Title: Hofer v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of McCook Cty.

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

334 N.W.2d 507 (1983) Roger HOFER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF McCOOK COUNTY, State of South Dakota, and Walter Stevens, Chairman, Ralph Hetland, Orville Hofer, Terry Krantz, and William Nafziger, Defendants and Appellees. No. 13762. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs January 19, 1983. Decided June 1, 1983. *508 Dale L. Strasser of Blue & Strasser, Freeman, for plaintiff and appellant. Douglas R. Bleeker of Shandorf, Bleeker, Boldt & Koch, Mitchell, for defendants and appellees; Roger R. Gerlach, McCook County State's Atty., Salem, on brief. MORGAN, Justice. This appeal arises from a referendum calling for a vote on a resolution adopted by appellees, McCook County Commissioners (Commissioners). Commissioners voted the resolution was not referable and appellant Roger Hofer (Hofer) brought this action in circuit court. Circuit court affirmed the Commissioners' actions and Hofer appeals. We reverse and remand. On June 2, 1981, Commissioners adopted the following resolution: On July 7, 1981, sufficient referendum petitions calling for the submission of said resolution to the voters of McCook County for approval or rejection were filed with the county auditor. Commissioners, at a meeting held on July 8, 1981, voted that the action was not subject to a referendum since it was a ministerial act. Hofer appealed this decision of Commissioners by mailing a copy of the notice of appeal upon one of the Commissioners and the state's attorney on July 16, 1981. The circuit court held that Commissioners' action was not subject to a referendum since it was brought pursuant to SDCL 7-18A-15 which the court thereby found unconstitutional. We first take note of the serious procedural error that has occurred in the proceedings below. SDCL 15-6-24(c) provides, in pertinent part: The Commissioners of McCook County do not fall within the category of "the state, or an officer, agency or employee of the state." Id. There could hardly be a clearer case for the necessity of intervention by the attorney general, the chief legal officer for the state. A local branch of government *509 using taxpayers' funds was assailing an enactment of the state legislature. Defense of the legislative action was left to a private citizen. The record is barren of any notice to the attorney general in compliance with the statute and we cannot conceive that, had such notice been given, the attorney general would have failed to take action to intervene. We therefore hold that the attorney general had a right of intervention on behalf of the state, that absent the requisite notice or waiver by the attorney general the trial court below proceeded to judgment absent an indispensable party. Because remand for rehearing without some direction would possibly produce the same result, we proceed to the merits of the constitutional issue. Appellant Hofer acted under SDCL 7-18A-15 when he obtained the signatures to refer the Commissioners' resolution. This statute provides: There is no suggestion that the resolution falls within the exceptions noted "for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, or for the support of the county government and its existing public institutions." SDCL 7-18A-15. Commissioners, however, contend that there is no constitutional basis for the legislation providing a referendum for decisions of a county commission. The South Dakota Constitution, Article III, section 1, provides, in pertinent part: Commissioners argue that because the constitution specifically extends the referendum to municipalities, application to counties is excluded under the doctrine "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) and that the trial court was correct in its decision. The longstanding rule is that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1981); People in Interest of T.L.J., 303 N.W.2d 800 (S.D.1981); County of Tripp v. State, 264 N.W.2d 213 (S.D.1978); McFarland v. Barron, 83 S.D. 639, 164 N.W.2d 607 (1969). This presumption in favor of constitutionality placed a heavy burden on assailant. State v. Neville, supra. Further, where validity of a statute is assailed and there are two possible interpretations, by one of which the statute would be unconstitutional and by the other it would be valid, the court should adopt the construction which will uphold it. Crowley v. State, 268 N.W.2d 616 (S.D.1978). This court has clearly held in Kramar v. Bon Homme County, 83 S.D. 112, 115, 155 N.W.2d 777, 778 (1968) (citations omitted), "[t]he constitution is not a grant but a limitation upon the lawmaking power of the state legislature and it may enact any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited by state and federal constitutions." We further held, "[t]he rule of `expressio unius est exclusio alterius' (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) is generally not applied in construing constitutional provisions relative to the taxing power of the legislature which has been said to be *510 without limit except as prescribed by the constitution." Kramar, 83 S.D. at 117, 155 N.W.2d at 779 (citations omitted). We can conceive of no reason why the right of the people to subject the legislative actions of the county commissioners to the scrutiny of referendum vote should be afforded less protection than taxing powers. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter judgment upholding the constitutionality of SDCL 7-18A-15. All the Justices concur.