Title: Pearce v. PIERCE

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

214 Miss. 344 (1952) 58 So. 2d 824 PEARCE v. PIERCE, et al. No. 38433. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 19, 1952. Glenn G. Young and W. Arlington Jones, for appellant. *345 Hall & Callender, for appellees. *346 Alexander, J. Appellant filed suit for personal and property damage arising out of an automobile collision. The answer of the defendants, appellees, pleaded a release and settlement of all claims. The contention of appellant is not that there was not a payment to, and a release executed by, him, but that it was understood that the release included only property damage. The release executed by the appellant is in the following form: We need not set out the testimony by which the appellant sought to show that there was a misunderstanding or fraud in its procurement, or that it was orally agreed that it covered only damage to his car. (Hn 1) Appellant testified that before he signed it, he read it and knew its contents, also that he accepted and cashed a draft issued pursuant to the agreement in the sum of three hundred dollars, on which was written "Payment of all claims arising out of an accident. Date of accident, December 18, 1950." There is no issue whether this referred to the collision which is the basis for the suit herein. While there are contentions alleging fraud, and representations at variance with the terms of the contract of release, fraud as to past or existing facts was neither alleged with conciseness nor proven with clear and convincing *348 testimony, and, in view of a full understanding of the terms of the release, voluntarily executed, together with acceptance of the draft issued thereunder, the attack upon the release must fail. (Hn 2) It merged all previous discussions and agreements, if any. See Koeing v. Calcote, 199 Miss. 435, 25 So. (2d) 763; Yazoo & M.V.R. Company v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669. The appeal is from a judgment for the defendants. (Hn 3) It is assigned for error that the issue raised by the plea ought to have been tried to a jury, a request for which was denied. Assuming that such request ought to have been granted, as to which see Scott v. Nichols, 27 Miss. 94; Chapter 230, Laws of 1948, as amended, no error may be predicated of such refusal, since, under the testimony the plea was rightfully sustained as a matter of law. Had it been tried to a jury the defendant would have been entitled to a peremptory charge, or in the absence of a request therefor a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff would lack support. Compare Plummer-Lewis Company v. Francher, 111 Miss. 656, 657, 71 So. 907, as to procedure followed. The error, if any, is therefore not prejudicial. Affirmed. McGehee, C.J., and Kyle, Holmes and Ethridge, JJ., concur.