Title: State v. Olsen

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-028


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

 Thomas Olsen                                 June Term, 1992


 George F. Ellison, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Jane Gomez, Assistant Attorney
   General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

 William A. Hunter, Windsor, for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      Dooley, J.   The State of Vermont appeals from a trial court order
 suppressing evidence of marijuana possession obtained in a search of
 defendant's home.  We reverse.
      The facts are not in dispute.  After defendant was arrested and charged
 with delivering marijuana to a confidential informant, members of the
 Southern Vermont Drug Task Force prepared the paperwork for a search warrant
 for defendant's home in Springfield.  The Task Force officers, however,
 found that all of the judges usually available for consideration of warrant
 applications were attending a training conference in Chittenden County,
 including Judge Paul Hudson, who was then assigned to the judicial district
 in question.  At the suggestion of Judge Hudson, who was in telephone
 contact with Officer Douglas Robinson, Robinson prepared a detailed
 affidavit and sent it and the warrant application by telefax to Officer Todd
 McCabe at the Essex Police Department.  In turn, McCabe prepared his own
 affidavit, stating that he had probable cause to believe that defendant had
 committed the crime of possession of marijuana and that the Robinson
 affidavit was attached, which it was.  The McCabe affidavit also stated that
 he had participated in the drug investigation detailed by Officer Robinson
 and that he had conducted the audio surveillance described in the Robinson
 affidavit.  The McCabe affidavit was personally sworn to before Judge
 Hudson.  Judge Hudson issued the warrant, and upon its execution the police
 uncovered marijuana in defendant's home.
      After informations were filed, defendant moved to suppress, alleging
 numerous grounds not at issue here.  The trial court reviewed the appli-
 cation process and ruled sua sponte that the warrant did not meet the
 requirements of V.R.Cr.P. 41(c) because the principal affiant had not
 appeared personally before Judge Hudson. (FN1) As a result, the court concluded
 that the evidence should be suppressed.  The trial court granted permission
 for the present interlocutory appeal pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5(b)(1).
      Almost all of the arguments in this case center on whether suppression
 is the proper remedy for a technical violation of Criminal Rule 41 that does
 not involve constitutional rights of the defendant.  If Officer Robinson
 had faxed his affidavit to Judge Hudson and the judge had issued the search
 warrant based on the faxed affidavit, we would have to reach that issue.  In
 that case, the affidavit would not have been "sworn to by the affiant
 personally before a judicial officer," as required by Criminal Rule 41(c),
 and we would have to decide the consequences of that noncompliance.
      This case is different.  Here, Officer Robinson faxed his affidavit to
 Officer McCabe, who prepared his own affidavit.  Officer McCabe was able to
 personally swear to his own affidavit before Judge Hudson and thus comply
 with Rule 41(c).  The district court found a violation of Rule 41 because
 the "principal affiant" did not appear personally before Judge Hudson.
      Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Rule 41(c) does not
 require that the "principal affiant" personally appear before the judicial
 officer.  The rule requires that the warrant issue "only on an affidavit or
 affidavits sworn to by the affiant personally before a judicial officer and
 establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant."  It goes on to say,
 however, that the court's finding of probable cause can be based on "hearsay
 in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the
 source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a
 factual basis for the information furnished."  Obviously, if the affidavit
 provided to the judicial officer conveys hearsay "in whole," the principal
 source of the information will not personally appear before the judicial
 officer. (FN2) To recognize by implication a principal affiant requirement in
 Rule 41(c) would make the rule internally inconsistent.
      The real issue before the court was not whether the principal affiant
 appeared before Judge Hudson, but instead whether the McCabe affidavit was a
 sufficient basis for Judge Hudson to find probable cause.  In addressing
 that issue, we must view the affidavit "in a common sense manner" and not
 subject it to "hypertechnical scrutiny."  State v. Ballou, 148 Vt. 427, 434,