Title: VALANCE v. VI-DOUG, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VALANCE v. VI-DOUG, INC.2002 WY 11350 P.3d 697Case Number: 00-316Decided: 07/19/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

CATHERINE 
A. VALANCE, Personal

Representative 
of the Estate of

JEANNE 
V. MILES, deceased, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

VI-DOUG, 
INCORPORATED, a Wyoming

corporation, 
d/b/a Village Inn

Restaurant, 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Converse County

The 
Honorable Barton R. Voigt, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming   

Representing 
Appellee:

Peter S. 
Dusbabek and Steven G. Greenlee of Montgomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio, Dusbabek & 
Parker, L.L.P., Fort Collins, Colorado 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J.; GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* and KITE, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. 
(RET.)

 

KITE, 
J., delivered 
the opinion of the Court; SPANGLER, 
D.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Jeanne Miles, age 
seventy-five, was opening the front door of a restaurant when the wind 
forcefully caught the door.  A sign 
posted on the door instructed:  
"Please Hold Door Tight Due to Wind."  Mrs. Miles claimed she did what the sign 
instructed her to do.  The force of 
the wind on the door caused her to fall onto the concrete walkway, breaking her 
hip.  In her personal injury action 
against VI-Doug, Incorporated, a Wyoming corporation doing business as Village 
Inn Restaurant, Mrs. Miles alleged this event was caused by VI-Doug's failure to 
provide a reasonably safe entryway for its patrons. VI-Doug moved for summary 
judgment, contending, just as a restaurant does not owe a duty to protect its 
patrons from the effects of natural accumulations of snow and ice on its 
premises, it does not owe a duty to protect them from the effects of naturally 
occurring wind on its premises.  In 
addition to disputing application of the "open-and-obvious-danger" exception in 
the context of wind, Mrs. Miles contended the sign instructing patrons to 
tightly hold the door also violated VI-Doug's duty to maintain the restaurant's 
premises in a reasonably safe condition.  
Simply stated, Mrs. Miles claimed the sign as worded, if heeded by a 
patron, created a hazardous condition.

 

[¶2]      The district 
court ruled, first, that the open-and-obvious-danger exception applies to 
naturally occurring forces of wind just as it does to natural accumulations of 
snow and ice.  Secondly, it 
determined reasonable minds could not differ that VI-Doug did not violate its 
duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for its patrons by 
placing the sign as worded on the restaurant's front door.

 

[¶3]      Affirming the 
district court's first ruling, we hold the open-and-obvious-danger exception 
does apply to naturally occurring forces of wind.  Reversing the district court's second 
ruling, we hold genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the sign 
violated VI-Doug's duty to maintain the restaurant's premises in a reasonably 
safe condition for its patrons.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶4]      Catherine A. 
Valance, personal representative of the Estate of Jeanne V. Miles (the personal 
representative),1 presents the following issues for 
our review:

 

            
1.  Did the district court erroneously revive the absolute 
defenses of act of God and assumption of risk?

 

            
2.  Did the district court err when it held that the open and 
obvious danger rule eliminates liability for dangers which exist on 
premises?

 

            
3.  Did the district court err when it determined as a matter 
of law that a restaurant owner has no responsibility for any hazard or injury 
involving wind?

 

            
4.  Did the district court err when it created an 
"open-and-obvious-natural-accumulation-of-wind" immunity rule; if not, was the 
incident in question really a "natural accumulation of wind" case when the 
record shows that manmade objects, such as a door and a building, were 
intimately involved in the injury?

 

            
5.  Did the district court err when it ruled that a restaurant 
owner has no duty to guard against wind-related injuries on its 
premises?

 

            
6.  Did the district court err in holding as a matter of law 
that no reasonable juror could find that a danger was created by a sign which 
instructed customers to bind themselves to a powerful wind blown 
door?

 

            
7.  Did the district court err when it ruled that restaurant 
owners have no duty [to] minimize dangers created by the effect of wind on the 
doors of their premises?

 

            
8.  Did the district court err in determining that [there] were 
no disputed issues of material fact?

 

            
9.  Did the district court err in granting summary judgment 
against the plaintiff?

 

VI-Doug phrases 
the issues as:

 

            
1.  Did 
the district court properly rule as a matter of law that VI-Doug, Incorporated 
had no duty to protect Ms. Miles against harm caused by the 
wind?

 

            
2.  Did the district court properly rule as a matter of law 
that VI-Doug did not breach any duty by placing a sign on or near the door of 
its restaurant which stated "Please hold door tight due to 
wind["?]

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      We view the 
record on appeal in the light most favorable to Mrs. Miles who opposed VI-Doug's 
motion for summary judgment, affording her all the favorable inferences which 
can be drawn from the record.  On 
March 5, 1999, Mrs. Miles went to the Village Inn Restaurant in Douglas with her 
grandson.  She recalled that it was 
a terribly windy day.  Her grandson 
let her off in front of the entrance to the restaurant, and he parked the car. 
 Mrs. Miles testified she saw a sign 
posted on the door instructing patrons to hold the door tightly due to possible 
high winds.  She maintained she 
followed the sign's directions and held on tightly to the door.  Mrs. Miles claimed that, as she opened 
the door, a strong gust of wind caught it and caused her to fall to the 
ground.  As a result of her fall, 
she suffered a broken hip that required surgery.  The owner of VI-Doug testified that, 
three or four months prior to Mrs. Miles' accident, another woman was slightly 
injured under very similar circumstances.  
Subsequent to this incident, VI-Doug sought bids to construct an 
effective windbreak although one was not constructed until after Mrs. Miles was 
injured.

 

[¶6]      Mrs. Miles 
alleged VI-Doug was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe entry for 
its patrons and claimed damages for her resulting severe physical injuries.  On October 16, 2000, the district court 
granted VI-Doug's motion for summary judgment concluding the same policy reasons 
that support the open-and-obvious-danger exception and the 
natural-accumulation-of-ice-and-snow rule, which immunize defendants from 
liability, applied equally to wind.  
The district court also concluded the wind that caused Mrs. Miles' 
injuries was naturally occurring.  
It granted summary judgment because (1) VI-Doug had no duty to protect 
Mrs. Miles from harm inflicted by the wind and (2) VI-Doug's placement of the 
sign on the restaurant's front door did not violate its duty to maintain a 
reasonably safe premises.  This 
appeal followed.

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶7]      

Summary judgment is proper, even in 
negligence cases, when there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  When we review a motion for summary 
judgment, we view the record on appeal in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion and accept all favorable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record in favor of that party.

 

Paulson 
v. Andicoechea, 926 P.2d 955, 957 (Wyo. 1996) (citations omitted).  "Summary judgment is not favored in 
negligence actions and is subject to more exacting scrutiny.  However, even in negligence actions, 
summary judgment may be appropriate, especially if a plaintiff cannot establish 
the existence of a duty on the part of a defendant."  Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 
551 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted); see 
also McCoy v. Crook County Sheriff's Department, 987 P.2d 674, 676 (Wyo. 
1999).  Consequently, to prevail on 
her negligence claim, Mrs. Miles had to show VI-Doug owed her a duty of 
care.  Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, Ltd., 
990 P.2d 491, 495 (Wyo. 1999); Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo. 1995).  

 

 

 

[¶8]      The elements a 
plaintiff must establish to maintain a negligence action are:  (1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached the 
duty of care, (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused 
injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is 
compensable by money damages.  Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County by Teton County Sheriff's Department v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1086 
(Wyo. 2000).  In this case, we are 
required to address the first element: whether a duty exists.  The application of the natural 
accumulation rule and the open-and-obvious-danger exception determines whether 
the defendant has a duty.  Selby, 990 P.2d  at 494.  This is a question of law that the 
courts normally determine.  Id.  We have, however, recognized that in 
certain instances the question of the existence of a duty hinges upon the 
initial determination of certain basic facts and, in those circumstances, the 
initial determination of those basic facts is properly placed before the trier 
of fact.  Id.  

 

[¶9]      "As a general 
rule, a possessor of land owes a duty to his business invitees to maintain his 
premises in a reasonably safe condition."  
Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 895 (Wyo. 1994).  VI-Doug, 
as the possessor of land in this case, relies on the recognized 
open-and-obvious-danger exception and posits that wind is like a natural 
accumulation of ice or snow in that it is a force of nature, an element of 
weather, and a naturally occurring phenomenon which a business invitee 
encounters off the business premises as well as when entering the business 
premises.  The issues in this appeal 
are whether the natural accumulation rule and the open-and-obvious-danger 
exception are applicable to injuries resulting from naturally occurring wind 
and, if so, whether VI-Doug created a hazard on the restaurant's premises by 
posting a sign on its door directing patrons to take specific action when they 
encountered the natural effect of the wind on the restaurant's 
door.

 

[¶10]   It is important to note that one of 
the underlying principles of the natural accumulation rule is that the dangers 
of natural accumulations are obvious; thus, the open-and-obvious-danger 
exception is contained within, and is part and parcel of, the natural 
accumulation rule.  Paulson, 926 P.2d  at 957.  With this understanding in mind, we 
first address the personal representative's argument that the 
open-and-obvious-danger exception was abrogated in O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985).  Her reliance on 
O'Donnell for this proposition is 
without merit.  In that case, we 
discussed the viability of the exception in light of the adoption of comparative 
negligence.  Mr. O'Donnell operated 
a motorcycle and encountered an accumulation of gravel remaining on the street 
from a resurfacing project performed by the City of Casper.  We distinguished the facts in O'Donnell, an instance of injuries 
arising from a man-made cause, where the city placed gravel on the street and 
allowed it to accumulate in ridges and piles, from instances in which liability 
arises from natural causes.  
Subsequently, in Eiselein, we 
explained the effect of this distinction:  
"[In O'Donnell, w]e did not 
conclude . . . the comparative negligence statute completely 
abrogated the rule; rather, we indicated it modified the known and obvious 
danger rule, restricting its application to known and obvious dangers resulting 
from natural causes."  868 P.2d  at 
895.  Rather than suggesting 
abrogation of the exception, our decisions since O'Donnell specifically confirm that, 
once it is determined the defendant owes a duty of care, the trier of fact may 
consider the open-and-obvious nature of a danger to determine a plaintiff's 
percentage of negligence.  See Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 895-97.  Stated another way, a defendant may 
present evidence of a plaintiff's negligence in order to reduce damages; 
however, this in no way defines or affects the scope of the defendant's initial 
duty.  

 

"The 
adoption of comparative negligence . . . does not abrogate the 
necessity of an initial finding that the premises owner owed a duty to 
invitees.  Moreover, we find that 
the duty element and the comparative negligence standard are fundamentally 
exclusive--two doctrines to be utilized at different junctures in the 
determination of liability in a negligence cause of action."  

 

Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 896 (quoting Riddle v. McLouth 
Steel Products Corporation, 485 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Mich. 1992)).  The court in the first instance must 
determine whether the defendant owed a duty of care as a matter of law or owed 
no duty because the danger was open and obvious and was not aggravated by the 
defendant.  On the other hand, the 
court could conclude the question of dutywhether the danger was open and 
obvious or aggravatedhinges upon the determination of certain basic facts which 
must first be considered by the trier of fact.           

 

[¶11]   In this case, the district court 
concluded the same policy reasons exist for the element of wind as exist for the 
elements of ice and snow.

 

The 
justification for the natural-accumulation rule comports with the factors to be 
considered in determining the existence of a duty.  The magnitude of the burden on defendant 
to prevent injuries from snow or ice is 
great. . . . [N]atural winter conditions make it impossible 
to prevent all accidents.  The 
plaintiff is in a much better position to prevent injuries from ice or snow 
because the plaintiff can take precautions at the very moment the conditions are 
encountered.  Even if the plaintiff 
is unaware of the ice or snow he happens to slip on, he may be charged with 
knowledge that ice or snow is a common hazard in winter, one which he must 
consistently guard against.

 

Eiselein, 868 
P.2d at 897-98; see also Selby, 990 P.2d  at 494.  Therefore, the rules 
should naturally be extended to include the natural effect of the 
wind:

 

"[A] 
proprietor is not considered negligent for allowing the natural accumulation of 
ice due to weather conditions where he has not created the condition.  The conditions created by the elements, 
such as the forming of ice and falling of snow, are universally known and there 
is no liability where the danger is obvious or is as well known to the plaintiff 
as the property owner."  Bluejacket [v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494], at 497 [(Wyo. 
1976)].  The rationale underlying 
this rule is that "in a climate where there are frequent snowstorms and sudden 
changes of temperature, these dangerous conditions appear with a frequency and 
suddenness which defy prevention and, usually, correction; consequently, the 
danger from ice and snow in such locations is an obvious one, and the occupier 
of the premises may expect that an invitee on his premises will discover and 
realize the danger and protect himself against it."  62A Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 699 
(1990).

 

Paulson, 926 P.2d  at 957. 

 

[¶12]   We agree with the district court's 
statement:

 

Anyone 
who has ever lived anywhere in Wyoming knows that the wind and its potential 
severity are just as natural as the accumulation of ice and snow.  The wind is an open and obvious 
danger.  Probably the most common 
manifestation of that danger is in the opening of doors.  The same policy reasons for the 
existence of the obvious danger rule and the natural accumulation rule apply 
equally to wind[.]

 

We 
conclude the terms of naturally occurring forces such as ice, snow, and wind can 
be used interchangeably in this court's social policy analysis.  In general, the possibility of a sudden 
gust of wind, particularly in Wyoming, is an obvious danger foreseeable to 
anyone.  A plaintiff is in a 
superior position to protect against hazards caused by wind at the moment it is 
encountered.  A proprietor does not 
owe a duty of care to invitees to prevent the natural consequences of wind on 
his premises where he has not created or aggravated the naturally existing 
condition.

 

[¶13]   However, a proprietor's affirmative 
action in dealing with a force of nature, such as wind, may alter the situation 
and give rise to the existence of a duty of care.  In such an instance, the equities 
shift.  The proprietor owes a duty 
to his business invitees to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe 
condition. Mostert v. CBL & 
Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Wyo. 1987).  "If the defendant creates the hazard, 
then it is within the defendant's control and he is in a better position to 
foresee and prevent injuries resulting from the hazard."  Selby, 990 P.2d  at 494.  In this case, the issue remains, whether 
the proprietor's action of placing a sign on the door instructing specific 
action by customers altered the situation.  
The district court phrased and answered the issue as follows:  "Simply stated, could a reasonable jury 
find that the Defendant acted negligently by placing a sign on its front door 
that said Please Hold Door Tight Due to Wind'?  This Court finds that no reasonable jury 
could find that such a sign created a hazard."  So stated, the district court correctly 
recognized VI-Doug's duty to its invitees to maintain the restaurant's premises 
in a reasonably safe condition.  The 
district court also properly recognized that whether the sign created a 
hazardous condition was a jury question; however, it then decided reasonable 
minds could not differ that the sign did not violate the applicable duty of 
care.  It is that ruling which we 
now review.

 

[¶14]   VI-Doug maintains the posted sign 
did not cause Mrs. Miles to act any differently than she normally would 
have.  However, such a statement is 
not an accurate characterization of her deposition testimony.  Mrs. Miles' exact testimony was as 
follows:

 

Q.  You mentioned having seen the sign 
--

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  -- on the door.

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q. 
 Did that cause you to do something that you normally wouldn't 
do?

 

A.  No, 
because I had seen that sign before.

 

An 
appropriate question for determination by the finder of fact is whether, in the 
absence of the sign directing Mrs. Miles to hold the door tightly, she 
independently would have acted to hold on tightly to the door.  If, however, she held on tightly because 
she was simply following the directions provided, the finder of fact must 
determine whether following those directions increased the risk of injury.  The question whether a hazardous 
condition was created when VI-Doug placed the sign on the door directing patrons 
to take specific action is one of basic fact which the trier of fact must 
determine. 

 

[¶15]   The general rule is that one who 
voluntarily assumes a duty must perform the duty with reasonable 
care.

 

A person 
who gratuitously undertakes to warn someone of a dangerous condition must use 
reasonable care in making the warning, but that person is not subject to 
liability unless a failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of 
harm to those he is trying to aid, or if harm is suffered because of another's 
reliance on the undertaking.  

 

57A Am. 
Jur. 2d Negligence § 384 at 380 
(1989).  In Codd v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 725 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), the decedent caught his ski tips on a mogul 
and plummeted head first into another mogul, likely hitting his head on a snow 
covered rock.  The appellant 
maintained the ski operator negligently warned the decedent when it sectioned 
off a jump downhill from the accident site because the warning gave skiers the 
impression the accident area had been inspected for hazards.  The Washington Court of Appeals found a 
triable issue of fact and stated:  
"One who attempts, albeit gratuitously, to warn a person in danger must 
do so with reasonable care.  If his 
failure to exercise such care results in an increased risk of harm, he is liable 
for any physical damage which the reliance causes."  725 P.2d  at 1014.  Although Codd involved a dissimilar factual 
situation, we believe adherence to the principles reviewed in that case and in 
57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence, supra, is appropriate.  When those principles are applied, a 
triable issue of fact exists in this case. 

 

[¶16]   We conclude material facts are at 
issue with regard to whether VI-Doug maintained the restaurant's premises in a 
reasonably safe condition which preclude disposing of this matter by summary 
judgment.  A jury must determine 
whether VI-Doug (1) created a hazardous situation by directing patrons to take 
specific action; (2) knew or should have known the directions given could create 
a hazard to patrons; and, finally, (3) by giving directions, created a hazardous 
condition substantially more dangerous than it would have been in the absence of 
the directions.  Therefore, this 
case must be submitted to a jury.

 

[¶17]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded.

  
            
SPANGLER, District Judge (Retired), concurring in part 
and dissenting in part.

 [¶18]   I agree that the summary judgment 
should be reversed.  I do not agree 
that the issue on remand should be whether VI-Doug is liable for gratuitously 
posting an allegedly unsafe warning.

 

[¶19]   The issue of property owner 
liability has produced a series of irreconcilable decisions in Wyoming.  This is partly due to the application of 
two rules that are not in the public interest.  The first rule is that the owner or 
occupier of the premises has no obligation to protect invitees against open and 
obvious dangers.  The second rule is 
that owners and occupiers are not liable for injuries caused by natural 
accumulations of ice and snow.  The 
case of O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 
696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985), limited the open-and-obvious-danger rule to 
situations where the danger results from the natural accumulation of ice and 
snow.

 

[¶20]   The open-and-obvious-danger rule is 
contrary to Wyoming's comparative negligence law.  The effect of the rule is to dismiss the 
case when the plaintiff may be negligent, without comparing the negligence of 
the actors.

 

[¶21]   The majority opinion incorrectly 
says that the open-and-obvious-danger rule has nothing to do with negligence but 
defines the duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff.  It is an essential element in all tort 
causes of action that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.  The duty is that of the defendant to the 
class occupied by the plaintiff, as in the duty owed by a doctor to his or her 
patient.  The duty element in this 
case was correctly defined earlier in the majority opinion: "As a general rule, 
a possessor of land owes a duty to his business invitees to maintain his 
premises in a reasonably safe condition."  
Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 895 (Wyo. 1994).  There is 
no issue about duty in this case.    

 

[¶22]   The open-and-obvious-danger and 
snow-and-ice rules are about negligence, not about duty.  One rule says that the personal 
representative is barred from recovery because of Mrs. Miles' negligent conduct 
in unreasonably proceeding in the face of an open and obvious danger.  The other rule says that VI-Doug is not 
negligent because it cannot reasonably be expected to remove snow and ice from 
its premises.       

 

[¶23]   The rules are contrary to public 
policy.  They discourage property 
owners from removing or mitigating dangerous conditions.  If the owner lets snow and ice 
accumulate, he is not liable.  But 
if he attempts to remove it, he loses his immunity.

 

[¶24]   The ruling in this case 
demonstrates the policy shortcomings.  
The case against VI-Doug continues only because it placed an 
informational or warning sign on the door. The personal representative 
apparently is precluded from raising what could be a much more important 
allegation, which is that VI-Doug allowed the door to blow dangerously in the 
wind for an extended time.

 

[¶25]   Application of these rules has 
produced decisions which cannot be reconciled.  The majority opinion in this case says 
that walking in the front door of a Village Inn Restaurant is to proceed in the 
face of an open and obvious danger.  
But in the O'Donnell case, the 
court did not find that there was an open and obvious danger in driving a 
motorcycle on a street covered with piles of loose gravel.

 

[¶26]   Similarly, the cases of Eiselein, 868 P.2d 893, and Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, Ltd., 
990 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1999), involved plaintiffs slipping and falling on snow 
and ice in parking lots.  The Eiselein case was dismissed even though 
there were indentations in the paving.  
The Selby case survived only 
because there was a dumpster on the parking lot.

 

[¶27]   From this experience, we can see 
that one of the difficulties in applying these rules is in defining a "natural" 
condition.  Are wind, ice, and snow 
"natural" once they have landed on a parking lot or are battering a 
doorway?  

 

[¶28]   We should abrogate the 
"open-and-obvious-danger" and "snow-and-ice" rules.  Instead, a plaintiff's cause of action 
in all cases against owners and occupiers of property, including landlord and 
tenant cases, should consist of the following elements: (1) The plaintiff was 
lawfully on the premises; (2) there was an unreasonably dangerous condition on 
the property; (3) the owner or possessor knew of the dangerous condition or 
should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence; (4) the owner or 
possessor did not take reasonable action to mitigate or remove the danger; and, 
(5) as a result, the plaintiff suffered legally compensable 
injuries.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Mrs. Miles died 
on April 26, 2001, and the district court appointed Catherine A. Valance as her 
personal representative to continue with this action.  The Supreme Court entered an order on 
August 3, 2001, allowing the substitution of Ms. Valance as appellant for Mrs. 
Miles in this matter.