Title: State v. Herring

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Herring , 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 2002-Ohio-796.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HERRING, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Herring (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 246.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 98-904 – Submitted July 17, 2001 – Decided February 27, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, No. 96-CR-339. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  Shortly after midnight on April 30, 1996, five masked gunmen 
intent on robbery entered the Newport Inn, a bar in Youngstown.  They shot five 
people, robbed the till, and left.  Three of the five victims died.  One of the gunmen, 
Willie S. “Stevie” Herring, is the appellant in this case.  He was convicted of three 
counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death on each count. 
 
Herring’s partners in crime were Adelbert Callahan, Antwan Jones, Eugene 
Foose, Louis Allen, and Kitwan Dalton.  On the night of April 29, 1996, these five 
gathered at Herring’s house.  At one point, Callahan and Jones left the house for 
about fifteen minutes before returning with a stolen van. 
 
Herring and the others got into the van, Callahan taking the wheel.  Callahan 
drove to a blue house on Laclede Avenue near Hillman Street and Rosedale Avenue.  
Herring went inside the blue house and came back with four guns.  He gave a .38 
special to Allen, a 9 mm pistol to Callahan, and a .357-caliber pistol to Jones.  He did 
not give a gun to Foose, who was already carrying a .45, or to Dalton, who was to be 
the getaway driver.  Herring kept a 9 mm Cobray semiautomatic for himself. 
 
Herring then said to the others, “If you all know like I know, then you all 
want to get paid.”  It turned out that all six needed money.  They therefore decided to 
commit a robbery.  Foose suggested the Newport Inn as a target.  Callahan drove the 
van there. 
 
Everyone but Dalton got out of the van carrying a gun.  They put on 
disguises.  Herring donned a white Halloween mask, which Dalton agreed was a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
“store-bought” mask similar to one seen in “slasher” movies.  No one else had such a 
mask; the others hid their faces with bandanas or, in Allen’s case, a T-shirt.  Herring, 
Allen, and Foose went to the back door of the Newport Inn; Callahan and Jones took 
the front door. 
 
Ronald Marinelli, the Newport Inn’s owner, was tending bar that night.  He 
had six or eight customers, including Deborah Aziz, Herman Naze, Sr., Dennis 
Kotheimer, and Jimmie Lee Jones.  Jones was sitting with a woman at a table in the 
back. 
 
Sometime between 1:45 and 2:15 a.m., the robbers burst in.  Hearing a sound 
like a gunshot, Marinelli looked and saw four armed black males in the bar.  The two 
at the front door were disguised in dark bandanas.  One carried a revolver; one had 
what looked to Marinelli like a 9 mm semiautomatic pistol.  Marinelli saw two more 
at the rear.  One wore a bandana, the other a “white hockey-type mask.”  Herring, in 
the white mask, carried a “very distinctive” gun, which looked like an Uzi or a MAC-
10, squarish in shape, with a long clip.  Allen, entering last through the back door, 
saw Jimmie Lee Jones already lying on the floor.  At a nearby table, a woman was 
screaming.  Allen told her to be quiet.  Then he returned to the van. 
 
One of the other gunmen ordered Herman Naze: “Give me your fucking 
money.”  “I don’t have any money,” Naze replied.  The gunman immediately shot 
him. Then Herring shot Deborah Aziz, who fell to the floor.  She managed to crawl 
away and hide between a cooler and a trash can.  She later described her assailant’s 
mask as “a hard plastic, like one of those Jason masks.” 
 
Now Herring walked around the end of the horseshoe bar toward Marinelli 
and the cash register.  As he approached, he shot Marinelli four times in the stomach 
from about five feet away. 
 
Somehow Marinelli managed to stay on his feet as Herring came closer.  
Herring stopped about a foot away from him.  Marinelli noticed his assailant’s long 
reddish-orange hair.  Despite the mask, Marinelli could also see that his assailant had 
an “odd skin pigment,” large eyes “almost like a hazel” color, and buckteeth. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
 
Herring said, “Give me your fucking money.”  Despite his wounds, Marinelli 
obeyed, handing over the cash in the register.  But the robber screamed that Marinelli 
hadn’t given him everything.  He had guessed right: in a nearby drawer there was 
some cash belonging to a pool league. 
 
As Herring threatened to “blow [Marinelli’s] brains out,” Marinelli gave him 
the money from the drawer.  Herring screamed for more.  Marinelli urged him to 
“[b]e cool” and told him there was no more.  Herring responded by leveling his gun 
at Marinelli’s head. 
 
Marinelli reached into the drawer again.  This time, he pulled out a gun of his 
own.  But by now, Marinelli was so weak that Herring easily took the gun from him.  
Marinelli collapsed.  Herring said, “You ain’t dead yet, motherfucker,” and shot 
Marinelli in the legs as he lay on the floor. 
 
After Herring shot Marinelli, Aziz heard Dennis Kotheimer say, “You 
motherfucker.”  Then she heard more shots.  Marinelli saw Kotheimer get shot but 
did not see who shot him.  Nobody saw who shot Jimmie Lee Jones. 
 
Someone reported the gunshots to the Youngstown police, and officers were 
sent to the Newport Inn.  When the officers saw the carnage inside, they summoned 
emergency personnel. 
 
The five shooting victims were taken to a Youngstown hospital.  Herman 
Naze and Jimmie Lee Jones were both pronounced dead on the morning of April 30.  
Dennis Kotheimer died on May 1. 
 
Autopsies showed that each victim died of gunshot wounds to the trunk.  
Jones had been shot twice; one 9 mm slug was recovered from his body.  Kotheimer 
and Naze had each been shot once, but no bullets were recovered from either victim. 
 
On May 7, 1996, Officer Daniel Mikus responded to a report of an unruly 
juvenile at 641 West Laclede Avenue.  There, Mikus confronted sixteen-year-old 
Obie Crockett, who was sitting on a couch with his hand concealed under a pillow.  
Mikus looked under the pillow and found State’s Exhibit 5, a 9 mm semiautomatic 
firearm.  A forensic scientist at the Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
Investigation later determined that State’s Exhibit 5 had fired the 9 mm slug 
recovered from the body of Jimmie Lee Jones. 
 
Herring was indicted on three counts of aggravated murder in violation of 
R.C. 2903.01(B).  Count One charged him with killing Jimmie Lee Jones; Count 
Two, with killing Herman Naze; Count Three, with killing Dennis Kotheimer.  The 
instructions and verdict forms on Count One gave the jury the option of convicting 
Herring of the aggravated murder of Jones either as the principal offender or as an 
accomplice.  The indictment also included two counts of attempted aggravated 
murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A), and two counts of aggravated robbery in 
violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). 
 
Each aggravated murder count originally had two death specifications 
attached: multiple murder, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and felony-murder, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7).  Ultimately, the (A)(7) specifications for Counts Two and Three were 
not submitted to the jury. 
 
On Count One, the jury found Herring not guilty of committing aggravated 
murder as a principal offender, but guilty of complicity in the aggravated murder of 
Jones.  The jury also found Herring guilty of the (A)(5) multiple-murder specification 
to Count One.  The jury convicted Herring of all other counts and specifications.  
After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended death for all three aggravated 
murders, and the trial judge sentenced Herring to death. 
I. Intent to Kill 
 
In his first and second propositions of law, Herring contends that faulty instructions 
on the issue of specific intent to kill invalidate his aggravated-murder convictions. 
 
Purpose (i.e., intent) to kill is an essential element of aggravated murder.  R.C. 
2903.01.  See, e.g., State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, 656 N.E.2d 623, 634.  
Moreover, “[t]o support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 
2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show * * * that the defendant shared the criminal intent 
of the principal.”  State v. Johnson (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796, syllabus. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
With respect to Count One (aggravated murder of Jimmie Lee Jones), the trial court 
gave a standard instruction on specific intent.  However, the court then instructed that if the 
state failed to prove that Herring was the principal offender on Count One, the jury could 
consider whether he was guilty of complicity.  The court instructed: “You may not convict 
Willie S. Herring of complicity to commit aggravated murder unless you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he specifically intended to aid and abet another in causing the death 
of Jimmie Lee Jones.”  On Counts Two (aggravated murder of Herman Naze) and Three 
(aggravated murder of Dennis Kotheimer), the court gave the same instruction, precluding 
the jury from convicting Herring of complicity in aggravated murder unless it found that he 
“specifically intended to aid and abet another in causing the death of” each victim.  The 
court also defined the terms “aid” and “abet” as follows: “Aid means to help, assist or 
strengthen.  Abet means to encourage, counsel, incite or assist.”  See 4 Ohio Jury 
Instructions (2000) 573, Sections 523.03(8) and 523.03(9). 
 
These instructions, Herring contends, did not sufficiently inform the jury that it 
could not find him guilty on Counts One, Two, or Three without finding that he specifically 
intended to kill. 
 
Where an instruction is claimed to be “ambiguous and therefore subject to an 
erroneous interpretation,” the court must inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury has applied the challenged instruction” incorrectly.  See Boyde v. California 
(1990), 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329. 
 
Herring’s claim assumes that the jury could have found that he “specifically 
intended to aid and abet another in causing the death” of another without finding that he 
specifically intended to cause the death of another.  We disagree.  It is hard to see how a 
person could, in the words of the instruction, intend to “help, assist, or strengthen” or 
“encourage, counsel, incite, or assist” another person in causing death, without also 
intending that the victim die.  It is equally hard to see any reasonable likelihood that the 
jury would understand the instruction as allowing the conviction of a defendant who did not 
intend that the victim die.  Thus, the instructions the trial court gave are functionally 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
equivalent to an instruction requiring specific intent to cause death.  Herring’s first 
proposition of law is overruled. 
 
In his second proposition of law, Herring contends that the jury never actually 
found that he intended to kill Jones, Naze, and Kotheimer.  Ordinarily, of course, the guilty 
verdicts on the aggravated-murder counts would show that the jury did so find.  However, 
Herring contends that due to the allegedly faulty  instruction on intent, these verdicts do not 
reflect an actual jury finding of intent.  Rejecting the premise that the instructions were 
flawed, we reject this claim as well. 
 
Herring’s second proposition of law further contends that the trial judge made an 
affirmative finding of a lack of intent to kill and that we should accept that finding and 
reverse his aggravated-murder convictions.  But this case was tried to a jury, and it is the 
jury’s verdict that binds us.  The jury found that Herring did intend the deaths of Jones, 
Naze, and Kotheimer. 
 
Moreover, the trial judge did not, in fact, find that Herring lacked intent to kill.  
Herring quotes passages from the sentencing opinion stating that “the degree of the 
defendant’s participation in the offense which led to the deaths of Herman  Naze, Sr., 
Dennis Kotheimer and Jimmie Lee Jones could not be determined and was therefore 
unclear.” But the sentencing opinion did not say that Herring’s state of mind was unclear or 
indeterminate; it said that the “degree of his participation in the offense” was. 
 
The opinion goes on to state that “the defendant was the offender (shooter) in the 
attempt to kill Marinelli and Aziz.”  In other words, the judge was distinguishing between 
the shootings in which the degree of Herring’s participation was unclear and the shootings 
in which it was clear that Herring was the principal offender.  He was not making any sort 
of finding as to lack of mens rea. 
 
Herring’s second proposition of law lacks merit and is overruled. 
II. Complicity 
A. Bill of Particulars 
 
The state’s second amended bill of particulars alleged that Herring “shot and 
killed” Jimmie Lee Jones.  Thus, the bill specified that Herring was the principal offender 
January Term, 2002 
7 
in the aggravated murder of Jones.  However, at the state’s request, and over defense 
objection, the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict Herring of aggravated 
murder on Count One if it found that Herring was either the principal offender or an aider 
and abettor.  The jury was given two verdict forms for Count One, reflecting the alternate 
theories.  The jury found Herring not guilty of being the principal offender in the 
aggravated murder of Jimmie Lee Jones, but found him guilty of complicity, i.e., of aiding 
and abetting the aggravated murder of Jones. 
 
In his fourth proposition of law, Herring claims that the jury instruction violated his 
Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” He 
contends that, because the bill of particulars indicated that he was the principal offender on 
Count One, he lacked notice that the trial court would instruct on accomplice liability as to 
that count. 
 
R.C. 2923.03(F) states: “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this 
section, or in terms of the principal offense.”  Thus, a defendant charged with an offense 
may be convicted of that offense upon proof that he was complicit in its commission, even 
though the indictment is “stated * * * in terms of the principal offense” and does not 
mention complicity.  R.C. 2923.03(F) adequately notifies defendants that the jury may be 
instructed on complicity, even when the charge is drawn in terms of the principal offense.  
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151, 689 N.E.2d 929, 946, citing Hill v. 
Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406, 407-408.  We reject Herring’s Sixth Amendment 
claim. 
 
Moreover, Crim.R. 33(E)(2) provides that a variance between the allegations and 
the evidence at trial is not reversible error unless the defense is prejudiced or misled 
thereby.  On the record before us, we cannot conclude that the state’s failure to allege 
complicity in the bill of particulars prejudiced or misled Herring.  Herring knew before trial 
that complicity was an issue with respect to the other aggravated-murder counts.  He does 
not indicate how he could have defended himself differently, given notice that complicity 
would also be an issue as to Count One.  Since Herring does not show prejudice, we 
overrule his fourth proposition of law. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
B. Accomplice Liability for Multiple-Murder Specification 
 
Under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), an aggravating circumstance exists if “the offense at bar 
was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or 
more persons by the offender.”  (Emphasis added.)  In his third proposition of law, Herring 
argues that the term “offender” in the (A)(5) multiple-murder specification means the 
principal offender—i.e., the actual killer.  He argues that since the jury did not find him to 
be the actual killer in any of the three murders, he cannot be guilty of this specification. 
 
We reject this contention.  As he must, Herring concedes that R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) 
contains neither an express requirement of prior calculation and design nor an express 
requirement that the offender be the actual killer.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) uses the unadorned 
term “offender,” rather than “principal offender.”  Nor does the term “prior calculation and 
design” appear therein. 
 
Nevertheless, Herring attempts to read a principal-offender requirement into our 
precedents.  He cites State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117, 684 N.E.2d 668, 693, 
and State v. Sneed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 10-11, 584 N.E.2d 1160, 1168, fn. 3, as 
supporting his claim.  These cases do not support Herring’s argument.  Smith holds that the 
Eighth Amendment permits a state to sentence to death one who aids and abets a killing 
with prior calculation and design.  It does not hold, or even suggest, that prior calculation 
and design is necessary to convict an aider and abettor of the (A)(5) specification.  Sneed 
involved the felony-murder specification of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), not the (A)(5) multiple-
murder specification.  Unlike the (A)(5) specification, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifically 
requires that “either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the 
aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with 
prior calculation and design.” 
 
Herring’s third proposition of law is overruled. 
III. Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
In his eighth proposition of law, Herring contends that the evidence was 
legally insufficient to convict him of the three aggravated murders.  Chiefly, Herring 
claims that the state failed to prove that he was the man in the white mask. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
 
When a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the state’s evidence, 
“the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis sic.)  Jackson v. 
Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573. 
 
Kitwan Dalton testified that he saw Herring put on a white mask resembling 
one seen in a “slasher” movie.  Allen testified that Herring’s mask was the only 
“store-bought” one worn by any of the robbers.  Dalton and Allen testified that the 
gun Herring carried resembled State’s Exhibit 5, the 9 mm semiautomatic with which 
Jimmie Lee Jones was killed.  Dalton claimed that Foose’s gun also resembled 
State’s Exhibit 5, but Allen disagreed with this opinion. 
 
Herring argues that the testimony of Dalton and Allen was uncorroborated 
and should be disbelieved.  However, that argument misconceives the nature of the 
sufficiency inquiry.  On review for sufficiency, “[t]he weight and credibility of the 
evidence are left to the trier of fact.”  State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 430, 
588 N.E.2d 819, 825, citing State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 
366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “[T]his inquiry does not require 
a court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318-319, 99 S.Ct. at 
2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573, quoting Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. 
(1966), 385 U.S. 276, 282, 87 S.Ct. 483, 486, 17 L.Ed.2d 362, 367. 
 
In any case, Herring’s claim that the accomplice testimony lacked 
corroboration is incorrect.  The testimony of Dalton and Allen was substantially 
corroborated by the testimony of Marinelli and Aziz.  Marinelli testified that a man in 
a “white hockey-type mask” shot him and Deborah Aziz and robbed the till.  He 
further testified that the shooter was the only one of the robbers who wore a mask 
instead of a bandana.  Aziz testified that the assailant’s mask was white and “a hard 
plastic, like one of those Jason masks.”  Marinelli described the “very distinctive” 
gun that the man in the white mask used, which he said looked exactly like State’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
Exhibit 5.  Aziz could not be certain that State’s Exhibit 5 was the same gun that the 
man in the white mask had used, but she did testify that his gun looked like State’s 
Exhibit 5.  Finally, Marinelli described the distinctive reddish-orange hair, odd skin 
tone, and buckteeth of the man in the white mask.  Herring has similar features. 
 
Thus, the state presented evidence sufficient, if believed, to show that Herring 
was the man in the white mask who, on April 30, 1996, robbed the Newport Inn, shot 
Marinelli and Aziz, and aided and abetted three aggravated murders. 
 
Part F of Herring’s eighth proposition of law deals with the issue of purpose to kill.  
Herring does not argue that the state failed to prove that he intended the deaths of the 
victims; instead, he reiterates his claim that the instructions regarding purpose were 
inadequate.  (See discussion of Herring’s first and second propositions of law above.) We 
continue to reject this claim.  Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A), we will consider the sufficiency 
of evidence of purpose to kill as part of our independent review of the death sentence. 
 
Herring’s eighth proposition of law is overruled. 
IV. Evidentiary Issues 
 
Herring’s tenth proposition of law raises two evidentiary issues. 
 
After Marinelli described the visible features of the man in the white mask, 
including his hair, the prosecutor showed him a photo of Herring.  The prosecutor’s 
intention was to ask Marinelli if the gunman’s hair and mouth were similar to 
Herring’s, as depicted in the photo.  A photo was used because Herring had changed 
his hairstyle since the crime. 
 
But when the prosecutor asked Marinelli to look at the photo, Marinelli 
spontaneously said: “I don’t have to look at it more than a second.  I saw it through 
my eyes and was shot five times by this guy, and it is him.” 
 
The defense moved for a mistrial, arguing that the identification was 
improper because the circumstances were “unnecessarily suggestive,” and because 
the defense had no advance notice that Marinelli would make a positive 
identification.  See, generally, United States v. Hill (C.A.6, 1992), 967 F.2d 226, 232 
(admissibility of suggestive in-court identification subject to totality-of-the-
January Term, 2002 
11 
circumstances analysis of Neil v. Biggers [1972], 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 
L.Ed.2d 401).  The judge denied this motion. 
 
However, before the next witness was called, the judge instructed the jury to 
disregard that portion of Marinelli’s testimony that identified Herring as the man who 
shot him.  The instruction left the jury free to consider “the other comments that Mr. 
Marinelli made about other physical features of the individual in the photograph, 
specifically the hair, the eyes, the mouth and pigment * * * for whatever probative 
value you would give them.” 
 
Herring contends that no instruction could cure the prejudice of Marinelli’s 
identification.  However, jurors are generally presumed to follow the trial court’s 
instructions, including instructions to disregard testimony.  See, e.g., Garner, 74 Ohio 
St.3d at 59, 656 N.E.2d at 634. 
 
Herring argues that eyewitness identification is unusually difficult to 
disregard.  That may be, but “[j]uries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure 
intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable 
feature.”  Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2254, 53 
L.Ed.2d 140, 155.  Testimony like this—positively identifying a criminal who was 
wearing a mask—is not necessarily persuasive, and its impact on the jury is highly 
uncertain.  Moreover, the state did not elicit Marinelli’s identification of Herring.  
Nor did the prosecutors refer to that identification during trial or in argument.  See 
State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 59, 512 N.E.2d 585, 588. 
 
As we said in State v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1, 
9, “[m]istrials need be declared only when * * * a fair trial is no longer possible.”  
We conclude that Marinelli’s remark did not render a fair trial impossible.  Therefore, 
no mistrial was necessary. 
 
Herring also complains that the trial judge excluded a proffered 
demonstrative exhibit.  The defense recalled Deborah Aziz to the witness stand and 
showed her Defense Exhibit 1, a toy hockey goalie’s mask.  Aziz testified that the 
mask “has some similarities” to the white mask worn by the man who shot her and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
Marinelli.  She also testified that Defense Exhibit 1 was wider than the gunman’s 
mask, that the mouth was different, and that the other mask “didn’t have holes all 
over.” 
 
A trial court’s ruling on a demonstrative exhibit is reviewed under the abuse-
of-discretion standard.  State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 566, 687 N.E.2d 
685, 705.  “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court’s attitude is 
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 
151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149.  “[W]hen applying this standard, 
an appellate court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge.”  
Berk v. Matthews (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169, 559 N.E.2d 1301, 1308. 
 
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the mask.  
The differences between the two masks directly undermined the claimed relevance of 
the exhibit.  The defense wanted to use the mask to show that Marinelli could not 
have seen as much of the shooter’s features as he claimed.  But since the exhibit was 
wider and had a different mouth, it is doubtful whether the exhibit could give the jury 
an accurate idea of how much Marinelli could see.  We therefore cannot say that its 
exclusion was “unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  Compare Palmer, 80 
Ohio St.3d at 566, 687 N.E.2d at 705 (trial court did not abuse discretion by 
admitting, for demonstrative purposes, a gun that belonged to the defendant, was “a 
match” for missing murder weapon, and was similar to the actual murder weapon 
with respect to specific feature being demonstrated). 
 
Herring’s tenth proposition of law is overruled. 
V. Jury Issues 
A. Batson Issue 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, Herring claims that the prosecutor 
peremptorily challenged a black prospective juror because of her race, which if true 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause.  See Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 
79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.  However, the trial court concluded that the 
prosecutor had not engaged in racial discrimination. 
January Term, 2002 
13 
 
A court decides a Batson claim in three steps.  First, the opponent of the 
peremptory strike must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  Second, if 
the trial court finds that the opponent has fulfilled this requirement, then the 
proponent of the strike must come forward with a racially neutral explanation for the 
strike.  Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724, 90 L.E.2d at 87-89.  The “explanation 
need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”  Id. at 97, 106 
S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. 
 
Third, if the proponent puts forward a racially neutral explanation, the trial 
court must decide, on the basis of all the circumstances, whether the opponent has 
proved purposeful racial discrimination.  Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 
88-89; Purkett v. Elem (1995), 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-1771, 131 
L.Ed.2d 834, 839; State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 436, 709 N.E.2d 140, 
147.  The burden of persuasion is on the opponent of the strike.  Purkett, 514 U.S. at 
768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839. 
 
The original venire had included twenty-six black veniremembers, but only 
three were left after challenges for cause.  The state peremptorily challenged two of 
those three, using one-third of its six challenges on black veniremembers, resulting in 
an all-white jury.  The trial court overruled a defense Batson objection to these 
strikes. 
 
However, the original jury was later discharged for an unrelated reason, and a 
new venire was called.  In the second venire, after challenges for cause, two of the 
thirty-two remaining veniremembers were black.  This time, the state used only three 
peremptories.  One was used to remove a black veniremember.  The state also waived 
peremptories with one black left on the venire.  As a result, although the jury was all 
white, one of the alternate jurors was black. 
 
The trial court found that the defense had made a prima facie case (a ruling 
the state does not challenge) and required the prosecutor to explain why he struck the 
black venireman. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
The prosecutor gave several racially neutral reasons for striking the juror.  
First, he regarded her as “not too bright,” inasmuch as “[h]er hobbies are eating, 
doing hair and watching Oprah.”  (The prosecutor’s statements about the juror’s 
hobbies and background appear to be based on the jury questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire is not in the record, but the trial judge reviewed it in ruling on the 
Batson objection.)  Second, he believed that the juror “flouts society’s conventions.”  
He noted that “[s]he had her first child at 16.  She’s had three children, no husbands.”  
He also believed that she was a transient because “[s]he lives at one of the missions” 
and  “[i]t took your [the court’s] office three days to find” her.  Third, the prosecutor 
considered the juror “soft on the death penalty” based on her voir dire and her jury 
questionnaire, in which “she checked a block where there are no crimes” that warrant 
the death penalty. 
 
The trial court found that the defense had not proved that the prosecutor had 
excused the veniremember because of her race.  He accordingly overruled the Batson 
objection and dismissed her.  The finding of the trial court, because it turns largely on 
the evaluation of credibility, is entitled to deference on appeal and will not be 
reversed unless clearly erroneous.  White, supra, 85 Ohio St.3d at 437, 709 N.E.2d at 
148, quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 89, fn. 21; State 
v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583, 589 N.E.2d 1310, 1314. 
 
The prosecutor’s belief that the prospective juror was “soft on the death 
penalty” has support in the record.  The juror stated: “I don’t think I could” vote to 
recommend death.  She later said, “I have no reason not to” abide by the judge’s 
instructions.  Nevertheless, her initial response “certainly indicated some degree of 
opposition to capital punishment,” and “it is highly likely that such an attitude made 
her undesirable to the prosecution.”  State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 529, 
747 N.E.2d 765, 786. 
 
Herring contends that “there were a suspiciously low number of minorities 
available on the panel.”  Even if true, that contention throws no light on whether the 
prosecutor committed purposeful discrimination. 
January Term, 2002 
15 
 
Herring contends that the state’s waiver of four peremptories, with one black 
remaining on the venire, supported an inference that the prosecutor was trying to keep 
blacks off the jury.  The argument, while not entirely clear, seems to be that the black 
veniremember could have been on the jury only if the state had used all four of its 
remaining peremptories on other jurors.  Even if the record supported this claim, it 
provides no reason to infer purposeful discrimination. 
 
The evidence Herring relies upon to support his discrimination claim fails to 
demonstrate that the trial court’s finding, under the totality of the circumstances, was 
clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, Herring’s sixth proposition of law is overruled. 
B. Fair Cross-Section 
 
The judges of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court have authorized the jury 
commissioner of that court to grant citizens’ requests to be excused from jury duty, 
applying the criteria set forth in R.C. 2313.16(A) through (E).  The jury commissioner 
granted a number of such requests in this case.  He kept a list of prospective jurors whom 
he excused, on which he recorded the excuse given by each prospective juror.  He did not 
record the race of any excused juror. 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, Herring contends that the jury commissioner 
violated the Constitution by failing to record the race of prospective jurors excused from 
service.  Herring contends that underrepresentation of blacks on the venire violated his 
constitutional right to “a jury drawn from a fair cross[-]section of the community.”  Taylor 
v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 527, 95 S.Ct. 692, 696, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 696.  To 
demonstrate the alleged violation, Herring needed to show at trial that the jury selection 
process systematically excluded members of a distinctive group.  See Duren v. Missouri 
(1979), 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 587; State v. Fulton (1991), 
57 Ohio St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Herring contends that 
the jury commissioner therefore had a constitutional obligation to record the race of those 
he excused from jury duty. 
 
Herring cites no authority requiring the jury commissioner to record such 
information in order to facilitate a fair-cross-section challenge.  Nor does he explain why 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
his counsel could not have learned the race of the excused jurors through investigation.  
The record shows that they had access to the venire list—which included the addresses of 
prospective jurors—and to the list of jurors excused by the commissioner.  Herring’s 
seventh proposition of law is overruled. 
C. Outside Contact with Juror 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, Herring maintains that he was denied due 
process because a juror received harassing phone calls during the penalty phase.  
Someone using the name “Antwan,” apparently calling from a correctional facility, 
telephoned Juror No. 9 at home.  (It was not established whether the caller was 
Antwan Jones.)  After the jury returned its sentencing recommendation and was 
discharged, the juror received more calls, prompting her to report the incidents to the 
trial court’s bailiff. 
 
The trial court convened a Remmer hearing to determine whether the calls 
had biased the juror.  See Remmer v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 227, 229-230, 74 
S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654, 656; Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 215-216, 
102 S.Ct. 940, 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 84; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 88, 
656 N.E.2d 643, 661-662.  At the hearing, Juror No. 9 testified that when she got 
home after the February 12 court session, there was a message on her answering 
machine about accepting the charges on a collect call. 
 
Later she received a call from someone using the name “Antwan.”  “Antwan” 
refused to give his last name but told the juror “his whole life history” and tried to get 
personal information from her.  Then another person, identified as “Mark,” got on the 
line and asked the juror whether she engaged in “kinky sex.”  At this point, the juror 
hung up.  The caller did not mention the case. 
 
Juror No. 9 mentioned the calls in two conversations with fellow jurors.  
Accordingly, the trial judge questioned each juror regarding what the jurors had been 
told about the calls and how the jurors had reacted to this information. 
 
One of Juror No. 9’s conversations took place as she carpooled to the 
courthouse with Juror No. 12.  The second took place in the jury room during a break 
January Term, 2002 
17 
in the trial, as Juror No. 9 chatted with three other jurors and an alternate.  Two other 
jurors overheard bits of the jury-room conversation. 
 
Juror No. 9 told the others that the caller was named “Antwan” and that he had 
called from a correctional facility.  She also told them that she did not think the calls 
were related to the case.  It did occur to her and the other jurors that “Antwan” might 
be Herring’s accomplice Jones, and one juror suggested that Juror No. 9 report the 
incident.  However, another juror testified: “I don’t think we thought of it as a 
possibility, that it could actually be him.” 
 
Juror No. 9 testified that she “didn’t really think it was a big deal.”  On the 
other hand, Juror No. 9 told other jurors that she was “a little worried.”  One juror 
described Juror No. 9 as  “concerned” and “cautious”; another thought she was 
“upset” and “very scared.” 
 
Juror No. 9 testified that the incident did not affect her impartiality.  
Likewise, the jurors who heard her mention the incident testified that their 
impartiality was not affected.  One juror admitted being concerned but also stated that 
she “didn’t think about” the incident. 
 
After the hearing, the defense moved for a mistrial.  The trial court denied the 
motion, basing his decision on his evaluation of the jurors’ credibility.  “In cases 
involving outside influences on jurors, trial courts are granted broad discretion in * * * 
determining whether to declare a mistrial.”  State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 89, 656 
N.E.2d at 661.  Accord State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 526-527, 684 N.E.2d 
47, 60.  The decision depends on “how the jury interprets and expectably will react to 
the communication.”  United States v. Williams (C.A.D.C.1987), 822 F.2d 1174, 1189.  
The complaining party must show actual prejudice, see, generally, Crim.R. 33(A), i.e., 
he must show that the communication biased one or more jurors.  See Keith, 79 Ohio 
St.3d at 526, 684 N.E.2d at 60, citing State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 88-89, 656 
N.E.2d at 661.  See, also, Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215-217, 102 S.Ct. at 945-946, 
71 L.Ed.2d at 85-86; United States v. Zelinka (C.A.6, 1988), 862 F.2d 92, 95-96. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Herring argues that we should reject the trial court’s finding that the calls did 
not affect the jurors’ impartiality.  However, the record supports the trial court’s 
finding.  Each juror testified that the incident did not affect his or her verdict.  A trial 
court may rely upon a juror’s testimony as a basis for finding that her impartiality 
was not affected.  Smith v. Phillips, supra, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946, 71 
L.Ed.2d at 86, fn. 7; Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 95-96. 
 
Moreover, the objective facts support the jurors’ testimony that they were not 
affected.  The caller never mentioned the case, nor did he identify himself as Antwan 
Jones.  The jurors do not appear to have believed that Jones was in fact the caller.  
The calls themselves, as offensive as they were, were not “so inflammatory that they 
foster an almost conclusive presumption of prejudice.”  Williams, supra, 822 F.2d at 
1189. 
 
Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we overrule Herring’s ninth 
proposition of law. 
D. Judge’s Communication with Jury 
 
During its guilt-phase deliberations, the jury submitted written questions to 
the trial court.  On two occasions, the judge entered the jury room, with both counsel 
but without Herring, to respond.  Two questions concerned the content of trial 
testimony; the judge told the jury to rely on its own collective memory.  Two 
questions were requests for items that had not been admitted into evidence; the judge 
refused to supply the items.  (The judge’s only response to the fifth question was to 
say, “[W]e’ll address those [issues] in the morning.”  The next day, the judge 
responded to that question in open court, with Herring present.) 
 
In his thirteenth proposition of law, Herring contends that it was prejudicial 
error for the trial judge to communicate with the jury in his absence.  Indeed, we have 
repeatedly held that a trial judge may not do so.  See State v. Abrams (1974), 39 Ohio 
St.2d 53, 68 O.O.2d 30, 313 N.E.2d 823; Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 
524 N.E.2d 881, paragraph four of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2002 
19 
 
However, we have also held that, if the communication is not substantive, the 
error is harmless.  See State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 236-237, 15 OBR 
311, 373-374, 473 N.E.2d 264, 324; State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 630, 
653 N.E.2d 675, 682.  The trial court’s responses to the jury’s questions were not 
substantive.  Moreover, Herring’s counsel were present.  See State v. Taylor (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 15, 25-26, 676 N.E.2d 82, 93.  Thus, while the judge erred by 
answering the questions during Herring’s absence, the error was harmless.  Herring’s 
thirteenth proposition of law is overruled. 
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
In his eleventh proposition of law, Herring alleges three instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
1.  The prosecutor asked Officer Mikus on cross-examination whether Obie 
Crockett “was in the gun rental business.”  Upon objection, the trial court ordered the 
jury to disregard the question and answer.  In closing argument, the prosecutor 
referred to Crockett’s house as “Guns R Us.”   Herring argues that this reference went 
beyond the evidence by implying that Crockett was a gun dealer and that that was the 
reason he was found with the murder weapon, and not because he was the one who 
had used it in the robbery.  However, the evidence showed that Herring obtained a 
variety of guns from a house on Laclede Avenue—inferably Crockett’s, since that 
was where police found the murder gun.  This provided factual support for the “Guns 
R Us” comment. 
 
2.  Herring accuses the prosecutor of improperly vouching for two of his 
witnesses, Kitwan Dalton and Louis Allen.  During closing arguments, the prosecutor 
said that Dalton did not lie in a videotaped statement to police the day after the 
murders and that Allen had lied to police but only about his own involvement. 
 
The prosecutor’s statements were based on the trial testimony, not on his 
personal evaluation of credibility.  Dalton testified that on the day after the murders 
he gave the police a videotaped statement.  Dalton testified that this statement was 
truthful and voluntary, that he had no agreement with the state at that time, and that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
the police had promised him nothing.  Thus, when the prosecutor said that Dalton did 
not lie in the videotaped statement, he was not vouching for Dalton’s testimony; he 
was simply repeating it. 
 
Similarly, the prosecutor explicitly based his reference to Allen upon Allen’s 
testimony.  The prosecutor said:  “[A]s Louis Allen told you, the only thing he lied about 
was himself.  He told them he didn’t go into the bar, and he didn’t have a gun.  He didn’t 
lie about the rest of them.  He didn’t lie about this guy. * * *  And he said that.”  This 
assertion did not ask the jury to rely on the prosecutor’s opinion of Allen’s credibility. 
 
3.  Finally, Herring argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Dalton and 
Allen by stating, in response to defense arguments, that he “told them if they don’t tell the 
truth they got no deal, they’ve got to go to prison.”  But Herring did not object, so the issue 
is waived.  See State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 12, 679 N.E.2d 646, 657. 
 
Herring’s eleventh proposition of law is overruled. 
VII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
In his fifteenth proposition of law, Herring claims ineffective assistance of counsel.  
To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that, in light of all the 
circumstances, counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation and 
that but for his unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is one sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the result.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687-
688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693; see, also, State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. 
A. Guilt Phase 
 
Herring contends that his counsel should have objected to instructions on purpose 
and reasonable doubt.  However, these objections were unsupported by existing law.  See 
State v. Phillips, supra, 74 Ohio St.3d at 100, 656 N.E.2d at 668; State v. Van Gundy 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 594 N.E.2d 604.  Declining to present rejected legal theories is 
not ineffective assistance.  See State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 448-449, 700 
N.E.2d 596, 607. 
January Term, 2002 
21 
 
Herring further contends that counsel should have objected to the instruction on 
foreseeability.  However, Herring was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object, 
since the instructions as a whole required the jury to find purpose to kill in order to convict.  
(See discussion of Herring’s second proposition of law above.) 
 
Herring was also not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to insist on his presence when 
the judge gave nonsubstantive responses to jury questions because there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the result of the trial would have been different had Herring been present. 
 
Herring contends that counsel should have objected to more of the prosecutorial 
misconduct alleged in his eleventh proposition of law, but there were no grounds to object. 
 
Herring contends that counsel should not have called Officer Mikus to testify about 
finding the murder weapon in Obie Crockett’s possession.  He contends that this merely 
helped the state in “tying up loose ends” by corroborating the testimony of Allen and 
Dalton that Herring got guns at a house on Laclede Avenue.  However, the record does not 
demonstrate that counsel committed an unprofessional error by calling Mikus to the stand.  
Evidence that a murder weapon was found in the possession of someone other than the 
defendant could reasonably be considered favorable to the defense.  Moreover, using that 
evidence gave counsel an opening to attack the police investigation as inadequate because 
of failure to investigate Crockett’s possible role in the crime.  Calling Mikus to testify 
about Crockett’s possession of the murder weapon appears to have been a reasonable 
tactical choice that did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable representation. 
B. Penalty Phase 
 
Because Herring’s attorneys called only two witnesses in the penalty phase, Herring 
speculates that they must have failed to conduct an adequate investigation into mitigating 
factors.  However, the record before us does not show how extensive counsel’s 
investigation actually was, nor does it show that more investigation would have developed 
anything useful. 
 
Herring contends that counsel should have objected to “the trial court’s instruction 
that required the jury to unanimously determine the appropriateness of a death sentence 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
before the jury was allowed to consider life-sentencing options.” However, the trial court 
never gave any such instruction. 
 
Herring further contends that his attorneys should have made other objections to the 
instructions.  However, he fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the penalty-
phase outcome would have been otherwise had he made the objections. 
 
Finally, Herring contends that his counsel should have objected to the victim-
impact statements of Marinelli and Aziz.  But these statements (see discussion of sixteenth 
proposition of law below) were heard only by the judge, and nothing in the record indicates 
that he considered them in sentencing Herring to death.  Consequently, counsel’s failure to 
object was not prejudicial within the meaning of Strickland.  See State v. Post (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759. 
 
Herring’s fifteenth proposition of law is overruled. 
VIII. Sentencing 
A. Sentencing Disparity Among Accomplices 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, Herring contends that the noncapital sentences 
imposed on his accomplices were relevant in mitigation and that the trial judge therefore 
violated the Eighth Amendment when he ruled that evidence inadmissible. 
 
Before the penalty phase, the defense informed the court of its intention to 
introduce Defense Mitigation Exhibits 1 through 17, a series of documents pertaining to the 
sentences given to his accomplices Callahan, Foose, and Jones.  The state objected to these 
exhibits on the ground that they were not relevant to mitigation, and the trial court ruled 
them inadmissible.  The defense proffered them into the record. 
 
Subsequently, the parties agreed on the admissibility of the exhibits.  The state 
withdrew its objection to introducing the sentences received by Jones and Callahan.  
Furthermore, since the jury already knew about the plea bargains that Dalton and Allen had 
entered into, the state agreed that the defense closing argument could address the sentences 
received by Dalton and Allen. 
 
The defense agreed not to offer evidence about Foose’s sentence and to withdraw 
its proffered exhibits, except for Defense Mitigation Exhibits 3 (jury verdict finding Jones 
January Term, 2002 
23 
guilty), 4 (judgment entry showing Jones’s sentences), and 9 (judgment entry showing 
Callahan’s guilty pleas and sentences).  Finally, Assistant Prosecutor Timothy Franken was 
permitted to testify and explain why Herring’s accomplices had not received the death 
penalty. 
 
Courts have divided over whether disparate treatment of accomplices is 
relevant mitigation.  See Downs v. Dugger (Fla.1987), 514 So.2d 1069, 1072 (lesser 
sentence for accomplice is mitigating).  See, also, State v. White (1999), 194 Ariz. 
344, 352, 982 P.2d 819, 827 (unexplained discrepancy between defendant’s and 
accomplices’ sentences may be mitigating); State v. Ferguson (Del.Super.1992), 642 
A.2d 1267, 1269, citing Riley v. State (Del.1985), 496 A.2d 997, 1026; State v. 
McIlvoy (Mo.1982), 629 S.W.2d 333, 341-342 (en banc).  Contra People v. Carrera 
(1989), 49 Cal.3d 291, 343, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 381, 777 P.2d 121, 154 (punishment 
meted out to accomplices not relevant to whether defendant should be sentenced to 
death); Brogdon v. Butler (C.A.5, 1987), 824 F.2d 338, 343; Coulter v. State 
(Ala.Crim.App.1982), 438 So.2d 336, 344-346; People v. Page (1993), 156 Ill.2d 
258, 271-272, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339, 347-348. 
 
However, we need not address that issue today.  Because of the agreement, 
the trial court ultimately permitted the jury to learn what sentences Jones and 
Callahan had received.  Herring was thus able to ask the jury to weigh those 
sentences in his favor as mitigating factors.  Similarly, Herring was permitted to 
argue that the state’s agreements with Dalton and Allen militated against the death 
penalty for Herring. 
 
It is true that not all the proffered defense exhibits were admitted.  However, the 
defense withdrew those exhibits pursuant to its agreement with the prosecutor.  Herring 
presents no reason why he should be allowed to go back on his bargain.  Having agreed to 
withdraw them, he waived any issue as to their admissibility.  Accordingly, Herring’s 
twelfth proposition of law is overruled. 
B. Other sentencing issues 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
In his sixteenth proposition of law, Herring contends that victim-impact 
statements by Aziz and Marinelli violated the Eighth Amendment. 
 
After the jury’s sentencing recommendation, the trial judge held a sentencing 
hearing.  Pursuant to R.C. 2930.14(A), Aziz and Marinelli made victim-impact 
statements pertaining to the sentences for the attempted aggravated murder counts.  
However, both victims stated that Herring should be sentenced to death. The trial 
court then sentenced Herring on all seven counts, including death sentences on 
Counts One through Three. 
 
In capital cases, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the admission or 
consideration of expressions of opinion in favor of a death sentence.  See State v. 
Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 438-439, 650 N.E.2d 878, 882.  However, 
judges, unlike juries, are presumed to consider only relevant evidence.  State v. Post 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759; Fautenberry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 
439, 650 N.E.2d at 882.  The sentencing opinion does not indicate that the judge 
considered the victim-impact statements when sentencing Herring on the capital 
counts.  See id. 
 
Herring seeks to overcome this presumption by pointing out that R.C. 2930.14(B) 
required the judge to consider the statements in sentencing on the noncapital counts.  We 
presume that the judge did so here, but we have no reason to suppose that he also 
considered them on the capital counts.  In State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 
N.E.2d 895, where the trial judge considered victim-impact statements in sentencing the 
defendant on both capital and noncapital offenses, we found “no affirmative indication that 
the victim impact statements were considered in sentencing [the defendant] to death.”  Id. 
at 33-34, 544 N.E.2d at 913.  We find none here either. 
 
Herring further notes that the sentencing opinion discusses the attempted 
murders of Aziz and Marinelli.  That was proper, since the attempted murders are part 
of the (A)(5) specification.  But it hardly follows that he also considered the victim-
impact statements when he sentenced on the capital counts.  Herring’s sixteenth 
proposition of law is overruled. 
January Term, 2002 
25 
 
In his eighteenth proposition of law, Herring contends that the trial court’s 
sentencing opinion was erroneous in two respects. 
 
First, he notes that the opinion erroneously speaks of the “aggravating 
circumstances” even though he was convicted of only one aggravating circumstance with 
respect to each aggravated murder count.  From this, Herring contends that the judge 
weighed the aggravating circumstances from all three counts collectively against the 
mitigating factors, contrary to State v. Cooey, supra, 46 Ohio St.3d at 38-39, 544 N.E.2d at 
916-917, and paragraph three of the syllabus.  We disagree.  Other than the easily explained 
extra “s,” there is no indication in the record that the trial judge improperly aggregated the 
aggravating circumstances.  See State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 348-349, 703 
N.E.2d 1251, 1265-1266. 
 
Second, Herring contends that the trial court failed to consider all the mitigating 
factors he presented.  However, the sentencing opinion need not specifically mention all of 
the mitigating factors presented.  State v. Phillips, supra, 74 Ohio St.3d at 102, 656 N.E.2d 
at 670. 
 
Herring’s eighteenth proposition of law is overruled. 
 
In his twenty-first proposition of law, Herring contends that the Ohio death-
penalty statutes are unconstitutional.  We summarily overrule this proposition.  See 
State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph 
one of the syllabus; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 
N.E.2d 768, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 
24, 26, 528 N.E.2d 1237, 1240; State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 103-104, 656 
N.E.2d at 670-671.  See, also, Garza v. Lappin (C.A.7, 2001), 253 F.3d 918, 925-926 
(Organization of American States’ American Convention on Human Rights is not 
binding on United States). 
IX. Instructions 
 
In his fifth, fourteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth propositions of law, 
Herring contends that the trial court made various errors when instructing the jury.  
However, at trial he did not object to any of the instructions challenged here.  He 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
thereby waived these issues.  See State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 
178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We find no plain error with 
respect to any of these claims.  Accordingly, we overrule Herring’s fifth, fourteenth, 
seventeenth, and nineteenth propositions of law as waived. 
X. Independent Sentence Review 
 
Under R.C. 2929.05, we independently review the death sentence on each of 
the aggravated murder counts.  We must determine whether the evidence supports the 
jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance, whether the aggravating circumstance 
outweighs the mitigating factors, and whether the death sentence is proportionate to 
death sentences affirmed in similar cases. 
 
The sole aggravating circumstance on each count is that the aggravated 
murder was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing or attempted 
killing of two or more persons by Herring. 
 
The evidence shows that all five killings and attempted killings were part of a 
single course of conduct.  Moreover, we find sufficient evidence that Herring 
intended the deaths of Jones, Naze, Kotheimer, Aziz, and Marinelli.  The manner in 
which the robbery was committed strongly suggests that each of the robbers, 
including Herring, intended to kill all of the victims. 
 
The robbers clearly coordinated their actions in advance.  They discussed the 
robbery among themselves before going into the Newport Inn; they divided into two 
groups to cover both doors; they started shooting almost immediately.  The 
coordination displayed here belies the notion that the killings were merely impulsive 
acts by individual members of the gang. That coordination supports the conclusion 
that the killings were integral to the robbery plan and that each of the robbers 
intended to kill the victims as part of that plan. 
 
And that inference is especially strong with regard to Herring, because he was 
the evident ringleader.  It was at his house that the robbers assembled, and he initiated 
the discussion of the robbery.  Herring was the only robber prepared with a mask.  He 
also obtained the guns (except Foose’s), and he decided who would carry which gun. 
January Term, 2002 
27 
 
There is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of the multiple-
murder aggravating circumstance.  “[I]ntent may be inferred from the circumstances 
surrounding the crime.”  State v. Johnson (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796, 
syllabus. 
 
Against this aggravating circumstance, we must weigh the mitigating factors 
present in the record. 
 
The youth of the offender is a statutory mitigating factor.  R.C. 
2929.04(B)(4).  Herring, born on August 30, 1977, was eighteen years and eight 
months old on April 30, 1996, when he took part in these murders.  The (B)(4) factor 
is an important one, since Herring is only eight months above the minimum age for 
death eligibility. 
 
Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(6), “[i]f the offender was a participant in the offense 
but not the principal offender,” the court must consider “the degree of the offender’s 
participation in the offense and the degree of the offender’s participation in the acts 
that led to the death of the victim.”  Herring was not proven to be the principal 
offender.  Therefore, this mitigating factor applies. 
 
However, where the offender plays a “critical role” as a “leader,” we have 
held that the (B)(6) factor will carry less weight.  See State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 59, 91, 723 N.E.2d 1019, 1051.  Here, the evidence shows that Herring played 
such a role. 
 
A related factor is the noncapital sentences received by Herring’s 
accomplices Callahan, Dalton, Allen, and Jones.  The state vigorously contends that 
lesser sentences received by accomplices are not a proper mitigating factor in a 
capital case.  Yet the state agreed at trial that the accomplices’ sentences could be 
considered in mitigation.  As we said earlier of the defense, we see no reason why the 
state should not be held to its bargain.  We will therefore consider the accomplices’ 
sentences. 
 
Antwan Jones was convicted of three counts of aggravated murder, without 
capital specifications, and was sentenced to life with parole eligibility after twenty 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
years of imprisonment on each count.  See R.C. 2929.03(A).  He was also convicted 
of two counts of attempted aggravated murder and two counts of aggravated robbery, 
and received an indefinite term of ten to twenty-five years on each count.  He was 
convicted of a firearm specification and received an additional three years’ actual 
incarceration.  All sentences were ordered to run consecutively.  Adelbert Callahan 
was convicted of complicity in the same array of charges and received identical 
sentences. 
 
During the penalty phase, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Timothy Franken 
testified 
that 
he 
had 
voluntarily 
dismissed 
the 
aggravating-circumstance 
specifications against Jones because he did not think he could prove them.  As for 
Callahan, he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and therefore not eligible for the 
death penalty. 
 
Kitwan Dalton testified that he was charged with fleeing a police officer.  See 
R.C. 2921.331(B) (operating motor vehicle so as to flee or elude police) and 
2921.331(C)(4) (violation of R.C. 2921.331[B] is fourth-degree felony if offender 
was fleeing immediately after committing a felony).  At the time of trial he was 
awaiting sentencing and acknowledged that he faced imprisonment.  Pursuant to 
Dalton’s agreement to testify, all other charges were dropped. 
 
Louis Allen was charged with perjury and entered an admission of 
delinquency in juvenile court.  He too was awaiting sentencing at the time of trial.  
He had an agreement with the state that “if I was truthful at the trial, then I would not 
get charged with anything but perjury.” 
 
We give some weight to the lighter sentence given to Antwan Jones.  While 
Franken testified that he could not prove death specifications against Jones, this 
explanation is not completely convincing.  Jones’s five convictions for aggravated 
murder and attempted aggravated murder all required proof of intent to kill, so the 
(A)(5) multiple-murder specification should also have been provable. 
 
On the other hand, since Herring was the leader, the state certainly had a 
stronger case against him than against Jones on the issue of intent.  Moreover, the 
January Term, 2002 
29 
state had ballistics evidence pointing to Herring, not Jones, as the actual killer on 
Count One (even though the jury acquitted Herring of being the actual killer on that 
count).  There was no such evidence against Jones, who was carrying a .357-caliber 
firearm rather than a 9 mm.  The state thus had a rational basis to seek the death 
penalty for Herring and not for Jones. 
 
However, the lesser sentences given to Foose, Callahan, Allen, and Dalton 
deserve little (if any) weight in mitigation because of the differences between their 
situations and Herring’s.  Foose and Callahan were juveniles, exempt from the death 
penalty.  Allen did not shoot anyone; indeed, he ran away as soon as the shooting 
started.  Dalton neither entered the Newport Inn nor carried a weapon. 
 
Finally, we consider the testimony of Herring’s mother, Deborah Herring, and 
his older sister, Nicole Herring.  Herring’s mother testified that he helped her with 
household chores as soon as “he could walk and pick up stuff.”  Herring had five 
younger siblings, with whom he had a “good and loving relationship.”  As part of 
their daily chores, Herring and Nicole used to bathe, feed, and play with the younger 
children.  Herring’s siblings remained close to him and saw him when they could, 
even though he was in jail.  Both Deborah and Nicole Herring asked the jury to spare 
Herring’s life.  Herring’s loving relationship with his family is a mitigating factor, but 
we give it little weight. 
 
While mitigating factors exist in this case, the single aggravating 
circumstance—Herring’s intentional participation in three murders and his personal 
attempt to commit two more—outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
We further find that the death sentence in this case is proportionate to death 
sentences affirmed in other multiple-murder cases.  See, e.g., State v. Hessler (2000), 
90 Ohio St.3d 108, 734 N.E.2d 1237; State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 679 N.E.2d 
646; State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 667 N.E.2d 960; State v. Kinley 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 491, 651 N.E.2d 419; State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 
322, 530 N.E.2d 1294 (one victim, an additional intended victim). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
 
The convictions and death sentences are therefore affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, HILDEBRANDT and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
LEE H. HILDEBRANDT, JR., J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for COOK, 
J. 
__________________ 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, Janice T. O’Halloran 
and Dawn M. Durkin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Pamela Prude-Smithers and Angela 
Greene, Assistant State Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________