Title: Thomas H. Barland v. Eau Claire County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1607 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Thomas H. Barland, Paul J. Lenz, Gregory 
Peterson, Benjamin Proctor, and Eric Wahl, 
Circuit Court Judges for Eau Claire County, 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Eau Claire County, 
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
AFSCME Local 2223, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 13, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 4, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire  
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy L. Vocke 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Geske, J, dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J. and Bradley, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in 
the Court of Appeals) by Bruce F. Ehlke and Shneidman, Myers, 
Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks and Domer, Madison and oral 
argument by Bruce F. Ehlke. 
 
 
For the defendant-co-appellant there were briefs 
(in the Court of Appeals) and oral argument by Keith R. Zehms, 
Corporation Counsel, Eau Claire. 
 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents the cause was 
argued by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief (in the Court of Appeals) was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief (in the Court of Appeals) was 
filed by Thomas G. Cannon and O'Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., 
Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Trial Judges Association, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief (in the Supreme Court) was 
filed by Robert Horowitz and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & 
Hansen, Madison for the Wisconsin Counties Assocation. 
 
No. 96-1607 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1607 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas H. Barland, Paul J. Lenz, Gregory 
Peterson, Benjamin Proctor, and Eric Wahl, 
Circuit Court Judges for Eau Claire 
County, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
 
v. 
 
Eau Claire County, 
 
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
 
AFSCME Local 2223, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire 
County, Timothy L. Vocke, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is not about powers that 
are explicitly set forth or described in our constitution, or 
even mentioned in our statutes.  Rather, it is about powers that 
"[f]rom time immemorial . . . have been conceded to courts 
because they are courts.  Such powers have been conceded because 
without them they could neither maintain their dignity, transact 
their business, nor accomplish the purposes of their existence. 
 These powers are called inherent powers."  State v. Cannon, 196 
Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 (1928).  Inherent powers allow the 
No. 96-1607 
 
2 
judiciary to maintain their status as a separate and co-equal 
branch of government. 
¶2 
Indeed, the inherent powers of the courts have been 
referred to as the "sword and shield of the judiciary."  Felix 
F. Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Courts: Sword and Shield of 
the Judiciary, National Judicial College (1994).  Using these 
tools to protect its constitutional independence as a third 
branch of government, the judiciary should be able to shield 
against intrusions into its domain of exclusive judicial 
authority, 
while 
using 
its 
sword 
to 
cut 
away 
the 
constitutionally defective portions of a legislative enactment. 
 Today we must determine whether circuit court judges have the 
exclusive, inherent constitutional authority to prevent the 
unilateral removal of their judicial assistants by way of a 
collective bargaining agreement between county government and 
its employees.  We hold that they do. 
¶3 
This case is before the court on certification by the 
court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1995-96).1  
The circuit court granted the plaintiff judges' ("the judges") 
motion for summary judgment and declared that a circuit court 
has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove its 
judicial assistant regardless of the provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement negotiated between the county and its 
employees under the Municipal Employment Relations Act ("MERA"), 
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70-111.77.  Defendants Eau Claire County ("the 
County") and AFSCME Local 2223 ("AFSCME") appealed from the 
circuit court's decision and order. 
                     
1  All future references to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1995-
96 version of the statutes unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 96-1607 
 
3 
¶4 
On certification, we consider whether a circuit court 
judge has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and 
remove his or her judicial assistant, regardless of the 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.  As stated, we 
hold that a circuit court judge has the exclusive, inherent 
constitutional authority to prevent the unilateral removal of 
his or her judicial assistant despite the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement.  However, we do not address a circuit 
court judge's power to appoint that assistant.2  Therefore, we 
affirm the order of the circuit court granting the judges' 
motion for summary judgment on the basis that circuit court 
judges have the exclusive, inherent authority to remove their 
judicial assistants.3 
I. 
                     
2 At its core, this decision requires us to determine 
whether circuit court judges can prevent the removal of their 
judicial assistants.  The power to appoint an assistant after 
one has been removed is a secondary consideration, and one that 
is not necessarily triggered by the facts of this case.  Because 
we typically decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds, see 
State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 
1989), this decision solely encompasses a circuit court judge's 
power to remove his or her judicial assistant. 
3 Following oral argument in this case, AFSCME filed a 
motion with this court seeking leave to file a "Supplemental 
Statement in Followup to Oral Argument."  That motion is hereby 
denied.  Briefs and papers in addition to those discussed in 
Wis. Stat. § 809.19 are accepted by this court under very 
limited circumstances; such action is typically allowed only 
when the court has requested additional briefing on a particular 
issue.  Accordingly, we do not consider, nor does this opinion 
address, any of the additional arguments that are set forth in 
that statement. 
No. 96-1607 
 
4 
¶5 
Five Eau Claire County circuit court judges filed a 
declaratory judgment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.044 
requesting the court to declare that a circuit court has the 
exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove its judicial 
assistants, and that such authority cannot be modified by a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
¶6 
The circuit court made certain findings of fact based 
upon the parties' pleadings, briefs, and oral arguments, 
including the following.  The County is a municipal employer 
within the meaning of MERA.  AFSCME is the exclusive collective 
bargaining representative for the Eau Claire County courthouse 
clerical employees bargaining unit.  AFSCME and the County were 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("the agreement") 
in force for the period of January 1, 1994, through December 31, 
1995.  Collective bargaining agreements covering courthouse 
employees have been in effect in Eau Claire County since 1972.  
See County of Eau Claire v. AFSCME Local 2223, 190 Wis. 2d 298, 
301, 526 N.W.2d 802 (Ct. App. 1994). 
                     
4 Wis. Stat. § 806.04 Uniform declaratory judgments 
act.  (1) SCOPE.  Courts of record within their 
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed. . . .  
   
(2) POWER TO CONSTRUE, ETC.  Any person interested under a 
deed, 
will, 
written 
contract 
or 
other 
writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or 
other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . 
may have determined any question of construction or 
validity arising under the instrument, statute . . . 
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other 
legal relations thereunder. . . . 
 
No. 96-1607 
 
5 
¶7 
Section 4.02 of the agreement provides that in the 
event of a layoff, an affected employee has the right to invoke 
his or her seniority and move or "bump" into a position held by 
an employee with less seniority within the same bargaining unit, 
provided that the bumping employee possesses the "necessary 
qualifications" for that position. 
¶8 
In Eau Claire County, judicial assistant or legal 
secretary5 vacancies have always been posted pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement, and filled through a posting procedure.6 
 The last time that a judicial assistant position in the county 
was filled by posting was on July 13, 1981—14 years before the 
layoff here. 
¶9 
There are five judicial assistant positions within the 
courthouse clerical employees' bargaining unit.  Three of those 
five positions provide clerical assistance to the circuit court. 
 Ms. Shanan Melland serves as the judicial assistant to Eau 
Claire County Circuit Court Judge Paul J. Lenz and to the family 
court commissioner/court commissioner.  Although the three 
                     
5 The Eau Claire County collective bargaining agreement uses 
the term "legal secretary."  At oral argument, counsel referred 
to that position as a "judicial assistant."  We take the term 
"judicial assistant" as described in SCR 70.39(11)(a) (1996) to 
be synonymous with "legal secretary" and use the term "judicial 
assistant" throughout this opinion except in direct reference to 
the terms of this collective bargaining agreement. 
6  At oral argument, counsel for the county stated that if 
no qualified person applied for the posted position, the county 
would then use standard recruitment policies to fill the 
position.  In that event, the appointing person, such as the 
judge, would indicate how many outside applicants he or she 
wanted to consider.  There is no evidence that judges are 
involved in the appointment process when the normal posting 
procedure is successful. 
No. 96-1607 
 
6 
judicial assistants for the five Eau Claire County circuit 
judges have specific responsibilities, they will, if the need 
arises, assist one another in their assignments. 
¶10 The circuit court also made findings describing the 
procedural history of this action.  On November 15, 1995, the 
County Board of Supervisors for Eau Claire County adopted 
Ordinance 
No. 
95-96/237 
which 
abolished certain positions 
effective January 1, 1996.  Ms. Penny Walske, a member of the 
courthouse clerical bargaining unit, held a position that would 
be affected by the new ordinance.  On November 30, 1995, Ms. 
Walske, a more senior employee, elected to bump Ms. Melland from 
her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz.  The circuit 
court found that Ms. Walske meets or exceeds all the judicial 
assistant job qualifications required by the agreement.7  
¶11 The five Eau Claire County circuit court judges 
expressed their objection to the bumping of Ms. Melland to the 
County Board Committee on Personnel.  The judges claimed to have 
exclusive authority to appoint and remove their judicial 
assistants, under the doctrines of inherent judicial authority 
and separation of powers.  Despite these arguments, the 
Committee on Personnel rejected the judges' arguments.  Ms. 
Melland was notified by both the County and AFSCME that if she 
                     
7  Specifically, the circuit court found that Ms. Walske, 
whose position in the Register of Deeds Office had been 
eliminated by Ordinance No. 95-96/237, possesses a high school 
diploma plus an Associate Degree, has over six years secretarial 
experience in a general office, with four of those years working 
as a legal secretary for two different private law offices.  Ms. 
Walske also has experience and training in typing, personal 
computer use with word processing software, basic bookkeeping 
and 
standard 
office 
practices 
and 
procedures, 
plus 
a 
demonstrated ability to maintain confidentiality. 
No. 96-1607 
 
7 
did not abandon her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz 
and report for work in the Office of the Clerk of Courts, she 
might be disciplined for insubordination.  Further, a failure to 
comply meant that Ms. Melland would not be paid by the County 
after December 31, 1995. 
¶12 On December 28, 1995, the judges filed a complaint 
seeking a declaration that they have the exclusive authority to 
appoint and remove their judicial assistants, and that such 
authority may not be modified by a collective bargaining 
agreement.  The judges also requested an order enjoining the 
County from bumping Ms. Melland and from refusing to pay her.  
On December 29, 1995, the circuit court heard arguments of the 
parties and issued a temporary injunction to enjoin the County 
and AFSCME from removing Ms. Melland from her position as 
judicial assistant to Judge Lenz.  Then, on March 18, 1996, the 
judges filed a motion for summary judgment seeking declaratory 
relief and a permanent order to enjoin the County and AFSCME 
from bumping Ms. Melland. 
¶13 On May 1, 1996, the court entered a declaratory 
judgment that circuit court judges have the exclusive authority 
to appoint and remove their judicial assistants under the 
doctrines of inherent judicial authority and separation of 
powers.  The court held that such authority may not be modified 
by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the 
County and AFSCME under MERA.  Even if there were joint 
authority to appoint and remove, the circuit court concluded 
that 
the 
deliberate 
removal 
of 
a 
trained, 
trusted, 
and 
compatible employee would significantly impair the efficiency of 
No. 96-1607 
 
8 
the court and would irreparably harm the circuit judges as well 
as the public. 
¶14 Having reached these conclusions, the circuit court 
permanently enjoined the County and AFSCME from removing Ms. 
Melland from her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz, 
from refusing to pay her, and from disciplining her for 
remaining in her judicial assistant position.  Thereafter, the 
County and AFSCME timely appealed from the decision and order of 
the circuit court.  We granted the court of appeals' request for 
certification. 
II. 
¶15 In this declaratory judgment action, we must decide 
whether the County's unilateral act to remove a judicial staff 
member, albeit pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement, intrudes upon the exclusive, inherent constitutional 
authority of the circuit court.  This is a question of first 
impression in the state of Wisconsin. 
¶16 A court's power to declare rights is broad.  See Loy 
v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 407, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  A 
circuit court has discretion to grant or deny declaratory 
relief, 
but 
only 
when 
there 
is 
a 
justiciable 
case 
or 
controversy.  See id. at 409-10.  To sustain a discretionary 
act, we must conclude that the circuit court examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach.  See id. at 414-15.  Most 
importantly in this case, we must determine whether the circuit 
court applied the proper standard of law in granting the judges' 
No. 96-1607 
 
9 
request for declaratory relief.  Whether an act by the 
legislative branch of government violates the separation of 
powers doctrine by infringing upon the inherent constitutional 
authority of the judicial branch of government is a question of 
law that we review independently of the lower courts.  See State 
v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41 n.7, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982). 
 
III. 
¶17 The County and AFSCME contend that the legislature has 
constitutionally delegated power to the County to enter into a 
collective bargaining agreement, and that the circuit court is 
not constitutionally empowered to avoid the effect of the 
agreement's "bumping" provision.  The judges, on the other hand, 
contend that the bumping provision is void as applied to 
judicial assistants, since the judges' power to appoint and 
remove such assistants is an exclusive one.  To address these 
conflicting claims, it will be helpful to set forth some general 
principles regarding the separation of powers. 
A.  
¶18 "The doctrine of separation of powers, while not 
explicitly set forth in the Wisconsin constitution, is implicit 
in the division of governmental powers among the judicial, 
legislative and executive branches."  State ex rel. Friedrich v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 531 N.W.2d 32 
(1995) (citation omitted). "The Wisconsin constitution creates 
three separate coordinate branches of government, no branch 
subordinate to the other, no branch to arrogate to itself 
control 
over 
the 
other 
except 
as 
is 
provided 
by 
the 
No. 96-1607 
 
10
constitution, and no branch to exercise the power committed by 
the constitution to another."  Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 42. 
¶19 In 
attempting 
to 
delineate 
the 
powers 
of 
our 
tripartite government, we need not seek a "strict, complete, 
absolute, scientific division of functions between the three 
branches of government.  The separation of powers doctrine 
states the principle of shared, rather than completely separated 
powers.  The doctrine envisions a government of separate 
branches sharing certain powers." Id. at 43 (citations omitted). 
 "In these areas of 'shared power,' one branch of government may 
exercise power conferred on another only to an extent that does 
not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the other 
branch's exercise of its power."  In re Complaint Against Grady, 
118 Wis. 2d 762, 775, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984). 
¶20 The majority of governmental powers lie within these 
"great borderlands" of shared authority, In re Appointment of 
Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 597, 124 N.W. 670 (1910), where it is 
"neither possible nor practical to categorize governmental 
action as exclusively legislative, executive or judicial."  
Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14 (citation omitted).  Nevertheless, 
"[e]ach branch has a core zone of exclusive authority into which 
the other branches may not intrude."  Id. at 13-14 (citation 
omitted).  Although finite and restricted in size, these core 
zones of authority are to be "jealously guarded" by each branch 
of government.  Id. at 14.  Therefore, as to these areas of 
power, we do not employ the undue burden or substantial 
interference test because "any exercise of authority by another 
No. 96-1607 
 
11
branch of government is unconstitutional."  In re Grady, 118 
Wis. 2d at 776 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).8 
¶21 With regard to areas of exclusive judicial authority, 
we have stated: 
 
For more than a century, this court has been called 
upon 
to 
resist 
attempts 
by 
other 
branches 
of 
government to exercise authority in an exclusively 
judicial area.  These have included an attempt to 
remove and replace a court employe, In re Janitor, 35 
Wis. 410 (1874); an attempt to dictate the physical 
facilities in which a court was to exercise its 
judicial functions, In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109 
(1912); an attempt to legislate what constitutes the 
legal sufficiency of evidence, Thoe v. Chicago M. & 
St. P.R. Co., 181 Wis. 456 (1923); an attempt to 
regulate trials in the conduct of court business, 
Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501 (1931); bar 
admission and regulation of attorneys, In re Cannon, 
206 Wis. 374 (1932), Integration of Bar Cases, 244 
Wis. 8 (1943), 249 Wis. 523 (1946), 273 Wis. 281 
(1956).  In each of these cases we recognized areas of 
authority 
exclusive to 
the judicial branch 
and, 
therefore, free from intrusion by another branch of 
government. 
Id. at 778 (holding that the setting and enforcement of time 
periods for judges to decide cases falls within an area of 
exclusive judicial authority). 
¶22 To 
determine 
whether 
a 
legislative 
enactment 
unconstitutionally infringes upon judicial power, the court must 
consider first whether the subject matter of the legislation 
falls within the power that is constitutionally granted to the 
legislature.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14.  If it does, the 
                     
8 We note that "'[i]f a statute falls within the judiciary's 
core zone of exclusive authority, the court may abide by the 
statute if it furthers the administration of justice, 'as a 
matter of comity or courtesy rather than as an acknowledgment of 
power.''  Compliance, however, is at the discretion of the 
judiciary and cannot be mandated."  Joni B. v. State, 202 
Wis. 2d 1, 8 n.5, 549 N.W.2d 411 (1996) (citation omitted). 
No. 96-1607 
 
12
court must then inquire whether the subject matter of the 
legislation also falls within the judiciary's constitutional 
grant of power.  See id. at 14-15. 
B. 
¶23 We examine first the extent of the legislature's 
constitutional authority in the employment of judicial staff 
members. 
 
The 
state 
constitution 
provides 
that 
"[t]he 
legislature may confer upon the boards of supervisors of the 
several counties of the 
state such 
powers 
of 
a 
local, 
legislative and administrative character as they shall from time 
to time prescribe."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 22.  Pursuant to 
that 
constitutional 
grant 
of 
power, 
the 
legislature 
has 
delegated certain statutory powers to each county, including the 
power to "make such contracts and to do such other acts as are 
necessary and proper to the exercise of the powers and 
privileges granted and the performance of the legal duties 
charged upon it."  Wis. Stat. § 59.01.  The legislature has also 
delegated 
to 
county 
boards 
of 
supervisors 
the 
power 
to 
"establish regulations of employment for any person paid from 
the county treasury."  Wis. Stat. § 59.22(2)(c).9  Finally, 
municipal 
employers 
must 
bargain 
collectively 
with 
public 
                     
9 Wis. Stat. § 59.22(2)(c) was formerly designated as Wis. 
Stat. § 59.15(2)(c).  1995 Wis. Act 201 renumbered all sections 
of Chapter 59.  The briefs of AFSCME and the County use the 
1993-94 statutory designations. 
No. 96-1607 
 
13
employees regarding wages, hours and other terms of employment.10 
 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.01(3), 
111.04, 
111.70(1)(a), 
111.70(1)(j).   
¶24 These statutory provisions set out the broad authority 
of the County, as delegated by the legislature, to regulate 
employment 
of 
county 
employees, 
including 
court 
staff.  
Moreover, the subject matter of the agreement seems to fall well 
within the boundaries of this authority: it covers compensation, 
holidays, vacation, pregnancy leave, and various types of 
insurance. 
                     
10 In its brief, the County objects to the circuit court's 
characterization 
of 
judicial 
assistants 
as 
"confidential" 
employees, 
because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70(1)(i) 
excludes 
confidential employees 
from 
the definition 
(and 
protected 
status) of a municipal employee.  The County asserts that the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) requires that 
for an employee to be considered confidential, he or she must 
have access to, knowledge of, or participate in confidential 
matters relating to labor relations.  Further, for information 
to be confidential, it must deal with the employer's strategy or 
position in collective bargaining, contract administration, 
litigation 
or 
other 
similar 
matters 
pertaining 
to 
labor 
relations 
and 
grievance 
handling 
between 
the 
bargaining 
representative and the employer, and be information which is not 
available to the bargaining representative or its agents.  See 
County's brief at 9.  The judges contend that the circuit 
court's use of this term is not meant to fit the WERC definition 
of confidential employees, but is a common sense recognition of 
the fact that a circuit court judge entrusts his or her judicial 
assistants with confidential information.  See judges' brief at 
15-16 n.2. 
We likewise do not read the circuit court's "confidential" 
characterization of judicial assistants to mean that those staff 
persons have, for example, access to the employer's strategy in 
collective bargaining or grievance handling.  The circuit court 
judges are not parties to the collective bargaining agreement.  
Instead, 
we 
read 
the 
circuit 
court's 
use 
of 
the 
term 
"confidential" to refer to knowledge of the substantive business 
of the courts, and not to a knowledge of labor relations 
strategies. 
No. 96-1607 
 
14
 
 
C. 
¶25 At the same time, it is clear that circuit courts also 
have constitutional authority over matters of staff and judicial 
administration.  The legislature has delegated some powers of 
appointment to the circuit court, such as the power to appoint 
court reporters for each branch of court.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.02.  Other delegated appointment powers include Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.04, appointment of a clerk of court for juvenile matters, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.065, 
appointment 
of 
juvenile 
court 
commissioners, and Wis. Stat. § 851.71, power to appoint and 
remove a register in probate.  See also, Wis. Stat. § 32.08(2) 
(power to appoint county condemnation officers); Wis. Stat. 
§ 17.13(3) (power to remove local government officers).  Both 
the County and AFSCME point out that Wis. Stat. § 751.02 also 
authorizes each supreme court justice and court of appeals judge 
to appoint and prescribe the duties of a secretary and a law 
clerk.  There is, however, no similar statutory authority for a 
circuit court judge to appoint a secretary. 
¶26 However, we do not take the County and AFSCME to 
seriously contend that courts can only have authority over 
matters of staff and judicial administration by virtue of 
legislative delegation.  Examples of non-delegated authority 
over such matters have been recognized in numerous appellate 
No. 96-1607 
 
15
decisions.11  Circuit court authority in matters of staff and 
judicial administration emanates not from an express grant of 
constitutional power, but is an inherent authority derived from 
the powers granted in sec. 2, Art. VII of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.12  Inherent, implied, or incidental powers are 
those which must necessarily be invoked to enable the courts to 
accomplish their constitutionally or legislatively mandated 
functions.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 16.13  The outer limits 
                     
11 See, e.g., Rupert v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 138 Wis. 2d 1, 
7, 405 N.W.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987)(concluding circuit court has 
inherent power to control its docket to achieve economy of time 
and effort); Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 94, 368 N.W.2d 
648 (1985)(recognizing that court has inherent power to control 
the judicial business before it).  
12 Wis. Const. art. VII provides: 
Court system.  Section 2.  The judicial power of this 
state shall be vested in a unified court system 
consisting of one supreme court, a court of appeals, a 
circuit court, such trial courts of general uniform 
statewide jurisdiction as the legislature may create 
by law, and a municipal court if authorized by the 
legislature under section 14. 
  
13 We recognize that there are subtle differences between 
inherent and implied powers.  See generally, Felix F. Stumpf, 
Inherent Powers of the Courts: Sword and Shield of the 
Judiciary, National Judicial College (1994).  However, we reject 
any mechanical distinction drawn between the two concepts: 
There is a distinction between the two terms. . . . 
[I]nherent powers refer to the exercise of powers that 
are reasonably necessary for the conduct of a court's 
constitutional functions and that grow out of the 
court's jurisdiction.  Implied powers are those that 
arise out of and are necessary to carry out the 
authority expressly granted and contemplated either 
constitutionally or legislatively. 
(Continued) 
No. 96-1607 
 
16
of that authority are not fully delineated in the constitution, 
nor in our case law.  See E.B. v. State, 111 Wis. 2d 175, 181, 
330 N.W.2d 584 (1983).  
¶27 We need not comprehensively catalog the powers granted 
to the courts.  For purposes of this case, we need only 
determine whether the inherent power of the circuit court 
includes the power to prevent enforcement of the bumping 
provision against judicial assistants to circuit court judges. 
¶28 Inherent 
powers 
include 
those 
powers 
which 
are 
"essential to the expedition and proper conducting of judicial 
business."  In re Janitor of the Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410, 419 
(1874).  We have also stated: 
 
The authorities, in so far as any can be found on the 
subject, are to the effect that a constitutional court 
of general jurisdiction has inherent power to protect 
itself against any action that would unreasonably 
curtail 
its 
powers 
or 
materially 
impair 
its 
efficiency.  A county board has no power to even 
attempt to impede the functions of such a court, and 
no such power could be conferred upon it. 
In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 121, 134 N.W. 490 (1912).  
Later, in Latham v. Casey & King Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 311, 314, 127 
N.W.2d 225 (1964), this court further stated: 
 
The general control of the judicial business before 
[the court] is essential to the court if it is to 
function. 
 
'Every 
court 
has 
inherent 
power, 
exercisable in its sound discretion, consistent within 
the Constitution and statutes, to control disposition 
of causes on its docket with economy of time and 
effort.'  14 Am.Jur., Courts, p. 371, sec. 171, 
Inherent Powers of Courts, 1963 Suppl., p. 77. 
                                                                  
Id. at 5 (citation omitted).  We have little trouble 
concluding that most inherent powers, just as implied powers, 
ultimately find their roots in constitutional provisions such as 
art. VII, § 2. 
No. 96-1607 
 
17
¶29 AFSCME asserts that constitutionally-grounded inherent 
powers are "need specific" only, and not a prerogative that may 
be exercised at will. According to the County, the circuit 
court's need remains filled if Ms. Melland is replaced by a 
qualified member of the bargaining unit.  This instance of 
employee substitution is in contrast to the need for a new 
circuit court staff position, or the need to provide the circuit 
court judges with additional facilities, equipment or services.14 
 Because this is not a case of judicial need, the County 
contends that the judges cannot invoke their inherent authority 
to avoid the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
¶30 We disagree with the appellants' arguments.  We 
recognize the distinction between this case and cases involving 
the need for additional facilities or additional staff, but we 
reject the implication that a court's inherent powers may be 
asserted only under such circumstances.  The courts of this 
                     
14 See, e.g., State ex rel. Moran v. Dep't of Admin., 103 
Wis. 2d 311, 307 N.W.2d 658 (1981) (expenditure of funds for 
automated legal research system would be a proper exercise of 
inherent powers); State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of 
Kenosha County, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960) (court can 
order installation of air conditioning if necessary); In re 
Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912) (upholding judge's 
refusal to accept leased space outside courthouse which failed 
to include a jury room). 
The circuit court below recognized that there are several 
functional areas to which inherent powers apply.  Decision and 
Order at 4.  One of those areas is logistical support, which the 
circuit court described as the ordering of additional personnel, 
mandating the construction of court facilities, the procurement 
of services, the acquisition of equipment, or the setting of 
salaries.  Id.  For an overview of cases and commentary 
discussing logistical support, see Felix F. Stumpf, Inherent 
Powers of the Court, 47 et seq., National Judicial College 
(1994). 
No. 96-1607 
 
18
state may call upon their inherent powers when needed to protect 
themselves against actions that would "unreasonably curtail 
[their] powers or materially impair [their] efficiency" in 
expediting and conducting their judicial business.  In re Court 
Room, 148 Wis. at 121.  Therefore, we disagree with the County's 
suggestion that the circuit court's "need" has necessarily been 
fulfilled when the judicial assistant who "bumps" the incumbent 
is a qualified member of the bargaining unit. 
¶31 In fact, when another branch unilaterally removes and 
replaces an already trained and qualified court employee, the 
court is forced not only to lose the efficiencies developed by 
the incumbent employee, but to spend valuable judicial time 
training and orienting the replacement employee.  A positive, 
productive working relationship is not established overnight.  
The training time spent by the court on the replacement staff 
member 
could 
be 
given 
to 
other 
pressing 
judicial 
responsibilities. 
¶32 AFSCME also argues that the exercise of inherent 
authority is limited to those instances where a circuit court 
judge acts in a judicial capacity.  According to AFSCME, when a 
circuit court judge makes an appointment decision, it exercises 
administrative, not judicial, powers. 
No. 96-1607 
 
19
¶33 The authorities cited by AFSCME for this proposition 
are not persuasive.  In none of those cases15 did the courts 
discuss the distinctions between inherent constitutional powers 
of the judiciary and the legislature's constitutional authority 
to delegate employment decisions to counties.  Other cases upon 
which AFSCME relies are also distinguishable, because they 
assess whether certain employment decisions by judges were 
sufficiently 
"judicial" 
to 
qualify 
for 
immunity 
from 
prosecution.16 
¶34 AFSCME's 
request 
that 
we 
distinguish 
between 
"judicial" power and "administrative" authority in order to 
identify a court's inherent power misses the point.  Contrary to 
AFSCME's assertion, a court's inherent powers are not limited to 
deciding outcomes in particular cases.  "Judicial power extends 
beyond the power to adjudicate a particular controversy and 
encompasses 
the 
power 
to 
regulate 
matters 
related 
to 
adjudication."  Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44. 
¶35 The constitutional obligation to administer justice 
includes addressing court administration issues which frequently 
arise "off the bench."  Judicial employees can and often do play 
                     
15 AFSCME cites State ex rel. Drake v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175, 
188 (1876) and State ex rel. Ellis v. Thorne, 112 Wis. 81, 87-88 
(1901) for its judicial/administrative distinction argument.  
The focus in Ellis was on whether persons other than judges 
could exercise certain judicial power.  Drake addressed whether 
the secretary of state, empowered by statute to revoke certain 
licenses, unconstitutionally performed a judicial act when 
revoking such licenses. 
16 See, e.g., Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988), Rosenbarger v. 
Shipman, 857 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ind. 1994), Forrester v. White, 
484 U.S. 219 (1988), and Guercio v. Brody, 814 F. 2d 1115 (6th 
Cir. 1987).  
No. 96-1607 
 
20
an extremely important role in the discharge of a court's 
constitutional duty to deliver justice to the citizens of the 
state.   
¶36 Our appellate courts have long recognized the inherent 
constitutional responsibility of the circuit courts to employ 
efficient 
and 
effective 
off-the-bench 
judicial 
management 
techniques.  The delivery of justice requires much more than 
presiding over cases and announcing decisions.  Judges and their 
staff also serve as courtroom and calendar administrators, 
performing a myriad of tasks all designed to carry out 
constitutionally required responsibilities.  A circuit court 
necessarily has inherent power, derived from the constitution, 
to protect itself and to control the judicial business before 
it, business that includes "administrative" tasks.  See Jacobson 
v. Avestruz, 81 Wis. 2d 240, 245, 260 N.W.2d 267 (1977).  See 
also, Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis. 2d 457, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
¶37 We draw support for this conclusion from a number of 
examples of the exercise of a circuit court's inherent power in 
non-adjudicative matters.  In Stevenson v. Milwaukee County, 140 
Wis. 14, 19, 121 N.W. 654 (1909), for example, we held that a 
circuit court has inherent power to appoint its own bailiff, 
notwithstanding a statute restricting appointment to candidates 
selected by the sheriff.  Another example is our conclusion in 
State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, 11 
Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960), that the court's need to 
function efficiently included the inherent power to order 
installation of an air conditioner. 
No. 96-1607 
 
21
¶38 In sum, we are satisfied that courts have inherent 
constitutional 
authority 
to 
perform 
their 
administrative 
responsibilities.  As a result, the subject matter of the 
agreement also falls within the judiciary's constitutionally-
based sphere of inherent powers to "protect itself against any 
action that would unreasonably curtail its powers or materially 
impair its efficiency," In re Court Room, 148 Wis. at 121, and 
to exercise those powers which are "essential to the expedition 
and proper conducting of judicial business," In re Janitor, 35 
Wis. at 419. 
IV. 
¶39 However, 
that both 
the 
legislative 
and judicial 
branches exercise power in the realm of staff and judicial 
administration does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
the two branches share this power.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 20.  For example, the bumping provision of the agreement 
might fall within the legislature's general power to delegate 
employment decisions to county boards, but might also intrude 
impermissibly on the judiciary's core zone of exclusive power.  
We are somewhat more persuaded by AFSCME's argument that the 
power to remove a judicial assistant is shared with the 
legislative branch, and not exclusive to the judiciary, via the 
County's specific, constitutionally-based power to establish 
regulations of employment for persons paid from the county 
treasury.  See Wis. Stat. § 59.22(2)(c).  However, examining 
such general powers of the legislature provides imprecise 
guidance in this case. 
No. 96-1607 
 
22
¶40 We reach this conclusion because in our assessment, 
the "bumping" or removal of a judicial assistant is a power 
wholly distinct from the power to "establish regulations of 
employment."  In establishing certain regulations of employment, 
the agreement sets forth guidelines on working conditions such 
as leaves of absence (see § 6.07 of the agreement), pregnancy 
leave (see § 6.12), vacation (see § 7.09), sick leave (see 
§ 7.10), health, life and dental insurance (see §§ 7.05-.07) and 
worker's compensation or injury leave (see § 7.11).  These 
provisions regulate the employment of county personnel, but do 
not control or commandeer it as the bumping provision of the 
agreement does.  We are satisfied that the bumping provision 
takes a step down a heretofore unexplored path in collective 
bargaining negotiations relating to judicial staff, and in doing 
so, crosses the threshold of the judiciary's private abode.17 
¶41 The distinction between establishing regulations of 
employment and making the ultimate decision to retain an 
employee once hired is made clear by several authorities.  The 
American Bar Association has promulgated certain standards for 
courts in the area of court organization.  See ABA Standards 
Relating 
to 
Court 
Organization 
§ 1.42.5(a), 
Collective 
Bargaining for Nonjudicial Personnel (1990).  These standards 
indicate that "[t]he scope of collective bargaining should be 
limited to those 
matters 
concerning 
compensation, working 
conditions, and related subjects permitted by state law applying 
to public employees, including those in the judicial branch."  
                     
17 In fact, counsel for the County conceded at oral argument 
that this was the first time that a judicial assistant had been 
bumped under a collective bargaining agreement. 
No. 96-1607 
 
23
Id.  A study done by the American University Criminal Courts 
Technical Assistance Project similarly indicates that "[u]nions 
bargain for strength on wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
employment.  The courts retain management's right to hire, 
administer, discipline, and remove their employees."  Harry O. 
Lawson, et al., Personnel Administration in the Courts 141 
(1978).  See also Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Courts at 54-55 
and cases cited therein ("Generally, the line that has been 
drawn in collective bargaining litigation is whether the 
judiciary when not designated as the managerial representative 
has retained control of selecting, supervising, and discharging 
court personnel."). 
¶42 Therefore, we conclude that the unilateral removal of 
a circuit court judge's judicial assistant without permission 
from the judge is not synonymous with, or even a logical 
extension of, "establish[ing] regulations of employment."  Thus, 
while we agree that the legislature has constitutionally-based 
authority to regulate the conditions of county employment, this 
fact does not aid in our analysis of whether it has ever shared 
the power to remove a judicial assistant without the circuit 
court judge's permission.  Therefore, we look to the historical 
practices and laws of this state to determine whether the power 
to remove a judicial assistant is shared with the legislature or 
exclusive to the judiciary.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 20. 
¶43 The legislative powers to control and regulate county 
personnel have significant history in the state of Wisconsin.  
Since 1945, Wisconsin counties have had the ability to establish 
No. 96-1607 
 
24
"rules and regulations" of county employment.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.15(2)(c) (1945) provided: 
 
The county board . . . may provide, fix  or change the 
salary or compensation of any . . . employe . . . and 
also 
establish 
the 
number 
of 
employes 
in 
any 
department or office . . . and may establish rules and 
regulations of employment for any or all persons paid 
from the county treasury . . . . 
 
¶44 Prior to that date, statute provided that the board 
could "at any time fix or change the number of deputies, clerks 
and assistants that may be appointed by any county officer, and 
fix or change the annual salary of each such appointee."  Wis. 
Stat. § 694(4)(b) (1915) (emphasis added).  The phrase "county 
officer" was defined and clarified in 1929 to include "any 
elective officer whose salary or compensation is paid in whole 
or in part out of the county treasury . . . ."  See 1929 Wis. 
Laws 362.  This definition would have included both county and 
circuit judges prior to the court reorganization of 1978, since 
they were typically paid, at least in part, out of the county 
treasury.18 
¶45 By engaging in the historical analysis employed by 
Freidrich, it becomes clear that there is no evidence that the 
legislature has ever held the power to unilaterally remove a 
judicial assistant without the judge's authority.  To the 
contrary, the history of the statutes upon which the County and 
AFSCME rely suggests that the legislature has historically had 
                     
18 Although this statute is silent on the issue of removal, 
it does address the power of appointment, and "if the court or 
the justices possess the latter, it follows that they alone can 
exercise the former."  In re Janitor of the Supreme Court, 35 
Wis. 410, 417 (1874).  
No. 96-1607 
 
25
only the limited power to set the number and salaries of 
assistants, along with other secondary powers to regulate 
employment.  The power to remove such assistants appeared to 
rest in the hands of the judge alone, so that once again, the 
legislature could regulate employment, but not control the 
employment decision altogether.19 
¶46 This analysis is similar to that we employed in State 
ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 99, 454 
N.W.2d 770 (1990), where this court concluded that a legislative 
enactment imposing a continuing legal education requirement on 
attorneys prior to their appointment as guardians ad litem 
improperly intruded upon a regulation of the practice of law 
that is exclusively within the province of the judiciary.  See 
id. at 98.  As a result of this intrusion, we held that the 
statute was void as an unconstitutional violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine.  See id. 
¶47 In Fiedler, we first concluded that the judiciary is 
concerned with the qualifications of attorneys in the exercise 
of its inherent power to regulate the bar.  See Fiedler, 155 
Wis. 2d at 101.  We also noted that the legislature may 
prescribe minimum qualifications for persons desiring to be 
admitted to practice law in the state as an incident to its 
general power to protect the public.  See id. at 102.  "Once 
                     
19 We recognize that the agreement simultaneously protects a 
judicial assistant's public employment status, but also makes 
the employee susceptible to bumping.  Therefore, we reference 
"control over the employment decision" only insofar as it 
relates to the judge's personal choice of retaining a particular 
individual as his or her judicial assistant; we do not suggest 
that a circuit court judge may subsequently terminate the 
assistant from public employment entirely. 
No. 96-1607 
 
26
admitted, however, it does not follow that the legislature 
shares with the judiciary the authority to establish minimum 
qualifications in specific areas of law."  Id.   
¶48 Having determined that "[t]his court has never in the 
past authorized the legislature to adopt rules or enact 
legislation attempting to establish a threshold level of 
competency to practice in a particular area," we concluded that 
"once an 
attorney 
has been 
determined to 
have met the 
legislative and judicial threshold requirements and is admitted 
to practice law, he or she is subject to the judiciary's 
inherent and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of 
law."  Fiedler, 155 Wis. 2d at 103. 
¶49 In the same way, we conclude that the power to remove 
a judicial assistant falls not within an area of shared powers, 
but within an area that historically has belonged exclusively to 
the judiciary.  The legislature has set limits on employee hours 
and wages, set compensation levels, and has even established a 
posting 
procedure 
for 
appointment 
to 
judicial 
assistant 
positions,20 but once a county employee has been appointed to the 
position of judicial assistant, the legislature has, until now, 
never enjoyed the power to remove that assistant without the 
judge's permission.  To the contrary, history illustrates that 
                     
20 Once again, the presence of posting procedures in the Eau 
Claire County system is irrelevant for purposes of this opinion. 
 A position is posted only when a vacancy occurs in the judicial 
assistant position, and does not affect a judge's power to 
remove his or her assistant when there is no vacancy.  We 
express no opinion on the constitutionality of the posting 
procedures that have previously been utilized by the County. 
No. 96-1607 
 
27
judicial assistants have traditionally been subject to the 
judiciary's exclusive authority once appointed.21 
¶50 Because we are left with an action that lies wholly 
within the judiciary's sphere of exclusive power,22 we conclude 
that the bumping provision is unconstitutional, and therefore 
void and unenforceable as it applies to judicial assistants.  We 
also note that § 2.02 of the agreement provides for final and 
                     
21 This analysis is no different from that we recently 
employed in Flynn v. Department of Administration, No. 96-3266, 
op. at 19-27 (S. Ct. March 13, 1998).  After concluding that the 
subject matter of 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 fell within both the 
legislature's and the judiciary's constitutionally-granted zones 
of authority, op. at 21-27, we concluded that the subject matter 
of the statute could not be within the judiciary's core zone of 
exclusive authority.  Op. at 27.  Under the circumstances 
presented in Flynn, it was clear that the legislature had 
consistently acted in the area of appropriations and allocating 
government resources—a power so legislative in nature as to 
eliminate any question that the judiciary's exclusive powers 
might be involved.  
22 It is worth noting that other authorities have expressed 
similar opinions on the nature of the court's removal power.  
See, e.g., Winnebago County v. Winnebago County Courthouse 
Employees Ass'n, 196 Wis. 2d 733, 741, 741 n.4, 540 N.W.2d 204 
(Ct. App. 1995) (decision "does not infringe upon the inherent 
power of a court to appoint or remove his or her staff"; "The 
court's right to remove members from his or her staff is not 
subject to collective bargaining."); Kewaunee County v. WERC, 
141 Wis. 2d 347, 358, 415 N.W.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[A]ny 
provision in a collective labor agreement between the union and 
the county that hampers a court in its operation or interferes 
with 
its 
constitutional 
functions 
would 
be 
void."); 
ABA 
Standards Relating to Court Organization, Non-Judicial Personnel 
of Court System, § 1.42(b)(iii) ("Confidential employees include 
secretaries and law clerks and other persons whose duties 
require them to work on a personal and confidential basis with 
individual judges or judicial officers. . . . their appointment 
and tenure may be at the pleasure of the person for whom they 
work.") (emphasis added), cmt. at 99 (1990) ("Confidential 
personnel, including secretaries and law clerks . . . should be 
selected and retained at the choice of the individual for whom 
they perform their confidential functions.") (emphasis added). 
No. 96-1607 
 
28
binding arbitration in the event of an alleged breach of the 
"bumping" provision.  As a result, any attempt to enforce the 
provision would transfer the removal decision to an arbitrator. 
 See Iowa County v. Iowa County Courthouse/Social Servs. 
Employees, Local 413, 166 Wis. 2d 614, 621, 480 N.W.2d 499 
(1992).  Because this directly conflicts with a circuit court 
judge's 
exclusive, 
inherent 
power 
to 
remove 
a 
judicial 
assistant, we also hold that the bumping provision is not 
subject to arbitration. 
V. 
¶51 Having 
reached 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
bumping 
provision of the agreement impermissibly intrudes upon the 
judiciary's core zone of exclusive authority, it is important to 
set forth the foundation upon which the exclusive, inherent 
power to remove one's judicial assistant rests. 
 Early in the 
history of this state we considered the invocation of inherent 
authority after the abrupt removal of a court employee by 
another branch officer.  See In re Janitor, 35 Wis. 410 (1874). 
 There, the state superintendent of public property served, 
without cause or notice to the justices, an order of removal 
upon the person serving as janitor of the supreme court.  The 
superintendent then appointed another person, someone unknown to 
the supreme court justices, to serve as the new janitor.  See 
id. at 410-11. 
¶52 Up until the unilateral action of the superintendent, 
the supreme court janitor had always been removed by the 
justices, or "by and under their direction and with their 
consent and approval."  Id. at 411.  Moreover, the court's 
No. 96-1607 
 
29
opinion demonstrated that the justices had developed a very 
positive working relationship with the janitor, and that they 
depended on him to perform many necessary functions.  See id. at 
412-16.  Citing these customs, the Janitor court reasoned that 
"no removal should be ordered . . . without the advice and 
approbation of the justices."  Id. at 416. 
¶53 Following this reasoning, the court first considered 
statutory support for the superintendent's power to remove a 
janitor.  One of those statutes provided that the superintendent 
was authorized "to employ such workmen in and about the capitol 
and public grounds as may be necessary to keep the same in a 
proper state of cleanliness . . . ."  In re Janitor, 35 Wis. at 
419-20.  After concluding that the statute did not give the 
superintendent the powers asserted, see id. at 420-21, the court 
considered the division of powers between the three branches of 
government: 
 
As a power judicial and not executive or legislative 
in its nature, and one lodged in a co-ordinate branch 
of the government separated and independent in its 
sphere of action from the other branches, it seems to 
be under the protection of the constitution, and 
therefore a power which cannot be taken from the 
court, 
and 
given 
to 
either 
the 
executive 
or 
legislative departments . . . . 
Id. at 419.  From this reasoning, the court concluded that the 
power to remove a court assistant was exclusive to the 
No. 96-1607 
 
30
judiciary, and declared the superintendent's order of removal 
void.  See id. at 421.23 
¶54 In sum, the Janitor court held that the power to 
remove a court assistant was exclusive to the judiciary based in 
part on custom, and in part on the nature of the relationship 
between the justices and their janitor.  In the same way, we 
conclude that the exclusive, inherent power of a circuit court 
judge to remove his or her judicial assistant springs from 
historical custom, as well as the unique relationship between 
judges and their immediate assistants. 
¶55 As stated, we find no historical support for the 
proposition that the legislative branch has ever possessed the 
power 
to 
remove 
judicial 
assistants 
without 
the 
judge's 
permission.  To the contrary, Janitor strongly supports the 
conclusion that circuit court judges have exclusive power to 
protect their assistants from removal by another branch of 
government.  At the same time, we conclude that a unique 
                     
23 We note that the Janitor court did not engage in a 
modern-day 
separation 
of 
powers 
analysis 
to 
reach 
this 
conclusion.  However, this is relevant only to highlight the age 
of the decision.  Although it is not the most recent 
proclamation of law that this court has seen, In re Janitor is 
still considered one of this state's preeminent cases involving 
the exclusive, inherent powers of the judiciary, and has been 
routinely cited and discussed in our decisions involving 
inherent powers.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 16-17 n.7, 531 N.W.2d 32 
(1995); State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 
94, 100-101 n.1, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990); In re Complaint Against 
Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 778, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984); State ex 
rel. Moran v. Dep't of Admin., 103 Wis. 2d 311, 316, 307 N.W.2d 
658 (1981); State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha 
County, 
11 
Wis. 2d 
560, 
575-76, 
105 
N.W.2d 
876 
(1960); 
Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 46, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943); 
Stevenson v. Milwaukee County, 140 Wis. 14, 18, 121 N.W. 654 
(1909).  
No. 96-1607 
 
31
relationship exists between a judge and his or her judicial 
assistant.  Judges share their labors and confidences with their 
assistants, rely upon their assistants' experience in managing 
an increasingly complex caseload, and entrust highly sensitive 
matters to their assistants' good judgment.  As the Janitor 
court 
observed: 
"This 
principle 
of 
trust 
and 
confidence 
pervading every department of active life, both public and 
private, the law also recognizes and acts upon and will enforce 
and protect."  35 Wis. at 415. 
¶56 The integral role played by judicial staff in the 
overall administration of justice is also reflected in Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Rule 70.39(11)(a) (1996),24 which recommends that 
"[e]ach branch of  circuit court should be staffed by one full-
time judicial assistant."  The Comment to the Rule explains the 
basis for that recommendation: 
 
 
The trial court system faces ever increasing 
caseloads and cases of ever increasing complexity.  
The judge today must take charge and aggressively 
manage his or her caseload.  To do so the judge needs 
a full-time judicial assistant.  This staff position 
will permit each judge to devote more of his or her 
efforts to the primary judicial taskpresiding over 
and judging lawsuits. 
 
 
The position of judicial assistant should be in 
the state service.  It will perform for the court the 
following work: type  . . .; assist with calendar 
management . . .; hold scheduling conferences; assist 
with file and record acquisitions;  . . . maintain 
judge's law library; act as receptionist in answering 
telephone, handling visitors and processing mail; . . 
. such other work as required by the court.  See, sec. 
758.19(h), Stats., "The director of state courts shall 
                     
24 SCR 
Chapter 
70, 
entitled 
"Rules 
of 
Judicial 
Administration," governs court administration at the state and 
local levels.  Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979.  
No. 96-1607 
 
32
establish a description of the qualifications and 
duties of . . . a judicial assistant. . . ." 
 
 
Judicial experience and expertise support the 
long-standing 
position 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Conference that this staff position is vital to a 
well-functioning court.  Where judicial assistants now 
exist as part of the court staffing, caseloads are 
much more current and the oldest cases are disposed of 
with priority consideration. 
 
The citizens of this state have a right to 
communicate directly with each judge's office during 
normal work day hours and get immediate answers to 
their questions and service on their requests without 
waiting for return calls from the judge, court 
reporters, or court clerk who at the time of the call 
are working in the courtroom. . . . Also, judges must 
be protected from ex parte communications by having 
their 
telephone 
calls 
screened 
by 
knowledgeable 
staff.25 
¶57 Evidence of this unique relationship can be found in 
statutory law as well.  As mentioned, each justice and court of 
appeals judge in the state of Wisconsin "may appoint and 
prescribe the duties of a secretary and a law clerk to assist 
the justice or judge in the performance of his or her duties."  
Wis. Stat. § 751.02.  This statute also reveals the unique and 
confidential relationship that is inherent to a judge and his or 
her assistant.  Although the legislature has chosen not to 
provide equivalent statutory authority to a circuit court judge, 
we see no reason why the relationship is any different at the 
circuit court level. 
                     
25  In October, 1993, the director of state courts issued a 
description of the duties of a judicial assistant which mirrors 
the position description contained in the above Comment.  That 
description also contains a list of desired qualifications, 
including 
an 
ability 
to 
maintain 
a 
high 
level 
of 
confidentiality, 
discretion 
and 
integrity, 
an 
ability 
to 
communicate clearly, concisely and tactfully, and an ability to 
exercise judgment and diplomacy. 
No. 96-1607 
 
33
¶58 The reasons for protecting this relationship are 
arguably stronger at the circuit court than they are at the 
appellate level.  Circuit court judges handle numerous court and 
jury trials, have dockets that are equally if not more crowded 
than those at the appellate level, and have more contact with 
the 
parties 
and 
the 
public 
in 
general. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, stripping a judge of his or her assistant without 
prior approval could impair the court's constitutional function 
more than it would at the appellate level. 
¶59 In Iowa County, 166 Wis. 2d 614, this court faced a 
situation nearly identical to the present case.  The county had 
argued that the circuit court judge's statutory authority to 
appoint a register in probate could be harmonized with a county 
board's power to establish working conditions pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 59.15(2)(c), the precursor to Wis. Stat. § 59.22(2)(c), 
and 111.70(1)(a).  See id. at 621.  Thus, the county argued, a 
provision of the labor agreement requiring the judge to post a 
vacancy in the register in probate position prior to appointment 
could coexist with the statute granting a circuit court judge 
the power to appoint the register in probate.  See id. at 618. 
¶60 The 
court 
held 
that 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement could not supersede the judge's statutory authority to 
appoint a register in probate.  See id. at 621.  Therefore, the 
provisions within the agreement which purported to regulate the 
judge's statutory authority were void and unenforceable.  See 
id.  In essence, the judge's statutory authority to appoint a 
register in probate was held to be exclusive. 
No. 96-1607 
 
34
¶61 Once again, the nature of the relationship between a 
judge and his or her judicial assistant does not change simply 
because there is no statutory authority to appoint an assistant 
at the circuit court level.  Given our decision in Iowa County, 
we find it difficult to conclude that the appointment and 
removal of a register in probate is a power to be more 
"jealously guarded" by the judiciary than the power to remove 
assistants to the judges themselves.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 14. 
 
VI. 
¶62 Based on the customary practices in our state, and the 
unique relationship between a judge and his or her assistant, we 
conclude that the bumping provision cannot be harmonized with 
the circuit court judge's exclusive, inherent power to remove a 
judicial assistant.  Because the provision obstructs the 
judiciary in its exclusive sphere, and thereby violates the 
separation of powers principles implied by our constitution, it 
is void, unenforceable, and not subject to arbitration. 
¶63 The circuit court applied the proper standard of law, 
and reached a sustainable conclusion in doing so.  Therefore, 
the grant of declaratory relief for the judges was proper. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
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1 
¶64 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Dissenting).   I dissent.  The 
majority opinion errs in two important respects.  First, the 
majority mistakenly concludes that the power to bump a circuit 
court employee, despite the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement, is an exclusive power of the circuit court and not a 
power shared with the legislative branch.  Second, the majority 
purports to state a narrow rule, but the true impact of this 
rule will be hard to contain.  
¶65 Based 
upon 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
our 
constitutional case law interpreting shared powers, I would 
conclude that a circuit court shares power with the legislative 
branch in the realm of court staff employment.  This conclusion 
realistically embraces all circuit court staff, and does not 
artificially distinguish between judicial assistants and other 
court employees.  Had the majority fully engaged in a shared 
powers analysis, it would have concluded that a circuit court 
has inherent constitutional authority to prevent a court staff 
member from being unilaterally removed and replaced, despite the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, if such removal and 
replacement unduly burdens or substantially interferes with the 
court's ability to conduct its constitutional functions and 
responsibilities.  In this case the circuit court did not 
undertake the factually intensive shared powers analysis to 
determine whether replacing Ms. Melland with another qualified 
member 
of 
the 
bargaining 
unit 
would 
unduly 
burden 
or 
substantially interfere with the circuit court of Eau Claire 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
2 
County.26  I conclude that the circuit court applied the wrong 
standard of law and in doing so, failed to examine the relevant 
facts. 
¶66 The majority begins its analysis by describing the 
inherent powers of the courts.  There is no dispute that circuit 
court power over staff employment is not an express power 
conferred by the constitution, but derives from the inherent 
power of the courts.  This court has previously described the 
nature 
of 
inherent 
powers 
possessed 
by 
each 
branch 
of 
government: 
 
In order that any human agency may accomplish its 
purposes, it is necessary that it possess power.  The 
executive must have power to direct and control his 
business.  The superintendent of the works must have 
power to direct his men.  In order to accomplish the 
purposes for which they are created, courts must also 
possess powers.  From time immemorial, certain powers 
have been conceded to courts because they are courts. 
 Such powers have been conceded because without them 
they could neither maintain their dignity, transact 
their business, nor accomplish the purposes of their 
existence.  These powers are called inherent powers. 
State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 (1928).  
Inherent 
powers 
are 
those 
powers 
that 
the 
particular 
governmental branch requires to get its constitutional job done. 
                     
26  The circuit court failed even to consider whether the 
employment 
decision 
here 
was 
within 
the 
legislature's 
constitutional grant of authority presumably because the court 
concluded that Eau Claire County is not an equal branch of 
government with the state judiciary.  The court concluded 
alternatively that even if the county had joint authority to 
appoint and remove, enforcement of the bumping provision would 
irreparably harm the courts and the public, and such enforcement 
would also diminish the inherent authority of the judges. 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
3 
 In this case, the circuit court clearly has inherent power to 
assure that it has staff available to get its constitutional job 
done. The question is, does the circuit court have exclusive 
power27 to say which of several qualified persons will aid the 
court in getting the job done?  
¶67 The majority opinion offers a blurred analysis in 
answering that question.  It correctly acknowledges that many 
inherent court powers are shared with one of the other branches 
of government.  I agree with the majority that most governmental 
powers lie within the "great borderlands" of shared authority.  
Majority op. at 11.  In that large realm, "it is neither 
possible nor practical to categorize governmental action as 
exclusively legislative, executive or judicial."  Majority op. 
at 11, citing State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995).  
¶68 In contrast, inherent powers exclusive to courts are 
few in number.28  Under our system of separation of powers, those 
finite exclusive powers should be "jealously guarded."  See 
Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 228, 556 N.W.2d 721 
(1996), citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
                     
27 See, for example, the majority's historical analysis 
concluding that "the legislature has historically had only the 
limited power to set the number and salaries of assistants."  
Maj. op. at 26 (emphasis added).  
28 See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603 
(1928) (power to admit and disbar attorneys); State ex rel. 
Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 454 N.W.2d 770 
(1990)(ability 
to 
impose 
legal 
education 
requirement 
on 
attorneys desiring to be appointed as guardians ad litem).   
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
4 
579, 635 (1952) and Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14.  Under our 
system the "'subtle balancing of shared powers, coupled with the 
sparing 
demarcation 
of 
exclusive 
powers, 
has 
enabled 
a 
deliberately 
unwieldy 
system 
of 
government 
to 
endure 
successfully for nearly 150 years.'"  Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 
228 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
¶69 The majority neatly lays out the constitutional and 
statutory powers of the legislative and executive branches over 
county employees and then identifies the circuit court's 
constitutional and statutory powers in this arena.  The majority 
concludes 
that 
"the 
subject 
matter 
of 
the 
(collective 
bargaining) 
agreement 
also 
falls 
within 
the 
judiciary's 
constitutionally-based sphere of inherent powers to 'protect 
itself against any action that would unreasonably curtail its 
powers or materially impair its efficiency,'" citing In re Court 
Room.  Majority op. at 22.  The majority continues, "[w]e are 
somewhat more persuaded by AFSCME's argument that the power to 
remove a judicial assistant is shared with the legislative 
branch, and not exclusive to the judiciary."  Having brought us 
to the junction of shared powers, the majority hesitates.  Why? 
 The "general powers of the legislature provides imprecise 
guidance in this case."  Majority op. at 22. 
¶70 Unfortunately, 
imprecise 
guidance 
drives 
the 
majority's conclusion.  Citing statutes from early this century 
that gave county boards the power to fix or change the number 
and salary of court employees, the majority deduces that the 
failure to assign removal power means that the county boards 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
5 
never had it.  This is only wishful deduction.  The power to 
change the number of employees includes the power to reduce that 
number.  The power to remove is shared. 
¶71 After 
concluding 
that 
the 
bumping 
provision 
impermissibly intrudes on an exclusive power of the court, see 
majority op. at 29, the majority could have rested.  Instead, it 
engages in a lengthy discussion, albeit dicta, of the Janitor 
decision and the "unique" relationship between a judge and his 
or her assistant.  Had that discussion been placed elsewhere in 
the opinion, it would be no more persuasive.  For instance, the 
majority essentially elevates a Supreme Court Rule and Comment 
to the status of evidence sufficient to prove the value or 
"uniqueness" of a particular judicial assistant.  Neither of 
those documents has any bearing on whether the power to appoint 
and remove court employees is shared or exclusive.  The Rule is 
only a recommendation for the creation of the judicial assistant 
position in courts that currently lack them. Those documents 
might have meaning on remand, but without specific factual 
determinations we are only left with speculation and rosy 
ideals. 
¶72 Remand for fact-finding could have solidified other 
aspects of the majority's opinion.  Again in dicta the majority 
follows Janitor to rely on a historical "custom"29 of exclusive 
                     
29 Under the laws of England, Blackstone identified seven 
requisites for every custom: 
1. It must have been used so long, that the memory of 
man runneth not to the contrary. 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
6 
circuit court authority in employment decisions.  While the 
historical perspective can assist courts in identifying the core 
zone of exclusive circuit court function, see Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d 14, vague references to "custom" are not determinative 
of this constitutional question.30  If anything, the record here 
                                                                  
2. It must have been continued. There must have been 
no interruption of the right, though there may have 
been of the possession. 
3. It must have been peaceable and acquiesced in. 
4. It must be reasonable, or at least no good reason 
can be assigned against it. 
5. It ought to be certain. 
6. It ought to be compulsory, although originally 
established by consent.  It ought to be left to the 
option of every man, whether he will use it or not. 
7. Customs must be consistent with each other, and 
must be construed strictly and submit to the king's 
prerogative.  
 
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 
Washington Law Book 1941) 43-44. 
30 For criticism of reliance on custom in a property rights 
case, when the appellate court draws a fact-intensive conclusion 
without benefit of trial court analysis, see Stevens v. City of 
Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (1994) (mem.) 
denying cert. to 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993), (Scalia, J. 
and O'Connor, J. dissenting):  
"The requirements (of custom) set forth by Blackstone 
included, inter alia, that the public right of access 
be exercised without interruption, and that the custom 
be obligatory, i.e., in the present context that it 
not be left to the option of each landowner whether he 
will recognize the public's right to go on the dry-
sand area for recreational purposes.  In Thornton, 
however, the Supreme Court of Oregon determined the 
historical existence of these fact-intensive criteria 
(as well as five others) in a discussion that took 
less than one full page of the Pacific Reporter.  That 
is all the more remarkable a feat since the Supreme 
Court of Oregon was investigating these criteria in 
the first instance; the trial court had not rested its 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
7 
demonstrates a "custom" of shared authority.  In Eau Claire 
County circuit court judges do not have exclusive decision-
making authority in the employment realm.  Eau Claire judges 
only have input in the employment of judicial assistants if the 
normal posting procedures 
under the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement do not result in any interested and qualified 
candidates.31 
¶73 Dicta again, the majority cites Iowa County v. Iowa 
County Courthouse, 166 Wis. 2d 614, 480 N.W.2d 499 (1992), to 
assert that a court's inherent authority to appoint staff cannot 
be modified by a collective bargaining agreement. "In essence, 
the judge's statutory authority to appoint a register in probate 
was held to be exclusive."  Majority op. at 35  However, the 
Iowa County court expressly declined to consider whether a 
circuit court judge's power to appoint a register in probate was 
an inherent constitutional power.  Instead the opinion measured 
only the court's statutory powers against the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement.  See 166 Wis. 2d at 618.  
Consequently Iowa County adds nothing to a determination of 
                                                                  
decision on the basis of custom and the State did not 
argue that theory to the Supreme Court." 
 
31 In this case I note that Ms. Melland is not even under 
the sole supervision of Judge Lenz.  The record indicates that 
Ms. Melland also reports to the family court commissioner. 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
8 
whether that power was exclusive or shared; nor did it apply the 
undue burden/substantial interference test.32  
¶74 The majority's own analysis, as described above, 
demonstrates that for court staff employment decisions it is 
neither possible nor practical to categorize that governmental 
action as exclusively legislative, executive, or judicial.  See 
Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14; see also In re Appointment of 
Revisor, 
141 
Wis. 
592, 
598, 
124 
N.W. 
670 
(1910). 
The 
constitutional 
authority 
for 
legislative 
delegation 
of 
employment decisions to the counties has already been described 
quite fully by the majority, see majority op. at 13-14.  The 
judiciary's inherent constitutional authority to perform its 
administrative functions is also demonstrated by the majority.  
Based on both lines of authority, I would conclude that 
                     
32 Other iterations of this test exist.  In State v. Holmes, 
106 Wis. 2d 31, 69, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982), the court considered 
whether the operation of a judicial substitution statute  
"materially impair[ed] or practically defeat[ed]" the circuit 
court's exercise of jurisdiction so as to constitute a violation 
of the separation of powers doctrine.   In Integration of Bar 
Case, 244 Wis. 8, 49, 11 N.W.2d 604, 12 N.W.2d 699 (1943), this 
court said that the separation of powers doctrine would be 
violated if the legislative conduct in regulating attorneys had 
"so far invaded the judicial field as to embarrass the court and 
impair 
its 
proper 
functioning." 
 
While 
each 
of 
these 
articulations bear some ambiguity, see Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 
70, they are essentially interchangeable.  Each seeks to measure 
the 
intrusion 
on 
the 
court's 
ability 
to 
conduct 
its 
constitutional functions and responsibilities.  Each of these 
tests resembles the test adopted in In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 
109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912), upon which the majority frequently 
relies to support its identification of an exclusive power: 
“actions that would unreasonably curtail their powers or 
materially impair their efficiency" in conducting judicial 
business”.  See majority op. at 17, 19, and 22. 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
9 
regulation of employment of court staff falls within an area 
where legislative and judicial responsibilities overlap. 
¶75 The next step in the analysis is whether that overlap 
unconstitutionally burdens or substantially interferes with the 
constitutional functions and responsibilities of the circuit 
court.  See State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 360, 
441 N.W.2d 696 (1989).  The county argued that that there are no 
facts in this record to prove that enforcement of the bumping 
provision is unconstitutional.  The county emphasized that the 
plaintiffs have not alleged an insufficient number of court 
staff and that because the collective bargaining agreement 
provides that bumping will occur only when there is a senior 
employee with the necessary qualifications, there is no undue 
burden or substantial interference with the function of the 
circuit court.  The effect of the bumping, according to the 
county, is only a "temporary inconvenience" to the court.  
AFSCME asserts that because 
there 
is 
no 
loss 
of 
court 
efficiency, the bumping provision can be harmonized with the 
court's inherent power. 
¶76 AFSCME's counsel also contended at oral argument that 
there is no difference in the operation of the circuit court 
when a permanent employee is bumped than when accommodations are 
made for personnel situations such as maternity leave or sick 
leave.  AFSCME predicted that the likelihood that a circuit 
court judicial assistant would be bumped is much less than the 
likelihood that such an employee would become pregnant or leave 
for his or her own reasons.  While AFSCME's assertions may be 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
10
true they are not dispositive.  The proper focus in a shared 
powers analysis is on neither the particular person who occupies 
the judicial assistant desk nor the frequency of potential 
personnel changes. 
¶77 The proper focus is on the degree of the threat to the 
independence and efficient functioning of the judicial branch.  
Certainly no one asserts that the separation of powers doctrine 
is violated whenever a judicial employee decides to resign and 
seek other work.  When another branch of government, albeit 
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, acts unilaterally 
to remove and replace a permanent, experienced circuit court 
staff member, that unilateral act may infringe on the inherent 
authority of the court to maintain its dignity, transact its 
business and accomplish the purposes of its existence.  See 
Breier v. E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 386, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986). 
¶78 At oral argument counsel for the county agreed that 
all three circuit court judicial assistants could be bumped in 
the event of a county employee reduction in force.  The Janitor 
court contemplated such a possibility.  Were the court not 
empowered to prevent unilateral ouster of its employees, "[i]t 
would be impossible to foresee when or how often such changes 
would be made, and they might be rendered intolerable by their 
very frequency."  35 Wis. at 417-18.  Then again changes might 
not be intolerable, but only inconvenient.  And therein lies the 
utility 
of 
the 
fact-specific 
undue 
burden/substantial 
interference test.  
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
11
¶79 AFSCME contends that the Holmes decision prohibits the 
use of inherent judicial authority to avoid mere inconvenience. 
 I do not read Holmes so broadly. Holmes is an example of the 
application of the undue burden/substantial interference test 
where the alleged unconstitutional interference is interruption 
of court routine. 
¶80 The Holmes court addressed the effect of a judicial 
substitution statute upon the circuit court's constitutional 
exercise of jurisdiction.  See 106 Wis. 2d at 52.  The court 
acknowledged that while the statute resulted in a decrease in 
productive judicial time because of increased travel and an 
increase in judicial system operating costs to the state, the 
legislature 
must 
have 
decided 
that 
the 
inefficiencies, 
inconveniences 
and 
higher 
costs 
caused 
by 
peremptory 
substitution were an acceptable price for the benefits gained.  
See id. at 62. 
¶81 The Holmes court upheld the substitution statute 
because its purpose was to ensure a fair trial before an 
impartial judge and the court could harmonize the legislative 
balancing with the need to avoid significant interference with 
administration of the court's work.  See id. at 64, 66-67.  
Holmes also noted that similar statutes had been upheld in other 
jurisdictions despite the resulting burden on state courts.  
That increased burden included court calendaring and scheduling 
problems as well as interference with the normal and routine 
operation of the trial courts.  See id. at 63-64.  Ultimately 
the court recognized that even if substitution prevented a 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
12
particular judge from hearing the case, cases were nevertheless 
heard and resolved.  See id. at 69-70.  The court also observed 
that the legislature was making efforts to diminish the 
inefficiencies arising from the statute. 
¶82 In concluding that peremptory substitution of judges 
did not rise to the level of substantial interference or undue 
burden on the constitutional functions and responsibilities of 
the court system, the Holmes court considered statistical 
evidence 
offered 
to 
show 
the 
frequency 
of 
requests 
for 
substitution.  Substitution requests were filed in less than two 
percent of the total cases, and in less than five percent of the 
criminal cases.  See id. at 70.  The plaintiff judges were not 
able 
to 
prove 
that 
the 
volume 
of 
substitution 
requests 
materially impaired the operation of the judicial system.  See 
id. at 71.  Instead the judges were only able to offer common 
sense perceptions of delay and inefficiency.  This court 
considered the potential for abuse of the substitution statute 
but concluded that such a criticism could not be gauged 
quantitatively.  See id. at 73. 
¶83 In this case, by contrast, the circuit court never 
undertook the factual weighing required by Holmes.  Instead the 
circuit court, and now the majority, erred by concluding that 
the power to appoint judicial staff is not a shared power, but 
an exclusive power of the court.  In my view the employment 
related power in this case is shared, but the current state of 
the record prevents this court from determining as a matter of 
law whether bumping Ms. Melland would substantially interfere 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
13
with the constitutional functions and responsibilities of the 
Eau 
Claire 
County 
Circuit 
Court. 
 
Remand 
is 
therefore 
appropriate. 
¶84 On remand, the circuit court could have analyzed the 
specific 
functions 
of 
the 
staff 
position, 
the 
actual 
responsibilities of the employee, and the impact bumping would 
have on the constitutional functions and responsibilities of the 
circuit court.  By examining these factors, the circuit court 
could have assessed whether the removal of Ms. Melland from her 
position as assistant to a judge and to a court commissioner 
would result in an undue burden or substantial interference with 
the functions and responsibilities of the Eau Claire County 
Circuit Court. 
¶85 This court has held that "appointment to office, while 
generally called an executive function, cannot under our 
constitution be classed as exclusively a function of either of 
the three great departments," which may explain the majority's 
desire to cleave "bumping" from other employment related powers 
like appointment.  See Revisor, 141 Wis. at 598.33  Those other 
employment 
related 
powers, 
by 
virtue 
of 
the 
majority's 
                     
33 The holding of In Re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 
592, 124 N.W. 670 (1910), is valid, despite the recognition in 
Stevenson v. Milwaukee County, 140 Wis. 14, 17, 121 N.W.654 
(1909), that "the power to appoint necessary attendants upon the 
court is inherent in the court in order to enable it to properly 
perform the duties delegated to it by the constitution."  
Stevenson recognized an appointment power in the courts but did 
not determine whether this inherent power is exclusive or 
shared. 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
14
rationale, are now inescapably added to the expanding "core 
functions" of the judicial branch.  Case law upon which the 
majority relies address appointment and removal in tandem.  See, 
e.g., majority op. at 25 n.18 and 29 n.22.  The majority also 
relies upon industry recommendations and treatises to reach its 
conclusion on exclusive power.  These sources diverge from the 
majority's narrow approach because they would broadly reserve to 
the courts the rights to hire, administer, discipline, and 
supervise court staff.  The majority cannot deny that its 
decision, relying in part on these sources, will have broad 
application to all circuit court employment decisions. 
¶86 The majority's rationale also cannot be limited to an 
exclusive power over the employment of "judicial assistants."  
Its rationale, based on the "trust and confidence" involved in 
this "unique" relationship, will be applied to the employment of 
all circuit court staff.34  Indeed it appears that the Janitor 
decision, cited by the majority at length, recognized the trust 
and confidence reposed in many government employees. 
 
"In all the affairs and transactions of life, even 
down to those which are strictly private and domestic 
                     
34 At oral argument counsel for the plaintiff judges broadly 
asserted that the power to appoint and remove court staff, 
including bailiffs, is an exclusive judicial function. Counsel 
did argue that other provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement would still apply even if the court determined that 
the circuit court had exclusive authority over appointment and 
removal decisions.  Along that line counsel agreed it was 
possible that this court would subsequently handle grievances 
brought by employees of the circuit court although circuit court 
judges could, as a matter of comity, submit grievances to 
collective bargaining. 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
15
in their nature, where the services or agency of 
others are necessary, the fiduciary or confidential 
relation, more or less clearly marked and defined, and 
constituting 
in 
part 
the 
consideration 
of 
the 
engagement and the value of the services, between 
employer and employed, or master and servant, is well 
known, and its existence recognized and respected.  
This principle of trust and confidence pervading every 
department of active life, both public and private, 
the law also recognizes and acts upon and will enforce 
and protect." 
35 Wis. at 415.  
¶87 I would declare that a circuit court has inherent 
authority to prevent its staff member from being unilaterally 
removed 
and 
replaced 
despite 
the 
terms 
of 
a 
collective 
bargaining agreement if that removal and replacement unduly 
burdens 
or 
substantially 
interferes 
with 
the 
court's 
constitutional functions and responsibilities.  This conclusion 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
inherent 
authority 
of 
the 
court 
recognized as far back as the Janitor case, but also considers 
the legislature's delegation of power to counties to enter into 
collective bargaining agreements with representatives of county 
employees, including those employed as court staff.  My 
conclusion would not affect the validity of any collective 
bargaining agreement provisions that do not unduly burden or 
substantially interfere with a court's constitutional functions. 
 See Kewaunee County v. WERC, 141 Wis. 2d 347, 358-59, 415 
N.W.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1987). 
¶88 I respectfully dissent.  I am authorized to state that 
Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley join in this dissent. 
No.  96-1607.jpg 
 
16