Title: Bevel v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and 
McClanahan, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
JAMES LUTHER BEVEL 
 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
v.  Record Nos. 102246 & 102323 
LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
November 4, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In these appeals, we consider what effect the death of a 
convicted criminal defendant has on a pending appeal and the 
underlying criminal prosecution.  Our consideration of these 
issues invokes the determination of the extent of the 
application of the so-called "abatement doctrine" in such 
instances under the law of Virginia.  We have not addressed 
this issue previously in a reported opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
Because the issues raised by these appeals concern only 
the proceedings that followed the defendant's death, a brief 
summary of the underlying criminal conviction of the 
defendant will suffice.  On May 21, 2007, James Luther Bevel 
was indicted by the Grand Jury in the Circuit Court of 
Loudoun County for violating Code § 18.2-366 by having sexual 
relations with his daughter who was at the time between the 
ages of 13 and 18.  The felony indictment was founded on an 
allegation made by Bevel's adult daughter that her father had 
sexual relations with her repeatedly during a two-year period 
 
2 
between 1992 and 1994 while they were living in Loudoun 
County.  At trial, the victim testified that these acts of 
sexual abuse began when she was 6 years old and living in 
another state.  Bevel was convicted in a jury trial on April 
10, 2008.  The circuit court entered a final sentencing order 
on October 27, 2008, imposing the jury's verdict of 15 years 
imprisonment and a fine of $50,000.   
The following facts reflect the procedural history of 
the subsequent appeals in this case.  On November 4, 2008, 
Bevel's counsel, from the Office of the Public Defender, 
noted an appeal of Bevel's conviction.  On December 8, 2008, 
counsel filed a notice of filing of transcripts, thus 
completing the record of the trial for transmission to the 
Court of Appeals as required by Rule 5A:8(b).  The record was 
duly received by the Court of Appeals, and the appeal was 
assigned Record Number 2646-08-4 (hereafter, "the merits 
appeal"). 
On December 29, 2008, Bevel's counsel filed a "notice of 
death" in the circuit court and the Court of Appeals averring 
that Bevel had died on December 19, 2008.  Simultaneously, 
counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel in the Court of 
Appeals, asserting that as a result of Bevel's death she was 
unable to proceed with the representation as she "no longer 
[had] a client with whom to consult or from whom to take 
 
3 
direction regarding this appeal."  Within none of these 
pleadings did counsel request that the prosecution abate.  On 
January 23, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the motion to 
withdraw as counsel. 
Thereafter, Bevel's counsel filed a "motion to dismiss" 
in the circuit court.  Within the motion, counsel noted that 
Code § 8.01-20 allowed, in the discretion of the court, for 
the abatement of a civil case in which a party had died while 
the case was pending appeal.  Conceding that there were no 
reported appellate cases in Virginia addressing the abatement 
or dismissal of a criminal prosecution in such circumstances, 
counsel noted that in a prior unreported decision the circuit 
court had ruled that when a defendant dies while his appeal 
is pending, "[the] conviction must be dismissed."  Counsel 
further averred that abatement ab initio of criminal 
convictions when the defendant dies while the conviction is 
pending appeal is the rule in a majority of other 
jurisdictions that have considered the question.  By an order 
dated February 26, 2009, the circuit court denied the motion 
to dismiss. 
On March 25, 2009, Bevel's counsel filed a "motion to 
abate conviction ab initio" in the Court of Appeals.  
Reciting the same argument for abatement of the entire case 
as that contained in the motion to dismiss filed in the 
 
4 
circuit court, counsel further noted that continuation of the 
appeal was "inappropriate as counsel for the deceased cannot 
fulfill . . . her ethical obligations, to wit: counsel cannot 
communicate with her client and therefore lacks authority 
either to proceed with the appeal or to withdraw the appeal."  
She further maintained that the Commonwealth would suffer no 
prejudice from the abatement of the conviction "as it can 
neither retry the accused if his appeal succeeds nor impose 
punishment upon the accused if his appeal fails."  The 
Commonwealth did not file a response to this motion to abate. 
On March 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals entered an order 
suspending the time for filing the necessary petition for 
appeal in the merits appeal.1  On August 26, 2009, the Court 
                     
1 Although Bevel’s counsel had done all that was required 
to advance the appeal from the circuit court to the Court of 
Appeals, unless and until a timely petition for appeal was 
filed the appeal would not have been perfected, thus, the 
Court suspended the time for filing the petition in order to 
give consideration to the motion to abate.  In criminal cases 
in Virginia, other than in cases where a sentence of death is 
imposed, the awarding of an appeal is discretionary and not a 
matter of right.  Code § 17.1-406(A)(i); see, e.g., West v. 
Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 340-41, 597 S.E.2d 274, 280 
(2004) (holding that a merits review is undertaken only after 
an appeal is granted and only as to the issues accepted by 
the Court).  As will be explained below, in some 
jurisdictions abatement ab initio applies only when a 
convicted defendant dies and at that time he was entitled to 
an appeal of right or where a discretionary appeal had 
already been granted.  Although Bevel had not yet perfected 
his discretionary appeal on the merits of his conviction, we 
emphasize that our resolution of these appeals does not rest 
 
5 
entered an order remanding the case to the circuit court 
"with instructions to hold a hearing and to abate the 
prosecution ab initio, unless good cause is shown by the 
Commonwealth not to do so." 
The circuit court complied with the mandate of the Court 
of Appeals' order by conducting a hearing on September 10, 
2009.  In support of its contention that the conviction 
should not abate, the Commonwealth presented testimony from 
the victim and one of her sisters who also claimed that Bevel 
had sexually abused her.  Both women stated, among other 
reasons, that they opposed having the conviction abate 
because acknowledgement by the court of their father's guilt 
provided them with a sense of closure and validation. 
On September 30, 2009, the circuit court entered an 
order denying the motion to abate Bevel's conviction, finding 
that the Commonwealth had an interest in maintaining the 
conviction for the benefit of the victim and as a "powerful 
symbol" that a guilty verdict represents.  The court further 
concluded that following conviction the presumption of 
innocence no longer applied and, thus, abatement should not 
be favored in such cases.  For these reasons, the court ruled 
                                                               
on the fact that his appeal was discretionary, not of right, 
and had not yet been granted. 
 
6 
that the Commonwealth had established good cause for not 
abating the conviction. 
Bevel's counsel noted an appeal from the judgment of the 
circuit court finding that there was good cause not to abate 
the conviction.  The Court of Appeals treated the appeal as 
if it were from a separate proceeding and assigned it Record 
Number 2373-09-4 (hereafter, "the good cause appeal").  After 
receiving briefs and hearing oral argument, the Court issued 
an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment of the circuit 
court.  Bevel v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2373-09-4 
(September 14, 2010).   
The Court of Appeals first reviewed similar cases in 
that Court and in the Supreme Court, noting that prior 
dispositions of criminal appeals when the defendant had died 
were inconsistent, with the appellate court in which the 
appeal was pending sometimes abating the conviction and other 
times simply dismissing the appeal and leaving the conviction 
intact.  Id., slip op. at 5-6.  Thus, the Court concluded 
that there was no clear authority in Virginia for routinely 
abating a criminal conviction ab initio when the defendant 
dies while pursuing an appeal.  Id., slip op. at 6.   
The Court then considered whether the circuit court had 
correctly determined the factors to consider in determining 
whether there was good cause not to abate the conviction and 
 
7 
whether it properly applied the facts from the hearing in 
determining that Bevel's conviction should not abate.  The 
Court held that these matters were committed to the circuit 
court's discretion and found no abuse of that discretion.  
Id., slip op. at 7.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the 
judgment of the circuit court refusing to abate Bevel's 
conviction.  Id., slip op. at 8. 
On October 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a rule 
to show cause in the merits appeal, which required Bevel's 
counsel to show why that appeal should not be dismissed as 
moot in light of the Court's judgment in the good cause 
appeal.  In her response to the show cause, Bevel's counsel 
maintained that dismissal of the merits appeal would be 
premature, as a petition for rehearing en banc was pending in 
the good cause appeal, and, failing that, she intended to 
appeal the judgment to this Court.  Counsel also contended 
that the dismissal of the merits appeal would render the 
appeal of the abatement issue equally moot, and deny the 
Court of Appeals sitting en banc and this Court jurisdiction 
to consider whether abatement had been properly denied.  
Notably, although counsel referenced an assertion made by the 
Commonwealth in the circuit court "that Mr. Bevel's death 
should not necessarily act as a bar to hearing the [appeal 
from the underlying conviction] on its merits," she did not 
 
8 
retreat from the position first stated in her motion to 
withdraw as counsel that she could not ethically pursue the 
appeal, nor did she contend that the appeal could go forward 
in its current posture without an appellant or with the 
substitution of a personal representative of Bevel's estate 
or other party.  Rather, counsel only requested that the 
merits appeal remain suspended while she pursued the appeal 
of the abatement issue. 
After the petition for rehearing en banc on the good 
cause issue was denied, Bevel's counsel noted an appeal of 
that judgment to this Court on November 1, 2010.  On November 
16, 2010, the Court of Appeals entered an order in the merits 
appeal dismissing the appeal as moot.  Counsel noted an 
appeal from this judgment as well.  By orders dated May 5, 
2011, we awarded appeals from the Court of Appeals' judgments 
in the good cause appeal (our Record Number 102246) and the 
merits appeal (our Record Number 102323), consolidating the 
appeals for briefing and argument. 
DISCUSSION 
While we have not previously addressed in a reported 
opinion what effect the death of a criminal defendant has on 
a conviction or an appeal that is pending at the time of the 
defendant's death, the issue has arisen in several prior 
appeals before this Court.  As the Court of Appeals noted in 
 
9 
its opinion and we acknowledge, there has been a disparity in 
the treatment of such cases, which have always been disposed 
of by an unpublished order.  Compare, e.g., Isaac v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 102208 (March 30, 2011) (firearms 
possession appeal abated ab initio) and Alaia v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 011575 (March 15, 2002) (capital 
murder appeal abated ab initio) with Barber v. Commonwealth, 
Record Nos. 930409 & 930492 (November 9, 1993) (capital 
murder appeal dismissed as moot).   
In these previous cases, however, the orders were 
entered solely in response to a notice of the defendant’s 
death from his counsel or the Commonwealth.  The present case 
presents the first opportunity this Court has been given to 
address the issue of abatement after receiving briefs and 
argument of counsel.  Accordingly, we are of opinion that the 
prior orders in which abatement was applied have no 
precedential value.  Cf. Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 
410-12, 559 S.E.2d 616, 618-19 (2002) (holding that with 
respect to unpublished order denying a petition for appeal, a 
clear statement of the grounds for the denial "is 
indispensable in assessing its potential applicability in 
future cases" and that "unless the grounds upon which the 
[denial] is based [are] discernable from the four corners of 
the . . . order, the denial carries no precedential value"). 
 
10 
We begin by first considering the historical context of 
the abatement doctrine.  We further consider how it has been 
applied to criminal prosecutions in other jurisdictions.   
Abatement is the dismissal or discontinuance of a legal 
proceeding "for a reason unrelated to the merits of the 
claim."  Black's Law Dictionary 3 (9th ed. 2009).  Abatement 
can occur in civil cases for a variety of reasons, see 1 Am. 
Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival §1 (2006), but in 
criminal prosecutions abatement traditionally has been 
limited to circumstances where the defendant dies prior to a 
final resolution of the case in the trial court.  It is clear 
that when a defendant dies before the trial court has 
confirmed a verdict by a final order of judgment, the death 
of the defendant causes the prosecution to abate.  United 
States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 874 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(citing United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 
1993)); see also United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 
(9th Cir. 1983).  Obviously, subsequent to the death of the 
defendant there is no one upon whom the trial court can 
impose a final judgment.  When final judgment of conviction 
has been entered in the trial court, however, there is less 
certainty as to the effect of the death of the defendant at 
the time he was pursuing, or at least had the opportunity to 
pursue, a direct appeal of the conviction. 
 
11 
The origin of the abatement doctrine as applied to 
criminal appellate cases is unclear, with little or no 
evidence of its application prior to the late nineteenth 
century.  See Timothy A. Razel, Note, Dying to Get Away With 
It: How The Abatement Doctrine Thwarts Justice-And What 
Should Be Done Instead, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2193, 2198 (2007).  
These early decisions were occasionally quite terse and 
provide little insight into the reasons the courts elected to 
abate a case or not, or even as to what aspect of the case 
was being abated – the appeal only or the entire prosecution.  
See, e.g., List v. Pennsylvania, 131 U.S. 396, 396 (1888) 
(per curiam) (dismissing a writ of error because "this cause 
has abated"); O'Sullivan v. People, 32 N.E. 192, 194 (Ill. 
1892) (per curiam) (denying motion to consider an appeal and 
render judgment nunc pro tunc because "the writ of error 
abated upon the death" of the defendant); March v. State, 5 
Tex. Ct. App. 450, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1879) (granting a 
"motion to abate the proceedings"). 
The modern statement of the abatement doctrine is found 
in Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971)(per 
curiam), in which the United States Supreme Court held that 
"death pending direct review of a criminal conviction abates 
not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the 
prosecution from its inception."  The defendant in Durham 
 
12 
died after filing a petition for a writ of certiorari.  The 
Supreme Court granted the defendant's writ, vacated the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit affirming his conviction, and 
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss the indictment.  Id.  Justice Blackmun dissented, 
contending "the situation is not one where the decedent 
possessed, and had exercised, a right of appeal."  Id. at 484 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Thus, rather than abating the 
entire proceeding, Justice Blackmun contended that the proper 
remedy was to "merely dismiss the decedent's petition for 
certiorari," noting further that "[i]f, by chance, the 
suggestion of death has some consequence upon the survivor 
rights of a third party (a fact not apparent to this Court), 
the third party so affected is free to make his own timely 
suggestion of death to the court of appeals."  Id. at 484-85. 
Just five years later in Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 
325, 325 (1976) (per curiam), the Supreme Court, with only 
Justice White dissenting, overruled Durham.  In a concise 
opinion, the Court denied Dove's petition for certiorari 
because he had died before the petition was heard, overruling 
Durham "[t]o the extent that [it] may be inconsistent with 
this ruling."  Id.  Subsequently, however, the federal 
circuit courts have concluded that Dove did not abrogate the 
abatement doctrine entirely for criminal cases, but only for 
 
13 
those cases that had concluded their initial appeals.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th 
Cir. 1977) ("We do not believe that the Court's cryptic 
statement in Dove was meant to alter the longstanding and 
unanimous view of the lower federal courts that the death of 
an appellant during the pendency of his appeal of right from 
a criminal conviction abates the entire course of the 
proceedings brought against him").   
Nonetheless, the circuits are divided on how the 
abatement doctrine applies in specific cases, such as whether 
an order of restitution abates along with other aspects of 
the conviction.  Compare United States v. Christopher, 273 
F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding restitution order 
does not abate); United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 
179-80 (4th Cir. 1984) (same), with United States v. Rich, 
603 F.3d 722, 728-31 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding restitution 
order does abate); United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 
F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same); United States 
v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); see 
also John H. Derrick, Annotation, Abatement Effects of 
Accused's Death Before Appellate Review of Federal Criminal 
Conviction, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 446 (1986 & Supp. 2011). 
Among the states, the treatment of the abatement 
doctrine is even more multifarious.  Although the issue is 
 
14 
most frequently framed as being a choice between abatement ab 
initio of the entire prosecution or dismissal of the appeal 
only, there are at least seven categories of policies on 
abatement:  (1) abatement ab initio when the defendant dies 
pending resolution of his appeal; (2) abatement ab initio 
when the appeal at issue is an appeal of right; (3) abatement 
ab initio when the court has granted a discretionary 
application for review, thereafter treating the case as if 
the appellant had been given an appeal of right; (4) the case 
is not abated and the appeal may be prosecuted; (5) the case 
is not abated ab initio, but the appeal may not be 
prosecuted; (6) a personal representative may be substituted 
to avoid abatement ab initio; or, (7) the appeal abates 
without addressing whether the proceedings are abated ab 
initio.  United States v. Rorie, 58 M.J. 399, 402 (C.A.A.F. 
2003) (citing Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Abatement of State 
Criminal Case by Accused's Death Pending Appeal of Conviction 
- Modern Cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 189 (1990 & Supp. 2002)).  Thus, 
although most courts and commentators agree that abatement in 
some form is the majority position in the federal and state 
courts, see, e.g., Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1046 (Md. 
2006) (Greene, J., dissenting); Ex parte Estate of Cook, 848 
So. 2d 916, 918 (Ala. 2002), it is also true that a modern 
trend has been to limit or modify the application of the 
 
15 
doctrine, or dispense with it entirely, though this remains a 
minority view.  See, e.g., State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 
759-60 (Alaska 2011); Surland, 895 A.2d at 1039; State v. 
Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 133 (Idaho 2005). 
Given the diversity of opinion in the application of the 
abatement doctrine, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
doctrine's legal underpinnings are not well established.  As 
one court has observed, "[d]espite the common acknowledgment 
that abatement ab initio is a well-established and oft-
followed principle . . . few courts have plainly articulated 
the rationale behind the doctrine."  Parsons, 367 F.3d at 
413.  This is so, apparently, because the abatement doctrine, 
at least as applied to criminal prosecutions "is largely 
court-created."  Id. at 414.  It does not appear that 
abatement of a criminal case is addressed by statute in any 
jurisdiction in the United States, see Razel, supra, at 2197-
98, nor is the ability to challenge abatement addressed by 
any statutory scheme providing for victim's rights.  Douglas 
E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims' Interests In Judicially 
Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1135, 1159 
(2007). 
 
16 
Against this background, we now turn to the issues 
raised in these appeals.2  The thrust of Bevel's counsel 
contentions is that under the abatement doctrine, "death [of 
the defendant] during the pendency of a direct appeal 
necessitates abatement of the conviction ab initio."  The 
Commonwealth responds that the abatement doctrine is founded 
upon a false premise that a convicted defendant who dies 
while his appeal is pending would have ultimately prevailed 
and been exonerated.  The Commonwealth contends that the 
modern trend in jurisdictions that have examined the issue is 
to dismiss the appeal, leaving the conviction intact, because 
on appeal there is no presumption of innocence and the 
conviction is presumed to be correct.   
The Commonwealth further contends that abatement "is 
also outdated because it rests on the premise that criminal 
convictions and sentences serve only to punish the 
                     
2 For the reasons that will become apparent, we do not 
reach the assertions of Bevel's counsel in the good cause 
appeal that the Court of Appeals erred in creating a "good 
cause" exception to the abatement doctrine and remanding the 
case to the circuit court for a hearing whether good cause 
existed to deny the motion to abate.  The Court of Appeals 
stated in its opinion that Bevel failed to present argument 
on this issue and, thus, had waived this issue on appeal.  
Bevel, slip op. at 7 n.4.  Although the Court of Appeals went 
on to review and approve the circuit court's application of 
the "good cause" exception, id., slip op. at 11-12, Bevel's 
counsel did not assign error to the Court's determination 
that the issue was waived. 
 
 
17 
convicted."  The modern trend, according to the Commonwealth, 
recognizes "that the criminal justice system does not only 
serve to punish, but it also serves to protect and compensate 
crime victims."  We believe that the Commonwealth’s 
contentions have merit. 
Reviewing the authorities cited above, it seems clear 
that the determination of various courts whether to abate a 
conviction ab initio when the defendant has died while his 
appeal was pending, to merely dismiss the appeal and leave 
the conviction intact, or to apply some intermediate 
solution, rests largely on the individual court's 
consideration of the purpose of the punishment imposed on the 
defendant, the interest of society in acknowledging the fact 
of his offense, and the potential effect on the victim or 
victims of the offense in erasing that fact.  We are of 
opinion, however, that such policy determinations fall 
outside the scope of the authority granted to the appellate 
courts of this Commonwealth by the Virginia Constitution and 
by statute.   
Likewise, to the extent that such authority might derive 
from the common law of England as applicable in Virginia at 
the time of the founding of the Jamestown colony in 1607, 
 
18 
Code §§ 1-200 and -201,3 we find no support for the notion 
that a criminal proceeding necessarily would abate following 
conviction if the defendant were to die while he might yet 
have obtained relief through a writ of error or some other 
process equivalent to a direct appeal.  To the contrary, the 
authorities are consistent in affirming that at common law an 
attainder of felony would not be affected by the death of the 
defendant, but that his executor or heirs could pursue a writ 
of error in his stead.  See, e.g., 4 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *391-92; 2 William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 
654 (John Curwood, ed., 8th ed. 1824).  The rule appears to 
derive from the case of Marsh and his Wife, found in the 
reports of Sir George Croke for the Easter Term of the 
                     
3 As we recently explained in construing and applying 
Code §§ 1-200 and -201, 
 
our adoption of English common law, and the rights 
and benefits of all writs in aid of English common 
law, ends in 1607 upon the establishment of the 
first permanent English settlement in America, 
Jamestown.  From that time forward, the common law 
we recognize is that which has been developed in 
Virginia.  More simply stated, English common law 
and writs in aid of it prior to the settlement of 
Jamestown (insofar as the same are consistent with 
the Bill of Rights and Constitution of the 
Commonwealth and the Acts of Assembly), together 
with common law developed in Virginia thereafter, 
constitute the corpus of common law that guides our 
analysis. 
 
Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 82, 705 S.E.2d 503, 508-
09 (2011). 
 
19 
Queen's Bench in the 33rd (1590-91) and 34th (1591-92) years 
of the reign of Queen Elizabeth I.  See Marsh & his Wife, 
(1790) 78 Eng. Rep. 481 (Q.B.); Cro. Eliz. 225 (holding that 
"[a]n executor may bring a writ of error to reverse the 
outlawry for felony of his testator"), continued sub nom.  
Marshe's Case, (1790) 78 Eng. Rep. 528 (Q.B.); Cro. Eliz. 273 
(same). 
We conclude that if it is to be the policy in Virginia 
that a criminal conviction necessarily will abate upon the 
death of the defendant while an appeal is pending and whether 
there should be a good cause exception in that policy, the 
adoption of such a policy and the designation of how and in 
what court such a determination should be made is more 
appropriately decided by the legislature, not the courts.  
See, e.g., Uniwest Constr., Inc. v. Amtech Elevator Servs., 
280 Va. 428, 440, 699 S.E.2d 223, 229 (2010)("The public 
policy of the Commonwealth is determined by the General 
Assembly [because] it is the responsibility of the 
legislature, not the judiciary . . . to strike the 
appropriate balance between competing interests.")(internal 
quotation marks omitted).  For these reasons, we hold that 
the Court of Appeals erred in applying the abatement doctrine 
to Bevel's criminal appeal.  In light of this holding, the 
remainder of Bevel's counsel's assignments of error relating 
 
20 
to the proceedings in the circuit court and the subsequent 
review of those proceedings in the Court of Appeals are now 
moot.  Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals in Record Number 102246 (the good cause appeal). 
We now turn to the sole issue raised by Bevel's counsel 
in the merits appeal, which is whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in dismissing the appeal of Bevel's conviction on its 
merits as moot on account of his death.  As we have already 
indicated, Bevel's counsel's objection to the dismissal of 
the appeal by the Court of Appeals was not based upon any 
contention that the appeal could go forward, but rather was 
based only on the concern that dismissal of the underlying 
appeal would result in the Court of Appeals and this Court 
losing jurisdiction over the issue of abatement.  Having 
resolved the abatement issue, we conclude that under the 
facts and procedural posture of this case, proceeding on the 
merits would be a pointless exercise, as there is no party 
seeking to prosecute the appeal.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Record Number 102323 
(the merits appeal) dismissing Bevel's appeal of his 
conviction as moot.   
In doing so, however, we expressly do not address 
whether in all cases an appeal on the merits of a criminal 
conviction would become moot on the death of the defendant.  
 
21 
It is conceivable that in a case where a criminal conviction 
could have a significant negative impact on a deceased 
defendant's estate or the rights of his heirs or another 
party, the appeal could be prosecuted by a substituted party 
as was allowed under the common law of England before 1607.  
But, as neither Bevel's counsel nor the Commonwealth has 
argued for such a remedy, or even averred that it would be 
practical in this particular case, we leave that issue to 
another day. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals applying the abatement doctrine.  We will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, under the 
specific facts and procedural posture of this case, holding 
that Bevel's death renders the appeal of his conviction moot. 
          Record No. 102246 – Vacated. 
          Record No. 102323 – Affirmed.