Title: State v. Burroughs

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Burroughs, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2146.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2146 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BURROUGHS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Burroughs, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2146.] 
Fourth Amendment—Warrantless search—Single-purpose-container exception to 
the warrant requirement applies only when the illegal nature of the contents 
of a package are readily apparent because of the distinctive characteristics 
of the package—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed, conviction vacated, 
and cause remanded to the trial court. 
(No. 2020-1304—Submitted October 27, 2021—Decided June 28, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, 
No. 9-19-91, 2020-Ohio-4417. 
_________________ 
 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} While executing an arrest warrant, police discovered a closed 
bookbag with a plastic baggie stuck in its zipper.  Without obtaining a search 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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warrant, they opened the bookbag and discovered illegal drugs.  The question for 
us is whether the warrantless search comports with the Fourth Amendment under 
the “single-purpose-container exception” to the warrant requirement.  We hold that 
it does not.  The exception applies only when the illegal nature of the contents of a 
package are readily apparent because of the distinctive characteristics of the 
package.  A bookbag could hold a variety of items—some illegal, some not. 
{¶ 2} Because there was no valid basis to search the bookbag without a 
warrant, the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion to suppress the evidence.  
The court of appeals held otherwise, so we reverse its judgment. 
I.  Background 
A.  A warrantless search of a bookbag and a possession charge 
{¶ 3} Early on a January morning, Officer Chris Coburn knocked on 
Kennedy Burroughs’s door.  He and two other officers had come to arrest 
Burroughs for obstruction of justice.  Eventually the door cracked open. 
{¶ 4} When Officer Coburn told Burroughs he had a warrant for her arrest, 
she shut the door.  Through the closed door, Burroughs implored the officer to give 
her a second.  Officer Coburn refused, but when he turned the knob, he found that 
the door had been locked.  He threatened to kick down the door; Burroughs 
answered that she was coming. 
{¶ 5} Officer Coburn walked to a window and looked in.  He saw Burroughs 
grab some baggies off a table and head toward the back of the house.  Fearing that 
Burroughs was attempting to get rid of drugs, he kicked in the door and rushed into 
the house.  In one bedroom, he found Burroughs and a teenager.  On a plate beside 
the bed were marijuana-cigarette butts and residue.  And on the floor of an attached 
bathroom, he found a closed bookbag with part of a plastic baggie caught in the 
zipper.  Officer Coburn suspected that Burroughs had taken the bookbag into the 
bathroom to flush drugs.  But believing that he needed a search warrant to open the 
bookbag, he left it zipped. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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{¶ 6} Burroughs was placed under arrest and removed to the squad car; 
meanwhile officers questioned the teenager and conducted a protective sweep of 
the house.  Another police officer, Lieutenant Mark Elliott, arrived on the scene 
and opened the bookbag, ostensibly to make sure it did not contain weapons.  He 
found marijuana inside, leading to Burroughs being charged with illegal possession 
of drugs. 
B.  Burroughs challenges the constitutionality of the search 
{¶ 7} Burroughs moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the 
warrantless search of the bookbag violated her right to be free from unreasonable 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.  The trial court denied Burroughs’s motion.  
It reasoned that the warrantless search was lawful because the bookbag was in plain 
view and the lieutenant had probable cause to suspect it contained contraband. 
{¶ 8} On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals rejected the trial 
court’s reasoning but affirmed the judgment on other grounds.  The court of appeals 
opined that the plain-view exception could justify only the seizure of the bookbag, 
not its search.  2020-Ohio-4417, 158 N.E.3d 699, ¶ 19.  Nonetheless, it concluded 
that the search was justified based on the single-purpose-container exception to the 
warrant requirement.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 9} Burroughs appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to 
decide the validity of the search. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Absent exigent circumstances, the search of a closed container requires a 
warrant 
{¶ 10} Burroughs argues that the search of a bookbag inside a home without 
a warrant is unreasonable absent exigent circumstances that were not present in her 
case.  Burroughs does not argue that the officers’ seizure of the bookbag was 
unlawful.  Nor does she contend that the officers lacked probable cause to believe 
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that the bookbag contained marijuana.  Instead, Burroughs argues that the officers 
should have obtained a search warrant before they opened the bookbag. 
{¶ 11} In briefing to this court, Burroughs relies upon the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, but she also references Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.  She fails, however, to make any argument 
based on the text, history, or tradition of the Ohio Constitution.  Nor did Burroughs 
advance any argument below relating to the Ohio Constitution.  Because Burroughs 
has failed to develop any argument under the Ohio Constitution, we are constrained 
to analyze this case under the Fourth Amendment only. 
{¶ 12} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution commands 
that the “right of the people to be secure in their * * * effects, against unreasonable 
searches * * * shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched * * *.” 
{¶ 13} It is the rule, not the exception, that police must obtain a warrant to 
conduct a search.  See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 
L.Ed.2d 430 (2014).  The warrant requirement ensures that the lawfulness of a 
search is determined “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”  
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).  “In 
the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific 
exception to the warrant requirement.”  Riley at 382. 
B.  The state argues that the single-purpose-container exception applies 
{¶ 14} The state contends that no warrant was required because the search 
fell under the single-purpose-container exception to the warrant requirement.  That 
exception can be traced to a footnote in Arkansas v. Sanders, a United States 
Supreme Court case involving the warrantless search of luggage in a car based on 
an anonymous tip.  442 U.S. 753, 755, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 
619 (1991); see id. at 764, fn. 13.  When considering whether the search required a 
warrant, the Supreme Court observed that “some containers (for example a kit of 
burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable 
expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward 
appearance.”  Id. at 764, fn. 13.  Because the luggage in Sanders was not a single-
purpose container of this sort, the court held that a warrant was required, id. at 766. 
{¶ 15} The single-purpose-container exception is best understood as an 
offshoot of the plain-view doctrine.  See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427, 
101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (plurality) overruled on other grounds, 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).  
Under the Fourth Amendment’s plain-view doctrine, an officer may seize an object 
in plain view without a warrant if (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be viewed, (2) 
the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a 
right to access the object where it is located.  See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 
128, 136-137, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).  There is simply no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the outward appearance of an object that has 
been left in plain view.  See id. at 133. 
{¶ 16} Ordinarily, when the requirements of the plain-view doctrine are 
satisfied, police may seize a closed container but must obtain a warrant to search 
the container.  See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 
77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983).  The reason the police may seize, but not open, the closed 
container has to do with the two distinct interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment—“the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in 
maintaining personal privacy,” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 
75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  When there is 
probable cause to believe that the closed container holds evidence of criminal 
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activity, the owner’s interest in possession is outweighed by the risk that the 
contents may disappear or be put to their intended use before a warrant may be 
obtained, see Place at 701-702.  Thus, police may seize the container.  On the other 
hand, once the container has been seized, those risks disappear.  There is no 
justification for allowing the officer to forego a warrant before opening the closed 
container.  This limitation protects the owner’s privacy interest. 
{¶ 17} The single-purpose-container exception is premised on the notion 
that when “the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the 
contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed from a searching officer’s 
view,” Robbins at 427.  “The same would be true, of course, if the container were 
transparent, or otherwise clearly revealed its contents.”  Id.  A warrant is 
unnecessary in such a case because the outward appearance of the container has 
already made evident the container’s contents; there is no privacy interest left to 
protect.  See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, fn. 13. 
{¶ 18} The single-purpose-container exception is a particularly narrow 
exception to the warrant requirement.  Indeed, neither this court nor the United 
States Supreme Court has ever used the exception to authorize a warrantless search.  
While the court has made clear that there are circumstances in which the exception 
will apply, such are limited to only the rare, obvious case.  See Brown at 750 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Robbins, 453 U.S. at 428-429, 
101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744. 
{¶ 19} To meet the requirements of the single-purpose-container exception, 
the container’s contents must be sufficiently obvious that they could be said to be 
in plain view.  Robbins at 427.  In Robbins, officers found two packages wrapped 
in green opaque plastic in the recessed luggage compartment of a car; upon 
unwrapping the packages, they discovered marijuana.  Id. at 422.  In holding that 
the officers needed a warrant to search the packages, the court rejected the argument 
that the single-purpose-container exception applied.  Id. at 427-428.  The court 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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explained that to fall within that exception, “a container must so clearly announce 
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, 
that its contents are obvious to an observer.”  Id. at 428. 
{¶ 20} We are concerned with a bookbag, an object commonly used to carry 
a wide variety of items.  As the name suggests, a bookbag may carry books.  It may 
also carry lunch, private letters, or as Lieutenant Elliott ostensibly believed, 
weapons.  The bookbag at issue is not transparent, it did not silhouette a distinctive 
shape, and its illicit contents could not be observed without opening it.  The 
bookbag did have part of a baggie stuck in the zipper, but the visible part of the 
baggie was empty.  It therefore announced only that the bookbag contained a 
baggie.  Under these circumstances, the contents of the bookbag cannot be said to 
have been so obvious that they may as well have been in plain view. 
{¶ 21} The state seeks to broaden the single-purpose-container exception 
beyond single-purpose containers to include situations in which, based on a totality 
of the circumstances, the contents of a container are a foregone conclusion.  We 
cannot square such a far-reaching exception—one essentially allowing searches of 
containers based on a super-probable-cause showing—with traditional Fourth 
Amendment principles.  To allow container searches based on a totality-of-the-
circumstances test would, in essence, have the exception swallow the rule, enabling 
officers “to conduct warrantless searches of indistinct and innocuous containers 
based solely on probable cause derived from the officers’ subjective knowledge and 
the circumstances,” United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.2005).  A 
broad exception of this sort could not easily exist alongside the long-held principle 
that “no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent 
‘exigent circumstances,’ ” Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 
L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). 
{¶ 22} Thus, we see no reason to extend the single-purpose-container 
exception beyond its rationale: that when a container by its very nature makes its 
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contents clear, its owner has no expectation of privacy in those contents.  When the 
container does not do so, a warrant is required.  That’s true, no matter how confident 
an officer is about what he thinks is inside. 
{¶ 23} The single-purpose-container exception, as the name makes clear, 
applies to single-purpose containers.  A bookbag is not a single-purpose drug 
container.  Lacking an exigent circumstance, Lieutenant Elliott was required to 
obtain a warrant before searching the bookbag. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 24} The single-purpose-container exception did not authorize the police 
to search Burroughs’s bookbag.  When police search a bookbag in a home under 
circumstances that do not give rise to any exigency, they must follow the command 
of the Fourth Amendment: get a warrant.  The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, Burroughs’s conviction is vacated, and this case is remanded to the court 
of common pleas with instructions to enter judgment suppressing the evidence 
found in the bookbag. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Raymond A. Grogan Jr., Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nathan 
R. Heiser, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Craig M. Jaquith, Assistant 
State Public Defender, for appellant. 
_________________