Title: Carlson v. Bratton

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Carlson v. Bratton1984 WY 53681 P.2d 1333Case Number: 83-153Decided: 06/04/1984LOUIS W. CARLSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEWCASTLE, WYOMING; AND NORM STEVESON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COUNCILMAN OF THE CITY OF NEWCASTLE, WYOMING, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

RICHARD BRATTON, WAYNE BURR, ALBERT ZANONI, DOUGLAS HOLWELL, AND HELEN WEYRICH, AS MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEWCASTLE, WYOMING; AND HOWARD SNIDER, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
LOUIS W. CARLSON, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEWCASTLE, WYOMING; AND 
NORM STEVESON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COUNCILMAN OF THE CITY OF NEWCASTLE, WYOMING, APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

RICHARD BRATTON, WAYNE 
BURR, ALBERT ZANONI, DOUGLAS HOLWELL, AND HELEN WEYRICH, AS MEMBERS OF THE CITY 
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEWCASTLE, WYOMING; AND HOWARD SNIDER, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, WestonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

Carl L. Lathrop, 
Lathrop & Uchner, Cheyenne, for appellants. 

Richard S. 
Dumbrill, Jones, Dumbrill & Hansen, Newcastle, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     After appellant 
Carlson, Mayor of Newcastle, discharged appellee Snider from the position of 
Chief of Police, the majority of the City Council (those appellees named as 
Council members) directed the Mayor to specify reasons for the discharge and to 
reinstate appellee Snider as Chief of Police pending the hearing; they also 
appointed a hearing officer to conduct a hearing to determine whether or not 
there was cause for the discharge. Appellant Carlson refused to specify charges 
or reinstate appellee Snider. However, the Council continued to pay his 
salary.

[¶2.]     Appellants sought a 
judgment declaring valid the discharge of appellee Snider by appellant Carlson. 
The district court refused such declaratory judgment and held "that such action 
of termination by the Mayor be held for naught and is void ab initio," and that 
by virtue of § 19-7 of the Code of Newcastle,1 the chief of police could be 
removed only with the consent of the council.

[¶3.]     We 
reverse.

[¶4.]     Although the parties 
argue, pro and con, four or five bases for upholding or reversing the district 
court, the issues condense into two:

1. Did the Mayor have 
authority under the law to discharge appellee Snider from the position of Chief 
of Police without Council approval and without a hearing?

2. Is the appeal moot 
because of failure by appellants to consolidate the case with an administrative 
proceeding held to reinstate appellee Snider?

AUTHORITY TO 
DISCHARGE

[¶5.]     Law and ordinances 
concerning the authority to discharge city employees are premised on the 
necessity for efficient operation of a city by its executive officer, in this 
instance, the mayor. The chief of police is in a position of making and carrying 
out policy for the mayor. The legislature recognized this fact in enacting the 
Civil Service Act for city fire and police departments. Sections 15-5-101 et 
seq., W.S. 1977.2

[¶6.]     The Civil Service Act 
allows for the establishment of a police department civil service commission 
which in turn classifies the various positions in the police department, and 
provides for the examination of applicants for employment.

[¶7.]     Section 15-5-105, W.S. 
1977, provides for the employment and appointments of chiefs of the fire 
department and the police department. Section 15-5-105(c) 
provides:

"This section does not 
apply to the appointment, tenure or office of the chief of police. However, if 
any member of the police department is appointed chief of police, he shall 
remain on the list of eligible persons certified and his classification remains 
the same at the end of his term as chief of police."

[¶8.]     The position of chief 
of police is clearly recognized as different than that of any other position in 
the police department for the obvious reason that the chief of police is in a 
position of making and carrying out policy for the mayor. The mayor is entitled 
to have someone in that position who concurs in the mayor's policies, and with 
whom the mayor can work towards the goal of implementing those 
policies.

[¶9.]     To require the mayor to 
employ a police chief with differing philosophies could frustrate the mayor's 
entire program. The voters of a city elect a mayor who they believe will act in 
their best interests. Many political issues become involved necessarily, and to 
force the winner of a political election to be saddled with a member of his 
immediate executive staff with whom he cannot work, is to block the efficiency 
of that political system. The governing body itself is of course a check on the 
powers of the mayor's office; but the legislature recognized the necessity for 
the mayor to retain control over his or her policy making 
employees.

[¶10.]  The pertinent statutes must be 
interpreted with reference to that background. The following is set forth under 
General Provisions relating to Cities and Towns:

[¶11.]  The term "mayor" is defined by § 
15-1-101(a)(viii), W.S. 1977:

"`Mayor' means the person 
elected, either by popular vote or by vote of the governing body, to exercise 
the powers of the office and to be presiding officer of the governing 
body."

[¶12.]  "Governing body" is defined by § 
15-1-101(a)(vi), W.S. 1977:

"`Governing body' means 
the council or commission constituting the elected legislative body of any city 
or town."

[¶13.]  Section 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii), W.S. 1977, 
provides as follows:

"(a) The governing bodies 
of all cities and towns may:

* * * * * 
*

"(xxxvii) Appoint, in 
addition to the appointed officers and employees provided by law, other 
personnel as are necessary for the efficient operation of the city or town 
and:

* * * * * 
*

"(D) If any person is 
removed from office for incompetency, neglect of duty or otherwise for cause, 
specify the charges and provide the person removed an opportunity for a hearing 
on the charges;

"(E) Make the cause of 
removal a matter of record."

[¶14.]  Under provisions relative to cities of 
the first class, § 15-3-204, W.S. 1977, provides:

"The clerk, treasurer, 
engineer, attorney, fire chief, police chief, policemen and police justices 
shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor according to conditions fixed 
by the governing body. All other appointments and removals shall be in a manner 
determined by the governing body pursuant to the general powers granted cities 
and towns. The mayor has the power to remove any officer appointed under W.S. 
15-1-101 through 15-10-137 for incompetency or neglect of 
duty."

[¶15.]  Appellees contend that the limiting 
phrase in § 15-3-204, "according to conditions fixed by the governing body," 
qualifies the power of the mayor to remove the police chief. As already noted, 
the meaning of the phrase cannot be taken to hamstring the mayor in controlling 
his executive duties.

[¶16.]  The phrase must be read to refer to the 
authority of the governing body to set conditions affecting the reasonable terms 
of employment of the persons listed in that section, such as hours of work, 
rates of pay, insurance coverage and the like. The legislature did not intend to 
allow the governing body to abrogate the power given in the section itself for 
the mayor to remove the chief of police. If the clause were read as contended by 
appellees, the conditions fixed by the governing body could be so stringent that 
only it would have the power to appoint and remove these key officers. If the 
legislature had so intended, it would have given the power directly to the 
governing body and not the mayor.

[¶17.]  The quoted provisions of § 
15-1-103(a)(xxxvii), supra, authorize the governing body to appoint "other 
personnel" and set forth requirements for their dismissal. By implication, such 
requirements and the appointing power are applicable only to those other than 
"appointed officers and employees provided by law."

[¶18.]  Unless modified by a statute or 
otherwise, the power of appointment to an office such as police chief carries 
with it, as an incident, the power of removal. 4 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, § 12.229(b), p. 228 (1979); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 118(b), p. 481 
(1978). The fact that the appointment of a chief of police is subject to the 
approval of the city council does not make that confirming body the appointing 
authority. LaPeters v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 263 N.W.2d 734 (1978); 63 Am.Jur.2d 
Public Officers and Employers § 110, p. 697 (1972). A number of other 
jurisdictions have recognized that in the absence of a statutory or contractual 
prohibition the mayor or other executive officer having the power to appoint a 
chief of police can remove that official without notice, hearing or reasons. Newby v. City of Andalusia, Ala., 376 So. 2d 1374 (1979); Gray v. City of 
Manitou Springs, 43 Colo. App. 60, 598 P.2d 527 (1979); LaPeters v. City of Cedar Rapids, 
supra; Zeloyle v. Bettor, 371 Pa. 
546, 91 A.2d 901 (1952); Hackler v. 
Ward, 105 Cal. App. 2d 615, 234 P.2d 170 (1951); State v. Reichert, 226 Ind. 358, 80 N.E.2d 289 (1948); and Gray v. State, 
24 Ohio App. 445, 157 N.E. 905 (1927).

[¶19.]  In this case the mayor of the City of 
Newcastle is 
possessed of the power to appoint the chief of police subject to confirmation by 
members of the city council. It is a necessary corollary of that power that the 
mayor also is vested with the power of removal of the chief of police from that 
office. The rule of common law was that the appointment to municipal office 
carried with it no vested property interest in continued employment, and such 
officers were subject to removal without cause, reason or hearing unless 
otherwise prescribed. 4 McQuillin, supra, § 12.249, p. 322. See also State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, Wyo., 
401 P.2d 954, 956 (1965). The net result of these authorities is that there is 
no property right in the office of chief of 
police.

[¶20.]  Appellees argue that notwithstanding the 
fact that the mayor had the authority to discharge the chief of police, such 
discharge would have to be pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. They 
point to the language in the trial court's opinion letter on this matter in 
support of their argument. The trial court stated:

"16-3-101(b)i excepts the 
governing body of city or town from 
the Administrative Procedures Act. 15-1-101(a)(vi) defines `governing body' as 
the council constituting the elected legislative body of the City. It would 
therefore seem that since the action of removal of the Chief was not by the 
governing body but by the Mayor of the City the Administrative Procedures Act 
would apply. I'm not sure what effect this has, but it certainly appears that 
had the Mayor the power to remove the Chief of Police, he would have to comply 
with the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act and probably conduct a 
hearing."

[¶21.]  Section 16-3-107, W.S. 1977,3 sets out the procedure to be 
followed in a contested case. It provides in part:

"(a) In any contested 
case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable 
notice served personally or by mail. * * *"

The section goes 
on to give details of the notice requirement, discovery and various other 
things.

[¶22.]  Section 16-3-101(b)(ii) provides the 
following definition:

"`Contested case' means a 
proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing and 
licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required 
by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for 
hearing."

[¶23.]  Section 16-3-101(b)(i) defines agency as 
follows:

"`Agency' means any 
authority, bureau, board, commission, department, division, officer or employee 
of the state, a county, city or town or other political subdivision of the 
state, except the governing body of a city or town, the state legislature and 
the judiciary."

[¶24.]  Although a proceeding by the mayor which 
falls into the category of a contested case may be subject to the provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, this matter is not encompassed within the 
definition of a "contested case." A contested case is one where, under the law, 
legal rights are to be determined after opportunity for 
hearing.

"This court has 
previously had opportunity to construe the meaning of a `contested case.' Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, 
Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26, 29 (1969); Thornley v. Wyoming Highway Dept., Motor 
Vehicle Division, Wyo., 478 P.2d 600, 603 (1971); Lund v. Schrader, Wyo., 492 P.2d 202, 
209-210 (1971); and Firemen's Pension 
Fund v. Hoy, Wyo., 516 P.2d 365, 366-367 (1973). Each of these cases dealt 
with the question of whether or not there was a `contested case,' requiring 
notice and hearing at the agency level. To be a `contested case' there must 
exist legal rights which, under the law, are to be determined after an 
opportunity for a trial-type hearing. Scarlett v. Town Council, supra." Diefenderfer v. Budd, 
Wyo., 563 P.2d 1355, 1359 
(1977).

[¶25.]  The Administrative Procedure Act does not 
require an opportunity for a hearing 
in a contested case, it only defines 
a contested case as one where a hearing is otherwise required by law, and then 
sets out the procedure for such hearing.

"Our administrative 
procedure act and our rules of civil procedure both contemplate administrative 
proceedings where there is a hearing and administrative proceedings where there 
is no hearing. If the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required 
by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing, the 
proceeding is called a `contested case.' If such hearing is not required, the 
proceeding is a non-contested case. See § 9-276.19(b)(2), W.S. 1957, 1969 
Cum.Supp.; and Rule 72.1(b), W.R.C.P." Thornley v. Wyoming Highway Department, 
Motor Vehicle Division, Wyo., 478 P.2d 600, 603 
(1971).

[¶26.]  In the case presently under 
consideration, no hearing was required, either by statute, or by city ordinance. 
Section 15-1-103 requires a hearing when a person is removed from office for 
incompetency, neglect of duty, or otherwise for cause. That was not the case 
here. The Rules and Regulations of Practice and Procedure, adopted by the City 
of Newcastle, 
Chapter II, Decisions, Section 1, provides in part as 
follows:

"Whenever the City of 
Newcastle makes any decision which entitles the person affected by the decision 
to a hearing under the Administrative Procedures Act, the City shall, acting 
through its Mayor, * * * give notice * * *."

This anticipates 
a decision in a "contested case" as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, 
and requires a notice in such instance. Beyond that, appellees themselves admit 
that the decision taken here was not by "the City of Newcastle," inasmuch as it 
was not taken by the governing body. Therefore, said "Rule" would not be 
applicable to the action taken by the Mayor. Appellees cite us to no other city 
ordinance or rule of practice and procedure applicable to a hearing 
requirement.

[¶27.]  Appellees refer us to Keslar v. Police Civil Service Commission, 
City of Rock Springs, Wyo., 665 P.2d 937 (1983), for the argument that the 
chief of police was entitled to a hearing. We would distinguish that case on two 
dispositive grounds. First, the City of Rock Springs in that case had adopted the 
Police Department Civil Service Commission, which provided for a hearing; that 
is not the case here. Second, that case involved a police officer, not the chief 
of police. We believe there to be a qualitative difference between the two 
positions, for reasons relative to the policy making role of the chief of police 
given above. We need not say more about that case. There is no right or 
privilege for one to be a chief of police or to continue to be a chief of 
police. As already noted, the policy making officials of a city are appointed 
and removed from office at the pleasure of the mayor. When a new mayor is 
elected, these officials are often changed - and it should be the prerogative of 
the new mayor to do so.

[¶28.]  Absent a discrimination amounting to a 
violation of civil rights, a person does not have tenure in employment unless 
such tenure is established by statute or by contract or by rules and regulations 
pursuant to statute or by rules and regulations having the force of a contract. 
One of the bargaining items in labor contracts concerns the causes for 
termination and the method of establishing the same. Adoption of the Little 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 27-7-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, was for the purpose of 
insuring the right of labor to organize and bargain for such items. Personnel 
rules of the several governmental units serve the purpose of contractual labor 
requirements. In all such, there is a recognition of a definite cleavage between 
management and labor. The positions listed in § 15-3-204, supra, are positions 
of management and the appointees thereto serve at the pleasure of the 
mayor.

[¶29.]  Appellant Carlson had the authority under 
the law to discharge appellee Snider from the position of Chief of Police 
without Council approval and without a hearing.

MOOT?

[¶30.]  Appellees contend that because the 
declaratory judgment appealed from herein did not specifically reinstate Chief 
Snider, but only recommends that the Mayor do so, another petition for review in 
the district court was filed, and it was from this petition that the appeal 
should have been taken.

[¶31.]  The declaratory judgment states, "* * * 
such action of termination by the Mayor be held for naught and is void ab 
initio." "Ab initio" is defined as, "From the beginning; from the first act; 
from the inception. * *" Black's Law Dictionary, (5th Ed. 1979), p. 6. The 
declaratory judgment was not a recommendation that the Chief of Police be 
reinstated, it was a declaration that the dismissal was never effective, as it 
was void from the minute it was given. It was proper for appellants to appeal 
from the order.

[¶32.]  Reversed.

BROWN, J., 
dissenting.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 19-7 of the Code 
of Newcastle provides in part:

"There is hereby 
established the office of chief of police, who shall be appointed by the mayor, 
by and with the consent of the city council."

2 The provisions of that 
Act are not applicable to this matter inasmuch as the City of Newcastle has not adopted 
it. It is referred to here only as an example in point.

3 Sections 16-3-101 thru 
16-3-115, W.S. 1977, comprise the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.