Title: Albert Holland V. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1033 
____________ 
 
ALBERT HOLLAND,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-34 
____________ 
 
 
ALBERT HOLLAND,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[November 10, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Albert Holland appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for 
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions 
 
 
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the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const.  We affirm the circuit court’s order denying Holland’s rule 3.851 
motion and deny Holland’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:1  On July 29, 1990, Holland 
attacked a woman and ran off after a witness interrupted the attack.  Police officers 
responding to the call found the woman semiconscious with severe head wounds.  
Pompano Beach police officer Scott Winters and other officers began searching for 
the man believed to have been involved in the attack.  A short time later, witnesses 
saw Officer Winters struggling with Holland.  During the struggle, Holland 
grabbed Officer Winters’ gun and shot him.  Officer Winters died of gunshot 
wounds to the groin and lower stomach area. 
Holland was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, sexual 
battery, and attempted first-degree murder.  The jury recommended death by a vote 
of eleven to one.  The trial court sentenced Holland to death.  On direct appeal, this 
Court reversed Holland’s conviction due to the erroneous admission of expert 
medical testimony concerning an examination of Holland by a State psychiatrist.  
                                          
 
1.  These facts are taken from Holland v. State, 773 So. 2d 1065, 1068 (Fla. 
2000). 
 
 
 
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The court found that the examination took place in violation of Holland’s right to 
counsel and right to remain silent. 
On retrial, Holland was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, 
attempted sexual battery, and attempted first-degree murder.  The jury 
recommended death by a vote of eight to four.  The trial court found the following 
aggravating circumstances:  (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a person;  (2) the capital felony was 
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt 
to commit, or in flight after committing or attempting to commit the crime of 
robbery or an attempt to commit the crime of sexual battery or both;  and (3)(a) the 
crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from custody, merged with (3)(b) the victim of the capital 
felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his legal 
duties.  The court did not find that any statutory mitigating circumstances were 
established but did find the existence of two nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances:  (1) history of drug and alcohol abuse (little weight) and (2) history 
of mental illness (little weight).  The trial court concluded that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Holland to death. 
 
 
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Holland raised twenty-two claims on direct appeal from his conviction and 
death sentence in his second trial.2  This Court found no merit in any of his claims, 
and on October 5, 2000, it affirmed both the convictions and the sentences, 
including the sentence of death.  Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
                                          
 
2.  Holland raised the following twenty-two issues on direct appeal from his 
second trial:  (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to 
represent himself;  (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent 
element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery;  (3) the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying Holland’s motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s 
mental health experts;  (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the state 
attorney and the state attorney’s office;  (5) the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Holland’s motion to redepose certain witnesses;  (6) the trial court abused 
its discretion in overruling Holland’s objections to the admissibility of a videotape;  
(7) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland’s motion to suppress his 
statements to the police;  (8) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
admission of Dr. Tate’s prior testimony;  (9) the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Holland’s motion for judgment of acquittal;  (10) the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Holland’s objections to Dr. Martell’s testimony;  (11) the 
trial court erred in rejecting as nonstatutory mitigation that Holland had two prior 
adjudications of insanity in Washington, D.C.;  (12) the record does not support the 
trial court’s findings regarding Dr. Polley and Dr. Patterson’s testimony and the 
mental mitigators;  (13) the trial court erred in rejecting the “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” mitigator;  (14) the trial court failed to consider certain 
nonstatutory mitigators;  (15) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
Roger Durban’s testimony that related to one of Holland’s prior offenses for which 
he was found not guilty by reason of insanity;  (16) the trial court improperly 
doubled the “murder in the course of a felony” and “prior violent felony” 
aggravators;  (17) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the “murder in 
the course of a felony” aggravator and the record does not support this aggravator;  
(18) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting victim-impact evidence;  (19) 
the trial court applied a presumption that death was the appropriate penalty when it 
found the existence of one aggravator;  (20) the “murder in the course of a felony” 
aggravator is unconstitutional;  (21) the sentence of death is disproportionate;  and 
(22) electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
 
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3.851, Holland filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence in the Circuit Court 
of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. 
The Lower Court’s Order 
Holland raised eight claims in his motion for postconviction relief.3  The 
trial court held an evidentiary hearing on claims III and VIII, pursuant to Huff v. 
State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1983).  At this hearing, the court determined that claims 
III and VIII were without merit and that the remaining claims were either legally 
insufficient, refuted by the record, or procedurally barred.  Holland now appeals 
the trial court’s denial of relief.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
                                          
 
3.  Holland raised the following claims in his motion to vacate judgment and 
sentence pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851:  (I) that 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of the deputy 
who found the firearm the day after the incident that the firearm had been 
intentionally hidden; (II) that the State misstated the evidence, argued matters not 
in evidence, shifted the burden of proof, vouched for the credibility of State 
witnesses, expressed personal belief in Holland’s guilt, ridiculed Holland and his 
defense, engaged in inflammatory argument, accused the defense of denigrating 
witnesses, and commented on Holland’s postarrest silence, all without objection by 
defense counsel; (III) that Holland’s guilt phase counsel was ineffective because he 
conceded Holland’s guilt to attempted first-degree murder without his consent; 
(IV) that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s failure to object to the various 
alleged procedural errors listed in claim II rendered Holland’s trial fundamentally 
unfair; (V), (VI), and (VII) that Holland’s death sentence is unconstitutional 
because a judge determined the aggravating circumstances instead of a jury in 
violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and (VIII) that 
Holland’s penalty phase counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly 
investigate mitigation evidence concerning Holland’s birth, childhood, and early 
adult life. 
 
 
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MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF UNDER  
RULE 3.851 
In his 3.851 motion for postconviction relief, Holland alleges two claims 
involving ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim involving the trial court’s 
summary denial of some of his claims.  We consider each in turn and find that all 
are without merit.   
1.  CONCESSION OF GUILT CLAIM 
 
Holland’s first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on his trial 
counsel’s concession of guilt to attempted first-degree murder without Holland’s 
express, prior consent.  We find that the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), applies to this claim and that this claim is without merit.4   
This Court has recently reiterated the standard we apply to claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel:    
                                          
 
4. Holland argues that we should consider this claim under the per se 
ineffectiveness standard of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  He bases 
this argument on this Court’s decision in Nixon v. State, 857 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
2003), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004), in which we held that Cronic, rather than 
Strickland, provided the standard for assessing ineffectiveness of counsel when a 
defendant’s attorney concedes guilt to the crime charged without the defendant’s 
express consent.  See Nixon, 857 So. 2d at 174.  However, the United States 
Supreme Court recently reversed our decision in Nixon and stated that a 
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel challenge based upon counsel’s 
concession of guilt, even without the defendant’s consent, must be evaluated under 
the standard set forth in Strickland.  See Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004).  
Thus, Holland must show that the concession of guilt was deficient performance 
and that he was prejudiced by it.  Id. at 561-62.   
 
 
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Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in  
Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)], this Court held that 
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two 
requirements must be satisfied:  
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be 
considered meritorious, must include two general 
components. First, the claimant must identify particular 
acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be 
outside the broad range of reasonably competent 
performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must 
further be demonstrated to have so affected the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is 
undermined.  
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).   
. . . [Furthermore] [t]he defendant alone carries the burden to 
overcome the presumption of effective assistance: “[T]he defendant 
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”  
[Strickland, 466 at 689-90.]   
State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817, 823 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
397 (2005).   
Applying this standard to Holland’s case shows that his argument is without 
merit.  Defense counsel did not simply concede Holland’s guilt.  Instead, during 
closing argument, defense counsel acknowledged Holland’s damaging trial 
testimony in which Holland effectively admitted each element of the crime, and 
counsel argued that Holland was not guilty by reason of insanity.  Additionally, 
Holland’s trial testimony was basically consistent with significant, damaging 
testimony from the victim and two eyewitnesses.  Under the unique facts of this 
 
 
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case, we conclude that defense counsel’s “assistance was reasonable considering 
all the circumstances.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
2.  FAILURE TO PROPERLY INVESTIGATE  
MITIGATION EVIDENCE CLAIM 
 
Holland’s second claim involving ineffective assistance of counsel alleges 
that his penalty phase counsel was ineffective because the sole defense investigator 
did not investigate Holland’s background or social history to discover evidence of 
mitigating factors.  While we recognize that “the obligation to investigate and 
prepare for the penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated,” State v. 
Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002), and that attorneys have a “strict duty to 
conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant’s background for possible 
mitigating evidence,” Ragsdale v. State, 798 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 2001) (quoting 
State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 2000)), we find this claim is without 
merit.  Holland has not established that any unpresented mitigation actually 
existed; therefore, there is no evidence his counsel was deficient or that he was 
prejudiced by this deficiency.    
In evaluating claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
mitigating evidence, this Court requires that the defendant bear the burden of 
establishing that counsel’s ineffectiveness “deprived the defendant of a reliable 
penalty phase proceeding.”  Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998)).  The principal concern, 
 
 
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as recognized by the United States Supreme Court, is not whether a case was made 
for mitigation but whether the “investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to 
introduce mitigating evidence . . . was itself reasonable” from counsel’s 
perspective at the time the decision was made.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
523 (2003).  In conducting our review, we accord deference to the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See 
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999).   
We also note two maxims that assist our review.  First, counsel cannot be 
deemed deficient for failing to investigate or present mitigation evidence unless the 
defendant establishes that mitigation exists.  Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 469-70 
(Fla. 2003) (holding, in part, that defendant failed to prove his ineffectiveness 
claim by failing to present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing from witnesses 
he claimed would be helpful).  Second, defense counsel cannot be deemed 
deficient for failing to present cumulative evidence.  Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 
1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002) (finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
present evidence in mitigation that was cumulative to evidence already presented 
in mitigation).   
Employing these maxims, as well as the relevant case law, we find that 
Holland has failed to establish that his counsel’s conduct warrants a new penalty 
phase proceeding.  Penalty phase counsel explained that he considered Holland’s 
 
 
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background not only in his review of the records but also in speaking with Holland 
and Holland’s father.  While we recognize that counsel failed to make use of the 
available investigator and never spoke with the three family members he expected 
to appear and testify on Holland’s behalf, 5 Holland has not met his burden of 
establishing that his penalty phase counsel’s conduct was deficient.  At trial, 
counsel presented Holland’s family history through Holland’s father, who arguably 
was able to give the jury a sufficient picture of Holland’s life.  More importantly, 
there was no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing as to what any other 
witness would have testified to in mitigation, and the evidentiary hearing 
demonstrates that the testimony of the family members who did not appear would 
have likely been cumulative to the father’s testimony. 
Moreover, even assuming penalty phase counsel’s background investigation 
was deficient, Holland’s claim still fails because he did not establish that he was 
prejudiced by this deficiency.  See Maxwell v. Wainright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 
(Fla. 1986).  Holland’s allegation that he was prejudiced because penalty phase 
                                          
 
 
5.  Holland’s father had assured counsel that three additional family 
members were coming to testify at the penalty phase.  Counsel never expected a 
problem and was surprised when Mr. Holland, Sr. explained that no other family 
members were available or desirous of coming to the trial.  Counsel’s repeated 
efforts to contact them were unfruitful.  Counsel declined the State’s offer to have 
the sister’s testimony from the first trial read into the record because it would be of 
no value as she had not seen her brother in a number of years and really knew 
nothing about him.  He also believed that testimony of the other siblings would be 
of no value because none of them had contact with Holland throughout the years. 
 
 
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counsel’s deficiencies substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the 
proceedings is merely conclusory and must be rejected.  See Gaskin v. State, 737 
So. 2d 509, 516 n.14 (Fla. 1999) (“Prejudice, in the context of penalty phase errors, 
is shown where, absent the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the balance 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different or the 
deficiencies substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.”); 
see also Armstrong v. State, 862 So. 2d 705, 712 (Fla. 2003) (finding that a mere 
conclusory allegation of prejudice was legally insufficient).  Accordingly, we deny 
relief on this claim. 
3.  SUMMARY DENIAL OF REMAINING CLAIMS 
 
Finally, Holland contends that it was error for the trial court to summarily 
deny claims I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII, and that these claims should have been found 
to be meritorious.6  We disagree.  The trial court complied with rule 3.851 in 
respect to these claims.  Not only did the lower court make findings, but it also 
adopted and incorporated by reference the State’s response to Holland’s rule 3.851 
motion, which contains the portions of the record necessary for meaningful 
appellate review.  We hold that the trial court did not err. 
   
                                          
 
 
6.  The trial court’s reasons vary for summarily denying these claims.  These 
reasons include that the claim was refuted by the record, procedurally barred to the 
extent it was not raised on direct appeal, or was legally insufficient.   
 
 
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Claim I 
In claim I, Holland alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the admission of Officer McDonald’s opinion testimony that Officer 
Winters’ service weapon had been intentionally hidden in the place where it was 
found.  Counsel’s performance was not deficient in this regard.  Officer 
McDonald’s lay witness opinion testimony is analogous to testimony this Court 
held admissible in Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225, 1231-32 (Fla. 1990).  In Floyd, 
this Court found that it was within the permissible range of lay observation and 
ordinary police experience for an officer to testify that a Kleenex box lying near 
the victim’s body “appeared to have been knocked off the dresser.”  Id. at 1231.  
Similarly, in this case, Officer McDonald testified that a gun lying on the floor 
“appeared dropped” because it was lying in a “crevice” in the ground.  This clearly 
falls within the permissible range of lay observation and ordinary police 
experience.  See Floyd, 569 So. 2d at 1232; § 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2004).  Therefore, 
defense counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient for failing to object to 
this testimony. 
Claim II 
In claim II, Holland alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to ten comments made by the State during its guilt phase closing 
 
 
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argument. 7  The trial court found that the issues raised in this claim were refuted 
by the record.  In support of this finding, the court adopted and incorporated by 
reference the reasoning from the State’s 3.851 response.  We affirm.  Holland has 
failed to show that defense counsel’s failure to object was deficient performance or 
                                          
 
7.  The comments are as follows:  (1) that the State Attorney twice misstated 
the evidence during his closing argument.  In the first instance, the record is clear 
that he misstated Officer Winters as saying: “I’ve been shot. He’s got my gun.”  
The record shows that Officer Winters did not say that “He’s got my gun”; (2) In 
the second instance, Holland alleges that the State Attorney misstated expert 
testimony concerning schizophrenia and insanity but failed to identify which 
expert’s testimony differed from the statement and how it differed; (3) that the 
State Attorney argued matters not in evidence when he analogized Holland’s 
actions to avoid detection with those of a little kid who, after breaking a window, 
runs, hides, and lies about it when caught; (4) that the State Attorney expressed his 
personal belief in the defendant’s guilt when he stated, “The reason the robbery is 
in the indictment is because the robbery occurred; he took the gun away by force, 
violence, and assault”; (5) that the State Attorney improperly shifted the burden of 
proof regarding insanity when he stated in his closing argument, “There has been 
no person to ever say in this courtroom or anyone that testified that the defendant 
 . . . didn’t know the difference or the consequences of his actions, except for 
Doctor Love”; (6) that the State improperly attacked and ridiculed the defendant 
and disparaged his defenses; (7) that the State’s comment “[a]nd it’s really 
interesting that Mr. Lewis denigrates all the witnesses who came in here”  
criticized Holland for exercising his constitutional right to confront the witnesses 
against him; (8) that the State’s comments “He forced his penis in Thelma 
Johnson’s mouth and then he beat her mercilessly[;] He beat her savagely[;] He 
beat her brutally[;] . . .  You saw the pictures of Thelma Johnson–– Unbelievable”;  
“He beats her seriously, savagely” was impermissible inflammatory argument; (9) 
that the State vouched for the credibility of its eyewitness, Abraham Bell, by 
stating that his testimony was “almost like a videotape.”  Holland also alleges that 
the State vouched for the credibility of police and other witnesses when it stated 
“You haven’t heard anything other than Pompano [police] or anyone else being 
fair in the presentation of the case”; (10) that the State commented on Holland’s 
postarrest silence by stating: “But remember on the tape, Detective Butler said, 
well, was it a fight. . . . He didn’t say anything about the beating of Thelma 
[Johnson], but he did make up an excuse of the shooting [of] Officer Winters.”   
 
 
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that if defense counsel had objected and the objection had been sustained, there is a 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have declared a mistrial.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in summarily 
denying this claim.    
Claim IV 
In claim IV, Holland alleges that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s 
failure to object to claims I and II and counsel’s unauthorized concession of guilt 
in claim III deprived him of a fair trial.  The trial court found this claim to be 
legally insufficient, agreeing with the State’s reasoning that Holland’s individual 
claims were either legally insufficient, procedurally barred, or without merit and, a 
fortiori, Holland has suffered no cumulative effect which rendered his counsel 
ineffective.  See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 1995) (noting that 
the cumulative effect of ineffective assistance of counsel claims only bears on the 
ultimate determination of the effectiveness of counsel if the claims are proven).  
The trial court properly summarily denied this claim as legally insufficient. 
Claims V, VI, and VII 
Holland alleges that the trial court improperly grouped claims V, VI, and VII 
together.  We disagree.  The trial court was correct in grouping these claims 
because they are all Ring8 claims, or variants thereof.  They allege that Holland’s  
                                          
 
8.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
 
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death sentence violated the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution because (1) a judge, rather than a jury, determined the 
aggravating factors, and (2) the aggravating factors were not pled in the 
indictment.   
Furthermore, we affirm the trial court’s finding that these claims were 
without merit.  One of the aggravators is a prior violent felony conviction.  The 
felonies on which this aggravator was based are included in the indictment, and the 
jury unanimously found Holland guilty of them.  This Court has repeatedly upheld 
the constitutionality of Florida’s capital sentencing when the prior violent felony 
aggravator was present.  See Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 49 (Fla. 2003) (“We 
have previously rejected claims under Apprendi and Ring in cases involving the 
aggravating factor of a previous conviction of a felony involving violence.”), cert. 
denied, 541 U.S. 993 (2004).  Moreover, we have recognized that Ring does not 
apply retroactively.  Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 422 (Fla. 2005). 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Having affirmed the trial court’s denial of Holland’s 3.851 motion, we now 
consider Holland’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.  In his petition, Holland 
asserts four claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  We reiterate that 
the core principle behind each of these claims is that “appellate counsel will not be 
considered ineffective for failing to raise issues that have little or no chance of 
 
 
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success.”  Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 74 (Fla. 2003).  Applying the Strickland 
analysis to each of these claims leads to the conclusion that they are without merit.   
1.  FAILURE TO CHALLENGE TRIAL COURT ORDER 
Holland argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging 
the trial court’s decision to preclude him from referencing internal police 
documents, which allegedly described incidences when Officer Winters used 
excessive force.9  Holland contends that had evidence of Officer Winters’ (alleged) 
habitual use of excessive force, poor judgment, and racial confrontation been 
revealed to Holland’s jury, the evidence would have supported a finding that 
Officer Winters’ excessive use of force precipitated the struggle.  These internal 
police records were not admissible; therefore, appellate counsel cannot be deemed 
deficient for failing to raise this issue. 
As a general rule, evidence of a victim’s character is inadmissible to prove 
action in conformity with it on a particular occasion.  § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2004).  However, when a claim of self-defense is raised, a defendant may 
introduce evidence of a victim’s character to establish who the aggressor was, or 
that the defendant was apprehensive of the victim at the time of the homicide.  
                                          
 
 
9.  The State filed a pretrial motion in limine requesting that the trial court 
preclude Holland from referencing these reports, and the trial court granted the 
motion.  The court stated that such internal affairs investigations, even if they 
touched upon the excessive use of force, were not probative of Officer Winters’ 
conduct in the current instance.      
 
 
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Williams v. State, 252 So. 2d 243, 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).  However, before a 
defendant may introduce evidence of the victim’s character, he must first show that 
there was an “overt act by the [victim] at or about the time of the [incident] that 
reasonably indicated a need for [self-defense].”  Quintana v. State, 452 So. 2d 98,  
100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (quoting Williams, 252 So. 2d at 247).  Holland failed to 
establish this prerequisite.  The trial record does not support his claim that Officer 
Winters committed an overt act that would have caused Holland to act in self-
defense.  In fact, the record evidence of undisputed eyewitness testimony is that 
Officer Winters did not commit an overt act.  
Regardless, even if Holland were able to show an overt act by Officer 
Winters, the police records would still be inadmissible.  The internal affairs records 
only show prior, specific acts.  Because there is no indication Holland was aware 
of these prior acts at the time of the homicide, these records were inadmissible.  
See Smith v. State, 606 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (recognizing that 
when character evidence is offered to prove the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
apprehension, prior knowledge of the specific acts of violence is necessary).    
Because the internal affairs records are inadmissible, Holland has failed to 
show deficient performance under Strickland.  Even assuming that appellate 
counsel was deficient for not raising the issue on direct appeal, Holland would still 
not be able to establish prejudice under Strickland.  Holland was convicted of 
 
 
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attempting to commit a forcible felony.10  Because the defense of self-defense is 
legally unavailable11 to a person who is attempting to commit, committing, or 
escaping from the commission of a forcible felony, Holland was not prejudiced and 
this claim is without merit.  See Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. 1992); 
§ 776.041, Fla. Stat. (1989). 
2.  FAILURE TO CHALLENGE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING AFTER A 
NELSON12 INQUIRY 
 
Holland next argues that his appellate counsel was deficient for failing to 
raise the fact that his allegations during the Nelson inquiry were entirely 
unrefuted.13  Therefore, Holland argues that the trial court’s order following the 
inquiry was not supported by competent, substantial evidence, and appellate 
                                          
 
 
10.  As previously noted, Holland was convicted of first-degree murder, 
armed robbery, attempted sexual battery, and attempted first-degree murder.  
Section 776.08, Florida Statutes (1989), specifically defines “forcible felony” to 
include both robbery and sexual battery. 
 
11.  The trial court gave the jury instruction on the forcible felony exception 
to self-defense.  It instructed the jury that the defense of self-defense was not 
legally available if “Holland was attempting to commit, committing or escaping 
from the commission after a robbery [or] sexual battery.” 
 
12.  Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). 
 
13.  During the Nelson inquiry, Holland sought to discharge trial counsel 
and obtain substitute counsel.  He testified that his appointed trial counsel lied to 
him about the facts of the case; lied to the trial court about having visited him in 
jail, calling his father, providing him with copies of depositions, and investigating 
the case; and were unequivocally incompetent because they failed to go to the 
crime scene or utilize the evidence he had given them that would have proven his 
innocence.   
 
 
 
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counsel was deficient for not raising this on appeal.  We disagree.  A review of the 
record reveals that the trial court’s finding was well supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.   
The trial court’s duty in a Nelson inquiry is to “make a sufficient inquiry . . . 
to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court 
appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant.”  Nelson, 
274 So. 2d at 259.  In Holland’s case, the trial judge conducted an extensive 
inquiry into Holland’s appointed counsel.  The transcript of the Nelson inquiry 
covers almost 100 pages, and many of Holland’s complaints were generalized 
grievances without any reference to a specific fact or area of law.  His allegations 
that the attorneys were untruthful were not substantiated, and his counsel testified 
to extensive preparation for trial and the potential penalty phase.  His counsel also 
testified to Holland’s lack of cooperation with the State’s mental health witness, 
lack of cooperation with defense counsel concerning trial preparation, and his 
refusal to discuss any defenses until he was able to discuss with the court issues 
that were troubling him.  The trial court’s finding is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Therefore, we deny relief.  
3.  FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF A CAUSE 
CHALLENGE AND ADDITIONAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
 
Holland also claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the trial court’s denial of a cause challenge to a juror based on the juror’s 
 
 
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racial prejudice and for denial of adequate peremptory challenges.  We deny this 
argument because Holland has failed to establish that his counsel acted deficiently 
or that this deficiency prejudiced him.   
Holland has failed to establish that his appellate counsel acted deficiently 
because the argument he claims counsel should have made is without merit.  “It is 
well settled that the trial judge has discretion to grant or deny additional 
peremptory challenges.”  Parker v. State, 456 So. 2d 436, 442 (Fla. 1984); see Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.350(e).  In Holland’s case, the trial judge used his discretion to 
initially grant both sides twelve peremptory challenges—two more than the 
statutory requirement.  He later granted each side two more peremptory challenges.  
The trial judge also dismissed the challenged venire member for cause.  Therefore, 
not only is Holland unable to establish that the trial court abused its discretion, but 
he also is unable to point to any objectionable juror who served.  He has not 
established error.  See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990) (requiring a 
defendant to identify a specific juror who “actually sat on the jury and whom the 
defendant either challenged for cause or attempted to challenge peremptorily or 
otherwise objected to after his peremptory challenges had been exhausted”); see 
also Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004) (requiring a defendant to 
“show that an objectionable juror has served on the jury” before finding a 
 
 
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defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision not to authorize an additional 
peremptory challenge), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2976 (2005).     
4.  FAILURE TO ARGUE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR FOR UNEXPLAINED 
INCREASE IN ORIGINAL SENTENCE 
 
Finally, Holland contends that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to 
raise or discuss an allegedly fundamental sentencing error.  Holland claims that the 
trial court committed fundamental error by not stating its reasons for increasing 
Holland’s original sentence for armed robbery from seventeen years to life upon 
reconviction for the same offense, other than the fact that the defendant was 
convicted of an unscorable capital felony.  We find this argument to be without 
merit.   
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that state courts must 
include their reasons for imposing a more severe sentence upon reconviction, but 
this does not automatically apply in every situation where the defendant receives a 
harsher sentence on retrial.  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969) 
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state courts to include in the 
record the reasons for imposing a more severe sentence upon reconviction); Texas 
v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138, 140 (1986) (recognizing that the Pearce  
presumption does not automatically apply in situations where different judges 
assigned the sentences).   In cases like Holland’s where the judge presiding over 
the retrial was not the same judge who presided over the original trial, the 
 
 
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defendant bears the burden of proving the court acted with actual vindictiveness.  
Graham v. State, 681 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).  Holland has failed to make 
the requisite showing of vindictiveness.  For these reasons, we find that Holland’s 
fourth claim is also without merit.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the lower court’s denial of Holland’s 
rule 3.851 motion and deny Holland’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Charles M. Greene, Judge - Case No. 90-15905 CF 10A 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bradley M. Collins, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Debra Rescigno, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent