Title: GORDON KELLY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GORDON KELLY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 20694 P.2d 126Case Number: 84-75Decided: 01/31/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
GORDON KELLY, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot SpringsCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, and K. 
Leslie Delk, Asst. Public Defender, Laramie, for appellant; oral argument by K. 
Leslie Delk.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee; oral argument by Michael 
A. Blonigen.

Before THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from an 
involuntary manslaughter conviction for which appellant was sentenced to the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary for a term of not less than twelve nor more than 
eighteen years. The claims of error, as stated by appellant, 
are:

"1. Whether the trial 
court erred in admitting into evidence the hearsay statements of Arnette 
Goepfert.

"2. Whether James 
Ratcliff's statements were inadmissible under the dying declaration exception to 
the hearsay rule since the prejudicial nature of such statements far outweighed 
their probative value."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On May 29, 1983, the 
beginning of the Memorial Day weekend, appellant Gordon Kelly, his girlfriend, 
Arnette Goepfert, and James B. Ratcliff, with tent and fishing gear, left 
Thermopolis, Wyoming, in Kelly's car. They traveled to the 
Ten Sleep area where they camped that weekend. During their return trip to 
Thermopolis on May 31, 1983, they stopped at a Ten Sleep tavern for a few drinks 
of alcoholic beverage. After leaving the tavern and reentering the automobile, 
Kelly decided they needed a six-pack of beer and reentered the tavern to make 
this purchase. Ratcliff decided that Kelly was too drunk to drive and he drove 
off with Miss Goepfert leaving Kelly behind. As he was driving away, Kelly came 
out of the tavern, running and yelling "stop," but to no 
avail.

[¶4.]     Kelly hitchhiked back 
to Thermopolis, going immediately to the Ratcliff trailer where he picked up his 
car and left. Later that evening Gordon Kelly returned to the Ratcliff trailer. 
He was angry, became involved in a fight with Arnette Goepfert, grabbed her arm 
and slapped her. Ratcliff stepped in to calm them down and Kelly began to fight 
with him. Kelly was violent, struck Ratcliff and knocked him to the floor. 
Arnette Goepfert tried to stop him but could not, was scared, ran to the 
neighbor's house to call police to "get Gordon [Kelly] away from 
[Ratcliff]."

[¶5.]     When the police 
arrived, Ratcliff was in bed and refused medical attention. The next morning, 
June 1, 1983, Kelly and a friend took Ratcliff to Hot SpringsCountyMemorialHospital where he remained until June 17, 
1983. On that date, he was transferred to a hospital in Cody, Wyoming for surgery. Ratcliff's death on July 
14, 1983, resulted from constrictive pericarditis due to scarring around the 
heart which was caused by blunt force trauma. James Ratcliff was 58 years and 
Gordon Kelly was 28 years of age at the time of the 
incident.

I

ADMISSION OF HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY OF CRANDALL

[¶6.]     Arnette Goepfert left 
the Ratcliff trailer to get help during the time Gordon Kelly was beating and 
stomping James Ratcliff. She ran across the street to the Crandall residence 
where she telephoned the police, notifying them of the fight at the trailer. 
Phyllis Crandall, over objection by appellant, was allowed to testify that 
Arnette Goepfert had stated that evening at her residence that Gordon Kelly 
first beat her and then beat up James Ratcliff.

[¶7.]     Appellant objected to 
the testimony upon the grounds of hearsay. "`Hearsay' is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial * * *." Rule 801(c), 
W.R.E. Phyllis Crandall, when testifying, was the declarant. When she repeated 
the statements of Arnette Goepfert, they were statements made by one other than 
herself (declarant), and they were hearsay.

[¶8.]     Hearsay is generally 
inadmissible1 because it is thought to be 
unreliable and untrustworthy and because there is no opportunity to confront the 
witness or cross-examine. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 493. Where, however, a 
statement is made under circumstances which bring it within an exception to the 
exclusionary-hearsay rule, it will be admissible. 4 Louisell & Mueller, 
Federal Evidence § 437 (1980). The hearsay statement of Arnette Goepfert, in 
this case, was admissible under the "excited utterance" exception of Rule 
803(2), W.R.E., which provides that statements are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule that relate "to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." The exception 
is founded upon the proposition that a statement made during the stress of 
excitement resulting from a startling event is probably trustworthy, since there 
is not leisure to reflect, contrive or fabricate. Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 615 P.2d 720 (1980); Bankers Life Co. v. Nelson, 56 
Wyo. 243, 108 P.2d 584 (1940), rehearing 
denied, 56 Wyo. 513, 111 P.2d 136 
(1941).

[¶9.]     The beating and 
stomping of a 58-year-old man into helplessness resulting in multiple rib 
fractures on both sides of the chest and of such magnitude as to necessitate 
surgery is surely a startling event. Because of her involvement in that event, 
Arnette Goepfert was frightened, scared and ran screaming across the street 
"bursting" into her neighbor's residence to call the police. In this condition, 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event, she made the statements to 
which Phyllis Crandall testified. Generally these questions of admissibility 
must be determined upon their own facts and circumstances. Matter of GP, Wyo., 679 P.2d 976 
(1984). Considering the sudden and violent nature of the assault, Arnette 
Goepfert's inability to stop it, and her frightened, screaming state, it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the court to rule the statements admissible under the 
excited-utterance exception to the exclusionary hearsay 
rule.

[¶10.]  Appellant contends, nevertheless, that 
the statements should have been held inadmissible because Arnette Goepfert had 
been drinking intoxicating liquor and was mad at Kelly; therefore, the 
statements were unreliable and not trustworthy. Whether a hearsay statement is 
admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule is 
determined by the nature and effect of the startling event and stress of 
excitement under which the statement is made. If the witness is competent and 
the statement is found to be made under conditions which satisfy the 
excited-utterance exception, it is admissible. Once the statement is held 
admissible, the weight to which it is entitled and the credibility of the person 
making the statement may be affected by that person's age, ability, experience, 
intelligence, mental state, or sobriety. Goldade v. State, Wyo., 674 P.2d 721 (1983), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3539, 82 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1984); State v. Jeffers, 
135 Ariz. 404, 661 P.2d 1105, cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 199, 78 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1983). Appellant adduced evidence of drinking and the mental state of 
Arnette Goepfert at the time of making the statements. It is assumed that the 
jury duly considered the evidence of Miss Goepfert's condition and gave the 
statements the weight to which they were entitled.

II

ADMISSION OF DYING 
DECLARATION

[¶11.]  James Ratcliff's daughter was allowed, 
over objection, to testify to statements made by her father concerning appellant 
Kelly's beating and stomping him. Testimony as to these statements was also 
hearsay under Rule 801(c), W.R.E., supra, and inadmissible under Rule 802, 
W.R.E., supra, unless it also falls within an exception to the hearsay 
rule.

[¶12.]  The statement of the victim, James 
Ratcliff, was offered into evidence as a dying-declaration exception to the 
hearsay rule pursuant to Rule 804(b)(2), W.R.E., which 
provides:

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness:

* * * * * 
*

"(2) Statement Under 
Belief of Impending Death. - In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death 
was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be 
his impending death."

[¶13.]  It is uncontroverted that the statement 
offered was that of a declarant (Ratcliff) in a homicide prosecution and 
concerned the circumstances of his impending death. Appellant contends only that 
the statement was inadmissible because not made at a time Ratcliff believed "his 
death was imminent."

[¶14.]  The rationale for the admissibility of a 
dying declaration is,

"* * * held to rest on 
the religious belief `that the dying declarant, knowing that he is about to die 
would be unwilling to go to his maker with a lie on his lips' * * * [and] the 
feeling that `men are not apt to lie in the shadow of death' * * *." 4 
Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 804(b)(2)[01] (1984) at p. 804-80.

[¶15.]  For this reason, a statement made while 
"believing death imminent," is thought to be trustworthy and reliable. But that 
may not be so. If the statement itself, and the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement, indicate that it is patently 
unreliable, as where it is speculative, conjectural, or conclusory without any 
basis in fact or foundation, it should be excluded although made at a time the 
declarant believed death imminent. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 54 S. Ct. 22, 78 L. Ed. 196 (1933). In this case the statement of James Ratcliff was 
not speculative or conjectural, but entirely factual, describing in detail the 
beating administered by Gordon Kelly. Thus, where the statement is made at a 
time the declarant believes his death imminent and the statement itself has a 
factual basis, other facts and circumstances surrounding the making of it may 
serve to make clearer its reliability. This is so where the statement is 
corroborative of other testimony and evidence.

[¶16.]  In United States v. Mobley, 421 F.2d 345 
(5th Cir. 1970), the victim was beaten and kicked and the assailant stomped on 
his chest. An officer interviewed him at the hospital prior to his death. 
Objection was made to the officer testifying to the victim's statement upon the 
grounds that the government had failed to prove that the victim was aware of the 
gravity of his condition or of his impending death at the time of the statement. 
The court, in ruling upon admissibility, stated that a sense of impending death 
"* * * may be made to appear `from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted 
being obviously such that he must have felt or known that he could not 
survive,'" 421 F.2d  at 347 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 
13 S. Ct. 50, 54, 36 L. Ed. 917 (1892)), and from the testimony of his physician 
who was "* * * of the opinion that the patient knew that his chances for living 
were `very slim,'" 421 F.2d  at 347-348. When it also appears that independent 
evidence of appellant's guilt is overwhelming, the information furnished by the 
victim is the obvious fact that he has been assaulted and the statement is 
corroborative of the other evidence, its trustworthiness and reliability is even 
greater than what flows from belief of imminent death alone, and the statement 
will be held admissible. United States v. 
Mobley, supra; United States v. 
Kearney, 136 
U.S.App.D.C. 328, 420 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Trial courts, in reaching a 
determination as to the admissibility of this kind of evidence, will often first 
hear the evidence out of the jury's presence, and upon finding it "fundamentally 
reliable," rule it admissible. United 
States v. Kearney, supra.

[¶17.]  In this case, on admission to the 
hospital in Thermopolis on June 1, 1983, James Ratcliff was found to have 
multiple bruises about his face, head and chest, fractures of six ribs on the 
left side of his chest and four ribs on the right and a leakage of air into the 
space between the lungs and the ribs on the right side. A few days after 
admission, he developed pneumonia, blood leaked into the left side of his chest 
cavity, and because of low blood pressure he went into shock. He stopped 
breathing, was revived by artificial respiration and thereafter tubes were 
inserted into his left chest and trachia, and he was placed on a respirator to 
assist his breathing. He was in the intensive care unit for a period of time. On 
June 17, 1983, it was determined that surgery would be necessary if he was to 
have a chance to survive and he was transferred to a hospital in Cody, Wyoming for that 
surgery.

[¶18.]  Ratcliff's daughter had visited him in 
the hospital at Thermopolis daily following his admission. When his lung 
collapsed, she feared that he was not going to survive and she felt then that he 
knew how bad things really were. The date James Ratcliff was to be transferred 
to Cody for surgery, his sister inquired when he would go home, and he replied 
that it would be "a very, very long time, if ever." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶19.]  At that time and under those 
circumstances, his daughter inquired what had happened. The fact that the 
statement by James Ratcliff was in response to this question and, therefore, not 
spontaneous, does not preclude its admissibility, for

"[i]ndeed, a person in 
his dying moments may be inclined more toward silence than conversation, and the 
stimulus of a question may be essential." 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 488, p. 1124.

If the response 
to the question is reasonable, indicative of reliability, and the victim is 
aware of the seriousness of his condition and his impending death, it should be 
admissible. Commonwealth v. Dowd, 472 
Pa. 296, 372 A.2d 705, cert. denied 434 U.S. 970, 98 S. Ct. 520, 54 L. Ed. 2d 459 
(1977).

[¶20.]  The daughter testified 
that:

"* * * Gordon had come to 
the house and he was mad and upset and he had slapped his girlfriend around and 
my father had stepped in to try and calm him down. And when he did, Gordon hit 
him behind the head with something and knocked him to the floor. And then he 
just started stomping on him.

* * * * * 
*

"He said he tried to get 
up and every time he would try to get up, he would kick him back down. And he 
had even tried to pull the coffee table between himself and 
Gordon.

* * * * * 
*

"And Gordon threw the 
coffee table out of the way and stomped on him some more. And he said at one 
point in time that Gordon rolled him over so that he could stomp him on the 
other side. And after that he pretty well lost contact with what was going on. 
He doesn't remember much after that."

[¶21.]  Whether James Ratcliff believed his death 
was imminent and whether the statement otherwise satisfied requirements for 
admissibility as a dying declaration is a preliminary question concerning "the 
admissibility of evidence [and] shall be determined by the court * * *." Rule 
104(a), W.R.E.

[¶22.]  Thus, in a trial to a jury, it is the 
province of the court to determine the admissibility of evidence 
and,

"in this general respect, 
the admissibility of such evidence [hearsay] lies within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and its determination is, in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion, conclusive on appeal." 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 
715.

[¶23.]  The absence of arbitrary determination 
and the exercise of a discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason are 
the essence of discretion. Sanford v. Smith, 11 Cal. App. 3d 991, 90 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1970).

"`[D]iscretion' 
contemplates a process of reasoning which depends on facts that are in the 
record or are reasonably derived by inference from the record, and yields a 
conclusion based on logic and founded on proper legal standards." Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis.2d 164, 325 N.W.2d 321, 328 (1982).

We have said 
that:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did." Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶24.]  Here there was no abuse of discretion in 
the court's ruling the statement of James Ratcliff admissible. The daughter 
feared her father was not going to survive and testified that she believed he 
knew how bad things really were. James Ratcliff's condition had steadily 
worsened following his admission to the hospital and, on the date of his 
statement, he stated that he did not believe he would ever be going home. From 
the severe beating and the extensive injuries to his head and back, the ten 
broken ribs and collapsed lung, he must have known he could not 
survive.

[¶25.]  We note also that the statement of James 
Ratcliff is mostly corroborative of Goepfert's testimony that Gordon Kelly had 
beaten James Ratcliff to the extent that she said, "enough is enough," and she 
called the police to get Gordon Kelly off James Ratcliff. Ratcliff's statement 
was consistent with the severe beating he suffered. It was factual. There was 
nothing speculative or conjectural about it. Upon all the facts and evidence, 
the court could reasonably conclude that the statement was made when James 
Ratcliff "believed his death was imminent" and that it was trustworthy and 
reliable. The court's ruling admitting this statement was within the bounds of 
reason, supported by the evidence, not arbitrary, nor an abuse of discretion, 
and it will not be disturbed on appeal.

[¶26.]  Appellant next contends that the 
statement should not have been admitted because it was made two weeks after the 
beating which permitted time for reflection and fabrication. Passage of time 
between the incident causing death and the death is a factor to be considered 
together with all other facts and circumstances as it might bear upon the 
question: whether declarant believed his death imminent. Johnson v. State, Alaska, 579 P.2d 20 
(1978); 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence § 488, p. 1114. But that 
factor alone is not determinative of the question, for circumstances may be such 
that death may not at first be imminent, but may become so with an injury that 
does not respond to treatment and finally results in death. If a statement is 
then made with knowledge that death is imminent, that is 
sufficient.

[¶27.]  Appellant finally contends that the 
prejudicial impact of the statements outweighed their probative value and that 
they should have been ruled inadmissible under Rule 403, W.R.E., which 
provides:

"Although [R]elevant * * 
* evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice * * *."

Relevant 
evidence is defined as

"* * * evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Rule 401, W.R.E.

Generally, all 
relevant evidence is admissible. Grabill 
v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802 (1980); Rule 402, W.R.E. 
Most relevant evidence offered by the State in a homicide case such as this is 
harmful, even prejudicial. But that is not enough. It must also appear that it 
is unfair, Elliott v. State, Wyo., 
600 P.2d 1044 (1979), and that the evidence has little or no probative value, is 
extremely inflammatory, or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury. Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1023 
(1981). The decision of the trial court, in ruling whether evidence should be 
excluded because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340 
(1979).

[¶28.]  James Ratcliff suffered massive injuries 
which others described as resulting from a beating. Arnette Goepfert testified 
that she called the police because she thought the fight had gone too far. She 
said, "I mean a fight is a fight, all right? Enough is enough." There was no 
other testimony as to the nature of the beating or the manner in which the 
injuries were inflicted except the dying declaration of James Ratcliff. That 
evidence was necessary for the jury to understand the cause of the injuries and 
whether and how they resulted in Ratcliff's death. In that context it was 
prejudicial, but we cannot find that it was unfairly prejudicial as to require 
exclusion by the rule. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting this evidence.

[¶29.]  There being no error in the admission of 
the statements of Arnette Goepfert, and the declarations of James Ratcliff, the 
judgment is affirmed.

1 Rule 802, W.R.E., 
provides:

"Hearsay is not 
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute."