Title: Peterson v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12281 
 
OMARI PETERSON  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 5, 2017. - November 29, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Erroneous Conviction.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, 
Review of interlocutory action. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 12, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Adam R. LaGrassa, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
William S. Smith for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  After the Appeals Court reversed the conviction 
of the plaintiff, Omari Peterson, and set aside the verdict on a 
charge of unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, he filed a 
civil complaint in the Superior Court seeking compensation under 
the erroneous convictions statute, G. L. c. 258D.  A judge 
2 
 
 
 
denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the complaint, and 
the Commonwealth appealed.1  We transferred the case here on our 
own motion to determine whether, under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) 
(ii), Peterson is eligible to pursue a claim for compensation.  
Because we conclude that Peterson's conviction was not reversed 
by the Appeals Court on "grounds which tend to establish" his 
innocence within the meaning of this statute, he is not eligible 
to seek compensation under it.  Accordingly, we vacate the order 
denying the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss and remand the case 
to the Superior Court, where judgment shall enter for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Background and prior proceedings.  We recite the 
uncontested facts.  The charge underlying Peterson's conviction 
stemmed from a traffic stop of the motor vehicle Peterson was 
driving.  The officers stopped the vehicle in an area known for 
gang activity after observing the driver commit several traffic 
infractions.  The officers approached the driver's side of the 
vehicle and asked Peterson for his driver's license and 
registration, both of which he promptly provided.  Despite 
confirming that Peterson's driver's license and registration 
                                                          
 
 
1 The Commonwealth is entitled, under the doctrine of 
present execution, to seek interlocutory review of the order 
denying its motion to dismiss with respect to Omari Peterson's 
eligibility under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii).  See Irwin v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 842 (2013). 
3 
 
 
 
were valid, the officers ordered Peterson to step out of the 
vehicle.  As Peterson did so, the officers noticed that a knife 
was clipped to his jeans.  Peterson was then placed under arrest 
for carrying a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b). 
 
Peterson moved to suppress the knife prior to trial, 
arguing that the exit order lacked constitutional justification.  
That motion was denied, and the case proceeded to trial.  A jury 
found Peterson guilty of unlawful possession of a dangerous 
weapon, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b), and he was sentenced to two and 
one-half years in a house of correction. 
 
On direct appeal, Peterson challenged his conviction on the 
grounds that (1) the judge erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because the exit order, resulting in discovery of the 
knife, was not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that the knife was a 
"dangerous weapon" within the meaning of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b); 
and (3) jury instructions.  In its unpublished memorandum and 
order pursuant to its rule 1:28, see Commonwealth v. Peterson, 
82 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2012), a panel of the Appeals Court 
determined that the exit order was invalid because it was devoid 
of specific, articulable facts to support a reasonable 
apprehension of danger or that a crime had been committed; the 
police inquiry should have terminated once Peterson produced a 
valid driver's license and registration.  Concluding that the 
4 
 
 
 
motion to suppress the knife should have been granted, the 
Appeals Court reversed Peterson's conviction and set aside the 
verdict, but did not reach his additional claims on the ground 
that they were rendered moot.  Accordingly, that court did not 
address whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that 
the knife was a dangerous weapon under the governing statute. 
 
After Peterson filed his complaint in the Superior Court 
seeking compensation under the erroneous convictions statute, 
the Commonwealth moved to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  A Superior Court judge denied 
the Commonwealth's motion, reasoning that the effect of the 
Appeals Court's decision was that there was no longer a judicial 
determination that the knife found on Peterson was dangerous 
under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b), and that absent a determination by 
the Appeals Court that the knife was legal, it would be 
speculative to presume that the reversal of Peterson's 
conviction rested on grounds tending to establish innocence. 
 
Statutory overview.  The Legislature enacted the erroneous 
convictions statute, G. L. c. 258D, in 2004 in response to the 
steady increase in exonerations in Massachusetts and throughout 
the nation.  See Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 355 
(2010).  See also Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 847-850 
5 
 
 
 
(2013).2  The erroneous convictions statute provides a cause of 
action against the Commonwealth for certain "erroneous felony 
conviction[s] resulting in incarceration."  G. L. c. 258D, § 1 
(A).  The class of claimants eligible to pursue relief includes 
"those who have been granted judicial relief by a [S]tate court 
of competent jurisdiction, on grounds which tend to establish 
the innocence of the individual."  G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) 
(ii).3,4 
                                                          
 
 
2 In construing the erroneous convictions statute's language 
setting out the requirement that to be eligible for recovery 
under the statute, a person must show that his or her conviction 
was reversed "on grounds which tend to establish" innocence, we 
have examined the "exchange between the legislative and 
executive branches" in order to discern a legislative intent 
relative to threshold eligibility.  Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 
Mass. 354, 358 (2010).  "The version of the bill initially 
passed by the Legislature and sent to the Governor for signature 
provided for eligibility where judicial relief had been granted 
'on grounds consistent with . . . innocence.'"  Id., quoting 
2004 House Doc. No. 4166, as replaced by 2004 House Doc. No. 
4981.  The final bill enacted into law, however, adopted the 
Governor's proposed amendments that replaced "the phrase 
'consistent with' with the phrase 'which tend to establish' in 
§ 1 (B) (ii)."  Guzman, supra, quoting 2004 House Doc. No. 4166, 
as replaced by 2004 House Doc. No. 5030. 
 
 
3 An individual seeking eligibility under G. L. c. 258, § 1 
(B) (ii), must also show that the indictment or complaint 
underlying his conviction has been dismissed, that a nolle 
prosequi has been entered, or that he was found not guilty at a 
new trial. 
 
 
4 "[T]he eligibility requirement is 'separate and distinct 
from the merits of the claim of relief that a claimant must 
establish at trial,' namely that he or she did not commit the 
charged offense."  Renaud v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 315, 319 
(2015), quoting Irwin, 465 Mass. at 842.  At trial, the burden 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
We have previously construed the eligibility language at 
issue, "grounds which tend to establish [] innocence."  G. L. 
c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii).  The statute does not restrict 
eligibility "to individuals whose convictions were vacated or 
reversed strictly on the basis 'of compelling or overwhelming 
exculpatory evidence,' that is, on the grounds that they were 
actually innocent."  Irwin, 465 Mass. at 844, quoting Guzman, 
458 Mass. at 359.  "Rather, 'grounds which tend to establish' a 
plaintiff's innocence require that a conviction be overturned 
'on grounds resting upon facts and circumstances probative of 
the proposition that the claimant did not commit the crime.'"  
Irwin, supra, quoting Guzman, supra. 
 
"We have cautioned, however, that such grounds must 'tend[] 
to do more than merely assist the defendant's chances of 
acquittal.'"  Irwin, supra, quoting Guzman, supra at 360.  
"[C]onvictions that are reversed only because of 'procedural or 
evidentiary errors or structural deficiencies at . . . trial[] 
that could well be 'consistent' with innocence without any 
tendency to establish it' would not meet the statutory 
definition."  Irwin, supra at 846, quoting Guzman, supra at 358. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on individuals eligible to seek relief under the erroneous 
convictions statute is much greater:  they bear the burden of 
establishing by "clear and convincing evidence" that they did 
not commit the crimes with which they were charged.  G. L. 
c. 258D, § 1 (C). 
7 
 
 
 
 
Discussion.  Both the Commonwealth and Peterson rely on 
previous case law to argue whether Peterson's conviction was 
reversed "on grounds which tend to establish" his innocence 
under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii).  See Drumgold v. 
Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 367, 376-378 (2010); Guzman, 458 Mass. 
at 357-362.  See also Renaud v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 315, 
318-320 (2015); Irwin, 465 Mass. at 843-847, 850. 
 
We first interpreted the eligibility requirement language 
in Guzman, 458 Mass. at 357-362.  In that case, a Superior Court 
judge allowed Guzman's motion for a new trial because trial 
counsel, to avoid what he perceived to be a conflict of 
interest, took actions that prejudiced Guzman's defense of 
misidentification and deprived him of a fair trial.  Id. at 363-
364.  More specifically, the judge found that Guzman was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed 
to call two percipient witnesses who would have testified that 
someone other than Guzman committed the crimes.  Id. at 363.5  
Although presented in the context of an ineffective assistance 
claim, we held that Guzman's reversal "rest[ed] upon facts and 
                                                          
 
 
5 Guzman's trial counsel had represented a percipient 
witness in a recently completed case, who, if called to testify 
at Guzman's trial, would have contradicted the testimony of the 
Commonwealth's key witnesses.  Guzman, 458 Mass. at 363.  Not 
only did counsel fail to call these witnesses at trial, but he 
also moved successfully to prevent one of the two from being 
called as a witness by the Commonwealth.  Id. at 363 n.16. 
8 
 
 
 
circumstances probative of the proposition that Guzman did not 
commit the crimes charged as required by G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) 
(ii)."  Id. at 365.  Essential to our analysis was that 
"counsel's ineffective assistance took the form of depriving 
Guzman of the introduction of evidence tending to establish his 
actual innocence."  Id. at 365 n.20. 
 
In Drumgold, 458 Mass. at 376-379, decided the same day as 
Guzman, this court held that the order granting a new trial, 
based the absence of critical evidence that undermined the 
credibility of two key prosecution witnesses, satisfied the 
eligibility requirement of § 1 (B) (ii).  Drumgold was convicted 
of murder in the first degree based, in large part, on the 
testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified him as the 
assailant.  Id. at 378.  One witness was discovered to have had 
terminal brain cancer, which significantly diminished her 
testimonial faculties, id. at 372-373, and the other had 
received undisclosed inducements to testify at Drumgold's trial, 
id. at 373-375.  These omissions, which prevented meaningful 
cross-examination of key prosecution witnesses, detracted from 
the reliability of the Commonwealth's identification of Drumgold 
as one of the perpetrators and, therefore, from the strength of 
his alibi defense.  Id. at 375, 378.  The grounds for the 
allowance of Drumgold's motion for a new trial, accordingly, 
9 
 
 
 
"rested on facts and circumstances probative of [his] 
innocence."  Id. at 378. 
 
In contrast, this court concluded in Irwin, 465 Mass. at 
854-855, that the grant of a new trial based on the erroneous 
inclusion at Irwin's initial trial of consciousness of guilt 
evidence related to his prearrest silence did not rest on facts 
and circumstances tending to establish his innocence.  We 
explained that while the inclusion of improper consciousness of 
guilt evidence was an error of law, its exclusion "did not 
change the weight of the properly admitted evidence."  Id. at 
854.  Nor did its exclusion "make it more likely that Irwin did 
not commit the offense charged."  Id. at 855.  Thus, reversal of 
his conviction on this basis did not constitute "grounds which 
tend to establish" innocence under the statute, and the 
eligibility requirement therefore was not met.  Id. 
 
More recently, in Renaud, 471 Mass. at 319-320, we held 
that reversal of Renaud's convictions by the Appeals Court on 
the basis of insufficient evidence to prove that Renaud was the 
person who committed the crimes charged constituted "grounds 
which tend to establish" innocence under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) 
(ii).  Renaud's convictions, all of which related to a break-in, 
rested "almost entirely" on an electronic bank transfer card 
bearing his name that police found at the burglarized home.  
Renaud, supra at 316-317.  In determining that Renaud was 
10 
 
 
 
eligible under the erroneous convictions statute, our conclusion 
rested on "the unique facts" of that case, that is, that "the 
Commonwealth's 'insufficient evidence' pertained to [] 
[Renaud's] identity."  Id. at 319. 
 
Here, similar to Irwin, Peterson's conviction was not 
overturned on grounds probative of the proposition that he did 
not commit the crime of which he was convicted.  Peterson's 
conviction was overturned because of the improper denial of his 
pretrial motion to suppress the knife obtained during the 
unjustified exit order.  Reversal on this basis is not probative 
of the proposition that Peterson did not commit the crime for 
which he was convicted.  The Appeals Court's decision reversing 
Peterson's conviction implicates only the constitutionality of 
the police officers' conduct.  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 704 (1996) ("[T]he issue in these probable-cause and 
reasonable-suspicion cases is not innocence but deterrence of 
unlawful police conduct"); Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 
438 (2008) ("The suppression of evidence under the exclusionary 
rule is a 'judicially created remedy,' whose 'prime purpose is 
to deter future unlawful police conduct'" [citation omitted]).  
Suppression of the knife based on the unjustified exit order, 
therefore, is not probative of whether Peterson possessed a 
dangerous weapon.  This is true notwithstanding the fact that 
the Appeals Court's decision, as a practical matter, required 
11 
 
 
 
the dismissal or nolle prosequi of the underlying criminal 
charge. 
 
In sum, unlike in Guzman and Drumgold, where the grounds 
for relief were based on omissions that would have detracted 
from the weight of the Commonwealth's evidence and were 
probative of the proposition that the defendants in those cases 
did not commit the crimes charged, or Renaud, where the grounds 
for relief rested on insufficient evidence pertaining to the 
defendant's identity as the person who burglarized the home, 
Peterson's reversal was unrelated to the weight of the evidence 
establishing that he was in possession of a dangerous weapon.  
Thus, Peterson cannot meet the threshold eligibility requirement 
because reversal on the basis of an unjustified exit order does 
"not rest on facts and circumstances probative of the 
proposition that [Peterson] did not commit the crimes charged" 
in the complaint.  Guzman, 458 Mass. at 365. 
 
To the extent that Peterson claims eligibility under G. L. 
c. 258D based on an argument that he raised in his direct appeal 
but that was not considered by the Appeals Court -- namely, that 
the knife he was carrying in fact did not qualify as a dangerous 
weapon within the meaning of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b) -- there is 
nothing in the language of the erroneous convictions statute or 
our cases interpreting it that suggests arguments raised but not 
relied on in reversing or vacating a conviction render an 
12 
 
 
 
individual eligible to seek relief under that statute.6  See 
Guzman, 458 Mass. at 361, citing Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Morrison, 456 Mass. 463, 468 (2010) ("Unless the plain 
meaning of the statute requires it, we will not expand or limit 
its meaning"). 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that Peterson's conviction was not 
overturned on grounds tending to establish his innocence, 
thereby rendering him ineligible for compensation under G. L. 
c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii).  The order denying the Commonwealth's 
motion to dismiss is vacated and set aside.  The case is 
remanded to the Superior Court, where judgment shall enter for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                          
 
 
6 Peterson's position is that the knife was not a dangerous 
weapon under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b).  As the Appeals Court has 
recognized, the fact that a knife blade can be locked in place, 
without more, is insufficient to qualify as a dangerous weapon; 
there must also be "a 'device or case' that allow[s] the blade 
to be drawn at a locked position."  Commonwealth v. Higgins, 85 
Mass. App. Ct. 534, 536 (2014), quoting G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b).  
The record before this court is inadequate to resolve whether 
the knife Peterson was carrying qualified under the statute. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that the 
ground on which the Appeals Court vacated Omari Peterson's 
conviction of unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (b) -- the unconstitutional exit order that led to 
the discovery of the knife clipped to his jeans -- was not a 
ground "which tend[s] to establish [his] innocence" of the crime 
charged, and therefore not a ground that makes him eligible for 
compensation under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii).   I write 
separately to note that, if Peterson is correct that the knife 
which he was convicted of possessing was not the type of knife 
whose possession is a crime under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b), the 
Appeals Court denied him the opportunity to seek the 
compensation that he might be entitled to by resting its 
reversal solely on the unconstitutional exit order and not 
reaching the question whether the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law.  And if Peterson is correct that his possession 
of the knife was not a crime, there is the additional unfairness 
that he is denied the opportunity to seek compensation for his 
wrongful conviction only because he suffered a separate 
constitutional violation that, when considered alone, was 
sufficient to require the dismissal of the criminal complaint. 
 
A lesson learned from this appeal is that, in the absence 
of corrective legislation, appellate courts in criminal cases 
need to be mindful of the practical consequences of not reaching 
 
 
 
2 
a defendant's claim that the evidence at trial was insufficient 
as a matter of law to permit a guilty verdict, where reversal of 
the conviction on this ground would tend to establish the 
innocence of the individual, see, e.g., Renaud v. Commonwealth, 
471 Mass. 315, 319-320 (2015), and where the ground that is the 
basis for reversal would not.  The practice of this court has 
generally been to address challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence before evaluating other claims, because a determination 
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support 
a conviction will always result in dismissal of the complaint 
with prejudice, but a determination of error on other grounds 
may result in reversal of the conviction but not dismissal of 
the complaint.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aldana, 477 Mass. 
790, 797 (2017); Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360, 375 n.21 
(2014).  I recognize that the Appeals Court here dismissed the 
complaint after concluding that the motion to suppress the knife 
should have been allowed.  But if Peterson is correct that his 
possession of the knife was not a crime, the unintended 
consequence of the Appeals Court's not reaching the issue of the 
sufficiency of the evidence might be to deny him compensation to 
which he otherwise might be entitled for a wrongful conviction.