Title: Douglas H. Cooner v. Alabama State Bar (Appeal from ASB No. 02-150

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  03/15/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
_________________________
1111340
_________________________
Douglas H. Cooner
v.
Alabama State Bar
Appeal from the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar 
(ASB No. 02-150(A))
WISE, Justice.
On February 17, 2010, a panel of the Disciplinary Board
("the Board") of the Alabama State Bar ("the Bar") ordered
that Douglas H. Cooner be disbarred from the practice of law. 
Cooner appealed the Board's decision to this Court.  On
1111340
October 8, 2010, this Court held that the Board's order
disbarring Cooner did not satisfy the requirements of Rule
4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P., because it did not include findings of
fact as to each allegation of misconduct adequate for this
Court to conduct a meaningful review to determine whether the
Board's conclusion that Cooner had violated Rules 1.7(b),
8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(g), Ala. R. Prof. Cond., was supported
by clear and convincing evidence.  Cooner v. Alabama State
Bar, 59 So. 3d 29 (Ala. 2010) ("Cooner I").   Accordingly,
1
this Court reversed the Board's judgment as to those
violations, ordered the Board to vacate its order of
disbarment as to those violations, and remanded this case for
the Board to enter a new order that complied with Rule 4.2,
Ala. R. Disc. P.  On June 27, 2012, the Board entered its
The Board also concluded that Cooner had violated Rule
1
1.8(c), Ala. R. Prof. Cond.  On appeal, Cooner conceded that
the Board's findings of fact regarding its determination that
he had violated Rule 1.8(c) were sufficient for appellate
review.  Based on that concession, this Court considered
Cooner's argument that the Board erred in finding that he had
violated Rule 1.8(c), Ala. R. Prof. Cond.; held that Cooner's
preparation of the trust instrument did not violate Rule
1.8(c), Ala. R. Prof. Cond.; and reversed the Board's judgment
with regard to the violation of Rule 1.8(c), Ala. R. Prof.
Cond.
2
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"Report and Order (On Remand)" ("the order on remand"). 
Cooner then appealed to this Court from that order.
Standard of Review 
"'The standard of review applicable to
an appeal from an order of the Disciplinary
Board is "that the order will be affirmed
unless it is not supported by clear and
convincing evidence or misapplies the law
to the facts."  Noojin v. Alabama State
Bar, 577 So. 2d 420, 423 (Ala. 1990),
citing Hunt v. Disciplinary Board of the
Alabama State Bar, 381 So. 2d 52 (Ala.
1980).' 
"Davis v. Alabama State Bar, 676 So. 2d 306, 308
(Ala. 1996)."
Cooner I, 59 So. 3d at 37.  
Discussion
I.
Cooner argues that the order on remand does not comply
with this Court's mandate in Cooner I.   In Cooner I, this
2
The Bar argues that Cooner did not preserve this issue
2
for our review because he did not raise this argument before
the Board.  However, 
"[w]ith respect to a trial court's duty on
remand, we have said:
"'It is well established that on
remand the issues decided by an appellate
court become the "law of the case," and
that the trial court must comply with the
appellate court's mandate.  Walker v.
3
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Court held that the recitation of the evidence in the Board's
original order did not constitute findings of fact as to each
allegation of misconduct and that the Board's order did not
contain conclusions of law as to each allegation of
misconduct.  Thus, we remanded the case for the Board to
vacate its February 17, 2010, order of disbarment and to enter
a new order that complied with Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P. 
On appeal from the order on remand, Cooner contends that
the Board did not vacate its February 17, 2010, order, even
though this Court instructed it do so in Cooner I; that the
order on remand does not comply with this Court's mandate in
Cooner I because it does not include specific findings of fact
Carolina Mills Lumber Co., 441 So. 2d 980
(Ala. Civ. App. 1983).  See also Erbe v.
Eady, 447 So. 2d 778 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984).
The trial court's duty is to comply with
the mandate "according to its true intent
and 
meaning," 
as 
determined 
by 
the
directions given by the reviewing court. 
Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So. 2d 151
(Ala. 1983).'
"Gray v. Reynolds, 553 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala. 1989)."
Ex parte King, 821 So. 2d 205, 208 (Ala. 2001).  Similarly,
the Board had a duty to comply with this Court's mandate in
Cooner I.  Because the Board had a duty to comply with this
Court's mandate, we will review Cooner's claim even though he
did not first present it to the Board.
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as to each allegation of misconduct; that the Board made only
"cosmetic changes" in the order on remand; and that the order
on remand "still simply recites the testimony and other
evidence presented at the hearing."  Cooner's brief, at p. 16. 
We agree.  
Initially, it does not appear that the Board vacated its
February 17, 2010, order as we instructed in Cooner I.  In
fact, the Board adopted the procedural history set forth in
the February 17, 2010, order.
The order on remand contains a section titled "Findings
of Fact," which includes a statement of facts with numbered
paragraphs.  It also includes a section titled "Conclusions of
Law," in which the Board quoted the specific Rule of
Professional Conduct involved in charges IV, IX, X, and XI
against Cooner, and found that Cooner was guilty of violating
each of those rules.  
However, the order on remand does not fully comply with
our mandate in Cooner I because the order on remand still does
not include specific findings of fact as to each allegation of
misconduct. In its brief, the Bar states:
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"Construing the Disciplinary Board's order as a
whole, it first references this Court's opinion of
October 8, 2010, and states the Board's intention to
enter a report and order consistent with that
opinion.  (C. 29)  The Board next references the
prior order of February 17, 2010, and adopts the
'PROCEDURAL HISTORY' section of that order by
reference.  (C. 29)  The next section of the Board's
order is captioned 'FINDINGS OF FACT,' which
contains 30 separately numbered paragraphs of facts
as found by the Disciplinary Board. (C. 29-35) 
Clearly, a valid construction of this section of the
Board's order is that these separately numbered
paragraphs are, indeed, the findings of fact as
found by the Board."
The Bar's brief, at p. 43 (capitalization in original). 
However, the "findings of fact" included in the order on
remand are nothing more than a general recitation of the
evidence presented at the hearing. Additionally, those
"findings of fact" are nearly identical to the recitation of
evidence this Court previously held was not sufficient to
comply with Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P.  See Cooner I, 59 So.
3d at 39.  Because the order on remand does not include
specific findings of fact as to each allegation of misconduct,
the order on remand does not comply with either Rule 4.2, Ala.
R. Disc. P., or with this Court's mandate in Cooner I, supra. 
Accordingly, we must again reverse the Board's order of
disbarment and remand this cause with directions that the
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Board vacate its February 17, 2010, order of disbarment,
vacate its order on remand, and enter a new order that
complies with Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P.  See Cooner I, supra.
II.
Cooner also argues that this Court should dismiss the
remaining formal charges against him because of the Board's
allegedly "excessive delay and its failure to comply with this
Court's mandate."  Cooner's brief, at p. 19.  Specifically, he
contends that the Board's failure to comply with Rule 4.2,
Ala. R. Disc. P., in its February 17, 2010, order frustrated
his right to appellate review pursuant to Rule 12(f), Ala. R.
Disc. P.; that the Board's "inordinate, and unexplained delay
in attending this Court's mandate has 
delayed 
and consequently
further frustrated, Mr. Cooner's right to appellate review of
the Board's conclusions of guilt"; and that, if this Court
concludes that the order on remand still does not comply with
Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P., the allegedly excessive delay in
this proceeding will only get worse.  Cooner's brief, at p.
21.3
In his reply brief, Cooner makes it clear that he is
3
challenging the delay between this Court's decision in Cooner
I and the entry of the order on remand and that he is not
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1111340
Cooner cites this Court's decisions in Noojin v. Alabama
State Bar, 577 So. 2d 420 (Ala. 1990), and Hayes v. Alabama
State Bar, 719 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1989), to support his position
that the disciplinary charges against him should be dismissed
based on the Board's delay in entering the order on remand. 
However, the circumstances in Hayes and Noojin that warranted
a dismissal of the disciplinary charges in those cases are
vastly different from the circumstances presented here.  
In Noojin, Noojin pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama ("the federal district court").  In November 1988,
Noojin received a suspended sentence and probation.  The
conditions of his probation provided that he not engage in the
practice of law for a period of one year and that, if a
complaint based on the action charged in the federal criminal
proceeding or any earlier act was filed with the Bar, Noojin's
response to the complaint would be that he would not oppose a
one-year suspension of his law license. 
arguing that the charges against him should be dismissed based
on the delay between the filing of formal charges and the
first setting of the hearing.
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1111340
On November 29, 1988, the Mobile Bar Association notified
Noojin that there was a complaint against him that arose out
of the action that was the basis for the proceedings in the
federal district court.  Noojin filed a written response that
was accompanied by a conditional guilty plea.  Noojin
subsequently contacted the Bar regarding the status of the
charges against him.  Both individuals he spoke with told
Noojin that the matter was still pending in the local
committee.  On June 29, 1989, Noojin filed a motion to dismiss
the proceeding, even though no formal charges had been filed
against him at that time.  Noojin did not receive a response
to his motion.  However, on October 24, 1989, Noojin was
served with disciplinary charges.  After a hearing was
conducted, the Board found him guilty of three of the six
charges and suspended him from the practice of law for a
period of one year.  Noojin appealed from the Board's order
suspending him from the practice of law. 
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1111340
Citing Rule 11, Ala. R. Disc. Enf.,  for support, Noojin
4
argued on appeal that the Board had violated his due-process
and equal-protection rights by delaying or deferring the
disciplinary action until after he had completed the
probationary period imposed by the federal district court.
Noojin, 577 So. 2d at 421.  This Court stated: 
"The real issue ... is whether the provisions of
Rule 11 should apply here, that is, whether the
Board had 'good cause' to defer or delay this
disciplinary proceeding because of the pending
federal action, knowing that the federal judge had
made it a condition of Noojin's probation that he
not practice law for at least one year and not
oppose a one-year suspension by the Bar."  
Noojin, 577 So. 2d at 424.  In addressing this issue, this
Court stated that, although the Bar had filed the formal
charges against Noojin within the six-year period of
limitations set forth in Rule 23, Ala. R. Disc. Enf., "special
Rule 11, Ala. R. Disc. Enf., read substantially the same
4
as does current Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P.  See Hayes v.
Alabama State Bar, 719 So. 2d at 790-91 n.4.  Rule 14, Ala. R.
Disc. P., provides:
"Disciplinary 
proceedings 
shall 
not 
be
deferred or abated because of substantial
similarity to the material allegations of
pending 
criminal 
or 
civil 
litigation
involving 
the 
respondent, 
unless 
authorized
by 
the 
Disciplinary 
Board, 
in 
its
discretion, for good cause shown."
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1111340
circumstances existed here, which appear to us to call for the
application of the provisions of Rule 11."  577 So. 2d at 424.
This Court also noted that the Bar's delay in that case had
worked to Noojin's disadvantage.  This Court looked at the
fact that Noojin did not receive the formal charges until
three or four weeks before the end of his one-year period of
suspension that was a condition of his probation; the fact
that it appeared that Noojin was contemplating that the Bar
would take action against him when he entered his guilty plea
in the federal district court and his conditional plea in the
local grievance proceeding; the fact that the Bar did not deny
that, or explain why, the proceeding was delayed until shortly
before Noojin was to complete the one-year suspension that was
a condition of his probation in the federal case; and the fact
that Noojin had contacted the Bar at the time plea
negotiations were being conducted and had inquired as to the
status of the grievance proceeding.  Ultimately, this Court
stated that "the record here is sufficient for us to conclude
that the spirit of Rule 11 has been violated and the State Bar
has provided no good cause to delay."  577 So. 2d at 424. 
This Court went on to hold that, even if the disciplinary
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proceeding by the Bar was not barred, the question still
existed as to "whether this Court should exercise its right to
review the severity of the punishment in this case in view of
all the attendant circumstances."  577 So. 2d at 424.  After
recognizing this Court's inherent power to review discipline
imposed by the Bar, this Court stated:  "After examination of
all the facts in this record, we believe that we should
exercise our power and overturn the order of suspension in
this case, because we believe it to be inappropriate in view
of all the facts and circumstances of this case."  577 So. 2d
at 425 (emphasis added).  Thus, the decision in Noojin appears
to have been based on special circumstances that are simply
not present in this case.
In Hayes, the Bar filed formal charges against Hayes and
two other attorneys on May 15, 1996.  Subsequently, the three
attorneys were indicted for conduct related to their practice
of law.  In preparing to answer the Bar's formal charges
against him and the other attorneys, Hayes sought discovery
from the Bar regarding the allegations against him and sought
to depose Richard Poff, whose complaint to the Bar had
initiated the Bar's investigation of the attorneys.  During
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1111340
the deposition, general counsel for the Bar alleged the
deposition of Poff "was being taken in a bad faith attempt to
obtain discovery for the criminal cases and terminated the
deposition."  717 So. 2d at 788 n.2.  On October 28, 1996, the
Bar filed a motion with the Board seeking to stay the
discovery in the attorneys' disciplinary proceedings pending
the trial in the criminal cases, which the Board granted.  On
February 14, 1997, the attorneys pleaded guilty to various
misdemeanor charges.  Subsequently, the Bar filed a petition
pursuant to Rule 22(a)(2), Ala. R. Disc. P., and asked the
Board to declare the misdemeanors to which the attorneys
pleaded guilty "serious crimes," and the Board granted the
petition.  The Board later entered an "Order of Final
Discipline," in which it suspended the three attorneys from
the practice of law "for having committed 'serious crimes' as
evidenced by their pleas to the charges in their criminal
cases."  710 So. 2d at 789.  On July 29, 1997, the attorneys
filed motions to dismiss the remaining charges against them,
which the Board denied. The attorneys appealed from the
Board's discipline order and also sought a petition for a writ
13
1111340
of mandamus ordering the dismissal of the remaining charges
pending against them.  
Relying on this Court's holding in Noojin, the attorneys
in Hayes argued that the Bar's delay with regard to the
remaining formal charges violated Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P.,
and warranted dismissal of those charges.  In addressing this
issue, this Court examined the facts to determine whether
there was good cause to defer or delay the disciplinary
proceedings in that case.  This Court stated:
"The Bar asserts that it 'stayed' the proceedings on
the formal charges based on the attorneys' alleged
attempts to obtain discovery for their criminal
cases.  Aside from this assertion, the Bar has not
attempted to provide a reason for its continued
delay in regard to the formal charges against the
attorneys.   Therefore, if we accept the Bar's only
5
explanation of 'good cause' for delay, there remains
a period of over a year, from February 14, 1997, to
now, during which the Bar has taken no action to
proceed on the merits of the formal charges.  Under
our Noojin analysis, we find that this delay in
proceeding on the remaining formal charges is
excessive.  Therefore, because of the inordinate
delay on the part of the Bar in pursuing the
remaining formal charges against the attorneys,
those charges are dismissed.
"__________________
" At oral argument before this Court, in
5
response to questions regarding the Bar's continued
delay in proceeding on the remaining formal charges,
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general counsel for the Bar stated that the Bar had
stayed those disciplinary matters pending the
outcome of the criminal cases against the attorneys,
and that those charges were 'pending,' but he
offered no further explanation for the delay."
719 So. 2d at 790-91.  Thus, in Hayes, the remaining formal
charges this Court ultimately dismissed had been stayed and
were still pending at the time this Court held oral arguments. 
However, in this case, the Board has already conducted a
hearing on the formal charges against Cooner and has found
Cooner guilty of violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Thus, the situation in this case is quite different from the
situation presented by Hayes.
Additionally, Hayes and Noojin involved situations where
the final disposition of the formal charges was stayed or
deferred based on separate criminal proceedings.  Therefore,
those cases involved the application of Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc.
P., and its predecessor, Rule 11, Ala. R. Disc. Enf.  However,
in this case, the Board did not delay or defer its entry of
the order on remand based on separate criminal or civil
litigation.  As Cooner points out in his brief: "[N]o civil or
criminal litigation was pending against [him] that might have
served as an occasion for the Board to decide that good cause
15
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existed for the deferral or abatement of the case."  Cooner's
brief, at p. 20.  Therefore, this case does not implicate Rule
14, Ala. R. Disc. P.  
For the above-stated reasons, the facts in our prior
decisions in Hayes and Noojin are distinguishable from the
facts in this case and do not offer any actual support for
Cooner's argument that the delay in the remand proceedings
warrants 
a 
dismissal 
of 
the 
charges 
against 
him. 
Additionally, Cooner has not cited any additional authority
that supports his specific contention that the delay in
entering the order on remand warrants a dismissal of the
formal charges against him.  Thus, he has not established that
he is entitled to the dismissal of the formal charges against
him based on the Board's delay in entering its order on
remand.
For the above-stated reasons, we remand this cause with
instructions that the Board vacate its February 17, 2010,
order of disbarment; vacate the order on remand; and enter a
new order that complies with Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P., and
with this Court's prior mandate in Cooner I.  The Board shall
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make due return to this Court at the earliest possible time
and within 30 days after the date of this opinion. 
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Main,
and Bryan, JJ., concur.
17