Title: Schueck v. Burris

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Thomas B. SCHUECK v. W.F. BURRIS

97-465                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 18, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- bench trials -- correct standard of review.
     -- The correct standard of review on appeal of civil cases
     where the trial judge, rather than a jury, sits as the trier
     of fact is whether the judge's findings were clearly erroneous
     or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

2.   Appeal & error -- negligence -- burden of proof. -- To meet
     appellee's burden of proving negligence, he was required to
     prove that he sustained damages, that appellant was negligent,
     and that appellant's negligence was the proximate cause of his
     damages. 

3.   Negligence -- sufficient proof for finding that appellee
     sustained damages caused by appellant's negligence -- trial
     court's finding not clearly erroneous. -- Where, at trial,
     appellee claimed that cement and water used during the
     construction of the foundation of the patio homes washed onto
     his property and damaged his azalea bushes; he offered oral
     testimony, photographic evidence, and a written estimate of
     the cost of replacing the lost bushes; and appellant's general
     contractor testified that some of the cement did go into
     appellant's azalea bed, and that the concrete people may have
     ruined the azaleas, the trial judge could have rightfully
     concluded that appellee sustained damages to his azaleas, that
     appellant was negligent in permitting cement to run into the
     azalea beds, and that, as a result of appellant's negligence,
     appellee's azalea bushes were lost; the trial judge's finding
     in this regard was not clearly erroneous.

4.   Witnesses -- factfinder judges witness credibility. -- As the
     fact-finder, it is within the judge's province to believe or
     disbelieve the testimony of any witness.

5.   Appeal & error -- judge free to believe appellee's testimony -
     - judge's finding as to erosion claim not clearly erroneous. -
     - Where appellee testified that his property was eroded and
     offered photographic evidence of erosion damage, the trial
     judge was free to find that appellee was a truthful witness;
     the trial judge was in the best position to observe appellee,
     to hear his testimony, and to weigh the alleged inconsistences
     argued by appellant; the trial judge's finding as to
     appellee's erosion claim was not clearly erroneous.

6.   Negligence -- when proximate-cause evidence sufficient --
     proximate cause defined. -- In a negligence action, the
     proximate-cause evidence is sufficient if the facts proved are
     of such a nature and are so connected and related to each
     other that the conclusion therefrom may be fairly inferred;
     proximate cause is a cause that, in a natural and continuous
     sequence, produces damage and without which the damage would
     not have occurred. 

7.   Negligence -- judge could infer that appellee's damages were
     proximately caused by appellant's negligence -- trial judge's
     finding not clearly erroneous. -- Appellee testified that
     appellant's contractor's truck was driven on the elevated
     ground and caught the telephone wire attached to his house,
     pulling the trim off the structure and he contended that the
     trier of fact might infer from circumstantial evidence that
     his damages were proximately caused by appellant's negligence;
     giving the trial judge's finding the benefit of all reasonable
     inferences permissible under the proof, the supreme court
     could not agree that his finding as to the damaged siding was
     clearly erroneous.

8.   Civil procedure -- amendment of pleadings to conform to
     evidence at trial -- issue tried by implied consent of parties
     treated as if it were raised in pleadings. --   Arkansas Civil
     Procedure Rule 15(b) permits the amendment of pleadings to
     conform to the evidence presented at trial; if an issue is
     tried by the implied consent of the parties, it is  treated as
     if it were raised in the pleadings; a party may move to amend
     the pleadings, but failure to do so does not affect the result
     of the trial of the issue. 

9.   Civil procedure -- appellant aware of contract claim -- trial
     judge did not err in treating contract issue as if it were
     raised in pleadings. -- Appellant's contention that, because
     the contract claim was not specifically pleaded, he was
     deprived of notice and the opportunity to prepare a defense to
     this claim at trial was without merit where the record did not
     support his contention; in his motion to dismiss made at the
     close of appellee's case, appellant's attorney argued the
     alleged lack of proof on the contract issue, stating that the
     "agreement is explicit on the terms in regard to the fence";
     under these circumstances, the supreme court did not agree
     that appellant was unaware of the contract claim; the trial
     judge did not err in treating the contract issue as if it were
     raised in the pleadings.

10.  Contracts -- breach-of-contract claim -- trial judge's finding
     that appellant breached contract was not clearly erroneous. --
     Where the trial judge heard testimony that the new fence was
     twelve-feet high and encompassed a concrete wall that
     prevented maintenance and mowing, and after considering the
     four corners of the parties' 1978 written agreement, the
     photographic evidence, and oral testimony describing the old
     and new fences, the supreme court could not say that the trial
     judge's finding that appellant breached the contract was
     clearly erroneous.

11.  Appeal & error -- award not objected to below -- argument not
     reached on appeal. -- Appellant's assertion that the trial
     judge's award of attorney's fees was inappropriate because the
     case involved a tort action was not reached because appellant
     did not object to this award below; he did not preserve this
     issue for appeal.

12.  Evidence -- parol evidence rule -- rule does not prohibit
     trial judge from becoming familiar with circumstances
     surrounding making of contract. -- Although the parol evidence
     rule prohibits the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary
     the terms of a written agreement, absent an ambiguity in the
     contract's terms, it does not prohibit a trial judge from
     becoming familiar with the circumstances surrounding the
     making of a contract; on appeal, the supreme court will not
     reverse the trial judge's ruling allowing or disallowing
     evidence absent an abuse of discretion.

13.  Evidence -- testimony about terms of parties' agreement
     properly allowed -- no abuse of discretion found. -- Where the
     disputed testimony described the basic terms of the agreement,
     appellee's maintenance efforts, and the difference between the
     old and new fences, the supreme court could not say that it
     varied the terms of the parties's contract; rather, the
     appellee was merely describing the circumstances surrounding
     the making of the 1978 agreement; therefore, the trial judge
     did not abuse his discretion in permitting this testimony.  

14.  Evidence -- appellee did not open door to testimony violative
     of parol evidence rule -- no abuse of discretion found in
     trial judge's disallowing testimony. -- Although appellee's
     testimony was properly admitted, he did not open the door to
     testimony violative of the parol evidence rule; while
     appellee's testimony addressed circumstances surrounding the
     making of the agreement, the agent's testimony was offered to
     elicit a legal opinion and an interpretation of the contract
     that could vary its terms in the absence of any ambiguity in
     those terms; the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
     disallowing this testimony.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; John Ward,
Judge; affirmed.
     Mark T. McCarty, for appellant.
     Lewis E. Ritchey, for appellee.
     
     W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     The appellee, W. F. Burris, filed a negligence suit against
the appellant, Thomas B. Schueck, in Pulaski County Circuit Court. 
Following a bench trial, the trial judge ruled that Mr. Schueck was
negligent and that he had breached the partiesþ contract.  The
trial judge awarded Mr. Burris a judgment of $1392.51.  It is from
that judgment that Mr. Schueck appeals, raising four allegations of
error.  We find no merit to his arguments and affirm.
     The parties are former owners of adjacent properties located
in the Hillside Village area of Little Rock.  They entered into a
written agreement in 1978 to settle Mr. Burrisþs  claim that he had
established title by adversely possessing a portion of Mr.
Schueckþs land.  Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Burris received
$2,500.00 cash and was entitled to use, for so long as he owned and
occupied his property, a six-foot strip of Mr. Schueckþs land
running along Mr. Burrisþs south property line.  Desiring to settle
the ownership dispute, Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. (þRPMþ), the
agent who sold Mr. Schueck his lot and a party to the 1978
agreement, constructed a six-foot high wooden fence, six-feet south
of Mr. Burrisþs south property line, that extended the 140-foot
depth of Mr. Burrisþs lot.  RPM also covenanted to leave the
property in such a condition that Mr. Burris could plant and mow
the strip.  On January 3, 1979, Mr. Burris and his wife executed a
quit-claim deed in favor of Mr. Schueck, relinquishing all of their
ownership rights in the disputed property. 
     In 1994, Mr. Schueck began construction of six separate patio
homes known as Fillmore Place.  During this construction, Mr.
Schueckþs contractor removed the six-foot wooden fence described in
the 1978 agreement and replaced it with a twelve-foot-high wall. 
The height of the new fence was six feet off the ground at one end
of the property line and then rose to twelve feet at the other end,
with a concrete wall underneath the wooden portion of the fence.
     In Mr. Burrisþs complaint against Mr. Schueck, he alleged that
Mr. Schueckþs agent negligently carried out the performance of
constructing the patio homes, resulting in damage to his land and
property.  Specifically, Mr. Burris claimed that Mr. Schueckþs 
negligent and intentional actions caused the loss of a fence, the
destruction of twelve azalea bushes, the erosion of soil, and the
destruction of siding on the southeast corner of his home.  Mr.
Burris requested compensatory damages in the amount of $1,838.51,
attorneyþs fees, and costs.
     After hearing the testimony of the parties and other
witnesses, the trial judge ruled in Mr. Burrisþs favor.  Mr.
Schueck appeals.
1. Negligence
     Mr. Schueck first claims that the trial judgeþs finding that
he was negligent was not supported by substantial evidence.  This
is not, however, the correct standard of review in civil cases
where the trial judge, rather than a jury, sits as the trier of
fact.  In bench trials, the standard of review on appeal is not
whether there is any substantial evidence to support the finding
of the court, but whether the judgeþs findings were clearly
erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. 
Superior Improvement Co. v. Mastic Corp., 270 Ark. 471,