Title: Bloomfield v. Weakland

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  November 18, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEFAN D. BLOOMFIELD,
MOLLY M. BLOOMFIELD; RUTH H. BLOOMFIELD
and RICHARD ANDREW BLOOMFIELD,
trustee of the William M. and Ruth H. Bloomfield Trust
U/A dated July 9, 1980;
MILOSH POPOVICH,
trustee of the MILOSH Popovich Trust
dated January 29, 1991;
J. MICHAEL SCHWAB; STEVEN W. BROOKSHIRE;
ROBERT M. CORTRIGHT; JOSEPH S. CORTRIGHT;
CASCADIA INVESTMENT CO., LLC.
an Oregon limited liability company;
LIN L. CRAFT,
trustee of the Lin L. Craft Trust
dated December 23, 1998;
BRUCE G. BLAIN; PATRICIA A. BLAIN; JANET YARBROUGH;
DOKAY, LLC,
an Oregon limited liability company;
BLOOMFIELD ASSOCIATES,
a California limited partnership;
GARY J. JONES; SARAH D. WRIGHT;
KATHLEEN L. BUCHNER,
fka Kathleen Weswig;
and ROBERT DEAN JONES and HILDA M. JONES,
as trustees of the Hilda M. Jones Trust,
Respondents on Review,
v.
JEAN MARIE WEAKLAND,
Petitioner on Review.
SARAH K. CHARTZ
and BRIAN D. TOOLEY,
Respondents on Review,
v.
JEAN MARIE WEAKLAND,
Petitioner on Review.
JAN MARIE WEAKLAND
and MARGARET ANNE PATRICIA MONTGOMERY,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
CORINNE LABARRE;
VALERIE L. TADDA; LINDA L. CRAFT;
KAY NELSON; MARILYN J. THOMPSON;
LAWRENCE K. LABARRE,
Third-Party Defendants.
(CC 003480, 003497; CA A119891; SC S51768)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 11, 2005.
George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.
Thomas L. Gallagher, Corvallis, argued the cause and filed
the brief for respondents on review.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
*Appeal from Lincoln County Circuit Court, Charles P. Littlehales, Judge. 193 Or App 784, 92 P3d 749 (2004). 
GILLETTE, J.
The issue in this dispute involves alleged easements
appurtenant to certain subdivision lots.  Plaintiffs each claim
that he or she has a right to such an easement, and they brought
the present action against defendant for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief to establish that right.  Defendant asserts
that plaintiffs are barred from receiving the relief that they
seek on the ground of claim preclusion.  The trial court
concluded that plaintiffs' claims were not barred and granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the underlying merits
of the case (that is, respecting the existence of the easements). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court
concerning claim preclusion, but reversed the trial court's award
of summary judgment to plaintiffs on the merits and remanded the
case to the trial court.  Bloomfield v. Weakland, 193 Or App 784,
92 P3d 749 (2004).  Defendant sought review in this court only as
to the claim preclusion issue.  We allowed review and now affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals, albeit on a different
rationale.  
The facts pertinent to the claim preclusion issue are
not in dispute.  Since 1972, defendant has owned a parcel of
oceanfront property, Lot 14, in Sea Woods Park, a subdivision in
Waldport.  There is a 10-foot-wide walkway from a road to the
beach along the southwestern edge of defendant's property.  That
walkway is described on the Sea Woods Park subdivision plat,
recorded in 1957, as a "private walkway."  From the time that she
bought Lot 14 until about 1991, defendant permitted owners of
other lots in the subdivision to use the walkway for access to
the beach.  However, in 1991, a stairway that was located on the
walkway partly washed away and, from that time on, defendant has
refused to permit anyone other than the owners of Lots 5 and 6 --
the lots immediately to the south of Lot 14 -- to use the
walkway.
In 1993, the owners of other lots in the Sea Woods Park
subdivision formed Sea Woods Park, Inc. (SWPI), a nonprofit
corporation, for the purpose of bringing legal action to secure a
right for all lot owners in the subdivision to use the walkway on
defendant's property for access to the beach.  In 1994, SWPI
brought a declaratory judgment and injunction action in Lincoln
County Circuit Court against defendant for that purpose.  The
complaint alleged that certain acts of the common grantors of the
Sea Woods Park subdivision lots -- specifically, in first
recording a plat in 1957 that showed a "private walkway" and then
in conveying deeds that referred to that plat -- constituted a
private dedication and grant of easements over the private
walkway on Lot 14.  Alternatively, the complaint alleged that the
members of SWPI had a prescriptive easement over the walkway by
virtue of their continuous, open, notorious, and hostile use of
the walkway for a period in excess of ten years.  SWPI also
sought to enjoin defendant from interfering with its members' use
of the walkway.  
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that
SWPI did not have standing to bring the action.  The trial court
agreed that SWPI was not a real party in interest because it did
not have an ownership interest in any property in the
subdivision.  The court therefore granted defendant's motion. 
However, the court gave leave for the real parties in interest,
the other property owners in the Sea Woods Park subdivision, to
join the litigation.
Only Lin Craft, the owner of Lot 5, chose to accept the
trial court's invitation and join the 1994 litigation as a
plaintiff.\fn,1\  Craft filed a complaint that was identical in
all material respects to the complaint that SWPI had filed
earlier.  That is, Craft alleged that she had an easement that
entitled her to use the walkway across Lot 14, which arose out of
a private dedication when the plat was recorded in 1957, or,
alternatively, arose by prescription.  By way of relief, Craft
sought not only the right to use the walkway herself but also the
right to assign that use to the other property owners in the Sea
Woods Park subdivision.  Although none of the other members of
SWPI personally joined the litigation, SWPI and its members
supported Craft throughout the litigation by paying her legal
fees, tracking the progress of the action, and actively
participating in litigation strategy and settlement decisions.   
Ultimately, the trial court ruled in Craft's favor, but
on a very narrow ground.  Specifically, the court held that Craft
had an easement appurtenant to Lot 5 by virtue of express wording
in the deed conveying that property and Lot 6 to Craft's parents,
Craft's predecessors in interest.  That 1955 deed described the
property that now is known as Lots 5 and 6 by metes and bounds,
and included the following:  "Also an easement for ingress and
egress over and across a 10-foot strip of land adjoining and
adjacent to the north of the above described premises."  Having
reached that conclusion, the court observed that it did not need
to decide whether Craft or anyone else had a right to use the
walkway by virtue of the designation on the plat of the ten-foot
strip at the southwesterly edge of Lot 14 as a "private walkway." 
For the same reason, the court declined to make any findings
pertaining to the existence of an easement by prescription. 
Finally, the court held that Craft's express easement ran in
favor of Lots 5 and 6 and benefitted other members of the
subdivision only to the extent that they were the owners of or
guests of the owners of Lots 5 and 6.  The court ruled that Craft
could not assign her right to use the easement to others in the
subdivision unless she also assigned to such persons her interest
in the property to which that easement was appurtenant.  Finally,
the court enjoined defendant from interfering with Craft's use of
the easement.  Defendant appealed those rulings, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed without opinion.  Craft v. Weakland, 145 Or App
482, 928 P2d 366 (1996). 
In 2000, plaintiffs filed the complaint in the present
case.  Plaintiffs include most of the present owners of lots in
the Sea Woods Park subdivision, several of whom were members of
SWPI when the earlier complaints were filed.\fn,2\  Among the
plaintiffs is Craft, the plaintiff in the 1994 action.\fn,3\  
Both sides moved for summary judgment.  Plaintiffs
sought summary judgment on the merits, arguing that the
undisputed facts established the existence of implied easements
to use the walkway appurtenant to each of their lots.  Defendant
based her motion on a contention that all the plaintiffs in the
present case are barred from prosecuting an action for an
easement against her under the doctrine of claim preclusion.  The
trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment and
entered a judgment and decree granting declaratory relief to
plaintiffs.  The court ruled that each plaintiff has a perpetual
easement by implication for ingress and egress to the Pacific
Ocean arising out of the reference to the private walkway on the
Sea Woods Park subdivision plat.  The court further enjoined
defendant from interfering with plaintiffs' use of the easements. 
As noted, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
That court affirmed the trial court's ruling on defendant's
summary judgment motion, concluding that plaintiffs in the
instant case were not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion
from bringing the present action against defendant.  However, the
Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that there were genuine
issues of material fact that the court could not resolve on
summary judgment with respect to, among other things, the
existence of implied easements in favor of the owners of lots
(other than Lots 5 and 6) in the Sea Woods Park subdivision. 
Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor
of plaintiffs and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.  Bloomfield, 193 Or App at 798-99. 
The only issue before this court is whether the
doctrine of claim preclusion prevents plaintiffs from bringing
the present action.  The doctrine of claim preclusion, formerly
known as res judicata, generally prohibits a party from
relitigating the same claim or splitting a claim into multiple
actions against the same opponent.  As this court stated in
Rennie v. Freeway Transport, 294 Or 319, 323, 656 P2d 919 (1982), 
"a plaintiff who has prosecuted one action against a
defendant through to a final judgment binding on the
parties is barred on res judicata grounds from
prosecuting another action against the same defendant
where the claim in the second action is one which is
based on the same factual transaction that was at issue
in the first, seeks a remedy additional or alternative
to the one sought earlier, and is of such a nature as
could have been joined in the first action."  
See also Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 140-41, 795 P2d 531
(1990) (to same effect).  The rule forecloses a party that has
litigated a claim against another from further litigation on that
same claim on any ground or theory of relief that the party could
have litigated in the first instance.  Dean v. Exotic Veneers,
Inc., 271 Or 188, 194, 531 P2d 266 (1975).  Accordingly, the
doctrine of claim preclusion bars plaintiffs' claims in the
present action if those claims are parts of the same claim that
Craft litigated in the 1994 action. 
This court also has held that a person who was not a
party to an earlier action but who was in "privity" with a party
to that earlier action also can be barred on claim preclusion
grounds from bringing a second action.  See Kelley v. Mallory,
202 Or 690, 705, 277 P2d 767 (1954) (so stating); see also Crow
v. Abraham, 86 Or 99, 105, 167 P 590 (1917) (to same effect).  An
inherent limitation on using the concept of privity in such
circumstances, however, is a concern about the fairness of
binding a person to a judgment rendered in an earlier case in
which he or she was not a party.  As this court stated in Wolff
v. Du Puis, 233 Or 317, 321, 378 P2d 707 (1963), privity "is
merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one
who is a party on the record and another is close enough to
include the other within the res judicata."  And that
relationship is "close enough" for purposes of preventing the
third party from pursuing claims in a second trial "only when it
is realistic to say that the third party was fully protected in
the first trial."\fn,4\  Id. at 322.  Thus, even if the present
plaintiffs can be said to have been in privity with Craft in the
earlier litigation, claim preclusion will not operate to bar
their claims in the present action unless it is fundamentally
fair to do so.\fn,5\  
With the foregoing general considerations in mind, we
turn to the present case.  On review, defendant continues to
press her argument that both the 1994 Craft litigation and the
present action present the same claim.  As defendant puts it,
both Craft and the present plaintiffs claim a right to the same
implied easement, both Craft and the present plaintiffs filed an
action to have that easement recognized by the court, both Craft
and the present plaintiffs used the same facts and legal
reasoning to support their claims, and the present plaintiffs
controlled the earlier litigation, with both Craft and the
present plaintiffs treating Craft as pursuing the 1994 litigation
on behalf of the entire group.  The Court of Appeals agreed with
defendant that the claims raised in both cases were the same
because "the underlying factual bases for the claim in the
earlier proceeding were the same as those involved in the current
claim."  Bloomfield, 193 Or App at 793.
However, the Court of Appeals nonetheless ruled that
claim preclusion does not operate to bar plaintiffs' claims
because plaintiffs were not in privity with Craft in the earlier
litigation.  Id. at 793-95.  In reaching that conclusion, the
court first held that, as a matter of law, control over
litigation is a basis for privity only in the context of issue
preclusion and not in the context of claim preclusion;\fn,6\
accordingly, the court held, the fact that the present plaintiffs
controlled the earlier litigation does not establish privity in
this case.  Second, the Court of Appeals held that Craft did not
adequately represent the interests of the other plaintiffs in the
earlier litigation because the source of the easement appurtenant
to Lot 5 was the express grant in Craft's parents' deed, whereas
the other plaintiffs' claims depended on the existence of an
implied easement arising out of the subdivision plat.  Id. 
Defendant challenges the Court of Appeals' application
of the concept of privity, but we are of the view that we need
not discuss that concept further because we conclude that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs' present claim
is the same one that Craft pursued in the 1994 litigation. 
As this court observed in Peterson v. Temple, 323 Or
322, 330, 918 P2d 413 (1996), no statute defines the term "claim"
for purposes of applying the rule against splitting a claim, but
this court consistently has applied a broad definition of that
term for that purpose.  For example, in Troutman v. Erlandson,
287 Or 187, 201, 598 P2d 1211 (1979), this court stated that,
"[f]or res judicata purposes, a 'claim' or 'cause of action' * *
* [means] a group of facts which entitled plaintiff to relief." 
In addition, as discussed above, in Rennie, this court stated
that claim preclusion applies with respect to all or part of the
transaction, or connected series of transactions, out of which
the first action or proceeding arose, where the claim in the
second action seeks a remedy in addition or as an alternative to
the one sought earlier and the claim is of such a nature that it
could have been joined in the first action.  294 Or at 323.
The Court of Appeals viewed the conveyances in the
1950s of deeds to lots in the Sea Woods Park subdivision as a
connected series of transactions.  The court then concluded,
based on that view of the facts, that the claims of the present
plaintiffs in this litigation are the same as the claim Craft
asserted in the 1994 action.  However, that analysis overlooks
the fact that that "connected series of transactions" did not
entitle Craft herself to more relief than she actually obtained
in the 1994 case.\fn,7\  Craft had no legally cognizable interest
in any lot in the Sea Woods Park subdivision that she did not
own.  Accordingly, in the 1994 action, Craft was no more entitled
than was SWPI to bring implied easement claims on behalf of the
nonparty owners of lots in the Sea Woods Park subdivision.  It
follows that the trial court in the 1994 action lacked authority
to award Craft easements appurtenant to lots that she did not
own.\fn,8\  That is, the only relief that the trial court could
have granted to Craft on her claim in the 1994 litigation was an
easement appurtenant to the lot that she in fact owned.  The
claims of other lot owners for easements appurtenant to their
lots were -- and remain -- separate from Craft's claim; Craft
never had the ability to protect the interests of the present
plaintiffs during the earlier action.\fn,9\  It follows that the
present action does not involve a single claim that plaintiffs
split improperly, and the doctrine of claim preclusion does not
bar it. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. Craft also owns several other lots in Sea Woods Park,
Inc., including part of Lot 6, which, as noted, is located
immediately to the south of defendant's Lot 14.  However, in her
1994 complaint, Craft sought relief solely in her capacity as
owner of Lot 5 of the Sea Woods Park subdivision.  
2. Other plaintiffs in this action are the successors in
interest to individuals who were members of SWPI when the earlier
complaints were filed.  Two of the present plaintiffs, owners of
Lot 4, did not own that property in 1993 and filed a separate
action.  Both actions were consolidated in the trial court. 
3. In this case, Craft, in her capacity as trustee of the
"Lin L. Craft Trust," created in 1998, seeks a declaration of
easements appurtenant to the other lots that she owns in the Sea
Woods Park subdivision.  
4. Although Wolff involved issue preclusion (rather than
claim preclusion), we perceive no basis for a different rule
respecting claim preclusion, particularly given the more drastic
consequence to a party faced with application of the claim
preclusion doctrine. 
5. The parties make no separate argument concerning
whether the doctrine of claim preclusion would bar Craft, as a
plaintiff in both the 1994 litigation and in the instant case,
from pursuing her claims in this proceeding even if the other
plaintiffs in this proceeding are not so barred.  We therefore do
not address that question. 
6. In support of that proposition, the Court of Appeals
relied on its own earlier decision in Ditton v. Bowernman, 117 Or
App 483, 487, 844 P2d 919 (1992), rev den, 316 Or 527 (1993),
which, in turn, relied on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments  § 39 (1982).  The Restatement explains that a person who controls
litigation on behalf of another person is bound only by the
determination of issues actually litigated in the first action. 
That sort of bar is known as issue preclusion.  The commentary
explains that that rule "applies to issue preclusion, and not to
claim preclusion, because the person controlling the litigation,
as a non-party, is by definition asserting or defending a claim
other than one he himself may have."  Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 39 comment b. 
We note in passing that this court held to the contrary
in Carter v. LaDee Logging Co., 142 Or 439, 455-56, 18 P2d 234
(1933) (persons not nominal parties to litigation may so connect
themselves through active participation and control of litigation
that the result of the litigation is conclusive against them to
same extent as if they were nominal party to action).
7. Again, we emphasize that the parties do not argue, and
we do not decide, whether claim preclusion bars Craft herself
from participating in the instant case, in light of the fact
that, at the time of the earlier litigation, Craft owned all the
lots for which she now seeks easements.  
8. Moreover, that earlier action was one for declaratory
judgment.  ORS 28.110 requires joinder in such cases of all
persons who have any claim or interest that might be affected by
the declaration and provides that "no declaration shall prejudice
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding."  It may be
that any of the parties to the 1994 litigation -- Craft or
defendant -- properly could have impleaded these plaintiffs (or
their predecessors in interest) in that earlier litigation, but
none did so.  And, because they were not parties, plaintiffs
cannot suffer prejudice from the declaratory ruling that the
trial judge entered in that case. 
9. As noted above, defendant argued that the plaintiffs'
claims in the two cases were identical because all the plaintiffs
were seeking "the same implied easement" to use defendant's
walkway.  However, as is evident from the text above, the
easements at issue in this case, if they exist at all, are
appurtenant to and run with the lots themselves; they do not
represent a right that belongs to a particular individual.  Thus,
the fact that one lot includes an easement to use defendant's
walkway does not necessarily mean that any other lot includes a
similar easement.