Title: Zamos v. Stroud

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 4/19/04 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JEROME ZAMOS et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S118032 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B160484 
JAMES T. STROUD et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. LC 060622 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
The question presented by this case is whether, assuming the other elements 
of the tort are established, an attorney may be held liable for malicious prosecution 
when he commences a lawsuit properly but then continues to prosecute it after 
learning it is not supported by probable cause.1  We conclude an attorney may be 
held liable for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
 
The instant case for malicious prosecution is based upon a lawsuit (the 
fraud lawsuit) brought by Patricia Brookes (Brookes)—who is named as a 
                                             
 
1  
As a convenient shorthand, we will refer to this as continuing to prosecute 
a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. 
2  
We adopt the Court of Appeal’s statement of the factual and procedural 
background.  Brackets enclosing material in that part of the opinion (other than 
citations) denote insertions or additions by this court.  Defendants James T. Stroud 
and Van T. Do petitioned for rehearing, and in their petition objected in certain 
respects to the Court of Appeal’s statement of the facts.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
28(c)(2).)  The petition was denied.  In part II.C., we discuss defendants’ 
objections and find they do not undermine the factual conclusions or the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal.  
 
2
defendant in this case but is not a party to this appeal—against [Jerome Zamos and 
Odion L. Okojie (collectively Zamos)].  Zamos had represented Brookes in 
another lawsuit (the foreclosure lawsuit) arising from the foreclosure on her house.  
Jerome Zamos and [] Okojie practiced law together.  Jerome Zamos was the 
attorney who primarily represented Brookes in the foreclosure lawsuit, although 
Okojie made some appearances in that case.   
 
After a jury trial of the foreclosure lawsuit, when it appeared that the jury 
was deadlocked, Brookes settled the lawsuit against some of the defendants in that 
case in exchange for $250,000 paid by those settling defendants as damages for 
emotional distress.  Out of that $250,000, Zamos received $83,333.33 as a 
contingency fee, and Brookes received $166,666.67.  As part of the settlement, 
Brookes expressly released all claims to her house.  The terms of the settlement 
agreement were stated on the record before the court at two separate hearings.  
Brookes appeared by telephone at the first hearing, held on October 27, 1995, and 
appeared personally at the second hearing, held on October 30, 1995.  
 
Almost two years later, in 1997, Brookes sued Zamos for fraud, among 
other claims, based upon certain alleged representations Zamos made to induce her 
to settle the foreclosure lawsuit.  Brookes alleged that Jerome Zamos told her that 
(1) he would continue to represent her (to judgment) against the nonsettling 
defendants in the foreclosure lawsuit, (2) he would substitute into and represent 
Brookes in a malpractice lawsuit Brookes filed against her former attorneys (the 
malpractice lawsuit), (3) he would have her house returned to her, and (4) he 
would withdraw from representing her in the foreclosure lawsuit if Brookes did 
not accept the settlement.  Brookes also alleged, among other things, that Mr. 
Zamos never intended to keep his first three promises and that Zamos withdrew 
from representing her against the nonsettling defendants, never substituted into the 
malpractice lawsuit, and never tried to have her house returned to her.  
 
3
 
[James T. Stroud, Van T. Do, and their law firm, Stroud & Do (collectively 
Stroud)] represented Brookes in the fraud lawsuit.  In October 1997, shortly after 
Brookes’s fraud lawsuit was served on Odion Okojie, Zamos sent to Stroud 
reporter’s transcripts of three hearings in the foreclosure lawsuit, which transcripts 
Zamos contended proved that Brookes’s fraud claim had no merit.  The first two 
hearings reflected in the transcripts were those held on October 27, 1995 and 
October 30, 1995, and the transcripts show that Brookes was told and agreed that 
she was releasing all claims to her house and that Zamos would not substitute into 
the malpractice lawsuit.  The third hearing, held on January 29, 1996, was a 
hearing on Zamos’s motion to be relieved as counsel in the foreclosure lawsuit.  
During that hearing, Jerome Zamos explained that he had submitted all of the 
paperwork necessary for entry of default against the nonsettling defendants, and 
the trial court explained to Brookes that Zamos would be relieved as counsel and 
that Brookes would be responsible for bringing the default to judgment.  When the 
trial court asked Brookes whether “there [was] a problem” with relieving Zamos 
as counsel, Brookes responded, “No, not really.”  The transcript even shows that 
Brookes contended that Zamos was never her attorney of record, and she 
complained that Zamos forced her to come into court for the hearing; she asked 
the court, “Why couldn’t he just send me whatever to be relieved of counsel?”  A 
short time later, Brookes told the court, “I don’t care if you sign him off or not.  
He’s never been on.”  
 
After Stroud and Brookes refused to dismiss the fraud lawsuit against 
Zamos despite these transcripts, Zamos moved for summary judgment.  In 
opposition to Zamos’s motion for summary judgment, Stroud submitted a 
declaration signed by Brookes in which Brookes stated, among other things, that 
she agreed to settle the foreclosure lawsuit in reliance upon Zamos’s promises to 
(1) continue representing her against the nonsettling defendants, (2) represent her 
 
4
in the malpractice lawsuit, and (3) have her house returned to her.  The trial court 
questioned whether Brookes could establish that she was damaged as a result of 
Zamos’s alleged fraud, but the court nonetheless denied Zamos’s motion, although 
it did so “reluctantly,” finding that Brookes’s declaration raised a triable issue of 
fact regarding whether Zamos made the alleged promises.  
 
Brookes’s fraud lawsuit proceeded to trial before a judge who had not been 
the judge in any of the other proceedings in that case.  Before the trial began, the 
trial judge informed the parties that he had read the transcripts of the three 
hearings discussed above in preparation for ruling on several motions.  Based on 
the judge’s understanding of Brookes’s anticipated testimony, he warned Mr. 
Stroud several times that he needed to advise Brookes of her Fifth Amendment 
rights, and that he would notify the district attorney’s office if Brookes’s 
testimony at trial contradicted those transcripts because such testimony would be 
perjurious.   
 
[Carl A.] Taylor and [Nancy M.] Peterson testified at the trial.  Apparently 
(although the record is not entirely clear), Brookes was unable to testify due to 
health reasons, and Zamos had to put on the defense before the plaintiff’s  
case-in-chief was completed.  When Brookes failed to appear after all other 
witnesses had completed their testimony, Stroud asked for a continuance to allow 
her an additional opportunity to appear.  The trial court denied Stroud’s request 
and granted Zamos’s motion for a nonsuit.  In granting the motion, the court found 
that, even if Brookes testified in accordance with the offers of proof that had been 
made, “no reasonable jury would ever provide a judgment for [Brookes].”  In 
addition, the court found that, based upon the transcripts of the hearings regarding 
the settlement of the foreclosure lawsuit, Brookes’s settlement of that lawsuit “acts 
as a bar probably in the form of estoppel to [Brookes’s fraud lawsuit].”  
 
5
 
Following entry of judgment in the fraud lawsuit, Zamos filed the instant 
malicious prosecution action against Brookes, Stroud, Taylor, and Peterson.  
Zamos alleged on information and belief that Taylor encouraged Brookes to file 
the fraud lawsuit against Zamos and engaged Stroud to represent Brookes, and that 
Peterson urged Brookes to file the fraud lawsuit and gave false testimony to assist 
Brookes in prosecuting the lawsuit.  Zamos also alleged that defendants 
prosecuted the fraud lawsuit to extort an unwarranted settlement by Zamos.   
 
Stroud, Taylor, and Peterson filed a joint anti-SLAPP[3] motion in which 
they argued that Zamos could not show a reasonable probability of success on the 
malicious prosecution claim.  Stroud asserted that Zamos cannot show that the 
fraud lawsuit was brought without probable cause because Stroud’s decision to file 
the action was based upon (1) Brookes’s statements regarding Zamos’s alleged 
promises; (2) corroboration by Peterson and, to a lesser degree, by Taylor; and (3) 
the timing of Zamos’s alleged promises, Zamos’s receipt of the contingency fee 
from the settlement, and Zamos’s motion to be relieved as counsel in the 
foreclosure lawsuit.  Taylor and Peterson asserted that Zamos [could not] hold 
them liable for malicious prosecution because their sole involvement with the 
fraud lawsuit was as witnesses, and thus they [were] protected by the litigation 
privilege.  
 
In opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, Zamos presented evidence that 
shortly after the fraud lawsuit was filed Stroud received the transcripts that Zamos 
contended gave notice to Stroud that the fraud lawsuit had no merit.  Zamos also 
presented evidence that Taylor sought counsel to represent Brookes in the fraud 
lawsuit and gave assistance to Stroud during Peterson’s deposition.  (Taylor 
                                             
 
3  
[SLAPP stands for strategic lawsuit against public participation.  (Equilon 
Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57, fn. 1 
(Equilon).)] 
 
6
graduated from law school, although apparently he is not a licensed attorney.)  
Zamos contended that this evidence shows that Taylor was actively involved in 
maliciously prosecuting the fraud lawsuit.  Finally, Zamos presented evidence that 
Peterson was not present or within hearing distance when Jerome Zamos spoke 
with Brookes about the settlement agreement in the foreclosure lawsuit, and 
therefore Peterson is liable for malicious prosecution because her assertion that 
she heard Mr. Zamos make the alleged promises at issue in the fraud lawsuit was 
demonstrably false.  
 
The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to all of the moving 
parties.  As to Stroud, the court found that Stroud had probable cause to bring the 
lawsuit based upon Brookes’s representations that were corroborated by Taylor 
and Peterson.  The court held that Taylor and Peterson were immune from liability 
under the “common law witness immunity doctrine” set forth in Briscoe v. LaHue 
(1983) 460 U.S. 325 and Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 214.  The 
court awarded $3,000 in attorney fees to Taylor and $3,000 in attorney fees to 
Peterson.  Zamos timely appealed from the trial court’s order dismissing the entire 
action against Stroud, Taylor, and Peterson and awarding attorney fees. 
 
[The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal as to Taylor and Peterson, 
holding that Zamos failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that their malicious 
prosecution claim would succeed against Taylor and Peterson.  However, the 
Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal as to Stroud, “hold[ing] that Zamos met his 
burden with respect to Stroud because we conclude that an attorney may be liable 
for malicious prosecution if the attorney continues to prosecute a lawsuit after 
discovery of facts showing the lawsuit has no merit.”] 
 
[Both plaintiffs Jerome Zamos and Odion Okojie and defendants James 
Stroud and Van Do petitioned this court for review.  Defendants’ petition was 
granted; plaintiffs’ petition was denied.]   
 
7
 
[We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.] 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Interface Between Anti-SLAPP Statute and Malicious Prosecution 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, provides 
in relevant part:  “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the 
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be 
subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff 
has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
claim.”  (Id., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  Under this statute, the party moving to strike 
a cause of action has the initial burden to show that the cause of action “aris[es] 
from [an] act . . . in furtherance of the [moving party’s] right of petition or free 
speech.”  (Ibid.; Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)  Once that burden is met, the 
burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate the “probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); 
Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)  “To satisfy this prong, the plaintiff must 
‘state[ ] and substantiate[ ] a legally sufficient claim.’  [Citation.]  ‘Put another 
way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient 
and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable 
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’  [Citation.]”  
(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 741, fn. omitted 
(Jarrow Formulas).)  
 
The parties agree that plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution action arises from 
acts in furtherance of defendants’ right of petition or free speech.4  Thus, the issue 
                                             
 
4  
In Jarrow Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 741, we declined to create a 
categorical exemption from the anti-SLAPP statute for malicious prosecution 
actions. 
 
8
is whether plaintiffs presented evidence in opposition to defendants’ anti-SLAPP 
motion that, if believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient to support a judgment in 
plaintiffs’ favor.  Whether plaintiffs have established a prima facie case is a 
question of law.  (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 
821 (Wilson) [“In deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers 
the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant 
([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the 
credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should 
grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the 
motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the 
claim”].) 
B. Liability for Continuing to Prosecute Lawsuit Found to Lack Merit 
 
Previously, this court has characterized one of the elements of the tort of 
malicious prosecution as commencing, bringing, or initiating an action without 
probable cause.  “ ‘To establish a cause of action for the malicious prosecution, of 
a civil proceeding a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was 
commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal 
termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor [citations]; (2) was brought without probable 
cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice [citations].’  (Bertero [v. 
National General (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43,] 50 [(Bertero)].”  (Crowley v. Katleman 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 676 (Crowley), italics added.) 
 
Defendants contend continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack 
probable cause does not constitute the tort of malicious prosecution, and in making 
this argument they rely heavily on the tort’s being a disfavored cause of action.   
 
The tort of malicious prosecution is disfavored “both because of its 
‘potential to impose an undue “chilling effect” on the ordinary citizen’s 
willingness to report criminal conduct or to bring a civil dispute to court’ 
 
9
[(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 872 (Sheldon 
Appel Co.)]) and because, as a means of deterring excessive and frivolous 
lawsuits, it has the disadvantage of constituting a new round of litigation itself 
(id. at p. 873).”  (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817.)  For these reasons, we 
have declined to extend the scope of the tort.  (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at  
p. 680; Sheldon Appel Co., at p. 873.) 
 
On the other hand, we have cautioned that this “convenient phrase,” i.e., 
the characterization of malicious prosecution as a disfavored cause of action, 
“should not be employed to defeat a legitimate cause of action” or to “invent[] 
new limitations on the substantive right, which are without support in principle 
or authority.”  (Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 53; see Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th 
at p. 680.)  
 
Confining the tort of malicious prosecution to the initiation of a suit 
without probable cause would be, we conclude, without support in authority or in 
principle. 
1. Authority 
 
The question we address today is a question of first impression in this 
court, and was first addressed by a California Court of Appeal only two years 
ago.5  However, so far as our research reveals, the rule in every other state that 
has addressed the question is, and in many states has long been, that the tort of 
malicious prosecution does include continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered 
to lack probable cause.  
                                             
 
5  
Prior to this case, only one division of the Court of Appeal—Division 
Seven of the Second District—had addressed this question.  (Swat-Fame, Inc. v. 
Goldstein (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 613, 627-629 (Swat-Fame); Vanzant v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1290-1291 (Vanzant).) After 
the decision in this case was filed, Swat-Fame was followed by Division Three of 
the Fourth District.  (Morrison v. Rudolph (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 506, 514 
(Morrison).) 
 
10
 
Over 25 years ago the drafters of the Restatement Second of Torts 
(Restatement) stated that “one who continues a civil proceeding that has properly 
been begun or one who takes an active part in its continuation for an improper 
purpose after he has learned that there is no probable cause for the proceeding 
becomes liable as if he had then initiated the proceeding.”  (Rest., § 674, com. c, 
p. 453.)6  Indeed, almost 80 years ago Corpus Juris, in reciting the elements of an 
action for malicious prosecution, stated the first element as the “commencement 
or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding.” (38 C.J. 
(1925) Malicious Prosecution, § 5, p. 386, italics added; see 34 Am.Jur. (1941) 
Malicious Prosecution, § 26, p. 718.)7 
 
The Restatement’s position on this question has been adopted or was 
anticipated by the courts of a substantial number of states:  Alabama (Laney v. 
Glidden Co., Inc. (Ala. 1940) 194 So. 849, 851-852); Arizona (Smith v. Lucia 
(Ariz.Ct.App. 1992) 842 P.2d 1303, 1308); Arkansas (McLaughlin v. Cox (1996) 
922 S.W.2d 327, 331-332); Colorado (Slee v. Simpson (Colo. 1932) 15 P.2d 
                                             
 
6 
Section 674 of the Restatement (section 674) provides:   
 
“One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or 
procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other 
for wrongful civil proceedings if  
“(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than 
that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings 
are based, and  
“(b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in 
favor of the person against whom they are brought.” (Italics added.) 
7  
Corpus Juris Secundum continues to state that “[t]he commencement or 
continuation of the original proceeding by defendant against plaintiff is essential 
to an action for malicious prosecution.”  (54 C.J.S. (1988) Malicious Prosecution 
or Wrongful Litigation, § 17, p. 537, italics added.)  American Jurisprudence 
Second concurs, giving the first element of the tort of malicious prosecution as 
“the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings by, or at the 
instance of, the defendant.”  (52 Am.Jur.2d (2000) Malicious Prosecution, § 8,  
p. 145, fns. omitted & italics added.) 
 
11
1084, 1085); Idaho (Badell v. Beeks (Idaho 1988) 765 P.2d 126, 128); Iowa 
(Wilson v. Hayes (Iowa 1990) 464 N.W.2d 250, 264); Kansas (Nelson v. Miller 
(Kan. 1980) 607 P.2d 438, 447-448); Mississippi (Benjamin v. Hooper 
Electronic Supply Co., Inc. (Miss. 1990) 568 So.2d 1182, 1189, fn. 6); New 
York (Broughton v. State of New York (1975) 37 N.Y.2d 451, 457); Ohio (Siegel 
v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co. (Ohio Ct.App. 1943) 56 N.E.2d 345, 347); Oregon 
(Wroten v. Lenske (Or.Ct.App. 1992) 835 P.2d 931, 933-934); Pennsylvania 
(Wenger v. Philips (Pa. 1900) 45 A. 927); and Washington (Banks v. Nordstrom, 
Inc. (Wash.Ct.App. 1990) 787 P.2d. 953, 956-957). 
 
Even more significantly, defendants have not brought to our attention, nor 
has our own research revealed, a single state that has declined to adopt the 
Restatement’s view in this regard.   
 
Defendants’ position, that the tort of malicious prosecution does not 
include continuing a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause, is no more 
supported by the decisions of this court than it is by out-of-state authority. 
 
Defendants rely upon two decisions of Division Seven of the Second 
District—Swat-Fame, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 613 and Vanzant, supra, 96 
Cal.App.4th 1283.  In Swat-Fame, the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action 
contended “a party can be held liable for malicious prosecution even if he or she 
first becomes aware of facts that negate the claim after the litigation is 
commenced . . . .”  (Swat-Fame, at pp. 627-628.)  Reiterating the position it had 
taken five months earlier in Vanzant, Division Seven of the Second District 
Court of Appeal rejected the contention.  (Id. at p. 628.)  Vanzant relied upon 
this court’s decision in Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782 
(Coleman) for the proposition that “California courts have typically refused to 
permit malicious prosecution claims where, as here, the claim is based on the 
 
12
continuation of a properly initiated existing proceeding.”  (Vanzant, at pp. 1290-
1291.) 
 
Coleman is distinguishable.  In order to establish a cause of action for 
malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove “ ‘the prior action . . . was 
commenced by or at the direction of the defendant [in the malicious prosecution 
action].’  [Citation.]”  (Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 793, italics added.)  In 
Coleman, the underlying action was commenced by the plaintiffs in the 
malicious prosecution action.  Therefore, in order to establish their cause of 
action against the defendant’s insurer for malicious prosecution, the plaintiffs 
argued that the insurer, in maliciously causing the defendant to file a frivolous 
appeal, caused the initiation of a separate action.  This is the argument the 
Coleman court rejected.   
 
In the underlying action in Coleman, the survivors of a man who drowned 
in a city swimming pool brought a wrongful death action against the city and 
were awarded $350,000 in damages.  During the pendency of the city’s appeal, 
the city’s insurer offered the plaintiffs less than half the judgment award to settle, 
and plaintiffs declined, but later accepted a settlement of $300,000.  The 
plaintiffs then sued the insurer, which allegedly controlled all aspects of the 
defense, on the ground, among others, of malicious prosecution, claiming the 
appeal had been frivolous, designed solely to force the plaintiffs to settle for a 
fraction of the judgment and to enable the insurer to realize interest earnings 
during the pendency of the appeal based on the differential between the statutory 
rate of interest and the market rate.  (Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 788-789.) 
 
The Coleman court distinguished Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43.  In 
Bertero, this court held malicious prosecution may include maliciously filing a 
cross-complaint.  “By seeking affirmative relief [through a cross-complaint],” 
the Bertero court pointed out, the “defendants . . . did more than attempt to repel 
 
13
[the plaintiff’s] attack; they took the offensive in attempting to prosecute a cause 
of action of their own.”  (Bertero, at p. 53.)  “By contrast,” the Coleman court 
held, “filing an appeal ‘is not a separate proceeding and has no independent 
existence’ [citation]; it is merely the continuation of an action.  [Citation.]  Based 
on the reasoning of Bertero, a defendant’s appeal cannot be considered a 
separate action ‘seeking affirmative relief,’ but rather is merely the continuation 
of an attempt ‘to repel’ plaintiff’s attack.”  (Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 794, 
fn. omitted.) 
 
The operative distinction, then, is between continuing a prosecution and 
continuing a defense.  In Coleman, the defendant in the malicious prosecution 
action had merely continued its defense of the underlying wrongful death action 
by causing the filing of the appeal in that action.8  Here, defendants in the 
malicious prosecution action continued their prosecution of the underlying fraud 
action after learning it was baseless. 
2.  Principle 
 
Just as it is without support in authority, the limitation defendants urge is 
also without support in principle.  Malicious prosecution “is actionable because it 
harms the individual against whom the claim is made, and also because it threatens 
the efficient administration of justice.”  (Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 50; see 
Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 677.)  Continuing an action one discovers to be 
baseless harms the defendant and burdens the court system just as much as 
initiating an action known to be baseless from the outset.  (See 1 Harper et al., The 
                                             
 
8 
Vanzant also relied upon Merlet v. Rizzo (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 53 (Merlet) 
and Adams v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 521 (Adams).  (Vanzant, 
supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1290-1291.)  Merlet and Adams are distinguishable, 
as well.  These two cases simply involved application of the familiar rule that 
subsidiary procedural actions cannot be the basis for malicious prosecution claims.  
(Merlet, at p. 59; Adams, at p. 528.) 
 
14
Law of Torts (3d ed. 1996) § 4.3, p. 4:13 [“Clearly, it is as much a wrong against 
the victim and as socially or morally unjustifiable to take an active part in a 
prosecution after knowledge that there is no factual foundation for it, as to 
instigate such a proceeding in the first place”].)  As the Court of Appeal in this 
case observed, “It makes little sense to hold attorneys accountable for their 
knowledge when they file a lawsuit, but not for their knowledge the next day.” 
 
Moreover, as the Court of Appeal went on to point out, “Holding attorneys 
liable for the damages a party incurs as a result of the attorneys prosecuting civil 
claims after they learn the claims have no merit also will encourage voluntary 
dismissals of meritless claims at the earliest stage possible.  Because an attorney 
will be liable only for the damages incurred from the time the attorney reasonably 
should have caused the dismissal of the lawsuit after learning it has no merit, an 
attorney can avoid liability by promptly causing the dismissal of, or withdrawing 
as attorney in, the lawsuit.  This will assist in the efficient administration of justice 
and reduce the harm to individuals targeted by meritless claims.  Moreover, by 
advising a client to dismiss a meritless case, the attorney will serve the client’s 
best interests in that the client will avoid the cost of fruitless litigation, and the 
client’s exposure to liability for malicious prosecution will be limited.” 
 
Defendants contend our holding—that malicious prosecution includes 
continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause—would be 
unworkable and therefore contrary to public policy.  Defendants assert the holding 
would be unworkable because it would divert an attorney’s attention away from 
the zealous representation of his or her client by causing the attorney (1) 
continually to second-guess the merits of the litigation and (2) to fear retaliation 
for malicious prosecution if the attorney argues for an extension of the law.  We 
disagree.  Only those actions that any reasonable attorney would agree are totally 
and completely without merit may form the basis for a malicious prosecution suit.  
 
15
(Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817; Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 886.)  
The same standard will apply to the continuation as to the initiation of a suit.  
Applying the standard in any given case may be very difficult.  However, applying 
it to the decision to continue to prosecute a case should be no more or less difficult 
than applying it to the decision to initiate a case.9 
 
For the reasons stated, we conclude an attorney may be held liable for 
malicious prosecution for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack 
probable cause. 
C.  
Defendants’ Prima Facie Liability 
 
As we stated earlier, the parties agree that plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution 
action arises from acts in furtherance of defendants’ right of petition or free 
speech.  Thus, the issue is whether plaintiffs presented evidence in opposition to 
defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion that, if believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient 
to support a judgment in plaintiffs’ favor.  Plaintiffs, we conclude, did make the 
required showing.   
 
As the Court of Appeal observed, “Whether the facts known to Stroud 
constituted probable cause to prosecute the fraud lawsuit is a question of law.  
(Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817.)  The court must ‘make an objective 
determination of the “reasonableness” of [Stroud’s] conduct, i.e., to determine 
whether, on the basis of the facts known to [Stroud], the institution [and 
prosecution] of the [fraud lawsuit] was legally tenable.’  (Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 
Cal.3d at p. 878.)  The test applied to determine whether a claim is tenable is 
                                             
 
9  
 Counsel who receives interrogatory answers appearing to present a 
complete defense might act reasonably by going forward with the defendant’s 
deposition in light of the possibility that the defense will, on testimonial 
examination, prove less than solid.  The reasonableness of counsel’s persistence is, 
of course, primarily an issue of fact, and we have no occasion here to formulate 
more detailed rules. 
 
16
‘whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable.’  (Id. at p. 
886.)  [¶]  In the present case, . . . Stroud presented evidence in support of the anti-
SLAPP motion to show that the facts available to Stroud at the time the lawsuit 
was filed were sufficient to support a cause of action for fraud.  But in opposition 
to the motion, Zamos presented evidence that Stroud was given transcripts shortly 
after the fraud lawsuit was filed that, Zamos contends, show[s] that Stroud knew 
or should have known that the fraud lawsuit had no merit.” 
1. Zamos’s alleged promise to represent Brookes in 
 
 
 
the foreclosure action 
 
Brookes alleged that Jerome Zamos told her he would continue to represent 
her against the nonsettling defendants in the foreclosure lawsuit.  However, at the 
January 29, 1996 hearing, the judge advised Brookes there was a motion pending 
to relieve Mr. Zamos in the foreclosure matter.  “Is there a problem?” he asked 
her.  “No,” Brookes replied, “other than I can’t understand how Mr. Zamos can be 
relieved when he’s never been my attorney of record to my knowledge.”  After 
listening to Brookes’s rambling diatribe against Zamos, the judge asked her, 
“What’s the point?”  “The point,” Brookes replied, “is I don’t care if you sign him 
off or not.  He’s never been on.”  Brookes was apparently being sarcastic because 
as the judge pointed out, Mr. Zamos had tried the foreclosure matter and had 
persisted in obtaining a favorable settlement for her “when lesser lawyers would 
have just bowed out.”  Hearing no objection whatsoever from Brookes regarding 
Mr. Zamos’s motion to be relieved, the judge, after admonishing Brookes that she 
“couldn’t have had a better lawyer than Mr. Zamos,” ordered him relieved.  
 
17
2. Zamos’s alleged promise to represent Brookes 
 
 
 
in the malpractice action  
 
Brookes alleged that Jerome Zamos told her he would substitute into and 
represent her in a malpractice lawsuit Brookes had filed against her former 
attorneys.  However, as the Court of Appeal stated, the “transcript of [the]  
October 30, 1995 settlement hearing in the foreclosure lawsuit . . . shows that 
before Brookes agreed to the settlement, Brookes and Zamos stated on the record 
that Brookes had changed her mind regarding Zamos’s representation in the 
malpractice lawsuit and that Zamos was not going to represent Brookes in that 
lawsuit.” 
 
On Friday, October 27, 1995, in a phone call he placed to Brookes in open 
court, Jerome Zamos advised Brookes he would represent her in the malpractice 
action.  However, on Monday, October 30, 1995, Mr. Zamos advised the court he 
would not be doing so, after all, and that Brookes had another attorney who would 
be representing her in that matter.  Brookes, who was present in court on this 
occasion, acknowledged, “That’s correct, yes.”   
 
Defendants assert “there is testimony from Taylor that he was later told by 
Brookes that Zamos had promised to get back into the case.”  To the contrary, 
Taylor’s statement was unclear in this regard.  In a declaration, Taylor stated 
Brookes told him “she had been promised that Mr. Zamos would continue with the 
malpractice lawsuit against [her former attorneys] and that it would be taken to a 
conclusion as long as the offer to settle was accepted.”  However, Taylor did not 
claim that his second conversation with Brookes occurred after Brookes 
acknowledged in court on Monday, October 30, that Jerome Zamos was not going 
to represent her in the malpractice action.  Taylor merely stated he spoke to 
Brookes on “a Friday in late October of 1995” and again “on the following 
Monday.” 
 
18
3. Zamos’s alleged promise that Brookes’s house 
 
 
 
would be returned to her 
 
Brookes alleged that Jerome Zamos promised Brookes he would secure the 
return of her house.  As the Court of Appeal stated, “The October 30, 1995 
transcript shows that Brookes was told repeatedly that she would be giving up all 
claims to her house if she agreed to the settlement.” 
 
Defendants do not dispute this characterization of the record.  Instead, 
defendants claim that, off the record, Jerome Zamos told Brookes “the settlement 
would be for ‘post eviction’ damages and that the claim for [her] house could still 
proceed.” 
 
Contrary to Brookes’s claim that she agreed to the settlement in reliance on 
an assurance from Jerome Zamos that she would still be able to proceed with an 
action to have her house returned to her, Brookes initially declined the settlement, 
complaining that he had never discussed it with her.  Then, after having been 
given an opportunity to consult by phone with someone other than Mr. Zamos, 
someone who was not an attorney, Brookes decided to accept the settlement. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Malicious prosecution, we hold, includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit 
discovered to lack probable cause.  Accordingly, we disapprove of Swat-Fame, 
Inc. v. Goldstein, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 613 and Vanzant v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1283, as well as Morrison v. Rudolph, supra, 103 
Cal.App.4th 506, insofar as they are inconsistent with the views expressed herein.   
 
19
 
Plaintiffs did present evidence in opposition to defendants’ anti-SLAPP 
motion that, if believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient to support a judgment in 
plaintiffs’ favor.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
reversing the order of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution 
claim against defendants.10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
                                             
 
10  
Defendants argued below that under Roberts v. Sentry Life Insurance 
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 375, an opinion we cited with approval in Wilson, supra, 
28 Cal.4th 811, the trial court’s order had to be affirmed because Zamos lost their 
motion for summary judgment in the fraud lawsuit.  The Roberts court held that a 
favorable ruling on a motion for summary judgment in the underlying action 
conclusively establishes probable cause unless that ruling was procured by 
“materially false facts.”  (Roberts, at p. 384.)  The Court of Appeal rejected 
defendants’ argument on the ground that “Zamos presented evidence in opposition 
to the anti-SLAPP motion that, if believed by the trier of fact, demonstrates that 
the denial of Zamos’s summary judgment motion was procured by materially false 
facts.  As discussed above, the trial court in the fraud lawsuit denied Zamos’s 
motion for summary judgment ‘reluctantly,’ because Brookes’ declaration that 
Zamos made the representations at issue raised a triable issue of fact.  In 
opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion in the instant case, Zamos presented the 
declaration of Jerome Zamos, in which Mr. Zamos states that he did not make the 
representations Brookes asserted he made.  If the trier of fact in the instant case 
believes Mr. Zamos’s declaration that he did not make those representations, then 
the denial of Zamos’s summary judgment motion was procured by materially false 
facts, and the rule set forth in Roberts does not apply.” 
 
As defendants did not petition for review on this issue, we need not decide 
whether the Court of Appeal correctly decided it. 
 
 
20
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Zamos v. Stroud 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
IV. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 110 Cal.App.4th 60 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S118032 
Date Filed: April 19, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Stephen D. Petersen 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Jerome Zamos, in pro. per., and for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
James T. Stroud, in pro per., and for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Milam & Larsen and Paul A. Larsen for Association of California Insurance Companies as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
21
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jerome Zamos 
Law Offices of Jerome Zamos 
5228 Campo Road 
Woodland Hills, CA  91364-1927 
(818) 348-7151 
 
James T. Stroud 
Stroud & Do 
14541 Hamlin Street 
Van Nuys, CA  91411 
(818) 994-0347