Title: Duncan v. Essary

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

193 Kan. 241 (1964)
392 P.2d 877
ELMER DUNCAN and SHIRLEY L. DUNCAN, Appellants,
v.
DAVID H. ESSARY and NORMA ESSARY and THE ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH OF BELLE PLAINE, KANSAS, Appellees.
No. 43,700

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 6, 1964.
Wilmer E. Goering, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Earl M. Clarkson, Jr. and I.D. Brown, both of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
J.H. Taggart and C.E. Russell, both of Wellington, argued the cause and were on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a judgment in an action which was commenced on the theory of forcible detention of real property after failure to pay rent, but which later developed into a controversy as to whether certain absolute deeds were in fact security for a debt.
The testimony relating to the material facts are in direct conflict. We will present the factual issues as they appear in the pleadings.
The plaintiffs, Elmer Duncan and Shirley, his wife, filed a complaint before a justice of the peace against the defendants, David H. Essary and Norma, his wife, and the Assembly of God Church, *242 Belle Plaine, Kansas. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of the premises (specifically described) consisting of a tract of land, 1.17 acres, adjacent to the city limits of Belle Plaine, Kansas, and:
The prayer was for restoration of possession of the premises and such further relief as the court deemed just and equitable.
Defendants by verified answer made it appear that title to the real estate claimed by plaintiffs and additional real estate located in Blackwell, Oklahoma involving the same transaction was in dispute. The action was transferred to the district court for trial pursuant to G.S. 1949, 61-107.
The defendants answer, filed in the district court, was challenged by a motion to make definite and certain which was sustained in part. An amended answer was then filed which will be presented in considerable detail as the facts alleged and established by the evidence are implicit in the lower court's judgment. We quote in part:
..............
..............
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The prayer of the answer was in part that:
The amended answer covered twenty-two printed pages alleging the facts in detail. Only the most pertinent allegations have been quoted.
The case came on for trial and at the conclusion thereof the trial court, after advisory consideration, concluded that the relationship of the parties was that of lender and borrower; that the deeds conveying the real estate in Sumner County, Kansas and Kay County, Oklahoma, were security for loans made by plaintiffs to defendants for the erection of a church building on the Sumner County real estate; that after balancing debits and credits there was due the plaintiffs by defendants the sum of $16,217.12 which constituted a lien against the two pieces of real estate; that the defendants, Essarys, were entitled to a decree adjudging them to be the owners of the real estate in Kay County, Oklahoma, and that the Assembly of God Church of Belle Plaine, Kansas was entitled to a decree adjudging it to be the owner of the real estate in Sumner County, Kansas. Judgment was so entered.
*245 A timely motion for a new trial was overruled and plaintiffs have appealed.
The appellants allege numerous trial errors but the gravamen of their contention is that the oral agreement, that the properties conveyed to the appellants by absolute deeds were to be held as security for a loan, was in violation of the statute of frauds and therefore void.
The appellants direct our attention to G.S. 1949, 33-106 which provides in part:
The appellants further call our attention to numerous cases where this court has refused to enforce parole agreements pertaining to land.
The appellees counter with the contention that they had partly performed the agreement and that part performance of an oral agreement pertaining to land takes the agreement out of the operation of the statute of frauds. Numerous cases are cited in support of this general rule of law.
The contention of neither party requires specific attention. The controversy can be determined on much firmer legal grounds, leaving no necessity for the construction and application of the statute of frauds.
This court has held in numerous cases that parole evidence is admissible to prove that a deed absolute in form was in fact an equitable mortgage to secure the payment of a debt, and that such a transaction is not governed by the statute of frauds.
In Saylor v. Crooker, 89 Kan. 51, 130 Pac. 689, it was held in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
The rule was again affirmed in Dyer v. Johnson, 109 Kan. 338, 198 Pac. 944, and the earlier cases cited. It was stated at page 342 of the opinion:
The statute of frauds was not intended to affect the power which courts of equity had always exercised to declare absolute deeds to be mortgages to secure a debt. We go back to one of our very early decisions to find a clear statement of the general principle. In Curtis v. Buckley, 14 Kan. 449, it was said:
For the latest pronouncement that it is not necessary that such transactions or agreements pertaining to land should be in writing in order to take them out of the operation of the statute of frauds, see Hill v. Hill, 185 Kan. 389, 345 P.2d 1015.
The contention of the appellants, that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of the trial court that the absolute deeds were in fact security for a debt, is without merit. The testimony of numerous witnesses supported the facts as alleged in the petition in considerable detail. There was additional testimony that the appellant, Elmer Duncan, joined with the appellee, David H. *247 Essary, in instructing an insurance agent to prepare a fire insurance policy on the Belle Plaine church building naming Essary as the insured and Duncan as mortgagee. An application to have the Belle Plaine property removed from the tax rolls was also introduced. The application stated that the property was exclusively for religious purposes and carried Duncan's signature under oath.
Appellants complain of the rental credits which the trial court allowed the appellees after the appellants took possession of the Kay County, Oklahoma property. The trial court allowed a credit for substantially the same amount of monthly rent as was being paid at the time possession was taken by the appellants. Appellants contend that the appellees should have produced evidence as to the exact net amount received by appellants. They state:
If appellants reduced the rent, failed to collect part of the rent or had some unusual expenditures, this was a matter peculiarly within their own knowledge. The appellees produced all of the facts they had in their possession, i.e., the amount of rent that was being paid when the appellants took possession of the property. Appellants cannot be heard to say that appellees must produce more detailed facts when the details are particularly within appellants' own knowledge. In Blackburn v. Colvin, 191 Kan. 239, 380 P.2d 432, it is stated at page 244 of the opinion:
A careful consideration of the record discloses no trial errors which would justify the granting of a new trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.