Title: State v. Huebler

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

0 ee

128 Nev. Advance Opinion 14
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA, | No, 50953

Appellant, | FI L E D

CHARLES EDWARD HUEBLER,
Respondent. ‘APR 262012

Appeal from an order of the district court granting relief on a
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second Judicial
District Court, Washoe County; Steven R. Kosach, Judge.

Reversed,

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard
Gammick, District Attorney, and Gary H. Hatlestad, Chief Appellate
Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County,

for Appellant.

Franny A. Forsman, Federal Public Defender, and John C. Lambrose and
Lori C. Teicher, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC."

'The Honorable Miriam Shearing, Senior Justice, was appointed by
the court to sit in place of the Honorable Naney M. Saitta, Chief Justice,
who voluntarily recused herself from participation in the decision of this
matter. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 19; SCR 10,

1g-/ 3206

 

 
er

 

OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.:

‘This case arises from an untimely post-conviction petition for
a writ of habeas corpus stemming from a conviction, pursuant to a guilty
plea, of lewdness with a child under 14 years of age. In his petition,
respondent Charles Huebler alleged that he had good cause for his delay
in filing the petition because the State improperly withheld surveillance
videotapes that were exculpatory, which rendered his guilty plea
involuntary. The district court granted relief to Huebler, and the State
appeals.

In this appeal, we consider whether the State is required
under Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose material
exculpatory evidence within its possession to the defense before the entry
of a guilty plea. We conclude that the State is required to disclose such
evidence before entry of a guilty plea. When the State fails to make the
required disclosure, the defendant may challenge the validity of the guilty
plea on that basis. To succeed, the defendant must demonstrate the three
components of a Brady violation in the context of a guilty plea: that the
evidence at issue is exculpatory, that the State withheld the evidence, and
that the evidence was material. As to the materiality component in
particular, we hold that the test is whether there is a reasonable
probability or possibility (depending on whether there was a specific
discovery request) that but for the State's failure to disclose the evidence
the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and would have gone to
trial. Because Huebler failed to demonstrate that he would have refused
to plead guilty and would have gone to trial had the evidence been
disclosed before the plea, we reverse the district court's order.

 
FACTS:

A fellow resident of Huebler's apartment complex viewed
Huebler swimming with children in the complex’s pool, believed Huebler
was acting inappropriately with the children, and called the police. A
seven-year-old girl who resided at the complex told the police that Huebler
touched her buttocks and vagina while they were swimming. The child
victim also stated that Huebler touched her inappropriately on multiple
occasions while in the swimming pool and that the touching occurred
underwater. ‘The police collected surveillance videotapes that showed
Huebler and the girl together in the pool on three days.

Huebler was arrested and charged with lewdness with a child
under the age of 14. Counsel was appointed to represent Huebler, and
counsel filed a motion for discovery. Counsel also asked the district

 

attorney's office if it would provide access to the surveillance videotapes:
the prosecutor had not yet received a copy from the police but told defense

counsel that the videotapes would be sent to the public defender's office

 

when the district attorney's office received them. Soon after the request
for the surveillance videotapes, and only one month after his arrest,
Huebler entered a guilty plea to lewdness with a child under the age of 14.
Huebler did not file a direct appeal.

More than two years after entry of the judgment of conviction,

 

Huebler, with the aid of counsel, filed a post-conviction petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the district court. In his petition, Huebler alleged
that, among other things, he had good cause for the delay in filing his
petition because the State had violated Brady by withholding the
surveillance videotapes. He alleged that, but for the State's failure to

disclose the evidence, he would have refused to plead guilty and proceeded

 

 
oe

 

to trial. The State opposed the petition, arguing that Huebler failed to
demonstrate cause and prejudice. The district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing and granted Huebler relief, determining that the

evidence w:

 

exculpatory, had been withheld by the State, and was
material to Huebler's defense because the lack of access diminished his
counsel's “ability to provide a sound defense.”

On appeal, the State argues that the district court did not use
the appropriate materiality standard in deciding that Huebler’s Brady
claim was sufficient to demonstrate good cause for his delay and to

warrant the relief granted. We agree and reverse,

 

vetition an

 

 

RS 34.726 limits the time in which a post-conviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus that challenges a judgment of convietion or
sentence may be filed. Such a petition must be filed within one year after
entry of the judgment of conviction or, if a timely appeal is taken from the
judgment, within one year after this court issues its remittitur, absent a
showing of good cause for the delay. NRS 34.726(1); Dickerson v, State,
114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.24 1132 (1998) (holding that NRS 34.726(1) refers to
timely direct appeal). Huebler did not pursue a direct appeal, and he filed
his petition on May 26, 2006, more than two years after the judgment of

 

conviction was entered on October 24, 2003. Thus, Huebler’s petition was,
untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good
‘cause for the delay.

To show good cause for delay under NRS 34.726(1), a
petitioner must demonstrate two things: “[tJhat the delay is not the fault

 
of the petitioner” and that the petitioner will be “unduly prejudice(d” if
the petition is dismissed as untimely. Under the first requirement, “a
petitioner must show that an impediment external to the defense
prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default
rules.” Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 606 (2003)
(citing Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 368, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994). “An
impediment external to the defense may be demonstrated by a showing
‘that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to

counsel, or that some interference by official

 

made compliance
.” Id. (quoting Murray v, Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)
citations and quotations omitted). Under the second requirement, a

impracticable.

 

petitioner must show that errors in the proceedings underlying the
judgment worked to the petitioner's actual and substantial disadvantage.
Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 959-60, 860 P.2d 710, 716 (1993). We
give deference to the district court's factual findings regarding good cause,
but we will review the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.
See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that district
court's findings of facts are reviewed for clear error, but questions of law
are reviewed de novo); see also Lader v, Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120
P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005) (using similar reasoning for review of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel).

!We recognize that Colley v, State, 105 Nev. 295, 236, 773 P.2d 1229,
1230 (1989), states that. a district court's determination regarding the
existence of good cause will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion;
however, under the current statutory scheme the time bar in NRS 54.726
is mandatory, not discretionary. State v, Dist. Ct. (Riker), 121 Nev. 225,
231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005); State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180,
continued on next page

 

 
—s

 

To demonstrate good cause for his delay, Huebler claimed
below that the State violated Brady by withholding exculpatory evidence,
that the State's withholding of the exculpatory evidence caused the delay,
and that the withholding of the exculpatory evidence prejudiced him by
making his guilty plea involuntary. Huebler’s good-cause showing
therefore is intertwined with the merits of his Brady claim.

“Brady and its progeny require a prosecutor to disclose

evidence favorable to the defense when that evidence is material either to

guilt or to punishment.” State v, Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599, 81 P.3d 1, 8
(2003) (quoting Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.24 25, 36

(2000)). To prove a Brady violation, the accused must make three
showings: (1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the evidence, either

 

intentionally or inadvertent! .e., the evidence
was material.” Jd, (quoting Mazzan, 116 Nev. at 67, 993 P.2d at 37).
When a Brady claim is raised in an untimely post-conviction petition for a

ind (3) “prejudice ensued,

 

writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and
proving specific facts that demonstrate both components of the good-cause
showing required by NRS 34.726(1). Id, Those components parallel the
second and third prongs of a Brady violation: establishing that the State
withheld the evidence demonstrates that the delay was caused by an

~ continued

69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003); Pellegrini v, State, 117 Nev, 860, 885-86, 34 P.3d
519, 636 (2001).

 
ones Se

 

impediment external to the defense,® and establishing that the evidence
was material generally demonstrates that the petitioner would be unduly

prejudiced if the petition is dismissed as untimely. Id. Therefore, Huebler

 

‘must establish both the second and third prongs of a Brady violation in
order to overcome the procedural time bar. Because a claim that the State
committed a Brady violation requires consideration of both factual
circumstances and legal issues, we conduct a de novo review of the district
m resolving a Brady claim, Id, (citing Mazzan, 116 Nev. at
66, 993 P.2d at 36).

Guilty pleas and Brady violations

Before addressing the substance of Huebler’s Brady claim, we

 

court's deci

 

must address a threshold issue: may a defendant challenging the validity

 

of a guilty plea assert a Brady claim? This issue arises because Brady
evolved from the due-process guarantee of a fair trial, Brady, 373 U.S. at
86-87, and therefore has been described as a trial right, U.S, v. Moussaoui,

591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010), but when a defendant pleads guilty, he

 

waives several constitutional guarantees, including the due-proceas right
to a fair trial, and any errors that occurred before entry of the plea.

Tollett v, Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 638

We note that a Brady claim still must be raised within a reasonable
time after the withheld evidence was disclosed to or discovered by the
defense. See Hathaway v, State, 119 Nev. 248, 71 P.3d 503 (2003). It is
not clear whether Huebler demonstrated that he raised his Brady claim
within a reasonable time after discovering it.

 
P.2d 164 (1975). We have never addressed in a published opinion whether
a Brady claim can survive the entry of a guilty plea.

Several federal circuit courts of appeals have held that a
Brady violation may be asserted to challenge the validity of a guilty plea.
Exg., Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir, 1995); White v, U.S,
858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319-
20 (2d Cir, 1988); Campbell v, Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1985);
accord State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 696 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). But
see Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence before entry of guilty plea does not render
plea involuntary or constitute Brady violation), The Ninth Cireuit, for
example, has reasoned that “a defendant's decision whether or not to
plead guilty is often heavily influenced by his appraisal of the
prosecution's case” and a waiver of the right to trial “cannot be deemed
‘intelligent and voluntary’ if ‘entered without knowledge of material
information withheld by the prosecution.” Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453
(quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320). A contrary decision, according to the
Ninth Circuit, could tempt prosecutors “to deliberately withhold
exculpatory information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas.” Id,

‘The validity of those decisions allowing a challenge to a guilty
plea based on a Brady violation have been called into question following
the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v, Ruiz, 536

“The parties here agree that a Brady claim survives the entry of a
guilty plea. In particular, the State observes in its opening brief that “[tJo
rule otherwise could introduce an unacceptable level of gamesmanship
into the litigation.”

 

 
U.S. 622 (2002)—the Court's only decision to date that has addressed
Brady in the guilty-plea context. See U.S. v. Danzi, 726 F, Supp. 2d 120,
127 (D. Conn, 2010) (discussing government challenge to circuit precedent
based on Ruiz). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the

 

Constitution does not require the prosecution to disclose impeachment
information related to informants or other witnesses before entering a
plea agreement with a defendant. Ruiz, 636 U.S. at 625. The Ruiz Court
did not address the obligation to disclose exculpatory information; as a
result, courts have split as to whether the Court’ decision also
encompasses exculpatory information. Compare U.S. v, Conroy, 567 F.3d
174, 178-79 (6th Cir, 2009) (rejecting argument that Ruiz implied that
exculpatory evidence must be disclosed before guilty plea is entered), with
McCann _v, Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir, 2003) (reasoning

that “it is highly likely” based on language in Ruiz indicating “

 

 

 

significant
distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence”
that Supreme Court would require prosecution to disclose exculpatory
evidence before guilty plea is entered). See also Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at
285-86 (discussing differing opinions regarding scope of Ruiz in dicta but
Ieaving issue unresolved because prosecutor did not withhold exculpatory
evidence). We are persuaded by language in Ruiz and due-process
considerations that a defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea

%Exculpatory evidence” is defined as “[e]vidence tending to establish
a criminal defendant's innocence.” Black's Law Dictionary 637 (9th ed.
2009), “Impeachment evidenco” is defined as “[elvidence used to
undermine a witness's credibility.” Id,

 

 
based on the prosecution's failure to disclose material exculpatory
information before entry of the plea.

In holding that the Constitution dees not require the
prosecution to disclose impeachment information before a guilty plea is
entered, the Ruiz Court focused on the nature of impeachment information
and its limited value in deciding whether to plead guilty. The Court first

‘We recognize that the same piece of evidence may be characterized
as both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Cf, Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S, 263, 282 n.21 (1999) (rejecting argument that withheld evidence
was inculpatory and therefore did not fall under Brady because Court's
“cases make clear that Brady's disclosure requirements extend to
materials that, whatever their other characteristics, may be used to
impeach a witness’). Before Ruiz this distinction made little difference
because both types of evidence were treated as favorable to the defense
and subject to disclosure under Brady. See United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (explaining that impeachment evidence as well as
exculpatory evidence falls under Brady and that “Court has rejected
any... distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory
evidence”). For purposes of this case, we need not address whether Ruiz
leaves open the possibility that certain types of impeachment information
must be disclosed before entry of a guilty plea, see 536 U.S. at 633
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), or, if Ruiz does foreclose any
challenge based on withheld impeachment information, whether we
should recognize greater protections under the Due Process Clause of the
Nevada Constitution, ef, Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 881 P.2d 1
(1994) (relying on state due-process guarantee in adhering to different
materiality tests for Brady claims depending on whether there was a
specific request, despite contrary Supreme Court decisions), overruled on
other grounds by Foster v, State, 116 Nev. 1088, 13 P.3d 61 (2000). See
also Kevin C, MeMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Bradv Disclosure, and Wrongfu
Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651 (2007) (discussing flaws in Ruiz
Court's reasoning). The State has not asserted that Ruiz precludes the
relief granted by the district court because the evidence at issue is
impeachment evidence rather than exculpatory evidence; therefore, those
are issues for another day.

 

 
looked to the requirements for a knowing and voluntary plea. The Court
explained that “[iJt is particularly difficult to characterize impeachment
information as critical information of which the defendant must always be
aware prior to pleading guilty given the random way in which such
information may, or may not, help a particular defendant” because the
value of impeachment information “will depend upon the defendant's own
independent knowledge of the prosecution's potential case—a matter that
the Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose.” Ruiz, 536 U.S.
at 630. Because of the limited value of impeachment evidence, the Court
was reluctant to distinguish it as being more important than other
information of which a defendant may be ignorant but still enter a
knowing and voluntary plea. Id, at 630-31.

‘The Ruiz Court then turned to the due-process considerations
that led to its decision in Brady, weighing the nature of the private
interest at stake, the value of the additional safeguard, and any adverse
impact that the additional safeguard would have on the government's
interests. Id, at 631. Specifically, the Court repeated that the nature of
impeachment information limited the added value of a right to that
information before pleading guilty. And the Court rejected the idea that
the additional right would have added value in reducing the chance that
innocent individuals would plead guilty, in part because the plea
agreement in that case stated that the prosecution would “provide ‘any
information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant.” Id.
Against the limited private interest and added value, the Court
determined that an obligation to provide impeachment information before

entry of a guilty plea “could seriously interfere with the Government's

interest in securing those guilty pleas that are factually justified, desired

 

 
by defendants, and help to secure the efficient administration of justice.”
Id, Given these considerations, the Court held that “the Constitution does
not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.” Id, at 633.

In our opinion, the considerations that led to the decision in
Ruiz do not lead to the same conclusion when it comes to material
exculpatory information. While the value of impeachment information
may depend on innumerable variables that primarily come into play at
trial and therefore arguably make it less than critical information in
entering a guilty plea, the same cannot be said of exculpatory information,
which

 

special not just in relation to the fairness of a trial but also in
relation to whether a guilty plea is valid and accurate, For this reason,
the due-process calculus also weighs in favor of the added safeguard of
requiring the State to disclose material exculpatory information before the
defendant enters a guilty plea.

It is not every day that an innocent person accused of a crime
pleads guilty, but a right to exculpatory information before entering a
guilty plea diminishes the possibility that innocent persons accused of
crimes will plead guilty. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady
Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651 (2007)
(discussing reasons that innocent defendant might plead guilty and how
Brady disclosure in the guilty-plea context helps reduce risk of such
pleas). ‘The distinction between exculpatory and impeachment
information in this respect is implicitly recognized in the Ruiz Court's
focus on the disclosure requirement in the plea agreement in that case,

which provided that the prosecution would disclose “any information

establishing the factual innocence of the defendant.” 536 U.S. at 631.

 

 
Unlike in Ruiz, it is information that could establish the factual innocence
of the defendant—exculpatory information—that is at issue. In turn, the
adverse impact on the government of an obligation to provide exculpatory
information is not as significant as the impact of an obligation to provide
impeachment information. And importantly, the added safeguard
‘comports with the prosecution's “special role... in the search for truth.”
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); see also Jimenez v, State,
112 Nev. 610, 618, 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (“The prosecutor represents

 

the state and has a duty to see that justice is done in a criminal
prosecution.”); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function
Standard 3-1,2(¢) (3d ed. 1993) (The duty of the prosecutor is to seek
; id, emt. (‘[It is fundamental that the
prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well

justice, not merely to convict.”

 

to convict the

 

guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of
the public.”). We therefore hold that a defendant may challenge the
validity of a guilty plea based on the prosecution's failure to disclose
material exculpatory information before entry of the plea. Cf, RPC 3.8(4)
(providing that “prosecutor in a criminal case shall” “[mlake timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused”).

‘The guilty-plea context, however, requires a different
approach to the prejudice component of a Brady violation. Prejudice for
purposes of a Brady violation requires a showing that the withheld

evidence is “material.” Normally, evidence is material if it “creates a

 

 
nes

 

reasonable doubt."? Mazzan, 116 Nev. at 74, 998 P.2d at 41. That
standard of materiality is not helpful in the guilty-plea context because
the defendant has admitted guilt. In fashioning a materiality test in that
context, we also must be mindful that guilty pleas are presumptively valid
and that the defendant therefore bears a heavy burden when challenging
the validity of a guilty plea, See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190, 87
P.3d 633, 537 (2004),

Other courts considering this issue have applied a standard of
materiality that is based on the relevance of the withheld evidence to the
defendant's decision to plead guilty: “whether there is a reasonable
probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the
defendant would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial.”
Sanchez, 60 F.3d at 1454. This materiality test is similar to the prejudice
test that is used to evaluate ineffective-assistance claims by a defendant
who has pleaded guilty. Cf, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1986) (holding
that to establish prejudice prong of ineffective-assistance claim, defendant
who pleaded guilty must demonstrate reasonable probability that but for
counsel's deficient performance he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial). We conclude that this materiality
test best parallels the materiality test used for Brady claims in the trial

‘We have explained that when there was no defense request or only
a general defense request for evidence, withheld evidence “creates a
reasonable doubt” when “there is a reasonable probability that the result
would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed.” Mazzan,
116 Nev. at 74, 993 P.2d at 41. But after a specific request for evidence,
withheld evidence “creates a reasonable doubt” when “there is a

reasonable possibility that the undisclosed evidence would have affected
the outcome.” Id,

4

 
ome ae

 

context while also ensuring that guilty pleas are not lightly set aside. We
therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in
Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (0th Cir. 1995), but we adhere to our
decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled
on other grounds by Foster v, State, 116 Nev. 1088, 13 P.8d 61 (2000), to
uuse separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific
request by the defense. Thus, when the defendant has made a specific
request, withheld evidence is material in the guilty-plea context if there is
a reasonable possibility that but for the failure to disclose the evidence the
defendant would have refused to plead and would have insisted on going

to trial.
‘The materiality test is a high bar, of, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
US. __, __, 130 8. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (describing ineffective-

 

assistance test as “high bar’), that involyes both a subjective and objective
component. As a threshold matter, a defendant must affirmatively assert
that he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. See
Hill, 474 US. at 60 (rojecting ineffectiv
petitioner “did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly

 

istance claim because

informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not,
guilty and insisted on going to trial”). That is a subjective assertion.* But
the validity and reasonableness of that subjective assertion must be
evaluated through an objective analysis considering the totality of the

“Huebler’s petition summarily asserts that “[bJut for the failure of
the State to turn over this exculpatory evidence, fhe] would not have pled
guilty and proceeded to trial.” We have not been asked to determine

whether this assertion was sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.
See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 686 P.2d 222 (1984).

10

 
circumstances. See Ostrander v, Green, 46 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir. 1995)
(iscussing prejudice prong of Hill and observing that “[olbjective analysis
of the prejudice prong is probably the only workable means of applying
Hill”), overruled on other grounds by O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214
(4th Cir, 1996); see also Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454 (explaining that
materiality test for Brady violation in guilty-plea context is “an objective
one that centers on ‘the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information”
with respect to decision whether to plead guilty (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d
at 1922). Accordingly, the court must consider objective factors to
determine whether a reasonable defendant in the same circumstances as
the petitioner would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.
See Ostrander, 46 F.3d at 356.

Cases from other jurisdictions provide useful guidance for
evaluating whether there is a reasonable probability/possibility that, but
for the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, the defendant would have
refused to plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. In
particular, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, which has adopted the same
materiality inquiry for Brady claims based on withheld exculpatory
evidence in the guilty-plea context, has developed the following list of
factors to consider in applying the materiality test:

(1) the relative strength and weakness of the
State's case and the defendant's case; (2) the
persuasiveness of the withheld evidence; (8) the
reasons, if any, expressed by the defendant for
choosing to plead guilty; (4) the benefits obtained
by the defendant in exchange for the plea; and (6)
the thoroughness of the plea colloquy.

 

 
or

 

State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).” We agree
that these are relevant considerations, but we also emphasize that this is
not an exhaustive list and that “[t}he particular case may present other
relevant considerations.” Id, With these considerations in mind, we turn
to the district court’s decision in this case.
‘The district court's ruling in this ca

‘The district court concluded that the State withheld
exculpatory evidence (the surveillance tapes) and that the evidence was
material because its absence adversely affected trial counsel's “ability to
provide a sound defense." On appeal, the State has focused on the

"Since Sturgeon, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held, in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Ruiz. that “due process does not require
the disclosure of material exculpatory impeachment information before a
defendant enters into a plea bargain.” State v, Harris, 680 N.W.2d 737,
741 (Wis. 2004). But the court declined an invitation to overrule Sturgeon
and has not determined “whether due process requires the disclosure of
purely exculpatory information prior to a plea bargain.” Id, at 750 n.15.

Hucbler suggests that the district court also granted relief based
on the State's alleged failure to disclose an audio-video recording of his
police interview before entry of the plea. The district court's order does
not mention this recording, and we are not convinced that the alleged
failure to disclose this recording provides an alternative ground to affirm
the district court's decision for three reasons. First, Huebler participated
in the interview, and therefore, any Brady or ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims related to the interview and the recording were reasonably
available to be raised in a timely petition. Second, the interview was not
exculpatory, and therefore, Huebler had no viable Brady claim or good-
cause allegation based on the State's alleged failure to disclose the
recording. And finally, even assuming the recording had any exculpatory
value, Huebler failed to demonstrate it was material,

 

VW

 
materiality component of the district court's decision. We do so as well
and conclude that the evidence was not material. 1!

‘The relevant factors support the conclusion that Huebler
failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that he would have refused

 

‘Although the State's appeal focuses primarily on the materiality
component of the district court's decision, a few observations are in order
regarding the district court's decision on the other two components of
Huebler's Brady claim: that the State withheld exculpatory evidence.

‘The district court determined that the evidence was exculpatory
because it “fails to show the crime charged.” It is not entirely clear that
the tapes tend to establish Huebler’s innocence because the victim
indicated that Huebler touched her buttocks and vagina underwater and
the tapes do not show what occurred underwater. The State questions the
district court's description of the evidence as exculpatory in the context of
its argument that the evidence is not material but does not argue that the
evidence is not exculpatory and therefore there was no duty to disclose it.
Because the State has not challenged the district court’s decision that the
evidence is exculpatory, that question is not presented here and we do not
answer it.

The district court also determined that the evidence had been
withheld by the State. It is not clear from the district court’s order that it
considered whether the surveillance videotapes could have been uncovered
through diligent investigation by the defense. See Steese v, State, 114
Nev. 479, 495, 960 P.2d 321, 331 (1998) (‘Brady does not require the State
to disclose evidence which is available to the defendant from other sources,
including diligent investigation by the defense.”). There are some facts in
the record to support such a conclusion. At the evidentiary hearing,
Huebler's trial counsel acknowledged that she was informed of the

 

existence of the surveillance videotapes prior to Huebler's guilty plea.
Also, the police report, which Huebler’s counsel acknowledged was in her
possession, stated the name of the police detective to contact with
questions relating to the collection of the videotapes. Again, because the
State does not challenge the district court's decision that the evidence was
withheld, we need not resolve this issue.

 

 
4

 

to plead guilty and would have gone to trial if the surveillance tapes had
been delivered to counsel before entry of the guilty plea. First, there was
substantial evidence of Huebler's guilt given the victim's

 

ements and
Huebler’s statements regarding touching the victim and past molestation
allegations involving young girls. Second, the withheld evidence is not
particularly persuasive; the surveillance tapes did not record any events
underwater, and therefore, do not refute the victim's claims. Thus, as
noted in the margin above, it is questionable whether the tapes were
exculpatory at all. ‘Third, the testimony presented at the evidentiary
hearing demonstrated that Huebler insisted on entering a guilty plea.
‘Trial counsel's testimony indicated that she told Huebler that they
“needed to look at the discovery” before he pleaded guilty and that she told
him why they needed to do that but that he insisted on moving forward
with the guilty plea.” Fourth, Huebler received a benefit from entry of

the guilty plea as the charges were reduced and any investigation into

 

potential additional charges ended. Finally, Huebler indicated by signing

the guilty plea agreement that he entered the plea voluntarily and
knowingly. Based on those factors, it is clear that pre-plea disclosure of
the surveillance tapes would not have caused him to refuse to plead guilty

and instead insist on going to trial. Because Huebler fails to demonstrate

"We note that there was little time for counsel to obtain the
requested videotapes. The charging document alloged that the offense
occurred on or between July 27 and 29, 2003. ‘The waiver of preliminary
examination was filed approximately three weeks later, on August 19,
2003. Huebler was arraigned in district court and entered his guilty plea
ten days later, on August 29, 2003. Thus, just more than four weeks
elapsed between the last date on which the offense occurred and the entry
of the guilty plea,

19.

 
  
   
   
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     

materiality, he fails, as a matter of law, to demonstrate that any errors in
the disclosure of the tapes prejudiced him. The petition therefore is
procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.726(1), Accordingly, we reverse

the district court’s order, !>
~~ Deoughe 4.
Douglas

Wexoncur:

    

sd
Pickering
[sur Cece, 4
sty
Parraguirre

AN Sr. J.
Shearing

\Huebler suggests that the district court’s decision can be affirmed
based on a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim—that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and obtain a copy of the surveillance
tapes. We disagree for two reasons. First, this claim could have been
raised in a timely petition and Huebler failed to explain his delay. Second,
even assuming that the claim was not reasonably available to be raised in
a timely petition, Huebler cannot demonstrate prejudice. In this instance,
the inquiry is the same as the materiality prong of the Brady claim:
whether Huebler would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial. Hill v, Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); see also Missouri v,
Erye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 11-12 (U.S. March 21, 2012) (explaining that
Hill ‘standard applies where “a defendant complains that ineffective
assistance led him to accept a plea offer as opposed to proceeding to trial”)
As explained in this opinion, Huebler failed to make that showing. For
these reasons, Huebler’s ineffective-assistance claim is procedurally
barred under NRS 34.726.

 
os

 

CHERRY, J., with whom GIBBONS, J., agrees, dissenting:

‘The district court held that respondent Charles Huebler had
demonstrated cause and prejudice to excuse the untimely filing of his post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a violation of
Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that made his guilty plea
involuntary and that Huebler therefore was entitled to withdraw his
guilty plea. The court now concludes that even assuming that the
evidence was withheld by the State and is exculpatory (two points that the
court does not entirely embrace), Huebler failed to demonstrate that the
evidence was material and therefore the district court's order must be
reversed. I would conclude that the evidence is exculpatory and was
withheld by the State, but then remand for the district court to apply the
correct test for materiality (as sot forth by the court),

agree with the court that a Brady claim survives the entry of
1 guilty plea in that the State has a constitutional duty to disclose
material exculpatory information that is within the State's possession
before entering a plea agreement with a defendant, See, e.g., MeCann v,
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2008). I also find no fault in
the court's articulation of the prejudice component of such a Brady claim,
that withheld evidence is material if the defendant demonstrates a
reasonable probability or possibility (epending on whether there was a
specific request for evidence) that but for the failure to disclose the
evidence he or she would have refused to plead guilty and would have

 

ted on going to trial. Where I must part company with my colleagues

is in applying the three prongs of a Brady claim to the facts and

 

circumstances presented in this case.

 
‘The starting point is whether the evidence at issue is
exculpatory, ‘The court suggests in the margin of its decision that the
surveillance videotapes may not be exculpatory because the victim
described the lewd acts as occurring underwater and the videotapes do not
depict what occurred underwater. I cannot agree with this suggestion
that the videotapes are not exculpatory. In my view, the videotapes tend
to establish Huebler’s innocence because they show appropriate
interactions between an adult and child in a swimming pool and show no
conduct or reactions on any individual's part that would suggest there had
been any lewd or I

 

‘civious acts involving Huebler and the victim.

‘The next consideration is whether the State withheld the
evidence. ‘The court suggests, again in the margin of its decision, that
certain facts in the record would support a conclusion that the evidence
could have been uncovered by the defense through diligent investigation.
While defense counsel may have been able to contact law enforcement to
obtain the videotapes (the police report included the name of the detective
who could be contacted with questions related to the collection of the
videotapes), the duty under Brady is the prosecutor's, and defense counsel
had requested the videotapes and been told that the prosecutor would
provide them to defense counsel (albeit at some later unspecified time
after they had been provided to the prosecutor). Cf, Jimenez v. State, 112
Nev. 610, 620, 918 P.2d 687, 693 (1996) (“[E]ven if the detectives withheld
their reports without the prosecutor's knowledge, ‘the state attorney is
charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence withheld

by other state agents, such as law enforcement officers.” (quoting Gorham
¥, State, 597 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 1992))); see also Allen v, State, 854 So.
2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (stating that “{tJhe defendant's duty to exercise

 

 
on

 

due diligence in reviewing Brady material applies only after the State
discloses it” and therefore “[o]nce the State obtained the results of the hair
analysis, it was required to disclose them to the defendant’),

‘The final consideration is whether the evidence is material,
On this point it is clear that the district court did not apply the correct test
for materiality, focusing instead on the impact that the videotapes’
absence had on defense counsel's “ability to provide a sound defense.”
Under the circumstances, I would remand for the district court to apply
the correct test in the first instance. In my view, a remand is appropriate
because many of the relevant factors involve factual and credibility
determinations that should be made by the district court.

In sum, while I applaud the court's recognition that the State
has a constitutional duty to disclose material exculpatory information

within its posses

 

ion before entering a plea agreoment with a defendant, I
cannot agree with its application of the law to this case. Rather, I agree
with the district court that the evidence at issue is exculpatory and was
withheld by the State and would remand for the district court to apply the
correct test for materiality.

I must also comment on footnote 13 and the discussion
preceding footnote 12 in the majority opinion, I have reviewed the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the court below and the testimony
provided at the hearing and it demonstrates both factually and legally
why Huebler should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and
that the district court was correct in its ruling.

Trial counsel had defended clients. charged with
misdemeanors for only two weeks, and then began representing clients
charged with felonies. She had less than one year of experience when she

 
wo Be

 

represented Huebler. This caso was the first time counsel had
represented a defendant charged with a sexual offense and the first time
Jone of her clients faced a possible life sentence. ‘The record further reveals
that Huebler had attempted suicide, w:

 

fon suicide watch, and was
incredibly depressed. Huebler waived a preliminary hearing to plead to
Jone count of lewdness, and the second count would be dismissed. Counsel

had requested discovery but did not receive either the video surveillance

 

lor video recording of Huebler’s interrogation. Counsel knew these videos
existed, but had not received them.

Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that if she had
received these videos, she could have stopped Huebler from entering «
plea. Even more enlightening is counsel's profound revelation that after
she finally reviewed the tapes, she would have thrown herself into traffic
to prevent Hucbler’s guilty plea.

Looking at the totality of circumstances in this contested
matter, I would remand this case back to the district court to apply the
correct test for materiality and for further hearings on whether Hucbler
can, in fact, show prejudice so that his ineffective assistance claim is not
procedurally barred. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent landmark
decision emphasizing the importance of the right to effective assistance of
counsel during plea bargaining, see Lafler v, Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op.
at 3-4 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), it is imperative that the instant case be

 
10

 

remanded to the trial court in order that a finding be made as to whether
trial counsel, who allowed a plea to be entered without the benefit of

crucial discovery, was ineffective.

Cherry

 

Tconeur:

J
Gibbons