Title: Burton v. Benner

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CT-549 
Bryce A. Burton, 
Appellant, 
–v– 
Martin Benner and Indiana State Police, 
Appellees. 
Argued: November 26, 2019 | Decided: March 3, 2020 
Appeal from the Benton Circuit Court 
No. 04C01-1612-CT-176 
The Honorable Hunter J. Reece, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 19A-CT-135 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 03 2020, 9:22 am
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David, Justice. 
Certain negligent acts or omissions on the part of a government 
employee have the potential to remove the shield of respondeat superior 
and expose the employee to personal liability. Under the Indiana Tort 
Claims Act, there are only a handful of well-delineated pathways to 
accomplish this task. One of those paths is to show that the employee’s act 
or omission was “clearly outside the scope of the employee’s 
employment.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c)(2).  
Here, Bryce Burton attempted to sue Indiana State Trooper Martin 
Benner in his personal capacity after the two were involved in an accident 
in rural Benton County. At the time of the accident, Trooper Benner was 
off duty but was operating his state issued police commission as allowed 
under State Police policy. Arguing he was acting within the scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident, Benner sought summary 
judgment on whether he could be held personally liable for any damages 
that flowed from the incident. The trial court awarded summary judgment 
in favor of Benner because though off duty, Benner was otherwise in 
substantial compliance with State Police policy in operating his 
commission and was therefore not clearly outside the scope of his 
employment. The Court of Appeals reversed, opining that reasonable 
minds could disagree whether the trooper was outside the scope of his 
employment and summary judgment was thus inappropriate. 
We granted transfer and now find that, although there is some evidence 
that Trooper Benner was not in strict compliance with State Police policy 
at the time of the accident, this was not enough to place him “clearly 
outside” the scope of his employment. Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
As of 2015, Indiana State Trooper Martin Benner had been employed by 
the Indiana State Police for eighteen years. As part of his employment, the 
State Police issued Benner an unmarked 2012 Dodge Charger—commonly 
referred to as the trooper’s “commission.” Troopers that operate State 
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Police commissions are subject to a Standard Operating Procedure that 
establishes guidelines for the operation of the vehicle when the officer is 
on- or off-duty and during both emergency and non-emergency driving 
situations. Under the policy, employees that operate a commission are 
required, among other things, to maintain radio contact at all times (even 
while off-duty), to not violate any traffic law unless necessary in 
performance of official duties, and to respond to emergency situations if 
they are “assigned or made aware of a nearby situation.” (Appellant’s 
App. Vol. 2 at 37-39.) The policy also authorizes employees to exercise de 
minimis use of their commission for limited and reasonable personal 
transportation.  
On June 4, 2015, Trooper Benner completed his road patrol duties for 
the day, went home to take a shower, and re-entered his commission to 
drive to his son’s baseball game. Now in street clothes, Benner was 
traveling southbound on Meridian Road south of State Road 352 in Benton 
County when he decided to pass the vehicle in front of him after 
northbound traffic cleared. As he departed the southbound lane, he 
noticed a motorcycle in the northbound lane approaching him from 
approximately 139 yards away. Benner quickly slowed his vehicle and 
moved back into his own lane, but not before the oncoming motorcycle 
locked its brakes, swerved from side to side, rolled over, and ejected both 
the operator—Plaintiff Bryce Burton—and Burton’s passenger.  
Burton filed suit against Benner alleging the trooper was negligent in 
operating his vehicle and seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in 
the accident. Benner moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was 
acting within the scope of employment while driving his commission and 
was thus immune from personal liability under Indiana Code chapter 34-
13-3 (Tort Claims Against Governmental Entities and Public Employees). 
Benner also alleged that Burton was contributorily negligent so as to bar 
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recovery under the common law.1 The trial court granted partial summary 
judgment on the first issue in Trooper Benner’s favor, finding that he was 
not “clearly outside” the scope of his employment when the incident 
occurred.2 After the Indiana State Police was added as a defendant, Benner 
sought and obtained dismissal of the suit against him in his personal 
capacity. Burton appealed. 
In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed. Burton v. 
Benner, 127 N.E.3d 1198, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). While the “salient facts 
[were] undisputed,” the Court of Appeals found “the inferences that can 
be made from and conclusions that can be based on those facts are 
anything but.” Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded summary 
judgment in favor of Trooper Benner was inappropriate because 
reasonable factfinders could disagree on whether Benner was acting 
outside the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Id. 
The State sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the 
Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review 
When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.” Murray v. Indianapolis 
Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Campbell 
Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Company v. Johnson, 109 N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 
2018)). We ask, “whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
 
1 See Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Indiana Dep’t of Natural Resources, 756 N.E.2d 970, 977 (Ind. 
2001) (Shepard, C.J., concurring and delivering the Court’s opinion in Part III) (explaining 
claims brought against government entities under the Indiana Tort Claims Act are subject to 
the common law theory of contributory negligence which bars a plaintiff’s recovery if the 
plaintiff was even slightly negligent).  
2 The trial court denied summary judgment on Benner’s contributory negligence theory. 
Accordingly, Burton sought—and was granted—leave to amend his complaint to add the 
Indiana State Police as a defendant. 
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Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016) 
(citation omitted). The party moving for summary judgment bears the 
burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no issue of material 
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The burden 
then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine 
issue. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or 
inferences to be drawn therefrom … in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence “shows 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). 
Discussion and Decision 
Because Trooper Benner raised an affirmative defense that he was 
immune from personal liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act 
(“ITCA”), the issue in this case is whether Benner was acting “clearly 
outside” the scope of his employment at the time of the accident such that 
he could be held personally liable for the injuries sustained by Burton. The 
State urges us to affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment 
in favor of Benner on this issue, while Burton argues there is a genuine 
issue of material fact that should be decided by a jury. 
 The ITCA “governs lawsuits against political subdivisions and their 
employees.” Bushong v. Williams, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003); Ind. 
Code § 34-13-3-1 et seq. The statute sets forth certain parameters to 
determine liability for negligent acts or omissions on the part of 
government employees and “provides substantial immunity for conduct 
within the scope of the employee’s employment.” Id. “The purpose of 
immunity is to ensure that public employees can exercise their 
independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat 
of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made 
within the scope of their employment.” Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 
727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted). Relevant to the present 
case, “A lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that an 
act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is … clearly outside the 
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scope of the employee’s employment.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c)(2) 
(emphasis added).3  
Generally speaking, “whether an employee’s actions were within the 
scope of employment is a question of fact to be determined by the 
factfinder.” Knighten v. East Chicago Housing Authority, 45 N.E.3d 788, 794 
(Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). When the facts are undisputed and “would 
not allow a jury to find that the tortious acts were within the scope of 
employment,” however, a court may conclude as a matter of law that the 
acts were not in the scope of employment. Cox v. Evansville, 107 N.E.3d 
453, 460 (Ind. 2018). 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employee’s act or 
omission falls within the scope of employment if the injurious behavior is 
incidental to authorized conduct or furthers the employer’s business to an 
appreciable extent. Knighten, 45 N.E.3d at 792 (citation omitted). 
Conversely, “an employee’s act is not within the scope of employment 
when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by 
the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.” Id. (quoting Barnett 
v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind. 2008)). But “an employee's wrongful act 
may still fall within the scope of his employment if his purpose was, to an 
appreciable extent, to further his employer's business, even if the act was 
predominantly motivated by an intention to benefit the employee 
himself.” Id. Ultimately, we have found that “the scope of employment 
encompasses the activities that the employer delegates to employees or 
authorizes employees to do, plus employees’ acts that naturally or 
predictably arise from those activities.” Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 461. 
Viewing this lawsuit through the ITCA, the question becomes whether 
Trooper Benner was “clearly outside” the scope of his employment when 
the accident occurred. The State urges that Trooper Benner was within the 
 
3 Indiana Code section 34-13-3-5(c) also authorizes a lawsuit to be filed against an employee 
personally if the plaintiff alleges the employee’s act or omission is criminal, malicious, willful 
and wanton, or calculated to benefit the employee personally. Those circumstances have not 
been alleged in the present suit. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-00549 | March 3, 2020 
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scope of employment because, even though he was off duty, he was 
required by State Police policy to maintain radio contact, respond to 
emergencies, carry a firearm, and conform to a certain dress code. This, 
the State argues, furthers State Police business by providing an increased, 
more visible presence on the roads. Additionally, the State believes that if 
Benner’s acts arguably fell within the scope of his employment, then by 
definition the acts cannot be “clearly outside” the scope of his 
employment.  
Burton, on the other hand, argues that Benner’s actions had no causal 
connection to his employment and any minimal compliance with State 
Police policy should not immunize the trooper from personal liability. 
Unlike cases where police misconduct occurred while officers were on 
duty, see Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 463-64, Burton urges this Court to find that no 
nexus of employment existed in this case because there was a complete 
divorce in time and activity between the end of Benner’s shift and the 
accident. For the reasons expressed below, we agree with the State that 
Benner’s involvement in the accident was not “clearly outside” the scope 
of his employment. 
The undisputed evidence in this case indicates Trooper Benner 
complied with the vast majority of State Police procedures for operating 
his police commission while off duty. His “conduct [was] of the same 
general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized” 
by the State Police, Bushong, 790 N.E.3d at 473 (quoting Celebration 
Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 453), and included maintaining radio contact and 
conforming to a dress code. Additionally, as the trial court observed, 
Benner’s presence on the road and his ability to respond to nearby 
emergency situations undoubtably provided a benefit to the State Police 
through increased police presence on the roads. This ability to suddenly 
become available for official duties certainly “furthers his employer’s 
business.” Id. (citation omitted). Compare with Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 462 
(“[T]ortious acts are not within the scope of employment when they flow 
from a course of conduct that is independent of activities that serve the 
employer”). 
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To the extent Burton argues Trooper Benner’s violation of traffic laws 
exposed him to personal liability under the ITCA, we disagree.4 True, 
State Police policy expressly prohibits violation of traffic laws, but in our 
view, the violation in this case did not move Benner “clearly outside” the 
scope of his employment. Recall that the scope of employment “may 
include acts that the employer expressly forbids” or “that violate the 
employer’s rules, orders, or instruction.” Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 461. While 
State Police policy forbids speeding in non-emergency situations, 
speeding could “naturally or predictably arise” from driving a 
commission even while off duty. See id. at 461-62. The “clearly outside” 
standard set forth in Indiana Code section 34-13-3-5(c)(2) represents a high 
bar and, in this case, we are not convinced that bar has been cleared. 
To be sure, there is no precise formula to determine whether an act is 
“clearly outside” the scope of employment. There could certainly be 
circumstances that would oblige such a finding, but given the evidence 
presented in this case, we cannot say Trooper Benner was acting clearly 
outside the scope of his employment. 
Conclusion 
We find that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Trooper Benner was acting “clearly outside” the scope of his employment. 
As such, the trial court properly granted Benner’s motion for summary 
judgment on this issue.  
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 
4 The speed limit in the area of the accident was fifty-five miles per hour. Although conflicting 
testimony estimated Benner’s speed at between sixty-two and sixty-five miles per hour before 
he began to brake, there is no dispute he was operating his commission beyond the speed 
limit while he attempted to pass the other vehicle. 
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Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Karl L. Mulvaney 
Margaret M. Christensen 
Nana Quay-Smith 
Bingham Greenbaum Doll, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
R.T. Green 
Kellie C. Clark 
Collin W. Green 
Blackburn & Green 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Aaron T. Craft 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana