Title: Nicolas v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

McKenzie A. Nicolas v. State of Maryland
No. 88, September Term 2011, Opinion by Greene, J.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – MERGER OF OFFENSES
Under Maryland law, the appropriate test for determining whether two offenses merge for
double jeopardy purposes is the required evidence test.  Merger follows as a matter of course
when only one offense requires proof of an additional fact, so that all elements of one offense
are present in the other, and where both offenses are based on the same act or acts.  Where
there is a factual ambiguity regarding the underlying basis for a conviction or convictions,
that ambiguity is resolved in favor of the defendant.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – JURY NOTES
Maryland Rule 4-326(d) is triggered upon receipt by the court of a communication from the
jury pertaining to the action at a time before the verdict is rendered.  Receipt by the court, as
contemplated by Rule 4-326(d), encompasses receipt by the trial judge or any member of the
court staff.  The petitioner or appellant has the burden of producing a sufficient appellate
record to establish trial error in the context of jury communications.  There is a presumption
of regularity in trial court proceedings; this presumption is rebuttable.  An unexplained and
unmarked jury note found in the record after the jury has rendered its verdict and has been
excused raises a rebuttable presumption that the note was not received by the court.  The
burden is on the petitioner or appellant to rebut that presumption.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 88
September Term, 2011
MCKENZIE A. NICOLAS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins 
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
       Bell, C.J., concurs and dissents.
Filed:   May 8, 2012
 
1 The three counts of second degree assault and second degree assault on a law
enforcement officer for which Petitioner was charged corresponded to each of the three
officers involved in the incident.  The three counts of resisting arrest related to three separate
incidents that allegedly occurred during the course of the events of December 12, 2009. 
2 Petitioner’s brother, Dominique Nicolas, was a co-defendant at his trial.
On December 12, 2009, three police officers from the Montgomery County Police
Department responded to a 911 call in the Rockville area.  Subsequent investigation by the
officers led them to question Petitioner, McKenzie A. Nicolas, at his home.  As a result of
events that occurred during that encounter, Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County with one count of disorderly conduct, one count of obstructing and
hindering, three counts of resisting arrest, three counts of second degree assault, three counts
of second degree assault on a law enforcement officer, one count of malicious destruction
of property, and one count of escape.1  Following a jury trial,2 the jury convicted Petitioner
of one count of resisting arrest and two counts of second degree assault stemming from a
confrontation with two of the officers present at the scene.  The court imposed a sentence of
eighteen months for each of the convictions, to run consecutively with each other, and three
years of supervised probation.  The court then suspended the sentences for the second degree
assault convictions.  
After the trial had concluded and the jury had been discharged, an unmarked jury note
was found in the record purporting to inquire about whether an assault is committed when
contact is made with another person as a result of acting in self-defense.  Trial counsel was
unaware of the existence of that note during the course of the trial and jury deliberations.
The trial judge stated in a letter to Petitioner’s appellate counsel that he did not have any
2
recollection of the particular note at issue.  Furthermore, the trial judge indicated that his
usual practice upon receiving a communication from the jury is to convene with counsel on
the record to discuss possible responses and, thereafter, to provide a written response to the
jury on the note itself.  The trial judge maintained that if he had received the note at issue,
he would have handled it in accordance with his usual practice.
Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming, inter alia, that
the trial court erred in failing to merge his second degree assault convictions with his
conviction for resisting arrest, thereby vacating his sentences for the second degree assault
convictions, and in failing to disclose, to him and his trial counsel, the jury note found in the
record.  The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  We
granted certiorari, Nicolas v. State, 423 Md. 450, 31 A.3d 919 (2011), to answer the
following questions posed by Petitioner:
1. Does a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the
appellate record establish that the trial court received the jury
communication at issue in order to trigger the requirements of
Md. Rule 4-326(d)?
2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that
Petitioner’s convictions for second degree assault do not merge
into his conviction for resisting arrest for sentencing purposes
where the record is ambiguous as to whether the jury convicted
Petitioner of second degree assault based on acts different than
those underlying his conviction for resisting arrest?
We shall answer the first question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Court
of Special Appeals on that issue.  In response to Petitioner’s second question, we hold that
the intermediate appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s failure to merge
3
Petitioner’s convictions for second degree assault into his conviction for resisting arrest,
pursuant to the required evidence test.  It is ambiguous whether the jury found Petitioner
guilty of both counts of second degree assault based on events that were an integral part of
the resisting arrest conviction, or whether the underlying factual bases for the second degree
assault convictions were separate and distinct from the events leading to Petitioner’s
conviction for resisting arrest.  In such a situation, we resolve the ambiguity in Petitioner’s
favor.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court should have merged the second degree assault
convictions into the conviction for resisting arrest.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Arrest
During Petitioner’s trial, the State called Alycia Moss, who testified that on December
12, 2009, at approximately 10:00 p.m., she was at home when she noticed headlights in her
driveway.  When Ms. Moss went outside, she observed a white SUV backing out of her
driveway.  According to her, as the SUV backed up, she heard it hit a parked van on her
street.  Ms. Moss indicated that she called out to the driver of the vehicle, “Hey, you all hit
that car.”  In response, she heard a voice say, “No, I didn’t.”  At that time, Ms. Moss was
unaware of the identity of the driver of the vehicle or anyone else who may have been in the
vehicle.  Ms. Moss testified that she then told the driver that she had his license plate number,
and she went inside to write it down.  As she was walking inside, Ms. Moss heard a voice in
the car say, “I’m going to fucking kill her.”  She then decided to call 911, and while she was
on the phone with the operator, “somebody [came] up to the door and start[ed] banging, and
4
saying stuff.”  Although Ms. Moss could not hear everything that was being said, she
indicated that at some point she heard the word “neighbor” and realized that her neighbor
may have been the driver of the SUV.  When Ms. Moss expressed that she was on the phone
with 911, the person at her door “went away.”  The police soon arrived at her home, and Ms.
Moss recounted the events of the evening to them.
The State next called Officer Jonathan Anspach of the Montgomery County Police
Department, who testified that he responded to the 911 call placed by Ms. Moss on
December 12, 2009.  Officer Anspach testified that Officer Mark Burhoe and Officer
William Sands also responded to the scene of the alleged motor vehicle accident.  When
Officer Anspach arrived at the scene, he and the other officers attempted to identify the
owner of the SUV, which was parked outside with the headlights on and the engine still
running.  An MVA registration check revealed that Petitioner was the owner of the vehicle.
In addition, on the dashboard of the vehicle was a piece of mail addressed to Petitioner.
After observing a small dent in the left rear bumper of the SUV, as well as some minor
damage to the van that had allegedly been hit, the officers approached Petitioner’s house to
identify the driver of the vehicle and gather more information about what had happened. 
Officer Anspach testified that an older woman answered the door and indicated that
her son, Petitioner, had been driving the SUV.  The officers entered the home, and according
to Officer Anspach, when Petitioner came upstairs from the basement he was “very agitated,
started using profanity and everything along those lines.”  Officer Anspach explained the
investigation to Petitioner, who agreed to accompany Officers Anspach and Burhoe outside.
5
Officer Anspach testified that at that point in the encounter, he did not have any intention of
placing Petitioner under arrest; the purpose of the interview was to gather information about
the alleged accident.  According to Officer Anspach’s testimony, Petitioner initially walked
toward his car when he went outside, but when asked for his identification, Petitioner walked
by Officer Anspach “kind of brushing [him] and just pushing [him]” with his arm.  The brush
or push was hard enough to cause the officer to step back.  Officer Anspach indicated that
Petitioner then approached the porch, where Officer Burhoe was standing, and “as he walked
up to Burhoe, he hit him in the face.” 
Officer Anspach was asked on direct examination: “[A]fter [Petitioner] had pushed
you . . . [a]nd hit Officer Burhoe in the face, at that point did you make a decision as to
whether or not you wanted to place [Petitioner] under arrest?”  Officer Anspach responded,
“That decision after he brushed against me, any type of unwanted touching is considered
assault on any person, let alone a police officer.  So at that point, it was decided he was going
to [be] placed under arrest for assault on a police officer.”  When asked, “[A]fter you and
Officer Burhoe had been assaulted and decided to place [Petitioner] under arrest, did you tell
him he was under arrest,” Officer Anspach replied that he repeatedly told Petitioner he was
under arrest and that Petitioner refused to comply. 
Petitioner then attempted to re-enter his home, and Officer Anspach testified that he
grabbed onto Petitioner’s shirt to keep him outside.  Petitioner managed to get back into his
house, with Officer Anspach following, and a struggle ensued for several minutes.  Officer
Anspach stated, “[Petitioner] and I grabbed each other and started pushing each other against
6
the walls and hitting each other.”  Officer Anspach described in further detail Petitioner’s
actions during the scuffle: 
We were hitting each other in the chest.  I don’t, [sic] we
then hit each other in the face, I don’t believe that many times,
a few times here and there.  
I mean, it was so chaotic for these two or three minutes
I don’t really remember.  It was more or less, the main thing I
remember is him grabbing me and me grabbing him and just him
putting me in the wall and vi[ce] ver[s]a, for a length of time.
Officer Anspach estimated that “the entire fight was probably two to three minutes.”  When
asked to relate any injuries he sustained “during this fight,” Officer Anspach described
several abrasions to his knuckles, as well as a lower back strain, which caused him to seek
treatment at a local hospital on the night of the incident. 
Officer Burhoe testified that he also responded to the hit and run call on December
12, 2009.  After observing minor damage on the SUV and on the van that was allegedly hit,
Officer Burhoe accompanied Officers Anspach and Sands to Petitioner’s home to continue
the investigation.  Officer Burhoe offered an account of Petitioner’s initial demeanor similar
to that given by Officer Anspach, describing Petitioner as “agitated” and “shouting curse
words.”  When Petitioner went outside with Officers Burhoe and Anspach, Officer Burhoe
asserted that he remained on the porch during that time.  Officer Burhoe testified that
Petitioner initially walked toward his car but then turned around and “pushed Officer
Anspach as he was coming up the steps and at that point, you know, I had said, you know,
listen.  We’re just trying to talk at which time he says, oh hell no.  And I put my arm in front
7
of him so he wouldn’t walk past me.”  Officer Burhoe stated that when he put his arm up in
front of Petitioner to stop him from going back inside, “[Petitioner] swung and knocked my
arm out of the way and punched me in the face at the same time” with the back of his closed
fist.  The prosecutor asked Officer Burhoe on direct examination: “After [Petitioner] pushed
Officer Anspach, did you make a decision whether or not at that point [Petitioner] had
committed a crime . . . [a]nd . . . whether or not you wanted to place him under arrest?”
Officer Burhoe responded that because Petitioner “had committed assault on a police
officer,” he was going to place Petitioner under arrest. 
According to Officer Burhoe, Petitioner then attempted to go back inside his house,
and Officer Burhoe grabbed the back of his sweater and told him he was under arrest.
Despite the officers’ efforts, Petitioner was able to get back inside, and the officers followed
him in an attempt to effectuate the arrest.  A struggle ensued in the kitchen, and Petitioner
continued to resist being placed under arrest.  Officer Burhoe testified that he observed
Petitioner punching Officer Anspach and pushing him against walls and doors.  While
Officer Burhoe was attempting to assist Officer Anspach, Petitioner’s brother pulled Officer
Burhoe from behind and punched him in the face several times.  At trial, the State entered
into evidence a picture of Officer Burhoe’s face that depicted the injuries he suffered as a
result of being hit by Petitioner and his brother.  Officer Burhoe also described a back injury
he sustained while attempting to put Petitioner in a police car after placing handcuffs on him:
Ms. Kaplan:
[D]id you have to go hands on with him
again?
8
Officer Burhoe:
Yes, we did.
Ms. Kaplan:
Okay.  And when you did that, this is
outside now?
Officer Burhoe:
Yes, it is.
Ms. Kaplan:
And you were explaining you were
attempting to get him to the ground?
Officer Burhoe:
We were attempting to get him to the
ground.  At first, we put him up against the
hood of the cruiser which, because
sometimes if we’re able to bend them
across the hood of the cruiser, we can kind
of end the situation because a lot of people
realize, okay, well, this is done.
But that didn’t happen with him.  He was
[s]till fighting the whole way, so we pulled
him off of the cruiser and we struggled
with him, actually back past the broken
mirror to another part of the street, at
which point I hooked my right arm into his
right shoulder and twisted him, flipped
him over my back onto the ground and I
actually ended up landing on him because
of the momentum.  And the twist and
falling back on my back on top of him is
what injured my back.
Ms. Kaplan:
Your back.  And that was based on the
force of [Petitioner] pulling you to the
ground?
Officer Burhoe:
It was based on me trying to get him to the
ground.
Ms. Kaplan:
Okay.  Had he not been resisting the arrest,
would you have had to do that?
9
Officer Burhoe:
Oh, absolutely not.
As a result of his injuries, Officer Burhoe took himself to the emergency room on the night
of the incident.
Officer Sands also testified about the events that occurred on December 12, 2009.  He
indicated that when Officers Anspach and Burhoe went outside with Petitioner, he (Officer
Sands) remained inside to speak with Petitioner’s parents.  At some point not long after the
officers went outside with Petitioner, Officer Sands was hit from behind with the front door.
He turned around and observed both officers “fighting” with Petitioner.  Officer Sands
testified that he heard Officers Anspach and Burhoe telling Petitioner he was under arrest and
commanding that he put his hands behind his back.  Officer Sands stated that when the
“scuffle” moved into the kitchen, Petitioner was hitting, pushing, shoving, and slapping
Officer Anspach.  
Petitioner later testified on his own behalf, offering a vastly different version of
events.  According to Petitioner, when the officers came to his home to question him about
the alleged hit and run, they began “pulling” him and “tasing” him without any provocation.
When asked whether he was swinging at the officers, Petitioner stated that he did not swing
at them and, in fact, he had his hands up.  According to Petitioner, when he initially followed
Officers Anspach and Burhoe outside, he did not touch either one of them; rather, he walked
around the officer who was “in the doorway” to regain entry into his home.  When asked
whether he pushed the officer out of the way to get past him, Petitioner stated, “No, sir.  I
would never touch an officer.  I know what’s assault to even touch, or whatever.”  Petitioner
3 The charging document also charged Petitioner with escape and obstructing and
hindering a law enforcement officer.  Those charges were not presented to the jury.
10
claimed that the officers abused him throughout the entire encounter, “throwing [him] down
the stairs” after they had handcuffs on him and “hitting [him] in the back of the head.”
Petitioner asserted that he was not at any time resisting arrest or attempting to struggle with
the officers.
The verdict sheet3 indicated that the following charges were before the jury for
consideration: resisting arrest, when initially placed under arrest for assaulting a police
officer (count 1); disorderly conduct (count 2); second degree assault of Officer Anspach
(count 3); second degree assault of Officer Burhoe (count 4); second degree assault of
Officer Sands (count 5); second degree assault of a law enforcement officer, Officer Anspach
(count 6); second degree assault of a law enforcement officer, Officer Burhoe (count 7);
second degree assault of a law enforcement officer, Officer Sands (count 8); malicious
destruction of property (count 9); resisting arrest by grabbing the taser of Officer Sands
(count 10); and resisting or interfering with arrest by resisting the officers outside as they
attempted to walk to, and get Petitioner into, the police cruiser (count 11).  Of particular
relevance to this discussion, the jury was given the following instruction regarding the
offense of assault:
An assault is the generic term which includes battery.  Assault
is causing offensive physical contact to another person.  In order
to convict the defendant[] of assault, the State must prove, one,
that the defendant caused offensive physical contact with or
physical harm to the victim or victims, that the contact was the
11
result of an intentional or reckless act of the defendant and was
not accidental, and that the contact was not consented to by the
victims and/or was not legally justified.
The jury was also instructed about the offense of resisting arrest:
In order to convict the defendant of resisting arrest, the State
must prove, one, that a law enforcement officer attempted to
arrest the defendant, two, that the defendant knew that a law
enforcement officer was attempting to arrest him, three, that the
officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was
committing or had committed a crime, and four, that the
defendant refused to submit to the arrest and resisted the arrest
by force.
The jury returned the following guilty verdicts against Petitioner: resisting arrest,
when initially placed under arrest for assaulting a police officer (count 1); second degree
assault of Officer Anspach (count 3); and second degree assault of Officer Burhoe (count 4).
The jury found Petitioner not guilty of the remaining charges.  The trial judge sentenced
Petitioner to eighteen months for the resisting arrest conviction, with credit for time served;
eighteen months for second degree assault of Officer Anspach, to run consecutively with the
sentence for count one, which was suspended; eighteen months for second degree assault of
Officer Burhoe, to run consecutively with the sentences for counts one and three, which was
suspended; and three years of supervised probation.
Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending, inter alia, that
the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions for second degree assault with the
conviction for resisting arrest, thereby asserting that the sentences for the assault convictions
should be vacated.  In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the
12
convictions and sentences of the trial court.  The court relied upon the cases of Grant v. State,
141 Md. App. 517, 786 A.2d 34 (2001) and Cooper v. State, 128 Md. App. 257, 737 A.2d
613 (1999), to support its conclusion that if an assault is committed in the course of resisting
an arrest, “[a] merger of conviction is . . . compelled in order to avoid multiple punishment.”
The court then analyzed the “issue of sequence” to determine whether the assaults for which
Petitioner was convicted occurred prior to any attempt to arrest him or whether they occurred
during the course of Petitioner’s resistance of his arrest.  The court concluded that, because
the assault on Officer Anspach was the basis for the arrest, it must have preceded it; thus, that
conviction would not merge into the conviction for resisting arrest.  In its review, the
intermediate appellate court decided to “accept that version of the evidence, including the
inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom, most favorable to the State.”  While the court
acknowledged that the factual basis for the assault on Officer Burhoe was somewhat
ambiguous, it concluded that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the inference
that the assault on Officer Burhoe occurred prior to any communication to Petitioner that he
was being placed under arrest.  According to the intermediate appellate court, because the
assault on Officer Burhoe was separate and distinct from the resisting arrest, that assault
conviction also need not merge into the resisting arrest conviction.
The Jury Note
At some point after the jury returned with its verdict and had been excused, four notes,
all written on loose-leaf style, lined paper, were found in a single envelope contained within
the court file marked “Jury Notes, Filed.”  Three of the notes contain questions directed to
13
the court, and, at the bottom of the respective notes, there are handwritten answers to the
questions, accompanied by the trial judge’s apparent signature and an indication of the date
and time.  The first note contains the following question: “May we see the charging
documents?”  The handwritten response is: “No[.]”  The response is signed by the trial judge
and indicates a date and time of “3/11/10 12:15 PM[.]”  The second note reads: “[P]lease
define the word offensive as applied in the directions for second degree ass[a]ult.  ‘Assault
is causing offensive physical contact to another person.’”  The response on the note reads:
“Please refer to the jury instructions.”  Below the response is the trial judge’s signature and
the following date and time: “3/11/10 1:25 PM[.]”  The third note contains the following
inquiry: “There is no instruction on interference with the arrest of another.  If we don[’]t have
an instruction for interfering w/ arrest, can we reach a finding?  (The only instruction is for
resisting your own arrest)[.]”  Within the envelope, there is a photo copy of the third note that
contains a handwritten response at the bottom.  The response reads: “Yes – You have been
instructed on resisting [and] you can use that instruction along w/ your own understanding
of interference.”  Below the signature of the trial judge is the following date and time:
“3/12/10 10:40 AM[.]”  The Fourth note, the note at issue in this case, contains the following
question: “Does assault cover physical contact when done in self-defense?”  The Note
contains no other markings.  In addition, while the transcript reflects a discussion on the
record between counsel and the trial judge regarding responses to the first three notes, the
transcript does not contain any mention of the Fourth note or its contents.
In an attempt to discover the origins of the Fourth note, Petitioner’s appellate counsel
14
sent a letter to the trial judge, the Assistant State’s Attorney who prosecuted the case, and
Petitioner’s trial counsel, inquiring about the Note.  In response, both attorneys and the trial
judge indicated that they had no independent recollection of the Note at issue.  Furthermore,
the trial judge indicated that his usual practice when receiving a communication from the jury
is to provide counsel with a copy of the note, to convene with counsel on the record to
discuss possible responses, and to supply an answer to the jury on the note itself.  The trial
judge stated that his usual practice, as reflected on the first three notes, includes providing
a signature, as well as the date and time, to accompany the written response.  The judge
maintained that had he received the Note at issue, he would have followed his usual practice.
In his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner contended that the trial court
erred in failing to disclose the Fourth note to him and his trial counsel, thus violating the
mandates of Maryland Rule 4-326(d).  The intermediate appellate court began its analysis
with the premise that the requirements of Rule 4-326(d) are not triggered until the court
receives a communication from the jury.  As the Court of Special Appeals phrased the issue:
“The only question before us is whether, as a matter of fact, the activating threshold of a
receipt by Judge Algeo of a communication from the jury was ever crossed.”  The court
contrasted the handling of the first three notes with that of the Fourth note, explaining that
the Fourth note was never mentioned in the trial transcript, it was never marked as an exhibit,
it was never responded to by the court, and it contained no date or time-stamp.
Distinguishing the facts regarding the Note in this case with the facts surrounding discovery
of the notes at issue in Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 837 A.2d 944 (2003) and Fields v.
15
State, 172 Md. App. 496, 916 A.2d 357 (2007), the intermediate appellate court concluded
that Petitioner had not established a prima facie case that the trial court ever received the
Fourth note; thus, according to the Court of Special Appeals, Rule 4-326(d) was never
triggered.
DISCUSSION
Merger of Convictions
Our resolution of the issue of merger, as it relates to Petitioner’s convictions for
second degree assault of Officer Anspach, second degree assault of Officer Burhoe, and
resisting arrest, involves essentially two issues: (1) whether the offenses merge under the
required evidence test and (2) whether a reasonable jury would have concluded that the
offenses were based on the same acts or on acts that were separate and distinct.  As discussed
in greater detail, we hold that the offenses of resisting arrest and second degree assault merge
under the required evidence test.  Furthermore, we hold that where there is a factual
ambiguity in the record, in the context of merger, that ambiguity is resolved in favor of the
defendant.  Here, a reasonable jury could have concluded either that the factual bases
underlying Petitioner’s convictions for second degree assault were separate and distinct from
the facts surrounding his conviction for resisting arrest, or that the assaults were an integral
part of the resisting arrest.  In light of this factual ambiguity, we resolve the issue in
Petitioner’s favor by determining that the assault convictions and the resisting arrest
conviction were based on the same act or acts committed by Petitioner.  Thus, the trial judge
should have merged the second degree assault convictions with the conviction for resisting
16
arrest.
This Court has consistently explained and applied the principle of merger in the
following way:
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which is applicable to the States, provides that no person shall
“be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb . . . .”  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, [793], 89
S. Ct. 2056, [2062], 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, [715] (1969); State v.
Boozer, 304 Md. 98, 101, 497 A.2d 1129, 1130 (1985).  The
Double Jeopardy Clause forbids multiple convictions and
sentences for the same offense.  Holbrook [v. State], 364 Md.
[354,] 369, 772 A.2d [1240,] 1248 [(2001)]; Nightingale v.
State, 312 Md. 699, 702, 542 A.2d 373, 374 (1988); Brown v.
State, 311 Md. 426, 431, 535 A.2d 485, 487 (1988); Boozer, 304
Md. at 101, 497 A.2d at 1130.  Under the common-law rule of
merger as well, when offenses merge, “separate sentences are
normally precluded.”  State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 392, 631
A.2d 453, 457 (1993); see White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 743, 569
A.2d 1271, 1273 (1990).  Offenses merge and separate
sentences are prohibited when, for instance, a defendant is
convicted of two offenses based on the same act or acts and one
offense is a lesser-included offense of the other.  Lancaster, 332
Md. at 391, 631 A.2d at 456.
“Under ‘both federal double jeopardy principles and
Maryland merger law, the test for determining the identity of
offenses is the required evidence test.’”  Nightingale, 312 Md.
at 703, 542 A.2d at 374; see, e.g., Holbrook, 364 Md. at 369-70,
772 A.2d at 1249 (“[U]nder Maryland common law, the
required evidence test is the appropriate test for determining
whether the different statutory or common law offenses,
growing out of the same transaction, are to merge and be treated
as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.”); Dixon v.
State, 364 Md. 209, 236, 772 A.2d 283, 299 (2001); Lancaster,
332 Md. at 391, 393 n.8, 631 A.2d at 456, 457 n.8 (“In addition
to being the normal standard for determining merger of offenses
under Maryland common law, the required evidence test is also
the usual test for determining when two separate offenses . . .
17
shall be deemed the same for purposes of the prohibition against
double jeopardy.” [(citations omitted)]); Monoker v. State, 321
Md. 214, 219, 582 A.2d 525, 527 (1990); White, 318 Md. at
743, 569 A.2d at 1272.
Writing for this Court in Lancaster, Judge Eldridge
provided a thorough explanation of the required evidence test:
The required evidence test focuses
upon the elements of each offense;
if all of the elements of one offense
are included in the other offense, so
that only the latter offense contains
a distinct element or distinct
elements, the former merges into
the latter.  Snowden v. State, supra,
321 Md. [612,] 617, 583 A.2d
[1056,] 1059 [(1991)], quoting
State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 517,
515 A.2d 465, 473 (1986).  Stated
another way, the required evidence
is that which is minimally
necessary to secure a conviction for
each . . . offense.  If each offense
requires proof of a fact which the
other does not, or in other words, if
each offense contains an element
which the other does not, there is
no merger under the required
evidence test even though both
offenses are based upon the same
act or acts.  But, where only one
offense requires proof of an
additional fact, so that all elements
of one offense are present in the
other, and where both offenses are
based on the same act or acts . . .
merger follows.  Williams v. State,
supra, 323 Md. [312,] 317-318, 593
A.2d [671,] 673 [(1991)], quoting
in part Thomas v. State, 277 Md.
18
257, 267, 353 A.2d 240, 246-47
(1976).
332 Md. at 391-92, 631 A.2d at 456-57 (internal quotation[]
marks omitted).  The required evidence test is the “threshold”
test and, if it is met, merger follows as a matter of course.  Id. at
394, 631 A.2d at 458.  (Footnote omitted.)
Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 431-433, 855 A.2d 1175, 1193-94 (2004).
As we stated in McGrath v. State, 356 Md. 20, 736 A.2d 1067 (1999), “[w]hen there
is a merger under the required evidence test, separate sentences are normally precluded.”
McGrath, 356 Md. at 24, 736 A.2d at 1069 (quoting Lancaster, 332 Md. at 392, 631 A.2d
at 457).  Rather, the lesser included offense merges into the greater offense, and a sentence
is imposed only for the offense having an additional element or elements.  Id.; Miles v. State,
349 Md. 215, 220, 707 A.2d 841, 844 (1998).  A sentence will be imposed in accordance
with this principle regardless of the penalties carried by the respective offenses.  See Dixon
v. State, 364 Md. 209, 238, 772 A.2d 283, 300 (2001) (noting that “‘where there is a merger
of a lesser included offense into a greater offense, we are not concerned with penalties – the
lesser included offense generally merges into and is subsumed by the greater offense
regardless of penalties’” (quoting Spitzinger v. State, 340 Md. 114, 125, 665 A.2d 685, 690
(1995))).
The two offenses at issue in this case are second degree assault and resisting arrest,
both of which have been codified by the Maryland General Assembly.  Assault is defined in
Md. Code (2002, 2011 Cum. Supp.), § 3-201(b) of the Criminal Law Article as “the crimes
of assault, battery, and assault and battery, which retain their judicially determined
4 In Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698 (1999), we addressed the issue of
whether the assault statutes, adopted in 1996, repealed the common law offenses of assault
and battery.  In that case, we stated, “By subsuming and combining all statutory offenses of
assault then existent as well as all common law forms of assault and battery into a single and
comprehensive statutory scheme, the 1996 assault statutes represent the entire subject matter
of assault crimes.”  Robinson, 353 Md. at 695-96, 728 A.2d at 703-04.  Thus, we held that
the assault statutes abrogated the common law offenses of assault and battery.  Robinson, 353
Md. at 696, 728 A.2d at 704.
19
meanings.”4  Section 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article prohibits the offense of second
degree assault and provides a penalty upon violation of imprisonment not exceeding ten years
or a fine not exceeding $2,500 or both.  Md. Code (2002, 2011 Cum. Supp.), § 3-203 of the
Criminal Law Article.
As indicated by the statutory language, the offense of second degree assault retains
its common law meaning.  We stated in Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 893 A.2d 1018
(2006), that “[w]hen applying the required evidence test to multi-purpose offenses, i.e.,
offenses having alternative elements, a court must examine the alternative elements relevant
to the case at issue.”  Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 353, 893 A.2d at 1055 (quoting McGrath, 356
Md. at 24, 736 A.2d at 1069).  Because the assaults for which Petitioner was convicted were
clearly of the battery variety, we will focus our analysis under the required evidence test on
the elements of that form of the offense of second degree assault.  Under Maryland common
law, an assault of the battery variety is committed by causing offensive physical contact with
another person.  In the present case, the trial judge, in accordance with the Maryland
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (MPJI-Cr), instructed the jury in this case that to find
Petitioner guilty of assault, the State must prove that: (1) the defendant caused offensive
20
physical contact with, or harm to, the victim; (2) the contact was the result of an intentional
or reckless act of the defendant and was not accidental; and (3) the contact was not consented
to by the victim or was not legally justified.  See MPJI-Cr 4:01 (2007 Supp.); Epps v. State,
333 Md. 121, 127, 634 A.2d 20, 23 (1993); Snowden, 321 Md. at 617, 583 A.2d at 1059.
The statutory offense of resisting arrest is codified at Md. Code (2004, 2011 Cum.
Supp.), § 9-408 of the Criminal Law Article.  Subsection (b) provides that “[a] person may
not intentionally . . . resist a lawful arrest[.]”  Prior to its codification, the crime of resisting
arrest was a common law offense.  See Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 687, 827 A.2d 68, 73
(2003).  Here, the trial judge instructed the jury that in order to find Petitioner guilty of
resisting arrest, the State must prove that: (1) a law enforcement officer attempted to arrest
the defendant; (2) the defendant knew that a law enforcement officer was attempting to arrest
him; (3) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was committing or
had committed a crime; and (4) the defendant refused to submit to the arrest and resisted the
arrest by force.  See MPJI-Cr 4:27.1 (2007 Supp.); Barnhard v. State, 325 Md. 602, 609-10,
602 A.2d 701, 705 (1992) (explaining that to convict a defendant of resisting arrest, the State
must prove that: (1) the defendant was arrested; (2) the arrest was lawful; and (3) the
defendant resisted or refused to submit to that arrest).
While this Court has not yet addressed the particular merger issue posed by Petitioner,
the Court of Special Appeals has discussed whether the offenses of second degree assault and
resisting arrest merge under the required evidence test.  In Cooper v. State, 128 Md. App.
257, 261, 737 A.2d 613, 615 (1999), Cooper was convicted, inter alia, of one count of
21
resisting arrest and two counts of second degree assault.  The trial judge sentenced Cooper
to five years for the resisting arrest conviction and ten years for each assault conviction.  Id.
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Cooper claimed that the convictions for assault
should be merged into the conviction for resisting arrest.  Id.  The facts underlying the
convictions are relatively simple.  After an informant for the Washington County Narcotics
Task Force engaged in a drug transaction with Cooper, Officer Kayser, a member of the
arrest team, attempted to arrest Cooper.  Cooper, 128 Md. App. at 262-63, 737 A.2d at 615-
16.  During that attempt, Cooper pulled away and punched Officer Kayser repeatedly in the
head.  Cooper, 128 Md. App. at 263, 737 A.2d at 615-16.  Sergeant Haltzman then attempted
to effectuate the arrest, and Cooper struck him in the face.  Cooper, 128 Md. App. at 263,
737 A.2d at 616.
The intermediate appellate court examined the elements of resisting arrest by
reviewing the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions for resisting a warrantless arrest.
Cooper, 128 Md. App. at 265, 737 A.2d at 617.  The court also discussed the applicable
elements for an assault that is based upon “the unlawful application of force to the person of
another.”  Id.  The court ultimately concluded that “because all of the elements of assault are
included in resisting arrest, the two offenses satisfy the required evidence test.”  Cooper, 128
Md. App. at 266, 737 A.2d at 617.  Furthermore, when considering whether the convictions
for the assaults and the resisting arrest stemmed from the same act or acts committed by
Cooper, the court concluded that “the only force applied to Officers Haltzman and Kayser
was that utilized by [Cooper] to resist arrest.”  Id.  Thus, the court determined that Cooper’s
22
convictions for second degree assault should merge into his conviction for resisting arrest.
Id.
In Grant v. State, 141 Md. App. 517, 786 A.2d 34 (2001), the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed its holding in Cooper with regard to merging convictions for second degree
assault and resisting arrest.  In Grant, the trial court denied Grant’s request to merge his two
assault convictions into his conviction for resisting arrest.  Grant, 141 Md. App. at 521, 786
A.2d at 36.  Evidence was produced by the State at trial that in response to a 911 call, three
officers from the Salisbury City Police Department entered Grant’s apartment.  Grant, 141
Md. App. at 522, 786 A.2d at 36-37.  Officer Drewer testified that after he observed drug
paraphernalia in one of the rooms, Grant “became hostile and started fighting” with Officer
Taylor.  Grant, 141 Md. App. at 524, 786 A.2d at 38.  Officer Drewer informed Grant that
he was under arrest and instructed him to place his hands behind his back.  Grant, 141 Md.
App. at 525, 786 A.2d at 38.  Grant continued to struggle, and Officer Drewer was struck by
Grant’s arms and legs.  Id.  The jury found Grant guilty of assaulting Officers Drewer and
Taylor, as well as resisting arrest.  Grant, 141 Md. App. at 527, 786 A.2d at 39.  On review,
the intermediate appellate court held that, although second degree assault merges into
resisting arrest under the required evidence test, “[Grant’s] assault on Officer Taylor, unlike
his assault on Officer Drewer, occurred before any attempt was made to arrest him.”  Grant,
141 Md. App. at 541, 786 A.2d at 48.  Thus, the court determined that the trial court should
have merged Grant’s conviction for second degree assault of Officer Drewer into his
conviction for resisting arrest, but that the conviction for second degree assault of Officer
5 For example, “if a defendant, standing in a doorway, is told by an officer that he is
under arrest, but, before the officer can physically place him under arrest, the defendant shuts
the door and applies force to the door to prevent the officer from opening that door, such a
defendant would have used force to resist an arrest (and thus be guilty of resisting arrest)
despite having used no force against the person of the officer.”
23
Taylor did not stem from the same act or acts leading to Grant’s conviction for resisting
arrest.  Grant, 141 Md. App. at 542, 786 A.2d at 48.
Petitioner relies on Cooper and Grant for his assertion that, “where it is based on the
same underlying conduct, second degree assault merges into resisting arrest under the
required evidence test.”  Contrary to Petitioner’s position, the State contends that second
degree assault does not merge into resisting arrest because “despite some facial similarity,
each of those offenses requires a different element from the other.”  According to the State,
“unlike with a second-degree assault, there is simply no requirement that the force used to
resist an arrest be employed against the person of the officer.”  The State provides several
examples of force that would be sufficient to constitute resisting arrest but that would not be
sufficient to constitute second degree assault against a police officer.5  Maintaining that a
defendant must “cause” the offensive touching required to be found guilty of second degree
assault, the State asserts that second degree assault contains an element that is not required
to satisfy the offense of resisting arrest.  Additionally, the State claims that “[b]ecause the
offenses of resisting arrest and second-degree assault are premised on different victims and
different harms, merger of those offenses is not appropriate.”  The State cites Purnell v. State,
375 Md. 678, 827 A.2d 68 (2003), in support of its position that the offenses are distinct
24
because second degree assault is an offense against a person and resisting arrest is an offense
against the State.
We agree, however, with Petitioner’s position and with the analysis provided by the
Court of Special Appeals in Cooper and Grant, and we hold that the offense of second
degree assault merges into the offense of resisting arrest under the required evidence test.
As we have stated, “‘if all of the elements of one offense are included in the other offense,
so that only the latter offense contains a distinct element or distinct elements, the former
merges into the latter.’”  Lancaster, 332 Md. at 391, 631 A.2d at 456 (quoting Snowden, 321
Md. at 617, 583 A.2d at 1059).  All of the elements of second degree assault are included
within the offense of resisting arrest.  The “force” that is required to find a defendant guilty
of resisting arrest is the same as the “offensive physical contact” that is required to find a
defendant guilty of the battery variety of second degree assault.  Furthermore, there is no
element required to satisfy the offense of second degree assault that is different from or
additional to the elements required to satisfy the offense of resisting arrest.  The State makes
the argument that force applied by a defendant to resist arrest does not have to take the form
of force against a person, i.e., a law enforcement officer; thus, the offenses need not merge.
While we agree with the State’s contention that the force element of resisting arrest need not
always constitute second degree assault against a law enforcement officer, we hold that when
the force used by a defendant to resist arrest is the same as the offensive physical contact
with a law enforcement officer attempting to effectuate that arrest, the convictions merge
under the required evidence test.
6 The Court of Special Appeals analyzed the merger issue presented by Petitioner as
a question of legal sufficiency and, thus, it decided to review the evidence, and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the State.  As Maryland
case law indicates, the appropriate standard to apply when addressing a question of factual
ambiguity in the context of merging convictions is to resolve the ambiguity in the
defendant’s favor in a situation where it is impossible to know for certain the rationale of the
trier of fact for finding the convictions entered against the defendant.  See Snowden, 321 Md.
at 619, 583 A.2d at 1059-60; Nightingale, 312 Md. at 708, 542 A.2d at 377; State v. Frye,
283 Md. 709, 723-25, 393 A.2d 1372, 1379-80 (1978); Cortez v. State, 104 Md. App. 358,
361, 656 A.2d 360, 361 (1995).  Thus, we apply that standard, and not the standard employed
by the intermediate appellate court, in our analysis of the relevant issues.
25
Merger occurs as a matter of course when two offenses are deemed to be the same
under the required evidence test and “when [the] offenses are based on the same act or
acts[.]”  Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 370, 772 A.2d 1240, 1249 (2001).  Having
concluded that the offenses of second degree assault and resisting arrest merge under the
required evidence test, we next consider whether those offenses were based on the same act
or acts committed by Petitioner in the instant case.  We further hold that, in light of the
factual ambiguities produced at trial, which we resolve in Petitioner’s favor,6 Petitioner’s
convictions for assault and resisting arrest were based on the same act or acts.  Thus, the trial
court should have merged the assault convictions into the conviction for resisting arrest.  
In the case of Nightingale v. State, 312 Md. 699, 542 A.2d 373 (1988), we discussed
similar merger issues related to two petitioners, Nightingale and Myers.  In reviewing both
cases, we addressed whether the petitioners’ convictions for child abuse and certain sexual
offenses would merge under the required evidence test.  Nightingale, 312 Md. at 700, 542
A.2d at 373.  After discussing the particular facts of each case and the elements of each
26
offense, we determined, “Under these circumstances, we believe that each jury could have
found the defendant before it guilty of child abuse based solely on evidence of a sexual
offense in some degree.  If that were done, then the sexual offense became, in effect, a lesser
included offense of sexual child abuse, and . . . the offenses are the same for double jeopardy
purposes.”  Nightingale, 312 Md. at 708, 542 A.2d at 377.  We concluded, however, that we
could not decipher from the trial records whether the factual bases underlying the convictions
of both petitioners were based on the same acts or on different acts committed by the
petitioners.  Id.  We held that the proper approach in such a situation was to resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the petitioners and to merge the convictions for the sexual offense
counts.  Id. (citing State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 723-25, 393 A.2d 1372, 1379-80 (1978)).
In Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 614, 583 A.2d 1056, 1057 (1991), this Court
addressed the issue of whether Snowden’s conviction for assault and battery merged into his
conviction for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon.  We recounted the following
relevant facts:
Upon hearing noises in the kitchen, the restaurant manager,
Framouzis Stamidis, came from the office to the kitchen where
he was immediately shot in the left arm by Snowden.  [The
victims] were then told to lie down on the floor.  Snowden,
while pointing his rifle at the two [victims], asked repeatedly
where Stamidis’ gun was, but after several denials by Stamidis
of the existence of a gun in the restaurant, Snowden ordered
Stamidis to take him to the money.  Still at gunpoint, Stamidis
led Snowden to the office where the money was located, and
Snowden and his accomplice left with $3000 taken from the
restaurant.
Snowden, 321 Md. at 615, 583 A.2d at 1057-58.  Snowden claimed that the conviction for
27
assault and battery should merge into the robbery conviction because the events arose from
the same transaction and all of the elements of assault and battery that occurred were required
to prove the robbery.  Snowden, 321 Md. at 615, 583 A.2d at 1058.  The State countered that
the shooting was a separate crime from the robbery and, therefore, the assault and battery
conviction should not merge.  Id.  After reviewing the proceedings from the trial court, we
concluded, “We do not know whether the robbery charged was based on battery as a lesser
included offense or on assault as a lesser included offense with the battery considered
separate.”  Snowden, 321 Md. at 619, 583 A.2d at 1059.  We held that, similar to our analysis
in Nightingale, it was appropriate to resolve the factual ambiguity in Snowden’s favor and
to merge his conviction for assault and battery into the robbery conviction.  Snowden, 321
Md. at 619, 583 A.2d at 1059-60.
The Court of Special Appeals relied on Nightingale and Snowden to resolve the
merger issues presented in Cortez v. State, 104 Md. App. 358, 656 A.2d 360 (1995).  In that
case, the Court of Special Appeals confronted the issue of whether Cortez’s battery
conviction should merge with his conviction for fourth degree sexual offense.  Cortez, 104
Md. App. at 360, 656 A.2d at 361.  In its examination of the trial record, the intermediate
appellate court surmised that the trial judge could have found Cortez guilty of battery on the
basis of acts separate and distinct from the sexual offense, or he could have found that the
battery was an integral part of the sexual offense.  Cortez, 104 Md. App. at 368, 656 A.2d
at 364-65.  Taking into account this Court’s analysis in Nightingale and Snowden, the Court
of Special Appeals decided to resolve the factual ambiguity in Cortez’s favor.  Cortez, 104
28
Md. App. at 361, 367-68, 656 A.2d at 361, 364-65.  The court ultimately concluded that,
“because we cannot tell whether the trial judge did find that appellant committed a battery
by the use of force separate and distinct from that used to commit the fourth degree sexual
offense, we must resolve the doubt in favor of appellant and vacate the sentence for battery.”
Cortez, 104 Md. App. at 361, 656 A.2d at 361.
In the present case, the main thrust of Petitioner’s argument on the issue of factual
ambiguities in the record is that “the imposition of separate sentences for assault and resisting
arrest was impermissible as the charging document, jury instructions, closing arguments, and
verdict provide no clarification as to whether Petitioner’s assault convictions are based on
acts different than those underlying his conviction for resisting arrest.”  Petitioner claims that
the first acts that could have constituted a factual basis for convicting him of second degree
assault were pushing Officer Anspach and striking Officer Burhoe outside Petitioner’s home.
According to Petitioner, the State’s evidence was unclear as to when the decision to arrest
him was made and when this decision was communicated to him.  Furthermore, Petitioner
asserts that the State’s evidence at trial indicated that he potentially committed several
additional assaults on the officers both inside the house and later in the encounter when he
had been handcuffed and brought back outside.  Petitioner maintains that because the record
is ambiguous as to whether the jury convicted him of assault based on conduct that preceded
or followed the initiation of the officers’ attempt to arrest him, that ambiguity should be
resolved in Petitioner’s favor.
In its alternative argument, the State claims that the jury’s guilty verdicts were based
29
on separate and distinct acts committed by Petitioner; thus, according to the State, there is
no ambiguity, and the convictions should not merge.  The State asserts that the evidence
adduced at trial clearly shows that Petitioner’s “assault of Officer Anspach occurred during
the early stages of an investigation of a hit-and-run, and certainly did not occur in the course
of effectuating an arrest.”  Moreover, the State emphasizes the fact that Petitioner’s assault
on Officer Anspach provided the basis for the officers’ decision to arrest him.  The State
contends that because the jury found Petitioner guilty of “resisting arrest, when initially
placed under arrest for assaulting a police officer,” the jury must have concluded that
Petitioner committed an assault prior to any attempt to arrest him.  Lastly, with regard to the
assault on Officer Burhoe, the State posits, “The jury’s finding that [Petitioner] was guilty
of assaulting Officer Anspach and Officer Burhoe (but not Officer William Sands) is also
consistent with a finding that the assault convictions related to conduct that occurred prior
to the arrest and during the initial stages of the encounter when only Officer Anspach and
Officer Burhoe were outside with [Petitioner].”
Upon reviewing the trial transcript, the judge’s instructions to the jury, and the verdict
sheet, we hold that the record is ambiguous as to the factual bases for which the jury found
Petitioner guilty of second degree assault of Officer Anspach and Officer Burhoe.  In our
view, a reasonable jury could have found that the assaults were based on acts that preceded
the officers’ attempt to arrest Petitioner, or that the assaults were an integral part of the
resisting arrest.  In accordance with Maryland precedent, we must resolve this factual
ambiguity in Petitioner’s favor.  Accordingly, the trial judge should have merged the assault
30
convictions into the conviction for resisting arrest.
First, we address the facts surrounding the second degree assault of Officer Anspach.
If the assault on Officer Anspach occurred prior to any attempt to arrest Petitioner, the
conviction would not merge into the resisting arrest conviction; if the assault occurred during
the resisting arrest, such that the convictions were based on the same underlying act or acts
perpetrated by Petitioner, the offenses would merge.  Officer Anspach testified that when he,
Officer Burhoe, and Petitioner were initially outside for the purpose of investigating the
alleged hit and run incident, Petitioner walked by him “kind of brushing [him] and just
pushing [him]” with his arm.  Officer Burhoe similarly testified that Petitioner pushed Officer
Anspach as he turned to go back inside his home.  It does not appear to be disputed that this
alleged act occurred before any attempt was made to arrest Petitioner.  If the jury believed
that this event occurred, and that it occurred in the manner described by the officers, a
reasonable jury could have concluded that the act constituted a second degree assault of
Officer Anspach.  Because Petitioner’s testimony indicated that he did not in any way touch
the officers, a reasonable jury could have also concluded that the event did not occur.
Moreover, even if the jury did believe that the event occurred, a reasonable jury could have
concluded that such an act did not constitute second degree assault; a reasonable jury could
have determined, for instance, that the brush or push did not constitute offensive physical
contact or that the contact was accidental.  
There is also ample testimony in the trial transcript of an extended scuffle between
Petitioner and Officer Anspach after Petitioner re-entered his home.  Although it is unclear
31
from the record exactly when the attempt to arrest Petitioner began, both Officer Anspach
and Officer Burhoe testified that they communicated to Petitioner that he was under arrest
when he re-entered his home.  Testimony was produced that, during the “fight” inside
Petitioner’s home, Petitioner hit, pushed, and shoved Officer Anspach.  Officer Anspach
testified that the injuries he sustained as a result of this struggle caused him to seek medical
attention.  A reasonable jury could have found that the events that occurred inside
Petitioner’s home, during the course of the resisting arrest, constituted a second degree
assault on Officer Anspach.  In light of the fact that either the events that occurred outside
or the events that occurred inside could have led the jury to find Petitioner guilty of second
degree assault on Officer Anspach, we resolve the factual ambiguity in Petitioner’s favor.
Thus, we hold that Petitioner’s conviction for second degree assault of Officer Anspach
merges into his conviction for resisting arrest.
The State raises the point in its Brief that the jury must have found that one of the
assaults preceded the officers’ attempt to arrest Petitioner.  The State claims that Petitioner’s
assault of Officer Anspach was the basis for the officers’ decision to arrest Petitioner.
Furthermore, count one on the verdict sheet contained the offense of “resisting arrest, when
initially placed under arrest for assaulting a police officer.”  According to the State, when the
jury found Petitioner guilty of count one, it must have concluded that Petitioner committed
an assault prior to his arrest.  We disagree with the State’s contentions, and we conclude that
the jury need not have found that Petitioner committed an assault prior to any attempt to
arrest him.  In addition to count one on the verdict sheet, which contained the offense of
32
“resisting arrest, when initially placed under arrest for assaulting a police officer,” there were
two other resisting arrest charges presented to the jury for consideration; a reasonable
explanation for the presence of a description of the resisting arrest charge in count one was
to differentiate it from the factual bases underlying the other resisting arrest charges.
Moreover, in order to find Petitioner guilty of resisting arrest, the jury only needed to find
that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Petitioner was committing or had
committed a crime; the jury did not need to find that Petitioner had actually committed a
crime.
Next, we discuss the ambiguity surrounding the factual basis underlying Petitioner’s
conviction for second degree assault of Officer Burhoe.  Similar to our analysis of the assault
of Officer Anspach, if the assault of Officer Burhoe preceded any attempt to arrest Petitioner,
then the assault conviction does not merge, and if the assault of Officer Burhoe occurred as
a part of the resisting arrest, then the convictions merge.  Both Officer Anspach and Officer
Burhoe testified that, after Petitioner pushed or shoved Officer Anspach, he immediately
walked up to Officer Burhoe and hit him in the face.  A reasonable jury, if it believed the
officers’ testimony, certainly could have concluded that this act constituted a second degree
assault of Officer Burhoe.  As previously discussed, however, it is ambiguous whether any
attempt had been made to effectuate an arrest of Petitioner at the time when he allegedly hit
Officer Burhoe.  Officers Anspach and Burhoe both testified that after Petitioner pushed
Officer Anspach, a decision was made to arrest him for assaulting a police officer.
According to Officer Burhoe, after Petitioner pushed Officer Anspach and continued to walk
33
toward the house, Officer Burhoe put his arm up in an attempt stop Petitioner from entering
his home.  A reasonable jury could have concluded that this event began the officers’ attempt
to effectuate an arrest and, thus, the assault on Officer Burhoe occurred during the resisting
arrest.  A reasonable jury also could have concluded that the officers’ attempt to arrest
Petitioner did not begin until after the assault on Officer Burhoe.  Again, we resolve this
factual ambiguity in Petitioner’s favor, and we hold that Petitioner’s conviction for second
degree assault of Officer Burhoe should be merged into the conviction for resisting arrest.
Officer Burhoe also offered testimony at trial that he suffered an injury later in the
encounter, after Petitioner had been handcuffed and several officers were attempting to put
him in a police cruiser.  According to Officer Burhoe, Petitioner continued to resist and, in
an attempt to get Petitioner to the ground, Officer Burhoe “flipped” Petitioner, injuring his
back in the process.  Officer Burhoe indicated that his injury would not have occurred had
Petitioner not continued to resist arrest.  A reasonable jury could have found that this act
constituted second degree assault of Officer Burhoe.  This incident provides additional
evidence of ambiguity in the record and further supports our conclusion that Petitioner’s
conviction for assault of Officer Burhoe should be merged with his conviction for resisting
arrest.
Jury Notes
We recently decided the case of Black v. State, __ Md. __ (2012) (No. 88, September
Term, 2011) (filed May 3, 2012), which involves facts that are indistinguishable from the
jury note facts before us in the instant case.  Therefore, the law as we stated it in Black is
34
controlling in these circumstances.  In accordance with the principles declared in Black, we
hold that there is a presumption of regularity in court proceedings, and Petitioner in this case
has not produced a sufficient factual record on appeal to rebut that presumption by
establishing that the jury note at issue was received by the trial court within the
contemplation of Maryland Rule 4-326(d).  Because Petitioner has not established a prima
facie case that the Fourth note was received by the trial court, within the meaning of Rule 4-
326(d), we affirm the intermediate appellate court’s determination that Rule 4-326(d) was
not triggered.
Maryland Rule 4-326(d), which governs communications between a jury and the trial
court, provides:
(d) Communications with jury.  The court shall notify
the defendant and the State’s Attorney of the receipt of any
communication from the jury pertaining to the action as
promptly as practicable and in any event before responding to
the communication.  All such communications between the
court and the jury shall be on the record in open court or shall be
in writing and filed in the action.  The clerk or the court shall
note on a written communication the date and time it was
received from the jury.
In Black, we began our analysis with a discussion of the appropriate standard of
review and a summary of relevant principles of construction used to interpret and apply the
Maryland Rules: 
To determine the existence of reversible error, ordinarily
we conduct two inquiries: (1) whether an error occurred in the
trial court; and (2) if so, whether that error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.  See Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213, 228, 638
A.2d 754, 761 (1994); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 558, 446
35
A.2d 844, 848 (1982); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350
A.2d 665, 678 (1976).  With respect to the first inquiry, we have
held that “[t]here is a presumption of regularity which normally
attaches to trial court proceedings, although its applicability may
sometimes depend upon the nature of the issue before the
reviewing court.”  Harris v. State, 406 Md. 115, 122, 956 A.2d
204, 208 (2008) (citations omitted).  To overcome the
presumption of regularity or correctness, the appellant or
petitioner has the burden of producing a “sufficient factual
record for the appellate court to determine whether error was
committed.”  Mora v. State, 355 Md. 639, 650, 735 A.2d 1122,
1128 (1999); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 184, 825 A.2d 452,
461 (2003); Bradley v. Hazard Tech. Co., 340 Md. 202, 206,
665 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1995).  If the appellant or petitioner
demonstrates that error occurred, the burden rests with the State
to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Dorsey, 276 Md. at 658, 350 A.2d at 677. 
* 
* 
*
 
In interpreting the Maryland Rules, we have stated that
“we use the same well-established canons of construction that
we use when interpreting statutes.”  Perez v. State, 420 Md. 57,
63, 21 A.3d 1048, 1052 (2011) (quotation omitted); State ex rel.
Lennon v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274, 627 A.2d 1055, 1057
(1993).  We “look to the plain meaning of the language
employed in the[] rules and construe that language without
forced or subtle interpretations designed to limit or extend its
scope.”  Lee v. State, 332 Md. 654, 658, 632 A.2d 1183, 1185
(1993).  We avoid a construction of a rule or statute that is
unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.
Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005).
We construe statutes and rules as a whole “so that no word,
clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous,
meaningless, or nugatory.”  Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453,
879 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2005) (citation omitted).
Black, __ Md. at __.
We then summarized basic principles pertaining to communications between the trial
36
court and the jury:
The rules governing communications between the judge
and the jury are basic and relatively simple to adhere to in
practice.  If a judge receives a communication from the jury or
wishes to communicate with the jury, he or she is required to
notify the parties.  See Md. Rule 4-326(c).  The communication
with the jury shall be made in open court on the record or shall
be made in writing and the writing shall become part of the
record.  See Md. Rule 4-326(c).  Putting aside certain exceptions
not relevant here, the defendant has a recognized right to be
present during communications between the judge and the jury
during [the] trial.  See Md. Rule 4-231(b); Stewart v. State, 334
Md. 213, 224-25, 638 A.2d 754, 759 (1994); Williams v. State,
292 Md. 201, 211, 438 A.2d 1301, 1306 (1981) (“a criminal
defendant’s right to be present at every stage of his trial is a
common law right [and] is to some extent protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution”).
These rules are not abstract guides.  They are mandatory and
must be strictly followed.  See Taylor v. State, 352 Md. 338,
344, 722 A.2d 65, 68 (1998); Stewart, 334 Md. at 222, 638 A.2d
at 758.  (Footnote omitted.)
Black, __ Md. at __ (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 322, 765 A.2d 97, 122-23
(2001)).  We explained the Winder Court’s discussion of Rule 4-326(c) by noting that the
subsection of the Rule discussing communications with the jury was previously subsection
(c) and, through a 2003 amendment, is currently subsection (d).  Black, __ Md. at __ n.2.
Our review of the plain language of Rule 4-326(d) led us to conclude that the
requirements of that subsection are not triggered unless the appellant or petitioner produces
a sufficient factual record to establish that the trial court actually received the communication
at issue.  Black, __ Md. at __.  Furthermore, we maintained that, to trigger the mandates of
subsection (d), the communication must have been received by the trial court prior to the
37
jury’s rendition of the verdict.  Black, __ Md. at __.  We determined that receipt by the
“court,” as contemplated by the Rule, includes “the trial judge and all court personnel who
are subject to the direction and control of the judge, including, but not limited to, the
courtroom clerk, the judge’s law clerk, and the bailiff.”  Black, __ Md. at __.  The April 2005
amendment to Rule 4-326(d), requiring that written communications to or from a jury be
dated and time-stamped and that the time of any oral communications be noted in the record,
led us to conclude:
“There is a strong presumption that judges and court clerks, like
other public officers, properly perform their duties.”
Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 126, 213 A.2d 475, 479
(1965) (citing Lewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 63, 73, 49 S. Ct.
257, 260, 73 L. Ed. 615, 619 (1929)).  This presumption of
regularity is rebuttable.  Harris v. State, 406 Md. 115, 122, 956
A.2d 204, 208 (2008).  Thus, there is a presumption, under Rule
4-326(d), that written jury communications that are received by
the trial court will be dated and time-stamped and that the time
of any oral communications will be noted in the record.
Furthermore, we interpret the requirements contained in that
Rule and the presumption of regularity to mean that when a
purported jury note found in the appellate record is not dated or
time-stamped, nor is the time of any oral communication noted
in the record, there is a rebuttable presumption that the trial
court did not receive the communication.  The burden is on the
petitioner or appellant to overcome the presumption of
regularity in a situation where there is no date or time-stamp on
the jury note and there is no indication in the record that the trial
court addressed, or otherwise responded to, the communication.
 
Black, __ Md. at __.
We discussed the circumstances presented in Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 837
A.2d 944 (2003) and Fields v. State, 172 Md. App. 496, 916 A.2d 357 (2007), concluding
38
that the facts surrounding the jury notes in those cases were distinguishable from Note four
in Black.  See Black, __ Md. at __.  In both Denicolis and Fields, the courts concluded that
the jury notes at issue, which were included in the court records and had been marked as
court exhibits, were received by the respective trial courts within the contemplation of Rule
4-326(d).  See Denicolis, 378 Md. at 658, 837 A.2d at 951; Fields, 172 Md. App. at 516, 916
A.2d at 369.  In addition to the trial judge’s attestation in Black that he did not receive the
note at issue, we determined:
[I]t is reasonable for us to conclude, based on the appellate
record produced by Petitioner, that no other court personnel
received the Note prior to the discharge of the jury.  Unlike the
circumstances in Denicolis, where a member of the court staff
marked the jury note as a court exhibit, the Note in the instant
case contains no indication that any court personnel received it.
The lack of any notations on Note four indicating receipt and the
assertion in the trial judge’s affidavit that he did not receive the
note, raise a rebuttable presumption that Note four was not
received by the court.  Notations on a jury communication,
including, but not limited to, a date and time-stamp, a signature
by the judge, or a marking indicating that a document is a court
exhibit, can rebut that presumption.  Accordingly, Petitioner has
failed to produce a sufficient appellate record to rebut the
presumption of regularity.
Moreover, for Note four to have been “received,” and for
it to have any relevance, it must have been received prior to
rendition of the jury’s verdict.  In other words, it must have been
received before or during the jury’s deliberations, at a time when
the trial court could have responded to the communication.  For,
as we have often stated, information contained in the jury room
and discovered or made known after the verdict has been
rendered may not be used to impeach the jury’s verdict.  See
Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 637, 843 A.2d 64, 75 (2004)
(concluding that “[i]t would be a most pernicious practice, and
in its consequences dangerous to this much valued mode of trial,
39
to permit a verdict, openly and solemnly declared in the [c]ourt,
to be subverted by going behind it and inquiring into the secrets
of the jury room” (quotation omitted)); Williams v. State, 204
Md. 55, 70, 102 A.2d 714, 721 (1954) (holding that “[i]n
Maryland there has been no deviation from the rule that what
takes place in the jury-room ought to be, as it generally is,
known only to the jurors themselves and that their testimony
cannot in general be heard to impeach their verdict” (citation
omitted)).  In this case, the record is devoid of any evidence,
including any statements by the trial judge, trial counsel, or
anyone else present at the trial, to support the conclusion that the
jury sent a substantive note, namely Note four, to the court
before or during deliberations.  If Note four had been dated or
time-stamped, this fact could have overcome the presumption
that the note was not received by the court before the jury
rendered its verdict.  Dates and time-stamps can confirm how
much time elapsed between receipt of any jury note and the
jury’s agreement on a verdict.  In addition, a notation on a jury
note, such as a marking by the judge, a law clerk, or a courtroom
clerk, can raise a presumption regarding the trial court’s receipt,
thereby removing any ambiguity or doubt from the record.
Black, __ Md. at __.
Lastly, in Black, we addressed the issue, raised in Denicolis, of whether the
petitioner’s ability to establish the circumstances surrounding the trial court’s receipt of the
note in question was hampered in any way.  Black, __ Md. at __.  We opined that, although
the petitioner’s appellate counsel in Black had made an effort to obtain affidavits from the
trial judge and trial counsel regarding Note four, there was no adequate explanation given
for the absence of affidavits from other court personnel who may have had knowledge of
Note four’s presence in the record.  Black, __ Md. at __.  We concluded that the petitioner
did not establish sufficiently that his ability to produce a record on appeal regarding the
court’s receipt of Note four was hampered.  Black, __ Md. at __.  Ultimately, we held that
40
the petitioner in Black had failed to provide a sufficient record on appeal to rebut the
presumption of regularity and to establish that Note four had been received by the trial court.
Black, __ Md. at __.
In the instant case, Petitioner contends that the facts surrounding the Fourth note are
similar to the facts presented in Denicolis and Fields.  According to Petitioner, “[w]hile the
fact that a note is marked as a court exhibit is evidence that the court received it, so too does
the fact that the court (defined broadly to include court personnel) placed the note in the
record.”  Thus, Petitioner claims, the trial court in this case received the Note at issue and
failed to disclose it to him and his counsel as required by Rule 4-326(d).
Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the State maintains that Petitioner failed to meet
his burden of producing a sufficient record on appeal to establish that the trial court received
the Note, thereby triggering the requirements of Rule 4-326(d).  The State claims that “unlike
in Denicolis and Fields, where [a note labeled as a court exhibit] was found to be prima facie
evidence that the note had been received by the trial court, there is no such label (or any
marking) in this case, and thus no indication that Note 4 was actually received by the trial
court.”  Positing that receipt by the court would only be relevant if it occurred prior to the
jury’s rendition of the verdict, the State further asserts that Petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case that the Note at issue, if it was received at all, was received prior to
announcement of the verdict in open court.
This case is analogous to the circumstances presented in Black.  Here, an unexplained
and unmarked jury note located in the record was discovered by Petitioner’s appellate
41
counsel well after the jury had rendered its verdict and been discharged.  While the other
three jury notes located in the record include a response, a date and time, and the judge’s
apparent signature, the Fourth note contains no markings whatsoever to indicate receipt by
the court.  In addition, the trial transcript contains a record of the discussions between the
trial judge, the prosecutor, and Petitioner’s trial counsel pertaining to the three answered jury
communications.  The record contains no mention of the Fourth note, other than the presence
of the Note itself in an envelope in the court file.  Additionally, the trial judge, the
prosecutor, and Petitioner’s trial counsel all affirmatively indicated that they had no
recollection of the Fourth note.
As we stated in Black, there is a presumption of regularity in trial court proceedings.
Black, __ Md. at __.  In accordance with the mandates of Rule 4-326(d), a written jury
communication that is received by the court shall be dated and time-stamped.  Thus, there
is a presumption under the Rule that a note that has been received by the court, including the
trial judge or any court personnel, will contain a date and time-stamp.  Furthermore, the trial
judge in this case indicated that his usual practice upon receiving a communication from the
jury is to convene with counsel on the record to discuss possible responses and, thereafter,
to provide a response on the note itself, along with a date and time.  The Fourth note in this
case was not dated or time-stamped, in accordance with Rule 4-326(d) and the trial judge’s
usual practice, thus raising the presumption that the Note was not received by the court.
Petitioner has failed to produce a sufficient record to rebut this presumption by establishing
a prima facie case that the court did, in fact, receive the jury Note at issue and that such
42
receipt occurred prior to the jury’s rendition of the verdict.
Furthermore, not unlike the circumstances in Black, there is no indication that
Petitioner’s efforts to establish a sufficient record on appeal were hampered.  Although
Petitioner claims that obtaining affidavits from courtroom personnel, in addition to the trial
judge and trial counsel, “is an impossible burden and, in any case, is likely to provide no
additional insight into how a note got into the record,” we disagree with this assertion.
Similar to our conclusions in Black, a plausible explanation for the existence in the record
of the Fourth note in this case is that all papers that were left in the jury room following
rendition of the verdict and discharge of the jury were placed in a single envelope, including
notes that had been presented to the judge for a response and notes that had not left the jury
room during the trial or deliberations.  An inquiry directed toward various court personnel
who may have come in contact with the Note in question certainly could have provided an
explanation for the Note’s presence in the record.  Thus, we are not convinced that no better
record than the one presented by Petitioner could have been made for purposes of appeal.
Upon reviewing the record, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Petitioner
failed to produce a sufficient record to rebut the presumption of regularity by establishing
that the trial court actually received the Fourth note.  Thus, the trial court’s responsibilities
under Rule 4-326(d) were never triggered.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED
43
IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
SENTENCES 
FOR 
ASSAULT
CONVICTIONS IN COUNTS 3 AND 4
VACATED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REMAND
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT
INCONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
DIVIDED
EQUALLY 
BETWEEN 
THE
PARTIES.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 88
September Term, 2011
MCKENZIE A. NICOLAS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins 
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
by Bell, C. J.
Filed:   May 8, 2012
 
While I agree with the majority that the trial court erred when it failed to merge the
petitioner’s conviction for second degree assault into his conviction for resisting arrest,
pursuant to the required evidence test, for the reasons set forth in detail in my dissenting
opinion in Black v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.3d ___, ___ (2012) (slip op. at 1) , I
dissent from its holding that the petitioner failed to produce sufficient evidence of the court’s
non-compliance with Maryland Rule 4-326(d).