Title: Elyria v. Lorain Cty. Budget Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Elyria v. Lorain Cty. Budget Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-940.] 
 
 
CITY OF ELYRIA ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. LORAIN COUNTY  
BUDGET COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Elyria v. Lorain Cty. Budget Comm.,  
117 Ohio St.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-940.] 
Local Government Fund — Local Government Revenue Assistance Fund — 
Jurisdiction — R.C. 5747.55 applies to an appeal taken from budget 
commission orders that allocate funds based on an alternative method of 
apportionment — An appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals from an 
apportionment by a budget commission must strictly comply with R.C. 
5747.55(C)(3). 
(Nos. 2006-2293, 2006-2389, and 2006-2390—Submitted November 6, 2007—
Decided March 12, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals,  
Nos. 2003-T-1533, 2004-T-1166, and 2005-T-1301. 
————————— 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  R.C. 5747.55 applies to an appeal taken from budget commission orders that 
allocate funds based on an alternative method of apportionment. 
2.  An appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals from an apportionment by a budget 
commission must strictly comply with R.C. 5747.55(C)(3). 
————————— 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In the three consolidated appeals before us, four political 
subdivisions in Lorain County – the city of Elyria, the city of North Ridgeville, 
the city of Avon Lake, and Amherst Township – challenge the alternative method 
of apportionment that was used by the county budget commission to apportion 
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certain funds set aside by the state for local governments for distribution years 
2004, 2005, and 2006.  A fifth subdivision, Lorain County Metropolitan Park 
District, was an appellant at the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), but did not 
appeal to this court. 
{¶ 2} Ohio law provides for the creation of a “local government fund” 
(“LGF”) and, during the relevant period at issue here, a “local government 
revenue assistance fund” (“LGRAF”).1  R.C. 5747.03(A)(1) (creating LGF); 
former R.C. 5747.61(B) (creating LGRAF).  By statute, a certain portion of 
various state taxes is directed into the LGF and LGRAF at the state level as a 
matter of course.  See R.C. 5747.03(A)(1) and 5747.03(A)(4) (personal income 
tax); R.C. 5733.12(A) (corporation franchise tax); R.C. 5739.21(A) (sales tax); 
R.C. 5741.03(A) (use tax); R.C. 5725.24 (dealers-in-intangibles tax); R.C. 
5727.45 (public utility property and excise taxes); R.C. 5727.84 (kilowatt-hour 
tax).  Pursuant to statutory formulas, the Tax Commissioner is required to 
distribute the LFG and LGRAF to the county treasurers.  The law mandated that 
the distributed amounts be credited, respectively, to the Undivided Local 
Government Fund (“ULGF”) and the Undivided Local Government Revenue 
Assistance Fund (“ULGRAF”) of each county.  See R.C. 5747.50, 5747.51, and 
former 5747.61.  143 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2331, 2630-2632. 
{¶ 3} At the county level, the statutes called for distributing the funds 
through a basic “statutory” method of apportionment that computes the “relative 
need” of the political subdivisions.  R.C. 5747.51; former R.C. 5747.62.  147 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3906, 3945-3947.  The statutes allowed the political 
subdivisions to adopt an “alternative method of apportionment” for LGF and 
LGRAF.  R.C. 5747.53; former 5747.63.  149 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7881, 7887-
7890. 
                                                 
1.  The 2007 budget bill repealed R.C. 5747.61, 5747.62, and 5747.63 as of June 30, 2007.  2007 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 119. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 4} The appeals we address today have their genesis in an earlier case 
that came before the BTA.  In 2002, the city of Lorain (“Lorain City”) appealed 
the budget commission’s apportionment for the 2003 distribution year.  In that 
appeal, Lorain City contended that the budget commission had allocated funds to 
an ineligible entity and that the alternative method of apportionment that the 
budget commission used had not been properly adopted under the statute.  
Although 23 political subdivisions, including the budget commission, were named 
as appellees in that appeal, none of the subdivisions that are appellants in this case 
were named. 
{¶ 5} The parties to that case settled, and the terms of that settlement 
appear in the record via correspondence between Lorain County and Lorain City.  
Lorain City accepted the county’s proposal that (1) the county make an additional 
lump-sum payment of $500,000 to Lorain City for the 2003 distribution year, (2) 
the county be responsible for half of this sum, with the subdivisions named in the 
appeal to be responsible for the other half, and (3) a new alternative method be 
adopted that would prospectively adjust apportionment percentages so that Lorain 
City would receive about $640,000 more than it had under the previous 
alternative method.  This last provision would be effectuated by apportioning to 
Lorain City an additional 3.396 percent of the funds – an increase that would be 
financed by across-the-board reductions in allocations to the other subdivisions, 
including appellants, who were not parties to the appeal. 
{¶ 6} Elyria and the other appellants appealed the allocation under the 
new method of apportionment with respect to distribution year 2004 (No. 2006-
2293), distribution year 2005 (No. 2006-2389), and distribution year 2006 (No. 
2006-2390).  (For convenience, we will use “Elyria” or “city of Elyria” as an 
abbreviated way of referring collectively to all of the appellants.)  The notices of 
appeal to the BTA made two principal allegations of error.  First, citing R.C. 
5747.55(D), Elyria contended that it could not suffer a reduced allocation of LGF 
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and LGRAF because it had not been made a party to Lorain City’s BTA appeal, 
which had produced the settlement.  Second, Elyria argued that the new 
alternative method of apportionment had not been properly adopted pursuant to 
the timetable and procedures prescribed by the statutes. 
{¶ 7} In each of the cases before us, Elyria had attached a table as 
Exhibit G to the notice of appeal.  In Exhibit G, Elyria names the political 
subdivisions in Lorain County that had participated in the allocation of LGF and 
LGRAF.  For each subdivision, the table identifies (1) what that subdivision 
received under the new alternative method of apportionment, (2) what that 
subdivision would have received under the prior method of apportionment (with 
modifications, see below), and (3) the amount of any overallocation or 
underallocation.  On each Exhibit G, only one subdivision was identified as 
overallocated:  Lorain County.  The city of Lorain was listed, but the sums in the 
first two categories were presumed to be identical as a result of the settlement, so 
the tables showing under- and overallocation were blank. 
{¶ 8} In case No. 2006-2293, the BTA held a hearing and received 
stipulations and evidentiary exhibits.  Instead of addressing the merits of the 
arguments advanced by Elyria, the BTA dismissed on the grounds that Elyria had 
failed to identify Lorain City as an overallocated subdivision. 
{¶ 9} The BTA justified its dismissal by explaining that the second 
column in Exhibit G, which purports to represent a list of the funds “that should 
have been allocated under the alternative method used prior to settlement in Case 
No. 02-T-1865,” overstates what the city of Lorain’s allocation would have been 
under the old formula and that in fact, the city benefits from the new formula.  
Therefore, the BTA stated, “the appellants do not, in fact, claim that all 
allocations should be reverted to the prior formula,” because under the former 
alternative method of apportionment, Lorain City would have received less 
money.  The BTA concluded, therefore, that Elyria had made “a deliberate 
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5 
decision to exclude the city of Lorain as an over-allocated subdivision.”  
Confirming this conclusion was the claim for relief in the notice of appeal, in 
which Elyria initially asked the BTA to “allocate the 2004 LGF and 2004 RAF 
among the parties to the appeal in accordance with the alternative method used by 
the [budget commission] prior to the settlement of Case No. 02-T-1865.”  But 
Elyria also asked that “any increased allocation to Lorain [city] as a result of such 
settlement [be] borne only by Lorain County from its allocated share and with no 
reduction suffered by any other participating subdivision.”  Id. 
{¶ 10} Because R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) requires an appellant to identify “each 
participating subdivision * * * that the complaining subdivision believes received 
more than its proper share of the allocation,” and because Elyria did not identify 
Lorain City as overallocated, the BTA found that Elyria had not complied with 
R.C. 5747.55(C)(3).  Citing cases for the proposition that the requirements set 
forth in that statute constitute jurisdictional prerequisites to pursuing the appeal at 
the BTA, the BTA dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Based on this analysis, the 
BTA also dismissed case Nos. 2006-2389 and 2006-2390, which pertain to 
subsequent distribution years.  Elyria has appealed all three decisions to this court, 
and we now reverse. 
{¶ 11} The BTA dismissed all three cases because it found that Elyria had 
failed to comply with R.C. 5747.55(C)(3).  On appeal to this court, Elyria argues 
for the first time that R.C. 5747.55 and division (C)(3) in particular do not apply 
to appeals from budget commission decisions that allocate under an alternative 
method of apportionment.  In the alternative, Elyria renews its contention that it 
complied with R.C. 5747.55(C)(3). 
I 
{¶ 12} R.C. 5747.55 states, “The action of the county budget commission 
under sections 5747.51 and 5747.62 of the Revised Code may be appealed * * *.”  
Because the statutory method of apportionment is detailed in R.C. 5747.51 and 
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former 5747.62, and because separate sections address alternative methods of 
apportionment, Elyria argues that the provisions of R.C. 5747.55 apply only to 
appeals from statutory-method allocations.  This argument appears to constitute a 
threshold issue:  if R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) does not apply to these appeals, then the 
premise that the BTA relied upon for dismissing the appeals evaporates.  We 
conclude, however, that another issue arises as a threshold to the threshold:  
Elyria’s notice of appeal to this court does not assert that the BTA erred by 
applying R.C. 5747.55(C)(3).  Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction to decide an issue 
that has not been properly asserted in the notice of appeal to this court.  See 
Dayton-Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 
Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 32, and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 13} But Dayton does not preclude us from deciding whether the BTA 
properly regarded R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) as being applicable to this case.  The 
applicability of R.C. 5747.55 affects the subject-matter jurisdiction of the BTA 
and, derivatively, of this court on appeal.  See Colonial Village Ltd. v. 
Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 
N.E.2d 298, ¶ 2.  We have jurisdiction to review whether the BTA had 
jurisdiction of the merits of a case, and we can exercise that jurisdiction even 
when the alleged defect in the BTA’s jurisdiction was not asserted in the notice of 
appeal to this court.  See id. at ¶ 2, 10 (jurisdictional defect considered by the 
court even though it was asserted through a motion to remand rather than the 
notice of appeal); H.R. Options, Inc. v. Zaino, 100 Ohio St.3d 373, 2004-Ohio-1, 
800 N.E.2d 740, ¶ 8 (court considered jurisdictional issue raised by appellant for 
the first time in his brief to the court).  We conclude that it is both logical and 
practical to address whether R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) is applicable before we address 
whether Elyria complied with it.  Determining the applicability of R.C. 5747.55 is 
crucial to our discussion of the scope of the BTA’s jurisdiction in Part III of this 
opinion.  Accordingly, we will exercise jurisdiction to determine whether R.C. 
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7 
5747.55(C)(3) limits the BTA’s jurisdiction to review the budget commission’s 
decision in these appeals. 
{¶ 14} We hold that R.C. 5747.55 applies to an appeal taken from budget 
commission orders that allocate funds based on an alternative method of 
apportionment.  As a result, R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) imposes a jurisdictional 
requirement on the appeals before us. 
{¶ 15} The plain language of the various sections of the Revised Code 
establishes that R.C. 5747.55 is applicable.  By its very terms, R.C. 5747.55 
applies when an appeal to the BTA concerns the “action of the county budget 
commission under sections 5747.51 and 5747.62 of the Revised Code.”  Elyria 
argues that because R.C. 5747.51 and former 5747.62 set forth the basic or 
statutory method of apportionment at divisions (C) to (I) and (C) to (H) 
respectively, the legislature must have intended R.C. 5747.55 to apply only to 
appeals from an apportionment under the statutory method.  We conclude 
otherwise because that argument fails to consider the function of division (B) of 
both R.C. 5747.51 and former 5747.62. 
{¶ 16} In both R.C. 5747.51 and former 5747.62, division (B) sets forth 
the general mandate that the budget commission “determine the amount” of the 
LGF or LGRAF “needed by and to be apportioned to each subdivision.”  In each 
section, division (B) expressly states that “[t]his determination shall be made 
pursuant to [the statutory method] unless the commission has provided for a 
formula pursuant to [R.C. 5747.53 or former 5747.63] of the Revised Code.”  The 
“unless” clause refers to the provisions that authorize alternative methods of 
apportionment, and as a result the budget commission acts pursuant to division 
(B) of R.C. 5747.51 and former 5747.62 when it apportions funds under either the 
statutory or an alternative method.  It follows that when the budget commission 
apportions in accordance with an alternative method, it is acting pursuant to 
division (B) of R.C. 5747.51 or former 5747.62.  As a result, R.C. 5747.55 applies 
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to appeals from such an apportionment, because it involves an action by the 
budget commission pursuant to R.C. 5747.51 and former 5747.62. 
{¶ 17} Our holding in this regard is not contrary to earlier cases.  In 
Shawnee Twp. v. Allen Cty. Budget Comm. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 14, 567 N.E.2d 
1007, the county argued that R.C. 5747.55 did not apply because the township’s 
appeal to the BTA had challenged an alternative method of apportionment.  We 
held that the appeal should be understood to be one that raised a right to a 
statutory apportionment, rather than constituting a challenge to apportionment 
under an alternative method.  Id. at 16.  Accordingly, we conclude that Shawnee 
did not reach and does not control the issue we decide here.  See Mogadore v. 
Summit Cty. Budget Comm. (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 42, 44, 520 N.E.2d 1370.  
See also Union Twp. v. Butler Cty. Budget Comm. (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 212, 
216, 655 N.E.2d 260 (the court of appeals referred to our decision in Shawnee 
Twp. and apparently analyzed the case before it as involving an appeal from a 
statutory apportionment, but did not directly address the issue we consider here). 
{¶ 18} Because R.C. 5747.55 applies, it follows that Elyria was obligated 
to comply with R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) in order to maintain its appeal at the BTA. 
II 
{¶ 19} We next address whether Elyria complied with R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) 
by identifying “each participating subdivision * * * that the complaining 
subdivision believes received more than its proper share of the allocation.” 
{¶ 20} The parties dispute the standard to be applied in determining 
compliance with R.C. 5747.55(C)(3).  Elyria contends that it may prosecute its 
appeal as long as it made a good-faith effort and substantially complied with R.C. 
5747.55(C)(3).  The county argues that strict compliance with R.C. 5747.55(C)(3) 
is required.  We agree with the county, and we hold that an appeal to the BTA 
from the apportionment by a budget commission must strictly comply with R.C. 
5747.55(C)(3).  See Cincinnati v. Hamilton Cty. Budget Comm. (1979), 59 Ohio 
January Term, 2008 
9 
St.2d 43, 45, 13 O.O.3d 32, 391 N.E.2d 734 (good-faith reason for not naming 
overallocated subdivisions did not prevent dismissal of appeal); Painesville v. 
Lake Cty. Budget Comm. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 282, 284-285, 10 O.O.3d 411, 
383 N.E.2d 896. 
{¶ 21} The BTA dismissed the case because it found that Elyria should 
have named Lorain City as an overallocated subdivision.  That finding was 
predicated on the BTA’s view that a litigant in Elyria’s position could assert only 
two types of claim before the BTA.  Elyria could establish either that “the 
allocation should have been made under the old formula,” pursuant to which 
claim Elyria should have identified Lorain City as an overallocated subdivision, 
or that neither the current nor the former alternative formula applies, in which 
case allocation would have to occur pursuant to the statutory method.  Because 
Elyria requested “something different,” i.e., a variation on the former alternative 
method, not statutory apportionment, the BTA barred its appeal, stating, “[T]he 
appellants have decided to ‘pick and choose’ which entity should be responsible 
for any changes in the allocation, rather than seek to have the old formula applied 
as approved.  As in the case of Union Twp. [101 Ohio App.3d 212, 655 N.E.2d 
260], by not identifying all entities the appellants believe are overallocated under 
the new formula, but only setting forth the county as the sole entity to be 
responsible for any changes in the amounts allocated among the subdivisions, the 
appellants have created their own formula, an alternative that is beyond the scope 
of these proceedings.”  Elyria faults this rationale as consisting of the BTA’s 
“conclusions regarding the merits of Appellants’ claims and arguments” rather 
than constituting “grounds that are truly jurisdictional.”  We agree, and we 
therefore reverse. 
{¶ 22} The starting point is to ascertain what claim or claims Elyria’s 
notices of appeal to the BTA assert.  In its notice of appeal for distribution year 
2004, Elyria states, “[The budget commission] should have allocated the LGF and 
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RAF for 2004 in accordance with the settlement reached in the tax appeal 
proceeding in Case No. 02-T-1865 but with no reduction suffered by any 
Appellant which was not a named party in that tax appeal proceeding.  The 
reductions in the 2004 LGF and 2004 RAF necessitated by the increased 
allocation to Lorain should have been borne entirely by allocation to appellee, 
Lorain County, Ohio * * *.” 
{¶ 23} The notice of appeal refers to Exhibit G as showing the amounts 
underallocated, along with “the exact amount in dollars which has been 
overallocated to Lorain County.”  The notices of appeal to the BTA for 
distribution years 2005 and 2006 set forth the same theory. 
{¶ 24} Elyria’s theory of relief in paragraph 4(c) of the notices of appeal 
relies on R.C. 5747.55(D), which states that “no change shall, in any amount, be 
made in the amount allocated to participating subdivisions not appellees” in a 
BTA appeal.  In effect, the notices of appeal to the BTA argue that the alternative 
method contemplated by the settlement is binding on the subdivisions of the 
county and that settlement involves a contractual increase to Lorain City financed 
completely by the county.  The assertion of this internally coherent theory, even if 
it ultimately fails on the merits, distinguishes this case from Union Twp., 101 
Ohio App.3d 212, 655 N.E.2d 260, upon which the BTA heavily relied in 
dismissing these appeals.  In Union Twp., officials of appellant Union Township 
believed that other townships would be overallocated, but made a conscious 
decision not to name those townships as being overallocated, preferring instead to 
recover only from the cities, even if that approach limited the amount of recovery.  
Id. at 217 (appellant told the BTA that it would content itself with “[w]hatever 
additional amount the Board of Tax Appeals chooses to re-allocate from the 
named Appellees”).  There was no indication that Union Township had advanced 
any coherent theory of relief that justified naming only the subdivisions it named 
as being overallocated.  In characterizing Elyria’s theory of relief as coherent, we 
January Term, 2008 
11 
are not prejudging the merits of that theory.  We hold only that because Elyria’s 
notices of appeal to the BTA asserted a claim that justified naming the county as 
the only overallocated subdivision, the BTA had jurisdiction to determine the 
merits of that claim, and accordingly, the BTA committed legal error when it 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
{¶ 25} In Hamilton Cty. Budget Comm., 59 Ohio St.2d 43, 13 O.O.3d 32, 
391 N.E.2d 734, we addressed a different situation.  The notice of appeal to the 
BTA in that case stated that the appellant “cannot state with certainty which, if 
any, of the participating subdivisions may have received more and which may 
have received less than its proper share or what the amount of its proper share 
should be.”   Id. at 45.  The BTA and the court agreed that such a notice did not 
invoke the BTA’s jurisdiction.  This case is significantly different from Hamilton 
Cty. Budget Comm.  Elyria has named one overallocated subdivision, a 
designation that is arguably consistent with its theory as to the errors committed 
by the budget commission, whereas in Hamilton Cty. Budget Comm., no 
subdivision was identified as overallocated. 
{¶ 26} Finally, we address the possibility that the BTA has already 
considered and rejected the merits of Elyria’s theory of relief.  To be sure, the 
BTA’s discussion broadly implies that such a theory is not cognizable on the 
merits, but we decline to view the cursory attention the BTA devoted to it as a 
rejection of the merits of that theory.  When litigants present their contentions to 
the BTA, the law requires the BTA to apply its expertise and present its findings 
and the basis therefore.  See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 233, 235, 559 N.E.2d 1328.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the BTA to dismiss the appeals, and we remand for further 
proceedings. 
III 
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{¶ 27} It remains for us to clarify the scope of the BTA’s jurisdiction on 
remand. 
{¶ 28} First, as we have discussed, the BTA has jurisdiction to determine 
the validity of Elyria’s primary claim for relief on the merits.  Accordingly, on 
remand, the BTA will have the authority to decide whether Elyria is entitled to the 
specific relief reflected by the figures in Exhibit G of the notices of appeal. 
{¶ 29} Second, the BTA on remand will not have jurisdiction to entertain 
any theory of relief not consistent with Elyria’s identification of Lorain County as 
the only overallocated subdivision.  In Union Twp., 101 Ohio App.3d at 218, 655 
N.E.2d 260, the court of appeals explained that the “purpose of appeal is to permit 
a subdivision receiving less than its statutory [or alternative-method] share to seek 
to recover that share,” and it does so from the fund consisting of “the over-
allocations to the named appellees.”  By requiring an appellant to name the 
appellees and identify their potential liability, the statute furnishes notice to those 
other subdivisions about what they stand to lose and thereby puts them on guard 
to defend.  It follows that the BTA may not exercise jurisdiction to consider a 
claim that the earlier alternative method of apportionment should be completely 
reinstated.  As the BTA correctly found, this theory cannot be squared with the 
notice of appeal because reinstating the earlier formula, with adjustment for the 
settlement, would mean that Lorain City has been overallocated, but the notice of 
appeal does not identify that city as being overallocated. 
{¶ 30} Finally, the BTA will not have jurisdiction to apply the statutory 
method.  We understand that the BTA, in the decision under review, has already 
found that the statutory method is not jurisdictionally before it, and the appeal to 
this court did not challenge that disposition.  See Dayton-Montgomery Cty. Port 
Auth., 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 31} These jurisdictional limitations are particularly significant because 
Elyria asserted an alternative claim that the new apportionment method had not 
January Term, 2008 
13 
been properly and timely adopted in case Nos. 2006-2293 and 2006-2389.  If the 
BTA finds that this contention is correct in one or more of the appeals before us, 
it would ordinarily have to either reinstate the former alternative method or 
determine the proper distribution through the statutory method.  But in this case, 
the BTA will lack jurisdiction to pursue either of these alternatives.  It would, 
upon making such a finding, have to dismiss the appeal. 
{¶ 32} With these precepts in mind, we reverse the decisions of the BTA 
in the three appeals before us and remand each case for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion. 
Decisions reversed 
and causes remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Terry S. Shilling, Elyria Law Director, and Michelle D. Nedwick, 
Assistant Law Director, for appellants city of Elyria and Amherst Township. 
 
Geoffrey R. Smith, Avon Lake Law Director, for appellant city of Avon 
Lake. 
 
Eric H. Zagrans, for appellant city of North Ridgeville. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P, John T. Sunderland, and John B. Kopf, for 
appellees Lorain County and Lorain County Board of Commissioners. 
 
John R. Varanese, for appellee city of Lorain. 
 
Gerald A. Innes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Lorain 
County Budget Commission. 
______________________