Title: Woodbury v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-8 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL LAWRENCE WOODBURY, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
April 15, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Michael Lawrence Woodbury appeals his conviction of first-
degree murder and sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In March 2018, Woodbury was indicted on one count of first-
degree murder for killing his cellmate, Antoneeze Haynes.  At the 
time of the offense, Woodbury was serving life sentences for killing 
three people in New Hampshire during a 2007 robbery.   
 
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The evidence presented at trial showed that on September 22, 
2017, Woodbury barricaded the door to the cell he shared with 
Haynes and then proceeded to brutally assault Haynes for hours, 
using his fists, boots, and makeshift weapons Woodbury had 
gathered in preparation for the attack.  Woodbury appeared to 
delight in torturing Haynes, at one point telling the victim: “I know 
it hurts, I know.  You deserved that one, you know you did.  It’s 
called torture.  Welcome to the house of pain.  Welcome to the 
house of pain.  The house of pain actually exists.  It’s in the ninth 
level of hell.  I used to run it.”  The assault lasted about four hours, 
and it involved what Woodbury admitted was a hostage situation, 
with Woodbury threatening to further harm Haynes if officers on 
the scene failed to meet Woodbury’s demands.  At one point, 
Woodbury instructed the correctional officers to take away medical 
equipment that had been brought in to treat the victim, saying: 
“You’re probably going to need a body bag, but not medical 
equipment.  You can take that stuff with you.”  Woodbury only 
stopped assaulting Haynes and surrendered when he realized a 
forcible extraction was imminent. 
 
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At his first appearance in court, Woodbury invoked his right to 
represent himself at trial, which prompted the court to conduct a 
Faretta1 inquiry.  Woodbury indicated that he understood every 
question asked and informed the court that he was taking 
medication for treatment of bipolar disorder.  The next time 
Woodbury appeared in court, he remained adamant about wanting 
to represent himself at trial, and when the court explained the 
advantages of counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation, 
Woodbury said he understood.  He expressed frustration when told 
to expect renewed offers of counsel and Faretta inquiries 
throughout the proceedings.   
The court asked Woodbury about his history of bipolar 
disorder and Woodbury told the court that he had experienced 
“[m]ood swings, just stuff like that.”  The court also asked about the 
treatment Woodbury was undergoing for his disorder and asked if 
there were any physical issues that would impair Woodbury’s ability 
to represent himself, and Woodbury said he had no other issues.  
The court granted Woodbury’s request to proceed pro se, finding 
 
1.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 
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that Woodbury’s waiver of counsel was made freely and voluntarily 
with a full understanding of his rights, and that Woodbury was 
competent to make that decision.  With Woodbury’s agreement, the 
court appointed standby counsel for Woodbury and told him that 
counsel would be appointed to represent him if, at any point in the 
proceedings, he ever decided that he wanted an attorney.   
  
At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the trial court conducted 
another Faretta inquiry and again found Woodbury competent to 
waive counsel and that he had done so knowingly and intelligently.  
The State asked the court to conduct new Faretta inquiries each 
day of the trial to perfect the record.  Woodbury objected to having 
to endure so many inquiries, saying he had read more than 105 
cases and failure to conduct repeated Faretta inquiries was not a 
basis for appeal.   
Woodbury’s trial began on May 14, 2018.  On the first day of 
trial, the court renewed the offer of counsel and conducted another 
lengthy Faretta inquiry.  Woodbury maintained his decision to 
proceed pro se, explaining that he would want an attorney to 
handle his appeal if he were to be convicted but that he did not 
want counsel for the trial.  Woodbury answered more questions 
 
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about his bipolar disorder and other issues that might affect his 
ability to proceed pro se.  The court again found that Woodbury 
understood the charges against him and the consequences of 
waiving counsel, and found that he had voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel.   
During jury selection that same day, Woodbury conducted voir 
dire on the potential jurors and occasionally consulted with his 
standby counsel.  The State asked for a finding on Woodbury’s 
competence and demeanor, and the court said: 
I think you’ve done actually very well for somebody in 
your circumstance with what you’re charged with, the 
seriousness of it . . . .  I actually will compliment you on 
your behavior.  It’s a little more laid back than an 
attorney is going to do, there’s no question about that, 
you know what I mean.  But overall I think you’ve 
complied with the general courtroom demeanor that’s 
necessary and I appreciate that for what it’s worth. 
. . . . 
 
. . . You’d be surprised, some people come here unrepresented 
and you can’t figure what their focus is.  Yours I think is 
pretty clear.  So I’ll leave the record at that and I think it’s 
actually . . . quite impressive. 
 
The following day, the court renewed the offer of counsel and 
Woodbury maintained his insistence on representing himself.  The 
 
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trial court found that Woodbury was competent to waive his right to 
counsel and that he had done so knowingly and voluntarily. 
In his opening statement to the jury, Woodbury claimed that 
the victim had tried to sexually assault him and that the assault 
and killing of the victim was in response to that attempted sexual 
assault.  Woodbury admitted, however, that he “went berserk” and 
that he kicked the victim in the face “like a 50-yard field goal that 
would have been good from 60.”   
During the State’s case-in-chief, law enforcement officers and 
prison staff provided gruesome details about Woodbury’s four-hour 
assault on the victim.  Correctional officers testified that they were 
unable to enter the cell because Woodbury had barricaded the door, 
but that they could see Woodbury through a window and could see 
another inmate lying face down on a bunk with blood “all over the 
place.”  The State introduced photographs of the victim’s extensive 
injuries, and the medical examiner testified that by the time officers 
got into Woodbury’s cell, the victim had died from severe blunt force 
trauma, and that he died experiencing a “great, great, great deal of 
suffering.” 
 
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During a brief recess to discuss time to call defense witnesses, 
Woodbury told the court that he was planning to change his plea to 
guilty.  He said, “I know, it’s crazy, but that’s what I’m doing 
tomorrow.  I’ll be changing my plea to guilty of first-degree murder 
tomorrow after I get done testifying.”  The next day of trial, the court 
renewed the offer of counsel and conducted a truncated Faretta 
inquiry.  The court stated that a full inquiry was unnecessary 
because one had already been conducted during the same stage of 
the proceeding.  The State called Major Frank Gatto, who testified 
that Woodbury was “very malicious . . . in his intent on what he 
was trying to do” and appeared “methodical” with his actions, which 
“seemed to be almost planned out, like he had a plan in mind.”  The 
State played a lengthy video recording filmed during Woodbury’s 
assault on the victim, in which Woodbury could be heard 
assaulting, torturing, and tormenting the victim. 
The next day of trial began with another renewed offer of 
counsel, and Woodbury said he understood the disadvantages of 
representing himself and rejected the offer.  The trial court found 
that Woodbury was competent to waive counsel and had done so 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  When the State rested, the 
 
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court began yet another Faretta inquiry, but Woodbury objected, 
declaring: “I have a constitutional right to represent myself, and 
this has rose to the level of harassment.”  The court replied: 
You know what.  For the record, I don’t disagree.  I think 
the fact is you’ve understood this the multiple times I’ve 
done it.  That doing it again, if an appellate court were to 
think that it’s a good idea to do this as often as we have, I 
think that I would disagree with them and you’d be in 
agreement with me.  However, the above trial level courts 
have a different way of viewing things.  They’re not as 
worried about practicality as they are about structural 
integrity of the system.  So I’m going to go through them 
relatively quickly, you can answer them yes or no.  If at 
any point, though, you do have a question, please let me 
know.  So, again, I’m going to do it relatively quickly. 
 
Woodbury asked the court: “[H]ow long do I got to answer?  We’re 
going to play the game now. . . .  Do I got five minutes, ten minutes?  
I might want to think about each question and consider it.”  
Woodbury insisted that his right to represent himself superseded 
the need for constant Faretta inquiries, and he threatened to stall 
the proceedings.  The court asked, “[A]m I right to conclude you are 
requesting the Court not to ask you these questions at this time?”  
Woodbury stated that this was exactly what he was requesting and 
declared that in all the cases he had read, “every time they only did 
the Faretta hearing one time and that was enough.”  Woodbury 
 
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acknowledged that a new Faretta inquiry would be required before 
moving to the penalty phase, and he said he would cooperate fully 
with that inquiry when the time came.  The court found that 
Woodbury validly requested to forgo a Faretta inquiry before the 
defense case-in-chief, and that Woodbury had knowingly and 
voluntarily waived counsel and was competent to do so. 
During the defense case-in-chief, Woodbury briefly called two 
defense witnesses and then took the stand on his own behalf.  He 
testified that he woke up on the morning in question to find the 
victim attempting to sexually assault him.  Woodbury admitted he 
had a weapon at the ready but he claimed the victim’s death was 
not premeditated, saying: “[I]f I was planning on killing my 
roommate before I went to bed, I would have at least put a point on 
my knife.”  He also admitted to holding the victim hostage but 
claimed he only did so to stall for time until a tactical team with 
cameras arrived.  He insisted he did not wish to keep hurting the 
victim but that the victim kept sitting up, and so “every time he sat 
up, [Woodbury] refreshed him with the business.”   
After giving the jury his version of events, Woodbury declared 
in open court: “So in the eyes of the law, you know, what the 
 
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prosecution has charged me with is true.  And at this time, I’d like 
to plead guilty to first-degree premeditated murder, your Honor.  
What you got?”   
The trial court quickly excused the jury and then went 
through the plea form line-by-line, with Woodbury’s input.  The 
court conducted a colloquy on the voluntariness of Woodbury’s 
plea, and Woodbury indicated that he understood that the death 
sentence was still a possibility.  Before it accepted Woodbury’s plea, 
the court renewed the offer of counsel, conducted another Faretta 
inquiry, and found that Woodbury was competent to waive his right 
to counsel.  The court then complimented Woodbury again, stating: 
[Y]our ability to understand, you’re obviously intelligent 
and you have been able to handle yourself in court, 
whether it’s questioning or just behavior or being -- being 
able to ask your standby counsel.  Even asking to do so, 
you’ve been polite, you’ve been courteous, and I think 
your behavior has been, compared to all the other pro se 
people in the past, actually better than all of them 
combined. 
 
Woodbury told the court that his standby counsel had provided 
excellent assistance with all legal questions, and the trial court 
accepted Woodbury’s guilty plea.  Woodbury then asked to be 
permitted to represent himself at the penalty phase trial and said 
 
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he had consulted with standby counsel about that decision.  The 
court ordered a presentencing investigation, and the State asked 
the court to appoint a mental health expert for potential mitigation.  
Three days later, the court appointed Dr. Joseph Sesta to conduct a 
mental health evaluation for mitigation. 
Woodbury’s penalty phase trial began on July 23, 2018.  The 
proceeding began with another renewed offer of counsel and Faretta 
inquiry, and with the court taking judicial notice of Woodbury’s 
previous statements about his bipolar disorder.  Woodbury 
indicated that he understood the rights he was waiving and the 
disadvantages of self-representation, and the court granted his 
request to proceed pro se after finding him competent to waive his 
right to counsel.   
Woodbury asked the court to read either of two special jury 
instructions Woodbury had prepared that would have informed the 
jurors that even if they found death to be justifiable, they could still 
recommend life in prison as an act of mercy.  Following a recess 
and an abridged Faretta inquiry, the court rejected Woodbury’s 
instructions.  Woodbury did not object to the final instructions 
read.   
 
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The State presented penalty phase testimony from law 
enforcement officers and victims of Woodbury’s prior crimes, 
introduced fingerprint evidence and a judgment from another case 
to show that Woodbury had prior convictions for robbery and three 
other murders, and presented evidence to show that Woodbury 
killed his cellmate while serving a sentence of imprisonment and 
that the killing was particularly heinous and cruel.  The State also 
played portions of an interview given shortly after the murder, in 
which Woodbury made no mention of the victim attempting to 
sexually assault him but did describe how he had sharpened a 
piece of metal, taken a lock from his locker, waited until an inept 
correctional officer was on duty, put on and laced up his boots, and 
barricaded his cell door to prevent entry by responding officers.  
Woodbury testified on his own behalf.  He admitted that his assault 
on the victim constituted torture, but he claimed that the victim 
had tried to rape him and that “it was getback time. . . .  It was just 
getback, it was just vengeance, it was just wanting to hurt you for 
what you tried to do to me, for what you thought you could do. . . .  
That’s really why I did what I did.” 
 
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The court instructed the jury that in order to recommend the 
death penalty, it must unanimously find that at least one 
aggravating factor had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The court read instructions on the four aggravators alleged by the 
State: (1) Woodbury was previously convicted of a felony and under 
sentence of imprisonment; (2) he was previously convicted of 
another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to another person; (3) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the murder was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral 
or legal justification.  The court then instructed the jury to consider 
mitigation, such as whether the crime was committed while 
Woodbury was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance or 
any other factors that mitigate against the death penalty.  The jury 
unanimously recommended the death penalty after unanimously 
finding that the State had proved all four aggravators alleged and 
that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and were sufficient 
to impose death. 
 
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A Spencer2 hearing was held on September 21, 2018.  It began 
with a Faretta inquiry that included asking Woodbury if he 
understood that the State was in possession of mental health 
mitigation evidence.  Woodbury said he understood all questions 
asked.  The court asked Woodbury about his bipolar disorder and 
treatment for it.  Woodbury said he began taking Tegretol shortly 
after the murder, that he took it consistently during the trial, and 
that it did not affect his ability to understand the proceedings.  The 
court asked Woodbury if he had been diagnosed with any other 
mental illnesses.  When he said no, the court replied: “You had 
hesitation. It’s fine with me if you answer it.  I mean, now–look, it’s 
for your benefit.”  Woodbury said: “None that I believe.”  The court 
found that Woodbury knowingly and intelligently waived counsel 
and was competent to do so.   
Standby counsel testified at the hearing that Woodbury knew 
there was a factual basis for mental health mitigation, including 
opinions contained in the report written by Dr. Sesta, but that 
Woodbury elected not to present any such mitigation.  When 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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pressed on that issue by Woodbury, standby counsel agreed with 
Woodbury that the decision was strategic in nature—that Woodbury 
already had a penalty phase strategy and never intended to present 
mental health mitigation.  After Woodbury explained why he did not 
wish to present mental health mitigation on his own behalf, the 
State offered Dr. Sesta’s report into evidence, and the court 
admitted the report for potential mitigation. 
Woodbury was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to death.  In 
the sentencing order, the court found that all four aggravators 
alleged by the State had been proved and assigned great weight to 
each aggravator.  The court then examined whether the murder was 
committed while Woodbury was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.  The court found that although 
there was no competent evidence to support that mitigator, it could 
not say there was no evidence whatsoever in the record, and so 
assigned the mitigator minimal weight.  The court then examined 
whether Woodbury’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired, finding that this mitigator was never raised 
 
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and that any applicability would be covered by the findings on 
mental or emotional disturbance.   
The court also found that although the facts cast doubt on 
Woodbury’s version of the incident, there was at least some 
mitigation on that issue in the record, but only worthy of minimal 
weight.  In addition, the court found that although Woodbury did 
not present any mental health mitigation on his own behalf, there 
was mental health mitigation in the record because Dr. Sesta’s 
report mentioned bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.  The court 
assigned little weight to Woodbury’s diagnosis and history of bipolar 
disorder and assigned minimal weight to Dr. Sesta’s mention of 
schizophrenia.  After making findings on each aggravator and 
mitigator, the court sentenced Woodbury to death. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In this direct appeal of the judgment of conviction and 
sentence of death, Woodbury argues that the trial court erred by: (1) 
granting Woodbury’s waiver of counsel and request to proceed pro 
se without first ordering a mental health evaluation; (2) failing to 
sua sponte order a competency hearing to determine if Woodbury 
was competent to stand trial; (3) accepting a guilty plea that was 
 
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not entered intelligently and voluntarily and had no factual basis; 
(4) failing to renew the offer of counsel at the start of the defense 
case-in-chief and when Woodbury announced his change of plea; (5) 
accepting Woodbury’s waiver of mental health mitigation without 
appointing special counsel to present mitigation evidence; (6) 
finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner, and instructing the jury on that aggravator; 
(7) admitting a noncomprehensive presentence investigation report 
that contained impermissible sentencing recommendations; (8) 
assigning minimal weight to the mitigator of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance; (9) rejecting a requested special jury 
instruction on mercy; and (10) failing to instruct the jury that it 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigators and were sufficient for the death 
penalty.3  We address each claim in turn, and for the reasons set 
forth below, we affirm Woodbury’s conviction and sentence of death. 
 
3.  Woodbury also asserts that the court’s failure to consider 
mitigators precludes us from conducting proportionality review.  In 
light of our recent decision in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 
(Fla. 2020), we need not address this claim. 
 
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1. Competency to Stand Trial and the Right to Self-
Representation 
Woodbury insists that the record shows that the trial court 
knew of Woodbury’s history of bipolar disorder and observed 
instances of erratic behavior from Woodbury in court.  Thus, 
Woodbury argues that the trial court knew he suffered from a 
severe mental illness to the point of being incompetent to conduct 
the proceedings without assistance and should therefore have 
denied his request to proceed pro se at trial.  Even more 
fundamentally, Woodbury argues that his bipolar disorder diagnosis 
and erratic behavior gave the trial court reasonable ground to 
believe Woodbury was not mentally competent to stand trial, and 
that the court should therefore have ordered a competency hearing 
before proceeding. 
A. Whether a Competency Hearing was Required  
An accused has a right to adequate process to ensure he is not 
tried or sentenced while mentally incompetent to stand trial.  Pate 
v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).  Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.210(b) provides: 
If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the 
court of its own motion, or on motion of counsel for the 
 
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defendant or for the state, has reasonable ground to 
believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to 
proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order 
setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s 
mental condition . . . . 
 
When a defendant claims a trial court failed to order a competency 
hearing, either sua sponte or on request from a party, we will 
uphold the court’s determination absent an abuse of discretion.  
Rodgers v. State, 3 So. 3d 1127, 1132 (Fla. 2009). 
Woodbury argues that his admission of bipolar disorder gave 
the court reasonable ground to believe he was not mentally 
competent, but “[n]ot every manifestation of mental illness 
demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence 
must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand 
the charges.”  Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 913 (Fla. 2013) 
(defendant’s disclosure of mental illness did not require the trial 
court to order a competency hearing because nothing about the 
defendant’s behavior during the proceedings created grounds to 
believe he was incompetent) (quoting Card v. Singletary, 981 F.2d 
481, 487-88 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 
20, 29 (Fla. 2010) (defendant’s suicide attempt and treatment with 
 
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antipsychotic medication did not raise doubts about his 
competency to stand trial).   
Like the defendant in Barnes, Woodbury disclosed a history 
and diagnosis of bipolar disorder, but nothing about his behavior in 
court indicated a present inability to understand the proceedings 
against him or an inability to consult with his standby counsel (or 
with counsel, had an attorney been appointed).  Woodbury filed 
motions on his own behalf, was consistently alert, demonstrated 
knowledge of legal issues, behaved appropriately, and stated 
multiple times that he understood the proceedings.  At no time did 
the trial court, Woodbury’s standby counsel, or the attorneys for the 
State express any concerns about Woodbury’s competency.  Rather, 
the trial court outright praised Woodbury more than once for his 
ability to conduct himself appropriately and properly engage with 
the court, jury, and standby counsel.  The court went so far as to 
call Woodbury’s behavior better than all other pro se defendants the 
court had seen, combined.  
Woodbury invokes Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 179 
(1975), where the Supreme Court held that a trial court ignored 
details that raised doubts about the defendant’s competency.  But 
 
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the defendant in Drope did not merely disclose a history of mental 
illness and demonstrate attention problems; he attempted suicide 
during the trial.  Id. at 180.  That suicide attempt plus uncontested 
testimony about the defendant’s wildly irrational recent behavior—
including trying to choke his wife to death just before trial—created 
sufficient grounds to doubt the defendant’s competency to stand 
trial.  Id.   
Here, by contrast, Woodbury did nothing so extreme as 
attempting suicide during the trial, and the trial court was given no 
evidence of wildly irrational recent behavior.4  Woodbury points to 
moments from trial that supposedly show erratic and irrational 
behavior, but at most, the cited conduct suggests attention span 
problems or overconfidence; nothing put the court on notice that 
Woodbury had a present inability to understand the proceedings or 
to consult with counsel.5   
 
4.  Certainly, Woodbury’s behavior during the assault of the 
victim could be described as irrational, but that was not as recent 
as the pretrial behavior in Drope, and the court here conducted in-
depth inquiries into the mental health treatment and medication 
Woodbury had received following the murder. 
 
5.  Woodbury further argues that the side effects of his 
medication created reasonable ground to doubt his competency to 
 
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Likewise, although Dr. Sesta’s psychological report, which was 
entered for potential mitigation, described Woodbury as having a 
fluctuating attention span, the report never suggested that 
Woodbury’s behavior during the examination indicated an inability 
to understand the charges or consult with counsel.  Thus, even 
though the trial court knew that Woodbury had been diagnosed 
with (and treated for) bipolar disorder, nothing about his behavior 
in court, and nothing presented to the trial court, created a 
reasonable ground to believe Woodbury was not mentally competent 
to stand trial.  Accordingly, the trial court was not required to sua 
sponte order a competency hearing. 
B. Whether the Court Erred in Granting Woodbury’s Request to 
Represent Himself at Trial 
Woodbury argues that even if he was competent to stand trial, 
the trial court knew he had a severe mental illness that rendered 
him incompetent to represent himself, and that the trial court 
therefore erred in granting his request to proceed pro se.  Trial 
 
stand trial.  But the side effects he said he had experienced were 
sleepiness, nervousness, blurry vision, and trouble urinating.  
Woodbury points to no authority declaring that these side effects 
create grounds to doubt one’s ability to understand the trial 
proceedings or assist counsel.  
 
- 23 - 
court rulings regarding competency to waive counsel are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.  Trease v. State, 41 So. 3d 119, 124 (Fla. 
2010). 
An accused has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself 
at trial.  Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 2008).  And while 
an accused also has a right to the assistance of counsel, that right 
confers just what it says—assistance.  “To thrust counsel upon the 
accused, against his considered wish . . . violates the logic of the 
[Sixth] Amendment.  In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, 
but a master . . . .”  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.  Therefore, each 
defendant “must be free personally to decide whether in his 
particular case counsel is to his advantage.  And although he may 
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice 
must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the 
lifeblood of the law.’ ”  Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 
337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
Given the constitutional right to self-representation, “once an 
unequivocal request for self-representation is made, the trial court 
is obligated to hold a hearing, to determine whether the defendant 
is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed 
 
- 24 - 
counsel.”  Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 378.  The purpose of this inquiry 
(often called a Faretta inquiry) is not to assess whether the 
defendant possesses a degree of technical skill at trial advocacy, but 
whether his waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent.  McKenzie 
v. State, 29 So. 3d 272, 281 (Fla. 2010); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. 
at 835 (“Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and 
experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to 
choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . .”).   
That said, while technical skill is not part of the Faretta 
calculus, “the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and 
efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in 
acting as his own lawyer.”  Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 
(2008) (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162 
(2000)).  Thus, after conducting a Faretta inquiry, a trial court may 
preclude a defendant from exercising his right to proceed pro se if 
the court finds that the defendant is “unable to carry out the basic 
 
- 25 - 
tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of 
counsel.”  Id. at 175-76.6 
In Florida, Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) addresses 
the right to self-representation.  It accounts for the aforementioned 
bases by which a court may lawfully force counsel on an unwilling 
defendant, stating: 
Regardless of the defendant’s legal skills or the 
complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a 
defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself or 
herself, if the court makes a determination of record that 
the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of the right to counsel, and does not suffer from severe 
mental illness to the point where the defendant is not 
competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself or 
herself. 
 
Fla. R. Crim P. 3.111(d)(3).  Thus, a Florida trial court may deny a 
defendant’s request to proceed pro se if: (1) the defendant’s waiver 
of his right to counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently; or 
(2) the defendant suffers from severe mental illness to the point of 
being incompetent to conduct trial proceedings without assistance.  
 
6.  In Edwards, the Supreme Court did not define these “basic 
tasks,” but it did cite a case declaring that basic trial tasks included 
“organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law, 
participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the 
court and jury.”  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (citing McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)). 
 
- 26 - 
The competency standard to waive one’s right to counsel is the 
same as the competency standard to stand trial, whereas the 
competency standard to conduct trial proceedings without 
assistance is somewhat higher.  See Wall v. State, 238 So. 3d 127, 
140 (Fla. 2018) (“[D]efendants may be competent to waive counsel 
yet incompetent to represent themselves.”).   
Here, starting from his first appearance, Woodbury never 
wavered in his insistence on representing himself at trial.  As it was 
required to do upon receiving an unequivocal request for self-
representation, the trial court explained the benefits of counsel and 
the pitfalls of self-representation and conducted a full Faretta 
inquiry.  The court renewed the offer of counsel and conducted 
additional Faretta inquiries approximately a dozen times over the 
course of the proceedings.7  At the conclusion of each inquiry, the 
court found that Woodbury’s rejection of the offer of counsel was 
 
7.  We do not suggest that all of these offers and Faretta 
inquiries were legally required.  The record indicates that the trial 
court conducted so many inquiries to ensure that the offer of 
counsel was renewed at all critical stages of the proceedings.  
Nothing in the record suggests that any of the inquiries were 
prompted by new concerns about Woodbury’s behavior or 
competency. 
 
- 27 - 
knowing and intelligent and that Woodbury was competent to make 
his decision.  We agree.  Woodbury responded appropriately to the 
court’s questions and indicated that he understood both the 
proceedings against him and the rights he was giving up by 
proceeding pro se.   
That leaves the question whether Woodbury’s behavior in 
court, together with his bipolar disorder diagnosis, required the trial 
court to find that Woodbury suffered from severe mental illness to 
the point of being incompetent to conduct the proceedings by 
himself.  To that end, Woodbury filed pro se discovery motions and 
a demand for speedy trial, conducted voir dire examination of the 
potential jurors by himself, cross-examined witnesses, argued 
evidentiary objections, and even requested a special jury instruction 
derived from the federal standard instructions.  In fact, the record 
reveals several instances where Woodbury’s pro se representation 
could easily be mistaken for the work of a veteran trial attorney.   
Take for example this excerpt from voir dire of Woodbury 
questioning a potential juror’s ability to set aside biases and 
consider mitigation: 
 
- 28 - 
MR. WOODBURY: Sir, just three minutes ago you 
said you have a very biblical view of the Bible, that it 
should be an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for 
a life.  With respect to what he just said, do you still feel 
like that now? 
 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I have to say yes, but you 
still have to take each situation, you know, you have to 
take each case, case by case. 
 
MR. WOODBURY: So would -- so I am to 
understand that you can look past the Bible and obey 
Florida law and give consideration to mitigators such as 
self-defense, a bad childhood, level of involvement, all the 
mitigators that may be out there, you can give due 
consideration even though now the Florida law has 
trumped your Bible law, you’re not going to have a 
problem with that? 
 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No.  I can – that’s tough. 
 
Thus, Woodbury’s behavior in court defeats any claim that he 
was not competent to conduct the proceedings on his own.  And 
Woodbury cites no authority—and we are aware of none—where a 
bipolar disorder diagnosis, without more, established that a 
defendant suffered from severe mental illness to the point of being 
incompetent to conduct trial proceedings without assistance.  
Woodbury’s own arguments on appeal describe bipolar disorder as 
a broad spectrum of mental conditions, with varying degrees of 
symptoms and severity, including “hypomania,” which Woodbury 
 
- 29 - 
describes as a less severe form of mania in which individuals are 
able to function well in social situations or at work and can retain 
the ability to act rationally on subjects beyond the sphere of the 
controlling delusion.  Given that certain people with bipolar 
disorder function well and act rationally, we see no logic in creating 
a per se rule or presumption that all individuals with bipolar 
disorder suffer so severely from mental illness that they are unable 
to carry out basic trial tasks without assistance.   
Woodbury points out that some individuals with bipolar 
disorder exhibit “confusion and poor judgment” and “potential 
disordered thinking,” but these are only possible symptoms of 
bipolar disorder.  When asked how bipolar disorder affected him 
personally, Woodbury told the trial court that prior to taking 
Tegretol (which he claimed was very effective at treating his 
symptoms), he experienced “[m]ood swings, just stuff like that.”  
Mood swings, without more, do not indicate that a defendant is 
suffering from a severe mental illness to the point of incompetency.  
Accordingly, on this record, knowledge of Woodbury’s bipolar 
disorder did not require the court to go beyond a Faretta inquiry 
before granting Woodbury’s request to proceed pro se. 
 
- 30 - 
Woodbury argues that in addition to his history of bipolar 
disorder, his erratic courtroom behavior created reasonable ground 
to doubt his competence.  Woodbury points out that he: (1) filed a 
demand for speedy trial before receiving any discovery; (2) 
announced he was ready to start trial just a month after being 
arrested; (3) indicated that he was unconcerned about the guilt 
phase; (4) compared the likelihood of a death penalty 
recommendation to getting struck by lightning; (5) said his prison 
outfit and handcuffs made for “excellent” courtroom attire; (6) told 
the jury he had chosen to represent himself because it was simple; 
(7) admitted his guilt during his guilt phase testimony; and (8) 
goaded the jurors by telling them to sentence him to death if it 
would make them feel better. 
Even without any context, most of these purportedly erratic 
moments merely suggest a lack of technical skill.  They can be 
considered “irrational” only insofar as they imply a nonchalant 
attitude from Woodbury about being found guilty.  But Woodbury 
was already serving life sentences for three prior murders; the only 
way this trial could have affected him in any meaningful sense was 
in the penalty phase.  In fact, Woodbury told the court that he 
 
- 31 - 
expected to be found guilty and that his focus was on sentencing.  
Thus, the cited behavior suggesting a blasé attitude toward a guilty 
verdict did not create grounds to doubt his competence. 
As to the “lightning strike” comment, although Woodbury’s 
appellate counsel frames this remark as a manic rant showing that 
Woodbury believed he was more likely to get struck by lightning 
than get the death penalty, Woodbury was not raving about the 
likelihood of weather phenomena.  He was explaining to the court 
that while he was confident a jury would recommend a life 
sentence, he wanted a guilt phase trial “in case lightning strikes 
and somehow you find 12 people to agree and I get the death 
penalty, I want appeal issues for the guilt phase.”  If this comment 
demonstrates anything, it is not that Woodbury had erratic 
outbursts in court; it is that he was cognizant of the fact that a 
death penalty recommendation was possible notwithstanding his 
confidence in his penalty phase case, and that an appellate record 
would be helpful should he need to appeal.   
Woodbury further argues that Dr. Sesta’s psychological report 
created doubts about Woodbury’s competence to proceed pro se.  In 
that report, Dr. Sesta opined that Woodbury was experiencing an 
 
- 32 - 
active manic episode during the examination, had a fluctuating 
attention span, made some inappropriate comments, and was 
undermedicated.  But Woodbury points to no case where 
inattentiveness or overenthusiasm rendered a defendant 
incompetent to represent himself at trial. 
In sum, nothing in the record shows that the court abused its 
discretion by finding that Woodbury knowingly and intelligently 
rejected the court’s offer of counsel, or that the court was required 
to find that Woodbury suffered from severe mental illness to the 
point of incompetency.  Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing 
Woodbury to invoke his constitutional right to conduct his own 
defense. 
2. Woodbury’s Guilty Plea  
Woodbury argues that the trial court erred in accepting his 
guilty plea.  He insists that his decision to change his plea to guilty 
in open court, in front of the jury, gave the trial court reasonable 
ground to believe he was not mentally competent to enter the plea.  
Woodbury further argues that the trial court erred in finding that 
there was a factual basis for the plea.  We find no error on either 
basis. 
 
- 33 - 
A. Whether the Court Erred in Finding Woodbury Competent to 
Plead Guilty  
 
The competency standard to plead guilty is the same as the 
competency standard to stand trial, Wall, 238 So. 3d at 140, and 
so, “[d]uring ‘any material stage’ of a criminal proceeding, a 
defendant must immediately be examined for competence if the trial 
court ‘has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not 
mentally competent to proceed.’ ”  Id. (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.210(b)).  “If that sufficient basis exists, the trial court ‘shall 
immediately enter its order setting a time for a [competency] 
hearing . . . and may order the defendant to be examined by no 
more than 3 experts, as needed, prior to the date of the hearing.’ ”  
Id. (modifications in original) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b)).  
“Due process requires a court accepting a guilty plea to carefully 
inquire into the defendant’s understanding of the plea, so that the 
record contains an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligent 
and voluntary.”  Sanchez-Torres v. State, 130 So. 3d 661, 668 (Fla. 
2013) (quoting Koenig v. State, 597 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1992)).   
Woodbury points out that when he initially told the court that 
he was planning to change his plea to guilty, he himself called the 
 
- 34 - 
decision “crazy.”  But while the decision to change one’s plea in 
open court may be unorthodox, and while Woodbury may have 
believed at the time that he was doing something crazy, he points to 
no authority declaring that announcing a change of plea in front of 
a jury creates reasonable ground to believe the defendant is not 
mentally competent.   
In any event, the trial court did not simply accept Woodbury’s 
plea without question.  It went through a colloquy with Woodbury 
to determine if his plea was being entered intelligently and 
voluntarily, and it explained to Woodbury that first-degree murder 
has only two possible sentences: life in prison and the death 
penalty.  The court also told Woodbury that the plea form would 
indicate that there was no agreement for his open plea, meaning 
Woodbury could still be sentenced to death.  Woodbury said he 
understood.  The court then went through the plea form line-by-line 
with Woodbury to make sure he understood what he was doing, 
and at no time did Woodbury say anything that suggested he did 
not understand the plea or the consequences of pleading guilty.8  
 
8.  The State argues that Woodbury’s decision to change his 
plea in open court was an attempt to game the system by 
 
- 35 - 
On this record, we find no error in finding Woodbury competent to 
enter a guilty plea. 
B. Whether There Was a Factual Basis for the Plea 
Woodbury argues that the trial court erred in finding that 
there was a factual basis for his guilty plea.  “[I]n order to challenge 
a guilty plea for lack of a factual basis determination by the trial 
judge, a defendant must show prejudice or manifest injustice.”  
State v. Kendrick, 336 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 1976).  The inquiry to 
determine if a plea has a factual basis “need not be a ‘mini-trial’ ”; a 
court may be satisfied from “statements and admissions made by 
the defendant, or by his counsel, or by the prosecutor.”  Farr v. 
State, 124 So. 3d 766, 778 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Monroe v. State, 318 
So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)); see also Santiago-Gonzalez v. 
 
presenting a sympathetic explanation for his actions and then avoid 
a damning cross-examination that would have impeached him with 
prior inconsistent statements and convictions for felonies and 
crimes of dishonesty.  It is true that Woodbury objected when told 
he might still be cross-examined, and that he said his plea change 
was “110 percent my idea to spin a circle around you like I said I 
was going to.”  But it matters not why Woodbury chose to change 
his plea the way he did; what matters is that his actions did not 
establish reasonable grounds to believe his plea was not being 
entered voluntarily and intelligently.  See Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 
1276 (Fla. 2009). 
 
- 36 - 
State, 301 So. 3d 157, 180 (Fla. 2020) (“The State provided a factual 
basis for the murder, to which the defense conceded for the purpose 
of the guilty plea.”).  However, when the defendant raises the 
possibility of a defense to his guilty plea during the plea colloquy, 
“the potential prejudice is apparent” and so the trial judge “should 
make extensive inquiry into factual basis before accepting the guilty 
plea.”  Kendrick, 336 So. 2d at 355. 
Here, the trial court did not err in finding a factual basis for 
Woodbury’s guilty plea to premeditated first-degree murder.  During 
the trial, law enforcement and correctional officers who responded 
to the incident described Woodbury’s assault on the victim as 
“methodical” and planned out.  And video played at trial showed 
that Woodbury had weapons on hand and that he brutally attacked 
the victim several times after the victim had been completely 
incapacitated.   
Woodbury also said nothing during the plea colloquy 
suggesting a defense to premeditated murder.  Although he testified 
on the stand that he had no intent to kill the victim when he went 
to bed the night before, this does not establish a defense to the 
charged offense such that an extensive inquiry into factual basis 
 
- 37 - 
was required, for “[p]remeditation can be formed in a moment and 
need only exist ‘for such time as will allow the accused to be 
conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the 
probable result of that act.’ ”  DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440, 
441 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 
1991)).   
Because the guilty plea to premeditated first-degree murder in 
this case was entered intelligently and voluntarily and there was a 
factual basis for the plea, we affirm the trial court’s acceptance of 
Woodbury’s plea. 
3. Renewed Offer of Counsel 
Woodbury’s next claim is that the court failed to renew the 
offer of counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings.  Specifically, 
Woodbury argues that the trial court was required to, but did not, 
offer counsel at the start of the defense case-in-chief and at the 
time Woodbury announced his change of plea. 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5) provides that if 
a waiver of counsel is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, “the 
offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at each 
subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant 
 
- 38 - 
appears without counsel.”  This rule does not require a renewed 
offer of counsel each time the defendant appears in court; rather, a 
court must renew the offer of counsel at “critical” stages of the 
proceedings.  Knight v. State, 770 So. 2d 663, 670 n.6 (Fla. 2000); 
see Muehleman v. State, 3 So. 3d 1149, 1156 (Fla. 2009) (“[T]he 
waiver applies only to the present stage and must be renewed at 
each subsequent crucial stage where the defendant is 
unrepresented.” (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla. 
1992)). 
Woodbury points to no case holding that the transition from 
the State’s case-in-chief to the defense’s case-in-chief marks a new 
critical stage of the proceedings such as to require a new offer of 
counsel and new Faretta inquiry.  To the contrary, in Knight, we 
held that a renewed offer of counsel was not required “during the 
same stage of the proceeding where Knight waived his right to 
counsel, the trial portion.”  Knight, 770 So. 2d at 669. 
As to whether a new offer of counsel was required at the time 
Woodbury announced his change of plea, there was no intervening 
stage of the proceeding that separated the court’s previous Faretta 
inquiry from Woodbury’s announcement of his change of plea.  See 
 
- 39 - 
id. at 669-70 (holding that a Faretta inquiry conducted at a pretrial 
hearing satisfied the requirement to offer counsel at the start of trial 
because the pretrial hearing was held to discuss the upcoming trial 
and there were no intervening proceedings).  On the previous day of 
trial, Woodbury told the court that he intended to change his plea 
to guilty when he finished testifying, and the court held a Faretta 
inquiry at the start of the next day of trial.  The court also 
conducted a full Faretta inquiry and made a renewed offer of 
counsel before accepting Woodbury’s plea.  These inquiries and 
offers of counsel were sufficient to satisfy the obligations imposed 
by rule 3.111(d)(5). 
4. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances  
Woodbury makes a series of claims related to the trial court’s 
findings on the statutory aggravators alleged by the State, and on 
certain statutory and nonstatutory mitigators.  Woodbury argues 
that the trial court erred by allowing him to waive his right to 
mental health mitigation, by failing to consider mental illness 
mitigation that was in the record, and by not appointing special 
counsel to argue mitigation.  Woodbury further argues that the trial 
court erred in assessing the “extreme mental or emotional 
 
- 40 - 
disturbance” statutory mitigator.  Finally, Woodbury asserts that 
the court erred in instructing the jury on the “cold, calculated, and 
premeditated” aggravator and in finding its existence.   
A. Mental Health Mitigation 
A competent defendant may waive his right to present 
mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of his first-degree murder 
trial.  Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 854 (Fla. 2003).  We review 
for abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination on a defendant’s 
competence to waive mitigation.  Id.   
When a defendant does not challenge the imposition of the 
death penalty and refuses to present mitigation evidence on his own 
behalf, the trial court has an obligation “to require the preparation 
of a meaningful, comprehensive presentence investigation report 
(PSI).”  Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 491 (Fla. 2015).  In such 
circumstances, the trial court should require the State to place into 
the record all evidence of a mitigating nature that the State has in 
its possession.  Id.  Then, “[i]f the PSI and the accompanying 
records alert the trial court to the probability of significant 
mitigation, the trial court has the discretion either to call its own 
 
- 41 - 
witnesses or . . . appoint an independent, special counsel, who can 
call witnesses to present mitigation evidence.”  Id.   
Woodbury argues that the trial court erred in this case when it 
let Woodbury waive his right to present mental health mitigation.  
Woodbury insists that “severe mental illness prevented him from 
entering a knowing, voluntarily [sic], and intelligent waiver” of his 
right to present mitigation.  Woodbury also argues that a report 
discussing his mental health revealed an aspect of his character 
that mitigated against imposition of the death penalty, and that 
notwithstanding his waiver of mental health mitigation, the trial 
court should have considered the information in that report and 
should have appointed special counsel to argue the evidence. 
As to whether Woodbury was competent to waive his right to 
present mitigating evidence, the trial court conducted a Faretta 
inquiry at the start of the penalty phase, advised Woodbury about 
the aggravators being alleged by the State, went over possible 
mitigating circumstances with Woodbury, and explained to 
Woodbury his right to present mental health mitigation.  
Woodbury’s history of bipolar disorder did not in itself create a 
reasonable ground for the court to believe Woodbury was not 
 
- 42 - 
competent to waive his right to present mitigation, and Woodbury’s 
responses to the court’s inquiries created no such ground.   
Moreover, the record demonstrates that Woodbury’s waiver of 
mental health mitigation was not a product of mania, but of 
strategy.  Woodbury told the court that his penalty phase strategy 
was to emphasize his alleged sexual assault by the victim, and he 
said, “I don’t want to really mess that up with oh, he was a bad 
kid.”  And Woodbury’s standby counsel testified that he and 
Woodbury discussed how Woodbury might avoid a mental health 
evaluation by the State and that Woodbury chose not to present 
mental health mitigation.  Under these circumstances, we find that 
the trial court had no reasonable ground to doubt Woodbury’s 
competency to waive his right to present mental health mitigation, 
and we therefore find no abuse of discretion in allowing the waiver.   
As to whether the court failed to consider mitigating evidence 
in the record, particularly information mentioned in Dr. Sesta’s 
psychological report, we note that the trial court properly ordered a 
PSI report after Woodbury waived his right to present mitigation.  
The State then introduced Dr. Sesta’s report as potential mitigation.  
Later, in its sentencing order, the court found that “Dr. Sesta 
 
- 43 - 
diagnosed [Woodbury] with bi-polar disorder and some degree of 
Schizophrenia.”  And ultimately, the court found: “[T]here is proof in 
the record that [Woodbury] has been diagnosed with and is 
medicated for [bipolar] disorder.  The Court will find that the 
mitigation is reasonably established and will assign little weight to 
the mitigation.”  Given that the trial court found the existence of 
mental health mitigation in the record and assigned it weight, at 
least in part based on information in Dr. Sesta’s report, and given 
the weighty aggravation and minimal mitigation in this case, any 
error in the trial court’s characterization or assessment of aspects 
of Dr. Sesta’s report was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.9  
To the extent Woodbury is asserting that the trial court should 
have given more weight to the mental health mitigation, Woodbury 
has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining the degree of weight to assign to this mitigator.  See 
Covington v. State, 228 So. 3d 49, 66 (Fla. 2017) (finding no abuse 
 
9.  We also find no merit in Woodbury’s claim that the trial 
court was required to appoint special counsel to argue mitigation on 
Woodbury’s behalf.  See Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 74 (Fla. 
1995). 
 
- 44 - 
of discretion in the trial court affording moderate weight to a 
mitigator, given the court’s findings on that mitigator).   
Moreover, “HAC, CCP, and prior violent felony are three of the 
weightiest aggravating circumstances.”  Damas v. State, 260 So. 3d 
200, 216 (Fla. 2018).  Given that all those aggravators (and more) 
were found in this case and assigned great weight, there is no 
reasonable possibility that affording too little weight to mental 
health mitigation affected Woodbury’s sentence.  See, e.g., Tanzi v. 
State, 964 So. 2d 106, 119-20 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]he trial court [made] a 
finding that is contrary to this Court’s precedent.  However, any 
error present was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of 
the following: (a) the trial court recognized and gave weight to 
numerous other mitigating circumstances; (b) this case involves 
substantial aggravation, including the HAC and CCP aggravating 
circumstances; and (c) the . . . proposed mitigator is minor and 
tangential with respect to the record in this case.”).10 
 
10.  Woodbury also asserts a procedural defect, insisting that 
after the Spencer hearing, the trial court should have ordered a 
recess and convened a separate proceeding for imposition of the 
sentence.  However, Woodbury himself expressly objected to the 
court delaying the pronouncement of sentence and told the court to 
proceed directly to sentencing.  Thus, the asserted error was 
 
- 45 - 
B. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Mitigation 
Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2017) lists the statutory 
mitigators that, if applicable, can weigh against imposition of the 
death penalty.  One such statutory mitigator is when the capital 
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  See § 921.141(7)(b), 
Fla. Stat. (2017).  Another statutory mitigator—addressed in a 
separate subsection—is when the defendant’s capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law, was substantially impaired.  § 921.141(7)(f), 
Fla. Stat. (2017).  Woodbury argues that the trial court conflated 
the tests for these two distinct mitigators when it assessed whether 
Woodbury was under the effect of mental or emotional disturbance. 
It does appear from the sentencing order that the court 
applied the wrong test for determining the existence of the extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance mitigator.  Specifically, when 
evaluating in the sentencing order whether Woodbury was under 
 
invited, and Woodbury may not be heard to complain of it on 
appeal.  See Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 23, 53 (Fla. 2018).  And even 
if we were to consider this claim, Woodbury has not shown that the 
asserted procedural defect rose to the level of fundamental error. 
 
- 46 - 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the trial court stated that 
“[t]here is no evidence that [Woodbury]’s emotional state was 
anywhere close to the level of obviating his knowledge of right and 
wrong.”  But while the degree to which a defendant knows right 
from wrong is relevant to assess whether the section 921.141(7)(f) 
mitigator applies (i.e., that defendant’s capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired), see Duncan v. 
State, 619 So. 2d 279, 283 (Fla. 1993), the section 921.141(7)(b) 
mitigator (i.e., that the capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance) does not speak to a defendant’s knowledge of right and 
wrong. 
Nonetheless, the court ultimately assigned weight to the 
mitigator, remarking that “the Court cannot say there is no 
evidence of emotional disturbance.”  Thus, Woodbury cannot 
complain that the court’s incorrect method of analysis resulted in a 
viable mitigator going unconsidered.  Because the mitigator was 
considered, even if the path to get there was incorrect, and because 
extremely weighty aggravators were proved in this case, there is no 
 
- 47 - 
reasonable possibility that Woodbury would have received a 
different sentence had the trial court engaged in the proper analysis 
or had given more weight to the mitigator.  See Covington, 228 So. 
3d at 66.  Accordingly, we find no reversible error as to the extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance mitigator. 
C. Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravation 
Woodbury next argues that the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury on the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) 
aggravating factor and erred in finding the existence of the 
aggravator.  We disagree.    
Competent and substantial evidence from the penalty phase 
supports the trial court’s instruction to the jury and its finding as to 
the CCP aggravator.  Although Woodbury had told the jury that the 
victim attempted to rape him, Woodbury’s testimony on the stand 
during the sentencing phase trial described the killing as an act of 
retribution, not self-defense.  Woodbury said that the murder of his 
cellmate “was just getback [sic], it was just vengeance, it was just 
wanting to hurt you for what you tried to do to me, for what you 
thought you could do.”  This evidence supports the conclusion that 
Woodbury had no moral or legal justification for his actions.  See 
 
- 48 - 
Williamson v. State, 511 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1987) (affirming a 
finding of CCP where the defendant’s explanation that the victim 
posed a danger to others was not held to be a pretense of moral 
justification). 
The penalty phase jury was also informed that Woodbury had 
admitted to procuring in advance the lock that he later used to beat 
the victim to death, to sharpening a blade prior to the murder, to 
waiting until a correctional officer whom Woodbury viewed as 
particularly inept came on duty, and to barricading his cell door to 
prevent officers from entering the cell during the assault.  All this 
evidence, taken together, supports a conclusion that Woodbury 
made calculated and highly premeditated plans to carry out the 
killing of his victim.   
Moreover, the jury watched a video played during the penalty 
phase, in which Woodbury said that he “was so happy to kill 
someone again” and that he “enjoyed torturing” the victim.  Cf. 
Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 498 (Fla. 2011) (affirming a CCP 
finding where the defendant had obtained the murder weapon to 
commit the killing and then committed the murder as “a matter of 
course”).   
 
- 49 - 
Because evidence introduced during the penalty phase 
supports each aspect of the proof required for the CCP statutory 
aggravator, we find no error in the trial court finding the existence 
of the CCP aggravator or instructing the jury on the aggravator.11 
5. Presentence Investigation Report  
Woodbury’s next claim is that the trial court erred in admitting 
a presentence investigation report that allegedly violated the 
requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710.  Because 
Woodbury never brought any concerns with the report to the trial 
court’s attention, this claim is reviewed for fundamental error.   
Rule 3.710(b) provides that when a criminal defendant refuses 
to present mitigation evidence, the trial court shall refer the case to 
the Department of Corrections for the preparation of a presentence 
 
11.  Because Woodbury failed to preserve his claim that the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury on the CCP aggravator, we 
would have corrected the asserted error only if it rose to the level of 
fundamental error.  See Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 887 (Fla. 
2019).  Moreover, given the other weighty aggravators found in this 
case, even if the CCP aggravator were invalid, there is no reasonable 
possibility that an absence of this one aggravator would have 
resulted in a different sentence.  See Hall v. State, 246 So. 3d 210, 
215 (Fla. 2018) (an error in finding the existence of CCP was 
harmless because “Hall has significant and weighty aggravation 
beyond the invalidated CCP aggravator.”). 
 
- 50 - 
investigation report.  That report “shall be comprehensive and 
should include information such as previous mental health 
problems (including hospitalizations), school records, and relevant 
family background.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710(b). 
Woodbury argues that the PSI report prepared for this case 
was inadmissible because it lacked a comprehensive summary of 
his mental health history.  But the trial court had ample 
information about Woodbury’s mental health issues at the time it 
evaluated the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  At trial, 
Woodbury described his long history of bipolar disorder during 
numerous Faretta inquiries, and he gave the court documentation 
describing his treatment and medication.  And Dr. Sesta’s report, 
which was placed into evidence for mitigation purposes, addressed 
Woodbury’s mental health issues and included additional 
diagnoses.  Because the trial court had the relevant information 
and found the existence of mental health mitigation in the record, 
the absence of a summary of that information in the PSI report does 
not constitute fundamental error. 
Woodbury also argues that the PSI report included an 
improper sentencing recommendation in favor of the death penalty.  
 
- 51 - 
Woodbury relies upon Robertson v. State, 187 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. 
2016), where we held that although the governing statute provides 
that the Department of Corrections must include a disposition 
recommendation based on several factors in noncapital cases, those 
factors do not apply to capital sentencing matters.  Id. at 1215.  
However, in Robertson, the recommendation for death did not 
render the PSI report invalid, for “the sentencing order show[ed] 
that while the court relied upon the PSI for information about 
Robertson’s background, the officer’s recommendation of a death 
sentence did not influence the judge’s sentencing decision.”  Id. at 
1215-16. 
In this case, the sentencing order contains the trial court’s 
findings on each aggravating and mitigating circumstance, 
including four weighty aggravators, and the sentencing order never 
mentions any “recommendation” from the Department of 
Corrections.  Thus, as in Robertson, the sentencing order shows 
that the trial court’s decision on whether to impose a life sentence 
or the death penalty was not influenced by any recommendation in 
the PSI report.  See id.; see also Barnes v. State, 29 So. 3d 1010, 
1028 (Fla. 2010) (holding that an unpreserved challenge to a PSI 
 
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report was barred, but that if preserved, there was “no basis to find 
that had the trial court not considered the PSI, Barnes would have 
received a life sentence”).  Accordingly, we find that any error in this 
case in the inclusion of a sentencing recommendation in the PSI 
report does not rise to the level of fundamental error.  
6. Special Jury Instruction on Mercy 
Next, Woodbury argues that the trial court erred by rejecting 
his requested special jury instructions on mercy, and by reading 
the standard jury instruction instead.  Standard Jury Instruction 
7.11 (criminal), which the trial court read to the jury, informs jurors 
that “[r]egardless of the results of each juror’s individual weighing 
process—even if you find that the sufficient aggravators outweigh 
the mitigators—the law neither compels nor requires you to 
determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death.”  In re 
Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital Cases, 214 So. 3d 
1236, 1263 (Fla. 2017).  Woodbury proposed a special instruction 
derived from the federal standard instructions, which added: “You 
may always consider mercy in making this determination.”  He 
proposed an alternate instruction that he claimed came from “the 
ether,” which added: “Mercy itself is sufficient to justify a sentence 
 
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other than death.”  He now claims that the court erred by rejecting 
his proposed instructions.  
We affirm the trial court’s ruling because the instruction that 
was read to the jury adequately informed the jurors of the 
applicable legal standard.  See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 994 
(Fla. 2006) (“[F]ailure to give special instructions does not constitute 
error where the instructions given adequately address the 
applicable legal standards.” (quoting Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 
747, 755 (Fla. 2001)).  When a juror votes for a life sentence despite 
finding that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and were 
sufficient to impose death, this decision is often referred to as a 
mercy vote.  In fact, we have referred to the relevant provision of 
Standard Instruction 7.11 as the “mercy instruction.”  Reynolds v. 
State, 251 So. 3d 811, 816 n.5 (Fla. 2018).  Thus, the court did 
read an instruction on mercy, and although Woodbury might have 
preferred the wording of his proposed instruction, Standard Jury 
Instruction 7.11 is not ambiguous when it comes to addressing the 
jurors’ options. 
 
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7. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard for Sentencing 
Considerations 
Woodbury next argues that the trial court reversibly erred by 
failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances and were sufficient to justify the death penalty.  We 
affirm because Woodbury did not preserve this claim for appeal and 
because (as Woodbury acknowledges) we have already determined 
that “these determinations are not subject to the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard of proof.”  Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886.  
CONCLUSION 
Because Woodbury has not demonstrated any reversible error, 
we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence of death. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and COURIEL, 
JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
GROSSHANS, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
While I agree that Woodbury is not entitled to relief, I write to 
emphasize the importance of ensuring that a defendant—especially 
one who is facing the death penalty—is competent to conduct the 
basic tasks necessary to represent one’s self at trial.  Here, where 
the defendant had a significant mental health history, a competency 
evaluation would have been in order. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okeechobee County, 
Sherwood Bauer, Judge – Case No. 472018CF000164CFAXMX 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Mara C. Herbert and Paul 
Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defenders, Fifteenth Judicial 
Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rhonda 
Giger, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee