Title: Fisher v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LINFORD U.  FISHER,
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§
No.  603, 2002
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below–Superior Court 
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of the State of Delaware, in 
v.
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and for Sussex County in Cr.  
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ID No.  9501022972
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: February 19, 2003
Decided:
March 19, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
O R D E R
This 19th day of March 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the
State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
On July 19, 1995, Linford U. Fisher pleaded guilty to one count
of Unlawful Penetration in the Third Degree and one count of Unlawful Sexual
Intercourse in the Third Degree.  He was sentenced on August 25, 1995, to a
total of fifteen years in prison, with credit for time served, suspended after
1State v.  Fisher, Del.  Super., Cr.A. No.  S02-02-0360, Graves, J.  (July 11,
2002).
2Fisher v.  State, 2003 WL 423449 (Del.  Supr). 
2
serving three years at Level V, for twelve years of decreasing levels of
supervision.
(2)
On February 6, 2002, Fisher was arrested and was subsequently
charged by Information with one count of Rape in the Second Degree.  As a
result of his arrest for the new sexual offense, Fisher was charged with violation
of probation (VOP).  On July 11, 2002, the Superior Court found Fisher guilty
of VOP and sentenced him to a total of twelve years at Level V, suspended after
serving five years at Level V, for seven years at Level III supervision.  
(3)
On June 14, 2002, Fisher pleaded nolo contendere to the lesser
included offense of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third Degree.  He was
sentenced, on July 11, 2002, to one year at Level V imprisonment, with credit
for 155 days served.1  Fisher appealed his Third Degree Unlawful Sexual
Contact conviction to the Supreme Court.  By Order dated February 19, 2003,
the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.2
3Super.  Ct.  R.  35(b).
3
(4)
Fisher did not appeal his VOP conviction.  Instead, on October 4,
2002, Fisher moved for a reduction of his VOP sentence.3  Fisher argued that
the sentence exceeded that which was recommended by Fisher’s probation
officer.  Fisher also argued that his advanced age and medical condition
justified a reduction in his sentence.  By order dated October 8, 2002, the
Superior Court denied Fisher’s motion.  This appeal followed.
(5)
Fisher’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Fisher’s counsel asserts that, based
upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably
appealable issues.  By letter, Fisher’s counsel informed him of the provisions
of Rule 26(c) and provided Fisher with a copy of the motion to withdraw and
the accompanying brief.  Fisher also was informed of his right to supplement
his attorney’s presentation.  
(6)
Fisher has responded with several issues that he wishes to raise on
appeal.  First, Fisher claims that the record “falls short [of] demonstrating [that]
Fisher committed a new offense” to justify his conviction of VOP.  Second,
Fisher contends that the Superior Court sentencing judge made “material false
4Penson v.  Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v.  Court of Appeals, 486 U.S.
429, 442 (1988)); Anders v.  California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
4
assumptions” and had a “closed mind” during the VOP sentencing proceeding.
Third, Fisher claims that when the Superior Court deferred sentencing on
Fisher’s nolo contendere plea, the court violated a term of the plea agreement
and invalidated “anything obtained as a result of the delayed sentencing,”
including Fisher’s VOP conviction and sentence.  The State has responded to
Fisher’s issues, as well as to the position taken by Fisher’s counsel, and has
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s decision.
(7)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration
of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is
twofold.   First, this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.
Second, this Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues
that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.4
(8)
 Fisher’s first claim of error challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his VOP conviction.  Fisher’s attempt to challenge his VOP
5Strawley v.  State, 2002 WL 86687 (Del.  Supr.).
6Doran v.  State, 1991 WL 78439 (Del.  Supr.). 
7Supr.  Ct.  R.  8; Trump v.  State, 753 A.2d 963, 971 (Del.  2000) (citing
Wainwright v.  State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100) (1986)).
8Wainwright v.  State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986).
5
conviction, however, is untimely.5  Fisher may not use this appeal, from the
denial of a reduction of sentence, to collaterally attack the merit of his VOP
conviction.6
(9)
Second, Fisher argues that the sentencing judge relied on “material
false assumptions” and exhibited a “closed mind” during the VOP sentencing
proceeding.  Fisher, however, did not raise these claims in his Rule 35(b)
motion, which was filed primarily on the basis of sentence leniency.
Consequently, having failed to raise the claims at sentencing or on appeal or in
his Rule 35(b) motion, Fisher has waived review of the claims in the absence
of plain error.7  
(10)
Plain error is “limited to material defects which are apparent on the
face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character,
and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly
show manifest injustice.”8  To constitute “plain error,” the error “must be so
9Id.
6
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity
of the trial process.”9  
(11)
There is no evidence in the record of plain error in the trial court’s
sentencing decision.  The record indicates that, when imposing the sentence, the
Superior Court judge appropriately relied upon Fisher’s lack of amenability for
any lesser sanctions and his custody status at the time of the new offense.
Moreover, the trial judge fairly considered the arguments presented by defense
counsel in mitigation as well as the letters in support of Fisher from friends in
the community and church members.    
(12)
Fisher’s claim, that deferred sentencing invalidated his VOP
conviction and sentence, is unavailing.  His claim is based upon an alleged
breach of a plea agreement in another case and has no bearing in this appeal
from the denial of a motion for sentence reduction.
(13)
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded
that Fisher’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Fisher’s counsel has made a
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conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly
determined that Fisher could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The
motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh
         Justice