Title: Otho L. Lafayette v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Mark A. Bates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Crown Point, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Karl M. Scharnberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joby D. Jerrells 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorneys General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 45S03-0904-CR-182 
OTHO L. LAFAYETTE, 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, No. 45G04-0708-FA-00025 
The Honorable Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 45A03-0803-CR-00118 
_________________________________ 
 
December 08, 2009 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
Defendant Otho Lafayette was convicted of rape based in part on evidence of a ten-year-
old conviction for attempted rape of another woman.  Indiana law prohibits the use of evidence 
of prior crimes “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with” except in certain circumstances.  The exceptional circumstance advanced by the State – 
intent – does not apply in this case.  Accordingly, we reverse Defendant‟s conviction. 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Dec 08 2009, 1:42 pm
2 
 
Background 
 
The facts most favorable to the convictions indicate that in July, 2007, C.E. told the po-
lice that Defendant had raped her.  Defendant admitted that he and C.E. had had sexual inter-
course but claimed that it had been consensual.  Prior to trial, the State filed notice that it in-
tended to introduce his 1997 conviction for the attempted rape of another woman as evidence of 
Defendant‟s intent to rape C.E.  The admissibility of this evidence for this purpose is the central 
issue in this appeal.   
 
As a general rule, evidence of prior crimes may not be used as evidence “to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”  Ind. Evid. R. 404(b).  “It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of . . . intent[.]”  Id.  In a lengthy 
and well-reasoned ruling, the trial court concluded that the evidence of Defendant‟s prior convic-
tion for attempted rape was admissible to prove intent. 
 
The jury found Defendant guilty of rape and related charges and the court sentenced him 
to a term of 60 years.  Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, 
finding that the trial court had committed reversible error in admitting the prior conviction evi-
dence.  Judge Vaidik dissented.  Lafayette v. State, 899 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  The 
State sought, and we granted, transfer.  Lafayette v. State, 2009 Ind. LEXIS 391 (2009). 
 
Discussion 
 
I 
 
A 
 
To obtain a conviction for rape in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Defendant “knowingly or intentionally [had] sexual intercourse with [C.E.] 
when [C.E. was] . . . compelled by force or imminent threat of force.”  Ind. Code § 35-42-4-
1(a)(1).  Because Defendant acknowledged that he had had sexual intercourse with C.E., neither 
3 
 
the fact that he had had intercourse with C.E. nor his intent to do so were at issue.  Cf. Ely v. 
State, 655 N.E.2d 372, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (defendant specifically denied intent to rape).  
Rather, the dispute was over whether C.E. had been “compelled by force or imminent threat of 
force.”  See Bryant v. State, 644 N.E.2d 859, 860-61 (Ind. 1994) (once defendant admitted to 
having sexual intercourse with the victim, defendant‟s sole argument on appeal was whether the 
defendant used force or the threat of force). 
 
B 
 
As mentioned under Background, supra, Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that evi-
dence of prior crimes may not be used as evidence “to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith[]” but “may, however, be admissible . . . as proof of . . . in-
tent.”  The scope of this intent exception often arises in criminal prosecutions simply because a 
defendant‟s intent is likely relevant to the requisite mens rea of the charged crime.  Hicks v. 
State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 n.12 (Ind. 1997).  Shortly after promulgating Evid. R. 404(b),1 we 
examined this subject in an appeal from a conviction for child molesting, Wickizer v. State, 626 
N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1993).  Our view was that an expansive reading of the intent exception would 
be inconsistent to the principal thrust of the rule itself: 
 
Mindful of the variety of judicial perspectives regarding the proper role of 
prior conduct evidence in the ascertainment of truth, we conclude that Indiana is 
best served by a narrow construction of the intent exception in Evid. R. 404(b).  It 
does not authorize the general use of prior conduct evidence as proof of the gen-
eral or specific intent element in criminal offenses.  To allow the introduction of 
prior conduct evidence upon this basis would be to permit the intent exception to 
routinely overcome the rule‟s otherwise emphatic prohibition against the admissi-
bility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith.   
 
Id. at 799. 
 
                                                 
1 Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) was included in the Indiana Rules of Evidence adopted by this Court on 
August 24, 1993, with an effective date of January 1, 1994. 
4 
 
Consequently, we held that the intent exception is available when a defendant goes 
beyond merely denying the charged culpability and alleges a particular contrary intent, whether 
in opening statement, by cross-examination of the State‟s witnesses, or by presentation in defen-
dant‟s own case-in-chief.  Id.  The State can respond by offering evidence of prior crimes, 
wrongs, or acts to the extent genuinely relevant to prove the defendant‟s intent at the time of the 
charged offense.  Id.  The trial court must then conduct an Evid. R. 403 analysis to determine if 
the “probative value [of the prior sexual misconduct evidence] is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
 
C 
 
Although Wickizer was our first discussion of the scope of the intent exception to Evid. 
R. 404(b), it largely tracked the common law of evidence in this regard that had developed prior 
to our adoption of the Rules of Evidence.  This was particularly so with respect to cases like this 
one – where defendants had proffered defenses of consent in prosecutions for rape.  For example, 
in Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. 1982), this Court held that the trial court had commit-
ted reversible error when it allowed evidence of another rape allegedly committed by the defen-
dant six weeks after the act for which he was being prosecuted.  Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Pivarnik said: 
 
To indiscriminately admit proof of criminal activity beyond that specifically 
charged may compel a defendant to meet accusations without notice and may ef-
fectively negate the due process presumption of innocence which our system of 
justice accords to every accused.  Moreover, the admissibility of such evidence 
may raise collateral issues which confuse the jury or divert its attention from the 
actual charges before it.  The admission of such evidence may also violate our 
evidentiary rules which forbid the State from attacking an accused‟s character be-
fore the accused has put his character into controversy and from proving an ac-
cused‟s bad character by showing particular bad acts. . . . 
 
. . .  Evidence of other criminal activity may be admissible in certain cases 
to prove an accused‟s identity, knowledge, intent or motive, or to demonstrate the 
common plan or scheme of criminal activity from which the accused originated 
the charged crime.  To be admissible according to any one of these exceptions, 
however, the evidence must possess substantial probative value.  The test for ad-
5 
 
mission is whether or not the evidence is so specifically and significantly related 
to the charged crime in time, place and circumstance as to be logically relevant to 
one of the particular excepted purposes. . . .  
 
. . .  There is no specific exception to the general rule prohibiting evidence 
of an accused‟s other criminal activity which makes such evidence admissible to 
prove a [prosecuting witness]‟s lack of consent. 
 
Id. at 1346 (citations omitted).  Malone followed Meeks v. State, 249 Ind. 659, 664, 234 N.E.2d 
629, 632 (1968), and was, in turn, followed by Jenkins v. State, 474 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ind. 1985), 
and Reichard v. State, 510 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 1987).  All of these cases reversed convictions 
for rape on grounds that the trial court had committed reversible error when it allowed evidence 
of other alleged rapes to refute defenses of consent. 
 
It is true that for a time, our Court did allow prior crimes to be admitted as evidence of 
“depraved sexual instinct.”  See Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992) (abolishing the 
depraved sexual instinct exception).  However, the depraved sexual instinct exception was never 
extended to rape prosecutions.  Indeed, Reichard reversed a rape conviction where the trial court 
had explicitly admitted testimony as to a prior rape as evidence of depraved sexual instinct.  510 
N.E.2d at 165. 
 
D 
 
Defendant in this case filed a pre-trial motion to prevent the admission of the prior bad 
acts evidence under the intent exception of Evid. R. 404(b).  Rather than rule on the motion, the 
trial court took the matter under advisement to see if the Defendant would place his intent at is-
sue as the trial progressed.  After the completion of voir dire, opening statements, and defense 
counsel‟s cross-examination of C.E. about the facts surrounding the alleged rape, the trial court 
ruled that the Defendant had triggered the admission of the prior sexual misconduct evidence by 
placing his intent at issue when he attacked the credibility of C.E. on the issue of her consent.2  
                                                 
2 The trial court ruled as follows: 
All right, an essential element of the charge of rape is really a lack of consent because if 
sexual intercourse is consensual, it is not rape.  Where the State of Indiana would like to 
get into 404(b) evidence under the intent exception, it is necessary for the defendant to af-
6 
 
The trial court then found that the evidence was relevant and probative for the determination of 
whether the Defendant possessed the requisite intent to rape C.E.3  The trial court further deter-
mined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence substantially outweighed any 
prejudice it may have posed.4 
This Court appreciates the careful attention given this issue by the trial court and, in par-
ticular, its considered ruling which has greatly facilitated appellate review.  But we are unable to 
agree with the trial court‟s conclusion which we find to be contrary to the requirements of Evid. 
R. 404(b) as enunciated by Wickizer and presaged by common law precedents. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
firmatively present a claim of contrary intent.  When a defendant merely denies the alle-
gations and does not put forth a particular contrary intent, 404(b) evidence is not admiss-
ible.  The question before the Court is whether or not the defendant has placed his intent 
in issue.  This Court concludes that the defendant has placed his intent in issue and has 
gone beyond merely claiming a – beyond merely denying the charges.  The comments in 
questioning during the jury selection and the cross-examination of [C.E.] go beyond 
merely denying the allegations and are an attempt at discrediting her in such a way that 
you cannot believe her and since you therefore, cannot believe her, she in fact did consent 
or if she did not consent, then there is at least reasonable doubt as to whether or not she 
had consented. 
. . . . 
That is the tone of the defense.  The Court is well aware of the fact that under Wickizer, 
a narrow construction must in fact be used in the State of Indiana.  
(Tr. 264-67.) 
 
3On this point, the court ruled: 
The next question becomes whether or not this is relevant evidence.  Relevance, under 
401 is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.  In this particular case, “consent”.  The 404 evidence that 
the State seeks to get into under the intent exception, clearly would give the jury other 
evidence to consider on whether or not the defendant formed the requisite intent to have 
sex with [C.E.] against her will. 
Id. at 267. 
 
4On this point, the court ruled: 
The third prong of the test requires that prior misconduct evidence be such that a reason-
able jury could find that the act did occur and that the defendant committed the act.  
Based on past arguments by the State of Indiana, I conclude that the test has been met and 
the last prong of the analysis requires the Court to go and make a 403 analysis as to 
whether or not the evidence[„s] probative value is not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  The probative value in this case is whether or not the sex that 
was had was consensual. 
Id. 
7 
 
Judge Crone, writing for the Court of Appeals in this case, took the position that a defen-
dant does not put intent at issue at any stage of the proceedings simply by questioning the alleged 
victim‟s credibility, Lafayette, 899 N.E.2d at 742-43, and we agree with his conclusion.  Al-
though neither we nor the Court of Appeals has previously addressed the precise question of 
whether challenging the credibility of a prosecuting witness in a rape case on the issue of consent 
puts defendant‟s intent at issue, long-standing Indiana precedent discussed supra dictates that a 
defendant‟s use of the defense of consent in a rape prosecution is not, standing alone, enough to 
trigger the availability of the intent exception.  When a defendant questions the credibility of the 
prosecuting witness, we believe that the defendant does no more than advance that consent de-
fense.   
 
Our conclusion that questioning a prosecuting witness‟s credibility should not open the 
door to prior misconduct evidence is further supported by three factors.  First, if a defendant‟s 
intent were placed at issue by the questioning of the prosecuting witness‟s credibility, then the 
defendant is effectively precluded from exercising the right to confront a witness‟s credibility at 
all.  Second, a defendant‟s ability to question a prosecuting witness in such a circumstance is al-
ready limited by Evid. R. 412 which prohibits the defendant from using evidence of the past sex-
ual conduct of the witness.  Third, this approach is consistent with Wickizer‟s mandate that the 
intent exception be narrowly construed.   
 
Although not cases in which defenses of consent are proffered in response to rape 
charges, there is authority from other jurisdictions that challenges to a prosecuting witness‟s cre-
dibility do not place a defendant‟s intent at issue for Evid. R. 404(b) purposes.  See Bargas v. 
State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 890 (Tex. App. 2008) (“A challenge to the complainant‟s credibility on 
cross-examination does not automatically open the door to extraneous-offense evidence.”); ac-
cord State v. McKoy, 347 S.E.2d 374, 379 (N.C. 1986) (“impeach[ing] [the witness‟s] credibili-
ty[] did not „open the door‟ to evidence of the defendant‟s commission of other crimes.”).  We 
have found no authority to the contrary and the State cites none for this proposition. 
 
We also agree with Judge Crone that a defendant‟s assertions that an alleged rape victim 
consented to sexual intercourse does not present a claim of particular contrary intent for purposes 
8 
 
of triggering the intent exception to Evid. R. 404(b).  Defendant here admitted to having sexual 
intercourse with C.E.; he did not present a claim of particular contrary intent for purposes of Ev-
id. R. 404(b).  At this point, the issue became one of C.E.‟s intent – whether the Defendant 
brought her to his apartment without her permission and forced her to have sexual relations 
against her will – not one of contrary intent on his part.  Lafayette, 899 N.E.2d at 742-43.   
 
Finally, we agree with Judge Crone that the prior attempted rape conviction was also not 
admissible because it was not relevant to prove that C.E. consented to having sexual intercourse 
with the Defendant.  Here, because the Defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with 
C.E., the only issue that bore any relation to testimony of the Defendant‟s prior sexual miscon-
duct was whether C.E. had consented to the intercourse.  Such evidence must be relevant to some 
point at issue, and “with consent being the only element at issue, the [prior attempted] rape was 
irrelevant.”  Meeks, 249 Ind. at 664, 234 N.E.2d at 632.  See Evid. R. 401 (defining “relevant 
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence.”); Evid. R. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”).5 
 
The evidence in this case related to Defendant‟s prior attempted rape conviction was not 
admissible. 
 
II 
 
No error in the admission of evidence is grounds for setting aside a conviction unless 
such erroneous admission appears inconsistent with substantial justice or affects the substantial 
                                                 
5At trial and during oral argument, the State argued that the prior sexual misconduct testimony was rele-
vant and admissible as demonstrating Defendant‟s “modus operandi.”  The trial court did not discuss 
“modus operandi” in its ruling.  Another exception to the general rule of Evid. R. 404(b), the exception of 
“identity,” incorporates the concept of “modus operandi.”  The identity “exception‟s rationale is that the 
crimes, or means used to commit them, [i.e., their modus operandi,] were so similar and unique that it is 
highly probable that the same person committed all of them.”  Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 
1999) (quoting Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
As defendant‟s identity was not at issue once he admitted that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with 
C.E., “modus operandi” does not provide a basis for admitting the evidence of his prior conviction for 
attempted rape. 
9 
 
rights of the parties.  Ind. Trial Rule 61.  The improper admission of evidence is harmless error 
when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy 
the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contri-
buted to the conviction.  Wickizer, 626 N.E.2d at 800.  To determine whether the erroneous ad-
mission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of “extrinsic offenses is harmless, we judge 
whether the jury‟s verdict was substantially swayed.  If the error had substantial influence, or if 
one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.”  Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 132 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
In the present case, Defendant has shown error in admitting evidence of prior bad acts, 
specifically the testimony of a woman he was convicted of attempting to rape in 1997.  Other 
than the prior conduct testimony of the State‟s witness, independent proof of whether the sexual 
intercourse had been consensual consisted solely of the testimony of the victim.  The State em-
phasized the Defendant‟s prior conviction in closing argument.  The morally repugnant nature of 
the prior sexual misconduct of the Defendant, as well as the similarities in pattern and methods 
employed during both the prior misconduct and the rape in the instant case, received emphasis at 
trial.  Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the jury verdict was not sub-
stantially swayed or that there was no substantial likelihood that the prior conduct testimony con-
tributed to the conviction.  Indeed, on review of the record, one is left with the unmistakable and 
forbidden impression that because the defendant was convicted of attempted rape in 1997, he 
must have raped C.E. in 2007.  We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that admission of the 
prior conviction evidence was therefore not harmless error and the conviction must be reversed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The defendant‟s conviction is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a 
new trial. 
 
 Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.