Title: State v. Lloyd

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Lloyd (98-321); 169 Vt. 643; 740 A.2d 364

[Filed 02-Sep-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-321

                              APRIL TERM, 1999

State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont
                                       }	Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
Brian F. Lloyd	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 4-1-98Cncr	

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals from a district court sentencing decision, entered
  pursuant to a plea  agreement, that ordered defendant is not to be
  discharged from probation.  He argues that (1) the  court is not authorized
  to order that defendant never be discharged from probation, and (2) the 
  court violated V.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(4) by failing to afford defendant an
  opportunity to withdraw his  plea when it imposed a sentence more onerous
  than that contemplated by the sentencing  agreement.  With one
  clarification, we affirm the decision.

       On May 4, 1998, defendant pled nolo contendere to a charge of domestic
  assault.  The plea  agreement provided that the parties had agreed to hold
  a contested sentencing hearing.  On June  23, 1998, at the sentencing
  hearing, however, the parties filed an agreement on sentencing, and  no
  contested hearing was held.  The agreement provided a sentence of
  six-to-twelve months, all  suspended except three days, with credit for
  three days served, and probation.  The agreement  also required that
  defendant complete the domestic abuse education program and 200 hours of 
  community service, and that defendant have no contact with the victim
  unless the victim and the  probation officer agreed to such contact.  The
  court imposed the sentence in the agreement "with  one modification,"  that
  "[d]efendant is not to be discharged from probation."  Defendant  objected,
  and now appeals that condition.

       First, defendant contends that the court has no authority to order
  that a probationer never  be discharged from probation.  The State counters
  that the court ordered probation for an  indeterminate period as authorized
  by 28 V.S.A. § 205(a), which states: "After passing sentence,  a court may
  suspend all or part of the sentence and place the person so sentenced in
  the care and  custody of the commissioner upon such conditions and for such
  time as it may prescribe in  accordance with law or until further order of
  court."  (Emphasis added.)  The record is  inconsistent.  The written order
  states that "[d]efendant is not to be discharged from probation," 
  indicating a permanent probationary status from which he may never be
  discharged.  The  transcript of the hearing, however, indicates that the
  judge intended to impose an "indeterminate"  probation with "no automatic
  endpoint."  Moreover, the judge indicated that he would reconsider 
  defendant's probation status after "some period of years have gone by."  

       We resolve this inconsistency by reading the court's written order to
  be consistent with the  order from the bench, and thus, to impose an
  indeterminate probation period from which  defendant is not to be
  discharged "until further order of court."  28 V.S.A. § 205(a).  In this 
  form, the condition is explicitly authorized by 28 V.S.A. § 205(a). 
  Further, defendant may move  for termination of the period of probation "at
  any time if such termination is warranted 

 

  by the conduct of the offender and the ends of justice."  28 V.S.A. § 251. 
  Consequently, we do  not address whether the court is authorized to order a
  probationer never to be discharged from  probation.
	
       Second, defendant contends that our precedent requires either (1) a
  fixed probationary  period or (2) discharge from probation upon completion
  of specific and clear conditions within  the control of the probationer. 
  Our decisions reveal no such requirements.  On the contrary, in  State v.
  Bensh, ___ Vt. ___, ___,