Title: The People v. Amber Bauman and Charles Edward Lafler

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 38  
The People &c., 
            Appellant, 
        v. 
Amber Bauman and Charles Edward 
Lafler, 
            Respondents.
Kelly Christine Wolford, for appellant.
William Clauss, for respondent Bauman.
Gary Muldoon, for respondent Lafler.
JONES, J.:
The issue before this Court is whether an indictment
charging depraved indifference assault under Penal Law § 120.10
(3) which alleges eleven acts over an eight month period under
one count violates Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 200.30 (1).
By indictment, defendants were charged with one count
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of intentional assault under Penal Law § 120.10 (1) (the first
count) for allegedly causing injury to victim by means of "a
baseball bat[,] and/or a frying pan[,] and/or a vacuum cleaner[,]
and/or a hammer[,]" and one count of depraved indifference
assault under Penal Law § 120.10 (3) (the second count) for
allegedly "striking [victim] about the head and body with fists
and/or a baseball bat and/or a hammer; and/or burning said person
with a frying pan; and/or scalding said person with hot water;
and/or placing a vacuum cleaner hose on said person's genital
area; and/or providing inappropriate and/or inadequate nutrition;
and/or subjecting said person to inadequate and/or inappropriate
living conditions; and/or failing to seek medical attention"
during a period from August 1, 2004 to April 7, 2005.
Supreme Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss
both counts of the indictment on the ground of duplicity and the
Appellate Division, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed (51 AD3d 316
[2008]).  The dissent below disagreed on the issue of duplicity
only with respect to the second count (id. at 320).  We agree
with the majority below and now affirm.
CPL 200.30 (1) provides that "[e]ach count of an
indictment may charge one offense only."  As this Court explained
in People v Keindl (68 NY2d 410 [1986]), "acts which separately
and individually make out distinct crimes must be charged in
separate and distinct counts, and where one count alleges the
commission of a particular offense occurring repeatedly during a
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designated period of time, that count encompasses more than one
offense and is duplicitous" (id. at 417-418 [internal citations
omitted]).  Compliance with CPL 200.30 (1) is essential because
"[t]he prohibition against duplicity furthers not only the
functions of notice to a defendant and of assurance against
double jeopardy, but also ensures the reliability of the
unanimous verdict" (id. at 418).
Here, the second count of the indictment was pleaded in
a manner which made it duplicitous.  This count, alleging eleven
incidents over an eight month period, encompassed "such a
multiplicity of acts ... as to make it virtually impossible to
determine the particular act of [assault] ... as to which [a]
jury [could] reach a unanimous verdict" (id. at 421).  The first
count is similarly defective.  Were these counts to stand as
pleaded, "individual jurors might vote to convict ...
defendant[s] of [each] count on the basis of different offenses"
and "defendant[s] would thus stand convicted under [each] count
even though the jury may never have reached a unanimous verdict
as to any of the offenses" (id. at 418).
Our decision in this case is not inconsistent with the
People's argument that depraved indifference assault can be a
continuing crime and that the element of depravity can be alleged
by establishing that defendant engaged in a course of conduct
over a period of time.  Notwithstanding this point, the
indictment in this case was defectively pleaded and properly
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dismissed.  The conclusion of the dissenting Justices below that
April 7, 2005 should be the date "on which defendants' conduct
resulted in serious physical injury and a grave risk of death"
(id. at 323) does not salvage the second count because setting
this date amounts to an improper amendment to the indictment.
Our dissenting colleagues are of the view that some or
all of defendant's acts -- and not any single act -- could have
created the grave risk of death and the jury could unanimously
agree on this before convicting defendants of depraved
indifference assault.  However, the People's use of the
conjunction "and/or" between each act undercuts this position. 
Despite the possibility that a jury could find that the entire
course of conduct created a grave risk of death, given the
"and/or" language, a jury could just as easily find that
defendants committed only one of the alleged acts; not only would
a single act not be sufficient to establish a course of conduct
but we still would not know on which particular act defendant was
convicted.
In addition, the dissent, citing People v Suarez (6
NY3d 202 [2005]), analogizes the pleading of depraved
indifference murder to that of depraved indifference assault and
argues that "the only distinction between those crimes is that,
under the former, the conduct must cause the death of another
person as opposed to serious physical injury."  We believe that
the injury element is the precise point which distinguishes these
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crimes for the purpose of a duplicity analysis.  Where the
resulting injury is "death of another person" (P.L. § 125.25
[2]), regardless of how many acts are alleged in a single count,
there can always only be one completed offense -- the victim can
only die once.  However, where, as here, the injury is "serious
physical injury to another person" (P.L. § 120.10 [3]), there can
be (and might well have been in this case) multiple instances of
serious physical injury and, consequently, multiple completed
offenses.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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The People of the State of New York v Amber Bauman and Charles
Lafler
No. 038
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting in part) :
Although I agree with the majority that depraved
indifference assault can be a continuing offense, I respectfully
dissent because, in my view, the majority's conclusion that count
two "was pleaded in a manner which made it duplicitous" is
inconsistent with its later statement "depraved indifference
assault can be a continuing crime" (maj op at 3).  
A person is guilty of depraved indifference assault in
the first degree when, "[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and
thereby causes serious physical injury to another person" (Penal
Law § 120.10 [3]).  Count two of this indictment lists the
elements of that offense and then identifies the multiple acts
allegedly engaged in by defendants while acting in concert. In my
view, contrary to the majority's opinion, the pleading of
multiple acts under this one count does not threaten the
reliability of a unanimous verdict, because it is defendants'
course of conduct, and whether that conduct is deemed to be
reckless and to have created a grave risk of death--and not any
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No. 038
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singular act--upon which the jury must unanimously agree before
defendants may be convicted of depraved indifference assault. 
Therefore, unlike the multiple intentional assault allegations
charged in count one--which are indeed duplicative--it is the
alleged multiple acts of defendants, over a period of eight
months, that support count two, because some or all of those
acts, if proven, could lead a jury to conclude that defendants'
conduct created a grave risk of death, resulting in serious
physical injury to the victim. 
In a related context, in People v Suarez (6 NY3d 202
[2005]), we stated that depraved indifference murder is
"established when a defendant--acting with a conscious objective
not to kill but to harm--engages in torture or a brutal,
prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct against a
particularly vulnerable victim" (Suarez, 6 NY3d at 212). 
Clearly, if more than one act may be alleged within the
parameters of a depraved indifference murder count, so too may
more than one act be alleged with respect to the crime of
depraved indifference assault, because the only distinction
between those crimes is that, under the former, the conduct must
cause the death of another person as opposed to serious physical
injury.  Had the victim died in this case, under our
jurisprudence, the People would have been able to allege multiple
acts in a depraved indifference murder count.  The same result
should follow here.  
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No. 038
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In my view, the indictment sufficiently alleges that on
April 7, 2005, the conduct of defendants had "resulted in serious
physical injury and a grave risk of death" (People v Bauman, 51
AD3d 316, 323 [4th Dept 2008] [Fahey, J., dissenting]), because
it was at that time that the victim is alleged to have been found
by emergency personnel in a hypothermic condition and near death.
Based on the foregoing, I would modify the order of the
Appellate Division by reinstating the second count and would
otherwise affirm.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Read concur.  Judge Pigott dissents
in part and votes to modify in an opinion in which Judge Smith 
concurs.
Decided March 26, 2009