Title: Pete v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Pete v. State, No. 19, Sept. Term 2004.  Opinion by Harrell, J.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- RESTITUTION AS PART OF SENTENCE OR AS
CONDITION OF  PROBATION
Pete was convicted in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County of second degree assault,
among other charges, and received probation in exchange for a suspended sentence,
pursuant to § 6-221 of the Criminal Procedure Article.  He also was convicted, under the
same case number, for reckless driving (§ 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article) for an
incident occurring approximately two hours after the assault.  He was fined $250 for
reckless driving.  During the incident underlying the reckless driving conviction, a police
cruiser was damaged as a direct result of Pete stopping his truck abruptly as the police
cruiser followed it.  One condition of the probation for the second degree assault included
restitution to the Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) for damages to the police
cruiser damaged as a direct result of the reckless driving incident.  Because restitution
under § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article was unavailable for either the second
degree assault conviction (the damage incurred by the LGIT was not a direct result of the
second degree assault and the LGIT was not a victim of the assault) or the reckless
driving conviction (§ 11-603 does not permit restitution for a reckless driving conviction),
the restitution order as a condition of probation was an illegal sentence.
Circuit Court for Dorchester Co unty
Case # 11232
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 19
September Term, 2004
SCOTT ALAN PETE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   December 6, 2004
1 All Maryland code citations, unless otherwise noted, will be to the Criminal
Procedure Article (2001) in effect at the time of Pete’s trial.
2 Pete also was convicted, under Case No. 11332, of attempting to elude Patrolman
Michael Cheesman by failing to stop (Count 8), one count of failing to stop at the scene of
an accident with bodily injury (Count 9), and one count of failing to return and remain at the
scene of an accident (Count 10).  During the same trial, although not relevant to the issues
raised in Pete’s petition for writ of certiorari, he was convicted in Case No. 11333 of second
degree assault of Deputy Sheriff Timothy Eberling, malicious destruction of property,
attempting to elude Deputy Eberling by failing to stop, and attempting to elude Deputy
Eberling by fleeing on foot.
We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to explore again the bounds of § 6-221 of
the Maryland Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code, which allows a sentencing
court discretion to suspend a defendant’s sentence and order probation on “the conditions
that the court considers proper.”   Md. Code (2001), § 6-221.1  Our exploration leads us to
conclude that the restitution ordered in this case was an illegal sentence and not properly
imposed as a condition of probation.
Scott Alan Pete was convicted, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Dorchester
County, of second degree assault and reckless driving, among other charges included in Case
No. 11332.2  He was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for the assault, with all but
two months suspended in favor of three years probation upon his release.  He also was fined
$250 for the reckless driving conviction.  As one of the conditions of probation, Pete was
ordered to make restitution in the amount of $355.06 to the victim of the assault and
$6,490.53 to the Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) for repairs to Patrolman Michael
Cheesman’s police cruiser, which was damaged in the incident underlying the reckless
driving conviction.
3 We need not, and do not, decide Pete’s second question.
2
Pete appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging, among other things, the
Circuit Court’s restitution order.  The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion,
affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  We granted Pete’s petition for writ of certiorari, 381 Md.
324, 849 A.2d 473 (2004), to consider the following questions:
1. Did the trial court have authority to order, as a condition of probation for
assault, restitution for damages directly resulting from an unrelated act of
reckless driving – an offense other than the conviction on which the court
suspended sentence and imposed probation?
2. Where a court orders restitution for damages resulting from the commission
of a non-jailable offense, may the court order the restitution paid as a condition
of probation for an unrelated offence which carries a maximum prison
sentence of ten years’ imprisonment?
We conclude that the trial court’s restitution order with regard to LGIT, as a condition
of probation, is an illegal sentence.  This is so because restitution to the LGIT was
unavailable, as a matter of law, as a sentencing option for either the second degree assault
or reckless driving convictions in this case.3  We shall vacate that portion of the restitution
order, and the parallel condition of probation for the second degree assault conviction,
requiring payment of $6,490.53 to the LGIT.
4 Ms. Raickle incurred $355.06 in costs associated with her trip to the emergency
room following the incident.
5 Ms. Raickle testified that she told the police that, at the time of the assault, Pete had
a handgun.  The police later would discover that Pete had brandished a replica of a handgun
in Ms. Raickle’s apartment.
3
I.
A.
On 23 April 2002 Pete entered the Cambridge apartment of Susan Raickle and, during
an argument, hit Ms. Raickle on the back of the head.4  Ms. Raickle called the police after
Pete left the apartment and Officer Gilbert McCall responded to the police call at 3:59p.m.
After a brief investigation, the police broadcast a lookout for Pete, alerting that, among other
things, he may have a gun.5  
At 4:45p.m. Patrolman First Class Michael Cheesman, while in his marked police car,
heard a radio dispatch to be on the lookout for Pete and that he likely would be driving a late
model, tan Ford pickup truck.  At approximately 5:45p.m, Patrolman Cheesman saw a man,
resembling the broadcast description of Pete, in a truck (also matching the given description)
stopped at a traffic light at the corner of Cedar Street and Academy Street in Cambridge.
After driving past the person in the truck to confirm the apparent identification, Patrolman
Cheesman turned his vehicle around and activated his overhead lights in an attempt to
effectuate a traffic stop.  Pete turned onto Hughlett Street after the police vehicle closed to
within approximately twenty feet of the truck.
6 Pete later would be apprehended after assaulting a police officer, committing
malicious destruction of property, and attempting to elude police.  See supra, note 2. 
4
Patrolman Cheesman testified that Pete drove the truck away from his police cruiser
at a “very fast rate,” characterizing his speed as “well above 20 – a lot of dust was thrown
up off the roadway.”  He later testified on cross-examination that, in his opinion,  Pete “was
trying to get away from [him].”  Neither Pete nor his passenger acknowledged seeing
Patrolman Cheesman in pursuit with the cruiser’s overhead lights activated.
As Pete approached Washington Street on Hughlett Street, he stopped abruptly,
slamming on his brakes, five feet beyond the intersection’s stop line.  Patrolman Cheesman
testified that the truck’s “front end went down[,] [t]he back end went up” when this stop took
place.  The police cruiser struck the rear of the truck, resulting in $6,490.53 in damage to the
cruiser.  Pete left the accident scene, headed towards Maryland Route 50.6
B.
At Pete’s sentencing on 22 August 2002, the trial judge stated: 
So, in Case No. 11332 the Court sentences you to 18 months to
the Dorchester County Detention Center, and I’m going to
suspend the last six months of that sentence.  Now, that’s on –
only on Count 1, the second-degree assault upon Susan Raickle.
And you’ll be on probation for a period of 3 years, subject to the
standard conditions of probation, the special conditions of
probation, the special conditions that you avoid contact with
Susan Raickle and that you pay any fines ordered in this case,
that is, Case No. 11332 and that you make restitution within 3
years in the amount of $6,845.59, and of that total $355.06
would be to Dorchester General Hospital, and $6,490.53 would
be to the Local Government Insurance Trust.
7 Pete points out an apparent typographical error in the transcript, resulting in an
inaccurate reflection of the actual sentence imposed.  He suggests that the first sentence of
the transcript excerpt quoted above should read, “So, in Case No. 11332 the Court sentences
you to 18 months to the Dorchester County Detention center, and I’m going to suspend the
last six[teen] months of that sentence.”  (Emphasis added).  The State contends that the
sentencing proceeding transcript quoted in the text of this opinion accurately reflects the trial
court’s intent to address “the total time of incarceration, the total term of probation, the total
amount of restitution, and then the specific terms and fines for each of the five criminal
counts in case number 11332."  It offers no typographic triage, however, to resolve the
arithmetical puzzle occasioned by its reading of the transcript that places Pete’s unsuspended
second degree assault sentence at ten months and his total unsuspended jail sentence at
twenty-two months, rather than the two and twelve months, respectively, the court later
specified.  We resolve this conflict by looking to the terms and conditions of the probation
order itself, infra, at 6-7.  Pete’s view is the correct one.
5
Now, as to the next count, reckless driving, the Court imposes
a fine of $250.  As to attempting to elude police in an official
police vehicle by failing to stop, the court imposes a sentence of
4 months to the Dorchester County Detention Center.  That will
be consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count 1.   And on
count, failure to stop vehicle at the scene of accident involving
bodily injury, the Court sentences you to 6 months to the
Dorchester County Detention Center and that’ll be consecutive
to the 4 months on attempting to elude police in an official
police vehicle by failing to stand and also . . . [by] failing to
stop, and also consecutive to the 18-month sentence on Count 1,
that is, second-degree assault upon Susan Raickle, 16 months of
which were suspended.
On the tenth count, failure to return and – return to and remain
at the scene of accident involving attended vehicle, the Court
sentences you to 6 months to the Dorchester County Detention
Center, and that’ll be concurrent to other sentences imposed in
Case No. 11332.  So – that’s a total to serve of 12 months.[7]
The Court’s order for probation, also signed on 22 August 2002, ordered three years
of probation for the second degree assault on Ms. Raickle.  The probation order listed several
8 The probation order also ordered Pete to pay court costs of $145.00 and ordered him
to avoid contact with Ms. Raickle for three years.
6
conditions for Pete’s supervised probation, including that he pay $355.06 to the Dorchester
General Hospital for Ms. Raickle’s hospital visit and $6,490.53 to the LGIT.8  The probation
order also included conditions attributable to specific counts: a $250 fine on the reckless
driving conviction, and imprisonment for convictions under Counts 8, 9, and 10.  Lastly, the
order stated that he must pay his fine and the ordered restitution within three years.
In its unreported opinion the Court of Special Appeals addressed Pete’s argument that
the restitution order constituted error because the $6,490.53 to be paid to the LGIT had no
nexus to the assault crime underlying the probation order.  The intermediate appellate court
observed that restitution is generally available as part of a sentence for a criminal conviction
under § 11-603 or as a condition of probation under § 6-221.  Contrary to Pete’s assertion
that restitution to a victim should be available only when the injury is a direct result of the
criminal conviction from which it flows, the Court of Special Appeals held that restitution
was available as a condition of probation for “related criminal conduct for which criminal
liability has been adjudicated.”
II.
A.
At the outset, we examine the probation order to determine its terms and conditions.
Probation was ordered relative to Pete’s second degree assault conviction.  He received
9 The restitution provisions of § 11-603 of Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Article
were re-codified from Article 27, § 807, without substantial change, by the Acts of 2001,
chapter 10, § 1, effective 1 October 2001.  For a thorough review of the history of restitution,
see Judge Wilner’s discussion in Grey v. Allstate Insurance Company, 363 Md. 445, 450-62,
769 A.2d 891, 894-900 (2001).
7
probation for three years with explicit conditions that required completion within that period–
conditions that, if left uncompleted, would result in him serving the suspended sixteen
months of his sentence for the second degree assault conviction.  He first had to complete his
effective total of twelve months incarceration under Case No. 11332– two months for the
second degree assault, four months for Count 8 and six months for Count 9, consecutive to
the assault sentence, and six months for Count 10, concurrent to the assault and Counts 8 and
9.  He also had to pay a fine of $250.00 as punishment for his reckless driving conviction.
More important to this case, he had to make restitution of $6,490.53 to the LGIT.  This
requirement was included without a specific reference to the reckless driving count. 
B.
Restitution under Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Article is “a criminal sanction, not
a civil remedy.”  Grey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 363 Md. 445, 451, 769 A.2d 891, 895 (2001)
(emphasis in original).9  It serves at least three distinct purposes.  First, it “is a form of
punishment for criminal conduct.”  Songer v. State, 327 Md. 42, 46, 607 A.2d 557, 559
(1992).  Second, it is intended to rehabilitate the defendant.  Anne Arundel County v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 329 Md. 677, 685, 621 A.2d 427, 431 (1993) (citing Lee
v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986)).  Lastly, it affords  “the aggrieved victim
10 Section 6-221 of Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Article was re-codified from
Article 27, § 641A, without substantive change, by the Acts of 2001, chapter 10, § 1,
effective 1 October 2001.  
8
recompense for monetary loss.”  Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374
(1986)). 
In Maryland, restitution may be ordered, with qualifications, as a direct sentence for
a crime or delinquent act, in addition to any other penalty prescribed by the underlying
sentencing or remedial statute.  §11-603(a).  Sentencing courts also may order restitution
under the broader powers of probation after conviction, “the court may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the conditions
that the court considers proper.”  §6-221.  We previously commended the use of restitution
as a condition of probation: “[a] court which orders restitution does a certain solomonic
justice for the aggrieved victim who is entitled to requittal of that unlawfully taken or
reparation for injury criminally inflicted; thus, restitution as a probationary tool has an
understandable appeal.”  Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 305, 429 A.2d 1029, 1033 (1981). Yet,
the broad power to order conditions of probation under § 6-221 is not boundless.  See, e.g.,
Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 299, 734 A.2d 684, 690 (1999) (holding that home detention
as a condition of probation under § 641A of Article 2710 is improper without explicit
statutory authorization); Sheppard v. State, 344 Md. 143, 154, 685 A.2d 1176, 1181 (1996)
(holding improper a probation order under § 641A of Article 27 forbidding a defendant from
driving, even if the Maryland Transit Authority, which had specific regulatory power over
11 Section 11-603 reads, in relevant part,
(a) Conditions for judgment of restitution. – A court may enter
judgment of restitution that orders a defendant or child
respondent to make restitution in addition to any other penalty
for the commission of a crime or delinquent act, if:
(1) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, property of
the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or
unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased . . . .
9
driver’s license suspensions under the Transportation Article, gives the defendant a license);
Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 433, 488 A.2d 949, 954 (1985) (holding that probation order
under § 641A of Article 27 was an illegal sentence when it ordered restitution to be paid by
a defendant to a victim of an alleged crime for which the defendant was not convicted).  If
a sentencing court exercises its discretion under §6-221, it may grant probation regardless
of whether the defendant was convicted of a crime “punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both.”  § 6-225(b).
We determine that restitution to the LGIT in this case was unavailable under § 11-603
for the reckless driving charge, the State’s contention to the contrary notwithstanding.  Even
though the damage to Patrolman Cheesman’s police cruiser, on these facts, was undoubtedly
a direct result of the reckless driving, reckless driving is not a “crime” for which restitution
may be ordered.  Under § 11-603, restitution may be ordered to a victim “as a direct result
of the crime . . . .”  § 11-603(a)(1).11  A crime includes “a violation of the Transportation
Article that is punishable by a term of confinement.”  § 11-601(d)(2).  Any person convicted
12 All citations to the Maryland Transportation Article will be to the 2002
Replacement Volume.
13 Probation with restitution might have been an appropriate sentence for a reckless
driving conviction under §§ 6-221 and 6-225 of the Criminal Procedure Article.  See, infra,
note 18, at 21 and 22.
10
of reckless driving under § 21-901.1 is guilty of a misdemeanor and only “subject to a fine
of not more than $1,000.”  Md. Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 21-101(g) of the
Transportation Article.12  Here, Pete received a $250 fine and was not eligible for punishment
“by a term of confinement” for his reckless driving conviction under § 21-901.1 of the
Transportation Article; therefore, restitution was not available to the sentencing court as a
direct sentence.13
We also conclude, upon further analysis, that restitution to the LGIT as part of a
sentence for the second degree assault conviction was inappropriate under § 11-603 because
the damage to Patrolman Cheesman’s cruiser did not arise as a “direct result” of the second
degree assault on Ms. Raickle.  The term “direct result of the crime” appeared first in the
Restitution for Crimes Act of 1977.  1977 Md. Laws, Chap. 581 (H.B. 1680); Md. Code
(1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1977 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27 § 640(b). We recently observed, in
determining whether daytime housebreaking, after it was abolished as a crime, nonetheless
remained a “crime of violence” for purposes of sentencing for an illegal possession of a
firearm conviction, that:
The chief goal of statutory interpretation is to discover the actual
intent of the legislature in enacting the statute, and the legion of
cases that support this proposition need not be repeated here.  In
14 There is little in the legislative history of H.B. 1680 to suggest that “direct result of
the crime” means anything other than that discerned from the plain language.  The history
of H.B. 1680 shows that the Director of the Department of Legislative Reference of the
General Assembly had sought, and received, the existing restitution statutes of the Colorado,
Georgia, and Oklahoma code from their respective legislative bodies.  Of these statutes, only
the Oklahoma statute provided specifically that, “‘Monetary restitution’ shall mean the sum
paid by the defendant to the victim of his criminal act to compensate that victim for the
economic loss suffered as a direct result of the criminal act of the defender.”  1976 Okla.
Sess. Laws c. 160, § 5 (emphasis added).
11
fact, all statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with
the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute
primarily reveals itself through the statute's very words.  A court
may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not
evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute;
nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle
interpretations that limit or extend its application.  In short, if the
words of a statute clearly and unambiguously delineate the
legislative intent, ours is an ephemeral enterprise.  We need
investigate no further but simply apply the statute as it reads. 
In some cases, the statutory text reveals ambiguity, and then the
job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the
legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory
construction at our disposal.   However, before judges may look
to other sources for interpretation, first there must exist an
ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more reasonable
alternative interpretations of the statute.  Where the statutory
language is free from such ambiguity, courts will neither look
beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative
intent nor add to or delete words from the statute.  Only when
faced with ambiguity will courts consider both the literal or
usual meaning of the words as well as their meaning in light of
the objectives and purposes of the enactment.  As our
predecessors noted, "We cannot assume authority to read into
the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out.
Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an
ambiguity exists."  Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of
statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the
statutory text . . . . 
Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387-88, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003) (citations omitted).14
12
 
This is not the first time we have interpreted the restitution statute.  In Grey, we
resolved whether a restitution order was a civil judgment sufficient to allow the intended
recipient victims of a vehicular manslaughter crime to attach the proceeds of the defendant’s
automobile insurance policy.  363 Md. at 449-50, 769 A.2d at 894.  In concluding that
restitution by itself was insufficient to allow the victims to attach the defendant’s insurance
proceeds based on civil liability for the accident, we explained, “[a]n order of restitution
entered under § 807 [currently § 11-603] establishes, at most, two things: (1) that the
defendant was guilty of a crime; and (2) that, as a direct result of that crime, the persons or
entities to whom the restitution is ultimately payable suffered losses (i) of a kind enumerated
in the statute and (ii) at least in the amount stated in the restitution order.”  Id. at 465-66, 769
A.2d at 903.  
Pete alleges that the “direct result of the crime” of second degree assault on Ms.
Raickle may not include as victims either Patrolman Cheesman or the LGIT because they
were not victims of the assault.  Section 11-603, he urges, compels that conclusion by stating
plainly that restitution may be ordered as “as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act,
property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or unlawfully obtained,
or its value substantially decreased . . . .”  Furthermore, he asks us to read the statute’s plain
language and determine that a direct result of a crime is limited to the victim of the qualifying
crime and that victim’s injuries and/or damages arising from that crime.  In the alternative,
he asks that we apply tort proximate cause analysis.  Under this analysis, the intervening
13
event of the reckless driving incident occurring approximately two hours after the assault
would break the chain of causation between the assault and the motor vehicle collision
between Pete’s truck and Patrolman Cheesman’s cruiser.
The State believes that these assertions, if accepted, would limit too much the scope
of §11-603.  It urges us, like the reasoning employed by the intermediate appellate court in
this case, to adopt a broader reading of § 11-603 by interpreting the pretextual sentence in
paragraph (a) in light of the narrower language of subparagraph (a)(1): “[a] court may enter
a judgment of restitution . . . in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime
or delinquent act . . . .”  § 11-603(a) (emphasis added).  As the State sees it, if it can obtain
a conviction for a crime where restitution may be had, but is not ordered, and another
conviction of a related crime, then restitution may be ordered to the appropriate victims as
an appropriate sentence under the related crime.  Such a reading would require solely “a
nexus between the defendant’s criminal activity and the losses that form the basis for an
order of restitution.”  This nexus is justified by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion
in the present case as allowing restitution orders if the orders are “related to losses that were
caused by conduct for which [Pete] had been convicted.”  The State also described its nexus
theory as the “Single Charging Document” Doctrine.  Under this “doctrine,” any count for
which a defendant is convicted under the same charging document would be sufficient to
satisfy the statutory “direct result” test.  
15 The dangers of relying on a type of tort causation analysis are almost too numerous
too summarize.  We already clearly have stated that restitution is a criminal sanction and not
a civil remedy, Grey, 363 Md. at 451, 769 A.2d at 895, and that there is a “fundamental and
clear separation of criminal and civil liability . . .”  Id. at 467, 769 A.2d 904.  Tort law and
criminal law “must be regarded a very unreliable analogy . . . .”  Prosser and Keeton on The
Law of Torts, 9 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).  One need look no further than the
commonly accepted definition of proximate cause to see the difficulty in utilizing a tort
causation analysis when a “direct result of a crime” is required: “[t]he term, which many
suspect is interpreted by jurors to mean ‘approximate cause,’ is no more than a showing by
plaintiff of a reasonable connection between his/her injuries and the act or omission by the
defendant.”  Richard J. Gilbert and Paul T. Gilbert, Maryland Tort Law Handbook, § 11.7,
at 127 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added).  Using a tort causation theory is especially dangerous
because tort scholars have described the “art” of determining proximate cause as “[t]here is
perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon
which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”  William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts,
240 (3rd ed. 1964).  This is especially true when one considers that a crime is a “public
wrong” accepted as “being against society generally,” regardless of whether the wrong is
against the individual victim or the public. Gilbert, supra, at 1.  Even with the advent of
restitution statutes like § 11-603, the individual victim’s role in the consideration of
restitution is vastly different where he/she is the accuser and witness on behalf of the State,
not the adverse party in a tort claim.  Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 7.  To balance this,
criminal prosecutions require a showing by the State of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
while tort claims may succeed on a preponderance of the evidence showing, or a more likely
than not, proof.  Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 5 (2000); also Alan T. Harland, Monetary
Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 U.C.L.A.
L.Rev. 52, 87, n. 206 (1982) (noting that criminal liability under restitution is generally less
complete than civil liability and that neither the full principles nor procedures of civil liability
damages claims have been adopted for criminal restitution damages).
14
The standards governing restitution as a direct penalty for the second degree assault
conviction in this case require a particular type of crime, a victim, and damages as a direct
result of the crime.  We need not engage in a tort causal relationship analysis,15 nor weigh the
persuasion quotient of an attenuated nexus between the damages to Patrolman Cheesman’s
police cruiser and the assault on Ms. Raickle.  The General Assembly has required a direct
15
result between the qualifying crime committed and the damages inflicted before restitution
may be ordered.  Any attempt by a court to craft a proximate causation, mere nexus, or single
charging document substitute would be clearly contrary to the plainly-worded intent of § 11-
603. 
In this case, the collision with, and resultant damage, to Patrolman Cheesman’s cruiser
are a direct result of Pete’s reckless driving, not his assault on Ms. Raickle.  The damage to
the cruiser is a direct result of Pete stopping abruptly, from a relatively high rate of speed,
in the path of the cruiser.  Reckless driving, by definition, is driving with a “wanton or willful
disregard for the safety of persons or property.”  § 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article.
In this case, Pete’s wanton or willful disregard was for the safety of Patrolman Cheesman,
his police cruiser, and possibly any other person, vehicle, or property on the same roadway
or placed at risk by Pete's driving.  It is easy to see on this record that the damage to the
police cruiser could not be a direct result of the assault on another individual that occurred
approximately two hours earlier than the vehicle collision.
C.
We turn to the question of whether restitution as a condition of probation for the
second degree assault might be appropriate under § 6-221.  
Pete argues that, because restitution to the LGIT would have been impossible as a
direct result of either the second degree assault or the reckless driving conviction, the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering restitution as a condition of probation.  Such a result,
16 Pete also alleges that such a result would align Maryland with other jurisdictions
that hold similarly, an argument which the State claims to be able to distinguish.  Because
we resolve this case based on an analysis of Maryland’s statutory language, we need not look
to other jurisdictions that may base their restitution and probation statutes on different
jurisprudential, economic, or societal theories.
16
he maintains, conflicts with the General Assembly’s obvious intent to limit the ordering of
restitution to specific persons victimized by specific crimes as evidenced by the language in
§§ 11-603 and 11-601.  He urges us to resolve this conflict by vacating the condition of
probation.16 
The State simply asks us to agree with the courts below that Pete is responsible for the
damages to the police cruiser caused by his reckless driving.  It alleges, without reference to
any specific support in the record, that the Circuit Court merely added the restitution to the
LGIT as a condition of probation for the assault to grant Pete the “opportunity to make the
payments over a three-year period.”  Such a conclusion, it believes, would be harmonious
with its belief that restitution to a victim may be ordered as a condition of probation for any
loss “from a criminal count for which a defendant was convicted in the same criminal case.”
Under the State’s analysis of including the broader language of § 11-603(a), the LGIT is a
victim of “a” crime for which Pete was convicted under Case No. 11332, and because the
second degree assault conviction occurred under Case No. 11332, restitution as a condition
for probation is appropriate.  
Our analysis under § 6-221 begins with consideration of the scope of the trial court’s
power to order probation.  The relevant portion of § 6-221 provides a trial court broad
17 Section 6-221 states, “[o]n entering a judgment of conviction, the court may
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the
conditions that the court considers proper.”  Its ancestor, House Bill 551, was approved on
28 April 1970 and codified as § 641A of Article 27.  While the text has undergone revision
and re-ordering since its original enactment, the current statute preserves much of the original
language, save a few clarifying provisions; “[u]pon entering a judgment of conviction, the
court having jurisdiction, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the
defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the courts deem proper.”  1970
Md. Laws, Ch. 480; see, e.g., § 6-221 (Revisor’s Note explaining that “‘terms’ is deleted in
light of the reference to ‘conditions.’”); 1981 Md. Laws, Ch. 398 (changing original language
from “courts deem proper” to “court deems proper” as clarifying language).
17
discretion to suspend the enforcement of a sentence (or portion thereof), following a
conviction, and order probation with such conditions as “the court considers proper.”17  We,
have vacated, on occasion, ordered conditions of probation on the grounds that they were an
illegal sentence or otherwise improper.  See Sheppard, 344 Md. at 154, 685 A.2d at 1181
(holding that a trial court improperly conditioned probation on the defendant not being able
to drive where the Transportation Article enabled the Maryland Transit Authority to regulate
the suspension of drivers); Walczak, 302 Md. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954 (holding that probation
order conditioned on restitution for a crime for which the defendant was not convicted
violated the “direct result of the crime” provisions of the restitution statute under § 641A).
In contrast, we affirmed a probation order with a condition of restitution in Coles v.
State, 290 Md. 296, 429 A.2d 1029 (1981).  In Coles, the defendant was convicted of
violating §62(a) of Article 88A, making false or fraudulent statements in applications for
public assistance benefits.  Id. at 298, 429 A.2d at 1030.  He was subsequently sentenced to
serve seven, concurrent ten year sentences that were suspended in lieu of probation under §
18
641A.  He appealed, challenging his probation order that was conditioned on monthly
restitution payments of $200, with full restitution due within one year, because the restitution
statute, then § 640, did not include Article 88A convictions as crimes for which restitution
could be ordered as a direct penalty.  Because the General Assembly, Coles argued, did not
allow restitution as a direct penalty for his convictions, the trial court's order was an illegal
sentence because it ordered probation conditioned upon his paying full restitution.  Id. at 303
- 304, 429 A.2d at 1032-33.  We disagreed with this argument and held that § 641A
“generally authorizes the type of action taken by [the trial judge] . . .,” and, “may include an
order to pay restitution, whether entered for the purpose of furthering rehabilitation of the
defendant or otherwise.”  Id. at 305, 429 A.2d at 1033 (citations omitted). 
Four years after Coles, we curtailed somewhat a trial court's broad discretion to order
conditions for probation based on our further interpretation of the probation and restitution
statutes.  Walczak, 302 Md. at 427-33, 488 A.2d at 951-54.  In Walczak, the defendant was
charged with multiple counts of assault, robbery, and robbery with a dangerous weapon, for
his conduct in robbing two victims at gunpoint in their residence. Id. at 424, 488 A.2d at 949-
50.  Walczak entered an agreement with the State to be tried solely for robbery with a
dangerous weapon for one of the victims.  Id. at 424, 488 A.2d at 950.  After his conviction
at a bench trial, the State nol prossed the remaining charges.  Id.  At sentencing, the trial
court ordered, as a condition of probation for a suspended sentence, that Walczak make
restitution to both victims.  Id.  Walczak appealed, claiming that restitution could not be
19
ordered properly  under § 641A regarding a person who, although the victim of “a” crime,
was not “the” victim of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.
We agreed with Walczak and held that both § 641A and the restitution statute granted
“a court the authority to order the payment of restitution only upon a ‘conviction.’” Id. at 430,
488 A.2d at 953.  We explained that Coles held that § 641A “vested additional power in the
trial court beyond that conferred by § 640, to suspend Coles’s sentence and impose
conditions of probation.”  Id.  At the same time, that additional power was limited by the
plain statutory language of §§ 640 and 641A.  As a result, we held that Walczak’s probation
order was illegal and remanded to the Circuit Court to remove the offending probation
condition.
While neither Walczak nor Coles, on their factual predicates, offer a dispositive
solution for Pete, the probation orders dealt with in those cases, and their respective
conditions, were measured by a common metric–  whether the result of the conditions of the
probation order granted under the broad powers of § 6-221 could be read consistently with
concurrent legislation addressing the same subject matter.  Underlying Walczak, Coles, and,
more importantly, this case, is the requirement under § 11-603 that a legal restitution order
address the victim of the crime for which probation could be ordered.  A probation order for
a criminal conviction conditioned on restitution must meet the minimum requirements of: (1)
a victim with property damage of the type enumerated in § 11-603, and (2) the damage to the
20
victim be the direct result of the crime for which the defendant was convicted and for which
it was directed.
Such a conclusion is consistent with our interpreting a statute in “full awareness” of
related statutes.  State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990) (citations omitted).
Our harmonizing of the trial court’s powers under § 6-221 and § 11-603 is a constant tenet
of statutory interpretation: “[t]herefore various consistent and related enactments, although
made at different times and without reference to one another, nevertheless should be
harmonized as much as possible.” Id. at 93, 581 A.2d at 12 (citations omitted).  After all, “it
is presumed that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and
intended statutes that affect the same subject matter to blend into a consistent and
harmonious body of law.”  Id. at 93, 581 A.2d at 12 (citations omitted).  As a result, “statutes
on the same subject are to be read together and harmonized to the extent possible, reading
them so as to avoid rendering either of them, or ‘any portion, meaningless, surplusage,
superfluous or nugatory.’” Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 303,
783 A.2d 667, 671 (2001) (quoting Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r, 332 Md. 124,
132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993)).
In this case, we conclude that it was improper to order restitution as a condition for
probation for the second degree assault conviction.  As previously explained, the General
Assembly crafted explicit statutory requirements allowing restitution under limited
circumstances.  It is quite clear that restitution to the LGIT was unavailable under § 11-603
18 As noted earlier, probation could have been ordered for the reckless driving
conviction.  Supra, note 13.  If probation, with a condition of restitution, had been ordered
for the reckless driving conviction under § 6-221, however, the condition may have
conflicted with the statutory definition of “crime” under § 11-601(d)(2) and also produced
an unharmonious result in light of § 11-603.  Pete suggested at oral argument that probation
conditioned on restitution should be controlled by the definition of “judgment of restitution”
in § 11-601(g).  This term is used in § 11-603 to define a trial court's power to order
restitution.  As the probation ordered here was clearly not for the reckless driving conviction,
nor has Pete properly briefed this argument, the issue is not squarely before us and we
decline Pete's invitation to 1) rule on the legality of probation with a condition of restitution
for a reckless driving charge and 2) reverse Coles in light of § 11-601(g).  Lastly, we note
that, if a challenge to a probation order conditioned on restitution were to occur in the future
based on § 11-601(g) and the term “judgment of restitution,” it would have to overcome
legislative history suggesting that the General Assembly did not specifically intend to
circumscribe, by this statutory definition, a court's probation power under § 6-221.  1992 Md.
Laws, Chap. 236 (S.B. 221); see Floor Report S.B. 221, Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee (stating that S.B. 221 provides that “an order to pay restitution which is included
as a condition of probation in document that is entitled 'order of probation' must be recorded
and indexed in the same fashion as a separate order of the court for the payment of
restitution” and that it “also clarifies that an obligation to pay restitution which is included
as a condition of probation will survive the termination of the probation order.”).    
21
for either the second degree assault or the reckless driving conviction.  Whether the trial
judge’s action was well-intended (as the State asserts) in allowing Pete three years to make
restitution or intended merely to clarify an earlier mistaken utterance (as evidenced in the
transcript of the sentencing proceeding), is of no matter; it was improper for the court to
order restitution as a condition of probation for the second degree assault conviction when
Patrolman Cheesman and the police cruiser were neither the victim of the second degree
assault nor were damaged as a direct result of that crime.18 
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMING 
RESTITUTION 
ORDERED 
AS
CONDITION OF PROBATION AS TO COUNT 1 IN
22
CASE NO. 11332 REVERSED IN THAT REGARD;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THAT PART OF THE
CONDITION OF PROBATION THAT REQUIRES
PETITIONER TO PAY $6,490.53 IN RESTITUTION
TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSURANCE
TRUST; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN COURT
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
DORCHESTER COUNTY.