Title: State v. Hurt

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Hurt, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3013.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3013 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HURT, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hurt, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3013.] 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2022-1037—Submitted June 27, 2023—Decided August 30, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 110732, 
2022-Ohio-2039. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} This cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DETERS, J. 
KENNEDY, C.J., dissents. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
DEWINE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 2} This court has fallen into the habit of dismissing a lot of cases after 
oral argument as having been improvidently accepted.  While in some situations it 
is necessary, we ought not do so without good reason.  After all, in accepting a case, 
we have put the parties to the time and expense of briefing and oral argument, and 
we have occasioned considerable delay in the case’s ultimate resolution. 
{¶ 3} There is no good reason to not decide the double-jeopardy issue we 
accepted as the third proposition of law in this case.  The matter is squarely in front 
of us; I would decide it.  I dissent from the majority’s decision to do otherwise. 
The court of appeals reverses Hurt’s convictions and orders a new trial 
{¶ 4} Darnelle Hurt shot and killed Melvin Dobson.  The killing happened 
after Melvin attempted to intervene in a dispute between Hurt and Melvin’s 
daughter, Tannika Dobson.  Hurt claims that he acted in self-defense.  (For a more 
detailed version of the facts, see 2022-Ohio-2039, ¶ 3-11.) 
{¶ 5} Hurt was charged in six counts: (1) the purposeful murder of Melvin 
in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), (2) felony murder of Melvin in violation of 
R.C. 2903.02(B), (3) voluntary manslaughter of Melvin in violation of 
R.C. 2903.03(A), 
(4) felonious 
assault 
of 
Melvin 
in 
violation 
of 
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), 
(5) felonious 
assault 
of 
Tannika 
in 
violation 
of 
R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), and (6) domestic violence against Tannika in violation of 
R.C. 2919.25(A).  The jury found Hurt not guilty of purposeful murder, but guilty 
of the remaining charges. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals reversed Hurt’s convictions on Counts 2 through 
5.  2022-Ohio-2039 at ¶ 53.  It found that the trial court committed plain error in 
failing to instruct the jury that it could not find Hurt guilty of both felony murder 
January Term, 2023 
 
3 
and voluntary manslaughter.1  Id. at ¶ 28-29.  It also held that the trial court erred 
by declining to instruct the jury on (1) the inferior offense of aggravated assault as 
to the felonious-assault charges in Counts 4 and 5, and (2) involuntary 
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder as to Count 2.  Id. at 
¶ 31, 39, 43.  The court of appeals, however, rejected Hurt’s argument that a new 
trial would violate the constitutional protections against double jeopardy and the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Id. at ¶ 45, 52-53.  Thus, it remanded for a new trial 
on Counts 2 through 5.  Id. at ¶ 53. 
{¶ 7} Hurt appealed to this court, and we accepted three propositions of law.  
See 168 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2022-Ohio-4201, 198 N.E.3d 869.  In the first 
proposition, Hurt asserts that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that he 
had no duty to retreat before exercising self-defense.  This argument is premised on 
the legislature’s amendment to R.C. 2901.09 eliminating the duty to retreat.  See 
2020 Am.S.B. No. 175, effective Apr. 6, 2021.  Hurt killed Melvin before the 
effective date of the statute, but his trial occurred after the effective date.  He 
contends that the new self-defense standard should have been applied to his trial 
because the trial took place after the effective date of the statute. 
{¶ 8} In his second proposition of law, Hurt contends that the trial court 
erred by failing to provide a requested jury instruction on Count 5 that would have 
allowed the jury to consider his claim of self-defense against Melvin in determining 
whether he was guilty of feloniously assaulting Tannika. 
{¶ 9} Hurt’s third proposition of law asserts that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel preclude his retrial on the felony-murder charge in Count 2 
and the felonious-assault charge in Count 4. 
 
1. The state did not appeal, so we have no occasion to consider whether the court of appeals was 
correct in reversing Hurt’s convictions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
There is no reason not to decide Hurt’s third proposition of law 
{¶ 10} I am not going to quibble with the majority’s decision not to reach 
Hurt’s first and second propositions of law.  Hurt raised the arguments contained 
in these propositions in the court of appeals, asserting that his convictions on 
Counts 2 through 5 were improper because the trial judge failed to provide 
appropriate jury instructions.  Hurt was successful in getting his convictions 
reversed on those counts, albeit on different grounds. 
{¶ 11} Even though he was successful in getting his convictions reversed, 
Hurt would like us to reach his first two propositions of law to give guidance to the 
trial judge as to the proper jury instructions for the next trial.  The problem is that 
we generally “refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions” and “avoid the 
imposition by judgment of premature declarations or advice upon potential 
controversies.”  Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970). 
{¶ 12} Jury instructions necessarily depend on the evidence presented.  
Here, there is no way to know for sure what evidence will be presented at Hurt’s 
retrial.  The state and the defense may well pursue different strategies and put on 
different evidence.  The parties may request different jury instructions.  Hurt, who 
did not testify at his first trial, may elect to do so at the second.  We just don’t know.  
And because we don’t know what the evidence will be, there is good reason to 
abstain from providing an advisory opinion about potential jury instructions under 
a hypothetical set of facts. 
{¶ 13} But it’s a different story when we come to Hurt’s third proposition 
of law.  That proposition asks us to hold that the court of appeals erred in ordering 
a new trial.  If we rule in Hurt’s favor, it will definitively resolve the matter.  The 
state will not be able to put Hurt on trial again for these offenses. 
{¶ 14} None of our traditional reasons for dismissing a case as having been 
improvidently accepted apply to Hurt’s third proposition of law.  This is not a 
situation “where a case presented on the merits is not the same case as presented” 
January Term, 2023 
 
5 
in the memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Williamson v. Rubich, 171 Ohio St. 
253, 259, 168 N.E.2d 876 (1960).  It is not a case where a deeper review has 
revealed that the issue presented in the proposition of law has been waived.  See 
State v. Mayfield, 102 Ohio St.3d 1240, 2004-Ohio-3440, 811 N.E.2d 81, ¶ 5 
(Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring).  It is not a case where a review of the record 
reveals other grounds for the decision below not encompassed in the proposition of 
law we accepted.  See State v. Harrison, 166 Ohio St.3d 479, 2021-Ohio-4465, 187 
N.E.3d 510, ¶ 56-63 (DeWine, J., dissenting).  Nor is it a case in which the facts 
prevent this court from reaching the issue.  See Ahmad v. AK Steel Corp., 119 Ohio 
St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-4082, 893 N.E.2d 1287, ¶ 2-9 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
And as explained above, answering the third proposition of law would not require 
us to write an advisory opinion.  See In re N.M.P., 160 Ohio St.3d 472, 2020-Ohio-
1458, 159 N.E.3d 241, ¶ 30-35 (DeWine, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 15} Further, there is particularly good reason to resolve Hurt’s claim 
now.  “ ‘[T]he protection against double jeopardy is not just protection against 
being punished twice for the same offense, it is also the protection against being 
tried twice for the same offense.’ ”  State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-
Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 58, quoting Wenzel v. Enright, 68 Ohio St.3d 63, 68, 623 
N.E.2d 69 (1993) (Wright, J., dissenting), superseded by statute on other grounds 
as stated in State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23.  
Thus, if Hurt is correct about his double-jeopardy argument, this court’s refusal to 
decide his case will cause an irremediable violation of his constitutional rights. 
{¶ 16} One might argue that we shouldn’t have accepted the third 
proposition of law in the first place.  But we did.  The matter has been fully briefed 
and argued—I see no reason not to decide it.  Because the majority does not, I 
respectfully dissent from that portion of its judgment. 
DETERS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van and Owen W. Knapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
The Law Office of Schlachet & Levy and Eric M. Levy, for appellant, 
Darnelle Hurt. 
Steven L. Taylor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting 
Attorneys Association. 
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin 
and Jonathan Sidney, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender. 
Russell Bensing, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_________________