Title: STATE v LANE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No, 12267 I N T H E 'SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1973 STATE O F M O N T A N A , Plaintiff and Respondent, T E R R Y A. LANE a /k/a T E R R Y VAN DIVER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presbding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : D. R. Matthews argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J . C. Weingartner , Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Robert L, Deschamps, 111 County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Gene McLatchy, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: January 26, 1973 Decided : F'E'E in w . 3 Filed: 1 fi 7973 Y r , J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crime of receiving stolen property entered on a jury verdict i n the d i s t r i c t court of the fourth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Missoula. Defendant had a p r i o r felony and was sentenced t o a term of f i v e years, He had been charged with burglary i n the f i r s t degree o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y , receiving stolen property. The home of M r , & M r s . Charles Hurt, i n Missoula, was burglarized on October 22, 1971. Access had been gained through a window i n a bedroom during the Hurts' absence. Stolen were a Gibson Super 400 g u i t a r , an amplifier, a Pioneer reverberator u n i t , a stereo u n i t and one suede jacket. It shortly became apparent t h a t two men, Peter Probst and defendant Terry Lane, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s Terry Lane Van Diver, were involved because the two went t o Bakke Motors i n Missoula and traded a 1959 Cadillac, $50 of defendant's money, and the stolen g u i t a r f o r a 1965 Pontiac purchased i n defendant's name. The stolen amplifier was sold t o a l o c a l secondhand s t o r e f o r $50 by Probst while defendant waited i n h i s car. Both men sold the s t e r e o and speakers t o an employee a t S t , p a t r i c k ' s Hospital f o r $40. The two men, Probst and Van Diver, disappeared. Subse- quently,after traveling together t o N e w Orleans and Canada, the two were arrested i n Canada f o r having an i l l e g a l weapon, among other charges. While i n j a i l i n Regina, Saskatchewan, they in- formed the Canadian a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t there was a warrant f o r t h e i r a r r e s t i n Missoula, Montana. They were subsequently deported t o the United States from Canada and were arrested on December 3 , 1971, i n Plentywood, Montana, and returned t o Missoula. The suede jacket taken i n the burglary was found i n defendant Van ~ i v e r ' s c a r i n Plentywood, While the charges were pending, Probst dismissed h i s attorney, made a statement, and plead g u i l t y t o f i r s t degree burglary. He was sentenced t o two years; which sentence was deferred, Defendant Van Diver plead not g u i l t y and the case went t o t r i a l . During the t r i a l , the owner of the property t e s t i f i e d a s t o the burglary and identified the stolen items. The items were a l l connected t o the possession and s a l e by both Probst and defendant Van Diver. Probst t e s t i f i e d t h a t both he and Van Diver burglarized the Hurt home; t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e i r purchase of Van ~ i v e r ' s automobile, t h e i r s a l e of the items, t h e i r t r i p t o Canada, t h e i r a r r e s t , and h i s subsequent decision t o plead guilty. As s t a t e d before, the charge was i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , burglary o r receiving stolen property. The jury was instructed on both charges and given a l t e r n a t i v e verdicts. The jury returned a verdict of g u i l t y of receiving stolen property. Defendant on appeal r a i s e s three issues f o r review: (1) That the t r i a l court erred i n giving Instruction No. 13; (2) t h a t an alleged prosecution comment on defendant's f a i l u r e t o explain h i s possession of the goods was reversible e r r o r ; and ( 3 ) whether the court erred i n not granting defendant a new t r i a l on the receiving stolen property charge by i t s e l f . Issue 1 concerns the giving, over the objection of defendant, of Instruction No. 13 which reads: 1 l You a r e instructed t h a t the mere possession of stolen property, however soon a f t e r the taking, unexplained by the person having possession, i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y conviction. It i s , however, a circumstance t o be considered i n con- nection with other evidence i n determining the question of innocence o r g u i l t . I f you should find from the evidence t h a t a burglary was com- mitted on the premises involved i n t h i s case and t h a t thereafter the defendant was found i n posses- sion, or claimed t o be the owner, of property stolen from the burglarized premises, such a f a c t would be a circumstance tending i n some degree t o show g u i l t , although not s u f f i c i e n t , standing alone and unsupported by other evidence, t o warrant your finding him g u i l t y . In addition t o proof of posses- sion of such property there must be proof of corrob- orating ciwcumstances tending of themselves t o e s t a b l i s h guilt, Such corroborating circumstances may consist of the acts, conduct, falsehoods, if any, or other declarations, if any, of the defendant, and any other proved circumstances tending to show the guilt of the accused, "One who is found in the possession of property that was stolen from burglarized premises is bound to explain such possession in order to remove the effect of that fact as a circumstance, to be con- sidered with all other evidence, pointing to his guilt. I I In addition to Instruction No. 13, other instructions on receiving stolen property were given. Instruction No. 18 specifically required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant argues Instruction No. 13 violated his consti- tutional rights. Namely, that the instruction allows the judge, by way of an instruction, to comment on the fact defendant did not take the stand during the trial, Such comments, on the defendant not taking the stand during a criminal trial, have been held to violate defendants' rights against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti- tution. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1 4 This Court recently considered the question of the con- stitutionality of such an instruction, In State v. Branch, 155 Mont. 22, 23, 26, 465 P,2d 821, this instruction was given: I t One who is found in possession of stolen property is bound to explain such possession in order to remove the effect of that fact as a circumstance, to be considered with all other evidence, pointing to his guilt, and if he gives a false account of how he acquired that possession or, having reasonable opportunity to show that his possession was honestly acquired he refuses or fails to do so, such conduct is a circumstance that tends to show his guilt. I I In Branch, appellant contended that: "* * +c since defendant did not testify on his own behalf that the instruction is a comment on the defendant's failure to testify, forbidden by Art, 111, 5 8, of our Constitution and section 94-8803, R.C.M. 1947," As to the questioned instruction in Branch, this Court stated: "'we can find no error with the instruction i n question. The instruction clearly stated that mere possession alone is not sufficient to justify a conviction; such has been the long standing rule i n Montana. I 11 The Court then went on t o deal directly with the identical issue raised here: "'The defendant contends that the instruction was a comment on h i s failure t o t e s t i f y , This contention i s without merit. [Citing cases ] W e therefore hold that the challenged instruction i s constitutional. 1 I! W e find nothing new i n the argument presented by defendant i n t h i s appeal. This argument has been heard before by t h i s Court, and we considered the matter a f t e r the United States Su- preme Court case cited by defendant as controlling was handed down. This instruction i s not i n violation of the protection of the right against self-incrimination, It does not comment on f a i l u r e of the defendant t o t e s t i f y , It does permit the defendant t o explain how he came into possession of the stolen goods. A defendant can do t h i s by taking the stand himself, by having another t e s t i f y on h i s behalf, or by introducing other types of evidence t o show how he came into possession of the stolen goods, I f the defendant does not explain, by any of the enumerated methods of explaining h i s possession, then t h i s fact can be considered by the jury i n making i t s determination. Defendant urges that i n s p i t e of our holding i n Branch and State v. Gray, 152 Mont. 145, 447 P.2d 475, it i s error for the prosecution t o comment even by way of instruction on failure of a defendant t o explain h i s possession of recently stolen goods, Defendant puts it a l i t t l e differently i n that he s t a t e s it in 11 these terms: failure t o explain away h i s g u i l t by association", B e that a s it may, defendant urges that the rule in Griffin re- quires a reversal. In 24 ALR3d 1093, an annotation appears £01- lowing the case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L ed 2d 705, 24 ALR3d 1065. That discussion i s of harmless error, cured error, prejudicial error, and automatic reversal. However, i n t h i s case, no comment a s such was made on defendant's f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y , Counsel makes it out by r e f e r r i n g t o Instruction No. 13. That instruction plainly, i n our view, i s n o t meant t o be a comment on the f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y . Rather, it i s an evidentiary r u l e , The unexplained possession of recently stolen goods--not necessarily an explanation i n court---is a c i r - cumstance t o be considered by the jury. hat 's a l l , Other in- s t r u c t i o n s go on t o require other evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The r u l e of Griffin, Chapman, and t h e other cases referred t o , simply a r e not applicable.here. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s issue 2 on appeal r e f e r s t o alleged comments made by the prosecution t o the jury concerning defendant's f a i l u r e t o take the stand. In support of t h i s contention counsel f o r defendant produced an a f f i d a v i t , signed by himself, i n which i s s e t out allegedly verbatim the language the prosecutor used. That i s the e n t i r e record counsel f o r defendant has used t o support h i s position. There is nothing e l s e , no t r a n s c r i p t ; only h i s a f f i d a v i t of what he alleges was said, The s t a t e i n i t s argument c i t e s an a f f i d a v i t signed by t h e deputy county attorney who t r i e d the case. I n t h i s a f f i d a v i t he r e f u t e s what was alleged by defendant. There i s no way of knowing what was a c t u a l l y said, because there i s no written record. This Court must have a w r i t t e n record before i t which shows exactly what was said. W e cannot allow cases t o be reversed only on what one of the attorneys thought was said a t t h e time. Prejudice i n a criminal t r i a l must be shown from the record, it w i l l not be presumed, S t a t e v. Gallagher, 151 Mont, 501, 445 P.2d 45, Additionally, on motion f o r new t r i a l the t r i a l judge, who was present when the alleged statements were supposedly made, denied a new t r i a l . Even a t t h a t time, counsel made no e f f o r t t o supplement the record. The f i n a l issue r a i s e d i s apparently t h a t i f t h i s con- v i c t i o n were t o be reversed, defendant could not then be charged with the crime of burglary. W e need not discuss t h i s issue, since the conviction of defendant of receiving stolen property i s not reversed. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. Ass c i a t e Justices. !