Title: Edward Dawson v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Victoria L. Bailey 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ann L. Goodwin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-1103-CR-176 
 
 
EDWARD DAWSON, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff  below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court,  
No. 49G02-0804-FB-087393 
The Honorable Robert R. Altice, Jr., Judge  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1001-CR-155 
_________________________________ 
 
March 29, 2011 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
The trial court’s final, appealable order revoking Dawson’s probation and ordering him to 
serve six years in the Department of Correction was entered in April 2009.  Some eight months 
later, the trial court granted Dawson permission to file a belated notice of appeal pursuant to 
Post-Conviction Rule 2.   
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Mar 29 2011, 10:18 am
2 
 
 
The rule allows belated appeals in certain criminal cases.1  A threshold question in this 
appeal is whether Post-Conviction Rule 2 allows belated appeals from an order revoking 
probation.  The Court of Appeals held that the rule did not apply and declined to consider 
Dawson’s appeal on the merits.  Dawson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 841, 844-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  
 
 
The Court of Appeals correctly decided that belated appeals from orders revoking 
probation are not presently available pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2.  We agree with the 
Court of Appeals’ analysis that the sanction imposed when probation is revoked does not qualify 
as a “sentence” under the Rule, and therefore Dawson is not an “eligible defendant.”  
Accordingly, we grant transfer and adopt and incorporate by reference the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals under Appellate Rule 58(A)(1). 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, Rucker and David, JJ., concur.  
                                                 
1 As relevant to this case, Post-Conviction Rule 2 provides:   
Eligible defendant defined. An “eligible defendant” for purposes of this Rule is a 
defendant who, but for the defendant's failure to do so timely, would have the 
right to challenge on direct appeal a conviction or sentence after a trial or plea of 
guilty by filing a notice of appeal, filing a motion to correct error, or pursuing an 
appeal. 
. . . . 
Section 1. Belated Notice of Appeal 
(a) Required Showings. An eligible defendant convicted after a trial or plea of 
guilty may petition the trial court for permission to file a belated notice of 
appeal of the conviction or sentence if:  
(1) the defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal;  
(2) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not due to the fault of the 
defendant; and  
(3) the defendant has been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated 
notice of appeal under this rule.