Title: State v. Roth

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

305 N.W.2d 501 (1981) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary Joseph ROTH, Appellant. No. 63741. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 13, 1981. *502 Jody A. Dible and Paul D. Miller, Woodbury County Public Defenders, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., John P. Messina and Douglas F. Staskal, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Patrick C. McCormick, Woodbury County Atty., for appellee. Considered en banc. UHLENHOPP, Justice. This appeal presents the issue of the constitutionality of inventorying the contents of a motor vehicle which Woodbury County sheriff's personnel impounded. Deputy Sheriff David Amick testified: Q. Do you do this as a matter of course in every investigation that you make that involves a motor vehicle? A. *503 Anytime the vehicle is seized or towed by our department, it's the department policy that it will be inventoried. At about 3:00 a. m. on April 11, 1979, Deputy Sheriff Royce G. McGuire was on duty in a patrol car in a rural area. After observing a car containing two occupants, he "pulled it over" and stopped it. He testified at the subsequent suppression hearing: McGuire observed and talked with the driver, administered field tests for intoxication, concluded that the driver was intoxicated, arrested him for driving while intoxicated, and placed him in the patrol car. McGuire then saw and talked with defendant Gary Joseph Roth, who was a passenger in and the owner of the car, smelled his breath, observed his eyes and balance, concluded that he also was intoxicated, arrested him for public intoxication, and placed him too in the patrol car. McGuire saw a partially empty bottle of whisky on the car seat, took possession of it, and later deposited it with the "I.D. Bureau" when he escorted the arrested men to the station. McGuire testified further: Accordingly, McGuire radioed for a wrecker and for help. Deputy Amick responded to the call for assistance. McGuire told him to inventory the contents of the car and stand by it until the wrecker arrived. Amick followed usual procedure in looking through the car for valuables, under the seat, on the floor, in the glove compartment, and in the trunk. Apparently the trunk lid on this car, like those on cars generally, automatically locks when latched, and is opened by a key rather than by a handle. Amick obtained the key for the trunk from the ignition where the occupants had left it. He testified: Q. Deputy, would it be a correct statement, then, that at the time that you proceeded to check the trunk of the vehicle *504 out, that at that time you were not searching for criminal evidence? Would that be correct so far? A. That's correct. In taking inventory, Amick found nothing of value to list in the passenger compartment of the car. In the trunk he observed two items. One was a Craftsman tool box containing miscellaneous tools; he so listed it. The other was a paper sack to the right of the wheel well, containing about two pounds of marijuana. He took possession of this item and made a written report of it. Amick stood by the car to protect it until the wrecker arrived. After turning the car over to the towing firm personnel, he delivered the marijuana together with the whisky to the I.D. Bureau. The county attorney subsequently charged defendant with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Defendant moved to suppress the marijuana, contending that Amick conducted an unconstitutional search and seizure. After a hearing, the district court overruled the motion. Defendant sought discretionary review of the district court order, which we granted. § 814.6(2), The Code 1979. We later transferred the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court order by a vote of three-to-two. The State applied to us for further review, and we granted the application. Our review of the district court order, like that of the Court of Appeals, is de novo. Bettuo v. Pelton, 260 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 1977). I. The Constitutional clause. This searchand we will assume it was a searchwas conducted without a warrant. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained by law officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is inadmissible in evidence in state as well as federal criminal trials. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961). That Amendment states: Warrantless searches are unconstitutional if they are unreasonable and reasonableness depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S. Ct. 788, 790, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 732 (1967). They are per se unreasonable unless they fall within carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1731, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 935 (1967). II. Motor vehicle inventory exception. The State does not seek to justify the present inventory of the contents of the vehicle on the ground that probable cause existed. Neither the deputies nor the Attorney General claims probable cause existed to search for contraband; on the contrary, the officers disclaim any intent to look for drugs. See State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 1981). Nor is this a case in which an officer opened locked personal luggage without a warrant although he had time and opportunity to obtain one. See State v. Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979). This case is presented by the State as coming within the motor vehicle inventory exception. Differing from the probable cause and personal luggage cases, the impounded motor vehicle situation presents a practical problem for law officers. As in this case, officers must frequently remove occupants from vehicles at night on criminal charges. The vehicles can hardly be left unattended; they may be broken into or stripped. If the officers call third parties to tow in the vehicles, they run the risk that contents of the passenger and trunk compartments may disappear in the process, or even after the *505 vehicles are stored. They also run the risk of claims that they themselves stole items from the compartments. The officers thus have the problem of how to protect themselves and their governmental units from civil liability. The former days are no more when the officers and their governmental units could interpose an absolute defense simply from the performance of a governmental function. See Franks v. Kohl, 286 N.W.2d 663, 666-71 (Iowa 1979) (liability of public officers); chs. 25A, 613A, The Code (governmental tort liability). The United States Supreme Court took a practical approach to this problem in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976). In both cases the Court brought out the practical problems we have described and found the particular searches to be reasonable under the circumstances. Dombrowski involved a variation of the situation; the officer believed the vehicle might contain a handgun which some third person might obtain and use. Opperman involved an inventory of the contents of a car which was twice ticketed for overparking within a single period. An officer observed a watch and other articles in the car. He thereupon had the car unlocked, and he inventoried its contents. In so doing, the officer came across marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. The language used by the Court is quite broad, at least for the case in which officers follow standard procedures in taking inventory of the contents of impounded vehicles. Thus see id. at 373, 96 S. Ct. at 3099, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1007: "In applying the reasonableness standard adopted by the Framers, this Court has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents." Justice Powell was one of the five-justice majority in Opperman. He filed a concurring opinion. We do not understand, however, that he questioned the Court's opinion. Rather, he gave additional reasons for the result. His introductory statement was this: "While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opinion to express additional views as to why the search conducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 376, 96 S. Ct. at 3101, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1009. We thus have an opinion joined in by five justices upholding an inventory search of an impounded motor vehicle. III. Circumstances here. This appears to be a classic case of a proper inventory of a car. The sheriff had an established policy requiring an inventory of valuables if the car was impounded and not released to relatives or others of responsibility. This car was operated erratically, and Deputy McGuire properly stopped it. He properly took charge of the car after he arrested the occupants for intoxication. He properly directed, and Deputy Amick properly executed, an inventory of the contents of the car. The inventory was not taken to search for contraband or other incriminating evidence, but for self-protection before the car was delivered into the hands of a third person. Defendant endeavors to distinguish Dombrowski and Opperman by their details, but the present facts fall well within the principle of those decisions. We do not regard the circumstance of the locked trunk to be a distinguishing factor of substance. The same reasons which impel officers to look through a locked or unlocked passenger compartment of a caron the floor, beneath the seat, in the glove compartment also impel them to inventory the contents of the trunk. Locked trunks are not impenetrable by third persons, and officers should be allowed to seek some protection against future lawsuits equally in the cases of the trunk and the passenger compartments. Moreover, the potential for lawsuits is not only on allegations that third persons stole from the trunk, but also on allegations that the police themselves did so. An inventory of personal property in the parts of the car where such property would be carried should afford the police some protection against spurious claims. *506 We agree with the statement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding locked and unlocked car trunks, glove compartments, and other compartments where personal effects may be placed, in State v. Prober, 98 Wis.2d 345, 354-355, 297 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (1980): Some decisions disapprove inventory trunk searches. Illustrative are United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161, 1165 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1973) (predates Opperman); State v. Hatfield, 364 So. 2d 578, 580-81 (La.1978); Manalansan v. State, 45 Md.App. 667, 670-74, 415 A.2d 308, 310-12 (1980); State v. Goff, W.Va., 272 S.E.2d 457, 459-62 (1980). On the other hand, a number of decisions approve inventory searches of the trunks of impounded vehicles made under standing rules. Among them, in addition to Prober, are United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1288-90 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S. Ct. 207, 66 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1980); United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 893-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1978); United States v. Martin, 566 F.2d 1143, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 1977); Cabbler v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, 528 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 60, 50 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1976); United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135, 94 S. Ct. 879, 38 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1974); United States v. Barnes, 443 F. Supp. 137, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Balanow, 392 F. Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D.Ind.1975), aff'd, 528 F.2d 923 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gerlach, 350 F. Supp. 180, 182-83 (E.D. Mich.1972); People v. Meeks, 194 Colo. 214, 216-17, 570 P.2d 835, 837-38 (1977); People v. Trusty, 183 Colo. 291, 295-96, 516 P.2d 423, 425 (1973); State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291, 293-94 (Del.1972); Griffin v. State, Ind.App., 372 N.E.2d 497, 499-501 (1978); State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 46-47, 173 N.W.2d 372, 374, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912, 90 S. Ct. 2211, 26 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1970); State v. Roberson, 156 N.J.Super. 551, 557, 384 A.2d 195, 198 (1978) ("The police are just as exposed to claims of lost or stolen property from the trunk as from any other part of the car."); State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980) ("To forbid entry into trunks as part of an inventory search would frustrate the very purpose of the inventory, since the trunk is a likely place for valuables to be stored."); State v. Vigil, 86 N.M. 388, 391, 524 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955, 95 S. Ct. 1339, 43 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1975); People v. Prator, 93 Misc.2d 303, 307-08, 402 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (Dist.Ct.1978); People v. Kern, *507 67 Misc.2d 495, 497-98, 324 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (Crim.Ct.1971); State v. Lemacks, S.C., 268 S.E.2d 285, 286 (1980); Capps v. State, 505 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn.1974) ("An inventory of the contents of the car would be meaningless without an accounting of items in the trunk."); Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 500-01, 211 S.E.2d 73, 74-75 (1975); see United States v. Wade, 564 F.2d 676, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1977); Roush v. State, 203 So. 2d 632, 633-34 (Fla.App.1967); Highland v. State, 144 Ga.App. 594, 594-95, 241 S.E.2d 477, 477-78 (1978); Pierce v. State, 134 Ga.App. 14, 14-15, 213 S.E.2d 162, 163 (1975); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 577-80 (1973). These decisions appear to us to be more consonant with the rationale of Opperman. Defendant challenges the search under the Iowa Constitution as well as the United States Constitution, but we see no reason to impose a different rule under the state constitution. See State v. Davis, 304 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1981) ("The Supreme Court of Iowa is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Iowa Constitution, but when the federal and state constitutions contain similar provisions, they are usually deemed to be identical in scope, import, and purpose."). We have no occasion to try to anticipate the outer limits which the United States Supreme Court may impose on the inventory exception, for the circumstances of this case clearly bring it within that exception. We do not, for example, have a case in which Amick came upon latched personal luggage in the trunk, and opened it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished such cases in Prober, 98 Wis.2d at 355-356, 297 N.W.2d at 7: See also United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (8th Cir. 1979); Gwinn, 301 A.2d at 293-94. Deputy Amick described the receptacle holding the marijuana as a "brown paper bag." If, as we hold, Amick could lawfully inventory the contents of the trunk, could he lawfully look into the paper bag for valuables or was the bag of the nature of a locked or latched suitcase, briefcase, travel trunk, or similar container? The question is whether a person who places items in a paper bag such as this one has a reasonable expectation of privacy *508 in doing so which would require an officer, in taking inventory of valuables, to have grounds for a warrant and to obtain a warrant before looking into the bag. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243 (1979). We think that so to hold would extend "expectation of privacy" to an unreasonable extent. A person normally expects privacy when placing items in a suitcase, briefcase, or travel trunk, but hardly so when merely placing them in a paper bag. See the following decisions upholding car trunk inventories: Staller, 616 F.2d at 1288 (plastic bag containing counterfeit bills, also shopping bags from stores "each bag containing one or two small items of merchandise"); Barnes, 443 F. Supp. at 141 (bags of counterfeit bills in shopping bag); Gerlach, 350 F. Supp. at 183 (counterfeit bills in box); Ruffino, 94 N.M. at 501, 612 P.2d at 1312 ("The items in the trunk included grocery bags, clothing, a radio, repair items and a twelve-gauge shotgun with shells."); Vigil, 86 N.M. at 390, 524 P.2d at 1006 ("They found a brown paper bag in the trunk which, upon inspection, was found to contain twenty-one packages of suspected marijuana."). We thus uphold the district court order overruling the motion to suppress, and return the case to district court for further proceedings. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. REMANDED. All Justices concur except McCORMICK and ALLBEE, JJ., who dissent. McCORMICK, Justice (dissenting). I would affirm the Court of Appeals. The question here is whether the warrant clauses of the Federal or Iowa Constitutions were violated by the warrantless police search of a closed paper sack in the locked trunk of defendant's impounded automobile. I believe the search was unlawful under both constitutions. I. The Federal Constitution. As the court recognizs, the authorities construing the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution are divided concerning whether a locked automobile trunk may always be entered during a routine inventory search. Such a blanket right is plainly not authorized under Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). Justice Powell recognized this in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377, n.2, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3101, n.2, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1010 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (distinguishing Dombrowski on the basis that an officer in that case reasonably believed the trunk contained a gun). Moreover, I do not believe Opperman recognizes such a right. Even if it did, the right could not include authority to open a closed container when its exterior does not disclose its contents and its incriminating nature is not immediately apparent. A. Reasonableness of searching the locked trunk. When a Supreme Court opinion does not have the unqualified assent of five members, the holding of the Court may be viewed as the position taken by the members who concurred on the narrowest grounds. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct. 990, 993, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260, 266 (1977). Although Justice Powell joined the opinion in Opperman, his separate opinion expresses his understanding of the holding. Because the holding commanded only five votes, his view is authoritative. Among other observations relating to the circumstances in Opperman, Justice Powell noted that the standard inventory at issue in that case did not include opening a vehicle trunk if it was found to be locked. 428 U.S. at 380, n.6, 96 S. Ct. at 3102, n.6, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1011. He also recognized that the reasonableness of a particular inventory search would depend on the circumstances of the case: "The absence of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of post-search review of the reasonableness of a particular inventory search." Id. at 383, 96 S. Ct. at 3104, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1014. Indeed, the majority opinion recognized that an inventory search must be reasonable in scope. 428 *509 U.S. at 376, n.10, 96 S. Ct. at 3100, n.10, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1009. I would hold that the search was unreasonable in scope in the present case. A similar conclusion was reached in analogous circumstances in United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1980). After stopping an automobile and arresting Wilson for traffic offenses, an officer decided to take him to the police station. Because he believed Wilson was incapable of driving the vehicle to the station, the officer decided to have it towed by a private towing service to a private towing yard. Before it was towed, the officer conducted a routine inventory search of the vehicle, including its locked trunk. Firearms were found in the trunk, and Wilson unsuccessfully moved to suppress that evidence in subsequent weapons offense prosecutions. On appeal, the court found the decision to have the vehicle towed was justified but held the search of the locked trunk was unreasonable: Id. at 1165. In contrasting the circumstances with those in Opperman, the court said: Id. at 1165-66. In distinguishing a locked trunk from the rest of the automobile, the court observed that a locked trunk is not subject to the same level of visual intrusion as the vehicle interior and is more likely to be the repository of private effects, implicating a greater expectation of privacy. Id. at 1164. The court's reasoning is equally persuasive in the present case. Other decisions which impose limitations on the scope of inventory searches include State v. Hatfield, 364 So. 2d 578, 580-81 (La.1978); Manalansan v. State, 45 Md.App. 667, 670-74, 415 A.2d 308, 310-12 (1980); State v. Goff, W.Va., 272 S.E.2d 457, 459-62 (1980). B. Reasonableness of searching the closed sack. The Opperman principle converges in this case with the principle in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979). The question in Sanders was whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly stopped and searched for contraband. The Court said that the right to search an automobile does not carry with it the right to search everything found in it. Id. at 762-63, 99 S. Ct. at 2592, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 244. It also said "a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations." Id. at 764, 99 S. Ct. at 2593, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 245. Consequently the Court held that "the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other locations." Id. at 766, 99 S. Ct. at 2594, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 246. *510 Thus, under Sanders, the right to search items found during lawful automobile searches is independently subject to fourth amendment constraints. We are now confronted with a problem suggested by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Sanders: Id. at 772, 99 S. Ct. at 2597, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 250. (emphasis added). We addressed an analogous problem involving a knapsack in State v. Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979). We said: "The answer appears to turn on whether, under the circumstances, defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the contents." Id. at 346. We also noted the remark of the Court in Sanders: "`Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.'" Id. The remark in Sanders included these additional statements: 442 U.S. at 764, n.13, 99 S. Ct. at 2593-94, n.13, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 245. Under the Sanders-Schrier test, defendant plainly had an expectation of privacy in the contents of the paper sack in the present case. It was closed and kept in the locked trunk of his automobile. Unlike a kit of burglar tools or a gun case, its contents could not be inferred from its outward appearance. Because the Sanders court said the extent to which the fourth amendment applies to containers and other parcels does not depend upon whether they are seized from an automobile, the "inventory search exception" to the warrant requirement does not justify the search of the paper bag. Furthermore, because the incriminating nature of the contents was not readily apparent, the plain view doctrine is inapplicable. See State v. Davis, 228 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 1975). Consequently I would hold that the search of the sack infringed defendant's fourth amendment rights. See United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979) (knapsack); United States v. Hill, 458 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C.1978) (flight bag); State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979) (briefcase); People v. Dennison, 61 Ill.App.3d 473, 18 Ill.Dec. 756, 378 N.E.2d 220 (1978) (tool box). Thus, even if the search of the locked trunk did not exceed the scope of a lawful inventory search, the search of the closed paper sack was unlawful. II. The Iowa Constitution. We have previously exercised our prerogative to afford greater protections under the Iowa Constitution than are provided under similar provisions of the Federal Constitution. See, e. g., Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980). Even if the court were right that the fourth amendment was not violated in this case, I would hold that Ia.Const.Art. I, § 8, was violated. A similar course was taken by the South Dakota Supreme Court in Opperman after remand. See State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976). Iowa has a proud tradition of concern for individual rights. We should not be reluctant to show greater sensitivity to the *511 rights of Iowans under our constitution than the Supreme Court accords to their rights under the Federal Constitution. The reasons for doing so are persuasive in this case. ALLBEE, J., joins this dissent.