Title: Ball v. Division of Child Support Enforcement

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DONALD B. BALL,
§
§  No. 571, 2000
Respondent Below,
§
Appellant,
§  Court BelowFamily Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
v.
§  in and for New Castle County
§  CN97-11233
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT
§  Petition No. 99-18454
ENFORCEMENT, KEN 
§
MITCHELL,
§
§
Petitioner Below,
§
Appellee.
§
  Submitted:  April 10, 2001
     Decided:  May 30, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  REVERSED.
Felice Glennon Kerr, Esquire, of The Bayard Firm, Wilmington,
Delaware, for appellant.
Peter S. Feliceangeli, Esquire and Brenda L. Sammons, Esquire, of
the Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.
HOLLAND, Justice:
2
The parties in this matter are the respondent-appellant, Donald B.
Ball (the “Father”) and the petitioner-appellee, the Division of Child
Support Enforcement (“DCSE”), appearing on behalf of Ken Mitchell (the
“Grandfather”).  This is the Father’s direct appeal from a final judgment
of the Family Court denying his motion, under Family Court Civil Rule
60(b), to reopen the dismissal of his petition for review of a
Commissioner’s order.  The Family Court Commissioner’s order modified
the amount of child support the Father was obligated to pay to the
Grandfather.
The Father has raised two issues on appeal.  First, he argues that the
Family Court abused its discretion in denying his Motion to Reopen its
final judgment of dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).  Alternatively, he
argues that the Family Court abused its discretion in denying his Motion to
Reopen its final judgment of dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).1
                                   
1 See Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b)(1) & (6):
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a
party or legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons:
(1)
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; or.
. .
(6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
3
We have concluded that the Family Court abused its discretion per
se in denying the Father’s Motion to Reopen without an explanation.
Contrary to the well-established law of this State, the Family Court’s
disposition of the Father’s motion simply incorporated the Grandfather’s
position by reference and did not set forth an independently reasoned
judicial explanation for its ruling.  Therefore, the judgment of the Family
Court must be reversed.
Background Facts
The Father is a resident of Delaware and the sole surviving parent of
Bonnie Ball.  Bonnie resides with her maternal grandfather, Ken Mitchell.
The Grandfather receives Title IV-D services from the State of New
Jersey.2
New Jersey initiated a reciprocal child support proceeding in
Delaware through DCSE, pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act.3  On February 18, 1998, the first reciprocal support petition
from New Jersey was heard in the Delaware Family Court.  The evidence
presented indicated that the Father’s sole source of income was from Social
                                   
2 42 U.S.C. § 651.
3 13 Del. C. §§ 601-691.
4
Security benefits.  The Family Court held that the Father was not required
to pay any child support to the Grandfather.
Proceedings Before Commissioner
The State of New Jersey initiated a second reciprocal child support
proceeding in June of 1999.  This second petition was heard by a Family
Court Commissioner on September 14, 1999.  It was treated as a petition
for modification of the original child support order.  The Father appeared
pro se.  The Grandfather appeared through DCSE.  The Commissioner
performed a Melson Formula calculation using an income figure of
$52,000 per annum for the Father.  On October 4, 1999, the
Commissioner entered an order requiring the Father to pay $517 per month
for child support.
The Father, through counsel, filed a Motion to Reopen the
Commissioner’s order on October 12, 1999.  The motion alleged that the
Father had made a reasonable, excusable mistake in misdelivering certain
documents to the Family Court.  The motion requested that the
Commissioner consider these documents and also schedule a new hearing.
The Grandfather, through DCSE, objected to a new hearing, but did not
5
object to the Father’s request that the Commissioner consider the
misdirected documentation.
The Commissioner granted the Father’s Motion to Reopen and
reconsidered his income in light of the information provided with the
motion, but without an additional hearing.  Another Melson Formula
calculation was performed using a monthly income of $2,302 for the
Father – as opposed to $4,300 in the previous calculation.  The
Commissioner entered a modified order which required the Father to pay
current child support of $343 per month, $174 less than previously
ordered.
Before the Commissioner reopened the initial child support order, an
arrears petition was decided by the Family Court.  The Father agreed to
make a lump sum payment of $3,000 on the arrears and pay an additional
$25 per month until the arrears were paid in full.  Accordingly, the
Commissioner’s child support order, as modified, was consolidated with
the arrears order.  The Commissioner’s final order set the Father’s total
monthly support obligation at $368 – representing $343 for current support
and $25 for the arrears.
6
Family Court Judge’s Dismissal
The Father appealed to a Family Court Judge from the
Commissioner’s modified order requiring him to pay $343 per month in
current support.4  The Father alleged that the Commissioner erred in
calculating his income and that the Commissioner should have granted him
a new hearing.  On behalf of the Grandfather, DCSE filed a response to
the Father’s objections.  The Father requested that the transcript of the
proceedings before the Commissioner be prepared and stated at paragraph
5:  “I certify that I will pay all costs associated with the preparation of the
transcript.”
A Family Court paralegal sent a letter to the Father’s attorney dated
August 10, 2000, requesting payment of the transcript fee within thirty
days or the petition “may” be dismissed.  The Father paid the cost of the
transcript fee to his attorney on September 21, 2000.  These funds were
erroneously applied toward outstanding attorney’s fees rather than
forwarded to the Family Court for payment of the transcript fee.  The
Father’s attorney discovered this bookkeeping error on September 27,
2000 and called the court paralegal.  The funds were paid to the Family
                                   
4 10 Del. C. § 915; Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 53.1.
7
Court on September 28, 2000.  On September 29, 2000, the court
paralegal contacted the Father’s attorney and informed her that a judge had
dismissed the case on September 25, 2000.
Motion to Reopen Denied
The Father’s attorney immediately filed a Motion to Reopen,
pursuant to Family Court Civil Rule 60(b)(1) alleging excusable neglect
and Rule (b)(6) alleging another reason “justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.”  The Father’s attorney filed this motion before
actually receiving the order dismissing the petition and while in the process
of moving to another law firm. The order was received by the Father’s
attorney on October 3, 2000.
The Grandfather and DCSE filed a response in opposition to the
Motion to Reopen, noting that the payment for the transcript cost was late,
even if it was received on September 21, 2000.  Moreover, the
Grandfather submitted that remitting the transcript fee nineteen days late
was not excusable neglect and did not justify any other basis for relief from
the judgment dismissing the Father’s appeal from the Commissioner’s
order.  Accordingly, the Grandfather contended that the Father’s failure to
pay for the transcript in a timely manner precluded further review.
8
A Family Court Judge denied the Father’s Motion to Reopen “for
the reasons set forth in the Response.”  The Father then filed a Motion to
Reargue the order denying the Motion to Reopen.  This motion was also
denied.  The Father has taken this appeal from the judgments of the Family
Court denying the Motion to Reopen and the Motion for Reargument.
Dispositions Without Reason
The entire disposition by the Family Court in denying the Father’s
Motion to Reopen is as follows:  “the Motion to Reopen is DENIED for
the reasons set forth in the Response.”  “It is established law in this State
that a
9
judge must state the reasons for the decision.”5  This Court has held that
the failure to provide reasons for a judicial determination constitutes an
abuse of discretion.6  Moreover, “a judicial ‘short cut’ of this mandate, by
the mere incorporation by reference of a party’s [written position] as the
[trial judge’s] opinion may not be countenanced by this Court.”7
Although the law is well established, we have concluded that it
should be restated in this opinion.  While a judge may state the reasons for
a decision briefly,8 he or she must do so with “particularity sufficient to
discharge the judge’s ‘duty to make a record to show what factors [were]
considered and the reasons for [the] decision.’”9  The reasons for the rule
were stated by this Court many years ago:
A judge of our State must understand that the legal
requirement of supplying reasons is a matter of judicial ethics
as well as a matter of law.  In Walsh v. Hotel Corporation of
American, Del. Supr., 231 A.2d 458, 460 (1967), this Court
specifically noted the then governing Canon of Judicial Ethics
No. 19.  That Canon read in pertinent part:
                                   
5 B.E.T., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Sussex County, Del. Supr., 499 A.2d 811
(1985) (citing Cannon v. Miller, Del. Supr., 412 A.2d 946 (1980); Storey v. Camper,
Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458 (1979); Husband M. v. Wife D., Del. Supr., 399 A.2d 847
(1979); General Motors Corp. v. Cox, Del. Supr., 304 A.2d 55 (1973); Ademski v.
Ruth, Del. Supr., 229 A.2d 837 (1967)).
6 Husband M. v. Wife D., 399 A.2d at 848.
7 B.E.T., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Sussex County, 499 A.2d at 812.
8 Ademski v. Ruth, 229 A.2d at 838.
9 B.E.T., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Sussex County, 499 A.2d at 811 (quoting
Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d at 466).
10
In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should
indicate the reasons for his action in an opinion showing that
he has not disregarded or overlooked serious arguments of
counsel.  He thus shows his full understanding of the case,
avoids the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes
confidence in his intellectual integrity and may contribute
useful precedent to the growth of the law.10
In addition to the foregoing concerns, a disposition without reasons
precludes any meaningful appellate review by this Court.  The dilemma
presented to this Court was described more than twenty years ago:
This Court basically has three options when faced with
an order by a trial judge unsupported by reasons.  First, it can
affirm the decision as being within the fact finding or
discretionary power of the trial judge, if, upon a reading of
the record in relation to the order, the reasons appear obvious.
Even in cases where this first option is followed, this Court
has noted the trial judge should have given reasons.  Second,
this Court on appeal can retain jurisdiction and remand the
case in order to require that the trial judge state the reasons
which support his decision. Third, this Court can reverse and
order a new trial.  None of the three options are satisfactory
and all could be avoided if the trial judge would simply state
his reasons in the first instance.  Then there would be no need
to speculate on appeal.
We are mindful of the tremendous time burdens on our
trial courts.  But it is part of a trial judge’s adjudicative
responsibilities to state the reasons for his action, no matter
how briefly.  There is no problem in most appeals.  Indeed,
                                   
10 Id. at 811-12 (quoting Cannon v. Miller, 412 A.2d at 947).
11
most trial judges are diligent in meeting their responsibility.
All should be.11
Conclusion
The supplying of reasons for a judicial decision is part of established
law of this State.12  The failure of a trial judge to give reasons for the
court’s disposition constitutes a per se abuse of discretion.13  “An opinion
in which the [trial court] merely adopts and incorporates by reference [the
written position] of one of the parties, is inadequate and unacceptable.”14
The judgment of the Family Court is reversed.  We remand the case
to the Family Court with directions to consider the Father’s motion ab
initio and, thereafter, to file an order or opinion stating the reasons for its
decision.
                                   
11 Husband M. v. Wife D., Del. Supr., 399 A.2d 847, 848 (1979) (citations omitted).
12 B.E.T., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Sussex County, Del. Supr., 497 A.2d 811
(1985).
13 Husband M. v. Wife D., Del. Supr., 399 A.2d 847, 848 (1979).
14 B.E.T., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Sussex County, 499 A.2d at 811.