Title: State ex rel. Ragozine v. Shaker

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Ragozine v. Shaker, 96 Ohio St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. RAGOZINE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SHAKER, JUDGE, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ragozine v. Shaker, 96 Ohio St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent common pleas court judge from 
proceeding to trial in a removal and forfeiture of office case involving 
members of the Girard City School District Board of Education — Court 
of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed. 
(No. 2002-0016 — Submitted June 4, 2002 — Decided August 21, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 2001-T-0122, 2001-
Ohio-7062. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In early 1999, the Board of Education of the Girard, Ohio, City 
School District approved the construction of the Girard Intermediate School to 
replace an old school.  Construction of the new school was completed in 2000, 
and it opened for the 2000-2001 school year.  Students attending the new school 
subsequently experienced physical ailments, and environmental testing uncovered 
problems with the school’s ventilation system.  On May 1, 2001, the board of 
education closed the school. 
{¶2} 
On September 19, 2001, 1,612 petitioners filed a complaint in the 
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas requesting, under R.C. 3.07 et seq., the 
removal and forfeiture of office of appellants, the members of the board of 
education.  On September 21, 2001, the board members’ attorneys filed an entry 
of appearance on behalf of the board members in the removal proceeding.  On the 
same date, the board members filed a motion to deny the pro hac vice admission 
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of the petitioners’ counsel and a motion to transfer the case to a different common 
pleas court judge. 
{¶3} 
On October 16, 2001, this court, upon application of the common 
pleas court, appointed appellee, Judge Mitchell F. Shaker, to preside as a visiting 
judge over the removal case.  On October 18, the board members moved to 
dismiss the removal action, alleging that the court was divested of jurisdiction 
pursuant to R.C. 3.08 because the board members had not been served with a 
copy of the complaint at least ten days before a hearing on the merits.  Moreover, 
the board members argued that in contravention of the time limits in R.C. 3.08, a 
merits hearing could not be conducted within 30 days of the filing of the 
complaint, i.e., October 19, 2001.  On October 19, Judge Shaker held a hearing on 
the board members’ dismissal motion and their motion to deny the application of 
petitioners’ attorney for admission pro hac vice. 
{¶4} 
On October 23, 2001, Judge Shaker denied the motions.  Judge 
Shaker reasoned that given his late appointment to preside over the removal case, 
it would have been impossible to comply with the 30-day provision of R.C. 3.08, 
and that any failure to serve the board members with a copy of the complaint did 
not prejudice them because they had notice of the complaint within two days of its 
filing.  Judge Shaker scheduled a trial on the removal case for November 5, 2001, 
and ordered service of the notice of trial as well as service of the complaint upon 
the board members. 
{¶5} 
On October 30, 2001, the board members filed a complaint in the 
Court of Appeals for Trumbull County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 
Shaker from proceeding to trial in the removal case.  On October 31, the court of 
appeals issued an alternative writ staying further proceedings in the removal case 
and ordering Judge Shaker to file an answer or a motion to dismiss.  Judge Shaker 
filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint in prohibition for failure 
January Term, 2002 
3 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  On January 2, 2002, the court 
of appeals granted Judge Shaker’s motion and dismissed the cause. 
{¶6} 
This cause is now before the court upon the board members’ 
appeal as of right.  The petitioners seeking removal of the board members filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of Judge Shaker. 
{¶7} 
The board members assert that the court of appeals erred in 
dismissing their prohibition action.  The court’s dismissal of the prohibition 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was 
appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint were presumed true 
and all reasonable inferences were made in the board members’ favor, it appeared 
beyond doubt that the board members could prove no set of facts warranting the 
requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. 
v. Skok (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 646, 710 N.E.2d 710.  In the absence of a 
patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that 
jurisdiction is not entitled to a writ of prohibition because of the availability of an 
adequate remedy at law by appeal.  State ex rel. Key v. Spicer (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 469, 746 N.E.2d 1119. 
{¶8} 
Based on these standards and for the following reasons, the court 
of appeals properly dismissed the board members’ prohibition action. 
The R.C. 3.08 30-Day Provision 
{¶9} 
Under R.C. 3.07, public officers who willfully and flagrantly 
exercise authority or power not authorized by law, refuse or willfully neglect to 
enforce the law or to perform any official duty imposed upon them by law, or are 
guilty of gross neglect of duty, gross immorality, drunkenness, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance are guilty of misconduct in office and may be 
removed from office by a judgment of forfeiture of office. 
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{¶10} R.C. 3.08 specifies that proceedings for removal of public officers 
for any of the grounds enumerated in R.C. 3.07 are commenced by the filing of a 
complaint and further provides the following service and hearing requirements: 
{¶11} “The judge or clerk of the court shall cause a copy of such 
complaint to be served upon the officer, against whom the complaint has been 
filed, at least ten days before the hearing upon such complaint.  Such hearing shall 
be had within thirty days from the date of the filing of the complaint by said 
electors, or by the governor.” 
{¶12} The board members initially contend that Judge Shaker patently 
and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed on the 
petitioners’ complaint for removal because he failed to hold a merits hearing on 
the complaint within 30 days after it was filed, i.e., by October 19, 2001.  The 
board’s contention lacks merit. 
{¶13} “As a general rule, a statute providing a time for the performance 
of an official duty will be construed as directory so far as time for performance is 
concerned, especially where the statute fixes the time simply for convenience or 
orderly procedure.”  State ex rel. Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467, 32 
O.O. 542, 66 N.E.2d 531, paragraph three of the syllabus.  As in other cases in 
which the court has held that statutory time provisions are not jurisdictional, R.C. 
3.08 “ ‘does not include any expression of intent to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
court for untimeliness.’ ”  See State v. Bellman (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 210, 
714 N.E.2d 381 (sexual-predator-hearing time requirement), quoting In re Davis 
(1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 522, 705 N.E.2d 1219 (time requirement for juvenile 
court disposition order); cf. R.C. 2941.401, which was cited in Bellman and  
provides that if a trial on an untried indictment, information, or criminal 
complaint is not brought within the required time, “no court any longer has 
jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or complaint is void, and the 
court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.” 
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{¶14} Moreover, unlike the cases cited by the board members, this case 
does not involve statutory requirements that manifestly strike “to the core of 
procedural efficiency” and are “essential to the proceeding.”  See, e.g., Nibert v. 
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 100, 103, 702 N.E.2d 70 
(filing of notice of appeal); see, also, In re Removal of Osuna (1996), 116 Ohio 
App.3d 339, 341, 688 N.E.2d 42 (leave to appeal). 
{¶15} Furthermore, to support their position that the time requirement in 
the statute is jurisdictional, the board members erroneously rely on authorities 
holding that statutes authorizing the removal of an incumbent from public office 
are quasi-penal in character and should be strictly construed.  See State ex rel. 
Stokes v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 120, 51 O.O.2d 
180, 258 N.E.2d 594, paragraph one of the syllabus; Pengov v. White (2001), 146 
Ohio App.3d 402, 405, 766 N.E.2d 228.  A statutory provision may warrant strict 
construction even if it is not jurisdictional.  See, e.g., Planck v. Auglaize Soil & 
Water Conservation Dist. (Sept. 2, 1999), Auglaize App. No. 2-99-11, 1999 WL 
693159 (“While not jurisdictional, the procedural statutes [relating to an 
administrative appeal] as applied to the facts of this case should be strictly 
construed * * *”); Ramsey v. A.I.U. Ins. Co. (June 18, 1985), Franklin App. No. 
84AP-317, 1985 WL 10329 (“Although the procedural requirements of Section 
1446, Title 28, U.S.Code, are not jurisdictional they are mandatory and are to be 
strictly construed against the right of removal”); Parente v. Day (1968), 16 Ohio 
App.2d 35, 40, 45 O.O.2d 104, 241 N.E.2d 280 (statutes relating to special or 
local assessments are strictly construed but do not necessarily constitute 
jurisdictional requirements). 
{¶16} Finally, it is significant that the preeminent cases cited by the 
board members in support of their claim that the failure to conduct a trial on the 
removal action within 30 days after it was filed is jurisdictional, e.g., In re 
Removal of Tunstall (C.P.1939), 28 Ohio Law Abs. 635, 14 O.O. 309, Nibert, and 
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Osuna, were resolved in the ordinary course of law rather than by extraordinary 
writ. 
{¶17} Therefore, Judge Shaker did not patently and unambiguously lack 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the removal proceeding even though a trial was 
not conducted within 30 days of the filing of the removal complaint. 
R.C. 3.08 10-Day Service Provision 
{¶18} The board members next assert that they are entitled to a writ of 
prohibition because they were not served with a copy of the removal complaint at 
least 10 days before the hearing on the complaint. 
{¶19} Judge Shaker, however, ordered service of copies of the complaint 
on the board members on October 23, which was more than 10 days before the 
November 5, 2001 hearing that he scheduled. 
{¶20} In addition, the board members waived service of process by 
voluntarily submitting themselves to the common pleas court’s jurisdiction by 
filing an entry of appearance and two motions just two days after the removal 
action was filed.  See Maryhew v. Yova (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156-157, 11 
OBR 471, 464 N.E.2d 538 (“In order for a judgment to be rendered against a 
defendant when he is not served with process, there must be a showing upon the 
record that the defendant has voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s 
jurisdiction or committed other acts which constitute a waiver of the jurisdictional 
defense”); see, also, Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 366-367, 721 N.E.2d 40. 
{¶21} Further, there is no evidence of a complete failure to comply with 
constitutional due process here.  “If contested allegations of defective service of 
process are not premised upon a complete failure to comply with the minimum-
contacts requirement of constitutional due process, prohibition does not lie.”  
Suburban Constr. Co., 85 Ohio St.3d at 646, 710 N.E.2d 710. 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶22} Consequently, the board members’ defective-service claim also 
does not entitle them to a writ of prohibition. 
Conclusion 
{¶23} Based on the foregoing, Judge Shaker did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the removal case, and the board members 
have an adequate remedy by appeal from any adverse judgment in that case.  The 
board members thus failed to state a viable claim for extraordinary relief in 
prohibition.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Armstrong, Mitchell, Damiani & Zaccagnini, Louis C. Damiani and Bruce 
A. Zaccagnini, for appellants. 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, James T. Saker 
and LuWayne Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Sebastian Rucci, pro hac vice, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 1,612 
petitioners who signed the complaint for the removal of appellants from office. 
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