Title: STATE v ULRICH

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-29 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 STATE OF b1ONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellant, JOEL JON ULRICH, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ted 0. Lympus, County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana Dennis J. Hester argued, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : Daley, Sherlock & Nardi, Kalispell, Montana Stephen J. Nardi argued, Kalispell, Montana Submitted: February 28, 1980 Filed: r I m M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his i s an i n t e r l o c u t o r y appeal by t h e S t a t e of Montana from a judgment of t h e District Court of t h e Eleventh Judi- c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , i n and f o r Flathead County, suppressing c e r t a i n evidence i n t h e case of J o e l Jon Ulrich, who i s charged with t h e offense of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Testimony received a t t h e preliminary hearing held on August 10, 1979, and a t t h e suppression hearing held on Jan- uary 4 , 1980, i n d i c a t e s t h a t Carolyn Wiley died i n her Columbia F a l l s t r a i l e r house as a r e s u l t of a gunshot wound i n f l i c t e d i n t h e l a t e evening hours of J u l y 1 4 o r t h e e a r l y morning hours of J u l y 15, 1979. Death was caused by a small c a l i b e r b u l l e t e n t e r i n g the back of her head. A t approximately 8:00 a.m. on J u l y 15, 1979, O f f i c e r Gregory Dawson of t h e Columbia F a l l s P o l i c e Department a r r i v e d a t t h e t r a i l e r house occupied by defendant, J o e l Jon Ulrich, and t h e deceased, Carolyn Wiley, and located t h e body of M s . Wiley. During an i n v e s t i g a t i o n conducted t h a t morning by O f f i c e r Dawson and o t h e r o f f i c e r s of t h e Columbia F a l l s P o l i c e Department, information received from i n t e r - views i n d i c a t e d t h a t Carolyn Wiley and defendant had been l i v i n g together f o r approximately t h r e e years; t h a t they had been arguing t h e day preceding her death; and t h a t defen- d a n t was t h e l a s t person seen with her i n t h e trailer. A t about 2:30 p.m. t h a t same day, defendant Ulrich walked i n t o t h e Columbia F a l l s p o l i c e s t a t i o n and asked, "Will someone t e l l m e what's going on . . .?" H e w a s taken t o t h e o f f i c e of t h e chief of p o l i c e and placed under a r r e s t . H e w a s then given h i s Miranda r i g h t s . A t t h a t time, defen- d a n t s t a t e d t h a t he was n o t going t o say any more u n t i l he saw an attorney. Defendant was asked some questions and several t i m e s informed t h e o f f i c e r s t h a t he wished t o have an a t t o r n e y present. During t h i s t i m e period, Officer Dawson entered t h e room, prepared h i s equipment, and per- formed a neutron a c t i v a t i o n t e s t upon defendant. The neutron a c t i v a t i o n test involves running cotton swabs over the fingers, palms, and top of t h e hands. The swabs a r e then placed i n a s p e c i a l k i t and mailed t o a s c i e n t i f i c laboratory f o r examination t o determine t h e presence of barium and antimony, t h e residue of gunpowder. A t no time d i d t h e defendant consent t o t h e taking of t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n t e s t . A t no t i m e up t o and during t h e taking of t h e test w a s defendant's counsel present o r had he consulted with counsel. A t no t i m e up t o and during t h e swabbing of defendant's hands d i d he voice a r e f u s a l o r o f f e r any physical o r verbal r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e administra- t i o n of t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n test. N o force of any kind w a s used i n t h e administration of t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n test by Officer Dawson. Ulrich was charged with t h e offense of d e l i b e r a t e homicide by complaint dated July 16, 1979. H e has entered a plea of n o t g u i l t y . O n December 26, 1979, defendant f i l e d a motion t o suppress t h e r e s u l t s of t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n test on t h e grounds t h a t it was an unreasonable and i l l e g a l search and s e i z u r e under t h e Fourth Amendment. H e a l s o sought t o suppress o t h e r evidence as being i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s a g a i n s t self-incrimination under the F i f t h Amendment and Miranda, and i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s S i x t h Amend- ment r i g h t t o counsel. A hearing on t h e motion t o suppress was held on January 4 , 1980, a t which t i m e the D i s t r i c t Court made findings of f a c t and conclusions of law and ordered c e r t a i n i t e m s of evidence suppressed. The D i s t r i c t Court found a s a matter of law t h a t the arrest of defendant a t t h e Columbia F a l l s police department w a s lawful and proper i n t h a t t h e r e w a s probable cause t o a r r e s t defendant a t t h a t t i m e . The Court a l s o determined a s a matter of law t h a t t h e taking of the neutron a c t i v a t i o n test without having afforded defendant h i s r i g h t t o counsel and without obtaining h i s a f f i r m a t i v e consent v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Such evidence obtained w a s thereby ordered suppressed. The D i s t r i c t Court's findings, however, are unclear a s t o t h e s p e c i f i c l e g a l b a s i s f o r suppressing the r e s u l t s of t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n test. Pursuant t o s e c t i o n 46-20-103(2) (e) , MCA, t h e S t a t e of Montana appeals only t h a t p a r t of t h e order suppressing t h e r e s u l t s of the neutron a c t i v a t i o n test and presents t h e following i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Whether defendant's Fourth Amendment r i g h t t o be secure a g a i n s t unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s w a s vio- l a t e d by t h e administration of a neutron a c t i v a t i o n test without a search warrant immediately a f t e r h i s a r r e s t ? 2. Whether defendant's F i f t h Amendment r i g h t s a g a i n s t self-incrimination w e r e v i o l a t e d by administering t h e neu- t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t ? 3 . Whether defendant's S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o coun- s e l a p p l i e s t o t h e administration of t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n t e s t ? The S t a t e contends t h a t the administration of a neutron a c t i v a t i o n test by p o l i c e o f f i c e r s upon defendant a f t e r a lawful and proper a r r e s t i s within t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e o f f i c e r ' s r i g h t t o search t h e defendant's person i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t under t h e Fourth Amendment of the united S t a t e s Constitution and under s e c t i o n s 46-5-102(4) and 46-5- 1 0 1 ( 1 ) , MCA. The manner of search w a s reasonable under t h e standards set f o r t h i n Schmerber v. C a l i f o r n i a (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. The Fourth Amend- ment does n o t p r o h i b i t a l l searches and i n t r u s i o n s , only those "which a r e n o t j u s t i f i e d i n t h e circumstances, o r which a r e made i n an improper manner," i.e., "unreasonable." Schmerber, 384 U.S. a t 768. Defendant contends t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o m e e t i t s burden of proof a t t h e suppression hearing t o make an a f f i r - mative showing t h a t t h e evidence seized by t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n test could o r would have been destroyed o r l o s t had a search warrant been obtained, c i t i n g Cupp v. Murphy (1973), 4 1 2 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900; Schmerber, supra; and S t a t e v. Cripps (1979), Mont. , 582 P.2d 312, 35 St.Rep. 967. Therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly suppressed any evidence r e l a t i n g t o t h e taking of o r r e s u l t s from t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n t e s t . Furthermore, defendant argues t h a t t h e r e could be no v a l i d search i n c i d e n t t o arrest because t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o allow a warrantless a r r e s t , and defendant's a r r e s t w a s t h e r e f o r e unlawful. F i r s t , w e take note t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t found probable cause and a l e g a l a r r e s t . This i s s u e has n o t been appealed, and i s n o t before t h i s Court. This appeal concerns t h e permissible scope of a warrant- less search i n c i d e n t t o a r r e s t where t h e m a t e r i a l seized from t h e person of t h e defendant c o n s t i t u t e s evidence of t h e offense. " I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a search i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t i s a t r a d i t i o n a l exception t o t h e warrant requirement of t h e Fourth Amendment." u n i t e d S t a t e s v. Robinson (1973), 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427. See a l s o United S t a t e s v. Edwards (1974), 415 U.S. 800, 802, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771. A search i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t r e q u i r e s no a d d i t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n i f it i s within t h e permissible scope, Robinson, 414 U.S. a t 235, and t h e r e i s no requirement t h a t t h e S t a t e make a showing t h a t t h e evidence i s d e s t r u c t i b l e . "The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a search i n c i d e n t t o a r r e s t does n o t depend on whether t h e r e i s any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e person a r r e s t e d possesses weapons o r evidence. The f a c t of a lawful a r r e s t , standing alone, a u t h o r i z e s a search. United S t a t e s v. Robinson . . ." Michigan v. Def i l l i p p o (1979) , U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 ~ . E d . 2 d 343. Additionally, although the f a c t t h a t t h e r e was evidence upon defendant's person t h a t could be destroyed o r l o s t over a period of t i m e w a s a f a c t o r considered by t h e Court i n Schmerber and i n Cupp v. Murphy, supra, t h e evidence i n t h i s c a s e w a s a l s o d e s t r u c t i b l e o r s u b j e c t t o l o s s with t h e passage of t i m e , as w e r e t h e f i n g e r n a i l scrapings i n Cupp and t h e blood sample i n Schmerber. W e are of t h e opinion t h a t t h e administration of a neu- t r o n a c t i v a t i o n test by p o l i c e o f f i c e r s upon defendant following h i s a r r e s t was within t h e permissible scope of a search i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t under t h e Fourth Amend- ment. To begin with, t h e Fourth Amendment does n o t p r o h i b i t a l l searches and s e i z u r e s , only those which are "unreason- able"; i.e., "which a r e n o t j u s t i f i e d i n t h e circumstances, o r which a r e made i n an improper manner." Schmerber, 384 U.S. a t 768. Any i n t r u s i o n involved i n t h i s case w a s mini- m a l , and t h e search and t h e manner i n which it was conducted w e r e reasonable under t h e standards set f o r t h by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Schmerber and Cupp. In affirming the defendant's conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a majority of the Court in Schrr~erber held that the - - extraction from the defendant of a blood sample to test for alcohol as an incident to his arrest was not an unreasonable search. The Court compared searches of dwellings and "intru- sions into the human body," and went on to observe that the taking of a blood sample to prevent the destruction of evidence was justified by the emergency nature of the search: "We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system." 384 U.S. at 770. There is no doubt an affirmative showing was made in Schmerber, but it is highly questionable that this becomes part of the rule. In any event, we do not have an intrusion of the body in this case, so we view the matter in a softer light than the defendant and look to a more factually simi- lar case for direction. In Cupp v. Murphy, supra, the suspect voluntarily appeared at the police station for questioning concerning the strangulation death of his wife, at which time the police noticed what appeared to be dried blood on his finger. The suspect had not been formally placed under arrest, although the police had probable cause to arrest him at that time. He attempted to rub the evidence off his hands after refusing to consent to the taking of a fingernail sample. Against his will and without obtaining a search warrant, the police took scrapings from the defendant's fingernails which produced incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights: "We believe t h i s search was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permissible under t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 . . . Chimel stands i n a long l i n e of cases recognizing an excep- t i o n t o the warrant requirement when a search i s i n c i d e n t t o a v a l i d arrest . . . The b a s i s f o r t h i s exception i s t h a t when an a r r e s t is made, it i s reasonable f o r a p o l i c e o f f i c e r t o expect t h e a r r e s t e e t o use any weapons he may have and t o attempt t o destroy any i n c r i - minating evidence then i n h i s possession . . . The Court recognized i n Chimel t h a t t h e scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate with the r a t i o n a l e t h a t excepts t h e search from the warrant requirement. ". . . The r a t i o n a l e of Chimel, i n these c i r - cumstances, j u s t i f i e d t h e p o l i c e i n subjecting him t o the very limited search necessary t o preserve t h e highly evanescent evidence they found under h i s f i n g e r n a i l s . . . "On t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, considering the existence of probable cause, t h e very limited i n t r u s i o n undertaken incident t o the s t a t i o n house detention, and t h e ready d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y of t h e evidence, w e cannot say t h a t t h i s search v i o l a t e d t h e Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Cupp, 4 1 2 U.S. a t 295-96. The r a t i o n a l e of these holdings i s t h a t the permissible scope of a search i n c i d e n t t o a lawful arrest, when t h e o f f i c e r s are searching f o r evidence of t h e offense, i s r e s t r i c t e d t o where t h e evidence seized w a s of such a nature t h a t it w a s l i k e l y t o be l o s t o r destroyed i f not immedi- a t e l y seized. Contrary t o defendant's contentions, however, these cases do n o t impose upon t h e S t a t e a burden of making an a f f i r m a t i v e showing t h a t t h e evidence seized w a s of such a nature t h a t it was l i k e l y t o be l o s t o r destroyed i f n o t immediately seized. I n any event, t h e S t a t e i n i t s t r i a l b r i e f informed t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t a f t e r a period of time t h e presence of gunpowder residues on t h e defendant's hand can change and f i n a l l y be destroyed so t h a t the evi- dence i n f a c t disappears. Furthermore, t h i s Court has upheld a f u l l body search incident t o a custodial a r r e s t i n State v. Cripps (1978), Mont. 582 P.2d 312, 35 St.Rep. 967, where the police had probable cause to arrest the defendants and found illegal drugs in one defendant's pocket and on the other defendant during a jailhouse search. We said: "It is well settled that law enforcement of- ficers may make a full body search pursuant to a lawful arrest for purposes of protecting themselves or seizing evidence cf the crime." Cripps, 582 P.2d at 318. In the same case, a search of the defendant's car for illegal drugs conducted at the scene of the arrest was held improper "when there was no chance of defendant's harming the police officers nor of their destroying their evidence." 582 P.2d at 319. From the uncertainty of the trial court's order, we should comment beyond the Fourth Amendment to avoid any future delay in this matter. The administration of a neutron activation test upon defendant did not violate his rights under the Fifth Amend- ment because the Fifth Amendment protects only against compelling "evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761. The gunpowder resi- dues taken from defendant's hands do not meet this criteria. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to these circumstances. An initial search of a defendant incident to arrest does not require the presence of counsel because the defendant's right to counsel attaches only at the time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him by way of a formal charge. See Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877r 32 L.Ed.2d 411. The judgment of the trial court is reversed on the one issue appealed from said judgment, suppression of the re- sults of the neutron activation test. The cause is remanded for further proceedings. ) . , d d + Justice We concur: s;&l wid weeQ C - Justice Justices Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting: The holding of the District Court is not unclear to me. It found that no reason existed for the police not seeking a search warrant before applying the neutron activation test: ". . . There is no showing that a warrant was not available under the procedure in Montana for securing same, nor is there any showing that the neutron activation test could not have been obtained at that time through proper request, and ips un- fortunate; that the Court is of the opinion that such could have been taken within that time and it would have been permissible.. . ." Neither Cupp v. Murphy (1973), 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900, nor Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, sect. - - 1 - L.Ed.2d , are applicable in this case, and do not support the majority. In Ccpp, the Court found that the fingernail scrapings were evanescent; in Schmerber, the Court found the prejudicial evidence in the blood sample would disappear. Here, the District Court found no such situation. There is - no evidence here, as the District Court found, that the incriminating evidence would disappear before a search warrant could be obtained. To say that the State has no burden to make an affirmative showing that the object of the search might be lost or destroyed is to say that the State never needs to justify a warrantless search if the search reveals some incriminating evidence. Under that rationale, we can kiss the Fourth and Fifth Amendments goodbye.