Title: Commonwealth v. Sylvain

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11896 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEMPESS SYLVAIN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 5, 2015. - March 14, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Alien.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Judicial discretion, 
Affidavit. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on April 17, 2007.  
 
 
Following review by this court, 466 Mass. 422 (2013), 
further proceedings on a motion to vacate, filed on January 12, 
2012, were had before James W. Coffey, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Laura Mannion Banwarth (Wendy S. Wayne, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, with her) for the defendant. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  Relying on advice from his attorney that a plea 
agreement would not result in his deportation, the defendant, 
who is not a citizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to one 
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count of possession of cocaine.1  The attorney's advice was 
incorrect, and Federal authorities eventually placed the 
defendant in a removal proceeding.  The defendant moved to 
vacate his guilty plea pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  That motion was denied, and we granted 
the defendant's motion for direct appellate review.   
We concluded in Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 
423-425 (2013) (Sylvain I), that the defendant received 
ineffective assistance from his plea counsel when counsel 
provided erroneous advice that the defendant would not be 
subject to deportation if he received a suspended sentence of 
less than one year in connection with a guilty plea to 
possession of cocaine.  In our decision in Sylvain I, we noted 
that "[a]lthough the defendant's affidavit [in support of the 
motion to vacate was] highly suggestive that he would have 
elected to go to trial but for his attorney's erroneous advice," 
                                                 
1 The defendant was charged with one count of possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a), 
and one count of a drug violation in a school zone.  G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32J.  He filed a motion to suppress, which was not 
heard because the parties reached a plea agreement before the 
scheduled hearing.  As part of the agreement, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and the Commonwealth 
agreed to recommend the dismissal of the distribution and school 
zone charges.  The judge sentenced the defendant to eleven 
months in a house of correction, suspended for two years, in 
accordance with the parties' agreement.  The defendant 
successfully completed his term of probation.  
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we could not make such a determination in the absence of 
additional findings and credibility determinations.  Id. at 439.  
We therefore remanded the matter to the Boston Municipal Court 
"with instructions to provide findings relating to the issue of 
prejudice and, if necessary, to hold an additional evidentiary 
hearing."  Id.   
On remand, the matter went before the judge who had 
accepted the defendant's guilty plea, and who earlier had denied 
his motion to vacate that plea.  The judge found, based 
primarily on the affidavits of the defendant and his plea 
counsel, that "the defendant placed particular emphasis on the 
immigration consequences."  The judge stated that the affidavits 
were supported by the fact that the defendant had agreed to a 
disposition of eleven months' incarceration, suspended for two 
years, indicating to the judge that deportation was a "live 
issue" for the defendant at the time of the plea.  The 
Commonwealth appealed, and we allowed the defendant's second 
application for direct appellate review. 
The Commonwealth now contends that the judge erred in 
allowing the defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea 
because the defendant failed to establish that he suffered 
prejudice as a result of his counsel's ineffective 
representation.  The Commonwealth asserts also that the judge 
abused his discretion by relying primarily on the affidavits in 
4 
 
 
  
allowing the defendant's motion.  Because the affidavits, which 
properly were considered by the judge, provide a sufficient 
basis on which to conclude that there was "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial" (citation omitted), see Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 
Mass. 30, 47 (2011) (Clarke), we affirm the allowance of the 
motion to vacate.     
Background.  In the wake of our decision in Sylvain I, the 
defendant filed a motion seeking an emergency evidentiary 
hearing.  At an emergency hearing on November 13, 2013, defense 
counsel called one witness, the mother of the defendant's son, 
and submitted affidavits from members of his family and a 
supplemental affidavit from plea counsel.  The defendant also 
relied on his own previously submitted affidavit and that of his 
plea counsel.  The Commonwealth objected to the submission in 
evidence of affidavits made by family members who were 
testifying, and argued that the only probative witness the judge 
needed to hear from was the defendant.  Neither the defendant 
nor plea counsel was present at the hearing.  Defense counsel 
informed the judge that the defendant was in the custody of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials in Plymouth, 
and waived his presence.  The Commonwealth called no witnesses 
and submitted no affidavits in opposition to the motion for a 
5 
 
 
  
new trial.2  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001) ("parties opposing a motion may file and 
serve affidavits where appropriate in support of their 
respective positions").  
As set forth in the judge's findings of fact, which are not 
disputed by the Commonwealth, the defendant, a lawful permanent 
resident of the United States, is a citizen of Haiti who came to 
the United States with his family in 1996, when he was seventeen 
years old.  He is a high school graduate of the Boston public 
school system and has held various jobs in Massachusetts over 
the last several years.  His mother, three sisters, his son, and 
the mother of his son are all United States citizens.  In an 
affidavit submitted in support for his motion for a new trial, 
the defendant averred, "I would not have agreed to plead guilty 
to something that would surely result in my deportation from the 
country I have lived in for the past [fifteen] years. . . .  
This is my home; all of my immediate family lives here, along 
with my [six] year old son and my girlfriend of [eleven] and a 
half years. . . .  I understand that by pleading guilty I got a 
'deal,' . . . however, it's not a 'deal' if it results in me 
being deported from my home and my family."   
 
                                                 
2 Responding to defense counsel's waiver of the defendant's 
presence in court, the prosecutor stated that if the judge 
intended to rely on the defendant's affidavit, "the Commonwealth 
would need an opportunity to be able to cross-examine him."  
 
6 
 
 
  
The judge allowed the defendant's motion for a new trial 
and issued a written decision explaining his reasoning.  The 
Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider, contending that the 
judge improperly relied on the affidavits of plea counsel and 
the defendant as evidence.  The judge offered to conduct a 
further evidentiary hearing at which the Commonwealth would be 
permitted to cross-examine witnesses, including plea counsel.3  
The Commonwealth rejected this suggestion on the asserted basis 
that it was not the Commonwealth's burden to call witnesses.  
The judge then denied the Commonwealth's motion to reconsider, 
and the Commonwealth appealed from that order and the order 
allowing the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "A motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) . . . ."  Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 
Mass. 174, 178 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 
101, 106 (2009).  We review "the motion judge's conclusion only 
to determine whether there has been a significant error of law 
or other abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 
Mass. 42, 47 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 
303, 307 (1986).  To the extent that a motion judge was in a 
                                                 
3 We think that the judge took the appropriate course of 
action by providing the Commonwealth with the opportunity to 
challenge the factual assertions contained in the affidavits.  
The Commonwealth, however, chose not to do so, and thus waived 
any argument on this ground. 
7 
 
 
  
better position to evaluate the credibility of the affiants, we 
will defer to the judge's assessment of the "credibility, 
weight, and impact of the affidavits" submitted in support of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.  See Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 
44 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 48 (1997).  We grant "substantial 
deference" to a decision on a motion brought pursuant to Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 30 (b) "when the judge passing on the motion is the 
same judge who heard the plea."  Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 
Mass. 667, 672 (1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 1001 (2003).  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Grace, supra ("When, as here, the motion judge 
did not preside at trial, we defer to that judge's assessment of 
the credibility of witnesses at the hearing on the new trial 
motion, but we regard ourselves in as good a position as the 
motion judge to assess the trial record"). 
2.  Claim of abuse of discretion.  As we concluded when 
this case was before us in 2013, counsel was ineffective in 
giving erroneous advice to the noncitizen defendant regarding 
the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.  See Sylvain I, 
supra at 438.  Therefore, the sole question before us is whether 
the judge abused his discretion in concluding that the defendant 
suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's erroneous advice.   
The judge's conclusions of law reflect that he correctly 
understood that, in order to satisfy the prejudice requirement 
in these circumstances, "the defendant has the burden of 
8 
 
 
  
establishing that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial.'"  See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47, 
quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  A defendant 
may make this showing by demonstrating that "(1) he had an 
available, substantial ground of defense . . . that would have 
been pursued if he had been correctly advised of the dire 
immigration consequences attendant to accepting the plea 
bargain; (2) there is a reasonable probability that a different 
plea bargain (absent such consequences) could have been 
negotiated at the time; or (3) the presence of 'special 
circumstances' that support the conclusion that he placed, or 
would have placed, particular emphasis on immigration 
consequences in deciding whether to plead guilty" (footnote 
omitted).  Clarke, supra at 47-48, quoting Hill, supra. 
The judge found that the defendant did not have an 
available ground of defense and could not have negotiated a 
better plea agreement.  But he found that the defendant had met 
his burden by establishing the presence of "special 
circumstances."4  The judge gave "significant weight" to plea 
                                                 
4 The Commonwealth's argument that, even if the defendant 
establishes the presence of special circumstances, the decision 
to allow the motion for a new trial was nevertheless an abuse of 
discretion because the defendant did not also establish that he 
had a viable defense is unavailing; it disregards the standard 
set forth in Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47-48 (2011) 
9 
 
 
  
counsel's affidavits, in which the counsel stated (as summarized 
by the judge) that "during the time of the plea, the defendant's 
major concern was to avoid deportation."5  The judge found this 
statement was "supported by the defendant's own affidavit."  In 
that affidavit, the defendant averred that all of his family 
lived in the United States, including his mother, father, three 
sisters, the mother of his son, and his son, and that he would 
not have agreed to accept the plea "deal" if he knew it would 
have resulted in "being deported from my home and my family."  
He said further, "I would have taken my chances at trial, 
knowing full well that if I was found guilty at trial I would be 
sentenced to committed time and then deported afterward; at 
least I would have had a chance at staying in the country."  
Relying on these affidavits, the judge found "that the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Clarke), that the presence of special circumstances alone may 
be sufficient to meet the defendant's burden.  The judge 
properly considered the presence of special circumstances in 
this case, to which he could give "substantial weight in 
determining, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether 
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have 
rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to trial."  See 
Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 43 (2015).   
 
5 During the 2013 hearing on the defendant's emergency 
motion for a new trial, the judge stated that he credited plea 
counsel's affidavits because counsel was a "veteran lawyer" who 
appeared before the court "all the time." 
 
10 
 
 
  
placed particular emphasis on the immigration consequence during 
the plea."6     
Clearly, a judge is not required to credit statements in a 
defendant's affidavit that he placed special emphasis on 
immigration consequences because of his circumstances; a judge 
could find those statements to be "merely self-serving."  
Sylvain I, supra at 439.  In this case, however, the judge 
looked to the two affidavits in order to evaluate the 
credibility of the defendant's assertions that he placed a 
particular emphasis on avoiding immigration consequences.  As 
the judge explained, according to the affidavits of plea counsel 
and the defendant, "the defendant was advised that if the 
sentence was less than one year, that he would not be deported.  
This is supported not only by the affidavits but by the sentence 
itself, eleven months suspended for two years.  The sentence 
provides insight to the court that it was a 'live' issue at the 
time and the defendant thought it would be safe to plead 
guilty."  Thus, the judge was able to conclude, without having 
                                                 
6 "[A] determination whether it would be rational for a 
defendant to reject a plea offer 'must take into account the 
particular circumstances informing the defendant's desire to 
remain in the United States.'" Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 
Mass. 174, 184 (2014), quoting People v. Picca, 97 A.D.3d 170, 
183-184 (N.Y. 2012).  Although the judge's decision reflects 
that he gave "minimal weight" to affidavits from the defendant's 
family attesting to the defendant's reasons for seeking to avoid 
deportation to Haiti, he nonetheless appears to have taken those 
circumstances into account.  
11 
 
 
  
to test the defendant's statements through cross-examination and 
personal observation of his demeanor, that the statements were 
supported by the context in which the defendant had pleaded 
guilty and by his counsel's affidavit.   
Based on the above, the judge determined that, here, the 
defendant had established "the presence of 'special 
circumstances'" showing that he "placed . . . particular 
emphasis on immigration consequences in deciding whether to 
plead guilty."  Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. at 183, 
quoting Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-48, and that the defendant's 
expressed concern about being deported was not a mere pretext 
for seeking a new trial.7  
In many circumstances, a defendant, as a result of 
counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to warn about the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea, is deprived of the 
opportunity to evaluate the risks of going to trial against the 
possible immigration consequences that may arise from a guilty 
                                                 
7 We note that the defendant established that he indeed had 
considered the immigration consequences of a guilty plea before 
pleading guilty, and therefore that he had "placed" emphasis on 
his immigration consequences before making the decision to 
accept the plea.  See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-48.  This inquiry 
is somewhat different from the circumstance in which a defendant 
is unaware that he faces immigration consequences because his 
counsel failed properly to advise him of them.  In those types 
of cases, the presence of special circumstances must be shown in 
order to support a conclusion that a defendant "would have 
placed" emphasis on such consequences, had he been advised of 
them.  Id. at 47. 
12 
 
 
  
plea.  In those cases, a judge may face a more difficult task in 
determining whether a defendant "would have placed . . . 
particular emphasis on the immigration consequences in deciding 
whether to plead guilty."  See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-48, 
quoting Hill, supra at 60.  Here, however, the judge found that 
the immigration consequence of a guilty plea was a "live" issue 
at the plea hearing, but the defendant was ill-advised by 
counsel.  The judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the 
defendant's motion for a new trial. 
3.  Reliance on affidavits.  As discussed supra, we 
conclude that the judge's decision properly relied on the 
affidavits submitted in support of the defendant's motion for a 
new trial.  We reject the Commonwealth's argument that the judge 
erred in allowing a new trial based solely on those affidavits.  
The rule of criminal procedure governing motions for 
postconviction relief, Mass R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), states 
explicitly that a "judge may rule on the issue or issues 
presented by such a motion on the basis of facts alleged in the 
affidavits without further hearing if no substantial issue is 
raised by the motion or affidavits."  See Commonwealth v. Muniur 
M., 467 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2014) (whether to conduct evidentiary 
hearing requires consideration of "the seriousness of the issue 
raised and the adequacy of the showing on that issue").  See 
also Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. at 257 ("the decision 
13 
 
 
  
whether to decide the motion on the basis of affidavits or to 
hear oral testimony . . . is left largely to the sound 
discretion of the judge"); Commonwealth v. Coggins, 324 Mass. 
552, 557, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 881 (1949) ("In accordance with 
the practice in this Commonwealth motions for new trial in both 
civil and criminal cases ordinarily are heard on the facts as 
presented by affidavit"). 
At the evidentiary hearing in this case, the defendant 
called one witness and submitted several affidavits.  As noted, 
the Commonwealth chose not to call any witnesses and submitted 
no affidavits in support of its position opposing the allowance 
of a new trial.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3) ("parties 
opposing a motion may file and serve affidavits where 
appropriate in support of their respective positions").  
Following the hearing, the judge weighed all of the evidence 
before him, and based his decision on the affidavits of the 
defendant and his plea counsel, as well as on the context in 
which the defendant had pleaded guilty.  It was not error for 
the judge to rely on the affidavits in granting the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, where, as here, those affidavits provide 
a sufficient factual basis to support the ruling.  See 
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. at 259; Commonwealth v. 
Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 395 (2012) (evidentiary hearing 
may not be necessary "if the substantial issue raised is solely 
14 
 
 
  
a question of law, or if the facts are undisputed in the 
record").  
Order vacating guilty plea 
  and granting new trial 
  affirmed.