Title: LOYA v. WYOMING PARTNERS OF JACKSON HOLE, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LOYA v. WYOMING PARTNERS OF JACKSON HOLE, INC.2004 WY 12399 P.3d 972Case Number: 04-11Decided: 10/28/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

RICHARD 
LOYA,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff) 
,

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
PARTNERS OF JACKSON

HOLE, 
INC., a Wyoming corporation,

d/b/a 
Jackson Sign Co., and GARY

SCHULER, 
a married man,

 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Katherine L. Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Joseph Moore and Abigail S. Moore of Moore & Myers, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Moore. 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Richard Loya sued 
his employer, Wyoming Partners of Jackson Hole, Inc. (Wyoming Partners), and 
Gary Schuler and Elizabeth Schuler (Schuler), for breach of contract, breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and promissory estoppel. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of 
Elizabeth Schuler.  Following the 
trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding Wyoming Partners breached its 
employment contract with Mr. Loya, and he was damaged in the amount of 
$18,415.  The jury made no findings 
regarding Mr. Schuler's liability for the claims against him individually.  The district court entered a judgment 
against Wyoming Partners for the compensatory damages, and in favor of Mr. 
Schuler on the claims against him individually.  On appeal, Mr. Loya claims the district 
court erred by granting a judgment in favor of Mr. Schuler.  We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issue 
presented on appeal is whether the judgment entered by the district court is 
consistent with the jury verdict form.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      This case first 
came before this Court in Loya v. Wyoming Partners of Jackson Hole, Inc., 
2001 WY 124, 35 P.3d 1246 (Wyo. 2001) and the pertinent facts are set forth in 
that opinion.  Essentially, Mr. Loya 
contended Wyoming Partners and Mr. Schuler had breached his contract of 
employment, which consisted of both written and oral agreements, by discharging 
him before the end of his first year.  
In Mr. Loya's complaint, he alleged wrongful discharge and breach of 
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and application of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel1.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Wyoming Partners and Mr. Schuler.  On appeal, this Court reversed the 
district court's order granting summary judgment holding that 
genuine issues of material fact existed on all claims and the case was remanded 
to the district court for trial.

 

[¶4]      After a five-day 
trial, the jury found Wyoming Partners breached its employment contract with Mr. 
Loya and assessed compensatory damages in the amount of $18,415.  The questions in this case stem from the 
manner in which the special verdict form was constructed.  The interrogatories presented to the 
jury and its answers read as follows:

 

We, the 
jury, present the following answers to questions submitted by the 
Court:

 

1.         
Do you find that Defendant Gary Schuler was acting in his capacity as an 
officer of Wyoming Partners of Jackson Hole, a Wyoming corporation, in hiring 
Mr. Loya and handling Mr. Loya's separation from the company? 

 

­­­____X____  Yes                   
________      
No

 

 

2.         
Do you find that Plaintiff was an "at will" employee of Defendant Wyoming 
Partners of Jackson Hole? 

 

________  Yes                      
____X____   
No

 

            
3.         
Do you find that there was an express contract to employ Mr. Loya for one 
year as Manager of Jackson Sign Company?

 

________  Yes                      
____X____   
No

 

            
4.         
Do you find that Plaintiff misrepresented his experience, skills and/or 
his qualifications for the job of Manager of Jackson Sign Company? 

 

________  Yes                      
____X____   
No

 

            
5.         
Do you find that Plaintiff was terminated for cause? 

 

________  Yes                      
____X____   
No

 

            
If you answered "yes" to questions 2 or 5 STOP your deliberation and DO 
NOT answer any more questions.  If 
you answered "no" to both of those questions, please continue and answer all of 
the following questions.

 

6.         
Do you find that Defendant Wyoming Partners of Jackson Hole breached an 
Employment Cont[r]act with Plaintiff? 

 

____X____  Yes                   
________      
No

 

            
7.         
If you answered "yes" to question 6, in what amount, if any, do you 
assess compensatory damages to Mr. Loya for breach of the Employment Contract? 

 

                        
$ 18,415.00

 

            
8.         
If you answered "yes" to question 6, do you find that Plaintiff had a 
"special relationship" of trust and reliance, as the Court has defined that 
term, with Defendant Wyoming Partners that created a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing? 

 

________  Yes                      
____X____   
No

 

            
9.         
If you answered "yes" to question 8, do you find that any action of 
Defendant Wyoming Partners breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
(not answered)

 

________  Yes                      
____ ____     
No

 

            
10.       
If you answered "yes" to question 9, in what amount, if any, do you 
assess compensatory damages to Mr. Loya for breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing? (not answered)

 

                        
$__________

 

            
11.       
If your answer to question 1 is "no" and your answer to question 6 is 
"yes", do you find that Gary Schuler had personal responsibility for the breach 
of the employment contract? (not answered)

 

________  Yes                      
____ ____     
No

 

            
12.       
If you answered "yes" to question 11, in what amount, if any, do you 
assess compensatory damages to Plaintiff for Mr. Schuler's breach of contract? 
(not answered)

 

                        
$_____________

 

            
13.       
If you answered "yes" to question 11, do you find that Plaintiff had a 
"special relationship" of trust and reliance, as the Court has defined that 
term, with Defendant Gary Schuler that created a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing? (not answered)

 

________  Yes                      
____ ____     
No

 

            
14.       
If you answered "yes" to question 13, do you find that any action of Gary 
Schuler breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? (not 
answered)

 

________  Yes                      
____ ____     
No

 

            
15.       
If you answered "yes" to question 14, in what amount, if any, do you 
assess compensatory damages to Mr. Loya for breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing? (not answered)

                        

                        
$__________

 

            
16.       
If you answered "yes" to question 6, do you find that Defendant Wyoming 
Partners of Jackson Hole engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct and 
intentionally or recklessly caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress? 

 

            
________  Yes          
            
____X____   
No

 

            
17.       
If you answered "yes" to question 16, in what amount, if any, do you 
assess compensatory damages to Plaintiff for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by Defendant Wyoming Partners? (not 
answered)

                        

                        
$___________

 

            
18.       
Do you find that Plaintiff has proved his claim for punitive damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Wyoming Partners? 

 

            
________  Yes                      
____X____   
No

 

            
19.       
If you answered "no" to question 1, do you find that Defendant Gary 
Schuler engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct and intentionally or 
recklessly caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress?  (not answered)

 

            
________  Yes                      
________      No

 

            
20.       
If you answered "yes" to question 19, in what amount, if any, do you 
assess compensatory damages to Plaintiff for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by Defendant Gary Schuler? (not 
answered)

                        

                        
$___________

 

(no 
question 21)

 

            
22.       
Do you find that Plaintiff has proved his claim for punitive damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Gary 
Schuler?

 

            
________  Yes                      
____X____   
No

 

            
23.       
a.  If you find that there is 
no contract express or implied to employ Mr. Loya, do you find that there was a 
clear and definite agreement between Plaintiff Loya and Defendants? 

 

            
_______  Yes            
_______  No ___X___  N/A

 

                        
b.         
Do you find that the Plaintiff engaged in good faith in an action or 
forbearance of a definite and substantial character in reliance on the agreement 
to his detriment? 

 

            
___X____  Yes         
_______  No ______  
N/A

 

After 
the jury returned its verdict, Mr. Loya submitted a proposed form of judgment 
entering judgment against both Wyoming Partners and Mr. Schuler.  Mr. Schuler did not agree to the form of 
judgment proposed by Mr. Loya, and subsequently submitted an alternative form of 
judgment to the court which entered judgment against Wyoming Partners, and in 
favor Mr. Schuler individually.  
On July 31, 2003, the district court adopted Mr. Schuler's proposed 
judgment and entered its judgment against Wyoming Partners for the full 
amount awarded by the jury, plus costs of $1,831.20, and in favor of Mr. 
Schuler individually.  Mr. Loya 
appeals from that judgment.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶5]      The issue 
presented on appeal is whether the judgment is consistent with the jury's 
findings in the special verdict form.  
That is an issue of law which we review de novo.  Any objection to a special verdict form 
must be raised before it is submitted to the jury and, without such an 
objection, the parties are deemed to have waived a trial by jury of any question 
of fact not included in a special verdict form.  If an issue of fact is raised by the 
pleadings, but not included within the special verdict form, a party may demand 
the court make a finding or it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord 
with the judgment on the special verdict.  
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 49(a); WERCS v. Capshaw, 2004 WY 
86, ¶16, 94 P.3d 421, ¶16 (Wyo. 2004).  It is 
the duty of the district court to attempt to harmonize the jury's answers if it 
is at all possible under a fair reading of the responses.  Furthermore, where there is a view of 
the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, 
they must be resolved that way.  9A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
Civil 2d § 2510 at 200-70 (2001 Supp).  
See also Auwood v. Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884 
(2nd Cir. 1988). 

 

            
  

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]      Mr. Loya contends 
the trial court's judgment erroneously interpreted the jury's answers to the 
questions presented in the special verdict form.  He argues the jury's findings, while 
imposing liability on Wyoming Partners, did not grant relief to, or immunize Mr. 
Schuler from liability, and Mr. Schuler should be obligated individually to pay 
the $18,415 judgment.  Mr. Loya asks 
this Court to remand this matter to the district court for "correction of [the] 
judgment in a manner consistent with the Special Verdict Form." 

 

[¶7]      To understand Mr. 
Loya's objections to the judgment, we must review the claims asserted in his 
complaint and compare those claims to the questions submitted to the jury in the 
special verdict form.  The complaint 
asserts two causes of action for breach of contract, one against Wyoming 
Partners and one against Mr. Schuler individually.  It also asserts a claim for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against both Wyoming Partners and Mr. 
Schuler.  However, Mr. Loya did not 
plead or argue that the corporate veil of Wyoming Partners should be pierced and 
its actions attributed to Mr. Schuler as an individual.2  Therefore, in this case, Mr. Schuler 
could not have been liable for a breach of contract unless he had entered into a 
contract individually with Mr. Loya.  
See Sexton v. Taylor County, 692 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1985) (a party cannot be liable for breach of contract to a person who is 
not a party to the contract).  
However, that question was not posed to the jury in the special verdict 
form.  Likewise, he could only have 
been liable individually for the tort of a breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, which is available in limited contractual circumstances, if he 
had been found to have entered into the contract individually.  Without 
a contract, there is no basis for imposition of the implied covenant, whether in 
contract or in tort, because either cause of action arises out of the 
contractual relationship.  Birt 
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶21, 75 P.3d 640, ¶21 (Wyo. 
2003).  The duty of good faith and 
fair dealing does not come into play until the parties have reached an 
agreement.  Id.  In addition, Mr. 
Schuler could only have been liable for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress if the jury found Mr. Schuler's actions fulfilled the 
elements of that tort. 

 

[¶8]      However, the 
special verdict form was not constructed so as to require the jury to address 
all of the claims asserted in the complaint against Mr. Schuler.  The verdict form did not ask whether Mr. 
Schuler had entered into a contract individually with Mr. Loya, and then whether 
he breached that contract.  Instead, 
question 1 of the special verdict form asked:  "Do you find that Defendant Gary Schuler 
was acting in his capacity as an officer of Wyoming Partners of Jackson Hole, a 
Wyoming corporation, in hiring Mr. Loya and handling Mr. Loya's separation from 
the company?"  The jury answered 
"yes" to this question.  While the 
purpose of that question in the context of these claims is not entirely clear, 
it is certain the answer cannot be interpreted to mean that Mr. Schuler had 
entered into the contract individually with Mr. Loya.  The verdict form then asked, in question 
6, whether Wyoming Partners had breached an employment contract with Mr. Loya, 
and the jury answered "yes."  The 
jury was never asked to determine whether Mr. Schuler had entered into a 
contract with Mr. Loya individually.  
Instead, the jury was instructed to answer question 11, which addressed 
Mr. Schuler's individual liability for breach of contract, only if it had 
answered question 1 "no" finding Mr. Schuler had not been acting in his capacity 
as an officer of Wyoming Partners in his dealings with Mr. Loya.  Therefore, the jury made no finding with 
regard to Mr. Schuler's individual liability for breach of the employment 
contract. 

 

[¶9]      In the 
alternative, Mr. Loya had also pled promissory estoppel contending that both 
defendants were estopped from denying a contract existed.  However, the jury answered "NA" to 
question 23, which inquired as to the elements of promissory estoppel, 
apparently because it had already found a breach of contract and question 23 
instructed the jury to answer only if there was no contract.  Consequently, the jury made no findings 
to support a judgment against Mr. Schuler based upon the claim of promissory 
estoppel either.

 

[¶10]   Question 13 instructed the jury not 
to consider whether Mr. Schuler had a "special relationship" with Mr. Loya that 
would support a covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim against Mr. 
Schuler individually unless it had answered "yes" to question 11 which addressed 
Mr. Shuler's individual liability for breach of contract.  With regard to the claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against Mr. Schuler, the verdict form 
instructed the jury not to answer question 19, which asked whether Mr. Schuler 
engaged in conduct which would support that tort, unless it had answered "no" to 
question 1.  In question 22, the 
jury answered "no" to the question of whether Mr. Schuler's actions justified 
punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  

 

[¶11]   Reviewing all of the jury's answers 
to the questions posed by the special verdict form, we can find none that 
support a judgment against Mr. Schuler individually on any of the causes of 
action pled by Mr. Loya.  Despite 
the lack of such findings, Mr. Loya argues that the jury did not intend to 
relieve Mr. Schuler of his individual liability and, consequently, the judgment 
entered by the district court in Mr. Schuler's favor was in error.  In reality, Mr. Loya's problems stem 
from the construction of the special verdict form and having failed, pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 49(a), to insist on findings either by the jury or the court on Mr. 
Schuler's individual liability or to object to the special verdict form 
submitted to the jury by the district court.  

 

[¶12]   Wyo. R. Civ. Proc. 49(a) governs 
special verdict forms and states that if any issue of fact raised by the 
pleadings or by the evidence is omitted from the special verdict form, each 
party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted, unless, 
before the jury retires, the party demands its submission to the jury.  Further, the trial court may make a 
finding as to an issue of fact omitted without such demand, but if it fails to 
do so, the trial court "shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with 
the judgment on the special verdict."  
Id.  We have recently 
addressed this rule and the serious consequences that can befall a party who 
omits issues of fact from a special verdict form that are crucial to that 
party's success in the litigation.  
WERCS, ¶ 17.  See 
also Ansin v. River Oaks Furniture, Inc., 105 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 
1997); AG Systems, Inc. v. United Decorative Plastics Corp., 55 F.3d 970 
(4th Cir. 1995); Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995); 
and Hyde v. Land-of-Sky Regional Council, 572 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 
1978).  A timely objection to a 
verdict form considered to be inconsistent or irregular is essential to 
preservation of such an issue on appeal.  
Addakai v. Witt, 2001 WY 85, 31 P.3d 70 (Wyo. 2001). 

 

[¶13]    Special verdict forms constitute 
additional instructions to the jury, and as a consequence, Rule 51, which 
governs jury instructions and objections to jury instructions, is also 
applicable here.  It reads in 
pertinent part: "Before the argument of the case to the jury is begun, the court 
shall give to the jury such instructions on the law as may be necessary and the 
same shall be in writing, numbered and signed by the judge, and shall be taken 
by the jury when it retires.  No 
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the 
objection."  See North Central 
Gas Co. v. Bloem, 376 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1962); Ortega v. 
State, 966 P.2d 961 (Wyo. 1998).  

 

[¶14]   This Court applied Rule 49(a) and 
Rule 51 in Davis v. 
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840 (Wyo. 1990), 
where the jury was instructed that it need not consider the additional 
interrogatories if the answer to the first interrogatory was in the 
negative.  While the court and 
counsel had considered the instructions and the verdict form at length at 
conference, and numerous objections were made to various instructions, there was 
no objection to the first interrogatory at any time before the jury retired as 
required by Rule 51.   In 
resolving the case, we explained the purpose of Rule 51 is to inform the court 
of the nature and specific grounds of contended error in the instruction or 
verdict form so that the judge may reconsider the same and correct or modify it, 
if necessary, to avoid error.  
Davis, 802 P.2d  at 843.  

 

[¶15]   Mr. Loya asserts he objected to the 
special verdict form, but the record does not reflect such an objection.  In fact, while sparse, the record 
reflects that Mr. Loya failed to object when given the opportunity to do so.3  After all witnesses had testified, the 
court held a hearing for the sole purpose of allowing the parties to put their 
objections to jury instructions on the record.  Mr. Loya's attorney objected to 
instruction number 20, relating to the defendants' claims of misrepresentation, 
and number 23, relating to consideration of Mr. Loya's failure to seek 
counseling on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  No objection to any portion of the 
special verdict form exists in the record.  
Furthermore, Mr. Loya's own proposed verdict form did not ask the jury 
whether Mr. Schuler entered into a contract individually with Mr. Loya, or 
whether he breached such contract.  
His proposed verdict form simply asked the jury what Mr. Loya's damages 
were if they found that Wyoming Partners breached its contract.4   

 

[¶16]   We do not think it harsh or 
unreasonable to require a litigant, when an opportunity is afforded during the 
trial, to timely bring a matter such as this to the attention of the trial court 
in order that it might be corrected, and failing to do this he shall not be 
heard here to complain.  Addakai 
at ¶ 28.  As in Davis 
and Capshaw, Mr. Loya's failure to object is fatal to his 
appeal.  A careful reading of the 
special verdict form would have alerted Mr. Loya to the possibility of the jury 
making no findings on Mr. Schuler's individual liability for breach of 
contract.  The parties are held 
accountable for creating and acquiescing to an inartfully drafted jury verdict 
form.  Dewey v. Wentland, 
2002 WY 2, 38 P.3d 402, (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶17]   We are not unsympathetic to Mr. 
Loya's dilemma.  However, the matter 
of waiver is grounded, among other things, on the proposition that jury trials 
are time-consuming and costly proceedings, and while litigants are entitled to a 
fair trial, they have responsibilities to assist the trial court in bringing 
about such a result.  DeWitt v. 
Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1963).  
Mr. Loya provides us with no authority that would allow us to alter the 
district court's judgment, which is founded upon the jury's specific findings. 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   Having not properly preserved the 
issue before the district court, Mr. Loya is foreclosed from raising objections 
to the verdict form on appeal.  We 
hold the district court's judgment in favor of Mr. Schuler was consistent with 
the jury's findings in the special verdict form and affirm.  

 

FOOTNOTES

1In 
his pretrial memorandum, Mr. Loya sought to amend his complaint to include the 
claim of promissory estoppel as an alternative to his claims of breach of 
contract and violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

2Indeed, 
Mr. Loya argued the corporate veil need not be pierced because the 
contract was between Mr. Loya and Mr. Schuler individually.  Mr. Loya attempted to argue that because 
the letter verifying his employment was dated August 21, and the company was not 
officially incorporated until September 11, retroactive to September 1, a 
contract existed between Mr. Loya and Mr. Schuler, as well as between Mr. Loya 
and Jackson Sign Company.  Mr. Loya 
concludes "the employment contract with Mr. Loya was entered into by Gary and 
Elizabeth Schuler and they agreed to be bound by it," citing Peters Grazing 
Association v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 449 (Wyo. 1975).  Peters Grazing actually holds 
that acceptance by the corporation of the benefits of a contract amounts to an 
implied ratification by the corporation of a contract entered into prior to 
incorporation.  Id. at 
454.  However, Wyoming Partners 
never argued its incorporation avoided the contract Mr. Schuler entered into on 
its behalf and Mr. Loya never argued that the corporation was liable instead of 
Mr. Schuler, but in addition to him.  
Nonetheless, this argument does not overcome the issue of whether or not 
Mr. Schuler individually entered into a contract was addressed by the 
jury.

 

3The 
limited portion of the record we are provided with on appeal consists of one 
witness's testimony and a brief colloquy at the end of the trial.  The appellant bears the burden of 
bringing to the reviewing court a sufficient record on which to base a 
decision.  Erhart v. Evans, 
2001 WY 79, 30 P.3d 542 (Wyo. 2001). 

 

4Mr. 
Loya designated his proposed verdict form as part of the record and the record 
index reflects it was filed.  
However, for reasons unknown to this Court, the document itself was 
omitted from the record on appeal.  
A copy was attached to Wyoming Partners' brief as an appendix.  It read as follows: 

 

We 
the jury, being duly impaneled, and after careful consideration of all of the 
evidence presented at trial, find as follows:

 

1.   Did an express or 
implied employment contract exist between Plaintiff and Wyoming Partners? (Yes 
or No)

 

(If 
your answer to this questions is no, skip to question 
4.)

 

2.   Was Plaintiff's 
employment wrongfully terminated by the Defendant Corporation? (Yes or 
No)

 

3.   Was Plaintiff's 
employment wrongfully terminated by the Defendant Gary Schuler? (Yes or 
No)

 

4.   Did Defendants make 
material representations upon which Plaintiff relied to his detriment? (Yes or 
No)

 

5.   Are one or both 
Defendants guilty of intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon Plaintiff? 
(Yes or No)

 

If 
you find, in response to the preceding questions,  that an employment contract existed 
between plaintiff and defendant Wyoming Partners, and that Wyoming Partners 
breached that contract by wrongfully terminating plaintiff, what amount of 
damages has  plaintiff suffered as a 
consequence?

 

$_________

 

If 
you find one or both defendants guilty of inflicting intentional emotional 
distress upon plaintiff, what damages has plaintiff suffered as a 
consequence?

 

$_________

 

If 
you find one or both defendants guilty of making material representations or 
promises upon which plaintiff relied to his detriment by leaving his previous 
employment and relocating his family to Jackson, Wyoming, what damages has 
plaintiff suffered as a consequence?

 

$_________

 

If 
you find defendant's conduct to have been willful and wanton misconduct, what 
damages are appropriate for the purpose of punishing the defendants and to deter 
the defendants and others similarly situated from engaging in similar conduct in 
the future?

 

$_________

 

TOTAL damages awarded to Plaintiff:  
$_______________