Title: Ex Parte Brewington

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

445 So. 2d 294 (1983)
Ex parte Faye T. Blair BREWINGTON.
(Re James Mitchell BLAIR v. Faye T. Blair BREWINGTON.)
82-923.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 16, 1983.
*295 Stephen V. Hammond of Chenault, Chenault & Hammond, Decatur, for petitioner.
Bingham D. Edwards, Decatur, for respondent.
BEATTY, Justice.
The trial court in this case ordered respondent, the father of a permanently disabled child, to support the child past the age of majority, and further, increased the amount of support payments the father was already making. The Court of Civil Appeals, 445 So. 2d 292, reversed the order of the trial court because it felt compelled to follow the decision of this Court in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 274 Ala. 477, 149 So. 2d 770 (1963), which held that, because the Alabama statute providing for child support (Code of 1975, § 30-3-3) had been held to apply only to minor children, the trial court was without jurisdiction to order a parent to support an adult child. We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's request that this Court overrule Reynolds, supra.
The facts as set out in the opinion rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals are as follows:
Although we appreciate the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals which follows the general rule announced in Reynolds, supra, this Court concludes that the decision of the trial court is the result which accords with the legislature's intent in this instance. To the extent that Reynolds, supra, is inconsistent with this holding, it is specifically overruled.
An analysis of the Alabama cases reveals that Reynolds-type decisions were based on the position that, absent a statute or agreement, no common-law authority existed to impose upon a non-custodial parent the obligation to support his adult child. However, the majority trend is to recognize an exception to this rule when the adult child is so mentally and/or physically disabled as to be unable to support himself. See e.g. Kruvant v. Kruvant, 100 N.J.Super. 107, 241 A.2d 259 (1968); Fincham v. Levin, 155 So. 2d 883 (Fla.App.1963); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947); O'Malley v. O'Malley, 105 Pa.Super. 232, 161 A. 883 (1932).
The Court in Reynolds based part of its decision on Murrah v. Bailes, 255 Ala. 178, 50 So. 2d 735 (1951), which held that the term "children" as used in § 30-3-1 was clearly meant to apply only to minor children. The statute, however, does not express such a limitation, and such a narrow interpretation is unacceptable. In the frame of reference of the present case, we believe the legislature intended that support be provided for dependent children, regardless of whether that dependency results from minority, or from physical and/or mental disabilities that continue to render them incapable of self-support beyond minority.
Thus, we adopt the reasoning of the New Jersey Superior Court in the case of Kruvant v. Kruvant, supra, where the facts were similar to those of the case at bar. The case involved an appeal by a divorced husband from orders of the lower court reopening and modifying provisions for support of his son contained in a divorce decree. The husband argued that the New Jersey court did not have the jurisdiction under New Jersey's divorce statutes to order support for an adult child. The New Jersey court, however, said of its divorce statute:
100 N.J.Super. at 113, 241 A.2d  at 265-266. Further, we take note of the case of Strom v. Strom, 13 Ill.App.2d 354, 142 N.E.2d 172 (1957), where an Illinois court observed that the Illinois divorce statute did not specifically refer to children who are minors and held that where care is necessary to equip the child for adult life and the financial circumstances of the father are adequate, equity can continue its jurisdiction to compel support of an adult child.
Moreover, in addition to our expanded interpretation today of the term "children" in the Alabama child support statute, we *297 recognize a duty imposed on parents to support their children who continue to be disabled beyond their minority. Accordingly, as urged by our Court of Civil Appeals, we follow the reasoning of our sister state, Florida, as expressed in the case of Fincham v. Levin, supra, at 884:
Not only does this appear to be the better view, it also accords with the legislative intent. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing the trial court's order continuing child support for the disabled child beyond his majority is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion. Since respondent does not address in brief the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the trial court's order increasing the amount of the child support payment from $50.00 to $300.00 per month, we do not consider this issue addressed by the petitioner.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, SHORES, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
ALMON, J., not sitting.