Title: In re Wieland

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Wieland, 89 Ohio St.3d 535, 2000-Ohio-233.] 
 
 
 
 
 
IN RE WIELAND ET AL. 
[Cite as In re Wieland (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 535.] 
Juvenile court — Dependent and/or neglected children — Evidence — In the 
absence of a specific statutory waiver or exception, the testimonial 
privileges established under R.C. 2317.02(B)(1), 4732.19, and 2317.02(G) 
are applicable to communications made by a parent in the course of 
treatment ordered as part of a reunification plan in an action for 
dependency and neglect. 
In the absence of a specific statutory waiver or exception, the testimonial privileges 
established under R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) (concerning communications between 
a physician and patient), R.C. 4732.19 (concerning communications between 
a licensed psychologist and client), and R.C. 2317.02(G) (concerning 
communications between a licensed counselor or licensed social worker and 
client) are applicable to communications made by a parent in the course of 
treatment ordered as part of a reunification plan in an action for dependency 
and neglect. 
(No. 99-1586 — Submitted May 10, 2000 — Decided September 6, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 17646. 
 
 
2
 
On December 22, 1996, Dayton police officers removed Lindsey and Holly 
Wieland from the home of their mother, appellee Laura Wieland, and delivered 
them to appellant, Montgomery County Children Services Board.  On December 
23, 1996, appellant filed complaints in the Montgomery County Juvenile Court, 
alleging that Lindsey and Holly were dependent and/or neglected.  A shelter 
hearing was held that same day, and the juvenile court granted interim custody of 
the children to appellant. 
 
On February 10, 1997, an adjudicatory and dispositional hearing was held.  
On February 20, 1997, the juvenile court ordered that Lindsey be committed to the 
temporary custody of her maternal aunt, that Holly be committed to the temporary 
custody of appellant, and that the reunification case plan filed by appellant be 
incorporated as the order of the court.  The case plan required appellee to submit to 
a substance abuse and domestic violence assessment, and to attend parenting 
classes. 
 
On November 10, 1997, appellant filed a motion for permanent custody of 
Holly and, on February 24, 1998, moved for permanent custody of Lindsey.  
Meanwhile, on February 20, 1998, the juvenile court approved and adopted an 
amended case plan, which noted, among other things, that appellee had “been 
terminated from two [substance abuse] programs this review period for 
 
 
3
noncompliance.  The programs are CADAS [Center for Alcoholism and Drug 
Addiction Services] and the Turning Point.” 
 
On May 10, 1998, appellee was admitted to Miami Valley Hospital with 
ruptured membranes.  On May 11, 1998, appellee gave birth to Danielle Wieland, 
who, at thirty-two weeks and weighing three pounds, tested positive for crack 
cocaine.  When appellant’s motions for permanent custody of Lindsey and Holly 
came on for hearing on June 11, 1998, the juvenile court continued the matter in 
order to consolidate the dispositional hearing for all three children.  On August 31, 
1998, appellant filed its complaint for neglect and dependency of Danielle, seeking 
a preferred disposition of permanent custody.  On September 18, 1998, the juvenile 
court ordered Danielle committed to the temporary custody of appellant on an 
interim basis. 
 
On December 24, 1998, pending the consolidated permanent custody 
hearing, appellant moved the court for an order admitting into evidence certain 
records and testimony regarding appellee’s substance abuse treatment at CADAS.  
In so doing, appellant argued that “[t]he testimony to be presented is appropriate 
for release since either the treatment was requested as a result of the court-
approved comprehensive reunification plan or the treatment secured is relevant to 
this case.” 
 
 
4
 
On January 29, 1999, the juvenile court ordered that the records shall be 
disclosed as requested despite appellee’s objection that she had not waived the 
physician-patient privilege.  The court found that the “privilege only extends to 
voluntarily sought treatment.  When the mother submits to testing or counseling 
pursuant to a case-plan, such treatment is not voluntary.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that “it 
erred to the extent that its order allows the introduction of any communications 
made by [appellee] to her providers during the course of treatment.”  In so doing, it 
found that the trial court had correctly followed the law as previously set forth in 
its decision in In re Smith (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 75, 7 OBR 88, 454 N.E.2d 171.  
However, the court of appeals chose to revisit its former decision, finding that “the 
bright-line test of voluntary-involuntary treatment set forth in Smith is overly 
simplistic.”  The court reasoned that the underlying justification for the creation of 
the privilege, which is to promote more complete and effective treatment, is 
present regardless of whether the patient undergoes treatment voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  The court of appeals held instead that communications between the 
patient and provider are privileged when made in the course of court-ordered 
treatment, but not privileged when made in the course of court-ordered 
examinations or evaluations conducted for forensic purposes. 
 
 
5
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Kirsten A. Davies, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Lynn G. Koeller, Montgomery County Public Defender, and Arvin S. Miller, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  Under the juvenile court’s order of January 29, 
1999, appellee is precluded from invoking the physician-patient privilege because 
she did not voluntarily undergo treatment.  However, as aptly noted by the court of 
appeals, the record in this case does not reveal whether the testimony and records 
that appellant seeks to obtain regarding appellee’s treatment at CADAS concern 
communications received by physicians, licensed psychologists, licensed 
counselors, and/or licensed social workers.  Thus, in the interest of judicial 
economy, and because all of these providers are governed by similar statutes, we 
will determine at once whether the testimonial privileges governing all these 
providers are applicable to communications made by a parent in the course of 
treatment ordered as part of a reunification plan in an action for dependency and 
neglect. 
 
 
6
 
The relevant testimonial privileges are statutory in nature, and are codified at 
R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) (concerning communications between a physician and patient), 
R.C. 4732.19 (concerning communications between a licensed psychologist and 
client), and R.C. 2317.02(G) (concerning communications between a licensed 
counselor or licensed social worker and client).  Under these sections, the 
respective privileges are to be given effect absent specific statutory waivers or 
exceptions, none of which applies to this case.  No provision is made in any of 
these statutes that would allow for the in-court disclosure of confidential 
information on the basis that the treatment or service received by the patient or 
client was involuntary in nature, ordered as part of a journalized case plan provided 
in R.C. 2151.412, or is necessary or relevant to a determination of permanent 
custody under R.C. 2151.414.  Nor is any such provision to be found anywhere in 
R.C. Chapter 2151 as it pertains to dependency and neglect proceedings. 
 
This court has repeatedly and consistently refused to engraft judicial 
waivers, exceptions, or limitations into the testimonial privilege statutes where the 
circumstances of the communication fall squarely within the reach of the statute.  
In State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222, 223, 553 N.E.2d 672, 673-674, the 
court explained: 
 
“The question presented for review by this certification is whether the courts 
of Ohio should judicially create a public policy limitation upon the statutorily 
 
 
7
created physician-patient privilege which would allow otherwise clearly 
inadmissible evidence to be received in ‘drunk driving’ cases.  In keeping with the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers, we cannot adopt such a position.  
Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative 
enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.” 
 
In In re Miller (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 99, 108, 585 N.E.2d 396, 404, we 
succinctly stated that “Ohio’s physician-patient privilege statute makes no 
exception for civil commitment proceedings.  This means that the privilege applies 
in the appropriate commitment situation involving a patient and his or her 
psychotherapist.”  And in State v. McDermott (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 572-573, 
651 N.E.2d 985, 987, the court reiterated that “the General Assembly may broaden 
the 
statutory 
exceptions 
which 
constitut[e] 
waiver 
of 
the 
privileged 
communications but * * * the courts should not augment the enumerated waivers.  
‘The argument addressed to this court might be addressed to the legislature with 
persuasive power * * * but it is not for this court to make such an amendment.’  
[Swetland v. Miles (1920)], 101 Ohio St. [501] at 504-505, 130 N.E. [22] at 23.” 
 
Nevertheless, appellant argues that “the purpose of the privilege is severely 
undermined when the patient is not voluntarily seeking help,” and that “the 
rationale protecting communications by a parent to a physician, licensed 
psychologist, social worker or counselor does not apply in proceedings under R.C. 
 
 
8
Chapter 2151.”  Whatever persuasive force these arguments may have, this is not 
the appropriate forum in which to raise them.  This court will not engage in 
subterfuge by judicially creating a public policy limitation under the guise of 
statutory interpretation. 
 
Moreover, there is nothing in the interplay between R.C. Chapter 2151 and 
the testimonial privilege statutes that supports appellant’s position.  “The purpose 
of the [physician-patient privilege] statute is to create an atmosphere of 
confidentiality, encouraging the patient to be completely candid and open with his 
or her physician, thereby enabling more complete treatment.”  In re Miller, supra, 
63 Ohio St.3d at 107, 585 N.E.2d at 403.  Otherwise, the fear of disclosure “could 
seriously impede the patient’s chances for a recovery.”  Id. at 108, 585 N.E.2d at 
404.  The same purpose, of course, underlies each of the testimonial privilege 
statutes.  The same concerns are prevalent where a parent is required, under the 
terms of a reunification plan, to utilize medical, psychological, or other social and 
rehabilitative services in an effort to remedy the problems that initially caused the 
child to be placed outside the home so that the child can return home.  See R.C. 
2151.01(C), 2151.412(F)(1)(b)(i) and (H), and 2151.414(E)(1).  Thus, as well 
stated by the court of appeals: 
 
“In order to meet the goal of the reunification plan, the purpose underlying 
the statutory privilege—effective treatment—is material and significant.  In other 
 
 
9
words, if a parent is fearful that any communications with her provider will not be 
privileged, she may not be open and truthful during treatment, thereby 
undermining the effectiveness of treatment and ultimately defeating the goal of 
remedying the reason for the removal of the child.” 
 
Accordingly, we hold that in the absence of a specific statutory waiver or 
exception, the testimonial privileges established under R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) 
(concerning communications between a physician and patient), R.C. 4732.19 
(concerning communications between a licensed psychologist and client), and R.C. 
2317.02(G) (concerning communications between a licensed counselor or licensed 
social worker and client) are applicable to communications made by a parent in the 
course of treatment ordered as part of a reunification plan in an action for 
dependency and neglect. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  I reluctantly concur for the reason 
that the statutory privileges neither distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
 
 
10
treatment, nor create any exception for communications made in the course of 
court-ordered treatment. 
 
There are strong public policy reasons in favor of creating such an 
exception, particularly when the safety and welfare of a child are at stake.  If an 
expert witness who treated or consulted with a parent in court-ordered treatment 
reports only that the parent involuntarily attended counseling sessions, the court is 
left to wonder whether the counseling sessions were effective or whether the parent 
continues to experience problems that would impede his or her ability to parent.  If 
no additional details of the treatment are disclosed, the court does not have 
material, relevant information upon which to base its decision about the child’s fate 
and the parent’s continued right to parent that child. 
 
These are serious concerns that must be weighed against the basic tenet of 
confidentiality, and the concern that a parent will not be candid and open while 
undergoing treatment for fear of later disclosure.  However, I agree that these 
competing public policy issues should not be judicially crafted, and instead belong 
in the legislative forum subject to public debate.