Title: Mutty v. Department of Corrections

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 7 
Docket: 
Ken-16-35 
Submitted 
On Briefs: October 13, 2016 
Decided: 
January 12, 2017 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
DANIEL E. MUTTY 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  This appeal concerns whether a petition to review a disciplinary 
decision by the Department of Corrections was timely filed and whether the 
court properly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
[¶2]  Daniel E. Mutty appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Kennebec County, Marden, J.) dismissing his Rule 80C petition for failure to 
state a claim and an order (Murphy, J.) denying his motion to set aside the 
judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P 60(b).  We conclude that the court erred in 
dismissing the petition and vacate the judgment. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND1 
[¶3]  On July 21, 2015, Daniel E. Mutty filed a petition in the Superior 
Court challenging a disciplinary decision by the Department of Corrections that 
resulted in a deprivation of good-time credit and the imposition of monetary 
sanctions.  At the same time, Mutty moved to proceed without payment of the 
filing fee and service costs and submitted supporting documentation.2   
 
[¶4]  On September 10, 2015, the court (Marden, J.) issued a written order 
that stated:  
Petitioner fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.  The 
court cannot determine its jurisdiction in the absence of its 
determination of the date of the final agency action.  This matter 
will be dismissed unless the petition is amended within 15 days of 
receipt of this order. 
 
  Mutty’s petition was dismissed on October 21, 2015.  The docket entry stated 
“Case dismissed per 9/10/15 Order.”   
                                               
 
1  The record and procedural history in this case are convoluted and disorganized.  We thus recite 
the background in some detail.  See Torres v. Dep't of Corr., 2016 ME 122, ¶ 2, 145 A.3d 1040.  We 
acknowledge that these cases, often wrought with procedural pitfalls and navigated by 
unrepresented parties, can present challenges for litigants and the courts.  
 
2  The record materials, including the docket, reflect that Mutty’s application to proceed without a 
filing fee and to cover service costs submitted in July 2015 was never acted upon.  Mutty’s application 
included his general account statement for the previous six months.  See Collins v. Dep’t of Corr., 
2015 ME 112, ¶¶ 4-5, 122 A.3d 955.  Because the waiver was never acted upon, the Department was 
never served and did not appear in this case. 
 
 
3 
[¶5]  In a letter dated the same day as the dismissal, the clerk informed 
Mutty that correspondence he had attempted to submit to the court had been 
rejected as an ex parte communication and would not be accepted until he 
complied with the applicable civil rules.  According to Mutty, the clerk enclosed 
with the letter an amended petition that he had mailed on September 17, 2015, 
in an attempt to comply with the court’s September 10 order.   
[¶6]  On November 4, 2015, Mutty attempted to file a notice of appeal and 
an amended petition that alleged a final agency action date: July 20, 2015.  
Mutty also attempted to file a motion to reconsider.  The notice of appeal and 
motion to reconsider were rejected on November 21, 2015, for Mutty’s failure 
to include a filing fee or an application to waive the fee.  On December 2, 2015, 
Mutty filed a motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside the order 
dismissing his petition, together with a motion to proceed without payment of 
fees.  On January 8, 2016, the court (Murphy, J.) granted the motion to waive 
fees3 and denied the Rule 60(b) motion.   
[¶7]  On January 19, 2016, Mutty filed a second notice of appeal and 
submitted an application to proceed with the appeal without payment of fees.  
                                               
 
3  It appears this waiver only applied to the fee for the Rule 60(b) motion.  As noted previously, 
the court never acted upon the initial application for a fee waiver submitted in July 2015.   
 
4 
Mutty sought to appeal from both the dismissal of his petition and the denial of 
his Rule 60(b) motion pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 11008(1) (2016) and M.R. 
App. P. 2.  The court (Mullen, J.) granted the motion to proceed with the appeal 
without payment of fees on February 11, 2016.  This appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION  
 
[¶8]  An appeal from a final agency action must be commenced “within 
30 days after receipt of notice if taken by a party to the proceeding of which 
review is sought.”  5 M.R.S. § 11002(3) (2016).  The time limits set forth in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001-11008 (2016), “are 
jurisdictional,” Persson v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2001 ME 124, ¶ 9, 775 A.2d 363, 
meaning that unless the petition is timely filed, the court lacks jurisdiction.  See 
Ramelli v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2016 ME 6, ¶ 10, 130 A.3d 963.  If 
jurisdiction is lacking, the court must dismiss the petition.  M.R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) 
(“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”).  
When reviewing a motion to dismiss for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we 
make no favorable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”  Tomer v. Me. Human 
Rights Comm’n, 2008 ME 190, ¶ 9, 962 A.2d 335.  We have emphasized that the 
APA’s time limits “must be applied uniformly and consistently to parties 
 
5 
represented by counsel and self-represented parties alike.”  Fournier v. Dep’t of 
Corr., 2009 ME 112, ¶ 2, 983 A.2d 403.    
 
[¶9]  Because the court dismissed Mutty’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, 
we look to the APA to determine whether the court had jurisdiction.  See Tomer, 
2008 ME 190, ¶¶ 8-14, 962 A.2d 335.  We review de novo an issue of statutory 
interpretation and a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  See Windham Land Tr. 
v. Jeffords, 2009 ME 29, ¶ 12, 967 A.2d 690; Tomer, 2008 ME 190, ¶ 9, 962 A.2d 
335.  In construing statutes, we first consider the plain language “and we 
interpret [statutory] provisions according to their unambiguous meaning 
unless the result is illogical or absurd.”  Sabina v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
2016 ME 141, ¶ 6, 148 A.3d 284 (alteration in original) (quotation marks 
omitted).  
[¶10]  Although the court ordered Mutty to allege the date of final agency 
action, the relevant date for purposes of jurisdiction pursuant to the APA is the 
date Mutty received notice of the agency decision, 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3), not the 
final agency action date.  See Fournier, 2009 ME 112, ¶ 2, 983 A.2d 403.  
Furthermore, nothing in the statute requires petitioners to allege a specific 
 
6 
date, but rather only requires that they allege “the final agency action . . . they 
wish reviewed.”  5 M.R.S. § 11002(2) (2016).4   
[¶11]  A petition that states a claim for relief and facially meets statutory 
requirements is, at least preliminarily, sufficient to establish jurisdiction.  See 
Bureau of Taxation v. Town of Washburn, 490 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Me. 1985); 
Dufresne v. Bd. of Trs., 428 A.2d 412, 414 (Me. 1981); Sewall v. Spinney Creek 
Oyster Co., 421 A.2d 36, 38 (Me. 1980) (stating that the Maine Rules of Civil 
Procedure governing pleadings generally apply to petitions for review of 
government agency action brought pursuant to the APA); see also M.R. 
Civ.  P. 8(a).  
[¶12]  On the other hand, the court may properly dismiss a petition for 
lack of jurisdiction when, for example, the date the petitioner received notice of 
the final agency action is clear from the petition, or when a party in the case 
raises the jurisdictional defect, and the court then determines that the petition 
was untimely.  See, e.g., Collins, 2015 ME 112, ¶¶ 2-3, 11-12, 122 A.3d 955; 
Fournier, 2009 ME 112, ¶ 7, 983 A.2d 403; Britton v. Dep’t of Conservation, 
2009 ME 60, ¶ 12, 974 A.2d 303; Davric Me. Corp. v. Bangor Historic Track, Inc., 
                                               
 
4  The APA further requires that the petition contain the “persons seeking review,” the “manner in 
which they are aggrieved,” a statement as to the action or inaction under review, the demand for 
relief, and the grounds for relief.  5 M.R.S. § 11002(2) (2016). 
 
7 
2000 ME 102, ¶¶ 11-12, 751 A.2d 1024; see also 2 Harvey & Merritt, Maine Civil 
Practice § 12:7 at 414-15 (3d, 2016-2017 ed.) (“[T]he court will dismiss [for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction] of its own initiative whenever the defect 
appears.” (emphasis added)).  There must be some affirmative basis in the 
record for the court to conclude it lacks jurisdiction.  See id.   
[¶13]  The court erred in dismissing the petition.  By ordering Mutty to 
allege a specific date, and dismissing for his failure to do so, the court 
improperly required that the petition include content not required by 5 M.R.S. 
§ 11002(2) and presumed a lack of jurisdiction without a basis to discern the 
date Mutty in fact received notice.  See 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3); see also Pederson v. 
Cole, 501 A.2d 23, 25 n.2 (Me. 1985) (“Any claimed deficiency in the pleading 
. . . does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.”); cf. State v. Nolan, 150 Me. 355, 
356, 111 A.2d 478, 479 (1955) (“[T]he jurisdiction of trial justices depends 
upon statutory provisions and cannot be enlarged by presumption or by 
implication, and . . . the facts which determine the jurisdiction must appear of 
record . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)).  We therefore vacate the order.5  
Because the Department neither was served nor appeared in this case, we also 
                                               
 
5  Because we vacate the order of dismissal, we need not address whether the court erred in 
denying Mutty’s motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
 
8 
remand for the court to act on Mutty’s initial motion to waive fees associated 
with service costs.  Any jurisdictional defect that surfaces on remand can be 
addressed by the court in the first instance. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the trial court 
to act on Mutty’s motion for waiver of fees 
associated with service costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel E. Mutty, appellant pro se 
 
The Department of Corrections did not file a brief 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2015-51 
For Clerk Reference Only