Title: STATE v FIFE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-88 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . HAROLD mLVIN FIFE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Stacey and Jarussi, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs: July 2, 1981 Decided: August 20, 1981 Filed: AUG 2 0 19% M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from a conviction of robbery. The defendant wasllfirst t r i e d on the charge A p r i l 17, 1979, and convicted. That conviction was reversed by t h i s Court and remanded f o r a new t r i a l . S t a t e v. F i f e (1980), - Mont. I - 608 P.2d 1069, 37 St.Rep. 600. The a p p e l l a n t was accused of t h e December 14, 1978, robbery of M r . and M r s . C u r t i s Workman. The f a c t s a r e set f o r t h i n the f i r s t opinion and w i l l n o t be r e s t a t e d . W e reversed t h e conviction, holding the D i s t r i c t Court had abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by denying the defendant's motion f o r continuance, made so t h a t a subpoenaed witness, c r u c i a l t o the defense of t h e case, could be compelled t o a t t e n d and t e s t i f y . Remittitur was ordered April 1 0 , 1980. The S t a t e took no f u r t h e r a c t i o n u n t i l September 11, 1980, when the D i s t r i c t Court granted an order authorizing the r e t u r n of t h e defendant from the Montana S t a t e Prison, t o t h e Yell-ow- stone County j a i l . On October 8, 1980, t h e a p p e l l a n t made motions t o suppress evidence seized from a p p e l l a n t ' s truck and t h e apartment t h e a p p e l l a n t shared with two o t h e r per- sons. The a p p e l l a n t a l s o moved t o dismiss t h e case on t h e grounds the a p p e l l a n t had been denied b a i l following r e - v e r s a l of h i s f i r s t conviction. Section 46-9-104, MCA. B a i l had been o r i g i n a l l y s e t i n January 1979 a t $20,000. Following a hearing on t h e motion t o s e t b a i l October 9, t h e c o u r t reduced b a i l t o $15,000. Appellant could n o t p o s t the reduced b a i l . The record shows the a p p e l l a n t has been continuously incarcerated s i n c e h i s a r r e s t . The second t r i a l was s e t f o r October 21, however, before t r i a l , on October 17, the a p p e l l a n t made a second motion t o dismiss contending deprivation of h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l . The motion w a s denied. The second t r i a l l a s t e d three days and included the testimony of the absent defense witness. The a p p e l l a n t renewed h i s motion t o dismiss f o r d e n i a l of h i s speedy t r i a l r i g h t s e v e r a l t i m e s during the t r i a l . A f t e r d e l i b e r a t i o n , t h e jury found t h e a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y of robbery. Following t r i a l , the a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t notwithstanding the judgment and a motion f o r f u r t h e r hearing on t h e d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l motions e a r l i e r f i l e d . A b r i e f hearing was held November 25; both motions w e r e denied. O n November 26, t h e a p p e l l a n t was sentenced t o 20 years and from t h a t judgment, the defendant appeals. Appellant r a i s e s the following i s s u e s : I-. Whether the District Court e r r e d by denying appel- l a n t ' s motion t o dismiss f o r f a i l u r e t o g r a n t a speedy t r i a l . 2. Whether comment by a witness revealing the f i r s t t r i a l was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . 3 . Whether d e n i a l of t h e motion t o suppress, which was based upon t h e record of the e a r l i e r t r i a l , w a s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e f i n d t h e f i r s t i s s u e determinative and consequently need n o t address t h e a d d i t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d . The r i g h t of any defendant t o a speedy t r i a l i s guaran- teed by t h e f e d e r a l and state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . U.S. Const., Amend. V I ; 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, S24. When faced with a claimed d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t , t h i s Court has applied the four p a r t standard of review s t a t e d i n Barker v. Wingo (1972) , 407 U . S . 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 3 3 L.Ed. 2d 1 0 1 . S t a t e v. Larson (1981), - Mont. , 623 P.2d 954, 38 St.Rep. 213; S t a t e v. B r e t z (1979), Mont. 605 P.2d 974, 36 St.Rep. 1037; S t a t e v . Harvey (1979), Mont. 603 P.2d 661, 36 St.Rep. 2035; S t a t e v. Freeman (1979), - Mont. , 599 Mont. P.2d 368, 36 St.Rep. 1622; S t a t e v. Puzio (1979), - I - 595 P.2d 1163, 36 St.Rep. 1004; S t a t e v. Tiedemann (1978), 178 Mont. 394, 584 P. 2d 1284; S t a t e v. ~ o l l i n s (1978), 178 Mont. 36, 582 P. 2d 1179. The f a c t o r s considered a r e (1) l e n g t h of t h e d e l a y , ( 2 ) reason f o r delay, ( 3 ) d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t , and ( 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant from delay. Application of t h i s "balancing t e s t " of course must be made on a n ad hoc -- b a s i s . Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 514, 530. W e have reviewed t h e circumstances p e c u l i a r t o t h i s c a s e and a f t e r balancing many f a c t o r s , w e r e l u c t a n t l y must o r d e r r e v e r s a l and d i s m i s s a l of t h i s cause. The f i r s t f a c t o r , l e n g t h of d e l a y , has been termed t h e " t r i g g e r i n g mechanism" t o speedy t r i a l i n q u i r i e s . Barker, 407 U.S. a t 530-531. The d e l a y i n t h i s c a s e i s indeed s u f f i c i e n t t o t r i g g e r f u r t h e r i n q u i r y . A f t e r a conviction h a s been reversed and remanded f o r r e t r i a l , t h e speedy t r i a l timeclock begins on t h e d a t e of t h e r e m i t t i t u r and continues u n t i l trial. S t a t e v . Sanders (1973), 163 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d 372. W e ordered r e m i t t i t u r of t h i s cause A p r i l 10, 1980. The a p p e l l a n t w a s t r i e d 194 days l a t e r on October 21, 1980. W e f i n d t h e S t a t e ' s t o t a l i n a c t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t f i v e months of t h e d e l a y t o be par- t i c u l a r l y troublesome. I n Sanders, w e held s i x months and 22 days was s u f f i - c i e n t t o t r i g g e r f u r t h e r i n q u i r y . 516 P.2d a t 375. I n Freeman, w e held 207 days, approximately seven months, m e t t h i s threshold requirement. While w e a r e aware of t h e p r a c t i c a l problems i n gradually reducing t h e minimum number of days required t o support speedy t r i a l inquiry, w e are equally aware of the fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t i n - volved. The a p p e l l a n t has remained incarcerated s i n c e h i s a r r e s t on January 15, 1979. W e cannot d i r e c t l y consider t h e period from the i n i t i a l arrest u n t i l r e m i t t i t u r f o r purposes of a p p e l l a n t ' s claim of d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l , however, w e note i n holding t h a t the a p p e l l a n t has m e t t h e threshold requirement of Barker, t h a t throughout the delay under s c r u t i n y t h e a p p e l l a n t was incarcerated; 154 days a t Montana S t a t e Prison and 40 days i n the county j a i l . The a p p e l l a n t has triggered f u r t h e r review of h i s claim. "The length of delay thus s h i f t s t h e burden t o t h e S t a t e of explaining the reason f o r t h e delay - and showing absence - of prejudice - t o defendant. " ( C i t a t i o n s omitted and emphasis added.) Tiedemann, 584 P.2d 1288. The S t a t e contends t h e case was j u s t i f i a b l y delayed be- cause of (1) i t s good f a i t h b e l i e f t h a t defendant's counsel- intended t o n e g o t i a t e a p l e a bargain, and ( 2 ) t h e time consumed by t h e number of motions f i l e d , b r i e f e d , argued and decided between September 15 and October 21. W e a r e n o t persuaded. The S t a t e ' s argument is, a t b e s t , t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t somehow waived h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l . F i r s t , we cannot conclude from t h i s record t h a t the a p p e l l a n t waived h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l . Barker, 407 U.S. a t 525-526. Second, t h e S t a t e has com- p l e t e l y f a i l e d t o supply a p l a u s i b l e reason f o r i t s i n a c t i o n f o r f i v e months y e t argues we should decide t h e case a s w e d i d Freeman. I n Freeman, w e held w e could n o t presume prejudice was a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the S t a t e where the prosecu- t i o n was d i l i g e n t and numerous time-consuming motions had been made. Freeman, 599 P.2d a t 371. I n our view, t h i s case i s c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . The S t a t e has n o t been d i l i g e n t ; t h e e n t i r e period of delay must be charged t o t h e S t a t e . Mere a l l u s i o n t o good f a i t h misunderstanding and crowded c o u r t calendars i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n where t h e S t a t e has n o t been d i l i g e n t and t h e a p p e l l a n t has been unable t o p o s t b a i l from h i s i n i t i a l a r r e s t . The t h i r d test i s whether t h e r e has been a timely a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t by defendant. A motion t o dismiss f o r d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l made by the defendant p r i o r t o t h e commencement of the t r i a l is an "appropriate motion" which f u l f i l l s t h i s requirement. S t a t e v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 390, 543 P.2d 178, 182. The a p p e l l a n t properly a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t with such a motion four days p r i o r t o t r i a l . The S t a t e contends we should consider t h a t the appel- l a n t f a i l e d t o p u t the S t a t e on n o t i c e by e a r l i e r communi- c a t i n g h i s d e s i r e f o r a speedy retrial. This i s n o t t h e law. " . . . [ I ] t i s n o t t h e duty of defendant t o bring himself t o t r i a l . " Larson, 623 P.2d a t 958. The l a s t i n q u i r y i n Barker i s whether t h e defendant has been prejudiced. The S t a t e contends t h a t unless t h e appel- l a n t was s o prejudiced a s t o deny him a f a i r t r i a l w e must deny h i s c l a i m . W e do n o t agree. "Prejudice i n a speedy t r i a l c o n t e x t i s t o be as- sessed i n l i g h t of the i n t e r e s t s of defendants which the speedy t r i a l r i g h t w a s designed t o pro- t e c t . I n t h i s regard, defendants' i n t e r e s t s have been i d e n t i f i e d as: ' ( i ) t o prevent oppressive pre- t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; (ii) t o minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) t o l i m i t t h e pos- s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e defense w i l l be impaired.' Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. a t 532." Larson, 623 P.2d a t 959. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court f u r t h e r explained t h e requirement i n Moore v. Arizona (1973), 4 1 4 U.S. 25, 26, 94 ". . . Barker v. Wingo expressly r e j e c t e d t h e no- t i o n t h a t an a f f i r m a t i v e demonstration of preju- d i c e was necessary t o prove a d e n i a l of t h e con- s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l : "'We regard none of t h e four f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d above [length of delay, reason f o r delay, de- f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of h i s r i g h t and p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant] a s e i t h e r a necessary o r s u f f i c i e n t condition t o finding of a deprivation of t h e r i g h t of speedy t r i a l . Rather, they a r e r e l a t e d f a c t o r s and must be considered together with such o t h e r circumstances a s may be relevant. . . I 1 1 The S t a t e contends the a p p e l l a n t was n o t prejudiced be- cause two important witnesses w e r e a l s o i n t h e S t a t e prison. The S t a t e argues t h a t proximity of these witnesses gave t h e a p p e l l a n t a g r e a t e r opportunity t o a s s i s t i n the preparation of h i s l e g a l defense than i f he were incarcerated i n t h e Yellowstone County j a i l . W e can hardly agree t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t had a b e t t e r opportunity t o prepare h i s defense i n p r i s o n with the help of two fellow p r i s o n e r s than he would with t h e a i d of h i s r e t a i n e d counsel i n Yellowstone County. W e hold t h e a p p e l l a n t has shown s u f f i c i e n t p r e j u d i c e from the record and circumstances of the case. The appel- l a n t t e s t i f i e d a t h i s suppression hearing of anxiety over n o t knowing whether t h e S t a t e would r e t r y h i s case. The record of extended confinement i s c l e a r . W e f i n d ample evidence i n t h e record t o hold t h e delay i n t h i s case prejudiced the appellant. Having found t h e deprivation of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l , we must dismiss t h e case. Strunk v. United S t a t e s (1973), 4 1 2 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed. 2d 56; S t a t e v. Keller (1976), 170 Mont. 372, 553 P.2d 1013. I n summary, a f t e r considering a l l t h e circumstances and t h e f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h above, we hold t h a t excessive delay between r e m i t t i t u r of t h e f i r s t conviction i n t h i s a c t i o n and r e t r i a l of the a p p e l l a n t has occurred; t h a t t h e S t a t e has f a i l e d t o adequately explain i t s t o t a l i n a c t i o n f o r s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l l of t h e delay; t h a t the a p p e l l a n t timely a s s e r t e d deprivation of h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l ; t h a t s u f f i c i e n t evidence of r e s u l t a n t prejudice t o the a p p e l l a n t has been shown; t h a t t h e only proper remedy i s dismissal of t h e case. For t h e foregoing reasons, t h e conviction i s reversed and dismissed with prejudice. W e concur: