Title: Karen D’amario v. Ford Motor Company

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
Nos. SC95881 & SC96139
____________
KAREN D’AMARIO, individually and
on behalf of Clifford Harris, a minor, and
CLIFFORD HARRIS, individually,
Petitioners,
vs.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Respondent,
____________________________________________
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, etc., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
BRIAN NASH, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Maria Nash,
Respondent.
[November 21, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in Ford Motor Co. v. D’Amario, 732 So.
2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which we have concluded conflicts with the decision
1We accepted jurisdiction to review both cases and thereafter consolidated
the cases for purposes of appeal and final resolution.  We have jurisdiction under
article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
2We say ordinarily because we recognize that in some cases a valid issue
may exist as to whether the plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the cause of the
enhanced injuries.  In that case, the automobile manufacturer should be permitted to
assert that plaintiff’s negligence was a legal cause of the enhanced injuries.
-2-
in Nash v. General Motors Corp., 734 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), on the issue
of whether principles of comparative fault apply in a crashworthiness case.1  We
hold that principles of comparative fault concerning apportionment of fault as to the
cause of the underlying crash will not ordinarily apply in crashworthiness or
enhanced injury cases.2  Because the manufacturer alleged to be responsible for a
defective product that results in a second accident and injury ordinarily may not be
held liable for the injuries caused by the initial accident, the fault of the manufacturer
may not be compared or apportioned with the fault of the driver of the vehicle who
allegedly caused the initial crash. 
SECONDARY INJURY CASES
Both cases before us involve lawsuits premised on the crashworthiness
doctrine.  Such cases, which are also often referred to as “secondary collision” or
“enhanced injury” cases, involve both an initial accident and a subsequent or
secondary collision caused by an alleged defective condition created by a
-3-
manufacturer, which is unrelated to the cause of the initial accident but which
causes additional and distinct injuries beyond those suffered in the primary
collision.  One court has explained that the damages sought in such cases “are not
for injuries sustained in the original collision but for those sustained in the second
impact where some design defect caused an exacerbated injury which would not
have otherwise occurred as a result of the original collision.”  Meekins v. Ford
Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339, 341 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first recognized a cause of action
against an automobile manufacturer for enhanced injuries caused by a defective
product in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).  The
Larsen court reasoned that “[n]o rational basis exists for limiting recovery to
situations where the defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the
accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called
‘second collision’ of the passenger with the interior part of the automobile, all are
foreseeable.”  Id. at 502.  While the court acknowledged that an “automobile
manufacturer is under no duty to design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle,” it
nevertheless concluded the following:
[s]uch manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the
design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable
risk of injury in the event of a collision.  Collisions with or without
-4-
fault of the user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are
statistically inevitable.
Id.  Accordingly, the court held:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer
should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the
defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably
would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the
defective design.
Id. at 502-03.  The ruling in Larsen recognizing a distinct cause of action against
manufacturers for secondary collisions caused by defective products has
subsequently received widespread approval throughout the country.
Florida adopted the principle of Larsen in Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327
So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 1976), wherein we declared: “We hold that a manufacturer of
automobiles may be held liable under certain conditions for a design or
manufacturing defect which causes injury but is not the cause of the primary
collision.”  See also Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1981)
(extending crashworthiness doctrine to cases sounding in strict liability as well as
negligence).  However, while the crashworthiness doctrine is now well established
in this state, it is not entirely clear whether or how the principles of comparative
3This Court in Evancho expressly declined to address the issue.  See
Evancho, 327 So. 2d at 204 n.4.  Similarly, in Hill, this Court did not expressly
address the issue on the face of the opinion.  Rather, it adopted the opinion of the
district court of appeal on the issue of indemnification.  See 404 So. 2d at 1052. 
The district court held that the manufacturer of a defective product may not seek
indemnification (through a third party complaint) from the driver and his employer
based on their negligence in causing the accident.  The court reasoned that a third
party complaint based on indemnification may only “lie where the liability if any is
‘solely vicarious, constructive, derivative or technical.’”  Ford Motor Co. v. Hill,
381 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), approved, 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1981). 
The court concluded “a defendant manufacturer’s defective product, which
proximately causes an injury, presupposes much more than mere vicarious
liability.”  Id.  These decisions were issued prior to the legislative adoption of
comparative fault.  Thus, none of these decisions directly resolves the issue before
us.
4The driver died as a result of burns and smoke inhalation.  The record
reveals that another passenger was also in the car and he, too, died as a result of
smoke inhalation and burn injuries.  Both Harris and the driver were fifteen years
old at the time of the accident.  
-5-
fault should apply in such cases.3  That is the issue presented in the two cases
before us today.
D’Amario
In D’Amario, Clifford Harris, a minor, was injured when the car in which he
was riding as a passenger collided with a tree and then burst into flames.  The car
was driven by a friend of Harris who was allegedly intoxicated and speeding at the
time of the accident.4  As described in the opinion below:
A witness to the crash circled the car twice and noticed a fire in the
engine area.  Some minutes later, the fire spread and an explosion
-6-
occurred, engulfing the car in flames.  Harris was severely injured,
losing three limbs and suffering burns to much of his body.
D’Amario, 732 So. 2d at 1145.  Harris, and his mother, Karen D’Amario, sued
Ford alleging that a defective relay switch in the automobile caused Harris’s
injuries.  The plaintiffs did not seek damages against Ford for the injuries to Harris
caused by the initial collision with the tree.  Rather, they sought damages for the
injuries caused by the alleged defective relay switch only.  Ford asserted as an
affirmative defense that the injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of a
third party, although in its answer to the complaint, Ford did not specifically
identify the vehicle’s driver as a non-party tortfeasor.
At trial, the two sides advanced conflicting theories as to the cause of the fire
and Harris’s injuries.  The plaintiffs’ “theory of liability was that a relay switch
failed, thus preventing it from disrupting the flow of power to the fuel pump.”  Id. 
Plaintiffs’ experts “testified that gasoline continued to be pumped after the impact
and caused the fire.”  Id.  On the other hand, Ford’s “experts countered that the
relay switch and fuel pump properly worked and that the original crash caused an
oil pan to burst, which resulted in an oil-based fire.  [Ford] pointed to the slow
spreading nature of the fire in support of its theory.”  Id.  Hence, clear lines and
choices for the jury were drawn between the positions of the parties, the plaintiffs
5The trial court cited Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981), as the legal basis for its ruling.  It further ruled that it would allow the
defense to proffer evidence of the driver’s intoxication at trial.  
-7-
asserting the failure of the manufacturer’s product, and the manufacturer countering
that its products worked properly and no failure occurred.
Prior to jury selection, the plaintiffs moved to exclude evidence about the
driver’s alcohol consumption on the day of the accident and the trial court ruled
that evidence of the driver’s alcohol consumption would be excluded.5  The court
reasoned that the acts leading up to the collision were not at issue, rather, the issue
as to Ford’s liability concerned events occurring after the initial collision with the
tree.  However, at trial, Ford moved to amend its affirmative defenses to include an
allegation that Harris’s injuries were caused by the fault of a third party, and
proffered evidence of the driver’s intoxication and excessive speed.  The trial court
granted Ford’s request and held that an apportionment defense was available and
evidence of the driver’s actions in causing the initial accident could be admitted in
support of such defense.  In the face of such ruling, the parties stipulated to the
jury that the negligent and excessive speed of the driver caused the initial accident
and that at the time the driver had a blood alcohol level of .14 percent.  
Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding
that Ford was not a legal cause of the injuries to Harris.  Because the jury found for
6See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
-8-
the defense, it did not reach the question on the interrogatory verdict form as to the
driver’s comparative negligence.  D’Amario subsequently moved for a new trial,
alleging that the court erred in permitting evidence of the driver’s intoxication to go
to the jury.  D’Amario also contended that the court erred in permitting Ford to
amend its affirmative defense to include the driver as a “Fabre party”6 and to
include him on the jury verdict form, where the defense had failed to comply with
the advance pleading requirements of Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc.,
678 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1996).  In a supplemental memorandum to the court,
D’Amario asserted that the driver’s conduct was not a legal cause of Harris’s
injuries, and that the court’s ruling during trial further prejudiced the plaintiffs
because it came after the jury was selected, hence depriving the plaintiffs of the
right to question the venire panel about potential bias towards alcohol consumption
and driving while intoxicated.  
The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.  With regard to the
apportionment defense issue, the trial court ruled there was no prejudice in allowing
the defense to amend its affirmative defense during trial.  However, the court ruled
that it had erred in permitting evidence of the driver’s alcohol content to go to the
jury:
7Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
-9-
The Court now finds that by permitting the publication of the blood
alcohol content to the jury, coupled with the remarks of defense
counsel in closing arguments to the effect that the “animal in the car
was ‘alcohol,’” caused undue emphasis to be placed on alcohol as a
primary cause of the injury. . . .  The Court found that under the
Kidron[7] case that the Defendant was entitled to a jury finding of
percentage of fault, if any, on the part of anyone whose negligence
was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages. . . .  While generally
the right to amendment of pleadings declines as trial approaches, the
Court here found no real prejudice was present in allowing Defendants
to amend their affirmative defenses as was done and especially so
since there was no doubt from the pleadings before the amendment as
to whom the driver was.  Nothing in the evidence offered before or
after the amendment changes now the conclusion that under F.S.
90.403 the Court should have excluded the remote condition of
alcohol from the case.
When Ford appealed, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
“[o]n the facts in this crash-worthiness case, the appellant [Ford] properly raised an
apportionment defense.”  D’Amario, 732 So. 2d at 1145 (citing Kidron, Inc. v.
Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)).
Nash
While Maria Nash was driving to church with her two children in the back
seat of her 1990 Chevrolet Corsica, a car approaching from the opposite direction
crossed the center line and crashed into Nash's car.  Nash's head struck the metal
post that separates the windshield from the driver's door.  She later died as a result
-10-
of her head injuries, although her two children survived.  The record reveals that the
driver of the other car was intoxicated and had a blood alcohol content of .15
percent.  Nash's estate filed suit against General Motors, the manufacturer of the
vehicle Nash was driving at the time of the accident, alleging a failure of the
vehicle’s seatbelt and “that General Motors was strictly liable for a design defect
which had been discovered in the seatbelt of the 1990 Chevrolet Corsica.”  Nash,
734 So. 2d at 439.  As in D’Amario, the district court’s opinion reflects that prior
to trial, 
the estate asked the trial court to exclude evidence of the other driver's
intoxication.  The estate argued that such evidence would be too
prejudicial in the jury's consideration of comparative fault.  In ruling on
this matter, the trial court relied on this court's decision in Stellas v.
Alamo Rent-A-Car Inc., 673 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that a
non-party intentional tortfeasor should appear on the verdict form so
as to permit the jury to apportion fault with the negligent tortfeasor),
review granted, 683 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1996), and decision quashed by
702 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1997).  Accordingly, the trial court found that the
jury "had a right to know all the facts" concerning someone who
appears on the verdict form.
Nash, 734 So. 2d at 439.  The jury ultimately found no liability on the part of the
automobile manufacturer, General Motors, and therefore did not consider the
percentage of fault that should be attributed to the drunk driver who caused the
accident.  The trial court denied the estate’s motion for new trial. 
On appeal, the estate asserted that the evidence that Charles Chatfield, the
8The district court reasoned that although Stellas was decided after the trial
court’s order in this case, it nevertheless controlled the outcome in this case.  See
Nash, 734 So. 2d at 440.  The court further reasoned that the nonparty’s conduct
of driving while intoxicated constituted an intentional tort.  See id. at 440-41 (relying
on Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976)).  
-11-
other motorist, was intoxicated, was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to the issue of
whether General Motors was negligent in designing a defective seatbelt.  The Third
District agreed, holding that it was error to permit the jury to apportion fault
between an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor.  See id. (citing Stellas v.
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1997)).8  The district court
concluded that “it was error for the drunk driver, an intentional tortfeasor, to appear
on the same verdict form as General Motors, the negligent tortfeasor in a products
liability action.”  Id. at 441.  Accordingly, the district court reversed the trial court’s
order and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.  See id.
ANALYSIS
Comparative Fault In Crashworthiness Cases
As noted above, although we recognized the crashworthiness doctrine in
Evancho some time ago, the issue of whether principles of comparative fault apply
in enhanced injury cases is one of first impression for this Court.  It appears that
the first case in Florida to have addressed this issue is Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona,
665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), wherein the Third District held that an
-12-
automobile manufacturer in a crashworthiness case may apportion fault with the
plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s contributory negligence in causing the initial impact. 
There, the plaintiff’s husband was killed in an auto accident after his car crashed
into the back of a stalled delivery truck manufactured by Kidron.  The plaintiff sued
Kidron in strict liability alleging that it assembled a truck without a rear underguard,
which if installed would have prevented the decedent’s car from being forced under
the truck’s bed during the collision.  Kidron asserted a comparative fault defense
based on the decedent’s alleged negligence in failing to avoid hitting the stalled
truck.  The trial court refused to allow this defense and the plaintiff prevailed at trial. 
On appeal, the Third District held that the principles of comparative fault apply in a
strict liability suit regardless of whether the injury at issue resulted from the primary
or secondary collision.  See id. at 292.  The court reasoned:
This view is based on the belief . . . that fairness and good reason
require that the fault of the defendant and of the plaintiff should be
compared with each other with respect to all damages and injuries for
which the conduct of each party is a cause in fact and a proximate
cause. 
Id. (citing § 768.81, Fla. Stat. (1993)).  In so concluding, the court rejected the
argument that a plaintiff’s comparative fault should not be considered in the
secondary collision context.  See id.  Without discussion, the court noted that the
plaintiff’s argument represented a minority view, and the court declined to follow it. 
9In Montag, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs’
contention that the cause of the initial accident was irrelevant to their cause of
action, in which they sought damages only for the enhanced injuries caused by the
design defect in the second collision.  In doing so, the court focused on the
wording of Colorado’s statutory comparative fault scheme:
We have previously recognized, however, that the term "fault"
in § 13-21-406 should be given a broad reading. Huffman v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990).  In Huffman we found
that "[t]he term fault, as employed in C.R.S. 13-21-406, is more
plausibly construed as a general term encompassing a broad range of
culpable behavior including, but not limited to, negligence."  Id. at
1477.  Furthermore, fault is not limited to assumption of risk or
-13-
See id.  
The Majority View
Outside of Florida, courts have wrestled with the comparative fault issue and
have adopted conflicting views.  Under what has been characterized by Whitehead
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. 1995), as the “majority view,” the
fault of the plaintiff or a third party in causing the initial accident is recognized as a
defense to a crashworthiness case against a product manufacturer.  This line of
cases reasons that the fault of the person causing the accident that created the
circumstances in which the second accident occurred should be compared with the
role of the automobile manufacturer’s negligence in designing a defective product in
assessing total responsibility for the claimant’s injuries.  See Montag v. Honda
Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Colorado law);9
product misuse.  Id.  Given this broad interpretation of the word
"fault," no good reason exists not to allow the jury to compare Mrs.
Montag's initial negligence with Honda's fault in designing the seat belt. 
In every crashworthiness case, the jury will be required to determine
how much of a plaintiff's injuries resulted from the initial collision and
how much of the injuries were the result of a second collision.  In this
case, the jury was required to determine which of Mrs. Montag's
injuries resulted from her initial collision with the train and which of her
injuries resulted from the allegedly defective seat belt.  Thus, to an
extent, the jury is already comparing the plaintiff's and the defendant's
behavior in order to determine causation. Requiring the jury to make a
similar determination for the purpose of damages is certainly
reasonable and consistent with Colorado's comparative fault statute.
Montag, 75 F.3d at 1419.  Hence, the court approved the application of
comparative fault principles to the case against the manufacturer.
-14-
Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying
Arkansas law); Hinkamp v. American Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp. 176, 178
(E.D.N.C. 1989), aff’d, 900 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1990); General Motors Corp. v.
Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Alaska 1998) (holding it was error not to instruct
jury on plaintiff’s comparative fault in a strict liability action against manufacturer
based on defective seatbelt and not to allocate fault to third person who may have
caused the accident); Doupnik v. General Motors Corp., 275 Cal. Rptr. 715 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that doctrine of comparative fault is applicable in
crashworthiness cases); Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339, 346 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1997); Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 351, 357-58
-15-
(N.D. 1984) (holding that both plaintiff’s accident causing fault and injury
enhancing fault should be considered in determining extent of plaintiff’s recovery);
Whitehead, 897 S.W.2d at 693-94.  As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has
stated, “The majority view is based on the belief that the fault of the defendant and
of the plaintiff should be compared with each other with respect to all the damages
and injuries for which the conduct of each party is a cause in fact and a proximate
cause.”  Whitehead, 897 S.W.2d at 693-94. 
In Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., a Delaware trial judge set out a
comprehensive analysis discussing the arguments on both sides of the issue, before
ultimately concluding that principles of comparative fault should apply in enhanced
injury cases.  First, the court reasoned that while some cases may present a clear
factual delineation between primary injuries and secondary injuries, whereby the
driver’s comparative fault should be excluded from consideration, most cases do
not.  The court stated that there are usually several acts of negligence involved, all
of which may have been a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and “it would be difficult
and confusing to instruct a jury that it should not consider the cause of the collision
but only the cause of the enhanced injuries.”  699 A.2d at 345.  Second, the court
was concerned that a rule excluding consideration of the plaintiff driver’s fault in
causing an accident would logically extend to prevent the plaintiff from suing a
-16-
negligent third party who caused the accident, and thereby run counter to well-
established principles of tort law:  
Another logical hurdle inherent in plaintiff’s position is this.  If a
plaintiff negligently crashes his vehicle into a tree and suffers an
enhanced injury because of a design defect in his car, plaintiff says
that the manufacturer is liable for the enhanced injury regardless of the
plaintiff’s negligence in causing the collision.  But what if a plaintiff
collides with another vehicle and the driver of that vehicle is negligent? 
Assume also that the enhanced injuries caused to the plaintiff by a
design defect in his car are clearly identifiable.  Under ordinary rules of
proximate cause the other driver would have potential liability for all of
the plaintiff’s injuries, but logically, following the enhanced injury
theory of the plaintiff, only the manufacturer should have the liability
because the other driver’s conduct in causing the initial collision would
not have caused the injury absent the design defect.  Thus, carrying
the theory to its logical conclusion, plaintiff should have no recovery
against the other driver for his negligence in causing the collision.  This
result would run counter to well settled principles of tort law.
Id.  Finally, the court noted that the rule concerning proximate causation should be
no different in enhanced injury cases than that applied in ordinary negligence cases. 
It reasoned that “[t]he existence of other proximate causes of an injury does not
relieve a plaintiff driver under Delaware’s comparative negligence statute from
responsibility for his own conduct which proximately caused him injury. . . . 
Public policy seeks to deter not only manufacturers from producing a defective
product but to encourage those who use the product to do so in a responsible
manner.”  Id. at 345-46.  Thus, the court concluded that “[i]t is obvious that the
-17-
negligence of a plaintiff who causes the initial collision is one of the proximate
causes of all of the injuries he sustained, whether limited to those the original
collision would have produced or including those enhanced by a defective product
in the second collision.”  Id. at 346.
The Minority View
In contrast to the approach of the “majority” view, the “minority” view,
rejecting the application of comparative fault principles, focuses on the underlying
rationale for imposing liability against automobile manufacturers for secondary
injuries caused by a design defect.  The federal district court in Jimenez v. Chrysler
Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 548 (D.S.C. 1999), reversed in part and vacated, No. 00-
1021 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 2001), explained the essential rationale of the minority view:
The crashworthiness doctrine imposes liability on automobile
manufacturers for design defects that enhance, rather than cause,
injuries.  The doctrine applies if a design defect, not causally
connected to the collision, results in injuries greater than those that
would have resulted were there no design defect.  The issue for
purposes of a crashworthiness case, therefore, is enhancement of
injuries, not the precipitating cause of the collision.
74 F. Supp. 2d at 565 (citations omitted).  The district court in Jimenez pointed out
that the rule of damages in crashworthiness cases also effectively acts to apportion
fault and responsibility between the first and second collisions and their respective
causes:
-18-
First of all, such a rule intrinsically dovetails with the crashworthiness
doctrine: Because a collision is presumed, and enhanced injury is
foreseeable as a result of the design defect, the triggering factor of the
accident is simply irrelevant.  Secondly, the concept of “enhanced
injury” effectively apportions fault and damages on a comparative
basis; defendant is liable only for the increased injury caused by its
own conduct, not for the injury resulting from the crash itself.  Further,
the alleged negligence causing the collision is legally remote from, and
thus not the legal cause of, the enhanced injury caused by a defective
part that was supposed to be designed to protect in case of a
collision.
Id. at 566 (emphasis added).  Under this reasoning, concerns about fairness in
apportioning responsibility for damages based upon fault in crashworthiness cases
are satisfied by the limitation of liability of a manufacturer to only those damages
caused by the defective product.
Hence, the primary reason offered by courts excluding evidence of the
driver’s fault in causing an accident is that the accident-causing fault is not relevant
to whether an automobile manufacturer designed a defective product, and, further,
that such evidence, if admitted, may be unduly prejudicial to the plaintiff.  See Cota
v. Harley Davidson, 684 P.2d 888, 895-96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
evidence of the plaintiff’s intoxication and conduct in causing the initial accident
was not relevant in a crashworthiness case against a motorcycle manufacturer
based on a design defect in the motorcycle’s gas tank system); Andrews v. Harley
Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Nev. 1990) (holding that evidence of
-19-
plaintiff’s intoxication on night of accident was not relevant to whether motorcycle
manufacturer’s design defect proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries); cf. Green v.
General Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 212-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(holding that plaintiff’s excessive speed was not relevant to issue of defective
design but was relevant to issue of proximate cause of injuries). 
Consistent with this approach, the Iowa Supreme Court has held that
evidence of the plaintiff’s intoxication and excessive speed is not admissible in a
crashworthiness case against a vehicle manufacturer.  In Reed v. Chrysler Corp.,
494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992), the court explained:
The theory, which presupposes the occurrence of accidents
precipitated for myriad reasons, focuses alone on the enhancement of
resulting injuries.  The rule does not pretend that the design defect had
anything to do with causing the accident.  It is enough if the design
defect increased the damages.  So any participation by the plaintiff in
bringing the accident about is quite beside the point.
494 N.W.2d at 230.
Some commentaries on the crashworthiness doctrine also support the view
that the accident-causing fault of the driver should not be compared with the fault
of an automobile manufacturer whose product caused an enhanced injury.  See,
e.g., Robert C. Reichert, Limitations on Manufacturer Liability in Second Collision
Actions, 43 Mont. L. Rev. 109, 117-20 (1982).  In contrast to the majority view that
10This view is premised on language in Larsen that suggests that a
manufacturer should be liable only for the enhanced injuries caused by the design
defect:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer
should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the
defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably
would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the
defective design.
Larsen, 391 F. 2d at 503 (emphasis added).    
-20-
all possible causes of an injury should be considered, Reichert stresses that
accident-causing fault must be distinguished from injury-enhancing fault; otherwise
manufacturers of a defective product will be shielded from liability in every second
injury case, a result contrary to the holding in Larsen and contrary to the purpose
for which the crashworthiness doctrine was first recognized.  See id. at 117-18. 
Reichert asserts that because Larsen established “new precedent by holding that a
manufacturer would be liable for enhanced injuries even though the design defect
did not cause the first collision[,] [i]mplicit in this holding is the rule . . . [that]
accident-causing fault cannot be compared with injury-enhancing fault.”  Id. at
118.10  He explains:
[B]y definition, a manufacturer in a second collision action has zero
percent accident-causing fault, so there is always 100 percent
accident-causing fault to be considered in mitigation of a
manufacturer’s injury-enhancing fault.  One hundred percent accident-
-21-
causing fault compared with a manufacturer’s injury-enhancing fault
will always constitute a superseding cause of enhanced injuries,
thereby insulating a manufacturer from liability in every second
collision action and contradicting the holding in Larsen and the axiom.
Id.  In other words, Reichert contends, to permit a manufacturer to apportion fault
with a third party or the plaintiff’s conduct in causing the accident, manufacturers
would effectively avoid liability for designing and manufacturing a defective
product, and would thus countermine the essential purpose for which the
crashworthiness doctrine was established.
Florida Law
The automobile manufacturers urge us to adopt the “majority” view and
contend that Florida statutory and case law requires juries to apportion fault among
all persons who contributed to the resulting injuries and that enhanced-injury cases
do not constitute an exception to this well-established rule.  They cite section
768.81(3), Fla. Stat. (1997), which provides for the entry of “judgment against each
party liable on the basis of such party’s percentage of fault” and this Court’s
interpretation of the statute in Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).  
In Fabre this Court concluded “that section 768.81 was enacted to replace
joint and several liability with a system that requires each party to pay for
noneconomic damages only in proportion to the percentage of fault by which that
-22-
defendant contributed to the accident.”  Id. at 1185.  We interpreted the term
“party” to include all persons who contributed to the accident “regardless of
whether they have been or could have been joined as defendants.”  Id.  However, it
is not entirely clear that our holding in Fabre resolves the question presented today
since Fabre involved a simple automobile accident involving joint and concurrent
tortfeasors, and did not involve successive tortfeasors or enhanced or secondary
injuries allegedly stemming from a manufacturing or design defect.  
On the other hand, the estate and D’Amario contend that our statutory and
case law support the minority view.  They rely on Florida case law dealing with
successor tortfeasors and analogous circumstances.  After considering the majority
and minority views discussed above, we conclude that the minority view is more
consistent with the principles of tort law and comparative fault as presently
developed in Florida.
Medical Malpractice Cases
We have searched for an appropriate analogy to help us resolve the issue.  In
the context of a medical neglect case, for example, courts in this state have
concluded that (1) the cause of an initial injury which may require medical
assistance is not ordinarily considered as a legal cause of injuries resulting from the
11See Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
12Joint tortfeasors are usually defined as two or more negligent entities whose
conduct combines to produce a single injury.  See Davidow v. Seyfarth, 58 So. 2d
865, 868 (Fla. 1952).  In such cases, there need not be a common duty, a common
design or a concerted action.  See id. 
-23-
subsequent negligence of the medical-care provider;11 and (2) an initial wrongdoer
who causes an injury is not to be considered a joint tortfeasor12 with a subsequent
medical provider whose negligence enhances or aggravates injuries caused by the
initial wrongdoer.  In other words, in cases involving medical malpractice, the cause
of the underlying condition that brought the patient to the professional, whether a
disease or an accident, is not to be compared to the cause of the independent
enhanced injury allegedly resulting from medical neglect.  See Frank M. Stuart,
M.D., P.A. v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).  In Hertz Corp. we held:
Having finally decided the issue in favor of contribution among
joint tortfeasors in Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975),
the Court here finds itself faced with the question of whether to
apportion the loss between initial and subsequent rather than joint or
concurrent tortfeasors.  This cannot be done.
Id. at 706.  In Hertz Corp. we held that an initial tortfeasor, upon being sued by the
injured party, could not join a medical professional in the same action and seek
indemnity for damages caused by medical negligence in the treatment of the injured
party.  
13As Reichert points out, the jury would be faced with the task of
apportionment while being told at the same time that the initial tortfeasor may be
held liable for all the damages, even those caused by the subsequent or second
collision.
-24-
However, this principle is to be distinguished from the principle that the initial
tortfeasor may be held responsible for all subsequent injuries including those
caused by medical negligence.  See Hertz Corp.; see also Underwriters at Lloyds v.
City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 1980); Association for
Retarded Citizens–Volusia, Inc. v. Fletcher, 741 So. 2d 520, 524-25 (Fla. 5th DCA
1999); Dungan v. Ford, 632 So. 2d 159, 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Rucks v.
Pushman, 541 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).  In fact, the rule of complete
liability of initial tortfeasors, if interjected into the trial of a claim for medical
malpractice or secondary collisions based upon a product defect, would only serve
to create additional confusion for a jury charged to resolve the secondary collision
claim.  See Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d at 706.13
The circumstances considered in Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So. 2d 377
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981), further illustrate the medical malpractice analogy.  In
Whitehead, the plaintiff’s decedent was brought to the defendant hospital after he
attempted to commit suicide.  While under the care of the treating doctor,
Whitehead died.  An expert testified that the care received by Whitehead deviated
14See also Vendola v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 474 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA
1985) (applying Whitehead in rejecting comparative fault defense by telephone
company in suit against it for negligently failing to trace telephone call to plaintiff
who had dialed 911 after being shot; holding that plaintiff’s shooting was a remote
condition which merely furnished occasion for supervening, intervening negligence
by Southern Bell).
-25-
from the standard practice in the community and that but for the doctor’s
negligence, Whitehead would have survived.  The jury was instructed that it could
consider Whitehead’s own conduct as a defense to the medical malpractice claim
against the doctor and hospital and the jury returned a verdict for the defense.  
On appeal, however, the First District reversed, holding that Whitehead’s
conduct was too remote and could not be considered the proximate legal cause of
his injuries from the alleged professional malpractice.  The court reasoned:
A remote condition or conduct which furnishes only the
occasion for someone else’s supervening negligence is not a
proximate cause of the result of the subsequent negligence. . . .  Since
Whitehead's death would not have occurred "but for" the negligent
acts or omissions of the hospital and the doctor, those acts and
omissions must be deemed the cause of the injury.  See Fellows v.
Citizens Savings & Loan Association of St. Lucie County, 383 So. 2d
1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Bryant v. Jax Liquors, 352 So. 2d 542
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977).  Stated differently, any conduct on Whitehead's
part before he entered the hospital which contributed to his cardiac
and pulmonary arrest and subsequent death was not a proximate, legal
cause of the damages sought in this case.  Accordingly, we find that
the trial court erred in submitting the instruction on comparative
negligence to the jury over the prior and timely objection of counsel.
Id. at 379 (emphasis added).14  The reasoning in Whitehead is similar to the
-26-
rationale upon which the “minority” view of the application of comparative fault
principles to the crashworthiness doctrine is based.  Both focus on the particular
cause “of the damages sought in this case.”  Id.
As noted above, unlike automobile accidents involving damages solely
arising from the collision itself, a defendant’s liability in a crashworthiness case is
predicated upon the existence of a distinct and second injury caused by a defective
product, and assumes the plaintiff to be in the condition to which he is rendered
after the first accident.  No claim is asserted, however, to hold the defendant liable
for that condition.  Thus, crashworthiness cases involve separate and distinct
injuries–those caused by the initial collision, and those subsequently caused by a
second collision arising from a defective product.  We agree that when viewed in
this light, crashworthiness cases may be analogized to medical malpractice cases
involving a successive negligent medical provider who is alleged to have either
aggravated an existing injury or caused a separate and additional injury.  Thus, just
as the injury-causing fault of the patient in Whitehead was held not relevant in
assessing the doctor’s subsequent and separate negligence, the accident-causing
fault of the driver would not be relevant in crashworthiness cases in assessing a
manufacturer’s neglect in designing an automobile or its parts.  The initial accident
merely furnished the occasion for the manufacturer’s fault to be tested.
-27-
Hence, a primary collision, by whatever cause, is presumed to have occurred
in crashworthiness cases, and it is further presumed that a manufacturer, like a
physician, may not be held responsible for the injuries caused by the primary
collision.  Further, only the cause of the enhanced injury is at issue in
crashworthiness cases such as those at issue here because the only damages sought
are those caused by the defective products.  Thus the focus in such cases against a
manufacturer is not on the conduct that gave rise to the initial accident, but rather,
on the conduct that allegedly caused the enhanced or secondary injuries.  It will
always be conceded in such cases that the fault of others was completely
responsible for the happening of the first accident.  However, as with medical
negligence cases, the accident or event giving rise to the initial injuries merely
creates the occasion for the second impact or action to occur. 
We agree that to automatically compare the fault of the driver in causing the
accident with the fault of the automobile manufacturer for the subsequent enhanced
injury would be, as Reichert explains, to confuse two different causes–the cause of
the accident and the cause of the enhanced injury.  See Reichert, Limitations on
Manufacturer Liability in Second Collision Actions, supra, at 117-18.  The essential
point is that under the crashworthiness doctrine, as in medical malpractice cases,
the initial collision and its separate cause is always presumed, and the cause of the
-28-
initial collision is simply not at issue in the determination of the cause of the second
collision.  Instead, any analysis concerning the causal connection of the second
collision to the separately claimed damages depends solely upon whether a defect
existed and gave rise to the enhanced injuries suffered by the plaintiff. 
Intentional Tort Exception to Comparative Fault
The estate and D’Amario also contend that even if we were to hold that the
comparative fault principles of section 768.81, Florida Statutes (1997), apply to
crashworthiness cases, we should hold that this case falls within the intentional tort
exception to section 768.81.  Section 768.81(4)(b) states that the comparative fault
statute does not apply “to any action based upon an intentional tort.”  Id. §
768.81(4)(b).  They urge this Court to approve Nash’s holding that drunk driving
constitutes an intentional tort under this exception.  We decline to do so. 
In holding that drunk driving is an intentional tort, the court in Nash relied on
this Court’s reasoning in Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1976), wherein
we stated that “[d]riving in an intoxicated condition is an intentional act which
creates known risks to the public.”  However, the sole issue in that negligence case
was whether the jury should be allowed to consider a claim for punitive damages
based on the defendant’s negligent conduct of driving while intoxicated.  See id. at
923.  The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s intoxication and erratic driving
-29-
provided the egregiousness necessary for an award of punitive damages.  This
Court agreed, holding that “the voluntary act of driving ‘while intoxicated’ evinces,
without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude for a jury to be asked to provide an
award of punitive damages if it determines liability exists for compensatory
damages.”  Id. at 924.  Hence, our ruling in Ingram was directed to the showing
required to justify an award of punitive damages, and not to the issue of whether
the cause of action constituted an intentional tort.  Once the Court’s above-
mentioned statements concerning the intentional act of drunk driving are placed in
proper context, it is apparent that Ingram does not stand for the proposition that
driving while intoxicated is an intentional tort.  Indeed, the Court’s reasoning was
applied in a case based on negligent conduct albeit it was claimed that the negligent
driving took place because of the alleged intoxication. 
This Court has defined an intentional tort as one in which the actor exhibits a
deliberate intent to injure or engages in conduct which is substantially certain to
result in injury or death.  See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000).  In
Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972), this Court explained the difference
between negligence and intentional torts.  Relying on Prosser and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 8A (1965), we explained:
Where a reasonable man would believe that a particular result was
-30-
substantially certain to follow, he will be held in the eyes of the law as
though he had intended it. . . .  However, the knowledge and
appreciation of a risk, short of substantial certainty, is not the
equivalent of intent.  Thus, the distinction between intent and
negligence boils down to a matter of degree.  “Apparently the line has
been drawn by the courts at the point where the known danger ceases
to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable man would avoid
(negligence), and become a substantial certainty.”
Id. at 817 (quoting William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts 32 (3d ed. 1964))
(footnote omitted).  While acting under the influence of alcohol may sometimes
justify an award of punitive damages against the offender, we cannot conclude that
negligent conduct induced by the use of alcohol constitutes an independent
intentional tort under our “substantially certain” test for intentional torts. 
Accordingly, we reject the estate and D’Amario’s contention that driving while
intoxicated is an independent intentional tort.  Cf. Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian
Independent Refinery, Inc., 879 P.2d 538, 545 n.9 (Haw. 1994) (“The act of
driving under the influence is clearly a negligent act[.]”); People v. Townsend, 183
N.W. 177, 179 (Mich. 1921) (noting that driving an automobile while intoxicated is
“gross and culpable negligence”); Stinson v. Daniel, 414 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tenn.
1967) (noting that driving while drunk constitutes wanton negligence).  Hence, we
do not find that the intentional tort exception to the comparative fault statute may be
15We do agree that the reasoning of our recent cases discussing the
intentional tort exception to statutory apportionment is somewhat analogous to our
analysis here.  See Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDonald, 705 So. 2d 560 (Fla.
1997); Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1997).  
In Merrill Crossings, the plaintiff was shot by an unknown assailant in the
parking lot of a Wal-Mart store.  He sued Wal-Mart and Merrill Crossings
Associates, the owner of the shopping center, for their failure to provide reasonable
security measures.  The comparative fault of the unknown assailant was not
included on the jury verdict form.  In holding that the comparative fault provisions
of section 768.81 do not apply to such a situation, this Court approved the trial
court’s action and distinguished Fabre:
In Fabre, the plaintiff was an innocent passenger suing for damages
resulting from an automobile accident caused by the combined
negligence of her husband and the other driver, where the negligence
of both drivers caused the harm.  Here, the harm was a directly
foreseeable result of Wal-Mart and Merrill Crossing's negligence.  In
Fabre we dealt with two negligent tortfeasors whose negligence
combined to produce the harm; in the instant case we deal with a
negligent tortfeasor whose acts or omissions give rise to or permit an
intentional tortfeasor's actions.
Merrill Crossings, 705 So. 2d at 562 (second emphasis added).  Accordingly, this
Court concluded that “it would be irrational to allow a party who negligently fails to
provide reasonable security measures to reduce its liability because there is an
intervening intentional tort, where the intervening intentional tort is exactly what the
security measures are supposed to protect against.”  Id. at 562-63.  
We held in Stellas that it was error to include the name of a non-party
intentional tortfeasor on the jury verdict form in a suit against a rental car company
based on the company’s failure to warn the plaintiffs of the danger of touring
certain areas of Miami with the name of the rental car company visibly displayed on
the car.  See 702 So. 2d at 234.  In both Stellas and Merrill Crossings, the alleged
negligence of the named defendants was claimed to have given rise to or resulted in
the occurrence of the intentional tort, the very occurrence of which the defendants
were supposed to guard against or prevent. 
-31-
invoked.15
Similarly, under the crashworthiness doctrine, primary collisions such as
those involved in both D’Amario and Nash have been deemed to be legally
foreseeable and presumed to sometimes occur.  In other words, in designing
automobiles, Ford and GM, as well as other manufacturers, are charged with the
knowledge that their automobiles will sometimes be involved in an accident or
collision, including accidents involving negligent and sometimes even drunk drivers,
and to reasonably design and build safe vehicles based upon that knowledge.  For
this reason, both Larsen, and later this Court in Evancho, clearly placed the burden
on automobile manufacturers to “use reasonable care in design and manufacture of
its product to eliminate unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.”  Evancho, 327 So.
2d at 204.  Of course, we are mindful of the fact that D’Amario and Nash are not
directly on point, that under the crashworthiness doctrine automobile manufacturers
are not insurers of their cars’ fitness, and that automobile manufacturers are under
no duty to create a car capable of withstanding all collisions.  See Evancho, 327
So. 2d at 204.
-32-
No Liability For Initial Accident
We are not unmindful of the concerns that a manufacturer not end up
improperly being held liable for damages caused by the initial collision.  Of course,
we must remember that in crashworthiness cases the plaintiff not only has the
burden of proving the existence of a defect and its causal relationship to her
injuries, but she must also prove the existence of additional or enhanced injuries
caused by the defect.  In this regard, we are impressed with the reasoning of the
federal district court in Jimenez that the proper application of the crashworthiness
doctrine is also consistent with comparative fault principles.  The major concern of
those courts following the majority rule is in seeing that successive tortfeasors only
be held liable for the damages they cause, and not be held liable for damages
16We recognize that in some cases the jury may not be able to separate the
damages from the initial and secondary collisions.  Should such event occur, the
parties should resort to established precedent in that area of the law.  See Gross v.
Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2000).  Further, as explained in note 2, comparative
fault may sometimes be raised if the circumstances require that there be a fair and
just allocation of fault and damages.  For example, the misuse of a product has
been recognized as a defense in product liability actions.  See Standard Havens
Products, Inc. v. Benitez, 648 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1994).
-33-
caused by the initial tortfeasor.  We agree with this concern, but see no reason why
it cannot be properly addressed, as in Jimenez, by a recognition of the
crashworthiness doctrine’s legal rationale limiting a manufacturer’s liability only to
those damages caused by the defect. 
Further, when appropriate, the defendant manufacturer in a crashworthiness
case will be entitled to have the jury told that no claim is being made for damages
arising out of the initial accident, and that the manufacturer should not be held liable
for damages caused by the initial collision.  Indeed, such an instruction should
ensure, much like our holding in Fabre, that no defendant will be held responsible
for damages it did not cause.  Such an instruction should have much the same
effect as an instruction on comparative fault, but without the worrisome baggage of
retrying the cause of the underlying accident in the crashworthiness case.  As these
cases illustrate, and as we have discussed above, trying both issues together can
result in substantial confusion.16  
-34-
Juror Confusion
We also conclude that to inject the issue of the driver’s fault in causing the
initial accident into the trial of a crashworthiness case tends to unduly confuse the
jury by focusing attention on the conduct giving rise to the accident instead of the
issues of the existence of a defect and its role in causing the enhanced injuries. 
Such confusion is magnified in cases such as D’Amario and Nash, which involve
intoxicated drivers, due in large measure to the public’s understandable intolerance
of drunk driving.  Indeed, both cases exemplify the confusion caused by focusing
on the conduct of a drunk driver and the attendant difficulty juries have in
separating the accident-causing fault from the enhanced-injury-causing fault in such
cases.  While there may be a legitimate issue as to whether the claimant’s injuries
were caused by the defect, if any, or by the original collision, there is no reason to
also litigate the cause of that initial collision.
For example, in both D’Amario and Nash, evidence of the driver’s
intoxication was admitted in evidence, and both Ford and General Motors were
permitted to point the finger at the intoxicated drivers as the cause of the accidents
and all of the plaintiffs’ resulting injuries.  In D’Amario, the jury was told by the
court that the parties had stipulated that the driver’s excessive speed and
intoxication caused the accident.  During closing argument, Ford’s counsel argued
17The attorney for Ford argued that:
Well Mr. Florin and Mr. Wagner [plaintiffs’ attorneys] are
right to this extent about the animal.  They are right to the
extent that the cause of this unfortunate injury is a word
that starts with an A, but ladies and gentlemen, it’s not
animal.  It’s alcohol.  It’s slamming into a pine tree doing
40 miles an hour.
-35-
to the jury that the cause of Clifford Harris’s injuries was the driver’s intoxication
and the fact that he “slammed into a pine tree doing 40 miles an hour.”17 
In Nash, evidence of the driver’s intoxication was presented that was even
more pervasive.  During voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire panel about their
views on drunk driving.  Then, during opening statements, the defense argued that
the evidence would show that “at the end of the day . . . the real fault in the case is
not anything GM did or did not do with this retractor.  It is instead the fault of
Charles Chatfield, who that Sunday afternoon, got drunk and then got deadly when
he barrelled [sic] his 4500-pound Cadillac into the Nash Corsica.”  The defense
introduced evidence of Chatfield’s intoxication during trial while cross-examining
the investigating officer at the scene of the accident.  Officer Medina testified that
Chatfield’s breath smelled of alcohol and his blood-alcohol level was .15.  Finally,
during closing argument, the defense argued:
We have got a drunk who gets in a car and goes out on a public
thoroughfare and wipes out the life of Carmen Nash and changes the
18This confusion is reflected in the juries’ verdicts in the consolidated cases. 
During deliberations, the juries in both cases were asked to indicate on the jury
verdict form whether the automobile manufacturers placed the vehicle on the market
with a defect which was a legal cause of the enhanced injuries to the plaintiffs.  In
both cases, the jury answered in the negative.  On the face of the jury question, it is
impossible to discern whether the jury found no defect, whether the jury found a
defect but concluded that it did not proximately cause the enhanced injuries, or
whether the jury found the intoxicated driver solely responsible for the plaintiff’s
injuries.  That the jury did not reach the second question as to the drivers’
comparative fault is not dispositive.  Based on the emphasis placed on the two non-
parties’ conduct in driving while intoxicated, the jury could have concluded that the
drivers’ conduct caused the accident and all resulting injuries and, therefore, that
the automobile manufacturers were not liable.
-36-
lives of all of those in her family.  That’s what we have got here: a
drunk who aimed his car at Carmen Nash and killed her.  And it is that
which is the sole cause of the injuries in this case.  That is where the
blame lies, that is where the fault lies.
The defense made numerous other references to Chatfield’s intoxication throughout
closing argument–“Charles Chatfield was a drunk,” “a disaster in the form of a
cream-colored Cadillac driven by a drunk who came blasting out of the blue that
Sunday afternoon and snuffed out the life of Carmen Nash.”  Thus, it is apparent
that the defendants in both cases were permitted to effectively shift the focus of the
trial from the existence of a defect to the driver’s conduct in driving while
intoxicated,18 even though the existence of a defect was the fundamental liability
issue to be tried in these cases.
CONCLUSION
-37-
In sum, we hold that principles of comparative fault involving the causes of
the first collision do not generally apply in crashworthiness cases.  Such a rule, we
believe, recognizes the important distinction between fault in causing the accident
and fault in causing additional or enhanced injuries as a result of a product defect, a
distinction that defines and limits a manufacturer’s liability in crashworthiness cases. 
In such cases, the automobile manufacturer is solely responsible for the enhanced
injuries to the extent the plaintiff demonstrates the existence of a defective condition
and that the defect proximately caused the enhanced injuries.  Thus, an automobile
manufacturer who allegedly designed a defective product may not be held liable for
damages caused by the initial collision and may not apportion its fault with the fault
of the driver of the vehicle who caused the initial accident.
We believe this rule will ensure both fairness in the apportionment of damages
and that the jury will not be unduly confused about the issues in the case, especially
in cases like those before us today, where both accidents involved drinking and
driving.  Because the initial collision is presumed in crashworthiness cases, the
jury’s focus in such cases should be on whether a defect existed and whether such
defect proximately caused the enhanced injuries.  Unfortunately, in the consolidated
cases, the juries’ focus was shifted to the conduct of the intoxicated drivers who
caused the initial accidents.  In light of the confusion caused by the introduction of
19Because we are holding that it was error for the trial court to permit
evidence of a non-party’s fault in causing the accident, D’Amario’s related claim
that the trial court erred in permitting Ford to amend its pleadings to include a non-
party apportionment defense is moot.  Accordingly, we offer no opinion on this
issue.  Similarly, the other issues discussed in the district court opinions are
rendered moot by our holding and we decline to address them.
20  The majority’s general holding states:
We hold that principles of comparative fault concerning
-38-
accident-causing fault and the improper focus placed on the non-party drivers’
intoxication in each case, we conclude that both the estate and D’Amario are entitled
to a new trial. 19    
Accordingly, we quash the Second District’s decision in D’Amario and
approve the Third District’s decision in Nash to the extent it is consistent with this
opinion.  We further disapprove the opinion in Kidron to the extent it is inconsistent
with our holding herein.
It is so ordered.    
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
HARDING, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I cannot agree with the majority’s general holding,20 the adoption of either the
apportionment of fault as to the cause of the underlying crash will not
ordinarily apply in crashworthiness or enhanced injury cases.  Because
the manufacturer alleged to be responsible for a defective product that
results in a second accident and injury ordinarily may not be held liable
for the injuries caused by the initial accident, the fault of the
manufacturer may not be compared or apportioned with the fault of
the driver of the vehicle who allegedly caused the initial crash.
Majority op. at 2 (footnote omitted).
-39-
purported majority or minority views as described by the majority opinion, or the
application of Frank M. Stuart, M.D., P.A. v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla.
1977), to secondary injury products liability cases.
With respect to the majority’s holding, I conclude that stating that
comparative negligence “will not ordinarily apply” simply will be too difficult for trial
judges to fairly administer.  We have uniformly held that comparative negligence
does apply in products liability cases since the adoption of strict liability in West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976).  The law on this issue was
recently fully examined, explained, and reaffirmed in Standard Haven Products v.
Benitez, 648 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1994).
Next, I do not find it necessary to adopt either the majority or minority rule
because we already have sufficient rules to apply in these cases to resolve the main
issue.  In my view, the main issue presented by these consolidated cases is how to
handle the state of intoxication of the other driver who causes the initial wreck.  I
-40-
recognize that the driver’s intoxication has the potential of distorting these cases
because the emotional nature detracts from the proper focus of the case, but a trial
judge has the discretion under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2000), to control the
evidence and ensure that the driver’s intoxication does not misdirect the jury’s
proper focus.  Thus, there is no need to add another set of rules to be followed. 
Furthermore, our recent decision in Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2000),
applies to many of these cases because usually there is a jury issue with regard to
the proper apportionment of damages between the initial collision and the
manufacturing defect.
Finally, I do not agree with the application of Hertz Corp. to these cases
because that case in reality involved issues of indemnity and contribution, i.e., the
difference between active and passive tortfeasors and how those issues were to be
procedurally handled.  There are sound policy reasons for doing this when the case
involves allegations of negligence by a treating physician following an automobile
accident.  But that case should be limited to cases involving the issue of subsequent
medical malpractice, which presents procedural hurdles when added to the accident
case.
Therefore, I concur in result only with the majority’s quashing of the Second
District’s decision in Ford Motor Co. v. D’Amario, 732 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA
-41-
1999).  I conclude that the D’Amario case should be decided by applying this
Court’s long-standing precedent concerning a trial court’s authority to rule on a
motion for a new trial.  Specifically, the D’Amario case is governed by a
straightforward application of those decisions in which this Court has recognized
that a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial is vested in the sound, broad
discretion of the trial court.  See Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490, 495
(Fla. 1999) (trial court is vested with broad discretionary power to grant motion for
new trial to prevent miscarriage of justice); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 707 So. 2d
1110, 1111 (Fla. 1998) (“The judicial determination on a motion for a new trial is a
discretionary act of the trial court.”); Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1959)
(“When a motion for new trial is made it is directed to the sound, broad discretion
of the trial judge . . . .”).  Under these precedents, an appellate court applies a
reasonableness test to a trial court’s ruling on such a motion, and the appellate court
should not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  See Brown,
749 So. 2d at 498 (“[T]he appellate court must employ the reasonableness test to
determine whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion.”); Manasse, 707 So.
2d at 1111 (“The appellate court should apply the reasonableness test to determine
whether the trial judge abused his [or her] discretion . . . .”); Cloud, 110 So. 2d at
673 (“[T]he ruling should not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that
-42-
discretion has been abused.”).
The trial court in the D’Amario case concluded when ruling on the motion for
new trial that
permitting the publication of the blood alcohol content to the jury,
coupled with the remarks of defense counsel in closing arguments to
the effect that the “animal in the car was ‘alcohol,’” caused undue
emphasis to be placed on alcohol as a primary cause of the injury. . . . 
Nothing in the evidence offered before or after the amendment changes
now the conclusion that under F.S. 90.403 the Court should have
excluded the remote condition of alcohol from the case.
D’Amario v. Ford Motor Company, No. 93-2290-21-CI, order at 8-9 (Fla. 6th Cir.
Ct. order filed April 30, 1997).  Clearly, it cannot be concluded that no reasonable
trial court would have made that decision.  I would apply Brown, Manasse, and
Cloud, which appear to me to compel the conclusion that the district court’s
decision must be quashed.
Moreover, I find that the trial court addressed this issue correctly in ruling on
the motion for rehearing.  The trial court recognized that it had discretion under
section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1997), in respect to the evidence presented to the
jury.  The trial court’s ruling does not mean that comparative negligence was not a
proper issue for the jury’s consideration.  Rather, this ruling simply recognizes that
the probative value associated with the presentation of the other driver’s blood
alcohol level was outweighed by the resulting prejudice.  For these reasons, I find
21  The state of intoxication of the driver of the car which collided with the
car driven by Maria Nash should be handled as a section 90.403 issue, as was done
by the trial court in D’Amario.  However, that issue is not presented in Nash.
-43-
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for a new trial. 
Accordingly, I would find that the Second District erred in reversing the trial court’s
ruling granting a new trial.
With regard to the consolidated case from the Third District, Nash v. General
Motors Corp., 734 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), I concur with the majority that
the Third District erred by finding drunk driving to be an intentional tort.21 
However, I dissent from the majority’s decision to approve Nash to the extent that it
is consistent with the majority opinion.  Nor do I join in disapproving Kidron, Inc. v.
Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding comparative negligence
applies in strict liability suits regardless of whether injury occurred in primary or
secondary accident).  Instead, I would quash Nash and approve the Fourth
District’s recent decision in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Ferayorni, 26 Fla. L. Weekly
D1983, 1984 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 25, 2001) (finding error in trial court’s refusal to
instruct on comparative negligence in strictly liability case).
Judge Terry of Delaware set forth sound advice in Meekins v. Ford Motor
Co., 699 A.2d 339 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997):
One must be careful to resist the temptation to view this issue in
-44-
an isolated, over simplified way.  Under some circumstances there may
exist a clear line of demarcation between the injuries sustained as a
result of the initial collision and those enhanced injuries arising from a
defective product.  The case of a driver running into a tree at a slow
speed and being ejected from the car as the result of a defective seat
belt, for instance, might create a situation where it is clear that no
injuries would have occurred without the ejection.  Under those kinds
of facts the injuries are so distinct that application of the rule barring
evidence of the driver’s comparative negligence might be workable,
even if not advisable.
However, most cases are not so clear cut.  For instance, in the
case at bar the plaintiff’s car was hit by another vehicle at an
intersectional collision.  A dispute exists as to whether the plaintiff
stopped at the stop sign.  A dispute could exist as to whether the driver
of the other vehicle was negligent in a way which contributed to the
collision.  Plaintiff maintains that he would not have been injured at all
except for the defective air bag which upon inflating crushed his fingers
against the steering wheel.  Ford denies that its air bag caused any of
the injuries and says that the fingers were injured when the steering
wheel spun around as a result of the collision.  Here, it is obvious, we
have potentially several acts of negligence, all of which might be
proximate causes of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Under this factual situation it would be difficult and confusing to
instruct a jury that it should not consider the cause of the collision but
only the cause of the enhanced injuries.
Another logical hurdle inherent in plaintiff’s position is this.  If a
plaintiff negligently crashes his vehicle into a tree and suffers an
enhanced injury because of a design defect in his car, plaintiff says that
the manufacturer is liable for the enhanced injury regardless of the
plaintiff’s negligence in causing the collision.  But what if a plaintiff
collides with another vehicle and the driver of that vehicle is negligent? 
Assume also that the enhanced injuries caused to the plaintiff by a
design defect in his car are clearly identifiable.  Under ordinary rules of
proximate cause the other driver would have potential liability for all of
the plaintiff’s injuries, but logically, following the enhanced injury
theory of the plaintiff, only the manufacturer should have the liability
because the other driver’s conduct in causing the initial collision would
-45-
not have caused the injury absent the design defect.  Thus, carrying the
theory to its logical conclusion, plaintiff should have no recovery
against the other driver for his negligence in causing the collision.  This
result would run counter to well settled principles of tort law.
Our tort law has historically recognized the fact that there may be
more than one proximate cause of an injury.  Jurors have had no
difficulty in apportioning fault equitably between multiple parties where
negligent conduct is the proximate cause of injuries.  The existence of
other proximate causes of an injury does not relieve a plaintiff driver
under Delaware’s comparative negligence statute from responsibility
for his own conduct which proximately caused him injury.  Further, I
can discern no policy reason why, in an enhanced injury case, the rule
should be any different.  Public policy seeks to deter not only
manufacturers from producing a defective product but to encourage
those who use the product to do so in a responsible manner.
Under plaintiff’s theory, a jury would be instructed that it should
not consider the negligence of the plaintiff in causing the accident. 
Rather the jury would be instructed to simply determine what injuries
the plaintiff sustained over and above what he probably would have
sustained had no defect existed and then award the plaintiff damages
for the enhancement.
However, this approach ignores the well established rule of
proximate cause.  It is obvious that the negligence of a plaintiff who
causes the initial collision is one of the proximate causes of all of the
injuries he sustained, whether limited to those the original collision
would have produced or including those enhanced by a defective
product in the second collision.
Id. at 345-46 (emphasis added).  I would follow Judge Terry.
Accordingly, I would quash both D’Amario and Nash for the reasons I set
forth above.
HARDING, J., concurs.
Two Cases Consolidated:
-46-
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Second District - Case Nos.  2D97-02429 & 2D97-02540 
(Pinellas County)
Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A.,
Miami, Florida; Florin, Roebig & Walker, P.A., Clearwater, Florida; and Wagner,
Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Karen D’Amario, etc., et al., Petitioners
Wendy F. Lumish and Jeffrey A. Cohen of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith
& Cutler, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Ronald E. Cabaniss and Francis M. McDonald of
Cabaniss, Conroy & McDonald, P.A., Orlando, Florida,
for Ford Motor Company, Respondent
Benjamin H. Hill, III, and Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward & Henderson, Tampa,
Florida; William Powers, Jr., and Steven Goode, Austin, Texas; and Hugh F. Young,
Jr., Reston, Virginia,
for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amicus Curiae
--------------------
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Third District - Case No. 3D97-2844 
(Dade County)
-47-
Daniel S. Pearson of Holland & Knight, Miami, Florida; and Chilton Davis Varner, Halli
D. Cohn, and Michelle Jerusalem Cole of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia, 
for General Motors Corporation, etc., et al., Petitioners
Mark Poses of Poses & Poses, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Marc Cooper and Nancy C.
Ciampa of Colson, Hicks & Eidson, Miami, Florida,
for Brian W. Nash, etc., et al., Respondents
Benjamin H. Hill, III, and Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward & Henderson, Tampa,
Florida; William Powers, Jr., and Steven Goode, Austin, Texas; and Hugh F. Young,
Jr., Reston, Virginia,
for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amicus Curiae