Title: Lavoie v. Safecare Health Service, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lavoie v. Safecare Health Service, Inc.1992 WY 125840 P.2d 239Case Number: 90-140Decided: 10/02/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Philip H. 
LAVOIE and Marilyn Lavoie, husband and wife, d/b/a Daisy Laundry, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

SAFECARE 
HEALTH SERVICE, INC., a Washington Corporation, d/b/a LanderValleyRegionalMedicalCenter, Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District Court, FremontCounty, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

 Glenn E. 
Smith of Glenn E. Smith & Associates, Cheyenne, and John R. Vincent of Vincent & 
Vincent, Riverton, for 
appellants.

William 
M. McKellar and Peter K. Michael of Lathrop, Rutledge & Michael, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Mr. and Mrs. Philip H. 
Lavoie d/b/a Daisy Laundry (Lavoies) sued Safecare Health Services, Inc. d/b/a 
LanderValleyRegionalMedicalCenter and PineRidgeHospital (Safecare) for 
damages for Safecare's alleged breach of an oral contract under which Lavoies 
would clean Safecare's laundry for three years. In their complaint, Lavoies 
asserted claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and breach of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Safecare and dismissed the complaint. This appeal presents 
a classic legal problem of contract formation.

 [¶2.]     Lavoies raise these 
issues:1

 1. Did the 
district court err in adjudicating material facts in a summary judgment 
proceeding?

2. Did 
the district court err in determining there were not genuine issues of material 
fact in this case?

3. Did 
the district court err in holding that the appellant's breach of contract claim 
is barred by the statute of frauds?

4. Did 
the district court err in holding that the claim for promissory estoppel is 
barred by the statute of frauds?

5. Did 
the district court err in granting summary judgment on the Lavoies' fraud 
claim?

 [¶3.]     Safecare restates the 
issues in this way:

I. 
Whether the statute of frauds bars the Lavoies' claim for breach of 
contract

II. 
Whether the theory of promissory estoppel could circumvent the statute of frauds 
under circumstances established by Mr. Lavoie's own testimony 

III. 
Whether the Lavoies' fraud claim was barred because they expected a written 
contract

IV. 
Whether the Lavoies' fraud claim was barred by their inability to offer any 
clear and convincing evidence of intent to defraud

V. 
Whether an independent claim for bad faith can survive the dismissal of the 
underlying breach of contract claim in a case that does not involve an insurance 
policy

 [¶4.]     We 
affirm.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 [¶5.]     This court's standard 
of review of summary judgment is:

     When a motion for 
summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as 
the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have 
exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing 
in the record.

Roth v. 
First Sec. Bank of Rock Springs, 684 P.2d 93, 95 
(1984) (quoting Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 150 (Wyo. 
1981)).

 [¶6.]     This court further 
said:

A 
summary judgment should only be granted where it is clear that there are no 
issues of material facts involved and that an inquiry into the facts is 
unnecessary to clarify the application of law. A material fact is one which has 
legal significance. It is a fact which would establish a defense. After the 
movant establishes a prima facie case the burden of proof shifts to the opposing 
party who must show a genuine issue of material fact, or come forward with 
competent evidence of specific facts countering the facts presented by the 
movant. The burden is then on the nonmoving party to show specific facts as 
opposed to general allegations. The material presented must be admissible 
evidence at trial. Conclusory statements are not admissible. We give the party 
defending the motion the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If the evidence is 
subject to conflicting interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, 
summary judgment is improper.

Roth, 
684 P.2d  at 95 (citations omitted).

 [¶7.]     In a summary judgment 
context, we will not disturb the trial court's judgment if it is sustainable on 
any theory. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 650-51 (Wyo. 
1986).

FACTS

 [¶8.]     In keeping with our 
standard of review, our statement of facts is drawn largely, if not exclusively, 
from Mr. Lavoie's deposition transcript and his subsequent affidavit, together 
with the various exhibits identified and discussed in his 
deposition.

 [¶9.]     Safecare supported its 
summary judgment motion with portions of the transcripts of the depositions of 
Mr. Lavoie and exhibits from his deposition; Mike Ockinga, Safecare's 
comptroller; and Don Pierson, Safecare's plant manager and head of maintenance. 
Lavoies countered with the entire transcript of Mr. Lavoie's deposition and 
exhibits; Mr. Lavoie's affidavit; and affidavits of Mike Kaker and Loretta 
Rickey, former Safecare employees.

 [¶10.]  In 1988, Safecare, whose hospitals are in 
FremontCounty, was in the final year of a written three year 
laundry services contract with Steiner Corporation whose facility was in 
Casper. In 
casual conversation between Lavoie and David Elling, an insurance salesman whose 
client was Safecare, Lavoie approved of Elling's asking Safecare whether it 
would be interested in having the Lavoies do Safecare's laundry. Elling later 
called Lavoie, telling him Safecare was interested and to call Ockinga. 

 [¶11.]  In late April, 1988, Lavoie called 
Ockinga to arrange a meeting. On April 29, 1988, the two met in Ockinga's 
office. At that meeting Lavoie said he was interested in doing Safecare's 
laundry and that could remodel his facility to handle the job. Ockinga expressed 
interest and asked Lavoie to send a written proposal to Dave Brown, 
administrator of Safecare's Lander Valley Regional Medical Center; Hugh Simcoe, 
administrator of Safecare's Pine Ridge Hospital; and Ockinga. Lavoie submitted 
his written proposal by identical cover letters dated May 3, 1988, addressed to 
Brown and Ockinga. In his cover letter Lavoie said, "We now have the capability 
to handle all of" Safecare's laundry and drycleaning needs. In the written 
proposal itself, Lavoie said nothing about remodeling his facility, buying and 
installing new equipment, and obtaining approval from the state health 
department. Rather, Lavoie proposed, among other things,2 that he would meet and comply with 
all state regulations and would do laundry for twenty-seven cents a pound for 
three years.

 [¶12.]  On May 9, 1988, Lavoie met again with 
Ockinga to discuss Lavoie's written proposal. Ockinga said he was pleased with 
the proposal. Lavoie said he would meet with his banker to tell him what was 
going on, meet with his accountant to do the proper paperwork, and meet again 
with his banker to obtain a loan to remodel his facility, and then apprise 
Ockinga of the outcome.

 [¶13.]  Upon leaving Ockinga's office, Lavoie 
went to see his banker, Charles Krebs. Lavoie told him about his opportunity to 
do Safecare's laundry and that he would be meeting with his accountant to 
prepare the necessary documents to apply for a loan.

 [¶14.]  Next, Lavoie contacted equipment vendors 
and obtained prices on the equipment he would need in his remodeled facility. He 
then met with his accountant, Dave Prina, and they worked on a loan proposal 
which culminated in a loan proposal letter dated May 20, 1988, which they 
submitted to Lavoie's banker, Krebs.

 [¶15.]  In Lavoie's May 20 loan proposal letter 
to Krebs, Lavoie set forth a proposal to expand his existing business. After 
stating a history of his business, he recited his basic proposal underlying his 
request for a $30,000 loan:

1. 
First Wyoming Bank commit to Section I - costs to remodel existing building 
(refer to Exhibit D) of approximately $3,900.00. Then the owner, Phil Lavoie, 
will have the State of Wyoming issue a preliminary certification for 
commercial laundry. This work needs to be completed by June 15, 
1988.

2. 
Owner, Phil Lavoie, then will go to Board of Lander Valley Regional Medial 
Center to show state certification of facilities and ask for a signed contract. 
The first Wyoming Bank will also need to commit to the balance of the costs of 
approximately $27,000.00 (Total costs 

$30,801.57 
minus the $3,900.00 in number 1 above.)

3. If 
contract is obtained and the balance of the project monies are received, then 
the commercial laundry facilities should be operational by August 15, 
1988.

The 
first monthly payment on the new note at First Wyoming Bank should commence in 
September, 1988. All other existing debt payments are made timely during the 
construction phase. (Emphasis added).

 [¶16.]  Among the several reasons for the bank to 
make the loan, in addition to the Safecare opportunity, the May 20 letter 
included the reason that through this expansion Lavoie would be able to acquire 
additional commercial laundry business from area motels and other 
hospitals.

 [¶17.]  On May 20, 1988, Lavoie and his 
accountant met with Krebs at his office to discuss the loan proposal letter. 
Krebs told Lavoie he was proceeding in a proper manner. Lavoie said he needed a 
small amount of the loan money to do the interior remodeling; then, in Lavoie's 
words, "if we were able to get the certification from the state then I would 
need the rest of the money in order to put the equipment in place." Krebs said 
the bank's loan committee would meet on the loan proposal and "probably approve 
the whole package." Krebs told Lavoie, in Lavoie's words, "You just take 
whatever you want, the first part first, and let me know when you need the 
second part * * *."

 [¶18.]  A day or so after this May 20 meeting, 
Krebs called Lavoie informing him the whole loan package was approved and loan 
proceeds would be disbursed upon Lavoie's request. Krebs also told him he 
[Krebs] would notify Brown and Ockinga by letter that Lavoie had proper 
financing.

 [¶19.]  On May 24, 1988, Lavoie met with Ockinga 
and told him that he had obtained the loan. Ockinga said, in Lavoie's words, "if 
we got certified by the State Department of Health we would do 
business."

 [¶20.]  Lavoie then met with Krebs at the bank 
and was told, in Lavoie's words, "to go ahead and get started." Lavoie began 
remodeling his facility. Pierson, Safecare's plant manager and head of 
maintenance, came by to see the remodeling work.

 [¶21.]  By letter dated June 8, 1988, addressed 
to Ockinga, Krebs assured him that Lavoie had made the proper financial 
arrangements with the bank to fund the remodeling and related costs necessary to 
receive state certification. Lavoie approved of Krebs' sending that letter since 
it was very important, before he had a contract with Safecare, to show Safecare 
that he would be able to handle Safecare's laundry business in a satisfactory 
manner. Lavoie believed that Krebs' letter enhanced his credibility with the 
prospective client.

 [¶22.]  On June 16, 1988, in accordance with 
arrangements previously made by Lavoie, Francis Reuer, a design engineering 
consultant with the state health department, inspected Lavoie's facility. At 
that time Reuer told Lavoie, in Lavoie's words, the facility "[w]as approved as 
soon as we got [some conditions] done." In Lavoie's words, Reuer "thought all we 
needed to do was to correct these areas and take care of those things and it 
wouldn't be a problem." Following Reuer's inspection, Lavoie called Ockinga, 
told him the result of Reuer's inspection, and arranged to meet with Ockinga the 
next day.

 [¶23.]  Lavoie concedes, concerning the above and 
foregoing activities and events, no contract, oral or written, existed between 
Safecare and him. Concerning the meeting with Ockinga on June 17, 1988, however, 
Lavoie contends that in that meeting Safecare and he made the oral contract on 
which his suit is based. Consequently, we now focus our attention on the facts 
of that allegedly significant meeting.

 [¶24.]  In both his deposition, taken on February 
27, 1990, and his affidavit, executed on May 11, 1990, Lavoie describes the June 
17 meeting. According to his affidavit, Lavoie met Ockinga to inform him that 
Reuer "had inspected the laundry the day before and things were progressing 
well; that at this time I explained to Mr. Ockinga I was going to get the 
remainder of the loan proceeds and purchase the equipment necessary to complete 
the laundry facility and Mr. Ockinga told me everything looked good and to go 
for it * * *." On this same subject, Lavoie's deposition testimony was that he 
told Ockinga that Reuer had approved the laundry facility the day before; he 
gave Ockinga a copy of Krebs' June 8 letter and explained that he, in Lavoie's 
words, "had just borrowed a pickup full of money to do the interior remodeling 
to get the [state's] certificate, that if [he] was to proceed further [he] would 
be borrowing a semi-truck full of money, and without his business [he] could not 
service the debt, and [he] needed to know where [he] stood." According to 
Lavoie, Ockinga then told him he had liked Lavoie's initial proposal that Lavoie 
had sent to Brown and him and, in Lavoie's words, "we were in a positive mode; 
`go for it.'" Ockinga also said, in Lavoie's words, "we were going to save him a 
lot of money, we were closer, we were in the county * * * `go for it; we will do 
business.'" According to Lavoie, Ockinga said Safecare would require Lavoie to 
submit a policies and procedure manual with which Lavoie's operation would 
comply; Ockinga suggested that Lavoies hire Jean Palladino, a former Safecare 
employee, to prepare such a manual. Ockinga also told Lavoie to resubmit his 
written proposal to Brown, Simcoe, and him, and he told Lavoie that Pierson had 
earlier visited Lavoie's facility at Ockinga's direction. Lavoie asked Ockinga 
if Steiner Corporation was going to submit a bid for another three years. 
Ockinga told him he had contacted Steiner several weeks earlier, had not had 
contact since, and "not to worry about it, period," in Lavoie's 
words.

 [¶25.]  According to Lavoie, when he left the 
June 17 meeting, he anticipated he would get a signed contract. In his words, he 
"figured it was the normal course of business when we do business up here." He 
thought that either Brown or Ockinga would sign the contract on Safecare's 
behalf.

 [¶26.]  By identical cover letters dated June 27, 
1988, Lavoie resubmitted his written proposal to Brown, Simcoe, and Ockinga. In 
his cover letter Lavoie stated that Reuer had inspected and approved Lavoie's 
facility on June 16 and Lavoie was working on the exceptions or conditions which 
Reuer had listed. He referred to Reuer's letter dated June 20, a copy of which 
was enclosed. Lavoie's cover letter further stated that Reuer's conditions would 
be completed by July 27 and that Lavoie was, in Lavoie's words, "requesting a 
meeting with you and your staff to discuss the possibility of entering 
negotiations with your facility for the laundry business."

 [¶27.]  In addition to resubmitting to Safecare 
his written laundry proposal, Lavoie called Jean Palladino to see if he could 
hire her to prepare the policies and procedures manual. Lavoie and Palladino met 
on July 11, but apparently did not sign the written agreement under which he 
hired her until July 12 or shortly thereafter.

 [¶28.]  After Lavoie resubmitted his written 
laundry proposal on June 27, he called Ockinga and arranged a meeting. According 
to Lavoie, this meeting took place on or about July 7, 1988. Attending the 
meeting were Lavoie, Brown, Pierson, Ockinga, and Safecare infection control 
nurse Pat Moore. According to Lavoie, at this meeting he discussed the 
possibility of entering negotiations with their facility for the laundry 
business. Safecare representatives were to make an inspection of Lavoie's 
facility the next day. That inspection was the first one made by Safecare since 
discussions began in late April. Pierson and Moore made the inspection on July 8 
and questioned Lavoie as to when various pieces of equipment would be installed 
and certain conditions completed.

 [¶29.]  Several days later Lavoie tried, 
unsuccessfully, to talk to Brown on the telephone. Finally, on July 12, while in 
Lander, Lavoie called Brown and talked to him. Brown told Lavoie there was no 
need to meet and Safecare was no longer interested. Brown told Lavoie he had a 
bad site report. Despite Lavoie's request to meet and discuss the situation, 
Brown told him he did not want to meet or talk. Brown told him he [Lavoie] might 
talk to Ockinga; then Brown hung up. 

 [¶30.]  Lavoie went to the LanderRegionalMedicalCenter and found Ockinga. Ockinga said 
there was a bad site report from Pierson's and Moore's July 8 inspection. They discussed the 
various site items raised by Ockinga, with Lavoie defending each one. Ockinga 
said perhaps he and Brown should look at the facility.

 [¶31.]  Six days later, on July 18, Lavoie called 
Reuer and asked him to again inspect the facility; he set it for July 22. Lavoie 
then telephoned Ockinga and told him about Reuer's upcoming inspection. Ockinga 
said he would talk to Brown and get back to him.

 [¶32.]  On July 22, Reuer inspected Lavoie's 
facility and told Lavoie to let him know when, in Lavoie's words, "all these 
things are done" and "there's no problem * * *." Lavoie concedes that the 
air-exchange unit had not arrived yet. By letter dated July 26, Reuer confirmed 
his inspection and listed three conditions: Lavoie had told him the air exchange 
unit would be available the middle of August; the fluorescent light tubes 
required protective sleeves; and the intersection of the outside walls with the 
floors needed to be tightly sealed from a sanitation 
standpoint.

 [¶33.]  In a telephone conversation on July 27, 
Ockinga told Lavoie that Brown and Pierson would visit the facility the next 
day. They visited the facility and discussed its clean appearance, the need for 
a certain door, installation of the air-exchange unit, and the status of the 
policies and procedures manual that Palladino was preparing for Lavoie. Lavoie 
said he would deliver the manual the next day; he asked Brown if he could have a 
decision to which Brown replied that he would meet with his staff and someone 
would get back to him.

 [¶34.]  The next day Lavoie got the manual from 
Palladino, took it to Ockinga, and talked to him. Ockinga told him Safecare's 
decision to go again with Steiner was final.

 [¶35.]  By letter dated August 10, 1988, Lavoie 
wrote Brown that he intended to sue Safecare for reneging on its promises. 
According to Lavoie's affidavit, by August 28, 1988, all the remodeling and 
equipment installation, including the air exchange unit, were 
completed.

DISCUSSION

1. The Breach of Contract 
Claim

A. The Complaint

 [¶36.]  We begin our analysis by parsing Lavoies' 
complaint to identify what kind of contract they pleaded. See Davies v. Martel 
Laboratory Services Inc., 189 Ill. App.3d 694, 136 Ill.Dec. 951, 545 N.E.2d 475 (1989). In paragraph 5, Lavoies allege that on May 3 they submitted "their 
proposal and offer." This was the written laundry proposal which recited that 
Lavoies proposed doing Safecare's laundry for three years at a price of 
twenty-seven cents a pound. In this written proposal Lavoies said nothing about 
remodeling their facility, buying and installing equipment, and obtaining state 
approval in exchange for a Safecare promise to pay them for three years' laundry 
service. In paragraph 7, Lavoies allege that Krebs' June 8 letter stated "the 
bank was aware of the remodeling requirements of the contract and related 
costs." However, the letter states the bank was aware of the remodeling 
requirements "regarding" the contract about which there had been negotiations. 
Moreover, Lavoies admit there was no contract in existence on or around June 8. 
Indeed, Lavoies claim unequivocally in their appellate argument that it was not 
until June 17, when Ockinga uttered the words, "Go for it; we will do business," 
that an oral contract was formed. And at no time have the Lavoies claimed that a 
written contract ever existed.

 [¶37.]  In paragraph 8, Lavoies alleged that at a 
meeting during the week of May 24, Ockinga informed Lavoie that state 
certification approving Lavoies' remodeled facility "would also be a 
prerequisite to a contract between the parties for laundry services." As Mr. 
Lavoie's deposition testimony revealed, however, the only meeting that week 
between Lavoie and Ockinga was on May 24, and at that meeting Ockinga simply 
said, in Lavoie's words, "if we got certified * * * we would do business." 

 [¶38.]  In paragraph 11, Lavoies alleged their 
facility received "a favorable rating and approval" from the state on June 16. 
In paragraph 12, Lavoies alleged that "Ockinga expressed satisfaction with [Lavoies'] proposal * * * [and] 
accepted [Lavoies'] offer and at that time the parties verbally and mutually 
agreed to do business together according to the terms discussed." (emphasis 
added).

 [¶39.]  In paragraph 20, Lavoies alleged that on 
May 3, pursuant to Safecare's request they "tendered an offer by proposal for 
health care institution linen and laundry services to [Safecare]." In paragraph 
21, Lavoies alleged that on June 17 they "demonstrated that all conditions 
imposed by [Safecare] had been or could be met or surpassed by August 15, 1988, 
the date stipulated by [Safecare]"; Lavoies further alleged that at that 
meeting, "the parties agreed on all terms and conditions of a contract." 
Continuing this theme in paragraph 22, Lavoies alleged that at the June 17 
meeting:

[Safecare] 
promised to purchase its * * * laundry services at a mutually agreed upon price 
per pound exclusively from [Lavoies] commencing on August 15, 1988, for a three 
(3) years period until August 14, 1991. In exchange [Lavoies] agreed to a 
certain schedule of delivery, and pick-up, certain policies and procedures in 
processing [Safecare's] linen and laundry, remodeling and refitting [their 
facility] to process [Safecare's volume], meeting the requirements and achieving 
certification from the [state] and to service all [Safecare's] laundry and dry 
cleaning needs during the stipulated period.

 [¶40.]  In paragraph 23, Lavoies alleged that before August 15, 1988, they incurred 
substantial expense and obligations by performing these conditions: obtaining 
financing, remodeling and refitting their facility, achieving state 
certification and commissioning a policies and procedures manual. In paragraph 
24, Lavoies alleged that on July 29, 1988, Safecare repudiated the contract 
unequivocally. We find these allegations in paragraphs 23 and 24 rather curious 
in light of the undisputed facts from Mr. Lavoies' own testimony. He applied for 
and obtained financing voluntarily, not in exchange for or in reliance on 
Safecare's demand or promise, and he did so before his meetings with Ockinga on 
May 24 and June 17. Similarly, he began remodeling before his June 17 meeting at which he 
claims the oral contract was formed. Likewise, he testified that he received 
state approval on Reuer's inspection on June 16, the day before the parties 
allegedly formed the oral contract. Concerning the allegation that Safecare 
unequivocally repudiated the June 17 oral contract on July 29, Lavoie testified 
Safecare's Brown told him unequivocally on July 12 that Safecare was no longer 
interested. Also on July 12 or shortly thereafter, Lavoie signed a written 
contract with Jean Palladino to prepare the manual, but Lavoie failed to tell 
her to stop work even after Brown had told him that very day that Safecare was 
not interested.

     B. The Summary 
Judgment

 [¶41.]  After reading the parties' memoranda and 
hearing their arguments at a hearing and after considering the evidence in light 
of the Lavoies' complaint, the trial court concluded that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed about the contract which the Lavoies sought to enforce. 
The court found that the Lavoies were alleging the formation of an oral contract 
to be performed over a period greater than a year, namely three years. The court 
also found that when Mr. Lavoie left the June 17 meeting he anticipated there 
would be a signed contract.

 [¶42.]  In granting summary judgment for 
Safecare, the trial court held that the alleged oral three-year contract was 
void under Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-105 (1988), the statute of frauds, because there 
was no writing signed by Safecare, the party to be charged. The trial court also 
held that the Lavoies demonstrated no proof that Safecare perpetrated fraud on 
the Lavoies which would have estopped Safecare from invoking the statute of 
frauds.

     C. Our Analysis

 [¶43.]  In their appellate argument, both oral 
and written, the Lavoies contend, contrary to their complaint allegations, that 
their May 3 written proposal was an "offer" with which Ockinga expressed 
satisfaction and which Ockinga accepted, and that on June 17 the parties formed 
an oral unilateral contract. As explained by the Lavoies, this oral unilateral 
contract consisted of Ockinga's "promise" to buy Lavoies' laundry services for 
three years if Lavoies would remodel and refit their facility and obtain state 
approval of it. In the Lavoies' view of this unilateral contract, by their 
performance of these conditions (remodeling and refitting their facility and 
obtaining state approval) within one year's time, and arguably by August 15, 
1988, as allegedly required by Safecare, they accepted Safecare's "offer" and 
had fully performed the oral contract. Since they had fully performed, they 
claim Safecare was bound to fulfill its promise to pay for three years' laundry 
service.

 [¶44.]  The Lavoies' oral unilateral contract 
theory is directly at odds with the type of contract they pleaded in their 
complaint. In paragraph 22, they alleged that in exchange for Safecare's promise 
to buy its laundry services for three years from the Lavoies, Lavoies "agreed" 
[promised] to adhere to a pick-up and delivery schedule, abide by policies and 
procedures, remodel and refit their facility, achieve state approval, and 
service Safecare's laundry and dry cleaning needs for three years. Indeed, as 
Safecare points out, Lavoies appear to have pleaded a bilateral contract, that 
is, a promise for a promise.3 Safecare also points out that 
Lavoies did not fully perform their promise as pleaded since they have never 
done one day's worth of Safecare's laundry.

 [¶45.]  The Lavoies concede that if in fact the 
alleged contract were bilateral, as Safecare maintains, then it would be within 
the statute of frauds and, to be valid, have to be in writing and signed by 
Safecare, the party to be bound. Under a bilateral contract theory, the alleged 
oral contract would be invalid and, legally, no contract would 
exist.

 [¶46.]  We are inclined to conclude that the 
Lavoies' complaint pleaded the formation of an oral bilateral three-year 
contract for laundry services. We shall analyze the propriety of the summary 
judgment under the Lavoies' oral unilateral contract position, however, because 
that is the position they have presented to us. See 1 E. Allen Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts § 2.3, at 65 (1990). Let us be clear about that 
position. Lavoies claim the contract was this: Safecare, as the 
promisor/offeror, promised or made the "offer" to pay Lavoies to do Safecare's 
laundry for three years if Lavoies accepted that "offer" by performing the 
conditions of: 1) remodeling their facility, 2) purchasing and installing 
laundry equipment, and 3) obtaining state approval to operate a commercial 
laundry handling health care institution laundry. They claim that Safecare, 
through its agent Ockinga, made that promise or "offer" at the June 17 meeting 
when he uttered the words, "We will do business; go for it," in response to 
Lavoie's inquiry about needing to know where he stood before he requested a 
"semi-truck full of loan proceeds" to purchase laundry equipment. They claim 
that in exchange for and reliance on that "offer," they accepted that "offer" by 
performing, i.e., remodeling, requesting additional loan proceeds, buying and 
installing equipment, obtaining state approval, and commissioning Jean Palladino 
to prepare the manual.

 [¶47.]  The Lavoies' unilateral contract position 
is untenable for a variety of reasons. To explain, we return to fundamental 
principles of contract and agency law. Whether an oral contract exists "depends 
on the intent of the parties and is a question of fact." Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 775 
(Wyo. 1988). 
See also Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39, 41 (Wyo. 1983); and Jim's Water Service, Inc. v. Alinen, 608 P.2d 667, 669-70 (Wyo. 1980).

     It is well established 
that an offer, acceptance, and consideration are the basic elements of a 
contract. The burden of proving a contract is on the one seeking to recover on 
it. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Negros-Philippine Lumber Company, 32 Wyo. 248, 231 P. 398 
(1924). This includes the burden of proving consideration.

Miller, 
664 P.2d  at 40 (citation omitted).

 [¶48.]  In Continental Ins. v. Page Engineering 
Co., 783 P.2d 641, 651 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted), this court 
observed:

It is 
an axiom of the law of contracts that, in the absence of a meeting of the minds, 
there is no contract. Thus, in an instance in which the terms of the contract 
are so uncertain that mutuality of agreement cannot be discerned, the contract 
is unenforceable because of uncertainty. Certainly, parties can create an 
implied contract by their conduct, but the conduct from which that inference is 
drawn must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the parties expressed a 
mutual manifestation of an intent to enter into an agreement. Although the 
question of whether particular conduct is sufficient to support a finding that 
an implied contract exists is generally submitted to a trier of fact, the 
question may be resolved by summary judgment if reasonable minds could not 
differ.

 [¶49.]  In their complaint the Lavoies alleged 
that Safecare through its agent Ockinga made the "offer" and that they accepted 
that "offer" by performance. Implicit in this allegation is the claim that 
Ockinga had authority to bind Safecare to a contract. A party claiming an agency 
relationship, such as the Lavoies here, has the burden of proof on that issue as 
well as on the issue of the scope of the agent's authority. Stone v. First 
Wyoming Bank N.A., Lusk, 625 F.2d 332, 343 (10th Cir. 1980); Czapla v. Grieves, 
549 P.2d 650, 653-54 (Wyo. 1976).

 [¶50.]  In support of Safecare's summary judgment 
motion, Safecare submitted Ockinga's deposition testimony that he had no 
authority to bind Safecare, a corporation. In the face of Safecare's summary 
judgment evidence that its agent, Ockinga, had no authority to contract with the 
Lavoies, the burden on that issue of fact shifted to the Lavoies. They failed to 
counter with any evidence that Ockinga possessed such authority. In regard to 
this matter, a brief review of their knowledge is revealing. In both the April 
29 and June 17 meetings between Lavoie and Ockinga, the latter asked the former 
to send his written proposals to both Brown and Simcoe, the chief administrators 
of Safecare's health care facilities. The Lavoies did so. In Lavoies' May 20 
loan proposal to the bank, Lavoie expressly stated he would show the state's 
certification to Safecare's board and ask for a signed contract. This is strong 
evidence the Lavoies knew that only Safecare's board had authority to contract. 
They knew they were dealing with a corporation. A corporation's comptroller, 
like Ockinga, generally has no authority to contract on behalf of the 
corporation. Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 225, at 
595-99 (3d ed. 1983). Under Wyoming statutory law, a corporate officer, 
such as comptroller, has only such authority and duties as set forth in the 
corporate bylaws or as prescribed by the board of directors. Wyo. Stat. § 17-16-841 
(1989). Cf., 
United States v. 
Marin, 651 F.2d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1981). Also under Wyoming law, a third 
person, such as the Lavoies, has a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to 
determine the scope of an agent's authority. Trails Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l 
Bank of Laramie, 76 Wyo. 152, 175, 301 P.2d 775, 784 (1956). Having examined the summary judgment evidence in a light most 
favorable to the Lavoies, we find that no genuine issue of material fact exists 
about the scope of Ockinga's authority. We hold as a matter of law that he had 
no authority to contract on Safecare's behalf and, consequently, no oral 
contract came into being at the June 17 meeting.

 [¶51.]  Another reason exists to explain why the 
Lavoies' unilateral contract position is untenable. There was no consideration 
between Safecare and the Lavoies. As Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 75 
(1981) provides, the consideration must both be sought by the promisor 
(Safecare) in exchange for its promise and be given by the promisee (Lavoies) in 
exchange for its promise. Under the undisputed facts, Lavoies' actions of 
seeking and obtaining the loan from Krebs, undertaking remodeling, and seeking 
and obtaining state approval on June 16 were not induced by Ockinga's alleged 
promise uttered on June 17. As explained in Farnsworth, supra, § 2.7 at 
73:

Only if 
[performance] has not yet been taken when the promise is made can the promisor 
be bargaining for it when making the promise. If the [performance] has already 
been taken, the promisor cannot be seeking to induce it. Such "past 
consideration" - [performance] already taken before a promise is made - cannot 
be consideration for the promise.

 [¶52.]  The facts clearly show that both Lavoies 
and Safecare intended that the purpose of negotiations was to achieve a written 
contract, not an oral one. Lavoies knew that Safecare's existing contract with 
Steiner Corporation was in writing. Lavoies' loan proposal to Krebs expressly 
stated they envisioned a written contract signed by Safecare's board. Ockinga 
told Lavoies to resubmit a written proposal to Brown and Simcoe. When Lavoie 
left the June 17 meeting he contemplated a written contract. In Lavoie's June 27 
cover letter he expressly stated he was requesting a meeting "to discuss the 
possibility of entering negotiations * * *." Reasonable minds cannot differ on 
the conclusion to be drawn from this undisputed evidence. No contract came into 
being on June 17.

2. Promissory 
Estoppel

     A. The Complaint

 [¶53.]  In their complaint the Lavoies assert a 
promissory estoppel claim based on the following allegations. They allege that 
at the June 17 meeting Safecare, by agent Ockinga's conduct, accepted their 
offer and promised to use Lavoies' laundry service for a three-year period. 
Lavoies allege that Safecare reasonably expected its promise to induce Lavoies' 
action. In that regard, the Lavoies contend that inducements were manifested by 
the following Safecare acts: at the June 17 meeting agent Ockinga asked Lavoies 
to obtain the remainder of available financing and complete the remodeling and 
refitting of their laundry; at that meeting agent Ockinga voiced the expectation 
that Lavoies would prepare a policy and procedure manual and recommended Jean 
Palladino to prepare it; and on July 8, Pierson and Moore inspected the laundry 
facility, making explicit Safecare's continuing supervision and expectation of 
the Lavoies. The Lavoies claim that they incurred indebtedness, undertook 
construction on and equipped their facility, hired Ms. Palladino, and obtained 
state certification because of Safecare's inducements. They conclude by alleging 
they substantially changed their position and relied, to their detriment, on 
Safecare's promise and misleading declarations.

     B. Promissory Estoppel 
Law

 [¶54.]  Recently, this court reviewed and applied 
its promissory estoppel jurisprudence in a similar case. The elements of 
promissory estoppel are:

(1) a 
clear and definite agreement; (2) proof that the party urging the doctrine acted 
to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and (3) a finding that 
the equities support the enforcement of the agreement.

Inter-Mountain 
Threading, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Tubular Services, Inc., 812 P.2d 555, 559 
(Wyo. 1991) (quoting Provence v. Hilltop Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d 990, 993 
(Wyo. 
1989)).

[In 
Provence], we looked to National Bank of 
Waterloo v. Moeller, 434 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa 1989). Moeller 
correctly informs us that, with respect to the first element, a clear and 
definite agreement, the "dual emphasis on clarity and inducement parallels the 
Restatement (Second) definition of an agreement for purposes of promissory 
estoppel as `[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action * * * on the part of the promisee.' Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
90 (1981)."

Inter-Mountain 
Threading, 812 P.2d  at 559 (quoting Nat'l Bank of Waterloo v. Moeller, 434 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Iowa 
1989)).

 [¶55.]  Measuring Ockinga's June 17 oral 
statements against the first element, we cannot conclude they are promises clear 
and unambiguous in their terms. His conversational remarks are, at best, mere 
expressions of hope and opinion in an obviously preliminary negotiation context. 
In somewhat analogous preliminary negotiation contexts, we have viewed similar 
remarks as mere expressions of opinion and agreements to agree. For instance, in 
Inter-Mountain Threading, 812 P.2d  at 558, we held that the manager's oral 
statement "we can do a deal" was not a clear and definite promise, but rather a 
mere expression of hope and opinion in an obviously preliminary negotiation 
context. See also Czapla, 549 P.2d  at 653 (owner's agent made such remarks as 
"This was as good as sold, that the deal would be final"); Roth, 684 P.2d  at 95 
(bank director made such remarks a "Things look very good at this time" and "You 
don't have any * * * problems as long as I own the bank"); and Doud v. First 
Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927, 928 (Wyo. 1989) (bank president told loan applicant 
that proposed line of credit was "not any problem"). See also Rialto Theatre v. 
Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 334 (Wyo. 1986) (portion of lease agreement "is 
merely an agreement to agree in the future"). In similar cases other courts have 
likewise found such expressions made in the course of preliminary negotiations 
not to be promises. See e.g., Jungmann v. St. Regis Paper Co., 682 F.2d 195, 197 
(8th Cir. 1982); Blanton Enterprises, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 680 F. Supp. 753 (D.S.C. 1988); Tull v. Mr. Donut Dev. Corp., 7 Mass. App. 626, 389 N.E.2d 447, 449-50 (1979); Pacific Cascade Corp. v. Nimmer, 25 Wn. App. 552, 608 P.2d 266 (1980).

 [¶56.]  With respect to the second element of 
promissory estoppel, that the Lavoies acted to their detriment in reasonable 
reliance on Ockinga's oral remarks on June 17, the uncontroverted evidence, most 
of which is taken from Lavoie's own deposition and affidavit, shows that Lavoies 
had acted and incurred most of their obligations before the June 17 meeting at 
which Ockinga made his remarks. Lavoies cannot rely upon statements not yet made 
when they took action and incurred legal obligations. We hold they did not 
change their position or suffer damages in reliance upon Ockinga's 
statements.

 [¶57.]  With respect to Lavoies' incurring 
damages after Ockinga's statements on June 17, Lavoies have failed to show that 
their reliance on those statements was reasonable. The ingredients of Lavoie's 
own loan proposal to his bank, as well as his deposition, reveal him to be an 
experienced business person. For example, he knew that:

·        
Safecare 
had a written three-year laundry service contract with Steiner 
Corporation;

·        
written 
contracts were the norm in business dealings of this 
nature;

·        
his 
written proposals were being reviewed by Safecare's hospital administrators 
Brown and Simcoe;

·        
at the 
June 17 meeting Ockinga told him to resubmit his written proposal to those 
administrators and on leaving that meeting he anticipated there would be a 
written contract; and

·        
Safecare 
acted through a board of directors (Lavoie's own loan proposal proposed 
obtaining a signed contract from that board).

 [¶58.]  Finally, when Lavoie resubmitted his 
written proposal on June 27, he stated in his cover letter that he was 
requesting a meeting for the purpose of entering into negotiations. He knew that 
Ockinga was only a financial officer of a corporation, and he did nothing to 
determine the nature and extent of Ockinga's authority to act on Safecare's 
behalf.

 [¶59.]  Lavoie did not contract with Jean 
Palladino to prepare the policy and procedures manual until July 12 or a few 
days later; it was on July 12 that Brown told him there would be no contract. 
And, yet, Lavoie took no action to stop Palladino's preparation work after 
that.

 [¶60.]  In many respects the Lavoies' claim is 
reminiscent of the land developer's (Roth) claim in Roth, 684 P.2d  at 93. There, 
this court upheld a summary judgment in favor of the alleged promisor. Roth had 
entered into extensive negotiations with the bank for a loan in order to develop 
a subdivision. He had numerous conversations with the bank's loan officer, other 
bank officials, and Keith West, a bank director. One evening Roth hosted a 
dinner party in order to show an official from the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA) that the development was a good project to finance. Bank 
director West attended at Roth's invitation. Before dinner a guest asked West 
about the status of Roth's loan, to which West replied, "Things look good at 
this time." At dinner West was asked when Roth could start writing checks on the 
loan, to which West replied, "We'll be ready before [FNMA] will." Roth asked 
West about the loan's status, saying, "If I didn't have that loan I was in real 
trouble." West replied, "You don't have any * * * problems as long as I own the 
bank."

 [¶61.]  Roth immediately ordered a deed to the 
land and ordered contractors to start turning the dirt. Two months later the 
bank denied the loan. Roth contended that the course of negotiations, capped by 
West's remarks at the dinner party, induced him to incur substantial expense; he 
asserted that both West and the bank were estopped from asserting the 
nonexistence of the construction loan.

 [¶62.]  In affirming the summary judgment against 
Roth, this court found that the uncontroverted evidence, most of which was taken 
from Roth's deposition, showed that Roth had entered into most of his contracts 
before the dinner party and West's remarks. This court held that Roth could not 
rely upon a statement not yet made when he entered into these contracts and 
incurred legal obligations. This court found Roth did not change his position or 
suffer damages in reliance upon West's statements. Id. at 
97.

 [¶63.]  With respect to Roth's incurring damages 
after West's representations, this court said Roth had to show that his reliance 
on those representations was reasonable. On this point the court noted that Roth 
was an experienced business person with a wide background of obtaining loans, 
that bank representatives had informed Roth in various conversations that they 
needed more information, that Roth should have known that he did not have a loan 
or even a loan commitment from the bank until a bank official or loan officer 
told him the loan was approved. In view of this evidence, this court held that 
Roth's reliance upon West's statements at the dinner party was unreasonable as a 
matter of law. This court further observed Roth knew that West did not own the 
bank, did not make loans, and was a member of a board that makes decisions as a 
board. Roth, 684 P.2d  at 97.

 [¶64.]  We find our analysis in Roth compelling 
here. In the face of undisputed evidence, we hold that Lavoie's reliance upon 
Ockinga's remarks on June 17 was unreasonable as a matter of 
law.

 [¶65.]  With respect to the final element of 
promissory estoppel, whether the equities support enforcement of the alleged 
promise, we treat that as a question of law. Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc., 812 P.2d  at 560. On the record before us there is no showing that Lavoies are unable 
to use their remodeled laundry facility and additional equipment to good 
advantage, and no showing they are unable to obtain laundry contracts. To the 
contrary, the undisputed evidence reveals they enjoy increased business and have 
been moderately successful in developing and retaining new business. Their 
success in this regard conforms to some of the expectations expressed in their 
May 20, 1988, loan proposal to their banker. We hold that the equities do not 
support enforcement of the alleged promise.

 [¶66.]  We note in conclusion that since the 
Lavoies have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact relating to 
Ockinga's authority to bind Safecare, the lack of that authority is also fatal 
to Lavoies' claim of estoppel against Safecare as principal. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in the 
City of Cheyenne, 141 F. Supp. 300, 309. (D.Wyo. 
1956).

3. Fraud

      A. The Complaint

 [¶67.]  In their fraud claim the Lavoies alleged 
that Safecare agent Ockinga at the June 17 meeting made the material 
representation that the parties would "do business." Lavoies alleged that 
representation was false when made and Safecare at that time knew it was false. 
As proof of Safecare's intention on June 17 not to form an exclusive 
relationship with the Lavoies, Lavoies point to Safecare's contemporaneous 
negotiations with Steiner Corporation on a renewal of the existing written 
laundry services contract.

     B. The Elements of a Fraud 
Claim

 [¶68.]  In Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 
(Wyo. 1985) 
(citations omitted), this court stated:

     The elements of a 
claim for relief for fraud are a false representation made by the defendant 
which is relied upon by the plaintiff to his damage, the asserted false 
representation must be made to induce action, and the plaintiff must reasonably 
believe the representation to be true. A plaintiff who alleges fraud must do so 
clearly and distinctly, and fraud will not be imputed to any party when the 
facts and circumstances out of which it is alleged to arise are consistent with 
honesty and purity of intention. Fraud must be established by clear, unequivocal 
and convincing evidence, and will never be presumed.

 [¶69.]  The Lavoies' fraud claim fails for 
several reasons. First, as with the promissory estoppel claim, Ockinga's lack of 
authority is fatal to the fraud claim against Safecare as principal. Certain 
Parcels, 141 F. Supp.  at 309. Second, it is clear from the record that a showing 
of fraud was not made by clear and convincing evidence. The uncontroverted facts 
show that Lavoie did not rely on Ockinga's June 17 statement in submitting the 
May 3 written proposal in which they agreed to meet or exceed all state 
regulations pertaining to health care institutional type laundry and stated in 
their cover letter that "we now have the capability to handle all of your health 
care institutional laundry * * * needs." Nor may Ockinga's statement be claimed 
as the reason for arranging Reuer's visit to secure state approval of their 
facility or to meet with their accountant and prepare a loan proposal which was 
subsequently submitted to their bank on May 20 and approved on May 21. Likewise, 
it cannot be seriously argued that Ockinga's statement induced Lavoies to 
initiate the remodeling of their facility which encouraged their banker to write 
his June 8 letter enhancing their credibility with Safecare as a prospective 
client, or to meet with Reuer on June 16 to obtain state approval of their 
facility.

 [¶70.]  Moreover, in his deposition Lavoie could 
not designate the factual basis for their fraud claim. When asked what facts he 
relied on for the allegation that Ockinga knew his statement was false and was 
intentionally misleading Lavoie, Lavoie replied, not with facts, but with only 
conclusions and opinions, such as "we don't have the contract. We're in 
financial straits because we did what he told us to do." In Duffy, faced with a 
similar response to a similar question, this court found no basis for a fraud 
claim. Duffy, 708 P.2d  at 438.

 [¶71.]  The Lavoies claim Ockinga's testimony, 
viz., that the purpose of his negotiations with them was to provide Safecare 
with an option to Steiner Corporation, creates a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether on June 17 he knew his statement was false. We disagree. It is not 
uncommon in business dealings for the parties to seek the best terms possible, 
to engage in similar negotiations with two or more parties in order to determine 
where the best deal is. Businesses are presumed to act in their own 
self-interest. The facts and circumstances surrounding Ockinga's seeking laundry 
service options for Safecare are consistent with honesty and purity of 
intention. Duffy, 708 P.2d  at 437. We hold there is no genuine issue of material 
fact about Safecare's intention. Lavoies' fraud claim 
fails.

 [¶72.]  In summary, we affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment against Lavoies on their claims of breach of an oral contract, 
promissory estoppel and fraud.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Lavoies have not 
appealed the issue of breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.

2

Laundry 
Proposal

3 1 E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth 
on Contracts § 2.3 at 64-65 (1990).

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶73.]  I, too, must dissent from the holding of 
the majority that the summary judgment in this case should be affirmed. I agree 
with much of what is said in the separate dissent of Justice Urbigkit, but I 
acknowledge that the issue of apparent authority may not be one of material fact 
if the Lavoies are foreclosed by the statute of frauds or other legal theories. 
Furthermore, I do not see the theory of part performance in the same light as 
Justice Urbigkit. For these reasons, I do not join in Justice Urbigkit's 
opinion. Instead, my concern is with the disposition of the theory of promissory 
estoppel. In my view, the majority has treated a question of fact as a question 
of law and has applied the standard for reviewing a judgment notwithstanding a 
verdict to justify the summary judgment.

 [¶74.]  I do note, with respect to apparent 
authority, a contradiction on of the slip opinion, where the majority first says 
that the comptroller generally has no authority to contract on behalf of the 
corporation, but then includes the comptroller among the corporate officers with 
such authority pursuant to Wyoming statutes. Actually the statutes make 
the issue depend upon the corporate bylaws and the authority of an officer 
described in the bylaws who can assign the duties of others. The record in this 
case does not foreclose Ockinga's authority to contract, and there are ample 
indications of his apparent authority.

 [¶75.]  The thrust of the majority opinion is 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the reliance 
element of promissory estoppel because that is a question of law. As I analyze 
the majority opinion, the first fallacy presented in resolving the case is 
contained in that thesis. I don't agree. Whether the Lavoies reasonably relied 
upon the conduct of Ockinga and other representatives of Safecare is a question 
of fact, not of law. I am satisfied that, as is generally true of subjective 
factors, the reasonableness of the conduct of a party is a question for the 
trier of fact to resolve. The majority attaches no significance to the various 
ways in which Lavoie said he had relied upon the conduct of Safecare and its 
representatives. Instead, the majority says he could not have relied upon that 
conduct because, as a matter of law, it was not reasonable for him to rely upon 
such conduct.

 [¶76.]  I am inclined to relate this situation 
very directly to our case of Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. Baker Hughes 
Tubular Services, Inc., 812 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1991). The majority rely 
substantially on that case, but it is important to recall that there we were 
reviewing an order granting a judgment notwithstanding a verdict. Therein lies 
the second fallacy; the majority treats this case like one in which a directed 
verdict should be granted in affirming the summary 
judgment.

 [¶77.]  In Western Surety Co. v. Town of 
Evansville, 675 P.2d 258, 264 (Wyo. 1984), we adopted 
the following language quoted in Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21, 25 
(8th Cir. 1976):

     It is only where it is 
perfectly clear that there are no issues in the case that a summary judgment is 
proper. Even in cases where the judge is of opinion that he will have to direct 
a verdict for one party or the other on the issues that have been raised, he 
should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather than attempt 
to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment, which was never 
intended to enable parties to evade jury trials or have the judge weigh evidence 
in advance of its being presented. Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 915 
(4th Cir), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887, 72 S. Ct. 178, 96 L. Ed. 666 
(1951); accord, Williams v. Chick, 373 F.2d 330, 331 (8th Cir. 1967).1

 I am 
satisfied that, at least subliminally, the majority was sensitive to this rule, 
but still it substituted the standard for reviewing a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict into this summary judgment case. That standard is summarized in 
Inter-Mountain, 812 P.2d at 558-59:

When 
this appellate court is faced with a JNOV question, we undertake a full review 
of the record without deference to the views of the trial court. Cody v. Atkins, 
658 P.2d 59, 61-62 (Wyo. 1983). In determining whether a JNOV 
motion should be granted, we consider "whether the evidence is such that without 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise considering the weight 
of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion reasonable persons could have 
reached * * *." Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1986). In our review 
we consider the evidence favorable to the nonmoving party, giving it all 
reasonable inferences. Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 877 (Wyo. 
1979). A court should cautiously and sparingly grant JNOV motions. Erickson, 713 P.2d  at 1186.

Read 
carefully, it is apparent the majority is saying that reasonable persons could 
reach only one conclusion from the facts incorporated in this record. That is 
not the standard for summary judgment review, however, where we look only for 
issues of fact, not resolutions. In order to avoid that hurdle, the majority has 
described the question of reasonable reliance as one of law rather than 
acknowledging it is a question of fact as to which there is a genuine issue in 
this instance.

 [¶78.]  I would hold that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact in this case with respect to the elements of promissory 
estoppel as articulated in Inter-Mountain. I would, therefore, reverse the 
summary judgment in favor of Safecare, and I would remand the case for trial on 
that theory, as pleaded by the Lavoies.

FOOTNOTES

 1In Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1983), we quoted from Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 
1250 (Wyo. 1977), to reaffirm the standard for reviewing a directed verdict, and 
went on to hold that "[t]he test then for granting a J.N.O.V. is virtually the 
same as that employed in determining whether a motion for directed verdict 
should be granted or denied." Cody, 658 P.2d  at 62.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶79.]  In dissenting to the present decision, I 
object to a very serious procedural appellate review misdirection now utilized. 
This error is found in the substantive factual decision the majority now makes 
on a nonlitigated issue not previously considered by the trial court, counsel or 
presented by appellate briefing. In result, the majority makes a first time 
considered factual determination in the appellate decision. We eliminate 
participation of counsel in the decisional process and combine the trial court 
nisi prius fact finding with appellate review to approve summary judgment on a 
concept completely not argued and factually undeveloped by 
anyone.

 [¶80.]  This case, previously non-litigated, is 
now decided on the question of the actual or ostensible authority of the 
negotiating comptroller to make a binding laundry service contract while acting 
and negotiating within his duties as the chief financial officer of the 
hospital.

 [¶81.]  To understand the structure of this 
appeal, we must recognize that the trial court applied the statute of frauds to 
grant summary judgment disposition as a matter of law, Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 636 (Wyo. 1986) (stage five), for all elements of 
the claim except fraud. In adversely determining the fraud allegation, the trial 
court found there were insufficient grounds in pleading or evidence to sustain 
the claim against a summary judgment disposition. Id. at 635-36 (stages one 
and four). The trial court was neither presented with a contested claim nor 
thereafter made a finding that Mike Ockinga, "Chief Financial Officer of 
Defendant," lacked authority to negotiate or make the deal which is the subject 
matter of this litigation. The majority now extracts from the evidence a factual 
conclusion which was not developed by assertion of affirmative defense or 
briefing argument. This result is achieved without citation of authority 
demonstrating why Ockinga, as the comptroller and chief financial officer of the 
hospital, would not have authority to negotiate a relatively modest laundry 
contract.

 [¶82.]  Within the broad sweep of summary 
judgment application, the majority has consequently shifted its review from 
considering the matter of law resolution to now addressing a factual concern by 
decision that there is no conflict in the evidence. Compare Cordova summary 
judgment (stage five) with the Cordova controlling legal principle ratio 
decidendi that no factual issue exists (stage six). The difference in 
application of principles of appellate review is divided by a gap figuratively 
as wide as the Grand Canyon. If the statute of 
frauds applies, issues of authority are not involved. Any decision where the 
title and character of the officer of negotiation is similar to what is found 
here overtly presents actual and apparent authority concepts of factual 
conflict. Affirming the fact finding by the trial court even with a grant of 
summary judgment might be one thing, a nisi prius fact finding function by this 
court is quite another.

 [¶83.]  Considering we are deciding an issue that 
was never litigated, I am forced to conclude on this record that the majority is 
entirely wrong in its decision to justify the summary judgment that was granted 
by the trial court based on statute of frauds. Since ostensible authority has 
never been in question by pleading, argument, evidence or briefing, we now 
embark on this fact finding exhibition with a very cloudy 
record.

 [¶84.]  In initial complaint, Lavoie claimed 
negotiatory sessions with "Mike Ockinga, Comptroller for and agent of defendant 
LVRMC, in Ockinga's business office in the LVRMC to discuss a relationship which 
would involve the plaintiffs providing laundry services to defendant Safecare." 
Lavoie also alleged negotiations during an extended course of meetings, 
including the exchange of correspondence, and then stated:

Mr. 
Ockinga expressed satisfaction with plaintiffs' proposal, location, and their 
price for laundry services, which amounted to a $10,000.00 savings to the 
defendant per year. Mr. Ockinga accepted plaintiffs' offer and at that time the 
parties verbally and mutually agreed to do business together according to the 
terms discussed. Mr. Ockinga encouraged Mr. Lavoie to obtain the remaining 
financing and complete the remodeling and refitting required by 
defendant.

Further, 
Lavoie contended:

     17. On July 29, 1988, plaintiffs had met 
or surpassed all the conditions mandated by defendant and notified defendant 
thereof. * * *

* * * * 
* *

     21. On June 17, 1988, 
plaintiffs demonstrated that all conditions imposed by the defendant had been or 
could be met or surpassed by August 15, 1988, the date stipulated by defendant. 
During the June 17th meeting between Mr. Lavoie and Mr. Ockinga, the parties 
agreed on all terms and conditions of a contract.

     22. On that occasion 
defendant promised to purchase its health care institution linen and laundry 
services at a mutually agreed upon price per pound exclusively from plaintiffs 
commencing on August 15, 1988, for a three (3) year period until August 14, 
1991. In exchange plaintiffs agreed to a certain schedule of delivery, and 
pick-up, certain policies and procedures in processing defendant's linen and 
laundry, a particular price per pound for processing defendant's linen and 
laundry, remodeling and refitting Daisy Cleaners to process the volume of linen 
and laundry generated by defendant, meeting the requirements and achieving 
certification from the Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services and to 
service all defendant's laundry and dry cleaning needs during the stipulated 
period.

 [¶85.]  In answer, Safecare Health Service stated 
in part:

Defendants 
admit that certain meetings between Mike Ockinga and Plaintiffs occurred wherein 
Plaintiffs and Mr. Ockinga discussed a potential business relationship in which 
Plaintiffs' cleaning establishment might be utilized to process hospital 
laundry. Defendants, however, deny all other allegations contained in paragraph 
4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

Generally, 
Safecare Health Service answered by denial of separate paragraphs which in many 
cases were obviously true or, if not true, could not have been known to be 
untrue by them. Of importance, however, are the affirmative defenses which were 
separately stated as the following: 

First Affirmative 
Defense

 As a 
further and separate defense, Defendants state that Plaintiffs' claims and 
causes of action brought against them fail to state claims for which relief can 
be granted.

Second Affirmative 
Defense

 As a 
further and separate defense, Defendants state that Plaintiffs failed to comply 
with the required prerequisites which were mandated before any contract could be 
negotiated.

Third Affirmative 
Defense

 As a 
further and separate defense, Defendants allege that there has been no 
consideration given and/or that there has been a failure of consideration which 
bars Plaintiffs' contract claims.

Fourth Affirmative 
Defense

 As a 
further and separate defense, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' claims are 
barred by the statute of frauds.

Fifth Affirmative 
Defense

 As a 
further and separate defense, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' claims are 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

 [¶86.]  A scheduling order (order for pretrial) 
was entered by the trial court on November 15, 1989, which required the 
following five identified items:

     1. Each element of 
each cause of action, and defense, and a reference to the witnesses, admissions 
and documents and exhibits to prove the element.

     2. The contested 
issues of law, with a brief citation of authority for counsels' 
position.

     3. The facts 
established by pleadings, admissions and stipulations.

     4. The contested 
issues of fact.

     5. Each witness, with 
a succinctly detailed summary of the testimony of each.

In 
accord, Safecare Health Service's designation of expert witnesses 
included:

Mike 
Ockinga, Lander Valley Medical Center, Lander, WY, in addition to his fact 
testimony, may testify regarding the proper financial management and contracting 
policies and procedures of hospitals and other health care institutions; all 
matters that may be raised in his deposition.

No 
witness was listed to testify about ostensible or actual 
authority.

 [¶87.]  Safecare Health Service filed extended 
interrogatories which, in addition to the normal introduction and definitions, 
included in part:

     7. Identify all 
persons present at the meeting between you and Mike Ockinga held on May 2, 1988, 
and state the exact words spoken by each person at such meeting, if possible. If 
it is not possible to state the exact words spoken, please state as specifically 
as possible the substance of the words spoken by each person at the 
meeting.

     8. Identify all 
persons present at the meeting between you and Mike Ockinga held on May 9, 1988, 
and state the exact words spoken by each person at such meeting, if possible. 
[I]f it is not possible to state the exact words spoken, please state as 
specifically as possible the substance of the words spoken by each person at the 
meeting.

     9. Identify all 
persons present at the meeting between you and Mike Ockinga held on May 24, 
1988, and state the exact words spoken by each person at such meeting, if 
possible. If it is not possible to state the exact words spoken, please state as 
specifically as possible the substance of the words spoken by each person at the 
meeting.

     10. Identify all 
persons present at the meeting between you and Mike Ockinga held on June 17, 
1988, and state the exact words spoken by each person at such meeting, if 
possible. If it is not possible to state the exact words spoken, please state as 
specifically as possible the substance of the words spoken by each person at the 
meeting.

     11. Identify all 
persons present at the meeting between you and Mike Ockinga held on July 29, 
1988, and state the exact words spoken by each person at such meeting, if 
possible. If it is not possible to state the exact words spoken, please state as 
specifically as possible the substance of the words spoken by each person at the 
meeting.

     12. Identify all 
persons participating in, or overhearing, the phone conversation between you and 
Mike Ockinga held on June 16, 1988, and state the exact words spoken by each 
person in that conversation, if possible. If it is not possible to state the 
exact words spoken, please state as specifically as possible the substance of 
the words spoken by each person at the meeting.

     13. Identify all 
persons present at the meeting between you and Mike Ockinga held on July 8, 1988 
involving Don Pearson, Pat Moore and Mr. Lavoie, and state the exact words 
spoken by each person at such meeting, if possible. If it is not possible to 
state the exact words spoken, please state as specifically as possible the 
substance of the words spoken by each person at the 
meeting.

The 
interrogatories totalled ten pages plus the signature and certification as the 
eleventh page and addressed in no regard questions of authority of Ockinga to 
negotiate and commit. Lavoie's first set of interrogatories to Safecare Health 
Service of eight pages similarly did not include any questions relating to 
Ockinga's authority as comptroller and chief financial 
officer.

 [¶88.]  The litigation never reached the stage 
where pretrial memoranda in response to the scheduling order and order for 
pretrial were answered since the proceeding found an earlier end. The trial 
court sustained Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Third Claim for 
Relief and for Summary Judgment on All Other Claims on the "grounds that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and Defendant is therefore entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." That final order came following exhaustive 
briefing by Safecare Health Service which had first addressed the issue of duty 
of good faith to be enforceable under Wyoming law as a separate claim and then that 
"the breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of 
frauds."

 [¶89.]  Safecare Health Service's posture was 
summarized in its stated conclusion:

     LanderValley is entitled to a dismissal of the 
third claim for relief based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
because that covenant cannot form an independent basis for relief. 
LanderValley is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
the breach of contract claim because any oral contract is rendered void by the 
Wyoming 
statute of frauds. The Lavoies' claim for promissory estoppel is subject to 
summary judgment on behalf of LanderValley under the Turner case because Mr. 
Lavoie expected a written contract to be executed. Under these circumstances, 
the statute of frauds cannot be overcome by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Finally, LanderValley is entitled to 
summary judgment on the fraud claim for two reasons. First, Mr. Lavoie expected 
a written contract and is therefore precluded from claiming reasonable reliance 
on any oral understandings. Second, despite repeated questioning, Mr. Lavoie was 
unable to offer any clear and convincing evidence that showed that Mr. Ockinga 
had specific intent to defraud during the critical meeting of June 17, 
1988.

 [¶90.]  In its decision, the trial court 
initiated its factual review:

On 
April 29, 1985, Plaintiff Philip H. Lavoie made an initial sales call on Mike 
Ockinga, Chief Financial Officer of Defendant. Ockinga expressed interest in 
Plaintiffs' business since it was more local than a Casper firm providing 
laundry services to Defendant. Ockinga told Lavoie that the existing contract 
would expire in August, 1988 and he asked Lavoie to submit a written proposal to 
Dave Brown, Administrator of Defendant hospital and Hugh Simco, Administrator of 
Defendant's sister facility, Pine Ridge Hospital.

After 
detailing specifically the various meetings conducted between Ockinga and 
Lavoie, the trial court held that the statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-105, 
precluded enforcement of any oral agreements and then stated: 

The 
supposed "contract" which Plaintiffs claim was entered into between them and 
Defendant is in violation of the Wyoming Statute of Frauds and is therefore 
void.

* * * 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter should be 
granted.

 [¶91.]  Although the subject of actual or 
ostensible authority was obviously never factually developed by either litigant 
in interrogatory or deposition examination, the only place where something 
appears which is the basis of the majority's decision, occurred during the 
deposition examination of Ockinga, only part of which is found in the 
record:

     Q. Do you recall 
telling Mr. Lavoie that the hospitals and him would do business, during this 
meeting on June 17, 1988?

     A. Would you repeat 
that question, please?

     Q. Do you recall 
telling Mr. Lavoie at the end of the meeting on June 17, 1988, that the 
hospitals and him would do business, or words to that 
effect?

     A. I deny saying that 
because I was never in a position - it is not within the purview of my authority 
to do that, and I've been in this business for long enough to know better than 
to do that.

(Discussion 
off the record.)

     MR. MICHAEL: Had you 
completed the * * * answer to that or do you know?

     MR. OCKINGA: I believe 
so.

     Q. (MR. VINCENT) The 
long and short of it - or maybe it's the short of it - is, you flatly deny ever 
saying to Mr. Lavoie that the hospitals would do business with his cleaners, or 
words to that effect?

A. I 
categorically deny saying that the hospitals definitely, without question, would 
do [page ended].

[The 
next page is not included in the record now presented for review by this 
court].

 [¶92.]  As previously stated, counsel has not 
been permitted to fully develop and argue the factually dispositive issue. In 
searching the record on this issue, we find the affidavit of Loretta Richey, 
which states in part:

     Loretta Richey, of 
lawful age and being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states as 
follows:

     1. That during the 
summer of 1988 your Affiant was employed by defendant as the medical staff 
coordinator; that Affiant's office was located in the administrative offices of 
the Lander Valley Regional Medical Center; that your Affiant's office was 
located approximately 10 feet from the desk of Cyd Freese;

     2. That Affiant, Cyd 
Freese, and Mike Ockinga had a conversation in the administrative offices of the 
Lander Valley Regional Medical Center pertaining to Phil Lavoie and the Daisy 
Laundry; that the conversation took place some time in late July or early August 
1988 after Mr. Dave Brown had told Mr. Lavoie that Mr. Lavoie would not be 
permitted to do the hospitals' laundry; that Mr. Ockinga said to Cyd Freese and 
your Affiant that there was a verbal agreement with Mr. Lavoie which provided 
generally that Mr. Lavoie was to complete the remodeling and, in return, be able 
to do both the hospital and Pine Ridge hospital's laundry; that Mr. Ockinga said 
generally that he knew all along this would turn into a bad thing; that even 
though they didn't have a written contract at that point, there had been a 
verbal agreement to give Mr. Lavoie the laundry contract when the remodeling was 
completed; that Mr. Ockinga said that he and Dave Brown knew of and, in fact, 
made this verbal agreement with Mr. Lavoie; that Cyd Freese, Mike Ockinga, and 
your Affiant knew that Mr. Lavoie had borrowed money to complete the remodeling 
required to do the hospital and Pine Ridge's laundry[.]

Furthermore, 
Lavoie stated in his affidavit:

     2. That I did not intend, 
nor did I say to any of defendant's employees, that a contract had to be reduced 
to writing prior to the time or as a condition to me remodeling or purchasing 
equipment for the Daisy Laundry;

     3. That Mr. Ockinga 
never, ever, told me that he did not have the authority to enter into a contract 
on behalf of the hospital; that I deny such to be the case and state that from 
the words, activities, and representations of Mr. Ockinga, he did have such 
authority[.]

 [¶93.]  Procedurally, it is inappropriate to 
affirm the summary judgment with this posture of the undeveloped trial court 
record. It is bad enough if two bases were submitted to the trial court and the 
decision was rendered on only one, but here it is even more unjustified where 
the trial court was not provided the basis to even consider the decision this 
majority now renders.

 [¶94.]  The authorities are extensive and 
generally consistent. I would find from a recent Texas case an approach that we should follow 
which, in itself, only addresses the more confined area where at least the issue 
was presented first to the trial court. Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App. 1991).

     What, then, of a 
summary judgment order that expressly states the ground on which it is granted, 
when the underlying motion contained other independent grounds on which summary 
judgment was sought? We conclude that the ground specified in the judgment is 
the only one on which the summary judgment can be affirmed, for the following 
reasons. First, where a party has sought summary judgment on grounds A and B, a 
judgment expressly granting summary judgment on ground A, without mentioning 
ground B, can only be construed to mean that the trial court did not consider 
ground B. To construe it otherwise would be to permit and encourage an inference 
that is neither warranted by the record nor in keeping with the spirit of Rule 
166a(c). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court in the present case did 
not consider defendants' "substantive-law" argument in deciding to grant the 
summary judgment. Having reached this conclusion, it appears obvious that a 
ground not considered by the trial 
court is functionally identical to one not presented to the trial court; we can 
conceive of no reason to treat them differently.

* * * * 
* *

     * * * We hold that 
where, as here, a summary judgment order specifies the ground or grounds on 
which it is based, without expressly ruling on other independent grounds alleged 
in the motion, such other grounds may not, on appeal, form the basis for 
affirming the summary judgment. On the basis of that holding, we decline to 
consider defendants' substantive-law arguments in this 
appeal.

Id. at 518-19 (emphasis 
in original and footnotes omitted). The cases are legion in which the appellate 
court asserts that it will not consider issues not previously presented for 
review by the trial court. R.O. Corp. v. John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Co., 
781 P.2d 910 (Wyo. 1989); Demple v. Carroll, 21 
Wyo. 447, 133 P. 137 (1913); Jones v. Kepford, 
17 Wyo. 468, 
100 P. 923 (1909).

 [¶95.]  At this juncture, little benefit to the 
bar and bench will be served by my exhaustive review of the subject of actual 
and ostensible authority since surely history will not reoccur where we make our 
decision upon an equivalently insufficient record as is done here. May it 
suffice that even if we now had a concluded trial with only the present evidence 
available, I would not vote to sustain a directed verdict by conclusion that 
actual or ostensible authority was not presented to be a question of fact. 
Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d 603 
(Wyo. 1978); Waisner v. Hasbrouck, 34 
Wyo. 61, 241 P. 703 (1925); Farmers' State Bank 
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo. 322, 222 P. 45 (1924). It is a generally 
accepted rule that actual or ostensible authority is a question for factual 
resolution unless the facts do not provide any evidentiary conflict. Stone v. 
First Wyoming Bank N.A., Lusk, 625 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 
1980).

 [¶96.]  If this dissent serves little benefit in 
substantively discussing the issue of actual or ostensible authority which was 
not considered by the litigants or the trial court during all times prior to 
appeal submission, there is even less benefit, since that is not a basis now 
considered in this majority, in now extensively discussing my disagreement with 
the trial court in regard to the statute of frauds preclusion by which summary 
judgment was granted. I do not, however, agree with the trial court decision as 
a matter of law under the developed facts that the partial performance escape 
from a statute of frauds preclusion might not be available for factual 
determination by a trial jury. In this litigative event, it is apparent that 
Safecare Health Service lead Lavoie far down the proverbial primrose path in 
sharp business dealing. There is clear indication from the affidavits in the 
record that the agent of negotiation, Ockinga, was following his orders in these 
activities for the covert, but real, purpose of developing negotiative leverage 
to reduce the price paid to a competitive source for the laundry services. From 
this perspective of summary judgment disposition, the question is whether 
Safecare Health Service went too far to escape the rainstorm of rejected 
business with the appellant by now being given the benefit in use from the 
umbrella of the statute of frauds.

 [¶97.]  Differing from the trial court, I would 
find in analysis, at least within summary judgment concepts, that this 
negotiated business deal went too far for Safecare Health Service to ignore what 
Lavoie had done to handle the promised laundry business. I would clearly find 
here a jury question of sufficient partial performance to deter pretrial 
disposition by application of the statute of frauds as a matter of law. The real 
question presented is how far into a transaction can a sharp-dealing business 
retain protection under the statute of frauds? This is contended to occur while 
the promise is clearly practicing a character of fraud on the negotiating party 
to only obtain a reduced price from someone else and without any actual 
intendment or commitment to do business. The partial performance feature of this 
transaction is unquestioned since clearly in good faith and with knowledge and 
encouragement of the negotiating party, Lavoie incurred substantial expenses by 
reliance on advice about the expectancy of doing the laundry. I would follow 
Lavoie's argument and authority to address this issue:

[T]he 
"part performance" doctrine would apply to the facts of this case. That doctrine 
has been articulated by [2 A.] Corbin, [Corbin on Contracts] § 459, at 583-84 
[(1950)] as follows:

     "The true rule is 
believed to be that, wherever there has been a `part performance' that is [of] 
such a character as to make the restitutionary remedy wholly inadequate, and the 
facts are such that it is what the courts call a `virtual fraud' for the 
defendant to refuse performance, equitable remedies are thereby made available 
to the injured party on the same terms as in other cases. The proof of the oral 
contract must be clear and convincing, the performance sought must be of a kind 
that courts of equity ordinarily feel competent to compel, and other similar 
conditions of the right to equitable relief must exist."

 [¶98.]  According to Corbin, supra, § 425 at 464, 
the type of part performance which is sufficient to take an oral contract from 
the Statute of Frauds is described below:

     "In order that acts of 
the plaintiff in reliance on the oral contract may make it specifically 
enforceable, there are several requisites, each being somewhat variable in 
character and enforced with varying degrees of strictness by the courts. (1) The 
performance must be in pursuance of the contract and in reasonable reliance 
thereon, without notice that the defendant has already repudiated the contract. 
(2) The performance must be such that the remedy of restitution is not 
reasonably adequate [* * *]. (3) The performance must be one that is in some 
degree evidential of the existence of a contract and not readily explainable on 
any other ground."

See 
Butler v. McGee, 373 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1962) and Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687 
(1930). See also Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1976).

 [¶99.]  In analysis of briefing before the trial 
court and now here, it is not necessary to significantly disagree with much of 
what is related to recognize that a statute of frauds issue is properly 
presented which is to be weighed against a partial performance deterrence.1 The invitation by Safecare Health 
Service for the bidding supplier to expend significant funds for contract 
performance leads me to the conclusion that we have an issue of fact case. The 
trial fact finder should be required to determine by trial whether or not a deal 
was struck by the statements made and the urging to proceed which was provided 
by Safecare Health Service. The substance of my disagreement with the trial 
court is acceptance of a decision by summary judgment where a factual decision 
was made.

 [¶100.]            
At the very minimum, I conclude that this appeal should have been 
submitted to the litigants for re-briefing so that they would have had some 
opportunity to examine and discuss the issue we now 
decide.

 [¶101.]            
If issues of decision are not to be further developed or even briefed by 
the litigants before we render a decision, I would reverse and remand for 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

 1 In answer to 
suggestions that Safecare Health Service, as a bargaining party, never got to 
the minister for the wedding, I would expound the idea that under the 
circumstances, an advance non-commitment letter provided to Lavoie would have 
served admirably to give warning and preclude damage to Lavoie. This would have 
been true, although perhaps not providing the negotiative leverage with the 
existent supplier, a Casper laundry, which was arguably Safecare 
Health Service's negotiating factor in extending the original invitation to bid. 
A non-commitment communication with an invitation to bid simply states that 
written acceptance of a bid is required to create any obligation and that in 
advance of the acceptance, no occurrence of expenses for anticipated performance 
would be justified or recognized as a basis for obligation. This is the "when 
you can perform, we may negotiate" message. In the analogy originally started in 
this footnote, the subject can be addressed within the profundity of "Do not 
listen to my words, my intentions are only dishonorable."