Title: Midkiff v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting,
1 Lacy,  
Hassell, and Keenan, JJ. 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON MIDKIFF  
 
v.  Record No. 941716 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                    September 15, 1995 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
I. 
 
Thomas Jefferson Midkiff was convicted by a jury in the 
Circuit Court of Carroll County of two counts of first degree 
murder and one count of arson.  He received a sentence of life 
imprisonment for each murder conviction and 10 years' 
imprisonment and a fine of $15,000 for the arson conviction. 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Midkiff challenged the 
admissibility of a confession he made during a police 
interrogation.  Midkiff contended that during the course of the 
questioning, he effectively invoked his constitutional right to 
counsel and his right to remain silent and that the exercise of 
these rights was not honored by his interrogators.  
Additionally, Midkiff maintained that, considering the totality 
of the circumstances, his confession was involuntary.   
 
The Court of Appeals denied Midkiff's petition for appeal, 
concluding that under the totality of the circumstances Midkiff 
voluntarily answered questions from the officers and that his 
statement, "I'm scared to say anything without talking to a 
lawyer," was not a clear and unambiguous invocation of either 
                     
    
1Justice Whiting participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
August 12, 1995. 
 
 
 
 
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his right to counsel or his right to remain silent.  We granted 
Midkiff's petition for appeal on these same issues and will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
II. 
 
At 8:00 p.m. on December 3, 1991, the Hillsville Volunteer 
Fire Department was dispatched to the scene of a fire at a 
Carroll County residence.  Inside, fire fighters found the 
bodies of Sheila Marie Ring and her two-year-old daughter, 
Jasmine Sutphin.  Although the bodies were badly burned, 
subsequent autopsies revealed that both victims died from 
wounds inflicted prior to the fire.  The cause of Ring's death 
was determined to be multiple stab wounds.  Sutphin died from a 
single cut to her throat. 
 
During the course of the investigation, Ring's landlord, 
Rhudy Lineberry, told investigators that he had seen a man on 
the porch of Ring's residence around 5:30 p.m. on the evening 
of the fire.  Lineberry later identified this man as Midkiff.  
 After being informed by his brother-in-law that he was a 
suspect, Midkiff voluntarily went to the sheriff's office for 
questioning on December 5, 1991, at 10:40 p.m.  Midkiff was 
read his Miranda rights before being questioned.  After 
approximately 20 minutes of questioning, Midkiff agreed to go 
to the state police headquarters in Wytheville for a polygraph 
examination and further interrogation.  Although he initially 
denied any involvement with the murders and the arson, during 
 
 
 
 
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the course of questioning at Wytheville Midkiff orally 
confessed to both murders and signed two written confessions.  
He was given his Miranda rights twice more at Wytheville, once 
prior to taking three polygraph examinations and again before 
signing the written confessions. 
 
III. 
 
Midkiff relies on two exchanges during the course of his 
interrogation in Wytheville to sustain his contention that he 
invoked his constitutional rights.  During post-polygraph 
questioning by State Police Special Agent T.S. Svard, the 
following conversation transpired: 
 
MR. SVARD:  This is the only job I've had in twenty-
three (23) years where I can actually help people.  
You can't help them in uniform.  You can't help them 
out there.  Here, I can help them, help them.  So I 
want you to tell me what happened. 
 
 
MR. MIDKIFF:  I'll be honest with you, I'm scared to 
say anything without talking to a lawyer. 
 
 
MR. SVARD:  Well, that's entirely up to you, but, 
 
but . . . 
 
 
MR. MIDKIFF:  Because I, I got hoodooed big time back 
in, when I was in, now, don't get me wrong, I ain't 
. . . 
 
 
 
(recorder is turned off) 
 
 
After the recorder was turned back on, Sheriff Carrico 
began questioning Midkiff. 
 
SHERIFF CARRICO:  Let's talk about it.  Be up front 
with me.  I'll be up front with you.  I'll get you 
every bit of help I can.  Was you over there?  Talk 
to me, T.J. 
 
 
MR. MIDKIFF:  I don't got to answer that, Dick, you 
know. 
 
 
 
 
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SHERIFF CARRICO:  No.  You've got to tell me.  I 
can't just up and say T.J., I got to, I got to listen 
to you.  You've got to tell me and the only way that 
I can get you help is for you to tell me. 
 
 
A. 
 
Midkiff relies on the statement, "I'll be honest with you, 
I'm scared to say anything without talking to a lawyer," to 
support the contention that his confession should be suppressed 
because he invoked his right to counsel.  Since the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 474 (1966), courts have recognized that the assertion of 
the right to counsel is a significant event and that thereafter 
all questioning must be suspended until an attorney is present. 
 In the years since Miranda, it has become well established 
that once an accused expresses a desire to exercise his right 
to counsel, authorities may not further interrogate the accused 
until counsel is present unless the accused initiates further 
conversation or exchanges with the authorities.  Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).  Miranda and its progeny 
do not permit the police to continue to interrogate an accused 
in custody if he has "clearly asserted his right to counsel."  
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. 
 
This Court has consistently held that a clear and 
unambiguous assertion of the right to counsel is necessary to 
invoke the Edwards rule.  See Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 
386, 422 S.E.2d 380 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. ___, 113 
 
 
 
 
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S.Ct. 1880 (1993); King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 416 
S.E.2d 669, cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 417 (1992); 
Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991).  Recently, the United States 
Supreme Court, while recognizing that good practice suggests 
that the police should attempt to clarify ambiguous statements, 
nevertheless held that, after a voluntary and knowing waiver of 
Miranda rights, officers may continue questioning until the 
suspect clearly and unequivocally requests an attorney.  Davis 
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2356-57 
(1994).  Therefore, the issue is whether the statement, "I'll 
be honest with you, I'm scared to say anything without talking 
to a lawyer," was a clear and unambiguous assertion by Midkiff 
of his right to counsel. 
 
In prior decisions, we have been faced with the task of 
evaluating statements similar to the one that Midkiff asserts 
is a clear invocation of his right to counsel.  We have held 
that defendants' questions, "Do you think I need an attorney 
here?," Mueller, 244 Va. at 396, 422 S.E.2d at 387, "You did 
say I could have an attorney if I wanted one?," Eaton, 240 Va. 
at 250, 397 S.E.2d at 393, and "Didn't you say I have the right 
to an attorney?," Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 410, 329 
S.E.2d 815, 823, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985), fell short 
of being clear assertions of the right to counsel.  Further, 
the United States Supreme Court recently held that the 
 
 
 
 
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statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not an 
invocation of the right to counsel and, therefore, subsequent 
statements by the accused did not need to be suppressed.  
Davis, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2357. 
 
Midkiff's statement falls within the category of 
statements which do not clearly and unambiguously request an 
attorney.  The statement, "I'm scared to say anything without 
talking to a lawyer," expresses his reservation about the 
wisdom of continuing the interrogation without consulting a 
lawyer; however, it does not clearly and unambiguously 
communicate a desire to invoke his right to counsel.  Midkiff's 
statement, similar to those of the defendants in Mueller, 
Eaton, and Poyner, fell short of requesting counsel in a clear 
and unambiguous manner. 
 
B. 
 
Similar considerations are raised by Midkiff's argument 
concerning his right to remain silent.  Relying on the 
statements, "I'll be honest with you, I'm scared to say 
anything without talking to a lawyer" and "I don't got to 
answer that, Dick, you know," Midkiff maintains that he invoked 
his right to remain silent.  Miranda recognized that if a 
suspect "indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or 
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the 
interrogation must cease."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.  
However, this Court has stated that "Miranda should not be read 
 
 
 
 
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so strictly as to require the police to accept as conclusive 
any statement, no matter how ambiguous, as a sign that the 
suspect desires to cut off questioning."  Lamb v. Commonwealth, 
217 Va. 307, 312, 227 S.E.2d 737, 741 (1976). 
 
Considering Midkiff's statements in context, it is clear 
that both are statements expressing reservations about 
discussing the case but do not invoke his right to remain 
silent.  The transcript of the interrogation session excerpted 
above shows that Midkiff was interrupted by Agent Svard.  When 
Midkiff's statement is examined without Svard's interjection, 
"I'll be honest with you, I'm scared to say anything without 
talking to a lawyer . . . [b]ecause I, I got hoodooed big time 
back in, when I was in, now, don't get me wrong . . .," it is 
clear that Midkiff merely expressed his reservations about 
answering questions based on his past experience with the 
criminal justice system.  As we noted recently, "[i]t is true 
that [the defendant's] statements can be perceived as a 
reservation about the wisdom of continuing the interrogation.  
However, in spite of whatever reservations he may have had, he 
elected to proceed with the interrogation and failed to 
exercise his right to terminate questioning."  Burket v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 610, 450 S.E.2d 124, 132 (1994), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1433 (1995). 
 
Similarly, the second statement, "I don't got to answer 
that, Dick, you know," is simply an affirmation that Midkiff 
 
 
 
 
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understood his right to remain silent.  Nothing within that 
statement connotes a desire to cease all questioning.  Here 
again, we decline to read Miranda so narrowly as to compel 
police interrogators to accept any statement, no matter how 
equivocal, as an invocation of the right to remain silent.  As 
we noted in Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 46, 216 S.E.2d 
28, 32 (1975), had Midkiff wished to terminate the questioning 
he could have simply said "I do not want to answer any more 
questions."   
 
IV. 
 
Midkiff's last contention is that his confession was 
involuntary.  The standard of review for determining whether a 
defendant's confession was voluntary is well established.   
 
"Whether a statement is voluntary is ultimately a 
legal rather than factual question.  See Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450 (1985). 
 Subsidiary factual questions, however, are entitled 
to a presumption of correctness. Id. at 112, 106 
S.Ct. at 451.  The test to be applied in determining 
voluntariness is whether the statement is the 
'product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker,' or whether the maker's will 
'has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired.'  Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).  In determining 
whether a defendant's will has been overborne, courts 
look to 'the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances,' id. at 226, including the defendant's 
background and experience and the conduct of the 
police, Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 464, 
352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987); Stockton, 227 Va. at 140, 
314 S.E.2d at 381." 
 
Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 611, 450 S.E.2d at 132 
(citations omitted).  If the suspect's "will has been overborne 
 
 
 
 
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and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired," 
the confession is considered involuntary and its use is 
unconstitutional.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 
(1973).  Voluntariness is a question of law, subject to 
independent appellate review.  Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 
Va. 576, 581, 423 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992).  The test of 
voluntariness is whether, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the confession was "the product of an 
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."  
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.  In assessing the surrounding 
circumstances, courts will consider the defendant's background 
and the details of the interrogation.  Gray v. Commonwealth, 
233 Va. 313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 157, 163, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
873 (1987). 
 
The record in this case indicates that Midkiff's will was 
not overborne and his capacity for self-determination was not 
impaired.  Although Midkiff and Sheriff Carrico were friends, 
there is no evidence that Sheriff Carrico used any undue 
influence to get Midkiff to discuss the crimes during 
interrogation.  Sheriff Carrico's offer to get Midkiff "help" 
if he talked to him about the murders cannot be considered 
coercion or inducement.  Midkiff's confession was not any less 
a "free and unconstrained choice" by virtue of this friendship. 
 Furthermore, Midkiff is no stranger to the criminal justice 
system.  Prior to the contested charges, Midkiff had been 
 
 
 
 
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convicted of five felonies, starting at the age of eighteen.  
He was 27 years old at the time of the murders in this case.  
It is apparent that Midkiff has experienced several prior 
police interrogations. 
 
Additionally, while the interrogation process lasted well 
into the early morning hours of December 6, 1991, and took 
place at a location approximately 40 miles from Midkiff's home, 
these factors are not sufficient to establish that his will was 
overborne.  All police interviews of suspects have coercive 
aspects to them by virtue of the fact that the interrogating 
officer is part of a system which may ultimately charge the 
suspect with a crime.  Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 
(1977).  With regard to the investigation in this case, Midkiff 
voluntarily went to the sheriff's office for questioning after 
learning from his brother-in-law that Sheriff Carrico wanted to 
talk to him.  In fact, when he was initially given his Miranda 
rights at the sheriff's office, Sheriff Carrico testified that 
Midkiff said something to the effect that "he didn't need to 
know them, that he already knew them."  Later, Midkiff 
willingly went to the state police station to submit to 
polygraph examinations and was again given his Miranda rights 
before the polygraphs and before signing two written 
confessions.  In Midkiff's second statement, he acknowledged 
that he "freely" waived his rights.  The evidence demonstrates 
that Midkiff voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived 
 
 
 
 
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his Miranda rights and agreed to submit to questioning.  
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the evidence simply 
does not suggest any other conclusion. 
 
V. 
 
In conclusion, we find no reversible error in the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals.  Midkiff did not clearly and 
unambiguously invoke his constitutional right to counsel or his 
right to remain silent.  Under the totality of the 
circumstances, his confession was voluntary.  Therefore, for 
the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
 
Affirmed.