Title: Mahmoud M. Basileh v. Arwa G. Alghusain

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
David W. Stone IV 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter S. French 
Stone Law Office & Legal Research 
 
 
 
Joseph P. Rompala 
Anderson, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewis & Kappes, P.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 29S02-0810-CV-584 
 
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: 
 
MAHMOUD M. BASILEH, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
 
v. 
 
ARWA G. ALGHUSAIN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court 1, No. 29D01-0112-DR-833 
The Honorable Steven R. Nation, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A02-0712-CV-1132 
_________________________________ 
 
 
September 3, 2009 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Sep 03 2009, 11:41 am
 
2 
 
In this post-dissolution action the Indiana trial court relinquished its jurisdiction over 
matters of child support to a California trial court.  At issue is the interplay between the Full 
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.  
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.   
 
Background and Procedural History 
 
The marriage between Arwa Alghusain (Mother) and Mahmoud Basileh (Father) was 
dissolved in Indiana – the Hamilton Superior Court – in 2002.  The parties were awarded joint 
legal custody of their two minor children with Mother having physical custody.  The parties 
agreed to a weekly child support amount payable by Father to Mother and to a liberal visitation 
schedule between Father and the children.  At the time of dissolution, Mother indicated her 
intention to relocate with the children to Monterey County, California, and the parties‟ visitation 
schedule accounted for the relocation.  
 
The cooperative relationship between the parents apparently fell apart, and in May 2004 
Mother filed a petition for modification and sought transfer of jurisdiction to California.  At 
some point in mid- to late-2004, Father, who is a United States citizen, left Indiana for his native 
country of Jordan in order to care for his ailing mother.  On December 1, 2004, Father lost his 
Indiana job after he was unable to return to the United States following expiration of his leave 
under the Family Medical Leave Act.  Father later explained that he was unable to return because 
his mother still had not recovered from her illness.  Father remained in Jordan seeking 
employment in either Jordan or the United States.    
 
In February 2005, Mother registered the parties‟ Indiana dissolution decree and the 
agreements concerning child custody, parenting time, and child support with the Monterey 
County, California trial court.  Mother also filed with the California court an “Application for 
Order and Support Declaration.”  Appellant‟s App. at 50.  In response, the California court 
entered a temporary order pertaining to visitation and custody, but not support.  In the meantime 
Father filed in the Indiana court an objection to Mother‟s petition to transfer jurisdiction to 
California.  On May 6, 2005, the Indiana court granted Mother‟s motion with a written order that 
provided: “After reviewing the pleadings and hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby 
 
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concedes and relinquishes its jurisdiction under the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act] to 
the Superior Court of Monterey County, California.  All pending matters will be transferred to be 
heard by the Superior Court in California.”  Appellant‟s App. at 64.  Father did not appeal.   
 
Thereafter, the California court accepted jurisdiction over child custody and visitation 
matters, but concluded that jurisdiction over child support matters had not been transferred from 
Indiana.  In August 2007, the California court sent a “Memorandum” to the Indiana court 
informing the court that Mother and the children resided in California, that Father “now resides 
in Saudi Arabia,” and that the parties had conducted visitation following orders issued by the 
California court.  Id. at 66.  The California court also inquired “whether Hamilton County 
[Indiana] will cede jurisdiction to Monterey County [California].”  Id.  The judge of the 
Hamilton Superior Court issued an order ceding jurisdiction “in all matters pertaining to 
visitation, custody, and child support matters[,]” noting that this is what he intended to do in 
2005.  Appellant‟s App. at 11-12. 
 
Father appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  In 
doing so the Court of Appeals reviewed Indiana‟s version of the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (“UIFSA,” sometimes referred to as the “Uniform Act”) and the federal Full Faith 
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (“FFCCSOA,” sometimes referred to as the “Federal 
Act”).  The court determined: (1) Father was not a resident of Indiana within the meaning of the 
Federal Act, and (2) the Federal Act preempts the Uniform Act because of a conflict between the 
two statutes.  Basileh v. Alghusain, 890 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).  We granted transfer to 
address the Court of Appeals‟ preemption determination.  We summarily affirm its determination 
concerning residency.1 
 
Discussion 
 
The trial court‟s 2005 order ceded jurisdiction to the California court pursuant to the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), which deals with child custody matters.  
                                                 
1 Although the Court of Appeals addressed the question of residency in the context of the FFCCSOA, the 
court‟s rationale is equally applicable to the UIFSA.  
 
 
4 
See State ex rel. Meade v. Marshall Super. Ct. II, 644 N.E.2d 87, 89 n.2 (Ind. 1994) (“[T]he 
legislature has provided for jurisdictional stability among the states by adopting the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act . . . .  The purpose of this act is to „discourage continuing 
controversies over child custody‟ and to „avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states 
in this state.‟” (quoting Ind. Code § 31-1-11.6-1(4), (6) (1994))).  However, the instant appeal, 
which involves child support matters, implicates the Federal Act and Indiana‟s version of the 
Uniform Act.  The Indiana version provides in relevant part: 
 
An Indiana tribunal that issues a support order consistent with 
Indiana law has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child 
support order: 
 
(1)   if Indiana remains the residence of the: 
(A)  obligor; 
(B)  individual obligee; or 
(C) child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or 
 
(2)   until each individual party has filed written consent with the 
Indiana tribunal for a tribunal of another state to modify the 
order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
Ind. Code § 31-18-2-5(a) (emphasis added).  The Federal Act provides in relevant part: 
 
Continuing jurisdiction.–A court of a State that has made a child 
support order consistently with this section has continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over the order if the State is the child‟s State 
or the residence of any individual contestant unless the court of 
another State, acting in accordance with subsections (e) and (f), has 
made a modification of the order. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1738B.  In concluding that the Federal Act preempts Indiana‟s version of the 
Uniform Act, the Court of Appeals determined there was a “crucial” distinction between the two; 
namely, the Uniform Act requires the parties‟ written consent to another state‟s jurisdiction, 
whereas the Federal Act does not.  Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 785.  This conclusion hinged on the 
court‟s interpretation of the word “or” in I.C. § 31-18-2-5 that links subsection (a)(1) (the 
nonresidency requirement) and subsection (a)(2) (the consent requirement).  
 
 
5 
General Rules of Federal Preemption  
 
The Supremacy Clause, which provides in relevant part that the laws of the United States 
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding,” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, provides Congress with the power to 
preempt state law.  Courts, however, are reluctant to presume that preemption of state law has 
occurred.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1993) (“In the interest of 
avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the States, however, a court interpreting a 
federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find 
pre-emption.”).   
 
 
Three variations of federal preemption doctrine exist:  express preemption, which occurs 
when a statute expressly defines the scope of its preemptive effect, Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992), field preemption, which occurs when a pervasive 
scheme of federal regulation makes it reasonable to infer that Congress intended exclusive 
federal regulation of the area, English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990), and conflict 
preemption, which occurs when there is an outright conflict between federal and state law and 
thus it is either impossible to comply with both federal and state or local law, or where state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress, Crosby v. Nat‟l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).  In this case the 
Court of Appeals relied on conflict preemption to determine that Indiana‟s version of UIFSA 
must yield to the FFCCSOA.  “[T]he language of Indiana Code § 31-18-2-5(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 
1738B (d) and (e) render the state and federal laws in conflict because they define continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction differently.”  Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 785 n.7.  
 
 
Preemption is basically a question of congressional intent.  Barnett Bank of Marion 
County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996).  “„[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone‟ in every pre-emption case.”  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 538, 
543 (2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).  But, “[t]here is indeed 
a presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such as family law.”  
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).  The best evidence of preemptive 
intent is an express preemption clause.  Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 895 
 
6 
(2000).  However, in the absence of explicit preemption language, courts examine the structure 
and purpose of the federal statute for implicit preemptory intent.  Barnett Bank of Marion 
County, 517 U.S. at 31.  See also Altria Group, 129 S.Ct. at 543 (“Pre-emptive intent may also 
be inferred if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the 
legislative field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law.”); Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“Congress‟ intent may be „explicitly stated in the 
statute‟s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.‟  In the absence of an 
express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with 
federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field „as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.‟”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
  
Does the FFCCSOA Preempt Indiana’s Version of UIFSA? 
 
 
In 1988 Congress established the United States Commission on Interstate Child Support 
(“Commission”) to offer recommendations on the resolution of interstate child support problems. 
As part of its recommendations, the Commission “declared its support for the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act . . . [and] also recommended that Congress mandate adoption of UIFSA by 
the States.”  H.R. Rep. No. 102-982, at 4-5 (1992).  As a consequence of the Commission‟s work 
the FFCCSOA was signed into law in 1994.  See Pub. L. No. 103-383, § 3 (1994) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738B).  From the beginning FFCCSOA was intended to be consistent with UIFSA.  
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-982, at 5 (1992) (“[FFCCSOA, as proposed,] is consistent with the 
recommendations of the Commission and the terms of UIFSA.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-
206, at 4 (1993) (same).  
 
 
In 1996, the Indiana legislature enacted its first version of UIFSA, following the 1992 
model promulgated by the Commission.  Pub.L. No. 116-1996, § 4 (codified at Ind. Code § 31-
1.5 (1996)).  In order for states to receive federal funding for aid to families with dependent 
children, effective October 1, 1996, Congress passed legislation requiring all fifty states to adopt 
UIFSA, including all amendments adopted by the Commission through August 1996. See 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (f) 
(2009).  In 1997, Indiana amended its UIFSA to account for the 1996 amendments adopted by 
 
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the Commission and recodified the statute at Ind. Code § 31-18-2-5.  Pub.L. No. 1-1997, § 10.  
Indiana‟s UIFSA is nearly identical to the 1996 federal version.2   
 
 
Congress apparently anticipated the necessity of amending FFCCSOA to comply with 
UIFSA.  See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S2823-02, S2887 (1995) (stating in summary of the Interstate 
Child Support Responsibility Act of 1995 that “The Full Faith and Credit Act, signed into law 
last year, which requires every state to respect child support orders from other states, would be 
modified to follow UIFSA.”).  And although conflicts between the two acts were recognized, 
they were characterized as unintentional.3  Subsequent revisions to the Federal Act were intended 
                                                 
2 Although amended in 2001, the 1996 version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, upon which 
Indiana‟s UIFSA is based, read: 
 
(a) A tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistent with the law 
of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-support 
order: 
 
(1) as long as this State remains the residence of the obligor, the 
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support 
order is issued; or 
(2) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written 
consents with the tribunal of this State for a tribunal of another 
state to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
 
Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 205 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 
3 For example, the Former Chair of the Commission testified before the Senate Finance Committee and 
the House Committee on Ways and Means:  
 
In order to achieve a “one order, one time” rule, Congress recently 
amended [FFCCSOA] to add a section that requires full faith and credit 
to child support orders, including ongoing and administrative orders, that 
are based on valid exercises of jurisdiction.  In defining jurisdiction, the 
Act attempts to be consistent with the UIFSA . . . .  
 
Unfortunately, as currently enacted, [FFCCSOA] conflicts with UIFSA.  
It requires recognition of orders that would not be entitled to recognition 
under UIFSA.  There are several other inconsistencies with UIFSA that 
also need correcting.  I urge Congress to make these technical 
amendments as quickly as possible.  States are currently in a great deal of  
 
confusion.  The inconsistencies were unintentional, and can be easily 
corrected.  
Child Support Enforcement: Before S. Comm. on Finance, 104th Cong. 1995 WL 133889 (1995) 
(testimony of Margaret Campbell Haynes, Former Chair, U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support) 
 
8 
to correct any conflicts and make the Federal Act consistent with the Uniform Act.  See H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 351 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2739 (revisions to 
FFCCSOA proposed “to ensure that full faith and credit laws can be applied consistently with 
UIFSA”); H.R. Rep. 104-651, at 1413 (1996) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2472 
(same); 142 Cong. Rec. H8829-02, H8919 (1996) (same); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-430, at 416 
(1995) (same). 
 
 
The application of general rules of federal preemption leads us to conclude that Congress 
did not intend the Federal Act to preempt the Uniform Act.  Rather, it appears that FFCCSOA 
was intended to follow the contours of UIFSA.  There is no indication in the text of FFCCSOA 
or its legislative history of any intent to preempt UIFSA.  And importantly for our purposes the 
specific provisions here at issue in Indiana‟s version of the Uniform Act – the nonresidency 
requirement and the consent requirement – are closely modeled after the federal version of the 
Uniform Act.  See supra note 2.  “The very fact that Congress mandated that all fifty states adopt 
UIFSA strongly mitigates against a construction of FFCCSOA that would impliedly preempt 
UIFSA to any degree.”  LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn. 2001).  We therefore 
also conclude that the FFCCSOA does not preempt the Indiana version of UIFSA.  
 
 
Reconciliation of the Federal Act and the Uniform Act  
 
 
Although we conclude Congress did not intend that the Federal Act preempt Indiana‟s 
version of the Uniform Act, we do acknowledge the Uniform Act contains a jurisdictional 
provision that is absent in the Federal Act, namely: a consent requirement.  More specifically, 
I.C. § 31-18-2-5(a) essentially provides that an Indiana court retains continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction “if” a party or related child remains in Indiana, “or until” each party has filed written 
consent to jurisdiction elsewhere.  The Court of Appeals in this case interpreted this provision to 
mean that Indiana retains jurisdiction unless both of these conditions are met.  The net effect of 
the court‟s interpretation is that in order for Indiana no longer to retain continuing jurisdiction 
both the nonresidency requirement and the written consent requirement must be met.  However 
                                                                                                                                                             
(emphasis added); Welfare Revision-Child Support: Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources, Comm. 
on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 1995 WL 45575 (1995) (testimony of Margaret Campbell Haynes, 
Former Chair, U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support) (emphasis added). 
 
9 
we are of the view that the statute is ambiguous on this point because it is susceptible to an 
alternative interpretation.4   
 
The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the Legislature has spoken 
clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.  Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air 
Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ind. 2001).  When a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken 
in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense.  Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154, 157 
(Ind. 2005).  Clear and unambiguous statutes leave no room for judicial construction. Id.  
However when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation it is deemed ambiguous 
and thus open to judicial construction.  City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg‟l Utils., 829 
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 2005); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 915 (Ind. 1993).  And when 
faced with an ambiguous statute, other well-established rules of statutory construction are 
applicable.  One such rule is that our primary goal of statutory construction is to determine, give 
effect to, and implement the intent of the Legislature.  City of N. Vernon, 829 N.E.2d at 4.  
 
The corresponding section of the federal UIFSA upon which the Indiana Legislature 
based I.C. § 31-18-2-5(a) is Section 205 of the 1996 version of UIFSA.  The drafters of the 1996 
version set forth in relevant part the following Comment to Section 205: 
 
[I]f all the relevant persons–the obligor, the individual obligee, and 
the child–have permanently left the issuing state, the issuing state 
no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to 
justify exercise of jurisdiction to modify. . . . 
 
[T]he issuing state may also lose its continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction to modify if the parties consent in writing for another 
state to assume jurisdiction to modify (even though one of the 
parties or the child continues to reside in the issuing state). 
 
Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 205 cmt. (1996) (emphasis added).  The comments to a 
uniform act are indicative of the Legislature‟s intent in enacting a statute based on the uniform 
                                                 
4 But see Brickner v. Brickner, 723 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (declaring, “The statutory 
language of UIFSA is plain and unambiguous in its requirement . . . that Indiana courts maintain 
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce such decrees as long as either the obligor, obligee, or child lives in 
Indiana or until all parties consent to modification by another state.”). 
 
10 
act.  See In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 38 (Ind. 1991) (noting it is permissible “to consider the 
notes of the Commissioners of Uniform Laws when construing a uniform statute”) (quoting Eads 
v. J & J Sales Corp., 257 Ind. 485, 275 N.E.2d 802, 806 (1971)).  Given that the 1996 version of 
section 205 of UIFSA and I.C. § 31-18-2-5(a) are almost identical, we find the language of the 
Comment to UIFSA (1996) § 205 to be a strong indicator of the legislative intent when it enacted 
I.C. § 31-18-2-5, namely:  subsection (a)(1) (the nonresidency requirement) and subsection (a)(2) 
(the consent requirement) are separate and alternative methods by which an Indiana court may 
maintain its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order; and thus do not require 
both the absence of the parties and consent before a court loses jurisdiction.5 
 
 
In this case it is of no moment that the parties did not file a written consent with the 
Indiana court for the California court to modify the Indiana support order.  Rather, the Indiana 
court lost its jurisdiction because Father, like Mother and the children, is no longer an Indiana 
resident.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
 
                                                 
5 We also observe: (1) courts of other states that have addressed this issue have reached the same 
conclusion.  See, e.g., McHale v. McHale, 109 P.3d 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Linn v. Delaware Child 
Support Enforcement, 736 A.2d 954 (Del. 1999); In re Marriage of Metz, 69 P.3d 1128 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2003); Groseth v. Groseth, 600 N.W.2d 159 (Neb. 1999); Etter v. Etter, 18 P.3d 1088 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2001);  and (2) a 2001 amendment to the consent requirement in the federal USIFA provides that a state 
maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: “even if this State is not the residence of the obligor, the 
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, [if] the parties consent in a 
record or in open court that the tribunal of this State may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its 
order.”  Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 205 (2001).