Title: Olelo: The Corporation for Community Television v. Office of Information Practices.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000.

 

“OLELO: THE CORPORATION FOR COMMUNITY TELEVISION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

OFFICE OF INFORMATION PRACTICES and LES KONDO, Director of the

Office of Information Practices, in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.

 

No. 27421

 

=
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFYAlgz. B

 

QBINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Defendants-Appellants the Hawai'i Office of Information
Practices and Les Kondo, Director of Office of Information
Practices, in his official capacity (hereinafter, collectively
OTP], appeal from the June 30, 2005 final judgment of the circuit
court of the first circuit! entered pursuant to its May 23, 2005
order that (1) granted sumary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee,
‘Olelo: the Corporation for Community Television (‘Olelo), and

(2) denied O18" cross-motion for summary judgment.

 

} the Honorable Victoria S. Marks presided over this matter
 

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on September 6, 2002, OIP issued OIP opinion lett:

 

number 02-08 (‘Olelo letter). OTP Op. Ltr. No. 02-08 (2002),
2002 WL 31126635. The ‘Olelo letter concluded that “Olelo met the
Gefinition of an “agency” contained in Hawai" Revised statutes
(HRS) § 92F-3 (1993) and, therefore, was subject to the
provisions of Hawai'i's Uniform Information Practices Act (UIPA),
HRS chapter 92. As an agency subject to UIPA, OIP concluded that
“Olelo was required to disclose “government records.”

The current controversy began in 2004 when ‘Olelo
received a request from three individuals for a master list with
contact information (names, addresses, telephone numbers, and
email addresses) for ‘Olelo's current clients, presenters,
producers, volunteers, and “all persons eligible to vote in
‘Olelo’s election.” When OIP subsequently demanded that ‘Olelo
disclose the requested information, ‘Olelo filed a complaint for
declaratory relief in cizcuit court requesting that the court
declare that it is not an agency under UIPA. After a de novo
review of the legal arguments and evidence submitted by both
parties, the circuit court granted ‘Olelo summary judgment and
Genied O1P’s corresponding motion for summary judgment.

OTP appealed to this court on July 26, 2005. o1P
alleges that the circuit court erred because (1) it did not apply

the correct standard of review to and/or grant deference to OIP’s
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conclusion that ‘Olelo was an agency subject to UIPA, and (2) it
concluded that ‘Olelo was not an agency as defined in UIPA.

Based upon the following analysis, we affirm the
circuit court’s declaratory judgment that ‘Olelo is not an agency
subject to UIPA.

1. BACKGROUND
A. ‘Dlelo's Creation

Under Hawai'i’'s Cable Television system’s Act (CTSA),
the director of the Department of Commerce and Consuner Affairs
(BCcA) is authorized to grant cable franchises. HRS § 4406-8(a)
(1993). operators of cable franchises are required to “designate
three or more channels for public, educational, or governmental
use” (PEG). HRS § 440G-8.2, PEG channels are funded by access
operating fees and equipment facilities fees that the DccA
directs cable franchise operators to pay directly to the PEG
facilitators. The allocated money does not pass through the
State’s general fund.

In 1988, the DCCA director granted a cable franchise to
Oceanic Time Warner Cable (Oceanic). Pursuant to the CTSA, the
director required that Oceanic set aside PEG channels. This
necessitated the creation of entities that would facilitate the
Production of programming that would be broadcast on the PEG

channels.
 

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The DCCA director intended that PEG facilitators be
“independent, private non-profit community based organization(s]”
that would operate “separately and independently from the state”
and not be considered ‘arm[s)’ of the State or be perceived as
taking ‘State action.’ Specifically, the OCCA director wanted
to structure the facilitation of PEG channels in such a way that
the State would be shielded “from any appearance of content
control in the future operation of ‘Olelo.” To accomplish this,
in 1989 the DCCA director “appointed a nine-person Access
Planning Conmission to make reconmendations to him regarding the
creation and implementation of a not-for-profit organization to
manage public, education, and government access channels,
facilities, equipment, and funding.” Based on the Access
Planning Conmission’s recommendations, the DCCA director
chartered ‘Olelo to manage PEGs on Oahu. ‘Olelo subsequently
incorporated and becane = nonprofit corporation with its
principal place of business in the state of Hawai'i.

Since 1989, ‘Olelo has facilitated all of the oahu PEG
channels pursuant to a contract between ‘Olelo and the DCCA.
According to the contract, ‘Olelo is responsible for (1) managing
PEG channels; (2) providing facilities and equipment to produce
and air PEG programs; (3) training governmental, educational, and

community organizations, as well as menbers of the general
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public, how to use “Slelo production facilities and equipment;

(4) marketing and promoting ‘Olelo channels and programming as

 

well as ‘Olelo production facilities; and (5) providing support

to PEG users through such methods as grants, production

 

assistance, and special projects to support PEG users. There is

nothing in the agreement that mandates, describes, or recommends

 

how ‘Olelo should accomplish its

 

sponsibilities.
The DCCA director retains the right to be generally
informed of ‘Olelo’s activities. ‘Olelo must submit to the DCCA

Quarterly and annual financial reports.
Quarterly and annual activity reports.
An annual operational plan.

Ba annual busget.

ba annial audit report.

Additionally, ‘Olele must provide the DCCA director “a current
roster of the Board of Directors,” and evidence of adequate,
reasonably conmercially-available insurance in several areas.

Currently, “Olelo functions as a nonprofit corporation
with a nine-menber board of directors. At the tine of ‘Olelo’s
creation, the DCCA director had the authority to appoint all
seven menbers of ‘Olelo’s initial Board of Directors (Board).
However, the DCCA director delegated his authority to the Access
Planning Commission, which appointed all of the initial Board
menbers. Eventually, the nunber of Board menbers was increased
to nine and the cable operator was granted the authority to

appoint Board members. At the time the dispute between ‘Olelo

5
 

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and OIP arose, the DCCA director had the authority to appoint six
of ‘Olelo’s nine Board members and the President of Oceanic had
the authority to appoint the remaining three Board members.
Presently, one of the DCCA’s six appointee positions is reserved
for a person who is elected by PEG users and approved by the DCCA
director.

‘Olelo’s Board participates in the DCCA’s selection of
new Board appointees. According to ‘Olelo’s bylaws, the current
Board must furnish the DCCA director and Oceanic with a slate of
recommended Board menbers. If the DCCA director or Oceanic
chooses to appoint an individual not on the slate, they must
first consult with the Board.

Tt is undisputed that the DCCA is not informed of and
does not exercise control over ‘Olelo’s day-to-day operations.
‘Olelo’s employees are paid from money collected from Oceanic and
are not considered state employees for any purpose. All
equipment and leases are in ‘Olelo’s name. ‘Olelo also retains
the intellectual property rights to its programming, logo, and
other material it develops. Day-to-day operations are managed by
the “Olelo Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who answers to the
Board. The DCCA has no direct control over the hiring or firing
of the CEO. Most important, there is no indication the DCCA has

any editorial oversight over ‘Olelo’s programming.
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B. Office of Information Practices:

O1P was established under UIPA, HRS § 92F-41. o1P's
authority and duties are enumerated in HRS § 92F-42 (Supp. 2006).
Relevant to this controversy are OIP's duty to “upon request,
review and rule on an agency denial of access to information or
records,” HRS § 92F-42(1), and authority to “[u]pon request
provide advisory opinions or other information regarding that
person’s rights and the functions and responsibilities of
agencies under [UIPA]." HRS § 92F-42(3).

OIP review is entirely optional. IP's authority is
triggered when a person who has been denied access to agency
records requests an advisory opinion from OIP in lieu of seeking
immediate judicial relief under section HRS § $2F-15.5(a) or when
a person requests that OIP provide an advisory opinion pertaining
to the person's rights to certain documents. Upon request, OIP
issues an opinion letter stating whether the agency records in
question are subject to disclosure under UIPA. HRS § 92F-42(3).
However, the issuance of an opinion letter “shall not prejudice
the person's right to appeal to the circuit court after a
decision is made by the office of information practices.” HRS §
92F-15.5(a). If judicial review is sought, OIP advisory opinion
letters are admissible, HRS 92F-15(b), but the opinion letters do

not constitute contested cases subject to the Hawai'i
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Administrative Procedure Act. HRS § 92F-42(1). An agency denial
of access to public records is reviewed de novo. HRS § 92F-
15(D)-
C. Procedural History

On several occasions, menbers of the public have
contacted OIP to request advisory opinions pertaining to the
applicability of UIPA to PEG facilitators. on October 20, 1993,
OIP issued an advisory opinion letter which concluded that Akaku-
Maui Television, Inc. (Akaku), the PEG facilitator on Maui, was
not an agency subject to UIPA because it was not “owned,
operated, or managed” by the DCCA or any State or county agency.
OTP Op. Ltr. No. 93-18 (1993), 1993 WL 531347. In reaching its
conclusion, OIP enphasized that community broadcasting was not a
required government function. On December 13, 1994, OIP issued a
similar advisory opinion letter concluding that Ho'ike: Kauai
Community Television Inc. (Ho'ike), the PEG facilitator on Kauai,
was not an agency subject to UIPA because it was similarly
situated to Akaku, and facilitating PEGs was not a government
function. OTP Op. Ltr. No. 94-23 (1994), 1994 WL 733580. on
December 13, 1994, OIP issued another advisory opinion letter
concluding that Na Leo ‘O Hawai'i Inc. (Na Leo), the PEG
facilitator on the island of Hawai'i, vas not an agency subject

to UIPA because it was similarly situated to Akaku and Ho'ike and
 

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\CIFIC REPORTER

facilitating PEGs was not a government function. OIP Op. Ltr.
No, 94-24 (1994), 1994 wi 733581.

However, in the 2002 ‘Olelo letter at issue herein, OIP
did an “about face” on its prior opinions concerning the
applicability of UIPA to PEGS, and concluded that ‘Olelo and
Ho'ike “are corporations owned, operated, or managed by or on
behalf of this State as set forth under section 92F-3 of the
Hawai" Revised Statutes.” OIP op, Ltr. No. 02-08, 34, otP's
revised opinion was based upon “the totality of circumstances,”
which included OIP’s view that (1) ‘Olelo and Hotike were
originally created by the government, notwithstanding their
current corporate form, OIP Op. Ltr. No. 02-08, 10-14; 20-277 (2)
the franchise fees paid by Oceanic are public funds, id. at 27-
327 (3) even though the DCCA does not exercise “day-to-day
control or management over the PEG Access Organizations,” the
Deca directly controls ‘Olelo and Ho’ ike through its power to
appoint a majority of directors to their Boards and the OCCA
indirectly controls ‘Olelo and Ho’ ike through its authority to
designate and fund PEG channels, id. at 14-207 and (4) two United
States Supreme Court First Amendnent decisions, when read
together, inply that providing community television is, in fact,
@ government function. See Lebron v, Nat'l R.R, Passenger Corp,

513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (holding that when “the Government
 

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creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of
governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent
authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that
corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for
Denver Area Educ, Telecomm,
Consortium, Inc, v, FCC, S1€ U.S. 727 (1996) (holding that a

statutory provision that permitted a cable operator to prevent

 

purposes of the First Amendment.)

transmission of “patently offensive” programming on PEG channels
was an unconstitutional First Anendment restriction because the
provision was not necessary to further the governnent objective
of protecting children).

‘Olelo subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action
against OIP on August 18, 2004, requesting that the circuit court
determine that (1) “Olelo 1s not ‘owned, operated, or managed’
by the State under UIPA” and (2) “Olelo is not a state ‘agency’
under UIPA.” On April 15, 2005, ‘Olelo filed a motion for
summary judgment. OIP responded with a cross-notion for summary
judgnent on May 23, 2005.

The circuit court granted ‘Olelo’s motion for summary
judgment, and denied OIP's corresponding motion, on May 23, 2005.
The circuit court ruled that: “As a matter of law, ‘Olelo is not

an agency under the Uniform Information Practices Act, HRS $ 92F-

10
 

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‘The circuit court’s ruling was based upon the following

 

findings of fact:

 

1. helo 4s a private, nonprofit corporation.

2: Olelo is not supported aizectly by taxpayer funds.
Rather, it gets ite finds from the cable provider,
Tine Warner Cablevision, through access fees paid by

3. There 48 no government control over “Olelo’s
activities. “Glelo"s Chiet Executive Officer and
Staff ron its day-to-day operations

    

 

4. ‘Dielors employees axe not State Empl

5! Olelo has title to its equipment and Leases, not the
Stat

6. ‘Olelo’s activities are not a required function of any

government agency.
The circuit court entered its final judgment on June 30, 2005.
OTP filed a timely notice of appeal alleging the following points
of error:

2. the circuit court erred by not applying the judicial
Standaras of review applicable to agency

determinations.

The circuit court erzed by failing to defer to Ol?

statutory construction absent a finding of palpable

3. The circuit court erred in ite interpretation of HRS §
528-3, which renders certain statutory Language.
meaningless and conflicts with its invent and the
IPR’ purpose.

4. The clreult court erred by failing to defer to o1P's
determination absent s finding that OIP abused ite
Siseretion

 

Significantly, OIP did not allege that any of the
circuit court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous.
Consequently, no material facts are in dispute.
IT. STANDARDS OF REVIEH
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
A circuit court order granting or denying summary

judgment is reviewed de novo. Hawai'i Community Federal Credit
cy
    

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Union v. Keka, 94 Hawai'i 213, 221, 11 P.34 1, 9 (2000). the
standard for granting summary judgment is as follows:

(S]usmary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
Gepositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
fle, together with the affisavits, if any, show that there
4s no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
soving party is entitied to judgnent as a matter of Lam.
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the
of establishing or refuting one of the

cause of action of defen seted by the parties, The
evidence aust be viewed in ight most favorable to the
Bon-noving party. In other words, we mist view ali of the
evidence and the inferences dravn therefron. in the Light
most f

 

 

   

 

 

rable to the party opposing the notion.

Ag. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Coon v.
City and County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 244-45, 47 P.3d 348,
399-60 (2002); Kau v, City and County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i

468, 474, 92 P.3d 477, 483 (2004).

B.  Deference to Administrative Acencies

In determining whether an agency determination should
be given deference, the standard to be applied is as follows:

Ilhen reviewing 2 determination of an adninistrative
agency, we first decide whether the legislature granted the
agency’ discretion to make the determinsticn being reviewed
Tf the legislature has granted the agency discretion over &
particular matter, then we review the agency's action
Pursuant to the deferential abuse of discretion standard
(bearing in mind that the legislature determines the
boundaries of that discretion). If the legisisture has not
granted the agency discretion over a particular matter, chen
the agency’ s conclusions are subject to de nove review.

 

Paul's Electr: ee . , 104 Hawai'i 412, 419-

20, 91 P.3d 494, 501-502 (2004).

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C. Statutory Interpretation

This court reviews the interpretation of a statute de
novo. Hawai'i Ora, of Police Officers v, Society of Prof.
Journalists Univ. of Hawai'i Chapter, 83 Hawai'i 378, 402, 927
P.2d 386, 410 (1996). Statutory construction is guided by

established rules:

  
  

1¢ Language of the statute itself.
fatutory Language 1 plain and
unambiguous, our sole auty ie to give effect to its
plain and obvious meaning: Third, implicit in the
task of statutory construction 18 our foremost
obligation to ascertain and give effect to the
{ntention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
Primarily from the language Contained in the statute
Ttself. fourth, when there Se doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinctivensss or uncertainty of an
expression used ina statute, an ambiguity existe

Feterson v, Hawaii Elec, Licht Cou, Inc., 85 Hawai'i 322, 327-28,

944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 (1997), superseded on other grounds by HRS
§ 269-15.5 (Supp. 1998) (block quotation format, brackets,

 

 

citations, and quotation marks omitted) .
TIT.  pIScuSSION
OIP essentially asserts that the circuit court erred in
(2) not giving deference to OIP’s determination that ‘Olelo was
‘an agency subject to UIPA and (2) concluding that ‘Olelo was not

fan agency subject to UIPA. We respond to each argument in turn.

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a a ot
eau Decl me m7
In order to determine whether the legislature granted
OTP the discretion to determine whether ‘Olelo is an agency for
Purposes of UIPA, we first look to the statutory language setting
forth OIP's powers and duties:

The director of the office of information practices:

 

(2) Shall, upon request, review and rule on an agency
denial of access to’ information or records, oF an
agency's granting of access; provided that’ any review
by the office of information practices shall ot be >
Contested case under chapter $1 and shall be optional
fan without prejudice to rights of judicial
fenforcenent available under this chapter:

 

 

(2) Upon request by an agency, shall provide and make
public advisory guidelines, opinions, of other
information concerning that agency's functions and
responsibilities;

 

(3) pon request by any person, may provide advisory
opinions or other information regarding that person's
Fights and the functions and responsibilities of
agencies unser this chapters

(4) May conduct inquiries regarding compliance by an
ney and investigate possible violations by any
agency:

 

(5) May examine the records of any agency for the purpose
of paragraph (4) and seek to enforce that power in the
Courts of this Stat

 

(6) May recommend disciplinary action to appropriate
officers of an agency:

(7) Shalt report annually to the governor and the state
Legislature on the activities and findings of the
office of information practices, incisding
Feconmendations for legislative changes;

 

(8) Shall receive complaints from and actively solicit the
comment's of the public regarding the implementation of
this chapters

(9) Shall review the official acts, records, policies, and
Procedures of esch agency:

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ao

an

a2

03)

an

as,

as)

an

 

st agencies in complying with the provisions of
this chapte:

 

‘Shall inform the public of the following rights of an
individual and the procedures for exercising then:

(A) The right of access to records pertaining to the
Snatvicuals

(B) The right to obtain a copy of records pertaining to
the Individval

(C) The right to know the purposes for which records
pertaining to the individual are kept;

(D) The right to be informed of the uses and disclosures
of records pertaining to the individual:

(E) The right to correct or amend records pertaining to
the Individuals and

(F) The Andividuar’s right to place as
record pertaining to that individual

tement in a

 

‘Shall adopt rules that set forth an adniniatrative appeals
structure which provides for:

(A) Agency procedures for processing records requests;

(B) A aizect appeel from the division maintaining the

 

 

Fecora: and
(©) Tine Limite for action by agencies:

Shall adopt rules that set forth the fees and other charges
that may be imposed for searching, reviewing, or segregating

  

 

Alsclosable records, a8
fees when the public intel

‘35 to provide for a waiver of
would be served:

 

Shall adopt rules which set forth uniform standards for the
records collection practices of agencies:

 

‘Shall adopt rules that set forth uniform standards for
Sleclosure of records for research purposes:

Shall have standing to app:
of this chapter are called

1x in cases where the provisions
inte question:

 

eal rules pursuant to chapter 91

Shall adopt, amend, oF
3 of this chapter) and

necessary for the purpo

 

Shall take action to oversee compliance with part 1 of
chapter 92 by all state and county boards including:

 

(&) Receiving and resolving complaints:

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(8) Advising 21 government boards and the public about
Compliance with chapter 925 ai

 

(©) Reporting each year to the legislature on all
complaints received pursuant to section 92-1.5,

 

RS § 92F-42.
OIP was thus created to facilitate the implenentation
of UIPA, whose purposes are set forth in HRS $ 92F-2:

Purposes; rules of construction. Ins denscracy, the
people are Vested with the ultinate decision-making power
Government agencies exist to aid the people in the formation
land conduct ‘of publie policy. Opening up the governaent
Processes to public scrutiny and participation 2 the only
Viable and reasonable method of protecting the public's
interest. Therefore the legislature declares that it is the
policy of this state that the formation and conduct of
Public polley-the discussions, deliberations, decisions, and
action Of governnent agencies-shall be concucted a openly
as possibie.

 

 

   

The policy of conducting governnent. busins
as possible must be tempered by a recognition of
of the people to privacy, as enbodied in section 6
Section’? of Article 7 of the Constitution of the State of

This chapter =!
ite underlying purpot

 

1 be applied and construed to promote
‘and policies, which are to:

 

(1) Promote the public interest in disclosure;

(2) Provide for accurate, relevant, timely, and
Complete government records,

(3) Enhance governmental accountability through a
general polley of access to government records:

(4) Make government accountable te individuals in
the collection, use, and dissexination o:
information relating to thems and

 

(5) Balance the individual privacy interest and the public
access interest, allowing access unless it would
itute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.

 

  

In brief summary, OP's powers and dutie:

 

include: providing

guidance to the public and agencies as to when agency records

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should be opened to the public: monitoring agency compliance with
UIPA; and adopting procedural rules related to the disclosure of
agency records. Therefore, a matter such as balancing the
public's interest in open government records against an
individual's right to privacy under article I section 6 and

ction 7 of the Hawai'l Constitution is within OIP’s designated

 

azea of expertise and is reviewed pursuant to the deferential
abuse of discretion standard.

Conversely, threshold issues that relate to the
applicability of UIPA, such as the definition of “agency” or
“governnent record,” are not left to OIP’s discretion. Instead,
they were explicitly defined by the legislature in HRS § 92F-3.
See Paul's Elec. Serv., 104 Hawai'i at 417, 91 P.3d at 499
("[Alaministrative agencies are created by the legislature, and
the legislature determines the bounds of the agency's
authority”); Morgan v. Planning Dept., County of Kauai, 104
Hawai'i 173, 164, 86 P.3d 982, 993 (2004) ("*An administrative
agency can only wield powers expressly or implicitly granted to
it by statute.’") (quoting TG Ins. Co. vs Kauhane, 101 Hawai'i
311, 327, 67 P.3d 810, 826 (App. 2003)).

Because the legislature has defined “agency” in UIPA,
O1P’s determination that ‘Olelo was an agency subject to UIPA is

not entitled to the deferential abuse of discretion standard on

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review. The circuit court thus correctly ruled that the issue of
whether ‘Olelo is an “agency,” as defined by UIPA, is a question
of law to be reviewed de novo.
B. ‘Dlele is Not an Agency for Purposes of UIPA,

The issue of whether an entity, such as ‘Olelo, is an
“agency” as defined in UIPA is one of first impression for this
court. “Agency,” in the context of the applicability of UIPA, is
defined as follows:

Agency" means any unit of government in this state, any
county, or any Combination of counties: departaent;
Snatitution; boards commission; district; couneil; bureaus
office; governing authority; other instrumentality of seate
oF county government; or aamporation or other eatabl is

re ‘or nas Eon ie
any county, but does not inclsde the nonada
functions Of the courts of this state.

  

   

iv

 

HRS § 92F-3 (emphases added) .

The dispute in this case is whether ‘Olelo is a

“corporation[’] . . . owned, ted, or managed by or on behalf
of this State.”
2. OP's position

Orr contends that ‘Olelo is a corporation “owned,

operated, or managed by or on behalf of this State” based on a

 

* interestingly, UPA does not provide OIP with enforcenent powers to

compel an agency to make governnent record: aveilabie o: to Ligai seek cout

stance to compel disclosure. Instead, UIFA provides that te-geraen,
sagrieved by 2 denial of access to a governnent record may Dring an action
against the agency” and that “the circuit court shall heat the matter ga
noua." HRS $°92F°15"(a)~(0) (emphasis added) -

   

 

» Although OTP suggests that ‘Olelo may be an “instrumentality” of the
State, both parties agree that ‘Olelo is a norprofit corporation

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“totality of the circumstances test,” adopted by the Connecticut
supreme court, which considers four factors:

(2) wether the entity performs  governsental function;
(2) the level of government. funding;

(3) the extent of government involvement or regulations and
(2) imether the entity Was created by the government
Connecticut Humane Society v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 591 A.2¢

395, 397 (Conn. 1991). However, the Connecticut freedom of
information statute is substantially different from UIPA.‘
Significantly, it does not contain the provision at issue herein,

“a corporation . . . owned, operated or managed by or on behalf

 

of this State.” Therefore, the Connecticut suprene court test is
of Limited utility when determining whether ‘Olelo is an “agency”
within the meaning of UIPA.

OTP next contends that federal caselaw interpreting the
federal “state actor” test supports its position that ‘Olelo is a

state agency under UIPA, OIP initially cites Lebron, 513 U.S. at

400, for its test that finds an entity is a “state actor” when

 

me Connecticut Freedon of Information Act, General Statutes of
“public agency” or “agency” as:

‘baninistrative oF legislative office of the state or any

political subdivision of the state and any state or town agency, eny
Separement, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority of
official of the state of of any city, tows, borough, municipal
Corporation, school district, regional district or other district or
other political subdivision of the state, including any committee of any
uch office, subsivision, agency, department, institution, bureau,
board, commission, authority or official, and also includes any judicial
office, official or body or committes thereof but only in respect to its
oF their administrative functions.

Sonnacticut Humane Society, 991 A.2d at 396 n.1.

     

 

 

 

 

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the Government creates a corporation by special Law, for the
furtherance of governmental obiectives, and retains’ for
itself permanent authority to appoint 4 majority of the
airectors of that corporation, the corporation is part of
the Government for purposes of the First Anendnent’

 

 

OTP op. Ltr. No. 02-08, 10.
OIP also cites two additional federal cases to support
its contention that PEG facilitators perform a government
function: Denver Area Educ, Telecomm, 518 U.S. 727, and
Demarest v, Athol/Orange County Television Inc., 188 F. Supp. 24
82 (D, Mass. 2002). Denver Area Education Telecommunication
declared unconstitutional a provision of the federal Cable
Television and Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
that permitted cable operators to prohibit the transmission of
“patently offensive” programming on PEG channels. In a plurality
opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that the provision
violated the first amendnent because the mixed public-private
supervisory scheme of most PEGs rendered the restriction not
“necessary” to the government purpose of protecting children from
offensive material.’ The first amendment was implicated not
because PEG channels were acting on behalf of the state, but
because the statutory provision at issue constituted a government

regulation of free speech. 518 U.S. at 740-41.

® gastices Kennedy and Ginsburg concurred in the result, but they
considered PEG channels to be designated public forums, and thus, would have
applied strict scrutiny to the restriction.

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In contrast, Demarest dealt with a PEG operator’ s
ability to regulate speech that was broadcast on PEG channels.

In Daenarest, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction against a PEG
facilitator because it found a substantial likelihood that the
PEG facilitator would be found a “state actor” for purposes of
the first and fourteenth amendments. Central to the district
court’s finding that the PEG facilitator in question was “bound
by the mandates of the Firat Amendment” was the fact that it was
created by the government “to serve the community” and all of its
“directors [were] appointed by the government.” 198 F. Supp. 2d
at 91.

OIP’s reliance on Lebron, Denver Area Education
‘Telecommunication, and Denarest is misplaced because these cases
are not relevant to whether ‘Olelo is “owned, operated, or
managed by or on behalf” of the State for purposes of UIPA. The
aforenentioned cases deal with the applicability of
constitutional obligations, not whether an entity is subject to a
federal or state freedom of information law. Furthermore, in the
federal context, entities found to be “state actors” for one
purpose are not necessarily “agencies” for purposes of the
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOI), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.

(2007). See invin Mem’) Blood Bank of the San Francisco Med,

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Socty v. Int'] Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1052 (9th cir. 1981).

In win, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
relevance of Department of Employment v, United States, 385 U.S.
385, 388 (1966), a Supreme Court case that determined the Red

Cross was an “instrumentality of the United states” for purposes
of immunity from state taxation, was “substantially diminished”
in the context of FOIA because Congress had “expressly defined”
what agencies FOIA applied to. Irwin, 640 F.2d at 1052. See

alse Dong v, Suithsonian Inst,, 125 F.3d 677 (D.C. cir. 1997)

(holding that even though the Smithsonian Institute was an agency

 

© pursuant to FOIA,

Tagency" a8 defined in section $51(1) of this title inciudes any
executive department, military department, Government corporation,
Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the
executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office
of the President), or any independent regulatory agency.

5 v.s.c. § 35218) (2007),

 

   

Pursuant to
a

 

C, § SSLI2), the Administrative Procedure Act,

mney” means each authority of the Government of the

United states, whether or not it is within or subject to

review by another agency, but does not include==

(A) the Congres:

(B) the courts of the United states;

(C)_ the governments of the territories or possessions of
tne United state

(D) the government of the District of Columbia:

 

 

 

 

or except as to
(E) “agencies composed of representatives of the part

 

(£) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in tine of
war or in occupied territory; or
(#) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1733, 1743, and
3744 of title 12; chapter 2 of titie’ 41; suvcnapter 12
Of chapter 471 of title 49; or sections 1884,
1891-1902, and former section 1641(b) (2), of title 50,
appendixy
9 U.8.c. § $51(2) (2007)

 

 

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for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, it did not meet the
definition of “agency” under the federal Administrative Procedure
Act, or FOIA, from which the Federal Privacy Act derives its
definition of the term “agency”). Thus, we do not believe that
the federal courts’ “state actor” analysis used to determine
constitutional obligations is helpful in determining the scope of
the statutory definition of “agency” under UIPA.

2. ‘Olele’s position

‘Olelo bases its position that it is not an agency
within the purview of UIPA upon the following alternative
grounds: (1) Olelo is not an agency based on the plain and
unambiguous language of HRS § 92F-3 defining “agency”? (2) ‘Olelo
is not an agency under federal Freedom of Information Act
precedent, and (3) OIP is estopped from contradicting adnissions
it made in Morales v. Na Leo ‘0 Hawai'i Inc., No. 04-0107 (D.
Haw. May 4, 2005) (unpublished) .

For the reasons discussed below, we agree with ‘Olelo
that the language of HRS § 92F-3 defining “agency” is plain and
unambiguous and that the application of the undisputed facts to
the statutory definition establishes as a matter of law that

‘Olelo is not an agency within the purview of UIPA.

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Undisputed facts
The circuit court found that the following facts were

not disputed:

   

elo is a private, nonprofit corporation,

2, ‘Olelo 3 not supported airectly by taxpayer funds.
Rather, it gets its funds trom the cable provider,
‘Mee Warner Cablevision, through access fees paid’ by

 

 

viewers.
3. There 1s no government control over “Blelo's
activities. “Olelo's Chier Executive Officer and
att run its day-to-day operations.
{.  ‘Dlelors ‘employees are not State Employees.
5: ‘elo has title to its equipment and leases, not the
6. ‘Olelo's activities are not = required function of any

government agency.

OIP did not challenge any of these findings of fact on
appeal, and thus, we will consider them undisputed facts. see
Okada Trucking Co., Ltd. v. ad. of Water Supply, 97 Hawai'i 450,
458, 40 P.34 73, 81 (2002) (“Findings of fact . . . that are not
challenged on appeal are binding on the appellate court.”):
Hawai't Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) R. 28(b) (4) (the
opening brief must contain “[a] concise statenent of the points
of error set forth in separately nunbered paragraphs . . .
Points not presented in accordance with this paragraph will be
disregarded, except that the appellate court, at its option, may
notice a plain error not presented.”); HRAP R. 28(b) (7) ("Points

not argued [in the opening brief] may be deemed waived.”).

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4. ‘The language of HRS § 92F-3 is plain and unambiguous.
‘As noted earlier, the dispute in this case concerns the
statutory language of HRS $92F-3 defining “agency” as a

“corporation . . . owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of

 

this State. . . .” Pursuant to our rules of statutory
construction, as we stated in a previous UIPA decision,

our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the legislsture|,) which ie to be cbtained

     

   

 

primarily fron the language of the statute itself. And where
fhe language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our
only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious
meaning

Hawai'i Ora, of Police Officers, @3 Hawai'i at 402, 927 P.2d at

410 (citation omitted). As such, the court will attempt to
construe the meaning of words in a statute according to their
“general or popular use or meaning.” HRS § 1-14 (1993).” If the
words at issue are not defined in the statute, “we may rely upon
extrinsic aids to determine [the legislature's] intent. Legal
and lay dictionaries are extrinsic aids which may be helpful in
discerning the meaning of statutory terms.” Singleton v. Liguor
Comm'n, County of Hawai'i, 111 Hawai'i 234, 243-44, 140 P.3d 1014,
1023-24 (2006) (quoting Ling v. Yokovama, 91 Hawai'i 131, 133, 980
P.2d 1005, 1007 (App. 1999).

7 ns gi-24 51
‘The words of @ law are generally to be understood in their rost
known end usual signification, withost attending go much to the
Literal ang strictly grammatical construction of the words as to
their general or popular use or meaning.

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It is within this context that we examine the statutory
language in question: “a corporation . . . owned, operated, or
managed by or on behalf of this sta

a. ‘Delo is not “owned” by the state.

‘The word “owned” is not defined in the definitions

 

section of UIPA, HRS § 92F-3, and hence we will 100k to legal and
lay dictionaries as extrinsic aids to determine its meaning.
Black's Law Dictionary defines “own” as “[tJo have good legal
titles to hold as property; to have a legal or rightful title to;
‘to have; to possess.” Black's Law Dictionary 1105 (6th ed.
1990). Webster's third New International Dictionary similarly

defines “own” as “to have or hold as property or appurtenance:

 

have a rightful title to, whether legal or natural.” fiebster's
Third New International Dictionary 1612 (1993).

Te is undisputed that ‘Olelo is a nonprofit corporation
which is the sole title owner of its equipment and the lessee of
its offices and facilities. Although there are relinguishnent
provisions in the DCCA agreement regarding PEG fee accounts,

‘th PEG fees, the DCCA does

 

facilities, and equipment acquired
not have any present rights in this property. Moreover, the
relinguishment provisions do not include the intellectual

Property created by ‘Olelo, which includes written materials,

Programming, trademarks, the company name, logo, website, and

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other non-tangible property created by “Olelo; ‘“Olelo is the legal
owner of these assets, not the State. Even if its agreement with

the DCCA were termina

 

, ‘Olelo would still have sole title to
these assets and any other assets not acquired with PEG fees.

Under these facts, ‘Olelo is not “owned” by the State.

bs 2 not “operated” by the state,

‘The word “operated” is similarly not defined in UIPA.
Black's defines “operate” as “(t]o perform a function, or
operation, or produce an effect.” Black's Law Dictionary at
1091. Webster's similarly defines “operate,” as it relates to an
entity, as “to manage and put or keep in operation whether with
personal effort or not.” Wi a New
Dictionary at 1580-81.

‘The undisputed facts are that the State does not
perform the function of providing PEG channel access and
programming because it does not manage or control ‘Olelo’s day-
to-day operations. See infra Section III.b.4.c. ‘Olelo’s CEO
and staff perform all operating functions. Moreover, ‘Olelo’s
employees are not State employees.

Under these facts, the State does not operate ‘Olelo.

% * “ 3

 

The word “managed” is also not defined in UIPA.

Black's defines “manage” as

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[elo control and direct, to adainister, to take charge of
To conduct; to carry on’ the concerns of a business oF
establishment. Generally applied to affairs that are
Somewhat complicated and thet involve skill and judgment.

 

Black’s Law Dictionary at 960. Webster's defines “manage,” as it

relates to an entity, as “to direct or carry on business or

 

affairs.” i n Iai 1 Du at 1372.
‘The undisputed facts are that the State does not
control, direct, administer, take charge of, or exercise skill or
judgment over ‘Olelo’s activities or business affairs. Against
these undisputed facts, ‘Olelo claims the State does manage or
contzol ‘Olelo to some extent through the DCCA’s power to appoint
2 majority of ‘Olelo’s Board. This power, however, is mitigated
by ‘Olelo’s corporate bylaws, which require Board involvenent in
the appointments. When @ Board vacancy occurs, @ nominating
committee made up of board menbers must “develop a slate of
individuals it recommends to £111 Director vacancies and to serve
as officers.” See ‘Dlelo’s By-Laws, § 6.9a. The Board must then
“review the slate of Directors and forward its approved slate of
Directors to the Director of the DCCA and the president of
Oceanic. The Board shall reconnend no less than two (2) menbers
more than the number of vacancies.” Id, Although the siate is
technically “advisory,” the record shows that, in reality, the
DCCA director traditionally, if not universally, makes the Board-

member appointments from ‘Olelo’s slate of recommended

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appointees. Furthermore, with respect to OIP’s claim that
‘Olelo’s mandatory reporting of financial and other activities to
the DCCA demonstrates some control by the State, these reports

app

 

F to be intended to ensure compliance by ‘Olelo with its
contractual obligations to the State rather than to exert control
over ‘Olelo. See Public Health Research Group v, Dept. of
Health, Educ, 6 Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 544 (D.C. Cir.

1981) (finding that reports intended to ensure contract compliance
were not sufficient indices of governmental control under the
FOIA definition of “agency”).

Under these facts, the State does not “manage” ‘Olelo.

a: Sow or managed.

babehalf of” the state.

‘The prepositional phrase “on behalf of” is also not
defined in UIPA. Webster's defines the phr:
“in the interest of: a the representative of: for the benefit
of.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 198

(emphasis added), The definitional phrase most relevant to

 

“on behalf of” as

whether ‘Olelo operates “on behalf of” the State is whether ‘Olelo
is a “representative of” the State. A “representative” is
defined as an “agent, deputy, substitute, or delegate usually
being invested with the authority of the principal.” Webster's
‘Third New International Dictionary at 1926-27 (emphasis added) .

Tt would thus appear that an entity is 2 representative of the

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State when it substitutes for the state in the performance of a
governmental function.

The circuit court found that “Olelo’s activities are
not a required function of any government agency.” This fact,
not appealed, is consistent with OI? own view, stated in its
pre-2002 opinion letters, that PEG organizations were not
agencies under UIPA. In one such letter, OIP opined that,
“{allthough we believe that Akaku [the Maui PEG organization], by
Providing community broadcasting on Maui, is providing a service
that benefits the public interest, we do not believe it is
performing a governmental function.” OIP Op. Ltr. No. 93-18, 4
In another letter, OP concluded that “because providing
‘community’ broadcasting is not a required function of any
government agency, we do not believe that Na Leo [the Island of
Hawai'i's PEG facilitator) performs a governmental function.”
OIP Op. Ltr. No. 94-23, 2.

Moreover, the record shows that the DCCA director
purposely created PEG facilitators, such as ‘Olelo, with the
intention that PEG facilitators would operate “separately and
independently from the State." In fact, during ‘Olelo’s
formation,

There were explicit discussions about how to form
‘Bielo in a way that would separate it from the State so
that it would be able to operate a an independent, pri
non-profit comunity based organization, We did not want

 

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‘Delo to be “en arm of the State” or be perceived as taking
“state action.”

Under these facts, ‘Olelo does not perform a government
function “on behalf of” the State.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the plain and unambiguous language of HRS §
92F-3 defining “agency,” the undisputed facts, and the record
before us, ‘Olelo is not an agency within the purview of UIPA.*

We affirm the circuit court's judgment.

on the briefs: y

Lestie Hondo,
athy‘us ratasey_ ana .
Jennifer 2. Brooks Balin
tor defendanescappeliants

Ofisee of tntorast ion

Practices and Les Kondo, Accs Co Newrieey 0.
blzector of" tne extice Ge

Information Practices, in

Ma oetiotea capecity aoe
aul Alston and Lea Hong

(of Alston Hane Floyd Vom 6 Dap

ing) tr plaintife=

tppetiee. ‘oles

TRE corporation for
Coneunsey telersason

 

* Having so held, we need not consider the alternative arguments raised
by ‘lelo.

3