Title: Vanderhoeven v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES VANDERHOEVEN,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 21, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0703026918 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 11, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 7, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 7th day of July 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, James Vanderhoeven, was found to 
have committed a violation of probation (“VOP”) in connection with his 
2007 sentences for Assault in the Second Degree and Delivery of a Schedule 
IV Controlled Substance.  For the VOP in connection with his assault 
sentence, he was sentenced to 1 year at Level V, with credit for 114 days 
previously served.  For the VOP in connection with his delivery sentence, he 
 
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was sentenced to 5 years at Level V, to be suspended after 3 years for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  This is Vanderhoeven’s direct appeal.      
 
(2) 
Vanderhoeven’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review 
applicable to the consideration of a motion to withdraw and an 
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) the Court must be 
satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the 
record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) 
the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether 
the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it 
can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Vanderhoeven’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and 
complete examination of the record and the law, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Vanderhoeven’s counsel informed 
Vanderhoeven of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy 
of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the complete 
transcript.  Vanderhoeven also was informed of his right to supplement his 
attorney’s presentation.  Vanderhoeven responded with a brief that raises 
several issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3 
position taken by Vanderhoeven’s counsel as well as the issues raised by 
Vanderhoeven and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Vanderhoeven 
raises 
several 
issues 
for 
this 
Court’s 
consideration, which may fairly be summarized as follows:  a) the Superior 
Court abused its discretion by conducting a contested VOP hearing rather 
than accepting his offer to admit the VOP, by denying a continuance to 
allow him to retain private counsel, by relying on inadmissible evidence, by 
failing to permit his counsel to review the presentence report, and by 
imposing excessive sentences, given the minimal nature of the violations; 
and b) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by requesting a contested 
VOP hearing, by failing to prepare for the hearing, and by failing to consult 
with him prior to the hearing. 
 
 
(5) 
The record reflects that, in November 2007, Vanderhoeven 
entered a plea of nolo contendere to Assault in the Second Degree and 
Delivery of a Schedule IV Controlled Substance.  He was sentenced on the 
assault conviction to 1 year at Level V, to be suspended for 1 year of Level 
III probation.  He was sentenced on the delivery conviction to 5 years at 
Level IV, to be suspended for 3 months Level IV Home Confinement, 
followed by 1 year at Level III probation.   
 
4 
 
(6) 
The record regarding the VOP reflects the following.  On 
October 3, 2008, Vanderhoeven’s appointed counsel appeared at the 
scheduled VOP hearing.  He stated that Vanderhoeven denied the violation 
and requested a contested hearing.  After consulting with Vanderhoeven, 
however, he stated that his client simply wanted to tell the judge “his side of 
the story and let [the judge] decide whether that is a violation.”  The judge, 
stating that there were “two sides to a story,” denied the request and 
scheduled the contested hearing.   
 
(7) 
The record further reflects that the contested VOP hearing took 
place on October 17, 2008.  Vanderhoeven’s probation officer, Krystal 
Woodyard, testified that, as conditions of his probation, Vanderhoeven was 
to have no contact with Crystal Garrett, the assault victim, and was to 
observe a curfew from 10:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m.  Woodyard testified that 
Vanderhoeven telephoned her in early September, 2008, and reported that he 
had been out past his curfew a couple of days previously and had stopped in 
a Wal-Mart where, unbeknownst to him, Garrett was working the night shift.  
Woodyard further testified that she received a phone call from Garrett’s 
mother who stated that Vanderhoeven had been in the Wal-Mart on August 
18 at 12:30 a.m. and on September 6 at 1:15 a.m.  The Wal-Mart shift 
supervisor, Marilyn Porches, also verified in a phone call to one of the other 
 
5 
probation officers that Vanderhoeven had been at Wal-Mart at those times.  
Porches testified at the hearing that Vanderhoeven had come into Wal-Mart 
three times, once in August and twice in September.  All three times Garrett 
had gone to Porches, upset, to report that Vanderhoeven was in the store. 
 
(8) 
Garrett testified at the hearing that Vanderhoeven was related to 
her by marriage and that he had raped her.  She stated that Vanderhoeven 
ultimately entered a plea to assault and delivery of drugs in connection with 
that incident.  Garrett further testified that Vanderhoeven came into the Wal-
Mart where she was working the night shift in mid-August, early September, 
and later in September, 2008.  She stated that he looked at her, but did not 
say anything.  Upset, she went to her supervisor to report the incidents.    
 
(9) 
Vanderhoeven testified in his own behalf.  He admitted calling 
his probation officer and telling her that he had been out past curfew because 
he had gotten two flat tires on the way home from the beach and had 
unexpectedly seen Garrett in Wal-Mart.  He agreed that he was in violation 
of the terms of his probation in connection with that incident.  Vanderhoeven 
admitted going into Wal-Mart for groceries on September 13, but did not 
recall seeing Garrett at that time.  He denied being out past curfew on that 
occasion.  Vanderhoeven denied going into Wal-Mart a third time.  He 
admitted to staring at Garrett for 90 seconds when he saw her in the store. 
 
6 
 
(10) Based upon the evidence presented, the Superior Court judge 
ruled that Vanderhoeven violated his curfew on August 18, 2008, September 
6, 2008, and September 13, 2008.  He further ruled that Vanderhoeven 
violated the no-contact provision of his probation on September 6, 2008.   
 
(11) At the sentencing hearing on December 12, 2008, the judge 
discussed the presentence report with Vanderhoeven and his counsel.  The 
judge noted that the report contained transcriptions of and notes pertaining to 
videotapes and phone calls in which Vanderhoeven discussed sex acts and 
illegal drugs he had bought and sold.  The judge asked Vanderhoeven’s 
counsel for his position on the materials and stated that they seemed to 
suggest 
that 
Vanderhoeven’s 
daughter 
was 
selling 
several 
of 
Vanderhoeven’s medications with his knowledge.  A colloquy with 
Vanderhoeven ensued during which Vanderhoeven attempted to explain 
what was happening in the videotapes.  The judge then set the matter down 
for an evidentiary hearing so that Vanderhoeven and his counsel would have 
an opportunity to further review the materials. 
 
(12) The transcript of the January 8, 2009 evidentiary hearing and 
continued sentencing hearing reflects the following.  Vanderhoeven’s 
counsel stated that his client told him the videotapes had been stolen from 
his house prior to the previous hearing.  Vanderhoeven acknowledged that 
 
7 
the conversations about drugs had taken place, but not since he began 
serving his probationary sentence.  Vanderhoeven’s counsel objected to the 
material on the ground that it was not relevant to Vanderhoeven’s sentencing 
on the VOP.  The State noted that, while the videotapes could not be dated 
exactly, Vanderhoeven’s physical appearance was not materially different, 
indicating that they had been made recently.  The State argued that the 
videotapes, which also showed Vanderhoeven having sex with prostitutes, 
were relevant to support the continuous nature of Vanderhoeven’s “deviant” 
behavior.  The transcript of one phone call also reflected that Vanderhoeven 
asked his daughter to contact Garrett while he was in prison.   
 
(13) In overruling Vanderhoeven’s counsel’s objection to the 
materials, the judge observed that Vanderhoeven had been convicted 
multiple times on weapon charges and for attempting to intimidate victims 
through violent acts and threats.  He stated that, in his view, the instant VOP 
was indicative of a pattern of such behavior going back to 1999.  In 
imposing sentence, the judge admonished Vanderhoeven that, “ . . . you are 
involved with drugs, cash, and prostitution, and you get into situations such 
as what got you convicted . . . assault in the second degree.  This is 
something that requires attention, and you will get the Family Problems 
Program.”               
 
8 
 
(14) Vanderhoeven’s first claim is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by conducting a contested VOP hearing rather than accepting his 
offer to admit the VOP, by denying a continuance to allow him to retain 
private counsel, by relying on inadmissible evidence, by failing to permit his 
counsel to review the presentence report, and by imposing excessive 
sentences, given the minimal nature of the violations.   
 
(15) It is well established that probation is an “act of grace” and that 
a judge has broad discretionary authority when deciding whether or not to 
revoke probation.2  Moreover, the State need only prove by a 
“preponderance of the evidence” that a VOP has occurred.3  In order to 
satisfy its burden of proof, the State must present “some competent 
evidence” to “reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the 
probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of 
probation.”4  Finally, under the relaxed rules of evidence applicable at a 
VOP hearing, hearsay evidence is admissible.5  Under the standards 
enunciated above, we find Vanderhoeven’s claims of abuse of discretion on 
the part of the judge at the VOP hearing to be without merit.  We further 
conclude that his claim of a failure on the part of the judge to permit his 
                                                 
2 Collins v. State, 897 A.2d 159, 160 (Del. 2006). 
3 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006). 
4 Collins v. State, 897 A.2d at 160. 
5 Id. 
 
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counsel to review the presentence report is without a factual basis and, 
therefore, also without merit.   
 
(16) As for Vanderhoeven’s claims of abuse of discretion with 
respect to his VOP sentence, Delaware law provides that a sentencing judge 
has broad discretion to consider “information pertaining to a defendant’s 
personal history and behavior.”6  As such, we find no abuse of discretion on 
the part of the judge in taking the videotapes and other material into 
consideration when sentencing Vanderhoeven.  Moreover, “[a]ppellate 
review of a sentence generally ends upon determination that the sentence is 
within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.”7  Once a defendant 
violates the terms of his probation, “the Superior Court has the authority to 
require [him] to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence.”8  
Because, as Vanderhoeven concedes, his sentence is within the statutory 
limits, any claim of an illegal sentence is without merit.  Furthermore, 
although Vanderhoeven’s sentence exceeds the SENTAC guidelines, this 
fact, in and of itself, provides no basis for relief.9  Based upon all of the 
above, we find Vanderhoeven’s claims of abuse of discretion with respect to 
his VOP sentence to be without merit.   
                                                 
6 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
7 Id. 
8 State v. Sloman, 886 A.2d 1257, 1260 (Del. 2005) (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 
4334(c)). 
9 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d at 845. 
 
10 
 
(17) Vanderhoeven’s also claims that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel in several respects.  It is settled Delaware 
law that this Court will not consider allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel that are asserted for the first time on direct appeal.10  Because 
Vanderhoeven’s claim was not presented to the Superior Court in the first 
instance, we decline to address it in this appeal.   
 
(18) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Vanderhoeven’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any 
arguably appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Vanderhoeven’s 
counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law 
and has properly determined that Vanderhoeven could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State of Delaware’s 
motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice  
                                                 
10 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994).