Title: State v. Kingsley

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 108,849 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ALAN W. KINGSLEY, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
K.S.A. 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally 
attacking a criminal conviction and sentence. Therefore, neither K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-
260(b) nor K.S.A. 60-2606 can be used for that purpose. 
 
2. 
 
If a direct appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction or sentence, the 
doctrine of res judicata provides that the parties to the appeal are barred from relitigating 
any issue decided in the direct appeal. Further, those issues that could have been 
presented in the direct appeal, but were not, are deemed waived in a collateral 
proceeding. 
 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; WARREN M. WILBERT, judge. Opinion filed June 13, 
2014. Affirmed. 
 
 
Mark Sevart, of Derby, was on the brief for appellant. 
 
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Alan W. Kingsley appeals from a summary denial of his pro se 
motion for relief from his first-degree murder conviction, which he filed pursuant to 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-260(b)(4), K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-260(b)(6), and K.S.A. 60-2606. 
The district court summarily denied Kingsley's motion, concluding his claims are 
foreclosed under the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm that ruling and also hold that 
relief from a criminal conviction cannot be obtained pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-
260(b) or K.S.A. 60-2606. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1991, a jury convicted Alan W. Kingsley of premeditated first-degree murder, 
in violation of K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 21-3401(a); aggravated robbery, in violation of K.S.A. 
21-3427 (Weeks 1988); aggravated arson, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3719 (Weeks 1988); 
and forgery, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3710(b) (Weeks 1988). The sentencing court 
imposed three consecutive life sentences—a term of 15 years to life for aggravated 
robbery, life without parole for 40 years for premeditated murder, and another term of 15 
years to life for aggravated arson. (This conviction was later reversed and remanded on 
direct appeal, reduced to a charge of arson, and resentenced to a term of 5 to 20 years, to 
run concurrent with his other sentences). A sentence of 1 to 5 years for forgery was run 
concurrent with the other sentences.  
 
During the jury trial, the court instructed the jury by giving the pattern 
premeditated murder instruction, PIK Crim. 2d 56.01. As it relates to Kingsley's current 
arguments, the pertinent portion of the instruction stated:  "Deliberately and with 
premeditation means to have thought over the matter beforehand." After having received 
that instruction, Kingsley's jury, while deliberating, asked for clarification of the time 
frame required for premeditation. The trial court further instructed:  "Premeditation under 
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the law does not require any specific time frame. Please review instruction No. 5," which 
was PIK Crim. 2d 56.01. On direct appeal, Kingsley argued the judge's response to the 
jury's question, which incorporated the language about which Kingsley now complains, 
was erroneous. This court rejected Kingsley's argument, citing State v. Patterson, 243 
Kan. 262, 268-69, 755 P.2d 551 (1988), in which this court found the same instruction 
"'correctly stat[ed] the law.'" State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 770-72, 851 P.2d 370 
(1993). 
 
In another issue raised by Kingsley in his direct appeal, he argued his mandatory 
hard 40 life sentence should be vacated because the jury's verdict on premeditated first-
degree murder was not unanimous. The trial court had instructed the jury that Kingsley 
was charged in Count One with murder in the first degree, which required proof that the 
killing was done with premeditation. In addition, the court instructed that Kingsley was 
charged in Count Two with felony murder in the first degree, which required proof that 
the killing was done while in the commission of aggravated robbery. 252 Kan. at 785. 
Further, the trial court told the jury that its "agreement upon a verdict must be 
unanimous." 252 Kan. at 786. The court gave the jury two verdict forms—one for 
premeditated first-degree murder and another for first-degree felony murder. The jury 
indicated on each verdict form that it was unanimous in finding Kingsley guilty on the 
respective counts, thus indicating a unanimous finding of guilt on both premeditated first-
degree murder and first-degree felony murder. Because the verdict form made it clear the 
jury was unanimous in finding Kingsley guilty of premeditated first-degree murder, this 
court rejected Kingsley's argument and concluded he could be sentenced to a hard 40 life 
sentence for that conviction. 252 Kan. at 784-87. 
 
After that appeal, Kingsley brought several collateral attacks on his convictions 
and sentences, all of which have been unsuccessful. See Kingsley v. McKune, 191 Fed. 
Appx. 748 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion); State v. Kingsley, No. 96,059, 2007 
WL 570298 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 284 Kan. 949 (2007); 
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Kingsley v. State, No. 90,133, 2004 WL 719260 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. 
denied 278 Kan. 846 (2004). 
 
In the current case, Kingsley filed a pro se "Motion for Relief from Judgment" and 
accompanying memorandum of law in 2012, which was more than 19 years after the 
entry of the final order in his direct appeal. In the motion, Kingsley cited K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 60-260(b)(4), K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-260(b)(6), and K.S.A. 60-2606 as the 
procedural statutes entitling him to relief from his first-degree murder conviction and 
sentence. He asserted two substantive reasons his first-degree murder conviction should 
be reversed and his hard 40 sentence should be set aside. First, he claimed the trial court 
had "constructively amended the complaint and usurped legislative authority to define 
crimes when it instructed the jury that 'deliberately and with premeditation' means to have 
thought over the matter beforehand as elements of first degree murder." Second, he 
argued it was error to instruct the jury on both premeditated murder and felony murder. 
On appeal, Kingsley's counsel summarizes Kingsley's second pro se argument on this 
point as a request for "relief from the Hard 40 Sentence, as it is not clear whether the Jury 
unanimously found him guilty of First Degree Premeditated Murder."  
 
In the district court, the State filed a response to Kingsley's pro se motion, noting 
that Kingsley had raised the same issues in his direct appeal. Citing State v. Neer, 247 
Kan. 137, 140-41, 795 P.2d 362 (1990), the State argued Kingsley's motion for relief 
from judgment was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The district court adopted the 
State's response as its findings of fact and conclusions of law and summarily denied the 
motion without appointing counsel or conducting a hearing. Kingsley filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and counsel was appointed to represent him. This court has jurisdiction 
under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3) (off-grid; maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment imposed). 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Kingsley argues the summary dismissal of his motion was error. We 
reject his argument for a host of reasons relating to both procedural defects and a lack of 
merit. We need not address all of those reasons, however, because two threshold defects 
preclude Kingsley's success:  (1) Kingsley filed his motion pursuant to statutes that do 
not apply to collateral attacks on a criminal conviction and sentence, and (2) his claims 
are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Both of these defects present questions of 
law subject to our unlimited review. See State v. Mitchell, 297 Kan. 118, 120-24, 298 
P.3d 349 (2013) (questions of statutory and caselaw interpretation, which are questions of 
law subject to de novo review, led to holdings that [1] K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-260[b] does 
not apply to collateral attack on conviction and [2] K.S.A. 60-1507 provides exclusive 
remedy present); Edgar v. State, 294 Kan. 828, 836-37, 283 P.3d 152 (2012) ("When a 
district judge summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court reviews that 
decision using a de novo standard of review. . . . This standard requires an appellate court 
to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show the 
movant is not entitled to any relief.").  
 
Regarding the procedural deficiency, this court has previously held K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 60-260(b)(4) "does not provide a procedure for a criminal defendant to obtain 
postconviction relief from his or her conviction or sentence." Mitchell, 297 Kan. at 118-
19. Mitchell reaffirmed a prior holding designating K.S.A. 60-1507 as the exclusive 
statutory remedy for a collateral attack on a criminal conviction and sentence. 297 Kan. at 
121-23; see Smith v. State, 199 Kan. 132, 135, 427 P.2d 625 (1967) (holding K.S.A. 60-
1507 is "the exclusive statutory remedy authorizing a prisoner in custody under sentence 
of a court of general jurisdiction to make a collateral attack upon the sentence in a 
criminal case, and that K.S.A. 60-260 is not available . . . for this purpose"). The 
exclusive nature of K.S.A. 60-1507 likewise excludes K.S.A. 60-2606 as a procedural 
mechanism for relief from Kingsley's convictions and sentences.  
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Kingsley's appellate counsel, apparently recognizing that relief cannot be afforded 
Kingsley pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-260 or K.S.A. 60-2606, asks this court to 
liberally construe Kingsley's pro se motion as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In making this 
request, however, Kingsley's counsel fails to mention the limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f), 
which states that an action filed pursuant to that statute must be "brought within one year 
of:  (i) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a 
direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction; or (ii) the denial of a 
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court." While this limitation 
can be extended under a manifest injustice exception, Kingsley, who has the burden of 
showing the exception applies, did not request such an extension and did not explain the 
19-year delay. Therefore, Kingsley has failed to meet his burden and has waived any 
argument that he should be allowed to bring an untimely request for relief under K.S.A. 
60-1507. See, e.g., State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 543, 285 P.3d 361 (2012) 
(issue abandoned for failure to adequately brief it); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central 
Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1, 15, 61 P.3d 68 (2002) (simply pressing a point without 
pertinent authority, or without showing why it is sound despite a lack of supporting 
authority, is akin to failing to brief an issue; when appellant fails to brief an issue, that 
issue is waived or abandoned); see also Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 39) (appellant's brief must include the "arguments and authorities relied on").  
 
Instead, Kingsley seems to suggest we should address the merits of his pro se 
motion because the district court did not determine the motion was procedurally 
defective. Rather, the district court summarily denied Kingsley's motion after concluding 
the issues were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The problem with Kingsley's 
argument is that the district court correctly ruled that his action was barred.  
 
The doctrine of res judicata provides that "where an appeal is taken from the 
sentence imposed and/or a conviction, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata 
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as to all issues actually raised, and those issues that could have been presented, but were 
not presented, are deemed waived." Neer, 247 Kan. at 140-41; see State v. Martin, 294 
Kan. 638, 641, 279 P.3d 704 (2012) (res judicata consists of four elements:  "'[1] same 
claim; [2] same parties; [3] claims were or could have been raised; and [4] a final 
judgment on the merits'"). The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that issues "once 
finally determined . . . cannot afterwards be litigated." Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. 
Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 61, 379 P.2d 342 (1963).  
 
Kingsley's direct appeal from his convictions obviously involved the same parties, 
and it resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Further, the current action involves the 
same claims as those which were or could have been raised in his direct appeal. More 
specifically, as we previously noted, on Kingsley's direct appeal this court found the jury 
instructions regarding premeditation, which included the language about which Kingsley 
now complains, appropriately reflected the law. Kingsley, 252 Kan. at 771-72. Likewise, 
in Kingsley's direct appeal, this court rejected his contention that "the mandatory 40-year 
sentence should be vacated on the ground that the jury's verdict on first-degree 
premeditated murder may not have been unanimous." 252 Kan. at 784. Hence, Kingsley's 
argument regarding the uncertainty of a unanimous verdict—the only issue related to 
giving the alternative theories of premeditated first-degree murder and felony first-degree 
murder that Kingsley argues on appeal—was addressed in the direct appeal.  
 
We note, however, that Kingsley's counsel attempts to put a new twist on the 
argument by suggesting the manner in which the jury was polled made it unclear whether 
the jury was indeed unanimous on both alternatives. Kingsley does not persuade us that 
this polling issue is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata or waiver because the 
essence of this issue—unanimity—was or could have been raised on direct appeal. Plus, 
this twist is raised for the first time before us and fails on that basis alone. See State v. 
Cheffen, 297 Kan. 689, 696-99, 303 P.3d 1261 (2013) (declining to address jury polling 
issue for first time on appeal).  
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Accordingly, the claims raised by Kingsley in his pro se motion are barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. As a result, contrary to Kingsley's argument, the district court did 
not err in summarily dismissing Kingsley's motion without appointing counsel or 
conducting an evidentiary hearing because the motion, files, and records of his cases 
conclusively showed Kingsley was not entitled to relief. See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 296 
Kan. 808, 819-20, 295 P.3d 560 (2013) ("[A] district court's initial review of the files and 
record may be enough to show the issues raised do not warrant further review and the 
matter may be summarily denied. K.S.A. 60-1507[b]."); State v. Conley, 287 Kan. 696, 
703-04, 197 P.3d 837 (2008) (same); State v. Hoge, 283 Kan. 219, 223-24, 150 P.3d 905 
(2007) (same).  
 
 
Affirmed. 
 
 
MORITZ, J., not participating.