Title: Pegan v. Crawmer

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Pegan, Appellant, v. Crawmer, Appellee. 
[Cite as Pegan v. Crawmer (1996),     Ohio St.3d      .] 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking restoration of custody of minor 
child -- Writ denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-2569 -- Submitted June 4, 1996 -- Decided July 24, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 94-CA-106. 
 
In February 1989, appellant, Stella M. Pegan, gave birth to a daughter, 
Candi.  Pegan subsequently filed a paternity action against appellee, Ronald L. 
Crawmer, who acknowledged that he is Candi’s natural father.  In December 1990, 
the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, entered a 
judgment establishing Crawmer’s paternity of Candi and ordering him to pay child 
support.  The juvenile court further awarded custody of the minor child to Pegan 
and visitation rights to Crawmer.  Effective January 1991, the General Assembly 
established the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 
Division, which possesses exclusive jurisdiction over, inter alia, parentage actions 
and postdecree proceedings arising in parentage actions in Licking County.  R.C. 
2301.03(S).  The domestic relations court thus possessed continuing jurisdiction 
 
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over the orders previously entered by the juvenile court in Pegan’s paternity 
action. 
 
In October 1993, Candi was discovered wandering the streets after she had 
been left alone by Pegan with Pegan’s two other minor children, Tekela and 
Daniel, who are younger than Candi.  In February 1994, the Licking County 
Municipal Court convicted Pegan of theft in connection with a shoplifting 
incident.  In March 1994, Tekela, then about two years old, was found wandering 
the neighborhood.  A police officer observed that the child had dried fecal matter 
on her legs and dried green “nasal matter” coming from her nostrils, and looked as 
if she had not bathed in several days.  In October 1994, the municipal court 
convicted Pegan of child endangering in connection with the March 1994 incident.   
 
Meanwhile, Crawmer had filed a motion for change of custody in the 
Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division.  The 
domestic relations court granted temporary custody of Candi to Crawmer, pending 
a hearing on the motion.  At the October 1994 hearing on Crawmer’s motion, 
Pegan moved to dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction because Crawmer had 
failed to attach an R.C. 3109.27 custody affidavit.  On October 19, 1994, the 
domestic relations court granted Pegan’s motion and dismissed Crawmer’s motion.  
 
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However, the court stayed the dismissal pending an appeal by Crawmer.  During 
the stay, Pegan filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the Licking County 
Court of Appeals to restore custody of Candi to her.   
 
On October 20, 1994, just prior to filing his notice of appeal from the 
domestic relations court’s October 19 dismissal entry, Crawmer filed a second 
motion for a change of custody, this time attaching an R.C. 3109.27 child custody 
affidavit indicating that he had no knowledge of any pending custody proceeding 
involving Candi in any other court.  The domestic relations court immediately 
issued an ex parte order granting temporary custody of Candi to Crawmer pending 
a hearing on his second motion for change of custody.   
 
The court of appeals dismissed Pegan’s habeas corpus complaint for failing 
to certify that a copy of it had been served on Crawmer.  On appeal, we reversed 
and remanded the cause to the court of appeals to determine if the writ should be 
allowed and a return ordered.  Pegan v. Crawmer (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 607, 653 
N.E.2d 659.  In the interim, the court of appeals affirmed the domestic relations 
court’s dismissal of Crawmer’s first motion for a change of custody.  Pegan v. 
Crawmer (Apr. 13, 1995), Licking App. No. 94-CA-107, unreported, 1995 WL 
434108.  Thereafter, the domestic relations court proceeded to hold a hearing on 
 
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Crawmer’s second change-of-custody motion and awarded custody of Candi to 
Crawmer.  Pegan appealed the custody determination.   
 
On remand of Pegan’s habeas corpus action, the court of appeals allowed 
the writ.  Crawmer then filed a trial brief with attached exhibits.  In November 
1995, the court of appeals denied the writ of habeas corpus.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Central Ohio Legal Aid Society, Inc. and Patricia L. Moore, for appellant. 
 
Cindy Ripko, for appellee. 
 
Price & Neel and Tyra L. Taylor, guardian ad litem, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Candi Pegan. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Pegan asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying the 
writ of habeas corpus.  The court of appeals determined that the domestic relations 
court retained continuing jurisdiction over the custody issues, that Pegan’s appeal 
was pending before the court of appeals regarding the domestic relations court’s 
custody award, and that Pegan had failed to demonstrate that she has no adequate 
remedy at law. 
 
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A writ of habeas corpus lies in certain extraordinary circumstances where 
there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and there is no adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 
591, 593, 635 N.E.2d 26, 29.  Habeas corpus relief is the exception rather than the 
general rule in child custody actions.  Barnebey v. Zschach (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 
588, 646 N.E.2d 162.  A writ of habeas corpus will ordinarily be denied where 
there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  In re Hunt (1976), 
46 Ohio St.2d 378, 75 O.O.2d 450, 348 N.E.2d 727, paragraph two of the syllabus; 
Marich v. Knox Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 163, 165, 543 
N.E.2d 776, 779.  Nevertheless, where a judgment is void due to lack of 
jurisdiction, habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy despite the availability of 
alternative remedies such as appeal.  Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282, 1284; In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 195, 
47 O.O. 129, 131, 105 N.E.2d 35, 37, and paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
In her first and second propositions of law, Pegan contends that the 
domestic relations court lacked continuing jurisdiction to grant custody of the 
parties’ child to Crawmer when its predecessor juvenile court lacked jurisdiction 
 
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to originally award custody and visitation concerning the child in the context of 
the paternity action instituted by Pegan.   
 
R.C. 3111.13(C) provides: 
 
“The judgment or order [determining the existence or nonexistence of the 
parent and child relationship] may contain any other provision directed against 
the appropriate party to the proceeding, concerning the duty of support, the 
furnishing of bond or other security for the payment of the judgment, or any other 
matter in the best interest of the child.  *** After entry of the judgment or order, 
the father may petition that he be designated the residential parent and legal 
custodian of the child or for visitation rights in a proceeding separate from any 
action to establish paternity.  ***”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Pegan relies on Burns v. Darnell (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 419, 654 N.E.2d 
169, in which an appellate court held that there is no provision in the paternity 
statute for the determination of visitation rights and that a trial court does not err 
in requiring a father to seek visitation in a separate action rather than by 
postjudgment motion for visitation in the paternity proceeding.     
 
The Burns view is not shared by other appellate courts.  See, e.g., Hammon 
v. Hammon (Apr. 12, 1991), Van Wert App. No. 15-90-14, unreported, 1991 WL 
 
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53747 (R.C. 3111.13[C] “does not mandate a separate proceeding [to determine 
visitation].  Instead, it grants permission to the father to petition for visitation in a 
separate proceeding rather than doing so at the paternity hearing.  The trial court 
may include provisions for visitation [in the paternity judgment] if it is ‘in the best 
interest of the child.’”); West v. Anderson (Mar. 17, 1992), Franklin App. No. 
91AP-1006, unreported, 1992 WL 55440 (“[T]he father may maintain a separate 
action, but [R.C. 3111.13(C)] does not preclude the parties from agreeing to 
litigate all issues in one action, including visitation.”).  
 
In addition, Burns noted that “any error in proceeding to determine 
visitation in [a paternity] action, rather than in a separate action, may not be 
prejudicial.”  Burns, 100 Ohio App.3d at 421, 654 N.E.2d at 170; see, also, West, 
supra (“The legislature has vested the common pleas court with subject matter 
jurisdiction over visitation and, therefore, whether the actions are maintained 
separately or jointly is not an issue of non-waivable jurisdiction but, rather, one of 
venue, which is waivable.”).  Burns is also distinguishable from the instant case, 
since the trial court in Burns did not enter a visitation order in the original 
paternity determination. 
 
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Pegan further relies on In re Byard (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 294, 658 N.E.2d 
735.  In Byard, at the syllabus, we held that “Ohio’s Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act [‘URESA’], R.C. Chapter 3115, does not confer 
subject matter jurisdiction over issues concerning child custody and visitation in 
an action for child support enforcement.”  In so holding, we noted that in a 
URESA action, the custodial parent requesting support enforcement has no notice 
that visitation and custody issues will be raised.  Id., 74 Ohio St.3d at 297, 658 
N.E.2d at 738.  Conversely, the record in this case, which does not include the 
pleadings or hearing in the 1990 paternity action, discloses no lack of notice 
concerning visitation and custody.  In fact, the record before the court of appeals 
indicates no argument to that effect by Pegan.  Further, the paternity action was 
governed by R.C. 3111.13(C), rather than the URESA provisions applicable in 
Byard.  Byard is thus not controlling here. 
 
Pegan next contends that the domestic relations court lacked continuing 
jurisdiction, since the juvenile court did not have original jurisdiction to award 
custody and visitation where no party filed the child custody affidavit required by 
R.C. 3109.27 in the paternity action.  R.C. 3109.27, part of Ohio’s adoption of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, provides: 
 
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“(A) Each party in a parenting proceeding, in the party’s first pleading or in 
an affidavit attached to that pleading, shall give information under oath as to the 
child’s present address, the places where the child has lived within the last five 
years, and the name and present address of each person with whom the child has 
lived during that period.  In this pleading or affidavit, each party shall also include 
all of the following information: 
 
“*** 
 
“(2) Whether the party has information of any parenting proceeding 
concerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state ***.” 
 
Parenting proceedings include proceedings in which a court awards custody 
and visitation.  R.C. 3109.21(B) and (C).  The juvenile court’s 1990 paternity 
determination included custody and visitation determinations.  Consequently, R.C. 
3109.27(A) required each party to file a child custody affidavit. 
 
“The requirement of R.C. 3109.27 that a parent bringing an action for 
custody inform the court at the outset of the proceedings of any knowledge he has 
of custody proceedings pending in other jurisdictions is a mandatory jurisdictional 
requirement of such an action.”  Pasqualone v. Pasqualone (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 
96, 17 O.O.3d 58, 406 N.E.2d 1121, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Pegan relies 
 
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on Pasqualone to support her jurisdictional argument on appeal.  However, she 
neither raised this issue nor introduced evidence below that no R.C. 3109.27 
affidavit was filed in the paternity proceeding.  The record does not include the 
pleadings filed in the paternity action. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court possessed jurisdiction to make 
custody and visitation orders in its paternity judgment under R.C. 3111.13(C).  
Furthermore, the domestic relations court possessed continuing jurisdiction over 
the juvenile court’s original custody award so that it could determine Crawmer’s 
motion for change of custody.  R.C. 3111.16 and 2301.03(S).  Pegan had an 
adequate remedy by appeal to raise her contentions concerning any alleged failure 
to comply with R.C. 3111.13(C). 
 
Moreover, in order to prevail on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a 
child custody case, the petitioner must establish that (1) the child is being 
unlawfully detained, and (2) the petitioner has the superior legal right to custody 
of the child.  2 Child Custody and Visitation Law and Practice (1992) 7-7, Section 
7.02[1].  In her complaint for habeas corpus relief, Pegan claimed entitlement to 
custody of Candi by virtue of the 1990 custody award in her paternity action.  
Therefore, assuming, arguendo, the validity of Pegan’s contentions in her first and 
 
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second propositions of law contesting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, her 
same arguments would defeat the very judgment she seeks to enforce to establish 
her alleged superior legal right to custody.  Any conclusion that the decisions 
relating to custody and visitation are void would result in neither Pegan nor 
Crawmer possessing a judicial order awarding custody, and the custody 
determination would simply be between Candi’s natural parents. 
 
In such circumstances, the court would have to determine which custody 
award would be in the best interest of the child.  See, e.g., Pruitt v. Jones (1980), 
62 Ohio St.2d 237, 16 O.O.3d 276, 405 N.E.2d 276 (In a habeas corpus action to 
obtain custody of an illegitimate child in a controversy between the child’s natural 
parents, a determination of the child’s best interests is required.); 1 Antieau, The 
Practice of Extraordinary Remedies (1987) 113, Section 1.50 (“Whenever child 
custody is litigated in a habeas corpus action, the best interest of the child is the 
prime consideration.”).  The evidence in the record indicates that the child’s best 
interests will be served by Crawmer retaining custody.  Candi’s guardian ad litem 
concurs in this conclusion.  Consequently, Pegan’s first and second propositions 
of law are meritless and are overruled. 
 
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In her third proposition of law, Pegan asserts that the domestic relations 
court could not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify custody based on 
Crawmer’ second postjudgment motion for change of custody where he had 
appealed the dismissal of his first motion for change of custody.  When a case has 
been appealed, the trial court retains all jurisdiction not inconsistent with the 
reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the judgment.  State ex 
rel. Neff v. Corrigan (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 15, 661 N.E.2d 170, 174.  Here, the 
domestic relations court granted temporary custody to Crawmer pending a hearing 
on his second motion prior to the filing of his notice of appeal from the court’s 
dismissal of his first motion.  Further, the domestic relations court did not proceed 
with the hearing and custody determination on the second motion until after the 
court of appeals had resolved the appeal concerning the dismissal of his first 
motion.  See State ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 
558, 653 N.E.2d 366, 371 (After appeal was dismissed, trial court had jurisdiction 
to rule on previously filed Civ.R. 60[B] motion.).  Finally, Crawmer filed the child 
custody affidavit required by R.C. 3109.27(A) with his second motion for change 
of custody.  The domestic relations court properly exercised its continuing 
jurisdiction.  Pegan’s third proposition of law is overruled. 
 
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In conclusion, Pegan did not establish her right to extraordinary relief in 
habeas corpus.  She possesses an adequate remedy via appeal of the domestic 
relations court’s award of custody of Candi to Crawmer.  In fact, she has an appeal 
from that judgment pending in the court of appeals.  Based on the foregoing, the 
judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.