Title: People v. Stroud

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 94823-Agenda 12-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
BENNIE STROUD, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case presents the question of whether defendant's constitutional
right to be present at his guilty plea hearing was violated when the circuit
court accepted his plea via closed circuit television. Under the facts
presented by this case, we hold that it was.

BACKGROUND
	On March 23, 1998, defendant, Bennie Stroud, entered a negotiated
plea of guilty in the circuit court of Kankakee County to the offense of
possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West
1998)), case No. 97-CF-621. When defendant entered his plea, he was
not physically present in the courtroom; rather, he appeared via closed
circuit television. Defendant was represented by counsel at the time the
plea was taken, and defendant made no objection to his absence from the
court or to the fact that the plea was taken through closed circuit
television. Pursuant to agreement, defendant was sentenced to two years'
probation. Before accepting the plea, the court advised defendant that any
wilful violation of his probation could result in revocation, with a prison
sentence of between three and seven years imposed. Following
acceptance of the plea, the court advised defendant of his appeal rights,
including the necessity of compliance with the requirements of Supreme
Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)).
	On July 1, 1998, the State filed a petition to revoke probation,
alleging that subsequent to the above-mentioned case, defendant
committed the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
as reflected in case No. 98-CF-374.(1) On November 3, 1998, defendant
was found guilty of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS
570/401(d) (West 1998)), case No. 98-CF-374. On December 1,
1998, defendant's probation for his initial conviction in No. 97-CF-621
was revoked because of the subsequent offense, and defendant was
sentenced to seven years in prison for each offense, the sentences to run
concurrently. Thereafter, defendant appealed the conviction in No.
98-CF-374 and the probation revocation in No. 97-CF-621. The
appeals were consolidated.
	The appellate court dismissed defendant's direct appeal in No.
97-CF-621 for lack of jurisdiction, finding that because defendant had
not filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Rule
604(d), he could not attack the guilty plea in the appeal of his probation
revocation. People v. Stroud, Nos. 3-98-0981, 3-98-0982 cons.
(2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	On November 22, 2000, defendant filed a postconviction petition,
again arguing that the original guilty plea should be vacated because he
entered it via closed circuit television, rather than in person. The State filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that because defendant had not filed a timely
motion to withdraw the guilty plea in No. 97-CF-621, he was barred
from moving to vacate the plea through his postconviction petition. The
trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, and defendant appealed.
	On review, the appellate court vacated both convictions and
remanded for further proceedings in No. 97-CF-621 and for
resentencing in No. 98-CF-374. 333 Ill. App. 3d 416. The appellate
court found that, although defendant was barred from challenging his guilty
plea on direct appeal, nothing prevented him from collaterally attacking his
plea in a postconviction proceeding on constitutional grounds. 333 Ill.
App. 3d at 419. The court then found that defendant's plea of guilty over
closed circuit television violated his constitutional right to be present at a
critical stage of the proceeding. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 419.
	We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315) and now affirm the appellate court.

ANALYSIS
	The State initially argues before this court that defendant waived his
right to challenge his guilty plea. It notes that defendant did not file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment as is normally
required by Rule 604(d) to bring an appeal. Relying on the rule that " ' "a
constitutional right, like any other right of an accused, may be waived, and
a voluntary plea of guilty waives all errors or irregularities that are not
jurisdictional" ' " (People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 491 (1993),
quoting People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill. 2d 414, 433 (1985), quoting
People v. Brown, 41 Ill. 2d 503, 505 (1969)), the State maintains that
defendant cannot attack his guilty plea for the first time in a postconviction
proceeding.
	In response, defendant argues that he can attack his guilty plea in a
postconviction petition even though he did not first move to withdraw the
plea or attempt to file a direct appeal because the plea itself was not
voluntary. Specifically, defendant contends that the plea was involuntary
because he was not advised of his right to be physically present in the
courtroom at the plea proceeding.
	We agree with defendant that the State's waiver arguments must be
rejected. " 'Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but
must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' " People v. Johnson,
75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970). Thus,
a guilty plea does not waive a contention that the plea itself was
involuntary because of faulty admonishments. People v. Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127, 141-42 (1991); People v. Beronich, 334 Ill. App. 3d 536, 540
(2002). Moreover, such claims may be raised for the first time in a
postconviction petition. Beronich, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 540. As we will
explain more fully below, this case involves whether and to what extent a
trial judge must admonish a defendant of his right to be physically present
prior to accepting a guilty plea by closed circuit television. Accordingly,
we conclude that the State's waiver arguments do not apply.
	We now turn to the merits of the question of whether defendant had
a constitutional right to be physically present at the guilty plea hearing and
whether his physical absence requires that his guilty plea be vacated. To
support his position, defendant relies upon People v. Guttendorf, 309 Ill.
App. 3d 1044 (2000), where the appellate court vacated a defendant's
guilty plea because he was not physically present in court for the plea
proceeding, but instead appeared by closed circuit television. Defendant
attempts to distinguish this court's recent decision in People v. Lindsey,
201 Ill. 2d 45 (2002), on the basis that it involved an appearance by
closed circuit television at an arraignment and jury waiver hearing, not a
guilty plea proceeding. The State in response argues that Lindsey is
controlling and the appellate court's decision should therefore be reversed.
	In Lindsey, this court found that arraignment and jury waiver were
"critical stages" at which a defendant generally has a right to be present,
but the right is not absolute. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 56. This court
recognized that both the federal and state constitutions afford criminal
defendants the general right to be present, not only at trial, but at all critical
stages of the proceedings from arraignment to sentencing. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 55, 57, citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 356, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058 (1970);
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998). Arraignment amounts to the
initiation of formal criminal proceedings and, as such, is " 'far from a mere
formalism.' " Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 55, quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 418, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1972).
Because of the importance of arraignment, a defendant's right to counsel
attaches at that time. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1997); Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 55.
	A defendant can plead guilty at arraignment: " 'Arraignment' means
the formal act of calling the defendant into open court, informing him of the
offense with which he is charged, and asking him whether he is guilty or
not guilty." 725 ILCS 5/102-4 (West 2000). Moreover, section 113-4
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) provides that
"[w]hen called upon to plead at arraignment the defendant *** shall plead
guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty" and if defendant pleads guilty
such plea shall not be accepted until defendant is fully admonished. But if
defendant understandably persists in his plea, it shall be accepted by the
court and recorded. 725 ILCS 5/113-4 (West 2000).
	Lindsey reviewed the holdings of the United States Supreme Court
in Stincer and of this court in People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65 (1990), and
concluded the following:
			"[E]ven where a defendant has the general right to be present
because the proceeding is a 'critical' stage, a defendant's
absence is not a per se constitutional violation. Rather, a
defendant's absence from such a proceeding will violate his
constitutional rights only if the record demonstrates that
defendant's absence caused the proceeding to be unfair or if his
absence resulted in a denial of an underlying substantial right."
Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 57.
	Applying the above-quoted standard, Lindsey then found that the
record did not demonstrate that the defendant's physical absence from the
courtroom contributed to the unfairness of the proceedings or caused him
to be denied any underlying constitutional right. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 58.
Lindsey observed that, while the defendant was not physically present in
the courtroom for his arraignment and jury waiver, he was not entirely
absent from the proceedings either. The defendant participated in the
proceedings by the closed circuit system, allowing him to interact with the
court with relative ease. The overall solemnity of the proceedings was
preserved, and the defendant's ability to defend against the charges was
unaffected by his physical absence from the courtroom. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 58-59. This court concluded by stating its holding as follows:
			"In sum, we hold that defendant's appearances via closed
circuit television at arraignment and jury waiver did not render
those proceedings unconstitutional. To show a constitutional
violation of the right to be present, there must be evidence that
defendant's due process rights were violated by his absence
from the courtroom, i.e., that defendant's physical absence from
the proceedings caused the proceedings to be unfair or that his
physical absence from the proceedings resulted in the denial of
an underlying constitutional right. There has been no showing on
this record. Consequently, we find no constitutional violation."
Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 60.
	We find Lindsey instructive, but not determinative of the outcome,
because, unlike the present case involving the constitutionality of a closed
circuit television procedure for taking a plea of guilty at a plea proceeding,
Lindsey only considered the propriety of a jury waiver and entry of a not-guilty plea at arraignment by closed circuit television. The number and
gravity of the rights at stake at a guilty plea hearing are greater than when
a defendant intends to plead not guilty at arraignment. In Guttendorf, the
appellate court addressed the precise issue here, concluding that a
televised guilty plea is not constitutionally permitted. Guttendorf, 309 Ill.
App. 3d at 1047. The court stated the following in explaining the
importance of a guilty plea hearing:
			"A guilty plea is a critical stage because its direct result is
defendant's conviction. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12 (1969).
It is an admission of guilt of the criminal acts charged as well as
of all material facts alleged in the charging instrument. See
People v. Johnson, 28 Ill. 2d 531, 533-34 (1963). This
admission rebuts the presumption of innocence. See People v.
Page, 38 Ill. 2d 611, 612-13, 232 N.E.2d 689, 690-91 (1967).
The entry of a guilty plea results in a waiver of a defendant's
'right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.' 177 Ill. 2d R. 402. A guilty plea also
waives other constitutional rights, such as the fundamental right
to present evidence and to raise the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin, 395 U.S.  at 243, 23 L. Ed. 2d  at
279, 89 S. Ct.  at 1712.
			A guilty plea is a decisive moment for the defendant in the
criminal process. The plea obviates the prosecution's burden of
proof. ' "It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending
controversy." ' Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 n.4, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279 n.4, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 n.4 (1969),
quoting Woodward v. State, 42 Ala. App. 552, 558, 171 So. 2d 462, 469 (1965). It carries the same finality as a jury verdict.
The atmosphere of the courtroom can play a critical, albeit
intangible, role in the proceedings, including a hearing on a plea.
A courtroom 'is more than a location with seats for a judge, jury,
witnesses, defendant, prosecutor, defense counsel and public
observers; the setting that the courtroom provides is itself an
important element in the constitutional conception of trial,
contributing a dignity essential to "the integrity of the trial"
process.' Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 561, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1642 (1965) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ.), quoting Craig
v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367, 377, 91 L. Ed. 2d 1546, 1553, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1256 (1947).
			In a televised appearance, crucial aspects of a defendant's
physical presence may be lost or misinterpreted, such as the
participant's demeanor, facial expressions and vocal inflections,
the ability for immediate and unmediated contact with counsel,
and the solemnity of a court proceeding. In a guilty plea hearing,
as in a trial, these components may be lost if a defendant's
appearance is through closed circuit television." Guttendorf,
309 Ill. App. 3d at 1046-47.
	The only other reported case to directly address the constitutionality
of a plea other than not guilty by closed circuit television is State v.
Peters, 237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655 (2000). There, the court
found that the defendant's voluntary plea of no contest by closed circuit
television to the offense of driving with a revoked license did not violate
his due process rights under the United States Constitution, even though
he did not specifically waive his right to be physically present. It noted that
"courts have recognized that 'the presence of the defendant is required as
a *** condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing
would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.' " Peters, 237
Wis. 2d at 747, 615 N.W.2d  at 659, quoting May v. State, 97 Wis. 2d
175, 186, 293 N.W.2d 478, 483 (1980), citing Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 78 L. Ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1934). The
court concluded that the defendant's right to a fair and just hearing was
not thwarted by his physical absence. Peters, 237 Wis. 2d at 749, 615 N.W.2d  at 660.
	Because of its rather scant analysis and because it involved a plea on
a misdemeanor charge, we do not find Peters to be persuasive. Peters
did not discuss Snyder in any detail, nor did it address the decisions of the
Supreme Court in United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486, 490, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484 (1985), and Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658,
2667 (1987), the three cases that have adumbrated a defendant's due
process right to be present for a trial proceeding. In Gagnon, the United
States Supreme Court observed:
			"We think it clear that respondent's rights *** were not
violated by the in camera discussion with a juror. '[T]he mere
occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge
and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional
right. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at
every interaction between a judge and a juror, nor is there a
constitutional right to have a court reporter transcribe every such
communication.' [Citation.]
			The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent
in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, e.g.,
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), but we have recognized
that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some
situations where the defendant is not actually confronting
witnesses or evidence against him. In Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934), the Court explained that a defendant has a
due process right to be present at a proceeding 'whenever his
presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of
his opportunity to defend against the charge.' " Gagnon, 470 U.S.  at 526, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 490, 105 S. Ct.  at 1484.
In Stincer, the Court added that "a defendant is guaranteed the right to be
present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its
outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure."
Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at 647, 107 S. Ct.  at 2667.
	Unlike the present case, Snyder, Gagnon and Stincer involved short
absences from minor portions of trial. In each of the three cases, the Court
held that the defendant's due process rights were not thwarted. In Snyder,
the defendant was absent from a jury view of the scene of the crime; in
Gagnon, the defendant was absent from a brief in camera discussion
between the trial judge and a juror; and in Stincer, defendant was not
present at the competency hearing of a witness where no substantive
evidence was addressed. Here, in contrast, defendant was physically
absent from the most decisive moment of the criminal proceedings against
him. We recognize that he was not entirely absent from the proceedings
either, however, because of his closed circuit television appearance.
Nevertheless, the importance of the courtroom itself in " 'contributing a
dignity essential to "the integrity of the trial" process' " (Guttendorf, 309
Ill. App. 3d at 1046-47, quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 561, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1642 (1965) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ.)) leads us to conclude
that a defendant's appearance at a guilty plea proceeding via closed circuit
television is constitutionally permissible only if the defendant waives the
right to physical presence on the record after being advised of his right to
be present. Defendant did not specifically waive his right to be bodily in
the courtroom. We believe that defendant's physical presence would have
contributed to the fairness of the proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude
that defendant's due process right to be present at the proceeding was
violated.
	While not dispositive of the constitutional issue, we find support for
our conclusion in the legislative stances of the various states on guilty pleas
via closed circuit television. The approaches of the states fall into three
distinct camps: (1) those that allow defendants to plead guilty by closed
circuit television (see, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. §767.37a(5) (2000) (the act
"does not prohibit the use of 2-way closed circuit television for ***
criminal pleas"); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15A-941(b) (LexisNexis 2002)
(plea in a noncapital case may be taken by audio and video transmission);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §178.388(4) (Lexis 2001) (presence of defendant
for plea at arraignment is not required if the court has provided for the use
of close circuit television)); (2) those that categorically do not allow a
guilty plea by closed circuit television (see, e.g., Mont. Code Ann.
§46-12-201(5) (2001) (a judge may not accept a plea to a felony if
defendant is not physically present in the courtroom)); and (3) those that
allow such pleas upon a specific waiver by the defendant of the right to be
present (see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §977 (West 2003) (guilty plea by
closed circuit television allowed upon execution of written waiver of right
to be present and stipulation by the parties); Miss. Code Ann.
§99-1-23(1)(d) (Supp. 2003) (upon waiver of any right to be present,
a personal appearance by means of closed circuit television may be made
at "[a]rraignment *** where a plea of guilty is entered"); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§561.031 (West Supp. 2003) (plea of guilty may be entered at
arraignment via closed circuit television upon waiver of any right such
person might have to be physically present); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 27.18(a) (West 2003) (court may accept a guilty plea or a waiver by
closed circuit video teleconferencing upon written consent to the
procedure by the defendant and prosecutor)).
	The State of Missouri appears to have enacted the most
comprehensive legislation on the use of closed circuit television. The
Missouri statute provides in relevant part as follows:
			"1. In the following proceedings, *** when the physical
appearance in person in court is required of any person held in
a place of custody or confinement, such personal appearance
may be made by means of two-way audio visual communication,
including but not limited to, closed circuit television or
computerized video conferencing; provided that such audio-visual communication facilities provide two-way audio-visual
communication between the court and the place of custody or
confinement and that a full record of such proceedings be made
by split-screen imaging and recording of the proceedings in the
courtroom and the place of confinement or custody in addition
to such other record as may be required:
			(1) First appearance before an associate circuit judge on a
criminal complaint;
			(2) Waiver of preliminary hearing;
			(3) Arraignment on an information or indictment where a plea
of not guilty is entered;
			(4) Arraignment on an information or indictment where a plea
of guilty is entered upon waiver of any right such person
might have to be physically present;
			(5) Any pretrial or posttrial criminal proceeding not allowing
cross-examination of witnesses;
			(6) Sentencing after conviction at trial upon waiver of any right
such person might have to be physically present;
			(7) Sentencing after entry of a plea of guilty; and
			(8) Any civil proceeding other than trial by jury.
			2. This section shall not prohibit other appearances via closed
circuit television upon waiver of any right such person held in
custody or confinement might have to be physically present."
(Emphasis added.) Mo. Rev. Stat. §561.031 (2002).
In Guinan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 427, 430-31 (Mo. 1989), the Missouri
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the above-quoted statute in a case where defendant's postconviction hearing was
conducted by closed circuit television.
	More recently, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been
amended to allow the taking of a defendant's plea at arraignment by
closed circuit television. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 10(c). Specifically, Rule
10(c) now provides that "[v]ideo teleconferencing may be used to arraign
a defendant if the defendant consents." Fed. R. Crim. P. 10(c). The
advisory committee notes explain that "[a]lthough the rule requires the
defendant to waive a personal appearance for an arraignment, the rule
does not require that the waiver for video teleconferencing be in writing.
Nor does it require that the defendant waive that appearance in open
court. It would normally be sufficient for the defendant to waive an
appearance while participating through video teleconference." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 10(c), Advisory Committee Notes.
	Because the federal rules prior to their amendment required the
defendant's physical presence at arraignment, there is a paucity of federal
case law addressing the constitutionality of pleas by closed circuit
television. In Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States, 915 F.2d 1276,
1280 (9th Cir. 1990), the court found that the defendant's not-guilty plea
at arraignment by closed circuit television was improper because the
preamended rules required the defendant's physical presence. The court
then commented, however, that the protections established by the rules
were "broader than the constitution provides." Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d  at 1280; cf. United States v. Melgoza, 248 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (interpreted the amended federal rules as prohibiting a
defendant's request to plead guilty by video teleconferencing, but did not
address the constitutionality of such a procedure).
	The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue allow a
guilty plea by closed circuit television with the precaution that it be allowed
only upon waiver by the defendant. We believe that this is the best
approach, as well as the only constitutionally permissible one that would
allow a guilty plea by television. In contrast to the statutes of many other
states and the federal rules, the Illinois statute is not as clear about the
kinds of proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit television
or whether the defendant's consent to the procedure would be required.
Specifically, section 106D-1(a) of the Code states that "[w]hen a
defendant's personal appearance is not required by the Constitution of the
United States or Illinois Constitution, the court may allow the defendant
to personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding by way of
closed circuit television when: (a) the court has authorized the use of
closed circuit television and has by rule or order set out the type of
proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit television." 725
ILCS 5/106D-1(a) (West 2000); see Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d  at 62-63. We
hold today that a defendant's physical presence at a guilty plea proceeding
is constitutionally required unless he consents to having the plea taken by
closed circuit television. Like the advisory committee to the federal rules,
we believe that it would normally satisfy constitutional considerations for
the defendant to waive his physical appearance in court by stating so on
the record while participating through closed circuit television. We further
add that an admonishment about the right to be physically present should
be given by the trial judge at the beginning of the guilty plea proceeding as
part of the admonitions required by Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d
R. 402), unless the defendant has previously given his written consent to
the closed circuit procedure. Because defendant's plea was taken without
him specifically waiving his right to be present, we affirm the judgment of
the appellate court, which vacated defendant's convictions and remanded
the cause for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant's closed
circuit television appearance at his guilty plea proceeding, without his
consent on the record, violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Affirmed.
1.               The June 9, 1998, indictment in case No. 98CF374 actually charged defendant 
with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of school property, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(d), 407(b)(2) 
(West 1998)). However, on November 3, 1998, defendant was convicted in No. 98CF374 of the lesser-included offense of unlawful delivery of 
a controlled substance, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 1998)).