Title: State v. Roberts

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

69 Wn.2d 921 (1966) 421 P.2d 1014 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, Appellant.[*] No. 38110. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. December 15, 1966. Harold M. Wilson, Jr., for appellant (Appointed counsel for appeal). John G. McCutcheon and Robert G. Hutchins, for respondent. *922 WEAVER, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment and sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of the crime of taking indecent liberties with and upon the person of a 10-year-old girl. We do not find it necessary to set forth the facts. Error is not assigned to the sufficiency of the evidence. [1] Defendant argues that he "was denied effective assistance of counsel contrary to" his constitutional rights. We have recognized that no conviction can stand, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt, if the accused is denied the effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Cory, 62 Wn.2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963). "Effective assistance of counsel" is an elusive term, difficult, if not impossible, of precise or all-inclusive definition. It must be equated to the facts of each case. An accused indigent is entitled to counsel who has an appropriate sense of professional responsibility for his client's welfare and for the presentation of his defense. In State v. Keller, 65 Wn.2d 907, 400 P.2d 370 (1965), this court said: It appears from the record that at the time trial counsel was first appointed, defendant asked to be appointed co-counsel with his court-appointed lawyer. Thus, a foundation was laid. When sentence was imposed defendant moved the dismissal of his trial counsel (who had already prepared a notice of appeal) because of alleged disagreement between them. His request for new counsel on appeal was granted. One section of defendant's appellate brief is, for the most part, an attack upon the capability and competence of defense *923 counsel. The record does not support some of the allegations; others may be classified as differences of opinion regarding trial strategy. The method and manner of presenting a case to a jury will vary with different counsel. The effectiveness of representation or the competence of counsel is not measured by acquittal or conviction. The test is: does the record, as a whole, show that the accused was accorded a fair and impartial trial? State v. Lei, 59 Wn.2d 1, 365 P.2d 609 (1961), and cases cited. The record before us meets this test. Defendant was charged under RCW 9.79.080: The jury was instructed: By appropriate assignments of error, defendant urges that RCW 9.79.080(2), supra, is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. As a corollary, he argues that the quoted instruction is subject to the same attack. We do not agree. *924 It is true that the terms of a statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. There must be a standard to determine whether specific acts constitute a crime under the statute. [2] In Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525, 99 Pac. 330 (1908), the court said of a statute similar to ours: This court has, on numerous occasions, considered the efficacy of the statute and the sufficiency of the questioned instruction. Our recent decision in State v. Leohner, ante p. 131, 417 P.2d 368 (1966), is dispositive of defendant's contentions. The court said: We conclude that the statute is not unconstitutional because of vagueness, nor is the instruction erroneous. Other decisions of this court dealing with the same statute are set forth in the margin.[1] We find no merit in defendant's assignment of error to the court's denial of two motions for a mistrial based upon counsel's statement that "defendant was ... you might almost say `paraded' in front of the jury in manacles...." The record shows that defendant was manacled when escorted through a corridor from the jail to the courtroom. A door to the jury room allegedly was open. There is nothing to establish that any juror saw him. He was not "paraded." No claim is made that defendant was manacled while in the courtroom or that the conduct of his defense was impaired. There is no indication that the criticized procedure was prejudicial. Our conclusion is supported by the rationale of State v. Boggs, 57 Wn.2d 484, 358 P.2d 124 (1961); State v. Sawyer, 60 Wn.2d 83, 371 P.2d 932 (1962); and Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253 (10th Cir.1960). [3] Defendant maintains that his basic guarantee of a fair jury trial was undermined by the association of a juror and a witness for the prosecution who allegedly engaged in a conversation in the courthouse corridor during a trial recess. Although the witness is identified, the juror is not. This claim is made in an affidavit filed by defendant's *926 wife on December 10, 1965 more than 9 months after entry of judgment and sentence and notice of appeal. We cannot consider the affidavit. Finally, defendant maintains that he "was denied speedy and exact justice contrary to Article 1 Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington," which reads: The acts with which defendant is charged allegedly occurred October 26, 1964. Defendant was arrested the next day at 2 p.m. by a detective of the city police department. November 19, 1964, an information was filed in the superior court. Trial counsel was appointed November 20, 1964. January 13, 1965, the case was tried. Based upon the fact that defendant was incarcerated from October 27 until November 20, 1964, when counsel was appointed for him, he asserts that his constitutional rights were so violated that his conviction must be reversed and the charges dismissed. In the abstract, defendant's contention could have merit, but what happened during the 24 days between arrest and appointment of counsel? [4] Ordinarily, we could not determine this from the usual appellate record, but, for some reason not apparent to this court, defendant had the clerk of the superior court certify to us in transcript a photostatic copy (or reproduction by some other method) of his handwritten application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the superior court April 29, 1965. It was, of course, filed after his conviction, but pending appeal. The handwriting is not good and the reproduction of the document does not improve its legibility. Insofar as we are able to translate it, defendant's petition alleges: Defendant further alleges that his requests for a preliminary hearing and for indictment by a grand jury were denied by the superior court. It is apparent from the record that defendant was originally arrested and detained pursuant to charges filed in the municipal and justice courts. RCW 10.37.020 provides: Assuming that defendant had been held to answer to a criminal charge in municipal court on October 27, 1964, the *928 day he was arrested, the state filed its information in superior court November 19, 1964, 23 days later, within the time set by statute. There is nothing to indicate that during his detention he was abused, refused the right to communicate with others, requested counsel, refused counsel, made a confession, lost witnesses, or was prejudiced in any way in the preparation of his defense. The state did not gain nor did the defendant lose any evidence during his detention prior to appointment of counsel. The record supports our conclusion that defendant's constitutional rights were not violated in the instant case. The judgment is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., FINLEY and HAMILTON, JJ., and BIRDSEYE, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 421 P.2d 1014. [1] State v. Fischer, 57 Wn.2d 262, 356 P.2d 983 (1960); State v. Winger, 41 Wn.2d 229, 248 P.2d 555 (1952); State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wn.2d 686, 171 P.2d 845 (1946); State v. Kosanke, 23 Wn.2d 211, 160 P.2d 541 (1945); State v. Huey, 14 Wn.2d 387, 128 P.2d 314 (1942). [2] In a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by court-appointed appellate counsel October 27, 1965, the charge is identified as being filed in Municipal Court of Tacoma. [3] In his October 27, 1965 petition for writ of habeas corpus petitioner alleges that his request for subpoenas for witnesses was granted.