Title: Commonwealth v. Vargas

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-10075 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PABLO VARGAS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.    March 11, 2016. - August 30, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional 
rights, Assistance of counsel, Public trial.  Due Process 
of Law, Assistance of counsel, Interpreter.  Evidence, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Hearsay.  Waiver.  Telephone.  Defense of Others.  Self-
Defense.  Interpreter.  Practice, Criminal, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Assistance 
of counsel, Instructions to jury, Hearsay, Motion to 
suppress, New trial, Interpreter, Public trial, Capital 
case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 2, 2004. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Daniel 
A. Ford, J.; the case was tried before Francis R. Fecteau, J.; 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on December 23, 2013, was 
heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., and a motion for reconsideration 
was also heard by him. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justice Cordy participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to his retirement.  Justice 
Spina participated in the deliberation on this case prior to his 
retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
John M. Thompson for the defendant. 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  There is no dispute that on the night of 
September 23, 2004, the victim, Tremayne King, was killed by the 
defendant, Pablo Vargas.  The defendant stabbed the victim eight 
times during an altercation at the residence of the victim's 
estranged wife, Yanira Rodriguez, who was the defendant's girl 
friend.  At trial, the defendant sought to rebut the charge of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of self-defense, 
alleging that he fought and killed the victim because he feared 
for his life. 
 
On May 24, 2006, a Hampden County jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity and cruelty, rejecting the Commonwealth's alternative 
theory of premeditation.  In December, 2013, the defendant moved 
for a new trial, which was denied, as was his motion for 
reconsideration thereof. 
 
On appeal from his conviction and from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, the defendant claims that (1) his 
statement made during police questioning shortly after the 
altercation should have been suppressed; (2) the trial judge 
erred in excluding relevant so-called Adjutant evidence of the 
victim's history of violence, see Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 
3 
 
Mass. 649, 664 (2005); (3) the judge erred in admitting certain 
testimony concerning the defendant's statements made to a third 
party; (4) the judge erred in denying his request for an 
instruction on defense of another; (5) the judge's jury 
instructions on malice, self-defense, and voluntary manslaughter 
were erroneous and created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice because they allowed the jury to convict 
the defendant without considering mitigating circumstances; (6) 
a qualified interpreter should have been appointed to assist 
with the testimony of Rodriguez, who was a witness to the 
altercation; (7) his right to a public trial was violated when 
the court room was closed during jury selection; (8) trial 
counsel was ineffective; and (9) evidence that was newly 
discovered after trial warranted the granting of a new trial.  
The defendant also requests that we exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the verdict 
of murder in the first degree to voluntary manslaughter. 
 
Although our review of the record does not reveal any 
errors that would warrant a new trial, the circumstances of this 
case persuade us that a reduction of the defendant's conviction 
from murder in the first degree to voluntary manslaughter is 
more consonant with justice.  We therefore vacate the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and his 
sentence, and we remand the case to the Superior Court for the 
4 
 
entry of a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter and for 
imposition of sentence. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our 
analysis of the issues raised on appeal. 
 
At 11:48 P.M. on September 23, 2004, Springfield police 
Detective Norman Shink and three other officers arrived at an 
apartment building on Bristol Street in Springfield.  Shink saw 
a man, who was later identified as the defendant, in front of an 
apartment on the second floor.  The defendant lifted his shirt, 
revealing a bloody knife tucked into his waistband, and said, 
"This is the knife I used to stab him.  Take it.  Take it.  He 
was beating me real bad.  I had no choice.  It was self-
defense." 
 
Rodriguez lived in the apartment on Bristol Street with her 
three children.  She was married to the victim, but the two were 
estranged.  The victim had enlisted in the National Guard, and 
on July 10, 2004, was assigned to Fort Drum, in New York, to 
train for deployment to Iraq.  At that time, the victim and 
Rodriguez separated.  The victim left a number of personal 
belongings stored at the apartment, including several handguns. 
 
In August, 2004, the defendant began staying at Rodriguez's 
apartment, and he was there on the evening of September 23.  
That day, Rodriguez received a telephone call from the victim, 
5 
 
who had received a pass from the National Guard and planned to 
return to the apartment to retrieve his belongings.  The victim 
did not specify when he would be arriving.2 
 
The defendant was present when Rodriguez spoke with the 
victim.  She discussed the conversation with him and encouraged 
him to leave before the victim arrived.  The defendant did not 
do so. 
 
At approximately 11:30 P.M. that evening, Rodriguez was 
sitting on a couch watching television in the living room.  She 
heard a sound at the door and observed a hand reaching in 
through the partially opened door and sliding the chain lock up 
to release it and gain access to the apartment.  At this point, 
the victim burst in and attacked her, hitting her with his fists 
as she covered her face with her arms.  The defendant, who was 
in the bedroom at the time, came into the living room and said 
something to the victim.  The victim ran at the defendant, 
knocking him back into the bedroom and jumping on top of him.  
The defendant shouted for Rodriguez to telephone the police, and 
Rodriguez ran to an apartment next door.  One of the occupants 
                                                          
 
 
2 On September 23, the victim drove with a fellow soldier to 
Springfield from Fort Drum.  The soldier was called as a witness 
for the Commonwealth.  He testified that while en route, the 
victim made two telephone calls.  The first was to a female (who 
the witness did not know), to whom the victim stated falsely 
that he was not coming to Springfield that day because his pass 
had been delayed.  In the second call, he told the person that 
he was coming home to get divorce papers, pick up his weapons, 
and surprise his wife. 
6 
 
answered the door; Rodriguez begged him to telephone 911 and 
stated that the victim had a firearm, although she had not seen 
the victim with any weapon.  When she returned to her apartment, 
Rodriguez saw the victim lying on the couch, bleeding.  No 
firearm was found in the victim's possession. 
 
The victim went into cardiac arrest and died while being 
transported to the hospital.  A medical examiner determined that 
of the eight stab wounds sustained by the victim, four had been 
lethal.  One wound to the victim's left upper arm was defensive. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress statement.  The 
defendant was arrested and interrogated by Sergeant Roy Carter 
and Shink at the Springfield police department in the early 
hours of September 24, 2004.  The interview was recorded.3,4 
                                                          
 
 
3 During the interview, the defendant shared his version of 
events, including that he saw the victim carrying a gun and that 
he used the knife in self-defense.  The defendant described the 
gun as black and gray, which was similar to one of the two guns 
found by police during a search of the victim's personal 
belongings (which had been stored at the apartment) and 
described to the jury as "two-tone."  The defendant's statement 
indicated the following:  A man whom the defendant did not 
recognize barged into Rodriguez's apartment while the defendant 
and Rodriguez were sitting on the couch.  The man attacked 
Rodriguez and then proceeded to charge at the defendant.  The 
man hit the defendant, tackled him, and jumped on top of him.  
The defendant saw the man had a gun, "freaked out," and grabbed 
a knife to defend himself.  The defendant told the man to stay 
back, and when he did not do so, the defendant began to swing 
the knife.  The two fell to the ground, at which point the 
defendant noticed that the man began to lose strength due to 
being stabbed. 
 
7 
 
 
Prior to questioning, Carter read and presented the 
defendant with the Miranda rights.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966).  When Carter instructed the defendant as to his 
right to an attorney,5 the defendant asked, "Is there a lawyer 
here present?"  Carter responded, "No, there isn't."  Carter 
then proceeded with his presentation of the Miranda rights, 
including that the Commonwealth would provide a lawyer if the 
defendant could not afford one.  Carter read the Miranda 
warnings for a second time, the defendant initialed the warnings 
as they were read, and the defendant indicated that he wished to 
speak to police. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4 The recording was played at trial.  In its closing 
argument, the Commonwealth characterized the defendant's 
statement as self-serving, and specifically attempted to 
undermine the credibility of the self-defense theory by 
highlighting various inconsistencies between the statement and 
reality.  The prosecutor stated:  "One of the most important 
pieces of evidence you will have in the jury deliberation is a 
copy of the [recording] of the statement taken by the police at 
the police station." 
 
 
5 The Miranda warning form for the Springfield police 
department, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
contained an error as to the right to counsel warning.  The 
document provided:  "You have the right to talk for advice 
before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during 
questioning."  Sergeant Roy Carter verbally corrected this 
error, as his instruction was, "[Y]ou have the right to talk to 
a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and you can 
have him with you during questioning." 
 
 
The form also presented the defendant with the Miranda 
rights prior to informing him of his right to use a telephone. 
8 
 
 
The police then notified the defendant of his right to use 
the telephone.  The defendant indicated that he intended to use 
the telephone, and Carter told him that he would be allowed to 
do so.  The defendant checked the box indicating that he had 
used the telephone, and signed that he had been notified of his 
rights.  The space on the form for timing of the defendant's 
telephone call was left blank, and the defendant never made a 
telephone call. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress his 
statement.  He argued that the statement was obtained in 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights,6 specifically that (1) 
he had not made a voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights due to 
his lack of language skills; (2) his waiver was not knowing 
because of the faulty Miranda warning; and (3) his statement, 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant's motion did not specifically address the 
defendant's cognate protections under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The Commonwealth argues 
that any arguments under art. 12 have therefore been waived.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 
(2004) ("A pretrial motion shall state the grounds on which it 
is based and shall include in separately numbered paragraphs all 
reasons, defenses, or objections then available, which shall be 
set forth with particularity").  See also Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 
456 Mass. 385, 389 (2010) (under rule 13 [a] [2], affidavits 
"must be sufficiently detailed to give fair notice to the 
prosecution").  Article 12 was, however, addressed at the motion 
to suppress hearing.  The defendant's art. 12 claims are not 
waived; issues of notice are irrelevant, as art. 12 guarantees 
the same rights as does the Fifth Amendment, see Commonwealth v. 
Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 337 (2012), and the motion judge relied 
on cases interpreting both the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights and the United States Constitution in denying the motion 
to suppress. 
9 
 
"Is there a lawyer here present?" constituted an invocation of 
his right to counsel, which invocation was not scrupulously 
honored.7  At an evidentiary hearing on the issue, the defendant, 
Carter, and Shink testified.  Carter and Shink both testified 
that the defendant was eager to share his version of events.  
The judge credited the officers' testimony, and, after reviewing 
the recording of the interview, denied the motion.  The judge 
found that the defendant had been advised of his rights, that he 
had a sufficient command of English to understand and waive 
those rights, that he had been informed of his statutory right 
to use the telephone, and that he had not made an unambiguous 
request for counsel. 
 
On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his 
motion to suppress on three grounds:  (1) the police did not 
scrupulously honor his invocation of his art. 12 right to 
counsel; (2) his statutory right to use the telephone, under, 
G. L. c. 276, § 33A, was intentionally violated; and (3) he did 
not make a knowing and voluntary Miranda waiver. 
                                                          
 
 
7 The defendant's motion to suppress his statement did not 
specifically set forth the purported G. L. c. 276, § 33A, 
violation of his telephone rights.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) 
(2).  However, the claim that G. L. c. 276, § 33A, was violated 
was addressed by the motion judge, and a suppression challenge 
on that ground is therefore not waived.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
13 (a) (2) ("Grounds not stated which reasonably could have been 
known at the time a motion is filed shall be deemed to have been 
waived, but a judge for cause shown may grant relief from such 
waiver"). 
10 
 
 
a.  Statutory right to use telephone.  Under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 33A, "an arrested person [must] be informed of his right to 
use the telephone as soon as reasonably practicable after 
arrival at the station."  Commonwealth v. Bouchard, 347 Mass. 
418, 420 (1964).  "The exclusionary rule applies to intentional 
deprivation by police of a defendant's rights under G. L. 
c. 276, § 33A."  Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 155 
(2010). 
 
There was not an intentional deprivation of the defendant's 
statutory telephone rights.  The defendant was informed of his 
right to use the telephone after waiving his Miranda rights.  
Carter asked the defendant if he "intend[ed] to use the 
[tele]phone."  The defendant said, "Yes."  Some confusion 
followed, as there was no indication that the defendant wanted 
to use the telephone at that moment or after he spoke with 
police.  The record does reflect, however, that the defendant 
was eager to speak to police.  In any event, although the 
defendant was not informed of his right to use the telephone for 
at least one hour and twenty-five minutes after he had been 
brought to the station,8 "he was informed before the inculpatory 
                                                          
 
 
8 Carter testified that the defendant arrived at the police 
station at 12:20 A.M.  The defendant was handcuffed to a chair 
in the detective bureau.  The recording of the interview 
indicated that it began at 1:40 A.M., and, roughly five minutes 
into the interview, the defendant was informed of his right to 
use the telephone. 
11 
 
statement was given."  Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 Mass. 687, 
702 (2008).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 503 
(1972) (statement suppressed where police waited more than one 
hour to inform defendant of right to make telephone call and 
damaging confrontation occurred in interim period).  There was 
no error. 
 
b.  Right to counsel.  The defendant claims that his 
question, "Is there a lawyer here present?" asked while Carter 
was reading him his Miranda rights, was an invocation of his 
right to counsel, and should have resulted in the cessation of 
the interrogation.  His subsequent statements, he argues, should 
therefore have been suppressed.  We disagree. 
 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, requires that "[p]rior to any 
questioning, the [suspect] must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of 
an attorney, either retained or appointed."  Miranda "protects 
both Fifth Amendment rights and rights guaranteed under art. 12" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 345 
(2012).  Once a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel, 
"all interrogation must cease until counsel is made available, 
unless the [suspect] himself [or herself] reinitiates further 
communication with the police."  Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 
143, 149 (2011) 
12 
 
 
The defendant's question concerning whether an attorney was 
present at the police station was, at best, ambiguous as to 
whether he was invoking his right to counsel.9  In response, 
Carter properly sought to clarify any ambiguity by repeating 
that the defendant had a right to counsel prior to questioning, 
advising him that he would be provided with an attorney if he 
could not afford one, and asking him if he understood those 
rights.  The defendant told Carter that he did, and proceeded to 
initial the document to indicate his acknowledgement and then to 
assent to police questioning.  There was no error in the judge's 
ruling that the defendant had not invoked his right to counsel. 
 
c.  Knowing and voluntary waiver of rights.  The defendant 
twice heard and then signaled comprehension of his Miranda 
rights.  When the defendant asked if there was a lawyer present 
during the reading of his rights, the police responded 
accurately and promptly.  Prior to questioning, Carter verified 
that the defendant was not intoxicated and that he could 
                                                          
 
 
9 The suspect "must articulate his desire to have counsel 
present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in 
the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request 
for an attorney."  Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 
(1994).  See Commonwealth v. Vincent, 469 Mass. 786, 796 (2014) 
("defendant's statements concerning possibly needing or wanting 
a lawyer were ambiguous and equivocal, and would not reasonably 
be understood in the circumstance to constitute an invocation of 
the right to counsel" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
13 
 
comprehend the English language.10  The motion judge found and 
the record reflects that the defendant was eager to share his 
version of the events with police.  We note also that the 
defendant's statement to the police was self-serving, in that it 
supported his theory of defense.  There was no error, and the 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress is affirmed. 
 
2.  Adjutant evidence.  At trial, the defendant sought to 
introduce, under Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664, evidence concerning 
the victim's history of violence in order to show that the 
victim was the initial aggressor in the altercation that 
resulted in the victim's death.  That evidence would largely 
have consisted of testimony concerning the victim's prior 
violence toward Rodriguez.  The trial judge determined that the 
issue as to the initial aggressor was not in dispute, and did 
not allow the evidence to be admitted for that purpose.11 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant indicated that he had trouble reading and 
writing English.  However, the defendant told Carter that he had 
secured his "GED," which we interpret as a reference to passing 
a general education development test, and Carter testified at 
the motion to suppress hearing that the defendant had "[n]o 
difficulty at all" with the English language.  The motion judge 
found that "the defendant is fluent in English" and that 
"language was simply not an impediment to the interview that 
took place." 
 
 
11 Rodriguez was, however, allowed to testify to violent 
acts committed by the victim against her, to the extent that she 
had conveyed those acts to the defendant, which she testified 
she had.  The trial judge instructed the jury: 
 
14 
 
 
"[W]here the identity of the first aggressor is in dispute 
and the victim has a history of violence, . . . the trial judge 
has the discretion to admit evidence of specific acts of prior 
violent conduct that the victim is reasonably alleged to have 
initiated, to support the defendant's claim of self-defense."  
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664.  The definition of "first aggressor" 
pertains not only to "the person who initiated the 
confrontation, but also the person who initiated the use or 
threat of deadly force, as 'resolution of both issues may assist 
the jury in deciding whether the prosecution has met its burden 
of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense.'"  
Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 592 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 529-530 (2013). 
 
Evidence of the victim's history of violence would not have 
bolstered the defendant's case, as the question of initial 
aggressor was never at issue.  There was no conflicting evidence 
as to the series of events leading up to the victim's death.  
The only accounts of the altercation came from the defendant 
(through his statement to police) and Rodriguez, who was called 
as a Commonwealth witness, both of which were consistent in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
"You are permitted to hear these out-of-court 
statements not for the truth of the matters contained, 
but for the fact of a conversation . . .  [The 
information] may be considered by you on the issue of 
the defendant's state of mind or his state of 
knowledge concerning those aspects, those events." 
15 
 
their portrayal of the victim as the initial aggressor.12  The 
jury also heard substantial evidence supporting the defendant's 
self-defense theory:  the victim was significantly larger than 
the defendant;13 and the victim had been trained in unarmed 
combat, including the incapacitation and killing of individuals, 
with or without weapons.14  Based on that evidence, and given 
                                                          
 
 
12 Rodriguez's testimony as to the portion of the 
altercation that she witnessed included the following exchange 
on cross-examination: 
 
 
Q.:  "[A]fter your husband, burst into that apartment on 
the night of his death, you said that he grabbed [the 
defendant,] correct?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes, sir." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Q.:  "Was your husband on top of him?" 
 
 
A.: "Yes, sir." 
 
 
Q.:  "Did your husband have his hand on [the defendant]?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes, sir." 
 
 
Q.:  "Was [the defendant] able to get away from [the 
victim]?" 
 
 
A.:  "No, sir." 
 
 
13 The victim was six feet tall and approximately 180 
pounds, while the defendant was five feet, six inches tall and 
weighed 114 pounds when he was booked. 
 
 
14 When the judge charged the jury, he instructed that 
"deadly force" can be used in self-defense where "the person 
using the weapon or deadly force [has] a reasonable apprehension 
of great bodily harm or death and a reasonable belief that no 
other means would suffice to prevent such harm."  The jury were 
16 
 
that there was no deadly weapon found with the victim, the 
assumption required to make the defendant's self-defense case 
was that the victim immediately used deadly force (with his 
hands and body) when the altercation began, and a deadly weapon 
was not necessary.  The defendant's proposed history of violence 
evidence would therefore have been both cumulative and 
unnecessary in making a case of self-defense, see Adjutant, 443 
Mass. at 663, and there was no "great[] danger that the 
exclusion of the evidence concerning the victim's violent acts" 
prejudiced the defendant.  Camacho, 472 Mass. at 593.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
allowed to "consider evidence of the relevant physical 
capability of the combatants, how many persons were involved on 
each side, the characteristics of any weapons used, the 
availability of rooms to maneuver, or any other factors . . . 
relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct under 
the circumstances." 
 
 
15 The defendant argues that, in its closing, the 
Commonwealth put at issue the initial aggressor question.  
During closing arguments, the prosecutor described the defendant 
and Rodriguez's versions of events as "wildly exaggerated" and 
posed an alternative series of events, indicating that the 
defendant may have been waiting for the victim so as to "ambush 
him" with a knife.  The prosecutor went on to say that "[c]ommon 
sense should tell you [Rodriguez and the defendant] were waiting 
and [the defendant] was prepared and ready for the eventuality 
that [the victim] would walk in and be upset to find the 
defendant and his wife."  This postulation did not change the 
evidence presented in terms of who was the initial aggressor.  
And, to the extent that the Commonwealth's "ambush" argument was 
intended to persuade the jury that the murder was premeditated, 
the jury rejected that theory. 
17 
 
 
3.  Jury instructions.16  The jury were instructed as to the 
prerequisites for a guilty finding of murder in the first 
degree, murder in the second degree, and manslaughter.  As to 
murder in the first degree, the jury were instructed on the 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  The jury returned a verdict convicting the defendant 
or murder in the first degree under the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant now claims error with the 
judge's decision, over his objection, not to instruct the jury 
on defense of another, and, for the first time, objects to 
various portions of the self-defense and homicide instructions, 
particularly those related to malice and voluntary manslaughter. 
 
a.  Defense of another.  The defendant argues that the 
judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the question of 
defense of another, given that he intervened after the victim's 
attack on Rodriguez.17  Because the defendant's exception was 
                                                          
 
 
16 The homicide jury instructions in this case were based on 
the 1999 Model Jury Instructions on Homicide. 
 
 
17 In declining to instruct the jury on defense of another, 
the judge reasoned: 
 
 
"The way I was looking at the evidence, I don't think 
it supports it because the evidence would indicate that the 
defendant appeared not to have armed himself until he 
himself was being attacked and wasn't intervening in the 
attack on another while armed.  So I think the evidence 
tends to support self-defense, not defense of another.  It 
may have initiated that way, the action may have started 
18 
 
preserved, we review the defendant's claim for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 Mass. 162, 168 (2016).   
 
Defense of another is warranted if "(a) a reasonable person 
in the actor's position would believe his intervention to be 
necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b) in the 
circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to 
be, the third person would be justified in using such force to 
protect himself."  Commonwealth v. Scott, 463 Mass. 561, 576 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 208 
(2012).  "The reasonableness of the belief is from the point of 
view of the actor and not of the third party, such that whether 
the third party was actually entitled to use self-defense, or 
believed the use of force to be necessary, is not at issue."  
Scott, supra.  "The actor's justification is lost if he uses 
excessive force, e.g., aggressive or deadly force unwarranted 
for the protective purpose."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 (2012). 
 
The judge did not err in finding that the defendant was not 
entitled to an instruction on the use of force in defense of 
Rodriguez.  Even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, Scott, 463 Mass. at 577, the 
evidence does not support an objective basis on which a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that way, but in terms of self-defense, the deadly force, I 
think that was done." 
19 
 
reasonable person would have believed that the defendant was 
justified in using deadly force in defense of Rodriguez.  The 
evidence tended to show that, when the defendant stabbed the 
victim, Rodriguez had left the apartment. 
 
b.  Other jury instruction issues.  The defendant, for the 
first time on appeal, claims error as to various portions of the 
jury instructions, particularly as to flaws in the self-defense 
and homicide instructions.  Because the defendant did not object 
to the jury instructions, we review them to determine whether 
there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 305 (2016).  When 
reviewing jury instructions, we "evaluate the instruction as a 
whole, looking for the interpretation a reasonable juror would 
place on the judge's words" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Young, 461 Mass. at 207.  We do not consider words from the 
instructions in bits and pieces or in isolation from one 
another.  See id.  If there is an error in the jury 
instructions, a new trial is called for unless we are 
"substantially confident that, if the error had not been made, 
the jury verdict would have been the same."  Commonwealth v. 
Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 626 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 
(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n.3 
(1988). 
20 
 
 
i.  Self-defense.  The defendant takes issue with the 
following instruction:  "A person may not use force in self-
defense until he has availed himself of all proper means to 
avoid physical combat."  The defendant argues that, under the 
circumstances of this case, the duty to retreat instruction 
should have been limited to the time frame of the face-to-face 
confrontation.  The flaw was exacerbated because in closing 
argument, the prosecutor asked if the defendant did "all he 
could to avoid physical combat when he told [Rodriguez's 
neighbor] he wasn't leaving even though they knew [the 
defendant] was coming home[.]"  This question, the defendant 
argues, in conjunction with the instruction, created the 
implication that if the defendant did not leave when he learned 
that the victim was coming, he was not justified in using any 
force to defend himself. 
 
We find no error with the instruction, which tracked the 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 55-56 (1999), and clearly 
and correctly conveyed the applicable law.  The judge instructed 
the jurors that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that 
the defendant did not act in self-defense and that the time 
frame in which the defendant must have been in fear of bodily 
harm was during the altercation.  Specifically, the jury were 
instructed that "[t]he proper exercise of self-defense arises 
from necessity and ends when necessity ends." 
21 
 
 
ii.  Homicide.  The judge instructed the jury on murder in 
the first degree (on theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty) and on murder in the second degree.  
As to both, the judge instructed on the prerequisite that the 
Commonwealth must prove malice, and on the possibility of a 
justified killing in self-defense.  See Model Jury Instructions 
on Homicide 8, 12, 20-21 (1999).  During the course of the 
instructions on murder in the first and second degrees, the 
judge instructed the jury three times that they are "permitted" 
but not required "to infer that a person who intentionally uses 
a dangerous weapon on another person is acting with malice."  
The dangerous weapon instruction was also consistent with the 
Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 61 (1999).  The judge then 
instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter and the 
circumstances that mitigate murder to manslaughter.  He stated: 
"Now going to move to the third form of homicide as a 
lesser included offense within the charge of murder, 
and that being manslaughter.  In order to prove that 
the defendant acted with malice, the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of certain 
mitigating circumstances.  Mitigating circumstances 
are circumstances which lessen a defendant's 
culpability for an act.  Both are crimes of murder, 
and voluntary manslaughter requires proof of an 
unlawful killing, but the killing may be the crime of 
voluntary manslaughter if it occurred under mitigating 
circumstances.  So that if the Commonwealth cannot 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
acted with malice, in order to obtain a conviction of 
murder, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of these mitigating 
circumstances.  Based on the evidence of this case, 
22 
 
mitigating circumstances you must consider are heat of 
passion upon a reasonable provocation; second, heat of 
passion induced by sudden combat; third, excessive 
force -- excessive use of force in self-defense."  
(Emphasis added to highlight variances from the Model 
Jury Instruction on Homicide 27 [1999]18). 
 
 
After introducing voluntary manslaughter, the judge 
outlined each of the three mitigating circumstances, the absence  
of which the Commonwealth had to prove.  The third of those 
circumstances was excessive use of force in self-defense.  The 
instruction as to the excessive use of force in self-defense 
mitigating circumstance was as follows: 
"[T]he Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense.  If the 
Commonwealth fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the absence of self-defense, your verdict must be not 
guilty with respect to the crimes of murder or 
voluntary manslaughter.  If, however, the Commonwealth 
does prove excessive force in an effort to defend 
himself, you'd be justified in finding the defendant 
guilty of voluntary manslaughter." 
 
                                                          
 
 
18 The model jury instruction provides: 
 
 
"In order to prove that the defendant acted with 
malice, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the absence of certain mitigating circumstances.  
Mitigating circumstances are circumstances which lessen a 
defendant's culpability for an act.  Both the crimes of 
murder and voluntary manslaughter require proof of an 
unlawful killing, but the killing may be the crime of 
voluntary manslaughter if it occurred under mitigating 
circumstances so that the Commonwealth cannot prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with malice.  
In order to obtain a conviction of murder, the Commonwealth 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of [these] 
mitigating [circumstances]" (emphasis added). 
 
Model Jury Instructions 27 (1999). 
23 
 
 
The defendant argues that errors permeated the jury 
instructions and allowed the jury to convict the defendant of 
murder in the first degree without considering any of the 
mitigating circumstances, essentially removing manslaughter as 
an option for the jury, and that such errors warrant a new 
trial.  We disagree. 
 
We note first that each of the distinct jury instructions, 
taken alone, were not erroneous.  The use of a deadly weapon 
instruction, interposed three times during the instructions on 
murder in the first and second degrees, was consistent with the 
model instructions both in terms of form and location.  Model 
Jury Instruction on Homicide 8, 12, 21, 61.  We have repeatedly 
approved of a similar instruction that "tells[s] the jury they 
may, rather than they must, infer malice from use of a dangerous 
weapon."  Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. at 212, and cases 
cited.  The deadly weapon instruction in this case, which 
"permitted" but did not "require[]" the jury to infer malice 
from the use of a dangerous weapon, was not erroneous. 
 
As noted above, the general description of the manslaughter 
charge varied in minor, though not insignificant, ways from the 
model instruction.  The sentence, "So that if the Commonwealth 
cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted 
with malice, in order to obtain a conviction of murder, the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of 
24 
 
these mitigating circumstances," taken alone, seems to imply 
both that (1) a finding of malice would preempt the 
consideration of mitigating factors and require a finding of 
murder, and (2) the Commonwealth could prove murder in the first 
degree without showing malice, but instead proving that there 
were no mitigating circumstances.  We do not, however, review 
the words of an instruction in isolation from each other, 
particularly where we are reviewing the instructions for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 749 (2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012).  See also Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 
Mass. 837, 844 (2006).  Just two sentences prior, the judge 
instructed, "In order to prove that the defendant acted with 
malice, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the absence of certain mitigating circumstances."  The 
instruction clearly delineates the proper rule:  malice and 
mitigating circumstances are mutually exclusive.  See 
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 661-662 (1989).  And 
earlier, the judge had specifically instructed that, in order to 
prove murder in the first degree, "[t]he second element the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the 
killing was committed with malice."  The jury were instructed 
that the absence of mitigating circumstances alone does not 
warrant the return of a verdict of murder in the first degree. 
25 
 
 
The use of excessive force in self-defense instruction was 
consistent with the Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 30-31, 
and is substantially similar to the instructions given in 
Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 96 (2013), and Commonwealth 
v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 448 (2012).  As in the present case, 
the defendants in those cases argued that the use of the 
permissive phrase "would be justified," as opposed to the 
mandatory "must," gave the jury the erroneous impression that, 
even if they found excessive use of force in self-defense, 
murder was still a possible verdict.  See Britt, supra; Bolling, 
supra.  We conclude, as we did in those cases, that the 
instruction in the present case, considered in its entirety, was 
not erroneous.  See Britt, supra; Bolling, supra. 
 
Finally, the instruction that the jury must convict the 
defendant of the most serious crime proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt was consistent with the model instruction and was not 
erroneous.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 65-66 
(1999).  We are also convinced that, taken as a whole, the 
instructions, although flawed, were not erroneous.19,20  In the 
                                                          
 
 
19 Because we conclude that the jury instructions were not 
erroneous, there is also no merit to the defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on defense 
counsel's failure to object to these instructions. 
 
 
20 The defendant also cites to Commonwealth v. Barnacle, 134 
Mass. 215, 216 (1883), for the proposition that the jury were 
not instructed that the victim need not be armed in order for 
26 
 
future, we urge judges to follow the model jury instructions 
verbatim to avoid such flaws and ensure a smooth recitation of 
the jury charge. 
 
4.  Hearsay testimony.  As part of the Commonwealth's case, 
the prosecutor elicited testimony from Rodriguez concerning an 
occasion in which she had shown the defendant one of the 
victim's handguns.  When the defendant handled the handgun, he 
did so through his shirt.  The prosecutor asked Rodriguez if the 
defendant indicated why he was holding the gun in that manner.  
Rodriguez, after first testifying that the defendant did not 
explain why he was doing so, reviewed her police statement and 
confirmed that she had told police that the defendant was 
holding the handgun in that manner in order to avoid getting 
fingerprints on the gun.  The defendant objected various times 
during the line of questioning, and we assume, without deciding, 
that he did so when the Commonwealth elicited Rodriguez's 
testimony about her police statement.  On appeal, the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the defendant's use of deadly force to be justified.  The record 
does not support this argument; the judge specifically 
instructed the jury: 
 
 
"In considering the issue of reasonableness of any 
force used by the defendant, you may consider evidence of 
the relevant physical capabilities of the combatants, how 
many persons were involved on each side, the 
characteristics of any weapons used, the availability of 
rooms to maneuver, or any other factors you deem relevant 
to the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct under the 
circumstances." 
27 
 
claims that the testimony was impermissible hearsay and that it 
was a gratuitous attack on the defendant's character. 
 
There was no error.  The evidence was relevant to explain 
how the defendant was able to describe one of the defendant's 
guns.  Moreover, the testimony was not hearsay, see Commonwealth 
v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 324-325 (2015) (extrajudicial statements 
by party opponent are not hearsay); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(2)(A) (2016). 
 
5.  Motion for a new trial. In his motion for a new trial, 
the defendant argued that (1) his due process rights were 
violated when the trial judge did not appoint a qualified 
Spanish interpreter for Rodriguez; (2) his right to a public 
trial was violated when the court room was closed during jury 
selection; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; 
and (4) there was newly discovered evidence that might have 
affected the outcome of his trial.21  The motion judge (who was 
not the trial judge) denied the motion. 
 
"The decision to allow a motion for a new trial lies within 
the sound discretion of the judge and will not be reversed 
unless it is manifestly unjust or unless the trial was infected 
with prejudicial constitutional error" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gorham, 472 Mass. 112, 117 (2015).  
                                                          
 
 
21 The defendant also raised the suppression issue as a 
ground warranting a new trial.  The motion judge found that this 
claim was waived as time barred. 
28 
 
Where an appeal from the denial of the defendant's motion for 
a new trial has been consolidated with his direct appeal from a 
conviction of murder in the first degree, we review both under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Espada, 450 Mass. at 697.  Pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we review the denial of the motion for a 
new trial "to determine whether there has been a significant 
error of law or other abuse of discretion, . . . and whether any 
such error creates a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice" (quotations and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 698 (2016). 
 
a.  Interpreter.  Rodriguez, a native Spanish speaker, 
testified almost entirely in English.22,23  At one point during 
direct examination, defense counsel requested that the court 
inquire as to whether Rodriguez would like the assistance of an 
interpreter.  The judge determined that Rodriguez was not 
"showing so much difficulty with the language that she needs an 
interpreter."24  Instead, an interpreter was put on stand-by for 
                                                          
 
 
22 Rodriguez also testified in English before the grand 
jury, and her police statements were in English (although they 
were made with the assistance of Spanish-speaking police 
officers).  The first of those statements specifically indicated 
that Rodriguez "read[s], write[s] and understand[s] English." 
 
 
23 During their deliberation, the jury requested a 
transcript of Rodriguez's testimony; the request was denied. 
 
 
24 The judge also sustained several objections to leading 
questions posed by the prosecutor, noting at one point that "the 
witness hasn't demonstrated any need for prompts."  When the 
29 
 
the following day.  When cross-examination began, the 
interpreter was made available to Rodriguez, the questions were 
posed to her in English, and she was allowed to use the 
interpreter's assistance as necessary.25  During the course of 
cross-examination, the interpreter assisted only on two 
instances.  The defendant argues that the trial judge's refusal 
to allow Rodriguez to testify on cross-examination through an 
interpreter restricted his right to present a full defense, in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights. 
 
By statute, "[a] non-English speaker . . . shall have a 
right to the assistance of a qualified interpreter who shall be 
appointed by the judge."  G. L. c. 221C, § 2.  "Non-English 
speaker" is defined as "a person who cannot speak or understand, 
or has difficulty in speaking or understanding, the English 
language, because he uses only or primarily a spoken language 
other than English."  G. L. c. 221C, § 1.  The party claiming a 
violation of G. L. c. 221C, § 2, bears the burden of proving 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
issue was raised the following day at trial, the judge indicated 
that "[Rodriguez's] direct demeanor, to me, did not demonstrate 
a lot of difficulty understanding English." 
 
 
25 Defense counsel inquired whether Rodriguez wanted the 
assistance of an interpreter, and Rodriguez indicated that she 
did.  Rodriguez also indicated that she had some trouble 
understanding some of the questions on direct examination. 
30 
 
that the witness in question was a "non-English speaker."  See 
Crivello v. All-Pak Mach. Sys., Inc., 446 Mass. 729, 735 (2006). 
 
When the issue was raised as part of the defendant's motion 
for a new trial, the motion judge conducted an evidentiary 
hearing, at which the defendant called Dr. Michael O'Laughlin, a 
certified court interpreter and the director of interpreter 
training at Boston University.  O'Laughlin reviewed Rodriguez's 
testimony at trial and before the grand jury, her statements to 
police, and an interview conducted by appellate counsel; he also 
conducted two independent standardized tests of Rodriguez's 
language skills in order to assess whether Rodriguez qualified 
as a non-English speaker. 
 
O'Laughlin concluded that Rodriguez is a limited English 
proficient speaker, and that her English proficiency, when 
measured by standardized scores, is "intermediate high."  
According to the results of that test, Rodriguez "[c]an satisfy 
survival needs and routine work and social demands [and] handle 
work that involves following oral and simple written 
instructions in familiar and some unfamiliar situations. . . .  
As to listening comprehension, [she] understands conversations 
on most everyday subjects at normal speed when addressed 
directly, [but m]ay need repetition, rewording and slower 
speech. . . .  [A]s to oral communication [she] [f]unctions 
independently in survival and many social and work situations 
31 
 
but may need help occasionally."  O'Laughlin indicated that 
Rodriguez's English language skills "would be that of a middle 
school student," and that testifying at trial requires a level 
of English proficiency at a high school graduate level. 
 
The Commonwealth elicited testimony regarding Rodriguez's 
language skills from Shannon Driskell, a longtime friend of the 
victim who was a bridesmaid at Rodriguez's wedding to the 
victim.  Driskell, whose testimony was credited by the motion 
judge, observed Rodriguez speaking English on a regular basis.  
On those occasions, Rodriguez spoke only English with her 
children and the victim.  Rodriguez would communicate with 
Driskell on the Internet social networking site Facebook using 
English.  Driskell testified that she did not have difficulty in 
communicating with Rodriguez in English. 
 
The motion judge concluded that Rodriguez did not fit the 
definition of a "non-English speaker" in need of the assistance 
of an interpreter and that, even if she had been so designated, 
the qualified interpreter who was made available to her on 
cross-examination was sufficient to satisfy the assistance 
necessary under G. L. c. 221C.  We agree.26 
                                                          
 
 
26 At the time of the incident, the witness spoke to her 
family in English and held a job as a certified nurse's 
assistant, in which she conducted her responsibilities using 
English. 
32 
 
 
b.  Court room closure.  The defendant claims that his 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated because his 
family and friends were excluded from jury selection.  The 
motion judge declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on this 
basis, and he denied the defendant's motion outright. 
 
The right to a public trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment extends to the jury selection process, and it is a 
well-settled principle that a properly preserved violation of 
that right is structural error requiring reversal.  See Penn, 
472 Mass. at 622.  However, "even structural error is subject to 
waiver," Commonwealth v. Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 578 (2016), 
and "[w]here counsel fails to lodge a timely objection to the 
closure of the court room -- as happened in this case -- 'the 
defendant's claim of error is deemed to be procedurally 
waived.'"  Penn, supra at 622, quoting Commonwealth v. LaChance, 
469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015).  
Such waiver need not be consented to by the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 672 (2014). 
 
The uncontroverted evidence tends to show that the court 
room was closed during jury selection.  It also shows that trial 
counsel was aware of the court room closure prior to jury 
selection, and did not object.27  The court room closure claim is 
                                                          
 
 
27 The defendant's motion for a new trial was accompanied by 
affidavits from the defendant's mother and sister.  Both 
33 
 
therefore procedurally waived.  Penn, 472 Mass. at 622, quoting 
LaChance, 469 Mass. at 857. 
 
However, where the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial has been subject to procedural waiver, the 
defendant after conviction may still make a collateral attack on 
the issue based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failure 
to object to the court room closure.  See Penn, 472 Mass. at 
623.  See also LaChance, 462 Mass. at 858.  The defendant must 
not only make a showing that his attorney was deficient for 
failing to make a timely objection but also "show that a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from 
the court room closure."  Penn, supra ("The structural nature of 
the underlying error does not automatically excuse the defendant 
from showing prejudice when advancing an unpreserved claim" 
[citation omitted]).  See LaChance, supra at 857.  The defendant 
has not proffered any substantive grounds on which the closure 
of the court room during jury selection would have resulted in 
any effect on the judgment in the case, and therefore failed to 
show prejudice arising from counsel's failure to object.28,29 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
affidavits aver to the fact that trial counsel was the one who 
informed them of the court room closure. 
 
 
28 The defendant argues that he was prejudiced because trial 
counsel's failure to object to the closure of the court room has 
resulted in a less favorable standard of review.  This alone 
does not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 623 (2015), 
34 
 
 
c.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  We review the 
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, brought as 
part of an appeal from a conviction of murder in the first 
degree, under the substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice standard, pursuant to § 33E.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 326, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 418 
(2015).  "We consider whether there was an error in the course 
of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) 
and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Id. at 327.  The defendant bears the burden of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
471 Mass. 262, 269 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1158 (2016). 
 
 
29 The motion judge's decision to deny the defendant's 
motion for a new trial without first holding an evidentiary 
hearing on the court room closure issue was not erroneous.  In 
adjudicating arguments made as part of a motion for a new trial, 
the motion judge "may rule on the issue or issues presented by 
such motion on the basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits 
without further hearing if no substantial issue is raised by the 
motion or affidavits."  Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 
31 (2015), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  On the other hand, "[w]hen a substantial 
issue has been raised, and supported by a substantial 
evidentiary showing . . . the judge should hold an evidentiary 
hearing" (citation omitted).  Id.  The motion judge effectively 
assumed the validity of the affidavits attached to the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, and still (without error) 
denied the motion.  See Penn, 472 Mass. at 622, where an 
evidentiary hearing was conducted concerning a court room 
closure issue and uncovered similar evidence as was assumed by 
the motion judge in the present case.  The decision to abstain 
from holding an evidentiary hearing was appropriate. 
35 
 
proving that trial counsel was ineffective.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 563 (2013).30 
 
The defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to (i) properly prepare defense expert witness, a 
forensic pathologist, for voir dire examination; (ii) object to 
the prosecutor's alleged misstatement of the law of self-defense 
during closing argument; and (iii) elicit testimony from 
Rodriguez that the victim was using a forearm on the defendant's 
throat to hold him down.31,32  The defendant has not satisfied his 
burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel as to any of 
his claims.  See id. 
                                                          
 
 
30 The defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel are not supported by an affidavit from lead counsel at 
trial, but did include one from co-counsel.  As a result, we 
must rely only on the record as to whether there was a strategic 
purpose behind some of counsel's decisions.  We keep in mind 
that "[r]elief on a claim of ineffective assistance based on the 
trial record is the weakest form of such a claim because it is 
'bereft of any explanation by trial counsel for his actions and 
suggestive of strategy contrived by a defendant viewing the case 
with hindsight.'"  Commonwealth v. Gorham, 472 Mass. 112, 116 
n.4 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 
n.5 (2002). 
 
 
31 As mentioned above, the motion judge did not err in 
denying the defendant's ineffective assistance claims regarding 
the G. L. c. 276, § 33A, telephone rights and the failure to 
object to the jury instructions on self-defense and excessive 
force in self-defense issues. 
 
 
32 Applying the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), the motion judge denied the 
motion as to all the claims of ineffective assistance. 
36 
 
 
a.  Failure to prepare expert witness.  Prior to 
testifying, the expert was subjected to voir dire examination as 
to his qualifications and bases to testify on certain subjects.  
The judge concluded, based on the voir dire examination, that 
the expert would not be allowed to testify as to his opinion 
that (1) the lack of clustering of the stab wounds indicated 
defensive action on the part of the defendant; and (2) the blood 
stains on the floor indicated that the defendant was retreating 
from the victim or the victim was chasing the defendant.  The 
judge determined that an opinion whether the lack of clustering 
was indicative of self-defense was inadmissible because "[t]he 
jury [do] not need to hear it from the expert.  They can draw 
that same conclusion if it's to be drawn."  The same was true as 
to the proposed chasing and retreating testimony, which was "not 
within the expertise of the proposed witness."  The expert was 
allowed to testify to the positioning, trajectory, and lack of 
clustering of the stab wounds, and the positioning of the blood 
stains, but not to the conclusions he drew from those facts.  
The defendant objected to the expert's testimony being so 
limited. 
 
Before the jury, the expert testified that it was his 
opinion that the victim's wounds were likely inflicted when the 
victim and defendant were "face-to-face."  He further opined 
that there was "no clustering of stab wounds on [the victim]," 
37 
 
and that such a lack of clustering "reflects the nature of the 
activity used to cause or create those stab wounds that results 
in the cluster," such that it was inconsistent with "somebody 
holding a knife and repetitively thrusting it in approximately 
the same location of the body."  He also testified regarding the 
fact that the wounds were inflicted in different areas of the 
apartment, causing blood to pool on various surfaces in the 
room.  From that testimony, the defense attorney argued as part 
of his closing that the lack of clustering and the positioning 
of the blood stains indicated that the parties were moving 
around during the altercation, and suggested that these were 
indications that there was not an intent to kill. 
 
"The purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of 
fact in understanding evidence or determining facts in areas 
where scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
would be helpful."  See Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 
827, 844 (2011).  "Expert testimony is admissible when it will 
'help jurors interpret evidence that lies outside of common 
experience.'"  Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 360 n.5 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 
581 (1998).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2016).  "A judge has wide 
discretion in qualifying a witness to offer an expert opinion on 
a particular question, . . . and [the judge's] determination 
38 
 
will not be upset on appeal if any reasonable basis appears for 
it" (citations omitted).  Pytou Heang, supra at 845. 
 
There are two distinct reasons that convince us that trial 
counsel was not ineffective in failing to further prepare the 
expert.  First, it was not a lack of qualifications that 
resulted in two of the expert's conclusions being excluded; 
instead, it was the fact that the evidence he sought to proffer 
was within the purview of the jury, and would not have "help[ed] 
jurors interpret [the] evidence."  Scott, 464 Mass. at 360 n.5.  
Second, whether trial counsel erred is irrelevant; the areas of 
testimony to which the expert proposed in his affidavit that he 
would testify if given another chance would either still be 
inadmissible or be cumulative of other evidence offered at trial 
by that expert or by the Commonwealth's expert.  Even assuming 
that counsel failed to adequately prepare his expert for voir 
dire examination, the defendant has not met his burden of 
proving that such a failure would have "influenced the jury's 
conclusion" (citation omitted).  Lessieur, 472 Mass. at 327.  
See Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. at 563. 
 
ii.  Failure to object to Commonwealth's closing argument.  
The defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to object to 
the Commonwealth's closing argument -- which he claims misstated 
and distorted the law on self-defense and was not fairly 
supported by the evidence -- constitutes ineffective assistance 
39 
 
of counsel.33  Because the defendant did not object to the 
closing argument at trial, we review it to determine if any 
error in failing to object would have created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  
Under that standard, we assess the closing argument "in the 
context of the entire argument, and in light of the judge's 
instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 19 (2015). 
 
In its closing argument, the Commonwealth argued that the 
defendant had "ambush[ed]" the victim, rather than acted in 
self-defense.34  The prosecutor later stated: 
"The law recognizes there may be circumstances where 
someone can defend themselves with a deadly weapon.  
First, you must avail yourself of all means to avoid 
physical combat.  For example, leave through the front 
door or back door if you can.  . . . Did [the 
defendant] do all he could to avoid physical combat 
when he told [Rodriguez's neighbor] he wasn't leaving 
even though they knew [the victim] was coming home?" 
(emphasis added). 
 
 
Although the emphasized sentence in the Commonwealth's 
closing argument was flawed, neither the argument taken as a 
                                                          
 
 
33 The defendant does not specify in his brief which portion 
or portions of the Commonwealth's closing argument misstated the 
law, or how such portion or portions had misstated the law. 
 
 
34 The prosecutor argued:  "Isn't it far more believable 
that . . . [the defendant] was waiting for [the victim] to come 
in that door and able to ambush him when he came through the 
door with this knife he had on a dresser in that bedroom[?]"; 
and "[The victim] got ambushed." 
40 
 
whole nor trial counsel's failure to object to that argument 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See id.  The single sentence of the Commonwealth's closing 
argument that indicated that the defendant did not do all he 
could to avoid physical combat because he had, hours before the 
altercation, told Rodriguez's neighbor he would not leave the 
home carried with it an implication that the defendant's actions 
prior to the time of the purported self-defense should be part 
of the jury's consideration.  However, the rest of the 
prosecutor's argument concerning self-defense focused on the 
altercation itself.  It is apparent that the jury were not 
convinced by the prosecutor's premeditation argument, as the 
charge of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation was rejected.  To the extent that the argument may 
have had any effect on the jury's apparent refusal to recognize 
that the victim initiated the assault, our reduction of the 
verdict from murder in the first degree to voluntary 
manslaughter addresses that concern.  See part 6, infra. 
 
iii.  Failure to elicit testimony.  Finally, the defendant 
argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
elicit testimony from Rodriguez that the victim was holding the 
defendant down, using a forearm as a bar across his throat.  As 
mentioned, Rodriguez gave two statements to police.  Only the 
second statement indicated that, after the victim came into the 
41 
 
house and the altercation began between the victim and the 
defendant, she "could see [the victim] on top of [the defendant] 
holding [the defendant] down with his left forearm, by his 
neck." 
 
The defendant has not met his burden of showing that better 
representation would have influenced the jury's conclusion.  See 
Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. at 563.  At trial, Rodriguez testified 
that the victim, who was much larger than the defendant, picked 
up the defendant, threw him against the air conditioner, and was 
on top of him.  She also specified that the victim had his hand 
on top of the defendant, and that the defendant could not have 
gotten away from the victim.  Although eliciting a more specific 
placement of the victim's hand on the defendant's throat may 
have bolstered his claim that he was in fear of his life, it 
would have been cumulative of the evidence already offered by 
Rodriguez.  Further, based on the record, it was not manifestly 
unreasonable for trial counsel to avoid references to 
Rodriguez's second police statement, given that it included 
several potentially inculpatory statements purportedly made by 
the defendant.35  See Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 808 
(2014). 
                                                          
 
 
35 For example, Rodriguez told police that the defendant had 
told her that if the victim ever came to the apartment, he, the 
defendant, would stab the victim. 
42 
 
 
d.  Newly discovered evidence.  The defendant moved for a 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence in the form 
of an opinion from a psychologist who, according to his 
affidavit, specializes in combat-related treatment.  The 
defendant sought testimony from the psychologist concerning the 
effects that a forearm across someone's throat might cause.  
Specifically, he would have testified that such forearm pressure 
to the throat can cause an adversary to lose consciousness and 
would put an adversary in reasonable fear that he was in 
immediate danger of being killed or seriously injured. 
 
The motion judge was entitled to make a ruling on the 
defendant's motion on this ground without an evidentiary 
hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 32 (2015), 
quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001) (only "substantial" issue warrants evidentiary hearing).  
To prevail on a motion for a new trial on this ground, "[f]irst, 
the defendant must establish that the evidence is 'newly 
available,' [and,] [s]econd, the defendant must show that the 
evidence 'casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction'" 
(citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cameron, 473 Mass. 100, 
104 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 
(1986). 
 
The defendant has not met his burden of establishing that 
the proposed testimony is newly available.  Commonwealth v. 
43 
 
Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 350 n.6 (2014) ("Newly available 
evidence is evidence that was unavailable at the time of trial 
for a reason such as . . . a particular forensic testing 
methodology had not yet been developed or gained acceptance by 
the courts").  The defendant offers no argument that the 
testimony that would have been offered by the psychologist at an 
evidentiary hearing could not have been uncovered by the defense 
at the time of trial.  There was therefore no "substantial" 
issue that required the motion judge to hold an evidentiary 
hearing.  The motion for a new trial was properly denied.36 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
requests that we exercise our extraordinary authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the verdict 
of murder in the first degree to voluntary manslaughter.  "Our 
duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is to consider broadly the whole 
                                                          
 
 
36 We are also not convinced (though we need not decide) 
that the psychologist's testimony would have been admitted even 
if offered at trial.  The jury heard testimony that the 
defendant reasonably feared that the victim would kill him, as 
adduced from their differences in size and physical strengths.  
A fellow member of the National Guard testified that the victim 
was trained in unarmed combat and that he could incapacitate or 
kill another person.  Rodriguez testified that the defendant was 
pinned down by the larger victim.  And the defendant himself 
told the police that he "had no choice" but to attack the 
victim, and that he did so in self-defense.  The psychologist's 
testimony, if offered at the time of trial, may have been 
cumulative of other testimony, and does not "cast real doubt on 
the justice of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. Cameron, 473 
Mass. 100, 104 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 
303, 305 (1986). 
44 
 
case on the law and the facts to determine whether the verdict 
is consonant with justice" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 747 (2014).  On such 
consideration, we "may, if satisfied that the verdict was 
against the law or the weight of the evidence, or because of 
newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice 
may require (a) order a new trial or (b) direct the entry of a 
verdict of a lesser degree of guilt."  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See 
Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109 (1963) ("If upon our 
examination of the facts, we should, in our discretion, be of 
opinion that there was a miscarriage of justice in convicting 
the defendant of murder in the first degree, and that a verdict 
of guilty of murder in the second degree or of manslaughter 
would have been more consonant with justice, it is now our power 
and duty to so declare").  "Each case depends on its peculiar 
facts.  No one fact is conclusive.  A most important 
consideration is whether the jury verdict is markedly 
inconsistent with verdicts returned in similar cases" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 432 (2008). 
 
There are a number of factors we have considered in similar 
cases in mitigating a verdict of murder in the first degree 
under § 33E: 
 
"Those factors include:  whether the intent to kill 
was formed 'in the heat of sudden affray or combat,' 
[Baker, 346 Mass. at 119]; whether the homicide occurred in 
45 
 
the course of a 'senseless brawl,' Commonwealth v. 
Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 583 (1971); whether 'a minor 
controversy . . . explode[d] into the killing of a human 
being,' [Baker], supra at 110; whether '[t]he entire 
sequence reflects spontaneity rather than premeditation,' 
Commonwealth v. Williams, [364 Mass. 145, 152 
(1973)]; whether the defendant carried a weapon to the 
scene, id., or left the scene after an initial 
confrontation and returned with a weapon to kill the 
victim, Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 809 (1975); 
whether the victim was the first aggressor, [Baker], 
supra at 118; whether the defendant and the victim were 
strangers, [Ransom], supra at 583, or, if only 
acquaintances, whether there had been prior trouble between 
them, [Jones], supra at 808; whether the defendant and the 
victim had enjoyed a good relationship prior to the 
killing, Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 94 (1977); 
whether alcohol or drugs were involved, [Ransom], supra at 
583; the personal characteristics of the defendant, such as 
age, Commonwealth v. McDermott, 393 Mass. 451, 460–461 
(1984) (seventeen years old), [Jones], supra at 808 
(twenty-eight years old); family, id. (married with six 
small children); hard working, [Seit], supra at 95; 
disability, Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 750 
(1975); and lack of prior criminal record, [Jones], supra." 
 
 
Colleran, supra at 431-432.  Most recently, in reducing a 
verdict from murder in the first degree to voluntary 
manslaughter, we principally considered the particulars of the 
fight that led to the victim's death.  See Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 679 (2015). 
 
In Jones, 366 Mass. at 805, the defendant was convicted of 
murder in the second degree on an indictment charging murder in 
the first degree.  The defendant had fatally stabbed the victim 
after an altercation.  Id. at 807.  That day, the defendant and 
the victim had done a considerable amount of drinking.  Id.  The 
two had gotten into an argument earlier in the day, and their 
46 
 
paths crossed again hours later.  Id.  The argument resumed, the 
victim "struck the defendant with a heavy blow on the jaw," and 
the defendant retaliated with his knife.  Id.  At trial, the 
defendant testified that he used his knife in self-defense 
because the victim had come at him with a straight edge razor.  
Id.  We were not convinced that the fatal wound was inflicted in 
the appropriate exercise of self-defense, but still acknowledged 
that the defendant "was reasonably apprehensive that the victim 
might use the razor which the defendant knew the victim 
possessed," due to the victim's reputation.  Id. at 808-809.  We 
reduced the verdict from murder in the second degree to 
manslaughter because of the absence of malice.  Id. at 808.  We 
concluded that the fatal attack was "senseless, undoubtedly the 
result of too much drinking," and that the intention to attack 
was "formed in the heat of sudden affray or combat, . . . thus 
negating the necessary element of malice" (citations omitted).  
Id. at 808-809. 
 
There are many factors in the present case that convince us 
that a reduction is warranted.  The jury rejected the theory of 
deliberate premeditation, meaning that it focused its inquiry 
exclusively on the altercation itself.  There was evidence that 
the victim was the initial aggressor;, that the defendant 
reasonably could have been and was fearful of the victim, who 
was much larger, trained in unarmed combat, and enraged; and 
47 
 
that the defendant swung the knife in a wild manner.  Moreover, 
prior to using the knife in self-defense, the defendant told 
Rodriguez to telephone 911.  After the altercation, he gave a 
full statement to police and never contested his involvement in 
the victim's death.  The sequence that led to the killing 
indicates spontaneity, and reflects that the killing was more 
the product of sudden combat and the heat of passion than of 
malice.  See Jones, 366 Mass. at 809. 
 
It is our conclusion that the jury relied on a confluence 
of factors, including a complicated set of instructions, in 
reaching their verdict, which, taken together, may have produced 
a result not consonant with justice.  Voluntary manslaughter due 
to mitigating circumstances shares several of the factors 
delineated by the judge as to a finding of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.37  See 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 776 (2014) (Gants, J., 
concurring) ("If the jury were to rest their finding of extreme 
                                                          
 
 
37 The judge instructed on the following factors to be 
considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant was 
guilty of murder in the first degree:  "One, whether the 
defendant was indifferent to or took pleasure in the suffering 
of the deceased; two, the consciousness and degree of suffering 
of the deceased; three, the extent of the injuries to the 
deceased; four, the number of blows delivered; five, the manner, 
degree and severity of the force used; six, the nature of the 
weapon, instrument or method used; and seven, the disproportion 
between the means needed to cause death and those employed").  
The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh factors could also 
be indicative of voluntary manslaughter if the jury did not find 
malice. 
48 
 
atrocity or cruelty on any but the first Cunneen factor, [see 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983),] the jury 
need not focus on the defendant's state of mind.  Consequently, 
a defendant may be found guilty of murder in the first degree 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty where the defendant did not 
intend that victim suffer before he died but nonetheless did 
suffer an agonizing death").  The evidence appears overwhelming 
that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden in proving the 
absence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt 
and, for this reason, we are concerned that the prosecutor's 
closing argument regarding lying in wait and the judge's failure 
to address this possibility in the jury instructions may have 
led the jury astray. 
 
Like the fight in Jones, 366 Mass. at 807, the altercation 
in the present case was a senseless brawl.  The defendant, 
through no malicious actions of his own, found himself in a 
relationship with a woman whose estranged husband had violent 
tendencies and was trained to kill.  The weight of the evidence 
supports the conclusion that the defendant killed the victim 
either as the result of reasonable provocation or through the 
use of excessive force in self-defense.  Under either 
circumstance, the killing was the result of uncontrolled violent 
action on the part of the defendant and the victim.  Because of 
the unusual circumstances of this case, and the fact that it 
49 
 
presents multiple factors we have considered in the past when 
exercising our power under § 33E, a conviction of voluntary 
manslaughter is more consonant with justice, and we exercise our 
extraordinary authority under § 33E to reduce the verdict.  See 
Niemic, 472 Mass. at 679; Jones, 366 Mass. at 809-810.38 
 
The case is remanded to the Superior Court, where the 
verdict of murder in the first degree and sentence imposed shall 
be vacated.  A verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter shall 
be entered and a sentence imposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
38 In his closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that 
the evidence at trial, at a minimum, proved that the defendant 
used excessive force in self-defense, and that the jury would be 
warranted in returning a guilty verdict as to voluntary 
manslaughter.