Title: Ex parte Michael Brandon Kelley.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 11/06/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1131451
____________________
Ex parte Michael Brandon Kelley
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Michael Brandon Kelley
v.
State of Alabama)
(St. Clair Circuit Court, CC-09-73;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-10-0642)
PARKER, Justice.
1131451
Michael Brandon Kelley petitioned this Court for a writ
of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision affirming the judgment of the St. Clair Circuit Court
("the trial court") sentencing Kelley to death for his
convictions for two counts of murder made capital pursuant to
§§ 13A-5-40(a)(1) and (8), Ala. Code 1975, and sentencing
Kelley to life imprisonment for his conviction for one count
of sexual torture, see § 13A-6-65.1, Ala. Code 1975.  Kelley
v. State, [Ms. CR-10-0642, Sept. 5, 2014] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
Crim. App. 2014).  We granted Kelley's petition solely to
determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked
jurisdiction 
to 
review 
Kelley's 
sexual-torture 
conviction. 
 
We
reverse in part and remand.  
Facts and Procedural History
The factual basis for Kelley's convictions is set out in
detail in the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision.  The
following procedural history is pertinent to our review.
On September 2, 2010, a jury convicted Kelley of murder
made capital because it was committed during the course of a
first-degree 
kidnapping, 
see 
§ 
13A-5-40(a)(1), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975;
murder made capital because it was committed during the course
2
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of sexual abuse, see § 13A-5-40(a)(8), Ala. Code 1975; and
sexual torture, see § 13A-6-65.1, Ala. Code 1975.  Following
the penalty phase of Kelley's trial, the jury recommended that
Kelley be sentenced to death. 
On November 18, 2010, the trial court conducted a
sentencing hearing.  After receiving evidence and considering
arguments from both sides, the trial court stated on the
record that it found Kelley guilty of both counts of capital
murder and sentenced Kelley to death. It is undisputed,
however, that the trial court did not state on the record that
it found Kelley guilty of sexual torture and did not state on
the record a sentence for Kelley's sexual-torture conviction. 
Nonetheless, that same day, November 18, 2010, the trial court
entered a written order sentencing Kelley to death for the
capital-murder convictions and purporting to sentence Kelley
to life imprisonment for his sexual-torture conviction.
On February 2, 2011, Kelley filed a notice of appeal to
the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The notice-of-appeal form asks
Kelley, in part, to "LIST EACH CONVICTION BELOW."  In
response, Kelley listed "CAPITAL MURDER (2 Counts)."  Kelley
3
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did not list the sexual-torture conviction, and no reference
to that conviction appears on his notice of appeal.
In Kelley's brief before the Court of Criminal Appeals,
Kelley did not allege any error regarding his sexual-torture
conviction. Similarly, in its brief before the Court of
Criminal Appeals, the State did not request that the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirm Kelley's sexual-torture conviction.
Nonetheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of
Kelley's capital-murder convictions and his conviction for
sexual torture. 
Kelley filed an application for rehearing in the Court of
Criminal Appeals, alleging, among other things, that the 
Court
of Criminal Appeals did not have jurisdiction to affirm his
conviction for sexual torture.  Kelley argued that a sentence
was never pronounced for his sexual-torture conviction and
that, therefore, "jurisdiction over the sexual torture
conviction remain[ed] in the circuit court."  Kelley also
argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals' lack of
jurisdiction over Kelley's sexual-torture conviction was the
reason he did not appeal that conviction.
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On September 5, 2014, the Court of Criminal Appeals
denied Kelley's application for rehearing, withdrew its March
14, 2014, opinion, and substituted a new opinion.  In its new
opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed Kelley's
allegation that he had never been sentenced for his sexual-
torture conviction in a footnote, as follows: "On rehearing,
Kelley argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review his
conviction for sexual torture because he was never sentenced
in relation to that conviction. Kelley's argument is refuted
by the record. (C. 322-24.)"  ___ So. 3d at ___ n.1.  The
citation to the record provided by the Court of Criminal
Appeals in that footnote refers to the trial court's written
order purporting to sentence Kelley to life imprisonment for
his sexual-torture conviction.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
did not provide any other analysis of Kelley's argument that
the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review
Kelley's conviction for sexual torture. 
Kelley then filed with this Court a petition for a writ
of certiorari.  In the first ground asserted in his petition
as a basis for issuing the writ, Kelley alleged that the Court
of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to affirm his sexual-
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torture conviction and thus that its decision conflicted with
prior decisions of this Court and of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.  We granted Kelley's petition for certiorari review
solely to address that first ground. 
Standard of Review
A claim that a court lacks jurisdiction presents a
question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. See
Sheffield v. State, [Ms. 1121172, May 30, 2014] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. 2014)(applying a de novo standard of review
when determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had
jurisdiction to consider an appeal), and Ex parte Walker, 152
So. 3d 1247 (Ala. 2014); see also Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d
539, 541 (Ala. 2004) ("'This Court reviews pure questions of
law in criminal cases de novo.'"(quoting Ex parte Key, 890 So.
2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003))).  
Discussion
Kelley alleges that the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked
jurisdiction to affirm his sexual-torture conviction because,
he argues, his sexual-torture conviction was not ripe for
appeal.  We agree.
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In Alabama, the right to appeal a conviction is
specifically provided for in § 12-22-130, Ala. Code 1975:
"A person convicted of a criminal offense in the
circuit court or other court from which an appeal
lies directly to the Supreme Court or Court of
Criminal Appeals may appeal from the judgment of
conviction to the appropriate appellate court."
Under § 12-22-130, appeals lie only from a "judgment of
conviction."  Ex parte Eason, 929 So. 2d 992, 993 (Ala. 2005);
Thornton v. State, 390 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (Ala. Crim. App.
1980).  A judgment of conviction consists of the pronouncement
of both a determination of a defendant's guilt and a sentence.
Ex parte Walker, 152 So. 3d at 1252.  Absent a judgment of
conviction, a conviction is not ripe for appeal.  Id. 
Kelley alleges that no judgment of conviction was entered
on the sexual-torture conviction because, he argues, 
the 
trial
court did not pronounce a sentence on that conviction.  After
reviewing the transcript from Kelley's sentencing hearing, we
agree. 
 
"'"Pronounce" 
is 
"to 
utter 
officially 
or
ceremoniously." Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
G. & C. Merriam Co. 1971. "Utter" is defined as "to send forth
as a sound: give out in an audible voice." Id.'"  King v.
State, 862 So. 2d 677, 678 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting
7
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Hill v. State, 733 So. 2d 937, 939 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)). It
is undisputed that, during Kelley's sentencing hearing, the
trial 
court 
did 
not 
mention 
Kelley's 
sexual-torture
conviction; the trial court did not pronounce a determination
of guilt as to that conviction or a sentence.  Thus, a
judgment of conviction was not entered as to that offense. 
See Ex parte Walker, supra (defining a judgment of conviction
as the pronouncement of both a determination of a defendant's
guilt and a sentence).  Because a judgment of conviction was
not entered for that offense, Kelley's sexual-torture
conviction was not ripe for appeal.  See Id.
The State argues that the trial court's failure to
pronounce 
a 
sentence 
on 
Kelley's 
sexual-torture 
conviction 
did
not deprive the Court of Criminal Appeals of jurisdiction to
consider an appeal of that conviction.  Specifically, the
State argues 1) that Kelley failed to preserve the issue
whether the trial court had pronounced a sentence on his
sexual-torture conviction; 2) that the trial court's failure
to pronounce a sentence on Kelley's sexual-torture conviction
did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal
Appeals as this Court defined jurisdiction in Ex parte
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Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 2006); and 3) that the trial
court's failure to pronounce a sentence on Kelley's sexual-
torture conviction was merely a procedural defect.  State's
brief, at pp. 8, 12, 15.  We address each argument in turn. 
We first address the State's allegation that Kelley
failed to preserve the issue whether the trial court
pronounced a sentence on his sexual-torture conviction.  As
explained above, the pronouncement of a sentence for a
conviction affects the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal
Appeals because, without such a pronouncement, a judgment of
conviction has not been entered.  "[J]urisdictional matters
are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time
and do so even ex mero motu.  Horn v. Dunn Brothers, Inc., 262
Ala. 404, 79 So. 2d 11 (1955)."  Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d
711, 712 (Ala. 1987).  Thus, even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Kelley failed to preserve the issue whether the
trial court pronounced a sentence on his sexual-torture
conviction, that issue is properly before this Court. 
Next, the State alleges that the trial court's failure to
pronounce sentence does not "affect the [Court of Criminal
Appeals'] power and authority to hear Kelley's appeal." 
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1131451
State's brief, at p. 15.  In support of this argument, the
State cites this Court's decision in Ex parte Seymour, supra,
in which we defined jurisdiction as follows: 
"Jurisdiction is '[a] court's power to decide a
case or issue a decree.' Black's Law Dictionary 867
(8th ed. 2004). Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns
a court's power to decide certain types of cases.
Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 303, 57 So. 754, 755
(1911) ('"By jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
meant the nature of the cause of action and of the
relief sought."' (quoting Cooper v. Reynolds, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 316, 19 L. Ed. 931 (1870))).
That power is derived from the Alabama Constitution
and the Alabama Code. See United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 630–31, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d
860 (2002)(subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a
court's 'statutory or constitutional power' to
adjudicate a case)."
946 So. 2d at 538.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has subject-matter
jurisdiction to review a conviction for sexual torture.
Section 12-3-9, Ala. Code 1975, provides that the Court of
Criminal Appeals "shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of ... all felonies," and § 13A-6-65.1, Ala. Code 1975,
provides that "the crime of sexual torture is a Class A
felony."  Yet, unless otherwise provided by law, the Court of
Criminal Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review a
conviction simply because that conviction falls within its
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subject-matter jurisdiction; instead, the jurisdiction of the
Court of Criminal Appeals must be invoked.  Ex parte Watkins,
268 Ala. 567, 570, 109 So. 2d 671, 673 (1959) ("A court's
jurisdiction and power until invoked lie dormant, and if the
court proceeds in a manner in which its jurisdiction has not
been invoked ... the proceedings are without jurisdiction."). 
In the present case, Kelley could not invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals to review his
sexual-torture 
conviction 
because 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
was
not entered for that offense.  Moreover, as the State
correctly points out, Kelley did not include his sexual-
torture conviction in his notice of appeal as a conviction as
to which he was seeking appellate review.  State's brief, at
p. 6.  Thus, not only could Kelley not have appealed his
sexual-torture conviction, but he also did not attempt to do
so. Consequently, although the Court of Criminal Appeals has
subject-matter jurisdiction to review a conviction for sexual
torture, it did not have jurisdiction in the present case to
review Kelley's sexual-torture conviction.
Next, the State alleges that the Court of Criminal
Appeals had jurisdiction to review Kelley's sexual-torture
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conviction because, the State argues, the trial court's
failure to pronounce sentence on that conviction was merely a
procedural defect.  State's brief, at p. 12.  In support of
this argument, the State cites our decision in Ex parte Eason,
supra, and the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Hill v.
State, 733 So. 2d 937 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).  The State's
argument is unpersuasive.
First, Ex parte Eason is distinguishable from the present
case.  In Ex parte Eason, the trial court had sentenced the
defendant to five years' imprisonment following a 
guilty 
plea,
but it did not formally pronounce the defendant's guilt or
enter a judgment of guilt.  929 So. 2d at 992.  This Court
held that the trial court's entry of a sentence "adequately
established that the trial court adjudicated [the defendant]
guilty and that the conviction and sentence were ripe for
appeal."  929 So. 2d at 996.  In so doing, this Court
recognized the proposition that "a judgment by the [trial]
court imposing sentence in accordance with a guilty verdict or
a guilty plea sufficiently implies the judgment of guilt and
serves as a judgment of conviction that will support an
appeal."  929 So. 2d at 995.  
12
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Thus, in Ex parte Eason, this Court held that a judgment
of conviction is entered when the trial court enters a
sentence that is consistent with a determination of guilt,
even though that determination of guilt is not explicitly set
out in the record.  In the present case, however, the trial
court failed to pronounce a sentence on Kelley's sexual-
torture conviction.  Furthermore, unlike the defendant in Ex
parte Eason, Kelley did not admit guilt through a guilty plea. 
Therefore, Ex parte Eason does not stand for the proposition
that a judgment of conviction is entered absent a trial
court's pronouncement of sentence. 
Additionally, in further distinguishing Ex parte Eason,
we recognize that the trial court in the present case entered
a written order purporting to sentence Kelley to life
imprisonment for his sexual-torture conviction.  However,
"'[s]entence' means the pronouncement by the court of the
penalty imposed upon the defendant after a judgment of
guilty."  Rule 26.1, Ala. R. Crim. P.  Thus, according to the
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure and the definition of the
word "pronounce" set forth above, the trial court's written
order was not the entry of a "sentence" sufficient to support
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a holding that a judgment of conviction was entered on
Kelley's sexual-torture conviction.  
Furthermore, the State's reliance on Hill, in light of
this Court's decision in Ex parte Walker, is misplaced.  In
Hill, the trial court pronounced sentence in open court on two
of the defendant's felony convictions but did not pronounce a
sentence on the defendant's misdemeanor conviction.  733 So.
2d 938.  Nonetheless, the trial court recorded a sentence for
the misdemeanor on its case-action-summary sheet.  On appeal,
the defendant alleged, and the State agreed, that the trial
court had violated Rule 26.9(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.,  by not
1
Rule 26.9(b) provides: 
1
"(b) Pronouncement of Sentence. In pronouncing
sentence, the court shall:
"(1) Afford 
the 
defendant 
an 
opportunity 
to 
make
a statement in his or her own behalf before imposing
sentence.
"(2) State that a credit will be allowed on the
sentence, as provided by law, for time during which
the defendant has been incarcerated on the present
charge.
"(3) Explain to the defendant the terms of the
sentence.
"(4) Inform the defendant as to the defendant's
right to appeal; provided, however, in cases in
which the defendant has entered a plea of guilty,
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pronouncing the defendant's sentence for the misdemeanor
conviction.  The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial
court had violated the defendant's constitutional right to be
present at the pronouncement of sentence and remanded the case
for the trial court to pronounce sentence upon the defendant
pursuant to Rule 26.9, Ala. R. Crim. P.  733 So. 2d at 939.
The State correctly points out that, in Hill, the Court
of Criminal Appeals did not hold that the trial court's
failure to pronounce sentence deprived the Court of Criminal
Appeals of jurisdiction.  However, in Hill, the parties did
not argue that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not have
jurisdiction to hear the defendant's appeal, and the Court of
the court shall advise the defendant of his or her
right to appeal only in those cases in which the
defendant (i) has entered a plea of guilty, but
before entering the plea of guilty has expressly
reserved his or her right to appeal with respect to
a particular issue or issues, or (ii) has timely
filed a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and
the motion has been denied, either by order of the
court or by operation of law. When informing the
defendant of his or her right to appeal, the court
shall also advise the defendant that if he or she is
indigent, counsel will be appointed to represent him
or her on appeal if the defendant so desires, and
that a copy of the record and the reporter's
transcript will be provided at no cost to the
defendant for purposes of appeal, if the appeal is
from a judgment and sentence of the circuit court."
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Criminal Appeals did not raise and address that issue ex mero
motu.  Moreover, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Hill
before this Court explicitly set out the requirements for a
judgment of conviction in Ex parte Walker.  Accordingly, the
State's reliance on Hill to demonstrate that the trial court's
failure to pronounce both a determination of guilt and a
sentence on Kelley's sexual-torture conviction was merely a
procedural defect is misplaced. 
The State makes a number of additional arguments in
response to Kelley's petition that are unrelated to the issue
whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to
review Kelley's sexual-torture conviction.  Specifically, the
State argues that Kelley invited any error the Court of
Criminal Appeals committed by failing to include his sexual-
torture conviction in his notice of appeal; that the plain-
error standard of review under Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.,2
Rule 45A provides: 
2
"In all cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall
notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings
under review, whether or not brought to the
attention of the trial court, and take appropriate
appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such
error has or probably has adversely affected the
substantial right of the appellant."
16
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does not apply to Kelley's sexual-torture conviction; and
that, even if the plain-error standard of review applied to
Kelley's 
sexual-torture 
conviction, 
Kelley 
did 
not 
satisfy 
the
requirements under that standard.  However, having concluded
that the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
review Kelley's sexual-torture conviction, we pretermit
discussion of the State's arguments. "'"[I]f a court ha[s] no
jurisdiction, its action is void."'  Moore v. State, 596 So.
2d 53, 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), quoting State v. Johns, 142
Ala. 61, 38 So. 755, 755 (1905), quoting in turn Church,
Church On Habeas Corpus, § 245, n. 1."  L.R.G. v. State, 996
So. 2d 208, 210 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008). 
Finally, Kelley alleges that, because the Court of
Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review his sexual-
torture conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion
purporting to affirm that conviction is merely advisory and
was ineffective to affirm his capital-murder convictions. 
Specifically, Kelley argues that the nonfinality of his
sexual-torture conviction and the Court of Criminal Appeals'
lack of jurisdiction to review that conviction rendered his
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entire case, including his two convictions for 
capital 
murder,
not "ripe for appeal."  Kelley's argument is unpersuasive. 
In support of his argument that the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision is merely advisory, Kelley relies 
on 
Eubanks
v. McCollum, 828 So. 2d 935 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002),  Taylor v.
Taylor, 398 So. 2d 267 (Ala. 1981), and In re United States of
America, 898 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1990).  Kelley cites Eubanks
and Taylor for the proposition, set out in Taylor, that "an
appeal will lie only from a final judgment which determines
the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the
rights of the parties involved."  Taylor, 398 So. 2d at 269. 
Kelley then quotes from In re United States, as follows:
"A final, appealable order is one that has 'a
final and irreparable effect on the rights of the
parties.' Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 545, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L. Ed. 1528
(1949). In the context of sentencing orders, our
predecessor circuit has held that, when a defendant
is sentenced on fewer than all of the counts on
which the defendant is convicted, the order is not
final for purposes of appeal. See United States v.
Wilson, 440 F. 2d 1103, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1971).3
Only when the defendant is sentenced on all counts
on which he is convicted (or when the convictions on
the other counts are otherwise disposed of) does the
order become final and appealable. See id. at 1105.4
"____________________
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" In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
3
1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this court adopted
as binding precedent all decisions of the former
Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
" If we were writing on a clean slate, we might
4
come to a different conclusion. An appealable order
is one that finally and irreparably affects the
rights of parties, and, in our view, each count on
which a defendant is convicted should constitute a
separate case, which is brought to a conclusion by
sentencing. We are not at liberty, however, to so
hold."
898 F.2d at 1487.
Eubanks is a decision from the Court of Civil Appeals
arising from a tort action, 828 So. 2d at 936, and Taylor is
a decision by this Court affirming a trial court's judgment
confirming the sale of land.  398 So. 2d at 270.  Thus,
Eubanks and Taylor address the appealability of a final
judgment in civil law.  Neither case demonstrates that the
Court of Criminal Appeals' lack of jurisdiction over a
particular conviction deprives it of the power to adjudicate
other convictions that are properly before it.3
We note that, under Alabama law, Kelley's capital-murder
3
convictions were properly before the Court of Criminal
Appeals.  The trial court pronounced a determination of guilt
and 
a 
sentence 
for 
each 
of 
Kelley's 
capital-murder
convictions; therefore, a judgment of conviction issued for
each 
of 
those 
convictions. 
Kelley 
then 
invoked 
the
jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals by timely filing
a notice of appeal that indicated that he was appealing his
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Additionally, In re United States is a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
"[T]his Court is not bound by decisions of the United States
Courts of Appeals ...."  Ex parte Johnson, 993 So. 2d 875, 886
(Ala. 2008).  Therefore, this Court is not required to follow
the rule from In re United States set out above.  Moreover,
the Eleventh Circuit indicated that its decision was pursuant
to its own precedent and that "if [it] were writing on a clean
slate, [it] might come to a different conclusion."  898 F.2d
at 1487.  We have found no Alabama precedent requiring us to
come to the same conclusion as the Eleventh Circuit.
Accordingly, we see no reason to adopt the above-quoted rule
from that court. 
Consequently, Kelley's argument that the Court of
Criminal 
Appeals' 
decision 
is 
merely 
advisory 
is 
unpersuasive. 
Conclusion
capital-murder convictions.  Moreover, even if Kelley did not
file a notice of appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals
automatically reviews a judgment of conviction in which the
sentence of death has been imposed. § 13A-5-55, Ala. Code 1975
("In all cases in which a defendant is sentenced to death, the
judgment of conviction shall be subject to automatic
review.");  Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 664 (Ala. 1980)
("In Alabama, a sentence of death is automatically reviewed by
the Court of Criminal Appeals ....").
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The Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
review 
Kelley's 
sexual-torture 
conviction. 
 
However, 
 
Kelley's
argument that that lack of jurisdiction rendered the entirety
of the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion merely advisory is
unpersuasive.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal
Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirms Kelley's sexual-
torture conviction, and we remand the case for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Main, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., dissents in part and concurs in the result
in part.
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting in part and concurring in the
result in part).
For a number of reasons, including the avoidance of more
than one appeal arising from the same criminal case and the
judicial inefficiencies resulting from such a scenario, as
well as the uncertainties created for defendants as to when
appeals must be filed, I believe that the rule recognized in
United States v. Wilson, 440 F.2d 1103, 1104–05 (5th Cir.
1971), and subsequently accepted in In re United States of
America, 898 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1990), is sound.  I
therefore respectfully dissent insofar as the main opinion
holds that Michael Brandon Kelley's convictions for capital
murder were properly before the Court of Criminal Appeals,
notwithstanding the lack of an entry of a final judgment by
the trial court as to the companion charge of sexual torture. 
I concur in the result achieved by the main opinion with
respect to the reversal of the Court of Criminal Appeals'
judgment as it relates to Kelley's sexual-torture conviction.
I write separately as to that conviction to note that I am not
persuaded 
that 
the 
present 
case, 
although 
distinguishable 
from
22
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Ex parte Eason, 929 So. 2d 992 (Ala. 2005), on other grounds,
may be properly distinguished from Eason on the ground that
Eason involved a guilty plea, whereas the present case
involves a guilty verdict.  Eason itself suggests the lack of
such distinction.  See  Ex parte Eason, 929 So. 2d at 995
("[A] judgment by the court imposing sentence in accordance
with a guilty verdict or a guilty plea sufficiently implies
the judgment of guilt and serves as a judgment of conviction
that will support an appeal." (emphasis added)).
23