Title: Tyma v. Montgomery County

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Tyma v. Montgomery County
No. 20, September Term, 2001
HEADNOTE:
PARTNER; DOMESTIC; HOME RULE; STATE CONSTITUTION;
ORDINANCE; MARRIAGE; MARITAL RELATIONSHIP; SPOUSE;
PUBLIC POLICY; SAME-SEX; COUNTY EMPLOYEE; EMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS; RECRUITMENT; RETENTION; HIGHLY QUALIFIED;
LOYALTY; 
DIVERSITY; 
HEALTH 
INSURANCE; 
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; 
PERSONNEL 
POLICIES; 
ELIGIBLE; 
STATEWIDE
CONCERN; LOCAL LAW; PREEMPT; AUTHORITY
A home rule municipality is authorized under the state constitution to adopt an
ordinance extending employment benefits to the domestic partners of its employees
because such an ordinance is a local law affecting only the municipality’s personnel
policies and not the state’s ability to regulate marriage on a statewide basis.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 20
September  Term, 2001
STEVE TYMA, et al..
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 
MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
    
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Filed:
1  All such references are to the Montgomery County Code, unless otherwise noted.
The question this case presents is whether Montgomery County, Maryland, (“the
appellee” or “the County”), exceeded its authority under, or otherwise contravened, State and
federal law by enacting an ordinance that extends employment benefits to the domestic
partners of county employees.  The trial court, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
concluded that the Montgomery County Council had authority under the Maryland
Constitution and laws to enact such benefits legislation and further, that the ordinance was
a local law that did not conflict with, and, therefore, was not preempted by, State or federal
law.  We agree.  Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
On November, 30 1999, the Montgomery County Council (the  “Council”) enacted
and the County Executive signed, Montgomery County Bill No. 29-99, the “Employee
Benefits Equity Act of 1999 (the “Act”).”  Generally, the Act, which became effective March
3, 2000 and applies to all active and retired County employees, extends benefits, such as
health, leave, and survivor benefits comparable to those afforded the spouses of County
employees, to the domestic partners of County employees.  In enacting  the ordinance, the
Council noted the County’s “longstanding policy, in law and practice, against employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation,” as well as its belief that “it is unfair to treat
employees differently based solely on whether the employee’s partner is legally recognized
as a spouse.” See § 33-22(a).1   In addition, the Council found that “many private and public
employers provide or plan to provide benefits for the domestic partners of their employees”
2  Section 19A-4(i) of the Montgomery County Code, as amended, provides:
“Immediate family means spouse and dependent children.   For a public
employee, immediate family also includes the employee’s domestic partner,
if the partner is receiving County benefits.”
3  Section 19A-4(n), as amended, provides:
“Relative means:
“(1) the public employee’s siblings, parents, grandparents,
children, grandchildren;
“(2) the public employee’s spouse, or domestic partner
receiving County benefits, and the spouse’s or partner’s
siblings, parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren; and 
the spouses of these relatives.”
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and that “[p]roviding domestic partner benefits will significantly enhance the County’s ability
to recruit and retain highly qualified employees and will promote employee loyalty and
workplace diversity.”  Id. 
The Act amended the definitions of “immediate family” and “relative” in Chapter
19A, Ethics, of the County Code, expanding them to include domestic partners, see id. at §§
19A-4(i)2 and (n),3 thus, extending to domestic partners “benefits equivalent to those
available for an employee’s spouse or spouse’s dependent,” including those benefits
available “under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”),
the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and other federal laws that apply to
County employment benefits.”  Id. at § 33-22(b).  To qualify as a domestic partner for
purposes of the Act,  the County employee and his or her partner must satisfy all of a number
of specific requirements or, in the event a domestic partnership registration system exists in
4  Section 33-22(c)(1) of the County Code provides: 
“(c) Requirements for domestic partnership.  To establish a domestic
partnership, the employee and the employee’s partner must ... 
“(1)  satisfy all of the following requirements:
“(A)  be the same sex;
“(B)  share a close personal relationship and be
responsible for each other’s welfare;
“(C)  have shared the same legal residence for at
least 12 months;
“(D)  be at least 18 years old;
“(E)  have voluntarily consented to the
relationship, without fraud or duress
“(F)  not be married to, or in a domestic
partnership with, any other person;
“(G)   not be related by blood or affinity in a way that
would disqualify them from marriage under State law
if the employee and partner were opposite sexes;
“(H)  be legally competent to contract; and
“(I)  share sufficient financial and legal
obligations to satisfy subsection (d)(2).”
Section (d) addresses the acceptable evidence of domestic partnership.   Pursuant to
subsection (d)(1), such evidence consists of either “an affidavit signed by both the
employee and the employee’s partner under penalty of perjury” or an official copy of the
domestic partner registration, and under subsection (d)(2), evidence that the employee and
partner share certain of several enumerated items, such as a joint lease, see §(d)(2)(A), or
checking account, see §(d)(2)(C), that may document a domestic partnership.
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the jurisdiction in which the employee resides and the County’s Director of Human
Resources determines that the legal requirements for registration are substantially similar,
legally register the domestic partnership.  See §33-22(c).4  A domestic partnership terminates,
§ 33-22(e) instructs, by the death of a partner or its dissolution, see subsection (e)(1), or the
occurrence of “any other change in circumstances that disqualifies the relationship as a
5  In this Court the appellants have not pursued their vagueness argument.   They
also have abandoned the argument made below that the Act conflicted with the State’s
sodomy statute.
6  The Circuit Court for Montgomery County broadly declared, “the Employee
Benefits Equity Act of 1999 is valid.”    We consider the propriety of this declaration only
in light of the issues that the appellants have raised and argued in this Court.
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domestic partnership,” see subsection  (e)(2), either of which the employee is required to
notify the County of within 30 days.
The appellants, employees and residents of Montgomery County, filed an action in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, in which they requested the court to enter  a
declaratory judgment that the Act is invalid and an order enjoining its implementation.   In
their complaint, the appellants alleged, as they would later argue, that the Act exceeded the
County’s  authority to enact local laws, conflicted with State law, was preempted by federal
law, and was unconstitutionally vague.5  The Circuit Court rejected all of these arguments.
Thus, it  granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, denied the appellants’ cross-
motion, and declared the Act constitutional.6  Dissatisfied with that result, the appellants
noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and  filed in this Court a Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, which we granted while the appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate
court.   As indicated, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding that, despite
the challenges presented by the appellants, the County’s action in passing the Act is
authorized under the constitution and laws of this State and that it conflicts with neither State
nor federal law.
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  II.
The trial court properly grants summary judgment, in accordance with Maryland Rule
2-501(e), “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”  Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 675-76, 766 A.2d 617, 624-25
(2001); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 144, 642 A.2d 219,
224 (1994); Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993).  This
Court, like any appellate court, reviews the grant of summary judgment to determine whether
the trial court was legally correct in entering the judgment.  Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md.
525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997); Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204,
680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996); Hartford Ins. Co., 335 Md. at 144, 642 A.2d at 224; Gross, 332
Md. at 255, 630 A.2d at 1160.    And, because an appellate court has ‘“the same information
from the record and decide[s ] the same issues of law as the trial court,’” its review of an
order granting summary judgment is de novo.  Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 502,
735 A.2d 1039, 1047 (1999) (quoting Heat & Power, 320 Md. 584, 591-92, 578 A.2d 1202,
1206 (1990)).
III  
Article XI-A of the State Constitution, known as the “Home Rule Amendment,”
enabled counties, like Montgomery County, which chose to adopt a home rule charter, to
achieve a significant degree of political self-determination.  See McCrory Corp. v. Fowler,
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319 Md. 12, 16, 570 A.2d 834, 835 (1990).   “Its purpose was to [] transfer the General
Assembly's power to enact many types of county public local laws to the Art. XI-A home rule
counties.”  Id. at 16, 570 A.2d at 836, citing generally,  Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot
County, 316 Md. 332, 344, 558 A.2d 724, 730 (1989);  Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381,
384, 470 A.2d 345, 347 (1984);  Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 342, 435
A.2d 425 (1981);  Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 597-598, 415 A.2d 255, 256
(1980).   We explained the rationale in State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 422, 137 A. 39, 41
(1927):
“The wisdom of incorporating in the organic law of the state such provisions
as are contained in this article had been urged for a number of years prior to
its adoption, the reasons assigned by its proponents being that a larger measure
of home rule be secured to the people of the respective political subdivisions
of the state in matters of purely local concern, in order that there should be the
fullest measure of local self-government, and that these local questions should
thus be withdrawn from consideration by the General Assembly, leaving that
body more time to consider and pass upon general legislation, and to prevent
the passage of such legislation from being influenced by what is popularly
known as 'log-rolling';  that is, by influencing the attitude and vote of members
of the General Assembly upon proposed general laws by threatening the defeat
or promising the support of local legislation in which a particular member
might be peculiarly interested.”
Sections 1 and 1A of Article XI-A empower Baltimore City and the counties in
Maryland to adopt a charter form of local government.  Section 2 requires the General
Assembly  to provide a grant of express powers for charter home rule counties.  Section 3
empowers any county adopting a charter form of government, “[f]rom and after the adoption
of a charter,” to enact local laws  upon all matters covered by the express powers the General
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assembly was authorized to grant, “except that in the case of any conflict between said local
law and any General Public Law now or hereafter enacted the General Public Law shall
control.” 
 
Md. Ann. Code, Art. 25A (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), the “Express Powers
Act,” was the legislative response, given by  Ch. 456 of the Laws of Maryland of 1918, to the
directive contained in § 2 of Article XI-A.    Section 5(S) of the Express Powers Act further
limits a home rule county’s ability to legislate.    It provides, in relevant part:
“The foregoing or other enumeration of powers shall not be held to limit the
power of the county council ... to pass all ordinances, resolutions or bylaws,
not inconsistent with the provisions of this article or the laws of the State, as
may be proper in executing and enforcing any of the powers enumerated in this
section or elsewhere in this article, as well as such ordinances as may be
deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and
welfare of the county.
“Provided, that the powers herein granted shall only be exercised to the extent
that the same are not provided for by Public General Law; provided, however,
that no power to legislate shall be given with reference to licensing, regulating,
prohibiting or submitting to local option, the manufacture or sale of malt or
spirituous liquors.”
This Court commented on the effect of these various provisions in Montgomery Citizens
League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 160, 252 A.2d 242, 246 (1969), in which we considered
whether the legislative powers delegated to the Montgomery County Council included the
power to pass a fair housing law.  Id. at 155, 252 A.2d at 243.  We said:
“The Council, having been given ‘full’ legislative power as specified by Art.
XI-A, is also given statutory power to pass ‘all’ ordinances it deems expedient
under the police power and the only limit on its powers is stated to be that such
an ordinance cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of  Art. 25A or the
7  In Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 680, 192 A.
531, 537 (1937), addressing whether an act requiring the use of voting machines in
Baltimore City was a local law for Baltimore City and, therefore, could not be passed by
the Legislature, we commented on the difficulty of defining the difference  between a
public local law and a public general law, offering the following:
“[I]t may be said that a 'public local law' is a statute dealing with some
matter of governmental administration peculiarly local in character in which
persons outside of that locality have no direct interest, a 'public general law'
is one which deals with a subject in which all the citizens of the state are
interested alike, and the fact that it permits or directs differences in matters
of mere administrative detail suited to the peculiar needs of localities does
not make it any the less a public general law.”   
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laws of the State, and the further provisos ‘that the powers herein granted shall
only be exercised to the extent that the same are not provided for by public
general law’ and that ‘no power to legislate shall be given with reference to
licensing, regulating, prohibiting or submitting to local option, the manufacture
or sale of malt or spirituous liquors.’”
Therefore, counties enjoy full legislative power as specified by Art. XI-A and statutory
power to pass all ordinances they deem expedient under the police power, limited only by the
provisions of Art. 25A, the laws of the State, and the admonishment that such power “shall
only be exercised to the extent that the same are not provided for by public general law.” 
We concluded that the county could enact a fair housing law.
“The classification of a particular statute as general or local is based on subject matter
and substance and not merely on form.”7   Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 433, 240
A.2d 272, 277 (1968), citing Ness v. Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City, 162 Md.
529, 536, 160 A. 8, 11 (1932) and State v. Stewart, supra, 152 Md. at 425, 137 A. at42.  
A general law is one that pertains to two or more geographical subdivisions within the State,
8  Article XI-A, § 4 provides:
“[a]ny law so drawn as to apply to two or more of the geographical
subdivisions of this State shall not be deemed a Local Law, within the
meaning of this Act.”    
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see Maryland Constitution, § 4 of Article XI-A,8 and “deals with the general public welfare,
a subject which is of significant interest not just to any one county, but rather to more than
one geographical subdivision, or even to the entire state.”  Cole v. Secretary of State, 249
Md. at 435, 240 A.2d at 278.   A local law, on the other hand,  applies to only one
subdivision, see Steimel v. Bd. of Election Supervisors of Prince George’s County, 278 Md.
1, 5, 357 A.2d 386, 388 (1976), and pertains only to a subject of local import.  Norris v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 192 A. 531, 537 (1937).  
 This Court has recognized that even a law that is local in form or the operation of
which is, by it terms, confined to a single county, may be a general law, nonetheless.    That
is the case when such law affects the interests of the whole state.  See McCrory, supra, 319
Md. at 17, 570 A.2d at 836; Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. at 434, 240 A.2d at 278
(“some statutes, local in form,” are “general laws, since they affect the interests of the whole
state”); Gaither v. Jackson, 147 Md. 655, 664-65, 128 A. 769, 772-73 (1925) ( “a law is not
necessarily a local law merely because its operation is confined ... to a single county, if it
affects the interests of the whole state”).  Thus, whether a law is general or local is “to be
determined by the application of settled legal principles to the facts of particular cases in
which the distinction may be involved.”  Dash v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 260, 183 A. 534,
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537-38 (1936).
IV
The appellants start with the premise that “Maryland law expressly prohibits
recognition of same-sex and common law ‘marriages,’ a fortiori, it expressly prohibits the
granting of the rights of same-sex, common law marriage to same-sex partners of
Montgomery County employees disguised as a domestic partners benefits ordinance.”    In
support of that premise, they rely on Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt
Homes, 300 Md. 75, 83-84, 475 A.2d 1192, 1197 (1984) (quoting Prince George's County
v. Greenbelt Homes, 49 Md.App. 314, 319-20, 431 A.2d 745, 748 (1981)), in which this
Court observed:
“Only marriage as prescribed by law can change the marital status of an
individual to a new legal entity of husband and wife.  The law of M aryland
does not recognize common law marriages (Henderson v. Henderson, 199 Md.
449, 454, 87 A.2d 403 (1952)) or other unions of two or more persons--such
as concubinage, syneisaktism, relationships of homosexuals or lesbians--as
legally bestowing upon two people a legally cognizable marital status.  Such
relationships are simply illegitimate unions unrecognized, or in some instances
condemned, by the law.”
Thus, the appellants  assert that the County exceeded its authority under the constitution and
laws of Maryland by extending employment benefits to the domestic partners of its
employees because Maryland does not recognize either same-sex or common law marriages.
 They argue that “[t]he County’s actions are an unlawful, back-door attempt to circumvent
State law which disallows same-sex unions” and “an attempt to legitimize illegitimate
relationships under Maryland law by attempting to create, in the guise of a benefits
9  As evidence of the County’s intention to create a same-sex equivalent to
marriage,  the appellants point to the fact that the requirements for domestic partnership
generally parallel those for marriage.  See § 33-22 ( c), supra, n. 1.
10  The appellants cite, for example, sections of the Internal Revenue Code,
pertaining to COBRA, that define “qualified beneficiaries” as the plan participant’s
spouse and dependent children.  See generally I.R.C.  § 152 (1986).
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ordinance, a legal equivalency between lawful spouses and same-sex domestic partners.”9
They further assert that the recognition of domestic partnerships, an ultra vires act, “affects
the interests of the whole State as well as interests outside of the state” and, in addition,
requires the expenditure of state funds.  They conclude that the provision of such benefits to
domestic partners is inconsistent with federal benefits laws that do not include domestic
partners among the enumerated  “qualified beneficiaries.” 10
Contrary to the appellants’ position, the County maintains that “the Act does not
create a marital relationship between domestic partners;” rather, “it merely extends to
domestic partners many of the employment benefits currently available to County employees’
spouses.”  Relying upon the Home Rule Amendment and the general welfare clause, and
citing the opinions of this Court  in Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md.
at 161, 252 A.2d at 247, and Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, 295 Md. 429, 438, 456 A.2d
380, 385 (1983), the County argues that it clearly is authorized to extend employment
benefits “where those benefits serve a valid public purpose,” in this case, “recruiting and
retaining qualified employees and promoting employee loyalty.”   Citing decisions from other
jurisdictions reviewing similar laws and rejecting the argument that such laws implicate the
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State’s interest in marriage, see, e.g., Slattery v. New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605
(App.Div. 1999), appeal dismissed, 727 N.E.2d 1253, 734 N.E.2d 1208 (N. Y. 2000) (“there
are enormous differences between marriage and domestic partnership, and, in light of those
very substantial differences, the DPL cannot reasonably be construed as impinging upon the
State's exclusive right to regulate the institution of marriage”); Crawford v. Chicago, 710
N.E.2d 91, 98-99 (Ill. App. Ct.), petition to appeal denied, 720 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. 1999)
(“Nothing in the DPO purports to create a marital status or marriage as those terms are
commonly defined. Rather, the DPO addresses only health benefits extended to City
employees and those residing with them”); Schaefer v. City and County of Denver, 973 P.2d
717, 719 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied (April 12,1999) (“The ordinance qualifies a
separate and distinct group of people who are not eligible to contract a state-sanctioned
marriage to receive health and dental insurance benefits from the City. Therefore, the
ordinance does not adversely impact the integrity and importance of the institution of
marriage”); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d 1199, 1206 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2000),
review denied, 789 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2001) (“The Act does not create a legal relationship that,
because of the interest of the state, gives rise to rights and obligations that survive the
termination of the relationship. Unlike a traditional marriage, a domestic partnership is purely
contractual, based on the mutual agreement of the parties”), it argues that because it “does
not interfere with State interests,” the Act is a local law.   The out of State cases have upheld
these similar laws on the basis that the applicable constitutional provisions, as is the case
here, delegate broad law-making authority to local governments.  See, e.g., Crawford v.
Chicago, 710 N.E.2d at 96;  Schaefer v. City and County of Denver, 973 P.2d at 720.    Only
when “the enabling statute expressly limits a local government’s ability to grant employment
benefits to ‘its employees and dependents,’” the County asserts, “have courts in some
11  Article 25A, § 5 (S) specifically prohibits counties from legislating with
reference to licensing, regulating, prohibiting or submitting to local option, the
manufacture or sale of malt or spirituous liquors.
 
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jurisdictions invalidated similar laws.”  See, e.g., Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706
(Va. 2000); Lilly v. Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. App. 1995). 
The County also asserts that it is authorized to fund the Act with State monies, which
the State generally provides for any valid public purpose.  It further argues that federal
benefits laws do not preempt the Act because “these laws represent federal minimum
standards that the County is free to exceed at its choosing.”      
 IV
We agree with the Circuit Court that the County had the authority, and clearly so,  to
enact the subject benefits legislation and that the Act is a local law that does not infringe
upon the Legislature’s ability to regulate marriage on a statewide basis.  As we have seen,
Article 25A, § 5(S) of the Maryland Code, which implements Article XI-A of the Maryland
constitution, authorizes counties, notwithstanding any enumeration of powers in that article,
to enact “such ordinances as may be expedient in maintaining the peace, good government,
health and welfare of the county” that “are not provided for by public general law.”11
We discussed § 5(S) at length in Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, supra.   In that
case, the issue presented was whether Anne Arundel County was empowered to enact a
program to pay the costs incurred by county employees in mounting a successful defense to
criminal charges arising from the performance of their duties.  295 Md. at 431, 456 A.2d at
381.   We held that § 5(S) provided the authorization.   Describing § 5(S) as a “general
welfare” clause that had been broadly construed to permit charter counties to legislate beyond
the powers expressly enumerated in the Express Powers Act, id. at 432, 456 A.2d at 382, we
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explained: 
"Gratification would not be afforded the purposes of home rule or the reasons
which prompted it if the language of § 5 (S) of Art. 25A were not to be
construed as a broad grant of power to legislate on matters not specifically
enumerated in Art. 25A and the language of that section clearly indicates that
such a construction is sound. ...
....  [N]ot only does it empower legislative action designed to carry out,
exercise and implement enumerated powers, it goes further to add that power
is given 'as well' to ordain for the maintenance of peace, good government,
health and welfare of the County."
Id. at 432-33, 456 A.2d at 382 (quoting Greenhalgh, supra, 253 Md. at 160-61, 252 A.2d at
246).  We concluded that the program was an extension of employment benefits, which  was
well within the scope of the authority given by § 5 (S), reasoning that the public benefitted
from the challenged ordinance because its provisions “better enable[d] the County to recruit
and retain qualified .. . employees, and to maintain morale.”  Id. at 438, 456 A.2d at 385.  
The Act at issue in this case does not, and does not purport to, define, redefine or
regulate marriage in Maryland.   Indeed, the Act itself includes the purpose for which the
County enacted it, setting out the County’s specific findings that “many private and public
employers provide or plan to provide benefits for the domestic partners of their employees”
and that “[p]roviding domestic partner benefits 
will significantly enhance the County’s ability
to recruit and retain highly qualified employees and will promote employee loyalty and
workplace diversity.”  Although not expressly enumerated, Home Rule counties in Maryland,
by necessary implication from the powers that the General Assembly enumerated as well as
12  Our determination that Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, supra,  is controlling
disposes of the appellants’ argument that the Act is somehow invalidated because “the
costs for these benefits will be borne by County and State taxpayers.”   In Annapolis v.
Anne Arundel County, 347 Md. 1, 698 A.2d 523  (1997), we rejected the argument made
by the City of Annapolis “that most charter counties do not have general taxing authority
to include general appropriation authority,” id. at 11, 698 A.2d at 528, and pointed out
that any county, charter counties included, is authorized to appropriate money for its
governmental purposes, i.e., any purpose within the authority of the county to perform. 
Id. at 12, 698 A.2d at 528.    As the Snowden court explained, “So long as the legislation
has a substantial relation to the public welfare and can fairly be said to serve a public
purpose, it is not the courts’ function to strike it down, merely because we fear it may lead
to unwise or unfortunate results.”  Id. at 434, 456 A.2d at 383 (quoting Frostburg v.
Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 16, 136 A.2d 852, 855 (1957).
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§ 5 (S)'s catchall provision, must have the power to regulate local employment and, as to that,
its employees.  
 We hold the purpose underlying the benefits legislation here at issue to be consistent
with that which the Snowden court found sufficient to uphold the ordinance challenged in
that case.   Moreover, the reasoning of that decision applies with equal, if not greater, force
to the case sub judice.12  We see no reason why, if reimbursing the private legal expenses of
certain county employees charged with a criminal offense qualifies as a valid public purpose,
extending to the domestic partners of county employees benefits comparable to those
afforded to the spouses of county employees, does not also qualify. Thus, we agree with the
County and amici’s argument, and the Circuit Court’s conclusion,  that the Act is well within
the scope of the authority delegated to the County under § 5(S).
The determination that the County has the authority to pass the subject Act under §
5 (S) also disposes of the appellants’ argument that the Act is general, or non-local,
legislation.   Such benefits legislation, moreover, does not infringe upon the State’s interest
13  The converse also is true:  whatever the form of the legislation, where the
subject matter is "exclusively local” to the county, it is a local law.  See  Park v. Board of
Liquor License Comm'rs for Baltimore City, 338 Md. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 687, 693
(1995); State v. Stewart, supra, 152 Md. at 425, 137 A. at 42.
 
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in marriage.  This Court has invalidated ordinances passed by Home Rule counties only when
they have intruded on some well defined State interest.13   See McCrory v. Fowler, supra, 319
Md. at 20, 570 A.2d at 938.   In McCrory, Montgomery County enacted an ordinance
providing a private cause of action for violations of the county’s employment discrimination
ordinance.  Noting that “[i]n Maryland, the creation of new causes of action in the courts has
traditionally been done either by the General Assembly or by this Court under its authority
to modify the common law of this State” and that “the creation of new judicial remedies has
traditionally been done on a statewide basis,” id., citing Adler v. American Standard Corp.,
291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), this Court struck the ordinance down as a non-local law.
See Dash v. Jackson, supra, (state statute concerning the licensing of paper hangers in
Baltimore City was not a “local law” within the meaning of Article XI-A ); Gaither v.
Jackson, supra, (state statute providing for gubernatorial appointment of auctioneers in
Baltimore City, with payment by the auctioneers of license fees and duties to the State, was
not a “local law” under Article XI-A); Bradshaw v. Lankford, 73 Md. 428, 431-33, 21 A. 66,
66-67  (1891) (because it would deprive people of the entire state of the common right to
take oysters within the waters of that county, prohibition of oyster dredging in Somerset
County is not a “local law”). 
To be sure, in the Act, the requirements for domestic partnership generally parallel
those for marriage.  See § 33-22( c), supra, n. 1.   On the other hand, the Act does not create
“a legal equivalency between lawful spouses and same-sex domestic partners” or otherwise
impinge upon the State’s interest in marriage.   It simply provides that “[a]ny benefit the
County provides for the spouse ... of a County employee or the spouse’s dependent must be
14  The statutory laws of Minnesota and Massachusetts, for example, specifically
enumerate the persons to be included within the term,  “dependent.”   In Minnesota,
statute defines “dependents” to mean “spouse and minor unmarried children under the age
of 18 years and dependent students under the age of 25 years actually dependent upon the
employee,” thus excluding domestic partners.  Lilly v. Minneapolis, 587 N. W. 2d 107,
110-111 (Minn. App. 1995).   In Massachusetts,  “dependents” are “defined as spouses,
children under nineteen years of age, and children over nineteen years who are unable to
provide for themselves.” Connors v. Boston, 714 N. E. 2d 335, 338 (Mass. 1999).   On
that basis, the Minnesota intermediate appellate court and the Supreme Judicial Court of
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provided, in the same manner and to the same extent, for the domestic partner of a County
employee and the partner’s dependents, respectively.”  See § 33-22(b).  And that essentially
is all that it does.  Nothing in the Act purports to, or can be construed to, create an alternate
form of marriage, authorize common law marriage or create any legal relationship. Nor does
the Act, by its terms or implication, restrict, modify or alter any rights incident to a marriage
recognized in this State or give one domestic partner rights, beyond the employment benefits
enumerated, against the other.    And, as the State of Maryland, as amicus curiae, points out:
“The partners gain no rights in property and income of the other that are
earned during the marriage and have no legally protected share in each other’s
estates.   Termination of the relationship requires no legal process or judicial
intervention, and can be done unilaterally by the filing of a notice with the
county.”
 As a matter of fact, therefore and in sum, the Act affects only the personnel policies
of Montgomery County and does not implicate the State’s interest in marriage or affect the
State’s ability to regulate marriage on a statewide basis.   Moreover, the only employer the
ordinance impacts is  the County; it has no effect outside the County and, therefore, no
statewide interests are affected.  The ordinance simply has no resemblance to other
enactments that we have held were not local laws.
This conclusion is consistent with the results reached by our sister courts that have
addressed the issue.    Indeed, all of the courts that have considered domestic partnership
laws, including those that have struck down such laws,14 see Connors v. Boston, 714 N.E.
Massachusetts struck down an ordinance and an executive order, respectively.   To like
effect, Virginia law expressly limits a local government’s authority to grant employment
benefits to “employees and dependents.”   Arlington County v. White, 528 S. E. 2d 706,
712 (Va. 2000).   The Supreme Court of Virginia struck down Arlington County’s
domestic partnership law, holding its definition of “dependent” to be unreasonable
because it was not limited to a spouse, child, or financially dependent partner.  Id. at 712-
15.
15  The Appellate Division modified the judgment of the Supreme Court “only to
formally declare, since a declaration was sought, that the DPL [wa]s valid to the extent
challenged.”  Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N. Y. S. 2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 1999).
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2d 335 (Mass. 1999); Lilly  v. Minneapolis, supra,  Arlington  County v. White, supra, have
refused to hold that the mere enactment of such laws creates  “a legal equivalency between
lawful spouses and same-sex domestic partners.” See, e.g.,  Schaefer v. City and County of
Denver, supra, 73 P.2d at 720 (“the ordinance does not adversely impact the integrity and
importance of the institution of marriage”); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d 1199, 1206
(Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“We disagree with Lowe’s contention that the Act has created a
‘new marriage-like relationship’”); Crawford v. Chicago, supra, 710 N.E.2d at 96, 98 (the
DPO “does not address the panoply of statutory rights and obligations exclusive to the
traditional marriage,” “is purely contractual, based on the mutual agreement of the parties,”
and does not “purport[] to create a marital status or marriage as those terms are commonly
defined, and addresses only health benefits extended to City employees and those residing
with them”); Connors, 714 N. E. 2d at 338 n.11 (“Contrary to the plaintiffs’ claims, we see
nothing in the executive order that creates the ‘equivalent’ of common-law marriage for
registered domestic partners, that conflicts with any criminal law of the Commonwealth, or
that otherwise seeks to define the marital status between two individuals in contravention of
any Massachusetts statute or the Massachusetts Constitution”); Slattery v. City of New York,
686 N. Y. S. 2d 683, 688 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1999), appeal
dismissed, 727 N. E.2d 1253 ( N.Y. 2000)15 (“as compared to marital relationships, domestic
16  A local law authorized pursuant to the Express Powers Act, nevertheless, may
be preempted by conflict,  express preemption,  or implied preemption.   See  Montrose
Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 579 n.5, 770 A.2d 111, 119 n. 5 (2001);
Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 487-88, 620 A.2d 880, 883 (1993):   None of
these apply to the case sub judice.   No Maryland statute expressly preempts the ordinance
at issue.    And, because, as we have seen, the ordinance does not impact the marriage
laws, only local employment, no Maryland statute conflicts with it or impliedly preempts
it.  
17  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 amended both
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161 to 1168 and
the Public Health Services Act to provide temporary continuation of health insurance
coverage .
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partnerships are marked by their lack of formalization, lack of legal protections, and by the
significantly fewer rights that are extended to the domestic partners”); see also Heinsma v.
City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709, 713 (Wash. 2001) (concluding from the facts that the City’s
giving domestic partners of its employees  insurance benefits  does not entitle them to receive
any  legal benefits the State extends to married couples and that the City's recognition of
domestic partnership is limited to its employee benefits program,  that the City's recognition
of domestic partnership is limited in scope and does not affect the Legislature's ability to
regulate familial relationships on a statewide basis); City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d
193, 195-96 (Ga. 1997).16   
 Finally, as they do with regard to the marriage laws and public policy arguments, the
appellants contend that “[t]he Act provides for the ‘equivalent of’ Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act benefits,17 federal Family and Medical Leave Act benefits, as well
as ‘other federal laws that apply to County employment benefits,” specifically, the Public
Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300bb-1 to -8, and that because these “equivalents” are
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neither federally funded nor the result of the amendment of the federal programs, the Act “is
an ultra vivres legislative enactment to State funded benefits plans and implicates use of State
monies without State legislative warrant.”  We agree with the County and the Circuit Court
that these laws represent minimum standards, which the County is permitted, and in this case
elected, to exceed.  See Kinek v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 22 F.3d 503, 510 (2nd Cir.
1994). Similarly, the regulations implementing the FMLA state, “an employer must observe
any employment benefit program or plan that provides greater family or medical leave rights
to employees than the rights established by the FMLA.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.700 (a).    
A similar position has been taken by other courts that have considered the issue; they
have overwhelmingly  concluded that local domestic partnership legislation is not preempted
by federal law.  See, e.g., Lowe, supra, 766 So.2d at 1207-08; Slattery, supra, 697 N.Y.S.2d
at 604-05; Schaefer, supra, 973 P.2d at 720-21; Morgan, supra, 492 S.E.2d at 195-196.   
Thus, to the extent that its power to do so is challenged, we hold that a home rule
county that provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees does not exceed its
local lawmaking authority or otherwise undermine State and federal law.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED, WITH
COSTS.