Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1460.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1460 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MOORE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1460.] 
Criminal law—Venue—Retaliation—R.C. 2921.05(B)—Venue for the crime of 
retaliation under R.C. 2921.05(B) is proper where the defendant committed 
the criminal offense or any of its elements, not where the victim previously 
pursued criminal charges against the defendant—Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2021-0266—Submitted February 9, 2022—Decided May 5, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, 
No. E-18-064, 2020-Ohio-6781. 
__________________ 
FISCHER, J. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 1} Appellee, In this case, we are asked to decide whether venue for the 
crime of retaliation is proper in the county where the victim previously pursued 
criminal charges against the defendant and where the victim was located when the 
alleged retaliation occurred, even if the defendant did not take any action there.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Based on constitutional venue requirements and the statutory elements of 
retaliation, we hold that it is not.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Sixth 
District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 2} Gerry Moore Sr., lived with his wife of 21 years, Diane Moore, in Erie 
County until Diane filed for divorce in 2015.  Approximately one month after Diane 
filed for divorce and while they were living separately, Moore snuck into Diane’s 
Erie County home, held her at gunpoint, and attempted to kidnap her.  Diane 
escaped, and as she was running away, Moore shot at her.  Diane called 9-1-1 and 
law-enforcement officers later apprehended Moore. 
{¶ 3} Felony charges were brought in Erie County, and Moore pled guilty 
to felonious assault, kidnapping, failure to comply with an order or signal of a 
police officer, and inducing panic (the “2015 crimes”).  Moore was sentenced to 8 
years and 11 months in prison. 
{¶ 4} In 2017, while Moore was incarcerated in Marion County for his 2015 
crimes, he told his cellmate, Richard Kiser, that he blamed Diane for his 
incarceration.  Moore then offered Kiser $50,000 to kill Diane if Kiser were to be 
released from prison before him.  According to Kiser, Moore asked him to go to 
two bars that Diane frequented and “slip her a lethal dose of drugs to end her life.”  
Moore drew Kiser a map showing the locations of the two bars, Diane’s residence, 
and Diane’s place of employment, which were all in Erie County. 
{¶ 5} Kiser contacted Diane’s divorce attorney about Moore’s plot to kill 
Diane, and Diane’s attorney contacted Erie County law enforcement.  Erie County 
law enforcement reached out to Kiser, who agreed to wear a recording device.  The 
recording device captured Moore encouraging Kiser to kill Diane; Moore referred 
to the map he had drawn for Kiser, and he suggested several locations in Erie 
County where Kiser could kill Diane. 
{¶ 6} Based on Kiser’s statements and the recordings, Moore was indicted 
in Erie County for retaliation, attempted aggravated murder, and conspiracy (the 
January Term, 2022 
 
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“2017 charged offenses”).  Before trial, Moore objected to venue and requested that 
the proceedings be transferred to Marion County, where he was incarcerated when 
the conversations with Kiser occurred.  The trial court summarily denied Moore’s 
motion. 
{¶ 7} At trial, appellant, the state, alleged that Moore committed retaliation 
against Diane because she had pursued criminal charges against him for the 2015 
crimes that led to his incarceration.  At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, Moore 
moved for an acquittal under Crim.R. 29.  Moore argued that he must be acquitted 
of retaliation because there was no evidence that he reasonably expected Diane to 
learn of his threats against her.  Moore further argued that the state failed to prove 
venue because all the events giving rise to the charges occurred while he was 
incarcerated in Marion County.  The state responded that venue was proper in Erie 
County for the retaliation charge because the 2015 crimes had occurred in Erie 
County and Diane had pursued the original charges there.  The state then argued 
that venue was proper in Erie County for the other charges because they were part 
of the same course of criminal conduct as the retaliation offense. 
{¶ 8} The trial court denied Moore’s motion and held that venue was proper 
under R.C. 2901.12.  The jury then found Moore guilty on all three charges, and 
the trial court sentenced him to 22 years in prison. 
{¶ 9} Moore appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, again 
challenging venue and sufficiency of the evidence on the retaliation claim.  The 
Sixth District reversed Moore’s retaliation conviction because it found no evidence 
that Moore reasonably expected his threats to be communicated to Diane.  The 
Sixth District also found that the state failed to prove venue for the retaliation 
charge because all of Moore’s conversations with Kiser had occurred in Marion 
County.  Because venue for all the 2017 charged offenses was based solely on 
venue for the retaliation charge under R.C. 2901.12(H), the Sixth District reversed 
Moore’s convictions for all three charges. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 10} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal to consider the 
following proposition of law: “The offense of retaliation occurs in three venues, the 
place where the defendant made the threat, the place where the victim prosecuted 
prior charges and the location of the victim.”  See 163 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2021-Ohio-
1606, 167 N.E.3d 982. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 11} Venue is established under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 
Constitution, which requires criminal trials to be held in the “county in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed.”  Likewise, R.C. 2901.12(A) requires 
criminal trials to be held “in the territory of which the offense or any element 
thereof was committed.”  This statute also allows offenses committed in other 
jurisdictions “as a part of a course of criminal conduct” to be tried “in any 
jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses 
occurred.”  R.C. 2901.12(H). 
{¶ 12} The state’s claim of proper venue in this case rests entirely on the 
retaliation charge.  The retaliation statute reads in part: “No person, purposely and 
by force or by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall retaliate 
against the victim of a crime because the victim filed or prosecuted criminal 
charges.”  R.C. 2921.05(B).  The state’s main argument is that the victim’s pursuit 
of criminal charges against a defendant is an element of retaliation; therefore, venue 
for the retaliation charge in this case is proper in Erie County because that is where 
Diane pursued criminal charges against Moore in 2015.  The state further contends 
that venue for the attempted-aggravated-murder and conspiracy charges is proper 
in Erie County under R.C. 2901.12(H) because those offenses were committed in 
the same “course of criminal conduct” as the retaliation offense. 
{¶ 13} The state claims that venue is proper in Erie County for the 
retaliation charge because one of the elements of retaliation under R.C. 2921.05(B) 
is that “the victim filed or prosecuted criminal charges” against the defendant.  
January Term, 2022 
 
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However, in reviewing the statute, it is clear that that phrase is really part of the 
broader requirement that the defendant retaliated against the victim “because the 
victim filed or prosecuted criminal charges.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2921.05(B).  
The word “because” indicates that what is important is why the defendant used force 
against or threatened to harm the victim.  Division (B) of the retaliation statute does 
not criminalize using force against or threatening someone who previously pursued 
criminal charges if the reason for the use of force or the threat is unrelated to the 
original charges.  The force or threat of harm must be committed because the victim 
filed or prosecuted criminal charges against the defendant.  The element describes 
the required reason for the act. 
{¶ 14} This textual reading of the offense’s elements not only fits the 
statutory language, it is also in accord with the Ohio Constitution and Ohio’s venue 
statute.  Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides criminal defendants 
the right to a jury trial in “the county in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed.”  Likewise, R.C. 2901.12(A) requires criminal trials to be held “in the 
territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was committed.”  Both 
require the trial to be held where the offense or any of its elements were 
“committed.”  Article I, Section 10, Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2901.12(A). Neither a 
criminal offense nor its elements are committed by the victim.  Elements of a crime 
are committed by the defendant.  Thus, for an R.C. 2921.05(B) retaliation charge, 
venue is proper where the defendant committed the criminal offense or any of its 
elements, not where the victim previously pursued criminal charges against the 
defendant. 
{¶ 15} While the state argues that its position is supported by this court’s 
decision in State v. Chintalapalli, 88 Ohio St.3d 43, 45, 723 N.E.2d 111 (2000), 
this case is distinguishable.  In Chintalapalli, this court held that when a defendant 
fails to pay court-ordered child support, the violation of that order occurs where the 
defendant resides and in the county that issued the order.  However, the defendant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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in Chintalapalli lived outside Ohio, so the case involved the application of R.C. 
2901.11(A)(4), which grants the state jurisdiction over people outside the state who 
fail to perform a legal duty imposed by the state.  This court concluded that under 
R.C. 2901.11(A)(4), the failure to pay child support occurs both where the 
defendant resides and where the defendant is required to perform the legal 
obligation. 
{¶ 16} Unlike the crime at issue in Chintalapalli, retaliation is not an act of 
omission or a failure to comply with a court order.  It is an act of commission, which 
requires the defendant to take affirmative action.  As an act of commission, the 
elements of retaliation must be committed by the defendant.  Again, the final 
element in division (B) of the retaliation statute sets forth the required reason for 
the defendant’s use of force or threat of harm and is committed by the defendant, 
not the victim. 
{¶ 17} The state further suggests that venue is proper in Erie County 
because Moore has a “significant nexus” with Erie County.  However, this court 
previously made clear that the “significant nexus” language in State v. Draggo, 65 
Ohio St.2d 88, 92, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981), does not alter statutory venue 
requirements.  State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 478, 453 N.E.2d 716 (1983).  In 
Draggo, the defendant was a highway field examiner who was charged in Franklin 
County with falsifying records.  The defendant challenged venue because his work 
territory included eight counties, but not Franklin.  This court held that venue was 
proper in Franklin County under R.C. 2901.12(G) and (H).  When Draggo was 
decided, R.C. 2901.12(G) read: 
 
When it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that any 
offense or any element thereof was committed in any of two or 
more jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in 
January Term, 2022 
 
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which jurisdiction the offense or element was committed, the 
offender may be tried in any such jurisdiction. 
 
Draggo at 90; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, Section 1,134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1894, 1895. 
{¶ 18} In Draggo, this court reasoned that the defendant “answered directly 
to his supervisor in Franklin County; that he knowingly submitted his falsified daily 
activity reports to Franklin County in an attempt to defraud his supervisor; that he 
went to Franklin County when directed to do so by his supervisor; and that he 
received his salary by means of state warrants issued in Franklin County.”  Id. at 
92.  Therefore, the court held that while it was impossible to determine where the 
defendant had actually falsified his reports, the defendant had a “significant nexus” 
with Franklin County that satisfied the “any element” requirement of R.C. 
2901.12(G).  Draggo at 92.  However, in Headley, this court made clear that 
Draggo does not alter the requirement in R.C. 2901.12(G) that one of the elements 
of the crime must have been committed in the jurisdiction where the trial will take 
place.  A “significant nexus” is not enough.  Headley at 478. 
{¶ 19} The state also advocates that R.C. 2901.12(H) provides venue for all 
offenses that were “part of a course of criminal conduct” regardless of whether 
some of the offenses were already prosecuted.  The state argues that Moore’s 2015 
crimes and 2017 charged offenses were part of one course of criminal conduct 
because they involved the same victim and were in furtherance of Moore’s 
objective to kill Diane.  The 2015 crimes occurred in Erie County.  Therefore, the 
state argues, Erie County is a proper venue for trying the 2017 charged offenses. 
{¶ 20} The purpose of “course of criminal conduct” venue under R.C. 
2901.12(H) is to “effectuate a sensible, efficient approach to justice” because the 
“modern mobility of criminals” allows them to “perform unlawful deeds over vast 
geographical boundaries.”  Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d at 90, 418 N.E.2d 1.  Thus, in 
Draggo, this court recognized that R.C. 2901.12(H) exists to promote judicial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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economy and allow the state to prosecute multiple offenses during one trial in one 
county. 
{¶ 21} Applying R.C. 2901.12(H) to offenses that have already been 
prosecuted would not further the judicial-economy purpose of the statute because 
it would still result in multiple trials.  Furthermore, the latter of those trials would 
be tried in a county where none of the charged crimes had actually occurred.  The 
Ninth District Court of Appeals in State v. Williams, 2015-Ohio-3932, 42 N.E.3d 
347 (9th Dist.), recognized that venue cannot be based on a crime that was not 
charged in that case.  In Williams, the defendant picked a minor up in Lorain County 
and drove her to Cuyahoga County where he raped her.  The defendant was charged 
in Lorain County with rape because he had picked the minor up in Lorain County.  
However, the Ninth District held that venue in Lorain County was improper 
because none of the filed charges were based on the defendant’s conduct in Lorain 
County.  The Ninth District recognized that under R.C. 2901.12(H), venue cannot 
be based on offenses that were not charged. 
{¶ 22} Similarly here, if R.C. 2901.12(H) allowed the location of Moore’s 
2015 crimes to form the basis of venue for the 2017 charged offenses, the trial for 
the latter offenses would occur in a county where none of the charged crimes had 
occurred.  This would be a clear violation of the right to venue provided by Article 
I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 23} Finally, the state claims that venue is proper for a charge of 
retaliation in the county where the victim is located.  That approach makes sense 
when the defendant used force against or communicated a threat of harm to the 
victim in that location.  However, those facts are not in the case before us.  Moore 
did not use force against Diane in Erie County.  He did not threaten her by phone 
call or mail in Erie County.  All the threats that Moore made were spoken to his 
cellmate while they were both incarcerated in Marion County. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 24} The state suggests that because the act of force or harm against Diane 
would have occurred in Erie County if the murder plot had been carried out, venue 
is proper in Erie County.  But the venue statute indicates just the opposite.  The 
crimes of attempt and conspiracy may be charged in the county where the crime 
would have taken place only if all the defendant’s actions occurred outside the state 
of Ohio.  R.C. 2901.12(E) and 2901.11(A)(3).  In other words, when a defendant’s 
actions occurred in Ohio, venue is proper in the county where those actions 
occurred, not in the county where the harm would have occurred.  Because Moore’s 
actions that gave rise to the retaliation, attempted aggravated murder, and 
conspiracy charges occurred in Ohio, it does not matter that Diane’s murder would 
have been committed in Erie County if it had been accomplished. 
{¶ 25} For all these reasons, Erie County was not a proper venue for this 
case.  Because venue was improper for the retaliation charge, and venue for the 
other charged offenses was based on the retaliation charge, this court does not reach 
the issue of whether venue may be based on a charge of which the defendant was 
not convicted. 
{¶ 26} Amicus Ohio Attorney General also asks us to clarify that double-
jeopardy protections do not preclude the state from retrying Moore in a county in 
which venue is proper.  See, e.g, United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762, 771 
(6th Cir.2019) (“A dismissal on venue grounds does not qualify as an ‘acquittal’ 
for double jeopardy purposes.”).  But because that issue was neither raised by the 
parties below nor is a part of the proposition of law we accepted, we must leave it 
for another day. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 27} For the reasons stated above, we hold that the state failed to prove 
that venue was proper in Erie County.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the 
Sixth District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Kevin J. Baxter, Prosecuting Attorney, Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip D. Bogdanoff, Special Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney, for appellant. 
Karin L. Coble for appellee. 
Steven L. Taylor, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Diane R. Brey, Deputy Solicitor General, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost. 
_________________