Title: State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Guadagnoli

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Guadagnoli1984 WY 22677 P.2d 823Case Number: 83-134Decided: 02/13/1984STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

ANTHONY L. GUADAGNOLI, APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE AND TAXATION, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

ANTHONY L. GUADAGNOLI, 
APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Ronald P. Arnold, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Robert J. Reese, 
Green River, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     It is the position of 
the appellant State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue and Taxation1 that the appeal to the district 
court should be dismissed for the reason that the court was not possessed of 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear what the appellant regards as a premature 
appeal. The tax commission also urges that if, for any reason, this court were 
not to dismiss the appeal, the district court's order should, in any event, be 
reversed. The order of the district court with which the tax commission takes 
issue had the effect of reversing the independent hearing examiner's order 
suspending appellee Anthony L. Guadagnoli's driver's 
license.

[¶2.]     We will hold that the 
district court had jurisdiction to decide the appeal from the order of the 
independent hearing examiner but we will reverse the holding of the district 
court.

[¶3.]     The record in this case 
discloses that Mr. Guadagnoli was notified by the motor vehicle division of the 
department of revenue that his driver's license would be suspended for 90 days 
because he was found to have been an habitually reckless or negligent driver, 
based upon the following moving violations: 46 miles per hour in a 30 
miles-per-hour zone; 54 miles per hour in a 35 miles-per-hour zone; and running 
a red light.

[¶4.]     Appellee's driving 
privileges were not, however, suspended until he was afforded a hearing before 
the independent hearing examiner. At this hearing, Guadagnoli was given an 
opportunity to present evidence to rebut the prima facie finding by the motor 
vehicle division that he was an habitually reckless or negligent driver. 
Following the hearing, the examiner entered an order upholding the motor vehicle 
division's suspension of the driving privileges.

[¶5.]     By authority of the 
provisions of § 31-7-133, W.S. 1977,2 the appellee Guadagnoli filed with 
the district court a petition for review of the independent hearing examiner's 
order of suspension. Subsequent to his activating the district court appellate 
process, Mr. Guadagnoli requested and received a hearing before the tax 
commission. The district court judge first entered a temporary order granting 
restricted driving privileges and, after considering the parties' briefs, 
reversed the independent hearing examiner's order suspending appellee's driving 
privileges. It is from this order that the State of Wyoming, Department of 
Revenue and Taxation appeals. The tax commission, on the other hand, entered its 
order granting Guadagnoli limited driving privileges, but the tax commission's 
order upheld the suspension order of the independent hearing examiner. Appellee 
Guadagnoli did not file a petition for review from the order of the tax 
commission.

Subject-Matter-Jurisdiction 
Issue

[¶6.]     The appellant tax 
commission urges that the district court did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction to enter its order reversing the independent hearing examiner's 
order of suspension because the appellee was obliged to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before pursuing the appeal to the district court, and 
this was not done. Given the facts and law of this appeal, we will hold that the 
court did have jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal from the order of the 
independent hearing examiner.

[¶7.]     Section 31-7-133, supra 
n. 2 provides that a person whose driver's license has been "cancelled, 
suspended or revoked" will have the right to appeal his or her suspension by 
filing a petition with the district 
court within 30 days. When the independent hearing examiner's order of 
suspension was filed, the 30 days commenced to run, and Mr. Guadagnoli thereupon 
timely filed his petition for review as directed by the statute. Once this was 
done, appellee was confronted by the requirements of § 31-7-105(c), W.S. 1977, 
1983 Cum.Supp.3 In order to avoid dismissal for 
failing to exhaust his administrative remedy, the appellee took an appeal to the 
tax commission but, as is noted above, when the commission came down with its 
decision, the appellee did not go on to file a petition for review from the 
commission's order of affirmance. We do not know whether or not Mr. Guadagnoli 
had the benefit of departmental rules and regulations pertaining to the 
procedure for appealing a ruling of the hearing examiner to the tax commission 
and from there to the district court. We do know, however that such rules or 
regulations have not been made a part of the record in this 
appeal.

[¶8.]     We find ourselves faced 
with the same problems that confronted this court in Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979), and Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979). In Irvine, supra, we were asked to identify the 
statutory provisions that must be complied with pertaining to the taking of an 
appeal. In holding that the 30-day provision of § 31-7-133, supra n. 2, was 
applicable, we also said that § 31-7-105(c), supra,

"* * * requires first an 
appeal from the hearing examiner to the tax commission before appeal to the 
district court." 589 P.2d  at 1299.

[¶9.]     In Yeik, supra, the issue concerned the 
effect of the licensee not having appealed a hearing examiner's adverse decision 
to the tax commission and, instead, bringing the appeal directly to the district 
court. In that case, we recalled and re-affirmed the Irvine 
tax-commission-appeal requirement, but held that the provision of the statute 
requiring an appeal be taken to the tax commission before filing a petition for 
review with the district court was void, absent implementing rules as 
contemplated by § 31-7-103, W.S. 1977.4 

[¶10.]  We also concluded that the reference to 
the administrative procedure act in § 31-7-105(c), supra, 
means

"* * * that the 
Wyoming tax 
commission will adopt rules of practice for the conduct of contested cases 
before it. Section 9-4-102 provides:

"`(a) In addition to 
other rulemaking requirements imposed by law, each agency 
shall:

"`(i) Adopt rules of 
practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal 
procedures available in connection with contested cases.'" Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
supra, 595 P.2d  at 969.

[¶11.]  In Yeik, we inquired and found that the 
commission had not adopted implementing rules. In holding § 31-7-105(c) to be 
inoperative and void, we said:

"No procedure having been 
provided by the state tax commission pursuant to § 9-4-102 or § 31-7-103 which 
would clarify and make plain to the persons affected what procedure must be 
followed to obtain the review required by § 31-7-105(c), we, therefore, hold 
that § 31-7-105(c) is inoperative and void until such time as adequate 
procedural rules and regulations are adopted pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the rule-making power of the state tax commission. In such 
case an intermediate appeal between the examiner and the district court does not 
exist and the petitioner may go directly to the district court from the 
examiner. He is not deprived of an appeal to the courts." 595 P.2d  at 
969.

[¶12.]  In the case at bar, the appellant tax 
commission urges that the appeal should be dismissed because the licensee did 
not appeal from the tax commission's ruling, under § 31-7-105(c). But the 
appellant tax commission does not bring to us the rules of the commission 
according to which Mr. Guadagnoli was obligated to pursue his appeal from the 
order of the independent hearing examiner to the tax commission and then to the 
district court while at the same time complying with the provisions of § 
31-7-133, supra n. 2.

[¶13.]  Since these commission rules - if there 
are any - are not before us, § 31-7-105(c) is not any more applicable or viable 
here than it was in Yeik. Absent the 
necessary rules and regulations, this section of the statute is "inoperable and 
void." The petition for review was therefore properly taken from the order of 
the independent hearing examiner, under the authority contained in § 31-7-133, 
supra.

Does § 31-5-1201(c), W.S. 
19775 Exempt Convictions of Speeding 
Violations in Zones Where the Speed Limit is Less Than 55 Miles Per 
Hour?

[¶14.]  The appellee was charged under Ch. II, § 
9 of the Department of Revenue and Taxation Rules and Regulations, which 
provides:

"Grounds for Suspension or Revocation. 
The license of any person may be suspended for up to twelve (12) months or 
revoked for any of the following reasons:

* * * * * 
*

"c. A person who is an 
habitually reckless or negligent driver. Upon a showing of the records of the 
Division that a person has been convicted of three (3) moving violations within 
a one (1) year period, such record shall be cause for a review by the Division 
of all factors to determine the degree of disregard for the safety of lives and 
property, and may, in the judgment of the Division, be grounds for suspension of 
the person's license as an habitually reckless or negligent driver. If the 
record shall be insufficient upon which to adjudge the person as an habitually 
reckless or negligent driver, the person shall nevertheless be given notice in 
writing of the review conducted, and as to the possible consequences of further 
convictions becoming a part of the driving record. A moving violation is an act 
of control or lack of control by the driver of a motor vehicle while the vehicle 
is in motion, which results in conviction."

[¶15.]  The statutory authority for the 
promulgation of this rule and regulation is § 31-7-127(b)(i), W.S. 1977. This 
section provides:

"(b) The division is 
hereby authorized to suspend the license of any driver for a period not to 
exceed twelve (12) months, upon a showing by its records or other sufficient 
evidence that the licensee:

"(i) Is an habitually 
reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle, such fact being established by 
a record of moving violations, accidents or by other evidence; * * 
*."

[¶16.]  The trial judge found that § 
31-5-1201(c), supra n. 5, exempts, for license-suspension purposes, the speeding 
violations of which the appellee was convicted. The decision letter by the court 
was dated May 20, 1983, and the court's order, consistent with the thoughts 
expressed in the decision letter, was dated and filed June 14, 
1983.

[¶17.]  Subsequent to the entry of the aforesaid 
order by the trial court, this court published its decision in State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1239 (1983). 
That case was concerned with the same problem as that which confronts us here, 
and our conclusion in Andrews is contrary to that reached by the trial court in 
this case.

[¶18.]  In Andrews, we drew attention to § 
31-5-301, W.S. 1977 which provides:

"(a) No person shall 
drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent 
under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing.

"(b) Except when a 
special hazard exists that requires lower speed for compliance with paragraph 
(a) of this section, the limits specified in this section or established as 
hereinafter authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive 
a vehicle on a highway at a speed in excess of such maximum 
limits:

"(i) Twenty (20) miles 
per hour when passing a school building, or the grounds thereof, or a school 
crossing, during school recess or while children are going to or leaving school 
during opening or closing hours, and providing that the presence of such school 
building, ground thereof, or school crossing is indicated plainly by signs or 
signals conforming to the provisions hereof;

"(ii) Thirty (30) miles 
per hour in any urban district;

"(iii) Fifty-five (55) miles per hour in other 
locations.

"(c) The maximum speed 
limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized in W.S. 31-131 [§ 
31-5-302] and 31-132 [§ 31-5-303].", (emphasis added),

and we then 
said:

"It is our conclusion 
that reliance by the appellee and by the district court upon § 31-5-1201(c), 
W.S. 1977, plainly is misplaced in an instance in which the statutory provision 
violated is not the general 55-mile-per-hour provision found in § 
31-5-301(b)(iii), W.S. 1977. We are guided by the principle that the court may 
not construe a statute in such a manner as will enlarge, stretch, expand or 
extend it to matters not falling within its express provisions. Matter of TRG, Wyo., 665 P.2d 491 
(1983); LoSasso v. Braun, Wyo., 386 P.2d 630 (1963). It is our duty to ascertain the intention of the legislature as 
completely as possible from the language used in the statute itself. Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982); Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979); and Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 551 P.2d 687 (1976). It follows that the statutory exclusion 
contained in § 31-5-1201(c), supra, comes into effect only if the speed limit 
specifically set in § 31-5-301(b)(iii), supra, has been violated." 671 P.2d  at 
1246.

[¶19.]  The Andrews holding and its rationale 
have been carefully revisited as we undertake our decisional obligations in this 
appeal, and we find no reason to retreat from the Andrews decision. Its 
conclusion as well as its reasoning is sound.

[¶20.]  This, then, leads us to a reversal of the 
trial court's holding that the tax commission had no authority to utilize 
speeding convictions of 74 miles per hour or less for 
driver's-license-suspension purposes in circumstances such as those with which 
we are concerned here.

Does the Record Contain 
Sufficient Evidence to Support a Holding of Such Habitually Reckless or 
Negligent Conduct as Will Warrant the Suspension of Appellee's Driver's 
License?

[¶21.]  The district court held that record proof 
of the three moving violations within a period of one year with which Mr. 
Guadagnoli was charged and found guilty does not - in and of itself - constitute 
such evidence of negligent conduct as will authorize the suspension of his 
driver's license. The reasoning of the trial court is that, while the record 
violations are evidence of negligence, they are not negligence per se and, 
without such further evidence as is contemplated by § 31-7-127(b)(i), supra, and 
Ch. II, § 9 of the Department of Revenue and Taxation Rules and Regulations, 
supra, Guadagnoli could not be found to be "an habitually reckless or negligent 
driver of a motor vehicle" under § 31-7-127(b)(i), supra.

[¶22.]  Again, this issue was decided in the 
Andrews case contrary to the holding of the district court judge in the case at 
bar. Like Andrews, the record here reveals nothing more than the bare fact that 
the appellee was found guilty of these driving violations and has thereafter 
employed the appellate process in an effort to obtain relief from the 
independent hearing examiner's order suspending his driver's license. The 
legislature has contemplated that the licensee may be regarded as "an habitually 
reckless or negligent driver" as this fact is "established by a record of moving 
violations, accidents or by other evidence" (emphasis added), § 
31-7-127(b)(i), supra.

[¶23.]  The record itself is, then, sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of habitual recklessness or negligence. This does 
not mean that we are adopting a negligence-per-se rule as the appellee contends 
and the district court found. Rather, when the statute and implementing rules 
provide that a motorist may be found to be an habitually reckless or negligent 
driver based upon the bare record, and, when the statutes and rules go on to 
contemplate a hearing of the issue before a hearing examiner, the tax commission 
and a trial before the court, we are only holding in this appeal that the naked 
record of the moving violations amounts to evidence of negligence which may be 
rebutted by the licensee as he pursues his due-process rights through the 
agencies and the courts. Of course, the other side of this coin is that, for the 
licensee to test the sufficiency of the evidence on the question of whether the 
record of moving violations is adequate to establish habitual recklessness or 
negligence, the motor vehicle operator whose license is in jeopardy must 
introduce rebutting testimony. It goes without saying that for this court to 
consider such rebutting evidence it must be made a part of the record on appeal. 
Otherwise, all this court has to consider is the bare record of the moving 
violations.

[¶24.]  This record does not contain one single 
shred of evidence which rebuts the motor vehicle division's prima facie showing. 
We are not presented with a transcript of any testimony of a rebutting nature 
which was adduced before either the independent hearing examiner, the tax 
commission or the court. In fact, the record contains no testimony at all. 
Therefore, we have nothing to consider concerning the habitually reckless or 
negligent driving charge, except the prima facie showing which is established by 
the admission of the parties that the appellee stands guilty of all three moving 
violation charges. 

[¶25.]  By not bringing the record of the agency 
hearings to this court,6 the appellee has waived any claims 
he might otherwise have to the failure of the motor vehicle division of the tax 
commission - the commission itself or the independent hearing examiner - to 
consider any proper rebutting evidence. As we noted in Andrews, supra, we have 
previously held, in Spiegelberg v. 
Wyoming Highway Department, Wyo., 508 P.2d 18 (1973), where we were 
considering an earlier version of the statutory provisions with which we are 
concerned here, that the speeding violations with which Spiegelberg was 
concerned would be sufficient to indicate "an habitually reckless or negligent 
driver," and that the motor vehicle division might properly draw such an 
inference.

[¶26.]  We hold, then, with State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, supra, and Spiegelberg v. Wyoming Highway 
Department, supra, that, given the fact that the statute, § 31-7-127(b)(i), 
supra, provides that the negligence of the driver is capable of being 
established by the record of moving violations, and, given the additional fact 
that the record in this appeal reveals no rebutting evidence which could be 
considered for the purpose of establishing that the motor vehicle division of 
the tax commission or the independent hearing examiner failed to consider 
testimony or other evidence which could overcome the prima facie case of 
habitual negligent driving, we must therefore conclude that the unrebutted 
record of the moving violations amounts to habitually reckless or negligent 
driving within the contemplation of the statutes, rules and regulations, and 
case law with which we are concerned here.

Mootness

[¶27.]  It is urged that this appeal should be 
dismissed because of mootness. We cannot agree for the reason that appellee 
Guadagnoli has not served any of his license-suspension 
time.

[¶28.]  We observed in Andrews, supra, that when this court has 
notice of facts which make the appeal unnecessary or which would render any 
judgment of this court ineffectual, the appeal should be dismissed, citing Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 620 P.2d 139 (1980); Shaffer v. Lee, Wyo., 616 P.2d 779 
(1980); In the Matter of Estate of 
Frederick, Wyo., 599 P.2d 550 (1979); Belondon v. State ex rel. Leimback, 
Wyo., 379 P.2d 828 (1963); Cheever v. 
Warren, 70 Wyo. 296, 249 P.2d 163 (1952); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Jones, 61 Wyo. 
350, 157 P.2d 993 (1945); and Scott v. 
Ward, 49 Wyo. 243, 54 P.2d 805 (1936).

[¶29.]  In Andrews, we held that the action was not 
moot because there the district court entered a preliminary order which enjoined 
the suspension of the appellee's license during the pendency of the action and 
the injunction became permanent upon entry of the final order of the district 
court. Much the same situation is present in the case at bar. While the tax 
commission upheld the independent hearing examiner's 90-day suspension of Mr. 
Guadagnoli's license, the commission modified the order to permit limited 
driving privileges. The district court, upon appellee's filing of his petition 
for review, entered a temporary order pending the outcome of the matter which 
also granted limited driving privileges. The final order of the district court 
reversed the suspension order of the independent hearing examiner and therefore 
Mr. Guadagnoli has never been without at least a limited driving permit. Our 
reversal has the effect of reinstating an order of suspension, which suspension 
has never been served. This appeal does not, therefore, contemplate a moot 
issue.

[¶30.]  Reversed and remanded for the entry of 
such an order as will give full force and effect to the order of the independent 
hearing examiner which upheld the finding of the motor vehicle division 
suspending the appellee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 90 
days.

FOOTNOTES

1 Hereinafter "the tax 
commission" or "the appellant."

2 Section 31-7-133, W.S. 
1977 provides:

"Right of appeal to 
court.

"Any person denied a 
license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended or revoked by the 
department shall have the right to file a petition within thirty (30) days 
thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the district court in the county 
wherein the person resides or in the case of cancellation, suspension or 
revocation of a nonresident's operating privilege in the county in which the 
violation occurred and the court is hereby vested with jurisdiction. The court 
shall set the matter for hearing upon thirty (30) days written notice to the 
commissioner and thereupon take testimony and examine into the facts of the case 
and determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is subject to 
suspension, cancellation or revocation of license under the provisions of this 
act."

3 Section 31-7-105(c), 
W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum. Supp., provides:

"(c) Any order of the 
hearing examiner is subject to a hearing before the Wyoming tax commission in 
accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 
16-3-115]."

4 The relevant part of § 
31-7-103, W.S. 1977 provides:

"The administration of 
this act is vested in and shall be exercised by the motor vehicle division under 
the state tax commission of Wyoming which may prescribe forms and reasonable 
rules and regulations in conformity with this act for the administration 
thereof."

5 The relevant part of § 
31-5-1201(c), W.S. 1977 provides:

"* * * Convictions shall 
not be considered pursuant to W.S. 31-276.26(b)(i) [§ 31-7-127(b)(i)] for driver 
license revocations for speeding violations of less than seventy-five (75) miles 
per hour."

6 There was no testimony 
taken in the district court. 

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶31.]  I concur in the result of reversal which 
is reached by the majority opinion in this case. I also am in accord with the 
holding that this court and the district court have jurisdiction over the appeal 
even though the administrative remedy of appeal to the Tax Commission from the 
hearing examiner's order was not pursued. I cannot, however, agree to premise 
that holding upon the failure of the Department of Revenue and Taxation to 
include the rules and regulations of the Tax Commission in the 
record.

[¶32.]  In Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor 
Vehicle Division v. Andrews, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1239 (1983), this court 
discussed and in part relied upon the rules of the Tax Commission with respect 
to its review authority as set forth in § 31-7-105(c), W.S. 1977. In Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979), we stated:

"* * * We will take 
judicial notice of the existence of rules and regulations though not made a part 
of the record by the parties. Logan v. 
Pacific Intermountain Express Co., Wyo. 1965, 400 P.2d 488; Dame v. Mileski, 1959, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205; 4A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1212; 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 
39."

In that case we 
did judicially notice the rules and regulations of the Tax Commission of the 
Department of Revenue, and found that they were deficient. We commented that 
among those factors as to which the rules and regulations of the Tax Commission 
furnished no guidance was the following:

"3. Is the decision of 
the hearing examiner stayed during the pendency of the review process or must 
the party seeking review specifically ask for such a 
stay?"

[¶33.]  Chapter XVIII, Section 7 of the Rules of 
Practice and Procedure for Appeals Before the Wyoming Tax Commission Involving 
Driver's Licenses, Financial Responsibility, Registration, and Other Related 
Matters, in effect at the time this case was before the Tax Commission, 
provides:

"Section 7. Stay. Even though a Notice of Appeal has 
been filed with the Commission, the order of the Hearing Examiner remains in 
force until such time as the appeal has [¶34.]    been decided by the 
Commission and no stay will be granted."

[¶35.]  Intellectual honesty compels me to 
recognize the rules and regulations of the Tax Commission, but I still agree 
that this court has jurisdiction because those rules and regulations are 
deficient. In my view rules which provide for review but do not permit the order 
being reviewed to be stayed pending the completion of the review process are 
little better than no rules providing for review or rules providing for no 
review at all. If the licensee must incur the sanctions provided by the order of 
the hearing examiner even though a review is sought before the Tax Commission I 
think that we encounter the same problems that are presented in Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
supra, and Department of Revenue v. 
Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979). Since Guadagnoli was in a position in 
which he could suffer the suspension imposed by the hearing examiner, without 
being able to seek a stay before the Tax Commission, in my judgment due process 
requires that we entertain his appeal pursuant to § 31-7-113, W.S. 1977. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor 
Vehicle Division v. Andrews, supra, is distinguishable because in that case 
the effective dates of suspension were deferred to permit the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. That policy was not followed in this 
case.

[¶36.]  I note specifically that my reaction 
would be entirely different if the rules of the Tax Commission provided for a 
stay pending completion of the administrative review process, and in that 
instance I would be disposed to require the exhaustion of the administrative 
remedies prior to seeking judicial review. It would seem to me that the Tax 
Commission well might wish to reconsider that portion of its rules and 
regulations which prohibits a stay pending review. 

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶37.]  I would dismiss the appeal as 
moot.

[¶38.]  The majority of the court refuses to do 
so "for the reason that appellee Guadagnoli has not served any of his 
license-suspension time."

[¶39.]  On February 2, 1983, the hearing officer 
suspended appellee's driving privileges for 90 days. The hearing officer refused 
appellee's request for a limited privilege to drive four miles from his home to 
Western Wyoming College where he was in attendance. On February 4, 1983, the 
district court granted limited driving privileges to appellee pending a hearing 
on his petition for review, and on April 8, 1983, the appellant upheld the 
suspension of appellee's driving privileges by the hearing officer, but modified 
the hearing officer's decision by granting limited driving privileges to 
appellee.1 The limited privileges by both the 
appellant and the court consisted of authorization to drive to and from his home 
and classes at the college; to and from his place of employment; and to and from 
his home in Green River to Rock Springs on Mondays from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., 
to visit his father.

[¶40.]  Accordingly, the 90-day period of 
suspension of driving privileges as ordered by the hearing officer and modified 
by the appellant has long since expired. The stay granted by the district court, 
by its terms, was not a stay of the final suspension conditions imposed by 
appellant in April of 1983 since the two were coextensive in 
application.

[¶41.]  A decision by this court upholding the 
propriety or the impropriety of the basis upon which appellee's driving 
privileges were suspended will have no practical effect on the past or present 
status of appellee's driving privileges. He lost them - subject to the limited 
use authorized by appellant and the court2 - for the 90-day period. We cannot 
change that which has happened. Our judgment would be ineffectual insofar as 
appellee's driving privileges are concerned. See cases cited in last section of 
the majority opinion.

[¶42.]  Inasmuch as I would hold the subject of 
the appeal to be moot, I would not address other issues and would dismiss the 
appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 31-7-105(c), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(c) Any order of the 
hearing examiner is subject to a hearing before the Wyoming tax commission in 
accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 9-4-101 to 
9-4-115]."

2 Even if the appellant 
had not modified the examiner's order by authorizing limited privileges, limited 
driving privileges are a far cry from total driving privileges. Appellee should 
not be held to suffer double penalties - one for loss of most of his driving 
privileges for a period of time, and one for loss of all of his driving 
privileges for another period of time - simply because he chose to exercise his 
right to appeal. A stay of the loss of any privileges could have been granted 
during the period of appeal.