Title: Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.1994 WY 88881 P.2d 1076Case Number: 94-20Decided: 09/23/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Letty 
K. HEPP,

Appellant 
(Petitioner Employee-Claimant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellee 
(Respondent Objector-Defendant),

and 
Bazel's Diner, Appellee (Respondent Employer-Defendant).

Appeal 
from District Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Rene 
Botten of Northern Wyoming Law Associates, Sheridan.

Representing 
Appellees:

Kenneth 
E. Spurrier, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div.

M. 
Greg Carlson of Drew & Carlson, Gillette, for appellee Bazel's 
Diner.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Letty 
K. Hepp sought review in the district court of the hearing examiner's order 
which denied her request for worker's compensation benefits. The district court 
certified the case to the Supreme Court for review.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Hepp presents the 
following issues:

I. 
Is the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the administrative law 
judge denying the award of benefits arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law?

II. 
Is the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the administrative law 
judge denying the award of benefits unsupported by substantial evidence and 
contrary to the weight of the evidence?

 

FACTS

[¶4]      Hepp was employed 
as a cook for Appellee Bazel's Diner in Sheridan, Wyoming. On April 29, 1993, 
Hepp reported to her supervisor that she had injured her back when, as part of 
her work duties, she lifted a rubber floor mat. Although she continued to 
experience pain, she completed her work shift at the 
restaurant.

[¶5]      After Hepp had 
left work, a friend took her to the emergency room at a local hospital. The 
emergency room physician examined her and concluded that she had suffered a 
severe muscle strain with some possible nerve involvement.

[¶6]      The next day, 
Hepp filed her report of injury and requested worker's compensation benefits. 
She indicated in her report that, while she was at work, she had injured her 
neck, left arm, and lower back. On May 5, 1993, Bazel's Diner filed its report 
in which it asserted that Hepp's injury had not occurred while she was at 
work.

[¶7]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division denied Hepp's application for worker's compensation 
benefits, stating: "The Division has received an objection to your case from 
your employer. It has come to our attention that you actually injured yourself 
prior to April 29, 1993 lifting bales of hay." Hepp objected to the Workers' 
Compensation Division's determination and requested that a contested case 
hearing be held so that a determination could be made as to whether she was 
entitled to receive benefits.

[¶8]      A contested case 
hearing was held in September 1993. Hepp presented several witnesses who 
testified that, to their knowledge, Hepp had not been injured before the April 
29, 1993, incident which occurred while she was at work. The Workers' 
Compensation Division called S. Kit Carson, D.C., a chiropractor, as a witness, 
and he testified that he had treated Hepp five times between April 13, 1993, and 
April 29, 1993, for discomfort in her neck, left shoulder, and 
arms.

[¶9]      The hearing 
examiner issued his decision letter on November 8, 1993, in which he ruled that 
Hepp was not entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits. He found that 
some of Hepp's witnesses were not credible and that those who were credible 
generally did not testify about matters of substance. Subsequently, an order 
entitled "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order," which incorporated 
the rulings made in the decision letter, was entered.

[¶10]   Hepp filed her petition for review 
of the hearing examiner's decision with the district court, and the district 
court certified the case to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

[¶11]   Hepp contends that two issues exist 
on appeal. However, we are convinced that, after having reviewed her arguments, 
only one issue exists: Whether substantial evidence supported the hearing 
examiner's conclusion that Hepp did not meet her burden of proving that her 
injury occurred during the course of her employment.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶12]   When we are reviewing cases which 
have been certified to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we apply the appellate 
standards which are applicable to the reviewing court of the first instance. 
Pinther v. State Department of Administration and Information, 866 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Wyo. 1994). Whether an employee's injury occurred in the course of 
her employment is a question of fact. See Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, 
Inc., 820 P.2d 553 (Wyo. 1991). We review factual issues by applying the 
substantial evidence standard. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) 
(1990).

"Our 
task is to examine the entire record to determine if substantial evidence exists 
to support the hearing examiner's findings. We will not substitute our judgment 
for that of the hearing examiner if his decision is supported by substantial 
evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept in support of the agency's conclusions." Romero v. Davy McKee 
Corporation, 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Farman v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 
1992)).

Bearden 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
868 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 1994), quoted in Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 875 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1994). "The 
claimant has the burden of proving each essential element of her claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 875 P.2d  at 1273 (citing Leonard v. McDonalds 
of Jackson Hole, 746 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Wyo. 1987)). "The party who appeals 
from an administrative determination has the burden of proving the lack of 
substantial evidence to sustain the ruling of the agency." Jaqua v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 873 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Wyo. 
1994).

DISCUSSION

[¶13]   The hearing examiner found in 
pertinent part as follows:

FINDINGS 
OF FACT

1. 
That the testimony of [Hepp's] witnesses Prado, Winterholler, Shaffer, Kuzara 
and Kawulok was not credible and [was] unsubstantial and, in any event, did not 
offer much, if anything, to the substance of the issues in the case, . . . 
.

. 
. . .

11. 
Most significantly, in April of 1993, she first saw Dr. Carson on April 13, 
1993. His notes from that visit indicate that on March 26, 1993 [Hepp] "lifted a 
heavy laundry basket at home - the left shoulder hurt. Now both arms go to 
sleep. Hot pain down the left arm."

12. 
On her next visit to Dr. Carson on April 16, 1993, he notes "3:00 A.M. this 
morning left arm started hurting again."

13. 
Although Dr. Carson made no diagnostic observations when [Hepp] next visited him 
on April 19, 1993, her visit on April 23 prompted the following note from Dr. 
Carson:

"Still 
numb in left hand - arm feels better."

14. 
Most significantly, on April 29, 1993, the Claimant visited Dr. Carson's office 
at 8:45 A.M. His notes for that date indicate:

"Neck 
and shoulders hurt. Arms go to sleep and can't lift them without 
pain."

15. 
On direct examination, Dr. Carson testified that her condition had worsened 
between April 23, 1993 and when he saw her at 8:45 A.M. on April 29, 
1993.

16. 
[Hepp] testified that the alleged injury at her work occurred at approximately 
4:30 P.M. on April 29, 1993.

. 
. . .

CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW

[¶14]   Based upon the above findings, this 
Hearing Officer concludes:

. 
. . .

3. 
From all of the evidence, this Hearing Officer concludes that at 8:45 A.M. on 
April 29, 1993, [Hepp] had a preexisting injury, which had been treated by Dr. 
Carson on five separate occasions beginning on April 13, 
1993.

. 
. . .

6. 
. . . .

In 
the case currently before this Hearing Officer, virtually all of the evidence 
(rather than a mere "scintilla") compels the conclusion that on the very day in 
question, and before even going to work, [Hepp] was suffering to such a degree 
that her health care provider noted "neck and shoulders hurt, arms go to sleep 
and can't lift them without pain." . . .

7. 
Based upon the above, this Hearing Officer concludes:

a. 
That [Hepp's] activities at work on April 29, 1993 did not constitute a material 
aggravation [of a preexisting condition];

b. 
That the only medical testimony proffered by [Hepp], from Dr. Nickerson, was a 
bald statement, without any foundation whatsoever, that her condition "was not a 
pre[]existing condition";

c. 
That such testimony is not persuasive.

[¶15]   The hearing examiner, therefore, 
denied Hepp's claim for worker's compensation benefits. On appeal, Hepp argues 
that the hearing examiner's conclusion that she had a preexisting condition 
which had not been materially aggravated by her work activities was not 
supported by substantial evidence. We do not agree with Hepp's argument. Hepp 
did not meet her burden of proving that her injury was related to her activities 
at work.

[¶16]   "In order to prevail before the 
hearing examiner, [the employee] was charged with demonstrating an injury, 
arising from [her] employment, while at work." Jaqua, 873 P.2d  at 1221. 
Preexisting conditions are excluded from the definition of "injury" in WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) (Supp. 1993):

(xi) 
"Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging 
and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. 
"Injury" does not include:

. 
. . . .

(F) 
Any injury or condition preexisting at the time of employment with the employer 
against whom a claim is made.

However,

Preexisting 
disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim under the 
"arising out of employment" requirement if the employment aggravated, 
accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or 
disability for which compensation is sought.

1 
ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.21 at 3-381 (1990). See 
Romero v. Davy McKee Corporation, 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶17]   In this case, substantial evidence 
was presented at the contested case hearing to support the hearing examiner's 
conclusions that Hepp's injury did not occur in the course of her employment and 
that her employment activities did not materially aggravate her preexisting 
condition. Dr. Carson testified that he had treated Hepp five times between 
April 13, 1993, and April 29, 1993, for discomfort in her neck, back, left 
shoulder, and left arm. His medical records revealed that Hepp had told him at 
the initial appointment on April 13, 1993, that she had injured herself while 
she was lifting a heavy laundry basket at her home on March 26, 1993. Hepp 
admitted that she had received chiropractic treatments from Dr. Carson to keep 
her back in alignment.

[¶18]   Hepp contends that the hearing 
examiner's decision to disregard much of the testimony offered by her witnesses 
was improper. We do not agree. In Creek v. Town of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353 
(Wyo. 1983), we stated:

The 
testimony in this record may be subject to varying interpretations, but we will 
not usurp the function of the [trier of fact] in making factual findings with 
respect to this case. It is the duty of the trier of fact to weigh and evaluate 
the testimony of the witnesses, including that given by experts. . . . [The 
trier of fact] "was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and was 
entitled to interpret the evidence." Ward v. Yoder, Wyo., 355 P.2d 371, 
374 (1960).

657 P.2d  at 357. On appeal, we will not "invade the province of the trier of fact by 
reaching a different conclusion." Id.

CONCLUSION

[¶19]   The hearing examiner's decision to 
deny Hepp's request for worker's compensation benefits was supported by 
substantial evidence.

[¶20]   Affirmed.