Title: Badura v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Badura v. State1992 WY 65832 P.2d 1390Case Number: 91-268Decided: 06/05/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
James Lawrence BADURA, 
Jr., 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court of Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, and Erin A. 
McIntyre, Asst. Public Defender, Public Defender Program, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and PRICE, District 
Judge.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      We review a 
criminal defendant's claim that the trial court failed to follow statutorily 
required procedures in ordering restitution included in his felony sentence 
following a guilty plea.

[¶2]      Appellant, James 
Lawrence Badura, Jr. (Badura), contends the trial court failed to comply with 
governing statutes in imposing restitution as a part of his sentence, in that: 
if inquiry had been made into his ability to pay, the trial court would then 
have been compelled to find Badura did not have the means to pay the ordered 
restitution. He also claims the trial court failed to make a proper 
determination of the amount of restitution required as a term of the 
probationary sentence. Appellate challenge comes after revocation was entered 
resulting in a penal confinement sentence.1

[¶3]      After being 
honorably discharged from the United States Navy on June 2, 1989, Badura lived 
at the home owned by his mother and father in Clark, Wyoming. His sister and 
brother-in-law, John and Janatt Pulczinski, had also lived there, but moved to 
Minnesota shortly before the incidents giving rise to this case. When they left 
for Minnesota, they left blank check books, cars and other personal property at 
the Clark residence. While he lived there, appellant had access to the blank 
checks and the automobiles. He negotiated over $3,000 worth of those checks by 
tracing his brother-in-law's signature. He also used, and damaged, two of the 
automobiles owned by the Pulczinskis.

[¶4]      Badura pled 
guilty to forgery2 at his arraignment held on 
September 12, 1990, and from that point forward it was clear he would pay 
restitution for his crime.3 After a presentence report was 
prepared, he was sentenced on January 30, 1991 to a term of imprisonment of one 
to three years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Sentence was suspended and a 
probationary sentence was granted, conditioned upon payment of restitution at 
$500 per month.

[¶5]      At his sentencing 
hearing, Badura acknowledged he would pay restitution of approximately $3,000 on 
the forged checks and also $2,500 for the damage he caused to the vehicles. 
Although stating some disagreement with the amount claimed by his brother-in-law 
for damages to the motor vehicles, he admitted owing just over $3,000 for the 
forged checks and assented to a requirement to pay the $2,500 for damage to the 
vehicles. He did object to inclusion for restitution of any travel expenses his 
brother-in-law had incurred in returning to Cody from Minnesota, which totalled 
$1,157.71.4 He was to make his first payment of 
$500, the amount he agreed he could pay, by February 5, 1991. During the period 
of probation after sentence, he did not make that payment, nor has he ever made 
any payment, in any sum, at any time.

[¶6]      On March 21, 
1991, a petition to revoke Badura's probation was filed in the district court. 
By order entered on November 7, 1991, Badura's probation was revoked and his 
prison sentence of one to three years was activated. Badura contends the trial 
court failed to adhere to the statutory requirements for imposing a sentence 
which includes a restitution order. Wyoming statutes require that a sentence 
incorporating restitution be accomplished in accordance with those statutes. 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-9-101 through § 7-9-115 (Supp. 1991).5 Badura correctly points out that 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-9-104 requires the trial court to have the probation officer and 
the defendant prepare a restitution plan. The record does not categorically 
demonstrate that this sort of restitution planning was done, but the presentence 
report does show that restitution was discussed and the transcripts demonstrate 
that appellant agreed at sentencing that he could and would make the monthly 
restitution6 payments which were ordered in the 
sentence. Essentially, Badura claims that if this planning process had been 
observed more rigorously, it would have been clear to the probation officer, as 
well as to the trial court, that he did not have the ability to pay $500 a month 
in restitution.

[¶7]      The record 
reflects the in-court examination provided a reasonable, factual basis about the 
accused's financial circumstances which was sustained by his insistence of 
willingness and ability to pay the restitution of at least $500 per month as he 
itemized his actual and expected income. Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758 (Wyo. 
1992); Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276 (Wyo. 1991). It was his offer. Asch v. 
State, 784 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1989). Moreover, the trial court's decision to revoke 
was not based on the failure to have paid the full amount of the total 
restitution or even full payments for the monthly installments required. Rather, 
it was based on Badura's failure to pay anything at all. The trial court took 
into account that following sentence, Badura had neither sought nor obtained 
employment - whether part-time or full-time; whether manual, menial or 
professional - at a time when jobs were readily available. Indeed, the trial 
court was very patient in continuing the proceedings so that Badura could show 
some sincere effort to pay something toward the restitution. The trial 
court judge granted continuances, in part because Badura simply did not show up 
for some hearings and in part to allow him time to become employed. In sum, 
fourteen months after Badura was first aware he would be making restitution, 
nothing had been paid. We hold the trial court satisfactorily observed the 
governing statutes in requiring Badura to pay restitution. Kahlsdorf v. State, 
823 P.2d 1184, 1191-95 (Wyo. 1991); and see generally Annotation, Ability to Pay 
as Necessary Consideration in Conditioning Probation or Suspended Sentence Upon 
Reparation or Restitution, 73 A.L.R.3d 1240 (1976).

[¶8]      Badura also 
contends the trial court erred in not determining the actual pecuniary damages 
suffered by the Pulczinskis as required by Wyo. Stat. § 7-9-103(a). The 
objection is solely directed to the $1,157.71 travel expense incurred by his 
in-law after he forged the checks and wrecked the cars. As appellant, he did not 
and does not question the total amount of restitution for the forged checks and 
the overdrafts. He considered the $2,500 for damage to the cars to be too high, 
but accepted it as suitable. Badura argued he should not have to pay his 
brother-in-law's travel expenses to return to Wyoming from Minnesota to take 
care of problems caused by his conduct, because they would have had to have 
returned in any event to transport the remainder of their property to Minnesota. 
The trial court then told him at sentencing:

     If you wish to 
challenge the amount of the restitution, you may petition the Court for a 
hearing to reconsider the amount of restitution, and if such a hearing is held, 
of course, it will be necessary for the State to come forward with evidence to 
document the total requested, and if you dispute it, you ought to be in a 
position to offer your evidence in response. Otherwise that will be the exact 
amount of restitution, and regardless of whether a petition to reconsider that 
amount is filed or not, you are ordered to begin making payments on restitution 
in the amount of not less than five hundred dollars a month, with the first 
payment to be due and payable on or before February 5th.

[¶9]      No request for 
such hearing was made. Cf. State v. Lewus, 170 Ariz. 412, 825 P.2d 471 (1992). 
No W.R.Cr.P. 36 (now W.R.Cr.P. 35) objection was raised to the sentence; and no 
restitution, including a victim's compensation $50 deposit payment, was ever 
made. See W.R.Cr.P. 35 (formerly W.R.Cr.P. 36). Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d  at 1193. We 
need not definitively decide here if the total figure is justifiable or if the 
travel expenses were a proper subject for restitution. The defendant must 
challenge the amount of restitution determined at sentencing (or within the time 
permitted by the rules after sentencing) or the amount is fixed as res judicata, 
not subject to attack at a probation revocation hearing. Sanderson v. State, 649 P.2d 677 (Wyo. 1982). See generally Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 3:3 
(2d ed. 1991).

[¶10]   The trial court ordered restitution 
in the amount of $7,304.82 and the record clearly reflects that Badura never 
paid anything. Revocation was validated because Badura made no demonstrable 
effort with more than adequate post-sentence notices to pay the court-ordered 
restitution. As the trial court said: "[Y]ou've gone for all of this time 
without having made even a single payment at all, that is quite frankly an 
insincerity. I'm not sure that you made very much of an effort because I think 
you could have made some of it in that much time." We agree with the trial court 
that appellant's failure to pay anything toward the required restitution was 
willful and a legitimate reason for revocation of probation. Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d  
at 1195.7 Seaton, 811 P.2d  at 280, is not 
precisely comparable, because in that case, no installment payment arrangement 
had been established in any fashion. See also Dreiman, 825 P.2d 758.

[¶11]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Propriety of the process 
used for revocation is not presented by this appeal. See W.R.Cr.P. 33, now 
W.R.Cr.P. 39 (effective March 24, 1992).

2 Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-602 
(1988) states:

(a) A person is guilty of 
forgery if, with intent to defraud, he:

* * * * * *

(ii) Makes, completes, 
executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to 
be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or 
to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; or

(iii) Utters any writing 
which he knows to be forged in a manner specified in paragraphs (i) or (ii) of 
this subsection.

(b) Except as provided in 
subsection (c) of this section, forgery is a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00), or both.

3 Badura pled guilty 
without a plea bargain, but had been carefully advised in advance by the trial 
court in case of a guilty plea that he "would be required to pay back any 
damages that might have been incurred by the victim. That's called restitution." 
Additionally, he was given specific warning during sentencing about the 
likelihood of probation revocation if he failed to make restitution.

4 The amount of the travel 
expenses was not contested. Objection was taken to the propriety of its 
inclusion for restitution on a legal basis. The trial court rejected the legal 
objection and appeal was not taken from the resulting judgment and sentence. 
Likewise, no W.R.Cr.P. 36 motion (now Rule 35) for correction of an illegal 
sentence was ever made. Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 758 (Wyo. 1986); Price v. 
State, 716 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1986). Cf. Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276 (Wyo. 1991). 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecuting attorney stated:

     As to the conditions 
of probation, I think it's imperative that, first and foremost, he be ordered to 
pay restitution as rapidly as possible. His testimony indicates he will be able 
to pay five hundred dollars a month. I would ask that the Court incorporate that 
into its order.

Badura's counsel 
responded:

     Your Honor, just in 
regards to the amount of restitution. As already been stated Mr. Badura does not 
object to the restitution amounts for the vehicles, checks and services 
charges.

5 Many of the statutes in 
Title 7, Chapter 9, were amended effective July 1, 1991, after Badura was 
sentenced, but before his probation was revoked. Badura claims the amendments 
should have a retroactive application which is beneficial to him. Our review of 
the statutes convinces us the applicable portions of the statutes he relies on 
were not changed by the 1991 amendments.

6 An interesting concept 
is offered to require the trial court to examine and conclude that the accused 
is exaggerating his capacity to make restitution and perhaps intentionally 
misstates his ability to repay damages caused. We would conclude that the trial 
court is entitled to rely on the validity of restitutional opportunity and 
agreement made by the accused.

7 Badura was invited to 
explain at the revocation hearing why no restitution had been made. If he had a 
defense of inability to pay, it simply was not argued or justified by his 
opportunity to provide defensive testimony. He declined to make any statement, 
which left the trial court without any realistic alternative except to revoke 
based on the obvious and admitted violation of the probationary sentence about 
which no defense or excuse was presented. The subject was covered by Badura's 
counsel at the trial court session by statement to the trial court and his 
client:

     THE COURT: Do you have 
witnesses to call, Mr. [defense counsel]?

    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your 
Honor.

     At this time I think 
it appropriate to advise the Court that I have discussed this proceeding with 
Mr. Badura prior to being in Court to day [sic]. I have explained to him that he 
would be given the opportunity to take the stand and testify, to make any 
statement that he wishes to make, to address any issues that he wants to 
address.

     He indicated to me at 
that time that he did not wish to take the stand today or to make any statement. 
I, of course, could give Mr. Badura that opportunity again now that we are in 
Court to do that if he so desires.

     I guess if it's his 
choice not to take the stand or make any statement, I just would like that to be 
made of record.

The trial court, at a 
later stage, stated:

     THE COURT: James 
Lawrence Badura, anything else you would like to say then before sentence is 
imposed against you in the case?

MR. BADURA: No, there is 
not.

THE COURT: Will you stand 
and face the Court.

     The Court will find 
for the record, actually already has found, that Mr. Badura was placed on 
probation by order of this Court and that there were some violations of the 
probation order, one of them being his failure to make restitution, and, if I 
recall correctly, a failure to make any restitution whatsoever.

     Is that right, Mr. 
Badura, you never paid the first dollar, did you?

     MR. BADURA: No, I did 
not.

     Sufficiency of the 
factual basis for revocation is not an issue presented on appeal and, in this 
case, the fact that no restitution had been paid, contrary to the terms of the 
sentence, was not only established, but also admitted. Why Badura did not elect 
to attempt a defense based on his obviously failed business enterprise is not 
discernible within this record. We do not ignore the Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed principle that a sentencing court cannot properly revoke a 
defendant's probation for failure to make restitution where ability to pay was 
not found to have existed, but once the State showed a failure to pay as 
ordered, the burden shifted to the defendant to show an inability to pay in 
accordance with the order of the restitution plan. That potential, affirmative 
defense was neither presented to the trial court nor now briefed or argued in 
this appeal. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 
(1983); People v. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d 1091, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 820 P.2d 278, 282 
(1991); State v. Parsons, 104 N.M. 123, 717 P.2d 99 (1986). See also People v. 
Thomas, 146 Cal. App. 3d 542, 194 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1983).