Title: Julia M. Meyer v. Joseph D. Meyer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 132 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0178 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Julia M. Meyer,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Joseph D. Meyer,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 12 
Reported at:  232 Wis. 2d 191, 606 N.W.2d 184 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 22, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
September 5, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Ramona A. Gonzalez 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and PROSSER, JJ., join concurrence. 
 
 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join. 
 
Dissented: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX and CROOKS, JJ., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Mary Anne Kircher and Bosshard & Associates, La 
Crosse, and oral argument by Sabina Bosshard. 
 
 
 
2 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by 
Daniel P. Ryan and Noble & Ryan, S.C., La Crosse, and oral 
argument by Daniel P. Ryan. 
 
 
2000 WI 132 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0178 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Julia M. Meyer,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph D. Meyer,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Julia M. Meyer (petitioner) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
that reversed the circuit court's maintenance determination and 
concluded that the court erroneously exercised its discretion.1  
She asserts that the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion pursuant to the maintenance statute, Wis. Stat. 
                     
1 Meyer v. Meyer, 2000 WI App 12, 232 Wis. 2d 191, 606 
N.W.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1999) (reversing and remanding a judgment 
of the Circuit Court for La Crosse County, Ramona A. Gonzalez, 
Judge).   
FILED 
 
DEC 22, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
2 
§ 767.26 
(1995-96),2 
when 
it 
considered 
her 
premarital 
contributions to the education of her spouse, Joseph Meyer 
(respondent), while he was pursuing his undergraduate and 
medical degrees.  Because we conclude that the consideration of 
premarital contributions by one spouse to the education of the 
other falls within Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9) and that the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in making its 
maintenance determination, we reverse the court of appeals.  
¶2 
This case arises from a relationship between the 
parties that spanned twelve years.  During that period of time, 
the respondent received his undergraduate and medical degrees, 
completed his residency program in internal medicine, and was at 
the threshold of beginning his career as a physician.   
¶3 
The Meyers met and began dating in 1985.  In the 
spring of 1986 they began living together at her apartment in 
Green Bay.  At that time, the petitioner was working as a nurse, 
and the respondent was pursuing his undergraduate education at 
the University of Wisconsin – Green Bay.   
¶4 
During the time the parties lived together in Green 
Bay, a pattern was established that would last into the parties' 
subsequent marriage: the petitioner financially supported the 
household, and the respondent focused on his education.  While 
she remained fully employed, first as a nurse and then as an 
insurance claims examiner, his employment was limited to 
                     
2 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version.   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
3 
irregular work and summer jobs.  He funded his education 
primarily with student loans.  In addition to her financial 
role, the petitioner also performed homemaking duties and 
assisted the respondent with his schooling by typing some of his 
college papers.   
¶5 
According to the petitioner's testimony, in late 1986 
the respondent gave her a "promise ring" to symbolize the 
parties' commitment to one another.  However, the parties did 
not become engaged to marry until 1989.  Their engagement 
coincided with the couple's move to Milwaukee.  The respondent 
decided to pursue a medical education in Milwaukee following 
completion of his undergraduate degree.  In the autumn of 1989, 
he began his studies at the Medical College of Wisconsin. 
¶6 
During their four-year engagement, the petitioner 
continued to work while the respondent attended school.  In 
Milwaukee, they lived together first in an apartment and then in 
a house purchased in 1990.  This home was purchased by the 
respondent's mother, but payments were made to her from the 
parties' joint checking account.  The couple purchased a duplex 
in 1992 and shared in the rental income.   
¶7 
In 1993 the parties married, and their wedding ushered 
in several years of rapid change in their lives.  At the time of 
their marriage, the respondent was still in medical school and 
the petitioner continued to work.  In the spring of 1994, the 
respondent graduated from medical school.  Following graduation 
the couple moved again, this time to La Crosse where the 
respondent began his residency program.   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
4 
¶8 
In La Crosse, the respondent worked to complete his 
residency, and except for periods of maternity leave, the 
petitioner continued to work in the insurance industry.  After a 
short time in La Crosse, their first child was born.  Soon 
thereafter, the petitioner became pregnant again and a second 
child was born.  This second child died of sudden infant death 
syndrome in October 1995, while only months old.  The respondent 
completed his residency in mid-1997.  He then began practicing 
as a physician at a La Crosse clinic.  At that time his monthly 
salary was $10,400 while hers was around $2,000.   
¶9 
In June 1997, just as the respondent was beginning his 
new career, the petitioner filed for divorce.  According to her 
testimony, around the time of the death of their second child 
the couple began having marital problems that left the marriage 
irretrievably broken.  In her original divorce petition, the 
petitioner requested maintenance.  She later amended the 
petition to include a cause of action for unjust enrichment.  
With this claim she sought compensation for the support given to 
the respondent during their period of premarital cohabitation.   
¶10 At trial, the court heard evidence relating to both 
causes of action.  In addition to the testimony of each of the 
parties, the circuit court heard the testimony of an expert 
witness called by the petitioner.  This witness testified to the 
value of the respondent's medical education and the petitioner's 
contributions to that education as calculated under the various 
methods approved by this court in Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 
200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984).  
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
5 
 
¶11 At the close of evidence, the court granted a judgment 
of divorce and ordered the respondent to make maintenance 
payments in the amount of $1,700 per month for eight years.  In 
support of its maintenance decision, the circuit court listed 
numerous factors.3  It cited the substantial energy the 
petitioner put into the birth and care of the parties' children. 
 It 
also 
noted 
her 
continuous 
employment 
and 
homemaking 
contributions.  In addition, the court was compelled by the fact 
that the respondent's student loans had been repaid during the 
marriage in part through a second mortgage on their La Crosse 
home, a mortgage that the petitioner assumed under the property 
division.  
¶12 The primary focus of the court's findings, however, 
was the "very significant and substantial" contributions made by 
the petitioner to the respondent's "current status" and earning 
capacity, both before and during the marriage.  The court 
explained: 
 
The Respondent wanted to go to school, and the 
Petitioner made it easy for the Respondent to do that. 
 She typed his papers and was there for him to do his 
laundry and make a home for him.  It was a 
relationship that the Respondent clearly benefitted 
from, and which enabled him to obtain his current 
education 
and 
resulting 
earning 
capacity 
as 
a 
practicing physician. . . . The Petitioner shared her 
bed, home, and income with the Respondent with the 
expectation that some day she would be a doctor's 
wife, and that is what she did become.  
                     
3 The circuit court also relied on these same considerations 
when it ordered an unequal property division.  The respondent 
did not challenge the property division on appeal. 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
6 
The court acknowledged that a four-year marriage would normally 
result in a maintenance award of a short duration.  However, 
invoking principles of "fairness and equity," it stated that the 
petitioner's contributions to the respondent's earning capacity 
warranted the award.4   
¶13 Prior to ordering the maintenance award, the circuit 
court addressed the respondent's arguments that it could not 
consider the petitioner's contributions to his education that 
occurred prior to the marriage.  The court looked to Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.255(3)(f), which provides that a court may consider "[t]he 
contribution by one party to the education, training or 
increased earning power of the other."5  Finding no language in 
the provision restricting its application to contributions 
arising only during the marriage, the court found that it could 
properly consider those premarital factors.  It noted that other 
provisions 
of 
the 
same 
statute, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                     
4 The circuit court also suggested that the petitioner's 
unjust enrichment claim supported the award of maintenance.  
However, it declined to make any specific findings in that 
regard.  Despite the fact that the circuit court did not base 
its decision on the unjust enrichment claim, the court of 
appeals proceeded to engage in a discussion of the issue.  
Because we uphold the circuit court's award of maintenance based 
on our reading of Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), we do not address the 
unjust enrichment claim. 
5 The circuit court based both its property division and 
maintenance 
determinations 
in 
part 
on 
these 
premarital 
contributions.  The statutory section cited by the circuit court 
is a provision of the property division statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.255(3)(f), and is identical to a provision of the 
maintenance statute, namely Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9).   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
7 
§ 767.255(3)(d),6 contain language limiting application to the 
marital context.   
¶14 The respondent appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's award of maintenance.  The court of 
appeals, relying on Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 
303 (1987), and Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 454 
N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1990), held that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered the 
premarital relationship in making its maintenance determination. 
 The court construed our holding in Watts that unmarried persons 
could not pursue a property division under the divorce statutes 
and our discussion of legislative intent in Watts to preclude 
application of the Family Code to the premarital relationship. 
¶15 With this case, we are presented with a question of 
statutory construction as it arises during the review of a 
circuit court's exercise of discretion.  The amount and duration 
of a maintenance award are matters within the sound discretion 
of the circuit court.  King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 247, 590 
N.W.2d 480 (1999).  We will uphold a circuit court's maintenance 
determination unless it erroneously exercises its discretion.  
Id. at 248.  An erroneous exercise of discretion may arise from 
an error in law or from the failure of the trial court to base 
its decision on the facts in the record.  Id. Statutory 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.255(3)(d) instructs that the court 
is to consider "[t]he contribution of each party to the 
marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party's 
contribution in homemaking and child care services."   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
8 
construction presents a question of law which we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Theis v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 
2000 WI 15, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162. 
¶16 We are asked today to decide whether the circuit 
court, in making its maintenance determination, erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it considered the premarital 
contributions by one spouse to the other spouse's education.  In 
order to do so, we must examine the statute on which the 
compensation for such contributions is based.   
¶17 In the interpretation of any statute, we look first to 
the statutory language.  Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 
2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, our inquiry is at an end, and we need not look 
beyond the language to ascertain its meaning.  Id.  
¶18 We begin our review of this maintenance award by 
examining Wis. Stat. § 767.26.  In applying this statute, a 
court has broad discretion in reaching fairness and equity 
through its award.  Achieving such fairness and equity is a goal 
of any maintenance determination.  LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 
Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987). 
¶19 Section 767.26 provides a list of factors that a 
circuit court is to consider when making a maintenance award.7  
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.26 reads: 
767.26 Maintenance payments.  Upon every judgment of 
annulment, 
divorce 
or 
legal 
separation, 
or 
in 
rendering 
a 
judgment 
in 
an 
action 
under 
s. 
767.02(1)(g) or (j), the court may grant an order 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
9 
These factors are the "touchstone of analysis" in maintenance 
cases.  LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 32.   
¶20 The factor set forth in subsection (9) directs a 
circuit court to consider: "The contribution by one party to the 
                                                                  
requiring maintenance payments to either party for a 
limited 
or 
indefinite 
length 
of 
time 
after 
considering: 
    (1) The length of the marriage. 
    (2) The age and physical and emotional health of 
the parties. 
    (3) The division of property made under s. 
767.255. 
    (4) The educational level of each party at the 
time of marriage and at the time the action is 
commenced. 
    (5) The earning capacity of the party seeking 
maintenance, 
including 
educational 
background, 
training, employment skills, work experience, length 
of 
absence 
from 
the 
job 
market, 
custodial 
responsibilities for children and the time and expense 
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training 
to enable the party to find appropriate employment. 
    (6) 
The 
feasibility 
that 
the 
party 
seeking 
maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard 
of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during 
the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary 
to achieve this goal. 
    (7) The tax consequences to each party. 
    (8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties 
before or during the marriage, according to the terms 
of which one party has made financial or service 
contributions to the other with the expectation of 
reciprocation or other compensation in the future, 
where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual 
agreement made by the parties before or during the 
marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial 
support of the parties. 
    (9) 
The 
contribution 
by 
one 
party 
to 
the 
education, training or increased earning power of the 
other. 
    (10) Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant. 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
10
education, training or increased earning power of the other."  
Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9).8  We find nothing in this language 
limiting the contributions to those that arose only during the 
marital period.  This lack of limiting language indicates to us, 
as it did to the circuit court when it examined an identical 
provision, that the court may freely consider the total 
contributions and not merely those arising during the marriage.9 
¶21 We know from the language of § 767.26(4) that when the 
legislature saw fit to limit the temporal scope of a factor, it 
did so explicitly.  For instance, subsection (4) instructs the 
court to consider "[t]he educational level of each party at the 
time of marriage and at the time the action commenced."  Thus, 
under subsection (4) the inquiry is specifically directed to the 
education obtained during the marriage. 
¶22 Indeed, to read the contributions to education in 
subsection (9) to be limited to those rendered during the 
marriage 
would render 
subsection 
(9) 
largely 
superfluous, 
because subsection (4) already covers education obtained during 
                     
8 The petitioner also argues that Wis. Stat. § 767.26(8) and 
(10) provide a basis for the maintenance award.  Because we base 
our decision on subsection (9), we need not address these 
provisions. 
9 The dissent suggests that the legislative directive to 
consider the "length of the marriage" in Wis. Stat. § 767.26(1) 
should apply to all subsequently listed factors.  Dissent at 
¶67.  Nothing in the statute indicates that subsection (1) has 
primacy over the other enumerated factors.  Indeed, such a 
suggestion 
effectively 
would 
require 
us 
to 
rewrite 
the 
enumerated factors by adding limiting language where none 
currently exists.   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
11
the marriage.  In interpreting a statute we must avoid a 
construction that results in a portion of a statute being 
rendered superfluous.  Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 
41, ¶30, 234 Wis. 2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467.   
¶23 The respondent argues that legislative intent as 
embodied in Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2) prevents any construction of 
the statute that allows for consideration of the petitioner's 
premarital contributions.10  Section 765.001(2) provides a 
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 765.001 reads: 
765.001 Title, intent and construction of chs. 765 to 
768. 
    (1) TITLE. Chapters 765 to 768 may be cited as 
"The Family Code". 
    (2) INTENT. It is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 to 
promote the stability and best interests of marriage 
and the family. It is the intent of the legislature to 
recognize the valuable contributions of both spouses 
during the marriage and at termination of the marriage 
by dissolution or death. Marriage is the institution 
that is the foundation of the family and of society. 
Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, 
and of vital interest to society and the state. The 
consequences 
of 
the 
marriage 
contract 
are 
more 
significant to society than those of other contracts, 
and the public interest must be taken into account 
always. The seriousness of marriage makes adequate 
premarital counseling and education for family living 
highly desirable and courses thereon are urged upon 
all persons contemplating marriage. The impairment or 
dissolution of the marriage relation generally results 
in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect 
upon the parties immediately concerned. Under the laws 
of this state, marriage is a legal relationship 
between 2 equal persons, a husband and wife, who owe 
to each other mutual responsibility and support. Each 
spouse has an equal obligation in accordance with his 
or her ability to contribute money or services or both 
which are necessary for the adequate support and 
maintenance of his or her minor children and of the 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
12
general statutory statement of legislative intent applicable to 
the four statutory chapters that comprise the Family Code.  The 
statute makes a strong statement regarding the importance of 
marriage and family.  It begins by stating that the Family Code 
is intended to "promote the stability and best interests of 
marriage and the family."  Thereafter, the legislature offers a 
brief catalogue of generalized policy goals and concerns and a 
description of the mutual obligations of the parties to a 
marriage. 
¶24 The respondent asserts that the second sentence of 
§ 765.001(2) should control our reading of the maintenance 
statute:  "It is the intent of the legislature to recognize the 
valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage and 
at termination of the marriage by dissolution or death."  He 
reads the sentence as limiting the contributions that may be 
considered to those that arise "during the marriage."   
¶25 At oral argument the respondent's counsel advanced 
that the legislature may have refrained from including a time 
limitation in the maintenance statute because such a limitation 
was clearly intended by this second sentence of § 765.001(2).  
However, the legislative history of the statutory language 
undermines such a position.  This second sentence was not added 
until 1983, six years after enactment of the Divorce Reform Act 
                                                                  
other spouse. No spouse may be presumed primarily 
liable for support expenses under this subsection. 
    (3) CONSTRUCTION. Chapters 765 to 768 shall be 
liberally construed to effect the objectives of sub. 
(2). 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
13
and four years after the last revision of the maintenance 
statute.  Ch. 105, Laws of 1977; § 33, ch. 196, Laws of 1979.  
Moreover, the sentence was added when the legislature enacted 
the Marital Property Act, with which it recognized, during the 
marriage, the contributions of both spouses.  1983 Wis. Act 186, 
§ 46.  We will not read a restriction into § 767.26(9) based on 
this postdated statement of legislative intent. 
¶26 Additionally, while we recognize that in Wis. Stat. 
§ 765.001(3) we are directed by the legislature to liberally 
construe the provisions of the Family Code to effect the 
objectives listed in § 765.001(2), we are not inclined to allow 
a generalized statement of intent to override the plain language 
of a specific, substantive statutory provision.  The rules of 
statutory construction generally require that specific statutory 
provisions take precedence over general provisions.  State ex 
rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 595-96, 
547 N.W.2d 587 (1996).   
¶27 We believe a similar principle is applicable in a case 
such as this.  On the one hand, the substantive provision is a 
specific factor set forth in § 767.26.  On the other hand, the 
statement of legislative intent covers in broad fashion the 
entire panoply of concerns addressed by the four statutory 
chapters comprising the Family Code. 
¶28 Our refusal to restrict the application of § 767.26(9) 
based on § 765.001(2) is bolstered by the fact that the various 
statements of legislative intent that make up § 765.001(2) bear 
no historical relationship to the statutory provision at issue 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
14
in this case.  The legislature added the controlling provision 
in this case, Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), to the statutes in 1979.  
§ 33, ch. 196, Laws of 1979.  It added this particular provision 
independent of any other § 767.26 factor.  The language of 
subsection (9) first appeared in the identically phrased 
provision of the property division statute, now numbered Wis. 
Stat. § 767.255(3)(f), as part of the 1977 Divorce Reform Act.  
§ 41, ch. 105, Laws of 1977.  In contrast, some of the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2) predates subsection (9) or its analog 
in the property division statute by almost two decades.  § 4, 
ch. 595, Laws of 1959.  The legislature added other language of 
the intent provision after it added subsection (9).  1983 Wis. 
Act 186, § 46. 
¶29 Our decision today is consistent with the limitations 
of liberal construction that we have discussed in the past.  We 
have long stated that we would refuse to read language into the 
plain language of a statute under the guise of liberal 
construction.  Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 467 N.W.2d 
772 (1991); Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 
335, 342, 168 N.W.2d 581 (1969).  Furthermore, "[w]hat is called 
a liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes a statute 
apply to more things or in more situations than would be the 
case under a strict construction."  R.W.S. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 
862, 871-72, 471 N.W.2d 16 (1991).  Thus, the restrictive 
interpretation of subsection (9) urged by the respondent seems 
inconsistent with the concept of liberal construction, as we 
have generally described the concept in the past. 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
15
¶30 Despite the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), 
the court of appeals held that Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 
405 N.W.2d 303 (1987), precludes any reading of the maintenance 
statute 
that 
allowed 
for 
consideration 
of 
premarital 
contributions.  In Watts, we held that a property division under 
Chapter 767 was not available to unmarried couples.  Id. at 519-
20.  We based this conclusion on a lack of legislative intent to 
allow unmarried couples to proceed under the divorce statutes.  
Id.  In the case at hand, the court of appeals extended this 
concept to forbid consideration of premarital contributions in 
making maintenance determinations between divorcing parties.  
¶31 Watts does not dictate the result reached by the court 
of appeals in this case.  The respondent's and the court of 
appeal's reliance on it ignores the fundamental distinction 
between the facts of this case and those in Watts: unlike the 
parties in Watts, the parties in this case did marry and were 
married at the time maintenance was sought under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.26.   
¶32 In Watts, the parties lived together for twelve years, 
never marrying.  Id. at 513-14.  At the end of their 
relationship, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover a 
share of the couple's property and compensation for her 
contributions to the relationship.  Id. at 514.  Her suit 
entailed several causes of action, among which was a property 
division action brought under Wis. Stat. § 767.255.  Id. at 514-
15.  The plaintiff argued that she, the defendant, and their 
children constituted a "family," and therefore she was entitled 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
16
to proceed under § 767.255, as it was part of the Family Code.  
Id. at 515.  We held that unmarried cohabitants could not 
proceed under Wis. Stat. § 767.255, although we also concluded 
that the plaintiff could proceed in her causes of action based 
on contract, unjust enrichment, and partition.  Id. at 521-38. 
¶33 The portion of Watts relied upon by the court of 
appeals addressed only the availability of a proceeding under 
the divorce statutes.  In a sense, the issue was whether an 
unmarried person had standing to pursue a property division 
under the divorce statutes.  This case concerns the scope of 
such a statute in an action properly brought under the divorce 
statutes.  Indeed, the action was not only proper, but when the 
petitioner sought to dissolve her marriage she was required to 
proceed under Chapter 767.  Once properly proceeding under the 
divorce statutes, those statutory provisions control. 
¶34 We acknowledge that in Watts we relied upon portions 
of Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2) in limiting the availability of a 
Wis. Stat. § 767.255 property division to married couples.  Id. 
at 518-19.  However, in Watts we were concerned with defining 
"family" and the applicability of the Family Code provisions in 
general. We deal here, however, with a specific statutory 
provision, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.26(9), 
addressing 
a 
specific 
concern, the factors for a circuit court to consider in awarding 
maintenance payments. 
¶35 In addition to Watts, the court of appeals relied on 
its opinion in Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 791, 454 
N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1990).  In Greenwald, a party to a divorce 
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
17
action argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to 
consider her premarital contributions to her husband when making 
its maintenance and property division determinations under the 
"catch-all" 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.26(10) 
and 
§ 767.255(12).11  In upholding the circuit court, the court of 
appeals 
summarily 
concluded 
that 
the 
facts 
in 
Greenwald 
presented "the very situation addressed in Watts."  Id. at 790. 
 We disagree.   
¶36 Again, a pivotal distinction exists between the facts 
in Greenwald and the facts in Watts.  In Greenwald the parties 
married, and in Watts they never married.  Yet, the court in 
Greenwald extrapolated the holding in Watts for the premise that 
even if the parties subsequently marry, nothing premarital may 
be considered.  Such a premise is inconsistent with the property 
division statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.255, addressed in Watts.  
¶37 Under 
a 
provision 
of 
§ 767.255, 
a 
court 
is 
specifically instructed to consider "[t]he property brought to 
the marriage by each party."  Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b).  The 
consideration of premarital property required by this statute 
contravenes 
the 
Greenwald 
court's 
premise 
that 
nothing 
premarital may be considered even if the parties subsequently 
marry.  Thus the Greenwald court, in relying on Watts, failed to 
acknowledge the critical factual distinction between the two 
cases and also incorrectly extrapolated from Watts a premise 
                     
11  The catch-all provision of the property division statute 
is now numbered Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(m).   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
18
that is inconsistent with the property division statute.  Thus, 
to the extent that the language of the Greenwald court suggests 
that Watts, by extension, necessarily precludes premarital 
considerations, such language should not be relied upon as 
controlling authority.   
¶38 Finally, we note that the dissent misconstrues the 
scope of today's holding.  We stress that under this decision, 
it is not cohabitation which may justify a circuit court's 
discretionary decision to award maintenance, but rather it is 
the contribution to the education of the spouse which justifies 
the award.   
¶39 Our opinion today is but another addition to a line of 
cases that we have described as "university degree-divorce 
decree" cases.  Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 206, 343 
N.W.2d 796 (1984); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 
N.W.2d 918 (1982); Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 
358 (1982).  This court has described a university degree-
divorce decree case as follows: 
 
[W]hile one spouse pursues an undergraduate, graduate, 
or professional degree or license, the other works to 
support the couple and foregoes his or her own 
education or career and the immediate benefits of a 
second income which the student spouse might have 
provided.  The couple typically expects that the 
degree will afford them a higher shared standard of 
living in the future.  That standard of living is 
never realized by the supporting spouse when the 
marriage breaks up just as the newly educated spouse 
is beginning the long-awaited career.   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
19
Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 206-07.12   
¶40 In such cases, we have recognized "that the supporting 
spouse 
was 
entitled 
to 
be 
fairly 
compensated 
for 
the 
contribution to the support of the student spouse."  Id. at 211. 
 Further, we have stated that the maintenance and property 
division statutes "provide a flexible means by which the trial 
court may examine all the relevant circumstances of the 
particular 
case 
and 
can, 
in 
its 
discretion, 
award 
just 
compensation to a supporting spouse by using either maintenance 
or property division or both."  Id. at 211.   
¶41 In essence, these university degree-divorce decree 
cases are about discretionary application of the relevant 
statutory provisions, including § 767.26(9), and the objective 
of fairness and equity underlying the statutes.  See Haugan, 117 
Wis. 2d at 207-11; Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 12-15.  In applying 
these statutes the circuit court has "broad discretion in 
rendering a fundamentally fair and equitable decision in each 
case."  Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 211.  When discussing fairness in 
the context of university degree-divorce decree cases, we have 
said "it is unfair . . . to deny the supporting spouse a share 
in the anticipated enhanced earnings while the student spouse 
                     
12 Although the quoted passage from Haugan mentions foregone 
educational or career opportunities, the opinion later states 
that compensation under the divorce statutes may be had for 
contributions alone, where there is no evidence of foregone 
opportunities.  Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 219, 343 
N.W.2d 796 (1984).   
No. 
99-0178 
 
 
20
keeps the degree and all the financial rewards it promises."  
Id. at 207.   
¶42 Here the circuit court determined that the language of 
§ 767.26(9) 
did 
not 
restrict 
its 
consideration 
of 
the 
petitioner's 
premarital 
contributions 
to 
the 
respondent's 
education in making its maintenance determination.  Moreover, 
the circuit court concluded that fairness and equity required 
this award of maintenance.  Because we find no error in this 
exercise of discretion, we uphold the maintenance determination. 
¶43 In sum, because a circuit court's consideration of 
premarital contributions by one spouse to the education of the 
other falls within Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), we conclude that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
making its maintenance determination.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
  
 
 
No. 99-0178.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
join the majority opinion.  I write merely to observe that while 
subsection (9) is the most directly applicable of the factors, 
further justification for the circuit court's award is found in 
subsection (10).  Furthermore, in some cases, subsection (8) may 
be helpful. 
¶45 Under subsection (10) a circuit court may consider 
"[s]uch other factors as the court may in each individual case 
determine to be relevant."  This broad "catchall" provision 
exemplifies the flexibility that a circuit court has in crafting 
a fair and equitable remedy.  Like subsection (9), the catchall 
contains no language limiting its scope to the marital period. 
¶46 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and DAVID T. PROSSER join this concurrence. 
 
 
99-0178.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶47 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring).   In this state, 
circuit courts have broad discretion in making maintenance 
determinations.  In 1995 this court emphasized that "the amount 
and duration of maintenance is entrusted to the sound discretion 
of the circuit court."  Olski v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 237, 243 
n.2, 540 N.W.2d 412 (1995).  "An appellate court will not 
disturb a circuit court's decision unless the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion."  Id.  These principles of 
broad discretion in the circuit court and substantial deference 
by an appellate court were reaffirmed last year in King v. King, 
224 Wis. 2d 235, 247-48, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999). 
¶48 The circuit court's broad discretion in maintenance 
determinations contrasts with its limited discretion in other 
areas 
of 
family 
law. 
 
For 
instance, 
absent 
certain 
circumstances, circuit courts are required to "presume that 
joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child" in 
custody determinations, Wis. Stat. § 767.24(2)(am) (1999-00), 
and they are "required to calculate the appropriate award of 
child support by using the DHSS percentage standards unless a 
party requests a deviation and the court finds that the 
percentage standards are unfair to the child or any party."  
Evenson v. Evenson, 228 Wis. 2d 676, 687-88, 598 N.W.2d 232 (Ct. 
App. 1999); see also Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1j) (1999-00). 
¶49 Sound discretion in maintenance determinations must 
reflect consideration of the factors set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.26, but the factors in the statute do not appear to be 
99-0178.dtp 
 
2 
weighted, implying that the weighting will be done by the 
circuit court. 
¶50 In addition, the court's discretion is underscored by 
the broad catchall at the end of the section, in which the court 
may consider "such other factors as the court may in each 
individual 
case 
determine 
to 
be 
relevant." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.26(10). 
¶51 In this case, the circuit court awarded maintenance 
payments to Julia Meyer based in part upon her contribution to 
the education, training, and increased earning power of Dr. 
Joseph Meyer during the period from 1986 to 1997.  Because Julia 
Meyer did not marry Joseph Meyer until 1993, she made more than 
seven years of contribution outside of the marriage.  The 
circuit court thought these seven-plus years should count.  In 
making the award, the court explained its determination by using 
the 
very 
words 
contained 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.26(9), 
"contribution . . . to the education, training, or increased 
earning power" of the other party.  It emphasized that the 
statute did not "specifically say 'during the marriage.'"  The 
court then observed: 
 
It is clear that other factors are to be considered 
specifically during the marriage. 
 
But, in this situation, where the parties have made 
contributions toone party has made a contribution to 
the increased earning capacity and education of the 
other throughout their relationship, the Court is, in 
my mind, free to consider the total amount of the 
contribution and not just simply the contribution 
during the marriage because that's not what the 
statute says.  
99-0178.dtp 
 
3 
 
. . .  
 
I 
do 
believe 
that, 
standing 
by 
itself, 
the 
contribution of Mrs. Meyer to the education, training, 
and increased earning capacity of Dr. Meyer is 
sufficient . . . to 
provide 
her 
some 
compensation 
under a fairness and equity argument in this case. 
¶52 The circuit court is charged with the responsibility 
of ensuring "a fair and equitable financial arrangement between 
the parties in each individual case."  LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 
Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987).  The court in this case 
articulated specific statutory language in making its award.  It 
could have cited the even broader authority for its discretion 
in Wis. Stat. § 767.26(10).  I cannot conclude on these facts 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
making an error of law.  Consequently, I join this court's 
strong majority opinion as well as the concurrence of Chief 
Justice Abrahamson. 
¶53 I also note, as does the Chief Justice, that Wis. 
Stat. § 767.26(8) is potentially relevant in this case.  This 
subsection is relevant to statutory interpretation because it 
explicitly 
entertains 
the 
possibility 
that 
"any 
mutual 
agreement" before marriage may be considered in the maintenance 
determination. 
¶54 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.   
¶55 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
 ABRAHAMSON 
and 
Justice 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH 
join 
this 
concurrence. 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
1 
 
¶56 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (Dissenting).  I 
respectfully 
dissent.  The majority interprets Wisconsin's Family Code to 
authorize circuit courts to consider periods of premarital 
cohabitation in awarding maintenance in divorce actions.  This 
is a form of "palimony," and I cannot find support for it in the 
language or purposes of the Family Code.  
¶57 We know the Family Code does not apply to claims of 
parties 
who 
are 
dissolving 
non-marital 
cohabitation 
relationships.  See Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 
 303 (1987).  Wisconsin law does not provide legal remedies for 
separating cohabitants except in the very narrow instance in 
which one party attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of 
property acquired during the relationship and the facts support 
application of a common law contract or quasi-contract theory.  
Id.  
¶58 This case is a variation on the theme.  Here the issue 
is whether the Family Code authorizes compensation in the form 
of maintenance for periods of premarital cohabitation.  The 
question is not whether the Family Code applies (it does), but 
how far it goes.  If a man and a woman live together and then 
eventually marry, can the period of premarital cohabitation be 
combined with the marriage for purposes of evaluating an award 
of maintenance upon divorce?  
¶59 It may seem perfectly fair to answer this question 
"yes," and therefore affirm the circuit court's award of 
maintenance for Julia Meyer's many and significant contributions 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
2 
to Joseph Meyer's achievement of his medical degree during their 
lengthy premarital cohabitation, which was followed by a shorter 
marriage.  After all, it is commonplace in today's society for 
couples to live together before marriage, and not unusual for 
one party to support the other while higher education and 
training is pursued during cohabitation, as was the case here. 
¶60 We are, however, bound by the unambiguous language of 
the maintenance statute, which cannot reasonably be read to 
authorize circuit courts to award maintenance for periods of 
premarital cohabitation.  In addition, the quasi-contract theory 
of unjust enrichment does not extend to "palimony," but only to 
cases involving the unjust retention of property by one party to 
the cohabitation relationship.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
court of appeals. 
 
¶61 The maintenance statute provides that "[u]pon every 
judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation" the circuit 
court may award maintenance after considering a broad list of 
factors:   
(1) The length of the marriage. 
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of 
the parties. 
(3) The division of property made under s. 
767.255. 
(4) The educational level of each party at the 
time of marriage and at the time the action is 
commenced. 
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking 
maintenance, 
including 
educational 
background, 
training, employment skills, work experience, length 
of 
absence 
from 
the 
job 
market, 
custodial 
responsibilities for children and the time and expense 
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training 
to enable the party to find appropriate employment. 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
3 
(6) 
The 
feasibility 
that 
the party 
seeking 
maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard 
of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during 
the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary 
to achieve this goal. 
(7) The tax consequences to each party. 
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties 
before or during the marriage, according to the terms 
of which one party has made financial or service 
contributions to the other with the expectation of 
reciprocation or other compensation in the future, 
where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual 
agreement made by the parties before or during the 
marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial 
support of the parties.   
(9) 
The 
contribution 
by 
one 
party 
to 
the 
education, training or increased earning power of the 
other. 
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant.  
Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (emphasis added).  
¶62 The majority rests its decision entirely on subsection 
(9), 
which 
directs 
circuit 
courts 
to 
consider 
"[t]he 
contribution by one party to the education, training or 
increased earning power of the other."  The majority reasons 
that because subsection (9) contains no language limiting the 
evaluation of this factor to the "marital period," circuit 
courts "may freely consider the total contributions and not 
merely those arising during the marriage."  Majority op. at  
¶20.  Thus, according to the majority, circuit courts are free 
to expand the scope of the inquiry beyond the "marital period" 
to include any premarital cohabitation that may have preceded 
it.  The majority characterizes this as a "plain language" 
reading of the statute. 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
4 
¶63 I disagree.  The majority approach reads subsection 
(9) in isolation and ignores the obvious import of the statute 
as a whole.  We are, after all, interpreting a law that pertains 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
powers 
and 
obligations 
upon 
the 
dissolution of a contract of marriage.   Marriage is commonly 
and legally understood to begin when a man and a woman in fact 
marry, not when they start living together.13 
¶64 It is odd, therefore, that the majority finds the 
absence of any statutory language limiting subsection (9) to the 
"marital period" significant to the determination of whether 
premarital cohabitation can be included in the maintenance 
equation.  I find the absence of language of expansion to be 
more significant than the absence of language of limitation.  
That is, since the dissolution of the marriage is the obvious 
focus of the statute, and since there is nothing in the text of 
subsection (9) expressly expanding the scope of the inquiry 
beyond the marriage, we can hardly interpret the statute as 
authorizing the circuit court to go outside the marriage to 
reach periods of premarital cohabitation in its maintenance 
decision. 
                     
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 765.16 provides that marriage can be 
entered into only after a marriage license has been issued and 
only by the mutual declarations of the parties to be joined as 
husband and wife before a "duly authorized officiating person" 
and two adult witnesses.  Marriages contracted in violation of 
the statutory requirements are void. Wis. Stat. § 765.21.  
Common law marriages were abolished in 1917.  § 21, ch. 218, 
Laws of 1917. 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
5 
¶65 In fact, subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 767.26 directs 
the circuit court to consider "[t]he length of the marriage" 
when deciding the issue of maintenance.  The statute does not 
say the circuit court should consider "the length of the 
marriage plus any period of premarital cohabitation," or "the 
total length of the parties' relationship," or any other 
combination of words that would explicitly or implicitly signal 
that premarital cohabitation is covered.   The fact that the 
legislature did not repeat the "length of the marriage" factor 
as a sort of "qualifier" in each of the subsequent statutory 
subsections does not mean that courts are free to disregard it, 
adding 
premarital 
cohabitation 
to 
the 
mix 
in 
evaluating 
subsection (9) or any of the other enumerated factors in the 
maintenance statute.14 
¶66 The 
majority 
purports 
to 
find 
support 
for 
its 
interpretation of subsection (9) in subsection (4) of the 
statute, which allows the circuit court to consider "[t]he 
educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at 
the time the action is commenced."  The majority says the 
language of subsection (4) demonstrates legislative intent to 
impose a "temporal" limit on the evaluation of this particular 
                     
14 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, I have not said 
that the "length of the marriage" subsection should be read into 
all the subsequent subsections of the maintenance statute, only 
that it informs our interpretation of the statute as a whole, 
and 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
it 
incorporates 
periods 
of 
premarital cohabitation into the marriage for purposes of a 
maintenance determination.  
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
6 
maintenance factor.  Therefore, the logic goes, the lack of 
similar limiting language in subsection (9) must mean that the 
legislature intended no temporal limit on the consideration of 
one party's contribution to the education of the other. 
¶67 But a legislative expression of limitation in one part 
of a statute does not always and necessarily imply limitlessness 
in another.  This technique of interpretation is especially 
misplaced here, in light of the explicit reference to "the 
length of the marriage" in subsection (1) of the statute.  
Furthermore, it is a pretty broad interpretive leap from the 
"temporal" limitation in subsection (4) to the conclusion that 
subsection (9) authorizes "palimony" awards for premarital 
cohabitation.  We are not really talking about temporal issues 
at all, but definitional ones: can premarital cohabitation be 
considered part of the marriage for purposes of evaluating the 
propriety, amount, and duration of a maintenance award upon 
dissolution of the marriage?  Not, in my judgment, unless the 
legislature has said so very clearly.  And it has not. 
¶68 The majority also believes that if subsection (9) is 
construed to refer to contributions made only during the 
marriage, it would be rendered "largely superfluous because 
subsection (4) already covers education obtained during the 
marriage."  Majority op. at ¶22.  This misunderstands the 
difference between the two subsections.  The former tells the 
circuit court to evaluate the educational level of each party at 
the time of the marriage and divorce; the latter tells the judge 
to consider the contributions made by one party to the education 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
7 
and training of the other.  These are two very different 
inquiries, aimed at different considerations.  The circuit court 
looks at the relative educational levels of the parties at the 
time of the marriage and divorce in order to evaluate post-
divorce 
standard-of-living 
questions 
in 
the 
maintenance 
determination.  The court looks to the educational contributions 
of one party to the other in order to provide some compensation 
for that "investment" in the form of a maintenance award.  
Interpreting subsection (9) to be confined to educational 
contributions made during the marriage creates no superfluity.  
¶69 The majority also disregards, wrongly I think, the 
legislature's very clear statement of intent that the Family 
Code pertains only to the institutions of marriage and the 
family, neither of which is defined in such a way as to include 
either non-marital or premarital cohabitation.  The statement of 
legislative purpose is unequivocal:  
 
INTENT.  It is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 [the 
Family Code] to promote the stability and best 
interests of marriage and the family.  It is the 
intent of the legislature to recognize the valuable 
contributions of both spouses during the marriage and 
at termination of the marriage by dissolution or 
death.  Marriage is the institution that is the 
foundation of the family and of society.  Its 
stability is basic to morality and civilization, and 
of vital interest to society and the state. ... Under 
the 
laws 
of 
this 
state, 
marriage 
is 
a 
legal 
relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband and 
wife, who owe to each other mutual responsibility and 
support.  Each spouse has an equal obligation in 
accordance with his or her ability to contribute money 
or services or both which are necessary for the 
adequate support and maintenance of his or her minor 
children and of the other spouse. 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
8 
Wis. Stat. § 765.001 (emphasis added).   
¶70 The majority dismisses the legislature's statement of 
intent by saying it is "postdated" and too general to override 
the "plain language of a specific, substantive statutory 
provision," that is, subsection (9) of the maintenance statute. 
 But 
the 
majority's 
"plain 
language" 
interpretation 
of 
subsection (9) is plainly wrong, and the legislature's statement 
of the Family Code's purpose as a whole cannot be disregarded 
merely because it was enacted after the particular statutory 
provision in question.  The legislature need not have repealed 
and recreated each and every section of the Family Code at the 
time it enacted its statement of intent in order to have that 
statement respected by the courts.   
¶71 The majority opinion is also inconsistent with the 
prior decisions of this court and the court of appeals on this 
issue.15  In Watts, this court declined to extend the Family Code 
                     
15 The majority cites Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 
N.W.2d 796 (1984), Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 
N.W.2d 918 (1982), and Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 
N.W.2d 358 (1982), the so-called "university degree-divorce 
decree" cases, and concludes that this case is merely an 
addition to the genre.  Majority op. at ¶39.  None of these 
cases involved the question of whether to include premarital 
cohabitation as part of a property division or maintenance award 
in a divorce. Furthermore, while the circuit courts have broad 
discretion to make property division and maintenance decisions 
to achieve fairness and equity in individual cases,  Haugan, 117 
Wis. 2d at 211, this case involves an alleged error of law: the 
inclusion 
of 
premarital 
cohabitation 
in 
the 
maintenance 
determination 
without 
any 
statutory 
authority 
to 
do 
so.   
Accordingly, the "university degree-divorce decree" cases do not 
help the analysis. 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
9 
to non-marital cohabitants based upon the clear and unambiguous 
language restricting its application to marriages and families 
"within the 'marriage' context."  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 519.  
Indeed, the court found its conclusion "almost inescapable" 
based upon the language of the code: 
 
[T]he Family Code emphasizes marriage.  The entire 
Family Code, of which ch. 767 is an integral part, is 
governed 
generally 
by 
the 
provisions 
of 
sec. 
765.001(2), which states in part that "[i]t is the 
intent of chs. 765 to 768 to promote the stability and 
best interests of marriage and the family. . . .  
Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of 
family and of society.  Its stability is basic to 
morality and civilization, and of vital interest to 
society and the state." (Emphasis supplied.)  Section 
765.001(3) further states that "[c]hapters 765 to 768 
shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives 
of sub. (2)."  The conclusion is almost inescapable 
from this language in sec. 765.001(2)(3) that the 
legislature not only intended chs. 765-768 to protect 
and promote the "family," but also intended "family" 
to be within the "marriage" context. 
 
The statutory prohibition of marriages which do 
not conform to statutory requirements, sec. 765.21, 
Stats. 1985-86, further suggests that the legislature 
intended that the Family Code applies, for the most 
part, to those couples who have been joined in 
marriage according to law. 
 
On the basis of our analysis of sec. 767.255 and 
the Family Code which revealed no clear evidence that 
the legislature intended sec. 767.255 to apply to 
unmarried persons, we decline the invitation to extend 
the 
application 
of 
sec. 
767.255 
to 
unmarried 
cohabitants. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 518-20.   
¶72 The majority notes an important distinction between 
this case and Watts: there, the cohabiting parties never married 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
10
and yet one attempted to invoke the Family Code upon dissolution 
of the relationship; here, the cohabiting parties eventually 
married and were therefore required to proceed under the Family 
Code upon divorce.  This distinction speaks to the applicability 
of the Family Code but not to its scope.  Yes, of course, the 
Family Code applies to this action, but what does it apply to: 
the marriage, or the marriage plus any period of premarital 
cohabitation that preceded it?  As noted above, I find nothing 
in the language of the code, or its purposes, to support the 
latter answer to the question and much to support the former.   
¶73 Watts gave effect to the language and expressed intent 
of the legislature in declining to extend the Family Code to 
non-marital cohabitation.  I see no reason to interpret that 
same language and expressed legislative intent any differently 
in the case of premarital cohabitation. 
¶74 Indeed, in Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 
454 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1990), the court of appeals, based upon 
Watts, reached the same conclusion.  Josephine and Darwin 
Greenwald lived together for ten years and were married for less 
than three.  Josephine wanted the ten years of premarital 
cohabitation added to the much shorter marriage for purposes of 
the property division and maintenance determinations at the time 
of the parties' divorce.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the statutes would not allow it, for the reasons stated in 
Watts:  
 
Although Watts did not present a maintenance claim, we 
are persuaded that Watts also requires us to reject 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
11
Josephine's claim that her premarital contribution to 
Darwin's 
estate 
is 
a 
relevant 
factor 
on 
her 
maintenance claim.  After examining the Family Code's 
legislative history 
in 
Watts, the 
supreme 
court 
concluded that the code did not govern property 
divisions between unmarried cohabitants.  We conclude 
that this same reasoning applies with equal force to 
Josephine's maintenance claim . . . . 
 
Nor are we persuaded that the parties' later marriage 
requires a different result.  The matter at issue 
concerns 
Josephine's 
premarital 
contributions 
to 
Darwin's propertythe very situation addressed in 
Watts. 
Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d at 790 (citations omitted). 
¶75 The 
majority 
undermines 
but 
does 
not 
overrule 
Greenwald, finding a distinction between premarital and non-
marital cohabitation for purposes of interpreting the Family 
Code, and identifying Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b) as an example 
of an allowable "premarital 
consideration" 
that 
undercuts 
Greenwald's premise "that nothing premarital may be considered 
even if the parties subsequently marry."  Majority op. at ¶37.  
However, Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b), part of the property 
division statute, merely authorizes the circuit court to 
consider "[t]he property brought to the marriage by each party" 
in determining division of property in a divorce action.  It 
cannot reasonably be read to support a conclusion that a period 
of premarital cohabitation may be considered as if it were part 
of the marriage for purposes of a maintenance award under Wis. 
Stat. § 767.26. 
¶76 True, in Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b) we find express 
legislative authorization for the consideration of "something 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
12
premarital" in a divorce:  property brought to the marriage by 
each party.  The legislature is certainly free to authorize the 
consideration 
of 
other 
premarital 
factorseven 
premarital 
cohabitationin the property division and maintenance statutes 
of this state.  But it is the legislature's prerogative to do 
so, not ours.  However tempted we may be to expand a statute's 
reach to achieve a result we believe to be fair, we are bound by 
the language of the law, absent unconstitutionality or other 
unusual circumstances not present here.  The interpretive power 
resides legitimately in the judiciary, but we test the limits of 
our legitimacy when we extrapolate a statute's meaning from 
something not contained in its text, fairly and fully and 
reasonably construed.  This is especially true in areas as 
socially and culturally sensitive as marriage, the family and 
divorce. 
¶77 There is nothing in the language of the maintenance 
statute or any part of the Family Code that authorizes circuit 
courts to consider contributions made by one party to the 
education of the other during premarital cohabitation.  The 
majority's contrary conclusion is an unwarranted expansion of 
the scope of the maintenance statute.  The lack of limiting 
language in subsection (9) is not an invitation to read more 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
13
into the maintenance statute than its language, structure, and 
purpose as a whole will reasonably bear.16  
¶78 Finally, although the trial court and the majority did 
not need to reach the common law question in this case, I do.   
I agree with the court of appeals that the quasi-contract theory 
of unjust enrichment does not apply to these facts.  Watts held 
that "unmarried cohabitants may raise claims based upon unjust 
enrichment following the termination of their relationships 
where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable 
amount of property acquired through the efforts of both."  
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 532-33.  An action for unjust enrichment 
requires: "(1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the 
                     
16 The concurrences suggest that subsection (8), which 
permits the circuit court to consider premarital agreements 
regarding financial compensation or support, and subsection 
(10), the so-called "catchall" provision of the statute, provide 
further justification for the circuit court's maintenance award. 
 My 
conclusions 
about 
the 
proper 
interpretation 
of 
the 
maintenance statute apply with equal force to subsection (10).  
A "catchall" provision in a statute conferring decisionmaking 
discretion 
on 
the 
circuit 
court 
cannot 
be 
construed 
as 
conferring an unlimited license.  Rather, it must be read in 
context, subject, at least, to whatever limitations in scope are 
explicit or implicit in the purposes of the statute as a whole. 
 For the reasons I have already discussed, I do not think there 
is any justification for reading the "catchall" provision in the 
maintenance statute as authorizing the circuit court to expand 
the scope of the maintenance inquiry beyond the marriage to 
include compensation for periods of premarital cohabitation.  In 
addition, regarding the applicability of subsection (8), there 
is no evidence in this case of a premarital agreement between 
the parties concerning financial compensation or support, and 
the circuit court made no findings in this regard.  So 
subsection 
(8) 
cannot 
be 
invoked 
as 
authority 
for 
the 
maintenance award in this case. 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
14
plaintiff, (2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the 
benefit, and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by the 
defendant under the circumstances making it inequitable for the 
defendant to retain the benefit."  Id. at 531. 
¶79 The court of appeals has held that the theory of 
unjust enrichment, as applied to a cohabitation claim, requires 
that 
"the 
complaining 
party 
present 
proof 
of 
specific 
contributions that directly led to an increase in assets or an 
accumulation of wealth."  Ward v. Jahnke, 220 Wis. 2d 539, 547-
48, 583 N.W.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1998).  The complaining party must 
demonstrate: "(1) an accumulation of assets, (2) acquired 
through the efforts of the claimant and the other party and (3) 
retained by the other in an unreasonable amount." Waage v. 
Borer, 188 Wis. 2d 324, 329-30, 525 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶80 In this case the circuit court found that Julia Meyer 
contributed in significant ways to Joseph Meyer's achievement of 
his 
medical 
degree 
while 
they 
lived 
together. 
These 
contributions, however, did not result in an accumulation of 
assets or property through the efforts of both.  What Julia 
Meyer is really seeking is a share of Joseph Meyer's future 
earning potential as a result of having helped him earn his 
medical degree during their premarital cohabitation.  Future 
earning potential is not an asset or property which can be 
recovered in an action for unjust enrichment by one cohabitant 
(non-marital or premarital) against the other. 
¶81 At present the law of unjust enrichment as applied to 
cohabitants is narrowly confined to situations in which one 
No. 99-0178.dss 
 
15
cohabitant 
unfairly 
retains 
property 
acquired 
through the 
efforts of both.  I would not extend it further.  To do so would 
open the door to all sorts of "palimony" claims.  Our cases have 
not ventured far down this road, for good reason.  To provide 
further 
measure 
of 
legal 
protection 
for 
cohabitation 
relationships via the common law is a serious step with 
substantial consequences for the institutions of marriage and 
the family.  It would inject this court into a social, cultural 
and policy debate which I think is better left to the 
legislative branch. 
¶82 Accordingly, for these reasons, I would affirm the 
court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's award of 
maintenance in this case, and remand for reconsideration of the 
maintenance issue, 
excluding 
consideration 
of 
the Meyers' 
premarital cohabitation. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissent. 
 
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