Title: DON GRONBERG, SUE GRONBERG, JIM FARMER, WES FOX, RENELDA FOX, CHRISTY FOX, JENNY FOX, DENNIS CICHELLI, SUE CICHELLI, DEBORAH FOX, DON LANDIS, BEVERLY LANDIS, SCOTT AUSTIN, HOLLY AUSTIN, ROBIN MOYER, PETER MOYER, EMILY MOYER, DOUG HANSON, ANNA MARIE HANSON, BARBARA SELLAS, DEBORAH D. WARD, PAUL PERRY, PAM ROMSA, LOU BREITENBACH, KEN JERN and SHERRIE JERN, v. TETON COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY and ERVING W. MANTEY and CARYL S. MANTEY,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DON GRONBERG, SUE GRONBERG, JIM FARMER, WES FOX, RENELDA FOX, CHRISTY FOX, JENNY FOX, DENNIS CICHELLI, SUE CICHELLI, DEBORAH FOX, DON LANDIS, BEVERLY LANDIS, SCOTT AUSTIN, HOLLY AUSTIN, ROBIN MOYER, PETER MOYER, EMILY MOYER, DOUG HANSON, ANNA MARIE HANSON, BARBARA SELLAS, DEBORAH D. WARD, PAUL PERRY, PAM ROMSA, LOU BREITENBACH, KEN JERN and SHERRIE JERN, v. TETON COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY and ERVING W. MANTEY and CARYL S. MANTEY,2011 WY 13Decided: 02/01/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
DON 
GRONBERG, SUE GRONBERG, JIM FARMER, WES FOX, RENELDA FOX, CHRISTY FOX, JENNY 
FOX, DENNIS CICHELLI, SUE CICHELLI, DEBORAH FOX, DON LANDIS, BEVERLY LANDIS, 
SCOTT AUSTIN, HOLLY AUSTIN, ROBIN MOYER, PETER MOYER, EMILY MOYER, DOUG HANSON, 
ANNA MARIE HANSON, BARBARA SELLAS, DEBORAH D. WARD, PAUL PERRY, PAM ROMSA, LOU 
BREITENBACH, KEN JERN and SHERRIE JERN,Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),
v.

TETON 
COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY and ERVING W. MANTEY and CARYL S. MANTEY,Appellees 
(Defendants)

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Peter 
F. Moyer, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Teton County Housing Authority:

James 
L. Radda, Deputy County Attorney, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees Mantey:

            
Andrea 
L. Richard of Richard Law Firm, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
KAUTZ, 
District Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      Gronberg, et al., 
(Appellants) sued the Teton County Housing Authority (TCHA), claiming that TCHA 
violated Wyoming's Public Meetings Act, improperly purchased land for investment 
purposes and incurred debt in violation of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming 
Statutes.  The district court 
dismissed some claims under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in 
favor of TCHA on other claims.  
Appellants appeal those rulings.  We affirm the district court on the 
Public Meetings Act and Wyoming Constitutional issues, but reverse on the Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissals of claims for improperly purchasing the land and financing 
the purchase.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Appellants 
present the following issues on appeal:

 
 
            
I.          
Could the Appellee Teton County Housing Authority (TCHA) ratify a real 
estate sale over 9 months after an illegal meeting occurred approving the 
transaction and over 4 months after the actual closing, where TCHA acknowledges 
that the only vote at the meeting was taken during a secret executive session 
resulting in a "null and void" approval?

 
 
            
II.         
After the real estate closing occurred, is TCHA, as a public Wyoming 
agency, entitled to keep secret an 8 page transcript and tape recording of the 
illegal meeting, where it improperly approved the expenditure of $2.1 Million in 
public funds for the real estate purchase?

 
 
            
III.        Is 
TCHA entitled to pursue a "land banking" real estate investment program, not 
housing projects, where the applicable specific purpose excise tax (SPET) 
funding was approved by the voters for "affordable housing projects," and 
Wyoming Statutes limit the use of SPET funds to the purposes approved by the 
voters, and where Wyoming Statutes strictly limit investments by public 
agencies?

 
 
            
IV.       
Is TCHA, as a public Wyoming agency, entitled to mortgage its properties 
and to pledge future tax receipts?

 
 
            
V.        Can 
the Appellants present these issues in a declaratory judgment 
action?

 
 
[¶3]      TCHA chose not to 
submit its own list of issues.

 
 

FACTUAL 
BACKGROUND

 
 
[¶4]      Appellants are 
landowners and/or residents of Teton County, Wyoming.  TCHA is a housing authority established 
by the Teton County Commissioners pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-10-101 
through 117 (LexisNexis 2009), which gives counties and municipalities in 
Wyoming the authority to create "housing projects."  Housing projects basically involve (1) 
planning, (2) cleaning up or removing substandard buildings, and (3) providing 
or assisting in providing suitable houses to persons of low income.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-101(a)(ii).  A county or municipality may exercise 
its housing project powers directly, or it may establish a "housing authority" 
to act on behalf of the county or municipality.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-115(a).   

 
 
[¶5] 
     Teton County 
chose to establish TCHA to act on its behalf in performing its housing project 
powers.  In 2006, the voters in 
Teton County approved a sales tax, known as a Special Purpose Excise Tax, or 
SPET, to fund TCHA's "affordable housing project."  Such a tax is authorized by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-15-204(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009) which requires tax proceeds to be 
used "for specific purposes authorized by the qualified electors."  The ballot for the tax stated that 
voters were deciding whether to fund

 
 
$5,000,000.00 
for the Teton County Housing Authority's Affordable Housing Program (the 
"project"), which shall include the acquisition, planning, improvement and 
financing of properties as allowed by law and to be utilized for affordable 
housing, or the pledge and use to pay debt service and/or lease payment for such 
purpose . . . .

 
 
[¶6]      TCHA purchased 
real estate including the Mantey property.  
TCHA members recognized that the Mantey property might not be appropriate 
for an "affordable housing" project.  
Even so, the TCHA board thought the Mantey purchase would constitute good 
"land banking" and would be used either directly or indirectly for affordable 
housing.  TCHA borrowed $2 million 
of the purchase price for the Mantey property, planning to use future SPET 
receipts to pay that debt.

 
 
[¶7]      Before purchasing 
the Mantey property, the TCHA board discussed the purchase in an executive 
session on March 1, 2007.  It voted 
to purchase the property in that executive session, and the transaction closed 
on June 9, 2007.  After learning 
that the vote to purchase the Mantey property should not have occurred in a 
closed executive session, TCHA voted to ratify the purchase on September 20, 
2007.   When questions 
developed about public notice for the September 20, 2007 meeting, TCHA voted to 
ratify the purchase again on November 15, 2007.

 
 
[¶8]      Appellants sued 
TCHA and the Manteys, seeking declaratory relief.  The district court dismissed some of 
Appellants' claims under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), finding that Appellants could not 
present any facts under those claims that would entitle them to relief.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees on the balance of the 
claims.

 
 
[¶9]      Further facts are 
included below with the analysis for each issue. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   The district court dismissed some 
claims under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  
These dismissals relate to issues II and IV, listed above.  When reviewing a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, we focus on the allegations contained in the complaint and liberally 
construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 7, 79 P.3d 500, 505-506 (Wyo. 2003) 
(citation omitted).  We will affirm 
an order of dismissal only when it is certain from the face of the complaint 
that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts which would entitle him to 
relief.  Id.  Dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is 
warranted if, having assumed the allegations of the complaint are true and 
viewing the facts in the light most advantageous to the plaintiffs, the facts 
dictate judgment for the defendant as a matter of law.  Cantrell v. Sweetwater County School 
District No. 2, 2006 WY 57, 
¶ 4, 133 P.3d 983, 984 (Wyo. 
2006).  Dismissal is a drastic 
remedy and is sparingly granted; nevertheless, we will sustain a W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the facts of the complaint that the 
plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would entitled that plaintiff to 
relief.  Robinson v. 
Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 
1135-36 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶11]   The district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees on claims that TCHA's land purchase was void 
because it violated Wyoming's Public Meetings Act, and that TCHA had no 
authority to purchase land as an investment.  We review an order granting summary 
judgment de novo.  Wyoming 
Med. Center, Inc. v. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2010 WY 21, ¶ 11, 225 P.3d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 2010). 

 
 
[W]e 
have exactly the same duty as the district judge; and if there is a complete 
record before us, we have exactly the same material as did [the district 
judge].  We must follow the same 
standards.  The propriety of 
granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's 
dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  This court looks at the record from the 
viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all 
favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, 
depositions and other proper material appearing in the 
record.

 
 

Id. 
(citation omitted).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate in a declaratory judgment action so long as there are no 
genuine issues of material fact.  
Snake River Brewing Co., Inc. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 4, 39 P.3d 397, 402 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
            
I.  Can a public agency ratify or cure a 
violation of the Wyoming Public Meetings 
Act?

 
 
[¶12]  We construe statutes according to the 
following standards:

 
 
The 
paramount consideration is to determine the legislature's intent, which must be 
ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  We look first to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  A statute is clear and unambiguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability.  
Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.

 
 

Morris 
v. CMS Oil and Gas Co., 
2010 WY 37, ¶ 26, 227 P.3d 325, 
333 (Wyo. 2010) (citation omitted).

 
 
[¶13]   The Wyoming Public Meetings Act 
requires most governmental actions to be taken in public meetings.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-401 (LexisNexis 
2009) specifies that "[t]he agencies of Wyoming exist to conduct public 
business.  Certain deliberations and 
actions shall be taken openly as provided in this act."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
            
All meetings of the governing body of an agency are public meetings, open 
to the public at all times, except as otherwise provided.  No action of a governing body of an 
agency shall be taken except during a public meeting. . . .  Action taken at a meeting not in 
conformity with [the public meetings] act is null and void and not merely 
voidable.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009) defines "action" as 
follows:

 
 
            
(i) "Action" means the transaction of official business of an agency 
including a collective decision of a governing body, a collective commitment or 
promise by a governing body to make a positive or negative decision, or an 
actual vote by a governing body upon a motion, proposal, resolution, regulation, 
rule, order or ordinance.

 
 
  
[¶14]   TCHA agrees that it violated Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) when it voted to buy the Mantey property at an 
"executive session" which was closed to the public, on March 1, 2007.1  It later took steps to remedy that error 
by properly publishing notice and conducting a public meeting.  The issue here is whether a decision 
made in violation of the Public Meetings Act can ever be remedied, and if so, 
how.  We have not previously 
addressed this issue directly. 

 

[¶15]   Our previous cases applying the Act 
have only arisen when an agency met in private, in violation of the Act, yet did 
not take action on the deliberated matter until a public meeting occurred.  Under those circumstances, we have found 
the Act was not violated, and the action taken is not null and void, 
notwithstanding the private deliberations.  
See Cheyenne Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Building Code Board of Appeals of the City of Cheyenne, 2010 WY 2, 222 P.3d 158 (Wyo. 2010); 
Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 
69, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 
2001).

 
 
[¶16]   The Public Meetings Act does not 
address whether an agency which improperly attempts an action in a closed 
meeting may later correct that error by properly taking action in a public 
meeting.  Appellants contend that 
because the initial decision to purchase the Mantey property was made in 
violation of the Public Meetings Act, the transaction is null and void.  They assert that TCHA must first undo 
the transaction, and then start over, if it wants to own the Mantey 
property.  

 
 
[¶17]   The district court resolved this 
issue via summary judgment, determining that TCHA had effectively cured any 
violation of the Public Meetings Act by later re-voting on the Mantey purchase 
in a properly-noticed public meeting, first on September 20, 2007, and again on 
November 15, 2007.  The facts before 
the district court for the purpose of summary judgment on this matter were 
undisputed.  They showed that TCHA 
in fact independently reconsidered the transaction twice, and both times voted 
to ratify the purchase of the Mantey property.

 
 
[¶18]   When TCHA reconsidered the Mantey 
property purchase on September 20, 2007, its attorney opened the issue by 
stating: 

 
 
  
So 
tonight I ask you to consider whether you want to ratify the agreement to 
purchase the Mantey property or not to ratify it.  And the law requires that you do so with 
an open mind and you have to keep in mind that not ratifying this agreement is 
just as much an option as ratifying the agreement.  So I ask you to, you know, go back in 
time and try to recollect back in March 1, on March 1, what the reasons were at 
that time for going forward with the agreement and for making the offer, and I 
do recall that at the meetings we had, excuse me, after the Jackson State Bank 
decided they were not going to finance the property I think there was even some 
discussion at some of those special meetings about whether this, whether this 
was something the Board still wanted to go through, and you had discussion at 
that time about the merits of going forward with the agreement, so I'm asking 
the Board to, to with a very open mind, decide tonight whether to ratify this 
agreement weighing all the pros and cons that you considered when you discussed 
alternative financing and any pros and cons that you might be, that you might 
consider tonight.  And then when you 
do, at some point I would ask the chair to ask for public comment.  Are there any questions at this 
point?

 
 
[¶19]   TCHA's counsel then engaged in a 
conversation with one of the board members, in which counsel stated that one of 
the board's options was to rescind the agreement to purchase the Mantey 
property.  The Chairman then asked 
for public comment.  There was 
none.  The board then voted to 
ratify the purchase.

 
 
[¶20]   When a question arose about public 
notice for the September 20, 2007, meeting, TCHA held a second hearing on 
November 15, 2007.  TCHA's counsel 
again made a statement to the board asking it to approach the issue with an open 
mind, cautioning that "rescission is just as much an option as ratification so I 
would ask you to once again consider whether you do in fact want to ratify or 
not ratify your purchase of the Mantey property, which occurred in July 
[2007]."  After discussion among the 
board members, the board again voted to "ratify" the 
purchase.

 
 
[¶21]   These facts were undisputed.  TCHA independently and substantially 
reconsidered the Mantey purchase, and properly voted to ratify that purchase in 
a public meeting.  Although we have 
not previously considered whether "void" action under the Public Meetings Act 
can later be ratified or cured, as was done here, other states with similar 
statutes have.  We find discussions 
from Alaska and Tennessee particularly helpful. 

 
 
[¶22]   In Alaska Community Colleges' 
Federation of Teachers, Local No. 2404 v. University of Alaska, 677 P.2d 886, 891-892 (Alaska 1984), the university board of regents voted in executive 
session to merge separate colleges into a state university system.  The applicable section of Alaska's 
public meeting law then provided "[a]ction taken contrary to this section is 
void."  Id. at 890.  The Court recognized, however, that the 
Alaska Act was silent as to how a void action could be remedied.  Examining the Act's purpose and the 
consequences of curing a void action, the court stated:

 
 
  
[Alaska's 
Open Meeting Act] exists primarily to advance the interests of "the people of 
this state."  When the sunshine law 
is breached it is "the people's right to remain informed" which sustains 
injury.  There is no inherent damage 
stemming from the substantive action which is taken; it is the manner of action 
which offends.  Of course, [the Open 
Meeting Act], by ensuring that issues are decided publicly, does attempt to 
insure that better substantive decisions are made through public scrutiny and 
adequate information.

 
 
            
The commentators who have reported upon the sunshine laws in other 
jurisdictions present a picture of the intent behind these statutes consistent 
with our reading of [the Alaska Open Meeting Act].  Open decision-making is regarded as an 
essential aspect of the democratic process.  It is believed that public exposure 
deters official misconduct, makes government more responsive to its 
constituency, allows for greater public provision of information to the 
decision-maker, creates greater public acceptance of government action, and 
promotes accurate reporting of governmental processes. . . .  Note that none of the above rationales 
focus upon the substance of the decision made.

 
 

Id. 
at 891.

 
 
[¶23]   Using this rationale, the Alaska 
Supreme Court determined that the policy behind open meeting laws does not 
prohibit ratification of a "void" action.  
The void act itself is not offensive to the law, but the closed process 
is offensive.  Public ratification 
cures that problem.  

 
 
[¶24]   In Neese v. Paris Special School 
District, 813 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals also considered whether a void decision could be ratified.  It stated:

 
 
[Tennessee's 
open meeting act] provides that "[a]ny action taken at a meeting in violation of 
this part shall be void and of no effect...."  We do not believe that the legislative 
intent of this statute was forever to bar a governing body from properly 
ratifying its decision made in a prior violative manner.  However, neither was it the legislative 
intent to allow such a body to ratify a decision in a subsequent meeting by a 
perfunctory crystallization of its earlier action.  We hold that the purpose of the act is 
satisfied if the ultimate decision is made in accordance with the Public 
Meetings Act, and if it is a new and substantial reconsideration of the issues 
involved, in which the public is afforded ample opportunity to know the facts 
and to be heard with reference to the matters at issue.  See Alaska Comm. Coll. Fed. of 
Teachers v. University of Alaska, 677 P.2d 886, 891 (Alaska 
1984).

 
 

Id. 
at 436.

 
 
[¶25]   The purpose of Wyoming's Public 
Meetings Act is to require open decision making, not to permanently condemn a 
decision or vote in violation of the Act.  
The focus of the Act is on the process of governmental decision making, 
and not on the ultimate decisions.  
It follows that the Act would permit ratification of a prior "void" 
action, if the ratification is done in compliance with the Act.  We hold that an agency may "cure" a 
"void" action made in violation of the Public Meetings Act by conducting a new 
and substantial reconsideration of the action in a manner which complies with 
the Act.  Because the undisputed 
facts show that TCHA did conduct a new and substantial reconsideration of its 
decision to purchase the Mantey property, the district court properly granted 
summary judgment on this issue. 

 
 

            
II.  Are Appellants entitled to a transcript 
and recording of the March 1, 2007, executive session?

 
 
[¶26]   Appellants sought a copy of the 
record made of TCHA's March 1, 2007, executive session.  After ruling that TCHA had properly 
ratified its March 1, 2007, vote to purchase the Mantey property, the district 
court ruled that the request was moot.  
A district court's decision on the question of mootness is an issue of 
law that we review de novo.  
Northfork Citizens for Resp. Dev. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park 
County, 2010 WY 41, ¶ 16, 
228 P.3d 838, 844 (Wyo. 2010).  In 
Northfork we quoted Wyoming's law on mootness from Bard Ranch Co. v. 
Frederick, 950 P.2d 564, 566 
(Wyo. 1997):

 
 
            
Our general law on justiciability provides that courts should not 
consider issues which have become moot.  
We do not decide cases when a decision will have no effect or pertains 
only to matters that might arise in the future.  A case is moot when the determination of 
an issue is sought which, if provided, will have no practical effect on the 
existing controversy.

 
 

Northfork, 
¶ 
18, 228 P.3d  
at 845.

 
 
[¶27]   Production of a transcript or 
recording of the executive session of TCHA would not have an effect on the issue 
of whether TCHA properly ratified its decision later.  However, a record of the executive 
session proceedings could have an impact on other issues that remain pending in 
this case.  As we discuss later in 
this decision, factual issues remain as to whether TCHA purchased the Mantey 
property as an investment, or for direct use as part of an affordable housing 
project.  Appellants' claim for 
discovery of the record of the executive session is not moot with respect to 
that factual issue.

 
 
  
[¶28]   Although Appellants argued that 
they are entitled to the record of the March 1, 2007, TCHA executive session, 
they entirely ignored Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-405(b).  That statute provides: 

 
 
Except 
for those parts of minutes of an executive session reflecting a members' 
objection to the executive session as being in violation of this act, minutes 
and proceedings of executive sessions shall be confidential and produced only in 
response to a valid court order.

 
 
We 
hold that the district court improperly dismissed Appellants' claim demanding a 
record of the executive session.  
The district court may consider reviewing the record in camera before 
determining if the matters discussed were appropriately considered in executive 
session and whether the record is appropriately discoverable under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §16-4-405(b).

 
 

            
III.  Can TCHA pursue a "land 
banking"2 
real estate investment program?

 
 
            
            
A.        SPET Ballot Limits

 
 
[¶29]   In their complaint against TCHA, 
Appellants asserted TCHA could not purchase the Mantey property as an investment 
or for the purpose of "land banking" for two reasons.  First, they claimed that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-15-204(a)(iii) required TCHA to use the SPET revenues only for the specific 
purposes authorized when the tax was approved.  They claimed that TCHA's purchase of 
real estate not specifically designated to be used for affordable housing was 
outside the specific purposes authorized by voters. 

 
 
[¶30]   The district court dismissed this 
claim under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  The 
court ruled:

 
 
Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that 
Defendant TCHA was acting within the limitations of the SPET ballot and under 
the authority of Wyoming law.  Thus, 
the Court grants the motion.

 
 
To 
reach that conclusion, the district court said:

 
 
Evidence 
provided by the Plaintiffs shows that the Manteys sold the Cheney Lane Parcel to 
TCHA with the intent that the property be used for affordable housing.  Information submitted by TCHA to the 
Teton County Commissioners, also provided by the Plaintiffs, stated that the 
Cheney Lane property acquisition was for the purpose of affordable housing land 
banking.  It is apparent from the 
statement of both sellers and buyers that the Cheney Lane land acquisition was 
to be utilized for affordable housing, either directly or indirectly if a 
housing project were not approved on the land.3 

 
 
[¶31]   The district court found, on the 
basis of Appellants' complaint, that TCHA purchased the Mantey property "to be 
utilized for affordable housing, either directly or indirectly." 
(Emphasis added).  The district 
court also found that TCHA purchased the property "for the purpose of affordable 
housing land banking."  Based on 
these findings the district court ruled, as a matter of law, the Mantey purchase 
was within the authority granted by voters on the SPET Ballot. 

 
 
[¶32]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-15-204 
(a)(iii) requires SPET proceeds to be used "for specific purposes authorized by 
the qualified electors."  In 2006, 
electors in Teton County authorized a SPET for the "Teton County Housing 
Authority's Affordable Housing Program."  
The ballot further described the program as including "the acquisition, 
planning, improvement and financing of properties as allowed by law and to be 
utilized for affordable housing . . . ."  
More succinctly, the ballot authorized use of the SPET proceeds for the 
"acquisition . . . of properties . . . to be utilized for affordable 
housing."  The district court 
found that purpose to be satisfied if the Mantey property was to be used "either 
directly or indirectly" for an affordable housing project. 

 
 
[¶33]   The SPET ballot in Teton County 
specified that tax proceeds would go to acquire properties to be utilized for 
affordable housing.  It did not 
specify that tax proceeds could be used for property purchases which 
indirectly would be used for affordable housing.  We find this distinction 
significant.  The terminology of the 
ballot, "to be utilized for affordable housing" is plain and unambiguous.  It authorizes the use of SPET proceeds 
to purchase land which will actually be used in an affordable housing 
project.  On the other hand, the 
phrase "directly or indirectly" anticipates that property purchased by TCHA 
might not actually be used in an affordable housing project, but instead could 
be purchased as an investment.  
 If the language "utilized 
for" meant "indirectly utilized for" then TCHA could use the tax proceeds for 
any speculative investments it chose, so long as ultimately, at some day in the 
unknown future, it "intended" to sell that investment and use the proceeds for 
affordable housing.  Such a 
definition is incredible, and far beyond the realm of common sense or the 
express language of the ballot. 

 
 
[¶34]   The facts presented to the district 
court as exhibits to the complaint conflict as to whether the Mantey purchase is 
to be used as part of an affordable housing project, or only is of indirect use in financing some other 
land.  The complaint, when read in 
the light most favorable to Appellants, alleges that the Mantey property is not 
to be utilized for affordable housing as authorized by the SPET ballot.  Purchase of property for direct 
utilization in an affordable housing project was authorized by the 2006 SPET 
ballot;  purchase of property for 
indirect utilization in an affordable housing project was not authorized.  We reverse the district court's 
dismissal of this claim and remand it for a resolution of the factual conflict. 

 
 
            
            
B.        
Statutory Limits of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-103(a)(viii).

 
 
[¶35]   Appellants claim that TCHA's 
investment in land not intended for use in an affordable housing project 
violates Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103(a)(viii).  In their complaint, Appellants asserted 
that TCHA purchased the Mantey property as an investment, and not for use 
in a housing project.  The court 
ruled that as a matter of law Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103(a)(viii) does not 
prohibit TCHA from investing in real estate and dismissed this claim under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

 
 
[¶36]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-103(a)(viii) grants counties with housing projects the authority to 
"invest any funds . . . in property or securities in which savings banks may 
legally invest."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-115(a) then recognizes that a county housing authority may exercise that 
same investment power.  
Consequently, TCHA could invest its funds in property or securities in 
which savings banks may legally invest. 

 
 
[¶37]   We find that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-103(a)(viii) is unambiguous.  
It has only one reasonable meaning, and reasonable persons would agree on 
this meaning with consistency.  The 
words "property" and "securities" are joined by the coordinate conjunction "or," 
and both are equally modified by the phrase that follows.  Both "property" and "securities" are 
objects of the prepositional phrase "in which savings banks may invest."  Consequently, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-103(a)(viii) TCHA could only invest in property if that property was such 
that a savings bank could invest in it.

                                                

[¶38]   In this part of their Complaint, 
Appellants essentially made two assertions: 1) that TCHA purchased the Mantey 
property as an investment, and 2) that a savings bank could not have made such 
an investment purchase.  We must 
consider those allegations as true when reviewing the dismissal under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).  If those allegations are 
true, Appellants clearly had a valid claim.  The district court erroneously dismissed 
this claim, believing that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103(a)(viii) permitted TCHA 
to invest in any property, whether a savings bank could make such an 
investment or not. We reverse the district court's dismissal of this claim under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

 
 

            
IV.  Is TCHA entitled to mortgage property 
and pledge future tax receipts against debt?

 
 
            
            
A.        
Limits of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108.

 
 
[¶39]   Appellants claimed TCHA borrowed 
funds to purchase the Mantey property and then mortgaged that property, all in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108.  
In this claim, Appellants argued that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108 
authorizes borrowing and mortgages only for property that actually is used for a 
housing project.  Because the Mantey 
property is an investment, and not intended for use in a housing project, 
Appellants assert that TCHA could not borrow against it under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-108.  The district court 
disagreed, and ruled that under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103 TCHA could borrow 
and mortgage, notwithstanding Wyo. Stat. § 15-10-108.  The district court dismissed this claim 
under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

 
 
[¶40]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103 is a 
statute providing general authority for counties and municipalities with respect 
to housing projects.  It permits 
counties to acquire property "by any means" (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103(a)(iv)) 
and to "pledge" real property (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §15-10-103(a)(v)).  In general, this statute permits a 
county to purchase real property and to pledge it as security.  Notably, this statute does not authorize 
a county to borrow.

 
 
[¶41]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108, on the 
other hand, is a more specific statute which authorizes borrowing and 
establishes conditions under which a county may borrow funds.  It permits a county to borrow for the 
purpose of financing housing for persons of low income (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-108(a)).  In other words, this 
statute permits borrowing for a housing project.  Such borrowing could be for purchasing 
land, construction of infrastructure, or building residential units for the 
project.  The statute does not 
permit borrowing for investment or for any other purpose beyond developing a 
housing project. 

 
 
[¶42]   TCHA argues that the limitations of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108(a) only apply to borrowing for the specific purpose 
of building housing, and not to the acquisition of land.  To support this argument, TCHA points to 
the first sentence of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108(a) which states that "a county 
may borrow funds . . . for the purpose of financing housing . . . ."  TCHA asserts that the term "for the 
purpose of financing housing" means actually building the housing units, and not 
to the acquisition of land, installation of utilities, paving or other items not 
related to actual living structures.

 
 
[¶43]   We disagree with TCHA's reading of 
this statute.  Taken as a whole, the 
statute is plain and unambiguous.  
The term "for the purpose of financing housing," in context, includes all 
of the activities and expenditures necessary to establish housing under a 
housing project.  Land acquisition 
is one of those activities, when the land actually will be used in the project. 

 
 
[¶44]   We note that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-108(a) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-1114 are the only statutes 
related to housing projects which authorize borrowing.  No other statutes mention borrowing, and 
any borrowing by a housing authority such as TCHA must comply with the limits of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108.

 
 
[¶45]   The district court incorrectly 
determined that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103 authorized TCHA to purchase land for 
any purpose and to borrow funds for any purpose.  That statute does not authorize 
borrowing.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-108, provides specific limitations on when borrowing may occur.  A specific statute granting authority 
controls over a more general statute.  
Quest Corp. v. PSC of Wyoming, 2007 WY 97, ¶ 32, 161 P.3d 495, 503 (Wyo. 2007). 
 Assuming that the allegations of 
Appellants' complaint are truethat the Mantey property is not part of a housing 
project, but instead was purchased as an investmentthen Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-108 does not authorize borrowing to purchase that property.  We must reverse the district court's 
dismissal of this claim. 

 
 
            
            
B.        
Constitutional debt limitations.

 
 
[¶46]   Appellants raised a claim that 
TCHA's purchase of the Mantey property for $1.2 million, with over 95% of the 
purchase price borrowed, violated Article 16 §§ 3, 4, and 5 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  The district court 
ruled that Article 16 of the Wyoming Constitution does not apply to TCHA because 
it is not a political subdivision of the state.  It also held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-108(c) precludes application of constitutional debt limits. 

 
 
[¶47]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §15-10-108(c) 
states that 

 
 
obligations 
issued under this chapter are payable solely from the sources provided in this 
section and do not constitute an indebtedness of the . . . county within the 
meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction and 
are not general obligations of the . . . county.

 
 
[¶48]   We disagree with the district 
court's conclusion that TCHA is a separate entity which is not a political 
subdivision.  TCHA is simply an 
agent of Teton County.  The Teton 
County Commissioners could exercise powers related to housing projects on their 
own, or they can appoint a board to exercise these powers on behalf of the 
county.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-115.  TCHA acts on behalf of 
Teton County.  Teton County clearly 
is subject to the debt limits of Wyoming Constitution Article 16,  §§ 3, 4, and 5.

 
 
[¶49]   However, we find that debt properly 
incurred  under the Housing Projects 
Statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-101 et. 
seq., is not limited by Wyoming Constitution Article 16, §§ 3, 4, or 5.  Article 16, § 3 of the Wyoming 
Constitution prohibits counties from incurring debt in excess of 2% of the 
county's assessed value.  Article 
16, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution prohibits a county from incurring debt in 
excess of the taxes for the current year.  
Article 16, § 5 of the Wyoming Constitution provides that a county may 
not create debt exceeding 2% of the taxable property in the county.  Each of these constitutional limits is 
connected to the taxable property or the tax income of the county.  The purpose of these constitutional 
provisions is to prevent counties from encumbering their property tax revenues 
with too much debt.

 
 
[¶50]   Here, any debt created by TCHA is 
unrelated to any property tax or tax assessments of Teton County.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-108(c) clearly 
states that any debt for a housing project is not a debt of the 
county.  No property tax revenues 
are available for payment of such debt.  
Instead, the debt may be paid "solely from the sources provided in this 
section."

 
 
[¶51]   We previously have recognized that 
the debt limits of the Wyoming Constitution in Article 16, §§ 3, 4, and 5 do not 
apply to county or municipal debt which is not a general obligation of the 
county or municipality.  In 
Banner v. City of Laramie, 74 Wyo. 429, 289 P.2d 922 (Wyo. 1955), we held 
that Laramie's special improvement district debts which were to be paid 
exclusively from gasoline and cigarette excise taxes were not subject to the 
limits of Wyoming Constitution, Article 16.  In Banner, we recognized a 
similar analysis from New Mexico in State v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097 (N.M. 1935) and Stone v. City of Hobbs, 54 N.M. 237, 220 P.2d 704 (N.M. 1950), and we 
said

 
 
The 
debt contemplated by the constitutional limitation was one for the payment of 
which the general faith and credit of the state or municipality was pledged, and 
to retire which the levy of a general property tax rather than an excise tax was 
contemplated.

 
 

Id. 
at 928.

 
 
[¶52]   The Wyoming legislature apparently 
was cognizant of our holding in Banner when it passed the housing project 
statutes.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-10-108(c) states: 

 
 
The 
obligations issued under this chapter are payable solely from the sources 
provided in this section and do not constitute an indebtedness . . . within the 
meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation . . . and are not 
general obligations of the municipality or county.

 
 
Because 
any debt created by a housing authority under §15-10-108 is not a general 
obligation and is payable only from sources other than the county's taxing 
authority, Article 16 §§ 3, 4, and 5 do not apply.  The district court's dismissal of the 
Appellants' constitutional claims was appropriate, although the district court's 
analysis was incorrect.

 
 

            
V.  Declaratory 
relief.

 
 
[¶53]   Appellants assert they should be 
able to present these issues to the district court in a declaratory relief 
action.  They claim the district 
court required them to pursue administrative remedies rather than seeking 
declaratory relief.  This assertion 
is not supported by the record.  The 
district court did not require Appellants to pursue administrative 
remedies in lieu of declaratory relief.  
Rather, the district court found that the primary issue of investing in 
real estate "is an appropriate subject for declaratory relief in that it 
involves the agency's authority and the interpretation of the statutes 
underlying its actions."  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶54]   We affirm the district court's 
summary judgment in Appellees' favor on claims based on the Public Meetings 
Act.  We hold that the undisputed 
evidence shows that TCHA properly ratified its decision to purchase 
property.  We also affirm the 
district court's dismissal of Appellants' claim that TCHA violated Wyoming 
Constitution debt limits.

 
 
[¶55]   We reverse the district court's 
finding that discovery of minutes of TCHA's executive session on March 1, 2007, 
is moot.  We also reverse the 
district court's dismissal of claims that TCHA's purchase of the Mantey property 
was beyond the scope of the SPET ballot and TCHA's purchase and financing of the 
Mantey property violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-10-103(a)(viii) and Wyo. Stat. § 
15-10-108.

 
 
[¶56]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-405(a)(vii) permits the governing body of an agency to hold a 
closed executive session "[t]o consider the selection of a site or the purchase 
of real estate when the publicity regarding the consideration would cause a 
likelihood of an increase in price."   
Appellees contend that discussion about the 
transaction was proper in executive session, but that their vote to make an 
offer on the property was not.

 
 

2No 
one offered a definition of "land banking" to the Court.  From the use of this term in the record 
and briefs we conclude that "land banking" involves purchasing real estate with 
the hope that the land would either be used in the future or sold for a profit. 

3Typically 
a 12(b)(6) motion does not require nor rely upon an analysis of "the 
evidence."  A motion to dismiss 
under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is converted to a motion for summary judgment when the 
district court considers materials outside the pleadings.  Wilson v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
the County of Teton, 2007 WY 
42, ¶ 12, 153 P.3d 917, 921 
(Wyo. 2007).  Here, however, 
Appellants attached exhibits to their complaint which included the facts 
mentioned by the district court.

4Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-10-111 simply authorizes a county to borrow from the federal 
government.