Title: Klemm v. American Transmission Co., LLC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2784 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Mark Klemm and Jeanne Klemm, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
American Transmission Company, LLC, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
Reported at: 329 Wis. 2d 415, 791 N.W. 2d 233 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 26, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 14, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory B. Huber 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Shane J. VanderWaal and Pietz, Vanderwaal, Stacker & 
Rottier, 
S.C., 
Wausau, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Shane 
Jon 
VanderWaal. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Steven M. 
Streck, Sara K. Beachy, and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by Steven M. Streck. 
 
An amicus brief was filed by Robert W. Roth, Joseph C. 
Niebler, Jr., James B. Hanley and Niebler, Pyzyk, Roth & Carrig, 
L.L.P., Menomonee Falls and Frank J. Jablonski and Progressive 
 
 
2
Law Group L.L.C, Madison and Michael R. Bauer and Bauer & Bach 
L.L.C. Madison as Eminent Domain Attorneys. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 37
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2784 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV432) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mark Klemm and Jeanne Klemm, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
American Transmission Company, LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 26, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals1 reversing the judgment 
of the circuit court for Marathon County, Greg Huber, Judge.  
                                                 
1 Klemm v. Am. Transmission Co., LLC, 2010 WI App 131, 329 
Wis. 2d 415, 791 N.W.2d 233. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
2 
 
This review involves litigation expenses2 under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d) (2009-10)3 in a condemnation proceeding between 
American Transmission Company, LLC (ATC) and Mark Klemm and 
Jeanne Klemm, the condemnees.     
¶2 
This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation:  Shall litigation expenses be awarded to an 
owner of property pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) if:  
• the owner conveys the property under the negotiated price 
procedure and receives a certificate of compensation 
pursuant to § 32.06(2a), with no jurisdictional offer 
issued under § 32.06(3);  
• the owner timely appeals to the circuit court, which 
refers the matter to the chairperson of the county 
condemnation commissioners for a hearing;  
• the owner is awarded at least $700 and at least 15% more 
than the negotiated price under § 32.06(2a); and  
• neither party appeals the commission's award?4 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(1) defines "litigation expenses" 
as "the sum of the costs, disbursements and expenses, including 
reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees necessary to 
prepare for or participate in actual or anticipated proceedings 
before the condemnation commissioners, board of assessment or 
any court under this chapter." 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise noted. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) applies when neither party 
appeals the award to the circuit court.  In the present case, 
neither party appealed the commission's award to the circuit 
court. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The question whether or not litigation expenses shall 
be awarded when an appeal is taken from a "negotiated price" 
recorded in a certificate of compensation was identified soon 
after the legislature's 1977 revision of chapter 32, entitled 
"Eminent Domain."  In 1979, James Thiel, the director of the 
office of advisory services of the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation at that time, wrote:  "It is not clear whether 
litigation expenses may be awarded if an appeal is taken from a 
negotiated price, i.e. certificate of compensation."5  Thirty 
years have elapsed.  The court is now asked to resolve the 
question posed by the statutes and identified by James Thiel in 
1979. 
¶4 
The circuit court answered the question presented in 
the affirmative.  The court of appeals answered in the negative, 
ruling that Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) permits an award of 
litigation expenses only when a jurisdictional offer has been 
made. 
                                                 
5 James S. Thiel, New Developments in Law of Eminent Domain, 
Condemnation and Relocation, Wis. Bar Bull., June 1979, at 23, 
25. 
James Thiel is now Counsel in the Office of General Counsel 
of the Department of Transportation. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(2a), which governs condemnation in 
transportation and sewerage cases, is substantially the same as 
§ 32.06(2a), which governs most other condemnation proceedings.  
Attorney Thiel wrote about both sections and § 32.28(3).     
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
4 
 
¶5 
We examine the texts of Wis. Stat. § 32.06 and 
§ 32.28(3)(d) (the statutes at issue), the statutes in the 
context of the condemnation statutes, the legislative purpose of 
awarding litigation expenses, and the legislative history of 
§§ 32.06 and 32.28(3)(d).  Upon such review, we conclude that 
litigation expenses shall be awarded to an owner pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) if the owner conveys the property and 
receives a certificate of compensation pursuant to § 32.06(2a), 
with no jurisdictional offer issued under § 32.06(3); timely 
appeals to the circuit court, which refers the matter to the 
chairperson of the county condemnation commissioners; and is 
awarded at least $700 and at least 15% more than the negotiated 
price 
under 
§ 32.06(2a); 
and 
neither 
party 
appeals 
the 
commission's award.  We consider but are not persuaded by 
various arguments ATC makes criticizing the circuit court's and 
our interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 32.06(2a) and 32.28(3)(d) 
that the condemnees in the present case shall be awarded 
litigation expenses.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.6    
I 
                                                 
6 Several attorneys who routinely represent owners in 
condemnation actions filed a non-party (amicus curiae) brief 
arguing that the decision of the court of appeals violates equal 
protection.  We need not address the equal protection argument 
because our interpretation of the statutes leads us to reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals.    
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The underlying facts in the case are brief and 
undisputed.  In stating the facts we set forth the two statutes 
at issue.   
¶7 
ATC initiated condemnation proceedings against the 
condemnees under Wis. Stat. § 32.06 for an easement to construct 
an electrical transmission line across the condemnees' property.  
More specifically, the parties proceeded under subsection (2a) 
of § 32.06, entitled "Agreed Price."  Thus, § 32.06(2a) governs 
the condemnation proceeding in the present case.   
¶8 
Under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2), the condemnor obtains at 
least one appraisal of the property to be taken.  Under 
§ 32.06(2a), the condemnor is required to "attempt to negotiate 
personally with the owner" of the property to be taken "before 
making the jurisdictional offer."  The statute requires the 
condemnor to record any conveyance from the owner to the 
condemnor "executed as a result of negotiations under this 
subsection."7   
¶9 
In 
addition, 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(2a), 
the 
condemnor must record a certificate of compensation detailing 
among other matters the compensation for the acquisition.  The 
condemnor must also serve a copy of the certificate of 
compensation on the owner, including "a notice of the right to 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a), see Ross F. 
Plaetzer, Comment, Statutory Restrictions on the Exercise of 
Eminent 
Domain 
in 
Wisconsin: 
Dual 
Requirements 
of 
Prior 
Negotiation and Provision of Negotiating Materials, 63 Marq. L. 
Rev. 489 (1979-80).  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
6 
 
appeal [six months from the date of recording the certificate] 
the amount of compensation under this subsection."      
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(2a) provides in relevant part 
as follows: 
(2a) Agreed price. Before making the jurisdictional 
offer under sub. (3) the condemnor shall attempt to 
negotiate 
personally 
with 
the 
owner . . . of 
the 
property . . . for the purchase of the same. . . . The 
condemnor shall record any conveyance by or on behalf 
of the owner of the property to the condemnor executed 
as a result of negotiations under this subsection with 
the register of deeds. . . . The condemnor shall also 
record a certificate of compensation stating . . . the 
compensation for such acquisition.  The condemnor 
shall serve upon . . . [the owner] the statement and a 
notice 
of 
the 
right 
to 
appeal 
the 
amount 
of 
compensation under this subsection.  Any person named 
in the certificate may, within 6 months after the date 
of 
its 
recording, 
appeal 
from 
the 
amount 
of 
compensation therein stated by filing a petition with 
the judge of the circuit court of the county in which 
the property is located for proceedings to determine 
the amount of just compensation. . . . The judge shall 
forthwith assign the matter to the chairperson of the 
county condemnation commissioners for hearing under 
sub. (8) . . . (emphasis added). 
¶11 ATC provided the condemnees with an appraisal that 
estimated the fair market value of the easement at $7,750.  The 
condemnees agreed to convey the easement for that price.  
Proceeding 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(2a), 
ATC 
recorded 
a 
conveyance 
from the condemnees to ATC, as well as the 
certificate of compensation (in proper statutory form) in the 
amount of $7,750. 
¶12 In 
compliance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(2a), 
the 
condemnees filed a Notice of Appeal and Petition with the judge 
of the circuit court for Marathon County.  Adhering to the 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
7 
 
statute, 
the 
circuit 
court 
referred 
the 
matter 
to 
the 
chairperson of the county condemnation commissioners for a 
hearing under § 32.06(8).  The commission awarded the condemnees 
$10,000 as just compensation for the value of the easement. 
¶13 Following 
the 
commission's 
award, 
ATC 
and 
the 
condemnees negotiated a settlement for $30,000 as compensation 
for the easement.  The settlement provided that neither party 
would appeal the commission's award but that the circuit court 
for Marathon County would determine whether the condemnees are 
entitled to litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d).8  
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) provides for awarding 
litigation expenses to the condemnee when "[t]he award of the 
condemnation commission under s. 32.05(9) or 32.06(8) exceeds 
the jurisdictional offer or the highest written offer prior to 
the jurisdictional offer by at least $700 and at least 15% and 
neither party appeals the award to the circuit court . . ." 
(emphasis added).  
¶15 The condemnees filed a motion in circuit court seeking 
an order awarding litigation expenses.  The circuit court ruled 
that the condemnees were entitled to litigation expenses under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d).  The parties stipulated to an amount 
of litigation expenses and the circuit court entered final 
judgment for the condemnees.  ATC filed an appeal.   
                                                 
8 The parties agreed that the additional sums paid the 
condemnees under the settlement were not relevant to the circuit 
court's decision of litigation expenses. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
8 
 
¶16 The court of appeals ruled that the condemnees were 
not 
entitled 
to 
litigation 
expenses 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d).  This court granted the condemnees' petition for 
review.      
II 
¶17 The instant case presents a question of statutory 
interpretation and application of statutes to undisputed facts.  
This court will ordinarily decide the interpretation of the 
statutes and the application of the statutes to undisputed facts 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.   
III 
¶18 Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the 
statute.  Statutory language is construed according to its 
common and approved usage; technical words and phrases and 
others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be 
construed according to such meaning.9  Statutes are interpreted 
to give effect to each word and to avoid surplusage.10  The 
statutory language is examined within the context in which it is 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1). 
10 See State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 894, 470 N.W.2d 900 
(1991) ("A statute should be construed so that no word or clause 
shall be rendered surplusage and every word if possible should 
be given effect." (quoting Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 
315, 286 N.W.2d 817 (1980))).  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
9 
 
used.11  An interpretation that fulfills the purpose of the 
statute is favored over one that undermines the purpose.12    
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) provides:  
(3) In lieu of costs under ch. 814, litigation 
expenses shall be awarded to the condemnee if: 
. . . .  
(d) The award of the condemnation commission under s. 
32.05(9) or 32.06(8) exceeds the jurisdictional offer 
or 
the 
highest 
written 
offer 
prior 
to 
the 
jurisdictional offer by at least $700 and at least 15% 
and neither party appeals the award to the circuit 
court; . . . . 
¶20 In analyzing the text of 32.28(3)(d), we point out 
that in the instant case the award of the condemnation 
commission 
was 
made 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(8); 
no 
jurisdictional offer was made; no jurisdictional offer was 
required under the statutes; the condemnor made a written offer; 
the condemnation commission award, $10,000, exceeds the agreed 
                                                 
11 See Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 
221 Wis. 2d 630, 641, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998) ("The circuit court 
properly stated that in resolving the issue of statutory 
interpretation . . . it 
must 
examine 
first 
the 
statutory 
language and then the statute in context.") 
See also Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 
WI 86, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893 ("[A]lthough 'it is 
true that statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute, it is also well established that courts must not 
look at a single, isolated sentence or portion of a sentence, 
but at the role of the relevant language in the entire 
statute.'" (quoting Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., 2000 WI 
7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515)). 
12 County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶34, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 
759 N.W.2d 571. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
10 
 
price, $7,750, by more than $700 and 15%; and neither party 
appealed the award to the circuit court.       
¶21 The focus of the present case is on that part of the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) that requires that the county 
condemnation 
commission 
award 
"exceed[ 
] . . . the 
highest 
written offer prior to the jurisdictional offer" (emphasis 
added).  The parties ask us to interpret this language and to 
determine whether it applies to the negotiated price appeal 
route 
set 
forth 
in 
§ 32.06(2a) 
in 
which 
there 
is 
no 
jurisdictional offer.   
¶22 As we explained above, the parties proceeded under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a), the negotiated price appeal route.  No 
jurisdictional offer was made or required.  The record does not 
contain a written offer from ATC to the condemnees.  The signed 
easement materials, including the certificate of compensation, 
are in writing and are in effect a written offer from the 
condemnor.  The phrase "written offer" appearing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28 does not appear any other place in chapter 32.  We give 
the phrase "written offer" in § 32.28 its ordinary meaning in 
common usage, not a peculiar meaning in the law.    
¶23 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals agreed 
that the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) was 
plain, clear, and unambiguous.  Nevertheless, the two courts 
came to opposite conclusions about the meaning of the statute 
and its application to the present case.       
¶24 The different results reached by the two courts may be 
explained 
by 
their 
different 
approaches 
to 
statutory 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
11 
 
interpretation.  The circuit court interpreted the text of Wis. 
Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) by focusing on the clause "highest written 
offer," and by examining §§ 32.06(2a) and 32.28(3)(d) in the 
context of the condemnation statutes.   
¶25 In contrast, the court of appeals interpreted the text 
of § 32.28(3)(d) by focusing on the clause "prior to the 
jurisdictional offer" in isolation, without looking at this 
phrase in the context of the condemnation statutes.  Because the 
court of appeals concluded that the text of § 32.28(3)(d) was 
plain, it determined that it need not harmonize the statute with 
other provisions in chapter 32.  
¶26 The circuit court viewed the "negotiated price" under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a) as a written offer by the condemnor 
within the meaning of the phrase "written offer" used in 
§ 32.28(3)(d). 
 
It 
viewed 
the 
clause 
"prior 
to 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer" 
as 
having 
significance 
had 
a 
jurisdictional offer been made.  If a jurisdictional offer had 
been made, the highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional 
offer would determine whether litigation expenses are awarded 
under § 32.28(3)(d).  The circuit court did not interpret 
§ 32.28(3)(d) as requiring that a jurisdictional offer be made 
for litigation expenses to be awarded.        
¶27 The circuit court interpreted Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) 
by examining the statute in the context of the condemnation 
statutes.  The circuit court explained that the legislature 
created two different routes by which the parties would reach 
the county condemnation commission and then get court review.  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
12 
 
One route is the route the parties in the present case took: the 
negotiated price appeal route.  This route is used, according to 
§ 32.06(2a), before the condemnor makes a jurisdictional offer.  
As we explained above and as the circuit court explained, 
§ 32.06(2a) 
begins 
by 
stating 
that 
"[b]efore 
making 
the 
jurisdictional offer," the condemnor shall attempt to reach a 
negotiated price.  The last step under § 32.06(2a) is for the 
judge to refer the matter to the chairperson of the county 
condemnation commissioners for a hearing under § 32.06(8).  
Section 32.06(8) is referenced in § 32.28(3)(d), governing 
litigation expenses; § 32.28(3)(d) explicitly governs awards of 
the condemnation commission under § 32.06(8).  
¶28 The other route is for the condemnor to make a 
jurisdictional offer under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3).  This route 
begins with the condemnor getting an appraisal under § 32.06(2).  
If 
the 
parties 
cannot 
reach 
a 
negotiated 
price 
under 
§ 32.06(2a), the condemnor presents the condemnee with a 
jurisdictional offer.  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3).  If the condemnee 
accepts the jurisdictional offer, the condemnation process is 
completed with a transfer of title.  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(6).  No 
further litigation is contemplated.   
¶29 If the condemnee rejects the jurisdictional offer, the 
condemnor may proceed with a petition in condemnation before the 
circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(7).  The judge assigns the 
matter of determining the amount of just compensation to the 
chairperson of the county condemnation commissioners for a 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(8).  Section 32.06(8) is 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
13 
 
referenced 
in 
§ 32.28(3)(d) 
governing 
litigation 
expenses; 
§ 32.28(3)(d) explicitly governs awards of the condemnation 
commission under § 32.06(8).13     
¶30 Regardless of whether the parties proceed under the 
negotiated price appeal route or the jurisdictional offer route, 
the county condemnation commission and court procedures are the 
same.  The circuit court concluded correctly that "the statutory 
condemnation procedure offers two different routes to the same 
destination."    
¶31 The circuit court concluded that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) "makes litigation expenses available  
under both of the litigation scenarios . . . ."  The circuit 
court further concluded that a jurisdictional offer need not be 
made; "the 'prior to' language of § 32.28(3)(d) echoes the 
beginning words of § 32.06(2a), which requires that negotiations 
be attempted '[b]efore making the jurisdictional offer.'"  Thus, 
when § 32.28(3)(d) refers "to the jurisdictional offer or the 
highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional offer,"  it is 
                                                 
13 Either 
party 
may appeal the award of the county 
condemnation commission to the circuit court.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(10).  If a condemnation commission award is appealed to 
the circuit court, then § 32.28(3)(f), (g), and (h) apply to 
determine whether a condemnee receives litigation expenses.  
Each subsection includes the language "or the highest written 
offer prior to the jurisdictional offer."  Each scenario 
presented by subsections (f), (g), and (h) can be reached either 
through the negotiated price appeal route or the jurisdictional 
offer route.  Our interpretation of "or the highest written 
offer prior to the jurisdictional offer" can be consistently 
applied to these subsections of Wis. Stat. § 32.28.  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
14 
 
referring to the two routes——the jurisdictional offer route and 
the negotiated price appeal route.   
¶32 In 
contrast, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
based 
its 
interpretation on the text of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d), focusing 
on the use of the article "the" in the phrase "The award of the 
condemnation commission exceeds . . . the highest written offer 
prior to the jurisdictional offer . . . ."  According to the 
court of appeals, § 32.28(3)(d) provides for litigation expenses 
only when there has been a jurisdictional offer.     
¶33 Resting 
its 
decision 
on 
the 
article 
"the" 
in 
§ 32.28(3)(d), the court of appeals concluded: "The use of the 
article 
'the' 
anticipates 
that 
there 
is, 
in 
fact, 
a 
jurisdictional offer."14  Because no jurisdictional offer was 
made in the present case, the court of appeals held that the 
condemnees were not entitled to litigation expenses under 
§ 32.28(3)(d).   
¶34 The court of appeals' emphasis on the article "the" in 
its interpretation of § 32.28(3)(d) cannot be consistently 
applied in interpreting § 32.28(3) and § 32.06(2a).   
¶35 The article "the" is used throughout § 32.06(2a), when 
the article "a" or "an" might be more grammatically correct.  
For instance, § 32.06(2a) provides that "the condemnor shall 
consider the owner's appraisal under sub. (2)(b)" (emphasis 
added), although an owner may not always obtain an appraisal.  
Likewise, the first words in Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a) are: "Before 
                                                 
14 Klemm, 329 Wis. 2d 415, ¶10. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
15 
 
making the jurisdictional offer . . . " (emphasis added).  This 
phrase cannot reasonably be interpreted to contemplate, in the 
words of the court of appeals, that "there is, in fact, a 
jurisdictional offer."15  The plain objective of § 32.06(2a) is 
that the parties come to a negotiated agreement such that a 
jurisdictional offer is unnecessary.  Indeed, the condemnor is 
required to negotiate with the owner before a jurisdictional 
offer can be made.16         
¶36 We have considered the interpretations of the circuit 
court and court of appeals and the arguments of the parties.  We 
are persuaded by the circuit court's interpretation of the text 
and context of the statutes.  The court of appeals' emphasis on 
the article "the" is too restrictive a reading of the statute; 
the emphasis on "the" does not fit the statutory language in 
§ 32.06(2a) (and elsewhere in chapter 32), which uses the phrase 
"the jurisdictional offer" but does not require a jurisdictional 
offer to materialize.  Furthermore, the emphasis on "the" is not 
consistent with the legislative purpose of awarding litigation 
expenses.   
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, 291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 
N.W.2d 213 (§ 32.06(2a) requires that a condemnor negotiate with 
the owner in good faith before issuing a jurisdictional offer); 
Arrowhead Farms, Inc. v. Dodge County, 21 Wis. 2d 647, 651-52, 
124 N.W.2d 631 (1963) ("[T]he condemnor stipulated that it did 
not negotiate with the property owner as required by sec. 
32.05(2a), Stats.  Because such negotiation is a necessary 
condition of conferring jurisdiction upon the administrative 
body and the court to determine just compensation, the judgment 
would be invalid . . . ."). 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
16 
 
¶37 We conclude that reading the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d) in the context of § 32.06(2a) and the condemnation 
statutes, as the circuit court did, is the appropriate method of 
statutory interpretation.  Chapter 32 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
provides comprehensive statutory procedures for condemnation.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06 sets forth the condemnation procedures 
used in the present case.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28 governs 
litigation expenses in chapter 32 proceedings.     
¶38 Section 32.06(2a) sets forth a sequential process of 
reaching just compensation.  Negotiations under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(2a) must be attempted by the condemnor "[b]efore making 
the jurisdictional offer . . . ."  Nothing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(2a) suggests that the legislature excluded owners from 
recovering litigation expenses if they proceeded only under 
§ 32.06(2a).  Instead, § 32.06(2a) expressly allows the owner to 
challenge the negotiated price through the same appeals process 
established for owners who receive and reject a jurisdictional 
offer.   
¶39 The 
text 
of 
§ 32.28(3)(d) 
explicitly 
governs 
litigation expenses when condemnation awards are made by the 
county condemnation commission under § 32.06(8).  Both the 
negotiated price appeal route and the jurisdictional offer route 
are 
heard 
by 
the 
county 
condemnation 
commission 
under 
§ 32.06(8).     
¶40 Evaluating 
the statutory language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d) 
and 
§ 32.06(2a) 
within 
the 
context 
of 
the 
comprehensive condemnation statutes, we conclude that an owner 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
17 
 
who accepts the negotiated price under § 32.06(2a), timely 
appeals that price, and subsequently receives an award from the 
county condemnation commission that exceeds the thresholds under 
§ 32.28 
shall 
be 
awarded 
litigation 
expenses. 
 
This 
interpretation is consistent with, and supported by, the 
language of the statutes in the context of the condemnation 
statutes.  This interpretation is also supported by the 
legislative purpose of chapter 32 and Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3) and 
by the legislative history.  
IV 
¶41 The legislative purpose of chapter 32 and specifically 
of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3) supports our interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 32.06(2a) and 32.28(3)(d) that the condemnees in the 
present case are entitled to litigation expenses.   
¶42 Under the American Rule, litigants must pay their own 
attorney fees unless there is a statute or enforceable contract 
providing otherwise.17  Litigation expenses are not ordinarily 
part of just compensation.18  The determination of whether 
                                                 
17 Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, 
¶17, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58; Elliott v. Donahue, 169 
Wis. 2d 310, 323-25, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992). 
18 Wieczorek v. City of Franklin, 82 Wis. 2d 19, 23, 260 
N.W.2d 650 (1978); Martineau v. State Conservation Comm'n, 54 
Wis. 2d 76, 85, 194 N.W.2d 664 (1972); W.H. Pugh Coal Co. v. 
State, 157 Wis. 2d 620, 634-35, 460 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1990). 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
18 
 
litigation expenses may be shifted is a matter of policy to be 
determined by the legislature.19      
¶43 To 
assist 
us 
in 
determining 
the 
meaning 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d), a litigation-expense-
shifting statute, we explore the legislative purpose in awarding 
litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3).   
¶44 The 
court 
has 
concluded, 
in 
cases 
in 
which 
a 
jurisdictional offer was made and a condemnee asserted a right 
to litigation expenses, that the litigation expense statute has 
a dual purpose.  The legislature's dual purpose in awarding 
litigation expenses under the jurisdictional offer route is "(1) 
to 
discourage 
the 
condemnor 
from 
making 
inequitably 
low 
jurisdictional offers and (2) to make the condemnee, who meets 
the statutory requirements, whole."20        
                                                 
19 Wieczorek, 82 Wis. 2d at 23 ("The allowance of attorney's 
fees in condemnation cases is a matter of policy to be 
determined by the legislature . . . ."). 
Generally there is a "rule against taxation of costs 
against the state in the absence of a statute expressly allowing 
such taxation."  Martineau, 54 Wis. 2d at 85. 
20 Redev. Auth. of City of Green Bay v. Bee Frank, Inc., 120 
Wis. 2d 402, 
411, 
355 
N.W.2d 240 
(1984) 
(citing 
Standard 
Theatres v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 741, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984)). 
In Warehouse II, 291 Wis. 2d 80, ¶33, the court concluded 
that the purpose of chapter 32 "is driven by the legislative 
decision to make condemnees whole through lightening the 
financial burden of successful challenges and to discourage 
inequitable jurisdictional offers during the exercise of the 
extraordinary power of condemnation." 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
19 
 
¶45 The 
same 
dual 
purpose 
identified 
in 
awarding 
litigation expenses pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3) in cases 
in which a jurisdictional offer is made is applicable to the 
present case in which the negotiated price appeal route was 
taken.  It is unreasonable to conclude that the legislature 
intended to treat better the contentious owner who forces the 
condemnor to go through the hoops of a jurisdictional offer than 
the cooperating owner who takes the negotiated price appeal 
route.  Thus, the dual purpose of § 32.28(3)(d) may be stated as 
follows:  Section 32.28(3)(d) was enacted to induce the 
condemnor to offer (whether under the negotiated price appeal 
route or the jurisdictional offer route) just compensation or 
reimburse the condemnee for litigation expenses associated with 
an offer of compensation that is significantly less than just 
compensation.   
¶46 This statement of the dual purpose of § 32.28(3)(d) in 
a negotiated price appeal case is in keeping with Warehouse II, 
LLC v. State of Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 2006 WI 62, ¶33, 291 
Wis. 2d 80, 715 N.W.2d 213, in which the court summarized the 
purpose of the entirety of § 32.28 as "a legislative policy 
choice to encourage condemnors to take seriously commencing a 
condemnation action, to make fair jurisdictional offers and to 
carefully follow the condemnation statutes."21 
¶47 Although 
the 
Warehouse 
II 
court 
examined 
§ 32.28(3)(b), which allows litigation expenses when the court 
                                                 
21 Warehouse II, 291 Wis. 2d 80, ¶29. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
20 
 
determines the condemnor does not have the right to condemn the 
property, the Warehouse II court nevertheless interpreted Wis. 
Stat. § 32.28(3) as a whole and stated that the circumstances in 
which condemnees recover litigation expenses under § 32.28(3) 
are those in which the condemnor has not made a reasonable offer 
to the owner.  The court stated the underlying rationale of all 
of the subsections of § 32.28(3) as follows:    
[A]ll [are] directed at actions that significantly 
short-change the property owner in some respect.  For 
example, in paras. (3)(d)-(i), if the compensation 
offered by the condemnor was at least $700 and 15% too 
low, the condemnee "shall" be awarded the reasonable 
litigation expense incurred. . . . These paragraphs of 
subsec. (3) level the playing field by shifting the 
obligation 
to 
pay 
expenses 
that 
may 
have 
been 
unnecessary 
if 
the 
condemnor 
shouldered 
its 
responsibilities properly.22 
¶48 In a similar vein, the Warehouse II court also 
declared that "the overall purpose of the 1977 amendments was to 
provide more specific and concrete opportunities to recover 
litigation expenses for condemnees with legitimate challenges to 
the actions of condemnors."23 
¶49 The condemnees in the present case have a legitimate 
challenge to the price offered by ATC.      
¶50 We conclude that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d) comports with the legislative purpose in awarding 
litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3).  Shifting 
litigation 
expenses 
to 
the 
condemnor, 
whether 
under 
the 
                                                 
22 Id., ¶22. 
23 Id., ¶33.   
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
21 
 
negotiated price appeal route or the jurisdictional offer route, 
ensures that the condemnee need not bear the cost of obtaining a 
fair amount of compensation for the property taken.  An award of 
litigation 
expenses 
in 
the 
present 
case 
discourages 
the 
condemnor from offering an inequitably low negotiated price and 
makes the condemnee, who meets the statutory requirements, 
whole.     
V 
¶51 The legislative history of § 32.28(3)(d) gives some 
support to our interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 32.06(2a) and 
32.28(3)(d) that the condemnees in the present case shall be 
awarded litigation expenses.  
¶52 The eminent domain statutes were substantially revised 
in 1977 by Laws of 1977, ch. 440, which was the culmination of 
the work of the Legislative Council Special Committee on Eminent 
Domain.                
¶53 Prior to 1977, the statutes permitted recovery of 
costs and attorney fees only when a condemnor abandoned the 
condemnation proceeding after the commission's award.24  The 
statutes did not permit recovery when the purchase price was 
negotiated or when a jurisdictional offer was too low. 
¶54 A goal of the Legislative Council Special Committee on 
Eminent Domain was to change the law to allow litigation 
expenses when a condemnee receives more money through an action 
                                                 
24 Wis. Stat. § 32.06(6)(a) (1975-76).  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
22 
 
or appeal than was originally offered.25   An award of litigation 
expenses was needed, according to the Special Committee, because 
it was not fair that a condemnee had to pay the expenses of 
litigation 
to 
receive 
a 
fair 
and 
reasonable 
amount 
of 
compensation.26 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Legislative Council Staff Brief 77-7, at 3, 4 
(June 13, 1977): 
Present Wisconsin Statutes do not permit recovery of 
any costs or expenses where the purchase price is 
negotiated or where the award of the condemnation 
commissioners 
is accepted by the condemnee. The 
condemnee bears his own expenses even when the circuit 
court judge or jury find the jurisdictional award too 
low. 
. . . . 
 . . . [M]any landowners may settle out of court for 
less than full compensation, in the knowledge that the 
cost of obtaining a fair price may exceed the 
difference between such price and the condemnor's 
offer. 
The intent of the attorney fee statutes is thus not to 
encourage litigation, but to equalize the bargaining 
position of condemnor and condemnee so that the 
former's offers and settlements will more nearly 
reflect full value. 
Legislative Council materials are on file with the Wis. 
Legislative Council and the Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis. 
26 See Legislative Council Report no. 77-28, at 5 (Dec. 12, 
1977):  
[T]he Bill awards statutory costs to the successful 
party in condemnation actions . . . . The condemnee is 
the "successful party" whenever the award of the 
commissioners or verdict of the court exceeds the 
jurisdictional offer. . . .  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
23 
 
¶55 Although the proceedings of the Special Committee 
demonstrate that the purpose of the more robust litigation-
expense-shifting statute is to allow condemnees to receive a 
fair and reasonable amount of compensation, the materials speak 
in terms of jurisdictional offers and jury awards.  That 
references are to jurisdictional offers and jury awards, and 
that no reference is made to negotiated price appeals or to "the 
highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional offer," is to 
be expected because the only route to the county condemnation 
commission or a jury was, under the Special Committee materials, 
through the jurisdictional offer route.  The Special Committee 
did 
not 
propose 
the 
negotiated 
price 
appeal 
route 
that 
ultimately became part of the 1977 legislation.   
                                                                                                                                                             
The costs of condemnation actions are often a problem 
when 
the 
condemnation 
proceedings 
involve 
a 
condemnation commission.  When the condemnee appeals 
the basic award, the condemnation commission's award 
is often higher than the jurisdictional offer.  If the 
condemnor then appeals, the jury verdict is often less 
than the condemnation commission's award, although 
still more than the basic award.  Under these facts, 
the current statutes provide that the condemnee must 
pay the costs of the appeal by the condemnor to the 
court. 
This Bill changes this result and requires the 
condemnor to pay the costs of the condemnee's appeal 
if either the award of the commissioners or the 
verdict of the court is more than the jurisdictional 
offer. The Bill thus assures that the condemnee need 
not bear the cost of obtaining a fair amount of 
compensation for property taken. 
Legislative Council materials are on file with the Wis. 
Legislative Council and the Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
24 
 
¶56 Accordingly, the legislative history evidenced by the 
material of the Legislative Council Special Committee on Eminent 
Domain does not enlighten us about the legislature's intended 
meaning of the language "or the highest written offer prior to 
the jurisdictional offer."   
¶57 The legislative drafting record of ch. 440 of the Laws 
of 1977 provides some guidance about the meaning of the language 
"or the highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional 
offer," as it relates to an action arising from the negotiated 
price appeal route.   
¶58 The legislature added both the negotiated price appeal 
route in Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a) and the language "or the highest 
written 
offer 
prior 
to 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer" 
in 
§ 32.28(3)(d).   
¶59 Representative Francis J. Lallensack, a member of the 
Assembly Highway Committee, asked the Legislative Reference 
Bureau to draft an amendment to § Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a) adding 
the negotiated price appeal route.27 
                                                 
27 Assembly Amendment 8 added the following language to 
§ 32.06(2a): 
The condemnor shall record any conveyance by or on 
behalf of the owner of the property to the condemnor 
executed as a result of negotiations under this 
subsection with the register of deeds of the county in 
which the property is located.  The condemnor shall 
also record a certificate of compensation stating the 
identity of all persons having an interest of record 
in the property immediately prior to its conveyance, 
the legal description of the property, the nature of 
the interest acquired and the compensation for such 
acquisition.  The condemnor shall serve upon or mail 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
25 
 
¶60 Thomas S. Hanson, who had been the chairperson of the 
Special Committee,28 and Representative Carl Otte29 asked the 
Legislative Reference Bureau to draft an amendment adding the 
words "or the highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                                                             
by certified mail to all persons named therein a copy 
of the statement and a notice of the right to appeal 
the amount of compensation under this subsection.  Any 
person named in the certificate may, within 2 years 
[subsequently amended to "6 months"] after the date of 
its recording, appeal from the amount of compensation 
therein stated by filing a petition with the judge of 
the circuit court of the county in which the property 
is located for proceedings to determine the amount of 
just compensation.  Notice of such petition shall be 
given to all persons having an interest of record in 
such property.  The judge shall forthwith assign the 
matter to the chairperson of the county condemnation 
commissioners for hearing under sub. (8).  The 
procedures prescribed under subs. (9)(a) and (b), 
(10), (12) and 13 [subsequently amended to "subs. 
(9)(a) and (b), (10), and 12 and chs. 808 and 809"] 
shall govern such appeals.  The date the conveyance is 
recorded shall be treated as the date of taking and 
the date of evaluation. 
The amendment also added substantially similar language to 
32.05(2a). 
See drafting request for Assembly Amendment 8 in drafting 
record for Laws of 1977, ch. 440, on file with the Wis. 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. 
28 See Legislative Council Report no. 77-27, at ii (Sept. 
19, 1977).  
Legislative Council materials are on file with the Wis. 
Legislative Council, and the Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis. 
29 See drafting request for Assembly Amendment 6 in drafting 
record for Laws of 1977, ch. 440, on file with the Wis. 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
26 
 
offer" to Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) (and to other paragraphs of 
subsection § 32.28(3)).     
¶61 Nothing in the legislative history clarifies the 
impetus for these amendments.      
¶62 There is nothing explicit in the drafting records that 
suggests that the creation of the negotiated price appeal route 
in § 32.06(2a) is tied to the words "or the highest written 
offer 
prior 
to 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d).  Nevertheless, the legislature adopted the two 
amendments contemporaneously, and we may surmise that the 
legislature intended to include condemnees who enforced their 
statutory rights under the negotiated price appeal route in 
§ 32.06(2a) under the words "or the highest written offer prior 
to the jurisdictional offer" in Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d).   
¶63 The legislative history of the two revisions to ch. 32 
provides 
no 
evidence 
contrary 
to 
our 
interpretation 
of 
§ 32.28(3)(d) 
as 
providing 
condemnees 
litigation 
expenses 
regardless of whether the negotiated price appeal route or the 
jurisdictional offer price route is used to get a county 
condemnation commission determination of just compensation.  
¶64 We conclude that the limited legislative history gives 
some support to our interpretation of the statutory language to 
provide condemnees litigation expenses when the owner agrees to 
a price with a condemnor under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a); timely 
appeals; and receives an award that is at least $700 and 15% 
greater than the negotiated price; and neither party appeals the 
commission's award.  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
27 
 
¶65 This interpretation comports not only with the text 
and the text viewed in the context of the condemnation statutes, 
but 
with 
the 
legislature's 
purpose 
of 
promoting 
fair 
negotiations and providing owners with full compensation for 
property taken through the condemnation process. 
VI 
¶66 Before we wrap up, we address several arguments ATC 
makes criticizing the circuit court's and our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 32.06(2a) and 32.28(3)(d) that the condemnees in 
the present case shall be awarded litigation expenses.   
¶67 ATC 
asserts 
that 
an 
interpretation 
that 
allows 
condemnees who accept a negotiated price to recover litigation 
expenses does not comport with the purpose of good faith 
negotiation.  ATC contends that the condemnees in the present 
case did not negotiate with ATC, and that if the condemnees in 
the present case did not think that its offer was just 
compensation then they should have negotiated and should not 
have agreed to the price.    
¶68 We agree with ATC that the condemnees in the present 
case did not exhaust the options that the statutes provide them 
to more effectively negotiate just compensation.  For instance, 
the condemnees did not get their own appraisal at the expense of 
ATC prior to agreeing on a price.  The condemnees did not submit 
a counter-offer.   
¶69 That the condemnees in the present case did not use 
all of the procedures available to them to negotiate a price 
does not support ATC's conclusion that the statutes prevent the 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
28 
 
condemnees (and all other property owners reaching a negotiated 
price) from recovering litigation expenses when the condemnation 
award is $700 and 15% higher than the negotiated price.  The 
statute provides that the condemnor shall record any conveyance 
by the owner "executed as a result of negotiations."  By 
recording the conveyance, ATC appears to have indicated that the 
conveyance and the certificate of conveyance stating the 
compensation were the result of negotiations.  If the condemnor 
is not satisfied that the compensation was determined by good 
faith negotiations, the condemnor can make a jurisdictional 
offer.   
¶70 ATC also suggests that our interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d) 
renders 
the 
phrase 
"prior 
to 
the 
jurisdictional offer" surplusage.  We disagree with that 
assertion.  In the present case there was no jurisdictional 
offer, yet the highest written offer presented to the plaintiffs 
occurred prior to any jurisdictional offer, just as the 
negotiations occurred "before making the jurisdictional offer," 
the beginning words of § 32.06(2a). 
¶71 ATC further contends that the interpretation we reach 
will encourage litigation and will increase the cost of 
condemnation for the State and other condemnors.  In turn, this 
added cost will be borne by the taxpayers or ratepayers.  ATC 
asserts that our interpretation is bad public policy. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
29 
 
¶72 Fee shifting may encourage litigation by ensuring 
owners that they will have access to representation if they 
believe the condemnor's offer is inequitable.30   
¶73 While it is axiomatic that an interpretation that 
allows condemnees to recover litigation expenses provides a 
greater opportunity for condemnees to exercise their statutory 
right to appeal a negotiated price and will increase the costs 
of condemnation, we disagree with ATC's assertion that this 
interpretation is not commensurate with the public policy 
established by the legislature.  The legislature was advised of 
the potential fiscal impacts of enacting additional fee-shifting 
statutes in favor of condemnees.31  That these increased costs 
are warranted is a decision for the legislature. 
¶74 Further, we are not persuaded that our interpretation 
will open the floodgates for litigation in the condemnation 
process.  First, as ATC itself acknowledges, in the majority of 
cases in which the condemnee and condemnor reach a negotiated 
settlement, the property owner is satisfied with the value 
received and there is no further litigation.  Second, property 
owners recover litigation expenses only when the award is $700 
and 15% higher than the offer.  In many instances, owners will 
                                                 
30 "[A]n important purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to 
encourage injured parties to enforce their statutory rights when 
the cost of litigation, absent the fee-shifting provision, would 
discourage them from doing so."  Kolupar, 303 Wis. 2d 258, ¶55. 
31 See DOT Fiscal Estimate to 1977 A.B. 1077, at 6, 9, 
drafting record for 1977 ch. 440, available at the Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.   
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
30 
 
be reluctant to take the risk that the award will not reach 
these thresholds, in which case they must pay their own 
litigation expenses.      
¶75 ATC suggests that as a result of our interpretation 
today, condemnors will present initial offers that exceed the 
just compensation value because of the specter of litigation 
expenses if the condemnor misses the mark.  In other words, ATC 
argues that condemnors will consistently skew their initial 
offers higher than the actual value of the property.  Such a 
result would not be in keeping with the legislative policy 
underlying eminent domain——that compensation must be just in 
regard to both the owner and the public.32   
¶76 At the same time, the legislature has recognized that 
condemnors have an overwhelmingly strong bargaining position and 
by statute have tried to level the negotiating power between 
condemnors and owners to discourage condemnors from offering 
inequitably low compensation and to ensure that owners receive 
just compensation for property taken.  Awarding litigation 
expenses to a condemnee if the compensation that has been 
offered is too low is one means the legislature has adopted to 
                                                 
32 City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars 
of U.S. v. Redev. Auth. of the City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI 84, 
¶¶50-51, 319 Wis. 2d 553, 768 N.W.2d 749.  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
31 
 
foster just compensation.33  Awarding litigation expenses has the 
same function in both the negotiated price appeal route and the  
jurisdictional offer route:  to encourage condemnors to be fair 
and reasonable in calculating just compensation and to make the 
owner whole.        
¶77 Valuation is not an exact science, and we acknowledge 
that litigation expenses may dwarf the difference between the 
compensation offered and that eventually awarded.  We do not 
doubt that our interpretation of the litigation-expense-shifting 
statute will factor into the calculus made by condemnors in 
presenting written offers in the negotiation stage of the 
process.  If the legislature concludes that we have not 
correctly interpreted Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d), the legislature 
may amend the statutes.   
¶78 Finally, ATC argues that if the court concludes that 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) applies in the present case, the court 
must address an additional issue.  The court must determine, 
according to ATC, the starting point for awardable litigation 
expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(1), which provides that the 
owner is not entitled to litigation expenses incurred prior to 
                                                 
33 The legislature adopted several provisions intended to 
equalize the bargaining positions between the parties.  For 
example, the legislature has provided that a condemnor must 
share its appraisal with the owner, pay for a second appraisal 
by a qualified appraiser of the owner's choosing, and provide 
the names of other owners to whom offers have been made.  Wis. 
Stat. § 32.06(2), (2a).   
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
32 
 
the need to "prepare for or participate in actual or anticipated 
proceedings before the condemnation commission."  
¶79 The date of the jurisdictional offer has been viewed 
as an appropriate date of demarcation from which expenses are 
necessary to prepare for or participate in actual or anticipated 
proceedings.34  The jurisdictional offer is, according to case 
law, an "official completive action" from which litigation can 
be anticipated. 
¶80 ATC contends that there is no similar "official 
completive action" when a condemnor and condemnee reach a 
negotiated price.  The circuit court determined that the 
equivalent "official completive action" under the negotiated 
price route is provided by Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a), namely "when 
the parties agree on a price and the condemnor records the 
conveyance and the certificate of compensation; from that point, 
the condemnee has 6 months to file an appeal; at that point, 
proceedings before the commission can be anticipated."35   
                                                 
34 See D.S.G. Evergreen F.L.P. v. Town of Perry, 2007 WI App 
115, ¶17, 300 Wis. 2d 590, 731 N.W.2d 667; Kluenker v. DOT, 109 
Wis. 2d 602, 606, 327 N.W.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1982). 
35 The circuit court examined the following language from 
Kluenker:  
Since there is no official completive action in a 
condemnation case until the jurisdictional offer, it 
follows that a condemnee cannot be certain of a 
condemnor's position until that juncture.  Only then 
does the expectation of appeal to a commission accrue, 
not when the preliminary negotiations are set in 
motion 
which 
may 
or 
may 
not 
ultimately 
prove 
unsatisfactory.   
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
33 
 
¶81 We need not, and therefore do not, determine the 
"official completive action" in a negotiated price appeal like 
the present case.  The parties in the instant case stipulated to 
the amount of litigation expenses to be awarded the condemnee 
following the circuit court's award of litigation expenses to 
the condemnee.  Because the issue of determining the specific 
"official completive action" from which time litigation expenses 
may be awarded is not presented by the facts of the present 
case, we do not address the issue.       
¶82 In sum, the arguments of ATC do not persuade us that 
the circuit court's and our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 32.06(2a) and 32.28(3)(d) is wrong. 
* * * * 
¶83 We have examined the texts of Wis. Stat. § 32.06 and 
§ 32.28(3)(d) (the statutes at issue), the statutes in the 
context of the condemnation statutes, the legislative purpose of 
awarding litigation expenses, and the legislative history of 
§§ 32.06 and 32.28(3)(d).  Upon such review, we conclude that 
litigation expenses shall be awarded to an owner pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(d) if the owner conveys the property and 
receives a certificate of compensation pursuant to § 32.06(2a), 
with no jurisdictional offer issued under § 32.06(3); timely 
appeals to the circuit court, which refers the matter to the 
chairperson of the county condemnation commissioners; and is 
awarded at least $700 and at least 15% more than the negotiated 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kluenker, 109 Wis. 2d at 606. 
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
34 
 
price 
under 
§ 32.06(2a); 
and 
neither 
party 
appeals 
the 
commission's award.  We consider but are not persuaded by 
various arguments ATC makes criticizing the circuit court's and 
our interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 32.06(2a) and 32.28(3)(d) 
that the condemnees in the present case shall be awarded 
litigation expenses.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
No. 
2009AP2784   
 
 
 
1