Title: PAMELA K. MOSS V. CHRIS BENTSEN MOSS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAMELA K. MOSS V. CHRIS BENTSEN MOSS2007 WY 67156 P.3d 316Case Number: 06-23Decided: 04/26/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
PAMELA 
K. MOSS,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHRIS 
BENTSEN MOSS,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofTetonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
S. Cohen of Cohen Law Office, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Lea 
Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., files an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Pamela 
Moss (hereinafter "Wife") seeks review of the district court's divorce decree 
which ended her marriage to Chris Bentsen Moss (hereinafter "Husband").  Wife asserts error in the district 
court's division of the marital property and its determination of child 
support.  We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Wife presents the 
following issues for our review:

 
 

1.                  
The 
district court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property by 
awarding both of the major appreciating assets  the business and the house  to 
the husband, and awarding to the wife an equalizing payment far less than that 
proposed by the husband, and parceled out over a period of eight years rather 
than in an immediate lump sum as proposed by the husband, dispossessing the wife 
and the parties' two children from the marital residence, effectively denying 
her the ability to purchase substitute housing, and thereby rendering the 
property division unfair and inequitable.

 
 

2.                  
The 
district court ordered the husband to pay child support at a rate less than the 
presumptive child support amount, without providing any justification for that 
deviation, and the court failed to impute a higher income to the husband based 
on the testimony of the husband's valuation expert, who testified that the 
parties' business was paying the husband substantially less than market value 
for his services, which the expert calculated at $75,000 per 
year.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
married on August 8, 1987, and had two children who were born in 1989 and 
1993.  Wife filed for a divorce in 
2004.  The parties were unable to 
reach an agreement concerning the marital property and child support, and a 
trial was held in June 2005.  Wife 
appeals from the divorce decree.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]      The division of 
marital property is within the sound discretion of the district court.  Hall v. Hall, 2005 WY 166, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d 284, 286 (Wyo. 2005); DeJohn v. 
DeJohn, 2005 WY 140, ¶ 11, 121 P.2d 802, 807 (Wyo. 2005); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d 922, 925 (Wyo. 2004).  We 
afford the district court considerable discretion to structure a distribution 
scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of the case, and we will not 
disturb its determination absent clear grounds demonstrating that the court 
abused its discretion.  Hoffman, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d  at 925.  Whether the district court's property 
division is just and equitable is evaluated from the perspective of the overall 
distribution of marital assets and liabilities rather than the effects of any 
particular disposition.  Dunham v. Dunham, 2006 WY 1, ¶ 6, 125 P.3d 1015, 1016-17 (Wyo. 2006). We generally defer to the district court's 
findings since it is in a better position to assess the witnesses' credibility, 
weigh the evidence and judge the respective merits and needs of the 
parties.  Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003).  We will find 
an abuse of discretion when the property disposition shocks the conscience of 
the Court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people 
could not abide it.  Hall, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d  at 286; Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 500 
(Wyo. 
1999).  

 
 
[¶5]      Decisions 
concerning child support are also reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard.  Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, ¶ 8, 74 P.3d 1230, 1233 (Wyo. 
2003); Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 
2000).  We have 
said:

 
 
Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  We must ask ourselves 
whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.

 
 

Durham, ¶ 8, 
74 P.3d  at 1233 (quoting Thomas v. 
Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo. 1999)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

Property 
Division

 
 
[¶6]      Wife takes issue 
with the district court for allegedly dividing the marital property in an 
inequitable manner.  We note that, 
by the district court's calculations, the ultimate property distribution left 
Wife with assets valued at approximately $684,000 and Husband with net assets of 
approximately $724,000.  We also 
note that we have long held that a marital property division does not have to be 
equal to be just and equitable.  DeJohn, ¶ 12, 121 P.3d  at 807 ("A just 
and equitable distribution is as likely as not to be 
unequal.")

 
 

[¶7       However, 
Wife also alleges that the property division rests on a material factual mistake 
rendering it inequitable.  In 1995, 
the parties purchased an automobile body shop in Jackson for $1,000,000.  They secured the full amount of the 
purchase price with a second mortgage on their Jackson residence.  At the time of the divorce, $470,000 of 
this debt was still outstanding.  
The district court accepted a valuation of the business that had treated 
the $470,000 as a debt of the business and reduced the present value of the 
business accordingly. That 
deduction appears to have been appropriate since the parties agreed the loan was 
for business purposes, and apparently assumed the business was obligated to 
repay the loan.  However, in determining the value of the 
marital residence, the district court also deducted the same $470,000 loan 
because it was secured by a mortgage on the residence.  Wife alleges that, by recognizing the 
$470,000 as a debt against both the business and the residence, the district 
court erroneously subtracted twice from the marital assets what is essentially 
one debt.

 
 

[¶8]      In its 
property distribution, the district court awarded the business to Husband at its 
reduced value.  The district court 
also awarded the residence to Husband at a value reduced by the same 
amount.  Assuming the business 
repaid the loan, Husband would have been left with substantially more equity 
than was assumed by the court in the marital property distribution.  If the business did not repay the loan, 
the present value of the business would have been that much higher.  Either way, Husband was awarded marital 
property on the basis of a mistake of fact, i.e. the real value of the two 
assets at the time of the divorce.  
That the district court did not intend to award a disproportionate amount 
of the marital estate to Husband is demonstrated by the fact that it expressly 
rejected a disproportionate result when addressing Wife's proposal that the 
entire value of the residence be awarded to her.  

 
 

[¶9] 
While it is not the role of this Court to determine the appropriate property 
distribution in a divorce, we are charged with reviewing the district court's 
factual findings and rejecting those that indicate an abuse of discretion. 
Hoffman, ¶ 9, 
91 P.3d  at 925.  It seems 
clear from the record that the district court, perhaps inadvertently, reduced 
the value of the assets awarded to Husband twice by the same amount, resulting 
in Husband actually receiving assets of greater value than Wife to a degree not 
intended by the district court or our statute requiring an equitable property 
disposition.  The "sound judgment" 
required by our abuse of discretion standard cannot rest on a mistake of fact 
and instead, must rely on objective criteria. 

 
 

[¶10]   Wife 
also complains the district court did not award her a lump sum equalization 
payment as great as she alleges Husband proposed at trial.  Wife contends that Husband offered a 
payment of $500,000 payable within three to four months, whereas the district 
court awarded her $344,000 payable over a period of eight years.  We find no support in the record for 
Wife's contention.  

 
 
[¶11]   In response to questions concerning 
a hypothetical property division, Husband testified that, if necessary, he would 
be willing to take out an additional mortgage on the marital home in order to 
make an equalizing payment to Wife.  
Husband testified $500,000 was the most he would be able to afford.  Husband did not testify $500,000 would 
be an appropriate amount.  Reading 
Husband's testimony in context, Husband was not proposing what he considered to 
be an equitable settlement, but rather was simply testifying as to his ability 
to comply with terms the district court might potentially consider in 
distributing the marital assets.  
Even had Husband suggested a property distribution he considered 
equitable, the district court is charged with making the ultimate decision on 
the equitable distribution of marital property and is not bound by any party's 
suggestion.  Madigan v. Maas, 2005 WY 91, ¶¶ 17-18, 117 P.3d 1194, 1199 (Wyo. 
2005); Hoffman, ¶ 16, 91 P.3d  at 
926.  Having reviewed the record, 
the district court's approach to the method by which Husband was required to 
make the equalizing payment neither shocks the conscience of this Court nor do 
we find it so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people could not abide 
it.  

            

Child 
Support

 
 
[¶12]   The district court ordered Husband 
to pay monthly child support in the amount of $1,000.  This amount appears to be based upon the 
amount of child support Husband agreed to pay during the pendency of the 
divorce.  The district court made no 
findings specifically supporting the amount ordered.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides for presumptive child support based upon the combined 
net income of both parents.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(a) (LexisNexis 2005) mandates that the presumptive child 
support amount be set forth in the district court's order or decree.  The district court failed to identify 
the statutory presumptive child support or even make basic findings of fact that 
would allow for the calculation of child support.  Because the district court failed to 
comply with this initial requisite step, its child support order must be 
reversed.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   Wife has demonstrated the 
distribution of marital property was based upon a factual mistake which 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.  In addition, the child support order is 
not supported by adequate findings.  
Consequently, we reverse and remand the divorce decree to the district 
court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.  In reaching this result, it is not our 
intent to direct what the property distribution should be between the parties. 
We emphasize that the ultimate distribution of the marital property is for the 
district court to resolve within its sound discretion utilizing accurate 
information concerning the value of the total marital estate. 

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 
[¶14]   While I agree that the divorce 
decree should be reversed and remanded for reconsideration of child support, I 
do not agree with the majority opinion concerning the property 
distribution.  The majority opinion 
finds that the district court made a mistake of fact in calculating the value of 
the marital property.  The record 
does not support a finding that the district court made a "mistake."  The divorce decree indicates the 
district court understood that there were not two distinct debts, but rather one 
business debt of $470,000.00 secured by a second mortgage on the Jackson 
residence.

 
 
[¶15]   I believe the pertinent issue to be 
whether the district court abused its discretion in subtracting the $470,000.00 
business debt from the value of both the business and the Jackson residence.  In a 
perfect world, the majority opinion would be correct.  If Husband's 
business paid off the business debt, then the second mortgage would be removed 
from the Jackson 
residence without ever having lowered the equity in the residence.  In this 
situation, deducting the business loan from the equity of the Jackson residence does 
result in a double credit to Husband.  However, the opposite could 
occur.  If Husband's business fails, and thereby cannot pay off the debt, 
then not only will the business be valueless because of its failure, but the 
full amount of the business debt will have to be paid off from the equity in the 
Jackson 
residence per the terms of the second mortgage.  In this situation, Husband 
financially comes out even worse than the marital distribution suggests since he 
will lose the $470,000 from the equity on the Jackson residence and he will lose whatever 
value was assigned to the business by the district court.

 
 
[¶16]   It seems to me that any finding 
reflecting either one of these two extremes, or anything in the middle, would be 
within the district court's discretion if supported by pertinent facts and 
circumstances.  In this case, the 
district court was presented with evidence that Husband's business was facing 
extreme difficulties in the near future, making failure a possibility.  Under the circumstances, I do not 
believe that the district court acted arbitrarily or capriciously, nor is its 
decision "so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people could not abide 
it."