Title: Webb v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Webb v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.  (93-501); 166 Vt. 119;
692 A.2d 343

[Filed 20-Dec-1996]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 3-Jan-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 93-501

Bruce and Martha
Webb                                              Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Franklin Superior Court

Navistar International                            November Term, 1994
Transportation Corporation

Linda Levitt, J.

       A. Gregory Rainville of Farrar & Rainville and Michael Rose (On the
  Brief), St. Albans, for plaintiffs-appellees

       Samuel Hoar, Jr. of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, and John A.
  Rupp and Ann L. Gibson of Coffield, Ungaretti & Harris, Chicago, Illinois,
  for defendant-appellant

       Peter B. Joslin and John Davis Buckley of Theriault & Joslin, P.C.,
  Montpelier, and Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens and David Bernstein of
  Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Product Liability
  Advisory Council

       Michael F. Hanley and Barney L. Brannen of Plante, Hanley & Gerety,
  P.C., White River Junction, for amicus curiae Kim P. Lussier

PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
  Specially Assigned

       DOOLEY, J.  Defendant Navistar International Transportation
  Corporation (Navistar) appeals from a jury verdict that held defendant
  liable to plaintiffs Bruce and Martha Webb on a theory of strict products
  liability for a design defect and/or failure to warn plaintiffs of dangers
  inherent in the design of a tractor.  A majority of the Court agrees to
  reverse and remand this case.

       Justice Morse, Justice Peck and I hold that principles of comparative
  causation apply in this products liability action.  We do not agree,
  however, to a general rule on when comparative

 

  principles apply in strict products liability actions, nor on how to
  implement these principles when they do apply.  I believe this case must be
  reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial judge failed to
  instruct the jury on comparative causation.  Justice Morse concludes that
  Bruce Webb is more than fifty percent responsible, as a matter of law, and
  therefore, under 12 V.S.A. § 1036 (comparative negligence), he would enter
  judgment for defendant.  Justice Peck agrees with Justice Morse that
  judgment should be entered for defendant but on the ground that the tractor
  is not defective as a matter of law.  Justice Johnson and Justice Gibson
  would affirm the judgment for plaintiffs; they would hold that comparative
  principles are not applicable in products liability actions.

       The positions of the Justices produce no majority on the mandate.  A
  majority of the Court agrees, however, that the judgment entered on the
  jury verdict cannot be affirmed.  Thus, although Justices Morse and Peck
  would prefer a mandate of "reversed," they have joined in a mandate of
  "reversed and remanded" because it accurately represents the center of
  gravity of the Court.  See Cell v. Drake, 100 P.2d 949, 951 (Idaho 1940). 
  Thus, the mandate requires a new trial based on principles of comparative
  causation.

       The dissent criticizes the majority for creating a rat's maze from
  which there is no exit. We strongly disagree with the characterization of
  the cause or consequence of the Court's voting.  If the dissent would
  accept that comparative causation has now become the rule in products
  liability cases in Vermont, and participate in an implementation design to
  guide future cases, the trial judge in this case might know exactly what to
  do on remand.  If a majority could not agree on an implementation design,
  the trial judge and parties would at least know the full range of options
  and votes in support of each on this Court.  I share Justice Peck's view
  that we should do all in our power to avoid stalemate, if possible.

                                     I.

       On November 13, 1985, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Bruce Webb learned
  that some of his cows might be out of the pasture.  He and his father got
  out their tractor, a 1978 Model 464

 

  farm tractor manufactured by Navistar, and they proceeded down Route 207
  with Bruce Webb standing on the draw bar and his father driving.  En route,
  the tractor was struck in the rear by a car driven by an allegedly
  intoxicated operator.  As a result of the accident, Bruce Webb suffered
  serious injuries to his legs.

       Plaintiffs filed suit against Navistar, the driver of the car, and
  others.  The complaint alleged negligence, breach of warranty, and strict
  products liability.  Claims against all defendants other than Navistar were
  ultimately dismissed, and the case proceeded to trial against Navistar
  solely on the products liability claim.  Plaintiffs argued that the tractor
  was defectively designed because (1) it allowed operation of a white field
  light at highway speeds without provision for separate red tail lights, and
  (2) it failed to provide a safe passenger location so that Bruce Webb could
  have ridden on the tractor without exposure to injury.  They contended
  further that defendant failed to provide adequate warnings of these
  dangers.

       The case was tried, and the trial court directed a verdict in
  defendant's favor on both claims.  On appeal, we affirmed the directed
  verdict regarding defendant's failure to provide a safe passenger location,
  but reversed as to whether the design of the field light was defective and
  whether the manufacturer's warning on its use was inadequate.  See Webb v.
  Navistar Int'l Transp., No. 91-384 (Vt. July 1, 1992) (Webb I) (unpub.
  mem.).

       The second trial focused on the lighting system of the tractor.  The
  Model 464 tractor has a red taillight, two amber lights with road flashers,
  two red rear reflectors, a reflective slow-moving-vehicle triangle and a
  white field light mounted on the left rear bumper.  A cautionary decal on
  the left front fender directs operators to use the flashing amber lights at
  all times when on public roads.  The light system is designed so that when
  the flashing amber lights are in use, the red taillight activates and the
  white field light does not work.  At the time of the accident, the flashing
  amber lights (FN1) and the taillight did not work, and the reflectors were
  missing.  In

 

  addition, by riding on the draw bar, Webb blocked the view of the
  reflective triangle.  The cautionary decal also warned against riding the
  tractor unless a seat or platform is provided and instructed the operator
  to "[k]eep others off."

       The owner's manual for the tractor also provides warnings and
  instructions.  On pages 3 and 4, the manual sets forth rules for safe
  operation of the tractor.  Here, the manual warns: "No riders allowed."  It
  also contains an instruction not to use the white field light on the
  highway on page 55, under the heading CAUTION!

       Webb testified that while travelling on the highway he employed both
  the headlights and the rear field light on the rationale that more light
  was better than less light.  He indicated that it had not occurred to him
  that operating the tractor on the highway at night with the rear field
  light on was a hazard.  The operator of the automobile that collided with
  the tractor testified that he believed the white field light mounted on the
  left rear bumper was the headlight of an approaching "one-eyed" car.

       Plaintiffs tried the case on two theories:  (1) that the lighting
  system was defective because it allowed the tractor to be operated on
  highways with the field light illuminated, and (2) that defendant failed to
  adequately warn consumers of the known risk of using the field light while
  operating the tractor on the highway.  The jury returned a verdict in favor
  of plaintiffs on liability, and the parties stipulated to damages. 
  Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
  the verdict and that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that
  it may apportion liability between the parties.  We have the benefit of
  briefs of amicus parties on both sides of the comparative liability
  issue.(FN2)

 

                                     II.

       Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to
  find that its tractor was defective, that its warnings were inadequate, and
  that either the defective tractor or the inadequate warnings proximately
  caused Webb's injuries.  These arguments all war with our decision in Webb
  I.  On this point, I understand that four of us agree.  Except for those
  eliminated by our decision in Webb I, the parties' claims and defenses
  remained essentially the same at the second trial.  If Webb I remains the
  law, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reach a judgment against
  defendant.  See McGee Constr. Co. v. Neshobe Dev., Inc., 156 Vt. 550, 556,
  594 A.2d 415, 418 (1991) (verdict will be sustained if, considering
  evidence in light most favorable to verdict and excluding effect of
  modifying evidence, there is evidence fairly and reasonably tending to
  support it).

       The jury could reasonably conclude that the danger of operating the
  tractor on a highway at night with the field light illuminated was not a
  danger obvious to the ordinary consumer, and plaintiffs presented evidence
  of a safety device that could have been installed by defendant to prevent
  such use.  Despite the evidence that the automobile operator was
  intoxicated and changed his story between the time of the accident and the
  trial, the jury could reasonably conclude that the lighting system on the
  tractor was defective and was the cause of the accident. Moreover, the
  question of whether a manufacturer provided adequate warnings about
  foreseeable dangers is a question of fact properly left to the jury.  See
  McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying
  Vermont law).

 

                                    III.

       I do not believe, however, that the judgment in this case can be
  affirmed.  I agree with defendant that comparative liability principles are
  applicable in strict products liability actions and should have been
  charged to the jury in this case.  Because the split in the Court reserves
  the details of implementing comparative principles for another day, I state
  only the reasons we adopt a comparative causation rule.

       The doctrine of strict products liability was first developed by the
  California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962), and then set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
  Torts § 402A (1965).  This doctrine was created in response to the
  limitations of traditional negligence and warranty actions for injuries
  caused by defective consumer goods.  Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
  Goods, Inc.,