Title: SMEDSRUD v. POWELL

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

SMEDSRUD v. POWELL  SMEDSRUD v. POWELL 2002 OK 87 61 P.3d 891 Case Number: 97046 Decided: 11/12/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA EDWARD SMEDSRUD, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CECIL POWELL d/b/a PAPPY'S CORNER, Defendant-Appellee ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. III ¶0 In an action to recover damages for bodily injuries sustained upon the premises of a convenience store owned by defendant, the District Court, Comanche County, C. Allen McCall Jr., trial judge, summarily ruled in favor of the owner. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari granted upon the plaintiff's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT Randy P. Conner, Randy P. Conner P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for appellant Mark D. Brown, Margo M. Brown, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for appellee ¶1 The dispositive issue on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] erred in affirming summary judgment for the defendant? We answer in the affirmative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Edward Smedsrud [Smedsrud] brought an action to recover for injuries he sustained upon the premises of Cecil Powell d/b/a/ Pappy's Corner [Owner]. This is Smedsrud's certiorari quest upon his second appeal for review of the trial court's second summary judgment and of its postjudgment decision on a new-trial motion. COCA affirmed the trial court's second summary disposition for Owner. The First Appeal - Smedsrud I ¶3 This controversy arose when Smedsrud was walking from Owner's car wash toward his convenience store along a pathway parallel to the store. A note at the car-wash change machine directed customers to go inside the store for needed coins. Smedsrud hit the top of his head on a wooden awning protruding from the side of the store. He sued Owner to recover damages for his injuries. Owner moved for summary adjudication, arguing that the danger posed by the awning was open and obvious and that Smedsrud's injuries were caused by his own negligence or inattention. He characterized the lawsuit as a "relatively simple premises case." ¶4 Smedsrud countered that several fact questions required his cause's submission to the jury, namely, (a) whether the overhang posed an open-and-obvious danger, (b) whether Owner used ordinary care to prevent a hazardous condition on the premises after being timely warned of its presence, (c) whether Owner exercised ordinary care to correct the hazard after he knew (or should have known) of its existence, (d) whether Owner was negligent in placing and designing the overhang and (e) whether he failed to maintain his premises in a safe condition. ¶5 The trial court gave summary judgment to Owner, ruling that the "awning was open and obvious" and the accident occurred because Smedsrud failed "to exercise due care" and "watch where he was going." In his later quest for new trial, Smedsrud argued that while the overhang was visible, it [61 P.3d 893] presented a deceptively innocent appearance of safety, which cloaked a reality of danger.3 The Second Appeal - Smedsrud II ¶7 Upon COCA's remand, Owner once again moved for summary judgment, this time resting his quest on COCA's inviting footnote about the § 109 time bar's availability. According to Owner, Smedsrud's claim is not predicated on premises liability but rests on the design of the pathway, including the awning, the protruding pipes and the concrete parking stops, which were installed in 1982 when the building was initially constructed. Because these improvements upon the real property had remained unchanged up until the time of the 1995 accident and Smedsrud's action was brought more than 10 years after their completion, Owner argued that by the terms of § 109 the cause became time-barred. To show Smedsrud's postremand reliance on a construction-and-design-defect theory of liability, Owner directs us to statements in Smedsrud's response6 to Owner's first (pre-appeal) motion for summary adjudication as well as to arguments pressed in his first (pre-appeal) motion for new trial.7 ¶9 After the trial court once again gave summary judgment to Owner on his § 109 defense, Smedsrud moved for new trial, arguing that the cited section neither applies to known hidden dangers nor defeats an owner's duty towards invitees to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn them of conditions in the nature of hidden dangers. Owner then responded that Smedsrud's claim and his alleged injury are so inextricably intertwined with allegations of negligence per se (based on violation of a city building ordinance) and design-and-construction deficiencies that it is barred by the § 109's statute of repose. He also argued that Smedsrud failed to produce any evidentiary material to establish an essential element of his claim - that Owner had advance notice of any hidden defect which allegedly caused his injury. II ARGUMENTS ON CERTIORARI ¶11 Owner explains that the § 109 defense was not pressed by him in Smedsrud I because there he preferred to urge what he then believed to be the stronger theory - his defenses against premises liability. For the notion that Smedsrud's claim is based on construction-and-design deficiencies, Owner directs us to Smedsrud's own allegations in his response to the first summary judgment motion and in the new-trial motion (that immediately followed the first summary judgment).15 Owner urges upon us extant jurisprudence that indicates common-law liability will be defeated by the statute of repose if the action is based on design-and-construction defects.16 He asserts that § 109 operates to bar Smedsrud's claim because his [61 P.3d 895] pressed theory of liability is inextricably intertwined with allegations of negligent design and construction.17 III SMEDSRUD I SETTLES ¶13 Where, on the judgment's reversal, a cause is remanded, it returns to the trial court as if it had never been decided, save only for the "settled law" of the case. ¶14 Smedsrud I clearly settled for this case (a) the claim's parameters as a cause of action in negligence pressed in the framework of premises liability, (b) the sufficiency of the basic facts (then before the court) to support the claim and (c) the triable (fact-based) character of the open-and-obvious condition of the harm-dealing danger. IV THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDUCT OF POSTREMAND PROCEEDINGS - BOTH UPON SUMMARY PROCESS AND ON THE NEW-TRIAL MOTION - WAS IN PATENT DISOBEDIENCE OF THE COURT'S MANDATE A. The Postremand Summary Proceedings Are Inconsistent With the Court's Mandate ¶16 At the postremand stage, i.e., after this court's mandate has been transmitted and spread of record, the trial court is duty-bound to comply with its terms by a careful consideration of the opinion on which it is based.25 If the trial court should fail to do so, the mandate's enforcement may be sought from this court by an original proceeding for a writ of mandamus to compel scrupulous obedience at nisi prius.26 B. In Post-Remand Proceedings A Plaintiff Could Not Be Forced to Abandon His Law-Settled Theory ¶18 Owner cannot prevail here on a theory of liability not advanced by Smedsrud in the post-remand process. So long as a plaintiff (or third-party plaintiff or counterclaimant) maintains a legal basis for the claim not eliminated from the purview of postremand proceedings, the adversary will not be allowed to reach for another theory to foist it upon an unwilling plaintiff (or third-party plaintiff or counterclaimant).32 [61 P.3d 897] If there is proof to support multiple theories, all must be submitted under proper instructions.33 Not until all proof has been adduced may the trial court eliminate from submission theories unsupported by evidence. Here, the choice was made for the plaintiff before (a) any proof was adduced and (b) while the case was still under consideration in summary process on remand for proceedings to be consistent with COCA's Smedsrud I pronouncement (and with this court's mandate). ¶19 To change a plaintiff's law-settled liability theory on remand, there must be a record showing of the plaintiff's postremand abandonment or withdrawal of that theory, a postappeal reliance on facts totally inconsistent with the earlier-tendered legal predicate for the claim, or the earlier theory's elimination by settled law.34 C. The § 109 Statute of Repose ¶ D. Postjudgment Proceedings On Smedsrud's Motion For New Trial Cured The Trial Court's Error In Totally Failing To Consider Smedsrud's Premises-Liability Theory At The Postremand Summary-Process Stage ¶22 After certiorari was granted this court directed the parties to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This had to be done because it appeared that the trial judge rested the post-Smedsrud I summary judgment solely on the § 109 time bar, leaving utterly unresolved the premises-liability issue .37 It was not until the parties' show-cause briefs were filed that it became clearly apparent the premises-liability theory was in fact injected into the case in postjudgment stages and then seemingly resolved against Smedsrud in the course of postjudgment rulings upon his new-trial motion. In those postjudgment proceedings, Owner's response to the motion challenged for the first time on remand Smedsrud's legal basis for his premises-liability claim by injecting Owner's want of notice (of the harm-dealing condition on the premises).38 The trial court's denial of Smedsrud's new-trial motion leaves for us a clear record-trail indication that both the motion and Owner's argument were indeed reached for consideration. By its denial the trial court had in factruled out as unsupportive of Smedsrud's claim both theories of liability - that advanced by the plaintiff and that pressed for him by Owner - and left no unresolved issues . Albeit at a postjudgment stage, the trial judge did consider Owner's challenge to premises liability before denying Smedsrud's new-trial quest. The appeal hence comes here from a "judgment"39 rather than from an intermediate order. It is hence invulnerable to dismissal as falling short of disposing of all tendered prejudgment issues.40 V THE POSTJUDGMENT CHALLENGE TO PREMISES LIABILITY BY OWNER'S INFUSION OF THE NOTICE ISSUE ¶23 Owner pressed upon the court (in postjudgment proceedings on Smedsrud's new-trial motion) that Smedsrud's claim must fail, insofar as it was sought to be rested on premises liability, because of Owner's lack of notice (of the alleged danger at locus in quo ). This new legal issue, sought to be injected on remand at the eleventh hour, stood clearly eliminated by [61 P.3d 899] the settled law of Smedsrud I. This is so because: ¶24 (1) The sufficiency of Owner's advance notice stands settled by Smedsrud I as a fact issue.41 ¶25 (2) The probative material relied on in Smedsrud I to show (a) the open-and- obvious character of the defect in the premises also demonstrates (b) Owner's constructive knowledge of the hazard.42 Smedsrud I settles the law upon both issues. It declares that these two issues present disputed facts to be determined by the trier. Nothing on this postremand record changes the legal characteristics of the earlier settlement in Smedsrud I. ¶26 (3) The postremand notice-of-danger controversy does not tender in law a new fact to be proved. The permanent nature of the harm-dealing condition was already among the record facts.43 VI SUMMARY ¶29 The law settled in the first appeal entitled Smedsrud to press his premises-liability claim on all the facts revealed by the probative materials before the court at the remand stage. Nothing in the postremand proceedings indicates the plaintiff abandoned this theory or that he now relies on some other legal predicate of liability. In the postremand summary process neither the trial court nor the defendant could force upon the plaintiff a theory of recovery different from, and inconsistent with, that which stands protected to him against nisi prius elimination by the settled law of his claim. ¶30 On certiorari granted upon the plaintiff's petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' [61 P.3d 900] opinion is vacated, the trial court's summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings to be conducted on a theory consistent with today's pronouncement. ¶31 HODGES, OPALA, KAUGER, SUMMERS and BOUDREAU, JJ., concur; ¶32 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., LAVENDER andWINCHESTER, JJ., dissent. [61 P.3d 901] FOOT