Title: State v. Zuniga

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

322 S.E.2d 140 (1984)
312 N.C. 251
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Bernardino ZUNIGA.
No. 2A84.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 6, 1984.
*141 Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Harry H. Harkins, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.
Adam Stein, Appellate Defender, and Robin E. Hudson, Asst. Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.
MEYER, Justice.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of 13 July 1982, 7-year-old April Lee Sweet was reported missing. Her body was discovered later that afternoon on the Calvin Johnson farm near Taylorsville in rural Alexander County. The victim had been stabbed, her throat had been cut, and, as was later confirmed by autopsy, she had been raped.
As a result of investigation conducted during the afternoon and evening of 13 July, law enforcement authorities determined the following:
On the morning of 13 July the victim's grandfather, Calvin Johnson, saw the defendant, whom he had known as Richard Lopez, traveling by taxicab toward the Johnson home. Mr. Johnson had previously employed the defendant as a farm worker. The cab driver took his passenger to the Johnson home and let him out at the house. It was further learned that later that day a Mexican male took a taxicab from Taylorsville to Statesville where he caught a bus destined for Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The passenger was identified as the defendant, Bernardino Zuniga, by means of a check which he had cashed with the driver of the taxicab. Based on the information given by these witnesses, law *142 enforcement authorities determined that the prime suspect in the murder of April Sweet was the defendant, Bernardino Zuniga, also known as Richard Lopeza Mexican male, approximately five feet nine inches in height, weighing approximately 155 pounds; that he had a mustache; and that when last seen he was wearing blue jeans, a blue-grey shirt, and possibly a ball cap. Law enforcement authorities were also aware that the suspect had fled the area and that in a matter of hours, the bus in which he was riding which was destined for Arkansas would arrive for a scheduled stop in Knoxville, Tennessee. Thus, this information was relayed to law enforcement authorities in Knoxville, Tennessee first by telephone and then over the Police Information Network.
In response to the request of North Carolina law enforcement authorities that defendant be held "for investigative purposes and for interview," Knoxville police, after conferring by telephone with the North Carolina authorities, met the bus in which defendant was believed to be riding. Defendant, the only Mexican male aboard the bus, was detained. Although defendant was wearing tan colored pants when he arrived in Knoxville, he was carrying a pair of wet blue jeans in a rolled-up paper bag. Defendant was taken to the Knoxville Police Department where he was placed in custody awaiting the arrival of North Carolina law enforcement authorities. During this time, the Knoxville police seized certain items of an incriminating nature, including a photograph of the victim found in defendant's wallet and a pair of bloodstained undershorts. After waiving extradition, defendant was returned to North Carolina on 14 July 1982 at which time an arrest warrant was issued for the murder of April Lee Sweet. On 19 July 1982, an arrest warrant was issued against the defendant for the first-degree rape of April Lee Sweet.
Prior to trial the defendant moved to suppress all evidence "seized or taken from the defendant upon his being taken into custody by law enforcement officers on or about July 13, 1982 in Knoxville, Tennessee," on the ground that at the time defendant was taken into custody, there was no probable cause to believe that defendant had committed the crime for which he was later charged. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge made the following pertinent findings of fact:
Based on the foregoing findings the trial judge made conclusions of law which included the following:
The trial judge therefore ordered "[t]hat any evidence obtained as a result of the defendant's detention without probable cause in the State of Tennessee be and the same is hereby ordered suppressed."
In its brief to this Court, the State presents three arguments in support of its position that the evidence obtained as the result of action taken by the Knoxville police should not be suppressed. The State first contends that the North Carolina officials had probable cause to believe that the defendant murdered and raped April Lee Sweet, and that even if the North Carolina officials lacked probable cause, the Knoxville police had probable cause to detain and search the defendant. Therefore, argues the State, the items in question were seized incident to a lawful arrest. Second, the State contends that in the absence of a finding of probable cause, the detention and search of the defendant was not an unreasonable search or seizure and therefore did not constitute a violation of defendant's fourth amendment rights. Third, in the event that we reject its first two contentions, the State urges us to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and find that the Knoxville police acted on a good faith belief that North Carolina authorities had probable cause to arrest the defendant.
A search without a search warrant may be made incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 263 S.E.2d 711 (1980); State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 364 (1971); State v. Roberts, 276 N.C. 98, 171 S.E.2d 440 (1970). In the course of such a search, the officer may lawfully take from the person arrested any property which such person has about him and which is connected with the crime charged. State v. Roberts, 276 N.C. 98, 171 S.E.2d 440. Property includes the contents of handbags or wallets, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 *145 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983); State v. Dickens, 278 N.C. 537, 180 S.E.2d 844 (1971); State v. Ross, 269 N.C. 739, 153 S.E.2d 469 (1967). Therefore, if the search conducted by the Knoxville police was made pursuant to a warrantless, but lawful arrest, it did not exceed the permissible scope of a valid search incident to such an arrest.
The first, and what we consider to be the determinative issue in this case, is whether the North Carolina law enforcement officials had probable cause on 13 July to believe that the defendant had committed a felony and thus, whether the seizure of incriminating evidence while defendant was detained in Knoxville was the result of a search conducted pursuant to a lawful, although warrantless, arrest.
To be lawful, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 280 S.E.2d 912 (1981); State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. 18, 269 S.E.2d 125 (1980).
State v. Shore, 285 N.C. 328, 335, 204 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1974). See also, State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. at 21, 269 S.E.2d  at 128 and State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 280 S.E.2d 912.
The evidence was conflicting as to the precise moment of defendant's arrest. The North Carolina officers who went to Tennessee testified that they did not believe that they had the authority to arrest the defendant in Tennessee and that Officer Moyers of the Knoxville Police Department arrested defendant in their presence. However, Officer Moyers testified that he did not formally arrest the defendant. It appears that defendant was not "formally" arrested until his return to North Carolina on 14 July.
An officer's testimony that the defendant was or was not under arrest is not conclusive. State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E.2d 674 (1978), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 973, 102 S. Ct. 523, 70 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1981); State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 155 S.E.2d 269 (1967). A "formal" declaration of arrest by an officer is not a prerequisite to the making of an arrest. State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E.2d 674; State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 155 S.E.2d 269; see 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest § 1.
We have held that "[w]hen a law enforcement officer, by word or actions, indicates that an individual must remain in the officer's presence or come to the police station against his will, the person is for all practical purposes under arrest if there is a substantial imposition of the officer's will over the person's liberty." State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. at 376, 245 S.E.2d  at 684.
In the present case, although Officer Moyers stated that the defendant was not placed under arrest while in Tennessee, that he was "just being formally detained" he readily admitted that he "would have not let [the defendant] go." We therefore hold that defendant was, for all practical purposes, under arrest no later than when he was escorted from the bus station to the Knoxville Police Department.
It is well established that one law enforcement officer may rely upon bulletins from other officers as the basis for an arrest, but only so long as the originating officer himself had probable cause. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, *146 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971); State v. Shore, 285 N.C. 328, 204 S.E.2d 682. Should we determine that probable cause existed for defendant's arrest by North Carolina authorities on 13 July when the defendant was detained at the bus station in Knoxville, the incriminating evidence seized while defendant was in Tennessee would be properly admissible as the result of a search conducted pursuant to a lawful, although warrantless arrest. State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 263 S.E.2d 711; State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 364; and State v. Roberts, 276 N.C. 98, 171 S.E.2d 440. Therefore, we must determine whether the North Carolina authorities had probable cause to believe that the defendant had murdered and raped April Lee Sweet prior to his arrest by the Tennessee authorities in the late evening of 13 July.
As in every case involving a determination of probable cause, it is upon the particular facts and circumstances, and the particular offense, that we must focus for resolution of the issue. And, in dealing with probable cause, "as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.  at 175, 69 S. Ct.  at 1310, 93 L. Ed.  at 1890. While this Court has, on numerous occasions, repeated the legal standard against which we measure the facts of each probable cause determination, perhaps the most succinct and enlightened definition is provided in Brinegar.
Id. at 175-76, 69 S. Ct.  at 1310-11, 93 L. Ed.  at 1890.
Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A practical, nontechnical probability is all that is required. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981).
Thus, while a reviewing court must, of necessity view the action of the law enforcement officer in retrospect, our role is not to import to the officer what in our judgment, as legal technicians, might have been a prudent course of action; but rather our role is to determine whether the officer has acted as a man of reasonable caution who, in good faith and based upon practical consideration of everyday life, believed the suspect committed the crime for which he was later charged. See State v. Mathis, 295 N.C. 623, 247 S.E.2d 919 (1978); State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 195 S.E.2d 502 (1973); State v. Alexander, 279 N.C. 527, 184 S.E.2d 274 (1971); State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 364; State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 155 S.E.2d 269.
We find that the North Carolina law enforcement authorities in the present case so acted. In reaching this conclusion we have attached particular significance to the fact that the murder occurred in a small, rural community;[1] that defendant's presence near the Johnson home was noted by the victim's grandfather and the taxi driver; that he was identified; that suspicion almost immediately narrowed to the defendant; and finally, that defendant fled within hours of the crime.
It is undisputed that the victim, a 7-year-old child, was brutally murdered and raped on the afternoon of 13 July 1982. It was a serious offenseone which demanded the most diligent and immediate police response. By early evening law enforcement authorities had targeted the defendant as a prime suspect. Indeed, a fair reading of the transcript indicates that the defendant, known to the family of the victim as Richard Lopez, a farm worker who had been employed by Calvin Johnson, was the only suspect. The ease with which the authorities were able to trace the defendant's movements on the day in question is a clear indication that in this tightly-knit, sparsely populated community, any unusual and unexplained presence was noticed and questioned. While presence in the vicinity of a crime which occurs in a populated area may, indeed, be of little significance, it is axiomatic that presence in the vicinity of a crime which occurs in a sparsely populated area, where access is limited and monitored, takes on added significance. Thus, in this rural section of Alexander County, the defendant's unexplained presence at the Johnson home on the morning of the murder, coupled with the discovery of the brutal slaying of a member of the Johnson family a short time later, would quite naturally arouse a high degree of suspicion in a reasonable person.
When the authorities sought out the defendant for questioning, they discovered that he had fled. He was on a bus destined for Arkansas. Flight to evade arrest is a strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with other relevant facts or the specific knowledge on the part of the arresting officer relating the suspect to the evidence of the crime, flight may properly be considered in assessing probable cause. State v. Williams, 32 N.C.App. 204, 231 S.E.2d 282, appeal dismissed, 292 N.C. 470, 233 S.E.2d 924 (1977); United States v. Garcia, 516 F.2d 318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Martinez-Lopez v. United States, 423 U.S. 934, 96 S. Ct. 290, 46 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1975). Not only did defendant's precipitous departure from the scene effectively deprive authorities of an opportunity to conduct an investigation prior to questioning the defendant,[2] but, more importantly, *148 it was a circumstance which, considered with facts already known, would have led a reasonable person to believe that defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.
We therefore hold that when defendant was taken into custody by the Knoxville authorities, North Carolina authorities had probable cause to believe that the defendant had murdered April Lee Sweet. The subsequent search of the defendant was incident to his lawful arrest. The trial judge erred in ordering that the evidence obtained as the result of this search be suppressed. The order suppressing such evidence is vacated and the case is remanded to the Superior Court, Davidson County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
EXUM, J., dissents.
[1]  We note that out of an abundance of caution, the able trial judge granted defendant's motion for a change of venue based on this fact.
[2]  Following defendant's return to North Carolina on 14 July, investigation into the crime continued. A newspaper or advertising circular bearing defendant's post office box number was found near the scene of the crime. The postmaster recalled that defendant had picked up his mail shortly after 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder. The mail contained numerous advertising circulars. A neighbor who lived approximately a mile from the Johnson home recognized the defendant as a Mexican who at one time had worked for Calvin Johnson. She recalled seeing the defendant walking along the road in front of her house at approximately 11:30 a.m. on the day of the murder. At approximately noon on the day of the murder, defendant was picked up by the local postman and driven into Taylorsville.