Title: Charles Alexander v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM NOVEMBER 8, 2001 CHARLES ALEXANDER Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee CR00-453 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, NO. CR 97-1450 HONORABLE JOHN LANGSTON, JUDGE AFFIRMED Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment without parole. This Court affirmed his conviction on appeal. Alexander v. State, 335 Ark. 131, 983 S.W.2d 110 (1998). Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. An amended petition was filed later and contained additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, conflict of interest, and denial of a fair trial and due process. A hearing on the petition was held by the circuit court, and the petition was subsequently denied by Order dated January 4, 2000. From that order comes this appeal. We cannot say that the circuit court erred in denying appellant's petition. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for assessing the effectiveness of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Thus, a defendant must first show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and second, that the errors, "actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Id. at 693. In reviewing a denial of relief under Rule 37, we must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 38, 26 S.W.3d 123, 125 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt in that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be established by a mere showing of error by counsel or by revealing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being addressed on appeal. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 448, 954 S.W.2d 255, 258 (1997) (citing Huls v. State, 301 Ark. 572, 785 S.W.2d 467 (1990)). We must consider the totality of the evidence before the factfinder, and we will not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the lower court's findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Noel, 342 Ark. at 38, 26 S.W.3d at 125. Appellant's first claim of ineffectiveness is trial counsel's failure to object to the testimony of Shakira Hubbard. Hubbard testified that she was present at the Red Roof Inn prior to the murderand that she heard appellant accuse David Jamar Dean of having been involved in a prior assault on appellant and the theft of appellant's car. The State characterized this evidence as proof of appellant's motive in shooting the victim, who he mistook for Dean. Appellant's trial counsel did not object to Hubbard's testimony regarding appellant's statement. Appellant also claims that the State failed to timely disclose the testimony of Hubbard, which included statements made by appellant, prior to trial. The circuit court held that trial counsel's failure to object to Hubbard's testimony was error. However, the court did find that Hubbard's testimony was supplemental to the trial testimony of two witnesses, who identified appellant as the shooter. Ms. Laquita Butler testified that she saw appellant, dressed in a black pullover, shoot the victim then run around the side of an apartment building. Mr. Perry Holloway testified that he was walking home, heard gunfire and saw appellant, dressed in black, run around the side of a building holding a chrome pistol. In addition, Mr. James Fairchild testified that the shooter had on a black pullover. Even if trial counsel had made a successful objection to Hubbard's testimony, there was substantial evidence that appellant had committed the murder; therefore, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had an objection been made by trial counsel. Appellant has failed to satisfy the second prong of Strickland, that is, that the deficient performance by counsel prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The citation to Bowden v. State, 297 Ark. 160, 761 S.W.2d 148 (1988) is incorrect as it is well established that Rule 37 does not permit review of mere error in the conduct of the trial and is not a substitute for direct appeal. Swisher v. State, 257 Ark. 24, 514 S.W.2d 218 (1974). The defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Huls, supra. The circuit court gave no specific ruling on appellant's due process claim that the State failedto timely disclose Hubbard's motive testimony before trial. Further, appellant cites no authority for this claim and instead, makes blanket accusations. We have said on numerous occasions that we will not consider the merits of an argument if the appellant fails to cite any convincing legal authority in support of that argument. Womack v. Foster, 340 Ark. 124, 158, 8 S.W.3d 854, 874 (2000). Appellant's second claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike a juror, Ms. Suzanne Godwin, during voir dire. When asked whether she knew any of the parities involved in the case, Godwin responded that she knew the parents of deputy prosecutor, Ms. Elizabeth Thomas. In addition, Godwin claimed that she had overheard a conversation in the hallway outside the courtroom that concerned her. Appellant makes an unsubstantiated claim that Godwin likely expressed these concerns during jury deliberations. However, the circuit court did not rule on this issue; therefore, we cannot consider it on appeal. We have repeatedly said that failure to obtain a ruling on an issue at the trial level precludes review on appeal. Jackson v. State, 334 Ark. 406, 412, 976 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1998). It is appellant's obligation to obtain a ruling in order to properly preserve an issue for review. Beshears v. State, 340 Ark. 70, 72, 8 S.W.3d 32, 34 (2000). Appellant's third claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to accept the Court's offer of a continuance because of the discovery of an eyewitness. The morning of trial, the State announced that Ms. Laquita Butler had been discovered the previous day. Butler testified that she witnessed the appellant shoot the victim. The State requested a continuance to present Butler's testimony; however, trial counsel opposed the continuance and instead, asked that the witness be excluded. The Court refused but offered to grant appellant a continuance in order to interview Butler and prepare for her testimony. Trial counsel and appellant indicated their desire to go forward with the trial. Issues of trial strategy and tactics are a matter of professional judgment and are not grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Noel, 342 at 41, 26 S.W.3d at 127 . Appellant claims that trial counsel failed to warn him of the risks of allowing Butler to testify without investigating further. This claim was not raised below; therefore, we are barred from reviewing it now. It is well settled that we will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Miner v. State, 342 Ark. 283, 288, 28 S.W.3d 280, 283 (2000). Appellant's fourth claim is that trial counsel was ineffective in his failure to renew a motion for directed verdict. Here, appellant must show, not only that counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, supra. Appellant makes no such showing. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be established by a mere showing of error by counsel or by revealing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being addressed on appeal. Thomas, supra. We find that there was substantial evidence, including the eyewitness testimony previously mentioned, presented to support the jury's verdict that appellant committed first-degree murder. Therefore, appellant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Appellant has not satisfied the two-prong test of Strickland. Appellant's fifth claim is actually a long list of several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which he submits as cumulative error. Some of these claims are included in other arguments on appeal. However, we do not recognize cumulative error in allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Noel, 342 Ark. at 42, 26 S.W.3d at 128. Therefore, these claims will not be considered on appeal. Appellant's sixth claim is that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial during the sentencing phase of the trial following remarks by the prosecutor regarding a profaneoutburst by appellant. However, appellant did not raise this specific claim in his petition and received no ruling from the circuit court. Therefore, we decline to review the issue on appeal. Jackson, supra. In his petition, appellant did claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial based on appellant's outburst. Appellant makes no mention of trial counsel's ineffectiveness being in response to the prosecutor's remarks; therefore, this specific claim should not be considered. The circuit court denied appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial in response to appellant's outburst, because appellant is not entitled to a mistrial based on his own actions. Further, had the request been made, it would not have been granted. Appellant makes no showing of trial counsel's deficiency, and because the motion for a mistrial would not have been granted, there is no showing of prejudice. Strickland, supra. Appellant's seventh claim is that a conflict of interest arose from trial counsel's representation of three separate persons and that this conflict rendered his performance ineffective. In Sheridan v. State, 331 Ark. 1, 959 S.W.2d 29 (1998), this Court restated the standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims due to an alleged conflict of interest, previously stated in Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995): Prejudice will be presumed from a conflict of interest only when the defendant demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Petitioner had the burden of proving a conflict of interest and showing its adverse effects. Dumond v. State, 294 Ark. 379, 743 S.W.2d 779 (1988). A petitioner is not entitled to relief under the Cuyler test unless he satisfies both prongs of the test. Salam v. Lockhart, 874 F.2d 525, 527-28 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Lightborne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 109 S. Ct. 329 (1988)). The prejudice must be real and have some demonstrable detrimental effect and not merely have some abstract or theoretical effect. Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372, 378 (8th Cir. 1990). Appellant bears the burden of providing factual support to demonstrate that the conflict of interestadversely affected counsel's performance. See Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 696 S.W.2d 736 (1985). In his petition, appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose his prior representation of Laquita Butler in a personal injury case.1 At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he represented Butler prior to appellant's trial. Trial counsel testified that he did not realize that Butler was a former client until two months after appellant's trial. Upon discovery of this representation, trial counsel filed an affidavit with the court. The circuit court held that appellant failed to show that trial counsel represented competing interests or that his performance while representing appellant was in any way affected by his former representation of Butler. We agree. On appeal, appellant makes nothing more than a blanket statement that a conflict existed. Appellant makes no showing of conflict of interest or its adverse effects on his defense. Sheridan, supra. Regarding Darrell Dean and David Jamar Dean, appellant claims that a conflict of interest existed, because trial counsel represented or previously represented these two individuals. However, neither of these individuals testified at trial or any of the three evidentiary hearings. Appellant only assumes what their testimony would have been and how this testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. Appellant makes no showing of conflict of interest or its adverse effects on his defense. Sheridan, supra. Therefore, the circuit court correctly denied appellant's claim for relief. Appellant's eighth claim is that he is entitled to relief, because the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In his amended Rule 37 petition, appellant claims that the State failed to disclose prior trial testimony of Shakira Hubbard and Laquita Butler. However, the circuit court did not rule on the issue. Failure to obtain a ruling on an issueat the trial court level precludes review on appeal. Jackson, supra. It is appellant's obligation to obtain a ruling in order to properly preserve an issue for review. Beshears, supra. Further, appellant claims that the State failed to investigate certain exculpatory evidence, which if investigated and tested, would have exonerated the appellant. Appellant claims that the State failed to test blood samples, bullet jackets and casings, failed to elicit testimony from witnesses, failed to call witnesses and failed to disclose an anonymous letter regarding the apartments where the crime occurred. These issues are presented for the first time; therefore, we decline to consider them on appeal. Jackson, supra. Appellant's ninth claim is that the circuit court erred in denying relief when two of the State's witnesses recanted their prior testimony regarding the identification of appellant and the presence of appellant at the crime scene. In Malone v. State, 294 Ark. 127, 132-33, 741 S.W.2d 246, 249 (1987), we refused to consider recanted testimony under Rule 37 "because the Rule provides for collaterally attacking a judgment and was never intended to provide a means to add evidence to the record or refute evidence adduced at trial. McDaniel v. State, 282 Ark. 170, 666 S.W.2d 400 (1984)." We find no error and affirm. Appellant's final claim is that a miscarriage of justice has occurred based upon appellant's actual innocence. Such a claim is not cognizable under Rule 37. We have summarily dismissed a postconviction claim of actual innocence, because the appellant was "trying to rechallenge the sufficiency of the evidence." Johnson, 321 Ark. at 135, 900 S.W.2d at 950. We will not consider the same claim in this case. Further, appellant's cumulative error claim is not cognizable under Rule 37. As stated, we do not recognize cumulative error claims in allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Noel, supra. Affirmed. 1 On appeal, appellant claims the conflict of interest was between trial counsel and Shakira Hubbard. We believe that this is a typographic error.