Title: P v. Moore

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 7/17/06 (reposted same date to correct counsel listing) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S125314 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E032142 
ADRIAN EUGENE MOORE, 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FSB022611 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
In 2003, we held that police officers must know of a defendant’s parole 
search condition to justify a warrantless search under that exception.  (People v. 
Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 335 (Sanders).)  In this case, because the hearing 
on the defendant’s suppression motion (Pen. Code,1 § 1538.5) occurred before we 
decided Sanders, the trial court concluded that the search was valid based only on 
evidence that the defendant was subject to a parole search condition.  (See In re 
Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 (Tyrell J.); People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743.)  
The parties did not present evidence whether the officers knew of the defendant’s 
search condition at the time of the search.   
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
2 
The question before us is the appropriate remedy in light of Sanders’s 
holding.  The Court of Appeal majority here simply reversed the judgment 
outright, rather than remand for a new suppression hearing.  For reasons that 
follow, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remand the matter for 
further proceedings, including to determine whether the officers knew of the 
search condition.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In outlining the relevant facts, we focus on the April 2000 suppression 
hearing proceedings, including evidence of the preliminary hearing transcript 
which the trial court considered.  (§ 1538.5, subd. (i) [defendant may challenge 
search “on the basis of the evidence presented at a special hearing”]; Lorenzana v. 
Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 640 (Lorenzana) [review of ruling on 
suppression motion limited to record of suppression hearings].)   
The preliminary hearing transcript reveals only that on May 5, 1999, San 
Bernardino City Police Officer Brennan encountered defendant Adrian Eugene 
Moore on the street.  An ambulance later transported defendant to the hospital.  
After defendant was sedated, doctors removed several objects from his mouth, 
including an off-white rock covered in plastic.  The parties stipulated that this 
substance tested positive for cocaine.  
At the suppression hearing, the prosecution also presented a certified copy 
of the parole terms for defendant, which included a search term that defendant 
“will agree to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any 
time of the day or night with or without a search warrant, with or without probable 
cause.”  Based on the existence of this valid search condition, the trial court denied 
the suppression motion.  The parties presented no evidence regarding whether the 
officers knew about defendant’s search condition, although the prosecution’s 
 
3 
opposition to the suppression motion and the police report suggested at least one 
of the officers had such knowledge. 
The jury found defendant guilty of the charged offense.  (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11350, subd. (a) [possession of a controlled substance].)  On July 26, 
2002, after finding defendant’s two prior conviction allegations to be true, the trial 
court sentenced him to 25 years to life.  Defendant appealed.  During the pendency 
of defendant’s appeal, we decided Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th 318, which held that 
officers must know of a defendant’s parole search condition to justify a 
warrantless search under that exception. 
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed.  Applying Sanders, the 
Court of Appeal majority found the prosecution did not present any evidence that 
police officers knew defendant was on parole when they searched him.  It pointed 
out that at the preliminary hearing, the only witness, Officer Brennan, testified 
only that he had an exchange with defendant, who was then taken to the 
emergency room where doctors removed a rock of cocaine from defendant’s 
mouth.  Because Officer Brennan’s preliminary hearing testimony did not describe 
details of either the initial encounter between police officers and defendant, or the 
subsequent events at the hospital, the Court of Appeal majority could not 
determine from the record whether the search of defendant’s mouth was conducted 
pursuant to a lawful arrest.  Thus, the majority concluded:  “On the basis of the 
only evidence the prosecution presented, the search was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment and we therefore must reverse the judgment.” 
Presiding Justice Ramirez dissented, questioning whether there was error 
under Sanders in the first place.  In any event, he believed that remand, not 
outright reversal, was appropriate.  He emphasized that “at the time of the hearing, 
both sides believed that the existence of the parole search condition alone justified 
the search of [defendant].  It was not until more than three years later that Sanders 
 
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was decided.”  The dissenting justice pointed out that even defendant believed 
remand—to determine whether officers had prior knowledge of defendant’s parole 
status—was fair to both parties.  In his supplemental reply brief in the Court of 
Appeal, defendant had proposed that “in light of the recent decision in Sanders, 
the appropriate remedy at this time would be to remand the matter for a new 
hearing in the trial court. . . .  It would be unfair to both the People and to 
[defendant] for the [Court of Appeal] to determine the constitutionality of the 
search based on a record which was not created for this purpose.” 
We granted the People’s petition for review to decide whether the matter 
should be remanded for a new suppression hearing. 
DISCUSSION 
In Sanders, we held that “an otherwise unlawful search of the residence of 
an adult parolee may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was 
subject to a search condition of which the law enforcement officers were unaware 
when the search was conducted.”  (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335.)  
Prohibiting this type of unreasonable search, we concluded, serves the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule, which is to deter future police misconduct.  (Id. at pp. 324, 
334.) 
In moving away from our decision in Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, which 
upheld the warrantless search of a juvenile probationer by officers unaware of his 
probation search condition, Sanders made clear that although an adult parolee has 
a diminished expectation of privacy, a warrantless search of the parolee by officers 
unaware of his parole search condition “cannot be justified as a parole search, 
because the officer is not acting pursuant to the conditions of parole.”  (Sanders, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333; see also People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 
 
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[invalid warrantless search where officers entered defendant’s garage without 
knowledge of brother’s search condition].)2  Arguably, Sanders constituted a 
major change in our search and seizure law, requiring some appellate courts to 
reconsider pending causes in light of our new holding.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Lazalde (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 858 (Lazalde); People v. Hester (2004) 119 
Cal.App.4th 376 (Hester); People v. Bowers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1261 
(Bowers); see also People v. Jordan (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544 (Jordan); People 
v. Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180 (Hoeninghaus).) 
In this case, the People do not dispute that Sanders is controlling or that the 
trial court’s ruling on defendant’s suppression motion was incorrect under that 
case.  The only issue is the appropriate remedy.  Did the Court of Appeal majority 
properly reverse the judgment outright, or should it have remanded the cause to 
allow the trial court to conduct a new suppression hearing?  For reasons that 
follow, we conclude the Court of Appeal should have remanded. 
In fashioning an appropriate disposition in a case, an appellate court “may 
reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree 
of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, 
affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, 
such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, 
remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just 
under the circumstances.”  (§ 1260; see also People v. Minor (1980) 104 
Cal.App.3d 194, 199 (Minor).)  If the court reverses a judgment without further 
                                              
2  
The issue whether Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, remains viable in light of 
subsequent developments, including our own decision in Sanders, supra, 31 
Cal.4th 318, is before us in In re Jaime P., review granted August 31, 2005, 
S135263.   
 
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directions, that unqualified reversal is an order for a new trial, placing the parties 
in the same position as if the cause had never been tried.  (§ 1262; People v. 
Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 247.) 
Reversing the judgment outright, the Court of Appeal could not determine 
from the record “whether the search of defendant’s mouth was conducted pursuant 
to a lawful arrest,” and concluded the search was unreasonable based on “the only 
evidence the prosecution presented.”  Because the suppression hearing occurred 
before we decided Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th 318, the trial court and the parties 
acted with the understanding that they were not required to present evidence 
whether the officers knew of defendant’s parole search condition.  In that 
situation, where the parties understandably did not present arguments and 
evidence relating to search issues, a reviewing court should remand to the trial 
court to consider any alternate grounds for or against suppression.  (See People v. 
Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 483 (Brooks) [with bifurcated suppression 
proceeding, on reversal reviewing court should remand for disposition of alternate 
grounds for suppression].)   
Indeed, several Courts of Appeal applying Sanders remanded the cause, 
rather than reversed the judgment outright, when the record was insufficient to 
determine if the search was “otherwise unlawful” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 
335).  (Lazalde, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 865-866; Bowers, supra, 117 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1272-1273.)  For instance, in Lazalde, after we directed it to 
reconsider the cause in light of Sanders, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
because the searching officer was unaware of the defendant’s probation search 
condition when he searched the motel room, the search was unjustified under that 
exception.  (Lazalde, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 865.)  However, because the 
prosecution relied only on that search condition and the defendant was 
“foreclosed” from challenging the search on other grounds, the Court of Appeal 
 
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“lack[ed] an adequate evidentiary record on which to decide the suppression 
motion on any theory other than the probation search justification advanced 
below.”  (Ibid.)  Out of fairness to the defendant, the Court of Appeal remanded 
the matter to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on his suppression motion.  
(Id. at pp. 865-866.) 
Similarly, the Bowers Court of Appeal, relying on Sanders, held that the 
defendant’s probationary status did not justify the warrantless search because the 
police officer conducting the search was unaware of the defendant’s probation 
search condition at the time.  (Bowers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1270-1271.)  
However, the Court of Appeal concluded that remand was appropriate to 
determine whether the search was “otherwise unlawful” under Sanders, which 
issue was not fully litigated below.  (Id. at p. 1271.)  The Court of Appeal found 
that based on the record, it was “impossible” to determine if the defendant’s initial 
contact with officers constituted a detention or consensual encounter.  (Id. at p. 
1272.)  The Court of Appeal concluded that the “evidence is simply inadequate to 
enable us to determine, based on the state of the law after Sanders, whether the 
trial court’s ruling is sustainable on the rationale that the search was lawful.”  (Id. 
at p. 1271.)  It directed the trial court to hear evidence and make factual 
determinations at a new suppression hearing, and to ultimately determine whether 
to deny the suppression motion and reinstate the judgment or grant the motion and 
conduct further appropriate proceedings.  (Id. at p. 1273; see also Jordan, supra, 
121 Cal.App.4th at p. 565 [superior court to determine “whether the record should 
be reopened on remand to allow additional evidence to be presented”]; 
Hoeninghaus, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1198 [where trial court addressed only 
 
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search condition in suppression motion, remand proper to determine prosecution’s 
alternative justification for warrantless search].)3 
Moreover, section 1538.5, which “provides a comprehensive and exclusive 
procedure for the final determination of search and seizure issues prior to trial” 
(Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 475), does not preclude remand in this case.  
“Section 1538.5 imposes certain limits on the relitigation of suppression issues.  
However, no case has decided the extent to which section 1538.5 precludes such 
relitigation after an appellate reversal.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 412, 443, fn. 18; see People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 850, fn. 10 
(Mattson) [“[p]rior to the adoption of section 1538.5 we did not question the right 
of the prosecution to reopen the question of admissibility of evidence challenged 
on the basis of an allegedly unlawful search and seizure”]; but see id. at p. 883 
(conc. opn. of Kennard, J.) [§ 1538.5 does not change rule that prosecution may 
introduce new evidence to relitigate suppression motion].)  We have recognized 
that a party’s right to have “objections to the evidence fully aired” is consonant 
with section 1538.5’s “statutory goal of achieving pretrial determination of search 
and seizure issues.”  (Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 482 [court must balance 
§ 1538.5’s policy “of conserving judicial resources and efficiently resolving all 
pretrial matters in one hearing” against a defendant’s right to litigate grounds for 
suppression].) 
                                              
3  
Although one Court of Appeal applying Sanders reversed outright rather 
than remand for a new suppression hearing, the record in that case was adequate to 
determine if the search was “otherwise unlawful.”  (Hester, supra, 119 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 392, 398 [officers unaware car’s occupants were on probation; 
“[m]ere membership in a criminal street gang, without additional facts supporting 
an inference of criminal activity, does not permit a detention”].) 
 
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Although we have stated that reopening a suppression motion on the basis 
of new legal theories would defeat section 1538.5’s purpose “to avoid the 
continued relitigation of the question of the admissibility of evidence” (Lorenzana, 
supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 640), our concern in Lorenzana did not address the situation 
here, where during the appeal a change in the law necessarily prevented parties 
from presenting all pertinent facts and theories at the suppression hearing.  Here, 
the record reveals the trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion based on 
his parole search condition alone.  Based on the trial court’s ruling, the 
prosecution did not present evidence of the officers’ knowledge regarding 
defendant’s search condition, although the prosecution’s opposition to the motion 
and the police report suggested at least one of the officers knew about the 
condition.  (See ante, at pp. 2-3.)  In that situation, a reviewing court should 
remand to the trial court for disposition of any alternate grounds for or against 
suppression.  (See Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 483.)  Based on the foregoing, 
we conclude that section 1538.5 does not bar remand in this case. 
Moreover, in the interest of efficiency and fairness, we conclude that 
remanding the cause to give the People an opportunity to present evidence 
justifying the search under Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th 318, is more appropriate 
than reversing the judgment outright.  (See § 1260 [reviewing court “may, if 
proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be 
just under the circumstances”].)  Section 1260 evinces a “legislative concern with 
unnecessary retrials where something less drastic will do.”  (People v. Vanbuskirk 
(1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 395, 405 (Vanbuskirk) [remand to take evidence of fairness 
in pretrial identification procedures “may avert the need for a retrial”].)  “[W]hen 
the validity of a conviction depends solely on an unresolved or improperly 
resolved factual issue which is distinct from issues submitted to the jury, such an 
issue can be determined at a separate post-judgment hearing and if at such hearing 
 
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the issue is resolved in favor of the People, the conviction may stand.”  (Ibid.)  In 
other words, “when the trial is free of prejudicial error and the appeal prevails on a 
challenge which establishes only the existence of an unresolved question which 
may or may not vitiate the judgment, appellate courts have, in several instances, 
directed the trial court to take evidence, resolve the pending question, and take 
further proceedings giving effect to the determination thus made.”  (Minor, supra, 
104 Cal.App.3d at p. 199.)   
Because the exclusionary rule’s purpose in suppressing evidence of 
unreasonable searches is to deter police misconduct (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 324; see ante, at p. 4), the issues relating to a suppression motion, which do not 
directly implicate the guilt determination process, are distinct from issues the jury 
must consider.  (See Vanbuskirk, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 405; Minor, supra, 
104 Cal.App.3d at p. 199.)  Remand for a new suppression hearing is appropriate 
and necessary here because our 2003 decision in Sanders significantly changed the 
law, requiring the lower court to consider its impact on defendant’s suppression 
motion.  (See People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 393 [declining to adopt a 
“rule of reversal per se” based on a prior decision’s impact and cautioning against 
“unwarranted retrials in cases in which there was actually no prejudice”]; see also 
People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 238 [finding remand proper because 
“defendant should not be penalized for failing to object where existing law 
overwhelmingly said no objection was required”].) 
Defendant, however, points out that he made several claims challenging the 
warrantless search in his suppression motion.  Because the prosecution chose to 
argue only the parole search justification below, defendant maintains it was not he 
“who limited the scope of the suppression hearing, it was the People, and it is the 
People who must bear the consequences of a woefully deficient presentation.”  We 
disagree.  The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion based on 
 
11 
defendant’s parole search condition, rendering any additional argument from the 
prosecution unnecessary.  (See Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 482 [trial court has 
discretion to limit presentation of evidence to avoid a “tedious and superfluous 
proceeding”].)  In that regard, we reject defendant’s speculative claim that at the 
time of the April 2000 suppression hearing the prosecution should have 
anticipated our 2003 Sanders decision and presented evidence of the officers’ 
knowledge.   
Arguing that remanding for a new suppression hearing would violate his 
right to due process, defendant asserts that because the search occurred in 1999, it 
would be difficult to locate witnesses who would likely remember events relating 
to the search.  We have already rejected such a claim.  “We are not persuaded that 
relitigation should have been denied because of delay.  Delays that are the product 
of the normal appellate process do not implicate due process concerns.  The 
difficulty in locating witnesses, and the possibility of fading recollection, are no 
different with respect to the hearing on the admissibility of [evidence] than with 
respect to the trial itself.”  (Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 852.)   
In the event of remand, both parties agree that a full hearing on the motion 
to suppress, rather than a limited hearing on whether the officers were aware of the 
parole search condition at the time of the warrantless search, is required.  Because 
the parties focused solely on the existence of defendant’s parole search condition, 
which the trial court relied on to justify the warrantless search and to deny 
defendant’s motion, we conclude that a new suppression hearing to decide any 
alternate grounds contained in the original suppression motion and the opposition 
thereto is proper.  (See Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 483; Hoeninghaus, supra, 
120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1198; Lazalde, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 865-866; see 
also Lorenzana, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 640 [party may not raise for first time on 
appeal a new theory to support or contest admissibility of evidence].)  
 
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DISPOSITION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with our opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Moore 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 4/23/04 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S125314 
Date Filed: July 17, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Patrick J. Morris, Brian S. McCarville, Kenneth Barr and Linda M. Wilde 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Sharon M. Jones, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster, William M. Wood, Frederick R. Millar, Jr., Steven T. 
Oetting, Bradley A. Weinreb and Charles C. Ragland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Sharon M. Jones 
P. O. Box 1663 
Ventura, CA  93002 
(805) 653-0195 
 
Charles S. Ragland 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2203