Title: State ex rel. Ottinger v. B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ottinger v. B&B Wrecking & Excavating Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1656.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1656 
THE STATE EX REL. OTTINGER, APPELLANT, v. B&B WRECKING & 
EXCAVATING, INC.; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ottinger v. B&B Wrecking & Excavating Inc., Slip 
Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1656.] 
Workers’ compensation—R.C. 4123.52—R.C. 4123.57(B)—Industrial Commission 
did not abuse its discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction to 
reverse order of Bureau of Workers’ Compensation that awarded injured 
worker scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B), because 
award was based on mistake of fact and mistake of law, which commission 
identified when exercising its continuing jurisdiction—Documentation from 
independent medical examination conducted after bureau issued its 
erroneous award was properly considered by commission as some evidence 
supporting its denial of injured worker’s motion for scheduled-loss 
compensation—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2023-0763—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided May 2, 2024.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 19AP-745, 2023-Ohio-1758. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded appellant, Billy J. 
Ottinger, scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for the loss of use 
of both legs (“loss-of-use compensation”).  Appellee, Industrial Commission of 
Ohio, exercised its continuing jurisdiction and vacated the bureau’s decision; it then 
denied Ottinger’s request for loss-of-use compensation.  Ottinger sought a writ of 
mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals directing the commission to 
reinstate the bureau’s decision.  The court of appeals denied the request for a writ, 
and Ottinger appealed to this court as of right.  Because the commission’s order is 
supported by some evidence, we affirm the Tenth District’s judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Ottinger was working for B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc., on 
June 12, 2018, when he fell from a roof and landed on his legs.  At the emergency 
department, Ottinger presented with some sensation in his lower extremities, but he 
was unable to move his legs.  He regained some sensation following emergency 
spinal surgery but continued to experience significant weakness and immobility in 
his legs.  The bureau allowed Ottinger’s workers’ compensation claim for, among 
other conditions, “incomplete spinal cord injury” and “paraplegia, incomplete.” 
{¶ 3} According to medical literature included in the record, “having an 
incomplete [spinal-cord injury] does not imply the ability to walk or even bear 
weight on the lower extremities,” Oleson, Osteoporosis Rehabilitation, Chapter 9: 
Osteoporosis in Spinal Cord Medicine, 137 (2017).  The ASIA (American Spinal 
Injury Association) Impairment Scale (“AIS”) sets forth five impairment levels 
following a spinal-cord injury, denoted “A” through “E,” with level “A” 
representing a complete spinal-cord injury from which no sensory or motor function 
January Term, 2024 
 
3 
is preserved and level “E” representing the patient’s return to normal sensory and 
motor function.  Id. at 134-135.1 
{¶ 4} Emergency-department physicians assessed Ottinger’s spinal-cord 
injury as “L1 ASIA B,” and when he began physical therapy postoperatively, he 
was unable to ambulate.  Within one month, Ottinger’s spinal-cord injury was 
assessed as “L1 AIS C,” and he was able to ambulate up to 35 feet using leg braces 
and a wheeled walker and with the assistance of two people.  By December 2018, 
he could stand briefly with leg braces and ambulate with a walker for 200 feet, but 
both legs would buckle, drag, and catch on the ground. 
{¶ 5} The following month, in January 2019, Ottinger filed a motion for 
scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for the loss of use of both legs.  
He asked the bureau to “please consider * * * the medical [documentation] on file 
and the fact that his claim is allowed for ‘paraplegia.’ ”  A bureau nurse reviewed 
Ottinger’s loss-of-use claim and entered the following note in the bureau’s file on 
January 31, 2019: 
 
RN reviewed [Ottinger’s] C86 request for compensation for 
the functional loss of use of both of his lower extremities.  The 
medical evidence and exam findings from Lifeforce, Akron City 
Hospital on 06/12/2018, and the allowed condition in the claim, 
Paraplegia—defined as paralysis of the legs and lower body—
supports the request for compensation for the functional loss of use 
of both his lower extremities. 
 
 
1. See also ASIA, International Standards for Neurological Classification of SCI (ISNCSCI) 
Worksheet, 
https://asia-spinalinjury.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ASIA-ISCOS-
IntlWorksheet_2019.pdf#page=1 (accessed April 8, 2024) [https://perma.cc/332B-ARYN]. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4 
{¶ 6} On February 4, 2019, the bureau granted Ottinger’s motion for loss-
of-use compensation.  In its decision, the bureau listed all previously allowed 
medical conditions in the claim, including “paraplegia, incomplete.”  Based on 
Ottinger’s motion, the emergency-department report from the date of injury, and 
“medical documentation in [the] claim,” the bureau found that Ottinger had 
sustained the loss of both legs due to loss of use.  The bureau modified its decision 
two days later, on February 6, by changing only the date of payment for the loss-
of-use award for the right leg.  That decision was not appealed. 
{¶ 7} Then, on March 5, 2019, Ottinger requested an award of permanent-
total-disability (“PTD”) compensation under R.C. 4123.58(C)(1), which provides 
that a claimant “shall be compensated” for PTD when the claimant has lost the use 
of both legs.  Based on the loss-of-use award issued by the bureau and “medical 
documentation” from the date of injury, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for the 
commission issued a tentative order on March 15, awarding Ottinger PTD 
compensation for “the loss of use of both legs resulting from the allowed condition 
of incomplete paraplegia.”  The bureau objected to the SHO’s order, citing 
“insufficient medical documentation that the injured worker’s request for statutory 
[PTD compensation] under R.C. 4123.58(C) rises to the level of permanent and 
total loss of use.” 
{¶ 8} On March 21, 2019, the bureau filed a motion requesting that the 
commission exercise its continuing jurisdiction “based on a clear mistake of fact, 
law, and clerical error” and that it vacate the bureau’s February 2019 decision 
awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation.  The bureau explained: 
 
The order was based on [Ottinger’s] motion dated 01/22/2019 
requesting loss of use of the right and left leg[s] based on the 
allowance of paraplegia.  The claim is only allowed for paraplegia, 
incomplete and not paraplegia.  The order was based on a nurse 
January Term, 2024 
 
5 
review on 01/31/2019 that found loss of use based on the allowance 
of paraplegia and the medical records on the date of injury.  After 
the date of injury, [Ottinger] had emergency surgery and extensive 
physical therapy.  He has not been found to have reached maximum 
medical improvement.  There are physical therapy records from 
January 10, 2019 that indicate that [Ottinger] has regained the ability 
to walk.  The [bureau’s] order should be vacated and the request for 
the loss of use award [for] the right and left leg[s] should be denied 
due to lack of medical evidence to support loss of use. 
 
{¶ 9} On April 27, 2019, following a hearing on the motion to exercise 
continuing jurisdiction, a district hearing officer (“DHO”) found that the bureau 
had properly invoked the commission’s continuing jurisdiction “based upon clear 
mistake of fact, mistake of law and error by [an] inferior tribunal.”  The DHO 
vacated the bureau’s February 2019 decision and denied Ottinger’s motion for loss-
of-use compensation.  The DHO found that the bureau’s mistake of fact was basing 
its decision on an incorrect diagnosis of paraplegia when there was evidence that 
Ottinger could stand and ambulate independently with a wheeled walker.  The DHO 
found that the bureau’s mistake of law was “that the award of a scheduled loss of 
use of the right and left legs is inappropriate when an Injured Worker demonstrates 
some ability or function of [the] lower extremities.”  Ottinger appealed this order 
administratively.2 
 
2. In his merit brief filed in this court, Ottinger challenges the mistake of law as found by the DHO, 
arguing that caselaw supports an award for loss-of-use compensation when the injured worker 
retains some level of residual function.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Johnson, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 243, 2011-Ohio-530, 943 N.E.2d 541, ¶ 21-22.  However, as noted throughout this opinion, 
the mistake of law as found by the DHO was not the same mistake of law subsequently found by 
the SHO on administrative appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 10} At the commission’s request, an independent medical examination 
(“IME”) was conducted on July 8, 2019, by Michael Harris, M.D., who opined that 
Ottinger’s “allowed injuries have not resulted in a total, permanent loss of use of 
the left and right legs to such a degree that the affected body parts are useless for 
all practical purposes.”  (Underlining sic.) 
{¶ 11} On August 6, 2019, after a hearing on Ottinger’s administrative 
appeal, another SHO affirmed the DHO’s order vacating the bureau’s February 
2019 order and denying Ottinger’s motion for loss-of-use compensation.  The SHO 
made independent factual findings, including that “as a matter of fact and law,” the 
bureau’s decision was based on a condition—paraplegia—that “was not, and is not, 
allowed in this claim.”  The commission denied Ottinger’s request for 
reconsideration of the SHO’s order. 
{¶ 12} Ottinger subsequently filed this mandamus action in the Tenth 
District, alleging that the commission’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction was an 
abuse of discretion.  The court of appeals denied the request for a writ of mandamus, 
concluding (1) that the commission found at least one clear mistake of fact that is 
supported by some evidence and (2) that to award Ottinger loss-of-use 
compensation based on that evidence was a clear mistake of law.  2023-Ohio-1758, 
¶ 19-21.  We review Ottinger’s appeal of the Tenth District’s judgment as of right. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Mandamus Standard 
{¶ 13} In a direct appeal of the judgment in a mandamus action that 
originated in a court of appeals, we review the judgment as if the action had been 
originally filed in this court.  State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 
141, 164, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967). 
{¶ 14} Ottinger is entitled to a writ of mandamus if he shows by clear and 
convincing evidence that he has a clear legal right to the requested relief, that the 
commission has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and that he has no adequate 
January Term, 2024 
 
7 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. 
Indus. Comm., 166 Ohio St.3d 216, 2021-Ohio-3669, 184 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 4123.512(A) provides for the right to appeal a commission’s 
final order “in any injury or occupational disease case, other than a decision as to 
the extent of disability.”  Appellate review is limited to “decisions involving a 
claimant’s right to participate or to continue to participate” in the workers’ 
compensation fund.  Afrates v. Lorain, 63 Ohio St.3d 22, 584 N.E.2d 1175 (1992), 
paragraph one of the syllabus, citing former R.C. 4123.519 (renumbered as R.C. 
4123.512, effective Oct. 20, 1993, see Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part 
II, 2990, 3153-3156).  Because the commission’s decision to exercise its continuing 
jurisdiction in this case does not involve Ottinger’s right to participate in or to 
continue to participate in the fund, it is not appealable under R.C. 4123.512(A) and 
must be challenged by way of a mandamus action.  See State ex rel. Belle Tire 
Distribs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 154 Ohio St.3d 488, 2018-Ohio-2122, 116 N.E.3d 
102, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Saunders v. Metal Container Corp., 52 Ohio St.3d 85, 
86, 556 N.E.2d 168 (1990).  But see State ex rel. Carroll v. Galion Assisted Living, 
Ltd., 149 Ohio St.3d 326, 2016-Ohio-8117, 75 N.E.3d 140 (because commission’s 
exercise of continuing jurisdiction prevented claimant from participating in the 
workers’ compensation fund, claimant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law by way of appeal and was therefore not entitled to a writ of 
mandamus). 
{¶ 16} A writ of mandamus may lie when there is a legal basis to compel 
the commission to perform its duties under the law or when the commission has 
abused its discretion in carrying out its duties.  State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 9.  
“Where a commission order is adequately explained and based on some evidence, 
even evidence that may be persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, 
the order will not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.”  State ex rel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8 
Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 579, 584, 679 N.E.2d 300 (1997).  We “will 
not order the commission to vacate its decision if the decision is supported by some 
evidence.”  State ex rel. Neitzelt v. Indus. Comm., 160 Ohio St.3d 175, 2020-Ohio-
1453, 155 N.E.3d 812, ¶ 23. 
B.  The Commission’s Continuing Jurisdiction 
{¶ 17} In his first proposition of law, Ottinger conflates our standard for 
reviewing whether the commission abused its discretion with the commission’s 
standard for exercising its continuing jurisdiction.  Ottinger argues that the 
commission abused its discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction to vacate 
a decision of the bureau that was supported by “some evidence.”  However, in 
contrast to our deferential standard of review, the commission has broad authority 
to exercise continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation cases. 
{¶ 18} Under R.C. 4123.52, “[t]he jurisdiction of the industrial commission 
and the authority of the administrator of workers’ compensation over each case is 
continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is 
justified.”  However, this broad authority is not without limit.  There must be 
evidence of either “ ‘(1) new and changed circumstances, (2) fraud, (3) clear 
mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or (5) error by [an] inferior tribunal.’ ”  
Neitzelt at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 454, 
459, 692 N.E.2d 188 (1998).  “The commission must both identify and explain the 
prerequisite on which it relies.”  State ex rel. Tantarelli v. Decapua Ents., Inc., 156 
Ohio St.3d 258, 2019-Ohio-517, 125 N.E.3d 850, ¶ 16, citing State ex rel. Gobich 
v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 585, 2004-Ohio-5990, 817 N.E.2d 398, ¶ 15.  It 
is insufficient for the commission to cite only the possibility of an unspecified error.  
State ex rel. Foster v. Indus. Comm., 85 Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 707 N.E.2d 1122 
(1999), citing Nicholls at 459. 
January Term, 2024 
 
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C.  The Commission’s Order Vacating the Bureau’s Decision 
{¶ 19} R.C. 4123.57(B) authorizes compensation to an injured worker for 
the loss of enumerated body parts, including a leg, for a specified number of weeks.  
For purposes of R.C. 4123.57(B), “loss” includes amputation or severance as well 
as the loss of use of the affected body part that is both permanent and total, to the 
same effect and extent as if the body part had been physically removed.  State ex 
rel. Walker v. Indus. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d 402, 403-404, 390 N.E.2d 1190 (1979), 
citing State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 67, 322 N.E.2d 
660 (1975).  A claimant must demonstrate with medical evidence a total loss of use 
of the body part “for all practical intents and purposes,” State ex rel. Alcoa Bldg. 
Prods. v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 341, 2004-Ohio-3166, 810 N.E.2d 946, 
¶ 12.  But it is not necessary that the injured body part be of absolutely no use for 
it to have lost its use for all practical purposes.  See id. at ¶ 13; see also State ex rel. 
Kroger v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 243, 2011-Ohio-530, 943 N.E.2d 541, ¶ 22 
(“residual use does not necessarily bar an award” for total loss of use under 
R.C. 4123.57(B)). 
{¶ 20} Here, the bureau initially found that Ottinger had sustained the loss 
of both legs under R.C. 4123.57(B) due to loss of use.  It based that decision on the 
information contained in Ottinger’s motion for loss-of-use compensation, the 
emergency-department report, and “medical documentation in [the] claim.”  Then, 
after Ottinger filed his motion for PTD compensation, the bureau argued to the 
commission that there was a lack of medical evidence to support the award for loss-
of-use compensation that it had previously issued and that the order granting that 
award should be vacated. 
{¶ 21} The SHO determined that the bureau’s decision granting Ottinger 
loss-of-use compensation constituted an error of an inferior tribunal based on a 
mistake of fact and a mistake of law.  The SHO found “as a matter of fact and law” 
that the bureau’s decision “was based on a condition which was not, and is not, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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allowed in this claim.”  Specifically, the SHO found that whereas Ottinger’s claim 
was allowed for “paraplegia, incomplete,” the bureau’s order granting Ottinger an 
award for loss of use “was at least partially based on the incorrect assumption that 
this claim is allowed for paraplegia.”  (Capitalization deleted.)  The SHO noted 
(1) that Ottinger had incorrectly asserted in his own motion that his claim was 
allowed for “paraplegia” and (2) that a nurse’s review of the case, which was 
documented in the bureau’s file, had also misstated that the allowed condition in 
the claim was “ ‘[p]araplegia.’ ”  The SHO concluded: 
 
Specifically, the [bureau] note dated 01/31/2019 indicates 
the following: “The medical evidence and exam findings from 
Lifeforce, Akron City Hospital on 06/12/2018, and the allowed 
condition in the claim, Paraplegia—defined as paralysis of the legs 
and lower body—supports the request for compensation for the 
functional loss of use of both his lower extremities.” 
As previously indicated, relative to the medical term 
paraplegia, this claim is allowed for “paraplegia, incomplete,” and 
not “paraplegia,” with the latter diagnosis leading to the conclusion 
that [Ottinger] has complete paralysis. 
Based on these mistakes of law and fact, the Administrator’s 
order reflects an error of an inferior tribunal. 
 
{¶ 22} We now turn to whether there is some evidence to support the SHO’s 
finding that the bureau’s decision contained a clear mistake of fact or law. 
D.  Clear Mistake of Fact 
{¶ 23} A clear mistake of fact may exist when a clerical error has occurred, 
see, e.g., State ex rel. Weimer v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.2d 159, 160, 404 N.E.2d 
149 (1980), or when a factual finding is not supported by any evidence in the record, 
January Term, 2024 
 
11 
see, e.g., State ex rel. Waste Mgt. of Ohio, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 171 Ohio St.3d 68, 
2022-Ohio-4581, 215 N.E.3d 512, ¶ 17-19.  A disagreement regarding evidentiary 
interpretation, on the other hand, is not a proper basis for invoking the 
commission’s continuing jurisdiction.  See State ex rel. Royal v. Indus. Comm., 95 
Ohio St.3d 97, 100, 766 N.E.2d 135 (2002). 
{¶ 24} Ottinger argues in his second proposition of law that the commission 
exercised continuing jurisdiction without adequate justification.  He contends that 
the SHO identified only the possibility of error and that the SHO mischaracterized 
a disagreement of evidentiary interpretation as a mistake of fact. 
{¶ 25} The SHO specified that the bureau erred by basing the award for 
loss-of-use compensation, at least in part, on documents that incorrectly identified 
Ottinger’s diagnosis as “paraplegia.”  The SHO explained that this led to the 
incorrect assumption that Ottinger’s claim was allowed for “paraplegia,” which led 
to the incorrect conclusion that Ottinger was completely paralyzed, rather than 
having some use of his legs, even though the medical documentation in the claim, 
beginning with the emergency-department report from the date of injury, includes 
references to and is consistent with the allowed condition of “paraplegia, 
incomplete.”  Emergency-department physicians assessed Ottinger’s injury on the 
ASIA Impairment Scale as “L1 ASIA B.”  In later physical-therapy notes, 
Ottinger’s injury was documented as “L1 AIS C.”  Postsurgical notes explain that 
Ottinger had regained some sensation in his legs as well as limited mobility with 
the assistance of leg braces and wheeled walkers.  Moreover, it is undisputed that 
Ottinger was not completely paralyzed as a result of his injury and that when he 
moved for an award of loss-of-use compensation, he was to some extent 
ambulatory. 
{¶ 26} The inconsistency between the medical documentation, which 
showed that Ottinger was not completely paralyzed, and the bureau nurse’s 
incorrect description of his allowed condition as “paraplegia” is some evidence that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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supports the SHO’s determination that the bureau’s order awarding Ottinger loss-
of-use compensation was based on a mistake of fact.  Contrary to Ottinger’s 
position, the SHO did not identify an evidentiary disagreement but instead 
identified a clear mistake of fact in the bureau nurse’s review notes that was used 
to support the bureau’s February 2019 decision to award Ottinger loss-of-use 
compensation.  We therefore conclude that the commission did not abuse its 
discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction to vacate the bureau’s order 
awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation based on a clear mistake of fact.  See 
Neitzelt, 160 Ohio St.3d 175, 2020-Ohio-1453, 155 N.E.3d 812, at ¶ 23 (we “will 
not order the commission to vacate its decision if the decision is supported by some 
evidence”). 
E.  Clear Mistake of Law 
{¶ 27} A clear mistake of law exists when it is “of such character that 
remedial action would clearly follow.”  State ex rel. Rodriguez v. Indus. Comm., 67 
Ohio St.3d 210, 213, 616 N.E.2d 929 (1993), citing State ex rel. B & C Machine 
Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 538, 542, 605 N.E.2d 372 (1992) (holding that 
a clear mistake of law exists when it is clear this court would issue a writ of 
mandamus). 
{¶ 28} Ottinger argues that the commission failed to identify a clear mistake 
of law and that any subsequent explanation conjectured by the courts on appellate 
review does not cure the commission’s failure to adequately explain its justification 
for exercising continuing jurisdiction. 
{¶ 29} As recognized by the Tenth District, “[a] single mistake of fact or 
mistake of law is all that is needed to justify the commission’s exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction.”  2023-Ohio-1758 at ¶ 19.  Therefore, we need not address 
the remaining arguments under Ottinger’s second proposition of law. 
January Term, 2024 
 
13 
F.  The Commission’s Decision to Deny Loss-of-Use Compensation 
{¶ 30} After the commission properly exercises its continuing jurisdiction 
and vacates an order, the commission is required to reexamine all facets of the 
underlying request for compensation, State ex rel. Sheppard v. Indus. Comm., 139 
Ohio St.3d 223, 2014-Ohio-1904, 11 N.E.3d 231, ¶ 24, and is then free to reach a 
different conclusion regarding any issues of law or fact, Waste Mgt., 171 Ohio St.3d 
68, 2022-Ohio-4581, 215 N.E.3d 512, at ¶ 21.  See also R.C. 4123.52(A) (“the 
commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings 
or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified”). 
{¶ 31} As stated above, to qualify for loss-of-use compensation under 
R.C. 4123.57(B), a claimant must demonstrate with medical evidence a total loss 
of use of a body part for all practical purposes.  Alcoa Bldg. Prods., 102 Ohio St.3d 
341, 2004-Ohio-3166, 810 N.E.2d 946, at ¶ 12-14.  A loss of use must be both 
permanent and total, to the same effect and extent as if the body part had been 
physically removed.  Walker, 58 Ohio St.2d at 403-404, 390 N.E.2d 1190. 
{¶ 32} In Ottinger’s final proposition of law, he argues that the commission 
abused its discretion by reexamining his motion for loss-of-use compensation and 
by finding that he had failed to establish a loss of use of both legs under R.C. 
4123.57(B).  This argument fails, however, because the commission supported its 
finding with the following evidence: 
 
The physical therapy notes do document progress relative to 
[Ottinger’s] use and function of his lower extremities.  At hearing, 
[Ottinger] testifie[d] that he is able to use both feet/legs in order to 
drive a car.[3]  Although he must use a walker during his daily 
 
3. Because the transcript of this hearing is not in the record on appeal, we cannot verify Ottinger’s 
testimony in this regard. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
activities, and his functioning is limited, he has not established a 
total loss of use. 
The Hearing Officer also relies on the report of Michael 
Harris, M.D., who conclude[d] that the allowed injuries have not 
resulted in a total, permanent loss of use of the left and right legs to 
such a degree that the affected body parts are useless for all practical 
purposes.  Dr. Harris note[d] that [Ottinger] is ambulatory as he 
ambulates independently with a walker for short distances.  Dr. 
Harris note[d] that [Ottinger] does have an incomplete spinal cord 
injury and remains quite weak, but he does not have a complete loss 
of use of his left and right lower extremities. 
 
Accordingly, the commission’s denial of Ottinger’s motion for loss-of-use 
compensation is supported by some evidence. 
{¶ 33} Ottinger additionally argues that the commission erred in denying 
his motion for loss-of-use compensation based on evidence that was not in the 
record—namely, Dr. Harris’s IME report—when the bureau initially granted him 
such an award.  However, the existence of a clear mistake of fact allowed the 
commission to reopen the case, vacate the bureau’s order, and reconsider all issues 
de novo.  See Waste Mgt., 171 Ohio St.3d 68, 2022-Ohio-4581, 215 N.E.3d 512, at 
¶ 21, citing Sheppard, 139 Ohio St.3d 223, 2014-Ohio-1904, 11 N.E.3d 231, at 
¶ 24.  “The commission may, at any point in the processing of an application for 
benefits, require the injured worker to submit to a physical examination or may 
refer a claim for investigation.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(A)(5).  “Since the 
commission may refer a claimant for examination at any time, the commission may 
consider the report generated therefrom, regardless of when it is obtained.”  State 
ex rel. Cordray v. Indus. Comm., 54 Ohio St.3d 99, 101, 561 N.E.2d 917 (1990) 
(applying former Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(B)(3), which set forth the same 
January Term, 2024 
 
15 
proposition as Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(A)(5)).  It was therefore within the 
commission’s discretion to consider Dr. Harris’s report, even though it was not in 
the record when the bureau issued its initial decision.  See id. 
{¶ 34} Because the SHO’s findings are supported by Dr. Harris’s report, we 
conclude that the commission did not abuse its discretion by denying Ottinger’s 
motion for loss-of-use compensation.  See Mobley, 78 Ohio St.3d at 584, 679 
N.E.2d 300 (an order based on some evidence will not be disturbed as manifesting 
an abuse of discretion). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Ottinger has failed to 
establish a clear legal right to the relief requested.  We therefore affirm the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals’ judgment denying Ottinger’s request for a writ of 
mandamus. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Craigg E. Gould, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
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