Title: State v. Perkins

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA14-77 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 7 October 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
Nos. 11 CRS 210130 
DWAYNE ANTHONY ELLIS, 
Defendant. 
11 CRS 211154 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 2 August 2013 by 
Judge W. Osmond Smith in Wake County Superior Court.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 11 September 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Joseph E. Elder, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender James R. Grant, for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
GEER, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant Dwayne Anthony Ellis appeals from his convictions 
of felony larceny, injury to personal property, first degree 
trespass, and possession of stolen property.  Defendant's sole 
argument on appeal is that the information charging defendant 
with injury to personal property was fatally defective because 
it failed to allege that the owners of the injured property -- 
"North Carolina State University (NCSU) and NCSU High Voltage 
Distribution" -- are legal entities capable of owning property. 
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Under State v. Campbell, ___ N.C. App. ___, 759 S.E.2d 380 
(2014), when an indictment alleges that the property at issue 
has multiple owners, the indictment must also show that each 
owner is capable of owning property.  Because the information 
fails to allege with respect to the charge of injury to personal 
property that "NCSU High Voltage Distribution" is a legal entity 
capable of owning property, the information is fatally flawed.   
Accordingly, we vacate defendant's injury to personal property 
conviction and remand for resentencing on defendant's remaining 
convictions.  
Facts 
The State's evidence tended to show the following facts.  
On 23 April 2011 at around 4:30 a.m., Sergeant Ian Kendrick of 
the North Carolina State University ("NCSU") Police initiated a 
traffic stop of a Chrysler 300 with an attached trailer that had 
exited from a parking lot near an electrical substation.  
Defendant, the driver of the vehicle, was taken into custody for 
an unrelated matter.  During a pre-impoundment inventory search 
of the Chrysler, law enforcement officers discovered four large 
rolls of copper wire and wet, muddy clothing.  It was later 
discovered that the copper wire had been taken from a fenced in 
area of the electrical substation.  Because the copper wire had 
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been cut, it could no longer be used at the electrical 
substation.   
On 12 July 2011 defendant was indicted in case file number 
11 CRS 210130 for felony larceny, misdemeanor injury to personal 
property, and first degree trespass in connection with the 23 
April 2011 theft of the stolen copper wire.  The same day, 
defendant was indicted in case file number 11 CRS 211154 for 
felony possession of stolen goods relating to a separate 
incident on 14 February 2011.  On 23 July 2013, defendant waived 
the finding and return of an indictment and consented to being 
tried on superseding informations alleging the same offenses.  
With respect to each charge in 11 CRS 210130, the State alleged 
that the copper wire was the personal property of "North 
Carolina 
State 
University 
(NCSU) 
and 
NCSU 
High 
Voltage 
Distribution."  
The trial court granted the State's motion to join the two 
cases for trial, and on 2 August 2013, a jury found defendant 
guilty of felony larceny, misdemeanor injury to personal 
property, and first degree trespass in 11 CRS 210130 and of 
misdemeanor possession of stolen goods in 11 CRS 211154.  The 
trial court consolidated the convictions in 11 CRS 210130 into 
one judgment and sentenced defendant to a presumptive-range term 
of six to eight months imprisonment, followed by a consecutive 
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term of 45 days imprisonment for the conviction in 11 CRS 
211154.  Defendant timely appealed to this Court.   
Discussion 
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the injury to personal 
property charge because the information was fatally defective in 
that it failed to allege that "North Carolina State University 
(NCSU) and NCSU High Voltage Distribution" are legal entities 
capable of owning property.   
It is well settled that a valid indictment alleging all of 
the essential elements of the offense is required for a trial 
court to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the charge.  
State v. Ledwell, 171 N.C. App. 328, 331, 614 S.E.2d 412, 414 
(2005).  When, as in this case, the defendant properly waives 
the indictment, the trial court may proceed on an information, 
which must "charge the crime or crimes in the same manner" as an 
indictment.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-923(b) (2013).  Although 
defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the information 
below, "[a] challenge to the facial validity of an indictment 
may be brought at any time, and need not be raised at trial for 
preservation on appeal."  State v. LePage, 204 N.C. App. 37, 49, 
693 S.E.2d 157, 165 (2010).  This Court reviews the sufficiency 
of an indictment -- or, in this case, an information -- de novo.  
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State v. Chillo, 208 N.C. App. 541, 543, 705 S.E.2d 394, 396 
(2010). 
This Court has previously addressed the requirements for 
indictments for injury to personal property and the similar 
crime of larceny:   
To convict a defendant of injury to 
personal property, the State must prove that 
the personal property was that "of another," 
i.e., someone other than the person or 
persons accused.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-160 
(2004) ("If any person shall wantonly and 
willfully injure the personal property of 
another he shall be guilty . . . ."); In re 
Meaut, 51 N.C. App. 153, 155, 275 S.E.2d 
200, 201 (1981). Moreover, "an indictment 
for larceny must allege the owner or person 
in 
lawful 
possession 
of 
the 
stolen 
property."  State v. Downing, 313 N.C. 164, 
166, 326 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985).  Thus, to 
be sufficient, an indictment for injury to 
personal property or larceny must allege the 
owner or person in lawful possession of the 
injured or stolen property.    
 
State v. Price, 170 N.C. App. 672, 673-74, 613 S.E.2d 60, 62 
(2005).  Moreover, "'[i]f the entity named in the indictment is 
not a person, it must be alleged that the victim was a legal 
entity capable of owning property[.]'"  Id. at 674, 613 S.E.2d 
at 62 (quoting State v. Phillips, 162 N.C. App. 719, 721, 592 
S.E.2d 272, 273 (2004)).   
 
Count II of the information in 11 CRS 210130 alleged that 
defendant  
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unlawfully and willfully did wantonly injure 
and damage personal property, 228 feet of 
350 
primary 
copper 
wire, 
the 
personal 
property of North Carolina State University 
(NCSU) and NCSU High Voltage Distribution, 
resulting in damage in excess of $200.  This 
act was done in violation of NCGS § 14-160.  
 
With respect to indictments alleging multiple owners of 
personal property, as the information did in this case, this 
Court has recently explained:  
Where an indictment alleges two owners 
of the stolen property, the State must prove 
that each owner had at least some property 
interest in it.  See State v. Greene, 289 
N.C. 578, 585, 223 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1976) 
("If the person alleged in the indictment to 
have a property interest in the stolen 
property is not the owner or special owner 
of it, there is a fatal variance entitling 
defendant to a nonsuit."); State v. Burgess, 
74 N.C. 272, 273 (1876) ("If one is charged 
with stealing the property of A, it will not 
do to prove that he stole the joint property 
of A and B."); State v. Hill, 79 N.C. 656, 
659 (1878) (holding that where an indictment 
alleges multiple owners, the State must 
prove that there were in fact multiple 
owners). 
 
If 
one 
of 
the 
owners 
were 
incapable of owning property, the State 
necessarily would be unable to prove that 
both alleged owners had a property interest.  
Therefore, 
where 
the 
indictment 
alleges 
multiple owners, one of whom is not a 
natural person, failure to allege that such 
an owner has the ability to own property is 
fatal to the indictment. 
 
Campbell, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 759 S.E.2d at 384 (emphasis 
added). 
-7- 
In Campbell, the indictment for larceny alleged two owners 
of the stolen property -- a natural person and "Manna Baptist 
Church" -- but did not allege that the church was a legal entity 
capable of owning property.  Id. at ___, 759 S.E.2d at 384.  
This Court held that the indictment was fatally flawed and 
vacated the defendant's conviction for larceny.  Id. at ___, 759 
S.E.2d at 384. 
Although Campbell involved an indictment for larceny, the 
same reasoning applies to the information for injury to personal 
property in this case.  See State v. Lilly, 195 N.C. App. 697, 
702, 673 S.E.2d 718, 721-22 (2009) ("Since this Court has 
previously held that both larceny and injury to personal 
property have the same requirement that the indictment allege 
ownership or lawful possession of the property, we think the 
Court's reasoning in [State v. ]Liddell, [39 N.C. App. 373, 250 
S.E.2d 77 (1979),] addressing a larceny indictment, applies with 
equal force in the context of a prosecution for injury to 
personal 
property."). 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
hold 
that 
to 
be 
sufficient, the information in this case must have shown that 
both NCSU and "NCSU High Voltage Distribution" are legal 
entities capable of owning property.   
With respect to NCSU, the State argues that it is clear 
from the information that NCSU is a legal entity capable of 
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owning property.  We agree.  In State v. Turner, 8 N.C. App. 73, 
75, 173 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1970), this Court upheld an indictment 
for larceny that named the "'City of Hendersonville'" as the 
owner of the stolen property.  The Court took judicial notice of 
the public act establishing Hendersonville as a municipal 
corporation 
and 
explained 
that 
"the 
words 
'City 
of 
Hendersonville' denote a municipal corporate entity.  Municipal 
corporations are expressly authorized to purchase and hold 
personal property."  Id.   
As with the municipality in Turner, the legislature has 
provided, in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-4 (2013), that North Carolina 
State University is a constituent institution of the University 
of North Carolina, "a body politic and corporate" expressly 
authorized under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-3 (2013) to own property.  
Thus, we hold that the words "North Carolina State University" 
sufficiently allege a legal entity capable of owning property.   
In contrast to Turner, this Court held in Price that an 
indictment for larceny and injury to personal property alleging 
that the property at issue was owned by "'City of Asheville 
Transit and Parking Services,'" without more, was fatally 
defective.  170 N.C. App. at 674, 613 S.E.2d at 62.  The Court 
distinguished Turner "in which 'City of Hendersonville' was 
sufficient as it clearly denoted a municipal corporation, 
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because the additional words after 'City of Asheville' make it 
questionable what type of organization it is."  Id.  
Similarly, here, the words "NCSU High Voltage Distribution" 
do not identify a legal entity necessarily capable of owning 
property because the additional words after "NCSU" do not 
indicate what type of organization it is.  The information is, 
therefore, 
insufficient 
to 
show 
that 
"NCSU 
High 
Voltage 
Distribution" is a legal entity capable of owning property.  See 
also State v. Strange, 58 N.C. App. 756, 757, 294 S.E.2d 403, 
404 (1982) (holding indictment for larceny naming owner as 
"Granville County Law Enforcement Association" was fatally 
defective).  
Because the information failed to allege that one of the 
owners, "NCSU High Voltage Distribution," is a legal entity 
capable of owning property, we hold that the information is 
fatally defective and vacate defendant's conviction for injury 
to personal property.  Defendant does not, however, challenge 
any of his remaining convictions on appeal.   
We note that the trial court consolidated defendant's 
conviction for injury to personal property with the other 
offenses in case file number 11 CRS 210130 and sentenced 
defendant under the Class H felony of larceny to a presumptive-
range term of six to eight months imprisonment.  Our Supreme 
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Court has explained that "[s]ince it is probable that a 
defendant's conviction for two or more offenses influences 
adversely to him the trial court's judgment on the length of the 
sentence to be imposed when these offenses are consolidated for 
judgment, we think the better procedure is to remand for 
resentencing when one or more but not all of the convictions 
consolidated for judgment has been vacated." State v. Wortham, 
318 N.C. 669, 674, 351 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1987).  Accordingly, we 
remand for resentencing on defendant's remaining convictions in 
case file number 11 CRS 210130.   
 
No error in part; vacated in part; and remanded. 
Judges STEELMAN and DIETZ concur.