Title: Commonwealth v. Kolenovic

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-08047 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ENEZ KOLENOVIC. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     December 4, 2014. - June 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Assistance of counsel.  
Intoxication.  Mental Impairment.  Evidence, Intoxication. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 24, 1996. 
 
 
The case was tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on March 18, 2003, was heard by her. 
 
 
 
Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Michael R. Schneider for the defendant. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  On February 2, 1999, a jury convicted the 
defendant, Enez Kolenovic, of murder in the first degree on the 
2 
 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  The defendant's 
conviction stems from the stabbing death of David Walker 
(victim) during the early morning hours of September 16, 1996, 
following an altercation between the two in a bar.  While the 
defendant's appeal to this court was pending, he filed a motion 
for a new trial arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and 
error in the jury instructions.  We remanded the motion to the 
Superior Court.2  The judge, who had been the trial judge, 
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Commonwealth appealed.  
We conclude that the judge erred and reverse the order allowing 
the motion for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a. Facts presented at trial.  From the 
evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the 
following facts.  In the early morning hours of September 16, 
1996, the defendant was riding in the back seat of his friend's 
vehicle after a day spent consuming alcohol.  His friend, John 
J. McCrystal, was driving; the defendant and another friend, 
                     
 
1 The jury did not find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. 
 
 
2 The defendant also moved for a reduction of the verdict 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 25 (b), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 
(1995).  The judge denied the motion as to the request for a 
reduction in the verdict and the claimed error in the jury 
instructions. 
 
3 
 
Melissa Radigan, were seated in the back seat, and the victim 
was sitting directly in front of the defendant in the front 
passenger seat.  The defendant and the victim had had an 
altercation earlier in the evening.  The group was on the way to 
the defendant's house to continue drinking when the defendant 
reached forward and slit the victim's throat.  McCrystal stopped 
the vehicle, and the defendant got out, opened the front 
passenger door, and pulled the victim to the ground.  The 
defendant stabbed the victim multiple times while he lay on the 
concrete. 
 
 The defendant spent the hours before the murder drinking 
to excess.  Beginning at approximately 12:45 P.M., the 
defendant, accompanied by a friend, David Bruso, consumed at 
least two beers and two double shots of one hundred proof 
alcohol at a bar owned by McCrystal.3  At 2:30 P.M., the 
defendant and Bruso left the bar, stopped at the liquor store 
Bruso owned to obtain eight to ten single-shot bottles of one 
hundred proof alcohol, and went to a barbecue at the local 
Knights of Columbus hall.  The two consumed the single-shot 
bottles, and the defendant also drank more than six beers and 
more than four shots of seventy-proof alcohol. 
                     
 
3 John J. McCrystal owned the building housing both his bar 
and the defendant's family's restaurant; he leased the 
restaurant portion to the defendant's family. 
 
4 
 
 
While at the barbecue, the defendant ran into Radigan, who 
was attending the event with her mother and sister.  For a brief 
time, the defendant and Radigan left the barbecue and returned 
to McCrystal's bar where they each had a drink. The two went 
back to the barbecue, where they continued to drink and fell 
down when they attempted to dance together. 
 
The defendant and Radigan left again at about 9:30 P.M. to 
return to McCrystal's bar.  Later in the evening, the defendant 
telephoned McCrystal to ask him to come to the bar to give the 
two a ride home.  McCrystal arrived and saw the defendant and 
Radigan in the restaurant portion of the building.  McCrystal 
then entered the bar to wait.  The victim arrived shortly 
thereafter.  The defendant and Radigan left the restaurant area, 
entered the bar, and sat next to McCrystal.  The defendant 
ordered a cognac on the rocks, and Radigan and McCrystal both 
ordered a beer.  The bartender hesitated in serving the 
defendant and Radigan because both appeared to "have been 
drinking quite a bit."  The bartender served the two only after 
McCrystal said he was driving them home. 
 
The altercation with the victim, a bar patron, began at 
approximately 11 P.M.  The defendant had thrown a drink on 
Radigan.  The victim reprimanded the defendant by telling him, 
"You don't do that to a lady" and "You don't treat a lady like 
that."  The defendant approached the victim, repeating, "Don't 
5 
 
cross my path."  The defendant challenged the victim to take 
their dispute outside; after trying to ignore the defendant, the 
victim agreed. 
 
The two men continued their argument outside, frequently 
bumping chests.  As the bar was across from the police station, 
a police officer arrived quickly and asked them to break it up.  
The officer recognized the two men and told them he did not want 
any "problems out here on the street."  Each man responded that 
there was no problem and returned inside.  The defendant then 
bought the victim a beer. 
 
The parties were joined at the bar by Bruso, who had spent 
several hours asleep in his vehicle after leaving the barbecue.  
Bruso described the defendant's demeanor, noting that "his eyes 
were very glossy.  He seemed very intoxicated to the point of 
almost being asleep, but not asleep.  His eyes were open."  
Although Bruso had seen the defendant intoxicated on many 
occasions, he noted that "it was the drunkest I've ever seen 
him."  Another patron, Irene Grigas, who arrived after the 
altercation with the victim, similarly noted that she had never 
seen the defendant in that state.  Bruso offered to give the 
defendant a ride home but McCrystal told Bruso that he was 
giving the defendant a ride.  Bruso left the bar. 
 
The bartender started to close the bar about 12:30 A.M. and 
the defendant, Radigan, and McCrystal made plans to go back to 
6 
 
the defendant's apartment to "keep the party going."  The victim 
declined McCrystal's invitation to join them, opting instead to 
assist the bartender in closing for the night.  Before 
departing, the defendant went to the restaurant side of the 
building, where he remained for about five minutes before 
meeting with the others.  While inside, he put on a winter 
jacket that he stored at the restaurant, even though the weather 
was "nice" and the evening was an "Indian Summer September type 
of night." 
 
McCrystal carried some beer to his vehicle, where he sat in 
the driver's seat to await the defendant.  Radigan joined him 
and sat in the front passenger seat.  The defendant arrived; 
when he was told the victim would not be joining them, he 
returned to the bar.  After a few minutes, the defendant emerged 
from the bar followed by the victim.  The defendant asked 
Radigan to get in the back seat.  Radigan complied and sat 
behind McCrystal.  The defendant directed the victim to sit in 
the front passenger seat and he sat in the back seat behind the 
victim. 
 
McCrystal drove the short distance to the defendant's 
apartment complex, stopping for a few minutes to talk to a 
police cruiser that pulled alongside his vehicle.  About one 
hundred yards from the complex, the defendant leaned forward and 
put his arm around the victim.  McCrystal admonished them 
7 
 
because he thought the two were "fooling around."  Radigan heard 
McCrystal shouting and then saw the defendant lean forward 
toward the victim.  In the immediate aftermath of that event, 
both McCrystal and Radigan felt and saw blood.  McCrystal 
stopped the vehicle. 
 
The defendant pulled the victim from the vehicle and 
continued to stab him.  McCrystal shouted to the defendant to 
stop and "get off him, you're going to kill him."  The defendant 
replied, "I think it's too late for that."  McCrystal was able 
to push the defendant off the victim when he noticed, for the 
first time, that the defendant had a knife in his hand.  
McCrystal recognized the knife as the type the defendant used at 
his family's restaurant. 
 
The defendant said to McCrystal, "You've got to be with me 
on this."  McCrystal responded, "What, are you crazy? . . . No 
way."  The defendant's face then became more serious and he ran 
past McCrystal into the driver's seat of McCrystal's vehicle.  
McCrystal attempted to reach through the window and shut off the 
engine but was unsuccessful.  In response to a resident's 
telephone call, Scott J. Crevier, a Ware police officer, arrived 
just as the defendant entered McCrystal's vehicle.  While the 
defendant was turning the vehicle around in the parking lot, 
Crevier attempted to block the exit with his cruiser.  The 
defendant "narrowly missed" striking the cruiser and took off 
8 
 
out of the parking lot.  After a high speed car chase, at times 
approaching 110 miles per hour, police eventually were able to 
apprehend the defendant, who resisted handcuffs until he was 
sprayed with mace. 
 
Police accompanied the defendant to the hospital at 2:55 
A.M. to be treated for the after-effects of the mace.  The 
defendant smelled of alcohol and admitted to drinking a lot.  
The emergency room physician did not perform any alcohol 
ingestion evaluation because the defendant's "gait was normal, 
his speech was clear, his coordination was intact, [and] he was 
cooperative."  Later, at the police station, a police officer 
observed that the defendant's eyes were "bloodshot, glassy, and 
watery"; his speech was "very slow"; and he "took a while" to 
answer questions. 
 
The victim was pronounced dead at 1:28 A.M.  The medical 
examiner who performed his autopsy opined that the victim 
suffered a "major fatal wound" that was one inch deep and six 
and one-half inches long and wrapped from the midline of the 
victim's neck to behind his ear.  The victim had a total of nine 
knife wounds to his neck, head, chest, abdomen, shoulder, and 
back. 
 
 The defendant presented an intoxication defense at trial, 
seeking to persuade the jury that because of his long-standing 
history of alcoholism and his excessive consumption of alcohol 
9 
 
in the twelve hours preceding the killing, he was not capable of 
forming the specific intent required for deliberately 
premeditated murder or to act with extreme atrocity or cruelty 
in causing the victim's death.  Three witnesses -- David Bruso, 
Irene Grigas, and Dr. Robert A. Fox, Jr. -- testified in support 
of the defendant's theory of defense. 
 
 As already noted, Bruso and Grigas recounted aspects of 
the day of drinking and the defendant's demeanor while in their 
presence.  Dr. Fox, a psychiatrist with an expertise in 
substance abuse, opined that because of the defendant's level of 
intoxication at the time of the killing, the defendant's 
thinking and reasoning functions would have been highly impaired 
and his higher functions required to premeditate, form intent, 
or to process what he was doing would have been impaired.  He 
opined that the defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of 
the murder was likely between .26 and .3 per cent,4 and explained 
the physiological effects of alcohol on the body, including on 
the ability to think, reason, remember, make connections, and 
concentrate, and the lowering of a person's inhibitions. 
                     
 
4 Two breathalyzer tests were administered to the defendant 
approximately four hours after the murder.  At that time, his 
blood alcohol level registered .17 and .16 per cent.  The 
defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of the murder was 
extrapolated from these two tests. 
 
10 
 
 
b.  The motion for a new trial.5  In his motion for a new 
trial, the defendant argued that trial counsel was ineffective 
in "fail[ing] to fully investigate, present and argue evidence 
of the defendant's severe neuropsychiatric disorders."  The 
judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and considered first the 
"performance prong" of the Saferian test, or whether counsel's 
performance fell "measurably below that which might be expected 
from an ordinary fallible lawyer."  Commonwealth v. Saferian, 
366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  The judge concluded that the defendant 
met the performance prong of the Saferian test because "further 
evaluation of the defendant's mental condition would have done 
nothing to diminish and potentially much to enhance the only 
possible defense available to the defendant." 
 
As a preface to our analysis of the Commonwealth's claim of 
error, we summarize the evidence presented at the hearing and 
relied on by the judge in her decision.6  The evidence at the 
hearing consisted of testimony from trial counsel; Dr. Fox, the 
                     
 
5 We note that the judge devoted an extraordinary level of 
attention to the issues raised by the defendant's motion.  The 
motion for a new trial was filed on March 21, 2003, and after a 
series of hearings, the motion, which was analyzed in two 
comprehensive memoranda of decision issued on January 19, 2010, 
and November 12, 2013, was allowed. 
 
 
6 Because we do not reach the prejudice prong of 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974), we do not detail 
the evidence on that issue. 
 
11 
 
expert retained by trial counsel to conduct a pretrial 
assessment of the defendant's history of alcohol dependence and 
intoxication level; and affidavits from three experts, retained 
after trial. 
 
The defendant's trial counsel, found by the judge to be an 
experienced and successful criminal trial attorney, was retained 
by the defendant's family to represent the defendant at the 
trial.  The attorney met with the defendant ten or more times in 
preparation for the trial.  During those meetings, he "perceived 
no evidence of mental illness or impairment" and received no 
information from the defendant or his family to suggest any 
mental abnormality.  Recognizing, however, that the defendant 
was highly intoxicated at the time of the murder, the attorney 
retained the services of Dr. Fox and requested an opinion 
whether, because of the defendant's alcohol consumption, the 
defendant had the "ability to form the specific intent necessary 
for first degree murder."  Although the request was limited to 
this question, counsel did not object to a full psychiatric 
evaluation of the defendant. 
 
Dr. Fox examined the defendant over the course of eight 
hours and thereafter advised trial counsel that he was prepared 
to opine at trial that the defendant was incapable of forming 
the specific intent required for murder in the first degree.  In 
a letter written subsequent to the initial meetings with counsel 
12 
 
and a few days before trial, Dr. Fox stated his opinion to "a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . that [the 
defendant] was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act 
and was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law."  He also informed counsel that he believed that the 
defendant had a dual diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and alcoholism, and suggested further testing by a PTSD 
expert.  Counsel, however, declined to seek further evaluation 
of the defendant for PTSD after meeting with Dr. Fox several 
times during the trial preparation and after considering all of 
the other information available from his investigation into the 
case.  He decided, as a matter of strategy, to pursue only an 
intoxication defense and to limit Dr. Fox's trial testimony to 
the defendant's history of alcohol dependence and intoxication 
at the time of the murder. 
 
Counsel's explanation for this strategic choice was that he 
believed, based on his experience as a criminal defense lawyer, 
"that juries almost never accept an insanity defense."  The 
attorney added that (1) he believed a dual defense based on both 
intoxication and PTSD could cause a loss of credibility with the 
jury and the PTSD defense could water down the substantial 
evidence he had developed to support an intoxication defense; 
and (2) he was skeptical of some of Dr. Fox's conclusions and 
thought the PTSD defense was based on a "shaky factual 
13 
 
foundation."  He believed there was a "real chance that [the 
intoxication] evidence was strong enough to win a manslaughter 
verdict" because it was based on undisputed evidence 
demonstrating the defendant's lengthy history of alcoholism and 
extreme amount of alcohol he had consumed at the time of the 
killing.  He noted as well his concern that a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility would allow the Commonwealth's experts 
to have access to the defendant and vitiate the advantage of the 
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's intoxication.7 
 
The judge credited the attorney's explanation of his 
strategic decisions and his recollection that he had discussed 
the decision with the defendant, who had agreed with counsel's 
strategy.  In addition, she found that defense counsel "did not 
ignore Dr. Fox's opinion that the defendant suffered as well 
from PTSD, [but] he made a tactical decision that the PTSD 
defense suggested by Dr. Fox was unlikely to succeed."  The 
judge also found that trial counsel "vigorously argued all the 
evidence [and] succeeded in part, as the jury found the 
defendant not guilty of murder by deliberate premeditation."  At 
the same time, she noted that counsel had only a rudimentary 
                     
 
7 The judge noted that only McCrystal disputed the extent of 
the defendant's intoxication but observed that McCrystal had a 
"clear motive" to minimize because of the possibility of a civil 
lawsuit as the owner of the bar where the defendant consumed 
alcohol in the hours before the killing. 
 
14 
 
understanding of PTSD and had based his decision to forgo 
further investigation of the condition on his personal 
assessment of the defendant during their meetings.  In addition, 
she noted defense counsel's "general lack of faith in psychiatry 
. . . as a defense in criminal trials." 
 
Dr. Fox confirmed that he had reported his PTSD diagnosis 
to trial counsel in advance of the trial and advised the 
attorney to pursue further evaluation of that condition.  Dr. 
Fox recalled that at one of the trial preparation meetings, 
trial counsel advised him that he intended to present only the 
intoxication defense and explained that his questions during the 
trial would be limited to that issue.  In recounting his 
pretrial involvement with trial counsel, however, Dr. Fox 
criticized counsel's strategic choices and testified that he 
disagreed with counsel's intoxication defense strategy.  He 
expressed "frustrat[ion]" that he did not have the "opportunity" 
for a full discussion of the issue with counsel.  As to this 
point, however, the judge found that Dr. Fox told defense 
counsel that "PTSD might be a defense worth pursuing" and that 
"further evaluation and objective testing would be useful if the 
defense were to be presented in court" (emphases added).  The 
judge made no finding that Dr. Fox ever expressed to counsel his 
disagreement with the trial strategy.  As the trial record 
15 
 
demonstrates, Dr. Fox testified at trial in accordance with 
trial counsel's defense strategy. 
 
The three experts, in their affidavits based on extensive 
posttrial testing and interviews with defendant's family, 
definitively diagnosed the defendant with PTSD and other mental 
diseases, including alcohol dependency, brain injury, 
intermittent explosive disorder, dysthymic disorder, social 
phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, and several unspecified 
personality disorders.8   All of these experts opined that 
because of the defendant's multiple mental disorders, he lacked 
the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a. Standard of review.  "In the absence of 
constitutional error, a motion for a new trial is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the trial judge," Commonwealth v. Smith, 
381 Mass. 141, 142 (1980), who may grant a new trial "if it 
appears that justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  Judges are to 
apply the rule 30 (b) standard rigorously and should grant such 
motion only if the defendant comes forward with a credible 
reason that outweighs the risk of prejudice to the Commonwealth.  
                     
 
8 The experts did not all diagnose the same mental diseases, 
with the exception of posttraumatic stress disorder, alcohol 
dependency, and brain injury. 
 
16 
 
Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 728 (2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 504 (1992).  On the 
Commonwealth's appeal of the grant of a defendant's motion for a 
new trial, we consider whether the judge committed a significant 
error of law or abuse of discretion in allowing the defendant's 
motion.  Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 591, 597 (2012).  That 
discretion, however, "is not boundless and absolute."  See 
Commonwealth v. Genius, 402 Mass. 711, 714 (1988).  Under the 
abuse of discretion standard, the issue is whether the judge's 
decision resulted from "a clear error of judgment in weighing 
the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(quotation and citation omitted).9  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
On review, "[a] judge's findings of fact after an 
evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial will be accepted 
if supported by the record."  Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 
213, 224 (2005).  Where, as here, the motion judge is also the 
                     
 
9 In L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), 
we "retired" the prior standard for abuse of discretion that 
deferred to the judge except on a showing that "no conscientious 
judge, acting intelligently, could honestly have taken the view 
expressed by [her]" (quotation and citation omitted).  While 
deference is still appropriate, the revised abuse of discretion 
standard confirms that an appellate court is entitled to correct 
a decision that is based on an erroneous view of the law or a 
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. 
17 
 
trial judge, we give "special deference" to the judge's findings 
of fact and the ultimate decision on the motion.  Lane, 462 
Mass. at 597.  We consider the record in its entirety, however, 
to determine whether "there exists in the record before us 
evidence to support the judge's decision to order a new trial."  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Preston, 393 Mass. 318, 324 (1984). 
 
b.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  "Where a new trial 
is sought based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the burden of proving ineffectiveness rests with the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 755 (2008), citing 
Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 90 (2004).  We begin the 
analysis with an overview of the legal principles underlying the 
judge's allowance of the defendant's motion for a new trial on 
the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Under the 
familiar Saferian test, a defendant is denied constitutionally 
effective assistance of counsel if the representation fell 
"measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer," and that the performance inadequacy "likely 
deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial 
ground of defence."  Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  The Saferian 
test is implicit recognition that the constitutional interest 
undergirding the assistance of counsel jurisprudence is the 
right to a fair trial.  Although a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may not prevail unless counsel's 
18 
 
performance affects the fairness of the trial, we need not reach 
that analysis if we determine that counsel's representation did 
not fall measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer.  See Commonwealth v. Haley, 413 Mass. 
770, 775 (1992).  See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 689 (1984) ("[T]he purpose of the effective assistance 
guarantee . . . is simply to ensure that criminal defendants 
receive a fair trial," not to "improve the quality of legal 
representation, although that is a goal of considerable 
importance to the legal system").  "In cases where tactical or 
strategic decisions of the defendant's counsel are at issue, we 
conduct our review with some deference to avoid characterizing 
as unreasonable a defense that was merely unsuccessful."  
Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 190 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 272 (1991).  This measure 
of deference is as it must be because, ultimately, counsel alone 
has the benefit of the full factual picture that dictates the 
choice of those matters to be revealed to the fact finder and 
those that are better left unexposed to court room scrutiny.  
From that vantage point, counsel "knows best how to defend a 
client."  Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 843 (2011). 
 
Where, as here, the defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is based on a tactical or strategic decision, the 
test is whether the decision was "'manifestly unreasonable' when 
19 
 
made."  Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442 (2006), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728 (1978).  The 
inquiry involves both temporal and substantive considerations.  
The temporal consideration limits the effect of hindsight by 
requiring a focus on the point in time when counsel made the 
challenged strategic decision.  Glover, 459 Mass. at 843, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Fenton F., 442 Mass. 31, 38 (2004).  
Substantively, "[o]nly 'strategy and tactics which lawyers of 
ordinary training and skill in the criminal law would not 
consider competent'" are manifestly unreasonable.  Commonwealth 
v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 186-187 (2005), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Levia, 385 Mass. 345, 353 (1982). 
 
c.  Manifest unreasonableness of counsel's strategic 
decisions.  Deference to the motion judge's discretion 
notwithstanding, see Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 669-
670 (2004), we conclude for the reasons explained infra that the 
record before us lacks support for the judge's ruling that 
counsel's duty to provide constitutionally effective assistance 
of counsel compelled further investigation of Dr. Fox's PTSD 
diagnosis and the presentation of a defense based on that 
diagnosis. 
 
First, the judge erred by misapplying the "manifestly 
unreasonable" test to the facts of this case.  Reasonableness in 
the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an 
20 
 
objective standard that measures counsel's conduct against that 
which "lawyers of ordinary training and skill in the criminal 
law" would consider competent.  See Pillai, 445 Mass. at 186-
187.  See Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  Although our cases 
applying the manifestly unreasonable test have not precisely 
marked the limits of a trial attorney's prerogative to make 
strategic decisions, we have been clear that reasonableness does 
not demand perfection.  Valentin, 470 Mass. at 190.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  Nor is reasonableness informed by 
what hindsight may reveal as a superior or better strategy.  
Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13, 17 (1971).  Counsel may 
strive for perfection, but only competence or the avoidance of a 
"serious incompetency" is required.  Walker, 443 Mass. at 225.  
The manifestly unreasonable test, therefore, is essentially a 
search for rationality in counsel's strategic decisions, taking 
into account all the circumstances known or that should have 
been known to counsel in the exercise of his duty to provide 
effective representation to the client and not whether counsel 
could have made alternative choices.  Id. at 227-228.  Counsel's 
strategic choices did not yield an outcome favorable to the 
defendant and, in hindsight, he could have done more or made 
different choices.  Nonetheless, those strategic choices were 
rational and entirely consistent with what "lawyers of ordinary 
training and skill in the criminal law" would deem to be 
21 
 
competent.  Pillai, 445 Mass. at 186-187; Saferian, 366 Mass. at 
96. 
Counsel's decision to forgo further investigation of the 
defendant's mental state was an informed exercise of his 
prerogative to decide on the defense strategy.  As the judge 
found, counsel was aware of the options but made the strategic 
decision that a lack of criminal responsibility or diminished 
capacity defense was unlikely to succeed and that further 
investigation was unnecessary.  Indeed, Dr. Fox's letter of 
January 5, 1999, proposing these options to counsel suggested 
that it would have been necessary to pursue further 
investigation only if counsel intended to choose either defense. 
Because counsel had done what was necessary to identify the 
defense options based on PTSD, we discern no basis to hold that 
he was required to exhaustively explore and identify the 
constellation of mental diseases later identified in the 
posttrial examinations.  See Commonwealth v. Candelario, 446 
Mass. 847, 856-858 (2006).  Cf. Walker, 443 Mass. at 223.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 280 (1998), 
S.C., 440 Mass. 245 (2003). 
In reviewing the judge's assessment of defense counsel's 
strategy, we cannot blind ourselves to what counsel and other 
experienced trial attorneys know all too well:  the extreme 
difficulty in successfully defending a murder case based on a 
22 
 
lack of criminal responsibility defense.10  Walker, 443 Mass. at 
226 & n.2 (affirming judge's finding of no ineffective 
assistance of counsel and noting "insanity verdicts are rare, 
even when . . . there is strong evidence of mental illness or 
bizarre human conduct").  We reiterate here the judge's 
references to counsel's concern that a lack of criminal 
responsibility defense would expose the defendant's mental 
condition to examination by the Commonwealth's experts.  This 
possibility was a powerful disincentive to pursue a defense 
based on a newly diagnosed condition that likely would have been 
undermined by the Commonwealth's expert.  Given the substantial 
agreement of all the trial witnesses, including the 
Commonwealth's witnesses, on the defendant's extreme 
intoxication at the time of the killing, counsel was entitled to 
weigh this factor more heavily in his strategic choice of a 
defense.  From the perspective of the hypothetical lawyer of 
ordinary skill and training, the choice between a defense that, 
in counsel's reckoning at least, would require riding "two 
horses," and a viable alternative defense based on the factually 
unassailable intoxication defense developed by counsel, would 
                     
 
10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 124-
125 (2000) (defendant convicted of murder despite insanity 
defense where victim's organs were removed and impaled on 
stake). 
 
23 
 
pose little difficulty.  Thus, we conclude that the judge's 
implicit finding that the hypothetical attorney of ordinary 
skills and training would perceive a "serious incompetency" in 
counsel's strategy to forgo an insanity defense in this case was 
error.  See Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96. 
 
Further, the adequacy of counsel's performance is supported 
by Dr. Fox's agreement to testify at trial in accordance with 
counsel's strategy to defend against the indictment based only 
on the intoxication defense.11  Dr. Fox's participation in the 
trial on these terms would not have communicated to counsel the 
fundamental disagreement that Dr. Fox asserted at the posttrial 
proceedings.  Rather, counsel likely would have assumed that his 
approach was acceptable from a medical point of view.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gaboriault, 439 Mass. 84, 95 (2003) (rejecting 
defendant's claim that trial counsel was manifestly unreasonable 
by failing to obtain expert's opinion on criminal responsibility 
prior to trial where counsel obtained opinion from another 
expert and this expert did not volunteer such opinion until 
after trial).  Where this is the case, we see no basis to fault 
counsel for elevating his concern for a viable legal defense 
                     
 
11 Dr. Fox testified as a witness for the defense as 
requested by counsel notwithstanding his advice that "PTSD might 
be a defense worth pursuing" and that "further evaluation and 
testing would be useful if the defense were to be presented in 
court." 
 
24 
 
over a possible alternative approach likely fraught with 
difficulty. 
 
The judge's assessment of counsel's performance also is a 
factor in our analysis.  Here, the judge found that defense 
counsel "is one of the most experienced and successful criminal 
trial attorneys in Western Massachusetts" and that, except for 
the strategic decision challenged by the defendant in his motion 
for a new trial, "counsel's performance at trial was in all 
other respects exemplary."  Significantly, the judge also found 
that counsel "took appropriate steps to investigate various 
defenses" and "did not ignore [the defense expert's] opinion 
that the defendant suffered . . . from PTSD."  Where counsel's 
performance is "in all other respects exemplary,"12 we are 
persuaded that the measure of deference generally accorded to 
counsel's strategic choices was not applied in this case. 
 
As a closing observation on this issue, we emphasize that 
caution is warranted in any suggestion that an attorney 
representing a defendant in a murder case must submit to the 
advice of a chosen expert.  Medical experts are not attorneys.  
A defendant's legal counsel is uniquely qualified to assess the 
                     
 
12 The judge noted that "counsel vigorously argued all the 
evidence . . . [and that the] impairment defense appeared to 
have succeeded, in part, as the jury found the defendant not 
guilty of murder by deliberate premeditation." 
 
25 
 
nuances that attend the development of the trial strategy.  See 
Glover, 459 Mass. at 843.  Although counsel's strategic choices 
are always open to review, we are hesitant to endorse an 
analytical approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
that permits a retained expert to support or otherwise cooperate 
with the defense strategy at trial and later repudiate that 
participation by criticizing or attacking the very role he 
played in the trial. 
 
We appreciate that our appellate cases offered no clear 
guidance to the judge in her analysis of counsel's strategic 
choices; however, the cases relied upon by the judge do not 
require a finding that counsel's strategic decisions were 
manifestly unreasonable.  In Walker, 443 Mass. at 223, the issue 
centered on counsel's decision not to investigate a defense of 
lack of criminal responsibility.  Despite defense counsel's 
knowledge in that case that the defendant had years prior 
attempted suicide and had been discharged from the armed 
services for psychological reasons, id. at 225-226, the court 
held that because of "scant" evidence that the defendant had a 
history of mental health problems, counsel's decision not to 
investigate lack of criminal responsibility was not a manifestly 
unreasonable strategic choice.  Id. at 227-228.  The judge 
extrapolated from Walker a constitutional duty to explore fully 
the nature and extent of defendant's PTSD, apparently based on 
26 
 
the defendant's presentation of "strong expert opinion evidence 
that he suffered from mental illness at the time of the 
homicide."  According to this logic, if counsel was excused from 
the obligation to investigate a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense where the evidence of mental disease was minimal or 
nonexistent, then counsel is obliged to investigate where there 
is strong evidence of such a condition. 
 
The judge's reference to the "strong" posttrial evidence of 
the defendant's mental illness at the time of the homicide 
suggests an undue reliance on hindsight.  As we often have 
cautioned, a court may not apply the benefit of hindsight in 
assessing counsel's strategic choices.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 680; Glover, 459 Mass. at 843.  The issue for the judge 
considering ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground is 
whether the strategic choice was reasonable at the time made.  
See Strickland, supra; Glover, supra.  We reiterate that despite 
the substantive appeal of the new information, the issue should 
not be resolved by giving undue weight to facts unearthed during 
counsel's posttrial research.  Rather, the issue is whether 
counsel was under a duty to make that same inquiry based on what 
he knew or should have known at the time of his trial 
preparation.  Here, trial counsel already was aware of the 
implications of the defendant's PTSD diagnosis and made a 
27 
 
rational choice to rely on a different defense; he was under no 
duty to seek further expert opinion on the point. 
 
Candelario, 446 Mass., also relied on by the judge, does 
not support the finding that counsel's strategic choices were 
manifestly unreasonable.  In Candelario, supra at 853, trial 
counsel retained a mental health expert to evaluate the 
defendant before trial.  Although the expert diagnosed the 
defendant with a frontal lobe deficit, trial counsel decided not 
to present an insanity defense and focused instead on winning a 
verdict of murder in the second degree or manslaughter.  Id. at 
853-854.  This court affirmed the denial of a motion for a new 
trial where the evidence suggested that the defendant was a 
malingerer and his mental health issues were contrived, and 
concluded that trial counsel's decision was reasonable in light 
of the obvious "weaknesses in a defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility."  Id. at 854, 856-857.  Thus, Candelario is in 
accord with the view stated above that defense counsel may 
reject an expert's opinion of a defendant's mental condition if 
it is in the best interest of the trial strategy.  Glover, 459 
Mass. at 843. 
 
c.  Prejudice.  Based on our conclusion that the judge 
erred in ruling that counsel's strategic choice to forgo further 
investigation of the defendant's mental condition and to present 
only an intoxication defense were manifestly unreasonable, we 
28 
 
need not address the issue of prejudice.  Glover, 459 Mass. at 
844-845. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order granting motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial reversed.