Title: B-F Drilling, Inc. v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

B-F Drilling, Inc. v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1997 WY 89942 P.2d 392Case Number: 96-134Decided: 07/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

B-F 
DRILLING, INC., Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel.,

WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
Appellee (Respondent).

                                

 

 

Appeal from District Court, Natrona County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

    

 

  Stephenson D. Emery of Williams, Porter, 
Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for Appellant. 

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; John 
W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, and LEHMAN, JJ., and PRICE, District 
Judge.

 

    TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice. 

 [¶1]        B-F Drilling, Inc. appeals the 
denial of worker's compensation benefits for its employee, Scott House, who was 
injured while working in Louisiana ten days after his hire. After a contested 
case hearing, the hearing examiner issued an order denying benefits, finding 
that the employee was permanently assigned outside of Wyoming. The hearing examiner also found 
that the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division was not estopped by 
acceptance of premium payments for the employee after it denied 
coverage.

 

 [¶2]        We affirm.

 

I. ISSUES

 

[¶3]          We decline to reiterate the 
issues as presented by B-F Drilling due to their unnecessary length and 
argumentative nature. The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division 
(Division) presents the same issues in a more succinct 
version:

 

A. Whether the hearing examiner's determination that 
Claimant was permanently assigned outside the state of Wyoming when injured is 
supported by substantial evidence.

 

B. Whether the hearing examiner erred in not 
assigning to the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division the burden of 
proving Claimant is not entitled to benefits in the state where he was 
injured.

 

C. Whether the hearing examiner erred in concluding 
that the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division is not estopped from 
denying extraterritorial coverage in this case.

 

D. Whether Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-204(b) provides an 
alternate basis for awarding Claimant workers' compensation 
benefits.

 

II. FACTS

 

 [¶4]        B-F Drilling is a seismograph 
exploration company which performs most of its work at drilling sites, with its 
base of operations in the Bergeron family home in Casper, Wyoming. Scott House 
(House)1 was severely injured on October 23, 
1994 while working for B-F Drilling on a job located in Minden, Louisiana.  Only ten days earlier, Charlene Bergeron 
(Bergeron), the corporate secretary, had hired House via a telephone call with 
House at his home in Dewey, Oklahoma. He was immediately assigned to work in 
Minden, Louisiana. Bergeron and House testified that at the time he was hired, 
they agreed he would move to Wyoming after he completed the job in Louisiana. 
After his injury, however, House returned to Oklahoma where he 
remained.

 

 [¶5]        House filled out a Report of 
Occupational Injury or Disease on October 27, 1994. The report of injury 
designated House as an Oklahoma resident and indicated the injury occurred in 
Minden, Louisiana. On November 7, 1994, the Division issued a final 
determination denying House's claim for benefits, stating "[t]he employee is not a Wyoming resident and 
is not permanently assigned to Wyoming pursuant to Wyoming Statute 
27-14-306(a)." Four days later, on November 11, 1994, B-F Drilling submitted its 
monthly premium payment to the Division with a payroll report listing House as 
one of its covered employees for the month of October 1994. The Division 
accepted the payment. B-F Drilling then objected to the final determination on 
November 16, 1994.

 

 [¶6]        A contested case hearing was held 
on September 19, 1995. The Division presented no witnesses at the hearing, but 
cross-examined House and Bergeron. Cross-examination of Bergeron revealed that 
B-F Drilling had not had a job in Wyoming since 1991. The last contract received 
by B-F Drilling was the job in Minden, Louisiana which was completed in March 
1995. Since that time, B-F Drilling's only permanent employees were Don and Doug 
Bergeron.

 

 [¶7]        During House's cross-examination, 
he testified that his permanent address prior to his injury was in Dewey, 
Oklahoma, and that it had been his home for his entire life. House stated his 
children lived in Dewey, and his cars have always been registered in Oklahoma. 
At the time he was hired, House knew B-F Drilling had no work in Wyoming, and he 
anticipated he would be working in the southern part of the United States. At no 
time did he investigate housing in Wyoming or take any other steps to prepare 
for relocation.

 

  [¶8]      The hearing examiner issued an Order 
Denying Benefits on October 20, 1995, concluding that the Division had shown by 
a preponderance of the evidence that House was permanently assigned outside 
Wyoming. B-F Drilling filed a petition for review with the district court, and 
the district court affirmed the hearing examiner's Order Denying Benefits. B-F 
Drilling then filed its notice of appeal to this court.

 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶9]      When reviewing an agency action, we 
accord no special deference to the district court's decision, instead reviewing 
the action as if it proceeded directly to us from the agency. Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). Our review of the 
factual determinations of an agency is conducted under the substantial evidence 
standard. Id. at 876. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of an agency's conclusion so long as it 
is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Cronk v. City of Cody, 897 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 1995). If evidence in the record provides a rational basis for the 
findings of fact made by the agency, we will affirm those findings. Aanenson v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 
1992) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 1992)). Our standard of review differs, however, when 
reviewing a conclusion of law. We do not defer to the agency's decision, but 
correct the agency's conclusion if it is not in accordance with the law. 
Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1079 (quoting Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Western 
Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1990)).

 

IV. DISCUSSION

 

 [¶10]     To dispose of all claims in this 
appeal, only two issues must be addressed: (1) whether the hearing examiner 
erred in concluding that the Division demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that House "was permanently assigned outside of Wyoming," thus 
precluding entitlement to Wyoming worker's compensation benefits pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-204(a) (Cum.Supp. 1995); and (2) whether the Division was 
estopped from denying benefits by accepting B-F Drilling's premiums in November 
1994 and January 1995 which included House as an employee.2

 

    A. PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT 
OUTSIDE OF WYOMING

 

 [¶11]     The parties agree that the 
Division carries the burden of proof to show House's assignment was permanently 
outside of Wyoming. B-F Drilling contends that in order to meet its burden, the 
Division was legally required to present "positive" evidence and "could not rely 
on cross-examination" to make its case. We disagree. We see no reason to require 
the Division to call the same witnesses to repeat testimony covered in 
cross-examination. If the record demonstrates that the hearing examiner's 
conclusion is supported by substantial 
evidence, it makes no difference whether the support is found in direct or 
cross-examination.

 

 [¶12]     B-F Drilling also asserts the 
hearing examiner twice failed to apply the correct rule of law to the facts. 
First, B-F Drilling argues the hearing examiner erred when he "ignored" the 
presumptions found in the Division's Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, ch. 
6, § 4(c)(i) and (ii). Chapter 6, § 4(c) of the Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules provides, in 
relevant part:

 

[A] worker will be presumed to have been permanently 
assigned or transferred outside of Wyoming if any of the following 
apply:

 

(i) 
The worker has been assigned to a work site outside of Wyoming continuously for 
a period of at least six (6) months prior to the date of the injury; 
or

 

(ii) The worker has been assigned and has worked at a 
work site outside of the State of Wyoming for more than two-thirds of the 
workdays in the year before the injury; however, this subparagraph (ii) shall 
not apply to workers hired in Wyoming for work that is contemplated at the time of hire to be transitory 
without a fixed employment site in another state.

 

 [¶13]     B-F Drilling argues that since 
House's work was transitory, the Division's failure to prove that House was 
assigned to work in Louisiana for a period of six months gives rise to a legal 
presumption that House was not assigned outside of the state.  This argument confuses the meaning of a 
legal presumption. A legal presumption 
is "a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of basic fact gives 
rise to existence of presumed fact, until presumption is rebutted." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1185 (6th ed. 1990). Although a demonstration of the "basic facts" 
enumerated in the rules would establish a legal presumption, the failure to establish these facts does not give rise 
to a reverse presumption. Neither do the rules preclude the presentation of an 
alternative basis for a factual finding that an employee was permanently 
assigned outside of Wyoming. Therefore, if the Division presented sufficient 
evidence to substantiate the hearing examiner's conclusion, the Division's 
failure to prove the facts identified in the rules did not legally require a 
finding in favor of B-F Drilling.

 

[¶14]      B-F Drilling also alleges that the 
hearing examiner failed to apply the rule that "[t]he domicil of an itinerant 
worker `depends on the intent of the party, . . .' 25 Am.Jur.2d Domicil, § 46 
(1966)." We find this contention contrary to the record. The hearing examiner 
specifically noted the testimony of House and Bergeron regarding the intent to 
move House to Wyoming, but found that "it is simply not believed." The hearing 
examiner continued, "[t]he surrounding facts and evidence do not support this 
contention, and it is found to be more likely than not the Claimant was intended 
to be permanently assigned outside of Wyoming." Finding no legal error, we 
review the hearing examiner's decision under a sufficiency of the evidence 
standard.

 

 [¶15]     The following evidence was 
considered persuasive by the hearing examiner. Bergeron testified that B-F 
Drilling had no work in Wyoming since 1991. House was assigned to work in 
Louisiana, and it was expected that House would work in Texas, Oklahoma and 
Louisiana. There was no evidence that he would perform any work in Wyoming. 
Although Bergeron testified that B-F Drilling wanted to have a "permanent 
employee" in Wyoming, the company did not hire a replacement for House after his 
injury. Moreover, House testified he had lived in Oklahoma all of his life, and 
his driver's license and car registration continued to list Oklahoma as his 
permanent address. At the time he was hired, he understood he would work in 
Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma, and at no time took any action consistent with an 
intent to move to Wyoming.

  

[¶16]       The hearing examiner is in 
the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Matter of Corman, 
909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 1996); Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1995); Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
881 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Wyo. 1994). In this case, the hearing examiner specifically questioned 
the credibility of House and Bergeron regarding the intent to relocate, finding 
the surrounding facts did not comport with their testimony. When more than one 
inference may be drawn from the evidence, we will not reweigh the evidence and 
substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner. Robles, 882 P.2d  at 
876, 880. Therefore, we find that the hearing examiner's determination is 
sufficiently supported by the record.

 

 [¶17]     Our holding on this matter is 
dispositive of House's entitlement to Wyoming worker's compensation benefits, 
and we therefore need not consider the issues surrounding House's entitlement to 
benefits in Louisiana.3

 

    B. EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL

 

[¶18]       B-F Drilling also contends 
the Division was estopped from denying benefits because it accepted worker's 
compensation premiums tendered by B-F Drilling which included House as an 
employee. In support of this argument, B-F Drilling relies on Wessel v. Mapco, 
Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 1373 (Wyo. 1988), where we held that an employee working in 
Colorado was covered under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act. We supported 
this decision by noting that the employer was estopped from denying coverage 
because "an estoppel is created when this employer paid and the state fund 
accepted the premiums for the employment as intended to include as covered 
duties the job duties in an adjacent state." Id. (emphasis 
added).

 

 [¶19]     "`Estoppel arises only when a 
party, by acts, conduct, or acquiescence causes another to change his position. 
* * *'" Garlach v. Tuttle, 705 P.2d 828, 829-30 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Roth v. 
First Sec. Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 96 (Wyo. 1984)). It 
"precludes a party who knows the truth from denying the assertion of any material fact with which 
he induced another to change his position where such other person is ignorant of 
the facts, had a right to rely upon the assertions, and suffers an injury." 
Roth, 684 P.2d  at 96. "Equitable estoppel is not applicable unless the person 
relied and had a right to rely on the representation or conduct," which "must 
induce and be the immediate or proximate cause of the act which is complained 
of." Id. The facts and circumstances of each individual case govern the 
application of equitable estoppel.  
Lewis v. State Bd. of Control, 699 P.2d 822, 827 (Wyo. 
1985).

 

[¶20]       The hearing examiner's 
factual determination that "the Division did not accept premiums `as intended to 
include as covered duties the job duties in an adjacent state'" is 
well-supported in the record. Unlike the facts in Wessel, 752 P.2d 1363, B-F 
Drilling had not paid premiums for House over an extended period of time prior 
to the denial of benefits. Instead, B-F Drilling sent in the first premium for 
House four days after the Division issued a letter denying benefits for his 
injury. Therefore, the Division made no representation that House was entitled 
to benefits prior to the time that B-F Drilling changed its position. We are not 
persuaded by B-F Drilling's argument that it sent the payment in reliance on 
correspondence with the Division in 1992 and 1993 regarding extraterritorial 
coverage for employees in Texas. The Division had made its position clear with 
regard to this injury and this employee before B-F Drilling self-reported and 
paid its premiums. Any previous statements by the Division regarding different 
employees in a different state cannot reasonably refute a specific notification 
denying benefits.

 

V. CONCLUSION

 

 [¶21]     The hearing examiner's conclusion 
that House was permanently assigned outside of Wyoming is in accord with the law 
and supported by the evidence. B-F Drilling failed to offer sufficient factual 
circumstances to support its claim of equitable estoppel.  Therefore, we 
affirm.

 

FOOTNOTES

1 House 
is not a party in this appeal.

  

2 B-F 
Drilling did not include House in the premium payment in December 1994 because 
"[House] was not working in November."  
Indeed, after his injury, House did not return to work for B-F 
Drilling. 
However, in December 1994, House received a payment in the nature of a 
"Christmas bonus;" hence, his inclusion in the premium payment submitted in 
January 1995.

  

3 B-F 
Drilling's alternative claim under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-204(b) would bear 
consideration only if House was not permanently assigned outside of Wyoming. The 
provision requires the 
claimant be "otherwise entitled * * * to the benefits of this act * * 
*."