Title: WSSC v. Bowen

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 103
September Term, 2007
_________________________________________
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION, et al.
v.
COLLEEN BOWEN, et al.
_________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
       * Raker
      
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned),
                  JJ.
_________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   August 26, 2009
*Raker, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member
of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
This is another case involving an attempted appeal, under the so-called
“collateral order” doctrine, from an interlocutory order rendered by a trial court.  Like
the result in numerous similar collateral order doctrine cases decided by this Court in
recent years, the attempted appeal in this case will be unsuccessful.1  
I.
The facts relating to the appealability issue in this case are not extensive.  Most
of the factual detail set forth in the briefs and record extract concern matters which we
shall not reach, namely the merits of the plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action and the
defenses advanced by the defendants.  
This litigation began on October 13, 2006, when 16 former merit system
employees of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the WSSC and
1
Other recent cases in this Court rejecting attempted appeals under the collateral order doctrine
include, e.g., Hudson v. Housing Authority, 402 Md. 18, 25-27, 935 A.2d 395, 399-400 (2007); St.
Mary’s County v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 427-431, 903 A.2d 378, 386-387 (2006); St. Joseph’s v.
Cardiac Surgery, 392 Md. 75, 85-88, 896 A.2d 304, 310-311 (2006); Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315,
329-330, 884 A.2d 1215, 1223 (2005); Dawkins v. Baltimore Police, 376 Md. 53, 827 A.2d 115
(2003); Theurer v. Farrell, 376 Md. 65, 827 A.2d 122 (2003); In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 633-636,
820 A.2d 587, 591-593, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 948, 124 S.Ct. 398, 157 L.Ed.2d 279 (2003); Housing
Authority v. Smalls, 369 Md. 224, 798 A.2d 579 (2002); Orthodox Council v. Abramson, 368 Md.
1, 791 A.2d 129 (2002); In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 326-328, 783 A.2d 673, 685-686 (2001);
Peck v. DiMario, 362 Md. 660, 766 A.2d 616 (2001); Bowers v. Callahan, 359 Md. 395, 754 A.2d
388 (2000); Dennis v. Folkenberg, 354 Md. 412, 731 A.2d 883 (1999); Pittsburgh Corning v. James,
353 Md. 657, 660-666, 728 A.2d 210, 211-214 (1999); Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 353 Md. 508, 727
A.2d 929 (1999); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 164-170, 725 A.2d 549, 561-563 (1999).  See
also Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 477-482, 540 A.2d 805, 807-810 (1988).
-2-
certain officials of the WSSC.2   The 16 plaintiffs had been employed in the Information
Technology Department of the WSSC.  The event giving rise to this lawsuit was the
WSSC’s “restructuring” of the Information Technology Department, whereby
approximately 80 merit system positions in the Department, including the positions
held by the 16 plaintiffs, were abolished, and new non-merit system positions were
created.3  The WSSC then terminated the employment of the 16 plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that, “after abolishing the plaintiffs’
positions, the WSSC spent millions of dollars on training the new, younger contract
workers who replaced the plaintiffs . . . .”  The complaint went on to state that “the real
purpose behind the abolishment . . . was: (1) for defendant WSSC to avoid paying
costly retirement benefits to the plaintiffs who were nearing retirement age; (2) and to
unlawfully create a new class of WSSC workers outside of the protections of the merit
system, where they could be hired and fired at will without the statutory protections
that the WSSC workforce is entitled to under Art. 29, §§ 11-101 et seq.” 
The complaint further alleged that most of the plaintiffs “would have been
eligible for retirement within the next few years” and that, because of their ages, most
of the plaintiffs “have been unable to find comparable employment elsewhere.”  The
plaintiffs also asserted that WSSC violated its own procedures and regulations by not
2
Hereafter, for convenience, both the defendant Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission and
the individual defendants will be collectively referred to as WSSC.
3
It is not clear from the briefs and record precisely how many positions were abolished.  At
different places in the briefs and record, the numbers 73, 80 and 81 are used.  The discrepancy is not
relevant to the issue now before the Court.
-3-
terminating “the least senior employee . . . first” and by failing to reemploy the
plaintiffs “in preference to any eligible person who is not an employee of the WSSC
. . . .”
In addition to claiming that the WSSC violated its own procedures and
regulations, the plaintiffs contended that the restructuring violated the merit system
provisions applicable to WSSC and contained in Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.
Vol., 2008 Supp.), Article 29, §§ 11-102 et seq. The plaintiffs also claimed that the
restructuring violated Article 29, § 11-110, relating to layoffs by WSSC, violated the
prohibition against age discrimination set forth in Article 29, § 1-107, and violated
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief restoring the plaintiffs to their former merit system
employment.  They did not seek monetary damages.
WSSC on January 3, 2007, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment.  The principal ground for the motion was that “the
lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity.”  The motion
continued:
“Abolishing the . . . positions Plaintiffs and others occupied
was accomplished through a budgetary process spelled out
by the Maryland General Assembly, and approved by
WSSC’s Commissioners, the Secretary of the Maryland
Department of Budget and Management, and by the County
Councils of Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties. 
Eliminating public-sector jobs under these circumstances
constitutes legislative activity to which the doctrine of
absolute legislative immunity squarely applies.”
-4-
WSSC’s motion also contended that the complaint failed to state a claim and that
WSSC did not violate its own procedures and regulations.  Attached to WSSC’s motion
were 45 exhibits, consisting of numerous governmental documents, minutes and agenda
of meetings, affidavits by government officials, memoranda written by government
personnel, and letters between government personnel.
The plaintiffs’ opposition to WSSC’s motion set forth in detail the reasons
underlying the plaintiffs’ contentions that the restructuring violated WSSC’s own
procedures and regulations as well as Article 29 of the Maryland Code and Articles 19
and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The plaintiffs’ opposition also
challenged the applicability of “legislative immunity” under the circumstances of this
case.  In addition, the plaintiffs disputed WSSC’s assertion that the restructuring was
approved by the County Councils of Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties.
A Circuit Court hearing on WSSC’s motion took place on June 1, 2007.  After
argument by counsel for each side, the Circuit Court orally denied WSSC’s motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.  On June 29, 2007, WSSC filed
a notice of appeal from the June 1st oral ruling by the Circuit Court.  Sometime
thereafter, the plaintiffs filed in the Court of Special Appeals a motion to dismiss the
interlocutory appeal.
In July 2007, WSSC filed in the Circuit Court a motion to stay all proceedings
in the case while the appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals.  The motion
was prompted by earlier interrogatories and document requests served on WSSC. 
WSSC had not responded to those interrogatories and document requests.  WSSC’s
-5-
motion indicated that its purpose was to stay all discovery during the pendency of the
appeal.  In addition, on July 23, 2007, the plaintiffs sent to the defendants’ counsel a
notice to take the deposition of one of the individual defendants.  The Circuit Court on
August 8, 2007, denied the motion for a stay pending appeal.  Nevertheless, WSSC
continued its refusal to comply with discovery requests, and the plaintiffs on
August 22, 2007, filed a motion for sanctions.
On September 4, 2007, the Court of Special Appeals granted the plaintiffs’
motion to dismiss WSSC’s appeal on the ground that the June 1, 2009, ruling was not
a final judgment.
Two days later, on September 6, 2007, WSSC filed a notice of appeal from the
Circuit Court’s August 8th order denying the motion for a stay pending appeal.  On the
following day, September 7, 2007, WSSC filed in the Court of Special Appeals a
“Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.”   This motion was denied by the Court of Special
Appeals on September 19, 2007.
Next, WSSC on October 15, 2007, filed in this Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari, presenting the following two issues:
“Petitioners seek review of the following two questions:
1. Are local government councils and commissions, such as the
WSSC, entitled to absolute legislative immunity for a decision
to restructure a department pursuant to the legislative budget
review process set forth at Art. 29, §§ 11-102 and 11-103?
2. Do the top officials of a local commission have the right to
appeal an interlocutory order denying their defense of absolute
legislative immunity under the collateral order doctrine?”
-6-
This Court granted the certiorari petition on December 13, 2007.  WSSC v. Bowen, 402
Md. 355, 936 A.2d 852 (2007).  
We shall answer the certiorari petition’s second issue in the negative and hold
that the June 1, 2007, interlocutory ruling was not appealable.  Consequently, we shall
not express any opinion with regard to the first issue in the certiorari petition.4 
4
As previously pointed out, in addition to WSSC’s appeal from the June 1, 2007, ruling denying
WSSC’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, WSSC on September 6, 2007, filed a second
notice of appeal.  This second appeal was from the Circuit Court’s August 8, 2007, order denying
a stay of Circuit Court proceedings, and particularly a stay of all discovery.  The Court of Special
Appeals on December 4, 2007, after the certiorari petition was filed in the present case, dismissed
the second appeal.  The Court of Special Appeals’ mandate in the second appeal was issued on
January 3, 2008.  WSSC did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the second appeal case. 
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals’ dismissal of the second appeal finally terminated
appellate proceedings with respect to the interlocutory appeal regarding a stay or a postponement
of discovery.
Nevertheless, WSSC’s briefs in this Court argued that officials of the WSSC should not be
required to appear for depositions, relying upon Public Service Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md.
200, 477 A.2d 759 (1984), and Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 654 A.2d 877 (1995). 
(WSSC’s opening brief at 34, 37-38; WSSC’s reply brief at 2, 19-20).  Neither Patuxent Valley nor
Stevens involved claims of immunity from suit.  Instead they were appeals from interlocutory orders
by trial courts, in actions for judicial review of adjudicatory administrative decisions, ordering the
administrative decision-makers to appear for depositions concerning their thought processes in
rendering the administrative decisions.
WSSC’s discovery argument is not properly before us for at least two reasons.  First, the
argument was the subject of the second appeal, from the Circuit Court’s order of August 8, 2007,
and WSSC did not file a certiorari petition in the second appeal case.  The present appellate
proceedings are from the Circuit Court’s June 1, 2007, ruling, and that ruling did not involve any
discovery matter.  In fact, at the beginning of the June 1, 2007, hearing, counsel for WSSC stated
that no discovery issue was before the Court.  Second, the discovery issue was not encompassed by
the questions presented in WSSC’s certiorari petition.  For this reason also, the issue is not before
us.  See Maryland Rule 8-131(b); Garner v. Archers Glen, 405 Md. 43, 60-61, 949 A.2d 639, 649
(2008); Boyd v. State, 399 Md. 457, 473, 924 A.2d 1112, 1121 (2007), and cases there cited. 
Finally, even if the issue were before us, it would lack merit.  The present case is distinguishable
from Patuxent Valley and Stevens on several grounds.  See also Hudson v. Housing Authority, supra,
402 Md. at 25-26, 935 A.2d at 399; Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 914 A.2d 783 (2007); St. Mary’s
(continued...)
-7-
II.
The exercise of appellate jurisdiction in Maryland is normally dependent upon
a final judgment rendered by the trial court.  See, e.g., Hudson v. Housing Authority,
402 Md. 18, 24, 935 A.2d 395, 398 (2007)(“The general proposition in Maryland is that
‘to be appealable an order or judgment ordinarily must be final’”); St. Mary’s County
v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 424, 903 A.2d 378, 383-384 (2006)(“Ordinarily, appellate
review is available only after the entry of a final judgment where all claims against all
parties are resolved. *** The fundamental objective of this principle is ‘to prevent
piecemeal appeals and to prevent the interruptions of ongoing judicial proceedings’”);
St. Joseph’s v. Cardiac Surgery, 392 Md. 75, 84, 896 A.2d 304, 309 (2006)(“As this
Court has emphasized on numerous occasions, very recently by Judge Raker for the
Court in Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 323, 884 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2005), ‘[t]he general
rule as to appeals is that, subject to a few, limited exceptions, a party may appeal only
from a final judgment’”).
The “exceptions” to the final judgment principle were recently summarized in
St. Joseph’s v. Cardiac Surgery, supra, 392 Md. at 84, 896 A.2d at 309:
“Moreover, under Maryland law, the ‘few, limited exceptions’ to the final
judgment rule number only three.  Judge Wilner for the Court in Salvagno
v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615, 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005), explained:
‘[W]e have made clear that the right to seek appellate review
of a trial court’s ruling ordinarily must await the entry of a
4
(...continued)
County v. Lacer, supra, 393 Md. at 429-430, 903 A.2d at 386-387; St. Joseph’s v. Cardiac Surgery,
supra,  392 Md. at 87-88, 896 A.2d at 311; Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 141 n.8, 680 A.2d
1040, 1045 n. 8 (1996). 
-8-
final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties,
and that there are only three exceptions to that final
judgment requirement: appeals from interlocutory orders
specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted
under Maryland Rule 2-602; and appeals from interlocutory
rulings allowed under the common law collateral order
doctrine.’”
See also St. Mary’s County v. Lacer, supra, 393 Md. at 424-425, 903 A.2d at 383-384. 
It is undisputed that the Circuit Court’s June 1, 2007, ruling denying WSSC’s
immunity defense was not a final judgment, was not an appealable interlocutory order
under any statute, and was not appealable under Maryland Rule 2-602.  The issue, as
pointed out in the beginning of this opinion, is whether the ruling was appealable under
the collateral order doctrine.
This Court, in numerous opinions, has described and delineated the requirements
of the collateral order doctrine.  For example, Judge Harrell for the Court, in St. Mary’s
County v. Lacer, supra,  393 Md. at 428, 903 A.2d at 386, explained the collateral order
doctrine as follows:
“This doctrine treats a ‘narrow class’ of interlocutory orders as
final judgments regardless of the posture of the case. In re Franklin
P., 366 Md. 306, 326, 783 A.2d 673, 685 (2001); Harris v. Harris,
310 Md. 310, 315, 529 A.2d 356, 358 (1987). This reprieve from
the final judgment requirement, however, is a ‘very narrow
exception.’ Pittsburgh Corning v. James, 353 Md. 657, 660, 728
A.2d 210, 211 (1999).
    “The collateral order doctrine permits an appeal from an
order that satisfies the following four requirements:
(1) it must conclusively determine the disputed question;
(2) it must resolve an important issue;
(3) it must be completely separate from the merits of the action;
and
(4) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
-9-
judgment.”
Moreover, the “‘four elements of the test are conjunctive in nature and in order . . . to
fall within this exception to the ordinary operation of the final judgment requirement,
each of the four elements must be met.’”  Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 563, 914 A.2d
783, 792 (2007), quoting In Re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 327, 783 A.2d 673, 686
(2001).
In Dawkins v. Baltimore Police, 376 Md. 53, 64, 827 A.2d 115, 121 (2003), we
characterized the collateral order doctrine as follows (footnote omitted):
“The collateral order doctrine is based upon a judicially created
fiction, under which certain interlocutory orders are considered to
be final judgments, even though such orders clearly are not final
judgments.  The justification for the fiction is a perceived
necessity, in ‘a very few . . . extraordinary situations,’ for
immediate appellate review.”
Time after time, this Court’s opinions have emphasized that the collateral order
doctrine is extremely narrow and that it is applicable only under extraordinary
circumstances.  See, e.g., Hudson v. Housing Authority, supra,  402 Md. at 25, 935
A.2d at 399 (The doctrine encompasses “a ‘narrow’ class of interlocutory orders in
‘extraordinary circumstances’”);  St. Joseph’s v. Cardiac Surgery, supra, 392 Md. at
85, 896 A.2d at 310 (The doctrine applies “under extremely limited circumstances”);
Nnoli v. Nnoli, supra,  389 Md. at 329, 884 A.2d at 1223 (“The collateral order doctrine
is a very narrow exception to the final judgment rule, and each of its four requirements
is very strictly applied in Maryland. * * * [It is inapplicable if the] case does not
-10-
present an extraordinary situation”); In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 634, 820 A.2d 587, 591,
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 948, 124 S.Ct. 398, 157 L.Ed.2d 279 (2003)(“[T]he doctrine may
be entertained only in extraordinary circumstances”).
The interlocutory ruling, from which the appeal in the case at bar was taken, was
the Circuit Court’s June 1, 2007, oral ruling denying the defendants’ claim of immunity
from suit.  We shall assume arguendo that the first three requirements of the collateral
order doctrine were satisfied.  The issue debated by the parties, and the issue that we
shall focus upon, is whether the fourth requirement of the doctrine was met, namely
whether the ruling denying the immunity claim would be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.
The issue of WSSC’s claimed immunity from an adverse judgment would clearly
be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.  If a final judgment is entered against
WSSC, and if WSSC is actually immune from suit under the circumstances, the
judgment will be reversed on appeal and the trial court will be directed to dismiss the
action.  Consequently, in this respect, the fourth requirement of the collateral order
doctrine is obviously not satisfied.
Nonetheless, WSSC argues that one aspect of immunity is to “insulate” the
defendants “against the rigors of defending a lawsuit” and that this aspect of “immunity
is effectively unreviewable if the appeal must await the entry of final judgment . . . .”
(WSSC’s opening brief at 32, 33.)  This “avoidance of trial” argument is the same
argument that has been made in all other cases in this Court involving attempted
appeals from interlocutory trial court orders denying immunity claims.  See Dawkins
-11-
v. Baltimore Police, supra, 376 Md. at 60-65, 827 A.2d at 119-122, and cases there
cited.
The Court in the Dawkins opinion, quoting Bunting v. State,  312 Md. 472, 540
A.2d 805 (1988), pointed to the major problem with the “avoidance of trial” contention
(Dawkins, 376 Md. at 60-61, 827 A.2d at 119):
“The Bunting opinion, 312 Md. at 479-480, 540 A.2d at 808, went
on to point out that a
‘difficulty with the defendant’s argument is that numerous
“rights” can readily be characterized as entitling a party to
avoid trial under some circumstances.  For example, the
“right” to summary judgment might be characterized as a
right not to stand trial unless the opposing party has created
a genuine issue of material fact.  Similarly, the statute of
limitations might be characterized as granting a defendant a
right not to be tried out of time.  See Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 550-551, 105 S.Ct 2806, 2828-2829, 86
L.Ed.2d 411, 441 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). If all “rights” which could be
characterized in this manner were treated like the right
against double jeopardy, the collateral order doctrine would
largely erode the final judgment rule.  Consequently, it is
important that we narrowly construe the notion of an
entitlement not to be sued or prosecuted.’
“The Court in Bunting concluded that permitting interlocutory
appeals because an order involves the right to avoid trial should be
confined to a few extraordinary situations (312 Md. at 481-482,
540 A.2d at 809):
   ‘In sum, the idea that an issue is not effectively reviewable
after the termination of the trial because it involves a “right”
to avoid the trial itself, should be limited to double jeopardy
claims and a very few other extraordinary situations. 
Otherwise, as previously indicated, there would be a
proliferation of appeals under the collateral order doctrine. 
This would be flatly inconsistent with the long-established
-12-
and sound public policy against piecemeal appeals.’”
This Court in Dawkins went on to hold as follows (376 Md. at 65, 827 A.2d at
122, emphasis added):
“As a general rule, interlocutory trial court orders rejecting
defenses of common law sovereign immunity, governmental
immunity, public official immunity, statutory immunity, or any
other type of immunity, are not appealable under the Maryland
collateral order doctrine.  Whether, and under what circumstances,
interlocutory orders overruling immunity defenses asserted by the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Comptroller, Treasurer, Attorney
General, Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, or judges
as defined in Article IV, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, are
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine will
have to be determined in any future cases that might arise.  Cf.
Mandel v. O’Hara, 320 Md. 103, 134, 576 A.2d 766, 781 (1990). 
Interlocutory trial court orders overruling immunity claims by other
government officials, employees, departments, agencies, entities,
units, or subdivisions, or by private persons or entities, are not
appealable under the doctrine.”
The Dawkins holding reflected several prior decisions by this Court rejecting appeals
from interlocutory trial court orders denying immunity claims.  See Housing Authority
v. Smalls, 369 Md. 224, 798 A.2d 579 (2002); Orthodox Jewish Council v. Abramson,
368 Md. 1, 791 A.2d 129 (2002); Peck v. DiMario, 362 Md. 660, 766 A.2d 616 (2001);
Bowers v. Callahan, 359 Md. 395, 754 A.2d 388 (2000); Dennis v. Folkenberg, 354
Md. 412, 731 A.2d 883 (1999); Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 353 Md. 508, 727 A.2d 929
(1999); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 165-170, 725 A.2d 549, 560-563 (1999). 
Moreover, Dawkins has consistently been cited with approval by this Court’s
subsequent opinions dealing with the collateral order doctrine.  See, e.g., Hudson v.
-13-
Housing Authority, supra, 402 Md. at 25, 935 A.2d at 399; Ehrlich v. Grove, supra, 396
Md. at 562-563, 914 A.2d at 791; St. Joseph’s v. Cardiac Surgery, supra, 392 Md. at
85-86, 896 A.2d at 310; Nnoli v. Nnoli, supra, 389 Md. at 329; 884 A.2d at 1223.
The holding in Dawkins is dispositive of the present case.  The immunity
asserted by WSSC certainly falls within the Dawkins phrase “any other type of
immunity.”  None of the individual defendants falls within the category of officials
whose immunity claims might be within an exception to the principle that interlocutory
orders denying immunity are not appealable.
Despite the above-cited cases, WSSC advances essentially two arguments for
allowing the present interlocutory appeal.
WSSC argues that Dawkins “did not include legislative immunity in [the] list”
of immunity claims which are not appealable under the Maryland collateral order
doctrine and that our cases do not preclude applying the doctrine when officials are
“acting in a legislative capacity.”  (WSSC’s opening brief at 35, emphasis in the
original).  Although Dawkins did not expressly delineate legislative immunity, such
immunity claims clearly fall within the language in Dawkins of “any other type of
immunity.”  Furthermore, the final paragraph of Dawkins, setting forth its holding,
expressly refers to Mandel v. O’Hara, 320 Md. 103, 132 -134, 576 A.2d 766, 781
(1990), which involved a claim of legislative immunity by the Governor in connection
with the veto of legislation.  There is no sound basis, in Dawkins or in any other
decision by this Court, for distinguishing legislative immunity from all other types of
immunity with respect to attempted appeals under the collateral order doctrine.
-14-
WSSC also argues that Dawkins, and other cases in this Court refusing to apply
the collateral order doctrine to interlocutory appeals from orders denying immunity,
involved “qualified immunity, not absolute . . . immunity,” and that “[a]bsolute
legislative immunity differs significantly from qualified . . . immunity, and it deserves
greater protection.”  (WSSC’s opening brief at 32, 36).  Dawkins, 376 Md. at 65, 827
A.2d at 122, however, expressly held that “interlocutory trial court orders rejecting
defenses of . . . sovereign immunity . . . , or any other type of immunity, are not
appealable under the Maryland collateral order doctrine.”  (Emphasis added). 
Moreover, one of the cases relied upon in Dawkins was Samuels v. Tschechtelin, supra,
353 Md. 508, 727 A.2d 929, reversing Tschechtelin v. Samuels, 124 Md. App. 389, 722
A.2d 414 (1999), which involved a claim of sovereign immunity.  Sovereign immunity
of the State or State Agencies is absolute immunity.5  
In addition, for purposes of interlocutory appeals from denials of immunity
claims, where the issue relates to the fourth requirement of the collateral order doctrine,
there is no reason for distinguishing between a valid absolute immunity claim and a
valid qualified immunity claim.  When a qualified immunity claim is not defeated by
5
In connection with the argument distinguishing qualified immunity from absolute immunity for
purposes of the collateral order doctrine, WSSC cites Shoemaker v. Smith, supra, 353 Md. at 166,
725 A.2d at 561, and attributes to Shoemaker a “ruling that the collateral order doctrine ‘will likely’
apply ‘when immunity is absolute and is not defeated by malice, gross negligence, or other
defense.’” (WSSC’s opening brief at 32). The quoted language from Shoemaker was this Court’s
description of a Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in another case.  Moreover, the portion of
Shoemaker which is quoted by WSSC related to the third requirement of the collateral order doctrine
and not the fourth requirement which involves reviewability of the order on appeal from a final
judgment.  Shoemaker dealt with the fourth requirement later in the opinion, 353 Md. at 168-170,
725 A.2d at 562-563.
-15-
malice or some other factor which might defeat qualified immunity, the two types of
immunity claims are the same and are reviewable on appeal from an adverse final
judgment.  If valid, either form of immunity will result in a reversal of the judgment
and a direction to dismiss the action.  As to the “avoidance of trial” aspect, there is also
no difference between a valid absolute immunity defense and a valid qualified
immunity defense.  One purpose of any type of immunity from suit is to avoid having
to stand trial.  This same purpose, however, underlies a plethora of pre-trial orders.  For
this reason, pre-trial orders denying immunity claims are generally not reviewable by
interlocutory appeals.
In light of Dawkins and numerous other decisions by this Court, the Court of
Special Appeals correctly dismissed WSSC’s appeal.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
PETITIONERS TO PAY COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS.