Title: State Farm v. Dehaan

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Richard DeHaan
No. 93, September Term, 2005
Headnote: Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §19-509 of the Insurance Article,
requires insurers to provide uninsured motorist protection in any policy sold in this State.
This section provides that an insured is entitled to coverage for injuries which “arise out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.”  In order to qualify for
coverage, there must be a nexus between the injury and the use of the vehicle, i.e., the vehicle
must be the instrumentality causing the injury.  Injuries resulting from the discharge of a gun
by an assailant sitting behind the wheel of the driver’s side of the insured’s vehicle, while the
insured is standing outside the vehicle, do not arise out of the use of a vehicle as
contemplated by the statute.
Circuit Court for How ard Cou nty
Case # 13-C-02-52183
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 93
September Term, 2005
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company
v.
Richard DeHaan
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: June 5, 2006
1  Unless otherwise indicated, every statutory reference in this opinion is to the
Insurance Article of the Maryland Code.
This case concerns the interpretation of Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Rep. Vol.), § 19-
509 of the Insurance Article1 (the State’s uninsured motorist statute) and the coverage due
to an insured under an automobile’s uninsured motorist section of his insurance policy.  Four
questions are presented for our review:
1.  “Did the courts below err in concluding that Richard DeHaan[’s]
injuries arose out of the use of an automobile?”
2.  “Did the courts below err in concluding that Richard DeHaan was
entitled to underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the terms of the
automobile insurance policy issued to him by State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company in light of the fact that the injuries and damages claimed
by Mr. DeHaan arise solely from a gunshot wound?”
3.  “Did the courts below err in concluding that simply by sitting in the
driver’s seat of a vehicle a person qualifies as an operator of the vehicle as that
term is used in the Maryland Annotated Code, Insurance Article Section 19-
509?”
4.  “Did the courts below err in concluding that Mr. DeHaan’s Blazer
qualifies as an uninsured motor vehicle under the very same State Farm
insurance policy that insures it and if not, did the courts below improperly find
that the ‘owned but not insured’ exclusion in the uninsured motorist portion of
the policy violates Maryland law?”
We hold that the injuries to respondent did not arise out of the use of the vehicle as
contemplated under the uninsured motorist statute and the insurance policy at issue in the
case at bar.  Because our holding on the first two questions is dispositive of the case, we shall
not address the third and fourth questions.
2  Both parties refer to the theft of Mr. DeHaan’s vehicle as a “carjacking.”  At oral
argument Mr. DeHaan’s counsel was asked whether the actions of the assailant met the
(continued...)
2
I. Facts and Procedural History
On January 28, 2001, after attending a Super Bowl party, Richard DeHaan,
respondent, stopped at the Westview Shell gas station in Baltimore County at approximately
11:15 p.m.  He was driving his 1989 Chevrolet Blazer, which was insured under a State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) policy.  The policy provided for $10,000.00
coverage in Personal Injury Protection benefits (PIP) and $100,000.00 coverage in uninsured
motorist benefits.
After arriving at the gas station, Mr. DeHaan turned off the vehicle, placed the keys
on the driver’s side floorboard and entered the convenience store portion of the Westview
station to make a purchase.  Upon returning to his vehicle, Mr. DeHaan noticed that there
was an individual sitting in the driver’s seat of the Blazer.  Mr. DeHaan opened the driver’s
side door and asked the stranger “what are you doing?”  His question was answered with
gunfire from the intruder, who then started the vehicle and left the scene, stealing Mr.
DeHaan’s car and leaving him wounded at the gas station.  After the shooting, Mr. DeHaan
was taken to Maryland Shock Trauma Center.  As a result of the incident, Mr. DeHaan
suffered substantial injuries, incurred approximately $70,000.00 in medical expenses, and
was unable to work for about six months.  The assailant, Mr. Ronald Neely, was later
identified, arrested, and convicted of attempted murder.2  Mr. Neely was incarcerated at the
2(...continued)
requirements of criminal carjacking.  Md. Code (2002), § 3-405 of the Criminal Law Article.
That section provides:  “(b) . . . (1) An individual may not take unauthorized possession or
control of a motor vehicle from another individual who actually possesses the motor vehicle,
by force or violence, or by putting that individual in fear through intimidation or threat of
force or violence.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Court of Special Appeals has stated that
actual possession does not require that the driver be inside the vehicle at the time of the
carjacking. Price v. State, 111 Md. App. 487, 500, 681 A.2d 1206, 1212 (1996), Mobley v.
State, 111 Md. App. 446, 455, 681 A.2d 1186, 1190, cert denied, 344 Md. 117, 685 A.2d 452
(1996).  Although, it is possible that the incident may qualify under the statute upon proper
factual findings by a trial court or jury, that determination has not been made and, therefore,
we will not refer to this incident as a carjacking–but consider it as a shooting during the
process of a theft.
3  Although the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the trial court on the substance
(continued...)
3
time this case was brought before the Circuit Court for Howard County.
Mr. DeHaan submitted two claims to State Farm.  The first claim sought recovery
under the PIP portion of the insurance policy and the second claim was based upon the
uninsured motorist section of the same policy.  State Farm denied both claims, alleging that
they were not covered by the relevant policy provisions.  Mr. DeHaan then filed a complaint
with the Circuit Court for Howard County.
The trial court granted Mr. DeHaan’s motion for summary judgment.  It determined
that the facts, agreed upon by the parties, supported Mr. DeHaan’s claims under both the PIP
and the uninsured motorist provisions of the insurance policy.  Petitioner then paid Mr.
DeHaan the amount covered under the PIP provision, but timely appealed the trial court’s
decision regarding the uninsured motorist claim.  The Court of Special Appeals in an
unreported opinion agreed3 with the trial court and State Farm filed a petition for writ of
3(...continued)
of its findings, the intermediate court vacated the judgment and remanded to the circuit court
because the trial court failed to issue an order in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-601,
which requires that judgments must be entered in a separate document from the
memorandum opinion.
4
certiorari on October 6, 2005.  We granted certiorari on December 5, 2005.  State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co. v. DeHaan, 390 Md. 90, 887 A.2d 655 (2005).
II.  Standard of Review
Judge Greene, writing for the Court, recently described the standard of review in
respect to the grant of a summary judgment motion by a trial court where, as in the case sub
judice, the parties have agreed that there are no disputed issues of material fact:
“As stated in Md. Rule 2-501(f), ‘[t]he court shall enter judgment in
favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor
judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’  Whether
summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law, and we must
determine whether the trial court was legally correct in doing so. Goodwich v.
Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996).  In
the present case, the parties agree that there are no factual disputes.  Rather,
the application of case law and the interpretation of a particular section of the
Insurance Article were the only questions before the trial court, and they are
the only questions now before us.  As such, it is clear that our review is de
novo.  See Walter v. Gunter,  367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002)
(noting that where the order of the trial court ‘involves an interpretation and
application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine
whether the lower court’s conclusions are “legally correct” under a de novo
standard of review’).”
Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 388 Md. 82, 86-87, 878 A.2d 615, 617-18 (2005).
Because the parties have agreed upon a stipulated statement of facts, we will review the
5
circuit court’s decision de novo to ascertain whether it was legally correct.
III. Discussion
In order to determine whether Mr. DeHaan is entitled to collect under the uninsured
motorist provision of his policy we must interpret Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Rep. Vol.),
§ 19-509 of the Insurance Article.  Our interpretation must conform to the well-settled
principles of statutory construction:
“As we have so often stated, ‘the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’  Oaks v. Connors,
339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). To begin with, we must consider
the plain language of the statute.  As noted in Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co. v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 683 A.2d 512 (1996), ‘we begin our inquiry with the
words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our
inquiry there also.’ Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 578, 683
A.2d at 517;  see also Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204,
1206-07 (‘If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and
everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning,
we will give effect to the statute as it is written.’). Moreover, ‘[w]here the
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor
delete language so as to “reflect an intent not evidenced in that language.”’
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 579,  683 A.2d at 517 (quoting
Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993)).”
Johnson, 388 Md. at 88-89, 878 A.2d at 618-19.  Furthermore, Judge Greene stated for the
Court:
“Our goal in interpreting statutes is to give them their ‘most reasonable
interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a
construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used.’  Greco v. State,
347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997).  We will avoid constructions
that are ‘illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.’ Frost v.
State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994).  Moreover, we will not
6
engage in a ‘“forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the
statute’s meaning.”’ Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 76, 854 A.2d 879, 885
(2004) (quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654
(2001)).”
Id. at 89, 878 A.2d at 619.
At the heart of this appeal lies our interpretation of two specific subsections of § 19-
509.  Subsection (a)(1) defines “uninsured motor vehicle” as a motor vehicle, “the
ownership, maintenance, or use of which has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an
insured . . . .”  § 19-509(a)(1) (emphasis added).  Subsection (c)(1) provides that the insured
is entitled to recover “because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.”  § 19-509(c)(1)
(emphasis added).  The statute does not define the word “use.”  The fact that word is not
defined subjects it to the possibility of different interpretations.  We, therefore, look beyond
the different meanings of the words in order to determine the intent of the legislature in
enacting this section.  We will first analyze the history of the uninsured motorists statute,
then evaluate the context of the words as interpreted within the entire section and, finally, we
will focus primarily on our interpretation of this language.
A.  Maryland’s Uninsured Motorist Statute
The Legislature first enacted the uninsured motorist statute as Chapter 73 of the Acts
of 1972.  This section was part of a large bill which also created the Maryland Automobile
Insurance Fund (MAIF), the bill provided: 
“(c)  In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, every
7
policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this
State after January 1, 1973 shall MAY contain coverage, in at least the
amounts required under Section 7-101 of Article 66½ of the Annotated Code
of Maryland (1970 Replacement Volume and 1972 Supplement), for damages
which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor
vehicle.” (Bolding added for emphasis.) 
The statute was later amended and codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol., 1978
Cum. Supp.), Art. 48A, § 541(c).
The enactment of this section complied with one of the recommendations made in a
Report of the Special Committee on No-Fault Insurance dated January 31, 1972.  The
committee’s recommendation stated:  “To complement the first party coverage and to protect
more fully a Maryland driver, the second bill requires the driver to carry uninsured motorist
coverage in the event he suffers damage caused by an out-of-state driver not protected by
liability insurance.”  This statute did not define the term “use” or explain the meaning of the
sentence “an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured
motor vehicle.”  § 541(c).
In 1981, the Legislature amended section 541 to include a definition of “uninsured
motor vehicle.”  The amended section provided: 
“(1) In this subsection ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle whose
ownership, maintenance, or use has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an
insured, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all valid and
collectible liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the
bodily injury or death is less than the amount of coverage provided to the
insured under this subsection.”
4  In the present case, although the vehicle was insured, if the vehicle had been the
instrumentality of the injury, it may have been considered “uninsured” because the assailant
was not an authorized “driver.”  The liability provision of the insurance policy defines
insured, inter alia, as “any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope
of consent of you or your spouse . . . .”
Section 19-509(a) of the Insurance Code provides:
“(a) ‘Uninsured motor vehicle’ defined. – In this section, ‘uninsured motor
vehicle’ means a motor vehicle: 
(1) the . . . use of which has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an
(continued...)
8
Md. Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 1985 Cum. Supp.), Art. 48A § 541 (c) (emphasis added).
Then in 1982 and 1985, the Legislature enacted additional amendments allowing insurance
providers to exclude from coverage “[t]he named insured or members of his family residing
in the household when occupying, or struck as a pedestrian by, an uninsured motor vehicle
that is owned by the named insured or a member of his immediate family residing in his
household . . . .” § 541(c)(2)(i).
Respondent asks us to hold that an injury suffered as a result of a gunshot from an
insured vehicle, which is standing still and with the ignition off, arose out of the use of the
vehicle.  Such a holding would imply that in enacting the exclusion clause above, the
Legislature intended to allow insurers to exclude only those injuries which occur as a result
of an actual collision or accident in which an uninsured vehicle owned by the victim is the
instrumentality of the harm, while forbidding the same insurer from excluding the insured
from coverage for injuries not directly related to the actual operation of an uninsured motor
vehicle owned by the victim.4  Such interpretation would not be logical.  Another more
4(...continued)
insured; and 
(2) for which the sum of the limits of liability under all valid and
collectible liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to
bodily injury or death: 
(i) is less than the amount of coverage provided under this section;
or 
(ii) has been reduced by payment to other persons of claims arising
from the same occurrence to an amount less than the amount of coverage
provided under this section.” (Emphasis added)
While it is possible that an insured’s vehicle might qualify as an “uninsured motor vehicle”
under subsection (2) because the liability coverage is less than that provided under the
section, the insured must be able to show that the vehicle’s use resulted in the injury in order
to reach that prong.  The conjunction “and” linking both subsections together requires such
a result.
5  It is not disputed that Mr. DeHaan’s automobile, the only automobile at issue in the
case at bar, was a properly insured vehicle.
9
reasonable interpretation of the amendment is that the Legislature did not consider the entire
uninsured motorist statute as one providing coverage from injuries other than those incurred
through the actual use of an uninsured motor vehicle, meaning that the motor vehicle had to
be the instrumentality that caused the harm and that vehicle had to be a vehicle, under the
circumstances, for which no sufficient liability insurance exists at the time of the incident.5
The next major revision of the section was codified in Maryland Code (1957, 1994
Repl. Vol.), Art. 48A, § 541, in which the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” remained
substantively unaltered, but the coverage section was amended to state:
“(2) In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, every
policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this
State after July 1, 1975 shall contain coverage in at least the amounts required
under Title 17 of the Transportation Article, for damages, subject to the policy
10
limits, which:
(i) The insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor
vehicle; . . . .” (Emphasis added).
Finally in 1997, Article 48A was recodified as the Insurance Article of the Maryland
Code.  The uninsured motorist section was reenacted without substantive changes and is now
codified as Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article, which
provides:
“§ 19-509. Uninsured motorist coverage – In general.
(a) . . . In this section, ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, or use of which has resulted in the
bodily injury or death of an insured; and 
. . . 
(c) . . . In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, each
motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State
after July 1, 1975, shall contain coverage for damages, subject to the policy
limits, that: 
(1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured
motor vehicle; and 
. . .
(f) Exclusions. – An insurer may exclude from the uninsured motorist
coverage required by this section benefits for: 
(1) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who
resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs when the
named insured or family member is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by
an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named insured or an
immediate family member of the named insured who resides in the named
insured’s household . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The history of the statute indicates several relevant concerns.  First, the uninsured motorist
11
section was enacted upon a recommendation to provide protection against uninsured drivers
for injured Maryland residents who have the misfortune to be harmed by tortious acts, where
the injury is caused by the instrumentality of an uninsured automobile, generally driven by
the tortfeasor.  From the amendments to the exclusion section we can reasonably infer that
the Legislature did not intend to extend coverage under the uninsured motorist provision to
situations where the vehicle is only incidentally related to the harm caused by intentional
criminal acts.
The next step in our analysis is to interpret the language in question in light of the
context of the entire section.  Here, the interpretation of the exclusion section is important.
That section specifically allows insurance companies to exclude from coverage injuries that
the insured suffers as a result of an incident with an uninsured vehicle, which the insured
owns.  § 19-509(f)(1).  There is no question that if the insured is struck by a vehicle owned
by him or her, and the policy contains the permitted exclusion, the policy holder will not be
able to recover.  This is consistent with the purpose of the statute to protect victims from
injury by a uninsured motor vehicle owned by others.  The statute would have to be stood on
its head to allow recovery for injuries incurred where the vehicle is only incidentally related
to the injury, especially where it is standing still with the ignition off, but to bar recovery if
the vehicle actually is moving and strikes the owner, i.e., is the direct instrumentality of the
harm. 
With this context in mind, we turn to the case law and its interpretation of this
12
language, more specifically to answer whether injuries from the discharge of a handgun by
an individual in the driver’s seat of a standing vehicle with the ignition off, in the course of
stealing the automobile, constitutes, for uninsured motorist coverage, a “use” or is “the result
of a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use” of the vehicle.
Mr. DeHaan argues that the shooting constitutes a “use” under the statute because the
assailant was in the vehicle and was in control of the vehicle at the time of the incident.  Mr.
DeHaan contends that the act of stealing the Blazer, by itself, was a “use” of the vehicle as
evidenced by the fact that the assailant drove the vehicle away from the scene after the
shooting.  He states that, as a result, the assailant “had taken control of [Mr. DeHaan’s]
vehicle and was exercising use over it.”  Mr. DeHaan, however, fails to recognize that
discharging a firearm does not have anything to do with the use of a vehicle as contemplated
under the statute.
We have previously stated that “[t]he uninsured motorist statutory plan is remedial in
nature and ‘dictates a liberal construction in order to effectuate its purpose of assuring
recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents.’  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976).”  Clay v. Gov’t
Employees Ins. Co., 356 Md. 257, 265, 739 A.2d 5, 9-10 (1999).  Such liberal construction,
however, “is not without limits.  The words of the statute itself delineate the extent of the
statute’s reach.”  Johnson, 388 Md. at 95, 878 A.2d at 623.
This Court has never gone as far as respondent suggests when pointing to Stevenson
6  We should note that under New Jersey law, while PIP coverage would provide
protection for intentional harm, UM coverage will only provide such coverage if the harm
was unintentional from the perspective of the carjacker.  Grabowski v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
345 N.J. Super. 241, 246, 784 A.2d 754, 757 (2001); but see Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 359 Md. 298, 315, 753 A.2d 533, 542-43 (2000) (determination of what constitutes an
“accident,” for purposes of accidental death and dismemberment coverage in an automobile
liability policy, assessed from perspective of injured insured, not from tortfeasor’s
viewpoint).  In addition, that state requires the injuries to arise out of the “use” of the vehicle,
i.e., there must be a substantial nexus between the automobile and the injuries. Id.
13
v. State Farm Indem. Co., 311 N.J. Super. 363, 709 A.2d 1359 (1998), where the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, noted: “Courts must apply a liberal construction
of the no-fault insurance scheme ‘so as to effect the purpose thereof.’ . . . The legislators
apparently sought to ensure the ‘broadest coverage possible so long as an automobile was
involved in that which happened.’”  Id. at 372, 709 A.2d at 1362-63.  Stevenson involved the
interpretation of New Jersey’s PIP coverage, not that state’s uninsured motorist statute.
Furthermore, although Stevenson dealt with two drivers being shot in the course of a
carjacking, the victims were inside the vehicle at the time of the incident and the PIP statute
provided for coverage to insured people who sustained injuries “while occupying, entering
into, alighting from or using [an] automobile . . . .”  Id. at 366 n.2, 709 A.2d at 1360 n.2
(emphasis added).6  This language of the New Jersey PIP statute, i.e., occupying, is absent
from the Maryland uninsured motorist provision.
This Court interpreted the meaning of the language “arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of the automobile” in National Indemnity Co. v. Ewing, 235 Md. 145,
200 A.2d 680 (1964).  In that case a drunk driver lost control of his vehicle striking a
14
telephone pole.  During the accident the sole passenger of the vehicle was thrown onto a
snow bank.  About twenty-five minutes later, the driver was helping the passenger cross the
road when they were both hit by another car.  The Court recognized the issue to be one of
first impression and looked at other states for guidance in interpreting the meaning of the
“arising out of” language as it related to the use of a vehicle requirement under the policy.
We determined that “it has generally been held that, while the words import and require a
showing of causal relationship, recovery is not limited by the strict rules developed in
relation to direct and proximate cause.”  Id. at 149, 200 A.2d at 682.
The Court in Ewing pointed to two cases from other states:  Schmidt v. Utils. Ins. Co.,
353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181 (1944) and Merchants Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
187 Miss. 301, 188 So. 571 (1939).  In Schmidt, a pedestrian had been injured when two
blocks used to unload a truck were negligently left behind by the truck owner’s employees.
In that case the M issouri court found that the injuries arose out of the use of the truck.
Schmidt, 353 Mo. at 223, 182 S.W.2d at 186.  In Merchants, the injuries were caused by
poles left on the road after a vehicle had been removed from a ditch.  We quoted from the
Merchants opinion, which stated:
“‘Our conclusion, under a policy such as is here before us, is that where
a dangerous situation causing injury is one which arose out of or had its source
in, the use or operation of the automobile, the chain of responsibility must be
deemed to possess the requisite articulation with the use or operation until
broken by the intervention of some event which has no direct or substantial
relation to the use or operation, –which is to say, that the event which breaks
the chain, and which, therefore, would exclude liability under the automobile
policy, must be an event which bears no direct or substantial relation to the use
7  In the present case, not only was the gun the instrumentality of the injury, but the
only vehicle present was not being used negligently at the time of the incident, and the
vehicle itself was a properly insured vehicle standing still with the ignition off.
15
or operation; and until an event of the latter nature transpires the liability under
the policy exists.’”
Ewing, 235 Md. at 149-50, 200 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added) (quoting Merchants Co., 187
Miss. at 301, 188 So. at 572).  In the case sub judice, the shooting had no direct or substantial
relation to the use of the vehicle.  The shooting broke the chain of use–even if the vehicle had
been in the process of being used.
The Ewing Court held that the injuries caused by the second automobile arose out of
the use of the first vehicle from which the claimant had been thrown.  It pointed out that 
“‘The fact that the insured vehicle was exerting no physical force upon the
instrumentality which was the immediate cause of the injury, and was not itself
in physical contact * * * is neither decisive of nor fatal to the plaintiff’s claim
of coverage.  * * * It is sufficient that the use was “connected with the accident
or the creation of a condition that caused the accident * * *.”’”
Id. at 150, 200 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added) (quoting Carter v. Bergeron, 102 N.H. 464,
471, 160 A.2d 348, 353 (1960)).  The Court concluded by stating that “the negligent use of
the car created a situation where [the passenger] was subjected to the risk of injury . . . .”  Id.
at 150-51, 200 A.2d at 683 (emphasis added).  Although the Court gave a somewhat broad
interpretation to the language, it still required that there be a connection between the use of
the vehicle and the injury that was created.7  As the closing statement in Ewing provides, the
“use” of the car must create the risk of injury.  To allow recovery under the uninsured
16
motorist coverage, when there is no connection between the “use” of the vehicle and the
injury inflicted, would be to require insurance companies to provide coverage for any
imaginable incident occurring near a vehicle.  A result which is clearly beyond the scope of
a statute which was enacted “to assure financial compensation to the innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from financially irresponsible uninsured
motorists.”  Johnson, 388 Md. at 95, 878 A.2d at 622 (quotations omitted) (quoting Lane v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 169, 582 A.2d 501, 503 (1990)).
In reference to the interpretation of the language “aris[ing] ‘out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle,’” respondent cites Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund Board, 262 Md. 115, 117, 277 A.2d 57, 58 (1971) (a claim against the
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board and not against a policy holder’s insurance
carrier).  In that case, the driver of an unidentified vehicle threw a lit firecracker into the rear
seat of the plaintiff’s convertible.  The plaintiff, distracted by the ensuing explosion, and the
cries of her five-year-old child who was riding in the back seat, lost control of the vehicle and
hit a tree.
The Court determined that in evaluating insurance policy coverage “whether an injury
is or is not within the coverage provided by an automobile insurance policy may well turn
on the question whether the use of an automobile is directly or merely incidentally causally
connected with the injury, even though the automobile itself may not have proximately
caused the injury.”  Id. at 118, 277 A.2d at 59 (emphasis added).  The Court recognized the
17
Ewing test under insurance policy law.  It held, however, that for purposes of the then
existing Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (the “Fund”), which required a liberal
construction to protect  innocent victims, “the injuries under the facts of [that] case did arise
out of the ownership, operation or use of an unidentified motor vehicle.”  Id. at 119, 277
A.2d at 59.  The Court did not provide any guidance as to the required relation between the
injury and the vehicle, nor did it set any limits to its holding.  But, what was very clear in
Frazier was that the injured parties were actually riding, i.e., using, a vehicle at the time it
ran off the road and struck a tree.  The act that caused the crash was also committed from a
moving, operating vehicle presumed to be uninsured.  The uninsured vehicle was, therefore,
being actually used as a car at the time the firecracker was thrown.
Respondent also relies on Northern Assurance Co. of America v. EDP Floors, Inc.,
311 Md. 217, 533 A.2d 682 (1987), for the proposition that only a “minimal ‘arising out of’
causal relation” between the injury and the use is required to entitle the insured to recover
under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy.  Id. at 232, 533 A.2d at 689.  In EDP,
the Court was called to interpret an exclusion clause on an general business insurance policy
stating that: “Coverage does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of . . .[a vehicle].”  Id. at 224-
25, 533 A.2d at 686.  The exclusion covered any vehicle owned by the insured or operated
by an employee of the insured while in the course of employment.  The Court reasoned that
“The words ‘arising out of’ must be afforded their common understanding,
namely, to mean originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like.
18
See Baca v. New Mexico State Highway Dept., 82 N.M. 689, 486 P.2d 625,
628 (1971);  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 117 (1961).  While
these words plainly import a causal relation of some kind, read in context, they
do not require that the unloading of the truck be the sole ‘arising out of’ cause
of the injury;  they require only that the injury arise out of the unloading of the
vehicle.”
Id. at 230, 533 A.2d at 689 (citation omitted).  The Court has more recently expounded on
this view stating:
“The insurance treatises support the view articulated in EDP Floors and
in Ewing that the words ‘arising out of’ mean ‘originating from, growing out
of, flowing from, or the like.’  See, e.g., 6B J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice § 4317, at 360-63 (R.B. Buckley ed., 1979) (in
the context of automobile insurance, the words ‘arising out of’ have ‘broader
significance than the words “caused by,” and are ordinarily understood to
mean originating from, incident to, or having connection with the use of the
vehicle’);  12 G.J. Couch, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 45:61, at 294
(2d ed. 1981) (‘[T]he words “arising out of” . . . generally mean “originating
from,” “growing out of,” or “flowing from.”’);  1 R.H. Long, The Law of
Liability Insurance § 1.22, at 1-57 (1972) (‘The phrase “arising out of” is not
to be construed to mean “proximately caused by.”  . . . The words “arising out
of” mean causally connected with, not “proximately caused by” use.’).”
Mass Transit Admin. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 349 Md. 299, 315, 708 A.2d 298, 306 (1998)
(emphasis added).
EDP involved a situation where two employees of the insured were delivering floor
tiles to a job site in a truck.  One of the employees was inebriated and as a result another
person was helping the sober employee unload the floor tiles.  At some point, the helper
operated the truck’s hydraulic lift and the floor tiles fell and injured him.  EDP claimed that
the exclusion clause only applied to vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees.
It argued that because the incident did not occur due to the negligence of its employee, it did
19
not arise out of the unloading of a vehicle as contemplated under the policy.  The Court
disagreed.  In arriving at its conclusion, the EDP Court stated:  “As we see it, the language
in the exclusionary clause clearly focuses the ‘arising out of’ inquiry on the instrumentality
of the injury, i.e., upon the truck and its unloading.”  311 Md at 230, 533 A.2d at 689.  In the
case at bar, if we focus our inquiry on the instrumentality of the injury, it is the handgun and
not the Blazer’s use, as it was intended to be used, which resulted in Mr. DeHaan’s injuries.
More recently in Mass Transit Administration v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 349 Md.
299, 708 A.2d 298 (1998), we analyzed Ewing, Frazier, and EDP and their interpretation of
the “arising out of” language.  CSX was not a case involving an automobile liability
insurance policy but related to the interpretation of an indemnification clause in a contract
between Maryland’s Mass Transit Administration (MTA) and CSX Transportation, Inc.
(CSXT).  That clause provided that the MTA would “‘indemnify, save harmless, and defend
CSXT from any and all casualty losses, claims, suits, damages or liability of every kind
arising out of the Contract Service under’ [the agreement.]”  Id. at 301, 708 A.2d at 300.
CSXT’s claim for indemnification resulted from an accident where a backhoe being used by
a CSXT contractor was destroyed by a MARC passenger train.  The MTA claimed that the
accident was the result of negligence prior to the accident.  The Court determined, however,
that the damage to the backhoe arose out of the accident.
The MTA argued that, according to Ewing and Frazier, “even if proximate causation
is not required for ‘arising out of’ coverage, something more than ‘but for’ causation is
20
required.”  CSX, 349 Md. at 316, 708 A.2d at 307.  The Court rejected that proposition,
pointing out that in Ewing the proximate cause requirement was simply rejected “without
mentioning any need for some lesser fault;” and in Frazier, there was no mention of
causation.  CSX, 349 Md. at 316, 708 A.2d at 307.  The Court in CSX determined that
proximate cause was not required and that Ewing and Frazier did not support requiring more
than “but for” causation in order to determine that the injuries “arose out of” the service
contract.  The present case differs from CSX in that we are dealing with an automobile
liability insurance policy and the uninsured motorist provision of the statute.  More
specifically, we must interpret the use of the vehicle as it is the object of the “arising out of”
clause in the insurance policy at issue.
Even in CSX the three dissenters pointed out that there should be more of a nexus
between the injury and the contract service than simple “but for” causation.  To require
otherwise, the indemnification clause would require the MTA to indemnify CSXT “for a
myriad of liabilities in no way closely related to the provision of commuter rail service by
CSXT for MTA.” Id. at 323, 708 A.2d at 310.  In the same manner, the broad reading of the
uninsured motorist statute suggested by respondent in the instant case, especially because the
language of the specific provision requires that the vehicle be used, i.e., be the
instrumentality of the injury resulting from an event rather than arising out of a contract,
would be improper.  It would require automobile liability insurance companies to cover a
myriad of liabilities in no way related to the purpose of the statute, which, as stated
21
previously, was “to assure financial compensation to the innocent victims of motor vehicle
accidents who are unable to recover from financially irresponsible uninsured motorists.”
Johnson, 388 Md. at 95, 878 A.2d at 622 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted) (quoting
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. at 169, 582 A.2d at 503).
State Farm points to a number of cases from the Court of Special Appeals in support
of its position that the shooting did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the
vehicle.  In Webster v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 130 Md. App. 59, 744 A.2d
578 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 610, 751 A.2d 472 (2000), three people were in an
uninsured car when a man approached them, told them to get out of the vehicle and showed
them a handgun.  The driver accelerated in an attempt to get away.  The assailant then fired
his gun at the vehicle killing the passenger, a sixteen-year-old girl traveling in the back seat.
The girl’s parents sued their insurance company, Government Employees Insurance Co.
(GEICO), under their policy’s uninsured motorist provision.  The Court of Special Appeals
appropriately refused to accept the parents’ argument that an attempted carjacking should be
deemed as “‘arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor
vehicle.’”  Id. at 64, 744 A.2d at 581 (emphasis added).  The court came to the conclusion
that
“In this case, there was only one car and one driver . . . .  The Carjacker
. . . was neither physically inside nor in control of any vehicle.  Furthermore,
[the victim’s] injuries were not causally connected to the use of an uninsured
vehicle, but rather were caused by [the assailant’s] assault.  Therefore, injuries
resulting from this attempted carjacking are not covered by the Maryland
uninsured motorist provision.”
22
Id. at 67, 744 A.2d at 582 (emphasis added).  The intermediate appellate court implied that
the injury needs to be at least causally connected to the normal use of the vehicle.  The
gunshot injuries were not the result of the use of the vehicle in Webster, nor were they in the
case sub judice.
Respondent relies on two apposite Court of Special Appeals’ cases to distinguish
Webster: McNeill v. Maryland Insurance Guaranty Ass’n, 48 Md. App. 411, 427 A.2d 1056,
cert. denied, 290 Md. 718 (1981) and Harris v. Nationwide, 117 Md. App. 1, 699 A.2d 447,
cert. denied, 348, Md. 206, 703 A.2d 148 (1997).  The Court of Special Appeals, however,
specifically addressed both opinions in Webster, stating:
“[I]n McNeill . . . , the plaintiff was injured when his car battery exploded
during an attempt to ‘jump-start’ his vehicle.  The driver of the other vehicle,
which was being used to help McNeill jump-start his car, lit a match while
observing the plaintiff, causing the explosion.  This Court held that McNeill’s
injuries were covered under the other automobile’s insurance policy because
the injury arose out of, or had its source in, the use or operation of the
automobile. 
“In Harris . . . , the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when an
unidentified driver grabbed the plaintiff’s purse and dragged her 15 feet before
speeding away.  This Court held that the insured pedestrian was covered under
her uninsured motorist provision because the assault arose out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of the thief’s vehicle.”
Webster, 130 Md. App. at 66-67, 744 A.2d at 582 (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).  In both cases, using Frazier’s language, the cars were directly causally
connected to the injuries sustained.  In McNeill, the vehicle was being used to jumpstart the
injured driver’s car.  In Harris, the thief’s vehicle was itself used to drag Ms. Harris, causing
her injuries.  The common thread in these two cases is the active participation of the vehicle
23
of the perpetrator or tortfeasor.
The second Court of Special Appeals’ case that State Farm relies on is Wright v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 128 Md. App. 694, 740 A.2d 50 (1999).  In that case, Mr. and Mrs.
Wright were stopped at a traffic light when a man named “PeeWee” Erskin Caldwell got out
of his vehicle and shot both of them.  PeeWee had attempted to shoot Mr. Wright in at least
one other occasion, apparently because he believed Mr. Wright to be a police informant.  The
Wrights sought to recover for their injuries under their uninsured motorist coverage.
The Court of Special Appeals explained that “the Wrights were injured because
PeeWee shot them, not because he was using a car. . . . We agree that the use of the car was
incidental to the attempt to kill Wright.  It was not directly, causally, connected to the
incident.” Id. at 698-99, 740 A.2d at 52 (emphasis added).  The court went on to point out
that:
“Were we to hold otherwise, as Allstate points out, any victim of a crime
whose assailant fled the scene of a crime in a car could seek recovery from his
own insurer if he had a policy containing uninsured motorists coverage.
Uninsured motorists coverage was never intended to cover the type of injuries
presented by the facts of this case.  The primary purpose of sec. 19-509 of the
Insurance Article is to assure financial compensation to the innocent victims
of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from financially
irresponsible uninsured motorists.  Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 (1980).”
Id.  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation.  Allowing this type of claim
would make insurance companies responsible for injuries the Legislature never contemplated
as being covered under the statute.
24
Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 753 A.2d 533 (2000), is not to the
contrary, nor do the parties here contend otherwise.  In Cole, the insured was covered under
an accidental death and dismemberment provision in her husband’s automobile liability
policy.  Id. at 302, 753 A.2d at 535.  While secured by a seatbelt into the right front passenger
seat of her husband’s idling van in a residential driveway, Mrs. Cole was shot and killed by
her husband’s former father-in-law, after he shot Mr. Cole, who had exited the van to collect
a child from his former marriage for a visit.  Id. at 301, 753 A.2d at 535.  In her panic at
seeing the man approaching with a handgun, Ms. Cole was unable to extricate herself from
her seatbelt and, thus, was unable to take evasive action either to drive the van away or
evacuate the van.  Id.
The accidental death provision in the Cole’s policy supplied first party coverage for
an insured who died or suffered a loss by “accident” while occupying, or was struck by, a
motor vehicle.  State Farm conceded that Mrs. Cole was occupying a covered vehicle when
she was shot and killed.  Id. at 306-07, 753 A.2d at 538.  The definition of what constituted
an “accident,” for purposes of determining coverage under the accidental death provision,
became the analytical focus of the Court’s opinion, as the policy gave no definitional
assistance in that regard.  Id. at 307 n.7, 753 A.2d at 538 n.7.
The Court in Cole noted that accidental death and dismemberment coverage was
“somewhat unusual” in automobile liability policies.  Id. at 306, 753 A.2d at 537.  Although
Mr. Cole and his insurer contended that, pursuant to Maryland case law, an “accident” should
25
be defined as “a happening; an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation;
an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect from a known
cause, and therefore not expected,” this definition, for purposes of the facts of Cole, was
incomplete because it failed to establish through whose eyes, the insured victim or the
tortfeasor, the Court should view whether M rs. Cole’s death was a the result of an “accident.”
Id. at 307, 753 A.2d at 538 (citation omitted).  Even under preexisting Maryland cases, “the
fact that damages were caused by an intentional act did not preclude [a] finding that they
were caused by ‘accident’ if something unforeseen produces an unexpected result.”  Id. at
308, 753 A.2d at 539, citing Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md.
148, 150, 235 A.2d 556, 557 (1967); see also Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254
Md. 120, 127, 254 A.2d 658, 662 (1969), and State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treas, 254 Md.
615, 620, 255A.2d 296, 298 (1969).  After analyzing relevant Maryland, federal, and sister
state cases, we concluded that:  (a) the proper approach was to apply the definition of
“accident” from the vantage point of the injured insured; and (b) that Mrs. Cole’s death was
the direct result of an “accident” because her shooting was an unusual and unforeseen event
when viewed from her perspective.  Id. at 318, 753 A.2d at 544.
Because accidental death and dismemberment coverage is not mandated by statute in
automobile liability policies in Maryland, unlike the uninsured motorist coverage that is
involved in the present case, the analysis in Cole proceeded as one solely of interpreting a
contract in accordance with established principles of the Maryland common law of contracts.
26
In the present case, while many of the same common law principles figure somewhat in the
Court’s reasoning, the overarching consideration is one of legislative intent, an inquiry not
undertaken or required in Cole.  Moreover, the coverage terms requiring interpretation here,
“use” of an automobile, are quite different than Cole’s analysis of the definition of
“accident.”
In Cole, if the actions of the shooter and Mrs. Cole’s frightened entrapment in the
idling motor vehicle were an “accident,” causation was conceded.  In the present case, the
causal relationship or connection between the known operative facts resulting in Mr. DeHaan
being shot is the crux of the inquiry for an entirely different kind of coverage than was
involved in Cole.
In the absence of any cases directly on point supporting his position from this Court,
Mr. DeHaan points to Carrigan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 326 Or. 97,
949 P.2d 705 (1997), for the proposition that injuries sustained in the course of a carjacking
are covered under statutes that provide benefits “for injuries ‘resulting from the use,
occupancy, or maintenance of any motor vehicle . . . .’”  Id. at 99, 949 P.2d at 706.  Carrigan
was a PIP case not an uninsured motorist case.  There, the driver agreed to give the assailant
a ride.  While they were driving, the man showed the driver a gun and directed him to a
residential neighborhood.  The assailant told the driver to stop and get out of the car.  Both
men got out, and a few minutes later the assailant shot the driver on the street.  The Oregon
court determined that the injury arose out of the carjacking, which under its PIP statute it
8  As indicated earlier, petitioner, paid the insured under the policy’s PIP coverage.
27
determined to be involved with the use of a vehicle.
The Oregon court explained that there were two possible interpretations of its PIP
statute.  Under one interpretation, the gunshot would have to be the direct consequence of
the use of the vehicle.  Such an interpretation would, according to the Oregon court, allow
recovery from the injuries suffered as a result of a collision caused by a gunshot, or maybe
even injuries resulting from the accidental discharge of a weapon caused by the vehicle, such
as hitting a pothole.  A second interpretation would permit coverage when the injury results
from any use of the vehicle.  Under such interpretation the injury in a carjacking would be
covered because it is a result of the vehicle being the object of the carjacking.  The Oregon
court adopted the second interpretation of the statute in allowing the driver to recover PIP
benefits.
Other courts, however, have not come to the same conclusion in cases specifically
addressing uninsured motorist coverage, such as the coverage at issue in this case.8  We find
them more persuasive.  In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.2d 377 (Ala. 1996), an
insured driver was savagely beaten by an uninsured driver when coming to the aid of a third
driver whom the uninsured driver was threatening with a pistol.  The Supreme Court of
Alabama held that the battery on the insured driver was an intervening act, which broke the
causal connection between the 
use of the vehicle and the injuries; therefore, the injuries were
not covered by the uninsured motorist clause on his policy.  Id. at 380.  In Arizona, the
28
plaintiff must affirmatively show that the injuries were caused and produced by the uninsured
vehicle.  Ruiz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 177 Ariz. 101, 103, 865 P.2d 762,764 (1993) (holding that
a passenger in an insured vehicle, who is shot by the passenger of an uninsured vehicle, was
not covered under the uninsured motorist provision of her insurance policy because the injury
did not arise out of the use of the uninsured vehicle); Spradlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 650 So.2d 1383 (Miss. 1995) (same); Razizadeh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 251
Kan. 254, 833 P.2d 1007 (1992) (holding that the death of a driver did not arise out of the
operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle when he was shot in the conduct of a
robbery where the assailant bumped the driver’s car with his own automobile in order to lure
him out, shoot and rob him); Kessler v. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co., 573 So.2d 476 (La. 1991)
(holding that the shooting of a motorist by an unidentified driver, while the shooter was
driving and had run a stop sign, did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
the uninsured vehicle.  The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that interpreting the word “use”
as to encompass a shooting would be to improperly extend the meaning to the term “while
using” a vehicle which it held was contrary to the plain and common-sense interpretation of
its statute.); Farm & City Ins. v. Estate of Davis, 2001 SD 71, 629 N.W.2d 586 (2001)
(holding that a drive-by shooting does not arise out of the use of a vehicle as contemplated
by the uninsured motorist provision); Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d
153 (Tex. 1999) (holding that while the intentional firing of a firearm, such as in a drive-by
shooting, does not arise out of the use of a vehicle, the accidental discharge of a shotgun
29
when a child is climbing onto the cab of the truck does arise out of the use of the truck as
required by the uninsured motorist provision); but see Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Howser, 309 S.C. 269, 422 S.E.2d 106 (1992) (per curiam) (where, when answering certified
questions from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that injuries from a gunshot fired from a moving uninsured vehicle arose out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured vehicle.); Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug,
415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1987) (holding that a shooting from a moving vehicle arises out of
the use of the vehicle because the shooter was using the vehicle for motoring purposes).
Recently, the Supreme Court of Iowa enunciated an illustrative standard.  American
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 679 N.W.2d 571 (Fla. 2004).  In that case, a woman
jumped from a moving vehicle while trying to escape an attack by her former boyfriend.  The
Supreme Court of Iowa upheld her uninsured motorist claim, but in doing so described the
following standard in evaluating uninsured motorist coverage:
“From an analytical standpoint, we observe that the ‘arising out of’ phrase is
tied directly to the phrase ‘use of the vehicle.’  Nevertheless, these two phrases
actually require separate inquiries.  See [8A Lee R. Russ, Couch on Insurance
§ 119:37, at 119-57 (3d ed. 1995)] (‘[T]he concepts of use and legal cause
should be analyzed separately, avoiding the traditional proximate cause
concepts.’).  This means the use of the vehicle at the time of the injury must
not only be a contemplated use and inherent in the purpose and nature of
vehicles, but the use must be causally related to the injury.  See Johnson v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 190 W.Va. 526, 438 S.E.2d 869, 872-73
(1993) (‘Use’ ‘must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the
vehicle’ as a vehicle.);  see also Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch. v.
Higginbotham, 
95 
Mich.App. 
213, 
290 
N.W.2d 
414, 
418-19
(Mich.Ct.App.1980).  Like the ‘arising out of’ phrase, the term ‘use’ is broad,
but not so broad as to embrace acts independent of the operation of a vehicle.
30
See 1 No Fault and Uninsured Motorist Automobile Insurance § 9.10[2], at
9-20 to -22 (MB 2000).  The vehicle must be more than the site of the tortious
conduct.”
Id. at 583 (emphasis added).  In the Iowa case, the injuries were a result of a fall from a
moving vehicle in which the victim was being carried away.  Such use of the vehicle, i.e.,
carrying people, the Supreme Court of Iowa reasoned, was a contemplated use of an
automobile and as such entitled the victim to uninsured motorist coverage.  See also Walsh
v. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co., 141 N.H. 374, 375, 685 A.2d 472, 473 (1996) (holding that “there
must be more than a tenuous connection to the automobile; the operator must have been
‘using his vehicle or behaving as a motorist’ at the time the plaintiff was injured”).  Applying
that standard to the case sub judice, it is clear that firing of a handgun is not a “contemplated
use and inherent in the purpose and nature of vehicles.” 
Other courts apply a test similar to that enunciated in Ewing, supra.  The Supreme
Court of New Mexico, for example, has described the test, stating:
“a court first considers whether there is a sufficient causal nexus between the
use of the uninsured vehicle and the resulting harm.  Such a causal nexus
requires that the vehicle be an ‘“active accessory” in causing the injury.’
[Continental W. Ins. Co. v.] Klug, 415 N.W.2d [876,] 878 [(Minn. 1987)]
(quoting Tlougan [v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.], 310 N.W.2d [116,] 117 [(Minn.
1981)]); see also Cung La [v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.], 830 P.2d [1007,]
1009 [(Colo. 1992)] (holding that recovery might be had if injury would not
have been suffered but for assailant’s use of the vehicle).  If a court finds that
there is a sufficient causal nexus, then it should next consider whether an act
of independent significance broke the causal link between the use of the
vehicle and the harm suffered. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878;  see Kish v. Central
Nat’l Ins. Group of Omaha, 67 Ohio St.2d 41, 21 O.O.3d 26, 424 N.E.2d 288,
294 (1981) (holding that intentional act of murder was intervening cause);  cf.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Ledger, 189 Cal.App.3d 779, 234 Cal.Rptr. 570,
9  Except perhaps military vehicles such as tanks, etc.
31
572 (1987) (interpreting liability policy and holding that stabbing was
intervening cause).  Finally, the court must consider whether the ‘use’ to which
the vehicle was put was a normal use of that vehicle.  For example,
transportation would be a normal use, whereas use of a parked car for a gun
rest would not be.  See Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878.”
Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co., 120 N.M. 813, 907 P.2d 994 (1995); see also Mayer v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 944 P.2d 288 (Okla. 1997) (holding that the use of a rental truck as a car
bomb in the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was not a
“use” as contemplated under the uninsured motorist provision).  Shooting people is likewise
not the manner in which vehicles are normally used, or for which they are designed, i.e.,
vehicles are not normally necessary for shooting people.9
As these cases indicate, an uninsured motorist provision requires that there be a direct
causal relationship between the injury and the actual use of the vehicle.  We agree with those
courts which have required such a connection, providing a reasonable interpretation of a
statute meant to protect lawfully insured individuals from automobile accidents caused by
financially irresponsible motorists.
B.  Interpretation of the Insurance Policy Language
Mr. DeHaan’s insurance policy includes the required uninsured motorist coverage
under § 19-509.  We have previously delineated the analysis of insurance policies:
“In Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 667 A.2d 617 (1995), we
summarized the rules for interpretation of insurance policies that apply here.
There we said:
32
‘In Maryland, insurance policies, like other contracts, are construed
as a whole to determine the parties’ intentions. Cheney v. Bell National
Life [Ins. Co.], 315 Md. 761, 766-67, 556 A.2d 1135[, 1138] (1989).
Words are given their “customary, ordinary, and accepted meaning,”
unless there is an indication that the parties intended to use the words
in a technical sense.  Id., see also Chantel Associates v. [Mount ]
Vernon [Fire Ins. Co.], 338 Md. 131, 142, 656 A.2d 779[, 784] (1995).
“A word’s ordinary signification is tested by what meaning a
reasonably prudent layperson would attach to the term.” Bausch &
Lomb [Inc.]  v. Utica Mutual [Ins. Co.], 330 Md. 758, 779, 625 A.2d
1021[, 1031] (1993). If the language in an insurance policy suggests
more than one meaning to a reasonably prudent layperson, it is
ambiguous.  Collier v. MD-Individual Practice [Ass’n ], 327 Md. 1,
[6,] 607 A.2d 537[, 539] (1992); Pacific Indem. [Co.] v. Interstate Fire
& Cas. [Co.], 302 Md. 383, [389,] 488 A.2d 486[, 489] (1985). A term
which is clear in one context may be ambiguous in another. Tucker v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74, 517 A.2d 730[, 732] (1986);
Bentz v. Mutual Fire [, Marine & Inland Ins. Co.], 83 Md.App. 524,
537, 575 A.2d 795[, 801] (1990).
. . .
Id. at 508-09, 667 A.2d at 619.”
Bushey v. Northern Assurance Co., 362 Md. 626, 631-32, 766 A.2d 598, 600-01 (2001).  We
will now evaluate the policy using these principles.
Mr. DeHaan’s insurance policy tracks the statutory language set out in section 19-509
of the Insurance Article:
“We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage an insured is
legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle.  The bodily injury must be sustained by an insured. The bodily injury
or property damage must be caused by accident arising out of the operation,
maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.” [Bolding added for
emphasis.]
As this language is identical to the statutory text, it is reasonable to infer that State Farm
33
intended to give it the same meaning given to the statute.  As explained previously we
conclude that the injuries, even if deemed accidental from the point of view of Mr. DeHaan,
did not arise out of the use of the motor vehicle as contemplated by the insurance policy, i.e.,
the contract between the parties.
IV.  Conclusion
The uninsured motorist provision of the Maryland Code was enacted to protect
innocent victims from irresponsible drivers who drive without insurance.  This section is to
be liberally construed to ensure that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents can be
compensated for the injuries they suffer as a result of such accidents.  The Legislature,
however, did not intend this provision to require insurance coverage against all criminal
activity perpetrated in connection with a vehicle.  In order to come within the coverage of the
statute there must be a nexus between the injury and an uninsured vehicle.  Although, this
nexus need not meet the proximate cause standard applicable to most tort cases, it must be
more than merely incidental.  The respondent’s injuries do not have the required nexus to the
use of the vehicle.
We shall interpret the insurance policy in light of the statute.  The policy tracks the
statutory language stating that coverage is provided for incidents “arising out of the . . . use
of an uninsured motor vehicle.” § 19-509(c)(1) (emphasis added).  We interpret the uninsured
motorist provision’s referral to use to require a nexus between the injury and the normal use
of an uninsured vehicle.  As with our interpretation of the statute, under the policy,
34
respondent’s injuries did not arise out of the normal use of an uninsured vehicle.  We
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the circuit
court’s grant of motion for summary judgment in favor of respondent.  Under the
circumstances of this case, State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED.
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD
COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE
CASE 
TO 
THAT 
COURT 
FOR
F U R T H E R  
P R O C E E D I N G S
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.