Title: Squillace v. Kelley

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Squillace v. Kelley1999 WY 151990 P.2d 497Case Number: 99-89Decided: 11/18/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MARK 
S. SQUILLACE, Appellant (Petitioner-Defendant),

v.

BRENDA HALE KELLEY, 
Appellee (Respondent-Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Albany County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, 
Judge.

Tim Newcomb and 
Maynard D. Grant of Grant & Newcomb, Laramie, Wyoming, and Seattle, 
Washington, representing appellant.

Becky N. Klemt 
of Pence and MacMillan, Laramie, Wyoming, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this case we 
shall address the constitutional propriety of the enactment of a statute, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128, by the legislature prescribing a rule of practice and 
procedure in civil actions. In a civil action seeking a downward modification of 
child support, the district court, upon motion by the custodial parent, applied 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128, which prohibit the signing and 
filing of a "pleading, motion, or other paper" for "any improper purpose." Under 
the statute, if an attorney or party violates this provision, the court "shall 
impose . . . an appropriate sanction. . . ."

[¶2]      The father, a 
licensed attorney who was representing himself in seeking the downward 
modification, had hand-delivered to the district court for filing a copy of a 
letter he was mailing to the attorney representing his former wife, the mother. 
The former wife's attorney filed a motion, invoking Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128, 
claiming that the letter copy was an improper ex parte communication to the 
district court and was interposed in an effort to taint the judicial process. In 
this motion, the former wife's attorney sought an order striking the letter copy 
from the court file and imposing costs and attorney's fees and such other 
sanctions as the court deemed appropriate. After a hearing on the motion and 
over the non-custodial parent's objection, the district court ruled that the 
filing of the letter copy was "not proper," ordered the letter copy stricken 
from the record, and awarded $220.00 in attorney's fees to the former wife's 
attorney. The non-custodial parent filed a timely appeal.

[¶3]      We hold the 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128, to be an invasion of the constitutional 
powers of the judicial branch of government, and we reverse the district court's 
order and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

[¶4]      The briefs of the 
parties in this case focus upon a number of issues.1 We shall not resolve these issues 
because of our treatment of the question of constitutional powers. Even though 
the parties have not raised the constitutional question, this Court has the 
power to dispose of that question. White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 
1984).

The procedural 
tenor of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128 (LEXIS 1999) is 
obvious:

§ 1-14-128. 
Baseless pleadings.

[¶5]      In any civil 
action whether based on tort, contract or otherwise, the signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or other 
paper is signed in violation of this section, the court, upon motion or upon its 
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, 
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties up to double the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by 
the other party because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper 
including reasonable attorney's fees.

This statute 
resembles in part W.R.C.P. 11 which provides:

Rule 11. Signing 
of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court; 
sanctions.

(a) Signature. - 
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one 
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not 
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state 
the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of 
the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the 
attorney or party.

(b) 
Representations to court. - By presenting to the court (whether by signing, 
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances:

(1) It is not 
being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation;

(2) The claims, 
defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or 
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law;

(3) The 
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; 
and

(4) The denials 
of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 

(c) Sanctions. - 
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines 
that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or 
parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the 
violation.

(1) How 
initiated.

(A) By motion. - 
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other 
motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be 
filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the 
motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, 
claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or 
appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party 
prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in 
presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm 
shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, 
associates, and employees.

(B) On court's 
initiative. - On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the 
specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an 
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision 
(b) with respect thereto.

(2) Nature of 
sanction; limitations. - A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be 
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable 
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives 
of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on 
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the 
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses 
incurred as a direct result of the violation.

(A) Monetary 
sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of 
subdivision (b)(2).

(B) Monetary 
sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues 
its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims 
made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be 
sanctioned.

(3) Order. When 
imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to 
constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction 
imposed.

(d) 
Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not 
apply to discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject 
to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.

[¶6]      When we make a 
side-by-side comparison of the statutory and rule provisions, however, we find 
the latter are more comprehensive than the former in several important 
particulars. One of those important particulars concerns the motion procedure 
dealing with sanctions. The statute is silent concerning the procedure to be 
used by the moving party when raising a violation by motion. In contrast, the 
provisions of W.R.C.P. 11(c)(1)(A) are specific: the motion for sanctions shall 
be served as Rule 5 provides "but shall not be filed with or presented to the 
court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period 
as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper . . . is not withdrawn or 
appropriately corrected." In the present case, this procedure was not 
followed.2 

[¶7]      Another important 
particular concerns the contents of the order imposing sanctions upon the 
court's determination that a violation has occurred. Again, the statute is 
silent on this particular. In contrast, the provisions of W.R.C.P. 11(c)(3) are 
specific: in the order imposing sanctions, the court must "describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the 
sanction imposed." In the present case, the order imposing sanctions did not 
meet these requirements.3

[¶8]      Having compared 
the statutory provisions and the rule provisions, we conclude that the former 
are inconsistent with the latter. "Statutory provisions shall not apply whenever 
inconsistent with these rules. . . ." W.R.C.P. 81.

[¶9]      We now turn to 
our consideration of the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128 because 
of its apparent infringement upon the doctrine of separation of powers. Article 
2, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
provides:

The powers of 
the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: the 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted.

Article 5, § 2 
of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides in pertinent part that this 
Court "shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, 
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law." This general 
superintending control "encompasses the authority to prescribe rules of practice 
and procedure in those courts." White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d  at 106. We have 
consistently upheld this Court's plenary power to control the course of 
litigation in the trial courts. Id. The legislature recognizes these pertinent 
constitutional provisions which afford this Court full authority over rules of 
practice and procedure and the Court's inherent power to prescribe rules. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 5-2-114, 115 (LEXIS 1999). The prescription of the practice and 
procedure attending the imposition of sanctions for the signing and filing of 
papers with the courts is a procedural, not a substantive, matter. The 
legislature is prohibited from enacting statutes pertaining to such matter. 
White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d  at 107. In Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128, the legislature 
has impermissibly enacted a statute pertaining to a procedural matter; 
therefore, we hold that this statute is unconstitutional.

[¶10]   We reverse the order of the 
district court and remand this case to that court for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 Mr. 
Squillace's brief raises these issues:

1. 
Did the sanctions imposed by the district court violate due 
process?

2. 
Did the sanctions imposed by the district court violate Rule 11, Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure?

3. 
Should the award of sanctions be vacated because the proposed Order was an 
improper ex parte communication which violated Rule 3.5 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Professional Conduct?

4. 
Should the proposed Order be vacated as untimely under Rule 58, Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and because the Appellee failed to submit the proposed Order to 
the Appellant before filing with the Court in violation of that same 
rule?

Ms. 
Kelley's brief presents these issues:

I. 
Appellant's letter was an improper ex parte communication to the district court, 
and was properly stricken from the court file.

II. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Appellee $220.00 in 
attorney's fees in connection with her motion to strike Appellant's letter from 
the court file.

III. Even if Appellant's letter was not an ex parte communication, it was 
an improper attempt to put matters before the district court, other than as 
allowed by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence.

IV. 
Appellee should be awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 10.05.

2 December 
16, 1998, was the scheduled date on which Mr. Squillace's modification petition 
was to be heard. On December 2, 1998, he hand-delivered the letter copy in 
question to the district court. He mailed the original to opposing counsel who 
received it two days later. On December 7, 1998, opposing counsel filed her 
motion for sanctions. On December 9, 1998, Mr. Squillace filed his opposition to 
that motion. On December 16, 1998, the district court heard the attorneys on the 
motion before proceeding with the hearing on the modification petition. On 
January 20, 1999, the district court entered its order which granted the motion 
and imposed sanctions.

3 The order 
granting the motion and imposing sanctions recites:

This matter having come on for hearing the 16th day of December, 1998; 
Petitioner appearing pro se, and Defendant appearing personally and with 
counsel, Becky N. Klemt of the law firm of Pence and MacMillan; the Court having 
heard the testimony of the parties and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

1. 
That Petitioner's Motion To Strike shall be 
granted.

2. 
That Respondent shall be awarded $220.00 in sanctions against 
Petitioner.

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Petitioner's Motion 
to Strike should be, and the same is hereby, 
granted.

IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall be awarded $220.00 in sanctions against 
Petitioner.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 19th day of January, 1999. . . 
.