Title: Robert Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP886 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Robert Stuart and Lin Farquhar-Stuart, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents, 
     v. 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. and Ronald R. 
Weisflog, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 109 
Reported at:  293 Wis. 2d 668, 721 N.W.2d 127 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 28, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick C. Haughney   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ZIEGLER, JJ., join 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Paul J. Pytlik, Michelle M. Stoeck, and Hills Legal Group, 
Ltd., Waukesha. 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants-petitioners 
there were briefs by James C. Ratzel, Joya J. Santarelli, and 
Ratzel and Associates, LLC, Brookfield, and oral argument by 
James C. Ratzel. 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-respondents there was a 
brief by James J. Carrig, Matthew R. Jelenchick, and Niebler, 
Pyzyk, Klaver & Carrig LLP, Menomonee Falls; Ryan M. Benson and 
Benson Law Office, Siren; and Roy E. Wagner and von Briesen & 
Roper SC, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Roy E. Wagner. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lori M. Lubinsky, 
Robert C. Procter, Carl A. Sinderbrand, and Axley Brynelson, 
LLP, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Builders Association, 
and oral argument by Lori M. Lubinsky. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Alan G. B. Kim, Jr., 
Abigail C.S. Potts, and Anderson & Kent, S.C., Madison, on 
behalf of NARI of Madison, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John S. Greene, 
assistant attorney general, Nelle R. Rohlich, assistant attorney 
general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP886  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV925) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert Stuart and Lin Farquhar-Stuart, 
 
       Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents, 
 
 
v. 
 
Weisflog’s Showroom Gallery, Inc., and Ronald 
R. Weisflog, 
 
       Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants-
Petitioners, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 
 
       Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 28, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 affirming in part, 
reversing in part, and remanding with directions, an order of 
                                                 
1 Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2006 WI App 
109, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 721 N.W.2d 127. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
2 
 
the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Judge Patrick C. 
Haughney.2 
¶2 
Petitioners, Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. (WSGI), 
Ronald Weisflog (Weisflog) individually, and American Family 
Mutual Insurance Company, WSGI's and Weisflog's insurer, seek 
review of the court of appeals' decision that affirmed in part 
and reversed in part the circuit court's judgment in favor of 
the 
respondents, 
Robert 
Stuart 
and 
Lin 
Farquhar-Stuart 
(collectively, 
the 
Stuarts). 
 
This 
case 
involves 
the 
interpretation and application of the Home Improvement Practices 
Act (HIPA), which is contained in Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 110 
(Oct., 2004)3 (ATCP 110), and Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) (2003-04)4. 
¶3 
There are six principal issues upon review: 1) Whether 
the HIPA and negligence claims of the respondents are barred by 
a statute of limitations? 2) Whether the HIPA, which provides 
for the doubling of damages "because of a violation . . . of any 
order" (Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5)) issued pursuant to HIPA, 
authorizes the doubling of an entire damage award even if a HIPA 
violation 
is 
combined 
with 
additional 
wrongdoing 
that 
contributes to the loss in question? 3) Whether, given the 
                                                 
2 The companion case to this case, Stuart v. Weisflog's 
Showroom Gallery, Inc., No. 2005AP1287 (Stuart II), is expected 
to be released later this term. 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the October 2004 version unless otherwise noted. 
4 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
3 
 
evidence presented in the present case, the circuit court 
committed error in asking the jury to apportion damages between 
the Stuarts' HIPA claims and their negligence claims? 4) Whether 
the economic loss doctrine (ELD) applies to bar the HIPA 
violation claims or the negligence claims of the respondents?  
5) Whether a corporate employee may be held personally liable 
for acts, he or she takes on behalf of the corporate entity that 
employs him or her, that violate the HIPA? and 6) Whether the 
circuit court erred in its determination of the appropriate 
attorney fee award? 
¶4 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  In 
doing so, we hold as follows on each of the six principal 
issues.  First, we hold that the Stuarts' HIPA claims and their 
negligence claims are not barred by the statute of limitations 
because their claims are governed by the discovery rule and the 
six-year statute of limitations set forth in Wis. Stat.         
§ 893.93(1)(b).  Second, we are satisfied that Wis. Stat.       
§ 100.20(5) authorizes the doubling of an entire damage award, 
even if a HIPA violation is combined with additional wrongdoing 
that contributes to the loss in question.  Third, based on the 
evidence in the record and on the facts of the present case, we 
hold that the circuit court erred by asking the jury to 
apportion damages between the Stuarts' HIPA claims and their 
negligence claims.  Fourth, we are satisfied that the ELD is 
inapplicable to the Stuarts' claims, and, therefore, does not 
bar their claims.  Fifth, we hold that a corporate employee may 
be held personally liable for acts, he or she takes on behalf of 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
4 
 
the corporate entity that employs him or her, that violate the 
HIPA.  Lastly, we hold that the circuit court erred in its 
determination of an appropriate attorney fee award. 
I 
¶5 
The Stuarts hired WSGI to remodel and to put an 
addition onto their home in Brookfield, Wisconsin.  Weisflog is 
the president of WSGI, a home building and remodeling company.  
In 1995, the Stuarts met with Weisflog to discuss their project.  
The Stuarts claim that Weisflog promised them that, for an 
architectural fee of $1,000, he would provide them with a design 
and final drawings for the remodeling and for the addition.  
Robert Stuart testified at trial that Weisflog promised him 
"independent architectural service[s]."  In addition, Weisflog 
stated 
that 
he 
understood 
Brookfield 
building 
codes 
and 
regulations, and that he would comply with them.  The Stuarts 
signed a "Remodeling Architectural Contract" (Architectural 
Contract) encompassing this agreement.5  Neither Weisflog nor his 
son, Robert, who was the project manager, was a licensed 
architect.  Furthermore, no outside architects were retained for 
the project.  This claimed misrepresentation that the Stuarts 
would receive "Architectural" services, when the services of an 
architect were not provided, is one of the bases for the 
Stuarts' HIPA and negligence claims.  In May 1996, after 
                                                 
5 In answer to a special verdict question, the jury found 
that WSGI made false, deceptive, or misleading representations 
in order to induce the Stuarts to enter into the remodeling 
architectural contract or for payment under said contract. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
5 
 
receiving the drawings, the Stuarts entered into a second 
contract for the remodeling and for the construction of their 
home addition (Remodeling Contract), which called for a total 
payment of $278,000. 
¶6 
In support of the Stuarts' misrepresentation claims, 
Robert Stuart testified at trial that Weisflog had promised the 
Stuarts that the products Weisflog would use on their project 
were high quality, that he was familiar with and understood the 
local building codes and regulations, and that "he could provide 
architectural service" for the Stuarts, which included doing the 
"architectural design work."6  However, in contrast to Weisflog's 
representations, the Stuarts highlighted at trial the poor 
quality of the services and products they had received, and also 
emphasized Ronald and Robert Weisflog's admissions at trial 
about their lack of familiarity with local building codes and 
regulations.  For example, at trial, Ronald Weisflog admitted he 
                                                 
6 Contrary to the concurrence/dissent's assertion, these 
statements show that Weisflog made misrepresentations on behalf 
of WSGI about his then existing qualifications, knowledge, and 
abilities, not just about future performance, in regard to the 
Remodeling 
Contract. 
 
Concurrence/Dissent, 
¶¶67-76. 
 
For 
example, his assertion that he understood Brookfield codes and 
regulations 
very 
well 
was 
exactly 
such 
a 
present 
misrepresentation given his later admissions at trial to the 
contrary.  He could not comply with building codes that he was 
not aware of, and this was a present misrepresentation.  
Accordingly, the record reflects that Weisflog and WSGI made 
present misrepresentations in regard to both the Architectural 
Contract and the Remodeling Contract.  Indeed, the jury answered 
"yes" when asked whether the remodeling contractor or its agents 
made false, deceptive, or misleading representations that the 
remodeling work would comply with the building codes.  The jury 
further found that this was a cause of damages to the Stuarts. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
6 
 
was not familiar with certain relevant portions of the City of 
Brookfield's building code.7  Furthermore, Robert Weisflog 
testified he was not even aware that Brookfield had a building 
code. 
¶7 
Under Robert Weisflog's direction, WSGI remodeled the 
home and built the addition, which included a room containing a 
hot tub.  In 2001, Robert Stuart stepped through the floor of 
the hot tub room.  When he lifted up the carpet in that room, he 
discovered that the floor had rotted through.  The Stuarts then 
hired an engineer/home inspector who found many other serious 
construction defects and building code violations. 
¶8 
In April 2003, approximately two years after the 
Stuarts discovered the problems and approximately seven years 
after construction commenced, the Stuarts filed this lawsuit.  
In the various versions of their complaint, the Stuarts 
initially alleged negligence in design and construction, breach 
of contract, and the HIPA violations by virtue of the claimed 
misrepresentations made by WSGI and Weisflog.  However, just 
before the trial began, the Stuarts dismissed their breach of 
contract claims. 
                                                 
7 A good example was Ronald Weisflog's admission at trial 
that he was unaware of the local building code for properly 
exhausting dryer vents.  The improperly-exhausted dryer vent was 
linked by the Stuarts' engineer/home inspector to the later mold 
growth and lint accumulation in the Stuarts' attic.  We note, 
again, that the jury found that the remodeling contractor or its 
agents made false, deceptive, or misleading representations that 
the remodeling work would comply with the building codes. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
7 
 
¶9 
At trial, the Stuarts presented the testimony of an 
architect who stated that WSGI's plans were deficient in 
multiple 
respects, 
including 
their 
nonconformance 
with 
applicable building codes.  The Stuarts also introduced the 
report of their engineer/home inspector that discussed many 
deficiencies in the construction.  The report concluded that 
some of these deficiencies stemmed from the nonconformance of 
the plans and some resulted from the actual construction.  The 
report also concluded that the hot tub room had to be demolished 
and rebuilt, which was an assessment that WSGI's expert at trial 
was forced to concede.  The total cost to repair the faulty 
project was estimated to be about $96,000. 
II 
¶10 We begin with a discussion of our standards of review.  
Determining the appropriate statutes of limitations to apply to 
the HIPA violations and to the negligence claims are questions 
of statutory and administrative regulation construction that are 
subject to our de novo review.  DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 
15, ¶10, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311. 
¶11 When 
determining whether Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) 
authorizes the doubling of an entire damage award, even if a 
HIPA violation is combined with additional wrongdoing that 
contributes to the loss in question, we apply the same standard 
of review as we do for other issues of statutory construction.  
We must give effect to statutory enactments by determining the 
statute's meaning, especially through its language, which we 
presume expresses the intent of the legislature.  State ex rel. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
8 
 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We favor a construction that will 
fulfill the intent of a statute or a regulation, over a 
construction that defeats its manifest object.  Shands v. 
Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 356, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983).  
However, for questions of statutory construction, such as this 
one, our review is de novo.  DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, 
Inc., 2007 WI 27, ¶26, 299 Wis. 2d 561, 729 N.W.2d 396.  
Administrative rules or regulations are to be construed in the 
same manner as are statutes.  Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, 
¶21, 245 Wis. 2d 632, 629 N.W.2d 277.  We utilize an identical 
standard of review in determining whether a corporate employee 
may be held personally liable for the acts, he or she takes on 
behalf of the corporate entity that employs him or her, that 
violate 
the 
HIPA, 
since 
that 
issue 
also 
involves 
the 
interpretation of statutes and administrative regulations. 
¶12 In determining whether the circuit court erred by 
asking the jury to apportion damages between the HIPA and the 
negligence claims, we start with the requirement that a special 
verdict must cover all material issues of ultimate fact.  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.12.  However, the content of the special verdict 
remains within the discretion of the circuit court, and this 
court will not interfere with the special verdict submitted, so 
long as all material issues of fact are covered by appropriate 
questions, Meurer v. ITT Gen. Controls, 90 Wis. 2d 438, 445-46, 
280 N.W.2d 156 (1979), and so long as the form correctly and 
adequately covers the law that applies to the case.  Vogel v. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
9 
 
Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 201 Wis. 2d 416, 422, 548 N.W.2d 
829 (1996). 
¶13 We are satisfied that the ELD cannot apply to bar 
statutory claims, including those under HIPA, because of public 
policy issues that we discuss herein.  When reviewing whether 
the ELD applies to bar the negligence claims of the respondents, 
we will determine whether the contracts in question are 
predominantly for services or for products, and then must apply 
the ELD to the relevant set of facts.  Linden v. Cascade Stone 
Co., 2005 WI 113, ¶¶8, 22, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189.  See 
also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶¶14, 
15, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 462.  Both of these 
determinations are questions of law that remain subject to our 
independent review.  Ins. Co. of N. Am., 276 Wis. 2d 361, ¶¶14, 
15. 
¶14 Whether the circuit court erred in its determination 
on the amount of the attorney fee award to the Stuarts is 
subject to a different standard of review.  Unless the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion, the amount of an 
attorney fee award typically is left to the discretion of the 
circuit court, given that court's greater familiarity with the 
locality's billing norms and its firsthand opportunity to 
witness the quality of the attorney's representation.  Kolupar 
v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶22, 275 Wis. 2d 
1, 683 N.W.2d 58 (Kolupar I); see also Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac 
Cadillac, Inc., 2007 WI 98, ¶15, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 735 N.W.2d 93 
(Kolupar II); Anderson v. MSI Preferred Ins. Co., 2005 WI 62, 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
10 
 
¶19, 281 Wis. 2d 66, 697 N.W.2d 73.  However, we may examine the 
circuit court's explanation to determine whether the court 
employed a logical rationale that was based on the appropriate 
legal principles and on the facts in the record.  Id. 
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
¶15 On review, Weisflog and WSGI argue that the Stuarts' 
HIPA claims and their negligence claims were barred by the six-
year statute of limitations set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.43, 
which is applicable to contract actions, under the premise that 
the Stuarts' claims actually were claims based on the breach of 
both contracts.  Weisflog and WSGI claim that the HIPA merely 
adds penalty provisions to the breach of contract claims and 
that, as a result, the contract statute of limitations should 
apply to the HIPA claims.  On review, the Stuarts argue that 
their HIPA claims, in addition to their claims for negligent 
design and construction, are independent claims similar to tort 
claims, which are governed by the discovery rule. 
¶16 This court first adopted the discovery rule in Hansen 
v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 559, 335 N.W.2d 578 
(1983).  In Hansen, we stated that it would be "manifestly 
unjust for the statute of limitations to begin to run before a 
claimant could reasonably become aware of the injury."  Id.  We 
noted that "as a practical matter a claim cannot be enforced 
until the claimant discovers the injury and the accompanying 
right of action."  Id.  Without the discovery rule, there could 
be instances where claims would be time barred before a harm 
was, or even could be, discovered, which would make it 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
11 
 
impossible for an injured party to seek redress.  Id.  As we 
noted, this would punish victims who were blameless for the 
delay and would benefit many wrongdoers by barring such 
meritorious claims.  Id.  We held "that the injustice of barring 
meritorious claims before the claimant knows of the injury 
outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent claims."  Id.  As a 
result, we concluded that the discovery rule applied to "all 
tort 
actions 
other 
than 
those 
already 
governed 
by 
a 
legislatively created discovery rule."  Id. at 560.  Finally, we 
held that "[s]uch tort claims shall accrue on the date the 
injury is discovered[,] or with reasonable diligence should be 
discovered, whichever occurs first."  Id.  We later extended the 
discovery rule to hold that a claim did not accrue until the 
cause of the injury was discovered.  Doe v. Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 335, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997). 
¶17 We are satisfied that none of the Stuarts' claims are 
barred by a statute of limitations.  The Stuarts' HIPA claims 
and their negligence claims are governed by the discovery rule.  
We hold that the Stuarts' harm was of the type that the HIPA was 
intended to prevent, the Stuarts were within the class of 
persons that the HIPA was enacted to protect, that there was a 
clearly expressed legislative intent that the HIPA provide a 
basis 
for 
the 
imposition 
of 
civil 
liability, 
and 
that, 
accordingly, violations of HIPA provisions constitute a basis 
for the imposition of civil liability separate and apart from 
any breach of contract claims.  See generally Taft v. Derricks, 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
12 
 
2000 WI App 103, ¶¶2, 12, 235 Wis. 2d 22, 613 N.W.2d 190.  As a 
result, we apply the discovery rule to the Stuarts' claims.  Id.  
¶18 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(b) is the 
applicable statute of limitations given the allegations of fraud 
and misrepresentation upon which the Stuarts' claims, including 
both their HIPA and negligence claims, are based.  The relevant 
statute reads: "An action for relief on the ground of fraud.  
The cause of action in such case[s] is not deemed to have 
accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the 
facts constituting the fraud."  Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(b). 
¶19 Applying 
the 
discovery 
rule 
and 
Wis. 
Stat.          
§ 893.93(1)(b), we are satisfied that, as a matter of law, the 
Stuarts timely filed their claims.  Discovery by the Stuarts of 
the facts could have occurred no earlier than when Robert 
Stuart's foot went through the floor of the hot tub room in the 
fall of 2001.  The Stuarts filed their claims on April 11, 2003, 
which was less than two years after the discovery of the facts 
in 2001.  The filing date was well within the six-year statute 
of limitations prescribed by § 893.93(1)(b).  Accordingly, none 
of the Stuarts' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
IV. DAMAGES 
¶20 The petitioners argue that double damages should be 
assessed only on the amount of the damages that the jury 
apportioned to HIPA violations, and not to the portion of the 
pecuniary loss attributed to negligent construction and design.  
In contrast, the Stuarts argue that their entire pecuniary loss 
should be doubled because that result would preserve the 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
13 
 
remedial 
nature 
of 
the 
important 
consumer 
protections 
encompassed in the HIPA. 
¶21 Given the facts of the present case, we hold that the 
HIPA should be applied to require the petitioners to pay double 
damages on the Stuarts' entire pecuniary loss, even though the 
Stuarts alleged other, non-HIPA, claims.  While the HIPA is 
silent on whether the doubling of damages applies to the entire 
amount of the pecuniary loss when other conduct by the 
contractor contributes to the loss, remedial statutes must be 
liberally construed to advance the remedy that the legislature 
intended to be afforded.  Benkoski v. Flood, 2001 WI App 84, 242 
Wis. 2d 652, 626 N.W.2d 851. 
¶22 In Benkoski, a case in which the court of appeals 
addressed the question of double damages, the court held that a 
mobile homeowner (Benkoski) should receive damages in the amount 
of twice the sales price of the mobile home, twice the 
advertising expenses Benkoski incurred, and an attorney fee 
award when the mobile home park's owner violated Wis. Admin. 
Codes §§ ATCP 125.06 and 125.09, and Wis. Stat. § 710.15, by 
adding an unreasonable restriction on the sale of the mobile 
home.  Benkoski, 242 Wis. 2d 652, ¶¶1-3.  The mobile home park's 
owner had added a condition to Benkoski's mobile home park lot 
lease that a future purchaser would have to remove the mobile 
home from the park at the end of the lease when Benkoski sold 
the mobile home.  Id.  The court of appeals held that the remedy 
of double damages was appropriate because it would: 1) encourage 
those who were injured by unfair trade practices that violated 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
14 
 
administrative 
regulations 
to 
bring 
suit; 
2) 
encourage 
individuals to become "private attorney generals" in enforcing 
their own rights, with the aggregate effect operating to enforce 
the rights of the public; 3) deter impermissible conduct that 
violated administrative regulations by subjecting violators to 
double damages, an attorney fee award, and costs; and 4) augment 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice's 
enforcement 
of 
administrative regulations.  Id., ¶17. 
¶23 We agree with the statement of the court of appeals in 
the matter before us that "double damages and attorney fees help 
dispel the reluctance of parties injured by unfair trade 
practices to bring forward their causes of action and help deter 
similar and future contractor malfeasance, with the aggregate 
effect of working to the public good."  Stuart v. Weisflog's 
Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2006 WI App 109, ¶48, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 
721 N.W.2d 127 (citation omitted).  In such cases, the entire 
pecuniary loss should be doubled for HIPA violations.  Double 
damages are an available remedy for HIPA violations, given that 
the clear language of Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) allows for the 
recovery of "twice the amount of such pecuniary loss . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5). 
¶24 Furthermore, in the present case, the Stuarts' entire 
pecuniary loss was suffered because of the petitioners' HIPA 
violations, namely the initial misrepresentations, upon which 
the Stuarts relied in entering into both contracts.  A clear 
causal connection exists between the Stuarts' entire pecuniary 
loss and the HIPA violations.  That connection is certainly 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
15 
 
within the statutory language that a person must suffer a 
"pecuniary loss because of a violation . . . ."  Wis. Stat.      
§ 100.20(5).  The present case meets the HIPA requirement of a 
seller making a misrepresentation "to induce any person to enter 
into a home improvement contract . . . ."  Wis. Admin. Code      
§ ATCP 110.02(11).  Petitioners made their misrepresentations 
out "of their own volition and design . . . ."  Rayner v. Reeves 
Custom Builders, Inc., 2004 WI App 231, ¶15, 277 Wis. 2d 535, 
545, 691 N.W.2d 705.  Accordingly, a doubling of the Stuarts' 
entire pecuniary loss is appropriate in the present case given 
the facts in this record.  Upon remand, the circuit court should 
double the damages based upon the entire pecuniary loss for the 
reasons stated herein. 
V. APPORTIONMENT 
¶25 Over the Stuarts' objection and at the petitioners' 
request, the circuit court submitted a question to the jury 
asking the jury to apportion the Stuarts' damages between those 
damages caused by WSGI's negligent design and construction and 
those damages caused by WSGI's misrepresentations that were 
actionable under the HIPA.  Specifically, the parties disagreed 
over the inclusion of Question 16B of the special verdict 
submitted to the jury.  Question 16B read as follows: "Taking 
100 percent as a total amount of damages, what percentage of the 
amount you placed in answer 16A[8] do you attribute to:     
                                                 
8 Question 16A read: "What sum of money, if any, will fairly 
and reasonably compensate Robert and Lin Stuart for damages 
resulting from the negligence of the defendant(s)?"  The jury 
answered this question with a figure of $95,000.00. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
16 
 
Misrepresentation 
___% 
 
Negligence 
in 
construction 
___%     
Total 100%." 
¶26 The jury found WSGI liable under both the negligence 
claims and the HIPA claims.  After determining the Stuarts' 
damages to be $95,000, the jury apportioned 75 percent of the 
damages to the negligence claims and 25 percent of the damages 
to the HIPA misrepresentation claims. 
¶27 The Stuarts filed a postverdict motion in the circuit 
court arguing that the inclusion of Question 16B was erroneous.  
The circuit court denied that motion.  Before the court of 
appeals, the Stuarts once again argued that the circuit court 
erred by submitting the apportionment question to the jury 
because doing so frustrated the public policy behind the HIPA.  
The court of appeals agreed and, therefore, reversed the circuit 
court.  The Stuarts continue to make that argument to this 
court. 
¶28 We hold that the circuit court erred by having the 
jury apportion damages between the negligence claims and the 
HIPA claims.  The circuit court's special verdict, particularly 
Question 16B, was not consistent with the law.  The HIPA was 
intended to curb unscrupulous business tactics that cause 
financial distress to both consumers and to persons engaged in 
legitimate businesses.  See generally Benkoski, 242 Wis. 2d 652, 
¶17. 
¶29 There is no place in this remedial framework for the 
apportionment of damages when, as here, the Stuarts' damages 
flowed from the petitioners' misrepresentations.  Certainly, the 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
17 
 
misrepresentations were instrumental in causing the Stuarts to 
enter into the contracts. 
¶30 To obtain apportionment in lawsuits that contain HIPA 
claims, we hold that, before a party may request apportionment, 
it must meet the burden of showing that the damages can be 
separated.9  The petitioners failed to do so in the present case.  
In cases such as the present one, where there is no clear way to 
apportion the Stuarts' pecuniary loss between negligence damages 
and HIPA damages, doubling the entire pecuniary loss serves 
public policy concerns by encouraging victims to become "private 
attorney generals" and by providing larger disincentives to 
unscrupulous contractors. 
¶31 There are additional reasons why apportionment is not 
appropriate in the present case.  There was not enough evidence 
presented at trial for the jury to make a determination on 
apportionment, as demonstrated by the record.  Furthermore, the 
circuit court did not instruct the jury on the apportionment 
                                                 
9 The concurrence/dissent argues that the jury had enough 
information to separate the negligent construction that occurred 
as a result of the erroneous specifications in the Weisflog-
created plans from the negligent construction that occurred as a 
result 
of 
the 
builders 
not 
following 
the 
plans.  
Concurrence/Dissent, ¶98.  Our review of the record does not 
support the concurrence/dissent's assertion that the jury had 
enough information to draw such distinctions. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
18 
 
issue.10  Accordingly, we are satisfied that the jury did not 
have enough information or instruction, as a matter of law, to 
apportion damages between the Stuarts' negligent design and 
construction claims and their HIPA claims.  We are satisfied 
that if, as here, the party requesting apportionment fails to 
meet its burden of providing sufficient evidence at trial to 
necessitate 
apportionment, 
that 
there 
should 
be 
no 
apportionment.11 
VI. ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
¶32 On review, the petitioners argue that the Stuarts' 
claims were barred by the ELD, and the petitioners urge this 
court to apply the "predominant purpose test," set forth in 
Linden.  Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶¶8, 22.  Petitioners want 
this court to hold that the transactions here were primarily for 
                                                 
10 The record reflects that the circuit court judge read 
Question 16, including Question 16B, to the jury.  The record 
also 
reflects 
that 
the 
judge 
read 
only 
standard 
jury 
instructions to the jury on negligence, contractors' negligence, 
damages, and causation.  The only explanation the judge gave to 
the jury on Question 16 specifically was that it was a damage 
question and then stated, "You must answer the damage questions 
no matter how you answered any of the previous questions in the 
verdicts.  The amount of damages, if any, found by you, should 
in no way be influenced or be affected by any of your previous 
answers to questions in the verdict."  The judge then continued 
by reading standard jury instructions on damages, proof of 
damages, ATCP 110 claims, misrepresentation, and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
11 The concurrence/dissent misconstrues our reasoning as 
requiring a defendant to prove damages.  Rather, we are placing 
the burden of proving that the evidence is of sufficient detail 
to 
allow 
for 
apportionment 
on 
a 
defendant 
who 
requests 
apportionment in an ATCP action.  Concurrence/Dissent, ¶97. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
19 
 
the sale of goods used in construction and not for services.  In 
contrast, the Stuarts argue that the ELD does not apply to bar 
their claims. 
¶33 We hold that the ELD is inapplicable to the Stuarts' 
claims, and, therefore, the ELD does not apply to bar those 
claims.  If we were to apply the ELD to bar the HIPA claims, we 
would be ignoring the public policies that are the basis for the 
HIPA.  We are satisfied that the ELD cannot apply to statutory 
claims, including those under HIPA, because of such public 
policies.12  Whether or not the ELD applies to the Stuarts' non-
HIPA negligence claims would be analyzed and determined using 
the predominant purpose test.  In analyzing those claims in 
light of the predominant purpose test, we hold that the 
architectural contract, which was one for services,13 was the 
core transaction from which the contract for the remodeling and 
for the addition flowed.  That second contract also involved 
services, as well as some products.  Given that the core 
contract was one for services, and given that both contracts 
involved services, we are satisfied that the transactions were 
                                                 
12 The ELD does not bar the statutory claims.  Given the 
inability in the present case to apportion damages between the 
statutory and the common law claims, none of the Stuarts' claims 
should be barred by the ELD. 
13 In arguing that the Remodeling Contract was predominantly 
a 
contract 
for 
goods 
(products), 
the 
concurrence/dissent 
elevates form over substance by claiming that the contract is 
one for "drawings," as opposed to being a contract for the 
service of creating architectural designs and communicating 
those designs.  Concurrence/Dissent, ¶106. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
20 
 
primarily for services and that the ELD does not apply in the 
present case.  The appropriate application of the predominant 
purpose test leads us to that result. 
¶34 In our Insurance Co. of North America v. Cease 
Electric decision, we enunciated a "bright line rule" that the 
ELD is "inapplicable to claims for the negligent provision of 
services."  Ins. Co. of N. Am., 276 Wis. 2d 361, ¶52.  
Accordingly, we hold that the ELD is not applicable to the 
Stuarts' claims because there were two contracts, both involving 
services, and because the most significant one, applying the 
HIPA, was the first one for the provision of so-called 
architectural services by Weisflog and WSGI.14  As we noted in 
Linden, economic damages for the purpose of the ELD "are those 
arising because the product does not perform as expected, 
including damage to the product itself or monetary losses caused 
by the product."  Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶6 (citation 
omitted).  Here, the Stuarts' damages resulted from the HIPA 
violations and from the negligent design and construction 
practices of the petitioners, not from a failure of the 
                                                 
14 While not controlling, we find helpful and illustrative 
the approach a Minnesota court used when faced with two separate 
contracts, one of which was for services and one of which was 
for goods.  See Minn. Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Mach., Inc., 
17 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D. Minn. 1998).  That court refused to apply 
the predominant purpose test when faced with the existence of 
"two separate and distinct contracts," one of which was for the 
design of a sawmill and one of which was for the sale of sawmill 
equipment.  Id. at 904. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
21 
 
construction supplies and products.15  Accordingly, for this 
additional reason, we hold that the ELD is inapplicable to the 
Stuarts' claims. 
¶35 As noted previously, to apply the ELD to the HIPA 
claims would defeat the public policies underpinning the HIPA 
and the remedies it provides.  Public policy concerns require 
consumer protection statutes and administrative regulations be 
read in pari materia to achieve the goals of providing 
consumers, as well as persons engaged in legitimate businesses, 
                                                 
15 The report of the Stuarts' engineer/home inspector, 
Thomas Feiza, which the Stuarts presented at trial, is replete 
with examples of how the architectural and design services 
provided by WSGI and Weisflog were the cause of the rotting wood 
in the hot tub room, as opposed to deficient products. 
The Stuarts' expert noted the following deficiencies in the 
hot tub room's design that led to the rotting wood: the plans 
for the hot tub room lacked appropriate specifications and 
details; the plans failed to specify the required pressure 
treated wood to discourage decay and termites; there was no 
ventilation in the unheated crawl space below the hot tub room; 
the sole exhaust fan in the hot tub room had no visible exterior 
discharge or termination; proper surface drainage was not 
specified; there was not slab on grade construction to prevent 
moisture problems with the wood framed flooring; there were no 
gutters on the hot tub room to drain water away from its 
foundation; the lack of a drain tile system; the use of a wood 
retaining strip instead of a metal retaining strip on the roof 
of the hot tub room, in contradiction to the manufacturer's 
specifications, which caused water to build up on the roof; the 
lack of crawl space access panels, as required by Brookfield 
building codes; and the lack of sufficient roof venting. 
For the reasons discussed herein, this case is very 
different than the circumstances presented to us in the case of 
1325 North Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 293 
Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d 822, where the mixed contract was 
predominantly for a product, rather than for services. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
22 
 
with necessary protections and appropriate remedies.  Jackson v. 
DeWitt, 224 Wis. 2d 877, 887, 592 N.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶36 In a case involving another unfair trade statute, our 
court of appeals held that the ELD did not apply to bar a claim 
under the "Fraudulent representations" statute, Wis. Stat.      
§ 100.18.  See Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, 252 Wis. 2d 
676, 643 N.W.2d 132.  As the Kailin court noted, applying the 
ELD to HIPA claims would eliminate the consumer protection that 
the state legislature intended.  Id. 
¶37 Furthermore, the HIPA gives no indication that the 
legislature merely intended to add a remedy to common-law breach 
of contract or misrepresentation claims.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the ELD does not extend to HIPA claims, nor does it cover 
negligence claims such as the ones here that are the result of 
misrepresentations under the HIPA. 
VII. PERSONAL LIABILITY 
¶38 The parties disagreed over the special verdict that 
would be submitted to the jury on the issue of Ronald Weisflog's 
personal liability.  The circuit court denied the Stuarts' 
request to include questions on the special verdict as to 
whether Weisflog should be held personally liable.  The 
petitioners asserted that such questions should not be included 
based on their argument that personal liability should not 
result when an individual is acting only in his or her corporate 
business capacity. 
¶39 The court of appeals held that the circuit court 
erroneously refused to submit to the jury special verdict 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
23 
 
questions on whether Weisflog should be held personally liable 
for the respondents' damages.16  As a result, the court of 
appeals 
remanded 
that 
issue 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
with 
instructions to hold a new trial on whether Weisflog should be 
held personally liable. 
¶40 The HIPA envisions that a person, such as Weisflog, 
may be personally liable given its plain language which reads: 
"'Seller' means a person engaged in the business of making or 
selling 
home 
improvements 
and 
includes 
corporations, 
partnerships, associations and any other form of business 
organization or entity, and their officers, representatives, 
agents and employees."  Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 110(5) (emphasis 
added).  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) states: "Any person 
suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation by any other 
person of any order issued under this section may sue for 
damages therefore . . . and shall recover twice the amount of 
such pecuniary loss, together with costs, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee." (Emphasis added.) 
¶41 We hold that a corporate employee may be personally 
liable for acts, he or she takes on behalf of the corporate 
entity that employs him or her, that violate the HIPA.  
Accordingly, such violations may create personal liability for 
                                                 
16 Contrary to the concurrence/dissent's assertion that "the 
Stuarts asked for no question that would have assigned personal 
liability 
to 
Ronald 
Weisflog 
for 
misrepresentation" 
(Concurrence/Dissent, ¶113), the Stuarts made exactly such a 
request in the Plaintiffs' Proposed Special Verdict, requests 12 
through 14. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
24 
 
individuals who are alleged to be responsible for prohibited, 
unfair dealings and practices.17  However, we note that merely 
being an officer, agent, employee, representative, shareholder, 
or director will not be enough to impose individual liability on 
a person in such a class in the absence of proof that he or she 
was personally responsible for prohibited, unfair dealings or 
practices. 
¶42 Furthermore, our decision today is in line with our 
prior jurisprudence in related areas of the law.  As we have 
stated, "The general rule is that the agent, as well as the 
principal for whom he is acting[,] is responsible for the 
tortious acts of the agent."  Hanmer v. ILHR Dep't, 92 Wis. 2d 
90, 97, 284 N.W.2d 587 (1979) (citation omitted).18  In another 
decision, we made it clear that this principle also applies to 
the tort of misrepresentation.  Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. 
                                                 
17 Despite the argument of the petitioners, our previous 
jurisprudence in Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases, 
such as Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc., 2000 WI 7, 
232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515, is distinguishable given that 
Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) and ATCP 110 clearly provide for 
individual liability for corporate employees who are wrongdoers, 
whereas the ADA does not contemplate such individual liability. 
18 In Hanmer, two business owners were held to have 
voluntarily terminated their own employment for unemployment 
compensation purposes when they decided the business should file 
for bankruptcy.  Hanmer v. ILHR Dep't, 92 Wis. 2d 90, 95, 284 
N.W.2d 587 (1979).  We noted that the co-owners did not enjoy a 
legal status apart from the business entity they jointly owned 
for this purpose.  Id.  In so holding, we stated, "It is not 
now, nor has it ever been, the law in this state that such an 
individual escapes liability merely because he was acting in the 
capacity of a corporate director."  Id. at 97. 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
25 
 
Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 692-93, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979) 
(holding a nonresident corporate officer personally liable for 
misrepresentations 
the 
officer 
"personally 
commit[ted] 
or 
participate[d] in" on behalf of the corporation while present in 
Wisconsin). 
¶43 We 
remand 
the 
case 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
with 
instructions to hold a new trial on whether Ronald Weisflog 
should be held personally liable for the Stuarts' damages. 
VIII. ATTORNEY FEES 
¶44 On motions after the verdict, the circuit court 
awarded attorney fees in the amount of $15,675 to the Stuarts.  
The circuit court declined to hold a separate hearing on the 
determination of an attorney fee award.  Instead, the circuit 
court reached that figure after it doubled the dollar value 
associated with the 25 percent of the damages that the jury 
attributed to the ATCP 110 violations, which made the ATCP 110 
damages rise from $23,750 to $47,500.  After doing so, the 
circuit court then reached its decision that the attorney fee 
award should be $15,675 by applying a 33 1/3 percent contingency 
fee to the damage amount of $47,500. 
¶45 The Stuarts contend that the circuit court erred in 
using this methodology instead of correctly applying the 
lodestar methodology.  The Stuarts had sought approximately 
$200,000 in attorney fees.  In Kolupar I, this court adopted the 
lodestar methodology for determining reasonable attorney fees 
under fee shifting statutes and specifically directed "the 
circuit courts to follow its logic when explaining how a fee 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
26 
 
award has been determined."  See Kolupar, 275 Wis. 2d 1, ¶30.  
In Anderson, we noted that "[u]nder this analysis, the circuit 
court must first multiply the reasonable hours expended by a 
reasonable rate . . . . The circuit court may then make 
adjustments using the SCR 20:1.5(a) factors."  Anderson, 281 
Wis. 2d 66, ¶39 (citations omitted); see also Kolupar II, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶15. 
¶46 As noted above, the apportionment of damages between 
the Stuarts' negligence claims and their HIPA claims, upon which 
the amount of damages for the attorney fee award determination 
was based, was erroneous.  Furthermore, we are satisfied that 
the use of a percentage contingency fee instead of the lodestar 
methodology was an erroneous exercise of discretion by the 
circuit court given the facts of the present case. 
¶47 We remand this matter to the circuit court for a 
determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee 
award in this case utilizing the lodestar methodology. 
IX 
¶48 We hold as follows on each of the six principal issues 
that we were asked to answer in this decision.  First, we hold 
that the Stuarts' HIPA claims and their negligence claims are 
not barred by a statute of limitations because their claims are 
governed by the discovery rule and the six-year statute of 
limitations set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(b).  Second, we 
are satisfied that Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) authorizes the 
doubling of an entire damage award, even if a HIPA violation is 
combined with additional wrongdoing that contributes to the loss 
No. 
2005AP886   
 
27 
 
in question.  Third, based on the evidence in the record and on 
the facts of the present case, we hold that the circuit court 
erred by asking the jury to apportion damages between the 
Stuarts' HIPA claims and their negligence claims.  Fourth, we 
are satisfied that the ELD is inapplicable to the Stuarts' 
claims, and, therefore, does not bar their claims.  Fifth, we 
hold that a corporate employee may be held personally liable for 
acts, he or she takes on behalf of the corporate entity that 
employs him or her, that violate the HIPA.  Lastly, we hold that 
the circuit court erred in its determination of an appropriate 
attorney fee award.  
¶49 The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed, and 
the case is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings 
consistent with our decision. 
By the Court.—Affirmed and remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2005AP886.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion except Part VI relating to the economic 
loss doctrine.   
¶51 I agree with the majority opinion that the economic 
loss doctrine "cannot apply to bar statutory claims, including 
those under HIPA."1  I do not join the majority opinion in 
addressing the question whether the economic loss doctrine bars 
the 
Stuarts' 
claims 
for 
negligent 
design 
or 
negligent 
construction.  This discussion is not necessary to the holding 
in the present case. 
¶52 I agree with the majority opinion in not responding to 
the concurrence/dissent that addresses and decides the instant 
case on whether the plaintiffs proved that the defendants made 
an actionable misrepresentation for purposes of the Home 
Improvement Practices Act (HIPA).2  This issue was not raised or 
briefed.3  The majority opinion properly leaves the issue 
untouched. 
¶53 For the reasons set forth, I join the majority opinion 
except Part VI.  I write separately on the issues of the 
economic loss doctrine and actionable misrepresentation.  
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶13.  
2 See concurrence/dissent, ¶¶66-81.   
3 The majority opinion correctly states the issues before 
the court at ¶3.  
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶54 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   The lawsuit before the court arises from 
the design and construction of an addition to the home of Robert 
Stuart and Lin Farquhar-Stuart (the Stuarts).  Two types of 
claims were tried to a jury:  (1) violation of Wisconsin 
Administrative Code § ATCP 110.02(11) (Oct. 2004)1 (a provision 
of the Home Improvement Practices Act or HIPA) based on 
misrepresentation and (2) common law negligence in the design 
and construction of the addition.  The Stuarts prevailed on both 
types of claims and the jury allocated damages between those 
claims.   
¶55 Before us as part of this review are a potential 
application of the statute of limitations, which the defendants, 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. and Ronald Weisflog, raised as 
an affirmative defense2 and the court of appeals decision that 
the attorney fees awarded by the circuit court were determined 
by an incorrect process and must be recomputed.   
¶56 The majority opinion concludes that the HIPA claim and 
the negligence claims are not barred by the statute of 
limitations 
and 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
its 
determination of an appropriate attorney fees award.3  I concur 
to the majority opinion, in part, because I conclude that the 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the October 2004 version, unless otherwise noted. 
2 Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
concluded that the affirmative defense was meritorious. 
3 Majority op., ¶4. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
2 
 
statute of limitations does not bar either type of claim.  I 
also conclude that if I were to assume that a HIPA violation 
were possible given the jury's factual findings in regard to 
what was represented, I would conclude that the Stuarts' HIPA 
claim would not be barred by the economic loss doctrine and that 
the analysis the circuit court used in determining the amount of 
attorney fees is inconsistent with the precedent established by 
Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶¶23-30, 
275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58.  However, on remand, the circuit 
court should determine whether the Architectural Remodeling 
Contract is a "home improvement contract" as defined in Wis. 
Admin. Code § ATCP 110.01(4)4 because under the lodestar method 
for determining attorney fees that we endorsed in Kolupar, the 
type of claim on which a litigant prevails is a factor for the 
circuit court's consideration.  Id., ¶30.  
¶57 I dissent, in part, because I further conclude, 
contrary to the majority opinion, that the following five 
holdings should be this court's conclusions when the law is 
applied to those facts that were found by the jury:  (1) the 
defendants' representations that they would design drawings and 
construct an addition to the Stuarts' home consistent with the 
                                                 
4 No party in this review has argued that either the 
Remodeling Architectural Contract or the Remodeling Contract are 
not "home improvement contracts," so the majority opinion and I 
have assumed that they both are.  However, "home improvement 
contract" has a specific definition in Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 
110.01(4).  It covers contracts between a "seller" and a "buyer" 
to construct "home improvements."  A "home improvement" is 
defined in § ATCP 110.01(2) as "the remodeling, altering, 
repairing, painting, or modernizing of residential or non-
commercial property, or the making of additions thereto . . . ."     
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
3 
 
building codes are not representations of a then existing or 
pre-existing fact and accordingly they cannot form the basis for 
a HIPA violation based on misrepresentation;5 (2) assuming that a 
HIPA violation were possible given the jury's findings in regard 
to what was represented, nothing in Wis. Admin. Code, ch. ATCP 
110, nor in Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) on which this HIPA claim is 
based, authorizes doubling the jury's award of damages for 
negligent construction, as well as those damages awarded for the 
HIPA violation; (3) assuming that a HIPA violation were possible 
given the jury's findings in regard to what was represented, the 
circuit court did not err by permitting the jury to allocate 
damages between the HIPA claim and the negligence claim because 
the Stuarts pled both types of claims, tried both types of 
claims and requested special verdict questions on both types of 
claims; (4) the economic loss doctrine bars the negligence 
claims that are based on negligent design and construction of 
the addition; and (5) the circuit court did not err in drafting 
Special Verdict Question 9, which placed Ronald Weisflog on the 
Special Verdict solely in regard to whether he was a principal 
in the Remodeling Contract because that is the only context in 
which he could have been personally liable under the evidence 
adduced at trial.  Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court to 
vacate the award of damages and attorney fees and dismiss the 
lawsuit.   
                                                 
5 However, as I explain below, they may form the basis for a 
breach of contract claim. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND6 
¶58 The Stuarts wanted to enlarge their home.  To this 
end, they had plans drawn by an unnamed builder for the addition 
they wanted.  However, when the bids came in, the addition was 
out of their price range.  Subsequently, the Stuarts heard of 
the Weisflog company, and in 1995, they met with Ronald 
Weisflog, the President of Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., to 
discuss their ideas for an addition.  They gave Ronald Weisflog 
a check for $500 and he agreed to begin work on drawings to 
implement their ideas.  
¶59 Following several meetings with Ronald Weisflog, the 
Stuarts entered into a written contract entitled, "Remodeling 
Architectural Contract."  This contract required the Stuarts to 
pay a "remodeling architectural fee" of $1,000 ten days after 
their approval of the finalized drawings for the addition.  The 
Remodeling Architectural Contract also provided as follows: 
We understand that this remodeling architectural fee 
will be applied toward the construction costs of the 
remodeling project, after we sign a contract with 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., accepting this 
corporation as the remodelers of our future project. 
¶60 Both 
of 
the 
Stuarts 
signed 
the 
Remodeling 
Architectural 
Contract 
and 
Ronald 
Weisflog 
signed 
it 
as 
"President" of Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc.  The Stuarts 
understood that the $1,500 in fees paid under the Remodeling 
Architectural Contract entitled them to ownership of the plans 
                                                 
6 The facts in the "Background" are either those found by 
the jury in the Special Verdict or they are undisputed. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
5 
 
once they were finalized and that they could take them to any 
builder for bids to do the actual construction.   
¶61 On April 21, 1996, the Stuarts entered into a second 
contract, entitled "Remodeling Contract," to construct the 2,000 
square foot addition to their home.7  The Remodeling Contract was 
in the amount of $278,076.96.  It listed various types of 
materials that would be used in the construction of the addition 
to the Stuarts' home, room by room.  On the last page, the 
Remodeling Contract showed $74,113 as "allowances" for various 
types of products, such as cabinets, carpet and appliances, 
wherein the contract price could vary if the Stuarts selected 
more or less expensive products than provided for in the 
allowances.  Robert Weisflog,8 Ronald's son, signed the contract, 
without any designation that he was signing on behalf of 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc.   
¶62 The Stuarts commenced this action alleging negligence 
in the design and construction of their home addition and breach 
of contract.  They later amended the complaint to allege they 
were damaged because of HIPA violations under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ ATCP 110.02(11) based on alleged misrepresentations.  Before 
trial, the Stuarts dismissed their breach of contract claims and 
proceeded on the alleged HIPA violations and claims of common 
law negligence in the design and construction of the addition.  
                                                 
7 The addition doubled the size of the Stuart's home, and 
also created an outdoor in-ground swimming pool with surrounding 
deck. 
8 Robert Weisflog has never been a defendant in the Stuarts' 
lawsuit.  
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶63 The jury was the fact finder for the Stuarts' claims.  
Therefore, the Special Verdict answers are critical to a correct 
application of the relevant law.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶64 Resolution of four of the five issues that I will 
address9 proceed before this court as questions of law wherein we 
provide an independent review, but benefiting from the analyses 
of previous court decisions.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 
262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  Whether a representation is 
sufficient to form a legally actionable misrepresentation is a 
question of law.  Loula v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 175 Wis. 2d 50, 
54, 498 N.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1993).  The interpretation and 
application of statutes are questions of law, Minuteman, Inc. v. 
Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 853, 434 N.W.2d 773 (1989), as are 
the interpretation and application of administrative rules, 
Snyder v. Badgerland Mobile Homes, Inc., 2003 WI App 49, ¶10, 
260 Wis. 2d 770, 659 N.W.2d 887.  Whether the economic loss 
doctrine applies either to a particular type of claim or to a 
particular fact set presents a question of law.  See Kaloti 
Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶10, 283 
Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205; Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 
70, ¶43, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132.   
¶65 However, the form of a special verdict is committed to 
the discretion of the circuit court.  Meurer v. ITT Gen. 
                                                 
9 I do not address the standard of review for issues that I 
do not discuss in this opinion. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
7 
 
Controls, 
90 
Wis. 2d 
438, 
445, 
280 
N.W.2d 
156 
(1979).  
Accordingly, I review the Special Verdict to determine whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in the 
questions relating to the apportionment of damages.  Ford Motor 
Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 465, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 
1987).   
B. 
Misrepresentation 
¶66 All of the Stuarts' HIPA claims are based on alleged 
misrepresentations.  Therefore, an understanding of the legal 
principles 
that 
underlie 
an 
actionable 
claim 
of 
misrepresentation is essential to my discussion of their HIPA 
claims. 
1. 
General principles 
¶67 Not every representation that turns out to be untrue 
is a legally actionable misrepresentation.  For example, to 
maintain a claim of misrepresentation, the Stuarts must allege 
and prove that the defendants made a representation of a fact 
that was untrue at the time when the representation was made.  
Consol. Papers, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 153 Wis. 2d 589, 594, 
451 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that Dorr-Oliver's 
representation that the clarifier it will construct will meet 
the specific operating requirements of Consolidated Papers was 
not actionable as a misrepresentation, even though the clarifier 
that was built did not comply with Consolidated Papers' specific 
operating requirements).  Representations that are promises of 
future performance are not actionable as misrepresentations, 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
8 
 
unless the person promising future performance had no intention 
of carrying out that promise at the time he made it.  Id.    
¶68 In addition, exaggerations or statements of opinion 
that a seller makes claiming that his product is the best or 
that the quality of his work is the finest are mere "puffery"; 
and therefore, they are legally insufficient to support a claim 
for misrepresentation.  Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
2004 WI 32, ¶41, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233 (concluding 
that Harley-Davidson's advertising its TC-88 motorcycle as a 
"masterpiece" and of "premium quality" were legally insufficient 
to support a claim of misrepresentation).  As we have explained, 
"[T]he exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to 
the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of 
which cannot be precisely determined," are not actionable 
misrepresentations under the law.  State v. Am. TV & Appliance 
of Madison, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 292, 301-02, 430 N.W.2d 709 (1988) 
(concluding that American TV's representation that its washing 
machines were the "best" or the "finest" were insufficient 
representations to violate Wis. Stat. § 100.18, as a matter of 
law).  Stated otherwise, commercial puffery is not within the 
ambit of legally actionable misrepresentation because it is the 
opinion of the speaker and "not capable of being substantiated 
or refuted."  Tietsworth, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶44; see also In re 
Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983) (concluding that 
Bayer's representation that it produced "the world's best 
aspirin" was lawful puffery).   
2. 
The jury's findings 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶69 The 
jury 
found 
for 
the 
Stuarts 
on 
two 
misrepresentation claims, one for each of the two contracts to 
which the Stuarts were parties.  First, the jury found that in 
order to induce the Stuarts to enter into the Remodeling 
Architectural Contract or to keep any payment under the 
Remodeling Architectural Contract, Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, 
Inc. 
made 
a 
representation 
that 
was 
false 
deceptive 
or 
misleading.10 
 
The 
jury 
did 
not 
identify 
the 
specific 
representation that was made.  Second, the jury found that in 
order to induce the Stuarts to enter into the Remodeling 
Contract, Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. made only one 
representation:  that construction of the addition "will comply 
with the building codes."11  Therefore, the majority opinion's 
examination 
of 
the 
HIPA 
claims, 
which 
rest 
on 
the 
misrepresentation findings of the jury, should rest solely on 
                                                 
10 The Special Verdict submitted to the jury provided: 
1. 
Did Weisflog Showroom Gallery, Inc., make any 
false, deceptive, or misleading representations 
in order to induce the Plaintiffs, Robert & Lin 
Stuart to enter into a remodeling architecture 
contract, or to obtain or keep any payment under 
the remodeling architecture contract? 
ANSWER:  Yes. 
11 The Special Verdict submitted to the jury provided: 
13. Did the remodeling contractor or its agents make 
false, deceptive or misleading representations 
that 
remodeling 
work 
will 
comply 
with 
the 
building codes in order to induce the Plaintiffs 
Robert and Lin Stuart to enter the remodeling 
contract? 
ANSWER:  Yes. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
10 
 
the representation that the addition "will comply with the 
building codes" because that is what the jury found.   
¶70 Before us, the Stuarts do not argue that the jury 
should have been asked whether the "remodeling contractor" made 
any additional false, deceptive or misleading representations 
other than those assuring that the future construction will 
comply with the building codes when finished.  Therefore, their 
sole HIPA claim in regard to the Remodeling Contract is that the 
"remodeling contractor" said the addition will be constructed in 
compliance with the building codes. 
¶71 Third, 
the 
jury 
found 
that 
Weisflog's 
Showroom 
Gallery, Inc. and Ronald Weisflog did not represent that they 
were licensed architects.12  This negative finding was a 
rejection of one basis for the Stuarts' HIPA claim that, 
                                                 
12 The Special Verdict Form provided the following questions 
and answers in this regard: 
4. 
Did Weisflog Showroom Gallery, Inc. misrepresent 
that they were licensed architects? 
ANSWER:  No.   
If you answered Question 4, "yes", then answer this 
question: 
5. 
Did the Stuarts rely on the misrepresentation? 
ANSWER:  N/A. 
If you answered Question No. 5, "yes", then answer 
this question: 
6. 
Was such misrepresentation a cause of damages to 
the Stuarts? 
ANSWER:  N/A. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
11 
 
contrary to Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 110.02(4)(d), the defendants 
had represented they were licensed architects when they were 
not.  The Stuarts do not contest this finding or argue that 
Special Verdict Question No. 4 was improperly framed.   
¶72 Fourth, because it was the Stuarts' position at trial 
that the remodeling contract was with Ronald Weisflog in his 
personal, not corporate, capacity, Special Verdict Questions 
Nos. 9 and 10 addressed this issue.13  Question No. 9 asked "Who 
did the Stuarts have a remodeling contract with?  Ronald 
Weisflog as [an] individual, or [with] Weisflog Showroom 
Gallery, Inc.?"  The jury answered that question, "Weisflog 
Showroom Gallery, Inc."  
¶73 Fifth, Question No. 16 asked the jury to find the 
total damages the Stuarts suffered and then to apportion the 
damages between the HIPA misrepresentation claim and the common 
                                                 
13 The Special Verdict submitted to the jury provided: 
9. 
Who did the Stuarts have a remodeling contract 
with? 
A. 
Ronald Weisflog as individual? 
OR 
B. 
Weisflog Showroom Gallery, Inc. 
ANSWER:  Weisflog Showroom Gallery, Inc. 
If you selected 9A only, then answer question No. 10. 
10. Did a party other than Ronald Weisflog act as 
general contractor or assume responsibility for 
the performance of the remodeling contract? 
ANSWER:  N/A. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
12 
 
law claim for negligent construction.14   The jury found that the 
total amount of damages resulting from the negligence of the 
defendants was $95,000.  It also found that 25% of the Stuarts' 
damages were due to misrepresentation and 75% were due to 
negligence in construction of the addition.  The jury did not 
assign any damages for negligence in design.    
                                                 
14 The Special Verdict submitted to the jury provided: 
Regardless of how you have answered any of the 
previous questions, you must answer these questions. 
16A. What sum of money, if any, will fairly and 
reasonably compensate Robert and Lin Stuart for 
damages resulting from the negligence of the 
defendant(s)? 
ANSWER:  $95,000.00. 
16B. Taking 100 percent as a total amount of damages, 
what percentage of the amount you placed in 
answer 16A do you attribute to: 
 
Misrepresentation 
 
 
 
 25% 
 
Negligence in construction 
 
 75% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
100% 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
13 
 
3. 
Lack of present or pre-existing facts 
¶74 All of the representations that the jury found were 
made to induce the Stuarts to enter into each of the two 
contracts were promises of future performance.15  Ronald Weisflog 
never disputed that he represented that he would create drawings 
for the addition that "will comply" with the building codes and 
that the addition Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. contracted 
to construct also "will comply" with the building codes.    
¶75 However, the majority opinion's analysis gets off 
track in at least three respects:  (1) it does not acknowledge 
that promises of future performance are not actionable as 
misrepresentations, Consolidated Papers, 153 Wis. 2d at 594; (2) 
it does not acknowledge that representations about the quality 
of a product or a service by the seller are not actionable as 
misrepresentations, Tietsworth, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶41; and (3) it 
does not acknowledge that the only facts that can underlie its 
opinion are those that the jury found in the Special Verdict, 
i.e., we are not free to add facts inconsistent with those found 
by the jury in order to support a position. Wurtz v. Fleischman, 
97 Wis. 2d 100, 108, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980).  The facts found by 
the jury show only representations of acts to be accomplished in 
the future.   
                                                 
15 If the jury had found that Weisflog Showroom Gallery, 
Inc. and Ronald Weisflog had represented they were licensed 
architects, that would have been the representation of a fact 
then in existence.  However, the Stuarts did not prevail on that 
allegation. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶76 The majority opinion repeatedly supports its opinion 
with facts that the jury did not find.  For example, the 
majority opinion says, "Ronald Weisflog had promised the Stuarts 
that the products he would use on their project were high 
quality, that he was familiar with and understood the local 
building codes and regulations, and that 'he could provide 
architectural service' for the Stuarts, which included doing the 
'architectural design work.'"16  However, the jury did not find 
that Ronald Weisflog represented that he "was familiar" with the 
building codes when he was not.  Instead, the jury found he 
represented "that remodeling work will comply with the building 
codes."  Special Verdict Question No. 13 (emphasis added).  The 
jury's finding is a promise of future performance, not a 
representation of a fact in existence when the representation 
was made.  Therefore, it cannot form the basis for a 
misrepresentation claim.  Consol. Papers, 153 Wis. 2d at 594. 
¶77 In addition, the jury made no finding that the 
defendants 
represented 
the 
quality 
of 
their 
products 
or 
services; nor should it have done so, as a representation of 
quality is not actionable as a misrepresentation.  Tietsworth, 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶6.  Note 5 to ¶6 elaborates that Ronald 
Weisflog's "assertion that he understood Brookfield codes and 
regulations 
very 
well 
was 
exactly 
such 
a 
present 
misrepresentation given his later admissions at trial to the 
contrary."  However, the jury made no finding that Ronald 
Weisflog represented that "he understood Brookfield codes and 
regulations very well" when he did not.  We are not the finders 
of fact in an appellate review and therefore, we are not free to 
supplement 
the 
facts found by the jury to support our 
conclusions.  See Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 108, 293 
N.W.2d 155 (1980).   
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
15 
 
270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶41.  In this regard, the majority mistakes 
mere puffery for an actionable misrepresentation.  For example, 
it relates, "Ronald Weisflog had promised the Stuarts that the 
products he would use on their project were high quality 
. . . ."17  However, the jury made no such finding of fact.  
Furthermore, as we recently explained in Tietsworth, where 
another statutory claim of misrepresentation was made, "the 
exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to the 
degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which 
cannot 
be 
precisely 
determined" 
are 
not 
actionable 
as 
misrepresentations.  Id. (quoting Am. TV, 146 Wis. 2d at 301-
02).  
¶78 And finally, the majority opinion ignores the jury's 
specific finding that Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. and 
Ronald Weisflog did not represent that they were licensed 
architects.  Special Verdict No. 4.  We are not free to add to 
or 
to 
ignore 
the 
Special 
Verdict. 
 
Accordingly, 
no 
misrepresentation claim under HIPA was proved by the Stuarts.  
No damages are due for misrepresentation under HIPA and no 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶6.  This contention could have relevance 
only to the Remodeling Architectural Contract because the only 
representation the jury found was false, deceptive or misleading 
in regard to the Remodeling Contract was the representation that 
the construction of the addition "will comply" with the building 
codes.   
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
16 
 
attorney fees should be awarded based on a proved HIPA 
violation.18   
¶79 The case before us is a civil action.  However, I am 
particularly concerned with the majority opinion's broadening 
the definition of a legally actionable representation to include 
promises of future performance because violations of Wis. Admin. 
Code ch. ATCP 110 may be prosecuted as crimes, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.26(3).  State v. Stepniewski, 105 Wis. 2d 261, 262-63, 314 
N.W.2d 98 (1982) (concluding that a criminal prosecution under 
§ 100.26(3) for violations of ch. ATCP 110 does not require 
proof of intentional conduct).   
¶80 The definition of "representation" that the court 
chooses to apply to § ATCP 110.02(11) in the case at bar will be 
the same definition that will apply when violations of § ATCP 
110.02(11) are prosecuted criminally.  Therefore, subsequent to 
the court's decision in this case, a plumber who tells a 
homeowner that he will properly install a toilet but does not do 
so, or a general contractor who tells a homeowner that he will 
comply with the building code in the remodeling of a residence 
but then a subcontractor does not adhere to the relevant codes, 
could be subject to criminal prosecution under § 100.26(3) for 
failing to keep those promises of future performance.   
                                                 
18 However, it should not be assumed that, because the 
defendants' representation that the design and construction of 
the addition will comply with the building codes is not an 
actionable misrepresentation, the defendants are relieved of 
their legal duty to fulfill the promise they made.  Failure to 
keep a promise of future performance is actionable as a breach 
of contract.  Eli Envtl. Contractors, Inc. v. 435 Partners, LLC, 
2007 WI App 119, ¶6, 300 Wis. 2d 712, 731 N.W.2d 354.    
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
17 
 
¶81 Breach of contract damages to compensate the homeowner 
for shoddy workmanship have been a sufficient remedy in the 
past.  However, because the majority opinion defines promises of 
future performance as actionable representations when those 
promises are not fulfilled, the law will change.  That change 
will 
place 
an 
unwarranted 
burden 
of 
possible 
criminal 
prosecution on the building trades.  It will have far-reaching 
impacts throughout Wisconsin, which the majority opinion appears 
not fully to appreciate.    
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 100.20(5) 
1. 
Double damages 
¶82 The majority opinion concludes that both the damages 
sustained by the Stuarts for misrepresentation and the damages 
they sustained due to negligent construction should be doubled 
under the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5).19  The majority 
opinion reaches this conclusion because it finds that a "clear 
causal connection exists between the Stuarts' entire pecuniary 
loss and the HIPA violations."20   
¶83 The majority opinion's conclusion is erroneous for at 
least two reasons:  First, causation is a jury question, K & S 
Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 
70, ¶¶38-39, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792, and the jury made 
no finding of a causal connection between the Stuarts' entire 
pecuniary loss and the HIPA violations.  Instead, the Stuarts 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶4. 
20 Majority op., ¶24. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
18 
 
requested,21 and the circuit court submitted, special verdict 
questions where causation for damages due to negligence22 and 
causation for damages due to misrepresentation23 were found 
separately by the jury.  The majority opinion conflates the 
jury's causation findings in order to bring both claims under 
the HIPA umbrella, but that is contrary to the specific findings 
of the jury.  
¶84 Second, whether the jury's award for the Stuarts' 
claim of common law negligence in construction could under any 
conceivable legal theory be combined with the jury's award for 
misrepresentation and then doubled depends on the interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5).  This is so because the Stuarts' sole 
right to double damages and an award of attorney fees arises 
under § 100.20(5).  However, the majority opinion engages in no 
attempt to determine the meaning of § 100.20(5).  
¶85 We interpret a statute to determine its meaning, 
assuming that the meaning the legislature intended is expressed 
in the words the legislature chose.  Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶43-44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning when the terms used are not technical or 
                                                 
21 The Special Verdict questions submitted by the Stuarts 
are contained in Exhibit 107B. 
22 See 
Special 
Verdict 
Question 
Nos. 
8 
(relating 
to 
negligence in the Remodeling Architectural Contract) and 12 
(relating to negligence in the Remodeling Contract).  
23 See 
Special 
Verdict 
Question 
Nos. 
3 
(relating 
to 
misrepresentation in the Remodeling Architectural Contract) and 
15 (relating to misrepresentation in the Remodeling Contract). 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
19 
 
require a special meaning.  Id., ¶45.  If the words are plain 
and unambiguous, we apply this meaning.  Id., ¶46.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 100.20(5) provides: 
Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a 
violation by any other person of any order issued 
under this section may sue for damages therefor in any 
court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover 
twice the amount of such pecuniary loss. 
Section 100.20(5) unambiguously requires that in order to obtain 
double damages and attorney fees, a claimant must show that he 
or she suffered "pecuniary loss" "because of" a violation of an 
"order issued" under § 100.20. 
¶86 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ ATCP 
110.02 
has 
been 
interpreted as creating an "order" that was "issued" under Wis. 
Stat. § 100.20.  Rayner v. Reeves Custom Builders, Inc., 2004 WI 
App 231, ¶13, 277 Wis. 2d 535, 691 N.W.2d 705 (concluding that 
ch. ATCP 110 was promulgated pursuant to § 100.20(2), and allows 
general orders forbidding unfair trade practices).  Accordingly, 
§ ATCP 110.02(11), which is the basis of the Stuarts' HIPA 
claim, 
is 
an 
"order" 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
§ 100.20(5).  
Therefore, the Stuarts may obtain twice the amount of the 
pecuniary loss24 that they suffered, if the loss was "because of" 
a representation that the jury found the defendants made in 
violation of § ATCP 110.02(11).  Snyder, 260 Wis. 2d 770, ¶19 
(concluding that because a party must establish that his 
"pecuniary loss" was suffered "because of" an ATCP violation in 
order to be entitled to double damages and reasonable attorney 
                                                 
24 Before us, the defendants do not contest the jury's 
finding that the Stuarts suffer a pecuniary loss. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
20 
 
fees, an ATCP violation that causes no damages precludes an 
award of attorney fees).   
¶87 Resolution of whether the Stuarts incurred pecuniary 
loss "because of" a representation made in violation of Wis. 
Admin. Code § ATCP 110.02(11) requires an interpretation of 
§ ATCP 110.02(11).  We interpret an administrative rule such as 
§ ATCP 110.02(11) "to give effect to the intent of the 
regulation."  Snyder, 260 Wis. 2d 770, ¶10 (quoting Jackson v. 
DeWitt, 224 Wis. 2d 877, 887, 592 N.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1999)).  
As with statutory interpretation, we begin with the plain 
meaning of the regulation.  Id.  If the language of the 
regulation clearly and unambiguously sets forth its meaning, we 
apply that meaning to the facts presented by the case at hand.  
Id.  Section ATCP 110.02 provides in relevant part: 
No seller shall engage in the following unfair methods 
of competition or unfair trade practices: 
. . .  
(11) MISREPRESENTATIONS; GENERAL.  Make any false, 
deceptive or misleading representation in order to 
induce any person to enter into a home improvement 
contract. 
This rule unambiguously requires the Stuarts to prove that the 
defendants 
made 
a 
"false, 
deceptive 
or 
misleading 
representation" to induce them to enter into a "home improvement 
contract."   
¶88 There is nothing in Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 110.02(11) 
that refers to negligence in the design or in the construction 
of a home improvement.  However, the Stuarts' expert witness, 
Architect Keith Schultz, opined that the remodeling contractor 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
21 
 
had not followed the construction specifications that were 
required by the drawings.  
¶89 These failures to follow the drawings support the 
award 
of 
damages 
for 
negligent 
construction. 
 
They 
are 
independent of any representations that the jury found that the 
defendants made about complying with the building codes.  
Accordingly, they do not come within the parameters of Wis. 
Admin. Code § ATCP 110.02(11), which is the "order" component of 
Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5).  The Stuarts are entitled to double 
damages only if those damages occurred "because of" a violation 
of an "order."  Events other than misrepresentations, i.e., 
negligent construction, that caused damages to the Stuarts are 
not compensable under § 100.20(5).  Paulik v. Coombs, 120 
Wis. 2d 431, 439 n.5, 355 N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1984) (concluding 
that no attorney fees could be awarded under § 100.20(5) for 
defending against Coombs' successful counterclaims).  Stated 
otherwise, the negligent construction did not result in damages 
"because of" an "order" issued under § 100.20.  The damages 
arising 
from 
negligent 
construction 
stand 
on 
different 
analytical footing.  Accordingly, I conclude that the majority 
opinion errs in lumping all the damages together and doubling 
them.  There is no statutory or administrative rule support for 
such a conclusion. 
¶90 The majority opinion relies on Benkoski v. Flood, 2001 
WI App 84, 242 Wis. 2d 652, 626 N.W.2d 851, for its decision to 
lump all the damages together, regardless of the cause of the 
damages, and then double the awards.  However, Benkoski provides 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
22 
 
no support for the majority's conclusion.  An entirely different 
question was decided in Benkoski than is presented here.  
Benkoski focused on the mathematical calculation of the amount 
of the pecuniary loss, not on whether the pecuniary loss 
occurred because of an order violation.  
¶91 In Benkoski, the question presented was whether the 
price of a lost sale of a mobile home should be doubled before 
subtracting the fair market value of the mobile home, or after 
subtracting the fair market price of the mobile home, in order 
to arrive at the amount of the "pecuniary loss" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.20(5).  Benkoski, 242 Wis. 2d 652, ¶26.  The court of 
appeals relied on our rationale under the Lemon Law cases, where 
we concluded that the legislature intended to include the 
purchase price in the calculation of the amount of pecuniary 
damages.  Id., ¶¶27-28 (citing Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 
197 Wis. 2d 973, 982, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996)).   
¶92 Benkoski does not stand for the proposition that any 
damages shown by a Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) claimant, regardless 
of the cause of the damages, can be lumped together with those 
incurred because of a § 100.20(5) violation and then doubled.  
To conclude as the majority opinion has, turns every instance of 
shoddy workmanship into a HIPA misrepresentation claim.   
¶93 Accordingly, were I to assume that a HIPA violation 
were possible given the jury's findings in regard to what was 
represented, I would conclude that the Stuarts are entitled 
under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) to double only $23,750,25 not the 
                                                 
25 The jury found total damages of $95,000 and that 25% 
($23,750) of those damages was caused by misrepresentation. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
23 
 
entire $95,000 award, because it is only the misrepresentation 
damages that were sustained "because of" a violation of an 
"order issued" under § 100.20(5).  Snyder, 260 Wis. 2d 770, ¶19; 
Paulik, 120 Wis. 2d at 439 n.5.   
2. 
Apportionment of damages 
¶94 Special Verdict Question No. 16 addressed damages.  
Part 16A asked the jury to determine the Stuarts' total damages 
and part 16B asked the jury to apportion the damages between 
"Misrepresentation" and "Negligence in construction."  The jury 
answered that $95,000 was the Stuarts' total damages and of that 
amount, 25% was due to "Misrepresentation" and 75% was due to 
"Negligence in construction."  The majority opinion concludes 
that the damages should not have been apportioned between the 
two different types of claims that the Stuarts tried and 
prevailed upon.26   
¶95  The circuit court has broad discretion in fashioning 
a special verdict form and jury instructions that accompany it.  
Meurer, 90 Wis. 2d at 445; Maci v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
105 Wis. 2d 710, 719, 314 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1981).  A 
discretionary act is the product of a rational process wherein 
the facts developed at trial are considered with the law that 
applies to them.   
¶96 The 
Stuarts 
tried 
two 
types 
of 
claims:  
misrepresentation to induce contracts (the HIPA claims) and 
negligence in the design and construction of the addition.  All 
damages recoverable under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) must have 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶28. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
24 
 
resulted "because of" a violation of an "order" referenced in 
§ 100.20(5).  Snyder, 260 Wis. 2d 770, ¶19; Paulik, 120 Wis. 2d 
at 439 n.5.  The "order" underlying the Stuarts' claim is Wis. 
Admin. Code § ATCP 110.02(11).  The Stuarts requested separate 
causation questions for misrepresentation and for negligence, 
and the jury apportioned damages caused by each claim according 
to its view of the evidence.  The jury's findings that 25% of 
the Stuarts' damages was caused by misrepresentation and 75% was 
caused by negligent construction are consistent with the 
evidence adduced at trial.  The circuit court considered this 
evidence and the requirements of § 100.20(5) when it arrived at 
the apportionment of damages question in the Special Verdict.  
Accordingly, were I to assume that a HIPA violation were 
possible given the jury's findings in regard to what was 
represented, I would conclude that there was no erroneous 
exercise of discretion by the circuit court in fashioning the 
Special Verdict.  
¶97 Furthermore, the issue of apportionment of damages is 
closely related to the issue of double damages.  In this regard, 
the majority opinion continues to rely on Benkoski; on the 
policy it wants to further; and on its determination that the 
defendants had the burden of "showing" that the damages for 
different claims could be separated.27  However, the special 
verdict shows that the defendants did prove that negligent 
construction caused damages different from damages caused by  
misrepresentation.  The majority opinion observes, "There is no 
                                                 
27 Majority op., ¶¶28–30. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
25 
 
place in this remedial framework for the apportionment of 
damages when, as here, the Stuarts' damages flowed from the 
petitioners' misrepresentations."28  The majority is incorrect; 
that is not what the jury found.  The Stuarts requested separate 
questions on negligence and on misrepresentation and separate 
questions on causation relating to each type of claim.29  They 
received what they requested.  
¶98 The majority opinion also asserts that "[t]here was 
not enough evidence presented at trial for the jury to make a 
determination on apportionment, as demonstrated by the record."30  
The majority opinion never points out why the record is 
insufficient to support the verdict.  Its assertion ignores the 
uncontroverted testimony of the Stuarts' own expert, Architect 
Keith Schultz, who testified to the remodeling contractor's 
failure to follow the drawings and to his observations of shoddy 
workmanship, as well as building code violations.  The jury 
heard this testimony and it was able to apportion the damages, 
as the Special Verdict shows.  We sustain a jury verdict if 
there is any credible evidence to support it.  Giese v. 
Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 408, 331 N.W.2d 585 
(1983); Stewart v. Wolf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 271 N.W.2d 79 
(1978) (concluding that an apportionment of negligence must be 
sustained if there is any credible evidence to support it).  
                                                 
28 Majority op., ¶29.  
29 See notes 35 and 36 above and Exhibit 107B, the Stuarts' 
requested Special Verdict. 
30 Majority op., ¶31. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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Here, Schultz reviewed the drawings for the addition and 
compared them with the actual construction.  He then pointed out 
numerous instances where the remodeling contractor did not 
follow the drawings.31  This evidence was credible and it 
supports the jury's verdict.   
D. 
Economic Loss Doctrine 
1. 
General principles 
¶99 The economic loss doctrine is a common law doctrine 
created by the courts to recognize that contract law and the law 
of warranty are better suited than tort law to deal with purely 
economic loss between two contracting parties.  Kaloti, 283 
Wis. 2d 555, ¶28.  We have defined "economic loss" as "damages 
resulting from inadequate value because the product is inferior 
and does not work for the general purposes for which it was 
manufactured and sold."  Id., ¶29 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, 
Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 400-01, 573 N.W.2d 
842 (1998)).  Economic damages include damages to the product 
itself and to other components in an integrated system.  Wausau 
Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 249-50, 
593 N.W.2d 445 (1999).  We have applied it to the construction 
of residential real estate, Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 
2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189, and to remodeling 
                                                 
31 Schultz testified that the drawings required double 2x10 
floor joists in the hot tub room and only single 2x12 floor 
joists had been used; the flooring under the carpeting in the 
hot tub room was to be 3/4 inch tongue and groove OSB over a 1/2 
inch sub-floor, but only a 3/4 inch OSB that was not tongue and 
groove was used and the 1/2 inch sub-floor was entirely omitted; 
the attic had been vented as required by the code, but 
insulation had been applied so as to block the attic vents.   
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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contracts, 1325 North Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 
94, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d 822.  However, contracts for 
services, where a product is merely incidental, do not fall 
within the scope of the economic loss doctrine.  Ins. Co. of N. 
Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶36, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 
N.W.2d 462.  When a contract is mixed, including both services 
and the creation of a product, we must determine the predominant 
purpose of the contract before we may conclude whether the 
economic loss doctrine applies.  Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶22.  
2. 
Negligence claims 
¶100 In order to determine whether the economic loss 
doctrine applies to preclude common law claims for negligence 
between contracting parties where both a product and services 
are provided, one must determine whether the predominant purpose 
of the contract is to provide a product or to provide services.  
1325 N. Van Buren, 293 Wis. 2d 410, ¶24; Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 
606, ¶¶18-22.  We employ a totality of the circumstances test to 
determine the predominant purpose of a contract.  Linden, 283 
Wis. 2d 606, ¶22.  The totality of circumstances includes both 
subjective and objective factors.  Id.  Those factors include, 
but are not limited to, the primary objective the contracting 
parties entered into the contract to achieve, the requirements 
of the contract, the nature of the business of the party doing 
work under the contract, and the value of the materials used.  
1325 N. Van Buren, LLC, 293 Wis. 2d 410, ¶42. 
¶101 Here, the Stuarts entered into two separate contracts; 
they tried two negligence claims; and the jury made separate 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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factual findings in regard to negligence under each contract.  
That is, the jury answered separate questions with regard to:  
(1) 
negligence 
in 
performing the Remodeling Architectural 
Contract32 and (2) negligence in performing the Remodeling 
Contract.33   
a. 
The Remodeling Architectural Contract 
¶102 In order to evaluate whether the economic loss 
doctrine has any effect on the Stuart's negligence claim based 
on the Remodeling Architectural Contract under which the jury 
found 
that 
Weisflog's 
Showroom 
Gallery, 
Inc. 
negligently 
designed the addition, I begin by determining whether the 
predominant purpose of the Remodeling Architectural Contract was 
for a product or for services, under the totality of the 
circumstances presented by this case.  Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 
¶22.   
¶103 Robert Stuart explained that his primary objective in 
contracting with Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. under the 
Remodeling 
Architectural 
Contract 
was 
to 
obtain 
drawings 
sufficient for the construction of the addition he and his wife 
hoped to build.  He said that contracting for the drawings was 
not tied to using Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. as the 
builder for the addition.  He explained that he could use any 
                                                 
32 Special Verdict Question No. 7 asked whether Weisflog 
Showroom Gallery, Inc. was negligent in its design of the 
Stuarts' addition. 
33 Special Verdict Question No. 11 asked whether the 
remodeling contractor was "negligent with respect to the 
construction of the Stuarts' addition." 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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builder of his choosing to do the actual construction.  The 
Remodeling Architectural Contract's terms34 are consistent with 
his testimony.  
¶104 There 
was 
no testimony that Weisflog's Showroom 
Gallery, Inc. was in the business of creating drawings for 
remodeling projects in general.  Rather, it appears that the 
drawings it created were for those who Ronald hoped would hire 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. to do the remodeling work.  
There is also nothing in the record that explains how many hours 
were spent on the drawings or what materials were used in their 
preparation, aside from the obvious paper on which they were 
printed.  However, there was a product produced, the drawings 
for the addition the Stuarts built.35  Its price was a fixed 
$1,500 and was not dependent on the number of hours it took to 
create a design that satisfied the Stuarts.  
¶105 The 
Remodeling 
Architectural 
Contract 
is 
much 
different from the general contract for the construction of a 
residence that was reviewed in Linden.  The tort claims at issue 
in 
Linden 
were 
made 
against 
subcontractors 
who 
produced 
components in an integrated system.  Therefore, we examined the 
effect that the Lindens' contract with the general contractor 
had on the subcontractors.  Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶25.  We 
concluded that the work of the subcontractors, who provided a 
stucco coating and roofing for the house had no independent 
value to the Lindens because they contracted to purchase a 
                                                 
34 See Exhibit 1. 
35 See Exhibit 3. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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completed house, not its components.  Id., ¶29.  Therefore, we 
examined whether the general contract to construct the house had 
as its predominant purpose the provision of a product or the 
provision of a service.  Id., ¶22.   
¶106 Here, 
the 
drawings 
made 
under 
the 
Remodeling 
Architectural Contract are not a component of an integrated 
system as the house's roof was in Linden.  Rather, the drawings 
had a separate price and an opportunity for independent use by 
the Stuarts.  As Robert Stuart explained, when the drawings were 
complete, he was free to choose any builder to do the 
construction.  Accordingly, I conclude that the predominant 
purpose of the Remodeling Architectural Contract was to produce 
a product, the drawings for the addition.  
¶107 However, the jury awarded no damages for negligent 
design; 
it 
awarded 
damages 
only 
for 
"Negligence 
in 
construction."  The jury's verdict is reasonable because there 
was 
no 
testimony 
whatsoever 
that 
assigned 
any 
value 
to 
negligence in design.  All of the damages testimony related to 
the cost of demolishing a portion of the addition, rebuilding it 
and correcting other construction errors in areas of the 
addition that were not demolished.   
 
 
b. 
The Remodeling Contract 
¶108 The Remodeling Contract indisputably involved:  (1) 
the creation of a product, the addition, and (2) services, the 
construction labor.  Therefore, I review the totality of the 
circumstances to determine the predominant purpose of this 
contract.  First, the addition constructed included many facets:  
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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a new hot tub room; a new, expanded kitchen; a new, expanded 
master bedroom suite; a powder room and entry change; and an 
add-on to the garage with a mudroom, bath and family room and an 
outdoor 
in-ground 
swimming 
pool 
and 
surrounding 
deck.  
Accordingly, a product was created.  Second, the Stuarts' 
primary objective in entering into the Remodeling Contract was 
to nearly double the size of their home and significantly 
upgrade its amenities.  Third, the "remodeling contractor," 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., was in the business of 
creating products:  remodeled residential properties.  Fourth, 
the addition's cost to the Stuarts was $278,076.96.  This cost 
included materials and the labor necessary to create a 2,000 
square foot addition.  The cost of all the materials is not 
fully identified, but the allowances for such items as pool, hot 
tub, 
cabinets, 
carpet, 
window 
coverings, 
countertops 
and 
appliances is $74,113.36  Finally, the Remodeling Contract stated 
that the "Contract amount is based upon bid sheet."  Any changes 
in the specifications bid upon that raised or lowered the cost 
of the addition would be charged or credited to the Stuarts.  
Therefore, the parties bargained for the price of the addition 
based on the specifications, not on the hours of labor it took 
to 
complete 
the 
addition. 
 
Under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances presented, the Stuarts contracted for much more 
than services with materials being merely incidental, as was the 
case in Cease Electric.  The Remodeling Contract had as its 
predominant purpose the creation of a product, the Stuarts' home 
                                                 
36 See Exhibit 4. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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addition.  It falls squarely within the economic loss doctrine's 
proscription that the Stuarts may not maintain tort claims for 
the failure to complete the construction in a workmanlike 
manner.  Their claims sound in contract.  Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 
606, ¶22.   
¶109 The analysis of the Remodeling Contract for the 
Stuarts' home should follow the analysis we employed in 1325 
North 
Van 
Buren. 
 
There, 
we 
applied 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances test to the remodeling of a warehouse and 
concluded that the parties bargained to produce a product:  42 
residential condominiums and adjacent parking garages.  1325 N. 
Van Buren, 293 Wis. 2d 410, ¶46.  My conclusion here is 
consistent with 1325 North Van Buren, LLC and with Linden, but 
the majority opinion's is not.   
¶110 The majority opinion's analysis gets off track because 
it conflates the two contracts and asserts that the Remodeling 
Architectural Contract, under which the drawings for the 
addition were created, is "the core transaction, from which the 
contract for the remodeling and for the addition flowed."37  The 
majority opinion never defines a "core transaction."  It also 
simply 
assumes, 
without 
analysis, 
that 
the 
Remodeling 
Architectural Contract is a contract for services.38  The 
majority 
opinion then labels the Remodeling Architectural 
Contract as the "core" contract and concludes that since it is a 
services contract, the Remodeling Contract's primary purpose is 
                                                 
37 Majority op., ¶33. 
38 Id. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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also to provide services.39  These conclusions permit the 
majority opinion to side-step the economic loss doctrine without 
an analysis of the totality of the circumstances presented by 
the claims in this case.  A totality of the circumstances 
analysis is required before the predominant purpose of a 
contract can be determined when a contract provides both a 
product and services.  1325 N. Van Buren, 293 Wis. 2d 410, ¶29; 
Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶22.  
¶111 The majority opinion also errs because it ignores both 
the facts and the law that apply to the question presented.  
First, the undisputed testimony of Robert Stuart is that he 
owned the drawings and could have taken them to any builder he 
chose to construct the addition.  Query, if the Stuarts took the 
drawings to another builder and that builder negligently 
constructed the addition, would the predominant purpose of the 
contract to construct the addition be for services?  Would the 
defendants be liable for the negligence of the builder who 
carelessly constructed the addition?  The answer to each 
question is "no."   
¶112 Second, the questions this case presents require the 
court to undertake a totality of the circumstances analysis to 
determine the predominant purpose of the Remodeling Contract.  
In my view, the majority opinion would come to a different 
result if it followed the court's precedent so clearly set out 
in 1325 North Van Buren and in Linden.  Accordingly, in 
conformance with that precedent and the predominant purpose of 
                                                 
39 Id. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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the Remodeling Contract, I conclude that the Stuarts' claim for 
negligent construction is barred by the economic loss doctrine 
and the $71,25040 in damages awarded by the jury for that claim 
must be vacated.   
                                                 
40 The jury found total damages of $95,000 and that 75% 
($71,250) of those damages were caused by negligent construction 
of the addition. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
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F. 
Personal Liability 
¶113 The jury was asked to determine whether the Remodeling 
Contract was with Ronald Weisflog or with Weisflog's Showroom 
Gallery, Inc., in order to determine whether Ronald Weisflog had 
personal liability for construction defects.  It determined that 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. was the party with whom the 
Stuarts contracted to do the construction of the addition.41  The 
majority opinion concludes that the circuit court erred in not 
submitting a question in regard to Ronald Weisflog's personal 
liability for the Stuarts' HIPA claims.42  However, the Stuarts 
asked for no question that would have assigned personal 
liability to Ronald Weisflog for misrepresentation.  What the 
Stuarts requested was: 
Taking 100 percent as a total amount of negligence 
which caused damages to the Plaintiffs, Robert and Lin 
Stuart, what percentage of such total negligence do 
you attribute to: 
(i)   Weisflog Showroom Gallery, Inc. 
____% 
(ii)  Ronald Weisflog 
 
 
 
____% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100%43 
¶114 The majority opinion also orders a new trial.  On 
remand, the circuit court must consider whether the HIPA 
misrepresentation claim on which the jury decided in favor of 
the Stuarts is based on a legally actionable representation or 
on a promise of future performance because this question has 
                                                 
41 See Special Verdict Question No. 9.   
42 Majority op., ¶43. 
43 See Exhibit 107B, question 20. 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
36 
 
never been addressed.  A representation of a fact then in 
existence or of a pre-existing fact is required for actionable 
misrepresentation.  Consol. Papers, 153 Wis. 2d at 594.  In my 
view, when the law on this issue is properly analyzed, the jury 
verdict supports no HIPA claim.  Accordingly, there can be no 
new trial in regard to a claim of misrepresentation based on 
promises of future performance. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶115 In conclusion, I dissent in part because I conclude, 
contrary to the majority opinion, that the following five 
holdings should be this court's conclusions when the law is 
applied to those facts found by the jury:  (1) the defendants' 
representations that they would design drawings and construct an 
addition to the Stuarts' home consistent with the building codes 
are not representations of a then existing or pre-existing fact 
and accordingly they cannot form the basis for a HIPA violation 
based on misrepresentation; (2) assuming that a HIPA violation 
were possible given the jury's findings in regard to what was 
represented, nothing in Wis. Admin. Code, ch. ATCP 110, nor in 
Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) on which this HIPA claim is based, 
authorizes doubling the jury's award of damages for negligent 
construction, as well as those damages awarded for the HIPA 
violation; (3) assuming that a HIPA violation were possible 
given the jury's findings in regard to what was represented, the 
circuit court did not err by permitting the jury to allocate 
damages between the HIPA claim and the negligence claim because 
the Stuarts pled both types of claims, tried both types of 
No.  2005AP886.pdr 
 
37 
 
claims and requested Special Verdict questions on both types of 
claims; (4) the economic loss doctrine bars the negligence 
claims that are based on negligent design and construction of 
the addition; and (5) the circuit court did not err in drafting 
Special Verdict Question 9, which placed Ronald Weisflog on the 
Special Verdict solely in regard to whether he was a principal 
in the Remodeling Contract because that is the only context in 
which he could have been personally liable under the evidence 
adduced at trial.   
¶116 Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court to vacate 
the award of damages and attorney fees.   
¶117 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this opinion. 
 
 
 
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