Title: State Ex Rel. Allen v. Radack

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

246 N.W.2d 661 (1976) STATE of South Dakota upon relation of T. L. ALLEN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Darrel RADACK, Superintendent, Human Services Center, Yankton, South Dakota, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11800. Supreme Court of South Dakota. November 12, 1976. Laurence J. Zastrow and Ronald E. Brodowicz, Rapid City, for petitioner and respondent. Peter H. Lieberman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for defendant and appellant; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief. BRANDENBURG, Circuit Judge. Petitioner was tried in Pennington County, South Dakota, on a charge of murder and his defense was a plea of "not guilty by reason of mental illness." The jury returned a verdict in accordance with the plea. The trial judge committed the petitioner to the Human Services Center in Yankton, South Dakota. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the county where the center is located. The circuit judge granted the writ and petitioner was released. The state appeals. We reverse. There can be no question about the trial judge having the authority to commit petitioner to the Human Services Center. SDCL 23-45-21 provides: The trial court ordered that petitioner "be committed forthwith to the Human Services Center at Yankton, South Dakota, for psychiatric treatment and for treatment with respect to your addiction to alcohol, and there to remain until you are no longer mentally ill or addicted to alcohol and, additionally until you are no longer a danger to yourself, to the public peace or the safety of the people of the State of South Dakota, and then only are you to be released upon a determination by a Court in this state of competent jurisdiction." The statute above quoted does not permit confinement for alcoholic treatment. It only provides confinement of petitioner until he becomes sane if he would be dangerous to public safety. To the extent that the trial court's order exceeds the jurisdiction of the statute it is without effect. Petitioner would still be within the court's order of commitment. The hearing on the writ of habeas corpus produced the testimony of two witnesses, both doctors at the Human Services Center. Neither had done any extensive counseling or testing of petitioner. Dr. Gannon testifying for petitioner stated that at the present time, under the present circumstances (petitioner then being confined at the Human Services Center) petitioner was not a danger to others and was sane. He further testified that if petitioner were under the influence of alcohol he could not venture an opinion as to whether or not petitioner then would be sane or a danger to others. He testified further that alcohol addiction is a behavioral disturbance. Dr. Doyle testified that petitioner was diagnosed as an habitual, excessive drinker; that this condition is officially considered a mental disease or mental condition by the American Psychiatric Association; that there is a reasonable probability that behavior that goes on while a person is intoxicated will repeat itself if the person again becomes intoxicated; that this behavioral pattern would apply to violence against another person; that petitioner's diagnosis is unchanged; that there is an excellent chance of petitioner successfully undergoing treatment; that upon successful treatment he would be satisfied to a reasonable degree of certainty that he would no longer be an excessive drinker; that at that place and time petitioner suffered from an abnormal mental condition and was a danger to others due to the fact he was an excessive drinker and had a history of behaving violently while under the influence of alcohol. Petitioner contends that the writ was properly granted because he does not suffer from any abnormal mental condition as would make him dangerous to himself and others. The position might be tenable if we were dealing with the normal commitment proceedings. The case at issue is not a normal commitment proceeding. The case at issue is controlled by State ex rel. Barnes v. Behan, 1963, 80 S.D. 370, 124 N.W.2d 179, which we decline to modify. Following Behan, it appears here that (1) petitioner was charged with a violent crimemurder, (2) his plea was "not guilty by reason of mental illness," (3) the jury found him "not guilty by reason of mental illness," (4) he was found by the trial court to be dangerous to the public peace and safety and was sent to the Human Services Center until he was sane, (5) the presumption is that having been found not guilty by reason of mental illness he is in fact insane and the condition is presumed to continue, and (6) the burden of proof is then upon him to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is restored to sanity so that he is no longer a danger to the public. As previously indicated, this case is outside of the normal commitment procedures, but the definitions and statutes can to some extent be used as a guide. SDCL 27-1-1 provides: SDCL 27-1-1.1 provides: Turning our attention to the case at issue, the petitioner certainly falls in the statutory definition of "mentally ill" and "danger to others." The record amply reflects that petitioner when he has consumed an excess of alcohol, will have a likelihood of committing violent acts. The court hearing the habeas corpus action granted the writ, stating that "addiction to alcohol was not within the contemplation of SDCL 23-45-20 and -21." The thrust of this case is not whether addiction to alcohol is within the scope of SDCL 23-45-20 and 23-45-21. The real question in this case is whether or not petitioner has an abnormal mental condition that makes it probable that he would be a danger to himself or others. Obviously, not all alcoholics are a danger to other persons. Petitioner, however, apparently has an abnormal mental condition that when coupled with an excess of alcohol creates a propensity to commit violent crimes and makes him dangerous to society. Certainly this is an "abnormal mental condition." The trial court in committing petitioner made such a finding. Under the meager record in this case, it certainly had every right to do so, if for no other reason than the presumption that an accused acquitted by reason of insanity is in fact insane. Such presumption is a continuing one. State ex rel. Barnes v. Behan, supra. A recent Minnesota case is pertinent to the present situation, albeit they have a somewhat different statute. Warner v. State, 1976, Minn., 244 N.W.2d 640: This case is remanded to the circuit court for further testimony with the following directions: DUNN, C. J., and WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur. BRANDENBURG, Circuit Judge, sitting for ZASTROW, J., disqualified.