Title: DANIELS v. CARPENTER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DANIELS v. CARPENTER2003 WY 1162 P.3d 555Case Number: 01-224Decided: 01/28/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

KENNETH 
WAYLAND DANIELS,

individually 
and by and through his

parent 
and guardian, CYNTHIA RICE,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

MARILYN 
and DAVID CARPENTER,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
Richard K. Blundell of the Law Office of Richard K. Blundell, Greeley, 
Colorado; and Tom Sedar, Casper, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
S.B. Freeman, III of Bormuth & Freeman, LC, Cody, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and 
VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the district court's dismissal of the appellant's complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and its denial of appellant's 
motion for leave to amend the complaint.  
We affirm the dismissal because the complaint did not allege facts that 
would entitle the appellant to relief.  
We affirm the denial because the appellant did not support his oral 
motion with facts justifying amendment.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented by the parties can conveniently be restated as 
follows:

 

            
1.         
Whether Wyoming law imposes a duty upon the appellees, under the 
circumstances of this case, to protect the appellant from harm caused by an 
intoxicated minor social guest?

 

            
2.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
appellant's motion for leave to amend the complaint?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Since this appeal 
results from the granting of a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion, we will accept the 
facts set forth in the complaint as true and will view those facts in the light 
most favorable to the appellant.  
Feltner v. Casey Family Program, 902 P.2d 206, 207 (Wyo. 
1995).  On May 10, 1997, Kenneth Daniels1 (the appellant), Michael T. 
Jefferson (Jefferson) and other teenaged boys spent the night in a trailer or 
camper "on land owned by, in the control of, and resided upon by" David and 
Marilyn Carpenter (the appellees).  
During the night, Jefferson became highly intoxicated.  At about 5:00 a.m., some of the boys, 
including the appellant, Jefferson, and Ryan Carpenter (Carpenter), left the 
appellees' property.2  After leaving the property, the boys 
borrowed a car from Anthony Pacino.  
At about 6:58 a.m., with Jefferson driving, the car left the road at a 
high rate of speed and wrecked.  
Jefferson and Carpenter were killed and the appellant was injured.  Jefferson's blood alcohol content at the 
time of the accident was 0.09%.

 

[¶4]      Based on these 
facts, the appellant sued the appellees, alleging (1) the appellees had a duty 
to control and supervise the actions of the teenagers; (2) the appellees knew or 
should have known that Jefferson was intoxicated; (3) the appellees breached 
their duty to control and supervise Jefferson by allowing him to drink alcoholic 
beverages and then allowing him to leave their home and drive a vehicle while he 
was intoxicated; and (4) the appellees' negligent control and supervision of 
Jefferson was a direct and proximate cause of the appellant's 
injuries.

 

[¶5]      The appellees 
separately filed motions to dismiss the complaint under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.3  The motions, which are identical, 
contend that (1) the accident did not occur on the appellees' property; (2) the 
appellees did not own the vehicle that wrecked; (3) Jefferson was not the 
appellees' son; (4) Jefferson was driving the car for his own purposes and was 
not on a mission for the appellees; (5) Jefferson and the other teenagers were 
acting without the appellees' consent or knowledge; and (6) therefore, the 
appellees owed no statutory or common law duty to the appellant to protect him 
from the accident that caused his injuries.

 

[¶6]      The district 
court granted the appellees' motions to dismiss, finding that the facts set 
forth in the complaint did not establish circumstances that would create a duty 
owed by the appellees to the appellant.  
The district court also denied the appellant's motion for leave to amend 
the complaint.  This appeal 
followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
Dismissal

 

In 
pursuing review of an order dismissing a complaint, we accept all facts alleged 
in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Gillis v. F & A 
Enterprises, 934 P.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Wyo.1997).  In Gillis, we reiterated that 
dismissal is a drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly.  We sustain a dismissal pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) only when it is certain from the face of the complaint that 
the plaintiff cannot allege any facts that would entitle him to 
relief.

 

Garnett 
v. Brock, 
2 P.3d 558, 562 (Wyo. 2000).  See also Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 
991 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Wyo. 1999) and Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1980).

 

[¶7]      The appellant 
begins his argument that the appellees owed him a duty in this case by turning 
to this Court's statement that "[t]he Wyoming common law of negligence imposes a 
duty on the defendant to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable 
person in light of all the circumstances."  
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 411 (Wyo. 1983).  He then cites the same case for a 
further explication of the same principle:

 

"* 
* *  One owes the duty to every 
person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person 
in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a 
failure to use such care might result in such injury.'  Kirby v. Sonville, 286 Or. 339, 
594 P.2d 818, 821 (1979).  * * 
*"

 

McClellan, 
666 P.2d at 412 (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 
Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980)).

 

[¶8]      The appellant 
bolsters his position by referring to various sections of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 314A (1965), 
for example, describes several non-exclusive special relationships that may give 
rise to a duty to aid or protect a third person, including common carrier and 
passenger, innkeeper and guest, and possessor of land held open to the public 
and invited guest.  More pertinent 
to the instant case is Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 
315, 
which describes a duty to control the actions of a third person to prevent harm 
to another:

 

There 
is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from 
causing physical harm to another unless

 

            
(a)       a special 
relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon 
the actor to control the third person's conduct, or

 

            
(b)       a special 
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right 
to protection.

 

[¶9]      The sections that 
follow Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 
315 describe situations where an actor has a duty 
to control the conduct of a third person.  Two of those sections describe situations that 
bear some resemblance to the case at hand.  Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 316 provides:

 

A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to 
control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or 
from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to 
them, if the parent

 

            
(a)       knows or has 
reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and

 

            
(b)       knows or should 
know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.

 

Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 318 provides:

 

If the actor permits a third person to use lands or chattels 
in his possession otherwise than as a servant, he is, if present, under a duty 
to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to 
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as 
to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the actor

 

            
(a)       knows or has 
reason to know that he has the ability to control the third person, and

 

            
(b)       knows or should 
know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.

 

And finally, Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 324A provides:

 

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 
render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third 
person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care 
to protect his undertaking, if

 

            
(a)       his failure to 
exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or

 

            
(b)       he has 
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or

 

            
(c)        the harm 
is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking.

 

[¶10]   One example of a case wherein a duty was 
based upon these Restatement principles is Gritzner v. 
Michael R., 228 Wis.2d 541, 598 N.W.2d 282 (1999).  
In Gritzner, a minor was sexually molested by 
another minor while playing at the latter's home.  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found "it 
self-evident that an adult who voluntarily takes on the supervision, custody or 
control, even on a temporary basis, of a visiting child . . ., stands in a 
special relationship to such child for purposes of the child's protection' 
under § 314A of the Restatement."  Gritzner, 598 N.W.2d  at 287-88.  
In reversing the dismissal of the victim's negligence action against the 
parent of the perpetrator, the court also found that a duty of protection 
existed under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 
324A.  
Gritzner, 598 N.W.2d  at 289.  
It is noteworthy that the potential liability of the homeowner in Gritzner did not arise from the concept of premises 
liability, but from the special relationship.  Id. at 288.4

 

[¶11]   Under different facts, a similar result 
was reached in Morgan v. Perlowski, 508 N.W.2d 724 
(Iowa 1993).  
While attending a "beer party" at Perlowski's mother's house, Morgan was 
assaulted by another guest.  Id. at 725-26.  In Morgan's 
negligence action against Perlowski, a question arose as to the proper source of 
any duty Perlowski owed Morgan.  Rejecting a premises liability theory, the 
Iowa Supreme Court held that the duty arose out of the special relationship 
concepts of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, §§ 
315 and 318.  
Morgan, 508 N.W.2d  at 726-28.  
In adopting the principles of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 318, the court held that "[a]s a matter of public policy, it is 
reasonable to impose a limited duty upon a possessor of land, who is present on 
the land, to control the conduct of social guests."  Morgan, 508 N.W.2d  at 728.  
The court then concluded that it was a jury question whether Perlowski 
knew or should have known he had the ability to control the assaulting guest and 
whether he knew or should have known of the necessity and opportunity to 
exercise such control.  
Id.5  See also Chavez v. 
Torres, 128 N.M. 171, 991 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1999).  
For a duty to arise under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 318, harm must have been reasonably foreseeable by the 
homeowner.  Anthony H. v. John G., 415 Mass. 196, 612 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1993).

 

[¶12]   As an alternative theory of liability, 
the appellant also contends that the appellees stood in 
loco parentis and had assumed the parental duty to control the teenagers who 
were staying overnight on their property.6  Without citation to 
any particular authority, the appellant simply argues that this theory supports 
a finding that the appellees had a duty to the minors.

 

[¶13]   This Court, and the Wyoming State 
Legislature, have both previously dealt with the tort of social host or vendor 
liability for harm caused by an intoxicated person.7  In Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, 397 (Wyo. 
1971), this Court stated that there was no common law cause of 
action against a liquor vendor in favor of one injured by an intoxicated vendee 
because proximate cause was deemed to be the vendee's consumption, not the 
vendor's sale.  
We also said that any change in that rule was up to the legislature.  Id. at 398.  Twelve years later, in McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 410-12, we reversed ourselves and acknowledged a cause of action 
based on common law negligence.8  We further held that statutes forbidding the 
sale of alcohol to minors were meant not only to protect minors, but also to 
protect the general public, and that violation of such statutes is evidence of 
negligence.  Id. at 413.

 

[¶14]   The primary holding of McClellan was legislatively abrogated in 1985 with 
passage of a statute specifically limiting the liability of alcohol 
providers.  1985 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 205, § 1.  The statute was modified in 1986.  1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 6, § 1.  In 
pertinent part, it provides that "[n]o person who has legally provided alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for damages caused by the 
intoxication of the other person."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 (LexisNexis 
2001).  The 
clear intent of the act is to immunize both vendors and social hosts from 
liability for damages caused by persons to whom alcohol has legally been 
provided.  In 
that regard, it is not legal for a person to provide alcohol to a minor who is 
not his "legal ward, medical patient or member of his own immediate family . . 
.."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 12-6-101(a) (Lexis 1999).

 

[¶15]   In the context of the present case, the 
effect of this statute is to allow the appellant to pursue a cause of action 
against the appellees if it can be shown that they provided alcohol to the 
teenaged boys.  
So, without the statute, there is certainly no legislative bar to such an 
action.  The 
question remains, however, where there is no allegation that the appellees, 
themselves, provided the alcohol, what facts might sustain a cause of action 
against them?  
In other words, under what circumstances should the appellees be seen to 
have had a duty to protect the appellant?

 

[¶16]   Broadly speaking, "[a] duty may arise by 
contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the parties is such 
that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the 
protection of the plaintiff."  Hamilton v. Natrona 
County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995).  
One such relationship is the parent/child relationship.  In Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 214 P.2d 486, 487 
(1950), we rejected the family purpose doctrine, under which a 
parent, as owner of a car, may be held liable for the negligence of a child who 
drives the car.  
In doing so, we held that "[a] parent is not liable for the tort of his 
minor child merely from the relationship.'"  Id. at 488 (quoting Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N.E. 30, 31 
(1919)).  
We reached a similar conclusion in Kimble v. 
Muller, 417 P.2d 178, 180 (Wyo. 1966), where we said:

 

For us to hold the father in this instance liable for his 
son's negligence, because the father permitted the son to use the car, would be 
equivalent to holding that every parent is liable for every tort of a child.

 

See also Hatch v. O'Neill, 133 Ga.App. 624, 212 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1974) ("[a] mother is not negligent in simply failing 
to keep a constant and unremitting watch and restraint over her children") and 
Paige v. Bing Const. Co., 61 Mich.App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49 (1975) ("impossibility of a parent knowing what a 
child is doing at all timesdespite utmost vigilance").

 

[¶17]   Clearly, the parental relationship, 
without more, is not sufficient to make a parent liable in tort for the conduct 
of his or her child.  
That is analogous to the principle that a social host, even when acting 
in loco parentis, is not necessarily liable in tort 
for the conduct of his or her minor social guests.  The question that 
must be answered is thiswhat is the "something more" that must exist in 
circumstances such as those in the instant case before a duty arises on the part 
of a social host to protect third parties from harm caused by an intoxicated 
minor guest?  
Some courts have said the answer lies in the host's knowledge of the 
minor's propensity to engage in the specific dangerous activity:

 

When a person has not furnished the instrumentality but 
through negligence allowed access thereto to a child, the standard for imposing 
liability upon the person is whether the person knew of the child's proclivity 
or propensity for the specific dangerous activity which caused the harm.  . . .  If such knowledge 
cannot be shown on the part of the parent, then liability cannot attach . . 
..

 

. . .

 

. . .  We hold that the [parents] were not negligent 
in simply failing to keep a constant and unremitting watch and restraint over 
their children, or over other children with whom their children were 
playing.

 

Dennis by Evans v. Timmons, 313 S.C. 338, 437 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1993).  
Similarly, in Manuel v. Koonce, 206 Ga.App. 
582, 425 S.E.2d 921, 923-24 (1992), parents who did not furnish alcohol to their son and his 
minor guests, who were absent from their home, and who had no reason to 
anticipate that their son and his minor guests would obtain alcohol, were not 
liable for personal injuries and deaths caused by a minor driver to whom their 
son had provided alcohol.  Specifically, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
found no evidence that the parents "knew or should have known" that their son 
had a propensity to provide alcohol to underage guests at their home.  Id. at 923.9  See also Gritzner, 
598 N.W.2d at 289 (duty arose under Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, supra, § 324A where parent had prior knowledge of son's 
propensity to sexually abuse other children) and Garrison 
Retirement Home Corp. v. Hancock, 484 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (Fla.App. 
1985) (defendant, who had knowledge of resident's 
poor driving capabilities, had duty to protect others).

 

[¶18]   In Austin v. 
Kaness, 950 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1997), we considered the specific question of the liability of 
homeowner parents to a third party injured by an intoxicated social guest who 
had obtained alcohol in the parents' home, not from them, but from their adult 
son.  Because 
the son was not a minor, and because he did not reside in his parents' home, the 
question of the parents' liability was presented under theories of agency and respondeat superior.  Id. at 563-64.  We found that the 
parents were not liable for their son's conduct because, even if he were 
considered an employee or agent, the act of throwing a "beer party" was clearly 
outside the scope of his duties.  Id. at 564.

 

[¶19]   Several courts have recognized a limited 
cause of action where an intoxicated social guest harms a third party.  For example, in Cravens v. Inman, 223 Ill.App.3d 1059, 166 Ill.Dec. 409, 
586 N.E.2d 367, 377-78 (1991), the court stated:

 

            
We agree with plaintiff's assertion that this court should, under the 
precise facts of the instant cause, adopt the view of other states that have 
recognized social host negligence liability for automobile accident injuries 
caused by an intoxicated minor driver.  We emphasize that our holding is limited to 
the facts alleged in plaintiff's pleading, i.e., 
where (1) a social host has knowingly served alcohol, and permits the liquor to 
be served, to youths under 18 years of age at the social host's residence, (2) 
the social host permits the minors' consumption to continue to the point of 
intoxication, and (3) the social host allows the inebriated minors to depart 
from the residence in a motor vehicle.  We express no opinion with respect to factual 
scenarios other than the one presented herein.[10]

 

These same factors, described somewhat differently, were 
also adopted in Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1985):

 

We therefore find that the defendant hostess and her 
daughter owed a duty to those using the highways not to subject them to an 
unreasonable risk of harm by furnishing alcohol to a person under 19 who was 
noticeably intoxicated and who these defendants knew would soon be driving his 
car.[11]

 

[¶20]   It should be recalled that, in Parsons, 480 P.2d  at 397, this Court stated that there was no common law cause of 
action against a liquor vendor for negligence because the consumption, rather 
than the sale, of the alcohol was the proximate cause of any harm to third 
parties.12  With the coming of comparative negligence, 
however, some courts see this as a question for the jury:

 

We hold that, where there is sufficient proof at trial, a 
social host who negligently serves or furnishes intoxicating beverages to a 
minor guest, and the intoxicants so furnished cause the minor to be intoxicated 
or cause the minor's driving ability to be impaired, shall be liable to third 
persons in the proportion that the negligence in furnishing the beverage to the 
minor was a substantial factor in causing the accident or injuries, as may be 
determined under the rules of comparative negligence.

 

Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis.2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (1985).13  The key element in this analysis of causation 
is foreseeability.

 

            
We turn now to the question of proximate cause.  Under many 
circumstances the act which is the proximate cause of the damage resulting from a 
breach of duty relating to alcohol is the act of the consumer of the 
alcohol.  Under 
such circumstances, the consumer is solely liable because the act of furnishing 
the alcohol is too remote to be the proximate cause of the negligence of the 
consumer.  . . 
.  That is to 
say, the subsequent act of the consumer is not foreseeable to the provider, or 
the consumption of an excessive amount of alcohol is the intervening 
(unforeseeable) cause of the damage.

 

            
However, where one provides alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated 
17-year-old knowing that he will soon be driving his car, it is foreseeable to 
the provider that the consumer will drive while intoxicated and a jury would be 
authorized to find that it is foreseeable to the provider that the intoxicated 
driver may injure someone.  That is to say, a jury would be authorized to 
find that providing alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated 17-year-old automobile 
driver was one of the proximate causes of the negligence of the driver and of 
the injuries to the deceased.

 

Sutter, 327 S.E.2d  at 719 (emphasis in original and footnote 
omitted).  
Furthermore, for such a duty to arise, the foreseeable harm need not be 
known with specificity:

 

". . .  The duty of any person is the obligation of 
due care to refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable harm to others 
even though the nature of that harm and the identity of the harmed person or 
harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act.  . . .

 

            
"A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it was 
foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone.  A party is negligent 
when he commits an act when some harm to someone is foreseeable.  Once negligence is 
established, the defendant is liable for unforeseeable consequences as well as 
foreseeable ones.  
In addition, he is liable to unforeseeable plaintiffs.'"

 

Koback, 366 N.W.2d at 863 (quoting Olsen v. 
Copeland, 90 Wis.2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1979) (Day, J., dissenting)).

 

[¶21]   The sampling of opinions cited herein 
reveals the extent to which courts have gone to establish liability on the part 
of social hosts for harm caused by their intoxicated guests.  Premises liability, 
parental liability, respondeat superior, agency, 
special relationships, gratuitous undertaking, and common law negligencethese 
theories have all been advanced to provide the underpinnings for such a 
tort.  In truth, 
the answer lies in a principle to which we have turned in the past in 
determining the existence of a duty in a negligence caseduty exists where 
society says it ought to exist.

 

            
"Essential to any negligence cause of action is proof of facts which 
impose a duty upon defendant.  See, ABC Builders, Inc. 
v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 931 (Wyo.1981).  The question of the existence of a duty is a 
matter of law for the court to decide.  Id., at 932.  A duty exists where, 
upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the 
community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the 
otheror, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered 
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant.'  Prosser and Keeton 
on Torts § 37 at 236 (5th ed.1984)."

 

Duncan, 991 P.2d at 742 (quoting Goodrich v. 
Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 1994)).  
Deciding whether a legal obligation should be imposed involves a 
balancing of certain identified factors:

 

            
When this Court has considered whether a duty should be imposed based on 
a particular relationship, we have balanced numerous factors to aid in that 
determination:

 

"(1)  the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 
(2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, 
(4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of 
preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the 
consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, 
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved."

 

Duncan, 991 P.2d  at 744 (quoting Ortega v. 
Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203, 206 (Wyo. 1995)) (footnote omitted).  
This is a test for the imposition of a duty under the general theory of 
common law negligence and it does not require the existence of a relationship 
recognized under some specialized theory such as premises liability or 
agency.  
Instead, it is the same theory set forth in McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 412 (quoting Alegria, 619 P.2d at 137), whereby a duty of reasonable care exists to avoid injury 
to another person where it "could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a 
failure to use such care might result in such injury.'"

 

[¶22]   People who legally provide alcoholic liquor or malt beverages 
to another person are immunized under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) against 
liability for damages that may be caused by the intoxication of that other 
person.  Under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-6-101(a), it is illegal to provide alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverages to minors, except in certain limited circumstances not pertinent 
here.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(c) makes it clear that the immunity provision does not 
affect liability where the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage is provided in 
violation of Title 12.  
Taken together, these statutory sections reflect the legislature's 
recognition that, where alcohol is illegally provided to a minor, the person 
providing the alcohol may become liable for injuries resulting from that minor's 
resulting intoxication.  Consequently, there is no statutory deterrent 
to a finding by this Court that a common law cause of action for social host 
liability exists under the appropriate circumstances.

 

[¶23]   This is not the case in which to make 
that determination.  
Neither party applied the Duncan factors to 
the facts of this case.  We are not inclined to pursue that task on our 
own initiative.  
Furthermore, the appellant's complaint lacked several allegations that 
seem to be universally required where a tort duty has been recognized in such 
circumstances.  
First, there is no liability unless the defendant parents/homeowners 
provided the alcohol to the minor guests or, at least, they knew or should have 
known alcohol was being provided to the minor guest.  Second, there is no 
liability unless the parents/homeowners knew or should have known that the minor 
guest was drinking to the point of intoxication.  And third, there is no liability unless the 
parents/homeowners knew or should have known that the minor guest would soon be 
driving an automobile.  
In other words, the mere failure of parents/homeowners to supervise the 
minors does not, without more, create a duty to protect third parties from harm 
caused by an intoxicated minor driver under these circumstances.14  See Sutter, 327 S.E.2d  at 719; Charles v. Seigfried, 251 
Ill.App.3d 1059, 191 Ill.Dec. 431, 623 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (1993), rev'd, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 209 Ill.Dec. 226, 651 N.E.2d 154, 
159 (1995) (reversed on ground that state's dramshop act 
had pre-empted the field); Cravens, 586 N.E.2d  at 
378; Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind.App. 1989); Fullmer v. Tague, 500 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1993); Spears v. Bradford, 652 So. 2d 628, 632 (La.App. 1995); O'Flynn v. Powers, 38 
Mass.App.Ct. 936, 646 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 (1995); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992); Daniel v. Reeder, 16 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Tex.App. 2000); and Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Social Host's Liability for Injuries Incurred by Third 
Parties as a Result of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16, §§ 
8-9, 13, 17-19 (1988).

 

[¶24]   It was not an abuse of discretion for 
the district court to dismiss the appellant's complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  The complaint failed to allege the minimal 
facts that would support a cause of action under these circumstances.  Perhaps the most 
noticeable deficiency is any allegation that the appellees knew or should have 
known that Jefferson would soon be driving a car.  Nowhere in the record is there even a 
suggestion, let alone any evidence, to contradict the complaint's own 
implication that the boys left the appellees' premises on foot.  Consequently, there is likewise nothing in the 
record to support any inference that the appellees knew or should have known 
that Jefferson would later be driving a vehicle.  Similarly, there is not a hint in the 
complaint as to the source of the alcohol that Jefferson drank that night.  An allegation of 
failure to supervise minors, without more, is not sufficient.

 

            
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint

 

[¶25]   W.R.C.P. 15(a) provides, in pertinent 
part:

 

A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 
days after it is served.  Otherwise a party may amend the party's 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires.

 

(Emphasis added.)  The decision whether to allow a pleading to be 
amended is left to the sound discretion of the district court and is subject to 
reversal only for an abuse of that discretion.  Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458, 459 (Wyo. 1978).  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.'"  Herbel v. S.K. Wood 
Co., 897 P.2d 478, 480 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).  
The basic guideline for the exercise of discretion in ruling on a 
W.R.C.P. 15(a) motion is whether the amendment will prejudice the other 
party.  Rose, 576 P.2d  at 459.

 

[¶26]   In the absence of undue delay, bad 
faith, dilatory motive, or undue prejudice to the opposing party, leave to amend 
a pleading should liberally be granted.  Beaudoin v. Taylor, 
492 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1972) (quoting Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 
(1962)).  
The movant has the responsibility to produce the evidence that clearly 
shows an abuse of discretion.  Dynan v. Rocky Mountain 
Federal Sav. and Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 640 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶27]   Upon hearing that the district court 
intended to grant the appellees' motion to dismiss, appellant's counsel orally 
moved for leave to amend the complaint.  As justification for such an amendment, 
counsel presented the following arguments:

 

            
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir.  Your Honor, the problem that exists is:  When we got this 
case, it had been with an attorney up there in Powell for about four years, and 
it was  the statute of limitations has now run.  So if we're not allowed to amend, this case 
would be, for all intent and purpose, over.

 

            
* * *

 

            
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]:  . . .  It would be our contention that they knew or 
should have known that alcohol was being consumed by those children.  And what I will do 
and what I intend [to] do is go back to my client, who was one of the few people 
who survived that party that night, and I will very specifically ask him where  
what's going on with the alcohol.  When we have talked to him about it in the 
past, he's been unable to tell us, probably because he's trying to protect 
someone.

 

            
But I would not refile this with the facts that we have.  I would not even 
amend.  But if 
we have facts that support  now that I understand the Court's ruling  that the 
Carpenters were either privy to alcohol being given out, or, consistent with 
some of the case law I've given you, had alcohol available to the children, then 
we would most certainly come back and amend the complaint in that situation.

 

            
And, Your Honor, I think that time their duty would arise out of the fact 
that they knew or should have known that those children were drinking, and I 
think they do have a duty to control that if they have guests at their house 
that are minors.

 

[¶28]   The district court considered these 
arguments, and the appellees' response thereto, and then orally denied the 
motion for leave to amend.  First, the district court concluded that the 
appellees' contentions as to a lack of duty continued to be correct.  Second, the district 
court found that the motion was not timely.  The district court noted that the complaint 
had been filed on June 28, 2001, and the motion to dismiss had been filed on 
August 22, 2001.  
The hearing took place on September 24, 2001.  The appellant had 
three months after the filing of the complaint, and one month after the filing 
of the motion, during which he could have made some attempt to correct any 
deficiencies in the filed complaint.  Apparently, no effort was made to do so.  The district court 
noted that, normally, a motion for leave to amend is accompanied by a copy of 
the proposed amended pleading.

 

[¶29]   There is little guidance within W.R.C.P. 
15(a), itself, to aid the district court in its exercise of discretion when a 
motion to amend the pleadings is made.  In interpreting the phrase, "when justice so 
requires," this Court has focused on two concepts:  first, whether the 
movant has been guilty of bad faith or dilatory motive, or similar conduct, and, 
second, whether the amendment will unduly prejudice the opposing party.  In re Paternity of IC, 941 P.2d 46, 50 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Hernandez v. Gilveli, 626 P.2d 74, 77 (Wyo. 
1981)); Johnson, 608 P.2d  at 
1303; Beaudoin, 492 P.2d  at 
970.  
We have also said that amendment should be allowed when it "will serve a 
good purpose . . ..'"  
Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
868 P.2d 211, 226 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Herrig v. 
Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992)).

 

[¶30]   We cannot say that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to amend.  While we may not 
have characterized the deficiencies in the motion exactly as the district court 
did, we may affirm the decision on any legal ground appearing in the 
record.  Litzenberger v. Merge, 698 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Wyo. 
1985); Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 159 (Wyo. 1981).  
We affirm here because the motion to amend the complaint was not so much 
a legitimate request to add allegations that might establish a cause of action 
as it was an attempt to avoid the statute of limitations while the appellant 
belatedly commenced a basic investigation of his own case.  The accident 
happened in May of 1997.  The complaint was not filed until four years 
later.  The 
motion was not heard for a month after it was filed.  During the interim, 
the appellant or his attorneys apparently failed to discover the operative facts 
necessary to state a cause of action.

 

[¶31]   In moving to amend the complaint, 
counsel did not inform the district court of the proposed particulars of the 
amendment.15  All that was offered was the hope that, if 
facts could be developed to support a cause of action, an amended complaint 
would be filed.  
Ironically, counsel's statements suggest that the failure to obtain the 
necessary information was partly the fault of the appellant, himself, who 
refused to divulge the source of the alcohol.  This simply is not a sufficient basis for 
amending a complaint.

 

[¶32]   Finally, we note that the motion for 
leave to amend the complaint drew from the appellant but one sentence in his 
brief:  "At a 
minimum, Appellants should be given an opportunity to amend their Complaint so 
as to more specifically allege breaches of the foregoing special relation' 
duties of care by Appellees, pursuant to this Court's liberal amendments 
policies."  This 
type of perfunctory argument usually results in our refusal to consider the 
issue.  Mt. Rushmore Broadcasting, Inc. v. Statewide 
Collections, 2002 WY 39, ¶ 12, 42 P.3d 478, 482 (Wyo. 2002); 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 427 (Wyo. 1998); Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 1979).  
However, because dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action is such a drastic remedy, and because the denial of a motion for leave to 
amend the complaint is, in effect, the death knell for the case, we have 
considered the latter issue despite the fact that the appellant presented no 
legal authority or cogent argument.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶33]   It was not error for the district court 
to grant the appellees' motions to dismiss because the complaint did not contain 
the minimal factual allegations to state a cause of action.  It was also not 
error by the district court to deny the appellant's motion for leave to amend 
the complaint because the motion resulted from the appellant's own dilatory 
conduct and was not made for a proper purpose.

 

[¶34]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1In the record, the appellant's last name is spelled both 
"Daniel" and "Daniels."  We will use "Daniels" since that is the 
spelling used in the Notice of Appeal.

2The complaint names one of the teenaged boys as Ryan 
Carpenter.  
Although it is not made clear in the complaint, Ryan is referred to in 
the briefs as the appellees' son.

3Statements within the motions suggest that separate motions 
were filed because the appellees no longer are husband and wife.

4In a subsequent appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said the 
focus in analyzing special relationship cases should not be upon duty, inasmuch 
as "every person is subject to a duty to exercise ordinary care in all of his or 
her activities."  
Gritzner v. Michael R., 235 Wis.2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906, 912 (2000).  Instead, the focus should be upon the question 
of whether public policy considerations preclude liability under the 
circumstances.  
Id. at 914.

5The holding in Morgan was 
abrogated five years later to the extent that the distinction in premises 
liability cases between invitees and licensees was abrogated.  Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt & Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 602, 
606 (Iowa 1998).

6In loco parentis is a Latin phrase meaning "in the place of a parent" or 
"[a]cting as a temporary guardian of a child."  Black's Law Dictionary 791 (7th ed. 1999).

7The parameters of such a tort are greatly debated.  See Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Social Host's Liability for Injuries Incurred by Third 
Parties as a Result of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16 
(1988).

8The specific holding was that "a vendor of liquor owes a 
duty to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of 
all the circumstances."  McClellan, 666 P.2d  
at 412.

9In Riley v. H & H Operations, 
Inc., 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1993), the Georgia Supreme Court 
underscored the fact that actual knowledge is not the test, and disapproved 
any suggestion in Manuel to the contrary.

10Cravens was overturned in Charles v. 
Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 209 Ill.Dec. 226, 651 N.E.2d 154, 164 (1995), 
because the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the entire field of liability 
for providing alcohol had been pre-empted by the legislature.

11Sutter has been abrogated on other grounds.  See Riley, 436 S.E.2d  at 660-61.

12For purposes of this discussion, we see no distinction 
between vendors and social hosts.

13The Koback decision was soon 
thereafter legislatively abrogated.  Kwiatkowski v. Capitol 
Indem. Corp., 157 Wis.2d 768, 461 N.W.2d 150, 152-53 (1990).

14The complaint does contain the unsupported allegations that 
the appellees knew or should have known that Jefferson was intoxicated, that the 
appellees allowed Jefferson to drink alcoholic beverages, that the appellees 
allowed Jefferson to leave and drive a vehicle while intoxicated, and that the 
appellees negligently supervised the teenagers.  Glaringly absent from the complaint, however, 
are any factual allegations, as opposed to conclusions and speculation, 
suggesting that the appellees, themselves, supplied the alcohol, or that they 
knew or should have known that the boys had obtained alcohol, or that they had 
any reason to anticipate that their son or the other minors would obtain 
alcohol, or that they knew or should have known that the boys would leave the 
premises by foot and borrow someone else's car while intoxicated.

15There is some authority for the proposition that the 
proposed amended pleading must accompany a motion to amend.  See Bownes v. City of Gary, Ind., 112 F.R.D. 424, 425 
(N.D.Ind. 1986).  
The appellees mentioned, but did not develop an argument on this 
proposition.