Title: Julie Mair v. Trollhaugen Ski Resort

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1252 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Julie Mair, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Trollhaugen Ski Resort and American Home 
Assurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 116 
Reported at: 283 Wis. 2d 722, 699 N.W.2d 624 
(Ct. App. 2005-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Polk   
 
JUDGE: 
Molly E. GaleWyrick 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Michael J. Brose, Anne E. Schmiege, and Doar, Drill & Skow, 
S.C., New Richmond, and oral argument by Michael J. Brose. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Todd 
Joseph Koback and Terwilliger, Wakeen, Piehler & Conway, S.C., 
Wausau, and oral argument by Todd Joseph Koback. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III, and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, III, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, and there was 
oral argument by William C. Gleisner. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas M. Pyper, Steven 
W. Keane, and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Builders Association, Associated Builders and 
Contractors of Wisconsin, Inc., Associated General Contractors 
 
 
2
of Wisconsin, Inc., American Institute of Architects - Wisconsin 
Chapter, and American Council of Engineering Companies of 
Wisconsin, Inc., and there was oral argument by Steven W. Keane. 
 
 
2006 WI 61
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1252  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV573) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julie Mair, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Trollhaugen Ski Resort and American Home 
Assurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The petitioner, Julie Mair (Mair), 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
affirming a summary judgment order of the Polk County Circuit 
Court, Molly E. GaleWyrick, Judge, that dismissed her safe place 
claim against Trollhaugen Ski Resort, more properly known as 
Trollhaugen, Inc. (Trollhaugen), and American Home Assurance 
Company (American Home).  See Mair v. Trollhaugen Ski Resort, 
2005 WI App 116, 283 Wis. 2d 722, 699 N.W.2d 624.   
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Mair contends that the circuit court erred in applying 
the ten-year statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2003-04)1 
to bar her claim brought under the safe place statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 101.11.  We disagree and conclude that ten years 
after a structure is substantially completed, § 893.89 bars safe 
place claims resulting from injuries caused by structural 
defects, as opposed to safe place claims resulting from injuries 
caused by unsafe conditions associated with the structure.    
Because the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mair's 
fall was caused by alleged defects in the location, depth, and 
slope of the floor drain that existed since the building's 
construction, her injury was caused by an alleged structural 
defect 
and 
not 
an 
unsafe 
condition 
associated 
with 
the 
structure.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
I 
¶3 
On January 23, 2001, Mair fractured her right femur in 
a women's bathroom located in the chalet of the ski resort.  She 
entered the bathroom wearing her ski boots and walked across the 
floor to the cubicle.  After exiting the cubicle, she stepped 
into a floor drain with her right foot, lost her footing and 
fell.  The fall fractured her right thigh.   
¶4 
The bathroom where Mair fell was constructed in 1976 
with a concrete floor.  Neither the configuration of the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
3 
 
bathroom nor the floor drain has been modified since the 
original construction.  The recessed area around the drain is an 
oval shape, not more than 24 to 30 inches in length the long 
direction.  The drain cover itself was depressed approximately 
half an inch from the bottom of the slope and at a maximum depth 
of two inches below the plane of the bathroom floor.  Routine 
daily maintenance measures, including inspection, mopping, and 
cleaning of the bathroom floors, are taken to ensure the safety 
of the bathroom.  The floor is not highly polished, waxed or 
slippery, and boot scrapers are provided outside the bathroom 
door.   
¶5 
Mair commenced this suit on December 16, 2002, 
alleging common-law negligence and violation of the safe place 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 101.11, 
against 
Trollhaugen 
and 
its 
insurer, American Home.2  She based her negligence claim against 
Trollhaugen on an assertion that her injury "was proximately 
caused 
by 
the 
negligence 
of 
employees 
and/or 
agents 
of 
Trollhaugen Ski Resort."  She also claimed Trollhaugen was 
liable under the safe place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11, for 
its failure "to design, construct, or maintain the premises in 
as safe a condition as the nature thereof reasonably permitted."   
                                                 
2 Dalco Enterprises, Inc. (Dalco) and its insurer were also 
named as defendants.  In 1992, employees of Dalco resealed the 
bathroom floor at issue with a clear epoxy sealant containing 
nonslip grit.  Because the coating was still in good condition 
at the time of Mair's fall and because Mair's liability expert 
did not find the sealant to be a contributing factor to her 
fall, Mair stipulated to dismiss Dalco and its insurer. 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On December 3, 2003, Trollhaugen moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that Mair's claims were time-barred by the 
builder's statute of repose, Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  This statute 
reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
[N]o cause of action may accrue and no action may be 
commenced . . . against the owner or occupier of the 
property or against any person involved in the 
improvement to real property after the end of the 
exposure period, to recover damages . . . for any 
injury 
to 
the 
person . . . arising 
out 
of 
any 
deficiency or defect in the design, land surveying, 
planning, supervision or observation of construction 
of, 
the 
construction 
of, 
or 
the 
furnishing 
of 
materials 
for, 
the 
improvement 
to 
real 
property. . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 893.89(2).  For purposes of the statute, "exposure 
period" means the "10 years immediately following the date of 
substantial completion of the improvement to real property."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.89(1).   
¶7 
In 
her 
response 
brief 
to 
Trollhaugen's 
summary 
judgment motion, Mair conceded that Wis. Stat. § 893.89 barred 
her common-law negligence claim and summary judgment was 
appropriate on that claim.  However, she disputed that § 893.89 
also barred her safe place claim.  Mair also conceded that the 
safe place statute did not create a distinct cause of action 
under Wisconsin law, but argued that the safe place statute 
imposed an ongoing duty to modify or make an existing structure 
safe if it was unsafe at the time of construction.  The circuit 
court agreed that the safe place statute does not create a 
distinct cause of action, but simply establishes a higher 
standard of care than an ordinary negligence claim.  It found, 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
5 
 
therefore, that if a common-law negligence claim is time-barred, 
any negligence claim as modified by the safe place statute would 
also be barred. 
¶8 
The circuit court also noted that safe place cases 
distinguish between property conditions causing injury that are 
"structural defects" and those that are "unsafe conditions 
associated with the structure."  The court determined that if 
Mair's cause of action arose from an unsafe condition associated 
with the structure, it might not fall within the statute of 
repose and there could potentially be liability against the 
property owner. 
¶9 
To determine whether the property condition at issue 
was a structural defect or an unsafe condition associated with 
the structure, the court considered the deposition of Larry 
Seiberlich (Seiberlich), Mair's liability expert.  Seiberlich 
opined to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that the 
design, location, and construction of the recessed floor drain 
caused or contributed to Mair's injury.  He also stated that the 
location, depth, and slope of the recess did not offend any 
Wisconsin building codes, only what he considered industry 
standards.   
¶10 Seiberlich was also asked whether he believed that the 
bathroom lighting or the color of the bathroom walls or floor 
may have caused or contributed to the fall.  He stated that the 
lighting was appropriate and that the red color of the bathroom 
wall "may have been" a factor in Mair's fall, but he could not 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
6 
 
state such an opinion to a reasonable degree of professional 
certainty. 
¶11 Mair's answers to Trollhaugen's interrogatories also 
spoke to a structural defect rather than an unsafe condition 
associated with the property as the cause for her fall.  For 
example, in response to her basis for the allegations of 
negligence, Mair responded as follows:3 
My fall resulted from the placement of an unmarked 
recessed drain in the exit path from the toilet 
cubicle in the bathroom facility.  This was of 
sufficient depth to result in my unfooting and injury.  
Nothing had been done to highlight this hazard either 
directly or in the form of any warning signs at entry 
or inside.  This incident occurred in a facility 
supposedly designed for the use of visitors to the 
center and the placement of the recess in a high 
traffic area which shows a lack of appreciation of 
foreseeable risk in the provision of such facilities.  
The depth of the depression is sufficient to be a 
major contributor to a fall but insufficient to draw 
immediate attention to itself without some form of 
visual enhancement or hazard warning sign, neither of 
which were present.  The failure of Dalco Enterprises 
Inc. [sic] their Agents or Employees to highlight the 
above hazard resulted in my jeopardy and injury.  They 
have failed to provide a facility for public use which 
one could regard as a Safe Place, either from a 
statutory point of view or in my own reality.   
Furthermore, at Mair's deposition, counsel for Trollhaugen asked 
her, "[i]s it fair to say that there was nothing about the 
condition of the floor other than the dip that caused or 
                                                 
3 Mair's answer was in response to a question asking her to 
state the manner in which she alleges employees or agents of 
Dalco were negligent; however, her answer references safe place 
duties and the placement of the drain, which indicate the answer 
was intended to address negligence on the part of Trollhaugen, 
not Dalco.   
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
7 
 
contributed to cause your fall?"  To this, Mair answered, "[a]s 
far as I was concerned, it was the dip that made me fall." 
¶12 The circuit court concluded that the defects in the 
location, depth, and slope of the floor drain, which Seiberlich 
opined were the cause of Mair's accident, were structural 
defects.  Although defects in the lighting or paint color or a 
lack of warning signs could be considered unsafe conditions 
associated with the structure, Mair did not present sufficient 
evidence necessary to survive summary judgment that these were 
potential causes of her fall.  Because the undisputed material 
facts demonstrated that the sole potential cause of Mair's fall 
was 
an 
alleged 
structural 
defect, 
the 
court 
granted 
Trollhaugen's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mair's 
complaint in a written decision entered on March 9, 2004.   
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed.  Mair, 283 Wis. 2d 722.  
It 
first 
concluded 
that 
the 
safe 
place 
statute 
covers 
construction and the ongoing duty to keep the premises safe by 
repairing and maintaining the premises.  Id., ¶¶7, 11.  The 
builder's statute of repose, however, bars claims made after ten 
years for an injury arising out of a defect in design or 
construction of a building.  Id., ¶8.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals concluded that "to the extent Mair's safe place claim is 
based on defective construction of the bathroom floor, the claim 
is barred by the ten-year statute of repose."  Id., ¶10.  The 
court of appeals also determined that to the extent Mair's 
injuries arose out of a breach of the statutory duty to repair 
or maintain the premises, thus leading to an unsafe condition 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
8 
 
associated with the structure, Trollhaugen did not have actual 
or constructive notice of the defect.  Id., ¶¶13-14.  Mair 
appeals from this decision. 
II 
¶14 This case comes before us on summary judgment.  "We 
review 
a 
circuit 
court's 
grant 
of 
summary 
judgment 
independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit 
court."  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶12, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 
682 N.W.2d 923 (citing Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 
17, ¶15, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470).  Pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2), summary judgment "shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
"We view the summary judgment materials in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Smaxwell, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 
¶12 (citing Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 
524, 537, 563 N.W.2d 472 (1997)).  "Summary judgment should not 
be granted, 'unless the facts presented conclusively show that 
the plaintiff's action has no merit and cannot be maintained.'"  
Id. (quoting Goelz v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 2d 491, 495, 
103 N.W.2d 551 (1960)).  "Where the material facts are not 
disputed, the court is presented solely with a question of law, 
subject to de novo review."  Id. (citing Winkelman, 269 Wis. 2d 
109, ¶16). 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
9 
 
¶15 Furthermore, this case presents an issue of statutory 
interpretation, which is a question of law we review de novo.  
Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶10, 244 
Wis. 2d 758, 
628 
N.W.2d 833. 
 
"[S]tatutory 
interpretation 
'begins with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 
WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Statutory 
language is also "interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
III 
¶16 We first address whether Mair's safe place claim is 
barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  Mair argues that it is not, as 
the statute of repose is intended to apply only to common-law 
negligence claims.  The statute of repose, Mair argues, is 
restricted to negligent acts at the time of construction, while 
the safe place law is not limited to the initial construction 
but 
imposes 
an 
ongoing 
duty 
to 
furnish 
a 
safe 
place.  
Essentially, it is Mair's position that if Trollhaugen built a 
bathroom floor that was unsafe at the time of construction in 
1976, the safe place statute places an ongoing duty on 
Trollhaugen to make the structure safe at all times thereafter.   
¶17 Conversely, Trollhaugen argues that Mair's claim is 
barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.89, as the statute of repose applies 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
10 
 
to safe place claims based on structural defects but not to 
claims based on unsafe conditions associated with the structure.  
Further, Trollhaugen argues that Mair has not presented evidence 
sufficient to overcome summary judgment on her safe place claim, 
as her claim was based solely on an alleged structural defect.     
¶18 Under a plain reading of the statutory sections at 
issue and in light of our prior safe place case law, we agree 
with Trollhaugen that Wis. Stat. § 893.89 bars safe place claims 
resulting from injuries caused by structural defects beginning 
ten 
years 
after 
a 
structure 
is 
substantially 
completed.  
Furthermore, in light of the pleadings, depositions, and answers 
to interrogatories presented to the circuit court at summary 
judgment, Mair's claim is based on an alleged structural defect 
and occurred more than ten years after the building was 
substantially completed.  Therefore, the circuit court properly 
rendered summary judgment to Trollhaugen, and we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.   
¶19 Wisconsin's safe place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11, 
is a negligence statute that imposes a heightened duty on 
employers and owners of places of employment and public 
buildings to construct, repair, or maintain buildings safely.  
Barry v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 2001 WI 101, ¶¶18-19, 245 
Wis. 2d 560, 630 N.W.2d 517.  Section 101.11(1) reads, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
(1) Every employer . . . shall furnish a place of 
employment which shall be safe for employees therein 
and for frequenters thereof and shall furnish and use 
safety devices and safeguards, and shall adopt and use 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
11 
 
methods and processes reasonably adequate to render 
such employment and places of employment safe, and 
shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to 
protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such 
employees and frequenters.  Every employer and every 
owner of a place of employment or a public building 
now or hereafter constructed shall so construct, 
repair or maintain such place of employment or public 
building as to render the same safe. 
For purposes of this statute, "safe" means "such freedom from 
danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of employees or 
frequenters, 
or 
the 
public . . . as 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
employment, place of employment, or public building, will 
reasonably permit."  Wis. Stat. § 101.01(13).  Furthermore, safe 
"does not mean completely free of any hazards. . . . Just 
because a place could be made more safe, it does not necessarily 
follow that an employer or owner has breached the duty of care 
established by Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1)."  Megal v. Green Bay Area 
Visitor & Convention Bureau, Inc., 2004 WI 98, ¶10, 274 
Wis. 2d 162, 682 N.W.2d 857 (citations omitted).    
¶20 The safe place statute does not create a distinct 
cause of action, but provides a higher duty than the duty of 
ordinary care regarding certain acts by employers and owners of 
places 
of 
employment 
or 
public 
buildings. 
 
Barry, 
245 
Wis. 2d 560, ¶18.  The statute imposes three specific duties on 
these employers and owners:  "to construct, to repair, and to 
maintain a safe place of employment or public building."  Id., 
¶20.   
¶21 Despite the statute's focus on the duties imposed upon 
employers and owners, our case law has focused on the unsafe 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
12 
 
conditions that arise from a breach of one of the three specific 
duties.  Id., ¶24.  The two categories of unsafe property 
conditions relevant here are:  (1) "'structural defects'" and 
"'unsafe conditions associated with the structure.'"4  Id., ¶21 
(quoting Howard H. Boyle, Jr., Wisconsin Safe-Place Law Revised 
139 (1980)). 
¶22 A 
structural 
defect 
arises 
"'by 
reason 
of 
the 
materials used in construction or from improper layout or 
construction.' . . . [A] 
structural 
defect 
is 
a 
hazardous 
condition inherent in the structure by reason of its design or 
construction." 
 
Id., 
¶28 
(internal 
citation 
omitted).  
Furthermore, a structural defect arises from a breach of the 
duty to construct a safe building.  Id.  There is no notice 
requirement for a structural defect; a property owner is "liable 
for injuries caused by structural defects regardless of whether 
he or she knew or should have known that the defect existed."  
Id., ¶22. 
¶23 Alternatively, an unsafe condition associated with the 
structure arises from "the failure to keep an originally safe 
structure in proper repair or properly maintained."  Id., ¶27.  
                                                 
4 Mair claims that the distinction between "structural 
defects" and "unsafe conditions associated with the structure" 
is not applicable to this case as the distinction has been 
recognized only as it pertains to whether a property owner need 
have notice of a defect before being held liable for an unsafe 
condition.  We do not read our case law in such a restrictive 
light and conclude that the categories of unsafe property 
conditions are a useful distinction for purposes of our analysis 
here.   
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
13 
 
These "conditions" arise from a breach of the statutory duty to 
repair or maintain the property and generally involve the 
structure falling into disrepair or not being maintained in a 
safe manner.  Id., ¶25.  The duty of the owner to repair or 
maintain the public building or place of employment arises when 
the owner has actual or constructive notice of the defect.  Id., 
¶23. 
¶24 In light of these categories of unsafe property 
conditions, we turn to the facts of this case.  After reviewing 
the record before us, Mair's single theory of liability is that 
the negligent design and placement of the floor drain and the 
slope of the surrounding floor caused her to fall and break her 
leg.  To support this theory, Mair had an expert witness, 
Seiberlich, testify to a reasonable degree of professional 
certainty that the location, depth, and slope of the recessed 
floor drain caused or contributed to Mair's injury.  In 
Seiberlich's words: 
I 
believe 
that 
the 
location 
of 
the 
drain 
was 
inappropriate.  And from a design perspective, we make 
all attempts as architects to locate depressed drains 
out of pathways.  I believe whoever located the drain 
made a mistake in that location and should have 
located it in a non-pathway area.  I believe that the 
drain was too deep, it violated normative and industry 
standards, and the slope was extensive beyond what the 
industry standards dictate.  The installation then and 
the design I believe were contributing factors.   
These allegations all relate to a hazardous property condition 
that is a structural defect rather than an unsafe condition 
associated with the structure.  That is, there is no allegation 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
14 
 
that Trollhaugen allowed the bathroom floor to fall into 
disrepair or did not maintain it in a safe manner.  Based on the 
evidence presented to the circuit court at the summary judgment 
stage, there is no dispute that the floor and drain were in 
their original condition since the initial construction of the 
ski resort approximately 30 years ago, and Mair's allegations 
are based on an alleged failure to safely construct the 
bathroom.   
¶25 Mair argues that the failure to modify the drain to 
comply with modern safety standards creates an unsafe condition 
associated with the structure.  However, as noted, an unsafe 
condition associated with the structure involves a structure 
falling out of repair or not being maintained in a safe manner.  
That is, the employer or owner essentially breaches his or her 
statutory duty to repair or maintain the property.  Barry, 245 
Wis. 2d 560, ¶25.  Because the design and placement of the floor 
drain and the condition of the surrounding floor have nothing to 
do with a failure to repair or maintain the property, they can 
be classified only as structural defects rather than unsafe 
conditions associated with the structure. 
¶26 Mair also alleges that the bathroom lighting, the 
color of the bathroom walls or floor or the lack of warning 
signs or markers may have caused her injury.  While Seiberlich 
testified that the color of the room may have been a 
contributing factor in causing Mair's fall, he was unable to 
give his opinion to a reasonable degree of professional 
certainty on that issue.  Although defects in the lighting or 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
15 
 
paint color or a lack of warning signs could be considered 
unsafe conditions associated with the structure, Mair did not 
present evidence sufficient to escape summary judgment that such 
a condition contributed to her fall.  Because the undisputed 
material facts demonstrate that Mair's injury was caused by 
alleged defects in the location, depth, and slope of the floor 
drain that existed since the building's construction, her injury 
was caused by an alleged structural defect and not an unsafe 
condition associated with the property.   
¶27 We now turn to an analysis of the builder's statute of 
repose, Wis. Stat. § 893.89, which sets forth "the time period 
during which an action for injury resulting from improvements to 
real property must be brought."  Kohn v. Darlington Cmty. Schs., 
2005 WI 99, ¶13, 283 Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794.  The statute 
begins to run when the improvement is substantially completed 
and prohibits a cause of action from accruing after the ten-year 
exposure period ends.  Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  It is a statute of 
repose rather than a statute of limitation because it "provides 
that a cause of action must be commenced within a specified 
amount of time after the defendant's action which allegedly led 
to injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff has discovered 
the injury or wrongdoing."  Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 
252, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  Causes of action within the scope 
of the statute include "any deficiency or defect in the design, 
land 
surveying, 
planning, 
supervision 
or 
observation 
of 
construction of, the construction of, or the furnishing of 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
16 
 
materials 
for, 
the 
improvement 
to 
real 
property."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (emphasis added). 
¶28 There are several exceptions to the statute of repose, 
enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4).  Safe place claims brought 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 101.11, 
however, 
are 
not 
specifically 
excepted.  This omission combined with § 893.89(1)'s inclusion 
of deficiencies or defects in the design or construction of 
improvements to real property indicate to us that the builder's 
statute of repose was intended to apply to at least certain safe 
place claims, namely those concerning a breach of the duty to 
construct a safe place of employment or a public building.  
Again, a breach of the duty to construct a safe structure 
correlates to structural defects.   
¶29 There is, however, an exception for claims brought 
against "[a]n owner or occupier of real property for damages 
resulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation or 
inspection 
of 
an 
improvement 
to 
real 
property."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(c) (emphasis added).  Under the safe 
place statute, a failure to "maintain" correlates to an unsafe 
condition associated with the structure, and thus allegations of 
such defects do not fall under the purview of the builder's 
statute of repose.  Thus, from a plain reading of the statute, 
we can conclude that § 893.89 bars safe place claims resulting 
from injuries caused by structural defects, but not by unsafe 
conditions associated with the structure, beginning ten years 
after a structure is substantially completed. 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
17 
 
¶30 In this case, Mair alleged in her complaint that 
Trollhaugen failed to maintain the premises in as safe a 
condition as its nature permitted.  However, at the summary 
judgment stage, Mair could not back such a claim up, as she did 
not present any genuine issues of material fact demonstrating 
that an unsafe condition associated with property caused her 
fall.  Furthermore, she did not allege in the complaint that 
Trollhaugen negligently operated or inspected the bathroom 
floor. 
 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(c), 
such 
claims 
are 
sufficient to escape the scope of the statute of repose.  In 
essence, Mair's claim related to a failure to design and 
construct a safe building, and therefore, it is barred under the 
statute of repose.  
¶31 Our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
interplay 
between 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.89 and 101.11 is also consistent with the 
legislative history 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.89. 
 
The original 
version 
of 
the 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.155 
(1973-74), 
protected those involved in the "'design, planning, supervision 
of construction or construction of such improvement to real 
property.'"  Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 
Wis. 2d 382, 
388, 
225 
N.W.2d 454 
(1975) 
(quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 893.155 (1973-74)).  The statute did not apply to 
those classes ignored by the statute, such as materialmen, and 
it specifically excluded the "owners and occupants" of the 
buildings.  Id.  The Kallas court held that the statute was 
unconstitutional as written, as "the legislative classification 
that gives special protection to the protected group is 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
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unreasonable."  Id. at 391.  While the court recognized that 
there are public policy reasons that may justify a limitations 
period for those in the construction business, it concluded 
"there appears no reason why only a very restricted class of 
those thus occupied is protected by the statute."  Id.  In other 
words, where the cause of injury would be the same in any 
particular case, a limited grant of immunity would serve only to 
shift liability from those who were most likely the cause of the 
defect to other groups who did not qualify for protection under 
the statute.   
¶32 The legislature subsequently passed a revised version 
of the statute that added land surveyors and material providers, 
but not owners and occupiers, to the list of protected groups.  
§ 2, ch. 323, Laws of 1975; Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 
148 Wis. 2d 59, 64-66, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989).  The revision also 
contained a statement of intent explaining that persons involved 
in the planning, design, and construction of improvements to 
real estate lacked sufficient control over the property after 
the project's completion to determine the need for maintenance 
or repairs and did not have the power to effect these repairs if 
needed.  § 1, ch. 335, Laws of 1975.  On review, the Funk court 
rejected the legislature's use of "control over the property" as 
a 
rational 
way 
to 
determine 
which 
groups 
qualified 
for 
protection under the statute, stating that continuing control 
was irrelevant where a statute was intended to prevent liability 
for errors or omissions in the construction of an improvement to 
real property.  Id. at 67.  Because the court determined that 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
19 
 
the revisions reduced the under-inclusiveness of the statute but 
did not eliminate it completely and that the statutory means 
were not substantially or rationally related to the stated end, 
it held that the revised version of the statute was still in 
violation of equal protection.   Id. at 76-77.   
¶33 Following this decision, the legislature passed 1993 
Wis. Act 309, which amended the statute a second time.  Kohn, 
283 Wis. 2d 1, ¶61.  The legislature cited a concern that 
"groups 
were 
reluctant 
to 
participate 
in 
state-sponsored 
construction 
projects 
because 
of 
the 
limited 
period 
of 
protection offered by state-purchased insurance coverage and the 
potential for unlimited tort liability past the end of such 
coverage."  Id.  The new revision provided protection for owners 
and occupiers to the extent they were involved in the original 
design and construction of the improvement, but not for 
negligence in maintenance or repair of the improvement once it 
was completed.  Id., ¶66.  In Kohn, we held that this class 
distinction was rationally related to the purpose of the revised 
statute, 
protecting 
those 
involved 
in 
the 
design 
and 
construction of improvements to real property, and that the 
statute did not violate equal protection.  Id., ¶81.   
¶34 Application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.89 
to 
safe 
place 
claims based on a structural defect is consistent with the 
intent of the legislature in passing revised versions of the 
statute of repose.  The previous versions of the statute were 
declared unconstitutional, in large part, because they did not 
include protection for owners and occupiers.  After the first 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
20 
 
two versions of the statute were struck down, the legislature 
was forced to choose between forgoing the statute of repose 
altogether or including owners and occupiers within its scope.  
By asking this court to apply the statute of repose as if the 
revisions had not been made, Mair is asking the court to ignore 
its 
own 
previous 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
statute's 
constitutionality and the decision of the legislature that it 
was preferable as a matter of public policy to limit causes of 
action against owners and occupiers than to discard the statute 
of repose for members of the construction industry.   
¶35 While we have concerns that this construction of the 
statutes effectively limits the duty of owners and occupiers to 
bring existing buildings in line with modern concepts of safety, 
this limitation of Wis. Stat. § 101.11 is necessary for the 
statute of repose 
to 
serve 
its 
intended 
purpose. 
 The 
legislature determined that there is a public interest in 
terminating liability for structural defects after a specified 
time in addition to an interest in providing safe buildings.  If 
Wis. Stat. § 893.89 terminates liability for members of the 
construction industry ten years after a structure is completed 
but does not terminate liability for property owners, an injured 
party will simply bring a claim against the owner and liability 
will 
shift 
between 
groups 
rather 
than 
being 
eliminated.  
Applying § 893.89 to safe place claims for structural defects, 
however, will terminate liability for these defects without 
affecting an owner's duty to repair and maintain a structure in 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
21 
 
a condition as safe as reasonably possible given any inherent 
defects in its structure. 
IV 
¶36 For the first time on this appeal, Mair seeks review 
of the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  Mair attempts 
to characterize the court of appeals' decision as creating a new 
classification under § 893.89.  However, the classification 
about which Mair is complaining is one which this court has 
already addressed and upheld.  See Kohn, 283 Wis. 2d 1, ¶80 
(holding that class distinctions in § 893.89 between owners and 
occupiers and other classes "rationally serve[d] the legitimate 
purpose of limiting the long-term liability of those who are 
involved in the improvement of real property[,]" and did not 
violate the equal protection clauses of the state or federal 
constitutions). 
 
We 
therefore 
need 
not 
address 
the 
constitutionality of § 893.89 again here today.   
V 
¶37 In sum, we conclude that ten years after a structure 
is substantially completed, § 893.89 bars safe place claims 
resulting from injuries caused by structural defects, as opposed 
to safe place claims resulting from injuries caused by unsafe 
conditions 
associated 
with 
the 
structure. 
 
Because 
the 
undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mair's fall was 
caused by alleged defects in the location, depth, and slope of 
the floor drain that existed since the building's construction, 
her injury was caused by an alleged structural defect and not an 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
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unsafe condition associated with the structure.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.     
 
 
No. 
2004AP1252   
 
 
 
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