Title: Alexandria City Council v. Mirant Potomac River

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
ALEXANDRIA CITY COUNCIL, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 061028     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 20, 2007 
MIRANT POTOMAC RIVER, LLC, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Frank J. Hoss, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, the City of Alexandria asks us to reverse 
the circuit court's judgment declaring the 2004 Text Amendment 
to the City's zoning ordinance invalid and reinstating two 
auxiliary special use permits (SUPs) issued to Mirant Potomac 
River, LLC, (Mirant) in conjunction with the operation of an 
electricity generating plant (the Plant).  As discussed below, 
we conclude that the Text Amendment violated Code § 15.2-2307 
because it impaired an established vested right to operate the 
Plant.  We also conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
holding that the revocation of the two auxiliary SUPs was 
unlawful.  For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court.  
Facts and Proceedings 
Mirant is the owner and operator of the Plant, a coal-
fueled power plant located in the City of Alexandria.  The 
Plant began operations in October 1949.  The City enacted a 
zoning ordinance in 1963 which designated the Plant site as 
"Industrial."  In 1989, the City granted the Plant's previous 
 
2
owner, Potomac Electric Power Company, two auxiliary SUPs for 
the construction of a building addition to house 
administrative offices and for a Transportation Management 
Plan.  In 1992, the City adopted its current zoning ordinance 
and Master Plan.  Under this comprehensive plan the Plant site 
was designated a Utilities and Transportation (UT) Zone.  
Electric plants were permissible uses in the UT Zone, however, 
the plants were designated "nonconforming uses" and were 
required to obtain comprehensive SUPs to operate.  The Plant 
was exempt from the comprehensive SUP requirement because the 
ordinance designated the Plant as a "noncomplying" use.  
Zoning Ordinance § 12-301 (June 24, 1992). 
Throughout the next decade, the City approved the 
construction of additional residential units in the vicinity 
of the Plant.  As a result, the Plant is currently bounded on 
the East by the Potomac River, on the West by an electric 
transmission facility, and is otherwise surrounded by 
residential and commercial uses.  
In August 2003, two private individuals living near the 
Plant prepared and submitted a report to the City outlining 
their concerns about possible adverse health effects 
associated with Plant emissions.  The report was based on a 
modeling study of Plant emissions conducted by an 
environmental consulting firm hired by the private citizens.  
 
3
The study concluded that there was a high probability of 
adverse effects from the Plant's operations and that Plant 
emissions likely exceeded National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards. 
After receipt of this report, the City retained experts 
to conduct additional studies of the impact of Plant-related 
emissions.  Dr. Jonathan Levy of the Harvard School of Public 
Health concluded that the Plant was the single largest 
contributor of PM2.5, a specific type of fine particulate 
matter emissions, in the City.  Maureen Barrett, an 
environmental engineer, conducted an air quality analysis and 
qualitatively concluded the Plant had an adverse effect on the 
health of the surrounding communities.  Barrett also provided 
the City with an overview of other scientific studies 
conducted since 1992 that documented the negative health 
effects of power plant emissions. 
In May 2004, after concluding the Plant's operations were 
not compatible with the City Council's long-term plan for 
Alexandria, the City Manager and his staff prepared a series 
of proposed policies and goals regarding the Plant, including 
cessation of all Plant operations and removal of Plant 
facilities from the City.  At the City's request, outside 
counsel provided the City with a memorandum identifying 
several potential actions the City could undertake to achieve 
 
4
these goals.  These actions included revoking Mirant's 
existing auxiliary SUPs and amending the City's zoning 
ordinance to change the status of the Plant from 
"noncomplying" to "nonconforming."  Specifically, counsel 
suggested in the memorandum that the auxiliary SUPs could be 
revoked on the basis of Mirant's purported violations of 
certain emission control limits in its state-issued Stationary 
Source Permit to Operate, which would constitute a violation 
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.   In the 
memorandum, counsel also suggested a text amendment to the 
City's zoning ordinance that would change the Plant's 
designation to "nonconforming" and require Mirant to obtain a 
comprehensive SUP to continue operating the Plant. 
The City Council then adopted Resolution No. 2111, which 
stated "public necessity, convenience, general welfare or good 
zoning practice requires consideration of a Text Amendment to 
revoke the noncomplying use status of certain heavy industrial 
uses which have not obtained a special use permit as required 
by current law, and categorize such uses as nonconforming 
uses."  The Resolution referred the Text Amendment to the City 
Planning Commission for consideration and public hearing.  The 
Planning Commission also considered the revocation of Mirant's 
existing auxiliary SUPs. 
 
5
The City Council and the Planning Commission held several 
public hearings on the adoption of the Text Amendment and 
revocation of the auxiliary SUPs.  Ultimately, the Planning 
Commission recommended adoption of the Text Amendment and 
revocation of the auxiliary SUPs.  On December 18, 2004, the 
Mayor and City Council unanimously ratified the 
recommendations.   
The Text Amendment stated, in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of this 
ordinance, any electrical power generating plant in 
existence on December 18, 2004, which produces power 
through the combustion of coal, and is located in a 
zone in which such use is neither a permitted or 
special use permit use, or in a zone in which such 
use is a special use permit use but for which a 
special use permit for the entire use, including 
power generation, has not been granted, shall be 
deemed a nonconforming use, and shall be subject to 
abatement as provided in Section 12-214(A) of this 
ordinance. 
Zoning Ordinance § 12-216(A). 
The abatement provision in § 12-214(A) referenced  
in the Text Amendment provides: 
Promptly upon becoming aware of the existence of a 
nonconforming use, the director shall notify the 
property owner and, if different, the property 
operator of the nonconforming status of such use. 
The nonconforming use shall be discontinued on or 
before the expiration of a period of seven years 
from the date of such notice, unless, prior to the 
expiration of such period, a special use permit 
which authorizes the continuation of the 
nonconforming use has been approved, or the seven-
year period has been extended by the city council. 
 
 
6
 
Mirant1 filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaration 
that the Text Amendment was invalid and that the City's 
revocation of the two auxiliary SUPs was unlawful and 
arbitrary and capricious.  Following an ore tenus hearing, the 
circuit court concluded that the Text Amendment was invalid 
because it violated Dillon's Rule and Code § 10.1-1321.1, 
violated Code § 15.2-2307, and was piecemeal downzoning that 
was not supported by changed circumstances.  The circuit court 
also invalidated the City's action revoking the auxiliary 
SUPs, holding that revocation of such permits for "violation 
of law" required that the City establish a nexus between the 
"violation of law" relied upon and the subject matter of the 
permits in issue, and that the City failed to sustain its 
burden of proof.  The City appealed each of these holdings. 
DISCUSSION 
1.  Validity of the Text Amendment 
 
We first address the City's contention that the circuit 
court erred in concluding that the Text Amendment violated the 
vested rights statute, Code § 15.2-2307.  That section states 
"[n]othing in this article shall be construed to authorize the 
impairment of any vested right."  We have applied the 
                     
1 The complaint was jointly filed by Mirant Potomac River, 
LLC, and Mirant Mid-Atlantic, LLC, (collectively "Mirant").  
Mirant Potomac River, LLC, is the owner of the improvements at 
 
7
principle of vested rights on a number of occasions, stating 
that a landowner acquires a vested property right to conduct a 
nonconforming use on its property if that use was in existence 
on the effective date of a zoning ordinance which would make 
the use nonconforming.  See, e.g., Holland v. Board of 
Supervisors, 247 Va. 286, 289 n.*, 441 S.E.2d 20, 22 n.* 
(1994) ("A landowner may . . . acquire a vested property right 
to conduct a nonconforming use on its property if that use was 
in existence on the effective date of the zoning ordinance."). 
In this case, the property in issue has been used for the 
operation of a power plant since 1949, at which time the City 
had no comprehensive zoning.  Thus, a vested right to use the 
property for operation of a power plant existed at the time of 
both the 1963 and 1992 zoning ordinances.  Neither of those 
ordinances affected the exercise of this right. 
Unlike the prior zoning amendments, however, the 2004 
Text Amendment did affect Mirant's ability to continue 
operating the Plant.  The question before us is whether the 
conditions imposed by redesignating the use of the property 
from noncomplying to nonconforming impaired Mirant's vested 
right to use the property for the operation of a power plant 
in violation of Code § 15.2-2307. 
                                                                
the Plant and the permittee under the State Operating Permit.  
Mirant Mid-Atlantic, LLC is the operator of the Plant. 
 
8
The City argues that requiring Mirant to secure a 
comprehensive SUP for continued operation of the Plant beyond 
seven years was a legitimate exercise of its zoning authority 
and did not violate Code § 15.2-2307.  In the posture of this 
case, however, we need not decide whether requiring a 
comprehensive SUP would impair Mirant's vested right to 
operate the Plant on the property.  At trial, in response to 
the City's argument that Mirant's declaratory judgment action 
was not ripe for adjudication because Mirant had neither 
applied for nor been denied a comprehensive SUP, the circuit 
court held that any attempt by Mirant to acquire an SUP would 
have been "futile" and, therefore, Mirant did not have to 
pursue such action before seeking the declaratory judgment.2  
Consequently, the Text Amendment requires that Mirant cease 
operation of the Plant in seven years.  Our review is thus 
limited to whether this requirement impairs Mirant's vested 
right to use the property for the operation of the Plant.  The 
answer is obvious; termination of the use allowed by virtue of 
an established vested right impairs the vested right and 
therefore violates Code § 15.2-2307.  Accordingly, the circuit 
court's conclusion that the Text Amendment violated Code 
§ 15.2-2307 was correct. 
                     
2 This Court did not grant the City's assignment of error 
on this ruling. 
 
9
 
Nevertheless, the City argues that the circuit court's 
conclusion is in error because § 9.09(g) of the City Charter 
authorizes the City to terminate nonconforming uses within a 
reasonable time and, under Code § 15.2-100, provisions of the 
City Charter supersede Code § 15.2-2307.  Although the City 
asserts that this argument was presented to the circuit court 
on three occasions, none of the instances upon which the City 
relies apprised the circuit court of the position now advanced 
regarding the application of § 9.09 of the City Charter.   
At trial, the City's discussion of City Council of 
Alexandria v. The Lindsey Trusts, 258 Va. 424, 520 S.E.2d 181 
(1999), Code § 15.2-100, and § 9.09(g) of the City Charter was 
in the context of the City's closing argument supporting the 
reasonableness of its actions in adopting the Text Amendment, 
specifically the argument that a seven-year abatement period 
was reasonable.  The City's objections to the final order, as 
relevant here, stated only that the circuit court erroneously 
interpreted Code § 15.2-2307.  At no time was the circuit 
court asked to hold that the provisions of § 9.09 of the City 
Charter superseded the requirements of Code § 15.2-2307 and no 
argument was directed to the source of authority for the 
City's claim.  Accordingly, we decline to consider this 
argument because the City makes it for the first time on 
appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
10
 
In light of our holding that the circuit court correctly 
held the Text Amendment invalid as a violation of Code § 15.2-
2307, we need not address the alternative grounds cited by the 
circuit court as a basis for its holding regarding the Text 
Amendment.  
2.  Revocation of Auxiliary Use Permits 
 
In its second assignment of error the City states that 
the circuit court erred in construing § 11-506(A) of the City 
Zoning Ordinance to require, as a prerequisite to revocation 
of a SUP, a violation of "a law having a nexus to the specific 
purpose of a special use permit, rather than to the overall 
operations to which the SUP is attached." 
 
Interpretation of a local zoning ordinance, like 
interpretation of a statute, is a pure question of law, 
subject to de novo review.  Renkey v. County Bd., 272 Va. 369, 
373, 634 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2006) (quoting Virginia Polytechnic 
Inst. v. Interactive Return Serv., 271 Va. 304, 309, 626 
S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006)). 
Zoning Ordinance § 11-506(A) states: 
After notice and a public hearing, the city council 
may revoke or suspend any special use permit 
approved by it upon proof that the holder of the 
permit has failed to comply with any law, including, 
without limitation, the conditions subject to which 
the special use permit was granted. 
 
 
11
The City first argues that the phrase "any law" should be 
given its plain meaning.  Adoption of the plain meaning of 
this phrase would allow revocation of an SUP if its holder 
violated a local traffic law or federal tax statute.  We 
decline to adopt an interpretation of this legislative 
enactment that would allow such incongruous results. 
The City apparently recognized the difficulties of 
applying a plain meaning construction to the phrase "any law" 
because, as expressed in its assignment of error, the City 
does not seek a plain meaning construction but instead asks 
that the phrase be construed to mean any law related to the 
overall operation to which an SUP is connected.  This 
construction, however, is not consistent with the legislative 
intent of the ordinance.  
The ordinance identifies violations of "conditions 
subject to which the special use permit was granted" as 
grounds for revocation of the SUP.  This provision reflects an 
intent to base the revocation of the SUP on activities 
connected to the SUP. The construction advanced by the City 
does not require any such relationship and thus is 
inconsistent with the expressed legislative intent.  The 
construction adopted by the trial court, however, does 
maintain the relationship between the SUP and the offending 
 
12
actions because it requires some nexus between the law 
violated and the purpose of the SUP. 
Nevertheless, the City maintains that its suggested 
construction of the ordinance should be given deference under 
the principle that a consistent administrative construction of 
an ordinance should be given much weight.  See, e.g., Trustees 
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 273 Va. 375, 381-82, 641 S.E. 2d 
104, 107 (2007); Lamar Co., LLC v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 270 
Va. 540, 547, 620 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2005).  Nothing in this 
record, however, establishes that the construction advanced by 
the City was a consistent construction of the ordinance or one 
that had been applied in the past.  The City identified two 
instances in which SUPs were revoked for violation of a law, 
but both involved violations of the City's zoning law, not a 
state or federal law.  Additionally, neither of those 
instances appeared to address the interpretation advanced by 
the City here – that is, a law with a nexus to the overall 
operation to which the SUP is attached.  Accordingly, we 
reject the City's contention that its interpretation of the 
zoning ordinance in this case is entitled to deference or 
great weight. 
 
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
construing the phrase "any law" in § 11-506(A) of the zoning 
ordinance as any law having a nexus to the purpose of the SUP 
 
13
and, therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court reversing the City's revocation of Mirant's two 
auxiliary SUPs.3 
Affirmed. 
                     
3 In its brief the City contends that even if the 
construction adopted by the circuit court is correct, the SUPs 
should not have been vacated because the violations upon which 
the City acted in revoking the permit "did have a nexus to the 
purpose of the SUPs."  We do not address this argument, 
however, because it is not encompassed in the assignment of 
error.  Rule 5:17(c).