Title: STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JAMES T. ROBBINS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JAMES T. ROBBINS2011 WY 23Case Number: No. S-10-0048Decided: 02/10/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,Appellant 
(Defendant),v.JAMES T. ROBBINS,Appellee 
(Complainant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. 
Kahler.  Argument by Mr. 
Kahler.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶ 
]       The 
State of Wyoming challenges the district court's finding that the standard of 
clear and convincing evidence was required to uphold a commercial driver's 
license disqualification, rather than a standard of preponderance of the 
evidence.  Also, the State 
challenges the lower court's finding that James Robbins' constitutional right to 
due process was violated.  We 
reverse.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The State raises 
one issue before this Court:

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred in finding that "clear and convincing evidence" rather 
than a "preponderance of the evidence," is required to uphold a commercial 
driver's license disqualification in a contested case proceeding and in finding 
that [Robbins'] constitutional right to due process was 
violated.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶ 
3]     On March 31, 
2006, the clerks at the Port of Entry in Evanston, Wyoming, contacted the 
Wyoming Highway Patrol to report a truck driver with the odor of alcohol on his 
breath.  Trooper Hutchinson arrived 
at the Port of Entry and made contact with the driver of the semi-truck, James 
T. Robbins.

 
 
[¶4]      Robbins admitted 
to drinking earlier in the day.  
Based upon his admission, and the fact that the trooper smelled the odor 
of alcohol, Robbins submitted to a breathalyzer test, which showed a .073% blood 
alcohol concentration.  After 
waiting fifteen minutes to take a second breath test, Robbins' second blow 
resulted in a .050% blood alcohol concentration.  Field sobriety tests were also 
administered, after which Trooper Hutchinson determined that in accordance with 
federal motor vehicle guidelines, Robbins should be transported to the Uinta 
County Sheriff's Office for chemical testing of his breath.  Implied consent advisements were read, 
and Robbins consented to the breath test, which resulted in readings of a blood 
alcohol concentration of .041% and .040%, respectively.  Robbins was transported back to the Port 
of Entry where he was issued a citation for a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-18-701(a) (LexisNexis 2007) for a violation of Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulation 392.5 (.04%).

 
 
[¶5]      Robbins received 
notice of disqualification of his commercial driver's license (CDL) from the 
Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT), dated April 5, 2006.  Robbins timely requested a contested 
case hearing in the matter.  At the 
hearing, Robbins argued that according to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305 ( 
LexisNexis 2007), a suspension for "driving or [being] in actual physical 
control of a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the 
person's blood, breath or other bodily substance is four one-hundredths of one 
percent (0.04%) or more," required a conviction as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-7-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2007).  On October 5, 2006, the hearing examiner 
issued an order upholding commercial vehicle 
disqualification.

 
 
[¶6]      Robbins filed a 
petition for writ of review in the third judicial district on October 23, 
2006.  WYDOT filed a motion to 
dismiss petition for writ of review, arguing that the central issue in the case 
was the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-105(e) (LexisNexis 2007), 
and that the proper avenue to address the issue was through a declaratory 
judgment action.  The district court 
agreed and issued its Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Review on February 
8, 2007.  Accordingly, Robbins filed 
a complaint for declaratory judgment, and supporting brief, asking the district 
court to declare § 31-7-105(e) unconstitutional, and seeking an order directing 
WYDOT to reinstate his CDL.  WYDOT 
filed an answer and reply brief, and the Court heard oral arguments on July 2, 
2007.  The parties supplied 
supplemental briefing to the Court addressing whether or not a CDL is a 
professional license.

 
 
[¶7]      On January 25, 
2008, the district court entered its Order on Declaratory Judgment Action, 
reversing the Office of Administrative Hearing's (OAH) Order Upholding 
Commercial Vehicle Disqualification.  
The order did not address any constitutional issues.  Instead, it decided the cases on issues 
raised in the petition for writ of review, which was previously 
dismissed.

 
 
[¶8]      On February 25, 
2008, WYDOT filed a notice of appeal.  
On December 15, 2008, this Court issued a Mandate Reversing Judgment, 
reversing and remanding the case to the district court to consider Robbins' 
claim that the applicable statutes are unconstitutional.  DOT v. Robbins, 2008 WY 148, ¶ 13, 
197 P.3d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶9]      In response to 
this Court's decision, the district court entered its Order on Declaratory 
Judgment Action, and again reversed the OAH's Order Upholding Commercial 
Disqualification.  In addressing the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-7-305 and 31-7-307 (LexisNexis 2007), 
the district court held, "[t]he appropriate standard for cases involving the 
disqualification of a commercial driver's license is clear and convincing 
evidence," and that "the use of a preponderance of evidence standard results in 
a denial of due process and is unconstitutional."  With regard to the statutes, the court 
stated, "[b]ecause the hearing examiner could have applied a clear and 
convincing standard in evaluating the evidence even though the statute is 
silent, the statute is not facially unconstitutional."  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶10]   "Inasmuch as 
the facts are not in dispute and the issues present questions of law, this 
[C]ourt conducts a de novo review of 
the district court's conclusions of law."  
Robbins, ¶ 7, 197 P.3d  at 
1245.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   
In addressing the 
constitutionality of §§ 31-7-305 and 31-7-307, the district court held, "[t]he 
appropriate standard for cases involving the disqualification of a commercial 
driver's license is clear and convincing evidence," and that "the use 
of a preponderance of evidence standard results in a denial of due process and 
is unconstitutional."  (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶12]   The State argues on appeal that the 
district court should have used the preponderance of the evidence standard in 
evaluating the evidence, rather than the clear and convincing standard.  Robbins responds that due process 
"requires" that the clear and convincing evidence standard that is applied to 
professional license cases be applied to the disqualification of a commercial 
driver's license case. (See Billings v. 
Wyo. Bd. of Outfitters & Prof'l Guides, 2004 WY 42, 88 P.2d 455 (Wyo. 
2004) (hunting guide license);  State ex rel. DOT v. Legarda, 2003 WY 
130, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 708, 713 (Wyo. 2003) (automobile sales license); In re Licensure of Jerry Penny v. State ex 
rel. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 2005 WY 117, ¶ 13, 120 P.3d 152, 160-61 (Wyo. 
2005) (social worker license); Dorr v. 
State Bd. of Certified Public Accountants, 2001 WY 37, 21 P.3d 735 (Wyo. 2001) (accounting 
license)).

 

[¶13]   Due process is a flexible concept 
which calls for such procedural protections as the time, place, and 
circumstances demand.  Cleveland 
Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985)); Wilson v. Board of Indiana Employment Sec. 
Div., 270 Ind. 302, 309, 
385 N.E.2d 438, 444 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 874, 100 S. Ct. 155, 
62 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979).  In order 
to determine the specific dictates of due process in a given situation, it is 
necessary to balance three distinct factors: (1) the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, along with the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 
(1976).

 
 
[¶14]   The Wyoming statutes make clear 
that driving is not a fundamental right, but a privilege.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-102(a)(xxv) 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
"License," 
"driver's license," "commercial driver's license," "instruction permit" or 
"intermediate permit" means a license or permit secured by a person from the 
division, in accordance with this act which grants the privilege to drive or 
operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, streets and roads of this 
state[.]

 
 
[¶15]   In Dept. of Revenue & Taxation v. Hull, 
751 P.2d 351, 356 (Wyo. 1988), we stated that "[A] license revocation 
hearing is civil in nature and the probable cause must only be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence."  
Although the license in Hull 
was non-commercial, our position was clear that a license revocation hearing is 
civil in nature, and the probable cause that must be proven requires only a 
preponderance of the evidence.

 
 
[¶16]   In reviewing the risk of error in a 
commercial license disqualification proceeding, we agree with the State that the 
district court erroneously focused on the criminality of Robbins' offense, 
rather than realizing that the heart of this matter in particular is the 
administrative portion of the case.  
The district court reasoned that because "the scope of the hearing 
prohibits a testing of the accuracy of the chemical test or allow proof to be 
made upon a written report with no opportunity for cross examination," then the 
risk of error increases.  In its 
analysis, the district court relied on Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 941 
(Wyo. 2000), regarding the due 
process concerns with considering a person's "property interest in a 
professional license or one's liberty interest in a right to earn a 
living."  Here, we are faced with 
Robbins' interest in his commercial driver's license.  As we stated above, the Wyoming statutes 
recognize a commercial driver's license as a privilege, not a constitutional 
right.  Moreover, this Court has 
never equated a professional license to a commercial driver's license.  In fact, we have unequivocally 
distinguished between the two.

 
 
[¶17]   In Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032 (Wyo. 
1983), this Court faced the issue of whether a plaintiff in a negligence action 
was entitled to a jury instruction that, as a matter of law, a professional 
truck driver is held to a higher standard of care.  Id., 661 P.2d  at 1038.  We explained that all drivers, 
regardless of class, are held to the same standard of care under the 
circumstances.  Id., 661 P.2d  at 1039.  In Cervelli, this Court refused to elevate 
the status of a commercial driver's license.  To date, we remain in agreement with Cervelli.

 
 
[¶18]   While the legislature did not 
provide for a burden of proof in a commercial driver's license disqualification 
proceeding, and while this Court has never addressed the burden of proof in a 
commercial driver's license appeal, as we are asked to do here, we have held in 
Hull, that a non-commercial driver's license 
hearing requires only a preponderance of evidence burden of proof.  Moreover, we note the distinct 
difference between a professional license, such as a medical license and a 
driver's license.  One involves a 
fundamental right, and one does not.  
A commercial driver's license is a privilege and not a right, and thus 
does not rise to the level necessitating a clear and convincing evidence burden 
of proof.

 
 
[¶19]   Accordingly, we also disagree with 
the district court that the Wyoming statutes governing the disqualification of 
commercial driver's licenses are unconstitutional.  We are confident that the preponderance 
of evidence standard of review applies in this instance.  Accordingly, because we reverse the 
district court's decision that due process requires a clear and convincing 
evidence standard in proceedings to disqualify a commercial driver, we conclude 
that the district court was also erroneous in determining that the statute, as 
applied here, denies Robbins his due process rights to the clear and convincing 
evidence standard.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶20]   The district court erred in finding 
that clear and convincing evidence, rather than a preponderance of the evidence, 
is required to uphold a commercial driver's license disqualification in a 
contested case proceeding and in finding that Robbins' constitutional right to 
due process was violated.  
Reversed.