Title: Lehman v. Bradbury

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  January 11, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MIKE LEHMAN,
BILL MARKHAM, RONALD K. CULBERTSON,
AND GILES E. PARKER,
	Plaintiffs-Respondents,
	v.
BILL BRADBURY,
Secretary of State
for the State of Oregon,
	Defendant-Appellant,
	and
FRANK EIZENZIMMER,
OREGONIANS FOR FAIR TERM LIMITS,
and U.S. TERM LIMITS,
	Intervenors-Appellants.
(CC 01C-14353; SC S48771)

	En Banc
	On appeal from Marion County Circuit Court.
	Richard D. Barber, Sr., Judge.
	Argued and submitted November 6, 2001.
	Mary H. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for defendant-appellant.  With her
on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Kelly W. G. Clark, of O'Donnell & Clark, LLP, Portland,
argued the cause for intervenors-appellants.  With him on the
briefs were Ross Day and Eric Winters, Portland.
	Charles F. Hinkle, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for plaintiffs-respondents.
	GILLETTE, J.
	The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
		GILLETTE, J.
Plaintiffs brought this action under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.010 et seq., and ORS
246.910(1), (1) challenging the constitutionality of Ballot Measure
3 (1992) (Measure 3 or "Term Limits Initiative)." (2)  Among other
things, Measure 3 added to Article II of the Oregon Constitution
section 19 (setting limits on the terms for most statewide
political officeholders and for state legislators) and section 20
(setting limits on the terms of Oregon members of the United
States House of Representatives and the United States Senate). 
Plaintiffs argued that Measure 3 contains two or more
constitutional amendments that should have been voted on
separately under Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution. (3)  The circuit court entered summary judgment for
plaintiffs and declared Measure 3 "null, void, and
unenforceable."  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
 		Plaintiffs are two former state representatives and two
voters, one from each of the former representatives' districts. 
The former representatives filed declarations of candidacy for
the office of State Representative for the 2003 legislative
session, but defendant Secretary of State rejected those
declarations, because each representative already had served the
maximum term that he was permitted to serve under Measure 3.  
After the trial court declared Measure 3 invalid, defendant and
intervenors (4) appealed to this court directly under Oregon Laws
2001, chapter 145, section 3(5). (5)

		The voters adopted Measure 3 in November 1992.  
Measure 3 provides, in part:
"AN ACT
		"Be It Enacted by the People of the State of
Oregon:
		"PARAGRAPH 1.  TERM LIMITS.  The Constitution of
the State of Oregon is amended by creating new Sections
19 and 20 in Article II, to read:
		"SECTION 19.  Limits on Oregon Terms.  To promote varied representation, to broaden the
opportunities for public service, and to make the
electoral process fairer by reducing the power of
incumbency, terms in Oregon elected offices are limited
as follows:
		"(1) No person shall serve more than six years in
the Oregon House of Representatives, eight years in the
Oregon Senate, and twelve years in the Oregon
Legislative Assembly in his or her lifetime.
		"(2) No person shall serve more than eight years in
each Oregon statewide office in his or her lifetime.
		"(3) Only terms of service beginning after this Act
goes into effect shall count towards the limits of this
Section.
		"(4) When a person is appointed or elected to fill
a vacancy in office, then such service shall be counted
as one term for the purposes of this Section.
		"(5) A person shall not appear on the ballot as a candidate for elected office or be appointed to
fill a vacancy in office if serving a full term in such
office would cause them to violate the limits in this
Section.
		"(6) This Section does not apply to judicial offices.
		"SECTION 20.  Limits on Congressional Terms.  To
promote varied representation, to broaden the
opportunities for public service, and to make the
electoral process fairer by reducing the power of
incumbency, terms in the United States Congress
representing Oregon are limited as follows:
		"(1) No person shall represent Oregon for more than six
years in the U.S. House of Representatives and twelve years
in the U.S. Senate in his or her lifetime.
		"(2) Only terms of service beginning after this Act goes into effect shall count towards the limits of this
Section.
		"(3) When a person is appointed or elected to fill a
vacancy in office, then such service shall be counted as one
term for the purposes of this Section.
		"(4) A person shall not appear on the ballot as a
candidate for elected office or be appointed to fill a
vacancy in office if serving a full term in such office
would cause them to violate the limits in this section."
		Under a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States rendered after the adoption of Measure 3, section 20 of
Measure 3 is not valid under the United States Constitution.  See
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 US 779, 115 SCt 1842, 131
LEd 2d 881 (1995) (states may not impose qualifications for
federal congressional offices in addition to those set out in
United States Constitution).  As we shall explain, the fact that
section 20 violates the United States Constitution plays no role
in our analysis concerning whether its presence in Measure 3
causes that measure to violate Article XVII, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution.
		Plaintiffs argue that Measure 3 presented the voters,
in a single "package," an amendment respecting limits on the
terms of members of Oregon's congressional delegation. 
Plaintiffs contend that that "package" amended, either explicitly
or implicitly the following provisions of the Oregon
Constitution:
		(1) Explicitly, Article II, relating to suffrage and
elections;
		(2) Implicitly, Article IV, section 8, relating to the
qualifications for state legislators;
		(3) Implicitly, Article V, section 1, relating to the
qualifications for Governor; and
		(4) Implicitly, Article VI, section 1, relating to the
qualifications for Secretary of State and State Treasurer.
Plaintiffs further argue that those amendments were substantive
changes to the Oregon Constitution that were not "closely
related" and, thus, that Measure 3 denied the voters the
opportunity to vote separately on each unrelated substantive
change, in violation of Article XVII, section 1, as this court
interpreted that section in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959
P2d 49 (1998).
		In the trial court, defendant and intervenors conceded
that Measure 3 made two or more substantive changes to the Oregon
Constitution, but argued that those changes were "closely
related" and, therefore, that the measure did not violate the
"separate-vote" requirement of Article XVII, section 1. 
Defendant also asserted two defenses.  First, he argued that
plaintiff Markham's claim was precluded because Markham
previously had challenged Measure 3 in federal court.  Second,
defendant argued that the claim of the two plaintiffs who are
voters was barred by the doctrine of laches because those
plaintiffs brought their claim nine years after the passage of
Measure 3, during which time the people of the State of Oregon
had come to rely on the validity of that measure.  Defendant
conceded in the trial court that plaintiff Lehman's claim was
timely, while intervenors argued that the doctrine of laches
barred the challenge of all four plaintiffs.  
		On appeal, defendant and intervenors make different
arguments concerning plaintiffs' alleged delay in bringing this
challenge to Measure 3.  Defendant argues that this court should
exercise its discretion not to consider plaintiffs' challenge --
including the challenge of plaintiff Lehman -- because too much
time has elapsed since the passage of Measure 3. (6)  Intervenors go
further.  They argue that challenges to the form in which
initiated measures were adopted may be brought only within 30
days of the election at which the voters approved the measure. 
We address intervenors' argument first.   
		Intervenors rely on Article IV, section 1, subsection
(4), paragraph (d), of the Oregon Constitution.  That paragraph
provides:
	"[A]n initiative or referendum measure becomes
effective 30 days after the day on which it is enacted
or approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon."
Intervenors argue that any challenge to the validity of a measure
must be brought by the effective date of the measure, as
established by paragraph (d), or the measure thereafter is valid
against the kind of constitutional challenge brought by
plaintiffs here.   
		That argument need not detain us long.  First, nothing
in the text of paragraph (d) specifically states that, once a
measure has gone into effect, the measure cannot be challenged on
the ground that it was adopted in violation of constitutional
requirements.  Second, it is clear from the context in which
paragraph (d) appears in Article IV, section 1(4), that paragraph
(d) is a procedural provision that establishes only the date on
which any measure -- regardless of whether it is a constitutional
amendment -- becomes effective after a majority of the voters
have approved it, nothing more.  Like the other paragraphs in
subsection (4) of Article IV, section 1, paragraph (d) addresses
one step in the process by which initiatives and referenda become
law.  For example, paragraph (a) addresses the Secretary of
State's verification of signatures on petitions; paragraph (b)
requires that procedures set out in section 1 be followed in
presenting any measure to the voters; and paragraph (c) provides
that elections on measures are to be held at regular general
elections.  Intervenors' argument is not well taken.  We turn to
defendant's argument.
		As noted, defendant does not seek to impose a specific
deadline on those who seek to challenge initiated measures on
form-of-adoption grounds; neither does he propose any specific
window within which such a challenge must be brought.  Instead,
he argues that, in deciding whether to hear such a challenge, the
court should consider "whether the challenges could have been
raised earlier, the time that has passed since enactment, and the
amount and type of reliance placed on an assumption that the
amendment was properly enacted."  Under those criteria, defendant
asserts, plaintiffs' challenge to Measure 3 on separate-vote
grounds, brought nine years after the voters adopted it, comes
too late. 
		Defendant is arguing that this court should exercise
its "discretion" not to consider plaintiffs' claim.  But, in so
arguing, he does not appear to be suggesting that the direct
appeal provision of Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 145, section 3(5),
set out at ___ Or at ___ n 5 (slip op at 2-3 n 5), somehow
provides for only discretionary review.  Instead, we understand
defendant's position to be that some challenges simply are made
so long after the adoption of the measure to which they are
directed that the challenges should not be entertained by any
court.  We therefore construe defendant's "discretion" argument
as a contention that the trial court should not have assumed
jurisdiction over this challenge, and we address it accordingly.
		Respecting defendant's argument, we note that, as part
of the same bill referred to above in which the legislature
provided for direct review of challenges like plaintiffs', the
legislature specifically authorized constitutional challenges to
the Term Limits Initiative.  The first paragraph of Oregon Laws
2001, chapter 145, section 3, provides:
		"Section 3. (1) If a candidate for state office
files a * * * declaration of candidacy * * * and the * * * declaration * * * is rejected by the Secretary of
State based on the provisions of section 19, Article II
of the Oregon Constitution, the candidate may file an
action that challenges the constitutionality or
validity of sections 19, 20 and 21, Article II of the
Oregon Constitution.  The action must be commenced in
the Circuit Court for Marion County."
According to paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 3, the trial and
appellate courts "shall have jurisdiction" over such a challenge
if, like plaintiffs', that challenge is
	"commenced within 30 days after the date the petition
or declaration [of candidacy] is rejected by the
Secretary of State and not later than the 250th day
before the date of the biennial primary election."
That is, the legislature specifically authorized actions
precisely like the one before us, but made no provision for any
act of discretion by the trial court.  It follows that the trial
court had no authority to decline this case on discretionary
grounds.  Defendant's contrary argument is without support.  We
turn to the merits.		
		We begin by discussing the separate-vote requirement of
Article XVII, section 1.  As noted above, Article XVII, section
1, provides, in part:
		"When two or more amendments shall be submitted * * * to the voters of this state at the same election,
they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be
voted on separately."
This court explained the separate-vote requirement in Armatta,
discussing and analyzing both the specific wording of the section
and its historical development.  This court held that the
separate-vote requirement applies to constitutional amendments
proposed by initiative, as well as to those proposed by the
legislature.  Id. at 261.  Moreover, based on the text of the
requirement, as well as on the historical circumstances
surrounding its creation, this court concluded that the concept
of a constitutional "amendment" meant "a particular
constitutional change," id. at 266-67 and, thus, held that the
separate-vote requirement requires that proposed amendments to
the constitution be submitted to the voters in a manner that
permits the voters to "express their will in one vote as to only
one constitutional change."  Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
This court then stated the following test to determine whether a
particular proposal to amend the constitution offends the
separate-vote requirement: 
		"[T]he proper inquiry is to determine whether, if
adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes to
the constitution that are substantive and that are not
closely related.  If the proposal would effect two or
more changes that are substantive and not closely
related, the proposal violates the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1, because it
would prevent the voters from expressing their opinions
as to each proposed change separately." 
Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
		As a preliminary matter, we note that in the
expression, "constitutional change," that this court used in
Armatta in describing Article XVII, section 1, as dealing with "a
particular constitutional change" and as permitting "only one
constitutional change," id. at 267, 269, the use of the
adjective, "constitutional," illuminates an important distinction
from this court's later use of the word "change," id. at 277,
without a modifier.  In the separate-vote test quoted above, this
court's use of the word "changes" rather than the expression
"constitutional changes" was a reference to "changes" in the
ordinary sense, i.e., to any alteration in the wording of the
constitution.  Although that distinction may be obvious, we
emphasize it here because, in any separate-vote inquiry, it is
imperative that we remain aware that any amendment to the
constitution involves some change to the wording of that
document.  However, not every one-word change to the wording of
the constitution is a separate "amendment."  If it were, then
amendments to the constitution would have to happen word-by-word,
and the people's power to amend the constitution would be
hamstrung.   
		On appeal, plaintiffs accept that the test from Armatta
-- whether a measure makes "two or more changes to the
constitution that are substantive and are not closely related" --
is the proper inquiry.  However, in the trial court, plaintiffs
relied on a decision of the Court of Appeals, Dale v. Kiesling,
167 Or App 394, 999 P2d 1229 (2000), in which that court
characterized the separate-vote inquiry in a different way. 
Because the trial court relied on the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of how to determine whether a proposed amendment
offends Article XVII, section 1, we address Dale briefly here.  
		Dale concerned a pre-adoption challenge to proposed
initiative Measure 15 (2000), which sought to create a "gross
receipts" tax. (7)  The Court of Appeals concluded that Measure 15
(2000), if adopted, would have made multiple, substantive changes
to the constitution that were not closely related and, therefore,
that the measure violated the separate-vote requirement of
Article XVII, section 1.  167 Or at 403-04.  The Court of Appeals
stated that "the separate-vote requirement, in contrast to the
single-subject requirement, is intended to have teeth."  Id. at
401.  The court then concluded that two or more substantive
changes to the constitution did not meet the "closely related"
test of Armatta "if a vote in favor of one amendment does not
necessarily imply a vote in favor of another."  Id. at 401.  In
the present case, the trial court applied the Court of Appeals'
"necessary implication" test in holding that Measure 3 violated
the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1. 
However, as we shall explain, the "necessary implication" test
reflects a basic misunderstanding of the separate-vote
requirement.
		In Armatta, this court emphasized that Article IV,
section 1(2)(d), and Article XVII, section 1, focus on different
concerns:  
	"[T]he single-subject requirement * * * focuses upon
the content of a proposed law or amendment, by
requiring that it embrace only one subject and matters
properly connected therewith. * * *  
		"The separate-vote requirement, by contrast,
focuses upon the form of submission of an amendment, as
well as the potential change to the existing
constitution, by requiring that two or more
constitutional amendments be voted upon separately. 
That is, in addition to speaking to the form of
submission, the separate-vote requirement addresses the
extent to which a proposed amendment would modify the
existing constitution.  That is significantly different
from the wording of the single-subject requirement,
which focuses in isolation upon only the text of a
proposed amendment in requiring that it embrace a
single subject." 
Id. at 275-76 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
		The Court of Appeals' opinion in Dale fails to take
into account that crucial difference between the single-subject
requirement and the separate-vote requirement and, therefore,
relies too heavily on their similarity.  In particular, the Court
of Appeals' summary of the separate-vote requirement as the
single-subject requirement "with teeth" suggests, incorrectly,
that the difference between the two requirements is only a matter
of degree.  As the foregoing quotations from Armatta demonstrate,
however, the two requirements differ in kind.  Nothing in the
text of the separate-vote requirement and nothing in this court's
opinion in Armatta or in any other case applying Article XVII,
section 1, requires that, for two or more constitutional changes
permissibly to be made by one proposed amendment, a vote for one
change must "necessarily imply" a vote for the other.  The Court
of Appeals erred in creating that unnecessarily restrictive
application of the Armatta test.
		We return to the separate-vote inquiry at issue here. 
As noted above, plaintiffs argue on appeal that the inquiry that
we should conduct to determine whether Measure 3 violates the
separate-vote requirement is the inquiry described in Armatta: 
We must determine whether Measure 3 proposed to the voters two or
more changes to the constitution that were substantive and were
not closely related.  Defendant also agrees that the Armatta
inquiry is the appropriate one to follow in this case, but he
asks this court to announce a further test to explain what
"closely related" means.  He offers the following:  "[T]wo or
more changes to the constitution are 'closely related' if they
are so logically interrelated as to present one specific,
discrete, cohesive policy choice."  
		Defendant apparently believes that Armatta needs
clarification.  However, adopting defendant's "clarification"
would mean that we potentially were permitting our task under
Article XVII, section 1, to degenerate into an endless war of
adjectives and adverbs, each battle of which would involve
further efforts to explain and elaborate on whichever set of
adjectives and adverbs had been used in the next preceding case. 
That does not mean that we would not accept a party's proposed
reformulation of an existing analytical test, if it appeared that
the proposed test would be a better tool to use in future cases. 
Defendant's proffered test simply does not appear to us to be a
better tool.        
		We begin our separate-vote inquiry concerning Measure 3
by focusing on the changes that Measure 3 made to the Oregon
Constitution.  See Armatta at 278 (beginning inquiry concerning
ballot measure by identifying changes that it would have made to
existing constitution).  As discussed earlier, by its terms,
Measure 3 purported to amend Article II of the Oregon
Constitution, the article concerning suffrage and elections, by
adding new sections to that article.  Measure 3 did not expressly
repeal or modify any existing constitutional provision.  However,
we look not only at the explicit changes but also at the implicit
changes that a measure would make to the constitution, if any, to
identify the changes that are relevant to our determination
whether the proposed amendment offends the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1.  See Armatta, 327 Or at
278 (identifying explicit and implicit changes).
Before Measure 3 was adopted, both Article II and 
Article IV of the Oregon Constitution described certain
qualifications for state legislators.  See Or Const, Art II, §§ 7
to 11; Or Const, Art IV, § 8 (both setting out qualifications). 
Article IV, section 4, set out the terms of office for
legislators (four years for a senator, two years for a
representative).  Neither those provisions nor other provisions
of the constitution limited the number of terms or years that
individual legislators could serve.  By adding Article II,
section 19, to the constitution, Measure 3 (8) changed the
constitution in that regard, by limiting state legislative
service to a lifetime maximum of six years in the Oregon House of
Representatives, eight years in the Oregon Senate, and a total of
12 years in the Legislative Assembly.  
		Article II, section 19, made similar changes respecting
elected members of the executive branch.  Before Measure 3 was
adopted, the Governor, Secretary of State, and State Treasurer
were limited to serving eight years in office in any 12-year
period.  See Article V, section 1 (Governor); Article VI, section
1 (Secretary of State and State Treasurer).  The addition of
section 19 to Article II changed the constitution in that regard
by limiting all persons who hold statewide office (except judges)
to eight years in any particular office over the course of a
lifetime.  
		Finally, Measure 3 -- specifically, with the addition
of Article II, section 20 -- also explicitly changed Article II
by adding term limits for the members of the Oregon delegation to
Congress.
		Contrary to their argument in the trial court,
intervenors argue on appeal that Measure 3 did not make more than
one change to the Oregon Constitution because Measure 3 was a
"cohesive combination of provisions" on a "discrete subject," 
i.e., term limits.  To the extent that intervenors are arguing
that the multiple alterations ("changes") to the wording of the
constitution nonetheless are only one constitutional change and,
therefore, permissible under Article XVII, section 1, their
argument ultimately fails for the reasons set forth below.  We
address that issue shortly.  But, to the extent that intervenors
are arguing that Measure 3 does not make multiple changes in the
ordinary sense of multiple substantive alterations to existing
wording, their argument is unsupportable.  Changes in the term
limits for state executive officers and the creation of such
limits for state legislators and for members of Congress are at
least two substantive changes to the constitution.  
		We turn to the remaining question under the Armatta
test, viz., whether those substantive changes to the constitution
are "closely related."  In Armatta, this court did not need to
elaborate on its application of the "closely related" test to the
substantive changes that had been made by the amendment at issue,
Ballot Measure 40 (1996) (Measure 40).  That was so because, once
this court had described the multiple, substantive changes that
Measure 40 made to the Oregon Constitution, their lack of "close
relation" was obvious.  Among other changes, Measure 40:  (1)
limited the right of all persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, self-incrimination, and former jeopardy
under Article I, sections 9 and 12, "by granting crime victims
the right to have 'all relevant evidence admissible against the
criminal defendant'"; (2) limited the right of a defendant in a
murder case, under Article I, section 11, to a unanimous verdict
by permitting convictions for murder based on a jury's 11-1
"guilty" vote; and (3) limited the legislature's authority under
Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a), to enact laws pertaining
to juror qualifications by requiring that jurors in criminal
cases be registered voters and not have been convicted of a
felony within the previous 15 years.  Armatta, 327 Or at 254,
283.  Under those circumstances, this court was able to conclude,
without extended discussion, that the changes made by Measure 40
were not "closely related" and, thus, that Measure 40 violated
the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1.  Id. at
283.  
		Armatta nevertheless provides some guidance for
resolving the question in this case, viz., whether the changes
that Measure 3 made to the Oregon Constitution were closely
related.  First, this court analyzed the relationship among the
constitutional provisions affected by Measure 40.  This court
noted that at least two affected constitutional provisions --
Article I, section 9, and Article I, section 11 -- conferred
rights that had "virtually nothing to do" with each other, viz.,
the right of all people to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and the right of the criminally accused to have a
unanimous verdict rendered in a murder case.  Armatta, 327 Or at
283.  The court further distinguished those two constitutional
provisions by the fact that each involves "separate
constitutional rights, granted to different groups of persons." 
Id.  For the voters to change such provisions in a substantive
way, the court held, they must vote on the changes separately. 
Id. at 284.  In that way, the separate vote requirement serves
its purpose to safeguard the fundamental law.  Id. at 276.  
		The court suggested in Armatta that Measure 40 had a
second weakness, viz., that the changes that it made to certain
constitutional provisions were very different from one another. 
For example, one change made by Measure 40 -- adding to the
Oregon Constitution the requirement that the jury pool in
criminal cases be drawn from registered voters -- did not "share
[the] relationship" that bound certain other changes to each
other.  Id. at 283.  In making that observation, the court, in
effect, considered both the relationship among the constitutional
provisions affected by Measure 40 and the relationship of the
constitutional changes that were made in those provisions to one
another.
		As summarized above, Armatta highlights this court's
analysis in determining whether a measure offends the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1.  First, we examine
the relationship among the constitutional provisions that the
measure affects, both explicitly and implicitly.  If the affected
provisions of the existing constitution themselves are not
related, then it is likely that changes to those provisions will
offend the separate-vote requirement. (9)  That conclusion makes
sense, because it is difficult to make related changes to
unrelated constitutional provisions.  However, we decline to
speculate whether the fact that a proposed amendment affects
unrelated provisions of the constitution will be fatal in every
case, because, in so doing, we might underestimate the ability of
initiative petitioners to design careful, constitutionally sound
amendments for the voters to consider.  Nonetheless, the fact
that a proposed amendment asks the people, in one vote,
substantively to change multiple provisions of the Oregon
Constitution that are not themselves related is one indication
that the proposed amendment might violate the separate-vote
requirement.  
		Next, we must consider the constitutional changes
themselves.  That is, assuming that the constitutional provisions
affected by the measure are related, we must determine whether
the changes made to those related constitutional provisions are
closely related.  If they are closely related, the measure under
consideration survives scrutiny under Article XVII, section 1. 
If they are not, it does not.
 		Returning to Measure 3, we begin, as the court did in
Armatta, by examining the relationship, if any, among the
existing constitutional provisions affected by that measure,
viz., Article II, Article IV, section 8, Article V, section 1,
and Article VI, section 1. 
		Plaintiffs first assert that the existing
constitutional provisions concerning eligibility for state
legislative office (Article IV, section 8) and the constitutional
provisions governing eligibility to be Governor (Article V,
section 1), Secretary of State, and State Treasurer (both at
Article VI, section 1), all of which are changed by section 19 of
Measure 3, are not related, because they are independent of each
other and are significantly different.  The framers demonstrated
that view, plaintiffs argue, by including a limitation in
Articles V and VI on the terms that the Governor, Secretary of
State, and State Treasurer could serve (no more than eight years
out of 12), while they did not include a limitation on the terms
that legislators could serve.  Because the framers believed that
term limits for state executive officers could exist
independently of term limits for state legislators, plaintiffs
reason that the constitutional provisions governing the
eligibility for those elected officials are not related. 
Accordingly, they contend, this court need go no further in
analyzing whether Measure 3 violates the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1.  
		Although we accept plaintiffs' argument that the
framers of the constitution viewed the terms of state legislators
differently from the terms of state executive officers, we
disagree with plaintiffs' derivative theory.  The framers' view
that some constitutional officers' tenure needed to be
circumscribed, but other officers' tenure did not need to be, is
not dispositive of whether the constitutional wording respecting
the tenure of each group of officers is related.  
		An examination of the text of Article II of the Oregon
Constitution demonstrates why plaintiffs' theory about the lack
of relationship among the constitutional provisions affected by
the addition of section 19 is flawed.  Article II, which
addresses suffrage and elections generally, always has contained
provisions respecting a wide variety of circumstances that could
disqualify a person from holding state elective office.  The
various offices involved were in different branches of state
government and had different responsibilities, but the terms for
disqualification were identical.  See, e.g., Or Const, Art II, §
7 (every person who gives or offers bribe to procure office is
disqualified from holding office); Or Const, Art II, § 9 (any
person who gives or accepts challenge to fight duel is ineligible
for any office of public trust or profit); Or Const, Art II, § 11
(no person who is a collector or holder of public moneys shall be
eligible for office until after accounting of monies for which
that person is liable). (10)  Those provisions of Article II
demonstrate that the framers considered state legislators and
state executive officeholders to be parts of a larger category,
namely, persons holding elected office in the political branches
of state government.  Section 19 adds an additional disqualifying
factor respecting state elective offices in those branches of
Oregon government, viz., term limits.  It follows, we think, that
the constitutional provisions affected by section 19 are related.
		By ordinary progression, the next question that this
court could address would be whether the changes made by section
19 to Article II, Article IV, section 8, Article V, section 1,
and Article VI, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, are
"closely" related.  Plaintiffs argue that they are not.  We do
not answer that question here, however, because, even assuming,
arguendo, that all the changes made to the Oregon Constitution by
section 19 are closely related -- and therefore would make only
one amendment to the Oregon Constitution under Article XVII,
section 1 -- the further change to the Oregon Constitution made
by section 20 of Measure 3 is different.
		Plaintiffs argue that, because Measure 3 changed
qualifications for holding federal elected office, in addition to
the qualifications for holding state elected office, not all the
changes that the measure made can be "closely" related.  They
state: 
		"As a matter of law, a proposal to establish
qualifications for officers of state government, which
is a matter clearly within the power and jurisdiction
of a state, is not 'closely related' to a proposal to
establish qualifications for officers of the federal
government, which is outside the power and jurisdiction
of a state."  
Recast in constitutional terms, we understand plaintiffs'
argument to be that the substantive change to the Oregon
Constitution made by the addition of a provision (section 20)
that limits the terms of members of Congress is not closely
related to the substantive changes that limit the terms of
elected officials in the political branches of state government. 
As explained below, we agree.
		Section 20 is similar to section 19 in that it, too,
creates a term limit for an elected official.  But stating the
similarity in those terms focuses exclusively on the measure
itself, not on changes that section 20 makes to the Oregon
Constitution.  When we consider section 20 in the context of the
Oregon Constitution -- as Armatta requires us to do -- its lack
of close relation to the substantive changes effected by section
19 is clear.  Of greatest significance, section 20 adds to
Article II a limitation on the term of federal officials elected
in Oregon whose eligibility in other respects never was -- and
still, absent section 20, is not -- addressed in the Oregon
Constitution.
		Before the addition of section 20, the Oregon
Constitution had little to say about members of Congress. 
Article II, section 17, for example, specifies where electors
must reside to qualify to vote for members of Congress, but it is
silent about what qualifications members must possess or how many
terms they are entitled to serve.  The only other mention of
congressional delegates in the Oregon Constitution is in Article
XVIII, section 6, providing for election of a Representative in
Congress and selection of two United States Senators as part of
the organization of Oregon State Government.  Those provisions
reflect the Elections Clause of Article I, section 4, of the
United States Constitution, (11) which had been in existence for 70
years before the ratification of the Oregon Constitution. 
Article I, section 4, of the United States Constitution
specifically delegates to the states the authority to prescribe
the time, place, and manner of election of members of Congress
from those states.  Other provisions of the United States
Constitution make clear that the eligibility of members of
Congress would be determined by that constitution, not by the
constitutions of each of the several states.  Article I, section
2, of the United States Constitution, provides that members of
the House of Representatives shall serve two-year terms.  There
is no limitation on how many terms a Representative may serve. 
Article I, section 3, of the United States Constitution, provides
that members of the Senate shall serve six-year terms.  There is
no limitation on how many terms a Senator may serve. 
		When the people were asked in Measure 3 to add section
20 to Article II of the Oregon Constitution, they were asked to
change the eligibility of members of Congress, a topic found
nowhere else in the Oregon Constitution.  The problem was not
necessarily that the provision was new.  Newness, in and of
itself, may be a neutral factor.  But the specific addition made
by section 20, affecting eligibility for federal public office,
had little or nothing to do with term limits for the Oregon State
Treasurer, for example, as those limits were established in
section 19.  Nonetheless, the voters were asked to vote for or
against both sections in a single measure.  In terms of Article
XVII, section 1, Measure 3 submitted two or more amendments to
the voters in a manner that prevented the voters from voting on
each amendment separately.  That was impermissible.
		As this court explained in Armatta, 327 Or at 284, a
proposed constitutional amendment must be adopted in compliance
with constitutional requirements:
		"It is a long-standing principle of law that a
proposed constitutional amendment must be adopted in
compliance with the procedures set forth in the Oregon
Constitution: 
		"'The provisions of the constitution for its
own amendment are mandatory, and must be
strictly observed.  A failure in this respect
will be fatal to a proposed amendment,
notwithstanding it may have been submitted to
and ratified and approved by the people.  The
constitutional provisions are as binding upon
the people as upon the legislative assembly,
and the people cannot give legal effect to an
amendment which was submitted in disregard of
the limitations imposed by the
constitution.'"
Id. at 284 (quoting Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or 118, 135-36, 74 P
710 (1903) (on reh'g 75 P 22 (1904)) (emphasis in Armatta). 
Accordingly, because Measure 3 was not adopted in compliance with
the requirements of Article XVII, section 1, we hold that it is
void in its entirety.
		The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 



1. 	ORS 246.910(1) provides, in part:
		"A person adversely affected by any act or failure
to act by the Secretary of State * * * may appeal
therefrom to the circuit court for the county in which
the act or failure to act occurred * * *."
2. 	The pertinent part of the text of Measure 3 is set out
below, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 3-4).
3. 	Article XVII, section 1, provides, in part:
		"When two or more amendments [to the Oregon
Constitution] shall be submitted * * * to the voters of this
state at the same election, they shall be so submitted that
each amendment shall be voted on separately."
		Plaintiffs do not challenge Measure 3 on any ground
other than the alleged deficiency of the measure under Article
XVII, section 1.
4. 	Intervenors are the chief petitioner for Measure 3 and
two organizations that supported it.  
5. 	Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 145 (created by HB 2674),
provides, in part:
		"Section 3. (1) If a candidate for state office
files a * * * declaration of candidacy * * * and the * * * declaration * * * is rejected by the Secretary of
State based on the provisions of section 19, Article II
of the Oregon Constitution, the candidate may file an
action that challenges the constitutionality or
validity of sections 19, 20 and 21, Article II of the
Oregon Constitution.  The action must be commenced in
the Circuit Court for Marion County.
		"* * * * *
		"(5) If a judgment in an action subject to the
requirements of this section holds that any part of
sections 19, 20 and 21, Article II of the Oregon
Constitution, is unconstitutional or invalid in whole
or in part, a party to the action may appeal the
judgment only by filing a notice of appeal directly
with the Supreme Court within the time and in the
manner specified * * *."
6. 	Defendant abandoned his claim-preclusion argument
respecting plaintiff Markham on appeal.
7. 	Measure 15 (2000) did not appear on the 2000 ballot,
because petitioners failed to obtain a sufficient number of
signatures.  This court therefore dismissed the petition for
review of the Court of Appeals' decision in Dale as moot.  Dale
v. Bradbury, 330 Or 567, 10 P3d 944 (2000).  
8. 	We refer to changes made by section 19 and changes made
by section 20 only as shorthand references to the wording changes
at issue in this case.  The fact that the authors of Measure 3
saw fit to divide the state and federal components of their
proposed measure into separate sections has no analytical
significance.
		We also note that it is not pertinent to our discussion
that section 20 turned out to be a "dead letter," in that it is
unenforceable due to a decision of the United States Supreme
Court.  However ineffective section 20 turned out to be in fact,
it was a part of the amendment that was submitted to the voters
with section 19 and, if the combination of those two sections
offended Article XVII, section 1, it is of no moment that section
20 turned out to be unenforceable for some other reason.
9. 	For example, as was true in Armatta, when the affected
constitutional provisions confer separate rights on different
groups of people, that is a strong indication that those
provisions are not "related" for purposes of the separate-vote
requirement.
10. 	We also note in passing that the recall power, found at
Article II, section 18, extends to "[e]very public officer in
Oregon," again reaching across separation-of-powers lines to
sweep in the widest possible range of officials, including all
elected ones.  The recall power originally was adopted by the
people by initiative in 1908. 
11. 	The Elections Clause of Article I, section 4, of the
United States Constitution, provides:
		"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of [choosing]
Senators."