Title: State v. Taylor

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

109 Ariz. 140 (1973) 506 P.2d 1034 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Laymon TAYLOR, Appellant. No. 2420. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. March 1, 1973. *141 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Peter M. Van Orman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Jed W. Jurkowitz, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is a delayed appeal from judgments of guilty after pleas of guilty to the crimes of murder (second degree), § 13-451 A.R.S., and assault with intent to murder, § 13-248 A.R.S., and from a sentence of twenty years to life on the murder (second degree) charge and a sentence of five to ten years on the assault with intent to commit murder charge. We are asked to determine on appeal whether defendant's pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The facts necessary for a determination of this appeal are as follows. After a preliminary hearing, the defendant was held to answer to the charges of murder, § 13-451 A.R.S., and assault with intent to murder, § 13-248 A.R.S. On 1 June 1966, the court granted a motion for a mental examination pursuant to Rule 250, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., to determine if the defendant was capable of understanding the proceedings against him and to determine if he was capable of assisting in his defense. After considering psychiatric reports, the court found that the defendant was able to understand the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his defense. On 16 August 1966, defendant withdrew his previously entered pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of guilty to an amended information charging murder (second degree) and assault with intent to commit murder. The following transpired: Defendant claims that his pleas of guilty were not taken in accordance with requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). We have stated that Boykin will be given only prospective application, State v. Griswold, 105 Ariz. 1, 457 P.2d 331 (1969), and defendant entered his pleas long before the decision in Boykin was rendered. We are then required to review the facts in this case under pre-Boykin standards. The rule in Arizona has always been that a plea of guilty must be voluntarily and understandingly made and without coercion. State v. Celaya, 107 Ariz. 175, 484 P.2d 7 (1971). We are convinced from a review of the record that defendant entered his pleas voluntarily and intelligently and without coercion. Pursuant to a motion for determination of defendant's mental ability to stand trial under Rule 250, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., the court found that the defendant was able to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. Before the defendant was questioned as to his desire to enter a guilty plea, his attorney informed the court that the possible consequences of a plea of guilty to both charges had been fully discussed with the defendant. Further questioning of defendant by the prosecutor and the court indicates that the pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily. There is nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. We have reviewed the entire record as required by § 13-1715 A.R.S., State v. Burrell, 96 Ariz. 233, 393 P.2d 921 (1964), and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. *143 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). We find no fundamental error. Judgments affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.