Title: State ex rel. Fleming v. Fox

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Fleming v. Fox, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-3555.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-3555 
THE STATE EX REL. FLEMING ET AL. v. FOX ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Fleming v. Fox, Slip Opinion No.  
2019-Ohio-3555.] 
Elections—Mandamus—County-charter 
petition—Adequate 
remedy 
in 
the 
ordinary course of the law—Writ denied. 
(No. 2019-1108—Submitted August 28, 2019—Decided September 3, 2019.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relators, six Williams County electors,1 
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, the Williams County Board of 
Elections and its members (collectively, “the board”),2 to place a petition for a 
proposed county charter on the November 5, 2019 ballot.  The board determined that 
                                                 
1. The relators are Sherry Lynn Fleming, Rosemary Hug, Albert Charles Kwader, Lyle Dean Brigle, 
Lou A. Pendleton, and Kim E. Gearhart.   
2. The board members are Mark E. Fox Sr., Scott Towers, Jeff Erb, and Paul Duggan.   
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the proposal was invalid after finding that it did not comply with Article X, Section 
3 of the Ohio Constitution, which governs county-charter proposals. 
{¶ 2} Relators’ main argument is that the board impermissibly examined the 
substance of the proposed charter, when it should have determined only the 
sufficiency and validity of the petition and signatures.  But we do not reach that issue.  
We deny the writ because relators had an adequate remedy at law. 
Background 
{¶ 3} On June 26, 2019, relators filed a petition with the board proposing the 
adoption of a county charter.  There is no dispute that the petition contained a 
sufficient number of valid signatures for placement on the ballot.  But on July 8, the 
board determined that the petition was invalid because it did not comply with Article 
X, Section 3.  That same day, relators challenged the board’s decision by requesting 
that the board bring an action in the Williams County Court of Common Pleas under 
R.C. 307.94.  The board commenced the action, and the court of common pleas 
affirmed the board’s decision on July 17. 
{¶ 4} On July 29, relators attempted to protest the board’s decision to the 
secretary of state under R.C. 307.95(B).  But on July 30, the board notified relators 
that it would not accept the protest or forward it to the secretary of state because 
relators already had elected to pursue an action in the common pleas court.  On 
August 2, relators asked the board to reconsider its refusal to accept the protest.  But 
on August 5, the board again refused to accept the protest. 
{¶ 5} On August 9, relators filed this original action seeking a writ of 
mandamus to compel the board to certify the petition to the November ballot. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal 
duty on the part of the board to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-
January Term, 2019 
 
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Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6, 13.  Because it is dispositive, we address the adequate-
remedy prong first. 
{¶ 7} Article X, Section 3 authorizes the people of a county to propose the 
adoption of a county charter.  R.C. 307.94, in turn, establishes the procedure for 
placing a proposed county charter on a ballot.  Under R.C. 307.94, if a board of 
elections finds that a county-charter petition is invalid, “the petitioners’ committee 
may protest such findings * * * as provided in section 307.95 of the Revised Code 
* * *, or request that the board of elections proceed to establish the validity or 
invalidity of the petition * * * in an action before the court of common pleas in the 
county.”  R.C. 307.94, paragraph two.  The statute plainly offers two ways to 
challenge an elections-board decision: either file a protest to be heard by the secretary 
of state under R.C. 307.95 or demand an action in the common pleas court.  State ex 
rel. Jones v. Husted, 147 Ohio St.3d 341, 2016-Ohio-5681, 65 N.E.3d 733, ¶ 11.  
Relators chose the latter option. 
{¶ 8} We held in Jones that judicial review under R.C. 307.94 is an adequate 
remedy at law.  Id. at ¶ 13-14.  See also State ex rel. McGinn v. Walker, 151 Ohio 
St.3d 199, 2017-Ohio-7714, 87 N.E.3d 204, ¶ 31 (DeWine, J., concurring in 
judgment only) (concluding that the relators had an adequate remedy because they 
had “already obtained legal review of the decisions of the boards of elections in 
common pleas court”).  We follow that holding today:  Relators obtained judicial 
review and could have appealed the common pleas court’s judgment in the ordinary 
course of law.  See Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); R.C. 2505.02. 
{¶ 9} Relators nevertheless argue that the common-pleas action was not 
adequate because the normal appellate process would not be completed in time for 
the election.  They contend that “Ohio’s courts of appeal have no obligation to 
accelerate consideration of ballot issue appeals.”  But even if we were to assume that 
a remedy at law is adequate in an elections case only if expeditious appellate review 
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is available, relators have not shown that timely appellate review was not available 
to them. 
{¶ 10} The Rules of Appellate Procedure, to be sure, do not provide for the 
expedited review of election matters.  But relators still could have asked the court of 
appeals to review the matter expeditiously, just as litigants often ask this court to 
expedite review when filing election matters outside the 90-day window for 
automatically expediting cases.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A)(1).  See also McGinn at 
¶ 31 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only) (“There is no reason to think that 
* * * courts of appeals are not as equipped as this court to decide these matters in an 
expeditious fashion”).  Relators cite cases in which we have suggested that the timing 
of normal appellate review generally is inadequate in an election matter.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 649 N.E.2d 
1205 (1995).  But those cases did not involve a special judicial proceeding under R.C. 
307.94—a remedy relators chose to pursue. 
{¶ 11} Although appellate review may not provide an adequate remedy in 
some election cases, the record here shows that there was ample time for relators to 
appeal:  If relators had appealed on July 18 (the day after the common pleas court 
decision), the court of appeals would have had 64 days to decide the appeal before this 
year’s September 20 deadline for distributing absentee ballots under the Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. 20302 (“UOCAVA”).  See 
R.C. 3511.04 (requiring distribution 46 days before the election).  Relators instead filed 
this action 23 days after the court decision, leaving only 42 days for the parties to brief 
and us to decide this case by the UOCAVA deadline.  Having wasted more than one-
third of the time available, relators’ claim that this action was their only option for 
timely judicial review rings hollow. 
{¶ 12} Relators argue that they should not be accountable for the 23-day 
delay because they spent part of that time attempting to protest the board’s decision 
to the secretary of state.  But having chosen to have the common pleas court review 
January Term, 2019 
 
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the board’s decision, relators had no right to file a protest.  Their argument to the 
contrary—i.e., that they had to exhaust both possible remedies—results from a 
misreading of Jones. 
{¶ 13} The petitioners in Jones neither filed a protest nor requested an action 
in the common pleas court.  147 Ohio St.3d 341, 2016-Ohio-5681, 65 N.E.3d 733, at 
¶ 11-14.  While the Jones petitioners understandably declined to file a protest because 
the secretary had participated in the invalidation of their petition by providing the 
tiebreaking vote, we held that they still had to pursue the other available statutory 
remedy.  Id. at ¶ 13.  Contrary to relators’ argument, Jones did not hold that a petition 
committee must (or could) pursue both a court action and a protest.  Indeed, not only 
is such a holding untenable under the plain language of R.C. 307.94, it also would 
create a clear separation-of-powers problem by effectively allowing an appeal of the 
common pleas court’s decision to the secretary of state.  See S. Euclid v. Jemison, 
28 Ohio St.3d 157, 503 N.E.2d 136 (1986), syllabus (holding that the separation of 
powers prohibits the appeal of a court decision to an executive-branch officer). 
{¶ 14} As a final matter, relators suggest that appellate review is adequate only 
if there is time for review by both the court of appeals and this court.  But relators have 
not shown that parties in an election dispute have an absolute right to an adjudication 
by this court before the election.  In short, relators fail to support their claim that initial 
review by a court of common pleas, followed by an appeal of right to a court of appeals, 
affords them an inadequate remedy at law. 
{¶ 15} Because relators had an adequate remedy at law, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 16} I concur in the majority’s judgment denying the writ of mandamus 
but would deny the writ for a different reason: the relators’ claim is barred by 
laches. 
{¶ 17} In an election case, extreme diligence and promptness are required.  
State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 
712 N.E.2d 696 (1999).  Respondents, the Williams County Board of Elections and 
its members (collectively, “the board”), argue that the relators, six Williams County 
electors, failed to act with the sense of urgency expected here and that the doctrine 
of laches should therefore apply to bar their claim.  I agree. 
{¶ 18} The elements of laches are “(1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time 
in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.”  State ex 
rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 
1277 (1995). 
{¶ 19} The relators waited 23 days from the date of the common pleas 
court’s decision before filing this action.  In prior election cases, we have held that 
shorter periods of time than this amount to an unreasonable delay.  See, e.g., Paschal 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 141, 142, 656 N.E.2d 1276 (1995) 
(finding that a 9-day delay did not satisfy the requisite diligence and prompt action 
required in election cases). 
{¶ 20} Nothing in the record—apart from the relators’ misreading of this 
court’s decision in State ex rel. Jones v. Husted, 147 Ohio St.3d 341, 2016-Ohio-
5681, 65 N.E.3d 733—explains, let alone excuses, this delay. 
{¶ 21} And, in this case, the relators had at least constructive knowledge 
that this 23-day delay would harm the board by reducing the time it had to finalize 
the ballot for the November election ahead of the statutorily imposed deadline for 
printing and distributing absentee ballots to members of the military and folks 
January Term, 2019 
 
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overseas.  See R.C. 3511.04 (requiring distribution of military and overseas absentee 
ballots by 46 days before the election (September 20, 2019)). 
{¶ 22} Finally, while this delay undisputedly harmed the board by 
compressing the ballot-printing process, we may go ahead and presume actual 
prejudice because the relators waited until 88 days before the November election 
to file their complaint.  This delay automatically expedited the matter under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A)(1).  When the relators’ delay causes the matter to become an 
expedited election case, prejudice is presumed.  State ex rel. Duclos v. Hamilton 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 145 Ohio St.3d 254, 2016-Ohio-367, 48 N.E.3d 543, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 23} Because all of the elements of laches are present, I would deny the 
writ on these grounds. 
_________________ 
Terry J. Lodge, for relators. 
Katherine J. Zartman, Williams County Prosecuting Attorney; McTigue & 
Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, Derek S. Clinger, and 
Ben F.C. Wallace, for respondents. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Jason D. Manion, 
Deputy Solicitor General, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney 
General. 
Chad A. Endsley, Leah F. Curtis, and Amy M. Milam, urging denial of the 
writ for amici curiae Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and Williams County Farm 
Bureau. 
_________________