Title: State v. Darryl J. Hall

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2848 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Darryl J. Hall, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis. 2d 850, 540 N.W.2d 219 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 24, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
September 24, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
 
RICHARD J. CALLAWAY 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
 
STEINMETZ and CROOKS, J.J. join 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Jerome F. Buting, Pamela S. Moorshead and Buting & 
Williams, S.C., Brookfield and Robert R. Henak and Shellow, 
Shellow & Glynn, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Jerome F. 
Buting & Robert R. Henak. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Gregory 
M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael J. Fitzgerald and 
Coffey, Coffey & Geraghty, Milwaukee for the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation and Wisconsin Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
94-2848-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Darryl J. Hall, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 24, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  Darryl J. Hall challenges the 
constitutionality of the drug tax stamp law (“the stamp law”), 
cited in full below.
1  Hall was convicted and sentenced to two 
                     
1 Tax on Controlled Substances.   
139.87 Definitions.  In this subchapter:  
(2) “Dealer” means a person who in violation of ch. 
161 possesses, manufactures, produces, ships, 
transports, delivers, imports, sells or transfers to 
another person more than 42.5 grams of marijuana, 
more than 5 marijuana plants, more than 14 grams of 
mushrooms containing psilocin or psilocybin, more 
than 100 milligrams of any material containing 
lysergic acid diethylamide or more than 7 grams of 
any other schedule I controlled substance or schedule 
II controlled substance.  “Dealer” does not include a 
person who lawfully possesses marijuana or another 
controlled substance. 
  (3) “Department” means the department of revenue. 
 (4) “Marijuana” has the meaning under s. 161.01(14). 
 (5) “Schedule I controlled substance” means a 
substance listed in s. 161.14. 
 (6) “Schedule II controlled substance” means a 
substance listed in s. 161.16. 
 
139.88 Imposition.  There is imposed on dealers, upon 
acquisition or possession by them in this state, an 
occupational tax at the following rates: 
  (1) Per gram or part of a gram of marijuana, 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
2
                                                                  
whether pure or impure, measured when in the dealer’s 
possession, $3.50. 
  (1d) Per marijuana plant, regardless of weight, 
counted when in the dealer’s possession, $1000. 
  (1g) Per gram or part of a gram of mushrooms or 
parts of mushrooms containing psilocin or psilocybin, 
whether pure or impure, measured when in the dealer’s 
possession, $10. 
  (1r) Per 100 milligrams or part of 100 milligrams 
of any material containing lysergic acid 
diethylamide, whether pure or impure, measured when 
in the dealer’s possession, $100. 
(2)Per gram or part of a gram of other schedule I 
controlled substances or schedule II controlled 
substances, whether pure or impure, measured when in 
the dealer’s possession, $200. 
 
139.89  Proof of payment.  The department shall 
create a uniform system of providing, affixing and 
displaying stamps, labels or other evidence that the 
tax under § 139.88 has been paid.  Stamps or other 
evidence of payment shall be sold at face value.  No 
dealer may possess any schedule I controlled 
substance or schedule II controlled substance unless 
the tax under § 139,88 has been paid on it, as 
evidenced by a stamp or other official evidence 
issued by the DOR.  The tax under this subchapter is 
due and payable immediately upon acquisition or 
possessing  of the schedule I controlled substance or 
schedule II controlled substance in this state, and 
the department that time has a lien on all of the 
taxpayer’s property.  Late payments are subject to 
interest at the rate of 1% per month or part of a 
month.  No person may transfer to another person a 
stamp or other evidence of payment. 
 
139.90  No immunity.  Acquisition of stamps or other 
evidence that the tax under s. 139.88 has been paid 
does not create immunity for a dealer from criminal 
prosecution. 
 
139.91  Confidentiality.  The department may not 
reveal facts obtained in administering this 
subchapter, except that the department may publish 
statistics that do not reveal the identities of 
dealers.  Dealers may not be required to provide any 
identifying information in connection with the 
purchase of stamps.  No information obtained by the 
department may be used against a dealer in any 
criminal proceeding unless that information has been 
independently obtained, except in connection with a 
proceeding involving possession of schedule I 
controlled substances or schedule II controlled 
substances on which the tax has not been paid or in 
connection with taxes due under s. 139.88 from the 
dealer. 
 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
3
                                                                  
139.92  Examination of records.  For the purposes of 
determining the amount of tax that should have been 
paid, determining whether or not the dealer should 
have paid taxes or collecting any taxes under s. 
139.88, the department may examine, or cause to be 
examined, any books, papers, records or memoranda 
that may be relevant to making those determinations, 
whether the books, papers, records or memoranda are 
the property of or in the possession of the dealer or 
another person.  The department may require the 
attendance of any person having knowledge or 
information that may be relevant, compel the 
production of books, papers, records or memoranda by 
persons required to attend, take testimony on matters 
material to the determination, issue subpoenas and 
administer oaths or affirmation. 
 
139.93  Appeals, presumption, administration (1) The 
taxes, penalties and interest under this subchapter 
shall be assessed, collected and reviewed as are 
income taxes under ch. 71.   
(2)  If the department finds that the collection of 
the tax under this subchapter is jeopardized by 
delay, the department may issue, in person or by 
registered mail to the last-known address of the 
taxpayer, a notice of its intent to proceed under 
this subsection, may make a demand for immediate 
payment of the taxes, penalties and interest due and 
may proceed by the methods under s. 71.91(5) and (6). 
 If the taxes, penalties and interest are not 
immediately paid, the department may seize any of the 
taxpayer’s assets.  Immediate seizure of assets does 
not nullify the taxpayer’s right to a hearing on the 
department’s determination that the collection of the 
assessment will be jeopardized by delay, nor does it 
nullify the taxpayer’s right to post a bond.  Within 
5 days after giving notice of its intent to proceed 
under this subsection, the department shall, by mail 
or in person, provide the taxpayer in writing with 
its reasons for proceeding under this subsection.  
The warrant of the department shall not issue and the 
department may not take other action to collect if 
the taxpayer within 10 days after the notice of 
intent to proceed under this subsection is given 
furnishes a bond in the amount, not exceeding double 
the amount of the tax, and with such sureties as the 
department of revenue approves, conditioned upon the 
payment of so much of the taxes as shall finally be 
determined to be due, together with interest thereon. 
 Within 20 days after notice of intent to proceed 
under this subsection is given by the department of 
revenue, the person against whom the department 
intends to proceed under this subsection may appeal 
to the department the department’s determination that 
the collection of the assessment will be jeopardized 
by delay.  Any statement that the department files 
may be admitted into evidence and is prima facie 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
4
                                                                  
evidence of the facts it contains.  Taxpayers may 
appeal adverse determinations by the department to 
the circuit court for Dane County. 
(3) The taxes and penalties assessed by the 
department are presumed to be valid and correct.  The 
burden is on the taxpayer to show their invalidity or 
incorrectness. 
(4) The department may request the department of 
administration to sell, by the methods under s. 
125.14(2)(f), all assets seized under sub. (2). 
(5) No court may issue an injunction to prevent or 
delay the levying, assessment or collection of taxes 
or penalties under this subchapter. 
(6) The department shall enforce, and the duly 
authorized employes of the department have all 
necessary police powers to prevent violations of, 
this subchapter. 
 
139.94 Refunds.  If the department is determined to 
have collected more taxes than are owed, the 
department shall refund the excess and interest at 
the rate of 0.75% per month or part of a month when 
that determination is final.  If the department has 
sold property to obtain taxes, penalties and interest 
assessed under this subchapter and those taxes, 
penalties and interest are found not to be due, the 
department shall give the former owner the proceeds 
of the sale when that determination is final. 
 
139.95  Penalties. (1) Any dealer who possesses a 
schedule I controlled substance or schedule II 
controlled substance that does not bear evidence that 
the tax under s. 139.88 has been paid shall pay, in 
addition to the tax under s. 139.88, a penalty equal 
to the tax due.  The department shall collect 
penalties under this subchapter in the same manner as 
it collects the tax under this subchapter. 
(2) A dealer who possesses a schedule I controlled 
substance or schedule II controlled substance that 
does not bear evidence that the tax under s. 139.88 
has been paid may be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than 5 years or both. 
  (3) Any person who falsely or fraudulently makes, 
alters or counterfeits any stamp or procures or 
causes the same to be done or who knowingly utters, 
publishes, passes or tenders as true any false, 
altered or counterfeit stamp or who affixes a 
counterfeit stamp to a schedule I controlled 
substance or schedule II controlled substance or who 
possesses a schedule I controlled substance or 
schedule II controlled substance to which a false, 
altered or counterfeit stamp is affixed may be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not less than 
one year nor more than 10 years or both. 
 
139.96 Use of revenue. If taxes, penalties and 
interest are collected under this subchapter as a 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
5
consecutive three-year sentences under the stamp law, and, 
concurrently, two consecutive 30-year sentences for delivery of 
cocaine base convictions.  The delivery convictions, and their 
30-year sentences, are not before us.  The stamp law requires 
dealers to purchase tax stamps for illegal drugs in their 
possession and affix the stamps to the drugs.  Hall argues that 
the stamp law is unconstitutional because it violates his 
privilege against self-incrimination under both the federal and 
the Wisconsin constitutions.  The State of Wisconsin (State) 
argues that the stamp law provides protection that is coextensive 
with the privilege against self-incrimination and therefore is 
constitutional.  We conclude that because the stamp law fails to 
protect against the derivative use, in a criminal proceeding, of 
information it compels, it violates the privilege against self-
incrimination and is therefore unconstitutional.  Although 
identifying and prosecuting drug dealers is a laudable purpose 
which this court whole-heartedly applauds, the legislature failed 
to use constitutional means to achieve this purpose.  We 
therefore reluctantly strike down the drug tax stamp law as 
unconstitutional.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
¶2 
The facts are undisputed.  The State enacted a law 
requiring “dealers” to purchase tax stamps for the drugs in their 
possession and to affix the stamps to their illegal drugs.  The 
statute defines “dealer,” as “a person who in violation of ch. 
161 
possesses, 
manufactures, 
produces, 
ships, 
transports, 
                                                                  
result of an arrest, the department of revenue 
shall pay the taxes, penalties and interest to the 
state or local law enforcement agency that made 
the arrest associated with the revenue. 
 
Wis. Stat. ch. 139, subch. IV (1991-92)(all further references 
are to the 1991-92 Statutes unless otherwise noted. 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
6
delivers, imports, sells or transfers to another person more than 
. . . 7 grams of any other schedule I controlled substance or 
schedule II controlled substance.”  Wis. Stat. § 139.87(2).  The 
drug tax is paid by purchasing stamps issued by the Department of 
Revenue (DOR).  Wis. Stat. § 139.89.  Drug tax stamps must be 
affixed to the drugs for which the tax has been paid.  § 139.89. 
 Failure to pay the required tax subjects the violator to 
incarceration for a term not to exceed five years, a fine of not 
more than $10,000, or both.  § 139.95. 
¶3 
Hall was arrested, charged, and convicted of two counts 
of 
delivering 
cocaine 
base, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stats. 
§§ 
161.41(1)(cm)4, 161.48, and 161.49, and two counts of failing to 
comply with the drug tax stamp law, contrary to Wis. Stat. ch. 
139, subch. IV.  On December 3, 1993, in the circuit court of 
Dane County, Judge Richard J. Callaway sentenced Hall to two 
consecutive three-year sentences for the stamp law convictions 
and, concurrently, two consecutive 30-year sentences for the 
delivery convictions. 
 
¶4 
Affirming Hall’s stamp law convictions, the court of 
appeals concluded that the statute would be unconstitutional if 
the State could use information it compelled either directly or 
derivatively against the dealer in a criminal proceeding and, on 
its face, the statute failed to protect against derivative use of 
compelled information.  State v. Hall, 196 Wis. 2d 850, 867-68, 
540 N.W.2d 219 (1995).  However, the court of appeals applied a 
“saving 
construction” 
to 
the 
statute, 
interpreting 
the 
confidentiality provision to prohibit both direct and derivative 
use of compelled information and consequently providing Hall with 
protection 
coextensive 
to 
the 
privilege 
against 
self-
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
7
incrimination.
2 
 
¶5 
Both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions 
protect persons from state compelled self-incrimination.  Whether 
or not a statute violates these constitutional provisions 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  State v. 
McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). 
 
¶6 
This case presents three issues: (1) whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 139.89 of the stamp law unconstitutionally compels self-
incrimination; and if so, (2) whether Wis. Stat. § 139.91, the 
confidentiality provision of the stamp law, on its face, provides 
Hall with protection as broad as the protection offered by the 
privilege against self-incrimination; and if not, (3) whether the 
confidentiality provision may be construed in a manner which 
provides protection coextensive with the privilege.
3  We conclude 
that the stamp law unconstitutionally compels self-incrimination, 
the confidentiality provision of the stamp law fails to provide 
protection coextensive with the privilege, and the stamp law 
cannot be construed to provide constitutional protection. 
I. 
 
¶7 
First, we consider whether Wis. Stat. § 139.89 of the 
stamp law unconstitutionally compels Hall to incriminate himself. 
 The right against self-incrimination is a fundamental right 
guaranteed 
by 
both 
the 
United 
States 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions.  In re Grant, 83 Wis. 2d 77, 80, 264 N.W.2d 587 
(1978).  Under the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause, 
                     
2  
The State argues that Hall lacks standing to raise this 
constitutional challenge.  For the reasons set out today in State 
v. Hicks, No. 94-2542-CR (S.Ct. January 24, 1997), we disagree. 
3 Hall also challenges the stamp law on double jeopardy grounds. 
 Because we hold the stamp law unconstitutional on self-
incrimination grounds, we need not address the double jeopardy 
issue. 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
8
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself. . . .”  U.S. Const., amend. V.  Our 
state constitution provides that “[n]o person . . . may be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or 
herself.”  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1).  Although much of the 
analysis of this opinion is derived from United States Supreme 
Court decisions construing the Fifth Amendment privilege, the 
same analysis applies in determining the protection afforded by 
Hall’s state privilege.  State v. Schultz, 152 Wis. 2d 408, 416, 
448 N.W.2d 424 (1989); State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 259-
60, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988). 
 
¶8 
The privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked 
whenever a person has a real and appreciable apprehension that 
information compelled by the state could be used against him or 
her in a criminal proceeding.  Grant, 83 Wis. 2d at 81.  The 
privilege extends not only to the direct use of information which 
would support a conviction, but also to derivative use of such 
evidence, i.e., using compelled information to furnish a link in 
the chain of evidence necessary for prosecution.  Id.  Darryl 
Hall contends that his compliance with the tax law would have 
provided the State with information that he reasonably supposed 
could have been used against him in a prosecution for violation 
of any one of several crimes contained in Wis. Stat. ch. 161, 
Wisconsin’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  We agree. 
¶9 
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
carefully 
considered the impact of tax laws on Fifth Amendment guarantees 
against self-incrimination.  Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 
(1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).  In Marchetti, the defendant 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
9
was convicted of violating federal wagering statutes which 
required persons engaged in professional gambling to pay an 
occupational tax and to register with the Internal Revenue 
Service.  Marchetti complained that these statutory obligations 
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
because they significantly enhanced the likelihood that those who 
complied with the provisions would be successfully prosecuted for 
violating state and federal anti-gambling laws.  The Court 
agreed, identifying the following criteria for determining the 
constitutionality of a tax statute challenged on Fifth Amendment 
grounds: (1) whether the regulated activity is in an area 
“permeated with criminal statutes,” and the tax aimed at 
individuals “inherently suspect of criminal activities;” (2) 
whether an individual is required, under pain of criminal 
prosecution, to provide information which a person might 
reasonably suppose would be available to prosecuting authorities; 
and (3) whether such information would provide a significant link 
in a chain of evidence tending to establish guilt.  Sisson v. 
Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1988)(explaining Marchetti). 
 These criteria form the three prongs of the Marchetti test.  If 
all three are met, the tax statute violates the privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
¶10 The fear of self-incrimination must be real and 
appreciable, not merely an imaginary possibility of danger.  In 
re Grant, 83 Wis. 2d at 82.  The danger should be appraised with 
reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course 
of things, not danger of an imaginary or insubstantial character. 
 Id.  This court has liberally construed the privilege in favor 
of the right which it was intended to protect.  Id.  We analyze 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
10
the stamp law in light of these principles, and apply the three-
prong Marchetti test. 
¶11 Hall contends that two requirements of the stamp law 
violate his privilege 
against self-incrimination: (1) the 
purchase requirement; and (2) the requirement that tax stamps 
must be affixed to a dealer’s drugs.  He argues that these 
requirements violate his privilege in two ways: (1) by requiring 
a dealer, when purchasing stamps, to provide incriminating 
information that may be used by prosecutors against him in a 
criminal proceeding; and (2) by providing vital evidence in a 
prosecutor’s case against a dealer who complies with the statute 
and affixes the stamps to illicit drugs because such acts show: 
(a) knowledge that the items are controlled substances, and (b) 
intent to possess controlled substances.  
¶12 Our analysis begins with the first prong of Marchetti - 
whether the regulated activity is in an area “’permeated with 
criminal 
statutes,’” 
and 
the 
tax 
aimed 
at 
individuals 
“’inherently suspect of criminal activities.’”  Marchetti, 390 
U.S. at 47 (citation omitted).  Few would disagree that the stamp 
law meets this criterion.  State and federal law are permeated 
with criminal statutes addressing the issue of controlled 
substances.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. ch. 161; 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et 
seq.  Moreover, the tax is imposed only upon “dealers” which, by 
its definition, includes only those persons who possess drugs in 
violation of ch. 161.  Persons lawfully in possession of 
controlled substances are specifically exempted from the tax 
provisions.  Wis. Stat. § 139.87(2).  Legally held controlled 
substances are not subject to taxation.  Wis. Stat. § 139.88.  
Without question, the stamp law is directed toward a select group 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
11
inherently suspect of criminal activities. 
¶13 We turn to the second prong of Marchetti: whether the 
dealer might reasonably suppose that information provided by 
either the purchase, or affix and display requirements requires a 
person, 
under 
pain 
of 
criminal 
prosecution, 
to 
provide 
information which the individual might reasonably suppose would 
be available to prosecuting authorities.  Here, we analyze 
separately the purchase, and the affix and display requirements 
of the stamp law. 
¶14 First, we examine the purchase requirement.  In State 
v. Heredia, 172 Wis. 2d 479, 493 N.W.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2386 (1993), the court of appeals 
distinguished Marchetti and held that the payment provision of 
Wisconsin’s drug tax stamp statute, on its face, does not violate 
a defendant’s constitutional privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.  The Heredia court concluded that, unlike the 
wagering tax in Marchetti, the stamp law “both contemplates and 
permits the anonymous payment of the tax . . .” and, therefore, 
does not subject those who comply with its provisions to 
compelled self-incrimination.  Heredia, 172 Wis. 2d at 485.  In 
so concluding, the court of appeals relied on the stamp law’s 
confidentiality provision, Wis. Stat. § 139.91, which provides 
that “[d]ealers may not be required to provide any identifying 
information in connection with the purchase of stamps.”  We agree 
with the Heredia court’s conclusion that the stamp purchase 
requirement is constitutional.  However, we arrive at our 
conclusion for different reasons. 
¶15 The incriminating nature of the compelled information under 
the purchase requirement is evident.  The requirement that 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
12
dealers 
purchase 
tax 
stamps 
compels 
them 
to 
incriminate 
themselves by telling the government that they are drug dealers. 
 Requesting tax stamps in the amount required of a dealer is, in 
and of itself, an admission that one possesses drugs illegally or 
intends to do so.  In this case, the statute required Hall to 
purchase more than $20,000 in tax stamps.  Contrary to the 
State’s contention that not all tax stamp purchasers are dealers, 
it defies common sense to suppose that a person buying more than 
$20,000 worth of tax stamps does not possess or contemplate 
possession of illegal drugs.  Consequently, a tax stamp purchase 
expresses the dealer’s involvement with at least the quantity of 
controlled substances commensurate with the number of stamps 
purchased. 
¶16 The fact that a dealer purchases drug tax stamps also 
indicates his or her knowledge of the nature of the substance 
possessed and of the fact of possession.  Under our controlled 
substances statutes, proof that the defendant knew or believed 
that the substance was a controlled substance is an element of 
the crime that must be proved by the state.  State v. Poellinger, 
153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  Thus, compliance with 
the stamp law’s purchase requirement involves the incriminating 
admission of crucial elements of the crime of possession of 
controlled substances. 
¶17 It is, of course, irrelevant that the purchaser might 
never give this information verbally.  Actions speak as loud as 
words under the Fifth Amendment.  Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 
201, 210 (1988).  In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 
(1976), the Court acknowledged that the act of producing physical 
evidence in response to a subpoena has communicative aspects of 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
13
its own because compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes 
that the taxpayer believes that the papers are those described in 
the subpoena.  The act of purchasing tax stamps similarly 
discloses the taxpayer’s knowledge and intent.  The incriminating 
communication is compelled because the statute mandates that a 
dealer purchase the stamps upon pain of criminal punishment.  
Wis. Stat. § 139.95(2). 
¶18 Next, we consider whether the purchase requirement 
creates a substantial danger that the information will be 
available for criminal prosecution.  Under the stamp law, a tax 
is imposed on drug dealers that must be paid immediately upon 
acquisition or possession of a controlled substance.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 139.89.  Failure to pay the tax exposes the dealer to a five 
year prison term, a fine, or both.  Wis. Stat. § 139.95(2).  The 
DOR has established two methods of purchasing the stamps.  
Dealers must either purchase the stamps in person at a DOR 
location, or dealers may purchase the stamps by mail.  Under the 
mail order option, dealers must supply the DOR with a name and 
address.  The stamps are not transferable. § 139.89.  The 
determinative question is whether the DOR provides a method of 
purchasing stamps that does not compel dealers to provide 
information available against them in a criminal proceeding, 
thereby allowing the stamp law to pass constitutional muster.   
¶19 The stamp law provides an exception for “independently 
obtained information.”  Wis. Stat. § 139.91.  Independently 
obtained information may be used against taxpayers in any 
criminal proceeding.  § 139.91.  For example, nothing in the 
stamp 
law 
prohibits 
the 
State 
from 
using 
information 
independently obtained by placing a law enforcement agent outside 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
14
the location where drug stamps are sold.  Consequently, a law 
enforcement agent surveilling the DOR’s tax stamp purchase outlet 
could photograph, identify, or follow taxpayers to their car, to 
their home, even to their drug manufacturing plant.  The 
information this officer gathered could then be used in any 
criminal proceeding against the taxpayer.  § 139.91.  A dealer 
purchasing drug stamps in person faces a serious risk of 
providing prosecutors with incriminating information. 
¶20 Nonetheless, by allowing tax stamps to be purchased by 
mail, the DOR offers a means by which dealers may purchase drug 
stamps 
without 
providing 
prosecutors 
with 
incriminating 
information.  Therefore, the danger that the information will be 
available for criminal prosecution is not substantial.  The 
purchase by mail provision allows the dealer to select a method 
of payment that will reveal his or her name (or pseudonym) and 
address only to the DOR.  The confidentiality provision of the 
statute expressly prohibits the DOR from revealing facts, such as 
the dealer’s name and address, obtained in administering the tax 
stamp.  Wis. Stat. § 139.91.  Therefore, this information is not 
available to prosecutors in a criminal proceeding.  Consequently, 
the statute provides an avenue by which dealers may purchase the 
stamps without incriminating themselves.  Although a dealer 
unavoidably runs the risk of incriminating himself or herself 
when he or she purchases the tax stamp in person, the payment by 
mail procedure coupled with the confidentiality provision assures 
the 
dealer 
of 
constitutional 
protection 
against 
self-
incrimination.  By providing a dealer with protection coextensive 
to that offered by the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
purchase requirement of the stamp law, standing alone, would pass 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
15
constitutional muster. 
¶21 However, it does not stand alone.  Purchasing the 
stamps is but the first step in the statutory process.  Once 
purchased, drug tax stamps must be affixed to and displayed on 
the dealer’s illegal drugs.  Wis. Stat. § 139.89.  We must 
therefore consider the constitutionality of this affix and 
display requirement.  The incriminating nature of the affix and 
display requirement is without question.  The act of affixing and 
displaying the tax stamps is an incriminating testimonial 
communication 
that 
the dealer knowingly and 
intentionally 
possesses a particular quantity of unlawful drugs.  Possession of 
the stamp signifies the possessor’s knowledge of the nature of 
the substance he or she possesses - an element of a drug 
possession charge - and thus requires self-incrimination.  In 
Marchetti, the United States Supreme Court struck down the 
federal wagering tax law on self-incrimination grounds.  The 
Court recognized that evidence of possession of a federal 
wagering tax stamp is highly incriminating testimonial evidence. 
 Likewise, the affix and display requirement of the stamp law has 
the direct and unmistakable consequence of incriminating any 
dealer who complies with the law. 
¶22 The danger that the information will be available for 
criminal prosecution is also evident.  Tax stamps are readily 
available to assist the State in establishing that defendants 
knew that the substance in their possession was a controlled 
substance.  Under our controlled substances statutes, proof that 
the defendant knew or believed that the substance was a 
controlled substance is an element of the crime that must be 
proved by the State.  Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 493. 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
16
¶23 The confidentiality provision does not prevent the 
State from using the presence of affixed drug stamps against 
dealers and therefore does not save the stamp law.  As the court 
of appeals recognized, while Wis. Stat. § 139.91 prohibits the 
use of information obtained by the DOR in administering the tax, 
the presence of affixed tax stamps is not “information obtained 
by the Department.” Hall, 196 Wis. 2d at 865.  The stamp law does 
not prohibit the State from using tax stamps to prove a 
taxpayer’s knowledge of the nature of the controlled substance.  
Nor does acquisition of tax stamps create immunity for a dealer 
from criminal prosecution.  Wis. Stat. § 139.90. 
¶24 Furthermore, nothing in the statute prohibits the State 
from using the stamps affixed to controlled substances in a 
prosecution for unstamped drugs.  For example, if the State found 
stamped and unstamped drugs during an arrest, the stamp law would 
not prevent the State from using the stamps to establish the 
defendant’s knowledge of the illegal nature of and intent to 
possess the unstamped drugs.  Consequently, Hall was required, 
under pain of criminal prosecution, to affix drug stamps to his 
illegal drugs, and he could reasonably have supposed that the 
presence of the affixed stamps could be used against him by 
prosecuting authorities. Accordingly, Hall has satisfied the 
second prong of the Marchetti test. 
¶25 Finally, we consider the third prong of Marchetti, 
whether the compelled information could provide a significant 
link in a chain of evidence tending to establish guilt.  In other 
words, does the statute protect dealers from derivative use of 
the compelled information?  The court of appeals acknowledged 
that the stamp law, on its face, only provides a dealer with 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
17
protection from direct - not derivative - use of information 
obtained by the DOR through compliance with the statute.  Hall, 
196 Wis. 2d at 866-68.  We agree.  The stamp law allows the State 
to use compelled information as an investigative lead to 
information used against dealers in a criminal proceeding.  Thus 
Hall has satisfied the third prong of Marchetti.  Having 
satisfied all three prongs of Marchetti, we conclude that the 
drug tax stamp law unconstitutionally compels self-incrimination, 
absent some preexisting statutory confidentiality or immunity 
provision providing protection equivalent to that of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
II. 
¶26 This brings us to our second issue: whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 139.91, the confidentiality provision of the stamp law, on its 
face, provides Hall with protection as broad as the protection 
offered by the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
¶27 The privilege can be replaced by a sufficient grant of 
immunity.  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).  
Therefore, the question becomes whether the stamp law provides 
such immunity.  The privilege against self-incrimination may not 
properly be asserted if other protection is granted which “’is so 
broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect’ as the 
privilege itself.”  Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58 (quoting Counselman 
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195, 206 (1892)).  If 
coextensive protection exists, the taxpayer could not reasonably 
suppose that the incriminating information would be available for 
use in a criminal proceeding.  The State argues that the stamp 
law’s confidentiality provision provides Hall with coextensive 
protection.  We disagree with the State. 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
18
¶28 First, we examine the extent of the privilege.  The 
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination requires 
protection 
against 
derivative 
as 
well 
as 
direct 
use 
of 
incriminating information.  This privilege protects against any 
disclosure that the witness reasonably believes could be used, or 
could lead to other evidence that could be used, in a criminal 
prosecution.  Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45.  The information need 
only furnish a “link in the chain of evidence . . .” against the 
defendant.  Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); 
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (an investigatory lead).  Where 
compliance with the requirements of a statute necessarily would 
result in self-incriminating communications, a proper claim of 
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination provides 
a full defense to prosecutions under that statute. 
¶29 Although the court in Heredia relied on the anonymity 
requirement of the confidentiality provision to find legislative 
intent of confidentiality, a closer examination of the statute 
reveals the inaccuracy of that interpretation.  As acknowledged 
by the court of appeals, the confidentiality provision of the 
drug tax stamp law, on its face, bars only the direct use of 
information against a dealer in a criminal prosecution.  Hall, 
196 Wis. 2d at 867-68.  The stamp law exhibits a lack of 
protection from derivative use in several ways. 
 
¶30 The breadth of the immunity exception in Wis. Stat. § 
139.91 creates a real danger that the information will be used in 
situations in which taxes are not at issue.  The first sentence 
of the confidentiality provision prohibits the DOR from revealing 
facts obtained in the administration of the stamp law.  However, 
the statute provides no penalty for unlawful dissemination.  
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
19
Furthermore, the last sentence of the same provision allows 
information obtained by the DOR to be used “in connection with a 
proceeding involving possession of schedule I . . . or schedule 
II controlled substances on which the tax has not been paid . . . 
” as well as “in connection with taxes due under s. 139.88 from 
the dealer.”  § 139.91.  Thus, in a prosecution for possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine for which no tax has been paid, 
any information learned from a defendant who had paid the tax on 
other, stamped, cocaine could be used against him or her as long 
as he or she had paid no tax on the cocaine directly involved in 
the possession charge.  For example, if a dealer possesses 25 
grams of cocaine, but buys tax stamps for only 15 grams, the 
statute does not bar the DOR clerk from identifying the dealer as 
having admitted, by application for the stamps, to possession of 
15 grams of cocaine, and thus knowledge and intent that the 
unstamped 10 grams are illegal cocaine and the dealer intended to 
possess them.  The ability of the State to use the information 
obtained even when the payment of taxes is not at issue 
distinguishes the statute from statutes which have been upheld in 
other states.  For a discussion of these statutes and cases, see 
below.
4 
                     
4  In its brief, the State contends that the Wisconsin stamp law 
is constitutional because § 139.91 “guarantees the same 
protection given by the confidentiality provisions in other 
states where the drug tax stamp laws were found to be in 
compliance with fifth amendment requirements.”  A comparison of 
the Wisconsin stamp law and the statutes upheld in the cases 
cited by the State’s illustrates the fallacy of this assertion.   
Section § 139.91 lists two criminal proceedings in which 
information obtained by the department may be revealed:  (1) 
proceedings involving possession of controlled substances on 
which the tax has not been paid, and (2) proceedings in 
connection with taxes due under the stamp law.  The 
confidentiality provisions of the stamp laws upheld in the cases 
cited by the State all include the second exception.  However, 
none of the stamp laws referred to by the State, that have been 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
20
                                                                  
upheld as constitutional, allow compelled, self-incriminating 
information to be used in proceedings involving possession of 
drugs on which the tax has not been paid.  Thus, none of the 
cases cited by the State involve statutes that allow derivative 
use to the extent allowed by the Wisconsin stamp law. 
We quote these cases, cited by the State, and the statutes which 
they upheld to make plain the fallaciousness of the State’s 
argument:  “[N]or can any information contained in such a report 
or return be used against a dealer in any criminal proceeding, 
except in connection with a proceeding involving taxes due under 
this chapter, unless such information is independently obtained.” 
 Briney v. State Dept. of Revenue, 594 So.2d 120, 122 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1991)(quoting Ala. Code § 40-17A-13 1975 (Cum. Supp. 1990)). 
 Clifft v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310 (1995), 
upheld Indiana’s stamp law which provides, in pertinent part:  
“Confidential information acquired by the department may not be 
used to initiate or facilitate prosecution for an offense other 
than an offense based on a violation of this chapter.  Ind. Code 
Ann.  6-7-3-9 (West. Supp. 1994).  Iowa’s stamp law “explicitly 
prohibits any information obtained from a dealer, pursuant to 
compliance with 421A, from being released or used against the 
dealer in any criminal proceeding except in connection with a 
proceeding involving taxes due under chapter 421A.”  State v. 
Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d 852, 857 (1992)(citing Iowa Code 
§ 421A.10).   
The stamp law at issue in State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1990), failed to contain a confidentiality provision.  The Utah 
Court of Appeals upheld the stamp law because it made no 
provision for disclosure of any identifying information to 
prosecuting authorities.  However, when reviewing the stamp law, 
the Utah court had the benefit of subsequent legislation to aid 
its interpretation of legislative intent.  The 1989 amendment to 
Utah’s stamp law provides:  “None of the information contained in 
a report, form, or return or otherwise obtained from a dealer in 
connection with this section may be used against the dealer in 
any criminal proceeding unless it is independently obtained, 
except in connection with a proceeding involving taxes due under 
this chapter from the dealer making the return.”  Id. (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 (1989)).  This amendment, 
significantly different from Wisconsin’s confidentiality 
provision, was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in Zissi v. State 
Tax Comm’n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (1992). 
Finally, the State contends that the Kansas stamp law, upheld by 
the Kansas Supreme Court, is “almost identical” to the Wisconsin 
stamp law because “information obtained through compliance with 
the  act could not be used in any criminal proceedings, except 
those involving violations of the act itself.”  State’s Brief at 
12.  The State is correct that the Kansas stamp law explicitly 
prohibits information contained in a report or return required by 
the Kansas act to be used “against the dealer in any criminal 
proceeding, unless independently obtained, except in connection 
with a proceeding involving taxes due under this act from the 
taxpayer making the return.”  State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174, 
1178 (1989)(quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-5206 (1988 Supp.))  As 
we have explained, this confidentiality provision is not 
“identical” or even “almost identical” from the stamp law before 
us. 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
21
 
¶31 We conclude that, while providing  some protection, the 
stamp law, on its face, fails to provide the taxpayer with 
protection 
coextensive 
with 
the 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination.  Because the confidentiality provision does not 
provide adequate protection, the stamp law does not meet Hall’s 
constitutional challenge. 
III. 
¶32 The above conclusion leads us to the third issue: 
whether the confidentiality provision may be construed in a 
manner which provides protection coextensive with the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The State urges us to “save” this 
unconstitutional statute by construing it to provide both direct 
and derivative use immunity. 
¶33 We 
recognize 
the 
strong 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality that must guide our examination of this 
statute.  This presumption requires Hall to demonstrate the 
statute’s 
unconstitutionality 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt.  
Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 894, (1996). 
 But the presumption of constitutionality presents a high hurdle, 
not an insurmountable barrier.  Although this court will strive 
to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional 
attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of 
perverting the purpose of a statute.  The statute before us 
cannot be construed as the State argues.  
¶34 The crux of the problem is this: the language of the 
stamp law fails to provide taxpayers with any protection against 
derivative use of incriminating information.   
¶35 While a statute should be held valid whenever by any 
fair interpretation it may be construed to serve a constitutional 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
22
purpose, courts cannot go beyond the province of legitimate 
construction to save it, and where the meaning is plain, words 
cannot be read into it or out of it for the purpose of saving one 
or other possible alternative.  Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 256 
Wis. 151, 155 (1949)(citing State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sande, 205 
Wis. 495, 501, 503 (1931).  On its face, a plain reading of the 
statute provides no protection against derivative use 
¶36 The State argues that the Court’s decision in United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 464 (1994), allows 
this court to bridge the great gap between the plain meaning of 
this statute and the presumption of constitutionality.  Indeed, 
the court of appeals applied a “saving” construction to this 
statute.  Hall, 196 Wis. 2d at 867-68.  It ruled that Wis. Stat. 
§ 139.91 precludes the State from using information gained as a 
result of a tax stamp purchaser’s compliance with the statute, 
either directly or derivatively, including the presence of 
affixed stamps, in a subsequent drug prosecution against the 
taxpayer.  Id.  Although the court of appeals justifies this 
construction in a well-written and well-reasoned opinion, we must 
reluctantly conclude that in the exercise of judicial restraint 
we cannot leap that far. 
¶37 To read the stamp law to bar derivative, as well as 
direct use, would be rewriting the statute, not merely correcting 
a scrivener’s error. X-Citement Video, 115 S.Ct. at 474 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)  Rather than the State’s argument, we prefer the 
Court’s reasoning in United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 
680 (1985), where the Court refused to add language to an 
unambiguous statute: 
Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional 
questions, but this interpretative canon is not license 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
23
for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the 
legislature.  Any other conclusion, while purporting to 
be an exercise in judicial restraint, would trench upon 
the legislative powers vested in Congress. . . .  
Proper 
respect 
for 
those 
powers 
implies 
that 
‘[s]tatutory construction must begin with the language 
employed by Congress and the assumption that the 
ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose.’  (cite omitted). 
 
¶38 Presented as we are with every indication in the 
statute itself that the legislature had no purpose to bar 
derivative use, nevertheless, this court’s primary purpose in 
interpreting a statute is to effectuate the legislature’s intent. 
 State v. Hopkins, 168 Wis. 2d 802, 814, 484 N.W.2d 549 (1992). 
¶39 The court need not look to the history of a statute 
clear on its face, Grosse v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 
2d 97, 117, 513 N.W.2d 592 (1994)(Steinmetz, J. dissenting).  
However, even the legislative history of the statute supports the 
conclusion that the legislature intended to bar direct use, but 
not derivative use. 
¶40 The legislative history supports the legislative intent 
to bar direct, but not derivative, use for several reasons: (1) 
Legislative history reveals that the legislature’s purpose for 
drafting the original drug stamp tax bill was to learn the 
identity of drug dealers.  Had the legislature intended to bar 
both direct as well as derivative use, that purpose could not 
have been effectuated.  (2) Even in early drafts, the legislature 
knew that the stamp law presented self-incrimination problems of 
constitutional dimension, yet chose not to revise the bill.  (3) 
The legislature was aware of how to draft a clear, unambiguous 
statute providing both direct and derivative use immunity, yet 
chose not to do so. 
¶41 The stamp law is the product of several attempts by the 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
24
Senate and Assembly to create a drug tax stamp statute. It was 
enacted during a special session of the legislature as part of 
1989 Wis. Act 122, a wide-ranging amalgamation of anti-drug 
measures.   
¶42 History reveals that the legislature’s purpose for 
drafting the original drug stamp tax bill was to learn the 
identity of drug dealers.  In 1987, Representative Foti asked the 
Legislative Reference Bureau to draft a drug tax statute.  Draft 
Request Form for 1987 AB 519.  He sought to solve the problem of 
“hav[ing] no control over drug dealers or knowledge of who they 
are” by “[making] them pay a tax on their drugs.”  1987 AB 519 
Draft Request Form.  The following excerpt from a memorandum 
attached to the draft request acknowledges the bill’s supporters’ 
intent to allow the State to use the drug tax law to obtain 
information about drug dealers. 
The only real objection anyone had to it was its 
constitutionality but they have gotten around that.  A 
drug dealer, according to the bill, can go to the 
Department of Revenue and obtain a stamp and the 
information has to be kept confidential.  They cannot 
call the police and tell them that so and so has a drug 
tax stamp.  It gives them 5
th amendment protection.  It 
does not legalize possession.  If a dealer is caught 
selling a drug the law enforcement people can then 
contact 
the 
revenue 
department 
and 
obtain 
any 
information on file.  The idea behind the bill is to 
get at the dealers. 
 
¶43 Compelling drug dealers to provide self-incriminating 
information is an unconstitutional means of “knowing who the drug 
dealers are.”  The unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent 
the activity from being taxed.  However, a statute imposing a tax 
on unlawful activity cannot be sustained when the methods of 
collecting the tax are in conflict with the privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 44.  While the State 
may lawfully tax controlled substances, the means used must be 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
25
constitutional. 
¶44 The lack of a revenue raising purpose underlying this 
act adds further weight to the legislative history expressing the 
unconstitutional purpose of “knowing who [drug dealers] are” and 
“get[ting] at [them].”  The drug stamp tax law is a tax law.  Yet 
the legislature never expected this tax law to raise revenue.  
The fiscal estimate of every draft of the drug tax bills exhibits 
a lack of revenue producing purpose.  1989 Act 122 Fiscal 
Estimate (“[b]ased on the experience of other states . . . 
revenues from sales of tax stamps would likely be minimal [and] 
actual tax collections generally amount to only a small portion 
of the total assessments since collection of the controlled 
substances tax is difficult.”); 1989 AB 633 Fiscal Estimate 
(estimating “minimal” sales revenues); 1989 SB 356 Fiscal 
Estimate (anticipating minimal sales and minimal collection of 
penalties); 1989 SB 295 Fiscal Estimate (anticipating that this 
bill 
would 
have 
“no 
fiscal 
impact 
on 
state 
or 
local 
government.”); 1987 AB 519 Fiscal Estimate (“likely that that 
[sic] the revenue from the tax would be very small.”).  We must 
pause and reflect when legislative history reveals that a tax 
statute was enacted without the expectation that it raise 
revenue.  
 
¶45 Finally, most troubling is the revelation in the 
legislative history that the legislature was well aware of how to 
craft a confidentiality provision that would provide dealers with 
 both direct and derivative use immunity.  Not only does the 
Minnesota statute, attached to the draft request form of 1989 
Bill 
633, 
provide 
the 
legislature 
with 
a 
model 
of 
a 
confidentiality provision that prohibits both the direct and 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
26
derivative use of information compelled by the stamp law, the 
legislature itself, in the same act as the stamp law, created an 
immunity clause that provides both direct and derivative use 
immunity.  Wis. Stat. § 972.085.  
 
¶46 A copy of the confidentiality provision for the 
Minnesota drug tax statute § 297D was attached to the bill 
request form for 1989 Assembly Bill 633.  This Minnesota 
confidentiality provision states that  
[no] information contained in such a report or return 
or obtained from a dealer be used against the dealer in 
any criminal proceeding, unless independently obtained, 
except in connection with a proceeding involving taxes 
due under this chapter from the dealer making the 
return.   
 
Compare this with the last sentence of Wis. Stat. § 139.91: 
No information obtained by the department may be used 
against a dealer in any criminal proceeding unless that 
information has been independently obtained, except in 
connection with a proceeding involving possession of 
schedule 
I controlled 
substances 
or schedule II 
controlled substances on which the tax has not been 
paid or in connection with taxes due under s. 139.88 
from the dealer. (emphasis added). 
 
¶47 The Minnesota statute prohibits the use of information 
compelled by its drug tax stamp law except in a proceeding 
involving taxes due against the dealer making the return.  In 
contrast, Wis. Stat. § 139.91 allows the use of information 
compelled by the stamp law in proceedings involving taxes due 
from 
the 
dealer 
and 
in 
proceedings 
involving 
controlled 
substances on which the tax has not been paid.  Consequently, the 
stamp law allows prosecutors to use information compelled by the 
act - the affixed stamps - against dealers in criminal 
proceedings involving unstamped drugs.  Herein lies the stamp 
law’s fatal flaw.   
¶48 The legislature ratified this constitutionally flawed 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
27
provision despite awareness that it posed potential problems, and 
in light of a solution to these problems.  A memorandum to the 
Legislative Reference Bureau (“LRB”) from the DOR regarding the 
confidentiality provision directs the drafters’ attention to the 
potential for claims of the self-incrimination privilege by drug 
dealers: 
The difficulty in maintaining confidentiality could 
result in dealers claiming that the requirement to pay 
the 
controlled 
substances 
tax 
violates 
their 
constitutional right against self-incrimination.  There 
have been successful challenges of similar taxes on 
illegal activities in both state and federal courts. 
 
¶49 Memo from DOR’s Eng Braun to the LRB.  June 17, 1987.  
The 
legislators 
knew 
they 
were 
treading 
constitutionally 
treacherous waters.  And, when enacting the stamp law, they had 
before them a statute which had been scrutinized and upheld by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court just the year before.  Sisson, 428 
N.W.2d 565.  Yet they chose not to follow this model. Instead, 
our legislature chose to enact the stamp law’s confidentiality 
provision as originally written.  
¶50 Finally, the most striking illustration of legislative 
intent is the contrast between the “use” language in Wis. Stat. § 
139.91 and the “use” language in Wis. Stat. § 972.085 of the same 
act which clearly provides direct and derivative use immunity.  
Section 972.085 provides: 
Immunity from criminal or forfeiture prosecution under 
[listed provisions - not listing § 139.87 et seq.] 
provides immunity only from the use of the compelled 
testimony 
or 
evidence 
in 
subsequent criminal or 
forfeiture proceedings, as well as immunity from the 
use of evidence derived from that compelled testimony 
or evidence. 
 
 
¶51 This statute, included in the same act as the stamp 
law, 
provides 
both 
direct 
and 
derivative 
use 
immunity.  
Obviously, the legislature knew how to immunize dealers under 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
28
Wis. Stat. § 139.91 from direct and derivative use, yet chose 
different language.  Consequently, we arrive at the inevitable 
conclusion 
that 
the 
legislature 
knew 
how 
to 
craft 
a 
confidentiality 
provision 
prohibiting 
derivative 
use, 
yet 
deliberately chose not to do so. 
¶52 We find no basis in the language of the statute nor in 
its legislative history for the saving construction applied by 
the court of appeals. 
‘A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as 
to 
avoid 
not 
only 
the 
conclusion 
that 
it 
is 
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that 
score.’  . . . But avoidance of a difficulty will not 
be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion.  Here 
the 
intention 
of 
the 
Congress 
is 
revealed 
too 
distinctly to permit us to ignore it.  . . .[T]he 
problem must be faced and answered.   
 
Welsh, II v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 355 (1970)(Harlan, J., 
concurring)(quoting J. Cardozo in Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 
289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933).  In this case, the language and history 
of the drug tax stamp law plainly demonstrate that the 
legislature never intended to prohibit derivative use of 
information compelled by the stamp law. 
 
¶53 A properly drafted drug tax stamp law is constitutional 
and will serve the societal purposes for which it is intended 
without violating constitutional protections.  See State Drug 
Taxes: A Tax We Can’t Afford, Rutgers L.J., Vol. 23:657 
(analyzing the challenges facing a legislature in drafting a drug 
tax stamp law and proposing a model law that meets the 
constitutional challenges)(1992).  The Wisconsin Drug Tax Stamp 
Law is not such a statute.  We agree that if the legislature had 
written the statute the way that the court of appeals rewrote it, 
it would likely resolve the constitutional infirmities.  However, 
the remedy rests with the legislature.  It is the legislature’s 
Case No. 94-2848CR 
 
29
function to amend the statute where amendment is found necessary. 
 Where a statute plainly includes, as this one does, only 
immunity from direct use of compelled incriminating information, 
we fail to see how the court would be justified in adding thereto 
the following limitation, ‘furthermore, we provide immunity from 
derivative use.’  This in effect is what the State would have us 
do.  Tempted as we may be to rewrite the confidentiality 
provision, as the court of appeals did and as the legislature 
very likely will, we would be setting a dangerous precedent to 
allow such a judicial usurpation of the legislature’s role.  The 
checks and balances needed to sustain a democratic government 
stay our hands from the pen. 
 
¶54 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 139.91, plainly and 
unambiguously provides direct, but not derivative use immunity.  
Consequently, the statute fails to provide Hall with protection 
coextensive 
with 
the 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination.  
Accordingly, we reject the court of appeals’ construction of the 
statute and conclude that the stamp law violates Hall’s privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
1 
 
¶55 JON P. WILCOX, J.  (dissenting.)  I dissent because I 
conclude that this court must construe the confidentiality 
provision 
found 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
139.91 
(1993-94)
5 
(the 
"confidentiality provision") to provide protection coextensive 
with the Fifth Amendment.  I agree that the affix and display 
requirement of the drug tax stamp law
6 (the "stamp law") would 
unconstitutionally compel self-incrimination if it allowed the 
State to use a drug tax stamp as evidence in any criminal 
proceeding not related to payment of the tax.  However, the 
majority misinterprets the legislative history of the stamp law 
and fails in its duty to preserve the statute. 
 
¶56 The majority concludes that "the affix and display 
requirement of the stamp law has the direct and unmistakable 
consequence of incriminating any dealer who complies with the 
law."  Majority op. at 18.  It further asserts that the 
confidentiality provision does not provide protection coextensive 
with the Fifth Amendment.  Majority op. at 18, 25.  The majority 
interprets the confidentiality provision to allow the State to 
use the stamps found on some illegal drugs to establish the 
defendant's knowledge of the illegal nature of and intent to 
possess other illegal unstamped drugs.  Majority op. at 22-23.  
The majority bases this conclusion on the language of the 
confidentiality provision.  Majority op. at 22.   
                     
     5  Unless otherwise stated, all future statutory references are 
to the 1993-94 volume. 
     6  Wis. Stats. ch. 139, subch. IV (1993-94).  
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
2 
 
¶57 The confidentiality provision of Wis. Stat. § 139.91  
provides: 
 
 
The department may not reveal facts obtained in 
administering 
this 
subchapter, 
except 
that 
the 
department may publish statistics that do not reveal the 
identities of dealers.  Dealers may not be required to 
provide any identifying information in connection with 
the purchase of stamps.  No information obtained by the 
department may be used against a dealer in any criminal 
proceeding 
unless 
that 
information 
has 
been 
independently obtained, except in connection with a 
proceeding involving possession of schedule I controlled 
substances or schedule II controlled substances on which 
the tax has not been paid or in connection with taxes 
due under s. 139.88 from the dealer. 
 
(emphasis added).  The majority reads the emphasized exception to 
mean that the State may use any information obtained through the 
administration of this subchapter in a prosecution for criminal 
possession of illegal drugs that were not stamped.  Majority op. 
at 22.  Therefore, according to the majority, affixing and 
displaying the stamps would constitute incriminating oneself.  I 
believe that the majority misinterprets this provision. 
 
¶58 First, the language of the confidentiality provision 
does 
not 
unambiguously 
create 
an 
exception 
for 
criminal 
proceedings for possession of illegal drugs.  The legislature did 
not 
state: 
"except 
in 
connection 
with 
a 
proceeding 
for 
possession," 
instead 
the 
legislature 
stated: 
"except 
in 
connection with a proceeding involving possession of [illegal 
drugs] on which the tax has not been paid . . . ."  (emphasis 
added) Wis. Stat. § 139.91. The logical meaning of this passage 
is that information not independently obtained can be used, not 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
3 
in a criminal possession proceeding, but in a proceeding under § 
139.95.  This section provides: 
 
(1) Any dealer who possesses a schedule I controlled 
substance or schedule II controlled substance that does 
not bear evidence that the tax under s. 139.88 has been 
paid shall pay in addition to any tax under s. 139.88, a 
penalty equal to the tax due.  The department shall 
collect penalties under this subchapter in the same 
manner as it collects tax under this subchapter. 
 
(2) A dealer who possesses a schedule I controlled 
substance or schedule II controlled substance that does 
not bear evidence that the tax under s. 139.88 has been 
paid may be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than 5 years or both. 
 
(3) Any person who falsely or fraudulently makes, alters 
or counterfeits any stamp or procures or causes the same 
to be done or who knowingly utters, publishes, passes or 
tenders as true any false, altered or counterfeit stamp 
or who affixes a counterfeit stamp to a schedule I 
controlled substance or schedule II controlled substance 
or who possesses a schedule I controlled substance or 
Schedule II controlled substance to which a false, 
altered or counterfeit stamp is affixed may be fined not 
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 10 
years or both. 
 
(emphasis added).  The purpose of this section is to set forth 
the penalties for violations of the stamp law.   
 
¶59 In addition to these penalties, a dealer who does not 
comply with the stamp law will have to pay the taxes due under § 
139.88.  Proceedings for unpaid taxes are referred to in the 
second part of the exception to the confidentiality provision: ". 
. . or in connection with taxes due under s. 139.88 from the 
dealer."  Wis. Stat. § 139.91.  Accordingly, under this 
interpretation, each of the exceptions serves a distinct purpose. 
 
¶60 This construction of the confidentiality provision is 
also supported by legislative history.  To lay the groundwork for 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
4 
our analysis we must first present an overview of the legislative 
history of the stamp law.  The drug tax stamp bill that 
eventually passed was the result of several attempts to enact 
such a law.  The first bill introduced in Wisconsin on this 
subject was 1987 AB 519.  The legislative history of this bill is 
relevant to 1989 Wis. Act 122 because the confidentiality 
provision has similar language
7 and because it may have been the 
original source for much of the language in the stamp law.  In 
1989, several more bills on this subject were proposed: (1) 1989 
SB 295, introduced on October 3, 1989, (2) Oct. 1989 Spec. Sess. 
SB 6, introduced on October 12, 1989, (3) Oct. 1989 Spec. Sess. 
AB 6, introduced on October 24, 1989, (4) 1989 SB 356, introduced 
on November 1, 1989, (5) 1989 AB 633, introduced on November 2, 
1989, and (6) Oct. 1989 Spec. Sess. AB 12 (the "Governor's 1989 
budget bill"), introduced on November 8, 1989.  Each of these 
bills included confidentiality provisions similar to the one 
found in Wis. Stat. § 139.91.
8  Finally, on November 9, 1989, 
                     
     7 The confidentiality provision of 1987 AB 519 stated: 
 
 
77.97 CONFIDENTIALITY. The department may not reveal facts 
contained in a return required under s. 77.94.  No 
information contained in such a return may be used against 
the dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless that 
information has been independently obtained, except in 
connection with a proceeding involving possession of untaxed 
controlled substances or taxes due under s. 77.93 from the 
dealer making the return. 
     8  The following confidentiality provision was included in 1989 
SB 295 and 989 AB 633: 
 
 
77.97 CONFIDENTIALITY. The department may not reveal 
facts contained in a return required under s. 77.94, 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
5 
                                                                  
except that the department may publish statistics that 
do not reveal the identities of dealers or contents of 
individual returns.  Dealers may not be required to 
provide any identifying information on returns.  No 
information contained in a return may be used against 
the dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless that 
information has been independently obtained, except in 
connection with a proceeding involving  possession of 
untaxed controlled substances or taxes due under s. 
77.93 from the dealer making the return.  
 
1989 SB 356 contained a slightly different provision: 
 
 
77.97 CONFIDENTIALITY. The department may not reveal 
facts contained in a return required under s. 77.94.    
No information contained in a return may be used against 
the dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless that 
information has been independently obtained, except in 
connection with a proceeding involving possession of 
untaxed controlled substances or taxes due under s. 
77.93 from the dealer making the return.  
 
The confidentiality provision found in Oct. 1989 S.S. SB 6 and 
Oct. 1989 S.S. AB 6 provided: 
 
 
139.91 CONFIDENTIALITY. The department may not reveal facts 
obtained in administering this subchapter, except that the 
department may publish statistics that do not reveal the 
identities of dealers.  Dealers may not be required to 
provide any identifying information in connection with the 
purchase of stamps.  No information obtained by the 
department may be used against a dealer in any criminal 
proceeding unless that information has been independently 
obtained, except in connection with a proceeding involving  
possession of untaxed controlled substances or taxes due 
under s. 139.88 from the dealer making the return.  
 
Finally, the Governor's budget bill contained the following 
provision: 
 
 
77.97 CONFIDENTIALITY. The department may not reveal 
facts contained in a return required under s. 77.94, 
except that the department may publish statistics that 
do not reveal the identities of dealers or the contents 
of individual returns.  Dealers may not be required to 
provide any identifying information on returns.  No 
information contained in a return may be used against 
the dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless that 
information has been independently obtained, except in 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
6 
Oct. 1989 Spec. Sess. Substitute Amend. 1 to Oct. 1989 Spec. 
Sess. AB 12 (the "substitute amendment to the 1989 budget bill") 
was introduced and eventually enacted as 1989 Wis. Act 122.
9  In 
considering the legislative history of 1989 Wis. Act 122, a 
review of each of these bills is relevant as each used similar 
language and many directly used the drafts of earlier bills.
10 
 
¶61 The majority contends that the legislative history 
supports its conclusion that the confidentially provision does 
not bar the use of derivative information in criminal proceedings 
not related to the tax.  Majority op. at 28.  The majority bases 
this conclusion on three points: "(1) Legislative history reveals 
that the legislature's purpose for drafting the original drug 
stamp tax bill was to learn the identity of drug dealers . . . . 
(2) Even in early drafts, the legislature knew that the stamp law 
presented 
self-incrimination 
problems 
of 
constitutional 
dimension, yet chose not to revise the bill.  (3) The legislature 
was aware of how to draft a clear, unambiguous statute providing 
                                                                  
connection with a proceeding involving  possession of 
untaxed controlled substances or taxes due under s. 
77.93 from the dealer making the return.  
 
     9  Although the confidentiality provision was slightly amended 
by 1991 Wis. Act 39, these changes do not affect our analysis. 
     10  Oct. 1989 S.S. AB 12 contains previous drafts that can be 
traced through the LRB reference number to 1989 SB 295, and Oct. 
1989 S.S. Substitute Amendment 1 to AB 12 uses language from Oct. 
1989 S.S. SB 6 and Oct. 1989 S.S. AB 6.  The drafting record of 
1989 SB 295 contains a draft of 1989 AB 633.  Similarly, the 
drafting record, of Oct. 1989 S.S. AB 6 contains a draft of 1989 
SB 295.  Finally, according to the drafting record 1989 SB 356 is 
a redraft of 1987 AB 519 and also uses language from a draft of 
1989 AB 633. 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
7 
both direct and derivative use immunity, yet chose not to do so." 
 Majority op. at 28.  In using these bases to reach such a 
conclusion, the majority misinterprets and overemphasizes some 
portions of the legislative history while ignoring other, more 
pertinent, information. 
 
¶62 The majority's first point, that the legislature's 
purpose in drafting the stamp tax bill was to learn the identity 
of drug dealers, is based on the draft request form and a 
supporting memorandum found in the drafting record of 1987 AB 
519.  Majority op. at 29.  In support of the majority's 
assertion, the majority cites the following description of the 
problem that the bill sought to address from the Drafting Request 
Form: "We have no control over drug dealers or knowledge of who 
they are."  Majority op. at 29.  The majority also cites part of 
a memorandum that was attached to the draft request.  Majority 
op. at 29.  The memorandum states: 
 
I talked to Mark Warnsing, Legislative Assistant to Sen. 
Barkhausen in Illinois about the drug bill . . . . He 
said it is a bill that is pretty hard to vote against.  
The only real objection anyone had to it was its 
constitutionality but they have gotten around that.  A 
drug dealer, according to the bill, can go to the 
Department of Revenue and obtain a stamp and the 
information has to be kept confidential.  They cannot 
call the police and tell them that so and so has a drug 
stamp.  It gives them 5th amendment protection.  It does 
not legalize possession.  If a dealer is caught selling 
a drug the law enforcement people can then contact the 
evenue [sic] department and obtain any information on 
file.  The idea behind the bill is to get at the 
dealers.  They are not concerned with an individual who 
has drugs in his possession because it would fill up the 
courts.  An amendment would make the cost of the stamps 
4 times the face value of each stamp instead of 100%.  
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
8 
He said if you have any questions to call him. 
 
When the information from the drafting record cited by the 
majority 
is 
read 
in 
isolation, 
it 
appears 
that 
the 
confidentiality provision of 1987 AB 519 was not intended to 
provide 
protection 
coextensive 
with 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment.  
However, the majority fails to fully consider the legislative 
history of 1987 AB 519. 
 
¶63 A consideration of all the material contained in the 
drafting record reveals that Representative Foti intended to 
introduce a bill that mirrored the one that had been introduced 
in 
Illinois. 
 
This 
is 
significant 
because 
the 
Illinois 
confidentiality provision provides protection coextensive with 
the Fifth Amendment in the clearest of terms.  The language of 
the Illinois confidentiality provision can be found in the 
drafting record for 1987 AB 519.  The Illinois provision 
provided: 
 
Section 13.  Neither the Director nor a public employee 
may reveal facts contained in a report or return 
required by this Act, nor can any information contained 
in such a report or return be used against the dealer in 
any criminal proceeding, unless such information has 
been independently obtained, except in connection with a 
proceeding involving taxes due under this Act from the 
taxpayer making the return. 
 
This provision, which unambiguously precludes the use of direct 
and derivative information, was the basis for the confidentiality 
provision in 1987 AB 519. 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
9 
 
¶64 Further indications that this bill was intended to 
mirror the Illinois bill can be found in the previously mentioned 
drafting request form and in the memorandum which accompanied the 
drafting 
request 
form. 
 
Contrary 
to 
the 
majority's 
interpretation, the apparent purpose of the memorandum was to 
paraphrase an explanation of the Illinois drug tax stamp bill 
given by Mark Warnsing, a legislative assistant to Illinois State 
Senator Barkhausen.  In the closing line of the memorandum, the 
drafting attorney is told: "[Warnsing] said if you have any 
questions to call him."  A phone number was written next to Mark 
Warnsing's name in the typed memorandum.  Additionally, in 
response to a question in the drafting request which asked 
"Provide names and phone numbers of persons we may contact for 
more information,"  the following response was typed in: "Sen. 
Barkhausen, State of Illinois."  This evidence suggests that the 
drafting attorney was told to draft a bill similar to the one 
from Illinois.  This is significant because it suggests that 
Representative Foti wanted the bill to include a confidentiality 
provision that provided the same protection as the one in the 
Illinois 
bill--a 
confidentiality 
provision 
that 
provided 
protection coextensive with the Fifth Amendment.  
 
¶65 Additional evidence of the legislature's intention to 
provide protection coextensive with the Fifth Amendment can be 
found in the drafting record of 1987 AB 519.  First, after the 
above quoted memorandum was written on May 20, 1987, and after 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
10 
the Draft Request Form was filled out on May 21, 1987, the 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
("DOR") 
sent 
a 
memorandum 
to 
the 
Legislative Reference Bureau ("LRB") drafting attorney for 1987 
AB 519.  This memorandum addressed several technical problems 
with an earlier draft of the bill including problems with the 
confidentiality provision.  The memorandum stated in relevant 
part: 
 
The confidentiality provision should clearly specify how 
the rules for the controlled substances tax differ from 
the general confidentiality rules for the department 
under s. 71.11(44).  Under the general confidentiality 
rules for other state taxes, law enforcement officials 
can request access to the department’s records. 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
The difficulty in maintaining confidentiality could 
result in dealers claiming that the requirement to pay 
the 
controlled 
substances 
tax 
violates 
their 
constitutional right against self-incrimination.  There 
have been successful challenges of similar taxes on 
illegal activities in both state and federal courts. 
 
This shows a concern over confidentiality and a desire to ensure 
that the statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
 
¶66 An even stronger indication of the legislature's intent 
can be found in the Analysis by LRB.  Part of this analysis 
stated: "Information from a return is confidential and may not be 
used in any criminal proceeding except those related to the tax 
itself."  This statement was included as an explanation at the 
beginning of the bill draft which was circulated to all 
legislative offices.  The analysis was written by the attorney 
who drafted the bill; he should have known what was intended by 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
11 
Representative Foti.
11  This same language was used in the LRB 
analysis of the Governor's 1989 budget bill and the substitute 
amendment to the 1989 budget bill which is the direct source of 
Wis. Stat. § 139.91.  It is likely that almost every legislator 
read this analysis before voting on the stamp tax bill.  
Accordingly, this is very strong evidence that the legislature 
intended that the confidentiality provision preclude the use of 
information in any criminal proceeding not related to the tax. 
 
¶67 The majority's assertion that 1987 AB 519 was enacted 
for an unconstitutional purpose, to learn the identity of dealers 
for use in criminal prosecutions not related to the tax, is not 
only in conflict with the legislative history of that statute, 
but is also in conflict with logic.  This is because the 
majority's theory fails to explain why the statute included a 
confidentiality provision.  If the purpose of the statute was to 
learn the identity of dealers in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, there would have been no need for any confidentiality. 
 In fact, the direct use of information, which the majority 
concedes is precluded by the confidentiality provision, would be 
the best means of identifying dealers.  The absence of an 
explanation for the presence of the confidentiality provision 
casts serious doubts on the majority's assertion that 1987 AB 519 
was drafted and that the stamp law was enacted for the purpose of 
                     
     11 A handwritten draft of the analysis was included with the 
drafting record. 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
12 
identifying dealers and using that information in criminal 
proceedings not related to the tax. 
 
¶68 As a side point, the majority argues that the lack of 
revenue raising purpose underlying the act suggests that the 
purpose of the bill was to identify drug dealers.  Majority op. 
at 30.  On the contrary, this information merely tells us that 
the purpose was not to raise revenue.  It is just as likely that 
the purpose was simply to provide additional penalties for drug 
dealers as that it was to identify them. 
 
¶69 Finally, the majority contends that further evidence of 
the unconstitutional purpose of the legislature is provided by 
the fact that the legislature knew how to craft a confidentiality 
provision that would provide dealers with both direct and 
derivative use immunity.  Majority op. at 30.  In support of this 
contention the majority cites (1) the fact that the Minnesota 
confidentiality provision can be found in the drafting record of 
1989 AB 633, (2) the fact that the legislature was aware of the 
potential constitutional problems through a memorandum from DOR 
that is in the drafting record of 1987 AB 519, and (3) the 
language used to provide for direct and derivative use immunity 
in Wis. Stat. § 972.085.  Majority op. at 30-31. 
 
¶70 Certainly, the confidentiality provision in Wis. Stat. 
§ 139.91 could have been more artfully drafted; however, the fact 
that it differs from the Minnesota provision and the immunity 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 972.085 does not prove that the 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
13 
legislature had an unconstitutional purpose in enacting the stamp 
law.  In fact, a review of the drafting record of 1989 SB 295 
indicates that the legislature intended to enact a law that 
mirrored the Minnesota stamp law.  The bill draft request from 
Senator Te Winkle's office to the LRB drafting attorney states: 
 
In reference to our discussion earlier today, and 
further discussion with Senator Te Winkle, I submit this 
request. 
  
 
We would like legislation drafted to place a stamp tax 
on cocaine and marijuana that is similar to Minnesota's 
law, with the same penalty provisions. 
 
 
The exception is that we would like to send the revenue 
from this tax directly to the Metropolitan Enforcement 
Groups (MEG's) or multi-jurisdictional groups (MJG's) in 
proportion to the incidence of drug crime in each 
group’s area during the previous year. 
 
The 
drafting 
request 
makes 
no 
mention 
of 
changing 
the 
confidentiality provision or of using the information in a 
criminal prosecution for possession. 
 
¶71 Additionally, the DOR memorandum from the drafting 
record of 1987 AB 519 that the majority quotes does show that the 
legislature was aware of the potential for a conflict with the 
Fifth Amendment; however, it does not prove that the legislature 
chose to ignore these constitutional concerns.  Instead, the 
legislative history of the stamp law demonstrates that the 
legislature attempted to provide protection coextensive to the 
Fifth Amendment in the confidentiality provision and believed 
that this had been done. 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
14 
 
¶72 The strongest evidence of this intention is the 
language from the LRB analysis which states: "Information from a 
return is confidential and may not be used in any criminal 
proceeding except those related to the tax itself."  This 
statement was included as part of the circulated bill draft for 
the first drug tax stamp bill, 1987 AB 519, the Governor's 1989 
budget bill, and the substitute amendment to the 1989 budget 
bill, which was the version enacted as the stamp law.
12  
Additional evidence of this intention can be found in the 
drafting records for the various drug tax stamp bills that were 
introduced in 1989. 
 
¶73 The drafting record for Oct. 1989 Spec. Sess. AB 6 
contained as part of the drafting instructions a DOR memorandum 
entitled "Summary of Controlled Substances Tax Proposal."  This 
memorandum stated in relevant part: 
Confidentiality: Tax information may not be revealed or 
used against a dealer in a criminal proceeding, unless 
the information was independently obtained.  This 
restriction does not apply to proceedings involving the 
possession of untaxed controlled substances or other 
tax-related proceedings.  
 
A similar description of the confidentiality provision is found 
in the drafting record for the Governor's 1989 budget bill: 
"Under your proposal, information from a controlled substance tax 
return would be confidential and could not be used in any 
criminal proceeding, except those relating to the tax itself." 
                     
     12  It was also included in 1989 SB 295, 1989 SB 356, and 1989 
AB 633. 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
15 
 
¶74 Finally, an examination of the drafting record of the 
substitute amendment to the 1989 budget bill itself and a 
comparison of the language of that bill with the language in the 
Governor's 1989 budget bill reveals that the legislature 
attempted to craft an adequate confidentiality provision.  The 
confidentiality provision of the Governor's 1989 budget bill, 
which was introduced on November 8, 1989, provided: 
 
77.97 CONFIDENTIALITY. The department may not reveal 
facts contained in a return required under s. 77.94, 
except that the department may publish statistics that 
do not reveal the identities of dealers or the contents 
of individual returns.  Dealers may not be required to 
provide any identifying information on returns.  No 
information contained in a return may be used against 
the dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless that 
information has been independently obtained, except in 
connection with a proceeding involving  possession of 
untaxed controlled substances or taxes due under s. 
77.93 from the dealer making the return.  
 
In the drafting record for the substitute amendment there is a 
memorandum dated November 8, 1989, from DOR to the Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau suggesting changes to the drug stamp tax provisions 
in the Governor's 1989 budget bill.  This memorandum makes 
specific 
suggestions 
for 
changes 
in 
the 
confidentiality 
provision: 
 
In order to preserve confidentiality, the return 
requirement should be eliminated.  Dealers should be 
able to purchase drug tax stamps on a cash basis in 
person or through the mail without having to submit a 
return which could identify them as a drug dealer. 
 
 
Giving the Department of Revenue police powers with 
respect to the drug tax would allow the Department to 
enforce 
the 
tax 
directly 
without 
involving 
law 
enforcement authorities.  This would simply [sic] 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
16 
administrative [sic] of the tax and ensure a higher 
level of confidentiality. 
 
Also included in this drafting record is a written motion by  
Representative Kunicki that follows the suggestions of DOR: 
 
Move to make the following modifications relating to 
administration and enforcement of the drug tax: 
 
 
1. Require the Department of Revenue to enforce the 
provisions of the tax, and specify that duly authorized 
employes of the Department would have all necessary 
police powers to prevent violation of these provisions. 
 
 
2. Delete the requirement that dealers must complete and 
submit tax returns in order to purchase drug stamps, and 
amend the bill's confidentiality provision to eliminate 
references to returns. 
 
Finally, the language of the substitute amendment reflects these  
changes:  
 
The department may not reveal facts obtained in 
administering 
this 
subchapter, 
except 
that 
the 
department may publish statistics that do not reveal the 
identities of dealers.  Dealers may not be required to 
provide any identifying information in connection with 
the purchase of stamps.  No information obtained by the 
department may be used against a dealer in any criminal 
proceeding 
unless 
that 
information 
has 
been 
independently obtained, except in connection with a 
proceeding involving possession of untaxed marijuana or 
controlled substances or taxes due under s. 139.88 from 
the dealer. 
 
The deletion of references to returns in the confidentiality 
provision in response to the concerns expressed by DOR provides 
further evidence that the legislature intended to provide 
complete confidentiality. 
 
¶75 I believe that the information contained in the various 
drafting records is more than sufficient to support the 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
17 
conclusion that the legislature intended to provide protection 
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment.  However, despite the 
legislature's efforts to provide protection coextensive with the 
Fifth Amendment, I believe that there is an ambiguity in the 
language of the confidentiality provision.  As the court of 
appeals astutely pointed out, "While § 139.91, STATS., prohibits 
the use of information obtained by the Department of Revenue in 
administering the tax, the presence of affixed stamps is not 
'information obtained by the department.'"  State v. Hall, 196 
Wis. 2d 850, 865, 540 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1995).  Although this 
could be read to allow the unconstitutional use of information 
gained by anyone other than the department, this court can only 
declare a statute unconstitutional if there is no viable 
alternative. 
 
¶76 In 
determining 
whether 
a 
statute 
violates 
the 
constitution, the court must give the statute a great deal of 
deference.  The party challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute 
has 
the 
burden 
to 
prove 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Carpenter, 
197 Wis. 2d 252, 263, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).   
Constitutional 
challenges to a statute must overcome a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.  State v. Theil, 188 Wis.2d 695, 706, 524 
N.W.2d 641 (1994).  In addition, the United States Supreme Court 
has stated that it must not construe a statute to violate the 
Constitution if another reasonable construction is available. 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
18 
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, __, 115 
S.Ct. 464, 472 (1994); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf 
Coast Building and Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988); National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
13  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
has also recognized this principle.  Demmith v. Wisconsin 
Judicial Conference,166 Wis. 2d 649, 665 FN 13, 480 N.W.2d 502 
(1992) ("The court must interpret a statute, if at all possible, 
in a manner that will preserve the statute as a constitutional 
enactment.");  State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 215, 378 N.W.2d 
691 
(1985) 
(There 
is 
a 
strong 
presumption 
favoring 
the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, and "[t]his court 
will construe the statute to preserve it if it is at all 
possible."); Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Directors, 83 Wis. 
2d 316, 331, 265 N.W.2d 559 (1978) (When a legislative enactment 
is attacked as being unconstitutional, "the cardinal rule of 
statutory construction is to preserve a statute and to find it 
constitutional if it is at all possible to do so." (citations 
omitted)); State ex. rel. Harvey v. Morgan, 30 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 139 
                     
     13  See also Patricia A. Burke, Note, United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc.: Stretching the Limits of Statutory 
Interpretation?, 56 La. L. Rev. 937, 943 (1996) ("The elementary 
rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in 
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.  This approach 
not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional 
issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that 
Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to 
uphold the Constitution.  The courts will therefore not lightly 
assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally 
protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
19 
N.W.2d 585 (1966) ("the duty of this court is not to impugn the 
motives of the legislature, but rather, if possible, to so 
construe the statute as to find it in harmony with accepted 
constitutional principles.") 
 
¶77 The courts of other states have used this canon of 
construction as a basis for upholding similar tax stamp laws. See 
State v. Durant; 769 P.2d 1174, 1183 (Kan. 1989) ("This court not 
only has the authority, but also the duty, to construe a statute 
in such a manner that it is constitutional if the same can be 
done within the apparent intent of the legislature in passing the 
statute."); State v. Garza, 496 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Neb. 1993) 
("State statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and when a 
law is constitutionally suspect this court will endeavor to 
interpret 
the 
statute 
in 
a 
manner 
consistent 
with 
the 
Constitution."); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 857 
(Utah 1992) ("[W]e are mindful of our power to save a statute 
from 
unconstitutionality 
by 
imposing 
on 
it 
a 
limiting 
construction.  This power permits us to uphold an otherwise 
questionable 
statute 
by 
tailoring 
it 
to 
conform 
to 
the 
Constitution, which is what we must presume the legislature 
intended.");  State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 523 (Utah App. 1990) 
("Based upon the foregoing, we find the pre-amendment Utah Drug 
Stamp Tax Act can be 'found to come within a constitutional 
framework,' by construing it to prohibit the use of any 
                                                                  
it."). 
 
No. 94-2848.JPW 
 
 
 
20 
information gained as a result of a purchaser's compliance with 
the act to establish a link in the chain of evidence in a 
subsequent drug prosecution." (citation omitted)).
14  Accordingly, 
the majority's declaration that the stamp law is unconstitutional 
is tantamount to declaring that it is not at all possible for 
this court to give the stamp law a constitutional construction.  
I disagree. 
 
¶78 I believe that a construction of Wis. Stat. § 139.91 
consistent with the intent of the legislature would render the 
stamp law constitutional.  It is clear from an examination of the 
legislative history that the confidentiality provision was 
intended to provide protection coextensive with the Fifth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, I would construe the confidentiality 
provision 
to 
preclude 
the 
use 
of 
any 
information 
not 
independently obtained in any proceeding except those related to 
the tax itself. 
 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice Donald W. 
Steinmetz and Justice N. Patrick Crooks join this dissenting 
opinion. 
 
 
                     
     14  A number of states have upheld drug tax stamp laws without 
relying on the constitutional construction argument.  Briney v. 
State Dept. of Revenue, 594 So. 2d 120 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); 
Clifft v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 641 N.E.2d 682 (Ind. Tax 
1994); Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1988); State v. 
Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1992).