Title: HARRY JOE BOUCH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HARRY JOE BOUCH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 122143 P.3d 643Case Number: 04-176Decided: 09/27/2006

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
HARRY JOE 
BOUCH,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Jason M. 
Tangeman, of Anthony, Nicholas, Tangeman & Yates, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice, delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, Chief Justice, files a 
specially concurring opinion.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Harry Joe Bouch 
entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of attempted second degree sexual 
assault and three counts of second degree sexual assault.1  He reserved his right to appeal an 
adverse determination of a motion to suppress evidence seized from his 
home.  We conclude that the district 
court erred in denying the motion to suppress.  The affidavit in support of the search 
warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand with 
instructions that Mr. Bouch be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
pleas.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      We restate the 
issues as follows: 

 
 
I.                     
Did the search warrant 
affidavit provide a sufficient nexus to lead a reasonably prudent and cautious 
person to believe that there was a probability that evidence of the crime was 
located at the address to be searched?

 
 
II.                   
Was Mr. Bouch's guilty 
plea entered involuntarily because he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel?   

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]      Mr. Bouch was 
charged in ConverseCounty with fifteen assorted felony counts 
for various acts of sexual misconduct with his four minor daughters.2  Mr. Bouch pled not guilty to all 
charges.  He retained counsel and 
was represented throughout the proceedings.  Prior to trial, Mr. Bouch filed a motion 
to suppress all evidence obtained from the execution of a search warrant at his 
residence, asserting that the affidavit presented to the magistrate did not 
establish probable cause.  The 
district court held a hearing and received testimony from the law enforcement 
officer who had signed the affidavit in support of the application for the 
search warrant.  The district court 
ruled that the affidavit did not establish a sufficient basis to search for most 
of the items that were seized, but denied the motion to suppress as it related 
to notes, letters, photographs, and a green box containing these items. Mr. 
Bouch sought interlocutory appellate review of the district court's 
decision.  We declined to accept the 
petition for review.

 
 

[¶4]      After his motion 
was denied, Mr. Bouch changed his plea pursuant to a plea agreement.  He pled guilty to four counts, one as to 
each daughter, and the other eleven counts were dismissed. The pleas were 
conditional, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).3  Mr. Bouch reserved the right to appeal 
the suppression determination.  The 
district court sentenced Mr. Bouch to a prison term of sixteen to eighteen years 
on each count, to run concurrently, and imposed a $10,000 fine.  A timely notice of appeal was filed. 
 Prior to completion of the appeal 
process, Mr. Bouch's counsel died.

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Bouch's new 
appellate counsel filed a motion requesting that the case be remanded to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing concerning the issue of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  We 
granted the motion, directing the district court to receive evidence and make 
findings regarding Mr. Bouch's claims pursuant to Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 692 (Wyo. 
1993).  Following remand, a hearing 
was held on March 2, 2005.  The 
district court issued its findings and conclusions on March 10, 2005, concluding 
that Mr. Bouch had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel with 
regard to the impact and meaning of his guilty plea.  However, the district court also found 
that prejudice may not have been established, depending upon the legal impact of 
our decision in Rutti v. State, 2004 
WY 133, 100 P.3d 394 (Wyo. 2004).  
The parties thereafter provided supplemental briefing on appeal 
addressing the issue of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

            

[¶6]      When evaluating 
the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit we are guided by these principles: 

 
 
An affidavit presented in 
support of a search warrant is presumed valid. Search warrant affidavits are 
tested by a less vigorous standard than those governing the admissibility of 
evidence at trial. We interpret a search warrant affidavit "in its totality in a 
commonsense and realistic fashion.'" Because of the desire to encourage law 
enforcement personnel to seek warrants, any doubt should be resolved by 
sustaining the search.

 
 

In re T.J.S. v. 
State, 2005 WY 68, ¶ 10, 113 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

            

[¶7]      In his first 
issue, Mr. Bouch contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress 
evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant.  On February 12, 2003, a police officer 
applied for a warrant to search 233 
North 6th Street in Douglas, Wyoming.  
He provided the magistrate with an affidavit in support of his 
application.  In its entirety, the 
affidavit provided:

  

            
I, [Affiant], being first duly sworn according to law depose and state as 
follows:

 
 
1.  That I am now, and have been at all 
times herein mentioned, a police officer for the Douglas Police Department, 
Douglas, Wyoming, and that all incidents and matters related herein 
took place and otherwise occurred in Douglas, Converse County, Wyoming.

 
 
2.  On February 11, 2003, Bob Shinmori, a 
Social Worker with the Department of Family Services, Laramie Peak District, 
Converse County Field Office, hereinafter referred to as DFS, reported that he 
had received a report from Douglas High School counselor, Bonnie Lane, that 
HARRY JOE BOUCH had allegedly molested his adoptive 
daughters.

 
 
3.  I made contact with [DB], who is 
approximately fifteen years and eleven months of age, having been born on or 
about March 7, 1987.  [DB] told me 
that her father, HARRY JOE BOUCH, had exposed his penis to her three or four 
times since they have lived in Douglas.  She further stated that he tried to have 
sexual contact with her, attempting to touch her sexually, while he exposed his 
penis.

 
 
4.  [DB] further stated to me that her 
sisters [AB] and [IB] had told her that they had seen their other sister, [AMB] 
and their father, Harry, having sex. 

5.  I made contact with [AMB], who is 
approximately fourteen years and four months of age, having been born on or 
about October 31, 1988, and she stated that she had been sexually assaulted by 
Harry, and that her father made her write sexually explicit notes to guys by the 
names of Richard and Sam, and he hid the notes  one of which was found on the 
heating ductwork in the basement.

 
 
7.  [sic] [DB] stated that she had written 
notes on a calendar of when [AMB] and Harry had sex, and other incidents that 
had occurred.  She further stated 
that her father had shown her Polaroid photographs of [AMB], one of which [AMB] 
was holding thong underwear that Harry had bought [AMB] and [DB], and another 
where she had her shirt off.  [DB] 
stated that Harry then burned the 
photographs.

 
 
8.  In cases of child molestation, there are 
frequently instances where the perpetrator has contacts through the internet and 
has accessed web sites displaying photographs of children, and may have placed 
photographs with respect to the victims on the computer hard drive or on web 
sites.

 
 
9.  That this Affidavit is made in support 
of a warrant to search 233 North 6th Street, Douglas, Converse 
County, Wyoming, for journals, diaries, letters, notes, photographs, Polaroid 
camera, sex toys, pornography, computer hard drive, computer cds, disks, 
calendar, thong underwear.

 
 
Further your Affiant 
sayeth naught.

 
 
DATED THIS 12 day of 
February, 2003.

                        
            
//signed by [Affiant]

 
 
The magistrate issued the 
warrant which authorized the search of 233 North 6th Street and the 
seizure of "journals, diaries, letters, notes, photographs, Polaroid camera, sex 
toys, pornography, computer hard drive, computer cds, disks, calendar, [and] 
thong underwear."  The officer 
executed the search at 233 North 
6th Street on February 12, 2003, during 
which time over seventy items were seized and 
inventoried.

 
 
[¶8]      On appeal, the 
State readily concedes that the district court properly suppressed most of the 
seized items, and therefore, those items are not at issue in this appeal.  For the sake of clarity, we will outline 
those items which, we agree, are not in dispute.  The majority of the suppressed items were 
not identified in the warrant, including candy, receipts, pieces of lace and 
rope, paper towels, a slip, a bathrobe, halter tops, plastic bags, a floral 
purse with accessories, pillow cases, bed sheets, blankets, socks, bras, couch 
cushions, a computer mouse, a computer keyboard, an 8mm video tape, and eight 
pairs of girls' underwear in varying sizes.  A diary, two computer towers, and two 
Polaroid cameras were also suppressed.  

 
 

[¶9]      Our review 
focuses upon the remaining items that the district court declined to 
suppress.  During the search, law 
enforcement also located a green metal military box with a lock marked "MSSGT HJ 
Bouch" in the basement of 233 North 
6th Street.  Within the box were five Polaroid 
pictures, six letters, and a scrap of paper.  Mr. Bouch contends that the district 
court erred in not suppressing these items as well.4 

 
 
[¶10]   At the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, the police officer who applied for the warrant testified.  He was questioned regarding his training 
and experience and the circumstances of the warrant issuance.  At the time of the hearing, he had been 
an officer for eight months.  The 
officer testified that he held the lowest level of certification and that this 
case was his first felony investigation and his first warrant application.  At the time he applied for the warrant, 
he had no experience investigating or dealing with someone accused of molesting 
a child or taking inappropriate photographs of a child.  His only training in this regard was a 
half-day class at the law enforcement academy.  The officer also testified that the 
search warrant affidavit was prepared by an employee of the county attorney's 
office who had been provided his reports.  
He stated that while he had not typed the affidavit, he reviewed it 
before signing it.  Although the 
officer personally appeared before the magistrate, he did not provide any 
additional information before the magistrate signed the warrant. 

 
 
[¶11]   At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the district court found that the affidavit established probable cause that a 
crime had been committed.  Defense 
counsel did not disagree with that conclusion but argued that the affidavit did 
not provide sufficient foundation that evidence of that crime would be found at 
233 North 6th 
Street.

 
 
. . . There is absolutely 
no connection in the affidavit  and we have to focus on the affidavit.  There is no nexus between that residence 
and those photographs.  There is no 
nexus whatsoever saying those are at that residence. . . .  You have to have some kind of nexus  
connection  between the crime and evidence, and tie it to a specific 
place.  This affidavit didn't do 
it.  It frankly doesn't cut 
it.

 
 
The district court 
announced a tentative decision to deny suppression of the notes, letters, and 
photographs but permitted the parties to submit written briefs in support of 
their positions.  Shortly 
thereafter, the district court issued a written decision and entered an order 
denying suppression of the notes, letters, photographs and the metal box where 
those items were found.

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Bouch asserts that the district 
court's decision was erroneous.  He 
claims that the affidavit failed to supply the magistrate with facts sufficient 
to connect notes, letters, photos, or Mr. Bouch, to the address to be 
searched.  He urges us to find that 
based upon the four corners of the affidavit, this essential nexus was lacking 
and, therefore, the warrant should not have issued.  Additionally, Mr. Bouch points to false 
information in the affidavit, asserting that such information should be excluded 
in assessing whether probable cause was demonstrated.  

 
 

[¶13]   In making his argument, Mr. Bouch 
relies upon Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, and our recent decisions 
interpreting that provision.5  Because the Wyoming Constitution, unlike 
the Fourth Amendment, requires an affidavit, rather than just an oath or 
affirmation, we have held that sufficient factual support for issuance of the 
warrant must be found within the affidavit.  Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d 904, 909 (Wyo. 2003); Hixson v. 
State, 2001 WY 99, ¶ 7, 33 P.3d 154, 157 (Wyo. 2001); Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 142, 148 (Wyo. 2001).  The 
affidavit must supply the issuing officer with sufficient information to make an 
independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant.  TJS, ¶ 12, 113 P.3d  at 1057; Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 
1292-1293 (Wyo. 1983).  The affidavit in support of the warrant, 
therefore, must include more than bare conclusions of the affiant.  Id.  
Because of this affidavit requirement, we have characterized Article 
1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution as somewhat stronger than its federal 
counterpart.  Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 132 
(Wyo. 
1976).  With these principles in 
mind, we turn to the contents of the affidavit.  

 
 

[¶14]   We note initially that the 
affidavit contains false information, as admitted by the officer during his 
testimony at the suppression hearing.6  However, the district court did not 
specifically address this issue.  
Based upon the record, we are unable to conclude that Mr. Bouch met his 
burden of proving that the affiant gave deliberately false statements or 
recklessly disregarded the truth.  
Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 93 (Wyo. 1993).  The false information in the affidavit 
may have resulted from negligence or innocent mistakes, which would not require 
that they be stricken from the affidavit.  
Id. at 
94.

 
 
[¶15]   Probable cause justifying issuance 
of a search warrant involves a twofold finding.  First, the factual situation must be 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent person to believe that a 
crime was being committed or that one had been committed. Second, there must be 
an adequate showing that the fruits of the crime or the evidence thereof are in 
the area or structure sought to be searched.  Cordova, ¶ 12, 33 P.3d  at 148.  This second prong is often described as 
requiring a "nexus" between the contraband to be seized or the suspected 
criminal activity and the place to be searched.  United 
States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th 
Cir. 1998).  It is "necessary that 
there be established a sufficient nexus between (1) criminal activity, and (2) 
the things to be seized, and (3) the place to be searched."  Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(d), at 412 
(4th ed. 2004).

 

[¶16]   Prior to this case, we have not 
specifically discussed the nexus requirement of probable cause.  Affidavits that we have found sufficient 
established the requisite nexus. E.g., Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207, 1214-1217 (Wyo. 2003) (facts connecting suspect to three locations); Kitzke v. State, 2002 WY 147, 55 P.3d 696, 700 (Wyo. 2002) (informant's description of premises belonging to suspect 
confirmed by officer investigation and observation); Cordova, ¶ 22, 33 P.3d  at 150-151 
(informant observed marijuana in residence and officer confirmed that suspect 
resided at place to be searched); Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444, 448 
(Wyo. 1996) (affidavit linked computer equipment stolen from elementary school 
to address to be searched and identified residents of that location).7

 
 
[¶17]   Under a probable cause analysis, 
the nexus inquiry is distinct from the first prong relating to criminal 
activity.  We have expressly 
rejected the notion that probable cause to believe one has committed a crime 
necessarily provides probable cause for a search of his residence.  Smith, 557 P.2d  at 134.  In Smith, we 
stated:

 
 
It is fundamental 
constitutional law, of course, that a search warrant may issue only upon a 
showing that there is probable cause to believe that the item sought is located 
on the premises for which the search warrant is 
requested.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
But of course it cannot 
follow in all cases, simply from the existence of probable cause to believe 
a suspect guilty, that there is also probable cause to search his 
residence.

 
 

Id. at 133 (citations 
omitted).  Accord Rowland, 145 F.3d  at 1204.  ("Probable cause to search a person's 
residence does not arise based solely upon probable cause that the person is 
guilty of a crime.  Instead, there 
must be additional evidence linking the person's home to the suspected criminal 
activity.").  

 
 
[¶18]   As noted by one court, if probable 
cause does not require a connection to the search location, the risk arises that 
an officer might "just as easily [supply] the magistrate with an address 
belonging to an unrelated third party."  Janis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 649, 
653 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). An absence of a nexus precludes a finding of probable 
cause.  United 
States v. 
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. 
Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582 (4th Cir. 1993); State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 749-751 
(Minn. 1998); State v. Longbine, 896 P.2d 367, 372 
(Kan. 1995); People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1267 
(Colo. 1994); 
Guth v. Commonwealth, 29 S.W.3d 809, 
811 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).  As 
explained below, we conclude that the affidavit in this case failed to establish 
the required nexus between the crime, or the evidence thereof, and the location 
to be searched.

 
 
[¶19]   There is nothing within the 
affidavit that connects notes, letters, photographs, or Mr. Bouch, to 
233 North 6th 
Street.  
Although we afford favorable inferences to support the issuance of the 
warrant, we cannot make inferences from facts that are not present.  While we do not require certainty in 
probable cause determinations, mere suspicion is not sufficient ground to issue 
a search warrant.  Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 478 
(Wyo. 1983). 
  This affidavit did not 
indicate why the officer believed that the items to be seized would be 
located at 233 North 6th 
Street or even that Mr. Bouch had a connection with 
the given address.  See, e.g., United States v. Hang Le-Thy Tran, 433 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2006); Mills v. 
City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Nothing is stated 
about why 801 North Allison is being searched."); United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original) ("[T]he affidavit completely 
neglects to indicate why the affiant 
believed that Shutters himself had any connection with the Tennessee 
Residence.").

 
 
[¶20]   The State argues that the nexus can 
be inferred, but the paucity of support offered by the State for this 
proposition is revealing.  The sole 
case cited by the State, United States v. 
Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 681-682 (7th Cir. 1996), is clearly 
distinguishable.  The challenged 
affidavit in Hunter ". . . referred 
four times to Hunter's residence."  Id. 
at 682.  The Hunter court understandably concluded 
that "the warrant application and affidavit     . . . clearly 
established that the place to be searched was Hunter's residence."  Id. 
at 681. Additionally, subsequent Sixth Circuit cases have specifically discussed 
a lack of any nexus as fatal to probable cause, and we find these decisions to 
be more on point.  See Hang Le-Thy Tran, 433 F.3d 472 and Van Shutters, 163 F.3d  at 336.  In direct contrast to the facts in Hunter, the affidavit challenged in this 
case makes no mention of Mr. Bouch's residence and does not identify 233 North 6th 
Street as Mr. Bouch's residence, the place where his 
daughters reside, or as a place having any connection to Mr. Bouch or the 
alleged crime.   

 
 
[¶21]   We have long recognized that the 
Wyoming Constitution requires a four corners analysis, and it is this emphasis 
upon the affidavit itself which informs our decision today.  Our cases firmly demonstrate that a 
finding of probable cause must be grounded in facts appearing in the 
affidavit.  Schirber v. State, 2006 WY 121, ¶ 7, ___ 
P.3d ____ (Wyo. 2006); Hixson, ¶ 7, 
33 P.3d  at 157; Cordova, ¶ 14, 33 P.3d  at 148-149.  Although we view 
affidavits in a practical and common sense way, we are ultimately constrained by 
the information included in the affidavit.  
Page, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d  at 909. 
 In this case, the officer omitted 
facts which should have been obvious, but which were nevertheless excluded from 
the affidavit.  We must disagree 
with the State that we can substitute "inferences" for these essential facts 
under the guise of a "common sense" reading.  In the absence of facts within the 
affidavit, establishing a nexus between the place to be searched and the 
evidence sought, we cannot find probable cause.  

 
 
[¶22]   Our sister courts in Montana and Washington have expressed similar sentiments 
explaining why the State's approach is incongruous with a four corners 
analysis.  In rejecting an expansive 
use of inferences to find a nexus, the Montana Supreme Court stated:  

 
 
We decline to eviscerate 
the requirement that when a person's residence is to be searched, the 
application must demonstrate the probability that the items to be seized will be 
found within it.

 
 
The warrant requirement 
is the mechanism implementing the constitutional protection against the "chief 
evil" of the government physically invading the privacy and sanctity of a 
person's home. . . .

 
 
Moreover, this bedrock 
principle cannot be overcome by resorting solely to "common sense," "practical 
considerations," and "probability." Facts stated in the application are also 
statutorily and constitutionally required before the magistrate is entitled to 
use these other intuitive approaches in making the totality of circumstances 
determination. Here, there were no facts included in the application for search 
warrant that implicated Graham's home. Common sense, practical considerations 
and probabilities are not, therefore, 
enough.

 
 
Rather, if the 
authorities had probable cause to search Graham's home, then they were required 
under well-settled principles of search and seizure law to include facts 
supporting that conclusion within the four corners of the search warrant 
application and to ensure that the home was particularly designated as a place 
to be searched in the warrant.

 
 

State v. 
Graham, ¶¶ 24-27, 103 P.3d 1073, 1080 (Mont. 2004) (internal citations omitted).  In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of 
Washington emphasized that underlying facts are needed to support an inferential 
nexus.

 
 
Absent a sufficient basis 
in fact from which to conclude evidence of illegal activity will likely be found 
at the place to be searched, a reasonable nexus is not established as a matter 
of law. . . .

. . . [O]ur precedent requires 
probable cause be based on more than conclusory predictions. Blanket inferences 
of this kind substitute generalities for the required showing of reasonably 
specific "underlying circumstances" that establish evidence of illegal activity 
will likely be found in the place to be searched in any particular case. . . 
.

 
 
The rule the State 
proposes would broaden "to an intolerable degree" the strict requirement that 
probable cause to search a certain location must be based on a factual 
nexus between the evidence sought and 
the place to be searched. Such a rule 
would not only subvert fundamental constitutional protections but would be 
inconsistent with the approach and reasoning of our previous 
cases.

 
 

State v. 
Thein, 977 P.2d 582, 588-589 
(Wash. 1999) 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  Likewise, we conclude that permissible 
inferences must arise from facts appearing in the affidavit.  Contrary to the State's contention, this 
is not unduly rigorous and is not at odds with our espoused policy favoring 
warrant applications.  First, we 
afford every favorable inference to, and may consider the totality of the 
circumstances appearing from, the facts that do appear within the affidavit.  Second, Wyoming law specifically affords the issuing 
judicial officer an opportunity to cure a flawed affidavit in a manner that 
preserves a record for later review. 

 
 
[¶23]   Unlike reviewing courts, the 
issuing officer is not necessarily limited to consideration of the facts the 
affiant has chosen to include in the affidavit.  In Wyoming, a judicial officer may seek 
supplementation of a search warrant affidavit by examining the applicant under 
oath and having that testimony recorded.  
W.R.Cr.P. 41(c). That provision provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(c) Issuance and 
contents of warrant.  - A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn 
to before a person authorized by law to administer oaths and establishing the 
grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judicial officer is satisfied that the 
grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe 
that they exist, the judicial officer shall issue a warrant particularly 
identifying the property or person to be seized and naming or describing the 
person or place to be searched. Before 
ruling on a request for a warrant the judicial officer may require the affiant 
to appear personally and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses 
the affiant may produce, provided that such proceeding shall be taken down by a 
court reporter or recording equipment and made part of the affidavit. . . 
.

 
 

(Emphasis added.)  This rule highlights the important role 
of judicial officers in the search warrant application process.  It also reinforces the principle that the 
probable cause determination for a search warrant be based upon a permanent 
record.  Hixson, ¶¶ 5-7, 33 P.3d  at 156-157.  In this case, the magistrate may have 
been able to remedy the lack of nexus problem had he invoked his authority under 
W.R.Cr.P. 41(c) or simply refused to sign the warrant until an adequate nexus 
had been set forth in the affidavit.8

[¶24]   The officer's affidavit failed to 
provide any basis to believe that evidence would be located at 233 North 6th 
Street.  
The only mention of 233 
North 6th Street is in the last paragraph, 
i.e. the request to search it.  The 
fact that an officer is requesting a search of a particular location has no 
bearing on whether or not probable cause exists.  "Facts which lead the affiant to believe 
that a warrant is justified must be presented in the affidavit." Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 
1293.

 
 
[¶25]   As the foregoing demonstrates, the 
affidavit did not supply the requisite nexus between the suspected criminal 
activity and 233 North 
6th Street.  The magistrate did not have a sufficient 
basis to find probable cause and should not have issued the warrant.  The district court erred in failing to 
suppress the remaining items obtained from the 
search.

  

[¶26]   Perhaps anticipating our decision, 
the State has requested that we make clear that our decision only pertains to 
evidence obtained pursuant to the execution of the search warrant at 233 North 6th 
Street, on February 12, 2003.  In that regard, the State specifically 
references two calendars provided by DB to law enforcement subsequent to the 
search.  Additionally, there is some 
mention by the parties of a search conducted at the Bouch residence prior to 
February 12, 2003.  We agree with 
the State that this opinion does not address any of the State's evidence 
obtained by means other than the search at issue here.  However, the State's request for 
clarification raises additional concerns.

[¶27]   The existence of additional 
evidence against Mr. Bouch not addressed in this appeal causes us to question 
the use of a conditional plea under the circumstances of this case.  The evidentiary value of the notes, 
letters, and photographs is not immediately apparent because these items were 
not included in the record on appeal.  
We do not have any indication that suppression of these items will 
preclude the State from pursuing any, or all, of the charges it originally filed 
against Mr. Bouch.  Indeed, the 
State's specific mention of other evidence and the request to clarify that we 
have not suppressed such evidence, indicates the State's intent to continue to 
prosecute Mr. Bouch if he prevailed on appeal.  Additionally, comments contained in the 
district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the Calene hearing indicate that Mr. Bouch 
also anticipated a trial even if he prevailed on appeal.  The district court stated, "It is likely 
that the Defendant . . . believed that he would win his suppression appeal 
before the Wyoming Supreme Court and 
then be able to present his case before a jury."  (Emphasis added.)  

 
 
[¶28]   Generally, a trial court should 
only approve a conditional plea if assured that the decision of the appellate 
court will dispose of the case.  United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 647-648 (4th 
Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 999 (7th Cir. 
1989).  The provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2) regarding conditional pleas are similar to those set forth in Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The advisory notes to the 1983 Amendment 
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indicate that the 
conditional plea procedure is appropriate only when determination of the issue 
on appeal would resolve the case:

 
 
. . . As 
for consent by the government, it will ensure that conditional pleas will be 
allowed only when the decision of the court of appeals will dispose of the case 
either by allowing the plea to stand or by such action as compelling dismissal 
of the indictment or suppressing essential evidence. Absent such circumstances, 
the conditional plea might only serve to postpone the trial and require the 
government to try the case after substantial delay, during which time witnesses 
may be lost, memories dimmed, and the offense grown so stale as to lose jury 
appeal. The government is in a unique position to determine whether the matter 
at issue would be case-dispositive, and, as a party to the litigation, should 
have an absolute right to refuse to consent to potentially prejudicial delay. . 
. .

Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983 
Amendment.

 
 
[¶29]   Prior to entering his guilty plea, 
Mr. Bouch petitioned this Court for review of the district court's ruling on the 
motion to suppress.  We denied the 
petition.  In essence, the reserved 
appeal resulting from the conditional plea is a renewed attempt to obtain 
interlocutory review of the district court's evidentiary ruling.  In our discretion, we could have 
declined to address this issue because it would not be case dispositive.  However, in light of the unique 
circumstances of this case and because we have not previously addressed our 
concerns regarding the proper application of W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) raised here, we 
have opted to consider and determine the appellate issues relating to the motion 
to suppress.  Having determined that 
the motion to suppress should have been granted, we need not address the 
ineffectiveness of counsel issue raised by Mr. Bouch.  

 
 
[¶30]   We reverse the district court's 
decision denying the motion to suppress.  
The judgment and sentence is hereby vacated and we remand to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Upon remand, Mr. Bouch shall be allowed 
to withdraw his guilty pleas.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶31]   I concur.  I write separately for the reasons set 
forth in my concurring opinion in Rohda 
v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶¶ 28-29, __ P.3d __, __ (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the 
change of plea hearing, Mr. Bouch pled guilty to three counts of second degree 
sexual assault and one count of attempted second degree sexual assault.  However, the Judgment and Sentence 
states that he pled guilty to four counts of second degree sexual assault.  Our disposition of this case makes it 
unnecessary for us to address this 
discrepancy.

 
 

2The original 
information included sixteen counts.  
After a preliminary hearing, Mr. Bouch was bound over on all counts.  The information was amended to charge 
fifteen counts.

 
 

3W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2) provides:

 
 
With the 
approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a defendant 
may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing 
the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on 
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the 
plea.

 
 

4These items 
were not included in the record on 
appeal.

 
 

5Article 1, § 
4 provides:

 
 
The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
 
In his 
brief, Mr. Bouch states that he brings his claim under the Fourth Amendment only 
to the extent necessary to preserve issues for any subsequent federal habeas 
proceedings. He provides no Fourth Amendment 
analysis.

 
 

6Mr. 
Bouch's trial counsel questioned the officer about inconsistencies between 
statements in the affidavit and information in the officer's reports.  The officer admitted that the incident 
described by DB in paragraph 7 about photographs shown to her and then burned 
did not take place in Douglas, Wyoming as asserted in paragraph 1 of the 
affidavit.  That incident took place 
in South Carolina before the family moved to 
Wyoming.  

 
 

7Even those 
affidavits which were otherwise lacking probable cause recited some nexus to the 
search location.  Page, ¶ 7, 63 P.3d  at 907-908 
(identifying residents and providing officer observations during welfare check 
at residence); Hixson, ¶ 8, 33 P.3d  
at 157-158 (identifying resident of premises and asserting belief that he was 
keeping controlled substances there).

 
 

8Under 
federal law, a magistrate may have even greater flexibility to remedy the 
defects in an affidavit before issuing a warrant. For example, an affidavit 
supplying no nexus was examined in Hang 
Le-Thy Tran, 433 F.3d 472.  In 
that case, the defendant challenged the warrant for her mobile home, asserting 
that it lacked probable cause since it failed to state the required nexus 
between the place to be searched and the crime.  Id. 
at 481.  The trial court denied the 
motion to suppress, finding that a "common sense" reading of the affidavit 
established a relationship between the defendant and the place to be 
searched.  Id. at 479.  The probable cause deficiency in the 
affidavit was noted by the appellate court:

 
 
The 
affidavit supporting the search warrant for 338 Vinedale SE, Kentwood, Michigan, described the residence with 
particularized detail, setting forth both the mobile home's exact location and 
its physical appearance. Likewise, it identified the items to be seized in an 
equally detailed fashion, recounted the arson at KimberlyBeautyCollege on March 25, 2002, and connected 
Tran with the arson. The underlying affidavit, however, neither explicitly 
connected the searched residence located at 338 Vinedale SE to the fire at 
KimberlyBeautyCollege, nor stated that a person 
connected with the arson lived at the searched residence. The affidavit contains 
no statement or evidence that Tran lived at 338 Vinedale SE. In short, the 
affidavit did not indicate why 
Detective Struve believed that the items to be seized would be located at 
338 Vinedale SE or that the defendant had a connection with the mobile home 
located at the given address. 

 
 
Id. 
at 481-482 (emphasis in 
original).  However, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the deficiency in the warrant was "cured" by 
oral explanation by the officer presented in supplementation of the 
affidavit.  Testimony at the 
suppression hearing established that it was the magistrate's practice to examine 
warrant applicants to ensure a nexus.  
In response to such questioning, ". . . Detective Struve established that 
the defendant lived at the residence to be searched, and that he believed that 
evidence of the arson would be found in the defendant's mobile home."  Id. 
at 482.