Title: Peterborough Oil Co., LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11851 
 
PETERBOROUGH OIL COMPANY, LLC  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     October 8, 2015. - June 6, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Hazardous Materials.  Oil and Gas.  Department of Environmental 
Protection.  Statute, Construction.  Administrative Law, 
Agency's interpretation of regulation.  Regulation.  
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention 
Act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 27, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by William F. Sullivan, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Robert D. Cox, Jr., for the plaintiff. 
 
Eric S. Brainsky for Independent Oil Marketers Association 
of New England. 
 
Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Edward J. DeWitt, for Association to Preserve Cape Cod, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Donald D. Cooper, for LSP Association, Inc., amicus curiae, 
2 
 
 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  After a spill of hazardous materials within a 
specified radius of a public water supply, Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) regulations require that those 
deemed to be liable undertake cleanup and monitoring actions to 
ensure the spill does not pose a danger to that water supply.  
See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0801, 40.0810, 40.0993(3)(a) 
(2014); 40.1030(2)(e) (2015).  An exemption promulgated in 2007, 
however, exempts "oil" from some of these requirements when 
other enumerated requirements are met.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a) (2014) (oil exemption).  The DEP's 
definition of the term "oil" in this "oil exemption" is at the 
heart of this lengthy litigation between DEP and Peterborough 
Oil Company, LLC (Peterborough). 
Peterborough owns a property, now vacant, in Athol, where 
it operated a gasoline station for more than ten years.1  The 
property is located within a protection area for public water 
supply wells.  In 1994, a release of leaded gasoline that 
originated from a subterranean gasoline storage tank was 
detected in soil on the site.  Since then, DEP has required 
Peterborough to undertake supervised cleanup and monitoring 
activities at the site.  In 2008, shortly after the oil 
                                                 
1 The facts are drawn from the undisputed facts in the 
summary judgment record. 
3 
 
 
exemption was established, Peterborough submitted a revised 
remediation plan to DEP, stating that further remediation was 
not required because the entirety of the leaded gasoline spilled 
falls within the definition of "oil" for purposes of the 
exemption.  In 2011, DEP audited the site and issued a notice to 
Peterborough that the revised remediation plan did not comply 
with departmental requirements.  The DEP explained that the 
meaning of "oil" in the exemption does not include gasoline 
additives such as lead.  According to DEP, "oil" within the 
exemption refers only to the petroleum hydrocarbons naturally 
occurring in oils, but not to any additives such as lead.  A 
spill of leaded gasoline, therefore, could not be completely 
excluded from further remediation under the "oil exemption."  
The DEP denied Peterborough's request for reconsideration. 
Peterborough thereafter filed an action in the Superior 
Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that 
DEP's interpretation of its regulation was incorrect.  
Concluding that DEP's interpretation was reasonable, a Superior 
Court judge granted its motion for summary judgment, and issued 
a judgment declaring that "oil" within the meaning of the oil 
exemption is limited to petroleum hydrocarbons and does not 
include gasoline additives such as lead; the judge denied 
Peterborough's cross motions for summary judgment and injunctive 
4 
 
 
relief.2  Peterborough appealed, and we granted its petition for 
direct appellate review.  We conclude that DEP's interpretation 
of its regulation is reasonable, and affirm the judgment.3 
Discussion.  A declaratory judgment may be sought in "any 
case in which an actual controversy has arisen."  See G. L. 
c. 231A, § 1.  The requirement that there be an "actual 
controversy" should be construed liberally.  See Gay & Lesbian 
Advocates & Defenders v. Attorney Gen., 436 Mass. 132, 134 
(2002).  An "actual controversy" may exist without final agency 
action, on the basis of an allegation that an improper agency 
interpretation of a regulation will harm the plaintiff.  See 
Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester, 384 Mass. 487, 493 
(1981), S.C., 390 Mass. 353 (1983), citing Massachusetts Ass'n 
of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 
373 Mass. 290, 293 (1977).  Because none of the material facts 
are disputed, and Peterborough challenges whether DEP's 
interpretation of its regulation is correct as a matter of law, 
declaratory relief is appropriate here. 
                                                 
2 The parties agree that if the oil exemption is not 
applicable, Peterborough Oil Company, LLC (Peterborough), will 
be required to engage in ongoing remediation efforts because of 
the presence of lead in the ground. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief in support of 
Peterborough that was submitted by the Independent Oil Marketers 
Association of New England; and the amicus briefs submitted by 
LSP Association, Inc., and by the Association to Preserve Cape 
Cod. 
5 
 
 
1.  Statutory and regulatory framework.  The Massachusetts 
Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act, 
G. L. c. 21E (act), was enacted in 1983 to ensure the proper 
cleanup of sites contaminated with oil and hazardous materials.  
See G. L. c. 21E, §§ 1, 3; St. 1983, c. 7, § 5.  The act grants 
DEP broad authority over cleanup of these contaminated sites.  
See G. L. c. 21E, § 3.  "Oil" is defined under the act as 
"insoluble or partially soluble oils of any kind or origin 
or in any form, including, without limitation, crude or 
fuel oils, lube oil or sludge, asphalt, insoluble or 
partially insoluble derivatives of mineral, animal or 
vegetable oils and white oil.  The term shall not include 
waste oil, and shall not include those substances which are 
included in 42 U.S.C. [§ ] 9601(14)."4 (Emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 21E, § 2.  In addition, to excluding from the 
definition of "oil" "substances which are included in 42 U.S.C. 
[§] 9601(14)," "oil" is explicitly excluded from the definition 
of "hazardous material" under the act.  The act provides that a 
"hazardous material" is a 
"material including but not limited to, any material, in 
whatever form, which, because of its quantity, 
concentration, chemical, corrosive, flammable, reactive, 
toxic, infectious or radioactive characteristics, either 
separately or in combination with any substance or 
substances, constitutes a present or potential threat to 
                                                 
4 The Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012), 
(CERCLA) was enacted to address similar concerns involving 
cleanup of hazardous waste contamination as the Massachusetts 
Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act, 
G. L. c. 21E.  See Martignetti v. Haigh-Farr Inc. 425 Mass. 294, 
321 (1997); Griffith v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. 414 Mass. 
824, 827 (1993), S.C., 420 Mass. 365 (1995). 
6 
 
 
human health, safety, welfare, or to the environment, when 
improperly stored, treated, transported, disposed of, used, 
or otherwise managed.  The term shall not include oil." 
(Emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 21E, § 2. 
To implement the cleanup process required under the act, 
G. L. c. 21E, § 3 (b), DEP promulgated regulations known as the 
Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP).  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 40.0001 (2014).  The definitions of "oil" in the MCP is 
identical to the definition of oil in the act.  See G. L. 
c. 21E, § 2; 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0006 (2014). 
The MCP creates a multiphased assessment and cleanup 
process whereby a contaminated site can reach either a 
"temporary" or a "permanent" solution, as determined by DEP.  
See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0006(2), 40.0006(12).  A 
temporary solution means that the site has achieved a 
substantial elimination of hazardous material, but monitoring 
and mitigation efforts may remain ongoing indefinitely.5  A 
permanent solution means that, having been remediated, the site 
creates a condition of no significant risk to health, safety, 
                                                 
5 A temporary solution "means any measure or combination of 
measures which will, when implemented, eliminate any substantial 
hazard which is presented by a disposal site or by any oil 
and/or hazardous material at or from such site in the 
environment until a Permanent Solution is achieved."  310 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 40.0006 (2015). 
 
7 
 
 
public welfare, and the environment.6  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 40.0006(12). 
The MCP also establishes additional cleanup requirements 
for sites where discharges pose a risk to a public water supply.  
See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0924.  These requirements apply 
within two distinct zones:  Zone I establishes a narrow, 
protective radius immediately surrounding the water supply; Zone 
II encompasses a larger area to address the risk that in extreme 
conditions, water from that location might enter the public 
water supply.7  Peterborough's site is located within a Zone II 
protective area.  Under the oil exemption, DEP may assume that 
there is no risk of unacceptable levels of contaminants seeping 
into a public water supply from a Zone II spill where the 
"[c]ontaminiation is limited to oil," and when other enumerated 
site conditions (effecting the likelihood of contaminants 
                                                 
6 A permanent solution "means a measure or combination of 
measures which will, when implemented, ensure attainment of a 
level of control of each identified substance of concern at a 
disposal site or in the surrounding environment such that no 
substance of concern will present a significant risk of damage 
to health, safety, public welfare, or the environment during any 
foreseeable period of time."  310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0006. 
 
7 The Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) defines Zone I 
as "the area within the protective radius surrounding a public 
water supply well or wellfield" and Zone II as "that area of an 
aquifer which contributes water to a well under the most severe 
pumping and recharge conditions that can be realistically 
anticipated."  310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0006. 
 
8 
 
 
reaching the water supply) are met.8  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a), 40.0926(8) (2014). 
Before creating the oil exemption, DEP conducted studies of 
the hazards posed by different chemicals released in soil and 
groundwater.  These studies showed that petroleum hydrocarbons 
are biodegradable and do not tend to travel through soil once 
released.  Thus, DEP determined that if released within a 
certain radius of a water supply, and where other conditions 
were met, petroleum hydrocarbons would not tend to seep into 
that water supply.  Based on the foregoing, DEP concluded that 
petroleum hydrocarbons pose a low safety risk to the public 
water supply when spilled within a specified radius of a 
potential water supply.  The DEP, therefore, interprets the oil 
                                                 
8 Title 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0926(8) (2014) provides 
that "[n]o exposure potential" exists as to sites described in 
310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0924(2)(b)3 if, in addition to the 
restriction that "the contamination is limited to 'oil,'" these 
conditions are met: 
 
"(a) Demonstration of source elimination or control at 
the disposal site as described in 310 [Code Mass. Regs. 
§] 40.1003(5); (b) Demonstration of diminishing contaminant 
concentrations throughout the horizontal and vertical 
extent of the plume; (c) Demonstration that contaminant 
concentrations are not detected at or above analytical 
limits appropriate for a GW-1 area [groundwater near a 
public water supply] at the downgradient edge of the plume, 
at least 1,000 feet from the Public Water Supply well; and 
(d) The demonstrations pursuant to 310 [Code Mass. Regs. 
§] 40.0926(8)(b) and (c) are confirmed by a minimum of two 
years of quarterly groundwater monitoring conducted after 
the termination of any Active Remedial System and after the 
achievement of such contaminant concentrations." 
 
9 
 
 
exemption to include only petroleum hydrocarbons.9 
2.  Statutory language.  Peterborough contends that the act 
plainly and unambiguously includes leaded gasoline in its 
definition of "oil."  See G. L. c. 21E, § 2.  On this view, 
Peterborough maintains that DEP erred in rejecting 
Peterborough's revised remediation plan. 
As with any statute, we review questions concerning the 
meaning of an agency's enabling statute de novo.  See Commerce 
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 (2006).  If 
the meaning of a term is clear in the plain language of a 
statute, we give effect to that language as the clearest 
expression of the Legislature's purpose.  See Goldberg v. Board 
of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 632-633 (2005).  If, 
however, the statutory language is "sufficiently ambiguous to 
support multiple, rational interpretations," Biogen IDEC MA, 
Inc. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 174, 186 (2009), 
citing Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 633 
                                                 
9 "Oil" is frequently understood in terms of its chemical 
composition of petroleum hydrocarbons.  See Chambers Dictionary 
of Science and Technology 807, 854 (1999); McGraw-Hill 
Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms 1466, 1569 (6th ed. 
2003).  See also Environmental Science Deskbook §§ 2:58, 3:84 
(Conrad, ed. 2014) (stating that petroleum products are category 
of petroleum hydrocarbons, and various fuel oils result from 
process of creating fractions of petroleum hydrocarbons).  
Standard dictionaries of the English language define "oil" 
similarly.  See, e.g., Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary 1346, 1449 (2003); American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1257, 1355 (3d ed. 1992). 
10 
 
 
(2005), we look to "the cause of [the statute's] enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated" (citation omitted).  Entergy Nuclear Generation 
Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319, 329 
(2011).  While the "duty of statutory interpretation is for the 
courts . . . an administrative agency's interpretation of a 
statute within its charge is accorded weight and deference . . . 
Where the [agency's] statutory interpretation is reasonable 
. . . the court should not supplant [its] judgment" (citations 
omitted).  Dowling v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 425 Mass. 
523, 525 (1997), quoting Massachusetts Med. Soc'y v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 402 Mass. 44, 62 (1988).  "Our deference 
is especially appropriate where, as here, the statutes in 
question involve an explicit, broad grant of rule-making 
authority."  Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, supra at 
634.  See Dowell v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 
613B614 (1997). 
In support of its claim that DEP's understanding of the 
term "oil" is incorrect under the plain language of the act, 
Peterborough argues that the statutory definition of "oil" is 
broad, encompasses any type of fuel or crude oil, and explicitly 
defines gasoline as a "partially soluble" "fuel oil" derived 
from a "mineral" oil.  This argument, however, does not take 
11 
 
 
into account that the statute then excludes from the definition 
of "oil" a list of substances, identified as "hazardous" under 
§ 9601(14) of the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012) 
(CERCLA).  See G. L. c. 21E, § 2.  Lead is included on one of 
the CERCLA lists of hazardous substances, see 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 
(2015), and therefore is excluded from the act's definition of 
"oil."  See G. L. c. 21E, § 2. 
While it distinguishes between "oil" and "hazardous 
substances," the act does not explain how a hazardous substance 
intermixed with an oil should be treated.  For our purposes, it 
does not specify how to treat the lead in leaded gasoline, where 
lead is "hazardous," but other parts of the mixture fall within 
the oil exemption.  This ambiguity is not resolved by the 
reference in the act to CERCLA's definition of hazardous 
materials. 
CERCLA's definition of hazardous materials contains a so-
called "petroleum exclusion" explicitly providing that petroleum 
may be excluded from certain cleanup requirements.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(14).  Leaded gasoline has been understood to fall 
within this "petroleum exclusion," albeit that lead is a 
hazardous substance, because of CERCLA's use of the term 
"petroleum."  See, e.g., Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic 
Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d, 801, 803-804 (9th Cir. 1989).  The 
12 
 
 
act, however, does not incorporate CERCLA's "petroleum 
exclusion."  To the contrary, the act's definition of oil does 
not use the term "petroleum," and does not define "oil" by 
reference to the definition of "petroleum" in CERCLA.  On its 
face, the language defining "oil" in the act incorporates only 
that portion of the CERCLA definition that enumerates materials 
that are "hazardous substances."  The act's definition of "oil" 
does not explicitly incorporate CERCLA's exceptions to its 
enumeration of "hazardous materials."  Indeed, the oil 
definition does not use the term "hazardous substance." 
The act as a whole also creates greater liability for 
cleanup of oil spills than does CERCLA.  See Griffith v. New 
England Tel. & Tel. Co. 414 Mass. 824, 830 (1993).  Nothing in 
the act's language suggests that its definition of "oil" is 
meant to be coextensive with that of CERCLA, or to include 
CERCLA's exclusions of certain hazardous substances.  See Id. at 
829-830.  We therefore do not agree that the act unambiguously 
incorporates CERCLA's "petroleum exclusion."  See ACME Laundry 
Co. v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 410 Mass. 760, 771 (1991), 
quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 
427, 432-433 (1983) (declining to interpret act in light of 
CERCLA because differences in language represent "a decision to 
reject the legal standards embodied or implicit in" CERCLA).  
See also DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446, 452 (2015); 
13 
 
 
Martignetti v. Haigh-Farr Inc., 425 Mass. 294, 321 (1997) 
(differences in statutory language require differing 
applications of similar provisions in CERCLA and act).  
Accordingly, we are unable to read into the statutory language a 
plain indication that the Legislature meant to include leaded 
gasoline within the definition of "oil," where the definition 
also provides that lead is not an "oil." 
3.  Legislative intent.  Because the statutory language is 
ambiguous, we turn to consideration of the legislative intent.  
See Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, supra at 329. 
The act "was drafted in a comprehensive fashion to compel 
the prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous material,"  
Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assocs., 436 Mass. 217, 223 (2002).  
"The purpose of the MCP is, among other things, to 'provide for 
the protection of health, safety, public welfare and the 
environment. . . .'"  Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 
638, 653 (2008), quoting 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0002 (1995). 
The act requires DEP to promulgate regulations to identify, 
assess, and mitigate sites where there has been a release of 
hazardous materials, and to establish standards for compliance 
with cleanup requirements.  See G. L. c. 21E, §§ 3A (d), (g).  
In promulgating these standards, the act requires DEP to 
"eliminate any substantial hazard to health, safety, public 
14 
 
 
welfare, or the environment which is presented by the site or by 
any oil or hazardous materials at or from the site in the 
environment."  G. L. c. 21E, § 3A (f). 
In light of the act's purpose to compel the cleanup of 
hazardous material, and the legislative mandate that DEP ensure 
compliance with that purpose, interpreting leaded gasoline 
entirely as an "oil" would stretch the meaning of the "oil 
exemption" to the point that it would become virtually a 
nullity.  In particular, under such an expanded definition, any 
hazardous material mixed with oil would appear to qualify for 
less stringent treatment under the oil exemption.  Such an 
interpretation would eviscerate the legislative purpose.  See, 
e.g., Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 531 
(2008) (statutory construction should not "frustrate the general 
beneficial purposes of the legislation" [citations omitted]); 
Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 421 
Mass. 106, 113 (1995) ("strictly literal reading" of statute 
should not be adopted if result would "thwart or hamper the 
accomplishment of the statute's obvious purpose"). 
4.  Creation of the oil exemption.  Furthermore, the 
history of DEP's drafting of the "oil exemption" is instructive 
as to its view, at the time the exemption was enacted, that the 
lead in leaded gasoline was not included within the definition 
of "oil."  The DEP created the oil exemption based on concern 
15 
 
 
that very few sites had achieved a permanent solution after 
gasoline spills.  The DEP, therefore, conducted studies at 
contaminated sites to determine the reason for the low rate of 
permanent resolution.  Through these studies, DEP determined 
that, in part, the reason for the low remediation rate was the 
manner in which the risk assessment to determine whether a 
temporary or a permanent solution was available at a particular 
site was conducted. 
Under the MCP, DEP determines risk to a public water supply 
by assessing the concentrations of specific substances, defined 
by their chemical properties and composition, in the soil near a 
contaminated site.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0902(2)(a), 
40.0904, 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a), 40.0996 (2014).  Where 
concentrations of individual substances of particular concern 
exceed certain levels, a "permanent" solution at a given site is 
not achievable unless and until those concentrations can be 
reduced to specified limits.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 40.1040(1)(a) and (2)(b) (2015).  Prior to DEP's promulgation 
of its exemption, the MCP deemed contamination by petroleum 
hydrocarbons (found in every gasoline spill) as hazardous to the 
public water supply, without factual demonstration that 
petroleum hydrocarbons actually posed a threat to the safety of 
drinking water. 
The DEP's studies showed that petroleum hydrocarbons had 
16 
 
 
unique properties.  For example, if spilled in soil within a 
specified area near a potential water supply, the petroleum 
hydrocarbons did not appear to seep into that water supply.  The 
DEP concluded this was because they were biodegradable, tended 
to be relatively stationary, and did not move through soil 
toward groundwater.  Therefore, DEP concluded, petroleum 
hydrocarbons were unlikely to contaminate the drinking supply if 
released within a distance equating to the Zone II radius of a 
possible water supply, if all other necessary site conditions 
were met. 
As a result of these studies, DEP created the "oil 
exemption" as a narrow exemption limited to petroleum 
hydrocarbons.  The exemption applied to Zone II sites (known as 
GW-1 areas) whose groundwater is located within a potential 
drinking water source area, but where spill contamination is 
limited to petroleum hydrocarbons.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a); 40.0932(4)(a)-(b) (2014). 
5.  DEP's interpretation of the oil exemption.  In DEP's 
view, limiting the oil exemption to petroleum hydrocarbons 
comports with the legislative mandate while providing 
flexibility in remediation efforts of hazardous spills.  Only 
petroleum hydrocarbons have been shown not to present a 
"significant risk of harm to health, safety, public welfare, or 
the environment during any foreseeable period of time," assuming 
17 
 
 
other required conditions for a "permanent" solution are met.  
See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0006.  Expanding the definition to 
include contaminants either known to be hazardous, or whose 
properties are less understood, would contravene the legislative 
mandate.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0007(1) (2014) (MCP 
"shall be construed to effectuate the purposes of" act).  
"An agency's interpretation of its own regulation and 
statutory mandate will be disturbed only 'if the "interpretation 
is patently wrong, unreasonable, arbitrary, whimsical, or 
capricious."'"  Box Pond Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
435 Mass. 408, 416 (2001), quoting TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health 
of N. Andover, 431 Mass. 9, 17 (2000). 
Although the statutory and regulatory definition of "oil" 
does not explicitly reference the term "petroleum hydrocarbons," 
DEP consistently has interpreted the oil exemption to apply only 
to petroleum hydrocarbons.  When it issued the proposed 
exemption for public comment, DEP termed the exemption 
"Petroleum Hydrocarbons in GW-1 Areas, 40.0924(2)(b)(3)."  No 
comments apparently were received indicating confusion over the 
term "petroleum hydrocarbons" in this context.  One comment 
indicated that the industry understood the term as a technical 
term for "oil," which excluded gasoline additives.  That comment 
stated, "Proposal should not be limited to [o]il; it should 
extend to additives . . . .  The limitation to [o]il is likely 
18 
 
 
to exclude all gasoline and many fuel oil releases."  In 
response, DEP clearly explained that the exclusion was not 
intended to include "all gasoline," stating the "proposal was 
not extended to additives." 
Risk assessment under the MCP requires DEP to examine the 
concentrations of specific substances, defined by their chemical 
properties and composition, in the public water supply.  See 310 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0902(2)(a), 40.0904, 40.0924, 40.0996.  
The oil exemption appears in the portion of the regulatory 
scheme governing response actions to contamination on the basis 
of risks posed by specific chemicals.  310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a).  Because the regulatory scheme relies on 
distinctions between substances on the basis of chemical 
composition, DEP's decision to interpret "oil" similarly, as 
defined with reference to its chemical composition, is 
reasonable.10  See Simmons v. State Examiners of Electricians, 
                                                 
10 Peterborough challenges the interpretation of the 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in part because DEP 
uses a less technical definition of "oil" in some other sections 
of the MCP, not related to spill cleanup near public water 
supplies.  Where a term's definition is generally applicable 
throughout a statute, that term nonetheless may be interpreted 
differently for purposes of a particular section, if the context 
so requires.  See Banushi v. Dorfman, 438 Mass. 242, 244-245 
(2002); Care & Protection of Jeremy, 419 Mass. 616, 622 (1995).  
Because the MCP creates additional cleanup requirements near 
public water supplies, and requires DEP to analyze these 
requirements on the basis of narrow and technically defined 
distinctions between chemical substances, DEP can reasonably use 
a narrow and technical definition for purposes of these 
19 
 
 
395 Mass. 238, 243 (1985) ("If a word or phrase has a technical 
or specialized meaning, this court will adopt that meaning in 
its construction of the statute"). 
The DEP's more narrow interpretation advances its mandate 
to ensure the cleanup of spills posing a threat to public health 
and safety, while reasonably permitting less stringent 
remediation based on the scientific studies it conducted 
concerning the observed levels of contamination in the public 
water supply.  See Northeast Energy Partners, LLC v. Mahar 
Regional Sch. Dist., 462 Mass. 687, 693 (2012) ("General 
expressions may be restrained by relevant circumstances 
showing . . . intent that they be narrowed and used in a 
particular sense" [citation omitted]).  Peterborough's proffered 
interpretation, by contrast, would require treatment of 
hazardous substances such as lead, as though they were not 
hazardous.  The DEP's interpretation that the oil exemption does 
not exempt hazardous fuel additives from cleanup requirements 
reasonably furthers the legislative purpose, and ensures that 
DEP will exempt from cleanup requirements only those substances 
that do not pose the very risks the MCP is designed to mitigate.  
See Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 783, 791 (2015) ("We interpret 
separate sections of statutes as a whole to produce internal 
consistency, . . . and to give a 'rational and workable effect'" 
                                                                                                                                                             
additional requirements. 
20 
 
 
[citations omitted]); 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0002(1)(a)(1) 
(2014) (MCP provides "for the protection of health, safety, 
public welfare and the environment)." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.