Title: Kincheloe v. Milatzo

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Kincheloe v. Milatzo1984 WY 25678 P.2d 855Case Number: 83-100Decided: 02/22/1984Supreme Court of Wyoming
THURSTON 
F. KINCHELOE, MICHAEL L. GILL, DAVID A. ROCK, MICHAEL C. ALBEE, ALBERT GRANT 
LANGSTON, WALTER W. ROCHE, DWAIN D. DICKMAN, THOMAS D. HALL, LEONARD McAFFEE AND 
EDDIE R. MILLER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 
VITO 
MILATZO, ANGIE G.F. MILATZO, AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION & EXCAVATING COMPANY, 
DAVID L. AYERS, COUNTRY WEST MOBILE HOMES, INC., AND FRANK L. NEAL, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
A. Joseph 
Williams of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellants.

 
 
Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., and Kay Snider Coffman, Cheyenne, for appellees Vito Milatzo and Angie G.F. 
Milatzo.

 
 
Walter C. 
Urbigkit, Jr. and Carole Shotwell of Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker & Davidson, 
P.C., Cheyenne, for appellees Country 
West Mobile Homes, Inc. and Frank L. Neal.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This case originated in 
the district court where the plaintiffs-appellants, as purchasers of lots from 
various defendants-appellees, unsuccessfully sought to restrain appellees from 
selling or otherwise disposing of adjoining properties in which some appellees 
were owners and others were possessed of contractual 
interests.

 
 

[¶2.]     The trial court denied 
injunctive relief and we will affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     The appellants 
purchased lots from the appellees, the Milatzos, American Construction & 
Excavating Company and David L. Ayers, between March 31, 1978 and December 16, 
1980. All of these properties were located within the parameters of a plat, 
properly executed, approved, filed on August 30, 1978, and designated as 
"Milatzo Subdivision, First Filing".1 The lots in this subdivision are 
one-half acre in size.

 
 

[¶4.]     Prior to the filing and 
recording of the First Filing plat, the Milatzos had caused a map to be 
prepared. This map included the area contemplated by the First Filing together 
with adjoining land which later came to be known as Country West Subdivision. 
Following is a reduced copy of this map for easy 
reference.

 
 
Map

 
 

[¶5.]     This map, which never 
became a recorded plat, was designated "Milatzo Subdivision" and it shows all 
included lots to be one-half acre in size. When the plaintiffs-appellants 
purchased their lots in the First Filing, which contained only one-half-acre 
lots, they had been shown this map as it hung on the walls of the Milatzos' real 
estate agent's office. The real-estate personnel and perhaps others who were 
interested in selling lots in the First Filing had stated that the lots depicted 
by the map were no less than one-half acre in size. The appellants had also 
visited the property where all the lots indicated on the Milatzo Subdivision map 
were staked on the ground as one-half-acre lots. The area, identified on the map 
as the Country West Subdivision, was not platted at any time during which the 
appellants were purchasing lots in the First Filing area - nor has it ever been 
platted. Some of the appellants had also been made familiar with covenants which 
- by reference to an existing plat - restricted lot sizes to be no less than 
one-half acre. The court held these restrictions to be applicable to only those 
lots which were contained in the First Filing, but the appellants testified that 
when they purchased their properties in the First Filing they were led to 
believe and did believe that the covenants were applicable to all lots appearing 
on the Milatzo Subdivision map (reproduced, supra).

 
 

[¶6.]     Following the platting 
of the First Filing and the signing of covenants, the defendants-appellees 
American Construction & Excavating Company and David L. Ayers obtained a 
number of lots in Milatzo Subdivision First Filing in repayment for services 
rendered and materials furnished. In their effort to sell their First Filing 
lots, the Milatzos engaged and gave a listing to the Key Real Estate Co., Ltd. 
Mr. Ayers and American Construction & Excavating Company also undertook 
sales of such properties as were owned by them in Milatzo Subdivision First 
Filing.

 
 

[¶7.]     Subsequent to the sale 
to the appellants of various lots in the First Filing, the Milatzos entered into 
a lease option with Frank L. Neal of Country West Mobile Homes, Inc. to sell and 
develop what was later designated as the Country West Subdivision. This area 
adjoined the First Filing area, and is illustrated as being within the confines 
of the Milatzo Subdivision map, supra. A proposed plat of this subdivision was 
prepared, showing lots which were one-quarter acre and smaller, and this plat 
was approved by all of the appropriate regulatory bodies although the document 
has never been recorded. These threatened Country West Subdivision lot transfers 
are the sales which the appellants seek to enjoin for the reason that the 
platted lot sizes are allegedly in violation of the oral representations, 
promises and covenants described above.

 
 
Contention 
of the Parties

 
 

[¶8.]     In the trial court and 
in this court, the appellants rely upon the covenants, statements of the 
appellees and their agents, inspection of the properties and the map hanging 
upon the real estate company wall as representations from which, they contend, 
injunctive relief should flow, thus precluding the sale of any lot or lots in 
the proposed adjoining Country West Subdivision area since all lots in that 
proposed subdivision are to be less than one-half acre in 
area.

 
 

[¶9.]     The appellees, on the 
other hand, urge that, while it is true that it was their original intention 
that all residential lots in the entire area designated as the Milatzo 
Subdivision would be no less than one-half acre in size, they had never made any 
written, oral or other form of legally binding representations to the appellants 
to the effect that the lots of the Country West Subdivision area would be 
platted and sold as one-half-acre lots. The appellees urge that the appellants 
were, at all times, on notice or chargeable with notice that appellees were not 
obligated to develop this adjoining land with one-half-acre lots because of the 
language of the covenants, the oral representations that were made, the 
information contained in the deeds and the title insurance commitments and 
policies, and by reason of the fact that a plat of Country West was not on file. 
With respect to the covenants which the Milatzos and David Ayers signed and 
recorded, the appellees say that it was their intention, and it is apparent on 
the face of the instrument itself, that the contained restrictions were to apply 
only to lots in the First Filing.

 
 
The 
Issues

 
 

[¶10.]  The appellants describe the issues for 
our review as follows:

 
 
1. 
"Whether the protective covenants apply only to lots included in the First Filing of Milatzo 
Subdivision."

 
 
2. 
"Whether the statute of frauds bars plaintiffs from the requested injunctive 
relief."

 
 
3. 
"Whether plaintiffs are legally entitled to have defendants enjoined from 
dividing lots into less than one-half acre in size on the theory of promissory 
estoppel."

 
 
Legal 
Theories of the Appellants

 
 

[¶11.]  The appellants' argument that the 
developers of the Country West Estates should be enjoined from subdividing the 
land into small lots is based on three different theories: (1) written 
protective covenants; (2) promissory estoppel; and (3) common scheme or plan. 
Our discussion of the common-scheme-or-plan contention will flow from our 
disposal of the covenant, statute-of-frauds and estoppel issues, and we will 
not, therefore, separately address this concept. Furthermore, except as the 
appellants address the protective-covenant, statute-of-frauds and 
promissory-estoppel topics, they themselves do not support the 
common-scheme-or-plan theory in their brief with cogent argument or authority. 
This court will not consider alleged error that is supported only with 
perfunctory argument and no authority. Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349 
(1981).

 
 
Legal 
Theories of the Appellees

 
 

[¶12.]  The appellees argue that the covenants in 
question only apply to the First Filing, the statute of frauds operates to 
render null and void any oral representations made by the appellees, and the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel does not, under the facts of this case, serve to 
defeat the effectiveness and applicability of the statute of 
frauds.

 
 
Restrictive 
Covenants

 
 

[¶13.]  On June 27, 1979 the Milatzos and David 
L. Ayers, owners of lots in platted subdivision First Filing, caused restrictive 
covenants to be recorded. These covenants provided, by reference to an existing 
plat, that the lots which the covenants contemplated were to be no less than 
one-half acre in size. The appellants say that the language of the covenants was 
indefinite and subject to court interpretation. They go on to urge that the 
trial court was in error when it decided that it was the intent of the parties - 
as that intent is gleaned from the covenants and all evidence of record - that 
the covenants were to apply to the lots in the First Filing only. The appellants 
contend that Ayers and the Milatzos intended that the covenants should be held 
to apply to all the area contained in the Milatzo Subdivision, and therefore the 
half-acre limitation contemplated by the covenants defines the lot size, not 
only in the First Filing, but also in the Country West Subdivision area (see 
map, supra). The appellees' position is that the covenants apply only to the 
lots contained in the area designated on the map, supra, as "First Filing."

 
 

[¶14.]  The trial court agreed with the 
appellees' contention on this issue, and so do we.

 
 

[¶15.]  The pertinent provisions of the 
protective covenants are the following:

 
 
"The 
undersigned, being the present owners of some of the following described real 
estate situated in Laramie County, Wyoming; towit:

 
 
"Milatzo Subdivision, First Filing, City 
of Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming "do hereby make this Declaration of 
Protective Covenants applicable to all lands owned by the undersigned and 
separately ratifying and adopting this declaration.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"6. Platted lots presently platted for a 
residential development shall not be divided for the construction of more than a 
one-family dwelling unit." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶16.]  With respect to these provisions, the 
court said in his decision remarks from the bench:

 
 
"The 
protective covenants were designed by David Ayers and by Mr. and Mrs. Milatzo. 
The recorded ones refer to land described as Milatzo Subdivision, First Filing, 
City of Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming. And then after that description the 
paragraph continues, `and do hereby make this declaration of protective 
covenants applicable to all lands owned by the undersigned and separately 
ratifying and adopting this declaration.'

 
 
"* * * 
[R]estrictions upon the use of land are normally fairly narrowly 
viewed."

 
 
The court 
then went on to say that it does not seem "sensible" to interpret the covenant 
language to apply to property outside the First Filing which would include 
Ayers' and the Milatzos' homes and other property wherever located. The court 
then observed:

 
 
"* * * 
[I]t seems to be much more sensible to apply the protective covenants to when it 
says all lands, meaning all lands within the subdivision that has been described 
above. And that will be the construction that the Court will adopt, and would 
limit the application of the declaration of protective covenants to the land in 
Milatzo Subdivision First Filing."

 
 
The court 
addressed the ¶ 6 language of the covenants, supra, when the judge 
said:

 
 
"Even if 
we went beyond that and expanded it, let's say to lands that were proposed in 
this area to be developed, the protective covenants, to my mind, other than 
paragraph 6, do not require half-acre lots. It's just simply not contained in 
the covenants anywhere. And paragraph 6 says that, `Platted lots presently 
platted for a residential development shall not be divided for the construction 
of more than a one-family dwelling unit.'

 
 
"Well, you 
might say that does it, except there was not land platted beyond first filing, 
and the platting process represents the adoption and acceptance of the plat by 
the authorities who are by law required to perform that function, and that 
function simply never occurred in this case.

 
 
"So I 
can't say by either construction, and I can't say by implication, that this 
matter is covered by the declaration of protective 
covenants."

 
 

[¶17.]  We find the trial court's analysis to be 
accurate and perceptive.

 
 

[¶18.]  When construing restrictions upon the 
free use of land, the rules of Kindler v. 
Anderson, Wyo., 433 P.2d 268 (1967), are applicable. In Kindler, we said:

 
 
"* * * 
Restrictions upon the use of land, being in derogation of the common law, are 
not favored, are to be strictly construed, will not be extended by implication, 
and in case of doubt the restrictions will be construed in favor of the free use 
of the land. Wahrendorff v. Moore, 
Fla., 93 So. 2d 720, 724; Naiman v. 
Bilodeau, Me., 225 A.2d 758, 759; Gardner v. Maffitt, 335 Mo. 959, 74 S.W.2d 604, 607, 95 A.L.R. 452; Edney v. 
Powers, 224 N.C. 441, 31 S.E.2d 372, 374; Latchis v. John, 117 Vt. 110, 85 A.2d 575, 577, 32 A.L.R.2d 1203; 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions, § 187, pp. 755, 756." 433 P.2d  at 271.

 
 

[¶19.]  We went on to add the caveat that where 
the language imposing the restriction is clear and unambiguous the rule of 
strict construction does not apply, citing Reetz v. Ellis, 279 Ala. 453, 186 So. 2d 915, 918 (1966) and Donald E. Baltz, Inc. 
v. R.V. Chandler & Co., 248 S.C. 484, 151 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1966). See 
also Remilong v. Crolla, Wyo., 576 P.2d 461 (1978) for the same propositions.

 
 

[¶20.]  The appellants urge that the covenants 
may be read to imply that they apply to the Country West Subdivision area. We 
are bound, however, to the rule which holds that implied covenants are not 
favored in the law and will not be found to exist unless the language of the 
instrument leads unerringly to the conclusion that the parties intended that the 
covenants attach. See Ready v. Texaco, 
Inc., Wyo., 410 P.2d 983 (1966).

 
 

[¶21.]  Given these rules of construction, the 
language of the covenants and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the 
court was correct when it held the covenants to apply only to the First Filing 
area. The plain language of the covenant document, taken with the testimony of 
the witnesses, points to that conclusion. The record leaves no room for any 
other resolution of the issue - and we so hold.

 
 
Promissory 
Estoppel and The Statute of Frauds

 
 

[¶22.]  The appellants urge that, in the event 
the court finds, as we do, that the recorded covenants do not serve to establish 
lot size in the Country West Subdivision area (map, supra), the appellees are 
nonetheless estopped from selling lots in that subdivision which are less than 
one-half acre in size, because of oral representations which some of the 
appellants or their representatives made to the appellees while the appellees 
were purchasing lots in the First Filing. The appellants argue that they had a 
right to rely upon these representations and that they did rely upon them to 
their detriment.

 
 

[¶23.]  The appellees, while denying that any 
such oral representations were made as would support injunctive relief, respond 
with the assertion that, in any case, the alleged oral restrictions upon the use 
of their Country West property are in violation of the statute of frauds and are 
therefore of no force and effect. The pertinent portion of the statute of 
frauds, § 16-1-101 (now renumbered as § 1-23-105), W.S. 1977 
provides:

 
 
"(a) In 
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(v) Every 
agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for 
more than one (1) year;"

 
 

[¶24.]  The trial court agreed that the oral 
representations were within the statute, relying upon our opinion in Remilong v. 
Crolla, supra, 576 P.2d 461. In his memorandum opinion the trial judge 
wrote:

 
 
"The 
defendants [appellees here] placed considerable reliance on the contention that 
the one-half acre lot oral restriction sought to be enforced by injunctive 
relief violates the statutes of frauds. Indeed, it does as such restrictions 
have been characterized by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Remilong v. Crolla, Wyo., 1978, 576 P.2d 461, 464 * * *."

 
 

[¶25.]  The court then observed that the 
plaintiffs (appellants here) seek to avoid the statute of frauds by urging facts 
which will invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In this regard, it was 
the trial judge's observation that this court held in the Remilong case that 
promissory estoppel could, in certain circumstances, serve to avoid the 
operation of the statute of frauds. The judge quoted from Remilong v. Crolla, supra, as 
follows:

 
 
"* * * The 
doctrine of promissory estoppel is equitable in nature and is to be employed in 
a manner consistent with the purposes behind the statute of frauds `in limited 
circumstances.' Remilong v. Crolla, 
."

 
 
The trial 
court correctly analyzed our holding in Remilong v. Crolla, 
supra.

 
 

[¶26.]  In Remilong, this court was called upon to 
consider the relationship between the statute of frauds and promissory estoppel. 
Remilong had sold a portion of his land to Crolla and orally promised that 
trailers would never be permitted on the remaining portions. Remilong breached 
that promise and Crolla sued to enjoin the breach. We held that a promise on the 
use or nonuse of land was an "interest in real estate" and hence within the 
statute of frauds. In Remilong we 
said:

 
 
"* * * An 
agreement restricting the use of land is described in many cases and considered 
to be a negative easement, Huggins v. 
Castle Estates, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 427, 369 N.Y.S.2d 80, 330 N.E.2d 48; Bennett v. Charles Corporation, W. Va., 
226 S.E.2d 559, 563; Putnam v. Dickinson, 
N.D., 142 N.W.2d 111, 124; Fort 
Dodge, Des Moines & Southern Railway v. American Community Stores 
Corporation, 256 Iowa 1344, 131 N.W.2d 515, 521. When its establishment is 
sought in equity it has been treated or described as an equitable estate or 
interest in land, Turner v. Brocato, 
206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d 855, 861, and cited authorities." 576 P.2d  at 
463.

 
 

[¶27.]  We went on to say:

 
 
"* * * It 
would appear of particular importance that such restrictive covenants be 
classified as interests in land without reference to particular terminology 
because of their increasing importance and use in our modern-day society. We 
would then hold that this asserted agreement creating a restrictive covenant 
upon appellants' land was within the prohibition of the statute of frauds, Frank v. Visockas, 356 Mass. 227, 
228-229, 249 N.E.2d 1; Cottrell v. 
Nurnberger, 131 W. Va. 391, 47 S.E.2d 454, 456, 5 A.L.R.2d 1298; Droutman v. E.M. & L. Garage, Inc., 
129 N.J. Eq. 545, 20 A.2d 75, 76; Annotation 5 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1320-1322; 5 
Powell on Real Property, § 672, pp. 152-153 (1976); A.L.I. Restatement of the 
Law, Property, § 522, p. 3165 (1944)." 576 P.2d  at 463.

 
 

[¶28.]  Even though we found the oral agreement 
to fall within the ambit of the statute of frauds, we wondered what effect the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel had upon the statute when we observed 
that:

 
 
"This case 
poses the direct question of whether equitable, or particularly promissory, 
estoppel may be used to defeat the statute of frauds and result in the creation 
of a restrictive covenant, a negative covenant, or equitable servitude upon the 
lands of the Remilongs." 576 P.2d  at 464.

 
 

[¶29.]  We then held that in certain limited 
circumstances, where it was necessary to avoid fraud, equitable or promissory 
estoppel would serve that purpose. The touchstone language of the opinion is 
this:

 
 
"Although 
this court has recognized the almost universal rule that restrictions upon the 
use of lands are not favored, we have also recognized that equity does have a 
role to play in limited circumstances, Kindler v. Anderson, Wyo., 433 P.2d 268, 
271; Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 513, 27 P. 900, 31 Am.St.Rep. 122, affirmed 31 P. 407; Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687, 
75 A.L.R. 639; Forde v. Libby, 22 
Wyo. 464, 143 P. 1190. We speak of 
limited circumstances because the declared legislative policy encompassed in the 
statute of frauds should be departed from only when such action is necessary to 
`avoid the fraud, and accomplish what justice and good conscience demand,' 
Metcalf v. Hart, supra, 27 P.  at 913. 
Also, see Roberts Construction Company v. 
Vondriska, Wyo., 547 P.2d 1171, 1181. To accomplish the purposes of the statute of 
frauds, it may be necessary for a court to uphold oral agreements. Tucker v. Owen, 4 Cir., 94 F.2d 49, 52." 
(Emphasis added.) 576 P.2d  at 465.

 
 
This is 
another way of saying, as we have said before, that we will not permit the 
statute of frauds to become an instrument of fraud, Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687 
(1930).

 
 

[¶30.]  We now examine the question which asks 
whether or not, under the facts and the law of this case, the statute of frauds 
should operate to render void the alleged oral representations of the appellees 
or whether they are estopped from successfully espousing this defense according 
to the promissory estoppel teachings of Remilong v. Crolla. In other words, we 
undertake the examination with the following question present in our 
minds:

 
 
Did the 
appellees or their agents perpetrate a fraud upon the appellants from which 
equitable relief must in justice and good conscience come to their 
defense?

 
 
Injunctive 
Relief

 
 

[¶31.]  Preliminarily, it is to be remembered 
that, when courts are called upon to employ their injunctive authority, they 
must utilize this power with great caution. We have said:

 
 
"The 
extraordinary remedy of an injunction is a far-reaching force and must not be 
indulged in under hastily contrived conditions. It is a delicate judicial power 
and a court must proceed with caution and deliberation before exercising the 
remedy." Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., 
Wyo., 548 P.2d 1, 3 (1976).

 
 

[¶32.]  Injunctions are extraordinary remedies 
and are not granted as of right. In granting an injunction, the court exercises 
broad, equitable jurisdiction. Brown v. 
J.C. Penney Co., D.C.Wyo., 54 F. Supp. 488 (1943). This discretion is, 
however, not unfettered, but "must be exercised reasonably and in harmony with 
well established principles," 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14, p. 772. Where 
injunctive relief is sought, it is the trial court that grants or denies it, 
based upon the facts - not the appellate court, 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14, pp. 
769, 773. Crosby v. Watson, 144 Colo. 
216, 355 P.2d 958 (1960); Hansen v. 
Galiger, 123 Mont. 101, 208 P.2d 1049 (1949).

 
 
Equitable 
Estoppel

 
 

[¶33.]  We then address the ultimate question 
which, when properly framed, asks whether, given the application of the statute 
of frauds, the facts of this case serve - under the doctrine of estoppel as 
applied in Remilong v. Crolla, supra 
- to overcome the mandate of the statute. We have said that equitable estoppel 
has as its purpose the prevention of injury arising from actions which have been 
acted upon in good faith in circumstances in which it would be inequitable to 
permit a retraction. Pickett v. 
Associates Discount Corporation of Wyoming, Wyo., 435 P.2d 445 (1967); Crosby v. Strahan's Estate, 78 Wyo. 302, 
324 P.2d 492 (1958). We also said in Crosby v. Strahan's Estate, supra, that 
the basic purpose of the doctrine is to prevent fraud or its 
equivalent.

 
 

[¶34.]  Fraud, we have held, must be clearly 
proved by the one alleging it. Cone v. 
Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 33 P. 31 (1893). Fraud will never be presumed and will 
only be sustained on evidence that is clear and convincing. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Petsch, 10th Cir., 261 F.2d 331 (1958). Finally, we have held 
that fraud cannot be imputed from facts that are as consistent with an honest 
intention since fraud must be demonstrated in a clear and convincing manner. See 
White v. Ogburn, Wyo., 528 P.2d 1167 
(1974); Fallon v. Wyoming State Board of 
Medical Examiners, Wyo., 441 P.2d 322 (1968).

 
 
Elements 
of Estoppel

 
 

[¶35.]  In Cheyenne Dodge, Inc. v. Reynolds and 
Reynolds Company, Wyo., 613 P.2d 1234 (1980), we said, in essence, that the 
party who relies upon estoppel must be able to show that he or she lacks 
knowledge of the facts, is without means of discovering them, relies upon the 
action and representations of the party sought to be charged and must be able to 
demonstrate a changed position accompanying such reliance. See also Wood v. Trenchard, Wyo., 550 P.2d 490 
(1976). We have said, with respect to the lack-of-knowledge element that 
ordinarily courts will not give effect to an estoppel where the parties were 
equally well informed as to the essential facts or where the means of knowledge 
were equally open to them. Pickett v. 
Associates Discount Corporation of Wyoming, supra, 435 P.2d  at 447, citing 
19 Am.Jur., Estoppel § 86, p. 742.

 
 

[¶36.]  As applied to the case at bar, these 
concepts say, as does the teaching of Remilong v. Crolla, that estoppel should 
not be invoked to defeat the operation of the statute unless the record contains 
clear and convincing proof that appellees induced appellants to detrimentally 
purchase land in the First Filing through fraudulent misrepresentations upon 
which appellants relied and had a right to rely - changed position in 
consequence thereof - and that justice and good conscience require that the 
protections offered by the statute of frauds give way to the benevolent 
exception contemplated by the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel.

 
 
Facts Most 
Favorable to Appellees

 
 

[¶37.]  For all purposes, the issue of 
factfinding comes to us under familiar and often-announced rules. We do not 
consider the conflicting evidence of the unsuccessful party and we give to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may reasonably 
and fairly be drawn from it. Crown Cork 
& Seal Company, Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272 
(1982); City of Rock Springs v. Police 
Protection Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980).

 
 

[¶38.]  Evidence which this court is bound to 
consider and which mitigates in favor of the successful invocation of the 
statute of frauds and against the implementation of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel may be summed up as follows: The Milatzos, when they first undertook to 
promote their subdivision, prepared a map of the proposed subdivided acreage 
which included the areas now designated as First Filing and Country West 
Subdivision. See map, supra. The map was designated Milatzo Subdivision, and all 
residential lots shown on this map were described as being one-half acre in 
size. The Milatzos came upon hard financial times with respect to utilities, 
services and financing, and were forced to reduce the size of the previously 
intended development area to the area now represented on the map as the First 
Filing. Consistent with the original plans of the Milatzos, the First Filing 
area was platted into lots which were one-half acre in size, and the plat was 
accepted by the appropriate officials and was duly recorded. On the other hand, 
the Milatzo Subdivision map containing the entire originally mapped area never 
became a recorded plat.

 
 

[¶39.]  During the time that the First Filing 
lots were being sold, David L. Ayers, acting in his own behalf, and Key Real 
Estate Co., Ltd. and its employees, acting in behalf of the Milatzos, were in 
possession of the original Milatzo Subdivision map and various appellants were 
shown or otherwise became acquainted with the map. However, the court could have 
found and, it must be assumed, did find that, while the map was, in one way or 
another, made available to appellants for observation during the time that they 
were contemplating the purchase of lots in the First Filing, neither David 
Ayers, nor the Milatzos nor the agents of the Milatzos made promissory 
representations upon which the appellants could or should have relied to the 
effect that the area now designated as Country West would ultimately be platted 
and burdened with restrictions which provided that the lots would be no smaller 
than one-half acre in size. This is admitted by the appellants in their brief, 
where they say:

 
 
"Although 
neither the Milatzos nor their agents specifically promised plaintiffs that all of the lots 
would be half-acres, the agents of the Milatzos showed the plaintiffs plats 
whereon all of the lots were shown to be half-acres, and the agents of the 
Milatzos told the plaintiffs that all the lots were 
half-acres."

 
 

[¶40.]  Other facts which mitigate against the 
invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to defeat the application of 
the statute of frauds are these: The trial court could have found and, we 
assume, did find that the appellants knew or are chargeable with the knowledge 
that neither their deeds nor their title insurance policies carried any 
provisions which indicated that any recited protections were intended to reach 
beyond the parameters of the First Filing area. The covenants which were on file 
pertained to the First Filing lots only and this was or should have been 
apparent from the action of the parties and the language of the covenants 
themselves.

 
 
Conclusion

 
 

[¶41.]  In this case, unless the district court 
could come to the conclusion that the conduct of Ayers, the real estate agents 
and the Milatzos was fraudulent in nature, that the proof of fraud was clear and 
convincing, that the appellants did rely, to their detriment and, under the 
circumstances, were warranted in relying upon the appellees' misrepresentations, 
and, finally, that the appellants were not as well informed as to the essential 
facts and the means of knowledge was not open to them, the district judge should 
not exercise his equitable authority to restrict the free use of the Milatzos' 
land.

 
 

[¶42.]  We agree with the district court that the 
elements of equitable estoppel were not proven in this case. There is no clear 
and convincing proof of fraudulent misrepresentation. There is no clear and 
convincing proof that the appellants lacked knowledge of all the facts 
pertaining to the Milatzos' use of and right to use their land or that the 
appellants did not have the means to discover all the pertinent and relevant 
facts concerning the purpose, intention and status of the Milatzos' land 
utilization. Lastly, unlike Remilong v. 
Crolla, supra, under the facts of this case we find that the statute of 
frauds should apply because the oral representations were not such as to cause 
the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to be invoked to 

 
 
"* * * 
`avoid the fraud, and accomplish what justice and good conscience demand.'" Remilong v. Crolla, supra, 576 P.2d  at 
465, citing Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 
513, 27 P. 900, 913, aff'd 31 P. 407 (1891).

 
 

[¶43.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 This 
subdivision area will usually be referred to as "First 
Filing."