Title: Paulino v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

John August Paulino v. State of Maryland
 No. 75, September Term, 2006
HEADNOTE: 
C O N S T I T UT I O N A L 
L A W – F O U R T H  
A M E N D M E N T – S EA R C H  
A ND
SEIZURE–REASONABLENESS– PLACE OF SEARCH–EXIGENCY
To determine the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court must
consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.  The police officers’
search of an arrestee is unreasonable when the officers conduct a highly intrusive search in
the parking lot of a public business in the presence of others and there were no exigent
circumstances requiring an immediate search.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Civil No. 00 CR 3812
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND
No. 75
September Term, 2006
__________________________________
JOHN AUGUST PAULINO
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
   JJ.
__________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.    
Cathell, Battaglia and Wilner, JJ., Dissent.
__________________________________
Filed:   June 4, 2007
This case requires us to consider whether a search conducted incident to an arrest is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in light of the manner and place in which the search
was conducted at a time when there were no exigent circumstances justifying the immediate
search.  We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the search of petitioner was
unreasonable.  Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 29, 2000 Detective Elliot Latchaw, and other members of the Baltimore
County Police Department received information from a confidential informant who told them
that later that evening petitioner, John August Paulino (“Paulino”), would be in the 1100
block of North Point Road, Dundalk, Maryland, and would be in possession of a quantity of
controlled dangerous substance.  The informant also advised the police that Paulino typically
hides the controlled dangerous substance in the area of his buttocks.  Acting on the
information provided by the informant, the police established surveillance in the 1100 block
of North Point Road.  At the suppression hearing, Detective Latchaw described the
surveillance in greater detail:
[Detective Latchaw]: He actually – we had surveillance established on the
parking lot, and he was actually observed on the parking lot, and he was
actually observed by myself as they pulled into the entrance to the car wash.
He was seated in the passenger seat.  I saw him clear as day, and I radioed real
quick to everybody, this is him, he’s in the passenger seat.  And at that time,
they actually pulled  [into one of] the bays of the car wash.  There’s like maybe
six or eight bays all away across in the line.  When they pulled in, they were
blocked in, and he was removed from the vehicle.  And I don’t know exactly
how he was taken out of the vehicle or if he got out on his own, I don’t know,
because at that point, I was back a little ways coming up.  There was a –  there
was a team to do all that. 
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*  *  *  *
There was also testimony describing the location of the search: 
[Defense Counsel]:  Is that area of Dundalk fairly busy at that time of night?
[Detective Latchaw]:  Not at all.  Its actually –  the car wash is actually back
–  you pull into a parking lot, and you’ve got to go past an entrance to a storage
facility, like those little mini storage buildings, and actually go past a –  like
an auto repair center.  And then at the very end of this little parking lot, it’s
kind of like a zigzaggy entrance.  Driveway kind of turns around to the left and
comes back to the right, and the very back is the car wash all by itself.  It’s real
secluded back there actually.
[Defense Counsel]:  Were there any other people back there at that time around
eleven-fifteen that evening other than yourself and Mr. Paulino?
[Detective Latchaw]:  No, not that I —  not that I can remember.
[Defense Counsel: Yourself —  
[Detective Latchaw]: Well, other units of Baltimore County Police.  Right.
[Defense Counsel]:  No civilian personnel?
[Detective Latchaw]:  No. Nobody was washing their cars, that I can
remember.
[Defense Counsel]:  Is that a lighted area, dark area?
[Detective Latchaw]:  Well lit.
[Defense Counsel]:  Is that viewable by people in the area walking by or not
really?
[Detective Latchaw]:  No. No, it’s way back.  It’s back off the road.  It’s real
secluded.
*  *  *  *
-3-
The testimony regarding the police officer’s subsequent actions is less clear: 
[Defense Counsel]:  And you did conduct a search then, is that correct?  How
did you come to find the drugs?
[Detective Latchaw]:  Well, when we –  when Mr. Paulino was removed from
the vehicle and laid on the ground, his pants were already pretty much down
around his –  below his butt, because I guess that’s the fad, these guys like
wearing their pants down real low, so it was just a matter of lifting up his
shorts, and - - and between his butt cheeks the drugs were –  I believe one of
the detectives actually put on a pair of gloves and just spread his cheeks apart
a little bit and it was right there.
  
[Defense Counsel]:  So they were not visible before you actually spread his
cheeks apart, is that correct?
[Detective Latchaw]:  I don’t think they were.
*  *  *  *
Paulino offers a slightly different version of the facts concerning the search:
[Defense Counsel]:  Where was the search conducted?
[Mr. Paulino]:  Inside a car wash
[Defense Counsel]:  In the presence of other people or by yourself?
[Mr. Paulino]:  Other people was around.  It was about 12 other officers.
[Defense Counsel]:  At that time, your –  your anal cavity was searched.  Is
that correct?
[Mr. Paulino]:  They had searched me in my pockets, didn’t find nothing, and
eventually, they came to the subject where – in my report, it states that the
officer said, Mr. Paulino, why is your butt cheeks squeezed?  And in further
response, I said nothing.  He said it again, and another officers come behind
with gloves and pulled my pants down and went in my ass.  Well, my cheeks.
Sorry about that.  
1Petitioner presents the following question for review:
Did the search of Petitioner, which involved an officer putting on
plastic gloves and spreading the cheeks of Petitioner’s buttocks to reveal drugs
which were not visible before that time, violate the Fourth Amendment, when
the search was conducted in the parking lot of a car wash in the presence of
individuals other than the searching officer?
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Paulino was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession
of cocaine.  Subsequent to his arrest, Paulino filed a motion to suppress, which, following
a hearing on the motion, was denied.  Proceeding on an agreed statement of facts, the trial
judge found Paulino guilty of possession with intent to distribute, and sentenced him as a
subsequent offender, to a mandatory ten-year sentence.
On September 12, 2003, Paulino filed a petition for post conviction relief.  The post
conviction court granted Paulino the right to file a belated appeal.  Paulino, in turn, filed a
notice of appeal.  Thereafter, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the Circuit Court.  On August 21, 2006, Paulino filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, which we granted.1  John August Paulino v. State of Md., 395 Md. 420, 910 A.2d
1061 (2006).
II.
Standard of Review
We are asked in this appeal to review the Circuit Court’s denial of Paulino’s motion
to suppress.  “Our review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence,
ordinarily, is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.  See Ferris v.
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State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999).  Thus, we refrain from engaging in de
novo fact-finding and looking at the trial record for supplemental information.”  Carter v.
State, 367 Md. 447, 457, 788 A.2d 646, 651 (2002).  We view the evidence presented at the
hearing on Paulino’s motion to suppress, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence, in the light most favorable to the State.  See Carter, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at
651; Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 143, 782 A.2d 862, 875 (2001); Riddick v. State, 319 Md.
180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240-1241 (1990).
  It is well established that the State has the burden of proving the legality of a
warrantless search and seizure.  See Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 114, 857 A.2d 65, 86 (2004)
(“[t]he ultimate burden of proving that evidence seized without a warrant should not be
suppressed falls on the State”(quoting State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 826 A.2d 486 (2003)));
State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 191, 638 A.2d 107, 114 (1994)(noting that warrantless searches
are presumptively unreasonable and that “the burden of proving the applicability of an
exception to the warrant requirement rests on the State”); Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203,
217, 468 A.2d 333, 341 (1983) (emphasizing “that the burden of establishing exigent
circumstances is on the State and that the facts and circumstances upon which the question
of reasonableness depends must be viewed in light of established Fourth Amendment
principles”).  See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032,
29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971) (holding that “there must be a showing by those who seek
exemption [from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment] that the exigencies of the
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situation made that course imperative.  The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show
the need for it.”).     
As this Court noted in State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581-82, 861 A.2d 62, 67 (2004),
“[a]lthough we extend great deference to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and will not
disturb them unless clearly erroneous, we review, independently, the application of the law
to those facts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law and,
accordingly, should be suppressed.”
III.
Discussion
A.
Fourth Amendment and Search Incident to Arrest
In support of his challenge to the validity of the search, Paulino relies on the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The Fourth Amendment provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to Maryland through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and prohibits searches that are “unreasonable under the
circumstances.”  Nieves, 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68.  In Nieves, we noted that “it is well
established that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
absent some recognized exception.”  383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68.  See also Illinois v.
2 It remains unclear whether Paulino’s pants were below his waist as a result of his
removal from the vehicle in the course of the arrest, or, whether Paulino intentionally wore
his pants below his waist as a part of a fad.  Even if Paulino intentionally wore his pants
below his waist and his undergarments were exposed , we conclude that because Paulino’s
pants were below his waist he retained, nevertheless, a Fourth Amendment right to privacy
in his person.   See generally United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248 (4 th Cir. 1997); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
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Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L.Ed.2d. 148, 156-57 (1990).  The
Supreme Court of the United States has, however, recognized the authority of the police to
search an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
224-26, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 434 (1973); as have we, State v. Evans, 352 Md.
496, 516, 723 A.2d 423, 432-33 cert. denied, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 310, 145 L.Ed.2d. 77
(1999).
In Evans, 352 Md. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432, we held that to execute a lawful arrest “a
police officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a felony and
must either physically restrain the suspect or otherwise subject the suspect to his or her
custody and control.”   Because Paulino does not challenge the validity of his arrest, the only
issue before the Court is the scope of the search under the circumstances.2
Police are allowed to conduct a search incident to an arrest in order “to remove any
weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape . .
. [or] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.”  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040,
23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694.  In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d
-8-
427 (1973), the Supreme Court explained the scope of a search incident to an arrest in light
of its decision in Chimel.  The issue before the Court in Robinson was whether after a
custodial arrest, a police officer could conduct a full search of the arrestee or, in the
alternative, if the scope of a search incident to arrest is limited to a frisk of the outer clothing.
 The Court held that a search of an arrestee’s waist, pants, pockets, as well as the contents
of the arrestee’s pockets, supports “the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
custody” as well as “the need to preserve the evidence on his person for later use at trial” and
is therefore permissible under Fourth Amendment law.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234, 94 S.Ct.
at 476, 38 L.Ed.2d at 440.    
The rationale of Chimel and Robinson entitles the police, under the Fourth
Amendment, to conduct a full search incident to arrest, without a warrant, so long as the
search does not involve a bodily intrusion.  See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769,
86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 (1966).  In Schmerber, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment protects an arrestee’s privacy interests in his person and prohibits bodily
intrusions that “are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper
manner.”  384 U.S. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d at 918.  We note, however, as we
did in Nieves, supra, that “the Supreme Court has not [specifically] addressed the validity of
strip searches incident to an arrest.”  383 Md. at 585, 861 A.2d at 69.  See Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983).   
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s failure to address the validity of strip searches
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incident to an arrest, we acknowledged in Stackhouse, supra, that “the rule developed in
Chimel was based on an exigency rationale, that is, the safety of the officer and the
preservation of evidence[,]” and that “[t]he justification, however, remains a narrow one.”
Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. at 211-212, 468 A.2d at 338.   In addition, we explained that
a warrantless search cannot be justified on the basis that the officers had probable cause,
“because that is the very determination for which the constitution requires a warrant
hearing.”  Stackhouse, 298 Md. at 219, 468 A.2d at 342.  
Here the police had reason to believe that Paulino carried drugs on his person and
under his clothing, but that fact was not the justification for the search.  Paulino’s arrest
served as justification for the search incident and the underlying probable cause for his arrest
was never challenged.  The actual challenge, however, is to the search of Paulino.  He
contends that the search constituted a strip search.  By definition a strip search involves a
more invasive search of the person as opposed to a routine custodial search.  Therefore, the
necessity for such an invasive search must turn upon the exigency of the circumstances and
reasonableness.  Without the constitutional safeguards of exigent circumstances and
reasonableness, every search incident could result in a strip search.  As we have said, “[t]he
meaning of exigent circumstances is that the police are confronted with an emergency--
circumstances so imminent that they present an urgent and compelling need for police
action.”  Stackhouse, 298 Md. at 219-220, 468 A.2d at 342.  Therefore, we must determine
whether the circumstances of the search in the present case rise to that level. 
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B.
Strip Searches and Body Cavity Searches
Paulino contends that, at a minimum, the search conducted here was a strip search.
In Paulino’s view, the search  “was more intrusive than a mere strip search” because the
cheeks of his buttocks were manipulated by the police.  Paulino asserts that “by spreading
apart the cheeks of [his] buttocks” the search was beyond the realm of a strip search and,
instead, was a “visual body cavity search.”  In response, the State contends that the search
of Paulino occurred “without removing any of Paulino’s clothing” and that the “search
arguably did not . . . constitute a ‘strip search.’”  Further, according to the State, “the police
action . . . did not constitute a visual or manual ‘body cavity search’” because, to retrieve the
contraband, the police officers only lifted up Paulino’s shorts.  For reasons discussed, infra,
we conclude that the search of Paulino was both a strip search and a visual body cavity
search.  
There exist three separate categories of searches.  As the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit  noted in Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1 st Cir. 1985), n. 3.:
A “strip search,” though an umbrella term, generally refers to an inspection of
a naked individual, without any scrutiny of the subject’s body cavities.  A
“visual body cavity search” extends to a visual inspection of the anal and
genital areas.  A “manual body cavity search” includes some degree of
touching or probing of body cavities.
3In accord, one attorney commentator, William J. Simonitsch, notes that there are
“three distinct categories” of body cavity searches:  strip searches, visual body cavity
searches and manual body cavity searches.  Mr. Simonitsch defines a strip search as
involving the removal of clothing for inspection of the under clothes and/or body and
“includ[ing] only those searches that do not involve a visual or manual inspection of the
genitals or anus”; visual body cavity search “include[s] only searches where there is a visual
inspection of a person’s genitals or anus, but no physical contact or intrusion”; manual body
cavity search includes “not only those [searches] performed by insertion of, or manipulation
with, the fingers, but also endoscopic examinations and the use of gynecological devices.”
William J. Simonitsch, Visual Body Cavity Searches Incident to Arrest: Validity Under the
Fourth Amendment, 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 665, 667-68 (2000).    
-11-
See Nieves, 383 Md. at 586, 861 A.2d at 703 (acknowledging that a strip search is “any search
of an individual requiring the removal or rearrangement of some or all clothing to permit the
visual inspection of the skin surfaces of the genital areas, breasts, and/or buttocks.”  The
Court noted that “[t]here is a distinction between a strip search and other types of searches,
such as body cavity searches, which could involve visually inspecting the body cavities or
physically probing the body cavities”); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (holding that when the arrestee was forced to drop his pants, bend over, and
spread his buttocks and the crack cocaine recovered was in plain view and was lodged
between the arrestee’s buttocks, the search was a visual body cavity search); Hughes v.
Commonwealth of Va., 524 S.E.2d 155, 159 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the arrestee
was subjected to all three types of searches when the arrestee was disrobed, directed to bend
over and expose his anus, cough in order to expand the officer’s view of the anus, and when
a plastic bag was subsequently removed from the arrestee’s anal cavity).  See also Amaechi
v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 363-64 (4 th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, 256
4The dissent seeks to adopt a definition of strip search that is unduly restrictive.  The
application of that definition underestimates the degree to which the search invaded Paulino’s
personal privacy.  Moreover, the cases cited by the dissent in support of its contention that
the search of Paulino was a “reach-in” search are distinguishable because they do not relate
to the manipulation of the intimate parts of a suspect’s person. 
5As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted in McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609,
616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), “[v]isual body-cavity searches are among the most intrusive of
searches.  Its intrusiveness ‘cannot be overstated.’”; United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240,
1246 (5th Cir.1978); Patterson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Kennedy
v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 711 (9th Cir.1989).) 
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(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995).
Based upon the record before us, we conclude that the police officers’ search of
Paulino was both a strip search and a visual body cavity search.  It appears that the police
officers attempted to manipulate Paulino’s clothing in such a manner that his buttocks could
be more readily viewed.  In this instance, the police did not only lift up Paulino’s shorts, but
also the officers manipulated his buttocks to allow for a better view of his anal cavity.  If, in
the case sub judice, the drugs were protruding from between the cheeks of Paulino’s buttocks
and visible without spreading his buttocks cheeks, the classification of the type of search
would be a close one4.  In this case, however, the drugs were not visible until after the cheeks
of Paulino’s buttocks were spread apart.  Therefore, when the police officers spread the
cheeks of Paulino’s buttocks to inspect his anal cavity and, upon doing so, observed a plastic
bag containing drugs, their conduct amounted to a “visual body cavity search.”5  
C.
Reasonableness
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Notwithstanding the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement,
the search conducted by the police must be reasonable in light of the exigencies of the
moment.  See, U.S. Const. amend. IV.; Nieves, 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68.  The fact that
the police can lawfully initiate the search of a suspect does not then give the police carte
blanche authority to conduct an unreasonable search.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558,
99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 481 (noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits
only unreasonable searches”).  The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bell sets forth
the appropriate test for determining the reasonableness of a search.  Judge Battaglia, writing
for this Court in Nieves, supra, said that:   
In Bell [], “the Supreme Court addressed the permissible scope of searches
incident to arrest that occurred in association with pretrial detention. [441
U.S.] at 523, 99 S.Ct. at 1866, 60 L.Ed.2d at 458.  Several defendants brought
a class action suit challenging detention policies requiring pre-trial detainees
to be subjected to a “visual body cavity” search every time the detainee had
contact with individuals outside of the institution. Id.  The Court assessed the
reasonableness of these searches by stating:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application.  In each
case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.
Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted.
383 Md. at 588, 861 A.2d at 71.  
In the present case, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that three “of the four
factors required to be balanced by Bell . . . all weigh in favor of the State.”  The appearance
that three out of four factors weigh in favor of the State, however, does not, in and of itself,
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make a search reasonable.  In our view, Bell requires a flexible approach, one that takes into
account the relative strength of each factor.  Further, Bell requires that a reviewing court,
when assessing the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment, balance “the
need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”
Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at 481.  In that regard, we conclude that,
on balance, the location of the search and the lack of exigency made the search of Paulino
unreasonable.        
Accordingly, we turn first to the scope of the search in the instant case.  Paulino
contends that “the scope of the intrusion involved in the [search of his person] was great[,]”
noting that he had to “suffer the indignity of having an officer view his naked body” as well
as having to “endure the humiliation of having an officer physically manipulate his buttocks.”
The State makes no specific argument regarding the scope of the search, other than that the
“‘intrusion’ into Paulino’s buttocks cheeks area” was reasonable.   The Court of Special
Appeals held that the scope of the search was reasonable because the police “only had to ‘lift
up’ [Paulino’s] shorts briefly” and that “the entire search was as brief as possible.”  Even if
we were to assume that the amount of time to conduct the search was brief, that factor, in our
view, does not render the search reasonable under the circumstances where there was no
exigency.  
 To determine reasonableness, we look to each of the factors delineated in Bell, and,
after balancing each of the four factors, we make a determination of reasonableness.  See
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Bell, 441 U.S. 520 at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at 481.  We hold that the police
officers’ search of Paulino was highly intrusive and demeaning.  The type of search that
Paulino was subjected to, and other searches that “entail[] the inspection of the anal and/or
genital areas have been accurately described as demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified,
humiliating, embarrassing, repulsive, degrading, and extremely intrusive of one’s personal
privacy.”  West, 87 F.Supp.2d at 565.  
We turn next to the second factor in the Bell analysis, justification for initiating the
search.  The State contends that there was justification for initiating the search “because the
police had sufficient cause to believe that the illegal narcotics Paulino was known to be
possessing were actually being concealed in that place.”  Citing our decision in Nieves,
supra, the State argues that the “authority to conduct a search of this scope is virtually
unassailable.”  Paulino offers no argument that the police officers’ search of him was not
justified.  As this Court noted in Nieves:
The Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23
L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), articulated the bases for a search incident to arrest, those
being, “to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order
to resist arrest or effect his escape . . . [or] to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”
Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694; see also United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03, 94 S.Ct. at 1234, 1237, 39 L.Ed.2d 771, 775
(1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226, 94 S.Ct. 467, 472, 38
L.Ed.2d 427, 435 (1973); Carter, 367 Md. at 460, 788 A.2d at 653.
383 Md. at 584, 861 A.2d at 68-69.  Because a police officer can lawfully make a “full
custodial search in order to support his general need to disarm a suspect or preserve evidence
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that may be in the individual’s possession,” we conclude that the police officers were
justified in initiating the search of Paulino.  See Robinson, supra.  We do not agree, as the
State’s argument suggests, that because the police had probable cause to arrest Paulino, the
police were justified in searching him to the extent he was searched under the circumstances.
The crux of this case, as illuminated infra, is not whether the police had the right to search
Paulino, but instead whether an exigency existed such that an invasive search, conducted at
the scene of the arrest, was reasonable.  
Lastly, we examine the final two factors in the Bell analysis.  We take into
consideration the place and manner in which the search of Paulino was conducted.   As to the
place of the search, Paulino contends that the parking lot of a car wash is a “very public
location [that was] within plain view of people who were not involved in the search itself.”
Further, Paulino contends that the presence of other people, who were not involved in the
search of his person made this search exceptionally public and therefore unreasonable.  The
State contends that the search of Paulino was conducted in an appropriate manner because,
in its view, “none of Paulino’s clothes were removed, nor is there evidence that any part of
his naked body was exposed unduly to any persons other than the searching officers.
Paulino’s pants were kept in place during the search . . . [and] [t]here is absolutely no
evidence of any gratuitous or unnecessary action taken by the police.”  The State also argues
that “the search occurred at night in the barricaded stall of . . . a ‘secluded’ car wash” and that
no “part of Paulino’s naked body was observed or was capable of being observed by anyone
-17-
other than the searching officers, much less others at the scene or the general public.” 
The decisions of other jurisdictions are instructive.  In McGee, police officers, acting
on information from an informant approached McGee, suspecting that he was selling crack
cocaine.  As the police officers approached McGee they observed “marijuana smoke in the
air above McGee and a marijuana cigarette on the ground next to him.”  McGee, 105 S.W.3d
at 614.  The police arrested McGee, and drove him to a nearby fire station.  In a secluded
area of the station, McGee was ordered to “drop his pants, bend over, and spread his
buttocks.”  McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 613.  The officer then performed a “visual search of
McGee’s anal region.”  Id.  The court concluded that the search of McGee amounted to a
visual body inspection.  To assess the reasonableness of the search of McGee, the court
applied the four factors of the Bell analysis.  In analyzing the place where the search was
conducted, the court  noted that “the search must be conducted in a hygienic environment
where there is no risk of infection.”  McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 617.  Further, the court held that
the searching officer acted appropriately to protect the privacy interest of McGee because he
took him to a separate location within the firehouse that was more secluded.  Id. (citing
Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1014 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that strip searches and body
cavity searches involve such an intrusion that they should rarely be conducted in public
places)).  
The testimony from the suppression hearing in the case sub judice, viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, does not indicate that the officers made any attempt to protect
-18-
Paulino’s privacy interests.  The search was conducted in the very place in which he was
arrested, a car wash.  Similarly, there is no indication in the record before us that the police
made any attempt to limit the public’s access to the car wash or took any similar precaution
that would limit the ability of the public or any casual observer from viewing the search of
Paulino.  In our view, the search as conducted was unreasonable.  
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, recently decided United States
v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974 (8 th Cir. 2007).   In Williams, the police obtained a warrant to
search Robert Lee Williams’s home and his person.  Prior to executing the warrant, the police
conducted a traffic stop of Williams’s vehicle.  “A pat-down search revealed something
inside Williams’s pants, but the officers testified they decided not to search Williams more
extensively while on the street because they were concerned about his privacy.  Instead, they
took Williams into custody, placed him in a squad car, and drove him several blocks to the
police department’s Fourth Precinct building.”  Williams, 477 F.3d at 975.  The police then
conducted a search of Williams in the parking lot of the police precinct, opening Williams’s
pants, reaching inside his underwear and retrieving contraband near his genitals.  The court
held that, in that instance, the search was not unreasonable.  The court noted, however, that
“there is no evidence that [a citizen] would have seen the private areas of Williams’s body
or any contact between the gloved hand of the officer and Williams’s genitals, which
remained obscured from the view of passers-by.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 977. 
 We contrast the facts of Williams to the facts of the present case.  The search of
6A “reach-in” search involves a manipulation of the arrestee’s clothes such that the
police are able to reach in and retrieve the contraband without exposing the arrestee’s private
areas.  See, U.S. v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974 (8 th Cir. 2007); State v. Jenkins, 842 A.2d 1148
(Conn. App. Ct. 2004); McCloud v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 866 (Va. Ct. App.  2001).
  
-19-
Williams was a “reach-in”6 type of search.  Williams’s pants were opened, but presumably
kept on his waist, while the officer reached into his underwear and retrieved the contraband.
In contradistinction, during the search of Paulino, his pants were below his waist, his
underwear was “lifted up” and the cheeks of his buttocks were manipulated and exposed.
In our view, the search of Paulino was far more invasive and, as a result, required a higher
degree of privacy than the search conducted in Williams.  Moreover, there is no evidence that
the search of Paulino was shielded from the view of passers-by or the people present at the
scene.  
In the instant case, the State contends that because the search did not occur on the side
of a well-traveled highway and was conducted at night; the search, therefore, was reasonable.
The State appears to overlook that its failure to prove exigent circumstances and the
reasonableness of the search are determinative.  As we have noted previously, “the burden
is on those seeking the exemption [from the warrant requirement] to show the need [for the
search].”  See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. at 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d at 576.  There was no
testimony at the suppression hearing in the case sub judice, that Paulino was attempting to
destroy evidence, nor that he possessed a weapon such that an exigency was created that
would have required the police officers to search Paulino at that precise moment and under
7In support of its contention that the police took “reasonable precautions to protect
Paulino’s privacy interest,” the dissent assumes facts that were not adduced at the
suppression hearing.  Specifically, the dissent incorrectly assumes that “no one saw Paulino’s
genitalia, and no one other than the searching officer saw Paulino’s buttocks.”  Detective
Latchaw’s testimony at the suppression hearing simply does not support this contention.  To
the contrary, it is entirely conceivable that the search of Paulino was visible to any of the
persons present at the scene of the arrest.  There is no dispute that three of Paulino’s
associates were present as well as a team of Baltimore County police officers. Moreover,
Detective Latchaw did not testify that the searching officer took any precautions to shield
Paulino’s body, particularly the obviously exposed part of his buttocks, from public view.
-20-
the circumstances, in a “well-lit” public car wash.  There is no dispute that members of the
public were present, specifically, the other passengers in the Jeep Cherokee.  It is their
presence, whether their view was obscured or otherwise, that makes the search of Paulino
unnecessarily within the public view and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment.7  The
police could have taken any number of steps, including patting Paulino down for weapons
at the scene of the arrest and conducting the search inside the Jeep Cherokee vehicle in which
Paulino was a passenger, or at the police station, to protect Paulino’s privacy interest.
Similarly, the police could have conducted the search in the privacy of a police van.  See
Dorlouis, 107 F. 3d at 256.  During the transportation of Paulino from the scene of the arrest
to the station or to a more private location, the police had the ability to secure Paulino to
prevent his destruction or disposal of the contraband found on his person.  Instead, they chose
to search him in a public place in the view of others.  Accordingly, we hold that the search
of Paulino unreasonably infringed on his personal privacy interests when balanced against
the legitimate needs of the police to seize the contraband that Paulino carried on his person.
-21-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
O F  
S P E C I A L 
A P P E A L S
REVERSED. 
 
BALTIMORE
COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 75
September Term, 2006
JOHN AUGUST PAULINO
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J.,
 which Cathell and Wilner, JJ.,  join.
Filed:    June 4, 2007
1
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.
I respectfully dissent.
The crux of the present case is whether the police’s search of Paulino was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 1  The majority concludes that the search was both a highly
intrusive strip search and a visual body cavity search and holds that the search was
unreasonable, emphasizing the location of the search and the perception that there was a lack
of exigency.  I disagree that the search constituted a strip search or a visual body cavity
search, and that the search was unreasonable.
A.
In Nieves v. State, 383 Md. 573, 861 A.2d 62 (2004), we addressed whether a strip
search conducted incident to a lawful arrest for a minor traffic offense was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.  In that case, Nieves’ clothes were removed and he was searched at
a police station, resulting in the discovery of two small plastic baggies containing cocaine
protruding from his rectum; we addressed what constitutes a strip search:
The term “strip search” has been defined and used in differing
contexts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In general, strip
searches involve the removal of the arrestee's clothing for
inspection of the under clothes and/or body.  Some have defined
strip searches to also include a visual inspection of the genital
and anal regions of the body.  Black's Law Dictionary defines a
strip search as “a search of a person conducted after that
person's clothes have been removed, the purpose usually being
to find any contraband the person might be hiding.” . . . There is
-2-
a distinction between a strip search and other types of searches,
such as body cavity searches, which could involve visually
inspecting the body cavities or physically probing the body
cavities.
Id. at 586, 861 A.2d at 70 (citations omitted).  Therefore, a strip search generally involves
the removal of clothing and inspection of the naked body; a visual body cavity search entails
a specific visual inspection of the anal or genital body cavity areas.  In the present case, the
search of Paulino was not a strip search, nor a body cavity search.
The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing reflected that police knew that
Paulino would be traveling in a Jeep Cherokee near a car wash in the 1100 block of North
Point Road in Dundalk around 11 p.m. on September 29, 2000, and that he would be in
possession of a quantity of crack cocaine, secreted in his buttocks area between his butt
cheeks.  Based upon this information, the police arrested Paulino when he arrived at the car
wash, placed him on the ground, and conducted the search, lifting up his boxer shorts,
reaching between his butt cheeks and securing the baggie.  Paulino was already wearing his
pants below his buttocks so that the officers found the drugs by simply “lifting up [Paulino’s]
shorts,” but not by removing them:
[COUNSEL FOR PAULINO]: And you did conduct a search
then, is that correct?  How did you come to find the drugs?
[DETECTIVE LATCHAW]: Well, when we -- when Mr.
Paulino was removed from the vehicle and laid on the ground,
his pants were already pretty much down around his -- below his
butt, because I guess that’s the fad, these guys like wearing their
pants down real low, so it was just a matter of lifting up his
shorts, and between his butt cheeks, the drugs were -- I believe
one of the detectives actually put on a pair of gloves and just
-3-
spread his cheeks apart a little bit and it was right there.
The fact that Paulino’s shorts were pulled away from his waist so that the searching officer
could determine whether he had drugs secreted in his buttocks area does not render the
intrusion a strip search or a visual body cavity search.
Rather, the search of Paulino was a “reach-in” search incident to a lawful arrest.  In
United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2007), after Williams was arrested, an
officer opened his pants, reached inside his underwear, and recovered a large amount of
drugs.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit distinguished strip searches
from “reach-in” searches, noting that unlike a strip search, a “reach-in” search does not
involve the exposure of the suspect’s private areas:
To be sure, our cases suggest that police officers should “take
precautions to insure that a detainee's privacy is protected from
exposure to others unconnected to the search,” Jones v.
Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir.1985), but Jones, like
Starks v. City of Minneapolis, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D.Minn.
1998), analyzed whether police may conduct a strip search
during which a suspect must expose fully his or her private
areas.  Jones, 770 F.2d at 740; Starks, 6 F. Supp. 2d. at
1088-1089.  In contrast, a reach-in search of a clothed suspect
does not display a suspect's genitals to onlookers, and it may be
permissible if police take steps commensurate with the
circumstances to diminish the potential invasion of the suspect's
privacy.
Id. at 977 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  See also United States v. Ashley, 37 F.3d
678, 682 (D.C. Cir.1994) (officer opened individual’s pants and discovered a bag from drugs
inside his underwear); United States v. Williams, 209 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2000) (police officer
-4-
conducted search wherein he reached into the back of Williams’s undershorts and removed
a plastic bag containing cocaine from between Williams’s buttocks); State v. Smith, 464
S.E.2d 45, 46 (N.C. 1995) (officer searched individual by pulling open pants and underwear
and reaching in to retrieve drugs).  Therefore, a “reach-in” search, or a search of a clothed
suspect wherein the officer conducting the search reaches between an individual’s clothing
and his skin, without exposing the individual’s genitalia to onlookers, is not the same as a
strip search or visual body cavity search and its reasonableness is measured by its limited
intrusiveness weighed against the needs of the police to seize drugs they believe are secreted
on a suspect’s body.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d
447, 481 (1979) (“The test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable
of precise definition or mechanical application.  In each case it requires a balancing of the
need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.
Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”); Nieves,
383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68 (“In determining the reasonableness of a search, each case
requires a balancing of the government’s need to conduct the search against the invasion of
the individual’s privacy rights.”).
In Williams, 209 F.3d at 940, the police conducted a traffic stop of Williams’s vehicle,
after which they asked Williams to get out of his car and for consent to search his person.
After Williams was arrested, he attempted to flee the scene; the police apprehended him, and
-5-
an officer reached into the back of Williams’s pants, within his undershorts, and removed a
plastic bag containing cocaine from between his buttocks.  Addressing whether the search
was unreasonable, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that
it was reasonable because the search was not significantly more intrusive than necessary:
Williams next argues that the “crack” seized from him should be
suppressed because it was found when Officer Lewis “strip
searched” him at the scene subjecting him to great humility and
indignity.  The district court, however, construed the search as
a search incident to an arrest, not a strip search.
* * * 
Lewis retrieved the object by sliding his hand under Williams’
waistband and down the back part of his pants.  Williams was
never disrobed or exposed to the public.  The search occurred
at night, away from traffic and neither officer saw anyone in the
vicinity. Additionally, Williams’ attempt to flee the scene and his
physical resistance prior to the retrieval of the substance
suggest that he would have tried to further conceal or dispose
of the evidence had they not retrieved it immediately.
In this case, the scope of the initial pat-down search by the
officers was no more intrusive that which was already
permitted. . . . The officers’ seizure of the drugs did not add
significantly to Williams’ invasion of privacy. Based on the
officers’ experience, the scope of the search, its justification and
the place where it occurred, the district court did not clearly err
in concluding the search of Williams was not overly intrusive
and was correct in denying the motion to suppress.
Id. at 943-44 (emphasis added).
In Williams, 477 F.3d at 974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
addressed a search wherein, on a police precinct parking lot surrounded by a residential
neighborhood, an officer opened Williams’s pants, reached inside his underwear, and
-6-
removed a large amount of crack and powder cocaine.  Assessing the reasonableness of the
“reach-in” search, the court noted that “[t]here is no question that police were justified in
searching inside Williams’s pants [because] [t]he police possessed a warrant authorizing
them to search his person for drugs and firearms, and an initial pat-down produced specific
probable cause that Williams was hiding something inside his pants,” and that the proper
issue was “whether the search was reasonable in its scope, manner, and location.”  Id. at 975.
In this respect, the court concluded that the search was reasonable, remarking that the officers
took sufficient precautions to protect Williams’s privacy:
We believe that the officers took sufficient precautions to
protect Williams's privacy before fulfilling their legitimate need
to seize contraband that Williams had chosen to carry in his
underwear.  The police refrained from searching Williams on a
public street, and instead took him to the more private precinct
parking lot. The parking lot is partially secluded.  It holds squad
cars and the cars of police employees, and is surrounded by a
chain link fence that is topped by barbed wire and covered to
some degree with vegetation. The district court's findings of fact
recounted uncontradicted testimony of police officer Randy
Olson that no vehicles entered the lot during the search, and that
he saw no person other than police officers-either inside or
outside the parking lot-within eyesight of the brief search.
To the extent any citizen observed the search without notice of
the police, there is no evidence that such a person would have
seen the private areas of Williams's body or any contact between
the gloved hand of the officer and Williams's genitals, which
remained obscured from the view of passers-by.  Rather, the
citizen would have observed from a distance that an officer
briefly reached inside Williams's pants and pulled out a bag of
cocaine.  We conclude that such a search does not unreasonably
infringe on Williams's privacy interests when balanced against
the legitimate needs of the police to seize contraband that he
carried on his person.
-7-
Id. at 977-78.
Likewise, in Smith, 464 S.E.2d at 45, the defendant was stopped by police officers,
and informed that he was suspected of transporting cocaine; the officer stood between the
open car door and Smith and pulled back and down Smith’s pants and underwear, reached
in, and pulled out a paper towel containing cocaine from under Smith’s scrotum.  Assessing
the reasonableness of the search, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the
intermediate appellate court and adopted the dissent, State v. Smith, 454 S.E.2d 680, 687
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (Walker, J., dissenting), wherein Judge Walker concluded that the
search was reasonable because there were sufficient exigent circumstances to conduct the
search in the street to prevent the loss or destruction of the drugs and because the officer took
precautions to protect Smith’s privacy interests:
The search in the instant case took place at approximately 1:30
A.M. at the intersection of two streets in Fayetteville.  The
record does not reveal the conditions at the time, and defendant's
objection was that he did not want the officer to “search [his]
rear” in “the middle of the street.”
Here the evidence does show that prior to the search Officer
Cook asked defendant to step behind the open car door of his
vehicle and that he positioned himself between defendant and
the car door on the outside.  Officer Cook said he took these
steps “because [he] didn't want to expose [defendant] to other
cars, the public, to embarrass him, that sort of thing.”  Defendant
did not dispute this testimony.  Considering the totality of the
circumstances, I believe that the officers here, like the trooper
in Bazy, took “the necessary and reasonable precautions to
prevent the public exposure of defendant['s] . . . private areas.”
While there may have been other less intrusive means of
conducting the search, I agree with the Bazy court that the
availability of those less intrusive means does not automatically
-8-
transform an otherwise reasonable search into a Fourth
Amendment violation.
Just as the court in Bazy was unwilling to second guess the
procedures used by the officers in that case, I am unwilling to
second-guess the trial court's finding here that the officers’
conduct during the search did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.  The trial court in ruling on defendant's
motion to suppress had the arguments of both parties before it
and was in a superior position to evaluate the reasonableness of
the search.  I do not believe defendant is entitled to a new trial,
and I would affirm the trial court in all respects.
Id. at 687 (Walker, J., dissenting).  Similar to the searches conducted in those cases, the
search of Paulino was reasonable under the Bell reasonableness balancing test; the police
needed to conduct the search in order to prevent either loss or destruction of the drugs, which
could have occurred while in transit, and the officers protected Paulino’s privacy interests
by conducting the search in such a manner to prevent any onlookers from viewing his
genitalia.
The majority contends, because the officer touched Paulino’s clothes and body to view
and secure the drugs, that the search constituted a strip search, citing Amaechi v. West, 237
F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001) (officer walked Amaechi to police car, causing her housedress to
fall open, and during search, swiped his hand across Amaechi’s vagina causing slight
penetration of her genitals); United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 1126, 117 S.Ct. 2525, 138 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (police took Paul inside a police
van and ordered him to remove his clothes); United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir.
1995) (Vance consented to a pat-down search, which revealed a bulge in his crotch area and
-9-
that he was wearing two sets of underwear; a customs officer then ordered Vance to remove
his trousers and pull down his underwear); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1985)
(Blackburn was required by prison officials to remove her clothes so that a matron could
view her armpits, lift her breasts, examine her genitalia, and spread her buttocks apart);
McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1004, 124 S.Ct.
536, 157 L.Ed.2d 410 (2003) (McGee was forced to remove his pants, bend down, and
spread his buttocks); and Hughes v. Commonwealth, 524 S.E.2d 155 (Va. Ct. App. 2000)
(Hughes’ clothes were removed and he was asked to bend over and cough).  These case are
not instructive, however, because the searches in those cases involved removal of clothing,
which was not present in this case, and because they involved an intentional touching of
genitalia, which was far more intrusive than the touching the officer did in this case to secure
the drugs.
Rather, the fact that Paulino was not fully or partially disrobed differentiates the
instant search.  In McCloud v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 866 (Va. Ct. App. 2001), the
defendant was arrested for possessing a stolen car; during the search incident to the arrest,
the officer pulled McCloud’s pants and underwear away from his body and discovered plastic
baggies containing cocaine.  The officer reached inside McCloud’s underwear and seized the
baggies.  In assessing the reasonableness of the search, the intermediate appellate court
concluded that the search was not a strip search because the search did not involve full or
partial disrobement, nor did it involve the exposure of McCloud’s genitalia:
-10-
We have found no cases, nor has appellant cited any, that
include “arranging” of the suspect's clothing in a definition of
“strip search.”
* * *
Further, in a review of a number of federal appellate decisions,
we found no cases that characterize a strip search as other than
partial or total disrobement.  See Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356
(4th Cir. 2001); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997);
Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992);
Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1989); Weber v.
Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1986); Salinas v. Breier, 695 F.2d
1073 (7th Cir. 1982).
In this case, in accepting the Commonwealth's evidence, we find
appellant was not subjected to a strip search. Unlike in Hughes,
Moss, Taylor, and Gilmore, appellant's clothing was not
removed, and his genital area was not exposed. The officers
made no visual inspection of appellant's genitals nor did the
officers touch appellant's genitals.  Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Id. at 868-69.
Further, in Williams, 477 F.3d at 974, a case remarkably close to the situation we
consider here, the court rejected the argument that a search was unreasonably intrusive
because it involved physical contact, remarking that such contact is unavoidable when
conducting a search for drugs:
Williams makes two objections to the search.  First, he claims it
was unreasonably intrusive in its scope and manner because it
involved physical contact with his genitals.  We disagree.  The
police could not have removed the drugs that Williams stashed
near his genitals without making some “intimate contact,” and
we reject Williams's claim that such contact is per se
unreasonable.  Some physical contact is permissible, and indeed
unavoidable, when police reach into a suspect's pants to remove
-11-
drugs the suspect has chosen to hide there. . . .
The search of Williams was both less intrusive, as it involved no
penetration or public exposure of genitals, and far more
justified, as police had probable cause to believe he was carrying
drugs inside his pants.
We disagree with Williams’s claim that the police were required
to avoid physical contact with him by directing him to disrobe
and then visually inspecting his body for drugs.  “A creative
judge, engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can
almost always imagine some alternative means by which the
objectives of the police might have been accomplished.”  But
the existence of “less intrusive means” does not, by itself, make
a search unreasonable.  While the potential for destruction of
evidence is diminished when a suspect is in custody, it is not
completely eliminated, and it was not unreasonable for the
officers to assume the initiative by seizing the contraband that
Williams secreted in his underwear, rather than allow Williams
to disrobe and remove the drugs himself.
* * *
In contrast, a reach-in search of a clothed suspect does not
display a suspect’s genitals to onlookers, and it may be
permissible if police take steps commensurate with the
circumstances to diminish the potential invasion of the suspect's
privacy.
Id. at 976-78 (some citations omitted).  Thus, the fact that the search of Paulino involved an
officer touching Paulino’s buttocks to view the drugs did not automatically make the search
an unreasonably intrusive strip search.  Instead, Paulino’s search was a reasonable “reach-in”
search incident to arrest.
B.
Even were the search of Paulino to be considered a strip search, it was reasonable.
Although the majority agrees that strip searches may be reasonable, it finds that the search
-12-
of Paulino was unreasonable because it was conducted at a “public” car wash in the presence
of Paulino’s friends who arrived with him in the Jeep Cherokee.  In its conclusion, the
majority is establishing a per se rule that strip searches must be done in an enclosed area.
Such a per se rule violates the standard of reasonableness iterated in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
at 520, 99 S.Ct. at 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d at 447.  In Bell, the Supreme Court remarked that
whether a strip search is reasonable is incapable of being measured by per se rules because
the test for reasonableness “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.”
Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at 481.  The Court did not differentiate between
searches conducted in public and searches conducted in enclosed areas, stating that the
reasonableness of a search is measured by balancing the need for the particular search – in
this case, the police’s need to prevent evidence from becoming destroyed or lost – against
the invasion of privacy the search entails.  Id.  
In Nieves, 383 Md. at 573, 861 A.2d at 62, this Court considered whether a strip
search was reasonable after Nieves had been stopped for a traffic offense.  In assessing the
reasonableness of the strip search, we noted that if an individual is connected with drug
trafficking, a reasonable strip search incident to a lawful arrest may be conducted.  Id. at 598,
861 A.2d at 77.  Moreover, we did not distinguish searches conducted in public from
searches conducted in enclosed areas, instead emphasizing that “[i]n determining the
reasonableness of a search, each case requires a balancing of the government’s need to
conduct the search against the invasion of the individual’s privacy rights.”  Id. at 583, 861
-13-
A.2d at 68.
Therefore, whether a search is conducted in public as opposed to in an enclosed area
is not controlling; the reasonableness of a search is measured by balancing the need for the
search against the intrusion upon the individual’s privacy rights.  In State v. Jenkins, 842
A.2d 1148 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004), an undercover police officer, after having been informed
that the defendant was dealing drugs, arranged to buy heroin from him.  When Jenkins
approached the officer to sell him the drugs, he was arrested and taken to the side of a
restaurant building to be searched; the officer subsequently pulled Jenkins’s pants and
underwear away from his body and discovered glassine packets of heroin and crack cocaine.
Although the court considered the search of Jenkins a strip search, it found the search
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the officers had reasonable suspicion that
Jenkins had drugs on his person, and they adequately protected his privacy interests even
though the search was conducted in public:
A custodial arrest gives rise to the authority to search, even if
the arresting officer does not “indicate any subjective fear of the
[defendant] or . . . suspect that [the defendant] was armed.”
“The justification or reason for the authority to search incident
to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the
suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need
to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. . . . It is
the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search, and . . . in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full
search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable
search under that amendment.”  (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted).  It was, therefore, of
no moment that Brody was searching for weapons or
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contraband.
* * *
In this case, the manner in which the officers conducted the strip
search struck the appropriate balance between “the need for the
particular search” and “the invasion of personal rights. . . .”
The officers took the defendant to the side of the restaurant,
away from the street and out of public view. [The officer] did
not require him to remove any of his clothing, but rather pulled
his pants and underwear away from his body specifically to
retrieve the glassine packets he discovered and suspected were
there from the patdown of the defendant.
Id. at 1157-58 (emphasis added).
Similar to the search conducted in Jenkins, the police took reasonable precautions to
protect Paulino’s privacy interests, and the search, although not done in a physically enclosed
space, was no more intrusive than necessary to determine whether Paulino possessed drugs.
The evidence at the suppression hearing reflected that Paulino arrived at the car wash late at
night when the car wash was closed to the public.  The police arrested him, placed him on
the ground and conducted the search, lifting up his boxer shorts, reaching between his butt
cheeks and securing the baggie, precisely where they were told it would be.  The police
secured the drugs in Paulino’s possession inside the bay of a car wash facility in the rear of
a parking lot, blocked in by police vehicles, and secluded behind a storage facility and an
automobile repair shop, such that the area could not be seen by passers-by.  Although the
majority assumes that Paulino’s friends were present at the car wash and that they had the
ability to view Paulino’s buttocks during the search, there was no evidence adduced at the
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suppression hearing to support this assertion.  Although one of the detectives testified that
the car wash area was well-lit, there is no evidence that anyone saw Paulino’s genitalia, nor
that anyone other than the searching officer saw Paulino’s buttocks.
Moreover, even when there exists alternatives, or less intrusive means, to conduct a
search, that does not by itself render the search unreasonable.  See Byndloss v. State, 391 Md.
462, 484, 893 A.2d 1119, 1133 (2006) (“A creative judge engaged in a post hoc evaluation
of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives
of the police might have been accomplished.  But ‘[t]he fact that the protection of the public
might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by “less intrusive” means does not, itself,
render the search unreasonable.’  The question is not simply whether some other alternative
was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue
it.”), quoting Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 577, 774 A.2d 420, 433 (2001), quoting in turn
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1576, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 616
(1985) (citations omitted).
By holding as it does, the majority impermissibly restricts the police’s ability to
conduct reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment for drugs that are secreted on an
individual known to be carrying such drugs to prevent their loss.  I disagree, and would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judges Cathell and Wilner authorize me to state that they join in this dissent.
In the Circuit Court of Baltimore County
Civil No. 00 CR 3812
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 75
September Term, 2006
JOHN AUGUST PAULINO
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
                 Assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:    June 4, 2007
I join Judge Battaglia’s dissent and would further hold that when a person wears their
pants below the level of their buttocks, he or she is intentionally offering that area for
observation by the public and obviously has no expectation of privacy sufficient to prohibit
a police officer from also looking.
If a person wants to have an expectation of privacy in that area of his or her body, he
or she should keep their pants up when in public.