Title: People v. Hicks

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
SEE DISSENTING OPINION 
Filed 12/28/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S232218 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B259665 
MARVIN TRAVON HICKS, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MA058121-01 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In this case, we decide whether during a retrial of a second degree murder 
charge, after a previous jury failed to reach a verdict on that charge but convicted 
the defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (along with other 
offenses), the new jury should be informed of the specific convictions that resulted 
from the previous jury’s deliberations.  We conclude that the trial court errs if it 
informs the new jury of such specific convictions.  The trial court does not err, 
however, if pursuant to Penal Code sections 1093 and 1127, it instructs the retrial 
jury along the following lines:  “Sometimes cases are tried in segments.  The only 
question in this segment of the proceedings is whether the prosecution has proved 
the charge of murder.  In deciding this question, you must not let the issue of 
punishment enter into your deliberations.  Nor are you to speculate about whether 
the defendant may have been, or may be, held criminally responsible for his 
conduct in some other segment of the proceedings.”  The foregoing instruction, 
which need only be given upon request, would prevent the jury from wrongly 
2 
assuming that an acquittal on the murder charge would result in the defendant 
escaping criminal liability altogether, and it would do so without introducing 
matters that are extraneous to the retrial. 
Here, defense counsel requested a specific instruction informing the retrial 
jury of defendant’s gross vehicular manslaughter conviction, and the trial court 
refused such an instruction, stating that it was “going to preclude any reference to 
the prior trial, or the prior verdict.”  In light of the court’s broad statement, the 
defense cannot be faulted for failing to request an instruction like the one we 
approve today.  Therefore, we must consider the question of prejudice.  We 
conclude that the failure of the trial court to give the instruction we approve today 
was not prejudicial, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
High on marijuana and phencyclidine (PCP), defendant Marvin Travon 
Hicks fled police in his black Toyota Camry, running several red lights and 
reaching speeds of about 100 miles per hour.  Defendant eventually plowed into 
the side of a blue Lexus, killing two-year-old Madison Ruano, and injuring Tina 
Ruano, Madison’s mother.  The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an 
information charging defendant with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) (count 
1), evading an officer resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3, subd. (a)) (count 
2), evading an officer resulting in death (Veh. Code, § 2800.3, subd. (b)) (count 3), 
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)) 
(count 4), and driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, 
subd. (a)) (count 5).  After a jury trial, defendant was convicted on all counts 
except the murder count.  The jury deadlocked on the murder count, and the court 
declared a mistrial as to that count. 
At the retrial of the murder count, evidence tending to show the following 
facts was presented to the jury.  At about 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 6, 
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2012, defendant drove a black Toyota erratically and at very high speeds through 
the City of Lancaster in Los Angeles County.  Sheriff’s deputies pursued him, 
lights and sirens activated.  At one point, the Toyota ran a red light, lost traction, 
and came to a halt at the curb.  A sheriff’s deputy approached the vehicle, and 
defendant gave him a “blank stare,” growled, and then sped away, veering into 
oncoming traffic, running another red light, and nearly hitting several vehicles. 
At the same time, Tina Ruano was approaching a nearby intersection, 
driving a blue Lexus.  Her two-year-old daughter, Madison Ruano, was in the car 
with her.  When the light turned green, Tina entered the intersection, and the last 
thing she remembered was a black car coming from the right.  She regained 
consciousness while in an ambulance on the way to the hospital.  Witnesses 
described a dramatic collision between defendant’s Toyota and the Lexus, with the 
Toyota going 80 to 100 miles per hour. 
After the collision, sheriff’s deputies approached defendant’s vehicle.  
Defendant was screaming, laughing, and talking to himself, but he was alert and 
oriented.  He was aware that he had been in a collision, that he was wearing a 
seatbelt, that he had just run a red light, and that he was not in any pain.  
Defendant resisted the efforts of the officers to extract him from his vehicle.  After 
defendant was extracted, an ambulance transported him to the hospital, where a 
phlebotomist drew his blood.  Defendant was “[v]ery combative” during the blood 
draw.  His blood tested positive for marijuana and PCP. 
Madison Ruano died from multiple injuries sustained during the collision.  
The first two vertebrae in her neck were fractured, causing her spinal cord to be 
severed from her brain.  Madison’s mother, Tina Ruano, was also seriously 
injured. 
The prosecution offered the testimony of two expert witnesses concerning 
the effects of PCP on a user’s mental state.  David Vidal, a retired senior 
4 
criminalist with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, testified that PCP 
affects a person’s “ability to process data from multiple sources,” and it disrupts 
time and distance perception.  California Highway Patrol Officer Joshua 
Wupperfeld testified that people under the influence of PCP are capable of making 
decisions, but they are more likely to make bad decisions. 
The prosecution also read into the record portions of defendant’s testimony 
from his first trial.  In that testimony, defendant admitted he was the driver of the 
black Toyota and that he was responsible for the collision.  Defendant also 
admitted a “wet reckless” conviction in 1995 (Veh. Code, §§  23103, 23103.5), at 
which time he attended a three-month educational program.  In addition, he 
admitted a driving under the influence conviction in 2001 (Veh. Code, § 23152, 
subd. (b)), at which time he attended an 18-month educational program.  As part 
of these educational programs, defendant was informed of the dangers of driving 
while intoxicated, and he watched graphic videos depicting people who had been 
injured or killed by impaired drivers. 
Defendant further testified that in 2011 and 2012 he had used PCP about 10 
to 15 times.  On October 30, 2011, he was hospitalized for a day because of PCP 
use, and on November 8, 2011, he was arrested for being under the influence of 
PCP.  Defendant also described the events of December 6, 2012, the day of the 
collision that killed Madison Ruano.  Defendant smoked marijuana mixed with 
PCP.  He then fell asleep, waking at about 3:30 or 4:00 in the afternoon.  
Defendant admitted that he next “made a conscious decision to go and retrieve 
[his] keys, to go and drive the car.”  He also admitted that he knew what could 
happen when a person drove while under the influence.  He knew that lives might 
be lost and that families might be destroyed. 
In addition to this transcribed testimony from defendant’s first trial, 
defendant also gave live testimony at his second trial.  He said that on the day of 
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the collision, he smoked marijuana mixed with PCP and had a bad reaction to the 
PCP.  He heard loud voices and felt as if he were being “compressed.”  He went to 
sleep and slept until about 4:00 p.m.  The bad reaction continued, and defendant 
decided to drive to his son’s house.  He testified that his next memory was waking 
up in county jail the following day.  He said that he did not remember starting his 
car, driving, being involved in a collision, being transported in an ambulance, 
having a blood draw at the hospital, being booked into jail, or being interviewed at 
the police station.  Concerning his general awareness of the dangers of driving 
while intoxicated, defendant testified that he did not “process everything [he] had 
learned in the past” or weigh “the good and the bad” when he entered his car to 
drive to his son’s house. 
Relying on People v. Batchelor (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1102 (Batchelor), 
the defense requested that the second jury be instructed that defendant had 
previously been convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter in connection with the 
collision that killed Madison Ruano, thus making clear to the jury that, regardless 
of its verdict on the murder charge, defendant would be held accountable for his 
manifestly wrongful conduct.  The trial court concluded, however, that Batchelor 
was distinguishable.  It declined to give the requested instruction, and the jury 
found defendant guilty of second degree murder. 
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, expressly 
disagreeing with the holding of Batchelor. 
We granted review. 
DISCUSSION 
This case requires us to revisit the distinction between necessarily included 
offenses and lesser related offenses, a distinction we discussed in People v. Birks 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 108 (Birks).  “Under California law, a lesser offense is 
necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the 
6 
greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all 
the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed 
without also committing the lesser.”  (Birks, at p. 117.)  If a lesser offense shares 
some common elements with the greater offense, or if it arises out of the same 
criminal course of conduct as the greater offense, but it has one or more elements 
that are not elements of the greater offense as alleged, then it is a lesser related 
offense, not a necessarily included offense.  (See id. at pp. 119–120.) 
In this case, if the first jury had convicted defendant of an offense that was 
necessarily included within the charge of murder, instead of a lesser related 
offense to murder, retrial of the murder charge would have been barred.  Although 
a jury’s inability to reach a verdict is a well-established exception to the double 
jeopardy bar (see People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 299–300 (Fields)), and 
although there is no implied acquittal when a deadlocked jury convicts on a 
necessarily included offense (id. at pp. 301–305), retrial of a greater offense after a 
defendant has been convicted of a necessarily included offense would be 
tantamount to trying the defendant on the necessarily included offense twice, and a 
conviction on the greater offense under such circumstances would be tantamount 
to convicting the defendant on the necessarily included offense twice.  Therefore, 
we held in Fields that if a jury fails to reach a verdict on a charged offense but 
convicts on a necessarily included offense, and if the conviction is recorded by the 
court and the jury is discharged, retrial of the greater offense is barred under Penal 
Code section 1023.  (Fields, at pp. 310–311; see People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 
589.) 
Here, however, retrial of the murder charge was permitted because the first 
jury, unable to agree as to the murder charge, convicted defendant of lesser related 
offenses, but it did not convict him of any necessarily included offenses.  Of these 
lesser related offenses, the one that was factually closest to the murder charge was 
7 
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, but because defendant’s gross 
vehicular manslaughter conviction required proof of elements that did not need to 
be proved to convict defendant of murder,1 the retrial of the murder charge did not 
constitute a second trial of the gross vehicular manslaughter charge, and the 
conviction on the murder charge did not constitute a second gross vehicular 
manslaughter conviction. 
Defendant argues, however, that it was unfair to him that the retrial jury 
faced what appeared to it to be an all-or-nothing choice between conviction and 
complete exoneration.  In other words, because the retrial jury was only presented 
with the murder charge, and because the trial court declined to inform the jury of 
the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction, the retrial jury was led to believe, 
defendant argues, that it had to convict him of murder to ensure that he would face 
some punishment for his manifestly wrongful actions. 
Defendant relies on cases in which we have discussed the trial court’s sua 
sponte obligation to give instructions on offenses that are necessarily included 
within a charged offense.  We have said that such instructions “encourag[e] the 
most accurate verdict permitted by the pleadings and the evidence.”  (Birks, supra, 
19 Cal.4th at p. 112; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 161 
(Breverman).)  Moreover, we have said that a rule requiring such instructions 
“ensures that the jury will be exposed to the full range of verdict options which . . . 
are presented in the accusatory pleading itself and are thus closely and openly 
                                              
1  
“Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of elements 
that need not be proved when the charge is murder, namely, use of a vehicle and 
intoxication.  Specifically, [Penal Code] section 191.5 requires proof that the 
homicide was committed ‘in the driving of a vehicle’ and that the driving was in 
violation of specified Vehicle Code provisions prohibiting driving while 
intoxicated.”  (People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 989.) 
8 
connected to the case.  In this context, the rule prevents either party, whether by 
design or inadvertence, from forcing an all-or-nothing choice between conviction 
of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete acquittal on the other.  Hence, 
the rule encourages a verdict, within the charge chosen by the prosecution, that is 
neither ‘harsher [n]or more lenient than the evidence merits.’ ”  (Birks, at p. 119; 
see Breverman, at p. 155; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196.)  In this 
connection, we have also emphasized that “ ‘[o]ur courts are not gambling halls 
but forums for the discovery of truth’ ” (Barton, at p. 196, quoting People v. St. 
Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524), implying that an all-or-nothing choice encourages a 
high-risk, high-reward gambler’s approach to criminal justice. 
Defendant argues that these same principles and policies apply here where 
the context is a retrial after a deadlock on a greater offense and a conviction on 
lesser related offenses.  Defendant contends that informing the retrial jury of his 
previous gross vehicular manslaughter conviction will ensure that the jury is not 
misled into believing it faces an all-or-nothing choice between a murder 
conviction and a complete exoneration.  Defendant concedes that the gross 
vehicular manslaughter conviction is a lesser related offense to murder, whereas 
all the cases he relies on involved necessarily included offenses.  He also concedes 
that this court held in Birks that trial courts should deny a defense request for 
instructions on uncharged lesser related offenses.  (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 
112–113, 137.)  But defendant concludes that as to the latter point, Birks is 
distinguishable. 
We reasoned in Birks that granting a defense request for instructions on 
uncharged lesser related offenses would interfere with prosecutorial charging 
discretion, essentially allowing the defendant, not the prosecutor, to choose which 
charges are presented to the jury for decision, thus forcing the prosecution not only 
to prove the charged offenses but also to disprove any uncharged lesser related 
9 
offenses that the defense might propose as an alternative.  (Birks, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at pp. 113, 129–130.)  In other words, Birks makes clear that the goal of 
enabling a jury to return the most accurate verdict that the evidence supports does 
not require that every possible crime a defendant may have committed be 
presented to the jury as an alternative.  Rather, a jury need only be instructed on 
offenses that the prosecution actually charged either explicitly or implicitly 
(because they were necessarily included within explicitly charged offenses). 
Here, defendant acknowledges this court’s reasoning in Birks, but he argues 
that in a case like his, involving retrial of a greater offense after a conviction on a 
lesser related offense, the prosecution in fact charged the lesser related offense, 
and therefore the concern we had in Birks about interfering with prosecutorial 
charging discretion is not implicated.  In such a case, defendant argues, the 
controlling principle should be that of obtaining the most accurate verdict 
supported by the evidence, and therefore the retrial jury should be informed of 
lesser related offenses that resulted in convictions during previous proceedings.  
Doing so, defendant argues, would avoid giving the retrial jury the false 
impression of an all-or-nothing choice. 
We are not persuaded by defendant’s argument. 
At the outset, we note that Penal Code sections 1093 and 1127 authorize a 
trial court to instruct the jury on the law that applies to the issue it is deciding, but 
the trial court may not, generally speaking, instruct the jury on questions of fact.  
Penal Code section 1093, subdivision (f), provides in relevant part:  “The judge 
may . . . charge the jury, and shall do so on any points of law pertinent to the issue, 
if requested by either party; and the judge may . . . declare the law.”  Similarly, 
Penal Code section 1127 provides in relevant part:  “In charging the jury the court 
may instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the case . . . .  
Either party may present to the court any written charge on the law, but not with 
10 
respect to matters of fact, and request that it be given.  If the court thinks it correct 
and pertinent, it must be given; if not, it must be refused.”  (Italics added.)  It is not 
clear that the instruction defendant requested is authorized by these provisions.  
He requested that the jury be instructed about the fact that a previous jury had 
convicted him of gross vehicular manslaughter in connection with evidence before 
the jury.  Sections 1093 and 1127 do not expressly authorize a trial court, as part 
of its power to instruct on the law, to inform the jury of the fact of a previous 
conviction, and section 1127 might be read as barring the court from doing so.  In 
some circumstances, however, a trial court may instruct the jury on an uncontested 
fact.  (See, e.g., Edmonds v. Wilcox (1918) 178 Cal. 222, 223–224; Moore v. 
Pacific Coast Steel Co. (1915) 171 Cal. 489, 491.)  We need not decide whether 
defendant’s requested instruction is authorized by sections 1093 and 1127, or falls 
within the trial court’s inherent authority, because we conclude that the instruction 
was unnecessary, and the instruction we approve in its place is an instruction on 
the law, and hence expressly authorized by sections 1093 and 1127. 
At the heart of this case is the risk that a retrial jury asked to resolve a 
single charge will let considerations of punishment enter into its 
deliberations.  (People v. Nichols (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 21, 24; People v. Holt 
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 458 [“A defendant’s possible punishment is not a proper 
matter for jury consideration.”]; CALCRIM Nos. 101, 3550 [“You must reach 
your verdict without any consideration of punishment.”].)  But this risk can cut 
both ways.  Defendant is obviously disadvantaged if the retrial jury believes it is 
faced with an all-or-nothing choice and convicts him of murder rather than have 
him go unpunished.  Conversely, the People are disadvantaged if the jury is told 
that the defendant has already been convicted of a serious homicide offense and 
then speculates about why, if that is so, the murder charge is being retried, or 
about the punishment defendant will face with or without an additional murder 
11 
conviction.  (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 920 [“ ‘The trial 
court has the duty . . . “to refrain from instructing on principles of law which not 
only are irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence but also have the effect of 
confusing the jury or relieving it from making findings on relevant issues.” ’ ”]; cf. 
Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307, fn. 5 [if retrial of a greater offense were 
permitted after conviction on a necessarily included offense, and if the new jury 
were told of the former conviction, “there exists the potential for juror confusion 
and/or speculation”].) 
Here, the instruction defendant requested did not even-handedly address the 
possibility that the jury’s attention might be diverted from the issue before it — 
guilt or innocence of the charged offense — to the question of punishment, a 
question that is not for the jury to decide.  Moreover, defendant’s concern that his 
retrial jury should not have been given the false impression of an all-or-nothing 
choice could have been adequately addressed by the instruction set forth at the 
beginning of this opinion.  Specifically, the trial court could have informed the 
retrial jury that cases are sometimes tried in segments, and it could have clarified 
the question at issue in the segment then before the jury, admonishing the jurors 
not to consider punishment or the possibility that defendant might be held 
criminally responsible in some other segment of the proceedings.  Such an 
instruction would have prevented the retrial jury from wrongly assuming that an 
acquittal on the murder charge would mean defendant escaped criminal liability 
altogether, and it would have done so without unnecessarily confusing the jury or 
focusing its attention on extraneous matters.2 
                                              
2  
The dissent says:  “[T]here is no reason why trial courts, in giving the 
instruction set forth in today’s opinion, could not add the following sentence:  
‘You are not to assume that an acquittal on the murder charge would result in the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
12 
Defendant relies on Batchelor, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 1102.  In Batchelor, 
as here, a jury convicted the defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter while 
intoxicated, but it failed to reach a verdict on a charge of murder.  As here, the trial 
court denied the defendant’s request that the retrial jury be informed of the gross 
vehicular manslaughter conviction.  The prosecutor then implied in argument to 
the retrial jury that an acquittal would mean the defendant went unpunished.  
Specifically, the prosecutor said:  “ ‘And now is the time that you have to hold this 
person accountable.  Now is the time that you have to send the message that you 
drink and drive and kill someone, you’re going to be held accountable.  There is 
only one count in this case that you have to decide on.  This is it.  Hold him 
accountable for killing someone.’ ”  (Batchelor, at p. 1117, italics added.)  In other 
words, the prosecutor led the jury to believe that convicting the defendant of 
murder was the only opportunity to hold him accountable for his actions. 
The appellate court in Batchelor reversed the defendant’s murder 
conviction and remanded for a new trial.  The court held that the trial court had 
erred by instructing the jury in a manner that gave the false impression of an all-
or-nothing choice, and the court added that the prosecutor’s misleading argument 
had compounded the error.  (Batchelor, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1116–
1117.)  The court also suggested that the best solution on remand was for the trial 
court to inform the retrial jury that the defendant had previously been convicted of 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
defendant escaping criminal liability altogether, nor are you to consider whether a 
conviction would result in the defendant receiving excessive punishment.’ ”  (Dis. 
opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 4.)  The added sentence is, however, unnecessary.  The 
instruction we approve today already makes the same point, and it does so without 
repeatedly focusing on the question of punishment:  the very topic the jury is not 
to consider. 
13 
gross vehicular manslaughter.  (Id. at p. 1117.)  For reasons already discussed, we 
disagree that a retrial jury should be so informed.  The only reason the Batchelor 
court gave for informing the retrial jury of the previous conviction was its concern 
that the jury should not be given the false impression of an all-or-nothing choice.  
(Ibid.)  But the instruction we approve today would have been adequate to dispel 
that false impression, and it would have done so without confusing the retrial jury 
with extraneous information. 
In People v. Johnson (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 505 (Johnson), the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed its holding in Batchelor, and it went further.  Johnson was 
factually similar to both Batchelor and this case — a retrial after a jury hung on 
second degree murder but convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while 
intoxicated.  But in Johnson, the trial court informed the prospective jurors during 
voir dire for the retrial that there had been a previous trial arising from the same 
underlying facts, that the defendant had been convicted of “ ‘two of the three 
charges brought by the district attorney’ ” (Johnson, at p. 510), and that the jury’s 
task would be to “ ‘address the one count that was left unresolved in the first 
trial’ ” (ibid.).  The Court of Appeal concluded that those comments were 
insufficient to dispel the false impression of an all-or-nothing choice between a 
murder conviction and a complete exoneration.  (Ibid.)  The court held that despite 
the trial court’s detailed description of the context of the proceeding then before 
the jury, and despite the fact that the prosecutor did not mislead the jury about the 
effect of an acquittal, the trial court nonetheless erred by not informing the jury of 
the previous gross vehicular manslaughter conviction.  (Id. at pp. 510–511.)  The 
court reasoned that “[t]he defense was . . . placed in a substantially weaker 
rhetorical position in the retrial,” because counsel could not ask the jury to convict 
the defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter instead of murder, and because 
14 
counsel could not tell the jury that defendant had been so convicted.  (Id. at p. 
511.) 
We think the information the trial court gave the prospective jurors in 
Johnson, informing them that the defendant had previously been convicted of 
“ ‘two of the three charges’ ” (Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 510), was 
sufficient to dispel the false impression of an all-or-nothing choice, and it avoided 
any disadvantage to the defendant from being unable to urge a vehicular 
manslaughter conviction.  Therefore, we disagree with the Johnson Court of 
Appeal that the trial court in that case needed to inform the jury specifically of the 
previous gross vehicular manslaughter conviction.3 
Defendant further argues that a rule requiring the trial court, upon request, 
to inform a retrial jury of the specifics of previous convictions on lesser related 
offenses would be analogous to the well-settled rule requiring the trial court, upon 
request and when relevant, to inform the jury that a verdict of not guilty by reason 
of insanity (NGI) will not result in the defendant going free.  (See People v. 
Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 625–626; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
495, 538; People v. Moore (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 540, 556; CALCRIM No. 
3450.)  The analogy to NGI cases is to a certain extent an apt one.  There, as here, 
the concern is that a jury, although instructed not to consider punishment, might 
nonetheless have the consequences of its verdict in mind, and it might decide 
against returning an NGI verdict because it imagines that the defendant, who has 
done a manifestly wrongful act, will go free.  The NGI instruction ensures that the 
jury does not make that mistake, and thus it ensures a more accurate verdict.  
                                              
3  
Insofar as the reasoning of either People v. Batchelor, supra, 229 
Cal.App.4th 1102 or People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th 505 is inconsistent 
with the views expressed herein, we disapprove those decisions. 
15 
Likewise, the instruction we approve today ensures that retrial juries do not 
wrongly assume that they are presented with an all-or-nothing choice between 
conviction and complete exoneration, and it finds support in the NGI cases.  But 
defendant draws too strong a conclusion from the NGI analogy.  The instruction 
we approve today is adequate to dispel any incorrect assumption that the retrial 
jury might make, and therefore there is no need for the trial court to inform the 
jury of the specific convictions a defendant has already suffered in connection 
with the facts presented at the retrial.  To that extent, the analogy defendant draws 
to the NGI cases is a false one. 
Here, the defense requested a specific instruction informing the jury of his 
gross vehicular manslaughter conviction, and the trial court refused such an 
instruction, stating that it was “going to preclude any reference to the prior trial, or 
the prior verdict.”  In light of the court’s broad statement, defendant cannot be 
faulted for failing to request an instruction like the one we approve today, and 
therefore, we must consider the question of prejudice. 
First, we conclude that the Watson prejudice standard applicable to state 
law error applies in this context.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  
In a noncapital case, the trial court’s failure to instruct on necessarily included 
offenses is reviewed for prejudice under the Watson standard.  (See Breverman, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 164–178.)  Here, defendant is arguing that the trial court 
failed to instruct on lesser related offenses, and it follows from the logic of our 
analysis in Breverman that such an error should likewise be reviewed for prejudice 
under the Watson standard.  Accordingly, in evaluating prejudice, the relevant 
inquiry is whether it is “reasonably probable” defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable result had the trial court given the instruction we approve today.  
(Watson, at p. 836.)  We conclude that it is not. 
16 
By defendant’s own admission, he drove at 80 miles per hour through a red 
light in a densely populated urban area during the weekday rush hour.  Doing so 
can be likened to shooting a gun into a crowd; it is manifestly an act dangerous to 
human life.  Thus, the only real issue was whether defendant acted intentionally, 
knowing the danger and consciously disregarding it.  (See, e.g., People v. Landry 
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 52; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 601–603.)  We need 
not reiterate here all the evidence presented to the retrial jury, but it is particularly 
significant that during the chase preceding the fatal collision, defendant ignored 
both red lights and the sirens of pursuing law enforcement officers, and he also 
nearly hit several vehicles.  Those are events that would tend to put a person on 
notice that he or she is driving in a dangerous manner, and there is no reason to 
conclude that they did not put defendant on such notice. 
Significantly, consistent with CALJIC No. 4.20, the jury here was 
instructed that defendant’s voluntary intoxication was not a defense.  Likewise, 
defense counsel did not rely on defendant’s intoxication, and the prosecution 
argued to the jury, without objection, that intoxication was not a defense.  There is 
no reason why any of those circumstances would have changed if the trial court 
had given the jury the instruction we approve today, an instruction that has nothing 
to do with intoxication evidence.  Accordingly, in assessing prejudice, we consider 
only the evidence and theories actually presented to the jury, and there is no 
reasonable probability that the jury would have used the fact of defendant’s 
voluntary intoxication to conclude that he did not act intentionally, did not know 
of the danger he was creating by his actions, or did not consciously disregard that 
danger. 
Moreover, defendant’s admissions and also his actions immediately before 
and after the fatal collision strongly support the conclusion that he was fully 
capable of acting intentionally and, in fact, did so.  Defendant testified that he 
17 
“made a conscious decision to go and retrieve [his] keys, to go and drive the car,” 
and he did so despite a general awareness that lives might be lost if a person drives 
while intoxicated.  Defendant then proceeded to drive in a manner that, although 
erratic and dangerous, demonstrated clear intentionality.  For example, after 
coming to a temporary halt at the curb, defendant was approached by a sheriff’s 
deputy, and he acknowledged the presence of the deputy before speeding away.4  
And after the collision, when sheriff’s deputies approached defendant’s vehicle, 
they found him alert and oriented, despite signs of intoxication.  He was aware that 
he had been in a collision, that he was wearing a seatbelt, that he had run a red 
light, and that he was not in any pain.  That fact that he was aware, immediately 
after the collision, that he had run a red light is particularly noteworthy; it strongly 
supports the conclusion that defendant acted knowingly and with conscious 
                                              
4  
The dissent argues that defendant lacked the ability to act with intention 
because he was hanging his body halfway out of the car window, screaming, 
talking to himself, reaching in the air, and seemed oblivious to the presence of law 
enforcement officers.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 5.)  The dissent also draws a 
distinction between evidence of defendant’s intoxication and evidence of 
defendant’s behavior, arguing that his behavior, without reference to its cause, is 
relevant to show his mental state.  (Id. at p. 6.)  The behavior that the dissent 
identifies suggests a certain cavalier exuberance, but it does not, in itself, prove 
that defendant was unable to act with intention, and in the context of this case, it 
can support such an inference only if the dissent’s theory is that it indicates 
intoxication.  Thus, the dissent’s distinction between intoxication evidence and 
behavior evidence does not withstand scrutiny.  Defendant did not argue 
intoxication as a defense, nor did he argue that his exuberant behavior, irrespective 
of his intoxication, indicated an inability to act intentionally.  The jury was 
instructed not to consider voluntary intoxication as a defense, and the prosecution 
highlighted that point during closing argument, without objection.  Under those 
circumstances, there is simply no reasonable probability that the jury would have 
relied on defendant’s behavior and admitted intoxication as a reason to reject a 
finding of implied malice. 
   
18 
disregard of any danger.5  Defendant also actively resisted the officers who 
extracted him from his vehicle and the medical personnel who drew his blood, 
again proving his ability to make decisions (albeit poor ones) and to act with 
intentionality. 
And defendant was also fully informed of the dangers of driving while 
intoxicated.  He had previously suffered convictions for alcohol-related reckless 
driving (Veh. Code, §§ 23103, 23103.5) and driving under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and after both convictions, he had 
attended educational programs related to the dangers of driving while intoxicated.  
In connection with these programs, defendant had also watched graphic videos 
depicting actual traffic collisions caused by impaired drivers.  In addition, 
                                              
5  
The dissent attempts to show that the evidence that defendant was alert and 
oriented immediately after the collision was equivocal.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, 
at pp. 5–6.)  It was not.  When the emergency medical technician arrived on the 
scene, he assessed defendant’s mental state using the Glasgow Coma Scale, which 
tests eye, verbal, and motor responses.  Defendant had a perfect score, indicating a 
“normal level of consciousness.”  Next, in accordance with county protocol, a 
paramedic assessed whether defendant was “alert and oriented,” meaning that 
defendant was asked four questions (his name, location, activity, and a simple 
question like, “Who’s the President?”).  Defendant was able to answer the 
questions correctly, receiving the highest score.  And, as noted, defendant knew 
that he was wearing a seatbelt, that he had run a red light, and that he was not in 
pain.  To undermine this evidence, the dissent points out that, 15 minutes later, 
when defendant was riding in the ambulance, he claimed not to remember what 
had happened and he wanted to know why he was in the ambulance.  It was the 
technician’s impression at the time that defendant was malingering, but even if 
defendant had in fact lost his memory during the intervening 15 minutes, that fact 
is irrelevant.  What is relevant is that immediately after the collision, defendant 
was “alert and oriented” and knew he had run a red light, which strongly suggests 
that he knew what he was doing when he was doing it.  The dissent also notes that 
after the collision, defendant exhibited the typical behavior of someone under the 
influence of PCP, including a blank stare and emotional volatility.  Again, the 
dissent does not seem to appreciate that the jury was instructed not to consider 
evidence of voluntary intoxication as a defense. 
19 
defendant signed a driver’s license form, certifying:  “If I drive while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or both and as a result, a person is killed, I can be 
charged with murder.”  Defendant also conceded in his testimony that he knew the 
risks associated with impaired driving.  The only evidence he offered that tended 
to negate implied malice was his testimony that he did not “process everything 
[he] had learned in the past” or weigh “the good and the bad” when he decided to 
drive on the day of the collision, and that he had no recollection of events from the 
time he entered the black Toyota to the time he woke up in jail.  But this self-
serving testimony stands in contrast to the evidence that immediately after the 
collision, defendant knew he had just run a red light.  The test for implied malice is 
whether a defendant had the required mental state at the time of his or her actions, 
which defendant clearly did; it does not matter if he later forgot it all. 
Furthermore, there is no indication that the jury was concerned about an all-
or-nothing verdict, or that it wondered about other possible offenses defendant 
might have committed.  During deliberations, the jury asked the court for 
definitions of “conscious disregard and knowledge.”  That question indicates that 
the jury’s focus was on defendant’s mental state, the only real factual issue in the 
case.  Thus, nothing suggests that the jury was concerned about anything other 
than the evidence as it related to the charge it was asked to resolve. 
Finally, although defense counsel was not able to point out in argument to 
the jury that defendant had previously been convicted of gross vehicular 
manslaughter in connection with the evidence presented at trial, counsel was 
permitted to argue (and did argue) that defendant was guilty of lesser offenses than 
murder, and that it was specifically the murder charge that went too far.  Thus, 
counsel told the jury:  “There are probably 30 other charges I could think of and I 
would have nothing to say.  I would stand here and say he is absolutely guilty of 
it.  [¶]  But murder, ladies and gentlemen, there is a dispute here.”  That argument 
20 
tended to minimize any disadvantage counsel faced as a result of the trial court’s 
failure to give the instruction we approve today.6 
In summary, we see no basis for finding prejudice.  The evidence was 
overwhelming both as to the objective dangerousness of defendant’s behavior and 
as to his mental state.  Defendant acted with complete disregard for human life, 
and he did so in an alert state of mind.  He admitted a general awareness that his 
actions were dangerous.  Moreover, he demonstrated, while driving, his ability to 
make intentional decisions, and his comments immediately after the fatal collision 
indicated his full awareness of the intentional decisions he had just made, 
including driving through a red light.  It is therefore not “reasonably probable” 
(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836) that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict if it had been instructed in the manner we approve today. 
 
 
                                              
6  
Before closing arguments, the trial court spoke with defense counsel 
concerning counsel’s argument.  The court said:  “[A] passing reference . . . to, 
[‘]There may be other charges that they might have proven but they are not 
charged here, this is the only one you have to concern yourself with’; I don’t have 
an issue with that.”  (Italics added.)  In other words, the court expressly permitted 
defense counsel to tell the jury essentially what the instruction we approve today 
would have told the jury, namely, that the prosecution “might have proven” “other 
charges” in a separate proceeding, but those other charges “are not charged here,” 
and the jurors need not be “concern[ed]” with them.  Counsel did not think these 
specific points were so important that he needed to convey them to the jury.  
Nonetheless, the dissent is now arguing that it was prejudicial error for the trial 
court not to have conveyed to the jury essentially the same points. 
21 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
MOORE, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
*       Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division 
Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
The court recognizes that an important concern in this case is to “prevent 
the [retrial] jury from wrongly assuming that an acquittal on the murder charge 
would result in the defendant escaping criminal liability altogether.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 1–2.)  Yet today’s opinion holds that the trial court, in addressing this 
concern, would have erred if it had informed the retrial jury that a previous jury 
had convicted defendant Marvin Travon Hicks of gross vehicular manslaughter.  
(Id. at p. 1.)  I respectfully disagree.  Upon Hicks’s request, the trial court should 
have informed the jury that he had already been convicted of gross vehicular 
manslaughter.  Further, the trial court’s error in instructing the jury was prejudicial 
in light of the evidence in this case. 
I. 
In assessing the merits of Hicks’s requested instruction, today’s opinion is 
correct that “[d]efendant is obviously disadvantaged if the retrial jury believes it is 
faced with an all-or-nothing choice and convicts him of murder rather than have 
him go unpunished.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)  But the court further states that 
“the People are disadvantaged if the jury is told that the defendant has already 
been convicted of a serious homicide offense and then speculates about why, if 
that is so, the murder charge is being retried, or about the punishment defendant 
will face with or without an additional murder conviction.”  (Id. at pp. 10–11.)  Of 
course, if the jury had been told of Hicks’s prior conviction, the prosecution may 
2 
have been “disadvantaged” compared to a scenario in which the jury had not been 
told.  (Id. at p. 10)   But that is not the relevant comparison. 
Fairness to the parties means they should have been put, to the extent 
possible, in the same position at the retrial as at the first trial.  Not telling the 
retrial jury of Hicks’s prior conviction may have led that jury to believe it faced an 
all-or-nothing choice that the first jury clearly did not face.  This significantly 
altered the complexion of the case for Hicks from the first trial to the second trial.  
By contrast, it is not clear that telling the retrial jury of Hicks’s prior conviction 
would have resulted in such a significant change for the prosecution from the first 
trial to the second.  True, telling the retrial jury of Hicks’s prior conviction would 
have conveyed certainty as to whether he would be punished, a certainty not 
present in the first trial.  But once the first jury had decided that Hicks was guilty 
of gross vehicular manslaughter, the first jury — like a retrial jury told of Hicks’s 
prior conviction — may have “speculate[d] about why . . . the murder charge 
[was] being [pursued], or about the punishment defendant [would] face with or 
without an additional murder conviction.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10–11.) 
The trial court’s refusal to give Hicks’s requested instruction disadvantaged 
the defense to a greater extent than the court acknowledges.  In the first trial, 
Hicks essentially conceded the elements of gross vehicular manslaughter in an 
effort to avoid conviction on the murder charge.  The prosecution then used 
Hicks’s admissions and stipulations to its advantage in the retrial, while Hicks 
could not.  The prosecution opened the retrial by reading back portions of the 
transcript in Hicks’s first trial:  “His words, not mine.  His words . . . . ‘I’m 
responsible.  I was the driver.’  These are words from Mr. Hicks at a prior 
proceeding.”  Hicks, by contrast, could no longer pursue a strategy of conceding a 
lesser offense in order to avoid conviction on the greater offense.  Instead, defense 
counsel could only say:  “There are probably 30 other charges I could think of and 
3 
I would have nothing to say.  I would stand here and say he is absolutely guilty of 
it.  I could stand here and think of charges involving killing that don’t rise to the 
level of murder and I would stand here and say he is absolutely guilty of 
it.  [¶]  But murder, ladies and gentlemen, there is a dispute here.”  (In light of this 
statement, it is untrue that defense counsel “did not think [the possibility of other 
charges was] so important that he needed to convey them to the jury.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 20, fn. 6).)  Unlike the prosecution, which enjoyed the advantage of 
using Hicks’s prior admissions at the retrial, Hicks suffered the disadvantage of 
having no means to bring his admissions to bear on his trial strategy, as he did at 
the first trial. 
The instruction Hicks requested will not always be advantageous to a 
defendant facing a retrial on a greater charge.  The instruction may ease the 
prosecution’s burden of proof, and it may encourage a jury that is not concerned 
about “over-punishment” to convict on the greater charge.  It is not difficult to 
imagine why a defendant might opt not to request the instruction.  But in cases 
such as this one, where the defendant concedes elements of a lesser charge at the 
first trial in order to avoid conviction on a greater charge, the parties’ positions at 
the retrial will more closely approximate their positions at the first trial if the court 
gives the instruction than if it does not.  Here, the trial court should have given the 
instruction upon Hicks’s request. 
Today’s opinion mentions Penal Code sections 1093 and 1127 but reaches 
no conclusion as to whether they prohibit a trial court from giving the kind of 
instruction Hicks requested.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9–10.)  It is doubtful these 
statutes present any obstacle here; both statutes authorize a trial court to “make 
such comment on the evidence . . . as in his or her opinion is necessary for the 
proper determination of the case.”  (Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. (f); see id., § 1127.)  
This language appears broad enough to permit a trial court, in the circumstances 
4 
here, to inform the jury that the evidence resulted in a prior conviction on a related 
offense.  The Attorney General does not rely on these statutes, and neither does 
today’s opinion. 
Instead of permitting an instruction that forthrightly informs the jury of a 
prior conviction and admonishes the jury to disregard it, today’s opinion 
authorizes an instruction that says:  “Nor are you to speculate about whether the 
defendant may have been, or may be, held criminally responsible for his conduct 
in some other segment of the proceedings.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.)  One might 
wonder whether telling the jury not to speculate about what “may have” happened 
or what “may” happen in the future is prone to encourage precisely such 
speculation.  But if we presume the jury can follow that instruction, then there is 
no reason why the jury could not also follow an instruction that identifies the prior 
conviction, thereby eliminating speculation, and admonishes the jury to disregard 
the prior conviction in deciding the defendant’s guilt or innocence on the current 
charge. 
At the very least, there is no reason why trial courts, in giving the 
instruction set forth in today’s opinion, could not add the following sentence:  
“You are not to assume that an acquittal on the murder charge would result in the 
defendant escaping criminal liability altogether, nor are you to consider whether a 
conviction would result in the defendant receiving excessive punishment.”  This 
sentence, the first part of which is taken virtually verbatim from the court’s 
opinion (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1–2, 11), simply makes explicit what the court 
says is the intended message of its formulated instruction. 
II. 
Even assuming that the limited instruction set forth in today’s opinion was 
all that the trial court should have given in this case, I disagree with the court’s 
5 
conclusion that there is no reasonable probability Hicks would have obtained a 
more favorable result had the trial court given the instruction. 
The evidence of implied malice required for second degree murder is closer 
in this case than the court suggests.  Before the collision, Hicks lost traction and 
came to a temporary halt.  Today’s opinion notes that Hicks acknowledged the 
presence of a sheriff’s deputy at that time before speeding away, thereby 
suggesting that Hicks was capable of acting with intention.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 16–17.)  However, the evidence also indicates that during this stop Hicks was 
hanging halfway out of the driver’s window, jerking and flopping around, 
screaming and mumbling incomprehensibly, and looking around and reaching out 
“like he was trying to grab stuff in the air.”  Although several deputies ordered 
Hicks to put his hands up, Hicks did not comply.  At times, he seemed oblivious to 
the deputies’ presence altogether. 
Today’s opinion suggests that Hicks was alert and oriented after the 
collision, and that he was aware he had run a red light.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3, 
16–18.)  This conclusion is based on the testimony of an emergency medical 
technician who indicated that Hicks was able to recall his name, location, and the 
time of day within minutes of the collision.  But the same technician also testified 
that Hicks “didn’t know what was going on” during the ambulance ride to the 
hospital and that Hicks kept asking why he was there and what was going on for 
the entire ride.  The technician further testified that Hicks was unable to recount 
any details of the collision when asked, including whether he had been wearing a 
seatbelt or had run a red light.  Moreover, a sheriff’s deputy testified that Hicks 
was unresponsive for up to a minute after the collision and that Hicks had a blank 
stare on his face and lacerations on his head.  According to the deputy, Hicks was 
“in his own world” and was “looking through” the deputies immediately after the 
collision, alternating between being angry and smiling, and not seeming to 
6 
understand he had been in a collision and needed to be taken to a hospital.  This 
evidence casts doubt on whether Hicks had the requisite intent or was sufficiently 
aware of his behavior and its potential consequences to support an implied malice 
finding. 
The court says this evidence of Hicks’s behavior can support an inference 
that he was unable to act with intention “only if the dissent’s theory is that it 
indicates intoxication.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17, fn. 4.)  I do not see why that is 
so.  Hicks did not argue voluntary intoxication as a defense at trial, and the jury 
was instructed not to consider voluntary intoxication as a defense.  But separate 
and apart from the fact of Hicks’s intoxication, both parties presented evidence of 
Hicks’s behavior (whatever its cause) around the time of the collision because it is 
relevant to his mental state.  The parties recognize the relevance of such evidence 
in their briefing, as does today’s opinion in its reliance on Hicks’s “actions 
immediately before and after the fatal collision” in assessing whether he acted 
intentionally.  (Id. at p. 16.) 
Given the closeness of the evidence, it is not surprising that the first jury 
deadlocked on the murder charge.  (See In re Richards (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291, 320 
(conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [citing cases recognizing that prior hung juries can be 
relevant to the determination of prejudice].)  Notably, the prosecution did not 
present much in the way of new or different evidence at the retrial.  Among the six 
new witnesses put forward by the prosecution, the Attorney General identifies 
only three who purportedly made the case stronger for the prosecution.  The first 
testified that Hicks was alert and conscious after the collision, but uncontroverted 
testimony to that effect had already been given by another witness in the first trial.  
The second was a motorcyclist who testified that Hicks had yelled “[y]ou guys are 
stupid . . . [g]et out of my way” when he passed him prior to the collision; it is 
unclear how that is probative of implied malice.  And the third witness provided 
7 
expert testimony that people under the influence of phencyclidine are capable of 
making decisions, although they may be poor ones.  But testimony to this effect 
had been given by another expert at the first trial.  In short, none of the new 
evidence was materially different or more probative as to the elements of second 
degree murder. 
What was different between the first trial and the second was that the 
defense could no longer concede elements of gross vehicular manslaughter in the 
hope that the jury would convict him of that homicide charge and not murder.  
Defense counsel could only allude in the abstract to “30 other charges” (besides 
murder) that his client would “absolutely be guilty” of.  And the trial judge 
admonished Hicks before he took the stand, warning him not to mention the prior 
trial, not to use the word “trial” when referring to his prior testimony, and not to 
talk about what he was convicted of or the fact that this was a retrial.  On the other 
hand, the prosecutor could and did turn this restriction into an advantage.  The 
prosecutor read back Hicks’s admission of guilt that he was “responsible.”  And 
after confirming that Hicks believed people should be personally responsible for 
their actions, the prosecutor asked Hicks:  “And you’re saying to this jury that you 
should be personally accountable for the crash shown here in [this photograph]?”  
Hicks could only reply that he was responsible for the crash without explaining 
that he had been held accountable for it through a homicide conviction.  In his 
closing statement, the prosecutor told the jury:  “Remember, I talked to all of you 
in voir dire about the idea of personal accountability.”  He went on to state that 
each juror had confirmed he or she would be willing to hold a wrongdoer 
“personally accountable for what they’ve done.”  These statements may have led 
the jury to believe that only they could hold Hicks accountable for his actions. 
On this record, it is reasonably probable that Hicks would have obtained a 
more favorable result if the jury had been informed of his prior manslaughter 
8 
conviction or even if the jury had been given the instruction set forth in today’s 
opinion.  Accordingly, Hicks’s murder conviction should be vacated. 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Hicks 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 243 Cal.App.4th 343 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S232218 
Date Filed: December 28, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Kathleen Blanchard 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Kim Malcheski, under appointment by the 
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Deputy State Solicitor 
General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Steven E. Mercer, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Esther P. Kim, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Nancy Gaynor 
California Appellate Project 
520 S. Grand Avenue, 4th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 243-0300 
 
Esther P. Kim 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2872