Title: REBECCA HATTON and ASA HATTON v. ENERGY ELECTRIC CO., a Wyoming corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

REBECCA HATTON and ASA HATTON v. ENERGY ELECTRIC CO., a Wyoming corporation2006 WY 151148 P.3d 8Case Number: No. 06-32Decided: 12/15/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
REBECCA 
HATTON and ASA HATTON,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
ENERGY 
ELECTRIC CO., a Wyoming corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

William 
R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
John R. 
Goodell of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & 
Bailey, Chtd., Pocatello, 
Idaho.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Rebecca Hatton 
was injured in an automobile accident while she was traveling through road 
construction in the Snake 
RiverCanyon.  She and her husband, Asa Hatton, filed 
suit against the general contractor and various subcontractors on the job, 
including Energy Electric Co. (EEC), claiming the defendants were negligent in 
providing safety precautions in the construction area.  The district court granted EEC's summary 
judgment motion, ruling EEC did not owe a duty to the Hattons because it was not 
working in the area of the accident and had no control over the accident 
site.  After the district court 
declared the judgment was final, the Hattons appealed, arguing the evidence in 
the record demonstrated there were genuine issues of material fact about the 
duty element of their negligence cause of action and the district court 
prematurely granted summary judgment before they had an opportunity to complete 
discovery.  We conclude the district 
court properly ruled that EEC did not owe a duty to the Hattons because there 
was no evidence EEC had control over the work site where the accident 
occurred.  In addition, under the 
circumstances presented here, we conclude the district court's summary judgment 
order was not premature.  
Consequently, we affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Hattons pose 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 

I.                     
Whether 
the lower court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in 
favor of Defendant Energy Electric, Co., was proper.

 
 

II.                   
Whether 
the lower court's Order Granting Energy Electric's Motion for Final Summary 
Judgment in favor of Defendant Energy Electric, Co., was 
proper.

 
 
EEC does 
not set out a separate statement of appellate issues.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      LeGrand Johnson 
Construction Company (LeGrand) was the general contractor on a highway 
construction project in the Snake RiverCanyon in TetonCounty.  LeGrand entered into a subcontract with 
EEC in January 2000, which generally identified the work to be performed by EEC 
as "[e]lectrical and related items."    

 
 
[¶4]      According to the 
official accident report, Mrs. Hatton was driving through the road construction 
project on October 31, 2000.  
Approximately .05 miles south of milepost 140, she encountered an orange 
traffic cone in her driving lane.  
She swerved to avoid the cone and then overcorrected, causing her car to 
leave the roadway and roll over, coming to rest on its roof.  Mr. and Mrs. Hatton filed two separate 
complaints, which were consolidated by the district court, naming various 
contractors involved in the project including LeGrand and EEC as defendants, and 
seeking damages for Mrs. Hatton's injuries and Mr. Hatton's loss of 
consortium.     

 
 
[¶5]      EEC filed a 
motion for summary judgment claiming it did not owe a duty to the Hattons 
because it was not working in the area and had no control over the site of the 
accident.  In support of its motion, 
EEC filed an affidavit of its vice-president, Lee Middleton, which relied upon 
the official accident report to establish the nature, location, and time of the 
accident.  Based upon that 
information, Mr. Middleton attested to the following facts concerning EEC's 
presence and role in the road construction project:  

 
 
3. 
        
On January 26, 2000, EEC entered into a subcontract agreement with 
Legrand Johnson Construction Co., whereby EEC agreed to perform certain services 
as an electrical subcontractor on WYDOT's highway construction job on U.S. 
Highway 89 between Alpine Junction and Hoback Junction.

 
 
4.         On the date 
and location of Plaintiff's auto accident, as described in such Report, EEC was 
doing no work on the WYDOT highway 
construction job being done by others in the area on U.S. Highway 89 between 
Alpine Junction and Hoback Junction.

 
 
5.         In 
accordance with EEC's subcontract agreement, and related construction drawings 
and documents, EEC performed electrical and related work in four separate (4) 
job locations.  The location and 
nature of the work performed in each location are as 
follows:

            

1st 
location:     At approximately MP 
[milepost] 135, which is also approximately 500 meters before the beginning of 
the project on the south end of the southbound lane, a beacon was placed on a 
wildlife signpost; 

            

2nd 
location:   At approximately MP 138 southbound 
lane, a beacon was placed on a wildlife signpost;

            

3rd 
location:    Work in the town of Alpine 
near a trailer park on the north end of the town which is south of the road 
project;

            

4th location:    Work at Hoback Junction which 
is north of the road project.

 
 
All 
of these locations are at least two (2) miles or more from MP 140 where the 
Plaintiff's accident occurred.

 
 

6.                  
This 
Defendant's work on the subject job, when such was being performed, consisted 
solely of installing "electrical work and related items."

 
 

7.                  
This 
Defendant's work on the subject job, when such are being performed, was done 
completely off and away from the traveled roadway, and had no impact on traffic 
movement.

 
 

8.                  
This 
Defendant's scope of work had nothing to do with placing or maintaining 
temporary traffic cones or other safety or traffic flow devices at any 
time.

 
 
9. 
        
This Defendant had shut down work on the job for the winter on October 9, 
2000.  This Defendant did not resume 
work on the subject job until July 20, 2001 the following year.  Plaintiff's auto accident reportedly 
occurred on October 31, 2000.  At 
that time, this Defendant was off the job for over three (3) 
weeks.

 
 
[¶6]      In response to 
EEC's summary judgment motion, the Hattons argued the evidence showed EEC was 
working "at the accident site" and the subcontract required EEC to provide 
safety precautions in the area of the accident.  In support of their position, they 
submitted a copy of the subcontract between LeGrand and EEC and an affidavit 
from Kent Ketterling, a Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) 
employee.  Mr. Ketterling stated 
WYDOT, pursuant to a request from the Hattons, provided a number of documents 
from its files pertaining to the road construction project, including contracts, 
engineer reports, project diaries, etc.  
Other than the transmittal letters, the documents referenced in Mr. 
Ketterling's affidavit are not included in the record on appeal.    

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court held a hearing on EEC's summary judgment motion and concluded there were 
no issues of material fact regarding whether EEC had any control over the 
accident site and, therefore, it could not have owed a duty to the Hattons.  Consequently, the district court granted 
EEC a summary judgment.  The order 
stated, in relevant part:

 
 
Defendant 
Energy Electric Co. (EEC) did not have a legal duty to the Plaintiffs.  EEC performed a limited scope of work in 
the Snake RiverCanyon, specifically, a 
flashing beacon light on a wildlife sign at milepost 135 and 138.  The closest location of work was at 
least two miles from the accident scene.  
The scope of work was off the road and had nothing to do with traffic 
cones, safety, traffic flow, or related matters at the time of the 
accident.  Further, EEC had 
completed all of its work for the season and had removed itself from the 
accident scene on October 9, 2000.  
EEC was not on site or working on October 31, 2000, the day of the 
accident.  

 
 
The 
district court also ruled there was "no reason for delay" in entering a final 
judgment and dismissed the Hattons' complaint against EEC with prejudice.  The Hattons appealed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶8]      We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and using the 
same materials as the district court.  
Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 
2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006).   Thus, our review is plenary.  Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 
2003 WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
Wyo. R. 
Civ. P. 56 governs summary judgments.  
A summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  When reviewing a summary judgment, we 
consider the record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  We 
review questions of law de novo 
without giving any deference to the district court's determinations.  

 
 

Cathcart 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 WY 
154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo. 2005), quoting Baker v. Ayres and Baker Pole and Post, 
Inc., 2005 WY 97, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d 1234, 1239 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶9]      "A genuine issue 
of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish 
or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the 
parties have asserted."  Christensen v. Carbon County, 2004 WY 
135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002)).  The party requesting a summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary 
judgment.  If he carries his burden, 
"the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists."  Id.   We have explained the duties of the party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows:

 
 
"After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon 
allegations and pleadings . . ., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are 
insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden."  

 
 
            
The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment 
"must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be 
entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.  

 
 

Cook, 
¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, quoting Jones v. 
Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005).  

            
  

1.         
Does the Evidence in the Record 
Establish Any Issue of Material Fact?

 
 
[¶10]   The Hattons' claims against EEC 
were grounded in negligence.  The 
elements of a negligence cause of action are:  "(1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached the 
duty of care, (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused 
injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is 
compensable by money damages."  Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113, ¶ 
8, 50 P.3d 697, 701 (Wyo. 2002).  
The determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law.1  D&D Transp., Ltd. v. Interline Energy 
Servs., Inc., 2005 WY  86, ¶ 18, 
117 P.3d 423, 429 (Wyo. 2005); Erpelding 
v. Lisek, 2003 WY 80, ¶ 13, 71 P.3d 754, 757 (Wyo. 2003).  "Summary judgment is not favored in 
negligence actions, and in such cases a more exacting scrutiny is applied.  However, where a plaintiff cannot 
establish the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant, summary judgment 
is appropriate."  Sponsel v. ParkCounty, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 8, 126 P.3d 105, 
108 (Wyo. 2006).  Thus, an absence 
of duty is the surest route to summary judgment in negligence actions.  D&D Transp., Ltd., ¶ 18, 117 P.3d  at 429.    

 
 
"Duty" 
is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is 
entitled to protection.  Anderson v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 
44, 49 P.3d 1011, 1024 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 
(Wyo.1986)). * * *  A duty may arise 
by contract, statute, common law, "or when the relationship of the parties is 
such that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for 
the protection of the plaintiff."  
Hamilton v. NatronaCountyEduc. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 
(Wyo.1995).  The legal question to 
be answered by the court is

 
 
"whether, 
upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the 
community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the 
other--or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered 
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant.  This is entirely a question of law, to 
be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and 
precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only by the court." 

 
 

Thomas 
By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 
702 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

Killian 
v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 2006 
WY 42, ¶ 8, 131 P.3d 975, 979-80 (Wyo. 2006) (some citations omitted).  In Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533 
(Wyo. 1991), 
we discussed the duties of contractors on road construction sites.  We held, under the circumstances 
presented there, the general contractor had a non-delegable duty to provide for 
the safety of the driving public; however, no similar duty attached to a 
sub-contractor who did not exercise control over the general job and was not 
working on the job site at the time of the accident.  Id. at 536-38. 

 
 
[¶11]   As explained above, EEC supported 
its summary judgment motion with Mr. Middleton's affidavit.  He described the location and timing of 
EEC's work on the road construction project and, relying on the official 
accident report to establish the date and location of Mrs. Hatton's accident, 
stated the company had not worked in the area of the accident at any time and 
was not working on the project at all when the accident occurred.    Although the Hattons did not 
contest any of the information contained in the accident report, they claim the 
district court should not have considered Mr. Middleton's affidavit because he 
relied upon the accident report without having any personal knowledge of the 
facts contained in it.  

 
 
[¶12]   W.R.C.P. 56(e) speaks to the 
requirements for affidavits in summary judgment 
proceedings:

 
 
            
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein.  Sworn or certified copies 
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith.  The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits . . . . 

            

[¶13]   Obviously, Mr. Middleton did not 
have personal knowledge about the accident because he was not there when the 
accident happened.  However, that 
was not the point of the affidavit.  
He was not attesting to the facts of the accident; instead, he was 
providing information about EEC's activities at the construction site at the 
time and place of the accident.  EEC 
attached a copy of the accident report to Mr. Middleton's affidavit.  The Hattons did not submit any 
information to counter the basic facts of the accident as set out in Mr. 
Middleton's affidavit or the accident report.   Presumably, Mrs. Hatton would have 
been able to correct any misstatements that may have existed in the accident 
report.  Moreover, the Hattons' 
statement of facts contained in their submissions to the district court and 
their brief to this Court do not contradict the basic facts relied upon by Mr. 
Middleton in his affidavit.  Under 
these circumstances, Mr. Middleton's affidavit provided proper evidentiary 
support for EEC's summary judgment motion.  

 
 
[¶14]   The Hattons also argue they 
presented sufficient evidence to refute the statements in Mr. Middleton's 
affidavit and, consequently, to establish material issues of fact about whether 
EEC was working in the area of the accident.  They claim the affidavit of WYDOT 
employee, Kent Ketterling, with its accompanying documents, verified their 
contention that EEC "was in control of the site and doing work on or around the 
accident site where plaintiff was severely injured."  Two problems exist with their 
position.  First, as we explained 
above, the actual documents referred to in Mr. Ketterling's affidavit were not 
included in the record.  Although 
the Hattons claim they referred to the documents at the summary judgment 
hearing, we have no way of verifying what occurred at the hearing because a 
transcript was not included in the record on appeal.  The Hattons, as the appellants, had a 
duty to "provide us with a sufficient record on appeal to ensure proper 
consideration of their arguments."  
Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 2005 WY 76, 
¶ 14 n. 4, 114 P.3d 1268, 1277 n. 4 (Wyo. 2005); W.R.A.P. 3.01 and 3.05.  This Court cannot rely on their 
assertions as to what information the missing documents might have contained in 
order to create a genuine issue of material fact. 

 
 
[¶15]   Second, in their appellate brief, 
the Hattons claim the engineer reports referenced in Mr. Ketterling's affidavit 
indicated EEC was working on the project during the weeks of September 24, 2000, 
October 8, 2000, and October 14, 2000.   Obviously, if evidence existed 
showing EEC was on the job site during the week of October 14, 2000, it would, 
arguably, contradict Mr. Middleton's claim that EEC did not work on the project 
after October 9, 2000. However, even if the Hattons' description of the 
documents is accurate and could be considered as part of the record, the 
relevant date was the date of the accident, October 31, 2000, and they point to 
no evidence EEC was working in the area on that date.  On this record, the Hattons did not 
refute Mr. Middleton's averments that EEC was not working in the area of the 
accident at any time and was not working on the road construction project at all 
when the accident occurred.  

 
 
[¶16]   The Hattons also present a vague 
claim that the subcontract between EEC and LeGrand imposed a general duty upon 
EEC to provide safety precautions on the portion of the highway where the 
accident occurred.  They direct us 
to two provisions of the subcontract:      

 
 
ARTICLE 
IV. LIABILITY OF SUBCONTRACTOR

 
 
            
The Subcontractor shall hold and save the Contractor harmless from any 
liability for damage to the said work, or for injury or damage to persons or 
property occurring on or in connection therewith.

 
 
ARTICLE 
V.  WARNING SIGNALS, BARRICADES, 
ETC.

 
 
            
The Subcontractor shall provide, erect and maintain proper warning 
signals, signs, lights, barricades and fences on and along the line of said 
work, and shall take all other necessary precautions for the protection of the 
work and safety of the public.

 
 
[¶17]   As we have said countless times, 
this Court interprets contracts to determine the parties' true intent.  See e.g., Baker, ¶ 17, 117 P.3d  at 
1240.  We interpret an unambiguous 
contract as a matter of law and in accordance with the ordinary and usual 
meaning of its terms. Id.; Carlson v. Flocchini Investments, 2005 
WY 19, ¶ 15, 106 P.3d 847, 853 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶18]   The subcontract refers to "said 
work," which, within the context of the entire document presented to us, means 
the work required under the subcontract.  
Under the rationale of Allmaras, 
a subcontractor is not typically responsible for safety on the entire job 
site as long as it does not exercise control over the same.  The contractual documents included in 
the record fall far short of creating some kind of general obligation for EEC to 
assume responsibility for safety for the entire project.  Under Article V of the subcontract, EEC 
was required to provide safety precautions in the area of its work.  The contract documents do not contain 
specific descriptions of the location of EEC's work on the road project; 
however, Mr. Middleton described the physical locations of EEC's work under the 
subcontract, which did not include the area of Mrs. Hatton's accident.  The Hattons did not submit any evidence 
to contradict his averments.  
Because the record does not include any evidence suggesting EEC was 
responsible for safety on the entire job site or that it was working in the area 
of Mrs. Hatton's accident, no issue of material fact existed concerning whether 
EEC owed a duty to the Hattons.  
Summary judgment was proper in such circumstances.

 
 
 2.        Was the Summary Judgment 
Premature?

 
 
[¶19]   The Hattons argue the district 
court erred by granting summary judgment to EEC because discovery had not been 
completed.  They claim the district 
court violated the applicable rules of civil procedure and their due process 
rights and cite to Abraham v. Great 
Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, 101 P.3d 446 (Wyo. 2004) as support for 
their position.  

 
 
[¶20]   In Abraham, we concluded the district court 
erred by refusing the plaintiffs' request for a continuance of the summary 
judgment hearing because they had not completed discovery.  We said: 

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
56(c) presupposes that discovery is complete and, ordinarily, discovery on the 
issues which are the subject of the summary judgment motion should be allowed to 
be completed before a motion for summary judgment is scheduled, heard, and 
decided.  By scheduling the hearing 
on the motions for summary judgment before the deadline for discovery had passed 
and, thus, not allowing the Abrahams adequate time to prepare and file any other 
pertinent materials prior to that hearing, they were deprived of the protections 
to due process afforded by the applicable rules of civil 
procedure.

 
 

Abraham, 
¶ 
19, 101 P.3d  at 455.  However, we 
did not rule a district court may never grant summary judgment before discovery 
has been completed, only that ordinarily, if doing so would unfairly prevent the 
opposing party from discovering contradictory evidence, it would be an abuse of 
discretion not to grant a request for a continuance to allow adequate time for 
such discovery.  In Cathcart, we rejected the plaintiff's 
claim the district court erred by prematurely granting summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant because Cathcart had been given adequate time to prepare for 
the summary judgment proceedings and the opportunity to file additional 
materials.  Cathcart, ¶ 31, 123 P.3d  at 590.  

 
 
[¶21]   In this case, the Hattons filed 
their complaint against EEC on October 29, 2004.  EEC answered and the district court held 
a scheduling conference in January 2005.  
Following the scheduling conference, the district court issued an order, 
setting the deadline for filing dispositive motions for February 22, 2005, and 
the hearing on those motions for March 22, 2005.  The record contains no objection from 
the Hattons regarding the deadlines.  
EEC filed its motion for summary judgment on February 2, 2005, and 
included Mr. Middleton's affidavit in support of its motion.  The Hattons responded with several 
filings, including:  Plaintiffs' 
Designation of Record in Opposition to Defendant Energy Electric, Inc.'s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, with the subcontract between EEC and LeGrand attached; 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion to Supplement the Record, seeking permission to 
supplement the record with the deposition of Mr. Middleton and Mr. Ketterling's 
affidavit; and a brief responding to EEC's summary judgment motion.   

 
 
[¶22]   The Hattons represented to the 
court that Mr. Middleton's deposition was tentatively scheduled for March 8, 
2005.  They did not, however, take 
Mr. Middleton's deposition before the summary judgment hearing nor did they seek 
a continuance of the hearing, which took place as scheduled on March 22, 
2005.   

 
 
[¶23]   On appeal, the Hattons claim the 
summary judgment proceedings were premature because, at the time of the summary 
judgment hearing, a discovery cutoff had not been established by the district 
court, expert witnesses had not been designated, and no depositions had been 
taken.  The Hattons suggest they 
needed to take the depositions of Mr. Middleton and "several other key witnesses 
and experts" in order to adequately defend against the summary judgment 
motion.  The error in the Hattons' 
argument is obvious.  Unlike the 
plaintiffs in Abraham, the Hattons 
did not take the necessary steps to protect their discovery options.  According to the record before us, the 
parties had scheduled Mr. Middleton's deposition prior to the hearing but, for 
reasons not revealed in the record, the deposition was not taken.  The Hattons did not ask the district 
court to continue the summary judgment proceedings to allow them additional time 
to prepare. 

 
 
[¶24]   In order to avoid summary judgment, 
the Hattons had to establish facts that would support their claim that EEC had 
control of the accident area.  It is 
obvious from Mr. Middleton's affidavit that he had information about EEC's work 
on the project.  Yet, the Hattons 
did not depose him in an effort to dispute the representations made in his 
affidavit prior to the summary judgment hearing nor did they request additional 
time from the district court in order to gather that information.2   In addition, the Hattons do not 
specifically identify the other "key witnesses or experts" they needed to depose 
to effectively oppose EEC's summary judgment motion or the testimony Mr. 
Middleton or the other witnesses may have given to establish material issues of 
fact.  Under these circumstances, 
the Hattons have not established the summary judgment hearing, held in 
accordance with the district court's scheduling order, was premature or violated 
the rules of civil procedure or their due process rights.

 
 
[¶25]   The summary judgment in favor of 
EEC is affirmed.  

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Hattons argue, based 
upon Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, 
Ltd., 990 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1999), the question of whether EEC owed them a duty 
is a question of fact which should be determined by the trier of fact.  We disagree.  Selby involved application of the law 
pertaining to natural accumulations of snow and ice.  Under the circumstances presented in 
that case, we concluded the question of whether the accumulation was natural was 
a question of fact.  Thus, the 
resolution of whether a legal duty existed required determination of certain 
basic facts, resulting in a rare circumstance where the question of whether a 
duty existed was given to the trier of fact.   Id. at 494-96. That same rationale does not 
apply to the circumstances presented in the case at bar.  In other cases involving accidents in 
road construction areas, 
courts have determined the duty issue as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533 
(Wyo. 1991); Miller v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 794 P.2d 91 (Wyo. 
1990).  Unlike the Selby case, we do not need to determine basic 
facts before we can rule on the duty issue in this case.  Consequently, the case at bar is not one 
of the rare circumstances where the determination of whether a duty exists 
should be made by the trier of fact.    

 
 

2In their 
appellate brief, the Hattons claim they argued to the district court at the 
hearing that the summary judgment proceedings were premature and discovery 
needed to occur.  However, they 
filed no motion for a continuance and provide no transcript of the summary 
judgment hearing.  Our review is 
limited to matters contained in the appellate record.  See Finch v. Farmers Co-op Oil Co., 2005 WY 
41, ¶ 9, 109 P.3d 537, 541 (Wyo. 2005).