Title: Kelm v. Kelm

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Kelm v. Kelm, 92 Ohio St.3d 223, 2001-Ohio-168.] 
 
 
 
KELM, APPELLANT, v. KELM, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Kelm v. Kelm (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 223.] 
Domestic relations — Arbitration — Child custody and parental visitation are 
not subject to arbitration in a domestic relations case. 
(No. 00-1168 — Submitted March 27, 2001 — Decided July 5, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-747. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In a domestic relations case, matters of child custody and parental visitation are 
not subject to arbitration. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  On October 1, 1993, the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, granted appellant, 
Russell A. Kelm, and appellee, Amy K. Kelm, a judgment of divorce. The 
judgment incorporated the parties’ shared parenting plan, which provided, inter 
alia, that any future disputes between the parties regarding child custody or 
visitation would be submitted to arbitration. 
 
On May 10, 1999, appellee filed in the domestic relations court a motion 
to modify or terminate the shared parenting plan. Appellant responded by filing a 
motion to stay proceedings on appellee’s motion and to compel arbitration 
pursuant to the shared parenting plan. On June 25, 1999, the trial court issued a 
judgment entry overruling appellant’s motion. The trial court concluded that, 
under Ohio law, matters relating to child custody are not subject to arbitration. 
 
Appellant appealed the trial court’s decision to the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to enforce the arbitration 
agreement. The court of appeals rejected this assignment of error and affirmed the 
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judgment of the trial court, holding that the use of arbitration to resolve child 
custody or visitation disputes conflicts with the duty of the domestic relations 
courts to protect the best interests of children. The court of appeals further held 
that appellee has not, by virtue of her being a party to the shared parenting plan, 
waived her right to challenge the arbitration clause. The court of appeals also 
concluded that appellee’s challenge is not barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
We are asked to decide whether, in a domestic relations case, matters 
relating to child custody and visitation may be resolved through arbitration. For 
the reasons that follow, we hold that these matters cannot be resolved through 
arbitration. Only the courts are empowered to resolve disputes relating to child 
custody and visitation. 
 
The parties’ divorce has a long and convoluted history. It has already 
produced one decision from this court, Kelm v. Kelm (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 26, 
623 N.E.2d 39 (“Kelm I”). In Kelm I, we were asked to decide whether an 
arbitration clause in the parties’ antenuptial agreement was enforceable as to 
matters relating to spousal and child support. We held that these support matters 
could be made subject to an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus. In so holding, we recognized that, under the doctrine of parens patriae,1 
courts are entrusted to protect the best interests of children. Id. at 30, 623 N.E.2d 
at 42. We concluded, however, that permitting parents to arbitrate child support 
does not interfere with the judicial protection of the best interests of children. In 
short, we saw “no valid reason why the arbitration process should not be available 
                                                          
 
1. 
Parens patriae means, literally, “parent of his or her country,” and refers to the role of 
the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. Black’s Law Dictionary (7 
Ed.1999) 1137. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
in the area of child support; the advantages of arbitration in domestic disputes 
outweigh any disadvantages.” Id. Appellant urges us to extend our holding in 
Kelm I to allow matters of child custody and visitation to be resolved through 
arbitration. We decline to do so. 
 
While we recognize the important impact that monetary support can have 
upon a child’s life, we believe that custody and visitation have a much greater 
impact upon the child in terms of both the child’s daily life and his or her long-
term development. Custody and visitation have the potential to affect countless 
aspects of a child’s life, including the child’s relationships with his or her parents, 
the child’s relationships with extended family, the child’s social and cultural 
upbringing, and even, in some unfortunate cases, the child’s physical and 
emotional security. More than support determinations, “ ‘determinations of 
custody go to the very core of the child’s welfare and best interests.’ ” Pulfer v. 
Pulfer (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 90, 94, 673 N.E.2d 656, 658, quoting Masters v. 
Masters (1986), 201 Conn. 50, 67, 513 A.2d 104, 113. “[T]he process of 
arbitration, useful when the mundane matter of the amount of support is in issue, 
is less so when the delicate balancing of the factors composing the best interests 
of a child is at issue.” Nestel v. Nestel (1972), 38 A.D.2d 942, 943, 331 N.Y.S.2d 
241, 243. For this reason, we are less inclined than we were in Kelm I to permit 
arbitration to encroach upon the trial court’s traditional role as parens patriae. 
 
As appellant points out, there are decisions from a number of jurisdictions 
upholding the use of arbitration to settle disputes over child custody and 
visitation. See, e.g., Dick v. Dick (1995), 210 Mich.App. 576, 534 N.W.2d 185; 
Kovacs v. Kovacs (1993), 98 Md.App. 289, 633 A.2d 425; Miller v. Miller (1993), 
423 Pa.Super. 162, 620 A.2d 1161; Crutchley v. Crutchley (1982), 306 N.C. 518, 
293 S.E.2d 793. Typically, these decisions protect the courts’ role as parens 
patriae by making the arbitrator’s decision subject to de novo review and 
modification by the courts. See id. at 524, 293 S.E.2d at 797; Kovacs, 98 Md.App. 
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at 299-302, 633 A.2d at 431-432; Miller, 423 Pa.Super. at 169-170, 620 A.2d at 
1165; but, see, Dick, 210 Mich.App. at 588-589, 534 N.W.2d at 191 (permitting 
only limited review by the courts). While this approach preserves the court’s role 
as parens patriae, we believe that, ultimately, it advances neither the children’s 
best interests nor the basic goals underlying arbitration. 
 
A two-stage procedure consisting of an arbitrator’s decision followed by 
de novo judicial review “is certain to be wasteful of time and expense and result 
in a duplication of effort.” Nestel, 38 A.D.2d at 943, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 243. 
Clearly, it does not seem advantageous to the best interests of children that 
questions of custody be postponed “ ‘while a rehearsal of the decisive inquiry is 
held.’ ” Glauber v. Glauber (1993), 192 A.D.2d 94, 98, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743, 
quoting Agur v. Agur (1969), 32 A.D.2d 16, 21, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 778. 
 
The protracted two-stage process adopted by some courts also frustrates 
the very goals underlying arbitration. “ ‘Arbitration is favored because it provides 
the parties thereto with a relatively expeditious and economical means of 
resolving a dispute * * * [and] “ * * * has the additional advantage of 
unburdening crowded court dockets.” ’ ” Kelm I, 68 Ohio St.3d at 29, 623 N.E.2d 
at 41, quoting Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 712, 590 
N.E.2d 1242, 1245. A two-stage process consisting of both arbitration and judicial 
review achieves none of these goals. 
 
Furthermore, “[i]f an issue is to be arbitrated, the expectation [of the 
parties] is that an award will not be disturbed.” Glauber, 192 A.D.2d at 98, 600 
N.Y.S.2d at 743. De novo review destroys this expectation. Thus, there is an 
inevitable tension between the court’s traditional responsibility to protect the best 
interests of children and the parties’ expectation that an arbitration award will be 
final. 
 
Appellant argues that because the shared parenting plan contained an 
agreement to arbitrate any future custody and visitation disputes, and because this 
January Term, 2001 
5 
agreement was, by consent of both parties, incorporated into the trial court’s 
judgment of divorce, appellee could not subsequently challenge the arbitration 
agreement. Essentially, appellant argues that by agreeing to arbitrate custody and 
visitation matters, appellee has waived her right to challenge the agreement. We 
disagree. 
 
The law permits parties to voluntarily waive a number of important legal 
rights, Sanitary Commercial Services, Inc. v. Shank (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 178, 
180-181, 566 N.E.2d 1215, 1218, and in the interest of finality, courts are usually 
quite reluctant to relieve parties of the consequences of these choices. See, e.g., 
Knapp v. Knapp (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 24 OBR 362, 493 N.E.2d 1353 
(holding that a couple who had obtained a dissolution of their marriage waived 
their right to challenge the alimony provisions in their separation agreement, 
which had been incorporated into the trial court’s dissolution decree). However, a 
waiver of rights will be recognized only when the waiver does not violate public 
policy. Shank, 57 Ohio St.3d at 180, 566 N.E.2d at 1218. A fundamental flaw in 
appellant’s argument is its assumption that arbitration of custody and visitation 
matters does not violate public policy. We have already concluded, for the reasons 
set forth above, that it does. 
 
To hold that appellee has waived her right to challenge the arbitration 
agreement and to permit arbitration of the parties’ child custody and visitation 
disputes would prevent the trial court from fulfilling its role as parens patriae. 
Because this is contrary to public policy, we conclude that appellee has not, by 
virtue of her acquiescence to the original shared parenting plan, waived her right 
to challenge that plan’s provision for arbitration of custody and visitation matters. 
 
There is an even more fundamental flaw in appellant’s waiver analysis. 
With respect to matters of custody and visitation, the central focus is not, as 
appellant suggests, the rights of the parents but is, rather, the best interests of the 
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children. See R.C. 3109.04(B)(1).2 The duty owed by the courts to children under 
the doctrine of parens patriae cannot be severed by agreement of the parties. It 
stands to reason that “[i]f parents cannot bind the court by an agreement affecting 
the interests of their children, they cannot bind the court by agreeing to let 
someone else, an arbitrator, make such a decision for them.” Kovacs, 98 Md.App. 
at 300, 633 A.2d at 431. “As the representative of the State, the [court’s] 
responsibility to ensure the best interests of the children supersedes that of the 
parents.” Id. at 301, 633 A.2d at 431. 
 
Finally, appellant argues that because appellee could have mounted a 
challenge to the arbitration clause in a previous action, she is now barred from 
bringing this challenge under the doctrine of res judicata. This argument, too, 
lacks merit. 
 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] valid, final judgment rendered 
upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of 
the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” 
Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226, syllabus.  
Res judicata operates to bar litigation of “ ‘all claims which were or might have 
been litigated in a first lawsuit.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 382, 653 N.E.2d at 
229, quoting Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 
558 N.E.2d 1178, 1180. 
 
It is true that any question as to the enforceability of the arbitration clause 
could have been litigated in the first divorce action, before the shared parenting 
plan was even adopted by the trial court. Nevertheless, we find that it would be 
inappropriate to invoke res judicata in this case. 
                                                          
 
2. 
R.C. 3109.04(B)(1) provides: 
 
“When making the allocation of the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the 
children * * * in an original proceeding or in any proceeding for modification of a prior order of 
the court making the allocation, the court shall take into account that which would be in the best 
interest of the children.” 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
In many states, including Ohio, an allocation of custody and visitation 
rights remains subject to future modification by the trial court. For this reason, a 
number of courts have held that the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied 
strictly in cases involving child custody and visitation. See, e.g., Childers v. 
Childers (Miss.1998), 717 So.2d 1279, 1282; Lipscomb v. Lipscomb (Ala.1994), 
660 So.2d 986, 989; People ex rel. Farina v. Sensor (1998), 299 Ill.App.3d 333, 
336, 233 Ill.Dec. 873, 875, 701 N.E.2d 1147, 1149. We find these decisions 
persuasive. 
 
In Ohio, the authority of the domestic relations courts to modify their own 
custody and visitation orders is found in R.C. 3109.04. For example, R.C. 
3109.04(E)(1)(a) allows modification when “a change has occurred in the 
circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents 
subject to a shared parenting decree, and * * * modification is necessary to serve 
the best interest of the child.” Thus, as a practical matter, a custody and visitation 
order is never absolutely final. This fact makes application of res judicata 
impractical. The very purpose of res judicata is to deter the repeated litigation of 
resolved issues, thereby ensuring finality in judgments and the conservation of 
judicial resources. Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 383-384, 653 N.E.2d at 230. However, 
in the area of custody and visitation, we sacrifice finality and some of our limited 
judicial resources in order to secure a higher value—the best interests of children. 
 
Hence, appellee’s failure to challenge the arbitration clause in the previous 
divorce action could not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider 
appellee’s subsequent motion to modify or terminate the shared parenting plan. 
The trial court has a continuing responsibility under R.C. 3109.04(B)(1) and 
(E)(1)(a) to protect the best interests of the children. As we have already held, the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate custody and visitation disputes impermissibly 
interferes with the court’s ability to carry out this responsibility. The doctrine of 
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res judicata, like the doctrine of waiver, cannot be relied upon to enforce this 
otherwise unenforceable agreement. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in a domestic relations case, 
matters of child custody and parental visitation are not subject to arbitration. The 
authority to resolve disputes over custody and visitation rests exclusively with the 
courts. Any agreement to the contrary is void and unenforceable. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs separately. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring.  I concur in the majority decision with the 
observation that it is confined to arbitration and does not apply to agreements 
reached regarding visitation and custody through the process of mediation. 
__________________ 
 
Law Offices of Russell A. Kelm and Russell A. Kelm, for appellant. 
 
Blaugrund, Herbert & Martin, Inc. and Steven E. Hillman, for appellee. 
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