Title: Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Muriel Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc., No. 86, September Term, 2013, Opinion by 
Adkins, J. 
 
MD. CODE (1991, 2008 REPL. VOL., 2013 CUM. SUPP.), TITLE 3 OF THE LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT ARTICLE –– INCLUSION OF OVERTIME WAGES IN 
THE DEFINITION OF WAGES:  Overtime wages are included within the statutory 
definition of wages, and are thus recoverable under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, 
and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law. 
 
MD. CODE (1991, 2008 REPL. VOL., 2013 CUM. SUPP.), § 3-507.2 OF THE 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARTICLE –– RECOVERY OF UNPAID WAGES –
– REQUIRED FINDING REGARDING WITHHOLDING OF WAGES PURSUANT 
TO A BONA FIDE DISPUTE:  When a finder of fact determines that an employee is 
owed withheld wages under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, it is 
required to make an explicit determination as to whether those wages were withheld by the 
employer pursuant to a bona fide dispute, before determining whether to grant enhanced 
damages. 
 
MD. CODE (1991, 2008 REPL. VOL., 2013 CUM. SUPP.), § 3-507.2 OF THE 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARTICLE –– NO PRESUMPTION OF TREBLE 
DAMAGES WHEN WAGES WITHHELD PURSUANT TO BONA FIDE 
DISPUTE:  An employee is not presumptively entitled to an award of enhanced damages 
under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, even if a finder of fact determines 
that an employer withheld wages not pursuant to a bona fide dispute. 
 
MD. CODE (1991, 2008 REPL. VOL., 2013 CUM. SUPP.), § 3-507.2 OF THE 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARTICLE –– CALCULATION OF TREBLE 
DAMAGES: The plain language of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law 
shows that the total award available to an employee is three times the withheld wage.  Thus, 
enhanced damages are not added to the award of withheld wage. 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 331908 
Argued:  April 29, 2014 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
No. 86 
 
September Term, 2013 
 
 
 
MURIEL PETERS 
 
 
v. 
 
EARLY HEALTHCARE GIVER, INC. 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Harrell 
Battaglia 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
 
Filed: August 13, 2014 
 
 
In this case we are asked to answer three questions concerning the Wage Payment 
and Collection Law (“WPCL”), Md. Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2013 Cum. Supp.), § 3-
501 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE”), a cause of action frequently 
litigated in the appellate courts.  In answering these questions we are treading new ground 
on some, but not all of them. 
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Muriel Peters worked as a certified nursing assistant for Early Healthcare 
Giver, Inc. (“EHCG”) from April 2008 to April 2009.  Peters provided in-home care for an 
elderly patient throughout her employment with EHCG.  She consistently worked 119 
hours in every two-week pay period.  EHCG paid Peters $12 per hour for all of her work, 
including the hours she worked in excess of 40 hours per week.  
Following her departure from EHCG, Peters sued EHCG in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, claiming that EHCG wrongfully withheld her overtime wages.  At 
trial, EHCG’s President, Esther Guy, conceded that she did not pay Peters overtime.  Guy 
explained that she did not think that Peters was owed overtime because Peters exercised 
during work hours.  Regarding the nature of Peters’s employment, Guy explained that 
Peters was paid under a federal program under which Medicaid would pay EHCG $16 per 
hour under the contract––EHCG would pay Peters $12 per hour and EHCG kept $4.  See 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2)(A) (2012).  EHCG’s counsel argued that 
because the company operated under a federal program, federal law governed EHCG’s 
payment of home healthcare workers.  Under that theory, Peters’s work fell under the Fair 
 
2 
Labor Standards Act’s (the “FLSA”) “companionship services” exemption label,1 thus, she 
was not entitled to overtime pay.  See 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(15).  The trial court denied Peters’s 
claim for overtime wages.  Though the court rejected Guy’s claim that overtime was 
withheld because Peters exercised at work, the court explained that federal law preempted 
Maryland law, and exempted the employer from paying overtime. 
Peters appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate appellate court 
held that the trial court erred in concluding that federal law preempted state wage laws.2  
Because the Court of Special Appeals held that the FLSA exemption did not apply, the 
case was remanded “for the [trial] court to consider whether Peters is entitled to recover 
[overtime wages] under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law and the Maryland Wage 
Payment and Collection Law as well as other issues raised in her complaint.” 
On remand to the Circuit Court, Peters filed an unopposed memorandum asserting 
a claim under the Wage and Hour Law (“WHL”) and the WPCL, requesting unpaid 
overtime and treble damages under LE § 3-507.2(b).3  She did not offer any additional 
                                              
1 It was undisputed at trial that Peters performed personal care work that would fall 
under “companionship services.” 
 
2 EHCG did not participate in the appeal before the Court of Special Appeals. 
 
3 This section provides that if: 
 
[A] court finds that an employer withheld the wage of an 
employee in violation of this subtitle and not as a result of a 
bona fide dispute, the court may award the employee an 
amount not exceeding 3 times the wage, and reasonable 
counsel fees and other costs. 
 
 
3 
evidence.  On March 28, 2013, the Circuit Court awarded Peters $6,201 in unpaid overtime 
wages, but denied her request for enhanced damages. 
Peters appealed the order to the Court of Special Appeals and filed a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to this Court.  Before the Court of Special Appeals could hear the case, 
we granted Peters’s petition to consider the following questions, which we have rephrased 
for clarity: 
1.  Are overtime wages recoverable under the Maryland Wage 
Payment and Collection Law? 
 
2.  Is it an abuse of discretion for a trier of fact to fail to award 
enhanced damages under § 3-507.2(b) of the Maryland Wage 
Payment and Collection Law when there is no claim of a bona 
fide dispute? 
 
3.  Should any award of up to treble damages under the 
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law be made in 
addition to the award of unpaid wages? 
 
For the following reasons, we answer the first question in the affirmative and answer 
the second and third in the negative.  Yet, because the trial court failed to make a required 
predicate finding, and there was no evidence to support a finding of a bona fide dispute, 
we remand this case for further proceedings. 
DISCUSSION 
Overtime Wages Under The Wage Payment And Collection Law 
                                              
Md. Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2013 Cum. Supp.), § 3-507.2(b) of the Labor and 
Employment Article (“LE”).   
 
4 
Maryland has two wage enforcement laws relevant to this case: the WHL and the 
WPCL.  The WHL aims to protect Maryland workers by providing a minimum wage 
standard.  See LE § 3-402.  The WPCL requires an employer to pay its employees regularly 
while employed, and in full at the termination of employment.  LE §§ 3-502,4 3-5055.  Read 
together, these statutes allow employees to recover unlawfully withheld wages from their 
employer, and provide an employee with two avenues to do so.  Battaglia v. Clinical 
Perfusionists, Inc., 338 Md. 352, 364, 658 A.2d 680, 686 (1995) (the WPCL’s “principal 
purpose was to provide a vehicle for employees to collect, and an incentive for employers 
to pay, back wages.”). 
Both Peters and the Commissioner of Labor and Industry (the “Commissioner”), 
appearing as amicus curiae,6 argue that this Court has already resolved whether overtime 
                                              
4 LE § 3-502 provides, in relevant part, that: 
(a)(1) Each employer: 
 
(i) shall set regular pay periods; and 
 
(ii) except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
 
subsection, shall pay each employee at least once in 
 
every 2 weeks or twice in each month. 
(2) An employer may pay an administrative, executive, or 
professional employee less frequently than required under 
paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection. 
 
5 LE § 3-505 provides, in relevant part, that: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, each 
employer shall pay an employee or the authorized 
representative of an employee all wages due for work that the 
employee performed before the termination of employment, on 
or before the day on which the employee would have been paid 
the wages if the employment had not been terminated. 
6 EHCG did not participate in this appeal. 
 
5 
pay is recoverable under the WPCL.  Peters relies on our decision in Friolo v. Frankel, 373 
Md. 501, 819 A.2d 354 (2003) (“Friolo I”) to support her argument that the WPCL not 
only concerns the timing of payments, but any dispute over entitlement of wages.  In Friolo 
I, we explicitly held that an employee “was entitled to sue under [the WHL and the WPCL] 
to recover any overtime pay that remained due after termination of her employment.”  373 
Md. at 515, 819 A.2d at 362.  Peters also claims that because this Court applies the WPCL’s 
“bona fide dispute” provision to all disputes generally regarding an employee’s entitlement 
to wages, the statute cannot possibly be interpreted to affect violations of time only.  See 
LE § 3-507.2(b); see Ocean City, Md., Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Barufaldi, 434 Md. 
381, 400, 75 A.3d 952, 963 (2013) (analyzing a bona fide dispute under the WPCL to mean 
“[a dispute] as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to the withheld wages[.]”).  We concur.   
This Court recently addressed the WPCL’s scope in Marshall v. Safeway, Inc., 
where we repeated our rejection of a narrow reading of the WPCL.  437 Md. 542, 560, 88 
A.3d 735, 745 (2014).  We were called upon to do so in the face of federal court decisions 
that continued to restrict its application.7  We reaffirm today that both the WHL and the 
                                              
7 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Murphy, 372 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474–75 (D. Md. 2004) 
(finding that the enhanced damage award under the WPCL only applies to disputes 
concerning timing of payment and not minimum wage and overtime claims based on 
entitlement to the wages themselves); see also Williams v. Maryland Office Relocators, 
485 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622 n.4 (D. Md. 2007) (distinguishing the plaintiff’s claim under the 
WPCL in Friolo because the wages were due after termination).  Under this reasoning, any 
withheld overtime claims by current employees must be brought exclusively under the 
WHL and the FLSA, its federal counterpart.  Williams, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 622 n.4. 
In response to these decisions, the Legislature amended the WPCL by adding 
“overtime wages” to the statute’s definition of “wages” for the sole purpose of “correct[ing] 
. . . .  [t]he 2004 holding in McLaughlin v. Murphy and the 2007 holding in Williams v. 
 
6 
WPCL are vehicles for recovering overtime wages.8  Without a doubt, Peters has a right to 
bring a private cause of action under the WPCL to recover any unlawfully withheld 
overtime wages. 
Challenges To The Trial Court’s Refusal To Grant Enhanced Damages 
Appellant argues that she was wrongfully denied treble damages under the WPCL.  
She presents three interrelated arguments that the court’s order was erroneous.  First, she 
claims that the court erred when it failed to make an explicit finding regarding whether 
EHCG withheld overtime wages as a result of a bona fide dispute.  Second, Appellant urges 
that the court could not have reasonably concluded that EHCG withheld the wages as a 
result of a bona fide dispute.  Finally, she avers that the court abused its discretion by 
declining to award her treble damages.  Because of this error, Appellant requests that we 
remand this case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County with instructions that she be 
awarded the full amount of treble damages under the WPCL.  We address each of these 
arguments in turn. 
                                              
Maryland Office Relocators, Inc. [that] misinterpreted our state law to say that Marylanders 
who are owed overtime cannot seek the full damages they are owed from employers who 
fail to properly pay them overtime.”  See Del. Josephine A. Peña-Melnyk, Testimony on 
House Bill 214 (House Econ. Matters Comm. Feb 18, 2010 and Sen. Fin. Comm. April 1, 
2010); see also 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 99 (S.B. 694); 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 100 (H.B. 214) 
(hereinafter “2010 Amendment”). 
   
8 In a prior case applying the law as it existed before the 2010 Amendment, this 
Court recognized that the Labor and Employment Article applied a uniform definition of 
“wage” that included overtime pay:  “[G]iven the multiple uniform definitions of ‘wage’ 
throughout the Labor and Employment Article, to read ‘wage’ narrowly to exclude 
overtime compensation . . . would produce a ‘farfetched, absurd, or illogical result[.]’”  
Montgomery County v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 71, 31 A.3d 191, 201 (2011) (quoting Kilmon 
v. State, 394 Md. 168, 177, 905 A.2d 306, 311 (2006)). 
 
7 
A brief review of the prior appeal in this case and the proceedings on remand is 
helpful to our discussion.  In the prior appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that 
EHCG’s federal preemption defense was legally incorrect and remanded this case for the 
Circuit Court to determine whether Peters could recover under the WHL and WPCL.  Back 
at the trial court, Appellant insisted that no trial or further evidentiary hearing was 
necessary and EHCG did not appear.  The Circuit Court requested a memorandum of law 
from Peters regarding the propriety and the amount of damages under the WHL and WPCL, 
and scheduled oral argument.  In her memorandum, Peters argued that EHCG did not 
withhold overtime as a result of a bona fide dispute, and that she was entitled to the full 
amount of enhanced damages pursuant to LE § 3-507.2(b).  The court subsequently granted 
Peters the withheld overtime wages, but denied any enhanced damages, without 
explanation.9 
No Finding Regarding Bona Fide Dispute 
In granting the unpaid wages pursuant to the WHL and the WPCL, the trial court 
was required to make a predicate finding as to whether the wages were withheld pursuant 
to a bona fide dispute.  See Friolo I, 373 Md. at 530, 819 A.2d at 371 (remanded in part 
because “the jury made no predicate finding of a lack of a bona fide dispute.”).  In 
Programmers’ Consortium, Inc. v. Clark, this Court recognized that a trier of fact “may 
not award enhanced damages unless it finds that the employee’s wages were not withheld 
as a result of a bona fide dispute[.]”  409 Md. 548, 563, 976 A.2d 290, 299 (2009).  For 
                                              
9 No hearing appears to have occurred. 
 
8 
this reason, we approved the ruling of the Court of Special Appeals that the trier of fact 
“‘will be required to make such an actual threshold determination’” regarding a bona fide 
dispute before proceeding to the question of enhanced damages.  Programmers’ 
Consortium, 409 Md. at 558, 976 A.2d at 296 (quoting Programmers’ Consortium, Inc. v. 
Clark, 180 Md. App. 506, 531, 951 A.2d 914, 928 (2008)).   
We will normally imply a finding of fact if the conclusion that the court reaches 
requires that finding, and there is evidence in the record to support it.  See, e.g., Edmonds 
v. State, 372 Md. 314, 337 n.13, 812 A.2d 1034, 1047 n.13 (2002) (“Sometimes the record 
is adequate for a reviewing court to find that the trial judge implicitly ruled on” a predicate 
fact) (emphasis in original).  Yet here, there is nothing to suggest that the court decided the 
question of bona fide dispute, one way or the other, and we will not imply a finding under 
these circumstances.  Because the court did not make the required predicate finding 
regarding a bona fide dispute, it erred.  This error, however, may be moot if Peters is 
successful in her next contention. 
Evidence Of A Bona Fide Dispute 
Peters next argues that whatever the judge intended, the evidence simply did not 
support a finding that EHCG withheld her wages pursuant to a bona fide dispute.  We have 
previously defined a “bona fide dispute” as “a legitimate dispute over the validity of the 
claim or the amount that is owing[]” where the employer has a good faith basis for refusing 
an employee’s claim for unpaid wages.  Admiral Mort., Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 543, 
745 A.2d 1026, 1031 (2000).  The inquiry into whether an employer’s withholding of 
wages was the result of a bona fide dispute is one concerned with the employer’s “‘actual, 
 
9 
subjective belief that the party’s position is objectively and reasonably justified.’”  
Barufaldi v. Ocean City, Md. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 206 Md. App. 282, 293, 47 
A.3d 1097, 1103 (2012) (quoting Friolo v. Frankel, 201 Md. App. 79, 130 n.42, 28 A.3d 
752, 783 n.42 (2011), vacated on other grounds, 438 Md. 304, 91 A.3d 1156 (2014)); see 
also Admiral Mortgage, 357 Md. at 541, 745 A.2d at 1030.  It is well settled that a plaintiff 
carries the initial burden of proving that he or she in fact performed the work that was 
inadequately compensated. 
The WPCL is silent, though, on which party carries the burden of production with 
respect to showing a bona fide dispute.  Because we have not considered this question 
directly, we look to other states for guidance.  We have found only a few cases addressing 
the issue where the statute is silent.  These cases have placed the burden of proof on the 
employer oftentimes because of the employer’s knowledge of its own mental state.  See, 
e.g., Washington State Nurses Ass’n v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 175 Wash. 2d 822, 834, 
287 P.3d 516, 521–22 (Wash. 2012) (“The burden falls on the employer to show the bona 
fide dispute exception applies.”); Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 598 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Where essential facts necessary to proof lie within the exclusive 
knowledge or control of one party, ‘fundamental fairness’ is what justifies shifting the 
burden of proof to this party.”) (citations omitted); In re Raymour and Flanigan Furniture, 
405 N.J. Super. 367, 376–77, 964 A.2d 830, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) 
(establishing that the employer carries the burden, and that “[g]iven the humanitarian 
purpose of the Wage and Hour Law, we construe the exemption narrowly, not broadly.”); 
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner, 2006 Pa. Super. 156, 903 A.2d 565, 575 (Pa. Super. 
 
10 
Ct. 2006) (“It is both logical and appropriate to allocate to the employer the burden of 
proving good faith.  Certainly, the information tending to establish good faith in a WPCL 
matter is in the possession of the employer.”).10  
The rules of evidence also support this burden-shifting rule.  In a civil trial, the 
burden of production (i.e., to produce evidence) can shift from one party to another 
concerning a particular issue, even though the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with 
the plaintiff.  See Lynn McLain, 5 Maryland Evidence, § 300.6 at 375–76 (3d ed. 2013); 
Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook, §§ 400–05 (4th ed. 2010).  In this 
context, the employer is in the best position to bring forward evidence concerning its own 
subjective belief as part of establishing a bona fide dispute.  See Md. State Dep’t of Health 
& Mental Hygiene v. Phoebus, 319 Md. 710, 718, 575 A.2d 335, 339 (1990) (shifting the 
burden of production to the party who would have particular knowledge of a key fact).  
Once the employer has done so, the burden of production shifts back to the employee to 
rebut the employer’s reason.  See id. at 717, 575 A.2d at 338.  The burden of proof, i.e., the 
                                              
10 Other cases address the issue, and reach the same result, but their holdings may 
be influenced by the terms of statutes different than Maryland’s.  Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-
Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1163 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that under the 
FLSA, “[t]he employer bears the burden of establishing both the subjective and objective 
components of [the] good faith defense against liquidated damages”) (citation omitted); 
Batiansila v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 952 F.2d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that under Louisiana law “[w]e find that the burden of proof is on the defendant 
to show that it has an equitable defense”) (footnote omitted); Arasimowicz v. All Panel 
Sys., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (D. Conn. 2013) (“Also, like the FLSA, the 
[Connecticut Minimum Wage Act] places the burden on the employer to prove that an 
employee fits within an exemption.”). 
 
11 
risk of non-persuasion, however, never shifts from the party on whom it is placed.  Id.; see 
also McLain at 376–77. 
With the guidance of other jurisdictions, and based on settled evidentiary principles, 
it is not difficult to conclude that the employer, as the party withholding the wages, is 
uniquely qualified to offer evidence about its reason for doing so. 
Evidence Of Reasons EHCG Withheld Overtime Wages 
EHCG concedes that Peters was its employee and that she worked more than 40 
hours per week, thus supporting “overtime” status.  The only disputed issue is why EHCG 
withheld the overtime wages and whether its reason could be considered a bona fide 
dispute.  
The record reveals the answer to this question.  When asked why Peters was not 
paid overtime wages, Ms. Guy repeatedly answered that she withheld overtime pay because 
Peters exercised around the neighborhood during work hours.  The trial court rejected the 
claim that Guy withheld pay because Peters was exercising, reasoning that it was 
inconsistent with the company’s payment to Peters for those same hours at regular rates.11 
                                              
11 The court explained: 
 
There’s some dispute by the defendant that in fact Ms. Peters 
worked those hours during that period of time based upon her 
observations of Ms. Peters; however there’s no dispute that the 
defendant paid Ms. Peters for working those hours.  So[,] even 
though the defendant may believe that she didn’t actually work 
those hours, she was paid for those hours, so from my 
perspective, it’s clear that Ms. Peters did in fact work the hours 
that she’s testified to[.] 
 
 
12 
Although Guy mentioned that the services provided by the company were paid for 
through the Medicaid program, she never testified that she believed that the federal law 
exempted the company from Maryland overtime requirements for that reason.12  Nor did 
EHCG present any other evidence to support the argument that the company withheld 
overtime pay pursuant to federal Medicaid law.  Put shortly, EHCG presented nothing that 
could sufficiently justify that its president, Ms. Guy, actually believed that federal law or 
any other law exempted EHCG from paying Peters overtime.  Without this, there was no 
evidence of a bona fide dispute, and EHCG did not meet its burden of production. 
Without evidence of any bona fide dispute, there is no reason for the trial court to 
make a factual determination on the issue of bona fide dispute.  We have foreclosed any 
such finding as a matter of law.  Yet, a remand is still necessary because the record does 
not reveal whether the trial court considered the absence of a good faith reason for 
withholding overtime pay, or gave appropriate consideration to the statutory availability of 
an enhanced award up to treble damages.  We now review the guidelines for considering 
such awards. 
Enhanced Damages Awards 
Appellant argues that it would be an abuse of discretion for the Circuit Court to deny 
her treble damages on remand from this Court.  She urges that “every purpose of the 
WPCL’s treble damages provision (punitive, deterrent, and compensatory) strongly favors 
                                              
12 An incorrect legal belief, such as federal preemption, may form the basis of a 
legitimate bona fide dispute.  See, e.g., Roy v. Cnty. of Lexington, South Carolina, 141 F.3d 
533, 548 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employer acted in good faith where it relied on 
counsel’s incorrect legal advice). 
 
13 
awarding treble damages to Ms. Peters.  And no factors weigh in favor of denying or 
diminishing those damages.”  Cautioning that without the threat of enhanced damages, 
employers will simply withhold wages, relying on the unlikelihood of employees bringing 
suit, Peters argues that “[i]f multiple damages awards are few and far between, the 
provision’s crucial deterrent purpose will be significantly impeded.”  In light of these 
reasons, Peters urges us to adopt a similar approach to enhanced damages as we do for 
awarding attorneys’ fees under the same provision, and hold that such damages should be 
granted “liberally.”  See Barufaldi, 434 Md. at 393–94, 75 A.3d at 959 (“In light of the 
purposes of the fee-shifting provision of the [WPCL], this Court has stated that when the 
factfinder concludes that there was no ‘bona fide dispute’ as to the employer’s liability, 
‘courts should exercise their discretion liberally in favor of awarding a reasonable fee, 
unless the circumstances of the particular case indicate some good reason why a fee award 
is inappropriate in that case.’” (quoting Friolo I, 373 Md. at 518, 819 A.2d at 364)).  
Appellant concludes that, because the facts are so one-sided in this case, it would be an 
abuse of discretion for the court to decline an award of enhanced damages. 
Although we recognize that the WPCL is a remedial statute to be construed liberally 
in favor of the employee, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that there should 
be a presumption in favor of granting enhanced damages.  To apply such a presumption 
would ignore the Legislature’s use of “may” in the clause granting the fact finder discretion 
to make such an award.  In Admiral Mortgage, this Court interpreted the Legislature’s 
rejection of “shall” in a proposed bill to mean an award was discretionary, explaining:  
 
14 
In its initial version, the bill that enacted § [3–507.2] provided 
for an automatic trebling.  It was amended, however, 
apparently at the behest of the Maryland Chamber of 
Commerce and with the support of the Maryland State Bar 
Association, to make that penalty discretionary.  That indicates 
to us, in line with the general discussion above, an intent by the 
Legislature to leave the determination in the hands of the trier 
of fact, which ordinarily determines both compensatory and 
punitive damages.  
 
357 Md. at 551, 745 A.2d at 1035.  This Court, in dictum, has indicated that the trier of 
fact has the discretion to decline any award of enhanced damages, notwithstanding a 
finding that there was no bona fide dispute.  Programmers’ Consortium, 409 Md. at 563, 
976 A.2d at 299 (“[A] jury may decide not to award enhanced damages even though it is 
persuaded that the wages were not withheld as a result of a bona fide dispute[.]”);13 see 
also Barufaldi v. Ocean City, Md. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 196 Md. App. 1, 36 n.17, 
7 A.3d 643, 664 n.17 (2010) (“[T]he jury properly could find the absence of a bona fide 
dispute and decline to award additional statutory damages.”)  (italics in original) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, an employee is not presumptively entitled to enhanced damages, even if 
the court finds that wages were withheld without a bona fide dispute. 
We have not attempted in the past to set forth any guiding principles that trial courts 
should follow when they exercise their discretion whether and in what amount to award a 
plaintiff employee enhanced damages.  Today, we shall be almost as circumspect.  In 
Barufaldi, we considered the nature of the trial court’s discretion whether to award 
                                              
13 The holding in Programmers’ Consortium, Inc. v. Clark, 409 Md. 548, 563–64, 
976 A.2d 290, 299 (2009) was that a court could not award attorneys’ fees to the employee 
when the jury had decided that there was a bona fide dispute about the wages due. 
 
15 
attorneys’ fees when there was no bona fide dispute, and decided that trial courts should 
exercise their discretion “liberally.”  One of the chief purposes for liberally awarding 
attorneys’ fees is “given the relatively small amounts typically at issue[, attorneys’ fees 
provide] a stronger incentive for private attorneys to undertake representation in wage 
cases.”  Barufaldi, 434 Md. at 392, 75 A.3d at 958.  That rationale is not truly applicable 
to consideration of a claim for treble damages.  Although attorneys may be more likely to 
be paid higher amounts when there are enhanced damage awards, the need for legal 
representation is adequately addressed by the section allowing attorneys’ fees awards.  
Thus, Barufaldi does not fully justify a rule that enhanced damages should be liberally 
awarded unless there exists a bona fide dispute as to the wages owed. 
Yet the treble damages option was included in the statute for a remedial purpose—
to cure what the Legislature saw as a problem with “wage theft,”14 and practical difficulties 
that employees had in bringing lawsuits to recover wages owed.  As we explained in 
Battaglia, the WPCL provides a greater incentive for employers to pay employees the 
amounts owed them, in full.  338 Md. at 364, 658 A.2d at 686.  Thus, we feel confident 
that we are not departing from the statutory language if we simply say that trial courts are 
encouraged to consider the remedial purpose of the WPCL when deciding whether to award 
enhanced damages to employees. 
The Calculation Of Enhanced Damages 
                                              
14 This is a term offered by some of the Amici, citing numerous articles that use it. 
We use it simply as a short-hand term referring to an apparently widespread failure to pay 
workers their wages due and owing. 
 
16 
Peters presents arguments contending that enhanced damages must be given in 
addition to an award of the unpaid wage.  Although, in the absence of any award, we need 
not reach this issue, we do so for the guidance of the trial court on remand.  See Md. Rule 
8-131(a).  Peters argues that the proper interpretation of “additional damages” pursuant to 
LE § 3-507.2(b) is that such damages be given in addition to the recovery of unpaid wages 
(“quadruple damages”).  She presents two main arguments in support of this claim. 
First, Peters avers that because the statute separates recovery of unpaid wages in § 
3-507.2(a) from treble damages in § 3-507.2(b), the statute contemplates two separate 
awards.  Peters explains that LE § 3-507.2 contains two damages provisions as opposed to 
the one found in § 3-507, which governs claims brought by the Commissioner.  She 
contends that the private right of action is unlike § 3-507 because in LE § 3-507.2(b), the 
Legislature authorized15 two separate awards. 
Second, Peters claims we should reject the holding of the Court of Special Appeals  
in Stevenson v. Branch Banking & Trust Corp., that “the employee’s total compensatory 
plus punitive award may ‘not exceed[] 3 times the wage[.]’” 159 Md. App. 620, 659, 861 
A.2d 735, 758 (2004) (quoting LE §3-507.2(b)).  Peters relies on this Court’s language in 
                                              
15 Appellant explains that the Legislature enacted this private right of action in 
response to a budget crisis in 1993 that left the Commissioner of Labor and Industry unable 
to enforce the WPCL.  For this reason, the General Assembly created a private right of 
action (LE § 3-507.2) separate from cases the Commissioner takes on pursuant to LE § 3-
507.  See Hearings on H.B. 1006 Before the House Economic Matters Committee, Floor 
Report; see also Baltimore Harbor Charters, Ltd. v. Ayd, 365 Md. 366, 382, 780 A.2d 303, 
312 (2001) (“It then became necessary for the General Assembly to revisit the Wage Act 
and fashion a new remedy for employees to obtain the wages owed to them by their 
employers.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
17 
addressing other WPCL claims to support her view that Stevenson is wrong.  See Friolo I, 
373 Md. at 508, 819 A.2d at 358 (“[T]he jury could award her extra compensation up to 
three times the amount she was entitled to receive[.]”) (emphasis added); Baltimore Harbor 
Charters, Ltd. v. Ayd, 365 Md. 366, 396–97, 780 A.2d 303, 321 (2001) (“[T]he employee 
would be entitled to receive additional damages according to the provisions of [§ 3–
507.2].”) (emphasis added).  According to Appellant, Friolo I and Baltimore Harbor 
Charters contemplate enhanced damages differently than Stevenson, and therefore we 
should reject the calculation espoused in Stevenson. 
The Commissioner and Peters part ways on this issue.  The Commissioner argues 
that the plain language of the statute dictates that, like the damages available in suits 
initiated by the Commissioner, the total damages for a private cause of action are limited 
to three times the unpaid wage.  The Commissioner explains that the private cause of action 
was enacted in 1993 because severe budget cuts rendered the Commission unable to handle 
the high number of enforcement actions needed.  See Friolo I, 373 Md. at 516, 819 A.2d 
at 363; see also Testimony by Senator Paula C. Hollinger on Senate Bill 274 (Sen. Fin. 
Comm. Feb. 4, 1993).  The Commissioner quotes Senator Hollinger, lead sponsor of the 
1993 legislation, who stated the new private right of action “would enable employees to 
collect back pay and get the same results as if the matter had been handled by the 
Commissioner of Labor and Industry.”  Testimony by Senator Paula C. Hollinger on Senate 
Bill 274 (Sen. Fin. Comm. Feb. 4, 1993).  Thus, the Commissioner urges us to follow the 
rule from Stevenson.  
 
18 
In determining whether the WPCL contemplates a maximum award of three times 
the unpaid wage, or three times the unpaid wage in addition to recovering unpaid wages, 
we first turn to the statute.  LE § 3-507.2(b) states: 
If, in an action under subsection (a) of this section, a court finds 
that an employer withheld the wage of an employee in violation 
of this subtitle and not as a result of a bona fide dispute, the 
court may award the employee an amount not exceeding 3 
times the wage, and reasonable counsel fees and other costs. 
This Court has consistently recognized these guiding principles of statutory 
interpretation: 
“We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain 
meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a 
whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is 
rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.  If 
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need 
not look beyond the statute’s provisions, and our analysis 
ends.” 
Nichols v. Suiter, 435 Md. 324, 339, 78 A.3d 344, 353 (2013) (quoting Friedman v. 
Hannan, 412 Md. 328, 337, 987 A.2d 60, 65–66 (2010)).  Applying these principles, we 
first examine the plain meaning of § 3-507.2(b).  Subsection (b) does not indicate anywhere 
that the award is in addition to the unpaid wage.  Thus, it seems, Appellant asks us to force 
a reading of the statute that is not supported by the plain text. 
In Stevenson, the Court of Special Appeals, finding no case that directly addressed 
whether § 3-507.2(b) is capped at three times the unpaid damage “explicitly adopt[ed this] 
construction based on a plain language interpretation of the statute.” 159 Md. App. at 659, 
861 A.2d at 758.  Reasoning that the damage provision addressed in Stevenson was 
 
19 
contained in just one clause of the Real Property section interpreted there,16 as compared 
to separate clauses in § 3-507.2, Appellant argues that the Stevenson court’s analogy was 
mistaken.  Yet the intermediate appellate court explained the link between the two statutes, 
reasoning that “[b]oth statutes create a civil remedy by which wrongfully withheld money 
can be recovered, along with litigation expenses and a substantial penalty that serves as an 
incentive for the payor not to stonewall without legitimate reason.”  Stevenson, 159 Md. 
App. at 661, 861 A.2d at 759. 
The Stevenson court also distinguished a federal trademark infringement law that 
provided quadruple damages because the statute contained “different language authorizing 
a federal court to increase the compensatory damage award by also awarding, in addition 
to those damages, ‘any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding 
three times such amount.’”  Id. at 660, 861 A.2d at 758 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 
(emphasis in original)).  We find persuasive the reasoning that because there is no such 
language under the WPCL like “also” or “in addition to” that would clearly indicate an 
award of quadruple damages, the Legislature did not intend to make it so. 
Appellant also argues that this Court has impliedly approved of quadruple damages 
under § 3-507.2(b) by describing the award as “additional damages” or “extra 
compensation.”  See Admiral Mortgage, 357 Md. at 541, 745 A.2d at 1030; Friolo I, 373 
Md. at 508, 819 A.2d at 358.  The question presented for our review today was not at issue 
in those cases, and there is nothing in the context of those words suggesting that we 
                                              
16 See Md. Code (1974, 2010 Repl. Vol.), § 8-203(e)(4), (h)(3)(ii) of the Real 
Property Article. 
 
20 
intended to address this issue in dictum.  For this reason, we again look to other states for 
guidance on how they calculate damages under similar damage provisions.  
Other states with analogous wage payment laws have reviewed similar language 
and held that a given multiple of unpaid wages is the maximum damage award when the 
legislature does not add conjunctive language between two damage provisions.  The 
Supreme Court of Vermont observed a distinction in various state wage laws in holding 
that its wage payment law provides for a double damages award that includes unpaid 
wages.  Stowell v. Action Moving & Storage, Inc., 182 Vt. 98, 110–11, 933 A.2d 1128, 
1137–38 (Vt. 2007).  The Stowell court remarked: “when a legislature intends to provide 
for wage-payment penalties in addition to actual damages, it does so explicitly.”  Id. at 111, 
933 A.2d at 1138; see, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26 § 626-A (2007) (“[I]n any action 
brought to recover unpaid wages . . . such judgment includes, in addition to the unpaid 
wages . . . an additional amount equal to twice the amount of unpaid wages as liquidated 
damages.”) (emphasis added).  On the other hand, “where a wage-payment statute does not 
specify whether a penalty is in addition to the amount of unpaid wages, courts typically 
interpret the penalty amount to include the unpaid wages.”  Stowell, 182 Vt. at 111, 933 
A.2d at 1138. 
In passing the WPCL, the General Assembly did not expressly include any language 
to suggest the enhanced damage award was meant to be in addition to the unpaid wages.  
We are guided by our longstanding principle that “a court may neither add nor delete 
language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of 
the statute. . . .  Moreover, [c]ourts will not engage in ‘a forced or subtle interpretation [in 
 
21 
an attempt to] extend[ ] or limit[ ] a statute’s meaning.’”  Stickley v. State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Co., 431 Md. 347, 365, 65 A.3d 141, 152 (2013) (citation omitted) (quoting Hastings 
v. PNC Bank, NA, 429 Md. 5, 36, 54 A.3d 714, 732 (2012)).  If the Legislature intended to 
impose a treble damage award on top of the compensatory damages, we think it would 
have said so explicitly.  The plain language of the statute dictates that the total amount of 
damages an employee may recover under the WPCL is three times the unpaid wage. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County to reconsider its decision whether to award any enhanced damages pursuant to LE 
§ 3-507.2(b) in light of (i) our holding that there was no evidence of a bona fide dispute as 
a matter of law, and (ii) the remedial purposes of the statute.  
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT FOR 
MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY 
VACATED.  
CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT 
COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 8-
604(a)(5) 
AND 
(d) 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 
APPELLEE.