Title: Com. v. Bullock

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

359 Pa. Superior Ct. 150 (1986) 518 A.2d 824 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James E. BULLOCK, III, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued September 5, 1986. Filed December 8, 1986. *152 W. Hamlin Neely, Allentown, for appellant. William E. Ford, Assistant District Attorney, Allentown, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before WICKERSHAM, OLSZEWSKI and BECK, JJ. OLSZEWSKI, Judge: This appeal follows judgment of sentence for homicide by vehicle, 75 Pa.Cons.Stat. Sec. 3732; homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol, 75 Pa.Cons. Stat. Sec. 3735(a); and driving under the influence of alcohol, 75 Pa.Cons.Stat. Sec. 3731(a)(1) and (a)(4). Following conviction by a jury, appellant filed timely post-trial motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. The trial court considered and denied appellant's motions in an opinion authored by the Honorable John E. Backenstoe, President Judge, in which the Honorable David E. Mellenberg joined. The Honorable James Knoll Gardner filed a dissenting opinion. Appellant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of three-to-seven years on the homicide by vehicle charge, two-to-five years on the homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence charge, and six-to-twenty-four months each on the driving under the influence charges. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently. At issue on appeal is the driving under the influence conviction under 75 Pa.Cons.Stat. Sec. 3731(a)(4).[1] In closing at trial, defense counsel argued that the jurors should *153 disregard a blood test result that had not been expressed in terms of percentage of alcohol in the blood by weight as contemplated by the statute. As part of its charge, the trial court instructed the jury that the test which was stipulated to by the parties was a blood test done by weight, and that they therefore should ignore defense counsel's argument to the contrary. Appellant contends that the foregoing instruction was prejudicial error. We have carefully reviewed the record and briefs submitted by counsel and find no merit in appellant's contention. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Appellant's conviction arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on February 5, 1983. On that date, appellant ran a red light and struck another vehicle passing through the intersection with the right of way. The police sergeant who investigated the accident spoke with appellant and detected a strong odor of alcohol about appellant's breath and person. The police transported appellant to the Sacred Heart Hospital where he was advised of his rights. Appellant then made a statement to the effect that he had consumed beer shortly before the incident. At the sergeant's request, the hospital drew a sample of appellant's blood to test it for the percentage weight of alcohol. The blood serum tested revealed a content of 0.135% alcohol.[2] Turning to the issue raised on appeal, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the blood test instruction was proper. First, we agree with the trial court that the test result's compliance with the statute's "by weight" designation was a question of law for the court. Not only was it a matter of construing the "by weight" language, but it also involved a factor going to the admissibility of the test result. See Commonwealth v. Karch, 349 Pa.Super. 227, 502 A.2d 1359 (1986) (We determined as a question of admissibility and statutory construction whether *154 the "by weight" language in 75 Pa.Cons.Stat. Sec. 1547(a) is satisfied when the blood-alcohol reading is expressed in terms of the weight of alcohol per volume of blood.). Having resolved this question, we find, as did the trial court, that defense counsel waived any objection he had to the legal efficacy of the blood test result. Defense counsel stipulated to the location of the subject test, the procedure employed to draw the blood, the type of test performed (ACA plasma alcohol, which determines alcoholic content of blood serum), the approval of said test by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, the chain of custody, the test result itself (0.135% alcohol in the blood serum), and the fact that the testing site and equipment used were licensed and approved by the Pennsylvania Department of Health. Significantly, appellant's counsel did not include in the stipulation any reservation that, in so stipulating, he was not necessarily agreeing that the test result complied with the statute's "by weight" language. In fact, everything to which counsel stipulated indicates that he agreed that the blood-alcohol reading complied with the statute. Appellant even confirmed his position at sidebar, stating to the court his agreement, inter alia, that the test taken was "an approved test." (N.T. 67.)[3] *155 Moreover, defense counsel allowed the blood test evidence to go before the jury without timely objection. Specifically, defense counsel permitted the stipulation containing the test result to be admitted into evidence and read to the jury, and allowed testimony regarding the result, each without objecting that the result was not properly expressed as a "by weight" alcohol reading. Having done so, defense counsel waived any argument he had that the test did not comply with the statute. See McCormick on Evidence Sec. 52 (2d ed. 1972) ("(A) failure to object to an offer of evidence at the time the offer is made, assigning the grounds, is a waiver upon appeal of any ground of complaint against its admission."). Finally, we find that the trial court properly relied on the evidence at trial to determine that the blood-alcohol result complied with the statute's "by weight" language. We adopt the trial court's analysis of this question as follows: (Trial court opinion at 7-9.) In agreeing with the foregoing conclusion, we observe that the statute's "by weight" language is ambiguous. This ambiguity is evident from our opinion in Commonwealth v. Karch, supra, where we concluded that a reading expressed in terms of "weight of alcohol per volume of blood" complies with the "alcohol by weight" requirement of 75 Pa.Cons.Stat. Sec. 1547(d). In light of such ambiguity and considering defense counsel's stipulation and failure to timely object, we feel justified in giving deference to the licensing and approval procedures of the Pennsylvania Department of Health. For all of these reasons, we find no error in the trial court's instructions to the jury. Judgment of sentence affirmed. [1] Sec. 3731. Driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (a) Offense defined. A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of any vehicle while: ..... (4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0.10% or greater. [2] The trial testimony of Dr. Isadore Mihalakis, a forensic pathologist, indicated that a test of appellant's whole blood would have produced a result of 0.116% alcohol. Dr. Mihalakis reached this figure by converting, using a medically accepted method, the 0.135% result obtained by testing the blood serum. (N.T. 30). [3] After the Commonwealth completed presentation of its evidence pertaining to the blood test, the following occurred at sidebar: (Commonwealth) MR. FORD: The only other thing, Your Honor, I would ask the Court if the Court deems it necessary to takes judicial notice of the Clinical Laboratory Act, which is 35 P.S. 2151 and also 28 Pa.Code, Section 5.50. (Defense Counsel) MR. NEELY: I have no objection to that. MR. FORD: It deals with approval of the laboratory and the test. MR. NEELY: I am not objecting that this was done in an approved clinical laboratory, and it was an approved test that was taken. MR. FORD: All right. THE COURT: Does that specifically authorize this test for taking of blood samples for driving while under the influence cases? MR. FORD: Yes, that's correct. The Pennsylvania Code does indicate approved. The only reasons I hesitate to bring this to the Court's attention I believe Mr. Neely is agreeing to this, however. MR. NEELY: Under 3731? Maybe it's under 1547, the blood test section. It requires the tests to be done in an approved clinical laboratory. I am agreeing or stipulating that Sacred Heart Hospital has such an approved clinical laboratory and the test was done in such a laboratory.