Title: HALSEY v UITHOF

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12376 I N THE S U P R L W E COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A DORIS HALSN, Administratrix of t h e Estate of Richard Halsey, Deceased, et a l . , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, ALBERT H. UITHOF, d/b/a GOLDEN STATE TRANSPORT, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great F a l l s , Montana Jack L. Lewis and John H. Weaver argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For ~espondents: Hoyt and Bottomly, Great F a l l s , Montana Richard V. Bottomly appeared and John C. Hoyt argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: November 15, 1974 Decided: FE$ r 4 ;:,Ts i d - 4 + M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . I n t h i s a c t i o n defendant A l b e r t H. Uithof secured a jury v e r d i c t i n h i s f a v o r a f t e r a n i n e day t r i a l a r i s i n g from a n automobile a c c i d e n t which occurred i n G l a c i e r County. Sub- s e q u e n t l y t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of G l a c i e r County granted p l a i n t i f f s a new t r i a l . From t h i s o r d e r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , defendant a p p e a l s . S u i t was i n i t i a t e d by Richard Halsey, a g a i n s t one David McWhirk, d r i v e r of t h e t r u c k t h a t h i t H a l s e y ' s t r u c k , and A l b e r t N . Uithof, owner of a t r u c k s t a l l e d on t h e highway, t o recover damages f o r i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d a s a consequence of a b i z a r r e series of motor v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t s . P r i o r t o t r i a l , Halsey d i e d of h i s i n j u r i e s ; h i s widow was s u b s t i t u t e d a s p l a i n t i f f . During t h e t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f s e t t l e d w i t h McWhirk f o r $100,000. t h e Here, due to/complexity and t h e volumes of f a c t s p r e s e n t e d , it i s d e s i r a b l e t o list t h e people involved and t h e i r position.: Anderson-------- Montana Highway Patrolman. Bryant---------- Passenger i n McWhirk t r u c k . Byington-------- Driver of d i s a b l e d Uithof t r u c k . Halsey---------- P l a i n t i f f and d r i v e r of second westbound t r u c k t o p a s s t h e d i s a b l e d t r u c k . Harris---------- Truck d r i v e r who came upon d i s a b l e d t r u c k e a r l y i n t h e morning. Hermance-------- Driver of f i r s t westbound t r u c k t o p a s s d i s a b l e d t r u c k , j u s t b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t . McWhirk--------- Driver of eastbound t r u c k involved i n a c c i d e n t w i t h Halsey. Uithof---------- Defendant and owner of d i s a b l e d t r u c k . Uphams---------- Man and w i f e who were i n eastbound c a r r e a r ended by Walker v e h i c l e . r&alkers--------- Man and wife and c h i l d i n v e h i c l e which h i t t h e Upham v e h i c l e . Early i n t h e morning December 22, 1970, a loaded t a n k t r u c k owned by Uithof and d r i v e n by Byington, s t a l l e d some 804 f e e t east and downhill from t h e t o p of Whiskey John h i l l l o c a t e d w e s t of Browning, Montana. The weather was below z e r o , snow was blowing over t h e road i n t o t h e d i t c h e s , t h e r e were some i c e s p o t s on t h e s t r e t c h of road but f o r t h e most p a r t t h e road was hare. A f t e r t h e t r u c k s t a l l e d , Byington checked a s t o why it s t a l l e d and found a broken c l u t c h . H e attempted t o r e p a i r t h e c l u t c h without s u c c e s s . A t about 3:15 a.m. a f e l l o w t r u c k e r , H a r r i s , stopped and t r i e d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t o r e p a i r t h e Uithof t r u c k . H a r r i s o f f e r e d t o t a k e Byington i n t o E a s t G l a c i e r , Montana, t h e next town w e s t , b u t Byington s t a y e d w i t h t h e t r u c k continuing t o t r y t o r e p a i r it. Two hours l a t e r , a t about 5:00 a.m., he caught a r i d e i n t o E a s t G l a c i e r w i t h t h e f i r s t v e h i c l e going e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n a f t e r t h e H a r r i s t r u c k departed. A t E a s t G l a c i e r he c a l l e d a mechanic. When h i s t r u c k s t a l l e d , Byington set o u t t h r e e r e f l e c t o r s t o warn oncoming t r a f f i c . One r e f l e c t o r was placed some 250 f e e t w e s t and i n f r o n t of t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k . H e d i d n o t p u t o u t r e d f l a g s which he had i n a k i t i n t h e t r u c k . The t r u c k had p r e v i o u s l y been r e p a i r e d a t Cut Bank, Mon- tanra, s o t h e mechanic he c a l l e d was a t Cut Bank, some 40 m i l e s e a s t of t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k . That mechanic suggested he c o n t a c t a mechanic i n E a s t G l a c i e r f i r s t and t h i s c o n t a c t was made between t h e hours of 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. A t about 8:00 a.m. Eyington and t h e mechanic went o u t and attempted t o r e p a i r t h e t r u c k without success. Byington t h e n r e t u r n e d t o E a s t G l a c i e r where he a g a i n c a l l e d t h e mechanic i n Cut Bank a t about 9:45 a.m., r e q u e s t i n g that he come o u t t o s e r v i c e t h e t r u c k . The mechanic l e f t Cut Bank a t 1 0 : O O a.m. and a r r i v e d i n E a s t G l a c i e r an hour l a t e r where he picked up Byington and took him back t o t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k . A f t e r t r y i n g u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t o r e p a i r t h e t r u c k , t h e y s e n t word i n t o Browning, t h e n e a r e s t town, t o c a l l t h e highway p a t r o l o r t h e s h e r i f f f o r a s s i s t a n c e . By t h i s t i m e of day, between 1 1 : O O a.m. and 1 2 : O O noon, t h e east-west t r a f f i c on t h e highway had begun t o increase. A t about 11:30 a.m. Eyington and t h e mechanic went i n t o Browning where Byington contacted t h e c i t y p o l i c e and had them c a l l Highway Patrolman Anderson, and a t about t h e same t i m e he again c a l l e d Cut Bank t o g e t a wrecker from t h e G e t t e r Trucking Co., t o come and remove t h e s t a l l e d truck. H e remained i n Brown- i n g u n t i l t h e wrecker from Cut Bank a r r i v e d a t about 1:30 p.m.; he then went back t o t h e truck only t o f i n d t h a t a series of accidents had occurred. Highway Patrolman Anderson who was stationed i n East Glacier, received a c a l l notifying him of t h e disabled truck a t about 11:45 a . m . H e a r r i v e d a t t h e t r u c k location about 12:15 p.m. and t r i e d t o d i r e c t t r a f f i c f o r t e n o r f i f t e e n minutes without t o o much success. Before leaving t h e scene he moved t h e r e f l e c t o r placed by Byington w e s t of t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k , t o a point on t h e h i l l c r e s t where he f e l t it would warn eastbound t r a f f i c . Neither Byington o r Anderson put o u t any f l a g s , although both t h e truck and t h e p a t r o l c a r were equipped with them. A t about 12:30 p.m. Anderson went i n t o Browning, some t h r e e t o four m i l e s e a s t of t h e s t a l l e d truck, t o g e t a s s i s t a n c e t o f l a g t r a f f i c u n t i l t h e wrecker could a r r i v e . During t h e next f i f t e e n t o twenty minutes t h e scene on t h e e a s t slope of Whiskey John h i l l changed. F i r s t , on t h e scene coming over t h e h i l l c r e s t from t h e west came t h e Upham c a r con- t a i n i n g M r . and M r s . Donald Upham. They w e r e driving a 1968 Rambler. They had s t a r t e d from East Glacier and p r i o r t o leaving had been informed by a son t h a t t h e r e was a s t a l l e d truck on t h e road between t h e r e and Browning. They described t h e road condi- t i o n s a s good, considering t h a t it was wintertime, and they drove a t a speed of from 55 t o 6 0 miles per hour, before coming t o t h e Location of t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k . Upon coming over t h e crest of t h e h i l l they saw t h e r e f l e c t o r placed by Anderson and slowed down t o about 2 5 m i l e s p e r hour. When t h e y g o t some 100 f e e t down from t h e c r e s t of t h e h i l l , t h e y saw a westbound t r u c k d r i v e n by Hermance going around t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k f u r t h e r down t h e h i l l , s o they stopped i n t h e i r l a n e , t h e eastbound l a n e , t o l e t t h e Hermance t r u c k p a s s t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k . J u s t a t t h a t t i m e , t h e Walker c a r came over t h e h i l l t r a v e l i n g e a s t and r a n i n t o t h e r e a r end of t h e stopped Upham c a r . The Uphams saw t h e Walker car, knew it w a s going t o h i t thern, s o they were a b l e t o brace themselves and t h e r e b y avoided s e r i o u s i n j u r y . Walker was r e t u r n i n g from t h e w e s t t o Browning w i t h h i s wife and son. H e t e s t i f i e d he had been d r i v i n g about 6 0 m i l e s p e r hour b u t t h a t a t t h e c r e s t of t h e h i l l he saw t h e r e f l e c t o r and slowed down. A t about t h e t i m e of t h e r e a r end a c c i d e n t between t h e Upham c a r and t h e Walker c a r , t h e Hermance t r u c k was a b r e a s t of t h e two c a r s and i n i t s proper l a n e . I t went t o t h e crest of t h e h i l l , stopped and, according t o t h e d r i v e r Hermance, he turned on h i s l i g h t s and b l i n k e r s and t h e n t r i e d t o s t o p a t r u c k d r i v e n by McWhirk which was coming over t h e c r e s t of t h e h i l l eastbound a t from 4 5 t o 60 m i l e s p e r hour. McWhirt denied t h a t Hermance's warning l i g h t s w e r e on, b u t acknow- ledges t h a t Hermance d i d wave a t him. McWhirt's father-in-law Bryant, a l s o a t r u c k e r , was a passenger i n McWhirt's t r u c k . They saw t h e r e f l e c t o r a s t h e y passed over t h e crest of t h e h i l l b u t s a i d it was l y i n g down on t h e highway. They observed both l a n e s of t h e highway blocked so McWhirt attempted t o go t o t h e n o r t h s i d e of t h e highway and use t h e borrow p i t , b u t i n doing s o h i s t r a i l e r skidded i n t o a t h i r d westbound t r u c k d r i v e n by Halsey, which was t h e immediate aause of H a l s e y ' s i n j u r i e s and r e s u l t i n g d e a t h . One o t h e r eastbound v e h i c l e , r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e pickup with two young men i n it, a r r i v e d e i t h e r j u s t before t h e McWhirt- Halsey accident o r j u s t a f t e r , but except f o r helping o u t a f t e r t h e accident they were n o t involved. The i s s u e s assigned f o r t h i s C o u r t ' s consideration a r e s e v e r a l , but t h e primary i s s u e is whether o r not t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g an o r d e r granting a new t r i a l . Other i s s u e s a r e : 1. May a d i s t r i c t c o u r t e n t e r t a i n and g r a n t a motion f o r new t r i a l when t h e motion f a i l s t o s t a t e "with p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e grounds t h e r e f o r " a s required by Rule 7 ( b ) ( 1 ) , M.R.Civ.P.? 2. Should t h e defendant's motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t have been granted? 3. I f any e r r o r o r d e f e c t occurred a t t r i a l , was such e r r o r o r d e f e c t of a nature which a f f e c t e d t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of p l a i n t i f f so t h a t t h e jury v e r d i c t i n favor of defendant was i n c o n s i s t e n t with s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e ? I n o t h e r words, d i d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n granting new t r i a l , f a i l adhere t h e requirements of Rule 6 1 , M.R.Civ.P.? For t h e p a s t s e v e r a l years t h i s Court has been c a l l i n g t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e bench and bar t o i t s concern with t h e f a i l - u r e of t r i a l c o u r t s t o s t a t e reasons f o r t h e granting of new t r i a l s . Beebe v. Johnson, Mont . , 526 P.2d 128, 31 St.Rep. 702; Haynes v. County of Missoula, 163 Mont. 270, 517 P.2d 370, 30 St.Rep. 1083; Campeau v. Lewis, 1 4 4 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960. Here, p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l was merely s e t f o r t h i n t h e conclusionary language of s e c t i o n 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947. That motion s t a t e d : "In t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e p l a i n t i f f moves t h e c o u r t f o r an order vacating and s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t of t h e jury and granting p l a i n t i f f a new t r i a l i n t h e above-entitled cause upon t h e following grounds, t o w i t : " ( 1 ) I r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e proceedings of t h e c o u r t , orders of t h e court and abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e court by which p l a i n t i f f s were prevented from having a f a i r t r i a l . " ( 2 ) Insufficiency of t h e evidence t o j u s t i f y t h e v e r d i c t o r o t h e r decision, o r t h a t it is a g a i n s t t h e law. " ( 3 ) Error i n law occurring a t t h e t r i a l and excepted t o by t h e p l a i n t i f f . ' ' This wording is almost an exact reproduction of t h e wording of subsections 1, 6 and 7, section 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947, which d e t a i l s t h e causes f o r which a new t r i a l may be granted. Rule 7 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. provides t h a t such motions s h a l l " s t a t e with p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e grounds therefor * * *." Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P., provides f o r t h e granting of such a motion. Hereafter a statement of t h e grounds i n t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e w i l l be i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e granting of a new t r i a l . While motions s u b s t a n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h i s motion have been previously presented t o t h i s Court and t h e contents have not been challenged o r found i n s u f f i c i e n t , i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P., is i n t h e process of being changed t o r e q u i r e t r i a l c o u r t s t o s t a t e with p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e grounds f o r granting a new t r i a l , t h e t i m e has come t o r e q u i r e a s i m i l a r requirement be placed on t h e moving party. Rule 7 (b) (1) , M.R.Civ.P., r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e grounds f o r any motion, including a motion f o r new t r i a l , be s t a t e d with p a r t i c u l a r i t y : "(1) A n a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e c o u r t f o r an order s h a l l be by motion which, unless made during a hearinq o r t r i a l , s h a l l be made i n writing, s h a l l s t a t e with p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e qrounds t h e r e f o r , and s h a l l set f o r t h t h e r e l i e f o r order sought. The requirement of writing i s f u l f i l l e d i f t h e motion is s t a t e d i n a w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e hearing of t h e motion." (Emphasis supplied.) This Court i n Martello v. Darlow and Lovely, 151 Mont. 232, 235, 4 4 1 P.2d 175, speaking of s e c t i o n 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947, s a i d : "To a u t h o r i z e g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , t h e e r r o r complained of must be an e r r o r ' m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of [ t h e aggrieved p a r t y ] ' ( s e c t i o n 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947) and t h e e r r o r must be of such c h a r a c t e r t h a t r e f u s a l t o g r a n t a new t r i a l 'appears t o t h e Court i n c o n s i s t e n t with s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . ' (Rule 61, I4.R.Civ.P.) I n o t h e r words, i f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e aggrieved p a r t y a r e n o t p r e j u d i c e d , only 'harmless e r r o r ' is involved n o t a u t h o r i z i n g a new t r i a l t o be granted. Within t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t has broad d i s c r e t i o n t o q r a n t a new t r i a l and w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d except f o r abuse t h e r e o f . [ C i t i n g c a s e s ] " H e r e , w e f i n d t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l was inadequate and d e f e c t i v e i n its e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t s i n t h a t it f a i l e d t o m e e t t h e recognized s t a t u t o r y requirements. A p p e l l a n t ' s i s s u e two q u e s t i o n s whether o r n o t a p p e l l a n t was e n t i t l e d t o a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t because o f independent i n t e r - vening causes. Appellant a r g u e s t h a t even i f Byington o r Uithof w e r e n e g l i g e n t , t h a t such negligence, i f any, was n o t t h e proximate cause of t h e McWhirk-Halsey a c c i d e n t i n t h a t it was superceded by t h e i n t e r v e n i n g negligence of Walker and McWhirk; t h a t t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k d i d nothing more than f u r n i s h a c o n d i t i o n by which t h e i n - j u r y occurred a s t h e r e s u l t o f a subsequent independent act of a t h i r d person; and t h e f a c t t h a t Byington f a i l e d t o set f l a g s 1 0 0 f e e t i n f r o n t of h i s s t a l l e d v e h i c l e was a t most a remote cause, f o r t h e a c c i d e n t occurred more t h a n 100 f e e t i n f r o n t of t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k . Appellant f u r t h e r argues t h a t Walker and McWhirk w e r e n e g l i g e n t i n t h a t t h e y w e r e d r i v i n g t o o f a s t t o s t o p w i t h i n t h e i r clear range of v i s i o n which, a l l e g e d l y , was 6 4 5 f e e t from t h e s t a l l e d t r u c k . F u r t h e r , t h a t Byington's f a i l u r e t o a n t i c i p a t e Waiker and McWhirk's negligence i s n o t negligence on t h e p a r t of Byington. The q u e s t i o n t h e n is: Was t h e r e an independent i n - t e r v e n i n g a c t ? Respondent argues t h a t any i n t e r v e n i n g a c t must he t h e wrongful a c t of another, and t h a t no negligence w a s shown by McWhirk; f u r t h e r , t h a t Byington d i d not have t o foresee t h e exact consequences of t h e accident, but t h a t some i n j u r y would occur from t h e s t a l l e d vehicle, and t h a t t h e r e can be more than one proximate cause of an i n j u r y and i f t h e intervening a c t s a r e forseeable t o a reasonable man, then it is not an independ- e n t intervening cause. W e agree with t h e proposition t h a t where one has negli- gently caused a condition of danger, he is not relieved of respon- s i b i l i t y f o r damage caused t o another merely because t h e i n j u r y a l s o involved t h e later misconduct of someone e l s e . But, t h i s is t r u e only i f both negligent a c t s a r e i n f a c t concurring proxi- mate causes of t h e injury; and it i s not t r u e i f t h e l a t e r neg- ligence is an independent, intervening s o l e cause of t h e i n c i - dent. Boepple v. Mohalt, 101 Mont. 417, 54 P.2d 857. I n determining whether t h e negligence i n c r e a t i n g a hazard ( t h e truck s t a l l e d on t h e highway) was a proximate cause of t h e accident, t h i s t e s t i s t o be applied: Did t h e wrongful a c t , i n a n a t u r a l continuous sequence of events, which might reasonably be expected t o follow, produce t h e injury? I f so, it is a concurring proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y even though t h e later negligent a c t of another [Walker and McWhirk] cooperated t o cause it. O n t h e other hand, i f t h e l a t t e r ' s a c t of negligence i n causing t h e accident was of such a character a s not reasonably t o be expected t o happen i n t h e n a t u r a l sequence of events, then such l a t e r a c t of negligence i s t h e independent, intervening cause and therefore t h e s o l e proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y . J i m - ison v. United S t a t e s , 267 F.Supp. 674; Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 437 P.2d 630; DeVerniero v. Eby, 159 Mont. 146, 496 P.2d 290; Ford v. Rupple, 1 6 1 Mont. 56, 504 P.2d 686; Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, Mont , - - , 513 P.2d 268; 30.St.Rep. 808. Applying the foregoing test to the instant situation, it was reasonable to foresee that the eastbound drivers [Walker and McWhirk] would see the truck parked on the highway. Considering Montana's case law and the federal court views on our law, this Court again finds that abstract foreseeability is not sufficient to meet the requirements of proximate cause. Applying Jimison here, appellant was not obliged to foresee or anticipate that either Walker or McWhirk would come over the hill at such speeds that they could not stop within the assured clear distance ahead of them. Neither was appellant obliged to foresee that Walker would continue over the hill without braking after seeing the reflector at the top and should have realized there might be trouble on the other side. All of this leads to the conviction that the district court should have granted appellant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of respondent's case-in-chief. We have reviewed the various other issues raised by appellant but confine our decision to issues one and two as con- trolling. Accordingly, the order of the court granting respond- ent a new trial is vacated and set aside. The jury verdict in favor of appellant and the judgment are affirmed. Justic We copcur: * - C I , ., br--L - . . <