Title: State v. Therrien

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_THERRIEN.92-477; 161 Vt. 26; 633 A.2d 272

[Filed 24-Sep-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                    No. 92-477


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Orleans Superior Court

 Carolyn Therrien, Executrix of               May Term, 1993
 the Estate of Andrew Therrien


 Stephen B. Martin, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Philip J. Cykon and Conrad W.
   Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-
   appellee

 Richard E. Davis and Richard E. Davis, Jr., of Richard E. Davis Assocs.,
   Barre, for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   This proceeding began with a complaint filed in the
 Orleans Superior Court by the State of Vermont against Andrew Therrien
 charging him with violating Act 250, 10 V.S.A. {{ 6001-6108, and the
 Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. {{ 2451-2462, in connection with his Salem
 Heights development in the Town of Derby.  Andrew Therrien died after trial
 but before judgment was entered against him.  His wife Carolyn was
 substituted as defendant, in her capacity as executrix and distributee of
 the estate of her husband.  The estate also became a defendant.  The court
 then issued its August 10, 1992 judgment nunc pro tunc effective July 9,
 1990.  Defendant Carolyn Therrien appeals from both the substitution and

 

 judgment order, arguing that the proceeding should have ended on her
 husband's death and that a part of the judgment dealing with water systems
 in the development was beyond the power of the court.  We affirm.
      In October 1975, Andrew Therrien was issued a land use permit pursuant
 to Act 250 allowing him to subdivide 100 acres in the Salem Heights
 development into seventy-seven residential lots.  Therrien failed to comply
 with the septic and well water system conditions in the permit; in fact, the
 superior court later found his noncompliance both willful and intentional.
 As a result of Therrien's failure to construct appropriate septic and well
 systems, numerous problems developed:  some residents had little or no water
 pressure, sewage effluent surfaced and stagnated, and water wells were
 eventually contaminated with fecal waste.
      Trial was concluded and the case taken under advisement on July 9,
 1990.  The court issued its findings, conclusions and order on July 10,
 1991, adjudging Therrien liable for violations of both Act 250 and the
 Consumer Fraud Act.  In the interim between trial and judgment, however,
 Andrew Therrien had died.  Therrien's death on June 15, 1991 was suggested
 upon the record on July 16, 1991.
      In its July 10, 1991 decision, the court cited Therrien for nine
 violations of his Act 250 land use permit, including installation of
 community water systems not allowed under his permit; installation of
 improper individual septic systems, community septic systems, and collection
 sewers; failure to install appropriate septic systems as required by the
 land use permit; failure to comply with the isolation distances for water
 wells and lines from septic systems; failure to show land purchasers the
 land use permit and associated documentation; and, finally, failure to seek

 

 appropriate amendments to the land use permit.  The court also found
 Therrien liable for unfair or deceptive acts and practices prohibited by the
 Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. { 2453, for selling subdivision lots not in
 compliance with the land use permit.  The court ordered Therrien to remedy
 the water supply and septic system deficiencies.
      In late August 1991, the court granted the State's motion to
 substitute the estate of Andrew Therrien as a party for Andrew Therrien, but
 denied a motion to substitute defendant Carolyn Therrien.  In early
 September 1991, Andrew Therrien's estate was opened, and defendant was
 appointed executrix.  In February 1992, the court granted the State's
 motion to amend the July 10, 1991 judgment to bind the estate and executrix;
 in the alternative, the court also granted the State's motion for judgment
 nunc pro tunc effective July 9, 1990.  Thereafter, on August 10, 1992, the
 court entered the judgment order substituting the estate of Andrew Therrien
 and defendant as parties.  The defendant now appeals.(FN1)
      On appeal, defendant argues that:  (1) the State's cause of action does
 not survive the death of Andrew Therrien; (2) the judgment order could not
 be issued nunc pro tunc to a date before the death of Andrew Therrien; (3)
 it was error to name defendant as a party and impose personal liability on
 her; and (4) it was error to alter the conditions of paragraph 5 of the Act
 250 permit in the judgment order.  We take these arguments in order.
      Under V.R.C.P. 25(a)(1), a court may order the substitution of proper
 parties "[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished."  To

 

 meet the requirements of Rule 25(a)(1), the claim must survive the death of
 the party and a proper replacement party must be substituted.
      The second requirement was met here because an executor or
 administrator may defend actions that survive that were "commenced in the
 lifetime of the deceased."  14 V.S.A. { 1401.  Additionally, "[a] person
 having a contingent or other claim against a deceased person may prosecute
 the same against the executor . . . [or] devisees."  14 V.S.A. { 1417.
 Thus, under either { 1401 or { 1417, defendant in her capacity as executrix
 was a proper party for substitution.  Similarly, under { 1417, defendant in
 her capacity as devisee (distributee) was a proper party for substitution.
 Thus, if the State's claims against Andrew Therrien survived his death,
 defendant as executrix and distributee was a proper party for substitution.
 See McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 99 (D.C. Cir.) (holding under
 virtually identical Federal Rule that "the distributee of a distributed
 estate is a 'proper party' for substitution under Rule 25(a)(1)"), cert.
 denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
      Defendant argues that the action abated on Andrew Therrien's death
 because all actions abated at common law and no statute authorizes survival
 of the claims in this case.  We agree that neither Act 250 nor the Consumer
 Fraud Act directly and explicitly authorizes survival of claims thereunder.
 We also find no general survival statute that explicitly addresses these
 claims.  Section { 1417 broadly states that when a party has a contingent
 or other claim against the deceased, "an action commenced against the
 deceased before death may be prosecuted to final judgment."  14 V.S.A. {
 1417.  Read literally, the section would allow for the survival of all
 actions.  This literal reading would, however, render superfluous the
 specific statutes on survival of actions.  See 14 V.S.A. {{ 1451-1453.

 

 Further, the history of { 1417 marks it as procedural, not substantive.  See
 Boyden v. Ward, 38 Vt. 628, 634 (1866) (discussing predecessor to { 1417 and
 noting that plaintiff could bring suit directly against executor or
 administrator when there was "mere omission" of appointment commissioners,
 but did not authorize claims otherwise barred).  The section specifies a
 proper procedure if a claim against the decedent otherwise survives.  See
 Kreichman v. Webster, 110 Vt. 105, 110, 2 A.2d 199, 201 (1938) (construing {
 1417 predecessor and holding that "if for any reason the appointment of
 commissioners is omitted, a claim which is not otherwise barred may be
 prosecuted against the executor or administrator") (emphasis added).
 Despite its broad wording, { 1417 does not direct the survival of claims at
 issue in this case.
      Defendant correctly notes that the survival statutes do not
 specifically allow for the survival of the actions brought under Act 250 and
 the Consumer Fraud Act.  See 14 V.S.A. {{ 1451 (survival of causes arising
 out of injury to personal or real property), 1452 (causes arising out of
 personal injuries), 1453 (actions arising under {{ 1451-1452 may be
 prosecuted for or against executor or administrator of estate)  It is
 important to recognize, however, that these statutes were adopted in the
 early nineteenth century. (FN2) If we accept defendant's argument, no claims
 created by the Legislature in this century would survive, whatever the

 

 practical consequences of abatement.  We find that result so unreasonable as
 to conflict with the basic purposes of Act 250 and the Consumer Fraud Act.
      Act 250 and the Consumer Fraud Act are remedial legislation.  See
 Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 586, 580 A.2d 51, 53 (1990); 1969, No. 250
 (Adj. Sess.), { 1 (purposes of Act 250 are remedial); 10 V.S.A. { 8221(b)(2)
 (courts authorized to "order remedial actions to be taken to mitigate hazard
 to human health or the environment" for any Act 250 violations).  Nothing
 demonstrates that better than the facts of this case.  Although the State is
 the plaintiff, the real beneficiaries of this action are the persons who
 bought lots in the Salem Heights development.  Andrew Therrien developed and
 sold the lots with widespread violations of the Act 250 permit that caused
 inadequate, failed and unhealthful sewer and water systems.  As a result,
 the purchasers faced difficult and unhealthful living conditions and
 incurred large expenses in correcting the permit violations.  The judgment
 order of the court requires these conditions to be corrected at the expense
 of the developer.
      The profits from the sale of lots in Salem Heights development went to
 Andrew Therrien and presumably are reflected in the amount present in his
 estate.  If this action abates, Therrien's devisees will reap the profit
 from the development while the lot owners incur the large expense of
 obtaining adequate sewer and water systems consistent with public health
 standards.  The basic protections created by Act 250 and the Consumer Fraud
 Act would be eviscerated, and defendant would receive a windfall of ill-
 gotten gains.
      There is an inconsistency between the remedial purposes of Act 250 and
 the Consumer Fraud Act, on the one hand, and the common-law abatement rule.

 

 We must apply remedial legislation liberally to accomplish its purposes.
 See Grenafege v. Department of Empl. Sec., 134 Vt. 288, 290,