Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Philip A. Shepherd

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP737-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Philip A. Shepherd, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Philip A. Shepherd, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SHEPHERD 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
CONCURRED AND 
DISSENTED: 
 
DISSENTED: 
 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs and dissents, joined by 
A.W. Bradley, J. 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
     
 
 
2017 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP737-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Philip A. Shepherd, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Philip A. Shepherd, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a report filed by Referee John 
B. Murphy concluding that Attorney Philip A. Shepherd committed 
ten counts of misconduct as alleged in the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation's (OLR) complaint.  The referee determined that a 
public 
reprimand 
was 
appropriate 
discipline 
for 
Attorney 
Shepherd's misconduct.  The referee also recommended that 
Attorney Shepherd should be directed to pay restitution in two 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
2 
 
client matters and should be assessed the full costs of the 
proceeding, which are $1,887.96 as of March 8, 2017.  
¶2 
After careful review of the matter, we conclude that 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
are 
supported 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence.  We adopt the referee's 
conclusions of law.  We agree that the appropriate discipline 
for Attorney Shepherd's misconduct is a public reprimand, and we 
agree 
that 
Attorney 
Shepherd 
should 
be 
required 
to 
pay 
restitution as recommended, and shall bear the full costs of 
this proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney 
Shepherd 
graduated 
from 
law 
school 
in 
Minnesota in 1991 and was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin 
in 2006.  He practiced in the Fond du Lac area.  He has no prior 
discipline but his Wisconsin law license is presently suspended.  
On October 31, 2014, the State Bar of Wisconsin administratively 
suspended Attorney Shepherd's Wisconsin law license for failure 
to comply with trust account certification requirements.  On 
June 2, 2015, the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) administratively 
suspended Attorney Shepherd's Wisconsin law license for failure 
to comply with continuing legal education requirements.  On 
October 31, 2015, the State Bar of Wisconsin administratively 
suspended Attorney Shepherd's Wisconsin law license for failure 
to pay bar dues. 
¶4 
On March 7, 2016, this court temporarily suspended 
Attorney Shepherd's Wisconsin law license for his failure to 
cooperate in an OLR investigation into conduct that resulted in 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
3 
 
Counts nine and ten of the disciplinary complaint in this 
proceeding.   
¶5 
On April 12, 2016, the OLR filed a ten-count complaint 
against Attorney Shepherd alleging misconduct involving three 
client matters as well as failure to cooperate with the OLR.  
¶6 
The first four counts of the OLR complaint involve 
Attorney Shepherd's representation of Jean and James B., a 
married couple, who hired Attorney Shepherd to complete a health 
care power of attorney for Jean's mother.  They did not sign a 
written 
fee 
agreement. 
 
Attorney 
Shepherd 
completed 
the 
paperwork and Jean gave Attorney Shepherd a $200 check, which he 
deposited into his business account.  On December 23, 2013, Jean 
met with Attorney Shepherd to begin drafting guardianship 
paperwork for her mother and paid Attorney Shepherd $2,000 in 
advanced fees; she did not sign a written fee agreement.  
Attorney Shepherd deposited the $2,000 into his business 
account.  Later that day, Jean learned that a guardianship would 
not be necessary.  She contacted Attorney Shepherd and told him 
not to proceed with the guardianship work. 
¶7 
In March of 2014, James asked Attorney Shepherd to 
draft an estate plan for his family and to form a limited 
liability corporation (LLC).  At that time, Attorney Shepherd 
had not refunded any fees to these clients or sent them an 
accounting.  They indicated they wished to use their previously 
paid funds for this legal work.  Attorney Shepherd did not 
prepare a fee agreement for this work.  He completed the LLC and 
estate work in April 2014.  On August 4, 2014, the clients 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
4 
 
requested an accounting and a refund of any unearned fees.  When 
Attorney Shepherd failed to provide an accounting or a refund, 
the clients filed a grievance. 
¶8 
On March 2, 2015, Attorney Shepherd created and 
submitted to the OLR an invoice showing $1,577.50 of work 
completed on the guardianship, estate plan, and LLC matters, 
leaving $622.50 in unearned fees.  Attorney Shepherd has not 
refunded any unearned fees to these clients. 
¶9 
The OLR complaint alleged four counts of misconduct 
with respect to Attorney Shepherd's representation of Jean and 
James:  (1) by accepting a $2,000 advance fee for legal work 
without a written fee agreement, when it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the total cost of the representation would 
exceed $1,000, and did exceed $1,000, Attorney Shepherd violated 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2);1 (2) by failing to place advanced fees 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.5(b) provides: 
(1) The scope of the representation and the basis 
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall he communicated to the 
client in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation, except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on 
the same basis or rate as in the past. If it is 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
the 
total 
cost 
of 
representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may he 
oral or in writing.  Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client.  
(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
5 
 
into his trust account, without evidence of an intention to 
follow the SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) alternative, Attorney Shepherd 
violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4);2 (3) by failing to respond to the 
clients' requests for information regarding fees and a final 
accounting, Attorney Shepherd violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(3);3 and (4) 
by failing to refund any unearned fees to these clients, 
Attorney Shepherd violated SCR 20:1.16(d).4 
                                                                                                                                                             
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing. 
2 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See S. 
Ct. Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  
Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 
2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme 
court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provided:   
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 
sub. (g). Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred. 
3 SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) provides:  "A lawyer shall promptly 
respond to a client's request for information concerning fees 
and expenses." 
4 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
6 
 
¶10 Counts five through eight of the complaint involved 
Attorney Shepherd's representation of I.P., in connection with 
documenting the sale of a farm. 
¶11 In early 2014, I.P. hired Attorney Shepherd to draft 
paperwork for the sale and transfer of a farm.  On January 23, 
2014, I.P. met with Attorney Shepherd to discuss the necessary 
legal work and gave him several original documents.  Attorney 
Shepherd indicated that the work would be completed within a 
month.  At that meeting, I.P. paid Attorney Shepherd $1,000 in 
advanced fees, but did not sign a written fee agreement.  
Attorney Shepherd did not deposit I.P.'s fees into his trust 
account and did no work on I.P.'s behalf.  
¶12 From March through May of 2014, I.P. and her daughter 
repeatedly attempted to contact Attorney Shepherd, without 
success.  Eventually I.P. hired another attorney to document the 
farm's sale.  Attorney Shepherd has not refunded any unearned 
fees to I.P., despite her request that he do so.5 
¶13 The OLR complaint alleged four counts of misconduct 
with respect to Attorney Shepherd's representation of I.P.:  (1) 
by failing to take steps to complete the work that he had been 
hired to perform on I.P.'s behalf, Attorney Shepherd violated 
                                                                                                                                                             
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
5 In December of 2014, the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for 
Client Protection reimbursed I.P.'s $1,000 advanced fee. 
 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
7 
 
SCR 20:1.3;6 (2) by failing to respond to I.P.'s status inquiries 
or otherwise keep I.P. informed regarding the status of her 
matter, Attorney Shepherd violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4);7 (3) 
by failing to place advanced fees into his trust account, and 
without 
evidence 
of 
an 
intention 
to 
follow 
the 
SCR 
20:1.15(b)(4m) 
alternative, 
Attorney 
Shepherd 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.15(b)(4); and (4) by failing to refund unearned fees to 
I.P., Attorney Shepherd violated SCR 20:1.16(d). 
¶14 Counts nine and ten of the OLR complaint pertain to 
Attorney Shepherd's unauthorized representation of M.T. and his 
failure to cooperate with the OLR's inquiries about this 
incident.  Attorney Shepherd's Wisconsin law license has been 
administratively suspended since October 31, 2014.  In March 
2015, Attorney Shepherd agreed to prepare a will and related 
documents for M.T.  M.T. paid Attorney Shepherd $700 and 
Attorney Shepherd completed the work for M.T.   
¶15 On November 16, 2015, the OLR contacted Attorney 
Shepherd requesting specific information regarding his work for 
M.T., which was conducted while his law license was suspended.  
Attorney Shepherd did not respond.  On December 17, 2015, the 
OLR personally served Attorney Shepherd with a letter directing 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
7 SCRs 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4) provides a lawyer shall:  "(3) 
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter, (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by the 
client for information." 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
8 
 
him to respond to the OLR's request regarding M.T.  Again, 
Attorney Shepherd did not respond.  The OLR filed a notice of 
motion and motion requesting an order to show cause as to why 
Attorney Shepherd's license should not be suspended for failing 
to cooperate in an OLR investigation.  On March 7, 2016, this 
court granted the OLR's motion and temporarily suspended 
Attorney 
Shepherd's 
law 
license. 
 
His 
license 
remains 
temporarily suspended.  
¶16 The OLR complaint alleged two counts of misconduct 
regarding this incident:  (1) by practicing law while his 
license was suspended, Attorney Shepherd violated SCR 22.26(2),8 
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f);9 and (2) by failing to respond to the 
                                                 
8 SCR 22.26(2) provides:   
An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
practice 
of 
law 
or 
in 
any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may 
engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice 
of law. 
9 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate a state supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
9 
 
OLR's request for information, Attorney 
Shepherd violated 
SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).10 
¶17 Attorney Shepherd filed an answer in which he admitted 
to "the general factual basis for Counts 1-10" and to the 
"general legal conclusions in Counts 1-10."  Referee Murphy was 
appointed.  
¶18 At an ensuing scheduling conference, Attorney Shepherd 
indicated he did not want to contest the allegations contained 
in the complaint nor did he contest the OLR's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  He did, however, contest the 
proposed 
discipline, 
maintaining 
private 
discipline 
was 
sufficient in view of his struggles with depression and other 
personal challenges.  The OLR was directed to forward a 
stipulation to Attorney Shepherd by September 9, 2016.  
¶19 By letter dated October 11, 2016, the OLR informed the 
referee that Attorney Shepherd had not returned the stipulation 
or otherwise responded to the OLR.  The OLR sought a judgment on 
the pleadings. 
¶20  The OLR and Attorney Shepherd then executed and filed 
a Waiver of Right to a Hearing and each party submitted briefs 
on the proper level of discipline. 
                                                 
10 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
10 
 
¶21 The referee filed his findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and recommendation for discipline on February 24, 2017.  
The referee determined that the OLR had met its burden of proof 
with respect to the ten counts of misconduct alleged in the 
complaint.  Essentially, the referee found that Attorney 
Shepherd admitted to each and every allegation contained in the 
complaint, based on his admissions contained in the Answer and 
in the Waiver of Right to a Hearing, together with Attorney 
Shepherd's statements made during the telephone scheduling 
conferences.   
¶22 The 
referee 
then 
considered 
the 
appropriate 
discipline, considering the seriousness, nature, and extent of 
misconduct, the level of discipline needed to protect the public 
and the legal system from repetition of the misconduct, the need 
to impress on the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, 
and the need to deter others from committing similar acts.  In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scanlan, 2006 WI 38, ¶72, 
290 Wis. 2d 30, 712 N.W.2d 877; citing In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 875-76, 498 
N.W.2d 380 (1993).  The referee concluded that in this case, 
public discipline is appropriate.  The referee recommends that 
we publicly reprimand Attorney Shepherd, that we order him to 
pay restitution, and that we impose the full costs of the 
proceeding on Attorney Shepherd.  
¶23 Attorney Shepherd sought to file an appeal from the 
referee's report and recommendation, but, by order dated May 15, 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
11 
 
2017 the court ruled that his appeal was untimely.11  Thus, the 
court's review proceeds under SCR 22.17(2).12  
¶24 In conducting our review, we uphold a referee's 
findings of fact unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, 
but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 
basis.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 
WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 
(1997).  Having established the proper factual and legal 
setting, we determine the appropriate level of discipline to be 
imposed under the circumstances, independent of the referee's 
                                                 
11 In his notice of appeal, Attorney Shepherd indicated his 
intent to resign his law license.  As part of our order 
dismissing his appeal we advised Attorney Shepherd that we would 
hold this disciplinary matter in abeyance for 20 days to afford 
him the opportunity to file a petition to voluntarily surrender 
his Wisconsin license with the State Bar of Wisconsin, such that 
his request for a voluntary resignation from the State Bar would 
be considered along with the pending disciplinary proceeding.  
On May 30, 2017, Attorney Shepherd filed a petition to 
voluntarily surrender his Wisconsin license with the State Bar 
of Wisconsin.  On June 1, 2017, the OLR asked that we resolve 
this disciplinary proceeding before acting on the petition. 
12 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline. The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
12 
 
recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶25 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We 
also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney 
Shepherd violated the supreme court rules set forth above.  
¶26 The only contested issue here is the appropriate 
discipline.  On balance, we accept the referee's recommendation 
that a public reprimand is appropriate.  
¶27 Attorney Shepherd argued for a private sanction.  He 
suffers from depression and has informed the referee that he 
intends to leave the practice of law permanently, such that a 
public reprimand would serve no purpose and would exacerbate his 
feelings of shame and sense of failure.  
¶28 The referee properly declined to accept Attorney 
Shepherd's promise to resign his law license in exchange for a 
private sanction.  First, as the referee correctly observed, 
sanctions are not only designed to deter an individual offending 
attorney from committing future violations.  Sanctions are also 
intended to give notice to other attorneys and to the public 
that the improper practice of law carries serious consequences.  
Therefore, Attorney Shepherd's stated plan to leave the practice 
of law does not mean a lesser sanction should be imposed.  
Second, a lawyer is typically not permitted to voluntarily 
resign his or her law license while a grievance is pending.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Snyder, 127 Wis. 2d 446, 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
13 
 
380 N.W.2d 367 (1986) (voluntary resignation is an inappropriate 
disposition of a disciplinary proceeding); SCR 10.03(7)(a).13  
¶29 Attorney Shepherd also asserts that his mental health 
issues, namely serious depression, warrant a private sanction 
because of the toll a public sanction will take on his mental 
health.  In his untimely appeal, he asserted that the referee 
failed to adequately consider the effects of depression and 
underestimated Attorney Shepherd's attempts to resolve the 
disciplinary issues.   
¶30 Although no timely appeal was filed, we note that the 
record does not support Attorney Shepherd's claims in this 
regard.  The referee acknowledged that Attorney Shepherd 
believed his misconduct stemmed from serious depression.  The 
referee acknowledged that depression "certainly can make the 
practice of law difficult."  However, the referee was not 
persuaded that, under these facts, depression was a sufficient 
explanation for the misconduct to warrant a private sanction.  
                                                 
13 SCR 10.03(7)(a) provides:  
Voluntary resignation of membership. If a member 
of the state bar files with the executive director a 
written notice of the member's surrender of his or her 
license to practice law and the acceptance by the 
supreme court of his or her resignation in the state 
bar, the person shall then cease to be a member of the 
state bar and his or her name shall be removed from 
the 
membership 
register. 
Before 
accepting 
a 
resignation, the supreme court shall request from the 
office of lawyer regulation information concerning 
whether the attorney is the subject of any pending 
grievances, investigations, or proceedings.   
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
14 
 
Moreover, the OLR had indicated that it had already considered 
Attorney Shepherd's depression as a mitigating factor when it 
recommended a public reprimand rather than a more severe 
sanction.  The referee also expressed justifiable concern that 
Attorney Shepherd had not taken steps to make his clients 
financially whole without the need for a restitution order.  
Indeed, he appears to have attempted to use restitution as a 
bargaining chip to obtain a lesser sanction.   
¶31 We recognize that depression apparently played a role 
in Attorney Shepherd's misconduct and have sympathy for the 
intense pain mental illness can inflict on those who suffer from 
it.  Based on this record, however, we accept the referee's 
determination that public discipline is appropriate.  Attorney 
Shepherd committed misconduct in three separate client matters.  
Work was left undone, unearned fees were not returned, and 
Attorney Shepherd undertook additional legal work knowing his 
license was suspended.  No two fact situations are identical, 
but we agree that in this case, a public reprimand is warranted.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead, 2013 WI 19, 
345 Wis. 2d 625, 827 N.W.2d 81 (imposing public reprimand for 
seven counts of misconduct including accepting fees without 
written fee agreements, failing to deposit fees into trust 
account, failing to respond to client inquiries, failing to 
return unearned fees, and failing to notify clients of his 
suspension); see also Public Reprimand of Rod J. Koenen, No. 
2011-15 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002428.html), 
(imposing 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
15 
 
public reprimand for four counts of misconduct including failing 
to have written fee agreement, providing inaccurate information, 
placing advanced fee into business account, and failing to 
respond to the OLR investigation); Public Reprimand of Koua 
Vang, 
No. 
2004-4 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/001662.html), 
(imposing 
public reprimand on lawyer, with depression, for nine counts of 
misconduct committed in three client matters including failure 
to keep clients informed, failure to diligently pursue client 
interests, and failing to comply with a court order directing 
return of a file). 
¶32 Finally, we agree that Attorney Shepherd should be 
required to pay restitution in two client matters as set forth 
herein and shall pay the full costs of the proceeding.  
¶33 IT IS ORDERED that Philip A. Shepherd is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct.  
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Philip A. Shepherd shall 
pay $622.50 in restitution to Jean B. and $1,000 in restitution 
to Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection regarding 
I.P.'s claim.  
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Philip A. Shepherd shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$1,887.96 as of March 8, 2017. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that payment of restitution to 
Jean B. and to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection 
No. 
2016AP737-D   
 
16 
 
is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation. 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the March 7, 2016 temporary 
suspension of Philip A. Shepherd's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin, due to his willful failure to cooperate with the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation's investigation in this matter, is 
lifted. 
¶38 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
administrative 
suspension of Philip A. Shepherd's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin, due to his failure to pay mandatory bar dues, failure 
to file a trust account certification, and failure to comply 
with continuing legal education requirements, will remain in 
effect until each reason for the administrative suspension has 
been rectified, pursuant to SCR 22.28(1). 
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Philip A. Shepherd's 
Petition to Voluntarily Surrender his Wisconsin Law License is 
granted, and his license is surrendered effective the date of 
this order. 
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
 
 
No.  2016AP737-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I disagree with the court's accepting the 
voluntary resignation from the practice of law.  See my dissent 
in the order dated May 15, 2017, in OLR v. Horsch, No. 
2015AP1928-D, addressing the issue of a voluntary resignation 
during an ongoing OLR proceeding. 
¶42 Our case law is clear:  The court does not grant an 
attorney's petition to voluntarily resign from the practice of 
law when a disciplinary action is pending to avoid the 
imposition of discipline for unprofessional conduct.  See, e.g., 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ewald-Herrick, 2014 WI 
40, ¶19, 354 Wis. 2d 672, 847 N.W.2d 823; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Schalow, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 388 N.W.2d 176 
(1986); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Snyder, 127 
Wis. 2d 446, 
380 
N.W.2d 367 
(1986); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Wortley, 126 Wis. 2d 58, 374 N.W.2d 898 
(1985).     
¶43 The difficulty with a voluntary resignation is that a 
lawyer who resigns can "unresign," and the Supreme Court Rules 
do not set forth a procedure the attorney, the OLR, and the 
court should follow at that time.  It may be difficult at that 
time to prove misconduct and impose appropriate conditions for 
readmission.        
¶44 If the court wants to accomplish the goals of 
disciplining Attorney Shepherd for misconduct and allowing 
Attorney Shepherd to terminate his practice of law, I conclude 
that the court should follow Supreme Court Rule 22.19.  Under 
No.  2016AP737-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
this rule, Attorney Shepherd would be permitted to file a 
petition stating that that he cannot successfully defend against 
the charges and that he petitions for voluntary revocation of 
his license.   
¶45 In contrast to resignation, Supreme Court Rule 22.19 
provides that an attorney who is the subject of an OLR 
proceeding may petition for voluntary revocation of his or her 
license as follows. 
SCR 22.19 Petition for consensual license revocation. 
(1) An attorney who is the subject of an investigation 
for possible misconduct or the respondent in a 
proceeding may file with the supreme court a petition 
for the revocation by consent or [sic] his or her 
license to practice law. 
(2) The petition shall state that the petitioner 
cannot successfully defend against the allegations of 
misconduct. 
(3) If a complaint has not been filed, the petition 
shall be filed in the supreme court and shall include 
the director's summary of the misconduct allegations 
being investigated.  Within 20 days after the date of 
filing of the petition, the director shall file in the 
supreme court a recommendation on the petition.  Upon 
a showing of good cause, the supreme court may extend 
the time for filing a recommendation. 
(4) If a complaint has been filed, the petition shall 
be filed in the supreme court and served on the 
director and on the referee to whom the proceeding has 
been assigned.  Within 20 days after the filing of the 
petition, the director shall file in the supreme court 
a response in support of or in opposition to the 
petition and serve a copy on the referee.  Upon a 
showing of good cause, the supreme court may extend 
the time for filing a response.  The referee shall 
file a report and recommendation on the petition in 
the supreme court within 30 days after receipt of the 
director's response. 
No.  2016AP737-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
(5) The supreme court shall grant the petition and 
revoke the petitioner's license to practice law or 
deny the petition and remand the matter to the 
director or to the referee for further proceedings. 
¶46 In contrast to a lawyer who voluntarily resigns, a 
lawyer whose license has been revoked cannot seek readmission 
for five years, SCR 22.29(2), and the revocation documents will 
provide a full record for the court's consideration at the time 
of readmission.  The Rules provide a procedure for investigation 
upon a request for readmission.  If Attorney Shepherd is sincere 
about not wanting to practice law again, SCR 22.19 seems to fit 
the instant case. 
¶47 For the reasons set forth, I would not accept Attorney 
Shepherd's voluntary resignation. 
¶48 I suggest that the OLR Procedure Review Committee 
(Professor Marsha Mansfield, University of Wisconsin Law School, 
Reporter), appointed by the court in June 2016, examine the 
issue of voluntary resignation (and readmission proceedings 
thereafter) and voluntary revocation by an attorney subject to a 
discipline proceeding who wishes to terminate his or her 
practice of law.  The instant case is illustrative of a problem. 
¶49 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2016AP737-D.ssa 
 
1