Title: State v. Hooks

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St.3d 83, 2001-Ohio-150.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HOOKS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Hooks (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 83.] 
Appellate procedure — Application for reopening appeal from judgment of 
conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
— Application denied when claimant fails to demonstrate that his 
allegations of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel have any merit — 
Court of appeals’ denial of application to reopen appeal affirmed. 
(No. 00-1771 — Submitted March 27, 2001 — Decided June 20, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 9275. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant, Danny E. Hooks, was convicted of the 
aggravated murders of Donald Danes, his wife, Karen Danes, and their sixteen-
year old son, Rodney Danes, and sentenced to death.  He was also convicted and 
sentenced to prison for three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of 
aggravated burglary.  The court of appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences.  
State v. Hooks (Oct. 22, 1986), Montgomery App. No. CA 9275, unreported, 1986 
WL 11906.  We also affirmed Hooks convictions and death sentences.  State v. 
Hooks (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 67, 529 N.E.2d 429, certiorari denied, Hooks v. Ohio 
(1989), 490 U.S. 1012, 109 S.Ct. 1657, 104 L.Ed.2d 171. 
 
Subsequently, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
deny Hooks’s petition for postconviction relief.  State v. Hooks (Oct. 30, 1998), 
Montgomery App. Nos. 16978 and 17007, unreported, 1998 WL 754574.  We 
refused to accept Hooks’s appeal of that decision.  State v. Hooks (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 1424, 707 N.E.2d 515. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
On March 17, 2000, Hooks filed an application with the court of appeals 
to reopen his initial appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, alleging ineffective assistance of his 
appellate counsel before the court of appeals in his first appeal.  However, the 
court of appeals found that Hooks had failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue 
existed and denied Hooks’s application to reopen his appeal.  State v. Hooks 
(Aug. 23, 2000), Montgomery App. No. 9275, unreported.  The cause is now 
before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Hooks raises three issues in this appeal.  First, Hooks seeks an evidentiary 
hearing to perfect his claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness.  However, a 
reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it that was not a part of the 
trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new 
matter.  See State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 
500.  Nor can the effectiveness of appellate counsel be judged by adding new 
matter to the record and then arguing that counsel should have raised these new 
issues revealed by this newly added material.  Thus, Hooks’s request for an 
evidentiary hearing lacks merit. 
 
In his second issue, Hooks argues that his appellate counsel suffered from 
a conflict of interest because his trial attorneys also represented Hooks on appeal.  
Hooks argues that a conflict exists, since such counsel were precluded from 
raising their own ineffectiveness at trial.  Admittedly, appellate counsel cannot 
realistically be expected to argue their own ineffectiveness.  State v. Lentz (1994), 
70 Ohio St.3d 527, 639 N.E.2d 784; see, also, State v. Cole (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 
112, 2 OBR 661, 443 N.E.2d 169. 
 
However, “ ‘[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a 
defendant * * * must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer’s performance.’  A possible conflict is insufficient.”  
(Citations omitted and emphasis deleted.)  State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2001 
3 
180, 187, 702 N.E.2d 866, 877.  The same rationale applies to Murnahan claims.  
As we shall discuss, Hooks has failed to demonstrate that his allegations of 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel have any merit. See State v. Dillon (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 166, 657 N.E.2d 273.  New counsel on this appeal represent Hooks, 
and no possible conflict of interest exists now. 
 
Hooks’s third issue reaches the merits of issues that he claims his former 
appellate lawyers should have raised.  Hooks claims that his appellate counsel 
were constitutionally ineffective because they failed to raise eleven specific 
assignments of error on his direct appeal before the court of appeals. 
 
The two-pronged analysis found in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, is the appropriate 
standard to assess whether Hooks has raised a “genuine issue” as to the 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, in his request under App.R. 26(B)(5).  State 
v. Spivey (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 701 N.E.2d 696, 697; State v. Reed 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 535, 660 N.E.2d 456, 458. 
 
To show ineffectiveness of counsel, Hooks must prove that his counsel 
were deficient for failing to raise the issues he now presents and that there was a 
reasonable probability of success had those claims been presented on appeal.  
State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373.  Moreover, to justify 
reopening his appeal, Hooks “bears the burden of establishing that there was a 
‘genuine issue’ as to whether he has a ‘colorable claim’ of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on appeal.”  State v. Spivey, 84 Ohio St.3d at 25, 701 N.E.2d at 696-
697. 
 
Our review of Hooks’s eleven assignments of error demonstrates that they 
had no reasonable probability of success, even if they had been raised on appeal.  
Hooks’s alleged errors are precluded by settled law, involve decisions within the 
discretion of the trial judge, or otherwise lack merit.  Additionally, the court of 
appeals noted that Hooks failed to raise many of these issues at trial and thereby 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
waived them on appeal.  Nor has Hooks demonstrated that the trial court abused 
its discretion in areas within that discretion. 
 
Hooks, for example, first claims that Ohio’s death penalty violates three 
international agreements, but that claim lacks merit.  See State v. Bey (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 487, 709 N.E.2d 484; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-
104, 656 N.E.2d 643, 670-671.  Second, Hooks asserts that he was denied a fair 
proportionality review, but that issue was resolved by State v. Steffen (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383. 
 
Hooks’s remaining assertions raise issues not previously raised at trial.  
Waiver therefore precludes those issues absent plain error, and Hooks has failed 
to demonstrate outcome-determinative plain error.  State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244. 
 
Finally, Hooks’s contention that cumulative errors committed in his case 
resulted in substantial prejudice is without merit, since “[s]uch errors cannot 
become prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.”  State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 195, 212, 661 N.E.2d 1068, 1084. 
 
Consequently, after reviewing Hooks’s assertions of deficient performance 
by appellate counsel, we find that Hooks has failed to raise “a genuine issue as to 
whether [he] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal” before 
the court of appeals as required under App.R. 26(B)(5). 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals by denying 
defendant’s appeal to reopen his appellate proceedings. 
 
Hooks was represented at trial and on direct appeal by the same two 
counsel.  Although this is a capital case, the brief filed by defense counsel in the 
court of appeals was only twenty-five pages long.  Counsel filed three 
assignments of error, one of which was a general challenge to the constitutionality 
of the death penalty.  Moreover, there were very few citations of authority within 
the assignments of error. 
 
Pursuant to App.R. 26(B)(5), “An application for reopening shall be 
granted if there is a genuine issue as to whether the applicant was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.”   Further, “[i]f the court finds that the 
performance of appellate counsel was deficient and the applicant was prejudiced 
by that deficiency, the court shall vacate its prior judgment and enter the 
appropriate judgment.  If the court does not so find, the court shall issue an order 
confirming its prior judgment.”  App.R. 26(B)(9). 
 
Clearly, in a capital case, where a defendant’s very life is at stake, a 
twenty-five-page brief is, on its face, deficient, particularly when it raises only 
three issues, only one or possibly two of which are meritorious, and none of 
which is supported by adequate authority.  Every criminal defendant is entitled to 
a thorough review of his or her case on direct appeal.  Many briefs in capital cases 
average from 150 to 300 pages and raise 15 to 25 assignments of error.  In a 
Murnahan appeal, we cannot adequately consider the numerous issues that should 
have been raised on direct appeal, as the majority has attempted to do here.  These 
issues should be fully briefed, presented by oral argument, considered in  
conference, and decided after a full review of the record in order to be completely 
and fairly addressed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
I believe that this defendant’s representation was so poor that he was not 
fairly represented on direct appeal of his death sentences.  If the facts in this case 
do not warrant a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, then I cannot 
imagine a set of facts that would meet the threshold.  The public confidence in the 
integrity of our system depends on our assurance that even those defendants who 
are alleged to have committed the most heinous crimes deserve an adequate and 
fair defense under our American system. 
 
Hooks did not receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to 
him by the Sixth Amendment.  I believe that by denying him the opportunity to 
reopen his appeal so that he may ultimately have a thorough review of his case, 
our faith in our capital system is undermined.  The results may not be different in 
the long run, but we would have the confidence that the final decision was 
reached only after Hooks received a full and vigorous representation.  For these 
reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Charles L. Willie, Clinton County Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
and Deborah Quigley, Clinton County Assistant Prosecuting Atorney, for 
appellee. 
 
Buell & Sipe Co., L.P.A., and Dennis L. Sipe; and Donald C. Schumacher, 
for appellant. 
__________________