Title: Paramo v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Paramo v. State1995 WY 87896 P.2d 1342Case Number: 94-143Decided: 06/09/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Jose 
PARAMO,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Goshen County, Keith Kautz, J.

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel; and Mike Vang, Legal Intern, 
for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Matthew F. McLean, 
Student Intern; and G. Bryan Ulmer III, Student Intern, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      A jury found 
appellant guilty of taking or passing a controlled substance into a jail. In the 
face of hard evidence, appellant repaired to a lesser included offense argument 
in an effort to mitigate the damage done by his deeds. Finding no necessarily 
included lesser offense, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the district 
court.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant 
articulates the following issues:

I.          
Is possession of a controlled substance under Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) a 
lesser included offense of taking or passing a controlled substance into a jail 
under Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-208?

II.          
Was the appellant's due process right violated where the trial court 
prevented the appellant from presenting relevant testimony that there was a 
general security problem at the jail, which would tend to prove the appellant's 
defense theory that the appellant did not take a controlled substance "into the 
jail?"

III.         
Should the appellant's motion for a mistrial have been granted, when the 
state violated the motion in limine preventing them from discussing information 
received from an unreliable and unavailable informant?

[¶3]      Appellee restates 
those issues:

I.          
Did the trial court properly refuse to give a lesser included offense 
instruction relating to misdemeanor possession of a controlled 
substance?

II.          
Did the trial court properly exclude irrelevant and unduly cumulative 
evidence?

III.         Did 
the trial court properly deny appellant's motion for a 
mistrial?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      Around 9:15 p.m. 
on June 22, 1993, appellant, Jose Paramo (Paramo), checked back into the Goshen 
County jail, having spent the preceding week under house arrest. Given orange 
overalls and a pair of sandals, Paramo was allowed to change out of his street 
clothes in a private bathroom. While Paramo was busy changing, a deputy sheriff 
"policed" the adjacent squad room to make sure that the table and carpeted floor 
therein were free of any loose material. 

[¶5]      Once Paramo was 
in his jail raiment, he was escorted to the squad room and told that a "strip 
search" would be undertaken. Paramo sat in a chair while removing his clothing, 
stepping out of the resultant pile to undergo inspection. Following a general 
visual body inspection, neither of which yielded contraband, Paramo was allowed 
to get dressed.

[¶6]      When told he 
could return to his cell, Paramo turned from the spot where he had disrobed and 
dressed, starting "hastily" toward the detention area. As the deputy sheriff 
began to follow, he noticed a folded piece of paper where Paramo had been 
standing. The deputy reached down and picked up the paper, asking Paramo: "Is 
this yours?" Without turning or slackening his pace, Paramo responded: "No, it 
is not mine."

[¶7]      Inside the folded 
paper, the deputy sheriff found what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette and 
two roaches (partially burned marijuana cigarettes). Chemical testing of those 
three items revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol, a Schedule I 
controlled substance.

[¶8]      At trial, Paramo 
submitted four proposed jury instructions addressing his theory that possession 
of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) (1994) is a 
lesser included offense of taking or passing a controlled substance into a jail 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-208 (Cum.Supp. 1994). The district court 
rejected the offered jury instructions, noting Paramo's objection for the 
record.

[¶9]      From judgment and 
sentence upon the jury's verdict finding him guilty of taking or passing a 
controlled substance into a jail, Paramo timely prosecutes this 
appeal.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE

[¶10]   A district court's failure to give 
a lesser included offense instruction when such an offense indeed exists, and 
the evidence presented would support conviction upon that offense, constitutes 
reversible error. Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 95 (Wyo. 1988). Such an error 
implicates a defendant's due process guarantees. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 
1132 (Wyo. 1993). Determination of what constitutes a "necessarily included" 
offense pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 31(c) is primarily a question of law for which the 
appropriate standard of appellate review is de novo. Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 
1137.

[¶11]   Paramo and the State concur with 
this court that Keffer clearly articulates the standard for identifying lesser 
included offenses by adoption of the statutory elements 
test:

"Under this test, one offense is not `necessarily 
included' in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of 
the elements of the charged offense. Where the lesser offense requires an 
element not required for the greater offense, no instruction is to be given 
under [W.R.Cr.P. 31(c)]."

Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1134 
(quoting Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1450, 103 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1989)).

[¶12]   Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-208 cites the 
material elements of taking a controlled substance into a jail: (1) taking or 
passing; (2) any controlled substance; (3) into a jail. The offense of 
possession of a controlled substance, as proscribed by Wyo. Stat. § 
35-7-1031(c), yields the following elements: (a) possessing; (b) any controlled 
substance; (c) knowingly or intentionally. Exceptions in each statute are not 
worthy of being characterized as elements of the respective offenses in this 
case because marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance with no legal 
medically indicated use and because, generally speaking, the absence of an 
exception is not an essential element to proof of the crime. Wyo. Stat. § 
35-7-1031. See Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 622 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶13]   On a theoretical plane, Keffer 
requires Paramo to convince us, as a matter of law, that the elements of 
possession of a controlled substance (possession) are a necessary subset of the 
elements of taking or passing controlled substances into a jail (taking or 
passing). It would seem self-evident that one might take or pass a controlled 
substance into a jail without necessarily being in contemporaneous possession 
thereof. The State suggests that one such manner of accomplishing that end might 
be the mail, while case law demonstrates that it might also be achieved with the 
help of a third-party courier traversing the prison while on work release. 
United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D.Pa. 1972), rev'd in part on other 
grounds sub nom. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 
1973).

[¶14]   Although dealing with a somewhat 
different set of statutes, United States v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 
1981) concerns the crime of introduction of contraband onto the grounds of a 
federal penal institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (1976). The defendant 
admitted to possession of marijuana, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
nonetheless found that possession of a controlled substance was not necessarily 
included in the offense of introduction of a controlled substance into a penal 
institution. Campbell, 652 F.2d  at 762. Campbell cites a number of cases where 
conviction was had both upon possession of a controlled substance and 
introduction of a controlled substance into a prison or conspiracy to promote 
the same, e.g., United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2nd Cir. 1974). 
Campbell, 652 F.2d  at 762.

[¶15]   In People v. Wyles, 873 P.2d 34, 35 
(Colo. App. 1994), the Colorado Court of Appeals construed § 18-8-204.1, C.R.S. 
(1986), proscribing knowingly obtaining contraband or having contraband in one's 
possession, as not necessarily requiring possession in order to complete the 
offense. The Wyles holding is made possible by a statute, not unlike taking or 
passing controlled substances into jails, which describes alternative means of 
completing the offense. In neither case is possession a sine qua non for 
conviction on the more serious offense. Constructive possession in Wyles was of 
no moment to that court's discounting of the possession requirement. Similarly, 
Paramo's actual possession cannot be considered dispositive, particularly in 
light of his strident denials of either possessing a controlled substance or 
taking and passing the controlled substance into the jail.

[¶16]   Without deciding the identity vel 
non of other elements, we hold that taking or passing controlled substances into 
a jail may be proven without necessarily proving possession of a controlled 
substance. Therefore, possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. § 35-7-1031(c), is not necessarily included in the offense of taking or 
passing a controlled substance into a jail in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
6-5-208.

B. 
EVIDENCE ON "THEORY OF THE CASE"

[¶17]   Paramo argues at prohibitive length 
that he was denied his "theory of the case" by the district court's refusal to 
allow unlimited testimony on issues of general jail security and cleanliness. In 
the face of the deputy sheriff's testimony that the squad room was pristine 
prior to Paramo's arrival and subsequent deposit of contraband, the district 
court sustained the prosecutor's relevance objections to Paramo's protracted 
forays into the realm of general jail security.

[¶18]   A trial court's evidentiary rulings 
will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion. Wilson v. 
State, 874 F.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). So it is with a trial court's relevancy 
determinations. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1099 (Wyo. 1989). 
Time and again at trial, Paramo was unable to tie his theory of generally lax 
security and/or jail cleanliness into evidence relating to the condition of the 
jail and/or squad room on June 22, 1993. It appears to us from the record that 
the district court generously indulged Paramo's adventures into the area of 
security and cleanliness, and we find not even a colorable argument that the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow unlimited 
inquiry.

[¶19]   Paramo impermissibly delayed his 
efforts to make possession of a controlled substance his "theory of the case" 
until the appellate stage. Proffering a theory of the case on appeal which is 
clearly contrary to the theory advanced at trial is a subversion of the judicial 
process. Eckert v. State, 680 P.2d 478, 481 (Wyo. 1984). Paramo denied bringing 
drugs into the jail and, furthermore, expressly denied ever being in possession 
of the drugs. Under such circumstances, even were it found to be a lesser 
included offense, the crime of possession of a controlled substance would 
warrant no instruction as a "theory of the case" instruction. Warren v. State, 
835 P.2d 304, 310 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶20]   This reaffirmation of Warren should 
not be construed in denigration of a defendant's opportunity to argue 
inconsistent or alternative defenses, if the evidence permits. Keffer, 860 P.2d 
at 1134-36; see United States v. Brittain, 41 F.3d 1409, 1412 n. 2 (10th Cir. 
1994). Rather, the rule is that where the defenses offered at trial are purely 
exculpatory, the defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense 
instruction, even where such a lesser offense may indeed exist. United States v. 
Brown, 26 F.3d 119, 120 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28-29 (2nd Cir. 1987).

C. MOTION 
FOR MISTRIAL

[¶21]   Paramo was most anxious about jail 
intelligence concerning his identity as the inmate who was bringing drugs into 
the Goshen County jail. He sought and received the district court's order 
preventing the State from identifying him as the alleged source of jailhouse 
drugs. When a witness for the State uttered Paramo's first name (Jose) in the 
context from which the jury might, conceivably, have inferred that he had been 
fingered as the drug source, he immediately requested a mistrial. The district 
court denied the request, labeling the violation, if any, as de minimis, and 
instructed the prosecutor to avoid questions calling for a narrative response. 
Paramo claims that a mistrial was necessitated and asks us to reverse his 
conviction on that basis. Paramo's appellate counsel advance this theory without 
presenting pertinent Wyoming precedent. The State responds in like 
fashion.

[¶22]   The decision to grant a mistrial 
rests within the sound discretion of the district court. Clegg v. State, 655 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Wyo. 1982). That decision may only summon reversal if a clear 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated which results in prejudice to the aggrieved 
party. Gallup v. State, 559 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶23]   Paramo made his request for a 
mistrial within minutes of the time the district court and trial counsel had 
carefully reviewed the order which Paramo alleges was violated. In ruling upon 
Paramo's request, the district court was candid concerning its impression of the 
challenged testimony: "I didn't hear that the way you did at all, [Paramo's 
defense counsel], * * * so I am going to deny the motion for a mistrial." Were 
we at liberty to substitute our own judgment, we cannot say that the challenged 
testimony conveys the import attributed to it by Paramo nor can we discern any 
degree of prejudice to his case.

[¶24]   Although it dealt with an outburst 
in the courtroom, rather than testimony, we believe the rule in Clegg to be 
germane under the particular circumstances of this case:

Because the trial judge is in an advantageous 
position from which to gauge the effect on the jury * * * of a violation of 
courtroom decorum, he will be allowed considerable latitude in the exercise of 
his discretion in ruling on a motion for a mistrial for such 
violation.

Clegg, 655 P.2d  at 1243. 
That rule expresses our approbation of the district court's refusal to grant a 
mistrial, and we find neither abuse of discretion nor prejudice to 
Paramo.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶25]   Whether the conditions of 
confinement in this country are thought to be overly harsh or unacceptably 
indulgent, it is fair to say that the level of personal accommodation sought by 
Paramo for his brief visit to the Goshen County jail was and remains well beyond 
the statutory pale.

[¶26]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court should be and hereby is affirmed in all respects.