Title: Kennon & Associates, Inc. v. Gentry

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

492 So. 2d 312 (1986)
KENNON & ASSOCIATES, INC.
v.
Donald S. GENTRY, et al.
84-1225.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 30, 1986.
*313 James R. McKoon, Jr., Phenix City, for appellant.
Homer W. Cornett of Cornett & Ivins, Phenix City, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal by Kennon & Associates, Inc. ("Kennon"), from a final decree rendered in favor of plaintiffs, Donald S. Gentry, James M. Adams, and J. Monte Miller, resident property owners of Phenix City, in plaintiffs' suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. We affirm.
Kennon made a contract to purchase a residential lot bearing a street address of 4503 Summerville Road, Phenix City. The terms of this contract called for a cash payment of $16,000 to the seller at closing, subject to the purchaser's obtaining satisfactory rezoning. Kennon desired to construct a day care center for children on the lot; at the time the contract was executed, there was located on it a residential structure which had been extensively damaged by fire. At that time, this lot was zoned R-1, single family residence, pursuant to Ordinance No. 79-6, the Phenix City comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted March 20, 1979. Having been advised that a C-2 zone would be appropriate for a nursery school, Kennon applied to the city for such a rezoning. On the day of that application, or the day before, a 4- by 8-foot sign was placed on the lot advertising Kennon's application for a rezoning of the lot.
On June 11, 1984, the Phenix City Planning Commission held a public meeting, during which the rezoning petition was presented. At this time, a petition was presented containing the names of 77 persons in favor of the petition. A petition containing the names of 62 neighboring property owners who opposed the rezoning petition was also presented. In due course, the Planning Commission voted 5 to 2 to approve the rezoning petition.
At a regular meeting of the city council held on June 19, 1984, the proposed ordinance (84-21) to amend the comprehensive zoning ordinance was offered for its first reading, and by a 5 to 0 vote was placed on first reading.
On July 17, 1984, rezoning ordinance 84-21 was before the city council for public hearing and was presented for a second reading and for a vote. There were two votes for approval, two votes against approval, and one abstention. Thus, the ordinance failed to pass.
Ordinance 84-21 was again placed on the agenda for the city council meeting of August 7, 1984, and was approved for first reading by a vote of 3 to 2. Thereafter, on September 4, 1984, it was submitted to the regular city council meeting and passed by a 3 to 2 vote.
Following the ordinance's adoption, Kennon purchased the lot, procured architect's plans, and cleared the lot. Then, in December 1984, Mr. Kennon learned that he was to first obtain from the Board of Zoning Adjustment a special exception permit to build a nursery school. When Mr. Kennon appeared at the January 10, 1985, meeting of the board, the motion to approve his plans was tabled. At the next meeting, the board denied his request. Kennon contested the decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment in the Russell Circuit Court, which upheld the decision of that board.
After the defeat of Kennon's request for a special exception permit to build a nursery school, plaintiff Gentry appeared before the city council on two occasions in an attempt to get the council to rezone the Kennon lot back from C-2 to R-1. Those attempts failed, and this suit was filed on April 3, 1985.
*314 By their complaint as amended, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring the amending ordinance, 84-21, null and void, and further sought to enjoin Kennon from using the property in any manner permitted by amendment 84-21. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged the following regarding to the passage of amendment 84-21:
Plaintiffs further alleged that ordinance 84-21 was void because "proper legislative procedures were not followed, resulting in a denial of due process to the plaintiffs."
The matter was heard on June 20, 1985, and on July 16, 1985, the trial court entered an order, set forth in pertinent part below, granting plaintiffs' requested relief:
"[T]he Court finds as follows:
It is from this order that Kennon appeals. Although a named defendant below, the City of Phenix City did not join in this appeal.
The comprehensive zoning ordinance (Ordinance No. 79-6) adopted on March 20, 1979, by the City Council of Phenix City contains a section (Article XI) in which regulations with respect to amendments are set forth. Besides the statutory notice requirements contained in Code of 1975, § 11-52-77 (see Builders Development Co. v. City of Opelika, 360 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala.1978)), Article XI, Section 2, of Ordinance No. 79-6 mandates the following additional notice requirements applicable to rezoning applications:
The above notice requirements are mandatory, because Article II of Ordinance No. 79-6 provides in part that:
In its brief on appeal, Kennon concedes (and the record discloses) that, in fact, there were adjacent landowners who did not receive by registered mail notice of the rezoning action pending. Those landowners include Mr. Monte Miller; the City of Phenix City; and others whose land adjoins a lot belonging to a Mr. George Lenoir, whose lot was mistakenly included in the description of the Kennon property to be rezoned. Indeed, Mr. Lenoir was not even aware of the pending action until after the amending ordinance was passed rezoning the Kennon lot as well as his own property.
This Court has held that the statutory 15-day notice requirements contained in § 11-52-74 and § 11-52-77 are mandatory and "must both be complied with when a city publishes notice of a proposed zoning ordinance or amendment." Builders Development Co. v. City of Opelika, 360 So. 2d  at 964; Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. City of Birmingham, 253 Ala. 402, 407, 44 So. 2d 593, 597 (1950). This Court has also held that when the legislative body of a city or a planning commission adopts zoning or planning regulations, ordinances, or by-laws, which are "specifically authorized by the Code, they have the same force and effect as properly enacted statutes." (Emphasis added.) Lynnwood Property Owners v. Lands Described In Complaint, 359 So. 2d 357, 359 (Ala.1978); Boulder Corporation v. Vann, *316 345 So. 2d 272 (Ala.1977); Code of 1975, §§ 11-52-1, et seq. Furthermore, when a city or planning commission has adopted such regulations, ordinances, or by-laws, "[i]n exercising its function ... [it] acts in an administrative capacity, and is bound by any limitations on its authority contained in the legislation authorizing it to act, as well as any restrictions contained in its own regulations." (Emphasis added.) Boulder Corporation v. Vann, 345 So. 2d  at 275. See also Lynnwood Property Owners, 359 So. 2d  at 360, wherein this Court quoted the above passage as well as excerpts from decisions of other jurisdictions:
In his treatise on zoning law, Emmett Yokley notes "many instances where it has been necessary for the courts to invalidate ordinances where proper notice was not given to affected parties as required by law." This "strong line of decisions" supports the view that "in amending a zoning ordinance the statute must be literally complied with, a failure to do so [is] fatal to validity." (Emphasis added.) 2 Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice § 11-10, at 167-68 (4th ed. 1978).
With respect to the procedural steps mandated by zoning regulations and their enabling statutes, Robert W. Anderson states the following in his zoning law treatise:
1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 4.03, at 185-87 (2d ed. 1976). Specifically, with respect to notice requirements, Anderson comments:
See also Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. City of Birmingham, supra. In Lynnwood Property Owners, supra, 359 So. 2d  at 360, we held as follows:
And, in Boulder Corporation v. Vann, 345 So. 2d  at 275-76, we held as follows:
Notwithstanding this line of our own authorities, Kennon argues that because none of the affected parties was prejudiced by the failure to give the proper notice, strict compliance ought not be required. Kennon contends that Monte Miller had actual notice of the proposed rezoning, and that there was no need for the City of Phenix City, through its building *318 department, to give itself notice by registered mail. As to Mr. Lenoir and the owners of land adjoining his property, Kennon concedes that that portion of the amending ordinance is invalid.
We find Kennon's arguments unpersuasive. In the line of decisions discussed herein, where there had been a failure to strictly follow the procedural requirements applicable to the action sought, especially notice provisions, this Court has invalidated the ordinance passed or the action taken, irrespective of whether any person was prejudiced by the error or omission. See Anderson, supra, § 405, and cases cited at n. 37, p. 189. Thus, not only has the City of Phenix City in this case adopted regulations which by their express terms make specific notice requirements mandatory, but also there is ample authority for the view that, in adopting or amending a zoning ordinance, mandated procedural steps, especially notice requirements, must be strictly followed. We adhere to this view in the present case.
Kennon further argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider Kennon's defenses of laches and estoppel. Kennon asserts: "The Plaintiffs, Miller and Gentry, and the neighborhood witnesses, Cytrynak, Sauls, Session and Gunter, all testified that they made no effort to protest the rezoning (although some signed a petition) prior to its becoming a reality. The Plaintiffs waited some seven months after the passage of the ordinance to bring suit to overturn it." Kennon claims to have inalterably changed his position in reliance on the rezoning by spending funds to remove the fire-damaged dwelling from the lot and on architectural plans for a nursery school. On these facts, we cannot say that plaintiffs' seven-month delay in filing this action was unreasonable and resulted from a lack of due diligence, or that it was of such a character that Kennon could have reasonably relied upon it. As we have already pointed out (as does Kennon in its brief), during this seven-month period, plaintiff Gentry, on two occasions, appeared before the planning commission and the city council in an attempt to have the Kennon lot rezoned from C-2 back to R-1. Further, Gentry, although not a party to Kennon's action, also appeared before the Board of Zoning Adjustment to oppose the special exception sought by Kennon for the nursery school. Thus, Kennon was aware that attempts were being made to prevent Kennon from following through on its plans pursuant to the amending ordinance. "Laches is not mere delay but such that works a disadvantage to another." Moore v. Pettus, 260 Ala. 616, 625, 71 So. 2d 814, 822 (1954). As plaintiffs aptly point out, whatever funds Kennon expended in furtherance of its plans had to be with knowledge of, and based upon its evaluation of, the situation then pending, which had an atmosphere of controversy combined with direct attempts to undo what had been done. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was the plaintiffs' delay of seven months in bringing the suit that worked a disadvantage to Kennon.
Furthermore, Kennon's expenditures for architectural plans for a nursery school were made in reliance on obtaining a special exception permit from the Board of Zoning Adjustment. While plaintiff Gentry appeared before the board and opposed such a permit, plaintiffs were not parties to those proceedings nor to the subsequent proceeding before the circuit court in which the board's decision was upheld. Additionally, while Kennon's purchase of the lot and his expenditure of money for removing the fire-damaged dwelling may have been made in reliance on the validity of the ordinance, under the circumstances of this case Kennon cannot claim that these transactions were occasioned solely as a result of plaintiffs' waiting seven months to file this action challenging the validity of the ordinance. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in not considering as meritorious Kennon's defenses of laches and estoppel.
Because the judgment of the trial court invalidating ordinance 84-21 is due to be affirmed on the ground that mandatory procedural steps were not followed in the passage of the ordinance, we pretermit decision *319 on the other issues raised by this appeal. Let the judgment be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur.