Title: Denise L. Burns and Matthew Burns v. Mark L. Belafsky, M.D., et als.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PORITZ, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers a dispute involving the timeliness of an affidavit of merit filed by plaintiff, Denise L. Burns, pursuant to the Affidavit of Merit Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. That statute establishes procedures by which plaintiffs in malpractice cases are required to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious. Specifically, the statute requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to file an affidavit of merit executed by an appropriate licensed physician within sixty days of the date the defendant files his answer to the complaint, but allows a sixty-day extension for good cause. In this case, Denise Burns and her husband alleged medical malpractice by defendants, Drs. Mark and Robert Belafsky, Dr. Ira Stark, and South Jersey Imaging Associates, in their diagnosis, treatment, and care of Denise Burns in respect of a soft tissue mass found in the left side of her neck. Between December 1995 and January 1996, the defendant physicians performed several tests and procedures on Denise Burns in an attempt to diagnose and remove the mass. Burns and her husband alleged that, as a result of those procedures, she suffered paralysis of certain cranial nerves, as well as other permanent damage to her head, neck, throat, and vocal cords. After undergoing successful surgery in April 1996 to remove the mass, Burns submitted her medical records to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Michael Salcman. In his report dated June 6, 1997, Dr. Salcman expressed his belief that the defendant physicians had deviated from accepted standards of care in their diagnosis and treatment of Burns. Burns and her husband then filed a malpractice action against the defendants on October 6, 1997. Thereafter, all of the defendant physicians filed answers to the complaint. However, Burns's counsel failed to provide an affidavit of merit within sixty days of those answers. Thus, on March 4, 1998, Dr. Stark filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on that failure. On March 23, 1998, ninety-five days after Dr. Stark filed his answer and eighty-five days after Drs. Mark and Robert Belafsky filed their answer, Burns filed Dr. Salcman's affidavit, incorporating his June 1997 report. Although the affidavit was filed within the extension period permitted by statute, Burns had not specifically sought leave of court within the initial sixty-day period to file the affidavit outside of that initial period. In June 1998, Drs. Mark and Robert Belafsky also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on Burns's failure to file the affidavit of merit within sixty days of the filing of their answer, to which Burns filed a responding motion. The trial court granted defendants' motions, agreeing that the statute required Burns to file either an affidavit of merit or a motion for an extension within sixty days of each defendant's answer. The trial court further found that Burns had not made a showing of good cause for an extension. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that Burns had timely filed her motion within the sixty-day extension period provided by the statute and that counsel's inadvertent failure to file Dr. Salcman's affidavit constituted good cause to permit the extension. The Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for certification. HELD: An affidavit of merit submitted within the sixty-day extension period set forth in the Affidavit of Merit Statute should be considered timely filed so long as good cause is found by the trial court. 1. When a statute is silent or ambiguous, it must be interpreted it in light of the Legislature's intent. Because the Affidavit of Merit Statute is silent regarding when a plaintiff must seek an extension and because the Legislature has given no explicit direction on the issue, the Court must adopt the interpretation of the affidavit of merit provision that best effectuates the legislative intent. (pp. 7-9) 2. Requiring plaintiffs to file a motion for an extension within the first sixty days to avail themselves of the extension provision adds a technical precondition that the Legislature did not include in the statute. Imposing such a technical requirement is unwarranted, especially where the Legislature has indicated a preference for flexibility by including the extension provision and thereby allowing leeway in the filing deadline. (pp. 9-11) 3. Reference to other enactments by the New Jersey Legislature, the purpose of the Legislature, and the silence of the Legislature all indicate that plaintiff is not limited to seeking an extension within the initial sixty-day period. (pp. 11-13) 4. In order to regularlize the affidavit of merit practice and to further the legislative purpose, the Civil Practice Committee is asked to revise the form Civil Case Information Statement (CIS) found in Appendix XII of the Rules of Court to require plaintiffs to inform the court on the CIS whether an affidavit of merit will be provided to each defendant. (pp. 13-14) 5. The Legislature did not intend to preclude meritorious lawsuits in these circumstances where, as here, a plaintiff has a physician's report and where, as here, plaintiff's lawyer inadvertently fails to file the affidavit of merit until the statutory extension period. In these circumstances, good cause has been demonstrated. (pp. 14-15) 6. The Appellate Division properly exercised its original jurisdiction to dispose of the issue of Dr. Salcman's qualifications to provide an affidavit of merit both because disposition of that issue was necessary for the sake of completeness and because the record provides ample basis for disposition without further factfinding. (pp. 15-16) 7. An affidavit of merit need not be executed by an expert with the same qualifications or certifications as the defending physician; that the expert is qualified to supply the required basis for the medical malpractice complaint is sufficient. Dr. Salcman meets the qualifications enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 in that he is licensed in this state and has particular expertise in the general area involved in the action. (pp. 16-19) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. DENISE L. BURNS and MATTHEW BURNS, w/h, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MARK L. BELAFSKY, M.D., ROBERT B. BELAFSKY, M.D., BELAFSKY AND BELAFSKY, M.D., P.A., and IRA STARK, D.O., Defendants-Appellants, and SOUTH JERSEY IMAGING ASSOCIATES, P.A., Defendant. Argued September 11, 2000 -- Decided February 26, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 326 N.J. Super. 462 (1999). Robert E. Paarz and Thomas B. Leyhane argued the cause for appellants (Paarz, Master, Koernig, Crammer, O'Brien, Bishop & Horn, attorneys for Ira Stark, D.O. and Mr. Leyhane, attorney for Mark L. Belafsky, M.D., Robert B. Belafsky, M.D. and Belafsky and Belafsky, M.D., P.A.; Mr. Leyhane and Joseph L Marczyk on the joint briefs). John J. Del Casale argued the cause for respondents. William L. Gold submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers - New Jersey (Bendit Weinstock, attorneys; Mr. Gold and Abbott S. Brown, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J. In this case we are once again called on to consider the Affidavit of Merit Statute enacted by the Legislature in 1995 as part of a legislative package designed to effectuate tort reform in New Jersey. See Peter Verniero, Chief Counsel to the Governor, Report to the Governor on the Subject of Tort Reform (Sept. 13, 1994). That statute establishes procedures by which plaintiffs in malpractice cases [are required] to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily [can] be identified at an early stage of litigation. Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998) (quoting In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997)). To make that threshold showing, when plaintiffs allege medical malpractice they must provide defendants with an affidavit of merit executed by an appropriate licensed physician. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. The dispute before the Court involves the timeliness of plaintiffs' affidavit. The statute requires a plaintiff to provide the affidavit of merit within sixty days of the date the defendant files his answer to the complaint, but allows a sixty- day extension for good cause. Ibid. Here, plaintiffs obtained a physician's report months before filing their complaint, and then failed to submit the affidavit until eighty-five and ninety-five days after each defendant's respective answer had been filed. The affidavit was thereby provided within the extension period permitted by statute, although leave of court had not been sought within the initial sixty-day window. Defendants claim that the affidavit may be submitted after the first sixty days only when the plaintiffs have made their request for an extension during the first sixty days. The statute is silent on that question. We do not know whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail at trial. We do know that in this case, an expert's report was obtained even before the complaint was filed. Indeed, the physician who prepared that report later executed the affidavit, asserting to the merit of plaintiffs' claims. When a statute is susceptible of an interpretation true to its purpose and that permits plaintiffs to proceed with meritorious claims, we will not add requirements not explicitly set forth that deny plaintiffs their day in court. We hold therefore that an affidavit submitted within the sixty-day extension period should be considered timely filed so long as good cause is found by the trial court. In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. The court may grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause. Both plaintiffs and defendants rest their respective positions in this appeal on principles of statutory construction. Plaintiffs' argue that the statute does not expressly require a plaintiff to file a motion for an extension within sixty days of a defendant's answer, and therefore permits a court to grant such an extension for good cause when the affidavit is provided before the expiration of the extension period, i.e., after sixty but before 120 days from defendants' answers. In support of that position, plaintiffs contrast the Affidavit of Merit Statute with other New Jersey statutes that explicitly state when a motion for an extension must be filed. Plaintiffs also contend that permitting an extension in this case will not compromise the legislative purpose behind the statute -- the prevention of meritless malpractice lawsuits -- because plaintiffs had Dr. Salcman's report in their possession even before filing their lawsuit. Defendants counter that the statute imposes a strict requirement on plaintiffs to file an affidavit within sixty days of a defendant's answer. Defendants contend that that requirement can be relaxed only if a court grants an extension for good cause within the original sixty day time period. Defendants further argue that counsel's inadvertent failure to file the affidavit does not constitute good cause to grant an extension. inadvertence of counsel may justly be deemed to constitute good cause where the delay does not prejudice the adverse party and a rational application under the circumstances present favors a determination that provides justice to the litigant. [Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341 (1956)]. Absent demonstrable prejudice, it is neither necessary nor proper to visit the sins of the attorney upon his [or her] blameless client. Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 196 (App. Div. 1985); see also Parker v. Markus, 281 N.J. Super. 589, 594 (App. Div. 1995). [Burns, supra, 326 N.J. Super. at 471.] We agree with the Appellate Division. In these cases defendants cannot claim demonstrable prejudice because of delay: it is simply too early in the litigation for that claim to be credible. When, as here, a plaintiff has a physician's report and when, as here, plaintiff's lawyer inadvertently fails to file the affidavit of merit until the statutory extension period, we find that good cause has been demonstrated. We do not believe that the Legislature intended to preclude meritorious lawsuits in these circumstances and would not raise the bar for a finding of good cause. Defendants urge this Court to reverse the Appellate Division and find that Dr. Salcman is not qualified to evaluate a radiologist because he is not board certified in radiology or otolaryngology and there is no evidence that he devotes a substantial portion of his practice to radiology. However, an affidavit of merit need not be executed by an expert with the same qualifications or certifications as the defending physician; that the expert is qualified to supply the required basis for the medical malpractice complaint is sufficient. See Wacht v. Farooqui, 312 N.J. Super. 184, 188 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that merely because defendant in medical malpractice action was board certified diagnostic radiologist did not mean that similarly qualified expert had to execute affidavit of merit against him; doctor in one field would be qualified to render an opinion as to the performance of a doctor in another with respect to their common areas of practice ). The Legislature clearly recognized, . . . that there are overlaps in practice between and among the various medical professions and specialties. Thus, a doctor in one field would be qualified to render an opinion as to the performance of a doctor in another with respect to their common areas of practice. [312 N.J. Super. at 187-88 (citing Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 331-34 (1985); Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 136 (1961)).] Dr. Salcman meets the qualifications enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 in that he is licensed in this state and has particular expertise in the general area involved in the action. As the Appellate Division observed [i]t seems unlikely that a neurosurgeon would not be qualified to discuss various radiological diagnosis techniques, given the need [in his practice] to locate the area and determine the type of surgical intervention needed. Burns, supra, 326 N.J. Super. at 473. Indeed, at least three papers authored by [Dr. Salcman] dealing with CT, MRI and radiological diagnosis techniques, ibid., are listed in his Curriculum Vitae, along with 194 other publications spanning a period of twenty-seven years, many of which are in related fields. We find, as did the Appellate Division, that Dr. Salcman is amply qualified to execute the affidavit of merit filed on behalf of plaintiffs. NO. A-99/105 DENISE L. BURNS and MATTHEW BURNS, w/h, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MARK L. BELAFSKY, M.D., ROBERT B. BELAFSKY, M.D., BELAFSKY AND BELAFSKY, M.D., P.A., and IRA STARK, D.O., Defendants-Appellants, and SOUTH JERSEY IMAGING ASSOCIATES, P.A., Defendant. DECIDED February 26, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz