Title: Smith v. Portante

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

212 So. 2d 298 (1968)
Gordon A. SMITH, Appellant,
v.
Peter A. PORTANTE, Jr., Thomas J. Lummus and E.B. Leatherman, ex Officio, As Members of the Dade County Jury Commission, Appellees.
No. 36774.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 2, 1968.
*299 Shutts & Bowen, Herbert L. Nadeau and Karl Vance Hart, Miami, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., T.T. Turnbull and Stephen Marc Slepin, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees.
ERVIN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a declaratory decree of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, upholding the constitutionality of Section 40.101, Florida Statutes 1967, F.S.A., which reads as follows:
In the case of Barrow v. Holland (Fla. 1960), 125 So. 2d 749, 752, we held:
In the instant case the "essential information" to be gathered from prospective jurors is not indicated in the language of the Act. The Act does not suggest the nature of the questions to be propounded to the prospective jurors. It provides no objective guidelines or standards for the Judicial Council to follow in formulating and promulgating an appropriate questionnaire. Consequently, the Act on its face represents an unlawful delegation of authority to the Judicial Council and to jury commissioners to propound any question they see fit to prospective jurors.
It well may be that the Act has a laudable object and purpose. Its sponsors, who originated the idea of propounding questions to prospective jurors and promoted its passage by the Legislature, no doubt were sincerely motivated and desired thereby to serve the public good. Unfortunately, however, the general nature of the questions to be propounded is not spelled out in the Act. No matter how laudable a piece of legislation may be in the minds of its sponsors, objective guidelines and standards should appear expressly in the act or be within the realm of reasonable inference from the language of the act where a delegation of power is involved and especially so where the legislation contemplates a delegation of power to intrude into the privacy of citizens.
*300 Conceivably, such an uncircumscribed questionnaire as here contemplated could cover the widest range of inquiries unconnected with traditional voir dire questioning or statutory requisites relating to qualifications of jurors, e.g., such questions might inquire into the prospective juror's political, religious, social and economic views, his marital status, his arrest or conviction record, his financial condition, his educational background, his addiction to alcohol or narcotics, his views on race relations, his views on allowance of damages in certain cases, or his general conduct and habits. Many of such questions could be unnecessarily embarrassing to the citizen who, according to the record here, is admonished on the proposed questionnaire that "You are required by law to promptly answer" and that if he does not he will be guilty of contempt.
For the reasons stated, we hold that Section 40.101, Florida Statutes 1967, F.S.A., is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the decree is reversed.
It is so ordered.
CALDWELL, C.J., THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., and SPECTOR, District Court Judge, concur.
ADAMS, J., dissents with Opinion.
DREW, J., dissents and concurs with ADAMS, J.
ADAMS, Justice (dissenting):
We have an appeal here from a declarative decree holding constitutional Chapter 67-2199, Laws of Florida, 1967 Special Session. The act in question reads:
The first attack upon the act is that it violates Article III, Section 16, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. in that the title fails to provide adequate notice that the jury commissioners are authorized and directed to require the return of mailed questionnaires by all prospective grand or petit jurors.
It is quite obvious that this act related one subject only, and that was qualification of jurors. In no sense was the title deceptive or misleading. It met the requirements of Section 16, Article III, Florida Constitution. See King Kole, Inc. v. Bryant, et al, 178 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1965).
The second question is whether the act is so vague, indefinite and uncertain and lacking in sanctions as to render it unconstitutional.
*301 Appellant relies upon our statement in Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 30 So. 2d 102, 104 (Fla. 1947):
There are many other authorities cited, however, the above rule is quite sufficient. The real labor upon us is applying the rule to this statute.
The law has long been settled that the court will not declare a legislative act unconstitutional unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act is deficient in meeting constitutional requirements. We must be able to discern and point out wherein the act contravenes some express part of the Constitution before we will hold it bad. In its policy and wisdom we have no part. If we have doubts of its place and purpose, our judgment must yield in favor of the act. See Knight & Wall Co. v. Bryant, et al., 178 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1965).
We find the act here complete in itself, designed for a good purpose and its application vested in lawfully created bodies, namely jury commissions, county commissioners and the Florida Judicial Commission. These lawfully created agencies are charged with the duty of rendering a very necessary and beneficial service to the judiciary of Florida.
We find no constitutional prohibition against the act. As for the want of sanctions, when a prospective juror's name is drawn for jury duty the trial court has inherent power to meet any and all exigencies to enforce compliance of duty on the part of jurors and prospective jurors.
In reaching this conclusion we are not at this time called upon to pass upon the questionnaire regarding its form or substance. We are in accord with the conclusion reached by the trial court that this questionnaire goes to those prospective jurors immediately after their names are drawn. Failure to return same in no way relieves the prospective juror from answering the court's summons for jury duty. His answer to the inquiry, however, may aid the court and litigants in procuring a jury as well as the court in empanelling grand juries.
DREW, J., concurs.