Title: State v. McKnight

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-6046.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MCKNIGHT, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-6046.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2002-2130 — Submitted March 29, 2005 — Decided November 30, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Vinton County, No. 01-CR-7230. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} Gregory McKnight, defendant-appellant, was convicted of the 
murder of Gregory Julious and the aggravated murder of Emily Murray and was 
sentenced to death.  In this appeal, appellant raises 30 propositions of law.  We 
find that none of his propositions of law have merit and affirm appellant’s 
convictions.  We have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigating factors and have compared appellant’s sentence of death to 
those imposed in similar cases, as R.C. 2929.05(A) requires.  As a result, we 
affirm appellant’s sentence of death. 
State’s Case 
{¶ 2} During early 2000, Julious lived with his girlfriend, Dana Bostic, 
at her home in Chillicothe.  At the time, appellant was dating Lisa Perkins, who 
was a friend of Bostic’s.  Appellant became acquainted with Julious by visiting 
Perkins at Bostic’s home. 
{¶ 3} On Friday, May 12, 2000, at around 4:00 p.m., Bostic returned 
home from work and found appellant, Julious, and her daughter in the kitchen.  
Julious was wearing only boxer shorts.  Bostic then left the house with her 
daughter to pick up her son. 
{¶ 4} When Bostic returned after approximately one hour, appellant and 
Julious were no longer at the house. Bostic testified, “The door was unlocked. 
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There was candles still burning, * * * and it was like he just ran out for a minute 
and he was coming right back.”  Moreover, Julious’s belongings, including his 
clothes, personal hygiene products, and his identification card, were still in the 
house. 
{¶ 5} When Julious did not return home, Bostic called appellant on his 
pager.  Later that night, appellant returned Bostic’s call and put Julious on the 
phone.  Julious told Bostic that “he was in Columbus at McKnight’s friend’s 
house and they were getting ready to go to a OSU block party and he would be 
home.”  Bostic described the conversation as “very unusual” because Julious 
“didn’t let [her] ask him anything else” and abruptly ended the conversation. 
Bostic never saw or talked to Julious again. 
{¶ 6} In June 2000, appellant and his wife, Kathy McKnight, acquired a 
trailer in a rural area near Ray, Ohio.  Appellant and Kathy moved their 
belongings into the trailer, but they did not move in.  Instead, they moved to the 
home of Kathy’s mother, in Gambier. 
{¶ 7} In late September or early October 2000, appellant was hired as a 
kitchen worker at the Pirate’s Cove restaurant in Gambier.  Appellant was 
friendly with his co-workers, and they would sometimes give him rides to his 
Gambier home after work. 
{¶ 8} Emily Murray, a Kenyon College student, was a part-time waitress 
at the Pirate’s Cove.  Murray lived in a Kenyon College dormitory approximately 
100 yards from the Pirate’s Cove, and she drove her mother’s Subaru Outback at 
Kenyon. 
{¶ 9} On November 2, 2000, Murray quit her job and spent her last 
evening working at the Pirate’s Cove.  Several college friends visited Murray at 
the Pirate’s Cove to help celebrate her last night at work, but her friends left 
before Murray finished work. 
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{¶ 10} Appellant also worked at the Pirate’s Cove on the evening of 
November 2.  Time cards showed that Murray finished work at 3:07 a.m. and 
appellant finished work at 2:59 a.m. on November 3.  Nathan Justice, the 
bartender at the Pirate’s Cove, saw Murray looking for her keys before 3:30 a.m.  
No one at the Pirate’s Cove recalls seeing Murray and appellant leave together. 
{¶ 11} Murray never returned to sleep in her dormitory room, and she 
failed to appear at a party on the evening of November 3.  This absence concerned 
Murray’s friends because Murray had not left a message regarding her 
whereabouts and they could not find Murray’s Subaru Outback on campus or in 
Gambier. 
{¶ 12} After an unsuccessful search for Murray, her friends notified 
Murray’s family and Kenyon College Security.  A search of Murray’s dormitory 
room by Murray’s friend, Abigail Williams, produced Murray’s wallet, which 
contained her Ohio and New York driver’s licenses, credit cards, and bank card. 
{¶ 13} On Sunday evening, November 5, Williams talked to appellant 
about Murray’s disappearance.  Appellant said that he had worked that night but 
“left well before she did * * * [and] that he was not there so he could see her 
leave.”  According to Williams, appellant was “very curt” and “[they] didn’t get 
any information.  He just kind of smirked” at them.  A short time after Murray 
disappeared, appellant told Nate Justice that “[h]e felt that [Murray] was probably 
dead.” 
{¶ 14} On December 9, 2000, Vinton County Sheriff’s Chief Deputy 
Charles Boyer and Deputy Matt Kight went to appellant’s trailer to serve an 
unrelated indictment on him, but appellant was not there.  Deputy Kight ran a 
license check on a vehicle on the property and learned that the Subaru Outback 
parked behind the trailer was associated with the disappearance of Emily Murray. 
{¶ 15} After obtaining a search warrant, law enforcement entered 
appellant’s trailer and found bloodstains on the carpet near the front door.  Police 
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followed a trail of blood down the hallway and discovered Murray’s clothed body 
wrapped inside a carpet in the spare bedroom. 
{¶ 16} During the search, Special Agent Gary Wilgus, a crime-scene 
investigator with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, 
found a copper bullet jacket near the bloodstained carpet in the living room.  A 
bullet hole was found in the area of the bloodstained carpet, but investigators did 
not find the bullet that went through the floor.  Additionally, police found five 
spent .357 shell casings inside a drawer in the living room, seven nine-millimeter 
bullets inside a drawer in the master bedroom, and a roll of bloodstained duct tape 
in the living room. 
{¶ 17} Investigators searching the property found human bones and 
clothing in the cistern, the root cellar, and in a plastic bag.  Police discovered that 
a fire had been started in the root cellar, and they recovered burned bones and 
pieces of clothing.  The skeletal remains included most of the bones from a single 
human, but only six skull fragments were found.  Dr. Nancy Tatarek, a forensic 
anthropologist, concluded that the remains were from an African-American male 
who was 20 to 25 years of age and six feet to six feet, six inches tall. 
{¶ 18} The police identified the remains as those of Gregory Julious.  Dr. 
Franklin Wright, a forensic dentist, positively matched the teeth and jaw bone 
found on appellant’s property with Julious’s dental records.  Bostic also identified 
the remains of boxer shorts found in the cistern as those Julious was wearing the 
day he disappeared.  Kim Zimmerman, appellant’s brother-in-law, had given 
police a bloodstained backpack that he had taken from the trailer’s living-room 
closet. 
{¶ 19} Police searched the vehicle that appellant was driving when Julious 
disappeared, and they discovered bloodstains on the carpet underneath the rear 
seat.  Subsequent DNA analysis showed that the “DNA from the * * * carpet 
[was] consistent with the DNA profile from Gregory L. Julious.”  According to 
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Diane Larson, a DNA serology analyst, the “chance of finding the same DNA 
profile in the population is * * * approximately 1 in 50 trillion people for the 
Caucasian population, one in 177 trillion in the African-American population, and 
1 in 51 trillion in the Hispanic population.” 
{¶ 20} Inside appellant’s Gambier home, police found an empty box of 
Winchester .357 magnum cartridges underneath the bed in the master bedroom, 
two .30 caliber bullets in the master-bedroom closet, and four nine-millimeter 
bullets in the basement.  Police also learned that appellant had purchased three 
handguns from two gun shops before the murders: a Jennings nine-millimeter 
semiautomatic pistol purchased on February 17, 1999, an Intratec nine-millimeter 
pistol purchased on April 24, 1999, and a Jennings .380 caliber semiautomatic 
pistol bought on May 24, 2000. 
{¶ 21} Dr. Dorothy Dean, Deputy Coroner for Franklin County, found 
that Murray had died from a single “gunshot wound to the head.”  Murray was 
shot with a high-powered weapon, and the gun was “very, very close or touching 
her skin” when fired. 
{¶ 22} Dr. Tatarek found that the condition of the skull fragments of 
Julious were “consistent with an injury by gunshot.”  She also found evidence of 
trauma to the vertebra “caused by some sort of sharp object penetrating the 
person’s neck and cutting into the bone.”  Moreover, trauma to two hand bones 
was “consistent [with] defense wounds.”  Dr. Tatarek also found trauma around 
joints “consistent with dismemberment of a person.”  The condition of the skeletal 
remains placed the date of death within a three- to six-month time frame that 
included May 12, 2000. 
{¶ 23} Diane Larson concluded that the DNA profile from the bullet 
jacket found in appellant’s trailer was consistent with Murray’s DNA profile.  The 
odds that the DNA from the bullet jacket was from someone other than Murray 
were one in 646 billion for the Caucasian population.  Larson also found that the 
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bloodstains on the backpack and duct tape matched Julious’s DNA profile.  The 
odds that the DNA from bloodstains on the backpack was from someone other 
than Julious were one in 64 quadrillion for the African-American population. 
{¶ 24} Heather Zollman, a firearms expert, compared a bullet taken from 
a tree behind the trailer and the bullet jacket from inside the house and concluded 
that they were “fired [from] the same firearm.”  Zollman described each as a 
“Remington brand 180 gram .357 magnum semi-jacketed hollow-point bullet.”  
She could not determine the caliber of the bullet removed from Murray’s body. 
Nevertheless, Zollman concluded that the lead was “consistent with having come 
from the bullet.”  Gunpowder on the surface of the bullet fragment was also “the 
same type of style of flattened ball powder that is loaded by Remington in these 
.357 magnum cartridges.” 
Defense’s Case 
{¶ 25} The defense called one witness.  Donald Doles, a Vinton County 
neighbor of appellant, testified that twice during the fall of 2000, he had observed 
a woman who looked like Emily Murray drive past his house in a Subaru Outback 
with New York license plates.  When she drove past on one occasion, Doles was 
only ten or 12 feet away from the car when “she turned around and looked at 
[him] and smiled and waved.”  During cross-examination, Doles did not 
recognize Murray’s picture, and he said that he was not 100 percent certain that 
the woman driving past his house was Murray. 
Indictment and Trial Result 
{¶ 26} The grand jury indicted appellant on one count of aggravated 
murder and one count of murder.  Count 1 charged appellant with the aggravated 
murder of Murray while committing a kidnapping, Count 2 charged kidnapping, 
and Count 3 charged aggravated robbery.  Count 6 charged appellant with the 
murder of Julious.  Additionally, appellant was indicted for tampering with 
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evidence in Counts 4 and 7 and gross abuse of a corpse in Counts 5 and 8.  Prior 
to trial, Counts 4, 5, 7, and 8 were dismissed. 
{¶ 27} The aggravated-murder count contained four death-penalty 
specifications: murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for 
another offense, pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(3); murder as a “course of conduct” 
in killing two or more people, pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5); murder while 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); 
and murder while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery, 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  The indictment also contained a firearm 
specification. 
{¶ 28} Appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.  The jury found 
appellant guilty of Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6, and he was sentenced to death. 
{¶ 29} Appellant appeals to this court as a matter of right. 
Pretrial Issues 
{¶ 30} Search warrant.  In proposition of law V, appellant argues that his 
trailer was illegally searched because the affidavit supporting the search warrant 
included false and misleading information. 
{¶ 31} “To successfully attack the veracity of a facially sufficient search 
warrant affidavit, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the affiant made a false statement, either ‘intentionally, or with reckless disregard 
for the truth.’ ”  State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 441, 588 N.E.2d 819, 
quoting Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 155-156, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 
L.Ed.2d 667.  “Reckless disregard” means that the affiant had serious doubts 
about the truth of an allegation.  United States v. Williams (C.A.7, 1984), 737 
F.2d 594, 602.  Omissions count as a false statement if “designed to mislead, or * 
* * made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead, the magistrate.”  
(Emphasis deleted.)  United States v. Colkley (C.A.4, 1990), 899 F.2d 297, 301. 
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{¶ 32} On December 9, 2000, Vinton County Sheriff’s Deputy Matt Kight 
observed a Subaru Outback with New York license plates behind appellant’s 
trailer.  A police computer check connected the vehicle to Emily Murray, who 
was listed as a “missing endangered person.” 
{¶ 33} Later that afternoon, Vinton County Chief Deputy Sheriff Charles 
Boyer went to appellant’s trailer and verified ownership of the Subaru by 
checking both the vehicle’s license plate and the vehicle identification number 
(“VIN”).  Boyer also learned through a Knox County police dispatcher that 
Murray had been missing since November 3 and that Knox County authorities 
“had done extensive searching, [and] had the F.B.I. involved.” 
{¶ 34} Boyer listed the following facts and circumstances in the affidavit 
to obtain a search warrant for the trailer:  “Emily Sarah Murray is listed as an 
endangered missing person by the Knox County, Ohio Sheriff’s Office, as of 
November 3, 2000.  Earlier today while attempting to serve an indictment on 
Gregory McKnight at his residence, I saw a vehicle with New York license plates 
on it.  Mr. McKnight was not at home, neither was anybody else.  Prior to leaving, 
I ran the license plate number.  It came back to Cynthia Murray with an alert for 
Emily Sarah Murray as an endangered and missing person.  The vehicle came up 
missing the same time Emily did.  I obtained confirmation from Knox County 
officials whom are traveling to Vinton County at this time.” 
{¶ 35} Boyer also attached to the affidavit a missing person’s flyer 
regarding Murray’s disappearance.  The affidavit listed “Abduction, R.C. 
2905.02; Kidnapping, R.C. 2905.01; ENDANGERED MISSING PERSON” as 
the provisions of law violated.  Later on December 9, Judge Grillo issued the 
search warrant. 
{¶ 36} Appellant claims that the search warrant was invalid because three 
false statements were included in the affidavit.  First, appellant asserts that Kight, 
rather than Boyer, saw the Subaru behind appellant’s trailer and checked the 
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plates on the police computer.  The facts do not support this allegation.  After 
being notified that Murray’s Subaru was found behind appellant’s trailer, Boyer 
checked the VIN and license-plate number of the Subaru on the police computer 
in the sheriff’s office.  Boyer then went to appellant’s trailer, checked the VIN on 
the Subaru, and verified the vehicle’s ownership.  Thus, Boyer correctly stated in 
the affidavit that he observed the Subaru and verified its ownership. 
{¶ 37} Second, appellant contends that Boyer’s affidavit falsely states that 
he contacted the Knox County Sheriff’s Office about Murray’s disappearance.  
We also reject this claim.  Boyer’s affidavit does not assert that he personally 
contacted Knox County officials about Murray’s disappearance.  The affidavit 
states, “I obtained confirmation from Knox County officials.”  (Emphasis added.)  
This statement encompasses information that Boyer obtained about Murray’s 
disappearance through the police dispatcher. 
{¶ 38} Moreover, information about Murray’s disappearance obtained 
through the police dispatcher was properly included in the affidavit.  Courts have 
recognized that “ ‘effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police 
officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to 
another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-
examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted 
information.’ ”  Maumee v. Weisner (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297, 720 N.E.2d 
507, quoting United States v. Hensley (1985), 469 U.S. 221, 231, 105 S.Ct. 675, 
83 L.Ed.2d 604. 
{¶ 39} Third, appellant argues that the affidavit improperly listed 
kidnapping and abduction as the violated laws because Murray was listed only as 
a missing and endangered person at that point. 
{¶ 40} Crim.R. 41(C) provides that a search-warrant affidavit “shall name 
or describe the person to be searched or particularly describe the place to be 
searched * * * [and] state substantially the offense in relation thereto, and state 
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the factual basis for the affiant’s belief that such property is there located.”  
(Emphasis added.)  See, also, R.C. 2933.23.  “Crim.R. 41(C) requires a 
substantial statement of the offense in relation to the property to be seized and not 
the specific code number or title of that offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  Cleveland v. 
Becvar (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 163, 166, 578 N.E.2d 489.  Moreover, the 
“failure to specify the offense to which the evidence is related by name or code 
section in the affidavit is not constitutionally significant” and does not require 
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that warrant.  Id. 
{¶ 41} Probable cause to search does not require proof that a crime was 
actually committed, merely the fair probability that evidence of a crime will be 
found at the location described.  State v. George (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 
N.E.2d 640, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The facts in the affidavit fully 
supported a finding of probable cause:  Murray had been missing for over a month 
and was considered a missing and endangered person; Murray and her car had 
disappeared at the same time from Knox County; police then discovered her car 
behind appellant’s trailer in an isolated part of Vinton County.  Based upon these 
facts, the affidavit properly listed kidnapping and abduction as possible offenses, 
and that listing did not constitute a false and misleading statement in violation of 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 170, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667. 
{¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, proposition V is overruled. 
{¶ 43} Dismissal of the capital specifications.  In proposition of law VII, 
appellant argues that the trial court erred in reinstating the capital specifications. 
{¶ 44} In a pretrial motion dated February 7, 2002, appellant’s trial 
counsel sought to dismiss the capital specifications due to asserted constitutional- 
and international-law violations.  On August 8, 2002, the trial court dismissed the 
capital specifications, finding “that the potential impact of financial 
considerations could compromise the Defendant’s due process rights in a capital 
murder trial.” 
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{¶ 45} In an August 14, 2002 motion for reconsideration, the state argued 
that the trial court improperly usurped the state’s authority to prosecute a capital 
case, that none of appellant’s requests for funding had been denied, and that 
adequate funding was available to prosecute this capital case.  On August 23, 
2002, the trial court vacated its earlier ruling.  The court later held that “its 
concern as to financial impact was based upon prospective due process 
considerations, rather than any actual deprivation of due process.”  On September 
19, 2002, the trial court held that its August 8, 2002 dismissal was “void ab 
initio.” 
{¶ 46} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in reinstating the capital 
specifications.  First, appellant argues that the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion by dismissing the capital specifications to avoid the risk of imposing an 
unreliable and arbitrary death sentence and thus erred by reinstating the capital 
specifications. 
{¶ 47} However, “[t]he grand jury is the ultimate charging body, and it is 
within its discretion, based on the evidence presented to it, to determine for which 
felony an accused shall be charged.”  Foston v. Maxwell (1964), 177 Ohio St. 74, 
76, 29 O.O.2d 94, 202 N.E.2d 425.  “Consequently, the decision whether to 
prosecute is discretionary and not normally subject to judicial review.”  
Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197; State ex 
rel. Master v. Cleveland (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 27, 661 N.E.2d 180. 
{¶ 48} The trial court abused its discretion by initially dismissing the 
capital specifications because of the “potential impact of financial considerations” 
on appellant’s due process rights.  (Emphasis added.)  See State v. Adams (1980), 
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144 (“abuse of discretion” 
defined to mean a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable).  
The trial court’s concerns about inadequate funding of appellant’s capital trial 
were speculative and without a factual basis.  The defense did not claim in the 
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motion to dismiss that financial considerations threatened appellant’s right to a 
fair trial.  Moreover, the prosecutor assured the court that funding was available 
for defense witnesses and counsel fees and that appellant’s due process rights 
were in no danger of being violated. 
{¶ 49} We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
reinstating the capital specifications upon learning that the underlying premise for 
its earlier ruling was flawed.  Indeed, “[a] court has the ‘inherent power to 
regulate the practice before it and protect the integrity of its proceedings.’ ”  State 
v. Busch (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 613, 615, 669 N.E.2d 1125, citing Royal Indemn. 
Co. v. J.C. Penney Co. (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 33-34, 27 OBR 447, 501 N.E.2d 
617.  Reinstatement of the capital specifications did not violate appellant’s right 
to a fair trial, and appellant does not argue that the defense was unprepared for 
trial after the capital specifications were reinstated. 
{¶ 50} Second, appellant claims that constraints on the trial court’s 
discretion to dismiss the capital specifications were unfair and arbitrary in view of 
Crim.R. 11(C)(3), which states, “If the indictment contains one or more 
specifications, and a plea of guilty or no contest to the charge is accepted, the 
court may dismiss the specifications and impose sentence accordingly, in the 
interests of justice.” 
{¶ 51} Appellant argues that Crim.R. 11(C)(3) is unconstitutional because 
it affords a defendant who pleads guilty the benefit of judicial discretion “in the 
interests of justice” while denying the same to him because he pleaded not guilty 
and exercised his right to a jury trial.  We have rejected similar attacks on Crim.R. 
11(C)(3). See State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 206, 214, 543 N.E.2d 
1250; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 138, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 
795. 
{¶ 52} Third, appellant asserts that the prosecutor misled the trial court by 
claiming that the court’s dismissal “comes at an unacceptable cost to fair justice 
January Term, 2005 
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required by Ohio’s citizens and the families of Emily Murray and Gregory Julius 
[sic].”  Appellant makes this claim because he asserts that the Murray family did 
not want appellant to receive the death penalty. 
{¶ 53} The prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration did not assert that the 
Murray family wanted the death penalty.  Although Murray family members 
requested during the penalty phase that appellant receive life in prison rather than 
the death penalty, the record does not show that the prosecutor was aware of these 
wishes at the time of this motion.  The motion related to dismissing the capital 
specifications because of financial considerations and had nothing to do with the 
Murray family’s desires concerning the death penalty.  Moreover, the trial court 
could not have been unduly influenced by the prosecutor’s reference to the 
Murray family.  A trial judge is presumed to consider “ ‘only the relevant, 
material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it 
affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ”  State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 
384, 513 N.E.2d 754, quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d.146, 151, 44 
O.O.2d 132, 239 N.E.2d 65. 
{¶ 54} Finally, appellant argues that his due process rights were violated 
because he waived his right to a speedy trial in exchange for an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion for reconsideration that was never conducted.  The facts do 
not support this claim. 
{¶ 55} On April 30, 2001, appellant filed an indefinite waiver of his right 
to a speedy trial. On August 21, 2002, appellant withdrew this waiver, filed a 
speedy-trial demand for the murder of Julious, and requested that the trial proceed 
as scheduled on September 23, 2002.  Appellant, however, offered to waive his 
demand for a speedy trial on all counts if the trial court granted a full evidentiary 
hearing on the motion for reconsideration of the capital specifications. 
{¶ 56} On August 23, 2002, the trial court vacated its earlier ruling, 
reinstated the capital specifications, and held that the trial would proceed on 
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September 23, 2002.  The trial court’s ruling avoided the need for an evidentiary 
hearing.  Moreover, appellant suffered no prejudice, because the trial proceeded 
on the date that the defense had requested in its speedy-trial demand. 
{¶ 57} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition VII. 
{¶ 58} Pretrial publicity.  In proposition of law VIII, appellant argues that 
the trial court erred by refusing defense requests for a change of venue and for 
funding to conduct a scientific jury survey. 
{¶ 59} 1. Change of venue.  Extensive pretrial publicity surrounded 
appellant’s case on television and in the newspapers.  National media focused on 
the case after the judge dismissed the capital specifications because of financial 
considerations and later reinstated them. 
{¶ 60} A motion for change of venue is governed by Crim.R. 18(B), 
which provides that “the court may transfer an action * * * when it appears that a 
fair and impartial trial cannot be held in the court in which the action is pending.”  
Crim.R. 18(B) does not require a change of venue merely because of extensive 
pretrial publicity.  The decision whether to change venue rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 116, 
559 N.E.2d 710. 
{¶ 61} We have stated that “ ‘a careful and searching voir dire provides 
the best test of whether prejudicial pretrial publicity has prevented obtaining a fair 
and impartial jury from the locality.’ ”  Id. at 117, 559 N.E.2d 710, quoting State 
v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 98, 2 O.O.3d 249, 357 N.E.2d 1035.  A 
defendant claiming that pretrial publicity has denied him a fair trial must show 
that one or more jurors were actually biased.  State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 460, 464, 739 N.E.2d 749.  “Only in rare cases may prejudice be 
presumed.”  Id.; see, also, State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 479, 653 
N.E.2d 304; Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 554-555, 96 
S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683. 
January Term, 2005 
15 
{¶ 62} Our review of the voir dire examination does not support 
appellant’s claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity.  During voir dire, each seated 
juror was individually questioned about pretrial publicity.  Although all of the 
jurors had some knowledge about the case, seven of the jurors had formed no 
opinion about it.  Four other jurors were not asked whether they had formed an 
opinion about the case, but they agreed to disregard anything that they had heard 
outside court.  The remaining juror stated that he had “[n]ot really formed an 
opinion, but it leans toward that.”  Further questioning showed that this juror 
knew few details about the case.  Finally, all 12 of the jurors agreed to set aside 
anything that they had heard and decide the case solely upon the evidence 
presented in court. 
{¶ 63} Moreover, the defense did not challenge any of the seated jurors 
for cause due to pretrial publicity.  The absence of defense challenges indicated 
that the defense, after voir dire was completed, was not particularly troubled by 
the jury’s exposure to pretrial publicity.  State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 
2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 52; State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-
Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 37. 
{¶ 64} Appellant has not shown that any juror was biased.  Under these 
circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing 
to change venue. 
{¶ 65} 2. Scientific jury survey.  The state must provide an indigent 
criminal defendant with funds to obtain expert assistance “only where the trial 
court finds, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that the defendant has made a 
particularized showing (1) of a reasonable probability that the requested expert 
would aid in his defense, and (2) that denial of the requested expert assistance 
would result in an unfair trial.”  State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 
N.E.2d 932, syllabus. 
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{¶ 66} In his motion for an expert to conduct a scientific jury survey, 
appellant asserted that a “scientific survey [was] necessary to prove the obvious 
that because of the publicity a fair trial cannot be had within Vinton County.”  
Such a generalized assertion does not qualify as the “particularized showing” 
required by Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, syllabus.  Furthermore, 
comprehensive voir dire examination of the seated jurors about pretrial publicity 
negated any need for a scientific jury survey of public opinion within Vinton 
County.  Thus, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate that denial of the 
requested expert denied him a fair trial.  See Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 152, 694 
N.E.2d 932 (services of a mass-media expert unnecessary); Landrum, 53 Ohio 
St.3d at 117, 559 N.E.2d 710 (psychologist for jury selection unnecessary); State 
v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 193, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264 
(sociologist to assist voir dire unnecessary). 
{¶ 67} Based on the foregoing, we find that proposition VIII has no merit. 
Trial Issues 
{¶ 68} Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.  In proposition 
of law I, appellant challenges the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence 
for his convictions of aggravated felony murder in Count 1, the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) kidnapping specification, and the separately charged kidnapping 
offense. 
{¶ 69} Although both are raised by appellant in one proposition of law, a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence differs from a challenge to the 
manifest weight of the evidence.  See State v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 2004-
Ohio-10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, ¶ 30. 
{¶ 70} In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he relevant 
inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio 
January Term, 2005 
17 
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. 
Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; see, also, State v. 
Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. 
{¶ 71} A claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence involves a different test.  “ ‘The court, reviewing the entire record, 
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of 
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury 
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.  The discretionary power to 
grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the 
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”  Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 
387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 
20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717. 
{¶ 72} Appellant argues that the state did not prove that he kidnapped 
Murray.  Appellant argues that no witnesses testified that they saw him remove or 
restrain Murray, and no evidence was presented about where she was murdered.  
Appellant uses the same rationale in arguing that his convictions for these 
offenses are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
{¶ 73} We find that appellant’s sufficiency claims lack merit.  The state 
proved that appellant kidnapped Murray by showing that Murray and appellant 
left work at approximately the same time on the night Murray disappeared, that 
Murray’s car was found parked behind appellant’s trailer, and that Murray’s 
murdered body was found rolled in a carpet inside appellant’s trailer.  Further, the 
evidence proved that Murray did not have her wallet, driver’s licenses, and credit 
cards when she disappeared and that Murray did not tell anyone she was leaving 
the area, despite her habit of informing friends of her whereabouts.  Additionally, 
appellant lied when Murray’s friend asked about her, and appellant also told a co-
worker that she was “probably dead.”  Appellant also falsely told Kimberly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
Zimmerman that the Subaru behind his trailer belonged to his boss or a friend, 
“and they were down there probably hunting.” 
{¶ 74} The evidence also established that the location of Murray’s murder 
was appellant’s trailer.  A copper bullet jacket found in the living room of the 
trailer had Murray’s DNA on it, and a bullet hole was discovered in the 
bloodstained living-room carpet. 
{¶ 75} We also reject appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient 
because there were no eyewitnesses.  We have “long held that circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if that evidence would convince the 
average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Heinish (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 238, 553 N.E.2d 1026.  Here, circumstantial 
evidence, forensic testimony, and appellant’s own statements proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant kidnapped and murdered Murray.  Forensic 
evidence showed that the copper bullet jacket and bullets removed from a tree 
behind appellant’s trailer were “fired from the same firearm.”  Moreover, the fact 
that appellant used a gun for target practice on his property linked him to the 
weapon that killed Murray. 
{¶ 76} As to appellant’s manifest-weight challenges, this is not an 
“‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”  
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio 
App.3d at 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717.  We find that the jury neither lost 
its way nor created a miscarriage of justice in convicting appellant of aggravated 
felony murder, the kidnapping-murder specification, or the separate offense of 
kidnapping.  Proposition I is overruled. 
{¶ 77} Evidentiary issues.  In proposition of law III, appellant argues that 
the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his marital infidelity, his reaction to 
the presence of the police, and the introduction of victim-impact evidence. 
January Term, 2005 
19 
{¶ 78} 1. “Other acts” evidence.  Amber Hammers and appellant worked 
together at Flappers Bar, a Mount Vernon bar and grill then owned by an owner 
of the Pirate’s Cove.  Hammers testified that appellant called and asked her to go 
dancing with him.  Hammers told appellant that she had not talked to her 
boyfriend about going dancing with another man, and no plans were made. 
{¶ 79} Gloria Ressler and appellant worked together at the Pirate’s Cove.  
Ressler testified that following Murray’s disappearance, appellant called her on 
three occasions during November 2000 and asked “if he could come over and 
hang out, have a party, come out and just have [her] and him * * * out there.”  
Appellant also approached her at work and said, “[W]e could have a quickie and 
your fiancé wouldn’t have to know.” 
{¶ 80} Lisa Perkins testified that at one point, appellant gave her a ride in 
his car and along the way, appellant “stopped up on the top of the hill, and * * * 
he just started talking and touching [her] and [they] had sex up on the hill in the 
car.”  Dana Bostic testified that appellant had spent the night with Perkins at 
Bostic’s home.  Following Julious’s disappearance, appellant told Bostic that “his 
plans were * * * to leave his wife [and] * * * come and stay with [Bostic] and 
Lisa at [Bostic’s] house.” 
{¶ 81} Paul Amstutz, a former Pirate’s Cove delivery driver, testified 
about a conversation with Kathy McKnight about appellant’s whereabouts.  
During a food delivery to the McKnight home, Kathy indicated to Amstutz that 
she thought that appellant was working that evening at the Pirate’s Cove.  
Amstutz knew, however, that appellant was not working that evening and was 
instead drinking at the Pirate’s Cove bar. 
{¶ 82} Under Evid.R. 404(B), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove” a defendant’s character as to criminal propensity.  “It 
may, however, be admissible * * * [to show] motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
However, “[t]he admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 
OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 83} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Hammers’s 
and Ressler’s testimony.  That evidence related to appellant’s modus operandi, or 
plan.  Evidence showing a modus operandi is admissible because “ ‘it provides a 
behavioral fingerprint which, when compared to the behavioral fingerprints 
associated with the crime in question, can be used to identify the defendant as the 
perpetrator.’ ”  State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 N.E.2d 
186, ¶ 104, quoting State v. Lowe (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 531, 634 N.E.2d 
616. 
{¶ 84} Hammers and Ressler helped to establish appellant’s opportunity, 
preparation, and plan to acquaint himself and be alone with Murray.  Appellant’s 
phone calls to Hammers and Ressler showed that appellant developed an interest 
in his co-workers and asked them out.  This pattern of behavior showed the 
likelihood that appellant also developed an interest in Murray.  Thus, the jury 
could reasonably infer from the testimony of Hammers and Ressler that appellant 
had asked Murray for a ride after work. 
{¶ 85} We also reject appellant’s argument that his phone calls to Ressler 
were not admissible because they were made after Murray’s disappearance.  
“[P]ursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), * * * evidence of subsequent crimes or acts of 
misconduct is admissible if it is relevant to an issue at trial and its probative value 
is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”  Cleveland v. Dillingham (May 11, 
1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67693, 1995 WL 277105, *4.  Appellant’s phone 
calls, though made two or three weeks after Murray’s disappearance, were 
relevant in establishing appellant’s modus operandi. 
{¶ 86} Moreover, the trial court provided the jury with cautionary 
instructions on “other acts” evidence.  The jury was advised:  “Evidence was 
January Term, 2005 
21 
introduced that the defendant may have committed other acts other than the 
offenses with which he was charged in this case.  If you find that the evidence of 
other acts is true * * *, you may consider that evidence only for the purpose of 
deciding whether it proves Gregory McKnight’s motive, opportunity, intent or 
purpose or plan to commit kidnapping of Emily Murray.  The evidence may not 
be considered for any other purpose. It was not received, and you may not 
consider it to prove the character of Gregory McKnight in order to show that he 
acted in conformity with that character.”  In view of these instructions and the 
probative value of the testimony of the two women, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting this “other acts” evidence.  See State v. Noling, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 48. 
{¶ 87} We also find that the testimony about appellant’s visits to Perkins 
in Bostic’s home was relevant to show how appellant and Julious knew each 
other.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence. 
{¶ 88} Testimony that appellant and Perkins had sex in appellant’s car and 
spent the night together at Bostic’s home was not relevant and not admissible 
under Evid.R. 404(B).  Nevertheless, we find that the impact of such testimony 
was minimal and not prejudicial given other compelling evidence of appellant’s 
guilt.  See Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 49. 
{¶ 89} 2. Reaction to the police.  Two to three weeks before Julious was 
murdered, appellant, Kathy, Bostic, and Julious drove from Chillicothe to 
Columbus to go to a reggae club.  Over defense objection, Bostic testified that 
when they “pulled into a parking lot [of the reggae club] * * * there was police 
sitting in the parking lot.”  Bostic testified that appellant said, “ ‘There’s the 
police.’  And then we turned * * * out of the parking lot and we drove all the way 
back home.” 
{¶ 90} We find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this 
testimony.  Appellant’s reaction to the police occurred before he murdered either 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
Julious or Murray.  This evidence did not prove consciousness of guilt, because 
there was no connection between appellant’s reaction to the police and the 
charged offenses.  Appellant’s reaction to the police, however, was not tied to any 
other misconduct, and he was not prejudiced by such testimony.  Thus, the 
introduction of this evidence constituted harmless error. 
{¶ 91} 3. Victim-impact comment and testimony.  During his opening 
statement, the prosecutor stated, “Two years ago, Emily S. Murray was attending 
Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio.  She was in her junior year, and she was 20 
years young.”  Further, the prosecutor stated, “At work, Emily was well-liked.  
She was outgoing, she was helpful, she was a good waitress.” 
{¶ 92} Thomas Murray, the victim’s father, testified that he had a “very 
close” relationship with his daughter.  He added, “Emily was in touch with her 
mother or me or both of us almost every day.”  According to Thomas, Emily “was 
very responsible; she was just a very honest kid.”  Moreover, Murray returned 
from a religious retreat about ten days before her disappearance and was “really 
excited about becoming a priest.”  Thomas also testified that when he learned of 
his daughter’s disappearance, “it was like somebody hit [him] in the stomach with 
a sledgehammer.” 
{¶ 93} Cynthia Murray, the victim’s mother, described a “very close 
relationship” with Murray, said Murray was “easy to love,” and testified that 
Murray “wanted to become an Episcopal priest.” 
{¶ 94} Megan DiCarlo, a college friend, described Murray as “very 
outgoing, very social, independent, very open with people, trusting of people.  
Like she always looked for the best in people.”  Kate Murray, another college 
friend, described Murray as “[v]ery outgoing, had a lot of friends, very friendly.”  
Kate also testified that Murray was very religious, and the tattoo of a dove on 
Murray’s back symbolized this interest. 
January Term, 2005 
23 
{¶ 95} Michael Corrigan, the general manager of the Pirate’s Cove, stated 
that Murray was “courteous and cared for people, and she was a very upbeat 
person, fun to work with.”  On the night she disappeared, Murray was “very 
upbeat and happy.”  Nathan Justice also testified that Murray was a “very nice, 
happy person.” 
{¶ 96} During the guilt-phase closing argument, the prosecutor described 
Murray’s disappearance as “every parents’ worst nightmare,” repeated Thomas 
Murray’s statement that “they felt as if they had been hit in the stomach with a 
sledgehammer,” and mentioned that “that pain in their stomach stays with them 
today.”  The prosecutor also argued that Murray was “nice” and “kind-hearted” 
and might have given appellant a ride on the night she disappeared. 
{¶ 97} The defense filed a motion in limine to exclude victim-impact 
evidence.  Nevertheless, except where noted, the defense did not renew its 
objection to the foregoing testimony at trial and thus waived all but plain error.  
See Gable v. Gates Mills, 103 Ohio St.3d 449, 2004-Ohio-5719, 816 N.E.2d 
1049, ¶ 34 (“a ruling on a motion in limine may not be appealed and * * * 
objections * * * must be made during the trial to preserve evidentiary rulings for 
appellate review”). 
{¶ 98} Evidence relating to the facts attendant to the offense is “clearly 
admissible” during the guilt phase, even though it might be characterized as 
victim-impact evidence.  State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 440, 
650 N.E.2d 878.  Thus, testimony that Murray was friendly, outgoing, and 
trusting was admissible in showing the likelihood that Murray provided appellant 
a ride in her car on the night she disappeared.  Moreover, testimony that Murray 
was a responsible person was admissible in showing that she would not have left 
campus in her car without taking her wallet and driver’s license. 
{¶ 99} The defense objected to Thomas’s and Cynthia’s testimony 
because of the lack of foundation to prove habit but did not object to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
testimony as inappropriate victim-impact evidence.  Thomas’s and Cynthia’s 
close personal relationship and frequent contact with their daughter laid the 
foundation about Murray’s habit of notifying family members as to her 
whereabouts before making a trip, and this testimony was also admissible.  
Thomas’s testimony that his daughter’s disappearance was “like somebody hit 
[him] in the stomach with a sledgehammer” was of questionable relevance; 
however, such testimony did not constitute outcome-determinative plain error.  
See State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 679, 687 N.E.2d 1358; cf. State 
v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 293, 754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 100} Testimony 
about 
Murray’s 
upbeat 
mood 
before 
her 
disappearance, her strong religious beliefs, and her aspirations to become an 
Episcopal priest was admissible in rebutting arguments that Murray might have 
committed suicide. 
{¶ 101} Kate Murray’s testimony about the tattoo of a dove on Murray’s 
back was relevant in identifying Murray’s body.  See State v. Myers, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 N.E.2d 186, ¶ 108 (photos of victim’s tattoo 
admissible to help identify the victim). 
{¶ 102} As to the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument, 
the trial counsel failed to object and thus waived all but plain error.  See State v. 
Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 236 N.E.2d 545, paragraph three 
of the syllabus.  There was no plain error.  The prosecutor’s brief description of 
Murray in his opening statement simply pointed out her age and that she had 
attended Kenyon College, which explained why she lived in Gambier.  Cf. 
Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 56 (description of 
victims’ lives established that the victims had been living persons, an element of 
the charge of aggravated murder). 
{¶ 103} The prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument also did not 
result in plain error.  The prosecutor described Murray as a nice, kind-hearted, and 
January Term, 2005 
25 
helpful person to point out the likelihood that Murray provided a ride to appellant 
on the night she disappeared.  The prosecutor’s comments about Thomas’s and 
Cynthia’s pain and anguish simply pointed out the obvious feelings that Murray’s 
parents experienced following their daughter’s death.  Moreover, the prosecutor’s 
remarks in question were very brief and not overly emotional. 
{¶ 104} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition III. 
{¶ 105} Habit evidence.  In proposition of law X, appellant argues that 
the trial court erred by admitting habit testimony. 
{¶ 106} Over defense objection, the state presented evidence of Murray’s 
habit of informing family and friends about her whereabouts before departing on a 
trip.  Thomas Murray testified that her family and friends maintained close 
contact with Murray as to her whereabouts following Murray’s suicide attempt in 
May 2000.  Murray exchanged phone calls and e-mails with her parents on an 
almost daily basis.  During the fall of 2000, Murray remained in contact with her 
parents when she traveled to Japan and made a trip to St. Louis.  Following this 
testimony, the prosecutor asked Thomas: 
{¶ 107} “Q:  Was it common for Emily to tell you where she might be 
going before she left? 
{¶ 108} “A:  Anything of significance, yes, sir. 
{¶ 109} “* * * 
{¶ 110} “Q:  Could you restate your answer? 
{¶ 111} “A:  Emily was in very close touch with us, and also with her 
friends, so if it was anything significant, we would have known about it, she 
would have told us, and she certainly would have told her friends.” 
{¶ 112} Megan DiCarlo, Murray’s roommate, testified that she and Emily 
used a dry-erase board to leave a message “if one of [them] went somewhere.”  
The prosecutor also asked DiCarlo: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶ 113} “Q:  Did Emily use the board when she took a trip, maybe a 
weekend or two before? 
{¶ 114} “A:  Uh-huh.  She had gone to see a friend in Cleveland a couple 
weeks beforehand * * * and had left a message like filling almost the entire board 
about where she was going, when she planning on leaving, when she was 
planning on being back, who she was going to see, and a phone number for that 
person. 
{¶ 115} “Q:  The night that Emily didn’t come back, was there any notes 
on that board? 
{¶ 116} “A:  No, there weren’t. 
{¶ 117} “Q:  Were there any notes anywhere else in the dorm room? 
{¶ 118} “A:  No. 
{¶ 119} “Q:  Did you get any phone messages? 
{¶ 120} “A:  No.” 
{¶ 121} Kate Murray, a former roommate, also testified about Murray’s 
habit of informing her friends about her whereabouts: 
{¶ 122} “Q:  I’m not talking about guessing what she might do in the 
future.  While you were her roommate, while you knew her, did she ever 
disappear unaccounted for and then reappear and say, ‘Well, I’m sorry, sorry?’ 
{¶ 123} “A:  No. 
{¶ 124} “Q:  How do you know that? 
{¶ 125} “A:  I would — from personal experience of living with her, it’s 
a very small campus, you see people a lot, and if she had disappeared for any 
amount of time, we would have noticed. 
{¶ 126} “Q:  Did she ever leave * * * unexpectedly? 
{¶ 127} “A:  Yes, one night she drove up to Cleveland to see a friend, but 
then when she did go that time – and no one knew she was going – she left us a 
note saying where she was going. 
January Term, 2005 
27 
{¶ 128} “Q:  Where did she leave the note? 
{¶ 129} “A:  I assume in her room.  I don’t know.” 
{¶ 130} Evid.R. 406 provides:  “Evidence of the habit of a person or of 
the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless 
of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person 
or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or 
routine practice.”  Evid.R. 406 is identical to Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
{¶ 131} Evid.R. 406 does not define habit.  “Habit,” however, has been 
defined as a “person’s regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation 
with a specific type of conduct.”  See Advisory Committee’s Notes, Rules of 
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates (1973), 56 F.R.D. 183, 223.  
Although a precise formula does not exist for determining when the behavior may 
become so consistent as to rise to the level of habit, “adequacy of sampling and 
uniformity of response are key factors.”  Id. at 224; see, also, United States v. 
Newman (C.A.1, 1992), 982 F.2d 665, 668; Reyes v. Missouri Pacific RR. Co. 
(C.A.5, 1979), 589 F.2d 791, 795.  These factors focus on whether the behavior at 
issue “ ‘occurred with sufficient regularity making it more probable than not that 
it would be carried out in every instance or in most instances.’ ”  Newman, 982 
F.2d at 668, quoting Weil v. Seltzer (C.A.D.C.1989), 873 F.2d 1453, 1460. 
{¶ 132} Murray’s father and two of her close friends established 
Murray’s habit of notifying friends and family members of her whereabouts 
before departing on a trip.  Murray’s daily phone calls and e-mails with her father 
as to her whereabouts, and her practice of leaving notes as to her whereabouts 
with her friends were “ ‘numerous enough to base an inference of systematic 
conduct,’ ” permitting the admissibility of the testimony.  Wilson v. Volkswagen 
of Am., Inc. (C.A.4, 1977), 561 F.2d 494, 511, quoting Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft 
Co. (C.A.2, 1968), 404 F.2d 1152, 1158. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
{¶ 133} We reject appellant’s argument that Murray’s behavior was a 
volitional act and therefore not admissible as habit evidence.  Activities that are 
“semi-automatic or nearly nonvolitional, can be easily classified as habit.”  1 
Giannelli & Snyder, Evidence (2d Ed.2001) 265, Section 406.4.  For example, 
locking the door of a house or traveling home from work by the same route are 
examples of habitual acts that may become semiautomatic and thus tend to prove 
that one acted in a particular situation in the same manner.  Id.; see, also, Cardinal 
v. Family Foot Care Ctr., Inc. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 181, 182, 532 N.E.2d 162 
(“habitual acts may become semi-automatic and may tend to prove one acted in 
the particular case in the same manner”). 
{¶ 134} Similarly, Murray’s repeated practice of notifying friends and 
family of her whereabouts before departing on a trip became a semiautomatic 
form of behavior that was admissible to prove habit.  See State v. Allen (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 626, 633, 653 N.E.2d 675 (testimony that victim was an immaculate 
housekeeper was admissible under Evid.R. 406 to show she would likely have 
wiped the defendant’s fingerprints off her glasses); see, also, Perrin v. Anderson 
(C.A.10, 1986), 784 F.2d 1040, 1045-1046 (five instances of violent encounters 
with the police sufficient to establish “habit” of reacting violently to uniformed 
police officers); Meyer v. United States (C.A.10, 1980), 638 F.2d 155, 156-158 
(dentist’s routine to advise patients of potential risks of extractions admissible to 
show that he acted in conformity with that habit when dealing with the plaintiff). 
{¶ 135} We also reject appellant’s argument that habit evidence should 
not have been admitted because the testimony did not identify a specific manner 
that Murray used to notify her friends and family of her whereabouts.  Testimony 
established that e-mails, phone calls, and notes were Murray’s specific methods 
for notifying family and friends as to her whereabouts. 
{¶ 136} Finally, sufficient examples of Murray’s conduct demonstrated 
Murray’s habit.  Murray exchanged e-mails and phone calls with her parents on 
January Term, 2005 
29 
almost a daily basis, remained in daily contact with her father as to her 
whereabouts in Japan, and notified her parents about her trip to St. Louis.  
Moreover, college friends testified that Murray left notes and information as to 
her whereabouts on an erase board before departing on trips.  Cf. Bollinger, Inc. v. 
Mayerson (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 702, 715, 689 N.E.2d 62 (testimony about 
two isolated instances of alleged cheating was not sufficient evidence of habit 
under Evid.R. 406). 
{¶ 137} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony 
about Murray’s habit under Evid.R. 406.  Thus, proposition X is overruled. 
{¶ 138} Gruesome photographs.  In proposition of law XII, appellant 
argues that the trial court erred in admitting gruesome autopsy and crime-scene 
photographs. 
{¶ 139} The defense failed to object to gruesome photographs at trial and 
has waived all but plain error.  State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-
5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 49.  The defense motion in limine to exclude crime-
scene and gruesome photographs did not preserve this issue.  Gable v. Gates 
Mills, 103 Ohio St.3d 449, 2004-Ohio-5719, 816 N.E.2d 1049, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 140} Nonrepetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible in 
capital cases as long as the probative value of each photograph outweighs the 
danger of material prejudice to the accused.  State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio 
St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus; State v. Morales 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267.  Decisions on the admissibility 
of photographs are “left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Slagle 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶ 141} 1. Crime-scene photographs.  Appellant complains about four 
crime-scene photographs.  State’s exhibits Nos. 47 through 49 depict Murray’s 
body as it was found in the carpet.  State’s exhibit No. 116 depicts Murray’s fully 
clothed body after the carpet was unrolled.  There was no plain error in admitting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
this evidence.  These photos portrayed Murray in relation to the crime scene and 
illustrated the testimony of Special Agent Wilgus and others who saw the crime 
scene.  See State v. Twyford (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 358, 763 N.E.2d 122; 
State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 288, 754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 142} 2. Autopsy photographs.  Appellant also objects to nine autopsy 
photographs.  State’s exhibit No. 144 is a photograph of the carpet before it was 
unrolled and contains no imagery of Murray’s body.  State’s exhibit No. 117 is a 
photograph of Murray’s body from her thighs to beneath her breast line and 
shows that she is wearing a pair of panties with the word “Thursday” on them.  
That evidence was relevant because Thursday was Murray’s last day of work at 
the Pirate’s Cove.  State’s exhibit No. 112 showed the tattoo of a dove on her 
back and was a prominent identifying mark on her body. 
{¶ 143} State’s exhibits Nos. 119, 148, and 149 depict Murray’s right and 
left hands.  These photographs supported the coroner’s testimony that no blood 
spatter was found on Murray’s hands or arms, an absence that helped show that 
Murray was not a suicide victim. 
{¶ 144} State’s exhibit No. 147 is a decidedly gruesome photograph 
showing the entry gunshot wound in Murray’s head.  State’s exhibit No. 146 is 
another gruesome photograph depicting the exit wound underneath Murray’s ear.  
State’s exhibit No. 145 is an X-ray of Murray’s skull showing bullet fragments 
lodged in her head.  These photographs supported the coroner’s testimony that 
Murray suffered “one gunshot wound * * * coming through the brain and the neck 
and coming out on the left side of the neck.” 
{¶ 145} No plain error occurred in admitting the autopsy photographs.  
The autopsy photographs depicted the victim’s wounds, illustrated the coroner’s 
testimony, and helped prove appellant’s intent.  See State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 73; State v. Smith, 97 Ohio St.3d 
367, 2002-Ohio-6659, 780 N.E.2d 221, ¶ 36. 
January Term, 2005 
31 
{¶ 146} We also reject appellant’s complaint about the reintroduction of 
the photographs during the penalty phase.  The defense did not object to their 
reintroduction at trial, and no plain error occurred by allowing these photographs 
into evidence.  Twyford, 94 Ohio St.3d at 358, 763 N.E.2d 122; State v. DePew 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 282-283, 528 N.E.2d 542. 
{¶ 147} Based on the forgoing, we overrule proposition XII. 
{¶ 148} Admissibility of Murray’s notebook and notepad.  In 
proposition of law XV, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by refusing to admit all of Murray’s notebooks and notepads into evidence 
because they rebutted the state’s evidence that she was a happy and upbeat 
person. 
{¶ 149} The police recovered Murray’s notebooks and notepads from her 
dorm room.  During the defense case, trial counsel sought to introduce all of 
Murray’s writings into evidence.  The trial court admitted most of Murray’s 
composition notebook into evidence. 
{¶ 150} In reviewing the record, it appears that the documents admitted 
as defense exhibit H include Murray’s reflections about her suicide attempt on 
May 5, 2000, her feelings about hospitalization and therapy, her self-analysis, and 
a drawing of a partial stick figure being hanged.  Murray’s letter to a friend dated 
June 14, 2000, is the latest date on any of the writings. 
{¶ 151} The trial court did not admit other parts of defense exhibit H that 
included undated loose papers, page 12 from the notebook, a legal pad that 
contained a letter dated January 2, 1999, and other undated writings.  These 
miscellaneous papers contain fictional stories, several drawings, and Murray’s 
reflections about life that did not mention suicide.  The trial court also did not 
admit Murray’s notebook pad and miscellaneous papers.  Defense exhibit G 
includes fictional stories, letters to friends, and two undated notes that mention a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
friend’s suicide attempt and discuss Murray’s feelings about dying and suicide.  
The latest date on writings in defense exhibit G was July 20, 1999. 
{¶ 152} The notebooks and notepads that the trial court excluded from 
evidence were neither relevant nor admissible under Evid.R. 401.  The evidence 
at the crime scene—Murray’s body found rolled in a carpet—and the coroner’s 
testimony ruled out suicide as a possible cause of death.  Thus, testimony about 
Murray’s depression and her fixation on death was simply not relevant. 
{¶ 153} Furthermore, any assertions contained in the excluded evidence 
were inadmissible hearsay. Evid.R. 803(3), the “state of mind” exception to the 
hearsay rule, governs the admissibility of Murray’s hearsay statements.  Evid.R. 
803(3) provides for the admissibility of “[a] statement of the declarant’s then 
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 154} The excluded evidence was not admissible under Evid.R. 803(3), 
because the latest date on any of the documents was July 20, 1999, which was 
more than a year before Murray’s death.  The state’s evidence about Murray’s 
state of mind related to the summer and fall of 2000, just prior to her 
disappearance. 
{¶ 155} Moreover, none of Murray’s excluded writings were admissible 
as statements of present intent to take future action.  See Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d at 
183, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343 (declarant’s statement that she intended to 
“break up” with defendant admitted to negate defendant’s contention that 
declarant was suicidal); Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon (1892), 145 U.S. 285, 295-
296, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706.  None of Murray’s excluded statements or her 
other writings that were admitted into evidence indicate that she intended to 
commit suicide. 
January Term, 2005 
33 
{¶ 156} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit all 
the notebooks and notepads found in Murray’s room.  Moreover, appellant 
suffered no prejudice, because most of the documents from Murray’s notebook 
and notepad that mentioned suicide were admitted. 
{¶ 157} Based on the foregoing, proposition XV is overruled. 
{¶ 158} Course of conduct.  In proposition of law II, appellant argues 
that his conviction for a “course of conduct” specification is based on insufficient 
evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Appellant also 
asserts that R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) is unconstitutionally vague. 
{¶ 159} 1. Constitutional 
challenge. 
 
“The 
course-of-conduct 
specification set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) is not void for vagueness under 
either the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 9, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution.”  State v. Benner (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 
533 N.E.2d 701, syllabus.  Accord State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 
569, 715 N.E.2d 1144; State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 155, 661 
N.E.2d 1030.  We find that no basis exists to overturn that ruling. 
{¶ 160} 2. Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.  
Appellant contends that the murders of Murray and Julious were not part of a 
“course of conduct” within the meaning of R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  Appellant argues 
that the murders occurred five and one-half months apart, and Murray and Julious 
had no connection with one another. 
{¶ 161} Our recent opinion in State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-
Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, syllabus, sets forth a test for “course of conduct.”  
Sapp states, “The statutory phrase ‘course of conduct’ found in R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5) requires that the state establish some factual link between the 
aggravated murder with which the defendant is charged and the other murders or 
attempted murders that are alleged to make up the course of conduct.  In order to 
find that two offenses constitute a single course of conduct under R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
2929.04(A)(5), the trier of fact ‘must * * * discern some connection, common 
scheme, or some pattern or psychological thread that ties [the offenses] together.’ 
”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., syllabus.  Moreover, “the factual link might be one of 
time, location, murder weapon, or cause of death.”  Id. at ¶ 52.  Ultimately, “when 
two or more offenses are alleged to constitute a course of conduct under R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5), all the circumstances of the offense, must be taken into account.”  
Id. at ¶ 56. 
{¶ 162} Significant similarities exist between the two murders.  Murray 
and Julious were both acquaintances of appellant.  Appellant was driving alone 
with both victims before their disappearances.  Appellant also shot both victims in 
the head and disposed of their bodies on his property. 
{¶ 163} Moreover, the passage of five and one-half months between the 
two murders does not invalidate appellant’s course-of-conduct specification 
conviction.  Indeed, “murders taking place at different times ‘may satisfy the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5) specification so long as the offender’s actions were part of a 
continuing course of criminal conduct.’ ”  State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 
2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 55, quoting State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 
181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 71. 
{¶ 164} In Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, 
¶ 57, ¶ 61, this court found that murders committed more than a year apart were 
part of the same course of conduct because of common motive and similarity in 
the offenses.  See, also, State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 444, 650 
N.E.2d 878 (five murders over a five-month period represented a course of 
conduct); Benner, 40 Ohio St.3d at 320, 533 N.E.2d 701 (two murders and an 
attempted murder over a five-month period evidenced a course of conduct).  In 
this case, the similarities in the Murray and Julious murders establish a course of 
conduct despite the lapse of five and one-half months. 
January Term, 2005 
35 
{¶ 165} In conclusion, we reject appellant’s claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction for a course-of-conduct specification in the 
murders of Julious and Murray.  The two murders involved similarities in the 
commission of the offenses, the causes of death, and the disposal of the bodies.  
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that evidence was sufficient to 
support appellant’s conviction of a course-of-conduct specification in the murders 
of Julious and Murray. 
{¶ 166} As to appellant’s manifest-weight challenge, we find that this is 
not “ ‘the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 
conviction.’ ”  Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. 
Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717.  The jury 
neither lost its way nor created a miscarriage of justice in convicting appellant on 
the course-of-conduct specification. 
{¶ 167} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition II. 
{¶ 168} Joinder.  In proposition of law VI, appellant contends that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to sever Count 6, the charge for Julious’s 
murder, from the rest of the charges.  Appellant argues that joinder of the charges 
was improper because the Julious and Murray murders were unrelated. 
{¶ 169} “The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial under 
Crim.R. 8(A) if the offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character.’ ”  
State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293, quoting Crim.R. 
8(A).  A defendant requesting severance “has the burden of furnishing the trial 
court with sufficient information so that it can weigh the considerations favoring 
joinder against the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  State v. Torres (1981), 66 
Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 20 O.O.3d 313, 421 N.E.2d 1288.  A defendant claiming 
error in the denial of severance must affirmatively show that his rights were 
prejudiced and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing separate trials.  
Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
{¶ 170} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 
to sever, and appellant was not prejudiced by joinder.  First, evidence of Julious’s 
murder was necessary to prove the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), course-of-conduct 
specification.  See State v. Hamblin (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 159, 524 N.E.2d 
476; see, also, Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 
71; Benner, 40 Ohio St.3d at 306, 533 N.E.2d 701. 
{¶ 171} Moreover, the evidence proving the two murders was 
interlocking.  Indeed, evidence relating to both murders would have been 
admissible at separate trials to prove appellant’s identity by modus operandi under 
Evid.R. 404(B).  See, generally, State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 185, 
552 N.E.2d 180.  During each murder, appellant was alone with the victim, drove 
with the victim somewhere, shot the victim in the head, and disposed of the body 
at his trailer.  See Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, 
¶ 72. 
{¶ 172} Finally, the evidence of appellant’s guilt is “amply sufficient to 
sustain each verdict, whether or not the indictments were tried together.”  Torres, 
66 Ohio St.2d at 344, 20 O.O.3d 313, 421 N.E.2d 1288.  Circumstantial evidence, 
forensic testimony, and appellant’s own statements provided strong evidence of 
his guilt for each murder.  The strength of the state’s proof “establishes that the 
prosecution did not attempt to prove one case simply by questionable evidence of 
other offenses.”  Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d at 187, 552 N.E.2d 180.  Based on the 
foregoing, proposition VI is overruled. 
Juror Misconduct 
{¶ 173} Sleeping jurors.  In proposition of law XI, appellant asserts that 
sleeping jurors violated his right to a fair trial.  The first alleged instance of a 
juror’s sleeping was raised following Detective Brenneman’s direct examination, 
when the prosecutor informed the trial court: 
January Term, 2005 
37 
{¶ 174} “Mr. Gleeson:  Your Honor, Mr. Miller requests, he’s noticing 
some of the jurors are kind of sweltering.  Perhaps we should give them ten 
minutes to walk around, put on the air conditioner.  Of course, I think they’re 
sleeping, and it’s not to cross yet. 
{¶ 175} “The Court:  I agree.  I think that’s appropriate. 
{¶ 176} “Mr. Miller:  That’s fine.” 
{¶ 177} The second alleged instance of a juror’s sleeping was raised by 
the prosecutor following Heather Zollman’s testimony: 
{¶ 178} “Mr. Gleeson:  Your Honor, I take full responsibility for this 
because my presentation was probably not very exciting, but Melissa Trivette, one 
of our jurors, is like asleep.  She’s not now, she’s wide awake.  The cross must 
have been exciting, woke her up.  But I would just ask the Court to pay attention 
to her to see if she is dozing off, and if we need to take any corrective measures 
because of that. 
{¶ 179} “The Court:  Okay.  Well, the Court would note that she doesn’t 
really look around that much anyway.  It’s her position pretty much to just sit 
there and look straight ahead. 
{¶ 180} “Mr. Gleeson:  Well, she was sleeping. 
{¶ 181} “The Court:  I’m not doubting that.  I’m not doubting that.  I’m 
just saying that she does not look around — move around like other jurors 
typically do, or even * * * the other jurors here do.  She just pretty much * * * 
maintains a fixed position, as she has throughout. 
{¶ 182} “Mr. Canepa:  Yeah, Judge.  Tim actually said the same thing to 
me, but I said, ‘Well, that’s usually true, except she had her eyes closed and her 
head down.’ 
{¶ 183} “The Court:  The Court will certainly take note of that, and be 
aware of that.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
{¶ 184} It is well established that “ ‘[t]he trial judge is in the best position 
to determine the nature of the alleged jury misconduct’ and ‘the appropriate 
remedies for any demonstrated misconduct.’ ”  United States v. Sherrill (C.A.6, 
2004), 388 F.3d 535, 537, quoting United States v. Copeland (C.A.6, 1995), 51 
F.3d 611, 613.  Moreover, a trial court has “ ‘considerable discretion in deciding 
how to handle a sleeping juror.’ ”  State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 
253, 750 N.E.2d 90, quoting United States v. Freitag (C.A.7, 2000), 230 F.3d 
1019, 1023. 
{¶ 185} Appellant argues that the trial court should have questioned Juror 
Trivette to determine whether she was sleeping, or in the alternative, Juror 
Trivette should have been dismissed and replaced by an alternate juror.  The 
defense did not request either remedy at trial and expressed no dissatisfaction with 
the trial court’s handling of the matter.  Thus, in the absence of plain error, this 
claim is waived.  See State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 
236 N.E.2d 545, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 186} No plain error occurred.  There was only a vague allegation that 
jurors were sleeping when the issue was first raised with the trial court.  Juror 
Trivette was alleged to have been asleep during a later portion of the trial, but the 
defense has provided no evidence that this juror was in fact sleeping.  Thus, 
whether Juror Trivette or any other juror was in fact sleeping is speculative.  The 
trial court observed that Juror Trivette did not “move around like other jurors * * 
* [and] just [maintained] a fixed position, as she [had] throughout.”  The trial 
court noted counsel’s concern about Juror Trivette’s sleeping, but no further 
concern about sleeping jurors was raised during the trial. 
{¶ 187} Moreover, appellant has provided no evidence of prejudice.  
Nothing in the record shows what part of the testimony, if any, jurors actually 
missed.  See Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d at 253, 750 N.E.2d 90 (affirming conviction 
January Term, 2005 
39 
where there was no evidence that the juror missed large or critical portions of the 
trial).  Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition XI. 
{¶ 188} 2. Outside conversations.  In proposition of law XIII, appellant 
argues that he was denied a fair trial because one juror discussed the case with a 
nonjuror during the trial. 
{¶ 189} During the state’s case, the prosecutor informed the trial court 
that Amy Warrix reported that her boyfriend, Terry Stewart, a juror, “has been 
talking to her about the case.”  The trial court then called Juror Stewart into 
chambers for questioning.  Juror Stewart denied talking with Warrix about the 
trial.  He stated that he had “never discussed the case with her at all, nothing about 
the facts or that deals with the case at all.”  Juror Stewart said that Warrix may 
have made these allegations against him because he had “left her last night, and 
she’s a mean, hateful girl.”  Juror Stewart said that when Warrix tried to talk to 
him about the case, he told her, “I’m under oath not to talk about it and not to hear 
about it.”  He also told the court that he had followed those instructions.  Juror 
Stewart also assured the court that he did not acquire any outside information 
about the case as a result of being around Warrix. 
{¶ 190} Following the completion of Juror Stewart’s questioning, defense 
counsel stated, “I’m satisfied with his explanation.”  Defense counsel indicated 
that no further inquiry was necessary and declined the opportunity to question 
Warrix.  The trial court then stated, “The Court is satisfied as well at this point.” 
{¶ 191} In cases involving outside influences on jurors, trial courts are 
granted “broad discretion” in dealing with the contact and determining whether to 
declare a mistrial or to replace an affected juror.  State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 72, 89, 656 N.E.2d 643.  A trial court is permitted to rely on a juror’s 
testimony in determining that juror’s impartiality.  State v. Herring (2002), 94 
Ohio St.3d 246, 259, 762 N.E.2d 940.  Moreover, issues concerning the weight 
given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
of fact.  State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 
212, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Here, the trial court’s ruling reflects that the 
court believed the juror’s denial that he talked to Warrix about the case. 
{¶ 192} Appellant argues that the trial court was obligated to conduct a 
Remmer hearing to question Warrix, and possibly other jurors, before making a 
determination that no improper contact had occurred.  See Remmer v. United 
States (1954), 347 U.S. 227, 229-230, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654.  The defense, 
however, was “satisfied” with the juror’s explanation and indicated that no further 
inquiry into the allegations was necessary.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion.  See Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d at 252, 750 N.E.2d 90; State v. Henness 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 65, 679 N.E.2d 686 (upholding a trial court’s refusal to 
question each juror individually). 
{¶ 193} Appellant has failed to demonstrate that any juror misconduct 
occurred, and proposition XIII is overruled. 
{¶ 194} Courtroom outbursts.  In proposition of law XVI, appellant 
contends that courtroom outbursts deprived him of a fair trial. 
{¶ 195} The first outburst occurred during the defense closing argument:  
{¶ 196} “[Mr. Toy:]  Why would [Gregory McKnight] want to kill 
Emily? * * * Emily liked Greg, according to Abigail Williams.  Emily and Greg 
were considering a relationship, according to Nate Justice. 
{¶ 197} “Audience member:  No. 
{¶ 198} “Mr. Toy:  That’s what he testified to.” 
{¶ 199} The trial counsel did not object to the outburst or request 
corrective action.  Trial counsel then completed his closing argument without 
further disruption. 
{¶ 200} The second outburst occurred following the trial court’s 
announcement of the death sentence: 
January Term, 2005 
41 
{¶ 201} “[The Court:]  It is, therefore, the judgment of this Court that the 
aggravating circumstance in Count 1 of this case outweighs the mitigating factors 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant is hereby sentenced to death. 
{¶ 202} “Audience member:  Yes.” 
{¶ 203} “The impact of emotional outbursts at trial by witnesses or 
spectators cannot be judged by an appellate court on a cold record.  ‘Was the jury 
disturbed, alarmed, shocked or deeply moved? * * * These questions necessarily 
depend on facts which no record can reflect.’ ”  State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068, quoting State v. Bradley (1965), 3 Ohio St.2d 38, 40, 
32 O.O.2d 21, 209 N.E.2d 215.  Thus, a trial court must determine, as a question 
of fact, whether an emotional outburst deprived the defendant of a fair trial.  State 
v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, ¶ 44.  “In the 
absence of clear, affirmative evidence to the contrary, the trial court’s 
determination will not be disturbed.”  Morales, 32 Ohio St.3d at 255, 513 N.E.2d 
267. 
{¶ 204} The record does not show whether the jurors heard the first 
outburst, and if so, whether it had any effect on them.  Further, neither counsel 
brought the outburst to the trial court’s attention.  Thus, it would be speculative to 
conclude that the one-word outburst was disruptive or prejudicial.  Under these 
circumstances, we find that no “clear, affirmative evidence” exists that the 
outburst deprived appellant of a fair trial.  Id. 
{¶ 205} The jury had been discharged when the second outburst occurred 
during the announcement of the sentence.  Clearly, no prejudice resulted.  
Accordingly, we find that proposition XVI has no merit. 
{¶ 206} Defendant’s absence.  In proposition of law XIV, appellant 
argues that his absence during trial proceedings violated his constitutional rights. 
{¶ 207} During pretrial proceedings on June 5, 2002, defense counsel 
informed the trial court that appellant did not object to being absent from 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
conferences in chambers.  The trial court then obtained appellant’s consent to his 
absence during in-chambers proceedings:  
{¶ 208} “Judge Simmons:  * * * Just * * * [so] I’m fully satisfied you’re 
in agreement, Mr. McKnight, but * * * you just heard what Mr. Carson said about 
* * * any discussions in chambers with counsel that that would be * * * [the] way 
those are typically conducted. 
{¶ 209} “Mr. McKnight:  Yes. 
{¶ 210} “Judge Simmons:  And he indicated that you and he were in 
agreement that that could be done in that way and * * * is that your agreement? 
{¶ 211} “Mr. McKnight:  Yes, I * * * agree with that.” 
{¶ 212} Appellant was absent from the in-chambers conference on 
allegations of juror misconduct.  See Proposition XIII.  Trial counsel waived 
appellant’s presence and stated that appellant’s absence was “by agreement or our 
position, he does not need to be present.”  Appellant was also absent from an in-
chambers conference on proposed jury instructions.  Trial counsel did not 
expressly waive appellant’s presence at that conference. 
{¶ 213} Appellant had a fundamental right to be present at all stages of 
his criminal trial.  Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution; Crim.R. 43(A).  A 
defendant’s absence, however, does not necessarily result in prejudicial or 
constitutional error.  See State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 371, 738 
N.E.2d 1208; State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 285-287, 6 OBR 345, 
452 N.E.2d 1323. 
{¶ 214} Appellant personally waived his right to be present at in-
chambers conferences, and his waiver was valid for the two in-chambers 
proceedings that he now challenges.  Thus, appellant’s absence from the two in-
chambers conferences was consistent with his wishes.  See Rice v. Wood (C.A.9, 
1995), 44 F.3d 1396, 1400 (defendant can waive his right to be present); see, also, 
January Term, 2005 
43 
Polizzi v. United States (C.A.2, 1991), 926 F.2d 1311, 1322-1323 (counsel can 
waive the defendant’s right to be present). 
{¶ 215} Appellant also fails to demonstrate how his absence prejudiced 
him.  See United States v. Brown (C.A.6, 1978), 571 F.2d 980, 987 (defendant 
must establish prejudice in absence from in-chambers conference).  Appellant’s 
counsel was present during both conferences and fully participated.  Moreover, 
the conferences mostly involved legal issues within the professional competence 
of counsel, not issues that appellant must personally decide.  See United States v. 
Gagnon (1985), 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (defendant’s 
absence from an in-camera hearing involving a juror, where counsel was present, 
did not offend due process); see, also, State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 26, 
693 N.E.2d 772 (defendant’s absence during hearing on proposed jury 
instructions did not deny him a fair trial).  Thus, proposition XIV is rejected. 
{¶ 216} Defendant’s shackling.  In proposition of law XVII, appellant 
contends that he was denied a fair trial when the jury saw him shackled. 
{¶ 217} After the jury had started guilt-phase deliberations, the jury 
returned to the courtroom for instructions prior to retiring for the evening.  
Appellant was placed in handcuffs while the jurors were leaving the courtroom.  
Although trial counsel acknowledged that the handcuffing was “inadvertent,” the 
defense requested a mistrial.  In overruling the motion for mistrial, the trial court 
stated that “Mr. McKnight has appeared throughout all stages of the proceedings, 
* * * whenever the jury has been present, * * * he has appeared in street clothing, 
and he has appeared free of any restraints of any type, at least anything visible to 
the jury.” 
{¶ 218} Over defense objection, the trial court provided a curative 
instruction before the jury resumed its deliberations.  The trial court advised the 
jury:  “If you have seen Gregory B. McKnight in any type of restraints at any time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
during this proceeding, you are hereby instructed to disregard it, as it does not 
bear on his guilt or innocence in any manner.” 
{¶ 219} No one should be tried while shackled, absent unusual 
circumstances.  Illinois v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 
L.Ed.2d 353.1  Even though the jury saw appellant handcuffed on one occasion, 
appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  The jury’s view of him was brief 
and inadvertent.  Cf. State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 285-286, 513 
N.E.2d 311 (danger of prejudice is slight where a juror’s view of defendant in 
custody is brief, inadvertent, and outside of the courtroom). 
{¶ 220} Moreover, the trial court’s curative instruction removed any 
prejudice.  See State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, 656 N.E.2d 623 
(jury presumed to follow the trial court’s curative instructions).  Thus, the fact 
that the jury observed appellant handcuffed on one occasion did not deprive him 
of a fair trial.  Accordingly, we find that proposition XVII lacks merit. 
Trial-phase instructions. 
{¶ 221} 1. Instructions on credibility.  In proposition of law IX, 
appellant argues that the trial court’s preliminary instructions on credibility were 
improper.  Trial counsel, however, failed to object and waived all but plain error.  
State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, 
syllabus. 
{¶ 222} During preliminary guilt-phase instructions, the court advised the 
jury:  “The testimony of one witness believed by you is sufficient to prove any 
fact.  Also, discrepancies in a witness’ testimony, or between his testimony and 
that of others, if there are any, does not necessarily mean that you should 
                                                 
1. The jury viewed appellant during the guilt phase of the trial.  Thus, Allen, which considered the 
use of visible shackles during the guilt phase of a criminal trial, is directly on point.  The United 
States Supreme Court also has held that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during 
the penalty phase of a criminal trial.  Deck v. Missouri (2005), ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 
L.Ed.2d 953.   
January Term, 2005 
45 
disbelieve the witness, as people commonly forget facts or recollect them 
erroneously after the passage of time.  You are certainly all aware of the fact that 
two persons who are witnesses to an incident may often see or hear it differently.  
In considering a discrepancy in witness testimony, you should consider whether 
such discrepancy concerns an important fact or a trivial one.”  (Emphasis added.)  
These preliminary instructions on credibility were not repeated during the closing 
instructions. 
{¶ 223} Crim.R. 30(B) permits the trial court to give cautionary jury 
instructions relating to credibility and weight of the evidence.  The preliminary 
instructions clarified the jury’s function in judging credibility and determining the 
weight to assign the testimony.  Moreover, this instruction is virtually identical to 
instructions approved in State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d 197, 2004-Ohio-
7007, 824 N.E.2d 504, ¶ 51-56.  Thus, we find no plain error in these instructions. 
{¶ 224} 2. Duplicative instructions.  In proposition of law XVIII, 
appellant argues that the instructions on the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) escaping-
detection specification and the separate kidnapping and aggravated-robbery 
charges were duplicative and violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict. 
{¶ 225} Appellant’s failure to object to the allegedly duplicative nature of 
the instructions waived all but plain error.  Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 
360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  Moreover, appellant’s proposed instructions 
included language that he now contends was erroneous.  Thus, appellant invited 
any error and may not “ ‘take advantage of an error which he himself invited or 
induced.’ ”  State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 493, 709 N.E.2d 484, quoting 
Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 28 
OBR 83, 502 N.E.2d 590, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Seiber (1990), 
56 Ohio St.3d 4, 17, 564 N.E.2d 408. 
{¶ 226} We reject appellant’s claims on the basis of plain error and 
invited error.  Instructions on the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification referred to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
appellant’s committing the murders for “the purpose of escaping detection, 
apprehension, trial or punishment for kidnapping and/or a theft offense.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Appellant argues that this instruction deprived him of his right 
to a unanimous jury verdict because some of the jurors may have convicted him 
of the (A)(3) specification on the basis of kidnapping and others on the basis of 
aggravated robbery.  The jurors did not convict appellant of the (A)(3) 
specification on alternative theories, because the same jury separately convicted 
him of both kidnapping and aggravated robbery.  Cf. State v. Noling, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 68; State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 646, 664, 693 N.E.2d 246.  Thus, the outcome of appellant’s case would not 
have been different had the instructions been worded differently. 
{¶ 227} On the kidnapping charge, the jury was instructed to determine 
whether “McKnight, by force, threat or deception, did remove Emily Murray from 
the place where she was found or restrain Emily Murray of her liberty for the 
purpose of terrorizing or inflicting serious physical harm on Emily Murray.”  
(Emphasis added.)  On the aggravated-robbery charge, the jury was instructed to 
determine whether appellant “knowingly obtained or exerted control over the 
green Subaru Outback without the consent of the owner or person authorized to 
give consent or by threat.”  (Emphasis added.)  Appellant argues that both sets of 
instructions deprived him of a unanimous jury verdict because the jury was 
instructed on alternative means for committing these offenses. 
{¶ 228} Neither the kidnapping nor the aggravated-robbery instructions 
were improper, because the alternatives were given to the jury disjunctively.  
State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 30, 752 N.E.2d 859; State v. Cook (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 516, 527, 605 N.E.2d 70.  Jurors need not agree on a single means 
for committing these offenses.  The United States Supreme Court has stated, “ 
‘[D]ifferent jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when 
they agree upon the bottom line.  Plainly there is no general requirement that the 
January Term, 2005 
47 
jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.’ 
”  Schad v. Arizona (1991), 501 U.S. 624, 631-632, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 
555, quoting McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), 494 U.S. 433, 449, 110 S.Ct. 
1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
{¶ 229} Based on the foregoing, proposition XVIII is overruled. 
{¶ 230} 3. Instructions on release in a “safe place unharmed.”  In 
proposition of law XX, appellant claims that the kidnapping instructions were 
flawed because of instructions on whether Murray was released “in a safe place 
unharmed.” 
{¶ 231} The indictment charging kidnapping included language that “the 
said Gregory B. McKnight did not release the said Emily S. Murray in a safe 
place unharmed.”  The trial court’s guilt-phase instructions on kidnapping stated, 
“If you find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential 
elements of the offense of kidnapping, your verdict must be guilty.  You must 
then go on to decide whether Emily Murray was or was not released in a safe 
place unharmed.” 
{¶ 232} Although the defense did not object at trial, the defense’s 
proposed instructions on kidnapping omitted the “released unharmed in a safe 
place” from its charge.  Thus, the defense has preserved this issue.  See Brooks, 
75 Ohio St.3d at 160, 661 N.E.2d 1030; State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 
541 N.E.2d 443, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Nevertheless, no prejudicial error 
was committed. 
{¶ 233} Under R.C. 2905.01(C), the offense of kidnapping is generally a 
first-degree felony but may be reduced to a second-degree felony if “the offender 
releases the victim in a safe place unharmed.”  This provision, however, is not an 
element of the offense; rather, the defendant must plead and prove that assertion 
as an affirmative defense.  State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d at 265, 750 N.E.2d 90; 
State v. Cornute (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 199, 18 O.O.3d 152, 412 N.E.2d 416, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
syllabus.  Appellant never argued that Murray was released unharmed in a safe 
place.  Thus, the language was not properly at issue. 
{¶ 234} Appellant argues that the instruction on release in a “safe place 
unharmed” was prejudicial, turning a mitigating circumstance into an aggravating 
element.  That assertion, however, is speculative.  Moreover, overwhelming 
evidence supported the jury’s verdict on the kidnapping and murder charges.  
Consequently, appellant suffered no prejudice by the finding of the jury that 
Murray was not released “in a safe place unharmed.”  Thus, we overrule 
proposition XX. 
{¶ 235} Vagueness challenge.  In proposition of law XIX, appellant 
argues that the term “serious physical harm,” as defined by R.C. 
2901.01(A)(5)(e), is unconstitutionally vague on its face and unconstitutional as 
applied to him. 
{¶ 236} The instructions on “serious physical harm” related to the felony-
murder charge, the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) kidnapping specification, and kidnapping.  
The trial court used the definition of “serious physical harm” set forth in R.C. 
2901.01(A)(5)(b), (c), (d), and (e) in instructing the jury on “serious physical 
harm”:  “ ‘Serious physical harm to persons’ means any physical harm that carries 
a substantial risk of death or any physical harm that involves some permanent 
incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary substantial 
incapacity, or any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or 
that involves some temporary serious disfigurement or any physical harm that 
involves acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering or that 
involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 237} Appellant argues that R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(e) does not give fair 
notice to persons of ordinary intelligence that they might be guilty of kidnapping 
by causing “prolonged or intractable pain” to a victim.  Although appellant did 
not challenge the statute as vague at trial, he argues that the error was not waived 
January Term, 2005 
49 
because the defense submitted a set of properly worded jury instructions.  See 
State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 541 N.E.2d 443, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  The defense’s proposed instructions did not define “serious physical 
harm,” and thus the defense waived this issue absent plain error.  Gross, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 44.  There was no plain error. 
{¶ 238} To withstand a claim of vagueness, a criminal statute must define 
a criminal offense with sufficient clarity for ordinary people to understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.  Akron v. Rowland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 381, 
618 N.E.2d 138, citing Grayned v. Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 
2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222; see, also, Papachristou v. Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 
156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110. 
{¶ 239} R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(e) is not vague on its face, nor is it 
unconstitutional as applied to appellant.  The statute provides a precisely worded 
definition of “serious physical harm to persons” that a person of ordinary 
intelligence can understand. If a person inflicts “[a]ny physical harm that involves 
acute pain [that results] in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of 
prolonged * * * pain,” that person has committed “serious physical harm.”  R.C. 
2901.01(A)(5)(e).  Further, the statute does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.  State v. Morris (Nov. 13, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 
51279, 1986 WL 12861, at *3-4 (ruling that the definition of “serious physical 
harm” was not constitutionally vague).  Thus, we reject proposition XIX. 
Penalty-phase Issues 
{¶ 240} Victim testimony for life sentence.  In proposition of law XXII, 
appellant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to 
allow Murray’s family members and friends to testify that he should receive a life 
sentence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
{¶ 241} Before the penalty phase, the defense requested a continuance to 
develop testimony that Murray’s family members wanted appellant to receive a 
life sentence.  An affidavit from Kathleen Murray, the victim’s sister, requested a 
life sentence because of the family’s following concerns: a death sentence would 
result in appeals that would continue to cause pain to the family, Emily would not 
have wanted appellant to receive the death penalty, and appellant should not 
receive the death penalty for the sake of his own children.  In denying the defense 
motion, the trial court held that “the position of the victim’s family as to the death 
penalty is not a relevant mitigating factor.” 
{¶ 242} Additional requests that appellant receive a life sentence were 
submitted to the trial court before sentencing and included a statement from the 
victim’s parents and letters and e-mails from several of Murray’s friends.  The 
trial court did not consider these statements in sentencing appellant. 
{¶ 243} First, appellant argues that proposed testimony from Murray’s 
family members recommending that he receive a life sentence was linked to his 
“history” and “background” and therefore admissible under R.C. 2929.04(B).  
Such testimony had no bearing on appellant’s history, character, or background.  
Similarly, sentencing recommendations from Murray’s family members did not 
constitute relevant mitigation under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), which encompasses 
“[a]ny other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should 
be sentenced to death.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 244} Other jurisdictions that have considered the admissibility of 
sentencing recommendations opposing the death penalty from a victim’s family 
members have reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g., Robison v. Maynard 
(C.A.10, 1991), 943 F.2d 1216, 1217-1218 (opinion of victim’s relative irrelevant 
to jury’s determination of whether death penalty should be imposed); 
Commonwealth v. Bomar (2003), 573 Pa. 426, 460-461, 826 A.2d 831 (testimony 
of victim’s mother opposing the death penalty irrelevant to the defendant’s 
January Term, 2005 
51 
character, record, or circumstances of the crime); Ware v. State (2000), 360 Md. 
650, 691, 759 A.2d 764 (testimony that victim’s family does not wish death 
sentence imposed has no bearing on defendant’s character, prior record, or 
circumstances of the offense); State v. Bowman (1998), 349 N.C. 459, 478, 509 
S.E.2d 428 (“conflicting feelings” of victim’s mother regarding death penalty not 
relevant); State v. Pirtle (1995) 127 Wash.2d 628, 671, 904 P.2d 245 (victim’s 
essay stating general opposition to death penalty inadmissible because it was not 
pertinent to extenuating circumstances or defendant’s moral culpability). 
{¶ 245} Furthermore, appellant’s constitutional rights were not violated 
by the exclusion of testimony from Murray’s family members recommending that 
appellant receive a life sentence.  In Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 98 
S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, a plurality of the court held that a jury should “not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 604, 98 
S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973.  It noted, however, that “[n]othing in this opinion 
limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not 
bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his 
offense.”  Id. at 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, fn. 12.  Here, possible 
testimony from Murray’s family members recommending a life sentence had no 
relevance to appellant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of the 
offense. 
{¶ 246} Second, 
appellant 
contends 
that 
the 
life-sentence 
recommendations from Murray’s family were admissible as victim-impact 
testimony.  This argument also lacks merit. 
{¶ 247} In State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 
syllabus, this court held, “Expressions of opinion by a witness as to the 
appropriateness of a particular sentence in a capital case violate the defendant’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
constitutional right to have the sentencing decision made by the jury and judge.”  
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court held, “[I]f the State chooses to 
permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on 
that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.”  Payne v. Tennessee 
(1991), 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, overruling Booth v. 
Maryland (1987), 482 U.S. 496, 507, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (victim-
impact evidence inadmissible at sentencing phase of capital trial unless directly 
related to circumstances of crime), and South Carolina v. Gathers (1989), 490 
U.S. 805, 811, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (extending Booth to prohibit 
prosecutor’s statements regarding personal characteristics of victim).  Payne did 
not reexamine the propriety of victims’ families’ recommendations as to the 
appropriate sentence or sanction their admission.  See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830, 111 
S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, fn. 2. 
{¶ 248} Since Payne, this court has adhered to Huertas and “prohibited 
the admission of witnesses’ opinions as to the appropriateness of a particular 
sentence.”  Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 487, 739 N.E.2d 749; State v. Franklin, 97 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 88 (holding that a “victim’s 
family may not recommend a sentence in a capital case”).  Thus, the 
recommendations of the Murray family concerning the appropriate sentence were 
not admissible as victim-impact testimony. 
{¶ 249} Finally, we find that the trial court did not err by failing to 
consider the recommendations from Murray’s family and friends before imposing 
the death sentence.  Cf. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 
26, ¶ 88 (sentencing recommendation from victim’s family not reversible error 
unless the judge actually considered it in sentencing the defendant to death). 
{¶ 250} Based on the foregoing, proposition XXII is overruled. 
Penalty-phase Instructions 
January Term, 2005 
53 
{¶ 251} 1. Instructions on “superaggravating” circumstance.  In 
proposition of law XXI, appellant argues that the instructions of the trial court 
improperly merged aggravating circumstances under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and 
2929.04(A)(5) into one “superaggravating” circumstance. 
{¶ 252} During preliminary penalty-phase instructions, the jury was 
advised that the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) kidnapping and aggravated-robbery 
aggravating circumstances and the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) course-of-conduct 
aggravating circumstance were recounted as a single aggravating circumstance.2  
The trial court later instructed the jury to consider the kidnapping, aggravated 
robbery, and course-of-conduct specifications as three separate aggravating 
circumstances. 
{¶ 253} During final instructions, the jury was again instructed that there 
was a single aggravating circumstance:  “In the first phase of this trial, you found 
Gregory B. McKnight guilty of one count of aggravated murder during the 
commission of kidnapping.  You also found him guilty of specifications of 
aggravating circumstances.  There were four of them, but to ensure that the 
weighing process is not influenced by mere numbers, the aggravating 
circumstances of which you found Gregory B. McKnight guilty have been merged 
into one aggravating circumstance.  It is as follows:  The aggravated murder was 
committed while Gregory B. McKnight was committing or attempting to commit 
or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and 
aggravated robbery of Emily S. Murray and Gregory B. McKnight was the 
principal offender, and the aggravated murder was part of a course of conduct by 
Gregory B. McKnight involving killing two or more persons.” 
                                                 
2.  The R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) escaping-detection aggravating circumstance was merged into the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) kidnapping and robbery aggravating circumstances. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
54 
{¶ 254} R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) specifies that the jury shall recommend a 
sentence of death “[i]f the trial jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found 
guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors.”  Moreover, “ ‘the 
“aggravating circumstances” against which the mitigating evidence is to be 
weighed are limited to the specifications of aggravating circumstances set forth in 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(1) through (8) that have been alleged in the indictment and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  Green, 90 Ohio St.3d at 360-361, 738 
N.E.2d 1208, quoting State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 
311, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Accord State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 
20, 544 N.E.2d 895, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 255} We find that the two R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5) aggravating circumstances were not duplicative, and they should 
not have been merged into a single aggravating circumstance, because the jury 
was obligated to “separately weigh the aggravating circumstances” of each count 
against the mitigating factors.  (Emphasis added.)  State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 
354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 96; see, also, State v. Keith (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 514, 532, 684 N.E.2d 47. 
{¶ 256} The error, however, was not prejudicial.  Grouping the 
aggravating circumstances did not alter their substance.  The trial court advised 
the jury that the aggravating circumstances were merged into a single aggravating 
circumstance “to ensure that the weighing process is not influenced by mere 
numbers.”  Cf. State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 115, 684 N.E.2d 668.  
Moreover, we have independently reevaluated the sentence and thereby rectify 
any error in the merger of the aggravating circumstances.  State v. Twyford, 94 
Ohio St.3d at 352, 763 N.E.2d 122; Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d at 527, 605 N.E.2d 70. 
{¶ 257} Based on the foregoing, proposition XXI is rejected. 
January Term, 2005 
55 
{¶ 258} 2. Instructions on mitigating factors and readmitted 
evidence.  In proposition of law XXIII, appellant alleges two errors in the 
penalty-phase instructions. 
{¶ 259} First, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to 
instruct the jury that it did not have to unanimously find mitigating factors.  See 
Mills v. Maryland (1988), 486 U.S. 367, 383, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 
(jury may not be instructed that it must unanimously agree on a mitigating factor 
before that factor may be weighed against an aggravating circumstance).  
Appellant did not request that the court instruct the jury that it need not 
unanimously find mitigating circumstances and thus waived all but plain error.  
Crim.R. 30(A); State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 
804, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  Appellant cites no instructional 
language that “could reasonably be taken to require unanimity as to the presence 
of a mitigating factor.”  Coe v. Bell (C.A.6, 1998), 161 F.3d 320, 338.  Because 
the jury was not so instructed, Mills was not violated.  See Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 
at 268, 750 N.E.2d 90; State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 129, 694 N.E.2d 
916.  Thus, there was no plain error. 
{¶ 260} Second, appellant contends that the trial court erred by 
readmitting all the guilt-phase evidence during the penalty phase and then 
advising the jury to “consider all of the testimony and evidence relevant to the 
aggravating circumstance Gregory B. McKnight was found guilty of committing.”  
Appellant failed to object and waived all but plain error.  See Underwood, 3 Ohio 
St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus. 
{¶ 261} To the extent that the jury may have interpreted the instructions 
as allowing them to determine relevancy, the trial court erred.  It is “the trial 
court’s responsibility to determine the admissibility of evidence.”  State v. Getsy 
(1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 201, 702 N.E.2d 866.  Nevertheless, much of the guilt-
phase evidence was relevant to the aggravating circumstances, the nature and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
circumstances of the offense, and the mitigating factors.  Further, properly 
admitted evidence supports the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating factors.  See State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-
Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 208.  Thus, we find that the trial court’s 
misstatement did not result in plain error.  Proposition XXIII is rejected. 
{¶ 262} Life-sentence options.  In proposition of law XXIV, appellant 
argues that the penalty-phase instructions and the language of the verdict forms 
improperly placed the burden of proof on the defense for the life-sentence 
options. 
{¶ 263} The defense failed to object to these instructions and verdict 
forms and waived all but plain error.  Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 
444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  Moreover, the defense-proposed jury instructions on 
the life-sentence options included language almost identical to that on the verdict 
forms.  Appellant cannot complain, because he invited any error.  Bey, 85 Ohio 
St.3d at 493, 709 N.E.2d 484; Seiber, 56 Ohio St.3d at 17, 564 N.E.2d 408. 
{¶ 264} Additionally, there was no plain error.  The trial court instructed 
the jury:  “If all twelve of you find that the State of Ohio proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt * * * that the aggravating circumstance * * * is sufficient to 
outweigh the mitigating factors in this case, then it will be your duty to decide that 
the sentence of death shall be imposed on Gregory B. McKnight. 
{¶ 265} “If you find that the State of Ohio has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance Gregory B. McKnight was 
guilty of committing is sufficient to outweigh the mitigating facts present in this 
case, then it will be your duty to decide which of the * * * life sentence 
alternatives should be imposed[.] * * * 
{¶ 266} “If the weight of the aggravating circumstance and mitigating 
factors are equal, then you must proceed to consider the life sentence alternatives.  
You are not required to unanimously find that the State failed to prove that the 
January Term, 2005 
57 
aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors before considering one 
of the life sentence alternatives.” 
{¶ 267} The language in the verdict forms tracked these instructions.  The 
three verdict forms presenting life sentence options stated:  “We, the jury, being 
duly impaneled and sworn, do hereby find that the aggravating circumstance that 
Gregory B. McKnight was found guilty of committing, does not outweigh the 
mitigating factors presented in this case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
The verdict forms then provided the jury with the options of life imprisonment 
with parole, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 30 years, or 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years. 
{¶ 268} The instructions and the language of the verdict forms for the 
life-sentence options did not place the burden of proof on the defense.  When read 
as a whole, the instructions of the trial court and the language of the verdict forms 
effectively informed the jury that a death-penalty recommendation could be 
returned only after a unanimous vote that the aggravating circumstance 
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Davis 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 117, 666 N.E.2d 1099.  As to the life-sentence options, 
the instructions and the language of the verdict forms simply instructed the jury 
that it must decide among the life-sentence options if it found that the state had 
failed to prove that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
factors.  See State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 29, 676 N.E.2d 82.  We 
reject proposition XXIV. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
{¶ 269} In proposition of law XXVII, appellant argues that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by making prejudicial statements during both phases of the 
trial.  The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the remarks were improper 
and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the accused.  
State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14-15, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
58 
The touchstone for analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 
L.Ed.2d 78. 
{¶ 270} Victim-impact evidence and argument.  Appellant recasts his 
objections to victim-impact and character evidence into claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Specifically, appellant maintains that the prosecutor erred by 
presenting testimony about Murray’s character and the impact of her death on 
friends and family.  He also argues that the prosecutor’s opening statement and 
final argument commenting on the character and victim-impact evidence 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct.  Appellant failed to object and waived all 
but plain error.  See State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 
N.E.2d 1244, paragraph one of the syllabus.  As discussed earlier in proposition 
III, we conclude that the prosecutor’s comments and presentation of testimony 
were not plain error. 
{¶ 271} Other-acts evidence.  First, appellant argues that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by eliciting testimony that the police went to appellant’s 
trailer to serve him with an indictment for burglary.  Defense counsel failed to 
object and waived all but plain error.  See Wade, 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 
362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 272} During direct examination, Vinton County Chief Deputy Sheriff 
Charles Boyer explained how Murray’s car was found at appellant’s trailer: 
{¶ 273} “Q:  Okay.  Now, let’s rewind a minute here.  You talked to Matt 
Kight; you told him to return to a scene.  What scene are we talking about? 
{¶ 274} “A:  On Clark Road, the McKnight residence. 
{¶ 275} “Q:  Okay.  And the vehicle that you’re talking about, tell us the 
circumstances surrounding why you were asking the deputy to go back and 
recheck this vehicle. 
January Term, 2005 
59 
{¶ 276} “A:  Well, * * * we had the indictment on Mr. McKnight on the 
burglary, he had made a statement about people from New York being involved— 
{¶ 277} “Q:  Okay, let me stop you there. 
{¶ 278} “* * * 
{¶ 279} “(Counsel approached the bench and the following proceedings 
were had out of the hearing of the jury:) 
{¶ 280} “Mr. Canepa:  With the Court’s permission, I’d like to be able to 
advise Deputy Boyer to not discuss any further the burglary or the indictment.  
I’ve been trying to avoid it, but obviously — 
{¶ 281} “Mr. Carson:  I didn’t object, because it just draws more 
attention to it * * *. 
{¶ 282} “Mr. Canepa:  Right.  I’m going to advise him to stay away from 
that.  At this juncture, if you can think of a curative instruction, I would not be 
opposed to that. 
{¶ 283} “Mr. Carson:  I think I would almost prefer to let it go, because I 
think it just draws more attention back to it.” 
{¶ 284} Boyer then finished testifying without any further reference to an 
indictment for burglary. 
{¶ 285} There was no plain error.  Boyer’s reference to the uncharged 
burglary indictment was isolated and of relatively minor significance given the 
gravity of the offenses for which appellant was being tried.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor took immediate steps to ensure that Boyer’s inadvertent comments 
were not repeated.  Cf. State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 161, 749 
N.E.2d 226 (improper testimony about defendant’s failure to pay child support 
was not plain error). 
{¶ 286} Second, appellant argues that the prosecutor misbehaved by 
introducing testimony about appellant’s marital infidelities and then referring to 
that testimony during closing argument.  As discussed in proposition III, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
60 
testimony of appellant’s co-workers Amber Hammers and Gloria Ressler helped 
establish appellant’s plan by modus operandi evidence under Evid.R. 404(B).  
Testimony that appellant and Lisa Perkins had had sex in his car and that he spent 
evenings with Perkins at Dana Bostic’s home was improper.  Nevertheless, the 
error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt.  
See State v. Williams (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 346, 351, 528 N.E.2d 910. 
{¶ 287} Finally, appellant correctly points out that the prosecutor 
improperly introduced evidence of his reaction to the presence of the police.  As 
discussed in proposition of law III, appellant’s reaction to the police occurred 
before he murdered either Julious or Murray and thus was inadmissible.  We find 
that the testimony was harmless error. 
{¶ 288} Guilt-phase argument.  Appellant argues that various aspects of 
the prosecutor’s guilt-phase argument resulted in prosecutorial misconduct.  The 
defense failed to object and waived all but plain error.  See Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 
at 604–605, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶ 289} First, appellant asserts that the prosecutor acted improperly when 
he speculated about what was in Murray’s mind.  Testimony was introduced that 
Murray returned to her dorm room on the night she disappeared and got her keys.  
The prosecutor argued that this was for the purpose of “giving Greg a ride home 
to Met O Wood Lane in Gambier, not to Vinton County. That’s what was in 
Emily’s mind.”  This argument represented fair comment on the evidence and was 
not plain error. 
{¶ 290} Second, appellant argues that the prosecutor’s rebuttal 
improperly responded to defense arguments.  During closing argument, trial 
counsel discussed the state’s failure to test the DNA of blood found on the .357 
Ruger that had belonged to Kimberly Zimmerman, the sister of Kathy McKnight.  
Counsel argued that even though “the gun was ruled out as the possible gun used 
in Emily Murray’s case, why wouldn’t [the police] check it for Julious?”  
January Term, 2005 
61 
According to the defense, the failure to conduct DNA testing was “a colossal 
blunder, * * * a deliberate act, and it ought to make you sick.” 
{¶ 291} In rebuttal, the prosecutor reminded the jury, “This gun was 
tested ballistically.  This gun was not the murder weapon that was held up to 
Emily Murray’s head and shot through her skull.”  The prosecutor then argued, 
“How does this blow the whole case out of the water?  It doesn’t, not at all.  This 
gun was at the Zimmermans’ in May.  ‘Now, it wasn’t tested, so that means that 
Kim Zimmerman did it, ha-ha.’  Guess who else lived with the Zimmermans in 
May of 2000?  This guy.” 
{¶ 292} The defense opened the door to the prosecutor’s rebuttal.  The 
prosecutor’s comment that the .357 Ruger was not linked to Murray’s murder 
explained the absence of DNA testing of blood on the weapon.  Furthermore, the 
prosecutor’s statement that the failure to conduct DNA testing did not exculpate 
appellant as to the murder of Julious was not improper.  This was fair comment in 
the face of the defense argument that the state’s failure to conduct DNA testing 
was a “colossal blunder” and a “deliberate act.”  Moreover, “[p]rosecutors are 
entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has shown and what inferences can 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”  State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 
111, 684 N.E.2d 668.  Thus, we find no plain error. 
{¶ 293} Third, appellant argues that the prosecutor misbehaved during his 
rebuttal argument by asking the jury, “Why didn’t [the defense] present any 
witnesses?”  According to appellant, the prosecutor’s comment attempted to shift 
the burden of proof to the defense.  The prosecutor may comment upon the failure 
of the defense to offer evidence in support of its case.  State v. Clemons (1998), 
82 Ohio St.3d 438, 452, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Bies (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
320, 326, 658 N.E.2d 754.  Moreover, “[s]uch comments do not imply that the 
burden of proof has shifted to the defense, nor do they necessarily constitute a 
penalty on the defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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silent.”  State v. Collins (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 524, 527-528, 733 N.E.2d 1118.  
Again, there was no plain error. 
{¶ 294} Penalty-phase opening statement.  Appellant argues that the 
prosecutor improperly informed the jury that the escaping-detection aggravating 
circumstance was one of the four aggravating circumstances for the jury’s 
consideration on sentencing, despite the trial judge’s ruling that this aggravating 
circumstance had merged with the others. 
{¶ 295} During penalty-phase opening statement, the prosecutor advised 
the jury that there were four aggravating circumstances and that the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3) specification was one of the aggravating circumstances.  Following 
a defense objection, the trial court informed the parties that the (A)(3) 
specification was duplicative of the (A)(7) specifications.  The trial court then 
advised the jury that the (A)(3) specification had been merged.  Thereafter, the 
prosecutor avoided any reference to the (A)(3) specification as part of the 
aggravating circumstance. 
{¶ 296} Nothing indicates that the prosecutor’s isolated reference to the 
(A)(3) specification was intentional.  See State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d at 436, 
588 N.E.2d 819, quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 646, 
94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (“ ‘[i]solated passages of a prosecutor’s argument, 
billed in advance to the jury as a matter of opinion[,] not of evidence, do not 
reach’ the level of a due process violation”).  Moreover, the trial court 
subsequently instructed the jury that the (A)(3) specification was merged.  Thus 
there was no prejudicial error as the result of the prosecutor’s comments. 
{¶ 297} Penalty-phase closing argument.  Appellant contends that the 
prosecutor also misbehaved by referring to him as a lying, cheating husband.  
Trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument waived all but plain 
error.  See Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d at 604–605, 605 N.E.2d 916.  There was no plain 
error. 
January Term, 2005 
63 
{¶ 298} The prosecutor’s closing argument did not present the theme that 
appellant was a lying and cheating husband.  The prosecutor argued that appellant 
had failed to take responsibility for the health and welfare of his two children; 
however, the defense had opened the door to that argument after Copley testified 
during mitigation that appellant was “a very caring, loving father.” 
{¶ 299} Finally, we also reject appellant’s argument that the prosecutor’s 
cumulative misconduct prejudiced him.  Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 113, 559 
N.E.2d 710.  Based on the foregoing, we find that proposition XXVII lacks merit. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶ 300} In proposition of law XXVI, appellant raises numerous instances 
of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during both phases of his trial.  
Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel “requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 301} First, appellant complains that his counsel conducted inadequate 
voir dire of a prospective juror.  “ ‘The conduct of voir dire by defense counsel 
does not have to take a particular form, nor do specific questions have to be 
asked.’ ”  State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 568, 715 N.E.2d 1144, 
quoting State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042. 
{¶ 302} Appellant argues that counsel was deficient in failing to question 
Juror I-30 about her opinion regarding appellant’s guilt after Juror I-30 indicated 
her belief in the juror questionnaire that appellant was guilty of the charged 
offenses.  One question in the juror questionnaire asked, “Based on what you may 
have heard about this case, do you have an impression or opinion about what 
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happened or who is responsible?”  Juror I-30 answered “yes” and explained, “In 
the case of the death of the girl, I believe the body was found on his premises, 
although this does not mean he did it, it doesn’t look good for him.” 
{¶ 303} Juror I-30’s response on the questionnaire did not indicate that 
she had formed a preconceived belief of appellant’s guilt.  Moreover, Juror I-30 
indicated that she had not formed an opinion about “who or what” caused the 
death of Julious or Murray in other responses on the questionnaire. 
{¶ 304} Moreover, during the prosecutor’s voir dire, Juror I-30 was asked 
whether she had formed any opinions about the case, and Juror I-30 answered, 
“Not necessarily.  No.”  As noted in State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 13, 
572 N.E.2d 97, defense counsel “need not repeat questions about topics already 
covered by * * * opposing counsel.”  Furthermore, “counsel is in the best position 
to determine whether any potential juror should be questioned and to what 
extent.”  State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 539, 747 N.E.2d 765.  Thus, 
the defense counsel was neither remiss nor ineffective. 
{¶ 305} Appellant raises other instances of alleged ineffectiveness of 
counsel, but none prejudiced him.  As discussed in other propositions of law, 
appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to request the removal of an 
alleged sleeping juror (proposition XI), or by counsel’s failure to request a 
Remmer hearing to explore allegations that a juror had discussed the case with his 
girlfriend (XIII).  Furthermore, appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s 
failure to request curative instructions following a courtroom outburst (XVI), or 
by his counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct (XXVII), gruesome 
photographs (XII), life-sentence options on the verdict forms (XXIV), or 
character and impact testimony about Murray (III).  Appellant also suffered no 
prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to various guilt-phase (IX, XVIII, 
XX, and XXIX) and penalty-phase (XXIII and XXIX) instructions.  Moreover, 
appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to request that evidence be 
January Term, 2005 
65 
stricken that related to appellant’s marital infidelities or his reaction to the police 
prior to the date of the offenses (III). 
{¶ 306} We also reject appellant’s argument that his counsel was 
ineffective by waiving appellant’s presence at in-chambers proceedings without 
consulting him.  Appellant personally waived his presence at in-chambers 
proceedings, and this waiver was valid for the two in-chambers proceedings that 
he challenged (XIV). 
{¶ 307} Finally, appellant argues that the cumulative effect of his 
counsel’s ineffectiveness necessitates reversal.  Appellant received a fair trial, and 
any error was nonprejudicial.  See Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 
785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 123.  None of appellant’s claims establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and proposition XXVI is overruled. 
Settled Issues 
{¶ 308} Reasonable doubt.  In proposition of law XXIX, appellant 
challenges the constitutionality of the instructions on reasonable doubt during 
both phases of the trial.  We have previously rejected similar arguments and 
summarily overrule them here.  See State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 347, 
744 N.E.2d 1163. 
{¶ 309} Constitutionality.  In proposition of law XXX, appellant attacks 
the constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty statutes.  This claim has also been 
resolved.  See State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 607, 734 N.E.2d 345; 
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 310} Appellant also argues that Ohio’s death-penalty statutes violate 
international agreements to which the United States is a party.  We also reject this 
argument.  Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d at 502, 709 N.E.2d 484; Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 
103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
Sentencing Opinion 
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{¶ 311} In proposition of law XXV, appellant asserts that there are 
numerous flaws in the sentencing opinion of the trial court. 
{¶ 312} First, appellant argues that the sentencing opinion of the trial 
court improperly considered the kidnapping and aggravated-robbery aggravating 
circumstances, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and the course-of-conduct aggravating 
circumstance, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), as one “superaggravating” circumstance.  As 
discussed earlier in proposition XXI, the trial court erred by combining the two 
nonduplicative aggravating circumstances into a single aggravating circumstance.  
We have independently reevaluated the sentence and rectified this error in our 
sentencing evaluation.  See State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 191, 631 
N.E.2d 124; State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 170, 555 N.E.2d 293. 
{¶ 313} Second, appellant contends that the trial court considered the 
following nonstatutory aggravating circumstances as aggravating factors: his use 
of a firearm, his failure to release Murray in a “safe place and unharmed,” and his 
concealment of Murray’s body “such that Emily remained missing for 36 days.”  
We reject this argument because “[u]nder R.C. 2929.03(F), a trial court * * * may 
rely upon and cite the nature and circumstances of the offense as reasons 
supporting its finding that the aggravating circumstances were sufficient to 
outweigh the mitigating factors.”  State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 512 
N.E.2d 598, paragraph one of the syllabus; see, also, Dickerson, 45 Ohio St.3d at 
212, 543 N.E.2d 1250. 
{¶ 314} Third, appellant asserts that the trial court improperly considered 
the “intentional killing” of Murray during a kidnapping.  The trial court could 
properly refer to the “intentional killing” of Murray in discussing the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance because intent is an element of the 
underlying felony murder.  See State v Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 345, 
738 N.E.2d 1178. 
January Term, 2005 
67 
{¶ 315} Finally, appellant argues that the trial court misconstrued the 
mitigating factors as evidence offered to reduce his culpability for the crimes.  
“Mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B) are not necessarily related to a 
defendant’s culpability but, rather, are those factors that are relevant to the issue 
of whether an offender convicted under R.C. 2903.01 should be sentenced to 
death.”  State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 527 N.E.2d 831, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 316} The sentencing opinion thoroughly discussed the mitigating 
evidence in appellant’s case.  The trial court also properly stated that the 
“aggravating circumstance must * * * be weighed against the mitigating factors 
about the individual which would weigh in favor of a decision that a life 
imprisonment sentence is the appropriate sentence.”  Thus, the trial court used the 
proper standard in weighing the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating 
factors.  Nevertheless, the trial court improperly concluded that “the mitigating 
factors * * * have very little effect in minimizing, lessening or excusing the 
degree of the Defendant’s murderous conduct.”  Again, we have independently 
reevaluated the sentence and rectified this error in the sentencing opinion.  Fox, 
69 Ohio St.3d at 191, 631 N.E.2d 124. 
{¶ 317} Based on the foregoing, we find that proposition XXV lacks 
merit. 
Cumulative Errors 
{¶ 318} In proposition of law IV, appellant argues that cumulative trial 
errors deprived him of a fair trial and mandate a reversal of his death sentence.  
We conclude that appellant received a fair trial and fair sentencing determination 
and that no significant cumulative error occurred.  We reject proposition IV. 
Weighing the Evidence and Proportionality 
{¶ 319} In proposition of law XXVIII, appellant argues that the death 
penalty must be vacated because the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh 
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the mitigating factors.  He also argues that the death penalty is disproportionate 
when his case is compared to similar cases in which the death penalty has been 
imposed.  We will consider these arguments during our independent sentence 
evaluation. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶ 320} Having considered appellant’s propositions of law, as required 
by R.C. 2929.05(A), we now independently review appellant’s death sentence for 
appropriateness and proportionality.  The evidence established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant was properly convicted of a course of conduct in 
killing Murray and Julious and murder while committing or attempting to commit 
kidnapping and aggravated robbery. R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) and (A)(7). 
{¶ 321} Against these aggravating circumstances, we now weigh the 
mitigating factors contained in R.C. 2929.04(B).  Appellant called two mitigation 
witnesses but did not make a statement on his own behalf. 
{¶ 322} Kathy McKnight, the defendant’s wife, testified that she and 
appellant were married on May 22, 1998.  Appellant has supported his family 
through a variety of jobs “from selling cars to being a delivery person.” 
{¶ 323} The McKnights have two small children, Kachina and Keena.  
Appellant has a “great relationship” with his children and calls them his little 
prince and little princess.  Appellant’s children visited appellant in jail whenever 
they could.  According to Kathy, their daughter “beams for days after going to see 
daddy, and every time [they] get into the car, she wants to know if [they’re] going 
to see daddy again.” 
{¶ 324} Emma Copley, the defendant’s mother-in-law, described 
appellant as “a very caring, loving father” to the children.  Appellant “plays with 
them * * * [and has] taken them to carnivals and that sort of thing, a very loving, 
trusting father.” 
January Term, 2005 
69 
{¶ 325} Appellant and Kathy moved to Gambier to take care of Copley 
when she was having medical problems.  Copley said that appellant was “very 
supportive, very helpful, always there.”  On one occasion, appellant kissed 
Copley on the forehead while she was in the hospital for some tests. Copley stated 
that “that proves what a caring, loving son-in-law he has been.” 
{¶ 326} In proposition of law XXVIII, appellant argues that his “support 
for and devotion to family, the love and support of his family members, his age, 
and his employment history are significant and should be given considerable 
weight.” 
{¶ 327} We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offenses 
to be mitigating.  Appellant kidnapped Murray, stole her car, and then brutally 
murdered Murray inside his trailer.  Murray’s murder was part of a course of 
conduct during which appellant had previously murdered Julious. 
{¶ 328} Appellant’s history and background provide some mitigating 
features.  Appellant has a loving family.  Appellant’s employment history also 
shows that he held several jobs. 
{¶ 329} We find that the following statutory mitigating factors are 
inapplicable:  R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, 
or strong provocation); (B)(3) (mental disease or defect); and (B)(6) (not principal 
offender).  Appellant does not assert the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) (lack of a significant 
criminal record) mitigating factor, nor is there any evidence that the (B)(5) 
mitigating factor applies. 
{¶ 330} We find that the R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) mitigating factor (youth of 
the offender) is applicable but entitled to little weight because appellant was 23 
years of age at the time of the offenses.  State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-
Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 197; Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 306, 754 N.E.2d 
1150. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 331} We also conclude that little weight should be given to mitigating 
factors under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) (other relevant factors).  The evidence includes 
testimony that appellant was a good father and has the support of a loving family.  
We also give little weight, if any, to appellant’s brief employment history.  The 
evidence does not suggest any other (B)(7) mitigating factors. 
{¶ 332} The trial court properly merged the (A)(3) aggravating 
circumstance with the (A)(7) aggravating circumstances prior to sentencing.  The 
trial court erred by merging the two separate (A)(7) aggravating circumstances 
into a single aggravating circumstance. 
{¶ 333} Upon independent weighing, we find that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Appellant’s family history and his brief employment record are entitled to some 
consideration.  These factors, however, are outweighed by the aggravating 
circumstances of appellant’s course of conduct in killing Murray and Julious and 
his kidnapping of Murray and the robbery of her car.  Therefore, we find that the 
death sentence in this case is appropriate. 
{¶ 334} Finally, we find that the death penalty is proportionate to death 
sentences approved in similar cases.  For other course-of-conduct murders, see 
State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 819 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 182; 
State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 130; 
State v Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 145.  
For kidnapping murders, see State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 
823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 204; Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 306, 754 N.E.2d 1150; State v. 
Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 258, 667 N.E.2d 369.  For aggravated-robbery 
murders, see State v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, 
109; State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 453, 751 N.E.2d 946; State v. 
Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 301, 731 N.E.2d 159. 
January Term, 2005 
71 
{¶ 335} Accordingly, appellant’s convictions and sentences, including 
the sentence of death, are affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 336} I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the murder 
convictions and the sentence of death. I disagree with the determination of the 
majority that sufficient evidence exists to convict McKnight for a course-of-
conduct specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 
{¶ 337} I agree that the passage of five and one-half months between the 
two murders does not necessarily invalidate the course-of-conduct conviction. 
Nevertheless, “ ‘[t]he further apart the acts are temporally, the more incumbent it 
is upon a court to carefully consider other factors * * * in determining whether the 
acts * * * are part of a course of conduct.’ ” State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 
2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 56, quoting State v. Cummings (1992), 332 
N.C. 487, 510, 422 S.E.2d 692. Because a significant period of time elapsed 
between the two murders, evidence of “other factors,” such as modus operandi 
and motive, must exist. 
{¶ 338} No distinctive modus operandi linked the murders of Murray and 
Julious. Both Murray and Julious were shot in the head, and their bodies were 
disposed of on McKnight’s remote homesite; however, no other “ ‘pattern or 
psychological thread * * * ties [the offenses] together.’ ” Id. at ¶ 52, quoting 
Cummings, 332 N.C. at 510, 422 S.E.2d 692. By way of comparison, in Sapp, 
each of the victims was raped and left nude from the waist down, and the victims’ 
pants were cut open in a distinctive way. Id. at ¶ 59. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 339} Moreover, no evidence of a common motive links the murders of 
Murray and Julious. Murray was murdered as part of a kidnapping and robbery. 
There is no evidence that Julious’s murder was motivated by similar secondary 
crimes. In contrast, in Sapp, there was a common motive linking the murders. 
Sapp murdered each victim to gratify his recurring “taste for blood.” Id. at ¶ 60. 
Furthermore, Sapp murdered his victims after he perceived that they had each 
provoked him. Id. 
{¶ 340} Though similarities exist between the two murders, there was no 
common scheme or pattern that tied the aggravated murders of Julious and 
Murray together. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
common pleas and vacate McKnight’s conviction for a course-of-conduct 
specification. I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion, which affirms the 
convictions for murder and the sentence of death. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 341} That Gregory McKnight killed Gregory Julious and Emily 
Murray was proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.  I concur in upholding 
both murder convictions.  I also join the Chief Justice’s separate opinion, which 
explains why  the two murders were not part of a course of conduct.  I write 
separately because the record does not contain proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that McKnight kidnapped Murray or that he committed aggravated robbery. 
{¶ 342} The majority states, “The state proved that [McKnight] 
kidnapped Murray by showing that Murray and [McKnight] left work at 
approximately the same time on the night Murray disappeared, that Murray’s car 
was found parked behind [McKnight’s] trailer, and that Murray’s murdered body 
was found rolled in a carpet inside [McKnight’s] trailer.”  None of this evidence 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that McKnight “by force, threat, or deception * 
January Term, 2005 
73 
* * remove[d Murray] from the place where [she was] found or restrain[ed her] 
liberty.”  R.C. 2905.01(A).  The majority also states that “the evidence proved 
that Murray did not have her wallet, driver’s license, and credit cards when she 
disappeared and that Murray did not tell anyone she was leaving the area, despite 
her habit of informing friends of her whereabouts.”  But this evidence doesn’t 
prove “force, threat, or deception.”  Further, this evidence suggests that Murray 
may have voluntarily given McKnight a ride home, as his co-workers sometimes 
did.  (The record does not indicate that McKnight’s co-workers ever gave him a 
ride to Vinton County.)  As further proof of kidnapping, the majority states that 
“[McKnight] lied when Murray’s friend asked about her, and [McKnight] also 
told a co-worker that she was ‘probably dead.’ ”  This evidence suggests nothing 
as to kidnapping; it is certainly damning evidence, but only as to murder.  Finally, 
as further proof of kidnapping, the majority states, “[McKnight] also falsely told 
Kimberly Zimmerman that the Subaru behind his trailer belonged to his boss or a 
friend, ‘and they were down there probably hunting.’ ”  Again, this evidence 
suggests nothing as to kidnapping. 
{¶ 343} “Other acts” testimony was admitted into evidence to prove 
McKnight’s motive, opportunity, intent or purpose or plan to commit kidnapping. 
The evidence established that McKnight often needed a ride home from work and 
that he had a penchant for seeking extramarital sex.  Calling these behavioral 
patterns a “modus operandi” is a significant stretch.  This evidence should have 
been excluded because “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.”  Evid.R. 403(A).  There is little to no probative value 
given the overwhelming evidence of murder and the absence of evidence of 
kidnapping.  Further, the prejudicial effect is significant because of the 
opprobrium that a jury is likely to feel toward a serial adulterer, instructions to the 
contrary notwithstanding.  That McKnight sought lovers seems a thin reed on 
which to base a kidnapping conviction. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
74 
{¶ 344} The majority discusses kidnapping only in the context of the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  I agree that there is sufficient evidence to crest that 
low threshold.  Affirming a death specification, however, requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which the record does not contain. 
{¶ 345} While it ignores the consequences of the paucity of evidence to 
support a kidnapping conviction, at least the majority discusses it.  The 
aggravated-robbery death specification was affirmed even though the majority 
opinion does not discuss any of the evidence on which it relies.  Apparently, the 
mere presence of the Subaru on McKnight’s property is sufficient evidence to 
prove that he stole it.  In reality, the Subaru’s presence on his property proves 
nothing more than its presence. 
{¶ 346} The majority opinion concludes, “[McKnight] kidnapped 
Murray, stole her car, and then brutally murdered Murray inside his trailer.”  As 
discussed above, there is no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that McKnight 
kidnapped Murray or that he stole her car.  Based on the evidence in the record, it 
is as likely that Murray voluntarily drove McKnight home and voluntarily entered 
his home.  Sadly, there is no doubt that McKnight committed a brutal murder.  
Nevertheless, because of the lack of evidence of the aggravating circumstances, 
McKnight should not be sentenced to death, and I dissent from the portion of the 
majority opinion that upholds the death sentence. 
__________________ 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Joseph E. Wilhelm, Kelly 
L. Culshaw, and Robert K. Lowe, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
______________________