Title: RICKS v TESLOW CONSOLIDATED

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12419 I N T H E SUPKEME COURT O F THE STATE O F P D N T A N A JIMMY A. RICKS, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, TESLOW CONSOLIDATED and A R G O N A U T INSURANCE C O M P A N Y , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Less l e y , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : H a r r i s , Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana. Vern Harris argued, Helena, Montana. For Respondent : Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana. Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana. - Submitted: April 25, 1973 Decided : J ~ L 2 6 l g n Filed : JUL 2 6 1975 M r . Justice Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from an amended judgment of July 30, 1971, and a supplementary judgment entered on October 17, 1972, entered by the d i s t r i c t court i n Gallatin County on findings of f a c t and conclusions of law i n favor of a claimant f o r workman's compensa- tion. Through a hearing before the I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board on June 3 , 1970, claimant Jimmy A. Ricks sought workmen's compensa- t i o n , based upon h i s claim f o r compensation which had been f i l e d with the Board over three years and seven months a f t e r t h e date of h i s accident. The I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board (hereinafter called the Board) denied compensation. Claimant appealed t o the d i s t r i c t court and was awarded compensation f o r 500 weeks, a t t h e r a t e of $50 per week, payable i n a lump sum. Subsequently, the d i s t r i c t court entered an amended order nunc pro tunc which awarded compensation f o r a period not t o exceed 500 weeks and deleted the provision f o r payment i n a lump sum. Defendants appealed the amended judgment t o t h i s Court. The appeal resulted i n a per curiam order, dated February 7, 1972, wherein t h i s Court stated: "IT IS ORDERED t h a t t h e cause be remanded t o the State I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board and t h a t said Board conduct a hearing i n t o the element of estoppel based upon the action o r inaction of the attorneys f o r Teslow Consolidated while representing claimant's i n t e r e s t s . I' A second hearing was held before the Board on May 19, 1972, pursuant t o t h i s court's order. O n June 7, 1972, the hearings o f f i c e r entered a memorandum opinion and findings of f a c t and conclusions of law denying compensation. The decision of the hearings o f f i c e r was adopted by the Board by order dated July 12, 1972. O n claimant's second appeal t o the d i s t r i c t court, t h a t court entered additional findings of f a c t and conclusions of law and a supplementary judgment which reversed the decision of the Board and awarded compensation f o r a period not t o exceed 500 weeks. Defendants appeal from the d i s t r i c t court's amended judgment of July 30, 1971, and from t h e c o u r t ' s supplementary judgment of October 17, 1972. The sole issue here is: Did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n reversing t h e decision of the Board and i n entering judgment f o r payment of 500 weeks of workmen's compensation? O n o r about April 27, 1966, while i n the employ of Teslow Consolidated, claimant Jimmy A. Ricks sustained an accidental injury i n the nature of a puncture would below h i s l e f t patella. H e a l s o complained of a foreign body i n h i s r i g h t eye. The knee was cleansed and dressed by D r . J.M.Brooke of Ronan, Montana, and claimant's eye was examined, but no foreign body was found. D r . Brooke indicated claimant would possibly be off work one day, but would not incur any permanent d i s a b i l i t y . O n April 29, 1966, Ricks was seen by D r . A. L. Vadheim of Bozeman, who indicated Ricks would be p a r t i a l l y disabled f o r two weeks. Ricks was seen periodically following April 29, 1966, by D r . Vadheim and ultimately by D r . Francis Kelly, an orthopedic surgeon, i n consultation on February 10, 1967, following which physical therapy was recommended. D r . Kelly diagnosed Ricks' d i f f i c u l t y a s an inflamation of the l e f t kneecap, termed chondro- malacia p a t e l l a , involving t h e back surface l i n i n g of the kneecap and he injected the knee several times with cortisone. Sometime a f t e r August 1, 1966, Ricks contacted M r . H.A. Bolinger, an attorney and stockholder f o r two of the four Teslow Companies t h a t owned Teslow Consolidated, who then was preparing a s u i t f o r damages against the other party or p a r t i e s involved i n the accident. A t the time of e i t h e r the f i r s t or second v i s i t with M r . Bolinger, Ricks engaged Bolinger t o look a f t e r h i s l e g a l in- t e r e s t s i n connection with the accident. Ricks was made a party lai in tiff i n the s u i t f o r damages along with h i s employer, Teslow Consolidated. This s u i t was eventually s e t t l e d t o the advantage of p l a i n t i f f s , with Ricks receiving a n e t amount ( a f t e r attorneys' fees and costs of some $4,100 t o $4,700) of $8,800 t o $8,900. During the statutory time f o r f i l i n g a claim f o r compensation there was only one attorney (Mr. Bolinger) f o r Teslow Consolidated involved with claimant Ricks. Two other attorneys entered the case a t varying times l a t e r , but neither was i n the case within one year a f t e r the accident. M r . Andriolo became involved when he became associated with Bolinger i n July o r August of 1967. M r . Wellcome, a l s o upon becoming associated with M r . Bolinger, was not involved u n t i l 1969. O n December 1, 1969, over three years and seven months a f t e r the date of the accident, Ricks f i l e d a claim f o r workmen's com- pensation. Defendant, Argonaut Insurance Co., paid medical benefits through May 20, 1970, t o t a l i n g $231. This sum represents a l l medical b i l l s submitted on the claim with the exception of one b i l l from D r . Kelly i n the amount of $25 f o r a report t o the Department of Labor and Industries i n the s t a t e of Washington. O n April 5 , 1971, the Board entered i t s f i r s t findings of f a c t and conclusions of law. In i t s conclusions numbered I1 and 111, the Board held specifically: "11. That the claimant f i l e d a claim f o r compen- sation a f t e r the statutory period as s e t f o r t h i n Section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947, had expired. "111. That the evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o estab- l i s h t h a t the defendant c a r r i e r because of t h e i r actions i n t h i s i n s t a n t case a r e equitably estopped from r a i s i n g the defense of the s t a t u t e of limita- t ions. I I Upon the f i r s t appeal t h e matter was submitted t o the d i s t r i c t court on the t r a n s c r i p t from the I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board and no new evidence was offered. On June 23, 1971, the d i s t r i c t court entered i t s findings of and fact,/conclusions of law, reversing the Board. A s a b a s i s of reversal, the court held t h a t defendant Argonaut Insurance Co. was equitably estopped from r a i s i n g the defense of the s t a t u t e of limitations, a s s e t f o r t h i n section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947. The court further held t h a t defendant Argonaut Insurance Co. had a duty t o obtain a claim f o r compensation from the p l a i n t i f f and t o advise him it must be f i l e d within one year from the date of the accident. The f a c t s upon which the court based its conclusions r e l a t e t o the actions of ~ r g o n a u t ' s agent, George Wood. The court found t h a t Wood had a c e r t a i n expertise i n the workmen's compensation f i e l d and t h a t h i s o f f i c e normally followed a procedure of sending a claim f o r compensation form t o a claimant and advising claimant he must f i l e h i s claim within twelve months of the date of the accident i n cases where the physician's f i r s t report o r t h e employer's report indicates a loss of time i n excess of seven days. The court found t h i s procedure was not followed i n the i n s t a n t case. It further found t h a t Wood f a i l e d t o send a copy of D r . Vadheim's f i r s t report t o the Board, although Wood normally would have done so. The court did not explain how the f a i l u r e t o forward D r . ~ a d h e i m ' s report i n any way prejudiced o r affected the claimant. Finally, the court based i t s conclusion of equitable estoppel on the f a c t t h a t defendant Argonaut Insurance Co. had "notice of the continuing d i f f i c u l t y which the p l a i n t i f f was experiencing by and through medical reports * * *.If Defendants f i l e d formal exceptions t o the c o u r t ' s findings and conclusions, which were subsequently denied. The testimony is undisputed t h a t claimant Ricks had never had any contact whatsoever with anyone connected with Argonaut Tnsurance Co. up t o the date of the hearing before the Board. There was nothing between claimant and the Argonaut Insurance Co. o r the Board toward making a claim, prior t o the a c t u a l f i l i n g of the claim. Counsel f o r claimant made some obscure references i n the f i r s t hearing t o something between claimant and attorneys f o r the employer, Teslow Consolidated, who were a l s o attorneys f o r claimant, but any contention of anything i n the nature of an estoppel i n t h i s respect was abaondoned u n t i l a f t e r t h i s Court's order of February 7, 1972. Counsel's letter of January 21, 1971, to the chairman of the Board stated: "* * Jc we will withdraw the contention which we made before the Board pertaining to an element of estoppel being based upon any action or inaction of the attor- neys for Teslow, Inc. * * *" After this court's order of February 7, 1972, claimant reasserted an issue of estoppel based upon the actions or inactions of claimant's and employert s counsel. At the second hearing before the Board on my' 19, 1972, Mr. Bolinger testified: "Q. Then at that time, when these notes were made, did you agree to represent Mr. Ricks with any legal problems he might have as a result of the accident? "A. 1'm sure I did. He was a party-plaintiff in the accident case, and 1'm sure I was representing him in whatever there was, yes. "Q. Do you have any specific recollection at this time as to any further discussion of the industrial accident claim? "A. I don't have any distinct recollection of it. He was off 11 days, it seems to me, and I thought he wasn't off long enough to present a claim, and he had this large family he was having to support, is all I remember about it. I I On cross-examination, Mr. Bolinger testified: " Q . In answer to Mr. Wellcome's question as to whether or not you discussed workmen's compensation with Mr. Ricks, that phase of this accident,'you said, I believe, you must have discussed it to some extent'. Do I understand correctly you meant to the extent of these notes in Exhibit No. l? 'A. Yes, there's a couple things in that that would have pertained to it, like the time he was off, and the reference at the bottom. I would have had to have talked about industrial accident or workmen's compen- sation to have written those notes. "Q. Of course, those matters could also have pertained to any claim against the driver and owner of the tractor, could they not, loss of time and claim for medical bene- fits? 1 "A. Well, yes, but the reference there that Industrial paid bills', means an industrial accident had to be mentioned at the time. "Q. But you might have been interested in that from the standpoint of a claim against the third party as owner of the tractor and driver of the tractor? "A. That would be true. "Q. And do I understand correctly t h a t you don't have any independent recollection of discussing the i n d u s t r i a l accident phase with M r . Ricks a t the time these notes were made? "A. Other than I remember him t e l l i n g m e he had so much family he'd have t o go back t o work sooner than he thought he should because he couldn't get by on what compensation he could get. I do remember that. I I Q. You d i d n ' t make any note on t h a t on Exhibit No. l? ' A . No. "Q. And t h a t ' s the only thing you r e c a l l in- dependently of t h i s memorandum then? "A. I think t h a t ' s correct, t h a t ' s the only independent recollection I have of it. 1 ' m inclined t o think t h a t when he was only off 1 1 days, I t o l d him it wasn't worth putting i n a claim. "Q. you're not sure whether you t o l d him t h a t o r not7 "A. Well, I would think I did, but I c a n ' t remember saying the words. I remember d e f i n i t e l y h i s talking about h i s large family, I remember that. 11 claimant's recollection of any discussion of a compensation claim with M r . Bolinger was a l s o extremely hazy a s t o precisely what was said and when. I n f a c t , claimant had t e s t i f i e d a t t h e f i r s t Board hearing t h a t he had discussed the subject of the claim f i l i n g requirement within a year of the accident date with M r . Andriolo and M r . Andriolo had advised him a s t o the f i l i n g re- A t the second hearing, claimant changed h i s story and s t a t e d t h a t he had not discussed the f i l i n g requirements u n t i l a f t e r the f i l i n g period had expired. Also, a t t h e second hearing, claimant changed h i s story a s t o how he came t o see M r . Bolinger i n the f i r s t place. Under cross-examination a t the f i r s t hearing, claimant f i n a l l y admitted t h a t it was h i s idea t o contact M r . Bolinger and use t h e same lawyer a s Teslow Consolidated. A t the second hearing, claimant t e s t i f i e d t h a t he f i r s t saw Bolinger a t the request of someone with Teslow Consolidated. There i s no dispute, however, t o the f a c t t h a t claimant retained M r . Bolinger t o represent him i n connection with h i s injuries within the one year claim filing period. On June 7, 1972, the Board entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law: "FINDINGS OF FACT " I . That there is no dispute that the Claimant suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Teslow, Inc. on April 27, 1966, in Lake County, Montana. "11. That the Claimant received medical benefits pursuant to the provisions of Section 92-706, R . C . M . 1947. "111. That no Claim for Compensation was filed within the statutory time for filing as required by Section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947. "IV. That the Claimant was summoned to the office of Mr. H . A. Bolinger, an attorney at Law, for the purpose of providing eye witness information to be used in preparation of a suit for damages in a Court of Law on behalf of the Claimant's employer, Teslow, Inc . "V. That Bolinger was a stock holder in two of the four corporations that owned Teslow, Inc., and further that Bolinger was and had been an attorney on a retainer and additional fee basis for the Teslow interests for a number of years prior to and at the time of his association with the Claimant. "VI. That the Claimant, subsequent to his meeting with Bolinger, became a party plaintiff along with Teslow, Inc. in a suit for damages filed in the 4th Judicial District, Polson, Montana, on November 9, 1967, against another party or other parties, and that Bolinger acted as attorney in the common interests of both the Claimant and Teslow, Inc. and further that the Claimant retained Bolinger to represent his legal interests in connection with the accident. "VII. That Bolinger pursued the interests of his clients, the Claimant and Teslow, Inc., to the point of a settle- ment without the necessity of a court decision. "~111. That the Claimant lost eleven (11) days work due to the injuries received in the accident Ghich occurred on April 27, 1966. "IX. That Pursuant to the provisions of Section 92-701, R.C.M. 1947 as this section stood in April 1966 the Claimant would have been entitled to four ( 4 ) days of compensation at the rate of $56.00 per week or a total of $32.00 for temporary total disability had a timely claim been filed. "X. That the matter of Workman's Compensation was only briefly discussed between the Claimant and Attorney Bolinger and that Bolinger mistakenly believed that the Claimant had not lost sufficient time from work to be entitled to receive compensation. "XI. That Atcorney Andriolo, an associate of Rolinger, did not enter the case or discuss the case with the Claimant u n t i l a f t e r the statutory time f o r f i l i n g a claim had run. "XII, That the preponderance of evidence f a i l s t o reveal t h a t any of t h e elements of equitable estoppel, or estoppel i n pais, a r e o r were present during the s t a t u t o r y twelve (12) month period subsequent t o the date of the accident. "I. That the Claimant w a s e n t i t l e d t o medical benefits under the provisions of Section 92-706, R.C.M. 1947. "11. That no Claim f o r Compensation was f i l e d by the Claimant o r someone legally authorized t o a c t i n h i s behalf within the time period described i n Section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947 and a s a r e s u l t the Claimant is not e n t i t l e d t o compensation under the provisions of the workman's Compensation Act, I' Upon t h e second appeal t o the d i s t r i c t court, the matter was again submitted t o the court on the t r a n s c r i p t from the Board and no new evidence was offered. O n October 11, 1972, the d i s t r i c t court entered i t s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law, reversing the Board. The court adopted i t s previous findings and conclusions and added thereto an additional ground f o r equitable estoppel based on t h e "actions, statements and assurances" of the attorneys f o r the defendant, Teslow Consolidated, who a l s o represented the claimant. The court, i n i t s amended order of July 27, 1971, and re- affirmed i n i t s supplementary judgment of October 17, 1972, held t h a t claimant w a s permanently disabled a s a r e s u l t of h i s accidental injury and was thereby e n t i t l e d t o compensation f o r a period not t o exceed 500 weeks. This holding was based upon the c o u r t ' s f i r s t findings of f a c t t h a t claimant had sustained further i n j u r i e s i n addition t o the puncture wound below h i s l e f t patella. The claimant's other i n j u r i e s r e l i e d on by the court a r e s e t f o r t h i n i t s findings of f a c t a s "sand i n h i s eye", "a tender l e f t second toe1', "a contusion of the l e f t thigh", and "a mental condition * Jc * which manifested i t s e l f i n h i s being a f r a i d t o drive a truck and feeling t h a t other vehicles coming towards him were i n the process of crossing over the center l i n e so a s t o s t r i k e the truck which he was driving. 11 D r . ~ r o o k e ' s f i r s t report, as w e l l a s claimant's own t e s t i - mony, indicates that the sand i n claimant's eye was nothing of significance. Claimant t e s t i f i e d that he had a piece of glass i n h i s eye which he removed himself. D r . ~ r o o k e ' s f i r s t report indicates that he examined claimant's eye and found no foreign body. Claimant, on cross-examination, testified: "Q. You haven't had any trouble with your eye since t h i s accident? "A. NO. II The only references i n the record t o a tender l e f t second toe and a contusion of the l e f t thigh occur i n the i n i t i a l reports and billings of D r . Vadheim. A n examination of D r . ~ e l l y ' s testi- mony before the Board reveals that claimant's only complaint t o him was the problem with h i s l e f t knee. In fact, claimant's attorney stated: "Q. (By M r . Harris) Maybe I can shorten m y cross-examination of the doctor, i f I ask M r . Wellcome one question---are you claiming any- thing i n t h i s procedure for any injury other than t o the knee? "MR. IELLCOME: Only insofar as t o what M r . Ricks has already t e s t i f i e d t o about the emotional problems which he has had i n driving a truck and the fear that other trucks or cars are coming across the center line which affects h i s a b i l i t y t o drive also, as a r e s u l t of t h i s accident. 1 I A s t o the "mental problem", the only evidence i n the record i s the unsubstantiated, self-serving testimony of the claimant. There i s no indication whatsoever that claimant ever sought treat- ment for h i s "problem", o r , for that matter, that he ever mentioned it t o his doctors. There i s no medical testimony corroborating the existence of t h i s "problemf'. In fact, the record i s completely devoid of any medical testimony connecting t h i s "problem" to the accident of April 27, 1966. It i s apparent the Board f e l t the evidence insufficient t o support a finding of any other injuries when it found: "That the medical evidence reveals the claimant i s suffering from an inflamation of the knee, termed Chrondromalacia patella, which max possibly necessi- t a t e surgery a t some future time. 4s set out heretofore, the issue is whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n reversing the decision of the Board and i n entering judgment f o r payment of 500 weeks of workmen's compensation. It i s defendants' position t h a t the d i s t r i c t court erred i n granting any compensation whatsoever because a claim f o r compensa- t i o n was not f i l e d u n t i l long a f t e r the s t a t u t e of limitations s e t f o r t h i n section 92-601, R.C.M., had expired; and there a r e absolutely no f a c t s i n the case which would j u s t i f y the imposition of an equitable estoppel against the insurer. This Court i n Becktold v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 137 Mont. 119, 125, 350 P.2d 383, said: "1f the evidence does not c l e a r l y preponderate against the findings of the Board, the d i s t r i c t court must af- firm the ~ o a r d ' s order. Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 26 Pac.2d 973." Here, the question is, i n thelanguage of section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947: l'* * * whether o r not the findings of the board ought t o be sustained, and whether o r not such findings a r e reasonable under a l l the circumstances of the case. I I I n Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 351, 26 P.2d 973, we said: "The case came t o the d i s t r i c t court with the DresumD- tion t h a t the board had decided correctly. [ c i i i n g cases ] I' See also: Kerns v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 87 Mont. 546, 289 P. 563. Was the Board a r b i t r a r y i n finding t h a t the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h an equitable estoppel against the defendant c a r r i e r ? This Court i n Meznarich v. Republic Coal Co., 101 Mont. 78, 93, 53 P.2d 82, said: "The board's decision on t h i s question can only be reversed i f a r b i t r a r y and founded on no substantial evidence. I I claimant's accident of April 27, 1966 did not r e s u l t i n any claim for compensation being f i l e d u n t i l December 1, 1969, o r over three years and seven months thereafter. The Montana workmen's Compensation Act has two requirements : (1) section 92-807, R.C.M. 1947, which requires notice i n s i x t y days a f t e r t h e accident; and (2) section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: I I I n the case of personal injury * * * a l l claims s h a l l be forever barred unless presented i n writing * * * within twelve months from the date of t h e happening of the accident, e i t h e r by the claimant o r someone legally authorized t o a c t f o r him. I I This Court, deeming section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947, t o be a I 1 s r a t u t e of limitations" has developed an exception known a s I I estoppel1'. This doctrine of estoppel applies where employer, insurer, o r Board a s the case may be, has taken some positive action which e i t h e r prevents the claimant from making a claim o r leads him reasonably t o believe he need not f i l e such a claim. This Court has seen f i t t o apply the doctrine of estoppel only where there have been affirmative a c t s before the s t a t u t o r y period has run which e i t h e r prevent the claimant from f i l i n g o r lead him t o believe he need not do so. The f i r s t case i n Montana dealing with estoppel was Lindblom v. ~ m ~ l o ~ e r s ' Etc. Assur. Corp., 88 Mont. 488, 295 P.2d 1007, where i t was held t h a t an estoppel would be applied a s t o the f a i l u r e t o f i l e a claim where the agent of an insurance company led the worker t o believe h i s claim would be s e t t l e d , I n McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining Co., 126 Mont. 435, 252 P.2d 1036, t h e injured workman was told by the company doctor t h a t he had not been injured. I n Levo v. Gen.-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086, the injured worker was t o l d by a company lawyer and the company person- n e l manager t h a t h i s claim was not covered f o r workmen's compensa- tion. I n Gugler v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 117 Mont. 38, 157 P. 2d 89, the c i t y c l e r k and mayor of the c i t y of Hamilton informed p l a i n t i f f t h a t i t was not necessary f o r him t o f i l e a claim with the Board. I n Yurkovich v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 132 Mont. 77, 314 P.2d 866, a Plan 1 1 1 case, the claimant wrote t o the Board, inquiring a s t o what he should do about h i s injury and the Board led him t o believe i t was not necessary t o f i l e a claim. Tn t h e instant case, claimant was never misled by anyone connected with the Board o r the insurer. The undisputed evidence shows there was never any communication between t h e claimant and anyone representing the insurer. Claimant's condition was f u l l y diagnosed by D r . Kelly within one year of the accident, and claimant knew of h i s condition. A review of the medical evidence shows the doctor's diagnosis has not changed and claimant's condition has not worsened. I n other words, the claimant knew, within one year, the f u l l extent of h i s injury. The only affirmative a c t the insurance c a r r i e r took i n t h i s matter a f t e r the accident w a s t o pay f o r medical expense incurred by t h e claimant. Before the Board and the d i s t r i c t court, claimant r e l i e d heavily on Gugler v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 117 Mont. 38, 157 P.2d 89. Although the f a c t s substantiating an estoppel o r waiver were present i n Gugler, the Court based i t s decision upon a theory t h a t the f i l i n g of a claim by a doctor f o r h i s services was the equivalent of t h e f i l i n g of a claim by the injured work- man, which dispensed with the necessity of any further claim by the workman. I n i t s haste t o abrogate the theory of Gugler, the l e g i s l a t u r e amended t h e Workmen's Compensation Act t o provide t h a t medical b e n e f i t s were "an additional benefit separate and apart from compensationf', but neglected t o have the l e g i s l a t i v e b i l l printed. B y reason of t h i s , the Court i n O'Bannon v. Gustafson, 130 Mont. 402, 303 P.2d 938, held the amendment unconstitutional. I n O'Ban- non it was recognized t h a t t h e 1945 l e g i s l a t i v e amendment would - 9 have chznged the Gugler r u l e had the amendment been constitutional. The pertinent sections have since been reenacted and recodified numerous times, so the constitutional defect of ~'Bannon no longer e x i s t s . It i s now c l e a r t h a t medical benefits a r e an additional benefit separate and apart from compensation. N o claim f o r medical benefits need be made and the medical benefits w i l l be paid during the f i r s t t h i r t y - s i x months a f t e r the accident. I n Vetsch v. Helena Transfer & Storage Co., 154 Mont. 106, 460 P.2d 757, the i s s u e was raised a s t o whether payment of medical claims would t o l l the s t a t u t e of limitations s e t forth i n section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947. The Court held that estoppel was inapplicable, thereby affirming the rule that payment of medical b i l l s does not dispense with the necessity of a claim for compensation by an injured workman. In reversing the ruling of the Board i n the instant case, the d i s t r i c t court p a r t i a l l y based i t s decision on the failure of Argonaut's agent, George Wood, t o follow h i s own ordinary internal office procedure. The court decided i n effect, that Argonaut had a duty t o obtain a claim for compensation from the claimant. This is directly contrary t o the plain, simple, un- ambiguous language of section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947: "* * * a l l cladms shall be forever barred unless resented i n writinn * * within twelve months Thus, the duty i s upon the claimant t o f i l e h i s claim, not upon the insurer t o s o l i c i t claims. The Workmen's Compensation Act has not changed the principle that he who asserts a right has the burden of proof or the burden of proceeding. In Nicholson v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, 374, 257 P. 270, the Court said: 1' The burden i s therefore upon the claimant t o prove injury, as above defined, resulting from (1) an in- dustrial accident, (2) arising out of and (3) i n the course of the employment, and, a s these terms a r e used conjunctively and not disjunctively i n the statute, unless a l l three of these necessary elements a r e proved by a preponderance of the evidence, no l i a b i l i t y rests upon the employer t o pay compensation. [Citing cases]. I I Other cases holding that the burden of establishing a right t o compensation is the claimant's are: Landeen v. Toole County Refining Co., 85 Mont. 41, 277 P. 615; Woin v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 99 Mont. 163, 43 P.2d 663. I n - Yurkovich which was a plan I11 case, the Court did hold that the Board had a duty t o fully advise an injured workman of the claim f i l i n g requirements. But i n Yurkovich the claimant wrote t o the Board asking for information as t o what he should do. I n the instant case there i s no such request from the claimant. There was no communication whatsoever between claimant and the insurer or the Board. In fact, claimant was represented by counsel who surely should have known of the claim f i l i n g requirements. The facts of the instant case are certainly distinguishable from Yurkovich. In addition, Yurkovich was decided on the theory that the Board was a trustee of the s t a t e fund, that it acted i n a dual capacity and, therefore,had a greater duty toward claimants. Defendant Argonaut i s not i n the same position as the Board. A s pointed out, the d i s t r i c t court partially based i t s ruling on what it f e l t was the failure of George Wood t o follow h i s own internal office procedure. In i t s findings of fact of April 5, 1971, the d i s t r i c t court found that Wood did not f i l e u n t i l 1970 a medical report with the Board which he had received i n 1966 from D r . Vadheim. This is immaterial t o any issue of estoppel. There i s no proof claimant had any knowledge that the report was not sent. Thus i t was impossible for the claimant to have been pre- judiced or misled. Even i f the report had been sent, it i s im- possible t o see how t h i s would have affected the situation i n any way. In i t s findings of fact of April 5, 1971, the d i s t r i c t court found that under Wood's "standard procedure" i f a doctor's report indicated a claimant would be disabled, a l e t t e r would be sent advising the claimant t o f i l e a claim within one year. There i s no legal requirement that the c a r r i e r must send such a l e t t e r . The burden i s on the claimant to f i l e a claim, not on the insurer t o - s o l i c i t claims. A t the f i r s t hearing, claimant attempted t o make something of the fact that his former counsel was the same as the employer's counsel. However, as pointed out heretofore, any contention of estoppel i n t h i s respect was abandoned u n t i l a f t e r t h i s Court's order of February 7, 1972. A t the f i r s t hearing, claimant's a t - torney stated: "m, ITELLCOME: Yes, let me make this clear for the record, for the ~oard's record. We are not contending that there was any overt misleading by anyone, either Teslow or any representative of Teslow. II After hearing additional testimony on May 19, 1972, the hearings officer observed: "At the time the claimant engaged Bolinger to repre- sent his legal interests in connection with the acci- dent, he, Bolinger, became an agent of the claimant while at the same time he was an agent for Teslow Consolidated. (Section 2-101, R.C.M. 1947) "The interests of the two principals were parallel and the same in the pursuit of the action for damages, while at the same time the interests of the two princi- pals could have been in conflict in the pursuit of any action relative to a workman's Compensation Claim. "A review of the evidence in the file and the testi- mony at the hearings fails to disclose any indication that this possible conflict had any influence whatsoever on ~olinger's failure to file a Claim for Compensation on behalf of his client and principal. He mistakenly believed that the claimant was not entitled to compen- sation payments and apparently gave no thought to pos- sible future complications that may arise. I I If Mr. Bolinger made a mistake in his understanding of the law at the time or in dismissing a possible compensation claim as not worth the effort, such mistake is attributable to claimant and acts as a bar to any assertion of an equitable estoppel by claimant. Section 2-209, R. C.M. 1947, states : ''ik * * a principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent in the transaction of the business of the agency, including wrongful acts committed by such agent in and as a part of the transaction of such business, and for his willful omission to fulfill the obligations of the principal. 11 Tn the instant case, claimant is the principal, Bolinger is the agent, and the employer and Argonaut Insurance Co. are the third persons. This Court stated the essential elements of equitable estoppel in Lindblom v . ~mployers' Etc. Assur.Corp., 88 Mont. 488, 494, 295 "Generally speaking, the following are the essential elements which must enter into and form a part of an equitable estoppel in all of its applications: '1. There must be conduct---acts, language, or silence--amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts. 2 . These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3 . The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the bene- fit of the estoppel, at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4 . The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon. * * * 5 . The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse; in other words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by rea- son of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it. I I I (Emphasis added) Thus, it is essential to establish an equitable estoppel that the party sought to be estopped have knowledge that he is misleading the claimant and an intention to mislead the claimant to his detriment. Here, Mr. Bolinger testified that at the time he talked to the claimant he had a mistaken impression of the law. He did not know that he was mistaken and he had no intention of misleading the claimant. Therefore, an equitable estoppel has not been established. Before the Board, claimant relied on the case of Levo v. Gene-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086. However, Levo is clearly distinguishable in that there a "company" attorney gave advice to the claimant; he was not an agent of the claimant as Bolinger was in the instant case. The Board was correct in ruling that claimant was not entitled to compensation because no timely claim for compensation had been filed. The district court erred in reversing that decision. Accordingly, we reverse and order the case dismissed. /Chief Justice Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: I respectfully dissent to the view of the majority. Simply, stated, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied to the Montana workmen's Compensation Act, creates an exception to the one year statute of limitations stated in section 92-601, R . C . M . 1947, if the claimant is misled or otherwise prevented from filing his claim by ( 1 ) the employer or its agent (McCoy v . Mike Horse Mining Co., 126 Mont. 435, 252 P.2d 1036 [company doctor]; Levo v . Gene-Shea-Morrison, 128 lont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086 [company lawyer and company personnel manager& ( 2 ) the insurer or its agent (Lindblom v . ~mployer's Etc. Assur. Corp. 88 Mont. 488, 295 P @ 1007 [insurance company a g e n t ] ) ; or ( 3 ) the Industrial Accident Board or its agent (~urkovich v . Industrial Accident Board, 132 Mont. 77, 314 P.2d 866 [agent of the b o a r d ] ] . The testimony of Mr. Bolinger, in hearing before the Board, quoted in the majority opinion, demonstrates that claimant Ricks relied upon Mr. Bolinger to resolve his industrial accident case. The following additional testimony by M r . Bolinger in the hearing before the Board demonstrates the misrepresentation made to Ricks: "Q. Did M r . Ricks ask you to file a claim. "A. I wouldn't think he asked me to file a claim. I don't think he would have known whether he should or not. The thing was discussed, but when he filed a claim I don't think he said that. He didn't have an- other attorney, and I was the one that knew the facts about his case. I did discuss workmen's compensation to the extent of whether or not he wasn't relying on anybody else as far as a claim was concerned, and actually I thought---I was under the impression, unless you were off 2 weeks, it wasn't worth filing a claim. That's the recollection I have about it. "Q. You think you may have advised him that it was hardly worth fooling with? " A . Yes. I I The quotation in the ma j ority opinion from Lindblom enumerating the essential elements of equitable estoppel is misleading because of the omission of the remaining five sentences in the quoted para- graph. They are: " ' I t will be seen that fraud is not given as an essential requisite in the foregoing statement. It is not absolutely necessary that the conduct mentioned in the first subdivision be donewith - a fraudulent purpose or intent, or with an actual and fraudulent intention of deceiving the other party; nor is this meaning implied by any of the language which I have used, The adoption of such an element as always essential would at once strike out some of the most familiar and best established instances of equitable estoppel. Undoubtedly a fraudulent design to mislead is often present as an ingredient of the conduct working an estoppel; but this only renders the result more clearly just, and, if I may use the expression, more conclusive. I ( 2 ~omeroy's Eq.Jur., 4th ed. 1644.) This language does not conflict in any way with what was said by this court in Waddell v . School District, supra. 1 I (Emphasis added) The district court, in its disposition of this case, recognized the advice given to Ricks by the attorney representing both Ricks and Teslow concerning his workmen's compensation claim was a misrepresentation of material legal facts. It does not appear that this misrepresentation was made intentionally nor fraudulently, but that is not a necessary component for the application of the equitable estoppel principle. Ricks did not know the true facts of the law concerning his claim, and he reasonably and predictably relied on the misrepresentation made to him, to his substantial detriment. The attorney-client relationship existent between the attorney and the defendants herein, at the time the misrepresenta- tion was made, precludes them from taking advantage of the conse- quences of that misrepresentation. This Court in its application of the law of estoppel in Levo v . Gen.-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570, 576, 280 P.2d 1086, stated: "The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a flexible one, founded in equity and good conscience; its object is to prevent a party from taking an unconscionable advantage of his own wrong while asserting his strict legal right. Seemingly the only strict legal right we are asked to adhere to is the statute which was passed solely for the benefit of the employer and the insurance carrier, i . e . Statute of Limitations. * * * "Certainly, if there is any circumstance wherein the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be extended, it is in matters concerning an injured workman, where the law itself says that the Workmen's Compensation Act shall be cons trued liberally. " This Court i n Newman v. Kamp, 140 Mont. 487, 490, 374 P.2d 100, stated: "In l i g h t of the foregoing findings of f a c t , we must keep i n mind the following well-established r u l e s concerning scope of review. T J e have held t h a t t h i s court w i l l not reverse the finding of the dis- t r i c t court except where the evidence c l e a r l y prepon- derates against it. [Citing cases] Similarly, we s t a t e d i n Rirnie v. United States Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 44, 328 P.2d 133 (1958), t h a t our duty i s t o determine whether there i s any substantial evidence i n the record t o j u s t i f y the conclusion of the court. 11 I find the decision of the d i s t r i c t court t o be supported by ample and substantial evidence and I would affirm the judgment