Title: Wing v. Comm’r of Probation

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11842 
 
ELMER WING  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 8, 2015. - December 28, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Criminal Records.  Evidence, Criminal records, Disclosure of 
evidence, Impeachment of credibility.  Practice, Criminal, 
Record, Disclosure of evidence, Discovery, Witness, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Statute, Construction.  
Constitutional Law, Access to criminal records, Witness, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Due Process of Law, Disclosure 
of evidence, Impeachment by prior conviction.  Witness, 
Impeachment.  Destruction of Property. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 12, 2015.  
 
 
The case was reserved and reported by Cordy, J.  
 
 
 
Adam M. Bond for the plaintiff. 
 
Sarah M. Joss, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Mary Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this appeal we decide whether a criminal 
defendant's right to disclosure of a prospective witness's 
criminal record under the mandatory discovery provisions of 
G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (D), as 
amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005), extends to a criminal record 
sealed under G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  Elmer Wing, who stands 
charged with malicious destruction of property over $250 on a 
complaint issued in the Wareham Division of the District Court 
Department, sought an order compelling production of the 
complaining witness's sealed criminal record.  A judge denied 
the motion.  The matter is now before us on a single justice's 
reservation and report of Wing's petition for relief under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, to the full court.   
 
Wing claims that the mandatory disclosure required by G. L. 
c. 218, § 26A, and rule 14 (a) (1) (D) is not subject to an 
exception for sealed criminal records.  He also claims that 
disclosure is necessary to effect his constitutional right to 
confrontation of the complaining witness.  Reading the 
potentially conflicting statutes harmoniously, as we are obliged 
to do, we conclude that G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and rule 
14 (a) (1) (D) do not require disclosure of criminal records 
3 
 
sealed pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100A.1  We conclude also that 
Wing has failed to establish a constitutional right to 
disclosure for confrontation purposes where he seeks only 
impeachment based on the witness's prior criminal conviction.   
 
Background.  We summarize only those aspects of the 
procedural history pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented in this appeal.  Although the facts underlying the 
charge of malicious destruction of property over $250 are not 
specified in the record, the Commonwealth has not disputed 
Wing's assertion that the charge is based on the allegation that 
Wing caused a security gate at his property to strike and damage 
the complaining witness's vehicle.2  During pretrial discovery, 
Wing filed a request for mandatory discovery of the complaining 
witness's criminal record under G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and rule 
14 (a) (1) (D).  The probation department produced the unsealed 
entries in the witness's criminal record but withheld the 
entries sealed pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  Wing filed a 
motion to compel production of the sealed criminal record.  The 
judge denied the motion, and this petition for review pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3, followed.   
                                                          
 
 
1 Although G. L. c. 276, §§ 100B and 100C, also concern 
sealed criminal records, only § 100A is relevant here. 
 
 
2 The Commonwealth submitted a brief in this case as an 
interested party. 
4 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Right to review under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
The probation department contends that Wing is not entitled to 
the review he seeks under G. L. c. 211, § 3, arguing that he has 
failed to establish a "substantial claim" of "irremediable" 
error sufficient to justify the extraordinary relief available 
under the statute.  See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 464 Mass. 1004, 
1004 (2012).  We bypass the issue, however, because, when a 
single justice reserves decision and reports a case to the full 
court, "we grant full appellate review of the issues reported" 
(quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 15 
(2010).     
 
2.  Discovery of sealed records.  The issue before us 
arises in the context of a potential conflict between a 
defendant's statutory right to mandatory discovery of a 
witness's criminal record under G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and rule 
14 (a) (1) (D), and the privacy protections accorded to former 
criminal defendants by the sealing of criminal records under 
G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  See Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 
300 (2014).  We begin the analysis by providing an overview of 
the relevant statutes and rule. 
a.  Mandatory discovery of criminal records.  Wing's claim 
derives from G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and rule 14 (a) (1) (D), both 
of which unequivocally provide for mandatory discovery of a 
witness's criminal record.  General Laws c. 218, § 26A, second 
5 
 
par., applicable to criminal trials in the Boston Municipal 
Court and District Court Departments, provides that "[u]pon 
motion of the defendant the judge shall order the production by 
the commonwealth of the names and addresses of the prospective 
witnesses and the production by the probation department of the 
record of prior convictions of any such witness" (emphasis 
supplied).  Similarly, rule 14 (a) (1) (D) of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that "[a]t arraignment the 
court shall order the Probation Department to deliver to the 
parties the record of prior complaints, indictments and 
dispositions of all defendants and of all witnesses" (emphasis 
supplied).  Thus, broadly speaking, a court has no discretion to 
deny a defendant access to a witness's criminal record.  Both 
G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and rule 14 are silent, however, as to 
their application to sealed criminal records.  
 
The provision for mandatory discovery of a witness's 
criminal record was part of a statutory reorganization of the 
Massachusetts trial court system.  G. L. c. 218, § 26A, as 
appearing in St. 1992, c. 379, § 139.3  Prior to 1986, pretrial 
discovery generally, and access to a witness's criminal record 
in particular, were left to the court's discretion with 
                                                          
 
 
3 Mandatory discovery of witnesses' criminal records 
initially applied only to the Essex and Hampden Divisions of the 
District Court Department, St. 1986, c. 537, § 8, but was later 
expanded to apply Statewide, St. 1992, c. 379, § 139. 
6 
 
predictably different results.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 732 (1978) (implicitly recognizing right 
of access but requiring showing of prejudice to establish error 
in denial of access to criminal record); Commonwealth v. 
Collela, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 706, 708-709 (1974) (no error in 
denying access to witness's criminal record as prosecution not 
required to collect such records for defendants).  The 
legislative actions in 1986 and 1992 imposed two fundamental 
changes that provide useful context for our consideration 
whether mandatory disclosure of criminal records applies to 
sealed criminal records.  First, the requirement in G. L. 
c. 218, § 26A, second par., that the judge  
"shall issue an order of discovery . . . requiring 
that the defendant be permitted to discover, inspect 
and copy any material and relevant evidence, 
documents, statements of persons, or reports of 
physical or mental examinations of any person or of 
scientific tests or experiments, within the 
possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor or 
persons under his direction and control,"   
 
recognized a defendant's presumptive right to relevant routine 
discovery in criminal cases.4  Second, the remaining language 
requires that "[u]pon motion of the defendant the judge shall 
                                                          
 
 
4 Routine discovery includes those types of discovery 
specified in Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A), as amended, 444 
Mass. 1501 (2005), including statements by the defendant, grand 
jury minutes, exculpatory facts, contact information for 
witnesses, anticipated expert opinion evidence, relevant 
exhibits, summaries of identification procedures, and 
inducements made to witnesses. 
7 
 
order . . . the production by the probation department of the 
record of prior convictions of any such witness."  G. L. c. 218, 
§ 26A, second par.  Against the backdrop of a discovery process 
entirely within the judge's discretion, the 1986 and 1992 acts, 
St. 1992, c. 379, § 139, and St. 1986, c. 537, § 8, reflect a 
legislative intent to streamline the discovery process by 
imposing a measure of predictability and efficiency in the 
treatment of routine discovery requests, including access to 
criminal records.  The presumptive right to routine discovery 
accomplished this purpose by relieving a defendant of the 
obligation to affirmatively establish a need for and right to 
such information, and limited judicial discretion in discovery 
orders governed by the statute.  See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 469 
Mass. 516, 521-522 (2014) (rule 14 facilitates automatic 
production by eliminating defendants' need to request items of 
mandatory discovery).  Mandatory discovery of criminal records 
likewise contributes to a streamlined discovery process by 
removing a barrier to the exercise of the right of impeachment 
as provided in G. L. c. 233, § 21.5   
 
Amendments to rule 14 in 2004, designed to promote 
efficiency in the disposition of criminal cases and to "improve 
both the administration and delivery of justice," reinforced the 
                                                          
 
 
5 G. L. c. 233, § 21, as amended through St. 2010, c. 256, 
§ 105. 
8 
 
more liberal approach to discovery as set forth in G. L. c. 218, 
§ 26A.  See Report of the Supreme Judicial Court Standing 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 73 
(May 9, 2003).  Rule 14 eliminated the need for a motion 
"consistent with criminal procedure," G. L. c. 218, § 26A, 
second par., and required automatic disclosure of the designated 
information.  See Reporters' Notes to Rule 14 (2004), Mass. Ann. 
Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1507 
(LexisNexis 2015-2016). 
 
b.  The sealing statute, G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  In 
contrast, G. L. c. 276, § 100A, prohibits, except in 
circumstances not relevant here, the disclosure of a "sealed" 
criminal record.  The statute provides in relevant part:  
     "Such sealed records shall not operate to disqualify a  
 
person in any examination, appointment or application   
 
for public service in the service of the commonwealth   
 
or of any political subdivision thereof; nor shall  
 
 
such sealed records be admissible in evidence or used   
 
in any way in any court proceedings or hearings before  
 
any boards or commissions, except in imposing sentence  
 
in subsequent criminal proceedings . . . ." (emphasis   
 
supplied). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
G. L. c. 276, § 100A, fourth par.  It mandates that "[t]he 
commissioner [of probation], in response to inquiries by 
authorized persons other than any law enforcement agency, any 
court, or any appointing authority, shall in the case of a 
sealed record . . . report that no record exists" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 276, § 100A, sixth par.  
9 
 
 
The impetus for the enactment of G. L. c. 276, § 100A, was 
the Commonwealth's "compelling interest in providing privacy 
protections for former criminal defendants" by prohibiting 
access to sealed criminal records.  See Pon, 469 Mass. at 300.  
The privacy protections extended to former criminal defendants 
serves the broader purpose of facilitating their reintegration 
into society.  See id. at 306 n.19, 307. 
 
In resolving the issue before us, we apply the familiar 
rule that we construe related statutes "together so as to 
constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative 
purpose."  Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 
635, 641 (2012), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of 
Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975).  We are obliged to 
discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  
Oxford v. Oxford Water Co., 391 Mass. 581, 587-588 (1984).  
Statutes "must be interpreted according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished."  Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 576-577 (2006), 
quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). 
Considering both the legislative purposes underlying the 
statutes and the specific language chosen to effect those 
10 
 
purposes, we are persuaded that the judge correctly rejected 
Wing's claim that the more general right to discovery of a 
witness's criminal record trumps the statutorily protected 
privacy interests in sealed criminal records.   
 
First, the language of the two statutes supports our view 
that sealed criminal records are beyond the reach of G. L. 
c. 218, § 26A, and the automatic discovery provisions of rule 
14.  As noted, G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and rule 14 are silent as to 
the application to sealed criminal records.  Although not 
dispositive, silence is a factor relevant to the interpretation 
of the statute.  "Where . . . a statute is 'simply silent' on a 
particular issue, we interpret the provision 'in the context of 
the over-all objective the Legislature sought to accomplish.'"  
Seller's Case, 452 Mass. 804, 810 (2008), quoting National 
Lumber Co. v. LeFrancois Constr. Corp., 430 Mass. 663, 667 
(2000).  Where, as explained above, the legislative objective of 
G. L. c. 218, § 26A, is to provide for more efficient discovery 
in criminal cases, we cannot say that disclosure of sealed 
criminal records is necessary to that purpose.  We are 
especially reluctant to require disclosure of sealed criminal 
records where to do so would contravene the explicit protections 
granted to persons under G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  Thus, Wing's 
argument that he is entitled to the sealed record based on the 
absence of a specific exclusion for sealed records is not 
11 
 
persuasive in light of the statutory scheme providing 
affirmative protection for such records.   
 
Moreover, where statutes deal with the same subject, the 
more specific statute controls the more general one, so long as 
the Legislature did not draft the more general statute to 
provide comprehensive coverage of the subject area.  
Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 610, cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 487 (2012); Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass. 
App. Ct. 126, 131-132 (2013).  Here, G. L. c. 276, § 100A, 
offers specific guidelines limiting access to sealed records.  
In contrast, G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and rule 14 are general 
discovery provisions, and, as such, must yield to the more 
specific protections of the sealing statute.    
 
Wing's argument as to the limits of G. L. c. 276, § 100A, 
also is unpersuasive.  Wing urges us to narrowly construe the 
statute's prohibitive language, "nor shall such sealed records 
be admissible in evidence or used in any way in any court 
proceedings."  He asserts that pretrial discovery is "access" 
not "use," and that § 100A only limits trial usage of sealed 
records after they are obtained.  The difference is illusory.  
See Brittle v. Boston, 439 Mass. 580, 585 (2003) (declining to 
unduly constrict phrase "criminal proceedings" so as to exclude 
matters fairly within scope of criminal misconduct statute).  As 
Wing concedes, he seeks the sealed record to "open up other 
12 
 
proper avenues for discovery" and to "raise a defense."  In the 
context of § 100A, the term "use" encompasses Wing's intended 
actions, and access is prohibited for that purpose.   
 
Wing also reads the language, "nor shall such sealed 
records be admissible in evidence or used in any way in any 
court proceedings . . . except in imposing sentence in 
subsequent criminal proceedings," as limiting §100A to 
proceedings against the record holder (emphasis added).  G. L. 
c. 276, § 100A, fourth par.  There is no such limit in the 
statute.  By its plain language, § 100A allows sealed records to 
be utilized in sentencing proceedings, but also in proceedings 
where there is reasonable cause to believe that a sealed record 
may be relevant to an issue of child safety or violence against 
another.6  Nothing in the text of the statute specifies that such 
proceedings must be against the record holder.   
 
Here, we also apply the rule that, where two statutes 
conflict, the later statute governs because the Legislature is 
presumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends or 
                                                          
 
 
6 Section 100A allows the use of a sealed record in 
sentencing proceedings and "in any proceedings under [G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 1-39I, G. L. c. 201, §§ 2-5, G. L. cc. 208, 209, 
209A, 209B, 209C, or G. L. c. 210, §§ 1-11A], [in which] a party 
[has] reasonable cause to believe that information in a sealed 
criminal record of another party may be relevant to (1) an issue 
of custody or visitation of a child, (2) abuse, as defined in 
[G. L. c. 209A, § 1,] or (3) the safety of any person . . . ."  
G. L. c. 276, § 100A, fourth par. 
13 
 
enacts a new one.  See Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 
520 (2001).  In 2010, "the Legislature made changes to the 
sealing provisions by enabling earlier automatic sealing under 
G. L. c. 276, § 100A, and expanding discretionary sealing to a 
broader class of nonconvictions."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 305-306.  
As the most recently amended statute, G. L. c. 276, § 100A, is a 
renewed limitation on the mandatory discovery provision in G. L. 
c. 218, § 26A.7  Given the temporal relationship between the two 
statutes, we reject the proposition that a criminal defendant's 
right to automatic discovery, absent the implication of a 
constitutional right to a sealed criminal record, takes priority 
over the later-enacted sealing statute.   
 
The balancing of the State's "compelling interest" in 
reintegrating former defendants into society promoted by G. L. 
c. 276, § 100A, against the defendant's interest in a more 
efficient and predictable discovery process as provided in G. L. 
c. 218, § 26A, and rule 14 yields the same outcome.  We are 
persuaded that the more compelling policy interest is the 
Legislature's concern that persons convicted of crimes have some 
opportunity to become productive members of their communities 
once they have paid their debt to society.  Thus, we adopt an 
                                                          
 
 
7 Rule 14 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 
was amended in 2012.  The amendment, however, did not change the 
provision for discovery of criminal records.  See 463 Mass. 1501 
(2012). 
14 
 
interpretation of G. L. c. 218, § 26A, that accommodates the 
Legislature's intent to insure, except in limited circumstances, 
the privacy protections embodied in G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  
Because Wing's mechanistic application of the automatic 
discovery rule to all criminal records would frustrate the 
legislative intent, we decline to adopt it in this case. 
 
Last, we reject Wing's urging to apply the rule of lenity 
in our analysis.  The rule of lenity is simply inapplicable 
where, as here, the statute contains no ambiguity requiring that 
Wing be given the benefit of the ambiguity.  See Commonwealth v. 
Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 652 (1992) (rule of lenity applied 
only where statute is plausibly ambiguous). 
 
c.  Constitutional right to discovery of sealed records.  
We next address Wing's argument that he is entitled on 
constitutional grounds to discovery of the witness's sealed 
criminal record.  Relying on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 
(1974), and Commonwealth v. Elliot, 393 Mass. 824 (1985), Wing 
asserts that his constitutional right to confrontation requires 
access to sealed records for impeachment purposes.  The 
probation department counters that a defendant's constitutional 
right to confrontation is not implicated where he seeks only to 
impeach the credibility of a witness based on a prior 
conviction.  We agree.    
15 
 
 
The right of confrontation encompasses the impeachment of a 
witness with a record of convictions.  This right, however, is 
limited to reasonable impeachment, subject to the court's 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 12 
(2002).  In Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 182 (1975), we 
outlined the parameters of the right to impeachment based on a 
prior conviction, observing that "[w]e are aware of no 
constitutional principle which confers on a defendant in every 
case a right to impeach the credibility of a witness by proof of 
past convictions or past delinquencies."  Id. at 186-187.  See 
also Davis, 415 U.S. at 321 (same) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
Following Ferrara, supra, our cases consistently have held that 
the court may exercise its sound discretion in ruling on a 
defendant's right to impeachment by a record of prior 
convictions.8  Wing, claiming only a right of impeachment based 
on the witness's sealed record of prior convictions, is subject 
to the limitation articulated in Ferrara, supra at 187 (juvenile 
records must show "rational tendency" to show bias of witness).  
In the absence of a showing that the judge abused her discretion 
                                                          
 
 
8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 726-727 
(2005) (judicial discretion is prerequisite to use of prior 
convictions as impeachment evidence); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 
Mass. 222, 224-226 (1981) (not all of complainant's prior 
prostitution charges admissible because only certain charges 
touched on possible motive to lie); Commonwealth v. Santos, 376 
Mass. 920, 924 (1978) (witnesses' juvenile records not always 
admissible to impeach credibility). 
16 
 
in denying the right of access to the sealed record for 
impeachment on this basis, Wing's claim must fail.   
It is true that we have recognized a defendant's 
entitlement "as a matter of right to reasonable cross 
examination for the purpose of showing bias or motive."  
Commonwealth v. Santos, 376 Mass. 920, 924 (1978).  However, 
Wing has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to disclosure 
of the witness's sealed criminal record for this purpose.  Wing 
has failed to establish a nexus between the witness's sealed 
criminal record and its potential to reveal bias or a motive to 
prevaricate.  See Ferrara, 368 Mass. at 186-187.  At most, he 
suggests that his suspicion about "the large number of aliases" 
in the unsealed criminal record prompted the request for the 
sealed entries.  Wing's only recourse, therefore, is to address 
the witness's credibility in accordance with the impeachment 
restrictions of G. L. c. 233, § 21.   
Nor are we persuaded by Wing's arguments that he is 
entitled to access the sealed criminal record for other 
constitutional purposes.  Wing claims that he is hindered in his 
ability to mount a defense based on bias by the lack of access 
to the sealed record.  In Santos, we rejected this argument as a 
basis for disclosure, noting that a defendant must "be expected 
to make some explanation as to how he expects to show bias."  
17 
 
Santos, 376 Mass. at 926 n.7, quoting Commonwealth v. Cheek, 374 
Mass. 613, 615 (1978).   
Wing's complaint that denial of the sealed record deprives 
him of information that could potentially help him access the 
witness's out-of-State records is likewise without merit.  
Wing's reliance on Commonwealth v. Corradino, 368 Mass. 411, 422 
(1975), which permits a defendant to obtain out-of-State records 
"when known facts suggest that a witness has a record 
elsewhere," is misplaced.  He suggests that the witness's out-
of-State record contains information that will assist him in 
establishing bias.  The potential existence of an out-of-State 
record is insufficient for this purpose.  Id. at 422-423.  A 
person must attest to not having convictions in other States in 
order to seal a record in Massachusetts.  See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100A, first par.  Contrary to Wing's assertions, a sealed 
record evinces the lack of an out-of-State criminal record.    
Last, Wing argues, for the first time in this appeal, that 
he has a constitutional right to present the first aggressor 
theory of self-defense and to access the witness's sealed record 
for this purpose.  See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 
659-660 (2005).  The argument has no merit.  As a threshold 
matter, Wing makes no attempt to show that Adjutant applies to 
the property crime of malicious destruction of property over 
$250 charged in the complaint.  See Commonwealth v. Haddock, 46 
18 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 246, 248-249 (1999) (defense of property, unlike 
self-defense, is limited to nondeadly force appropriate in kind 
and degree to nature of trespass).  Further, even if the 
Adjutant principle is applied to the facts of this case, Wing 
has failed to establish a factual basis for the defense.  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 136 (2012) (self-defense 
applicable only where defendant utilized appropriate means to 
avoid physical contact).  Nothing in the record before us 
demonstrates that Wing is plausibly able to assert that the 
identity of the first aggressor is in dispute and that the 
victim has a history of violence.  See Adjutant, supra, at 650. 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the judge did 
not abuse her discretion in denying Wing's motion to compel 
production of the witness's sealed criminal record.  Based on 
our interpretation of the language of the relevant statutes and 
the Legislature's intent in prioritizing the policy interests 
promoted by the sealing statute, the mandatory discovery 
provisions of G. L. c. 218, § 26A, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (1) (D) do not apply to a criminal record sealed under 
G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  Because Wing failed to establish a 
constitutional basis for access to the witness's sealed criminal 
record, we decline to require its disclosure.  The order denying 
Wing's motion to compel production is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.