Title: State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1845.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1845 
THE STATE EX REL. OHIO LIBERTY COUNCIL ET AL. v. 
BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1845.] 
Elections — Ohio Ballot Board’s approval of a proposed constitutional 
amendment — Abuse-of-discretion standard — Writ granted. 
(No. 2010-0643 — Submitted April 27, 2010 — Decided April 29, 2010.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents 
Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner and the Ohio Ballot Board to certify the 
board’s approval of a proposed constitutional amendment and to certify the same 
to respondent Attorney General Richard Cordray.  Because relators have 
established their entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, we grant the 
writ. 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} On March 21, 2010, the United States Congress enacted the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, which was signed into law by President 
Barack Obama on March 23.  U.S.Code Pub.L.No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
Among other things, the act requires individuals to maintain minimum essential 
health-care coverage beginning in 2014 and imposes a penalty for failure to 
maintain this coverage.  See Section 1501, Subtitle F, Part 1 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
{¶ 3} On March 22, relators gathered over 3,000 signatures to submit an 
initiative petition to amend the Ohio Constitution “to preserve the freedom of 
Ohioans to choose their health care and health care coverage.”  Relators are Ohio 
Liberty Council, a nonprofit corporation and political action committee that is a 
statewide coalition of 25 grassroots groups, including nearly all of Ohio’s Tea 
Party organizations; The Ohio Project, a ballot-issue committee; and five Ohio 
Liberty Council members who are state electors. 
{¶ 4} On April 1, pursuant to R.C. 3519.01(A), the Attorney General 
certified that relators’ summary of their proposed amendment contained “a fair 
and truthful statement of the proposed constitutional amendment” and then 
forwarded the proposed amendment to the Secretary of State, in her capacity as 
the chair of the Ohio Ballot Board, for the board’s consideration under R.C. 
3505.062. 
{¶ 5} The amendment, which proposes to add Section 21 to Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution, states:  
{¶ 6} “ARTICLE I 
{¶ 7} “Preservation of the freedom to choose health care and health 
care coverage  
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3 
 
{¶ 8} “Section 21 (A) No federal, state, or local law or rule shall 
compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health care provider to 
participate in a health care system. 
{¶ 9} “Section 21 (B) No federal, state, or local law or rule shall prohibit 
the purchase or sale of health care or health insurance. 
{¶ 10} “Section 21 (C) No federal, state, or local law or rule shall impose 
a penalty or fine for the sale or purchase of health care or health insurance. 
{¶ 11} “Section 21 (D) This section does not affect laws or rules in effect 
as of March 19, 2010; affect which services a health care provider or hospital is 
required to perform or provide; affect terms and conditions of government 
employment; or affect any laws calculated to deter fraud or punish wrongdoing in 
the health care industry. 
{¶ 12} “Section 21 (E) As used in this Section,  
{¶ 13} “(1) ‘Compel’ includes the levying of penalties or fines. 
{¶ 14} “(2) ‘Health care system’ means any public or private entity or 
program whose function or purpose includes the management of, processing of, 
enrollment of individuals for, or payment for, in full or in part, health care 
services, health care data, or health care information for its participants. 
{¶ 15} “(3) ‘Penalty or fine’ means any civil or criminal penalty or fine, 
tax, salary or wage withholding or surcharge or any named fee established by law 
or rule by a government established, created, or controlled agency that is used to 
punish or discourage the exercise of rights protected under this section.”  
(Boldface sic.) 
{¶ 16} On April 9, the ballot board held a meeting to determine, pursuant 
to R.C. 3505.062(A), whether relators’ initiative petition contained more than one 
constitutional amendment.  In the board’s discussion, the Secretary of State 
opined that although Sections A, B, and C of the proposed amendment were 
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arguably related to the subject of individual choice in health care and health 
insurance, Section D was not. 
{¶ 17} The secretary further explained that Section C of the proposed 
amendment could be successfully rationalized as relating to freedom of choice, 
but Section D could not: 
{¶ 18} “But then when I get to (D), (D) is where I really – I mean, (C) I 
could probably, you know, successfully rationalize that.  But when I get to (D) is 
where I run into problems where I don’t see where I am talking about the 
purchase or sale of health insurance, but we’re talking directly about government 
regulation without dealing with that industry of – of individual choice.” 
{¶ 19} At the conclusion of the meeting, the ballot board adopted the 
secretary’s recommendation, dividing the petition into two separate issues and 
certifying to the Attorney General the original petition as two proposed 
constitutional amendments.  In the ballot board’s April 9 letter to the Attorney 
General, the board stated: 
{¶ 20} “We, the undersigned members of the Ohio Ballot Board, hereby 
divide and certify that the initiative petition that you sent to us on April 1, 2010, 
proposing to add Section 21 to Article I of the Ohio Constitution contains two 
proposed constitutional amendments.  The two proposed amendments are:  one 
that deals with the freedom to choose health care and health care coverage; and 
the second that deals with the governance and oversight of the health care and 
health insurance industries.” 
{¶ 21} Four days later,  on April 13, relators filed this action for writs of 
mandamus and prohibition to compel the Secretary of State and the ballot board 
to certify the board’s approval of the proposed constitutional amendment as 
written and to certify the same to the Attorney General.  In the alternative, relators 
request that the writs compel the Attorney General to certify relators’ proposed 
constitutional amendment pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3519.  On April 15, we 
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granted an alternative writ on relators’ mandamus claim and issued an accelerated 
schedule for responses to the complaint and the submission of evidence and 
briefs.  State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2010-
Ohio-1662, __ N.E.2d __.  We also dismissed relators’ prohibition claim.  Id. 
{¶ 22} Respondents submitted answers, and the parties submitted 
evidence and briefs. 
{¶ 23} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Preliminary Matters 
{¶ 24} Before addressing the merits of relators’ claim, it is instructive to 
remember what our resolution of their claim does not address.  This case is not 
about the relative merits of relators’ proposed constitutional amendment and 
whether its passage would actually result in the specified purpose of preserving 
the freedom to choose health care and health-care coverage.  Nor is this case 
about the constitutionality or legality of the substance of the proposed 
amendment.  “Any claims alleging the unconstitutionality or illegality of the 
substance of the proposed [initiative], or actions to be taken pursuant to the 
[initiative] when enacted, are premature before its approval by the electorate.”  
State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 716 N.E.2d 1114. 
{¶ 25} Instead, the limited legal issue before us is whether the ballot board 
abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by determining that 
relators’ initiative petition contained more than one proposed constitutional 
amendment. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 26} Relators request a writ of mandamus to compel the ballot board to 
certify its approval of the single proposed amendment as written and certify the 
same to the Attorney General.  To be entitled to the writ, relators must establish a 
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clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the 
part of respondents to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 119, 
2009-Ohio-4805, 914 N.E.2d 397, ¶ 11. 
Lack of Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law 
{¶ 27} Because of the proximity of the June 30 deadline to file the signed 
initiative petition with the Secretary of State to have the proposed amendment 
submitted to the electorate at the November 2, 2010 general election, relators lack 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex rel. Greene v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 121 Ohio St.3d 631, 2009-Ohio-1716, 907 
N.E.2d 300, ¶ 10; Section 1a, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  No right to appeal 
from the ballot board’s determination is authorized.  See R.C. 3505.062; see also 
State ex rel. Morgan v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 121 Ohio St.3d 
324, 2009-Ohio-591, 904 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 20 (mandamus is an appropriate remedy 
to correct an abuse of discretion by a public board in a decision that is not 
appealable). 
{¶ 28} And notwithstanding respondents’ claim to the contrary, relators’ 
mandamus claim is not an ill-disguised claim of declaratory judgment and 
prohibitory injunction, and neither a declaratory judgment nor a prohibitory 
injunction would constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  A 
declaratory judgment would not be an adequate remedy without a mandatory 
injunction ordering the ballot board to immediately certify its approval of relators’ 
proposed constitutional amendment, as written, to the Attorney General.  See 
State ex rel. Mill Creek Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Tablack (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 293, 297, 714 N.E.2d 917.  And a prohibitory injunction would not 
provide relators with the relief they request:  an order to compel the ballot board 
to comply with its duties under R.C. 3505.062 to certify its approval of their 
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7 
 
proposed constitutional amendment as written.  Nor would it be sufficiently 
speedy, given the imminent deadline. 
{¶ 29} Therefore, relators’ complaint properly invokes our original 
jurisdiction, and an action in the court of common pleas for a declaratory 
judgment and a prohibitory injunction would not provide an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law. 
Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty 
{¶ 30} In extraordinary actions challenging the decisions of the Secretary 
of State and boards of elections, for example, the standard is whether they 
engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion or acted in clear disregard of 
applicable legal provisions.  See generally State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, __ 
Ohio St.3d __, 2010-Ohio-1374, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 26.  This standard is also 
appropriate for gauging the propriety of the ballot board’s determination here.  
Therefore, in the absence of any evidence of fraud or corruption, the dispositive 
issue is whether the ballot board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded 
applicable law in determining that relators’ initiative petition contained two 
proposed constitutional amendments and in dividing the petition into two and in 
certifying the two proposed amendments to the Attorney General. 
{¶ 31} Under Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, “the people 
reserve to themselves the power to propose to the general assembly laws and 
amendments to the constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a 
referendum vote as hereinafter provided.”  “The first aforestated power reserved 
by the people is designated the initiative, and the signatures of ten per centum of 
the electors shall be required upon a petition to propose an amendment to the 
constitution.”  Section 1a, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  “The limitations 
expressed in the constitution, on the power of the general assembly to enact laws, 
shall be deemed limitations on the power of the people to enact laws.”  Section 1, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
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{¶ 32} Under Section 1, Article XVI of the Ohio Constitution, the General 
Assembly is authorized to propose a constitutional amendment by joint resolution, 
and one of the requirements specified therein for a legislatively initiated proposed 
constitutional amendment is that each amendment be submitted separately to the 
electors: 
{¶ 33} “When more than one amendment shall be submitted at the same 
time, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each 
amendment, separately.” 
{¶ 34} R.C. 3519.01(A) imposes a similar requirement on citizen-initiated 
proposed constitutional amendments: 
{¶ 35} “Only one proposal of law or constitutional amendment to be 
proposed by initiative petition shall be contained in an initiative petition to enable 
the voters to vote on that proposal separately.  A petition shall include the text of 
any existing statute or constitutional provision that would be amended or repealed 
if the proposed law or constitutional amendment is adopted. 
{¶ 36} “Whoever seeks to propose a law or constitutional amendment by 
initiative petition shall, by a written petition signed by one thousand qualified 
electors, submit the proposed law or constitutional amendment and a summary of 
it to the attorney general for examination.  Within ten days after the receipt of the 
written petition and the summary of it, the attorney general shall conduct an 
examination of the summary.  If, in the opinion of the attorney general, the 
summary is a fair and truthful statement of the proposed law or constitutional 
amendment, the attorney general shall so certify and then forward the submitted 
petition to the Ohio ballot board for its approval under division (A) of section 
3505.062 of the Revised Code.  If the Ohio ballot board returns the submitted 
petition to the attorney general with its certification as described in that division, 
the attorney general shall then file with the secretary of state a verified copy of the 
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proposed law or constitutional amendment together with its summary and the 
attorney general's certification.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 37} R.C. 3505.062, in turn, specifies the duty of the ballot board to 
determine whether an initiative petition contains only one proposed law or 
constitutional amendment: 
{¶ 38} “The Ohio ballot board shall do all of the following: 
{¶ 39} “(A) Examine, within ten days after its receipt, each written 
initiative petition received from the attorney general under section 3519.01 of the 
Revised Code to determine whether it contains only one proposed law or 
constitutional amendment so as to enable the voters to vote on a proposal 
separately.  If the board so determines, it shall certify its approval to the attorney 
general, who then shall file with the secretary of state in accordance with division 
(A) of section 3519.01 of the Revised Code a verified copy of the proposed law or 
constitutional amendment together with its summary and the attorney general's 
certification of it. 
{¶ 40} “If the board determines that the initiative petition contains more 
than one proposed law or constitutional amendment, the board shall divide the 
initiative petition into individual petitions containing only one proposed law or 
constitutional amendment so as to enable the voters to vote on each proposal 
separately and certify its approval to the attorney general.  If the board so divides 
an initiative petition and so certifies its approval to the attorney general, the 
petitioners shall resubmit to the attorney general appropriate summaries for each 
of the individual petitions arising from the board's division of the initiative 
petition, and the attorney general then shall review the resubmissions as provided 
in division (A) of section 3519.01 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 41} Because this separate-petition requirement is comparable to the 
separate-vote requirement for legislative initiated constitutional amendments 
under Section 1, Article XVI of the Ohio Constitution, our precedent construing 
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the constitutional provision is instructive in construing the statutory requirement.  
In State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 
536, at ¶ 34, we set forth the test for determining satisfaction of the separate-vote 
requirement: 
{¶ 42} “[T]he applicable test for determining compliance with the 
separate-vote requirement of Section 1, Article XVI is that ‘a proposal consists of 
one amendment to the Constitution only so long as each of its subjects bears some 
reasonable relationship to a single general object or purpose.’ (Emphasis sic.)  
[State ex rel.] Roahrig [v. Brown (1972),] 30 Ohio St.2d [82,] at 84, 59 O.O.2d 
104, 282 N.E.2d 584.  ‘Thus, where an amendment to the Constitution relates to a 
single purpose or object and all else contained therein is incidental and reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the amendment, such amendment is not 
violative of the provisions of Section 1, Article XVI.’  State ex rel. Burton v. 
Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp. (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 34, 36, 36 O.O.2d 19, 
218 N.E.2d 446.  Courts have generally taken a ‘liberal [view] in interpreting 
what such a single general purpose or object may be.’  See [State ex rel.] 
Foreman [v. Brown (1967),] 10 Ohio St.2d [139], at 146, 39 O.O.2d 149, 226 
N.E.2d 116; see, also, cases from other jurisdictions cited at fn. 7.” 
{¶ 43} In applying this test to relators’ proposed constitutional 
amendment here, we hold that the proposal consists of one amendment because 
all the sections contained therein bear some reasonable relationship to the single 
general purpose of preserving Ohioans’ freedom to choose their health care and 
health-care coverage as it existed on March 19, 2010, with certain exceptions, 
before the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  Section 
21(A) preserves this freedom of choice by prohibiting the government from 
compelling any person, employer, or health-care provider to participate in any 
health-care system.  Section 21(B) advances the freedom of choice by forbidding 
the government to prohibit the purchase or sale of health care or health-care 
January Term, 2010 
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insurance.  As relators observe, persons’, employers’, and health care providers’ 
choices of health care and health-care insurance would be inhibited if their ability 
to choose between different providers is limited.  Moreover, it is manifest that 
Section 21(E) of the proposed amendment, which merely provides definitions for 
some of the terms used in the other sections of the amendment, relates to the 
single purpose as well.  Respondents do not argue to the contrary. 
{¶ 44} The ballot board and the Secretary of State argue in their merit 
brief that although Sections A, B, D, and E of relators’ proposed constitutional 
amendment all relate to the single general purpose or object of preserving 
freedom of choice of health care and health-care coverage, Section C does not 
because its “unintended consequences” “transcend the availability and terms of 
coverage,” and if passed, would “fundamentally rework the way Ohio regulates 
the insurance industry.”  At its April 9 meeting, however, the board appeared to 
acknowledge that Sections A, B, and C of relators’ proposed constitutional 
amendment relate to the single purpose or object of choice, but that Section D, 
which specifies exceptions to the amendment, constitutes the separate 
amendment.  Specifically, the ballot board seemingly determined that this section 
of the proposed amendment “deals with the governance and oversight of the 
health care and the health insurance industries” rather than “the freedom to choose 
health care and health care coverage.” 
{¶ 45} For the following reasons, the ballot board abused its discretion 
and clearly disregarded R.C. 3505.062 in so concluding, regardless of whether it 
relied on Section C or Section D of the proposed amendment. 
{¶ 46} First, despite respondents’ claims to the contrary, the transcript of 
the ballot board’s proceedings indicates that the board’s decision was based on 
Section D rather than Section C of relators’ proposed constitutional amendment.  
The Secretary of State, in her capacity as chair of the ballot board, reasoned that 
Section C could be successfully rationalized as relating to the general purpose of 
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freedom of choice of health care because a person “can’t be penalized for 
exercising freedom of choice to the point that it would impede the choice.” 
{¶ 47} Second, Section 21(C) reasonably relates to the general purpose of 
freedom of choice by prohibiting the government from imposing a penalty or fine 
for the sale or purchase of health care or health-care insurance.  As the Secretary 
of State acknowledged at the ballot board meeting, persons’ and employers’ 
choices of health care and health-care insurance would be impaired if their choice 
of certain providers would be subject to a substantial penalty or fine.  That is, as 
relators argue, “if a law imposes such a steep penalty upon the purchase or sale of 
private health care or health insurance to render it commercially and economically 
unrealistic, that law would effectively preclude the ability of an Ohioan to choose 
private health care or health care coverage.” 
{¶ 48} The ballot board asserts that relators improperly read Section 
21(C) as if it had added the language “based on the contents of the policy” to 
“[n]o federal, state, or local law or rule shall impose a penalty or fine for the sale 
or purchase of health care or health insurance.”  But this additional language is 
also not included at the end of Section 21(B), which uses language similar to that 
contained in Section C:  “No federal, state, or local law or rule shall prohibit the 
purchase or sale of health care or health insurance.”  And relators admit that 
Section B is reasonably related to the single general purpose of freedom of choice.   
{¶ 49} Third, Section D of the proposed constitutional amendment, which 
the ballot board determined at the board’s meeting was different from the rest of 
the amendment, has no independent meaning separate from the remainder of the 
amendment.  In fact, it specifies the exceptions to Sections A, B, and C by 
beginning with the phrase, “This section does not affect * * *.” 
{¶ 50} Fourth, limitations on the scope of or exceptions to the changes 
made in a proposed amendment do not change the single amendment into multiple 
amendments.  In effect, every amendment generally contains some limitations, 
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13 
 
whether they be temporal or by subject matter.  For example, in Foreman, 10 
Ohio St.2d 139, 39 O.O.2d 149, 226 N.E.2d 116, paragraph four of the syllabus, 
we held that a proposed constitutional amendment that created a bond 
commission, but further specified the limited purposes for which money could be 
raised and used, did not violate the separate-vote requirement of Section 1, Article 
XVI of the Ohio Constitution because it included limitations on the commission 
created by the amendment: 
{¶ 51} “If the proposed amendment provided only that a bond 
commission should be created to raise revenues for public purposes, no one would 
seriously contend that the proposal included more than one object and that 
therefore it represented more than one amendment.  The fact, that the proposal 
limits the authority of the commission by specifying the purposes for which the 
revenues may be raised and used, does not turn the proposal into one for more 
than one amendment.”  Id. at 147. 
{¶ 52} Fifth, relators’ proposed constitutional amendment does not violate 
the purposes of the separate-vote requirement.  “ ‘ “The constitutional mandate 
that multifarious amendments shall be submitted separately has two great 
objectives.  The first is to prevent imposition upon or deceit of the public by the 
presentation of a proposal which is misleading or the effect of which is concealed 
or not readily understandable.  The second is to afford the voters freedom of 
choice and prevent ‘logrolling’ or the combining of unrelated proposals in order 
to secure approval by appealing to different groups which will support the entire 
proposal in order to secure some part of it although perhaps disapproving of other 
parts.” ’ ”  Willke, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 28, 
quoting Andrews v. Governor (1982), 294 Md. 285, 295, 449 A.2d 1144, quoting 
Fugina v. Donovan (1960), 259 Minn. 35, 38, 104 N.W.2d 911, construing similar 
separate-vote requirements in the Maryland and Minnesota Constitutions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 53} The inclusion of Sections C and D with the remaining sections of 
relators’ proposed constitutional amendment does not render the amendment as a 
whole deceptive or constitute the attachment of an unrelated, unpopular proposal. 
{¶ 54} Finally, notwithstanding the ballot board’s implicit claim 
throughout its argument, there is no indication that the framers of the Constitution 
or the General Assembly intended that the citizens’ constitutional right of 
initiative to propose a constitutional amendment be relegated to a stricter 
separate-vote requirement than that required for the legislature’s constitutional 
right of initiative.  In State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 
322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 19-20, we recently reiterated that “[i]n 
1912, the electors of Ohio adopted the initiative and referendum amendment to 
the constitution” and that “[s]hortly thereafter, we explained the significance of 
the amendment” by recognizing the following: 
{¶ 55} “ ‘Now, the people’s right to the use of the initiative and 
referendum is one of the most essential safeguards to representative government.  
* * * The potential virtue of the “I. & R.” does not reside in the good statutes and 
good constitutional amendments initiated, nor in the bad statutes and bad 
proposed constitutional amendments that are killed.  Rather, the greatest 
efficiency of the “I. and R.” rests in the wholesome restraint imposed 
automatically upon the general assembly and the governor and the possibilities of 
that latent power when called into action by the voters.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 20, quoting 
State ex rel. Nolan v. ClenDening (1915), 93 Ohio St. 264, 277-278, 112 N.E. 
1029.  The power of initiative must be liberally construed, and the General 
Assembly cannot diminish that power.  State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 591 N.E.2d 1186.  By imposing the separate-vote requirement on 
citizen-initiated proposed amendments, therefore, the General Assembly could not 
diminish citizens’ constitutional right of initiative by construing that requirement 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
more strictly than the similar constitutional requirement applicable to the 
legislative right of initiative. 
{¶ 56} Based on the foregoing, the ballot board has a clear legal duty to 
liberally construe the right of initiative, and as long as the citizen-initiated 
proposed amendment bears some reasonable relationship to a single general 
object or purpose, the board must certify its approval of the amendment as written 
without dividing it into multiple petitions.  Because the board did not comply with 
this duty here, where relators’ proposed constitutional amendment bears some 
reasonable relationship to their single general object or purpose of preserving 
freedom of choice in health care and health-care coverage, relators are entitled to 
the requested writ of mandamus. 
Remaining Claims 
{¶ 57} As a result of the foregoing, relators’ alternate claim, that the ballot 
board lacks constitutional authority to divide a citizen-initiated proposed 
amendment, need not be addressed because it is not absolutely necessary to do so.  
See State ex rel. Miller v. Brady, 123 Ohio St.3d 255, 2009-Ohio-4942, 915 
N.E.2d 1183, ¶ 11; Smith v. Leis, 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125, 835 
N.E.2d 5, ¶ 54 (“courts decide constitutional issues only when absolutely 
necessary”). 
{¶ 58} Moreover, relators’ alternate claim for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the Attorney General to certify their proposed constitutional amendment 
is moot. 
Extension of the Constitutional Deadline to Submit Initiative Petition 
{¶ 59} In their complaint, relators requested that the court grant them an 
“extension of days by which Relators may continue to gather signatures, so as to 
atone for the delay associated * * * with [the] Secretary of State and Ohio Ballot 
Board’s wrongful conduct.”  We deny this request for the following reasons. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 60} First, although relators requested this relief in their complaint, they 
failed to include any argument in support of their request in their initial merit 
brief.  Instead, they resuscitated their request only in their reply brief in response 
to the ballot board’s extended argument in its brief that no extension of the 
constitutional deadline is warranted.  Consequently, we need not address relators’ 
request.  See State ex rel. Glasgow v. Jones, 119 Ohio St.3d 391, 2008-Ohio-
4788, 894 N.E.2d 686, ¶ 26 (court need not address claim that was raised in 
complaint but was not specifically argued in merit brief); State ex rel. Colvin v. 
Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 61 (relators in 
election-related writ case are forbidden to raise issue in reply brief that was not 
raised in initial merit brief). 
{¶ 61} Second, although we have extended the constitutional deadline for 
referendum petitioners to submit a petition when the Secretary of State has 
improperly refused to accept a summary and has thereby precluded the petitioners 
from circulating the petition for signatures, see LetOhioVote.org, 123 Ohio St.3d 
322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 7, 54, and State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. 
Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 225, 236-237, 631 N.E.2d 582, respondents have 
introduced evidence here that an extension of the deadline would impair the 
ability of the secretary and the boards of elections to comply with their 
constitutional and statutory duties regarding the initiative petition and would 
impact several additional constitutional and statutory deadlines before the 
November 2, 2010 election. 
{¶ 62} For example, an extension of the deadline here could result in no 
resolution of whether the proposed constitutional amendment should be placed on 
the November 2, 2010 election ballot until after the absentee-ballot deadline has 
passed. 
{¶ 63} Finally, the primary impetus of relators’ proposed constitutional 
amendment is the portion of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that 
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17 
 
requires individuals to maintain minimum essential health-care coverage and 
penalizes them if they do not, but these provisions are not effective until 2014.  
Therefore, relators need not be awarded an extension of time to place this issue on 
the November 2, 2010 ballot when they could seek placement of this initiative on 
the 2011, 2012, or 2013 general-election ballot without prejudice to their proposal 
or a departure from the constitutional deadlines. 
{¶ 64} Therefore, we deny the request for an extension. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 65} Relators have established their entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Therefore, we grant a writ of mandamus to 
compel the ballot board to immediately certify its approval of relators’ proposed 
constitutional amendment, as drafted, to the Attorney General as one amendment.  
This result is consistent with our duty to liberally construe the citizens’ right of 
initiative in favor of their exercise of this important right. 
Writ granted. 
 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, 
and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs but would have extended the deadline for 
submitting initiative petitions so that the matter could have been placed on the 
November 2, 2010 election ballot. 
 
The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 
decision in this case. 
__________________ 
 
1851 Center for Constitutional Law and Maurice A. Thompson; and 
Robert M. Owens, for relators. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Michael J. Schuler, Richard N. 
Coglianese, and Aaron N. Epstein, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents 
Secretary of State and Ohio Ballot Board. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Pearl M. Chin and Damian W. 
Sikora, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Attorney General. 
_____________________