Title: Jim Hilton v. Department of Natural Resources

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 84 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP3353 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jim Hilton, Acting on Behalf of Pages  
Homeowners' Association,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Department of Natural Resources,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green Lake   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. McMonigal   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Peter John Hoeper and Hoeper Law Offices, Waupun, and oral 
argument by Peter John Hoeper. 
 
For the defendant-appellant the cause was argued by Joanne 
F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John A. Kassner and 
Murphy Desmond S.C., Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Builders Association, and there was oral argument by John A. 
Kassner. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson and 
Debra P. Conrad, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Realtors 
Association. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William P. O’Connor, 
Mary Beth Peranteau, and Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C., 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of Lakes. 
 
 
 
 
2006 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP3353  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV148) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jim Hilton, Acting on Behalf of Pages 
Homeowners' Association, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Department of Natural Resources, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    Jim Hilton, acting on behalf of 
the Pages Homeowners' Association (Association) appeals an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, reversing the 
decision of the circuit court which had modified the order of 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
2 
 
the 
Administrative 
Law 
Judge 
(ALJ)1 
requiring 
that 
the 
Association reduce the number of boat slips on its pier.  There 
are three principal issues on appeal:  What standard of review 
must a court apply to an ALJ decision that has been expressly 
adopted by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) on a matter 
in that agency's particular area of expertise?  Whether the 
decision of the DNR, adopting that of the ALJ, that a 226-foot, 
11-slip pier is the most that "reasonable use" allows, is 
reasonable, consistent with applicable law, and supported by 
substantial evidence in the record?  Finally, if the DNR 
decision2 that the Association must reduce the number of slips 
from its current 22 to 11 is valid, whether the enforcement of 
that determination would constitute a taking of private property 
for public use under the state3 and federal4 constitutions, and 
therefore require the state to pay just compensation?   
                                                 
1 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was acting in his 
capacity as a hearing officer or examiner for the State of 
Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA).  The DHA and 
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) have authority under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 30.03(4)(a)(2001-02) and 227.43(1)(b)(2001-02), as 
noted in the findings of fact, to order removal of structures 
which violate Wis. Stat. ch. 30 (2001-02).  We are satisfied 
that the statutes permit an abatement action as was done here. 
2 As we determine infra, ¶14, the DNR expressly adopted the 
decision of the ALJ, and the DHA, thereby making it the decision 
of the DNR.  We will, therefore, refer to the ALJ's findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order as those of the DNR.   
3 Wis. Const. art. I, § 13. 
4 U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV, § 1. 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
3 
 
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
hold that because the DNR did not appeal the decision of the 
ALJ, and adopted by rule the decision as its own, the decision 
is entitled to great weight deference, because it is a decision 
within the DNR's area of expertise and satisfies the other 
necessary criteria.  Furthermore, the decision of the DNR was 
reasonable, consistent with applicable law, and supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.  The decision of the DNR was 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.  Finally, because the issue of 
whether the reduction in the number of boat slips allowed on the 
Association pier is an unconstitutional taking is not properly 
before this court, we decline to address it.   
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Nelson Page 
(Page) owned a 77-foot wide riparian lot on Green Lake, as well 
as nearby nonriparian land. In 1958 and again in 1961, Page 
subdivided, 
platted, 
and 
recorded 
the 
nonriparian 
land, 
developed a subdivision, and sold the lots.  At the same time, 
Page also conveyed various undivided 1/38 interests in the 
riparian lot and a common pier to those buyers who purchased and 
built 
on 
the 
nonriparian 
land. 
 
The 
Association, 
an 
unincorporated entity, was established in 1966.  Association 
membership consists of those persons who each own the 1/38 
interest in the riparian lot.   
¶4 
Since 1966, the Association has placed an unpermitted 
pier, with various numbers of boat slips, extending from the 
riparian lot into Green Lake.  In 1966, the pier had six boat 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
4 
 
slips.  In 1974-76, the number of slips increased to 11.  In 
1990, the number of slips had increased to 20.  The slips 
decreased to 16 in 1994-95 then rose to 21 by 2000.  Currently, 
the pier is 249 feet long, 3 feet wide, and contains 22 boat 
slips. 
 
In 
1993, 
when 
Green 
Lake 
County 
adopted 
an 
antipyramiding ordinance there were 17 slips on the pier.5 
¶5 
The Association first contacted the DNR regarding its 
pier in 1993, at which point Association representatives were 
told that although the pier's size and density were both 
excessive under DNR "reasonable use" guidance, the DNR would not 
commence an enforcement action unless a complaint was received.   
¶6 
In 1997, the DNR received a complaint about possible 
riparian zone conflicts involving the Association's pier.  When 
the conservation warden inspected the site, an Association 
                                                 
5 Pyramiding is the use of riparian lots to provide lake 
access for back lot nonriparian owners.  Green Lake County 
Zoning Ordinance #146-76, sec. 4.8 RC Recreation District 
(C)(19)(2003) provides, in relevant portion:   
The related back-lot development shall be contiguous 
to the access site/lot, and all lands within the back 
lot development shall be contiguous to each other.  As 
used in this section, the term 'contiguous' shall 
mean: In actual contact with or touching, a sharing of 
a common boundary.  For example, but not in limitation 
of the foregoing, a back lot development that is 
separated from an access site/lot by a road (whether 
public or private) is not contiguous to the access 
site/lot, and would not satisfy the requirements of 
this section.  
Ordinance #146-76, sec. 4.8 RC Recreation District (c)(19) 
(2003)(emphasis in original). 
 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
5 
 
member informed him that the Association was interested in 
increasing the number of slips on the pier above the existing 
22.6  The warden explained that the Association would need a 
permit to do so, and that the DNR would consider reasonable use, 
cumulative impact, and other public interest factors in deciding 
whether to issue a permit.   
¶7 
In 1998, the Association asked the DNR if it needed a 
permit to replace its existing pier with two piers containing 14 
slips each.  In response to that proposal, and repeatedly over 
the next four years, DNR staff advised the Association of the 
DNR's position: that the existing pier and any proposed 
expansion exceeded Wis. Stat. § 30.13 (1997-98) standards to 
maintain a pier without a permit; that the Association must 
apply for a permit if it wished to maintain the current pier or 
any pier exceeding the § 30.13 (1997-98) standards; if the 
Association did not reduce the pier to meet the standards, or 
submit a permit application, the DNR would seek an abatement 
hearing under § 30.03 (1997-98).7   
                                                 
6 Green Lake County Conservation Warden Cletus Alsteen 
(Warden Alsteen) testified before the ALJ that although an 
Association 
representative 
had 
claimed, 
in 
a 
telephone 
conversation, that the Association pier had 22 slips in 1997, 
upon inspection of the pier, Warden Alsteen only found 18 slips. 
7 We note that the DNR recently adopted new rules regarding 
the regulation of piers.  Included in these rules is a provision 
to "grandfather" in existing piers too big to qualify for an 
exemption, up to a certain size.  It is unclear whether the 
Association pier would be within the category of piers eligible 
for "grandfathering."  We also note that there is an effort by 
several legislators to set standards on piers, different from 
those of the DNR. 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
6 
 
¶8 
In 1998 and in 2000, the DNR received further 
complaints about the pier.  By June 2001, having still not 
received a pier permit application, pursuant to its enforcement 
powers under Wis. Stat. § 30.03 (2001-02),8 the DNR requested an 
abatement hearing.  Going into the abatement hearing, it was the 
DNR's recommendation that six slips represented the "reasonable 
use" that the Association pier could legally maintain without a 
permit.   
¶9 
In May 2002, all Association members but one submitted 
an application for a pier permit.   The abstaining member 
opposed the application.  Because the Association is an 
unincorporated entity, it does not have the authority to act on 
behalf of its members unless the members are unanimous.  The 
DNR's policy is that it does not have a complete application for 
which it can grant a permit unless all owners apply.   
¶10 The abatement hearing began on August 27, 2002, and 
testimony ensued for three days.  Administrative Law Judge 
Jeffrey D. Boldt issued his decision in the abatement action on 
November 22, 2002, and determined that the existing pier 
violated public rights in exceeding the "reasonable use" 
threshold, negatively impacted the aquatic habitat, and created 
a safety hazard.  After considering both the rights of riparians 
and the rights of the public, ALJ Boldt determined that the 
Association should be limited to a 226-foot pier with no more 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
7 
 
than 11 slips.  Eleven slips also happened to be the number he 
had concluded represented the "historic use" of the pier. 
¶11 On December 17, 2002, the Association petitioned for 
judicial review in the circuit court of the DNR decision.  The 
circuit court found that the DNR's determination of the historic 
use of the pier at 11 slips was arbitrary, without rational 
basis, and without sufficient basis in the record.  The circuit 
court determined that a better historic use date was 1993, when 
the antipyramiding ordinance went into effect.  At that time 
there were 17 slips on the pier.  Therefore, the circuit court 
set the number of allowable slips at 17.  The DNR appealed.  
¶12 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court.  In 
an order dated August 18, 2004, the court of appeals determined 
that the circuit court had applied an improper standard of 
review and substituted its judgment for the decision adopted by 
the DNR.  The court of appeals, therefore, reinstated that 
determination.  The Association appealed, and this court granted 
its petition for review. 
II 
¶13 The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of 
review a court should apply to an ALJ determination that has 
been expressly adopted by the DNR.  The Association suggests 
that the determinations of the ALJ should be reviewed de novo, 
because the DNR failed to employ its expertise in evaluating the 
ALJ decision.  The DNR maintains that the decision is entitled 
to great weight deference.  We agree with the DNR.  
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
8 
 
¶14 In this case, we review the ALJ's determination as a 
decision of the DNR.  See Borsellino v. DNR, 2000 WI App 27, ¶5, 
232 Wis. 2d 430, 606 N.W.2d 255 (citing Sea View Estates Beach 
Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 Wis. 2d 138, 146-47, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. 
App. 1998)).  We do so because "the DNR did not petition for 
judicial review of the ALJ's decision, and adopted the decision 
as its own pursuant to § 227.46(3)(a) Stats.,9 and Wis. Adm. Code 
§ NR 2.155(1)."  Borsellino, 232 Wis. 2d 430, ¶5 (footnote 
omitted).  Wisconsin Admin. Code §  NR 2.155(1) provides, in 
pertinent part, "The administrative law judge shall prepare 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision subsequent to 
each contested case heard.  Unless the department petitions for 
judicial review as provided in s. 227.46(8), Stats., the 
decision shall be the final decision of the department. . . ."  
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 2.155(1) (Sept., 1986).  In this case the 
DNR chose not to appeal the ALJ's decision, "thereby making the 
ALJ decision its own under its own rule."  Sea View, 223 Wis. 2d 
at 147.  Therefore, because the DNR has expressly adopted the 
ALJ decision, the ALJ decision should be afforded the same 
deference afforded the agency.  Id. at 146-47.   
¶15 When an appeal is taken from a circuit court order 
reviewing an agency decision, we review the decision of the 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.46(3) provides, in pertinent part:  
"With respect to contested cases except a hearing or review 
assigned to a hearing examiner under s. 227.43(1)(bg), an agency 
may by rule or in a particular case may by order: (a) Direct 
that the hearing examiner's decision be the final decision of 
the agency. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3).  The ALJ was the 
"hearing examiner" in the present case. 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
9 
 
agency, not the circuit court.  Clean Wisconsin v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 2005 WI 93, ¶36, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768.  The 
DNR's 
decision 
consisted 
of 
both 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law.  "We apply different standards of review to 
agency conclusions of law and agency findings of fact."  
Borsellino, 232 Wis. 2d 430, ¶6 (citation omitted).  Great 
weight deference is applied to an agency's legal conclusions 
when: 
"(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with 
the duty of administering the statute; (2)[ ] the 
interpretation of the statute is one of long-standing; 
(3)[ 
] 
the 
agency 
employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; 
and (4)[ ] the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the 
statute." 
Clean Wisconsin, 282 Wis. 2d 250, ¶39 (citations omitted).  
Further "the correct test is whether the agency 'has experience 
in interpreting [the] particular statutory scheme' at issue." 
Id., ¶40. 
¶16 In reviewing agency findings of fact, we apply the 
"'substantial evidence' standard."  Borsellino, 232 Wis. 2d 430, 
¶7 (citation omitted).  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(6) requires the 
court to set aside or remand an agency action "if the agency's 
decision depends on any findings of fact not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record."  Borsellino, 232 Wis. 2d 
430, ¶7.  "Substantial evidence does not mean a preponderance of 
the evidence."  Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
109 Wis. 2d 127, 133, 325 N.W.2d 339 (1982). Instead, the test 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
10 
 
is whether, after considering all the evidence of record, 
reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion. Id. 
¶17 Because we conclude this is a decision of the DNR, and 
that 
the 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
Sea 
View 
and 
Roehl 
Transportation v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 213 Wis. 2d 452, 
458, 570 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997) are met, the DNR's legal 
conclusions should be granted great weight deference, and the 
factual findings should be evaluated using the substantial 
evidence test.  Under great weight deference, we will sustain an 
agency's interpretation, if reasonable, even if an equally 
reasonable 
or 
more 
reasonable 
interpretation 
is 
offered.  
Therefore, we will affirm the decision of the DNR if it conforms 
to applicable law and is supported by substantial evidence from 
which reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion.  See 
Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 615-16, 146 N.W.2d 
577 (1966).  
III 
¶18 Our first inquiry is to examine applicable law to 
determine whether the conclusions of the DNR are consistent with 
the law governing piers.  When considering actions that affect 
navigable waters in the state, one must start with the public 
trust doctrine, rooted in Article IX, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.10  Under the public trust doctrine, "the state of 
                                                 
10 Article IX, Section 1 states in relevant part:  "The 
state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all rivers and lakes 
bordering on this state so far as such rivers or lakes shall 
form a common boundary to the state and any other state or 
territory now or hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the 
same. . . ."  Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1. 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
11 
 
Wisconsin holds the beds of navigable waters in trust for all 
its citizens. . . ."  Hixon, 32 Wis. 2d at 618 (citing Muench v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 499, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952)).   
¶19 The 
legislature 
has 
the 
primary 
authority 
to 
administer the public trust for the protection of the public's 
rights, and to effectuate the purposes of the trust.  See State 
v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 465, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983).  
Even 
though the beds of navigable waters are held in trust, "the 
legislature may authorize limited encroachments upon the beds of 
such waters where the public interest will be served."  Hixon, 
32 Wis. 2d at 618 (citing State v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 
112, 117, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957)).  Furthermore, under the common 
law, riparian rights must be reasonably exercised.  Borsellino, 
232 Wis. 2d 430, ¶21 (citing Sterlingworth Condo. Ass'n v. DNR, 
205 Wis. 2d 710, 731, 556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1996)).  
¶20 The legislature has delegated to the DNR the duty of 
enforcing the state's environmental laws.  Sea View, 223 Wis. 2d 
at 149 (citing Barnes v. DNR, 178 Wis. 2d 290, 304, 506 N.W.2d 
155 
(1993)). 
 
Particularly 
relevant 
to 
this 
case, 
the 
legislature "has charged the DNR with regulating piers under 
§§ 30.12 and 30.13, and the DNR has technical expertise in 
regulating piers and waterways."  Borsellino, 232 Wis. 2d 430, 
¶6 (citation omitted).   
¶21 There are three policy factors identified by the 
legislature that the DNR must balance in enforcing environmental 
laws related to navigable waters:  "the desire to preserve the 
natural beauty of our navigable waters, to obtain the fullest 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
12 
 
public use of such waters, . . . and to provide for the 
convenience of riparian owners."11  Hixon, 32 Wis. 2d at 620.  
The legislature has articulated this balancing requirement in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12 
and 30.13, 
disallowing 
any 
deposit or 
structure on the bed of navigable water that constitutes "'a 
material obstruction to navigation'" or is "'detrimental to the 
public interest.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  "The job of 
applying these two standards in each particular situation was 
delegated to the [DNR]."  Id. 
¶22 Under existing statutory guidelines, a riparian owner 
with a lot including 77 feet of shoreline would be entitled by 
statutory presumption to maintain a pier, without a permit:  
no more than 6 feet wide, that extends no further than 
to a point where the water is 3 feet at its maximum 
depth, . . . and which has no more than 2 boat slips 
for the first 50 feet of riparian owner’s shoreline 
footage and no more than one additional boat slip for 
each additional 50 feet of the riparian owner’s 
shoreline.   
Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1g)(f) (2003-04).  However, the public trust 
analysis requires the DNR to go beyond the statutory presumption 
to determine what the "reasonable use" is in light of the 
relevant facts particular to each situation.  In this case, the 
ALJ examined 
environmental 
impact, 
natural 
scenic beauty, 
historic use, safety, the statutory presumption, the absence of 
                                                 
11 Hixon was a case involving the Public Service Commission 
(PSC). Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 146 N.W.2d 
577 (1966).  The PSC previously had the duties to enforce 
environmental laws relating to navigable waters now assigned to 
the DNR.   
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
13 
 
a permit, and the DNR's delayed enforcement, among other 
factors, in determining "reasonable use."  There is ample 
evidence in the record that the ALJ considered the relevant 
factors in this case and weighed them appropriately in light of 
the public trust doctrine.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
decision of the DNR is consistent with applicable law.   
IV 
¶23 Because we have concluded that the DNR's decision to 
limit the number of permissible slips was consistent with 
applicable law, we next turn to the DNR's specific findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  We must determine whether the 
decision is reasonable and is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record.   
¶24 There 
are 
four 
elements 
of 
the 
decision, 
in 
particular, that the Association challenges: that the pier 
directly and cumulatively adversely impacts the aquatic habitat, 
that the pier presents a safety hazard, that the determination 
of 11 slips as the "historical use" of the pier was reasonable, 
and that a 226-foot pier with 11 slips is the most that can 
reasonably be maintained, without a permit.  There is a dispute 
as to which elements of the decision are findings of fact versus 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
14 
 
conclusions of law.12  We are satisfied that the first two issues 
are findings of fact, and the last two are conclusions of law.  
We will first examine the findings of fact.   
¶25 The "substantial evidence" rule affords significant 
deference to an agency's factual findings.  "The agency's 
decision may be set aside by a reviewing court only when, upon 
an examination of the entire record, the evidence, including the 
inferences therefrom, is such that a reasonable person, acting 
reasonably, could not have reached the decision from the 
evidence and its inferences."  Sterlingworth, 205 Wis. 2d at 727 
(citing Hamilton v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 611, 618, 288 N.W.2d 857 
(1980)).  Additionally, "the weight and credibility of the 
evidence are for the agency, not the reviewing court, to 
determine."  Id. (citing Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. DILHR, 90 Wis. 2d 
408, 418, 280 N.W.2d 142(1979)). 
¶26 First, we will examine whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to support the DNR's finding that the 
Association pier, in its current form, has direct and cumulative 
adverse impacts to the wildlife and fish habitat in Green Lake.  
The area in which the Association pier is located is part of the 
                                                 
12 The DNR argues that all four elements are findings of 
fact that should be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.  The ALJ, 
too, includes in his findings of fact section elements that seem 
to be conclusions of law.  The last two determinations required 
the ALJ to adjudge reasonableness; therefore, we determine that 
those are conclusions of law.  The determination of what is a 
finding of fact and what is a conclusion of law is often a 
confusing and difficult one.   
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
15 
 
littoral zone13 of Green Lake——the relatively small, shallow 
portion of the lake.  It is in these areas that aquatic plant 
growth can develop, providing habitat for fish and other aquatic 
life, 
stabilizing 
sediment, 
improving 
water 
quality, 
and 
providing 
sustenance 
for 
waterfowl, 
both 
migratory 
and 
residential.   
¶27 Green Lake County Conservation Warden Cletus Alsteen 
(Warden 
Alsteen) 
testified 
that 
wild 
celery, 
upon 
which 
migratory birds feed, is limited to growth in the littoral zone.  
Shawn Eisch (Eisch), a DNR water management specialist, stated 
that the area, and the access to wild celery, is important for 
canvasback duck and geese migration.  Eisch explained that 
because Green Lake is one of the last lakes in the area to 
freeze, it provides access to food after snow cover eliminates 
ground sources.  Eisch also testified that it was very apparent 
that the pier and shading by boats was restricting growth of 
wild celery in the area.  Both the DNR and the Association 
presented expert testimony that the existing pier configuration 
and size, as well as the parking of boats in pier slips, shades 
out beneficial aquatic vegetation in the littoral zone, although 
they disagreed about the extent of the harm.   
¶28 Department of Natural Resources fisheries biologist, 
David Bartz, testified that the pier had a detrimental impact on 
the fish in the area.  He stated that there was no question that 
                                                 
13 A littoral zone is the shore area or shallower zone of a 
lake.   
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
16 
 
fish habitat in the area would improve if the pier and boats in 
the area were removed.  Finally, the ALJ heard testimony from 
DNR wildlife biologist James Holzwart that, to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty, allowing the pier to remain as 
it is will continue to have a degrading effect on the aquatic 
habitat.  We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence in 
the record to support a reasonable conclusion that aquatic life 
was and is harmed by the existing pier.  As the court in 
Sterlingworth noted: 
Whether it is one, nine or ninety boat slips, each 
slip allows one more boat which inevitably risks 
further damage to the environment and impairs the 
public's interest in the lakes.  The potential 
ecological impacts include direct impacts on the water 
quality and sediment quality alteration, as well as 
direct and indirect influences on flora and fauna.  
For this very reason, the consideration of "cumulative 
impact" must be taken into account. 
Sterlingworth, 205 Wis. 2d at 721.14   
                                                 
14 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
in 
Sterlingworth 
Condominium 
Association v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 730, 556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. 
App. 1996) went on to quote the supreme court's decision in 
Hixon, in which this court stated:   
A little fill here and there may seem to be nothing to 
become 
excited 
about. 
 
But 
one 
fill, 
though 
comparatively inconsequential, may lead to another, 
and another, and before long a great body of water may 
be eaten away until it may no longer exist.  Our 
navigable waters are a precious natural heritage; once 
gone, 
they 
disappear 
forever. 
 
Although 
the 
legislature 
has 
constitutionally 
permitted 
some 
structures 
and deposits 
in navigable 
waters, it 
permitted them under sec. 30.12(2)(a), Stats., only if 
the Public Service Commission [now the DNR] found that 
"such 
structure 
does 
not 
materially 
obstruct 
navigation . . . and is not detrimental to the public 
interest." 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
17 
 
¶29 Next, we turn to the DNR's finding that the existing 
pier creates a safety hazard due to congestion and impaired 
visibility.  Warden Alsteen testified that the west end of Green 
Lake, where the Association pier is located, is a heavy use, 
high boat traffic area.  He expressed concerns for safety posed 
by the fact that the Association pier extends beyond the line of 
navigation, and is one of the longer privately-owned piers on 
the western side of Green Lake.  Warden Alsteen also expressed 
concern for safety of swimmers and boaters as a result of the 
design and congestion of the slips on the Association's pier, 
which causes limited visibility for boat operations.   
¶30 In 
addition, 
Warden 
Alsteen 
testified 
that 
the 
configuration of slips required a boat operator entering the 
area of the Association pier to maneuver the boat past 
neighboring piers and boats and turn to enter the slip, as very 
few slips at the Association pier have a straight-line approach.  
He further stated that even experienced boat operators might 
have 
trouble 
maneuvering 
in 
limited 
space, 
and 
such 
maneuverability becomes even more difficult when compounded by 
waves and boat wakes.  In addition, the ALJ heard testimony that 
the positioning of the pier and slips may necessitate incursion 
into neighboring riparian areas while navigating into and away 
from the pier.   
¶31 The 
ALJ, 
uniquely 
in 
a 
position 
to 
weigh 
the 
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses, determined that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hixon, 32 Wis. 2d at 631-32.   
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
18 
 
the greater weight of the credible evidence demonstrated that 
the existing pier constitutes a hazard to navigation because of 
its length, configuration, and the large number of boats 
navigating in a relatively narrow access area.  There is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that 
the Association pier creates a safety hazard.   
¶32 Next we turn to the conclusions of law, to which we 
give great weight deference.  Under great weight deference, if 
the 
conclusions 
of 
law 
are 
reasonable, 
are 
based 
upon 
substantial evidence in the record, and are consistent with the 
applicable law, we will uphold the decision of the agency. 
¶33   The 
Association 
first 
urges 
that 
the 
DNR's 
determination that 11 slips constituted the historic use of the 
pier was not reasonable.  In contrast to the DNR's conclusion, 
the Association maintains that the circuit court's determination 
of 17 slips as the proper historic use number, dating to the 
antipyramiding 
ordinance, 
is 
reasonably 
supported 
by 
the 
evidence.   
¶34 The Association's position is based upon the assertion 
that the ALJ ignored the legal methodology for establishing 
historic use with reference to actual events, as articulated in 
Sea View, and what it claims is the legal requirement enunciated 
in Sterlingworth to consider similar pier usages on Green Lake.  
The Association misinterprets the holdings in those cases.   
¶35 Sea View and Sterlingworth suggest that historical 
use, however it is determined, is one of the factors that the 
ALJ may weigh in balancing the private rights and public 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
19 
 
interests at stake in riparian rights/public trust doctrine 
cases like this one.  See Sea View, 223 Wis. 2d at 155-56; 
Sterlingworth, 205 Wis. 2d at 733.  The cases do not establish 
any set definition of historical use or any hard and fast 
methodology for determining it.  The court of appeals in Sea 
View and Sterlingworth did not even use the phrase "historic 
use" (or "historical use"), let alone define it.  
¶36 To the extent that the Association is suggesting that 
historic use must be based on something like passage of an 
ordinance or DNR contact, that suggestion is without solid 
underpinnings in the law, and is not required by public policy 
considerations.  In fact, in Borsellino, a case decided shortly 
after Sea View and Sterlingworth, the court of appeals explained 
that, under Sea View, "an ALJ may review local ordinances in 
making a permit determination under § 30.12(2), Stats., but an 
ALJ is not required to do so."  Borsellino, 232 Wis. 2d 430, ¶10 
(citation omitted).   
¶37 The DNR found that the evidence showed the following 
maximum number of members and/or slips in the following years:  
 
Years: 
 
Numbers: 
 
1966-68 
 
5-6 
 
1971  
 
8 
 
1972-74 
 
10 
 
1974-76 
 
11 
 
1978  
 
15 
 
1981  
 
17 
 
1988  
 
19 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
20 
 
 
1990  
 
22 
 
1991  
 
19 
 
 
 
1994-95 
 
16 
 
2000  
 
21 
 
Present 
 
22 
Considering these facts, the ALJ made a determination to use 11 
slips as the "historic use" factor, in that "no more than 11 
slips were placed at the site for the first 10 years that the 
Association placed a pier."  Although he acknowledged that "the 
number of slips has increased beyond 11 after 1976," he did not 
determine that the increase reflected the "'historic use' but 
rather the Association's continuing effort to pack as many boats 
as possible into its small riparian zone to accommodate 
Association members."   
¶38 The Association and the circuit court found this 
conclusion to be unreasonable and arbitrary.  We disagree.  
While the circuit court's conclusions were reasonable, arguably 
even more reasonable than that of the DNR, the standard of 
review requires us to decide differently.  Certainly, the DNR 
could have reasonably selected a different number of slips as 
determinative of the historic use factor, based on the facts of 
record, but the DNR did not.  The Association's argument is 
apparently that historic use had to be considered to be the high 
end of the various levels of use through the last 40 years, but 
that argument is no more reasonable or accurate than what the 
DNR did in light of the evidence.  It would not have been 
unreasonable, perhaps, if the DNR had selected the original 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
21 
 
number of slips as the historic use.  It must be kept in mind 
that this is not a case where the same number of slips had 
remained constant over a long period of time.  Rather, it is a 
case where the number of slips started out very small and slowly 
increased over four decades, sometimes even decreasing in 
certain years.  Thus, the DNR's decision to choose some sort of 
midpoint as historic use was both supported by substantial 
evidence in the record and was a reasonable determination.15   
¶39 We 
now 
turn 
to 
the 
DNR's 
conclusion 
that 
an 
unpermitted reasonable use for the Association is a 226-foot 
pier with 11 boat slips, which would adequately balance riparian 
rights with the public interest.   
¶40 In Sterlingworth, the court of appeals noted that the 
common law requires "reasonable use" by riparian owners to be 
                                                 
15 The Association urges that the decision to pin the 
historical use at 11 slips was without rational basis and 
arbitrary, yet fails to develop the argument to overturn the 
decision based on an arbitrary or capricious analysis.  When we 
look at arbitrary or capricious action of an agency, we 
determine it can be said to have occurred when "'such action is 
unreasonable or does not have a rational basis.  Arbitrary 
action is the result of an unconsidered, wilful and irrational 
choice of conduct and not the result of the "winnowing and 
sifting" process.'"  Hixon, 32 Wis. 2d at 630-31 (citation 
omitted) (footnote omitted).  In other words, "[w]hen applying 
the arbitrary and capricious standard, we determine whether the 
agency's action had a rational basis, not whether the agency 
acted on the basis of factual findings."  Sterlingworth, 205 
Wis. 2d at 730.  Clearly, under this standard, the ALJ had a 
rational basis for his determination. 
 
 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
22 
 
determined by "'the extent and capacity of the [lake], the uses 
to which it has been put, and the rights that other riparian 
owners on the same [lake] also have.'"  Sterlingworth, 205 Wis 
2d at 731, (citing Apfelbacher v. State, 167 Wis. 233, 239, 167 
N.W. 244 (1918)).  Such an inquiry is a highly fact-specific 
one, and determinations are made on a case-by-case basis.   
¶41 In this case, the decision of the DNR that the limit 
of "reasonable use" by the Association was a 226-foot, 11 slip 
pier was reasonable, consistent with applicable law, and 
supported 
by 
substantial 
evidence 
in 
the 
record. 
 
The 
Association was entitled to no more than reasonable use, without 
a permit, for its pier.  Riparian rights have always been 
qualified by reasonable use and subordinate to public rights.  
It is evident from the record that the ALJ considered the 
convenience of riparians, environmental impacts, natural scenic 
beauty, historic use, safety, the statutory presumption in 
Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1g)(f)(2003-04), the absence of a permit, and 
the DNR's delayed enforcement.  While not the only reasonable 
conclusion, the ALJ weighed all of the relevant factors in light 
of the public trust doctrine and arrived at a conclusion that is 
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record.  
Therefore, applying great weight deference, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision and, thus, the decision of the DNR.   
V 
¶42 Finally, we turn to the Association's argument that 
the abatement of the present number of boat slips constitutes an 
unconstitutional taking.  Because neither party appealed that 
No. 
2003AP3353   
 
23 
 
portion of the circuit court's decision, the issue is not 
properly before this court.  We decline, therefore, to address 
it.   
VI 
¶43 We hold that because the DNR did not appeal the 
decision of the ALJ, and adopted by rule the decision as its 
own, the determination is entitled to great weight deference, 
since it is a decision within the DNR's area of expertise and 
satisfies the other necessary criteria.  Furthermore, the 
decision of the DNR was reasonable and supported by substantial 
evidence in the record and was consistent with applicable law.  
The decision of the DNR was neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
Finally, we determine that the issue of whether the reduction in 
the number of boat slips allowed on the Association pier is an 
unconstitutional taking is not properly before this court.  We 
decline to address it further. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP3353.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion. 
¶45 I write separately to point out that the standard of 
review of and deference to a decision of the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, discussed by the majority opinion at ¶¶13-
17, was also raised in Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Division 
of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.   
¶46 Racine Harley-Davidson and the present case were both 
argued in November 2005.  In Racine Harley-Davidson the court 
requested supplemental briefing of the issue of the standard of 
review.  Part I of the Racine Harley-Davidson opinion, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶8-58, discusses in detail the standard of review 
of (including deference to) decisions issued by the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, including the cases upon which the present 
decision relies.  
 
 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
¶47 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
This 
case 
involves much more than the number of boat slips on a long-
established pier in Green Lake County.  This case epitomizes the 
growth of agency power, the decline of judicial power, and the 
tenuous state of property rights in the 21st Century.  I join 
the majority opinion because, under current law, this court is 
bound to uphold the decision of the administrative law judge 
(ALJ) even though several members of the court believe that the 
circuit court reached a more reasonable decision.  Although 
reluctantly conceding the result, I write separately to offer 
additional perspective. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶48 In this case, the standard of review is prescribed by 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(2) (2003-04):1 "Unless the court finds a 
ground for setting aside, modifying, remanding or ordering 
agency action or ancillary relief under a specified provision of 
this section, it shall affirm the agency's action."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
See 
also 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10). 
 
Pursuant 
to 
§ 227.57, a court's review is confined to the record except in 
cases 
of 
alleged 
irregularities 
in 
procedure.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).   
¶49 The court may review the agency's procedure, its 
interpretation 
of 
law, 
and 
its 
determinations 
of 
fact.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(3).   
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
2 
 
¶50 In review, however, the court must grant great weight 
deference to an agency's interpretation of law in situations 
where (1) the agency is charged by the legislature with the duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute 
at 
issue; 
(2) 
the 
agency 
determination is one of long standing; (3) the agency employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized 
knowledge 
in 
forming 
its 
interpretation; and (4) the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute.  
See majority op., ¶15;  UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 
548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 
Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)); Sea View Estates Beach 
Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 Wis. 2d 138, 148-49, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. 
App. 1998).  "If the foregoing criteria are met, we will sustain 
the 
agency's 
interpretation 
even 
if 
an 
equally 
or 
more 
reasonable interpretation is offered."  Sea View, 223 Wis. 2d at 
149 (citing Roehl Transp., Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearings & 
Appeals, 213 Wis. 2d 452, 459, 570 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
¶51 Once an agency's legal interpretation is entitled to 
great weight deference, it will be set aside or modified only if 
the court "finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a 
provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a 
particular action," Wis. Stat. § 227.57(5), or if the agency's 
interpretation 
violates 
a 
constitutional 
provision.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(8). 
¶52 Moving to the facts, courts apply a substantial 
evidence standard in reviewing an agency's findings of fact.  
Majority op., ¶16.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6) ("The court 
shall . . . set aside agency action . . . if it finds that the 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
3 
 
agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record").  Substantial 
evidence "is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  Sterlingworth 
Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 727, 556 N.W.2d 791 
(Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added).  It does not mean a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d 127, 133, 325 N.W.2d 339 (1982).  The 
court may set aside the agency's decision "only when, upon an 
examination of the entire record, the evidence, including the 
inferences therefrom, is such that a reasonable person, acting 
reasonably, could not have reached the decision from the 
evidence and its inferences."  Sterlingworth, 205 Wis. 2d at 727 
(citing Hamilton v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 611, 618, 288 N.W.2d 857 
(1980)) (emphasis added). 
COMMENTARY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS 
¶53 These standards of review frequently put reviewing 
courts in a straitjacket and are sometimes at odds with the role 
of courts.   
¶54 First, the supreme court is the state's preeminent 
law-developing court.  When the supreme court grants great 
weight deference to an agency's interpretation of law, however, 
it ceases to be "preeminent."  This is contrary to the 
fundamental role of the judiciary as articulated in Marbury v. 
Madison: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is."  Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  When the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
elects to hear only ten percent of the cases presented to it for 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
4 
 
review, 
the 
public 
expects 
and 
deserves 
that 
the 
court 
"take[] . . . case[s] to decide the substantive issues presented 
[and provide meaningful analysis and guidance on important 
issues], not to avoid deciding them by judicially created 
avoidance doctrines."  See Patience D. Roggensack, Elected to 
Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance Doctrine of Great Weight 
Deference Appropriate in this Court of Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. 
Rev. 541, 541, 544 (2006). 
¶55 In these situations, it is not enough for this court 
to perceive a more reasonable interpretation of a statute than 
the agency.  When deference is invoked, 
[t]here is no discussion of the facts and how the 
relevant 
statutes 
bear 
on 
them. 
 
There 
is 
no 
explanation of why the agency decision accords with 
the intent of the legislature in enacting the law 
under consideration.  Therefore, there is no reasoned 
decision about whether the law was correctly applied 
or interpreted. 
Roggensack, supra, at 546.  The supreme court and other 
Wisconsin courts are expected to rationalize and rubberstamp the 
agency's decision unless the agency's legal interpretation is 
plainly wrong.  The result is that many litigants have lost 
their right to a decision by an independent judiciary.  In fact, 
the public's right to meaningful judicial determinations of 
applicable law steadily contracts as the scope of agency 
regulation expands.  In essence, litigants lose the right to 
meaningful appellate review, which involves: 
review of factual records . . . ; extensive legal 
research of the laws of Wisconsin, of federal laws, 
and the laws of other states; careful attention to 
briefs and to oral arguments of the parties; thorough 
discussion among members of the court; and the 
synthesis of a written opinion that distills the facts 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
5 
 
and the law and comes to a reasoned conclusion that is 
both understandable and useable by the parties, other 
tribunals, and the public. 
Roggensack, supra, at 542. 
¶56 Second, judicial deference to administrative decisions 
is greater than it used to be.  In reviewing a decision of the 
Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission in 1977, this court stated:  
The first matter to be determined on this appeal 
is the standard of review to be applied. In Dept. of 
Revenue v. Smith Harvestore Products, 72 Wis. 2d 60, 
240 N.W.2d 357 (1976), this court held that the 
question of whether facts found by an administrative 
commission fulfill a particular legal standard is one 
of law properly reviewable by this court. Moreover, 
while due deference must be accorded an agency's 
application of the law to the found facts when the 
agency has particular competence or expertise in the 
matter 
at 
hand 
(Chevrolet 
Division, 
G.M.C. 
v. 
Industrial Comm., 31 Wis. 2d 481, 488, 143 N.W.2d 532 
(1966); sec. 227.20(2), Stats.), this court has held 
that such deference is not required when this court is 
as competent as the agency to decide the question 
involved. 
Dept. 
of 
Revenue 
v. 
Smith 
Harvestore 
Products, supra; Pabst v. Dept. of Revenue, 19 
Wis. 2d 313, 120 N.W.2d 77 (1963). Finally, when the 
material facts are not disputed, and only matters of 
law are in issue, this court may review the record ab 
initio and substitute its own judgment for that of the 
Commission. H. Samuels Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 70 
Wis. 2d 1076, 1083-84, 236 N.W.2d 250 (1975). 
Wis. Dep't. of Revenue v. Milwaukee Ref. Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 44, 
48, 257 N.W.2d 855 (1977). 
¶57 In State v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human 
Relations, 101 Wis. 2d 396, 402, 304 N.W.2d 758 (1981), the 
court repeated the proposition that when the facts before an 
agency are not in dispute, the court is "not bound by the 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
6 
 
[agency's] determination of a question of law."2  This statement 
was followed by the assurance that the court "does defer to some 
extent to the legal construction and application of a statute by 
the agency."  Id. (quoting Larson v. ILHR Dep't, 76 Wis. 2d 595, 
603, 252 N.W.2d 33 (1977), and De Leeuw v. ILHR Dep't, 71 
Wis. 2d 446, 449, 238 N.W.2d 706 (1976)) (emphasis added).  This 
point/counterpoint was once typical in our case law. 
¶58 In these older cases,3 the court appeared to reserve 
the ultimate authority to interpret the law.  Significantly, the 
phrase, "we are not bound by the agency's interpretation of 
law"——with its admitted qualifications——has almost disappeared 
from judicial decisions.  When this court does not reserve its 
authority to interpret the law, it is ratifying a decline in 
judicial power.   
¶59 Third, agencies lack the same degree of political 
accountability as elected office holders, yet agency officials 
are often given substantial latitude to make law.  They then 
turn to the courts for enforcement.  When agency decisions are 
given great weight deference, they are expected to be upheld 
uncritically by elected judges.  To illustrate the point, the 
critical statutes in this case are Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12(2) and 
                                                 
2 See also City of La Crosse v. DNR, 120 Wis. 2d 168, 179, 
353 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1984) ("We are not bound by an agency's 
conclusions on matters of law."). 
3 See, e.g., Am. Motors Corp. v. LIRC, 119 Wis. 2d 706, 710, 
350 N.W.2d 120 (1984) ("[Q]uestions of law are always reviewable 
by this court.  Although this court is not bound by an agency's 
conclusions of law, we hesitate to substitute our judgment for 
that of the agency on a question of law if the agency's 
conclusion has a rational basis.") (citation omitted). 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
7 
 
30.13(1) (2001-02).  These broadly worded statutes include key 
phrases such as "detrimental to the public interest," "interfere 
with public rights in navigable waters," and "interfere with 
rights of other riparian proprietors."  It is very difficult for 
a court to conclude that an agency's interpretation of the broad 
language in these statutes is erroneously or lacks a rational 
basis.   
¶60 To 
illustrate 
further, 
in 
Claflin 
v. 
DNR, 
58 
Wis. 2d 182, 206 N.W.2d 392 (1973), a property owner applied for 
a permit to build a boathouse.  A hearing examiner recommended 
the permit.  The Public Service Commission (predecessor to the 
DNR on such issues) denied the permit on a 2-to-1 vote.  A 
circuit court reversed, and then this court reversed the circuit 
court.  We said: "Specific structures may be determined to be 
detrimental to the public interest on the ground that they 
impair natural beauty.  This is a proper basis for denial of a 
permit."  Id. at 193 (emphasis added). 
¶61 It has long been understood that beauty is in the eye 
of the beholder.  Under the law, however, the agency's eye for 
beauty is entitled to great weight deference.  This brings to 
mind the insightful observation that: "Expert discretion is the 
lifeblood of the administrative process, but 'unless we make the 
requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, 
expertise . . . can became a monster which rules with no 
practical limits on its discretion.'"  Transp. Oil, Inc. v. 
Cummings, 54 Wis. 2d 256, 266, 195 N.W.2d 649 (1972) (quoting 
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 
(1962)). 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
8 
 
¶62 Fourth, courts defer to an agency's decision in large 
part because of the presumed experience and expertise of the 
agency.  This does not resolve the problem of "agencies" in 
conflict with each other.  In this case, the "agency" entitled 
to great weight deference is deemed to be the Department of 
Natural Resources, not because the DNR actually made the 
decision at issue, but because the DNR automatically adopted the 
decision of the ALJ when it did not seek judicial review.  See 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 2.155(1) (Sept., 2004).  The plain truth 
is, however, that when a rule turns an agency's inaction into 
the agency's "final decision," the affected litigant may never 
know whether the agency actually employed its expertise or not.  
The agency certainly could have agonized over the decision not 
to seek judicial review, but it could also have ignored the 
ALJ's decision or simply missed a filing deadline. 
¶63 Great weight deference is given to the agency's 
decision, even though the decision may be sharply at odds with 
the position the agency took before the ALJ.  In this matter the 
DNR's position was given no deference by the ALJ at the 
abatement hearing.  Moreover, if the DNR had decided to seek 
judicial review, it is not clear which "agency"——the DNR or the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA)——would have been given 
deference, 
or 
whether 
any 
agency 
would 
have 
been 
given 
deference.  If the DNR and the ALJ in the DHA had disagreed 
about the proper interpretation of the law, there would be 
little reason to believe that either interpretation would 
provide uniformity and consistency in the application of the 
statute——a prerequisite to great weight deference. 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
9 
 
¶64 Fifth, 
uniformity 
and 
consistency 
may 
not 
be 
achievable.  Compare the following cases: 
1. 
Hilton v. DNR.  In the present case, the 
Green Lake riparian lot has 77 feet of shoreline and 
is 
owned 
by 
38 
landowners 
who 
have 
built 
and 
maintained a pier on the riparian lot.  Currently, the 
pier is 249 feet long, 3 feet wide, and contains 22 
boat slips.  The DNR brought an action to reduce the 
size of the pier.  After an abatement hearing, the ALJ 
ordered that the pier be reduced in size to 226 feet 
with no more than 11 slips.  At one point, the DNR was 
advocating only 6 slips. 
2. 
Sea View Estates Beach Club v. DNR.  In Sea 
View, the riparian lot had 60 feet of shoreline with a 
215-foot pier with 23 boat slips.  Sea View, 223 Wis. 
2d at 144, 161.  At a permit hearing, the DNR 
recommended a 190-foot pier with 24 boat slips.  Id. 
at 144.  The ALJ concluded the riparian landowners 
should be issued a permit authorizing a 110-foot pier 
with 12 boat slips.  Id. at 145.  The DNR adopted the 
ALJ's decision.  Id. 
3. 
Borsellino v. 
DNR.  
In 
Borsellino the 
riparian lot had 12 feet of shoreline with a 78-foot 
pier. 
 
Borsellino, 
2000 
WI 
App 
27, 
¶2, 
232 
Wis. 2d 430, 606 N.W.2d 255.  Borsellino challenged 
the pier as an unreasonable use of the lot.  Id., ¶3.  
An ALJ decided the pier exceeded reasonable use for 
the lot and ordered it removed.  Id.  The landowners 
of the 12-foot lot applied for a permit for a 96-foot-
long pier, generally 6 feet wide, with an 8.5-foot 
wide boatlift attached.  Id.  The ALJ granted the 
permit and the DNR adopted the ALJ's decision.  Id., 
¶4. 
4. 
Sterlingworth Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. DNR.  
Sterlingworth owned a riparian lot with 331 feet of 
lakeshore on Mill Lake and 429 feet on Sterlingworth 
Bay. 
 
Sterlingworth, 
205 
Wis. 2d at 
718.  
Sterlingworth sought a permit for a pier along each 
section of shoreline with a total number of 34 boat 
slips (15 slips on Mill Lake and 19 slips on 
Sterlingworth Bay).  Id.  The DNR issued a permit for 
25 boat slips.  Id. at 719 n.1.  Sterlingworth 
petitioned for administrative review and the ALJ 
upheld the DNR's determination that 25 boat slips were 
appropriate.  Id. at 719. 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
10 
 
5. 
Nagawicka Bay Sailing Club Owners Ass'n, 
Inc. v. DNR.  The Nagawicka Bay Sailing Club Owners 
Association owned a riparian lot with 56 feet of 
shoreline and a pier 3.5 feet wide, consisting of two 
"Ts" of approximately 33 feet in width.  Nagawicka Bay 
Sailing Club Owners Ass'n, Inc., No. 1996AP2805, 
unpublished slip op. at 570 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 
1997).  The pier was designed to accommodate eight 
boats.  The DNR filed an action to have the pier 
removed.  The ALJ concluded the Nagawicka Bay Sailing 
Club Owners Association could build a pier 44 feet 
long provided it had no more than one "T" which did 
not exceed 33 feet in width. 
¶65 The seamless "consistency" in these cases is not self-
evident.  Moreover, the statutory law can change over time,4 and 
the ability of local governments to adopt their own ordinances 
under Wis. Stat. § 30.13(2),5 or, conversely, not adopt any 
ordinance, almost assures that the regulation of "wharves, piers 
and swimming rafts" will not be uniform.6 
¶66 Finally, the agency has been given enormous latitude 
in finding facts.  Finding facts involves more than determining 
the existence of A, B, and C.  Finding facts involves the 
                                                 
4 The 
majority 
opinion, 
¶22, 
quotes 
from 
Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1g)(f) (2003-04).  However, subsection (1g) 
was not adopted by the legislature until 2004, after both the 
ALJ and the circuit court had rendered their decisions.  See 
2003 Wis. Act 118, § 22 (effective Feb. 6, 2004). 
5 The "agency"——whatever it is——will be given great weight 
deference when it answers the legal question whether the local 
ordinance is "not inconsistent with" § 30.13. 
6 Petitioner 
effectively 
demonstrates 
inconsistencies 
between the ALJ's decision in this case and the decision in 
Sterlingworth 
Condominium 
Association, 
Inc. 
v. 
DNR, 
205 
Wis. 2d 710, 556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1996) (history of existing 
structure), and Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 
Wis. 2d 138, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998) (number of boats 
moored at pier at the time of adoption of local pyramiding 
ordinance). 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
11 
 
authority to select Fact B for emphasis, and deemphasize Fact C 
as unimportant.  In this case, the majority joins the "agency" 
in emphasizing the value of wild celery over the importance of a 
longstanding pier that has not had as few as 11 boat slips since 
1976. 
¶67 From time to time courts can overstep their bounds, 
but when they are at their best, courts serve as the great 
protector of people's rights to life, liberty, and property.  
The legislature and the courts have worked in tandem to dilute 
the role of the courts in protecting substantial rights and 
interests in agency cases.  Property rights become tenuous when 
they are subject to largely unreviewable ad hoc decision-making—
—even by well-qualified, dedicated administrative officials. 
¶68 I 
respectfully 
concur 
with 
the 
hope 
that 
this 
commentary will help to generate discussion of current law. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP3353.dtp 
 
 
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