Title: Muhammad v. Warden (order)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Tuesday, the 12th day of June, 
2007. 
 
John Allen Muhammad, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
against  
Record No. 061428 
 
Warden of the 
 Sussex I State Prison, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed July 31, 2006, the respondent’s motion to dismiss, and the 
petitioner’s reply to that motion, the Court is of the opinion that 
the motion should be granted and the writ should not be issued. 
John Allen Muhammad was convicted in the Circuit Court of 
Prince William County of one count each of conspiracy to commit 
capital murder, use of a firearm while committing or attempting to 
commit capital murder, and two counts of capital murder for the 
murder of Dean Meyers as more than one murder in three years, and 
the murder of Dean Meyers in the commission of an act of terrorism.  
Finding that the Commonwealth had proven the aggravating factors of 
“future dangerousness” and “vileness” beyond a reasonable doubt, 
see Code § 19.2-264.2, the jury fixed Muhammad’s sentence at death 
on each of the capital murder convictions and fixed sentences 
totaling thirteen years’ imprisonment for the non-capital 
convictions.  The trial court sentenced Muhammad in accordance with 
the jury’s verdict.  This Court affirmed Muhammad’s convictions and 
 
2
the sentences of death.  Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 619 
S.E.2d 16 (2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2035 
(2006). 
In claim (I), petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Eighth1 and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and corresponding rights under the 
Virginia Constitution were violated by the Commonwealth’s failure 
to disclose exculpatory information to petitioner as required by 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
As the Court has stated previously, and reiterated in our 
opinion affirming petitioner’s conviction and sentence of death:  
In Brady [], the United States Supreme Court held 
that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. Whether evidence is 
material and exculpatory and, therefore, subject to 
disclosure under Brady is a decision left to the 
prosecution. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 
(1987). Inherent in making this decision is the 
possibility that the prosecution will mischaracterize 
evidence, albeit in good faith, and withhold material 
exculpatory evidence which the defendant is entitled to 
have under the dictates of Brady. If the defendant does 
not receive such evidence, or if the defendant learns of 
the evidence at a point in the proceedings when he cannot 
effectively use it, his due process rights as enunciated 
in Brady are violated. United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 
1098 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Shifflett, 798 F. 
Supp. 354 (1992); Read v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 
560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 546-47 (1987). 
                     
1 The Court rejects petitioner’s claim that the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution supports his claim that 
he should be granted habeas relief because the Commonwealth failed 
to disclose allegedly exculpatory information. Petitioner has failed 
to establish that such a failure implicates the Eighth Amendment. 
 
3
 
. . . . 
 
Exculpatory evidence is material if there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense. “A reasonable probability” is one which 
is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of 
the proceeding. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
682 (1985); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 151, 
341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986). 
 
Muhammad, 269 Va. at 510, 619 S.E.2d at 49-50 (quoting Bowman v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 130, 133, 445 S.E.2d 110, 111-12 (1994)). 
In the first portion of claim (I), petitioner contends that 
the Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose an FBI 
Criminal Investigative Analysis, which stated in part: “There is 
likely only one offender.  Sniper attacks are generally a solitary 
type of murder.  It would be extremely unusual for there to be 
multiple offenders in this series of attacks.”  Petitioner states 
he did not receive this information until his prosecution in 
Maryland on related offenses. 
The Court need not resolve questions related to when the 
Commonwealth knew of the analysis, whether the knowledge of the FBI 
should be imputed to Prince William prosecutors, or whether the 
analysis was material because the Court holds that the analysis was 
not favorable to petitioner.  The record, including the full text 
of the analysis, demonstrates that the paragraph describing 
 
4
“offender characteristics” upon which petitioner relies actually 
states:  
There is likely only one offender.  Sniper type attacks 
are generally a solitary type of murder.  It would be 
extremely unusual for there to be multiple offenders 
involved in this series of attacks.  If there is a second 
offender, he is not likely to be an equal partner in 
these crimes, and would be subservient to the primary 
offender.   (Emphasis added). 
In whole, this statement supports the evidence admitted at trial 
and the Commonwealth’s theory of the case.  Therefore, the portion 
of the statement, taken in context, is not exculpatory. 
 
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner contends that the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose a memorandum 
attacking the credibility of a witness to the shooting of Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana citizen, Hong Im Ballenger.  The memorandum was 
prepared by the Baton Rouge Police Department in response to a news 
report, which aired on a Louisiana television station.  The news 
report referred to the witness by a pseudonym, “Frances” and the 
memorandum upon which petitioner relies includes a transcript of 
the report and written “factual” responses.  Petitioner believes 
that “Frances” and Ingrid Shaw, who testified concerning the 
Ballenger murder during his trial, are the same person.  Petitioner 
states he did not receive this memorandum until his prosecution in 
Maryland on related offenses. 
 
5
The Court need not resolve questions related to when the 
Commonwealth knew of the analysis, whether the knowledge of the 
Baton Rouge Police Department should be imputed to Prince William 
prosecutors, or whether the memorandum was material because the 
Court holds that petitioner has failed to establish that the 
memorandum was evidence favorable to petitioner.  Petitioner 
speculates, but fails to prove, that “Frances” and Ingrid Shaw are 
the same person.  Furthermore, evidence at trial proved that the 
bullet that killed Ballenger was fired from petitioner’s Bushmaster 
rifle. 
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner contends that the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not disclose the development 
of a suspect, Louis Robinson, in the Ballenger murder.  Petitioner 
includes page three from supplement number eight to the police 
report in the Ballenger investigation, which indicates that the 
Baton Rouge police found Robinson as a result of bloodhound 
tracking that ended between Robinson’s house and another house.  
When police encountered Robinson the next day, he had a knife in 
his hand, which, along with another knife and pair of tennis shoes 
with blood-like stains, was seized. 
The Court need not resolve questions related to when the 
Commonwealth knew of this information, whether the knowledge of the 
Baton Rouge Police Department should be imputed to Prince William 
 
6
prosecutors, or whether this information was material because the 
Court holds that this information was not favorable to petitioner.  
The record, including the full police report, demonstrates that, 
although Robinson was a suspect, police did not believe he was the 
killer because the stains on his tennis shoes were not blood, 
Robinson had no gun shot residue on his hands, and Shaw did not 
identify him in a photographic line-up.  Furthermore, evidence at 
trial proved that a bullet fired from petitioner’s Bushmaster rifle 
killed Ballenger. 
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner contends the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose the contents of 
supplement number sixteen to the Baton Rouge investigation file 
concerning the Ballenger murder.  Supplement sixteen contains a 
summary of the numerous suspects and tips received by the Baton 
Rouge Police Department, the investigation concerning these 
suspects, and the resolution of the case. 
The Court need not resolve questions related to when the 
Commonwealth knew of this information, whether the knowledge of the 
Baton Rouge Police Department should be imputed to Prince William 
prosecutors, or whether this information was material because the 
Court holds that this information was not favorable to petitioner.  
The record, including the full police report, demonstrates that 
police identified several suspects during the course of the 
 
7
investigation, that each suspect was eliminated as a possibility, 
and that, after petitioner was arrested for the Virginia and 
Maryland sniper shootings, it was determined that he and Lee Boyd 
Malvo had been in Baton Rouge at the time of the Ballenger murder 
and ballistics tests confirmed that the bullet which killed 
Ballenger was fired from the Bushmaster rifle used in the sniper 
attacks. 
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner contends that the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose the contents of 
investigative reports in connection with the wounding of Caroline 
Seawell.  The record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates 
that a witness to the Seawell wounding, Alex Jones, witnessed the 
shooting while waiting for Seawell’s parking place.  Jones 
initially got out of his car to check on Seawell and then decided 
to get help and to protect himself and his wife.  He returned to 
his car and drove it in a zigzag pattern through the parking lot 
until he drove up behind a “dirty” Chevrolet being driven very 
slowly.  Jones could not drive around the car and had to drive 
slowly behind it until the car turned one direction and Jones was 
able to turn the opposite direction and drive to a local furniture 
store to get help. 
While Jones was behind the car, he noticed that the windows 
were too dark for the interior of the car to be seen, and Jones was 
 
8
frightened and “felt” that the car did not belong there.  He 
testified that he noted the license plates were from New Jersey and 
that he “was trying to get the numbers but [] was a little 
frightened because [he] was only about a half a car away, and [he] 
didn’t want anybody in the car – . . . – [he] didn’t want to give 
whoever was looking at [him] the impression that [he] was trying to 
get their license plate. . . .” 
On cross-examination, after having been shown close-up 
photographs of the vehicle, Jones testified that he was about 80% 
sure the picture was of the vehicle he had seen because he “kind of 
remember[ed] those letters; but that was the car.”  Jones admitted 
he had did not tell the police officers about the three letters and 
that the first time he told anyone about remembering the letters 
was that moment at trial.  Petitioner contends the Commonwealth 
should have provided the FBI report that indicated that Jones 
“could provide no additional information about the license plate 
number” other than that it was a New Jersey license plate. 
The Court need not resolve questions related to whether the 
knowledge of the FBI should be imputed to Prince William 
prosecutors, or whether this information was material because the 
Court holds that this information was not favorable to petitioner.  
The record, including the trial transcript and the FBI report 
proffered by petitioner, demonstrates that the witness was not 
 
9
expected to testify concerning the license plate number.  As 
expected, the witness testified on direct examination that he tried 
to get the number but was too frightened; and that after being 
shown the picture of the license plate and “remembering” the 
letters on cross-examination, the witness admitted he had never 
informed the police that he knew the letters of the license plate 
number.  The FBI report is consistent with the witness’ testimony.  
The petitioner was able to successfully have the witness testify 
that he did not previously inform the FBI of his memory.  
Furthermore, the evidence at trial proved that a bullet fired from 
petitioner’s Bushmaster rifle wounded Seawell.  
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner contends that the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose the contents of 
investigation reports in connection with the shooting death of 
Kenneth Bridges in Spotsylvania County.  The record, including the 
trial transcript, demonstrates that a witness, Christine Goodwin, 
saw the Chevrolet Caprice parked at an odd angle at the Exxon 
station where Bridges was killed.  She paid special attention to 
this car because it had New Jersey plates and was parked at an odd 
angle in a corner of the lot, the paint was peeling, and the 
windows were covered with a dark tint, such that she could not see 
the interior, except for the dashboard, which was strewn with 
papers on the passenger side. Goodwin was nervous about the car and 
 
10
almost stopped getting gas, but a police cruiser pulled into the 
lot and she felt safer.   
Later after the shooting was made public and Goodwin saw a 
report that the police were seeking a Chevrolet Caprice, she 
contacted the hotline.  On cross-examination, Goodwin noted that 
she read the license number and it began with the letter “N” and 
that she had made a mental note of it.  Petitioner contends the 
Commonwealth should have provided a Spotsylvania County police 
report, which indicated that Goodwin “could not remember any of the 
tag number.” 
The Court need not resolve questions related to whether the 
knowledge of the Spotsylvania Sheriff’s Office should be imputed to 
Prince William prosecutors, or whether this information was 
material because the Court holds that this information was not 
favorable to petitioner.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the report proffered by petitioner, demonstrates 
that the witness was not expected to testify concerning the license 
plate number and that, as expected, the witness testified on direct 
examination that she recognized the car by its description and 
because it bore license plates from New Jersey.  It was not until 
cross-examination after the witness was shown pictures of the car 
that she testified she “remembered” the “N.”  Furthermore, evidence  
at trial proved that a bullet fired from petitioner’s Bushmaster 
 
11
rifle killed Bridges. 
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner contends the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose the contents of 
investigative reports in connection with the wounding of Kellie 
Adams and the death of Claudine Parker in Montgomery, Alabama.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that James A. 
Gray was standing across the highway from the location of the 
shooting and took chase of Malvo after it appeared that Malvo was 
going to get away from police officers.  Gray chased Malvo through 
a ditch and attempted to “cut him off” from the path he was 
running, eventually coming face-to-face with Malvo before losing 
him.  Gray testified that, at the time, Malvo did not appear to be 
a black man, but instead appeared to be “very fair” and possibly 
bi-racial. Gray was later called back to Montgomery to look at a 
photo line-up, from which Gray picked out Malvo’s picture.  Gray 
testified that he told the police officers that the person in the 
picture was not the right color.  Defense counsel asked Gray if he 
stated the picture was “a good likeness” to which Gray admitted he 
“might have said that.”  
Petitioner contends that he was unaware that Gray had 
described the person he chased as a black male who was holding a 
pistol, as documented in a report prepared by Detective W.D. Favor 
of the Montgomery Police Department.  Petitioner contends further 
 
12
that Gray told Detective Favor conflicting information later that 
same day.  The record, including the exhibits proffered by 
petitioner, demonstrates that Detective Favor prepared a report 
detailing his investigation in which he stated that Gray had come 
to the police station at approximately 3:30 p.m. and in which 
Detective Favor reports the contents of Gray’s statement to him.  
The transcript of the statement made “later that day” to which 
petitioner refers, indicates that the interview with Gray actually 
began at 4:06 p.m.   
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the Court finds that the 
report written by Detective Favor summarizes the interview he 
conducted with Gray, and that the references to Gray’s alleged 
assertion that he was chasing a black man holding a pistol are a 
result of Favor’s inaccurate recollection of the statements 
actually made by Gray and reflected in the transcript of the 
interview.  The portions of Detective Favor’s recollection, which 
are not supported by the transcribed version of the interview, do 
not constitute exculpatory evidence because they would have been 
inadmissible and would not have led to the discovery of exculpatory 
evidence as evidenced by Gray’s actual statements to Favor and his 
consistent testimony.   
Petitioner further contends that the prosecutor should have 
provided him with a copy of Gray’s October 24, 2002 interview 
 
13
during which he selected Malvo’s photograph from a photo line-up.  
The record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that 
petitioner’s attorney used the transcript of the October 24, 2002 
interview in his cross-examination of Gray and quoted directly from 
it.  Thus, this evidence was not withheld from petitioner and does 
not constitute a Brady violation.  
Finally, petitioner contends that the prosecution should have 
provided to him the statements made by Clyde Wilson, a man who was 
with Gray when the shooting occurred, but whom Gray did not know, 
and who also gave chase.  Petitioner argues that Gray’s testimony 
could have been impeached by evidence that Clyde Wilson described 
the suspect as wearing a green or turquoise shirt and that Wilson 
could not identify Malvo in the photo line-up.  The record, 
including Wilson’s statements and the trial transcript of Gray’s 
testimony, demonstrates that Wilson followed a different route in 
his attempt to aid police, thus, Wilson and Gray viewed the suspect 
from different vantage points.  Gray had the opportunity to look at 
Malvo face-to-face, while Wilson did not.  The Court holds that 
this evidence could not properly be used to impeach Gray’s 
testimony and, as Wilson did not testify, no Brady violation 
occurred. Furthermore, the evidence proved that Parker and Adams 
were shot with bullets fired from petitioner’s Bushmaster rifle and 
that Malvo dropped a .22 caliber handgun, which contained his 
 
14
fingerprints, while he was running.  
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose the contents of 
witness statements in connection with the shooting death of Paschal 
Charlot in the District of Columbia on October 3, 2002.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that Gail 
Howard testified that she saw a car parked in her parking lot at 
the time of Charlot’s murder that looked “pretty much like” the car 
in which petitioner and Malvo were arrested.  After she heard a gun 
shot, she observed the car leave the area, moving slowly with its 
lights off.  Karl Largie testified that he was standing outside his 
establishment near the site of the shooting and heard a “bang 
noise” and observed a car leaving the area with its lights off.  
Largie described the vehicle as a Chevrolet Caprice, dark in color 
with heavily tinted windows.   
Petitioner contends that he was unaware of Howard’s statement 
on a national news network, CNN, that she did not see the car and 
that this statement was exculpatory.  The Court holds that this 
statement is not encompassed within the requirements of Brady as a 
statement made on a public news broadcast such as CNN is public 
knowledge and available to the defense.   
Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory 
information because it did not disclose Largie’s statement to 
 
15
police that he believed the car to be brown or burgundy as this 
information could have impeached Largie’s trial testimony.  The 
Court holds that this information is not exculpatory.  First, 
petitioner attributes the statement that the car was brown or 
burgundy made by an anonymous witness as having been made by 
Largie.  Petitioner speculates that Largie and the anonymous 
witness were the same person.  Furthermore, even if Largie had made 
the statement, it does not contradict Largie’s testimony at trial.  
The record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that 
Largie testified that it was dark outside and that the Chevrolet 
Caprice was dark in color.  When asked what color the car was, 
Largie responded, “Well, it was very dark, and I assumed it be like 
–.”  Petitioner objected to any assumptions the witness would make 
and the objection was sustained.  Thus, nothing in the record 
demonstrates what color Largie assumed the car to be. 
Petitioner contends further that he was unaware of a statement 
made by Howard to Police Officer Antonio DuVall that she had urged 
Largie to talk to the police about the car, as she did not want to 
get involved because of her immigration status.  Furthermore, 
petitioner contends he should have been provided with a letter from 
Detective Leadmon to the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
that Howard was considered a witness, whose testimony was crucial 
to the prosecution.  Petitioner argues that this information would 
 
16
have impeached Howard’s testimony.  Petitioner next contends that 
statements of various witnesses that the sound of the gunshot 
appeared to come from near the victim, that the gunshot sounded 
like it came from a handgun, and that a puff of smoke was seen 
coming from a burgundy Nissan or Maxima, which sped away after the 
shooting, were all exculpatory as these statements would have 
impeached Howard’s and Largie’s testimony and the Commonwealth’s 
theory that Charlot was shot from a gun fired from the Caprice. 
The Court holds that this evidence is not favorable to 
petitioner.  Petitioner does not contend that Howard testified 
falsely in exchange for favorable treatment with the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service or that the letter written by Detective 
Leadmon influenced Howard’s testimony.  Neither Howard nor Largie 
testified concerning the location of the shooter or the direction 
from which the sound of the gunshot came.  The testimony from both 
Howard and Largie was corroborated by evidence that proved Charlot 
was killed by a bullet fired from petitioner’s Bushmaster rifle. 
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges the 
Commonwealth was required to, but did not, disclose the contents of 
witness statements in connection with the wounding of Muhammad 
Rashid in Prince George County, Maryland on September 15, 2002.  
Rashid testified at trial and identified Malvo as the person who 
shot him. Rashid testified further that he recognized the structure 
 
17
of Malvo’s face and that in his first statement he had described 
Malvo’s color as not pure black or pure white.  When questioned 
about his 911 telephone call and his description of the shooter as 
being 35 years old, Rashid testified that he had been misunderstood 
and that the assailant appeared to be between 25 and 30 years old. 
Petitioner contends the Commonwealth should have disclosed a 
posting for a “Robbery Lookout” which described the shooter as a 
35-year-old black male; Detective Darrell Disque’s investigative 
summary indicating that Rashid had named James E. Donmore as a 
suspect; Detective Disque’s hand written notes indicating Rashid 
had described the assailant as having cream colored skin and as 
being probably white; Rashid’s statement that he did not think he 
would recognize his assailant; and Rashid’s failure to pick Malvo 
from a photo line-up. Petitioner contends this information would 
have impeached Rashid’s credibility. 
The Court holds that this evidence is not exculpatory because 
it was not material.  The evidence at trial proved that Rashid was 
shot with the .22 caliber gun that Malvo dropped while being chased 
in Montgomery, Alabama.  Furthermore, as evidence connecting 
petitioner to numerous other shootings was abundant, petitioner 
cannot demonstrate that impeaching Rashid as to his identification 
of Malvo would undermine the confidence in the outcome of his 
trial. 
 
18
Petitioner argues that all of the allegedly exculpatory 
evidence must be considered in its totality when determining the 
materiality of the evidence.  Petitioner is correct that when 
considering materiality, we consider the suppressed evidence as a 
whole, not item by item.  Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 
644-45, 636 S.E.2d 368, 375 (2006); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
436 (1995).  However, we do not reach the issue of materiality 
unless we first determine that the evidence is favorable to the 
accused because it is exculpatory or because it may be used for 
impeachment.  Workman, 272 Va. at 644-45, 636 S.E.2d at 374.  We 
have already determined that, other than petitioner’s allegations 
concerning the Rashid shooting, none of the suppressed evidence 
upon which petitioner relies constituted evidence favorable to 
petitioner.  However, even if it were all favorable to petitioner, 
none of the suppressed evidence would have been material because, 
taken as a whole, it does not undermine confidence in the forensic 
evidence admitted at trial that tied petitioner to both the 
Bushmaster rifle used in many of the shootings, and the .22 caliber 
handgun Malvo dropped in Alabama, which was used in other 
shootings.  Furthermore, petitioner does not challenge the evidence 
that proved he was involved in at least nine other shootings, 
including the murder of Dean Meyers.  Thus, petitioner cannot 
establish that there is a reasonable probability that his knowledge 
 
19
or use of the alleged exculpatory evidence would have undermined 
the confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
In claim (II), petitioner alleges the trial court’s decision 
to permit petitioner to represent himself at trial violated 
petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States.  Although petitioner uses the 
terminology associated with a claim alleging the denial of the 
“effective assistance of counsel” as defined in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), the Court holds that this 
claim, in fact, involves petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and actions taken by the trial court as opposed to any act 
or omission of counsel.2 
In a portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges the trial court 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court 
allowed him to represent himself without adequately warning him of 
its dangers.  The record, including the petition for appeal filed 
with this Court on direct appeal of petitioner’s capital 
convictions, demonstrates that petitioner argued only that the 
                     
2 In a portion of claim (II), petitioner attempts to 
incorporate, by reference, arguments related to his capacity to 
choose not to present evidence of his serious mental health illness 
during the penalty phase of his trial. The Court declines to 
consider “by reference” these arguments and holds that this claim, 
as it relates to actions taken by the trial court, is conclusional 
and, therefore, will not support the issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367, 370-71, 49 S.E.2d 600, 601 
 
20
trial court erred because it had failed to adequately explain the 
limitations it was imposing on petitioner’s access to “standby 
counsel.” 
To the extent petitioner is reiterating the arguments raised 
on direct appeal, the Court holds that this portion of claim (II) 
is barred because this issue was raised and decided in the trial 
court and on direct appeal from the criminal conviction and, 
therefore, it cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition.  Henry 
v. Warden, 265 Va. 246, 249, 576 S.E.2d 495, 496 (2003).  To the 
extent petitioner is challenging any other aspect of the trial 
court’s inquiry or warnings to petitioner, the Court holds this 
claim is procedurally defaulted because this non-jurisdictional 
issue could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, 
thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
In another portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges the trial 
court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court 
allowed him to represent himself without assessing petitioner’s 
competence to waive his right to counsel.  The Court holds that 
this portion of claim (II) is procedurally defaulted because this 
non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on 
direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ 
                                                                     
(1948). 
 
21
of habeas corpus.  Id. 
In another portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges the trial 
court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the 
court placed restrictions that were too burdensome on petitioner’s 
use of standby counsel during that part of the trial.  The Court 
holds that this portion of claim (II) is barred because this issue 
was raised and decided in the trial court and on direct appeal from 
the criminal conviction and, therefore, it cannot be raised in a 
habeas corpus petition. Henry, 265 Va. at 249, 576 S.E.2d at 496. 
In a portion of claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel 
because information regarding petitioner’s mental condition was not 
presented to the trial court when petitioner sought to represent 
himself. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  The record, 
including the trial transcript, demonstrates that there was no 
indication that petitioner suffered from any mental illness as 
petitioner answered the court’s questions and insisted that he 
understood the risks and conditions associated with representing 
himself at trial.  Petitioner fails to point to expert evidence, 
available at that time, upon which counsel could have relied and 
 
22
which would have established that petitioner’s ability to make 
decisions and understand the proceedings was impaired.  The trial 
transcript demonstrates that counsel found petitioner to be “a very 
bright man” and petitioner has failed to proffer any evidence to 
the contrary.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel 
because information regarding petitioner’s mental condition was 
never presented to the jury during the penalty phase of his trial.  
Petitioner claims that counsel was “well aware” of his “severe 
mental illness and his bizarre behavior” but never investigated or 
presented this information to the jury.  Petitioner claims that, 
had this evidence been presented, he would not have been sentenced 
to death. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that petitioner refused to cooperate with 
the Commonwealth’s mental health expert and understood that his 
refusal would result in the trial court barring him from presenting 
 
23
mental health experts to testify at the penalty phase of the trial.  
Additionally, despite counsel’s inability to present expert 
testimony as to petitioner’s mental health, counsel did present lay 
testimony from petitioner’s friends regarding changes in his 
personality and demeanor prior to the shootings.  Furthermore, 
petitioner has failed to proffer the records from the mental health 
exams to which he subjected himself and, therefore, has failed to 
demonstrate that the mental health evidence available at the time 
of trial would have aided in his defense.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel 
because counsel failed to advise petitioner about the consequences 
he faced by refusing to cooperate with the Commonwealth’s expert 
mental health witness. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that any alleged inadequacy in counsel’s 
advice was cured when the trial court informed petitioner of the 
 
24
consequences he faced by refusing to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth’s mental health expert.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel 
because counsel failed to object when the trial court prevented all 
evidence of mental illness from being presented at trial even 
though the court did not inquire into the effect the evidence might 
have on the jury. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner has failed to state on 
what grounds trial counsel should have objected to the trial 
court’s ruling, which was properly within its discretion pursuant 
to Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2), as a result of petitioner’s decision 
to refuse to cooperate with the Commonwealth mental health expert.  
See Muhammad, 269 Va. at 508, 619 S.E.2d at 48.  Additionally, 
while the trial court did not permit expert testimony, counsel did 
present lay testimony from petitioner’s friends at sentencing 
regarding changes in his personality and demeanor.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
 
25
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In another portion of claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel 
because counsel failed to argue that recent opinions from the 
United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (defendants under the age of eighteen not eligible for the 
death sentence) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(defendants who are mentally retarded not eligible for the death 
sentence) and evolving standards of decency require that a person 
suffering from a mental illness should not be sentenced to death. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner does not articulate a 
factual basis to support this claim, as he has not demonstrated 
that he was, in fact, mentally ill at the time of the murders or at 
trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges the 
trial court erred in allowing petitioner to represent himself and 
 
26
by denying petitioner’s use of his mental health expert at trial.  
The Court holds that this claim is barred because these issues were 
raised and decided in the trial court and on direct appeal from the 
criminal conviction and, therefore, they cannot be raised in a 
habeas corpus petition. Henry, 265 Va. at 249, 576 S.E.2d at 496. 
In claim (III)(B), petitioner alleges that, after he 
acquiesced to representation by counsel, he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
object to improper arguments by the prosecution during the penalty 
phase of the trial.  During closing argument in the penalty phase, 
the Commonwealth commented that the “original” Muhammad that people 
knew years ago “no longer exists,” was “dead,” and had been 
“murdered” by the man that was on trial.  Petitioner claims that 
these remarks were improper and should have been objected to as the 
remarks effectively told the jury not to consider the mitigation 
evidence that had been presented and it minimized the importance of 
the jury’s decision regarding sentencing. 
The Court holds that claim (III)(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the jury was presented with 
mitigation evidence from various witnesses who knew petitioner in 
both a personal and professional capacity and who interacted with 
 
27
petitioner and his family.  Witnesses described changes in the 
petitioner’s personality and demeanor that caused petitioner to 
become someone that the witnesses no longer knew.  The 
Commonwealth’s remarks, therefore, were based on this testimony.  
Additionally, the jury was instructed that its sentence was to be 
based upon all of the evidence, “including evidence in mitigation.”  
It is presumed that a jury will follow the instructions given by 
the trial court.  Green v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 611, 571 S.E.2d 135, 
139 (2002).  Petitioner has failed to articulate any factual basis 
upon which the Court could conclude that the jury did not follow 
the court’s instructions.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (III)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
consult with or request expert assistance on subjects upon which 
the Commonwealth relied upon expert testimony. 
 
The Court holds that claim (III)(C) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner has failed to proffer the 
names of any experts he contends counsel should have consulted and 
fails to proffer any expert affidavits to demonstrate what 
 
28
information these experts could have provided at trial.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (III)(D), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because trial and appellate counsel 
failed to allege and preserve the claims made under claims (I), 
(II), (IV) and all subparagraphs.   
The Court holds that claim (III)(D) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner does not articulate a factual 
basis to support this claim and does not identify with specificity 
any act or omission of counsel which was objectively unreasonable.  
Furthermore, petitioner does not attempt to demonstrate how these 
failures were prejudicial.3  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (III)(E), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel because counsel 
failed to allege and preserve the errors assigned in his direct 
                     
3 There is no claim (IV) in the petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
29
appeal of his convictions to the Supreme Court of Virginia.  
Petitioner contends that, to the extent this Court holds any of the 
claims found in sections (I), (II) or (IV)4 could have been raised 
at trial or on direct appeal, counsel’s failure to raise and 
preserve the issues constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The Court holds that claim (III)(E) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner does not articulate a factual 
basis to support this claim and, therefore, cannot demonstrate that 
any omission of counsel was objectively unreasonable.  Furthermore, 
petitioner does not attempt to demonstrate how these failures were 
prejudicial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In a portion of claim (III)(F), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of trial counsel as counsel 
allegedly failed to adequately protect petitioner’s rights to due 
process and an impartial jury because “the indictment, jury 
instructions and verdict forms did not require the jury to agree 
that the elements of capital murder under Virginia Code §§ 18.2-
31(8), (13) and 18.2-46.4 were proven beyond a reasonable doubt in 
                     
4 As noted previously, there is no claim (IV) in the petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
30
order to find [Petitioner] guilty.”  Petitioner contends the 
indictments, jury instructions, and verdict forms were inadequate 
because they did not specify which other person petitioner had 
killed within a three-year period or which act of terrorism 
petitioner had committed.  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(F) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Regarding the charge and conviction 
under Code § 18.2-31(8), there is no requirement that the 
indictment, jury instructions, or verdict forms specify which other 
killing is being included within the three year period.  The 
Commonwealth only needs to prove that the defendant was a principal 
in the first degree in the capital murder charged in the indictment 
and at least an accomplice in any other killing within a three-year 
period.  Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 510-11, 544 S.E.2d 
360, 365-66 (2001); Code § 18.2-31(8).  Here, the evidence was 
sufficient to show petitioner’s involvement at least as an 
accomplice in multiple other killings.  
With regard to the charge and conviction of capital murder 
based upon the terrorism predicate in Code §§ 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-
46.4, we previously rejected on direct appeal petitioner’s argument 
that the indictment must specify the intent of the petitioner under 
the two separate subsections of § 18.2-46.4. Muhammad, 269 Va. at 
 
31
494-95, 619 S.E.2d at 40-41.  Petitioner proffers no other valid 
arguments he contends counsel should have made.  As such, 
petitioner cannot meet his burden to prove that counsel failed to 
adequately preserve petitioner’s rights and that he was prejudiced 
as a result. 
On direct appeal of petitioner’s convictions for the capital 
murder of Dean Meyers in the commission of an act of terrorism, we 
held that an act of terrorism is proven either by showing that 
petitioner intended to “(i) intimidate the civilian population at 
large; or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of the 
government of the United States, a state or locality through 
intimidation” or both.  Muhammad, 269 Va. at 494, 619 S.E.2d at 40.  
The record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that the 
jury was instructed, “An act of terrorism is any murder committed 
with the intent to intimidate the civilian population at large or 
to influence the conduct or activities of the government of the 
United States, a state or locality through intimidation.”    As to 
petitioner’s claim that counsel should have argued that the jury 
instructions and verdict forms must specify which act of terrorism 
petitioner intended to commit at the time of the killing, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the specific acts of 
terrorism constitute separate elements of the offense rather than 
the means by which an act of terrorism is accomplished.  The 
 
32
elements the jury was required to find unanimously in order to 
convict petitioner of capital murder were the killing of Dean 
Meyers and that the killing occurred during the commission of an 
act of terrorism.  Intimidating the civilian population and 
influencing the conduct of government constitute “possible sets of 
underlying brute facts [that] make up [the] particular element,” of 
having committed an act of terrorism.  See Richardson v. United 
States, 526 U.S. at 813, 817 (1999).  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
Furthermore, as the record demonstrates that the evidence 
overwhelmingly proved both sets of facts which can comprise an act 
of terrorism, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, had counsel asked for such 
specification in the jury instructions or verdict form, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (III)(F), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to “require” that the indictments include the aggravating 
factors that had to be proven in order to make petitioner eligible 
for the death penalty. 
The Court finds that this claim is without merit.  The record, 
including the trial transcripts and this Court’s opinion on direct 
appeal, demonstrates that counsel filed a motion to dismiss and 
 
33
properly preserved this issue, which was addressed on direct appeal 
as this Court found that “aggravating factors are not 
constitutionally required to be recited in a capital murder 
indictment.”  Muhammad, 269 Va. at 494, 619 S.E.2d at 40. 
In another portion of claim (III)(F), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to “argue the Court’s improper application of harmless 
error.”  Presumably, this contention refers to the direct appeal of 
petitioner’s convictions.  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(F) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner does not articulate a 
factual basis in support of this claim, fails to identify with 
specificity how this Court’s application of harmless error 
occurred, and fails to state how or on what ground counsel could 
have objected to this Court’s application of harmless error.  
Therefore, petitioner cannot demonstrate that any omission of 
counsel was objectively unreasonable.  Furthermore, petitioner does 
not attempt to demonstrate how this failure was prejudicial.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
 
34
In another portion of claim (III)(F), petitioner alleges that 
the various verdict forms did not comply with Code § 19.2-264.4(D).  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III)(F) is procedurally 
defaulted as this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised 
at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 
 
 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk