Title: JUAN JOSE VALLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JUAN JOSE VALLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 43132 P.3d 181Case Number: 05-31Decided: 04/12/2006
APRIL TERM, 
A.D. 2006

 
 
JUAN JOSE 
VALLE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Matthew D. Obrecht, Student Intern.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]       Mr. Valle 
appeals from an order denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  He contends that the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion without holding an 
evidentiary hearing.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]       Did the 
district court err in denying Mr. Valle's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
without a hearing?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       Mr. Valle 
was charged with three counts of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2001).  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, he pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance, marijuana, in exchange for dismissal of the other two 
charges.  Before accepting Mr. 
Valle's plea, the district court made the necessary advisements in accordance 
with W.R.Cr.P. 11.  Mr. Valle was 
also advised that his plea might have possible immigration consequences:  

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . It's my understanding the 
defendant will plead guilty to Count III, would be sentenced to a term in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary of three to five years with credit for time 
served.  That time would be 
suspended.  The defendant would be 
placed on supervised probation for a period of five years with the Department of 
Corrections here in Wyoming.  
The defendant would report to Probation and Parole within 24 hours after 
coming out of INS custody, or after he returns to the U.S. if, in fact, he is deported from the 
U.S.

 
 
. . . 

 
 
And after the conclusion of today's 
proceedings, the defendant would be placed in the ParkCountyDetentionCenter under an INS hold for further 
proceedings with that agency.

 
 
. . . 

 
 
[DEFENSE]:  Your Honor, that's my understanding of 
the agreement.  Of course, the 
probationary term mentioned by [the prosecutor] is contingent upon Mr. Valle 
actually being released by INS, and we don't know the outcome of that.  But in that event, certainly we agree he 
would be placed on probation.  
Probably he would desire to continue to reside in Washington, if that's 
allowed, so that would be transferred or he would apply for a transfer.  But I think he understands that in the 
event things work out and he is released by INS, that he would have to first 
report to the Wyoming office before that could be 
transferred.  I think that was 
correctly stated by [the prosecutor].

 
 
. . . 

 
 
[COURT]:  And do you understand that the essence 
of the plea agreement is that you would be pleading guilty to Count III, and in 
exchange for that, then, the State would be dismissing Counts I and II?  The recommendation to the Court with 
respect to Count III is that you would be sentenced to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary for a term of not less than three years and not more than five 
years, and that you would also get credit on that sentence for any time you 
already have served on this matter.  

 
 
That sentence to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary would be suspended, and you would be placed on five years 
supervised probation if you either stay in the United States or return to the 
United States.  In other words, if 
you are deported, while you're gone out of the country, you will not be on 
probation; but if you stay or if you return outside of the custody, of course, 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, then you would be on probation 
for that period of five years, and you would be required to report to the Park 
County [O]ffice of Probation and Parole within 24 hours.

 
 
The district court found a 
sufficient factual basis for the plea, determined that Mr. Valle was competent 
to enter his plea, and that his plea was knowing and voluntary. 

 
 
[¶4]       The 
district court accepted the plea and imposed the recommended sentence.  The district court also ordered that Mr. 
Valle's probationary term would commence immediately if he remained in the 
United States for any reason 
outside the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service1 and if Mr. Valle was 
deported, the probation would commence when he returned to the 
United 
States.  

 
 
[¶5]       After the 
judgment and sentence was entered, Mr. Valle filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  The district court 
denied the motion without a hearing.  
This appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]       We recently 
discussed our standard of review for a post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea 
in Deloge:

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that if a 
motion to withdraw a plea is made after sentencing, a plea may be set aside only 
to correct manifest injustice. Manifest injustice contemplates a situation that 
is unmistakable or indisputable, was not foreseeable, and affects the 
substantial rights of a party. It is, in part, intended to address a fundamental 
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an 
omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. The party 
seeking to withdraw his pleas bears the burden of demonstrating manifest 
injustice. Justification for this heightened standard for withdrawal of a plea 
after sentencing is based in the 

 
 
practical considerations important 
to the proper administration of justice. Before sentencing, the inconvenience to 
court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as 
compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to 
trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after 
sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of 
potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly 
severe. The result would be to undermine respect for the courts and fritter away 
the time and painstaking effort devoted to the sentencing 
process.

            
A district court has discretion in determining whether a party has proved 
manifest injustice. Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the 
district court's determination.  A 
district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea will not be 
reversed for an abuse of discretion so long as the district court reasonably 
could conclude as it did.

 
 

Deloge v. State, 2005 WY 152, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 573, 
578-579 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).

 
 
[¶7]       Whether a 
district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to deciding a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by the test we adopted in Coleman: 

 
 
[I]f the defendant 
alleges facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, the trial 
court must hold a hearing. To prevent a possible deluge of unnecessary court 
proceedings, the second element of the test allows a trial court to deny a 
hearing if the defendant's allegations are contradicted by the record, are 
inherently unreliable, or are merely conclusions rather than statements of 
fact.

Coleman v. State, 843 P.2d 558, 559-60 
(Wyo. 1992) 
(internal citations and footnote omitted).  
We have also recognized that "[i]f the defendant offers no plausible 
reason for withdrawal, the trial court has discretion to deny the motion without 
a hearing."  Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 468 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]       Mr. Valle 
contends the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea without a hearing.  Mr. Valle 
claims that "what has been alleged in this case is [he] was given affirmative 
mis-advice regarding the consequences of his plea."  He claims that he was advised only of 
the possibility of deportation, and asserts that a conviction of possession with 
intent to deliver requires mandatory deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(B) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).2  Mr. Valle contends that his plea was not 
entered voluntarily as a result of the erroneous advice.  He further contends that a hearing was 
necessary to develop the record "to show what advice he did receive and also to 
explore why alternative dispositions were not sought."  

 
 
[¶9]       The law 
concerning whether a defendant must be advised about immigration consequences 
before entering a guilty plea is well settled.  Immigration consequences are a 
collateral issue and no advice need be given to a defendant concerning those 
consequences:

 
 
A trial court's duty to insure that 
a defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters one 
extends only to direct consequences 
of such a plea. Possible deportation, or extradition to another country, is a 
speculative and collateral consequence of a guilty plea at best, and is not a 
part of the information which must be conveyed to a defendant under Rule [11], 
W.R.Cr.P. 

 
 
Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasis in original).  However, when an attorney affirmatively 
misrepresents deportation consequences to his or her clients, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel may arise.  See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 
1015-1017 (9th Cir.Cal. 2005); United 
States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 189-191 (2d Cir.N.Y. 
2002).

 
 
[¶10]     Although we understand 
Mr. Valle's desire to assert a claim of affirmative misadvice on appeal, the 
record does not support his contention that such claim was presented to the 
district court in his motion to withdraw his plea.  The pertinent allegations of Mr. Valle's 
motion state:  

 
 
            
4.         
Mr. Valle contends he was not advised that if he pled to possession 
instead of possession with the intent to deliver, he would not be deported.  This contention is based on information 
Mr. Valle received from his attorney representing him in the deportation 
proceedings.  

 
 
. . . 

 
 
            
6.         
Mr. Valle was not advised of a possible alternative course of action 
which would prevent him from being deported out of the country he has considered 
his home since he was a young child.  
Without knowing all of the alternative courses of action open to him, Mr. 
Valle could not make a voluntary and intelligent choice to 
plead.

            
 

                 

Our review is limited to the 
allegations contained in the motion and the materials before the district court 
at the time the motion was denied.  
Nothing contained in the motion suggests that Mr. Valle was seeking a 
withdrawal of his plea due to affirmative misadvice. 

 

[¶11]     The district court is 
required to hold a hearing regarding a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea only when a defendant alleges facts, which if true, would entitle him to 
relief.  Coleman, 843 P.2d  at 559-60.  Mr. Valle failed to make any such 
allegations in his motion.  In his 
motion, he alleged a failure to advise him of immigration consequences of a plea 
to a lesser charge.  Mr. Valle made 
no allegation of affirmative misadvice in his motion or any allegation that he 
was ever offered the opportunity to plead to the lesser offense referenced in 
his motion.  Mr. Valle's motion 
failed to allege a fundamental defect in the proceedings that would rise to the 
level of manifest injustice.  His 
motion offers no plausible basis for withdrawal of the plea and, accordingly, we 
find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Mr. Valle's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea without a hearing.

 
 
[¶12]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service has since been renamed the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Service.  See 6 U.S.C.S. § 291 (Supp. 
2005).

 
 

2With our resolution of this appeal, we 
need not analyze whether deportation is mandatory pursuant to the cited federal 
statutes.