Title: Maine v. Hunt

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 172 
Docket: 
Cum-15-493 
Argued: 
June 8, 2016 
Decided: 
November 29, 2016 
Corrected:   June 27, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
TIMOTHY M. HUNT 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  Timothy M. Hunt appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in 
the trial court (Cumberland County, Moskowitz, J.) after a jury found him guilty 
of six counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C) (2015), 
and six counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 255-A(1)(E-1) (2015).  Hunt argues that the court (Wheeler, J.) erred by 
denying his motion to suppress evidence of inculpatory statements he made 
during a police interview.  Although he also raises a number of issues from the 
trial, we need consider only the admissibility of the evidence of his confession.  
Because we conclude that the confession should have been suppressed, we 
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On December 4, 2013, the Cumberland County Grand Jury issued 
an indictment charging Hunt with six counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), 
17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C), and six counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 
17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1), involving an eight-year-old victim.  After 
pleading not guilty to the charges, Hunt moved to suppress evidence of 
incriminating statements he made during an interview with two Scarborough 
Police Department detectives. 
[¶3]  At the hearing on his motion, Hunt argued that his incriminating 
statements during the interview were motivated by improper promises of 
leniency and were therefore involuntary.  The court (Wheeler, J.) heard 
testimony from a psychologist who had evaluated Hunt, from the detectives, 
and from Hunt.  The parties stipulated to the admission of four psychological 
assessment reports and a recording of the police interview that included both 
video and audio. 
[¶4]  The recording shows that the following interactions took place.  
During the first part of the interview, Hunt repeatedly denied touching the 
victim inappropriately.  Throughout the interview, the detectives challenged 
Hunt’s denials with, inter alia, minimization of the moral blame associated 
 
3 
with the alleged conduct, pleas to “do the right thing,” and urges to avoid 
having the victim “go through” a trial.  Before he had confessed to any 
wrongdoing, but in response to questioning, Hunt expressed concern that 
admitting to “something like this could put [him] on that list,” apparently 
referring to the Maine Sex Offender Registry.  In response, one of the 
detectives told him, “don’t worry about that,” “don’t worry about going on the 
list,” and “we’re not gonna worry about anything else outside of this room, 
Tim, because it will work out, it will be fine.”   
[¶5]  Later, during a portion of the interview led by a second detective, 
the second detective told Hunt: 
[y]ou were worried about being on some kind of a list—not 
everybody ends up on the list.  I’ll tell you the guys that end up on 
the list.  Those are the guys that I’m talking about on the other end 
of the scale.  The guys that hang out by schools, and they take 
pictures of little kids in places in public, and they put themselves 
in positions that they can be around kids for the sole purpose of 
perpetrating on a child.  Those are the guys that end up on lists.  
Guys like you . . . they don’t end up [in] situations like that dramatic.  
They get help and they get opportunities like you’re being given 
here today . . . . 
 
(Emphases added.) 
 
[¶6]  The second detective also told Hunt that if Hunt was not being 
“one hundred percent truthful,” he was “harming [him]self,” and that 
 
4 
You need to think about it, because you don’t get this opportunity 
twice.  After today, it’s over.  You’re not gonna have another 
opportunity to come in here and explain yourself to [the first 
detective], and he’s not gonna have another opportunity to help 
you.  Because if he thinks you’re lying, after today, all hands are 
off. . . . If he knows . . . you’re telling . . . the truth, we can work with 
this.  You could still go home today.  Okay?  Nobody’s said you’re 
going to get arrested.  Right?  Nobody’s told you that today, right?  
This list thing you’re worried about?  That’s for the other end of the 
spectrum.  That’s for the people that are problematic. 
 
(Emphases added.)  The first detective returned to the interview room.  
Resuming the interview, he said, “I know you mentioned earlier, you know, 
‘I’m worried about being on a list,’ but I want you not to worry about that.  
You know, it—it—ah, not everyone goes on a list.  Okay?  Not everyone does.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
[¶7]  After Hunt made some incriminating statements, the first detective 
asked him why he hadn’t confessed earlier in the interview.  Hunt explained 
that he “didn’t know how to word it,” that “maybe the right questions wasn’t 
coming up for the right answer,” and that his “mind’s slow” and “isn’t like all 
the other minds that catch on.”  Hunt also said, “I don’t want, you know, 
people to look at me in like, you know in a certain way. . . .  Like your um, your 
friend, well, your partner slash friend . . . like he said, that I’m not even close to 
being on that list, you know?  That it should be fine.”  (Emphasis added.)  Only 
 
5 
after Hunt had incriminated himself did the first detective tell Hunt that he 
and his colleague were “not in control of that list.” 
[¶8]  In a written order denying Hunt’s motion, the court found that 
Hunt had gone willingly to the Scarborough Police Department with the 
detectives to be interviewed, knowing that they wanted to talk to him about 
information they had received from the Department of Health and Human 
Services about “sexual allegations.”  The court also found the following facts 
about the interview.  The detectives told Hunt that he was not under arrest, 
that he did not have to go with them, and that they would drive him back 
home at any time.  After bringing Hunt into an interview room, the first 
detective started an audio and video recording and told Hunt that the 
interview was being recorded.  He told Hunt that he was free to leave and 
advised him of his Miranda rights.  After stating each “right,” the first detective 
asked whether Hunt understood, and Hunt responded affirmatively. 
[¶9]  The court further found that after the second detective left the 
room, the first detective “reentered and used police interrogation techniques, 
including minimization of the crime.”1  The court found that Hunt eventually 
“confessed to sexual contact” with the victim.  
                                         
1  The court did not specifically describe the “interrogation techniques” used by either detective. 
 
 
6 
[¶10]  Although noting that Hunt’s “cognitive skills are less than 
average,” the court stated “there was no indication of any impairment of 
Hunt’s physical or mental condition.”  The suppression court had two reports 
from psychologists who measured Hunt’s cognitive capacity.  One measured 
Hunt’s composite IQ as 81, with a nonverbal skills score of 92 and a verbal 
skills score of 75; another measured Hunt’s composite IQ as 75, with a 
nonverbal skills score of 90 and a verbal skills score of 67. 
[¶11]  Although Hunt testified at the suppression hearing that he had 
snorted Vicodin on the day of the interview, and was taking other medications 
prescribed for him, namely Wellbutrin (an antidepressant) and Risperdal (an 
antipsychotic), the court also found that “the video does not disclose any 
bizarre, psychotic or . . . drug-induced behavior”; “Hunt appeared to be alert 
and rational, and he could respond to questions with appropriate answers.”  
 
[¶12]  In a footnote apparently directed at Hunt’s argument that his 
statements were involuntary in light of the detectives’ references to “the list,” 
the court stated that “[t]here is nothing illegal with . . . trying to narrow and 
shift the focus of the investigation on the critical issues, rather than possible 
outcomes in the case.”  The court concluded, “The detectives[’] interviewing 
 
7 
techniques were fundamentally fair and Hunt’s confession was not a product 
of coercive police conduct.”2   
 
[¶13]  As a result of the court’s ruling, the recording of Hunt’s 
confession was admitted in evidence at trial, over his continuing objection. 
[¶14]  The court (Moskowitz, J.) held a four-day jury trial in late July of 
2015.  Just before trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude 
Hunt’s proposed expert testimony regarding police interrogation techniques 
and risk factors associated with false confessions.  After the parties conducted 
a voir dire of the expert, the court granted the State’s motion, concluding that 
the testimony was inadmissible pursuant to M.R. Evid. 702 based on its 
findings that “it ha[d]n’t been demonstrated in the voir dire that there is a 
reliable scientific basis for determining some causal relationship” between 
certain interrogation techniques and unreliable confessions, and “the subject 
matter of the proposed testimony is really not beyond the common 
knowledge of a lay juror.”  
 
[¶15]  The jury found Hunt guilty of all twelve charges.  The court 
entered a judgment on the verdict and sentenced Hunt to twenty-five years of 
                                         
2  Although the court did not state expressly that the State had proved voluntariness beyond a 
reasonable doubt, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, we assume that the court applied 
the correct standard of proof.  See State v. Ashe, 425 A.2d 191, 194 n.4 (Me. 1981); State v. Collins, 
297 A.2d 620, 627 (Me. 1972). 
 
8 
unsuspended imprisonment for each of the gross sexual assault charges and 
five years of unsuspended imprisonment for each of the unlawful sexual 
contact charges, all to be served concurrently, followed by a lifetime term of 
supervised release.  Hunt appealed from the judgment of conviction.3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶16]  Hunt contends that the court (Wheeler, J.) erred by denying his 
motion to suppress because his incriminating statements were motivated by 
improper promises of leniency by police and were therefore involuntary.  
“The determination of whether a statement is voluntary is a mixed question of 
fact and law . . . .”  State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 15, 97 A.3d 595.  We review 
“the court’s factual findings . . . for clear error and its . . . ultimate 
determination regarding voluntariness” de novo.  Id. (citations omitted).  
Here, as we noted, the interrogation was recorded, and the recording was 
admitted at the suppression hearing.  Hunt does not challenge the accuracy of 
the recording or the suppression court’s factual findings; he argues that the 
court misapplied legal principles.  Thus, the facts are not in dispute.  
Accordingly, “we review the motion court’s application of the law to those 
facts de novo,” State v. Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶ 10, 17 A.3d 128. 
                                         
3  The Sentence Review Panel denied Hunt’s application for leave to appeal his sentence.  State v. 
Hunt, No. SRP-15-494 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Dec. 21, 2015); see 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2015); M.R. App. P. 
20. 
 
9 
A. 
Legal Standards 
 
[¶17]  In Maine, when a defendant in a criminal case moves to suppress 
statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily, the State has the 
burden to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.4  State v. Kittredge, 
2014 ME 90, ¶ 24, 97 A.3d 106; State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 627 (Me. 1972).  
To determine whether the suppression court erred when it concluded that 
Hunt’s confession was “voluntary,” we must first understand the concept of 
“voluntariness” as it has been employed in this area of law.  Our jurisprudence 
on this issue has not always been entirely clear.  With this opinion, we hope to 
clarify the law and process to be applied when determining the voluntariness 
of a confession in the face of a challenge to police action.   
 
[¶18]  The exclusionary rule for “involuntary” confessions is grounded 
in both the privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution5 and article I, section 6 of the 
                                         
4  In Lego v. Twomey, the United States Supreme Court held that in federal cases the government 
must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.  404 U.S. 477, 482-89 (1972).  “Of 
course,” the Court noted, “the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard.  
They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.”  Id. at 489.  
In Collins, which we decided eleven months after Lego, we concluded that public policy and “the 
values we find at stake”—namely, safeguarding “the right of an individual, entirely apart from his 
guilt or innocence, not to be compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances”—demand that, 
in Maine, the State must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.  297 A.2d at 626-27 
(alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
5  “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”  
U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 
10 
Maine Constitution;6 and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution7 and article I, section 6-A of the 
Maine Constitution.8 
[¶19]  There is a distinction between those statements that must be 
excluded pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because they are the product of 
compulsion, and those statements that must be excluded because their 
admission would otherwise create an injustice.  “Where the Fifth Amendment 
analysis seeks to determine whether the defendant’s confession was 
compelled, a due process analysis asks ‘whether the State has obtained the 
confession in a manner that comports with due process.’”  State v. Rees, 
2000 ME 55, ¶ 36, 748 A.2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985)).  Here, because no one has claimed that a 
confession was “forced” out of Hunt, we examine whether admission of his 
confession violated his right to due process.  That is, we examine whether his 
statements were free and voluntary or whether, considering the totality of the 
circumstances under which the statements were made, their admission would 
                                         
6  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence 
against himself . . . .”  Me. Const. art. I, § 6. 
 
7  “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend XIV. 
 
8  “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”  
Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A. 
 
11 
be fundamentally unfair.  “The Due Process Clause . . . prohibits deprivations 
of life, liberty, or property without fundamental fairness through 
governmental conduct that offends the community’s sense of justice, decency 
and fair play.”  State v. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶ 9, 755 A.2d 1075 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
[¶20]  More than thirty years ago, we discussed due process and the 
requirement of voluntariness in State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 500-01 
(Me. 1983), a case in which the police had allowed a defendant to “consume 
substantial quantities of alcohol” during a custodial interrogation, id. at 498.  
We stated:  
[T]he voluntariness requirement gives effect to three overlapping 
but conceptually distinct values: (1) it discourages objectionable 
police practices; (2) it protects the mental freedom of the 
individual; and (3) it preserves a quality of fundamental fairness 
in the criminal justice system. 
 
Id. at 500.  We reiterate today that a confession is involuntary when it is made 
under circumstances that offend one of these fundamental values of social 
policy and constitutional law.  See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972) 
(“The use of coerced confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because 
the method used to extract them offends constitutional principles.”).9   
                                         
9  The United States Supreme Court has “used the terms ‘coerced confession’ and ‘involuntary 
confession’ interchangeably by way of convenient shorthand.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
 
12 
 
[¶21]  In Mikulewicz, after noting that “articulating a uniform test of 
voluntariness ha[d] proven a difficult task,” we held that “[a] confession is 
voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a 
product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the circumstances its 
admission would be fundamentally fair.”  462 A.2d at 500-01.  Nearly twenty 
years later, in a case involving a police officer who affirmatively misled a 
defendant by telling him that a confession would be kept in confidence, we 
quoted that rule from Mikulewicz and noted that “[t]he focus in a due process 
analysis . . . is not limited to the presence or absence of compulsion, but rather 
addresses the totality of the State’s actions in obtaining the confession.”  
McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶¶ 4, 9 & n.3, 10, 755 A.2d 1075 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
                                                                                                                                   
287 n.3 (1991) (quotation marks omitted).  In 1959, seven years before it decided Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in “another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether a 
confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment,” Spano v. New 
York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959), the United States Supreme Court explained why no conviction based 
on an involuntary confession could be tolerated: 
 
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone 
on their inherent untrustworthiness.  It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that 
the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty 
can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be 
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves. 
 
Id.  at 320-21. 
 
13 
 
[¶22]  We have long held that when applying this totality of the 
circumstances approach to make a voluntariness determination, the trial 
court may consider various relevant circumstances, including 
the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; 
location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was 
custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of 
officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; 
threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the 
defendant’s age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, 
and conduct. 
 
State v. George, 2012 ME 64, ¶ 21, 52 A.3d 903 (emphases added) (quotation 
marks omitted); see Michaud v. State, 161 Me. 517, 530-31, 215 A.2d 87 
(1965). 
 
1. 
Improper “Promises or Inducements” 
 
[¶23]  We have discussed the effect “promises or inducements” may 
have on the voluntariness of a confession in a variety of cases, recognizing that 
not all statements made by law enforcement officers are improper.  For 
example, we have noted that neither “generalized and vague” suggestions that 
telling the truth will be helpful to a defendant in the long run, Kittredge, 
2014 ME 90, ¶ 28, 97 A.3d 106, nor “[m]ere admonitions or exhortations to 
tell the truth,” State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598, 601 (Me. 1977), will factor 
 
14 
significantly into the totality of the circumstances analysis.  See Kittredge, 
2014 ME 90, ¶¶ 27-28, 97 A.3d 106; Tardiff, 374 A.2d at 601. 
[¶24]  Thus, in a host of cases, we have held that certain representations 
by law enforcement officers did not constitute improper promises of leniency.  
See, e.g., State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶¶ 11-13, 43 A.3d 952 (officer 
“suggest[ed] that the State would get [the defendant] help” if he confessed); 
State v. Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, ¶ 21, 1 A.3d 408 (officer suggested that the 
defendant would get alcohol counseling if he confessed); State v. Nadeau, 
2010 ME 71, ¶ 57, 1 A.3d 445 (officer told the defendant that “the more 
cooperative you are, the better things are for you” (alteration omitted)); State 
v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 34, 928 A.2d 746 (officer stated “that it would ‘look 
better’ for [the defendant] to confess”); State v. Theriault, 425 A.2d 986, 990 
(Me. 1981) (officer stated that “‘it would be better to tell us [the truth],’ that ‘it 
would make [the defendant] feel better,’ and that ‘people would think more of 
him if he got it off his chest’” (first alteration in original)).   
 
[¶25]  We have found officers’ statements to defendants to be 
problematic when those statements involve false promises of leniency or 
misrepresentations about legal rights, however.  In Tardiff, the defendant 
went to the police station and discussed three burglaries but did not admit to 
 
15 
any involvement in the crimes.  374 A.2d at 600.  An officer drove him home.  
Id.  During the car ride, the officer told the defendant that the police “were 
willing to help him if, in any way, [they] could,” and that the officer “felt sure 
that the Captain would agree . . . that [the State] would charge him with one 
break, if he were willing to clear up all the matters that he had pending.”  Id.  
The defendant agreed to go back to the police station and talk with the 
captain.  Id.  After officers informed him of his Miranda rights, the defendant 
confessed to all three burglaries and, despite the officer’s promise, he was 
charged with all three.  Id. at 599-600.  We concluded that because the 
officer’s statement to the defendant was a false promise of leniency, it 
constituted an improper inducement to confess.  Id. at 601. 
 
[¶26]  In McConkie, the defendant agreed to meet with police to discuss 
allegations of sexual contact with a teenager.  2000 ME 158, ¶ 2, 755 A.2d 
1075.  After an officer told the defendant, inter alia, that “any information he 
provided during the interview would ‘stay confidential,’” the defendant made 
several incriminating statements.10  Id. ¶ 4 (alteration omitted).  We 
concluded that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to 
suppress the statements, stating that “it is evident that [the defendant’s] 
                                         
10  It was undisputed that the interview did not constitute a custodial interrogation, and 
therefore that police were not required to give the defendant Miranda warnings.  State v. McConkie, 
2000 ME 158, ¶ 7, 755 A.2d 1075; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. 
 
16 
statements to [the officer] were obtained through the use of an interrogation 
tactic that does not fall within the bounds of fair play and that the admission 
of those statements at trial therefore violated [the defendant’s] right to due 
process of law.”  Id. ¶ 10.  The officer, we held, “was . . . not at liberty to 
affirmatively mislead [the defendant] as to his constitutionally protected right 
against self-incrimination.”  Id.   
 
[¶27]  In Dodge, again focusing on the nature and timing of the police 
statements, 2011 ME 47, ¶¶ 13-20, 17 A.3d 128, we distinguished the 
statements the defendant made after an officer’s assurance of confidentiality 
from those he made after the officer’s “prompt correction of his assurance that 
the conversation would remain private,” id. ¶ 13.  We held that the statements 
made before the officer’s correction were properly suppressed.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 
[¶28]  Most recently, in State v. Wiley, we vacated a conviction after the 
trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.  2013 ME 30, ¶¶ 11, 31, 
61 A.3d 750.  We determined that an improper offer of leniency was made, id. 
¶ 25, where the interviewing law enforcement officer implied that if the 
defendant confessed, he would face a shorter sentence involving county jail 
and probation instead of “a lot of time in a state prison,” id. ¶ 21 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Our split decision in Wiley demonstrates the difficulty in 
 
17 
drawing the line between permissible police interrogation tactics and tactics 
that involve false promises and improper inducements by law enforcement.  
Nonetheless, we ultimately ruled that “[a] confession is not voluntary where 
an interrogating officer, with no more than apparent authority, leads a suspect 
to believe that a confession will secure a favorable, concrete sentence, and 
that belief motivates the suspect to confess.”  Id. ¶ 31. 
 
[29]  The lesson to be learned from these cases is that false promises of 
leniency that induce a confession are improper and thus will weigh 
significantly into our consideration of the totality of the circumstances in 
determining whether a confession must be suppressed.11  A promise is false 
when it involves a benefit that could not be delivered—or is not in fact 
delivered—by the governmental agent making the promise, or when the agent 
has no authority to give the defendant what was offered.  See, e.g., Kittredge, 
2014 ME 90, ¶ 27, 97 A.3d 106; Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 31, 61 A.3d 750; State v. 
Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 11, 704 A.2d 387; Tardiff, 374 A.2d at 601.  A promise 
involves leniency when it suggests that the process of prosecution or 
sentencing will somehow be “better” for the defendant if the defendant 
                                         
11  The same is true for officers’ misleading statements about the defendant’s legal rights.  See 
State v. Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶¶ 13-21, 17 A.3d 128; McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶¶ 8-11, 755 A.2d 
1075. 
 
 
18 
confesses.12  See, e.g., Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 31, 61 A.3d 750; Theriault, 
425 A.2d at 990; Tardiff, 374 A.2d at 600-01; cf. Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, ¶ 21, 
1 A.3d 408; 
 
[¶30]  The determination of the extent to which a false promise of 
leniency has induced a defendant’s confession is an issue where some 
clarification is needed.  Although we have stated that only those false 
promises of leniency that played a role in the defendant’s decision to confess 
can render a confession involuntary, see Tardiff, 374 A.2d at 601, we have 
been less than entirely clear about how and where that determination of the 
effect of improper state action is to be made.    
 
[¶31]  In Tardiff, McConkie, and Dodge, after concluding that some law 
enforcement actions had been improper, we ruled, as a matter of law, that the 
defendants’ statements were involuntary and should therefore have been 
suppressed.13  We did so without any discussion about whether the 
                                         
12  We agree with the California Supreme Court’s statement that 
 
[t]he line to be drawn between permissible police conduct and conduct deemed to 
induce or to tend to induce an involuntary statement does not depend upon the bare 
language of inducement but rather upon the nature of the benefit to be derived by a 
defendant if he speaks the truth, as represented by the police. 
 
People v. Hill, 426 P.2d 908, 916 (Cal. 1967).   
 
13  For example, in State v. Tardiff, we stated: 
 
 
19 
defendant’s confession had occurred as a result of that improper action.  In 
Wiley, based on our “experience and common sense,” we determined that the 
defendant’s confession was involuntary.  2013 ME 30, ¶ 30, 61 A.3d 750. 
 
[¶32]  As we noted earlier, in the 1977 decision where we seemed to 
distinguish the question of whether a confession had been motivated by 
improper police tactics from the tactics themselves—as though they were 
separate determinations—we also stated that the determination of 
voluntariness was entirely a question of fact.  Tardiff, 374 A.2d at 600-01.  
Twenty years later, in Coombs, we explained our adoption of a bifurcated 
approach to the standard of review in a voluntariness determination.  
1998 ME 1, ¶¶ 7-9, 704 A.2d 387.  We referred to Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 
(1985), with its explanation of the need for “plenary federal review” of state 
court determinations of voluntariness: 
[T]he nature of [the] inquiry itself lends support to the conclusion 
that “voluntariness” is a legal question meriting independent 
consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.  Although 
sometimes framed as an issue of “psychological fact,” the 
                                                                                                                                   
[W]e conclude that the defendant’s confession was involuntary as a matter of 
law. . . . Although there was testimony indicating that the defendant may have been 
contemplating confessing, the fact remains that he did not do so until after he had 
been led to believe by the police that he would be charged with only one offense of 
his own choice, rather than three.  The evidence thus establishes a legally 
impermissible promise of leniency by the police which preceded the defendant’s 
confession. 
 
374 A.2d 598, 601 (Me. 1977) (emphasis added). 
 
20 
dispositive question of the voluntariness of a confession has 
always had a uniquely legal dimension. 
 
Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 9, 704 A.2d 387 (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 115-16).  
Relying on that reasoning, we reiterated that “the dispositive issue of the 
voluntariness of a confession, although based on all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the confession, is a legal issue warranting 
independent appellate review.”  Id. 
[¶33]  Despite the clear adoption of the bifurcated standard, we have 
not precisely defined the contours of the analysis of the causal nexus between 
the conduct of law enforcement officers and the defendant’s decision to make 
incriminating statements.  Our lack of clarity may be grounded in confusion 
about the precise location of the line between the facts to be determined—
exclusively the task of a trial court—and the legal question of the “ultimate 
determination regarding voluntariness,” Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 15, 97 A.3d 
595.   
[¶34]  We clarify today that although the determination of the historical 
facts underlying a question of voluntariness must be made by the trial court, 
and will be reviewed deferentially, the “psychological fact” of the 
voluntariness of a confession is a determination of law and is subject to de 
novo review.  See, e.g., Miller, 474 U.S. at 115-17; Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 15, 
 
21 
97 A.3d 595; Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶ 10, 17 A.3d 128; Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 9, 
704 A.2d 387.   
[¶35]  We also clarify that the degree to which police conduct appears to 
have motivated the defendant’s decision to confess is one of the factors to be 
considered by a court in determining the legal question of whether that 
conduct constituted an improper inducement and, thus, the extent to which 
the officer’s statements will play a role in the ultimate voluntariness 
determination.   
2. 
Characteristics of the Defendant 
 
 
[¶36]  When a criminal defendant moves to suppress a confession, 
alleging that it was involuntary because of a due process violation, the trial 
court addresses “the totality of the State’s actions in obtaining the confession.”  
McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶ 9 n.3, 755 A.2d 1075 (quotation marks omitted).  
As we have already discussed, the voluntariness determination pursuant to 
this approach may include consideration of  
the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; 
location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was 
custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of 
officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; 
threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the 
defendant’s age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, 
and conduct. 
 
 
22 
George, 2012 ME 64, ¶ 21, 52 A.3d 903 (emphasis added) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
[¶37]  Like courts in other jurisdictions, we consider a defendant’s 
cognitive ability as part of the voluntariness determination.  In United States v. 
Preston, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a 
conviction that was based on the confession of a defendant who had an IQ of 
65, was easily manipulated, and was subjected to confusing and high-pressure 
interrogation techniques.  751 F.3d 1008, 1010-28 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).  
“Even if we would reach a different conclusion regarding someone of normal 
intelligence,” the court stated, “we hold that the officers’ use of the methods 
employed here to confuse and compel a confession from the intellectually 
disabled eighteen-year-old before us produced an involuntary confession.”  Id. 
at 1028. 
 
[¶38]  Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a conviction based 
on a confession where the defendant had an IQ of 76 and was subjected to 
some degree of police coercion—even though the officers’ “threats and 
promises [alone] may not [have been] sufficient to show coercion.”  State v. 
Swanigan, 106 P.3d 39, 42, 45-54 (Kan. 2005).  Likewise, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court uses a totality of the circumstances test in which the 
 
23 
defendant’s characteristics are balanced against the pressure exerted by law 
enforcement.  State v. Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d 407, 414 (Wis. 2003).  The court 
explained: 
The balancing of the personal characteristics against the police 
pressures reflects a recognition that the amount of police 
pressure that is constitutional is not the same for each defendant.  
When the allegedly coercive police conduct includes subtle forms 
of psychological persuasion, the mental condition of the defendant 
becomes a more significant factor in the “voluntariness” calculus. 
 
Id. at 415.  Relevant personal characteristics “include the defendant’s age, 
education and intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and prior 
experience with law enforcement.”  Id. at 414. 
 
[¶39]  With the clarifications explained above, and recognizing the need 
to 
consider 
law 
enforcement’s 
actions 
vis-à-vis 
each 
defendant’s 
characteristics, we apply the law to the undisputed facts. 
B. 
The Voluntariness of Hunt’s Incriminating Statements 
 
[¶40]  Hunt contends that his incriminating statements were 
involuntary because the detectives improperly induced his confession by their 
assurances that if he confessed to sexual contact with the victim, he would not 
have to register as a sex offender.  He also argues that the statement he made 
after the first detective asked why he did not confess earlier in the 
interview—“Like [the second detective] said, that I’m not even close to being 
 
24 
on that list”—demonstrates that those false promises of leniency motivated 
his decision to confess.  We agree and, considering the totality of the relevant 
circumstances, we conclude that the court erred when it determined that 
Hunt’s confession was made voluntarily. 
 
[¶41]  Here, based on the facts found by the suppression court, the 
circumstances are as follows.  Hunt voluntarily went to the police station for 
questioning that lasted around two hours.  He was not in custody, and was 
told that he could terminate questioning and leave at any time.  At the 
beginning of the interrogation, the officer recited Miranda warnings to Hunt 
and Hunt indicated that he understood them.  Two officers were involved in 
the questioning, although Hunt was questioned one-on-one.  The officers 
persisted in their questioning despite Hunt’s initial denials of the allegations 
of sexual assault.  Hunt has “less than average” cognitive skills—one report 
admitted at the motion hearing indicated he had a composite IQ score of 81 
and another reported a score of 75.   
 
[¶42]  Although the officers made no direct promises to Hunt, in 
response to his concerns about being placed on “the list,” the officers made 
statements assuring him that if he confessed to sexual contact with the victim, 
thereby taking the officers up on the one-time “opportunity” they were 
 
25 
offering him, Hunt would not be subject to the sex offender registration 
requirements.  Based on what they told him, Hunt could “reasonably believe 
[that the officers] had the authority or power to” relieve him from the 
registration requirements if he confessed to the allegations, see Tardiff, 
374 A.2d at 601, and also that “the list” was a component of a possible 
criminal sentence.14  The first detective did not tell Hunt that “we’re not in 
control of that list” until after Hunt confessed.15  Moreover, when asked why 
he had decided to confess, Hunt explained to the first officer that he 
understood that the second detective had told him that he was “not even close 
to being on that list.”  The officers’ statements regarding “the list,” if not 
sufficiently definite to constitute false promises of leniency, were perilously 
close.  And, given Hunt’s stated reliance on his understanding of their 
                                         
14  Hunt’s sex offender registration is governed by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act of 2013 (SORNA), 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11271-11304 (2015).  See 34-A M.R.S. § 11272(1).  In ways not 
relevant to this appeal, portions of SORNA have been amended since Hunt’s conviction and 
sentencing.  See, e.g., P.L. 2015, ch. 280, § 16 (effective Oct. 15, 2015).  According to the statute, 
“[t]he court shall notify the offender at the time of sentence of the duty to register.”  34-A M.R.S. 
§ 11282(1).  Hunt’s “notice of duty to register” identified him as a “Tier III registrant,” requiring him 
to register for the rest of his life and to verify his registration every ninety days.  See 34-A M.R.S. 
§§ 11273(16)(A), 11282(7)(A), 11285(5).  Sex offender registration is a consequence that applies 
to a convicted sex offender because of his conviction, and it is a consequence that may affect an 
offender far longer than his prison sentence. 
 
15  See Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶¶ 14-16, 17 A.3d 128 (holding that statements the defendant made 
after an officer misled him to believe the conversation was confidential, but before the officer 
“correct[ed]” himself, were properly suppressed); cf. State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 908, 911 (Me. 1995) 
(concluding that a confession was voluntary where officers told the defendant that he was “not in 
trouble” for possessing a handgun used in a murder but also “repeatedly told [him] that they had no 
control over charging decisions or sentencing” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
26 
assurances, we cannot disregard those statements in considering the totality 
of the circumstances. 
 
[¶43]  Although the officers’ statements might not have rendered a 
different defendant’s confession involuntary, the issue of Hunt’s cognitive 
limitations also plays a significant role in our analysis.  As the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin stated, “[w]hen the allegedly coercive police conduct includes 
subtle forms of psychological persuasion, the mental condition of the 
defendant becomes a more significant factor in the ‘voluntariness’ calculus.”  
Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d at 415.  Although no single factor renders Hunt’s 
confession involuntary, the totality of the circumstances—in particular, the 
officers’ misleading statements in light of Hunt’s cognitive disability and his 
apparent reliance on their representations—rendered Hunt’s incriminating 
statements involuntary as a matter of law. 
 
[¶44]  Given the values that the exclusionary rule for involuntary 
confessions serves to protect, see McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶ 9 & n.3, 755 A.2d 
1075; Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d at 500; Collins, 297 A.2d at 634 n.13, we must 
conclude that the suppression court erred when it denied Hunt’s motion to 
suppress the evidence of his incriminating statements.  We therefore vacate 
 
27 
the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new 
trial.16 
The entry is: 
Judgment of conviction vacated.  Remanded for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent 
with 
this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq., Paradie, Sherman, Walker & Worden, 
Lewiston, for appellant Timothy Hunt 
 
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, and William J. Barry, Asst. Dist. 
Atty., Prosecutorial District No. Two, Portland, for appellee State of 
Maine 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq., for appellant Timothy Hunt 
 
William J. Barry, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District No. Two, 
Portland, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2013-6687 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
 
                                         
16  The State does not argue that, if erroneous, admission of Hunt’s confession constituted 
harmless error.  See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-13; State v. Ayers, 433 A.2d 356, 362 (Me. 1981).  
And, because we vacate Hunt’s convictions based on the denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
of his confession, we do not discuss his arguments regarding either the trial court’s exclusion of his 
expert’s testimony or the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.