Title: Alcorn v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

279 N.E.2d 800 (1972)
Carl Edward ALCORN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 1270S313.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
March 14, 1972.
*801 Thomas L. Ryan, Robert S. McCain, Fort Wayne, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Mark Peden, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
ARTERBURN, Chief Justice.
This appeal arises on a motion to correct errors filed upon denial of appellant's petition for post conviction relief under Rule P.C. 1. Appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of second degree burglary and on April 14, 1964 was sentenced to not less than two (nor more than five) years. On April 8, 1970 appellant filed his amended petition for post conviction relief. The State filed an answer denying the petition. On June 11, 1970 the Court heard the petition and entered its finding of fact and conclusion of law and judgment on June 24, 1970, denying the relief prayed for.
Appellant was paroled from this commitment on July 20, 1966, and was released to parole supervision on September 15, 1966. On December 30, 1968, while on parole, appellant was again found guilty of Second Degree Burglary and was sentenced and committed to the Indiana State Reformatory for a period of not less than two (2) nor more than five (5) years.
The Indiana State Parole Board determined that the term of commitment of the sentence on April 7, 1964, expired on December 14, 1969, and therefore his present commitment did not commence until December 14, 1969.
Each of appellant's assignments of error revolves around the fact that appellant did not have a hearing before the Indiana Parole Board before the determination was made that his commitment on the last conviction would not commence until December 14, 1969.
Appellant's basic assertion is that his commitment to serve both sentences consecutively is invalid since he did not have a hearing before the Indiana Parole Board. To support his proposition appellant refers us to Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., § 13-1611 (1970 Supp.), IC 1971, XX-X-X-XX, which reads as follows:
This statute was passed in 1961 and superseded a prior statute on the same subject, Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., § 9-2250 (1956 Repl.), IC 1971, 35-8-7-1, which reads as follows:
The most prominent distinguishing characteristic about these two statutes is that in the earlier statute a prisoner returning to prison, after commission of a crime, while on parole "shall be subject to serve the second sentence after the first sentence is served or annulled", while in the later statute, § 13-1611, a prisoner who commits a crime, while on parole, "may be required" by the Indiana Parole Board to serve the second sentence after the first has been completed. The fact that the word "may" was used in the later statute means that the Parole Board has discretion to decide whether the second sentence should run concurrent with or consecutive to the completion of the first sentence. The exercise of discretion can only occur after consideration of the relevant facts and therefore a hearing as contemplated by § 13-1611 is necessary before the Parole Board can make a justifiable determination.
Furthermore, Burns' Ind. Admis. Rules and Regs. Anno., XX-XXXX-X, reads as follows:
This administrative rule requires an appearance by every parole violator before the Indiana Parole Board. This rule was adopted pursuant to Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., § 13-1609, IC 1971, 11-1-1-9, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Indiana Parole Board is bound to follow the Administrative Rules and it is the duty of the court to give validity to these rules made within the board's jurisdiction. We find that it was error for appellant to be denied a hearing following his return to prison and therefore this case must be reversed.
Judgment of the trial court is reversed with directions to restate its findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformity with this opinion and enter judgment accordingly.
GIVAN, HUNTER, PRENTICE and DeBRULER, JJ., concur.