Title: Reed v. BD. OF TRUSTEES FOR AL. STATE UNIV.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

778 So. 2d 791 (2000)
Joe L. REED et al.
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR ALABAMA STATE UNVERSITY et al.
1981227.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 26, 2000.
Rehearing Denied August 18, 2000.
*792 J. Cecil Gardner and Kimberly J. Calametti of Gardner, Middlebrooks, Fleming & Gibbons, Mobile; James A. Anderson of Beers, Anderson, Jackson, Nelson, Hughes & Patty, Montgomery; George L. Beck of Beck & Byrne, P.C., Montgomery; and Robert D. Segall of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, Montgomery, for appellants.
Kenneth L. Thomas and Wendell J. Chambliss of Thomas, Means, Gillis, Devlin, Robinson & Seay, P.C., Montgomery, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Dr. Joe L. Reed, Patsy B. Parker, and Toreatha L. Johnson appeal from a judgment removing Parker and Johnson from the Board of Trustees for Alabama State University ("the Board"). We affirm the judgment insofar as it relates to Johnson, but we reverse it insofar as it relates to Parker, and we remand the cause. It appears that the claims originally made against Dr. Reed are moot; therefore, we grant the motion to dismiss the appeal insofar as it relates to him.
This is an appeal from a judgment in a quo warranto action commenced on February 8, 1999, by the Board and the State of Alabama against Parker, Johnson, and others, challenging the right of Parker and Johnson to serve on the Board. The Board based its challenge on Ala.Code 1975, § 16-50-20(a), which provides:
(Emphasis added.) The Board relies specifically on that provision prohibiting an "employee ... of any public postsecondary education institution" from serving on the Board.
Parker and Johnson concede that they have had "working relationships" with postsecondary institutions coincident with their membership on the Board. In particular, Parker has served on the Board continuously since September 1, 1981. From March 23, 1987, to December 2, 1998, she had a "working relationship" with Southern Union State Community College ("Southern Union"), a "postsecondary education institution." Thus, she no longer has a "working relationship" with Southern Union. Johnson has served on the Board continuously since 1993. From September 26, 1996, until now, she has also worked with Alabama Southern Community College ("Alabama Southern"), a "postsecondary education institution," as a "project quest specialist."
This action was tried without a jury. At trial, Parker and Johnson argued that they have never been "employees" of their respective postsecondary institutions within the meaning of § 16-50-20(a). The trial court disagreed, and found that Parker and Johnson each had served as an "employee" of a postsecondary institution, within the meaning of § 16-50-20(a), during her tenure on the Board. Apparently reasoning that this service disqualified them from any further service on the Board, it ordered them removed. Parker and Johnson appealed. Because the Board's case against Parker and Johnson turns on dissimilar circumstances, we shall address the case against each of those members in separate sections of this opinion.[1]
Preliminarily, there is a question regarding the correct standard of review. Parker argues that the judgment must be reviewed de novo. The Board contends that the ore tenus rule applies. In Parker's case, however, we need notand do notchoose between the two standards, for we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in removing Parker from the Board.[2]
In entering its judgment against Parker, the trial court appears to have adopted one particular argument constructed by the Board. The Board states that argument as follows:
Brief of Appellee, at 27-28 (emphasis added). On the basis of this reasoning, the Board regards as entirely irrelevant the fact that Parker has not had an association with Southern Union since December 2, 1998. In other words, it regards the fact that she is now eligible to serve on the Board as of no consequence.
We reject this argument. Parker was qualified to serve on the Board when she began to serve and she is qualified now. In fact, her relationship with Southern Union had terminated two months before this action was commenced.
But, according to the Board, neither the passage of time nor the change of circumstances has affected Parker's ineligibility. On its face, the Board's argument is that Parker, having sometime served on the Board in violation of § 16-50-20(a), may never again serve on the Board. Otherwise stated, Parker will never be able to purge herself of the ineligibility. Indeed, the Board has neither proposed, nor suggested, any remedial scenario.
This is an unreasonable position and one that is not supported by the language of the statute. The Board is correct in noting that the statute does not say how ineligibility may be cured. That silence, however, does not support the Board's position, for the statute also does not say that ineligibility is incurable. But the statute does offer us a significant clue as to the intent of the Legislature in this matter.
The Board's argument may be, although it is not expressly so stated: (1) that Parker was employed by Southern Union in 1996, the date of her last appointment to the Board; (2) that she was ineligible for appointment in 1996 because of her employment, and, therefore, (3) that her ineligibility will follow her until, and unless, she is reappointed at a time when she is not employed by a postsecondary education institution. If this is the Board's argument, the statute offers the following clue.
Section 16-50-20(a) specifically states that employees of postsecondary education institutions are not "eligible to serve on the board." (Emphasis added.) It does not say that such persons are per se ineligible for appointment. In other words, the disability of which the Board complains does not attach to the appointment, but merely follows the Board member's service.
It will not be presumed that the Legislature has employed "meaningless words." Elder v. State, 162 Ala. 41, 45, 50 So. 370, 371 (1909). Instead, "we presume that the Legislature knows the meaning of the words it uses in enacting legislation." Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d 405, 407 (Ala. 1993). Had the Legislature intended the result urged by the Board, it might, for example, have said: "No ... employee or student of any public postsecondary education institution ... shall be appointed to the board." It did not do so, and this Court is not at liberty to rewrite the statute.
In short, the Board has cited no authority for the position it urges, and we know of none. Such a disability may be cured through the severance of the disability-creating employment.[3] Consequently, we conclude that Parker's ineligibility to serve on the Board ceased on December 2, 1998, with the termination of her relationship with Southern Union. The trial court erred in removing her from the Board. As it relates to Parker, therefore, the judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded.
Unlike the Board's case against Parker, its case against Johnson compels us to determine the proper standard of review. "The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the principle that when the trial court hears oral testimony it has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of witnesses." Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala.1986). The rule applies to "disputed issues of fact," whether the dispute is based entirely upon oral testimony or upon a combination of oral testimony and documentary evidence. Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala.1995). The ore tenus standard of review, succinctly stated, is as follows:
Raidt v. Crane, 342 So. 2d 358, 360 (Ala. 1977).
Johnson insists that this Court must review the judgment de novo, because, she contends, the evidence was undisputed. We disagree with that contention. The ultimate factual issue, namely, whether Johnson was an "employee" of Alabama Southern, was in dispute.
"Proof of a master and servant relationship is tested by the degree of control the alleged [employer] retains over the alleged [employee]." Gossett v. Twin County Cable T.V., Inc., 594 So. 2d 635, 639 (Ala.1992). "Where the alleged master retains merely the right to inspect the work as it progresses, in order to ascertain if it is completed according to plans or specifications, and the right to stop work improperly done, the master and servant relationship is not created." 594 So. 2d  at 639 (emphasis added). "How the parties characterize the relationship is of no consequence; it is the facts of the relationship that control." Martin v. Goodies Distrib., 695 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Ala.1997) (emphasis added). The burden of proving the existence of an employment relationship rests on the party asserting the relationship. Danford v. Arnold, 582 So. 2d 545, 547 (Ala.1991); Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Jones, 456 So. 2d 1, 10 (Ala. 1984); Johnson v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 291 Ala. 389, 281 So. 2d 636 (1973).
Moreover, "[t]his Court has, for many years, followed the rule stated in Birmingham Post Company v. Sturgeon, 227 Ala. 162, 149 So. 74 (1933)." Burbic Contracting Co. v. Willis, 386 So. 2d 419, 421 (Ala. 1980). In Sturgeon, this Court stated:
227 Ala. at 165, 149 So.  at 76 (emphasis added).
In this connection, the Board presented a document purporting to be the agreement under which Johnson was employed. It was styled:
The letter stated in pertinent part:
(Emphasis in original except where noted.) This letter was signed by Johnson and was dated September 26, 1996. The Board contends that the "president of Alabama Southern reserved the right of control over Johnson," which, it argues, is "unambiguously expressed in the Letter of Appointment." Brief of Appellees, at 20.
The record also contains copies of Johnson's "W-2 Wage and Tax Statement" forms for 1997-98. According to these forms, she was paid $12,578.75 in 1997 and $13,200.39 in 1998.
Regarding the services Johnson performed for Alabama Southern, she testified as follows:
(Reporter's Transcript, at 74-76.)
Johnson further testified that she does not "report to" Alabama Southern or work on the campus, but, instead, goes "directly" from home "to high schools [to] perform a service there." Also, she testified:
(Reporter's Transcript, at 79-82.)
In short, the record is replete with oral testimony, including the testimony of Donald Kelly, director of information services for the Department of Postsecondary Education, as well as documentary evidence, on this disputed issue. The weight to be accorded such testimony was a matter for the trial court. Thus, that court's factual conclusions are subject to the presumptions attendant upon the ore tenus standard of review. Under this evidence, we hold that the trial court's conclusion that Johnson was an employee of Alabama Southern was not "clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence." Raidt v. Crane, 342 So. 2d 358, 360 (Ala. 1977).
Johnson insists that, even if the trial court correctly held her to be ineligible to occupy her position on the Board, it erred in removing her forthwith. This is so, because, she contends, she should be able to cure her disability by voluntarily terminating her employment within a reasonable time. For the following reasons, we disagree with that contention.
Superficially, Johnson's contention seems consistent with our holding in Part I of this opinion. However, the Board's case against Johnson differs from that against Parker in one important respect, namely, that Johnson still had a "working relationship" with a postsecondary education institution when the judgment in this case was entered. The dispositive question thus becomes whether the fact that Johnson was still employed by Alabama Southern at the time the trial court entered its judgment necessitates a result different from the one reached in Parker's case. We conclude that it does.
This was a quo warranto action, and, consequently, it is subject to the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-6-590 to -604. In particular, it was subject to § 6-6-600, which provides in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
Section § 6-6-600 is clear on its face and its application unavoidable: if, at the *798 time a defendant in a quo warranto action is "adjudged guilty of ... unlawfully holding... any office," she is, in fact, ineligible to hold such office, "judgment must be entered," thus vacating the office. The imposition of exclusion attaches at the time the judgment is entered. In other words, such a defendant may not cure her disability by terminatingpostjudgmenther disability-causing employment. Specifically, because Johnson was employed by Alabama Southern at the time she was adjudicated to be ineligible, she cannot now cure her disability by terminating her employment.[4] The trial court properly removed Johnson from the Board. As it relates to Johnson, therefore, the judgment is affirmed.
The motion to dismiss the appeal as to Dr. Reed is granted. As to Johnson, the judgment is affirmed; as to Parker, the judgment is reversed; and the cause is remanded. The Board's objection to the sufficiency of the supersedeas bond filed in this case is overruled.
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS TO DR. JOE L. REED GRANTED; OBJECTION TO BOND OVERRULED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; AND CAUSE REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, COOK, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result in part.
SEE, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
I concur in the result as to Part I, which reverses the judgment as to Parker and remands the cause. I concur in Part II, which affirms that portion of the trial court's judgment removing Johnson from the Board. I concur in the ruling on the motion to dismiss as to Dr. Joe Reed and in the ruling on the Board's objection to the supersedeas bond.
[1]  The claims against Parker and Johnson are the only claims to be addressed by this appeal.
[2]  Questions of law are not subject to the ore tenus standard of review. Walker v. Walker, 695 So. 2d 58, 59 (Ala.Civ.App.1997); Plus Int'l, Inc. v. Pace, 689 So. 2d 160, 161 (Ala. Civ.App.1996); see also First Mercury Syndicate, Inc. v. Franklin County, 623 So. 2d 1075, 1076 (Ala.1993); DeWitt v. Stevens, 598 So. 2d 849, 850 (Ala.1992).
[3]  This statement is subject to a caveat, which is addressed in Part II of this opinion.
[4]  Our holding in this part of the opinion is the caveat to which we referred in note 3. Unlike Johnson, Parker had terminated her employment relationship with the postsecondary education institution before the entry of the judgment in this case; hence the different result as to Parker.