Title: Mannion v. Sandel

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Mannion v. Sandel, 91 Ohio St.3d 318, 2001-Ohio-47.] 
 
 
MANNION ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SANDEL, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Mannion v. Sandel (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 318.] 
Torts — Medical malpractice — Civil procedure — New trial — Civ.R. 59(A) — 
Standard of specificity that trial court must meet as that court articulates 
the reasons behind the determination that a new trial is warranted on the 
ground that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
(No. 00-903 — Submitted February 7, 2001 — Decided April 11, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 19433. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  This case involves a trial court’s decision in a 
medical malpractice action to grant a motion for a new trial after the jury had 
rendered a verdict in favor of one of the parties.  The particular issue that arises in 
the circumstances before us concerns the standard of specificity that the trial court 
must meet as that court articulates the reasons behind the determination that a new 
trial is warranted on the ground that the verdict is against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. 
I 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
This case is a medical malpractice action for damages brought by plaintiff-
appellant Michelle L. Mannion and includes a loss-of-consortium claim of her 
husband, plaintiff-appellant Thomas Mannion.  The defendant is appellee, Allan J. 
Sandel, M.D.  Appellants’ complaint against Sandel was filed on October 9, 1996, 
in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas.  The case proceeded to jury trial 
on November 10, 1997. 
 
The testimony presented at trial established that Mrs. Mannion was 
diagnosed with breast fibroadenomas and benign tumors in 1988.  On January 17, 
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1989, appellee performed a bilateral mastectomy and subcutaneously placed 
polyurethane-foam-covered breast implants.  Subsequently, appellant experienced 
infection, pain, and drainage to the left breast, and the left nipple sloughed off, 
exposing the implant.  Appellee performed a second surgery to remove 
appellant’s infected left breast implant.  On July 18, 1989, appellee again 
performed surgery to subcutaneously reinsert a new polyurethane-foam-covered 
left breast implant.  Within a few months, appellant’s left breast implant 
developed an open lesion, resulting in drainage, infection, and pain, and 
warranting emergency room visits.  On September 20, 1990, appellant was 
admitted to the hospital and administered intravenous antibiotics, which were 
ineffective.  Appellee again performed surgery to remove the implant. 
 
From 1990 to 1993, the wound on appellant’s left breast failed to heal, 
resulting in pieces of polyurethane foam coming to the surface and emerging 
through the lesion.  Appellee contended that there was no reason to remove the 
remaining polyurethane foam from the left breast implant, since it was working its 
way out on its own. 
 
Appellant continued to experience difficulties with the breast implant, and 
in August 1993, she went to see Zaheer Shah, M.D.  Shah told her that both the 
right implant and the residual polyurethane foam on the left side needed to be 
removed immediately.  The right breast implant and residual polyurethane foam 
from the left breast area were removed by Shah, leaving appellant with no 
implants and virtually no breast tissue. 
 
Appellants’ expert witness, Dr. Philip Lipkin, testified that the standard of 
care required submuscular rather than subcutaneous implants for appellant.  He 
further testified that this submuscular procedure had been in place since the early 
1980’s because of concern about compromised blood supply to the skin.  Lipkin 
opined that appellee’s decision to use subcutaneous placement rather than 
submuscular was not up to the standard of care in 1989.  Moreover, Lipkin 
January Term, 2001 
3 
testified as to the standard of care involved in removing a polyurethane-coated 
implant.  He further testified that due to appellee’s use of subcutaneous placement 
(as opposed to submuscular implantation), appellant suffered skin loss, infection, 
and implant exposure, which ultimately required total removal of the implants. 
 
Appellee’s expert, Dr. Brian Windell, similarly testified that the standard 
of care that existed in 1989 would have required appellee to attempt to remove all 
of the polyurethane foam fragments during the removal of the infected implant. 
 
After the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee, appellants filed a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new 
trial.  The trial court overruled the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and granted the motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(6), finding that 
the judgment was not sustained by the weight of the evidence.  Appellee appealed 
the granting of the motion for a new trial to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, 
which, in a two-to-one decision, reversed the order of the trial court. 
 
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
II 
Specificity Pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A) 
 
Civ.R. 59(A) provides: 
 
“A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part 
of the issues upon any of the following grounds: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(6)  The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence * * *.” 
 
Civ.R. 59(A) goes on to provide that “[w]hen a new trial is granted, the 
court shall specify in writing the grounds upon which such new trial is granted.” 
 
The order granting the new trial at issue in this case provided: 
 
“The Court has reviewed the testimony of the experts who appeared at the 
trial of this matter.  The Plaintiff[s’] and Defendant’s experts testified that certain 
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of the Defendant’s conduct violated the standard of care.  Both doctors testified 
that by failing to remove the polyurethane foam coating of Plaintiff’s left breast 
implant upon removal of the implant, the Defendant violated the standard of care 
as it existed at the time. 
 
“Therefore, there is evidence that, on at least one of Plaintiff[s’] claims 
regarding the negligent removal of Plaintiff’s left implant, the jury should have 
found that the Defendant did not meet the standard of care.  In order to correct a 
manifest injustice, the Plaintiff[s’] Motion for a New Trial is granted.” 
 
The issue before this court is whether the order of the trial court in 
granting the motion for a new trial complied with Civ.R. 59(A) as the rule was 
interpreted by this court in Antal v. Olde Worlde Products, Inc. (1984), 9 Ohio 
St.3d 144, 9 OBR 392, 459 N.E.2d 223. 
 
In assessing the propriety of the trial court’s compliance, we are guided by 
Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 52 O.O.2d 376, 262 N.E.2d 685, 
paragraph one of the syllabus: 
 
“Where a trial court is authorized to grant a new trial for a reason which 
requires the exercise of a sound discretion, the order granting a new trial may be 
reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court.” 
 
In Antal, 9 Ohio St.3d at 147, 9 OBR at 395, 459 N.E.2d at 226-227, the 
court stated: 
 
“The question remains as to how specific must a trial court be when 
granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the manifest weight 
of the evidence.  The record of the case at bar reveals that the trial court 
articulated no reasons whatsoever, other than stating generally that the jury’s 
verdict was not ‘sustained by the weight of the evidence.’  While the 
determination of whether a trial court’s statement of reasons is sufficient should 
be left to a case-by-case analysis, we can say with a reasonable degree of certainty 
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that such reasons will be deemed insufficient if simply couched in the form of 
conclusions or statements of ultimate fact.  [Citation omitted.] 
 
“Consequently, we hold that, when granting a motion for a new trial based 
on the contention that the verdict is not sustained by the weight of the evidence, 
the trial court must articulate the reasons for so doing in order to allow a 
reviewing court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering a new trial.”  See id. at syllabus. 
 
In its entry the trial court stated that both experts “testified that by failing 
to remove the polyurethane foam coating of Plaintiff’s left breast implant upon 
removal of the implant, the Defendant violated the standard of care as it existed at 
the time.”  The foregoing language of the trial court cannot be construed as being 
“simply couched in the form of conclusions or statements of ultimate fact,” as was 
found inadequate in Antal.  There can be no hard-and-fast rule set forth by this 
court as to sufficiency of the grounds specified by a trial court in support of the 
determination that a new trial is warranted.  We adhere to the necessity of case-
by-case determinations as set forth in Antal. 
 
The majority of the court of appeals stated in the opinion below that it was 
appropriate to apply a more stringent standard when dealing with the setting aside 
of a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence than for other new trial 
orders under Civ.R. 59(A).  However, courts of appeals are required to follow the 
law as it is interpreted by this court.  We decline to extend the rule of Antal to 
require a more stringent standard of specificity in setting forth reasons for 
granting a new trial in a situation such as the case sub judice. 
 
The trial court decision to grant a new trial in this case is subject to the 
same abuse-of-discretion standard discussed in Antal.  “[A] reviewing court 
should view the evidence favorably to the trial court’s action rather than to the 
jury’s verdict.  The predicate for that rule springs, in part, from the principle that 
the discretion of the trial judge in granting a new trial may be supported by his 
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having determined from the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the 
trial that the jury’s verdict resulted in manifest injustice.”  Jenkins v. Krieger 
(1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 314, 320, 21 O.O.3d 198, 202, 423 N.E.2d 856, 860. 
 
It is not the place of this court to weigh the evidence in these cases.  In 
reviewing the order of the trial court, we first find that sufficiently detailed 
reasoning was specified in writing to allow an appellate court to conduct a 
meaningful review to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering a new trial. 
 
Furthermore, after a thorough review of the record, we find that there has 
been no showing that the trial court’s order was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable.  See Rohde, 23 Ohio St.2d at 87, 52 O.O.2d at 378-379, 262 
N.E.2d at 689; Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448, 19 O.O. 148, 31 
N.E.2d 855, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Therefore, we find no abuse of 
discretion. 
III 
Conclusion 
 
The trial court’s order articulated reasons for granting a new trial 
sufficient for appellate review in accordance with the requirements of Civ.R. 
59(A) and of Antal.  In addition, the trial court’s order did not constitute an abuse 
of discretion.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this 
cause to the trial court for a new trial on all counts. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Chattman, Gaines & Stern, John V. Scharon, Jr., Dale A. Nowak and 
Michael B. Michelson, for appellants. 
January Term, 2001 
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Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Lynn L. Moore and Marie L. 
Perella; Edminster & Associates and Michael E. Edminster, for appellee. 
__________________