Title: Ex parte Gary Lee Beck. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Gary Lee Beck v. Attorney General Troy King et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 10/05/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060593
_________________________
Ex parte Gary Lee Beck
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Gary Lee Beck
v.
Attorney General Troy King et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-05-1102;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050940)
LYONS, Justice.
1060593
2
Gary Lee Beck filed a complaint for a declaratory
judgment in the Montgomery Circuit Court against Attorney
General Troy King; Michael H. Feehan, a Calhoun County parole
officer; Martha C. White, a hearing officer with the Alabama
Board of Pardons and Paroles; Dewitt Ashley, an investigator
with the Calhoun County Sheriff's Department; and Frederick
Moore, the police chief of Ohatchee.  The trial court entered
a judgment dismissing Beck's complaint based on the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  Beck appealed the
trial court's dismissal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
That court transferred the appeal to this Court; we
transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals pursuant
to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.  The Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion.  Beck
v. King (No. 2050940, November 17, 2006), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.
Civ. App. 2006) (table).  Beck then petitioned this Court for
a writ of certiorari, and we granted certiorari review.  We
affirm in part and reverse in part.  
I. Facts and Procedural History
Beck was convicted of murder on February 29, 1988, and
was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.  He was paroled on
1060593
3
March 30, 1998, and placed under Feehan's supervision.  On
November 6, 2000, Ashley arrested Beck for parole violations.
Chief Moore was present at the time of the arrest.  On
November 20, Feehan issued a written report of parole
violations, in which he charged Beck with three specific
violations.  On November 22, Feehan served Beck with a notice
that there would be a hearing before a hearing officer with
the Board of Pardons and Paroles, which took place on November
27.  According to the portion of that notice on which Beck
acknowledged its receipt, Beck did not request an attorney to
be present at the hearing, and he did not request that any
witnesses be notified to be present for him.  White, the
hearing officer, concluded that Beck was guilty of the three
parole violations and that evidence offered by Beck in
mitigation did not outweigh the seriousness of the violations.
White recommended that Beck's parole be revoked.  On February
7, 2001, the Board of Pardons and Paroles concurred with
White's recommendation and ordered that Beck's parole be
revoked.  
Beck 
petitioned 
the 
Montgomery 
Circuit 
Court 
for
certiorari review of his parole revocation (case no. CV-01-
1060593
4
2605).  The circuit court upheld the revocation, and the Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed that judgment, without an
opinion.  Beck v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles (No. CR-04-
1432, February 24, 2006), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2006) (table).  While that case was pending, Beck filed two
cases in federal court.  In 2002, he filed a habeas corpus
petition in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, case no. CV-02-B-3013-W, naming as
defendants Cheryl Price, whom he identified as a prison
warden; the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the
Alabama attorney general.  On April 22, 2004, the United
States magistrate judge assigned to Beck's case filed a report
and recommendation concluding that Beck's 2000 arrest was
valid and denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On May 21, 2004, the United States district judge to whom
Beck's case was assigned adopted the magistrate judge's
report, accepted his recommendation, and entered a judgment
dismissing Beck's petition.  
Beck also filed a an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama, which the court transferred to the Northern District,
1060593
5
case no. 7:02-CV-3050-LSC-HGD.  Beck named as defendants in
that case Feehan, Ashley, White, and Kairy Crum and Paul
Whaley II, a classification specialist and the director of
classification, respectively, with the Alabama Department of
Corrections.  On February 16, 2006, the United States district
judge to whom the § 1983 case was assigned entered a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.  Beck appealed that
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, case no. 06-11621-E, but on July 10, 2006,
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as frivolous.  
Beck filed the complaint in this case on May 5, 2005, in
the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring
that his arrest in 2000 was invalid because Feehan did not
comply with § 15-22-31(b), Ala. Code 1975, which provides that
a parolee may be arrested without a warrant only on "a written
statement by said parole officer setting forth that the
parolee has, in his judgment, violated the conditions of
parole."  Relying on Ex parte Dietz, 474 So. 2d 127 (Ala.
1985), in which this Court held that because § 15-22-54(d),
Ala. Code 1975, requires a written statement from a probation
officer for an arrest without a warrant on a charge of a
1060593
6
probation violation, an arrest based only upon an oral
statement from the probation officer was unlawful, Beck
alleged that § 15-22-31(b) is not being applied in the same
manner as is § 15-22-54(d), an analogous statute applicable to
probationers.
Although not named by Beck as a defendant in the action,
the Board of Pardons and Paroles moved to dismiss Beck's
complaint.  Thereafter, all five of the named defendants filed
motions to dismiss.  Attorney General King, Feehan, and White
each raised the affirmative defenses of res judicata and
collateral estoppel in their motions based on the federal
court actions and the prior Montgomery Circuit Court action;
Ashley, the investigator with the  Calhoun County Sheriff's
Office, and Moore, the chief of police of Ohatchee, did not
raise those affirmative defenses.  Despite the fact that
Ashley and Moore did not assert the doctrine of res judicata
or collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense, the trial
court dismissed Beck's complaint as to all the defendants on
the basis that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
1060593
Beck's certiorari petition is misleading in that it
1
refers to only one previous proceeding--the federal habeas
corpus petition he filed in 2002.  In fact, Beck has filed
numerous legal actions, both state and federal, challenging
different aspects of his 2000 arrest and the ensuing
revocation of his parole.  In addition to the two federal
actions and the 2001 complaint filed in the Montgomery Circuit
Court, Beck has been involved in the following litigation:  Ex
parte Beck (No. 1051535, July 31, 2006) (Ala. 2006)
(dismissing petition for writ of mandamus); Beck v. Alabama
Board of Pardons & Paroles, 907 So. 2d 1096 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005) (appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court's dismissal of
petition for writ of certiorari); Ex parte Beck, 923 So. 2d
360 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (table) (dismissing petition for
writ of mandamus); Ex parte Beck, 920 So. 2d 622 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2004) (table) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus);
Beck v. State, 886 So. 2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
891 So. 2d 1014 (Ala. 2003) (table) (appeal from denial of
Rule 32 petition); Ex parte Beck, 876 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2003) (table) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus);
and Ex parte Beck, 868 So. 2d 492 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)
(table) (granting petition for writ of mandamus).  
7
After the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment, Beck petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari.  Beck relied upon the ground found in Rule
39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P., i.e., that the decision of the
Court of Civil Appeals was in conflict with prior decisions of
this Court, the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court
of Civil Appeals, or the Court of Criminal Appeals.  He
contends that because the issue of the legislature's intent in
enacting § 15-22-31(b) was not addressed in his federal habeas
proceeding,  the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of the
1
1060593
8
trial court's judgment conflicted with authority setting forth
the elements that a party asserting the affirmative defenses
of res judicata and collateral estoppel must prove.  He also
contends that the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of the
judgment conflicted with authority holding that a trial court
may not sua sponte raise an affirmative defense on a
defendant's behalf and then dismiss the action based on that
defense.  Finally, Beck relies upon the ground asserted in
Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R. App. P., i.e., that his petition
presents a question of first impression:  Whether § 15-22-
31(b) should be interpreted by this Court in accordance with
this Court's interpretation of § 15-22-54(d), the statute
concerning arrests for probation violations, which contains
substantially the same language as § 15-22-31(b). 
II. Standard of Review
"On certiorari review, this Court accords no presumption
of correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate
appellate court.  Therefore, we must apply de novo the
standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil
Appeals."  Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135
(Ala. 1996).  
1060593
9
III. Analysis
In Lee L. Saad Construction Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C.,
851 So. 2d 507, 516-17 (Ala. 2002), this Court discussed the
elements of res judicata:
"Res judicata and collateral estoppel are two
closely related, judicially created doctrines that
preclude the relitigation of matters that have been
previously adjudicated or, in the case of res
judicata, that could have been adjudicated in a
prior action.
"'The doctrine of res judicata, while
actually embodying two basic concepts,
usually refers to what commentators label
"claim 
preclusion," 
while 
collateral
estoppel ... refers to "issue preclusion,"
which is a subset of the broader res
judicata doctrine.'
"Little v. Pizza Wagon, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1269, 1272
(Ala. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring specially).  See
also McNeely v. Spry Funeral Home of Athens, Inc.,
724 So. 2d 534, 537 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).  In
Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188 (Ala. 1988), this
Court explained the rationale behind the doctrine of
res judicata:
"'Res judicata is a broad, judicially
developed doctrine, which rests upon the
ground that public policy, and the interest
of the litigants alike, mandate that there
be an end to litigation; that those who
have contested an issue shall be bound by
the ruling of the court; and that issues
once tried shall be considered forever
settled between those same parties and
their privies.'
1060593
10
"533 So. 2d at 190.  The elements of res judicata
are
"'(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2)
rendered 
by 
a 
court 
of 
competent
jurisdiction, 
(3) 
with 
substantial 
identity
of the parties, and (4) with the same cause
of action presented in both actions.'
"Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634,
636 (Ala. 1998).  'If those four elements are
present, then any claim that was, or that could have
been, adjudicated in the prior action is barred from
further litigation.'  723 So. 2d at 636.  Res
judicata, therefore, bars a party from asserting in
a subsequent action a claim that it has already had
an opportunity to litigate in a previous action."
Clearly, the four elements necessary to establish res
judicata are present in this case.  (1) There is not only one
judgment, but several prior judgments, on the merits of Beck's
claim that his parole was impermissibly revoked.  (2) All of
those prior judgments were rendered by courts of competent
jurisdiction.  (3) There is substantial identity of the
parties named as defendants by Beck in the various actions.
(4) The same cause of action, namely, a challenge to Beck's
parole revocation, was presented in this and the previously
filed actions.  Beck's claim that Alabama's statute regarding
arrests for parole violations, § 15-22-31(b), should be
interpreted in line with this Court's interpretation of
1060593
11
Alabama's similar statute regarding arrests for probation
violations, § 15-22-54(d), could have been adjudicated in the
prior actions.  Certainly this claim could have been
adjudicated in the first action Beck filed in the Montgomery
Circuit Court (case no. CV-01-2605).  The claim also could
have been adjudicated in either of the actions Beck brought in
the federal district court pursuant to the doctrine of
supplemental or pendent jurisdiction outlined in United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  In Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors,
Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 742-43 (11th Cir. 2006), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
"Section 
1367(a) 
authorizes 
a 
court 
to 
hear
supplemental claims to the full extent allowed by
the 'case or controversy' standard of Article III of
the Constitution.  Palmer [v. Hospital Authority of
Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559,] 1566 [(11th Cir.
1994)].  The constitutional 'case or controversy'
standard confers supplemental jurisdiction over all
state claims which arise out of a common nucleus of
operative fact with a substantial federal claim.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218
(1966); Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1563-64 (a federal court
has the power under section 1367(a) to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over state claims which arise
from the same occurrence and involve the same or
similar 
evidence); 
L.A. 
Draper 
and 
Son 
v.
Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 427 (11th
Cir. 1984) (a federal court may exercise pendent
1060593
12
jurisdiction over state law claims deriving from a
common nucleus of operative fact with a substantial
federal claim)."
Because Beck has had numerous opportunities to litigate
his claim, this action is properly barred by the doctrine of
res judicata, and it is past time to end this litigation.
Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed that
portion of the trial court's order dismissing Beck's complaint
as to Attorney General King, Feehan, and White, who asserted
in the trial court the affirmative defense of res judicata in
their motions to dismiss.  
We cannot apply the same reasoning to Ashley and Moore,
however, neither of whom asserted in the trial court res
judicata as an affirmative defense in his motion to dismiss.
In Waite v. Waite, 959 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (Ala. 2006), this
Court quoted from the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in Waite
v. Waite, 891 So. 2d 341, 343-44 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), in
which that court discussed the issue presented to us here: 
"'The doctrines of res judicata and
collateral 
estoppel 
are 
affirmative
defenses, Rule 8(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Lee
L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects,
P.C., 851 So. 2d 507, 516 (Ala. 2002), and
do not affect a court's jurisdiction to
consider an action.  Affirmative defenses
may be waived if they are not pleaded by a
1060593
13
party against whom a claim is asserted.
Rule 8(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Bechtel v.
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 451 So. 2d 793
(Ala. 1984) (citing 2A J. Moore, Federal
Practice § 8.27[3] at 8-251 (2d ed. 1948)).
By its actions in the present case, the
trial court, in essence, asserted the
affirmative defenses of the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel on
behalf of the defendants and dismissed the
matter based on those affirmative defenses.
"'After careful consideration, we find
most persuasive the reasoning of the courts
that have held that, although a trial court
may dismiss an action on its own motion on
a 
jurisdictional 
basis, 
affirmative
defenses such as the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of res judicata are not
jurisdictional bases upon which a court may
base a sua sponte dismissal.  See Lease
Partners Corp. v. R & J Pharmacies, Inc.,
[329 Ill. App. 3d 69, 768 N.E.2d 54, 263
Ill. Dec. 294 (2002)]; Adams v. Inman, [892
S.W.2d 
651 
(Mo. 
Ct. 
App. 
1994)].
Therefore, we must conclude that the trial
court erred in dismissing the action, on
its own motion, based upon affirmative
defenses not asserted by the defendants.'"
We adopt the Court of Civil Appeals' reasoning in Waites, and
we hold that a trial court errs when it dismisses a case on
the basis of an affirmative defense not asserted by the
defendant. Therefore, we must reverse that portion of the
Court of Civil Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's
order dismissing Beck's complaint as to Ashley and Moore, who
1060593
14
failed to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata in
their motions to dismiss.  
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals
insofar as it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing
Beck's complaint as to Attorney General King, Feehan, and
White.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals
insofar as it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing
Beck's complaint as to Ashley and Moore, and we remand the
case to the Court of Civil Appeals for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.  
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.   
See, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Stuart, J., concurs specially.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., recuse themselves.
1060593
15
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
The circuit judge to whom this case was originally
assigned recognized that 
"Gary 
Beck 
is 
unrestrained 
in 
his 
zeal 
for
litigation, which involves the same issues over and
over, as this complaint does, on issues that have
been settled through judicial rulings and opinions.
To continue with his unbridled litigious lust would
be a gross abuse of the judicial system."
I agree; it is time to put an end to this litigation.
However, I cannot ignore the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure
and caselaw.
"'[R]es judicata is an affirmative defense that must
be especially pleaded in writing under [Ala. R. Civ.
P.], Rule 8(c).'  Wilger v. State Dep't of Pensions
& Security, 390 So. 2d 656, 657 (Ala. Civ. App.
1980).  'In some instances, res judicata may be
properly raised by means of a motion to dismiss or,
more commonly, through a motion for a summary
judgment.'  Wilger, 390 So. 2d at 657."
Ryals v. Walden, 773 So. 2d 1007, 1011 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
See also Hendricks v. Blake, 291 Ala. 575, 285 So. 2d 82
(1973).   The application of the Rules of Civil Procedure and
Alabama caselaw requires that the circuit court's judgment be
reversed as to defendants Ashley and Moore.  Ashley failed to
plead res judicata in the motion he styled as a "motion to
dismiss, answer to plaintiff's complaint for declaratory
1060593
16
judgment, and counterclaim."  However, he can move to amend
his answer, see Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., specifically
plead the affirmative defense of res judicata, and move for a
summary judgment.  Likewise, Moore, who did not plead the
affirmative defense of res judicata in his motion to dismiss
but who has not answered the complaint, can plead res judicata
in his answer and move for a summary judgment.