Title: BAXTER v. SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BAXTER v. SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION2004 WY 138100 P.3d 427Case Number: 03-229Decided: 11/10/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 

RIAL 
BAXTER,

 

Appellant(Petitioner/Employee-Claimant),

 

v.

 

SINCLAIR 
OIL CORPORATION,

 

Appellee(Respondent/Employer-Objector),

 

and

                                                                                                

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent/Objector-Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bernard 
Q. Phelan, Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Appellee Sinclair Oil Corporation:

Catherine 
MacPherson of MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Appellee State of Wyoming:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Radosevich.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

 

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
The 
primary issue presented in this appeal is whether the hearing examiner erred by 
denying worker's compensation benefits to Appellant Rial Baxter for his lower 
back pain even though two experts had testified that Baxter's condition was 
work-related.  Baxter had claimed 
his back pain was caused by a material aggravation of a preexisting condition, 
but the hearing examiner rejected this theory because it found the medical 
expert opinion was not credible.  
Another medical expert believed that the injury had occurred over a 
period of time, but the hearing examiner rejected this theory because the 
medical expert was not able to state that the condition did not result from a 
hazard outside employment.  Based on 
these findings, the hearing examiner determined Baxter had failed in his burden 
of proof.  

 

[¶2]           
Our 
record review shows that the hearing examiner incorrectly applied the applicable 
rule of law, and we must therefore reverse.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Baxter 
presents this statement of the issues for our review:

 

1. 
Is the finding that Dr. Pettine's opinion that the injury was a material 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition was not credible because he had an 
incomplete medical history supported by substantial 
evidence?

 

2. 
Is the finding that no evidence of absence of outside "hazards" was presented, 
because it wasn't presented by a competent medical authority, supported by 
substantial evidence or is such finding contrary to law?

 

Sinclair 
rephrases the issue as:

 

Whether 
the Hearing Examiner's decision denying workers' compensation benefits is 
supported by substantial evidence, based upon an examination of the entire 
record?

 

The 
Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) states the issue 
as:

 

The 
hearing examiner found Baxter failed to meet his burden of proving the back 
condition for which he sought benefits was the result of a material aggravation 
of his preexisting condition.  The 
hearing examiner also found Baxter failed to prove a compensable injury which 
occurred over a substantial period of time.  Does substantial evidence support the 
hearing examiner's decision denying workers' compensation benefits based on 
Baxter's failure to meet his burden of proof?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
The 
record shows that Baxter has suffered from back pain for at least ten years 
probably due to the heavy lifting, bending, and twisting required of a diesel 
mechanic.  In 1983, he was 
compensated for a pulled back muscle suffered while working and which fully 
resolved.  Baxter worked for several 
employers from that point until 1999 when Baxter began working for 
Sinclair.  In July of 2001, when 
Baxter was 38 years old, he lifted an item weighing 165 pounds while at work and 
experienced aching in his back.  He 
continued working and did not report any injury to his employer.  He suffered continuously from back pain 
that he self-medicated with ibuprofen. On October 29, 2001, Baxter lifted a 160 
to 180 pound item at work and experienced a shift and pop in his back and felt 
extreme pain.  Baxter continued 
working that day; however, the next morning Baxter was unable to walk because of 
severe pain in his back and pain radiating down his leg.  He was treated at the emergency room and 
did not return to work.  He was 
referred to Dr. Jenkins who diagnosed spondylolysis and spondylolisthesis, 
recommended physical therapy, but advised surgery might be needed at a later 
time.  Dr. Jenkins did not believe 
that Baxter's condition was the result of single work-related event nor did he 
believe that it was a preexisting condition that was aggravated by a single work 
incident.  Dr. Jenkins was of the 
opinion that Baxter had a preexisting condition that was aggravated by 
work-related exposure over a period of time and that his condition was one that 
occurred over a substantial period of time as a result of his employment.  Baxter filed an injury report in 
November of 2001; however, Sinclair objected, and the Division denied 
benefits.  

 

[¶5]           
In 
preparation for the hearing, Baxter sought an opinion from Dr. Pettine.  Dr. Pettine's deposition testimony was 
that Baxter's condition may have existed since childhood but he was asymptomatic 
until the incident in July.  It was 
Dr. Pettine's opinion that Baxter had a preexisting condition that had been 
materially aggravated by his work activities in July.  At the deposition, Dr. Pettine agreed 
that the aggravation could have occurred on October 29, 2001, and believed that 
lifting on that day caused Baxter to tear a disc which caused a marked increase 
in symptoms. 

 

[¶6]           
In 
its findings of fact, the hearing examiner reviewed the basis for each doctor's 
opinion.  The hearing examiner 
determined that Dr. Pettine's opinion should be given little weight because Dr. 
Pettine was unaware that Baxter had suffered previously from back pain, a 
finding that Baxter vigorously disputes.  
Having rejected the theory that Baxter's injuries resulted from a 
material aggravation of a preexisting condition during a single event, the 
hearing examiner briefly considered the theory whether Baxter's condition was 
the result of an injury occurring over a period of time and met the elements of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a).  
That theory was rejected on the basis that "Dr. Jenkins was not able to 
state the injury did not come from a hazard outside employment and that the 
condition was incidental to Baxter's employment as a mechanic." Baxter disputes 
this finding as an improper application of the rule of law to the particular 
facts.  Benefits were denied, and 
the district court affirmed that denial.  
This appeal followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶7]           
The 
substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals from 
Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act (WAPA) contested case proceedings when 
factual findings are involved and both parties submit evidence.  Newman 
v. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2002 WY 91, ¶22, 49 P.3d 163, ¶22 (Wyo. 2002).  When only the party with the burden of 
proof submits evidence in the contested case proceeding and that party does not 
ultimately prevail, the arbitrary or capricious standard governs the judicial 
review of that agency decision.  
Id.  Even if the factual findings are found 
to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency decision may still 
be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons.  Id. 
at ¶23.   We do not examine the 
record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the 
agency's decision, but we must also examine the conflicting evidence to 
determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its finding and 
order upon all of the evidence before it.  
Id. 
at ¶25.   

 

 

Credibility 
Determination

 

[¶8]           
The 
hearing examiner determined that Dr. Pettine's opinion was based upon a history 
of no prior pain symptoms and was entitled to little weight.  Baxter contends that this determination 
is not supported by substantial evidence because a review of the record shows 
that Dr. Pettine was aware that Baxter had written a narrative stating that he 
had suffered from a dull ache in his back for years and Dr. Pettine stated 
unequivocally that, despite the fact that Baxter had 
spondylolysis/spondylolisthesis, his current condition was caused by his work 
injury.   

 

[¶9]           
The 
hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is charged with weighing the evidence 
and determining the credibility of witnesses.   A hearing examiner's findings of 
fact are accorded deference, and the hearing examiner's decision will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence.  Brierley 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 
WY 121, ¶16, 52 P.3d 564, ¶16 (Wyo. 2002). "When presented with medical opinion 
testimony, the hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is responsible for 
determining relevancy, assigning probative value, and ascribing the relevant 
weight to be given to the testimony."  
Bando 
v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 
980 P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo. 1999).  "In 
weighing the medical opinion testimony, the fact finder considers:  (1) the opinion;  (2) the reasons, if any, given for 
it;  (3) the strength of it; and (4) 
the qualifications and credibility of the witness or witnesses expressing it." 
Id. 
at 329-30.  "Demonstrating 
evidentiary contradictions in the record does not establish the ruling was 
irrational, but we do examine conflicting evidence to determine if the agency 
reasonably could have made its finding and order based upon all of the evidence 
before it."  Id. 
at 
331.

 

[¶10]      Our 
record review shows that in Dr. Pettine's deposition testimony, he did state 
that his opinion was based upon the fact that Baxter had not indicated previous 
back pain until the incident in July.  
When confronted with Baxter's narrative, Dr. Pettine determined that the 
later October injury was probably the cause of Baxter's current condition.  We agree that Dr. Pettine was unaware of 
Baxter's previous history of pain, and, under these circumstances, the 
credibility determination and weight to be given the testimony is left to the 
hearing examiner.  Based on the 
evidence before it, the hearing examiner's conclusion was not irrational or 
without substantial support.

 

 

Statutory 
Burden of Proof

 

[¶11]      An 
employee seeking compensation for an injury that occurs over a substantial 
period of time is statutorily required to prove several elements by a particular 
burden of proof.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-603(a) (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

(a) 
The burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a 
substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical 
authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(i) 
There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under 
which the work is performed and the injury;

(ii) 
The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a 
result of the employment;

(iii) 
The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

(iv) 
The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been 
equally exposed outside of the employment; and

(v) 
The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of 
the relation of employer and employee.

 

[¶12]      We 
have previously decided that this statutory burden of proof requires a 
claimant/employee to prove that the claim arose out of and in the course of his 
or her employment through competent medical evidence, and to prove each of the 
five specified criteria which show a causal connection between the injury and 
employment by a preponderance of the evidence.  Our threshold inquiry asks if 
substantial evidence exists to support the finding that Baxter, using competent 
medical evidence, demonstrated that his claim arose out of and in the course of 
his employment with Sinclair.   
Our rule states:

 

To 
show that the injury arises out of or in the course of employment, the claimant 
must show a causal connection between the injury and the employment.  This causal connection exists when there 
is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment.

 

Sinclair 
Trucking v. Bailey, 848 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Johnson 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 
798 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1990)).  

 

[¶13]      Dr. 
Jenkins' medical opinion stated that Baxter's history of being engaged in the 
heavy occupation as a diesel mechanic for years required him to engage in 
repetitive, constant lifting and bending.  
Dr. Jenkins acknowledged that Baxter's spondylolysis had probably been 
present since adolescence or early adulthood and could be the result of aging; 
however, he had rejected that explanation because aging as a factor is "fairly 
rare in a 38 year old."  Dr. Jenkins 
concluded that the causation for Baxter's symptoms was his heavy work 
occupation.  Neither Sinclair nor 
the Division dispute that this testimony satisfies the requirement that the 
injury arise out of and in the course of employment.  They do dispute, however, that 
substantial evidence exists that Dr. Jenkins' testimony proved, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, all of the elements of § 27-14-603(a). 

 

[¶14]      "Although 
each of the five elements are [sic] specifically enumerated in the statute, they 
are closely related because each contributes to indicate whether the employment 
environment caused the injury.  
Therefore, the same evidence will often offer support to several of the 
elements."  Sinclair 
Trucking, 848 P.2d  at 1353.  Our review of the 
record indicates that Dr. Jenkins found that Baxter was employed to do heavy 
lifting, bending and twisting in the course of his duties as a diesel mechanic 
and, based on Baxter's youth and history, it was his work-related activities 
that caused his lower back pain.  
Dr. Jenkins stated that, over time, these factors aggravated Baxter's 
conditions rather than aging or naturally occurring vertebra slippage.  Sinclair and the Division, however, 
claim that because Dr. Jenkins did not testify that he had considered other 
factors as a possible cause, the hearing examiner properly concluded that Baxter 
failed in his burden of proof.  
Baxter contends that he cannot prove a negative and that he met his 
burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that work was the likely 
proximate cause and not a "hazard" to which he was equally exposed outside of 
work. 

 

[¶15]      
In 
Sinclair 
Trucking, we 
considered whether an employee had met his burden of proof on this same issue 
and our decision in that case supports Baxter's contention.  Sinclair 
Trucking held 
that the employee had met his burden by submitting medical testimony that the 
working conditions had caused the employee's condition and this medical 
testimony properly allowed the hearing examiner to conclude that no outside 
hazard to which the employee had been "equally exposed" was the 
cause.  848 P.2d  at 1353.  In this case, we have 
more.  Our review indicates that Dr. 
Jenkins had considered whether Baxter's condition was caused by aging or natural 
progression of his preexisting condition and had rejected those factors because 
of Baxter's youth and working conditions.  
During cross-examination, Baxter was questioned whether he engaged in 
activities involving snowmobiles, four wheelers, sports, or motorcycles, and he 
denied engaging in any of them, indicating that his constant back pain severely 
limited his off-work activities. He does fish and play with his children, but no 
allegation is made that these activities involve hazards equaling the hazards of 
his work conditions.  

 

[¶16]      The 
hearing examiner's conclusion that Baxter did not meet his burden is reversed as 
unsupported by substantial evidence.  
By a preponderance of the evidence, Baxter met his statutory burden of 
proof and, without any evidence that a hazard to which he would have been 
equally exposed outside of the employment even existed, he had no further 
burden.  The hearing examiner's 
conclusion otherwise is in error and must be reversed.  This case is remanded to the district 
court to reverse the order denying benefits and for entry of an order granting 
benefits.