Title: Janusz v. Gilliam

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Margaret Virginia Janusz v. Francis Peter Gilliam, No. 95, September Term, 2007 
HEADNOTE: CONTRACT LAW - A mutual mistake of law is not grounds for
rescinding an otherwise valid contract.  Where there is a valid modification of a contract
that fully addresses a subject matter, a party to the contract cannot claim unjust
enrichment.  The waiver provision contained in the contract did not extinguish the parties
ability to modify and enforce the terms of the contract.
 
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Civil No. 268655
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 95
September Term, 2007 
____________________________________
MARGARET VIRGINIA JANUSZ
v.
FRANCIS PETER GILLIAM
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Raker
        
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
   JJ.
____________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
____________________________________
Filed:   May 9, 2008
*Raker, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she
also participated in the decision and adoption of
1The survivor’s annuity is payable to a beneficiary upon the death of the retiree.  
this opinion.
This case involves the interpretation of a Voluntary Separation and Property
Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into between Margaret Virginia Janusz and
Francis Peter Gilliam.  In their Agreement, which was incorporated, but not merged, into the
judgment of divorce, the parties agreed that Mr. Gilliam would maintain in effect his
survivor’s annuity1 with the federal Civil Service Retirement System, for the benefit of Ms.
Janusz.  Unfortunately, upon the grant of their divorce, Ms. Janusz became ineligible,
pursuant to federal law, 5 C.F.R. § 838.802 (b) (2008), to receive the benefits of the
survivor’s annuity.
Upon discovering that she was ineligible to receive the benefits from the survivor’s
annuity, Ms. Janusz filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, requesting that
the court rescind the Agreement, or alternatively find that Mr. Gilliam had been unjustly
enriched.  The trial court found no basis for either rescinding the contract, or finding that Mr.
Gilliam had been unjustly enriched.  Ms. Janusz appealed to the Court of Special Appeals
and, before the intermediate appellate court decided the appeal, we granted certiorari.  Janusz
v. Gilliam, 402 Md. 352, 936 A.2d 850 (2007).
We are asked to decide whether a mutual mistake of law by the parties to a contract,
the assumed future entitlement, post-divorce, of Ms. Janusz to Mr. Gilliam’s survivor’s
annuity benefits, is grounds for rescinding their contract, or in the alternative, whether Mr.
Gilliam has been unjustly enriched.  Although we hold that a mutual mistake of law is no
2Md. Rule 8-604 (d) (1) provides as follows:
(d) Remand. (1) Generally.  If the Court concludes that the substantial merits of a case will
not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment, or that justice will be
served by permitting further proceedings, the Court may remand the case to a lower court.
In the order remanding a case, the appellate court shall state the purpose for the remand.  The
order of remand and the opinion upon which the order is based are conclusive as to the points
decided.  Upon remand, the lower court shall conduct any further proceedings necessary to
determine the action in accordance with the opinion and order of the appellate court. 
3Appellant is also a cross-appellee, and appellee is also a cross-appellant.  For
simplicity, we will refer to each only as appellant and appellee respectively.
-2-
basis for rescission or a claim of unjust enrichment, we shall neither affirm nor reverse the
trial court’s judgment and remand the matter, pursuant to Md. Rule 8-604 (d) (1)2, for the
limited purpose of determining whether a Court Order Acceptable for Processing (“COAP”),
executed by the parties’ attorneys, is a valid modification of the original Agreement.  If so,
the COAP explicitly states what actions the parties must take in the event that Ms. Janusz is
ineligible to receive benefits under the survivor’s annuity.  Finally, because the trial court,
in its ruling, did not address Mr. Gilliam’s allegations that his attorney did not have the
authority to bind him by signing the COAP, the court should address that allegation as well.
If the trial court determines that the COAP is not part of the parties’ Agreement, ultimately,
the court must determine whether Mr. Gilliam has been unjustly enriched, because Ms.
Janusz did not, as the trial court determined, waive her right to a claim for unjust enrichment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Margaret Virginia Janusz, appellant,3 and Francis Peter Gilliam, appellee, were
married on August 5, 1996.  The parties entered into a Voluntary Separation and Property
-3-
Settlement Agreement on February 14, 2000.  On March 1, 2000, the court entered a
Judgment of Absolute Divorce, and the Agreement was incorporated, but not merged, into
the Judgment.  The Agreement provided, in relevant part:
3. Rehabilitative Alimony.  The Plaintiff [appellee] agrees to
pay the Defendant [appellant] rehabilitative alimony in the
amount of $1,000.00 for thirty-six (36) months effective March
1, 2000.  These payments shall be mailed to the Defendant
[appellant] at an address or location to be provided by the
Defendant [appellant] and this address or location shall not be
changed more than once a year.  Additionally, Plaintiff
[appellee] agrees to continue funding and maintain in effect his
survivor’s annuity through the [federal] Civil Service
Retirement System at a cost to him of approximately $4,320.00
per year, with monthly benefits available to the Defendant
[appellant] after his death, in the amount of $1,500.00 plus cost
of living increases.  If the Plaintiff [appellee] should die before
the end of the thirty-six (36) month period of rehabilitative
alimony, such said alimony will cease and survivor’s annuity
will be effective.  This agreement as to alimony is non-
4The survivor’s annuity is not alimony.  We have consistently held as follows:
“[P]ayments to a wife, even if referred to in a separation
argeement or in a decree as ‘alimony’ will not be considered to
be alimony unless they are payments to continue during the joint
lives of both husband and wife and so long as the parties live
separate and apart.”
 
Bebermeyer v. Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72, 76-77, 215 A.2d 463, 466 (1965).  We have defined
“technical alimony,” or alimony in a legal sense, as “a periodic allowance for spousal
support, payable under a judicial decree, which terminates upon the death of either spouse
or upon the remarriage of the spouse receiving the payments or upon the reconciliation and
cohabitation of the parties.”  Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 410, 620 A.2d 305, 314-15
(1993); see also Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 186, 129 A.2d 917, 919 (1957) (noting
that alimony “is not a portion of his real estate, to be assigned to her in fee simple but a
provision for her support, to continue during their joint lives, or so long as they live
separate.”) (emphasis added).  Merely including the survivor’s annuity in the paragraph
labeled “Rehabilitative Alimony” is insufficient to characterize the annuity as alimony.  See
Bebermeyer, 241 Md. at 76-77, 215 A.2d at 466.  The survivor’s annuity does not begin to
pay benefits until appellee’s death, and as such, it does not qualify as alimony, which
terminates at the death of either spouse.  See Horsey, 329 Md. at 410, 620 A.2d at 314-15.
Therefore, the survivor’s annuity in this case, as a matter of law, is not alimony, and is thus
unaffected by the non-modifiable alimony clause of the Agreement.
-4-
modifiable.[4]
*  *  *
5. General Mutual Waiver of Claims.  The parties hereby
specifically agree that their intention is to conclude by this
Agreement all claims and disputes between them; accordingly,
apart from the agreements and promises specifically set forth in
5A COAP is similar to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”).  For further
(continued...)
-5-
this Agreement, the parties hereby mutually and irrevocably
waive and abandon all manner of claim against each other and
their estates, regardless of the legal, factual, or equitable basis
for any such possible claim; and the parties further specifically
agree that this mutual waiver and abandonment of claims against
each other and their estates shall be binding upon their heirs,
assignees, and successors in interest of any sort whatsoever.
*  *  *
12. Modification of Agreement.  The parties hereby agree that
there shall be no modifications of this Agreement except in
writing and executed with the same formality of this Agreement.
No other oral representations or agreements, or oral or written
agreements not specifically incorporated by reference in this
Agreement, whether made before or after the execution of this
Agreement, shall be of any force and effect.
A COAP,5 incident to the couple’s divorce, was executed on April 13, 2000, by both
5(...continued)
discussion of the COAP, see Section II of the Discussion.
6Appellee did not sign the COAP and claims he did not authorize his attorney to sign
the COAP.
-6-
parties’ attorneys in the divorce proceeding,6 and signed also by Domestic Relations Master
Ann Sundt, and then Circuit Court Judge Patrick Woodward.  The COAP provided in
relevant part:
4. The defendant [appellant] is entitled to a survivor annuity
based on the plaintiff’s [appellee’s] monthly retirement benefits.
The amount of her survivor annuity has been elected by the
plaintiff [appellee] and, at the time of divorce, has an
approximate value of $1,500.00 per month.  It is the intention of
the parties to maintain the plaintiff’s [appellee’s] election.
*  *  *
7. If any provision of this Order designated for implementation
by the Office of Personnel Management is found by that agency
to be unacceptable for processing, the parties shall renegotiate
their Agreement, if necessary, and draft a revised Order which
will accord with both their intent and the agency’s requirements
7In its decision, OPM noted that, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 838.802 (b) (2008), in the case
of a retiree who retired before May 7, 1985, “a court order awarding a former spouse
survivor annuity under CSRS is not a court order acceptable for processing unless the retiree
(continued...)
-7-
insofar as that is possible.  The parties shall request the Court to
enter a Modified Order acceptable for Processing, substituting
their renegotiated provisions in the Order nunc pro tunc.
8. If it is not possible to draft a Court Order Acceptable for
Processing which both accords with the parties’ original intent
and meets the agency’s requirements, the parties shall adjust
their Separation Agreement to assure that each party benefits in
a manner equivalent to the provisions originally negotiated.
9. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the above provisions
with respect to such modifications of this Order as are necessary
under the above paragraphs to assure that the Order is
Acceptable for Processing in accordance with applicable law. 
Several years after the divorce became final, the federal Office of Personnel
Management (“OPM”) informed appellant that she was not eligible for appellee’s survivor
benefits pursuant to federal law.7 
7(...continued)
was receiving a reduced annuity to provide a survivor annuity to benefit that spouse on May
7, 1985.”  Because appellee’s annuity was not reduced to provide appellant a survivor
annuity on or before May 7, 1985, appellant, it appears, is not entitled to benefits.
Appellant appealed this administrative decision to the federal Merit Systems
Protection Board, and Chief Administrative Judge William L. Boulden affirmed OPM’s
decision.
-8-
On January 25, 2006, appellant filed, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
a complaint which contained three claims: Count I - Rescission, Count II - Unjust
Enrichment, and Count III - Attorney’s Fees.  On November 1, 2006, appellee filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, arguing that he had complied with the contract, and that there was
no basis, in law or equity, for appellant’s claim.  On December 14, 2006, appellant filed an
opposition to appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  The trial court denied appellee’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on January 8, 2007.
After a trial, in April 2007, the Circuit Court determined that the mistake regarding
appellant’s eligibility for the survivor’s annuity was a mistake of law, rather than a mistake
of fact, as appellant had argued.  In its ruling, the trial court noted that a mistake of law could
not be the basis for rescinding the contract.  Regarding the unjust enrichment, quasi-contract
claim, the court determined that, although appellee may have been unjustly enriched,
appellant had waived her right to this equitable claim in paragraph five of the Agreement.
That paragraph states, in relevant part: “the parties hereby mutually and irrevocably waive
and abandon all manner of claim against each other and their estates, regardless of the legal,
factual, or equitable basis for any such possible claim.”  Finally, the trial court denied
8In her brief, appellant presents the following question for review:
Did 
the 
Trial 
Court 
err 
in 
failing 
to 
restore
Plaintiff’s/Appellant’s consideration to her after finding that the
Parties’ contract had failed due to a mutual mistake leading to
an impossibility of performance by Defendant/Appellee even
though the COAP required Plaintiff/Appellant to receive
“benefits equivalent”?
Appellee cross-appeals and presents the following question:
Did the trial court err in finding that Defendant/Appellee had
been unjustly enriched by Plaintiff/Apellant’s ineligibility to
receive benefits from his government pension?
-9-
appellant’s request for attorney’s fees.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.8  Before any
proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, we granted certiorari.  Janusz v. Gilliam, 402
Md. 352, 936 A.2d 850 (2007).
DISCUSSION
This case requires us to interpret a property settlement agreement which was
incorporated, but not merged, into a Judgment of Absolute Divorce.  Such agreements are
subject to the general rules of contract interpretation.  See PaineWebber, Inc. v. East, 363
Md. 408, 413-14, 768 A.2d 1029, 1032 (2001).  Without deciding the question, we have
previously noted that “other courts have characterized the [survivor’s benefits plan] as a
separate and distinct [marital] property interest.”  Matthews v. Matthews, 336 Md. 241, 253,
647 A.2d 812, 818 (1994) (citing cases from Illinois, Washington, and California).  The
Court of Special Appeals has said that “the right to a survivor annuity is incident to the
-10-
marital relationship, and that such a right, analogous to the right to the pension benefits
themselves, falls within the definition of marital property.”  
Potts v. Potts, 142 Md. App. 448,
463, 790 A.2d 703, 712 (2002) (quoting Pleasant v. Pleasant, 97 Md.App. 711, 725, 632
A.2d 202, 209 (1993)).  We agree that the survivor’s annuity in this case was marital property
and subject to division under the Agreement entered into between appellant and appellee.
 In her complaint, appellant presented two separate bases for relief: rescission of the
contract, and unjust enrichment, a quasi-contract theory.  Although appellant did not
specifically ask the court, in her complaint, to enforce the COAP, because she prayed for
“such other relief as the Court deems equitable and fair” and because she argued the point
at trial and raised it in her answer to appellee’s motion for summary judgment, we address
the point here.  We will also address the trial court’s finding that appellant waived her claim
to a cause of action for unjust enrichment. 
I. Rescission
We begin our discussion of rescission by noting that “[n]o party has a right to rescind
or modify a contract merely because he [or she] finds, in the light of changed conditions, that
he [or she] has made a bad deal.”  Harford County v. Town of Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 384, 704
A.2d 421, 431 (1998) (quoting McKeever v. Washington Heights Realty Corp., 183 Md. 216,
220, 37 A.2d 305, 308 (1944)).  Furthermore, “it is not within the power of either party to
9The trial court noted in its ruling that “[n]either the plaintiff nor defendant was aware
of the prohibition in the law, which would prevent an earlier named wife from receiving
those benefits once the parties were divorced.”
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rescind [a valid contract] without an option to do so or without the consent of the other party,
in the absence of fraud, duress or undue influence, or unless the equities are such that he [or
she] should not be permitted to enforce it.”  McKeever, 183 Md. at 219-20, 37 A.2d at 308.
Because the trial court did not find that there was any fraud, duress or undue influence, the
court determined that rescission of the contract was inappropriate, as a matter of law.
Notwithstanding that, we shall remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the
COAP effectively modified the Agreement.
Appellant argues that the Agreement should be rescinded because the parties made
a mutual mistake.  Equity will reform a contract where there has been a mutual mistake of
fact in the formation of the contract.  Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting
Co., Inc., 303 Md. 44, 58, 492 A.2d 281, 288 (1985).  In this case, however, the mutual
mistake was one of law.  “A mistake of law is where a person knows the facts of a case but
is ignorant of the legal consequences.”  State v. American Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 150 S.W.2d
1048, 1065 (Tenn. 1941).  Both parties, in the case at bar, mistakenly believed9 that appellant
could receive survivor benefits under the federal Civil Service Retirement System, even after
their divorce.  Without reaching the question, this Court has opined that it is not clear that
a mutual mistake of law “would be grounds for relief in Maryland.”  Ferrero Constr. Co. v.
Dennis Rourke Corp., 311 Md. 560, 578 n.8, 536 A.2d 1137, 1145 n.8 (1988); see also
-12-
Hoffman v. Chapman, 182 Md. 208, 213, 34 A.2d 438, 441 (1943) (noting that “[t]he general
rule is accepted in Maryland that a mistake of law in the making of an agreement is not a
ground for reformation”).  
The rule that a mistake of law is not grounds for rescission is founded on the principle
that ignorance of the law is no excuse.  American Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 150 S.W.2d at 1065.
See also Burggraff v. Baum, 720 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Me. 1998) (holding that a mistake of law
is not a basis to rescind a contract).  In Burggraff, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine noted
that “[t]he rationale behind this rule is that the parties are presumed to know the law, or at
least [are] capable of verifying it, whereas they cannot be expected to be acquainted with all
factual matters, regardless of their diligence.”  Burggraff, 720 A.2d at 1169.  We agree with
this rationale.  In addition, since both parties were represented by counsel in the negotiation
of the Agreement, they were on an equal footing to know or learn what relevant law applied
to their interests and the courts will not relieve them of their failure to do so.  As such we
hold that the mutual mistake of law made by the parties is not, as a matter of law, grounds
for rescission.
II. Unjust Enrichment
In Maryland, a claim of unjust enrichment, which is a quasi-contract claim, “may not
be brought where the subject matter of the claim is covered by an express contract between
the parties.”  County Comm’rs of Caroline County v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358
-13-
Md. 83, 96, 747 A.2d 600, 607 (2000) (quoting FLF, Inc. v. World Publications, Inc., 999
F.Supp. 640, 642 (D. Md. 1998)).  Although we rarely depart from this long-standing rule,
we have recognized exceptions, “when there is evidence of fraud or bad faith, there has been
a breach of contract or a mutual rescission of the contract, when rescission is warranted, or
when the express contract does not fully address a subject matter.”  Dashiell, 358 Md. at 100,
747 A.2d at 608-09 (footnotes omitted). 
The trial court ruled that this last exception, where the express contract does not fully
address the subject matter, applied.  The court noted that “this rehabilitative paragraph
number three, when it talks about the survivor annuity, doesn’t really fully address what’s
going to happen if [appellant is ineligible for the survivor’s annuity].”  Because the court’s
determination that the contract does not fully address the survivor’s annuity was a legal
conclusion, we review that determination de novo.  Griffin v. Bierman, 403 Md. 186, 195,
941 A.2d 475, 480 (2008).  
Paragraph 12 of the Agreement states in relevant part: “[t]he parties hereby agree that
there shall be no modifications of this Agreement except in writing and executed with the
same formality of this Agreement.”  It is arguable whether the COAP constituted a
modification of the Agreement.  The trial court did not make any determination, in its ruling,
as to whether the COAP qualified as a modification to the original Agreement.  The COAP
provides, in relevant part:
If any provision of this Order designated for implementation by
-14-
the Office of Personnel Management is found by that agency to
be unacceptable for processing, the parties shall renegotiate their
Agreement, if necessary, and draft a revised Order which will
accord with both their intent and the agency’s requirements
insofar as that is possible.
The COAP provides for the very situation that arose in this case, specifically, what is
required of the parties if the Office of Personnel Management should find that the order is
“unacceptable for processing,” a term of art that encompasses what the OPM decided here.
In that case, according to the provisions of the COAP, the parties are to renegotiate.  If, on
remand, the trial court determines that the COAP is an effective modification of the
Agreement, then as a matter law, the contract provides for the possibility that OPM may deny
appellant’s claim.  Because the contract, if it is found by the trial court to have been modified
by the COAP, fully addresses the issue of the survivor’s annuity, as a matter of law, then,
appellant cannot recover under the theory of unjust enrichment.  If, however, the trial court
determines that the COAP is not an effective modification, the court shall determine whether
appellant is entitled to appropriate relief on her unjust enrichment claim.
Clearly, a COAP is analogous to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”).
A QDRO is an order that has great significance in state domestic relations practice.
Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 35, 566 A.2d 767, 771 (1989).  A QDRO is required to
10Where, as here, an agreement is incorporated, but not merged, into a judgment, “the
agreement survives as a separate and independent contractual arrangement between the
parties.”  Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 56, 465 A.2d 436, 440 (1983).  As such, after
the entry of the final judgment, the Agreement remained as an independent contract that the
parties were free to modify, pursuant to the terms of their contractual arrangement.
-15-
transfer pension benefits from one beneficiary to another, either pursuant to the Marital
Property Disposition Act, or through an attachment in aid of a support obligation.  Id. at 35-
36, 566 A.2d at 771.  A QDRO can be “either collateral to a judgment as an avenue for
enforcement or it can be an integral part of the judgment itself.”  Potts, 142 Md. App. at 459,
790 A.2d at 710 (citing Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 42-43, 566 A.2d at 774).  In Marquis v.
Marquis, 175 Md. App. 734, 757, 931 A.2d 1164, 1177 (2007), the Court of Special Appeals
addressed an appellant’s argument that a Constituted Pension Order (“CPO”), the functional
equivalent of a QDRO for military retirement pay, modified the judgment of absolute
divorce.  Because the intermediate appellate court did not agree that the CPO modified the
judgment, the court did not reach the question of whether such an order can effectively
modify an earlier judgment.  Id.  In the present case, the COAP may be construed to be a
modification to the Agreement. 10  If the trial court determines that the COAP is an effective
modification of the Agreement pursuant to the requirements for modification set forth in the
original Agreement, the COAP constitutes an integral part of the judgment itself, and not
merely an avenue for enforcement.
Appellee contends that the COAP is ineffective because he did not authorize his
attorney to sign the COAP on his behalf.  In Maryland, “there is a prima facie presumption
-16-
that an attorney has authority to bind his [or her] client by his actions relating to the conduct
of litigation.”  Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 570-71 n.30, 766 A.2d 98, 118 n.30
(2001).  In this case, the trial court did not rule on whether appellee’s attorney had the
authority to bind his client by signing the COAP.  If, on remand, the court determines that
the COAP, if validly executed, is an effective amendment to the Agreement, it will then need
to decide whether appellee’s attorney had the authority to bind appellee.
III. Waiver
In its ruling, the trial court determined that appellant waived her right to all claims
against her former husband, “no matter the equitable basis.”  The trial court based this
determination on the following waiver language, contained in the Agreement: “the parties
hereby mutually and irrevocably waive and abandon all manner of claim against each other
and their estates, regardless of the legal, factual, or equitable basis for any such possible
claim.”  This analysis does not take into consideration both the surrounding language, and
the context in which that waiver was made.
When we interpret a contract, we examine the contract as a whole, in order to
determine the intention of the parties.  Moscarillo v. Professional Risk Management Services,
Inc., 398 Md. 529, 540, 921 A.2d 245, 251 (2007).  We also examine “the character of the
contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of the
execution.”  Id. (quoting Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 346 Md. 217, 224-25, 695 A.2d
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566, 569 (1997)).  The trial court disregarded the language immediately preceding the quoted
language, which qualifies the waiver.  Immediately preceding the language the trial court
referred to are the words “apart from the agreements and promises specifically set forth in
this Agreement.”  Because we examine the contract as a whole, we hold that, as a matter of
law, the waiver is qualified by language excluding claims relating to the Agreement.
Additionally, we look at the contract’s purpose.  Moscarillo, 398 Md. at 540, 921
A.2d at 251.  In this case, the purpose of the Agreement was to delineate each party’s
responsibilities with respect to the disposition of marital property.  The trial court’s
interpretation of the waiver language leads to the unreasonable result that the contract waives
the right to enforce the very agreement that it creates.  Taking into consideration the contract
as a whole, and its purpose, we do not believe the parties intended the waiver provision to
waive appellant’s right to modify and enforce the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
We hold that a mutual mistake of law is not grounds for rescission of an otherwise
valid contract, nor is it the basis for a claim of unjust enrichment.  Furthermore, appellant’s
claim of unjust enrichment cannot succeed if the Agreement fully addresses the subject
matter.  Therefore, on remand, the trial court should determine whether the COAP was a
valid modification to the Agreement, in which case the Agreement would fully address the
situation at hand.  Finally, we hold that, as a matter of law, the appellant did not waive her
right to modify or to enforce the Agreement.
-18-
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
C O U N T Y  
I S  
N E I T H E R
AFFIRMED NOR REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT 
FO R  
F U R T H ER
PROCEEDINGS AS LIMITED
B Y  
T H I S  
O P I N I O N .
APPELLEE 
TO 
PAY 
THE
COSTS.