 403 n.3 (Ala. 2006).
9
July 30, 2008.  The City filed its petition for a writ of
mandamus 37 days later, on September 4, 2008, within the
presumptively reasonable period established by Rules 4(a)(1)
and 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.  Accordingly, even if Rule 59.1
applied to the City's motion to reconsider, the City's
petition for a writ of mandamus was timely filed.
B.  The Merits of the Petition
In his petition to the circuit court seeking to have his
record expunged, McCardle sought relief under § 41-9-646, Ala.
Code 1975.  Together, §§ 41-9-645 and -646 establish specific
circumstances in which a circuit court may order that
"inaccurate, incomplete or misleading" information be purged
from a criminal record.  Section 41-9-645 provides, in
relevant part: "If an individual believes ... information [in
his criminal record ] to be inaccurate or incomplete, he may
3
request the original agency having custody or control of the
detail records to purge, modify or supplement them and to so
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10
notify the [Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center] of
such changes."  Section 41-9-645 then provides for an appeal
to the circuit court for a de novo hearing if the individual
is unsatisfied with the agency's response to the request.
Section 41-9-646 provides: "Should the record in question be
found to be inaccurate, incomplete or misleading, the court
shall order it to be appropriately purged, modified or
supplemented by an explanatory notation." 
This Court has construed the term "purge" as used in
§ 41-9-645 "to mean something less than complete expungement.
... The term 'purge' means: 'to make free of something
unwanted.' Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1010 (11th
ed. 2003)."  Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Lackey, 938 So. 2d
398, 403 (Ala. 2006).  This Court has explained:
"Thus, if there is erroneous information in the
record, 
the 
record 
may 
be 
purged 
of 
that
information; if the record misstates the offense, it
may be modified; or, if the record is incomplete, it
may be supplemented. However, all of this is
directed at making the record accurate, not making
it disappear."
State v. Blane, 985 So. 2d at 387.
In Blane, Milton Blane "pleaded guilty to third-degree
theft of property" and "fulfilled the terms of his sentence."
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985 So. 2d at 385.  He later moved "to have his criminal
record expunged, arguing that the record [was] 'misleading'
and that it [had] had a detrimental effect on his ability to
run his business." 985 So. 2d at 385.  Blane based his
argument on the premise that his actions did not constitute
theft of property; they were, he argued, more properly
characterized as fraud.  Blane contended that at the time he
entered his guilty plea, he did not understand the full import
of the plea.  The trial court entered an order expunging
Blane's record, and the State filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus.  985 So. 2d at 386.
This Court examined §§ 41-9-645 and -646 and determined
that the trial court in Blane had exceeded its discretion,
stating: "[I]t appears undisputed that the records at issue
accurately reflect that Blane pleaded guilty to the offense of
third-degree theft of property, that he was convicted of that
offense, and that he received a suspended sentence and was
ordered to pay costs, fees, and restitution." 985 So. 2d at
387.  This Court reasoned: 
"Although he now argues that he was not guilty of
that crime, Blane does not argue that his conviction
violated any of the constitutional protections
afforded an accused. Instead, he contends that he
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12
followed what may have been unwise legal advice and
that he did not understand the full ramifications of
pleading guilty to a misdemeanor offense. These
facts do not render the record of conviction
inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading."
985 So. 2d at 387.  This Court concluded:  "Blane has been
convicted of a crime, and his record of conviction is not
inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading; therefore, § 41-9-646,
Ala. Code 1975, does not authorize the circuit court to purge,
modify, supplement, or expunge that record."  985 So. 2d at
387-88.
Based on Blane and on §§ 41-9-645 and -646, Ala. Code
1975, the City contends that the circuit court exceeded its
discretion in ordering that McCardle's criminal record be
"purged, deleted and dissolved from the records of the
municipal court records to include any electronic and computer
generated records of said charge."  We agree.  As was the case
with Blane, McCardle "has been convicted of a crime, and his
record of conviction is not inaccurate, incomplete, or
misleading."  Blane, 985 So. 2d at 387.  The criminal record
at issue accurately reflects that McCardle pleaded guilty to
the offense of carrying a pistol without a permit.  That
offense denotes a violation of § 13A-11-73, and the written
charge 
against 
McCardle accurately states 
the charged
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Before this Court, as to the merits of his petition,
4
McCardle has argued only that the handwritten record of his
conviction is illegible.  McCardle cites no authority to
support his position regarding the illegibility of the
handwritten record, and the City correctly notes that the
circuit court also ordered the deletion of all computer-
generated records of the conviction, which records would not
suffer from the same illegibility as handwritten records.
13
violation of § 13A-11-73.  Section 13A-11-73 provides that
"[n]o person shall carry a pistol in any vehicle ... without
a license therefor...."  (Emphasis added.)  McCardle admitted
to carrying a pistol in his vehicle without a license to do
so.  Accordingly, McCardle's criminal record accurately
reflects the circumstances of his conviction; it is not
inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading within the meaning of
§§ 41-9-645 and -646.
McCardle argued to the circuit court that the charge is
misleading in that it communicates that he was carrying the
pistol on his person.  He has abandoned this argument in his
answer to the City's petition.   We note, however, that
4
McCardle was charged with "carrying a pistol without a
permit."  That phrase, and thus the charge, is consistent with
§ 13A-11-73, which embraces carrying a pistol in a vehicle,
and is not misleading.  
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14
Any concerns that in common parlance the word "carrying"
connotes possessing on the person rather than transporting in
a 
vehicle 
should 
be 
addressed 
to 
the 
legislature.
Furthermore, even if the circuit court was satisfied that,
under the facts of this case, the terminology used by the
legislature in defining the offense was misleading in that it
suggested that McCardle carried the weapon on his person and
not merely in a vehicle, as McCardle contended in the circuit
court, the circuit court did not have authority to order the
complete removal and deletion of the record of McCardle's
conviction.  In Blane, this Court declined to "read the word
'expunge' [meaning to treat the record as if it had never
existed] into" § 6-5-646.  985 So. 2d at 387.  As this Court
explained, the efforts authorized by the statute are "directed
at making the record accurate, not making it disappear."  Id.
Accordingly, the circuit court had no authority to order the
complete purge, dissolution, and deletion of McCardle's
criminal record.
IV. Conclusion  
For the reasons previously stated, we conclude that the
circuit court exceeded its discretion in granting McCardle's
petition to expunge his criminal record and ordering that the
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15
record be "purged, deleted and dissolved."  We therefore grant
the City's petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the
circuit court to vacate its order granting McCardle's
petition.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.