Title: Sumpter v. Sumpter

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Millicent Sumpter v. Sean Sumpter, Case No. 120, September Term 2011, Opinion by
Adkins, J.
FAMILY LAW - CHILD CUSTODY INVESTIGATION REPORT - LITIGANT’S
ACCESS - ABUSE OF DISCRETION: A trial court abused its discretion by applying its
erroneous conception of a local court policy limiting litigants’ access to a court-ordered child
custody investigation report, thereby applying a hard and fast rule to a matter that required
the court to exercise its discretion. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-D-10-000898
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 120
September Term, 2011
                                                                            
MILLICENT SUMPTER
v.
SEAN SUMPTER
                                                                             
Barbera, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins,  J.
McDonald and Watts, JJ., concurs and dissents.
                                                                            
Filed: December 9, 2013
In this case we examine the application of a local court policy that sets limits on
litigants’ access to court-ordered investigatory reports in child custody cases.  Here, Millicent
Sumpter (“Mother”) challenges the Circuit Court for Baltimore City’s application of its
“Policy Regarding Distribution of Court Ordered Evaluative Reports” (“the Policy”) and its
subsequent award of sole legal and physical custody of her children to Sean Sumpter
(“Father”).  The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the Circuit
Court.  We granted Mother’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider the following question:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in refusing to vacate and
remand the case to the circuit court when the parties and the best
interest attorney were not provided a copy of the custody
investigation report in violation of constitutional due process?
In our initial consideration of this appeal (“Sumpter I”), we declined to reach the
merits of Mother’s petition and remanded the case “for supplementation of the record as to
the full contours of [the Policy].”  Sumpter v. Sumpter, 427 Md. 668, 670, 50 A.3d 1098,
1099 (2012).  With the written expression of the Policy in hand, we now reach the merits.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS1
Father filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for absolute divorce
from Mother on March 24, 2010.  Father also sought sole physical and legal custody of the
couple’s two children.  Before the merits hearing on Father’s petition for divorce, the court
ordered that the Adoption and Custody Unit (“ACU”) for the Circuit Court complete a
custody investigation report (“the Report”).  
Because the details of the factual background and procedural history were addressed
1
in Sumpter I, 427 Md. 668, 50 A.3d 1098 (2012), we only briefly recount them here.  
The Report summarizes interviews that ACU staff conducted with the parties, the
parties’ relatives and partners, and the children.  The Report also describes the parties’
personal, criminal, health, education, housing, child protective services, and employment
histories.  This information is presented as findings in the Report’s first 17 pages.  The
findings are supplemented with 17 attachments.  These attachments span 147 pages and
consist of various records upon which the ACU based its findings, including: Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services records for Mother, Father, and
Father’s fiancée; school records for the children; mental health records for the children and
Mother; peace orders awarded to Father’s mother and Father’s fiancée against Mother; peace
orders awarded to Mother against Father and Father’s fiancée; a guilty plea by Mother in a
matter in the Superior Court of Liberty County, Georgia; a Jacksonville, Florida police report
about the death of Mother’s cousin; and an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
returning one of Mother’s other children to her custody after the child had been in the “Child
in Need of Assistance” program.  The Report does not make a recommendation concerning
custody of the children.  
The Report was due on November 1, 2010,  in time for a scheduled pre-trial
2
On July 12, 2010, the Circuit Court issued an Order For Referral To Adoption and
2
Custody Unit, which directed that  a custody investigation be performed by the ACU, and its
written report provided to the judge “no later than November 1, 2010 for the pretrial
conference scheduled on November 12, 2010.”  A copy of the order was sent to the ACU. 
On the same day, the court issued a Scheduling Order, setting the Pre-Trial Conference for
November 12, 2010, and the Trial on the Merits for December 13, 2010. 
2
conference, but the ACU did not file the Report with the court until December 3, 2010.  That
day, the ACU sent counsel for both parties a letter indicating that the Report was complete
and could be reviewed at the Family Division Clerk’s Office.  Counsel for Mother received
this notification on December 6, 2010, and visited the Family Division Clerk’s Office at 2:30
p.m. that day.  
We digress a little at this point.  According to the record, the Policy was promulgated
on June 25, 2004, as evidenced by a Memorandum from the Judge In Charge of the Family
Division to other judges, masters, and “All Members of the Family Law Bar.”   Counsel’s
3
access to the Report in the present case was limited by the Policy, which states the following
concerning litigants’ access to the Report: 
Review of Reports
•
Attorneys will be allowed to view all of the
sections of a report in the office of the Clerk of
the Court (room 109).  They will not be allowed
to carry the report out of the Clerk’s office and
will not be allowed to copy the report.
•
Pro Se litigants will be allowed to view the
Recommendation section and the section of the
report evaluating them in the office of the Clerk
of the Court (room 109).  They will not be
allowed to carry the report out of the Clerk’s
The Policy was promulgated in writing before the trial judge here was appointed to
3
the Circuit Court.  The record does not indicate whether the trial judge received a copy of the
written 2004 Policy, although obviously he had some awareness of a restriction on disclosure
of the Report.  The record is also silent as to whether counsel for Petitioner was included in
the “Family Law Bar,” who were recipients of the Policy.   
3
office and will not be able to copy the report. 
They will not be allowed access to sections of the
report that evaluate the other party or any minor
children.
•
Counsel for children will be allowed to view all
sections of a report in the Office of the Clerk of
the Court (room 109).  They will not be allowed
to carry the report out of the Clerk’s office and
will not be able to copy the report. 
•
Attorneys may obtain copies of a report with an
Order of the Court.
•
Pro Se litigants may be allowed to view all
sections of a report with an Order of the Court.
 
Mother’s counsel studied the 161-page Report and took notes for ninety minutes until
the Family Division’s Clerk’s office closed to the public for the day.   Mother’s counsel were
4
not able to return to the clerk’s office before the merits hearing, and did not see the Report
again until that time. 
The two-day merits hearing began on December 13, 2010.  Mother’s counsel moved
in limine to exclude the Report from evidence, or, in the alternative, to receive a copy of the
Report.  The trial court denied these motions, erroneously stating that the Policy “prevent[ed]
In Sumpter I we stated, based on representations of Mother’s counsel at argument, 
4
that under the Policy, “[c]ounsel of record may make only hand-written notes of the contents
of the report, yet are forbidden from copying verbatim significant passages.” 427 Md. at 670,
50 A.3d at 1099–1100 (footnote omitted).  The Policy itself does not explicitly prohibit
making verbatim notes of the Report.  The Policy states that counsel may take notes from the
Report, but may not copy it.  Exactly how staff in the Family Division Clerk’s Office apply
this provision of the Policy is unclear from the record.  Here, counsel “were [. . . ] permitted
to make [their] own personal notes from the report[.]”  
4
copies from being out even in the control of counsel[.]”   The trial court did allow counsel
5
access to the Report during breaks and for the purpose of examining witnesses.  To
accomplish this, the court’s copy of the Report had to be shared amongst counsel, the
mechanics of which brought some measure of absurdity to the proceedings.
The trial court granted Father’s petition for divorce and awarded him sole legal and
physical custody of the children.  Mother appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing
that the Policy violated her due process rights.  Specifically, Mother asserted that the Policy
prevented her and her counsel from receiving a copy of the Report, and provided them
insufficient time to review its contents.  Mother claims that this inhibited her ability to
prepare for trial, frustrated her ability to retain an expert, and ultimately, prevented her from
challenging the Report as she would any other piece of evidence.  In short, Mother argued
that the Policy afforded her inadequate procedural protection, given her fundamental liberty
interest in the care and custody of her children that was at stake in the trial.  The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court.  
Mother then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.  Neither
The following statement from the trial court demonstrates its misapprehension of the
5
Policy: “With respect to having a copy of the report, I will not deviate from the Court’s
practice in dealing with matters as sensitive as these reports of preventing them - preventing
copies from being out even in the control of counsel[.]”  In fact, the Policy explicitly states
that “Attorneys may obtain copies of a report with an Order of the Court.”  Significantly, the
State concedes that “the trial judge was incorrect in his apparent belief that the circuit court’s
policy prohibited each attorney from having his or her own copy during the trial[.]”
5
Father nor the children’s best-interest attorney opposed the petition, filed briefs or appeared
at oral argument. Sumpter I, 427 Md. 668, 672, 50 A.3d 1098, 1100 (2012).  In an opinion
filed August 21, 2012, we declined to reach the merits of Mother’s appeal for two reasons. 
Id.  First, the record did not contain the Policy or sufficient evidence to “elucidate the full
contours of the policy or rule and how it is applied.”  Id.  Second, Mother’s appeal had been
unopposed, and as a result, one-sided.  Id.  We remanded the case for supplementation of the
record and invited the Office of the Attorney General to participate, as amicus curiae, in light
of the absence of Respondent.   Sumpter I, 427 Md. at 672, 50 A.3d at 1101. 
6
DISCUSSION
Discretionary trial court matters are “much better decided by the trial judges than by
appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should only be disturbed where it is
apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.”
Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 436, 73 A.2d 461, 467
(1950). 
Even when we find an abuse of discretion, this Court follows the maxim that
“appellate courts of this State will not reverse a lower court judgment for harmless error:  the
complaining party must show prejudice as well as error.”  See Harris v. David S. Harris,
P.A., 310 Md. 310, 319, 529 A.2d 356, 360 (1987) (italics in original).  Prejudice means an
We appreciate the willingness of the Office of the Attorney General to assume this
6
role, at our request.
6
“error that influenced the outcome of the case.”  Id.
Before considering the trial court’s actions in this case, we must put those actions in
context.  When Mother’s counsel reviewed the Report to prepare for trial, this review was
circumscribed by the Policy, as enforced by the Clerk’s office for the Family Division.  When
Mother’s request for a copy of the Report at trial was denied, the trial court followed suit. 
Indeed, the entire trial was informed by a judicial fiat issued long before Father’s divorce
petition was filed.  Thus, in some sense, we cannot review the actions at the trial court
without also considering the Policy itself.
Undoubtedly, our court system vests trial judges with a great deal of discretion and
responsibility.  In City of Bowie v. MIE Props., Inc., we stated:
As a general proposition, trial judges have the widest discretion
in the conduct of trials, and the exercise of that discretion should
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse.  Thus,
a trial judge maintains considerable latitude in controlling the
conduct of a trial subject only to an abuse of discretion standard. 
398 Md. 657, 684, 922 A.2d 509, 525 (2007) (quotations omitted).    Recognizing the unique
position of a trial judge, we have declared: 
“[w]e place[] the responsibility on the trial judge to weigh and
balance the rights, interests, and reasons of the parties . . .”  and
“the trial judge, on the scene, will have a perception and
understanding of the legal environment in which the case is
temporarily mired [,]” and “[t]herefore, [the trial judge] [i]s
vested with the discretion to be exercised consistent with the
spirt of the law while subserving the ends of justice and fairness
to the parties. 
 St. Joseph Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Turnbull, 432 Md. 259, 275, 68 A.3d 823, 832–33 (2013)
7
(quoting Langrall, Muir & Noppinger v. Gladding, 282 Md. 397, 400–01, 384 A.2d 737, 739
(1978)) (alterations in original). We further observed that “once assigned to preside over a
trial, it is generally within the province of a trial judge to make discretionary decisions that
affect the rights and interests of the litigants.”  Id.
The Policy, through its enforcement by the clerk’s office and misapplication by the
trial court, frustrated Mother’s full ability to examine the Report and challenge its content.  
7
A child custody investigation report’s main content is a series of individual investigations of
the parents and relatives, and interviews with both children.  These reports typically contain
substantial hearsay and hearsay-within-hearsay.   These reports also include the investigators’
8
subjective impressions on matters like the parties’ homes, their relationship with the children,
and the parties’ relationship with each other.  The Report’s attachments include items like
Mother’s mental health records, the children’s school records, and various court documents.  
9
Likely, this is fertile ground for content that is biased, subjective, and contestable.
Under the Policy, Mother’s counsel had limited time to examine the Report and
investigate its findings—a process that requires interviewing witnesses and evaluating
To be sure, this case focuses on the effects that the Policy had on Mother’s ability to
7
challenge the Report at trial.  We acknowledge that these effects are more pronounced for
pro se litigants, who are unable to receive a copy of the Report (even by court order).
As the Court of Special Appeals noted in Denningham v. Denningham, 49 Md. App.
8
328, 335, 431 A.2d 755, 759 (1981), custody investigation reports “consist largely of hearsay
declarations . . . which may or may not have a reasonable basis[.]”
We recognize the legitimate need to protect the Report’s confidential information. 
9
The Policy is laudable, at least, in its pursuit of this goal.
8
documents.   Without a reference copy of the Report, Mother’s counsel was not able to
10
present the Report to an expert.   Indeed, without a copy of the Report, Mother may not have
11
been able to retain an expert at all.   Consequently, Mother was unable to prepare a vigorous
12
rebuttal of the Report. 
By disabling Mother from fully challenging the Report, the trial judge deprived the
court of one of the core benefits of the adversarial system: the progression towards truth
See Linda D. Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure, §§10:11–10:12 (2013)
10
(“The report is relevant evidence subject to discovery. The lawyers should be able to review
the report, prepare for cross-examination and possibly rebuttal testimony. . . . In reviewing
the report, the lawyer will check the qualifications of the investigator, the depth of the
investigation, and the techniques used . . . . The attorney can also try to find out the
investigator’s reputation and credibility in the field . . . . The attorney should be alert to the
biases of the investigator . . . . If psychological testing was done, by whom, under what
conditions and what were the results?  The attorney should obtain a copy of the actual
reports, rather than rely on the investigator’s summary.”) (footnotes omitted).     
See American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Custody Evaluations in
11
Family Law Proceedings, 65:9 American Psychologist 863, 866 (December 2010)
(“Psychologists strive to employ multiple methods of data gathering.  Multiple methods of
data gathering enhance the reliability and validity of psychologists’ eventual conclusions,
opinions, and recommendations. . . . Psychologists may seek corroboration of information
gathered from third parties and are encouraged to document the bases of their eventual
conclusion.”).
See American Psychological Association, Speciality Guidelines for Forensic
12
Psychology 
(2011), 
available 
at 
http://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/forensic-
psychology.aspx# (last accessed October 18, 2013) (“1.02 Impartiality and Fairness . . .
Forensic practitioners recognize the adversarial nature of the legal system and strive to treat
all participants and weigh all data, opinions, and rival hypotheses impartially.”) (emphasis
added).  Any expert working without the Report would not be weighing all the data.  The
inability to fulfill this ethical precept may have posed a significant barrier to Mother even
retaining an expert.
9
through the presentation of counter-evidence.   And, by so gravely impairing Mother’s
13
interest in a fair trial, application of the Policy surpassed, in this instance, mere court
administration. 
This Court has defined abuse of discretion in numerous ways, but has always
enunciated a high threshold.  Wilson-X v. Dep’t of Human Resources, 403 Md. 667, 677, 944
A.2d 509, 515 (2008); see also Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 199, 867 A.2d
1077, 1084 (2005) (“an abuse of discretion should only be found in the extraordinary,
exceptional, or most egregious case.”).  In North v. North, then Chief Judge of the Court of
Special Appeals, Judge Wilner, characterized the abuse of discretion landscape as follows: 
“Abuse of discretion” is one of those very general, amorphous
terms that appellate courts use and apply with great frequency
but which they have defined in many different ways.  It has been
said to occur “where no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the [trial] court,” or when the court acts “without
reference to any guiding rules or principles.”
.
.
.
The decision under consideration has to be well removed from
any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the
fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.  
102 Md. App. 1, 13–14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031–32 (1994) (alterations in original) (internal
See Robert G. Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System As A Means of
13
Seeking Truth and Justice, 35 J. Marshall L. Rev. 147 (2002) (“The adversary system is
based on the assumption that the truth of a controversy will best be arrived at by granting the
competing parties, with the help of an advocate, an opportunity to fight as hard as possible.”)
(citing Edward F. Barrett, The Adversary System  and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 479, 480 (1962)).  
10
citations omitted).  
In Gunning v. State, this Court considered a trial judge who applied a policy denying
requested eyewitness identification instructions based on his personal opinion that such
instructions were inappropriate.  347 Md. 332, 351, 701 A.2d 374, 383 (1997).  This Court
held that the trial court abused its discretion by applying a hard and fast rule to a decision that
required the court to exercise its discretion.  Id.  We emphasized that the requested
instructions “should have at least been given careful consideration in the instant cases, and
arbitrarily rejecting them as always inappropriate was an abuse of discretion.”  Gunning,  347
Md. at 353–54, 701 A.2d at 384.
A judge presiding over a particular case may not blindly apply an administrative
policy (or through misapprehension of what the policy required or allowed, misapply it)
without considering the particular circumstances at hand.  As we said in a recent case, 
Despite being vested with this discretion, the hearing judge
failed to appreciate or exercise her discretion, in favor of an
“unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position,” and an
improper deference to her understanding of the Administrative
Judge's views.  In this case, the record is clear that the hearing
judge commenced the hearing with no intention of entertaining
seriously the parties' arguments (no matter what they were), but
rather indicated that she had decided prior to the hearing to defer
to the Administrative Judge's opinion. . . . When a circuit court
is vested with discretion, such predispositions are inappropriate
and constitute an abuse of discretion. 
101 Geneva LLC v. Wynn, No. 89, 2013 WL 5663815, at *4 (Md. Oct. 18, 2013) (citations
omitted).
11
That is what happened here.  The trial court misapplied a policy issued by the Judge
in Charge of the Family Division for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  Although we do
not know the exact scope of this role, we assume that the Judge in Charge has authority to
make certain administrative decisions.  But the Policy does much more than impact the
administration of the courts.  By any standard, the Policy surpasses mere court administration
and affects the rights of individual litigants.  
  Mother’s access and ability to receive a copy of the Report is properly a matter of
judicial discretion, as the Policy recognizes.  See Goodman v. Commercial Credit Corp., 364
Md. 483, 491, 773 A.2d 526, 531 (2001) (“when there is no hard and fast rule governing the
situation, in arriving at a decision, the trial judge must exercise his or her judicial
discretion”); see also 48A C.J.S. Judges § 151 (“Judicial discretion is the right or power to
choose between the doing and not doing of a thing which cannot be demanded as an absolute
right of the party asking that it be done.”).  The trial court abused its discretion by invoking
what it incorrectly thought the Policy required, to govern its ruling.  When the court denied
Mother’s motion based on this misapprehension, it applied a misconceived, hard and fast rule
to a matter that required the exercise of its discretion. 
We now address the question of prejudice.  As indicated, prejudice occurs when an
error affects the outcome of a case.  See Harris, 310 Md. at 319, 529 A.2d at 360.  The
harmless error test does not have precise standards, but is instead based on the facts of each
case.  See Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 33, 919 A.2d 716, 720 (2007); see also State Deposit
12
Ins. Fund Corp. v. Billman, 321 Md. 3, 17, 580 A.2d 1044, 1051 (1990) (“In determining
whether [the error] . . . prejudicially affected the outcome of a civil case, the appellate court
balances ‘the probability of prejudice from the face of the extraneous matter in relation to the
circumstances of the particular case[.]’”) (citations omitted).  To determine whether prejudice
occurred, courts look “to the degree to which the conduct of the trial has violated basic
concepts of fair play.”  Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 658, 20 A.3d 765, 770 (2011)
(citations omitted).  Generally, the complaining party must show that prejudice was probable,
not just possible.  Barksdale, 419 Md. at 662, 20 A.3d at 773.  
The test for what constitutes prejudice varies based on the “context of the case—civil
or criminal—and by the type of error alleged.”  Barksdale, 419 Md. at 658, 20 A.3d at 770. 
For particularly acute errors, this Court will employ a presumption of prejudice. Barksdale,
419 Md. at 659, 20 A.3d at 771 (“In civil cases, Maryland courts have varied the tests based
on the relative gravity of the error.  For the more egregious civil errors, Maryland employs
a presumption of prejudice.”).   
14
A presumption of prejudice emanates from the balancing act courts employ in
14
determining prejudicial error.  See Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961). 
In Kyle, the Second Circuit explained:
The reason why the showing of prejudice required to bring
down the balance in favor of a new trial will vary from case to
case is that the pans contain weights and counterweights  other
than the interest in a perfect trial.  Sometimes only a small
showing of prejudice, or none, is demanded because that interest
is reinforced by the necessity that “The administration of justice
(continued...)
13
In cases involving egregious civil errors, the presumption of prejudice enables this
Court to meet “the need to provide for hearty review of trial errors.”  See Barksdale, 419 Md.
at 660, 20 A.3d at 771 (citing Harris, 310 Md. 310, 319–20, 529 A.2d 356, 360–361 (1987)). 
In Harris, the lower court erroneously disqualified one of the party’s attorneys.  Harris, 310
Md. at 319, 529 A.2d at 361.  We “relied on a presumption of prejudice due to the practical
impossibility of proving prejudice.”  See Barksdale, 419 Md. at 660, 20 A.3d at 771 (citing
Harris, 310 Md. at 320, 529 A.2d at 361).  Had this Court not presumed prejudice, the
disqualification would not be “subject to effective postjudgment review.”  Harris, 310 Md.
at 320, 529 A.2d at 361.
Like the court in Harris, we are faced with the practical impossibility of determining
whether Mother was prejudiced by the trial court’s error.  Here, the trial court’s error so
hamstrung the defense that every aspect of the trial was affected.   This error so infected the
15
(...continued)
14
must not only be above reproach, it must also [be] beyond the
suspicion of reproach,” and by the teaching of experience that
mere admonitions are insufficient to prevent repetition of abuse. 
Kyle, 297 F.2d at 514 (citations omitted). 
One need only consider the absurd procedure that occurred during the examination
15
of witnesses, where one copy of the Report was shared among three separate counsel. 
Forcing litigants to assume the role of dogs fighting over a bone does not comport with this
Court’s notion of fair play, particularly when the “bone” in question is a critical piece of
evidence.  
14
trial proceedings  that it can only be characterized as egregious.  Indeed, we cannot know
16
how that infection might have contaminated the outcome of the case.  Because determining
prejudice is practically impossible, we will presume it in this case.17
The State argues that Mother disclaimed prejudice by declining to move for a
continuance.  We are unpersuaded.  Given the court’s misapprehension of the Policy, a
continuance would not have resulted in Mother receiving a copy of the Report.  Without a
copy of the Report, Mother’s counsel would be limited to investigating its contents from the
information captured in their personal notes.  This would pose a practical hindrance to the
investigation of the Report’s findings.  Moreover, Mother would still have difficulty retaining
an expert.  In this case, a continuance would not have been a cure-all.  That is why Mother’s
counsel declined to move for a continuance, stating, “I do not need a continuance, Your
Honor.  I need an actual copy of the report.”
Even if Mother had sought a continuance upon first discovering the belated filing of
the Report, obstacles remained.  First, a continuance is not easily obtained.  Under the
“Postponement Policy for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,” a request for modification
of a pretrial conference date or trial date “shall be made through a written motion for
modification filed within 15 days of the initial order setting a date for pretrial conference
We described these trial ailments supra at 8–10. 
16
We emphasize that a presumption of prejudice is reserved for the most egregious
17
civil errors.  See supra at 13–15.  Moreover, we underscore that the harmless error test
always requires a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry.  See supra at 13.
15
and/or trial.”  Thereafter, motions for continuance are subject to the following policy:
Thereafter, except for exigent circumstances, the schedule may
be modified only upon filing with the clerk a written Motion for
Modification setting forth a showing of good cause for why the
schedule cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the
party seeking modification.  
Modification requests in cases on the domestic docket made for
exigent circumstances* will be heard daily at 4:00 p.m. in
Room 108, Courthouse East, on a walk in basis.  Any party
seeking a postponement must arrive in Room 108 no later than
3:45 P.M. and must ensure that all other parties and/or 
attorneys involved in the case are present for the postponement
proceeding.  The Court WILL NOT entertain a postponement
request unless ALL involved parties are present.
* “Exigent circumstances” means an unforeseen development
occurring within 30 days  of the scheduled date which prevents
compliance with the schedule.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Family Docket - Postponement Policy, available at
http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/family/postponement.htm, (last  accessed October 4, 2013).
As we read this policy, in any case where counsel need a continuance based on the
Report, counsel will need to coordinate the schedules of all parties to schedule a hearing. 
Otherwise, such a postponement must, presumably, wait until the merits hearing.  This
coordination may be difficult, particularly in cases where the parties are confrontational, or
there is a short time frame between the Report’s issuance and the merits hearing. 
Moreover, the State’s argument demonstrates some misapprehension of the delicate
nature of custody proceedings.  When custody is disputed, children face instability.  See In
re Adoption/Guardianship No. 95195062/CAD in Circuit Court for Baltimore City, 116 Md.
16
App. 443, 460–61, 696 A.2d 1102, 1110 (1997) (“We are mindful of the concerns of many
children’s advocates who are understandably critical of inordinate delays in resolution of
these painful cases.  Surely, these cases warrant swift and careful attention, because when
a child’s status remains in ‘limbo,’ the child often suffers.”) (footnote omitted). When
custody is disputed, children face instability and risk, becoming objects in a custodial tug-of-
war.  See Brown v. Brown, 463 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (“A prompt hearing is
especially essential in a custody case where the parties are dueling for a child’s affections and
the longer a delay, the more chance one party has to influence the child.”).  In recognition of
the maladies of delay in child access cases, Maryland issued Rule 8-207(a), providing
expedited appeal for adoption, guardianship, child access, and child in need of assistance
cases.   To accept a postponement may delay a trial for months.  Such a delay is not
18
desirable, and a litigant’s reluctance to pursue this result is understandable.
Mother has strenuously argued that the trial court’s erroneous application of the Policy
violated her due process rights.  Mother’s interest in the care and custody of her children “is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [law].”  Troxel v.
In adopting Md. Rule 8-207, the Reporter’s Note cites correspondence from Alan
18
M. Wilner, then Chief Judge, Court of Special Appeals, who stated that certain procedural
delays in deciding appeals were “much too long, however, especially in the guardian and
child custody/visitation cases, where time is particularly important.” Maryland Register, Vol.
22, Issue 11, Friday, May 26, 1995, Reporter’s Notes at 816.  As Chairman of the  Court of
Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of  Practice and Procedure, Judge Wilner also stated
that the rule’s “object is to reduce the time of the appellate process so that the children
involved are not in limbo for an extended period of time.” Minutes of January 6, 1995, at 47. 
17
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 12 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000).  In other circumstances, we might
inquire as to whether the Policy as stated affords parents constitutionally adequate procedural
protections, given the interest at stake.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct.
893 (1976) (setting forth a three-factor balancing test to determine the constitutional
adequacy of  procedural protections in cases infringing on individuals’ fundamental liberty
interest to parent).  But this Court has long embraced the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance.  See, e.g., State v. Raithel, 285 Md. 478, 484, 404 A.2d 264, 267 (1979)
(“[N]othing is better settled than the principle that courts should not decide constitutional
issues unnecessarily.”).  In practice, this doctrine means that when a non-constitutional
ground for deciding a case presents itself, we decide the case on that ground rather than the
constitutional grounds.  See Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 82, 522 A.2d 917, 929 (1987).  
Here, a non-constitutional ground presents itself, as the trial court erroneously applied
its mistaken understanding of a rigid policy to a matter that required the sound exercise of 
its discretion.  For this reason, we will not opine on the constitutional aspect of Mother’s
appeal.19
Although we refrain from commenting on the constitutionality of any matter until
19
we are compelled to do so, we nevertheless recognize that the Policy raises the potential for
constitutional concern.  We can envision a policy that better balances the concern for
safeguarding the confidentiality of information held by courts, and the interest in
fundamentally fair trial procedure held by litigants.  For instance, courts could use protective
orders and their contempt powers to control parties, counsel, and experts by issuing
appropriate sanctions.  See Md. Rule 15-201 et seq.  Alternatively, courts could require that
parties, counsel, and experts sign a confidentiality agreement or non-disclosure covenant as
(continued...)
18
In conclusion, the trial court abused its discretion by applying the Policy to procedural
matters that required the court to exercise its discretion.  Because of the egregious error of
not allowing Mother’s counsel a copy of the Report and the practical impossibility of
evaluating prejudice, we presume that the trial court’s error prejudiced Mother.  For these
reasons, we reverse.  As we do not wish to leave the matter of custody in a vacuum (and to
avoid the temptation for either party to engage in self-help) until this issue can be brought
before the Circuit Court on remand, we modify the custody order granting custody to Father,
with visitation to Mother, to an interim pendente lite order, subject to further order of the
Circuit Court on remand and after a new hearing on this matter.  See Koffley v. Koffley, 160
Md. App. 633, 641, 866 A.2d 161, 166 (2005); Md. Rule 8-604 (a)(4) and (e).
JU D G M E N T  
R E V E R S E D ; 
O R D E R
GRANTING CUSTODY TO FATHER, WITH
VISITATION TO MOTHER, MODIFIED TO
AN INTERIM PENDENTE LITE ORDER,
SUBJECT TO REVISION BY THE CIRCUIT
COURT ON REMAND; CASE REMANDED
TO 
THE 
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FO R
BALTIMORE 
CITY 
FOR 
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION; 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.
(...continued)
19
a condition of receiving the Report. See Sumpter I, 427 Md. 668, 684–86, 50 A.3d 1098,
1108–1109 (recounting the practices of some other counties in Maryland).  Great care should
be taken in striking the appropriate balance.  Thus, we refer this issue to the Rules Committee
for its consideration and recommendation. 
19
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 120
September Term, 2011
MILLICENT SUMPTER
v.
SEAN SUMPTER
Barbera, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts,
JJ.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
McDonald, J., which Watts, J., joins.
Filed: December 9, 2013
I agree with much, though not all, of the Majority opinion.  In particular, I share the
Majority’s concerns regarding the written policy of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City on
access to court-ordered custody investigation reports.  It is possible that application of that
policy could, in some instances, result in prejudice to a party.  But I would not apply a
“presumption of prejudice” in the circumstances of this case. 
Mother’s  counsel should be commended for shining a light on this important issue. 
1
As the Court of Special Appeals indicated 30 years ago,  a litigant in a custody case has a
2
right to have access to the circuit court’s custody investigation report.  But there is apparently
some confusion in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City concerning its policy on access to
such reports, and there appear to be disparate practices in other jurisdictions.  As Mother’s
counsel eloquently argued before us, this confusion may at times especially disadvantage
self-represented litigants.  These efforts of counsel, who represent Mother pro bono,
exemplify the best of the legal profession and hopefully will improve the quality of justice
in our courts. 
What to do about it in this case is another question.  Our appreciation for counsel’s
service to the legal system does not mean that the decision of the Circuit Court concerning
custody and visitation is unjust.  The record before the Circuit Court provided an ample basis
Millicent Sumpter is designated as “Petitioner” in some of the filings in this Court
1
and as “Appellant” in others, perhaps because she skipped the intermediate appellate court
in her second trip to this Court, see Maryland Rule 8-111(a)(1).  I will follow the Majority’s
convention of referring to her simply as “Mother.” 
Denningham v. Denningham, 49 Md. App. 328, 431 A.2d 755 (1981) (Wilner, J.).
2
for the Circuit Court’s decision concerning custody and visitation.   The relevant facts are
3
summarized in the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals and in this Court’s
prior decision.  See Sumpter v. Sumpter, 427 Md. 668, 673-75, 50 A.3d 1098 (2012).  These
facts included, among other things, sexual abuse of the children while in Mother’s custody,
her enlistment (while she had custody of the children) of a convicted murderer to locate and
assault a former boyfriend, and her contemporaneous convictions for assault and theft.  After
moving out of state and sending the children back to Maryland to live with her husband,
Mother attempted to regain physical custody through deception and abduction.
Unsurprisingly, the Circuit Court concluded that she had demonstrated “extremely poor
judgment.”
It is not at all clear that Mother suffered any prejudice from the Circuit Court’s
apparent misunderstanding of the access policy.  Both of Mother’s counsel were given
advance access to the custody investigation report, which did not make a custody
recommendation, for an hour and a half.  Most of the material in the report consisted of
records already available to Mother.  Counsel were able to use the report at the hearing to
cross-examine the author of the report.  In the Circuit Court, Mother’s counsel described the
It received little attention in the recent briefing before us, perhaps because no attorney
3
appeared on behalf of Father to defend that decision.  The Attorney General was invited by
this Court to appear as amicus curiae to defend the Circuit Court policy, not to advocate on
behalf of Father (who had no greater access to the report than Mother), and properly did not
address the merits of the custody and visitation decision. 
2
 report as “entirely cumulative” of the testimony of the report’s author.  As the Court of
Special Appeals noted, Mother’s counsel has not argued that any of the attachments to the
report contain anything that is “untrue, or misleading, or that ...  needed to be rebutted or
supplemented.”  In the recent argument before us, Mother’s counsel focused more on the
disadvantage a self-represented litigant might experience under the Circuit Court’s policy,
rather than argue any specific prejudice to his client.
As the Majority opinion notes, before this Court reverses a decision, a complaining
party must normally show prejudice – i.e., an “error that influenced the outcome of the case.” 
Majority slip op. at 7, 12.  And the effect on the outcome must be “probable, not just 
possible.”  Id. at 13.  The Majority opinion overcomes this standard by employing a
“presumption of prejudice.”  Majority slip op. at 14-15.
As I understand it, the Majority would not apply a presumption of prejudice to every
case governed by the Circuit Court’s policy, but only to cases in which the particular judge
misunderstood the option under the policy to provide a copy to counsel by court order.  The
“presumption of prejudice” that the Majority derives from the Harris case  is a burden-
4
shifting presumption, not a conclusive presumption.  Application of this presumption should
not result in the automatic reversal of a custody and visitation decision.  Thus, application
Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 319-20, 529 A.2d 356 (1987).
4
3
of such a presumption does not require a different result or, in my view, eliminate the
possibility that any error was harmless.5
Mother requested that we reverse the Court of Special Appeals with direction to
vacate the custody and visitation provisions of the Circuit Court’s Judgment of Absolute
Divorce.  The Majority opinion reverses the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and
remands for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, but maintains the current custody
and visitation order pending further proceedings in the Circuit Court.  Since the presumption 
underlying the reversal is not conclusive, it would seem that the Circuit Court has discretion
to decide what, if any, further action to take in this case based on the entire record before it.  
6
Thus, the Majority opinion should not be taken as a direction as to the award of custody in
this case.
Finally, I agree with the Majority that this issue should be referred to the Rules
Committee to consider the views of various interested parties and to craft a rule the provides
It appears that, under the Majority’s view, Denningham itself was wrongly decided.
5
In that case, the intermediate appellate court held that, although the father had been denied
any access to the report, its content was “basically cumulative” of other information available
to the father and the failure to provide access was harmless error that did not affect the circuit
court’s decision to award custody to the mother.  Denningham, 49 Md. App. at 338.
If the custody decision is reopened, it seems likely that a new report would be
6
necessary as it is now more than three years since the report in question was created.
4
a uniform system – or at least minimum standards – for making custody investigation reports
available to litigants in these cases.   See Majority slip op. at 18-19 & n.19. 
7
Judge Watts joins this opinion.
It is certainly difficult for us to fashion such guidelines in the narrow confines of a
7
particular case.  For example, while it is important, as Mother’s counsel has argued, that self-
represented litigants have access in some fashion to a custody investigation report, it may be
necessary to establish some limitations or safeguards on such access.  Emotions run high in
these cases, which sometimes necessitates protective orders; the disciplinary tools available
to the court to control misuse of information may be less effective in controlling the conduct
of a lay person than of an attorney.  
5