Title: Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander1988 WY 17750 P.2d 294Case Number: 87-96, 87-106Decided: 02/22/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming

BRUCE N. EDDY, 
INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), J.E.B. RANCH, A WYOMING CORPORATION, AND 
E.C. CATES, INDIVIDUALLY, (DEFENDANTS),

v.

FIRST WYOMING BANK, N.A.-LANDER, LANDER,WYOMING, A UNITED STATES BANKING CORPORATION, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

E.C. CATES, INDIVIDUALLY, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

J.E.B. RANCH, A WYOMING 
CORPORATION, AND BRUCE N. EDDY, INDIVIDUALLY, 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

FIRST WYOMING BANK, 
N.A.-LANDER, LANDER, WYOMING, A UNITED STATES BANKING CORPORATION, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

James R. 
McCarty, Casper, 
for appellant 
Eddy.

E.C. Cates, pro se.

W. Thomas 
Sullins, II and J. Kenneth Barbe of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and MACY, JJ., 
and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     These consolidated 
appeals challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings regarding 
the intent and meaning of a stipulation and confession of 
judgment.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On January 28, 1982, 
appellee First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander (bank) filed a complaint seeking to 
recover amounts owing on several promissory notes signed by appellants Bruce N. 
Eddy and E.C. Cates as either co-makers or guarantors. On May 23, 1983, the 
court executed a judgment against appellants in the amount of $207,110.55 plus 
interest at ten percent per annum beginning January 28, 1982, pursuant to a 
stipulation and confession of judgment. That stipulation and confession of 
judgment provided in applicable part:

"That [the bank] shall 
have judgment against the [appellants], jointly and severally, as of 28 January, 
1982, * * * in the amount of $207,110.55 together with interest thereon at the 
rate of 10% per annum from and after 28 January, 1982 * * 
*."

 

Subsequent to 
entry of the judgment, a dispute arose as to whether appellants' payments to the 
bank during the period of January 28, 1982, to May 23, 1983, had already been 
credited in arriving at the stipulated amount awarded or whether these payments 
should reduce the $207,110.55 judgment. In response, the court entered a 
judgment nunc pro tunc clarifying its previous judgment. That judgment included 
the following findings:

"3. The Judgment as 
rendered on May 23, 1983, does not contain any clerical 
error.

"4. That by the language, 
meaning and effect of the Judgment as rendered herein on May 23, 1983, the 
[appellants], jointly and severally, owed to [the bank] on May 23, 1983, the 
principal sum of $207,110.55 together with interest on said principal sum at the 
rate of 10% per annum calculated from and after January 28, 1982 * * 
*."

Appellants' 
appeal challenging the court's judgment nunc pro tunc 
followed.

[¶4.]     This Court remanded the 
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties' 
intent regarding the date the $207,110.55 mentioned in the stipulation and 
confession of judgment was due and owing; i.e., January 28, 1982, the date the 
complaint was filed, or May 23, 1983, the date the judgment was executed. Eddy 
v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander, Wyo., 713 P.2d 228 (1986). After conducting 
such evidentiary hearing, the court found in favor of the bank and issued its 
decision letter which provides in pertinent part:

"The Court finds that the 
parties intended that a judgment would be entered against the [appellants] for 
the principal amount due the bank, $193,929.86, together with attorney's fees of 
$13,180.69, for a total judgment of $207,110.55, to be effective at the time the judgment was 
executed by the trial court, on May 23, 1983. In the negotiations among the 
parties, it was understood by all that the bank would not compromise as to the 
principal amount due. The bank did agree to compromise as to the attorney's 
fees, the interest rate, and the time at which the lower interest rate would 
commence. For that reason, the parties provided that the judgment would bear 
interest at the rate of ten per cent beginning on January 28, 1982. The parties 
did not intend that the [appellants] were to be given a double credit for 
payments made to the bank after January 28, 1982, and until the date of the 
judgment. This construction of the documents is consistent with the subsequent 
conduct of the [appellants], who recognized that this was the agreement for a 
substantial time after May 23, 1983. To accept the position for which the 
[appellants] argue would be to provide them with a windfall in the form of 
double credits for payments made, a result which was not intended by anyone." 
(Emphasis added.)

On February 19, 
1987, the court entered an order clarifying and confirming its previously 
executed judgment of May 23, 1983. Appellants now appeal from that order, 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's 
decision regarding the intent of the parties.

[¶5.]     In this appeal, both 
appellants complain that the trial court's judgment did not take into account 
all the evidence presented before it.1 They contend that, if the trial 
court had chosen to believe certain credible evidence presented, it could not 
have found that appellants' intent was that the sum of $207,110.55 would be due 
and owing as of May 23, 1983, the date the judgment was 
executed.

[¶6.]     The function of this 
Court as an appellate court is not to resolve conflicting evidence or to retry 
the case. Gasaway v. Reiter, Wyo., 736 P.2d 749 (1987). Rather, when faced 
with a question involving the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, 

"`we assume that 
the evidence in favor of the successful party is true leaving out of 
consideration the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith and 
give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may 
reasonably and fairly be drawn from it.'" Id. 
at 751, quoting Walter v. Moore, Wyo., 
700 P.2d 1219, 1222 (1985).

See also Harmon 
v. Town of Afton, Wyo., 745 P.2d 889, 891 (1987). Unless the 
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of 
the evidence, we will not disturb its ruling on appeal. Fray v. Fray, Wyo., 721 P.2d 1054 (1986), quoting Pancratz Company, Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Construction/Development, Inc., Wyo., 720 P.2d 906 (1986).

[¶7.]     We conclude that there 
is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings (1) that it was the 
intent of the parties that the stipulated amount of $207,110.55 would be due and 
owing as of May 23, 1983; and (2) that it was not the intent of the parties that 
appellants would be entitled to double credit for the escrow payments received. 
The evidence shows that, while negotiating the settlement through numerous oral 
and written communications, the bank's attorney repeatedly advised the parties 
that the bank would accept no less than the principal amount due and that it 
would not compromise the amount in any way. The evidence further shows that, 
between the date the complaint was filed and the date the judgment was signed, 
the bank received periodic payments from the escrow accounts which were credited 
to, and reduced the amount due on, the promissory notes. The stipulation 
executed by the parties, as well as the judgment approved as to form by all the 
attorneys, also set out the separate principal balances due on each note. The 
total amount of principal set out in both the stipulation and the judgment was 
lower than that set out in the complaint.

[¶8.]     We are unable to 
locate, and appellants have failed to point out, any evidence indicating the 
parties ever discussed any reduction of the principal amount due. An adoption of 
appellants' position that the parties' intent was that the agreed upon amount 
would be effective January 28, 1982, would lead to the illogical and unintended 
result of double credits being given on the promissory notes. This conclusion 
clearly is not supported by the evidence.

[¶9.]     
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 We recognize that, 
through his brief in this case, appellant Cates brings numerous other issues 
before this Court on appeal. However, we conclude that these issues were 
addressed in the case of Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander, Wyo., 713 P.2d 228 (1986), when this Court 
held that an ambiguity existed. In any event, we have determined that the issue 
addressed in this case is dispositive.