Title: State v. Lussier

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Lussier  (98-394); 171 Vt. 19; 757 A.2d 1017 

[Filed 28-Apr-2000]
[Motion for Reargument in 99-017 Denied 12-Jun-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            Nos. 98-394 & 99-017

State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                               On Appeal from
     v.                                          
                                               District Court of Vermont,
                                               Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

Steven R. Lussier, Jr. 	                       April Term, 1999

State of Vermont

     v.

Robert R. Lussier

Mary Miles Teachout, J. (98-394)
Alan W. Cook, J. (99-017)

       Dale O. Gray, Caledonia County State's Attorney, and Alan M. Singer
  and Robert Butterfield, Deputy State's Attorneys, St. Johnsbury, for
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

       David C. Sleigh of Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, for
  Defendants-Appellants.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Defendants in these two consolidated cases appeal the
  civil suspension  of their driver's licenses.  At issue is whether the
  district court in a civil suspension proceeding  may consider the
  constitutionality of the underlying stop, and, if so, whether the stops in
  these  two cases were lawful.  We hold that a defendant in a civil
  suspension proceeding may challenge  the reasonableness of the underlying
  stop pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(1), which permits the  court to
  consider whether the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
  the defendant  was driving while intoxicated.  This interpretation of §
  1205(h)(1) is consistent with our belief that  the exclusionary rule's ban
  against the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence should extend  to
  civil suspension proceedings to protect the core value of privacy 

 

  embraced by Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution.  Examining
  the stops in the two  cases before us, we conclude that defendant Steven
  Lussier was lawfully stopped for operating a  motor vehicle with only one
  functioning taillight, but that defendant Robert Lussier was  unlawfully
  stopped for operating a vehicle with only one functioning rear license
  plate light.

       There is no dispute as to the facts in either case.  Defendant Steven
  Lussier was stopped  at 2:49 in the morning on June 28, 1998 by a police
  officer who observed that his passenger car's  right taillight was
  inoperable.  Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer noticed signs of
  intoxication  and ultimately processed defendant for driving while
  intoxicated (DWI) after he failed to  satisfactorily perform field
  dexterity tests.  Defendant agreed to a breath test, which revealed a 
  blood-alcohol concentration of .152.

       At his civil suspension hearing, defendant argued that because Vermont
  statutory law  requires only one functional taillight on passenger cars,
  the officer had no reasonable basis for  stopping him.  The district court
  rejected this argument, concluding that Vermont law requires  that each and
  every taillight on a motor vehicle be in good operating condition.  On
  appeal,  defendant renews his argument that there was no reasonable basis
  for the stop of his vehicle  because Vermont law requires only one
  functioning taillight.

       In the second case, defendant Robert Lussier was stopped at 1:18 in
  the morning on  November 29, 1998 by a police officer who observed that one
  of the two white lights intended to  illuminate his truck's rear license
  plate was inoperable.  Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer  noticed
  signs of intoxication and ultimately processed defendant for DWI after he
  was unable to  perform field dexterity tests.  Defendant agreed to a breath
  test, which revealed a blood-alcohol  concentration of .140.

       At the civil suspension hearing, defendant argued that because Vermont
  statutory law  requires only one light to illuminate the rear license
  plate, the officer had no reasonable and  articulable basis for stopping
  his truck.  The district court concluded that the stop was justified  by
  the inoperable plate light, and that in any event the issue concerning the
  validity of the stop 

 

  was not one of the limited issues enumerated in § 1205(h) that may be
  raised in civil suspension  proceedings.  On appeal, defendant contends
  that there was no reasonable basis for stopping his  truck because Vermont
  law does not require two functioning rear license plate lights, and his
  plate  was adequately illuminated.

       The parties in both cases requested and received permission to
  incorporate into their  appeals the briefs in two other appeals pending
  before this Court, State v. Nickerson, 98-530 and  State v. Rash, 98-531. 
  The principal issue raised in those appeals is whether the exclusionary 
  rule's ban against the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence should be
  applied in civil  suspension hearings.

                                     I.

       Before considering whether the stops in the instant cases were lawful,
  we must consider  whether a defendant in a civil suspension hearing may
  challenge the reasonableness of the  underlying stop.

                                     A.

       Under 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(1)-(5), the issues at a final civil
  suspension hearing are limited  to the following:

    (1) whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable
    grounds  to believe the person was operating, attempting to
    operate or in  actual physical control of a vehicle in violation
    of section 1201 of  this title;

    (2) whether at the time of the request for the evidentiary
    test the  officer informed the person of the person's rights and
    the  consequences of taking and refusing the test . . .;

    (3) whether the person refused to permit the test;

    (4) whether the test was taken and the test results indicated
    that the  person's alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the
    time of  operati[on] . . ., whether the testing methods used were
    valid and  reliable and whether the test results were accurate and
    accurately  evaluated. . . .;

    (5) whether the requirements of section 1202 of this title
    [consent  to taking of tests to determine blood alcohol content]
    were complied  with.

 

       According to the State, because the limited issues enumerated in §
  1205(h) do not  explicitly include whether reasonable grounds existed for
  the stop, the Legislature must not have  intended to allow defendants in
  civil suspension proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of  stops. 
  See State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 308,