Title: Smith v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LYNETTE SMITH, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 346, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 1206011052 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  September 29, 2014 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 23, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.  
 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 23rd day of October 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to 
the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Lynette Smith, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s sentence for her second violation of probation (“VOP”).  The State of 
Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of Smith’s opening brief that her appeal is without merit.1  We 
agree and affirm.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Smith was indicted for Theft and multiple 
counts of Unlawful Use of a Credit Card in November 2012.  On March 26, 2013, 
Smith pled guilty to Theft.  The Superior Court immediately sentenced Smith to 
three years of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III probation 
and six months of Level II probation.  Smith was also required to pay restitution, 
undergo evaluation for substance abuse, and follow any recommendations for 
substance abuse treatment.   Smith did not appeal. 
(3) 
On January 8, 2014, an administrative warrant charging Smith with 
her first VOP was issued.  The charges included failure to report to the probation 
officer as directed, positive drug tests for cocaine, and failure to comply with 
substance abuse treatment.  On February 19, 2014, the Superior Court found Smith 
in violation of her probation.  Smith was sentenced to three years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended for eighteen months of Level IV home confinement, 
suspended after sixth months for Level III probation.  Smith did not appeal. 
(4) 
On June 4, 2014, an administrative warrant charging Smith with her 
second VOP was issued.  The charges included use of cocaine and multiple 
unauthorized leaves from home confinement.  Smith appeared before the Superior 
Court on June 18, 2014.  The Superior Court found Smith in violation of her 
probation.  Smith was sentenced to three years of Level V incarceration, suspended 
after successful completion of the Key program for two years of Level IV 
3 
 
supervision, suspended after successful completion of the Level IV Crest program 
for Level III Crest Aftercare.  This appeal followed.      
(5) 
In her opening brief, Smith claims: (i) she was denied the right to 
present witnesses on her behalf and otherwise defend herself at the VOP hearing; 
(ii) there were medical reasons for her failure to return home by curfew; (iii) her 
counsel was ineffective; (iv) she was sentenced based on her juvenile and adult 
criminal history without a pre-sentence investigation; (v) she was coerced into 
making a statement and the probation officer committed perjury; and (vi) the 
sentence was excessive and too harsh.  We find no merit to these arguments. 
(6) 
Smith did not seek to present any witnesses at the VOP hearing.  
Appellate review of Smith’s claim that she was denied the right to present 
witnesses is therefore waived absent plain error.2  There is no indication Smith 
sought the presence of the witnesses identified in her opening brief at the VOP 
hearing or to present testimony of those witnesses on her behalf.  The record 
reflects that Smith was represented by counsel at the VOP hearing, spoke on her 
own behalf, and admitted to violating the terms of her probation.  Under these 
circumstances, there is no merit to Smith’s claim that she was denied the right to 
present witnesses or to defend herself at the VOP hearing. 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
4 
 
(7) 
Smith appears to claim that several of her curfew violations should be 
excused because those violations occurred while she was recovering from knee 
surgery and unable to return to her home by curfew.  Smith did not make this 
argument at her VOP hearing.  At the VOP hearing, Smith admitted to using 
cocaine and leaving her apartment without authorization to take out the trash or 
babysit for a friend.   
(8) 
In a VOP hearing, unlike a criminal trial, the State is only required to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms of 
his/her probation.3  A preponderance of the evidence means “some competent 
evidence” to “reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has 
not been as good as required by the conditions of probation.”4  Regardless of 
Smith’s new explanations for her curfew violations, Smith’s admission at the VOP 
hearing to using cocaine constituted sufficient competent evidence to revoke her 
probation.5  As for Smith’s claim that her appointed counsel was ineffective, this 
Court will not consider that claim for the first time on this direct appeal.6         
                                                 
3 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006). 
4 Id. (quoting Collins v. State, 897 A.2d 159, 160 (Del. 2006)). 
5 Collins v. State, 897 A.2d at 160. 
6 Barnes v. State, 2014 WL 60963, at *1 (Del. Jan. 7, 2014); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 
829 (Del. 1994).  
5 
 
(9) 
Smith’s attacks on her sentence are also without merit.  This Court’s 
appellate review of a sentence is extremely limited and generally ends upon a 
determination that the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the 
legislature.7  If the sentence is within statutory limits, the sentence will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the defendant can establish that the sentencing judge 
relied on impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind.8   
(10) Smith complains that the Superior Court sentenced her based on her 
juvenile and adult criminal record, but the transcript of the VOP hearing reflects 
that the Superior Court was most concerned by her cocaine use.  Smith also fails to 
identify any authority in support of her contention that the Superior Court was 
required to obtain a pre-sentence investigation before sentencing her for her second 
VOP.  As far as the length of Smith’s sentence, the Superior Court could impose 
any period of incarceration up to and including the balance of the Level V time 
remaining on the February 19, 2014 sentence (three years).9  The Superior Court 
did not exceed that amount of time in imposing a Level V sentence of three years, 
which was suspended for decreasing levels of supervision after Smith’s successful 
completion of the Key program.    
                                                 
7 Kurzmann, 903 A.2d at 714. 
8 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). 
9 11 Del. C. § 4334(c); Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005). 
6 
 
(11) Finally, Smith fails to substantiate her conclusory statements that she 
was coerced into making a statement and that her probation officer committed 
perjury at the VOP hearing.  In the absence of any evidence or argument in support 
of these conclusory statements, we conclude that Smith’s coercion and perjury 
claims are without merit.            
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice