Title: In re Child of T'Mara C.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 138 
Docket: 
Kno-18-87 
Submitted 
On Briefs: September 26, 2018 
Decided: 
October 4, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF T’MARA C. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  T’Mara C. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Rockland, 
Sparaco, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child.1  She argues that the 
record cannot support the finding of parental unfitness to the standard of clear 
and convincing evidence.  We affirm the judgment. 
[¶2]  The Department filed a child protection petition in December 2015, 
when the child was two months old.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2017).  The petition 
alleged that the mother was unable to meet the basic needs of the child due to 
homelessness and mental health issues.  The Department was granted custody 
of the child through a preliminary protection order entered by the court 
(E. Walker, J.) and the child was placed in foster care.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(2) 
(2017).  In April 2016, the court (Sparaco, J.) entered a jeopardy order with the 
                                         
1  The child’s father does not appeal from the termination of his parental rights, and we focus on 
the procedural history and findings regarding the mother.   
 
2 
mother’s agreement; custody remained with the Department.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4035 (2017).  The Department thereafter provided, and the mother 
participated in, multiple services as required by the jeopardy order and 
reunification plan.    
 
[¶3]  In March 2017, the Department petitioned for termination of the 
mother’s parental rights, alleging that she abused alcohol and had not shown 
the ability to parent the child outside a structured setting.  After a two-day trial, 
the court denied the petition, citing many positive changes the mother had 
made in her efforts toward reunification and not finding sufficient credible 
evidence that she had a substance abuse disorder that would prevent her from 
safely parenting the child.  The child remained in the Department’s custody and 
in foster care after the denial of the Department’s petition.   
 
[¶4]  The Department petitioned for the termination of the mother’s 
parental rights again in October 2017, reiterating its allegations from the first 
petition and further alleging that, after the denial of the first petition, the 
mother had declined an overnight visit with the child, missed meetings with her 
service providers, and appeared intoxicated during three encounters with 
police.  The Department asserted in its petition that the mother was unable to 
 
3 
protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for him in a time 
reasonably calculated to meet his needs.   
[¶5]  The court held a two-day trial on the second petition on 
January 29, 2018, and February 5, 2018.  It then entered a judgment granting 
the petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights after making findings of 
fact by clear and convincing evidence.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2017); In re 
A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463.    
 
[¶6]  In its judgment, the court made the following ultimate findings, all 
of which are supported by competent evidence in the record.   
In this case, the court finds clear and convincing evidence of 
parental unfitness on the two grounds alleged.  There is no 
doubting [the mother]’s love and affection of this child and the 
positive changes in her life that she made in her efforts toward 
reunification.  Nevertheless, that forward progress has essentially 
stopped and has, in some respects, regressed.  After more than two 
years, [the mother]’s visits remain supervised, with most, if not all, 
of her providers still express[ing] concerns about [the mother]’s 
ability to safely parent [the child] in an unstructured setting.  
Furthermore, it is very clear that [the mother] has a serious alcohol 
problem that has led to aggressive and threatening behaviors 
towards others.  Her treatment for this issue is in the early stages, 
and it is far from clear whether she will be able to successfully 
maintain her sobriety for any length of time.  Unfortunately, as was 
clear from her testimony at trial, [the mother] continues to 
minimize or deny her alcohol abuse.  In fact, had she not been 
arrested, it seems likely that she would have continued to deny 
having any problem at all.   
 
 
4 
It is also clear that, notwithstanding having been provided 
numerous services to assist her in basic child care skills, [the 
mother] continues to struggle in anticipating and responding to 
[the child]’s basic needs.  It does not appear to be from lack of effort, 
raising the question of when, if ever, [the mother] would be able to 
alleviate jeopardy.  Given [the mother]’s many challenges, and her 
lack of progress to date, the court must agree with the position of 
the Guardian ad litem and the Department that [the mother] is 
unable to protect [the child] from jeopardy and that these 
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is 
reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the child; 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), and that [the mother] has been unable to 
take responsibility for [the child] within a time which is reasonably 
calculated to meet the needs of the child, 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii). 
 
. . . . 
 
The court further finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
termination is in [the child]’s best interest.  [The child] has been [in 
foster care] for over two years and needs permanency.  [The child] 
has bonded with his foster family who has taken good care of him 
and would like to adopt him.   
 
 
[¶7]  Based on these factual findings, which are fully supported by the 
record, the court did not err in its ultimate finding that, despite the mother’s 
efforts to improve her circumstances, she remains unable to protect the child 
from jeopardy or take responsibility for him within a time that is reasonably 
calculated to meet his needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii) (2017); 
In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.  Nor did the court err or 
abuse its discretion in determining that the termination of the mother’s 
 
5 
parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) 
(2017); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pamela S. Holmes, Esq., Holmes Legal Group, LLC, Wells, for appellant Mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Rockland District Court docket number PC-2015-10 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY