Title: Thompson v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Djuane THOMPSON v. STATE of Arkansas

97-339                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 11, 1997


1.   Juveniles -- transfer of criminal case to juvenile court --
     factors considered. -- To determine whether a criminal case
     should be transferred to juvenile court, the trial court must
     conduct a hearing and consider the following factors: (1) the
     seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was employed
     by the juvenile in the commission of the offense; (2) whether
     the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated
     offenses which would lead to the determination that the
     juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing
     rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat
     and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such
     efforts; and (3) the prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation; although the court
     must consider all of the above factors, it is not required to
     give them equal weight.

2.   Juveniles -- decision to try juvenile as adult -- when
     reversed. -- The trial court's decision to try the juvenile as
     an adult must be supported by clear and convincing evidence,
     Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(f), and the supreme court will not
     reverse the court's determination unless it is clearly
     erroneous. 
3.   Juveniles -- may be tried as adult solely upon serious and
     violent nature of offense -- association with person using
     weapon sufficient. -- A juvenile may be tried as an adult
     solely upon the serious and violent nature of the offense; it
     is of no consequence that appellant may or may not have
     personally used a weapon, as his association with the use of
     a weapon in the course of the crimes is sufficient to satisfy
     the violence criterion.

4.   Juveniles -- violence employed by codefendants -- appellant
     did not need personally to use weapon. -- Appellant's claim
     that the trial court's ruling must be reversed because the
     prosecutor conceded that violence was employed by the
     codefendants but not appellant was without merit; his
     association with the use of a weapon in the course of the
     crimes is sufficient to satisfy the violence criterion. 

5.   Juveniles -- meaningful hearing required to substantiate
     serious and violent nature of charges contained in information
     -- all prior inconsistent decisions overruled. -- The trial
     court may not rely solely upon the allegations contained in
     the information to support its finding that a juvenile should
     be tried as an adult due to the serious and violent nature of
     the crime; pursuant to the language in Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-
     318(d), and effective as of December 11, 1997, a meaningful
     hearing is required in which some evidence must be presented
     to substantiate the serious and violent nature of the charges
     contained in the information; all prior inconsistent decisions
     were overruled.

6.   Juveniles -- no evidence presented during transfer hearing to
     substantiate serious and violent nature of crimes contained in
     information -- case reversed and remanded. -- The trial
     court's ruling was reversed because there was no evidence
     presented during the transfer hearing to substantiate the
     serious and violent nature of the charges contained in the
     information; the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to
     transfer was reversed and remanded for transfer to the
     juvenile court.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John W. Langston, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by:  Jeffrey A.
Weber, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Brad Newman, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     This is an interlocutory appeal filed by Djuane Thompson from
the circuit court's denial of his motion to transfer his criminal
case to juvenile court.  We reverse and remand for transfer to the
juvenile court.
     Djuane Thompson, and two others, were charged as adults in the
Pulaski County Circuit Court with aggravated assault, kidnapping,
and theft of property.  According to the information, a handgun was
used in these crimes, and less than $500 was taken from the victim. 
At the time of the alleged offenses, Thompson was sixteen years of
age.  Thompson subsequently filed a motion to transfer the case to
juvenile court.
     During the transfer hearing, Thompson's mother, Shirley Ford,
testified that her son had no prior charges in either juvenile or
circuit court, that he attended school regularly, and that he did
not "run the streets."  Thompson's mother explained that during the
summer months her son took tutoring classes and mowed yards to earn
money.  She described Thompson as a "good kid" who was helpful
around the house and got along well with his family.  Finally, Ford
testified that she never suspected that Thompson was involved in
gang activity or used drugs or alcohol.
     The State did not put on any evidence during the hearing, but
instead relied upon the allegations asserted in the information. 
The prosecutor, however, admitted to the trial court that Thompson
did not have a weapon, but his codefendants did.  The trial court
denied the motion to transfer, and Thompson timely filed this
interlocutory appeal.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Code
Ann.  9-27-318(h) (Supp. 1995).
     On appeal, Thompson alleges that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion to transfer.  To determine whether a criminal
case should be transferred to juvenile court, the trial court must
conduct a hearing and consider the following factors: 
          (1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether
     violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission
     of the offense;
          (2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive
     pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
     determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
     under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
     past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
     the response to such efforts; and
          (3) The prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.
Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1995).  Although the court must
consider all of the above factors, it is not required to give them
equal weight.  Fleetwood v. State, 329 Ark. 327, 947 S.W.2d 387
(1997); Olgesby v. State, 329 Ark. 127, 946 S.W.2d 693 (1997).  The
trial court's decision to try the juvenile as an adult must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence, Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-
318(f), and we will not reverse the court's determination unless it
is clearly erroneous.  Fleetwood, supra; Olgesby, supra.
             I.  Juvenile's Participation in the Crime
     It is well settled that a juvenile may be tried as an adult
solely upon the serious and violent nature of the offense. Sims v.
State, 329 Ark. 350, 947 S.W.2d 376 (1997);  McClure v. State, 328
Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997).  Although the charges against
Thompson were serious, he claims on appeal that the trial court's
ruling must be reversed because the prosecutor conceded that
violence was employed by the codefendants, but not Thompson.  We,
however, have previously held that:
     [i]t is of no consequence that appellant may or may not
     have personally used a weapon, as his association with
     the use of a weapon in the course of the crimes is
     sufficient to satisfy the violence criterion. 
Guy v. State, 323 Ark. 649, 916 S.W.2d 760 (1996); see also,
Collins v. State, 322 Ark. 161, 908 S.W.2d 80 (1995); Walter v.
State, 317 Ark. 274,