Title: State v. Fritz

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 108,292 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
FREDERICK W. FRITZ IV, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
A hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea of nolo contendere is limited to those 
instances in which the defendant's motion raises substantial issues of fact or law. When 
the files and records conclusively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief, the 
motion must be denied.  
 
2. 
 
Mere conclusions of the defendant are insufficient to raise a substantial issue of 
fact when no factual basis is alleged or appears in the record. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; GREGORY L. WALLER, judge. Opinion filed April 11, 
2014. Affirmed. 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Frederick W. Fritz IV appeals from the summary denial of his motion 
to withdraw his plea of no contest to charges of felony murder, attempted first-degree 
murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery.  
 
The State charged Fritz with one count of premeditated murder, three counts of 
attempted first-degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and four counts of 
attempted aggravated robbery. On August 16, 2010, he entered a plea of no contest to one 
count of felony murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, one count of 
aggravated robbery, and four counts of attempted aggravated robbery. On September 30, 
2010, the district court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment plus 652 months.  
 
On December 8, 2010, Fritz docketed his appeal from his sentence. On January 
21, 2011, he filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Then, on March 14, 2011, he withdrew his motion because his case was pending 
on appeal. After the parties submitted their appellate briefs but before the case was set on 
a docket, on December 16, 2011, this court issued an order summarily vacating the 
sentence and remanding the case to the district court for resentencing.  
 
On March 9, 2012, the district court resentenced Fritz, imposing a hard 20 life 
sentence plus 330 months. Also on March 9, 2012, new counsel filed a renewed motion 
in district court seeking leave to withdraw the no contest plea. After hearing brief 
argument from the parties, the district court denied the motion without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing. Fritz took a timely appeal to this court.  
 
A district court may, for good cause and at its discretion, allow a defendant to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest at any time before sentence is adjudged. K.S.A. 
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2013 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1). In determining whether a defendant has shown good cause to 
withdraw a plea, a district court should consider three factors, sometimes called the 
Edgar factors, after State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006):  (1) whether 
the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was 
misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was 
fairly and understandingly made. State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511, 231 P.3d 563 
(2010). These factors should not, however, be applied mechanically and to the exclusion 
of other factors. State v. Garcia, 295 Kan. 53, 63, 283 P.3d 165 (2012). 
 
After the district court pronounces sentence, it may allow a defendant to withdraw 
a plea in order "[t]o correct manifest injustice." K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2). 
 
An appellate court generally reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for 
abuse of discretion. The defendant has the burden of proving abuse of discretion. State v. 
Macias-Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). When a motion to withdraw a 
plea is summarily denied without argument and additional evidence, this court applies the 
same procedures and standards of review as in cases arising out of K.S.A. 60-1507. This 
court exercises de novo review because it has the same access to the motion, records, and 
files as the district court, and it determines whether the motion, records, and files 
conclusively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief. State v. Moses, 296 Kan. 
1126, 1127-28, 297 P.3d 1174 (2013). 
 
The State takes the position that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Fritz' 
motion because the mandate of this court limited the scope of the district court's authority 
to resentencing. The State essentially advocates penalizing defendants who successfully 
appeal from their sentences by preventing them from filing motions to withdraw their 
guilty pleas after they win their appeals. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3210 permits defendants 
to withdraw their pleas "at any time before sentence is adjudged" and "within one year" 
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of "[t]he final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a 
direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction." K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-
3210(d), (e)(1). 
 
Fritz may have been precluded from filing his motion to withdraw his plea while 
his conviction and sentence were on appeal. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 255 Kan. 756, 
761, 877 P.2d 961 (1994); State v. Dedman, 230 Kan. 793, 796-97, 640 P.2d 1266 (1982) 
(district court loses jurisdiction over case after direct appeal docketed). If, as the State 
contends, the district court also did not have jurisdiction over the motion after Fritz won 
his appeal, then his time to file a motion to withdraw his plea and receive relief from the 
district court would be limited to the approximately 9 weeks between the date of his 
original sentence and the docketing of his original appeal. Such a short time would 
conflict with the statutory language plainly giving him 1 year to file his motion to 
withdraw his plea. Furthermore, if the district court failed to act on his motion before he 
docketed the appeal, he would presumably be forever barred from filing such a motion 
under the State's theory. Such results are inconsistent both with the statutory scheme and 
with fundamental fairness. We therefore decline to adopt the State's theory that a 
defendant may not move to withdraw a guilty plea after a case is remanded from the 
appellate courts for resentencing. 
 
Fritz asserts several grounds as a basis for withdrawing his plea:  First, he was not 
sleeping well while in jail, which left him vulnerable to pressure from his attorney, who 
urged him to enter into the plea and who misled him as to the sentence that he would 
receive. In addition, he believed there were defenses to some or all of the charges against 
him. In his appellate brief, Fritz also raises arguments based on his original motion to 
withdraw his plea. That motion, however, was voluntarily withdrawn and is not properly 
before this court. 
 
5 
 
 
 
A hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is limited to those 
instances in which the defendant's motion raises substantial issues of fact or law. When 
the files and records conclusively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief the 
motion must be denied. State v. Jackson, 255 Kan. 455, 459, 874 P.2d 1138 (1994). Mere 
conclusions of the defendant are insufficient to raise a substantial issue of fact when no 
factual basis is alleged or appears in the record. 255 Kan. at 463; see also Burns v. State, 
215 Kan. 497, 499-500, 524 P.2d 737 (1974) (burden of establishing that defendant was 
misled by his or her attorney lies with the defendant; mere conclusory contentions with 
no evidentiary support insufficient basis for relief from conviction). 
 
In Jackson, the defendant's asserted basis for being allowed to withdraw his plea 
was "that my attorney corced [sic] me into pleaing [sic] guilty." 255 Kan. at 456. He also 
stated that he was "[c]ompeled [sic] to plea" and "[a]lso new evidence found in the case." 
255 Kan. at 456. This court determined that these allegations were mere conclusions and 
that they did not require an evidentiary hearing. 255 Kan. at 463. 
 
The pleading in the present case closely resembles that in Jackson. Aside from 
stating that he had not been sleeping well, Fritz asserted no specific facts indicating that 
he involuntarily or unknowingly entered into the plea agreement. The record on appeal 
includes the plea hearing and shows that the district court went over the plea agreement 
in detail, including the positions of the State and the defense regarding sentencing. The 
court also inquired whether Fritz was satisfied with the services provided by his attorney, 
whether he had any complaints about the manner in which he had been counseled, and 
whether he had been subject to any threats or promises beyond the specific language of 
the plea agreement. Fritz explicitly stated that he had no complaints and had not been 
subject to threats or promises.  
 
6 
 
 
 
Fritz directs this court to Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 172 P.3d 10 (2007), in 
which the court reversed the summary denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Bellamy, the movant asserted specific advice that his 
trial counsel gave him, advice that was legally incorrect. In the present case, Fritz makes 
no such specific assertion. In his original, and subsequently withdrawn, motion he 
asserted that his attorneys had not informed him of "a legal psychological defense." Such 
a claim is vague and does not assert sufficient grounds to justify a full evidentiary 
hearing.  
 
The district court elected not to choose between the good-cause and the manifest-
injustice standards. Instead, it ruled that Fritz' motion failed under either standard. We 
reach the same conclusion. Although the conclusory allegations of the motion correspond 
with the Edgar factors (incompetent counsel, coercion by counsel, and plea not 
understandingly made), they lack the substance that Jackson requires. Under the facts of 
this case, we cannot construe the district court's decision to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
Affirmed.