Title: Hagerman v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RYAN JOSEPH HAGERMAN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 151Case Number: No. S-11-0154, S-11-0155Decided: 11/07/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
RYAN 
JOSEPH HAGERMAN,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County
The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Ryan 
J. Hagerman, Pro 
se.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. 
Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, 
J., 
files a specially concurring opinion.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      In these 
consolidated appeals, the appellant challenges the district court’s denials of 
motions to correct illegal sentence that he filed in two unrelated, but 
temporally overlapping, cases.  He 
was first sentenced in a burglary case (S-11-0154), and was later sentenced in a 
stolen property case (S-11-0155).  
We find that presentence confinement time was not properly credited 
against the burglary sentence, and therefore remand S-11-0154 to the district 
court for correction of that sentence.  
In S-11-0155, we conclude that, even though the appellant was given 
credit for time served in that case to which he was not necessarily “entitled,” 
such did not create an illegal sentence, and we affirm the sentence in 
S-11-0155.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Was the sentence 
in either or both cases illegal because the appellant was not given the amount 
of credit for presentence confinement to which he was 
entitled?
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶3]      The question of 
whether a sentence is illegal because it does not include proper credit for time 
served is a question of law that we review de novo.  Swain v. State, 2009 WY 142, ¶ 8, 220 P.3d 504, 506 (Wyo. 2009).
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      On October 18, 
2005, the appellant committed a burglary.  
Although it is not precisely clear in the record, it appears that the 
appellant was arrested on the day of the offense.  He remained in jail until he was 
sentenced nearly a full year later, on October 3, 2006.1  He was sentenced to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a period of not less than three years, nor more 
than five years.  That sentence was 
suspended, however, pursuant to the “split sentencing” provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-107 (LexisNexis 2011), and the appellant was ordered to spend one 
year in the Fremont County Detention Center, to be followed by four years of 
supervised probation.
 
[¶5]      Two specific 
terms of this sentence are relevant to the discussion herein.  First, the appellant was given credit 
for 350 days already served in jail.  
Second, as a condition of probation, the appellant was ordered to “submit 
himself to high intensity residential [substance abuse] treatment.”  The district court made it clear that 
the credit for time served was to be applied against the jail sentence by noting 
that the appellant had only “15 days left on your sentence.”  In addition, the district court 
enunciated its intention that the appellant enter into the residential treatment 
program immediately upon his service of the jail sentence.
 
[¶6]      On October 11, 
2006, the district court entered an Order for Furlough for Treatment.  The essential elements of that order 
were:  (1) that the appellant be 
released from jail even though the one-year sentence had not fully been served; 
(2) that the Sheriff’s Department was to transport the appellant to the 
treatment facility; (3) that the appellant was to be considered in the custody 
of the Sheriff while in the treatment facility; and (4) that the Sheriff was to 
transport the appellant back to the Detention Center upon his discharge from the 
treatment facility.2  The appellant successfully completed 
residential treatment and was released from the facility on August 8, 
2007.
 
[¶7]      To 
recapitulate:  the appellant served 
350 days in the county jail before sentencing (October 18, 2005 to October 3, 
2006), eight days in the county jail following sentencing (October 3, 2006 to 
October 11, 2006), and 301 days in the treatment facility (October 11, 2007 to 
August 8, 2007), for a total of 659 days attributable to the burglary sentence 
before he was released from custody on that sentence.
 
[¶8]      We will interrupt 
this narrative as it relates to the burglary conviction by now introducing the 
salient facts concerning an unrelated stolen property conviction.  On October 10, 2005, the appellant 
committed the crime of possessing stolen property.  The State charged him with that offense 
in late June 2006, while he was in jail awaiting sentencing in the burglary 
case.  He was arraigned in the 
stolen property case on October 4, 2006, the day after he was sentenced in the 
burglary case.
 
[¶9]      Although the 
appellant pled guilty to the stolen property crime at arraignment, he was not 
sentenced for that crime until September 5, 2007.  He was sentenced to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a period of not less than two years, nor more than 
four years, with credit for 336 days served.  It is not explained in the record now 
before this Court, but it appears that the 336 days is the amount of time 
between October 4, 2006, when he pled guilty, and September 5, 2007, when he was 
sentenced.  Execution of the 
sentence was suspended, however, and the appellant was placed on supervised 
probation for a period of four years.  
An Order Nunc Pro Tunc was entered on December 23, 2010, in both cases, 
indicating that the two sentences were to be served 
concurrently.
 
[¶10]   The appellant’s performance on 
probation was less than sterling.  
His probation in both cases was revoked and reinstated twice.  After a third violation, probation was 
revoked and the underlying sentences were reimposed.  Upon reimposing the sentences, the 
district court made the following comment:
 
            
I’ll give him credit for his presentence confinement and ask counsel to 
see if you cannot agree on what that number should be.  And if you can’t, then contact me and 
we’ll see if we can’t, the three of us, come to some conclusion in that 
regard.
 
[¶11]   In each of the separate orders 
entered after the final revocation, the appellant was given “credit for 385 days 
already served, off his minimum/maximum sentence.”  Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell 
from the record how this 385 days was calculated.  We do not know if counsel stipulated to 
that amount of credit, or if it was necessary for the district court to make a 
determination.3  What we do know from the record, as will 
be discussed below, is that the amount of credit in the two separate cases 
should not have been equal, and neither credited amount should have been 385 
days.  In the burglary case, the 
appellant had been in official detention, in one form or another, for 659 days 
before his probation was revoked, and apparently spent an additional 33 days in 
jail awaiting probation revocations, for a total of 692 days.  In the stolen property case, the 
appellant suffered no presentencing confinement that was attributable to that 
crime, and spent the same 33 days just mentioned pending probation 
revocation.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]   “A sentence that does not include 
proper credit constitutes an illegal sentence.”  Swain, 2009 WY 142, ¶ 8, 220 P.3d  at 
506.  The law is clear that 
defendants are entitled to sentencing credit for the time they spend in 
presentence confinement if that confinement was due to the financial inability 
to post bond in regard to the charged offense.  Abitbol v. State, 2008 WY 28, ¶ 12, 178 P.3d 415, 418 (Wyo. 2008); Merta v. 
State, 2007 WY 137, ¶ 10, 165 P.3d 456, 459-60 (Wyo. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. 
State, 2009 WY 82, ¶ 12, 209 P.3d 897, 900 (Wyo. 2009).  In addition, a probationer is entitled 
to credit for time spent in an inpatient treatment facility, if he is subject to 
a charge of escape while there because he is in “official detention.”  Beyer v. State, 2008 WY 137, ¶¶ 8-12, 
196 P.3d 777, 780-81 (Wyo. 2008); Yellowbear v. State, 874 P.2d 241, 245 
(Wyo. 1994); Blouir v. State, 950 P.2d 53, 55 (Wyo. 1997).  Furthermore, if a petition for revocation 
has been filed and the probationer is in custody, “[w]here pre-revocation time 
is attributable to the underlying criminal charge, credit must be awarded 
against the underlying sentence.”  
Jackson, 2009 WY 82, ¶ 13, 209 P.3d  at 900.  In the instant case, 
therefore, the appellant is entitled to credit against either the burglary 
sentence or the stolen property sentence for the time he spent in jail awaiting 
the three probation revocations.  To 
the contrary, he is not entitled to credit for 336 days against the stolen 
property sentence, because he was in official detention during that period under 
the burglary sentence, against which he should have been receiving credit.  Stated otherwise, he was not in custody 
during that period because he could not post bond on the stolen property charge; 
he was in custody because he was in official detention under the burglary 
sentence.  
 
[¶13]   In cases where concurrent sentences 
have been imposed in a single case, the defendant is entitled to have credit for 
time served applied equally against both sentences, but this principle does not 
apply where a defendant is serving concurrent sentences imposed in separate 
cases.  Abitbol, 2008 WY 28, ¶ 13, 178 P.3d  at 
418; Weedman v. State, 792 P.2d 1388, 
1389 (Wyo. 1990); see also Smith v. 
State, 932 P.2d 1281, 1282 (Wyo. 1997) (escaped inmate entitled to credit 
for time served following arrest after escape against underlying sentence, but 
not also against sentence for escape; he was being held in jail upon a prison 
hold for the underlying sentence, not because he could not post bond on the 
escape charge); and Wilson v. State, 
896 P.2d 1327, 1328-29 (Wyo. 1995) (credit allowed against grand larceny 
sentence, but not against separate stolen property sentence, where incarceration 
resulted from hold on the former, not from inability to post bond on the 
latter).
 
[¶14]   Application of these rules of law 
to the facts sub judice leads to the 
following conclusions:
 
            
1.    The appellant 
was entitled to credit against the burglary sentence for the 350 days in the 
county jail between arrest and sentencing, for the eight days in the county jail 
following sentencing, and for the 301 days in residential treatment, for a total 
of 659 days.
 
2.    The appellant was entitled to 
credit for 33 days in the county jail pending probation revocation upon the 
three petitions, with such credit applied against either, but not both of the 
sentences.
 
3.    The appellant was not 
entitled to any credit for time served against the stolen property sentence, 
except for any portion of the probation revocation jail time mentioned assigned 
to that sentence.
 
[¶15]   The appellant was entitled to 
credit for time served in the burglary case (No. S-11-0154 on our docket; No. 
6105 below) in the amount of at least 659 days.  He was given credit for only 385 days, 
so this sentence was illegal.  The 
appellant was not entitled to any credit for time served in the stolen property 
case (No. S-11-0155 on our docket; No. 6158 below), except for whatever portion 
of the probation revocation jail time that may have been assigned to that 
sentence, yet he was given credit for 358 days served.  A credit “overage,” however, does not 
make a sentence illegal, and the receipt of that credit has not been challenged 
in this appeal.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶16]   The sentence in S-11-0154 is 
illegal because the appellant was not given credit against that sentence for 
time served for the period he was in official detention while in the residential 
treatment facility.  The sentence in 
S-11-0155 was not rendered illegal by the fact that the appellant was given 
credit against that sentence to which he was not “entitled.”  Consequently, we remand S-11-0154 to the 
district court for entry of a sentence consistent with this opinion, and we 
affirm in S-11-0155.4
 
BURKE, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.
 
[¶17]   I 
agree that Mr. Hagerman was entitled to credit against his burglary sentence for 
the time spent in the residential treatment center.  This was the only issue raised by 
Mr. Hagerman.  I write 
separately to recognize and emphasize that the decision to grant or deny credit 
against the stolen property sentence was properly within the district court’s 
sentencing discretion.  Sweets 
v. State, 
2001 WY 126, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 1130, 1131-32 (Wyo. 2001); Hedge v. State, 696 P.2d 51, 52 (Wyo. 
1985); Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 
381 (Wyo. 1979).
FOOTNOTES
1The 
Judgment and Sentence shows both October 3 and October 8 as the date of 
sentencing.  The transcript of the 
sentencing hearing shows that it occurred on October 3.  A later-entered furlough order states 
the date as October 4, 2006.  We 
will accept October 3 as the correct date. 
 
2Three 
issues raised by the terms of this order, but not raised in this appeal, 
are:  (1) whether the district court 
has statutory authority to furlough prisoners who are in a county jail under the 
split-sentencing statute; (2) whether, in granting such a furlough, the district 
court can extend the period of time that a prisoner is in a sheriff’s custody 
beyond the one-year statutory maximum; and (3) whether the appellant was on 
probation while he was in the Sheriff’s custody at the treatment center.  For additional discussion of the 
district court’s authority to grant a furlough, see Center v. State, 2011 WY 73, ¶¶ 
10-13, 252 P.3d 963, 966-67 (Wyo. 2010) (Voigt, J., dissenting, with whom Burke, 
J., joins).
 
3The 
State guesses in its Brief that the 385 days is “roughly based” on the original 
350 days of credit, plus twenty days, six days, and seven days that the 
appellant spent in jail, respectively, upon his three probation revocation 
arrests.
 
4The 
State cites Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 924 (Wyo. 2000) for the proposition that as long as the district court 
credits one of a defendant’s concurrent sentences with credit that is owed, even 
if the wrong sentence is credited, no additional or “double” credit should be 
given.  We do not read Jennings so broadly.  The opinion does not say that, where 
credit has accrued against one of two concurrent but separate sentences, it may 
be credited against either sentence.  
Rather, Jennings simply 
recognizes that, where the Department of Corrections has already allocated 
credit and a sentence has been served, it may be too late to correct the 
mistake, and double credit, in that instance, should not be given.  We do not know on this record whether 
that difficulty exists in this case.