Title: IMO Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Olekna

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Argued March 17, 1998 -- Decided July 28, 1998 PER CURIAM This is an attorney disciplinary case involving charges of improper client solicitation after a "mass disaster." Shortly before midnight on March 23, 1994, a gas line explosion rocked the Durham Woods apartment complex in Edison. The blast displaced all 1500 residents, many of whom lost everything they owned, including their cars. The American Red Cross established an emergency shelter in the Edison High School. Local hotels were also used to shelter displaced residents. After the press reported that attorneys were "preying" on the victims, the Court directed the Committee on Attorney Advertising (CAA) to investigate. Subsequently, the CAA concluded that attorneys Kenneth S. Oleckna, Charles E. Meaden, Raymond Eisdorfer, and Samuel V. Convery and the law firm of Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein (also known as TEAMLAW) had violated Sections 7.3(b)(1) and (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs). The CAA recommended that Meaden be suspended for three months, that Oleckna, TEAMLAW, and Eisdorfer should be reprimanded, and that the charges against Convery be dismissed. The matter was reviewed by the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), which agreed that the charges against Convery should be dismissed. In addition, the DRB determined that Meaden should be reprimanded and that the charges against Oleckna, TEAMLAW, and Eisdorfer should be dismissed. On February 3, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed the Convery matter and granted the petition of the Office of Attorney Ethics for review of the decision in respect of the remaining parties. HELD: The conduct of individual attorneys and the TEAMLAW law firm at the Durham Woods explosion site constituted improper client solicitation in violation of RPC 7.3(b)(1) and (4), warranting the imposition of a reprimand. 1. Through case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court has imposed limits on attorney solicitation of clients in "mass disaster" situations. In-person solicitation of victims of disasters presents opportunities for fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other misconduct. (pp. 3-8) 2. Kenneth Oleckna, a partner in the TEAMLAW law firm, rented an RV and parked it in close proximity to the apartment complex. The RV carried multiple advertisements on it, which evidenced an intent to target the victims of the disaster. (pp. 8-12) 3. There was no need to provide specific evidence that the disaster victims were so emotionally traumatized that they could not make reasoned decisions. The absence of findings of harm or injury is immaterial. Oleckna and TEAMLAW should have known that the victims of the disaster were not able to exercise reasonable judgment about employing a lawyer. (pp. 12-13) 4. Oleckna and TEAMLAW were not engaged in a protected First Amendment activity when they placed advertisements on the windows of the RV outside the disaster shelter. (pp. 14-16) 5. Raymond Eisdorfer was invited by a former client to speak with a group of victims at the Edison High School. By the end of the meeting, Eisdorfer had signed retainer agreements with twenty-six residents. By June 17, 1994, he represented a total of 222 victims. The Court concludes that the timing and location of Eisdorfer's meeting was a clear violation of RPC 7.3(b)(1). (pp. 16-19) 6. Eisdorfer claimed that any determination that his action violated the RPC would be a deprivation of the associational rights of the group that hired him. The Court concludes that far from being a highly protected form of political expression, Eisdorfer's speech at the high school simply proposed a commercial transaction. (pp. 19-20) 7. Charles Meaden drove to Edison the day after the explosion seeking clients. He wound up at the Red Roof Inn, where a number of victims were being sheltered. Meaden spent three or four hours at the Inn, distributed business cards, and compiled a list of sixteen prospective clients. His intention to solicit clients was clear and his actions violated RPC 7.3(b)(1). In addition, Meaden sent a prospective client a follow-up letter that did not comply with the requirements of RPC 7.3(b)(4). (pp. 21-24) Kenneth Oleckna, Charles Meaden, Raymond Eisdorfer, and the law firm of Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein are hereby REPRIMANDED. O'HERN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees with the Court that setting up a mobile law office in close proximity to disaster victims and that conducting a legal seminar in the sleeping area of an emergency shelter one day after a massive explosion are violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In his view, however, the Court had not already made clear the foregoing propositions. Under the circumstances, he believes that it is neither right nor fair to discipline these attorneys. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. IN THE MATTER OF RAVICH, KOSTER, TOBIN, OLECKNA, REITMAN & (D-32) GREENSTEIN, A New Jersey Law Firm. IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH S. OLECKNA, (D-33) An Attorney at Law. IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES E. MEADEN, (D-34) An Attorney at Law. IN THE MATTER OF RAYMOND EISDORFER, (D-36) An Attorney at Law. Argued March 17, 1998 -- Decided July 28, 1998 On Orders to show cause why respondents should not be disciplined. Lee A. Gronikowski, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. David B. Rubin argued the cause for respondents Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein and Kenneth S. Oleckna. Bernard K. Freamon argued the cause for respondent Charles E. Meaden. Michael P. Ambrosio argued the cause for respondent Raymond Eisdorfer. PER CURIAM This is an attorney-disciplinary case in which respondents were charged with violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct governing the solicitation of clients, in this case, the victims of a disaster. At the request of the Court, the matter was initiated by an investigation undertaken by the Committee on Attorney Advertising. The Committee's determination and disciplinary recommendations were reviewed by the Disciplinary Review Board. The Board's decision is before the Court based on the petition of the Office of Attorney Ethics. (1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer; or . . . . (4) the communication involves direct contact with a prospective client concerning a specific event when such contact has pecuniary gain as a significant motive except that a lawyer may send a letter by mail to a prospective client in such circumstances provided that the letter: (i) bears the word "ADVERTISEMENT" . . . and (ii) contains the following notice . . . "Before making your choice of attorney, you should give this matter careful thought . . . ."; and (iii) contains an additional notice [that if the letter is misleading, the recipient may report the attorney to the CAA]. In In re Anis, 126 N.J. 448, cert. denied sub nom. Anis v. New Jersey Committee on Attorney Advertising, 504 U.S. 956, 112 S. Ct. 2303, 199 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1992), the Court considered the ethics implications of attorney solicitation of clients who were the victims or the surviving relatives of the victims of a disaster. The Court analyzed RPC 7.3(b) and its application to the actions of an attorney following the December 21, 1988, downing of Pan American Flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland. 126 N.J. at 452. In determining that the attorney should be publicly reprimanded for sending a letter of solicitation to the grieving family of a victim shortly after the disaster, we noted that the State may regulate commercial speech with laws "that directly advance a substantial governmental interest and are appropriately tailored to that purpose." Id. at 456. We ruled that the level of intrusion involved with the solicitation of grieving persons is such that proscribing that conduct implicates a substantial governmental interest and that RPC 7.3(b) directly advances this interest. 126 N.J. at 458-59. The Court found that the attorney's conduct fell within that governmental interest, reasoning that it was "patently offensive to the common sensibilities of the community because it intrudes upon the private grief of victims or their families, serves only to compound their sorrow, and solicits representation of them at a moment of their extreme vulnerability." Id. at 459. Most important, the Court disagreed with the DRB's conclusion that RPC 7.3(b)(1) requires proof that the attorney knew that the person he solicited was unable to make a reasoned judgment about obtaining counsel. 126 N.J. at 457. We found rather that RPC 7.3(b)(1) contained an objective standard for determining whether a prospective client would be able to make a reasoned judgment. 126 N.J. at 457. The Court acknowledged the difficulty in drawing a bright line cutoff when solicitation may begin. Id. at 460. We referred the issue to the CAA to conduct a hearing to devise a "clearer line of vulnerability." Ibid.See footnote 1 Three years after Anis, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of attorney solicitation in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 132 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1995). The disciplinary rules at issue in Florida Bar created a thirty-day blackout period after an accident during which attorneys could not, directly or indirectly, solicit accident victims or their relatives. Id. at 620-21, 115 S. Ct. at 2374, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 547. In upholding the ban on targeted solicitation, the Supreme Court noted that the ban serves the salutary purposes of "protecting the personal privacy and tranquility of citizens from crass commercial intrusions by attorneys upon their personal grief in times of trauma" and "forestall[ing] the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession that the practice of direct solicitation only days after accidents has engendered." Id. at 630-31, 115 S. Ct. at 2379, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 553-54. The evils of in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain after an accident extend beyond intrusion upon private grief and tarnishment of the legal profession. See Anis, supra, 126 N.J. at 459; Florida Bar, supra, 515 U.S. at 630-31, 115 S. Ct. at 2379, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 553-54. Such solicitation presents an opportunity for "fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462, 98 S. Ct. 1912, 1921, 56 L. Ed. 2d 444, 457 (1978). "[I]n-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection." Id. at 457, 98 S. Ct. at 1919, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 454. The "aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decisionmaking; there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual." Ibid. "In-person solicitation is as likely as not to discourage persons needing counsel from engaging in a critical comparison of the 'availability, nature, and prices of legal services.'" Id. at 457-58, 98 S. Ct. at 1919, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 454. That such overreaching in-person solicitation in fact occurred in this case is evidenced by the fact that many of the clients initially procured by the respondents decided, when given sufficient time to reflect, that their best interest lay in representation elsewhere. Further, a lawyer who engages in personal solicitation of clients may be inclined to subordinate the best interests of the client to his own pecuniary interests. Even if unintentionally, the lawyer's ability to evaluate the legal merit of his client's claims may falter when the conclusion will affect the lawyer's income. A valid claim might be settled too quickly, or a claim with little merit pursued beyond the point of reason. These lapses of judgment can occur in any legal representation, but [the court] cannot say that the pecuniary motivation of the lawyer who solicits a particular representation does not create special problems of conflict of interest. [Id. at 461 n.19, 98 S. Ct. at 1921 n.19, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 457 n.19] CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in this opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. IN THE MATTER OF RAVICH, KOSTER, TOBIN, OLECKNA, REITMAN & (D-32) GREENSTEIN, A New Jersey Law Firm. IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH S. OLECKNA, (D-33) An Attorney at Law. IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES E. MEADEN, (D-34) An Attorney at Law. IN THE MATTER OF RAYMOND EISDORFER, (D-36) An Attorney at Law. O'HERN, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the Court that in mass disaster cases the setting up of mobile law offices in close proximity to victims immediately following a disaster is a form of targeted solicitation that violates Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 7.3(b)(1). I also agree that to conduct a legal seminar in the sleeping area of an emergency shelter a day after a massive explosion constitutes direct contact with prospective victims of a mass disaster in violation of RPC 7.3(b)(1). Because the Court had not previously made these propositions clear, I do not believe that a public reprimand for the attorneys involved in that conduct is the appropriate discipline in the circumstances of this case. Justice Stein joins this opinion. IN THE MATTER OF : O R D E R RAVICH, KOSTER, TOBIN, : OLECKNA, REITMAN & GREENSTEIN, : A NEW JERSEY LAW FIRM : It is ORDERED that the law firm of RAVICH, KOSTER, TOBIN, OLECKNA, REITMAN & GREENSTEIN of RAHWAY, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1); and it is further ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent's file as a law firm practicing law in this State; and it is further ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter. WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 28th day of July, 1998. /s/ Stephen W. Townsend CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE MATTER OF : KENNETH S. OLECKNA, : ORDER AN ATTORNEY AT LAW : It is ORDERED that KENNETH S. OLECKNA of RAHWAY, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1972, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1); and it is further ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter. WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 28th day of July, 1998. /s/ Stephen W. Townsend CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE MATTER OF : CHARLES E. MEADEN, : ORDER AN ATTORNEY AT LAW : It is ORDERED that CHARLES E. MEADEN of ENGLEWOOD, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1982, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1) and 7.3(b)(4); and it is further ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter. WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 28th day of July, 1998. /s/ Stephen W. Townsend CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE MATTER OF : RAYMOND EISDORFER, : ORDER AN ATTORNEY AT LAW : It is ORDERED that RAYMOND EISDORFER of ELIZABETH, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1988, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1); and it is further ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter. WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 28th day of July, 1998. /s/ Stephen W. Townsend CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT NO. D-32/33/34/36 Decided July 28, 1998 Order returnable Opinion by PER CURIAM Concurring/Dissenting opinion by JUSTICE O'HERN