Title: Hedrick v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BRANDON WAYNE HEDRICK 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record Nos. 982055 & 982056 
February 26, 1999 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPOMATTOX COUNTY 
Richard S. Blanton, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we review the capital murder 
conviction, sentence of death, and related convictions imposed 
upon Brandon Wayne Hedrick. 
I.  PROCEEDINGS 
 
The defendant was tried before a jury on indictments for 
the following offenses:  capital murder of Lisa Yvonne 
Alexander Crider in the commission of robbery, forcible 
sodomy, and rape in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4) and (5); 
robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58; rape in violation of 
Code § 18.2-61; forcible sodomy in violation of Code § 18.2-
67.1; abduction in violation of Code § 18.2-47; and use of a 
firearm in the commission of murder in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  The jury found the defendant guilty of these 
crimes and fixed his punishment at life imprisonment on the 
charge of forcible sodomy, life imprisonment on the charge of 
rape, life imprisonment on the charge of robbery, ten years 
imprisonment on the charge of abduction, and three years 
imprisonment on the charge of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony. 
 
In the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the 
jury fixed the defendant's punishment at death, finding that 
he represented a continuing serious threat to society and that 
his offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or 
aggravated battery to the victim.  After considering a report 
prepared by a probation officer pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, 
the trial court sentenced the defendant in accord with the 
jury verdicts. 
 
We consolidated the automatic review of the defendant's 
death sentence with his appeal of the capital murder 
conviction.  Code § 17.1-313(F).  The defendant's appeal of 
his non-capital convictions was certified from the Court of 
Appeals, Code § 17.1-409, and was consolidated with his 
capital murder appeal and given priority on our docket. 
II.  THE EVIDENCE 
 
On May 10, 1997, William K. Dodson, Trevor Jones, and the 
defendant were together at Jones' apartment in Lynchburg.  The 
defendant and Jones decided to leave the apartment and drive 
to an area in downtown Lynchburg where they could find some 
prostitutes.  Dodson remained at the apartment. 
 
2
 
Jones drove his truck to an area near Fifth and Madison 
Streets in Lynchburg where the defendant and Jones met two 
prostitutes.  The defendant and Jones gave the prostitutes 
money, asked them to purchase a small quantity of crack 
cocaine, and returned to Jones' apartment with the women.  The 
defendant and Jones smoked the crack cocaine that they 
purchased, and the women smoked their own cocaine.  Jones, the 
defendant, and Dodson had sexual relations with the 
prostitutes.  The defendant and Jones, along with the women, 
returned to the area near Fifth and Madison Streets.  The 
defendant and Jones gave the women $50 and asked them to 
purchase some more crack cocaine.  The women took the money 
but never returned. 
 
The defendant and Jones then rode around in Jones' truck 
for about 45 minutes.  They met two different prostitutes and 
returned with them to Jones' apartment.  The defendant and 
Jones drank bourbon, smoked marijuana, and had sexual 
relations with the women.  Dodson, who was still at Jones' 
apartment, was asleep when these women were present. 
 
Around 11:00 p.m., the defendant and Jones, along with 
the prostitutes, left the apartment and returned to the area 
near Fifth and Madison Streets.  After the women left Jones' 
truck, Jones observed Crider "walking down the road."  Jones, 
who had met Crider previously, told the defendant that 
 
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Crider's boyfriend was a seller of crack cocaine.  The 
defendant and Jones decided to "pick up" Crider, have sexual 
relations with her, and rob her because they thought she may 
have crack cocaine in her possession. 
 
Jones approached Crider and "asked if she wanted to have 
sex."  Crider got into Jones' truck, and the defendant, Jones, 
and Crider went to Jones' apartment.  Once they arrived at the 
apartment, Jones paid Crider $50 and had sexual intercourse 
with her.  The defendant did not have sexual relations with 
Crider at the apartment. 
 
After Jones had sexual intercourse with Crider, he left 
his bedroom while Crider was "getting dressed."  Jones went to 
a living room and spoke with the defendant.  The defendant and 
Jones devised a plan in which the defendant would pretend to 
rob both Jones and Crider.  Jones did not want Crider to know 
that he was involved in the robbery because Crider knew where 
Jones lived, and Jones was afraid that Crider's boyfriend 
would retaliate against him. 
 
Jones told the defendant to leave the apartment, go to 
Jones' truck, and get Jones' shotgun.  While the defendant was 
retrieving the shotgun, Jones told Crider that he had lost his 
keys, and she began to help him look for the supposedly lost 
keys.  Jones went into the kitchen, got some duct tape, 
returned to the bedroom, and placed the tape there.  Jones 
 
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also got a set of handcuffs.  When the defendant entered the 
house with the shotgun, Jones and Crider were in the kitchen.  
The defendant "racked" the pump on the shotgun to "get 
[Crider's] attention," and the defendant "motioned for" Crider 
and Jones and told them to go into Jones' bedroom. 
 
The defendant ordered Jones to empty Crider's pockets, 
and Jones took the $50 bill that he had paid Crider, 
cigarettes, and a cigarette lighter.  The defendant told Jones 
to place the handcuffs on Crider.  Jones did so.  Jones also 
covered Crider's eyes and mouth with duct tape, and he placed 
a shirt over her face.  The defendant took Crider out of the 
apartment and placed her in Jones' truck. 
 
Dodson, who had been asleep in the living room, woke up 
when he heard the sound caused when the defendant "racked" the 
pump on the shotgun.  In response to Dodson's question, "what 
. . . is going on?", Jones responded that, "this is one of the 
girls that ripped us off; we're just going to scare her." 
 
The defendant, Jones, and Crider left the apartment about 
1:00 a.m.  Jones sat in the driver's seat.  The defendant and 
Crider were in the backseat of the truck.  The defendant 
removed the shirt and duct tape from Crider.  After riding 
around in the truck for some time, the defendant decided that 
he wanted to have sexual intercourse with Crider.  The 
defendant told Crider that he "wanted some ass."  The 
 
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defendant warned her, "don't try anything; I got a twenty-
five," referring to a .25-caliber pistol.  Jones stopped the 
truck and got out.  The defendant raped Crider. 
 
After the defendant raped Crider, he got out of the truck 
and spoke with Jones.  The defendant told Jones that the 
defendant did not want to return Crider to the downtown area 
of Lynchburg because he was "afraid something might happen."  
The defendant, because he had just raped Crider, was afraid 
that "she might come back on him with her boyfriend."  The 
defendant and Jones had a brief conversation, "about killing" 
Crider, and decided to do so. 
 
The defendant and Jones got back into the truck.  Crider 
was crying.  She was "upset" and "scared."  Jones drove the 
truck as he and the defendant tried to find a good location to 
kill Crider.  As the defendant and Jones continued to look for 
a place to kill Crider, Jones drove the truck into Appomattox 
County.  Crider, who "kind of figured" that the defendant and 
Jones intended to harm her, pled, "don't kill me; I got two 
kids."  She was "sniffling and crying." 
 
Crider, continuing to plead for her life, asked:  "[I]s 
there anything I can do to make ya'll not do this?"  The 
defendant responded, "if you suck my dick, I'll think about 
it."  Crider then performed oral sodomy on the defendant. 
 
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Jones continued to drive the truck, and he proceeded on a 
road in Appomattox County and drove onto a "pull-off" space on 
a "back road" near the James River.  The defendant got out of 
the passenger side of the truck with the shotgun, and Jones 
took Crider out of the truck.  Jones removed the handcuffs 
from Crider because he was afraid that his fingerprints were 
on them.  The defendant and Jones put gloves on their hands to 
avoid leaving their fingerprints at the crime scene. 
 
The time was now "daybreak."  Crider, who was crying, 
continued to beg the defendant and Jones not to kill her, 
saying, "I got two kids."  After Jones had removed the 
handcuffs from Crider, he bound her hands together with duct 
tape.  He also placed duct tape around her mouth and around 
her eyes.  The defendant was standing, watching with the 
shotgun in his hands. 
 
The defendant, Jones, and Crider walked toward the river 
bank.  Jones led Crider because she was "blindfolded."  Jones 
"turned [Crider and] faced her back to the river."  Jones 
turned to the defendant, who was armed with the shotgun, and 
said, "do what you got to do."  Jones began to walk to the 
truck.  When Jones was within 10 feet from the truck, he heard 
a gunshot. 
 
The defendant returned to the truck with the shotgun and 
told Jones that Crider "went into the river."  Jones took the 
 
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shell from the shotgun so that it would not be present at the 
scene.  The defendant and Jones returned to Lynchburg.  They 
disposed of the shotgun shell, duct tape, and other evidence 
en route to Lynchburg.  They arrived at Jones' apartment at 
about 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, and went to sleep. 
 
The defendant and Jones subsequently fled Virginia, and 
they were arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska.  The shotgun that the 
defendant used to kill Crider was found in Jones' truck, which 
he had driven to Nebraska. 
 
Sherry Kelly Mays and Warren Johns, two friends who had 
gone to the James River to fish, found Crider's body on the 
evening of May 11, 1997.  Crider's body had been placed in 
such a manner that the body appeared to be "sitting up with 
[the] feet crossed," and the victim's hands were bound with 
duct tape. 
 
Dr. David Oxley, a deputy chief medical examiner for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, qualified as an expert witness on 
the subject of forensic pathology.  He performed an autopsy on 
Crider's body.  Dr. Oxley testified that an examination of the 
body revealed that Crider had been shot in the face with a 
shotgun.  Several of her teeth were missing and other teeth 
were fractured.  The top portion of her head had been bound 
with silver duct tape, which extended to the bridge of her 
nose.  Duct tape was also found around her mouth. 
 
8
 
The shotgun wound caused massive injury to Crider's 
brain, and shot pellets and wadding were found in the interior 
of her cranial cavity.  The location of the shotgun wad, deep 
in the victim's cranial cavity, indicated that she was killed 
within a "range of fire of less than ten feet."  The entrance 
wound from the shotgun blast measured an inch and a half in 
greatest diameter.  An x-ray of Crider's skull showed the 
presence of shotgun pellets in her skull and brain.  A blood 
sample was extracted from Crider's body, and a toxicology 
screen on that sample revealed an absence of any "drugs of 
abuse or prescription drugs" in her blood system. 
 
Robert L. Strubel, a forensic scientist, qualified as an 
expert witness on the subject of blood stain pattern analysis.  
He testified that based upon his analysis of certain 
photographs, after Crider had been shot in the face her body 
was moved and placed in the position where Sherry Mays found 
the body.   
 
Elizabeth Bush, a forensic scientist, qualified as an 
expert witness on the subject of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) 
and DNA testing.  She conducted DNA tests which revealed that 
the possibility of a person other than the defendant providing 
a sperm sample found in the victim's vagina was one out of 
260,000 in the Caucasian population, one out of 1,000,000 in 
 
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the Hispanic population, and one out of 8,000,000 in the Black 
population.  The defendant is Caucasian. 
 
Richard V. Roberts qualified as an expert witness on the 
subject of firearms.  He examined the shotgun that the 
defendant used to kill Crider, shotgun shells, and waddings.  
He also examined the wadding that was removed from Crider's 
brain.  Based upon his tests and examination, which included a 
pattern spray of 12-gauge shotgun shells, he concluded that 
the muzzle of the shotgun was three to seven feet from 
Crider's mouth when she was killed. 
III.  EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN PENALTY PHASE 
 
During the penalty phase of the capital murder 
proceedings, the Commonwealth adduced the following evidence.  
The defendant had been convicted of three robberies in three 
different jurisdictions.  The defendant was armed with a 
"Rambo type" knife when he participated in robberies in 
Campbell County and Bedford County.  The defendant was armed 
with a shotgun when he robbed a motel clerk in Farmville.  
During that robbery, the defendant, wearing a hood over his 
head and a bandanna around his face, pointed the shotgun at 
the clerk, who was five or six feet away from him, and 
demanded money. 
 
In September 1997, after the defendant had been arrested 
for the murder of Crider, and while being transported from 
 
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Appomattox to the Campbell County Jail, he tried to take a 
deputy sheriff's revolver.  The defendant later had to be 
restrained while being transported.  In July 1997, the 
defendant attempted to escape from incarceration by climbing a 
fence. 
 
The defendant told a State police officer that he shot 
Crider and that "he was an avid hunter, he liked to hunt . . . 
and how good a shot he was, how he killed deer in the past 
using shotguns and rifles at long range." 
IV.  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED 
 
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing to grant his "motion to dismiss the capital murder 
charges on the grounds that the capital murder statutes are 
unconstitutional."  In support of his contention, the 
defendant merely refers this Court to a memorandum of law that 
he filed in the trial court.  We hold that the defendant's 
assertions are insufficient and constitute a procedural 
default.  "An appellant who asserts that a trial court's 
ruling was erroneous has an obligation to state clearly to the 
appellate court the grounds for that assertion.  A cross-
reference to arguments made at trial is insufficient."  
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 99, 393 S.E.2d 609, 622, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 
256 Va. 471, 479, 506 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1998); Jenkins v. 
 
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Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 460-61, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993). 
V.  ISSUE PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing his motion for a jury questionnaire.  We have 
previously held that a trial court is not required to permit a 
defendant to mail a questionnaire to the potential jurors.  
See Swisher, 256 Va. at 479, 506 S.E.2d at 767; Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 454, 470 S.E.2d 114, 122, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 482, 489-90, 404 S.E.2d 227, 232, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
944 (1991).  We will adhere to our previous rulings, and we 
will not discuss the jury questionnaire issue further. 
VI.  BILL OF PARTICULARS 
 
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing his motion for a bill of particulars.  We hold that 
the defendant's contention is without merit.  The trial 
court's decision whether to require the Commonwealth to file a 
bill of particulars is a matter which rests within the trial 
court's sound discretion.  Swisher, 256 Va. at 480, 506 S.E.2d 
at 768; Goins, 251 Va. at 454-55, 470 S.E.2d at 122-23; 
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 402 S.E.2d at 
218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).  The defendant 
simply does not explain how the trial court abused its 
 
12
discretion by failing to grant his motion for a bill of 
particulars.  The defendant's conclusional argument fails to 
identify any error by the trial court. 
VII.  ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth was permitted, over the 
defendant's objection, to introduce in evidence an enlarged 
photograph of the victim's face.  The photograph, which was 
approximately two feet by three feet in size, revealed the 
injuries that the victim suffered when the defendant shot her 
in the face with the shotgun.  The defendant argues that the 
trial court erred by admitting this photograph in evidence 
because it was duplicative of another photograph of the 
victim's face which had not been enlarged, and the photograph 
was inflammatory and gruesome. 
 
We disagree with the defendant's contentions.  We have 
held that the admission of photographs in evidence rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Walton v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1998); 
Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126.  Photographs of a 
victim are admissible to show intent, method, malice, motive, 
premeditation, and the atrociousness of the crime.  Walton, 
256 Va. at 92, 501 S.E.2d at 138.  Photographs which 
accurately depict the crime scene are not rendered 
inadmissible simply because they are gruesome or shocking.  
 
13
Id.; Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126; Gray v. 
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 343, 356 S.E.2d 157, 173, cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).  We have examined the photograph, 
and we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
VIII.  AGGRAVATED BATTERY 
 
Code § 19.2-264.2 states: 
 
"In assessing the penalty of any person 
convicted of an offense for which the death penalty 
may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be 
imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after 
consideration of the past criminal record of 
convictions of the defendant, find that there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
serious threat to society or that his conduct in 
committing the offense for which he stands charged 
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of 
mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) 
recommend that the penalty of death be imposed." 
 
The jury, in accordance with this statute, sentenced the 
defendant to death finding that there is a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society and 
that the defendant's conduct was wantonly vile, horrible, or 
inhuman.  
 
During the penalty phase of the capital murder 
proceeding, the defendant proffered the following jury 
instruction which the trial court refused:  "A single gunshot 
wound causing immediate death does not constitute an 
 
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aggravated battery of the victim."  The defendant contends 
that he did not commit an aggravated battery upon Crider and, 
citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), asserts that 
"an aggravated battery is not proven where the evidence shows 
that the victim died almost instantaneously from a single 
gunshot wound."  The defendant's argument is without merit. 
 
We have stated that "[w]ithin the context of [Code 
§ 19.2-264.2], the term 'aggravated battery' means 'a battery 
which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than 
the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.'"  
Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 392, 464 S.E.2d 131, 
139 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996) (quoting Smith 
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), 
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979)). 
 
Here, there was more than sufficient evidence which would 
have permitted the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant committed an aggravated battery upon 
Crider.  Before the defendant murdered Crider, he had robbed 
and raped her, forced her to perform an act of oral sodomy 
upon him, bound her hands with duct tape, covered her eyes and 
mouth with duct tape, and held her in captivity for five 
hours.  He subsequently removed the duct tape from her hands 
and restrained her with handcuffs.  The defendant, an avid 
hunter who considered himself skilled with firearms, shot the 
 
15
victim in the face with the shotgun, as she stood helplessly 
awaiting her execution at a distance of three to seven feet 
from the barrel of the shotgun.  Without question, under the 
facts and circumstances of this case, the manner in which the 
defendant terrorized and killed Crider was qualitatively and 
quantitatively more culpable than the minimum necessary to 
accomplish an act of murder.   
 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Godfrey v. 
Georgia, supra, is not controlling here and is factually 
distinguishable.  In Godfrey, a defendant, who had been 
convicted of capital murder, killed two people by shooting 
each victim once with a rifle.  There was no other evidence of 
physical injury.  The Supreme Court, which reversed judgment 
confirming the sentence of death, stated that  
"[n]o claim was made, and nothing in the record 
before us suggests, that the petitioner committed an 
aggravated battery upon [the victims], or, in fact, 
caused either of them to suffer any physical injury 
preceding their deaths.  Moreover, in the trial 
court, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jury — and 
the trial judge wrote in his sentencing report — 
that the murders did not involve 'torture.'"  446 
U.S. at 432. 
 
Unlike the defendant in Godfrey, Hedrick committed an 
aggravated battery upon Crider and caused her to suffer 
physical injury and torture preceding her death. 
 
Moreover, we have held that "a mere inspection of the 
statutory language in [Code § 19.2-264.2] demonstrates clearly 
 
16
that the term 'vileness' includes three separate and distinct 
factors, with the proof of any one factor being sufficient to 
support a finding of vileness and hence a sentence of death."  
Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 442, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).  We have also stated that:  
"Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C) define vileness as conduct 
that involves torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated 
battery to the victim; the use of the disjunctive word 'or,' 
rather than the conjunctive 'and,' signifies the availability 
of alternative choices."  Id.  Here, the evidence was 
overwhelming that the defendant's conduct showed a depravity 
of mind and torture, which the defendant does not challenge on 
appeal. 
 
Furthermore, we also observe that the jury found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was a probability, based upon the 
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of 
which the defendant was accused, that he would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing, serious 
threat to society.  The defendant does not challenge this 
finding, which is a separate and independent basis for the 
imposition of the death penalty in this case. 
IX.  SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
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The defendant argues that the trial court erred "in 
refusing to set aside the verdicts of the jury finding [him] 
guilty of robbery, rape and forcible sodomy as contrary to the 
law and the evidence."  The defendant, in another assignment 
of error, argues that the trial court erred in refusing to set 
aside the verdicts of the jury finding the defendant guilty of 
capital murder in the commission of robbery, capital murder in 
the commission of rape, and capital murder in the commission 
of forcible sodomy.  The defendant's contentions are without 
merit. 
 
The standard of review for determining the sufficiency of 
evidence on appeal is well established.  We must examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
prevailing party at trial, and we will not disturb the trial 
court's judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Goins, 251 Va. at 466, 470 S.E.2d at 
130; Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 281-82, 427 S.E.2d 
411, 421, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993); Code § 8.01-680.  
Here, the evidence of record established, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant robbed Crider, raped her, and forced 
her to commit an act of oral sodomy.  The defendant and Jones 
decided before they asked Crider to get into Jones' truck that 
they would rob her of crack cocaine.  The defendant admitted 
to deputy sheriffs that he ordered Jones and Crider to a 
 
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bedroom where he demanded that she empty her pockets.  At 
trial, the defendant admitted that he brought the shotgun into 
the apartment as part of the plan to rob the victim. 
 
As we have already stated, Jones testified that the 
defendant told the victim he "wanted some ass," and the 
defendant told Crider, before raping her, "don't try anything; 
I got a twenty-five [caliber pistol]."  Jones also testified 
that when the victim begged the defendant and Jones not to 
kill her, the defendant told her that he would consider 
sparing her life if she performed oral sodomy upon him.  Thus, 
we hold that the jury's findings are fully supported by the 
evidence. 
X.  COMMUTATION 
 
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to commute the death sentence to a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  We disagree. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.5 states in relevant part: 
 
"When the punishment of any person has been 
fixed at death, the court shall, before imposing 
sentence, direct a probation officer of the court to 
thoroughly investigate the history of the defendant 
and any and all other relevant facts, to the end 
that the court may be fully advised as to whether 
the sentence of death is appropriate and just.  
Reports shall be made, presented and filed . . . 
[and] such reports shall in all cases contain a 
Victim Impact Statement. . . .  After consideration 
of the report, and upon good cause shown, the court 
may set aside the sentence of death and impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for life." 
 
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Our review of the record reveals that the trial court 
gave thorough consideration to the evidence and properly 
discharged its statutory duties imposed by Code § 19.2-264.5.  
And, the defendant simply failed to show good cause why the 
sentence of death should not be imposed. 
XI.  PASSION AND PREJUDICE 
 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) requires that we determine 
"[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 
factor."  The defendant argues that "the fact that the jury 
. . . imposed the maximum possible sentence in all of the 
predicate cases, when each of the predicate offenses was, 
standing alone, clearly not a maximum penalty offense, 
indicates that the jury gave no consideration whatever to the 
actual offenses involved, but blindly followed the request and 
recommendation of the Attorney for the Commonwealth.  It seems 
clear that the rape in this case, and the sodomy, involving a 
victim whose profession was prostitution, and who was in no 
way physically injured in the offense, do not rationally 
support life sentences for each offense."  Continuing, the 
defendant says that his robbery of the victim was "so little 
supported by the evidence that, absent the murder later, it 
would not have resulted in any conviction whatever." 
 
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We find no merit in the defendant's assertions.  The 
defendant's argument that the victim was not physically 
injured ignores the undisputed fact that he killed her with a 
shotgun blast to her face at close range while she was bound 
and gagged with duct tape.  Additionally, the defendant 
abducted the victim for over five hours, and the victim was 
forced "to experience the horror of waiting for [her] 
execution."  Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 579, 273 
S.E.2d 57, 67 (1980).  Our review of the record indicates that 
the jury and the trial court gave thoughtful and careful 
consideration to all the evidence, and we find nothing in the 
record before us which suggests that the jury or the trial 
court imposed the sentences of death under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. 
XII.  EXCESSIVENESS AND DISPROPORTIONALITY 
 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires this Court to consider and 
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant." 
 
The test of proportionality that we apply is whether 
"juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme 
penalty for comparable or similar crimes."  Murphy v. 
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 48, 54, cert. 
 
21
denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993); Walton, 256 Va. at 96, 501 S.E.2d 
at 140. 
 
Our comparison of the record in this case with the 
records in capital cases, including capital cases in which 
life sentences were imposed, fails to indicate that the death 
penalty imposed here is excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 
and the defendant.  We have examined the records of all 
capital cases reviewed by this Court pursuant to Code § 17.1-
313(E).  See Swisher, 256 Va. at 488-89, 506 S.E.2d at 773. 
XIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Having reviewed the sentence of death and related 
convictions, finding no reversible error in the record, and 
perceiving no reason to commute the death sentence, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Record No. 982055 —Affirmed. 
Record No. 982056 —Affirmed. 
 
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