Title: State v. Akau. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. ICA s.d.o., filed 09/21/2007 [pdf], 115 Haw. 476. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/08/2008 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'IEi

 
   

 

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Oe AVH a0

seams

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STATE OF HAWAI‘T, Respondent /Rasosstt hopes?

ste

ANTHONY KALANI AKAU, Petitioner/Defendant -Appellant .

 

No. 26989

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 03-1-2289)

MAY 30, 2008

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND DUFFY, JJ.; NAKAYAMA, J.,
DISSENTING; ACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

on February 8, 2008, this court accepted a timely
application for a writ of certiorari, filed by petitioner/
defendant-appellant Anthony Kalani Akau on January 7, 2008,
requesting thie court review the Intermediate Court of Appeals’
(ICA) October 11, 2007 judgment on appeal, entered pursuant to
ite September 21, 2007 summary disposition order (SD0). Therein,

the ICA affirmed the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s*

October 15, 2004 judgment, convicting Akau of, and sentencing him

» the Honorable Michael A, Town presided over the underlying
proceedings

 

aa
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for, -+ pursuant to his conditional guilty plea -- three counts
of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree, in violation
of Hawai't Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1242 (1993 & Supp

2003). Oral argument w.

 

held on March 6, 2008.

 

Briefly stated, on three separate occasions in October
and Novenber 2002, Akau unwittingly sold crystal methamphetamine
to undercover police officers. The drug buys led to the
execution of a search warrant of Akau’s person and personal
effects, which, in turn, led to charges of promoting a dangerous
Grug in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 712-1242 (1993),
and unlawful use of drug paraphernalia, in violation of HRS

§ 329-43.5 (1993) [hereinafter, the search warrant case or
possession case]. Approximately ten months later (and after Akau
pled no contest and was sentenced as a first-time drug offender
in the search warrant case), Akau was indicted on three counts of
promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree based upon the
three undercover drug buys (hereinafter, the drug buy case or
Gistribution case]. After unsuccessfully moving to disniss the
érug buy case based upon the compulsory joinder statutes, HRS

§§ 701-111 (1) (b) (1993) (barring a subsequent prosecution for
“lalny offense for which the defendant should have been tried on

the first prosecution") and 701-109(2) (1993) (requiring joinder

 

2 was § 712-1242 (2) (c) (2983) provides: “A person commits the offense
of promoting 4 dangerous drug in the ‘second degree if the person knowingly
Tal istributes any dangerous drug in any amount."

 
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of criminal offenses “bi

 

don the same conduct or arising from
the same episode"), Akau entered a conditional guilty plea,
pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 12(a) (2)
(2007),? and was sentenced.

on application, Akau apparently argues that the ICA
erred in affirming, inter alia, the circuit court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss. Specifically, Akau asserts -- as he did
before the ICA -- that the circuit court should have dismissed
the drug buy case for failure on the part of respondent/
plaintiff-appellee State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) to bring
all the charges in one action, as required under HRS
§§ 701-211 (1) (b) and 701-109(2), because the possession and
paraphernalia offenses and the distribution offenses “ [arose]
from the same episode.”

As discussed more fully infra, we hold that the ICA
erred in affirming the circuit court’s denial of Akau’s motion to
dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s October 11, 2007
judgment on appeal and the circuit court's October 15, 2004

judgment of conviction in the drug buy case

 

 

> RPP Rule 11 (a) (2) states

ith the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution), a defendant may enter « conditional plea of

guilty or mold contendere, reserving in writing the right,

Gn appeal from the jusgnent, to seek review of the adverse

Severn xy specific pretrial motion. A defendant
vio pre \ppeal shail be allowed to withdraw the

ple

 

 

  

 

 
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1. BACKGROUND

A, Eactual and Procedural Background Leading Up to the
Drug Buy Case

The following undisputed findings of facts (FOFs) are
taken from the circuit court's order denying Akau’s motion to

dismiss the drug buy case:

1. on october 8, 2002, fronting 25 Xeeauncku street,
fan undercover Honolulu’ Police Departnent (hereinafter “HPD")
police officer purchased 0.121 gras of crystal
‘ethanphetamine from (akauj for twenty dollars.

2. on October 22, 2002, fronting #25 Keeaumoke
Street, ‘a second undercover police officer purchased 0.094
grans Of crystal sethamphetamine from (Akau) for twenty
Soller

 

 

4. on Novenber 21, 2002, inside the mene restroom of
Daiei located at 601 Kahcka Street, the second undercover
police officer purchased 9.158 grams of crystal

1

Rethamphetamine from (akes for twenty dolla

 

5. Based on the [three] undercover transactions, a
search warrant was obtained and executed oa (Akaul and hie
personal effects on Novenber 26, 2002... [akau] wae never
Srreated for the (three) underlying drug transactions. ("]

    

 

 

5. upon execution of the search warrant fronting 035
Keeaunoia Street, 0,351 grams of crystal methamphetamine

 

 
    

in Violation of [MRS § 712-1243],
fujnlaweul [ules of (dlrug (plaraphernalia, in violation of
mas [$] 329-43-5() (.]

 

7. On Decesber 5, 2002 (Akau] was charged via
complaint with (plromoting a (dlangerous (d]rug in the
{elhird (d}egree and u)niawful [ulse of (alvug
Iplaraphernaiia() in (che search warrant case], based upon
the illegal narcotic and drug paraphernalia recovered during
the execution of the search warrant

2. on February 6, 2003, (Akau) pled [nlo [clontest as
charged’ in [the search warrant case]

 

As indicated by the prosecution, akau ‘was in fact arrested after he
wag indicted on three of the dlatribution offenses ae noted in FOP No. 10.

 

 
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9. on April 14, 2003, (Akau} was gentenced [as a
first-time drug offender] tol,] inter alia, a term of five
(5) years of probation (with One (1) year of incarceration),
pursuant to MRS [§) 706-622-5 {(supp. 2003)] in (the search’
warrant case]

 

20. on October 21, 2003, [akaul vas indicted in the
instant sutter for three counts of Iplromoting = (élangerous
(@]rug in the [sJecond (d)egree, in violation of HRS

[S] 7i2-1aea{a) (e) ss . y Based on the Ottober 8, 22, and
Novenber 21, 2002, undercover drug transactions:

B. Motion to Diemiss the Drug Buy Case

 

On March 22, 2004, Akau filed a motion to dismiss the
drug buy case, pursuant to HRS §§ 701-111(1) (b) and 701-109(2).

HRS § 701-111 provides in relevant part that:

 

men prosecution 1s barred by former prosecution for
Gitterent offense, Although « prosecution is for a
Violation of s different statutory provision or ie based on
Uifterent facta, it is barred by a former prosecution under
ny of the following eizcusseance
<3)" “the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal
hich nas not subsequent ly been set acide or
Ina conviction as defined in section 701-210(3)
{13993)"] and the subsequent prosecution is for:

ip” inv oftense for vhich che defendant should have

Desi_triedon the fiat prosecution under
section 701-109 unless the court ordered a
Separate trial of the offense -]

 

 

 

(Some emphases in original and some added.) In turn, HRS
§ 702-109, also known aa “the compulsory joinder of offenses

requirement,” State v, Aiu, 59 Haw. 92, 95, 876 P.2d 1044, 1047

 

(1978), provides in relevant part that:

 

Rs § 701-120(3) provides in relevant part: “There is a conviction
Lf the prosecution resulted in... # verdict of guilty which has not been

Get aside and which i capable of supporting = judgnent, or a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere accepted by the court.”

in the search warrant cage, Akau entered a no contest plea which wi
accepted by the circuit court resulting in the circuit court’e judgment of
Conviction and sentence; accordingly, under HRS § 701-110(3), the search

Gatrant case renulzed in a conviction for the purposes of HRS § ToI-113(1).

 

 

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(2) except as provided n aubsection (3) of chia
section { (authorizing the court co order separate trials),
Quoted infra note 10,)

Kigarace trials for muleipie offenses based on the sane
conduct or arising from the same episode, if such offenses
Src known tothe appropriate prosecuting officer at the time
Gf che comencesent of the first erial and are within the
Jurisdiction of « single court.

 

(umphases added.) Based on these two statutes, Akau argued that
the undercover drug buya were “part and parcel of a search
warrant and as such, both the purchase [of the drugs) and the

jesuance of a search warrant can and should be deemed ‘the same

 

episode.‘* The prosecution opposed Akau’s motion. A hearing was
held on May 13, 2004 at which time Akau called Lawrence Grean,
the head of the Screening Intake Division at the Prosecuting
Attorney's Office, to testify regarding the circumstances under
nich undercover buys or sales of narcotics that lead to a search

warrant are prosecuted or are not prosecuted. Specifically, the

following testimony was elicited:

 

0: [By Akau’s Counsel] tow, in those cases where the
Sndercover or the confidential informant sales/buys has
Yemuleed in search warrante, ie if the practice of Your
Effice, Mr. Orean, co then prosecute the actual buys and/or
Ghles in spite of the fact that the search warrant case fh
been prosecuted? bo you understand what T’m driving at?
Rriny Grean) f -- 1 think so. The answer to that ie it
depends

Gr All right. And will you please elucidate 11 of us as
fo why it depends?

 

 

    

 

 

Ae “Weil, if you have undercover police officers -- le
take! that scenario =

Q: Thank you.

Ki Mine they make three or four buys from a suspect, and

then as'a result of those buys the search warrant ie
prepared and executed, ~~

OF ves?

Bi Slere quite possible that the undercover buys cannot
Go forward because the police officer, the undercover
Seicer, is still working undercover and cannot surface at
that. eime

Qr And then?

 

 
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As So the prosecutor's office would go ahead with the
Search warrant case. And at a later Gate, when it’s -~ when
the undercover officer is going to be available and surface,
then we would go ahead with those cases

 

 

G1” tod, with rempect to the buye/eales involving an

 

 

cases would be postponed, to wit, that the
officer ie still serving in an undercover capacity and
therefore your office has to wait until -- until

 

 

that ~~ that person's undercover status has been lifted. 1s
cEbst_ true?

Ar Right

Q:” | |. of€ the top of your mind, you cannot recollect a

 

where an undercover Officer hae’ done the buy and the
Sale and which thes leads of course to a search warrant on
Suspect; right?” ‘The suspect ie

As the anewer is yes

Q: Right. And the suspect ie prosecuted on the search
Warrant case but then ie not prosecuted for the buys and
Sales, even though there was an undercover officer involved
Sh thé undereover buys and

   

 

As’ tei, it -- 4¢ the undercover officer has let’s say made
‘four buy and he can't surface at che -- at the tine of the
Duys, and he does surface later on, chen there wouldn't be
SSYumiese there's tone other reason I=” I don’ =~ I'm not
auare of, he -- he -- the suspect vould then be prosecuted
for these four buys.

 

 

o ow, can you say as a matter of fact that in all
Eizcinatances when there ie an undercover officer involved
ith the eales and the buys that -- that, even though you ve
muade 2 search warrant case on the suspect, chat you always
prosecute those buys and sales?

RewWell, F would think 80, yee,

 

Additionally, the circuit court questioned Grean as follows:

0: [By the circuit court] Mr. Grean, in your mind, correct
he if z/m not hearing you rigit, it’s a matter of
Prosecutorial discretion if there's gone buys and then later
‘Search warrant and the undercover officer ie able to
Surface, for lack of @ better word, and they're prosecuting,
fe'a prosecutorial dlecretion whether to charge separate
‘charges?
Ke Absolutely.

 

 

Akau aleo called HPD Officer Shellie Silva, who
executed the search warrant on Akau, as a witness. Officer Silva

testified, in relevant part, as follows:

 
 

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@: (By Akau’s counsel} z= there any reason why, Officer,
you decided to get three or four purchases?
Ko" (py ofticer Silva]

a done and

fave. the nore dave you have to execute the warrant tron the
‘dant purchase.
‘Okay. Now, earlier this afternoon I asked you about

Ehat, and ie it fair to say that, for instance, if you only
trade one undercover purchase, sore likely than sot the

 

13, Af you made three or four purchases, undercover
urchases, then the search warrant would be good’ for perhaps
Een days; is that correct?

At Maxim ten Gays, yee. (*]

  

Gs" And then finally, officer silva, the -- co your
Knowledge, the search warrant that you executed on Novenber
26(}, 2002, did in fact result in a criminal case being
Brougne against [akaul?

Re Yes

Qi The undercover officers that were us
+ with [aAkaul, Go you recall for what
any, after the’

2002, "that they stayed in an undercover capacity, if you
wal?

 

  
  

eT would 885
tavbe abbroximately six months. 1 don’t know exactly ca
there's other divisions and other teana that would use chem,
50 for my case, I would say approximately six months for
fone, and one ig etili currently working with us.
Grin the police reporte that were prepared regarding the
Purchases and sales in this matter with (Akau), their nanes
Ere disclosed, te that correct?
Re Us, in the criminal cases that ~~
@: Yeah, in the police reports
Ki Yer, because T would believe they had to doa -- a

jort on the actual transactions 20 thelr same would be
signed at the bottom of the report
Gr Yeah. “So it wouldn’t be blacked out oF something like
that; right?
Ae ho.

     

 

 

 

   

 

(Emphases added.) Ultimately, on June 18, 2004, the circuit
court issued its order denying Akau’s motion to dismiss.

Therein, the circuit court concluded that:

 

© aRBP gule 42(c) (2007) dictates that a search warrant must be
executed "within a specified period of time not to excead 10 days.” (Bmphasie
Sdded.). kovever, it is unclear fron the record what factors the issuing judge
Gxamines in determining how long @ search warrant will be valid for -- Les,
one day or ten days.

 
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3; _{Akau's) aesertion that the distribution charges
in the inetant matter and his possession of an illegal
harcotic and drug paraphernalia in (the search warrant
case], were “based jame conduct of arising from the
Sane episode” is unsupported by the evidence presented to
the court. HRS ($] 701-109(2)

     

 

6.” {akau’el act of distributing crystal
methanphetanine [(in the drug buy case)) and his act of
assessing an illegal narcotic and arog paraphernalia ((in
the search warrant case)] do not constitute the "sane
conduct."

1 the evidence descnstrated that (Akau's)
distribution of crystsl methamphetamine were discrete acts
Committed and completed on the specific dates charged in the
Sadicemenc

8. Similarly, the evidence dencnstrated that [akau's]
poteeasion of the iilegal narcotic and related drug
Paraphernalia were also discrete acts committed and
Completed on the specific date charged in the complaint and
Garelsted fo the ate of the distribution charges in the
Satan matter.

3. here de no basis to conclude the distribution

  

 

 

   

arose "fron the same episode." HRS {5} 701-108(2)-
Recora{] State vy Carroll, 6) Haw. 345, 627 P.2d 776 (2983)
10. Accordingly, {akau) has failed to substantiate
his contention that the instant prosecution ie barred by
operation of “HRS (86) 701-111(2) (b) and 701-209(2)-"

(Smphases and some brackets in original

c. entencing as a Firet~

the Drug Buy Case
on April 30, 2004, Akau filed a motion for sentencing
as a first-time drug offender, pursuant to HRS § 706-622.5. HRS

§ 706-622.5 (Supp. 2003) sete forth a sentencing scheme that

 

° me cirouit court made the following additional Fors in denying
xeau's notion to dlamiea®

12, [HPD] Officer Shellie Silva testified that the
@iseribution [offenses in the drug buy) case|) were not
referred inmediately to the (p]rosecutor’s (o]ffice as to
not compromise the identity of the undercover officers who
‘were still involved in ongoing investigations unrelated to
the instant matter.

 

22, There was no evidence that the prosecution delayed in
bringing the indictment in the instant matter in order to
gain a tactical advantage over [Aksu] or to unfairly cause
Sr expose him to stiffer penalties or punishment

 
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Girects the sentencing court, in certain circumstances, to
sentence first-time drug offenders to probation and drug
treatment rather than imprisonment. At the May 20, 2004 hearing
on the motion, Akau essentially argued that it was unfair to
sentence him as a first-time drug offender in the search warrant
case when the offenses in that action occurred subsequent in time
to the offenses for which he was indicted in the drug buy case.
He clained that he did not receive the benefits of the first-time
Grug offender statute because the search warrant case and the
drug buy case were brought separately, as opposed to all offenses
being joined in a single prosecution. The prosecution admitted
that the situation "[4id] look unfair to the defendant,~ but
argued that Aksu would not have been eligible for sentencing as a
first-time drug offender for the drug buy case even if those
charges had been joined with those in the search warrant case

because HRS § 706-622.5,' by its express terms, is limited only

+ WRB § 706-622.5 states in relevant parts

Sentencing for first-time drug offenders) expungenent.
(2) wotwithseanding any penalty or sentencing provision
under part IV of chapter 712, a person convicted for the
Kirst tine for any offenee under part IV of chapter 712
involving posssteion or use, not including to distribute or
‘aanufacture ... of any dangerous drug, detrimental érua,

harmful drug, intoxicating compound, maijuana, or sarijuana
concentrate, as defined in section 722-1240, oF involving
possession Or use of arug paraphernalia under section 329-
43.5, who ig nonviolent, as determined by the court after
reviewing the
(a) Criminal history of the defendant
(b) Factual cireunstances of the offer
the defendant is bes
(c) Other information deemed relevant by the court;
shall be sentenced in accordance with subsection (2);
Provided that the person does not have a conviction for any
(Continued...)

 

 

 

 

for whieh

 

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to possession offenses, not distribution offenses. The circuit
court denied Akau's motion for sentencing as a first-tine
offender on June 18, 2004. The circuit court agreed with the
prosecution and concluded, inter alia, that “HRS (§] 706-622.5

does not apply in drug distribution cai

Akau’e Conditional Plea and Sentence

Prior to the circuit court’s ieauance of the orders

 

 

denying Akau’s motions to dismiss and for sentencing as a first-
time drug offender, Akau entered a conditional guilty plea,
pursuant to HREP Rule 11(a) (2), quoted supra note 3, to the
charges in the drug buy case. At the hearing on Akau's change of

plea, the circuit court stated:

{HE COURT: Im well aware of this case. This wae a search
warrant case initially. And then the governnent chose to
ne the undercover officers to do the -- waa it
(confidential informants) or {undercover officers)?

 

 

(AKAU'S COUNSEL]: [Undercover officers.]

THE COURT: The undercover officers to get sales cases. And
there's # squabble, which 7 totally understand, whether the
law allow it. I tried real hard to either aectie thie case
or to figure out 2 way co cut [Akau] sone slack. I'm aking
@ transcript now for the [alppellate [clourt.. i couldn't do
ic, because 1 have an oath to follow the law. I can’t Just,
based on the length of my foot or what I had for breakfast,
take care of (Akau]. But I think I made 2 thorough record
So maybe the [alppeilate (clourts might see it differently

 

  

 

 

*(..-eontimued)
‘Violent felony for five years innediately preceding the date
of the comission of the offense for nich the defendant =
Being sentenced.

(2) "A person eligible under subsection (1) shall be
watenced to probation fo undergo and complete = drug
ment program

 

 

(Some empha

 

in original and sone added.)

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On October 15, 2004, the circuit court accepted Akai

 

conditional plea, entered its judgment of guilty conviction, and
sentenced Akau to a ten-year term of imprisonment with a

mandatory minimum of six months, pursuant to HRS § 712-1242(3)

 

(Supp. 2003)." On December 8, 2004, Akau filed his notice of
appeal.
2. Appeal Before the Ica

on appeal, Akau argued, as he does in his
application, that the circuit court erred in (1) denying his
motion to dismiss inasmuch as the search warrant case and the
distribution case should be considered part of the “same episode”
and (2) denying his motion to be sentenced as a firat-time drug
offender. The ICA issued its $00 on September 21, 2007,
discussed more fully infra, rejecting Akau’s arguments and
affirming the circuit courts October 15, 2004 judgment. The ICA
filed its judgment on appeal on October 11, 2007. Akau timely

filed his application for a writ of certiorari on January 7,

+ the 2003 ve

 

ion of HRS § 712-1242(3)

 

Notwithstanding any iaw to the contrary, except for
3re sentenced under section 706-622.5, if

  

‘under this-nea walt
strip OF any of its

Salte, isomers, and salts of Tsoners, the person convicted

Shall be sentences inpriscnnen

often veara with a mandatory minimum cer of imprisonment.
Eng length of which ehall be not Jess than eix-wouthe and
ot greater than five years, at the discretion of the
Sentencing court

 

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2008. Thereafter, this court accepted Akau's application on
February 8, 2008 and heard oral argument on March 6, 2008

TT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

401 indict

 

°A [circuit] court’ ruling on a motion to dismi

 

an
indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” state vs.
Mendonca, 68 Hawai'l 260, 283, 711 P.24 731, 734 (1985)
(citations omitted) .
B. Statutory Interpretation

We review the circuit court's interpretation of a
statute de novo. State v. Pacheco, 96 Hawai'i 83, 94, 26 P.3d
572, 583 (2001).

III. DISCUSSION

As previously stated, Akau essentially contends that
the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of his
motions to dismiss and for sentencing as a first-time drug
offender. We first address Akau’s argument with respect to his
motion to dismiss.
A. Motion to Dismiss

on application, Akau argues -- as he did before the ICA
-+ that the search warrant case and the drug buy case should have
been tried together as mandated by HRS §§ 701-111(1) (b) and
701-109(2) because both cases “[arose] from the same episode.”

As previously quoted, HRS § 701-111 provides in relevant part:

“3+
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hen prosecution 1s barred by former prosecution for a
‘Aitterent offense. Richeueh = prosecution 12 for 3
yiglation of a difterent statutory provision or is based oo
‘Gitterent facta. it is barred by a former prosecution under
‘any of the following circumstances

Ti) The former prosecution resulted 1n an acquittal
“hich nas not subsequently been set aside oF i
f conviction as defined in section 701-110(0) [,
quoted gupra sote'5,] and the subsequent
Prosecution is for:

ib)" fay oftense for which the defendant should have
Deen_cried on the firat proecubion under
fection 101-109 ualese the court ordered 8
Separate trial of the offensel.]

 

(Bold emphasis in original and underscored emphases added.) In

turn, HRS § 701-109 provides in relevant part

 

(2),, Except as provided in subsection (3) of this
section, (*)

Ecials for mitiple offenses based on the same conduct ox
arising from che sane episode, if such offenses are known Co
the appropriate prosecuting officer at the tine of the
comencenent of the first trial and are within the
Serisdiceion of a single cours

 

(Bmphases added.) Inasmich as "it is axiomatic that the ‘same
criminal episode’ element of the compulsory joinder rule is not a

self-defining concept [,]*" People v. Miranda, 754 P.2d 377, 360
(Colo. 1988), we first examine this jurisdiction's interpretation

of the above statutes and, specifically, the definition of the

ARE § 701-109(3) tater

 

When a defendant is charged with two or more offenses
based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode,
the court, on application of the prosecuting attorney or of
the defendant, may order any such charge co be tried
Separately, if it ie satisfies that justice 20 requires

Accordingly, based on HRS § 701-109(3), it appears that, prior to the
Of Akau's plea of no contest in the search warrant cage, the prosecution
have sought permission from the circuit court to bring the cas

ely. However, neither the circuit court, the ICA, nor the parties
Sddreas the effect of HRS § 701-109(3) on this case.

   

 

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Sees

same episode” before delving into the correctness of the ICA's
coneluaions.
1, Hawai'i case Law

a. the Carrol) case

In State v. Carroll, 63 Haw. 345, 627 P.2d 776 (1981),
the defendant was arreated for allegedly starting a fire at
school. Id. at 346, 627 P24 at 777. The arresting police
officer conducted a routine search of the defendant and found a
canister in the defendant’s possession. Id, Believing that the
canister contained nasal spray, the officer returned it to the
defendant. Id, The defendant was then transported to the police
station and booked for attempted criminal property damages in the
second degree. Id, During a custodial search, a second officer
recovered the cannister and identified it as mace. Id. The
defendant was subsequently charged with possession of an
obnoxious substance. Id, The defendant was first tried and
acquitted of the misdemeanor charge of possession of an obnoxious
substance -- the mace. Id, at 346-47, 627 P.2d at 777-78. The
Gefendant was subsequently brought to trial on the attempted
criminal property damage charge. Id, at 347, 627 P.2d at 778.
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
(2) the two offenses were part of a single “episode within the

context of HRS § 701-109(2)" and, (2) inasmuch as the offenses

 

were part of the same episode and not prosecuted in the sane

proceeding, the second ci

 

was prohibited by

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HRS § 701-2122) (b). Id, (internal quotation markee omitted)
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
indictment, and the prosecution appealed. Id. On appeal, this
court observed that:

(us) § 702-1092) reflects a policy that a
Gefendant should sot have co face the expense and
Uncereaineies of mltiple trials based oh fatly che
sane conduct oF episode. It Le designed to prevent the
prosecution) from haragsing a defendant with successive
prosecutions where the (prosecution) is dissatisfied with
Ehe punichnent previously ordered or where the (prosecution!
has previously failed to convict the defendant.

 

 

 

Id, at 352, 627 P.2d at 780 (citations omitted). Thie court held
that the preconditions for the application of HRS § 701-109(2)

had been satisfied inaemich

 

(2) it was “uncontested that the
appropriate prosecuting officer was aware of the

lalttempted [clriminal [plroperty (damage charge at the time
that the possessory charge was prosecuted” and (2) “both charges
[were] clearly within the jurisdiction of a single court." Id.
at 349, 627 P.2d at 779 (footnote and citations omitted)
Additionally, this court declared that, “[iJn view of the dual
considerations of fairness to the defendant and society's
interest in efficient law enforcement,” the “test for determining
the singleness of a criminal episode should be based on whether
the alleged conduct was so closely related in tine, place and
circumstances that a complete account of one charge cannot be
related without referring to details of the other charge.” Id.

at 351, 627 P.2d at 780. Applying the test to the facts

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presented, thie court held that the two cases did not arii
the ‘same episode” because:

[the] defendant vas charged with the comission of offe:
which occurred at different tines and places and under
Gitferent cireunetances. Our rationale is based primarily
fon the fact that the srvesting officer failed to recognize
Che illegal nature of the cannister at the tine of the
beareh for weapons. Asa result, defendant's possession of
the (elace continued after Bis initial arrest, until the
fubsequent discovery and identification at the police
Station

 

 

 

Id. at 352, 627 P.2d at 781. ‘This court further reasoned that:

nile Se 12 true that the possessory offense can be
traced to the time of the firet arrest, we cannot say that
the possessory charge should be deened effective as of the
Elmevof that arrest. the point in tine at which the [n]ace
wan identified i inportant because prior to the

 

TStae!tiatise. fhe Pocus and’ clecungtanser wishin che iret
9 believe the 2 ye other [el rimi
ae

1d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the

carroll court rev

defendant's motion to dismiss, Id. at 353, 627 P.2d at 782.

 

ed the trial court's order granting the

» serv:
This court, in State v, Servantes, 72 Haw. 35, 804 P.2d
1347 (1991), had an opportunity to apply the test announced by
the Carrol] court. In Servantes, a police officer observed a
passenger in the defendant's car smoking a marijuana cigarette.
Id. at 36, 804 P.2d at 1348. After ordering the passenger out of
the car, the police officers discovered a bag of marijuana in
plain view on the driver‘s side of the car next to the
defendant's foot. Id. The bag was seized, and the defendant and

the passenger were arrested for promoting a detrimental drug in

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the third degree, a misdemeanor. Id, at 36-27, 604 P.2d at 1348.
‘The defendant's car was towed to the police tation; four daye
later, after obtaining a search warrant, the police discovered
and seized cocaine and drug paraphernalia from the vehicle. Id.
at 37, 804 P.2d at 1348. ‘The defendant was arrested and charged
with promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree and
possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, both class C
felonies. Id. The defendant entered a nolo contendere plea to
the misdemeanor charge and was sentenced. Id, Subsequently, the
defendant woved to dismiss the felony indictment on the grounds
that HRS §§ 702-111(2) (b) and 701-109(2) barzed the prosecution
from proceeding on the felony charges. Id, The circuit court
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that “the
sarijuana offense occurred at a different time, place and

This court, in

 

circumstances from the felony offenses." Id.
reversing the trial court’s ruling, stated that:

in carroll, we reasoned that defendant's possession of the
{mjace continued until the discovery and identification ae

the pollee station. citvina the (mlsce,
‘facts_and circumstances known to the firet officer aid not
‘ford probable cauge £0 believe that an offense other than

 

Here, (the defendant] lost possesion of both the
wrijuana and cocaine when he was arrested and bis car

xed. Moat importantly, police had probable cause at the
Sime of {the defendant's] arrest on the marijuana offense to
‘guspact {the defendant] of possession of additional {liegal
ruse.

Furthermore, we cannot ignore that [the defendant’ s]
notion, filed previous to trial, to suppress the evidesce
Seized’ fron his car is obviously part of the trial
Proceedings. in the course of the suppression hearing, the

erosecut ion] would have to refer tos factual account of

forthe search. A fortiori, the felony charge cannot be
fried without wention of the misdeneancr offen!

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

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Id, at 39, 804 P.2d at 1349 (emphases added). Accordingly, this
court held that “the [prosecution] was barred under [HRS]

§ 701-109(2) from prosecuting [the defendant] for the felony

 

offense! of possession of cocaine] by hia conviction on the
misdeneanor marijuana possession charge." Id.

c. the Keliiheleua case

In State v. Keliiheleua, 105 Hawai'i 174, 95 P.3d 605
(2004), this court again applied the Carroll test to determine
whether two criminal offenses, prosecuted separately, were barred
pursuant to HRS §§ 701-111(1) (b) and 701-109(2). In Ke! a,
the defendant's van “drifted across three lanes of freeway and
rear-ended a parked car." Id, at 176, 95 P.3d at 607. A
passenger in the defendant's van and the driver of the parked car

were both injured. I

 

At the tine of the accident, the
defendant did not have insurance; however, he “obtained an
insurance policy later that sane day." Id, ‘After obtaining the
policy, he falsely represented the date and time of the accident
as occurring subsequent to the initiation of the policy.” Id.
During the police investigation of the accident, the Insurance
Fraud Division of the state of Hawai'i Department of Commerce and
consumer Affaire (OCCA) began a separate investigation of the
defendant’s purported insurance fraud. Id, The DCCA
investigator testified he had no knowledge regarding the "pending

criminal investigation for the negligent injury case.” Id. As a

 

ult of the DCCA investigation, the defendant was charged with

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insurance fraud and attempted theft in the second degree. id. at
177, 95 P.3d at 608. On Decenber 6, 2001, the defendant pled no
contest to the charges of insurance fraud and attempted theft in
the second degree and moved for a deferred acceptance of hia
plea, which was granted. Id, Thereafter, on July 17, 2002, asa
result of the HPD's investigation, the prosecutor's office
formally initiated prosecution against the defendant as a result
of the accident itself. Id. On September 19, 2002, a grand jury
indicted the defendant on the charge of negligent injury in the
first degree. Id. The defendant then moved to dismias the
negligent injury indictment, arguing that the case vas barred

pursuant to HRS §§ 701-111(2) (b) and 701-109(2). Id.

 

at 178, 95
P.3d at 609. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion.
Id. Thereafter, the defendant entered a conditional plea of no
contest and subsequently appealed. Id. On appeal to this court,
the defendant argued, inter alia, that the negligent injury case
should have been dismissed pursuant to HRS §§ 701-121(1) (b) and
701-109(2). Id. This court reasoned that: (1) “although the
rotor vehicle accident and fraudulent insurance claim occurred on
the sane day, they did not occur at the same time"; (2) "although

the record does not so indicate, the places where [the d]efendant

 

committed the offenses were presumably different; and (3) the
circumstances were not similar because "the facts and isques

involved in the charges (namely, the statutory requirements of

   

the alleged offenses) are dissimilar.” Id, at 161-62, 95 P.3d at

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612-23 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, this court held that,
“{hecause the criminal offenses in question are not closely
e}lated in time, place and circumstances, they did not arise
from the sane ‘epieode,’ (and, clonsequently[,] HRS §{1 701-
109(2) does not apply to this case." Id, at 162, 95 P.3d at 623
(footnote omitted). In so holding, thie court distinguished the
facts in the case at bar from Sexvantes, which was relied upon by
the defendant, stating that:

Here, there yas _no reason to suspect that subsequent to
= dent, aE

Spain an inuurance policy and thes file a fraudulent
naurance-clain. furthersore, unlike the offenses involved
in pervantag, the negligent injury charge can be tried
wlehout mention of the fraud case:

 

Id. (emphasis added) .

2. Application of the Compulsory Joinder statute in
thie Case

on dixect appeal before the ICA, the prosecution argued
that the circuit court correctly determined “that there was no

basis upon which to conclude that the distribution offenses in

 

] and the search warrant . . . case arose ‘from

 

the same episode.'* Specifically, the prosecution asserted:

 

 

ie also note here our agreement with the interpretation of

Kelisheleua set forth in che concurring opinion. See Concurring Opinion by
Aeoba, J. (Concurring op.) at 2-3 0.2.

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were, the circuit court was correct [that] the distribution
offenses and the search warrant case did not arise from the
jane episode or conduct. [*] The drug buya were conducted
3t tines separate and apart from the execution of the search
‘arrant, “There were entirely different witnesses involved
In'each offense. “the offenses were discovered under
aitferent circumstances and were not relaved in tine, place
and circunstances. ‘The fact that the buys were used as &
Bisis co support the search warrant aid mot require the
Offenses be charged together

 

 

 

 

   

da. at 13.
in affirming Akau's conviction, the ICA agreed with the

prosecution and rejected Akau’s arguments that all of the charged

offenses were required to be joined in a single prosecution.

specifically, the ICA explained that:

Akau'e case a similar to [Sexvantes) because the
[prosecution's drug buy case] against Aksu provided the
[prosecution] with provable cause to search his person and
personal effects. The prosecution’ s] search warrant, in
Eurn, gave rise to the [search warrant case). However,
Akau's case is distinguishable fron Sexvantes because che
Search warrant for Aksu was based on three separate
Buys/sales for crystal nethanphetanine from/to him conducted
on three separate buys/sales of crystal methamphetamine
Fron/to him conducted on three separate dates (October # and
22 and Novenber 21, 2002) ~~ all made before the police
department executed its search warrant on Akau and bis
personal effects on Novenber 26, 2002. ‘The dates and
Elrcumstances involved in the [drug buy case] and (the

(roh warrant case) were nore disparate than were the dates

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3 Im go asserting, the prosecution relied on this court’s decision in
State v. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 462, 865 7.24 150, 156 (1984), for the
Bropoaition that ** (p]rosecutions are for the same conduct 1f any act of the
Sefendant Ls alleged to constitute all or part of the conduct elenente of the
offenses charged in the respective prosecutions.” However, the prosecution's
Fellance on Lamuary is misplaced. in Lgugary. this court held that the "sane
conduct” test applies under the double jeopardy clause of the Hawai'i
constitution. 75 Haw. at 458-59, 865 P,24 at 156, This court specifically
Shdicates that 1t was not applying the veane episcde" test articulated in
Garreld and that the defendant was “confusing the "sane conduct’ test with the
ne episode’ test." 1d. at 461, 865 P.24 at 157. Here, the prosecution
appears to confuse thie court's double jeopardy jurieprudence with its
compulsory joinder jurisprudence, Moreover, « number of jurisdictions
Sooking at the interplay setween double jeopardy protections and thelr
compulsory joinder statutes, have held that, when applicable, “the compulsory
Joinder rule... offer(s] ‘greater protection to the accused than does the
double Jeopardy clause.” 603 2.24 1031, 1036 (Pa.
Super. ce. 1992); gee aleo People v. Miranda, 1542.24 379, 380 (Colo. 1968).

 

 

 

in

 

 

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SSMS

nd circunstances in the two cases involved in Semvantes.
Hence, we do not agree that the [search warrant case] and
{the drug buy cage! were part of the “sane episode” and, as
uch, should have Been consolidated into one trial

Beau's cage is more like (Kelilbeleus) in that the
criminal offenses were not closely related in time, place

‘The Supreme Court of Hawal‘s explained in [Carroll]
chat HRS's 761-109 (2) wae devigned to prevent the State fron
harassing a detendant with successive prosecutions where the
State had failed to convict the defendant or was
Gissatiefied with the punishment previously ordered
Rowever, the state's conviction of Akay in the (search
Warrant case) was successful, as Akau waa convicted of
iplronsting a [élangeroue (djrug in the (t/hira (e)egree and
[Slniawtul (alae of  [é)rug (plaraphernialia and sentenced to
2 term of five yeare of probation and one year of
Jncarceration. “There is no evidence in the record on appeal
that the [prosecution] attempted to harass. Akas by
prosecuting the [search warrant case) separately from the
Tarug buy case]

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

ICA Sp0 at 3-4.

Akau, however, contenda that the ICA “committed grave
error in being too mechanical and rigid in its approach to the
facts of this case and interpretation of case law."

specifically, Akau argues that

[elhis is evidenced in the [ICA's) own language found on
page [three] of the (500) Second full paragraph [.1
Sherein the (Ica) at firee tate (a) that the prei
Similar to State v. servantes. 72 Haw. 35, 808 P.24 1347
[beat and Enea Tp Eee ane Brent dlatinguishes Alay tron

vanteg by invoking the *.. 90 closery retaved in Eine,
Place and circumstances... language. from
Patne ue che obvious that’ the three Buye/eales occurred ca
Gitterent dates {) -- ignoring the commonality of purpose of
‘each buy/eale.

ven though this case might constitute an anomalous

situation (referred to [inl the [olpening (blrief as the
Skkau anonaly-), this court, nevertheless, should be
concerned with the administration of justice, [clf., Skate
Soong, 97 Hawai'i ‘S12, 40 P-3d 914 (2002) (1

 

   

   

(ellipses in original.) Ia.
As previously stated, criminal offenses that are “based
on the same conduct or aris{e] from the same episode" must be

joined in a single prosecution "if such offenses are known to the

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appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of commencement of
the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single
court." HRS § 701-109(2). If the prosecution fails to bring
such cases together, the subsequent charges are barred. HRS

§ 701-211(2) (b). Here, the evidence demonstrates (1) that at the
time Akau entered his plea of no contest in the search warrant
case the appropriate prosecuting officer was aware of the
existence of the three undercover drug buys inasmich as they
served ae the bases for the search warrant that ultimately led to
the charges levied against Akau in the search warrant case and
(2) that both cases were within the jurisdiction of a single
court -- the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. Additionally,
the parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the search warrant
case and the drug buy case were not based on the same conduct.
Accordingly, the relevant inquiry before us narrows to whether
both cases “[arose] from the sane episode."

In Carroll, this court announced that the “test for
determining the singleness of a criminal episode should be based
on the all
place and circumstances that a complete account of one charge
cannot be related without referring to details of the other
charge.” 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 760 (emphasis added). The
time” and “place” factors of the Carroll test are easily

determined and straightforward to apply. However, as discussed

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ee

more fully infra, the “circunstances" factor of the test is more
difficult to define and apply.

With respect to the “time* factor, the evidence in the
Anstant case indicates that the undercover drug buys occurred on
three separate occasions -- October 8, 22, and Novenber 21, 2002,
‘The search warrant was executed on November 26, 2002 -- five days
after the last drug buy. Thus, the facts unequivocally establish
that the drug buy offenses and the search warrant offenses did
not occur on the same day or at exactly the same time. However,
in Servantes, thie court determined that the lapse of several
days between the discovery of the first criminal offense and the
second offense was not fatal to the defendant's argunent that the
two criminal offenses “[arose] from the same episode.”
Servantes, 72 Haw. at 37, 804 P.2d at 1348. In our view, the
span of five days between the last undercover drug buy and the
execution of the seazch warrant, or even the forty-nine days
between the first drug buy and the execution of the search
warrant, is not so disparate as to render the drug buy offenses
and the search warrant offenses separate episodes. Thus, because
the drug buy offenses and the search warrant offenses were
closely related in time, we believe the time factor has been met

With respect to the “place” factor, we expressed
concern in Kelitheleua, that “defining ‘place’ as broadly as the
entire city and County of Honolulu would unduly hamper the
administration and application of HRS § 701-109(2)." 105 Hawai'i

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at 181, 95 P.3d at 612. However, auch concern is not present in
the case at bar inasmuch ae the evidence established that the
place where two of the three drug buys occurred and the place
where the search warrant was executed were the same or

similar -- i.e, in an area fronting @25 and 835 Keeaunoku
Street. The third drug buy occurred inside the men’s restroom of
the Daied store on Kaheka Street. we take judicial notice that
the distance between the Daiei store and the place where the
search warrant was executed is approximately .25 miles or about
three blocks. See State v. Puaoi, 78 Hawai'i 185, 191, 991 P.2d
272, 278 (2995) (holding that “geographical facts, such as
whether a particular address is within a certain city and county
of the state, is a proper matter subject to judicial notice"
(internal quotation marks and citations onitted)). Thus,
inasmuch as (1) the place where the first two drug buys occurred
and where the search warrant was executed was the same or similar
and (2) the third drug buy occurred within close proximity of the
place where the search warrant was executed, we likewise believe

the “place* factor has algo been met

 

With respect to the "circumstances" factor of the
Garrol] test, a close reading of our relevant case law reveals

that a common thread runs throughout these cases -- that ie, an

 

examination of whether the facts and circumstances of the first
discovered offense provided sufficient probable cause to suspect
that the defendant had committed or would commit the second

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discovered offense. For example, in Carroll, this court

determined that the two charged offen:

 

attempted criminal

property damage in the second degree and possession of an

cbnoxious substance (mace) -- were not part of the “same episode”
because,
,
prior to the identification of the mace), the facts and
bir within che firs ficar's
ae [alee e083 if che

63 Haw, at 352, 627 P.2d at 781 (emphases added). Likewise, in
utilizing a probable cause analysis, this court in Servantes

determined that the defendant's marijuana possession offenses and

 

ion offenses *[aro:

 

cocaine po from the same episode,”
reasoning that, “[mJost importantly, [the] police had probable
cause at the time of [the defendant's} arrest on the marijuana
offense to suspect (the defendant) of possession of additional
stlegal drugel, iue., cocaine].* 72 Haw. at 39, 804 P.2d at
1349. Pinally, in Keliiheleua, this court held that the

negligent injury charge and the charges in the fraud c

 

je did not

arise from the “

 

ne episode because, inter alia, “there was no
reason to suspect that(,] subsequent to causing the motor vehicle
accident, [the dlefendant would obtain an insurance policy and
then file a fraudulent ingurance claim." 105 Hawai'i at 162, 95
P.34 at 613. Based on the foregoing, we believe that the
relevant case law in this jurisdiction establishes that, when

examining the “circumstances” of offenses alleged to be part of

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the “sane episode,” thie court has focused primarily on whether
the facts and circumstances of the first discovered offense
provided sufficient probable cause to suspect that the defendant
had committed or would commit the second discovered criminal
offense

In this case, the undisputed facts and the reasonable
inferences therefrom establish that: (1) Akau sold drugs to
undercover police officers on three separate occasions, each of
which was sufficient to charge him with promoting a dangerous
Grug in the second degree; (2) the three drug buys, however, also
provided sufficient probable cause to suspect that Akau would
commit additional drug offenses; (3) rather than refer the drug
buy evidence to the prosecutors, the police opted to obtain a
search warrant based upon the drug buys; (4) the three previous
drug buys provided sufficient probable cause for the search
warrant; (5) the execution of the search warrant ultimately led
to the possession and paraphernalia charges; and (6) the
prosecutors were clearly aware of the distribution offenses at
the time they made the decision to charge Akau in the search
warrant case, Additionally, we observe that the circumstances
involved in the three undercover drug buys were also similar to
the circumstances involved in the execution of the search warrant
inasmuch as all the offenses were drug related, i.e., they

involved the sale and/or posse:

 

ion of crystal methamphetamine or
crystal methamphetamine paraphernalia. Because the circumstances

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of the drug buy cage and the search warrant case are closely
related, we believe the “circumstances* factor has been met.
Accordingly, we hold that the charged offenses in the
search warrant case and the drug buy case arose from the “same
episode" inasmuch as Akau’s conduct was “so closely related in
time, place and cixcunstances that a complete account of one

charge [could not have been] related without referring to the

 

details of the other charge." Carroll, 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d
at 780. The dissent, however, disagrees, contending that “the
offenses allegedly conmitted in the drug buy case and the
possession case [were] not so ‘closely related in time, place,
and circumstances,’ that a ‘substantial factual nexus’ existe

between the two casi xanda, 754 P.24 [377,] 362

 

[(colo, 1988) (en banc)], whereby ‘a complete account of one
charge cannot be related without referring to details of the
other charge[.]" Dissenting op. at 10-11 (bold emphasis added)
(underscored emphases provided by dissent) (citations to Carroll
omitted), The dissent’s belief that a “substantial factual

nexus” must be present misconstrues the Carroll test.

 

5 In Miranda, the Colorado Supreme Court applied the test for

determining wien two cages arose from the same episode in its wn

Suriediction. See Miranda, 754 P.24 at 380-6) (collecting cases and

Concluding that "(f]or purposes of compulsory joinder, the requirenent that
‘rise out of ‘the same criminal epigode,” must be interpreted to

je the condition that the offenses be connected in such @ manner that

provecution of the offenses involved substantially interrelated proof"). Wey

however, are bound by our own precedent, ‘Recordingly, the
e disregard of the

Gnuneiated in an out-of seal

 

 

 

  

 

     
 
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First, under the compulsory joiner statutes, multiple
offenses that are closely related in time, place, and
cArcumstances mist be known to the prosecuting officer. See HRS
§ 701-109 (2) (stating in part that ‘a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the
same conduct or arising from the same episode, if auch offenses
are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer"). and, second,
such knowledge mist be known “at the time of the commencement of
the first trial(.]* Id. (emphasis added). In other words,
because a defendant shall not be subjected to multiple trials,
prosecutors -- at the tine they review evidence submitted by the
police that involve miltiple offenses comitted by the defendant,
or at least by the tine of trial (if those offenses were charged
in separate cases) -- must necessarily consider whether the
offenses involve the same conduct or whether the alleged conduct
constitutes a single episode.

Third, in deciding the singleness of a criminal

episode, the prosecutor must,

 

indicated by our case law,
consider “whether the alleged conduct was so closely related in
time, place and circumstances that a conplete account of one
charge cannot be related without referring to details of the

other charge.” 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780. In making

charging decisions, prosecutors “ghal. or cause to
be instituted criminal charces when . . . it is obvious that the

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charges are not supported by probable cause.” Hawai'i Rules of

Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(a) (2004) (emphases added) .

 

In the instant case, the prosecutor, in making a
determination of the specific charges to be brought against Akau,

would necessarily have been required to review the police

 

affidavit in support of the search warrant -- that included a

 

factual accounting of the undercover drug buys, i.e., whether
there was probable cause to sustain criminal charges. In
conducting auch review and evaluating probable cause, it is
apparent that a complete account of the search warrant offenses
could not be made without reference to the details of the
undercover drug buys. Consequently, we also hold that all of the
offenses brought against Akau should have been joined in a single
prosecution.

Finally, our holding today is consistent with and
promotes the policies underlying Hawaii’s compulsory joinder
statutes, HRS §§ 701-211(4) (b) and 701-108(2), i.e, “fairness to

the defendant’ and “society's interest in efficient law

 

MWe recognize that, even though multiple offenses are know to the
prosecutor during the charging decision stage, the compulsory joinder statutes
Bovnce mandate that the prosecutor charge all of the offenses in a single
Sompiaint of indictment. Indeed, the prosecutor way charge the offenses in
arate couplainte or indlctsente; however, HRS § 703-109(2) appears to

EShtenplate tna, when the offenses arise from a single episode and are in the
Jurisdiction of a single court, the prosecuting officer must, at least by "the
Une of the commencement of the first trial," HRS § 701-103(2), decide to seek

(ae required by HRS § 701-209(2)) oF separate
Erlais (as permitte s"yoi-109(3))., Otherwise, once the first trial
Commences, the prosecution ruse the risk of having the subsequent-charged-
offenses diamisued of guilty verdicte on those charges overturned.

 

 
   

 

 

“31
 

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enforcement." Carroll, 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780. As
stated by this court in carroll:

Compulsory joinder of offenses which share a proximity in

 

P
conduct or episode, but it would algo save the defendant and
‘the (prosecution) time and money -]

Id, Likewise, the conmentary to HRS § 701-109(2) states that
*[t]hese rules reflect a policy that defendants should not have
to face the expense and uncertainties of two trials based on
essentially the same episode.” Connentary to HRS § 701-109. As
nore aptly stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where two

criminal cases “arise from the

 

me episode" but are not joined,
the criminal defendant is forced to “run the gauntlet repeated
times and confront the awesone resources of the state.”
Somonwealth v. Nolan, 655 A.24 634, 639 (Pa. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 180 (Pa. 1963)) (internal
quotation marks onitted)

Here, Akau wi

 

potentially facing “the expense and

uncertainties of two [criminal prosecutiona] based on essentially

 

the same episode.* Comentary to HRS § 701-109. At the time
‘Akau entered his no contest plea and wae sentenced in the search
warrant case -- in February and April 2003, respectively -- he
was unaware that law enforcement officials, who had knowledge of
the drug buy offenses, would be indicting him in the drug buy
case. Having such awareness would presunably have had some

impact on Akau‘s trial strategy, including his decision to plead

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no contest to the charges in the

 

arch warrant case. Moreover,
we observed in Carroll that HRS § 701-109(2) was “designed to
prevent the prosecution] from harassing a defendant with
successive prosecutions where the [prosecution] is dissatisfied
with the punishment previously ordered or where the {prosecution}
has previously failed to convict the defendant.” Carroll, 63
Haw. at 352, 627 P.2d at 780 (citation omitted). Inasmuch as law
enforcenent officials had knowledge of the drug buy offenses at
the time the search warrant offenses were charged, but,
nevertheless, choose to bring two separate cases at different
times, Akau was subjected to harassment with successive
prosecutions

Additionally, “society's interest in efficient law

enforcement,” Carrol], 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780, lies in

 

“judicial administration and economy," Hude, 458 A.2d at 180, As
such, we believe that, under the circumstances of the case at
bar, this policy consideration also weighs in favor of compulsory
Joinder because the prosecution could have charged all of the
offenses together in a single prosecution, which would have saved
the judiciary the expenses associated with having to deal with
the two cases separately, including the potential of holding two
trials. To hold otherwise would “unduly encourage pursuit and
surveillance for lengthy periods of time and multiple
prosecutions from the eventual arrest,” Morgan v. State, 469

8.8.24 340, 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), @ result surely not

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supported by either the plain language or purpose of HRS
§§ 701-111 (3) (b) and 701-109(2). Although the prosecution claims
that it could not bring all the charges in a single prosecution
because one of the undercover officers involved in the drug buys
had not yet “surfaced,” the prosecution's claim is weakened by
officer Silva’s testimony that, even after Akau was indicted in
the drug buy case, one of the undercover officers involved in the
drug buys had not yet surfaced. In other words, it appears that
the “surfacing of undercover officers does not necessarily
affect the prosecution's ability to bring charges based on
undercover drug buys. As such, the policies expressed by ERS

$5 701-211(1) (b) and 701-109(2) further compel this court to
conclude that the offenses contained in the search warrant case
and the offenses contained in the drug buy case should have been
Joined in a single prosecution.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that the
circuit court erred in denying Akau’s motion to dismiss based
upon the prosecution’s failure to join the search warrant
offenses and the drug buy offenses ina single prosecution. As
such, we also hold that the ICA erred in affirming the circuit
court's erroneous denial.

3. Akau's Remaining Contention

Akau additionally argues that the ICA erred in

affirming the circuit court's denial of his motion to be

sentenced

 

a first-time drug offender pursuant to HRS

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§ 706-622.5. However, in light of our holding, as discussed
above, we need not examine Akau’s remaining contention on
application.
Iv. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that, inasmuch as the

offenses associated with the

 

oh warrant case and the drug buy
case should have been joined in a single prosecution, pursuant to
RS § 701-109(2), the prosecution of the drug buy case was barred
by HRS § 701-211(3) (b). Accordingly, we reverse the ICA's
october 12, 2007 judgment on appeal and the circuit court's
october 15, 2004 judguent of conviction in the drug buy case.
cnr retieioner defendant Yror—

Eppeliant, on the

application Besa TRL.
Loren J. Thomas, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney, for Goren 6. Otis bre
respondent /plaintiff~
appellee

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