Title: State v. Jackson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-1.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. JACKSON, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-1.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2003-0137 — Submitted May 10, 2005 — Decided January 4, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas for  
Trumbull County, No. 01-CR-794. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In the very early morning of December 12, 2001, Donna Roberts 
phoned 911 to report the shooting death of her former husband, Robert Fingerhut, 
at their home in Howland Township, Trumbull County, Ohio. Over the next few 
days, police learned that she and Nathaniel Jackson had plotted to kill Fingerhut.  
Both Roberts and Jackson were arrested, convicted of aggravated murder, and 
sentenced to death.  This opinion addresses the appeal by defendant-appellant, 
Jackson. 
{¶ 2} As evidence at trial showed, Roberts and Fingerhut had been 
divorced in 1985, but were living together in the Howland Township home.  
Almost all of the couple’s assets, including two Greyhound bus terminals in 
Warren and Youngstown, were in Roberts’s name.  Fingerhut managed the 
terminals.  Many of those who dealt with the couple assumed that they were 
married, and Fingerhut referred to Roberts as his wife in many business dealings. 
{¶ 3} Donna Roberts and Nathaniel Jackson met and began having an 
affair sometime before 2001.  Their romantic relationship was interrupted during 
most of 2001 while Jackson was incarcerated in the Lorain Correctional 
Institution.  At the time of Fingerhut’s murder, Jackson was 29 years old, Roberts 
was 57, and Fingerhut was 56. 
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{¶ 4} While Jackson was in prison, he and Roberts exchanged letters and 
spoke on the phone.  Because phone calls from prisoners are routinely recorded at 
the Lorain Correctional Institution and kept for at least six months, there were 
digital recordings of 19 of their phone conversations.  Many of the letters and 
conversations were sexually graphic, describing the couple’s plans after Jackson’s 
release.  The couple used veiled terms in their letters and conversations to discuss 
how they would deal with Fingerhut once Jackson was out of prison. 
{¶ 5} Three days before Jackson was released from prison on December 
9, 2001, a woman reserved a Jacuzzi suite at the Wagon Wheel Motel in 
Youngstown.  The woman paid for the room, and she and Jackson stayed there on 
the night of his release. 
{¶ 6} For the next few days, Roberts and Jackson were seen together at 
various places.  On the afternoon of December 10, Frank Reynolds, an employee 
of the Youngstown Greyhound bus terminal, saw Roberts and Jackson talking 
near the terminal before Fingerhut arrived for work.  Later, Reynolds overheard 
Roberts ask Fingerhut for $3,000, which he refused to give her.  According to 
Reynolds, Roberts was nervous and shaky and gave Fingerhut “the dirtiest look 
like it can kill a person.” 
{¶ 7} The next afternoon, December 11, the day of the murder, at 
approximately 4:35 p.m., bus driver Jim McCoy saw Fingerhut working alone at 
the Youngstown terminal.  Shortly afterwards, McCoy drove his bus to the 
Warren bus terminal, where he saw Roberts with a black male who identified 
himself as “Nathaniel.”  According to McCoy, the two appeared to be in a hurry 
to leave. 
{¶ 8} Shortly before 6:00 p.m. that evening, a waitress at the Red 
Lobster restaurant in Niles began serving Roberts and Jackson.  The two paid for 
their dinner at 6:43 p.m. and left the restaurant. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 9} Fingerhut left the Youngstown bus terminal at 9:00 p.m., telling 
the security guard that he was going home. 
{¶ 10} Near 9:30 p.m. the same evening, a neighbor of Roberts saw her 
driving near her home.  Although no one else was on the road at the time, Roberts 
was driving very slowly.  Meanwhile, Fingerhut left the Youngstown bus terminal 
at 9:00 p.m., telling the on-duty security guard, “I’m going home.” 
{¶ 11} Later that night, Roberts reserved a room for a week at the Days 
Inn Motel in Boardman. The room receipt indicates that she paid for the room at 
11:33 p.m. 
{¶ 12} Shortly after midnight, December 12, 2001, Roberts called 911 
screaming that there was something wrong with her husband.  The computer 
showed that the call came from Roberts and Fingerhut’s home in Howland 
Township. 
{¶ 13} These facts from the trial record are consistent with the state’s 
theory that Roberts let Jackson into her home to wait for Fingerhut to return from 
work; that when Fingerhut got home, Jackson shot him and stole his car and then 
called Roberts’s cell phone from the cell phone in Fingerhut’s car; that Jackson 
abandoned Fingerhut’s car, and Roberts picked him up and took him to Days Inn, 
where she reserved a room for a week; and that Roberts then went home and 
called 911. 
{¶ 14} Upon arriving at the scene, police found Fingerhut’s bloody corpse 
lying face down on the kitchen floor near the door to the garage.  Roberts told 
police to do whatever they had to do to catch the killer.  She also gave police 
permission to search the house and her car in the garage.  She asked police several 
times where her “husband’s car” was, but told police later that somebody had 
stolen it.  Roberts’s emotional state fluctuated.  At times she was very coherent, 
while at other times she was screaming, crying, and asking police why they were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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not doing anything.  Eventually, police arranged for Roberts’s brother to come 
and get her while police continued to process the crime scene. 
{¶ 15} The deputy coroner for Trumbull County, Dr. Humphrey 
Germaniuk, observed the victim at the crime scene and later performed an 
autopsy.  Fingerhut had sustained lacerations and abrasions to his left hand and 
head, as well as three gunshot wounds: one to his head, a perforating wound that 
started at the right side of his back and went through his chest, and a grazing 
wound to the right side of his back.  Germaniuk concluded that the gunshot to his 
head was fatal. 
{¶ 16} During the search of the crime scene, police found a fully loaded 
.38-caliber revolver near Fingerhut’s body.  Near the gun was a bloody shoe print.  
A firearms expert with the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation 
(“BCI”) concluded that the bullets recovered from the crime scene and the victim 
had all been fired from the same weapon, but not from the one found at the scene. 
{¶ 17} In a dresser in the master bedroom of the house, police discovered 
145 letters and cards handwritten by Jackson to Roberts.  Most were addressed to 
Roberts at a post office box in Warren. 
{¶ 18} In the trunk of Roberts’s car parked in the garage, police found a 
brown paper bag with Jackson’s name on it.  Inside the bag were clothing and 139 
handwritten letters from Roberts to Jackson dated from October through early 
December 2001.  Roberts told police that she had written the letters.  Also in the 
trunk, police found an empty handcuffs box. 
{¶ 19} During the ensuing investigation, police learned that Jackson and 
Roberts had spent a night at the Wagon Wheel Motel and that Roberts had 
registered for a room (room No. 129) at the Days Inn and had paid for a week.  
Police and a BCI agent found bloodstains in room No. 129.  Police also recovered 
a garbage bag that had been in room No. 129 containing a nearly empty bottle of 
hydrogen peroxide and bloodstained bandages and gauze.  The DNA of the blood 
January Term, 2006 
5 
was later determined to be consistent with Jackson’s DNA profile.  Fingerprints 
lifted from inside room No. 129 and from a Days Inn room-key envelope marked 
“129,” which was also found in the garbage bag, matched Jackson’s fingerprints. 
{¶ 20} Police also learned that Fingerhut had two life-insurance policies 
naming Roberts as sole beneficiary.  The aggregate benefit from the two policies 
was $550,000. 
{¶ 21} Police discovered Fingerhut’s car abandoned on the east side of 
Youngstown.  A BCI forensic scientist found blood on the driver’s visor and 
elsewhere inside the car.  The blood on the visor was a mixture consistent with 
both Jackson’s and Fingerhut’s DNA profiles.  Blood recovered from the trunk-
release lever inside the car was a mixture with a major profile consistent with 
Jackson’s DNA and a minor profile consistent with Fingerhut’s DNA.  The 
occurrence frequency of the DNA profile from blood found on the trunk-release 
lever is one in 45 quintillion, 170 quadrillion in the Caucasian population, one in 
29 quadrillion, 860 trillion in the African-American population, and one in 22 
quintillion, 400 quadrillion in the Hispanic population. 
{¶ 22} Passages from the letters exchanged between Jackson and Roberts, 
as well as recorded phone calls Jackson made to Roberts from prison, revealed a 
plot to murder Robert Fingerhut.  The subject was raised on more than one 
occasion. 
{¶ 23} For example, on October 2, 2001, Jackson wrote to Roberts: 
“[W]hy don’t you leave Robert an lets carry on with a world of our own?  Or let 
me do what I was gonna do to him, because you know that – that was our little 
thing so you better not go an try to get know one else to do it, because I told you 
its getting done when I come home.” 
{¶ 24} On October 8, 2001, Jackson wrote:  “Donna I got it already 
planned out on how we are gonna take care of the Robert situation.  An baby its 
the best plan ever!  Because Donna its now time that we really be together so that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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we can really see the true side of our love because I’m tired of not being able to 
be with you * * *.” 
{¶ 25} In an October 20, 2001 letter, Jackson wrote: “An Donna I don’t 
care what you say but Robert has to go!  An I’m not gonna let you stop me this 
time.  An Donna you know that I’ve always wanted to live my life with you an 
only you but everytime that I wanted to take care of the situation by myself you 
wouldn’t never let me.  * * *  Because you wouldn’t let me do what I wanted to 
do to make you happy an that was get rid of him!  So Donna can I do this so that 
we can go on an live happy?  An then maybe we can sell the house an move on to 
somewhere else in our own world.  An I’m not gonna be happy until that 
happens!”  
{¶ 26} On October 26, 2001, Jackson wrote: “An then after that you don’t 
ever have to worry about making know more excuses to him, because he will no 
longer be with us after 12-10-01 an then it’ll be me an you totally an completely * 
* *.”  Within that same passage, Jackson drew a tombstone with the inscription, 
“Rest In Piss.”  Later in the same letter, Jackson wrote:  “Hey Donna just think 
come 12-11-01 you’ll be waking up to me or maybe we’ll give it a couple of days 
to let things look cool an then after the funeral baby when I come home I’m never 
leaving an we’re only doing it like that just to make it look good * * *.  Alls I 
need is for my baby not to worry an leave everything else up to me.” 
{¶ 27} On October 29, 2001, Jackson wrote: “An as far as the Robert 
problem?  Yes I’m taking care of that the next night, because I told you I’m tired 
of living like this when I don’t have to.  An after that will you get me a 2002 
Cadillac Deville?”  Later in the same letter, Jackson wrote:  “An even if I gotta 
come to the house and shoot Robert in his fucking head you’re gonna be with 
me.” 
{¶ 28} On October 30, Jackson wrote:  “Well I see now you know that 
I’m about my business when I get out as far as our little situation?  An get me a 
January Term, 2006 
7 
size large leather gloves an see if you can find me a ski mask hat okay?  An I need 
them handcuffs you have an its mandatory, so get them for me, because the way 
that I’m gonna do it is gonna be right okay?”   
{¶ 29} In recorded phone conversations between Jackson and Roberts 
during November 2001, the two continued to discuss Jackson’s plans for 
Fingerhut.  In a November 8, 2001 conversation, Jackson told Roberts that he 
wanted Fingerhut to see her perform fellatio on him before Fingerhut “goes away 
man.”  In their conversation on November 22, Roberts expressed worries that 
Jackson would get caught: 
{¶ 30} “[Jackson]: * * * You know what I’m saying, the next day after.  
You know what I told you I wanted to do right? 
{¶ 31} “[Roberts]:  I’m afraid Nate. 
{¶ 32} “[Jackson]:  What you, man. 
{¶ 33} “[Roberts]:  I can’t afford to lose you. 
{¶ 34} “[Jackson]:  And I, listen, listen here. 
{¶ 35} “[Roberts]:  I can not lose you.  Like I will kill myself. 
{¶ 36} “[Jackson]:  Man, look.  See man. 
{¶ 37} “[Roberts]:  If you go away from me again. 
{¶ 38} “[Jackson]:  Just forget about it man, * * * when a person, man, 
know what he’s doing, man, * * * that’s like jinxing, man.  * * *. 
{¶ 39} “[Roberts]:  But what was the story with the trunk and handcuffs, 
that’s too involved. 
{¶ 40} “[Jackson]:  Just, just, just leave it alone, alright. 
{¶ 41} “[Roberts]:  It’s too much involved.  Your gonna leave hair, your 
gonna leave prints, your gonna, 
{¶ 42} “[Jackson]: Leave it alone, man.  Leave it alone, alright. 
{¶ 43} “* * * 
{¶ 44} “[Jackson]:  Come on man.  This ain’t Perry Mason man. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 45} “[Roberts]:  I don’t want to know anything about it ever.” 
{¶ 46} Two days later, on November 24, Jackson tried to reassure Roberts 
about his plan: 
{¶ 47} “[Jackson]:  Man, * * * we gonna really talk when I come home, 
ok. 
{¶ 48} “[Roberts]:  Ok. 
{¶ 49} “[Jackson]:  Especially about our, that situation, man.  You know. 
{¶ 50} “[Roberts]:  Yeah. 
{¶ 51} “[Jackson]:  I mean, it just, you know, you get too nervous at 
times, that’s all the deal is. 
{¶ 52} “[Roberts]:  Yeah I know, it part of my nature. 
{¶ 53} “[Jackson]:  And then you said DNA, the only way they can do a 
DNA is if they got the other, the person’s, you know what I’m saying.  If they got 
the person and the hair cause they can’t just take no hair and say this is such and 
such hair.  * * * [T]he laws that we got in the State of Ohio and the laws from 
everywhere else, you know what I’m saying, I mean they way different.  * * *. 
{¶ 54} “[Roberts]:  Really. 
{¶ 55} “[Jackson]:  Hell yeah.  We’ll, we’ll talk about it when I come 
home Donna.  Ok, I don’t want to talk about it over the phone.” 
{¶ 56} On December 8, the day before Jackson was released from prison, 
Jackson and Roberts had one final recorded conversation.  Roberts expressed 
misgivings about what Jackson was planning to do to Fingerhut, but Jackson told 
her, “I got to do this Donna. I got to.”  Roberts told Jackson that she did not want 
to know about it, and then the following colloquy took place: 
{¶ 57} “N. Jackson:  Just consider it a done deal.  Only thing I’m gonna 
need is one thing. 
{¶ 58} “D. Roberts:  What? 
{¶ 59} “* * *  
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 60} “N. Jackson:  I just need to be in that house when he come home. 
{¶ 61} “D. Roberts:  Oh no. 
{¶ 62} “* * *  
{¶ 63} “N. Jackson:  Baby it ain’t gonna happen in the house.  It ain’t 
gonna happen in the house man, I promise you. 
{¶ 64} “* * *  
{¶ 65} “N. Jackson:  I just need to be in there man.  It ain’t gonna happen 
in the house man.  I mean I ain’t gonna jeopardize that man. 
{¶ 66} “D. Roberts:  Well, let’s not talk about it now. 
{¶ 67} “N. Jackson:  Ok.  We’ll talk, we’ll, I’ll just wait until tomorrow.” 
{¶ 68} Police arrested Roberts at her home on the night of December 20, 
2001.  Shortly afterwards, police arrested Jackson at the Youngstown home of 
Sheila Fields, Jackson’s friend.  Jackson surrendered without incident, and police 
noticed that he had a bandage on his left index finger.  Police searched the home, 
with Fields’s consent, and seized a pair of tennis shoes and a pair of black leather 
gloves.  The index finger of the left glove appeared to have been torn off, and 
there was a red substance on what remained of that finger.  The tread pattern of 
the shoes was consistent with the print left in blood near Fingerhut’s body. 
{¶ 69} Police brought Jackson to the Trumbull County Sheriff’s Office 
around 2:00 a.m. on December 21, 2001, and advised him of his Miranda rights.  
Jackson initialed and signed the waiver-of-rights form.  Jackson told Detectives 
Monroe and Hoolihan, “I just didn’t mean to do it, man.”  Jackson then related on 
videotape his version of what happened, essentially claiming that he had shot 
Fingerhut in self-defense. 
{¶ 70} Jackson’s story was that he approached Fingerhut at the 
Youngstown bus terminal about getting a job and Fingerhut told him to meet him 
outside a restaurant later that evening.  Jackson claimed to have known Fingerhut 
for a couple of years.  Jackson claimed to have sold Fingerhut “some weed” when 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
Fingerhut picked him up at the restaurant.  Once inside Fingerhut’s car, the two 
discussed a job at the bus terminal.  Jackson asked whether he could stay at 
Fingerhut’s house for the night and then get an early start on learning the job at 
the terminal the next day.  Fingerhut agreed and took Jackson to his home, which 
Jackson acknowledged having visited before. 
{¶ 71} Inside 
the 
home, 
Jackson 
claimed, 
Fingerhut 
started 
“disrespecting” him, and the two argued.  Jackson said that Fingerhut then pointed 
a gun at him and shot him in the finger as Jackson tried to disarm him.  Jackson 
claimed that he and Fingerhut had struggled over the gun and then Jackson got 
control of it and shot Fingerhut a couple of times.  Jackson then grabbed car keys 
off the kitchen counter and fled in Fingerhut’s car. 
{¶ 72} Jackson asserted that he had been scared and had not meant to kill 
Fingerhut.  He threw the gun from the car window while driving on the freeway 
back to Youngstown.  He then called Roberts on the cell phone in Fingerhut’s car 
and asked her to pick him up at Sheila Fields’s house and get him a room at Days 
Inn.  Jackson said he did not tell Roberts what had happened with Fingerhut and 
claimed, “Donna ain’t had nothing to do with it at all, man.” 
{¶ 73} On December 28, 2001, a grand jury indicted Jackson on two 
counts of aggravated murder for killing Robert Fingerhut in violation of R.C. 
2903.01(A) and (B).  Both murder counts carried two felony-murder death-
penalty specifications: murder during an aggravated burglary and during an 
aggravated robbery.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  The grand jury also indicted Jackson 
on separate counts of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery with a firearm 
specification on each count. 
{¶ 74} Before a jury, the state presented numerous witnesses establishing 
the facts already mentioned.  The defense presented three witnesses, whose 
testimony revealed that ownership documents for most of the property shared by 
January Term, 2006 
11 
Roberts and Fingerhut named Roberts as the owner.  This evidence was intended 
to undermine the financial motive for the killing asserted by the state. 
{¶ 75} The jury found Jackson guilty as charged. 
{¶ 76} At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury 
recommended death, and the court imposed the death sentence on Jackson. 
{¶ 77} Jackson has raised 12 propositions of law.  We have reviewed each 
and have determined that none justifies reversal of Jackson’s conviction for 
aggravated murder.  Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A), we have also independently 
weighed the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors.  We find 
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigation beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Therefore, we affirm Jackson’s sentence of death. 
PRETRIAL ISSUES 
Suppression Issues 
{¶ 78} In proposition of law I, Jackson argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion in overruling the motion to suppress his pretrial statement to police.  
Jackson contended at the suppression hearing that he repeatedly requested counsel 
but that police ignored his requests.  He also claims that he told detectives that he 
did not want to answer any more questions but that the detectives continued to 
interrogate him. 
{¶ 79} At the suppression hearing, Warren Police Detective Jeff Hoolihan 
testified that he arrested Jackson the night of December 20, 2001, and told him he 
was under arrest for aggravated murder.  Hoolihan advised Jackson of his 
Miranda rights on the ride to the Trumbull County Jail.  According to Hoolihan, 
without being questioned, Jackson denied killing anybody and asked whether he 
had the right to an attorney at any time.  Hoolihan replied that he did.  Jackson 
then told Hoolihan that he was on the phone with Roberts when he saw that police 
were surrounding the home where he was arrested.  Hoolihan then told Jackson 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
that Roberts had “snitched him out” and that he would have a chance to tell his 
side of the story when they arrived at the county jail. 
{¶ 80} Jackson was taken to the jail, where he waited with Howland 
Township Police Sgt. Dillon and a corrections officer for approximately an hour 
until Captain Bacon arrived to open the interview room.  Jackson was not 
questioned before Captain Bacon arrived.  At approximately 1:45 a.m. on 
December 21, 2001, he was taken to the interview room, where Hoolihan and 
Howland Township Police Detective Paul Monroe questioned him.  Jackson was 
given coffee and cigarettes and was very polite, cooperative, and alert.  Jackson 
claimed that Fingerhut shot him in the finger and that he then wrested the gun 
from Fingerhut and shot him.  Jackson agreed to allow police to videotape his 
statement.  According to Hoolihan, Jackson did not ask for a lawyer or decline to 
answer questions. 
{¶ 81} At 2:13 a.m., police began videotaping the interview and again 
informed Jackson of his Miranda rights and gave him a waiver-of-rights form, 
which he initialed and signed, thereby waiving his Miranda rights.  The interview 
lasted approximately an hour.  Jackson claimed that he did not mean to kill 
Fingerhut and essentially claimed that he had acted in self-defense. 
{¶ 82} At the suppression hearing, Jackson testified that during the 
interview, he had asked to speak to an attorney.  Jackson testified, “I didn’t want 
to speak to them unless I had an attorney around.”  Jackson claimed that the 
police persisted in questioning him, even though he asserted, several times, his 
rights to say nothing more and to have an attorney present.  Jackson also asserted 
that he had been high on painkillers and marijuana at the time.  Although Jackson 
admitted signing the waiver, he claimed that no one had read him his rights 
beforehand. 
{¶ 83} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress Jackson’s 
confession after according no weight to Jackson’s testimony.  Instead, the trial 
January Term, 2006 
13 
court found Det. Hoolihan’s testimony to be more persuasive.  The court 
concluded that Jackson had been sufficiently advised of his Miranda rights and 
had voluntarily waived those rights.  The court also found that Jackson had not 
unambiguously or unequivocally requested counsel before or during questioning.  
“At a suppression hearing, the evaluation of evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses are issues for the trier of fact.”  State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 
357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972. 
{¶ 84} During the videotaped statement, Jackson recounted his version of 
his interaction with Fingerhut before the shooting, described shooting Fingerhut 
in self-defense, and explained meeting with Roberts after the shooting.  The 
detectives then asked Jackson how he was able to treat the wound to his finger.  
Jackson now asserts that at that point in the questioning, he requested counsel.  He 
claims that the request is clear from the following portion of the transcript of the 
interview: 
{¶ 85} “Det Hoolihan: Okay, but then she goes to Walgreens and brings 
the stuff to the room? 
{¶ 86} “Jackson:  (Mumbles) I, you know, I, I, I told you, you know what 
I’m saying, but what I had to say, man, I mean, I mean, I can’t just sit here, you 
know what I’m saying, I mean, just, keep on, you know what I’m saying, back-
tracking, I mean, I don’t even want to talk about it no more, man.  I’m, I’m, I’m 
through with it, man, just, man, you know what I mean, police, you know, I mean, 
I, I talked to a lawyer or something, man, you know what I mean, ‘cause I, I 
mean, I ain’t got time to just, just keep on, over and over, man, I’m, I’m through, 
man, I’m through, man, you know what I’m saying. I say, I mean, I, I ain’t mean 
to do it, I’m sorry I did it, you know what I’m saying, I mean, but, I was left, I had 
no choice, man. And that’s it. End of discussion, man. 
{¶ 87} “Det Monroe:  Anything else you want to say? 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶ 88} “Jackson:  (Inaudible) all I got to say, man, I didn’t mean to do it, 
man. I mean, I mean, I’m sorry it happened. 
{¶ 89} “* * * 
{¶ 90} “Det Monroe:  Well, there’s, there’s more here that we didn’t get 
to. 
{¶ 91} “Jackson:  We, we just sum it up like I said, man, when, when I 
talk to my lawyer, man, you know what I’m saying.  Other than that, man, you 
know, I mean.” 
{¶ 92} The interrogation continued a little longer and then stopped at 3:15 
a.m., when Jackson said: “I have to go lay down, I don’t want to, but shit, I got to, 
you know.” 
{¶ 93} Under the Fifth Amendment, an accused must clearly invoke his 
constitutional right to counsel in order to raise a claim of deprivation of counsel.  
“[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel.  * * * [H]e must articulate 
his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police 
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an 
attorney.  If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards [v. 
Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378] does not require 
that the officers stop questioning the subject.”  Davis v. United States (1994), 512 
U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362. 
{¶ 94} Here, we find that Jackson’s alleged request for counsel was 
neither clear nor unambiguous.  In State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 62-
63, 679 N.E.2d 686, we held that “I think I need a lawyer” is not an unequivocal 
assertion of the right to counsel.  In State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003-
Ohio-5059, 796 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 19, we held that “don’t I supposed to have a lawyer 
present” was “at best ambiguous.”  Other courts have found similar remarks to be 
ambiguous and thus not invoking the constitutional right to counsel.  See, e.g., 
Mueller v. Angelone (C.A.4, 1999), 181 F.3d 557, 573-574 (defendant’s question 
January Term, 2006 
15 
to police, “do you think I need an attorney here” answered by headshaking, a 
shrug, and the statement “You’re just talking to us,” was not an unequivocal 
request); Dormire v. Wilkinson (C.A.8, 2001) 249 F.3d 801 (“Could I call my 
lawyer?” followed by police response of “yes” did not invoke the right to 
counsel); United States v. Zamora (C.A. 10, 2000), 222 F.3d 756, 766 (“I might 
want to talk to an attorney” was not “an unequivocal request for counsel”). 
{¶ 95} Because Jackson’s words “I talked to a lawyer or something” or 
“when I talk to my lawyer” did not amount to a clear, unambiguous, or 
unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in overruling his motion to suppress. 
{¶ 96} Nor did Jackson unequivocally assert his right to remain silent 
during questioning by the police detectives.  In Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 
U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, the United States Supreme Court held that 
once a suspect invokes the right to remain silent, police must cease questioning 
him.  However, similar to the invocation of the right to counsel, invocation of the 
right to stop questioning must be honored by police only if it is unambiguous.  
State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 520, 747 N.E.2d 765, citing Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. at 461-462, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362.  In Murphy, 
we held that the statement “I’m ready to quit talking now and I’m ready to go 
home, too” was ambiguous and not a clear invocation of the right to remain silent.  
Id. at 519, 521, 747 N.E.2d 765. 
{¶ 97} Here, Jackson initially told the detective at the beginning of the 
videotaped interview, “I don’t even like talking about it man * * * cause you 
know what I mean, it’s fucked for me, man, * * * I told you * * * what happened, 
man, * * * I mean, I don’t even want to, you know what I’m saying, discuss no 
more about it, man, you know, ‘cause it ain’t gonna, you know, it ain’t gonna to 
bring, ain’t gonna bring the man back.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 98} Later, in the colloquy set forth above during which Jackson alleges 
that he invoked his right to counsel, he stated: “I don’t even want to talk about it 
no more, man.  I’m, I’m, I’m through with it, man,” and then a few phrases later 
says:  “And that’s it.  End of discussion, man.”  Those statements alone might 
suggest that Jackson invoked his right to remain silent; but between those 
statements Jackson said, “I ain’t mean to do it, I’m sorry I did it, * * * but, I was 
left, I had no choice, man.”  Given his equivocation, it is unclear whether Jackson 
wanted to end the discussion by invoking his right to remain silent. 
{¶ 99} Although the police should have stopped their questioning once 
Jackson asserted, “And that’s it.  End of discussion,” the statements Jackson made 
after this assertion did not add anything of any consequence or implicate him 
further.  We find that the admission of the subsequent statements by Jackson was 
harmless error. 
{¶ 100} Thus, the trial court’s finding that Jackson was properly advised 
of his Miranda rights and that he waived those rights is amply supported in the 
record.  Jackson neither unequivocally nor unambiguously asserted his right to 
counsel.  Any infringement of his right to remain silent during his custodial 
interrogation was nonprejudicial.  Accordingly, we overrule proposition I. 
TRIAL ISSUES 
Judicial Errors 
{¶ 101} In proposition of law IV, Jackson asserts that four instances of 
error committed by the trial court denied him due process and a fair trial. 
{¶ 102} Two incidents cited by Jackson occurred during guilt-phase 
closing argument.  First, Jackson complains that the prosecutor improperly 
accused defense counsel of creating a diversion, thereby implying that the defense 
was somehow lying or committing a fraud upon the court and jury.  After an in-
chambers conference regarding Jackson’s objection to the prosecutor’s 
January Term, 2006 
17 
characterization, the trial court failed to rule on the objection or issue a curative 
instruction. 
{¶ 103} However, after the defense objected, the trial court told the jury: 
“Please disregard this little exchange.  It’s not part of this case.”  Even if the 
prosecutor’s diversion comment were improper, Jackson must also show he was 
prejudiced.  “Not every intemperate remark by counsel can be a basis for 
reversal.”  State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 112, 559 N.E.2d 710.  
Defense counsel directly rebutted the prosecution’s diversion accusation by 
stating during closing argument: “When he says * * * the defense is going to give 
you a diversion, he wants you to believe that I’m going to trick you somehow, 
okay.  Well, I’m not going to trick you.  You’re smarter than that * * *.”  In our 
view, the trial court’s failure to directly rule on the defense objection did not 
materially prejudice Jackson. 
{¶ 104} Second, Jackson argues that the trial court improperly allowed 
the prosecutor to theorize about the evidence.  The prosecutor stated during 
closing argument that Donna Roberts “depended on Robert [Fingerhut] and she 
was not in a position to financially take on the relationship [with Jackson] and 
have the way of life she had been used to with this guy.”  The defense objection 
was overruled. 
{¶ 105} Nevertheless, “[t]he prosecution is entitled to a certain degree of 
latitude in summation.”  State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 466, 739 
N.E.2d 749.  Several witnesses testified to the upper-middle-class lifestyle 
Roberts and Fingerhut enjoyed.  In a letter to Jackson, Roberts complained that 
Fingerhut had begun restricting her spending and that she was not used to living 
that way.  She wrote, “I am used to having plenty of cash for whatever I want and 
buying everything I want.”  The prosecutor’s comments were fair inferences 
based on this evidence.  See, e.g., State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-
6658, 780 N.E.2d 186, ¶ 144.  The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
objection, and Jackson does not demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the 
remarks. 
{¶ 106} The third instance cited by Jackson took place during penalty-
phase closing argument.  Jackson complains that the prosecutor commented on 
the absence of a mitigating factor not raised by Jackson.  Specifically, the 
prosecutor stated: “This lady [Jackson’s expert psychologist] testified that there 
was no mental disease or defect, that mitigating factor does not exist in this case.”  
Jackson’s objection was essentially overruled by the trial court after a sidebar 
conference. 
{¶ 107} The court erred here in permitting the prosecutor to argue the 
absence of a mitigating factor not raised by Jackson.  Prosecutorial comment is 
appropriate only with regard to those factors actually offered in mitigation by 
defendant.  State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 289, 528 N.E.2d 542; State 
v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 373, 582 N.E.2d 972. 
{¶ 108} The state contends that the defense opened the door to the issue 
when the defense expert testified that Jackson had once tested at a 70 IQ.  
Although the prosecutor was entitled to minimize that evidence by emphasizing 
Jackson’s mental abilities, it was misconduct to cast his comments explicitly in 
terms of the absence of a statutory mitigating factor.  Nevertheless, we find that 
the prosecutor’s comment was harmless error, given the overwhelming weight of 
the aggravating circumstances over the mitigating factors.  See State v. Dixon, 
101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 90. 
{¶ 109} Jackson also claims that error occurred during the testimony of 
prosecution witness Frank Reynolds, Fingerhut’s former employee.  Reynolds 
recalled overhearing a conversation between Fingerhut and Roberts the day before 
the murder.  According to Reynolds, Roberts asked Fingerhut for $3,000, and 
when Fingerhut refused, she gave Fingerhut “the dirtiest look like it can kill a 
person.” 
January Term, 2006 
19 
{¶ 110} The defense objected on hearsay grounds.  The trial court 
correctly overruled the defense objections.  Roberts’s request for money was not a 
statement as defined in Evid.R. 801(A), and thus Reynolds’s testimony was not 
hearsay.  State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 651 N.E.2d 965, paragraph 
two of the syllabus.  Fingerhut’s response was not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
{¶ 111} Last, Jackson claims that cumulative errors by the trial court 
denied him a fair trial.  We disagree.  Jackson received a fair trial.  Accordingly, 
we overrule proposition IV. 
Jury Instructions 
{¶ 112} In propositions of law V and VI, Jackson argues that he was 
prejudiced by the trial court’s jury instructions on purpose and reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 113} In proposition V, Jackson contends that the trial court’s 
instruction on purpose relieved the state of its burden of proof on the mens rea 
element of a capital crime.  He further asserts that the purpose instruction created 
a mandatory, rebuttable presumption of the mens rea element from the mere use 
of a deadly weapon. 
{¶ 114} But Jackson’s failure to object to the purpose instruction waived 
all but plain error.  State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 13-14, 3 OBR 
360, 444 N.E.2d 1332.  This court has repeatedly rejected similar arguments.  The 
trial court’s instructions on mens rea, purpose, and causation were similar to the 
instructions this court upheld in, e.g., State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 80-
81, 641 N.E.2d 1082; and State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 
N.E.2d 72, ¶ 71-75.  The instructions were therefore not plain error. 
{¶ 115} In addition, Jackson’s reliance on State v. Wilson (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 381, 393, 659 N.E.2d 292, is misplaced.  The instruction criticized 
there appears nowhere in any of the trial court’s jury instructions on purpose. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶ 116} In proposition VI, Jackson complains that the trial court’s 
reasonable-doubt instructions in both phases of the trial based on the language of 
R.C. 2901.05(D) were erroneous.  Jackson’s failure to object to either reasonable-
doubt instruction waived all but plain error.  State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d at 
13-14, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332.  This court has repeatedly upheld use of 
reasonable-doubt instructions based on the statutory language.  E.g., State v. 
Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph eight 
of the syllabus; State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 
N.E.2d 215, ¶ 65, 173.  Accordingly, proposition VI is overruled. 
SENTENCING ISSUES 
Sentencing Opinion 
{¶ 117} In proposition of law VII, Jackson argues that the trial court, in 
its sentencing opinion, improperly weighed both R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) alternatives 
contrary to State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744, and in 
effect required mitigation to be justification. 
{¶ 118} In contending that the trial court weighed both R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) alternatives (principal offender, prior calculation and design), 
Jackson points to the following passages in the court’s sentencing opinion: 
{¶ 119} “The evidence reveals that the sole purpose for the Defendant’s 
illegal entry in the Fingerhut residence was not to commit a theft, a kidnapping or 
a rape, but to [sic] rather to carry out the premeditated, cold blooded execution 
[of] Robert S. Fingerhut.  This is the most heinous form of Aggravated Burglary, 
and it is entitled to unsurpassed weight.  * * *  
{¶ 120} “* * * 
{¶ 121} “* * * From the overwhelming evidence, it is this Court’s 
opinion that the Defendant and the Co-Defendant plotted the murder of Robert S. 
Fingerhut solely to collect $550,00[0].00 in insurance proceeds.  This was 
January Term, 2006 
21 
accomplished by trespassing in the residence where Fingerhut resided, for the sole 
purpose of ambushing and murdering him.” 
{¶ 122} Jackson’s arguments are not well taken.  The jury found Jackson 
guilty of aggravated murder with prior calculation and design in count one.  In 
count two, the jury found Jackson guilty of aggravated murder while committing 
aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.  The jury also found Jackson guilty 
of the two specifications attached to each count, and the (A)(7) alternatives were 
listed in the disjunctive. 
{¶ 123} In its sentencing opinion, the trial court noted that the two counts 
had merged for sentencing purposes and that the state had elected to dismiss count 
two.  The trial court, however, did not err in its opinion by referring to the murder 
as “premeditated” and “plotted,” because the jury found in count one that Jackson 
murdered Fingerhut with prior calculation and design. Additionally, in its review 
of the jury’s verdict on the specifications attached to the aggravated-murder 
counts, the trial court referred to the defendant as the principal offender and made 
no mention of “prior calculation and design.”  Although the trial court’s 
commentary on the aggravated-burglary charge gives the appearance that it 
improperly weighed both R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) factors, in our independent review, 
we find that the trial court’s ultimate decision was correct. 
{¶ 124} In this case, the evidence clearly established that Jackson was the 
actual killer of Fingerhut.  See State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-
2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 168.  Jackson admitted that he had killed Fingerhut, 
although he claimed self-defense.  There is no merit to Jackson’s contention that 
the trial court equated “mitigation” with “justification” in its sentencing opinion.  
Nothing in the sentencing opinion states this.  The trial court specifically defined 
mitigating factors to the jury as “factors that while they do not justify or excuse 
the crimes of aggravated murder * * * shall be considered by you as extenuating 
lessening, weakening, excusing to some extent or reducing the degree of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
sentence.”  Thus, the trial court clearly understood that mitigating factors “do not 
justify or excuse” the offense. 
Appropriateness of the Sentence 
{¶ 125} In proposition of law VIII, Jackson contends that his death 
sentence is inappropriate and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases.  Jackson’s arguments will be considered as part of our independent review 
of sentence. 
Proportionality Review 
{¶ 126} In propositions of law IX and X, Jackson asserts that 
proportionality review in Ohio is fatally flawed under R.C. 2929.05 because only 
cases in which the death penalty has been imposed are used for comparison.  
Neither proposition has merit.  Proportionality review needs to entail only those 
cases in which the death sentence has been imposed.  State v. Steffen (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 111, 123-124, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383; State v. Jordan, 101 
Ohio St.3d  216, 2004-Ohio-783, 804 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 86. 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
{¶ 127} In proposition of law II, Jackson asserts that trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance.  Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance 
requires two showings.  “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  Proving prejudice requires showing that 
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”  
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373.  In no 
instance, however, does Jackson demonstrate prejudice, “a reasonable probability 
that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been 
different.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2006 
23 
{¶ 128} Voir Dire.  Jackson first argues that defense counsel failed to 
object to what he characterizes as the prosecutor’s “extraction of guilty verdict 
and death verdict promises from all twelve impaneled” jurors during voir dire, 
relying on State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 465, 739 N.E.2d 749.  Yet “ 
‘[t]he failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ”  State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 
347, 715 N.E.2d 136, quoting State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 
527 N.E.2d 831.  This court will normally defer to defense counsel’s judgment in 
voir dire and not find ineffective assistance.  See State v. Clayton (1980), 62 Ohio 
St.2d 45, 49, 16 O.O.3d 35, 402 N.E.2d 1189.  Like the prosecutor in Treesh, the 
prosecutor here asked potential jurors whether they would return a guilty verdict 
if the state proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  There is nothing wrong with 
such questions, and Treesh does not hold otherwise. 
{¶ 129} All of the jurors Jackson mentions indicated that they could 
return either a death sentence or life sentence depending on whether the state 
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence presented at trial.  
Accordingly, we reject Jackson’s claim of ineffective assistance in this regard. 
{¶ 130} Next, Jackson contends that counsel were ineffective by failing 
to object during voir dire to the prosecutor’s use of only mental disease and age as 
examples of mitigating factors.  Jackson asserts that in limiting examples to these 
two, the prosecution predisposed most jurors who sat on the case to expect those 
mitigating factors during the penalty phase.  Jackson relies on State v. Jones 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 744 N.E.2d 1163, in which this court stated, 
“During voir dire, a trial court is under no obligation to discuss, or to permit the 
attorneys to discuss, specific mitigating factors.”  According to Jackson, Jones 
stands for the proposition that it is improper to ask prospective jurors to weigh or 
consider specific mitigating factors during voir dire. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶ 131} Jackson’s counsel were not ineffective for failing to object.  
Jackson misconstrues the Jones holding.  Jones reiterated the proposition that a 
trial court does not err or abuse its discretion in refusing to allow attorneys to ask 
prospective jurors about specific mitigating factors.  See State v. Wilson, (1996), 
74 Ohio St.3d 381, 386, 659 N.E.2d 292.  Jones, however, does not prohibit 
attorneys from referring to specific mitigating factors as examples of mitigating 
evidence during voir dire questioning.  A trial court does not abuse its discretion 
in allowing that type of question. 
{¶ 132} Jackson also does not demonstrate how jurors were predisposed 
to expect mitigating factors that were not raised or did not apply.  Whenever the 
prosecutor referred to specific mitigating factors during voir dire, he used them 
solely as a hypothetical and cautioned the individual prospective jurors that the 
factors being discussed did not necessarily apply to Jackson’s case.  Counsel’s 
decision not to object to the prosecutor’s use of specific mitigating factors in voir 
dire inquiries did not constitute deficient performance.  Therefore, Jackson’s 
arguments are not well taken. 
{¶ 133} Jackson next argues that counsel were ineffective for not 
objecting to inappropriate statements and misconduct of the prosecutor that 
prejudiced and predisposed the jury to return guilty and death verdicts.  Jackson 
cites six prosecutorial comments that he claims were inappropriate: (a) “The first 
trial deals with the state proving beyond a reasonable doubt, the Defendant 
committed aggravated murder”;  (b) “if you found beyond a reasonable doubt 
even though there were mitigating factors, you would still, under the law, return a 
verdict recommending the death penalty, do you understand that?”; (c) “So we’re 
dealing with charges where the person committed the crime, the Defendant is 
alleged of killing a homeowner”; (d) “in this case the aggravating circumstances 
accuse the Defendant of purposely killing a homeowner in the commission of an 
aggravated burglary”; (e) “So that means that you would be able, if you were one 
January Term, 2006 
25 
of the 12 jurors, to listen to the evidence and decide the Defendant’s guilt based 
only on the evidence, right?”; and (f) “In this case, the Defendant is charged with 
killing a home owner in an aggravated murder.” 
{¶ 134} None of the foregoing statements constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct, and counsel were not deficient in failing to object to any of them.  
Statement (a) is largely accurate, although a more complete statement would have 
referred to “the first trial” as the first phase or the guilt phase.  Statement (b) was 
confusing and a misstatement because it was not limited to the situation in which 
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  R.C. 2929.03(D)(2). Nevertheless, soon after this 
misstatement, the prosecutor correctly stated the state’s burden of proof in the 
penalty phase. 
{¶ 135} Statements (c), (d), and (f) are inaccurate because Fingerhut was 
not a homeowner, and homeowner status is not an element of any crime or 
specification that Jackson was charged with committing.  Jackson’s claims of 
prejudice, however, are not persuasive.  Statement (e) was not improper in the 
context of the voir dire questioning concerning pretrial publicity.  The prosecutor 
followed up this alleged prejudicial statement with “And that is why we ask the 
question, because if you come into Court believing the Defendant was guilty from 
prior publicity, you wouldn’t be fair, right?” 
{¶ 136} Guilt phase.  Jackson next contends that counsel were deficient 
in fashioning a defense based on the fact that Roberts owned the house and car 
and that she had given Jackson permission to enter, thus supposedly negating the 
burglary and robbery charges. 
{¶ 137} Defense counsel unsuccessfully sought a jury instruction that 
would have provided that if the owner – i.e., Roberts – had given Jackson 
permission to enter the property or use the car, then there was no trespass.  
Jackson asserts that counsel were apparently unaware that such a defense to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
burglary and robbery was precluded, he claims, by decisions of this court.  See 
State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 115, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, and State 
v. Rhodes (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 2 OBR 629, 442 N.E.2d 1299. 
{¶ 138} However, counsel’s decisions in this area were trial strategy.  
This court ordinarily refrains from second-guessing strategic decisions counsel 
makes at trial, even when counsel’s trial strategy was questionable.  State v. 
Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d at 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189.  Given the abundant evidence of 
Jackson’s guilt, counsel were left with few options in attempting to create 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury.  Assuming that the jury could have 
found merit in the defense claim that Jackson had killed Fingerhut in self-defense, 
the requested jury instruction would have been consistent with that defense.  In 
any event, we find that counsel’s pursuit of this strategy did not prejudice Jackson 
or affect the outcome of his trial. 
{¶ 139} Jackson next asserts ineffective assistance in defense counsel’s 
failure to object to admission of letters allegedly written by Roberts to Jackson 
without requiring authentication of her writings as a predicate to admission.  In 
contrast, Jackson points out, his letters to Roberts were admitted only after 
authentication of his authorship was established by testimony of a handwriting 
expert. 
{¶ 140} Detective Monroe did properly identify the letters pursuant to 
Evid.R. 901(A).  Roberts told Monroe that she had written the letters.  They were 
found in the trunk of Roberts’s car in a bag with Jackson’s name on it. They were 
signed “Donna Marie.”  They had a return address of a post office box registered 
to Roberts.  Counsel were not ineffective in failing to object to the admission of 
Roberts’s letters to Jackson, for they were properly authenticated, and defense 
counsel used them as part of their trial strategy to bolster Jackson’s claim of self-
defense. 
January Term, 2006 
27 
{¶ 141} Finally, Jackson asserts that the cumulative effect of errors and 
omissions by trial counsel infringed his right to effective assistance of counsel.  
However, Jackson received a fair trial.  Accordingly, proposition II is overruled. 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
{¶ 142} In proposition of law III, Jackson alleges ten instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct during trial.  Whether improper remarks constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct requires analysis as to (1) whether the remarks were 
improper and, (2) if so, whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s 
substantial rights.  State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 
N.E.2d 883.  The touchstone of analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the 
culpability of the prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 
S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78.  This court will not deem a trial unfair if, in the context 
of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would 
have found the defendant guilty even without the improper comments.  State v. 
Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 464, 739 N.E.2d 749. 
{¶ 143} Voir Dire.  The first three instances cited by Jackson are the 
same as those he sets forth in proposition II, in which he claims that counsel were 
ineffective for failing to object.  As was discussed under proposition II, we 
determine that the prosecutor did not improperly extract promises from 
prospective jurors to find guilt and vote for a death verdict.  The prosecutor’s 
questions during voir dire on life and death were not improper. 
{¶ 144} Likewise, the prosecutor’s use of two mitigating factors with 
prospective jurors to illustrate the weighing process was not improper.  As we 
explained under proposition II, those examples were set forth as hypotheticals, 
and the trial court had discretion to allow them. 
{¶ 145} In addition, as we noted under proposition II, none of the alleged 
misstatements constituted prosecutorial misconduct.  Even the statements that 
were not accurate did not prejudice Jackson’s substantial rights. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
{¶ 146} Guilt Phase.  In the fourth instance, Jackson complains that the 
prosecutor expanded his opening statement into argument at the beginning of the 
guilt phase.  The prosecutor’s opening statement was at times argumentative, and 
the prosecutor conceded at a sidebar conference that he should have prefaced his 
remarks by stating: “The evidence is gonna show * * *.”  Defense counsel 
objected and moved for a mistrial.  Although the trial court overruled the motion, 
it immediately gave the jury a curative instruction, stating: “[T]he purpose for 
opening statements is to present what either side expects to show.  * * * It is not 
proper to get into the realm of opinion on the opening statement.  * * * So you 
should listen to what the State expects to show and disregard anything else that 
may have been said that might delve into the realm of opinion at this point.”  
Because we presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions, State v. 
Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 480, 739 N.E.2d 749, prejudice to Jackson is lacking. 
{¶ 147} In the fifth instance, Jackson contends that the prosecutor 
improperly solicited repetitive hearsay from Detective Monroe.  While on direct 
examination, Monroe sometimes responded beyond the scope of the prosecutor’s 
questions.  Defense counsel complained about this behavior in chambers and 
moved for a mistrial.  The court overruled the motion but agreed that defense 
counsel’s concern was legitimate because Monroe was answering beyond the 
scope of the questions.  The prosecutor was instructed by the court to talk to 
Monroe and tell him to limit his answers.  On his allegation of repetitive hearsay, 
Jackson does not provide specific instances.  He also does not show how the 
prosecutor’s direct examination of Monroe prejudiced his substantial rights. 
{¶ 148} The sixth instance raised by Jackson is the prosecutor’s 
characterization during guilt-phase closing argument of the defense’s 
interpretation of evidence as a diversion.  However, as we noted under proposition 
IV, even if it is assumed that the prosecutor’s comment was improper, prejudice 
to Jackson is lacking.  “Not every intemperate remark by counsel can be a basis 
January Term, 2006 
29 
for reversal.”  State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 112, 559 N.E.2d 710.  Even 
without the prosecutor’s remark, the jury would have found Jackson guilty, given 
the overwhelming evidence of guilt.  See State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 267, 
15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768. 
{¶ 149} Jackson alleges in his seventh instance that the prosecutor argued 
facts not in evidence.  He cites these comments of the prosecutor during the 
closing argument: “She [Donna Roberts] had the ability to walk out of the 
relationship with her significant other.  There wasn’t a marriage; there was a 
divorce.  And she had legal title to cars, legal title to the home, she had 
everything.  But we will go into when you read and listen to the evidence that she 
depended on Robert and she was not in a position to financially take on the 
relationship and have the way of life she had been used to with this guy.”  The 
defense’s objection was overruled. 
{¶ 150} As we noted under proposition IV, these comments were fair 
inferences that the jury could adopt based on the evidence and testimony.  See, 
e.g., State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 N.E.2d 186, ¶ 144. 
{¶ 151} In the eighth instance, Jackson argues that the prosecutor 
improperly theorized about the evidence during rebuttal guilt-phase closing 
argument.  The prosecutor stated: 
{¶ 152} “What happened?  Well, I don’t know for certain, but I think 
what the evidence is going to disclose is here is what happened.  This man and 
Donna Roberts plotted the murder and what their plan was was to go to the house 
and when Robert Fingerhut got home pull a gun on Robert Fingerhut, handcuff 
him and forcibly take him from the house at 254 Fonderlac, take him down to 
Youngstown and execute him in Youngstown and leave the car there.  That was 
the plan.” 
{¶ 153} The defense’s objection was overruled. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶ 154} Prosecutors are entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has 
shown and what inferences can be drawn from the evidence.  State v. Richey 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 362, 595 N.E.2d 915, overruled on other grounds, 
State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 402-404, 686 N.E.2d 1112.  A 
prosecutor may state his or her opinion if it is based on the evidence presented at 
trial.  See, e.g., State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 96, 568 N.E.2d 674. 
{¶ 155} We find in Jackson’s case that the prosecutor’s theory was based 
on the evidence at trial.  In his letter to Roberts dated October 30, 2001, Jackson 
asked Roberts to obtain for him leather gloves, a ski mask, and handcuffs.  
Detective Monroe found an empty handcuffs box in the trunk of Roberts’s car 
shortly after the murder.  In a recorded phone conversation the day before his 
release from prison, Jackson assures Roberts, “Baby it ain’t gonna happen in the 
house.  It ain’t gonna happen in the house man, I promise you.  * * * I just need to 
be in there man.  It ain’t gonna happen in the house man.” 
{¶ 156} In our view, the prosecutors’ comments were fair inferences 
based on the evidence at trial and therefore were not improper. There is also no 
showing that the comments prejudiced Jackson’s substantial rights. 
{¶ 157} Penalty Phase.  In Jackson’s ninth alleged instance, the 
prosecutor improperly argued during penalty-phase closing argument that Jackson 
had no mental disease or defect, a mitigating factor not raised by the defense. 
{¶ 158} As we discussed under proposition IV, the prosecutor erred in 
arguing the absence of a mitigating factor not raised by defendant.  Prosecutorial 
comment is appropriate only about those factors actually offered in mitigation by 
defendant.  See, e.g., State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d at 373, 582 N.E.2d 972.  
Nevertheless, the comment was harmless error. 
{¶ 159} Jackson claims in the tenth instance that the prosecutor 
improperly referred to the homicide as a “cold blooded psychopathic killing.”  
The defense objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, instructing the 
January Term, 2006 
31 
jury to disregard the comment.  In instructing in this way, the trial court 
ameliorated any error.  See State v. Wilson (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 199, 204, 59 
O.O.2d 220, 283 N.E.2d 632. 
{¶ 160} Last, Jackson’s claim that the cumulative effect of misconduct by 
the prosecutor during both phases of trial deprived him of a fair trial lacks merit.  
We believe that Jackson received a fair trial, and any error was either harmless or 
curable by our independent review of his sentence.  “Such errors cannot become 
prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.”  State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d at 212, 661 
N.E.2d 1068.  Furthermore, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have found Jackson guilty even without the alleged improper comments.  
State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 464, 739 N.E.2d 749.  Accordingly, proposition 
III is rejected. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
{¶ 161} In propositions of law XI and XII, Jackson challenges Ohio’s 
death-penalty statutes on numerous constitutional grounds and concedes that 
many of his constitutional claims have been rejected by this court in a number of 
cases.  We summarily reject all of Jackson’s constitutional claims.  See, e.g., State 
v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Buell 
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795; State v. McNeill (1998), 
83 Ohio St.3d 438, 700 N.E.2d 596; State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 502, 
709 N.E.2d 484; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, 
syllabus. 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶ 162} Upon our independent assessment, the evidence proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstances in this case: that Nathaniel 
Jackson murdered Robert Fingerhut while committing aggravated burglary and 
aggravated robbery. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
Mitigating Evidence 
{¶ 163} In the penalty phase, Jackson presented five witnesses and gave 
an unsworn statement. 
{¶ 164} Raymond Dickerson, Jackson’s stepfather, has known Jackson 
since Jackson was 15 years old.  He testified that Jackson was respectful to him 
and to Jackson’s mother and grandmother.  Dickerson noted that he did not see 
much of Jackson after Jackson turned 17 years old. 
{¶ 165} Taushia Korneagay, Jackson’s sister, stated that Jackson was 
kind and treated her well and did a lot for her.  Korneagay noted that Jackson 
helped her in many ways with her four children.  She said that she wanted the jury 
to spare Jackson’s life. 
{¶ 166} Lorraine Rue, the mother of Jackson’s daughter, Shaylese, and 
Shaylese herself, a second-grader, appeared on the witness stand together.  Rue 
testified that Jackson had visited Shaylese in the past and had brought her toys. 
{¶ 167} Pauline Korneagay, Jackson’s mother, briefly described 
Jackson’s upbringing and stated that Jackson did “pretty good” in school.  She 
answered “no” when asked whether Jackson had grown up in a rough 
neighborhood.  She did not remember Jackson’s being shot while in school, or 
that she had written a letter to excuse him from school for that reason.  Pauline 
said that she keeps in touch with Jackson. 
{¶ 168} Dr. Sandra McPherson, a clinical and forensic psychologist, was 
the principal mitigation witness.  Dr. McPherson interviewed Jackson, reviewed 
his school and other records, and submitted a report on her findings.  She noted 
that Jackson’s father had little, if any, involvement with his son and that Jackson 
grew up under the care of his mother and maternal grandmother.  According to 
Dr. McPherson, Jackson exhibited serious behavioral problems from the first 
grade on, “which is fairly unusual.”  By third grade, Jackson had already been 
suspended from school because of his behavioral difficulties. 
January Term, 2006 
33 
{¶ 169} Dr. McPherson observed that Jackson’s school record reflected 
an 
attention-deficit 
hyperactivity 
disorder 
(“ADHD”) 
characterized 
by 
impulsiveness and an inability to stop his behavior.  Jackson was never put in any 
kind of structured program to deal with his ADHD until the eighth grade, the only 
time Jackson recalled liking school. 
{¶ 170} Jackson began using alcohol and drugs early in life, but does not 
seem to have developed a primary alcohol dependency.  He began using 
marijuana at around age 13 and quickly became dependent on it.  He also used 
cocaine to some degree.  Jackson never used other serious drugs.  Nevertheless, 
Dr. McPherson noted that Jackson’s repeated involvement in crimes as an adult 
was mostly related to his drug habit. 
{¶ 171} Dr. McPherson said that Jackson had worked very little in his 
life.  His longest period of work was about six months, and he never worked 
fulltime.  Jackson dropped out of school in the 11th grade and decided to live 
independently of his mother. His idea of independence was to live on the streets.  
Jackson has been shot at least four times.  Even before he dropped out of school, 
Jackson had been a target of gunfire.  Dr. McPherson testified that Jackson’s 
school records indicate that his mother had once sent a note to school to excuse 
Jackson because he had been shot at and had to make a police report. 
{¶ 172} Jackson has fathered two children, but has never been in a 
position to assume parental responsibilities.  One of the children has cerebral 
palsy, and the mother’s family does not allow Jackson any contact with the child. 
{¶ 173} Dr. McPherson administered several tests to Jackson.  Although 
Jackson’s IQ had twice been tested at 70 in grade school, a more recent test put 
him at a full-scale IQ of 84.  Dr. McPherson attributed the difference in scores to 
the fact that Jackson had not been motivated to cooperate when he took the test in 
school and that he did better under the more structured environment of prison.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
Taking into account Jackson’s minimal education, Dr. McPherson believes him to 
be of average ability.  She noted that Jackson possesses some artistic talent. 
{¶ 174} Jackson suffers from an antisocial personality disorder, but has 
shown the capacity to be loyal to those within his own group.  According to Dr. 
McPherson, Jackson displayed loyalty to Roberts and did not try to avoid 
responsibility and blame the murder on her.  Dr. McPherson testified that Jackson 
does have the ability to get along with other people and has done well in the 
structured environment of prison.  Dr. McPherson opined that as far as Jackson’s 
future behavior was concerned, he would function best in a prison environment. 
{¶ 175} Dr. McPherson described Jackson’s relationship with Donna 
Roberts as “very destructive.” She stated that Jackson is very insecure and 
received a certain amount of reassurance in his relationship with Roberts, which 
made him feel like somebody special.  According to Dr. McPherson, Jackson felt 
that his life would be more stable with Roberts. 
{¶ 176} Jackson gave an unsworn statement in which he stated: “I would 
like to apologize for what happened to the victim.  I am very sorry for what 
happened and I know by me saying sorry ain’t going to bring his life back.  This 
is something I have to live with for the rest of my life, and also like for my 
daughter, to know that she still has a father that is alive and I would like to see her 
grow up.” 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 177} The nature and circumstances of the offense offer nothing in 
mitigation.  Jackson, with the aid and support of Roberts, planned to murder 
Fingerhut to get him out of the way and reap the insurance proceeds Roberts 
would obtain from Fingerhut’s death.  In correspondence and phone 
conversations, Jackson assured Roberts that the murder was something he had to 
do and that he had it all figured out.  Jackson murdered Fingerhut in his home and 
January Term, 2006 
35 
then fled the scene in Fingerhut’s car.  Jackson’s self-defense claim lacks 
credibility in light of all the evidence. 
{¶ 178} Jackson’s history, character, and background offer some 
mitigating features.  His father was never part of his life, and he suffered from 
behavioral problems in school, mostly because of his ADHD.  Although 
Jackson’s mother denied that Jackson had grown up in a rough neighborhood, the 
school records and evaluation by Dr. McPherson indicate otherwise.  Jackson’s 
drug dependency was fueled by his involvement in crime, which consisted mostly 
of burglaries. 
{¶ 179} Jackson appears to have the love and support of his family.  He 
indicated in his unsworn statement that he cares about his daughter.  Dr. 
McPherson testified that despite his problems, Jackson has also displayed loyalty 
— sometimes, as in his relationship to Roberts, to his detriment. 
{¶ 180} With respect to the statutory mitigating factors of R.C. 
2929.04(B), none appear applicable except for “other mitigating factors” under 
(B)(7).  Although Jackson claimed that Fingerhut pulled a gun on him, thus 
forcing him to kill Fingerhut in self-defense, the factor of victim-inducement 
under (B)(1) is not implicated because the claim of self-defense lacks any 
credibility under the evidence.  Likewise, there is no credible evidence of the 
factor of victim provocation under (B)(2).  Jackson’s mitigation expert dispelled 
any claim that he suffers from a mental disease or defect, the factor under (B)(3).  
Since Jackson was 29 years old at the time of the homicide, the youthful-offender 
factor under (B)(4) does not apply.  There is no mitigation in the factor of a clean 
record under (B)(5), for Jackson had a history of prior criminal convictions.  
Finally, since Jackson was the principal offender in the murder, the factor of 
being an accomplice rather than the principal offender under (B)(6) does not 
apply. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
{¶ 181} Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), Jackson’s ADHD and antisocial 
personality disorder deserve some weight in mitigation, as well as his ability to 
overcome his ADHD and adaption to the structured setting of prison.  See State v. 
Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, ¶ 106. 
{¶ 182} On the other hand, Jackson’s expression of remorse “for what 
happened to the victim” deserves little weight in mitigation.  See State v. Bryan, 
101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 226. 
{¶ 183} Upon independent weighing, we find that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Jackson murdered Fingerhut during a burglary and stole his car.  These were the 
aggravating circumstances that merit imposition of the capital penalty.  Those 
were weighed against the mitigating evidence found in the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, Jackson’s history, character, and background, and 
the statutory factors of R.C. 2929.04(B).  We find that the aggravating 
circumstances of this case outweigh the minimal mitigating factors. 
{¶ 184} We further find that the death penalty is both appropriate and 
proportionate when compared with capital cases also involving aggravated 
murder during aggravated burglary, see State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 
686 N.E.2d 245, and aggravated murder during aggravated robbery, see State v. 
Burke (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 653 N.E.2d 242; State v. Raglin (1998), 83 
Ohio St.3d 253, 699 N.E.2d 482. 
{¶ 185} We therefore affirm the convictions and sentences, including the 
death sentence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2006 
37 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 
Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
John P. Laczko and Dennis Day Lager, for appellant. 
______________________