Title: Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific1993 WY 107859 P.2d 85Case Number: 92-164Decided: 08/09/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gary 
ANDERSON,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

LOUISIANA-PACIFIC, a 
Delaware corporation, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

James A. 
Raymond, Brown, Raymond & Rissler, Casper and Thomas J. Herd, Cross, Gaddis, 
Kin & Quicksall, P.C., Colorado Springs, CO, for 
appellant.

David G. Lewis, 
Reeves, Murdock, Lewis & Gifford, Casper, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The major 
question posed in this case, which arises out of products liability claims, is 
whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence testimony from 
a human factors expert. Other issues are asserted with respect to claims of 
error in instructing the jury on misuse of the product and on assumption of the 
risk. We hold that the refusal of the testimony from the human factors expert 
was a matter subject to the discretion of the trial judge, and no abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated by the record. We agree with the trial court that, 
under the circumstances of this case, it was appropriate to instruct on misuse 
of the product and on the defense of assumption of risk. We affirm the judgment 
of the trial court entered upon the verdict of the jury, which found for the 
defendants on all asserted theories of liability.

[¶2]      Appellant, Gary 
Anderson (Anderson), sets forth the following issues in his brief:

A. Did the court err in 
precluding all of the testimony of Dr. Karnes, a well-qualified human factors 
expert who met all of the requirements to testify as an expert under W.R.E. 
702?

B. Did the trial court 
err in giving the jury an instruction on "misuse of a product" when the product 
was specifically designed to be used as stair tread, and was in fact used as 
stair tread when the accident occurred?

C. Did the court err in 
instructing the jury on an assumption of the risk affirmative defense, when 
there was no evidence that Anderson knew of any risk or danger in using the 
particleboard stair tread as stair tread?

Louisiana-Pacific, in the 
Brief of Appellee, articulates the issues in this way:

A. Whether it was an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion to exclude the testimony of Edward Karnes, 
human factors expert, on the question of the adequacy of warnings about the use 
of the particleboard.

B. Whether the evidence 
in the case supported the trial court instructing the jury on the defense of 
"misuse of a product".

C. Whether the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury on the defense of "assumption of 
risk."

[¶3]      In October of 
1985, Anderson began constructing an open-riser stairway in the basement of his 
home in Lynch, Wyoming. Anderson's plan was to build the stairway using two-inch 
clear (knot-free) lumber for the treads on the stairs. He requested his wife to 
purchase the lumber at Casper Lumber Company. When Anderson's wife went to 
Casper Lumber Company, the salesperson advised her that he did not have the type 
of lumber Anderson had requested. Instead, particleboard stair tread was 
recommended, and the salesperson advised it was the preferred material of house 
building contractors in Casper. No warning was offered by the salesperson to 
Mrs. Anderson to the effect that the particleboard stair treads were not to be 
used on open-riser stairways.1 Furthermore, no warning was set 
forth on the particleboard Mrs. Anderson purchased.

[¶4]      Mrs. Anderson 
returned home with the particleboard, and she related to Anderson what she had 
been told by the salesperson at Casper Lumber Company. Anderson inspected the 
particleboard and cut it into proper lengths and widths to fit the stringers 
(the stairway frame). He then began laying the tread on the stringers, one at a 
time, proceeding up the stairway. Anderson partially nailed the first tread and 
the fifth tread to insure a proper fit and then proceeded to place the rest of 
the treads on the stringers without securing them. After laying all the treads 
on the stringers, Anderson began nailing them to the stringers, starting at the 
top step and working down. While Anderson was nailing the treads to the 
stringers, because of the way he had proceeded with the task, it was necessary 
for him to stand, kneel, and walk on treads that were not secure.

[¶5]      Anderson was on 
his knees on the unsecured tread just below the top step preparing to nail the 
top tread to the stringers, when he fell approximately seven feet to the 
basement floor. He seriously injured his left knee, and he also hurt his neck 
and right hand. His injuries prevented him from resuming his former employment 
in the field of geology. 

[¶6]      In his complaint, 
filed against Louisiana-Pacific, Anderson alleged negligent failure to warn and 
strict liability for a defective product. Anderson theorized the defect was 
attributable to Louisiana-Pacific's failure to warn that the particleboard tread 
was not to be used on open-riser stairways. As his theory of the cause of the 
accident, Anderson urged that, because the tread was not supported by a riser, 
it broke under his weight as he was kneeling on it. Louisiana-Pacific contended 
that, because Anderson had not secured the tread to the stringers, it slipped 
while he was kneeling on it, and it broke when it struck the basement floor, not 
because Anderson was kneeling on it.

[¶7]      The case was 
tried to a jury beginning on June 1, 1992 and, on June 5, 1992, the jury 
returned a verdict against Anderson. The special verdict of the jury encompassed 
the following specific findings:

· Louisiana-Pacific did 
not negligently manufacture its particleboard;

· Louisiana-Pacific did 
negligently fail to warn of reasonable dangers associated with the 
particleboard, but that failure to warn was not the proximate cause of 
Anderson's injuries;

· Anderson was negligent 
in the use of Louisiana-Pacific product;

· The particleboard stair 
tread was not in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition;

· Anderson's misuse of 
the product caused the accident;

· The use of the product 
by Anderson with knowledge of danger was not the cause of the 
accident.

[¶8]      As we noted, the 
primary issue is Anderson's claim that the trial court erred in excluding the 
testimony of the human factors expert. Anderson offered that testimony to 
explain Louisiana-Pacific's duty to warn and the kind of warning which should 
have been provided. The trial court, in addressing a motion in limine by 
Louisiana-Pacific, ruled the expert testimony would not be received because it 
would not assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining any 
fact in issue.

[¶9]      Expert testimony 
is the subject of WYO. R.EVID. 702, which provides:

     If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The purpose of 
WYO.R.EVID. 702 is not to provide for blanket admissibility of expert testimony. 
The trial court still is vested with discretion in determining whether to 
exclude such testimony because it is deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the 
trier of the factual issues. We do not disturb the trial court's decision to 
exclude or admit expert testimony unless we identify an abuse of discretion. 
Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1983). In this instance, we can discern no 
abuse of discretion in excluding the proffered testimony of the human factors 
expert.

[¶10]   We cannot formulate any bright line 
rule categorizing kinds of expert testimony as either helpful or not helpful. In 
Krahn v. Pierce, 485 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Wyo. 1971), we recognized this difficulty 
when we noted that "[w]hether in any given case, the expert testimony is 
necessary to aid the jury in its search for the truth depends upon such a 
variety of factors readily apparent only to the trial judge that we must depend 
heavily upon his judgment." Because the nature of decisions regarding the 
usefulness of expert testimony varies so significantly with the trial 
circumstances, we are not persuaded by the cases Anderson cites illustrating the 
use of human factors testimony in other jurisdictions. We can only conclude 
Anderson's authorities demonstrate it was not error to admit such testimony in 
those cases.

[¶11]   The trial judge made a careful 
review of the deposition of the human factors expert and then found the proposed 
testimony would not be of assistance to the jury both because the testimony 
would go to matters within the ken of the average juror, and because Anderson 
had designated other witnesses to provide similar testimony. The determination 
of the trial judge was bolstered by the expert's response, during his 
deposition, to a question addressing the scientific basis for his conclusion 
that the warning Louisiana-Pacific provided with the particleboard would not 
reach the ultimate user of the product. The expert testified at the 
deposition:

I don't know. It's so 
obvious that I'm not sure that anybody taking time to write it down as a 
topic in an article or a chapter of a book. I don't know. I'd have to - I can 
look through my library here. I'm sure I can find something that certainly fits 
the bill, but it's so abundantly obvious that I don't think it requires a 
great deal of expertise to arrive at that conclusion, if that's really what you 
are getting at. I think that a jury, for example, could understand that quite 
well without my explaining it to them. (Emphasis added.)

The thrust of 
this testimony was that the opinion of the expert would not assist the 
jury.

[¶12]   Under these circumstances, we 
conclude there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony of the 
human factors expert. Since we hold there was no abuse of discretion, it is not 
necessary to address the question of whether any such error was prejudicial or 
whether it would have been harmless in any event.

[¶13]   Anderson next urges the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury on the defense of misuse of the product. The 
instruction given states:

A manufacturer or seller 
is entitled to expect a use of his product which is reasonably foreseeable by 
the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses it with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its characteristics.

     Community means those 
who ordinarily use a product in question.

Anderson's 
contention is that no evidence exists upon which the jury could have found 
misuse of the particleboard tread because its intended use was as a stair tread 
and that was how it was used. In order to justify an instruction, there must be 
evidence before a jury to which they may apply the rule of law given by the 
court in the instruction. Hernandez v. Gilveli, 626 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1981); Beard 
v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶14]   We do not agree with Anderson's 
perception of these circumstances. It is true Anderson was using the 
particleboard as stair tread. The record, however, contains evidence from which 
the jury could have decided that Anderson, while using the particleboard as 
stair tread, was not using it in the manner intended by the manufacturer. 
Particularly, the manufacturer would not anticipate Anderson would lay all but 
two of the treads on stringers without nailing them securely. Anderson conceded 
it was dangerous for him to stand, kneel, and walk on the unsecured stringers. 
In Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992), we 
defined misuse as using a product for an unintended or unforeseeable purpose. In 
this case, we expand upon Schneider by pointing out that using the product in an 
obviously dangerous manner is the same as using it for an unintended or 
unforeseeable purpose.

[¶15]   In this case, misuse of the product 
was treated by the parties and the court as an affirmative defense. Misuse was 
pleaded as an affirmative defense by Louisiana-Pacific, and the instructions to 
the jury placed the burden of proof as to misuse upon Louisiana-Pacific. 
Therefore, it is the law of this case that misuse of the product is an 
affirmative defense, which we perceive to be the appropriate rule in any 
event.

[¶16]   We perceive this case to be similar 
to Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982). The jury apparently 
concluded the stair treads only were dangerous because of the way in which 
Anderson used them, and the failure to warn of the alleged product defect did 
not result in any dangerous condition in this case, absent the manner in which 
Anderson used the stair treads. In some jurisdictions, the careless use of a 
product by the consumer does not constitute misuse so as to bar recovery under a 
theory of strict liability. See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Products 
liability: Product Misuse Defense, 65 A.L.R.4th 263 (1988).

[¶17]   The trial court's instruction to 
the jury explaining misuse (quoted here-in-before) would not, on its face, 
extend to the mere careless use of the stair treads by Anderson. It does, 
however, suffice to support a factual conclusion that use in an obviously 
dangerous manner was not reasonably foreseeable. Under these circumstances, we 
find no error in the giving of the instruction.

[¶18]   Our final consideration is 
Anderson's contention that there was error committed by the trial court in 
instructing the jury on the defense of assumption of risk. Actually, this 
instruction was in the form of use with knowledge of the danger, which is 
assumption of the risk. In view of the fact that the jury found Anderson's use 
of the stair treads with knowledge of the danger was not a cause of the 
accident, there was no prejudice to Anderson by the giving of this instruction, 
and we conclude no reversible error was committed in giving it. We have, 
however, noted in Schneider that assumption of risk is a bar to recovery under 
the theory of strict liability incorporated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
402A (1965).

[¶19]   Since we find no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in excluding the testimony of the human factors 
expert, and no error in the giving of the instructions by the court on misuse of 
the product and assumption of the risk, the decision of the trial court in this 
case must be affirmed.

MACY, Chief Justice, 
concurring.

[¶20]   I concur. However, I write to 
clarify one point about which, in my view, we have been somewhat inattentive in 
our prior opinions.

[¶21]   The final issue addressed by the 
majority opinion considers a defense which is generically classified as 
"assumption of risk." The majority opinion states: "Actually, this instruction 
was in the form of use with knowledge of the danger, which is assumption of the 
risk." It would be accurate to say: "Use with knowledge of danger is a 
subcategory of a generic doctrine known more generally as assumption of 
risk."

[¶22]   Of course, because of the advent of 
comparative negligence, the defense, in pure negligence cases, once known 
precisely as "assumption of risk" has gone by the wayside. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 
(1988); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979). I would prefer to see this 
Court discard use of the generic expression "assumption of risk":

It has been a subject of 
much controversy, and has been surrounded by much confusion, because "assumption 
of risk" has been used by the courts in several different senses, which 
traditionally have been lumped together under the one name, often without 
realizing that any differences exist.

W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 at 480 (5th ed. 1984). See 
also Annotation, Effect of Adoption of Comparative Negligence Rules on 
Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R.4th 700 (1982).

[¶23]   Because of the controversy and 
confusion which surround this "doctrine," it is my belief that we would work a 
notable service for the Wyoming Bar and a significant advancement for the 
jurisprudence of this state if we were to limit our discussion to the specific 
category of defense under scrutiny. In this case, that is "use with knowledge of 
danger."

 FOOTNOTES

1 An open-riser stairway 
is one that has no upright members between the treads.