Title: Skudlarek v. Dept. of Employment and Training

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

SKUDLAREK_V_DEPT_EMPLOYMENT_TRAINING.91-502; 160 Vt. 277; 627 A.2d 340



NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 91-502


Karen L. Skudlarek                           Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Employment Security Board

Department of Employment and                 October Term, 1992
Training; Portland Street Corp.,
Employer


Lawrence Leland and Mary Anne Gucciardi, board members

James C. May, South Royalton Legal Clinic, and A. J. Ruben and Glynis
   MacVeety, Law Students, South Royalton, for plaintiff-appellant

Brooke Pearson, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee Vermont Department of
Employment & Training


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     DOOLEY, J.   Claimant Karen Skudlarek appeals from a decision of the
Vermont Employment Security Board denying her unemployment compensation
benefits because she voluntarily quit her job as a nurse's aide at the
Tranquility Nursing Home.  We conclude that her voluntary termination was
with good cause attributable to her employer and reverse.
     Claimant was employed for a period of fourteen months at the nursing
home.  She was hired as a part-time worker for three eight-hour days per
week on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.  In December of 1990, the nursing
home modified its patient care procedures so that employees would be
assigned to specific patients.  In the new procedures, it was unwilling to
allow employees to work only part time, and in February 1991, notified
claimant that her position was being converted to full time.  She was
offered the full-time job or, alternatively, a weekend schedule that was
considered full time for twenty-four hours (two twelve-hour days) of work.
She considered but declined the offers because of child care difficulties.
She was told that if she changed her mind by March 1st she probably could
still have the full-time job.
     She requested the full-time weekday job on February 25th, but the
position had already been filled.  The employer offered to allow her to fill
in for another full-time employee who was going on medical leave, to
continue as a substitute after the medical leave ended, and to give her the
next full-time permanent position that arose.  When claimant rejected this
alternative, she was laid off on March 1, 1991.
     Both the referee and the Employment Security Board found that claimant
"left the employ of her last employing unit voluntarily without good cause
attributable to such employing unit" because she refused to continue under
the terms offered by the employer.  She was denied benefits pursuant to 21
V.S.A. { 1344(a)(2)(A).  The Board found that claimant was aware that her
work schedule could be changed and had resolved her child care problems;
consequently, there was no good cause for her refusal to continue working
under the new conditions.  The Board summarized its rationale as follows:
     While there is no question that unilateral changes effected by an
     employer which have an adverse impact on an employee can provide
     that individual with the requisite good cause attributable to the
     employer to quit his or her job without disqualification for
     unemployment compensation benefits, the options given to the
     claimant by the employer, all involving changes, were not of that
     type.

     Although the parties differ over the characterization of claimant's
termination and the proper resolution of the case, they agree that the
characterization does not affect the outcome.  We also agree with this
conclusion; therefore, for purposes of analysis, we use the Board's
characterization that claimant left her employment voluntarily.
     Many of the issues raised by claimant involve events that occurred
after claimant unsuccessfully attempted to accept the full-time position
that was originally offered.  We do not find these events to be relevant to
our disposition, and we do not reach the issues related to them.
     A voluntary termination is grounds for disqualification from
unemployment compensation benefits only if it is "without good cause
attributable to" the employer.  21 V.S.A. { 1344(a)(2)(A).  In determining
good cause, we must examine each case according to a standard of
reasonableness.  See Isabelle v. Department of Employment & Training, 150
Vt. 458, 460, 554 A.2d 660, 661 (1988).  The claimant bears the burden of
proving good cause.  See id.  On review of the Board's determination, we
will not disturb factual findings supported by credible evidence.  See Allen
v. Department of Employment & Training, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 618 A.2d 1317,
1319 (1992).
     The critical fact in this case is that the employer precipitated the
situation by requiring claimant, who had worked part time for over a year
and since the beginning of her employment, to work full time (or two twelve-
hour weekend days) in order to retain a job.  That circumstance is clearly
attributable to the employer; the question is whether it creates good cause
to quit.  The Board concluded that this change in hours to be worked was not
of the "type" to constitute good cause for claimant to leave.  We find this
conclusion to be in error.
     There is nothing in our case law to support a categorical approach that
certain types of causes can never justify a voluntary termination.  More
important, although we have not ruled directly on the question, the law from
other jurisdictions shows that the kind of work schedule change that
occurred here is normally sufficient to justify the claimant to quit. See
Murray v. Rutledge,