Title: Commonwealth v. Almeida

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12179 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARCELO ALMEIDA. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     January 9, 2018. - May 17, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Prior inconsistent 
statement, Consciousness of guilt.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 19, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
 
Amy M. Belger for the defendant. 
 
Audrey Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The defendant, Marcelo Almeida, stabbed the 
victim numerous times with a knife, causing her death.  After a 
jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. 
 
In his appeal, the defendant claims that reversal of his 
2 
 
conviction is required because the judge erred by (1) allowing 
evidence of a prior bad act in which the defendant waited 
outside the victim's bathroom with a knife and later stated that 
he would have killed her if she opened the door; (2) permitting 
the prosecutor to comment in her closing argument on omissions 
in the defendant's statement to a police officer, which the 
defendant contends were not inconsistent with the defendant's 
trial testimony and were caused by the officer's statements that 
he should discontinue speaking with police officers; and (3) 
failing to provide sua sponte a jury instruction addressing the 
omissions, and providing, over the defendant's objection, a 
consciousness of guilt instruction.  For the reasons stated 
below, we conclude that the trial judge did not err.  After a 
thorough review of the record, we also decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or set aside the 
verdict of murder in the first degree.  Therefore, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the 
legal issues. 
 
The defendant and victim were involved in a relationship 
together.  Both came to the United States from Brazil and lived 
with a mutual friend, Lucas Ferreira, in an apartment in 
Marshfield.  The defendant and victim also had a child together, 
3 
 
who lived in Brazil with the child's grandmother. 
 
In the summer of 2011, trouble within the relationship 
escalated as the defendant and the victim fought verbally on 
numerous occasions.  In July, 2011, while living with the 
defendant, the victim and the defendant engaged in a fight that 
resulted in the victim locking herself in the apartment 
bathroom.  The defendant then knocked on the door and banged his 
head against a wall, telling the victim to open the door.  After 
this incident, the victim left the defendant's apartment and 
moved into her aunt's house.  The next day, the defendant 
telephoned a mutual friend and said, "[T]hank God [the victim] 
didn't open the door because I would have kill[ed] her because I 
had a knife in my hand."  The defendant also told another mutual 
friend about the incident, stating that when the victim was in 
the bathroom, he "took a knife" and "was going to kill her." 
 
In late July and August, 2011, while the victim was living 
with her aunt, the defendant repeatedly telephoned the victim, 
asking the victim to move back into his apartment.  In one 
telephone call with the victim, the aunt overheard, on 
speakerphone, the defendant say that if the victim did not 
return, he "would kill her" and her mother and their son in 
Brazil.  In another telephone call directly to the aunt, the 
defendant said "he wanted [the victim] to return, and if she 
didn't return, he would kill her." 
4 
 
 
In late August, 2011, after living with her aunt for 
approximately three weeks, the victim moved back into the 
defendant's apartment.  Approximately two weeks later, the 
defendant and victim had another argument during which the 
defendant took the victim's belongings, threw them into the 
living room of the apartment, and told the victim to leave, 
stating that "he didn't want her anymore." 
 
Following this argument, the victim once again moved out of 
the defendant's apartment and moved into her friend's apartment, 
which was located downstairs in the same apartment building.  
While the victim was moving into her friend's apartment, the 
defendant saw the victim and called her names including "snake" 
and "prostitute." 
 
After the victim's move, the defendant continued to contact 
the victim every day, often calling the victim on the telephone 
more than ten times a day.  Sometimes the victim would answer; 
most of the time she did not.  During this time, the defendant 
frequently telephoned mutual friends, as well as the victim's 
mother, who still lived in Brazil.  In one of the telephone 
calls to the victim's mother, the defendant threatened to kill 
the victim, stating that he "was going to buy a gun to kill 
her," but then that he would kill her with a knife.  Despite 
these statements, the defendant repeatedly tried to convince the 
victim and others that he loved the victim and wanted the victim 
5 
 
to move back in with him. 
 
On the Saturday before the victim's death, which was 
approximately three weeks after the victim moved into her 
friend's apartment, the defendant invited the victim to go to a 
rodeo with him, but the victim declined.  The next day, Sunday, 
September 25, the defendant saw the victim at a friend's house 
and again asked if she would attend the rodeo with him.  The 
victim told the defendant to "go on with his life" and that 
their relationship "would not work out."  That day, the victim 
went to the rodeo with two other men. 
 
The defendant remained at the friend's house, where he 
consumed more than twelve beers.  Additionally, the defendant 
testified that he consumed cocaine that night for the first 
time.  While at the house, the defendant went outside with his 
housemate, Ferreira, and explained that the victim had lied to 
him about going to the rodeo.  The defendant then told Ferreira 
that he was "going to do something crazy" and that "he felt like 
killing [the victim]," repeating this statement more than once.  
The defendant also stated that "what he was going to do, not 
even his own mother would forgive him" and that "he knew that he 
would never see his son and that his family [would] never 
forgive him."  In response, Ferreira said that "there was no 
need for [the defendant] to do that, he had a beautiful son, 
that [the victim] is from a good family."  The defendant replied 
6 
 
that he "could not promise."  At trial, Ferreira testified that 
he had no difficulty in understanding the defendant, and that 
the defendant appeared agitated, sad, and "pissed off." 
 
That same afternoon, the defendant made a telephone call to 
a mutual friend of the victim, telling the friend, "Thank you 
very much.  Thank you for everything.  Thank you very much for 
everything.  I'm sorry.  Thank you and I'm sorry."  On hearing 
this statement from the defendant, the friend tried telephoning 
the victim five times, but she was unsuccessful. 
 
Later that evening, the defendant attempted to find the 
victim and speak with her.  Unable to find the victim, the 
defendant telephoned the victim 232 times throughout the night, 
but never spoke to her. 
 
The next day, Monday, September 26, the defendant saw the 
victim at the apartment building.  As the victim was leaving for 
work, the defendant stabbed the victim eleven times, causing the 
victim's death.  An autopsy of the victim revealed that the 
victim suffered numerous stab wounds with a sharp object, 
leading to severe blood loss and the death of the victim.1 
                                                 
 
1 During the autopsy, a sexual assault kit detected sperm 
cells on the victim, indicating that the victim had had sexual 
relations.  The evidence was admitted through the testimony of 
the forensic scientist who analyzed the sexual assault kit.  The 
trial judge initially did not allow the evidence of the results 
of the sexual assault kit, as the evidence was not relevant.  
The defendant then testified that the victim told him she had 
 
7 
 
 
After stabbing the victim with a knife, the defendant 
sliced his neck, threw the knife into the stairwell, and 
proceeded back to his apartment.  Following this, the defendant 
obtained another knife from his apartment and then proceeded out 
of the apartment.  The defendant headed towards the exit of the 
apartment building and passed by two friends telling them that 
he "killed [the victim]" and that he "did it for love."  He then 
left the apartment building carrying the second knife, which he 
used to stab himself in an attempted suicide.  The defendant 
subsequently ran into nearby woods and discarded the knife.  The 
defendant was later found in a shed by the State police and 
handcuffed.  While in custody, the defendant was transported to 
a local hospital to treat his injuries. 
 
At the hospital, the defendant was guarded by State police 
Troopers Robert Lima and Brian Galvin and had one wrist 
handcuffed to the hospital bed.  Soon after entering the 
defendant's hospital room, Lima read the defendant the Miranda 
rights in Portuguese, the defendant's native language.  The 
defendant signed the Portuguese-translated Miranda form.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
been with another man, prompting the prosecutor to renew the 
request to admit the evidence.  The judge subsequently 
determined that the fact that sperm was found was relevant, but 
only because it was probative as to whether the victim said she 
had sexual relations with another man.  Because of this, the 
judge limited admission of the evidence solely to the fact that 
sperm was found. 
8 
 
defendant then told Lima that he would talk.  In response, Lima, 
in Portuguese, told the defendant that Galvin had spoken with 
the defendant's attorney, who advised the defendant not to 
speak.  The defendant then said he did not want to make any 
statements. 
 
Approximately one-half hour after receiving the Miranda 
warnings, the defendant began speaking to Lima in broken 
English.  The defendant talked about his brother in Brazil and 
his deceased sister and that he had twelve siblings.  The 
defendant stated that he worked at a pizza shop and loved living 
in the United States.  Then speaking in Portuguese, the 
defendant told Lima that he has multiple children, "one of which 
doesn't even know him," and then stated, "[W]hat did I go do . . 
. .  I killed my woman."  Lima testified that the defendant was 
upset and began crying.  In response, Lima told the defendant to 
stop talking, reminded the defendant in Portuguese that the 
defendant had been read his rights, and reminded the defendant 
that he, Lima, was a police officer.  After this statement, the 
defendant said he "just wanted to talk to [Lima]."  Lima 
testified that the defendant appeared very alert and cognizant 
of his surroundings and that he was aware of what he was saying.  
Lima estimated that the exchange with the defendant lasted 
approximately two to three minutes. 
 
Regarding the interaction between Lima and the defendant, 
9 
 
defense counsel asked Lima on cross-examination: 
Q.:  "So did [the defendant] ever tell you when he did this 
act to his girlfriend?" 
 
A.:  "No, sir." 
 
Q.:  "Or how he did this act to his girlfriend?" 
 
A.:  "He did not."  
 
Q.:  "Or why he did this act to his girlfriend?" 
 
A.:  "He did not." 
 
Then in closing argument at trial, the prosecution 
commented on the defendant's exchange with Lima, arguing: 
 
"And then he tells him, what did I do?  I killed my 
woman.  Don't hear anything at that time about because she 
cheated on me.  Don't hear anything about because she told 
me she had sex with another man or that she'd been with 
another man.  Don't hear any of that in that moment." 
 
 
The defendant testified at trial.  He stated that he loved 
the victim and knew he "lost [his] life" as a consequence of his 
actions.  The defendant testified that while arguments occurred 
between him and the victim, the fights were never physical.  
When questioned about the bathroom incident, the defendant 
conceded that he banged his head against the wall, but denied 
having a knife. 
 
The defendant testified that, on the day the victim died, 
the victim knocked on the defendant's apartment door, and the 
victim and defendant proceeded to walk downstairs towards the 
building exit together.  The defendant believed that the victim 
10 
 
was going to leave for work without talking to him, so the 
defendant went back to his apartment and got a knife.  The 
defendant testified that he got the knife in order to slash the 
victim's tires so that she could not leave and would therefore 
talk to him.  The defendant returned to the stairway with the 
knife.  The defendant testified that the victim told him she did 
not love him anymore and that she had been with another man.  
The defendant testified that, on hearing this statement, he 
stabbed the victim numerous times. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Admission of prior bad act evidence.  At 
trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of the evidence 
of the incident in which the defendant held a knife outside the 
bathroom door of the victim.  It was the day after this incident 
that the defendant called a friend and said, "[T]hank God [the 
victim] didn't open the door because I would have kill[ed] her 
because I had a knife in my hand."  At trial, the basis for the 
objection to the bathroom incident evidence was improper 
foundation.  The defendant now contends that this prior bad act 
evidence should not have been admitted, as its probative value 
was outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. 
 
As the grounds for objection on this issue that were raised 
on appeal differ from the objection made at trial, the standard 
of review that applies to this claim is whether there was a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
11 
 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 473 n.12 (1998) (error 
objected to on ground different from that raised on appeal; 
proper standard of review is substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice).  We discern no error. 
 
"Evidence of a defendant's prior or subsequent bad acts is 
inadmissible for the purpose of demonstrating the defendant's 
bad character or propensity to commit the crimes charged."  
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2018).  "However, such evidence may be 
admissible for some other purpose, for instance, 'to establish 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or pattern of operation.'"  Crayton, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 613 (2011).  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b)(2).  "Even if the evidence is relevant to one of 
these other purposes, the evidence will not be admitted if its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant."  Crayton, supra.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2). 
 
Here, the evidence of the defendant holding a knife outside 
the bathroom door is highly probative of the hostile 
relationship between the victim and the defendant, and his state 
of mind.  See Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 575 (2005) 
(prior bad act evidence properly admitted to show hostile nature 
of relationship); Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 744 
12 
 
(1989), S.C., 412 Mass. 172 (1992) (prior bad act evidence 
admissible to show relationship between defendant and victim).  
The evidence shows that the victim and the defendant had a 
continuously hostile relationship with numerous arguments. 
 
The evidence also reveals the defendant's intent, as even 
he connected the bathroom knife incident to an intention to kill 
the victim, telling friends that he would have killed the victim 
with a knife.  See Commonwealth v. Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 56 
(2016) (prior bad act evidence properly admitted to show 
defendant's intent).  Finally, this evidence was relevant to 
whether the defendant had an intention to kill the victim 
regardless of whether he had been informed that she had been 
with another man.2  Such evidence was thus relevant to the 
critical issue of premeditation or provocation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 440 Mass. 84, 87-88 (2003) (prior bad act 
evidence admissible to show hostile nature toward victim and 
premeditation of subsequent killing); Commonwealth v. 
McGeoghean, 412 Mass. 839, 841, 844 (1992) (prior bad act 
evidence admissible to show intent, supporting finding of 
premeditation). 
 
The judge also provided a limiting instruction to the jury 
                                                 
 
2 At trial, the defense argued that the defendant was 
provoked by the victim in an attempt to mitigate the charge of 
murder in the first degree. 
 
13 
 
regarding the prior bad act evidence when it was offered and 
again in his final charge, thus minimizing any prejudicial 
effect.3  See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 480 (2014) 
(no error in admission of prior bad act evidence where, among 
other things, jury instructions minimized potential for 
prejudicial effect); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 
(2000) (proper jury instructions can render potentially 
prejudicial evidence harmless). 
 
We therefore conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting the evidence of the prior bad act. 
 
2.  Use of post-Miranda statements and omissions.  In the 
                                                 
 
3 The judge provided the following contemporaneous limiting 
instruction: 
 
 
"We just had some testimony about a prior incident 
between [the victim] and the defendant in which the 
defendant, according to this witness, had a knife and 
indicated that he felt that he could use it.  That evidence 
is not admitted for the purpose of proving that the 
defendant had a criminal propensity, a propensity to commit 
crimes.  It's being admitted solely to give you, the 
jurors, an understanding of the relationship between [the 
victim] and the defendant." 
 
 
Prior to jury deliberations, the judge again provided a 
limiting instruction regarding the prior bad act: 
 
 
"You may not take that evidence as a substitute for 
proof that the defendant committed the crime charged; that 
is, the murder.  Nor may you consider it as proof that the 
defendant has a criminal personality or bad character.  
However, you may consider it solely for the limited purpose 
of understanding the nature of the defendant's relationship 
with [the victim] at the time of the alleged murder.  You 
may not consider this evidence for any other purpose." 
14 
 
instant case, the defendant voluntarily made statements to Lima 
after receiving Miranda warnings.  Those statements were made 
spontaneously and not in response to interrogation.  
Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 456 Mass. 411, 420, (2010), S.C., 460 
Mass. 723 (2011).  Finally, those statements were inconsistent 
with the defendant's trial testimony, as facts alleged at trial 
were omitted from the prior statements. 
 
  The defendant challenges the propriety of the following 
portion of the prosecutor's closing argument: 
 
"And then he tells him, what did I do?  I killed my 
woman.  Don't hear anything at that time about because she 
cheated on me.  Don't hear anything about because she told 
me she had sex with another man or that she'd been with 
another man.  Don't hear any of that in that moment." 
 
"[W]here, as here, a defendant voluntarily makes post-
Miranda statements, and then testifies at trial, in order to 
expose inconsistencies and differences in testimony, a 
prosecutor may inquire into [and comment on] 'the omission[s] 
from a [defendant's] pretrial statement[s] where it would have 
been natural to include the omitted fact[s].'"  Commonwealth v. 
Guy, 441 Mass. 96, 106 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
425 Mass. 633, 639 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 
683, 699 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 39 Mass. App. 
Ct. 70, 72 (1995) (omission from earlier statement may be used 
to impeach witness when "[the] omission from the earlier 
statement is inconsistent with a later statement of fact" and 
15 
 
"it would have been natural to include the fact in the initial 
statement").  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 613(a).4 
The defendant contends, nonetheless, that the prosecutor 
should not have been permitted to comment on what the defendant 
did not say because as soon as the defendant confessed to 
killing the victim, Lima told the defendant to stop talking.  
The defendant further contends that the reason the defendant 
killed the victim would not naturally have been said in these 
circumstances to Lima and that, therefore, nothing the defendant 
voluntarily said or did not say was incompatible with his trial 
testimony. 
We disagree.  Despite numerous warnings, the defendant 
spoke freely; he was, in the words of the prosecutor, a 
"talker."  As exemplified by his numerous statements to his 
friends, he regularly spoke what was on his mind regardless of 
the consequences.  At the hospital, the defendant also appeared 
to be reaching out to Lima, speaking with Lima about various 
subjects, including the defendant's family in Brazil, 
particularly his brother who was a police officer; his current 
                                                 
4 The defendant also challenges various statements made by 
the prosecutor during closing argument, including misstatements 
of fact and improper requests to the jury to consider what they 
heard while on the view of the murder scene.  To the extent that 
the prosecutor did make improper remarks during closing 
argument, the judge addressed these issues during the jury 
charge, providing curative instructions to the jury. 
16 
 
employment; his love for and residence in the United States for 
five years; and his children, including a son that did not know 
him.  Even following a second warning given by Lima about the 
right to remain silent, the defendant still spoke, stating that 
he "just wanted to talk." 
In these circumstances, if the killing was provoked as a 
result of the defendant learning that the victim had "been with 
another man," it is reasonable to infer that the time the 
defendant would have made this known was when the defendant made 
his statement to the police.  See Commonwealth v. Donovan, 58 
Mass. App. Ct. 631, 639 (2003).  The defendant's statements were 
extensive enough to make the absence of any discussion about the 
defendant's alleged provocation conspicuous.  Id.  It was in 
this expansive context that the defendant said, "[W]hat did I go 
do . . . .  I killed my woman."  Therefore, it was not improper 
for the prosecutor to comment on this significant omission and 
draw the jury's attention to these inconsistencies, especially 
given the theory that the defense presented in closing argument.5 
Even if improper, the prosecutor's comments would not have 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
The Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of the 
                                                 
 
5 We note that only defense counsel inquired as to what was 
not said by the defendant in his cross-examination of Lima.  The 
issue was thus first raised by the defense. 
17 
 
defendant's premeditation.  The defendant, on numerous occasions 
over the course of several months and the days leading up to the 
murder, told family and friends of the victim that he wanted to 
kill the victim; that "what he was going to do, not even his own 
mother would forgive"; and that he "was going to do something 
crazy."  This included the previous knife incident in the 
bathroom.  All of these statements were made prior to the 
defendant's alleged knowledge that the victim had been with 
another man.  Consequently, the prosecutor's comments on the 
omission, even if improper, would not have changed the jury's 
finding that the killing was the result of the defendant's 
preexisting intent to kill.  See Commonwealth v. Littles, 477 
Mass. 382, 391 (2017) (even where there was error in jury 
instruction, error was found harmless when juxtaposed to 
strength of Commonwealth's case). 
 
3.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues that it was 
error for the trial judge to (1) fail to give sua sponte an 
instruction on impeachment by prior omission as part of the 
prior inconsistent statement instruction and (2) give a 
consciousness of guilt instruction.  We address each in turn. 
 
a.  Impeachment by prior omission.  Because there was no 
objection at trial to the jury instructions, we review this 
claim of error for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Kosilek, 423 Mass. 449, 452 
18 
 
(1996).  We conclude that the better practice would have been to 
include language concerning omissions in the prior inconsistent 
statement instruction, but that the instruction given here was 
adequate and not error.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simmonds, 
386 Mass. 234, 242 (1982) (court references omissions in 
considering prior inconsistent statements); Commonwealth v. 
West, 312 Mass 438, 440 (1942) (same); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 39 
Mass. App. Ct. 70, 72 (1995) (same). 
 
This issue has been raised in two Appeals Court cases.  In 
Commonwealth v. Clayton, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 198, 207 (2001), the 
defendant requested a jury instruction on prior inconsistent 
statements that included language concerning omitted statements.  
However, the trial judge's charge on impeachment by prior 
inconsistent statements did not include any instruction on 
omissions.  Id.  In that case, because the defendant's 
conviction was reversed on the basis of the trial judge's 
exclusion of relevant evidence, the Appeals Court did not 
consider whether the charge was sufficient on this point and, if 
not, whether any error was prejudicial or harmless.  See id. 
 
 In Commonwealth v. Bruce, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 484 
(2004), the Appeals Court decided the question, concluding that 
the judge's instruction on prior inconsistent statements was 
adequate, as it neither misstated the case law nor prevented the 
jury from considering omissions as inconsistencies.  Although 
19 
 
the judge's instruction in Bruce did not integrate omissions 
into the prior inconsistent statement instruction, the Appeals 
Court reviewed the prior inconsistent statement instruction and 
the over-all charge as a whole and found that it accurately 
conveyed to the jury their role in assessing the witness's 
credibility.  Id. 
 
We likewise conclude that the prior inconsistent statement 
instruction here adequately explained the issue to the jury.6  
See Bruce, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 484.  We thus discern no error.  
That being said, we reiterate that the better practice is to 
instruct on omissions in the prior inconsistent statement 
instruction where omissions are at issue.7 
                                                 
 
6 The judge provided the following instruction: 
 
 
"Now, as a general rule, we allow witnesses to testify 
in court and we exclude out-of-court, prior out-of-court 
statements by witnesses.  There have been some prior out-
of-court statements by witnesses used in this case.  One 
example is a prior inconsistent statement.  If a witness 
testifies in court, an attorney is permitted to ask the 
witness, well, isn't it true that you testified 
inconsistently, differently, on a prior occasion, or you 
gave a statement out of court on a prior occasion which is 
different from what you're saying now.  In that case, the 
out-of-court statement is not admitted as substantive 
evidence.  You're not allowed to base your verdict on it.  
It's introduced to assist you in judging whether or not you 
believe the in-court testimony.  That's the purpose of it." 
 
 
7 If omissions are at issue, the better practice would be to 
include an instruction along the following lines:  "A prior 
inconsistent statement is one that, either by what it says or by 
what it omits to say, affords some indication that the fact was 
 
20 
 
 
b.  Consciousness of guilt.  The defendant objected to the 
consciousness of guilt instruction, claiming that there was no 
evidence of flight and no dispute that the defendant had killed 
the victim.8  Here, given that there was evidence of the 
defendant's flight from the scene, we discern no error in the 
judge's instruction and conclude that the judge acted within his 
discretion in deciding, over the defendant's objection, to give 
                                                                                                                                                             
different from the testimony of the witness whom it is sought to 
contradict.  An omission from the earlier statement is 
inconsistent with a later statement of fact when it would have 
been natural to include the fact in the initial statement."  See 
Commonwealth v. West, 312 Mass. 438, 440 (1942); Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 70, 72 (1995). 
 
 
8 The judge instructed the jury: 
 
 
"We've also had evidence in the case that the 
defendant fled from the scene of the incident.  If the 
Commonwealth has proven the defendant did flee from the 
scene, you may consider whether such actions indicate 
feelings of guilt by the defendant and whether, in turn, 
such feelings of guilt might tend to show actual guilt of 
the charge.  You are not required to draw such inferences 
and you should not do so unless they appear to be 
reasonable in light of all the circumstances of this case.  
If you decide that such inferences are reasonable, it will 
be up to you to decide how much importance to give them.  
However, you should always remember that there may be 
numerous reasons why an innocent person might do such 
things.  Such conduct does not necessarily reflect feelings 
of guilt.  Please also bear in mind that a person having 
feelings of guilt is not necessarily guilty in fact, for 
such feelings are sometimes found in innocent people.  
Finally, remember that standing alone, such evidence is 
never enough by itself to convict a person of a crime.  You 
may not find the defendant guilty on such evidence; that 
is, evidence of flight from the scene, by itself.  But you 
may consider it in your deliberations along with all the 
other evidence." 
21 
 
an instruction on consciousness of guilt. 
 
The judge properly determined that a consciousness of guilt 
instruction served a "useful and proper purpose" because 
"although the killing has been admitted, [it was] still the 
Commonwealth's burden to prove guilt of murder."  Commonwealth 
v. Morris, 465 Mass. 733, 740 (2013).  See Commonwealth v. 
Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008) (consciousness of guilt 
instruction permissible where there is evidence of flight).  The 
judge also took careful steps to preserve the neutrality of the 
instruction by highlighting that innocent people do engage in 
flight, and that such conduct does not necessarily reflect 
feelings of guilt.  Morris, supra. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c.  278, § 33E.  We have reviewed 
the record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no basis 
to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree 
or to order a new trial.  Accordingly, we decline to exercise 
our authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.