Title: MOSES KUHBANDER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000149-MR
MOSES KUHBANDER APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE,
NO. 13-CR-00132

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE.

‘MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING

Appellant Moses Kuhbander appeals as a matter of right, pursuant to Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b), from the Jessamine Circuit Court judgment sentencing him
to twenty years’ imprisonment for first-degree sexual abuse and for being a
first-degree persistent felony offender. On appeal, Kuhbander raises the
following issues: (1) the trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth to
introduce evidence of Kuhbander’s arrest in Ohio for obstructing official
business; (2) the Commonwealth's prosecutorial misconduct constituted
palpable error; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to exclude recordings of

jail phone calls due to a discovery violation. For the following reasons, we
affirm Kuhbander's convictions, but reverse his sentence and remand for a

new penalty phase proceeding,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2013, Kuhbander lived in Dayton, Ohio, with his girlfriend Virginia
‘and her two children Sarah and Allison.! In July of that year, Kuhbander,
Virginia, Allison, Sarah, and Sarah’s friend, Beverly, took a weekend trip to
Nicholasville, Kentucky. On the trip, everyone but Allison stayed with
Virginia’s friend, Donna Smith, During the weekend trip, Allison stayed with
her father, Jeffery.

During the evening of July 21, Sarah was outside playing with Beverly
when she developed an earache and decided to go to bed. When Sarah entered
the bedroom her family was staying in, Kuhbander and Virginia were already
in bed watching a movie. Sarah laid down on the bed, resting her ear on
Kuhbander’s arm, and fell asleep.

Later that evening, Sarah was awakened by Kuhbander's hand reaching
inside her shorts, beneath her underwear, and massaging her buttocks. In an
effort to get Kuhbander to stop touching her, Sarah rolled over in bed.

However, Kuhbander was undeterred and reached his hand inside Sarah's
shorts, beneath her underwear and fondled her vagina. During the course of
the assault, Virginia got out of bed and went to the bathroom. In her absence,

The names ofall minors in this opinion have been replaced with pseudonyms

to preserve their privacy.
2
Kuhbander asked Sarah if she was enjoying what he was doing. Sarah replied
that she wanted to sleep. Subsequently, Sarah put on her pajama pants and
laid down on the floor of the bedroom to go back to sleep.

‘The next morning, Kuhbander asked Sarah if she remembered anything
from the previous evening. Sarah lied and informed him that she did not.

Later that morning, as the family was preparing to leave Donna’s house, Sarah
told Beverly about the assault, Subsequently, Sarah also told Donna that
Kuhbander had tried to put his hands down her pants. After learning about
the abuse, Donna insisted that Sarah tell Virginia about what had happened.

Shortly thereafter, Sarah informed her mother of the assault, but
Virginia did not take any action. Rather, despite Donna’s request that Virginia
leave Sarah with her, Virginia elected not to change the family’s plan to leave
that morning to return to Dayton.?

Several hours after the group left, Donna called Jeffery's girlfriend to
inform her about what had happened, and she in turn relayed the information
to Jeffery. After learning of the abuse, Jeffery concocted @ ruse with the
assistance of the Jessamine County Sheriff's Office (JCSO). Jeffery had a

friend contact

 

jnia to tell her that he and Allison had been injured in a car
accident and were in the hospital. In the meantime, Jeffery and law

enforcement waited at the hospital for the arrival of Virginia and Kuhbander.

2 While the trip to Dayton was not delayed, the group left in such a hurry that
they did not retrieve Allison from Jeffery’s home as expected.
3
However, the ruse was discovered when one of Virginia's friends went to
the hospital and learned that there had been no accident. That friend then
informed Virginia, who continued their trip back to Dayton. Subsequently,
Jeffery contacted Virginia to discuss Sarah’s claim of sexual abuse. After the
pair began to argue, Kuhbander took the phone to speak to Jeffery.
Kuhbander told Jeffery that accusing him was a mistake and threatened to kill
him.

In the meantime, while law enforcement had been unsuccessful in luring
Kuhbander back to Nicholasville, they continued to pursue the case.
Specifically, Detective Brian Carpenter of the JCSO requested that the Dayton
Police Department conduct a welfare check on Sarah. The Dayton police

agreed and dispatched two officers to Virgi

 

ind Kuhbander's residence.

When the Dayton police arrived at the residence, they informed
Kuhbander and Virginia that they were there to perform a welfare check on
Sarah. Virginia and Kuhbander informed the police that Sarah was not there,
but at a relative’s home in Kettering, a suburb of Dayton. The officers asked
for the relative’s address, at which point Kuhbander left the room to make a
telephone call. After completing his call, Kuhbander informed the police that
they could not know where Sarah was without a lawyer and a court order.

In response, the police informed Kuhbander and Virginia that by failing
to provide them with the address, they could be arrested for obstructing official

business. Kuhbander and Virginia remained steadfast in their refusal to

4
provide the address. Subsequently, the police arrested the couple for
obstructing official business, although the charges were dismissed shortly
thereafter. Ultimately, the police were able to locate Sarah and she
participated in a forensic interview. That interview was provided by the
Dayton police to Detective Carpenter, who presented the case to the grand
jury. The Jessamine County Grand Jury returned an indictment against
Kuhbander for first-degree sexual abuse and for being a second-degree
persistent felony offender.

During Kuhbander’s trial, the Commonwealth primarily relied upon
‘Sarah's testimony to establish the sexual abuse. The Commonwealth also
introduced a series of jail phone call recordings of conversations Kuhbander
had while in custody. In those recordings, among other damaging statements,
Kuhbander attempted to obtain an alibi and acknowledged that he was “not
one hundred percent sure” that he committed the crime he had been charged
with. To counter this evidence, Kuhbander testified on his own behalf. He
claimed that he had been drinking heavily the night of the incident, but denied
committing the offense for which he had been accused.

‘The jury found Kuhbander guilty of first-degree sexual abuse and for
being a first-degree persistent felony offender and recommended a penalty of

twenty years’ imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Kuhbander in

3 Prior to trial the charge of second-degree persistent felony offender was,
amended to first-degree persistent felony offender.
5
conformance with the jury’s recommendation. Kuhbander brings this appeal

‘a matter of right.

 

ANALYSIS

I. Evidence of Kuhbander’s Arrest for Obstructing Official Business was
Admissible Under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 404(b).

Kuhbander argues that evidence of his arrest in Ohio for obstructing
official business should have been excluded as impermissible prior-bad-acts
evidence. Under KRE 404(b),

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible:

   

(1) _ Ifoffered for some other purpose, such as proof of
‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or

2) _ If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering
party.
While KRE 404(b)(1) describes some examples of other purposes, “it states the

“other purpose” provision i

 

1 way that leaves no doubt that the specifically
listed purposes are illustrative rather than exhaustive." Tamme v.
Commonwealth, 973 8.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky, 1998) (quoting Robert G. Lawson, THE
KENTUCKY EVIDENCE Law HANDBOOK, § 2.25 at 87 (3rd ed, 1993).

In applying KRE 404, the tral court must exercise caution and eliminate
evidence which is solely relevant as proof of the accused's propensity to

commit a certain type of crime. Major v. Commonwealth, 177 8.W.34 700, 707
6
(Ky. 2005). “To determine whether evidence of prior bad acts is admissible, we
must decide if the evidence is relevant for some purpose other than to prove
the criminal disposition of the accused|,]' probative as to the actual
commission of the prior bad act, and not overly prejudicial under KRE 403.”
Kerr.

‘Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 250, 260 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Meece v.
Commonwealth, 348 8.W.3d 627, 662 (Ky. 2011)

On appeal, when reviewing the trial court’s balancing under KRE 403,
the reviewing court views “the evidence in the light most favorable to its
proponent, giving the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its
minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” Major, 177 S.W.3d at 707. The
standard for reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is abuse of discretion,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 8.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).

“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id.

Kuhbander preserved this issue by objection at trial and now argues
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his arrest for
obstructing official business. As noted, when the police arrived to check on
Sarah, Kuhbander refused to provide the address at which she could be
located. He insisted that the police needed to return with a lawyer and a court
order. Even after being warned that his actions could lead to criminal charges,
and arrest, Kuhbander refused to provide the information,

7
In light of these actions, a reasonable jury could have concluded that
Kuhbander’s refusal to provide Sarah's location to police was consciousness of
guilt and an attempt to avoid prosecution for her sexual abuse. See Woodard
v. Commonwealth, 147 8.W.3d 63, 67 (Ky. 2004) ("Evidence of assumption of a
false name following the commission of a crime is relevant as an admission ‘by
conduct, constituting circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt and.
hence of the fact of guilt itself.") (citation omitted); Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 29 -
82 (Attempted spoliation of evidence is relevant as evidence inconsistent with
innocence). Thus, it was proper for the Commonwealth to introduce
information about the efforts of the Dayton police to perform a welfare check
on Sarah, and Kuhbander’s refusal to comply with their queries. Kuhbander’s
refusal to comply with police led to his arrest, which further demonstrated
Kuhbander’s intent to avoid prosecution for sexually abusing Sarah, Pursuant
to the KRE 403 balancing test, the trial court properly weighed the probative
value of allowing the sequence of events to be accurately recounted to the jury,
including Kuhbander's arrest, and in determining that probative value
outweighed any prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of Kuhbander’s arrest

for a misdemeanor charge which w

 

ultimately dismissed, Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to

introduce evidence of Kuhbander’s arrest for obstructing official busines

 
IL, The Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct During Guilt Phase Does Not
Support Reversal.

Kuhbander alleges that multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct
occurred during the guilt phase of his trial, specifically the Commonwealth: 1)
vouching for Sarah’s testimony in closing argument; 2) cross-examining
Kuhbander about his arrest for interfering with official business; 3)
crossexamining Kuhbander about his jail phone calls; 4) shaming the jury to
convict Kuhbander; 5) arguing in closing argument that Kuhbander did a
“masterful job spinning this case” and by offering “red herrings”; and 6)
explaining in closing argument that Sarah’s story was not inconsistent, but
rather evolved as victim's accounts usually do.

Prosecutorial misconduct is “{a] prosecutor's improper or illegal act,
involving an attempt to . . . persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant
or assess an unjustified punishment.” Noakes v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.34

116, 121 (Ky. 2011) (quoting BLack’s LAw DicTionaRy (9th ed. 2009)). It “may

 

result from a variety of acts, including improper questioning and improper
closing argument.” Id. “Any consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct must center on the overall fairness of the trial. In order to justify
reversal, the misconduct of the prosecutor must be so serious as to render the
entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787,
805 (Ky. 2001} (internal citations omitted)

“If the misconduct is objected to, we will reverse on that ground if proof

of the defendant's guilt was not such as to render the misconduct harmless,
9
and if the trial court failed to cure the misconduct with a sufficient admonition
to the jury.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 8.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010).
Additionally, if the defendant failed to object, the Court “will reverse only
where the misconduct was flagrant and was such as to render the trial
fundamentally unfair.” Id.; Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCz) 10.26
(palpable error standard of review).

First, Kuhbander

 

sserts that the Commonwealth improperly vouched
for the credibility of Sarah. Specifically, Kuhbander complains of the
Commonwealth's statements in closing argument that “we stand firmly behind
[Sarah}.” Since Kuhbander failed to object to the Commonwealth's statements
at trial, we will review his claim for palpable error.

‘When reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in closing
argument, we consider the argument as a whole while keeping in mind that
counsel is granted “wide latitude” during closing argument. Brewer v.
Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Ky. 2006). “The longstanding rule is
that counsel may comment on the evidence and make all legitimate inferences
that can be reasonably drawn therefrom.” Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312
'8.W.3d 336, 350 (Ky. 2010). “Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor
‘supports the credibility of a witness by indicating a personal belief in the
witness's credibility thereby placing the prestige of the (prosecutor's office]
behind that witness.” United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.

1999). See also Lewis v. Commonwealth, 475 8.W.3d 26, 39 (Ky. 2015) (“{A]

10
prosecutor should not personally vouch for the credibility of a witness.")
Kuhbander alleges that on four occasions during closing argument the
Commonwealth improperly vouched for Sarah's credibility by stating as
follows: 1) “{ajnd we'll talk about it more as we move through this closing, but
we stand firmly behind [Sarah];” 2) “[wle stand firmly behind [Sarah] and her
3) “I'm going to address briefly the Commonwealth's proof, like I

 

said, we stand firmly behind [Sarah] and think her testimony proves our case;”
and 4) *[wle've talked about the Commonwealth's case, and like I said, we
firmly stand behind [Sarah].”

‘The Commonwealth claims that these comments were an expression of
the Commonwealth's support for the victim of a crime and a permissible
‘comment on the evidence. While we find the Commonwealth's commentary
constitutes improper vouching, reversal is only required if the misconduct was
“flagrant” and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. We employ a four-part
test to determine whether a prosecutor's improper comments amount to
flagrant misconduct. The four factors to be considered are: “(1) whether the
remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2) whether
they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or
accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against
the accused." Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509, 518 (Ky. 2010).

As to the first factor, we conclude Kuhbander was not prejudiced by the

‘Commonwealth's statements. The statements were made during closing

a
argument, and the jury was instructed not to consider them as evidence.
‘Again, counsel is afforded wide latitude in closing argument. We believe the
Jury could have reasonably deciphered that the Commonwealth's statements
were an attempt to persuade it to convict Kuhbander, much like defense
counsel persuaded it not to, and were not intended to mislead the jury.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the Commonwealth.

{As to the second factor, the Commonwealth's remarks comprised only a
‘small portion of the prosecutor's closing argument, so this factor likewise
‘weighs in the Commonwealth's favor. AAs to the third factor, we can only
conclude that the comments were deliberately placed before the jury. This
factor weighs in Kuhbander’s favor. However, the fourth factor, the weight of
the evidence against Kuhbander, weighs in the Commonwealth’s favor.
Contrary to Kuhbander’s suggestion, evidence of his guilt was considerable. In
particular, the Commonwealth presented detailed testimony about the abuse
from Sarah and recordings of Kuhbander’s jail phone calls, which were highly
incriminating. Therefore, we are unable to say that the Commonwealth's
vouching for Sarah during closing argument was so egregious as to undermine
the essential fairness of Kuhbander’s trial. While the prosecutor's statements
were clearly improper, the statements standing alone did not rise to the level of

flagrant misconduct.

 

* Kuhbander also alleges that the Commonwealth improperly vouched for

Sarah's account of the abuse, by telling the jury that her trial testimony was

‘consistent with what she said in her forensic interview. Kuhbander emphasizes that
12
Next, Kuhbander assigns as error the prosecutor's cross-examination of
Kuhbander about his arrest for obstructing official business. Specifically,
Kuhbander argues that the Commonwealth improperly implied that
Kuhbander was guilty of obstructing official business and, by extension, the
crimes that he had been charged with in the case in bar. Since Kuhbander
failed to object at trial, we review his claim for palpable error.

During the Commonwealth’s cross-examination of Kuhbander, the
prosecutor asked whether Kuhbander had been arrested in Ohio for

obstruction of official business. Kuhbander attempted to parry this question

  

by shifting blame to his brother-in-law, explaining that his arrest was due to
Virginia’s brother-in-law’s failure to cooperate with authorities by refusing to
provide the address where Sarah was located. Additionally, Kuhbander
emphasized that he was not convicted of the offense, Subsequently, the
Commonwealth asked whether in fact the obstruction charge (a misdemeanor)
was dismissed due to Kuhbander’s facing felony sex charges in Kentucky.

Kuhbander disagreed, explaining that the obstructing official business charge

 

had been dismissed prior to his indictment for sexual abuse.

 

Sarah's forensic interview was not admitted as evidence at the trial. In response, the
Commonwealth acknowledges that the interview had not been admitted into evidence,
‘but that a transcript of the interview had been used by Kuhbander to impeach Sarah.
‘Additionally, during Kuhbander’s closing argument, he alleged inconsistencies
between Sarah's forensic interview and her tral testimony. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth sought to rebut this claim by characterizing Sarah's testimony as
being consistent. While this issue was mishandled, we conclude any error was
harmless.

13,
‘The Commonwealth maintains that its questioning was proper since
Kuhbander had attempted to shift blame to another individual and then
‘emphasized the dismissal of the obstructing official business charge. The
‘Commonwealth contends that upon Kuhbander’s assertion of innocence to the
obstructing official business charge, the prosecutor was permitted to question
Kuhbander with an alternative explanation for why the charge was dismissed.
While the Commonwealth's questioning may have improperly suggested that
the obstructing official business charge had been dismissed due to
Kuhbander’s being charged with a more serious felony sex offense in the case
at bar - with the implication that Kuhbander’s punishment would be in
Kentucky - we cannot deem the comment, standing alone, to be flagrant. As
with Kuhbander’s first claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the limited nature of
the prosecutor’s remarks and the strength of the case against Kuhbander
precludes a finding that the questioning in and of itself undermined the
essential faimess of Kuhbander’s trial

Next, Kuhbander contends that the prosecutor's cross-examination of
him about his jail phone calls was improper. Specifically, Kuhbander argues
that the Commonwealth erred by asking Kuhbander why he declined to call

witnesses who would have allegedly supported hit

 

.ccount to testify at trial on
his behalf. Once again, Kuhbander failed to raise this objection at trial so we

review his claim for palpable error.

14
On cross-examination, the Commonwealth focused on Kuhbander's
assertion at trial that Sarah had made a claim of sexual abuse in order to get
back at him for threatening to send her to live with her father. When pressed
as to why this theory was not expressed in the jail phone calls between
Kuhbander and his family members, Kuhbander asserted that it had been and
that the Commonwealth was selectively choosing which portions of the
recordings to play. The Commonwealth disagreed, and inquired of Kuhbander
whether he intended to have those family members testify on his behalf.

‘At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's cross-examination,
Kuhbander requested an admonition that the Commonwealth's questioning
was improper burden shifting. Subsequently, the trial court admonished the
jury, reminding them that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proof and
that Kuhbander had no duty to present witnesses on his behalf, We believe
any flaw in the Commonwealth's questioning was appropriately addressed and
cured by the trial court’s admonition. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 8.W.34
430, 441 (Ky. 2003) ("A jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard
evidence and the admonition thus cures any error.”),

Kuhbander further maintains that the Commonwealth's questioning
improperly encouraged Kuhbander to try to admit testimonial evidence that
would have been barred as hearsay by KRE 802. However, as noted by the
‘Commonwealth, testimony about whether Kuhbander had recently fabricated

the defense he was presenting at trial (‘she made it all up to get back at me”)

15,
nevertheless would have been admissible under KRE 801A(a)(2). Thus, the
Commonwealth did not attempt to elicit testimony that was inadmissible;
rather, the prosecutor's questioning focused on the jail phone call recordings
and whether they would establish Kuhbander’s prior consistent statements
about Sarah's reason for accusing him of sexual abuse. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth’s questioning in this regard was not improper.

Next, Kuhbander argues that the Commonwealth improperly shamed the
Jury into convicting him by telling jurors that they would be “cynical” if they
did not believe Sarah. Kuhbander failed to raise an objection at trial, thus we
will review his claim for palpable error only.

Kentucky case law is well established that the prosecutor is prohibited
from shaming jurors or attempting to put community pressure on jurors’
decisions. Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 288 8,W.3d 291, 299 (Ky. 2009). The
‘Commonwealth argues that the prosecutor's statement was not an attempt to
shame the jury into convicting Kuhbander, but rather, a comment on the
veracity of Sarah's account which is permissible during closing argument. We
Gisagree. The prosecutor's remark about living in a cynical time and the jury
being cynical if they did not believe Sarah, when viewed in the entirety of the
prosecutor's closing argument, was clearly designed to pressure the jury to
accept Sarah's account of the abuse. This type of argument is inappropriate
as the Commonwealth’s Attorney is obligated to argue the law and facts of a
given case to obtain a conviction, rather than seek to influence the jury to

16
decide the case on other grounds. However, due to the strength of the
Commonwealth’s case against Kuhbander and the fact that the statement only
constituted a small portion of the prosecutor's closing argument, again we
cannot say that this remark standing alone fundamentally undermined the
essential fairness of Kuhbander’s trial. It plainly did not.

Next, Kuhbander contends that the Commonwealth made impermissible
‘comments about Kuhbander’s counsel during closing argument. In particular,
Kuhbander points to the prosecutor's statements that the defense had
‘employed red herrings and spun the case in an effort to obtain an acquittal.
Additionally, Kuhbander complains about the prosecutor's statement that the
defense had made up multiple versions of its story to explain Sarah’s sexual
abuse claim, Kuhbander did not object to these statements at trial, so
palpable error review is appropriate,

‘As we have previously explained, *[glreat leeway is allowed to both
‘counsel in a closing argument. It is just that—an argument, A prosecutor
may comment on tactics, may comment on evidence, and may comment as to
the falsity of a defense position.” Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d
407,

412 (Ky. 1987). Here, the prosecutor was permitted to comment during
closing argument on the defense's tactics and strategies, and that is precisely
what the prosecutor sought to accomplish here. No error, let alone palpable
error, occurred,

7
Next, Kuhbander argues that the Commonwealth improperly commented
‘on the facts of the case by arguing that Sarah's account of the abuse was not
inconsistent, but rather evolved over time as most victim’s accounts do.

‘Again, Kuhbander did not object at trial so we review for palpable error. The
statement at issue was made in response to Kuhbander’s closing argument
remark in which he argued that Sarah’s account was inconsistent and
unbelievable. The Commonwealth permissibly responded to this argument
and offered its interpretation of the evidence in the case, which supported the
conclusion that Sarah’s account was consistent.

However, in explaining any perceived inconsistencies in Sarah's
statement, the Commonwealth made a sweeping statement about how child
victims act when they have been abused. The Commonwealth argued that
‘{Sarah’s] story didn't get inconsistent, the story evolved. And that's what
children do when they've been abused. The longer they talk about things to
people they feel more comfortable with, the more they feel more comfortable
they're away from the setting of the abuser, the more stuff comes out.”

Kuhbander maintains that this argument was improper, relying on
Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1996). In Newkirk, the Court
reversed Newkirk’s conviction due to the improper admission of expert witness,
testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. id. at 693,
695. Newkirk is distinguishable since here, the challenged statement was not
expert testimony about child abuse victims generally, but rather was a

18
statement made by a prosecutor during closing argument. That said, we agree
‘with Kuhbander that the prosecutor improperly made sweeping,
representations to the jury about the actions of child victims of sexual assault,
in an effort to support Sarah's account of her abuse. Yet again, we are unable
to say that the Commonwealth's statement standing alone constituted flagrant
misconduct, due in large part to the limited nature of the remarks and the
strength of the case against Kuhbander.

IIL, Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Kuhbander's
Motion to Exclude Evidence.

Kuhbander alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to exclude evidence of the recordings of his jail phone calls.
Specifically, he contends that the Commonwealth failed to timely turn over the
recordings and in so doing violated the trial court’s discovery order and RCr
7.24. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
Goodyear, 11 S.W.3d at 581

Upon a defendant's written request, RCr 7.24 requires the
‘Commonwealth to turn over the defendant's written or recorded statements
that the attorney for the Commonwealth knows to be in the possession,
custody, or control of the Commonwealth. In this case, the Commonwealth
and defense counsel entered into an Agreed Order for Mutual Discovery to that
effect and the trial court entered a Discovery Order accordingly. No dispute
exists that the recorded jail phone calls fall under the Agreed Order and RCr

7.24, thereby requiring the Commonwealth to provide the records once the
19
attorney for the Commonwealth knows them to be in his possession, custody,
or control.

The record shows that the Commonwealth informed Kuhbander’s
counsel of the recordings a week and a half prior to trial, and promptly
provided copies. At trial, Kuhbander moved to exclude the recordings on
grounds that the late disclosure violated the discovery rules and that counsel
did not have a chance to review the recordings. In response, the
‘Commonwealth stated that discovery rules require disclosure to be timely, and,
that the Commonwealth promptly turned over the recordings once they came
into its possession. The trial court admitted the recordings, and portions of
Kuhbander’s phone calls were played for the jury, including him asking for
someone to verify he was working as an alibi, saying that being in jail on this
charge was embarrassing, and that he was not one-hundred percent sure that
he did it. The Commonwealth argued that the recordings were evidence of
Kuhbander's guilt.

After trial, Kuhbander filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV"), arguing that the trial court improperly played redacted

versions of the jail phone calls; the redacted versions were not agreed upon,

 

prior to trial; and defense counsel did not have an opportunity to thoroughly
review the tapes or anticipate which additional portions to play for the jury,
due to the volume of the material on the tapes and the short time in which

counsel had to review them. KRE 106 provides that *{wJhen a writing or

20
recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party
‘may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporancously with it." Kuhbander contends that the short recess given
to him by the trial court after the Commonwealth played its redacted versions
of the recordings was insufficient time in which to determine what relevant
portions to play to rebut the portions played by the Commonwealth. The trial
court denied Kuhbander's JNOV motion.

Kuhbander now argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting the recordings. However, the record reflects that the Commonwealth
disclosed the jail phone records to defense counsel once such recordings came

within the possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth,

 

 

by RCr 7.24. Defense counsel admits to receiving the jail phone records at
least a week before trial. The discovery rules do not require the
‘Commonwealth to inform defense counsel which portions of recordings it
intends to use at trial. Moreover, Kuhbander could have moved for a
continuance to allow defense counsel additional time to produce recordings to
rebut those presented by the Commonwealth, but no motion for continuance
was made. We fail to find any violation of RCr 7.24, or of the trial court’s

discovery order, so as to mandate reversal and do not believe the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting the recordings.

a1
Il, The Cumulative Effect of Alleged Errors During Guilt Phase Does
Not Mandate Reversal.

Kuhbander asks this Court to overturn his convictions due to
cumulative error. This doctrine recognizes that “multiple errors, although
harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to
render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 8.W.34
577, 631 (Ky. 2010). Application of the cumulative error doctrine has been
limited to those situations ‘where the individual errors were themselves
substantial, bordering, at least, on the prejudicial.” Id. If the errors have not

“individually raised any real question of prejudice,” then cumulative error

 

not implicated,

Id.
In the case at bar, we simply cannot conclude that Kuhbander's trial

was fundamentally unfair. His alleged errors were unpreserved, and do not
individually mandate reversal or rise to the level of “flagrant misconduct” so as,
to constitute palpable error, Even viewed collectively, the alleged errors do not
undermine our confidence in the overall fairness of the guilt phase proceeding
or otherwise deny Kuhbander his due process right to a fair trial
\V. Prosecutorial Misconduct During Penalty Phase Does Mandate Reversal.
Kuhbander alleges that the Commonwealth made improper comments
uring the penalty phase of the trial. Prior to the start of the penalty phase,
counsel met with the trial court in chambers to discuss how to present

Kuhbander’s criminal record to the jury, During that meeting, the
22
‘Commonwealth and Kuhbander’s counsel appeared to enter into an
agreement, whereby the Commonwealth would inform the jury only of the
charges for which Kuhbander had been convicted in the past, and not reveal
any details or underlying facts with respect to those convictions. In exchange,

Kuhbander’s counsel agreed to stipulate to those convictions. However,

 

despite this agreement, the penalty phase became contentious, apparently due
to a difference of opinion between counsel as to what the parties had agreed.
During the penalty phase closing argument, Kuhbander's counsel said
to the jury that “if you are satisfied that you have received enough evidence to
find him guilty of being a persistent felony offender,” at which point the
Commonwealth objected from counsel’ table in full hearing of the jury:
Your honor, once again, we took out multiple pages of these
documents and she’s up here saying ‘if you're satisfied you've
gotten enough evidence.” We took out pages that could have
been evidence based on our agreement and now she’s up here
trying to argue against the PFO charge.
‘The trial court, the prosecutor, and Kuhbander’s counsel then addressed
this objection for the next minute or so in front of the jury, before
Kuhbander’s counsel moved on to the next portion of her argument.
Kuhbander claims that the prosecutor's objection improperly
informed the jury that there was additional evidence about Kuhbander’s

past that they were not allowed to hear. In support of this argument,

Kuhbander cites the Court to Mack v. Commonwealth, 860 8.W.2d 275,

277 (ky. 1993), wherein the prosecutor, during closing argument of the
23
penalty phase, referred to the guilt phase and stated that there was a

“vast store of incriminating evidence,” against Mack which the jury had

 

not been able to hear due to “rules of evidence” and “legal proceedings."
This Court reversed, concluding that “[a] defendant cannot confront
phantom witnesses, or cross-examine real witnesses on a ‘ull story’
consisting of mere suggestion.” Id.

‘The Commonwealth contends that, unlike in Mack where the
Prosecutor's actions were clearly intended to persuade the jury of the
existence of hidden evidence of Mack's guilt, here the prosecutor's
statement was directed to the trial court in the form of an objection and
in an effort to enforce the agreement reached with Kuhbander’s counsel.

Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that the difference in the timing

 

of the statements was significant, with the improper conduct in Mack
occurring during the guilt phase closing argument as opposed to this

case where it occurred during the penalty phase closing argument.

 

‘Mack stands for the proposition that it is wholly improper for the
‘Commonwealth to suggest to the jury the existence of relevant evidence
that has been kept from them. Here, if the prosecutor believed that
Kuhbander’s counsel had not honored their agreement, the proper route
‘would have been for him to approach the bench to address the issue.
Instead, the Commonwealth improperly informed the jury, by way of an

objection, that additional evidence of Kuhbander’s wrongdoing existed, of

24
which they had not been made privy. Asa result, we hold that a new
penalty phase is warranted.
INCLUSION

We affirm Kuhbander's conviction, reverse his sentence, and remand to
the Jessamine Circuit Court for a new penalty phase proceeding.

All Sitting, Cunningham, Keller, VanMeter, and Wright, J., concur.
Hughes, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which
Minton, C.J., and Venters, J., join.

HUGHES, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
While I agree with the majority that prosecutorial misconduct warranted a new
penalty phase, errors in the guilt phase of the trial were substantial enough
and at least bordered on prejudicial individually so that, in my view,
considered collectively they undermined confidence in the overall fairness of
the proceedings. Accordingly, this cumulative error denied Kuhbander his due
process right to a fair trial.

1 respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that evidence of
Kuhbander’s arrest for obstructing official business was more probative than
prejudicial under KRE 403's balancing test. While I agree that the
Commonwealth was permitted to introduce evidence about the efforts of the
Dayton police to perform a welfare check on Sarah and Kuhbander’s response

to their queries, the admission of evidence of his arrest was erroneous.

25
By simply recounting the efforts of the police to check on Sarah’s welfare,
the Commonwealth had sufficient, relevant evidence to argue to the jury that
Kuhbander's failure to provide the police with Sarah's address demonstrated
consciousness of guilt. The fact that Kuhbander was arrested for the offense of
obstructing official business did nothing to further establish that point. Given
that the charge was dismissed almost immediately and does not appear to be
well grounded in Ohio law, the jury should not have been informed of
Kuhbander's arrest. See Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 933 N.E.24 1146 (Ohio App.
2010) (Defendant's refusal to provide police with his or his daughter's address
did not hamper police in the performance of their duties and as such was

insufficient to support conviction for obstructing official business).

 

‘The prejudicial nature of Kuhbander’s arrest for obstructing official
business easily outweighed its probative value. As such the trial court abused
its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of
Kuhbander’s arrest. It is possible that this error could be deemed harmless,
but when considered in conjunction with multiple other errors discussed
below, especially the suggestion that Kuhbander should be punished in
Kentucky for this “offense,” reversal is required.

‘As noted by the majority there were a series of errors committed by the
prosecution in this case including: 1) improper vouching for the victim during
closing argument; 2) suggesting during Kuhbander’s cross-examination that
the charge of obstructing official business had been dismissed due to his being

26
charged with a more serious felony sex offense in the case at bar—with the
clear implication that Kuhbander's punishment would be imposed in Kentucky
in the case the jury was considering; 3) shaming the jury to convict,
Kuhbander; and 4) improperly commenting on the facts of the case by arguing
that Sarah’s account of the abuse was not inconsistent, but rather evolved over
time.

However, in examining each of these errors individually, the majority
concluded that none of the errors undermined the essential fairness of
Kuhbander’s trial. Additionally, the majority determined that as a whole these
errors did not constitute palpable error. I disagree as the cumulative effect of
these errors denied Kuhbander a “fundamentally fair” trial.

‘The Brown Court in

 

iscussing the cumulative error doctrine noted that
“multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if
there cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” 313
S.W.3d at 631. See also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 n.15 (1978)
{Concluding that the cumulative effect of potentially damaging circumstances
violated the defendant's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness.);
Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir. 1983) (‘Errors that might not be
‘0 prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation of due process when considered
alone, may cumulatively produce a trial setting that is fundamentally unfair.”
‘The majority’s decision to not find cumulative error, despite a series of

errors, is similar to the issue raised in Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284 (6th
a7
Cir. 1988). In 1983, Cooper was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in
prison, Id. at 285. On appeal the Court affirmed Cooper's conviction and
sentence in an unpublished opinion. Id. However, in a dissent joined by
former Chief Justice Stephens, Justice Leibson argued that cumulative
evidentiary issues rendered Cooper's trial fundamentally unfair. id.
‘Subsequently, Cooper was denied a writ of habeas corpus from the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Id. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversed and issued the
writ, Id. at 288.

‘The Sixth Circuit explained that the trial court erred by permitting a
police officer to testify that all available evidence pointed to Cooper as the
perpetrator of the crime. Quoting from Justice Leibson's dissent, the Sixth
Circuit noted that “[t]he police officer was permitted to testify to his own,
personal opinion that such evidence as there was against other suspects was
insufficient to justify their arrest. . ... This opinion suggests to the jury the
guilt of the accused and the innocence of other suspects.” Id. at 287 (quoting
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 84-SC-494-MR at 2 (Ky. 1985) (Leibson, J.
dissenting). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit determined that this ‘opinion-
testimony had a direct influence on the jury’s consideration of [Cooper|’s guilt
or innocence.” Id.

Also, in overruling Cooper's objection to the police officer’s testimony, the
trial court explained that, “[hle can give an opinion, He is a police officer and

28
that is his job. He is an expert in that field.” Id, The trial court further noted
that the officer,

 

‘an expert on whether to arrest somebody or not.” Id. The
Sixth Circuit found that the trial court’s commentary about the officer being an
expert was impermissible as it invaded the province of the jury. Id. at 288. As
such, the Sixth Circuit determined that the “{trial] court’s comment was highly
prejudicial and ‘was tantamount to instructing the jury on this critical
subject.” Id. (quoting Cooper, at 2 (Leibson, J. dissenting).

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial court erred in
permitting a police informant to answer questions about the informant’s
“reliability,” to bolster his credibility. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held “that
when considered cumulatively, these errors produced a trial setting that was
fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 288 (citing Walker, 703 F.2d at 963}.

In the case at bar, the majority has affirmed Kuhbander’s conviction
despite a series of errors in his trial. While none of those errors was sufficient
to individually mandate reversal, their cumulative effect, as was the case in
Cooper, is sufficient to undermine confidence in the overall fairness of the
proceedings. As such, I would reverse Kuhbander's conviction for first-degree
sexual abuse and remand his case for a new trial untainted by these errors.

Minton, C.J.; and Venters, J., join.

29
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Brandon Neil Jewell

Assistant Public Advocate

Department of Public Advocacy

‘COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

‘Andy Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky
Nathan Todd Kolb

Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General

30