Title: Trombly Plumbing & Heating v. Quinn

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 70













Trombly Plumbing & Heating v.
Quinn, Quinn, and Gority
 
2011 VT 70
 
[Filed 6-Jul-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 70
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-198
 
JANUARY TERM, 2011
 
Trombly
  Plumbing & Heating
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
}
Caledonia Superior Court 
 
}
 
 
}
 
Edward A. Quinn, Thomas J. Quinn,
  
and Regina Gority
}
DOCKET NO. 162-5-08 Cacv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Alan W. Cook
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
This case arises out of a construction contract dispute between
contractor Trombly Plumbing & Heating and
homeowners Edward Quinn, Thomas Quinn, and Regina Gority.
 The trial court entered judgment for homeowners on contractor's claims
and dismissed homeowners' counterclaims.  It also made no award of
attorney's fees.  Contractor argues the trial court erred by:
(1) improperly placing the burden of proof on contractor with respect to
homeowners' defenses and making insufficient findings to support its decision,
and (2) improperly applying the "substantially prevailing party" standard under
the Prompt Payment Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 4001-4009.  Homeowners
cross-appeal, arguing the trial court erred in finding that homeowners were not
qualified to offer testimony as to damages for the corrective work
performed.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
In the summer of 2007, contractor and homeowners agreed that contractor
would perform services relating to the heating and hot water systems of
homeowners' residential vacation property.  Contractor wrote up a proposal
for homeowners' review.  Homeowners signed off on the proposal, and work
began in August 2007.  The total cost of the job as proposed was about
$28,000.  After a final walk-through of the property in late fall 2007,
contractor billed homeowners for a final balance of $7,113.40.  Homeowners
did not pay this balance because it was for work they claimed was not performed
correctly and completely in accordance with their agreement. 
    
¶ 3.            
Between November 2007 and February 2008, homeowners experienced a number
of problems with the home that they attributed to contractor's work, such as
pipes freezing and furnaces shutting down and leaking.  Homeowners were
concerned about whether contractor had installed the boiler vents with
sufficient clearance distance from the ground.  They were also displeased
with the aesthetics of contractor's work, especially the placement of wires and
pipes on the exterior of walls.           
¶ 4.            
Contractor brought an initial action for breach of contract and
violation of the Prompt Payment Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 4001-4009, seeking the balance
due plus the cost of collection.  Homeowners counterclaimed for breach of contract,
negligence, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and consumer fraud.  They sought actual and
punitive damages, as well as litigation costs.    
¶ 5.            
At trial, contractor introduced evidence of the contract, the work
completed, and homeowners' failure to pay the final invoice.  Homeowners
did not challenge the existence of the contract or the amount of the unpaid
invoice.  Instead, they disputed the quality of contractor's work. 
They described the multiple problems that had required additional corrective
work but did not offer expert testimony regarding the quality of the work or
the problems' potential causes.  Contractor also admitted on the record
that the placement of certain vents could be a health hazard and that certain
wires and pipes were attached to the walls' exterior, rather than placed within
walls.  
¶ 6.            
The trial court read its decision into the record.  It ultimately
decided that contractor could not recover from homeowners and homeowners could
not recover from contractor, and each party would bear its own costs and
fees.  The court found that homeowners were not liable to contractor for
anything beyond what they had already paid because the work "was not well
done," there were many problems with the work, and the problems were not
resolved until another plumber came to fix them.  The court thus found
homeowners to be the prevailing parties on contractor's claims because
contractor did not prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.  As
contractor did not prevail on the merits of the case, the court found there
could be no award of attorney's fees.  The court also dismissed all of
homeowners' counterclaims.  It found that the evidence submitted was insufficient,
given that there was no testimony from anyone who did repair work about the
problems that had to be corrected or whether the amounts paid for corrective
work were fair and reasonable.  The court issued a written judgment
implementing the oral decision.    
¶ 7.            
On appeal, contractor argues that the trial court committed reversible
error by:  (1) improperly placing the burden of proof on contractor
with respect to homeowners' defenses and counterclaims and making insufficient
findings to support this aspect of its decision; and (2) applying the
wrong legal standard with respect to a determination of the "substantially
prevailing party" under the Prompt Payment Act.  Homeowners argue on
appeal that the trial court erred in finding that they were not qualified to
submit evidence and testify as to damages in connection with the corrective
work done.  
¶ 8.            
Contractor first argues that the trial court improperly allocated the
burden of proof on homeowners' defenses to contractor.  Contractor
contends that he made out a prima facie case with respect to his claims of
breach of contract and Prompt Payment Act violation, but the trial court
essentially required him to prove that his work was not substandard.  Relatedly, contractor argues that the trial court made
insufficient findings to support a judgment in favor of homeowners on
contractor's claims.  We disagree. 
¶ 9.            
It is true that contractor made out a prima facie case under the Prompt
Payment Act, but homeowners responded by disputing the quality of contractor's
work.  See 9 V.S.A. § 4007(a) ("Nothing in this chapter shall prevent
an owner . . . from withholding payment in whole or in part under a
construction contract in an amount equaling the value of any good faith claims
against an invoicing contractor . . . , including claims arising from
unsatisfactory job progress, defective construction, [or] disputed
work . . . ."); see also Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 2006 VT 16, ¶ 12, 179 Vt. 351, 895 A.2d 193 ("A
claim of failure to pay will virtually always be met with some defense that
reflects a breakdown in the working relationship between the owner and the
contractorfor example, as here, a defense of breach of contract or defective
workmanship.  In fact, the prompt payment act specifically contemplates
owners withholding payments in good faith . .
. .").  The trial court found that contractor's work was not well
done.  Thus, the trial court found that homeowners would not be liable to
contractor beyond what they had already paida finding, in essence, that
homeowners had withheld an amount equaling their good faith claims against
contractor.  It concluded that homeowners prevailed on contractor's claims
for further payment.  While the trial court's articulation of its decision
may have appeared to place the burden on contractor, it did not result in any
injustice to contractor.  Given the ample evidence that contractor's work
was substandard, a different application of the burden
would not have changed the result.  The trial court's conclusion was
supported by its findings, and we have no reason to disturb it.  Waterbury Feed Co., LLC v. O'Neil, 2006 VT 126, ¶ 6, 181 Vt.
535, 915 A.2d 759 (mem.) (explaining
that we uphold trial court's conclusions if reasonably supported by
findings).            
¶ 10.        
Contractor argues, however, that the trial court made insufficient
findings to support its conclusion.  In particular, he challenges the lack
of specificity in the court's findings, as well as what he perceives as internal
inconsistency in the findings.   On appeal, we uphold findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.   Naylor v. Cusson, 2007 VT 108, ¶ 7, 182 Vt. 627, 940 A.2d 717 (mem.); see V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2). 
The trial court's findings will stand if there is reasonable and credible
evidence to support them.  Naylor, 2007 VT 108, ¶
7.  Here, although minimal, the trial court's findings were
sufficient.  The trial court found enough to allow us to understand and
review its judgment in homeowners' favor.  There was more than enough
evidence at trial to support the court's finding that contractor's work was not
performed well, including evidence of breakdowns of the plumbing and heating
system following his work, installation of vents with inadequate clearance, and
stapling of wires to the outside of walls, in addition to contractor's various
admissions regarding substandard work.  Even though the trial court did
not make specific findings regarding homeowners' good faith claims and the
amount withheld, we presume that a general finding in favor of one party is a
finding of every fact necessary to sustain it.  See Naylor, 2007 VT
108, ¶ 15 (explaining that finding on workmanship was not "impermissibly conclusory" where trial court judge did not itemize
construction complaints in order); In re Heath, 128 Vt. 519, 523, 266 A.2d 812, 815 (1970) ("A general finding in favor of one party or another is a
finding of every special fact necessary to sustain it and is conclusive as to
such facts, if there is evidence to support a finding of their
existence.").    
¶ 11.        
Contractor nonetheless faults the trial court for failing to make more
specific findings, given that the parties submitted proposed findings. 
Contractor relies on our aside in Naylor that "greater specificity in a
trial court's order may be required where the parties submit proposed findings
of itemized facts."  Id.  This reliance is misplaced.  In
Naylor, we did not require greater specificity in trial court orders
where parties submit proposed findings of itemized facts.  We merely
stated that the homeowners' lack of a request for specific findings in that
case undermined their assertion that the trial court's findings lacked required
specificity.  Id.  We agree that more specific findings are
always helpful to the reviewing courtbut the trial court did not commit error
here with its more general findings.  Because we find the trial court's
findings sufficient, we need not address contractor's argument that the trial
court was obliged to make more precise findings because contractor requested
written findings.  
¶ 12.        
Contractor argues that the trial court's judgment in favor of homeowners
on contractor's claims "cannot be squared" with the trial court's express
finding that homeowners failed to prove each and all of their claims. 
Contractor misconstrues the trial court's findings.  The trial court
dismissed homeowners' counterclaims only because they failed to produce the
experts who did the work, and the trial court deemed their own testimony
insufficient evidence as to the exact corrective work done and reasonableness
of the amounts paid.  This is not inconsistent with its findings that
contractor performed substandard work or that, in withholding the unpaid
balance, homeowners withheld the value of their good faith claims against
contractor.  
¶ 13.        
Next, contractor contends that the trial court misapplied the standard
for determining substantially prevailing party status under the Prompt Payment Act. 
The Prompt Payment Act requires the court to award attorney's fees to the party
it finds has substantially prevailed.  9 V.S.A. § 4007(c); see Fletcher
Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 10, 178 Vt.
77, 872 A.2d 292.  The trial court has discretion, however, in determining
which party, if any, "substantially prevailed."  Fletcher
Hill, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 12.  Contrary to contractor's argument, the
trial court did not misapply the standard.  In its discretion, the trial
court found that neither party would be awarded attorney's fees under the
Prompt Payment Act.  See Burton v. Jeremiah Beach Parker Restoration
& Constr. Mgmt. Corp., 2010 VT 55, ¶ 8, ___ Vt. ___, 6 A.3d 38
(explaining that trial court applies flexible standard, not net victor
approach, to determine substantially prevailing party under Prompt Payment
Act).  We therefore defer here to the trial court's decision that neither
party "substantially prevailed" within the meaning of the statute.  See Fletcher Hill, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 14 (explaining that Prompt
Payment Act does not require finding substantially prevailing party in every
case).  
¶ 14.        
Homeowners argue that the trial court erred in finding that they were
not qualified to submit evidence and testify as to damages in connection with
the corrective work done.  The trial court committed no error in this
regard.  The trial court was within its discretion to conclude that
homeowners did not have the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education needed to qualify as experts to testify about the problems requiring
correction and whether the amounts paid were fair and reasonable for the
corrections made.  See V.R.E. 702; State v. Griswold, 172
Vt. 443, 447, 782 A.2d 1144, 1148 (2001) (explaining that competency of expert
witness is threshold question to be determined by exercise of trial court's
sound discretion).  Because this testimony required knowledge about the
trade and, likely, comparison to industry practices, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to require an expert witness.  
           
Affirmed.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber,
  Chief Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice