Title: PUBLIC UTILITIES COM'N v. Colorado Motorway, Inc.

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

437 P.2d 44 (1968) The PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff in Error, v. COLORADO MOTORWAY, INC., Defendant in Error. No. 21526. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 5, 1968. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert P. Fullerton, Robert Lee Kessler, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff in error. David Butler, Holland & Hart, Denver, for defendant in error. KELLEY, Justice. The Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado (Commission) instituted on its own motion a proceeding "for the purpose of a general investigation of sightseeing and charter service covering services, authorities and the interpretation thereof * * * for the purpose of adopting rules and regulations therefor." A notice of the hearing was sent to all parties in interest, well over one hundred in number, of whom twenty-three appeared and participated. One of those which appeared *45 and participated in the hearing was Colorado Motorway, Incorporated (Motorway), owner of Private Permit B-277 and the defendant in error. Following the conclusion of the hearing the Commission issued two decisions, one relating to rules governing sightseeing and charter operators, and the other, Decision No. 56824, relating to Permit B-277. We are concerned only with Decision No. 56824 (the decision). It appears from the record that Permit B-277 was "unrestricted" so far as intrastate transportation of passengers was concerned, except as limited by statute. C.R.S. '53, 115-11-1(8) (b). The breadth of authority of Permit B-277 was altered and amended by the decision in these words: Being unhappy with the decision, Motorway, pursuant to C.R.S. '53, 115-6-15, applied to the district court for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the decision inquired into. The district court, in compliance with statutory edict (115-6-15), reviewed the record as certified to it by the Commission "to determine whether the Commission has [had] regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under review violates [violated] any right of the petitioner [Motorway] under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Colorado, and whether the order of the Commission is [was] just and reasonable and whether its conclusions are [were] in accordance with the evidence * * *." The district court reversed the order of the Commission. We affirm the judgment of the district court. We can summarize Motorway's challenge in the district court to the legality of Decision No. 56824, so far as it is deemed necessary to a disposition of the issues here for review, thusly: The district court, in its findings, meticulously reviewed the entire proceedings before the Commission from the order instituting the investigation to the rendering of its decision. An excerpt from the findings by the trial court is significant background for the rule of law which we apply in this decision. The trial court observed: We would add that Louis J. Carter, Supervisor of Complaints and Investigations for the Commission, testified that he had received complaints from virtually every carrier participating in the hearing relating to violations by virtually every other carrier. *46 In addition, in answer to questions relating to the background of the investigation, he testified that (Questions omitted for ease of continuity): The trial court in its findings concluded that Decision No. 56824 of the Commission could not withstand the statutory and constitutional challenges raised by Motorway. In passing, it observed that: The Commission, in justification of its Decision No. 56824, claims that: And that: It also contends that its "interpretation" of Permit No. B-277 was correct and should be upheld "unless clearly erroneous." In our disposition of this appeal we do not reach this argument. There is no question, as an abstract proposition of law, that the Commission has broad constitutional and statutory authority. However, the breadth of that authority is to be tested by the statutes themselves and not by the unbridled whim of the Commission. The Commission is a creature of statute. Both the power and scope of its authority and its procedures are necessarily controlled by the Act upon which it relies. Industrial Commission v. Plains Utility Company, 127 Colo. 506, 259 P.2d 282; Snell v. Public Utilities Commission, 108 Colo. 162, 114 P.2d 563. In its brief the Commission cites as authority for this broad power the case of Denver & South Platte Railway Co. v. City of Englewood, 62 Colo. 229, 161 P. 151, 4 A.L.R. 956, and Public Utilities Commission v. City of Loveland, 87 Colo. 556, 289 P. 1090. The first case was a contest between a municipality and the P. U. C. as to which had the authority to regulate a public utility operating within the municipality. The municipality relied upon a contract with the utility entered into prior to the creation of the P. U. C. The legislature had never delegated to cities and towns the power to regulate rates. The Commission, however, was subsequently given that power by the legislature *47 and it prevailed. In its decision this court pointed out that The mere fact that the legislature provided for judicial review is indicative of its intention that the Commission adhere strictly to the law. In the Loveland case, supra, the court noted: The Commission seeks to justify its Decision No. 56824 upon the basis of its recognized authority to interpret or clarify the scope of authority which it has theretofore granted. No one questions its authority to "interpret," nor for that matter to regulate, but Motorway has questioned whether the restrictions imposed under the guise of "interpretation" can be accomplished in a general investigation. The defendant in error contends that the Commission must proceed under C.R.S. '53, 115-11-8 and cites Snell v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, in support of its position. This court, in Snell, stated: Likewise, in the case before us, the provisions of C.R.S. '53, XXX-XX-XX, should have been strictly adhered to. In not doing so, the Commission exceeded its authority and it denied procedural "due process" to Motorway in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Armour Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania Public U. Com'n, 138 Pa.Super. 243, 10 A.2d 86, an opinion which reviews "procedural due process," in quoting Hughes, J., in Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388, 393, 58 S. Ct. 334, 82 L. Ed. 319, held that in addition to a fair and open hearing, "There must be due notice and an opportunity to be heard," and "the procedure must be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial, and the Commission must act upon evidence and not arbitrarily." The court continued: See also, Furniture Capitol T. Lines v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Com'n, 340 Mich. 173, 65 N.W.2d 303; Public Utilities Com'n of Colorado v. Donahue, 138 Colo. 492, 335 P.2d 285. The Public Utilities Commission, in a general investigation held for the purpose *48 of promulgating rules and regulations, cannot, regardless of the type of evidence that may be presented to it, revoke, amend or alter permits or certificates of participating parties. It must comply with the statutory procedural requirements which would legally justify the end sought to be accomplished, issue a notice, hold a hearing at which the respondent is given an opportunity to defend itself, and finally, enter its decision in accordance with the evidence. Anything less will not satisfy the statute nor that quality of fairness required by "procedural due process." The trial court measured the proceedings before the Commission by the foregoing rule and found that it did not regularly pursue its authority, and that the rights of Motorway under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Colorado were violated. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.