Title: State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 92 Ohio 
St.3d 529, 2001-Ohio-1276] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. ELSASS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
529.] 
Mandamus — Appropriation proceedings — Drainage project — Neither 
petitioning for public improvement nor paying assessments related to the 
improvement precludes landowners from seeking compensation for the 
taking of their property in connection with the project — Cause remanded 
to permit property owners to establish loss of any economically viable use. 
(No. 00-2051 — Submitted June 20, 2001 — Decided August 15, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Shelby County, No. 17-99-17. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant Robbie May Elsass has a life estate, and her son and 
daughter-in-law, appellants Murray E. Elsass and Janet E. Elsass, have a remainder as 
tenants in common in real property located in Dinsmore Township, Shelby County, 
Ohio, which is within the Shelby Soil and Water Conservation District (“district”).  
Appellants lease the property to others for agricultural purposes, i.e., growing crops.  
The Elsass property is located in the southeast area of a watershed in which rain 
falling in the area generally flows from the northwest to the southeast and drains into 
Loramie Creek, the eastern boundary of the Elsass property. 
 
Around 1990 or 1991, Timothy A. Byrd, the drainage coordinator for the 
district, received complaints from Clarence King and his wife about a standing water 
problem on their property, which is located northwest of and upstream from 
appellants’ property.  A lack of maintenance of a downstream area of the watershed 
that is upstream from appellants’ property, including a rotted culvert pipe underneath 
a driveway on the King property, caused much of the flooding problem.  At that time, 
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appellants had both surface and subsurface drains on their property, and they claim 
that they had no drainage problem during this period. 
 
In response to the complaints, Byrd contacted the property owners in the 
watershed, and a meeting was held in September 1993.  Because the property owners 
could not agree about forming a private group to rectify the drainage problems in the 
watershed, Byrd advised them to petition the district.  The property owners, including 
appellant Murray E. Elsass, then signed a petition requesting that the district assist 
them in the planning and construction of works of improvement needed to “[i]mprove 
drainage an[d] reduce flooding” in the watershed.  Although no construction plans 
had been drafted for the project at the time the petition was signed, Byrd explained to 
the property owners present at the meeting, including appellant Murray E. Elsass, that 
new surface and subsurface drains would have to be constructed on the property.  On 
September 21, 1993, the district, through its board of supervisors, approved the 
project, which was known as the King-Elsass Ditch Drainage Improvement Project 
(“project”). 
 
The project was placed on a waiting list until 1997, and in July 1997, the 
district board of supervisors held a public meeting concerning the project.  At this 
meeting, the details of the project were discussed.  Appellant Murray E. Elsass 
attended the meeting and did not object to the proposed project. 
 
On August 19, 1997, the board of supervisors of the district certified the 
project to appellee Shelby County Board of Commissioners (“board”).  In accordance 
with R.C. 1515.20 through 1515.24, the board determined that construction of the 
project would improve water management and development of the lands therein, that 
the costs of the project would be less than the benefits, and that the project would 
benefit the land by promoting its economic, agricultural, and social development.  
The purpose of the project was to relocate the surface flow of water in the area by 
correcting drainage conditions upstream from appellants’ property and channeling 
water through appellants’ property and into the creek through a drainage pipe. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
On December 11, 1997, the board accepted the project as certified by the 
district and as recommended by the county engineer.  The board authorized the 
advertisement and legal notice for bids to perform the work required for the project, 
which included the installation of about one thousand four hundred feet of corrugated 
plastic tubing and the construction of approximately 1,375 feet of surface drain and 
various erosion-control structures.  The board subsequently awarded the contract to 
Ruhenkamp Farm Drainage, Inc. for approximately $26,000.  The board then 
assessed property owners in the watershed to pay for the cost of the project pursuant 
to R.C. 1515.24.  Appellants were assessed approximately $1,518. 
 
At the request of appellant Murray E. Elsass, Ruhenkamp Farm Drainage, 
Inc. waited for appellants’ tenant to harvest his crops before it began construction of 
the project in mid-August 1998.  Appellees, the board and the individual 
commissioners, did not obtain an easement, right-of-way, or license from appellants 
before constructing the project.  During the construction, the contractor entered 
appellants’ property and installed surface and subsurface drains across and under the 
property.  The surface drain or swale constructed on appellants’ property is 
approximately eight hundred fifty feet long and fifty feet wide, with a maximum 
depth of two and a half feet.  The preexisting surface drain on appellants’ property 
was straightened and deepened to make it easier to farm through and across the drain.  
The contractor also constructed a subsurface drain that followed the approximate path 
of the old underground drain on appellants’ property and a rock shoot that emptied 
into Loramie Creek. 
 
During the construction of the project, appellants did not complain about it, 
and Byrd explained to appellant Murray E. Elsass what the project would look like 
upon its completion.  The contractor complied with appellant Murray E. Elsass’s 
request to correct a farm driveway so that appellants’ tenant would not tip his farm 
equipment.  The project was completed in September 1998.  The board paid the 
contractor after it was satisfied that the project was completed in accordance with 
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plans presented by the district and the county engineer.  Under R.C. 1515.29, the 
board has a continuing duty to maintain the completed improvement. 
 
In October 1998, appellant Murray E. Elsass, through counsel, asserted that 
the drainage project had resulted in a “taking” of his real property and requested that 
the board compensate him.  Appellants had not objected to the construction of the 
project before that time.  Appellees refused to initiate appropriation proceedings or 
otherwise compensate appellants for their use of appellants’ property in the 
construction of the project. 
 
In July 1999, appellants filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Shelby 
County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees to institute appropriation 
proceedings for the uncompensated taking of their property in connection with the 
project and for other relief.  Appellees filed an answer claiming that appellants 
consented to the construction of the project and were therefore estopped from 
claiming damages from the county.  In October 1999, the court of appeals ordered the 
parties to file all evidence on or before November 15, 1999. 
 
On the date specified by the court, the parties submitted evidence.  According 
to appellants’ evidence, construction of the project on their property limited access to 
a bridge crossing Loramie Creek, concentrated the flow of water in specific areas of 
appellants’ property, and diminished crop yields.  In addition, appellant Murray E. 
Elsass specified that construction of the project limited appellants’ ability to use their 
real property for nonagricultural purposes and inhibited future development.  
Conversely, appellees’ evidence indicated that appellants’ property was benefited by 
the project and that there was no limitation of access. 
 
The court of appeals subsequently granted the parties’ motions to submit 
additional evidence and to extend the time to file briefs.  The additional evidence 
submitted by appellants included a November 1999 appraisal of the ditch project  
concluding that the highest and best use of the property, presently zoned “U-1 rural 
district,” is its current agricultural use, that the project did not damage the residue of 
January Term, 2001 
5 
appellants’ property, and that, at most, there could be a possible loss of $100 in crop 
yield in 1999 attributable to the project. 
 
The parties filed briefs in December 1999, and in May 2000, appellants filed 
a motion for leave to submit additional evidence.  The evidence consisted of 
photographs purporting to depict appellants’ property at that time, i.e., after the crops 
had been harvested.  The court of appeals denied appellants’ May 2000 motion to 
submit this additional evidence. 
 
In October 2000, the court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that any 
physical invasion of appellants’ property occurred with their consent and by their 
invitation, that no fundamental attribute of appellants’ ownership of their property 
was destroyed by the project, and that appellants’ property still had an economically 
viable use. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon the Elsasses’ appeal of right, as is 
their request for oral argument. 
Oral Argument 
 
Appellants request oral argument, claiming that this appeal raises a 
substantial constitutional issue regarding the taking of private property without just 
compensation and is a matter of great public importance concerning the applicable 
standard to be applied in inverse condemnation cases. 
 
We deny appellants’ request.  We have resolved comparable cases without 
the necessity of oral argument.  See, e.g., State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 699 N.E.2d 1271.  And more important, the parties’ briefs 
are sufficient to resolve this appeal.  See State ex rel. Abner v. Elliott (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 11, 16, 706 N.E.2d 765, 769. 
Submission of Evidence 
 
Appellants contend that the court of appeals erred in denying their motion for 
leave to submit additional evidence outside the timetable set by the court for the 
submission of evidence.  The admission of evidence is normally within the discretion 
of the trial court, and the court’s decision will be reversed only upon a showing of an 
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abuse of that discretion.  Peters v. Ohio State Lottery Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
296, 299, 587 N.E.2d 290, 292; see, also, State v. Jalowiec (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
220, 229, 744 N.E.2d 163, 174 (“Under Evid.R. 403, the admission of photographs 
and similar evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court”).  The term 
“abuse of discretion” means an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision.  
State ex rel. Stevens v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 
736 N.E.2d 882, 884. 
 
No abuse of discretion is evident here.  Instead, the court of appeals properly 
denied appellants’ motion for leave to submit additional evidence because it was filed 
approximately six months after the court-ordered deadline for evidence and five 
months after the parties filed their briefs, and appellants made no attempt to 
authenticate the photographs.  See Evid.R. 901(A); Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc. (1977), 
53 Ohio App.2d 21, 31, 7 O.O.3d 20, 25, 371 N.E.2d 557, 564 (“There must be 
testimony that the photograph is a fair and accurate representation of that which it 
represents”): see, generally, 2 Giannelli & Snyder, Evidence (1996) 283-284, Section 
901.17. 
Mandamus and Appropriation 
 
In their main propositions of law, appellants assert that the court of appeals 
erred in denying their requested writ of mandamus to compel the board and its 
commissioners to commence appropriation proceedings. 
 
The United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution; Section 19, Article I, Ohio 
Constitution.  Mandamus is the appropriate action to compel public authorities to 
institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property is 
alleged.  BSW, 83 Ohio St.3d at 341, 699 N.E.2d at 1274; State ex rel. McKay v. 
Kauer (1951), 156 Ohio St. 347, 46 O.O. 204, 102 N.E.2d 703, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  Appellants have the burden of proving entitlement to the requested 
January Term, 2001 
7 
extraordinary relief in mandamus.  State ex rel. Sekermestrovich v. Akron (2001), 90 
Ohio St.3d 536, 537, 740 N.E.2d 252, 254. 
 
“ ‘In cases of either physical invasion of the land or the destruction of a 
fundamental attribute of ownership like the right of access, the landowner need not 
establish the deprivation of all economically viable uses of the land.’ ”  Id. at 537-
538, 740 N.E.2d at 254, quoting BSW, 83 Ohio St.3d at 342, 699 N.E.2d at 1275.  But 
in other cases, which generally involve a claimed regulatory taking, the landowner 
must prove that the taking deprived all economically viable uses of the land.  Id. at 
343, 699 N.E.2d at 1275-1276. 
 
The court of appeals held that the latter standard applied because there was no 
physical invasion of appellants’ land, since appellants had consented to the project 
and, in fact, had invited the county to construct the improvement.  The court of 
appeals further held that the project did not destroy any fundamental attribute of 
appellants’ ownership because the land is used for the purpose that it had before the 
taking. 
 
In effect, the court of appeals concluded that by petitioning for the public 
improvement, paying assessments relating to the improvement, and failing to object 
to it until after its completion, appellants are estopped from seeking compensation for 
the taking. 
 
The court of appeals erred in so determining.  It is well settled that while 
acquiescence by the owner to occupation of his land for a public use without 
compensation in advance and without the institution of condemnation proceedings 
may preclude him from recovering possession of the land, it does not constitute a 
waiver of the right to recover compensation for the taking.  See, generally, 3 Nichols 
on Eminent Domain (3 Ed.Rev.2000) 8-157, Section 8.20[2]; Harris v. Hot Springs 
Bd. of Cty. Commrs. (1956), 76 Wyo. 120, 126, 301 P.2d 382, 384. 
 
We have similarly held that the property owner retains a right to be 
compensated for a taking in connection with a public improvement.  See Goodin v. 
Cincinnati & Whitewater Canal Co. (1868), 18 Ohio St. 169, 1868 WL 15, paragraph 
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one of the syllabus, where we held that a landowner “who stands by, without 
objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over [his land], cannot, after the road 
is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his 
apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company,” 
but he may still have “a right of compensation.”  See, also, Cincinnati v. Kemper 
(1877), 7 Ohio Dec.Rep. 251, 1877 WL 5874. 
 
In addition, R.C. 1515.08(C), as made applicable to boards of county 
commissioners under R.C. 1515.21, authorizes boards that “acquire, by purchase or 
gift, * * * to hold, encumber, or dispose of and * * * lease real and personal property 
or interests” to construct water development and management improvements.  The 
board did not acquire appellants’ property by gift, purchase, or appropriation here.  
Cf. 1984 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 84-021. 
 
More specifically, neither petitioning for the public improvement nor paying 
assessments related to the improvement precludes landowners from seeking 
compensation for the taking of their property in connection with the project.  See 
Turner v. Stanton (1880), 42 Mich. 506, 507, 4 N.W. 204, 204-205 (“But there was 
nothing in the petition which waived compensation for any land of the petitioners 
which might be taken, and it is perfectly consistent with the petition that the 
petitioners expected to be paid if their land was taken; and they had a right to be paid, 
beyond question”); Lewis v. Burgess (1895), 166 Pa. 613, 614, 31 A. 335, 336 (no 
waiver or estoppel regarding claim for damages in taking for a public purpose even 
though the property owner requested the public improvement); Gray v. Salt Lake City 
(1914), 44 Utah 204, 224, 138 P. 1177, 1184 (no estoppel from maintaining action for 
damages to property where landowners did not object or protest the special tax levied 
against them for the improvement). 
 
Therefore, appellants were not estopped from claiming damages for 
appellees’ entry onto their land, construction of the drainage improvement project, 
and the board’s right under R.C. 1515.29 to continue to enter and maintain a portion 
of appellants’ property.  Equitable estoppel generally requires actual or constructive 
January Term, 2001 
9 
fraud, and appellants never represented to appellees that they would forfeit their right 
to seek compensation for the taking of land in connection with the project.  See State 
ex rel. Richard v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension 
Fund (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 409, 414, 632 N.E.2d 1292, 1296; State ex rel. Ryan v. 
State Teachers Retirement Sys. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 362, 368, 643 N.E.2d 1122, 
1128. 
 
Therefore, for purposes of determining if a constitutional taking occurred, we 
find that appellees physically invaded appellants’ property by entering their land and 
constructing surface and subsurface drainage systems as well as a rock shoot on it.  
Furthermore, R.C. 1515.29 affords appellees certain rights in appellants’ property.  
The standard that was used by the court of appeals for determining whether 
compensation to property owners is warranted is normally applicable to regulatory 
taking cases, which this case is not.  Cf. BSW, 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 699 N.E.2d 1271. 
 
Consequently, appellants needed to establish only the loss of any 
economically viable use, not just its present agricultural use.  See State ex rel. OTR v. 
Columbus (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 207, 667 N.E.2d 8, 12, quoting Mansfield v. 
Balliett (1902), 65 Ohio St. 451, 471, 63 N.E. 86, 92 (“ ‘To deprive [the landowner] 
of any valuable use of his land, is to deprive him of his land, pro tanto.  * * * [T]he 
principle of the constitution is as applicable where the owner is partially deprived of 
the uses of his land, as where he is wholly deprived of it.  Taking a part is as much 
forbidden by the constitution as taking the whole.’ ”).  Because the court of appeals 
did not decide this issue, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to that court 
for such determination.1  We deny appellants’ request for attorney fees. 
                                                          
 
1. 
Although it is true that reviewing courts defer to a lower court’s factual determinations if they 
are supported by competent, credible evidence, BSW, 83 Ohio St.3d at 344, 699 N.E.2d at 1276, the 
court of appeals did not determine whether appellants had established the loss of any economically 
viable use due to its erroneous conclusion that no physical invasion or destruction of a fundamental 
attribute of ownership had occurred.  But it should be noted that on other evidentiary matters, 
competent, credible evidence supports the court of appeals’ factual determinations, express and implicit 
to its holding, that the project did not impair appellants’ right of access to a bridge on their property and 
did not cause flooding of their property.  In this regard, appellants’ reliance on cases involving flooding 
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Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I dissent and would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals that appellants are not entitled to a writ of 
mandamus. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Elsass, Wallace, Evans, Schnelle & Co., L.P.A., and Stanley R. Evans, for 
appellants. 
 
James F. Stevenson, Shelby County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael F. 
Boller, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
caused by public improvements is misplaced.  Cf. Masley v. Lorain (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 334, 2 
O.O.3d 463, 358 N.E.2d 596; Lucas v. Carney (1958), 167 Ohio St. 416, 5 O.O.2d 63, 149 N.E.2d 238.