Title: Commonwealth v. Harris

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13046 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RONNIE M. HARRIS. 
 
 
April 29, 2021. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Execution of sentence, Stay of 
proceedings. 
 
 
 
The defendant, Ronnie M. Harris, was convicted of murder in 
the second degree and other offenses in 1975, and we affirmed 
the convictions after plenary review under the version of G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, then in effect.  Commonwealth v. Harris, 376 
Mass. 201 (1978) (Harris I).  In 2019, the defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial, which was denied.  His appeal from that 
ruling is pending in the Appeals Court.1  The defendant also 
filed, in the Superior Court, a motion to stay execution of his 
sentence pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 31, as appearing in 454 
Mass. 1501 (2009), arguing that his age and medical condition 
placed him at a heightened risk of illness and death from COVID-
19.2  After that motion was denied, the defendant filed a similar 
motion in the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b), as 
appearing in 481 Mass. 1608 (2019), seeking a stay of his 
 
 
1 Although he received plenary review of his conviction of 
murder in the second degree, the defendant was not obligated to 
seek leave to appeal pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Greene v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 
1008, 1009 (1982). 
 
 
2 It appears that, due to delays in the Superior Court 
clerk's office, the defendant was not aware that his motion for 
a new trial had been denied when he filed his motion for a stay.  
At the time, the defendant was not seeking to be released 
pending any appeal, but to be released until the end of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
2 
 
sentence pending appeal from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial.  A single justice of the Appeals Court denied the motion, 
and a panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the denial in an 
unpublished memorandum and order.  Commonwealth v. Harris, 98 
Mass. App. Ct. 1110 (2020) (Harris II).  We granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review and 
requested supplemental memoranda concerning the parties' 
positions as to the panel's decision and the question whether 
and in what circumstances a judge or a single justice has 
authority to grant a stay of execution of a sentence pending 
appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial, as opposed 
to a direct appeal from a conviction.  After considering those 
memoranda along with the papers filed in the single justice and 
panel sessions of the Appeals Court, we affirm.3 
 
 
Before us is the defendant's appeal from the decision of 
the single justice of the Appeals Court denying his motion for a 
stay.  We review that decision for error of law or abuse of 
discretion.  Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 394, 412 (2020).  
Here, the single justice of the Appeals Court both determined 
that the motion judge did not err or abuse her discretion by 
denying a stay and independently denied a stay after considering 
the matter under the factors articulated in Christie v. 
Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397 (2020), and Commonwealth v. Hodge 
(No. 1), 380 Mass. 851 (1980).  See Nash, supra at 410-411 
(appellate single justice may take either approach or both 
approaches).  We, however, "do[] not exercise [our] own 
independent discretion to evaluate the request for a stay; 
rather, [we] review[] the correctness of the single justice's 
ruling."  Id. at 412. 
 
 
In Nash, 486 Mass. at 402-412, we recently clarified the 
legal standards governing motions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
31 and Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) to stay execution of sentences 
pending appeals from criminal convictions, particularly during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  A judge considering such a motion must 
consider three factors:  "(1) the defendant's likelihood of 
success on appeal, (2) certain security factors [e.g., the risk 
of flight and the danger to any other person or to the 
community], and (3) certain risks associated with the pandemic."  
Id. at 403.  We particularly emphasized, as to the first factor, 
that "the defendant must show that there is at least one 
appellate issue of sufficient heft that would give an appellate 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus letter filed by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the New England Innocence Project. 
3 
 
court pause -- in other words, one or more issues that require a 
legitimate evaluation, that would engender a dialectical 
discussion among an appellate panel where both sides find some 
substantive support, and that would, if successful, lead to a 
favorable outcome for the defendant."  Id. at 404.  As to the 
COVID-19 factor, we clarified our decision in Christie, 484 
Mass. at 400-401, in which we first directed judges to consider 
the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic when deciding a motion 
for a stay of execution pending appeal.  We stated that "[i]t is 
not incumbent on a defendant seeking a stay to prove that COVID-
19 is present, let alone rampant, at the facility where he or 
she is incarcerated, or that the defendant is at an especially 
high personal risk because of his or her age or medical 
condition."  Nash, supra at 406-407.  It is not appropriate to 
use the COVID-19 factor against the defendant:  for example, the 
fact "that an individual defendant is not known to be at a 
particularly high risk from the dangers of COVID-19 should not 
be taken as a reason to deny a stay."  Id. at 409.  The COVID-19 
factor should be applied so as to fulfill "[o]ur objective in 
Christie[, which] was to reduce temporarily the prison and jail 
populations, in a safe and responsible manner, through the 
judicious use of stays of execution of sentences pending 
appeal."  Id. at 406. 
 
 
This case, however, stands on a significantly different 
procedural footing from Nash.  The defendant is not seeking a 
stay of his sentence pending appeal from his conviction; his 
conviction was affirmed over forty years ago.  Rather, he is 
seeking a stay pending appeal from the denial of his motion for 
a new trial.  The Rules of Criminal Procedure do not mention a 
stay of execution of sentence in this procedural posture.  
Indeed, even where a motion for a new trial is allowed, Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (c) (8) (A), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), 
provides that "the defendant shall not be discharged from 
custody pending final decision on the appeal," although the 
defendant may be admitted to bail in the judge's discretion.  
See Commonwealth v. Watkins (No. 2), 486 Mass. 1021, 1022 n.2 
(2021).  It is a closer question whether Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) 
authorizes a single justice of an appellate court to stay 
execution of a sentence pending a collateral appeal.  We have 
indicated that "[t]hose who are pursuing appellate proceedings 
or a motion for a new trial may seek a stay of execution of 
sentence pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 6."  Committee for Pub. 
Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 
Mass. 431, 435-436 (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 
Mass. 63, 83 (2013).  However, the language in rule 6 addressing 
stays presupposes that the defendant is taking a direct appeal 
4 
 
from a criminal conviction, not an appeal from a ruling on a 
postconviction motion.  See Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (5), (6) (stay 
automatically expires and trial court clerk to be notified upon 
release of decision "affirming the conviction").  Moreover, we 
have already recognized that the court rules themselves do not 
authorize a judge to grant a stay pending a ruling on a motion 
for a new trial; rather, a judge has inherent authority to grant 
such a stay only in exceptional circumstances.  See Charles, 
supra at 74.  Similarly, on appeal from a ruling on a motion for 
a new trial, we think it prudent to authorize a stay only where 
exceptional circumstances are present -- particularly where, as 
here, the defendant's trial, conviction, and direct appeal all 
took place many years ago -- regardless of whether the motion 
for a stay is presented to a trial court judge or a single 
justice of an appellate court. 
 
 
There has been no finding of exceptional circumstances in 
this case.  Harris suggests in his supplemental memorandum that 
the COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional circumstance.  
However, we do not agree that the COVID-19 pandemic itself 
presents an exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of a 
judge's inherent power to grant a stay where a defendant files a 
motion for a new trial and appeals from the denial thereof.  A 
comparison with the Charles case is instructive.  In Charles, 
466 Mass. at 74, we ruled that exceptional circumstances were 
present due to "the allegations of serious and far-reaching 
misconduct by [Annie] Dookhan at the [William A. Hinton State 
Laboratory Institute]" that "may have compromised thousands of 
cases."  Dookhan's misconduct "raise[d] significant questions 
regarding the veracity of the drug analysis, which purportedly 
served as the basis for [the defendant's] guilty pleas, and may 
be dispositive of his motion for a new trial."  Id.  We 
concluded that "the interest of justice [was] not served by the 
continued imprisonment of a defendant who may be entitled to a 
new trial," and so the judge had the inherent authority to allow 
a stay pending decision on the defendant's motion.  Id. at 74-
75. 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is different in both kind and scope.  
As serious and extraordinary as it is, it is unimaginable that 
the pandemic itself casts any doubt on the justice of any 
conviction that predates it.  Moreover, Dookhan's misconduct 
affected only a subset of criminal cases, namely, drug cases 
during her tenure at the Hinton drug laboratory -- a large 
subset, but a definable class nonetheless.  A ruling that the 
pandemic alone presents an exceptional circumstance would invite 
every prisoner in the Commonwealth, regardless of the nature of 
5 
 
his or her conviction or the amount of time that has passed 
since then, to file a motion for a new trial and, if it is 
denied, seek a stay of execution of sentence (that is, immediate 
release from confinement) pending appeal from that decision.  
Although the pandemic, when combined with other factors, might 
present an exceptional circumstance in a particular defendant's 
case, it is incumbent on the defendant to make that showing.  We 
reiterate that the pandemic alone does not constitute an 
exceptional circumstance.  Moreover, neither the Superior Court 
judge nor the single justice of the Appeals Court found that an 
exceptional circumstance existed in this case.  For that reason 
alone, there was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial 
of a stay pending appeal from the denial of Harris's motion for 
a new trial. 
 
 
The order of the single justice of the Appeals Court 
denying Harris's motion for a stay of execution of sentence is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Inna Landsman for the defendant. 
 
Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Anthony D. Mirenda, Christopher E. Hart, & Christopher 
Modlish for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others.