Title: Nickel v. United States

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 22 

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP987 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In the Matter of the Rehabilitation of: 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corporation: 
 
Ted Nickel and Office of the Insurance 
Commissioner, 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
Ambac, 
          Interested Party-Respondent, 
United States of America, 
          Interested Party-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Access To Loans for Student Loan Corporation, 
Assured Guaranty Corporation, Aurelis Capital 
Management LP, Bank of America, N.A., Bank of 
New York Mellon, Countrywide Home Loans 
Servicing L.P., Customer Asset Protection  
Company ("CAPCO"), Depfa Bank, plc, Deutsche 
Bank National Trust Company, Deutsche Bank Trust 
Company Americas, Eaton Vance, Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), Federal 
National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), 
Fir Tree Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co., Inc., HSBC 
Bank USA, National Association, King Street 
Capital Master Fund, Ltd., King Street Capital, 
L.P., Knowledgeworks Foundation, Lloyds TSB Bank 
plc, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Nuveen 
Asset Management, One State Street LLC, PNC 
Bank, Restoration Capital Management LLC, Stone 
Lion Capital Partners LP, Stonehill Capital 
Management LLC, Treasurer of the State of Ohio, 
U. S. Bank National Association, Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., Wells Fargo Bank, National 
Association as Trustee for the LVM Bondholders,  
Wilmington Trust Company and Wilmington Trust 
FSB, 
          Interested Parties. 

 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 8, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
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

 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
William D. Johnston 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. concurs. (Opinion filed).     
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the interested party appellant-petitioner, there were 
briefs filed by Richard D. Humphrey, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
Madison and Anthony T. Sheehan, with the U.S. Department of 
Justice, Washington D.C., and oral argument by Anthony T. 
Sheehan. 
 
For the interested party respondent, there was a brief 
filed by Daniel W. Stolper, Barbara A. Neider and Stafford 
Rosenbalm, LLP, Madison and Richard W. Reinthaler, Peter A. 
Ivanick, Henry J. Ricardo, Emily L. Saffittz and Dewey & 
LeBoeuf, LLP, New York. 
 
For the petitioners-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Michael B. Van Sicklen, Naikang Tsao, Matthew R. Lynch and Foley 
& Lardner, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Michael B. Van 
Sicklen. 


2012 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP987 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV1576) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Rehabilitation of: 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corporation: 
 
 
 
Ted Nickel and Office of the Insurance 
Commissioner, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
Ambac, 
 
          Interested Party-Respondent, 
 
United States of America, 
 
          Interested Party-Appellant-
Petitioner, 
 
Access To Loans for Student Loan Corporation, 
Assured Guaranty Corporation, Aurelis Capital 
Management LP, Bank of America, N.A., Bank of 
New York Mellon, Countrywide Home Loans 
Servicing L.P., Customer Asset Protection 
Company ("CAPCO"), Depfa Bank, plc, Deutsche 
Bank National Trust Company, Deutsche Bank 
Trust Company Americas, Eaton Vance, Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), 
Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie 
Mae"), Fir Tree Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co., 
Inc., HSBC Bank USA, National Association, King 
Street Capital Master Fund, Ltd., King Street 
Capital, L.P., Knowledgeworks Foundation, 
Lloyds TSB Bank plc, Monarch Alternative  
 
FILED 
 
MAR 8, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 



Capital LP, Nuveen Asset Management, One State 
Street LLC, PNC Bank, Restoration Capital 
Management LLC, Stone Lion Capital Partners LP, 
Stonehill Capital Management LLC, Treasurer of 
the State of Ohio, U. S. Bank National 
Association, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Wells 
Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee for 
the LVM Bondholders, Wilmington Trust Company 
and Wilmington Trust FSB, 
 
          Interested Parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case requires us to 
answer a threshold question concerning whether an appeal in this 
insurance company rehabilitation case may go forward.  The court 
of appeals granted the motion of the Office of the Commissioner 
of Insurance (Commissioner) to dismiss the appeal by the United 
States.1 The Commissioner had argued that the appeal should be 
dismissed either on the grounds that the notice of appeal was 
fundamentally defective such that the court of appeals had no 
jurisdiction or on the grounds that the United States had waived 
its right to appeal issues by failing to appear in the circuit 
court.  The United States Department of Justice attorney who 
signed the notice of appeal was not admitted to practice law in 
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1 In the Matter of the Rehab. of: Segregated Account of 
Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 2011AP987, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. May 3, 2011).  
No. 
2011AP987   

3 
 
Wisconsin and had not obtained pro hac vice admission. The court 
of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal did not include a 
signature of an "attorney of record" as Wis. Stat. § 802.05 
requires.  The court of appeals did not decide the waiver issue 
but dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.  The United States 
petitioned this court for review, which we granted.  We affirm 
the court of appeals on the basis of waiver.   
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶2 
The United States seeks to pursue an appeal of a 
circuit court order confirming a rehabilitation plan2 for the 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. (Ambac).  The 
account had been created under Wis. Stat. § 611.24(2)3 with the 
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2 Chapter 645, the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation 
Act, sets forth the process of a rehabilitation proceeding, a 
process created by statute to "protect the interests of the 
insureds, creditors and the public generally" by intervening to 
prevent the failure of a financially troubled insurance company.  
Wis. Stat. § 645.01(4)(2009-10).  All subsequent references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless 
otherwise indicated.  The procedures set forth in this chapter 
are created as the alternative to bankruptcy proceedings, which 
are prohibited by statute for insurers. Wis. Stat. § 645.035(2).   
3 Wis. Stat. § 611.24(2), titled "Optional segregated 
accounts," states, "With the approval of the commissioner, a 
corporation may establish a segregated account for any part of 
its business. The commissioner shall approve unless he or she 
finds that the segregated account would be contrary to the law 
or to the interests of any class of insureds."  The Comment adds 
clarification as follows:  
Sub. (2) provides for optional segregated accounts 
under any circumstances the corporation wishes, if the 
separation meets the commissioner's approval. This 
[in] effect extends to all insurance the liberality of 
former 
s. 
206.385(1), 
but 
protects 
insureds 
by 
requiring the commissioner's approval.  . . . .  The 
No. 
2011AP987   

4 
 
approval of the Commissioner in response to Ambac's rapidly 
deteriorating financial condition and the need to protect its 
policyholders.  As the court stated in the decision and final 
order, "Recognizing that a full rehabilitation or liquidation 
would have triggered covenants across almost all policies and 
caused other adverse consequences and collateral damages, OCI 
determined that a segregated account approach would have the 
most beneficial outcome for all policyholders."  In other words, 
the step was taken to segregate some of Ambac's most potentially 
damaging liabilities so that losses from those did not trigger a 
meltdown that would be catastrophic for its policyholders.  The 
Segregated Account was therefore separated from the "General 
Account" and capitalized through "a Secured Note for $2 billion 
and 
an 
Excess-of-Loss 
Reinsurance 
Agreement." 
 
The 
Commissioner's proposed rehabilitation plan for the Segregated 
Account was presented to the Circuit Court for Dane County, with 
the Honorable William D. Johnston, Lafayette County Circuit 
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basic 
idea 
behind 
segregated 
accounts 
is 
that 
different operations can be kept independent without 
formally creating a separate corporation. A segregated 
account is in some respects like a “corporation within 
a corporation”. Its legal nature and treatment is 
prescribed in sub. (3). Sub. (3)(a) requires that a 
segregated account be equipped with an adequate share 
of the corporation's capital and surplus. This is 
indispensable if the account is to be expected to 
function and survive like a separate corporation.  
Legislative Council Note, 1971, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 611.24 (West 
2006). 
 
No. 
2011AP987   

5 
 
Court, presiding by designation.  The rehabilitation plan was 
ultimately confirmed.  
¶3 
The order confirming the plan contained a provision4 
enjoining the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and other parties 
from 
pursuing 
claims 
against 
the 
Segregated 
Account 
and 
reserving exclusive jurisdiction over "any such actions, claims 
or lawsuits." The United States filed an appeal of the order 
because the Internal Revenue Service had made a tentative tax 
refund to Ambac of more than $700 million, and the potential 
liability related to that refund had become a part of the 
rehabilitation proceeding. The type of refund involved, a 
tentative carryback adjustment,5 is made with the understanding 
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4 The Decision and Final Order states that "prior orders of 
this Court shall remain in full force and effect," incorporating 
its prior injunction prohibiting the IRS from "commencing or 
prosecuting any actions, claims, lawsuits or other formal legal 
proceedings" against several entities, including the Segregated 
Account of Ambac Assurance Corporation.  
5 The tentative refund was made pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 
6411, which requires the IRS to refund allegedly overpaid 
corporate taxes within 90 days of an application by a corporate 
taxpayer and states in part,  
A taxpayer may file an application for a tentative 
carryback adjustment of the tax for the prior taxable 
year affected by a net operating loss carryback 
provided in section 172(b), by a business credit 
carryback provided in section 39, or by a capital loss 
carryback provided in subsection (a)(1) or (c) of 
section 1212, from any taxable year.  
See 15 Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 58:103 
("Since refunds pursuant to a claim could take several years, 
taxpayers in this situation can get immediate refunds of 
overpayments by filing an application for a prompt tentative 
refund."). 
No. 
2011AP987   

6 
 
that the IRS is entitled to verify the basis for the refund and 
recover any amounts it determines were erroneously refunded.6  In 
the course of the rehabilitation proceedings, the Segregated 
Account had been allocated by Ambac any liabilities arising from 
a review of that refund.        
¶4 
That allocation had occasioned an amendment to the 
Segregated Acount's plan of operation on November 8, 2010, as 
well as an order for temporary supplemental injunctive relief, 
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6 The United States Tax Court described the steps taken by 
the 
Commissioner 
of 
Internal 
Revenue 
regarding 
tentative 
carryback adjustments under 26 U.S.C. § 6411 as follows: 
Upon receiving an application for a tentative refund, 
the Commissioner is required within a 90–day period to 
undertake a “limited examination” of the application 
to discover omissions and errors of computation, 
determine the amount of the decrease in the tax 
occasioned by the carryback, and make the appropriate 
credit or refund. See sec. 6411(b); sec. 1.6411–3, 
Income Tax Regs. 
The tentative refund provisions were designed to give 
financially ailing taxpayers a quick infusion of cash 
without subjecting the claim to the delay attending a 
formal examination, as well as to provide relief from 
the 
strict application of the annual accounting 
period. Because of the limited time within which 
respondent must act, if he is to act at all, on an 
application for tentative carryback adjustment, the 
formal examination of whether the taxpayer is entitled 
to retain the tentative refund necessarily happens 
after the refund payment has been made.  
When it turns out (or respondent determines after a 
more leisurely examination) that a taxpayer is not 
entitled to retain a tentative refund, respondent has 
three remedies to recover the tentative refund.  
Acme Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1208, *22 (T.C. 2003) (citations omitted). 
No. 
2011AP987   

7 
 
which made the earlier injunction that had been entered in March 
applicable to the newly allocated contingency liabilities from 
the tentative refund.  The United States immediately received 
notice of the temporary injunction concerning the contingent 
liabilities.  Representatives of the IRS were personally served 
the next day, on November 9, 2010, with written notice of the 
order for temporary injunctive relief. The order included 
instructions for any party wishing to seek "modification or 
dissolution" of part or all of the order to "fil[e] a written 
motion with [the circuit court] no later than 45 days" after the 
issuance of the order.  The United States was also served by 
mail on November 10, 2010, with written notice of the dates of 
the upcoming confirmation hearing for the rehabilitator's plan 
of rehabilitation.  The written notice provided to the IRS also 
directed interested parties to a court-approved web site where 
all filings and notices in the case were compiled for the 
convenience of the parties.   
¶5 
Despite receiving notice, the United States filed no 
written motion in the circuit court seeking the modification or 
dissolution of the order and remained absent during the five 
days of the confirmation hearing.7      
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7 A hearing was later put on the rehabilitation court's 
calendar at the request of the Commissioner to address the 
United States' objections to the order, with notice provided to 
the United States. That hearing was eventually removed from the 
court's calendar following the United States' efforts in federal 
court to obtain an injunction to bar the circuit court from 
holding the hearing. 
No. 
2011AP987   

8 
 
¶6 
On January 24, 2011, having heard five days of 
testimony and one day of argument, and having ruled on scores of 
motions from parties in interest, the circuit court issued its 
decision and final order granting the Commissioner's motion for 
confirmation of the rehabilitation plan.  The United States then 
filed a notice of appeal, stating that it was seeking to 
"preserve its right to appeal within the Wisconsin state court 
system" but asserting that "the Court of Appeals . . . should 
hold this appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of the federal 
appeals."  In a later filing with the court of appeals, the 
United States restated its reason for filing the notice of 
appeal:  
The United States also has consistently asserted: (1) 
that it does not admit that the Wisconsin state courts 
have properly asserted jurisdiction over the United 
States; (2) that the federal courts, not Wisconsin 
state courts, properly have jurisdiction over the 
issues raised by the United States; and (3) that it 
was appealing to this Court only to preserve its 
Wisconsin appellate rights should the Seventh Circuit 
hold that the United States had to pursue its rights 
in the Wisconsin Courts.   
(The federal appeals were appeals taken by the United States of 
adverse decisions in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin, which had twice rebuffed attempts 
No. 
2011AP987   

9 
 
by 
the 
United 
States 
to 
circumvent 
the 
circuit 
court's 
injunction.8)   
¶7 
The court of appeals disregarded the United States' 
suggestion that it hold the appeal in abeyance.  Rather, the 
court of appeals found that due to a defect in the filing of the 
notice of appeal, it had no jurisdiction. It therefore granted 
the motion by the Commissioner to dismiss the United States' 
appeal.  The court of appeals concluded that contrary to 
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8 In the cases——the first a removal of the case to the 
federal court and the second a collateral attack seeking a 
federal injunction dissolving the circuit court's order——the 
district court had ruled that Wisconsin law "vests jurisdiction 
in the state rehabilitation court over matters related to the 
rehabilitation of an insurer" and that " [the district court] 
lacks jurisdiction over this case." In the Matter of the 
Rehabilitation of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp.: 
Nickel v. United States (Nickel I), 782 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 
(W.D. Wis. 2011); United States v. Wis. State Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty. (Nickel II), 767 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (W.D. Wis. 2011).  
The rulings in both cases have been appealed, and the appeals 
are currently pending in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  
(The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
issued an order in the first of the appeals requesting a 
memorandum to answer the question of why the appeal should not 
be dismissed in light of the fact that orders remanding for a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction are not reviewable.  Nickel 
v. United States, No. 11-1158 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011) ("In the 
present case, the district court explicitly determined that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and sent the case back to 
state court. As such, it appears that the order is not 
reviewable.").)  See ¶26 and ¶¶30-31 infra, for further 
discussion of the district court's analysis. 
No. 
2011AP987   

10 
 
appellate rules,9 the IRS's notice of appeal was "signed by 
someone who was not authorized to do so without first taking 
additional measures to obtain pro hac vice status." In the 
Matter of the Rehab. of: Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corp., No. 2011AP987, unpublished slip op. at 9 (Wis. Ct. App. 
May 3, 2011).  The Department of Justice attorney who signed the 
document had neither obtained admission to practice law in 
Wisconsin nor requested pro hac vice admission.  Viewing that 
violation of the rule as "a fundamental defect which cannot be 
corrected," the court of appeals dismissed the IRS's appeal.  
Id.    
¶8 
Before this court, the parties disagree as to whether, 
under Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 23.02(2), pro hac vice 
admission is required for a United States Department of Justice 
attorney appearing in Wisconsin courts, and whether preemption 
by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
renders 
any 
Wisconsin 
provision 
that 
would 
require 
such 
admission inapplicable to a United States Department of Justice 
attorney.  The parties also disagree about whether the United 
States, by failing to challenge the injunction when it had the 
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9 The rules cited by the court of appeals were the 
subscription requirement of Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (which states 
that a paper "shall be signed by at least one attorney of record 
in the attorney's individual name" on behalf of a party) and the 
rules authorizing licensed Wisconsin attorneys and attorneys 
licensed elsewhere who have been authorized to appear pro hac 
vice to serve as attorneys of record. See SCR 23.02(1) and 
10.03(4)(b).  
No. 
2011AP987   

11 
 
opportunity to do so in the circuit court, waived its right to 
appeal the order.10  
¶9 
What is inescapable in reviewing the record in this 
case is the sense that the United States almost begrudgingly 
took steps "to preserve its right to appeal" in only the most 
technical 
sense 
while, 
ironically, 
overlooking 
fundamental 
appellate principles establishing what parties must do to 
preserve that right:  raise their issues in the circuit court in 
the first instance.  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal 
on the basis of an unauthorized signature on the notice of 
appeal.  In reaching our conclusion, we focus not on the 
signature, but on the fact that the notice of appeal itself was 
the only effort by the United States to involve itself with the 
circuit court.  It did, as noted, attempt to remove this matter 
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10 We use the word "waiver" here, as both parties do in 
their filings, to mean failing to raise and preserve an issue 
before the circuit court, which is consistent with the use of 
the word "waiver" by this court in many cases cited herein.  
See, 
e.g., State 
v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶¶32-35, 235 
Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. Courts have often used the words 
"waiver" and "forfeiture" interchangeably.  However, there are 
cases which make a distinction between the act of failing 
(whether by accident or by strategic intention) to assert a 
right, which is characterized in those cases as "forfeiture," 
and the act of affirmatively and deliberately relinquishing a 
right, which in those cases is denominated as "waiver."  See 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993), State v. 
Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶28, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  As an 
example of the type of right in the second category in a 
criminal 
context and an analysis of whether it can be 
relinquished, see State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 673, 563 
N.W.2d 528 (1997) (holding that a defendant cannot waive the 
statutory right to be present at sentencing).  Koopmans is not 
applicable in the context presented here.   
No. 
2011AP987   

12 
 
to federal court.  Despite its apparent outrage at the 
injunction (in one filing to the court of appeals it stated, 
"[W]e are not aware of any other creditor that was so 
mistreated"), the United States chose to remain on the sidelines 
while the rehabilitation was proceeding in the circuit court and 
chose not to raise its objections until after the final order 
was entered.   
¶10 The United States conceded at oral argument that it 
made an intentional decision not to litigate any of the issues 
involved in the circuit court.  Our case law is clear and 
consistent:  failure to preserve issues at the circuit court 
means 
that 
they 
are 
waived. 
 
Applying 
well-established 
principles of law that apply equally to the government when it 
is a party, we hold that such a decision precludes the United 
States from pursuing relief in the court of appeals. We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals to dismiss 
the United States' appeal.  
II. 
BACKGROUND 
¶11 As is clear from the lengthy summary above, this case 
arises in the context of a large and complex proceeding, but the 
question presented by this appeal is a narrow one.  The question 
we address is whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing 
the appeal.  The United States asks us to reverse that threshold 
determination 
and 
remand 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals.  
Alternatively, it asks for a remand to permit the court of 
appeals to consider exercising its discretion under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2011AP987   

13 
 
§ 752.35 to hear the appeal in spite of any defect in the notice 
of appeal that would otherwise preclude review. 
 
¶12 The context in which this case arises is the financial 
crisis that began unfolding in 2007.  Ambac, which had for 
nearly 30 years been a large insurer of financial guarantees, 
had insured financial products that are by now notorious for 
their risks, such as residential mortgage-backed securities, 
credit default swaps, and commercial asset-backed securities.  
As the scale of the risks associated with these financial 
products became clear and Ambac's potential losses mounted, the 
Commissioner took steps to prevent the company's collapse.   
¶13 The timeline for the rehabilitation case begins on 
March 24, 2010, when the Commissioner filed a petition, pursuant 
to the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 645, asking that the circuit 
court for Dane County rehabilitate the Segregated Account.  As 
part of the rehabilitation, the Commissioner filed a motion, 
which the circuit court granted, to obtain "first-day injunctive 
relief" to bar entities from proceeding against the Segregated 
Account.  The rehabilitation proceeded. Dozens of entities filed 
motions to intervene.  
¶14 On November 8, 2010, the Commissioner submitted a 
notice of amendment to the plan of operation for the Segregated 
Account and moved for Temporary Supplemental Injunctive Relief, 
which the court granted ("the November Order").  The November 
Order stated that "[c]ounsel for [the Commissioner of Insurance 
for the State of Wisconsin] shall promptly serve copies of this 
Order on . . . the Department of Treasury – Internal Revenue 
No. 
2011AP987   

14 
 
Service, and any other party-in-interest [the Commissioner of 
Insurance] 
believes 
is 
directly 
affected 
by 
this 
Order, 
including those who have appeared in these rehabilitation 
proceedings."  The November Order also stated,  
If any interested parties believe any portion of this 
Order is unwarranted by the facts or the law, such 
parties may seek modification or dissolution of part 
or all of this Order by filing a written motion with 
this Court no later than 45 days following the 
issuance of this Order.  If one or more such timely 
motions are received, the Court may set a schedule for 
responsive 
briefing and a hearing regarding the 
modifications or dissolutions sought.   
 
It is not disputed that the Commissioner served the IRS copies 
in compliance with the November Order.  There is no dispute that 
despite receiving notice of this order as well as notice of the 
scheduled hearings, the IRS filed no written motion with the 
circuit court seeking modification of the order and made no 
appearance at the hearings. 
¶15 Rather than seeking modification or dissolution of the 
injunction, the United States removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin on 
Dec. 8, 2010.   On January 12, 2011, the district court held a 
hearing on the Commissioner's motion to remand to the Dane 
County Circuit Court and the United States' motion "to dissolve 
the order entered in the state court enjoining the United States 
from taking certain actions related to the potential tax 
No. 
2011AP987   

15 
 
liability of Ambac Assurant Corp."  The district court in its 
subsequent decision concluded that "removal of the state court 
injunction matter is preempted under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
which leaves to the states the business of insurance."  In the 
Matter of the Rehabilitation of Segregated Account of Ambac 
Assurance Corp.:  Nickel v. United States  (Nickel I), 782 F. 
Supp. 2d 743, 744 (W.D. Wis. 2011).  It also concluded that "the 
principles of comity and federalism set forth in Burford v. Sun 
Oil Co. require abstention in this case."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Significantly, the district court stated, 
The United States has not argued that its claims 
cannot be heard in the rehabilitation proceeding. The 
state rehabilitation court has allowed entities with 
an interest in the rehabilitation an ongoing right to 
be heard and apply for relief. . . . As other 
claimants have done, the United States may present its 
challenges to the state court, argue its position on 
the merits and if the result is unsatisfactory, appeal 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Court 
of 
Appeals.  
 
Id. at 752.  The district court quoted from a United States 
Supreme Court opinion11 which had denied a similar attempt to 
change the forum:  "We cannot see that there would be impairment 
of any rights the United States may possess, or any sacrifice of 
its proper dignity as a sovereign, if it prosecuted its claim in 
the 
appropriate forum where the funds are held."  Id.  
Concluding that removal was improper, the district court on 


11 United States v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust, 296 U.S. 463, 480-81 
(1936). 
No. 
2011AP987   

16 
 
January 14, 2011, granted the motion to remand the case to the 
Circuit Court for Dane County.  
¶16 On January 24, 2011, the circuit court entered a 
final, appealable order approving the Segregated Account's plan 
of rehabilitation; the order left in place the earlier temporary 
injunction against the IRS and other parties.   
¶17 The United States then filed a separate suit under the 
district court's original jurisdiction seeking both injunctive 
and declaratory relief.  That suit was also dismissed, on 
February 18, 2011, again for lack of jurisdiction.  As noted 
above, appeals from both of those cases are currently pending in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.12  
¶18 On March 9, 2011, in its first filing in this action 
in the Wisconsin courts, the United States filed a timely notice 
of appeal of the circuit court's final order concerning the 
rehabilitation plan.  The United States' notice of appeal was 
signed by an attorney in the Tax Division of the United States 
Department of Justice who was licensed to practice law in 
Washington, D.C., and California. The attorney was not admitted 
to practice as a member of the Wisconsin bar and had not applied 
for pro hac vice status. 
¶19 On March 25, 2011, the Commissioner moved the court of 
appeals to dismiss the United States' appeal. The Commissioner 
argued that the United States had failed to preserve issues for 
state court review and had waived its right to appeal.  The 
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
12 See supra ¶6, n.8. 
No. 
2011AP987   

17 
 
Commissioner also argued that Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1) requires 
all filings in the Wisconsin state courts to be signed by an 
attorney admitted to practice in Wisconsin and that without 
timely and fundamentally compliant notice of appeal, the court 
of appeals lacked jurisdiction of the case.  The court of 
appeals 
agreed 
and 
granted 
the 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
on 
jurisdictional grounds.  This court granted the United States' 
petition for review. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶20 This case presents the questions of whether the court 
of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal, and whether a 
party has waived its right to appeal.  These are questions of 
law that we review de novo.  Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 
2004 WI 17, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470.  The 
first 
question we must resolve is the question of whether the general 
principle of waiver applies in these circumstances.  If it does 
apply, that issue would be dispositive of the case, and there is 
no need to reach questions concerning preemption, the supremacy 
clause, and whether the signature was a fundamental or technical 
defect and, if so, whether such a defect is fatal to the appeal. 
¶21 The concept that an issue not raised in circuit court 
is deemed waived is one of long standing.  In a 1917 case, this 
court 
stated, 
"One 
of 
the 
rules 
of 
well-nigh 
universal 
application established by courts in the administration of the 
law is that questions not raised and properly presented for 
review in the trial court will not be reviewed on appeal." 
Cappon v. O'Day, 165 Wis. 486, 490, 162 N.W. 655 (1917).  "The 
No. 
2011AP987   

18 
 
practice of this court is not to consider an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal." Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc., 63 Wis. 
2d 585, 593, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).  "The burden is upon the 
party alleging error to establish by reference to the record 
that an error was specifically called to the attention of the 
trial court."  Id. at 594. 
¶22 This court set forth the reasoning behind the rule in 
State v. Huebner, and we cannot improve on our articulation 
there of this "essential principle": 
It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that 
issues must be preserved at the circuit court. Issues 
that are not preserved at the circuit court, even 
alleged constitutional errors, generally will not be 
considered on appeal.  The party who raises an issue 
on appeal bears the burden of showing that the issue 
was raised before the circuit court. 
We have described this rule as the “waiver rule,” in 
the sense that issues that are not preserved are 
deemed waived.  The waiver rule is not merely a 
technicality or a rule of convenience; it is an 
essential principle of the orderly administration of 
justice.  The rule promotes both efficiency and 
fairness, and “go[es] to the heart of the common law 
tradition and the adversary system.” 
Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶¶10-11 (citations omitted).  We 
went on to explain how this simple rule accomplishes many 
objectives that are crucial to the efficient functioning of 
a fair judicial system: 
Raising issues at the trial court level allows the 
trial court to correct or avoid the alleged error in 
the first place, eliminating the need for appeal.  It 
also gives both parties and the trial judge notice of 
the issue and a fair opportunity to address the 
No. 
2011AP987   

19 
 
objection.  Furthermore, the waiver rule encourages 
attorneys 
to 
diligently prepare for and conduct 
trials.  Finally, the rule prevents attorneys from 
“sandbagging” errors, or failing to object to an error 
for strategic reasons and later claiming that the 
error is grounds for reversal. For all of these 
reasons, the waiver rule is essential to the efficient 
and fair conduct of our adversary system of justice. 
Id., ¶12 (citations omitted).  
¶23 Skepticism toward review of unpreserved error is 
especially warranted where a party has been complicit in the 
error cited as grounds for reversal.  In State v. Gove, this 
court declined to order a new trial in the interest of justice 
where the error complained of was consented to below.  We said, 
"Indeed, as demonstrated by the record, Gove affirmatively 
contributed to what he now claims was trial court error. It is 
contrary to fundamental principles of justice and orderly 
procedure to permit a party to assume a certain position in the 
course of litigation which may be advantageous, and then after 
the court maintains that position, argue on appeal that the 
action was error."  State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 944, 437 
N.W.2d 218 (1989). 
¶24 The importance to the system of real appellate review, 
and not merely endless error-correcting review, requires holding 
parties accountable for the litigation strategies they choose in 
the circuit court. In a concurrence which criticized the 
majority for choosing to reach the merits in a case where the 
issue had been waived by consent in the lower court, Justice 
Scalia expressed concerns about the costs of "abandoning" 
conscientious application of the waiver principle: 
No. 
2011AP987   

20 
 
These [waiver] rules reflect the principle that a 
trial on the merits, whether in a civil or criminal 
case, is the “main event,” and not simply a “tryout on 
the road” to appellate review.  The very word “review” 
presupposes that a litigant's arguments have been 
raised and considered in the tribunal of first 
instance. To abandon that principle is to encourage 
the 
practice 
of 
“sandbagging”: 
suggesting 
or 
permitting, for strategic reasons, that the trial 
court pursue a certain course, and later——if the 
outcome 
is 
unfavorable——claiming 
that 
the 
course 
followed was reversible error. 
Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
¶25 In the federal district court's rulings in this case, 
the court emphasized the necessity of challenging in the lower 
court and then proceeding to appeal.   
In many respects, the state rehabilitation proceedings 
and the supplemental injunction are similar to federal 
bankruptcy proceedings and the automatic stay that 
goes into effect in bankruptcy.  Insurance companies 
are barred from using bankruptcy to reorganize; their 
only 
remedy 
is 
a 
state 
court 
rehabilitation 
proceeding. As in bankruptcy, the efficacy of a 
rehabilitation 
proceeding 
is 
dependent 
upon 
the 
court's ability to stay actions by creditors that will 
interfere with the court's ability to manage the 
proceeding.  When a claimant is affected by the stay, 
the claimant challenges the effect in the bankruptcy 
court and if the result is unfavorable, it appeals.  
The claimant does not file a separate proceeding in a 
separate court to determine whether the stay should 
apply, as the United States has done in this case. 
Nickel I, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (emphasis added).  
¶26 It is implicit in the district court's statement that 
the general necessity of "challenging" in the lower court first 
and 
then 
appealing 
unfavorable 
results 
applies 
to 
the 
government.  Certainly, federal courts have not carved any 
No. 
2011AP987   

21 
 
exception to that rule when the litigant is the United States.13 
For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals responded to 
the government's attempt, after having litigated the case on a 
different theory and then on remand "revived" a previously 
abandoned position, to claim that a defendant had waived an 
argument: 
But claims of waiver may themselves be waived, and the 
United States did just that——not in this court, but in 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Dunkel's 
petition 
for 
certiorari 
challenged 
this 
court's treatment of objectively unreasonable beliefs. 
The 
Solicitor 
General 
could 
have 
resisted 
this 
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
13 The waiver rule is applied in a variety of federal 
contexts, as is illustrated by this comment from a case in 
United States Claims Court, made in the context of holding that 
a government agency had waived an issue by failing to raise it 
in the initial forum:  
Moreover, 
courts 
have 
continuously 
followed 
the 
general rule that an issue or argument not raised in 
the trial court, here before the special master, is 
waived. Cedar Lumber, Inc. v. United States, 857 F.2d 
765, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that arguments not 
presented to the trial court (or initial adjudicatory 
forum) are deemed waived on appeal); see also, Borden 
v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 836 F.2d 4, 6 
(1st Cir. 1987) (affirming decision of district court 
judge to refuse to consider an argument, which could 
have 
been, 
but 
was 
not 
presented 
before 
the 
magistrate); Sigmon Fuel Co. v. Tennessee Valley 
Auth., 754 F.2d 162, 164-65 (6th Cir. 1985) (refusing 
to review an argument not raised in the district court 
in the interest of judicial economy and finality of 
judgments). 
McMillan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 26 Cl. Ct. 357, 358-
59 (1992).  
 
No. 
2011AP987   

22 
 
petition by arguing that Dunkel had not preserved the 
point. Instead he urged the Supreme Court to hold the 
case for whatever disposition Cheek made appropriate. 
The Court did so and has told us to review the case in 
light of Cheek. . . . The government has missed its 
chance to preclude Dunkel from receiving the benefits 
of Cheek. 
United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
¶27 The United States has argued that the usual rules 
concerning waiver do not apply here because its position was 
that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 
these circumstances, which is "a matter that can be raised at 
any time."14   
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
14 While the United States expressed its willingness to 
provide supplemental briefing on the threshold question of 
whether failing to litigate the question in circuit court 
constituted waiver of the right to appeal, we believe that the 
record, petition for review, briefing, and oral arguments 
together 
set 
forth 
adequate 
grounds 
for 
us 
to 
make 
a 
determination on this issue.  Its reasons for opposing a 
decision from this court using a waiver analysis were given in 
its petition for review (Pet. for Review at 43) (also discussed 
by respondents in Resp. to Pet. for Review at 12), in its brief 
and reply brief, and at oral argument. In each of those cases, 
the United States has consistently cited the same reasons that 
waiver should not apply to preclude its appeal.  (United States' 
Br. at 6 n.3.)  Counsel for the United States was questioned 
extensively at oral argument before this court concerning the 
question of waiver.  The United States filed no motion 
requesting supplemental briefing or an extension of the word-
limit rules for reply briefs.  (It cited the limit of 3,000 
words as a reason that it could not adequately respond to 
opposing counsel's waiver arguments.) 
No. 
2011AP987   

23 
 
¶28 It is axiomatic that a circuit court is never without 
subject matter jurisdiction. "Circuit courts in Wisconsin are 
constitutional courts with general original subject matter 
jurisdiction over 'all matters civil and criminal.' Wis. Const. 
art. VII, § 8. Accordingly, a circuit court is never without 
subject matter jurisdiction."  Vill. of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 
2004 WI 79, ¶1, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.  In this 
particular situation, the proposition that the circuit court's 
jurisdiction was properly exercised here in the rehabilitation 
proceeding is certainly strengthened by the federal district 
court's 
two 
written 
decisions 
methodically 
analyzing 
and 
rejecting the United States' arguments to the contrary.   
¶29 In the first case, the district court remanded the 
case to the circuit court on the Commissioner's motion after the 
United States had removed it.  The district court concluded that 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act "can restrict the right of removal to 
federal court in cases in which a state statute governing 
insurance 
sets 
up 
a 
comprehensive 
framework 
for 
state 

We note that both the petition for review and the response 
to the petition for review raised and addressed the issue of 
waiver (Pet. for Review at 43, Resp. to Pet. for Review at 12) 
and therefore there is no allegation by any party that the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 809.62(3)(d) were not followed here.  
Waiver was an alternative ground supporting the court of 
appeals' result. We resolve any potential conflict between the 
language of § 809.62(3)(d) (stating that a response "may contain 
 . . . [a]ny alternative ground supporting the court of appeals 
result . . . ") and § 809.62(6) (referring to consideration of 
"an issue that was identified in a petition" (emphasis added)) 
in favor of consideration of the alternative ground addressed by 
the respondent in the response to the petition, and briefed and 
argued by the parties before this court.   
No. 
2011AP987   

24 
 
rehabilitation proceedings to be conducted in state court and 
removal would impair that framework."  Nickel I, 782 F. Supp. 2d 
at 748.  It then turned to the question of whether abstention 
under Burford is appropriate and concluded that it was, on the 
grounds that federal court review of the United States' claims 
"would be disruptive of the state's rehabilitation goals and 
procedures" and of a rehabilitation proceeding that "has been in 
state court for roughly ten months and includes nearly 1,000 
financial guaranty insurance policies insuring approximately $60 
billion of financial obligations."  Id. at 751.  It observed 
that Wisconsin statutes provide for rehabilitation proceedings 
to occur in state court, with claims paid under the court's 
supervision and according to state priority statutes, and it 
considered the state court "uniquely qualified to hear these 
claims."  Id. at 752. Further, it noted that the case, if 
allowed to remain in federal court, "has the potential for 
disrupting any rehabilitation plan developed by the Commissioner 
and approved by the state court."  Id. It therefore decided that 
the 
principles 
of 
Burford 
require 
abstention 
"to 
permit 
resolution of the United States' claims through the available 
mechanisms in the state rehabilitation proceedings," and it 
wasted no time remanding the case to the circuit court. Id. 
¶30 Within a month, the United States was back in the same 
district court, this time with a collateral attack seeking to 
enjoin 
the 
circuit 
court 
from 
putting 
into 
place 
the 
rehabilitation plan.  The district court again rejected the 
arguments concerning jurisdiction:  
No. 
2011AP987   

25 
 
The United States attempts to avoid [a ruling based on 
reverse-preemption] by invoking sovereign immunity and 
arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act cannot preempt 
sovereign immunity. However, sovereign immunity does 
not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction 
 . . . . As the Supreme Court explained in United 
States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., the United 
States may participate as a creditor in a state 
rehabilitation proceeding without raising sovereign 
immunity concerns. 
United States v. Wis. State Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty. (Nickel 
II), 767 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (citations omitted). 
¶31 The reasons for the rule requiring parties to raise 
issues in the circuit court or waive the right to raise them on 
appeal were clearly stated by this court in the cases cited 
above.  The United States' approach in this case——declining to 
litigate issues in circuit court and then stating that it was 
filing a notice of appeal because it was seeking to "preserve 
its right to appeal"——contravenes without justification the 
accepted rule that issues not raised in the circuit court are 
deemed to be waived.  We fail to see how the reasons underlying 
those principles apply with any less force when the United 
States government is a party.   In any event, a party who has 
refused opportunities to challenge an injunction when it had the 
opportunity to do so in the circuit court is not in a proper 
position to claim a narrow subject matter jurisdiction exception 
No. 
2011AP987   

26 
 
to circumvent the obstacle posed by the waiver rule.15  As this 
case illustrates, to permit parties to do so would wreak havoc 
by allowing a party to sit out expensive litigation and then 
give it a free "do-over."  Such an approach is simply unfair to 
the parties who at significant expense did participate in the 
proceedings, and it would be a pointless waste of scarce court 
system resources.  It is inconsistent with the principle 
expressed in Gove, above: that it is "contrary to fundamental 
principles of justice and orderly procedure to permit a party to 
assume a certain position in the course of litigation"——here, 
refusing to take any part in the circuit court proceedings——and 
then seek relief from appellate courts for the result of that 
strategy.  Gove, 148 Wis. 2d at 944.  We therefore find no basis 
for exempting the United States from that rule under these 
circumstances.   
¶32 We next turn to the United States' invocation of Wis. 
Stat. § 752.35.  The United States argues that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35, the court of appeals may choose to consider its 
request to waive any procedural defect and in its discretion 
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
15 We have found no case in which a subject matter 
jurisdiction exception to the general waiver rule operated to 
permit an appeal where the party seeking to appeal refused to 
appear in the lower court proceedings.  Here, the United States 
is challenging an injunction that it failed to challenge in the 
circuit court despite having had notice and the opportunity to 
do so.   
No. 
2011AP987   

27 
 
take jurisdiction of the case.  It asks this court to remand 
this case to the court of appeals for that purpose. 
¶33 The Commissioner urges that the United States be held 
to the trial strategy it chose and argues that this case does 
not meet the criteria for reversal under Wis. Stat. § 752.35 
given 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
United 
States 
"strategically 
circumvented" the circuit court.  (Resp. Br. at 56.) 
 ¶34 The United States seeks to have the court of appeals, 
in its discretion, exercise its power to overlook any procedural 
defects and take jurisdiction, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.35.  
Wis. Stat. § 752.35 states:  
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears 
from the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
This argument resembles the first argument in that the IRS is 
essentially seeking a way out of the corner it chose to put 
itself in.  In a different case, the court of appeals was 
unmoved by an appeal to grant a new trial where it viewed the 
appeal as "another kick at the cat" rather than a genuinely 
needed opportunity to right a wrong.  As the court of appeals 
No. 
2011AP987   

28 
 
said in State v. Hubanks, "[Wis. Stat. § 752.35] was not 
intended to vest this court with power of discretionary reversal 
to enable a defendant to present an alternative defense at a new 
trial merely because the defense presented at the first trial 
proved ineffective."  173 Wis. 2d 1, 28-29, 496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. 
App. 1992).  Here there was no trial.  The United States never 
appeared in the circuit court proceedings.  It has acknowledged 
its strategic decision not to litigate in state courts.  A party 
is entitled to make such a decision, but it is not entitled to 
reversal 
when 
its 
strategy 
has 
"proved 
ineffective."  
Discretionary 
reversal 
is 
not 
justified 
under 
these 
circumstances. 
¶35 We 
note, 
again, 
that 
the 
alternate 
ground 
for 
dismissal argued by the Commissioner was that the court of 
appeals had no jurisdiction.  Finding no basis on which to 
depart from a bedrock principle of appellate practice, waiver, 
we affirm the court of appeals' decision to dismiss the appeal 
of the United States.16   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶36 What is inescapable in reviewing the record in this 
case is the sense that the United States almost begrudgingly 


16 Because this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we need 
not reach the other issues raised by the parties concerning 
whether the signature of a Department of Justice attorney 
without having sought pro hac vice admission is a defect in the 
filing, and if so, whether it is a fundamental defect (and 
cannot be remedied once the time to file a jurisdictional 
document has expired) or a technical defect that may, absent 
prejudice to other parties, be corrected. 
No. 
2011AP987   

29 
 
took steps "to preserve its right to appeal" in only the most 
technical 
sense 
while, 
ironically, 
overlooking 
fundamental 
appellate principles establishing what parties must do to 
preserve that right: raise their issues in the circuit court in 
the first instance.  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal 
on the basis of an unauthorized signature on the notice of 
appeal.  In reaching our conclusion, we focus not on the 
signature, but on the fact that the notice of appeal itself was 
the only effort by the United States to involve itself with the 
circuit court.  It did, as noted, attempt to remove this matter 
to federal court.  Despite its apparent outrage at the 
injunction (in one filing to the court of appeals it stated, 
"[W]e are not aware of any other creditor that was so 
mistreated"), 
it 
remained 
on 
the 
sidelines 
while 
the 
rehabilitation was proceeding in the circuit court and chose not 
to raise its objections until after the final order was entered.   
¶37 The United States conceded at oral argument that it 
made an intentional decision not to litigate any of the issues 
involved in the circuit court.  Our case law is clear and 
consistent——failure to preserve issues means that they are 
waived.  Applying well-established principles of law that apply 
equally to the government when it is a party, we hold that such 
a decision precludes the United States from pursuing relief in 
the court of appeals. We therefore affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals to dismiss the United States' appeal. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
No. 
2011AP987   

30 
 
¶38 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2011AP987.ssa 

1 

¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring). I agree 
with the majority opinion that many of our cases and many briefs 
use the words "forfeiture" and "waiver" interchangeably and 
carelessly.  Majority op., ¶8 n.10.  The court has observed that 
"[t]he case law is rife with confusion about the words 'waiver' 
and 'forfeiture.'"  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶28, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  Nevertheless, the two words 
represent two different important legal concepts.  See, e.g., 
Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶¶28-35; State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, 
¶11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  
¶40 This case is a forfeiture case.  The party forfeited 
the right to raise a legal issue on appeal by silence in the 
trial court.  Forfeiture is a doctrine relating to the 
preservation of an issue for appeal as a matter of right.  The 
law the majority opinion relies on and the cases it cites are 
forfeiture cases even though the word "waiver" is frequently 
used. 
¶41 This court's role is to develop and clarify the law.  
In the interest of clarity, I would have preferred the majority 
opinion to use the correct terminology.  The fact that many 
courts and attorneys have long used imprecise terminology is not 
a good reason for us to continue to do so. 
¶42 On another topic, the majority opinion properly calls 
attention to a "potential conflict" in our rules of appellate 
procedure between Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) and Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.62(3)(d) & (3m)(b)1.  See majority op., ¶27 n.14.  
No.  2011AP987.ssa 

2 

¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) used to state that 
a petitioner could not raise issues not raised in the petition 
for review.  The word "petitioner" was changed by the court to 
"parties" so that the subsection now prohibits "parties" from 
raising issues not raised in the petition for review.  Yet 
subsections (3)(d) and (3m)(b) expressly authorize a responding 
party to raise issues not necessarily identified in the petition 
for review.  I think it would be beneficial to the court and 
appellate counsel if interested persons, including the Judicial 
Council and the Appellate Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin, 
would consider whether a rule change is needed.  
¶44 With these comments, I join the majority opinion.