Title: Simmons v. Administrative Director

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

961 P.2d 620 (1998) 88 Hawai`i 55 James T. SIMMONS, Respondent-Appellant, v. The ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF the COURTS, State of Hawai`i, Petitioner-Appellee No. 19884. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. June 25, 1998. *621 Girard D. Lau, Deputy Attorney General, for petitioner-appellee, on the writ. MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. MOON, Chief Justice. We granted petitioner-appellee The Administrative Director of the Courts' [hereinafter, Administrative Director] petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Simmons v. Administrative Director of the Courts, No. 19884 (App. Apr. 9, 1998), wherein the ICA vacated and remanded a district court order affirming the Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office's (ADLRO) revocation of respondent-appellee James T. Simmons's driver's license. The ADLRO had revoked Simmons's license pursuant to Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 286, part XIV (1993) [hereinafter, Administrative Revocation Program]. In its opinion, the ICA held, inter alia, that an arrestee is deprived of due process by the ADLRO's practice of initially denying prehearing subpoena requests for relevant witnesses other than law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements until making a relevancy determination at the first scheduled hearing. We disagree. However, for different reasons, we vacate the district court's order affirming Simmons's revocation and remand this case to the district court with instructions to: (1) reverse the ADLRO's decision; and (2) direct that the ADLRO reverse Simmons's revocation and accordingly expunge his record. We further vacate the ICA's opinion and direct that an order depublishing the opinion, pursuant to Rule 2(a) of the Rules of the Intermediate Court of Appeals, be filed concurrently with this opinion. On December 2, 1995, Police Officer Eutiquio Tomimbang was dispatched to the parking lot of the Food Pantry store in Waik&imacrkī, the site of a reported two-car motor vehicle collision. Upon arriving at the site, Officer Tomimbang observed a group of people arguing in the parking lot. After separating the group, a male/female couple told Officer Tomimbang that their car had been damaged while parked in the parking lot. Claiming to have witnessed the collision, a woman by the *622 name of Angie Costa identified one of the men in the group, Simmons, as the driver of the car responsible for the damage. Simmons emphatically denied to Officer Tomimbang that he had operated the vehicle, stating that he had been drinking. Officer Tomimbang thereafter arrested Simmons for driving under the influence (DUI), in violation of HRS § 291-4,[1] and issued a Notice of License Revocation and a thirty-day driving permit, pursuant to HRS § 286-255.[2] Although notified of the implied consent to submit to a blood or breath test and the penalties for refusing to take either test, Simmons refused to be tested. Upon review of the evidence, the Director of the ADLRO [hereinafter, Director or director] revoked Simmons's license. Pursuant to Simmons's request, an administrative hearing was scheduled for January 24, 1996 [hereinafter, Hearing I]. On January 6, 1996, Simmons submitted a one-page form document produced by the ADLRO, entitled "Request For Subpoenas To Be Issued" [hereinafter, Subpoena Request I]. Under the section stating "I request that subpoenas be issued to the following parties (indicate complete name and address of each party)," Simmons identified four individuals, providing a brief comment as to each of their alleged relevancy: At the time, the ADLRO's prehearing practice was to grant only those requests for subpoenas which were addressed to law enforcement officials who submitted sworn statements.[3] Requests for other witnesses *623 would initially be denied until the first scheduled hearing, whereupon a hearing officer would determine whether such other witness were relevant. Thus, the hearing officer appointed to decide Simmons's administrative hearing granted Simmons's subpoena request only with respect to Officer Tomimbang. Simmons, however, chose not to serve Officer Tomimbang, explaining at Hearing I as follows: Pointing out that "the requested subpoenas were non sworn statement makers," the hearing officer ruled that the initial denial of those subpoenas was proper. The following colloquy ensued: At the close of Hearing I, the hearing officer ruled to continue the case for further hearing. Although the hearing officer granted Simmons's request to subpoena Costa to be present at the continued hearing, the hearing officer stated that she would take "the other requests under submission and/or until further evidence determines whether or not those witnesses are necessary." The hearing officer further stated that the continuance would be an "arrestee's continuance" and not a "director's continuance."[4] Objecting to an arrestee's continuance, Simmons stated: The hearing officer nonetheless ruled that the matter would be continued as an "arrestee's continuance." Simmons was notified by letter dated January 26, 1996 that the hearing would be continued to February 7, 1996 [hereinafter, Hearing II]. The letter also informed Simmons: On January 26, 1996, Simmons submitted a second ADLRO Request For Subpoenas To Be Issued form [hereinafter, Subpoena Request II], again asking that subpoenas be issued to Costa, Jacobs, and Officers Tomimbang and Kono. His request was granted only with respect to Costa and Officer Tomimbang. The subpoenas were ready on January 26, 1996 and were picked up by Simmons *625 on February 7, 1996, just prior to Hearing II. Simmons failed to serve either Costa or Officer Tomimbang, and neither Costa nor Officer Tomimbang were present at Hearing II. Arrestee Simmons also failed to appear at the hearing. As for Simmons's absence, counsel for Simmons [hereinafter, Counsel] explained: Explaining his failure to serve Costa, Counsel stated: Reluctant to grant a continuance, the hearing officer stated, "I don't have anything before me to indicate why this matter should be continued." The following colloquy ensued: The hearing officer granted Counsel a short recess to attempt to locate Simmons; Counsel was unsuccessful. The hearing officer thereafter closed the proceedings, finding no good cause to continue Hearing II due to the absence of any of the witnesses. On February 13, 1996, the hearing officer sustained the administrative revocation of Simmons's driver's license.[5] In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision, the hearing officer explained her initial denial of Simmons's request for subpoenas to be issued to Costa, Jacobs, and Officer Tomimbang: A subpoena should be issued in the situation where the witness has any relevant information to offer but not in the "fishing expedition" context. Lee v. Administrative Director of the Courts, JR 95-0001 (February 14, 1995). There was no evidence presented to indicate that Jacobs personally observed the Arrestee drive and the offer of proof presented by Counsel regarding the observations could have been addressed through the testimony of the Arresting Officer (sworn statement maker) which subpoena was issued to Counsel. Therefore, this Hearing Officer finds that Officer Kano's [sic] testimony would have been cumulative of the subpoenas that were already issued and that it is mere speculation that Jacobs personally observed the Arrestee absent any evidence to the contrary and denies these requests for subpoenas. Simmons appealed to the district court of the first circuit, and, on April 25, 1996, the district court affirmed the administrative revocation of his driver's license. Simmons thereafter appealed to the ICA which, upon perceiving a due process violation, see discussion infra section II.A.2, (1) vacated the district court's (a) April 25, 1996 Decision and Order Affirming Administrative Revocation, and (b) April 25, 1996 Judgment on Appeal, and (2) remanded the case to the district *627 court with instruction to reverse the hearing officer's February 12, 1996 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision. On May 13, 1998, the Administrative Director timely petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on May 21, 1998. Construing our decision in Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai`i 380, 878 P.2d 719 (1994), the ICA begins its discussion in Simmons by opining that Simmons, slip op. at 17-18. Examining the record pursuant to this standard, the ICA determined that Costa and Officer Kono clearly possessed relevant evidence from the outset;[6] moreover, Subpoena Request I was properly made.[7] The ICA thereby held that the hearing officer abused her discretion in denying Subpoena Request I with respect to Costa and Officer Kono. Simmons, slip op. at 22-23. The ICA then turned to the ADLRO's policy of initially denying all prehearing subpoena requests for witnesses other than for law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements. The ICA pointed out that: Simmons, slip op. at 26-27. Convinced that the ADLRO's policy is "clearly improper" and serves to deprive an arrestee of due process, the ICA stated: Simmons, slip op. at 27. The ICA held: Simmons, slip op. at 27-28. We disagree. As noted previously, HRS § 286-259 governs the administrative hearing procedure and provides in relevant part that: (Emphases added.) In Biscoe, this court discussed the circumstances under which subpoenas for witnesses *629 other than the arresting officer should be issued, stating: Biscoe, 76 Hawai`i at 385, 878 P.2d at 724 (footnotes omitted) (some emphases in original). The arrestee in Biscoe had submitted a prehearing subpoena request for the Custodian of Medical Records of Straub Clinic and Hospital; the ADLRO denied that request. The request had simply named the Custodian of Records and provided an address, but "neither identified the type of records that the custodian would be required to bring to the hearing nor indicated the date, time, or treatment of the records that Biscoe wished produced." Id. We held that the arrestee's request "was so vague that it would have proved useless, even if the subpoena had been issued[,]" id.; in other words, the subpoena request was deficient in form. Accordingly, we held that the ADLRO did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. We do not take issue per se with the ICA's formulation of the test for determining whether a subpoena should be issued to witnesses other than law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements. The problem, rather, is that the ICA misconstrues Biscoe to hold that, whenever a subpoena request is in "proper form," an elusive term in itself, (1) the ADLRO must determine, prehearing, whether a witness possesses relevant evidence, and (2) any subsequent grant of subpoenas for relevant witnesses is insufficient and violative of due process. Nothing in either Biscoe or the statute supports such an expansive holding. As stressed previously in both Biscoe and Park, with the exception of law enforcement officials required to be subpoenaed, HRS § 286-259 affords a hearing officer the authority and the discretion to issue subpoenas to other officers and individuals. Biscoe, 76 Hawai`i at 385, 878 P.2d at 724; Park, 75 Haw. at 275, 859 P.2d at 920. Although we held in Biscoe that a hearing officer should issue all requested subpoenas so long as "a proper request is made for a relevant witness," Biscoe cannot be fairly nor practically read to require that such subpoenas always be issued prehearing in order to comport with due process. First, as stated previously, nothing in our jurisprudence pertaining to the Administrative Revocation Program intimates that an arrestee is entitled to present his or her entire case at the initial hearing and that a continued hearing is insufficient to satisfy due process. See, e.g., Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 856 P.2d 1207 (1993) (holding the Administrative Revocation Program, which provides for continuances, constitutional on its face), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119, 114 S. Ct. 1070, 127 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1994). Indeed, "[d]ue process encompasses the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner[,]" id. at 22, 856 P.2d at 1218 (citations omitted), and the Administrative Revocation Program affords the arrestee an opportunity to examine all relevant witnesses, whether it be at an initial hearing or a continued hearing. Second, as the Administrator Director's petition points out, it is often difficult, if not impossible, for a hearing officer to make a prehearing determination from the face of a subpoena request whether a certain witness possesses relevant evidence. Whereas we, as an appellate court, have the benefit of hind-sight in determining this issue, a hearing officer is often limited solely to a one or two-line subpoena request and a curt written record containing only the arresting officer's police report and sworn statement, and, in *630 instances where the arrestee submits to a breath test, the sworn statements of the person who administered the breath test and the person who maintains the intoxilyzer. Nevertheless, under the ICA's holding, a hearing officer is compelled to rule as to each witness' relevancy, prehearing, without any opportunity to clarify the arrestee's assertion as to a particular witness's purported relevancy or to clarify the contested issues,[9] which are generally determined at the first hearing. Given the likelihood that some witnesses will be compelled to attend the initial hearing unnecessarily,[10] we believe that the ICA's rule invites poor and uninformed decision making and will unduly lengthen the hearing process, which was clearly intended to be "expeditious." 1990 Senate Journal, at 681 (remarks of Senator Fernandes Salling in favor of S.B. 1148, C.D. 1). Moreover, such a rule is, in any event, unnecessary to preserve an arrestee's right to due process, particularly considering that an arrestee would be able to examine his or her relevant witnesses at a continued hearing. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ADLRO's current practice of denying all prehearing subpoena requests for witnesses other than law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements does not violate an arrestee's right to due process. Accordingly, the hearing officer in the instant case acted within her discretion by initially denying Simmons's prehearing subpoena request and making her relevancy determination as to the requested witnesses at the first scheduled hearing. Notwithstanding that the ADLRO has discretion regarding the timing of its issuance of subpoenas for relevant witnesses other than law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements, we hold, based on the reasons set forth below, that the ADLRO cannot, at the same time, properly designate a continued hearing to subpoena previously requested, relevant witnesses as an "arrestee's continuance" under HRS § 286-259(j). We therefore further hold that the hearing officer abused her discretion in designating the continuance of Hearing I as an "arrestee's continuance." "We interpret statutes de novo." Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai`i 217, 221, 941 P.2d 300, 304 (1997) (citing Shimabuku v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 79 Hawai`i 352, 356, 903 P.2d 48, 52 (1995)). "Our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature[,] which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Products, 86 Hawai`i 214, 255, 948 P.2d 1055, 1096 (1997) (quoting State v. Wells, 78 Hawai`i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73, reconsideration denied, 78 Hawai`i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995)). As indicated previously, HRS § 286-259(j) provides in pertinent part that: (Emphasis added.) Thus, any continuance "granted at the request of the arrestee," to wit, an "arrestee's continuance," serves to penalize the arrestee in that the validity of his or her temporary permit will not be extended. Applying HRS § 286-259(j) to the instant case, it appears at first glance that the hearing officer appropriately designated the continuance of Hearing I as an "arrestee's continuance." After all, the continuance was arguably requested at the behest of Simmons so that he could subpoena Costa and thereby examine both Officer Tomimbang and Costa as part of his defense. Turning to the policies underlying the Administrative Revocation Program, generally, and HRS § 286-259, in particular, we are apprised, however, of the following. Speaking in favor of S.B. 1148,[11] C.D. 1, the Chairperson of the Senate Transportation Committee, Senator Lehua Fernandes Salling, stated in a floor speech that: 1990 Senate Journal, at 681 (emphases added). The above passage illustrates that the legislature was motivated to provide for continuances as a result of the state's concern that it would require "more time" to "adequately prosecute" an arrestee. To "balance" for a state requested continuance, the legislature, presumably in fairness to the arrestee, intended that his or her temporary permit would run until the hearing was finally held. As indicated previously, the hearing officer in the instant case granted Simmons an "arrestee's continuance" so that Simmons could serve a subpoena upon Costa. A "director's continuance," however, was refused, despite the fact that Simmons had duly submitted his subpoena request for Costa prior to the hearing and that it was the hearing officer who had postponed her relevancy determination as to his requested witnesses until Hearing I. Under these circumstances, we hold that the hearing officer's decision was in error. The need for a continuance was clearly generated herein by the hearing officer's very own actions, to wit, her decision to initially deny Simmons's prehearing subpoena so that a relevancy determination could be made at *632 Hearing I. Because the hearing officer essentially needed "more time" to make a relevancy determination as to Simmons's requested witnesses, we hold that, in fairness to Simmons and in accordance with the underlying policies of HRS § 286-259, the continuance should have been designated a "director's continuance." For the reasons stated by the ICA, see supra note 6, we agree that both Costa and Officer Kono possessed relevant evidence bearing on Simmons's case; a subpoena for Officer Kono, however, was never issued. We hold therefore that the hearing officer further erred in failing to issue a subpoena for Officer Kono. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ICA's decision insofar as it holds that an arrestee is deprived of due process by the ADLRO's practice of initially denying prehearing subpoena requests for relevant witnesses other than law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements. However, because the hearing officer abused her discretion in (1) designating the continuance of Hearing I as an "arrestee's continuance" and (2) failing to grant the issuance of a subpoena to Officer Kono, we vacate the district court's order affirming Simmons's revocation and remand this case to the district court with instructions to: (1) reverse the ADLRO's decision; and (2) direct that the ADLRO reverse Simmons's revocation and accordingly expunge his record. We further vacate the ICA's opinion and direct that an order depublishing the opinion, pursuant to Rule 2(a) of the Rules of the Intermediate Court of Appeals, be filed concurrently with this opinion. [1] HRS § 291-4 (1993) provides in pertinent part that: Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. (a) A person commits the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor if: (1) The person operates or assumes actual physical control of the operation of any vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, meaning that the person concerned is under the influence of intoxicating liquor in an amount sufficient to impair the person's normal mental faculties or ability to care for oneself and guard against casualty[.] [2] HRS § 286-255 (1993) provides that: Arrest; procedures. Whenever a person is arrested for a violation of section 291-4, on a determination by the arresting officer that: (1) There was reasonable suspicion to stop the motor vehicle, or that the motor vehicle was stopped at an intoxication control roadblock established and operated in compliance with sections 286-162.5 and 286-162.6; and (2) There was probable cause to believe that the arrestee was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; the arresting officer shall immediately take possession of any license held by the person and request the arrestee to take a test for concentration of alcohol in the blood. The arresting officer shall inform the person that the person has the option to take a breath test, a blood test, or both. The arresting officer shall also inform the person of the sanctions under this part, including the sanction for refusing to take a breath or a blood test. The arresting officer shall then complete and issue to the arrestee a notice of administrative revocation and shall indicate thereon whether the notice shall serve as a temporary permit. The notice shall serve as a temporary permit, unless at the time of arrest the arrestee was unlicensed, the arrestee's license was revoked or suspended, or the arrestee had no license in the arrestee's possession. [3] When a person is arrested for DUI, HRS § 286-257 (1993) requires that the following documents be immediately forwarded to the director: (1) the arrest report and the sworn statement of the arresting officer; and, where the arrestee submits to a breath test establishing an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, (2) the sworn statement of the person responsible for the maintenance of the breath testing equipment; and (3) the sworn statement of the person who conducted the test to determine alcohol concentration. See HRS §§ 286-257(a)(1), (2), and (3). [4] HRS § 286-259 (1993) governs administrative hearing procedure, providing in pertinent part that: (j) For good cause shown, the director may grant a continuance either of the commencement of the hearing or of a hearing that has already commenced. If a continuance is granted at the request of the director, the director shall extend the validity of the temporary permit for a period not to exceed the period of the continuance. If a continuance is granted at the request of the arrestee, the director shall not extend the validity of the temporary permit. For purposes of this section a continuance means a delay in the commencement of the hearing or an interruption of a hearing that has commenced other than for recesses during the day or at the end of the day or week. (Emphasis added.) [5] We note that the revocation of Simmons's driver's license was affirmed in accordance with HRS § 286-259(e) (1993), which provided in pertinent part that: The director shall affirm the administrative revocation only if the director determines that: (1) There existed reasonable suspicion to stop the motor vehicle or the motor vehicle was stopped at an intoxication control road-block...; (2) There existed probable cause to believe that the arrestee drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; and (3) The evidence proves by a preponderance that the arrestee drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or while having an alcohol concentration of.10 or more or that the arrestee refused to submit to a breath or blood test after being informed of the sanctions of this part. We note further that the revocation period for Simmons's driver's license was one year, from January 2, 1996 to January 1, 1997. [6] With respect to Costa, the sworn statement of Officer Tomimbang indicated that Simmons denied being the driver of the car but was positively identified as the driver by Costa. Costa was also the person to report the collision to police. As for Officer Kono, given that Officer Kono had taken Costa's statement and independently observed signs of Simmons's intoxication, Officer Kono was also a relevant witness. We note that the ICA determined Jacobs not to be a relevant witness based on the fact that nothing in the record indicated that Jacobs "possessed any evidence relevant to the questions of whether Simmons was the driver of the car which collided with Jacobs' car or whether Simmons was DUI." Simmons, slip op. at 22. [7] Considering that Subpoena Request I stated the name and address of each individual to be subpoenaed and also provided the reason that the individual was relevant to the case, the ICA held that the request had therefore been properly made. Simmons, slip op. at 24. [8] HRS § 286-259(a) requires that an administrative hearing to review the Director's administrative revocation of an arrestee's driver's license "shall be scheduled to commence no later than twenty-five days from the date the notice of administrative revocation was issued. The director may continue the hearing only as provided in subsection (j)." HRS § 286-259(j) provides in relevant part that "[f]or good cause shown, the director may grant a continuance either of the commencement of the hearing or of a hearing that has already commenced." [9] Contested issues might include intoxication, consent to take a breath test, whether the arrestee was driving, or whether the intoxilyzer was properly functioning. [10] For example, if, at the initial hearing, Simmons had admitted that he had been driving, then it would have been plainly unnecessary to subpoena Costa. [11] The predecessor to the Administrative Revocation Program.