Title: D.Staley and D.Staley, his wife, K. Sturgeon, E. Boyle, B. Hermansky, B. Bennett, V. Bennett, F. Haushalter, S. Syzmoniak, W. Somar, D. Sturm, T. Sturm, his wife, K. Cole, C. Best, M. Salopek and C. Salopek, his wife, V. Badamo and J. Badamo, aplts. v. B. Bouril d/b/a Bouril Mobile Home (Dissenting Opinion)

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

[J-78-98] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT DAVID STALEY AND DIANE STALEY, HIS WIFE, KURT STURGEON, EDWARD BOYLE, BONNIE HERMANSKY, BRENDA BENNETT, VIVIAN BENNETT, FRED HAUSEHALTER, SUSAN SYZMONIAK, WAYNE SOMAR, CAROL DELUIGI, GORDON SOMAR, DAVID STURM AND TERRI STURM, HIS WIFE, KERRYANN COLE, CLAYTON BEST, MARK SALOPEK AND CYNTHIA SALOPEK, HIS WIFE, VINCE BADAMO AND JOAN BADAMO, HIS WIFE, Appellants v. BEATRICE BOURIL D/B/A BOURIL MOBILE HOME COURT, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 0086 W.D. Appeal Docket 1997 Appeal from the Order of Superior Court entered June 3, 1997 at No. 2213PGH96 affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Civil Division, entered October 30, 1996 at No. 10786 of 1995. SUBMITTED: March 11, 1998 DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE ZAPPALA DECIDED: OCTOBER 1, 1998 Because I find that the implied warranty of habitability is an inappropriate basis for the relief being sought by the Tenants, I respectfully dissent. The rationale we applied in adopting the implied warranty of habitability in Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979), does not support the majority’s decision to expand the implied warranty to include lots in mobile home parks. Also, because the Tenants could proceed under a simple breach of contract claim, it is neither necessary nor prudent for us to recognize a cause of [J-78-98] - 2 action based on the amorphous concept of a “limited” implied warranty of habitability, which, as the majority recognizes, “leave[s] it to the trial court to determine the scope of the Landlord’s limited implied warranty of habitability; the extent, if any, to which the Landlord breached the warranty; whether the Tenants gave the Landlord adequate notice of the problems; and the remedies, if any, to which the Tenants are entitled.” Majority Opinion at 6 n. 2. A traditional breach of contract claim would resolve the dispute expeditiously without implicating such a host of additional issues. As the majority recognizes, our “primary rationale” for adopting the implied warranty of habitability in Pugh was that “the modern tenant is not interested in land, but rather bargains for a dwelling house suitable for habitation.” Id. at 3 (quoting Pugh, at 282, 405 A.2d at 902). My reason for concluding that this rationale does not support the expansion of the implied warranty to include land leased to mobile home owners can hardly be articulated any clearer than through the majority’s very own words: “Tenants’ lease is intended primarily to convey an interest in a plot of land, albeit with some improvements, and has nothing to do with the dwelling structure that sits on top of it.” Majority Op. at 4 (emphasis added). The Tenants’ injuries can be redressed in an action alleging that the Lessor breached its contractual duty to provide the Tenants with the accommodations necessary to adequately maintain their mobile homes on the land that they were leasing. We need not acknowledge a novel basis for recovery such as a “limited” implied warranty of habitability to compensate for the Tenants’ failure to pursue such a claim. As Superior Court noted, “the implied warranty of habitability recognizes that ‘the modern tenant is not interested in land, but rather bargains for a dwelling house suitable for habitation….In this case, land, not housing, was the focus of the parties’ bargains.” Superior Court Memorandum at 4-5 (quoting Pugh, at 282, 405 A.2d at 901-902). The only dwellings relevant to this suit are those that were brought by the individual Tenants themselves, and [J-78-98] - 3 were placed on the plots of land that are the subject matter of the contracts between the Landlord and each individual Tenant. Thus, I would affirm the orders of the lower courts. Mr. Justice Castille joins in the dissenting opinion.