Title: Marengi v. 6 Forest Road LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13316 
 
TERRENCE MARENGI, JR., & others1  vs.  6 FOREST ROAD LLC 
& another.2 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 3, 2022. - December 14, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Zoning, Comprehensive permit, Low and moderate income housing, 
Appeal, Bond.  Bond.  Practice, Civil, Bond, Costs, 
Standard of proof.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 15, 2021. 
 
 
A motion for an appeal bond was considered by Jeffrey T. 
Karp, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Eric Neyman, J., in the Appeals Court.  
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the 
case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Dennis A. Murphy (Daniel C. Hill also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Jonathan M. Silverstein for 6 Forest Road LLC. 
 
1 Tiffany Marengi; George S. Mowbray, Jr.; Lori Mowbray; 
Stephen Pivacek; Nancy Pivacek; Lynn Welch; and Daniel Welch. 
 
2 Zoning board of appeals of Salisbury. 
2 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
John Pagliaro & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Karla L. Chaffee & Jeffrey W. Sacks for Citizens' Housing 
and Planning Association & others. 
 
Daniel P. Dain, Nicholas S. Dorf, & Ryan D. Grondahl for 
Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In a recent amendment to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, 
enacted through legislation designed to promote economic growth 
and the construction of housing in the Commonwealth, the 
Legislature provided that "[t]he court, in its discretion, may 
require a plaintiff in an action under this section appealing a 
decision to approve a special permit, variance or site plan to 
post a surety or cash bond in an amount of not more than $50,000 
to secure the payment of costs" (bond provision).  St. 2020, 
c. 358, § 25. 
At issue is whether the bond provision set out in G. L. 
c. 40A, § 17, applies to comprehensive permits issued under 
G. L. c. 40B, § 21, to promote low- and moderate-income housing.  
We conclude that it does, as such permits are reviewed pursuant 
to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, and necessarily include, as in this case, 
site plans, which are referenced explicitly in the provision. 
Also at issue are what costs are recoverable under the bond 
provision and the standard for awarding such costs.  We conclude 
that the costs recoverable extend beyond "taxable costs" but do 
not include attorney's fees or delay damages, as they are not 
3 
 
ordinarily considered "costs" and are not expressly referenced 
in the statute.  As for the standard for awarding costs, it is 
defined, at least in part, by its purpose.  As the bond 
provision exists "to secure the payment of costs," and costs 
ultimately cannot be awarded in the absence of bad faith or 
malice, the bond provision requires a preliminary determination 
regarding the "relative merits of the appeal."  G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17, third par.  Unless such preliminary determination 
demonstrates that the appeal appears so devoid of merit as to 
support an ultimate determination of bad faith or malice, no 
such bond should be imposed. 
Finally, on the limited record before us, we are unable to 
determine whether the Superior Court judge in this case, who did 
not have the benefit of this opinion explicating the statutory 
requirements, abused his discretion in ordering the plaintiffs 
to post a $35,000 bond.  We therefore vacate the order and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Proposed project and comprehensive 
permit.  On November 20, 2020, the developer, 6 Forest Road LLC, 
initially applied to the zoning board of appeals of Salisbury 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Legal Foundation; Citizens' Housing and Planning 
Association, the Department of Housing and Community 
Development, and others; and the Real Estate Bar Association for 
Massachusetts, Inc., and the Abstract Club. 
4 
 
(board) for a comprehensive permit to build seventy-six 
condominium units at 6 Forest Road in Salisbury.  The proposal 
included site plans, which were revised as the permitting 
process proceeded, with the final plan featuring fifty-six 
condominium units, including fourteen affordable units 
(project).  After ten days of public hearings, on July 27, 2021, 
the board, in a twenty-eight page decision, approved the 
application and granted the developer a comprehensive permit, 
subject to ninety-six conditions.  The board found that, with 
these conditions, the project "promote[s] affordable housing 
while taking into consideration [l]ocal [c]oncerns," such as 
ensuring public health and safety, preserving "the natural 
environment" and "[o]pen [s]paces," and promoting local planning 
goals.  As part of the approval process, the board also granted 
various waivers. 
b.  Procedural history.  On September 15, 2021, the 
plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 40A, § 17, and G. L. c. 40B, § 21, challenging the 
board's approval of the comprehensive permit.  The plaintiffs 
included direct abutters and two non-abutters who claimed to be 
aggrieved by the permit approval.  They argued that the board 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion by 
granting a comprehensive permit for the project when (1) the 
developer did not have a valid purchase and sale agreement to 
5 
 
establish site control; (2) the developer lacked economic 
justification for constructing sixteen additional housing units 
beyond the forty originally stipulated in the purchase and sale 
agreement; (3) the town had already exceeded the statutory 
minimum requirement to allot ten percent of its housing stock to 
subsidized units prior to granting the permit, and the board did 
not address the issue when they approved the construction of 
additional subsidized units; and (4) the board failed to vet 
fully the proposed impact of the project on the plaintiffs' 
abutting properties.  More specifically, the complaint alleged 
water quality and quantity issues affecting at least one of the 
plaintiffs' properties as reflected in a condition to the permit 
requiring water quality testing, public safety issues arising 
from the project being situated along a dead-end road that is 
more than three times the length ordinarily allowed under the 
town's subdivision rules and regulations, "and environmental 
impacts to the extensive wetlands on the [p]roject [s]ite." 
In response, the developer4 filed a motion for the 
plaintiffs to post a $50,000 surety or cash bond, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 40A, § 17, "to secure the payment of costs owing to the 
 
4 The defendants to the lawsuit include the developer, 
members of the board in their official capacity, and the board, 
but only the developer as the private defendant brought the 
motion. 
 
6 
 
harm to the public interest" and to the developer "caused by the 
delays occasioned by this appeal."  In a supporting memorandum,5 
the developer argued that the maximum bond was necessary to 
protect the public interest in additional affordable housing 
units in Salisbury and counterbalance the costs incurred by the 
developer due to the appeal, estimated at $250,000.  This figure 
included price increases for lumber and framing materials; 
attorney's fees that "could be $75,000 or more"; the costs of 
traffic, engineering, and environmental experts that "could 
easily exceed $50,000"; and interest rate increases raising the 
cost of financing, with "[e]ven a one percent increase" costing 
$90,000.  The developer also contended that a $50,000 bond would 
not pose a significant financial burden to the plaintiffs, who 
owned real property with a collective assessed value of roughly 
$2.3 million.  
The developer also addressed the merits of the plaintiffs' 
arguments as presented in the complaint.  The developer 
explained that a purchase and sale agreement was in full effect 
when the permit decision issued and that the State subsidizing 
 
5 In further support of the motion, the developer included 
the following exhibits:  the comprehensive permit decision from 
the board; a bond order from a separate case, Anderson vs. 
Community Hous. Resources, Inc., Mass. Land Ct., No 21 PS 000324 
(Nov. 9, 2021); an affidavit from Steven Paquette, a principal 
of the developer, calculating the estimated costs from the delay 
due to the appeal; and the unofficial municipal tax records for 
plaintiffs' real property, featuring assessment values.   
7 
 
agency had properly determined the site control issue when 
issuing the project eligibility letter, which allowed the 
developer to apply for the comprehensive permit.  The developer 
also noted that the comprehensive permitting process allows for 
the overriding of local zoning requirements for the reasons 
stated by the board in its decision, even when the town has met 
the ten percent minimum requirement for subsidized units, and 
that the board, in its decision, considered and addressed the 
impacts on the plaintiffs and the public.   
The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the bond 
provision does not apply to appeals of comprehensive permits but 
that, even if the provision does apply, they did not bring the 
appeal in bad faith or with malice; any harm to the developer or 
public interest was not outweighed by the financial imposition 
on them to post the bond; and, in the alternative, the $50,000 
bond as requested by the developer was unreasonable.  In further 
support of the merits of their appeal, the plaintiffs averred 
that the project would cause "unique harms that threaten the 
health, safety and quiet enjoyment of [their] properties," as 
documented in a single affidavit from one of the abutters.  That 
affidavit only provided the following conclusory statement:  "I 
am actually aggrieved because the project will cause unique 
harms to my property, including public health and safety 
impacts, as alleged in the [c]omplaint."  
8 
 
In a margin endorsement order dated March 17, 2022, the 
Superior Court judge granted in part the developer's motion,6 
reducing the requested bond from $50,000 to $35,000.  The judge 
allowed the bond "substantially for the reasons argued by the 
[developer] in [its] memorandum and reply brief" and found 
persuasive "the reasoning of the Land Court . . . in [Anderson 
vs. Community Hous. Resources, Inc., Mass. Land Ct.], No 21 PS 
000324 [(Nov. 9, 2021),] . . . regarding the applicability of 
G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third [par.,] to appeals of comprehensive 
permits under G. L. c. 40B, § 21." 
A single justice of the Appeals Court granted the 
plaintiffs leave to file an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 231, § 118, seeking review of the bond order.  The 
plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on May 19, 2022.  We 
transferred the case sua sponte from the Appeals Court to 
address whether the bond provision of G. L. c. 40A, § 17, 
applies to appeals of comprehensive permits issued pursuant to 
G. L. c. 40B, § 21. 
2.  Discussion.  We begin our discussion with the relevant 
statutory language at issue.  General Laws c. 40A, § 17, 
provides:   
"Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals 
. . . may appeal to the land court department . . . [or] 
 
6 The Superior Court judge did not hold a hearing on the 
motion. 
9 
 
the superior court department in which the land concerned 
is situated . . . .   
 
". . . 
 
"The court, in its discretion, may require a plaintiff in 
an action under this section appealing a decision to 
approve a special permit, variance or site plan to post a 
surety or cash bond in an amount of not more than $50,000 
to secure the payment of costs if the court finds that the 
harm to the defendant or to the public interest resulting 
from delays caused by the appeal outweighs the financial 
burden of the surety or cash bond on the plaintiffs.  The 
court shall consider the relative merits of the appeal and 
the relative financial means of the plaintiff and the 
defendant."   
 
This section is expressly cross-referenced in G. L. c. 40B, 
§ 21, which provides:  "Any person aggrieved by the issuance of 
a comprehensive permit or approval may appeal to the court as 
provided in [G. L. c. 40A, § 17]." 
The plaintiffs challenge the bond order on four grounds.  
First, they allege that the bond provision in G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17, does not apply to appeals of comprehensive permits issued 
under G. L. c. 40B, § 21.  Second, they argue that, even if the 
bond provision applies, issuing a bond requires a finding that 
the appeal has been brought in bad faith or with malice, which 
the Superior Court judge did not find in this case.  Third, even 
if no such finding is required, then the bond amount in this 
case impermissibly included nontaxable costs.  Fourth and 
finally, the plaintiffs contend that, even if the judge included 
the appropriate costs under the statute, he abused his 
10 
 
discretion by improperly balancing the relevant statutory 
considerations.  We address each argument in turn.   
a.  Statutory interpretation.  "A fundamental tenet of 
statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be 
given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of 
the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an 
illogical result."  Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 
(2001).  We ascertain such meaning "by the ordinary and approved 
usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause 
of [the statute's] enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."  81 Spooner Rd. 
LLC v. Brookline, 452 Mass. 109, 113 (2008), quoting Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  "Where possible, we seek to 
harmonize the provisions of a statute with related provisions 
that are part of the same statutory scheme so as to give full 
effect to the expressed intent of the Legislature" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 
(2015).  When the statute's plain language suggests ambiguity, 
however, then "we look to external sources, including the 
legislative history of the statute, its development, its 
progression through the Legislature, prior legislation on the 
same subject, and the history of the times."  Worcester v. 
11 
 
College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013), quoting 81 
Spooner Rd. LLC, supra at 115.   
 
i.  Plain meaning of the bond provision.  We begin our 
discussion by examining the plain language of the statutory 
provisions at issue.  General Laws c. 40B, § 21, provides that 
"[a]ny person aggrieved by the issuance of a comprehensive 
permit . . . may appeal" such permit pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17, the statute containing the recently added bond provision.  
The bond provision itself begins by expressly stating that 
"[t]he court, in its discretion, may require a plaintiff in an 
action under this section appealing a decision to approve a 
special permit, variance or site plan to post a surety or cash 
bond" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third par.  This 
language is significant as comprehensive permits invariably 
include a site plan.  Under G. L. c. 40B, § 21, 
"[t]he board of appeals . . . shall have the same power to 
issue permits or approvals as any local board or official 
who would otherwise act with respect to such application, 
including but not limited to the power to attach to said 
permit or approval conditions and requirements with respect 
to . . . site plan" (emphasis added).   
 
See 760 Code Mass. Regs. § 56.04(2) (2020) (requiring 
"conceptual design drawings of the site plan" as part of the 
12 
 
"[e]lements of [a]pplication" under the comprehensive permitting 
regulations).7  
Thus, a plaintiff who appeals, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17, from a comprehensive permit approval decision issued under 
G. L. c. 40B, § 21, is appealing from a decision that 
necessarily includes the approval of a site plan as a component 
of the comprehensive permit, see 760 Code Mass. Regs. § 56.04, 
and so is, in part, "appealing a decision to approve a . . . 
site plan," G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third par. 
 
Further textual support for the bond provision's 
application to comprehensive permit appeals is provided in the 
latter part of the provision's first sentence, which calls upon 
the court to consider "the harm . . . to the public interest."  
G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third par.  Particularly, the court may 
require the plaintiffs to post a bond "to secure the payment of 
costs if the court finds that the harm to the defendant or to 
the public interest resulting from delays caused by the appeal 
outweighs the financial burden of the surety or cash bond on the 
plaintiffs."  Id.  As we explain infra, when discussing 
legislative purpose, the harm to the public interest is a 
significant consideration when plaintiffs appeal comprehensive 
 
7 The plaintiffs contend that the board waived a site plan 
review when, in fact, the board found that such review was 
"redundant with the [c]omprehensive [p]ermit process." 
13 
 
permits issued under G. L. c. 40B, § 21, where there is an 
impact on the Commonwealth's heightened interest in removing 
barriers to constructing necessary affordable housing.  In 
contrast, the public interest is often less pronounced, or even 
absent, in ordinary variance or special permit decisions.    
A plain reading of the text, therefore, supports our 
conclusion that the bond provision applies to appeals of 
approved comprehensive permits because such permits include site 
plans.  In so concluding, however, we recognize that some 
ambiguity persists, as comprehensive permits are not expressly 
referenced by the bond provision.  Had the Legislature included 
such language, we would engage in no further analysis of 
legislative purpose and history, but given the lingering 
ambiguity, we now turn to that discussion. 
ii.  Legislative purpose and history of the bond provision 
and broader statutory scheme.  Given the residual ambiguity in 
the plain language of the bond provision in G. L. c. 40A, § 17, 
we consider "external sources, including the legislative 
history" and purpose of the statute.  College Hill Props., LLC, 
465 Mass. at 139.  The plaintiffs contend that the bond 
provision applies to appeals in ordinary zoning cases of 
approved variances or special permits but not to affordable 
housing projects permitted through comprehensive permits issued 
pursuant to G. L. c. 40B, § 21.  This argument suggests that the 
14 
 
Legislature intended to allow bonds as an additional deterrence 
to meritless appeals in the context of most zoning challenges, 
but not to serve as a deterrence to affordable housing projects, 
thereby making it easier to appeal comprehensive permits for 
affordable housing than ordinary zoning permits.  This 
interpretation of the bond provision flies in the face of the 
history and purpose of affordable housing legislation, codified 
at G. L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23, and the special permitting process 
developed to encourage and speed the development of such 
projects. 
In 2020, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 40A, § 17, to 
include the bond provision with the passage of "An Act enabling 
partnerships for growth" (act), which the Governor signed into 
law on January 14, 2021.  St. 2020, c. 358, § 25.  The act 
broadly aimed to "finance improvements to the [C]ommonwealth's 
economic infrastructure and promote economic opportunity" and 
was "declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public convenience."  St. 2020, 
c. 358, preamble.  It included provisions of a bill filed by the 
Governor, see 2019 House Doc. No. 4529, such as a $5 million 
provision "to accelerate and support the creation of low-income 
and moderate-income housing in close proximity to transit 
nodes," St. 2020, c. 358, § 2A.  See Office of the Governor, 
Press Release, Baker-Polito Administration Files $240 Million 
15 
 
Economic Development Bill (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.mass.gov 
/news/baker-polito-administration-files-240-million-economic 
-development-bill [https://perma.cc/B3LU-G786] .  Referring to 
the bond provision specifically, a senator who sponsored the 
amendment inserting the provision stated in a floor speech that 
its purpose was "to protect developers from frivolous appeals."8  
Senator Brendan P. Crighton, Formal Session of Senate, July 29, 
2020, https://malegislature.gov/Events/Sessions/Detail/3711. 
By passing this act, the Legislature built upon a history 
of encouraging the construction of affordable housing throughout 
the Commonwealth and simplifying the permitting process for such 
projects.  Decades ago, "[t]he Comprehensive Permit Statute, St. 
1969, c. 774, now codified at [G. L.] c. 40B, §§ 20 through 23, 
was adopted by the [L]egislature to address the shortage of low- 
and moderate-income housing in Massachusetts and to reduce 
regulatory barriers that impede the development of such 
housing," 760 Code Mass. Regs. § 56.01 (2020), by "provid[ing] 
relief from exclusionary zoning practices," Zoning Bd. of 
 
8 Another senator, commenting after the act took effect, 
agreed with his assessment of the bond provision, noting "the 
value of the action the [L]egislature took to limit frivolous 
lawsuits that only serve to advance Nimbyism."  Legere, Long-
Pending "Cloverleaf" Plan Will Move Forward, Provincetown 
Independent, Feb. 16, 2022, quoting Senator Julian Cyr, 
https://provincetownindependent.org/news/2022/02/16/long-
pending-cloverleaf-plan-will-move-forward/ [https://perma 
.cc/VJ6Q-EX7D]. 
16 
 
Appeals of Amesbury v. Housing Appeals Comm., 457 Mass. 748, 760 
(2010), quoting Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals 
Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 354 (1973).   
In its quest to expand affordable housing, the Legislature 
designed a statutory scheme within G. L. c. 40B to "minimiz[e] 
lengthy and expensive delays occasioned by court battles 
commenced by those seeking to exclude affordable housing from 
their own neighborhoods."  Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury, 
457 Mass. at 761, quoting Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 
of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 29 (2006).  In particular, the 
comprehensive permitting process set out in G. L. c. 40B, § 21, 
streamlines the process for constructing affordable housing by 
allowing a potential developer to submit to a zoning board of 
appeals "a single application to build such housing in lieu of 
separate applications." 
Because the purpose of the bond provision in G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17, is to serve as an additional deterrent to meritless 
appeals, we discern no reason why the Legislature would add such 
a deterrent in ordinary zoning cases but not in cases under 
G. L. c. 40B, § 21, to which the Legislature has granted 
enhanced protections in the permitting process in recognition of 
the critical need for affordable housing throughout the 
Commonwealth.  The bond provision's express reference to the 
public interest, which is heightened in appeals of comprehensive 
17 
 
permits issued under G. L. c. 40B, § 21, for the construction of 
affordable housing but often less evident, or even absent, in 
ordinary variance or special permit cases involving disputes 
between private parties, further confirms this interpretation.  
Interpreting the "public interest" and "site plan" language in 
G. L. c. 40A, § 17, to apply to appeals of comprehensive permits 
brought under that statute thus "render[s] the legislation 
effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense," 
College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. at 139, quoting Harvard 
Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 
Mass. 745, 749 (2006), thereby "giv[ing] full effect to the 
expressed intent of the Legislature," Chin, 470 Mass. at 537, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hampe, 419 Mass. 514, 518 (1995).  In 
contrast, the plaintiffs' interpretation turns the legislative 
purposes on their heads.  See Sullivan, 435 Mass. at 360 
(statutory construction should avoid "illogical result").  
For all these reasons, we conclude that the bond provision 
applies to appeals of comprehensive permits. 
b.  Bad faith or malice requirement.  The plaintiffs' 
second challenge to the over-all validity of the bond order is 
that the Superior Court judge erred by requiring a bond in the 
absence of a finding that they brought the appeal from the 
comprehensive permit decision in bad faith or with malice.  
According to the plaintiffs, because a finding of bad faith or 
18 
 
malice is required before ultimately awarding costs in an appeal 
from a municipal zoning decision, see G. L. c. 40A, § 17, sixth 
par., such a finding should also be a prerequisite to ordering a 
bond.   
We begin with the specific language of the text.  As 
provided in G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third par.:  
"The court, in its discretion, may require a plaintiff 
. . . to post a surety or cash bond in an amount of not 
more than $50,000 to secure the payment of costs if the 
court finds that the harm to the defendant or to the public 
interest resulting from delays caused by the appeal 
outweighs the financial burden of the surety or cash bond 
on the plaintiffs.  The court shall consider the relative 
merits of the appeal and the relative financial means of 
the plaintiff and the defendant."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Later, in G. L. c. 40A, § 17, sixth par., the statute 
provides:  "Costs shall not be allowed against the party 
appealing from the decision of the board . . . unless it shall 
appear to the court that said appellant or appellants acted in 
bad faith or with malice in making the appeal to the court" 
(emphasis added). 
As the stated purpose of the bond provision is "to secure 
the payment of costs" (emphasis added)," G. L. c. 40A, § 17, 
third par., and costs can only be awarded if, at the end of the 
day, a plaintiff "acted in bad faith or with malice in making 
the appeal," G. L. c. 40A, § 17, sixth par., there is 
necessarily a close correlation between the bond requirement and 
a finding of bad faith or malice.  The Legislature did not, 
19 
 
however, expressly state that such a finding is required for the 
issuance of the bond.  Rather, it provided that the court may 
issue such a bond to secure the payment of costs "if the court 
finds that the harm to the defendant or to the public interest 
resulting from delays caused by the appeal outweighs the 
financial burden of the surety or cash bond on the plaintiffs."  
G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third par.  In making that determination, 
the Legislature directed the court to "consider the relative 
merits of the appeal and the relative financial means of the 
plaintiff and the defendant."  Id. 
The Legislature's focus on the "relative merits" rather 
than the specific intent of the plaintiffs at the bond stage 
makes sense as the bond is imposed at the beginning and not at 
the end of the judicial process.  Evidence of state of mind is 
difficult to prove and usually requires discovery and the 
completion of the fact-finding process.  See National Ass'n of 
Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass 
220, 232 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).  Although an 
evaluation of the relative merits of the appeal is also 
preliminary, that task is regularly performed by courts in 
injunctions and other contexts.  See, e.g., Packaging Indus. 
Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 616-617 (1980) ("By 
definition, a preliminary injunction must be granted or denied 
after an abbreviated presentation of the facts and the law"; in 
20 
 
making its decision, court must also evaluate moving party's 
"chance of success on the merits"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1, 365 
Mass. 737 (1974) (attachments); Mass. R. Civ. P. 65, 365 Mass. 
832 (1974) (temporary restraining orders and preliminary 
injunctions).  This evaluation is further informed and 
simplified by the high standard ultimately required for the 
award of costs.  Unless the claim is brought or pursued 
maliciously or in bad faith, no costs may be awarded.  Thus, the 
court should not require a bond unless the appeal appears to be 
so devoid of merit as to allow the reasonable inference of bad 
faith or malice. 
We are also concerned that a balancing of the relative 
merits of the appeal that is not informed and guided by the 
ultimate requirement of proving bad faith or malice for the 
award of costs has the potential to upend the normal appellate 
process.  If bonds up to $50,000 could be required in closer 
cases, plaintiffs could be frightened out of appealing by the 
possibility of the imposition of a bond, even when they have 
legitimate claims.  See Damaskos v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 
359 Mass. 55, 61 (1971) ("there is strong reason for careful 
scrutiny of any statutory provision . . . for a bond which, if 
literally applied, might have the practical effect of barring 
[meritorious claims] from the courts").  We discern no such 
21 
 
intent from the Legislature.9  Costs are meant to be an 
exceptional award at the tail end of the appellate process for 
meritless claims brought in bad faith or with malice; they are 
not meant to be a means of short-circuiting that process.  The 
tail cannot be allowed to wag the dog.  
We therefore conclude that the court should only order a 
bond if the judge finds that a plaintiff's appeal appears so 
devoid of merit that it may be reasonably inferred to have been 
brought in bad faith.  
c.  Costs secured by the bond provision.  As set out in the 
statute, the purpose of the bond is "to secure the payment of 
costs."  G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third par.  According to the 
plaintiffs, the use of the word "costs" is simply a reference to 
the default rule that a prevailing litigant can ordinarily only 
recover a circumscribed, statutorily defined set of litigation 
costs known as "taxable costs."10  See Waldman v. American Honda 
 
9 Indeed, our "anti-SLAPP" statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, was 
passed to prevent pressure tactics by developers from impeding 
meritorious challenges.  See Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
489 Mass. 724, 732 (2022), and sources cited ("The legislative 
history makes clear that the motivation for the anti-SLAPP 
statute was vexatious, private lawsuits, especially ones filed 
by developers to prevent local opposition to zoning approval"). 
10 Examples of taxable costs include filing fees; certain 
small daily fees (five dollars per day in court, up to fifteen 
dollars maximum); travel by the plaintiff or defendant in "such 
sum as the court may allow," G. L. c. 261, § 23; and witness 
fees for trial, G. L. c. 261, §§ 9, 11; G. L. c. 262, § 29 
 
22 
 
Motor Co., 413 Mass. 320, 322 (1992).  The developer contends 
that "costs" should not be so limited but rather should be read 
broadly to include, among other things, the costs of experts, 
attorney's fees, and damages caused by delay during the pendency 
of the appeal.  We conclude that neither party is fully correct.  
The bond provision's use of "costs" allows for a bond securing 
certain nontaxable litigation costs like those recoverable under 
G. L. c. 93A, which includes the costs of experts but, in the 
absence of any explicit authorization, does not extend to 
include attorney's fees, carrying costs, or other delay damages. 
We begin by acknowledging that "[t]he usual rule in 
Massachusetts is that the litigant must bear his own expenses," 
an approach known as the "American Rule."  Waldman, 413 Mass. at 
321-322, quoting Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 389 
(1979).  Thus "[a] successful litigant may recover the actual, 
reasonable costs of the action," and not just the taxable costs, 
"only if 'a statute permits awards of costs . . . or . . . a 
valid contract or stipulation provides for costs, or . . . rules 
concerning damages permit recovery of costs.'"  Waldman, supra 
at 322, quoting Broadhurst v. Director of the Div. of Employment 
Sec., 373 Mass. 720, 721-722 (1977).   
 
(setting witness fees at six dollars per day, with additional 
ten cents per mile traveled). 
23 
 
The language of the bond provision refers to "costs," alone 
and without modification.  In Waldman, 413 Mass. at 323, we were 
tasked with interpreting a similarly unadorned use of "costs" in 
G. L. c. 261, § 1, the statutory source of the default rule that 
"[i]n civil actions the prevailing party shall recover his 
costs, except as otherwise provided."  We concluded that the 
statute only authorized recovery of taxable costs because that 
was consistent with existing practice, and where "nothing . . . 
suggest[ed] that the Legislature intended that G. L. c. 261, 
§ 1, reverse the American [R]ule, we assume[d] the Legislature 
did not intend to do so."  Id. 
We went on, however, to contrast the codification of the 
default rule at G. L. c. 261, § 1, with other statutes that 
authorized more than just taxable costs.  In particular, we 
noted that, where G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 and 11, authorize recovery 
of "costs incurred," we have interpreted that to allow recovery 
of certain nontaxable costs "in order to vindicate the policies" 
of that statutory scheme.  Waldman, 413 Mass. at 324, quoting 
Maillet v. ATF-Davidson Co., 407 Mass. 185, 194 (1990) (allowing 
recovery of actual cost of experts).  See Linthicum, 379 Mass. 
at 388-390.  The question before us is thus whether G. L. 
c. 40A, § 17, third par., is merely affirming the background 
rule, as did G. L. c. 261, § 1, or whether it is an explicit, 
24 
 
policy-driven exception to that rule, as with G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 
and 11. 
We conclude that the statute is intended to provide for 
more than taxable costs.  Most persuasive is the maximum amount 
of the bond contemplated under the statute.  Allowing a bond of 
up to $50,000 strongly suggests that costs in this statute 
encompass more than taxable costs, as such costs almost never 
come close to $50,000.  Indeed, in the record below and at oral 
argument, the plaintiffs' counsel conceded that taxable costs 
are often too low to be worth recovering, because they are 
outstripped by the legal expense of doing so.  Limiting costs in 
the bond provision to taxable costs would thus render that cap 
largely superfluous.  We instead must choose an interpretation 
that "lends meaning and purpose" to all the statutory language.  
DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp Redev., LLC, 487 Mass. 690, 701 (2021).   
Moreover, the bond provision in G. L. c. 40A, § 17, is not 
establishing a default rule as G. L. c. 261, § 1, did.  Instead, 
the bond provision is one component of legislation with a 
unified policy goal:  to expand much-needed housing throughout 
the Commonwealth, in part by deterring frivolous appeals and the 
delays they cause in construction.  See Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Amesbury, 457 Mass. at 761.  See also St. 2020, c. 358, § 2A.  
To vindicate these policy aims, the bond provision logically 
must be "a statutory exception to th[e usual] rule" and must 
25 
 
authorize a bond securing more than mere taxable costs.  
Linthicum, 379 Mass. at 389.  To hold otherwise would undermine 
its purpose; because taxable costs are typically small, a 
correspondingly small bond would not provide any significant 
deterrent to meritless claims.11  See College Hill Props., LLC, 
465 Mass. at 139.  Cf. Polanco v. Sandor, 480 Mass. 1010, 1012 
(2018) ("[A] principal purpose of [the bond provision in medical 
malpractice appeals] is to deter plaintiffs from going forward 
with unmeritorious claims. . . .  Allowing a plaintiff to 
proceed on [a nominal bond amount] effectively ignores the 
deterrence intent of the statute"). 
Nevertheless, a review of other statutes authorizing costs, 
fees, and delay damages leads us to conclude that the "costs" 
secured by a bond issued pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third 
par., are not nearly so expansive as the developer claims.  We 
return to our initial textual point:  the statute only says 
"costs."  It does not authorize a bond to secure attorney's 
fees, delay damages, or even "all costs."12   
 
11 That costs are ultimately available only for appeals 
brought or conducted in bad faith or with malice further 
suggests that more than ordinary taxable costs are covered, as 
graver misconduct calls for greater deterrence. 
 
12 The bond provision does include "harm to the defendant or 
to the public interest resulting from delays" as a consideration 
in the balancing test governing whether to order a bond but not 
in any definition or explanation of the included "costs."  For 
 
26 
 
This choice of wording is telling.  There are numerous 
examples of the Legislature providing more expansive language 
when it intended to authorize more expansive recovery.  For 
example, G. L. c. 93A, § 11, enables recovery of not just costs 
but also, explicitly, "reasonable attorneys' fees."  General 
Laws c. 231, § 6F, provides for not only "costs" but also 
"expenses" and "counsel fees."  Likewise, another land use 
statute, G. L. c. 40R, § 11 (h), authorizes a bond that includes 
"an amount sufficient to cover the defendant's attorney[']s 
fees."13  See Matter of the Estate of King, 455 Mass. 796, 802 
(2010) (explaining that G. L. c. 215, § 45, separately 
authorizes "costs" and "expenses," latter of which includes 
attorney's fees under historical Probate Court practice).  
This deliberate choice of language is not just confined to 
attorney's fees.  The Legislature has also used specific 
language to authorize recovery of delay damages and other 
expenses.  General Laws c. 40R, § 11 (h), for example, spells 
out that a prevailing party can claim "carrying costs."  The 
statute governing appeals from variances in the city of Boston 
is also explicit in allowing awards of "damages and costs."  St. 
 
reasons discussed infra, we reject the developer's argument that 
it implicitly authorizes delay damages as part of costs. 
 
13 The statute governing bonds in medical malpractice cases 
also expressly defines the costs secured as "including witness 
and experts fees and attorney[']s fees."  G. L. c. 231, § 60B. 
27 
 
1956, c. 665, § 11, as amended by St. 1993, c. 461, § 5.  Cf. 
Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019) (in 
case of frivolous appeal, court may award both "costs" and "just 
damages" to appellee). 
"[T]he Legislature has demonstrated that, when it intends 
to" authorize recovery of attorney's fees or delay damages, "it 
knows how."  Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 
615, 621 (1997).  In particular, awarding delay damages of the 
type the developer seeks -- increased price of materials, 
increased construction and carrying costs, and financing costs 
caused by rising interest rates -- would represent a marked 
departure from the American Rule, and we would expect such a 
consequential change to be clearly presented in the text.14  See 
Waldman, 413 Mass. at 323.  No such clear language exists in the 
bond provision, and we decline to read any in it.  See National 
Lumber Co. v. United Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., 440 Mass. 723, 727 
(2004); Resendes v. Boston Edison Co., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 344, 
354 (1995) ("We decline to imply language which the Legislature 
has omitted, particularly where, unlike here, the Legislature 
has expressly provided [for as much] elsewhere in the general 
laws" [citation and alteration omitted]). 
 
14 Those costs could far outstrip the $50,000 bond limit.  
Indeed, in the instant case, the developer estimates costs 
totaling $250,000. 
28 
 
The more difficult question is what "costs" beyond "taxable 
costs" are recoverable.  We believe that our treatment of 
"costs" recoverable under G. L. c. 93A provides the correct 
measure.  By that measure, recoverable costs include the 
"actual, reasonable costs" directly incurred by litigating the 
appeal, Waldman, 413 Mass. at 322, the most significant of which 
often will be expert witness fees, see Maillet, 407 Mass. at 
194; Linthicum, 379 Mass. at 389.  In the instant case, the 
developer claimed that it would "also incur significant 
additional consultant fees (engineering, traffic, environmental) 
in order to provide testimony during the course of the 
litigation."  We conclude that these consultant fees are also 
reasonable recoverable costs.15  These fees could easily amount 
to or exceed $50,000.  This broader set of recoverable costs 
leaves the bond provision with some deterrent bite and is 
aligned with the $50,000 limit but does not entail reading in 
language that is not there by authorizing attorney's fees or 
delay damages. 
 
15 We have, however, excluded jury consultant fees from 
recoverable costs under G. L. c. 93A.  See Sullivan v. Five 
Acres Realty Trust, 487 Mass. 64, 76 (2021).  A "luxury 
service," like a jury consultant, is plainly different from the 
engineering, traffic, or environmental experts or consultants 
required to address the claims brought by the plaintiffs in the 
instant case.  See id. 
29 
 
d.  Decision to order a bond.  Finally, we examine the 
Superior Court judge's decision to order a $35,000 bond.  
Because under the bond provision the decision to order a bond 
rests with "[t]he court, in its discretion," G. L. c. 40A, § 17, 
third par., we reverse only if that discretion is abused.  "A 
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where it results 
from 'a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors' and 
consequently 'falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives.'"  Commonwealth v. Herring, 489 Mass. 569, 573 
(2022), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014). 
We conclude that a remand is required.  Although the 
$35,000 bond may have been justifiable here, the judge did not 
have the benefit of this decision, and we cannot discern from 
the ruling how the judge applied his discretion.  In particular, 
it is not clear what costs he considered, as the developer's 
analysis, which the judge adopted, defined costs broadly to 
include attorney's fees and costs of delay, which we conclude in 
this decision are not covered, as well as the costs of experts, 
which we conclude are recoverable.  The consideration of costs 
is important, especially because the financial burden to secure 
a $35,000 bond is by no means negligible, and comparison of "the 
relative financial means of the plaintiff and the defendant" is 
necessary.  See G. L. c. 40A, § 17, third par.   
30 
 
Without further explanation from the judge, we also cannot 
discern whether he concluded that the claims are so devoid of 
merit as to support a reasonable inference of bad faith or 
malice.  Such a possibility may exist here given the limited 
legal argument and factual support presented by the plaintiffs.  
For example, the plaintiffs provided no legal support to 
contradict the developer's explanation that the site control 
issue had been properly determined by the subsidizing agency as 
provided by Board of Appeals of Hanover, 363 Mass. at 378, and 
760 Code Mass. Regs. § 56.04(6), or that the comprehensive 
permitting process allows the overriding of local zoning 
requirements for the reasons stated by the board even when the 
ten percent requirement is met, see Taylor v. Housing Appeals 
Comm., 451 Mass. 149, 151 (2008) ("achievement of the ten per 
cent statutory minimum does not deprive a local zoning board of 
appeals of the ability to grant additional comprehensive permits 
to developers seeking to construct low or moderate income 
housing").  Finally, the sole affidavit provided in response to 
the developer's motion for the bond included only conclusory 
statements regarding unaddressed impacts on the plaintiffs' 
properties from the project.  At the same time, however, the 
developer had incorrectly argued that bad faith or malice did 
not figure into the analysis, and the judge's order adopted the 
developer's arguments more generally.   
31 
 
Consequently, on remand the judge should apply the standard 
we have explicated here explaining whether he found the claims 
so devoid of merit as to support an inference of bad faith or 
malice.  He should also expressly weigh "the harm to the 
defendant or to the public interest resulting from delays caused 
by the appeal" and explain whether that "outweighs the financial 
burden of the surety or cash bond on the plaintiffs."  See G. L. 
c. 40A, § 17, third par.   
In sum, a remand is required, as the judge's ruling 
predates our decision clarifying the standards for the issuance 
of the bond, and we cannot determine, based on the judge's 
limited explanation, whether he properly exercised or abused his 
discretion in ordering the $35,000 bond.  
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that the bond provision in G. L. c. 40A, § 17, applies to 
appeals from comprehensive permit approvals issued under G. L. 
c. 40B, § 21, but a remand is required to determine whether a 
$35,000 bond should have been issued to secure costs in the 
instant case.  We therefore vacate the bond order of the 
Superior Court and remand for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.