Title: Tyler v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Jerry S. Tyler v. State of Maryland - No. 108, 1995 Term
CRIMINAL LAW - Evidence -- State may not introduce as a prior
inconsistent statement the prior statement of a witness who takes
the stand but refuses to testify.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 108
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
JERRY S. TYLER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  July 30, 1996        
        
This case presents the question of whether in a criminal trial
the State may introduce, as a "prior inconsistent statement," the
prior testimony of a witness who takes the stand but refuses to
testify.  We hold that the prior testimony was not admissible as a
prior inconsistent statement in this case because a refusal to
testify is not "inconsistent" with prior testimony.  Hence, the
prior testimony was inadmissible hearsay evidence not within any
exception.  We reverse Petitioner's conviction and remand for a new
trial.
I.
Jerry S. Tyler, Petitioner, was charged with first degree
murder and related offenses stemming from the shooting death of
James "Jay" S. Bias, III.  Bias was shot and killed in the parking
lot of the Prince George's Plaza Mall on December 4, 1990.
According to testimony, Bias and Tyler got into a dispute inside
the mall, apparently because Tyler believed that Bias was
romantically involved with Tyler's wife.  After the argument, Bias
and two friends left the mall.  As Bias and his friends were
driving from the mall parking lot in a Toyota truck, a green
Mercedes came speeding across the parking lot and pulled up
alongside the truck at a stop sign.  The green Mercedes was driven
by Gerald Eiland.  Tyler was in the passenger's seat. 
Andre Campbell, who was riding in the Toyota with Bias,
testified that after the Mercedes pulled up next to the truck, he
-2-
     Less than a year after we decided Tyler v. State, 330 Md.
1
261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993), the Supreme Court similarly held that
gender-based use of peremptory challenges was impermissible.
J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex Rel. T.B., 511 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128
L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). 
saw Tyler point at Bias and then "reach[] down towards his leg on
the right side...."  Campbell stated "as I saw him reaching, I
[thought] he had a gun" but that "[b]efore I could get the word gun
out ... the shooting began."  A total of eight shots hit the truck,
two of them hitting Bias.  Bias was rushed to the hospital, but
died of the gunshot wounds.  Although he testified at trial that he
never actually saw the gun, on the day of the shooting Campbell
identified Tyler as the shooter from a police photo array.
Campbell's photo identification of Tyler was admitted into
evidence.
This case is before us for the second time.  In their first
trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Tyler and
Eiland were tried together as co-defendants.  Tyler was convicted
of first degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony, and Eiland was convicted of second degree murder and use of
a handgun in the commission of a felony.  After affirmance in the
Court of Special Appeals, this Court reversed the convictions of
both Tyler and Eiland because of the State's use of peremptory
challenges at trial to exclude women from the jury based solely on
their gender.   Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
1
On remand, Tyler and Eiland succeeded in having their cases
-3-
     The Court of Special Appeals pointed out in its opinion that
2
Eiland and Tyler probably did not qualify for a trial severance.
Tyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495, 504-05, 660 A.2d 986, 990-91
(1995).  The intermediate appellate court had expressly held in
Eiland and Tyler's first appeal that the trial judge had not erred
in denying Eiland and Tyler's motion for severance, Eiland v.
State, 92 Md. App. 56, 72-79, 607 A.2d 42, 50-54 (1992), and we did
not disturb this holding in our opinion overturning the
convictions, Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 271, 623 A.2d 648, 653
(1993).  Nonetheless, a severance was granted before Eiland and
Tyler were retried.
The effect of granting the severance was forcefully explained
by Judge Moylan in Tyler's second appeal:
"Notwithstanding the seal of approval
that we had placed on the denial of severance,
Eiland and Tyler, on their second try,
succeeded ... in having their trials severed.
The ground was thereby laid for each to point
the finger at the other, not simply through
the mouths of counsel but from the witness
stand without fear of contradiction by the
other."
Tyler, 105 Md. App. at 505, 660 A.2d at 991.
The Supreme Court has indicated that, in the federal courts,
two or more defendants may be charged together if "`they are
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction ...
constituting an offense....'"  Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.
___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 933, 937, 122 L.Ed.2d 317, 324 (1993)(quoting
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b)).  The Court explained:
"There is a preference in the federal system
for joint trials of defendants who are
indicted together.  Joint trials `play a 
vital role in the criminal justice system.'
They 
promote 
efficiency 
and 
`serve 
the
interests of justice by avoiding the scandal
and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.'  For
these reasons we repeatedly have approved of
joint trials."  (Citations omitted).
Zafiro, 506 U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 937, 122 L.Ed.2d at 324.  Cf.
severed.   Eiland was tried first.  At his trial, Eiland took the
2
-4-
Zafiro, 506 U.S. at ___-___, 113 S.Ct at 939-41, 122 L.Ed.2d at
327-29 (Stevens, J., concurring)(refraining from adopting a general
preference for joint trials).  
witness stand and blamed the entire shooting on Tyler.  Eiland
testified that he had no idea that Tyler intended to shoot Bias.
He stated that he was driving out of the mall parking lot when he
noticed the Toyota truck at a stop sign.  Suddenly, Tyler noticed
that Bias was in the truck and he started yelling out the window.
Eiland testified that Tyler leaned over the driver's seat and
"[n]ext thing I know he just started shooting out the window."  The
jury acquitted Eiland.
Predictably, at Tyler's second trial, Tyler took the stand and
blamed the shooting entirely on Eiland.  He testified that it was
Eiland who had fired the shots at the Toyota.  Tyler stated that he
was seated in the passenger seat of the Mercedes as it was stopped
next to the truck.  He testified that he was "having a few words"
with Bias and the others in the truck, when suddenly and
unexpectedly Eiland fired the shots out the window.  
Before Tyler's trial, the State subpoenaed Eiland to appear as
a witness at Tyler's trial.  Eiland moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground that compelling him to testify would violate his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  After hearing
argument, the trial judge ruled that, given his acquittal, Eiland
was in no danger of incriminating himself, and therefore he could
be compelled to appear.  After the court's ruling, counsel for
-5-
Eiland informed the court that Eiland might still refuse to testify
because some threatening conduct had been directed at him the day
before by some unknown person in a brown car.  Counsel explained
that Eiland felt "that his safety cannot be guaranteed and that he
is in great danger if he testifies in this case" and that he may
"take the position that he is unable to answer questions put to him
by either side." 
At Tyler's trial, the State called Eiland as a witness.  After
giving his name and address, he gave the following testimony:
"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Mr. Eiland, did you
shoot Jay Bias?
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question.
* * * 
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Mr. Eiland, are you the
same Mr. Eiland that testified in a previous
proceeding?
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, I would ask
the Court to direct the witness to answer the
question.
THE COURT:  Mr. Eiland, I'm going to order you
to answer the questions that have been
directed to you....
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Mr. Eiland, did you shoot
Jay Bias?
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Why can't you answer that
question?
-6-
[EILAND]:  I can't.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Were you in the car when
Jay Bias was shot?
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question.
* * *
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Were you in the Prince
George's Mall on December 4, 1990?
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  And why can't you answer
that question?
[EILAND]:  Because, I can't.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Were you driving a green
Mercedes that was occupied with Jerry Tyler at
the Prince George's Mall on December 4th,
1990?
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question.
* * * 
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, at this time
I would request the Court to direct the
witness that he must answer the questions.
THE COURT:  Mr. Eiland, you understood the
questions?
[EILAND]:  Yes.
THE COURT:  You understood that you have
previously testified under oath in this
courthouse concerning the issues and the facts
to which the questions the State has asked are
directed.  Do you understand that?
[EILAND]:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Is there some reason that you want
to articulate or express as to why you do not
want to answer those questions?
-7-
[EILAND]:  I can't answer that question."
Despite a second order from the court to answer the questions put
to him by the State, Eiland refused to answer.  After questioning
Eiland about his ability to understand the questions, and procuring
additional information regarding the incident with the brown car
that apparently frightened Eiland, the trial judge found Eiland in
contempt of court.  The trial was then recessed for eighteen days
and Eiland was jailed.  When recalled as a witness eighteen days
later, Eiland again refused to answer questions concerning the
events the day of the shooting. 
Because of Eiland's refusal to testify, the State sought to
admit as evidence the transcript of Eiland's testimony from his own
trial, in which he had testified that Tyler shot Bias.  Tyler
objected to the admission of the prior testimony on the ground that
it was hearsay, and that it did not fall within any exception to
the hearsay rule.  After hearing argument, the trial judge ruled
that Eiland's prior testimony incriminating Tyler was admissible
under the "former testimony" exception to the hearsay rule, and a
transcript of the testimony was read to the jury.  Tyler was
convicted of first degree murder and use of a handgun and sentenced
to imprisonment for life for the murder conviction, and 20 years
for the handgun conviction.  
Tyler appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, among
other things, that the trial judge erred in admitting Eiland's
prior testimony at trial.  A divided intermediate appellate court
-8-
     Maryland Rule 5-801(c) provides the same definition of
3
hearsay.  The Maryland Rules of Evidence, including Md. Rule 5-
801(c), however, took effect July 1, 1994 and hence were not in
effect at the time of the shooting in this case.  Our holding in
the instant case would be the same under the rules.
concluded that the trial judge had not erred in admitting the prior
testimony, and affirmed Tyler's conviction.  Tyler v. State, 105
Md. App. 495, 660 A.2d 986 (1995).  We granted certiorari to
consider Tyler's contention that Eiland's prior testimony was
improperly admitted.
II.
There is no question that Eiland's prior testimony was
hearsay.  It was a "statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."  Ali v. State, 314 Md.
295, 304, 550 A.2d 925, 929 (1988)(footnote omitted).   Hence, the
3
question before us is whether the testimony was admissible under an
exception to the general rule barring the admission of hearsay
evidence.
A.
We agree with Tyler and with the Court of Special Appeals that
Eiland's prior testimony was not admissible under the "former
testimony" exception to the hearsay rule.  In fact, the State
concedes this point in its brief.  As this Court made clear in
-9-
     In a civil case, there is no need to protect the defendant's
4
right of confrontation.  Hence, in a civil action, prior testimony
may be admissible if either the party against whom the former
testimony is offered or a predecessor in interest had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony at the time
it was originally given.
The former testimony exception is now codified in Md. Rule 5-
804(b)(1), which provides:
"(b) Hearsay Exceptions. -- The following are
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1)  Former Testimony. -- Testimony given
as a witness in any action or proceeding or in
a deposition taken in compliance with law in
the course of any action or proceeding, if the
party against whom the testimony is now
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding,
a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity
Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272 (1985), recon.
denied, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1023,
106 S.Ct. 3315, 92 L.Ed.2d 745 (1986), the former testimony
exception applies in a criminal trial only when (1) the witness has
given testimony under oath; (2) the witness who gave the prior
testimony is unavailable to testify; and (3) the accused had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the prior trial or
hearing where the testimony was elicited.  304 Md. at 566, 500 A.2d
at 275.  See also Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 744, 506 A.2d
580, 609, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174
(1986).  The purpose of the cross-examination requirement is to
protect the accused's constitutional rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.   See Huffington, 304 Md. at 566-67,
4
-10-
and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross or redirect examination."
Our holding in the instant case would be the same under this rule.
500 A.2d at 275-76.
In the instant case, the trial judge properly concluded that
Eiland was "unavailable" because he refused to testify.  See
Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 559, 636 A.2d 463, 469 (witness who
refused to testify was "unavailable" for purposes of hearsay
exception), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 70, 130 L.Ed.2d
26 (1994).  The Court of Special Appeals and the State recognized,
however, that Eiland's testimony was not admissible as former
testimony in Tyler's criminal trial because Tyler had no
opportunity to cross-examine Eiland when the prior testimony was
elicited at Eiland's separate trial in 1993.  Thus, the 1993
testimony did not fall within the former testimony exception.  
B.
The Court of Special Appeals held that Eiland's testimony was
admissible as a prior inconsistent statement under the holding of
Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993).  In Nance, we
held that a witness's prior testimony is admissible as substantive
evidence when the prior testimony is inconsistent with the
witness's in-court testimony, and the witness is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement at the trial where the
-11-
statement is admitted.  Nance, 331 Md. at 570-71, 629 A.2d at 643-
44.  This holding has since been codified in Maryland Rule 5-802.1,
which provides in pertinent part:
"The following statements previously made
by a witness who testifies at the trial or
hearing 
and 
who 
is 
subject 
to 
cross-
examination concerning the statement are not
excluded by the hearsay rule:
(a) A statement that is inconsistent with
the declarant's testimony, if the statement
was (1) given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or
other proceeding or in a deposition; (2)
reduced 
to 
writing 
and 
signed 
by 
the
declarant; or (3) recorded in substantially
verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic
means contemporaneously with the making of the
statement...."    
In the instant case, Eiland's prior testimony cannot be deemed
"inconsistent" with his refusal to testify at Tyler's trial.  At
Tyler's trial, Eiland flatly refused to answer any questions
regarding the shooting of Jay Bias or the events that occurred at
the Prince George's Plaza Mall on December 4, 1990.  In fact, aside
from giving his name and address and stating that he understood the
questions being put to him, Eiland gave no testimony at all.  He
made clear that he would not answer any questions about the
shooting.  The effect was virtually the same as if Eiland had not
physically taken the witness stand.  Clearly, if Eiland had not
taken the stand, his prior testimony could not be deemed
"inconsistent."  Similarly, we hold that Eiland's refusal to
testify was not inconsistent with his prior testimony, in which he
-12-
blamed the shooting on Tyler.  See Barksdale v. State, 453 S.E.2d
2, 4 (Ga. 1995)(holding that a prior statement was not admissible
because the witness refused to testify and hence "gave no testimony
in court with which the prior statement could be judged to be
inconsistent"); State v. Williams, 442 A.2d 620, 623 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1982)(witness's refusal to answer questions was not
"testimony" and thus could not be inconsistent with previous, out-
of-court statement); Davis v. State, 773 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1989)("A refusal to testify is not an inconsistent
statement.").  
The Court of Special Appeals analogized the instant case to a
case where a witness claims a loss of memory.  We have noted that
a witness's testimony that he or she cannot remember events about
which the witness testified earlier may be inconsistent with the
earlier testimony, and hence the earlier testimony may be
admissible under Nance as a prior inconsistent statement.  In
Nance, we held to be admissible prior statements by witnesses who
testified that they remembered some parts of the events described
in their earlier statements, but did not remember other parts:
"Harris, McCormick and Brown did not
uniformly testify that they had no memory of
their sessions with police or the grand jury
in which they made the identifications or
statements.  Instead, they remembered some
parts of these earlier events, did not
remember others, and outright denied or
repudiated other parts.  Their lapses of
memory conspicuously occurred whenever the
questions 
at 
trial 
approached 
matters
-13-
potentially implicating Nance and Hardy in the
murder."
331 Md. at 572, 629 A.2d at 644-45.  We explained:
"Inconsistency 
includes 
both 
positive
contradictions and claimed lapses of memory.
When a witness's claim of lack of memory
amounts to deliberate evasion, inconsistency
is implied."  (Citations omitted).
Nance, 331 Md. 564 n.5, 629 A.2d at 640-41 n.5.  See also 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251(A), at 121 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992)("[T]he tendency of unwilling or untruthful witnesses to seek
refuge in forgetfulness is well recognized.  Hence, the judge may
be warranted in concluding under the circumstances the claimed lack
of memory of the event is untrue and in effect an implied denial of
the prior statement, thus qualifying it as inconsistent...."
(Footnoted omitted)). 
In holding that Eiland's refusal to testify was inconsistent
with his earlier testimony, the Court of Special Appeals concluded
that there is no practical distinction between witnesses who
testify that they are unable to recall the events about which they
testified previously, and witnesses who refuse to testify at all.
See Tyler, 105 Md. App. at 540, 660 A.2d at 1008.  We disagree.
The case where the witness claims not to remember events about
which he or she testified earlier is far different than the
situation in the instant case, where the witness effectively gave
no testimony at all in the second trial.  Because Eiland's prior
testimony was not inconsistent with his refusal to testify at
-14-
Tyler's second trial, Nance is inapposite.
One of the reasons a claim of inability to remember differs
from a refusal to testify is that a witness who claims memory
failure may still be cross-examined, but a witness who absolutely
refuses to testify is not available for cross-examination.  Even if
we were to deem Eiland's 1993 testimony inconsistent with his
refusal to testify at Tyler's trial, the testimony still would not
be admissible because Nance requires that a witness be available
for cross-examination concerning his prior inconsistent statement.
See Nance, 331 Md. at 571, 629 A.2d at 644.  Eiland's refusal to
testify made him unavailable to be cross-examined by Tyler's
counsel concerning his prior statement.  Nance, 331 Md. at 572, 629
A.2d at 645 (noting that witnesses who refuse to testify are not
"available for cross-examination despite their presence in court");
Mayes v. Sowders, 621 F.2d 850, 856 (6th Cir.)("A witness is not
available for full and effective cross-examination when he or she
refuses to testify."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922, 101 S.Ct. 324,
66 L.Ed.2d 151 (1980).  See also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 253(2)-(3),
at 132-33 ("If a witness simply refuses to testify, despite the
bringing to bear upon him of all appropriate judicial pressures,
the conclusion that as a practical matter he is unavailable can
scarcely be avoided, and that is the holding of the great weight of
authority. *** The witness who falsely asserts loss of memory is
simply refusing to testify in a way that he hopes will avoid a
-15-
collision with the judge.  He is present in court, by definition,
and subject to cross-examination.").  Thus, Nance's cross-
examination requirement was not satisfied.
In holding that Eiland's prior testimony was admissible, the
Court of Special Appeals frankly acknowledged that it was seeking
to "push[] out ... the envelope" of the Nance holding in order to
prevent Eiland and Tyler from making a "laughingstock out of the
criminal justice system."  Tyler, 105 Md. App. at 516-17, 660 A.2d
at 996-97.  We agree with the intermediate appellate court's
observation that it seems unjust that Eiland and Tyler, at least
one of whom appears to have fired the shots that killed Jay Bias,
each should be able to take the witness stand in separate trials
and blame the other for the shooting without the jury having the
opportunity to hear the contradictory testimony of the other.  As
we have pointed out, however, the root of this apparent unfairness
was the granting of an unnecessary trial severance.  See n.2,
supra.  We decline to extend Nance or Md. Rule 5-802.1 to apply to
prior non-inconsistent statements, or to cases where the declarant
is not available for cross-examination concerning the statement.
     
C.
We also reject the intermediate appellate court's alternative
rationale for admitting Eiland's prior testimony -- that the
testimony was admissible as an "extrajudicial identification" of
-16-
     The extrajudicial identification exception to the hearsay
5
rule is now codified in Md. Rule 5-802.1(c).  Our holding would be
the same under the rule.    
Tyler as the shooter.  See Tyler, 105 Md. App. at 552-59, 660 A.2d
at 1014-17.  The requirements of the prior identification exception
to the hearsay rule are well recognized.  In Nance, we stated:
"It is well settled in Maryland that a
court 
may 
admit, 
as 
substantive 
proof,
evidence of a third party testifying as to an
extrajudicial identification by an eyewitness
when made under circumstances precluding the
suspicion of unfairness or unreliability,
where the out-of-court declarant is present at
trial and subject to cross examination.
Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 176-179, 443
A.2d 78[, 80-82] (1982)...." 
331 Md. at 560-61, 629 A.2d at 639.   The Court of Special Appeals
5
held that Eiland's testimony was, at its core, nothing more than an
extrajudicial identification of Tyler as the person who shot Jay
Bias and was admissible under the authority of Nance and Bedford.
Tyler, 105 Md. App at 559, 660 A.2d at 1017.  We disagree.
Eiland's prior testimony consisted of far more than a mere
identification of Tyler.  The portion of Eiland's testimony read to
the jury contained a detailed description of Eiland and Tyler's
trip to the Prince George's Plaza Mall, the events leading up to
the shooting in the parking lot, and the shooting itself.  The
critical portion of Eiland's testimony was not that he identified
Tyler as being the other person in the car with him.  Other
witnesses had already identified Tyler as being present in the
-17-
green Mercedes and that identification was never contested.
Rather, the critical portion of Eiland's testimony was that he was
not the person in the Mercedes who fired the fatal shots at the
Toyota.  Hence, the crucial aspect of Eiland's testimony was not
any "prior identification" of the other person in his car; it was
which of the two people in his car was the shooter.  This hearsay
exculpation of himself as the shooter was not admissible under the
prior identification exception to the hearsay rule.  See Mouzone v.
State, 294 Md. 692, 702, 452 A.2d 661, 666 (1982)(holding that
witness's statement to police was inadmissible under extrajudicial
identification exception because statement "simply contained too
much," including other hearsay evidence not within any exception),
overruled in part by Nance, 331 Md. at 569, 629 A.2d at 643.  
In any event, the inability of Tyler to cross-examine Eiland
rules out admissibility under the pre-trial identification hearsay
exception.  The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule
has 
the 
same 
cross-examination 
requirement 
as 
the 
prior
inconsistent statement exception: the declarant must be available
for cross-examination at the trial where the prior identification
is admitted.  See Nance, 331 Md. at 560, 629 A.2d at 639; Bedford,
293 Md. at 176-77, 443 A.2d at 80-81.  As we explained in section
II(B), supra, Eiland was not available at Tyler's trial to be
cross-examined concerning his prior testimony because he refused to
testify.  Hence, the testimony, even if it did constitute nothing
-18-
more than an extrajudicial identification, was inadmissible under
the holdings of Nance and Bedford. 
D.
The State suggests in its brief that the "highly unusual
circumstances" of this case call for application of the "residual
hearsay exception," which, in limited circumstances, allows for the
admission of hearsay evidence that does not fall within any
recognized exception.  See Brown v. State, 317 Md. 417, 426, 564
A.2d 772, 776 (1989).  See also Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24) and 5-
804(b)(5).  Because the question of whether Eiland's testimony was
admissible under the residual exception was not raised in the Court
of Special Appeals, we need not decide it here.  We point out,
however, that even if the issue were raised below, Eiland's
testimony would not be admissible under the residual exception
because it does not posses the sufficient "guarantees of
trustworthiness" required by the exception.  See Md. Rule 5-
803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5).  When Eiland testified that Tyler was
the shooter, he did so at a trial in which he was charged in the
killing.  Hence, Eiland had a powerful incentive to blame the
shooting on Tyler.  As Chief Judge Wilner explained:
"[Eiland's] testimony was certainly not given
under circumstances precluding the suspicion
of unreliability.  Eiland was on trial for
murder; in his first trial, he had been
convicted of second degree murder and use of a
handgun and had been sentenced to prison for
-19-
     For discussion concerning the admissibility of hearsay
6
statements under the Confrontation Clause see Simmons v. State, 333
Md. 547, 636 A.2d 463 (1994) and Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 628
30 years.  There was never much dispute that
one or the other of them fired the fatal
shots, so the only reasonable hope that Eiland
could possibly have of escaping another
conviction was to place all of the blame on
Tyler, which is what he succeeded in doing.
The fact that his testimony was under oath
hardly suffices to wash away that compelling
incentive to accuse Tyler.  The identification
aspect of his trial testimony was therefore
inadmissible because it was given under
circumstances nine months pregnant with the
suspicion of unreliability."
Tyler, 105 Md. App. at 570-71, 660 A.2d at 1023 (Wilner, C.J.,
dissenting).  We agree.  Eiland's testimony did not posses the
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to fall within
the residual exception.  See Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 313, 334-35,
639 A.2d 125, 135-36 (1994)(recognizing that a hearsay statement by
one accomplice incriminating another is presumptively unreliable).
III.
We hold that Eiland's 1993 trial testimony does not fall
within any exception to the rule against hearsay.  Hence, it was
inadmissible in Tyler's criminal trial.  Because we conclude that
the testimony was inadmissible as a matter of Maryland evidence
law, we need not reach the question of whether admitting the
testimony violated Tyler's rights under the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause.6
-20-
A.2d 676 (1993).
  
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
VACATE 
THE
CONVICTIONS AND REMAND THIS
CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY FOR A
NEW TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE
GEORGE'S COUNTY.