Title: Wright v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DENEISHA WRIGHT, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 605, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 1701009508A  
§                     
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 17, 2019 
Decided: 
June 6, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; SEITZ and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Deneisha Wright, was indicted on two counts of Murder 
First Degree, Attempted Robbery First Degree, three counts of Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), and Possession of a 
Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”).  A jury found Wright guilty of one count 
of Murder First Degree, Attempted Robbery First Degree, and two counts of PFDCF.  
After a separate bench trial following the jury trial, the Superior Court found Wright 
guilty of PFBPP.  The jury found Wright not guilty of one count of murder and the 
 
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related count of PFDCF.  The Superior Court sentenced Wright to a total term of 
imprisonment of life plus nine years.  This is Wright’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
The charges arose from the shooting death of Charles Mays.  The 
evidence presented at trial fairly reflects that in the early afternoon of January 14, 
2017, Mays’s pick-up truck crashed in Wilmington, and Mays was found 
unresponsive inside, with gunshot wounds to his legs.  Mays was transported to the 
hospital, where he was pronounced dead.  A trail of blood led police officers from 
Mays’s truck to a nearby apartment building.  Surveillance video obtained from the 
apartment complex showed Braheem Mitchell (Wright’s brother) and Kori Thomas 
(a friend of the family), exiting Apartment 1-A.  Lisa Mitchell (Wright’s aunt) then 
exited the apartment, where she lived with her daughter Sharnice Mitchell, and 
approached Mays’s truck.  While Lisa Mitchell was standing at the truck, a fourth 
person exited Apartment 1-A, stopped briefly behind a car, and then approached the 
passenger side of Mays’s truck.  As the truck pulled away, knocking Lisa Mitchell 
to the ground, the fourth person extended an arm toward the passenger door of the 
truck and shot Mays. 
(3) 
Lisa Mitchell testified that she purchased pills from Mays every 
morning, and that she arranged to meet Mays that morning.  As she leaned down to 
give Mays the money for the pills, someone approached the truck, shooting a gun.  
 
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Lisa Mitchell got knocked down as the truck began to drive away, and as she stood 
up, she saw that the shooter was Wright.   
(4) 
Ralph Mitchell, Wright’s cousin, testified that he was at Apartment 1-
A on the morning of January 14, 2017 and that Wright, Sharnice Mitchell, Latasha 
Brown (also known as “Brownie”), Kori Thomas, and Braheem Mitchell were also 
there.  He testified that he heard the others plotting to have Lisa Mitchell call Mays 
to the apartment so that they could rob Mays of pills and money.  He testified that 
he and Brownie watched from the apartment window and that he saw Wright fire 
four shots at Mays.  On the surveillance video, Ralph Mitchell identified Braheem 
Mitchell and Kori Black as the first two people to leave the apartment, followed by 
Lisa Mitchell and then Wright. 
(5) 
Tyrell Simpson testified that he was in a romantic relationship with 
Wright for approximately one year in 2016-2017.  He stated that around 12:30 p.m. 
on January 14, 2017, he and Wright were at their residence when Braheem Mitchell 
and Kori Black stopped by and Wright abruptly left with them.  Then, in the evening 
of January 14, Simpson spoke with Wright on the telephone and “[s]he said she had 
done something dumb. . . .  She had shot someone.”  Simpson also testified that 
about a week before the incident, he had heard Wright talking to Braheem Mitchell 
about robbing Mays because Mays had money from selling pills.  Simpson testified 
 
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under a plea agreement and cooperation agreement reached with the State in 
connection with unrelated charges. 
(6) 
When law enforcement located Wright approximately ten days after the 
shooting, she was wearing a jacket that the State suggested appeared similar to the 
jacket worn by the shooter in the surveillance video.  Expert testing identified several 
particles that were consistent with gunshot residue on the jacket.  Ballistics evidence 
indicated that a gun recovered by probation officers some time after the incident was 
the gun that killed Mays, but no link was established between Wright and the 
residence where the gun was found or its occupants. 
(7) 
The defense focused on questioning the credibility of the State’s 
witnesses and suggesting that Brownie, who died before trial, was the shooter.  
Wright testified that she was not at Apartment 1-A on January 14, 2017, and that she 
did not attempt to rob Mays and did not shoot Mays.  She testified that she was at 
the corner store at the time of the shooting.  She further testified that Lisa Mitchell, 
Ralph Mitchell, and Tyrell Simpson each had conflicts with her that could have 
motivated them to provide false testimony against her.  Aigner Neal, who had 
children with Wright’s brother, and Marsha Mitchell, Wright’s mother, testified that 
the shooter on the video looked like Brownie and not Wright.  Robin Henry, who 
was Wright’s cousin and Ralph Mitchell’s sister, testified that a few days after Mays 
 
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was shot, she drove Brownie on some errands.  When Brownie went into a store, 
Henry discovered that a wallet that Brownie left on the seat was Mays’s wallet. 
(8) 
The jury found Wright guilty of first-degree attempted robbery, felony 
murder, and the related PFDCF charges.  The jury acquitted her of the intentional 
murder charge and the related PFDCF charge. 
(9) 
On appeal, Wright’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Wright’s counsel asserts that, based upon a 
conscientious review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  Counsel 
informed Wright of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided her with a copy of the 
motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed Wright of 
her right to supplement counsel’s presentation.  Wright responded with points she 
wanted to present for the Court’s consideration, which counsel included with the 
Rule 26(c) brief.  The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues that the 
Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.  
(10) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made 
a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.1  This 
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine “whether the 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738, 744 (1967).  
 
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appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 
presentation.”2   
(11) Wright’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as follows:  (i) the 
jury should have received a lesser-included offense instruction because a gunshot 
wound to the leg can support only a manslaughter conviction, not a conviction for 
first-degree murder; (ii) counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-
included offense instruction; (iii) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing 
to request an alibi instruction and by failing to seek evidence to corroborate the 
defendant’s alibi defense; (iv) the court’s failure to give an alibi instruction, even 
absent a request from counsel, was plain error; (v) the State’s witnesses were 
unreliable and had conflicts of interest; (vi) the surveillance video did not 
demonstrate that Wright was the perpetrator; (vii) no DNA evidence linked Wright 
to the murder weapon; (viii) Lisa Mitchell’s testimony was unreliable; (ix) Wright’s 
counsel did not object to “unlawful procedures” in the courtroom; and (x) defense 
counsel provided ineffective assistance on appeal by failing to raise these points.   
(12) Many of Wright’s arguments raise claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  In general, the Court does not consider on direct appeal claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and does not do so here.3  For the reasons discussed 
                                                 
2 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81. 
3 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994).  See also Woods v. State, 2019 WL 643862, 
at *3 (Del. Feb. 14, 2019) (“Typically an ineffective counsel claim is pursued through a motion 
 
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below, we conclude that Wright’s other claims are without merit.  We therefore 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(13) Wright’s claim that the Superior Court should have provided the jury 
with an instruction for Manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of Murder First 
Degree is without merit.  Wright did not request a lesser-included offense 
instruction.  We review for plain error a claim that the Superior Court erred by failing 
to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on a lesser-included offense.4  Delaware has adopted 
the “party autonomy” approach for jury instructions on lesser-included offenses.5  
Under this approach, “the burden is initially on the parties, rather than the trial judge, 
to determine whether an instruction on a lesser-included offense should be 
considered as an option for the jury.  The trial judge should not give an instruction 
on an uncharged lesser offense if neither side requests such an instruction because 
to do so would ‘interfere with the trial strategies of the parties.’”6   
(14) We find no plain error with respect to the court’s failure to provide a 
lesser-included offense instruction.  Wright’s defense at trial was that she was not 
the shooter.  A lesser-included offense instruction would have been inconsistent with 
                                                 
for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and is adjudicated on the basis of 
the record developed during the postconviction proceeding.”). 
4 Hutt v. State, 2012 WL 3525404, at *1 (Del. Aug. 15, 2012). 
5 Id. at *2. 
6 State v. Brower, 971 A.2d 102, 107 (Del. 2009) (citations omitted). 
 
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that defense.7  Moreover, there is no basis for Wright’s contention that a gunshot to 
the leg cannot result in a conviction for first-degree murder.  The jury was instructed 
that they could find Wright guilty of felony murder if she recklessly caused Mays’s 
death “in the course of and in furtherance of Defendant’s commission of a felony, 
attempt to commit a felony, or Defendant’s immediate flight after committing a 
felony.”8  The relevant difference between manslaughter and felony murder for 
purposes of this case is that felony murder requires that the death occur “while 
engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit any felony,” while manslaughter does not; neither requires that 
the wound be to a particular part of the body.9 
(15) We also review for plain error Wright’s claim that the court erroneously 
failed to give an alibi instruction, even though Wright did not request the 
instruction.10  Wright has the burden of showing that the alleged error was so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial 
                                                 
7 Kent v. State, 2018 WL 3156987, at *5 (Del. June 26, 2018). 
8 State v. Wright, Cr. ID No. 1701009508A, Docket Entry No. 43 (Jury Instructions) at 11 (Del. 
Super. Ct.) [hereinafter “Jury Instructions”].  See also 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(2) (defining felony 
murder). 
9 Compare 11 Del. C. § 636(a) (“A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when . . . (2) 
While engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting 
to commit any felony, the person recklessly causes the death of another person . . . .”), with 11 Del. 
C. § 632 (“A person is guilty of manslaughter when:  (1) The person recklessly causes the death 
of another person . . . .”).  Cf. also Gregory Wright v. State, 374 A.2d 824, 827 (Del. 1977) (“[I]f 
a wound, even if not mortal, is a causal factor in bringing about a death, a defendant will be liable 
for homicide.”). 
10 Smith v. State, 2018 WL 2427594, at *3 (Del. May 29, 2018). 
 
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process.11  If a defendant offers an alibi defense by introducing substantial evidence 
that she was elsewhere when the crime was committed, the Superior Court’s failure 
to give an alibi instruction, even if one is not requested, is plain error.12   
(16) Wright testified at trial that she was not at Apartment 1-A on January 
14, 2017, but at home, and that she remembered, “clear as a bell,” that around the 
time of Mays’s murder she was at the corner store.13  But when she was questioned 
by police after her arrest, she said that she had been high on Percocet and Xanax and 
did not remember anything about the day that Mays died.14  Wright’s cousin and her 
aunt both testified that Wright was at the apartment on January 14, 2017, and that 
they saw Wright shoot Mays.  Although the court did not give an explicit alibi 
instruction, the jury was instructed that, to find Wright guilty, the jury had to be 
“satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has been accurately 
identified” and that “the defendant was in fact the person who committed the act.”15  
Moreover, the jury clearly recognized the alibi issue, because during deliberations 
they submitted a note that inquired, “Was there any verification of defendant’s alibi, 
corner store?”16  Based on a careful review of the record, we conclude that the 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 State v. Wright, Cr. ID No. 1701009508A, Tr. at 169:17-170:21 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2018). 
14 Id. at 170:22-171:20. 
15 Jury Instructions at 18. 
16 State v. Wright, Cr. ID No. 1701009508A, Jury Note Tr. at 2:11-12 (Del. Super. Ct. June 1, 
2018). 
 
10 
Superior Court did not commit plain error by failing, sua sponte, to issue an alibi 
instruction.  
(17) Wright’s other claims on appeal amount to arguments that the evidence 
was insufficient to prove that she was the perpetrator.  In reviewing a claim of 
insufficient evidence, this Court must determine whether any rational trier of fact, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.17  When making that determination, the 
Court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.18  Moreover, 
when the determination of facts turns on the credibility of a witness, this Court will 
not substitute its opinion for that of the trier of fact.19  Rather, “[i]t is the sole job of 
the jury to determine the weight to be given to the evidence and to resolve any 
conflicts in the testimony.”20 
(18) Wright argues that she could not be identified on the surveillance video; 
the State presented no DNA evidence linking her to the gun that killed Mays; and 
the testimony of the State’s fact witnesses was unreliable for various reasons, 
including because they had conflicts of interest.  We conclude that none of Wright’s 
contentions warrant reversal.  The jury heard testimony from several witnesses who 
                                                 
17 Mitchell v. State, 2012 WL 112602, at *2 (Del. Jan. 12, 2012). 
18 Dryden v. State, 2008 WL 555956, at *1 (Del. Mar. 3, 2008). 
19 Id. 
20 Mitchell, 2012 WL 112602, at *2. 
 
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said they saw Wright shoot Mays or provided corroborating, circumstantial 
evidence, including witnesses who knew Wright and identified her as the person on 
the surveillance video, and the jury heard testimony from Wright and others 
suggesting that she was not the shooter.  Both sides also presented evidence relating 
to the various witnesses’ credibility, including their prior convictions and their 
potential conflicts of interest.  The jury had discretion to determine the credibility of 
the witnesses, and we find that the evidence against Wright was sufficient to sustain 
her convictions.21 
(19) The Court has carefully reviewed the record and concluded that 
Wright’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the 
record and the law and properly determined that Wright could not raise a meritorious 
claim on appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.  
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
21 Id.; Dryden, 2008 WL 555956, at *1.