Title: State of Idaho v. Kraig D. Parkinson Lewd conduct with a minor

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 33333

STATE OF IDAHO, Boise, October 2007 Term

Plaintiff-Respondent, +2007 Opinion No. 114

“ Filed: November 23, 2007

KRAIG D. PARKINSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State
‘of Idaho, for Madison County. Hon. Brent J. Moss, District Judge.

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk:

‘The district courts order is affirmed.
Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., Boise, for appellant. Gary L. Quigley argued.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attomey General, Boise, for respondent.
Rebekah A. Cude argued,

J. JONES, Justice

Kraig Parkinson pleaded guilty to lewd conduct with a minor in March 1984. The
district court discharged Parkinson upon completion of his probation in 1988. Parkinson
subsequently filed a motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea and substitute a plea of
not guilty, and requested the charge be dismissed. The district court granted this motion.
‘Notwithstanding this decision, Parkinson's conviction remained, with a notation of the
dismissal, in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database maintained by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Thus, Parkinson filed a Petition for Expungement
of Record pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604. The district court denied his petition,
finding it lacked authority to require the notation of this case to be stricken from the
[NCIC database, We affirm.

 
L

‘When he was 32 years old, the State charged Kraig Parkinson for lewd conduct
with a minor pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-6607 (recodified as 1.C. § 18-1508). Parkinson
pleaded guilty and the district court judge initially sentenced him to a term of ten years in
the state penitentiary. The district court subsequently entered a “Withheld Judgment of
Conviction,” suspended the sentence, and sent Parkinson to Cottonwood, the correctional
facility at Maho, under 120-day retained jurisdiction. Upon completion of the 120-tay
retained jurisdiction, the district court entered a withheld judgment and placed Parkinson
fon five years of probation. The court discharged Parkinson when he successfully
completed his probation.

In September 2000, Parkinson filed a motion with the district court for leave to
withdraw his gulty plea and to substitute a plea of not guilty, and sought dismissal ofthat
charge. The district judge granted the motion on September 22, 2000. Although the
district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the September 2000 order, Parkinson’s
1984 conviction remained in the NCIC database, with a reference tothe dismissal."

Parkinson filed a Petition for Expungement of Record on the dismissal order,
seeking to remove his 1984 conviction ftom his criminal record in the NCIC database.
The district court denied Parkinson’s petition, finding the court lacked authority under
1C. § 19-2604 to require the FBI to strike any notation contained in the NCIC database.
Parkinson appeals to this Court.

a

We are concemed in this case with the question of whether Idaho Code § 19-2604
provides authority for a state court to order the removal from the NCIC database of any
and all references to a conviction that has been dismissed pursuant to the statue,

A

‘The interpretation of a statue is a question of law over which this Court exercises
free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004).
Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal
words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the
anguage of « statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute

"The PBL maintains the NCIC. See 28 US.C.§534 2006),

2
as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v, Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,
462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999) (citing State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578,
581 (1996)), The language of the statute must be given its plain, obvious and rational
meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. Unless the result is palpably
absurd, this Court assumes the legislature meant what is clearly stated in the statute,
Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688 (citing Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299, 715,
P.2d 968, 969 (1986).

When the Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain
the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at
688 (citing Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26,29, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963)). To ascertain
the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words ofthe statute be examined, but
also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative
history. Id

B

Parkinson does not directly address the court's authority to “clear the record”
contained in an FBI database. Parkinson relies on IC. § 19-2604 for the proposition that,
the district court must grant an order of expungement in order to “clear the record.”
‘Alternatively, Parkinson argues the district court had authority to order expungement of
his criminal record as a matter of the inherent power of the court to implement its own
orders and judgments under that statute. In essence, Parkinson argues that since the
istrict court had authority to grant relief under Section 19-2604, it must have the
authority to make that relief effective by entering an expungement order that would
“cleanse” Parkinson’s criminal record ofthis now “erased” conviction.

‘The State counters that the plain language of Section 19-2604 and case law
interpreting this statute make clear that itis not a true expungement statute, Since the
statute provides no authority or mechanism for removing the record of Parkinson's
conviction from the NCIC database, the istrict court has no authority to strike the record,

““Expunge’ means to erase or destroy; to declare null and outside the record, 80
that itis noted in the original record as expunged, and redacted from all future copies.”
Black's Law Dictionary (Sth ed. 2004), “Expungement of record” is the removal of @
‘conviction from a person’s criminal record. Id. Idaho law authorizes no type of
‘expungement of criminal record for adult offenders other than that authorized in
LC. § 19-2604, State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 406, 94 P.3d 709, 711 (CL. App. 2004),
LC. § 19-2604(1) sets forth the authority ofthe trial court to set aside a guilty plea or
conviction and discharge a defendant

If sentence has been imposed but suspended. ..or withheld, upon

application of the defendant and upon a satisfactory showing that the

‘defendant has at all times complied withthe terms and conditions upon

which he was placed on probation, the court may, if convinced by the

showing made that there is no longer cause for continuing the period of

probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest, terminate the
sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or convietion of the defendant, and

finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant... The final

dismissal ofthe case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring

‘the defendant of hs civil rights.

LC. § 19-2604 does not expressly authorize expungement, but allows the court to dismiss
the case against defendant if he complies with all the terms and conditions of his
probation

‘The statute creates an extraordinary remedy for a defendant who has strictly
adhered to the terms of probation and essentially restores the defendants civil rights.
State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 486, 959 P.2d 465, 467 (Ct. App. 1998). The
dismissal of a criminal charge under IC. § 19-2604(1) isan act of leniency by the court,
“notwithstanding the defendant's actual guilt of the charged offense.” State v. Perkins,
135 Idaho 17,20, 13 P.3d 344, 347 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a judgment has been vacated
under this statute, “itis a nullity, andthe effect is as if it had never been rendered at all,”
and there are no limits or conditions on the rights defendant regains. See Manners v. Bd.
of Veterinary Med., 107 Idaho 950, 952, 694 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1985) (quoting State v
Barwick, 94 idaho 139, 143, 483 P.24 670, 674 (1971).

Idaho cases addressing the effect of dismissal under Section 19-2604 have looked
to the purpose of the provision. ‘The purpose of an order withholding judgment, as an
altemative to @ conviction, isto allow the defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate himself
and thereby avoid the burden of a criminal record. Perkins, 135 Idaho at 20, 13 P.3d at
347 (citing Peltier . State, 19 Idaho 454, 460, 808 P.24 373, 379 (1991) and State v

 

* The Legislatre fas provided more extensive expungement authori fr juvenile records under Idaho
(Code § 20-5254. Had it intended such provision o apply to adults, it would have so provided.

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Wagenius, 99 Wdaho 273, 279, 581 P-2d 319, 325 (1978)). Hence, a dismissal of a
criminal charge after judgment has been withheld is an exercise of leniency by the court,
notwithstanding the defendant's actual guilt of the charged offense. Perkins, 135 Idaho at
20, 13 P.3d at 347. A dismissal ofthis type is not a determination that the defendant
factually innocent or thatthe State is unable to meet its burden of proof. 1d., 135 Idaho at
21, 13 P.3d at 348. Nor is this type of dismissal akin to setting aside a conviction or
dismissing a charge based upon some error in the criminal proceedings. Id

Based on the foregoing analysis, the statute does not require or authorize the
complete expungement of all records and references tothe charge. See State v. Deitz,120
Idaho 755, $19 P.2d 1155 (CL. App. 1991) (a defendant who has received an onder
withholding judgment and later discharged under Section 19-2604 does not thereby
escape from every possible consequence of the adjudication of guilt). A conviction is not
entirely erased. On the other hand, the statute dictates that a dismissed conviction cannot
‘be used to deny the defendant's civil rights. See Manners, 107 Idaho at 952, 694 P.2d at
1300 (A felony conviction cannot be the basis for revocation ofa veterinary license when
it has been vacated and the charge dismissed pursuant to LC. § 19-2604: “[NJowhere in
that statute is there language which limits or conditions the rights which defendant
regains.”)

In this case, the NCIC database contains a reference to Parkinson's conviction,
but also notes its dismissal. The notation in the database does not deny Parkinson of his
civil rights in the sense thatthe notation in Manners “limited the rights the defendant had
regained.” See Manners, 107 Idaho at 952, 694 P.2d at 1300. LC. § 19-2604, in and of
itself, does not compel the court to remove the notation. Rather, LC. § 19-2604 allows
the court to dismiss a case against a defendant if he complies with all the terms and
conditions of his probation. That is precisely what Judge Moss did in this case. The
statute does not provide authority to take further actions, such as eliminating each and
every reference to the case in an official record, Judge Moss dismissed the case and,
pursuant to the statute, Parkinson had his civil rights restored. He is not entitled to
further relief,

Even if Section 19-2604 purported to compel the state court to fully cleanse
Parkinson's recor, it should be noted that Parkinson cites no authority by which the state

  
court could compel the FBI to make changes to its database. Federal law does not
support the proposition that a state court, or even a federal district court could compel
the FBI to strike the notation in its database. Federal courts overwhelmingly hold they
are without jurisdiction to order an Executive Branch agency to expunge accurate records
‘of a person's conviction, See, eg. U.S. v. Janik, 10 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cit. 1994) (We
are without statutory authority to provide otherwise. In fact, in Section $34, Congress
suggested the opposite—that is, in favor of requiring the Executive Branch to maintain
accurate records of such convictions”). Federal courts have also recognized that state
courts cannot expunge FBI records. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, $07 F.2d 1116, 1128, n.34
(DC. Cir. 1974) ({SHtate courts cannot expunge FBI records and thus the relief they
ould grant is inadequate.”), If federal courts could not direct the FBI to correct its
database, it follows that state courts likewise lack inherent authority to do so. Parkinson
presents no authority tothe contrary
m.

‘The district court properly held it was without authority to expunge Parkinson’s
record under Idaho Code § 19-2604, Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of
Parkinson’s Petition for Expungement of Record.

Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and HORTON
CONCUR.