Title: Commonwealth v. Doughty

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13112 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WES DOUGHTY. 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 9, 2023. - May 2, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Mistrial, Argument by prosecutor, 
Instructions to jury, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror, 
Indictment, Capital case.  Mental Impairment.  
Intoxication.  Jury and Jurors.  Burning a Dwelling House.  
Attempt.  Jurisdiction, Superior Court.  Superior Court, 
Jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 9, 2017. 
 
The cases were tried before Timothy Q. Feeley, J. 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. 
Kathryn L. Janssen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Wes Doughty, was convicted on 
two counts of murder in the first degree in connection with the 
February 2017 killings of Mark Greenlaw and Jennifer O'Connor 
inside a Peabody home.  The defendant admitted to killing 
2 
 
Greenlaw, whom he shot in the face at close range; however, he 
contended that the killing was committed in a heat of passion 
stemming from Greenlaw's treatment of David Moise, a "crack" 
cocaine dealer who was wheelchair-bound and who also lived in 
the Peabody residence.  He also admitted to killing O'Connor, 
whom he stabbed and slashed more than twenty times as she 
pleaded for her life, asked to see her father, and gasped 
futilely for breath; but the defendant contended that he had 
been under the influence of crack cocaine.  The jury convicted 
the defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
premeditation as to both victims, and on the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty as to O'Connor.1 
 
On appeal, the defendant maintains that the trial judge 
abused his discretion in denying his motion for mistrial, that 
the prosecutor's closing argument was improper, that the jury 
instructions were erroneous, that a juror should have been 
dismissed, and that the attempted arson indictment was 
defective.  He also asks this court to exercise its authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or 
 
 
1 He was also convicted of one count of attempted burning of 
a dwelling, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A; one count of 
armed carjacking, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 21A; one count 
of kidnapping, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 26; and one count 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). 
3 
 
order a new trial.  We affirm the convictions and discern no 
reason to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts are 
supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
 
The events leading to the killings took place in the 
Peabody home from which Moise ran his drug distribution 
operation.  Shortly before the killings, Greenlaw moved into the 
home.  Greenlaw assisted Moise in his drug-selling enterprise, 
gradually replacing Michael Hebb, who, along with his 
girlfriend, Christine Cummisky, also resided in the home. 
 
The defendant was one of Moise's regular buyers; he came to 
the home daily to use cocaine and also to help care for Moise, 
whom he called "Dad."  On the afternoon of the killings, 
Cummisky heard Hebb and the defendant discussing Greenlaw in the 
second-floor bedroom.  Both men were angry.2 
 
Hebb complained that Greenlaw was "moving in" on Moise's 
drug dealing business and was adamant that he "wasn't letting it 
happen."  The defendant disapproved of the care Greenlaw 
provided to Moise, who required assistance in eating and 
 
 
2 Disagreements among the residents began after Greenlaw 
began spending more time at the house; a week before the 
killings, Greenlaw slapped Hebb, giving him a black eye, and 
Hebb later responded by discharging a rifle into the garage when 
he believed Greenlaw was inside.  Cummisky suspected that Hebb 
knew she had twice been intimate with Greenlaw.  Hebb also may 
have owed Greenlaw money. 
4 
 
toileting.  The defendant and Hebb discussed "doing something" 
to Greenlaw.  The defendant told Hebb, "When you see me standing 
in this spot, you know shit is about to happen," referring to a 
spot between two lion figures in front of the house. 
 
Soon thereafter, Cummisky saw the defendant standing in the 
agreed spot, and she notified Hebb, who had gone to the second-
floor bathroom to shower.  The defendant reentered the home and 
went upstairs into the bedroom; he was holding a revolver.  
Cummisky heard the first-floor bathroom door open, and the 
defendant ran downstairs; Hebb stayed upstairs with Cummisky. 
 
Cummisky heard the defendant and Greenlaw arguing, and then 
she heard gunshots.  The medical examiner later opined that 
Greenlaw was killed by a close-range shotgun blast between his 
eyes.3 
 
Cummisky next heard a woman -- presumably O'Connor, who was 
engaged to Greenlaw -- scream, "[O]h, my God.  What did you do?" 
and plead with Greenlaw to "wake up."4  Cummisky then heard 
O'Connor say, "[P]lease just let me leave.  I just want to go 
 
 
3 Police officers eventually recovered a shotgun in a marsh 
or wood through which the defendant and Hebb had fled, see 
infra; it was capable of firing the type of shot that killed 
Greenlaw and contained a live round.  Officers also recovered a 
rifle, a shotgun, and a revolver in the basement of the Peabody 
house, but none of these was likely the murder weapon. 
 
 
4 Hebb went downstairs and then returned a few minutes 
later. 
5 
 
see my dad," and, "If you're going to rape me, kill me first," 
followed by whimpering.5  The medical examiner testified that 
O'Connor was stabbed and sliced twenty times, including twice on 
her torso, with one stab wound penetrating her left lung and one 
penetrating to her spine.  She had at least a dozen wounds in 
her neck; her jugular vein was severed, and her carotid artery 
was cut.6  The medical examiner testified that the hemorrhaging 
from the wounds on her torso indicated that they likely were 
inflicted after the stab wounds in the neck.  As she was dying 
from blood loss, she would have tried to breathe faster and 
deeper, but the injury to her left lung would have interfered 
with her ability to do so.  Most likely, she did not die 
instantaneously, but rather over the course of minutes. 
 
When the defendant returned upstairs, he was shirtless and 
covered in blood.  Hebb went downstairs and returned with a 
shotgun or rifle wrapped in a pair of jeans.  Hebb also carried 
Moise, who was crying, upstairs.  Cummisky heard banging 
 
 
5 Forensic evidence later determined that O'Connor was 
killed on Moise's bed, which was located on the first floor, but 
on the other side of the house from where Greenlaw had been 
killed; her blood was found on the bedframe, floor, and walls.  
The defendant was very likely a minor contributor to 
deoxyribonucleic acid found under O'Connor's nails. 
 
 
6 Two knives stained with human blood were later recovered 
from the basement:  a folding knife and a serrated single-edge 
saw-type knife. 
6 
 
downstairs and asked Hebb whether the defendant had shot 
Greenlaw; Hebb confirmed that the defendant had done so. 
 
The next day, the defendant ordered Cummisky to clean blood 
off the kitchen cabinets, which Cummisky did.7  The defendant 
followed her as she cleaned.  By this point, the crack cocaine 
supply in the house had been depleted; Hebb and the defendant 
called a supplier to deliver more.  When the supplier arrived, 
he noticed the kitchen and living room had been cleaned; the 
defendant was carrying a shotgun and looked "strange." 
 
The defendant and Hebb then spent time in the basement; 
they told Cummisky to bang on the stairs if anyone pulled into 
the driveway.  While the defendant and Hebb were in the 
basement, Cummisky fled from the home, without shoes or a coat 
despite the winter conditions.  Cummisky waved down a driver in 
a passing vehicle and dove into the vehicle headfirst, screaming 
that "[t]hey just killed two people."  The driver took Cummisky 
to the police station, where Cummisky reported the killings.  A 
marked police cruiser established a loose perimeter at the home. 
 
Early the following morning, a former buyer of the drug 
distribution business arrived at the home; all the lights were 
off.  The buyer observed that the defendant was "high as a 
 
 
7 Cummisky had asked Hebb whether the defendant planned to 
kill her; Hebb responded that the defendant did not, but Hebb 
warned Cummisky not to "act crazy in front of him." 
7 
 
kite," and she saw him do "a couple of hits" of crack cocaine.  
The defendant, whom the buyer described as "a strange person," 
"an idiot," "always off," "a weird dude," and "always a little 
different," was "acting even stranger than he usually did."  The 
defendant pointed a rifle or shotgun at the buyer's face and 
asked repeatedly whether law enforcement officials were outside.  
After the defendant escorted the buyer from the home, the buyer 
sent Hebb a text message informing him of the presence of a 
police cruiser on the street outside the house. 
 
The defendant and Hebb fled from the home in a van before a 
special weapons and tactics team entered the home.  In the 
basement, the law enforcement officials found gasoline 
containers and a welding torch hose threaded down the bulkhead 
leading to two rolled up rugs; inside the rugs were the victims' 
bodies, wrapped in cellophane and placed in body bags.  The 
officers also found a bloody mattress, garbage bags, and a 
disassembled shotgun or rifle.  The welding torch hose was 
connected to an acetylene tank filled with flammable gas.8  The 
rugs and garbage bags were covered in flammable liquid; inside 
the bags were blood-soaked clothing and bedding, along with a 
pocket knife.  The kitchen smelled strongly of cleaning 
products. 
 
 
8 The defendant had experience with welding. 
8 
 
 
When the van in which the defendant and Hebb had fled broke 
down, Hebb called a friend to pick them up.  When the friend 
arrived, Hebb emerged from the woods wearing a mechanic's 
outfit, followed several minutes later by the defendant.  Both 
were soaking wet. 
 
Later, the defendant arrived alone at the Middleton home of 
one of his childhood friends; the defendant was wet and 
apparently cold.  The defendant said, "I'm in some trouble.  
I've got -- it was them or me.  I've got a couple of bodies."  
The defendant made a gesture as if he were handling a rifle.  
The friend declined to help him, and the defendant stole a car 
from the property and fled. 
 
A few days later, the defendant entered Kenneth Metz's car 
and forced him into the passenger's seat at knifepoint, tying 
him up with a seatbelt and driving to various locations.  The 
defendant twice mentioned "the Farm Ave. killing,"9 apparently 
assuming Metz had seen news coverage of it.  Metz testified that 
the defendant said he had been "really angry because the other 
people there had been giving medical-grade heroin to a relative 
or his godfather and he didn't want his godfather getting 
addicted to heroin."  The defendant told Metz that he "went in 
without any weapons but used whatever was in the house."  He 
 
 
9 The Peabody home where the killings occurred was on Farm 
Avenue. 
9 
 
also stated, "I've killed one person now.  It won't matter too 
much if I have to kill another one."  Metz managed to escape, 
and he later reported to the police that the defendant stated he 
had killed "these people."  Metz also stated that he "knew 
pretty quick this guy wasn't altogether" and that the 
defendant's "attitude was fluctuating."  The defendant drove 
Metz's car to South Carolina, where he was apprehended a few 
days later.10 
 
On his return trip to Massachusetts, police officers found 
the defendant to be "odd."  On the drive to the airport, the 
defendant asked to see the officers' cell phones to view media 
coverage of the killings.  The defendant asked one officer 
whether he was tired and offered to drive, which the officer 
found "[e]xtremely weird."  The defendant also commented that he 
had "made great time" driving down to South Carolina and pointed 
out landmarks, behavior which the officer found "odd."  The 
defendant assigned nicknames to the officers.  He asked the 
officers if they were right- or left-handed and commented that 
he needed to lace his boots tight in case he needed to run.  At 
the airport, the defendant shook his handcuffs, drawing 
attention to himself, behavior which the officers also found 
"odd."  On the airplane, the defendant tried to speak with other 
 
 
10 Hebb was apprehended in Peabody; he pleaded guilty to 
accessory after the fact and attempted burning of a dwelling. 
10 
 
passengers, stating to a passenger with a crucifix, "I'm evil."  
He also asked an officer whether he would "let [the defendant] 
go" if the plane crashed into the ocean.  Again, the officer 
found these statements "bizarre" and "[v]ery strange." 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted in 
May 2017 on two counts of murder in the first degree, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; one count of rape, in violation 
of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b);11 one count of attempted burning of a 
dwelling, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A; one count of armed 
carjacking, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 21A; one count of 
kidnapping, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 26; and one count of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation 
of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b).  A jury trial was held in 
September 2019.12 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation as to the 
killing of both Greenlaw and O'Connor, and also on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty as to O'Connor.  The defendant was 
sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without parole for 
 
 
11 As discussed infra, a nolle prosequi was entered on the 
rape charge. 
 
 
12 At the start of jury selection, defense counsel raised 
the issue whether to ask about sexual assault during voir dire; 
the judge did not add the proposed questions, explaining that 
the inquiry could bring to the attention of the jury a question 
about which there would potentially be no evidence. 
11 
 
the two counts of murder in the first degree.13  He filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant raises several 
errors, which we address in turn. 
 
a.  Mistrial.  The defendant maintains that the judge 
abused his discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after 
Cummisky testified to O'Connor's statement, "If you're going to 
rape me, kill me first." 
 
i.  Testimony regarding victim's fear of rape.  Prior to 
the trial, a nolle prosequi was entered on the rape charge.14  
The defendant filed a motion to exclude as hearsay certain 
statements that Cummisky said Hebb had made relating to this 
charge.  In particular, Cummisky had disclosed that, following 
Greenlaw's killing when Hebb returned upstairs carrying Moise, 
Hebb had told Cummisky that "[the defendant] is having sex with 
[O'Connor]" and "his DNA is going to be all in her."  The 
 
 
13 The jury also found the defendant guilty as to the other 
charges.  On the count of armed carjacking, the defendant was 
sentenced to a term of from twelve years to fifteen years, 
concurrent with the first life sentence, and a $1,000 fine.  On 
the count of kidnapping, the defendant was sentenced to a term 
of from eight years to ten years, concurrent with the first life 
sentence.  On the counts of attempted burning of a dwelling and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, the 
defendant was sentenced to twenty years' probation each, to run 
concurrently with one another and the first life sentence. 
 
 
14 The indictments were not renumbered; as a result, there 
was no count three either when the indictments were read aloud 
or on the verdict slips. 
12 
 
prosecutor consented to the motion and further agreed to exclude 
evidence that Cummisky heard sounds of sexual intercourse. 
 
On the sixth day of trial, Cummisky testified that after 
she heard gunshots, she heard a woman screaming15 and that Hebb 
went downstairs where the killings occurred and then came back 
upstairs.  The judge allowed defense counsel's request for a 
sidebar.  Defense counsel asked whether the prosecutor had 
instructed Cummisky not to testify as to hearing sounds of 
sexual intercourse, consistent with the parties' agreement.  The 
prosecutor asked for a recess during which she reminded Cummisky 
not to testify regarding the sounds and not to testify as to 
Hebb's excluded statements. 
 
When Cummisky returned to the witness stand, the prosecutor 
asked Cummisky whether she continued to hear O'Connor downstairs 
and what she heard O'Connor say; Cummisky responded that 
O'Connor said, "Please just let me leave.  I just want to go see 
my dad."  The prosecutor asked whether she heard O'Connor say 
"anything else."  Cummisky then testified that she heard 
O'Connor say, "If you're going to rape me, kill me first."16 
 
 
15 As set forth supra, the woman (presumably O'Connor) 
screamed, "[O]h, my God.  What did you do?" and pleaded with 
Greenlaw to "wake up." 
 
 
16 The prosecutor continued, asking whether Cummisky had 
heard O'Connor say "anything else"; Cummisky had not.  Finally, 
the prosecutor asked whether Cummisky heard screaming or other 
noises of pain; Cummisky responded that she heard whimpering. 
13 
 
 
The defendant moved for a mistrial.  The prosecutor 
explained that consistent with the parties' agreement, she had 
instructed Cummisky not to reference Hebb's excluded statements 
and the sounds of sexual intercourse.  She also represented 
that, prior to Cummisky's testimony, she had not known that 
Cummisky had heard O'Connor's statement that O'Connor feared 
being raped. 
 
The judge credited the prosecutor's explanation and denied 
the motion.  The judge reasoned that Cummisky's testimony 
regarding O'Connor's statement was different from the excluded 
evidence related to sexual noises and Hebb's statements.  He 
also explained that the statement did not "suggest that this 
witness [had] knowledge that, in fact, a rape did or did not 
occur"; it was "a statement that she heard that is totally 
consistent with the charges that remain . . . and [did] not 
disclose to the jury . . . that there [was] any suggestion in 
the Commonwealth's evidence of a rape." 
 
The judge offered to give a curative instruction and to 
have the statement struck from the record; defense counsel 
declined, determining that either option "would draw more 
attention to the issue."  Cummisky's testimony regarding 
O'Connor's statement was not mentioned again. 
 
ii.  Analysis.  "The decision whether to declare a mistrial 
is within the discretion of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. 
14 
 
Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 503 (2006).  This is because the judge is 
in the best position to determine whether the jury likely would 
be prejudiced.  Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 496 
(1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1003 (1998).  Thus, our review is limited to determining 
whether "the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing 
the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(quotation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014). 
 
The defendant speculates that the statement, coupled with 
the gap in the numbered indictments, changed the tenor of the 
jury's consideration by causing them to believe that rape was 
the missing charge.  He contends that the judge abused his 
discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.  We disagree. 
 
To begin, O'Connor's statement was relevant to the issue of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 
216, 227 (1983) (listing factors to be considered by jury in 
determining extreme atrocity or cruelty, including 
"consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim").17  See 
Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 683-684 (2021) 
 
 
17 After the defendant's trial, we modified the Cunneen 
factors prospectively.  See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 
852, 864-866 (2020). 
15 
 
(victim's "fear and terror" relevant to theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty); Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 44 
(2017) (victim's "emotional response" was relevant to theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 744 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 864 (2020) ("a victim's substantial 
degree of conscious suffering may support a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty where it is the reasonably likely 
consequence of the defendant's actions").18 
 
Moreover, the statement, which was a surprise to the 
prosecutor,19 was not highlighted; indeed, it was not repeated or 
otherwise referenced during the entire two-week trial.20  On this 
 
 
18 Contrary to the defendant's contention, the statement, 
which concerned the victim's fear that she might be raped, was 
not evidence of a prior bad act used to demonstrate bad 
character or propensity to commit crime.  See Commonwealth v. 
McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 140-141 (2018) ("evidence of the 
defendant's other bad acts . . . may be admissible to prove a 
material issue separate and distinct from the defendant's 
character or propensity to commit the crime charged"). 
 
 
19 We defer to the judge's credibility determination.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 780 (2021) ("Given the 
deference owed trial judges, particularly involving credibility 
determinations, we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused 
his discretion here . . .").  "There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the [testimony] was planned or even that the 
prosecutor had any reason to suspect" Cummisky would testify to 
the statement.  Santiago, 425 Mass. at 496. 
 
 
20 For this same reason, we are not persuaded by the 
defendant's contention that the isolated statement was 
prejudicial because there was no voir dire regarding sexual 
offenses during empanelment.  See note 12, supra. 
16 
 
record, there was no abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 517-518 (1990) (not abuse of 
discretion to deny motion for mistrial based on one reference to 
defendant's incarceration in ten-day trial).  See also Bryant, 
447 Mass. at 503-504 (collecting cases in which witness's 
spontaneous testimony was not so inflammatory as to require 
mistrial). 
 
b.  Closing arguments.  The defendant contends that the 
prosecutor's closing argument impermissibly appealed to the 
jury's sympathy and contained misstatements of the evidence.  
"In determining whether an argument was improper we examine the 
remarks in the context of the entire argument, and in light of 
the judge's instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial."  
Teixeira, 490 Mass. at 740, quoting Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 
478 Mass. 189, 199 (2017). 
 
i.  Appeal to sympathy.  The defendant maintains that the 
prosecutor impermissibly appealed to emotion by stating, " 
[Greenlaw] and [O'Connor] were human beings.  They were loved.  
And, despite the battles they were losing at the time of their 
deaths, they deserved a chance to win the war." 
 
It is well settled that a prosecutor may not appeal to the 
jury's sympathy.  Commonwealth v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 444-445 
(2009).  Neither may a prosecutor emphasize "personal 
characteristics [that] are not relevant to any material issue," 
17 
 
if such emphasis would "risk[] undermining the rationality and 
thus the integrity of the jury's verdict" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 791 (2021), cert. 
denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022) (discussing repeated reference to 
victim's age as relevant to extreme atrocity or cruelty and 
concluding that such reference as well as additional 
characterization of victim as "innocent boy" did not require new 
trial where jury were instructed that closing arguments are not 
evidence and that they were to be guided by "[r]eason, logic, 
[and] common sense" and "not emotion, not sympathy, not 
sentiment").  A prosecutor may, however, "tell the jury 
something of the person whose life had been lost in order to 
humanize the proceedings."  Fernandes, supra, quoting Santiago, 
425 Mass. at 495. 
 
Here, the prosecutor's statement was not quite the same as 
a statement that the victim did not "deserve" to die, which we 
have previously said is improper.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 580 (2002) ("victim 'didn't deserve to 
die this way'").  Instead, the statement was a plea that the 
jury not "write off" the victims (as well as the other occupants 
of the Peabody home, including the defendant) as unworthy of 
their attention, a theme to which the prosecutor returned at the 
end of her argument: 
18 
 
"It would be really easy, ladies and gentlemen, to write 
off the residence of Farm Ave., to think of it as just 
that, a parallel universe that has nothing to do with us 
and that, frankly, the people who enter there deserve what 
they get. 
 
"Nobody in this case, not [Greenlaw], not [O'Connor], not 
[the defendant,] not . . . Cummisky or . . . Hebb, nobody 
grew up thinking that they would end up at Farm Ave.  It is 
not what anyone plans for their life, and nothing about 
having been at Farm Ave. or having been an addict means 
that anyone deserved what they got . . . ." 
 
Nonetheless, we agree with the defendant that the statement was 
not material to any disputed issue, compare Fernandes, 487 Mass. 
at 791 (references to victim's young age material to extreme 
atrocity or cruelty), and it bordered on the types of emotional 
appeals we have discouraged, see Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 
Mass. 461, 470-471 (2000) (statement that victim "was entitled 
to the right to live and this man took it" improper); 
Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 581 (1997) (statement 
that victim had "right to live, and these guys, these guys took 
it away from him" improper).  See also Commonwealth v. Torres, 
437 Mass. 460, 465 (2002) ("remarks concerning the victims' 
rights were improper appeals to sympathy").  Although asking the 
jury not to "write off the residence" as people who "deserve 
what they get" was permissible humanizing, the prosecutor went 
further, stating that the victims "deserved a chance to win the 
war," which was impermissible. 
19 
 
 
We conclude, however, that the statement, to which no 
objection was made at trial, did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
Alemany, 488 Mass. 499, 511 (2021) ("Where the defendant did not 
object at trial, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice").  The prosecutor did not suggest that 
the jury base their verdict on sympathy for the victims.  
Compare Santiago, 425 Mass. at 495 (request for jury to "think 
about" victim's age and pregnancy improper).  The comment was 
fleeting and made in the context of an otherwise proper closing 
argument.  See Alemany, supra at 512-513 (no substantial 
miscarriage of justice where improper comments were made during 
course of otherwise proper closing argument).  The judge 
instructed the jury three times that closing arguments were "not 
evidence" and that the jurors must decide the case based on the 
evidence and not on "[e]motion or sympathy."  See Fernandes, 487 
Mass. at 791 (jury instruction not to be guided by emotions 
cured any prejudicial effect of prosecutor's improper remark 
during closing); Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 419 
(2020) (same).  And, as set forth supra, the evidence of the 
defendant's guilt was overwhelming.  See Alemany, supra at 513-
514 ("evidence against the defendant was overwhelming"); 
Commonwealth v. Kent K., 427 Mass. 754, 761 (1998) (appeal to 
sympathy "troubling" but "less crucial" where guilt was clear). 
20 
 
 
ii.  Misstatements.  The defendant also contends that the 
prosecutor's statement that "there is no view of this evidence 
[that the defendant] didn't take pleasure in the killing of 
. . . O'Connor"21 was unsupported by the evidence. 
 
"In closing argument, a prosecutor may not 'misstate the 
evidence or refer to facts not in evidence.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 188-189 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 129 (2013).  See Mass G. Evid. 
§ 1113(b)(3)(A) (2022).  "However, a prosecutor may argue 
reasonable inferences from the evidence."  Joyner, supra at 189, 
quoting Lewis, supra. 
 
The prosecutor's statement, which was relevant to the issue 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty, was a fair inference from the 
evidence, inter alia, that the defendant had alternative means 
of killing O'Connor quickly with the shotgun and instead chose 
to prolong her death by using a knife; that he brought her away 
from Greenlaw's body to Moise's bed and there slit her throat; 
and that he stabbed her additional times while she whimpered and 
begged for her father in the minutes during which she was 
bleeding out, gasping for breath, and dying.  See Castillo, 485 
Mass. at 865 ("whether the defendant was indifferent to or took 
 
 
21 The prosecutor later stated, "He took pleasure in that 
killing.  He killed her slowly in the worst possible way . . . .  
And then he took pleasure in the media coverage of it." 
21 
 
pleasure in the suffering of the deceased" is factor upon which 
jury can make finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty); Cunneen, 
389 Mass. at 227. 
 
c.  Jury instructions.  i.  Mental impairment instruction.  
The judge instructed that, in determining whether the defendant 
formed the intent to kill required for murder in the first 
degree under the theory of deliberate premeditation, the jury 
could consider "any credible evidence that the defendant was 
affected by his ingestion of drugs."  The judge denied the 
defendant's request to instruct the jury to also consider 
whether he "suffered from a mental impairment."  The judge 
concluded that "the evidence would not warrant any reasonable 
jury in drawing inferences that mental impairment may have 
affected his ability to form the intent with deliberate 
premeditation to commit murder."  That evidence consisted of lay 
witness testimony that the defendant generally was "odd," 
"weird," or "strange."  One witness testified that, following 
the killings, the defendant was "even stranger" than usual.  
Metz observed, also after the killings, that the defendant 
"wasn't altogether" and exhibited "fluctuating" attitudes.  And 
officers who escorted the defendant back from South Carolina 
where he had fled also thought the defendant "odd" and described 
his strange behaviors en route back to the Commonwealth.  No 
evidence linked these observations to the defendant's drug use, 
22 
 
and no evidence tied the drug use to a mental impairment, much 
less a mental impairment at the time of the killings. 
 
On this record, the judge did not err in denying the 
defendant's request for a mental impairment instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 426-427 (2020) 
("to be entitled to an instruction on mental impairment, a 
defendant must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that such an 
impairment existed at the time of the conduct in question").  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 485 Mass. 172, 197 (2020), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1111 (2021) ("Evidence that the defendant 
consumed alcohol in proximity to the crime[, two to three beers 
over several hours,] does not itself establish a resulting state 
of 'debilitating intoxication' such as could support reasonable 
doubt about the defendant's capability to form the requisite 
criminal intent"); Commonwealth v. Lennon, 463 Mass. 520, 522-
523 (2012) (no impairment instruction warranted where only 
evidence was that defendant "might have been under the influence 
of alcohol to some degree about two hours before the stabbing").  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 796-799 
(2011) (mental impairment instruction required based on evidence 
of defendant's "long history of mental illness," including 
hospitalizations and diagnoses). 
 
ii.  Mitigating circumstances instruction.  The defendant 
next contends that the jury instruction that the defendant's 
23 
 
ingestion of drugs was not a mitigating circumstance that would 
reduce murder to manslaughter contradicted the instruction that 
the jury could consider the defendant's voluntary ingestion of 
drugs as it related to his intent to commit murder.  "A trial 
judge has the duty to state the applicable law clearly and 
correctly, but is not required to grant a particular instruction 
so long as the charge, as a whole, adequately covers the issue" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Teixeira, 490 Mass. at 742.  
"Trial judges have considerable discretion in framing jury 
instructions, both in determining the precise phraseology used 
and the appropriate degree of elaboration" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 688 
(2015).  "In assessing the sufficiency of the jury instructions, 
we consider the charge in its entirety, to determine the 
probable impact, appraised realistically upon the jury's 
factfinding function" (quotation and alteration omitted).  
Teixeira, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 
670 (2014).  "Instructions that convey the proper legal 
standard, particularly when tracking model jury instructions, 
are deemed correct."  Green, petitioner, 475 Mass. 624, 629 
(2016). 
 
The judge properly instructed that the jury "may consider 
any credible evidence that the defendant was affected by his 
ingestion of drugs" in deciding whether the defendant acted with 
24 
 
the requisite intent for deliberate premeditation or extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.22 
 
The judge also correctly explained: 
"The law recognizes that in certain circumstances which we 
refer to as mitigating circumstances, a crime is a lesser 
offense than it would have been in the absence of one or 
more mitigating circumstances. 
 
"The killing of . . . Greenlaw that would otherwise be 
murder in the first or second degree is reduced to the 
lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter i[f] the defendant 
killed . . . Greenlaw under mitigating circumstances.  Not 
every circumstance you may think [is] mitigating is 
recognized as mitigating under the law." 
 
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 48-49 (2018). 
 
The judge then explained that "voluntary ingestion of drugs 
is not a mitigating circumstance."  This also was a correct 
statement of the law.  Voluntary ingestion of drugs, like mental 
impairment, is relevant to intent, but it is not a "mitigating 
circumstance" as that term is used in the law to reduce murder 
to manslaughter.23  See Commonwealth v. Johnston, 446 Mass. 555, 
559-560 (2006) ("While mental impairment [and voluntary 
 
 
22 These instructions were largely taken from the model jury 
instructions.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 47, 54 
(2018).  See also Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 222 
(2014); Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 207-208 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 300 (1992). 
 
 
23 "Mitigating circumstances" are limited to "heat of 
passion on a reasonable provocation," "heat of passion induced 
by sudden combat," and "excessive use of force in self-defense 
or in defense of another."  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
49 (2018). 
25 
 
intoxication] may be considered . . . on the question whether a 
defendant formed a specific intent to kill," "a specific intent 
to cause grievous bodily harm," or "intent to do an act, in 
circumstances known to the defendant, that a reasonable person 
would know creates a plain and strong likelihood of death," "it 
is not a mitigating factor that would reduce murder to 
manslaughter"). 
 
Thereafter, the judge explained that "mitigating 
circumstances" serve to reduce murder to manslaughter, and then 
described the particular mitigating circumstances at issue in 
the case.  Viewed as a whole, these instructions "state[d] the 
applicable law clearly and correctly" such that a reasonable 
jury could apply the law to the facts; there was no error.  
Teixeira, 490 Mass. at 742. 
 
iii.  Drug use instruction.  We agree with the defendant 
that the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that they 
could consider voluntary ingestion of drugs in determining 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, in addition to considering it in 
determining intent.  See Commonwealth v. Boucher, 474 Mass. 1, 7 
(2016) ("When the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty is in 
play, an instruction on voluntary intoxication that links 
consideration of intoxication only to a defendant's intent or 
knowledge, without also explaining that the jury may consider 
26 
 
intoxication in relation to whether the defendant committed the 
killing with extreme atrocity or cruelty, is in error"). 
 
Because the jury also convicted the defendant on the theory 
of deliberation premeditation, however, the error did not create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 220 (2007) ("If [the] jury 
return a guilty verdict based on two theories, the verdict will 
remain undisturbed even if only one theory is sustained on 
appeal"). 
d.  Alleged juror misconduct.  The defendant contends that 
the judge erred in declining to dismiss a juror accused of 
premature deliberation. 
 
i.  Allegation of premature deliberation.  After alternate 
jurors were selected and the jury retired for deliberations, an 
alternate juror, juror no. 10, reported to the judge that a 
deliberating juror, juror no. 15, had made comments about the 
case a few days prior.  Juror no. 10 reported that juror no. 15 
commented that "the defense is not bringing up anybody" and 
asked other jurors how long the deliberations would take, 
stating that deliberations "shouldn't take that long."  
Additionally, juror no. 10 reported that juror no. 15 had 
stated, before the trial began and before the judge had 
instructed the jury, "I hate to do this to someone, but you have 
to do what you've got to do." 
27 
 
 
The judge then questioned all other jurors; each answered 
that no one had expressed any thoughts or comments about the 
substance of the case prior to deliberations.  When juror no. 15 
was informed that the judge had received information that she 
may have commented about how long deliberations would take, 
juror no. 15 did not recall whether the comment had been made, 
but added, "I could have asked that because I don't know how 
long they take."  Juror no. 15 was also asked about forming 
opinions on the strength of the case prior to deliberations; 
juror no. 15 explained, "I don't feel like my mind was made up." 
 
The judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss juror 
no. 15, based on the lack of corroboration by other jurors and 
"concerns about the credibility and the motives" of juror no. 
10, given the fact that juror no. 10 waited days to report the 
allegations, only disclosing them after being made an alternate, 
perhaps on the hope of becoming a deliberating juror.24  "[G]iven 
the lack of corroboration of any statements by any other fellow 
jurors, some of whom were alleged to have been present" when 
juror no. 15 was alleged to have made the statements, and juror 
no. 15's responses, the judge concluded, "I don't find 
misconduct, and I have substantial questions . . . about the 
bona fides of the report."  The judge excused juror no. 10. 
 
 
24 The prosecutor noted that juror no. 10 had been "visibly 
angry" after being selected as an alternate. 
28 
 
ii.  Analysis.  We review the judge's decision not to 
excuse juror no. 15 for abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 31 (2016).  "Prohibiting premature 
jury deliberations, and extraneous influences on jurors, 
safeguards a defendant's right to trial before an impartial 
jury."  Id. at 30.  "A judge's 'determination of a juror's 
impartiality is essentially one of credibility, and therefore 
largely one of demeanor,'" to which we give "great deference."  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 849 (2013).  
"Jurors 'inevitably formulate impressions as they hear evidence.  
This is natural and cannot be prevented. . . .  The question is 
whether jurors can suspend final judgment and keep their minds 
open to other evidence that they hear.'"  Philbrook, supra at 
31, quoting Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 254 (2001), 
S.C., 449 Mass. 1018 (2007). 
 
Here, the record is devoid of any basis to doubt the 
judge's findings, after questioning the jurors, that juror no. 
10 was not credible, that there was no misconduct by juror no. 
15, and that juror no. 15's statement about being able to keep 
an open mind should be credited.25  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 
 
 
25 Juror no. 15 first explained, "I think everybody kind of 
forms an opinion as you're going along."  As we explained in 
Philbrook, this is "natural and cannot be prevented"; it is 
acceptable so long as the juror keeps an open mind.  Philbrook, 
475 Mass. at 31, quoting Guisti, 434 Mass. at 254. 
 
29 
 
453 Mass. 722, 735 (2009) ("The judge was in the unique position 
to note the juror's demeanor, and nothing in the record leads us 
to conclude that his decision to retain her was clearly 
erroneous or an abuse of discretion"). 
 
e.  Indictment charging attempted burning of a dwelling.  
The defendant maintains, for the first time, that the indictment 
charging the attempted burning of a dwelling should be dismissed 
because it failed to specify the crime charged and failed 
further to set forth the overt act constituting the alleged 
attempt.  "In a criminal case," however, "any defense or 
objection based upon defects in the . . . indictment, other than 
a failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an 
offense, shall only be raised prior to trial."  G. L. c. 277, 
§ 47A.  The parties suggest that the argument is preserved 
because it pertains to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.  
See Commonwealth v. Nick N., 486 Mass. 696, 702 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 151 (2003) ("A question 
of subject matter jurisdiction 'may be raised at any time and is 
not waived even when not argued'" [alterations omitted]).  This 
is not accurate.26 
 
 
26 In fairness to the parties, our case law has not always 
been consistent in describing the defect caused by the failure 
of an indictment to charge a crime.  See Commonwealth v. 
Garrett, 473 Mass. 257, 264 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. 
Senior, 454 Mass. 12, 14 (2009) ("whether an indictment fails to 
allege an offense is a matter of jurisdiction, which may be 
30 
 
 
Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the power of the court 
to entertain a particular category of case.  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 1017, 1020 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "jurisdiction" 
as "[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree" and 
"subject-matter jurisdiction" as "[j]urisdiction over the nature 
of the case and the type of relief sought"); Black's Law 
Dictionary 1425 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "[s]ubject matter 
jurisdiction" as "court's power to hear and determine cases of 
the general class or category to which proceedings in question 
belong; the power to deal with the general subject involved in 
the action").  See also J.W. Glannon, Civil Procedure:  Examples 
and Explanations 73 (2d ed. 1992) ("Subject matter jurisdiction 
. . . concerns the court's authority to hear generic types of 
cases.  All state court systems have a set of trial courts with 
 
raised at any time"); Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 547 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Palladino, 358 Mass. 28, 31 
(1970) ("No court has jurisdiction to sentence a defendant for 
that which is not a crime"); Commonwealth v. Cantres, 405 Mass. 
238, 239-240 (1989), citing Commonwealth v. Andler, 247 Mass. 
580, 581-582 (1924) ("if an indictment fails to state a crime, 
no court has jurisdiction to entertain it, . . . and the 
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time").  Rather 
than strip the court of subject matter jurisdiction, such an 
indictment violates constitutional principles, such as those 
secured by art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
See Canty, supra at 546-547 (failure of indictment to charge 
crime violates defendant's "due process rights under art. 12 
. . . , which provides that '[n]o subject shall be held to 
answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and 
plainly, substantially and formally, described to him'"); 
Palladino, supra ("A conviction on an indictment that charges no 
crime would be sheer denial of due process"). 
31 
 
very broad subject matter jurisdiction.  These courts . . . have 
subject matter jurisdiction over a wide range of suits . . ."); 
A.B. Spencer, Civil Procedure:  A Contemporary Approach 13 (5th 
ed. 2018) (subject matter jurisdiction addresses whether courts 
"have competency to hear a case, meaning they are authorized to 
adjudicate disputes of a particular kind"). 
 
The Superior Court has "original jurisdiction of all 
crimes."  G. L. c. 212, § 6.  The failure of an indictment 
charging the attempted burning of a dwelling to set forth the 
crime charged or an overt act does not strip the court of the 
power to hear the cause, let alone the category of criminal 
actions generally; in other words, a defect in an indictment has 
no bearing on the court's authority to hear a category of cases, 
here, all criminal cases. 
 
Having clarified that a defect in an indictment is not a 
question concerning the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
court, we turn to the defendant's argument that the indictment 
failed to charge a crime because it did not specify that he was 
charged with an attempt to burn a "dwelling."27  See G. L. 
 
 
27 The indictment stated: 
 
"Wes Doughty, of Peabody, in the county of Essex, on or 
about February 18, 2017 at Peabody in the County of Essex 
aforesaid, did willfully and maliciously attempt to set 
fire to, or attempt to burn, or aid, counsel[,] or assist 
in such an attempt to set fire to or burn, or did commit 
any act preliminary thereto or in furtherance thereof, 
32 
 
c. 277, § 47A (challenge based on indictment's "failure to 
charge" crime preserved).  Here, the indictment was captioned 
"Attempted Burning of a Dwelling" and cited "266/5A" (emphases 
added).  Accordingly, the defendant's challenge fails because 
the caption together with the other words of the indictment 
identifies that the offense charged is a violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 5A, which is a crime.  See Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 
Mass. 535, 548 (2013) (indictment provided "fair notice of the 
crime charged" "where the caption identified the criminal 
statute that was violated"). 
 
The defendant also challenges the indictment on the ground 
that the absence of an overt act from the indictment violates 
art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  Passing over whether the defendant has waived any 
challenge based on this purported defect in the indictment, we 
conclude that the absence of an overt act from the attempted 
arson indictment, charging a violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A, 
did not violate art. 12. 
 
Article 12 provides that "[n]o subject shall be held to 
answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and 
plainly, substantially and formally, described to him."  The 
 
against the peace of the Commonwealth aforesaid, and 
contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and 
provided." 
33 
 
defendant was charged with attempted burning of a dwelling in 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A, which delineates the overt acts 
that "constitute an attempt": 
"[t]he placing or distributing of any flammable, explosive 
or combustible material or substance or any device in or 
against any building, structure[,] or property . . . in an 
arrangement or preparation with intent eventually to 
willfully and maliciously set fire to or burn such 
building, structure[,] or property, or to procure the 
setting fire to or burning of the same." 
 
G. L. c. 266, § 5A.  In view of the statute's express 
delineation of the overt acts, the indictment was not required 
to restate these overt acts.28  "Provided there is fair notice of 
the crime charged, '[i]t is not necessary for the Commonwealth 
to set forth in the complaint or indictment every element of the 
crime . . . .'"  Canty, 466 Mass. at 547, quoting Commonwealth 
 
 
28 The defendant was not charged under the general attempt 
statute, which provides:  "Whoever attempts to commit a crime by 
doing any act toward its commission, but fails in its 
perpetration, or is intercepted or prevented in its 
perpetration" shall be punished."  G. L. c. 274, § 6.  "We have 
. . . recognized that a 'charge of attempt [under the general 
attempt statute] should set forth in direct terms that the 
defendant attempted to commit the crime, and should allege the 
act or acts done toward its commission.'"  Senior, 454 Mass. at 
15 n.3, quoting Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 365 Mass. 116, 121 
(1974).  Thus, we have held that an indictment under the general 
attempt statute, G. L. c. 274, § 6, must "allege the act or acts 
done toward its commission"; "[o]vert acts not alleged may not 
be relied on."  Gosselin, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 
177 Mass. 267, 274 (1901).  But see Commonwealth v. Lourenco, 
438 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2003) (question "whether the overt act 
requirement remains valid to describe fully and plainly the 
charge of attempt to the defendant, or if it reflects an 
anachronistic view of sufficient indictments and complaints"). 
34 
 
v. Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517, 520 (1999), cert. denied sub nom. 
Martinez v. Massachusetts, 530 U.S. 1281 (2000).  See Canty, 
supra at 548 ("the absence of a required element in an 
indictment does not by itself establish that a crime is not 
charged, even if acquittal is required if the prosecution were 
to prove only the allegations in the indictment").  See also 
G. L. c. 277, § 34 ("An indictment shall not be dismissed or be 
considered defective or insufficient if it is sufficient to 
enable the defendant to understand the charge and to prepare his 
defense; nor shall it be considered defective or insufficient 
for lack of any description or information which might be 
obtained by requiring a bill of particulars").  As such, the 
defendant's challenge to the indictment has no merit.29 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After review of the 
entire record, we discern no error warranting relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
29 The defendant also maintains that the indictment is 
defective because it failed to list the particular dwelling in 
question; this argument also fails.  The defendant did not ask 
for a bill of particulars, which could have provided him with 
the address of the dwelling.  See G. L. c. 277, § 34.  Moreover, 
he was provided with the grand jury minutes, which identified 
the specific dwelling alleged to have been the subject of the 
attempted arson.