Title: Malone v. Trans-States Lines, Inc.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Thomas E. MALONE v. TRANS-STATES LINES, INC.

95-1116                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered July 15, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- motion to dismiss -- standard of review. --
     In reviewing the denial of a dismissal granted pursuant to
     Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the supreme court treats the facts
     alleged in the complaint as true and views them in the light
     most favorable to the party who filed the complaint; when the
     trial court decides Rule 12(b)(6) motions, it must look only
     to the complaint.

2.   Pleading -- fact pleading required -- dismissal for failure to
     state facts. -- Arkansas has adopted a clear standard to
     require fact pleading; Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) requires that
     "a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief...shall
     contain (1) a statement in ordinary and concise language of
     facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief..."; Ark.
     R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint
     for "failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted"; 
     these two rules must be read together in testing the
     sufficiency of the complaint; facts, not mere conclusions,
     must be alleged. 

3.   Pleading -- motion to dismiss -- test for sufficiency of
     complaint. -- In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on
     a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be
     resolved in favor of the complaint, and pleadings are to be
     liberally construed.

4.   Pleading -- failure to plead facts -- dismissal without
     prejudice proper -- order modified. -- The supreme court,
     noting that appellant's complaint stated only conclusions
     without facts, agreed with the trial court's dismissal for
     failure to plead facts under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) but did
     not agree that such a dismissal was with prejudice; a
     dismissal under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to be without
     prejudice so that the plaintiff may elect whether to plead
     further or appeal; in this case, appellant was not afforded
     that election because the dismissal was with prejudice;
     accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
     order but modified it to reflect that the dismissal be without
     prejudice.

5.   Appeal & error -- part of order dismissing complaint for lack
     of subject-matter jurisdiction reversed. -- Appellant's
     failure to plead sufficient facts and the lack of explanation
     in the trial court's order rendered any meaningful further
     appellate review a practical impossibility; because, however,
     appellant asserted a cause of action in circuit court based in
     part on the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, the supreme
     court reversed and dismissed that part of the order dismissing
     the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; Floyd G. Rogers, Judge;
reversed and dismissed in part; affirmed as modified in part.
     Walker Law Firm, by: R. Scott Zuerker, for appellant.
     David B. Vandergriff, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.Associate Justice Donald L. Corbin, 7-15-96
*ADVREP*SC10*





THOMAS E. MALONE,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

TRANS-STATES LINES, INC.,
                    APPELLEE,


95-1116



APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CIV-95-320(I),
HON. FLOYD G. ROGERS, JUDGE,




REVERSED AND DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART.




     Appellant, Thomas E. Malone, appeals the judgment of the
Sebastian County Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice his
complaint against appellee, Trans-States Lines, Incorporated, for
retaliatory discharge under the Workers' Compensation Law, Ark.
Code Ann.  11-9-101 to -1001 (Repl. 1996), and for discrimination
in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code
Ann.  16-123-101 to -108 (Supp. 1995).  The trial court dismissed
appellant's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Appellant asserts two points for reversal of the order of
dismissal.  Resolution of these arguments requires interpretation
of the two aforementioned legislative acts.  Jurisdiction is
therefore properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-
2(a)(3).  We reverse and dismiss in part and affirm as modified in
part.
     Appellant began employment with appellee as a truck driver in
January 1990 and was first diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome in March 1993.  He had surgery on his right hand in March
1994 and on his left hand in April 1994.  Appellant was released to
return to work in August 1994 with restrictions that he not load or
unload his truck.  Appellee refused to return appellant to work
with these restrictions.  A dispute arose between appellee and
appellant, and appellee terminated appellant.  Appellant received
a full release to return to work in November 1994 with a five
percent permanent physical impairment rating in each hand. 
Appellant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits relating
to the carpal tunnel syndrome.  In addition to the aforementioned
facts, the administrative law judge found that the carpal tunnel
syndrome arose out of appellant's employment with appellee and that
appellant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits for
the period March 5, 1994, through August 18, 1994.  
     Appellant initiated the present action by filing a two-count
complaint in circuit court.  Count one of the complaint alleged a
cause of action under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993. 
Specifically, appellant alleged that appellee discriminated against
him in the terms and conditions of his employment on the basis of
appellant's physical disability.  Count two of the complaint
alleged a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on
appellant's filing of the workers' compensation claim.  
     Appellee relied on section 11-9-107 and moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to
state facts upon which relief can be granted.  The trial court
entered an order granting without explanation appellee's motion on
both grounds.  This appeal followed.
     Appellant asserts two points for reversal.  First, he argues
the trial court erred in dismissing count one of his complaint
because the exclusive remedy doctrine of section 11-9-107 does not
apply to a claim of discrimination based on physical disability. 
Second, he argues alternatively that section 11-9-107 is
unconstitutional in that it bars a civil rights action pursuant to
the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993.  Appellant correctly
concedes that count two of his complaint was properly dismissed due
to section 11-9-107 and this court's decision in Tackett v. Crain
Automotive, 321 Ark. 36,