Title: Johnson v. Clark County Board of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Johnson v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4390.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4390 
JOHNSON, APPELLANT, v. CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Johnson v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-4390.] 
Taxation—Real-property valuation—Current-agricultural-use valuation—Board 
of Tax Appeals did not misapply burden of proof, improperly apply 
presumption of validity to county board of revision’s decision, fail to 
properly consider property owner’s evidence under owner-opinion rule, err 
in finding that county auditor complied with his duty to determine 
property’s 2013 value, or err in finding that property owner failed to 
establish boundaries of portions of property for which he sought reduced 
valuation—Board of Tax Appeals’ decision affirmed. 
(No. 2016-1549—Submitted July 17, 2018—Decided November 1, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2016-326. 
______________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this real-property-valuation case, appellant, property owner 
William S. Johnson, who is pursuing this appeal pro se, challenges appellee Clark 
County auditor’s determination of the current agricultural use valuation (“CAUV”) 
for the subject property for tax year 2013.  Appellee Clark County Board of 
Revision (“BOR”) rejected Johnson’s claims, and the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”) affirmed the BOR’s decision. 
{¶ 2} Johnson has appealed and argues that the BTA misapplied the burden 
of proof, improperly applied a presumption of validity to the BOR’s decision, and 
failed to properly consider his evidence under the owner-opinion rule.  Johnson also 
contends that the BTA erred in finding that (1) the auditor complied with his duty 
to determine the property’s 2013 value and (2) Johnson failed to establish the 
boundaries of the portions of the property for which he sought a reduced valuation.  
We find no merit in any of Johnson’s arguments, and we therefore affirm the BTA’s 
decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} The property at issue consists of 154.61 acres, is operated as a farm, 
and qualifies for CAUV status.  The property has been the focus of several prior 
CAUV complaints and appeals, both to the BTA and to the Second District Court 
of Appeals. 
{¶ 4} For tax year 2013, the auditor determined the property’s true market 
value to be $726,350 and its CAUV to be $457,250.  Johnson challenged the 
CAUV. 
A.  BOR proceedings 
{¶ 5} At the BOR hearing, Johnson testified and elicited testimony from 
Chris Simpson, an employee of the Clark County Soil and Water Conservation 
District, and Shayne Gray, an employee of the auditor’s office.  Johnson also 
submitted photographs, excerpts from the tax commissioner’s land-valuation 
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tables, CAUVs determined by the county for the subject property, and a self-
prepared written statement purporting to convey Simpson’s site-visit findings. 
{¶ 6} The BOR rejected Johnson’s claims, and he appealed to the BTA. 
B.  BTA proceedings 
{¶ 7} At the BTA hearing, Johnson testified and presented testimony from 
Gloria Gardner, an employee of the Department of Taxation, and introduced 
numerous exhibits.  The BOR and the auditor (collectively, “the county”) cross-
examined Gardner and Johnson but did not present any independent evidence. 
{¶ 8} The BTA made several findings relevant to Johnson’s present appeal.  
The BTA found that the auditor “complied with his duties to record the basis for 
his valuation consistent with Ohio Admin.Code 5703-25-09,” BTA No. 2016-326, 
2016 WL 5348972, *3 (Sept. 20, 2016), distinguishing this appeal from Johnson v. 
Clark Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013 CA 32, 2014-Ohio-329, ¶ 41 
(finding, in a prior appeal relating to the property’s taxable value for tax year 2010, 
that there was insufficient valuation information in the record and remanding the 
matter for the BOR to demonstrate how it had arrived at the property’s CAUV and 
to make adjustments, if necessary).  The BTA also found that Johnson failed to 
prove the specific boundaries of the portions of the property for which he seeks a 
reduced valuation.  In addition, the BTA acknowledged that “Johnson appears to 
misunderstand the role that CAUV plays in the overall valuation” and “appears to 
[mistakenly] believe that every aspect of the property should be accorded a value 
based solely upon its ability to grow crops without consideration to any alternative 
use or basis for valuation.”  2016 WL 5348972 at *4. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
{¶ 9} On appeal, this court must determine whether the BTA’s decision is 
both “ ‘reasonable and lawful.’ ”  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-
Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
v. Zaino, 90 Ohio St.3d 496, 497, 739 N.E.2d 783 (2001); R.C. 5717.04.  In so 
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doing, we defer to the BTA’s factual findings “if they are supported by reliable and 
probative evidence, and we afford deference to the BTA’s determination of the 
credibility of witnesses and its weighing of the evidence subject only to an abuse-
of-discretion review on appeal.”  HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa, 132 Ohio St.3d 55, 
2012-Ohio-1871, 969 N.E.2d 232, ¶ 10.  However, we “will not hesitate to reverse 
a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.”  Gahanna-Jefferson 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789 
(2001). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Current-Agricultural-Use Valuation 
{¶ 10} Typically, real property is valued by the county auditor at its “true 
value in money,” R.C. 5713.01(B), which “refers to ‘the amount for which that 
property would sell on the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer * * *, 
i.e., the sales price.’ ”  (Ellipsis sic.)  Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio-4415, 83 N.E.3d 916, ¶ 9, quoting State 
ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 412, 195 N.E.2d 
908 (1964). 
{¶ 11} In 1974, however, the General Assembly enacted the CAUV statute, 
R.C. 5713.30 et seq., which permits owners of land that is devoted exclusively to 
agricultural use to request the auditor to value the property in accordance with its 
current agricultural use rather than its true market value.  Maralgate, L.L.C. v. 
Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 130 Ohio St.3d 316, 2011-Ohio-5448, 958 N.E.2d 
153, ¶ 13-14; see also Adams v. Testa, 152 Ohio St.3d 207, 2017-Ohio-8853, 94 
N.E.3d 539, ¶ 6 (“agricultural land” includes “land upon which timber is grown that 
is part of or next to farmland”), citing R.C. 5713.30. 
{¶ 12} CAUV is a preferred tax status because, in general, a value 
determined by agricultural use is lower than a property’s true market value and 
therefore, CAUV status typically results in a lower real-property-tax liability.  
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Renner v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Revision, 59 Ohio St.3d 142, 572 N.E.2d 56 
(1991).  Land must qualify to be valued at its agricultural use, and if a CAUV 
parcel, or any portion thereof, is converted to another use or no longer satisfies the 
CAUV requirements, it is removed from CAUV status and returned to the tax rolls 
to be assessed at its true market value, and the county recoups the prior three years 
of the tax savings realized by the taxpayer.  R.C. 5713.34. 
B.  Johnson’s arguments are unavailing 
{¶ 13} Johnson asserts four assignments of error, which actually raise five 
distinct arguments.  Because Johnson’s assignments of error are largely repetitive 
and overlapping, we discuss his arguments in a slightly different sequence than the 
one in which he presents them. 
1.  The BTA correctly applied the burden of proof 
{¶ 14} In Johnson’s view, the BTA misapplied the burden of proof because 
it failed to require the county to rebut his evidence and prove value.  We disagree.  
It is well settled that “the party challenging the board of revision’s decision at the 
BTA has the burden of proof to establish its proposed value as the value of the 
property.”  Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 15} To meet that burden, the challenging party “must come forward and 
demonstrate that the value it advocates is a correct value.”  EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-3096, 829 N.E.2d 
686, ¶ 6.  When the challenging party fails to sustain this burden at the BTA, the 
county “bears no burden to offer proof of the accuracy of the appraisal on which 
the county initially relies” and “the BTA is justified in retaining the county’s 
valuation of the property.”  Colonial Village at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 16} As the party challenging the BOR’s decision before the BTA, 
Johnson had the burden to prove that the decrease in value he sought was correct.  
And, in contrast, the county, as appellees, had no burden to prove value, be that the 
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auditor’s assessed value or some other value.  Id.; see also Simmons v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 689 N.E.2d 22 (1998) (if the BTA rejects 
the evidence presented to it and is unable to independently determine value, it may 
approve the board of revision’s valuation without the board of revision’s presenting 
any evidence). 
{¶ 17} Thus, we reject Johnson’s burden-of-proof argument. 
2.  The BTA did not presume the validity of the BOR’s decision 
{¶ 18} Johnson also contends that the BTA improperly applied a 
presumption of validity to the BOR’s decision.  In support of this argument, 
Johnson points to the BTA’s failure to require the county to rebut his evidence and 
prove value. 
{¶ 19} To be sure, decisions of boards of revision should not be accorded a 
presumption of validity.  Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 23.  Rather, the BTA is 
charged with the responsibility of independently determining value based on 
evidence that it finds competent and probative.  Id.  When the BTA has failed to 
independently evaluate the evidence, we have remanded with instructions that it do 
so.  See, e.g., Vandalia-Butler City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-5078, 958 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 14 (“even 
though the BTA itself was unpersuaded by the evidence, it adopted the [board of 
revision’s] reduction of value on the grounds that the [board of revision] was 
persuaded” [emphasis deleted], and “[t]hat constitutes the very deference that the 
case law prohibits”). 
{¶ 20} But in this case, the BTA’s decision reflects that it analyzed and 
rejected Johnson’s evidence, without deferring to the BOR’s decision.  
Accordingly, we reject Johnson’s presumption-of-validity argument. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
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3.  An owner’s opinion of value is competent evidence, but the BTA has discretion 
to determine its probative weight 
{¶ 21} Johnson insists that pursuant to the owner-opinion rule, the evidence 
he introduced is reliable and probative and thereby satisfied his burden on appeal.  
It is true that the owner-opinion rule provides an exception to the general rule that 
only an expert may express an opinion of value.  Worthington City Schools Bd. of 
Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 248, 2014-Ohio-3620, 17 
N.E.3d 537, ¶ 18.  And “Ohio law has long recognized that an owner of either real 
or personal property is, by virtue of such ownership, competent to testify as to the 
market value of the property.”  Smith v. Padgett, 32 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 513 
N.E.2d 737 (1987).  Indeed, this court has recognized this rule in the context of 
valuing real property for tax purposes.  Amsdell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
69 Ohio St.3d 572, 574, 635 N.E.2d 11 (1994). 
{¶ 22} But Johnson overstates the breadth of the owner-opinion rule.  
“Important in the owner-opinion rule * * * is that the owner qualifies primarily as 
a fact witness giving information about his or her own property * * *.”  Worthington 
City Schools at ¶ 19.  The BTA, as the finder of fact, “is vested with wide discretion 
in determining the weight to be given to evidence and the credibility of witnesses 
which come before [it].”  Cardinal Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 44 Ohio St.2d 13, 336 N.E.2d 433 (1975), paragraph three of the syllabus.  
And “there is no requirement that the finder of fact accept [the owner’s value] as 
the true value of the property.”  WJJK Invests., Inc. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
76 Ohio St.3d 29, 32, 665 N.E.2d 1111 (1996). 
{¶ 23} Under the owner-opinion rule, Johnson’s opinion of the subject 
property’s market value is competent evidence, but that opinion is not controlling 
because the BTA determines the credibility of witnesses who come before it, 
Cardinal Fed. S. & L. Assn. at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.  In this 
case, the BTA performed its duty to evaluate Johnson’s testimony and found that it 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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was not probative.  The BTA’s finding is reasonable and lawful, and Johnson has 
not identified any abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 24} Accordingly, Johnson’s owner-opinion-rule argument is not well 
taken. 
4.  Johnson has not shown error in the BTA’s finding that the auditor complied 
with his statutory duties to determine the property’s 2013 value 
{¶ 25} Johnson also argues that the BTA erred by finding that the auditor 
complied with his duty to determine the property’s 2013 value.  See Ohio 
Adm.Code 5703-25-09.  Johnson asserts that the auditor’s valuation violates R.C. 
5713.31 and Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-34(K); however, he does not cite evidence 
in the record and does not further explain these alleged violations. 
{¶ 26} The authorities cited by both the BTA and Johnson all relate to the 
auditor’s duty to record certain valuation information on real-property-record cards.  
See R.C. 5713.31; Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-34(K) and 5703-25-09. 
{¶ 27} In this case, the subject’s property-record card contains information 
relating both to its true market value and to its CAUV.  Further, the record contains 
several spreadsheets detailing the auditor’s valuation calculations for the property 
for tax years 2010 through 2014.  The tax-year-2013 spreadsheet contains the 
following valuation information: land uses, soil types, valuation rates, number of 
acres, agricultural values, rounded agricultural values, assessed and taxable values, 
and the amount of tax due and paid.  The spreadsheet also reflects an adjustment to 
the initial valuation and indicates that a corresponding refund was issued. 
{¶ 28} In relying on this information, the BTA reasonably and lawfully 
found that the auditor complied with his duty to determine the property’s 2013 
value.  And Johnson offers no explanation of how the BTA’s finding on this point 
is in error.  We find no obvious error, and it is not our role to develop Johnson’s 
argument for him.  See In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 
271, 2011-Ohio-2368, 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 19. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 29} On this record, we reject Johnson’s argument that the BTA erred in 
finding that the auditor complied with his duty to determine the property’s 2013 
value. 
5.  The BTA reasonably determined that Johnson failed to show the boundaries of 
the portions of the 154.61-acre CAUV parcel that are at issue 
{¶ 30} Finally, Johnson argues that because he “determine[d] [the] acreage 
assigned to each soil usage,” the BTA erred in finding that he failed to establish the 
boundaries of the areas for which he seeks a reduced valuation.  But we reject 
Johnson’s argument on this point, because “acreage” and “boundaries” do not have 
the same meaning. 
{¶ 31} “[B]oundary” is defined as “something that indicates or fixes a limit 
or extent: something that marks a bound (as of a territory or a playing field): a 
bounding or separating line.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 260 
(2002).  By contrast, “acreage” is a form of measurement, defined as “area in acres.”  
Id. at 19. 
{¶ 32} As discussed above, CAUV status is a preferred tax status and land 
must qualify to be valued in this manner.  The auditor’s determination of a CAUV 
for qualifying lands begins with the “delineation of the boundaries of the farm or 
tract.”  (Emphasis added.)  Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-34(D).  In this case, Johnson 
contests the valuation of only certain portions of the CAUV parcel’s 154.61 acres 
and suggests acreage amounts that he determined for those portions that do not 
comport with the county’s 2013 tax-valuation spreadsheet information.  But 
because a CAUV “depends so intimately on the exact land under review,” Renner, 
59 Ohio St.3d at 145, 572 N.E.2d 56, Johnson had a duty to prove the exact 
boundaries of the portions of land for which he sought a reduced valuation. 
{¶ 33} Thus, regardless of whether Johnson proved the acreage of the areas 
at issue, it was both reasonable and lawful for the BTA to find that he did not prove 
the specific boundaries of each of those areas. 
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{¶ 34} Accordingly, we reject Johnson’s acreage argument. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the BTA. 
Decision affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and DEGENARO, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
 
William S. Johnson, pro se. 
 
D. Andrew Wilson, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and William D. 
Hoffman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Clark County Board of 
Revision and Clark County Auditor. 
_________________