Title: GLEN R. WAYT V. HEATHER M. URBIGKIT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GLEN R. WAYT V. HEATHER M. URBIGKIT2007 WY 34152 P.3d 1057Case Number: 06-125Decided: 03/02/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
GLEN R. 
WAYT,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
HEATHER 
M. URBIGKIT,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Pro se.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Marvin L. Bishop, III of Bishop, Bishop & Yaap, Casper, Wyoming. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Glen R. Wayt 
appeals from the district court's summary judgment order quieting title to 
certain NatronaCounty real property in 
Heather M. Urbigkit.  He claimed 
that a warranty deed which conveyed property from him to Ms. Urbigkit was forged 
and was not supported by adequate consideration.  The district court relied upon the 
statutory presumption of correctness afforded to documents supported by a 
notary's certificate and granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Urbigkit.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Wayt, who 
appears pro se, does not set out a 
separate statement of appellate issues as required by W.R.A.P. 7.01.  The discussion section of his brief, 
however, contains three different arguments:

 
 

1.                  
The 
district court erred as a matter of law in granting defendant summary judgment 
because the court failed to recognize that plaintiff's submissions of 
affirmative evidence were sufficient to overcome the presumptive validity of the 
notarization of the warranty deed under Wyoming Statutory Law § 34-2-114, 
creating a question of fact.

 
 

2.                  
The 
district court erred in recognizing a lis 
[pendens] notice and reconveyance were determinative as a matter of law when 
the decision went on to consider the question of fact as to plaintiff's motive 
for the transfer of property.  
Further, the court failed to consider that the plaintiff and defendant 
stood on equal ground[] with regard to the alleged potential of government 
forfeiture of the property at the time of [] the alleged 
transfer.

 
 

3.                  
The 
district court failed to recognize that there was a question of fact with regard 
to adequacy of consideration when defendant's evidence as to consideration was 
conflicting, and the fact that no consideration for the transfer of the property 
occurred.

 
 
Ms. 
Urbigkit phrases the appellate issues as:

 
 
A.        Did the 
District Court err in holding that Appellant has failed to present clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that his signature 
on the notarized Warranty Deed is valid?

 
 
B.        Did the 
District Court commit error in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment 
by holding that since Appellant stated under oath he transferred the real 
property to Appellee by Warranty Deed that he is not allowed to recant in an 
effort to regain title to the property?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On September 17, 
1999, a warranty deed conveying certain NatronaCounty property from Mr. Wayt to Ms. 
Urbigkit was recorded in the county clerk's office.  The deed, dated August 5, 1999, 
purportedly contained Mr. Wayt's signature and was notarized by Donald Painter, 
a Casper 
attorney and notary public, who has since died.    It also recited that the 
conveyance was given "for and in consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other 
good and valuable consideration in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledged."     

 
 
[¶4]      On April 26, 
2005, Mr. Wayt filed an action to quiet title to the property in him.  He claimed he was the rightful owner of 
the property because his signature on the deed was forged and he had not 
received any consideration for the transfer.  Ms. Urbigkit denied Mr. Wayt's 
allegations and counterclaimed to have the title to the property quieted in her 
name.    

 
 
[¶5]      The parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment.  
In support of his claim that the deed was forged, Mr. Wayt filed 
affidavits indicating he had been incarcerated since July of 1999; he had not 
signed any legal documents, including the deed, during his incarceration; Mr. 
Painter's notarization certifying that Mr. Wayt acknowledged the deed before him 
on August 5, 1999, was false; and he did not receive any consideration for the 
conveyance.  Mr. Wayt also presented 
the affidavit of the Natrona County Detention Center Administrator who stated 
his records did not indicate either Mr. Painter or Ms. Urbigkit had visited Mr. 
Wayt in jail on the date the deed was signed and notarized.  Consequently, Mr. Wayt argued Mr. 
Painter could not have notarized his signature on the deed on that date.  He also referred to a letter dated 
September 3, 1999, (after the date on the warranty deed) in which Mr. Painter 
had asked him to sign the deed.   

 
 
[¶6]      Ms. Urbigkit 
filed an affidavit in support of her summary judgment motion and in opposition 
to Mr. Wayt's motion.  She stated 
that Mr. Wayt conveyed the property to her in consideration for work she 
performed for his businesses over a period of several years.  In addition, Ms. Urbigkit presented a 
sworn statement from a lis pendens 
notice included in an earlier civil action between the parties, in which Mr. 
Wayt stated he conveyed the property to her.      

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court granted Ms. Urbigkit's summary judgment motion and denied Mr. Wayt's 
motion, ruling that the notarized deed was presumptive evidence that Mr. Wayt 
acknowledged the deed before the notary public and Mr. Wayt had failed to 
present clear, cogent and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption.  The district court also concluded Mr. 
Wayt could not take the position that he did not sign the deed when he had 
admitted he made the conveyance in the prior civil action.  Mr. Wayt appealed the district court's 
summary judgment order to this Court. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      On appeal, we review a district court's 
summary judgment order de novo.  Carlson v. Flocchini Invs., 2005 WY 19, 
¶ 9, 106 P.3d 847, 852 (Wyo. 2005).

 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   W.R.C.P. 56(c); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 
1083 (Wyo. 
1999).  We use the same materials 
and follow the same standards as the district court did when it initially 
considered the motion.  Carlson, ¶ 9, 106 P.3d  at 851-52.  We examine the record from the 
standpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Id.  See also, Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶¶ 6-7, 
86 P.3d 270, 274 (Wyo. 2004).  A 
fact is material if it would have the effect of establishing or refuting an 
essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties.  Id.

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Wayt claimed his signature on 
the deed was forged.  A forged deed 
is void and is wholly ineffective to pass title.  23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 164 (2002).  In Wyoming, a deed must be properly 
acknowledged.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-113 (LexisNexis 2003).   
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-107 (LexisNexis 2005), if any document 
is notarized, the facts contained in the notary's certificate are presumed 
correct.  That statutory provision 
states:

 
 
            
In all the courts within this state the certificate of a notary public 
over his hand and official seal, shall be received as presumptive evidence of 
the facts contained in such certificate;  
provided, that any person interested as a party to a suit may contradict, 
by other evidence, the certificate of a notary public.

 

Id.  

 
 
[¶11]   Cases considering this provision 
have applied the well-settled rule that, to rebut the presumption that the facts 
contained in the notary's certification are true, the challenging party must 
provide cogent, clear and convincing evidence of their falsity.  See, e.g., Rowray v. Casper Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 48 
Wyo. 290, 310, 45 P.2d 7, 14 (Wyo. 1935); Goodson 
v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 463, 243 P.2d 163, 
173 (Wyo. 
1952).  Furthermore, the unsupported 
testimony of the grantor typically is not sufficient to overcome a certificate 
regular on its face.  Rowray, 45 P.2d  at 14.  
 

 
 
[A]s 
a general rule, such testimony should be supported either directly by testimony 
corroborative of the grantor's assertions, or by evidence of facts and 
circumstances that render the grantor's testimony very probable; and in 
connection with the clear and consistent statements of the grantor make the 
proof of the falsity of the certificate satisfactory and 
convincing.

 
 

Id.  The purpose behind this rule is to 
provide certainty and security in the realm of real property title.  Id. at 14-15.  

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Painter's notary certificate 
indicated Mr. Wayt acknowledged the deed before him on August 5, 1999.  Mr. Wayt claims that he provided 
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of Mr. Painter's notary 
certificate and raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his 
signature was forged.  He points to 
his averment that he did not sign the deed before Mr. Painter on August 5, 1999, 
and the detention officer's affidavit indicating his records did not show that 
Mr. Painter visited him at the jail on the date in question.  He also claims the September 3, 1999, 
letter addressed to him from Mr. Painter asking him to sign the deed gives rise 
to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the deed was properly 
signed and acknowledged.  

 
 
[¶13]   To counter Mr. Wayt's position, Ms. 
Urbigkit executed an affidavit stating that she had worked for Mr. Wayt for 
several years in various business enterprises and had not received a salary from 
him.1  She stated that, after Mr. Wayt was 
arrested in July of 1999, he told her he was going to convey the property to her 
in consideration for her work.  Ms. 
Urbigkit averred that Mr. Wayt directed her to contact Mr. Painter to prepare 
the deed and she did.  She stated 
that she subsequently received the signed and recorded deed from Mr. 
Painter.     

 
 
[¶14]   Ms. Urbigkit also presented a 
document from an earlier civil action Mr. Wayt brought against her.  That action included a lis pendens notice pertaining to the 
property at issue here, in which Mr. Wayt stated under oath:  

 
 
            
This property was conveyed by myself to Heather M. Urbigkit in document 
no. 642082, recorded September 17, 1999, subject to the unrecorded reconveyance 
from Heather M. Urbigkit to myself, copy attached and made a part of 
herewith.

 
 
Ms. 
Urbigkit argued the sworn statement amounted to an admission by Mr. Wayt that 
the conveyance was, in fact, signed by him.  Mr. Wayt responded that the lis pendens did not accurately express 
what he was trying to say and his position had always been that the document was 
fraudulent.   

 
 
[¶15]   A party is entitled to a summary 
judgment only when there are no genuine issues of material fact.  In making that determination, we must 
consider the level of proof required to ultimately prevail on the claim.  For example, in fraud cases, where the 
plaintiff must prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence, we have 
stated that in order to counter a summary judgment motion the opponent "must 
demonstrate genuine issues of material fact even at the summary judgment stage 
by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence."  Phillips v. Toner, 2006 WY 59, ¶ 22, 133 P.3d 987, 996 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶16]   As we explained above, there is a presumption in favor of the 
correctness of a notary's certificate.  
Rowray, 45 P.2d  at 14.  In order to overcome the presumption, the 
grantor must present cogent, clear and convincing evidence that the certificate 
is false and the grantor's uncorroborated testimony is not sufficient to 
overcome the presumption.  
Id.  Mr. Wayt argues he overcame the 
presumption by presenting the jail records, which indicated Mr. Painter did not 
visit him in the jail on August 5, 1999, and the September 3, 1999, letter from 
Mr. Painter asking him to sign the deed.    Although this evidence does 
seem to facially corroborate Mr. Wayt's position that he did not sign the deed 
before Mr. Painter on August 5, 1999, it does not prove Mr. Painter never 
notarized his signature on the deed.  
At most, it establishes that there may be a question of fact about the 
date the deed was signed and acknowledged.     

 
 
[¶17] 
Moreover, Mr. Wayt's sworn statement in the lis pendens notice effectively prevents 
him from being able to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard necessary 
to overcome the presumption that the facts contained in the notary certificate 
are true.  In his sworn lis pendens notice, Mr. Wayt stated he 
conveyed the property to Ms. Urbigkit and even recited the recording 
information.2  He also stated the conveyance was made 
subject to a subsequent re-conveyance from Ms. Urbigkit; however, that alleged 
promise is not the legal issue presented here.  On these facts, the district court 
correctly ruled, as a matter of law, Mr. Wayt did not overcome the presumption 
in favor of the notary's certificate and rejected Mr. Wayt's forgery claim.  

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Wayt also claims summary 
judgment was improper because issues of fact existed as to the adequacy of the 
consideration for the conveyance. The district court's summary judgment order 
did not address this issue.  The 
warranty deed recited consideration of ten dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration.  Mr. Wayt maintained 
he did not receive any consideration from Ms. Urbigkit for conveying the 
property to her.  Mr. Painter's 
September 3, 1999, letter indicated he understood the consideration was $5,000 
which had been previously exchanged by the parties.  Ms. Urbigkit averred the consideration 
for the transfer was the work she performed for several years for Mr. Wayt's 
various businesses.  Mr. Wayt claims 
an issue of material fact exists because of the inconsistency between the 
various accounts of the consideration for the conveyance.   

 
 
[¶19]   The factual dispute about the type 
or amount of the consideration for the deed is irrelevant.  The deed included the recital that the 
conveyance was made in consideration of ten dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration and Mr. Wayt acknowledged receipt of the consideration.  "The acknowledgement of the receipt of 
consideration in a deed is prima facie evidence of that fact.  A rebuttable presumption of the payment 
of valuable consideration is raised by the recital."  23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 80 (2002).  Although there were different accounts 
regarding the type and amount of consideration given for the transfer, Mr. Wayt 
did not present any evidence, other than his own uncorroborated statement, to 
rebut the presumption that he received some good and valuable consideration for 
the conveyance.  Consequently, no 
issues of material fact exist as to the adequacy of the consideration.  

 
 
[¶20]   Moreover, the law is well 
established that, as between the parties, a deed for conveyance of real property 
is good without consideration so long as there is no wrongful act, such as fraud 
or undue influence, on the part of the grantee.  See, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 841 P.2d 831, 
837 (Wyo. 1992); Maurer v. Ballou, 440 P.2d 126, 128 
(Wyo. 1968); Strom v. Felton, 76 Wyo. 370, 302 P.2d 917 (Wyo. 1956). Mr. Wayt has not presented 
evidence showing Ms. Urbigkit committed any wrongful act with regard to the 
conveyance.  In fact, in his 
response to Ms. Urbigkit's summary judgment motion, he conceded she may not have 
known the deed was forged.  Thus, he 
is not entitled to have the deed cancelled for a lack of consideration.  

 
 
[¶21]   The district court properly granted 
Ms. Urbigkit's summary judgment motion and quieted title to the property in 
her.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The parties 
indicated in court documents that they had been involved in an intimate 
relationship for approximately ten years before Mr. Wayt was 
incarcerated.

    

2The district 
court included a discussion in its summary judgment order regarding Mr. Wayt's 
possible motivation for conveying the property to Ms. Urbigkit.  Relying on a federal drug case involving 
Mr. Wayt, the district court apparently believed he may have transferred the 
property to avoid seizure of the property by the federal government.  Mr. Wayt argues the district court 
improperly decided a factual issue when it speculated on his motivation for the 
transfer.  We need not address this 
matter because Mr. Wayt's motivation for the conveyance is irrelevant to the 
issues presented here.