Title: State v. Cotton

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

407 S.E.2d 514 (1991)
329 N.C. 764
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Ronald Junior COTTON.
No. 460A90.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
September 5, 1991.
*516 Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Debra C. Graves, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant appellant.
WEBB, Justice.
The dissent in the Court of Appeals and the argument of the defendant on this appeal deal with testimony elicited by the State on redirect examination of a witness for the State. The State called the defendant's employer who operated a seafood restaurant. On cross-examination the employer was asked if the defendant was a good employee. The employer answered in the affirmative. On redirect examination the following colloquy occurred:
The Court of Appeals, relying on State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 277 S.E.2d 439 (1981) and State v. Fultz, 92 N.C.App. 80, 373 S.E.2d 445 (1988), held that when the defendant elicited testimony on the cross-examination of his employer that he was a good employee, the State was entitled to rebut this testimony by demonstrating his weakness as an employee by showing his misconduct with the waitresses. The Court of Appeals held that the superior court went too far and committed error when it allowed testimony as to the ages and race of the waitresses as this testimony was irrelevant in rebutting evidence that he was a good employee. The Court of Appeals held this was harmless error in light of the strong evidence against the defendant and *517 his own equivocal testimony. Judge Johnson dissented on the ground that the evidence was not as strong as the majority contended and there was a reasonable possibility that this erroneously admitted testimony could have contributed to the conviction.
In this Court the defendant argues that the evidence against the defendant was not strong and the erroneous admission of evidence that the defendant had been offensive to women of the same age and race as the victims was prejudicial. He also argues that, assuming the testimony of his conduct with the waitresses had some probative value, it should have been excluded pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403.
Assuming it was error to admit testimony as to the ages and race of the waitresses, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the defendant has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by this testimony. In order to show that erroneously admitted testimony is prejudicial, the defendant must show that had it not been admitted there is a reasonable possibility a different result would have been reached at the trial. State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 367 S.E.2d 618 (1988); State v. Milby, 302 N.C. 137, 273 S.E.2d 716 (1981); N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443 (1988). The Court of Appeals held that the evidence against the defendant was so strong there was not a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at the trial. We place our holding on a different ground.
We begin our analysis by noting that the State was properly allowed to question the defendant's employer about the defendant's peccadilloes on the job after his employer had testified he was a good worker. State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 277 S.E.2d 439. The thrust of the dissent and the defendant's argument in this Court is that by identifying two of the waitresses on whom the defendant made improper advances as white that this could have inflamed the jury because the defendant, a black, was being tried for raping two white women. We note that the defendant's employer in his testimony did not limit the defendant's molestations to the two white waitresses. He testified, "[i]t was not just one waitress, it was just about all of `em" and "[w]ell, it was two, more than anybody else."
From the testimony of defendant's employer we can conclude the defendant had bothered virtually all the waitresses and particularly two white ones. We can assume the race of the two waitresses was irrelevant to rebut otherwise proper testimony and should not have been admitted. Irrelevant testimony is not always prejudicial. In this case the prejudicial effect of this testimony should have been slight. It was to the effect that the defendant bothered all the waitresses and in particular two white waitresses. We cannot say it has been demonstrated that had this testimony not been admitted a different result would have been reached at the trial. We hold the admission of this testimony was harmless error.
The defendant also contends that the admission of this testimony violated N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 which provides:
Under this rule the court can exclude relevant evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 340 S.E.2d 430 (1986). Whether to exclude evidence under this section is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Schultz, 88 N.C.App. 197, 362 S.E.2d 853 (1987), aff'd, 322 N.C. 467, 368 S.E.2d 386 (1988).
The defendant argues that whether he was a good worker is collateral at best. He says that to allow testimony of his actions with women, under the guise of proving he was not a good employee, allows very damaging testimony which has little probative value in the case.
*518 A new trial will be ordered for an abuse of discretion in not excluding testimony pursuant to Rule 403 only upon a showing that the "ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 41, 347 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1986), quoting, State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756, 340 S.E.2d 55, 59 (1986). We cannot say that under this test it was error for the court not to exclude this testimony. The defendant elicited testimony that he was a good employee. The court allowed the State to elicit testimony to rebut this evidence. We cannot hold this was not the result of a reasoned decision.
This assignment of error is overruled.
AFFIRMED.
FRYE, Justice, dissenting.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the testimony about defendant's behavior towards the two waitresses at work was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. The majority assumes that it was error to admit the testimony of defendant's employer because the race of the two waitresses was irrelevant to rebut otherwise proper testimony and then concludes that the admission of this testimony was harmless error. I agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the ages and the race of the waitresses was not relevant to rebutting the defendant's evidence that he was a good employee." State v. Cotton, 99 N.C.App. 615, 394 S.E.2d 456 (1990) (emphases added). However, I agree with Judge Johnson's dissent in the Court of Appeals that this error was not harmless because the evidence of defendant's guilt in this case is not so overwhelming as to remove any reasonable possibility that if this testimony had not come in, a different result would have been reached at trial.
A review of the evidence in this case is crucial to a resolution of this issue since we must determine if the error was prejudicial. The majority opinion sets out the relevant testimony given by defendant's employer concerning defendant's behavior as exhibited towards two specific waitresses while he was working at the restaurant. That testimony reveals the employer testified that while defendant "messed" with all the waitresses, "it was two more than anybody else." "Messing" with the waitresses consisted of defendant's touching these two waitresses on various parts of their bodies, telling them dirty jokes, and talking about sex. The two waitresses who were the targets of defendant's actions were eighteen and forty-seven years old, and both were white. The victims in the present case were ages twenty-two and forty-one, and both were white.
The evidence concerning defendant's identity is less than overwhelming. As Judge Johnson points out in his dissent:
State v. Cotton, 99 N.C.App. at 624-25, 394 S.E.2d  at 461 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the physical evidence gathered at this victim's home, semen stains on her bed sheets, was inconsistent with defendant's blood type.
State v. Cotton, 99 N.C.App. at 624, 394 S.E.2d  at 461 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In addition, the second victim was present at the first trial but did not indicate until shortly before the second trial, some three and one-half years after the incident, that she could identify defendant as her assailant.
As with the first victim, the physical evidence gathered at the scene of the second incident was inconsistent with defendant's blood type. At the home of the second victim, the officers recovered a pair of the victim's panties which had semen stains, and these stains were inconsistent with defendant's blood type. The evidence at the second victim's home indicated that the assailant had broken an outside light on the porch when breaking into the home, and the police gathered a sample of fresh blood found on the storm door at the victim's home. This blood sample was likewise inconsistent with defendant's blood type. Thus, there was no evidence gained from the laboratory testing of the samples collected at the scene of either incident linking defendant with these two attacks.
Under the circumstances, I conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error not occurred, a different result would have been reached at trial. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1988). Thus, I find the error prejudicial.
EXUM, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.