Title: Krahn v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JEFFREY KRAHN,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 701, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0804036086 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: September 23, 2011 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 11, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 11th day of October 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Krahn, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s October 6, 2010 order adopting the Commissioner’s 
September 13, 2010 report, which recommended that Krahn’s first 
postconviction motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be 
denied.1  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in June 2008, Krahn was 
indicted on charges of Assault in the First Degree, Reckless Endangering in 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2
the First Degree and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During 
the Commission of a Felony in connection with an attack on two probation 
officers.  On January 21, 2009, following his decision to enter a guilty plea, 
Krahn became emotionally upset and had an altercation in the courthouse.  
The Superior Court postponed the guilty plea colloquy until a later date.  On 
February 4, 2009, Krahn pleaded guilty to Assault in the First Degree and 
Reckless Endangering in the First Degree.  After a presentence investigation, 
he was sentenced to a total of 31 years at Level V, to be suspended after 8 
years for decreasing levels of supervision.  Krahn did not file a direct appeal 
of his convictions. 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his first 
postconviction motion,2 Krahn claims that a) his trial counsel failed to utilize 
his mental/emotional disorders as a defense strategy; b) the trial court did 
not pursue the issue of his competency; c) his trial counsel coerced him into 
accepting a plea agreement; and d) his assault conviction is faulty because 
he was acting in self-defense.3  To the extent that Krahn has failed to raise 
                                                 
2 Because this was Krahn’s first postconviction motion, the Superior Court requested that 
Krahn’s counsel submit affidavits in response to his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Rule 61(g) (2); Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2005). 
3 This final claim is contained in an amendment to Krahn’s reply brief filed on August 
17, 2011. 
 
3
additional claims that were presented to the Superior Court, those claims are 
deemed to be waived and will not be addressed by this Court.4 
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel within the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.5  We have 
reviewed the transcript of Krahn’s guilty plea. It reflects that Krahn 
expressly stated that it was in his best interest to enter the plea, that he had 
committed the crimes to which he was pleading guilty and that he 
understood the consequences of pleading guilty.  Krahn confirmed that no 
one had coerced him into accepting the guilty plea.  In the absence of clear 
and convincing evidence to the contrary, Krahn is bound by those 
representations.6   
 
(5) 
Krahn has presented no support for his claim that he would not 
have pleaded guilty but for error on the part of his counsel.  He received a 
clear benefit when the State dismissed his weapon charges as part of the plea 
bargain.  Finally, Krahn’s claim of self-defense is unavailing, since his 
voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any claims of error or defect 
                                                 
4 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  
5 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988). 
6 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
4
occurring prior to the entry of his plea.7  In the absence of any error or abuse 
of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in denying Krahn’s 
postconviction claims, we conclude that the judgment of the Superior Court 
must be affirmed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
7 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988).