Title: Chapman v. Meyers

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Chapman v. Meyers1995 WY 108899 P.2d 48Case Number: 94-261Decided: 07/13/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Worker's Compensation Claim of: Brad CHAPMAN,

 Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

Anderson MEYERS, Appellee 
(Employer-Respondent), and State of Wyoming, ex rel., 

Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division,

 Appellee 
(Objector-Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Park County, John T. Langdon, J.

Dick L. Kahl, 
Powell, for appellant.

No appearance, 
for appellee Anderson Meyers.

Richard J. 
Albanese, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Powell, for appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Div.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal we 
decide whether injuries suffered by an employee in an automobile accident while 
returning home from work are compensable under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act. A hearing examiner determined the employee was not within the course and 
scope of his employment and denied benefits. The district court affirmed that 
decision.

[¶2]      We also 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant Brad 
Chapman raises these issues:

1. Did the required 
"nexus" exist between Employee/Claimant's employment and the accident in which 
the Employee/Claimant was injured?

2. Were the injuries 
suffered by Employee/Claimant in a motor vehicle accident caused by a "special 
risk" associated with his employment and thus compensable under the Worker's 
Compensation Act?

3. Did the District Judge 
in affirming the decision of the Hearing Examiner apply an incorrect definition 
of "injury"?

[¶4]      The Worker's 
Compensation Division states these issues:

1. Whether the 
Employee-Claimant's claim for benefits is foreclosed by the "going to and coming 
from" rule contained in prior case law of the Wyoming Supreme Court as well as 
Wyoming Statute Section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (1993) and Wyoming Statute Section 
27-311(n) (1977)?

2. Whether the so-called 
"special risk" exception applies in this case or whether that exception exists 
in Wyoming?

[¶5]      Chapman filed his 
claim for worker's compensation benefits on September 7, 1990, asserting he had 
suffered an injury on December 6, 19841, while in the course and scope of 
his employment. After three years of proceedings, Chapman's case came on for 
hearing on its merits.2 The record does not provide a very 
clear picture of the facts which govern the result in this case. We perceive 
these to be the material facts which were relied upon by the hearing examiner in 
reaching his decision.

[¶6]      After completing 
his work shift on December 6, 1984, Chapman left his job on a drilling rig 
located near Hayden, Colorado, to return home to Wyoming to visit his family for 
several days. The rig crew lived in a motel in Craig, Colorado. Chapman was 
traveling in a vehicle owned by the wife of a co-employee. Chapman and three 
other employees car-pooled from Craig to the rig site. The employees were not 
reimbursed for travel to and from the rig, nor was a travel allowance paid as 
part of overall wages. The road leading to the rig was a two-lane, graveled, 
public road through a mountainous area. The road was snow-packed the day of the 
accident. Approximately one mile from the rig, the vehicle in which Chapman rode 
collided head-on with a tanker truck heading to the rig. In that collision 
Chapman suffered severe injuries when he was thrown from the back seat of the 
vehicle into the windshield.

[¶7]      Loren Martinez 
was one of the other passengers in the vehicle with Chapman and it was his task 
to bring a water jug filled with water to and from work with the group. He did 
not know who owned the water jug, though another co-employee believed it had 
been given to the employees by the employer.

[¶8]      This court has 
settled the standard for reviewing factual findings made in worker's 
compensation hearings. If, after examining the entire record, we discern 
substantial evidence to support the agency's findings, we will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the agency. Under such circumstances we must uphold the 
agency's findings. Britton v. Halliburton Services, 895 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Wyo. 
1995); Jaqua v. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 873 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶9]      We begin our 
analysis from the vantage point of a well-established rule. Ordinarily an 
employee is not within the course of employment when he is injured going to and 
from work. Railworks, Inc. v. Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Wyo. 1986); Corean v. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 723 P.2d 58, 61 (Wyo. 1986); Western Power 
Service & Constr. v. Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815, 816 (Wyo. 1983); H.K. Ferguson 
Co. v. Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 250-51 (Wyo. 1977)3.

[¶10]   Chapman contends his employer 
required, and contemplated, that its employees would not be able to live at the 
well site. Rather, of necessity, they would have to live in Craig and commute to 
the rig. Therefore, he argues, there is a sufficient nexus between the injury 
and his employment to require compensation. Chapman does not provide us with the 
benefit of much authority on this point. Under the factual circumstances 
outlined above, we are not persuaded Chapman was in the course and scope of his 
employment merely while driving to and from the work site under what can only be 
described as relatively typical (in Wyoming/Colorado) commuting circumstances. 
See Cody v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 413 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 
1987); Clark v. Daniel Morine Constr. Co., 98 Idaho 114, 559 P.2d 293, 294 
(1977); Stark v. L.E. Myers Co., 58 Mich. App. 439, 228 N.W.2d 411 (1975); see 1 
ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 16 (1995).

[¶11]   Chapman contends the presence of an 
employer's water can in the vehicle provides the necessary nexus to sustain his 
claim. The record is hazy as to exactly who owned the water can and whether it 
benefitted only Chapman's immediate group of employees, or both the employer and 
the employees. There are a number of cases on this subject of which we shall 
make note.

[¶12]   For instance, in Hackfeld v. 
Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 393 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ.App. 1965), the court 
held the presence of a water can belonging to an employer did not change the 
fact the employees were going to and from work and were not in the course of 
employment. Also see Henshaw v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n, 282 S.W.2d 928 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1955); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Forson, 268 S.W.2d 219 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1954).

[¶13]   On the other hand, in Ince v. 
Chester Westfall Drilling Co., 346 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1959), concerning an employee 
killed in an automobile accident while returning home from work, the employee 
was carrying an empty water can which the employer owned and the water was used 
by the drilling crew while on the job. The reviewing court reversed the 
determinations of the trial judge and the Industrial Commission that the injury 
had not arisen out of and in the course of employment. Ince, 346 P.2d  at 348 
(and cases cited therein); and see Hughes v. Haco Drilling Co., 340 P.2d 472 
(Okla. 1959). Sustaining a jury award on the basis that the question was one for 
the jury and the evidence sufficient, the Fifth Circuit held that an employee 
killed while on his way to an ice house to obtain ice for the drilling crew's 
water can could have been within the course and scope of his employment. 
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Bush, 201 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1953); and see Janak 
v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964) (remanding for 
further consideration of a similar question).

[¶14]   In fleshing out his contentions in 
this regard, Chapman relies on our decision in Corean v. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div., 723 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1986). In that case we reaffirmed and 
clarified a rule which focuses on the nexus between the injury and the 
employment. We held that where an employee was carrying his employer's tools in 
his truck and had entered the zone where the employment took place, and the 
employer thereby benefitted, the injuries suffered by the employee in a one car 
accident were compensable. Corean, 723 P.2d at 61-63; and see Richard v. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Div., 831 P.2d 244, 247 (Wyo. 1992). In this instance, the 
hearing examiner found that the presence of the water can was not a significant 
benefit to the employer; indeed, any connection of the employer with the water 
can is equivocal. We hold there is substantial evidence to support the hearing 
examiner's findings to that effect.

[¶15]   Chapman contends his employment was 
attended by a "special risk," principally the winding mountain road which led to 
the rig. We will not recite the many cases contained in Chapman's brief. The law 
governing this area is well summarized in 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION § 15.13 (1995). This court has not previously had occasion to 
discuss the "special risk" rule. On this occasion, we neither embrace nor reject 
that rule. We do hold substantial evidence exists to support the hearing 
examiner's finding that the elements of a "special risk" were not present. The 
record reveals only that the road was a public, two-lane, gravel road in a 
mountainous area; Chapman was injured in a head-on collision on that road; and 
the accident occurred within a mile or so of the rig site. Those facts would not 
call into play the concept of a special risk, even if we were to give that rule 
full recognition. See Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166-68 
(Utah 1985).

[¶16]   Chapman also contends the hearing 
examiner erroneously applied an incorrect definition of "injury." We agree with 
Chapman that the definition in effect at the time of his accident would be the 
correct one to apply. That definition was:

(xii) "Injury" means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, and includes 
damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer, incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to business. * * *.

WYO. STAT. § 
27-12-102(a)(xii) (1983). Subsection (D), which we recited above in footnote 3, 
was not a part of that definition in December 1984. However, even if the hearing 
examiner did cite the wrong definition of "injury," we hold such error to be 
harmless. The result would be exactly the same under the circumstances of this 
case, whether the former or the latter definition was employed. Any error in 
reciting the incorrect definition is harmless and we must disregard it. WYO. 
R.APP.P. 9.04 (1992).

[¶17]   The order of the district court 
affirming the hearing examiner's denial of benefits is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1           
Because of legal incompetence caused by the accident at issue, Chapman 
was considered to have timely filed his claim for benefits and no further 
question in that regard is raised in this appeal. We also note Chapman suffered 
his injuries in Colorado, but the Division determined that under WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-204(a) (Supp. 1994), that fact was not an impediment to the 
claim.

2           
The claim was filed on September 7, 1990. The case was originally 
docketed in Park County, then transferred to Natrona County, and then returned 
to Park County on April 9, 1991. The hearing examiner found the claim had not 
been timely filed and dismissed it by decision entered on December 19, 1991. 
Upon review, the district court reversed the hearing examiner, finding that the 
period of limitations was tolled by Chapman's incompetence. That order was 
entered on July 17, 1992. By order entered of record on August 13, 1993, the 
hearing examiner denied benefits. Chapman sought review of that determination on 
August 31, 1993. The district court affirmed by order entered on September 2, 
1994. Further review was sought in this court and the matter was docketed here 
on October 31, 1994. Briefing in this court was completed by the parties on 
January 26, 1995. The case was assigned to the expedited docket on February 7, 
1995, and was conferenced upon by this court on April 11, 1995.

3           
This rule has now been codified at WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) 
(Supp. 1994): Injury does not include "Any injury sustained during travel to or 
from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is 
transported by a vehicle of the employer." That language was added to the 
statute in 1986. 1986 WYO. SESS. LAWS (Special Session) Ch. 3. Because Chapman's 
accident occurred on December 6, 1984, we apply the law as it stood at the time 
of that occurrence. Morris v. Smith, 837 P.2d 679, 681 (Wyo. 1992); Shapiro v. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 703 P.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Wyo. 
1985).