Title: Commonwealth v. Corliss

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11523 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDWARD CORLISS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 29, 2014. - January 20, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Robbery.  Practice, Criminal, View, Loss 
of evidence by prosecution, Capital case.  Evidence, 
Firearm, Jury view, Prior misconduct, Relevancy and 
materiality, Exculpatory, Expert opinion, Experiment.  
Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 25, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Diane M. Kottmyer, J. 
 
 
 
Stephen Neyman for the defendant. 
 
Mindy S. Klenoff, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. 
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Edward 
Corliss, of murder in the first degree on the theories of 
deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, and of unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and robbery while armed and masked.  
The defendant appeals, claiming (1) the trial judge's 
2 
 
restrictions on the defendant's attendance at a jury view were 
improper; (2) it was error to admit a witness's testimony that 
he saw the defendant with a gun more than one year before the 
shooting in question occurred; (3) the "destruction" by police 
of money seized from the defendant's residence without first 
examining the money for fingerprints or deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) warrants dismissal of the charges against him; and (4) it 
was error to exclude the video and testimony of the defendant's 
expert showing that surveillance footage of the shooting 
distorted the height of the perpetrator.  Finally, the defendant 
asks us to reverse his convictions under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
We affirm the convictions and decline to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them at trial, reserving some facts for later discussion.  
On the afternoon of December 26, 2009, Surendra Dangol, the 
victim, was working alone as a clerk at a convenience store 
located on Centre Street in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood of 
Boston.  At approximately 2:45 P.M., a white motor vehicle 
stopped on Eliot Street opposite the store, at the intersection 
of Eliot and Centre Streets.  A person wearing a hat and a bulky 
coat, and carrying a backpack, approached the vehicle and 
appeared to speak briefly with the driver, who had lowered the 
window.  The vehicle then backed up on Eliot Street, away from 
3 
 
the intersection with Centre Street and out of view of the 
store's surveillance cameras. 
 
Minutes later, at approximately 2:56 P.M, a person who 
appeared to be the same individual wearing a bulky coat entered 
the store, put the backpack on the counter by the register and 
pointed a gun at the victim, who stood behind the counter.  The 
victim put both hands in the air.  The gunman handed his 
backpack to the victim, who opened the cash register and, still 
at gun point, transferred the money from the register into the 
backpack.  Once the victim finished doing so, the gunman 
continued to point the gun at the victim, who stretched both 
hands out to either side.  The gunman then shot the victim, and 
the victim fell to the ground.  The gunman took his backpack 
from the counter and left the store, running down Eliot Street 
in the same direction in which the white vehicle had driven in 
reverse before the robbery.  Seconds later, the vehicle drove 
down Eliot Street toward Centre Street and the store, turned 
right onto Centre Street, and drove away.  The store was missing 
$746 following the robbery. 
 
A customer entered the store shortly after the shooting and 
heard a gasping noise emanating from behind the counter.  The 
customer found the victim lying motionless and telephoned 911.  
Boston police officers and paramedics arrived at the scene.  The 
victim was transported to a hospital, where he was pronounced 
4 
 
dead shortly after his arrival.  An autopsy revealed that the 
cause of death was a gunshot wound to the victim's chest. 
 
Police secured the scene and reviewed video recorded by the 
store's surveillance cameras.  The police made efforts to 
enhance the video of the white vehicle shown on Eliot Street 
immediately before and after the robbery and shooting, but were 
unable to determine the license plate or any details about the 
appearance of the driver. 
 
The police showed photographs of the white vehicle to an 
automobile sales manager and a police officer with experience in 
automobile accident investigations, both of whom identified it 
as a Plymouth Acclaim made between 1989 and 1995.  Both also 
noted that the vehicle in the surveillance video had hubcaps 
that were "after-market," i.e., not included with the vehicle 
when it was originally manufactured, and the officer noted that 
the brake light in the vehicle's rear window appeared not to be 
functioning properly. 
 
The police obtained from the registry of motor vehicles a 
list of white Plymouth Acclaims registered in Massachusetts that 
were made between 1989 and 1995.  One such vehicle was 
registered to Jacqueline L. Silvia, the defendant's wife, who 
lived with the defendant on Hyde Park Avenue in the Roslindale 
section of Boston.  The police conducted surveillance of the 
white Acclaim in the weeks following the shooting and, in early 
5 
 
January of 2010, observed Silvia driving it with the defendant 
in the passenger seat. 
 
On January 15, 2010, police sought and obtained a search 
warrant for Silvia's Acclaim.  Upon examining the vehicle at the 
police station, the police observed that, similar to the white 
vehicle in the surveillance video, the Acclaim had after-market 
hubcaps, and the brake light in the rear window was close to 
burning out and, thus, producing less light than intended. 
 
The defendant also admitted to three different people that 
he had committed a robbery and had shot someone at the store.  
In particular, on the night of the incident, while the defendant 
was visiting his brother, he pulled dollar bills of various 
denominations out of his pocket and told his brother that he had 
"pulled a score" during which he killed a man in the store who 
had lied to him by saying that there was no money in the 
register; he also stated that he had no remorse about the 
incident.  Later, while being held in custody before trial, the 
defendant told a fellow inmate that he entered a store intending 
to rob it; that he shot a man inside the store (to whom the 
defendant referred as a "sand nigger"); that the vehicle used in 
the offense was his wife's Plymouth; and that he disposed of the 
gun used in the shooting along Revere Beach.  The defendant told 
another inmate that he robbed the store while wearing a wig and 
a puffy outfit, and shot the store clerk; he killed the clerk, 
6 
 
he explained, to ensure that there would be no witnesses to the 
robbery.  The defendant added that he had disposed of the gun 
used in the shooting in the water.  In addition, fearing 
Silvia's possible testimony against him in court, the defendant 
asked the inmate to kill Silvia upon the inmate's release from 
prison, and gave him details of Silvia's whereabouts and 
routines to facilitate her killing.1 
 
Based on information they had received during the course of 
their investigation, the police searched a rocky portion of 
Revere Beach several times.  During their third search police 
found a handgun in the sand.  Ballistics testing confirmed that 
the bullet removed from the victim's body was fired from this 
gun.  The Commonwealth also presented evidence that the 
defendant had told his brother that he often carried a gun for 
protection that he referred to as his "buddy."  Finally, there 
was evidence that, prior to the robbery of the store, the 
defendant had told his brother in December of 2009 that he was 
experiencing financial trouble due to a decrease in his Social 
Security benefits.2 
                     
 
1 The defendant also asked the inmate to kill a neighbor and 
a friend of the defendant, both of whom the defendant believed 
had provided testimony against him. 
 
 
2 The defendant also told his parole officer that his Social 
Security payments decreased in early December of 2009 despite an 
increase in his rent obligation. 
7 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Jury view.  The defendant argues that the 
trial judge erred in denying his request to attend a view that 
would be separate from, but identical to, the view taken by the 
jury.  Acknowledging that the judge did allow him to attend the 
jury view, the defendant further claims that the judge erred in 
confining him to a vehicle during the view.  Finally, the 
defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 403 
n.9 (2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96 (2014), to argue that his 
presence was required throughout the jury's view because, he 
claims, the view involved an experiment or demonstration, and in 
any event, the view could have been avoided.  There was no 
error. 
 
The background facts are the following.  The Commonwealth's 
pretrial motion for a view by the jury was allowed without 
objection.  Prior to the view, the defendant wavered as to 
whether he wished to be present for the jury's view or to attend 
a separate view, but ultimately indicated a preference for the 
latter.  The judge stated that under existing case law, the 
defendant had no constitutional right to be present during the 
view.  Furthermore, the judge noted that there was some 
information available indicating that the defendant had plotted 
to escape from custody and had spoken about killing prison 
guards, and that this evidence dictated the need for security 
personnel to accompany the defendant on any separate view.  The 
8 
 
judge was skeptical about the feasibility of conducting a 
separate view for the defendant, given the shortage of security 
personnel available, but indicated that she would look into 
whether a private view for the defendant was practicable.  The 
judge thereafter did not mention the issue of a separate view, 
but ultimately ruled, based on security concerns, that the 
defendant could not be present with the jury during their view, 
but that security personnel would transport the defendant in a 
separate vehicle and the vehicle would be positioned to allow 
the defendant to observe each location on the jury view to the 
extent possible.  The judge prohibited the defendant from 
leaving the vehicle during the view, but provided him with a 
"notice of view details," drafted by the Commonwealth, which 
described "precisely what it is that the Commonwealth [pointed] 
out to the jurors." 
The jury went on the planned view, during which counsel for 
the Commonwealth and for the defendant showed jurors the area 
surrounding the store, the interior of the store, the exterior 
of the defendant's residence, Sylvia's white Acclaim, a rock 
jetty along Revere Beach, and the exterior of a business 
establishment in Revere.  The defendant was unable to view the 
interior of the store, but the judge noted her expectation that 
the Commonwealth would introduce depictions of relevant aspects 
of the store at trial. 
9 
 
"'We have held repeatedly that a defendant does not have a 
right to be present during a jury view' under either the Sixth 
or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  Morganti, 
455 Mass. at 402-403, quoting Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 
816, 849 (1996).  This is so because a "view is not part of the 
trial," Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 199 (2011), due to 
the fact that, "[a]lthough what is seen on the view may be used 
by the jury in reaching their verdict, in a 'strict and narrow 
sense a view may be thought not to be evidence.'"  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Curry, 368 Mass. 195, 198 (1975).  See Berlandi 
v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 424, 451 (1943); Commonwealth v. 
Snyder, 282 Mass. 401, 412-413 (1933), aff'd, 291 U.S. 97 
(1934).  Accordingly, it was not required that the defendant 
observe what the jury saw on their view, either during the view 
itself or on a separate occasion.  Rather, a trial judge has 
discretion whether to permit a defendant to be present at a jury 
view, "may consider issues of security in deciding whether to 
permit a defendant to be present," as the judge did here, and 
"may impose reasonable conditions or restrictions" on a 
defendant attending such a view.  See Commonwealth v. Evans, 438 
Mass. 142, 151 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 966 (2003).  Given 
the security risk posed by the defendant, the judge's decision 
to confine him to a police vehicle during the jury view was 
10 
 
reasonable and well within her discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mack, 423 Mass. 288, 291 (1996) (affirming trial judge's 
decision that defendant could attend jury view only if he 
remained "in a police car and some distance away from the 
jury").3 
 
2.  Admission of evidence that the defendant possessed a 
firearm.  The defendant challenges the trial judge's decision to 
allow a witness, Robert Dauteuil, to testify that sixteen months 
before the store robbery and shooting, he saw the defendant with 
a firearm that the defendant proceeded to load with bullets.  We 
disagree. 
The pertinent background facts are these.  Before trial, 
the Commonwealth filed a motion to permit Dauteuil, a friend of 
                     
3 The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 
Mass. 388, 403 n.9 (2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96 (2014), is 
misplaced.  That footnote states, "Because no demonstration was 
performed during the view and the automobile [that was a subject 
of the jury view] plainly could not be brought into the court 
room, we need not consider whether the defendant's presence 
would be required if there had been a demonstration or if the 
view could have been avoided."  This statement concerned the 
specific facts of the Morganti case, where the automobile the 
jury were viewing featured, in the front passenger seat, a 
mannequin that had a rod through its head to demonstrate "the 
path of travel of the bullet that killed the victim."  Morganti, 
supra at 402.  There were no such unusual features of the jury 
view in this case -- it was, as the judge remarked, a "classic 
view," in which counsel for the Commonwealth and the defendant 
pointed out particular locations and features to the jury 
without comment.  The Morganti footnote should not be understood 
to suggest that whenever the defendant does not accompany the 
jury on a view, the trial judge is obligated to make a specific 
determination whether the view could have been avoided by 
introduction of evidence that would provide the same 
illustrative information. 
11 
 
the defendant, to testify as just described.  The Commonwealth 
sought to admit this testimony, in part, because, in the 
Commonwealth's view, it would allow the jury to infer that the 
gun seen by Dauteuil was the murder weapon.  The judge noted the 
relevance of evidence showing a defendant "to have knowledge of 
and the ability to use firearms," and allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion, concluding the probative value of Dauteuil's proposed 
testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. 
Dauteuil testified at trial that he saw the defendant 
holding a handgun and putting bullets into the clip of the gun 
at the defendant's home in August of 2008.  He stated that the 
gun was black and that the bullets, of which there were between 
six and eight, were silver and "a little bigger" than a .22 
caliber bullet.4  Dauteuil conceded that he was "not familiar 
with guns," but stated that he was sufficiently familiar with 
them to recognize the size of the bullets.  Upon being shown a 
photograph of the gun retrieved from Revere Beach, Dauteuil 
stated that the gun the defendant had in 2008 was similar in 
size and shape to the gun in the photograph, but he stopped 
short of saying that the two guns were the same.  The defendant 
objected. 
                     
 
4 Later, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that the 
murder weapon took bullets that were larger than .22 caliber 
bullets. 
12 
 
At the time Dauteuil testified about the gun, the judge 
instructed the jury that they were precluded from considering 
the testimony as evidence that the defendant committed a crime 
by possessing a firearm in August of 2008, or from considering 
the testimony as evidence of the defendant's bad character or 
propensity to commit crimes.  She stated that they could 
consider Dauteuil's testimony, if they deemed it credible, only 
to determine whether the defendant had access to a firearm and 
knowledge of how to operate a firearm at the time of the 
shooting in the store.  The judge repeated these instructions 
during her final charge. 
"It is well settled that the prosecution may not introduce 
evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably 
or not, for the purposes of showing his bad character or 
propensity to commit the crime charged, but such evidence may be 
admissible if relevant for some other purpose."  Commonwealth v. 
Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986), and cases cited.  As the 
trial judge recognized, one such purpose is "to show that the 
defendant has the means to commit the crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 322 (2009).  "The judge, within sound 
discretion, must consider whether the probative value of such 
evidence is outweighed by potential prejudice," Commonwealth v. 
Gollman, 436 Mass. 111, 114 (2002), and the judge's 
determination is "not disturbed absent palpable error."  
13 
 
Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48 (2013).  See 
Commonwealth v. Ashman, 430 Mass. 736, 744 (2000) (admission of 
"[e]vidence that a defendant possessed a weapon that could have 
been used to commit a crime" to show that defendant had means to 
commit crime is left to discretion of trial judge whose decision 
will be accepted on review except for palpable error). 
We discern no error in the admission of Dauteuil's 
observations of the defendant's possession of a gun, even though 
they occurred more than one year before the shooting at the 
store.  The testimony was relevant to show that the defendant 
had the means to perpetrate the crime.  See McGee, 467 Mass. at 
156-157.  See also Ridge, 455 Mass. at 322-323 (no error in 
admitting "evidence of the defendant's access to, and knowledge 
of, firearms and bullets" where trial judge "instructed the jury 
that the evidence was only to show that the defendant had some 
familiarity with firearms and not that he was a bad person"). 
As for the sixteen-month interval between Dauteuil's 
observations and the shooting, "[p]roximity to the crime in 
point of time is an element to be considered in viewing the 
probative value of testimony, and it is a factor which should be 
left largely to the discretion of the judge," Commonwealth v. 
Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 491 (1978), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Russell, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 295 (1974), although it must "not 
14 
 
be too remote in time."  Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 
574 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 794 
(1994).  Here, in exercising her discretion to admit the 
testimony, the judge indicated that the temporal remoteness of 
Dauteuil's observations did not preclude their admission because 
once the defendant knew how to operate a gun, he would retain 
such knowledge over time.  Moreover, as stated, the judge 
instructed the jury twice that they could use this testimony 
only to determine whether the defendant had access to a firearm 
and knowledge of how to operate a firearm, and that they could 
decide "what weight, if any" to give to Dauteuil's testimony.  
Cf. Helfant, 398 Mass. at 226-227, 228 n.13 (evidence of 
defendant's prior misbehavior admitted on issue of defendant's 
intent and state of mind; where such evidence is relevant, jury 
may consider time interval between such incidents as bearing on 
weight to be given such evidence).  See Commonwealth v. 
McLaughlin, 352 Mass. 218, 221, 229-230, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
916 (1967) (no error in admitting guns found in possession of 
defendant approximately one year after murder for which he was 
indicted). 
The defendant argues that in addition to the question of 
remoteness, Dauteuil's testimony, in conjunction with later 
testimony by a police ballistician that the murder weapon took 
bullets larger than .22 caliber bullets, created significant 
15 
 
prejudice because it improperly linked the gun observed by 
Dauteuil with the murder weapon.5  However, "evidence of '[a] 
weapon that could have been used in the course of a crime is 
admissible'" to show that the defendant had the means to commit 
the crimes alleged, "even without direct proof that the 
particular weapon was in fact used in the commission of the 
crime" (internal quotations omitted).   McGee, 467 Mass. at 156, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  See 
McGee, supra at 156-157 (witness's testimony concerning gun seen 
in defendant's possession prior to shooting was admissible where 
witness's description of gun was consistent with other testimony 
indicating nature of murder weapon, and probative value of 
testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect; it was for jury to 
determine "any link between the gun [defendant] was said to 
possess and the one used to shoot the victim").  See also 
Ashman, 430 Mass. at 744.  Moreover, the judge's limiting 
instructions permitted the jury to use Dauteuil's testimony only 
                     
 
5 Dauteuil's testimony that the gun the defendant possessed 
in 2008 took bullets larger than .22 caliber bullets is 
consistent with the ballistician's description of the gun used 
in the shooting. 
 
 
The defendant argues that there was no foundation for 
Dauteuil's testimony about the size of the bullets he saw in the 
defendant's possession.  This argument appears to relate to the 
witness's statement on cross-examination that he was "not 
familiar with guns."  A witness, however, need not have 
familiarity with firearms to testify about details of a gun seen 
in the possession of the defendant on an earlier occasion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 491 (1978). 
16 
 
to determine whether the defendant had access to a firearm and 
knowledge of how to operate a firearm, despite the 
Commonwealth's contention that the testimony was admissible to 
show that the gun Dauteuil observed was, in fact, the murder 
weapon.  We presume the jury followed these instructions, and 
thus the defendant received the benefit of limits greater than 
those to which he was entitled.  See Commonwealth v. Auclair, 
444 Mass. 348, 358 (2005).  His argument of prejudice fails. 
3.  Destruction of money seized from the defendant's 
residence.  The defendant argues that the failure of the police 
to retain and segregate the money seized from his residence 
precluded him from establishing that the victim's fingerprints 
or DNA were not on this money and, thus, denied him a fair 
trial, requiring dismissal of the charges against him. 
Testimony at trial revealed that, based on information 
gathered during the course of their investigation, police sought 
and obtained a search warrant to search the defendant's 
apartment.  During the search, the police seized $320 -- two 
fifty-dollar bills and eleven twenty-dollar bills -- that were 
on top of the kitchen table in the apartment.  The defendant and 
the Commonwealth stipulated that this money had been in Silvia's 
possession immediately prior to being placed on the table.  The 
inference the Commonwealth sought to have the jury draw was that 
these bills were some of the proceeds of the robbery. 
17 
 
Sergeant Detective Michael Devane of the Boston police 
department testified at trial that it is police policy to 
document seized money and then either to hold it as evidence or 
submit the money to the department's cashier's office for 
deposit into a bank account.  Upon seizing the bills from the 
defendant's apartment, the police photographed the money and 
recorded the serial numbers of each bill, but did not test any 
of the money for fingerprints or DNA.  Ultimately, according to 
Devane, the seized money was deposited in a bank account 
consistent with police department policy.  Cross-examination of 
Devane elicited that the police did not retain and segregate the 
seized bills as evidence because the police decided that the 
physical form of the bills did not have evidentiary value. 
Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude any evidence 
concerning the seized bills as a sanction against the 
Commonwealth for "destroying" the money.  The judge denied the 
motion and allowed the Commonwealth to introduce the evidence, 
concluding that there was no "showing that the Commonwealth 
acted deliberately or in bad faith."  The judge also noted that 
it was speculative to suggest that the seized bills would have 
yielded something of evidentiary value. 
"A defendant who seeks relief from the loss or destruction 
of potentially exculpatory evidence has the initial burden . . . 
to establish a reasonable possibility, based on concrete 
18 
 
evidence rather than a fertile imagination, that access to the 
[evidence] would have produced evidence favorable to his cause" 
(citations and quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cintron, 
438 Mass. 779, 784 (2003).  See Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. 
1, 12 (1984).  In other words, "the defendant must establish a 
reasonable possibility that the lost or destroyed evidence was 
in fact exculpatory."  Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 554 
(2007).  If the defendant does not satisfy this initial burden, 
"there is no need to engage in [a] balancing test," Commonwealth 
v. Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 718 (2010), weighing "the 
Commonwealth's culpability, the materiality of the evidence, and 
the prejudice to the defendant in order to determine whether the 
defendant is entitled to relief."  Id. 
The defendant's argument fails.  Assuming that testing the 
bills in question yielded no evidence of the victim's 
fingerprints or DNA, the exculpatory value of such a result 
appears to be slim to none.  The victim may well not have 
touched every bill of the approximately $750 stolen in the 
robbery -- the surveillance video of the actual robbery makes it 
clear that the victim transferred the money in the cash drawer 
by hurriedly lifting groups or wads of bills together and 
stuffing them into the robber's backpack -- and therefore the 
absence of the victim's fingerprints or DNA on the seized bills 
would not indicate that the bills were not the proceeds of the 
19 
 
robbery.  Moreover, the evidence is undisputed that the 
defendant's wife had held and handled the money in question 
after the robbery, creating the real possibility that any 
fingerprints or DNA that might have been on the bills before 
would not be identifiable.  See Commonwealth v. Walker, 14 Mass. 
App. Ct. 544, 548-549 (1982) ("absence of the defendant's 
fingerprints on the [destroyed evidence] would not have proved 
his innocence" because "any fingerprints may have been destroyed 
by the handling of others" before police obtained evidence).6 
Because the defendant has failed to satisfy his initial 
burden of establishing "a reasonable possibility" that "access 
to the [seized money] would have produced evidence favorable to 
his cause," we need not balance the Commonwealth's culpability, 
the evidence's materiality and the prejudice to the defendant. 
See Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 309 (2008), cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009), quoting Kee, 449 Mass. at 554.  
See also Williams, 455 Mass. at 718.  The judge did not abuse 
her discretion in allowing the admission of evidence concerning 
the seized money. 
 
4.  Exclusion of images produced by the defendant's expert 
witness.  The defendant argues that the judge's exclusion of a 
                     
 
6 Moreover, it goes without saying that bills held in the 
cash register of a convenience store are likely to have been 
handled by a variety of individuals in addition to the 
convenience store clerk, including the customers who transferred 
the bills in exchange for the goods they purchased. 
20 
 
video that consisted of three images created by his expert 
witness, Michael Garneau, and of Garneau's testimony regarding 
the video, was reversible error because it infringed upon his 
right to present a defense.  To create the images, the 
defendant's expert had superimposed a height chart on top of 
three different images of the perpetrator captured by the 
store's surveillance cameras during the robbery.  The purpose -- 
at least as suggested by defense counsel in a voir dire of the 
expert held before he testified at trial -- was to show that the 
surveillance video footage distorted the perpetrator's height.7 
 
Before she ruled on the admissibility of the superimposed 
video images, the judge conducted a voir dire hearing of Garneau 
to determine the method by which he had created the images and 
his proposed testimony.8  Garneau testified that he had extracted 
three still images depicting the perpetrator in the store during 
the robbery from the store's surveillance footage.  In August, 
                     
 
7 In his opening statement, defense counsel had suggested to 
the jury that they would hear from the expert, Michael Garneau, 
that the perpetrator of the robbery was five feet eleven inches, 
whereas the defendant was only five feet five inches.  At the 
time of the voir dire examination of Garneau, however, defense 
counsel argued that the reason Garneau's testimony was important 
was not to indicate the perpetrator was any particular height.  
Rather, the reason counsel advanced was that one could not make 
an accurate estimate of the perpetrator's height from the video 
footage because the placement of the surveillance camera on the 
ceiling and the angle of its focus meant that the appearance of 
the perpetrator's height was distorted and changed depending on 
where the perpetrator was standing in relation to the camera at 
any given point in time. 
8 Garneau's qualifications as a video editing expert were 
not disputed and were not at issue during the voir dire. 
21 
 
2011, he went to the store and, with the help of the store's 
owner, adjusted the focus of one of the surveillance cameras 
mounted to the ceiling of the store to replicate as closely as 
possible the angle of the still images.  He then filmed a height 
chart attached to a metal stand that he had positioned in the 
"general area" of the three spaces occupied by the perpetrator 
of the robbery in the three 2009 surveillance images.  
Thereafter, with the help of a video compositing program, he 
laid the video of the height chart on top of the three original 
surveillance images of the perpetrator.  The resulting video 
superimposed the lines of the height chart on the perpetrator as 
depicted in the original surveillance images, with each line 
representing one inch in height.  In two of the superimposed 
surveillance images, the perpetrator appeared to measure five 
feet five inches on the height chart, and the third image showed 
the perpetrator's height to measure five feet nine inches.  
During his voir dire testimony, Garneau acknowledged that the 
interior of the store had changed in the interval between the 
2009 robbery and August, 2011, and he could not say whether the 
store's ceiling had been renovated.  The store's video 
surveillance system had changed in that period as well. 
 
Over the defendant's objection, the judge excluded the 
video of the perpetrator with the superimposed height chart on 
the grounds that it would not be helpful to the jury.  She 
22 
 
appeared to believe (perhaps based on the defense counsel's 
opening) that the defendant sought to use the superimposed 
images to argue that the perpetrator was a particular height, 
and she opined that the expert's testimony would be misleading 
on that point.  She also indicated that there was insufficient 
foundation that the height chart was placed on a floor that was 
on the same level as the floor during the robbery, and noted 
that there had been "a change in the ceiling [at the store] with 
respect to the camera." 
The judge, however, did allow admission of Garneau's video 
showing only the height chart, without any image of the 
perpetrator.9  Furthermore, the judge allowed Garneau to testify 
to the distorting effect of camera angles and to the "fallacy of 
using a fixed object like the bolt [on the doorframe of the 
store visible in the surveillance footage, see note 9, supra] to 
determine height" in light of the angle of the camera.  
Thereafter, the defendant called Garneau as a witness at trial, 
and his testimony covered both of these points. 
 
 "The permission to perform or make experiments or 
illustrations in the presence of the jury rest[s] in the sound 
judicial discretion of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Chin 
                     
9 In admitting this video, the judge reasoned that the 
height chart provided a measurement of distance from the floor 
of the store as it existed just prior to trial and, given that 
the Commonwealth had introduced into evidence a measurement from 
that same floor to a bolt on the store's doorframe, fairness 
required the admission of the height chart video. 
23 
 
Kee, 283 Mass. 248, 260 (1933), and cases cited.  See 
Commonwealth v. Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 592 (1956).  
"Although it must appear that the conditions or circumstances 
were in general the same in the illustrative case and the case 
in hand, . . . the determination whether the conditions were 
sufficiently similar to make the experiments of any value in 
aiding the jury is a matter resting in the sound discretion of 
the judge" (citation omitted).  Id. at 592-593, quoting Guinan 
v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 521-522 (1929).  
See Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass. 455, 473 (1972), quoting 
Field v. Gowdy, 199 Mass. 568, 574 (1908) (trial judge has 
discretion to determine "[w]hether the conditions were 
sufficiently similar to make the . . . [experiment or 
demonstration] of any value in aiding the jury to pass upon the 
issue submitted to them").  A judge's decision concerning the 
similarity of the experiment's conditions to those of the 
original incident "will not be interfered with unless plainly 
wrong."  Flynn, supra, quoting Field, supra. 
 
Evidence at trial supported the judge's finding that there 
was an insufficient showing that the floor level and 
surveillance camera positioning at the store were the same 
during Garneau's videotaping and the robbery.  Although it would 
not have been an abuse of discretion for the judge to have 
permitted the introduction of the superimposed video and 
24 
 
accompanying explanation by the expert, we cannot say it was an 
abuse to exclude it.10  More importantly, even assuming for 
argument that the exclusion constituted error, it was not 
prejudicial because Garneau was permitted to, and did, testify 
concerning the purpose of the height chart and to the 
substantive points that the video was intended to illustrate:  
the inaccuracy of using an elevated camera angle to judge the 
height of something in relation to the height of a fixed object, 
and a camera angle's distorting effect on the images the camera 
captures.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 398 (2011) 
(exclusion of evidence did not prejudice defendant where it was 
cumulative of admitted evidence).  These concepts were not of 
such complexity that the excluded video was needed to elucidate 
Garneau's testimony for the jury.  Moreover, in his closing, the 
prosecutor did not seek to argue that the surveillance video 
demonstrated that the perpetrator's height corresponded to that 
                     
 
10 The defendant cites several cases to support his argument 
that any differences between the conditions of an experiment and 
the conditions of the original incident "affect the weight of 
the [experiment] evidence and not its admissibility."  See 
Calvanese v. W.W. Babcock Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 730-731 
(1980); Bechtel v. Paul Clark, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 688-
689 (1980).  See also Commonwealth v. Ellis, 373 Mass. 1, 5 
(1977).  In each of these cases, however, the trial judge had 
exercised discretion to allow evidence of an experiment.  
Accordingly, the defendant's argument does not alter the legal 
landscape that affords a trial judge discretion to exclude 
evidence of an experiment due to the different conditions 
present during the experiment.  See Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 
Mass. 455, 473 (1972). 
25 
 
of the defendant.  The judge's exclusion of the expert's video 
did not infringe on the defendant's right to present a defense. 
 
5.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After review of the entire record 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we find no basis on which to 
grant the defendant relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.