Title: Torloni v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SUZANNA S. TORLONI 
 
v.  Record No. 061506      OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
JUNE 8, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in reducing the ad damnum against the Commonwealth to $100,000 
prior to a jury verdict and subsequently dismissing the action 
with prejudice. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Suzanna S. Torloni ("Torloni") was a passenger in a 
vehicle that was driven off a state-maintained road and onto 
the right shoulder which dropped off abruptly, approximately 
eight to twelve inches below the surface of the roadway.  The 
driver lost control of the vehicle, which then traveled to the 
other side of the road, hit an embankment, and rolled over, 
injuring Torloni. 
 
Before filing this suit against the Commonwealth, Torloni 
settled with the driver of the vehicle ("settling tortfeasor") 
for $100,000.  Torloni's present action against the 
Commonwealth asserts claims of negligence and nuisance, 
alleging that improper maintenance of the roadway created a 
 
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dangerous condition at the accident site that caused the 
driver to lose control of the vehicle. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a demurrer to Torloni's motion for 
judgment, arguing, in part, that the $1.5 million claim 
against the Commonwealth should be reduced to $100,000, the 
liability limit under the Virginia Tort Claims Act Code 
§§ 8.01-195.1 to –195.9 (the "Act").  Torloni's memorandum in 
opposition to the Commonwealth's demurrer did not address this 
argument.  After hearing argument on the demurrer, the trial 
court entered an order, which in part provided that "the 
demurrer is sustained as to the amount of the claimed damages 
and by this Order the damage claims against the Commonwealth 
are reduced to $100,000."  Torloni wrote "[s]een and all 
objections presented in writing and argument preserved" on the 
order.  There is no transcript of the demurrer proceeding. 
 
Almost two months later, Torloni filed a motion for 
reconsideration and reinstatement of the original amount of 
the ad damnum of $1.5 million.  The Commonwealth filed a brief 
in opposition to the motion.  The trial court subsequently 
entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration. 
 
The Commonwealth next filed a special plea or motion for 
partial summary judgment and motion to amend grounds of 
defense/answer.  Torloni filed a brief opposing the 
Commonwealth's special plea or motion for partial summary 
 
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judgment.  The trial court granted the Commonwealth's special 
plea and dismissed the action with prejudice. 
 
The trial court highlighted the following facts in 
reaching its decision:  the Commonwealth's maximum liability 
under Code § 8.01-195.3 was $100,000; Torloni could not 
recover more than $100,000 from the Commonwealth under the 
reduced ad damnum; Torloni had already recovered $100,000 from 
the settling tortfeasor; and pursuant to Code § 8.01-35.1, the 
statute governing settlement agreements in actions with joint 
tortfeasors, a credit of $100,000 from the settlement with the 
settling tortfeasor would be applied against any damages 
Torloni was awarded in the action against the Commonwealth.  
Accordingly, the trial court found that the settlement for 
$100,000 with the settling tortfeasor effectively insulated 
the Commonwealth from liability. 
 
Torloni filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  
We granted Torloni's petition for appeal on two assignments of 
error: 
1. 
The Circuit Court erred in reducing the ad damnum 
against the Commonwealth to $100,000 prior to trial and 
verdict by the jury. 
 
2. 
The Circuit Court erred in granting the Commonwealth’s 
special plea and in dismissing the action with 
prejudice. It erred in holding that since the maximum 
amount recoverable against the Commonwealth was 
$100,000, Ms. Torloni could not recover any damages 
from the Commonwealth because she had already recovered 
$100,000 from the joint-tortfeasor and Va. Code § 8.01-
 
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35.1 required that the $100,000 be applied to reduce 
any amount recovered against the Commonwealth. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Procedural Error 
 
The Commonwealth argues that Torloni did not preserve her 
objection to the trial court's ruling that reduced the ad 
damnum against the Commonwealth to $100,000.  The 
Commonwealth's brief in support of a demurrer argued that 
because the Act caps claims against the Commonwealth at 
$100,000, the trial court should dismiss Torloni's claims or 
at the very least, reduce the ad damnum.  Torloni's memorandum 
in opposition to the Commonwealth's demurrer did not address 
this argument.  There is no transcript of the demurrer 
proceeding.  The trial court's order provided that "the 
demurrer is sustained as to the amount of the claimed damages 
and by this Order the damage claims against the Commonwealth 
are reduced to $100,000."  Torloni wrote "[s]een and all 
objections presented in writing and argument preserved" on the 
order. 
 
Almost two months later, Torloni filed a motion for 
reconsideration and reinstatement of the original amount of 
the ad damnum of $1.5 million.  The arguments presented in 
support of the motion are the same arguments Torloni makes in 
this appeal. 
 
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Because the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer 
was not a final order, and because Torloni briefed the issue 
in a motion for reconsideration and the trial court ruled on 
the motion by denying it, we hold that Torloni adequately 
preserved the issue for review in this appeal. 
B.  Harmonizing Code § 8.01-195.3 and Code § 8.01-35.1 
 
Prior to a jury verdict and in response to the 
Commonwealth's demurrer, the trial court reduced Torloni's ad 
damnum against the Commonwealth, from $1.5 million to 
$100,000.  Pursuant to the Act, the most a plaintiff can 
recover against the Commonwealth is $100,000.  Code § 8.01-
195.3 ("The amount recoverable by any claimant [against the 
Commonwealth] shall not exceed . . . $100,000.").  We hold 
that this limitation is a matter properly considered and 
imposed after the jury returns a verdict. 
In Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 96, 
376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1989), we stated that "the jury's fact-
finding function extends to the assessment of damages."  
Because limitations on recoveries are matters of remedy, "[a] 
trial court applies the remedy's limitation only after the 
jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function."  Id.  By 
reducing the ad damnum before a jury verdict, the court erred 
in placing a cap on the amount Torloni could recover for her 
 
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injuries.  See Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 257 
Va. 1, 13, 509 S.E.2d 307, 314 (1999). 
Additionally, the statute waiving the Commonwealth's 
immunity, Code § 8.01-195.3, does not provide that an action 
cannot commence for an amount in excess of the Commonwealth's 
exposure nor does it limit the total amount a plaintiff may 
recover for an injury.  Rather, Code § 8.01-195.3 simply 
limits the amount the Commonwealth may have to pay if a jury 
reaches a verdict in excess of the $100,000 limitation.  
Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in reducing 
the ad damnum against the Commonwealth before the jury 
returned a verdict. 
For these reasons, the trial court's error in reducing 
the ad damnum to $100,000 led to the dismissal of Torloni's 
action because "a plaintiff cannot recover more than he sues 
for."  Powell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 Va. 464, 469, 344 
S.E.2d 916, 919 (1986).  Because Torloni had already received 
$100,000 from the settling tortfeasor, and the Commonwealth 
was entitled to a credit for that amount, there was nothing 
left to be recovered from the Commonwealth.  Therefore, the 
trial court's erroneous reduction of the ad damnum to $100,000 
foreclosed the possibility of any recovery against the 
Commonwealth. 
 
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The second assignment of error is based on the statutory 
interpretation of both Code § 8.01-195.3 and Code § 8.01-35.1 
which presents a pure question of law subject to de novo 
review.  Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 
925 (2006).  When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, 
the plain meaning will apply.  Lynch v. Commonwealth Transp. 
Comm'r, 255 Va. 227, 231, 495 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1998). 
Code § 8.01-195.3, governing the waiver of the 
Commonwealth's sovereign immunity, provides that "[t]he amount 
recoverable by any claimant [against the Commonwealth] shall 
not exceed . . . $100,000."  The clear and unambiguous 
language of this statute reveals that a claimant may recover 
up to $100,000 from the Commonwealth. 
Code § 8.01-35.1 in pertinent part provides: 
[A release or covenant not to sue] shall 
not discharge any of the other tort-
feasors from liability for the injury, 
property damage or wrongful death unless 
its terms so provide; but any amount 
recovered against the other tort-feasors 
or any one of them shall be reduced by any 
amount stipulated by the covenant or the 
release, or in the amount of the 
consideration paid for it, whichever is 
the greater. . . . A release or covenant 
not to sue given pursuant to this section 
shall not be admitted into evidence in the 
trial of the matter but shall be 
considered by the court in determining the 
amount for which judgment shall be 
entered. 
 
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The clear and unambiguous language of Code § 8.01-35.1 
preserves the right of action against the non-settling 
tortfeasor, provides that "any amount recovered" from the non-
settling tortfeasor must "be reduced" by the amount received 
from the settling tortfeasor, and requires the court to 
consider the amount paid by the settling tortfeasor in 
determining the amount for which judgment should be entered. 
We hold that there is no conflict between Code § 8.01-
195.3 and Code § 8.01-35.1.  The plain meaning of the two 
statutes, read together and applied to this case, is that an 
award that a plaintiff receives in tort against the 
Commonwealth must be reduced by the amount received from the 
settling tortfeasor.  In other words, if the jury returned a 
verdict in excess of $100,000, the trial court would then 
reduce the verdict by the amount received from the settling 
tortfeasor and would enter judgment for the difference, not to 
exceed the Commonwealth's exposure of $100,000. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that our decision in Fairfax 
Hospital System, Inc. v. Nevitt, 249 Va. 591, 457 S.E.2d 10 
(1995), governs the application of Code § 8.01-195.3 and Code 
§ 8.01-35.1.  The Commonwealth asserts that Nevitt means that 
the Act's cap of $100,000, which limits the "amount 
recoverable," must be applied before applying any settlement 
credits.  We disagree. 
 
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In Nevitt, we considered the interplay of the joint 
tortfeasor statute and the medical malpractice cap statute, 
Code § 8.01-581.15.  Id. at 596-99, 457 S.E.2d at 13-14.  Code 
§ 8.01-581.15, outlining the medical malpractice cap, in 
pertinent part provides: 
In any verdict returned against a health care 
provider in an action for malpractice where the 
act or acts of malpractice occurred on or after 
August 1, 1999, which is tried by a jury or in 
any judgment entered against a health care 
provider in such an action which is tried 
without a jury, the total amount recoverable 
for any injury to, or death of, a patient shall 
not exceed $1.5 million. The maximum recovery 
limit of $1.5 million shall increase on July 1, 
2000, and each July 1 thereafter by $50,000 per 
year; however, the annual increase on July 1, 
2007, and the annual increase on July 1, 2008, 
shall be $75,000 per year. Each annual increase 
shall apply to the act or acts of malpractice 
occurring on or after the effective date of the 
increase. The July 1, 2008, increase shall be 
the final annual increase. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In Nevitt, we held that a jury verdict must 
be reduced first to the statutory cap level before applying 
credits from joint tortfeasors.  Id. at 599, 457 S.E.2d at 14-
15. 
Torloni maintains that our analysis in Nevitt was wrong 
and urges the Court to reconsider Nevitt.  We need not accept 
Torloni's invitation because Nevitt does not apply to this 
case.  There is a fundamental difference between the statutory 
cap on medical malpractice claims and the limit on the 
 
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Commonwealth's liability pursuant to Code § 8.01-195.3.  The 
medical malpractice statutory cap limits the total damages 
recoverable for an injury, regardless of the number of 
defendants or theories sued upon.  Id. at 598, 457 S.E.2d at 
14.  In contrast, Code § 8.01-195.3 limits the amount 
recoverable against the Commonwealth to $100,000, but it does 
not limit the total amount the plaintiff may recover for her 
injuries. 
Accordingly, the appropriate order of reduction when 
harmonizing Code § 8.01-35.1 and Code § 8.01-195.3 is as 
follows:  pursuant to Code § 8.01-35.1, an award would be 
reduced by the amount the plaintiff received from the settling 
tortfeasor; and then, pursuant to Code § 8.01-195.3, the 
$100,000 limitation on the Commonwealth's exposure would be 
applied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Because the trial court erred in reducing the ad damnum 
against the Commonwealth to $100,000 prior to verdict, the 
trial court also erred in dismissing Torloni's claim against 
the Commonwealth pursuant to Code § 8.01-35.1.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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