Title: People v. Flinner

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL WILLIAM FLINNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S123813 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCE211301 
 
 
November 23, 2020 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Groban, and Greenwood* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
S123813 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Michael William Flinner of the 
first degree murder of Tamra Keck and found true financial-gain 
and lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegations.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a); id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(1), (15).)  The jury also 
convicted Flinner of conspiracy to commit murder and grand 
theft (id., § 182, subd. (a)(1); id., § 187, subd. (a); id., § 487, subd. 
(a)); mingling a harmful substance with food or drink (id., § 347, 
subd. (a)); and solicitation to commit murder (id., § 653f, subd. 
(b)).  The jury could not reach a verdict on a second count of 
solicitation to commit murder.  Following a penalty phase trial, 
the jury returned a death verdict and the trial court entered a 
judgment of death.  The court also sentenced Flinner to an 
indeterminate term of 25 years to life for the conspiracy 
conviction, a determinate term of four years for the mingling a 
harmful substance with food or drink conviction, and a 
determinate term of six years for the solicitation to commit 
murder conviction.  The court imposed but stayed the 
indeterminate 
and 
determinate 
sentences 
pending 
the 
resolution and execution of the death judgment. 
This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. 
(a); Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment.  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
The trial evidence showed that on June 11, 2000, Flinner 
called his fiancée, Tamra Keck, while she was out shopping.  He 
directed her to meet his former employee, Haron Ontiveros (also 
known as Juan de la Torre), at a local gas station so that she 
could help jump start Ontiveros’s car.  Keck picked Ontiveros up 
from the gas station and drove to a nearby cul-de-sac where 
Ontiveros’s car was parked.  As Keck was propping the hood of 
her car open, Ontiveros approached her from behind and shot 
her in the back of the head, killing her.   
1. Prosecution Evidence 
Flinner met Keck in 1999.  At the time, Keck was 18 years 
old and had just started her senior year of high school.  Flinner 
was 31 or 32 years old and was operating a landscaping business 
after being paroled from prison earlier that year.  Flinner and 
Keck developed a romantic relationship.  Keck moved into 
Flinner’s apartment in Alpine, California, and the two made 
plans to marry.   
On December 29, 1999, Flinner and Keck met with an 
Allstate Insurance agent and applied for a $500,000 term life 
insurance policy for Keck, naming Flinner as the primary 
beneficiary.  At the meeting, Flinner introduced Keck as his 
fiancée and represented that she was an employee of his 
landscaping business with an annual income of $30,000 per 
year.  Flinner explained to the Allstate agent that they were 
taking out the life insurance policy because Keck was an 
important part of his landscaping business and that he would 
suffer financially were something to happen to her.  This 
explanation was false.  Keck was not, in fact, a regular employee 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
 
of Flinner’s business; Keck occasionally purchased office 
supplies for Flinner, who then reimbursed her, but those 
payments were irregular and relatively small.  Although Flinner 
did not provide verification of Keck’s employment or salary, the 
agent issued the insurance policy.  Flinner and Keck paid for the 
first insurance premium payment that day, and Flinner paid for 
the next two premium payments in March and April 2000. 
The prosecution sought to show that Flinner’s business 
was suffering financially in the months leading up to the murder 
and that he accumulated an increasing amount of debt.  After 
Keck’s death, Flinner attempted to collect on the insurance 
policy, attempted to make large purchases on credit with the 
promise of payment out of his forthcoming insurance proceeds, 
and continued even in custody to tell fellow inmates that he 
expected to receive a substantial payout plus interest from the 
life insurance policy. 
The prosecution also presented evidence that Flinner’s 
relationship with Keck was strained.  Flinner took another 
teenage girl, Tiffany Faye, out for meals several times and told 
her that although Keck thought they were going to get married, 
he could get rid of Keck and date Faye.  In December 1999, while 
Faye was visiting Flinner and Keck at their apartment, Flinner 
proposed a “threesome,” which prompted Faye to break off her 
relationship with Flinner.  Various witnesses testified that 
Flinner treated Keck poorly, said Keck was just after his money, 
and referred to her by derogatory names.  Two days before the 
murder, Keck called her mother, crying, to report the wedding 
was going to be postponed.   
Around the time Flinner and Keck took out the life 
insurance policy, Flinner began asking associates what it would 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
cost to have someone killed and whether they would kill 
someone on his behalf.  Robert Johnston, one of Flinner’s 
employees, testified that sometime between December 1999 and 
January 2000 Flinner asked whether Johnston would kill 
somebody for him.  Charles Cahoon, who worked briefly for 
Flinner, testified that in January 2000, Flinner asked Cahoon 
how much it would cost to have somebody killed and whether 
$10,000 would be enough.  When Cahoon asked Flinner what he 
was talking about, Flinner said that he had gotten Keck insured 
for $1,000,000.  Juan Morales testified that in April 2000, while 
paying Flinner for a car Morales had bought from him, Flinner 
asked Morales if he knew where to get a gun.   
A few days before the murder, Flinner obtained the car 
that codefendant Haron Ontiveros, one of Flinner’s landscaping 
employees, would use on the day of the murder.1  Flinner visited 
an auto dealership that he had done business with before and 
signed a borrower agreement for a small white Nissan NX car.  
Amir Bahador, an employee at the auto dealership, testified that 
when Flinner came to pick up the Nissan NX, he was 
accompanied by a “Hispanic gentleman, kind of short, kind of 
stocky,” though Bahador could not say for sure that it was 
Ontiveros.  Flinner told Bahador that he was getting the car for 
his employee, the man who was with him at the dealership.  
 
1  
Ontiveros was tried jointly with Flinner before a separate 
jury, which found Ontiveros guilty of first degree murder and 
conspiracy to commit murder and found true the lying-in-wait 
and financial-gain special circumstances.  At the penalty phase, 
Ontiveros’s jury returned a verdict of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole, and the court sentenced Ontiveros to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction 
and a concurrent term of 25 years to life for the conspiracy 
conviction.  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
After the murder, Flinner also gave Ontiveros a forged check for 
$7,000 in payment for his role.   
On the morning of the murder, at about 10:45 a.m., video 
surveillance showed Flinner driving his white Ford pickup to 
the Ultramar gas station in Alpine.  Flinner was also placed at 
that location through his cell phone records and the testimony 
of Phillip Finch, who drove by Flinner while he was pulled over 
on the road near the gas station to make a call.  The clerk at a 
nearby Shell station testified that around 10:30 a.m. Flinner 
purchased gas and milk and asked the clerk to hurry ringing up 
the purchase because he “was late to meet his friend down the 
street.”   
At about the same time, video surveillance showed the 
white Nissan NX driving into the Ultramar gas station.  Shortly 
thereafter, video showed both Flinner’s Ford pickup and 
Ontiveros’s Nissan NX leaving the Ultramar station and 
heading toward a cul-de-sac down the street.  Flinner later 
admitted to detectives that he entered the cul-de-sac sometime 
between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on the morning of the 
murder.  Suzanne Scanlan, who volunteered at a veterans’ 
organization that had a view of the cul-de-sac, testified that in 
this timeframe she saw two white cars parked next to each other 
in the cul-de-sac.  Video footage picked up the two white cars 
exiting the cul-de-sac road about 15 minutes after they entered.  
Flinner arrived at his parents’ house at about 11:30 a.m. 
on the day of the murder.  Shortly thereafter, at around 
11:45 a.m., Keck and Flinner left Flinner’s parents’ house 
separately — Flinner to go shopping and to a car wash with his 
son and Keck to go to Walmart and Vons.  Walmart’s video 
surveillance showed Keck entering and shopping in the store.  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
While Keck was at Walmart, phone records show she received 
two calls from Flinner, at 12:08 p.m. and 12:15 p.m., and Flinner 
confirmed in a police interview that he called Keck while she 
was at Walmart.  Video then showed Keck leaving the Walmart 
and, instead of driving to Vons, entering the Ultramar gas 
station. 
In the meantime, surveillance video showed the white 
Nissan NX driving back into the cul-de-sac at 12:02 p.m.  A man 
left the cul-de-sac by foot at 12:08 p.m. and headed toward the 
Ultramar gas station, where he arrived and waited in front of 
the station.  At 12:32 p.m., video showed Keck’s white Mustang 
coming into the Ultramar station and pulling up to where the 
man was waiting (although he was no longer visible in the 
surveillance video), and it then showed the Mustang leaving the 
station and heading toward the cul-de-sac.  About three minutes 
after the Mustang entered the cul-de-sac, video showed the 
white Nissan NX speeding out of it.2  
Shortly after the murder, a motorist discovered Keck’s 
body and called the police.  Keck’s body was found lying in front 
of her car.  The car’s engine was running, the hood was ajar and 
the passenger side door open.  Keck had been shot once in the 
back of the head.  This and other circumstantial evidence 
indicated that, once she had parked in the cul-de-sac, Keck left 
her car running and exited the vehicle.  While she was opening 
 
2  
We consider the details of the evidence concerning the 
events in the cul-de-sac during these three minutes in further 
depth below, in connection with Flinner’s claim that insufficient 
evidence supports the lying-in-wait special-circumstance 
finding.   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
the hood of her car, she was shot in the head from behind.  She 
died within a minute of being shot.   
Flinner attempted to cast the responsibility for Keck’s 
murder on others.  In the days before the murder, Flinner had 
told two sheriff’s deputies that one of his landscaping customers 
was “after him” and had tried to run him off the road, though he 
dismissed the deputies’ suggestion that Flinner file a police 
report.  During an interview with lead detective Rick Scully on 
the night of the murder, Flinner denied being near the cul-de-
sac that day and said he had never been to the cul-de-sac.  He 
again brought up the disgruntled customer and said that one of 
the customer’s associates had recently threatened his life and 
initiated a physical altercation with him.   
Later that night, the police searched Flinner and Keck’s 
apartment.  During the search, Detective Scully told Flinner 
that in his experience people who are found in isolated areas, as 
Keck was, are usually there for a drug deal or to meet a love 
interest.  At the time, Flinner rejected this theory of Keck’s 
death and police found no evidence suggesting Keck was using 
drugs.  But days later, Flinner contacted police to say he and his 
mother had found drugs and syringes while going through 
Keck’s possessions, and they turned them over to Detective 
Scully.  Within a week of the shooting, Flinner also reported he 
had received threatening phone calls from a Hispanic man with 
whom he had been in an altercation a decade before. 
Later in the investigation, Flinner attempted to frame or 
cast blame for Keck’s murder on various employees and business 
associates.  Flinner invited employee Martin Baker to dinner at 
his house about a month after the murder and spiked Baker’s 
chili with Xanax.  While Baker was passed out on Flinner’s 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
couch, Flinner called his friend Gilberto Lopez and asked Lopez 
to call Flinner’s home number from a pay phone.  Flinner then 
called the police and said that he had just received a call from a 
woman who claimed Baker had confessed to Keck’s murder and 
that Baker was currently asleep on his couch.   
Next, Flinner apparently tried to frame employee Charles 
Cahoon by planting a sock that contained bullets matching the 
bullet that killed Keck in Cahoon’s car.  DNA on the sock 
matched Keck’s and Flinner’s, but not Cahoon’s.  An anonymous 
letter accusing Cahoon of murder was also placed on a police car.  
Flinner also told detectives that his friend and business 
associate Rick Host said on his deathbed that Keck was killed 
due to her knowledge of a casino software scheme Host was 
involved with that also involved the North Korean government 
and mobsters in the United States.   
Finally, while in custody, Flinner claimed that his 
codefendant Ontiveros killed Keck after having an affair with 
her and that Ontiveros had put out a contract on Flinner’s life.  
Flinner also attempted to make it look like he was being 
targeted, planting bullets with his and Keck’s names on them 
on his parents’ property. 
Flinner also made several attempts to derail his trial.  
Flinner attempted to taint the witnesses in his case by mailing 
them letters containing information deemed inadmissible by the 
trial court so that the witnesses’ testimony would be rendered 
suspect and impeachable.  Flinner asked a fellow jail inmate, 
Gregory Sherman, to use his library privileges to look up the 
addresses of witnesses, detectives, the prosecutor, and the trial 
judge in his case.  Flinner told Sherman that he intended to 
sabotage his trial by sending witnesses letters with confidential 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
information that would preclude them from testifying.  He 
indicated that he would make it look like his former attorney or 
a detective in the case sent the letters and would then have an 
associate “take out” the fall guy.  Flinner then sent these names 
and addresses to a former girlfriend, Catherine McLarnan, 
along with a cover letter that he directed her to send to all of the 
witnesses.  He instructed her to use the address of his former 
defense attorney as the return address for the letters.  
McLarnan instead turned the information over to a defense 
investigator.   
Flinner had a backup plan to sabotage his trial:  He told 
Sherman that he planned to ensure that only property owners 
with unique names were impaneled as jurors so that he could 
easily look up their addresses through property records searches 
and send them similar letters with inadmissible evidence.  
Flinner said he would frame the prosecutor for sending this set 
of letters by using the prosecutor’s address as the return 
address.   
Flinner also made various threats intended to obstruct the 
prosecution of his case.  He asked fellow inmate James 
Theodorelos and another inmate to kill his codefendant 
Ontiveros.  When these inmates began cooperating with the 
prosecution, Flinner tried to intimidate them or pay them off.  
Finally, Flinner tried to intimidate the prosecutor by sending 
letters conveying threats against the prosecutor to Flinner’s 
family and other inmates, knowing the letters were being 
photocopied and read by the authorities.   
Flinner made a number of statements after Keck’s death 
that suggested he was complicit in her murder.  Robert Pittman, 
a former employee of Flinner, testified that the morning after 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
 
the murder Flinner called him and said that Keck had been shot 
in the back of the head, even though this information was not 
public at the time and the pathologist had not yet determined 
whether Keck was shot in the face or in the back of the head.  
Flinner described other details about the crime at times when 
they were not publicly known, such as that Keck’s car was 
running when found.   
A few days after the murder, Flinner went out to dinner 
and drinks with his friend Gilberto Lopez and Lopez’s girlfriend 
Marie Locke.  According to Lopez, Flinner got “tipsy” at the meal 
and became upset about Keck’s death, stating either “I shouldn’t 
have killed her” or “I should not have had her killed.”  On 
another occasion after Keck’s murder, and after Flinner had 
taken several sleeping pills, Flinner again said to Lopez, “I 
shouldn’t have killed her.”  In custody, Flinner told fellow 
inmate Theodorelos that Keck’s murder stemmed from an ill-
fated business transaction with “some overseas Asians.”  But 
Flinner subsequently told Theodorelos that he was sure to make 
credit card purchases at the time of Keck’s murder to create an 
alibi for himself and that he had bullets planted on his parents’ 
property and an anonymous note accusing Cahoon of killing 
Keck left on a police car. 
2. Defense Evidence 
The defense argument was that Flinner had nothing to do 
with Keck’s murder.  Flinner presented evidence that he was 
loving and kind toward Keck.  He also put on evidence intended 
to bolster several exculpatory theories Flinner had raised during 
the investigation and before trial.  According to Donald Landon, 
a business partner of Flinner’s friend Rick Host, Host was at the 
same Walmart as Keck the morning she was killed.  Landon also 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
testified about Host’s gambling ventures.  Flinner’s father 
testified that Flinner had received threatening phone calls after 
the murder and that Flinner’s parents had received anonymous 
calls as well.  The defense also presented evidence that there 
was a tunnel near the crime scene big enough for an adult to 
pass through that people used to pass under the nearby 
highway.   
Flinner sought to discredit some of the People’s evidence.  
A forensic accountant testified that while the prosecution had 
calculated Flinner’s debt at the time of the murder to be 
$194,000, the accountant calculated it to be about $94,000.  A 
custodian of records for a local news channel produced 
recordings of news broadcasts about the murder and testified 
that the channel publicized that Keck was shot in the head the 
morning after the murder, which could have explained how 
Flinner was able to report this information to Pittman on the 
same day; on cross-examination, however, the witness clarified 
that at no time did the broadcasts say that Keck was shot in the 
back of the head, as Pittman had testified Flinner told him.  
Prison inmate James Baggett testified that inmate Theodorelos 
said he intended to fabricate the statements from Flinner about 
the murder.  Flinner’s DNA expert challenged the prosecution 
expert’s conclusion that DNA found on the sock in Cahoon’s car 
belonged to Flinner.  A defense investigator testified that 
Martin Baker, one of the employees Flinner had tried to frame 
for Keck’s murder, had been prescribed Xanax after receiving 
treatment at the county mental health hospital, and defense 
counsel elicited Baker’s testimony on cross-examination that at 
the time of trial Baker was living in an assisted care facility and 
taking 
several 
antipsychotic 
medications. 
 
A 
defense 
investigator testified that after reviewing of the gas station 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
surveillance tapes, he was unable to identify the driver of the 
white Ford pickup truck. 
B. Penalty Phase 
The prosecution introduced the testimony of Keck’s family 
members, who described her early life and the impact that losing 
Keck had on them.  The prosecution also introduced the 
testimony of four women, including Flinner’s former wife, who 
described being sexually assaulted by Flinner after he drugged 
them, or other forms of physical and emotional abuse.  Finally, 
the prosecution introduced evidence of Flinner’s prior felony 
convictions for forgery, possession of stolen property, rape by a 
foreign object, three counts of grand theft, and failure to appear 
while on bail.  
The defense called Flinner’s mother and father, who 
testified 
about 
Flinner’s 
troubled 
childhood, 
including 
hyperactivity, various head injuries, behavioral problems, and 
psychiatric hospital admissions.  The defense introduced expert 
psychiatric evidence that Flinner suffered brain dysfunction 
from early childhood, possibly exacerbated by the use of illegal 
drugs and head injuries, which contributed to his criminal and 
antisocial behaviors.  Prison officers testified that Flinner had 
previously attempted suicide after he was returned to prison.  A 
correctional consultant testified about the security measures 
that would be in place if Flinner was sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole.  Flinner’s friend and a fellow inmate 
testified about Flinner’s efforts to help them during previous 
emergency situations.  Flinner’s son testified that he loved his 
father, who had kept in touch since he was arrested.   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
1. Pretrial Detention 
Flinner raises four claims of error stemming from 
Flinner’s pretrial relocation from a downtown San Diego jail 
facility to a more remote jail facility in Vista, which is in the 
northern part of San Diego County.  We conclude these claims 
lack merit. 
a. Background 
Flinner was detained in San Diego County facilities while 
awaiting trial.  In January 2002, defense counsel requested that 
Flinner remain in the downtown jail and not be moved to the jail 
in Vista.  The court entered a “request[],” but not an order, to 
that effect.   
As explained in greater detail above, while in jail Flinner 
sought to disrupt his upcoming trial.  With the help of Gregory 
Sherman, a fellow jail inmate with library privileges, Flinner 
obtained personal information about the prosecutor and trial 
judge, including their home addresses.  Sherman later gave his 
account of their activities to the San Diego County District 
Attorney’s Office.  The information was passed to the San Diego 
County Sheriff’s Department, as well as the trial judge, Allan J. 
Preckel.  
At a January 17, 2003, ex parte hearing, the prosecutor 
discussed this information with Judge Preckel.  Immediately 
afterward, Judge Preckel held a security meeting with sheriff’s 
department personnel, the supervising judge of the courthouse, 
and the prosecutor, but not defense counsel.  The supervising 
judge requested Flinner be moved to a more secure housing unit 
to prevent him from gathering further information and 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
attempting to manipulate events outside the jail.  The assistant 
sheriff proposed the Vista facility as having the most secure cells 
but noted that if Flinner were moved to Vista the court would be 
“hearing from the defense attorney.”  Judge Preckel agreed 
Flinner’s attorneys would be displeased, but the supervising 
judge indicated he approved of the move.  No order was issued.   
Later in January 2003, the sheriff transferred Flinner to 
Vista and placed him in administrative segregation, restricting 
his visitation and telephone privileges.  At a conference with all 
parties and counsel on February 28, 2003, the trial court 
summarized Flinner’s custodial status as related by the sheriff’s 
office:  Flinner was housed in an isolation cell and allowed no 
contact with other inmates; he was permitted three 20-minute 
telephone calls per week to Sandra Resnick, one of his two 
attorneys, and 45-minute personal visits with Resnick or John 
Mitchell, his other attorney, if they gave a day’s notice.  The 
court added that Flinner was permitted visits with the defense 
investigator.  The court emphasized that it had not ordered 
these restrictions and was generally not inclined to interfere 
with the sheriff’s decisions on jail operations.  Attorney Resnick 
complained that the distance to Vista and the limits on 
communications would 
slow 
down 
the 
defense team’s 
preparation for trial; in particular, Resnick expressed 
frustration at the inability of defense team members other than 
herself to arrange telephone conversations with Flinner.  In 
response, the court stated it was willing to consider making 
orders to allow increased contact “as they are presented to me.” 
After the February 28 conference, the trial court issued an 
order providing information Sherman had supplied to Flinner’s 
attorneys but prohibiting them from revealing the information 
to Flinner or other members of the defense team.  On March 11, 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
defense counsel, in an ex parte hearing, complained about the 
restrictions on their communication with and access to Flinner.3  
Counsel’s primary concern was that their relationship with 
Flinner would be disrupted by their inability to tell him about 
Sherman’s disclosure.  Attorney Mitchell stated that the 
restriction “requires me to lie to my client, at least by omission 
and possibly by commission.”  Attorney Resnick explained that 
Flinner had been asking why he had been moved to Vista and 
had his telephone privileges restricted.  By not telling him the 
reasons these security measures had been taken, Resnick 
“almost began to feel as though [she] was lying to [her] client by 
omission.” 
Attorney Mitchell also elaborated on the difficulties with 
the Vista location and the telephone restrictions.  Driving to and 
from Vista meant each visit took half a day.  In order to prepare 
for trial and maintain their relationship with a sometimes 
difficult client, Mitchell and Resnick each tried to visit Flinner 
once a week, while their investigator did so twice a week.  The 
telephone restrictions prevented Mitchell or the investigator 
from talking to Flinner by phone.  When Mitchell visited 
Flinner, jail officers searched his briefcase. 
In response, the trial court repeated that it was not 
inclined to second-guess the sheriff’s department as to the 
appropriate housing for Flinner or, at least “here and now,” as 
to telephone privileges.  Attorney Mitchell suggested that, given 
 
3 
In the interim, the trial court had, at defense request, 
issued three orders allowing increased contact between Flinner 
and the defense team:  Counsel and the investigator were given 
access to Flinner in the holding area before and after court 
appearances, and two defense trial consultants were permitted 
contact visits with him. 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
the security measures in place, the court could relax the 
prohibition on counsel telling Flinner and their investigator 
about the information Sherman had provided.  The court found 
Mitchell’s suggestion “well taken” and proposed discussing it 
further at an upcoming conference with all counsel.   
On March 14, 2003, after an additional brief ex parte with 
Flinner’s attorneys, the trial court conferred with counsel for all 
parties, with neither defendant present.  The court explained 
that with Flinner now securely housed at Vista and a mail cover 
and telephone restrictions in place, the court tentatively 
planned to lift its previous prohibition on defense counsel 
discussing Sherman’s disclosure with Flinner and members of 
the defense team, with the proviso that the written materials 
would still not be provided to Flinner.  The court noted that its 
previous order would remain in place for a reasonable period so 
that Sherman could be provided whatever additional security 
was deemed necessary.   
Asked for comment, Attorney Mitchell said that the court’s 
proposal to lift the prohibition on talking to Flinner about 
Sherman’s disclosure “makes good sense.”  He expressed the 
hope that this “resolution” would allow defense counsel to 
“finesse” their previous concealments from their client and 
“move on in terms of the attorney/client relationship.  We’re 
going to be together for a while in this matter.”  As to Flinner’s 
housing and telephone restrictions, Mitchell “assume[d]” that 
the defense was “stuck with that,” that as the court had said 
earlier, “You run the courtroom and they run the jail, and you’re 
not going to get involved unless it fouls up your courtroom.”  
Mitchell went on to observe that a time might come when the 
defense needed greater access to Flinner, for example to have an 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
 
expert consult by telephone, “but we may be able to do that on a 
case by case basis, so I’ll kind of leave that aside.”   
The prosecutor raised no objection to the court’s tentative 
order but requested a few days to alert Sherman’s current 
confinement facility and allow them to take necessary security 
measures.  The court set a further conference for March 19, five 
days later.  At that hearing, the prosecutor confirmed necessary 
measures had been taken, and the court issued the order.   
b. Discussion 
i. Interference with Attorney-Client 
Relationship  
Flinner contends that the trial court, prosecutor, and 
sheriff interfered with his attorney-client relationship by 
moving him to the Vista detention facility and restricting his 
telephone 
and 
visiting 
privileges, 
in 
violation 
of 
his 
constitutional rights to due process and the assistance of 
counsel.  Flinner maintains the imposition of these restrictions 
“greatly interfered with the preparation of [his] defense by 
requiring a time-consuming 82 mile round trip for each visit, 
barring visits from members of the defense team other than 
appointed counsel, and sharply limiting the time counsel had to 
confer with their client.”  The trial judge, Flinner argues, also 
violated his constitutional rights by permitting the sheriff to 
impose these restrictions without a contested evidentiary 
hearing to determine the credibility of Sherman’s disclosure, 
and by ordering defense counsel to “lie” to their client by 
concealing the disclosure from him.   
At the threshold, we agree with the Attorney General that 
these claims were forfeited by Flinner’s failure to raise them 
below.  Although defense counsel complained of the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
inconvenience of visiting Flinner at the Vista facility and of his 
limited telephone privileges, counsel never asserted these 
conditions infringed on Flinner’s right to counsel or, for that 
matter, any other legal right.  Nor did Flinner or his attorneys 
demand an evidentiary hearing on whether he could be kept in 
administrative segregation based on Sherman’s report.4  Having 
made no objection or request on these grounds, Flinner failed to 
preserve his due process and right to counsel claims. 
Nor do the claims have merit.  Visiting Flinner at the Vista 
facility was undoubtedly inconvenient for the defense team, but 
nothing in the record suggests Flinner’s housing or telephone 
restrictions prevented counsel from effectively communicating 
with Flinner in order to prepare for trial.  The trial court, at 
defense request, permitted increased communication with 
members of the defense team (see fn. 3, ante) and the court said 
nothing to preclude further accommodations as needed “on a 
case by case basis,” as Attorney Mitchell put it.  Trial counsel’s 
 
4  
Attorney Mitchell initially stated he was “concerned by the 
acceptance of what this individual [Sherman] said as being the 
truth.”  But he never asked for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine that point.  After Judge Preckel explained that he 
was inclined to substantially credit Sherman’s information — 
because the informant had “provided a lot of detail,” much of 
which rang true, and he “knows too much to simply be creating 
this out of whole cloth” — Mitchell did not raise the point again. 
 
At oral argument, defense counsel asserted that further 
defense complaints or requests would have been futile because 
the trial judge had disavowed any authority over jail 
confinement conditions.  The record does not support this 
assertion:  Though the judge indicated he would generally defer 
to the sheriff’s department, he also agreed to make changes after 
defense complaints, and did not close the door to additional 
accommodations.   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
principal concern, the court’s order prohibiting them from 
telling Flinner about Sherman’s report, was in place less than 
three weeks before being resolved by the trial court’s revised 
order on March 19, 2003.  At the March 14 hearing, Mitchell 
expressed the hope this would allow any damage to the attorney-
client relationship to be repaired over the long pretrial and trial 
period to come, and Flinner points to nothing in the record 
suggesting it did not.   
Had Flinner requested a hearing on his placement in 
administrative segregation, and done so in an appropriate 
forum, he might have been entitled to one.  (See In re 
Davis (1979) 25 Cal.3d 384, 390–391 [where state prison 
regulations set out “specific circumstances under which 
administrative segregation may be imposed,” “ ‘the inmate has 
an interest, conferred by statewide regulation and protected by 
due process, in not being confined in maximum security 
segregation unless he is found, for clearly documented reasons, 
to come within the standard set by the rules’ ”].)  But without 
any such request at the time, and with no indication in the 
record that Flinner’s housing placement deprived him of any 
trial right or prejudiced the result of his trial, he is not entitled 
to a reversal on this ground.  
ii. Violation of Right to be Present at All 
Critical Stages of Proceedings  
Flinner next asserts that the trial court violated his right 
to be present all critical stages of proceedings, pointing to the ex 
parte discussions with jail personnel and the in camera 
discussions with the attorneys.  Contrary to the Attorney 
General’s argument, Flinner had no effective opportunity to 
object to proceedings at which he was not present, and therefore 
did not forfeit his due process claim.  The claim fails on the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
merits, however, because none of these pretrial proceedings, 
which 
concerned 
only 
the 
circumstances 
of 
Flinner’s 
confinement in jail, were critical to the determination of guilt or 
penalty.   
A defendant has the constitutional right to be personally 
present in court “where necessary to protect the defendant’s 
opportunity for effective cross-examination, or to allow him to 
participate at a critical stage and enhance the fairness of the 
proceeding.”  (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1299.)  It 
does not extend to “in camera discussions on matters bearing no 
reasonable, substantial relation to the defense of the charge.”  
(Ibid.)  And while ex parte proceedings are generally disfavored, 
“the trial court retains discretion to conduct in camera, ex parte 
proceedings to protect an overriding interest that favors 
confidentiality.”  (Ibid.)  The same standard for requiring the 
defendant’s personal presence applies under California law, and 
to prevail on such a claim under federal or state law the 
defendant bears the burden of showing “that his absence 
prejudiced his case or denied him a fair trial.”  (People v. 
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357; accord, People v. 
Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 799.) 
The ex parte proceedings in this case were occasioned by 
the revelations of a jailhouse informant, Sherman, that while in 
jail Flinner had been engaging in investigative activities aimed 
at disrupting his upcoming trial, including obtaining personal 
information about the prosecutor and trial judge.  The trial court 
acted within its discretion in excluding Flinner, and initially his 
attorneys, from these proceedings until Flinner had been placed 
in a more secure housing unit where his communication with 
other inmates could be controlled.  Most important, Flinner fails 
to demonstrate that his absence from the hearings on his 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
housing and telephone privileges resulted in any actual 
prejudice to his defense.  The ex parte hearings did not concern 
the conduct of the trial, but only pretrial security measures.  
And as observed above, despite the inconvenience caused by 
Flinner’s housing in Vista and the discomfort defense counsel 
felt about temporarily concealing Sherman’s disclosure from 
Flinner, the record gives no indication the defense team was 
ultimately prevented from effectively preparing for trial.   
iii. Prosecutorial Bias 
 
Flinner argues that the prosecutor was biased against him 
after the prosecutor learned of Flinner’s death threats against 
him.  Flinner asserts that this bias is manifest in the decision to 
have Flinner transferred to the Vista jail, a decision for which, 
he asserts, the prosecutor was at least in part responsible.  
During a February 28, 2003, status conference, Defense 
Attorney Resnick told the court that a sheriff’s captain at the 
Vista facility said the security of Flinner’s confinement was 
being monitored by Deputy District Attorney Paul Morley, a 
division chief within the district attorney’s office.  Based on that 
apparent involvement by the prosecutor’s office, Flinner asserts 
the trial prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Rick Clabby, 
misrepresented his influence in assuring defense counsel, “I 
have absolutely no control over what the jail does.” 
Flinner forfeited this claim by failing to raise it below.  Once 
the information provided by Sherman became available to 
defense counsel, any claim of prosecutorial bias could and 
should have been raised by a motion under Penal Code section 
1424 to disqualify Prosecutor Clabby for a claimed conflict of 
interest.  Counsel neither moved for disqualification nor 
asserted by any other means that Clabby harbored a 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
disqualifying bias against their client.  “Defendant’s failure to 
move to disqualify the district attorney in the trial court bars 
appellate review of the claim.”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 342, 438.)   
In any event, nothing in the record indicates that Flinner’s 
threats and insults aimed at Prosecutor Clabby created a bias 
that threatened the fairness of the proceedings.  If the existence 
of threats were sufficient by itself to require disqualification, a 
disruptive scheme like Flinner’s could easily succeed.  “[W]ere it 
possible for a defendant charged with serious crimes to 
disqualify the prosecutors trying the case from proceeding with 
the prosecution by threatening them, willful defendants would 
be handed a powerful weapon to disrupt the course of justice.”  
(Millsap v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 196, 204.)  The 
fact that the district attorney’s office was monitoring Flinner’s 
housing status and communications restrictions does not show 
that Clabby or any other member of the office acted improperly.  
Having learned from Sherman of Flinner’s plans to disrupt the 
trial, prosecutors had a legitimate interest in seeing that 
security measures were taken to prevent those plans from being 
executed.   
iv. Judicial Bias 
Flinner also argues Judge Preckel was biased after he was 
warned that Flinner had made a threat against him.  Flinner 
infers bias from Judge Preckel’s “refus[al] to become involved in 
the unconstitutional restrictions the prosecutor and jailer had 
arranged, which improperly limited appellant’s access to his 
counsel.”  Flinner argues it was therefore a due process violation 
for Judge Preckel to preside over his trial.   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
The Attorney General argues this claim was forfeited by 
Flinner’s failure to move for Judge Preckel’s recusal.  Flinner 
responds that his codefendant had already used a peremptory 
challenge (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6) against the judge previously 
assigned.  He concedes, however, that he could have requested 
recusal on grounds of bias (id., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1)), though he 
insists that would have “run the risk of further alienating” 
Judge Preckel.  We agree with the Attorney General that if 
Flinner believed his threat had resulted in a bias against him 
on Judge Preckel’s part, he should have requested the judge 
recuse himself on that basis, either via the statutory procedure 
cited above or by a nonstatutory motion invoking Flinner’s right 
to due process.  Instead, according to Attorney Mitchell, Flinner 
said he “feels he’s very comfortable” having Judge Preckel 
preside over his trial.  Flinner cannot now ask for reversal on 
the basis of a claimed error he accepted without complaint 
below.5 
We also reject Flinner’s due process claim on its merits.  A 
due process claim of this type requires a showing that “under 
the ‘extreme facts’ of the case, ‘the probability of actual bias rises 
to an unconstitutional level.’ ”  (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 
Cal.4th 993, 1001.)  Here there are no extreme facts and no 
probability of actual bias.  Although Sherman had reported that 
Flinner raised the possibility of trying to kill his prosecutor and 
trial judge, there was no indication of imminent or severe 
 
5  
Flinner cites Arizona v. Fulminate (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 
310, for the proposition that a structural defect like trial by a 
biased judge cannot be forfeited.  The cited passage, however, 
states only that such structural defects are not subject to 
harmless error analysis; it says nothing about forfeiture. 
 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
danger to Judge Preckel or anyone else.  When first discussing 
Sherman’s information with the court, the prosecutor 
summarized the general threat level from Flinner as justifying 
“concern[]” and “aware[ness],” but did not “assess[] it much 
higher than that.”  The record provides nothing to support 
Flinner’s assertion that the judge “likely feared” Flinner. 
As for the court’s deference to the sheriff’s department on 
details of Flinner’s housing and communications restrictions, 
such deference creates no inference of fear or bias.  It is as 
consistent, or more so, with Judge Preckel’s repeated 
explanation that he respected the lines between judicial and law 
enforcement authority and expertise, and therefore would no 
more tell the sheriff how to run the jail than he would expect 
that officer to tell him how to run his courtroom.   
Nor, finally, did Judge Preckel display indifference to 
Flinner’s rights and interests.  To the contrary, he showed a 
willingness to make and change orders as defense counsel 
convinced him was necessary for the attorney-client relationship 
and the defense team’s trial preparation.  No probability of 
unconstitutional bias appears from the record. 
2. Denial of Flinner’s Severance Motions  
Flinner contends that he was denied the right to due 
process and a fair trial when the trial court declined to fully 
sever his case from that of his codefendant Ontiveros and 
instead empaneled two separate juries for a joint trial.   
“Penal Code section 1098 provides, in relevant part:  
‘When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any 
public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be 
tried jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials.’  ‘Joint 
trials are favored because they “promote [economy and] 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
efficiency” and “ ‘serve the interests of justice by avoiding the 
scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  
‘When defendants are charged with having committed “common 
crimes involving common events and victims,” as here, the court 
is presented with a “ ‘classic case’ ” for a joint trial.’  [Citation.]  
We review a trial court’s denial of a severance motion for abuse 
of discretion, based on the facts at the time of the trial court’s 
ruling.  [Citation.]  ‘Even if a trial court abuses its discretion in 
failing to grant severance, reversal is required only upon a 
showing that, to a reasonable probability, the defendant would 
have received a more favorable result in a separate trial.’ ”  
(People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 819 
(Daveggio).)  “Conversely, even if a trial court acted within its 
discretion in denying severance, ‘ “the reviewing court may 
nevertheless reverse a conviction where, because of the 
consolidation, a gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Thompson 
(2016) 
1 
Cal.5th 
1043, 
1079 
(Thompson).)  
“Defendants bear the burden of establishing that the trial was 
grossly unfair and denied them due process of law, and ‘a 
judgment will be reversed on this ground only if it is “reasonably 
probable that the jury was influenced [by the joinder] in its 
verdict of guilt.” ’ ”  (Daveggio, at p. 821.) 
Before trial, the prosecution conceded that dual juries 
were appropriate but contended that the cases should proceed 
in a single trial.  Flinner’s counsel moved to sever the cases 
completely on the ground that Flinner and Ontiveros intended 
to present antagonistic defenses.  Flinner planned to argue that 
he was not involved at all in Keck’s killing, while Ontiveros 
intended to show that Flinner was the mastermind of the 
murder and manipulated Ontiveros into participating.  As we 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
have explained, “ ‘[m]utually antagonistic defenses are not 
prejudicial per se.’ ”  (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1081, 
quoting Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 538.)  In 
Daveggio, for example, we rejected an antagonistic-defense 
argument similar to the one raised here, in which one 
codefendant’s defense was that her codefendant “controlled her 
and was the instigator of their joint crimes.”  (Daveggio, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 819.)   
Flinner posits that the conflict here rises beyond mere 
antagonism; he claims that the two positions are “completely 
irreconcilable” because “[i]f the jury believed Ontiveros, it would 
have to convict [Flinner].”  We have explained that “antagonistic 
defenses require severance only when ‘ “ ‘the conflict is so 
prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury 
will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that 
both are guilty.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  ‘If the moving party’s guilt can be 
established by sufficient independent evidence, “it is not the 
conflict alone that demonstrates . . . guilt,” and severance is not 
required.’ ”  (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820.)   
We made the statements above in the context of a joint 
trial before a single jury.  Whether antagonistic defenses ever 
require severance in the context of separately empaneled juries 
is unclear, but we need not decide that general question here.  
Flinner cannot show, in any event, that in this case the conflict 
between the two defenses alone established guilt, given the 
overwhelming independent evidence against him, including the 
video surveillance evidence showing Flinner and Ontiveros 
meeting shortly before the murder near the scene of the crime 
and the inculpatory statements Flinner made to Lopez.  The 
nature of Flinner’s and Ontiveros’s defenses would not have 
compelled severance even in a single-jury trial.  A fortiori, they 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
did not do so in a dual-jury trial, where evidence properly 
admitted solely for or against one defendant could be excluded 
as to the other.6  
Nor did the existence of Ontiveros’s incriminating 
confession require the trial court to grant Flinner’s severance 
motion.  The existence of an “ ‘ “incriminating confession” ’ ” is 
one of many “[f]actors that may bear on a trial court’s decision 
to order separate trials.”  (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 
274.)  But it is settled that a trial court may resolve admissibility 
problems posed by a codefendant’s confession by empaneling 
dual juries at a single trial, as the court did here, instead of 
ordering separate trials.  (See People v. Anderson (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 372, 387; Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1085 [“ ‘[W]e 
have upheld the use of separate juries for jointly tried 
defendants, as an alternative to outright severance’ ”].) 
Flinner argues that the single trial raised issues under 
Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 (Bruton) and 
 
6  
In Zafiro v. United States, supra, 506 U.S. at page 539, the 
high court explained that when defendants have been properly 
joined, antagonistic defenses call for severance “only if there is 
a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial 
right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making 
a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”  As examples, the 
court pointed to the possibility that “evidence that the jury 
should not consider against a defendant and that would not be 
admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted against a 
codefendant” or that “[c]onversely, a defendant might suffer 
prejudice if essential exculpatory evidence that would be 
available to a defendant tried alone were unavailable in a joint 
trial.”  (Ibid.)  The dual-jury procedure appears to solve most or 
all such evidentiary problems, suggesting that antagonistic 
defenses do not require severance where the defendants have 
separately empaneled juries. 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford) because 
the prosecution was permitted to introduce parts of Ontiveros’s 
postarrest confession through Detective Scully before Flinner’s 
jury.  As we explain in detail below, no Bruton issue arose 
because Flinner and Ontiveros were tried by separate juries.  
Flinner does, however, establish that the trial court committed 
Crawford error in admitting parts of Ontiveros’s confession 
against Flinner.  But it was not the nature of the single trial 
that produced this error:  Before the high court decided 
Crawford, the trial court ruled portions of Ontiveros’s confession 
admissible against Flinner as statements against penal 
interest.  The trial court’s error was in admitting Ontiveros’s 
statements in violation of the confrontation clause, not in 
denying Flinner’s severance motion.  The basis for the trial 
court’s ruling — that Ontiveros’s statements were admissible 
against Flinner as statements against interest — would have 
permitted their introduction even at a separate trial.  (See 
pt. II.B.7., post.) 
Flinner moved to sever his case again midtrial after 
Ontiveros’s cross-examination of the state’s witness Charles 
Cahoon.  Defense counsel argued that Cahoon’s testimony as 
elicited by Ontiveros’s counsel was “not quite character 
assassination, but . . . awful close to it.”  The trial court denied 
the motion.  Cahoon testified that he was afraid of Flinner, that 
Flinner was manipulative, and that Cahoon was not involved in 
the murder, contrary to the allegations in an anonymous letter 
left on a police sergeant’s windshield.  Defense counsel appeared 
most concerned with the trial court’s admission, over Flinner’s 
objection, of Cahoon’s statement that Flinner “is a very bad man 
and he should be stopped” and that “he doesn’t deserve to even 
be with us here on Earth,” given in response to a question by 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
Ontiveros’s counsel about why Cahoon belatedly came forward 
to Detective Scully with information implicating Flinner.  
Flinner does not now argue that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying this second severance motion; instead, he 
lists Cahoon’s testimony as one illustration of how the 
antagonistic defenses unfairly prejudiced him.  We disagree.  As 
we explain later, the trial court did not err in admitting 
Cahoon’s statements, which could with equal propriety have 
been elicited by the prosecution.  (See pt. II.B.1.c., post.) 
We also reject Flinner’s claim that reversal is required 
because the trial court’s failure to sever allowed Ontiveros to act 
as a “second prosecutor.”  As we have previously explained in 
rejecting a similar argument, just “because the prosecution’s 
case will be stronger if defendants are tried together, or that one 
defense undermines another, does not render a joint trial 
unfair.”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 
335, 379.) 
Flinner argues that Ontiveros was permitted to introduce 
evidence damaging to his defense that the prosecution did not 
offer, but he does not establish that the prosecution would have 
been unable to offer the same evidence against him.  Flinner’s 
argument focuses in particular on the admission of hearsay 
statements that he made to Gilberto Lopez that Flinner 
“shouldn’t have killed her” or “should not have had her killed,” 
referring to Keck.  Although Flinner complains that Ontiveros 
and not the prosecution called Lopez and that Ontiveros’s 
counsel did not ask Lopez any question about Ontiveros, the fact 
remains that the prosecution could have offered the very same 
evidence against Flinner, regardless of whether the two 
defendants were jointly tried.   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
Flinner complains that Ontiveros was responsible for the 
admission of other pieces of damaging evidence as well, but the 
evidence in question was in fact introduced by the prosecution, 
not Ontiveros.  For example, Flinner notes that “[i]t was 
Ontiveros’[s] counsel who had a police sergeant read a portion of 
an anonymous letter found on the windshield of his patrol car,” 
but it was actually the prosecution that called the sergeant as a 
witness and projected the relevant portion of the letter for the 
jury to read.  Similarly, Flinner complains that Ontiveros’s 
counsel attempted to impeach a mental health expert called by 
Flinner to challenge Martin Baker’s competency and that 
Ontiveros’s counsel elicited testimony from the state’s forensic 
computer examiner that Flinner used his computer to print 
fraudulent checks.  But in each case, Ontiveros’s questioning 
largely replicated the prosecution’s earlier work.  Flinner does 
not argue that any of this evidence was inadmissible, and the 
fact that it was first introduced by the prosecution rebuts the 
argument that its damaging effects stemmed from the joint 
nature of the trial.  In any event, “no denial of a fair trial results 
from the mere fact that two defendants who are jointly tried 
have antagonistic defenses” and one offers evidence “that is 
damaging to the other and thus helpful to the prosecution.”  
(People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 313.)  
Flinner also points to a number of instances in the record 
where he claims that Ontiveros was permitted to ask 
inappropriate questions.  In some of these instances, Flinner 
simply misreads the record.  He suggests that Ontiveros’s 
counsel was permitted to present damaging “innuendo” evidence 
against Flinner when Ontiveros’s counsel asked prosecution 
witness Robert Pittman whether he had ever heard that 
Flinner’s first wife “had died mysteriously.”  In fact, it was 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
Flinner’s counsel, not Ontiveros’s, who posed this question to 
Pittman.  In other instances, Flinner objects to questioning by 
Ontiveros that was substantially the same as a line of 
questioning first posed by Flinner or the prosecution.  Flinner 
objects to questions that Ontiveros’s counsel posed to witness 
Sterling Thomas about whether Flinner had asked Thomas to 
steal his Chevy SUV so that Flinner could file an insurance 
claim, whether Flinner had “hit on” Thomas’s fiancée, or 
whether Flinner said he wanted to “get rid of” his girlfriend 
(even though Thomas denied some of these conversations ever 
took place and said that others were in jest).  But it was Flinner 
who called Thomas as a witness, and Flinner who first brought 
up the alleged conversation in which Flinner asked Thomas to 
steal his truck.  As for Thomas’s testimony that Flinner said he 
wanted to “get rid of” his girlfriend, it was the prosecution that 
first elicited the testimony on cross-examination.  In any event, 
regardless of whether Ontiveros was the first to ask the 
questions or merely followed up on the questions already asked 
by others, the jury was properly instructed that questions are 
not evidence, and we presume it followed the court’s 
instructions.  (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)   
Flinner argues that Ontiveros’s defense strategy reduced 
the People’s burden to prove Flinner’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but we are not persuaded.  “[T]his was not a case in which 
only one defendant could be guilty.  The prosecution did not 
charge both and leave it to the defendants to convince the jury 
that the other was that person.  Here the prosecution theory was 
that both defendants participated in, and were guilty of, the 
murder.”  (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1287.)  
The prosecution put on substantial evidence of Flinner’s guilt, 
including evidence that Flinner met with Ontiveros the day of 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
 
the murder to run through the plan, that Flinner made 
incriminating statements before and after he was charged with 
Keck’s murder, and that he attempted to pay Ontiveros for his 
role in the crime. 
Finally, Flinner argues that the trial court’s failure to 
sever his case produced gross unfairness because Ontiveros used 
the codefendants’ single peremptory challenge to dismiss the 
original judge, ostensibly preventing Flinner from dismissing 
Judge Preckel for alleged bias.  As we have explained 
(pt. II.A.1.b.iv., ante), Ontiveros’s use of the single statutory 
peremptory challenge did not prevent the defense from raising 
a nonstatutory motion for recusal.  Thus, any prejudice flowed 
from Flinner’s failure to object and not from the trial court’s 
failure to order severance.  And, in any event, as we have 
explained, Flinner’s judicial bias claim fails on the merits; Judge 
Preckel’s presiding did not render Flinner’s trial unfair.  
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Admissibility of Consciousness of Guilt and 
Witness Fear Evidence  
Flinner asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence that he obtained or planned to obtain the home 
addresses of persons connected to the trial, that he threatened 
the prosecutor, and that certain witnesses were afraid of or 
intimidated by him. 
Under the Evidence Code, “[e]vidence must be relevant to 
be admissible.  (Evid. Code, § 350.)  Moreover, even if relevant, 
it may be excluded if the court determines that its prejudicial 
impact substantially outweighs any probative value.  (Id., 
§ 352.)  We afford trial courts wide discretion in assessing 
whether in a given case a particular piece of evidence is . . . more 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
 
prejudicial than probative.”  (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
527, 558.)  
Flinner argues that the challenged evidence was 
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial in violation of Evidence Code 
sections 350 and 352.  He also argues that admission of the 
evidence violated his rights to due process and a reliable penalty 
determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
We address each category of challenged evidence in turn. 
a. Flinner’s Attempt To Obtain Addresses of 
Witnesses, Judge, Prosecutor, and Potential 
Jurors 
Flinner first asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence that he obtained or planned to obtain the home 
addresses of various persons connected to his trial.  Inmate 
Gregory Sherman, who was housed in the same area as Flinner 
at the county jail, was called as a prosecution witness.  As noted 
above, Sherman had special privileges at the jail’s law library — 
including access to unmonitored phone calls and the internet — 
because he represented himself pro se.  He also had past 
experience tracking down people’s addresses through public 
record searches.  Sherman testified that after Flinner learned 
about his library privileges and skills, Flinner asked him for 
help in obtaining the addresses of prosecution witnesses, as well 
as the prosecutor, the judge, and the bailiff in his case. 
Flinner explained that he intended to sabotage the trial by 
flooding the witness pool with letters containing confidential 
information about the case; he expected this tactic would 
preclude the witnesses from testifying.  He planned to make it 
look like the letters came from one of the lead detectives in his 
case or his prior defense attorney, and he told Sherman that he 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
knew some people who he would then direct to “take . . . out” the 
person he framed.  If that plan failed, Flinner had a “plan B” 
that he shared with Sherman:  Flinner would try to ensure that 
the jurors selected to serve in his case were homeowners with 
uncommon names, so that he could easily track down their home 
addresses.  As with the witness pool plan, Flinner would then 
send the jurors packets of information about the case intended 
to disqualify the jurors from serving.  For this scheme, Flinner 
suggested to Sherman that he would make it look like the 
prosecutor sent the packets.  
The prosecution also called Catherine McLarnan, who 
previously dated Flinner.  She testified that after she visited 
Flinner in jail, he sent her a package containing a list of names 
and addresses of witnesses, a letter to send to those witnesses, 
and instructions on how to prepare the letters.  Flinner asked 
her to type up the letter, wear latex gloves while preparing the 
letters and envelopes, and use the address of his former defense 
attorney as the return address.  He explained that the letter 
included evidence deemed inadmissible by his trial judge and 
that, by sending it to all the witnesses, he would be able to “ ‘ruin 
the People’s case.’ ”  McLarnan testified that she did not follow 
Flinner’s directions and instead turned the materials from 
Flinner over to his defense investigator.  
Flinner argues that this evidence about his efforts to 
tamper with the witnesses and the jury was irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial, but he does not point to a specific trial 
objection to this evidence.  We thus agree with the Attorney 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
 
General that the issue has been forfeited by lack of objection.7  
We reject the claim for lack of merit in any event.  As the jury 
was instructed (with a version of CALJIC No. 2.06), a 
defendant’s efforts to suppress harmful evidence can be 
probative of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.  Sherman’s 
and McLarnan’s testimony concerning Flinner’s plans to tamper 
with the witnesses and jury pool was relevant to show his 
consciousness of guilt.  Nor was this evidence was unduly 
prejudicial:  None of this testimony suggested that Flinner 
intended to threaten or harm the jurors, as opposed to a 
detective or defense attorney, and we conclude that any 
prejudice that may have arisen from jurors’ awareness that 
 
7  
In response to the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument, 
Flinner points to an asserted trial court order that all defense 
objections are made on all relevant state and federal grounds.  
As we explain later in this opinion (see pt. II.B.3., post), the 
order in question did not operate to generally excuse Flinner 
from objection requirements.  He also attempts to demonstrate 
that the trial court did, in fact, consider an objection to the 
evidence and overruled it.  But there is nothing in the record to 
support the contention.  Flinner invokes a “discussion regarding 
appellant’s alleged efforts to suppress or fabricate evidence,” but 
cites a transcript page that does not exist.  Next, Flinner points 
to the trial court’s consideration of a pretrial motion which the 
court characterized as concerning “purported efforts by and on 
behalf of Mr. Flinner to fabricate and/or suppress evidence” but 
none of the documents (letters authored by Flinner) that the 
court went on to consider concern Sherman or McLarnan.  
Finally, Flinner points to a hearing in which, he says, the “court 
overrules defense objections to evidence regarding McLarnan.”  
But the record contains no indication that such a thing occurred 
at the hearing; instead, it appears from the record that the 
materials that McLarnan handed over to the defense 
investigator were first brought to the court’s attention at this 
hearing, and the court agreed to defense counsel’s request to 
consider the materials in camera at a later time. 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
 
Flinner sought out and may have discovered the jurors’ 
addresses was outweighed by the probative value of this 
testimony.   
b. Flinner’s Threats to the Prosecutor 
Flinner also claims that the trial court erred in admitting 
portions of three letters he wrote expressing hatred toward the 
prosecutor and threats against the prosecutor or his family.  The 
first is a letter that Flinner wrote to his mother, where he 
characterized the prosecutor as a “little maggot.”  The letter goes 
on to state:  “You’d think a guy who achieved as he is could afford 
more than a $263,000 mortgage.  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . .  His wife must 
be unquestionably ill-bred, empty, and misguided being with 
him, either that or one hideous, sordid shrew with a back harrier 
[sic] than his own. . . .  I hope he dies young.  The Freedom of 
Information Act is a great thing. . . .  Looking forward to getting 
out of here and moving to Chula Vista so I can hang out with all 
of my great friends.” 
The second letter is one that Flinner wrote to an inmate 
at another prison with whom Flinner corresponded frequently.  
It reads, in part:  “Have you ever heard of the Freedom of 
Information Act?  Why is it okay for him to know all about me, 
and yet I’m not supposed to know anything about him? . . .  One 
cannot be a true adversary without knowledge of his opponent 
and his critical position in life. . . .  [¶] . . . [¶] . . .  He has me 
locked away in solitary confinement so as not to be able to talk 
to the other convicts, et cetera.  But I ride four busses [sic] when 
I go to court and can speak to whomever I wish.  Many people 
know the things that I want them to know.  One thing is for sure, 
this shit is a long way from over.  [¶]  Anyway, just thought I’d 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
 
put that out there in case this sorry piece of shit happens to read 
this, miserable mother fucker.” 
The third letter Flinner points to is one he sent to another 
inmate.  The court admitted only part of this letter, which 
included the following statement:  “By the way, the dicks [on top 
of each page of the letter] are for the D.A.’s memory.  He’s [sic] 
trying to send him a subliminal message, actually a series of 
them.  First, I will fuck him in front of his wife and kids when 
I’m free.”   
Before trial, the prosecution had sought to admit these 
and several other letters written by Flinner disparaging the 
prosecutor, illustrating Flinner’s knowledge of personal details 
about the prosecutor like his home address and wife’s name, 
disclosing such information to other inmates, and threatening 
harm to the prosecutor and his family.  The prosecution argued 
that this evidence was relevant to showing Flinner’s efforts to 
intimidate the prosecutor and thereby hinder the prosecution of 
the case.  Although these letters were sent to third parties and 
not directly to the prosecutor, the prosecution asserted that 
Flinner knew his letters were being photocopied and monitored 
by the authorities.  Defense counsel objected to the admission of 
the letters, arguing that Flinner was merely “venting his 
frustrations regarding his situation rather than attempting to 
hinder the prosecution of this case” and was just trying to “get[] 
a rise out of” the prosecutor.  To the extent the letters were 
relevant, Flinner urged, they should be excluded as unduly 
prejudicial.  The court agreed with the prosecution that these 
letters supported the inference that Flinner was trying to alter 
the course of the prosecution by intimidating the prosecutor, but 
it carefully walked through the letters and excluded many 
entirely and others in part under Evidence Code section 352.  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
 
We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the 
portions of the three letters of which Flinner now complains.  We 
agree with the trial court that these letters contained not-so-
veiled threats against the prosecutor and his family, which were 
relevant to whether Flinner attempted to suppress evidence by 
obstructing the prosecution of his case and thus tend to 
demonstrate consciousness of guilt.  (See People v. Hamilton 
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 408, 429 [where the defendant knew his 
jailhouse letter would be copied and read by authorities, his 
reference to threats against the prosecutorial team made by an 
acquaintance, which were to be carried out if the defendant was 
convicted, 
constituted 
a 
form 
of 
“subtle 
attempt 
at 
intimidation”].)  We also conclude that the court acted within its 
discretion in admitting under an Evidence Code section 352 
analysis the portions of the letters that Flinner points to here.  
We do not think the jury would be biased by the derogatory 
characterizations of the prosecutor as a “little maggot” or a 
“miserable mother fucker,” especially in light of the evidence of 
the actual crimes at issue in this case.  The probative value of 
Flinner’s pointed references to details about the prosecutor’s 
personal life outweighs any prejudice that might have arisen 
from the jurors’ knowledge that Flinner was targeting the 
prosecutor.  We cannot say the trial court abused its wide 
discretion in admitting these threats.   
Finally, Flinner suggests that it was unduly prejudicial to 
expose the jurors to both the violent threats Flinner made 
against the prosecutor and his attempts to collect the jurors’ own 
addresses.  He reasons that the jurors might have inferred that 
he would retaliate against them or their families, too, and they 
would be prejudiced against him as a result.  We conclude the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting either 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
 
category of evidence.  As we have already explained, the 
probative value of Flinner’s attempts to obtain jurors’ addresses 
and his threats against the prosecutor was significant, and we 
are not convinced that any additional prejudice arising from the 
synergy of these two strains of evidence substantially 
outweighed that probative value.   
c. Witnesses’ Fears of Flinner 
Flinner argues that the trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony of three witnesses in which each expressed fear of 
Flinner.  The Attorney General argues that, in each instance, 
the witness’s fear of Flinner was relevant to the witness’s 
credibility and therefore admissible.  We consider each witness’s 
testimony in turn.  
Witness Charles Cahoon testified about Flinner’s attempt 
to frame him for Keck’s murder.  The prosecution sought to show 
that Flinner was responsible for planting a sock with bullets 
inside it in Cahoon’s car.  Cahoon testified that he saw Flinner 
break into his apartment shortly before Cahoon found the sock 
in his car, and that Cahoon realized his car keys were missing 
shortly after the apartment break-in.  On cross-examination, 
Flinner’s attorney elicited testimony that, when Cahoon first 
reported the incident to the police, Cahoon said the intruder 
looked like a Mexican person and resembled Flinner’s friend, 
Gilberto Lopez.  During later cross-examination by Ontiveros’s 
counsel and redirect examination by the prosecution, Cahoon 
explained that he had always thought the intruder was Flinner 
but had been reluctant to name him because Cahoon was afraid 
of Flinner.  Over Flinner’s objection, the trial court permitted 
Cahoon to explain why he ultimately chose to come forward and 
name Flinner:  “Because I think he is a very bad man and he 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
 
should be stopped.  And I think he doesn’t deserve to even be 
with us here on Earth.” 
On recross-examination, Flinner’s counsel attempted to 
impeach Cahoon by portraying Cahoon as a biased witness who 
was trying to ensure Flinner’s conviction.  Defense counsel 
elicited Cahoon’s testimony that Cahoon had been trying to find 
out what he “could do to go ahead and help to get [Flinner] off 
the street and away from the public eye and so he couldn’t hurt 
or kill anybody else.”  And Cahoon confirmed, upon defense 
counsel’s followup, that this was his “angle” — that he did not 
like Flinner and did not think he “should be with us here.”  At 
defense counsel’s request, the trial court struck other portions 
of Cahoon’s testimony as nonresponsive, including Cahoon’s 
statement that he was still scared of Flinner and thought “what 
he’s doing to [codefendant Ontiveros] is ridiculous.” 
We conclude the trial court properly admitted this 
testimony.  Cahoon’s description of his initial fear in response to 
questioning by the prosecution and by Ontiveros’s counsel were 
relevant to Cahoon’s credibility:  His fear of Flinner provided an 
explanation for why he did not immediately name Flinner as the 
home intruder.  Cahoon did express strong negative feelings 
about Flinner alongside his fear; some of his statements held a 
potential for prejudice within the meaning of Evidence Code 
section 352.  But the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion 
to balance that potential against the statements’ probative 
value in showing how Cahoon overcame his fear of testifying.  
We note as well that Cahoon’s later statements against Flinner 
— that Cahoon was testifying in order to get Flinner “off the 
street and away from the public eye and so he couldn’t hurt or 
kill anybody else” and that he did not think Flinner “should be 
with us here” — were elicited by Flinner’s own attorney, 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
 
presumably believing these statements useful to show Cahoon’s 
bias.  Flinner cannot claim error in admission of evidence he 
elicited.  (See People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1139 
[if there was error, it was invited]; People v. Escobar (1996) 48 
Cal.App.4th 999, 1022, fn. 4 [rejecting defendant’s claim of 
inadmissibility of evidence where defendant “not only failed to 
object to the admission of the evidence, but . . . sought its 
admission”].)   
Next, Flinner argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting prosecution witness Ronald Millard’s statement that, 
although Flinner had never threatened or harmed him, Millard 
felt intimidated by Flinner.  Millard, who had worked for 
Flinner, testified to aspects of the relationship between Flinner 
and Ontiveros.  On cross-examination, Flinner’s attorney asked 
the following questions: 
“Q:  Did Mr. Flinner ever threaten you personally? 
“A:  No. 
“Q:  Did Mr. Flinner ever touch you physically? 
“A:  No. 
“Q:  Did Mr. Flinner ever do anything to make you 
personally afraid of him where he said something to you 
concerning anything. 
“A:  He’s a very intimidating man.”  
As with Cahoon’s later statements of fear, defense counsel 
initiated this line of questioning and did not ask the trial court 
to strike Millard’s answer that Flinner is “a very intimidating 
man,” the only portion of Millard’s testimony to which he now 
objects.  Under these circumstances, his claim of error is not 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
 
cognizable on appeal.  (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 1139.)  
Finally, Flinner returns to McLarnan’s testimony.  The 
prosecutor asked McLarnan what she did upon receiving the 
letter from Flinner asking her to send letters to witnesses in his 
case.  When she said that, at first, she “didn’t do anything with 
it” and ultimately turned it over to the defense investigator, the 
prosecutor asked whether she ever contacted police or the 
district attorney’s office to tell them about Flinner’s letter.  She 
said she had not.  The prosecutor proceeded to ask her whether 
she had been concerned about her family’s safety should Flinner 
find out about her decision not to help him.  Over Flinner’s 
objection on grounds of relevance and undue prejudice, the trial 
court allowed McLarnan to answer that she “was concerned 
about Michael’s reaction” and she “was concerned for [her] son.”  
The prosecutor also introduced portions of a letter she sent to 
the defense investigator in which she wrote, “I’m seriously 
concerned for my family’s safety should Michael find out about 
this,” and queried, “Do you think we’ll need protection?”  
We conclude that this evidence was relevant.  “Evidence 
that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for 
testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is 
therefore admissible.”  (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 
833, 869.)  McLarnan’s explanation of why she was afraid was 
“likewise relevant to her credibility” and its admission “well 
within the discretion of the trial court.”  (Ibid.)  McLarnan did 
not initially tell anyone about the letter that she received from 
Flinner and never handed the information over to the 
authorities; her fears of what Flinner would do if he found out 
about her actions were relevant to why she held this information 
so closely and did not come forward immediately with it, despite 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
 
her understanding that the letter could be seen as tampering 
with witnesses and hampering Flinner’s trial.  (People v. 
Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1085 [“a trial court has 
discretion, within the limits of Evidence Code section 352, to 
permit the prosecution to introduce evidence supporting a 
witness’s credibility on direct examination, particularly when 
the prosecution reasonably anticipates a defense attack on the 
credibility of that witness”].)  And this evidence was not unduly 
prejudicial:  Though McLarnan’s statements suggest she feared 
some kind of retaliation from Flinner, she did not testify that 
Flinner had ever threatened or harmed her, including during 
their prior relationship or when she visited him in prison.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code 
section 352 in admitting evidence of her concern.  
2. Flinner’s Derogatory Statements About Keck  
Flinner argues that the trial court improperly admitted 
derogatory and callous comments he made about Keck before 
and after her death.  Tiffany Faye testified about a visit that 
Flinner made to the flower shop where she worked to purchase 
flowers for Keck’s funeral.  During the visit, Flinner yelled at a 
woman driving by in a car, “Hey baby, I’m single now,” and 
laughed.  In declining to add a message to accompany the 
flowers he purchased, Flinner told Faye, “Tammy is dead.  It’s 
not like she can read it anyway,” and laughed again. David 
Pemberton, a contractor who met Flinner at their local Chamber 
of Commerce meetings, testified that Flinner referred to Keck 
as a “bitch,” “cunt,” and “slut” in front of her and others.  Flinner 
contends that these statements should have been excluded as 
irrelevant or, even if relevant, as substantially more prejudicial 
than probative.  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
 
Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine to 
introduce this and other evidence concerning Flinner’s strained 
relationship with Keck.  The prosecution argued that this 
evidence was admissible in part because it “clearly rebuts 
[Flinner’s] claim that he ‘loved’ Tamra and therefore could not 
have killed her.”  Flinner opposed the admission of much of this 
evidence, arguing that it was highly prejudicial and irrelevant, 
but acknowledged that some evidence of Flinner’s lack of grief 
after Keck’s death might properly come in.  The trial court 
concluded that evidence of the strained nature of Flinner’s and 
Keck’s relationship was relevant and admissible to establish 
motive, identity, and state of mind, reasoning in part that 
“defendant is not entitled to have the jury determine his guilt or 
innocence on a false presentation of their relationship.”  But the 
court restricted the evidence that the prosecutor could present 
to the jury based on an analysis under Evidence Code section 
352. 
We conclude the trial court properly admitted the 
contested testimony of Faye and Pemberton.  Flinner’s 
derogatory characterizations of Keck, made both in Keck’s 
presence and as well as in front of others, are relevant to proving 
his strained relationship with Keck and thus his relative 
willingness to have her killed in furtherance of his own material 
gain.  His callous remarks in Faye’s presence shortly after 
Keck’s death are relevant to establishing his lack of sorrow, thus 
refuting the defense’s theory that Flinner was in love with Keck 
and therefore would not have been involved in her murder.  And 
the probative value of these statements was not substantially 
outweighed by any prejudicial impact.  These disparaging 
remarks were not particularly inflammatory considering the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
 
other evidence that Flinner arranged and facilitated a cold-
blooded murder for financial gain.8  
3. Admissibility of Series of Writings Allegedly 
Authored by Flinner or at His Direction  
Flinner argues that the trial court erred in admitting a 
series of letters, a telephone call recording, and two bullet 
casings with “Tammy” and “Mike” written on them, all allegedly 
authored by Flinner or made at his direction.  He asserts that 
none of these writings was properly authenticated, in violation 
of Evidence Code section 1401, as well as his right to confront 
the witness against him under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Flinner also contends that this evidence was 
irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative, 
and that its admission thus violated Evidence Code sections 350 
and 352, as well as his rights to a fair trial and a reliable penalty 
determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
With respect to a majority of these pieces of evidence, 
Flinner has forfeited his objection based on lack of 
authentication.  Flinner argues that he preserved all his 
authentication claims for our review.  Without fully explaining 
his argument on this point, he points to a pretrial ruling in 
which he claims the court granted his request that all objections 
by the defense be regarded as having been made on all relevant 
state and federal grounds.  But this ruling was not a sweeping 
 
8  
Flinner briefly suggests that his comments about Keck 
were inadmissible hearsay.  But he fails to explain how these 
comments were offered for the “truth of the matter stated” (Evid. 
Code, § 1200), as opposed to showing Flinner’s state of mind.  
Nor does he explain why, if considered hearsay, they would not 
fall within the exception for statements of a party opponent.  
(Id., § 1220.)  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
 
authorization to remain silent at trial and raise objections for 
the first time on appeal.  Instead, the trial court granted, 
without objection from the prosecution, what the court described 
as “a rather standard motion in a capital case” filed on behalf of 
codefendant Ontiveros and joined by Flinner:  that defense 
objections as raised on the record may be deemed, without 
otherwise being expressly stated, to be objections based on 
California state constitutional as well as United States 
constitutional grounds.  We have held that “[w]hen ‘new 
arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from 
those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert 
that the trial court’s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the 
reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional 
legal consequence of violating the Constitution . . . [a] 
defendant’s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on 
appeal.’ ”  (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730, fn. 19; see 
also People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 [explaining that, 
“[a]s a general matter, no useful purpose is served” by declining 
to consider such constitutional claims on appeal].)  The trial 
court’s order did nothing more than confirm that a defendant 
does not forfeit an argument on appeal that is “merely a 
constitutional ‘gloss’ ” upon an objection properly raised below.  
(Redd, at p. 730, fn. 19.)  But it is still generally the case that a 
defendant forfeits an argument on appeal where he fails to 
object at all to the evidence in the trial court or when he objects 
on substantively distinct grounds.  (See, e.g., People v. Partida 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433–434 [“ ‘[W]e have consistently held 
that the “defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific 
objection” on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground 
not cognizable’ ”].)  The trial court did not rule otherwise.  And 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
 
here, Flinner failed to adequately object to most of the writings 
he now complains about.  
Under the Evidence Code, authentication of a writing — 
including documents, audio recordings, and “every other means 
of recording upon any tangible thing” (Evid. Code, § 250) — is 
required before the writing may be admitted in evidence (id., 
§ 1401).  “Authentication is to be determined by the trial court 
as a preliminary fact ([id.,] § 403, subd. (a)(3)) and is statutorily 
defined as ‘the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a 
finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence 
claims it is’ or ‘the establishment of such facts by any other 
means provided by law’ ([id.,] § 1400).  The statutory definition 
ties authentication to relevance.  As explained by the California 
Law Revision Commission’s comment to section 1400, ‘[b]efore 
any tangible object may be admitted into evidence, the party 
seeking to introduce the object must make a preliminary 
showing that the object is in some way relevant to the issues to 
be decided in the action.  When the object sought to be 
introduced is a writing, this preliminary showing of relevancy 
usually entails some proof that the writing is authentic.’ ”  
(People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266 (Goldsmith).)  
“The proponent’s assertion as to why the writing is relevant 
determines what the proponent claims the writing is, typically 
that it has some specific connection to a person or organization, 
whether through authorship or some other relation.  It is this 
connection that must be proved to authenticate the writing.”  (2 
McCormick, Evidence (7th ed. 2013) § 221, pp. 82–83, fns. 
omitted; Goldsmith, at p. 267 [“The first step is to determine the 
purpose for which the evidence is being offered.  The purpose of 
the evidence will determine what must be shown for 
authentication, which may vary from case to case”].)   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
 
“The foundation requires that there be sufficient evidence 
for a trier of fact to find that the writing is what it purports to 
be, i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered.  [Citation.]  
Essentially, what is necessary is a prima facie case.  ‘As long as 
the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing 
is admissible.  The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn 
regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight as 
evidence, not its admissibility.’ ”  (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 
at p. 267.)  We review a trial court’s finding that sufficient 
foundational facts have been presented to support a writing’s 
admissibility for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 415, 466.)  
Here, the prosecution introduced the challenged writings 
for the purpose of showing that Flinner attempted to derail the 
investigation of Keck’s death by framing others for her murder 
while making himself appear innocent or, indeed, another target 
of her killer(s).  Flinner argues that the prosecution failed to 
properly authenticate these writings because the prosecution 
did not make a sufficient preliminary showing that Flinner was 
the author of these writings or that he directed others to create 
them.  The Attorney General responds that a preliminary 
showing that Flinner authored these writings was unnecessary 
because these writings were not offered for the truth of their 
contents but rather “for the jury to specifically consider whether 
Flinner authored or caused their production.”  The Attorney 
General asserts that “when the content of the writing or the 
truthfulness of the assertions in the writing are not at issue, 
authentication as to authorship is largely unnecessary,” citing 
People v. Adamson (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 714, 720 (Adamson). 
As an initial matter, the Attorney General’s interpretation 
of Adamson is flawed and his reliance on the case is misplaced.  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
 
Adamson stands for a narrower proposition:  namely, that 
preliminarily establishing the author of a writing is not 
necessary if the authorship of the writing is irrelevant.  In 
Adamson, the prosecution had introduced a letter a witness 
received in order to establish that the witness had acted 
pursuant to the letter.  (Adamson, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at 
p. 720.)  The court concluded the prosecution was not required 
to make a preliminary showing that the letter was genuinely 
written by the alleged author, because “[w]hether it be genuine 
or a forgery, it was merely offered to show that [the witness] was 
motivated by it in his actions.”  (Ibid.)  In such instances, where 
authorship is irrelevant and the sole issues are whether a 
witness “receive[d] th[e] material, and if so what effect, if any, 
did it have on [his] mind[],” we have confirmed that establishing 
authorship is not necessary to properly authenticate a writing.9  
(People v. Marsh (1962) 58 Cal.2d 732, 740 [discussing 
Adamson].)  Here, unlike in Adamson, the prosecution 
introduced the series of writings at issue precisely for the 
purpose of establishing that Flinner wrote them or directed 
their production.  Authorship was not irrelevant; it was, rather, 
the central purpose for which the writings were introduced.  For 
 
9  
The Adamson court’s conclusion that authentication is 
“not necessary” under these circumstances, however, is 
inaccurate as stated.  (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., 29B 
pt. 5 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2015 ed.) foll. § 1401, p. 203.)  
Although proof of genuineness was unnecessary in Adamson, 
“[u]nder the Evidence Code, the requirement of authentication 
would require a showing that the letter offered in evidence was 
in fact the one received and acted upon; and this is the 
preliminary showing that was found sufficient in the Adamson 
case.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., 29B pt. 5 West’s Ann. 
Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1401, p. 203.)   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
 
that reason, and contrary to the Attorney General’s contention, 
the prosecution was required to make a preliminary showing 
that these writings were what the prosecution claimed them to 
be:  writings created by Flinner or at his direction.  
That said, we conclude that the writings at issue here were 
properly authenticated or could have been authenticated had an 
objection been timely raised.  “ ‘[A] writing can be authenticated 
by circumstantial evidence and by its contents’ ” (People v. 
Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 87 (Landry)), and we agree with the 
Attorney General that “the prosecutor presented circumstantial 
evidence sufficient to enable the jury to ascertain that [Flinner] 
was responsible for the writings.”  We address each of the 
challenged writings in turn.  
a. Anonymous Letter Implicating Cahoon 
A few weeks after Keck was killed, a police officer found 
an anonymous letter left on the windshield of his police car.  The 
letter claimed that Charles Cahoon had killed Keck.  Flinner did 
not object to the introduction of this evidence on authentication 
grounds, and his claim is thus forfeited. 
Even if Flinner had objected, we conclude it was not an 
abuse of discretion to admit the letter.  The prosecution 
introduced circumstantial evidence that provided a sufficient 
preliminary showing for the prosecution to put the letter before 
the jury, which then had to make the ultimate factual 
determination of whether Flinner did indeed author it.  During 
the trial, the prosecution introduced other evidence tending to 
prove that Flinner attempted to frame Cahoon for Keck’s 
murder.  Cahoon testified that Flinner broke into his apartment 
and that shortly after the break-in, Cahoon realized that his car 
keys were missing.  Around the time the police officer found the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
 
anonymous letter framing Cahoon, Cahoon found a sock with 
bullets inside it hidden in his car, which he turned over to 
Detective Scully.  A criminalist specializing in DNA typing 
testified that he analyzed DNA found on the sock and concluded 
that it contained a mixture of DNA from Keck and a man.  The 
male DNA matched Flinner’s profile in many respects and the 
criminalist concluded that it was quite likely that the DNA was 
in fact from Flinner.  He also concluded that the male DNA could 
not have come from Cahoon.  Although this circumstantial 
evidence of Flinner’s other attempts to frame Cahoon is not 
conclusive of the letter’s authorship, it was sufficient to admit 
the letter.  “ ‘The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn 
regarding’ ” the letter’s authorship “ ‘goes to the document’s 
weight as evidence, not its admissibility.’ ”  (Goldsmith, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 267.)  
b. Anonymous Letter Implicating Software 
Developer 
In February 2001, Flinner’s mother received an 
anonymous letter posted from New York and made up of letters 
cut out of a magazine.  The letter’s contents made little sense 
but included the following passage:  “My continuing professional 
work is on improving the reliability of software. . . .  We have got 
a head start of 100 years.  Forced to kill the fiancé[e].  She knew 
too much.”  The letter also said, “Keep him quiet.”  Flinner failed 
to object to the admission of the letter; he therefore has forfeited 
his appellate claim that the letter should not have been 
admitted.  The claim also fails on the merits.  In the months 
leading up to the letter’s delivery, Flinner shared a theory that 
Keck was killed due to her knowledge of a scheme in which the 
North Korean government was seeking to have special gambling 
software delivered to mobsters in the United States.  Flinner 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
 
said that a friend and business partner, Rick Host, was involved 
in the scheme.  Host passed away after Keck’s death, but Flinner 
claimed that just before Host’s death, Host told Flinner that 
Keck was killed because she had too much information about the 
gambling software.  In light of this circumstantial evidence, one 
plausible inference is that Flinner had someone send the 
anonymous letter to Flinner’s mother to buttress Flinner’s story 
that Keck was killed due to her connection with the North 
Korean gambling software scheme, and not by Flinner.    
c. First Letter Implicating Host and Ontiveros 
Shortly after a press release announced that the police had 
taken Ontiveros into custody, police intercepted a letter 
addressed to Ontiveros.  The letter was signed “Eli” and blamed 
Ontiveros for ruining a hit on “the target” and “Mike.”  It reads, 
in part, “What were you doing?  ICSC with Rick [Host] were 
acting on behalf of Kwan and they selected the target for a 
reason. . . .  [Y]ou need to keep your mouth shut.  If things go 
bad, blame everything on Mike.”  The letter also expressed 
concern “that Rick may have told Mike all that was going on 
before his death,” and purported to remind Ontiveros that he 
was “instructed not to call or see Rick after . . . giving him back 
his car.”  Flinner failed to object to this letter in the trial court 
and has thus forfeited the claim that it should not have been 
admitted.  And, as with the letter to Flinner’s mother, it was not 
an abuse of discretion to admit this letter.  The other 
circumstantial evidence that Flinner was trying to pin blame on 
Ontiveros, Host, and the North Korean government supports 
the inference that Flinner forged this letter.  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
 
d. Second Letter Implicating Host and Ontiveros 
Before trial, Judge Preckel received a letter written in 
broken English from a person claiming to know Ontiveros.  The 
letter asserted that “a man named Rick” paid Ontiveros “to kill 
the girl.”  It explained that Keck’s boyfriend — who “never know 
about this” — lent a car to Rick, who then lent it to Ontiveros.  
Rick told Keck to pick up Ontiveros, who then shot her in the 
head.  The letter was signed “A.”  Flinner did not object to the 
admission of the letter and has forfeited his challenge on 
authentication grounds.  The challenge is also meritless.  As 
discussed above, the prosecution introduced other evidence 
tending to prove that Flinner tried to implicate Rick Host in 
Keck’s death.  And the prosecution also introduced other 
evidence that Flinner attempted to pin the blame for Keck’s 
death on Ontiveros:  Flinner sent a series of letters to religious 
organizations claiming that Ontiveros killed Keck.  He also sent 
a letter to United States Representative Duncan Hunter 
(discussed below) claiming that Ontiveros killed Keck and that 
her death was related to the gambling software scheme.  In light 
of this other evidence making it possible to infer that Flinner 
caused this letter to be sent as part of his plan to shift blame 
from himself to Host and Ontiveros, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to admit the letter.  
e. Anonymous Phone Call Implicating “Ernesto” 
A few days after Keck’s murder, the sheriff’s department 
received a phone call from a Spanish-speaking woman who 
declined to identify herself.  She claimed that a man named 
Ernesto told her that he killed Keck because he wanted to take 
revenge on Flinner.  The woman explained that Ernesto “had 
had some problems with Mike like . . . like 10 years ago.”  And 
she said that Ernesto told her that Keck had been driving a 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
 
white Mustang the day of the murder, that Ernesto went to Vons 
or a gas station to pick her up, and that they went to a dead-end 
street where Ernesto “killed her with a 45.”  The Attorney 
General concedes that Flinner objected to the introduction of 
this phone call on authenticity grounds.    
We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in 
overruling the defense objection and admitting the phone call.  
Days after the sheriff’s department received the anonymous call, 
Flinner passed along to Detective Scully a voicemail message 
that Flinner received from a man with a “strong, Hispanic 
accent.”  The caller said, “Mike, I see your wife Sunday [the day 
of the murder].  I see you next.  Bye.”  Flinner explained to 
Detective Scully that “[t]he only time [he] ever had a problem 
with anybody that was Hispanic” was 10 years earlier, when he 
got into an argument with a group of “Mexican folks.”  The police 
had not told Flinner about the anonymous call claiming that 
Ernesto had killed Keck in revenge for a decade-old problem.   
One possible inference in light of this evidence is that the 
anonymous caller was telling the truth about Ernesto.  But 
another inference, in light of the other, substantial evidence that 
Flinner attempted to frame others for Keck’s death, is that 
Flinner arranged for the initial anonymous phone call to be 
placed to the sheriff’s department to deflect attention from 
himself.  The factual determination of whether Flinner was 
responsible for the call was properly put to the jury.  Again, 
“ ‘[t]he fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding’ ” the 
call’s origin goes to the call’s weight and not its admissibility.  
(Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267.)   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
 
f. Bullets with “Mike” and “Tammy” Written on 
Them 
During the investigation, Flinner’s father found a 
container on his property with two bullets in it, which he turned 
over to the police.  One was a spent casing with “Tammy” 
written on it, and the other was a live bullet with “Mike” written 
on it.  The bullets were of the same caliber and make as the 
bullet that killed Keck.  James Theodorelos, a cooperating 
informant who met Flinner in prison, testified that Flinner told 
him that Flinner had “put a few bullets on his parents’ property, 
one had been spent, with the initial of [Keck’s] name and the 
other one was the initial of [Flinner’s] name.”  Flinner did not 
object to the introduction of the bullets and has forfeited the 
claim that they were improperly admitted.  In any event, in light 
of Theodorelos’s testimony linking Flinner to the bullet writings, 
the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in 
admitting evidence of the two bullets.  
g. Letters to John Martin 
One of Flinner’s fellow inmates, John Martin, turned over 
to Detective Scully two letters that Flinner had allegedly 
written.  In the first letter, the author claimed that Theodorelos 
turned on the author:  “You see, [Theodorelos] has taken all of 
what I’ve shared about matters and twisted them up into his 
favor, saying that I told him that I sent the letter from the east 
to my parents, that I put . . . the casings on my dad’s property et 
cetera.”  The letter also asks Martin to “remember the times . . . 
I had mentioned things like how my folks had received threats 
from the east coast and how my father found shell casings on his 
property and things about my business partner telling you that 
Asians were involved in that deal with my wife and things like 
that.”  The second letter, which appears to respond to an 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
 
intermediate letter from Martin, laments that Martin has 
“decided to flip the script” and says that “the district attorney’s 
office will invariably find their way to you now because of this 
letter I just got from you.”  The trial court overruled defense 
counsel’s objection to these letters on foundation and hearsay 
grounds, and the Attorney General does not argue that Flinner 
forfeited his authentication objection to them. 
We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting these 
letters because their contents and other circumstantial evidence 
presented by the prosecution sufficiently authenticated the 
letters.  The content of the first letter connects it to Flinner:  The 
letter discusses the bullet casings that Flinner’s father found, 
the letter that his mother received from New York (a threat from 
“the east coast”), and the theory that Keck was tied up in a “deal” 
with some “Asians” (similar to the North Korean gambling 
software scheme theory).  It also faults Theodorelos, the same 
man who testified against Flinner at trial, for cooperating with 
the prosecution.  (See Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 87 [relying 
on the contents of a letter to support the letter’s authenticity, 
even where the information relayed in the letter may have been 
known by individuals other than the alleged author]; see also 
Evid. Code, § 1421 [“A writing may be authenticated by evidence 
that the writing refers to or states matters that are unlikely to 
be known to anyone other than the person who is claimed by the 
proponent of the evidence to be the author of the writing”]; id., 
§ 1410 [“Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit the 
means by which a writing may be authenticated or proved”].)  
Though the second letter does not contain similar references to 
personal information about Flinner and his case, the jury could 
reasonably infer from its contents that it was part of the same 
conversational chain; the letter reads as if it is a reply from 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
 
Flinner to a letter sent by Martin addressing Flinner’s first 
letter.  (Cf. Evid. Code, § 1420 [“A writing may be authenticated 
by evidence that the writing was received in response to a 
communication sent to the person who is claimed by the 
proponent of the evidence to be the author of the writing”].) 
h. Letter to Member of Congress  
While in jail before trial, Flinner wrote a letter to United 
States Representative Duncan Hunter.  In the letter, Flinner 
explained that his former employee was responsible for Keck’s 
murder, that “the Korean gaming industry” arranged the 
murder because Keck “was in possession of crucial software 
desired to promote and advance political payoffs,” and that 
Flinner had learned all of this from “a now deceased business 
associate . . . on his death bed.”  Flinner did not raise an 
authentication objection in the trial court and has forfeited that 
claim.  In any event, the letter was properly authenticated.  
Before the letter was introduced, the prosecution had Detective 
Scully explain how he had requested a mail cover for Flinner’s 
jail mail and that he had accordingly received photocopies of all 
Flinner’s incoming and outgoing mail, including the letter to 
Representative Hunter.  (See, e.g., Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 87.)  
Although Flinner lumps this letter in with the other 
writings to which he objects on authentication grounds, 
Flinner’s complaint about this letter is primarily based on other 
concerns.  Specifically, Flinner claims that jail employees 
violated Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601 in reading his letter 
to Representative Hunter and asserts that the letter should 
have been suppressed on that basis.  Penal Code section 2601, 
subdivision (b) lists a series of civil rights that a person 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
58 
 
sentenced to prison retains, including the right “[t]o correspond, 
confidentially, with any member of the State Bar or holder of 
public office, provided that the prison authorities may open and 
inspect incoming mail to search for contraband.”  (Italics added.)  
Penal Code section 2600, subdivision (a) provides that an inmate 
may be deprived of those rights only “as is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”  Flinner did not object to the 
introduction of his letter to Representative Hunter on this or 
any other ground in the trial court and has thus forfeited this 
claim.  Any error would also be harmless under any standard, 
given the wealth of similar evidence that Flinner attempted to 
place blame for Keck’s murder on the North Korean gambling 
industry and various employees and associates. 
In sum, Flinner’s objections to these eight writings are all 
either forfeited or meritless.  We also reject Flinner’s claim that 
these writings were irrelevant or substantially more prejudicial 
than probative (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352):  These writings 
supported the prosecution’s theory that Flinner attempted to 
obstruct the investigation and prosecution of the case, from 
which the jury could properly infer a consciousness of guilt.  And 
none of the letters created a substantial risk of undue prejudice.  
4. Admissibility of Flinner’s Statements Suggesting 
He Killed Keck  
Flinner contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
statements he made to his friend Gilberto Lopez, suggesting 
that Flinner killed Keck or had Keck killed.  Flinner argues that 
these statements were hearsay and that they are insufficiently 
reliable to admit as statements against interest.  Even if these 
statements were not inadmissible hearsay, he asserts, they 
should have been excluded as substantially more prejudicial 
than probative.  He maintains that the admission of these 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
59 
 
statements violated his rights to confrontation, a reliable 
penalty determination, and due process under the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments.   
Lopez testified that a few days after Keck’s murder he 
went out to dinner with his girlfriend Marie Locke and 
Flinner.10  He recalled Flinner having two large drinks and 
described him as becoming “tipsy” and seeming “really sad, 
really down.”  During the meal, Flinner stated, “I shouldn’t have 
killed her.”  On cross-examination, Lopez acknowledged Flinner 
may have just been “talking trash” that night, and that Lopez 
had thought at the time that Flinner was blaming himself but 
did not think Flinner was, in fact, responsible for Keck’s death.  
Lopez also testified about another occasion after the murder, in 
which Flinner had taken sleeping pills and was “acting all 
groggy, mumbling.”  While Lopez was helping Flinner up to his 
bed, Flinner said, “I shouldn’t have killed her.” 
Flinner’s hearsay objection to the admission of this 
testimony lacks merit.  Hearsay is an out-of-court statement 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is generally 
 
10  
Flinner made no objection to Lopez’s testimony.  The 
hearing to which Flinner points as containing an objection 
instead concerned a defense request for a mistrial arising from 
a related, but significantly different, event:  The subsequently 
stricken double-hearsay testimony (discussed further below) of 
Lopez’s girlfriend, Marie Locke, about Lopez’s relation to her of 
Flinner’s statement in the restaurant.  In arguing for a mistrial, 
defense counsel at no point suggested that Lopez’s testimony 
about the statement would be inadmissible.  The court denied 
the mistrial motion and a related motion to strike the testimony 
of an investigator but did not rule on any question regarding 
testimony by Lopez himself.  Despite the lack of an objection, 
the Attorney General does not assert the claim is forfeited. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
60 
 
inadmissible.  (Evid. Code, § 1200.)  But there are a number of 
exceptions to this rule.  One, the party-admission exception 
codified in Evidence Code section 1220, covers “[e]vidence of a 
statement . . . when offered against the declarant in an action to 
which he is a party . . . .”  Flinner was of course a party to this 
action.  The parties focus on another, related exception to the 
hearsay rule, the exception for statements against interest:  
“Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient 
knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the 
statement, when made . . . so far subjected him to the risk of 
civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his 
position would not have made the statement unless he believed 
it to be true.”  (Id., § 1230.)  “The proponent of such evidence 
must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the 
declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when 
made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to 
warrant admission despite its hearsay character.”  (People v. 
Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610–611 (Duarte).)  “In 
determining whether a statement is truly against interest 
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is 
sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take 
into account not just the words but the circumstances under 
which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the 
declarant, and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.”  
(People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745.)  We review the 
application of the statement against interest exception to the 
particular facts of a case for abuse of discretion, but whether a 
trial court has correctly construed Evidence Code section 1230 
is a question of law that we review de novo.  (People v. Grimes 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 712.) 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
61 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
Flinner’s statements to Lopez, regardless of whether we focus 
on the statement of party opponent exception in Evidence Code 
section 1220 or the statement against interest exception in 
Evidence Code section 1230.  Although Lopez’s testimony was 
offered by codefendant Ontiveros rather than by the People, it 
was nonetheless “offered against” Flinner within the meaning of 
Evidence Code section 1220.  As discussed earlier, Ontiveros’s 
defense was antagonistic to Flinner’s:  Ontiveros sought to show 
Flinner manipulated him into participating in Keck’s killing, 
while Flinner denied all involvement.  Lopez’s testimony that 
Flinner took responsibility for killing Keck clearly harmed 
Flinner’s case, as well as helping Ontiveros’s.  (Cf. People v. 
Allen (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 426, 433 [to be relevant under Evid. 
Code, § 1220, “the statement must assert facts which would 
have a tendency in reason either (1) to prove some portion of the 
proponent’s cause of action, or (2) to rebut some portion of the 
party declarant’s defense”].) 
As for section 1230, Flinner does not dispute that he was 
“unavailable as a witness” within the meaning of Evidence Code 
section 1230, since he had asserted his Fifth Amendment right 
not to testify.  And his statements that he should not have killed 
Keck are, on their face, clearly contrary to his penal interests as 
they admit culpability for her murder. 
Flinner nevertheless argues that the circumstances 
surrounding the two statements establish that they are not 
sufficiently disserving of his interests nor sufficiently reliable to 
justify admission.  Flinner notes that he was under the influence 
of alcohol or sleeping pills when he allegedly made these 
statements and that Lopez may not have taken them literally.  
He relies on Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th 603, in which the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
62 
 
declarant admitted shooting at a house, but did so by 
minimizing his own culpability, suggesting that the defendant 
bore a greater culpability for the crime than the declarant.  The 
declarant’s statement was made to police shortly after he had 
been arrested and after he had learned that the police had 
evidence linking him to the crime.  We held that not only were 
portions of the declarant’s statement improperly admitted 
because they were not “ ‘specifically disserving’ ” of his penal 
interest (id. at p. 613), but also that under these circumstances 
— “ ‘where a declarant in police custody seeks to exculpate 
himself by implicating another suspect’ ” — the statement 
“lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness” and was 
inadmissible as a whole (id. at p. 618).11  But here, by contrast, 
no portion of Flinner’s statements sought to shift blame for 
Keck’s death away from himself, and he made the statements to 
a close friend, first at an intimate dinner and then in the privacy 
of his home.  While the statements were made under the 
influence of alcohol or sleeping pills, no testimony suggests that 
Flinner was unable to understand what he was saying.  (Cf. U.S. 
v. Two Shields (8th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 789, 792–793 [where 
declarant made nonverbal statement at hospital with blood 
alcohol level of .389 and was described as “unintelligible” by 
doctor, he could not appreciate that the statement was against 
 
11  
Flinner erroneously reads the Duarte court as including 
the declarant’s intoxication at the time of the statement as one 
of the circumstances undermining the reliability of the 
statement.  But the declarant in Duarte had emphasized he was 
very drunk at the time of the shooting, as part of his effort to 
reduce his own culpability.  (Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 615.)  
The Duarte declarant was not intoxicated at the time he made 
the disputed statement against interest to the police, and the 
case thus does not serve Flinner’s purposes.   
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
63 
 
his interests and thus it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability 
and was inadmissible].)  And finally, while the jury was 
certainly entitled to consider Lopez’s relatively innocuous 
interpretation of Flinner’s comments, Lopez’s interpretation 
could not have precluded the jury from drawing a more 
incriminating inference.  Under these circumstances, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Flinner’s hearsay 
statements as statements against his penal interest. 
Nor were these statements inadmissible under Evidence 
Code section 352 as substantially more prejudicial than 
probative.  The prejudice contemplated by section 352 typically 
involves a potential for evoking an emotional bias against the 
defendant on legally irrelevant or improper grounds; it is not the 
“ ‘ “damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, 
highly probative evidence.” ’ ”  (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
452, 491.)  Nothing in Flinner’s statements that he should not 
have killed Keck would inflame the emotions of the jury in this 
way.   
In sum, we conclude the trial court properly admitted 
Flinner’s statements to Lopez.  We thus reject Flinner’s 
argument that the admission of these statements violated his 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.12 
 
12 
Having concluded that Lopez’s testimony was properly 
admitted, we reject Flinner’s argument that the improper 
admission of the testimony “aggravated” the harm caused by the 
stricken testimony of Lopez’s girlfriend, Marie Locke.  Locke, 
who was at the dinner with Flinner and Lopez, testified about 
the dinner before Lopez did.  She stated that Lopez told her that 
Flinner said, “I shouldn’t have killed her” that night, but that 
she had not personally heard the statement.  The trial court 
 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
64 
 
5. Admissibility of Evidence of Keck’s Pregnancy  
Flinner argues that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence that Keck may have been pregnant when she was 
killed.  He asserts that evidence of Keck’s pregnancy was not 
relevant to any issue in dispute and that, even if relevant, its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
impact on the jury.  Flinner also claims the admission of this 
evidence violated his rights to a reliable penalty determination 
and due process under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Before trial, the prosecution moved to admit evidence 
about Flinner’s strained relationship with Keck — including 
evidence of Flinner’s displeasure with her possible pregnancy — 
as relevant to establishing his motive for her murder and 
because it tended to refute Flinner’s claim that he was deeply in 
love with Keck, wanted to marry her, and wanted to father her 
child.  Included in this motion was the prosecutor’s plan to 
introduce the testimony of Melissa Henderson and Nathalie 
Reed, who would each testify that Flinner discussed Keck’s 
pregnancy with her soon after Keck’s murder and expressed 
displeasure with the pregnancy.  Flinner objected generally to 
evidence of his strained relationship with Keck, arguing it was 
irrelevant because the prosecution’s theory of the case was that 
Flinner had Keck killed in order to collect insurance money, not 
because of any relationship problems.  Although the trial court 
excluded some of the evidence of the state of Keck’s and Flinner’s 
 
properly struck this portion of Locke’s testimony as inadmissible 
double hearsay and admonished the jury to disregard it.  We 
presume the jury followed the court’s instructions as to Locke’s 
testimony (People v. Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 852), and 
Lopez’s testimony clearly did not suffer from the same defect. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
65 
 
relationship as substantially more prejudicial than probative 
under Evidence Code section 352, it admitted much of it, 
including the planned testimony of Henderson and Reed.  
Defense counsel preserved the objection that this evidence was 
irrelevant and, even if relevant, should have been excluded 
under Evidence Code section 352.  Also before trial, Flinner 
objected to the planned expert testimony of the pathologist who 
conducted Keck’s autopsy that Keck’s ovaries and uterus 
suggested that she may have been in the early stages of 
pregnancy at the time of her death.   
At trial, the prosecutor introduced photos of a pregnancy 
test found in Keck’s truck at the scene of the crime, as well as a 
Walmart receipt showing that she had purchased the test just 
before she was killed.  Henderson testified that she met Flinner 
on a phone chat line in June 2000, shortly after Keck’s death, 
and that Flinner told her his fiancée had been pregnant and he 
was “dreading her being pregnant.”  Reed testified that she 
worked at a casino that Flinner frequented and that after Keck’s 
death, Flinner said Keck was “lying” about the pregnancy “and 
she was trying to get him to marry her and he wasn’t going to 
do that.”  Defense counsel renewed his objection on Evidence 
Code section 352 grounds, and the trial court again overruled 
the motion.  Kim Milan then testified that she met Flinner 
through Lopez and during one conversation asked Flinner if he 
had killed Keck.  He replied, “I know they think I did it, but why 
would they want to believe that?  She was pregnant with my 
baby and we were about to be married.”  Gregory Sherman, who 
met Flinner in jail, testified that Flinner discussed his “wife” 
and said that she was pregnant when she was killed.  Over 
Flinner’s objection, the prosecutor introduced letters that 
Flinner wrote to religious organizations from jail, blaming a 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
66 
 
former employee for killing Keck after an affair.  In these letters, 
Flinner references Keck’s pregnancy, speculating that she was 
having an affair with the former employee that led to the 
pregnancy.  Finally, the pathologist testified that the state of 
Keck’s ovaries and uterus were suggestive of pregnancy but 
conceded on cross-examination that he could not say for sure 
that she was pregnant. 
Although Flinner now claims error in the admission of all 
evidence concerning Keck’s pregnancy, he did not raise all of 
these objections at trial.  In particular, he did not object to the 
relevant portions of the testimony of Milan and Sherman, nor to 
the photos of the pregnancy test and Walmart receipt.  Flinner’s 
objection as it applies to these pieces of evidence is thus 
forfeited.   
His objection to all evidence concerning Keck’s pregnancy 
as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial also fails on the merits.  As 
at trial, Flinner argues that evidence of Keck’s pregnancy was 
irrelevant because the prosecution’s theory of the case was that 
Flinner arranged Keck’s death in order to collect on her life 
insurance policy, and there was no evidence suggesting that she 
was pregnant, or that Flinner believed she was, when he insured 
her life.  As support for his argument, Flinner points to People 
v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 729, where we held that an 
attempted murder victim’s pregnancy was “clearly irrelevant” to 
any issue in the case.  There, the defendant shot the victim in 
the course of committing a robbery and had no personal 
relationship with the victim apart from renting a room in her 
boyfriend’s house.  Neither the defendant’s relationship to the 
victim nor the victim’s pregnancy had any bearing on the case.  
Here, by contrast, Flinner’s displeasure with Keck’s pregnancy 
provides an additional motive for her murder and is probative of 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
67 
 
why he decided to have her killed at the time he did.  Flinner’s 
belief that Keck was pregnant is also relevant to the financial 
motivations for Keck’s murder, insofar as Flinner had expressed 
irritation with the financial strain that Keck placed on him, 
which might be expected to increase with the arrival of a new 
baby.  Keck’s own belief that she may have been pregnant, as 
evidenced by the pregnancy test found in her car, and the 
pathologist’s testimony that Keck may have been pregnant, are 
relevant because they tend to corroborate Flinner’s belief that 
Keck was pregnant.   
We also reject Flinner’s claim that this evidence is 
substantially more prejudicial than probative.  The kind of 
evidence that Evidence Code section 352 excludes is that which 
“ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the 
defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on 
the issues.” ’ ”  (People v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 491.)  We 
recognize that in some instances, as in Cash, a victim’s 
pregnancy may have little or no relevance to the guilt phase of 
a trial and may serve only to inflame the emotions of the jury.  
But here, Keck’s possible pregnancy was probative of Flinner’s 
motive for her murder, and — against the backdrop of evidence 
that he hired a hitman to kill his teenage fiancée for insurance 
money — we do not think this evidence was so uniquely 
damaging as to require its exclusion.  Flinner also argues that 
the pathologist’s testimony, even if relevant, was too speculative 
to present to the jury in light of its prejudicial impact.  The 
pathologist properly presented his expert opinion based on the 
autopsy; that he could not say for sure that Keck was pregnant 
goes to the weight a reasonable juror would assign it, not its 
admissibility.   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
68 
 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting evidence of Keck’s possible pregnancy and reject 
Flinner’s statutory and constitutional claims to the contrary.  
6. Martin Baker’s Competence to Testify 
Through the testimony of Martin Baker and other 
witnesses, the prosecution sought to show Flinner had 
attempted to frame Baker for Keck’s murder.  Flinner contends 
that Baker was incompetent to testify under Evidence Code 
section 701, subdivision (a) and lacked the requisite capacity to 
perceive and recollect in order to testify under Evidence Code 
section 702, subdivision (a).  He argues that the trial court’s 
failure to disqualify Baker as a witness and refusal to strike 
Baker’s incoherent testimony violated his Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to cross-examination, due 
process, and a reliable penalty determination.  
When a witness’s competency to testify at all, or to testify 
as to a particular matter, is questioned, we start from the 
general rule that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, 
every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and 
no person is disqualified to testify to any matter.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 700.)  A person is completely disqualified from testifying under 
Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a) if he or she is 
“(1) [i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the 
matter so as to be understood . . . or [¶] (2) [i]ncapable of 
understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.”  “Capacity 
to communicate, or to understand the duty of truthful 
testimony, is a preliminary fact to be determined exclusively by 
the court, the burden of proof is on the party who objects to the 
proffered witness, and a trial court’s determination will be 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
69 
 
upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”  (People v. 
Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 573 (Anderson).)   
Here, the record does not support the claim that Baker 
lacked the capacity to communicate so as to be understood or 
that he was unable to understand the duty of truthful testimony.  
Baker worked for Flinner’s landscaping business.  The 
prosecution called Baker as a witness to testify that Flinner 
tried to frame Baker for Keck’s death and to establish the 
independent poisoning charge.  When the prosecution first 
called Baker, the court held a preliminary Evidence Code 
section 402 hearing in front of the jury to “assess Mr. Baker’s 
apparent condition and circumstances,” asking the prosecution 
to first “inquire of Mr. Baker as to who he is and what he’s been 
doing presently and in the recent past,” without “get[ting] into 
any substantive matters.”  Baker demonstrated his ability to 
communicate when he testified as to his early life, his education, 
and his family.  Flinner points out that Baker initially refused 
to answer questions concerning his siblings’ ages, saying, “I 
plead the 5th,” but this does not establish that Baker did not 
understand his duty to testify truthfully.  His reluctance to 
respond stemmed from his sense that the question was “pretty 
personal” and that the case “has nothing to do with [his] family,” 
but he acquiesced as soon as the court admonished him that as 
a witness, he must answer questions honestly and to the best of 
his ability.  We are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that, although Baker may be “a bit 
different,” he was nevertheless qualified to testify.  (See People 
v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 361 [witness diagnosed as having 
intellect of a seven year old was not disqualified from testifying 
even though he “often responded in incomplete, sometimes 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
70 
 
nonsensical, sentences,” and testified that he “ ‘heard’ ” blood 
and knew how money “ ‘sounds’ ”].)  
Even if a witness is not disqualified as incompetent under 
Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a), his or her testimony 
on a particular matter (other than expert opinion testimony) is 
inadmissible “unless [the witness] has personal knowledge of 
the matter.”  (Id., § 702, subd. (a).)  “In order to have personal 
knowledge, a witness must have the capacity to perceive and 
recollect.”  (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 356.)  “A 
witness challenged for lack of personal knowledge must 
nonetheless be allowed to testify if there is evidence from which 
a rational trier of fact could find that the witness accurately 
perceived and recollected the testimonial events.  Once that 
threshold is passed, it is for the jury to decide whether the 
witness’s perceptions and recollections are credible.”  (Anderson, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 574.) 
Our review of the record confirms that, although Baker 
departed on odd and incoherent digressions during his 
testimony, there was substantial evidence from which a rational 
trier of fact could conclude that Baker perceived and recollected 
the events of the night that Flinner poisoned him and attempted 
to frame him for Keck’s murder.  Flinner points to isolated 
portions of Baker’s testimony that Flinner claims show that 
Baker’s mental illness or drug use rendered him unable to 
perceive and recollect the events of that night.  For instance, 
when asked at what time he began to feel less groggy after 
eating the chili provided by Flinner, Baker responded:  “A few 
days after that.  It was like a reoccurring of a myth is what I felt 
like.  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . Something like in a previous livelihood 
specting [sic] him reincarnated, someone getting reincarnated 
in a certain fashion.  It would never work, say for instance, 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
71 
 
Adol[f] Hitler, he would never want to come back to life.  But 
people would want him to come back to life, so people would have 
to use certain individuals.”  In another instance, when asked 
about what kinds of problems he reported having to the County 
Mental Health Hospital (CMH) a few months after the chili 
incident, Baker replied:  “It put me in a state of mind like they 
wanted my backbone for this.  It started off like as a quote of a 
price, like it started off at $35,000.  And as my ride went into 
CMH, after sedation you could hear they were going for like a 
bid.  But it was like a music box going off.  You know, it was 
premeditated.  So I just went along with it.  The highest price 
was like 87 million dollars.  I just went with it.”  
As Flinner points out, the jury also heard Baker’s testimony 
that he had used methamphetamine a few days before the 
evening at Flinner’s house, as well as Baker’s testimony about 
his broader past drug usage and mental health issues, including 
“delusions” that caused him to check into CMH a few months 
after the evening in question.  The jury was presented with 
evidence that Baker tested positive for methamphetamine, 
THC, and Xanax after being taken from Flinner’s apartment to 
the sheriff’s substation.  And the jury heard the expert 
testimony of a psychiatrist, who reviewed Baker’s medical 
records from his time at CMH and testified that Baker was 
“having 
a 
very 
severe 
problem 
with 
psychosis, 
with 
hallucinations and psychotic delusions” and who conveyed his 
expert opinion that such a person’s “ability to accurately 
perceive what’s going on in the real word [sic] is severely 
impaired.”   
But “ ‘[t]he fact that a witness has made inconsistent and 
exaggerated statements does not indicate an inability to 
perceive [or] recollect . . . .’  [Citation.]  Nor does a witness’s 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
72 
 
mental defect or insane delusions necessarily reflect that the 
witness lacks the capacity to perceive or recollect.”  (People v. 
Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 356.)  Despite these isolated 
digressions, Baker was consistently brought back to the relevant 
events by the prosecutor’s and defense counsel’s questioning.  
He was able to testify coherently about his work for Flinner’s 
landscaping business, about how Flinner invited him to dinner 
and offered him a bowl of chili, that Flinner also ordered a pizza 
for himself and did not have any of the chili, and about how he 
became drowsy five to 10 minutes after he ate the bowl of chili.  
He recalled being awoken in the early hours of the morning by 
sheriff’s deputies who were responding to a complaint that he 
had been running around the pool and yelling and related how 
he was taken to the sheriff’s substation to have his blood drawn 
and urine sample taken.  Thus, “[a]lthough [Baker’s] testimony 
may have consisted of inconsistencies, incoherent responses, 
and possible hallucinations, delusions and confabulations,” he 
“ ‘presented a plausible account’ ” of his relationship with 
Flinner and the evening’s events.  (Lewis, at p. 357; see 
Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 574–575 [trial court properly 
allowed witness’s testimony about murder despite her delusion 
that her imaginary son was present at the murder].)  Nor were 
the deficiencies in Baker’s capabilities as a witness hidden from 
the jury, which was given an “ample basis upon which to judge 
the reliability of [Baker’s] observations.”  (Anderson, at p. 575.)  
In sum, the trial court did not err in permitting Baker to 
testify or in failing to strike his testimony on these matters.  We 
reject Flinner’s argument to the contrary and his related 
constitutional claims. 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
73 
 
7. Admissibility of Portions of Codefendant’s 
Confession to Police  
Flinner contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
portions of his codefendant Ontiveros’s confession to police and 
that 
the 
admission 
of 
these 
statements 
violated 
his 
confrontation clause rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  We agree there 
was error but conclude that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
Before trial, the prosecution conceded that two juries were 
appropriate in this case but sought to establish that certain 
parts of Ontiveros’s confession to police would be admissible 
before Flinner’s jury.  Flinner moved in limine to exclude all of 
Ontiveros’s statements to police as inadmissible hearsay whose 
admission would violate Flinner’s confrontation clause rights.  
The trial court determined that certain portions of Ontiveros’s 
confession that inculpated Ontiveros alone and did not explicitly 
or implicitly refer to Flinner were sufficiently trustworthy to be 
admitted against Flinner as statements against the declarant’s 
interest. 
At trial, Ontiveros did not testify.  With only Flinner’s jury 
present, the prosecution offered the approved statements 
against interest through Detective Scully, who interviewed 
Ontiveros after his arrest.  To ensure that the jury heard only 
the narrow, approved statements from Ontiveros’s confession, 
the prosecutor read verbatim portions of the interview 
transcript and asked Detective Scully whether the answers in 
the transcript were the ones that Ontiveros gave him.  By this 
means, the prosecutor introduced Ontiveros’s admissions that 
on the day of Keck’s killing he was driving the white Nissan NX 
car by himself, and that Keck picked him up, drove him to the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
74 
 
cul-de-sac, and parked her car facing the Nissan in the cul-de-
sac.   
After the jury returned the guilt verdicts but before 
sentencing, the high court issued its decision in Crawford, 
supra, 541 U.S. 36, where it held that the admission of 
testimonial hearsay statements against a criminal defendant 
violates the confrontation clause unless the witness is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  Flinner moved for a new trial, arguing that 
Ontiveros’s statements were inadmissible against Flinner under 
Crawford.  The trial court agreed that the admission of 
Ontiveros’s statements fell afoul of Crawford but ruled that 
their admission was subject to harmless error review under 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, and was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It accordingly denied Flinner’s 
motion for a new trial.   
Flinner renews his trial arguments that the introduction 
of Ontiveros’s statements through Detective Scully’s testimony 
violated the confrontation clause under Crawford and that the 
error necessitates a new trial.  The Attorney General responds 
that Ontiveros’s statements are admissible under pre-Crawford 
case law concerning the introduction of a codefendant’s 
confession in a joint trial — namely, Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. 
123, and Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson).  
And he argues that Crawford does not bar the admission of 
Ontiveros’s statements because Ontiveros’s statements neither 
accused Flinner of anything nor mentioned the involvement of 
anyone other than Ontiveros in Keck’s murder.  
The 
Attorney 
General’s 
reliance 
on 
Bruton 
and 
Richardson is misplaced.  “In Bruton, the United States 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
75 
 
Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence at a joint 
trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the 
defendant violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination 
guaranteed by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is 
instructed to disregard the confession in determining the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant.  [Citation.]  The high court 
reasoned that although juries ordinarily can and will follow a 
judge’s instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence, ‘there 
are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or 
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of 
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human 
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.’  [Citation.]  
Such a context is presented when ‘the powerfully incriminating 
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused 
side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before 
the jury in a joint trial.’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 
453 (Lewis).)  As we explained in Lewis, “[t]he high court limited 
the scope of the Bruton rule in Richardson . . . .  The court 
explained that Bruton recognized a narrow exception to the 
general rule that juries are presumed to follow limiting 
instructions, and this narrow exception should not apply to 
confessions that are not incriminating on their face, but become 
so only when linked with other evidence introduced at trial.  
[Citation.]  That is because, ‘[w]here the necessity of such 
linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury 
will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence.’  
[Citation.]  Accordingly, the high court held, ‘the Confrontation 
Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying 
codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction 
when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
76 
 
defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.’ ”  
(Lewis, at p. 454, italics omitted.)   
The Attorney General argues that under Richardson, 
Ontiveros’s statements were admissible because nothing in 
Ontiveros’s statements expressly inculpates Flinner.  But the 
codefendants in Bruton and Richardson, unlike those here, were 
jointly tried in a case before a single jury, and both cases rested 
on the premise that the nontestifying defendant’s confession 
was inadmissible against the codefendant.  In each case, the 
trial court imposed a limiting instruction to the jury that it could 
only consider the confession as evidence against the declarant 
and not against the codefendant.  (See Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. 
at p. 125; Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 204–205.)  The high 
court had to decide whether the limiting instruction sufficed to 
protect the codefendant’s confrontation rights.  In other words, 
the question in these cases was not whether a nontestifying 
defendant’s confession is admissible against his codefendant; 
the opinions assumed that it was not.  The question, instead, 
was whether — given that the defendant’s confession was only 
admissible against him and not his codefendant — a limiting 
instruction by the court is sufficient to protect the codefendant’s 
confrontation rights.  Here, Flinner and Ontiveros were jointly 
tried but before two separate juries.  No limiting instruction was 
given — indeed, the relevant testimony by Detective Scully was 
offered only to Flinner’s jury — because the trial court expressly 
determined that Ontiveros’s statements were admissible 
against Flinner as statements against interest.  For these 
reasons, Bruton and Richardson are simply irrelevant here.  
(See also People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537 [Bruton 
rule inapplicable where defendants are not jointly tried].)  
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
77 
 
The Attorney General’s Crawford argument fares no 
better.  Crawford held that the admission of testimonial hearsay 
statements violates a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights 
unless the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  (Crawford, 
supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68.)  Because Ontiveros invoked his right 
not to testify and Flinner had no prior opportunity to cross-
examine him, the introduction of Ontiveros’s statements to 
Detective Scully violated the confrontation clause if those 
statements are “testimonial.”  In Crawford, the high court held 
that “[w]hatever else th[at] term covers, it applies at a minimum 
to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations,” for these are 
“the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”  (Crawford, at 
p. 68, italics added.)  Here, the statements the trial court 
admitted are ones that Ontiveros made after his arrest, while in 
custody, in response to questioning by Detective Scully, and as 
part of his confession to playing a role in Keck’s murder.  There 
can be no doubt that these statements are testimonial, and the 
Attorney General does not seriously contend otherwise.   
The Attorney General argues instead that the “chief evil” 
that Crawford sought to prevent is the introduction of 
“accusatory testimonial statements.”  Because Ontiveros’s 
statements did not explicitly or implicitly accuse Flinner of 
anything, the Attorney General reasons that Flinner’s 
confrontation rights were not implicated by their admission.  
But the high court has already rejected a similar argument.  In 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, the high 
court concluded that the affidavits of crime lab analysts 
certifying that a substance found in the defendant’s possession 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
78 
 
was cocaine “were testimonial statements” and that “the 
analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”  
(Melendez-Diaz, at p. 311.)  In so doing, the high court rejected 
Massachusetts’ argument that “the analysts are not subject to 
confrontation because they are not ‘accusatory’ witnesses, in 
that they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing; rather, 
their testimony is inculpatory only when taken together with 
other evidence linking petitioner to the contraband.”  (Id. at 
p. 313.)  The court rejected this distinction between accusatory 
and nonaccusatory witnesses:  “The text of the [Sixth] 
Amendment contemplates two classes of witnesses — those 
against the defendant and those in his favor. . . .  Contrary to 
respondent’s assertion, there is not a third category of 
witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune 
from 
confrontation.” 
 
(Melendez-Diaz, 
at 
pp. 313–314.)  
Similarly, in Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50, 135, a 
majority of the court rejected the plurality’s reasoning that a 
statement must be “ ‘prepared for the primary purpose of 
accusing a targeted individual’ ” in order to be testimonial, 
pointing to the high court’s reasoning in Melendez-Diaz.  
(Williams, at p. 135 (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.), quoting id. at p. 84 
(plur. opn. of Alito, J.); accord, U.S. v. Duron-Caldera (5th Cir. 
2013) 737 F.3d 988, 994–996.)   
We conclude the Attorney General’s argument fails for the 
same reason.  The prosecution offered the approved portions of 
Ontiveros’s confession before Flinner’s jury out of the presence 
of Ontiveros’s jury, presumably because these statements 
corroborated the prosecution’s theory that Flinner had hired 
Ontiveros to kill Keck.  The fact that the selected statements do 
not explicitly mention Flinner does not render Ontiveros any 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
79 
 
less a “witness[] against” Flinner within the meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment.   
The Attorney General suggests we have held otherwise in 
People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182 and Lewis, supra, 43 
Cal.4th 415, where we reasoned that “[t]he same redaction that 
‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ ”  
(Stevens, at p. 199; accord, Lewis, at p. 506.)  But as with Bruton 
and Richardson, Stevens and Lewis have no application here:  
Both concerned the admission of a codefendant’s statement at a 
joint trial before a single jury.  The codefendant in Stevens also 
testified at the joint trial and was thus available for cross-
examination, obviating any confrontation clause problem.  
(Stevens, at p. 199.)   
In Lewis, redacted portions of the codefendant’s confession 
to police were read to the jury and the “jury was instructed to 
consider these statements against the speaker only and not 
against any other defendant.”  (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 452.)  Although we agreed with the defendant that the 
admitted statements from his codefendant’s confession were “no 
doubt testimonial,” we reasoned that the statements were not 
admitted “against” the defendant within the meaning of the 
confrontation clause because they did not facially implicate the 
defendant.  (Id. at p. 506.)  We noted:  “As the high court has 
explained, ‘[o]rdinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced 
at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness “against” a 
defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony 
only against a codefendant.’  [Citation.]  The only exception to 
this rule is the narrow class of statements . . . that powerfully 
incriminate the defendant on their face because they directly 
implicate the defendant by name or do so in a manner the jury 
could not reasonably be expected to ignore.  [Citations.]  
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
80 
 
Accordingly, redacted codefendant statements that satisfy 
Bruton’s requirements are not admitted ‘against’ the defendant 
for Crawford purposes.”  (Lewis, at p. 506.)  By contrast, as we 
have already explained, Ontiveros’s statements were expressly 
admitted against Flinner.   
For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that the 
admission of Ontiveros’s statements against Flinner violated 
Flinner’s confrontation clause rights.  The question remains, 
however, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (See Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 139–140.)  On 
this question, too, we agree with the trial court.  Nothing elicited 
from Ontiveros directly implicated Flinner, whose involvement 
in the scheme to kill Keck was proven by independent evidence.  
And even as to the manner in which Ontiveros implemented the 
final phase of that scheme, the killing itself, other evidence 
illuminated most of the details:  Photos and videos from nearby 
surveillance 
cameras 
showed 
Keck’s 
and 
Ontiveros’s 
movements into and (in Ontiveros’s case) out of the cul-de-sac, 
and the crime scene and forensic evidence showed Keck was shot 
in the back of her head while opening the hood of her car, which 
was still running.  As we conclude in the next discussion section, 
there was ample evidence, independent of Ontiveros’s 
statement, that he accompanied Keck to the cul-de-sac and 
waited until she was occupied opening her hood before shooting 
her in the back of the head.  As to both first degree murder and 
the lying-in-wait special circumstance, therefore, Ontiveros’s 
statement that Keck drove him to the cul-de-sac and parked her 
car facing his was cumulative of other prosecution evidence 
regarding the manner of Keck’s killing.  For that reason, and 
because the portion of Ontiveros’s statement admitted in 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
81 
 
Flinner’s trial did not directly inculpate Flinner, its admission 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
8. Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Lying-in-Wait 
Special-Circumstance Finding and the Lying-in-
Wait First Degree Murder Conviction  
Flinner contends there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for lying-in-wait first degree murder, as 
well as insufficient evidence to support the lying-in-wait special-
circumstance finding.   
“We often address claims of insufficient evidence, and the 
standard of review is settled.  ‘A reviewing court faced with such 
a claim determines “whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  [Citations.]  We examine the record to 
determine “whether it shows evidence that is reasonable, 
credible and of solid value from which a rational trier of fact 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
[Citation.]  Further, “the appellate court presumes in support of 
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could 
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ”  (People v. Moon (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 1, 22.)   
The capital murder in this case occurred in June 2000, 
shortly after Proposition 18 amended the lying-in-wait special-
circumstance statute.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 629, § 2, pp. 4163–4166, 
enacted as Prop. 18, approved by voters, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 
2000) eff. Mar. 8, 2000.)  We consider the effect of that 
amendment below (pt. II.B.9., post), in addressing Flinner’s 
argument 
that 
the 
amendment 
rendered 
the 
special 
circumstance unconstitutional.  As relevant here, however, 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
82 
 
“[l]ike the former version, the amended lying-in-wait special 
circumstance requires ‘ “ ‘an intentional murder, committed 
under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of 
purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an 
opportune time to act, and (3) . . . a surprise attack on an 
unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage . . . .’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 629 (Johnson).)  The 
lying-in-wait special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. 
(a)(15)) includes the elements of first degree lying-in-wait 
murder (id., § 189, subd. (a)), but requires the additional 
element that the killing was intentional, not merely committed 
with implied malice.  (See, e.g., People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 
at p. 24, fn. 1.)  Thus, we focus here on whether substantial 
evidence supports the special circumstance, for if it does, it 
necessarily supports the theory of first degree lying-in-wait 
murder.  (See, e.g., People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
388.)  
Flinner concedes that the concealment element of the 
statute is satisfied here, where Flinner and Ontiveros concealed 
their purpose from Keck when they summoned her to the cul-
de-sac on the pretense of jumpstarting Ontiveros’s car.  And 
Flinner does not argue that he or Ontiveros lacked the intent to 
kill.  But Flinner maintains that the evidence was insufficient 
to establish a “substantial period of watching and waiting” and 
a “surprise attack from a position of advantage.”    
First, Flinner contends that the mere three minutes that 
elapsed between the time Keck’s Mustang entered the cul-de-sac 
to the time Ontiveros drove away from the scene of the murder 
could not constitute a substantial period of watching and 
waiting.  But as we have repeatedly explained, the purpose of 
the watching and waiting element “ ‘ “is to distinguish those 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
83 
 
cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in which 
he acts out of rash impulse.  [Citation.]  This period need not 
continue for any particular length ‘ “of time provided that its 
duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to 
premeditation or deliberation.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Cage (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 256, 278.)  
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdicts, we conclude that the prosecution presented 
sufficient admissible evidence from which a trier of fact could 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ontiveros watched and 
waited for an opportune moment to launch a surprise attack on 
Keck.  The prosecution’s theory of the murder was that Flinner 
called Keck and asked her to pick up Ontiveros from a nearby 
gas station and drive to a cul-de-sac where Ontiveros’s car had 
broken down in order to give him a jumpstart.  While Keck was 
facing her Mustang and opening its hood, Ontiveros shot her in 
the back of the head.  The prosecution’s evidence of how the 
actual killing occurred consisted largely of surveillance videos 
and stills from gas stations, stores, and businesses in the area, 
as well as forensic evidence of Keck’s injuries and the state in 
which her car was found at the crime scene.13  Video shows 
 
13  
As we have explained, the trial court erred in admitting 
portions of codefendant Ontiveros’s custodial confession.  (See 
pt. II.B.7., ante.)  Due to that error, the jury heard Ontiveros’s 
statements that he drove the white Nissan NX car on the day of 
the murder and was alone in the car that day, that Keck picked 
him up and drove him to the cul-de-sac, and that Keck parked 
her car nose-to-nose with the Nissan in the cul-de-sac.  Our past 
case law suggests that it would not be improper to consider these 
statements in assessing Flinner’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
claim.  (See People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 70–71.)  But 
 
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Keck’s Mustang leaving the Ultramar station where she met 
Ontiveros and then heading towards the cul-de-sac road.  
Approximately three minutes and 15 seconds after her white 
Mustang enters the cul-de-sac, video shows the Nissan NX 
speeding out of it.   
Deputy Sheriff Troy Doran testified that Keck’s Mustang 
was found with the keys still in the car, the engine running, and 
the passenger door open.  Photos of the crime scene showed that 
the hood of Keck’s Mustang was ajar, though not propped open 
with the hood rod.  And photos showed blood stains on the front 
bumper of the car, the underside of the hood, and on the hood 
rod, which was out of place.  Robert Whitmore, who performed 
the autopsy, testified that he found a “textbook entrance wound” 
on the back of Keck’s head, and that the lack of soot on the 
wound indicated that the gun was some distance away from her 
head when it was fired.  He also testified that Keck sustained 
facial abrasions before she died, which he opined were 
consistent with her face hitting the engine compartment of the 
Mustang after she was shot.  And he testified that he found no 
evidence of evasion by Keck, suggesting that she never saw the 
gunshot coming.  The bullet thus passed through Keck’s brain, 
exited through her right cheek, and finally lodged in the firewall 
of her car in the engine compartment.  David Cornacchia, a blood 
spatter expert, testified that blood on Keck’s leg and on the 
engine of the car were consistent with Keck being shot while 
holding open the hood and leaning over the engine.  And even 
before the autopsy was performed, at a point when the 
 
even without Ontiveros’s confession, sufficient evidence 
supports the lying-in-wait special circumstance, and we do not 
rely on that confession here. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
85 
 
pathologist at the scene of the crime could not determine 
whether Keck had been shot in the back of the head or in the 
face, Flinner told witness Robert Pittman that Keck had been 
shot in the back of the head.  In light of this substantial 
evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Ontiveros 
watched and waited at the cul-de-sac for the opportune moment 
to shoot Keck from behind:  when Keck was facing her Mustang 
in order to lift the hood of the car to provide a jump start.   
Flinner also argues that there is insufficient evidence that 
Ontiveros shot Keck from a position of advantage.  He reasons 
that the fact that Keck was shot in the back of the head “does 
nothing to distinguish this case from any other such ‘ordinary 
premeditated murder,’ ” quoting our decision in People v. 
Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557.  As we explained in Morales, 
“a mere concealment of purpose” is not sufficient to establish 
lying in wait, since “many ‘routine’ murders are accomplished 
by such means, and . . . constitutional considerations . . . might 
well prevent treating the commission of such murders as a 
special circumstance.”  (Ibid.)  Were there only evidence 
suggesting, for example, that Ontiveros drove up behind Keck 
while she had the hood of her car open and shot her from behind, 
we might agree with Flinner that the evidence could not 
distinguish the killing from an ordinary premediated murder 
not subject to a lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding.  (Cf. 
People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 551 [insufficient evidence 
for lying-in-wait special circumstance where evidence only 
showed the defendant “came up behind his victims on foot to 
take them by surprise” and no evidence showed that he “arrived 
before the victims or waited in ambush for their arrival”].)  But 
here, as discussed above, the evidence tends to show that 
Ontiveros left the Nissan NX in the cul-de-sac in advance of 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
86 
 
Keck’s arrival, waited for Keck at the gas station, and drove with 
her back to the cul-de-sac.  The evidence further shows that 
Keck was shot while facing her car and opening the hood.  In 
light of this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that 
Ontiveros “ ‘ “ ‘watch[ed] and wait[ed] for an opportune time to 
act’ ” ’ ” on the drive from the gas station to the cul-de-sac, while 
Keck parked and got out of the car, and while she proceeded to 
open the hood of the car, before launching “ ‘ “ ‘a surprise 
attack’ ” ’ ” on Keck from an advantageous position:  from behind 
her as she was otherwise preoccupied with opening the hood.  
(Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 629.) 
9. Constitutionality of Lying-in-Wait Special 
Circumstance  
Flinner argues that Proposition 18 rendered the lying-in-
wait special circumstance indistinguishable from lying-in-wait 
first degree murder, and that the special circumstance is 
therefore unconstitutionally vague and fails to adequately 
narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, creating an 
arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  We 
recently rejected this argument in Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
pages 634 to 637, and Flinner offers no reason to reconsider that 
decision here. 
“In assessing defendant’s challenge to the amended lying-
in-wait special circumstance, we are guided by the following 
constitutional principles.  The Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit a sentence of death ‘imposed under 
sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the 
punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.’  [Citation.]  To satisfy this constitutional command, 
‘the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find 
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one “aggravating circumstance” (or its equivalent) at either the 
guilt or penalty phase.  [Citations.]  . . .  [T]he aggravating 
circumstance must meet two requirements. First, the 
circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a 
murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted 
of murder.  [Citation.]  Second, the aggravating circumstance 
may not be unconstitutionally vague.’  [Citation.]  The lying-in-
wait special circumstance is an ‘aggravating circumstance[]’ 
subject to these constitutional requirements.”  (Johnson, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at pp. 634–635.) 
As we explained in Johnson, “in March 2000, the voters 
passed Proposition 18, which changed the definition of the lying-
in-wait special circumstance from a killing while lying in wait to 
a killing by means of lying in wait, mirroring the language of the 
first degree murder statute.”  (Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 634.)  “[T]he voters’ purpose in amending the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance was to eliminate the temporal distinction 
between the special circumstance and lying-in-wait first degree 
murder . . . thereby expand[ing] the class of cases in which the 
special circumstance could be found true . . . .”  (Id. at p. 636.)  
Nevertheless, we concluded that the amended lying-in-wait 
special circumstance comports with the Eighth Amendment 
because it “adequately distinguishes itself from other murders 
and does so in terms that are not so vague as to permit arbitrary 
determinations regarding the truth of the special circumstance 
allegation.”  (Johnson, at p. 636.)  As we have long held, the 
“factual matrix” presented by the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance — an intentional murder coupled with the 
elements of concealment, watching and waiting, and a surprise 
attack from a position of advantage — sufficiently distinguish it 
from “ ‘ordinary’ premeditated murder” (People v. Morales, 
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supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 557), such that it is “neither applicable to 
all murderers nor impermissibly vague” (Johnson, at p. 636).  
And, in Johnson, we reasoned that even if Proposition 18 had 
rendered the special circumstance identical to lying-in-wait first 
degree 
murder, 
the 
special 
circumstance 
would 
pass 
constitutional 
scrutiny 
because 
lying-in-wait 
murder 
“historically has been viewed as ‘ “a particularly heinous and 
repugnant crime,” ’ ” which “provides ‘a rational basis for 
distinguishing those murderers who deserve to be considered for 
the death penalty from those who do not.’ ”  (Johnson, at p. 637.) 
Johnson 
likewise 
forecloses 
Flinner’s 
as-applied 
constitutional challenge to the special circumstance.  Like the 
defendant in Johnson, Flinner here contends that “because his 
liability for lying-in-wait first degree murder as an aider and 
abettor required a showing of intent to kill, there was no 
meaningful distinction between that theory of first degree 
murder and the lying-in-wait special circumstance in his case.”  
(Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 637.)  This “is simply another 
way to state his facial attack on the statute” (Lewis, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 517), which we have rejected in part because — 
even were the special circumstance identical to the lying-in-wait 
first degree murder statute, as Flinner claims it is as applied to 
him in this case — it would not offend the Constitution.  
10. Juror Misconduct 
Based on information received from jurors after the penalty 
verdict was returned, Flinner moved for a new trial, alleging 
several instances of juror misconduct.  The trial court held a 
multiday evidentiary hearing, at which numerous jurors 
testified, and denied the motion on the ground that no 
misconduct had occurred.  On appeal, Flinner contends the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
89 
 
evidence showed reversible misconduct on the parts of Jurors 
No. 1 and No. 10.  We review the factual background and 
hearing evidence before considering both these aspects of the 
misconduct claim. 
During trial, defendant Flinner’s jury was sometimes 
referred to as the “Red” jury and codefendant Ontiveros’s as the 
“Green” jury.  In December 2003, after both juries had returned 
their penalty verdicts and had been excused, the trial court 
received an e-mail message from two members of the Green jury 
relaying assertions by Red Juror No. 1 about misconduct by Red 
Jurors No. 10 and No. 12.14  The messages also revealed that 
Juror No. 1 was interested in writing a book about the trial or 
her experiences as a juror and had been enlisting others in a 
possible group writing effort.  The court provided the parties 
printouts of the e-mails in early January 2004.  After 
investigation, Flinner filed a memorandum in support of his new 
trial motion alleging several instances of misconduct by Juror 
No. 1, Juror No. 10 and unspecified other jurors.  The court set 
the matter for an evidentiary hearing in March 2004. 
At the hearing, Juror No. 1 testified to the personal conflicts 
between her and Jurors No. 10 and No. 12 arising from what she 
saw as those jurors’ misconduct.  Throughout the trial, Juror 
No. 1 asserted, Jurors No. 10 and No. 12 acted in a 
“manipulative” manner, “attempt[ing] on a daily basis to swing 
the other[,] older women over to their way of thinking.”  During 
breaks in the courthouse hallway and cafeteria, they gave their 
opinion about the evidence the jury had just heard and, when 
anyone voiced a different view, “we were told how wrong we 
 
14  
Red jurors will hereafter be identified by their numbers 
alone; Green jurors will be identified as such. 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
90 
 
were.”  By the time of deliberations, “[t]hose two girls had [the 
older women] wrapped up.  They knew that they were going to 
get a guilty verdict out of them.”  
Jurors No. 10 and No. 12 also put together a weekly 
invitational lunch group that eventually grew to include most of 
the jury.  Juror No. 1 testified she was never invited but did not 
feel slighted because she knew that the group discussed the case 
over lunch and she did not want to violate the court’s admonition 
against such discussions.  After a while during the trial, the 
group around Jurors No. 10 and No. 12 would stop talking 
whenever Juror No. 1 approached them; Juror No. 1 understood 
that to be because they knew that she was taking notes on what 
they said and “they were talking about things they shouldn’t be.”   
Juror No. 1 testified she twice overheard Juror No. 10 say 
she had driven past the home of Flinner’s parents on Harbison 
Canyon Road.  The second time occurred after the wildfires in 
San Diego County in the fall of 2003; Juror No. 10 said she had 
to travel that road in order to visit relatives in the area.  
Juror No. 1 also testified to remarks by Juror No. 10 
suggesting a prosecution bias on her part.  Juror No. 10 
sometimes wore tight blouses and short skirts.  Once, when 
Juror No. 1 and others told her the buttons on her blouse had 
popped open, she said she did not care, that she wanted her 
blouse open so that Flinner would look at her and she could tell 
him that she wanted him dead.  Later in her testimony, Juror 
No. 1 said she actually observed Juror No. 10 mouthing “I want 
to kill you,” or “I want you dead,” at Flinner.  “Many times 
during side bars, many times I would turn around,” Juror No. 1 
testified, “and [Juror No. 10] would be doing it and . . . [h]er and 
12 would be giggling about it.”  Still later, Juror No. 1 testified 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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she only saw Juror No. 10 do this once, though she also saw her 
making throat cutting gestures at times, usually during a side 
bar.  Juror No. 1 also testified to hearing Juror No. 10 refer to 
the lead police investigator, Detective Scully, as “our detective” 
and comment to other jurors on his “cute . . . rear end.”   
The tensions between Jurors No. 1 and No. 10 came to a 
head during guilt phase deliberations, when Juror No. 1 saw 
Juror No. 10 conferring privately with the foreperson.  In what 
Juror No. 1 described as a “blowup,” she confronted them, and 
they said they had been strategizing about how to sway a 
holdout juror.   
At the evidentiary hearing, Juror No. 1 acknowledged she 
had planned to write a book about her experience as a juror in a 
capital case.  She kept extensive notes during the trial, in part 
with the book prospect in mind.  She testified that she did not 
attempt to find a means of publication until after the trial, when 
she explored “tools on the internet that will allow you to do self-
publishing with their assistance.”  She also testified, however, 
that in September 2003, during the trial, she e-mailed a self-
publishing service about the possibility of a loan, giving them an 
estimate of January 2004 as the date she would be ready to 
discuss further steps.  She received a positive response from the 
company (her testimony was unclear as to the date), but she 
never actually received any money.   
After the trial, Juror No. 1 began drafting a book and 
discussed the idea with former Green jurors.  But in January, a 
stranger in a mall parking lot approached her and threatened 
unspecified harm if she kept “testifying.”  This threat, together 
with some unexplained events at her home (hang-up telephone 
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92 
 
calls and banging on her door at night) prompted her to abandon 
the book project and destroy her notes and draft.   
Some of Juror No. 1’s assertions were corroborated by other 
jurors.  Jurors No. 10 and No. 12 admitted that during the trial 
breaks they joked about Detective Scully having a nice butt.  
Juror No. 3 and members of the Green jury corroborated Juror 
No. 1’s testimony that Juror No. 10 sometimes wore short skirts 
and tight blouses.  Green Juror No. 11 testified to seeing Juror 
No. 10 use a water bottle to mime oral sex during a court 
session, and Green Juror No. 10 testified that Juror No. 10 
parted her legs so that Detective Scully could see up her skirt.  
On cross-examination, though, Green Juror No. 10 admitted he 
could not actually see up Juror No. 10’s skirt and did not know 
whether Detective Scully could.  
Generally, however, Juror No. 1’s assertions of misconduct 
by her fellow jurors were not corroborated.  Jurors No. 10 and 
No. 12 denied discussing the evidence at breaks or lunch during 
the trial; when they did talk about witnesses who had appeared, 
it was only to comment on their dress or speculate on how long 
they would testify.  Other jurors agreed the hallway and lunch 
conversations did not involve the evidence, though Juror No. 7 
recalled one occasion, early in the trial, when she began to talk 
about a witness in the hallway but stopped when Juror No. 1 
reminded her of the admonition.  Juror No. 10 denied having 
ever attempted to communicate with Flinner across the 
courtroom, and no other juror corroborated Juror No. 1’s 
account.  Juror No. 10 also denied having deliberately parted 
her legs in the direction of Detective Scully or anyone else in the 
courtroom or having made any sexual gesture with her water 
bottle.  Juror No. 10 also denied having deliberately visited the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
93 
 
home of Flinner’s parents; she had to drive on their road to reach 
her children during the fire emergency.  
The trial court denied Flinner’s new trial motion on factual 
grounds.  Were Juror No. 1’s assertions of misconduct correct, 
the court opined, Flinner would be entitled to a new trial.  But 
those misconduct claims were “[a]lmost in their entirety . . . 
rejected, countered, rebutted and/or innocently explained by the 
rest of the jurors.”  The court concluded Juror No. 1’s antipathy 
for Juror No. 10, and her desire for the spotlight, had led her to 
engage in “grandiosity, puffery, hyperbole, gross exaggeration, 
speculation, flights of fancy, unsupported assumptions” and, 
where there was no more innocent explanation, “outright 
fabrication to further her own personal agenda.”  The court 
based its credibility determination on the hearing evidence and 
the court’s observations of the jury during trial.  Had there been 
juror misconduct as frequent and severe as Juror No. 1 had 
asserted, “it would not and it could not have escaped notice by 
the court, court personnel, counsel for the parties and the 
spectators.”  There had been “isolated violations” by the jurors 
of the court’s admonitions, the court concluded, but none of a 
nature that “singly or in combination” substantially prejudiced 
the trial’s fairness.   
a. Asserted Misconduct by Juror No. 1 
Jury misconduct serious and extensive enough to impair the 
fairness of the trial or deliberations may warrant granting a new 
trial motion.  (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 3; People v. Collins (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 175, 242.)  Where the trial court has heard evidence 
and made findings of historical fact regarding the alleged 
misconduct, we accept those findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence.  (People v. Weatherton (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
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589, 598; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 260.)  Whether 
those facts constitute misconduct is, however, a legal question 
we review independently.  (Collins, at p. 242.) 
Flinner 
contends 
Juror 
No. 1’s 
exaggerations 
and 
fabrications about her fellow jurors, viewed in the context of her 
plan to write a book about her jury experience, demonstrate a 
bias on her part.  Her efforts to make her contemplated book 
more “entertaining,” he argues, show that “her literary project 
compromised her objectivity.”  Moreover, Juror No. 1’s lack of 
credibility, Flinner maintains, shows she misconducted herself 
in deliberations:  “She exaggerated various claims of juror 
misconduct, and for the same reason would likely have 
exaggerated the evidence.”  Finally, in a later section of his brief, 
Flinner argues alternatively that:  (a) Juror No. 10 committed 
misconduct, as Juror No. 1 asserted; but (b) “if this court accepts 
the trial court’s factual finding that Juror No. 1 fabricated her 
testimony, it must reverse because of Juror No. 1’s perjury.”   
We accept the trial court’s findings regarding Juror No. 1’s 
credibility.  The contrary testimony of other jurors, as well as 
the tenor of Juror No. 1’s own testimony, amply supports the 
conclusion that her assertions of misconduct by other jurors 
were the product of speculation, gross exaggeration, and 
perhaps conscious fabrication.  We note, however, that the trial 
court did not specifically find any particular part of Juror No. 1’s 
testimony to be deliberately false.  No finding of perjury was 
made, and Flinner does not demonstrate by argument from the 
record that any such finding was compelled.  
Although Juror No. 1 made unwarranted accusations of 
misconduct against others after the trial’s conclusion, we 
conclude the facts do not demonstrate she committed 
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misconduct during the trial or deliberations.  Flinner himself 
engages in speculation by assuming that because Juror No. 1 
gave exaggerated accounts of other jurors’ behavior, she must 
similarly have distorted the trial evidence.  There was no 
evidence at the new trial hearing that Juror No. 1 said or did 
anything in deliberations to distort the evidence bearing on guilt 
or penalty.  To the contrary, other jurors, including the 
foreperson and Juror No. 10, found her contributions, many 
based on detailed notes of the evidence, appropriate and helpful. 
Flinner’s assertion that Juror No. 1’s book idea led her 
make her unfounded and exaggerated claims of misconduct is 
also unsupported by the hearing evidence.  Rather, as the trial 
court found, Juror No. 1’s claims appear to have been generated 
by her “palpable” antipathy to Jurors No. 10 and No. 12 and by 
her desire to be the center of attention.15  As far as the 
evidentiary hearing record discloses, Juror No. 1’s plan to write 
 
15  
The confrontation during deliberations that resulted from 
Juror No. 1’s dislike of Juror No. 10 was unfortunate and 
disturbing to the participants — Juror No. 10 testified Juror 
No. 1 called her a “bitch” and screamed at her, reducing her to 
tears — but it did not derail the deliberations.  Juror No. 10 also 
testified that after the incident, which occurred “at the very, 
very end of all of our decisions,” the jury completed its 
deliberations and returned its verdicts; later, Juror No. 1 
apologized for her “inappropriate” conduct, though Juror No. 10 
did not feel the apology was sincere.  Nor does the fact of an 
emotional confrontation between jurors necessarily indicate 
misconduct; it is not extraordinary for feelings among jurors to 
run high, especially in the context of disagreements during 
deliberations.  (See People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 541–
542 [that one juror may have made an angry threat against 
another does not show reversible jury misconduct].) 
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a book about her jury experience did not cause her to misconduct 
herself in any other manner.   
Flinner cites no authority suggesting that by itself a juror’s 
plan to write a book about the case or the jury experience 
constitutes misconduct warranting reversal, and we have found 
none.  It has been hypothesized that a juror’s profit motive could 
lead the juror into controversial behavior “for the sake of making 
a story worth telling,” or into “strong-arming the other members 
of the jury into an inequitable result that makes for good copy 
or a profitable film deal.”  (Note, Capote in the Jury Box:  
Analyzing the Ethics of Jurors Writing Books (2006) 19 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 643, 645; see Sims v. Brown (9th Cir. 2005) 425 
F.3d 560, 577 [juror who discussed writing a book during trial 
did not commit prejudicial misconduct where “there is no 
suggestion that she had a financial interest in any particular 
outcome”].)  In response to such dangers, California law 
prohibits offering or accepting a payment to a juror in exchange 
for information about a criminal case during trial or for 90 days 
after discharge (if the payment is greater than $50).  (Pen. Code, 
§ 116.5.)  The hearing evidence, however, did not show any 
agreement to write a book for profit:  Juror No. 1 testified 
without contradiction that while she had received a positive 
response to her book proposal and was hoping to borrow money 
to complete the project, she never obtained an agreement for 
payment of any amount. 
Flinner compares Juror No. 1 to the hypothetical juror 
discussed in dictum in Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 
970, 982, footnote 19, who “lies his way on [to the jury] because 
he secretly plans to write a memoir of the experience” and who, 
the court suggested, might then “vote differently to provide 
drama, or . . . inject personal prejudice into the jury room in an 
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attempt to jazz up the deliberative process.”  But while Juror 
No. 1 wrote on her questionnaire that she was “excited to be 
summoned” for jury service and that she thought Flinner’s case 
would be “very interesting,” there was no evidence she lied in 
order to be selected.16   
b. Asserted Misconduct by Juror No. 10  
Flinner contends Juror No. 10 “exhibited a clear bias by 
telling appellant she wanted him dead and by her personal 
infatuation with the lead detective.”  He acknowledges that the 
trial court found untrue Juror No. 1’s allegations in this regard 
but maintains that finding was unsupported by the record. 
We disagree.  The trial court’s finding was supported by 
substantial evidence and was based on the court’s assessment of 
the witnesses’ credibility.  As such, it is entitled to deference.  
(People v. Nessler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582.)  Juror No. 10 
denied making hostile gestures or expressions to Flinner, and 
no other juror corroborated Juror No. 1’s account.  Juror No. 10 
admitted making remarks about Detective Scully’s anatomy, 
 
16  
Flinner faults Juror No. 1 for failing to disclose on her 
questionnaire that she had been among the persons protected 
by a protective order her sister had obtained against an abusive 
former boyfriend.  But no question on the questionnaire 
specifically called for such information.  Juror No. 1 did disclose 
her sister’s history of drug addiction and related crime, which 
included an incident in which “[t]he group she hung with 
actually burned down her home.”  At the new trial hearing, she 
acknowledged she also should have referenced that incident in 
answer to the question whether she or members of her family 
had ever been victims of crime.  The trial court made no finding 
that Juror No. 1 was deceptive regarding the protective order or 
her sister’s former boyfriend, and we find nothing in the record 
that compels such a finding. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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but denied any acts that would suggest an “infatuation,” much 
less a “fixation.”  As for Green Juror No. 10’s claim that he saw 
Juror No. 10 expose herself to Scully, cross-examination showed 
that to be mere speculation on his part.   
Juror No. 10 may not have conducted herself with perfect 
decorum throughout the trial.  But the trial court found she did 
not commit the misconduct Juror No. 1 attributed to her, and 
we uphold that finding as supported by substantial evidence. 
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Competence to Stand Trial  
Flinner contends the court erred, after the guilt verdicts 
were returned, in declining to suspend trial proceedings under 
Penal Code section 1368 in order to determine his competence 
to stand trial. 
Defendant Flinner’s jury returned its guilt-phase verdicts 
on October 16, 2003, but those verdicts were ordered sealed 
while codefendant Ontiveros’s jury continued deliberating.  In 
the early morning of Sunday, October 19, jail personnel found 
Flinner, in his cell, in what the trial court, paraphrasing the jail 
records, described as “an apparent state of physical distress.”  
Flinner was hospitalized and was discharged on the morning of 
Tuesday, October 21.  Declaring that he had been told Flinner 
had attempted suicide, defense counsel moved to initiate 
competency proceedings under Penal Code section 1368.  In 
opposition, the prosecutor asserted Flinner’s apparent conduct 
on this occasion was consistent with his record of previous failed 
“ ‘attempts’ ” at suicide, other instances of malingering, and 
“manipulation and deceit,” and did not suggest an inability to 
proceed with the penalty phase.  The court heard and denied the 
motion on Thursday, October 23.   
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
99 
 
At the hearing, the court and counsel reviewed Flinner’s 
recent medical records.  The court asked Attorney Mitchell 
whether, with the additional information in those records, he 
wished to give his view as to Flinner’s present competency to 
stand trial.  Although Mitchell and cocounsel Resnick had met 
with Flinner the day before the hearing, Mitchell did not 
indicate Flinner acted or spoke in a manner suggesting 
incompetence.  Mitchell believed himself “on the horns of a 
dilemma” as both Flinner’s attorney and an officer of the court; 
although he made no representations as to Flinner’s mental 
condition, 
he 
believed 
the 
examination 
and 
hearing 
requirements of Penal Code section 1368 had been triggered.  
The prosecutor observed that the medical records showed 
Flinner’s blood pressure and pulse at the time of his 
hospitalization, while elevated, were within the range that 
might be seen for a man of his age doing an intense physical 
activity and that when interviewed on October 21 by a sheriff’s 
department employee, Flinner denied any suicidal thoughts and 
stated, “ ‘I don’t really know what happened to me.’ ” 
Summing up the record, the trial court added that when 
interviewed, Flinner denied taking any drug, prescription or 
nonprescription, to excess, and that the court’s own observations 
at the October 23 hearing showed Flinner to be apparently alert, 
not in physical distress, and conversing with counsel in an 
apparently normal manner.  The court found scant evidence 
Flinner’s condition on Sunday was the result of a suicide 
attempt, but even if it was, the evidence did not indicate 
incompetence to stand trial.   
“The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court 
from trying or convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
100 
 
incompetent to stand trial.  [Citations.]  Section 1367 of the 
Penal Code, incorporating the applicable constitutional 
standard, specifies that a person is incompetent to stand trial 
‘if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the 
defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a 
rational manner.’  (Id., subd. (a); see Dusky v. U.S. (1960) 362 
U.S. 402 [4 L.Ed.2d 824, 80 S.Ct. 788] [competence requires 
‘ “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding” ’ and ‘ “a rational 
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him” ’].)”  (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230–231.) 
“Penal 
Code 
section 
1368 
requires 
that 
criminal 
proceedings be suspended and competency proceedings be 
commenced if ‘a doubt arises in the mind of the judge’ regarding 
the defendant’s competence (id., subd. (a)) and defense counsel 
concurs (id., subd. (b)).  This court has construed that provision, 
in conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional 
law, as meaning that an accused has the right ‘to a hearing on 
present sanity if he comes forward with substantial evidence 
that he is incapable, because of mental illness, of understanding 
the nature of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his 
defense.’  (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518 [58 
Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942], discussing Pate v. Robinson (1966) 
383 U.S. 375, 385–386 [15 L.Ed.2d 815, 86 S.Ct. 836].)  ‘Once 
such substantial evidence appears, a doubt as to the sanity of 
the accused exists, no matter how persuasive other evidence — 
testimony of prosecution witnesses or the court’s own 
observations of the accused — may be to the contrary.’  
(Pennington, at p. 518.)  As we have explained in more recent 
cases, substantial evidence for this purpose is evidence ‘that 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
101 
 
raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt’ as to competence, and the 
duty to conduct a competency hearing ‘may arise at any time 
prior to judgment.’ ”  (People v. Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 231.)   
We agree with the trial court that there was insufficient 
evidence of incompetence to call for suspension of criminal 
proceedings and a formal inquiry into competence to stand trial.  
The exact nature and cause of the medical crisis Flinner suffered 
on October 19 was unknown.  After Flinner’s release from the 
hospital, he denied having suicidal thoughts or overdosing on 
any drug.  Even assuming Flinner did try to kill himself in jail, 
it is not clear that was the result of any mental disorder; defense 
counsel pointed to nothing in the medical records so indicating.  
(See People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 509 [preference for 
receiving the death penalty and hoarding of medication for 
possible suicide attempt do not indicate incompetence].)  
Counsel said nothing to suggest Flinner was experiencing any 
difficulty understanding the proceedings or communicating with 
the defense team; nor did the court’s own observations give any 
indication Flinner was having problems following the 
proceedings or communicating with counsel.  In the absence of 
substantial evidence of incompetence, the court properly denied 
Flinner’s Penal Code section 1368 motion. 
2. Cumulative Impact of Errors  
Flinner contends the errors and misconduct committed in 
his trial, considered cumulatively, deprived him of due process 
and a fair trial.  We have found harmless the erroneous 
admission against Flinner of Ontiveros’s statements detailing 
Ontiveros’s killing of the victim (pt. II.B.7., ante) and the 
possibly 
erroneous 
admission 
of 
Flinner’s 
letter 
to 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
102 
 
Representative Hunter (pt. II.B.3.h., ante).  Examining their 
potential impact together, we find them cumulatively harmless 
as well.  Though both evidentiary issues, they went to different 
factual aspects of the prosecution case; their potential prejudice 
would not have a strong tendency to accumulate.   
3. Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Law  
Flinner contends several aspects of California’s death 
penalty scheme violate the United States Constitution.  We have 
considered and rejected these claims before, and we decline to 
revisit the following holdings.   
“[T]he California death penalty statute is not impermissibly 
broad, whether considered on its face or as interpreted by this 
court.”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 813.)  Penal Code 
section 190.3, factor (a), which permits a jury to consider the 
circumstances of the offense in sentencing, does not result in 
arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty in 
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 98, 149; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 
975–976, 978.) 
“The death penalty statute does not lack safeguards to avoid 
arbitrary and capricious sentencing, deprive defendant of the 
right to a jury trial, or constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
on the ground that it does not require either unanimity as to the 
truth of aggravating circumstances or findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance (other than 
Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or factor (c) evidence) has been 
proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
factors, or that death is the appropriate sentence.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
103 
 
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235; accord, People v. McDowell 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 444; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 1, 40–41.)  We have held that the Supreme Court’s 
recent Sixth Amendment decisions (e.g., Hurst v. Florida (2016) 
577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 616]; Cunningham v. California (2007) 
549 U.S. 270; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring 
v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 
530 U.S. 466) do not affect our conclusions in this regard.  
(Rangel, at p. 1235.) 
“Intercase proportionality review, comparing defendant’s 
case to other murder cases to assess relative culpability, is not 
required by the due process, equal protection, fair trial, or cruel 
and unusual punishment clauses of the federal Constitution.”  
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 490.)  Flinner also 
refers in passing to the lack of “intra-case” proportionality 
review, but he does not argue his death sentence was grossly 
disproportionate to the offense committed or to the treatment of 
other participants in the capital crime.  (See People v. Clark 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 642.)  Given the evidence that Flinner, a 
mature man acting on his own initiative, organized and 
participated in a callous and cold-blooded killing of his fiancée 
purely for his financial gain, we would not, were the claim made, 
conclude his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his 
individual culpability. 
Finally, “California’s use of the death penalty does not 
violate international law either by punishing certain first degree 
murders with death or by employing the procedures defendant 
complains of above.”  (People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 
456.)  “Defendant’s argument that the use of capital punishment 
‘as regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes’ 
violates international norms of human decency and hence the 
PEOPLE v. FLINNER 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
104 
 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution fails, at 
the outset, because California does not employ capital 
punishment in such a manner.  The death penalty is available 
only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when a special 
circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the 
penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions 
different from those applying to ‘regular punishment’ for 
felonies.”  (People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 43–
44.) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.  
 
 
    KRUGER, J.  
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GREENWOOD, J.* 
 
* 
Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Flinner 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  
Original Appeal  XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted    
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S123813 
Date Filed:   November 23, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Allan J. Preckel 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Patrick M. Ford, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General,  Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Theodore Cropley and 
Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Patrick M. Ford 
1901 First Ave., Suite 400 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 236-0679 
 
Christopher P. Beesley 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9161