Title: United Educators of San Francisco, AFT/CFT v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO, AFT/CFT, 
AFL-CIO, NEA/CTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS 
BOARD, 
Defendant, Cross-defendant and Appellant; 
 
SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
* * * * 
 
SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS 
BOARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S235903 
 
First Appellate District, Division One 
A142858 and A143428 
 
San Francisco County Superior Court 
CPF 12-512437 
 
 
 
 
January 16, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO v. 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
S235903 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Under section 1253.3 of the Unemployment Insurance 
Code (section 1253.3), public school employees are not eligible to 
collect unemployment benefits during “the period between two 
successive academic years or terms” if the employees worked 
during “the first of the academic years or terms” and received 
“reasonable assurance” of work during “the second of the 
academic years or terms.”  Here we address whether this 
limitation applies to substitute teachers and other public school 
employees during the summer months.  We conclude that 
section 1253.3 does not bar such employees from collecting 
unemployment benefits if the summer session constitutes an 
“academic term.”  A summer session is an “academic term” 
within the meaning of the statute if the session, on the whole, 
resembles the institution’s other academic terms based on 
objective criteria such as enrollment, staffing, budget, and the 
instructional program offered. 
I. 
California operates its unemployment insurance program 
in collaboration with the federal government.  (American 
Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 1017, 1024 (American Federation of Labor); see Unemp. 
Ins. Code, § 101; all undesignated statutory references are to 
this code.)  As part of this arrangement, the federal government 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
subsidizes California’s unemployment insurance fund, and 
California employers receive federal tax credits for their 
contributions to the state fund.  (Russ v. Unemployment Ins. 
Appeals Bd. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 834, 842 (Russ); see 42 
U.S.C. § 502(a); 26 U.S.C. § 3302(a).)  In exchange, the 
Legislature has agreed to conform our unemployment insurance 
laws to requirements established by Congress.  (Russ, at p. 842; 
see § 101.) 
Many of these requirements are set forth in the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).  (26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.)  In 
1970, Congress passed the Employment Security Amendments 
of 1970, which amended FUTA to require states to provide 
unemployment insurance coverage to employees of state 
“institution[s] of higher education.”  (Pub.L. No. 91-373 (Aug. 10, 
1970) 84 Stat. 697.)  In doing so, Congress imposed the following 
limitation on such coverage:  “[W]ith respect to service in an 
instructional, 
research, 
or 
principal 
administrative 
capacity . . . [unemployment] compensation shall not be payable 
based on such service for any week commencing during the 
period between two successive academic years (or, when the 
contract provides instead for a similar period between two 
regular but not successive terms, during such period) to any 
individual who has a contract to perform such services in any 
such capacity for any institution or institutions of higher 
education for both of such academic years or both of such 
terms . . . .”  (Ibid., codified in 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A).) 
When Congress amended FUTA under the Unemployment 
Compensation Amendments of 1976 to require coverage of 
employees at most other public “educational institution[s],” it 
added a similar limitation:  “[W]ith respect to services in an 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
instructional[,] research, or principal administrative capacity 
for an educational institution . . . [unemployment] compensation 
shall not be payable . . . for any week commencing during the 
period between two successive academic years (or, when an 
agreement provides instead for a similar period between two 
regular but not successive terms, during such period) to any 
individual if such individual performs such services in the first 
of such academic years (or terms) and if there is a contract or 
reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services 
in any such capacity for any educational institution in the 
second of such academic years or terms.”  (Pub.L. No. 94-566 
(Oct. 20, 1976) 90 Stat. 2670–2671, codified in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 3304(a)(6)(A)(i).)  Congress also established that “with respect 
to services in any other capacity for an educational institution 
. . . [unemployment] compensation payable on the basis of such 
services may be denied to any individual for any week which 
commences during a period between two successive academic 
years or terms if such individual performs such services in the 
first of such academic years or terms and there is a reasonable 
assurance that such individual will perform such services in the 
second of such academic years or terms.”  (Pub.L. No. 94-566, 
supra, 90 Stat. 2671, codified in 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(ii), 
italics added.) 
Congress amended FUTA again in the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977.  (Pub.L. 
No. 95-19 (Apr. 12, 1977) 91 Stat. 39.)  As relevant here, 
Congress added the words “or terms” after the phrase “between 
two successive academic years” in the provision regarding 
“services 
in 
an 
instructional[,] 
research, 
or 
principal 
administrative capacity for an educational institution” (Id., 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
codified in 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(i)), thereby “clarif[ying] 
that the denial provisions apply between two successive terms 
as well as between two successive academic years” (H.R.Rep. 
No. 95-82, 1st Sess., p. 12 (1977)). 
The Legislature responded to these changes in federal law 
by enacting and subsequently amending section 1253.3.  (See 
Stats. 1971, ch. 1107, § 58, p. 2116, codified in § 1253.3, 
subd. (b); Stats. 1978, ch. 2, § 80, p. 42, codified in § 1253.3, 
subds. (b)–(c); see also Russ, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 844.)  
As amended in 1978, section 1253.3, subdivision (b) (section 
1253.3.(b)) provides:  “[W]ith respect to service in an 
instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for 
an educational institution,” unemployment benefits “are not 
payable to any individual with respect to any week which begins 
during the period between two successive academic years or 
terms or, when an agreement provides instead for a similar 
period between two regular but not successive terms, during 
that period . . . if the individual performs services in the first of 
the academic years or terms and if there is a contract or a 
reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services 
for any educational institution in the second of the academic 
years or terms.”  Section 1253.3, subdivision (c) (section 
1253.3(c)) declares the same limitation on benefits for “service 
in any other capacity . . . for an educational institution.”   
II. 
This case arises from unemployment benefit claims filed 
by 26 employees of the San Francisco United School District 
(SFUSD or District) in 2011.  During the 2010–2011 school year, 
the claimants worked for SFUSD as on-call substitute teachers 
or as paraprofessional classified employees such as instructional 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
aides and custodians.  In the spring of 2011, all but one of the 
claimants received a letter from SFUSD providing “reasonable 
assurance” of employment during the 2011–2012 school year; 
the remaining claimant received such a letter on July 25, 2011.   
The parties agree that “[t]he last date that the [SFUSD] 
schools operated during the ‘regular’ session of the 2010–2011 
school year was May 27, 2011” and that “[t]he first day of 
instruction for the 2011–2012 school year was August 15, 2011.”  
The parties further agree that the District operated a session of 
summer school from June 9, 2011 to July 7, 2011 for elementary 
school students, and from June 9, 2011 to July 14, 2011 for 
middle and high school students.   
The claimants in this case did not receive regular 
compensation during the period from May 27, 2011 to August 
15, 2011 unless they worked for the District during that period.  
Some claimants worked for the District intermittently during 
the summer school session, whereas other claimants worked 
continuously throughout the session.  Several claimants were on 
call to work during summer school but ultimately were not 
asked to work.  A number of claimants also worked for the 
District during the period between the end of the summer 
session and the start of the 2011–2012 school year.  The 
remaining claimants did not work for the District at all over the 
summer and were not on call or otherwise expected to work 
during the summer.   
Each claimant filed for unemployment benefits for the 
entire period between May 27, 2011 and August 15, 2011.  After 
the Employment Development Department (EDD) denied their 
claims, the claimants — represented by their union, United 
Educators of San Francisco AFT/CFT, AFL-CIO, NEA/CTA 
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UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
(UESF) — sought review by an administrative law judge.  The 
judge reversed the EDD’s decisions, reasoning that section 
1253.3 did not preclude any of the claimants from collecting 
unemployment benefits during the period between May 27, 2011 
and August 15, 2011. 
The District appealed the administrative law judge’s 
decisions to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals 
Board (CUIAB or Board).  As relevant here, the Board concluded 
that claimants who were “employed during the summer of 
2010 . . . generally had a reasonable expectation of employment 
of work during the 2011 summer.”  Accordingly, the Board 
determined that section 1253.3 did not bar such claimants from 
collecting benefits for the portion of the period between May 27, 
2011 and August 15, 2011 during which they expected to work 
but did not. 
UESF subsequently petitioned the superior court for a 
writ of administrative mandate, arguing that section 1253.3 did 
not bar any claimants from collecting unemployment benefits 
during the entire period between May 27, 2011 and August 15, 
2011 because the summer session constituted an “academic 
term[]” and none of the claimants were “given reasonable 
assurance of employment in the summer term.”  While this 
matter was pending in the superior court, the Board adopted a 
precedent benefit decision that is relevant here.  (Brady v. 
Ontario Montclair School Dist. (Dec. 10, 2013) CUIAB, 
Precedent Benefit Dec., No. P-B-505  [as of Jan. 1, 2020] 
(Brady) (all Internet citations are archived by year, docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
); see § 409 [“The [CUIAB] . . . may designate 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
certain of its decisions as precedents. . . .  The director and the 
appeals board administrative law judges shall be controlled by 
those precedents except as modified by judicial review.”]; 
American Federation of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1027 
[“ ‘[P]recedent decisions are akin to agency rulemaking, because 
they announce how governing law will be applied in future 
cases.’ ”].)  Brady involved a substitute teacher who was 
available and on call during a session of summer school but was 
not called to work during the session.  Drawing on legislative 
history, appellate case law, and its prior precedent benefit 
decisions, the Board determined that the term “ ‘period between 
two 
successive 
academic 
years 
or 
terms’ ” 
was 
“interchangeabl[e]” with “ ‘summer recess’ ” and “ ‘summer 
vacation recess.’ ”  (Brady, at p. 9; see id. at pp. 3–9.)  Because 
“the claimant was qualified and eligible for work during the 
summer school session,” the Board explained, “she was not on 
recess within the meaning of section 1253.3 . . . and the denial 
provisions do not apply for the weeks of the summer school 
session.”  (Id. at p. 11.) 
Here, the superior court rejected Brady as contrary to 
section 1253.3’s plain meaning, denied UESF’s petition, and 
reversed and remanded the CUIAB’s decisions as to all 26 
claimants.  UESF appealed from the denial of its petition, and 
the CUIAB separately appealed from the superior court’s 
declaration of Brady’s invalidity. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It first rejected UESF’s 
contention that a 2005 superior court ruling in a different case 
had preclusive effect on the instant proceedings.  That case 
involved 10 substitute teachers who applied for benefits after 
they were unable to obtain work during SFUSD’s summer 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
session in 2003.  The superior court in that case agreed with the 
Board that section 1253.3 “only applies to periods in which a 
school district is in recess” and that summer school was not such 
a period.  The Court of Appeal here determined that neither 
issue preclusion nor claim preclusion applied because the 2005 
opinion made no reference to the relevant federal statute and 
because it found applicable an exception to issue preclusion for 
pure questions of law implicating the public interest.  (United 
Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California Unemployment Ins. 
Appeals Bd. (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th 1235, 1250.)  The court 
then concluded, based on the text, history, and purpose of 
section 1253.3, that “summer sessions are not academic terms 
and instead fall between academic years or terms under section 
1253.3,” and on that basis found the claimants ineligible for 
benefits for the entire period from May 27, 2011 to August 15, 
2011.  In so holding, the appellate court agreed with the superior 
court that Brady cannot be reconciled with section 1253.3.  We 
granted and consolidated the separate petitions for review filed 
by UESF and the CUIAB. 
III. 
As a threshold argument, UESF contends that issue 
preclusion from the 2005 superior court judgment bars the 
Board and the District from relitigating whether a summer 
session is an academic term under section 1253.3(b).  While 
issue preclusion generally “bars the party to a prior 
action . . . from relitigating issues finally decided against [it] in 
the earlier action,” we have recognized a “public-interest 
exception” to this rule:  “ ‘[W]hen the issue is a question of law 
rather 
than 
of 
fact, 
the 
prior 
determination 
is 
not 
conclusive . . . if the public interest requires that relitigation not 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
be foreclosed.’ ”  (City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 51, 64; see Arcadia Unified School Dist. v. State Dept. 
of Education (1992) 2 Cal.4th 251, 258; Kopp v. Fair Pol. 
Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 622.)  The proper 
interpretation of section 1253.3 is a question of law we review 
de novo.  Our resolution implicates the expenditure of public 
funds and will affect districts and school employees throughout 
California.  Even if issue preclusion would otherwise apply, this 
is a matter where “public interest requires that relitigation not 
be foreclosed.”  (City of Sacramento, at p. 64.)  
IV. 
We turn now to section 1253.3.  “ ‘ “[O]ur fundamental 
task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to 
effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ [Citation.]  As always, 
we start with the language of the statute, ‘giv[ing] the words 
their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing 
them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose 
[citation].’  [Citation.]”  (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 128, 135.)   
A. 
Section 1253.3(b) says that public school employees “in an 
instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity” 
may not receive unemployment benefits for “any week which 
begins during the period between two successive academic years 
or terms or, when an agreement provides instead for a similar 
period between two regular but not successive terms, during 
that period, . . . if the individual performs services in the first of 
the academic years or terms and if there is a contract or a 
reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
for any educational institution in the second of the academic 
years or terms.”  For public school employees “in any other 
capacity,” section 1253.3(c) precludes benefits for “any week 
which commences during a period between two successive 
academic years or terms if the individual performs the service 
in the first of the academic years or terms and there is a 
reasonable assurance that the individual will perform the 
service in the second of the academic years or terms.”  The 
question here is whether SFUSD’s summer session falls within 
one of section 1253.3(b)’s ineligibility “period[s]” or whether the 
session is itself an “academic term.” 
Neither section 1253.3 nor any other Unemployment 
Insurance Code provision defines an “academic year[] or term[]” 
or “the period between two successive academic years or terms.”  
In particular, the statute does not address whether summer 
school, such as the District’s summer session, constitutes an 
“academic term,” a “period between two successive academic 
years,” or a “period between two successive academic . . . terms.” 
In construing these phrases, we begin by noting that an 
“academic year” is conventionally understood to refer to a nine- 
or ten-month school calendar, typically running from August or 
September to May or June, followed by a period of summer 
recess.  (See, e.g., Ed. Code, § 45102, subd. (c) [referring to “the 
regular September–June academic year”]; id., subd. (d)(1) 
[referring to “the period between the end of the academic year 
in June to the beginning of the next academic year in 
September”].)  On this view, section 1253.3 would appear to bar 
payment of unemployment benefits during any summer session 
because the session would necessarily occur during “the period 
between two successive academic years.” 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
But the traditional school calendar is not the only possible 
definition of an “academic year.”  For example, the Education 
Code provides for the establishment of year-round school 
programs.  (Ed. Code, § 37610 et seq.)  In that context, an 
“academic 
year” 
means 
something 
different 
than 
the 
conventional school year.  (See, e.g., id., §§ 37620, 37630, 37632.)  
The term “academic year” in section 1253.3 does not necessarily 
exclude a year-round school program or some other variation of 
the school calendar that treats a summer session as part of the 
academic year. 
The Court of Appeal concluded and the District now 
contends that Education Code section 37620 makes clear that 
an “academic year” does not include any summer sessions.  (Ed. 
Code, § 37620 [“The teaching sessions and vacation periods 
established pursuant to Section 37618 shall be established 
without reference to the school year as defined in Section 37200.  
The schools and classes shall be conducted for a total of no fewer 
than 175 days during the academic year.”].)  But that provision 
merely establishes the minimum period of instruction for year-
round school programs; it does not establish that a summer 
session cannot be part of an academic year.  The provision says 
that 175 days of school must be conducted “during the academic 
year,” not that those 175 days constitute the academic year. 
We next examine the phrase “academic term.”  An 
“academic term” demarcates a period of study or instruction, 
such as a quarter, semester, or trimester, that is often labeled 
by season (e.g., fall, winter, spring, or summer).  An “academic 
term” can be construed expansively to encompass any discrete 
period during which classes are held or instruction is offered.  
On this view, a summer session is not a “period between two 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
successive academic . . . terms” because it is itself an “academic 
term.” 
On the other hand, an “academic term” can be construed 
more narrowly to mean not just any instructional period, but an 
instructional period that meets certain objective criteria. For 
example, an “academic term” can be understood to encompass a 
typical semester or quarter during which a school offers a full 
curriculum and students are enrolled full-time, while excluding 
an intersession or summer session that offers only a limited 
curriculum, enrolls fewer students, or permits only part-time 
enrollment.  On this view, whether a summer session is an 
“academic term” depends on its particular characteristics. 
Finding “academic year” and “academic term” to be 
ambiguous on their own, we broaden our lens to examine these 
words in the context of other parts of section 1253.3.  (See Robert 
L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 903 [“ ‘Statutory 
language should not be interpreted in isolation, but must be 
construed in the context of the entire statute of which it is a part, 
in order to achieve harmony among the parts.’ ”].)  As noted, 
section 1253.3(b) says that public school employees “in an 
instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity” 
may not receive unemployment benefits for “any week which 
begins during the period between two successive academic years 
or terms or, when an agreement provides instead for a similar 
period between two regular but not successive terms, during that 
period” if the employee works for the district during the first of 
the academic years or terms and has a reasonable assurance of 
work in the second academic year or term.  (Italics added.)  The 
italicized phrase offers a clue to the meaning of “academic term.” 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Section 1253.3(b)’s reference to “regular” terms indicates 
that the Legislature contemplated the existence of “regular” and 
non-“regular” terms, and it strongly suggests an intent to 
foreclose benefits during non-“regular” terms.  The reason is 
that an agreed-upon period of benefits ineligibility “between two 
regular but not successive terms” is necessarily a period that 
includes any non-“regular” terms.  In other words, contrary to 
the Board’s arguments before this court, the statute does not 
envision any “agreement” under which a non-“regular” term 
could be a period of benefits eligibility.  Section 1253.3(b) 
describes an agreed-upon “period [of ineligibility] between two 
regular but not successive terms” as “similar” to “the period [of 
ineligibility] between two successive academic . . . terms,” 
implying that the latter period likewise contemplates a non-
“regular” term as a period of benefits ineligibility.  (§ 1253.3, 
subd. (b).)  These two types of ineligibility periods would be quite 
dissimilar if one necessarily includes any non-“regular” terms 
while the other necessarily excludes them — yet that would be 
the result if non-“regular” terms counted as “academic terms” 
and could never fall within a period “between two successive 
academic . . . terms.”  Instead, the most natural inference is that 
the Legislature did not intend benefits eligibility to extend to 
any non-“regular” term, whether “between two regular but not 
successive terms” or “between two successive academic . . . 
terms.”  From this inference, it follows that the phrase 
“academic term” in section 1253.3(b) means a “regular” term, as 
does the equivalent phrase in section 1253.3(c).  (See People v. 
Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1168 [“ ‘ “when statutes are in pari 
materia similar phrases appearing in each should be given like 
meanings” ’ ”].) 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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The statute, however, does not further define what 
constitutes a “regular” term.  If “regular” is understood to mean 
“recurring . . . at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals” (Merriam-
Webster, Regular (2019)  [as of Jan. 9, 2020]), then a summer session 
that occurs every year could be characterized as a “regular” 
term.  Alternatively, the word “regular” could mean “formed, 
built, arranged, or ordered according to some established rule, 
law, principle, or type” (ibid.), in which case a summer session 
would be a “regular” term if it conforms to a set of 
specifications, presumably those characteristic of the typical 
academic terms in the school year. 
On this latter view, if a school district with conventional 
fall and spring semesters also offers a two-week summer session 
with limited offerings and limited enrollment, the summer 
session would not be a “regular” term.  By contrast, if a school 
district offers a summer session that resembles the fall and 
spring semesters in terms of enrollment, staffing, budget, and 
the instructional program offered, then the summer session 
would qualify as a “regular” term.  Although the text of section 
1253.3 does not illuminate the intended meaning of “regular,” 
the purpose and history of the provision support this latter view, 
as we now explain.  
B. 
As noted, the Legislature enacted and later amended 
section 1253.3 in response to changes that Congress made to 
FUTA.  The text of section 1253.3 largely mirrors the text of the 
federal statute, and nothing in the legislative history of section 
1253.3 suggests that the Legislature intended to establish 
different limitations on the unemployment insurance coverage 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
of school employees than those contemplated by Congress.  
Accordingly, FUTA’s legislative history is relevant to our 
interpretation of section 1253.3. 
Congress initially introduced the “academic years or 
terms” limitation in 1976 when it extended unemployment 
insurance coverage to employees who provided “instructional, 
research, or principal administrative” services to state 
institutions of higher education.  (Pub.L. No. 94-566, supra, 90 
Stat. 2670.)  Because many such employees were “employed 
pursuant to an annual contract at an annual salary, but for a 
work period of less than 12 months,” Congress sought to 
preclude them from collecting unemployment benefits during 
“summer periods, a semester break, a sabbatical period or 
similar nonwork periods during which the employment 
relationship continues.”  (Sen.Rep. No. 91-752, 2d Sess., p. 16 
(1970) (hereafter Sen.Rep. No. 91-752).) 
Congress relied on a similar rationale when it mandated 
that states adopt essentially the same limitation for 
“instructional, research, or principal administrative” employees 
at most other public educational institutions, including school 
districts.  The legislative history of that limitation suggests that 
Congress 
was 
specifically 
concerned 
about 
paying 
unemployment benefits to school employees who, pursuant to a 
traditional nine-month school calendar, are required to work 
only from August or September to May or June of the following 
calendar year.  The employment contracts of such employees 
typically “take into account . . . a 9-month school year . . . either 
by paying them more during the 9 months” or by “pay[ing] a 
salary which is adequate to pay [them] for a year even though 
[they] worked for the school . . . for 9 months.”  (Remarks of Sen. 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
Long, 122 Cong. Rec. 33285 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).)  In other 
words, although such employees are not expected to work for the 
school over the summer, their income is intended to be 
“adequate . . . to provide for [their needs] on an annual basis.”  
(Ibid.)  They are “really not unemployed during the summer 
recess” even if they are not working.  (Ibid.)  The same 
consideration informed Congress’s authorization for states to 
establish a similar limitation for employees who provide 
“services in any other capacity for an educational institution.”  
(Pub.L. No. 94-566, supra, 90 Stat. 2671, § 115(c)(1), codified in 
26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(ii).)  Relevant remarks suggest that 
Congress understood such employees to be like “instructional, 
research, or principal administrative” employees to the extent 
that they are typically “engaged in seasonal employment” with 
a “summer vacation period[].”  (Remarks of Sen. Javits, 122 
Cong. Rec. 33284 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).) 
Thus, the legislative history of the federal statute on 
which section 1253.3 was modeled suggests that Congress 
intended to deny unemployment benefits during parts of the 
calendar year when employees are generally not expected to be 
working but remain in the employ of the school or district, i.e., 
“nonwork periods during which the employment relationship 
continues.”  (Sen.Rep. No. 91-752, supra, at p. 16.)  Even if a 
district offers a summer session every year (i.e., the summer 
session is “regular” in the sense of recurring), we doubt that 
Congress intended school employees to be eligible for benefits 
during such periods if the educational program is attenuated 
such that most or many employees are not expected to be 
working.   
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
At the same time, there is no indication that Congress 
intended to deny benefits to the employees of a school or district 
offering a summer session that, as a whole, resembles other 
academic terms based on objective criteria such as enrollment, 
staffing, budget, and the instructional program offered.  
Summer sessions of this kind are not materially different from 
other academic terms.  In such circumstances, school employees 
are expected to work over the summer, and they expect the 
income from that work to provide for their needs.  If, through no 
fault of their own, they are not asked to work as expected, then 
it is consistent with the purpose of unemployment insurance to 
provide “partial replacement of [their] wages . . . to enable 
[them] ‘to tide themselves over, until they get back to their old 
work or find other employment, without having to resort to 
[other forms of] relief.’ ”  (California Dept. of Human Resources 
Development v. Java (1971) 402 U.S. 121, 131, fn. omitted; cf. 
§ 100 [noting unemployment insurance’s purpose of “providing 
benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own” 
and 
“reduc[ing] . . . the 
suffering 
caused 
thereby 
to 
a 
minimum”].) 
In light of the history and purpose of the federal statute, 
we conclude that an “academic term” for purposes of section 
1253.3 may include a summer school session if, based on 
objective criteria, that summer session is a “regular” term 
comparable to other academic terms that comprise the school 
year.  As the federal legislative history suggests, Congress had 
in mind a traditional nine-month school calendar and 
employment arrangement when it prohibited the payment of 
unemployment benefits between academic years or terms.  But 
we see no evidence that Congress sought to foreclose eligibility 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
for benefits during a summer session that is a “regular” term 
occurring outside of the traditional nine-month school calendar.  
Notably, in the years since Congress enacted FUTA, the 
proportion of American teenagers enrolled in summer school has 
more than quadrupled:  42.1 percent of youth aged 16 to 19 were 
enrolled in summer school in 2016, compared to 10.4 percent in 
1985.  (Morisi, Teen Labor Force Participation Before and After 
the Great Recession and Beyond (Feb. 2017) Monthly Labor 
Review  
[as of Jan. 9, 2020].)  Although we have no indication that all 
summer sessions enrolling such students are “regular” terms, it 
is reasonable to believe that at least some are.  Our reading of 
section 1253.3 comports with the principle that a “ ‘statute may 
be applied to new situations not anticipated by Congress, if, 
fairly construed, such situations come within its intent and 
meaning.’ ”  (Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (1975) 422 
U.S. 151, 158.) 
Under today’s rule, some summer sessions — such as 
those offered as optional or remedial programs to a subset of 
students on a part-time basis and requiring the participation of 
fewer staff than a regular semester or quarter — do not qualify 
as “academic terms.”  (See, e.g., Community College v. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 1993) 634 
A.2d 845, 847 [concluding that a summer session was not “a 
regular term” because it “differ[s] as to enrollment, length, and 
class availability” compared to the college’s fall and spring 
terms].)  In such situations, employees who expect to teach 
summer school or perform other services over the summer would 
be ineligible for benefits if they are not called to work.  But other 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
summer sessions — such as those in year-round schools or those 
that, as a whole, resemble other academic terms of the school 
year in terms of enrollment, staffing, budget, instructional 
program, or other objective criteria — would qualify as 
“academic terms” during which unemployment benefits are 
payable. 
C. 
We find unpersuasive the alternative constructions of 
section 1253.3 offered by the District, the Board, and UESF.  
The District cites two guidance documents promulgated by the 
U.S. Department of Labor in support of its position that section 
1253.3 categorically bars benefits eligibility during any non-
mandatory summer session.  But assuming we should assign 
those documents any weight (cf. Yamaha Corp. of America v. 
State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 10–15), they shed 
little light on the matter here.  The first document says:  “The 
period between two regular and successive terms is the short 
period of weeks between regular semesters or quarters, whether 
the institution operates on a two or three semester or a four-
quarter basis.  The suspension of classes during that short 
period in which services are not required is not a compensable 
period.”  (Unemp. Ins. Service, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Draft 
Language and Commentary to Implement the Unemployment 
Compensation Amendments of 1976—P.L. 94-566, Supplement 
3 (Dec. 1976) p. 4.)  This guidance does not rule out the 
possibility that a non-mandatory summer session may, in some 
circumstances, be an “academic term.”  More generally, the 
reference to institutions that “operate[] on a . . . three semester 
or a four-quarter basis” contemplates the possibility of a 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
summer session as an “academic term,” contrary to the Court of 
Appeal’s holding. 
The second document notes that “the summer quarter is 
not a period between academic years” for colleges operating 
pursuant to “a 12-month academic year.”  (Emp. & Training 
Admin., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Interpretation of “Contract” and 
“Reasonable Assurance” in Section 3304(a)(6)(A) of the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (Dec. 2016) p. 11.)  The District 
contends that this statement means “a summer term could only 
be treated as an ‘academic term’ if ‘the college has a 12-month 
academic year, consisting of four quarters.’ ”  But that is not a 
necessary inference; the statement does not foreclose treating a 
summer session as an “academic term” for a college or school 
district with an academic year spanning less than 12 months, 
where the session’s staffing, enrollment, budget, instructional 
program, or other objective characteristics, as a whole, resemble 
those of the school’s other academic terms. 
An additional reason why we reject the District’s position 
is that “[t]he provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Code 
must be liberally construed to further the legislative objective of 
reducing the hardship of unemployment.”  (Sanchez v. 
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 575, 584; see 
§ 100.)  We would not be liberally construing section 1253.3 to 
further the objective of reducing the hardship of unemployment 
if we were to read the statute to render ineligible a class of 
employees whom neither Congress nor our Legislature had in 
mind when enacting the rule — namely, school employees who 
have a reasonable assurance of work during a summer session 
that resembles the other academic terms of the school year. 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
Meanwhile, the Board urges us to defer to Brady, the 
Board’s 2013 precedent decision.  (Brady, supra, CUIAB, 
Precedent Benefit Dec. No. P-B-505; see ante, at pp. 6–7.)  Brady 
addressed “whether a substitute teacher may be entitled to 
benefits during the weeks a school district operates summer 
school within the meaning of section 1253.3.”  (Brady, at p. 2.)  
The Board held that the benefits ineligibility “period between 
two successive academic years or terms” in section 1253.3 refers 
only to periods of actual recess for the claimant, and it explained 
that “when a substitute teacher is ‘on-call’ during a summer 
school session, and is not called to work, the claimant is not on 
recess, but is unemployed due to a lack of work.”  (Id. at p. 9.) 
Although “we give great weight to interpretations . . . 
rendered in an official adjudicatory proceeding by an 
administrative body with considerable expertise interpreting 
and implementing a particular statutory scheme” (Larkin v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 158), we 
cannot accept the Board’s interpretation of section 1253.3 if “its 
application of legislative intent is clearly unauthorized or 
erroneous” (American Federation of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 1027).  Notwithstanding the Board’s expertise in this area, we 
cannot square the Board’s position in Brady that school 
employees are ineligible for benefits only during periods of 
actual recess — i.e., when they are neither working nor on-call 
— with section 1253.3’s text and FUTA’s legislative history.  We 
thus disapprove Brady to the extent it is inconsistent with 
today’s opinion. 
Finally, UESF and the Board make various policy 
arguments for extending unemployment benefits to school 
employees who are on-call or expected to work during periods in 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
which classes are held.  But as to “instructional, research, or 
principal administrative” employees, these arguments must be 
addressed to Congress because the statute originally enacted by 
Congress as well as the conforming statute adopted by our 
Legislature foreclose their eligibility for benefits during terms 
that are not “regular,” even if classes are held and they remain 
on-call.  (26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(i) [“compensation shall not be 
payable”]; see § 1253.3(b).)  By contrast, federal law does not 
prevent the Legislature from amending section 1253.3(c) to 
expand benefits eligibility for school employees who do not work 
in an instructional, research, or principal administrative 
capacity.  As to these employees, federal law authorizes but does 
not require benefits ineligibility between two successive 
academic years or terms.  (26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) 
[“compensation . . . may be denied”], italics added.)  The 
Legislature may amend section 1253.3(c) to extend benefits 
eligibility to these latter employees during summer sessions 
regardless of whether the session is a “regular” term. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that a summer session does not fall within the 
period of unemployment benefits ineligibility mandated by 
section 1253.3 if the summer session is a “regular” term — that 
is, if the summer session, as a whole, resembles the other 
academic terms of the school year in terms of enrollment, 
staffing, budget, instructional program, or other objective 
characteristics.  UESF notes that “SFUSD [has] offered no 
evidence that the summer session was any different from the 
sessions that ended in May 2011 or began in August 2011.”  But 
the record contains little evidence, one way or the other, on the 
objective characteristics of the summer sessions at issue, and 
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO  v. CALIFORNIA 
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. APPEALS BD. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
the parties, with the guidance of today’s opinion, may introduce 
such evidence on remand. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion United Educators of San Francisco AFT/CFT, AFL-CIO, NEA/CTA v. 
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
_______________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 247 Cal.App.4th 1235 
Rehearing Granted 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S235903 
Date Filed: January 16, 2020 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Francisco 
Judge:  Richard B. Ulmer, Jr. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Stewart Weinberg and David A. Rosenfeld for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy 
Solicitor  General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Samuel P. Siegel, Associate 
Deputy Solicitor General, Susan M. Carson, Gregory D. Brown and Beverley R. Meyers, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Defendant, Cross-defendant and Appellant and for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Glenn Rothner; David J. Strom and Samuel J. Lieberman for the 
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen and John R. Yeh for Real Party in Interest and Respondent and for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Marion L. McWilliams, Michael L. Smith and Amy D. Brandt for Oakland Unified School 
District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Respondent and Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Laura Schulkind, Michael D. Youril; Keith Bray, Joshua R. Daniels 
and Michael Ambrose for California School Boards Association’s Education Legal Alliance as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Respondent and Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David A. Rosenfeld 
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld 
1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200 
Alameda, CA 94501 
(510) 337-1001 
 
Gregory D. Brown 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 703-5461 
 
John R. Yeh 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 
1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 
Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 
(650) 327-2672