Title: Argereow v. Weisberg

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 140 
Docket: 
Cum-18-15 
Argued: 
July 18, 2018 
Decided: 
October 16, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
JABAR and ALEXANDER, JJ. 
 
 
PAMELA G. ARGEREOW 
 
v. 
 
VERNE M. WEISBERG, M.D., et al. 
 
 
HJELM, J.  
[¶1]  Pamela G. Argereow commenced this action against Dr. Verne M. 
Weisberg and Mercy Hospital, alleging that Weisberg communicated with 
someone at Mercy about Argereow’s professional background and that, as a 
result, Mercy did not follow through with its decision to employ her.  
Argereow—a former employee at one of Weisberg’s medical offices—alleges 
that Weisberg’s statements to Mercy were retaliatory because, in an 
administrative proceeding, she had testified adversely to the interests of 
another of Weisberg’s clinics.  The Superior Court (Cumberland County, 
L. Walker, J.) granted Weisberg’s and Mercy’s separate motions to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state claims on which relief could be granted, see M.R. 
 
2 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because some counts were legally insufficient and other counts 
failed due to the absolute immunity provisions of the Maine Health Security Act, 
24 M.R.S. §§ 2501-2988 (2017).  Argereow challenges these determinations on 
this appeal.  We correct one aspect of the judgment and affirm.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Because this appeal is based on a facial review of the complaint, we 
consider only the alleged facts, which we take as true, see Lalonde v. Cent. Me. 
Med. Ctr., 2017 ME 22, ¶ 2, 155 A.3d 426, and “examine the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements 
of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief 
pursuant to some legal theory.”  Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm’n, 
2004 ME 20, ¶¶ 7-8, 843 A.2d 43 (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶3]  Between February of 2012 and October of 2014, Argereow worked 
as a nurse practitioner at a medical practice that Weisberg owns and operates.  
Argereow began seeking other employment, including at Mercy, in the summer 
of 2014.  She disclosed in an online application for Mercy that she had 
consented to a professional reprimand in 2005 because in 2003 she falsely 
indicated on a checklist that during a medical procedure a surgical team had 
completed a step that it had not taken.   
 
3 
[¶4]  On September 23, 2014, Argereow testified under subpoena at a 
hearing concerning an unemployment claim brought by a former employee of 
another clinic owned and operated by Weisberg.  On October 1, the 
Unemployment Commission administrative hearing officer, citing Argereow’s 
testimony, issued an order favorable to the former employee and allowed 
benefits, which were “chargeable” to Weisberg’s clinic.   
[¶5]  On the same day as the unemployment hearing, Mercy sent 
Argereow a written offer for her to work as a nurse practitioner at one of its 
clinics.  On October 6, Argereow underwent a pre-placement screening, 
resulting in her approval for employment at Mercy without restrictions, and 
received Mercy’s employee handbook.  Her projected start date was 
November 10, 2014.   
 
[¶6]  On October 15, Argereow informed Weisberg that she was leaving 
her job at his practice and that her last day there would be October 29.  
Weisberg learned from Argereow on October 31 that she would be working for 
Mercy.  Sometime, “likely” during the ensuing week, Weisberg “or someone on 
his behalf” “made a phone call [to someone at Mercy] and cost [Argereow] her 
job at Mercy” because of her testimony at the unemployment claim hearing.  
The information conveyed by Weisberg during the phone call concerned 
 
4 
Argereow’s “professional background” and her “employment qualifications or 
performance,” and suggested that she was “incompetent in her professional 
practice.”  Argereow’s complaint contains no further allegations about what the 
caller allegedly said during the phone call, who made the call,1 to whom the call 
was made, or when the call was made.  Weisberg’s statements had “the effect of 
discouraging Mercy from employing [Argereow].”   
[¶7]  On November 7, a human resources employee at Mercy advised 
Argereow that her “projected start date was being pushed back on the basis 
that there were potential issues associated with her medical credentialing.”  
Although Mercy had not concluded the hiring process, Argereow “had already 
been introduced to the . . . team as a new employee and understood that there 
were no remaining contingencies regarding her employment by Mercy and that 
all interviews had already taken place.”  At Mercy’s request, however, Argereow 
met with its Chief of Surgery on November 7.  After they discussed the 
reprimand on her nursing license, the physician expressed his appreciation for 
Argereow’s candor concerning the incident and said he would “present this 
information to the Mercy Board the following week.”  During the meeting, the 
                                         
1  The complaint alleges variously that Weisberg made the call and that it could have been made 
by someone else.   
 
5 
physician noted to Argereow that “a Dr. Weisberg, which could refer to 
Dr. Tracey Weisberg, [Dr. Verne M.] Weisberg’s spouse, was a member of 
Mercy’s Board or held a significant administration role.”   
[¶8]  On November 10, 2014, a Mercy representative called Argereow to 
suggest that she withdraw her credentialing application.  Argereow then called 
the human resources department and was told to expect a call from another 
Mercy physician.  That physician called Argereow the next day to warn her that 
if she “pursued her application, it would be denied on the basis that she did not 
qualify for credentialing and that this would constitute an event which would 
have to be reported to the Maine State Board of Nursing and which would 
impair her ability to find work elsewhere.”  Shortly thereafter, Argereow 
requested a copy of her employment application with Mercy and confirmed that 
she had “truthfully responded to all questions asked in conjunction with her 
initial online application.”  Nevertheless, Argereow withdrew her application 
for employment and credentialing with Mercy on November 13.  On 
December 1, 2014, Argereow reviewed her Mercy credentialing file, “which did 
not contain any adverse information except a notation, without explanation, 
from [the Chief of Surgery] recommending against credentialing.”  As a result 
of Weisberg’s and Mercy’s conduct, she underwent marriage counseling 
 
6 
because of stress and lost eight months of wages, which was a significant 
financial hardship.   
[¶9]  In November of 2015, Argereow commenced this action, naming 
Weisberg as the sole defendant.  In her complaint as amended, Argereow 
asserted claims for tortious interference with a prospective economic 
advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, slander per se, and violation of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), see 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(C) (2017).  
Weisberg moved for the court to dismiss each count for failure to state a claim.  
The court granted the motion in part, dismissing without prejudice the claims 
for defamation, slander per se, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
but allowing Argereow to proceed on the other claims.2   
 
[¶10]  During pretrial proceedings, Argereow served Mercy with a 
subpoena to obtain certain credentialing-related documents.  After resulting 
motion practice involving Argereow and Mercy, the court issued an order 
protecting Mercy from producing some of that material.  Argereow then filed a 
                                         
2  The dismissal of a claim for failure to state a basis for relief is an adjudication on the merits.  See 
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Mackenzie, 2016 ME 149, ¶ 11, 149 A.3d 267; Potter, Prescott, Jamieson 
& Nelson, P.A. v. Campbell, 1998 ME 70, ¶ 9, 708 A.2d 283.  Therefore, the dismissal of Argereow’s 
claims for defamation, slander per se, and negligent infliction of emotional distress should have been 
with prejudice, and we correct that aspect of the order of dismissal accordingly.  
 
7 
second amended complaint, which included all of the counts she had asserted 
against Weisberg, including the ones the court had dismissed, and added Mercy 
as a defendant and asserted claims against Mercy for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and whistleblower retaliation, and a count seeking access to 
credentialing records in Mercy’s possession.  
[¶11]  Weisberg and Mercy filed separate motions to dismiss Argereow’s 
second amended complaint.  The court granted Dr. Weisberg’s motion to 
dismiss the remaining counts against him based on its determination that he is 
entitled to immunity pursuant to 24 M.R.S. § 2511.  The court granted Mercy’s 
motion to dismiss, which was based on assertions that Mercy was statutorily 
immune, also pursuant to section 2511, and that Argereow’s claims did not 
state a basis for relief.  The court “determined that Mercy is not unquestionably 
entitled to immunity” but granted the motion because the claims against Mercy 
did not state claims for relief.  Argereow filed a notice of appeal,3 and Mercy 
filed a cross-appeal to preserve the argument that its motion to dismiss should 
                                         
3  On appeal, Argereow does not pursue any claim that the court erred by dismissing her claims 
against Weisberg for negligent infliction of emotional distress or slander per se, or the dismissal of 
her claim against Mercy seeking access to “professional competence review records.”   
 
8 
have been granted based on section 2511 immunity.4  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c), 
2C(a).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12]  When we review an order dismissing a complaint, we consider 
only the facts alleged in the complaint and “examine the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a 
cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant 
to some legal theory.”  Moody, 2004 ME 20, ¶¶ 7-8, 843 A.2d 43 (quotation 
marks omitted).  This is a process that “tests the legal sufficiency of the 
allegations in a complaint, not the sufficiency of the evidence the plaintiffs are 
able to present.”  Barnes v. McGough, 623 A.2d 144, 145 (Me. 1993) (citation 
omitted).  Dismissal of a complaint “should only occur when it appears beyond 
                                         
4  We acknowledge Mercy’s desire to be cautious, particularly in light of some of our suggestions 
describing when a cross-appeal is required.  See, e.g., MaineToday Media, Inc. v. State, 2013 ME 100, 
¶ 28 n.17, 82 A.3d 104; Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2013 ME 55, ¶ 6 n.4, 66 A.3d 585.  Nonetheless, 
Mercy’s cross-appeal was unnecessary because—as we now clarify—an appellee is not required to 
cross-appeal “if it argues in favor of affirming the decision in every respect but simply contends that 
the same result should have been reached through different legal reasoning.”  Harris v. Woodlands 
Club, 2012 ME 117, ¶ 16 n.8, 55 A.3d 449; accord Scott Dugas Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Homeplace 
Bldg. & Remodeling, Inc., 651 A.2d 327, 329 (Me. 1994); State v. Me. Cent. R.R., 517 A.2d 55, 57 
(Me. 1986); Givertz v. Me. Med. Ctr., 459 A.2d 548, 556 (Me. 1983) (“An appellee need not cross-appeal 
to raise an issue that merely could provide an alternative ground to uphold his judgment.”); 
Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice, § 2C.1(a) at 72 (5th ed. 2018) (“[A]n appellee need not 
cross-appeal and may argue by brief any issue that could provide an alternative basis to affirm the 
judgment.”).  In any event, we affirm the court’s order on grounds other than Mercy’s assertion of 
immunity and therefore do not reach that issue.  
 
9 
doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might 
prove in support of his claim.”  Potter, Prescott, Jamieson & Nelson, P.A. v. 
Campbell, 1998 ME 70, ¶ 5, 708 A.2d 283 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶13]  We first address Weisberg’s immunity from Argereow’s claims 
against him, and we then address the sufficiency of the allegations in 
Argereow’s two remaining counts against Mercy.   
A. 
Physician Immunity 
 
[¶14]  The claims that Argereow continues to pursue against Weisberg 
are for tortious interference with an economic advantage, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act.5 
 
[¶15]  Immunity is an affirmative defense because it is a legal doctrine of 
avoidance of liability.  See M.R. Civ. P. 8(c).  A defendant may raise immunity as 
                                         
5  Argereow’s principal brief on appeal did not contain any assertion that the court erred by 
dismissing her defamation claim against Weisberg, which was on a ground other than immunity.  She 
raised that contention only in her reply brief, and at oral argument acknowledged that she was 
attempting to “resurrect” such an argument.  That effort is insufficient to preserve for appellate 
review any challenge to the dismissal of that count of the complaint.  See Lincoln v. Burbank, 2016 ME 
138, ¶ 41, 147 A.3d 1165 (“An issue raised for the first time [on appeal] in a reply brief may be viewed 
as not preserved for appeal.”).     
We note, however, that even if Argereow had preserved that issue, her argument would have been 
unavailing for two reasons.  First, pursuant to section 2511, Weisberg is entitled to immunity from 
civil liability on the defamation claims, just as he is from Argereow’s other claims against him, see 
infra ¶ 23.  Second, that count fails as a matter of law because, as the court correctly ruled in granting 
Weisberg’s first motion to dismiss, she did not allege with specificity any defamatory statement.  See 
Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 834-35 (Me. 1973) (explaining that because a defendant can claim 
truth as a defense against a claim for defamation, the “defendant is . . . entitled to know precisely what 
statement is attributed to him” both in the pleadings and in the evidence presented at trial).   
 
10 
the ground for dismissal of a claim for failure to state a basis for relief.6  Lalonde, 
2017 ME 22, ¶ 11, 155 A.3d 426.  When a party seeks dismissal of a claim based 
on an affirmative defense, the relevant inquiry is whether the “facts giving rise 
to the defense appear on the face of the complaint.”  Shaw v. S. Aroostook Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 683 A.2d 502, 504 (Me. 1996); see M.R. Civ. P. 12.   
[¶16]  Section 2511 of the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) grants 
immunity from civil liability as follows:  
Any person acting without malice, any physician, podiatrist, 
health care provider, health care entity or professional society, any 
member of a professional competence committee or professional 
review committee, any board or appropriate authority and any 
entity required to report under this chapter are immune from civil 
liability: 
1. Reporting.  For making any report or other information 
available to any board, appropriate authority, professional 
competence committee or professional review committee 
pursuant to law; 
2. Assisting in preparation.  For assisting in the origination, 
investigation or preparation of the report or information described 
in subsection 1; or 
                                         
6  We are not persuaded by Argereow’s assertion that Weisberg waived the immunity defense by 
not having included it in his responses to earlier iterations of her complaint.  When Argereow filed 
the operative pleading, namely, the second amended complaint, Weisberg moved for the court to 
dismiss it based on an assertion of immunity.  He therefore did not waive that defense any more than 
Argereow waived any claims that were not included in the previous complaints.  See ConnectU LLC v. 
Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008) (“An amended complaint, once filed, normally supersedes 
the antecedent complaint.  Thereafter, the earlier complaint is a dead letter and no longer performs 
any function in the case.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 
11 
3. Assisting in duties.  For assisting the board, authority or 
committee in carrying out any of its duties or functions provided 
by law. 
 
[¶17]  The complaint establishes that Weisberg is a physician,7 and 
Argereow does not argue otherwise.  Therefore, section 2511 immunizes 
Weisberg from civil liability for any conduct falling within the purview of that 
statute.    
[¶18]  Argereow alleges that “likely” sometime between October 31 and 
November 7, Weisberg—or someone on his behalf—called someone at Mercy 
and made statements about her “professional background,” including her 
“employment qualifications or performance,” and suggested that she was 
professionally incompetent.  That report had the effect of discouraging Mercy 
from finalizing an employment relationship with Argereow, and Mercy 
proceeded to persuade her to withdraw her employment application.    
[¶19]  The MHSA requires every licensed hospital to establish at least one 
professional competence committee “with responsibility effectively to review 
the professional services rendered in the facility for the purpose of insuring 
quality of medical care of patients therein.”  24 M.R.S. § 2503(3)(A).  
                                         
7  The MHSA defines a “physician” as “any natural person authorized by law to practice medicine, 
osteopathic medicine or veterinary medicine within this State.”  24 M.R.S. § 2502(3) (2017). 
 
12 
Professional competence committees engage in professional competence 
review activities, id. § 2502(4), which are defined in section 2502(4-B) as the 
study, evaluation, investigation, recommendation or action, by or on 
behalf of a health care entity and carried out by a professional 
competence committee, necessary to: 
 
A. Maintain or improve the quality of care rendered in, 
through or by the health care entity or by physicians;  
B. Reduce morbidity and mortality; or  
C. Establish and enforce appropriate standards of 
professional 
qualification, 
competence, 
conduct 
or 
performance. 
 
[¶20]  Here, Argereow’s allegations place Weisberg’s report to Mercy 
squarely within the scope of immunity established in section 2511.  The 
information Weisberg conveyed pertained to Argereow’s professional 
background, employment qualifications or performance, and professional 
competence, and Argereow alleges that it was this information that caused 
Mercy to effectively rescind the job offer that had been extended to—and 
accepted by—Argereow.  Weisberg’s conduct in providing information about 
her professional background and competence to Mercy is therefore immunized 
by section 2511.   
 
[¶21]  Argereow makes two arguments in an attempt to remove 
Weisberg’s conduct from the protections of section 2511.  First, she emphasizes 
her allegation that Weisberg acted with a retaliatory motive—that is, in bad 
 
13 
faith—when he made the report about her professional competence and 
background to Mercy.  We have held, however, that the presence of animus is 
irrelevant to the availability of physician immunity created by section 2511.  
See Strong v. Brakeley, 2016 ME 60, ¶ 12, 137 A.3d 1007.  In that case, we 
examined the Legislature’s designation in section 2511 of the persons and 
entities that are entitled to the immunity created by that statute.  Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 11.  
Based on the plain language of the statute, we concluded that the immunity 
provided by section 2511 to a physician is not conditioned on the absence of 
malice.8  Id. ¶ 12.  Rather, malicious intent precludes immunity only for persons 
who are not included within any of the groups of other qualified reporters 
enumerated in the statute after the phrase “[a]ny person acting without 
malice.”  Id.; 24 M.R.S. § 2511.  Because “physicians” constitute one of those 
enumerated groups, immunity is not forfeited even when the otherwise 
protected conduct is accompanied by malice.  Therefore, the immunity that 
section 2511 provides to Weisberg is not defeated or otherwise restricted by 
Argereow’s allegation that he made the report about her professional 
competence and qualifications with a retaliatory motive. 
                                         
8  To the extent that Argereow’s complaint can be read to assert that Weisberg’s privilege pursuant 
to section 2511 is “conditional,” Strong v. Brakeley establishes that the assertion is wrong as a matter 
of law.  2016 ME 60, ¶¶ 4-14, 137 A.3d 1007. 
 
14 
 
[¶22]  As a second argument to take her claims outside section 2511, 
Argereow contends that because Mercy had completed its process of approving 
her credentials before Weisberg called the hospital in early November, 
Weisberg’s report was no longer protected.  The protections created by 
section 2511 are not limited in that manner, however.  Nothing in the statute 
restricts its application to a particular phase of the credentialing assessment.   
[¶23]  Further, as noted above, see supra ¶ 19, the professional 
competence committee that a hospital is required to create and maintain 
pursuant to section 2503(3)(A) is charged with studying, evaluating, 
investigating, recommending, and acting on the hospital’s legal responsibility 
to “[m]aintain or improve the quality of care rendered in, through or by the 
health care entity . . . .”  Id. § 2502(4-B)(A) (emphasis added).  This makes clear 
that credentialing and assessing of the professional competence of a hospital’s 
health care practitioners, which includes nurse practitioners such as Argereow, 
see id. § 2502(1-A), is an ongoing, open-ended endeavor.  Even after the 
credentials of a prospective employee have been approved, the health care 
entity has a continuing legal duty to monitor and, when appropriate, to reassess 
that person’s professional credentials.   
 
15 
[¶24]  As we pointed out in Strong, section 2511 is intended to encourage 
reports and participation in the communication and assessment of medical 
competence.  2016 ME 60, ¶ 14, 137 A.3d 1007.  The immunity is therefore 
coextensive with a hospital’s continuing responsibility—even as to health care 
professionals who are already in the hospital’s employ—to monitor and act in 
furtherance of quality of care.  Therefore, Argereow’s allegation that “there 
were no remaining contingencies regarding her employment” at Mercy does 
not bear on Weisberg’s statutory immunity.  
[¶25]  In summary, because Argereow alleges that Weisberg provided 
Mercy with a report about her professional background and competence and 
that Mercy determined it would not ultimately approve her credentialing 
application, Weisberg is entitled to immunity pursuant to section 2511.  The 
court therefore correctly dismissed all claims against Weisberg because he is 
immune from civil liability.9   
                                         
9  Even if Weisberg were not statutorily immune from liability on Argereow’s claim, as we discuss 
below, Argereow’s allegations of the emotional distress resulting from Weisberg’s conduct are not 
sufficient as a matter of law to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, see infra 
¶ 27.  Although the court rejected that analysis, its ultimate conclusion—that Argereow could not 
proceed on this count against Weisberg—was correct.  See Town of Madawaska v. Cayer, 2014 ME 
121, ¶ 17, 103 A.3d 547 (affirming the judgment “for reasons different from those stated by the trial 
court”).  Further, for the reasons we have discussed, see supra n.5, Argereow’s claim for defamation 
fails for reasons separate from Weisberg’s immunity. 
 
16 
B. 
Claims Against Mercy Hospital 
 
[¶26]  We next turn to Argereow’s two claims against Mercy that she still 
seeks to pursue: intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the 
WPA.   
 
1. 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
[¶27]  The four elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress are that “(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe 
emotional distress or was certain or substantially certain that such distress 
would result from her conduct; (2) the conduct was so extreme and outrageous 
as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the defendant 
caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress 
suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be 
expected to endure it.”  Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 10, 784 A.2d 18 
(quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted).  The determination of whether 
the facts alleged are sufficient to establish that the defendant’s conduct is “so 
extreme and outrageous to permit recovery” is a question of law for the court 
to decide.  Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 16, 711 A.2d 842 
(quotation marks omitted).  
 
17 
 
[¶28]  Here, Argereow alleges that Mercy acted on Weisberg’s report 
concerning her professional qualifications and performance, where he 
suggested that she was professionally incompetent, by encouraging her to 
withdraw her employment application.  As a matter of law, this falls short of the 
standard for actionable conduct necessary for a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  See Bratton v. McDonough, 2014 ME 64, ¶ 23, 91 A.3d 
1050 (vacating judgment on an IIED claim, where the trial court had 
determined that the evidence did not show extreme and outrageous conduct by 
a landlord who “allowed a family with young children to live in a house that 
exposed the children to toxic levels of lead for several years” and did not 
relocate the family, despite being under a legal duty to do so, for four years after 
the State declared the house to be a lead hazard); Rubin v. Matthews Int’l Corp., 
503 A.2d 694, 700 (Me. 1986) (concluding that a complaint alleged “conduct 
upon which liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be 
predicated” where, in the context of a contractual relationship, the defendant 
repeatedly misrepresented that a monument had been shipped and would be 
delivered on time for a religiously significant event).   
[¶29]  Further, Argereow’s allegations do not place her emotional 
distress, which takes the form of lost wages and a strained marriage that led to 
 
18 
counseling, at a level where it could be characterized as “so severe that no 
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”  Curtis, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 10, 
784 A.2d 18 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted).  Rather, her 
allegation is akin to the “general feelings of upset and defeat” that are 
insufficient to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
See Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶¶ 4-8, 26, 48 A.3d 
774; see also Lyman v. Huber, 2010 ME 139, ¶¶ 19, 24-26, 10 A.3d 707 (stating 
that the “serious” emotional distress resulting from fifteen years of emotional 
abuse inflicted by a domestic partner is not sufficient for a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress).   
[¶30]  Because Argereow’s allegations fell short of meeting the pleading 
requirements for two elements of the claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, the court correctly dismissed that count.10   
                                         
10  Argereow also argues that Mercy’s conduct in “aid[ing] and abett[ing] Weisberg’s retaliation 
against Argereow” is sufficient for a claim against Mercy for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  As the theory of joint tortfeasor liability applies here, however, the claim is predicated on 
“harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another” if one “does a tortious act in 
concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 876 (Am. Law. Inst. 1979).  As explained above, see supra ¶¶ 6-8, Argereow has not alleged in her 
complaint any conduct by Mercy that was in concert with Weisberg.     
 
19 
 
2. 
Whistleblower Retaliation  
 
[¶31]  Argereow’s second amended complaint included a claim against 
Weisberg and Mercy for violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act and the 
Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 4553(10)(D), 4572(1)(A) (2017).11  Mercy 
moved to dismiss all of Argereow’s claims against it, including the WPA claim, 
asserting that it is immune from liability pursuant to section 2511 and, 
alternatively, that its alleged conduct did not violate the WPA.  In her opposition 
to Mercy’s motion to dismiss the WPA claim, Argereow addressed only the issue 
of Mercy’s immunity.   
[¶32]  In its order granting Mercy’s motion to dismiss, the court stated 
that it was unable to determine definitively that Mercy was entitled to 
immunity but agreed with Mercy’s alternative argument—the one that 
Argereow did not address in her opposition to Mercy’s motion—and concluded 
that Argereow’s WPA claim against Mercy failed to state a basis for relief.  
Although Argereow contends here that the court erred by dismissing her WPA 
claim, she did not preserve a challenge to the ground on which the court 
dismissed that claim, and it is therefore waived.  See Homeward Residential, Inc. 
                                         
11  Argereow has made clear that she is not asserting that Mercy is liable for a violation of the WPA 
on any theory other than “aid[ing] and abet[ing]” Weisberg’s own alleged violation of the WPA.   
 
20 
v. Gregor, 2017 ME 128, ¶ 9, 165 A.3d 357 (stating that an issue is waived for 
appeal if it was not timely presented in the trial court); Alexander, Maine 
Appellate Practice § 402(a) at 311 (5th ed. 2018) (“The Law Court will not reach 
an issue . . . if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.”).  
The entry is: 
Judgment dismissing the claims against Verne M. 
Weisberg, M.D. for defamation, slander per se, 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
corrected as dismissals with prejudice.  As 
corrected, judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
JABAR, J., with whom ALEXANDER, J., joins, dissenting. 
 
 
[¶33]  We respectfully dissent because, at this motion-to-dismiss stage of 
the proceedings, with all favorable inferences given to Argereow, the pleadings 
do not affirmatively establish that Weisberg is entitled to the immunity 
provided by section 2511.  Immunity under section 2511 is an affirmative 
defense that physicians are “eligible” for, therefore, Weisberg has the burden of 
proving that his actions are within the statute in order to be afforded immunity.  
See Strong v. Brakeley, 2016 ME 60, ¶¶ 6-9, 137 A.3d 1007; Lalonde v. Cent. Me. 
Med. Ctr., 2017 ME 22, ¶ 11, 155 A.3d 426.  Consistent with the method by which 
other affirmative defenses are reviewed at the motion-to-dismiss stage of 
 
21 
proceedings, it must be clear on the face of the complaint that the cause of 
action is barred by the immunity statute.  See Jackson v. Borkowski, 627 A.2d 
1010, 1013 (Me. 1993) (statute of limitations); Danforth v. Gottardi, 667 A.2d 
847, 848 (Me. 1995) (governmental immunity under the Maine Tort Claims 
Act); Shaw v. S. Aroostook Cmty. Sch. Dist., 683 A.2d 502, 504 (Me. 1996) 
(immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act).   
[¶34]  When a complaint is dismissed on a M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, 
we review it de novo, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and give no 
deference to the trial court.  See Bog Lake Co. v. Town of Northfield, 2008 ME 37, 
¶ 6, 942 A.2d 700.  At this stage of the proceedings, it is premature to conclude 
that Weisberg’s claim of immunity has been clearly established within the four 
corners of Argereow’s complaint.  In Strong, we determined that two physicians 
were entitled to immunity under section 2511, but this was done on a motion 
for summary judgment after the trial court denied the physician’s motion to 
dismiss based on a claim of immunity pursuant to section 2511 and ordered the 
parties to proceed to discovery on the limited issue of immunity.  See Strong, 
2016 ME 60, ¶¶ 3, 14, 137 A.3d 1007.  Because we believe that the Superior 
Court should do the same here, we respectfully dissent. 
 
22 
A. 
Immunity under Section 2511 of the Maine Health Security Act 
[¶35]  The Court holds that Weisberg is entitled to immunity pursuant to 
section 2511 because the pleadings establish that Weisberg “provided Mercy 
with a report about her professional background and competence.”  Court’s 
Opinion ¶ 25.  The Court refers to the information supplied by Weisberg as 
information normally associated with credentialing, and states that “immunity 
is . . . coextensive with a hospital’s continuing responsibility . . . to monitor and 
act in furtherance of quality care.”  Court’s Opinion ¶ 24.  By bootstrapping the 
content of the information to the hospital’s continuing duty to monitor the 
quality of care, the Court characterizes Weisberg’s actions as falling within the 
peer review privilege.  However, the Court fails to consider the context in which 
the information was supplied to the hospital representative by Weisberg.  
Courts should not merely consider the content of information when deciding 
whether a physician is entitled to immunity under section 2511.  Such a narrow 
focus overlooks the way in which the information was produced, the purpose 
for which the information was produced, and to whom the information was 
directed.  See Bd. of Registration in Med. v. Hallmark Health Corp., 910 N.E.2d 
898, 907 (Mass. 2009) (holding that courts must look to the “way in which a 
document was created and the purpose for which it was used, not . . . its 
 
23 
content.”).  The Court’s decision expands the scope of immunity to include any 
information supplied to any representative of a hospital by a physician.  This is 
not the intended scope of the immunity provided by section 2511.  Rather, the 
immunity is intended to apply to information supplied by a qualifying reporter 
to an appropriate authority during a legitimate peer review process.   
[¶36]  The legislative history of section 2511 reveals that context is 
critical in evaluating whether a physician’s comments are entitled to immunity.  
In 1975 the Legislature responded to escalating medical malpractice insurance 
rates in Maine by creating the Commission to Revise the Laws Relating to 
Medical and Hospital Malpractice Insurance, more commonly referred to as the 
Pomeroy Commission.  L.D. 727, Statement of Fact (108th Legis. 1977).  As a 
result of the Commission’s findings and recommendations, the Maine Health 
Security Act (MHSA) was enacted.  P.L. 1977, ch. 492 (effective Oct. 24, 1977).  
Discussing the then-proposed legislation, the Pomeroy Commission’s findings 
and recommendations briefly touched on section 2511: 
The doctors of Maine are justly proud of their self[-]discipline in 
terms of organized quality control.  Their efforts will be 
strengthened, and the public reassured by the enactment of 
sections 2503 through 2507 which make a minimal level of peer 
review a legal duty for hospital medical staffs and for medical 
societies.  These sections also substantially broaden the existing 
law on reporting incompetence or negligence to the appropriate 
licensing authority. 
 
24 
 
Commission to Revise the Laws Relating to Medical and Hospital Malpractice 
Insurance, Report to the 108th Legislature, at xx (Jan. 25, 1977) (emphasis 
added).   
[¶37]  In 1985 the Legislature amended section 2511 in “An Act to Clarify 
the Law Regarding Peer Review Immunity Under the Maine Health Security 
Act.”  P.L. 1985, ch. 193, § 2511.  The purpose of the amendment was “to clarify 
existing law and fulfill the original legislative intent that all those participating 
in good faith in legitimate peer review activities are entitled to immunity.”  L.D. 
1107, Statement of Fact (112th Legis. 1985) (emphasis added).  Although 
malice is irrelevant for purposes of affording immunity to a physician under 
section 2511, see Strong, 2016 ME 60, ¶ 12, 137 A.3d 1007, the context in which 
a physician makes statements and then later seeks shelter under section 2511 
is not.  As this legislative history demonstrates, a physician must be 
participating in a legitimate peer review activity with an appropriate 
authority.12  Case law from other states concerning the peer review privilege 
support that notion as well. 
                                         
12  When the MHSA was first enacted, the only authority that could receive protected reports was 
the Board of Registration in Medicine or the Board of Osteopathic Examination and Registration.  P.L. 
1977, ch. 492, §§ 2502, 2511 (effective Oct. 24, 1977).  In 1985 the Legislature amended the statute 
to protect reports to certain committees that were organized for the purpose of identifying and 
treating physicians impaired by misuse of alcohol or drugs, or by physical or mental infirmity.  P.L. 
 
25 
 
[¶38]  Almost all of the fifty states have some form of medical peer review 
privilege.  Some courts have differentiated between conversations and 
documents arising in the course of ordinary business operations as opposed to 
conversations associated with peer review proceedings.  The United States 
District Court for the District of Vermont explained the importance of context 
in determining whether the privilege applies: “Because the dividing line 
between peer review and normal business operations can be unclear, courts 
generally apply the peer review privilege only when the formalities of a peer 
review process are clearly apparent.”  Robinson v. Springfield Hosp., 
No. 1:09-CV-75, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10160, at *5 (D. Vt. Feb. 5, 2010) 
(requiring disclosure in a discovery dispute, the Vermont court declined to find 
that two meetings involving a physician’s assistant were part of a “formal peer 
review process,” and instead characterized the meetings as “in the course of 
ordinary business operations.”); see also Prouty v. Sw. Vt. Med. Ctr., No. 89-2-13, 
2013 Vt. Super. LEXIS 64, at *5-7 (Vt. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2013) (considering the 
discoverability of documents, the court ruled that defendant’s “blanket 
assertion of [peer review] privilege” did not state a valid claim for the privilege 
                                         
1985, ch. 185, §§ 2502(4-A), 2511 (effective May 20, 1985).  Eventually, the Legislature added the 
language we now have to protect reporting to any board, authority, or committee.  See 24 M.R.S. 
§ 2511. 
 
26 
because “the party invoking a privilege must show the privilege applies.  
Defendant cannot exclude all information considered by a peer review 
committee.  Instead, Defendant may only refuse to disclose material that 
Defendant shows was created as a part of a formal peer review process.”  
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 
[¶39]  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dealt with a similar 
problem involving a document prepared by an established peer committee that 
was claimed to be privileged in a privilege log, and therefore not subject to 
discovery requests.  See Bd. of Registration in Med. v. Hallmark Health Corp., 
910 N.E.2d 898, 907 (Mass. 2009) (remanding “for an individualized 
consideration whether each of the documents listed on [the] privilege log is 
protected by [the peer review statute]. . . .”).  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held that merely labeling records as privileged is insufficient.  Id. 
at 906-07.  Instead, the court must look to the “way in which a document was 
created and the purpose for which it was used, not . . . its content.”  Id. at 907 
(quotation marks omitted).  In all of these cases it is apparent that the context 
in which statements are made, or a document produced, makes a difference in 
evaluating an assertion of immunity.   
 
27 
 
[¶40]  As we have noted before in the context of immunity under the 
Maine Tort Claims Act, “[t]he review of a claimed exception to governmental 
immunity often requires, as it does here, a close examination of the individual 
facts of the case.”  Bussell v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 103, ¶ 2, 731 A.2d 862.  
For that reason, we suggested in Bussell that “parties should be sparing in their 
use of Rule 12(b)(6) to test the sufficiency of a complaint when resolution of 
the motion requires analysis of a claimed exception to governmental 
immunity.”  Id. at 862-63.  The same is true of immunity under section 2511, 
given the need to identify the context of the statements to ensure that they fall 
within the purview of section 2511.  See generally Cunningham v. Haza, 
538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me. 1988) (vacating the Superior Court’s dismissal of a 
complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion, finding plaintiff’s complaint legally sufficient 
and defendant’s affirmative defense needing further factual development); 
Danforth, 667 A.2d 847, 847-48 (Me. 1995) (vacating the Superior Court’s 
dismissal of a complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion claiming governmental 
immunity); Shaw, 683 A.2d 502, 504 (Me. 1996) (vacating a trial court’s 
“premature” dismissal of a complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion claiming immunity 
under Workers’ Compensation Act).  
 
28 
[¶41]  In this case, we are addressing the pleadings without any context 
of Weisberg’s allegedly defamatory statements, context typically obtained 
through discovery.  Simply because Weisberg is a physician commenting on 
another’s qualifications does not necessarily bring the immunity statute into 
play.  The Court’s overbroad interpretation of section 2511 is being applied 
prematurely, without any consideration of the context in which the alleged 
defamatory statements about Argereow were made by Weisberg to 
representatives of Mercy Hospital.  As we stated in Strong, “[i]n subsections 
1 and 2, immunity is dependent upon the identity of the recipient of a report 
and the purpose of the report.  For subsection 3, immunity is dependent upon 
the provision of assistance to a board, authority, or committee.”  Strong, 
2016 ME 60, ¶ 7, 137 A.3d 1007.  Unlike in Strong, we do not know to whom 
Weisberg placed his call or report, and after examining the four corners of the 
pleadings we do not know whether that person could be properly deemed an 
appropriate “board, authority, or committee” pursuant to section 2511.  
Weisberg’s affirmative defense of immunity should be determined only after 
the facts have been developed through discovery. 
 
29 
B. 
Causes of Action 
 
[¶42]  Since we do not believe that Weisberg is entitled to immunity at 
this stage of the proceedings, we must address the merits of Argereow’s 
allegations contained in her complaint.  We find that the complaint makes 
legitimate claims of defamation, slander per se, and tortious interference with 
a prospective economic advantage.13 
 
1. 
Defamation 
 
[¶43]  Defamation consists of four elements: (1) “a false and defamatory 
statement concerning another”; (2) “an unprivileged publication to a third 
party”; (3) “fault amounting to at least . . . negligence on the part of the 
publisher”; and (4) “either actionability of the statement irrespective of special 
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”  Morgan v. 
Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 26, 941 A.2d 447.  “Slander per se refers to spoken 
defamatory statements that relate to a profession, occupation or official station 
in which the plaintiff was employed.  Malice is implied as a matter of law in such 
cases, and the claimant may recover compensatory damages without proving 
                                         
13  We agree with the majority regarding Argereow’s claims against Mercy Hospital and Weisberg 
for intentional infliction of emotion distress and whistleblower liability, and do not discuss those 
claims further. 
 
30 
special damages.”  Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 27, 974 A.2d 276 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶44]  “A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim should 
not be granted if the pleading alleges facts which would entitle the plaintiff to 
relief upon some theory, or if it avers every essential element of a claim.”  
Vahlsing Christina Corp. v. Stanley, 487 A.2d 264, 267 (Me. 1985).  In the context 
of a defamation action, we have acknowledged as “suspect” the application of a 
strict standard of specificity at the motion-to-dismiss stage of proceedings.  See 
Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587, 591 (Me. 1993) (noting that the continuing 
validity of the requirement that plaintiffs prove the defamatory words strictly 
as alleged “is suspect in light of modern notice pleading and increased reliance 
on discovery” (emphasis added)).  Moreover, the requirement that defamatory 
words be proven at trial strictly as alleged has been relaxed to afford plaintiffs 
more latitude.  See Saunders, 497 A.2d 1121, 1125-26 (Me. 1985) (“[M]aterial 
words, those essential to the charges made, must be proved as alleged, but 
. . . some latitude may be allowed with respect to unimportant, connecting or 
descriptive words.”).  
 
[¶45]  In Vahlsing, we vacated a trial court’s granting of a motion to 
dismiss and held that the “failure to specifically allege the date, month, and year 
 
31 
of the publication of the alleged defamatory material is not necessarily fatal.”  
Vahlsing, 487 A.2d 264, 267 (Me. 1985).  We reasoned that “[i]n modern 
pleading practice, the purpose of the complaint is to provide the defendant with 
fair notice of the claim against him.”  Id.   
 
[¶46]  Turning to the case before us, Argereow has pleaded sufficient 
facts that would entitle her to relief in an action for defamation and slander per 
se against Weisberg.  Furthermore, the pleadings allege sufficient facts to 
provide Weisberg with fair notice of the defamation claim against him.  
Specifically, Argereow’s complaint alleges that, between October 31, 2014, and 
November 7, 2014, Weisberg contacted representatives of Mercy Hospital and 
made false and intimidating statements with the intention of discouraging 
Mercy from employing her.  Further, Argereow alleges that Weisberg informed 
one of his employees that when he found out Argereow was going to be 
employed at Mercy he made a phone call and cost Argereow her job at Mercy.   
 
[¶47]  There are certainly situations in which the granting of a motion to 
dismiss a defamation claim is warranted, notwithstanding the highly 
deferential standard of review afforded to plaintiffs on such a motion.  See Halco 
v. Davey, 2007 ME 48, ¶¶ 4, 14, 919 A.2d 626 (affirming the dismissal of a 
defamation claim under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), where the alleged defamatory 
 
32 
statements were merely statements of opinion).  However, it would take far 
more unsupported speculation and vagueness than is present in the pleadings 
of this case to appropriately dismiss a defamation complaint for a lack of 
specificity in the alleged defamatory statements.  To this point, the Court relies 
upon the Picard case, in which we vacated a judgement following a bench trial.  
Court’s Opinion n. 5; see Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 833-35 (Me. 1973).  
The Court’s reliance on this case is misplaced.  Picard was an appeal following 
a bench trial, and does not take into account the procedural posture of the case 
before us and the standard by which motions to dismiss are decided.  See id; 
Marston, 629 A.2d 587, 591 (Me. 1993).  We find that Argereow’s complaint 
alleges a sufficient statement to give fair notice of the claims to the defendants 
in this case.  See Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. Rush, 348 A.2d 239, 241 (Me. 1975) 
(disclosure of “all material details . . . is not the function of the complaint but is 
a burden which the . . . motion for more definite statement, or the various 
discovery devices provided by the Rules, can better carry.”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
2. 
Tortious Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage 
 
[¶48]  To establish a claim of tortious interference with a prospective 
economic advantage, the complaining party must prove “(1) that a valid 
 
33 
contract or prospective economic advantage existed; (2) that the defendant 
interfered with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation; and 
(3) that such interference proximately caused damages.”  Currie v. Indus. Sec. 
Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 31, 915 A.2d 400.  Intimidation that “procures [a] breach of 
a contract that would have continued but for such wrongful interference . . . is 
not restricted to frightening a person for coercive purposes.”  Pombriant v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Me., 562 A.2d 656, 659 (Me. 1989) (quotation marks 
omitted).    
 
[¶49]  As the Superior Court correctly held, Argereow’s claim sufficiently 
alleges that Weisberg intimidated Mercy Hospital into rescinding its job offer 
to Argereow.  Accordingly, we would affirm the decision of the Superior Court 
denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Argereow’s claim for tortious 
interference with a prospective economic advantage. 
C. 
Conclusion 
 
[¶50]  In sum, we would hold that, at this stage of the proceedings, with 
all favorable inferences given to Argereow, the pleadings do not establish that 
Weisberg is entitled to immunity pursuant to section 2511.  Furthermore, we 
would hold that Argereow’s claims for defamation, slander per se, and tortious 
interference with a prospective economic advantage all allege sufficient facts to 
 
34 
withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  We would vacate the Superior 
Court’s decision and remand with instructions to proceed with discovery on the 
immunity issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert W. Kline, Esq. (orally), Kline Law Offices LLC, Portland, for appellant 
Pamela G. Argereow 
 
Joanne I. Simonelli, Esq. (orally), and Frederick B. Finberg, Esq., The Bennett 
Law Firm, P.A., Portland, for appellee Verne M. Weisberg, M.D. 
 
Thad B. Zmistowski, Esq. (orally), and Ryan P. Dumais, Esq., Eaton Peabody, 
Bangor, for appellee Mercy Hospital 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2015-504 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY