Title: Pratt v. Weiss

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-1783 
____________ 
 
ANCEL PRATT, JR.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL C. WEISS, D.O., et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[April 16, 2015] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
Petitioner Ancel Pratt, Jr., seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Pratt v. Weiss, 92 So. 3d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), on the basis 
that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of this Court and other district 
courts on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. 
Const. 
BACKGROUND 
At issue in this negligence case is whether a settlement offer complied with 
the requirements delineated by the Florida Statutes and the Florida Rules of Civil 
 
 
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Procedure so as to justify an award of attorney’s fees and costs.  Section 768.79, 
Florida Statutes (2014),1 provides, in relevant part: 
(1)  In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this 
state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted 
by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by her or him or 
on the defendant’s behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or 
other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is 
one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 
25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs 
and attorney’s fees against the award. . . .  If a plaintiff files a demand 
for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days 
and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent 
greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the filing of the 
demand. . . . 
 
(2)  The making of an offer of settlement which is not accepted 
does not preclude the making of a subsequent offer.  An offer must: 
(a)  Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this 
section. 
(b)  Name the party making it and the party to whom it is being 
made. 
(c)  State with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim 
for punitive damages, if any. 
(d)  State its total amount. 
 
The offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be 
awarded in a final judgment.     
                                          
 
 
1.  Although the incident in this case occurred in 1996, and section 768.79 
was amended in 1997, the changes to the statute were not substantive.  Therefore, 
we reference the current version of the statute.  
 
 
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Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 articulates the procedures that implement 
section 768.79.  See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 
278 (Fla. 2003).  The rule provides, in relevant part: 
(c)  Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement. 
. . . . 
(2)  A proposal shall: 
 
(A)  name the party or parties making the proposal and the party 
or parties to whom the proposal is being made;  
 
 
. . . . 
 
(C)  state with particularity any relevant conditions; 
(D)  state the total amount of the proposal and state with 
particularity all nonmonetary terms of the proposal; 
 
. . . .  
(3)  A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and 
by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. 
A joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each 
party. 
 
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 (emphasis supplied).2   
 
The Fourth District in the decision below provided a brief summation of the 
facts of the case: 
                                          
 
2.  In 2011, rule 1.442 was amended to add subdivision (c)(4).  The new 
subdivision, which is not applicable to this case, provides:  
 
Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(3), when a party is alleged to 
be solely vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically 
liable, whether by operation of law or by contract, a joint proposal 
made by or served on such a party need not state the apportionment or 
contribution as to that party.  Acceptance by any party shall be 
without prejudice to rights of contribution or indemnity. 
In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Civ. Pro., 52 So. 3d 579, 588 (Fla. 2010).  
 
 
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In 1998, [Pratt] filed a medical malpractice action against 
multiple defendants, including FMC Hospital, Ltd., a Florida Limited 
Partnership d/b/a Florida Medical Center [FMC Hospital], and FMC 
Medical, Inc., f/k/a FMC Center Inc., d/b/a Florida Medical Center 
[FMC Medical].  The complaint alleged that these two entities 
“owned, operated, maintained, and controlled” Florida Medical 
Center.  The plaintiff also alleged that FMC Hospital, Ltd. was a 
limited partnership, and that FMC Medical, Inc. was a general partner 
of Florida Medical Center.[3] 
The complaint alleged two claims (negligent hiring/retention 
and vicarious liability for the negligence of two doctors) against each 
of these defendants using exactly the same wording.  
 
Pratt, 92 So. 3d at 852.   
A proposal for settlement was served upon Pratt which stated, in part: 
DEFENDANT, FLORIDA MEDICAL CENTER’S, PROPOSAL 
FOR SETTLEMENT/OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO THE 
PLAINTIFF, ANCEL PRATT, JR., INDIVIDUALLY 
The Defendant(s), FMC HOSPITAL LTD., a Florida Limited 
Partnership d/b/a FLORIDA MEDICAL CENTER; FMC MEDICAL, 
INC. f/k/a FMC CENTER, INC. d/b/a FLORIDA MEDICAL 
CENTER, by and through their undersigned counsel, and pursuant to 
Florida Statute § 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 state as follows: 
The Party making this proposal are Defendants, FMC 
HOSPITAL LTD., a Florida Limited Partnership d/b/a FLORIDA 
MEDICAL CENTER; FMC MEDICAL, INC. f/k/a FMC CENTER, 
INC. d/b/a FLORIDA MEDICAL CENTER, and this proposal is 
being made to the Plaintiff, ANCEL PRATT, JR., individually. 
1.  This Proposal for Settlement is made in an attempt to 
resolve all pending matters between the Plaintiff and the 
named Defendants as noted above. 
                                          
 
3.  Pratt actually asserted that FMC Medical was “actively doing business in 
Florida, as General Partner of FMC HOSPITAL LTD., a Florida Limited 
Partnership.”  (Emphasis supplied.) 
 
 
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2.  The relevant conditions of this Proposal for 
Settlement are that the lawsuit be settled, each Party to 
bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees, with the Plaintiff 
signing a full and complete General Release and Hold 
Harmless Agreement. . . .   
3.  The total amount of the Proposal for Settlement is 
TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00), with the 
conditions as stated above. 
. . . .   
 
This Proposal for Settlement includes all costs and attorneys’ 
fees incurred by Plaintiff in the prosecution of this case, and by 
making this Proposal for Settlement, the Defendants FMC 
HOSPITAL LTD., a Florida Limited Partnership d/b/a FLORIDA 
MEDICAL CENTER; FMC MEDICAL, INC. f/k/a FMC CENTER, 
INC. d/b/a FLORIDA MEDICAL CENTER, does not admit the 
allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint, and deny each and 
every allegation. 
Pratt did not accept the offer.  A jury returned a verdict adverse to Pratt with 
respect to the claims, and the trial court entered final judgment in favor of FMC 
Hospital and FMC Medical.   
 
FMC Hospital and FMC Medical subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s 
fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442.  Pratt opposed the motion, 
asserting that the entities were joint offerors, and the proposal was invalid because 
it failed to apportion the amount offered, as required by the statute and the rule.  
FMC Hospital and FMC Medical responded that there was only a single offeror—
Florida Medical Center—and, therefore, apportionment of the amount offered was 
not required.  The trial court agreed with FMC Hospital and FMC Medical and 
entered a judgment that awarded their attorney’s fees and costs.        
 
 
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On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed.  Pratt, 92 So. 3d at 852.  The district 
court held that because the offer was made on behalf of the single hospital entity 
that was allegedly responsible for the injury to Pratt, the settlement proposal 
complied with section 768.79 and rule 1.442.  Id. at 854-55.  We granted review 
based upon conflict with cases that hold apportionment of a settlement amount is 
required where an offer of judgment is made by or to multiple parties.  See, e.g., 
Hilyer Sod, 849 So. 2d at 278-79; Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So. 2d 1037, 1040 
(Fla. 2005). 
ANALYSIS 
Proposals for Settlement 
 
The eligibility to receive attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 
and rule 1.442 is reviewed de novo.  See Frosti v. Creel, 979 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 
2008).  This Court has held that subdivision (c)(3) of rule 1.442, which requires a 
joint proposal to state the amount and terms attributable to each offeror or offeree, 
must be strictly construed because it, as well as the offer of judgment statute, is in 
derogation of the common law rule that each party is responsible for its own fees.  
See Hilyer Sod, 849 So. 2d at 278; see also Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger 
Anesthesia Prof. Ass’n, 539 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989) (“[T]he rule in Florida 
 
 
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requires that statutes awarding attorney’s fees must be strictly construed.”).4  Thus, 
to be valid, an offer of judgment presented by multiple offerors must apportion the 
amount that is attributable to each offeror.  Hilyer Sod, 849 So. 2d at 278-79.   
The purpose of the apportionment requirement in the rule is to allow each 
offeree to evaluate the terms and the amount of the offer as it pertains to him or 
her.  See id. at 278 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Materiale, 787 So. 2d 173, 175 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).  On more than one occasion, the Fourth District has referred 
to the requirement as a “bright line rule,” to be applied without exception.  See 
Cano v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 8 So. 3d 408, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); 
Graham v. Yeskel, 928 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  Strict application of 
the requirement has resulted in the invalidation of offers of judgment where two 
plaintiffs presented an unapportioned settlement offer to one defendant, see Hilyer 
Sod, 849 So. 2d at 277; where one plaintiff presented an unapportioned settlement 
offer to two defendants, even though one defendant was alleged to be only 
vicariously liable, see Lamb, 906 So. 2d at 1040;5 and where one defendant 
presented an offer to two plaintiffs that was conditioned upon the acceptance of 
                                          
 
4.  This Court has also strictly applied other provisions of the offer of 
judgment statute and rule.  See Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 226-27 
(Fla. 2007) (holding that settlement proposal was invalid for failing to cite section 
768.79 as mandated by both the statute and the rule).   
  
5.  Lamb was decided prior to the 2011 amendment to rule 1.442.   
 
 
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both plaintiffs, see Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 
647-48 (Fla. 2010).  We held that the proposal in Gorka was invalid because the 
conditional nature of the offer divested each plaintiff of independent control over 
the decision to settle.  Id. at 649.   
This Case 
We conclude that the plain language of the settlement offer in this case 
demonstrates it was a joint proposal.  Although the offer was titled “Defendant, 
Florida Medical Center’s, Proposal for Settlement/Offer of Judgment,” the text of 
the proposal unambiguously refers to the defendant offerors in the plural.  Thus, 
under the clear wording of the proposal, two offerors—FMC Hospital and FMC 
Medical—presented the offer.  Accordingly, under section 768.79 and rule 1.442 
the proposal was invalid because it failed to apportion the settlement amount 
between FMC Hospital and FMC Medical.   
This conclusion is supported by the amended complaint filed by Pratt, which 
treated FMC Hospital and FMC Medical as separate defendants.  Counts VI and 
VII were directed at FMC Hospital, and Counts VIII and IX were directed at FMC 
Medical.  The complaint also noted that FMC Hospital was a Florida Limited 
Partnership, and FMC Medical was a general partner of the limited partnership of 
FMC Hospital.  Florida law recognizes that “[a] limited partnership is an entity 
distinct from its partners.”  § 620.1104(1), Fla. Stat. (2014); see also § 620.8201, 
 
 
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Fla. Stat. (1997) (“A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”).  Thus, 
FMC Hospital was a distinct entity from FMC Medical.   
Moreover, despite the assertion that Florida Medical Center was the only 
party in interest, both FMC Hospital and FMC Medical sought attorney’s fees and 
costs in a motion the entities filed together.  FMC Hospital and FMC Medical are 
repeatedly referred to in the motion as “Defendants, FLORIDA MEDICAL 
CENTER.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  The motion is even titled: “DEFENDANTS, 
FMC HOSPITAL, LTD. D/B/A FLORIDA MEDICAL CENTER AND FMC 
MEDICAL, INC. F/K/A FMC CENTER, INC. D/B/A FLORIDA MEDICAL 
CENTER’S MOTION FOR ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 
COSTS.”  (Emphasis supplied.) 
To the extent any alleged liability of FMC Hospital and FMC Medical could 
be viewed as coextensive, this does not constitute an exception to the 
apportionment requirement.  Even where no logical apportionment can be made, it 
is nonetheless required where more than one offeror or offeree is involved.  See 
Easters v. Russell, 942 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), rev. denied, 966 
So. 2d 966 (Fla. 2007).  In Easters, a plaintiff filed an action against her physician 
and a professional association that was exclusively owned and controlled by the 
physician.  Id.  The plaintiff submitted an unapportioned offer of settlement to the 
physician and the association.  Id.  After a verdict was entered in favor of the 
 
 
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plaintiff, she sought attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442.  Id. 
at 1008-09.  The Second District held that the offer of settlement was invalid 
because it failed to apportion the amount offered: 
The fact that the professional association is entirely owned and 
controlled by Dr. Russell, that its liability is purely vicarious for her 
actions, and that damages could not be logically apportioned between 
these two defendants is . . . not a basis to permit such an offer of 
judgment.  The fact that the offer permits either or both defendants to 
pay the proposed settlement and gives them the option to determine 
whether or how to apportion their contribution to the settlement is 
likewise not an exception to the rule announced in Lamb.   
Id. at 1009.  
Although Easters involved the vicarious liability of a professional 
association, whereas this case involved allegations of negligent hiring and retention 
by both FMC Hospital and FMC Medical, we conclude that the strict construction 
utilized in Easters is equally applicable here.  While it may have been difficult for 
FMC Hospital and FMC Medical to apportion the settlement amount based upon 
their purported liability, and even though they could have later apportioned their 
contribution had Pratt accepted the offer, these are not recognized legal elements to 
disregard or circumvent the rule that requires apportionment of a settlement 
amount where a proposal is presented by multiple parties.  Hilyer Sod, 849 So. 2d 
at 278.  The complaint in this case treated FMC Hospital and FMC Medical as two 
defendants, and the offer of settlement referenced two defendants—FMC Hospital 
and FMC Medical.  Attorney’s fees and costs were requested by two defendants.  
 
 
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Thus, the offer constituted a joint proposal and, under a strict construction of 
section 768.79 and rule 1.442, apportionment of the settlement amount was 
required.  Id.  FMC Hospital and FMC Medical failed to apportion the amount and, 
therefore, the proposal was invalid.  Accordingly, the Fourth District erred when it 
affirmed the award of attorney’s fees and costs to these defendants.   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we quash the decision in Pratt.  We reiterate that 
parties must strictly adhere to the requirements of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 to 
be eligible for an award of attorney’s fees and costs.  We remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
Because I conclude that the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in Pratt v. Weiss, 92 So. 3d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), does not expressly and 
directly conflict with decisions of the other district courts of appeal or this Court, I 
would dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of 
the Florida Constitution. 
 
 
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The majority granted review of this case “based upon conflict with cases that 
hold apportionment of a settlement amount is required where an offer of judgment 
is made by or to multiple parties.”  Majority op. at 6 (citing Willis Shaw Express, 
Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278-79 (Fla. 2003); Lamb v. Matetzschk, 
906 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 2005)).  While Florida caselaw does require 
apportionment in an offer of judgment made by or to multiple parties, the Fourth 
District below concluded that the offer at issue was not jointly made by multiple 
parties.  Instead, it was “made on behalf of the single hospital entity allegedly 
responsible.”  Pratt, 92 So. 3d at 854.  In support of this conclusion, the district 
court found that the parties were treated as a single entity during litigation, they 
were represented by the same lawyer, they filed a single answer, and they were 
listed on the verdict form as “FMC Hospital, Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnership 
d/b/a Florida Medical Center.”  Id.  Additionally, the district court determined that 
“[t]he singular nature of the entity [was] most evident in the parties’ ultimate 
agreement that FMC Hospital, Ltd. was the only proper defendant.”  Id.  Because 
the settlement offer was made by a single entity, the district court held that the 
“defendants’ failure to apportion the offer did not run afoul of section 768.79, rule 
1.442, or any case law interpreting those provisions.”  Id. at 854-55.  Pratt is 
therefore distinguishable from the cases with which the majority finds conflict and 
 
 
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does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction based on express and 
direct conflict.  None of those cases have facts that are similar to Pratt. 
For these reasons, I conclude that this Court is without jurisdiction to review 
Pratt based on express and direct conflict.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D10-4398 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Linda Anderson Alley of Sheldon J. Schlesinger, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
and Philip Mead Burlington and Andrew A. Harris of Burlington & Rockenbach, 
P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
James C. Sawran, Andrea Candace Marcus, and Kimberly J. Kanoff of McIntosh, 
Sawran & Cartaya, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent Florida Medical Center