Title: State v. Castaneda

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

428 Nev., Advance Opinion 4S
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

 
     
      

{THE STATE OF NEVADA, No. 52911
Appellant,
vs FILED
MARTY EDWARD CASTANEDA,
Nov 24 2010

Respondent.

 
 
   
    
  
   
     
  
 
 
   
   
 
   
 
  

Appeal from a district court order dismissing charges of
indecent exposure after concluding that NRS 201.220 is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
James M. Bixler, Judge.

Reversed and remanded,

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David Roger.
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and

|Andrea M. Rachiele, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Appellant,

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Amy A. Porray, Deputy Public
Defender, Clark County,
for Respondent,

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, PICKERING, J.:
Respondent Marty Edward Castaneda is accused of
intentionally and repeatedly exposing his genitals and buttocks while

standing on the sidewalk in front of the county jail near Lewis Avenue and

First Street in Las Vegas, A witness sitting in a nearby car observed his

10-3004

 

 
exhibitions and called the police. Castaneda was arrested and charged
jwith indecent exposure under NRS 201.220. He did not deny the
allegations but instead asserted a constitutional challenge to the statute,
arguing that it is facially vague and overbroad. The district court agreed
|with Castaneda and dismissed the indecent exposure charges.

We reverse and remand. NRS 201,220(1) provides that “[a]
person who makes any open and indecent or obscene exposure of his or her

person, or of the person of another, is guilty” of a gross misdemeanor for a

 

{first offense. While Castaneda is correct that NRS 201.220 does not define

 

Jwhat it means to expose one’s “person” in an “open and indecent or
Jobscene” manner, the lack of internal definitions does not invalidate the
statute,

Indecent exposure was a public offense at common law. For

such an offense, NRS 193.050(3) incorporates the common law definitio

 

|The common law, as well as the case law concerning NRS 201.220, leaves

‘no doubt that a person who intentionally exposes his genital

 

on a public
street corner commits indecent exposure, Thus, NRS 201.220 applies to
Castaneda’s conduct, and he may not avoid liability by theorizing about
ithe statute's hypothetical vagueness as to others,

Given the Legislature’s use of the common law to define NRS
201.220's terms, we read NRS 201.220 as limited to the common law
prohibition against open and indecent or obscene exposure of one’s
genitals or anus. So limited, NRS 201.220 does not catch a substantial

/amount of constitutionally protected expressive conduct within its sweep.
/See Barnes v, Glen Theatre, Inc,, 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991) (plurality).
Thus, Castaneda's overbreadth challenge also fails.

 

 
ome ae

 

 

 

Although our review is de novo, we commence it under the
presumption “that statutes are constitutional’; the party challenging a
statute has “the burden of making ‘a clear showing of invalidity.” Berry v.
State, 125 Nev. _, __, 212 P.8d 1085, 1095 (2009) (quoting Silvar v.
Dist Ct,, 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d 682, 684 (2006)). Further, we

jadhere to the precedent that “every reasonable construction must be

 

resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” Hooper v.
(California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895); accord Virginia and Truckee RR. Co.
ly. Henry, 8 Nev. 165, 174 (1873) (It requires neither argument nor
reference to authorities to show that when the language of a statute
Jadmits of two constructions, one of which would render it constitutional
Jand valid and the other unconstitutional and void, that construction
should be adopted which will save the statute”). This canon of
constitutional avoidance dates back to Murray v, The Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. 64 (1804), and remains in full force today. Skilling v. United States,
561 US. __, _ & n.40, 130 §. Ct. 2896, 2929-30 & n.40 (2010).

Th

A
The district court invalidated NRS 201.220 as
‘unconstitutionally vague. “Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the
‘First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause(s] of the Fifth” and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. United States
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at
684-85. “Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two
independent reasons,” Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999): (1) if it
“fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited’; or (2) if it “is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages

 

 
seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law

Project, 561 U.S. _, __, 190 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010) (quoting Williams,
553 U.S. at 304). See also Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Att'y General

125 Nev. _, __, 217 P.3d 646, 551-64 (2009) (discussing how these tests
apply in the civil and criminal contexts).

“[MJathematical precision is not possible in drafting statutory
language.” City of Las Vegas v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. at 864, 59 P.8d at 481.
Nonetheless, “the law must, at a minimum, delineate the boundaries of
junlawful conduct. Some specific conduct must be deemed unlawful so

individuals will know what is permissible behavior and what is not.” Id.

'Some Nevada cases have used a conjunctive “both/and” formulation
in stating these two vagueness tests. See City of Las Vegas v. Dist. Ct.

118 Nev. 859, 862, 59 P.3d 477, 480 (2002) (a statute is subject to facial
vagueness attack “if the statute both: (1) fails to provide notice sufficient
to enable ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited; and
(2) authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”)
(emphasis added), quoted in Berry, 125 Nev. at__, 212 P.3d at 1095. Our
sccasional conjunctive phrasing dates back at least to State of Nevada v,
Father Richard, 108 Nev. 626, 629, 836 P.2d 622, 624 (1992), where we
stated that “[a] vague law is one which fails to provide persons of ordinary
intelligence with fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and also fails to
provide law enforcement officials with adequate guidelines to prevent
discriminatory enforcement,” (emphasis added) (citing Papachristou_v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U-S. 156 (1972)). While the ordinance challenged
in Papachristou failed both vagueness tests, see 405 US. at 162 (this
ordinance is “void for vagueness, both in the sense that it fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions” (internal quotation and citation omitted),
Papachristou did not hold, as Father Richard’s paraphrase suggests, that
both tests must be met before a vagueness challenge can succeed. As
Morales, Williams, and Holder state, the vagueness tests are independent
and alternative, not conjunctive.

 

 

 
A law that leaves the determination of whether conduct is criminal to a
purely subjective determination, such as what might “annoy” a minor or
“manifest” an illegal “purpose,” is “vague, not in the sense that it requires
fa person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all.” Id, at 865, 59 P.3d at 482 (quoting Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)) (invalidating a law making it a
misdemeanor to “annoy” a minor); Silvar, 122 Nev. at 294, 129 P.3d at 685,
(invalidating law prohibiting loitering that “manifest{s] the purpose of
tion”). See Holder, 561 U.S. at _, 180 8. Ct. at 2720
(We have in the past ‘struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability

inducing . . . prost

    

to whether the defendant's conduct ws

 

‘annoying’ or “indecent”—wholly
subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or
settled legal meanings.” (quoting Williams, 553 U.S, at 306).

But constitutional vagueness analysis does not treat statutory
{text as a closed universe. Enough clarity to defeat a vagueness challenge
“may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute,”
Skilling, 561 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2983 (quoting United States v,
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997), by giving a statute's words their “well-
settled and ordinarily understood meaning,” Berry, 125 Nev. at _, 212
P.3d at 1085 (citing Nelson v, State, 123 Nev. 584, 540-41, 170 P.3d 517,
'522 (2007), and by “look[ing] to the common law definitions of the related
term or offense,” id. (citing Ranson v, State, 99 Nev. 766, 767, 670 P.2d
574, 575 (1983).

As the discussion that follows will show, we conclude that,
under NRS 193.050, NRS 201.220(1) must be read as incorporating the
common law prohibition against intentional exposure of the genitals or

 

 
anus under circumstances that make such exposure open and indecent or
obscene. ‘Thus limited, NRS 201.220(1) properly applies to Castaneda and
is not unconstitutionally vague.

B

‘The challenged statute states: “A person who makes any open

and indecent or obscene exposure of his or her person, or of the person of

 

another,

 

is guilty: (a) [flor the first offense, of a gross misdemeanor [and]
(b) [flor any subsequent offense, of a category D felony...” NRS
201.220(1). Castaneda has
Castaneda’s vagueness argument focuses on the statute's

 

prior conviction, so he faces a felony charge.

euphemistic reference to “his or her person.” As he reads the word
“person,” most of us expose our “person” every day. He faults the statute
for not specifying the parts of the body whose exposure qualifies as
“indecent or obscene” and argues that the statute, as written, leaves too
much to guesswork to satisfy due process.

‘The State responds by pointing to the settled common law and
commonsense understanding that, in a civilized society, people do not
intentionally and publicly display their genitals. Going further, the State
argues that NRS 201.220(1)'s prohibition of “any open and indecent or
obscene exposure of the person” forbids exhibition of those parts of the
body “which instinctive modesty, human decency or natural self respect
requires shall be customarily kept covered in the presence of others.” An
exposure can be “indecent” without being “obscene.” Quiriconi v, State, 95
Nev. 195, 591 P.2d 1133 (1979). Unlike obscenity, see NRS 201.235,

indecency does not convey prurience; rather, “the normal definition of

‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of
morality.” FOC v, Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978). The
State argues that NRS 201.220(1) prohibits a range of exposures, from

 

 
ot ee

 

genitals to buttocks to women’s breasts, depending on community
tolerance and prevailing standards of morality.

Both sides miss the point that history provides. In the
indecent exposure context, the common law used “person” as a euphemism
for penis, making it fair to read NRS 201.220(1) as prohibiting open and

indecent or obscene exposure of one’s genitals. However, neither the

 

statute's words nor its common law antecedents support the State's view
that NRS 201.220(1) penalizes exposures just because they offend local
sensibilities or standards of morality. Leaving it to the word “indecent” to
‘conclusively define the conduct that NRS 201.220(1) outlaws, rather than
adhering to the common law equation of “person” with “genitals,” goes
beyond settled common law doctrine and the fair intendment of the words
in NRS 201.220(1) and ventures into vagueness territory.

“By statute in virtually every jurisdiction, indecent exposure is
Wharton's Criminal Law §
308, at 200 (16th ed. 1995). Over half the states have indecent exposure

recognized as an offense.” 3 Charles E. Torcia,

 

statutes that specify what body parts cannot be openly exposed, with most
naming the genitals, anus, or sex organs and some also listing the
buttocks and female breasts, See Jeffrey C. Narvil, Revealing the Bare
Uncertainties of Indecent Exposure, 29 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 85, 92-
93 (1995) (canvassing statutes). Other jurisdictions, including Nevada,
have older, more general statutes. These statutes express their
prohibition “not in terms of genitals, buttocks, or breasts, but rather
‘person,’ ‘private parts,’ ‘intimate parts,’ or simply an exposure ‘of the
body.” Id, at 93-94.

Whether or not there is merit in actually
prohibiting the exposure of specific anatomical
parts, the [specific] statutes do accomplish an

 
om

 

important objective in criminal law: They inform
the public precisely what behavior will be
considered unlawful....While most persons
possessing even a passing familiarity with
mainstream American society would recognize
that [the more general] statutes restricting
exposure of one’s ‘private’ or ‘intimate’ parts [or
‘person’] would likely encompass the genitals, one
might not hold the same assurance with regard to
other parts of the body.

Id, footnotes omitted).

 

Addressing vagueness challenges like Castaneda’s, courts
elsewhere have not found their generally worded statutes to require
people to search their “own standards of morality [or] standards of dress”
to know which body parts they publicly exhibit at their peril, Duvallon v.
District of Columbia, 515 A.24 724, 725 (D.C. 1986). Instead, they find
these statutes to express the common law's core prohibition against
genital exposure. Id, at 726, While social mores and norms may inform
when and where exposure of one's genitals is “open and indecent or
obscene,” the core prohibition remains constant. Parnigoni v. District of
Columbia, 933 A.24 823 (D.C. 2007). So applied, general indecent
exposure statutes have repeatedly survived void-for-vagueness challenge.
People v. Massicot, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 714 (Ct. App. 2002); State v,
Wymore, 560 P.2d 868, 869 (Idaho 1977); People v, Vronko, 579 N.W.2d
138, 141 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998): Threet v, State, 710 $.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986); State v, Galbreath, 419 P.2d 800, 803 (Wash. 1966).

‘The analysis in Duvallon and Parnigoni is cogent, especially
because the District of Columbia's indecent exposure statute resembles
NRS 201.220(1) in that it makes it unlawful “for any person or persons to

 
make any obscene or indecent exposure of his or her person.” D.C. Code §
22-1812(a) (2001).

‘The defendant in Duvallon sought review from the United
States Supreme Court by appearing outside its building wearing only a
sandwich board entitled, “Petition for Rehearing.” 515 A.2d at 725. While
the signboard in front covered Duvallon’s breasts and genitals, in back it
left her buttocks completely exposed. Id, Noting that “[iJn the absence of
a statutory definition of the elements of a crime, the common law
definition is controlling,” id, at 725 (quoting Perkins v. United States, 446
A.24 19, 23 (D.C. 1982)), the court canvassed the “English common law
cases [and found them to] compel the conclusion that indecent exposure
Id, at 726, ‘The court went on to
say, “Significantly, the word ‘person’ has been held to be a euphemism for

 

was limited to the exposure of genital

the penis,” such that “by 1824, the word ‘person’ in connection with sexual
matters had acquired a meaning of its own, a meaning which made it a
Id, at 727 (quotation omitted)? The common law
prohibited exposure of the genitals, not the buttocks by themselves. Since

 

synonym for peni

no proof suggested that the defendant exposed more than her buttocks, the

’The court noted that the “statute refers to the “.... indecent
‘exposure of his or her person” and concluded that it thus was not limited
to males but, rather, “[iJt is the indecent exposure of the comparable
portions of the male and female anatomy that constitutes the crime. In
other words, the indecent exposure of human genitalia is the offense.”
Duvallon, 515 A.2d at 728 (alteration in original). By 2009 amendment,
NRS 201.220(1) now uses gender-neutral “his or her” phraseology, A.B.
415, 75th Leg. (Nev. 2009), although when Castaneda was charged it only
said “his.” The change is immaterial to Castaneda’s arguments on this
appeal,

 

 

 
os

 

conviction was reversed, which obviated the vagueness challenge. Id, at
728 v.10.

In Parnigoni, the defendant took off his clothes to play nude
Ping-Pong with his host's eleven-year-old son, surprising his host who
came home early to find his houseguest naked in the family’s basement
game room. 933 A.2d at 825, The court upheld the indecent exposure
conviction against a vagueness challenge. Given Duvallon, the defendant
could not claim lack of notice that the statutory prohibition against
“obscene or indecent exposure of his or her person” [made] the indecent
exposure of human genitalia [a criminally punishable] offense.” 933 A.2d
at 826 (quoting D.C. Code § 22-1312(a) and Duvallon, 615 A.2a at 728),
Also clear from prior cases was the criminal intent required: A defendant
must have intended to expose his or her genitals; accidental exposure is
not enough. Id. (citing Peyton v. District of Columbia, 100 A.2d 36, 37
(D.C. 1953)), Because Parnigoni's intentional exposure of his genitals
violated the statute's terms as defined by existing case law, his vagueness
challenge failed. “[O]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies is not
entitled to attack it on the ground that its language might be less likely to
give fair warning in some other situation not before the court.” Id, at 827
n.6 (quoting Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1976)).

Castaneda’s complaint that he did not have fair notice that
NRS 201.220(1) incorporates the common law prohibition against genital
exposure fares no better than Parnigoni’s. The predecessor to NRS
201.220(1) was adopted in 1911, at the same time as the predecessor to
NRS 193.050. Nev. Crim. Practice Act, §§ 35, 195 (1911), reprinted in
1912 Revised Laws of Nevada, Vol. 2, §§ 6300, 6460. NRS 193.050(3)
declares that, “The provisions of the common law relating to the definition

10

 
 

nee

 

of public offenses apply to any public offense which is... prohibited [by

fatute] but is not defined, or which is . . . prohibited but is incompletely
defined.” And as we held in Hogan v. State, 84 Nev. 372, 373, 441 P.2d
620, 621 (1968), “The term common law [in NRS 193.050], has reference
not only to the ancient unwritten law of England, but also to that body of
law created and preserved by the decisions of courts as distinguished from
that created by the enactment of statutes by legislatures.” Thus, NRS
193.050(3) incorporates into NRS 201.220(1) the common law definitions
applicable to indecent exposure.

This court definitively construed NRS 201.220(1) in Young v.
State, 109 Nev. 205, 849 P.2d 336 (1993). Young holds that NRS
201.220(1) incorporates the common law and that “indecent exposure of
one’s genitals was punishable at common law” and today if the “exposure
‘was intentional” and open and indecent or obscene. Id, at 215, 849 P.2d at
343; accord Ebeling v. State, 120 Nev. 401, 91 P.3d 599 (2004) (upholding
conviction of defendant who exposed his penis to children staying in a
hotel room); Quiriconi, 95 Nev. 195, 591 P.2d 1133 (upholding conviction of
defendant who stood on his front porch minus his pants so cars passing by
could see his private parts).

Numerous authorities agree that intentional genita] exposure
violates statutory and common law prohibitions against indecent exposure
of one’s “person” or “private parts.” See Com. v. Arthur, 650 N.E.2d 787,
790-91 (Mass. 1995) (although “indecent exposure’ Incks a commonly
understood meaning when considered with respect to parts of the body
other than the genitalia,” the common law gives “fair warning” that
“exposure of [one’s] genitalia [is] a crime” and holding that exposing pubic
hair but not genitals does not violate the law); State v. Fly, 501 S.E.2d

u

 
one

 

656, 659 (N.C. 1998) (a defendant commits indecent exposure when he
exposes his “external organs of sex and excretion,” meaning “either his
anus, his genitals, or both"); Wicks v. Citv of Charlottesville, 208 S.E.24
752, 764 (Va, 1974) (indecent exposure is defined as the “intentional
exposure of part of one’s body (as the genitals) in a place where such
Jexposure is likely to be an offense against the generally accepted
standards of decency in a community” (quoting Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1147 (1966))); State v, Galbreath, 419 P.2d 800,
}802-03 (Wash, 1966) (rejecting vagueness challenge by defendant who
Jopenly exposed his genitals; the statute's common law roots gave fair
warning such exposure was prohibited); People v. Massicot, 118 Cal. Rptr.
2d 705, 710-11 (Ct. App. 2002) (the common law offense of indecent
exposure requires display of the genitals’; it “targeted what psychologists
‘term exhibitionism, or genital exposure”); People v. Vronko, 579 N.W.24
138, 141 (Mich. Ct, App. 1998) (defining indecent exposure as “intentional

 

exposure of part of one’s body (as the genitals) in a place where such
exposure is likely to be an offense against the generally accepted
standards of decency in a community” (quoting Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary (1977))); cf, People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 237 & n4
(N.Y. 1992) (Titone, J., concurring) (among jurisdictions with statutes
specifying the parts of the body exposure of which constitutes the offense,
22 prohibit genital exposure) (collecting statutes); Model Penal Code §
218.5 (1980) (prohibiting as indecent exposure of one’s “genitals under
circumstances in which [the actor] knows his conduct is likely to cause
affront or alarm’)

In 1995, the Legislature amended NRS 201.220 to add a new
subsection 2 that provides, “For the purposes of this section, the breast

12.

 
nes

 

feeding of a child by the mother of the child does not constitute an act of
‘open and indecent or obscene exposure of her body.” 1995 Nev. Stat., ch.
105, § 3, at 128. Castaneda argues that this new paragraph makes NRS
202.120(1) unconstitutionally vague, even if it was clear before; why have

@ specific permis

 

ion for breastfeeding, he asks, if indecent exposure of
one’s “person” only prohibits genital exposure? But the new language was
added as part of the Legislature's larger effort to endorse breastfeeding,
not to change the prohibition in NRS 201.220(1). NRS 201.220(2) did not
substantively expand NRS 201.220(1) and introduce vagueness that didn’t
before. See also NRS 193.060 ("The provisions of this title (15,
sing NRS Chapters 193-207], insofar as they are substantially
the same as existing statutes, shall be construed as continuations thereof

exis

 

‘encompas

 

‘and not as new enactments”).

Castaneda stands charged with intentionally exposing his
genitals on a downtown Las Vegas street corner. If proved, this violates
NRS 201.220(1). ‘The fact the statute depends on case- and common-law
definitions to establish the conduct it forbids—specifically, what it means
to expose one’s “person’—does not render it impermissibly vague. See
Berry, 125 Nev. at __, 212 P.3d at 1095-97 (upholding NRS 201.210, the
“open and gross lewdness” companion statute to NRS 201.220, against a

"The 1995 Legislature added an almost identical breastfeeding
exemption to Nevada's lewdness statute, NRS 201.2102), and also
enacted NRS 201.232(2): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
mother may breast feed her child in any public or private location where
the mother is otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether the
nipple of the mother's breast is uncovered during or incidental to the
breast feeding.” This makes sense because the common law teaches that
breasts are not genitals.

13,

 
 

 

challenge that its lack of internal definitions renders it unconstitutionally
vague; the common law and cases give sufficiently precise meaning to its
terms), With the core forbidden conduct thus concretely defined, NRS
201.220(2) neither leaves ordinary people to guess at what they must, can,
or cannot do, see Flamingo Paradise Gaming, 126 Nev. at __, 217 P.3d at
564, nor does it invite seriously discriminatory enforcement, see Silvar,
122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 685, Some discretion, to be sure, applies to
determining when and where genital exposure may be open and indecent
or obscene, but this is not enough to invalidate the statute on void-for-
vagueness grounds.
G

‘The amended information alleges that Castaneda
intentionally “ma(dje an open, indecent, and obscene exposure of his
person by then and there deliberately dropping his pants and underwear
and exposing his penis and/or groin area and/or buttocks in the direct view
and presence of’ the complaining witness. (Emphasis added.) ‘The
“and/or” phrasing is problematic. It suggests—as the State’s expansive
reading of NRS 201.220(1) would hold—that NRS 201.220(1) permits
conviction based on exposure of the buttocks alone. We disagree.

As discussed above, in the absence of a specific indecent
exposure statute, many courts have held that “intent to expose one’s
genitals is a necessary element of the offense.” Massicot, 118 Cal. Rptr. 24
at 709. Thus, under a generally worded indecent exposure statute like
NRS 201.220(1), a defendant who displays only his buttocks but not his
anus or his genitals does not commit the offense of indecent exposure. Fly,
501 S.E.2d at 659; see Duvallon, 515 A.2d at 728; see also Com. v. Quinn,
789 N.E.2d 138, 146-47 (Mass. 2003) (while deciding that exposing the
buttocks can amount to gross lewdness, “[t]his defendant cannot be

4

 
prosecuted for exposing his buttocks” because he “did not have fair notice
that exposure of ‘thong’ clad buttocks could be prosecuted as an open and
gross lewdness offense”).

Of note, the offense consists of the intentional, open and
indecent or obscene exposure, not its visual observation by others. See
Young, 109 Nev. at 215, 849 P.2d at 343 ("{a] conviction under... NRS
201.220 does not require . .. that the exposure was observed”). ‘Thus, the
cases holding exposure of the genitals to be a necessary element of
indecent exposure do not require the genital exposure to have been
witnessed. People v, Carbajal, 8 Cal. Rptr. 34 206, 211 (Ct. App. 2003)
(while California law “requires evidence that a defendant actually exposed
his or her genitals in the presence of another person... there is no
concomitant requirement that such person actually must have seen the
defendant's genitals”); State v, Vars, 237 P.3d 378, 382 (Wash. Ct. App.
2010) (‘the witness's observation of the offender's genitalia” is
‘immaterial’; “[s}imply because” the Washington statute, as interpreted,
“requires an exposure of genitalia in the presence of another, it does not
mean that the other person must observe the defendant's private parts for
‘an indecent exposure to have occurred"); see 50 Am. Jur. 24 Lewdness,
Indecency, and Obscenity § 16 (2006) (“That a victim never actually saw

the accused’s genitals does not necessarily preclude a conviction for

 

indecent exposure, where the crime involves the exposing of oneself under

“States that extend the offense to include exposure of the buttocks
have done so explicitly. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 764 (2007) (defining
“indecent exposure” to include exposure of the genitals or buttocks); Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-45-4-1(d) (LexisNexis 2009) (defining “nudity” to include
“showing of the .... buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering’),

 

 
circumstances that he reasonably expects to be seen naked, and not
whether the victim actually sees his genitalia.”), Evidence that a witness
saw the defendant's bare buttocks or naked body can be relevant
circumstantial evidence, if it suggests that genital exposure occurred, seen

Jor not. However, the mere exposure of one’s buttocks, as occurs with a

 

thong or G-string, dos not establish exposure of one’s “person,” which is a
required clement of the indecent exposure offense. Fly, 501 S.H.2d at 659

CItlo hold that buttocks are private parts” whose exposure is forbidden

 

“would make criminals of all North Carolinians who appear in public

 

‘wearing ‘thong’ or ‘g-string’ bikinis,” which the legislature should state
specifically if that is its intent).

‘We deal here with a criminal statute of statewide application
Nevada is home to rural, sparsely populated areas “where generations of
families with old values have left their stamp upon a small town” and
where “attitude[s] toward life [have] changed but little over a span of a
century.” Robert Laxalt, Nevada 12 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1977).
These rural values contrast sharply with Las Vegas and Reno “where the
exodus from neighboring California and the westward movement of people
have created cities of newly forming identities.” Id, See also Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 697 (2002) (Kennedy, J..
concurring) (noting how different the “public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City” might be from that acceptable
elsewhere (quoting Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 15, 32 (1973)). While
the Legislature has empowered local governments to regulate obscenity,
see NRS 201.239, it is unreasonable to read NRS 201.220(1) as varying the

 

exposures it prohibits depending on community ethos. We thus read NRS
201.220(1) as other jurisdictions have read similarly worded statutes, to

 

 
   
 
   
 
 
 
  
   
     
  
 
 
   
   

forbid exposures of the “person,” meaning genitals or anus, that are “open
and indecent or obscene.” Thus, we disregard the words “or buttocks” in
the amended information as unnecessary factual detail or surplusage. See
Quiriconi, 95 Nev. at 196, 591 P.2d at 1134 (treating the words “and

surplusage in an information alleging open and indecent

Our reading of NRS 201.220(1) keeps it true to its common
law origins. See Duvallon, 515 A.2d at 728. It also avoids an
interpretation that would leave a statewide statute to apply variably from

 

locale to locale, depending on an arresting officer's, judge's, or jury's sense
of propriety. Community standards may inform when and where genital
exposure is “open and indecent or obscene.”> However, under our
interpretation of NRS 201.220, the act that is prohibited—exposure of the
genitals or anus—remains constant, avoiding the significant vagueness
problems that might otherwise result,
oh

‘The district court also declared ~NRS — 201.220
unconstitutionally overbroad. It did so based on stated concerns that NRS
201.220 could be used to convict “a woman nursing a child who is not the
child's mother” or “{plersons expressing themselves artistically or
politically through nudity or dressing scantily.” ‘The statute’s application
to wet nurses, however, is not before the court: NRS 201.220(1) clearly
proscribes Castaneda’s conduct and his wet nurse hypothetical neither

"The parties do not argue and this case does not present an issue of
whether a statewide or local standard governs the determination of when
a given exposure is indecent or obscene.

 
implicates the First Amendment, see Holder, 561 U.S. at __, 130 §, Ct, at
2720, nor describes a scenario common enough to say vagueness
“permeates” its text. Flamingo Paradise Gaming, 125 Nev. at __, 217
P.3d at 553-54. However, “[sJexual expression which is indecent but not
obscene is protected by the First Amendment,” Sable Communications of
Cal. Ine, v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). This lends Castaneda’s
erotica-based overbreadth argument moro, but not much, merit.

In Barnes _v, Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), the

Supreme Court upheld enforcement of Indiani

 

public indecency law
against nude dancers and the establishments that employed them. A
plurality recognized that “nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed
hhore is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First

 

Amendment, though . .. only marginally so.” Id, at 566. Nonethele:
majority concluded that the intrusion was justified because “[plublic
indecency statutes of this sort are of ancient origin{,] presently exist in at
least 47 States,” and “reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in the
nude among strangers in public places,” which reflects a substantial
governmental interest. Id, at 567-68. Further, “the public indecency
statute is ‘narrowly tailored’; Indiana’s requirement that the dancers wear
at least pasties and G-strings is modest, and the bare minimum necessary
to achieve the State's purpose.” Id, at 572.

To invalidate a statute as overbroad at the behest of one to

whom it properly applies “is, manifestly, strong medicine” that is
administered “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick_v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Even assuming that NRS 201.220
applies to constitutionally protected expressive conduct—and there is no
showing that this general statute has been or will be applied to artistic

 

 
   
       
        

performances, see NRS 201.253—“where conduct and not merely speech is
involved ...the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.” Id, at 615. Although Barn:

 

did not present an overbreadth
challenge to Indiana's public indecency statute, its holding defeats

Castaneda’s overbreadth argument. NRS 201.220 captures, at most, no
more than Barnes allows, Judged in relationship to its legitimate sweep,
the statute thus does not, by its terms, interdict a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected activity, and accordingly, Ci
overbreadth challenge fai

taneda’s

 

 

For these reasons, we reverse and remand.

J.
Pickering

Cd. ) = \. a dash J.
lardesty

‘Parraguirre