Title: Commonwealth v. G.F.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12388 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  G.F. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 9, 2017. - March 20, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Constitutional Law, Sex offender.  Due Process of 
Law, Sex offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Civil 
commitment, Verdict. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 24, 2010. 
 
 
A motion to modify the temporary order of confinement and 
for an order of custody conditions, filed on October 17, 2016, 
was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., and questions of law were 
reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 24, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Gaziano, J., and the matter was 
reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
After consolidation in the Appeals Court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from 
the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Joseph M. Kenneally (Michael F. Farrington also present) 
for G.F. 
2 
 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  This case concerns G. L. c. 123A, the statute 
governing civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons (SDP).  
Prior to civilly committing an individual under this statute, 
the Commonwealth must obtain a unanimous jury verdict finding 
that the individual is sexually dangerous.1  G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 14 (d).  Subject to certain exceptions, the trial to determine 
sexual dangerousness must be held within sixty days after the 
Commonwealth files a petition for trial.  G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 14 (a).  During this time, the individual is to be temporarily 
confined.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (e); Commonwealth v. 
Pariseau, 466 Mass. 805, 808 (2014). 
 
In this case, the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking to 
commit the petitioner as an SDP in December, 2010.  Following 
years of delay and three mistrials, the petitioner remains 
confined without a finding that he is sexually dangerous.  He 
contends that substantive due process and the SDP statute 
require dismissal of the Commonwealth's petition.  A judge of 
the Superior Court concluded that continued confinement violated 
the petitioner's substantive due process rights, ordered his 
                     
 
1 Such a finding also may be obtained at a jury-waived 
trial, if neither party requests a jury trial.  G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 14 (a). 
3 
 
release, and then stayed that order and reported a number of 
questions. 
We conclude that the SDP statute permits a fourth trial in 
the circumstances of this case.  While due process would impose 
a limit on the number of retrials that may take place under the 
SDP statute, that limit has not been reached here.  The 
petitioner's nearly seven-year confinement without a finding of 
sexual dangerousness, however, does violate his substantive due 
process rights as provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Accordingly, he must be 
afforded the opportunity to seek supervised release prior to his 
fourth trial. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the uncontested facts from 
the record, discussed in part in two different Superior Court 
judges' decisions on the petitioner's motions for release from 
confinement.  See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 529 (2015). 
 
a.  Offenses.  The petitioner has pleaded guilty to sexual 
offenses on four separate occasions.  In 1980, he pleaded guilty 
in the California Superior Court to lewd and lascivious conduct 
upon a child.  On multiple occasions, he had sexually molested a 
friend's thirteen and eleven year old daughters. 
 
In 1982, while he was on probation for these offenses, the 
petitioner sexually molested the thirteen year old daughter of a 
4 
 
friend, at knife point, in the friend's apartment.  He pleaded 
guilty in the California Superior Court to lewd and lascivious 
conduct upon a child by force with the use of a deadly weapon. 
 
In 1992, the petitioner also agreed to sufficient facts in 
the Massachusetts District Court to support convictions of, 
among others, open and gross lewdness and assault with a 
dangerous weapon.  In October, 1993, the petitioner pleaded 
guilty in the Superior Court to charges of three counts of rape 
of a child; three counts of kidnapping; two counts of assault 
and battery; one count of mayhem, assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon, and one count of making threats.  The 
petitioner repeatedly had raped his girl friend's six year old 
daughter while she was bound and gagged.  According to the 
child's statements, he threated to kill her mother if the child 
said anything.  The child reported that, on one occasion, her 
four year old sister entered the room, and the petitioner forced 
both girls to perform fellatio upon him.  He also forced his 
girl friend to do so until she had an asthma attack.  The 
petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of from fifteen to 
twenty years on each of the rape charges, and concurrent terms 
of from five to ten years on each of the charges of kidnapping 
and mayhem. 
 
b.  Proceedings prior to the three mistrials.  Shortly 
before the petitioner's sentences were to end, the Commonwealth 
5 
 
retained as a qualifying examiner Dr. Carol Feldman to evaluate 
him.  In December, 2010, Feldman determined that the petitioner 
suffers from pedophilia, a mental abnormality as defined in the 
SDP statute, as well as antisocial personality disorder, 
resulting in an inability to control his sexual impulses.  
Feldman analyzed multiple risk factors, including the 
petitioner's prior sexual offenses, his prior inability to abide 
by the rules of his probation, and his termination from sex 
offender treatment in 2007 after slapping another resident.  She 
also utilized an actuarial tool that assesses the risk of 
recidivism.  She concluded that "if [the petitioner] were 
released at this time, both his Mental Abnormality and 
Personality Disorder make it highly likely that he would 
recidivate sexually," and opined that he met the criteria for 
sexual dangerousness as defined by G. L. c. 123A, § 1.2 
 
In December, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), alleging that the 
petitioner is still sexually dangerous.  The Committee for 
Public Counsel Services assigned the petitioner an attorney, 
whom the petitioner asked to file a motion to dismiss the SDP 
                     
 
2 "To obtain a commitment of a sexually dangerous person, 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant 'suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder which makes [him] likely to engage in sexual offenses 
if not confined to a secure facility.'"  Commonwealth v. Nieves, 
446 Mass. 583, 586-587 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
6 
 
petition as untimely.3  In January, 2011, the Commonwealth moved 
to commit the petitioner to the Massachusetts Treatment Center 
(treatment center) pending a determination of probable cause 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (e).  A Superior Court judge 
allowed the unopposed motion.  That month, the petitioner asked 
his attorney to withdraw as counsel because the attorney had not 
filed a motion to dismiss the SDP petition as the petitioner had 
requested and because, one month into their attorney-client 
relationship, the two had yet to meet.  The attorney did not 
withdraw at that time, and no formal filings were made 
requesting his withdrawal. 
 
In February, 2011, the petitioner waived his right to a 
hearing and stipulated that there was probable cause to believe 
that he was sexually dangerous.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (c).  A 
Superior Court judge accordingly found probable cause that the 
petitioner was sexually dangerous, and ordered him committed to 
the treatment center for a sixty-day period of evaluation, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a).  While at the treatment 
center, the petitioner was evaluated by two qualified examiners, 
as required under G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a).  In March, 2011, the 
                     
 
3 The petitioner claimed that his sentence had been 
completed before the Commonwealth submitted its petition because 
he believed that a specific number of days should have been 
credited to his sentence.  This issue is not before us. 
7 
 
qualified examiners filed written reports in the Superior Court, 
concluding that the petitioner was sexually dangerous. 
 
On March 21, 2011, the Commonwealth filed a petition for 
trial pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a).4  The trial was 
scheduled for June, 2011.  In April, 2011, the petitioner 
corresponded with his attorney about retaining experts to assess 
him, in addition to the qualified examiners that the 
Commonwealth would present at trial.  The attorney suggested two 
experts; the petitioner agreed to one and not the other.  That 
same month, the  petitioner told the attorney that he was not 
ready to set a trial date, even if this meant waiving his "time 
limits."  The petitioner explained that he needed time to 
"counter[] the [S]tate [qualified examiner] reports" and to 
ensure that his experts had sufficient time to interview him.  
He then once again asked his attorney to withdraw, and this time 
filed a motion requesting that the attorney be dismissed as 
counsel.  The petitioner also filed a pro se motion to dismiss 
the SDP petition as untimely. 
 
In June, 2011, a Superior Court judge allowed the 
petitioner's motion to dismiss his counsel, canceled the trial 
                     
 
4 A trial must begin within sixty days after the 
Commonwealth files an SDP petition, unless it is continued for 
good cause or in the interests of justice, as long as the person 
named in the petition will not be prejudiced.  See G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14 (a); Commonwealth v. DeBella, 442 Mass. 683, 687 
(2004). 
8 
 
scheduled for that month, and set a status date in July, 2011.  
Later that month, the Commonwealth moved to continue the status 
date for another ten days, so that the assistant district 
attorney could attend to a family matter.  The judge set a new 
hearing date for early August.  At the August hearing, a new 
attorney appeared for the petitioner. 
 
In May, 2012, after no further proceedings had taken place, 
the assistant district attorney wrote to the petitioner's 
counsel, proposing to "get this case back on track."  At the end 
of July, without hearing from the petitioner's counsel, the 
assistant district attorney moved for trial.  At an August, 
2012, hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion and the parties set a trial date for November, 2012.  At 
a status hearing in September, the judge allowed a motion by the 
Commonwealth to continue the trial because one of the qualified 
examiners was scheduled to be on vacation during the time that 
the trial was scheduled.  The trial was rescheduled for 
December.  The Commonwealth opposed the petitioner's previously-
filed pro se motion to dismiss.  The Commonwealth also moved for 
an order to update the qualified examiner reports, which the 
court allowed. 
 
Later in September, the petitioner's counsel moved to 
dismiss the petition, arguing that the Commonwealth had failed 
to begin trial within sixty days of its petition, as required by 
9 
 
G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a).  The following month, finding 
"sufficient circumstantial evidence" of compliance with G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14 (a), the judge denied this motion.  By December, 
the court received updated written reports from the qualified 
examiners and the petitioner's experts.  In a motion and 
accompanying affidavit filed that month, the petitioner 
requested that the trial be postponed, because his attorney had 
not received recordings of his interviews with the qualified 
examiners.  The petitioner also waived his statutory rights to a 
prompt trial.  The judge allowed this motion to continue for 
"good cause," and set trial for the week of February 4, 2013, 
the date that the petitioner had requested, in order to 
accommodate his experts. 
 
In January, 2013, the petitioner again moved to reschedule 
the trial, this time to February 25, 2013, "or a date agreeable 
to the court," and again waived his rights to a prompt trial.  
For reasons that are not apparent from the record, the judge 
subsequently rescheduled the trial to April, 2013.5 
 
c.  The three mistrials.  The petitioner's first SDP trial 
took place in April, 2013, more than two years after the 
                     
 
5 Separately, in November, 2012, the petitioner filed a 
petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, from a 
Superior Court judge's October, 2012 order denying his motion to 
dismiss.  A single justice in the county court denied the 
petition, and the full court affirmed the denial. 
10 
 
Commonwealth filed the SDP petition in March of 2011.  The 
petitioner was then fifty-five years old. 
 
After four days of trial, the jury deliberated for two 
days, but were not able to reach a unanimous verdict.  The judge 
declared a mistrial.  In June, the Commonwealth moved to update 
the qualified examiner reports; the motion was allowed.  In 
September, the parties moved jointly to reschedule a pretrial 
status hearing to October.  When the petitioner's counsel had a 
medical emergency, the hearing was moved again, to one week 
later.  Following the start of medical complications, however, 
the petitioner's counsel experienced "an unforeseen, unexpected 
and unanticipated incapacity to engage in the on-going 
preparation of [the petitioner's] opposition to [the SDP] 
petition for three months."  A hearing scheduled for December, 
2013, subsequently was canceled, and the petitioner requested 
that a January, 2014, hearing be postponed.  Hearings scheduled 
for February, 2014, and March, 2014, also were not held.  In 
February, 2014, the two qualified examiners filed updated 
reports with the court. 
 
In March, 2014, the petitioner moved unsuccessfully to 
continue his trial -- scheduled to begin that month before a 
different judge -- in a motion that again waived his statutory 
right to a prompt trial.  The petitioner requested the 
postponement after one of his experts stated that he would be 
11 
 
unable to testify effectively before the judge who would oversee 
the March trial due to "continuing confrontations" concerning 
the expert's requests for payment.  That motion was denied the 
same month.  The judge also denied motions for a directed 
verdict, mistrial, and dismissal of the SDP petition. 
 
The petitioner's second trial took place over approximately 
two weeks in March, 2014.  The petitioner filed another motion 
for a directed verdict, which was denied.  At the end of the 
trial, the judge declared a mistrial because the jury were once 
again unable to reach a verdict.  In April, 2014, the judge held 
a trial assignment conference. 
 
In May, the petitioner requested to continue the third 
trial, which was scheduled for the end of that month, to 
September, in order to provide him time to interview new 
witnesses and to consult with an expert.  A different Superior 
Court judge allowed the motion, but ordered the parties to 
return in June for a hearing on a trial date.  In September, the 
petitioner's counsel was hospitalized and underwent major 
surgery.  A trial that had been scheduled for December was 
canceled. 
 
In March, 2015, updated qualified examiner reports were 
filed with the Superior Court, and the Commonwealth petitioned 
for a trial within sixty days.  The trial was scheduled for 
June.  The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.  He argued that 
12 
 
because G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d), provides only that a unanimous 
jury finding of sexual dangerousness requires commitment to the 
treatment center, in the event that a jury failed to reach 
unanimity, the Commonwealth's petition would have to be 
dismissed and he would have to be released.6  In April, this 
motion was denied, on the grounds that the jury's failure to 
reach a unanimous verdict did not require either a directed 
verdict or dismissal of the SDP petition. 
In May, the petitioner waived the  trial date that had been 
scheduled for June, due to his attorney's medical complications 
and resulting temporary inability to work on his case.  The 
petitioner expressed his desire to have the same counsel 
continue to represent him, and "waive[d] all of [his] procedural 
rights for a trial of this action during the next four months."  
The judge allowed this motion and ordered the parties to confer 
with the session clerk to set a new trial date.  Also that 
month, the Commonwealth moved to admit evidence that, prior to 
the third trial, the petitioner had declined to speak with the 
qualified examiners; the motion was allowed. 
                     
 
6 "If after trial, the jury find[] unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person named in the petition is a 
sexually dangerous person, such person shall be committed to the 
treatment center . . . for an indeterminate period of a minimum 
of one day and a maximum of such person's natural life until 
discharged pursuant to the provisions of [G. L. c. 123A, § 9]."  
G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d). 
13 
 
 
In August, 2015, the petitioner moved to continue his trial 
to December because of his attorney's medical complications and 
resulting incapacity.  The judge allowed the continuance, and 
scheduled the trial for January, 2016; the parties thereafter 
jointly requested that date be postponed.  In January, 2016, the 
court received updated reports from the qualified examiners. 
 
The petitioner's third trial took place in January, 2016; 
at trial he again filed a motion for a directed verdict.  The 
two qualified examiners testified that the petitioner was likely 
to reoffend, due in part to his failure to complete sex offender 
treatment. The petitioner responded that core sex offender 
treatment was unavailable to him during his pretrial 
confinement, and therefore he last had participated in core 
treatment during his prison sentence, in 2007.7  According to the 
testimony at trial, the only sex offender treatment levels 
available to the petitioner while he was being held in pretrial 
confinement are ones that he had completed while serving his 
criminal sentence.8 
                     
 
7 The petitioner was terminated from core sex offender 
treatment in 2007 for noncompliance with institution rules that 
treatment professionals interpreted as a failure to learn and 
apply the self-control taught in treatment. 
 
 
8 Full treatment, developed for individuals who are 
committed to the treatment center after being found sexually 
dangerous, begins with an assessment period that can take months 
to complete.  As a result, full treatment has been deemed 
infeasible for individuals awaiting an SDP trial, whose 
14 
 
 
The third trial also ended in a mistrial when the jury were 
unable to reach a unanimous verdict.  One juror sent the judge a 
note about the petitioner's decision not to speak with a 
qualified examiner prior to the third trial, expressing his view 
that, by refusing to be available for interviews with qualified 
examiners, the petitioner could "virtually guarantee" a 
mistrial.  The petitioner had asked the judge to instruct the 
jury that a unanimous verdict was required to find him sexually 
dangerous, but that only ten votes were needed to find that he 
was not (asymmetrical jury verdict).  The judge denied this 
request. 
 
d.  Proceedings before fourth trial.  The Commonwealth 
moved for a fourth trial, and the trial judge set a trial date 
for May, 2016.  In January, 2016, the petitioner filed a motion 
to modify the terms of his confinement; the Commonwealth opposed 
the motion.  In February, concluding that due process required 
that the petitioner be granted access to full sex offender 
treatment during his pretrial confinement, the same judge denied 
the motion in part and allowed it in part.  The judge ordered 
the Commonwealth to file a report concerning whether to offer 
the petitioner full sex offender treatment or, in the 
alternative, to show cause why the petitioner should not be 
                                                                  
commitment is intended to last for at most a few months.  See 
G. L. c. 123A, §§ 13(a), 14(a). 
15 
 
released on constitutional grounds or offered another 
alternative to detention that the Commonwealth might suggest.  
The judge also changed his view as to the asymmetrical jury 
verdict, stating that he would instruct the jury that only ten 
votes were required to find that the petitioner was not sexually 
dangerous, if the petitioner so requested.  The Commonwealth 
filed a notice of interlocutory appeal as to the decision 
regarding the jury verdict.  In March, the Commonwealth learned 
that the petitioner had been offered and declined sex offender 
treatment. 
 
In May, 2016, the petitioner filed a motion for directed 
verdict or dismissal of the petition.  The Commonwealth opposed 
this motion, and the judge denied it.  Due to his counsel's 
health, the petitioner subsequently moved to continue the May 
trial.  The judge allowed the motion and assigned the earliest 
possible trial date, which was in October, 2016. 
 
In June, 2016, both parties filed a number of motions with 
regard to the admissible evidence at the forthcoming trial.  The 
Commonwealth again sought to exclude evidence of the date of the 
filing of its SDP petition, and again moved to admit evidence 
that the petitioner had refused to speak with the qualified 
examiners prior to the third trial.  The petitioner filed a 
"Memorandum in Support of Right to Refuse Additional Interviews 
of Qualified Examiners."  After a hearing, the petitioner filed 
16 
 
before the single justice of the Appeals Court a petition for 
leave to appeal from the May, 2016, denial of his motion to 
dismiss the SDP petition; this petition was dismissed as 
untimely.  Separately, in August, 2016, a single justice of the 
Appeals Court denied without prejudice the Commonwealth's 
petition for leave to appeal from the asymmetrical jury 
instruction. 
 
A few days before the scheduled trial in October, 2016, a 
single justice of the Appeals Court stayed the trial.  A 
Superior Court judge then reported the case for appellate 
determination pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 
423 Mass. 1403 (1996).9  Having concluded that continued 
confinement would violate the petitioner's substantive due 
process rights, the judge also ordered the petitioner released 
with conditions pending trial.  The single justice stayed this 
order pending a decision by the full court. 
The petitioner filed a petition for relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court.  In December, 2016, he 
moved to consolidate the claims raised in that petition with the 
case that had been reported to the Appeals Court.  A single 
justice of this court ordered that the claims raised in the 
petitioner's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition  be transferred to the 
                     
 
9 Among the reported questions, the judge included his 
proposed instruction on asymmetrical jury verdicts. 
17 
 
Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court subsequently consolidated the 
petitioner's claims with the related reported questions.  We 
transferred the matter to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We are asked to resolve the following 
reported questions: 
 
"1.  After three mistrials resulting from jury deadlock, 
does this court have the statutory and constitutional authority 
to hold a fourth trial on the Commonwealth's petition to commit 
[the petitioner] as a sexually dangerous person under G. L. 
c. 123A, § 12? 
 
 
"2.  If so, may the Commonwealth continue to keep [the 
petitioner] confined in strict security pending trial for more 
than 5 3/4 years based solely upon a stipulation of probable 
cause in January[,] 2011, consistent with statutory and 
constitutional principles, including due process and equa1 
protection? 
 
 
"3.  In the absence of statutory authority, does this 
[c]ourt have any power to conduct a hearing to determine whether 
[the petitioner] is sexually dangerous solely for purposes of 
pretrial detention and, if so, must such a determination be made 
by a preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt or some other burden of proof? 
 
 
"4.  If the [c]ourt may continue to hold trials on the 
Commonwealth's petition in this case, what proportion of the 
jury is required to return a verdict of 'not sexually dangerous' 
under equal protection and due process principles? 
 
 
"5.  Does the [c]ourt have any power to impose bail, 
electronic monitoring, minimum security or other alterations in 
the strict security required by G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a)?" 
 
We review these questions of law de novo.  See Commonwealth v. 
Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 81 (2016). 
 
We conclude that the SDP statute permits a fourth trial in 
this case.  While due process would not permit an indefinite 
18 
 
number of retrials, see Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 797 (1st 
Cir. 1973), that limit has not been reached here, so the 
petitioner may be retried. 
Although the SDP statute requires confinement until the end 
of the SDP trial, the continued confinement in this case, 
without a finding of sexual dangerousness beyond a reasonable 
doubt, violates the petitioner's substantive due process rights.  
As a result, we conclude that he must be afforded the 
opportunity to seek supervised release, subject to conditions 
that the judge determines are necessary in order to protect 
public safety, pending his fourth SDP trial.  At a hearing to 
determine whether the petitioner may be released pending 
retrial, the Commonwealth must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that no conditions reasonably could assure that public 
safety would be protected if the petitioner were to be released. 
If a mistrial occurs at an SDP trial following the release 
of the rescript in this case, any individual who is the subject 
of an SDP petition must be afforded the opportunity to seek 
supervised release according to these procedures.10 
Consistent with existing statutory and common law, at the 
petitioner's fourth trial, a unanimous jury will be required in 
                     
 
10 This shall not apply where a mistrial is necessitated by 
the misconduct of an individual who is the subject of an SDP 
petition or his counsel at trial. 
19 
 
order to make a finding either that the petitioner is sexually 
dangerous, or is not sexually dangerous. 
a.  Whether a fourth trial may be conducted.  General Laws 
c. 123A, § 14 (d), provides, "If after trial, the jury find[] 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the person named 
in the petition is a sexually dangerous person, such person 
shall be committed to the treatment center."  Unlike lawmakers 
in other States, the Legislature did not limit the number of 
times the Commonwealth could seek an SDP finding, or restrict 
the circumstances under which a retrial could take place.  
Compare id. with N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 (McKinney 2011) 
(if jury were twice unable to render unanimous verdict, court 
shall dismiss petition); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.917(1) (West 
2011) (if jury are unable to reach unanimous verdict, judge must 
declare mistrial and poll jury, and may conduct retrial only if 
majority would find respondent sexually dangerous).  See Nemet 
v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 113 
(2002) (had Legislature intended different policy, "it is 
reasonable to think that it would have worded the statute in 
that manner, as other State legislatures have done"). 
 
The SDP statute provides only that commitment is required 
after a unanimous finding of sexual dangerousness; it does not 
specify the proper course of action in circumstances where the 
jury are unable to reach a verdict.  See G. L. c. 123A, 
20 
 
§ 14 (d).  The petitioner argues that if the jury do not reach a 
unanimous finding, the statutory language requires that the 
petition be dismissed.  Jury deadlock, however, "has long been 
considered the 'classic basis' for a proper mistrial,"  
Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 470, 473 (2012), quoting 
Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599, 609 (2012), and permits 
another trial.  Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-736 
(1963). 
 
We assume that the Legislature does not depart from settled 
law without clearly indicating its intent to do so.  See Greater 
Boston Real Estate Bd. v. Department of Telecomm. & Energy, 438 
Mass. 197, 202 (2002), quoting Ferullo's Case, 331 Mass. 635, 
637 (1954).  While, in crafting the SDP commitment scheme, the 
Legislature had the power to supersede the common law, see 
McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass. 143, 147 (2005), cert. denied, 547 
U.S. 1114 (2006), it has not done so with regard to the 
procedure following a mistrial.  Had the Legislature intended 
that jury deadlock would result in dismissal, rather than 
retrial, "the wording of the statute could have easily reflected 
[this intent].  It does not."  Rowley v. Massachusetts Elec. 
Co., 438 Mass. 798, 802 (2003).  As a result, we conclude that 
the SDP statute does not require dismissal in the event that the 
jury are unable to reach a verdict, and permits a fourth trial 
in this case. 
21 
 
 
We conclude further that a fourth trial in the 
circumstances of this case would not offend substantive due 
process.  Substantive due process prohibits governmental conduct 
that "shocks the conscience" or infringes on rights "implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty" (citation omitted). Commonwealth 
v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 583, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014).  
The "requirements for minimum due process may vary depending on 
the context."  Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 372 
(2008), and cases cited.  Although "the oppressive misuse of 
multiple commitment proceedings would doubtless be a violation 
of due process," Gomes, 471 F.2d at 797, a fourth trial here 
would not rise to that level. 
We interpret the SDP civil commitment statute in light of 
its dual goals:  protecting public safety while safeguarding 
respondents' procedural rights.  See Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 
Mass. 157, 160 (2004).  "[I]t is beyond question that the 
Legislature has a compelling interest in protecting the public 
from sexually dangerous persons."  Burgess, 450 Mass. at 376.  
We repeatedly have affirmed the statute's balancing of 
respondents' rights and the goal of protecting public safety.  
See, e.g., Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 811, 814 (2014); Commonwealth 
v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 594 (2006).  Both interests remain at 
stake in this case.  While the Commonwealth has been unable to 
secure a unanimous jury verdict finding the petitioner to be 
22 
 
sexually dangerous, jury disagreement does not necessarily 
indicate a failure of proof.  See Sheridan, petitioner, 422 
Mass. 776, 780 (1996).  Given the possibility of a risk to 
public safety, the Commonwealth's decision to retry the 
petitioner is not an arbitrary use of government power, rising 
to the level of a substantive due process violation.  See County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (arbitrary 
conduct that shocks conscience violates substantive due 
process). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that two or even 
three criminal retrials may be held without violating due 
process, so long as the prosecution acts in good faith.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 273 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(due process did not prohibit retrial after three mistrials); 
United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(due process permitted third trial after two mistrials, absent 
harassment by prosecutor); State v. Cordova, 128 N.M. 390, 394  
(1999) (same).  See also United States vs. Jones, U.S. Ct. App., 
No. 96-1667, slip op. (2d Cir. July 25, 1997), cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 976 (1997) (fourth trial not barred by due process after 
two juries were unable to reach verdict and one conviction later 
reversed); People v. Sierb, 456 Mich. 519, 521, 525 (1998) (due 
process did not preclude third trial after two juries were 
unable to reach verdict).  The petitioner has adduced no case, 
23 
 
and we are aware of none, indicating that due process prohibits 
a retrial after three mistrials. 
 
The purpose of the SDP statute is "to have cases brought to 
trial rapidly, but not to deny justice in the interest of 
expediency."  Commonwealth v. DeBella, 442 Mass. 683, 691 
(2004).  At a certain point, the use of retrials undoubtedly 
would violate due process.  Gomes, 471 F.2d at 797.  See United 
States v. Castellanos, 478 F.2d 749, 753 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(multiple retrials could violate due process if prosecution 
sought "trial by attrition").  That point has not been reached 
here, however.  Given the potential threat to public safety, 
dismissal of the SDP petition in this case is not necessary in 
order to balance the constitutional interests at play.  As a 
result, we conclude that the petitioner may be retried. 
 
b.  Resulting delay.  Permitting a fourth trial will, of 
course, occasion further delay.  Recognizing that the petitioner 
already has experienced extraordinary delay -- years beyond what 
the Legislature likely envisioned when it drafted the SDP 
statute -- we nonetheless conclude that, in this case, the delay 
resulting from the allowance of a fourth trial is not in 
violation of statutory requirements.  Due process, however, 
entitles the petitioner to seek supervised release pending 
retrial. 
24 
 
 
General Laws c. 123A, § 14 (a), generally requires that an 
SDP trial be held within sixty days after the Commonwealth files 
its petition, but allows delays for good cause or in the 
interest of justice, as long as the respondent is not 
prejudiced.  See Gangi v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 158, 161 
(2012).  Where an individual has acquiesced to the delay, the 
Commonwealth may be able to show good cause for exceeding the 
sixty-day statutory deadline.  See DeBella, 442 Mass. at 690.  
See also Knapp, 441 Mass. at 166 n.12 (no statutory violation 
although trial had not occurred over two years after probable 
cause finding, where "the judge noted that trial has been 
delayed '[m]ostly at the request of the [defendant]'").  While 
the delay in this case cannot be attributed entirely to one 
party's actions, it falls within the statutory exceptions to the 
sixty-day requirement. 
 
The petitioner sought to postpone his trial and related 
proceedings on several occasions.  In April, 2011, he told his 
counsel that he did not want a trial to be held right away.  He 
subsequently requested that his trial, then scheduled for 
December, 2012, be postponed until February, 2013, and then 
again to later that month.  In both postponement requests, the 
petitioner waived his right to a prompt trial.  Following the 
first mistrial, the petitioner's newly appointed lawyer 
experienced medical complications, and several pretrial 
25 
 
conferences and hearings subsequently were postponed.  After the 
second mistrial, the petitioner repeatedly requested that his 
third trial be continued due to his attorney's medical 
complications, and the trial subsequently was postponed, from 
May, 2014, until January, 2016.  While his attorney's medical 
situation was undoubtedly out of the petitioner's hands, he 
chose to continue working with his attorney, although he was 
aware that a delay could occur as a result.  See DeBella, 442 
Mass. at 690 (where respondent acquiesces in delay, statutory 
exception to sixty-day deadline applies). 
 
The delay preceding the first trial included a period from 
August, 2011, through May, 2012, when no action took place.  The 
responsibility for this delay appears to rest with both parties.  
While the Commonwealth bears the primary responsibility for 
bringing the case to trial within the statutory time frame, "the 
defendant shares the obligation to take active steps to move his 
case through the system."  Commonwealth v. Lynch, 70 Mass. App. 
Ct. 22, 27 (2007).  The petitioner and his attorney took no 
action in response to a May, 2012, letter from the Commonwealth 
proposing to "get this case back on track," until the 
Commonwealth petitioned for trial in July of that year. 
 
Some portion of the delay in this case clearly resulted 
from the Commonwealth's actions.  The Commonwealth, for example, 
took two months to request updated qualified examiner reports 
26 
 
after the first mistrial.  The Commonwealth also moved to 
continue a status conference for eleven days in July, 2011, 
because an assistant district attorney needed to tend to a 
family matter, and moved to continue the first trial from 
November, 2012, because a qualified examiner would be on 
vacation that day.  Given the relatively short time frame of 
both delays, and the fact that the Commonwealth requested these 
postponements for reasons beyond its control, the allowance of 
these continuances was reasonable and the brief delays were 
merited.  See Knapp, 441 Mass. at 165-166. 
 
Additionally, the petitioner has experienced substantial 
delay since his third trial took place in January, 2016.  To the 
extent that this resulted from interlocutory appeals, it falls 
within the good cause exception to the sixty-day requirement.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (A) (iv), 378 Mass. 909 (1979) 
(excluding time elapsed during interlocutory appeals from time 
within which criminal trial must commence).  See also Pariseau, 
466 Mass. at 811 (criminal context may provide guidance in 
construing SDP statute).  The petitioner also requested that the 
fourth trial, scheduled for May, 2016, be continued due to his 
counsel's health. 
Finally, the majority of the delay undoubtedly has resulted 
because the petitioner's first three trials resulted in jury 
deadlock.  While the petitioner is not responsible for this 
27 
 
portion of the delay, for purposes of determining whether the 
statutory deadline has been met, the clock must restart after a 
mistrial.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) (D), as amended, 422 
Mass. 1503 (1996) (restarting speedy trial timeline after 
retrial).  Additionally, these delays were merited:  the 
Commonwealth was attempting to adjudicate the petitioner's 
sexual dangerousness. 
In sum, although the delay in this case is extraordinary, 
it occurred in large part due to circumstances that cannot be 
attributed to the Commonwealth, and therefore falls within the 
statutory exceptions to the sixty-day requirement.  See G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14 (a). 
We note, however, that G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a), prohibits 
delay -- even for good cause or in the interest of justice -- 
where "the person named in the [SDP] petition will be 
substantially prejudiced."  The petitioner's inability to 
receive SDP treatment pending trial clearly constituted 
prejudice.  See Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 811.  Following the third 
trial, the Department of Correction ultimately offered 
treatment, which the petitioner thereafter declined.  
Considering the circumstances overall, there is no indication 
that the petitioner would be prejudiced at a fourth trial, given 
that he will receive the protections guaranteed by G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14 (a).  "The robust, adversary character of the 
28 
 
c. 123A procedure minimizes the risk of the erroneous commitment 
of a person who is not sexually dangerous."  Nieves, 446 Mass. 
at 591.  Given this, in some other circumstances involving 
substantial delay, the court has concluded that a petitioner's 
"case was not impaired by reason of the delay," and therefore 
that dismissal was not required.  See Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 
Mass. 267, 280 (2009) (Ireland, J., concurring).  Such is the 
case here.  Accordingly, at this juncture, dismissal of the 
Commonwealth's petition is not required.  Nonetheless, due 
process demands the petitioner be afforded certain relief at 
this point. 
 
Substantive due process prohibits government conduct that 
"shocks the conscience," or interferes with "rights implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty" (citation omitted).  Fay, 467 
Mass. at 583.  Where the government seeks to infringe on a 
fundamental right, in order to comply with the requirements of 
substantive due process, its action must be narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling and legitimate government interest.  
Commonwealth v. Aime, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993).  "The right of 
an individual to be free from physical restraint is a 
paradigmatic fundamental right."  Knapp, 441 Mass. at 164. 
 
The SDP statute requires that the subject of an SDP 
petition be confined between a probable cause finding and the 
resolution of the SDP trial.  See Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 809.  
29 
 
Nonetheless, "[i]t is settled that a temporary civil commitment 
to the treatment center, pending the outcome of a G. L. c. 123A 
hearing, implicates a liberty interest, and therefore, due 
process protections apply."  Blake, 454 Mass. at 276 (Ireland, 
J., concurring), and cases cited.  As a result, "we . . . go 
beyond the language of the statute to determine whether its 
apparent intent is constrained by the requirements of due 
process under the State or Federal Constitutions."  Sheridan, 
petitioner, 422 Mass. at 778.  In this case, the petitioner's 
extraordinarily long commitment absent a finding of sexual 
dangerousness violates substantive due process. 
 
We consistently have concluded that confinement pending an 
SDP trial is constitutional, only because that commitment is 
temporary, and the SDP statute requires an expedited timeline 
for trial.  See, e.g., Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 811, n.8; Blake, 
454 Mass. at 268; id. at 278 (Ireland, J., concurring); Knapp, 
441 Mass. at 168.  See also Gangi, 462 Mass. at 160 ("Among the 
rights afforded an individual subject to confinement under G. L. 
c. 123A are strict procedural deadlines governing commitment 
proceedings").  "The balancing of interests contemplated by the 
statutory framework may be upset when an SDP determination is 
not made within the established time frames."  Pariseau, 466 
Mass. at 813.  Civil commitment of people who potentially pose a 
threat to public safety does not violate substantive due 
30 
 
process, as long as that commitment takes place according to 
proper procedures and evidentiary standards.  See Fay, 467 Mass. 
at 584.  "It is uncontested that G. L. c. 123A outlines proper 
procedures and evidentiary standards," Fay, supra at 585, but 
the statute does not envision commitment for almost seven years, 
based merely on a determination of probable cause. 
 
While substantive due process permits limited confinement 
after a probable cause determination, it does not permit the 
Commonwealth to hold an individual indefinitely while repeatedly 
seeking a finding of sexual dangerousness.  See Andrews, 
petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 488 (1975) (Commonwealth cannot hold 
person indefinitely without proving sexual dangerousness beyond 
reasonable doubt).  "[C]onfinement without legal justification 
is never innocuous," Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 435 Mass. 527, 530 
(2001), and the legal justification for confinement weakens 
after an SDP trial is concluded without a finding of sexual 
dangerousness.  See Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 813. 
 
Due process demands that the petitioner have the 
opportunity to seek supervised release.  See Pariseau, 466 Mass. 
at 814.  In that case, we considered the appropriate remedy 
after a judge presided over a jury-waived trial pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123A, § 14, and then failed to meet the thirty-day 
deadline for rendering a verdict.  Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 806. 
31 
 
See Blake, 454 Mass. at 268.11  Because the petitioner was not 
prejudiced by the delay, however, due process required neither 
dismissal nor a new trial.  See Pariseau, supra at 812-813.  We 
determined, however, that "justification for continued 
confinement becomes considerably more attenuated after the 
passage of this thirty-day period, or any agreed-upon extension, 
absent countervailing extraordinary circumstances."  Id. at 814.  
Accordingly, we concluded "that a defendant may seek review by 
the trial judge if, thirty days after the end of a jury-waived 
trial, the judge has not issued a decision on the Commonwealth's 
petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14.  A defendant may move 
for a prompt decision and supervised release while the matter 
remains under advisement and until a decision issues regarding 
sexual dangerousness."  Id. 
 
The circumstances here require a similar conclusion.  In 
the event of a mistrial, an individual who is the subject of an 
SDP petition may seek release under the supervision of the 
Department of Probation pending retrial.  "The availability of 
release in such circumstances is justified by [such a person's] 
liberty interest, which the Legislature recognized when it 
                     
 
11 The SDP statute does not provide a deadline by which a 
judge must render a verdict in a jury-waived trial.  See 
generally G. L. c. 123A, § 14.  Consistent with the expedited 
pace of the SDP statute, in Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 
267, 268 (2009), we determined that, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, the judge must render a decision within thirty 
days after the end of a trial. 
32 
 
established an expedited pace for proceedings under" the SDP 
statute.  Id.  The opportunity ensures that the SDP regime is 
sufficiently "narrowly tailored," Aime, 414 Mass. at 673, under 
the strictures of substantive due process, yet meets the 
government's compelling interest in protecting public safety.  
See Burgess, 450 Mass. at 376. 
 
We recognize that, here, the petitioner will be afforded 
the opportunity for supervised release only after his third 
mistrial, notwithstanding our conclusion that this right exists 
after a single mistrial.  Nonetheless, due process does not 
require dismissal in this case.  As the Superior Court judge 
noted, "The absence of full sex offender treatment plays a major 
role in the substantive due process violation."  See Pariseau, 
supra, at 811 (inability to access sex offender treatment 
constitutes prejudice).  After the third mistrial, the 
Commonwealth ultimately offered full sex offender treatment, 
which the petitioner declined.  "Prejudice required for 
dismissal focuses on the subsequent trial and the interference 
with procedural rights therein."  Commonwealth v. Viverito, 422 
Mass. 228, 231 (1996).  The delay in this case has not impaired 
the petitioner's ability to mount a legal defense at his fourth 
trial.  In the absence of prejudice, dismissal of the SDP 
petition is not required, where other remedies can ensure 
33 
 
compliance with the requirements of due process.  See Pariseau, 
supra, at 812. 
 
c.  Supervised release hearing.  The criminal context can 
provide useful guidance as to the appropriate procedures for a 
supervised release hearing under the SDP framework.  See 
Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 813-814.  We look particularly to G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, which permits pretrial detention of persons 
accused of certain crimes on the grounds of dangerousness, in 
order to protect public safety.  We have determined that this 
scheme meets the requirements of substantive due process 
provided by the Federal and State Constitutions.  Mendonza v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 778, 782 790 (1996).  The pretrial 
detention statute applies only to individuals who have been 
arrested for specific dangerous offenses, and requires the 
government first to show probable cause.  Id. at 774.  The SDP 
civil commitment regime, which applies only to individuals who 
have committed specified sex offenses, and requires a probable 
cause finding before initial commitment, is similar in these 
respects.  See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 1, 13. 
 
Under the pretrial detention statute, before an individual 
may be detained pending trial, a judge must find "by clear and 
convincing evidence that no conditions of release will 
reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the 
community."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3).  The individual has the 
34 
 
right to be represented by counsel, to testify, present and 
cross-examine witnesses, and present information.  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (4).  In the event of a negative determination in the 
District Court Department or the Boston Municipal Court 
Department, the individual may seek review in the Superior Court 
Department, and the petition for review must be heard within two 
days.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (7).  A bail decision by a Superior 
Court judge is reviewable in the county court under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  See Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 705 
(2017).  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-752 
(1987) (upholding Federal Bail Reform Act, which also requires 
adversary hearing using clear and convincing evidence standard, 
and provides for expedited appeal); Aime, 414 Mass. at 680, 
quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (Federal 
Bail Reform Act represents "one of those carefully limited 
exceptions [to pretrial freedom] permitted by the due process 
clause").  In the event that a judge determines that no 
conditions of release reasonably will assure the safety of any 
other person or the community, G. L. c.  123A, § 58A (3), 
permits pretrial detention for 120 days, excluding any period of 
delay as defined in Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2). 
 
Applying similar principles to the SDP regime, following a 
mistrial, a Superior Court judge must conduct an adversary 
hearing to determine whether the subject of the petition can be 
35 
 
released under conditions that reasonably would ensure public 
safety.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3).  At such a hearing, due 
process requires the individual have all of the rights afforded 
at a hearing under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), including the right 
to be represented by counsel, to testify, to present and cross-
examine witnesses, and to present information.  If the judge 
concludes that public safety concerns could be addressed by 
imposition of conditions, the judge may order release, with 
conditions, such as electronic monitoring, that he or she deems 
necessary.  The judge may order the individual held in custody 
only if the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that no 
conditions reasonably can ensure public safety. 
 
In determining whether any conditions reasonably could 
ensure public safety, a judge should consider those factors set 
forth in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (5), and those risk factors 
provided in the regulations of the Sex Offender Registry Board 
(SORB) that are relevant to the current mental state of a person 
confined pending an SDP trial.12  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) 
(SORB risk factors used to assess risk of recidivism); 803 Code 
                     
 
12 Relevant risk factors contained in the Sex Offender 
Registry Board's regulations include statutorily defined mental 
abnormality; behavior while incarcerated or civilly committed; 
recent threats made by the respondent; hostility towards women; 
less than satisfactory participation in sex offender treatment; 
age; physical condition; and participation in or completion of 
sex offender treatment.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.33(1), 
(12), (14), (15), (24), (30), (31), (32) (2016). 
36 
 
Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016).  As it will at trial, the inquiry 
should focus on the individual's current mental state.  See 
Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 291 (2002) ("the 
requisite sexual offense conviction is not the basis for the 
commitment [rather it is mental condition]" [emphasis in 
original]).  Whereas, at a probable cause hearing, the court 
lacks "the necessary and critical expert evidence of sexual 
dangerousness that will be offered at a trial on a petition for 
commitment under" the SDP statute, Commonwealth v. Reese, 
438 Mass. 519, 523-524 (2003), following a mistrial, the court 
may consult the qualified examiner reports and any other expert 
testimony presented at trial.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a).  Cf. 
Green, petitioner, 475 Mass. 624, 630 (2016). 
 
If a judge determines, after a hearing held pursuant to 
these procedures, that no conditions of release reasonably will 
assure the safety of any other person or the community, the 
individual shall remain confined until retrial.13  If a petition 
for release is denied, the court must order the Commonwealth to 
offer SDP treatment, in order to avoid prejudice to the 
individual in subsequent trials to determine sexual 
                     
13 Accordingly, the 120-day time limit for pretrial 
confinement under G. L. c. 123A, § 58A (3), is inapplicable 
here. 
 
37 
 
dangerousness.14  See Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 811; G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 14 (a).  If a second mistrial occurs, the individual must have 
the opportunity to seek supervised release again, under the 
procedures outlined. 
 
Although the SDP statute does not explicitly include 
provisions regarding a supervised release hearing in these 
circumstances, "[w]e recognize that the courts of the 
Commonwealth have certain inherent and implied powers in 
addition to those powers expressly enumerated in various 
statutes."  Department of Mental Retardation v. Kendrew, 418 
Mass. 50, 55 (1994).  See Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 814 (judge may 
allow supervised release pending decision on sexual 
dangerousness in jury-waived trial, notwithstanding absence of 
express statutory authority); Commonwealth v. Parra, 445 Mass. 
262, 266 n.5 (2005) ("this court ordered the release of the 
defendant pending outcome of this appeal, on appropriate 
conditions to be determined after a hearing before a judge in 
the Superior Court").  Due process requires that an individual 
held pursuant to the SDP statute have the opportunity to seek 
supervised release following a mistrial, and must be released 
unless a judge determines by clear and convincing evidence, 
                     
 
14 While an individual may decline sex offender treatment, 
that decision would not render continued confinement a violation 
of due process.  See Nieves, 446 Mass. at 593. 
38 
 
after an adversary hearing, that no conditions of release 
reasonably can assure the safety of the community or any person. 
 
d.  Jury verdict.  We also are asked to determine what 
proportion of the jury is required, at the petitioner's fourth 
trial, to return a verdict of "not sexually dangerous."  General 
Laws c. 123A, § 14(d), requires a unanimous jury verdict for a 
finding of sexual dangerousness and subsequent commitment to the 
treatment center.  General Laws c. 123A, § 9, provides that a 
person who has been held at the treatment center for at least 
one year may petition annually for release, and a verdict as to 
whether the individual remains sexually dangerous may be reached 
by a vote of ten out of twelve jurors.  See Sheridan, 
petitioner, 422 Mass. at 780-781.  In this case, the Superior 
Court judge determined that the SDP statute permits the 
Commonwealth's petition to be dismissed if ten out of twelve 
jurors conclude that the petitioner is not sexually dangerous, 
because, had the jury found him sexually dangerous at his first 
trial, by now he would have spent at least one year at the 
treatment center, and could have filed a petition for release 
under G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  Equality and fairness therefore 
require, according to the judge, an asymmetrical jury verdict 
instruction in this case. 
 
We are mindful that G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d), explicitly 
refers to the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict for a 
39 
 
finding of sexual dangerousness, and is silent as to the 
proportion necessary to reach the contrary conclusion.  Common 
and statutory law consistently have provided, however, that the 
same proportion of jurors is required in order to reach a 
finding for either party in a civil case, and of guilt or 
innocence in a criminal case.  See, e.g., 3 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *375 (unanimous jury required for verdict in civil 
trial); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *354 (jury must deliver 
criminal verdict in same form).  See also Blueford, 566 U.S. at 
608, quoting Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) 
(goal of jury system is to secure unanimity); Commonwealth v. 
Zekirias, 443 Mass. 27, 33 (2004) (only unanimous jury verdict 
is valid); Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (a), 378 Mass. 897 (1979) (jury 
verdict must be unanimous); Mass. R. Civ. P. 48, 450  Mass. 1404 
(2008) (parties may stipulate that finding by stated majority of 
jurors be accepted as verdict).  Indeed, we are unaware of any 
scenario in which an asymmetrical requirement has been allowed 
or imposed. 
 
An individual who petitions for release under G. L. 
c. 123A, § 9, unlike a person tried under G. L. c. 123A, § 14, 
has had access to at least one year of sex offender treatment.  
"Commitment to the treatment center and the treatment an SDP 
receives there is intended to provide an SDP with an opportunity 
to overcome his 'general lack of power to control his sexual 
40 
 
impulses' so that he can successfully reenter society."  Hill, 
petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 154, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867 
(1996).  Because the differential treatment of those confined 
under G. L. c. 123A, § 14, and G. L. c. 123A, § 9, is 
"rationally based" on this treatment opportunity, it raises no 
equal protection concern.  See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 
(1997), quoting Personnel Admin'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 272 (1979). 
 
"We shall not override the legislative mandate without a 
compelling constitutional basis."  Sheridan, petitioner, 422 
Mass. at 780.  The Legislature chose to require a less than 
unanimous jury verdict in G. L. c. 123A, § 9, and not in G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14.  "The omission of particular language from a 
statute is deemed deliberate where the Legislature included such 
omitted language in related or similar statutes."  Fernandes v. 
Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 129 (2014).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 833 (2003) ("where the 
legislature has carefully employed term in one place and 
excluded it in another, it would not be implied where excluded" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
We read statutory provisions in light of the common law and 
existing statutes.  Liability Investigative Fund Effort v. 
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Mass., 409 Mass. 
734, 742 (1991), S.C., 418 Mass. 436, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
41 
 
1058 (1994), quoting Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 
109, 115 (1973).  "Statutes are to be construed in the light of 
the preexisting common and statutory law . . . .  It is not to 
be lightly supposed that radical changes in the law were 
intended where not plainly expressed."  Greater Boston Real 
Estate Bd., 438 Mass. at 202, quoting Ferullo's Case, 331 Mass. 
635, 637 (1954). In the absence of clear legislative intent, the 
SDP statute cannot be read to permit an asymmetrical jury 
verdict at the petitioner's fourth trial. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the reported questions as 
follows: 
 
1.  The petitioner may be retried for a fourth time on the 
Commonwealth's petition to commit him as a sexually dangerous 
person under G. L. c. 123A, § 12. 
 
 
2.  Due process requires that the petitioner be afforded a  
hearing and the opportunity for release with conditions pending 
his fourth trial. 
 
 
3.  The Superior Court judge has the authority, and the 
obligation, to conduct a hearing to determine, by clear and 
convincing evidence, whether there are conditions under which 
the petitioner may be released pending his retrial.  The 
petitioner must be released unless the Superior Court judge 
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions 
can reasonably ensure public safety. 
 
 
4.  To reach a determination that an individual is "not 
sexually dangerous" at a trial under G. L. c. 123A, § 14, a 
unanimous jury verdict is required. 
 
 
5.  After a mistrial at a G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a) trial, a 
Superior Court judge may impose bail, electronic monitoring, or 
other conditions of release, as the judge deems appropriate, 
consistent with public safety. 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.