Title: State v. Solis

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

#28679, #28680-a-DG 
2019 S.D. 36 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 
* * * * 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT JAMES SOLIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE ROBIN J. HOUWMAN 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
JASON R. RAVNSBORG 
Attorney General 
 
MATTHEW W. TEMPLAR 
Assistant Attorney General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
 
and appellee. 
 
BEAU J. BLOUIN of 
Minnehaha County Public 
  Defender’s Office 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Attorneys for defendant  
 
and appellant. 
 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 
 
ON APRIL 29, 2019 
 
OPINION FILED 06/26/19 
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice 
 
[¶1.]  
Robert James Solis appeals his judgment and conviction of aggravated 
assault with a dangerous weapon and simple assault against his girlfriend, Lexie 
Sanchez, stemming from two separate incidents.  Solis claims the circuit court 
abused its discretion by joining the indictments for trial, and erred in denying his 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of aggravated assault.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.]  
Solis and Sanchez were in a romantic relationship and lived together 
in a duplex on South Lincoln Avenue in Sioux Falls.  On April 23, 2017, police were 
dispatched to the couple’s address after it was reported that a person there had 
called 911 and hung up.  Before the call ended, the 911 dispatcher heard a female 
voice say “I got jumped” or “I got dumped.”  When Sioux Falls Police Officers Jeff 
Van Gerpen and Brant Van Dyke arrived at the duplex, the front door was locked 
and no one answered.  Officer Van Gerpen then spoke with a neighbor who 
confirmed hearing noises coming from Solis and Sanchez’s apartment.  Upon 
hearing this, Officer Van Dyke entered the apartment through an open window and 
unlocked the front door to allow the other officers to enter. 
[¶3.]  
After entering the apartment through the kitchen window, Officer Van 
Dyke noticed glass and pieces of a broom on the floor.  He then saw Solis walking 
down the hallway of the apartment.  Solis had a cut on his forehead.  Officers Van 
Gerpen and Van Dyke spoke to Solis, who claimed that he and his girlfriend had 
been jumped by three men while out for a walk.  Solis did not provide any 
additional information.  He also stated that his girlfriend had run off after the 
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incident occurred and that he did not know where she went.  Sanchez subsequently 
called 911 from a nearby gas station and informed police that she had called 911 
earlier. 
[¶4.]  
Officer Van Gerpen was dispatched to a bank near Solis and Sanchez’s 
apartment to speak with Sanchez.  He observed that Sanchez was holding a cloth or 
shirt over a jagged cut on the left side of her face and that she was crying.  Sanchez 
told Officer Van Gerpen that Solis had: struck her on the left side of her face with a 
broom; head butted her, causing bruising to her forehead; grabbed her cloth lanyard 
and pulled it across her neck to strangle her; and choked her with his hands.  
Sanchez also stated that Solis came up behind Sanchez and tightly wrapped his 
arm around her neck until Sanchez could hear a cracking noise.  Sanchez reported 
that she struggled to breathe, made gurgling noises during this incident, and was 
close to passing out.  She stated that during the incident, Solis stated “Shut the fuck 
up.  Shut the fuck up.  You’re going to listen to me.  You’re not going nowhere.”  
Sanchez told Officer Van Gerpen that after she was choked, she left the apartment 
to smoke a cigarette.  When Sanchez returned, she saw that Solis had a cut on his 
forehead and that he was sweeping up glass from the floor because Solis had head 
butted a picture frame.  Officer Van Gerpen took photos to document Sanchez’s 
injuries. 
[¶5.]  
Paramedic Monte Mathews tended to Sanchez’s injuries shortly after 
the incident.  He claimed that Sanchez sustained a two to three-inch laceration on 
the left side of her head, a one-inch laceration on the top of her head, and an egg-
sized hematoma on her forehead.  Paramedics transported Sanchez to the Avera 
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McKennan emergency department.  Registered nurse Amy Clay cared for Sanchez 
when she arrived at the hospital.  Clay stated that Sanchez had an “obvious 
laceration” on the side of her head, a hematoma on the right side of her head, and 
some redness around her neck.  While in the emergency room, Sanchez said that the 
room was spinning and that her head hurt.  Clay removed a piece of plastic from the 
laceration on Sanchez’s face.  Ultimately, Sanchez received stitches and a CT scan. 
[¶6.]  
On July 19, 2017, police responded to another argument between Solis 
and Sanchez.  On that day, Sanchez’s mother, Calista Honomichl, and sister, 
Angela Roubideaux, were on their way to Solis and Sanchez’s house to pick Sanchez 
up when they received a phone call from Sanchez.  Sanchez sounded as if she 
needed help, so Roubideaux called 911.  Around the same time, Solis and Sanchez’s 
sixteen-year-old neighbor claimed to have heard the pair arguing, but did not call 
911 because Sanchez had instructed her not to call police if she heard them. 
[¶7.]  
When Roubideaux arrived at Solis and Sanchez’s apartment, she saw 
Solis tugging at Sanchez’s arms and shirt.  Solis let Sanchez go when he saw 
Roubideaux.  Solis called Sanchez “a crazy bitch,” and said, “She’s hitting me.  Stop 
hitting me.”  Solis attempted to flee the duplex through a window.  Roubideaux and 
Sanchez attempted to grab Solis and pull him back into the home, but were 
unsuccessful.  Honomichl observed that Sanchez had red marks on her face; lumps 
on her cheeks, forehead, and back of her head; and bruises on her knees and elbows.  
Roubideaux also observed that Sanchez “had marks all over her face[.]”  The pair 
both observed that there were holes in the walls inside the residence. 
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[¶8.]  
Sioux Falls Police Officers Skylar Mathis and Eric Olson were 
dispatched to Solis and Sanchez’s apartment.  The officers were told that Solis had 
fled the scene and were given his description.  Solis was located shortly thereafter 
at a nearby gas station.  When officers detained and frisked Solis, they found a blue 
and black knife in his right front pocket.  Officer Olson asked Solis if he had any 
contact with Sanchez that day, but Solis responded that “he had not seen her all 
day.”  Solis was transported back to the duplex, and the officers continued to 
investigate the incident. 
[¶9.]  
Officer Mathis took pictures of Sanchez’s injuries, which included 
bruises on her arms and forehead, and holes in the wall of the duplex.  Sanchez told 
the officers that Solis hit her with either a closed fist or open hand 30 to 40 times, 
kicked her, hit her on the head with a plastic bottle, pointed a knife at her, and 
lunged at her with the knife.  Sanchez described the knife as being blue and black.  
Sanchez stated that during the incident, she attempted to leave the duplex by 
climbing out a window and walking out the front door, but that Solis kept pulling 
her back inside the residence.  Sanchez also claimed that she attempted to call 911, 
but Solis took her cell phone and threw it to the ground.  Sanchez said that the 
holes in the wall of the duplex were caused by Solis flinging her body into the wall 
and pushing her head into the wall.  The officers observed that one of the holes in 
the wall contained what appeared to be human hair. 
[¶10.]  
A Minnehaha grand jury indicted Solis on six counts stemming from 
the incident on April 23, 2017, including one count of aggravated assault by 
choking, one count of aggravated assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and four 
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alternative counts of simple assault.  A Minnehaha County grand jury also indicted 
Solis on eight different counts in a separate criminal file stemming from the 
incident on July 19, 2017.  That indictment included charges for aggravated assault 
by means of a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault by physical menace, three 
alternative counts of simple assault, interference with an emergency 
communication, false imprisonment, and violation of a conditional bond.  The State 
filed a part II information in both cases alleging Solis had five prior assault 
convictions which occurred in Dakota County, Iowa, and a prior felony conviction 
which occurred in Dakota County, Nebraska. 
[¶11.]  
On October 23, 2017, the State filed a motion for joinder in both cases.  
It sought to join the indictments because Solis was represented by the same 
attorney in each case; each case involved the same victim; and the cases were “of 
the same or similar character[, t]he charges occurred close in time, location, and 
manner . . . [, and] the alleged factual scenarios of each charge [were] part of a 
common scheme or plan . . . [involving] the same victim.”  Solis opposed the motions 
for joinder. 
[¶12.]  
The circuit court held a hearing on the motion for joinder on 
January 26, 2018.  After hearing oral arguments from the parties, the court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the State’s motion.  The court 
determined that the charge against Solis for violation of a conditional bond should 
be tried separate from the remaining counts “to reduce any potential prejudice to 
[Solis] at trial.” 
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[¶13.]  
A jury trial on both indictments was held on April 9-11, 2018.  At the 
end of the State’s case-in-chief, Solis moved for a judgment of acquittal on the 
charges of aggravated assault by choking and aggravated assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon from the April 23, 2017 incident.  Solis moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on the charges of aggravated assault by means of a dangerous weapon and 
aggravated assault by physical menace from the July 19, 2017 incident.  The court 
denied Solis’s motions.  Solis also renewed his objection to the joinder of his 
indictments, which the court denied.  On April 11, 2018, the jury found Solis guilty 
of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon (broom stick), and on the four 
counts of simple assault stemming from the incident on April 23, 2017.  The jury 
found Solis guilty on three counts of simple assault stemming from the incident on 
July 19, 2017. 
[¶14.]  
A sentencing hearing was held on June 26, 2018.  Solis admitted to the 
allegations contained in the part II informations.  The State dismissed the charge 
against Solis for violation of a conditional bond and two other unrelated criminal 
cases pending against Solis.  The circuit court sentenced Solis to 15 years in prison, 
with seven years suspended, for aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon 
(broom stick) for the April 23, 2017 incident and credit for time served.  The court 
also sentenced Solis to two years in prison for simple assault (recklessly causes 
bodily injury), for the incident on April 23, 2017.  The court suspended the sentence 
and ordered it to be served concurrently to the sentence for aggravated assault.  
Finally, the court sentenced Solis to two years in prison for simple assault (physical 
menace) for the incident on July 19, 2017.  The court suspended the sentence, but 
#28679, #28680 
 
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ordered it to be served consecutive to the sentences for aggravated assault and 
simple assault (recklessly causing bodily injury).  The circuit court filed separate 
judgments of conviction on July 2, 2018. 
[¶15.]  
Solis appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence, raising the 
following questions for our review: 
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred in joining the cases for 
trial. 
 
2. 
Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Solis’s 
guilt for aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon. 
Standard of Review 
[¶16.]  
“A circuit court’s decision to join charges is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.”  State v. Goodshot, 2017 S.D. 33, ¶ 10, 897 N.W.2d 346, 349 
(quoting State v. Waugh, 2011 S.D. 71, ¶ 11, 805 N.W.2d 480, 483).  “An abuse of 
discretion refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and 
clearly against reason and evidence.”  Waugh, 2011 S.D. 71, ¶ 11, 805 N.W.2d 
at 483 (quoting Kostel v. Schwartz, 2008 S.D. 85, ¶ 12, 756 N.W.2d 363, 370). 
[¶17.]  
“We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo.”  State v. 
Quist, 2018 S.D. 30, ¶ 13, 910 N.W.2d 900, 904 (quoting State v. Traversie, 
2016 S.D. 19, ¶ 9, 877 N.W.2d 327, 330).  “Our task is to determine whether the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.”  Id. (quoting State v. Guthmiller, 
2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 21, 843 N.W.2d 364, 371).  “To do so, we ask whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. (quoting Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 21, 843 N.W.2d at 371).  “If the evidence, 
#28679, #28680 
 
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including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
sustains a reasonable theory of guilt, a guilty verdict will not be set aside.”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Martin, 2017 S.D. 65, ¶ 6, 903 N.W.2d 749, 751). 
Analysis & Decision 
 
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred in joining the cases for 
trial. 
[¶18.]  
Solis argues the circuit court erred in joining the charges from his two 
criminal files “because the danger of unfair prejudice to Solis stemming from the 
impermissible character inferences created by putting two unrelated allegations of 
assault in front of the jury substantially outweighed any governmental interest in 
joining the cases.”  Solis claims the charges from the two incidents were 
inappropriate for joinder because the incidents occurred almost three months apart, 
involved different methods of perpetuating the alleged assaults, were not a part of 
the same act or transaction, and were not connected by a common plan or scheme. 
[¶19.]  
SDCL 23A-11-1 provides that “[a] court may order two or more 
indictments . . . to be tried together if the offenses . . . could have been joined in a 
single indictment or information.”  SDCL 23A-6-23 sets the criteria for determining 
whether two offenses may be tried together, stating: 
[t]wo or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or 
information in separate counts for each offense, if the offenses 
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the 
same or similar character or are based on the same act or 
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
 
Thus, SDCL 23A-6-23 provides “three separate tests which permit joinder of 
offenses.”  State v. Dowty, 2013 S.D. 72, ¶ 23, 838 N.W.2d 820, 828 (quoting Waugh, 
2011 S.D. 71, ¶ 12, 805 N.W.2d at 483). 
#28679, #28680 
 
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[¶20.]  
Under the first test, “joinder is appropriate ‘where separately charged 
offenses are closely related in time, location, and manner of execution.’”  Id. ¶ 24 
(quoting State v. Loftus, 1997 S.D. 131, ¶ 13, 573 N.W.2d 167, 171).  “This test for 
finding joinder appropriate where the separately charged offenses are closely 
related in location and manner of execution has been broadly construed.”  Id. 
(quoting Loftus, 1997 S.D. 131, ¶ 12, 573 N.W.2d at 170). 
[¶21.] 
When joinder is proper under SDCL 23A-6-23, “the burden of 
proof falls to the party opposing joinder to establish sufficient 
prejudice to justify severance of the joined counts.”  “A showing 
of prejudice requires more than a showing of a better chance of 
acquittal at a separate trial.”  The requisite showing of prejudice 
is high in order “to offset the purpose of joinder, judicial 
efficiency.” 
 
Goodshot, 2017 S.D. 33, ¶ 12, 897 N.W.2d at 350 (quoting Waugh, 2011 S.D. 71, 
¶¶ 13-14, 805 N.W.2d at 483). 
[¶22.]  
The circuit court held a hearing regarding the State’s motion for 
joinder on January 26, 2018.  After hearing oral arguments from the parties, the 
court adopted the facts of the two incidents involving Solis as recited in the State’s 
brief in support of the motion for joinder.  The court noted that the State’s factual 
allegations were “very similar” to those contained in Solis’s brief.  Based on those 
facts, the court considered the criteria for joinder as contained in SDCL 23A-6-23.  
The court first found that the charges were sufficiently similar under SDCL 23A-6-
23 because the two charges against Solis occurred in the same location, occurred 
within 87 days of each other, involved the same victim, and were caused by similar 
methods. 
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[¶23.]  
The court also considered whether Solis undertook a common scheme 
or plan against Sanchez in both incidents.  The court determined that such a 
common plan or scheme existed because each incidence of violence would be 
admissible against Solis at trial to prove motive under SDCL 19-19-404(b).  The 
court cited our decisions in State v. Phillips, 2018 S.D. 2, 906 N.W.2d 411, for this 
proposition.  In Philips, we noted that “[p]rior instances of domestic abuse against 
the same victim are often relevant in the familial context because they show the 
nature of the relationship, which explains the interactions between the parties.”  Id. 
¶ 16, 906 N.W.2d at 415.  The court also noted our decision in State v. Laible, where 
we stated: 
Domestic abuse often has a history highly relevant to the truth-
finding process.  When an accused had a close relationship with 
the victim, prior aggression, threats or abusive treatment of the 
same victim by the same perpetrator are admissible when 
offered on relevant issues under Rule 404(b).  The rationale for 
admissibility is that an accused’s past conduct in a familial 
context tends to explain later interactions between the same 
persons. 
 
1999 S.D. 58, ¶ 21, 594 N.W.2d 328, 335.  The court appeared to reason that 
because prior instances of domestic abuse are admissible to show motive under 
SDCL 19-19-404(b), those instances can also be considered as part of a common plan 
or scheme of domestic violence to prove joinder under SDCL 23A-6-23. 
[¶24.]  
Finally, the court considered the possibility of any prejudice to Solis 
which may have resulted from the joinder of the charges.  The court noted that 
“cases say that simply because two acts are being charged, that is not prejudice, 
there must be something more than that, and the [c]ourt finds that there has not 
been any demonstrable prejudice over and above what would naturally occur.”  
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Ultimately, the court stated that it believed that each of the acts allegedly 
committed by Solis were “probative of the parties’ relationship[,]” and indicative of a 
general “motive, intent and plan.”  Finding that no prejudice would result, the court 
granted the State’s motion to join the two indictments. 
[¶25.]  
The court properly considered the similar character of the two offenses 
committed by Solis and indicated the importance of each offense as showing part of 
a common scheme of Solis’s domestic abuse of Sanchez under SDCL 23A-6-23.  The 
court’s findings were based on sound reasoning and supported by evidence in the 
record.  The court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s motion to join 
the indictments against Solis. 
 
2. 
Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Solis’s 
guilt for aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon. 
[¶26.]  
Solis next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for 
judgment of acquittal as to the charge of aggravated assault with a dangerous 
weapon.  Namely, Solis claims there was insufficient evidence to show that Solis 
used a dangerous weapon to cause bodily injury against Sanchez.  He contends that 
the plastic broom used against Sanchez in the April 23, 2017, incident was not 
calculated or designed to inflict death or serious bodily harm, nor used in a manner 
likely to inflict death or serious bodily harm. 
[¶27.]  
Solis was charged with aggravated assault pursuant to SDCL 22-18-
1.1(2), which provides: “Any person who: . . [a]ttempts to cause, or knowingly 
causes, bodily injury to another with a dangerous weapon . . . is guilty of aggravated 
assault.”  SDCL 22-1-2(10) defines a “[d]angerous weapon” or “deadly weapon” as 
“any firearm, stun gun, knife, or device, instrument, material, or substance, 
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whether animate or inanimate, which is calculated or designed to inflict death or 
serious bodily harm, or by the manner in which it is used is likely to inflict death or 
serious bodily harm[.]” 
[¶28.]  
Here, Solis contends, and the State concedes, that a plastic broom is 
not “calculated or designed to inflict death or serious bodily harm.”  SDCL 22-1-
2(10).  However, Solis also contends that the evidence did not establish that the 
plastic broom was used against Sanchez in a manner that was “likely to inflict 
death or serious bodily harm.”  Id.  He first claims that there was “[n]o evidence . . . 
presented that Solis struck Sanchez with a broom repeatedly, maliciously[,] or more 
than one time[.]”  He further claims that “plastic brooms are generally light and 
flimsy, [and] unlikely to cause serious injury, especially with one hit.” 
[¶29.]  
There was no testimony as to the exact manner in which Solis struck 
Sanchez with the plastic broom.  However, there was sufficient evidence to support 
an inference that: (1) Solis had struck Sanchez in the face with the plastic broom at 
least once, and (2) Solis struck Sanchez at least hard enough for the broom to break 
and embed a piece of plastic in Sanchez’s face.  According to Officer Van Gerpen, 
Sanchez told him that Solis had hit her in the head with the broom.  Photos taken 
of Sanchez after the incident showed her with a piece of plastic stuck to the side of 
her face.  Finally, Nurse Clay testified that she removed a piece of plastic from 
Sanchez’s face after the incident.  The sheer force needed to cause this type of injury 
to Sanchez is enough to establish that the broom was swung in a “manner . . . likely 
to inflict death or serious bodily harm[.]”  SDCL 22-1-2(10). 
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[¶30.]  
Solis next argues that the injuries Sanchez sustained from the incident 
on April 23, 2017, did not rise to the level of “serious bodily harm.”  Solis cites this 
Court’s decision in State v. Janisch, 290 N.W.2d 473 (S.D. 1980), for this 
proposition.  In Janisch, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault after he 
had repeatedly struck, kicked, and thrown a victim to the floor.  Id. at 474.  The 
victim suffered “blue marks across his head, shoulders, and right thigh[, but] 
showed no real damage to his mouth, nose, or eyes, and he had no fractures or 
evidence of concussion.”  Id. at 474-75.  On appeal of Janisch’s conviction, this Court 
concluded that such injuries did not constitute “serious bodily injury,” finding them 
instead to be “more closely related to the ordinary injuries sustained in any simple 
assault and far below the status of grave or dangerous to life, health or limb.”  Id. 
at 476.  Solis points out that Sanchez’s injuries only amounted to a laceration to the 
side of her face which required stitches, and red marks on her neck, which he claims 
cannot be considered serious bodily injury under Janisch.  
[¶31.]  
Solis’ argument that the State was required to show “serious bodily 
injury” misapprehends the statutory elements for aggravated assault with a 
dangerous weapon.  Further, Solis’s reliance on Janisch is misplaced as Janisch 
involved a claim of aggravated assault under SDCL 22-18-1.1(4), which requires a 
showing that the assault actually resulted in “serious bodily injury” to the victim.∗  
                                            
∗  
Moreover, Janisch is inapposite because it was decided before the Legislature 
defined “serious bodily injury,” and the jury in Janisch was not instructed on 
the meaning of the term.  The Legislature has since defined “serious bodily 
injury,” and juries are now instructed on its meaning.  Although often quoted 
as authoritative by litigants, Janisch did not create an evidentiary standard 
upon which all future injuries are to be compared.  In fact, since its release, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
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Here, Solis was convicted of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon under 
SDCL 22-18-1.1(2) by the use of a plastic broom.  To prove aggravated assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon under this subsection, the State was required to show 
that Solis attempted to cause or knowingly caused “bodily injury” with a dangerous 
weapon.  The State was also required to show that the plastic broom was a 
dangerous weapon as defined in SDCL 22-1-2(10) because it was “calculated or 
designed to inflict death or serious bodily injury” or that “by the manner in which it 
[was] used [was] likely to inflict death or serious bodily injury.”  Proof of “serious 
bodily injury” to the victim is not an element of the offense of aggravated assault 
with a dangerous weapon under SDCL 22-18-1.1(2). 
[¶32.]  
Here, evidence indicates that Sanchez received a two to three-inch 
laceration on the left side of her head, a one-inch laceration on the top of her head, 
an egg sized hematoma on her forehead, and some redness around her neck.  A 
piece of plastic was embedded within the larger laceration.  The plastic had to be 
removed, and the wound required stitches.  This evidence was sufficient for a jury 
________________________ 
(. . . continued) 
Janisch has not been substantially relied on by this Court in any subsequent 
aggravated assault cases.  Instead, each case has been decided on its own 
facts to determine whether an injury “is grave and not trivial, and gives rise 
to apprehension of danger to life, health, or limb[]” under SDCL 22-1-2(44A).  
See State v. Miland, 2014 S.D. 98, ¶ 14, 858 N.W.2d 328, 331; State v. 
Fasthorse, 2009 S.D. 106, ¶¶ 10-11, 776 N.W.2d 233, 237; State v. Eagle Star, 
1996 S.D. 143, ¶ 27, 558 N.W.2d 70, 76; State v. White Mountain, 477 N.W.2d 
36, 39 (S.D. 1991); State v. Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d 777, 781 (S.D. 1991); State 
v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812, 822-23 (S.D. 1983); State v. Williams, 297 N.W.2d 
491, 494 (S.D. 1980); State v. Battest, 295 N.W.2d 739, 742 (S.D. 1980); State 
v. Shear, 295 N.W.2d 176, 178 (S.D. 1980).  Therefore, Janisch has limited 
precedential value and is explicitly confined to its facts. 
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to conclude that Solis attempted to cause or knowingly caused bodily injury with a 
dangerous weapon. 
Conclusion 
[¶33.]  
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s 
motion to join the two indictments against Solis.  The court also did not err in 
denying Solis’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge that Solis committed 
an aggravated assault by means of a dangerous weapon.  We affirm. 
[¶34.]  
KERN, JENSEN, and SALTER, Justices, and WILBUR, Retired 
Justice, concur.