Title: Commonwealth v. Bruhn

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 020774 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 1, 2002 
CHRISTOPHER BRUHN 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia correctly determined that, as a result of amendments 
enacted in 1994 to Code § 18.2-111, proof of embezzlement, as 
defined by that statute, will not sustain a conviction under an 
indictment charging grand larceny under Code § 18.2-95. 
BACKGROUND 
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the party that prevailed at trial.  Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 645, 648, 529 S.E.2d 787, 789 (2000).  In 
February 1999, Barbara A. Farley contacted Christopher Bruhn and 
asked him to refinish some antique furniture for her, as he had 
done in the past.  Farley was not aware that Bruhn had recently 
become an employee of Thomas J. Marzeros, who operated under the 
trade name of Old World Cabinetry.  Although refinishing 
antiques was not part of Marzeros’ regular business, he allowed 
employees to do personal work in his shop on their own time, but 
he did not allow them to do “side jobs” for profit. 
Marzeros accompanied Bruhn to Farley’s home when Bruhn 
picked up the furniture.  Bruhn and Marzeros performed the 
refinishing work together in Marzeros’ workshop outside normal 
business hours.  Bruhn, with Marzeros’ knowledge, purchased 
supplies to refinish Farley’s furniture at a cost of $82.55 on 
Old World Cabinetry’s account. 
After the work was completed, Bruhn delivered the furniture 
to Farley at her home.  At that time, Bruhn presented her with a 
bill for $519 that Marzeros had generated for Bruhn on a 
computer.  The bill did not identify a payee and made no mention 
of Old World Cabinetry.  At Bruhn’s request, Farley paid him 
with a check payable to Bruhn personally. 
Marzeros made repeated inquiries to Bruhn concerning the 
payment due from Farley.  Bruhn was evasive in his replies, 
fabricating various stories about having failed to receive 
payment from Farley or not having access to the payment.  
Marzeros contacted Farley several weeks later to request payment 
and learned that Farley had paid Bruhn directly.  Marzeros 
telephoned Bruhn about the matter and tape-recorded the 
conversation.  During the telephone call, Bruhn told Marzeros 
that he had the check from Farley and would give it to Marzeros, 
but Bruhn never did so. 
On February 2, 2000, Bruhn was tried in a bench trial in 
the Circuit Court of Henrico County under an indictment charging 
 
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that he “did . . . take, steal and carry away property, namely, 
United States currency, belonging to Old World Cabin[e]try, 
valued at $200.00 or more, with the intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of the value thereof, in violation of Virginia 
Code § 18.2-95.”  At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Bruhn 
moved to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, contending that it 
did not prove larceny.  The circuit court denied the motion.  At 
the conclusion of all the evidence, defense counsel renewed the 
motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, which the circuit 
court again denied.  Bruhn was found guilty of grand larceny. 
Before sentencing, Bruhn filed a motion to set aside the 
verdict, contending that the Commonwealth failed to prove that 
the victim possessed the allegedly stolen property, which is a 
necessary element of larceny.  In response, the Commonwealth 
argued for the first time that the evidence at trial proved 
embezzlement and that Code § 18.2-111 “states that embezzlement 
shall be deemed larceny.”  The circuit court denied the motion 
to set aside the verdict, stating, “I think the offense was 
proved.”  Bruhn was sentenced to 12 months in jail with the 
entire sentence suspended on condition of his good behavior for 
three years. 
Bruhn filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals, contending 
that the evidence in his trial was not sufficient to prove 
either grand larceny or embezzlement and that, even if the 
 
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evidence would prove the latter offense, the Commonwealth could 
not sustain an indictment for grand larceny upon proof of 
embezzlement.  A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals 
agreed with Bruhn, reversed his conviction, and dismissed the 
indictment against him.  Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 339, 
346, 544 S.E.2d 895, 898 (2001).  The Commonwealth sought a 
rehearing en banc, which the Court of Appeals granted, staying 
the mandate of the panel opinion.  Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. 
App. 586, 546 S.E.2d 755 (2001). 
Following argument before the Court of Appeals sitting en 
banc, a majority of the Court reversed Bruhn’s conviction and 
dismissed the indictment against him.  The majority adopted the 
reasoning of the three-judge panel that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction for grand larceny.  Bruhn 
v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 537, 540, 559 S.E.2d 880, 882 
(2002) (en banc).  Addressing the Commonwealth’s contention that 
Code § 18.2-111 permitted the Commonwealth to prove embezzlement 
under an indictment charging larceny, the majority reasoned that 
amendments to Code § 18.2-111 in 1994 altered the law in such a 
way that the former practice of permitting the Commonwealth to 
prove embezzlement under an indictment charging larceny was no 
longer valid.  Id. at 546-47, 559 S.E.2d at 884-85. 
One judge dissented, contending that the 1994 amendments to 
Code § 18.2-111 merely eliminated the requirement that the 
 
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Commonwealth elect a statutory theory upon motion of the defense 
where an indictment charged larceny.  The dissent concluded that 
the availability of a bill of particulars as the result of the 
1975 enactment of Code § 19.2-230 had rendered this provision 
unnecessary, and that the continued association of embezzlement 
with larceny within the overall scheme of property crimes 
permitted the Commonwealth to bring an indictment for the latter 
offense where it intended to prove the former.  Id. at 547-56, 
559 S.E.2d at 885-90 (Bumgardner, J., dissenting).  We awarded 
the Commonwealth this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
As did the majority of the Court of Appeals sitting en 
banc, we also agree with the reasoning of the three-judge panel 
that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove 
grand larceny under the common law definition of that crime 
because there was no proof of a trespassory taking.  Maye v. 
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 48, 49, 189 S.E.2d 350, 351 (1972).  
Additionally, we will also assume, without deciding, that the 
evidence previously recounted was sufficient to prove that Bruhn 
was guilty of embezzlement.  Accordingly, the sole issue of 
concern here is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that the Commonwealth is no longer permitted to sustain an 
indictment for grand larceny by proving that the defendant 
 
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committed embezzlement.  We find no error in either the 
reasoning or result of that judgment. 
Unquestionably, the Commonwealth is correct that prior to 
1994, Code § 18.2-111 expressly stated that one who committed 
the acts constituting embezzlement “may be indicted as for 
larceny, and proof of embezzlement shall be sufficient to 
sustain the charge.”  In addressing the crime of embezzlement 
this way, the General Assembly recognized the long-standing 
practice of permitting other unlawful takings, such as receiving 
stolen goods and theft by false pretenses, to be charged as 
larceny.  See Pitsnogle v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 808, 811, 22 
S.E. 351, 352 (1895), and cases cited therein. 
In 1994, however, the General Assembly amended Code § 18.2-
111 and deleted the language that permitted a defendant who had 
committed embezzlement to be “indicted as for larceny.”  The 
amendments further eliminated the phrase that made proof of 
embezzlement “sufficient to sustain the charge” of larceny and 
the requirement that the Commonwealth elect, upon motion of the 
defendant, the specific statutory theory of the crime of larceny 
it intended to rely upon for a conviction.  The first sentence 
of the statute now provides that any person committing the 
described acts “shall be guilty of embezzlement.”  Code § 18.2-
111.  The only reference to larceny in Code § 18.2-111 is in its 
second sentence, which now states, “[e]mbezzlement shall be 
 
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deemed larceny and upon conviction thereof, the person shall be 
punished as provided in [the larceny code sections].” 
We concur with the view expressed by the majority of the 
Court of Appeals that these amendments were not merely intended 
to eliminate “surplusage” from Code § 18.2-111 as the result of 
the 1975 enactment of Code § 19.2-230 giving defendants the 
right to request a bill of particulars.  “As a general rule, a 
presumption exists that a substantive change in law was intended 
by an amendment to an existing statute.”  Virginia-American 
Water Co. v. Prince William County Service Authority, 246 Va. 
509, 517, 436 S.E.2d 618, 622-23 (1993); see also Dale v. City 
of Newport News, 243 Va. 48, 51, 412 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1992); 
Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688, 693, 77 S.E. 470, 472 
(1913).  Thus, in construing a statute that has been amended by 
the General Assembly, we presume that the legislature acted with 
full knowledge of the law as it affected the subject matter.  
See Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 
600-01, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985). 
It is our task, as it was for the Court of Appeals, to 
adopt a construction that gives import to the legislative 
purpose and the words used.  See Van Geuder v. Commonwealth, 192 
Va. 548, 554, 65 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1951).  Contrary to the view 
taken by the dissent below, the 1994 amendments were not 
narrowly tailored to eliminate unneeded language, but 
 
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constituted a complete reformulation of the statute.  Most 
particularly, the elimination of the permissive provision that 
embezzlement could be “indicted as for larceny” evinces a clear 
legislative intent to prohibit that former practice and require 
specificity in the indictment. 
Finally, we concur with the view of the majority of the 
Court of Appeals that the continued association of embezzlement 
and larceny in the second sentence of Code § 18.2-111 is to 
“classify embezzlement as a larceny crime for the limited 
purpose of punishment according to the larceny statutes.”  Bruhn 
37 Va. App. at 546, 559 S.E.2d at 885.  Accordingly, we hold 
that there can be no question that the Commonwealth failed to 
prove that Bruhn committed the crime charged in the indictment. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals reversing Bruhn’s conviction and dismissing the 
indictment for grand larceny. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
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