Title: Neustadter v. Holy Cross

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Alexander H. Neustadter, et al. v. Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring, Inc., No. 12,
September Term 2010. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE  – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – The trial court abused its discretion
by denying plaintiff’s motions to suspend trial for two days during which plaintiff and his
attorney were prohibited from attending court because of religiously mandated abstention
from any participation in court proceedings.  The effective exclusion of plaintiff from court
was presumptively prejudicial.
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
No. 273195-V
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 12
September Term, 2010
ALEXANDER H. NEUSTADTER, et al.
v.
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL OF SILVER
SPRING, INC.
  
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia 
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Harrell, Murphy, and Adkins, JJ., Concur.
Filed:   February 24, 2011
1 Capital Internal Medicine, LLC and Dr. Ahmed Nawaz, MD, were dismissed from
the suit on October 16, 2006, and May 22, 2008, respectively, leaving Respondent, Holy
Cross Hospital, as the sole defendant in the underlying trial. 
2 Although the date entered in the record was June 2, 2008, all parties understood that
trial would actually begin on June 3, 2008.  On May 23, 2008, the trial judge notified the
Assignment Office that trial would begin on June 3, 2008, and had been reduced to nine days.
(continued...)
Petitioner (“Mr. Neustadter”) appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County and asserts that his constitutional right to the free exercise of his
religion was infringed by rulings denying a two-day postponement or recess during his
medical malpractice case so that he could observe an Orthodox Jewish holiday.  The trial
judge and County Administrative Judge collectively denied four motions for postponement
of the case.  We hold that the judges abused their discretion in denying the requests for a
continuance of the trial where the movant’s religious beliefs prohibited any appearance or
advocacy on his behalf in the pending civil court proceeding.  Therefore, we reverse and
remand for a new trial. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Petitioner filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against
Capital Internal Medicine, LLC, Dr. Ahmed Nawaz, MD, and Holy Cross Hospital of Silver
Spring (“Holy Cross”) alleging negligent medical care of his father, Israel Neustadter, who
died on March 27, 2003.1  On October 20, 2006, the Circuit Court scheduled the case for a
ten-day trial to commence on February 11, 2008.  At a pre-trial hearing on January 24, 2008,
the trial judge rescheduled the ten day trial, on a motion to continue by Respondent, to begin
instead on June 2, 2008.2  In addition, the trial judge appointed a Special Master to resolve
(...continued)
3 In his first postponement motion entitled, “Motion to Suspend Trial Days for
Religious Holidays” (“May 6th motion”), Petitioner drew the trial court’s attention to the
parameters of the Orthodox Jewish Holiday described by the Orthodox Union website at
http://www.ou/org/calendar/2008.htm: 
Shavout
6 Sivan - Israel (6 & 7 in Diaspora) 
Moses Receives The Torah (Pentecost) - Celebrating G-d’s
giving of the Torah and Ten Commandments to the Jews at Mt.
Sinai.  Memorial (Yizkor) services said (on 2nd day in
diaspora). 
Work Restrictions: Sabbath-like work restrictions one day
in Israel - two days in Diaspora.  
4 The May 6th motion provided the first notice to Respondent and to the trial court that
counsel for Mr. Neustadter was also prohibited from being present in court on June 9th and
10th because as an agent he was prohibited from doing work on Mr. Neustadter’s behalf. 
-2-
ongoing discovery disputes. 
Between January and May, 2008, counsel for the parties communicated on several
occasions about an anticipated scheduling conflict due to Petitioner’s anticipated religious
observances, which would fall on the fifth and sixth days of the, then, ten-day trial.
Subsequently, on May 6, 2008, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Suspend Trial Days for
Religious Holidays”3, 4 (“May 6th motion”) stating in pertinent part: 
Mr. Neustadter is an Orthodox Jew who is one of the most
observant followers of Jewish principles and requirements. 
During Shavous he is (1) prohibited from doing any work
including attending trial on these days [June 9 and 10, 2008]
and (2) his attorney is prohibited, as his agent, from doing work
on his behalf .…  On the Sabbath, Orthodox Jews … strictly
observe the requirement that work is prohibited … and an agent
-3-
is also prohibited from doing work on his behalf.  
Petitioner’s motion also summarized the attempts that had been made with opposing counsel
to resolve the scheduling conflict without the intervention of the court.  Dr. Nawaz opposed
the motion.  In his opposition motion, Dr. Nawaz suggested that rather than suspend the trial,
if the trial court was “inclined to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, the entire case
should be continued to a future date where any conflicting religious commitments can be
known in advance and avoided.”  An order denying Petitioner’s first motion was entered May
7, 2008. Subsequently, Petitioner raised the scheduling conflict at a discovery hearing on
May 14, 2008, at which point Respondent expressed an interest in maintaining the current
trial schedule.  The trial judge denied Petitioner’s request to alter the trial schedule.  At that
hearing, Petitioner notified the court that he would file a motion to reconsider. 
On May 19, 2008, Petitioner filed a second postponement motion entitled, “Motion
to Reconsider Motion to Suspend Trial Days for Religious Holidays.”  Petitioner reiterated
his argument from the May 6th motion and submitted an affidavit from the Assistant Rabbi
of his congregation citing the specific prohibitions of the Sabbath and concluding that it
would be impossible for either Petitioner, or his attorney, to participate in any way in a legal
proceeding on June 9th and 10th.  Furthermore, Petitioner contended that conducting his trial
on the Sabbath violated his First Amendment Rights, that he had a right to attend and appear
at trial, and that he would be prejudiced if the trial were held in his absence.  When the
Motion to Reconsider was discussed at the pre-trial hearing on May 22, 2008, Petitioner
asked the court to consider the “constitutional issues … when deciding not to honor
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somebody’s religious requirements.”  The Motion to Reconsider was denied.
On June 2, 2008, the day before trial was to begin, Petitioner filed a third “Motion to
Postpone Trial for Religious and Fairness Reasons,” which was opposed by Respondent.
Petitioner stated two grounds for the motion: (1) prejudice and (2) fairness because of an
earlier accommodation to Respondent.  Petitioner stated in the motion: 
This case was rescheduled on January 24, 2008 … due to
pending discovery matters and other issues that still had to be
resolved. … At that time, the Plaintiff consented to the
postponement. 
At that time, it was about two weeks before trial when the
defense attorneys’ scheduling problem was raised for the first
time at the pretrial conference. 
Respondent opposed the Motion to Postpone arguing that the court had already denied
Petitioner’s request on three occasions, that there was no mention at the January pre-trial
conference of a scheduling conflict, and that only one of their four expert witnesses could be
rescheduled to testify on June 11th.  The Administrative Judge denied the Motion to
Postpone.
On June 3rd, before the trial judge, Petitioner raised the issue of postponement “one
more time.”  The trial judge declined to postpone the trial stating, “[w]e’ve addressed that
issue numerous, this issue, particular issue, numerous times and I have explained numerous
times why the case is not going to be continued or suspended and that’s really the ruling of
the case at this point.  So I have to deny the motion.” 
The trial began on June 3, 2008.  Petitioner presented his case, which consisted of 13
-5-
witnesses, from June 3rd through June 6th.  At the conclusion of Mr. Neustadter’s case on
June 6, 2008, Holy Cross moved for judgment, which the court denied.  After the jury was
dismissed for the day, the trial judge asked Mr. Neustadter’s counsel, “[i]t’s my
understanding you’re not going to be here [on Monday]?”  Counsel for Petitioner responded
affirmatively and then objected to the trial continuing on Monday and Tuesday.  Court
proceedings were set to begin mid-morning on Wednesday so that Petitioner could listen to
a recorded transcript of the trial proceedings.  The parties also discussed that a defense
witness, Dr. Geckler, who had previously agreed to move his appearance to Wednesday,
would actually testify on Monday.  
On Monday and Tuesday, June 9 and June 10, 2008, in Mr. Neustadter’s absence,
Holy Cross Hospital put on its entire case-in-chief, which included the testimony of four
expert witnesses and one of Israel Neustadter’s treating physicians, all offered to refute the
Hospital’s liability for damages.  On June 9, 2008, Holy Cross offered the testimony of Dr.
Richardson, qualified as an expert in geriatric and family medicine, and of Dr. Geckler,
qualified as an expert witness in internal medicine and infectious disease.  On June 10, 2008,
Holy Cross introduced the testimony of Dr. Ball, one of the treating critical care
pulmonologists for Israel Neustadter; Ms. McMullen, qualified as an expert in the field of
nursing; and Dr. Goldstein, qualified as an expert in internal medicine, pulmonary medicine,
and critical care medicine.  In addition to offering the testimony of the witnesses mentioned,
Holy Cross offered as physical evidence a manual on nursing ethics and the curricula vitae
for those experts who testified.  Afterwards, Holy Cross rested its case.  On June 11, 2008,
-6-
Mr. Neustadter and his counsel appeared at trial.  That day the jury returned a verdict in favor
of Holy Cross.  
Petitioner appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court asking the intermediate appellate
court to consider three questions related to: a possible violation of his right to religious
freedom and right to be present at trial; error in refusing to submit a claim of administrative
negligence to the jury; and error in refusing an instruction on negligence per se.  In an
unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment holding,
in pertinent part, that there was no constitutional violation of Petitioner’s right to free
exercise of religion, stating:
Given appellant’s delay in alerting the court to the conflict with
trial on June 9-10, and given the scheduling conflicts that
existed at the time appellant made his requests, as well as
counsel’s failure to suggest any other options, we find no error
in the trial court’s ruling denying the requests for a
postponement of the trial. 
We granted certiorari,  Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp., 412 Md. 494, 988 A.2d 1008
(2010), to consider the following question, which we have reworded slightly for clarity: 
Whether the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s request to
suspend a civil trial for two days that Petitioner’s Jewish
Orthodox faith required him to strictly observe as days of
worship violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to free exercise
of his religion. 
I.
Petitioner urges this Court to scrutinize strictly the trial court’s rulings by positing that
his right to engage in religious conduct, protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
5 Mr. Neustadter urges this Court to scrutinize strictly the case pursuant to either: (1)
the balancing test of government conduct as weighed against the “substantial burden”
imposed upon an individual espoused by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398, 410, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1797, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 974 (1963), in which the Court held that
a state had no compelling interest in imposing a statute that substantially infringed upon a
Seventh Day Adventist who was denied unemployment benefits upon a refusal to accept
Sabbath day employment; or alternatively, according to the “hybrid rights” theory espoused
in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 110 S.
Ct. 1595, 1601, 108 L. Ed. 2d. 876, 887 (1990), in which the Court held that a neutral and
generally applicable criminal law is applicable even if it imposes a burden upon religious
conduct and noting that the only cases in which the Court has struck down such a law was
when other constitutionally protected rights were contemporaneously infringed, i.e. “freedom
of speech and of the press …, or the right of parents to direct the education of their children.”
6 The Court of Special Appeals used a test that Petitioner asserts and we agree was a
“free-floating balancing test,” which apparently combined elements of a constitutional
analysis with those of an abuse of discretion analysis.  That court held that Petitioner’s
religious beliefs were sincere and caused a bona fide conflict, nevertheless it held that the
trial court had a compelling interest in the “efficient and orderly administration of justice,”
the tardiness of Petitioner’s request “weighed against” him, and that the trial court had no
ability to adjust its schedule to accommodate the request.  
-7-
Amendment to the United States Constitution, was impermissibly infringed.5  Conversely,
Respondent maintains that we should apply an abuse of discretion analysis because the trial
court’s rulings were discretionary and had no constitutional implications.  The intermediate
appellate court explicitly declined to apply any particular standard of review stating, “[w]e
need not decide the applicable standard.  Even applying the higher standard advocated by
appellant, we find no error.”6  
Ordinarily, 
[i]n reviewing a possible violation of a constitutional
right, this Court conducts its own independent constitutional
analysis.  See Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d
1102, 1106 (2001) (“[W]hen the issue is whether a
7 “[T]his Court has regularly adhered to the principle that we will not reach a
constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground.”
In re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 667 (2009) (quoting State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 403
n.13, 631 A.2d 453, 463 n.13 (1993) (declining to consider the constitutionality of actions
by defendants when the case was found to be moot); Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh,
363 Md. 565, 578, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001); Baltimore Sun v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 659,
755 A.2d 1130, 1133-1134 (2000).  Moreover, because the Supreme Court has not addressed
the impact of its Smith decision, supra note 6, on judicial determinations such as the one in
the instant case, there is no applicable constitutional precedent that must be applied in this
case.  At least one of our sister states has applied a strict scrutiny analysis to discretionary
judicial rulings even after the apparent limitation on that analysis as enunciated by the Smith
Court. Given that it is unclear how Smith impacts such discretionary rulings, we prefer to
resolve this case according to well-settled Maryland non-constitutional law relating to Md.
Rule 2-508 (Continuances).  See, e.g., People v. Farrell, 812 N.Y.S.2d 101,102 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006) (holding that the court had a “legitimate and compelling interest in completing
the trial without the requested weekend adjournment” that defendant made in order to
observe Jewish Sabbath); People v. Gilliam, 626 N.Y.S.2d 245, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(holding that a defendant’s request to adjourn court proceedings to observe Muslim Sabbath
was “improperly denied in that no compelling State interest was shown”); People v.
Williams, 602 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that defendant’s request
for a Friday adjournment to attend religious services properly denied because the proceeding
(continued...)
-8-
constitutional right has been infringed, we make our own
independent constitutional appraisal”).  “We perform a de novo
constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case
at hand….”  Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 221, 792 A.2d 1160,
1166 (2002).
State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 29, 997 A.2d 780, 784 (2010).  Although the issue, briefs and
oral argument in this case directed our attention to the various tests employed by the United
States Supreme Court upon claims of violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, we conclude that the issue presented here, i.e., the propriety of repeatedly
denying Petitioner’s motions to suspend and/or postpone his civil trial, can be resolved
without reaching the constitutional question.7  Therefore, our task is to determine whether
7(...continued)
was an incidental burden, justified by the compelling interest of the state to insure a fair trial
where the jury had been sequestered for two days). 
-9-
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner a reasonable accommodation when
his religious beliefs directed that he and his attorney refrain from any form of advocacy
during the two days of the Jewish Orthodox Holiday of Shavout that fell in the period
scheduled for his civil trial. 
II.
Md. Rule 2-508 states that, “[o]n motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court
may continue a trial or other proceeding as justice may require.”  Generally, an appellate
court will not disturb a ruling on a motion to continue “unless [discretion is] arbitrarily or
prejudicially exercised.”  Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15, 28, 320 A.2d 266,
273 (1974) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying a motion where there was an “eleventh
hour” request to continue a 26 month trial).  This Court recently reiterated that the “decision
to grant a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”  Touzeau v.
Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 669, 907 A.2d 807, 816 (2006) (noting in footnote five that the
legislative history of Md. Rule 2-508 and the judicial discretion to consider such motions
dates back to 1787).  We have also affirmed that the trial court has authority over the
management of its trial docket.  Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111, 442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982)
(stating “[e]xcept as limited by statute or rule, a trial court has inherent authority to control
its own docket”).  
-10-
Appellate courts do not defer to discretionary rulings of the trial judge, however, when
the judge has resolved the issue on ‘unreasonable or untenable’ grounds.  We have stated:
We have defined abuse of discretion as “discretion manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for
untenable reasons.”  Jenkins v. City of College Park, 379 Md.
142, 165, 840 A.2d 139, 153 (2003) (emphasis not included).
See also Garg v. Garg, 393 Md. 225, 238, 900 A.2d 739, 746
(2006) (“The abuse of discretion standard requires a trial judge
to use his or her discretion soundly and the record must reflect
the exercise of that discretion.  Abuse occurs when a trial judge
exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when
he or she acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.”) (quoting
Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 295-96, 825 A.2d 1008, 1015
(2003)).
Touzeau, 394 Md. at 669, 970 A.2d at 816.  
In exercising discretion, the trial court must apply the correct legal standard in
rendering its decision: 
[W]here the record so reveals, a failure to consider the proper
legal standard in reaching a decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
* * * * 
The “abuse of discretion” standard of review is premised, at
least in part,  on the concept that matters within the discretion of
the trial court are “much better decided by the trial judges than
by appellate courts ….”  So long as the Circuit Court applies the
proper legal standards and reaches a reasonable conclusion
based on the facts before it, an appellate court should not reverse
a decision vested in the trial court's discretion merely because
the appellate court reaches a different conclusion.
Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 433, 436, 914 A.2d 113, 130-32 (2007)
(citations omitted) (holding that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a motion
-11-
for voluntary dismissal without prejudice because the judge considered the proper legal
standard as defined by Maryland case law, namely that there was no conflict of interest,
fraud, or neglect by a party moving on behalf of a minor).  In Edwards v. State, where we
undertook an analogous challenge, we stated that “the ultimate decision, assuming the
application of correct principles of law in the balancing process, is a discretionary one with
the trial court …, we look to see whether the court applied correct legal principles and, if so,
whether its ruling constituted a fair exercise of its discretion.”  350 Md. 433, 441-42, 713
A.2d 342, 346 (1998) (internal citations omitted) (holding that there was no abuse of
discretion in denying a defendant’s motion for disclosure of the identity of a confidential
informant after an appropriate balancing test which did not run afoul of defendant’s
constitutional rights).  Thus, here, we must consider whether the interests of the court and the
Petitioner were properly balanced.  
This Court has consistently affirmed denials of motions to continue when litigants
have failed to exercise due diligence in preparing for trial, in the absence of unforeseen
circumstances to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably mitigated, where
untimely requests were made, where procedural rules were ignored, where attorneys failed
to adequately prepare for trial, where a witness was missing, and where a litigant’s chosen
counsel was absent but alternative counsel was available.  See Touzeau, 394 Md. 654, 678,
907 A.2d 807, 821 (2006) (finding no abuse of discretion when the trial court denied a
request to continue where a self-represented litigant did not exercise due diligence to obtain
counsel until five days before trial and failed to demonstrate that hardship in obtaining
-12-
counsel was an unanticipated event); Dart Drug Corp., 272 Md. at 28, 320 A.2d at 273
(finding no abuse of discretion where there was an “eleventh hour” request to continue a 26
month trial); Abrams v. Gay Inv. Co., 253 Md. 121, 124, 251 A.2d 876, 878 (1969) (finding
no abuse of discretion where a party failed to follow court procedural rules); Cruis Along
Boats, Inc. v. Langley, 255 Md. 139, 142-44, 257 A.2d 184, 186 (1969) (finding no abuse of
discretion where an unavailable lead attorney could be replaced with associate counsel at
trial). 
In contrast, this Court has found reversible error in the denial of a motion to continue
in certain circumstances: 
We have found that it would be an abuse of discretion for a trial
judge to deny a continuance when the continuance was
mandated by law, see Mead v. Tydings, 133 Md. 608, 612, 105
A. 863, 864 (1919), or when counsel was taken by surprise by
an unforeseen event at trial, when he had acted diligently to
prepare for trial, Plank v. Summers, 205 Md. 598, 604-05, 109
A.2d 914, 916-17 (1954), or, in the face of an unforeseen event,
counsel had acted with diligence to mitigate the effects of the
surprise, Thanos v. Mitchell, 220 Md. 389, 392-93, 152 A.2d
833, 834-35 (1959).
Touzeau, 394 Md. at 669-670, 907 A.2d at 816.  The intermediate appellate court has also
reversed a denial of a motion to continue when a wife sought more time to obtain counsel in
a contentious and complex divorce proceeding, Reaser v. Reaser, 62 Md. App. 643, 650, 490
A.2d 1315, 1319 (1985), and when a mother could not attend a custody hearing because the
child whose welfare was in issue was ill, In re McNeil, 21 Md. App. 484, 499-500, 320 A.2d
57, 66 (1974). 
8 Respondent moved for a continuance of the first trial date in order to resolve
discovery issues and that request was granted at the pre-trial conference on January 24, 2008.
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We hold that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the May 6th Motion and
discretion was unreasonably exercised with regard to Petitioner’s three subsequent pleas for
a suspension of the proceeding, and finally for a postponement on May 16, June 2, and June
3, 2008, because the articulated rationales, discussed infra, failed to reasonably accommodate
Petitioner’s right to engage in religious conduct and to meaningfully participate in his trial.
In this case, the absence of the plaintiff and his counsel from trial could not have been and
indeed was not meaningfully mitigated.  Moreover, Petitioner’s notice to the court and
opposing counsel of the scheduling conflict was not so untimely as to preclude
accommodation or indicate an utter lack of diligence.
III.
In the instant case, the trial judge concluded that Petitioner’s repeated request to
suspend trial for two days was impossible to accommodate in light of the court’s interest in
the orderly administration of the court proceedings.  Essentially, the court’s reasons included:
lack of approval from the County Administrative judge, inconvenience to jurors and
witnesses, prior rescheduling,8 double-booking the judge and defense counsel for a
speculative third week of trial, untimeliness of Petitioner’s first motion, a crowded trial
docket, and that the court was “down two judges.”  In our view, these rationales do not
indicate the impossibility of offering a reasonable accommodation to Petitioner and therefore
the decision misses the mark and implicates prejudice to the movant.  
-14-
On May 14th, the trial judge stated:
 [The] difficulty I have is, and I did discuss this with our
administrative judge before I ruled on that motion, is that when
this trial date was set in February this issue was not raised. 
* * * * 
And I cannot, the administrative judge will not let me,
hold up jurors for an extra two days because of something that
was not brought to our attention.  And the case has already been
rescheduled once, and I simply cannot suspend the trial for those
two days.  
If we had depositions de bene esse that were already “in
the can,” as they say, or on film, we could play those and then
it wouldn’t matter.  But I don’t know that we do. 
And, you know, our trial calendar is extremely heavy
right now.  I’m down two judges, and I’m simply not authorized
to suspend the trial for two days.  Because, it affects a lot of
people not just us in … this room, it affects the witnesses, but if
affects jurors, members of the community, and the entire docket
if I don’t finish the trial within a time that’s allowed for it.  So,
I cannot suspend the trial.
But you can file a motion to reconsider if you want, but
I won’t be suspending the trial. 
At the pre-trial hearing on May 22, 2008, the trial judge considered Petitioner’s Motion to
Reconsider stating: 
The concern, the Court’s concern is that when this trial
was scheduled to back in, I believe it was the end of January
when a motion to continue the February trial date was discussed
and this trial date was picked, there was, at that time, no request
that this trial be suspended for two days.  It was set for nine days
to begin on Tuesday the 3rd.  And had there been a request to
suspend it for two days it would have been addressed when the
trial was set.  And either, if it couldn’t be accommodated, you
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know, if that wasn’t agreeable a different date would have been
picked. 
But the problem is that the request comes less than a
month before trial in a very crowded trial docket for the court
system itself, because we are short two judges.  We are already
having a lot of problems juggling trials and so forth, so it’s very
difficult on the Court.  It also carries the trial over to next week
for jurors who are greatly imposed on. 
And it may seem like a relatively short trial to a federal
court if they typically have six, eight, 14 week trials, but for a
circuit court an eight, nine, 10 day trial is a long trial and it ties
up a lot of, it ties up myself, it ties up all the courtroom
personnel, it ties up a lot of people, but also jurors.
Not to mention … expert witnesses. 
Petitioner interjected: 
Your Honor … you’ll recall that there was tremendous difficulty
finding a date at all for the two defense firms, that they could
not find when the primary counsel had to be here, and that was
a date that was taken out of the only time frame that could be
accepted.  So the fact that is if you had known that an earlier
date, I don’t think there would have been an easier way to set
this trial unless it was next year.
But the fact is that we did, and I laid out in my motion
that I did contact pretty promptly, in February, the two defense
firms and said to them, “Look, we got this problem, and here’s
what the problem is.  Would you consent?”  And I think I laid
out the dates in my motion.  And I got a response back from Mr.
Ceppos [Counsel for Dr. Nawaz], and I, some time passed I had
to contact Ms. Ward [Counsel for Holy Cross] again and she
responded.  And the fact is that, you know, we couldn’t reach
agreement on it.  
With the, with the dropping of Dr. Nawaz from the case,
this case is now going to be three or four days shorter. 
-16-
Therefore, by extending this trial, by having a two-day,
two days off it’s really not going to be any longer than the
original court trial schedule, was scheduled for anyway.  
Petitioner maintained that June 9th and 10th could be removed from the trial calendar
because the case was going to involve significantly fewer witnesses because of the dismissal
of Dr. Nawaz.  Respondent disagreed, stating, “I don’t possibly see how Dr. Nawaz not being
in this case is going to shorten this trial three to four days.”  The court restated its position
from the first motion: 
The motion to suspend was filed May 6th.  And I don’t
know, I didn’t look at when the e-mail correspondence started.
There was some attached, I just didn’t notice the date.  But the
motion itself as we got it May 6th was ruled on promptly,
because I immediately called, after I realize that the defense
counsel were saying their witnesses were lined up and couldn’t
consent I did immediately check with the administrative judge.
So, as of this point, it’s still my position I do not have
authority to suspend the trial for two days. 
On May 22, 2008, the trial judge denied Petitioner’s Motion to Reconsider. 
On June 2, 2008, the Administrative Judge denied a third Motion to Postpone, without
a hearing.  Subsequently, the trial judge declined to postpone the trial upon an oral motion
on June 3, 2008, stating, “[w]e’ve addressed that issue numerous, this issue, particular issue,
numerous times and I have explained numerous times why the case is not going to be
continued or suspended and that’s really the ruling of the case at this point.  So I have to deny
the motion.” 
At the most, six jurors, possibly eight including two alternates, would have been asked
9 On January 24, 2008, the trial judge noted to counsel that there was another medical
malpractice case beginning on June 9th: 
 I have [another] case on my [docket] … It’s also a medical
malpractice case … scheduled to start at June 9th.  But we also
double book cases all the time, too. … It is double booking us
for the following week, but apparently it’s also double booking
Ms. Kahn’s [Dr. Nawaz’s counsel] office.
Moreover, according to the trial transcript and docket entries, the trial judge was not specially
assigned to the trial when the original trial date was set.  At the pre-trial conference on
January 24, 2008, the trial judge stated, “the assignment office doesn’t have this on my
calendar for that date [Feb. 11, 2008] and set in another trial recently on that same date. …
I mean, we don’t have to change the trial date, but it might affect whether they bring in
another judge or not.”  
-17-
to stand by, while trial proceedings were suspended for two days.  This would not have been
an unprecedented scenario.  The double-booking issue similarly fails because there is no
indication that the trial judge was specially assigned to hear the merits of this particular case,
judges are double-booked not infrequently, and in the present case, another judge stepped in
for the trial judge, to handle another medical malpractice case set for the same ten-day period
as Petitioner’s case.9  The threat of a third week of trial does not follow from the facts of the
case, which indicate that the trial was originally set for ten days, was then shortened to nine
days because the trial judge would not be available on the first day, shortened further when
Dr. Nawaz was dismissed from the suit on May 22, 2008 (along with an estimated 29
witnesses and substantial number of exhibits), and ultimately was completed in seven days.
The record indicates that Petitioner did try to obtain the consent of defense counsel prior to
bringing the conflict to the court’s attention through e-mails dated January 28, April 22, April
-18-
23, and May 1, 2008.  When no consent was given, Petitioner filed a motion with the trial
court, approximately one month prior to the start of trial.
This Court is not unsympathetic to the need for trial courts to efficiently and
effectively manage overflowing dockets and judicial resources.  There is no evidence on the
record, however, that suspending court proceedings for two days of a nine day trial would
unreasonably or substantially burden the docket or squander resources.  Pursuant to the
record, the trial judge could have taken a two day break and resumed the proceedings on
Wednesday, June 11, 2008, and still finished the trial by the end of the second week.  We
have indicated on prior occasions that if a request for a continuance is predicated upon a
circumstance that may be “obviated within a brief period of time,” then the fact that the trial
may resume progress “within a reasonable, rather than a protracted, period of time is an
important consideration in a continuance decision.”  Touzeau, 394 Md. at 671-72, 907 A.2d
at 818 (citing King v. Mayor of Rockville, 249 Md. 243, 246, 238 A.2d 898, 900 (1968)). 
The only attempt at any alternate means for adapting the trial schedule to
accommodate Petitioner was an ineffective attempt to reschedule Respondent’s witnesses for
June 11th  when Petitioner would return to court.  At the pre-trial hearing on May 22, 2008,
Counsel for Holy Cross stated:
Additionally, which my four experts, either three or four
of them are scheduled for Monday and Tuesday.  So, to say that
it wouldn’t affect anything is, is, frankly, not true.  Even though
I’m, I understand that there’s not multiple defendants anymore,
I still have experts that I’ve prepaid and prearranged with to be
here to testify on those two days.
10 The trial judge also suggested that each party could take some depositions on video,
de bene esse, and those could be presented to the jury by television.
-19-
The trial judge then inquired:
I would ask counsel if you can contact your expert
witnesses to see if any of them are available to reschedule
…Wednesday or Thursday ….  If enough witnesses were
rescheduled so that we didn’t need to sit either Monday or
Tuesday I would then not sit.10 
* * * * 
But … I can’t do it the third week, either. [T]he Court’s
calendar is, I mean, I’m already, frankly, double booked the
second week of this trial … they are bringing another judge in
to cover [another malpractice case].  But that’s how, I mean,
we’re just double and triple booked every week. 
* * * * 
So it is important that this trial end that second week.
But if defense counsel can reschedule any of their experts, I am
asking them to attempt to do that. 
On May 28, 2008, Petitioner wrote the trial judge stating that he and Respondent had
communicated about rescheduling some of Respondent’s expert witnesses, but only one of
the four could possibly move.  Ultimately, the defense did not move any of its witnesses.
The trial judge stated that her denials “had nothing to do with the fact” that the nature
of the request was religious, which we accept.  Taking an objective view of Petitioner’s
predicament, however, it is difficult to imagine that a trial court would have refused to
accommodate a litigant or counsel who requested a continuance because of family or
personal illness, or in order to observe a time of bereavement upon the death of a family
-20-
member.  We note an apt reflection by the intermediate appellate court in In re McNeil
wherein that court stated,“myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
request for delay can render the right to due process an empty formality.”  21 Md. App. at
499, 320 A.2d at 66.  The trial court did not give sufficient weight to the impact on Petitioner
of being absent from trial for the Respondent’s entire case-in-chief.  Moreover, the court
unreasonably juxtaposed the convenience of jurors, witnesses, and attorneys against
Petitioner’s request for a religious accommodation, prejudicially assigning more value to the
former.  
While the trial court has broad discretion under Md. Rule 2-508 to continue a trial, the
facts of this case gave rise to an exceptional circumstance that warranted a continuance.  E.g.
Thanos, 220 Md. at 392, 152 A.2d at 834-35 (stating “[i]n some instances, however, refusal
to grant a continuance has been held to be reversible error … We think the case before us is
one of the exceptional instances where there was prejudicial error”) (citation omitted).  Under
the circumstances of the present case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make
a reasonable accommodation, given the exceptional circumstance raised by the movant,
whereby both he and his counsel were prohibited from participating in court proceedings for
two days as a result of an asserted and uncontroverted religious tenet.
IV.
When an appellate court determines that a trial court has abused its discretion in ruling
on a motion to continue, to the prejudice of the movant, the appropriate appellate action is
to overturn such a ruling.  Jackson v. State, 214 Md. 454, 459, 135 A.2d 638, 640 (1957)
11 Because we conclude that prejudice is presumed in the instant case, we need not
(continued...)
-21-
(noting that a discretionary ruling on a motion to continue should not be disturbed absent a
showing of abuse that was prejudicial to the movant); see also Thanos, 220 Md. at 392, 152
A.2d at 834-45; Plank, 205 Md. at 605, 109 A.2d at 917.  Prejudice means an “error that
influenced the outcome of the case.”  Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 319, 529
A.2d 356, 360 (1987) and cases cited therein.
Petitioner contends that prejudice should be presumed in the instant case because he
was “wrongfully excluded” by the trial judge, citing our decision in Safeway Stores v.
Watson, 317 Md. 178, 562 A.2d 1242 (1989).  In Safeway Stores, we held that a corporate
entity had a right under Md. Rule 2-513 to designate a representative to be in the courtroom
and that the trial judge’s exclusion of Safeway’s expert designee was wrongful and
presumptively prejudicial so that Safeway did not have to prove both error and the prejudice.
317 Md. at 184, 562 A.2d at 1245-46.  Relying on our decision in Safeway Stores, we stated
more recently that “[w]hat emanates from these cases is that there is a right of presence, that
the right is not absolute, and that a determination of whether exclusion of a party constitutes
sufficient prejudice, either presumed or actual, to warrant a new trial depends, to some
extent, on the circumstances.”  Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 366 Md. 597, 620, 785 A.2d
361, 375 (2001) (citing Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956)).  
In the instant case, we hold that conducting the trial in Petitioner’s absence was
presumptively prejudicial and requires reversal.11  Petitioner’s absence from court is
11(...continued)
reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that he was actually prejudiced because of the trial
judge’s comments to the jury, which arguably criticized Petitioner’s two-day absence from
trial. 
-22-
analogous to the “wrongful exclusion” in Safeway Stores, and pursuant to Green, while some
exclusions are appropriate given the circumstances of the case, others are reversible error.
In essence, the trial court precluded Petitioner from effectively litigating his case when it
created a circumstance in which Respondent presented its entire case in the Petitioner’s
absence.  Moreover, upon the presumption of prejudice, the non-complaining party must
prove that the error did not impact the outcome of the case, which Holy Cross has failed to
do.  See e.g. Harris, 310 Md. at 319-20, 529 A.2d at 361 (noting that an erroneous
disqualification of an attorney must be shown, by the advantaged party, to have had no
influence on the outcome of the case).  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE
C I R C U I T  
C O U R T  
F O R
MONTGOMERY COUNTY FOR A
NEW TRIAL.  RESPONDENT TO
PAY THE COSTS.
-23-
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 273195-V
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 12
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
ALEXANDER H. NEUSTADTER, et al.
v.
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL OF SILVER
SPRING, INC.
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Concurring Opinion by Harrell, J.,
which Murphy, J., joins.
                                                                             
Filed:   February 24, 2011
I concur with the result reached in the Majority opinion, which reverses the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals.     The Majority opinion, in response to Neustadter’s
argument, declines to analyze the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence in
determining the appropriate standard of review in the present case, invoking the principle that
this Court ordinarily will not decide a constitutional issue when the case may be disposed of
fairly on a non-constitutional ground.  __ Md. __, __, __ A.2d __, __ (2010) (Majority slip
op. at 8 & n.7).   The Majority is correct to do so.  “Going rogue,” however, I write
separately for posterity to express my  views  as to the constitutional principles argued by
Petitioner as his sole basis for reversal.  In this way, a response of sorts to Petitioner’s
constitutional argument will appear in the Maryland Reports, albeit not one carrying the
weight of precedent (but also not violating the Court’s duty to honor the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance).    Moreover, I disagree with the Majority opinion’s analysis of
what, on this record, constitutes the abuse of discretion warranting reversal.
I.
A Road Map of the Undulating Free Exercise Highway
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963), is
recognized generally as the case in which “the high court first fully articulated its modern
free exercise clause jurisprudence . . . .”  Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’m, 913
P.2d 909, 943 (Cal. 1996); see Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672
F. Supp. 81, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The Supreme Court formulated its modern approach to
free exercise claims in its 1963 Sherbert decision.”).  In Sherbert, a claimant for
-2-
unemployment benefits was denied benefits after being found ineligible under a South
Carolina law requiring that, to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be “able to work and
. . . [be] available for work,” and that a claimant is ineligible if “he has failed, without good
cause . . . to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or
the employer . . . .”  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-01, 83 S. Ct. at 1792, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 968.
South Carolina’s Employment Security Commission ruled the claimant ineligible for
unemployment benefits, reasoning that, because the claimant – a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church – was discharged by her employer for refusing to work on Saturday (her
Sabbath), she failed to “accept available suitable work when offered [her] by . . . the
employer.”  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401, 83 S. Ct. at 1792, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 968.  The South
Carolina Supreme Court rejected the claimant’s contention that the statutory provisions
impermissibly infringed upon her federal First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.
The Supreme Court’s first task became determining “whether the disqualification for
benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.”  Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 403, 83 S. Ct. at 1793-94, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 970.  Answering that question in the affirmative,
the Court reasoned that the Commission’s ruling “forces her to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”  Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 404, 83 S. Ct. at 1794, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 970.  After determining that the South Carolina
statute infringed substantially on the claimant’s Free-Exercise rights, the Court explained
1 The phrase “substantial burden”never appears expressly in the Sherbert opinion.
Sherbert, rather, speaks of a “substantial infringement” of a First Amendment right.  See
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 972 (1963).
-3-
that, in order to pass constitutional muster, the State must demonstrate a compelling state
interest in enforcing the eligibility provisions of the unemployment benefits statutes.  See
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07, 83 S. Ct. at 1795, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 972.  Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the State made no such showing.  Id.  Thus, it has been observed that
Sherbert required a two-step analysis in determining whether or
not a statute, as applied to a particular individual, violated the
First Amendment.  First, the court must determine if the
application of the statute constitutes an infringement upon the
individual’s religious liberty, and second, if an infringement
exists, the court must then determine if it is justified by a
“compelling state interest.”
State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 890 (N.D. 1980).
Sherbert is considered a landmark decision, as it is “the first case to assert that laws
interfering with religiously motivated conduct must be analyzed under the compelling state
interest test.”  Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Mediating Institutions:
Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277 (1994).  Mere
“interference,” however, was not enough (under Sherbert) to mandate application of the
compelling state interest test.  Rather, Sherbert became known for creating the “substantial
burden test.”1  See Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
894, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1608, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 896 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e
have respected both the First Amendment’s express textual mandate and the governmental
-4-
interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial
burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest . . . .”) (emphasis
added).  That is, under Sherbert – to the extent it survives Smith’s analysis, discussed infra
– strict scrutiny is not the pertinent standard of review unless the governmental action in
question imposes a “substantial burden” on the challenger’s Free Exercise rights.
As stated in Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City v. People’s Counsel for
Baltimore County, 407 Md. 53, 87, 962 A.2d 404, 424 (2008), “[t]he substantial burden test
(the Sherbert test) remained the law of the land governing claims under the Free Exercise
Clause until 1990,” when the Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, 110 S. Ct. at 1608, 108 L. Ed. 2d at
896.  In Smith, two individuals were fired from their jobs because they used peyote – in
violation of Oregon penal statutes – at a ceremony in the Native American Church, of which
they were members.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 110 S. Ct. at 1597, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 883.  Upon
termination, the individuals applied for unemployment benefits, which were denied
ultimately by the Oregon Employment Division because the claimants were ineligible, having
been terminated for work-related “misconduct.”  Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 110 S. Ct. at 1598,
108 L. Ed. 2d at 883.  
The question before the Supreme Court was 
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired
peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on
use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs
-5-
because of such religiously inspired use.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 110 S. Ct. at 1597, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 882.  Rejecting the claimants’
argument that “their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of
a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice,” the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Scalia, held that “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not
the object of the [governmental action] but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 110 S. Ct. at 1600, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 878.  Further, in holding that
Sherbert’s “substantial burden test” need not be applied, the Court distinguished Sherbert,
stating that Sherbert dealt with unemployment compensation cases, which, with their
accompanying eligibility criteria and “good cause” exception, “create[] a mechanism for
individualized exemptions” that “invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind
an applicant’s unemployment . . . .”  Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S. Ct. at 1603, 108 L. Ed.
2d at 884.  Thus, Smith stands for the proposition that “generally applicable, religion-neutral
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by
a compelling governmental interest,” Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3, 110 S. Ct. at 1604 n.3, 108
L. Ed. 2d at 890 n.3, even if the effect of the governmental action is to substantially burden
the challenger’s religious practice.  See Neutral Rules of General Applicability: Incidental
Burdens on Religion, Speech, and Property, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1713, 1721 (2001) (“Smith
. . . held that the state has no duty to exempt people whose religions are substantially
burdened as a result of a neutral and generally applicable law.”).
2  While the Supreme Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 531-32, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472, 489 (1993), stated that “[a] law
failing to satisfy [Smith’s neutrality and general-applicability] requirements must be justified
by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest” – without mention of a finding of “substantial burden” – elsewhere in the opinion
the Court noted that “a law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny,” and that “a law restrictive of
religious practice must advance ‘interests of the highest order.’” Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546,
113 S. Ct. at 2233, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 498 (emphasis added).  I, therefore, do not read  Smith
or Hialeah as doing away with the first Sherbert prong in cases where Smith’s neutrality and
general-applicability guideposts are not met.,   See Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name
We Pray: Fixing the Establishment Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 277 n.418 (2008) (“Sherbert applies to laws targeting religious
practice, while Smith applies to generally-applicable laws.  They address different types of
state action, and need not contradict each other.  The legal fact that Smith does not overrule
Sherbert can be understood both by the fact that Sherbert is still referenced as authoritative
in recent Supreme Court cases, and because Smith never says it overrules Sherbert.  To the
contrary, Smith simply holds that Sherbert does not apply to religion-neutral laws . . . .  The
Supreme Court has clearly stated as much, [citing Hialeah] . . . .”).
-6-
Because Smith held Sherbert’s “substantial burden” test inapplicable to cases
involving neutral laws of general applicability, our first task in the present case
unquestionably is to determine whether the trial court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s requests
for a postponement due to a religious conflict results from application of a neutral law of
general applicability, or an analog thereto – a task that I undertake infra.  Assuming
arguendo (for a moment) that the trial court’s decision does not fit there, the next inquiry is
whether application of Sherbert’s “substantial burden” test is appropriate, and if so, whether
the test necessitates the standard of review in the present case to be strict scrutiny.2
Answering this second group of questions requires a closer examination of the effect of Smith
on Sherbert, an analysis over which much ink has been spilled already.
-7-
One school of thought holds that Smith limited Sherbert only to those cases involving
individualized exemptions vis á vis a system of unemployment benefits.  Language from
Smith supports arguably this narrow reading, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 883, 110 S. Ct. at 1602,
108 L. Ed. 2d at 888 (“We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of
the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.  Although we have
sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always
found the test satisfied.  In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test
(outside the unemployment compensation field) at all.”) (internal citations omitted).  See also
Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The Smith majority
expressly limited . . . Sherbert to the unemployment compensation field.”); Miller v.
Drennon, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20382, at *23 (D. S.C. 20 June 1991) (“According to
Smith, Sherbert and its progeny are limited to the denial of unemployment benefits . . . .”);
S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm’n of Oh., 911 F.2d 1203, 1213 (1990) (Boggs, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Supreme Court now appears to have confined the applicability of those
words to the rather limited field of unemployment compensation . . . .”); see also Sara Witt,
Modifying the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act to Create a
Constitutional Statutory Protection for Religious Landowners, 59 CASE. W. RES. L. REV.
767, 771 (2009) (“Some suggest that the Sherbert exception is further limited to
unemployment compensation cases alone.”).
The other main school of thought – and the one that has garnered the most support –
is that Smith limited application of Sherbert’s “substantial burden” test to all individualized
3 See Catherine Maxson, “Their Preservation is Our Sacred Trust”– Judicially
Mandated Free Exercise Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances under
Employment Division v. Smith, 45 B.C. L. REV. 205, 225 (2003) (“Because the ordinances
(continued...)
-8-
exemptions, and not only to those involving unemployment benefits.  Language in Smith
hints at this conclusion, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S. Ct. at 1603, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 889
(“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment
compensation field . . . .”), and language from published opinions embraces this view.  See,
e.g., In re Hofer, 124 P.3d 1098, 1110 n.2 (Mont. 2005) (“Despite its expressed reluctance,
the Supreme Court in fact has applied the Sherbert test outside the unemployment benefits
context.”).  This view is best exemplified, perhaps, by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed.
2d 472 (1993), in which the Court applied strict scrutiny to certain municipal ordinances it
held to be non-neutral and not generally applicable, but did not involve unemployment
benefits.  Specifically, Hialeah dealt with the Santerian religion, which practices animal
sacrifice as a principle form of devotion, a branch church of which leased land in the city of
Hialeah to establish itself there.  Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 524-26, 113 S. Ct. at 2222-23, 124 L.
Ed. 2d at 484-86.  Expressing concern over the religious practices’ effect on public morals
and safety, the City passed various enactments which declared the City’s commitment to
proscribing animal sacrifices.  Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 526, 113 S. Ct. at 2223, 124 L. Ed. 2d
at 486.  After holding the ordinances to be neither neutral nor generally-applicable, the
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny (á la Sherbert) to strike down the ordinances.3
3(...continued)
[in Hialeah] were neither neutral nor generally applicable under Smith, the Court subjected
Hialeah’s laws to Sherbert’s . . . analysis.”). The Court did not undertake explicitly an
analysis of the first, “substantial burden,” prong of Sherbert, finding that point likely
indisputable. 
-9-
Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S. Ct. at 2233, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 498-98.  Thus, the Supreme
Court has applied Sherbert to scenarios other than those involving unemployment benefits.
In subscribing to the latter understanding of Smith’s effect on Sherbert, I do not write
on a clean slate.  In Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for
Baltimore County, 407 Md. 53, 87 n.13, 962 A.2d 404, 424 n.13 (2008), discussed more fully
infra, I wrote for a unanimous Court (albeit as dicta) that “Smith left open the possibility that
the substantial burden test still applies to Free Exercise Clause challenges where the
government made an individualized assessment.” We did not see Sherbert in Trinity as
limited merely to unemployment compensation scenarios, but rather, to all individualized
assessment situations.  Therefore, assuming, arguendo, that the trial court’s denial in the
present case of Petitioner’s motion to postpone the trial for the two-days of Shavuot was not
the result of a neutral and generally-applicable government action, my reading of Smith and
its progeny requires a Sherbert-type, “substantial burden,” analysis.  If I determine that a
substantial burden analysis is required, this Court’s opinion in Trinity, supra, becomes
relevant more so.
To summarize the road map I believe should be followed in determining the
appropriate standard of review to be applied in the present case: (1) determine whether the
-10-
trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial for the Shavuot holiday was
the result of a “neutral, generally applicable” governmental action such that application of
Sherbert is inapposite (stated differently, determine whether the trial court’s denial of the
motions was an “individualized assessment” which necessitates application of Sherbert’s
substantial burden test; (2) assuming the denial is not a neutral and generally applicable
governmental action, apply Sherbert’s substantial burden test – with Trinity’s gloss – to
determine whether strict scrutiny or abuse of discretion is the pertinent standard of review;
and (3) assuming abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review, decide whether
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial for
the Shavuot holiday. As will be explained more fully infra, one of the outcomes, I believe,
is that application of strict scrutiny is inapposite to the present case.
II.  Neutral and Generally-Applicable Governmental Conduct, or Individualized
Assessment?
As noted supra, “generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of
burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest.”  Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3, 110 S. Ct. at 1604 n.3, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 890 n.3.  While
neutrality and general-applicability “are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied,” Hialeah, 508 U.S. at
531, 113 S. Ct. at 2226, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 489, each requires its own analysis ultimately.  In
this regard, Hialeah is instructive.  See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d
1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Hialeah presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
-11-
elaborate upon what was meant by neutrality and general applicability.”).  Briefly,
[i]n Hialeah, the Court reviewed various ordinances of the City
of Hialeah that effectively prohibited members of the Santeria
religion from sacrificing animals, a traditional practice of
Santeria Worship. . . .  The Court . . . examined the Hialeah City
ordinances and found that they were neither neutral nor of
general applicability.  Instead, the ordinances were written in
such a way as to target only those animal killings that occurred
attendant to Santeria religious worship.  The Court found
additionally that the city had no compelling governmental
interest to support the ordinances.
State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 826 (Utah 2004) (internal citations omitted).  
A.  Neutrality
Under Hialeah, a law (or rule) is, by definition, not neutral “if the object of the law
[or rule] is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation . . . .”
Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533, 113 S. Ct. at 2227, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 490.  The starting point in
determining whether the object or purpose of the government action is to suppress religious
conduct “must begin with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not
discriminate on its face.  A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice
without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context.”  Id.
In the present case, the trial court’s explanation of the denial of Petitioner’s motions
to postpone is devoid of any language that could be construed as having a purpose or object
of denying the motions because of Petitioner’s religious convictions.  As the trial court
stated:
[T]he administrative judge will not let me, hold up jurors for an
extra two days because of something that was not brought to our
-12-
attention.  And the case has already been rescheduled once, and
I simply cannot suspend the trial for those two days. . . .  And,
you know, our trial calendar is extremely heavy right now.  I’m
down two judges, and I’m simply not authorized to suspend the
trial for two days.
The record, therefore, reveals that the denial stemmed (at least in part), not from any
religious animus, but rather from the lack of authorization from the administrative judge,
apparently because Petitioner was raising an issue that, theretofor, was not brought to the
attention of the trial court.
Although the trial court’s decision was neutral facially, “[f]acial neutrality is not
determinative,” as the “Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which
is masked as well as overt.”  Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S. Ct. at 2227, 124 L. Ed. 2d at
491.  In Hialeah, the Supreme Court scrutinized the record for evidence of covert
discrimination, concluding ultimately the object of the City of Hialeah’s ordinances was to
infringe upon the Church member’s Free Exercise rights, considering that the only conduct
subject to the ordinances was the expression of the religious exercise (animal sacrifice) of
the Church members.  See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 535, 113 S. Ct. at 2228, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
The record in the present case is devoid of any evidence from which one could infer
reasonably that the trial court was acting in a manner other than a neutral arbiter.  The trial
court articulated the following reasons for denying the motion to postpone the trial, none of
which suggest that the judge’s decision would have been any different had Petitioner been
Christian, Muslim, or a member of any other religious faith (or an agnostic or atheist): lack
of authorization from the administrative judge; busy trial calendar; lack of judges; effect on
-13-
witnesses, jurors and members of the community; and Petitioner’s delay in bringing the
problem to the court’s attention.  Unlike Hialeah, in which the legislative history of the
City’s ordinances revealed concern “that certain religions may propose to engage in
[religious] practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,” Hialeah,
508 U.S. at 526, 112 S. Ct. at 2223, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 486, the record here is devoid of even
a hint of religious animus.
Finally, the Court in Hialeah stated that “[i]n determining if the object of a law is a
neutral one . . . , we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases.”  Hialeah, 508 U.S.
at 540, 113 S. Ct. at 2230, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 495.  In undertaking this mode of analysis, the
Court noted that “[r]elevant evidence includes . . . the historical background of the decision
under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the . . . official policy in question,
and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by
members of the decisionmaking body.”  Id.  A judicial determination to deny a continuance
or a postponement (as opposed to a legislative act), has no legislative history, but the
“specific series of events leading to” the judge’s ruling in this case is telling.  The relevant
facts of the present case are that the parties became aware of the 3 June 2008 trial date on 24
January 2008, yet Petitioner waited until 6 May 2008 – less than a month prior to the
commencement of trial – to inform the trial court that neither Petitioner nor his counsel
would be present on the two days of trial that fell out on the Shavuot holiday.  See PIRKEI
AVOT – ETHICS OF OUR FATHERS § 1:14 (“If not now, when?”).  The trial judge mentioned
at the 14 and 22 May 2008 hearings on the matter Petitioner’s tardiness.  Whether the trial
-14-
court abused its discretion to rely on this delay is discussed infra; however, it appears clear
to me that this justification, alone or in conjunction with the balance of the record, in no way
evinces an “object” on the part of the trial court to infringe upon Petitioner’s Free Exercise
rights.  According to Judge Sykes of the federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
“the point of [Hialeah]” was that “even a facially neutral law of general applicability might
be discriminatory in violation of the Free Exercise Clause because of its design, operation
. . . or in the manner in which it is enforced.”  River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of
Hazel Crest, Ill., 611 F.3d 367, 387 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting).  Concluding that
the record is devoid of any evidence from which one could conclude that the trial court’s
denial of Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial was either designed to, or operated to,
infringe upon Petitioner’s Free Exercise rights, I would hold that the judicial determination
in the present case was “neutral.”
B.  General Applicability
One federal district court detailed Hialeah’s analysis of the “general-applicability”
prong:
Discussing the requirement of general applicability, the
Lukumi [C]ourt observed that “all laws are selective to some
extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern
when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious
practice.”  The “government . . . cannot in a selective manner
impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.”
The ordinances at issue in Lukumi were so deficient that the
court declined to “define with precision the standard used to
evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application.”
However, the Lukumi [C]ourt made clear that a law is not
generally applicable if it was purportedly adopted to protect
4 See Federal Trial Continued for BCS National Championship Game,
http://law.about.com/b/2010/12/10/federal-trial-continued-for-bcs-national-championship-
game-auburn-vs-oregon.htm (last visited 21 December 2010) (“This past week the BCS
National Championship game pitting Auburn against Oregon was cited as the grounds for
continuing a federal trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama - and
the motion was granted.”).
-15-
certain interests, yet “fails to prohibit nonreligious conduct that
endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than [the
banned religious conduct] does.”
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1244-45
(D. N.M. 2002) (internal citations omitted); see Green, 99 P.3d at 828 (employing a similar
analysis).
The governmental action at issue here – the denial of Petitioner’s motions to postpone
the trial for the Shavuot holiday – has no “categories of selection.”  Being a judicial
determination, the trial court’s ruling is made on particular motions, and facts, applicable to
two unique parties,; but, there is nothing in any of the judge’s rulings that suggests that she
“selected” Petitioner’s motions for denial on the grounds that they were based on Petitioner’s
intent to observe a religious holiday.  Further, the judge’s rulings do not “fail to prohibit
nonreligious conduct that endangers the[] interests” sought to be protected by the ruling.
That is, as mentioned infra, the trial court denied the motions, citing interests of docket
efficiency and the effect a delay would have on jurors and witnesses; nowhere in the rulings,
however, did the judge suggest that she would have granted the motions to postpone if they
were based on nonreligious reasons (e.g., the Bowl Championship Series title game,4 the
5 
See 
Lawyers 
Who 
Follow 
the 
Texas 
Rangers 
Are 
Crazy,
http://www.abovethelaw.com/2010/10/lawyers-who-follow-the-texas-rangers-are-crazy/ (last
visited 21 December 2010) (detailing the story of a Texas attorney who requested a
continuance to attend the World Series).
-16-
World Series,5 etc.). 
To be sure, judges and courts decide cases and controversies.  See Thom v. Cook, 113
Md. 85, 88, 77 A. 120, 120 (1910) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S. Ct. 132,
133, 40 L. Ed. 293, 293 (1895)) (“The duty of this [C]ourt, as of every other judicial tribunal,
is to decide actual controversies . . . .”).  Accordingly, the judge’s ruling on a motion affects
generally only the litigants to the particular case.  Thus, a judicial ruling does not have the
same generally-applicable effect as a legislative act.  That said, I believe the judge’s denial
of Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial was the judicial analog to a generally-applicable
legislative act, in that there is no evidence in the record from which one could conclude that
the judge’s ruling would have been any different if faced with nonreligious justifications for
the requested postponement.  See State v. Blackmon, 719 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ohio 1998)
(holding that appellant’s Free Exercise rights were not violated where there was no evidence
that the trial court considered anything other than “generally applicable factors” in
considering a motion for a continuance, including: length of delay requested, inconvenience
to litigants and witnesses, whether the moving party contributed to the circumstances for
which the request was made, etc.). 
C.  Individualized Assessment
Notwithstanding my view that the judge’s rulings on Petitioner’s motions to postpone
-17-
the trial constitute a judicial analog to a neutral and generally-applicable legislative act, I
must undertake another inquiry, namely, whether the judge’s determination constitutes an
“individualized assessment,” sufficient to trigger a Sherbert analysis.  See Kissinger v. Bd.
of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 179 (6th Cir. 1993) (employing a “three-part
analysis”: whether the governmental action “was generally applicable, was not aimed at
particular religious practices, and did not contain a system of particularized exemptions”).
But see First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 181 (Wash. 1992) (appearing
to conflate the “individual assessment” analysis with the “neutral/generally-applicable”
analysis).
Smith said, vis-á-vis individualized exemptions/assessments, that:
The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a
context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.  As a
plurality of the Court noted in Roy [476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct.
2147, 90 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1986)], a distinctive feature of the
unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility
criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances
behind an applicant’s unemployment: The statutory conditions
. . . provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment
compensation benefits if, without good cause, he had quit work
or refused available work.  The “good cause” standard created
a mechanism for individualized exemptions.  As the plurality
pointed out in Roy, our decisions in the unemployment cases
stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
system to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling
reason.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S. Ct. at 1603, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 884 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
6 But see Md. Rule 2-508(b) (“When an action has been assigned a trial date, the trial
shall not be continued on the ground that discovery has not yet been completed, except for
good cause shown.”). 
-18-
To be sure, and as mentioned supra, because trial courts deal with discrete
controversies between the parties before them, each ruling or determination in the case is
somewhat “individualized.”  The rub, though, is whether a judicial ruling is cut from the
same cloth as the individualized exemptions with which the Supreme Court in Sherbert and
its progeny dealt.  In formulating an answer to this question, I proceed along the following
path: 
The determination of whether the Sherbert exception [i.e.
application of Sherbert] is triggered proceeds in two steps.  The
first focuses on whether a law contains a mechanism similar to
the “good cause” criterion that is open to unfettered
discretionary interpretation.  If such a mechanism exists, the
second step requires courts to determine whether it is enforced
in a discriminatory manner.  Absent evidence of discrimination
in the actual enforcement of the [governmental action], . . .
Sherbert . . . is not triggered, and there is no need to apply the
compelling state interest test.
Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and
Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1081 (2000).
First, although there is no requirement in civil cases in the posture of the present case
that a judge find expressly “good cause” before granting a motion to postpone a trial,6 a trial
court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to postpone or continue a trial is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and, accordingly, the decision is subject to a great degree of
deference on appellate review.  See Schroder v. State, 206 Md. 261, 265, 111 A.2d 587, 589
7 Instructive on this point is Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St.
Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), in which members
of a church alleged violations of their Free Exercise rights when the Landmark Preservation
Commission of New York City applied the City’s “Landmarks Law” – which protects
buildings deemed “landmarks” from being altered or demolished – to prevent them from
replacing the church’s activities building with an office tower.  See St. Bartholomew, 914
F.2d at 350-352.  St. Bartholomew is particularly apt because the plaintiffs did not assert that
the law itself infringed upon their Free Exercise rights; rather, they alleged that the
decisionmaker’s (i.e., the Board’s) application of the statute caused the constitutional
violation.  The church members, in support of their argument that the Commission’s
application of the Landmarks Law infringed impermissibly on their Free Exercise rights,
“cite[d] commentators  . . . who are highly critical of the Landmarks Law on grounds that it
accords great discretion to the Commission . . . .”  St. Bartholomew, 914 F.2d at 354.  In
(continued...)
-19-
(1955) (“It has long been a well settled rule in this State that the granting or refusing of a
continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be set aside on
appeal unless the exercise of that discretion has been arbitrary.”).  Although the abuse of
discretion standard does not leave judges with “unfettered discretionary interpretation,”
appellate review of this type of judicial determination is highly deferential and gives judges
a substantial degree of discretion in granting such motions.
Whether the abuse of discretion standard of review that insulates, to a degree, a trial
court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to postpone or continue a trial is akin to the “good
cause” standard with which Sherbert and the other unemployment compensation cases deal,
absent from the record here is any evidence that this ruling specifically, rulings from this
particular judge, or rulings from this particular court, were in any way discriminatory.
Absent such evidence, I conclude Sherbert to be inapposite and inapplicable to the present
factual situation.7 
7(...continued)
responding to this argument, however, the Second Circuit held that “absent proof of the
discriminatory exercise of discretion, there is no constitutional relevance to these
observations.”  St. Bartholomew, 914 F.2d at 355.
-20-
One final observation on this point is in order.  I do not believe that the legislative ills
that strict scrutiny protects against in the Free Exercise sphere are applicable with equal force
to the judicial branch.  See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 609 (1969) (concluding that separation of powers was intended to “ensure the
protection of individual rights against all governmental encroachments, particularly by the
legislature, the body which Whigs ha[d] traditionally cherished as the people’s exclusive
repository of their public liberty”) (emphasis added).  That is, a concern of any democratic
society is that an oppressive or tyrannical electorate will emerge and elect similarly minded
legislative representatives, who, in turn, will enact laws that will oppress certain disfavored
groups.  See Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The branch thought to constitute the
greatest danger . . . was the legislative; during the operation of the Articles of Confederation,
the legislature, in the view of many of the Framers, intruded impermissibly into the sphere
of liberty and private property.”).  To protect against laws whose object is to restrict religious
practice, strict scrutiny in the Free Exercise realm acts as a judicial check against this
legislative possibility, placing the burden on the government to prove that the legislative
enactment is tailored narrowly to further a compelling governmental interest.  If the
government fails to shoulder this burden with respect to laws that place a substantial burden
-21-
on one’s Free Exercise rights, it is the courts’ duty to invalidate such a law or action. 
The judiciary, then, “[i]n our system of checks and balances . . . by its very nature, is
and is supposed to be the anti-democratic branch.”  Porter v. State, 47 Md. App. 96, 109, 421
A.2d 985, 992 (1980) (Moylan, J., concurring).  Or, stated differently, the judiciary was
envisioned as the branch of government that would curb a legislature’s attempts to oppress
the minority (or, in this case, oppress one’s religious beliefs and/or practices), and not the
branch that, itself, would engage in the oppressing.  The possibility of a “tyranny of the
majority” in legislative enactments – perhaps best exemplified in Hialeah – does not exist
to the same degree in isolated judicial rulings or determinations.  Of course, it is possible for
a judge to decide the outcome of a case or of a motion based on religious animus; strict
scrutiny, however, does not apply inevitably to all judicial determinations invoking the word
“religion.”  The abuse of discretion standard provides adequately a proper check against such
a possibility. 
IV.  Substantial, or Mere Incidental, Burden?
If one disagrees with my view that the judge’s denial of Petitioner’s motions to
postpone the trial for Shavuot constitutes a neutral and generally-applicable governmental
action, it does not follow necessarily that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review.  As
discussed supra, to the extent a governmental action is an “individualized assessment” or is
not neutral and generally applicable, under Sherbert, strict scrutiny applies only if the
governmental action in question places a “substantial burden” on one’s Free Exercise rights.
In this regard, our opinion in Trinity, supra, becomes relevant.  Accordingly, a brief
-22-
reiteration of the relationship between Trinity and Free Exercise jurisprudence is in order. 
In 1993, Congress enacted . . . the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (the “RFRA”), in response to what it perceived
to be an erosion of religious liberty reflected in Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting and applying the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment. [42 U.S.C.A.] § 2000bb(a).  Three
decades before Congress enacted the RFRA, the Supreme Court
decided Sherbert v. Verner . . . .  The substantial burden test (the
Sherbert test) remained the law of the land governing claims
under the Free Exercise Clause until 1990 . . . . [when it
decided] Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v.
Smith . . . .  The Court [in Smith] turned its back on the
substantial burden test, noting that it “was developed in a
context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,” namely
unemployment compensation.  Congress enacted the RFRA to
respond to Smith.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
513 (1997) (noting that “Congress enacted RFRA in direct
response to . . . Smith”). . . .  Congress disagreed that application
of the substantial burden test would invite anarchy, finding
instead that it “is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior government
interests.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(5).  Congress found further
that neutral, generally applicable laws nonetheless may have the
effect of burdening religious exercise to the same degree as laws
intended to stifle such exercise.  Accordingly, the RFRA
announced that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion[,] even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it demonstrates that
application of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest[] and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that . . . interest.” Id. § 2000bb-1(a) & (b).  An attack
on the RFRA, however, was quick and decisive. In City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court partially invalidated the
RFRA, holding that the enforcement power granted to Congress
by the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to
impose universally the substantial burden test on state and local
governments. . . .  After three years of hearings, Congress found
that actions by state and local governments, in these two areas
[land use and institutionalized persons] particularly, threaten
-23-
religious exercise.  To ensure that the RLUIPA did not suffer the
same fate as the RFRA, Congress circumscribed the reach of the
substantial burden test.
Trinity, 407 Md. at 86-89, 962 A.2d at 423-425.  Because courts “have defined RLUIPA’s
substantial burden provision by reference to the Supreme Court’s free exercise
jurisprudence,” Vision Church, United Methodist v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 996
(7th Cir. 2006), and because it is my view that the substantial burden test is relevant to the
present case, I turn for guidance to Trinity – a Maryland RLUIPA case – to “gauge the reach
of ‘substantial burden.’” Trinity, 407 Md. at 93, 962 A.2d at 427; see Rouse v. Caruso, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4941, at *18 (E.D. Mich. 24 January 2007) (“The RLUIPA does not define
‘substantial burden,’ but the courts that have considered the Act have defined the term by
reference to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law.”).  
In Trinity, this Court cited, with approval, the following elucidation of other courts
regarding “substantial burden”:
•
Government action “which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but
which ha[s] no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs” does not qualify as a substantial burden – Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1988).
•
“[A] substantial burden on religious exercise occurs when a . . . government, through
act or omission, ‘put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs.’” – Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006).
•
“A ‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must impose a significantly great
restriction or onus upon such exercise.” – Guru Nanak Soc’y of Yuba City v. County
of Sutter; Casey Kroon; Dennis Nelson; Larry Munger; Dan Silva, 456 F.3d 978, 988
(9th Cir. 2006). 
•
“A ‘substantial burden’ must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise;
-24-
a ‘substantial burden’ is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” – Midrash Sephardi,
366 F.3d at 1227. 
•
A substantial burden on religion is a restriction that “prevents adherents from
conducting or expressing their religious beliefs or causes them to forgo religious
precepts.” – Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F.
Supp. 2d 507, 515 (D. N.J. 2005)
Trinity, 407 Md. at 93-94, 962 A.2d at 428-29.  I think that the judge’s denial of Petitioner’s
motion to postpone the trial for Shavuot did not “coerce,” “put substantial pressure on,” or
“impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon” Petitioner to violate his religious
precepts.  Had the judge’s denial of his motion to postpone placed such a burden on
Petitioner’s Free Exercise rights (or Petitioner perceived truly such a burden), Petitioner, I
suspect, would have informed the trial court at some point during the period between 24
January 2008 – when the final trial dates were scheduled – and 6 May 2008 – the date on
which Petitioner first and ultimately informed the trial court of the Shavuot conflict, less than
a month before commencement of trial.  See United States v. Jackson, 770 F.2d 1550, 1557
(11th Cir. 1985) (“Appellant had a duty to inform the court [about a religious holiday]
sufficiently before the trial in order to assert his [F]irst [A]mendment rights.”) (emphasis
omitted).  That is not to say that the exercise of Petitioner’s religion was not affected in any
way by the trial court’s denial of his motion; of course, neither he nor his counsel was able
to attend trial on either day of Shavuot.  Yet, governmental action “that merely
inconvenience[s] the exercise of religion do[es] not create a substantial burden.”  First
Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 610 F.3d 1274, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated
-25-
by, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010).
In distilling the authorities in Trinity, we stated that a substantial burden on religious
exercise exists – albeit in the RLUIPA context – “only if it leaves the aggrieved religious
institution without a reasonable means to observe a particular religious precept.”  Trinity, 407
Md. at 96, 962 A.2d at 429.  An amicus here asks rhetorically: “If Jews could not hold public
office in Maryland until 1825, is it an unfair stretch – or an unconscionable reality – to
suggest that they cannot freely observe their holidays in 2010?”  Brief for Interested
Professors of Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 31.  Simply put, Petitioner was
free to celebrate Shavuot as he deemed fit; the trial court did not compel his presence in court
in violation of the Jewish faith.  Accordingly, because Petitioner was with “reasonable
means” to observe the holiday of Shavuot, I do not think a “substantial burden” was placed
upon his Free Exercise rights.  See State v. Pride, 1 S.W.3d 494, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(applying the abuse of discretion standard to a denial of a motion to continue a trial); Gordon
v. Gordon, 739 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
VI.  Applying the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review to the Present Case
According to the Majority opinion, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial “because the articulated rationales . . . failed to
reasonably accommodate Petitioner’s right to engage in religious conduct and to
meaningfully participate in his trial.”   __ Md. __, __, __ A.2d __, __ (2010) (Majority slip
op. at 13).  That is not the abuse of discretion that I would find.  Rather, I believe the trial
court abused its discretion because the facts in evidence, according to the record extract, do
-26-
not support the proffered rationales for denying Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial. 
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-508, “[o]n a motion of any party . . . the court may
continue a trial or other proceeding as justice may require.” (Emphasis added.)  Because the
Rule invokes the precatory word “may,” we have held that “the decision to grant a
continuance [or postponement] lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge” and that
“[a]bsent an abuse of that discretion we historically have not disturbed the decision to deny
a motion for a continuance [or postponement].”  Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 669,
907 A.2d 807, 816 (2006). 
In Gray v. State, we explained the abuse of discretion standard as follows:
Abuse of discretion is one of those very general,
amorphous terms that appellate courts use and apply with great
frequency but which they have defined in many different ways.
. . . [A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would
not have made the same ruling.  The decision under
consideration has to be well removed from any center mark
imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what
that court deems minimally acceptable.  That kind of distance
can arise in a number of ways, among which are that the ruling
either does not logically follow from the findings upon which it
supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its
announced objective.  That, we think, is included within the
notion of “untenable grounds,” “violative of fact and logic,” and
“against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the
court.”
Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 383-84, 879 A.2d 1064, 1073-74 (2005) (quoting Dehn v.
Edgecombe, 384 Md. at 628, 865 A.2d at 616 (quoting North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13-
14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031-1032 (1994))).  Although we are reticent (because of the highly
-27-
deferential nature of the standard) to find an abuse of discretion in a trial court’s denial for
a request for a postponement or continuance, I would hold here that a trial court is required
to make an on-the-record explanation of the reasons supporting a decision to deny.  See
Baumann v. Wyse, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 78, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (finding an abuse of discretion where the trial court gave no explanation in denying
a party’s motion).  While the trial court, in this case, did make an on-the-record findings, I
would hold that her denial is “well removed from any center mark imagined” by this Court
and that she abused her discretion in denying the motion, not because her ruling does not
flow logically from the findings upon which it rests, but rather because the record extract
does not support the articulated findings upon which it rests.  See Grant v. State, 414 Md.
483, 995 A.2d 975 (2010) (holding that it is an abuse of discretion for a court to “exercise
that discretion without preserving the evidentiary basis for its decision” and finding that
“[t]he fact that the trial court’s bases for its decision . . . are beyond our reach makes it
untenable to sustain the trial court’s ruling as a permissible exercise of its discretion”).  
As mentioned supra, the trial court offered the following reasons for delaying
Petitioner’s motion to postpone the trial:  lack of authorization from the administrative judge;
busy trial calendar; lack of judges; effect on witnesses, jurors and members of the
community; and delay in bringing the issue to the court’s attention.  At bottom, however, the
judge, at various points throughout the relevant motions hearings, stated that she was willing
to work around the two-day Shavuot holiday if defense counsel was able to reschedule the
expert witnesses scheduled originally for those two days.  For example, during the 22 May
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2008 hearing on Petitioner’s motion to postpone the trial, the following colloquy ensued:
[JUDGE]
I would ask [defense] counsel if you can contact
your witnesses to see if any of them are available
to reschedule.
[COUNSEL] I will do that, Your Honor.
[JUDGE] 
If enough witnesses were rescheduled so that we
didn’t need to sit either Monday or Tuesday I
would not sit.
[COUNSEL] I will certainly do that.  I will contact all four of
the experts.  I will make my best efforts to explain
the holiday situation and see what we can do.
[JUDGE]
[T]he Court’s calendar is . . . double booked the
second week of this [trial].  I at one point had five
trials that Monday, we’re now down to only two,
this, and another malpractice trial which they are
bringing in another judge to cover.  But that’s
how, I mean, we’re just double and tripled booked
every week.  So it is important that this trial end
that second week.  But if defense counsel can
reschedule any of their experts, I am asking them
to attempt to do that.
(Emphasis added.)  Similarly, Respondent, in its brief, argues:
By that time [May 5 – when Petitioner first sought redress from
the Circuit Court] counsel for both of the Defendants had
already begun scheduling their expert and fact witnesses to
testify at trial.  Incidentally, as with most medical malpractice
cases, the expert witnesses were physicians or other health care
providers.  In order to secure these witnesses live at trial, several
months notice is often required to ensure their availability.
Furthermore, once confirmed, schedules are extremely difficult
to adjust within a month’s timeframe.”
In support of these contentions, Respondent cites to the record extract and the appendix in
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support of the above assertions.  The record extract at the cited-to page, however, merely
quotes Respondent’s counsel as saying that “I am trying to get my experts and witnesses set
in for trial.”  Furthermore, the cited-to pages in the appendix merely show that Respondent’s
counsel informed the experts of the June 3 commencement of trial – not that they were either
(a) officially scheduled to testify on June 9 or 10 of the trial scheduled to run through June
13; or (b) asked about their availability to testify at another time during that period.  Further,
while Respondent argues on appeal that “[o]nly one of Respondent’s experts (Dr. Geckler)
could accommodate moving his trial appearance” and “Respondent’s experts were unable to
change their trial appearances,” Respondent offers no citation to the record extract to support
these statements.  My review of the record extract proved fruitless in finding support for
Respondent’s appellate advocacy. 
While the abuse of discretion standard appreciates that “[q]uestions within the
discretion of the trial court are much better decided by trial courts than by appellate courts,”
In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586, 819 A.2d 1030, 1051 (2003), the phrase “standard of review”
suggests that appellate courts nevertheless have some duty to review.  Where, like here, the
reasons upon which a trial court bases his or her denial of a motion to postpone a trial –
especially where the tendered and undisputed reasons for a brief postponement is the practice
of genuinely held religious beliefs – are not supported by an adequate evidentiary predicate
in the record extract, it is my view that the judge abused his or her discretion.  See United
States v. Doe, 356 F. App’x 488, 489 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Where First Amendment rights are
implicated, our abuse-of-discretion review . . . is more rigorous than usual.”) (internal
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quotation marks omitted).  Agreeing with the Majority opinion that Petitioner’s absence from
the trial was presumptively prejudicial, I concur in the judgment.
Judge Murphy authorizes me to state that he joins the views expressed in this
concurring opinion.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 273195-V
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 12
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
ALEXANDER H. NEUSTADTER, et al.
v.
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
OF SILVER SPRING, INC.
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Concurring Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   February 24, 2011
Although the majority is correct that we should avoid addressing constitutional issues
when unnecessary, I write separately because I think we should reach the constitutional issue
presented here. 
The doctrine under which we avoid unnecessary Constitutional issues is most
applicable when the constitutional issue is moot, or when there are two independent grounds
on which we can resolve the case, one of which does not require constitutional analysis. 
This is illustrated by the cases cited by the majority.  See Maj. Slip. Op. at 7 n. 8 (citing In
re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 667 (2009) (constitutional issue was moot); Montrose Christian
Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 578, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001) (analyzing court’s order
to seal courtroom under common law principle of openness); Baltimore Sun v. Baltimore,
359 Md. 653, 659, 755 A.2d 1130, 1133-1134 (2000) (case determined on issues of conflict
of laws and on “charitable immunity” ).  Unlike those cases, this appeal raises the threshold
question of which of the levels of scrutiny is required for this claimed violation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
The level of scrutiny demanded by the Constitution depends upon whether the action
at issue was an individualized government action, or a neutral action of general applicability,
as explained in Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990).  This is not a separate issue which may be
avoided, but a threshold question.  See Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275,
292 (5th Cir. 2001) (“the opt-out policy enacted by Forney is neutral and of general
application[, thus] [a]s a threshold matter . . . the [policy] survives constitutional scrutiny
under Smith.”);  First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423 (11th Cir. 1994)
2
(“the threshold questions in analyzing a law challenged under the Free Exercise Clause are
(1) is the law neutral, and (2) is the law of general applicability?”); Hyman v. City of
Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 537 (W.D.Ky. 2001) (“Smith requires a court to determine
as a threshold matter whether the challenged regulation is "a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability[.]'") vacated on other grounds by Hyman v. City of Louisville, 53 Fed. Appx.
740 (6th Cir. 2002).  The majority’s conclusion that the refusal to postpone the trial was an
abuse of discretion does not relieve of us of our obligation to identify which is the
appropriate constitutional standard.  Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32, 116 S. Ct.
1620, 1627 (1996) (in analyzing law targeted at homosexuals, the Court first identified
“rational basis” as the correct level of scrutiny, and then held that the law “fails, indeed
defies, even this conventional inquiry.”)  An action is only entitled to the more deferential
“abuse of discretion” standard of review, and relieved from higher constitutional scrutiny,
if it qualifies as a neutral, generally applicable action under the threshold test.  
Turning to this question, I agree that the trial court’s refusal to postpone was neutral
and of “general applicability,” and not an individualized action that demands the higher
scrutiny of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963).  On
this point, I am persuaded by Judge Harrell’s detailed analysis of the nature of the trial
court’s action, in light of Sherbert and Smith.  
I would therefore hold that the correct level of scrutiny is Smith’s lower level of
scrutiny, which means that we apply our usual standard of review when considering trial
court discretionary decisions, i.e., whether the trial court abused its discretion.  On this point,
1A party’s failure to make a timely assertion of the claimed infringement on his
religious beliefs may reflect on his sincerity, and in that sense diminish the infringement. But
the level of sincerity was resolved favorably to Neustadter by the trial court, and I see no
reason to disturb that factual finding.  
3
the majority opinion convincingly explains why the trial court’s action should fail.  I join the
majority’s analysis regarding why it was an abuse of discretion.
Because I believe this discussion resolves the question, I would decline to wade into
the thorny issue of whether the court’s action imposes a “substantial burden” as Judge Harrell
does.  This is partly because I consider some of Judge Harrell’s reasoning regarding
“substantial burden” to be inapposite.  Judge Harrell faults Neustadter for failing to raise the
issue regarding his religion earlier: 
Had the judge’s denial of his motion to postpone placed
such a burden on Petitioner’s Free Exercise rights (or Petitioner
perceived truly such a burden), Petitioner, I suspect, would have
informed the trial court at some point during the period between
24 January 2008 – when the final trial dates were scheduled –
and 6 May 2008 – the date on which Petitioner first and
ultimately informed the trial court of the Shavuot conflict, less
than a month before commencement of trial. 
Although I agree that a party’s failure to raise such an objection timely is important, and
often dispositive, that delay invokes an issue of “waiver,” not “substantial burden.”  Clearly,
whether or not a state action imposes a “substantial burden” on a party is an independent
question from how adequately that party enforces his rights.1
Furthermore, I would not address the intriguing  issue Judge Harrell raises of whether
the Free Exercise clause is “applicable with equal force to the judicial branch.”