Title: P. v. Scott

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 2/19/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE 
) 
 
 
)  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
)  
S136498 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
)  
Ct.App. 3 C044964 
 
) 
ANDRE RENE SCOTT et al., 
)  
Sacramento County 
 
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. 01F03583 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
We granted review to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal concerning 
whether, for purposes of the offense of robbery, all employees have constructive 
possession of the employer’s property while on duty and thus may be separate 
victims of a robbery of the employer’s business, assuming the other elements of 
robbery are met as to each employee.  In the present case, the Court of Appeal 
concluded the trial court did not err in informing the jury, in response to its 
question, that all employees on duty during a robbery have constructive possession 
of their employer’s property, a conclusion in accord with the holding in People v. 
Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 485 (Jones).  This decision of the Court of Appeal 
conflicts with People v. Frazer (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1115 (Frazer), 
which requires the jury to examine all of the circumstances in order to determine 
whether each “employee has sufficient representative capacity with respect to the 
owner of the property, so as to have express or implied authority over the 
1 
property.”  We agree with the Court of Appeal below that Jones correctly states 
the law and, accordingly, we disapprove Frazer. 
I. 
Defendants Andre Rene Scott and Maurice Kenney were charged with three 
counts of robbery based on a single incident, the early morning robbery of a 
McDonald’s restaurant in Sacramento.  (Pen. Code, § 211.) 1  An enhancement for 
personal use of a firearm was alleged as to each robbery count, and each defendant 
also was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.  (§§ 12022.53, 
subd. (b), 12021, subd. (a).)  Defendant Kenney was charged with having one 
prior conviction and defendant Scott with having two prior convictions.  (§§ 667, 
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) 
The three alleged victims were employees on duty at the restaurant that 
morning — Jinel Guillebeau, Diana Salazar, and Serena Wong.  Evidence 
presented at trial established that defendants Scott and Kenney were two of the 
three men who participated in the robbery.2  The three men entered the restaurant 
at approximately 6:15 a.m., shortly after it opened.  Each wore dark clothing and 
ski masks; one had a gun, and another had a rifle.   
Ms. Guillebeau was working at the restaurant’s drive-through window.  
When she saw two masked men, one with a gun, she immediately hid under the 
grill and remained there for the duration of the robbery.  Ms. Salazar was working 
in the kitchen area, preparing food, when she saw the men.  She observed that one 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2  
A third defendant also was charged in connection with the robberies, but 
the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charges against him.   
 
2 
of the men stood in front of the counter, holding a rifle.  She hid under a table and 
remained there for the duration of the episode. 
Ms. Wong, the manager, was working at the drive-through window.  She 
heard Ms. Guillebeau scream, turned around, and saw a man holding a handgun.  
This individual directed Wong to the back of the store toward the safe.  She 
brought him to the office and opened the safe using the combination, which she 
had memorized.  She placed money in a bag, along with an electronic tracking 
device that she had been trained to place with the money in case of a robbery.  
Later, through the activation of the tracking device, the police located both 
defendants at an apartment building where defendant Scott resided. 
Ms. Wong was the only employee working at the restaurant during the 
robbery who had access to the safe.  As the shift manager, she was responsible for 
directing the work of others, taking care of any customer complaints, and 
generally overseeing the operation of the restaurant.  Ms. Guillebeau’s 
responsibilities included taking customers’ orders, presenting food to customers, 
and working one of the cash registers.  Ms. Salazar’s duties involved food 
preparation.  She did not handle money or work at a cash register.   
During closing arguments, counsel for defendant Kenney argued that Ms. 
Guillebeau was not a victim of the robbery, because she did not have constructive 
possession of the money stolen.  Counsel argued that unlike Ms. Wong, who was 
responsible for everything in the restaurant, Ms. Guillebeau did not have access to 
the safe.  The district attorney objected to that argument.  At a sidebar conference, 
the court directed defense counsel to discontinue this line of argument.  Thereafter, 
defense counsel concluded this portion of his argument by simply telling the jury 
that it would have to decide whether Ms. Guillebeau or Ms. Salazar had 
constructive possession of the property in the safe.  In rebuttal, the district attorney 
argued that all three of the alleged victims were in constructive possession of the 
3 
property because at the time of the robbery they were engaged in performing the 
responsibilities of their employment. 
The jury was instructed that the crime of robbery requires, among other 
things, proof that a person “had possession of property of some value” and that the 
property was taken against the will of the person by force or fear.  (See 
CALJIC No. 9.40.)  The jury also was instructed that “[t]here are two kinds of 
possession: actual possession and constructive possession.  Actual possession 
requires that a person knowingly exercise direct physical control over a thing.  
Constructive possession does not require actual possession but does require that a 
person knowingly exercise control over or the right to control a thing, either 
directly or through another person.  One person may have possession alone, or two 
or more persons together may share actual or constructive possession.”  (See 
CALJIC No. 1.24)  
On the second day of deliberations, the jury returned a partial verdict, 
finding defendants Scott and Kenney guilty of the robbery of Ms. Wong.3  After 
the jurors resumed deliberations on the remaining charges, they sent a note to the 
judge, asking for clarification of CALJIC No. 1.24; specifically, they inquired 
whether all employees have constructive possession of the company’s property 
while on duty. 
During a discussion with counsel concerning how the trial court should 
respond to the jury’s question, the court observed that two recent appellate 
decisions were in conflict on this issue.  The trial court noted that Jones, supra, 82 
                                              
3  
The jury also found true the allegation that both defendants personally had 
used a firearm during the robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and found each guilty of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). 
 
4 
Cal.App.4th 485, 490-491, stands for the proposition that all employees on duty 
during the robbery of a business establishment constructively possess the business 
owner’s property.  The trial court believed Jones was better reasoned than Frazer, 
supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1115, which requires a fact-based inquiry into the 
express or implied authority of each employee.  Over objections from defense 
counsel, the trial court answered the jury’s question in accordance with Jones:  
“The employees of a business constructively possess the business owner’s 
property during a robbery.”  Shortly thereafter, the jury found defendants Scott 
and Kenney guilty on the remaining robbery charges.  In a bifurcated hearing, the 
jury also found true the allegations of defendants’ prior felony convictions, 
making the defendants eligible for sentencing under the Three Strikes law.  (§§ 
667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)  Defendant Scott was sentenced to a term of 116 
years eight months to life, and defendant Kenney was sentenced to a term of 30 
years eight months.  In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed the 
judgment rendered by the trial court and held that the trial court properly 
instructed the jury based upon the decision in Jones.  We granted review to resolve 
the conflict between Jones and Frazer. 
II. 
Robbery is defined in section 211 as “the felonious taking of personal 
property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and 
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”  Robbery is a crime of 
violence committed against a person.  (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 589 
(Ramos).)  Robbery of a particular person has not occurred unless property was 
taken from the person’s immediate presence and the defendant used force or fear 
to take the property or to prevent the person from resisting.  (See CALCRIM 
No. 1600.) 
5 
A person from whose immediate presence property was taken by force or 
fear is not a robbery victim unless, additionally, he or she was in some sense in 
possession of the property.  “It has been settled law for nearly a century that an 
essential element of the crime of robbery is that property be taken from the 
possession of the victim.”  (People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 762 
(Nguyen).)  We affirmed the continuing validity of that principle in Nguyen, 
overruling an appellate court decision, People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117, 
that had dispensed entirely with the requirement of possession.  In Nguyen, we 
concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a visitor to the 
premises of a business where a robbery occurred could be the victim of the 
robbery based upon the taking of the business’s property, even though the visitor 
did not “ ‘own, possess, [have] control of or even have the right to possess or 
control the property sought by the perpetrator.’ ”  (Nguyen, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 
p. 765.) 
A person who owns property or who exercises direct physical control over 
it has possession of it, but neither ownership nor physical possession is required to 
establish the element of possession for the purposes of the robbery statute.  
(Nguyen, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 762; People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 880 
(Miller).)  “[T]he theory of constructive possession has been used to expand the 
concept of possession to include employees and others as robbery victims.”  
(Nguyen, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 762.)  Two or more persons may be in joint 
constructive possession of a single item of personal property, and multiple 
convictions of robbery are proper if force or fear is applied to multiple victims in 
joint possession of the property taken.  (Ramos, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 589.)4  
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
4  
Ramos overruled an older line of cases, including People v. Guerin (1972) 
22 Cal.App.3d 775, which held that the forcible taking of a single item from 
6 
As the jury was instructed in the present case, a person who has the right to 
control property has constructive possession of it.  (CALJIC No. 1.24; see also 
CALCRIM No. 1600 [person possesses property “if the person has (control over 
it/[or] has the right to control it)”].)5  For constructive possession, courts have 
required that the alleged victim of a robbery have a “special relationship” with the 
owner of the property such that the victim had authority or responsibility to protect 
the stolen property on behalf of the owner.  (E.g., Sykes v. Superior Court (1994) 
30 Cal.App.4th 479 (Sykes); People v. Galoia (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 595 
(Galoia).)  In Sykes, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th 479, the defendant burglarized a music 
store and removed a saxophone from the premises.  (Id., at pp. 480-481.)  A 
security guard from a neighboring business managed to retrieve the musical 
instrument by chasing after the defendant.  (Ibid.)  The defendant was charged 
with robbing the security guard.  The appellate court, reversing the trial court’s 
denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the robbery charge, rejected the 
argument that the guard was in constructive possession of the saxophone.  
“Constructive possession depends upon a special relationship with the owner of 
the property, not upon the motives of a person seeking to recover possession from 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
multiple victims could result in only a single conviction of robbery.  (Ramos, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 589.) 
 
5  
Both the CALJIC instruction given in this case and the current CALCRIM 
instruction concerning robbery define constructive possession generally in terms 
of control, but the CALCRIM version also includes a specific instruction 
pertaining to constructive possession by employees.  The latter instruction is 
consistent with Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, and states:  “If the facts 
show that the employee was a representative of the owner of the property and the 
employee expressly or implicitly had authority over the property, then that 
employee may be robbed if property of the store or business is taken by force or 
fear.”  (CALCRIM No. 1600 [optional punctuation omitted].)   
7 
a thief or burglar.”  (Id., at p. 484.)  The security guard employed by a neighboring 
business could not be a victim of robbery, because he was not an employee of the 
owner, never actually possessed the saxophone, and had no special obligation to 
protect the stolen property on behalf of the owner.  (Ibid.)  Rather, the security 
guard’s relationship to the music store owner “was that of a neighbor and good 
citizen seeking to catch a criminal.”  (Ibid.)  “[G]ood motives alone cannot 
substitute for the special relationship needed to create a possessory interest in the 
goods.”  (Galoia, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th. at p. 599.) 
We have recognized that, based upon a theory of constructive possession, 
“ ‘a store employee may be the victim of a robbery even though he is not its owner 
and not at the moment in immediate control of the stolen property.’ ”  (Miller, 
supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 880, quoting People v. Johnson (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 1, 9.)  
“Robbery convictions have been upheld against contentions that janitors and night 
watchmen did not have a sufficient possessory interest in their employer’s 
personal property to qualify as victims.”  (Miller, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 880, citing 
People v. Downs (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 758, 765-766 (Downs); People v. Dean 
(1924) 66 Cal.App. 602, 607 (Dean).)  In Miller, the defendant held up a jewelry 
store and shot the store’s security guard twice.  Thereafter, the defendant and an 
accomplice threatened two other employees with a gun and took jewelry from 
several display cases.  We stated that the security guard, as well as the other 
employees, had “constructive possession of the property taken and could properly 
have been alleged to be a victim.”  (Miller, supra, at pp. 877-879, 881.)6   
                                              
6  
See also People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 27 (security guard, 
“[a]s the agent of the owner and a person directly responsible for the security of 
the items, . . . was in constructive possession of the merchandise to the same 
degree as a salesperson”). 
 
8 
Although we have recognized instances in which a victim’s status as an 
employee may establish the element of possession, our cases have not addressed 
the question whether each employee subjected to force during a robbery is in 
constructive possession of the owner’s property solely by virtue of his or her status 
as an employee.  As noted above, in responding to the jury’s inquiry the trial court 
relied upon Jones, which concluded that “business employees — whatever their 
function — have sufficient representative capacity to their employer so as to be in 
possession of property stolen from the business owner.”  (Jones, supra, 82 
Cal.App.4th at p. 491.) 
In support of the argument that constructive possession analysis depends 
upon the particular responsibilities of the employee in question, defendants rely 
upon Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1105.  Addressing a claim that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that the nonmanagerial employees constructively 
possessed property taken during the robberies of two stores, the appellate court in 
Frazer concluded that a fact-based inquiry must determine “whether the 
circumstances indicate the employee has sufficient representative capacity with 
respect to the owner of the property, so as to have express or implied authority 
over the property.”  (Id., at p. 1115.)  Under this “standard, employee status does 
not alone as a matter of law establish constructive possession.  Rather, the record 
must show indicia of express or implied authority under the particular 
circumstances of the case.”  (Ibid.)  To illustrate application of this standard, the 
court in Frazer suggested that, for example, a janitor might have such implied 
authority only if no employees with express authority over the property were 
present.  On the other hand, a security guard might be deemed to have such 
9 
implied authority, even if other employees with express authority over the 
property were present, because the guard is charged with protecting the premises.7 
We conclude that the trial court’s response to the jury, based upon the legal 
principle set out in Jones, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 485, was correct.  Jones is 
supported by a long line of California cases that have found evidence sufficient to 
establish that employees working at a business premises were in constructive 
possession of the employer’s property during a robbery, based upon their status as 
employees and without examining whether their particular duties involved access 
to or control over the property stolen.  Although some of these cases may stop 
short of declaring an unequivocal rule, they support the proposition, stated 
explicitly in Jones, that “California follows the long-standing rule that the 
employees of a business constructively possess the business owner’s property 
during a robbery. . . . ”  (Id. at p. 490.)  
For example, in an early case, Dean, supra, 66 Cal.App. 602, the defendant 
and his accomplices broke into a theater safe and took the money inside.  In the 
course of this incident, they tied up two employees who worked on the premises 
both as janitors and watchmen.  (Id., at pp. 604-605.)  Rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that there was insufficient proof that the two workers were in possession 
of the theater’s cash, the court stated that “[w]hile these men did not own the 
                                              
7  
Applying that standard, the court in Frazer found the evidence sufficient to 
support the defendant’s convictions for the robberies of the nonmanagerial 
employees.  Although those employees did not have access to a safe containing 
money, they did have access to cash registers and products.  The decision in 
Frazer concluded that “the entire retail team could reasonably be viewed as having 
implied authority over whatever property was necessary to handle the sales, 
including the money in the safe through the manager.”  (Frazer, supra, 106 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1119.) 
 
10 
money, nor even [know] the amount in the safe, yet they were rightfully in 
possession of the theater and its contents at the time of the robbery and were 
entitled to this possession as against the defendant.”  (Id., at p. 607.)   
Similarly, in Downs, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d 758, 760, the Court of Appeal 
upheld convictions for the robbery of two janitors.  The defendant entered a 
telephone company building and took money from a safe.  When two janitors 
employed by the company entered the room, the robbers forced them to lie on the 
floor and bound them.  (Ibid.)  The defendant argued on appeal that his robbery 
convictions should be overturned, because the janitors did not possess the money 
in the safe.  (Id., at p. 765.)  After citing Dean, supra, 66 Cal.App. 602, and 
several cases from other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeal concluded it was “no 
undue extension of the robbery statute to hold it applicable to any servant or 
servants left in sole occupation of the premises or particular part thereof by the 
employer.”  (Downs, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 766, citing Brooks v. People (1872) 49 
N.Y. 436 [11-year-old girl left alone in her parent’s apartment had sufficient 
possession of their property to support robbery conviction], Reese v. State (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1922) 239 S.W. 619 [upholding conviction for robbery of a night clerk 
and a telegraph operator at a railway station, even though they did not have access 
to the safe from which money was taken], and State v. Adams (Kan. 1897) 49 
P. 81 [“As against the robber, a servant has the same rights, and rests under the 
same duty, to preserve and defend his possession of the property, that the owner 
has”].)   
A similar result was reached in People v. Arline (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 200 
(disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834), in 
which the defendant threatened two service station attendants with a gun and 
forced them to relinquish money from a cash box.  (Arline, supra, 13 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 202.)  The defendant argued he was not properly charged with the robbery of 
11 
one of the attendants, because only the other one had the key to the cash box at the 
time of the robbery.  (Ibid.)  The appellate court concluded that because both were 
“employees of the station, and both were threatened by the robbers,” both 
attendants were in constructive possession of the property taken.  (Ibid.)  “It is 
established that an attendant or employee may be the victim of a robbery even 
though he is not in charge or in immediate control of the items stolen at the 
moment.”  (Ibid., citing Downs, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d 758; see also People v. 
Masters (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 509, 519 [citing Downs, at p. 766, in support of 
the conclusion that a cook and a waitress both were in constructive possession of 
the owner’s property during the robbery of a restaurant]; People v. Jones (1996) 
42 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1054 [“employees such as the store truck driver . . . have 
sufficient representative capacity with respect to the owner of the property to be 
the victim of robbery”].)      
The conclusion that employees have constructive possession of their 
employer’s property when they are present during a robbery is consistent not only 
with this long line of cases addressing constructive possession by employee 
victims, but also with cases addressing constructive possession by nonemployees.  
As discussed above, those cases require only that there be some type of “special 
relationship” with the owner of the property sufficient to demonstrate that the 
victim had authority or responsibility to protect the stolen property on behalf of 
the owner.  (E.g., Galoia, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 595; Sykes, supra, 30 
Cal.App.4th 479; People v. Gordon (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 519.)  These cases do 
not require that the victim have general authority to control the owner’s property 
in other circumstances.  For example, in Gordon, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at 
page 529, the defendant pointed a pistol at the two victims in their own house, 
entered their adult son’s bedroom, and took the son’s personal property.  (Id., at 
pp. 523-524.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed two robbery convictions, rejecting 
12 
the defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the 
victims were in possession of their son’s property.  Reviewing prior cases in which 
various individuals were found to be robbery victims, the court in Gordon stated 
that “[i]n these cases, the courts have found the victims were responsible for 
protecting and preserving the property taken.”  (Id., at p. 529.)  Applying that 
principle, the court determined that the parents constructively possessed their adult 
son’s personal items for the purposes of the robbery statute, because they had the 
“responsibility to protect goods belonging to their son who resides with them in 
their home.”  (Ibid.)   
People v. Gilbeaux (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 515, 523, concluded that 
sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for the robbery of two 
janitors who were independent contractors — not employees — of a grocery store 
owner.  The appellate court held that the janitors were in constructive possession 
of the store property because “[t]hey were part of the group of workers in charge 
of the premises at the time of the robbery.”  (Id., at p. 523.)  Although they were 
contract workers and had no responsibility for handling the cash, the court found 
that the two janitors had a special relationship with the grocery store and thus had 
representative capacity with respect to the grocery store sufficient for them to be 
in constructive possession of the property stolen.  (Ibid.)  
Although not every employee has the authority to exercise control over the 
employer’s funds or other property during everyday operations of the business, 
any employee has, by virtue of his or her employment relationship with the 
employer, some implied authority, when on duty, to act on the employer’s behalf 
to protect the employer’s property when it is threatened during a robbery.  
“[E]mployees are custodians of the property on the business premises for the 
benefit of the owner/employer,” (State v. Behrens (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) 
61 P.3d 636, 638 [citing with approval Jones, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 485].)  They 
13 
are “therefore in ‘possession’ of the property as against anyone who might attempt 
to steal it.”  (State v. Behrens, supra, 61 P.3d at p. 639.)  An employee’s authority 
to protect the employer’s property is recognized in Civil Code section 50, which 
establishes the right to use “necessary force” to protect the “property of oneself, or 
of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative, or member of one’s family, or 
of a ward, servant, master, or guest.”  (Italics added.)  In other words, the 
employee’s relationship with his or her employer constitutes a “special 
relationship” sufficient to establish the employee’s constructive possession of the 
employer’s property during a robbery.   
Furthermore, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended that all 
on-duty employees have constructive possession of the employer’s property 
during a robbery, because such a rule is consistent with the culpability level of the 
offender and the harm done by his or her criminal conduct.  As a matter of 
common knowledge and experience, those who commit robberies are likely to 
regard all employees as potential sources of resistance, and their use of threats and 
force against those employees is not likely to turn on fine distinctions regarding a 
particular employee’s actual or implied authority.  On-duty employees generally 
feel an implicit obligation to protect their employer’s property, and their sense of 
loss and victimization when force is used against them to obtain the employer’s 
property is unlikely to be affected by their particular responsibilities regarding the 
property in question.   
In reaching a different conclusion, the court in Frazer, supra, 106 
Cal.App.4th 1105, cited People v. Guerin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 775, 782 (Guerin) 
(disapproved on other grounds in Ramos, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 589), as 
“stand[ing] for the proposition that employee status alone is not enough to give an 
employee constructive possession of his employer’s property for purposes of 
supporting a separate robbery conviction.”  (Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at 
14 
p. 1114.)  Guerin is the only published California case that reversed a robbery 
conviction on the ground that a particular employee was not shown to have 
constructive possession of the employer’s property during the robbery.  In Guerin, 
supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 775, the defendant was convicted of robbing four employees 
of a supermarket — the manager, a liquor clerk in charge of one cash register, a 
checker in charge of another register, and a box boy.  The court concluded that the 
box boy did not have constructive possession of the money in the cash registers, 
because there was nothing “to suggest that he had any dominion or control 
whatsoever over any money.  As to him there was no taking and, thus, no 
robbery.”  (Id., at p. 782.)   
Because Guerin’s analysis is limited to the conclusory statement just 
quoted and did not cite or attempt to distinguish prior cases holding that 
employees constructively possess their employer’s property, it carries little 
persuasive weight.  (See also Jones, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 491 [“Guerin is an 
anomaly in light of evolving case authority broadening the permissible range of 
robbery victims”]; People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055 [“Guerin is 
wrong and even a market box boy has sufficient representative capacity vis-à-vis 
the owner so as to be in ‘possession’ of the property stolen from the store 
owner”].)  
The decision in Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, acknowledged the 
holdings in cases such as those discussed above, which “found employees 
possessed their employer’s property even when the particular employees could not 
personally access the stolen property because of their job functions.”  (Id., at 
p. 1112.)  The court in Frazer, however, determined that the approach to 
constructive possession should be reevaluated in light of two later developments in 
the law regarding robbery.  The first development was our decision in Nguyen, 
supra, 24 Cal.4th 756, in which we concluded that possession remains an element 
15 
of the crime of robbery.  As observed earlier, in Nguyen, we overruled People v. 
Mai, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th 117, which held that a visitor to a business could be a 
robbery victim even if he or she was not in possession of the business’s property.  
Frazer noted that Mai was one of the cases cited in Jones in support of the latter 
opinion’s conclusion that every employee has constructive possession of his or her 
employer’s property for purposes of the robbery statute.  Nevertheless, our 
overruling of Mai does not undermine the holding in Jones.  Mai’s conclusion 
that, as a matter of law, each employee is in constructive possession of the 
employer’s property does  not, as Frazer appears to suggest, conflict with our 
holding in Nguyen that possession — actual or constructive — remains an element 
of the offense of robbery.  That conclusion simply signifies that the prosecution 
may meet its burden of proving the element of possession by establishing that the 
alleged victim, from whose immediate presence the property was taken by force or 
fear, was an employee of the property owner and was on duty when the robbery 
took place.   
The second development cited by Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, in 
support of its conclusion, was our 1982 decision in Ramos, supra, 30 Cal.3d 553, 
which held that a single taking of property from the joint possession of two 
victims could support two convictions of robbery.  The decision in Frazer notes 
that the earlier cases concerning constructive possession “usually involved only 
one robbery count and conviction, even if there were multiple employee victims,” 
because “[m]ultiple robbery convictions were typically sustained only if there 
were distinct takings from different employees.”  (Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1112.)   
The decision in Frazer appears to suggest that a narrower view of 
constructive possession became warranted after we held in Ramos, supra, 30 
Cal.3d 553, that multiple counts of robbery could be supported by a single taking.  
16 
We disagree.  No policy justifies narrowing the meaning of possession merely 
because our decision in Ramos permits multiple convictions for multiple victims.  
As we explained in Ramos, “[w]hen two or more persons are in joint possession of 
a single item of personal property, the person attempting to unlawfully take such 
property must deal with all such individuals.  All must be placed in fear or forced 
to unwillingly give up possession.  To the extent that any threat may provoke 
resistance, and thus increase the possibility of actual physical injury, a threat 
accompanied by a taking of property from two victims’ possession is even more 
likely to provoke resistance.  [¶]  We view the central element of the crime of 
robbery as the force or fear applied to the individual victim in order to deprive him 
of his property.  Accordingly, if force or fear is applied to two victims in joint 
possession of property, two convictions of robbery are proper.”  (Ramos, supra, 30 
Cal.3d at p. 589.)  Because robbery is an offense of violence against the person, 
the number of counts is limited by the number of persons against whom force or 
fear is used to remove the property.  We see no justification for further limiting the 
offense by adopting a restrictive interpretation of the element of possession.  
Defendants contend that the meaning of constructive possession adopted by 
the Court of Appeal below and in Jones would accord the word “possession” a 
broader meaning in the context of robbery than it has in the context of other 
offenses, such as possession of controlled substances or the illegal possession of 
weapons.  Defendants argue that “[t]he concept of constructive possession should 
not turn upon whether the property in question is an illegal drug or the lawful 
earnings of a business.”  We disagree. 
In construing a statute, we consider the words in context and interpret them 
in a manner that effectuates the intent of the Legislature.  (Cummins, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487.)  In the context of possession of 
contraband, constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the 
17 
accused “maintained some control or right to control over contraband in the 
physical possession of another.”  (People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 134.)  
The definition and application of the concept of possession in this context involves 
an “inquiry into when the law may punish an individual who is exercising such a 
degree of intentional direction over contraband that he can be justifiably and fairly 
punished in the same manner as if he were indeed in actual physical possession of 
a controlled substance.  Implementation of this policy necessarily encompasses a 
potentially wide variety of conduct in a wide variety of settings, all directed by 
such factors as the alleged offender’s capacity to direct the illicit goods, the 
manifestation of circumstances wherein it is reasonable to infer such capacity 
exists and the degree of direction being exercised by the accused over the 
contraband.”  (Armstrong v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 535, 539.) 
In the context of the crime of robbery, the policies served by the element of 
possession are obviously quite different, because possession itself is not the 
unlawful act.  As we explained in Ramos, the crime of robbery may be committed 
against any person who is in possession of the property taken, because such a 
person may be expected to resist the taking, and — in order to achieve the 
taking — the robber must place all such possessors in fear, or force them to give 
up possession.  (Ramos, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 589.)  By requiring that the victim 
of a robbery have possession of the property taken, the Legislature has included as 
victims those persons who, because of their relationship to the property or its 
owner, have the right to resist the taking, and has excluded as victims those 
bystanders who have no greater interest in the property than any other member of 
the general population.  It would not further the purposes of the robbery statute to 
require that the robbery victim have the same level of custody or control over the 
property that is required in order to establish that the perpetrator is guilty of 
possessing contraband.  
18 
19 
III. 
For the reasons stated above, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeal, 
upholding the judgment of the trial court, is affirmed. 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Scott 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 7/19/05 – 3d Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S136498 
Date Filed: February 19, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Patricia C. Esgro 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Maurice Kenney. 
 
Cara DeVito, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Andre Rene Scott. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, 
Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Michael 
P. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General, Janet E. Neeley, J. Robert Jibson, and Raymond L. Brosterhous II, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John Steinberg 
P.O. Box 8148 
Berkeley, CA  94707-8148 
(510) 559-8051 
 
Cara DeVito 
PMB 834 
6520 Platt Avenue 
West Hills, CA  91307-3218 
(818) 999-0456 
 
Raymond L. Brosterhous II 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
9916) 324-5246