Title: In re N.M.H.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 474A19 
Filed 20 November 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: N.M.H. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 
28 August 2019 by Judge Robert J. Crumpton in District Court, Wilkes County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
 
Vannoy, Colvard, Triplett & Vannoy, P.L.L.C., by Daniel S. Johnson, for 
petitioner-appellee mother. 
 
No brief for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
NEWBY, Justice.  
 
Respondent appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights 
to his minor child, N.M.H. (Nicole)1, in this private termination action. We affirm.  
Petitioner and respondent are the mother and father of Nicole, who was born 
in September 2010 while petitioner and respondent were married. Petitioner and 
respondent resided in Caldwell County for most of their marriage. Petitioner 
                                            
1 A pseudonym agreed to by the parties is used to protect the identity of the juvenile 
and for ease of reading.  
IN RE N.M.H. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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admitted to abusing drugs during her marriage to respondent and accused 
respondent of the same, which he denied. Petitioner and respondent separated in 
2012 when petitioner stopped using drugs and moved to Wilkes County with Nicole 
in order to provide a better life for herself and Nicole. Respondent helped care for 
Nicole while petitioner continued to work in Caldwell County for approximately one 
month after the parties separated, until petitioner got a job in Wilkes County. 
Petitioner and respondent divorced in 2014, and petitioner married her current 
husband in 2015.  
From 2012 until July 2016, respondent had sporadic contact with petitioner 
through Facebook Messenger. During this four-year period, respondent visited the 
minor child approximately three or four times. Around 1 July 2016, petitioner agreed 
to let the minor child stay overnight at respondent’s house. The next day, the child 
came home dirty and smelling like cigarette smoke, and the child stated that 
respondent had a smoke room in his house. At that point, petitioner contacted 
respondent via Facebook Messenger, and they got into an argument. Petitioner told 
respondent she would not bring the child back to him. From that point in 2016, 
respondent had no contact with petitioner until March 2019, after he was served with 
the petition in this matter. Similarly, respondent had no contact with the minor child 
from July 2016 on. Other than paying for a $160 dance class in 2016, respondent did 
not provide any financial support for the minor child from 2012 on, nor did he give 
the child any type of gift or tokens of affection at any point.  
IN RE N.M.H. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On 14 March 2019, petitioner filed a petition to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights to Nicole on grounds of neglect and willful abandonment. 
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (7) (2019). In support of the asserted grounds, 
petitioner alleged that respondent had abandoned Nicole, had not provided any 
financial support for Nicole, had not provided any care for Nicole, had not shown any 
ability and/or willingness to provide a safe and loving home for Nicole, and had shown 
a complete indifference to the welfare and well-being of Nicole.  
The termination petition was heard on 23 August 2019, and the trial court 
entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights on 28 August 2019. The 
trial court determined that both grounds alleged in the termination petition to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights existed and concluded that termination was 
in Nicole’s best interests. Respondent appealed to this Court.  
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred by adjudicating 
grounds to terminate his parental rights to Nicole. “Our Juvenile Code provides for a 
two-step process for termination of parental rights proceedings consisting of an 
adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 94, 839 
S.E.2d 792, 796 (2020) (citing N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019)). 
At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden 
of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the 
existence of one or more grounds for termination under 
subsection 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019). . . . If 
the petitioner meets her burden during the adjudicatory 
stage, “the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at 
which the court must consider whether it is in the best 
IN RE N.M.H. 
 
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interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.” In re 
D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) 
(citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–
15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110).  
 
In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32, 35, 839 S.E.2d 748, 751–52 (2020).  
Respondent only challenges the trial court’s determination that grounds 
existed to terminate his parental rights at the adjudicatory stage in this case.   
“We 
review 
a 
trial 
court’s 
adjudication 
under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine whether the findings are 
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re E.H.P., 372 
N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2019) (quoting In re 
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 
(1984)); 
see 
also 
N.C.G.S. 
§ 
7B-1109(f) 
(2019). 
Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the 
evidence and are “binding on appeal.” In re Z.L.W., 372 
N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2019). “Moreover, we 
review only those [challenged] findings necessary to 
support the trial court’s determination that grounds 
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” In re 
T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58–59 (2019); 
accord In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 195, 835 S.E.2d 417, 421 
(2019) (reviewing only the challenged findings necessary to 
support the trial court’s determination that grounds for 
termination existed).  
 
In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 53, 839 S.E.2d 735, 737–38 (2020) (alteration in original).  
In this case, the trial court concluded that petitioner proved that grounds 
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on neglect and willful 
abandonment based on the following findings of fact: 
11. From 2012 until July 2016, the Respondent had 
sporadic contact with the Petitioner using the Facebook 
messenger app.  
IN RE N.M.H. 
 
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12. From 2012 until the summer of 2016, the Respondent 
visited with the child approximately three to four times. 
These visits were of short duration and in a public location. 
The Petitioner arranged these visits because the minor 
child did not know the Respondent.  
 
13. On or about July 1, 2016, the Petitioner agreed for the 
minor child to have an overnight visit at the Respondent’s 
home.  
 
14. When the minor child returned after her visit at the 
Respondent’s home, she was dirty and smelled of cigarette 
smoke. The minor child told the Petitioner that the 
Respondent had a “smoke room” in his home.  
 
15. The Petitioner contacted the Respondent using 
Facebook messenger and an argument ensued. The 
Petitioner told the Respondent she would not bring the 
minor child back to him.  
 
16. The Respondent did not have any further contact with 
the Petitioner until March 2019, after he was served with 
the petition filed in this matter.  
 
17. The Respondent has not provided financial support for 
the minor child at any time that she has been in the 
Petitioner’s care since 2012.  
 
18. The Respondent has been self-employed as a 
mechanic. He is under no physical or mental disability that 
prevents him from being gainfully employed. The 
Respondent has had the ability to provide financial support 
for the minor child but has provided no support since the 
parties separated.  
 
19. The Respondent has four other children. He pays child 
support for two of the children that do not reside in his 
primary custody.  
 
IN RE N.M.H. 
 
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20. The Respondent never filed any type of custody action 
seeking visitation with the minor child. The Respondent 
has not sought any visits with the minor child since July 
2016.  
 
21. The Respondent has had no contact with the minor 
child since July 2016.  
 
22. The Respondent has never sent the minor child any 
type of gift or customary or expected tokens of affection on 
her birthday, Christmas, or any holiday.  
 
23. The Respondent has failed to provide for the minor 
child’s physical and economic needs while she has been in 
the care of the Petitioner since 2012.  
 
24. During the six-months immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition to terminate his parental rights, the 
Respondent had no contact with the minor child and did 
not provide any financial support.  
 
25. The Respondent has failed to perform his natural and 
legal obligations of support and maintenance as a parent 
for the minor child.  
 
 
Respondent first argues the trial court erred by determining that his parental 
rights to Nicole were subject to termination based on willful abandonment. Under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), the trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights 
when “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive 
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(7).  
“Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent 
which manifests a willful determination to forego all 
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the 
child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617 
IN RE N.M.H. 
 
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(citation omitted). “[I]f a parent withholds his presence, his 
love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and 
wil[l]fully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such 
parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the 
child.” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 
608 (1962) (citation omitted). “Whether a biological parent 
has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of fact 
to be determined from the evidence.” In re Adoption of 
Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 276, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986). 
“[A]lthough the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct 
outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent’s 
credibility and intentions, the ‘determinative’ period for 
adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive 
months preceding the filing of the petition.” In re N.D.A., 
373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2019) (citation 
omitted). 
 
In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. at 35–36, 839 S.E.2d at 752 (alterations in original).   
Petitioner filed the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights on 14 
March 2019. Thus, the determinative six-month period for willful abandonment was 
from 14 September 2018 through 14 March 2019.  
Respondent challenges several of the trial court’s findings as not supported by 
the evidence, including findings of fact 12 and 17. Those findings of fact concern the 
number and duration of his visits with Nicole prior to the summer of 2016, petitioner’s 
reason for scheduling those visits, and his failure to contribute anything to Nicole’s 
care. Respondent directs this Court’s attention to evidence that petitioner did not 
remember how many visits respondent had with Nicole before 1 July 2016, that he 
was more involved in Nicole’s life prior to 2012, and that he paid for a dance class for 
Nicole in 2016. We note that respondent’s challenges to findings of fact 12 and 17 do 
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not relate to the determinative six-month period, but that the trial court may still 
rely on the findings to evaluate respondent’s credibility and intentions. See In re 
N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 77, 833 S.E.2d at 773.  
We agree with respondent that the trial court’s finding of fact 17, that 
respondent failed to provide financial support for the minor child since 2012, is not 
consistent with the evidence at the termination hearing showing that at one point in 
2016 respondent paid $160 for a dance class for the minor child. Nevertheless, other 
than this one payment, the record is clear that respondent did not provide any 
financial support to the child from 2016 to the date the termination petition was filed, 
including during the relevant six-month period.  
As for finding of fact 12, even assuming that respondent had more than three 
to four visits with the child between 2012 and 2016, it is undisputed that after the 
summer of 2016 respondent neither contacted nor visited the child at any point 
during the almost three years preceding the filing of the termination petition, 
including within the relevant six-month period. Moreover, respondent testified that 
he did not see the minor child at any point during 2014 or 2015 and that he saw the 
child three times during 2016, meaning that he only saw the child three times 
between 2014 and 2016, and did not see the child at any point after mid-2016.  
Respondent asserts, and we agree, that the trial court does not utilize the word 
“willful” when discussing whether respondent’s conduct met the required statutory 
standard of willful abandonment. Nevertheless, when read in context, the trial court’s 
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order makes clear that the court applied the proper willfulness standard to determine 
that respondent willfully abandoned the child under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). When 
evaluating the findings together, it is evident that the trial court took into 
consideration that respondent did not contact the minor child or petitioner at any 
point in the nearly three years preceding the filing of the termination petition. Only 
after the filing did petitioner reach out. Similarly, during the years preceding the 
filing, respondent never pursued court-ordered visitation with the child, nor did he 
utilize any avenue to arrange visits with the minor child since mid-2016. In sum, from 
the summer of 2016 to the filing of the termination petition, which occurred on 14 
March 2019, respondent made no attempt to contact the child.  
Though in July 2016 respondent and petitioner got into a disagreement via 
Facebook Messenger and petitioner testified that she told respondent that she was 
“done messaging [respondent],” nothing in the record indicates that petitioner 
blocked respondent from further communicating with her or from seeking to 
communicate with the minor child. Respondent knew how to contact petitioner 
through Facebook Messenger despite not having her phone number, but respondent 
did not make any effort to contact the child in a nearly three-year time span. See In 
re L.M.M., 847 S.E.2d 770, 775–76 (N.C. 2020) (concluding that the trial court did not 
err by terminating the respondent’s parental rights based on willful abandonment 
where, though the petitioner had blocked the respondent on Facebook, the respondent 
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utilized no other channel to contact the petitioner or minor child during the 
determinative period).  
The trial court’s conclusion that respondent’s conduct met the statutory 
standard of abandonment of the child is consistent with other cases in which this 
Court has upheld termination based on willful abandonment. See In re K.N.K., 374 
N.C. at 54–55, 839 S.E.2d at 738–39 (concluding that termination was justified based 
on willful abandonment where the respondent had no contact with the minor child, 
provided no financial support, and sent no cards, gifts, or other tokens of affection not 
only during the determinative six-month period, but at any point during the 
approximately three years preceding the filing of the termination petition); In re 
B.C.B., 374 N.C. at 40–41, 839 S.E.2d at 754–55 (concluding that the trial court 
properly terminated the respondent’s parental rights based on willful abandonment 
when the respondent chose not to take advantage of visitation and had no contact 
with the minor child, and reiterating that a parent is not excused from contacting or 
showing interest in a child even if only limited means are available to do so).  
Moreover, the findings as a whole show that the trial court, in making its 
ultimate determination, properly considered respondent’s failure to provide any 
tangible or financial support. Despite paying for a $160 dance class for the child in 
2016, respondent did not provide any other financial or tangible support or any tokens 
of affection, including cards, for the child from 2016 on, including within the 
determinative six-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition. 
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Nonetheless, respondent pays child support for his other biological children who do 
not reside in his primary custody. See In re C.J.H., 240 N.C. App. 489, 503–04, 772 
S.E.2d 82, 92 (2015) (discussing the respondent’s failure to provide support during 
the relevant period when concluding that the respondent had abandoned the 
juvenile).  
While the trial court should have used the statutory language of “willful 
abandonment” to address respondent’s conduct, the trial court’s findings that are 
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence ultimately support the conclusion 
that respondent’s conduct met the statutory criterion of willful abandonment. Cf. In 
re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 77–78, 833 S.E.2d at 773–74 (concluding that, despite the trial 
court’s finding that the respondent had failed to contact the minor child or provide 
support during the six-month period, the record indicated that the respondent had 
attempted to work out arrangements to visit the child on numerous occasions, 
including during the relevant six-month period, and therefore the trial court’s order 
did not support termination based on willful abandonment since the trial court failed 
to make specific findings on whether the respondent’s actions were willful). 
Because we conclude that termination was proper on willful abandonment 
grounds, we need not review the neglect ground for termination as contested by 
respondent. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 194, 835 S.E.2d at 421 (“[A] finding of only 
one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental rights . . . .”). 
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Accordingly, the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights is 
affirmed.  
AFFIRMED.