Title: OLSEN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

OLSEN v. STATE2003 WY 4667 P.3d 536Case Number: 98-62Decided: 04/14/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                            

MARTIN 
J. OLSEN,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

Representing Appellant:

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Assistant Public Defender; Karl Linde, Assistant Public Defender; T. Alan Elrod, 
Assistant Public Defender; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos and Mr. Elrod.

 

Representing Appellee:

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Baker-Musick.

 

Before GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, MACY, Ret., and TAYLOR, Ret., 
JJ.

 

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 

TABLE OF 
CONTENTS

 

Opening ............................................................................................................................... 
Ö¶1-3

Facts 

I.  The Murders .......................................................................................................................... 
¶4

II.  Events Leading Up To and Subsequent To the 
Murders ......................................... ¶¶5-11

III.  Prosecution's Case .................................................................................................. 
¶¶12-13

IV.  Defense Case .......................................................................................................... 
¶¶14-17

V.  Closing Arguments ................................................................................................... 
¶¶18-21

VI.  Sentencing Phase ................................................................................................... 
¶¶22-56

Discussion 

I.  Standard of Review ............................................................................................................ 
¶57

II.  Guilt Phase 

A.  Special Prosecutor ....................................................................................... 
¶¶58-63

B.  Prospective Jurors ....................................................................................... 
¶¶64-68

C.  Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel .............................................................. 
¶69

1.  Counsel's Admission of Guilt ........................................................... 
¶¶70-76

2.  Impeachment Evidence .................................................................... 
¶¶77-82

3.  Change of Venue .............................................................................. 
¶¶83-84

D.  Sufficiency of the Evidence of Premediation 
............................................ 
¶¶85-87

E.  Summary ............................................................................................................... 
¶88

III.  Sentencing Phase 

A.  Constitutionality of Wyoming's Death Penalty 
Statute ...................................... ¶89

1.  Background of Federal Precedent .................................................. 
¶¶90-95

2.  Weighing/Nonweighing Distinction ............................................... 
¶¶96-102

3.  Summary .................................................................................................. 
¶103

B.  Statutory Interpretation ............................................................................. 
¶¶104-105

C.  Aggravating Circumstances ................................................................... 
¶¶106-109

1.  Atrocious or Cruel Aggravating Circumstance 
.......................... ¶¶110-119

2.  Great Risk of Death Aggravating Circumstance 
....................... ¶¶120-123

3.  Purpose of Avoiding or Preventing a Lawful 
Arrest Aggravating Circumstance      ¶¶124-128

4.  Premediated Felony Murder Aggravating 
Circumstance ........ 
¶¶129-130

5.  Summary ....................................................................................... 
¶¶131-132

D.  Mitigating Circumstances ................................................................................. 
¶133

1.  Law of Mitigating Circumstances ............................................... 
¶¶134-142

2.  Burden of Proof ............................................................................. 
¶¶143-145

3.  Failure to Instruct on Mitigating 
Circumstance of Duress ................... ¶146

4.  Adequacy of the Verdict Form .................................................... 
¶¶147-149

5.  Summary .................................................................................................. 
¶150

E.  Role of Victim Impact and Mercy Plea Evidence 

1.  Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence .................................... ¶¶151-176

2.  Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence of Plea for 
Mercy .................. ¶¶177-182

F.  Jury Instructions 

1.  Comment on Right to Silence in Psychiatric 
Evaluation 

Instruction ............................................................................................ 
¶¶183-186

2.  Consideration of Counsel's Argument in 
Sentencing Decision ¶¶187-188

3.  Instruction in Response to Jury Question 
About Parole ........... ¶¶189-194

G.  Sentencing Phase Jurors................................................................................... 
¶195

1.  Second Jury .................................................................................. 
¶¶196-198

2.  Replacement Juror ....................................................................... 
¶¶199-201

3.  Selection of Alternate Juror ......................................................... 
¶¶202-210

H.  Lethal Injection is Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment ................................ ¶¶211-213

I.  Repeal of Statutory Proportionality Review 
............................................. 
¶¶214-218

IV.  Appellate Review ................................................................................................ 
¶¶219-221

Appendix A

Appendix B

  

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]           
In accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103(a) (Michie 
1997), this is an appeal from convictions of capital murder charged under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §6-2-101(a) (Michie 1997) and sentences of death imposed under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102 (Michie 1997), following a jury trial and sentencing 
proceedings.  
Martin J. Olsen (Olsen) was charged with and convicted of murdering three 
victims during a robbery at a bar in Worland, Wyoming.  On appeal, with 
respect to his capital murder convictions and sentences, he enumerates 
twenty-five errors under the various headings of constitutional issues, 
instruction issues addressing the sentencing phase, additional issues addressing 
the sentencing phase, trial phase issues, and punishment issues.  The statements of 
the issues submitted by Olsen and the State are attached as Appendix A to this 
opinion.  In 
addition to considering the specific errors enumerated by Olsen, this court has 
also considered the punishment.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103(c) (Michie 
1997).  With 
regard to the sentences, this court has considered (1) whether the jury imposed 
the sentences of death under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other 
arbitrary factor and (2) whether the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances 
and mitigating circumstances is supported by the evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-103(d)(i) and (ii) (Michie 1997).

 

[¶2]           
We find no constitutional errors and find no errors in the 
guilt phase of Olsen's trial.  Therefore, we affirm Olsen's convictions of 
capital/first degree murder and robbery.  We do find error, however, in the sentencing 
phase of Olsen's trial in the following matters:  (1) insufficient evidence to support the 
jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance that the murders were especially 
atrocious or cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the victims; (2) 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of the aggravating 
circumstance that Olsen knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more 
persons; (3) improper jury instructions on the law of mitigating circumstances, 
the decision-making process, the mitigating circumstance of duress, Olsen's 
parole status if he received life sentences, and the verdict form; and (4) the 
introduction of victim impact evidence and a plea of mercy.  Consequently, we 
set aside Olsen's sentence of death and remand for a new sentencing hearing to 
be conducted with a new jury impaneled for that purpose.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-103(e)(iii) (Michie 1997).

 

[¶3]           
From this court's study of death penalty jurisprudence, 
this court acutely appreciates that a capital case, by its very nature, requires 
of a reviewing court the most meticulous and thoughtful consideration and 
deliberation of the issues presented. In fulfilling that requirement in this 
case, the members of this court have had divergent views concerning the 
resolution of some of the many difficult issues presented and have expended 
substantial amounts of time working through those divergent views to achieve 
agreement on the resolution and the reasoning supporting the resolution of these 
issues. In light of the requirement of meticulous and thoughtful consideration 
and deliberation, the working through of divergent views to achieve agreement on 
resolution of issues, the unique set of appellate responsibilities conferred by 
the legislature upon this court, the errors enumerated in this appeal, the 
parties' extensive briefing of the issues underlying these enumerated errors, 
and the caution that the punishment of death is different, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2760, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), this court 
has taken considerable time to reach its decision in this case and in another 
capital case submitted for review after this one and which is also decided 
today.  See Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47.  Although the time to reach decision has 
been considerable, it has been necessary and unavoidable for the reasons 
stated.

 

                                                                        
FACTS

 

[¶4]           
On the night of January 20, 1997, sometime between 11:00 
p.m. and midnight, Olsen entered the Little Chief Bar in Worland.  He instructed two 
patrons to lie down on the floor and robbed the bar.  After having the 
bartender also lay face down on the floor, he shot all three in the back of the 
head, firing a fourth shot seconds later when it appeared that one victim was 
not dead.  He 
left the bar, went to a convenience store and pumped gas into his pickup.  He chatted with the 
store clerk until asked if he knew why the police were active in the area.  At this question, 
he became agitated, left, and went home and packed.  Before he left his 
home, he confessed the murders to his mother and then fled in his vehicle.  After he left, his 
mother called the police, told them Olsen was involved, and within a few hours, 
Olsen was apprehended.  He was advised of his rights, and spent much 
of the rest of the day confessing the murders to police.  Several of these 
confessions were recorded on audiotape and videotape.

 

[¶5]           
At approximately 4:15 p.m. on the day of the murder, 
Olsen's mother contacted him at RJ's Saloon where he had been drinking and 
requested he return home.  Olsen left the bar, went home, had dinner, 
and left home again at 6:30 p.m. to play dart games for a dart league team.  Between 7:00 p.m. 
and 9:00 p.m., Olsen and three others played darts at the American Legion where 
he consumed five or six beers.  The group moved on to the Rendezvous for an 
hour and drank at least two more beers.   By 10:00 p.m., Olsen was back at RJ's 
playing pool and continuing to drink.  He was seen leaving RJ's around 11:30 
p.m.  A few 
minutes before midnight, Olsen pumped gas into his truck at a convenience store, 
paid for snacks and a coke with a fifty-dollar bill, and conducted a friendly 
conversation with the store clerk for several minutes, telling her that he was 
going to Colorado where the temperature was 56 degrees.  A register receipt 
from that store indicated the purchase occurred at 11:54 p.m.  The clerk could 
smell alcohol on his breath, but did not notice any drunken behavior, until, 
after seeing numerous police cars driving by during the evening, she asked Olsen 
if he knew what the cops were doing. The clerk testified that at that point, 
Olsen "couldn't say 56 degrees" and he then went to the door, apparently 
agitated, turned around, said "Yes, I have been drinking," and walked out the 
door.   
Olsen went home at a few minutes after midnight, parked in the alley, and 
entered a doorway that opened directly to his room and locked the door that 
opened to the rest of the house.

 

[¶6]           
Testifying as a witness for the State, Olsen's mother 
described the following events.  Hearing him return and lock his door, his 
mother became concerned, and knocked on his bedroom door.  He joined her in 
another part of the house, and the two talked until about 12:35 a.m.  She returned to 
bed, but became aware that Olsen was packing, and arose to confront him.  She saw a gun and, 
at that point, Olsen confessed to her he had killed three people, claiming that 
years earlier, while in the Marine Corps, he had accumulated a $70,000 gambling 
debt and still owed $17,000.  He claimed that over the years, he had been 
constantly harassed for the money and, several years before, his fiancé had been 
killed because of the debt.  He further claimed that he believed he had 
seen the man sent to collect the gambling debt in town and followed him into the 
Little Chief Bar, shot him, and shot what he described as two innocent people. 
Olsen told his mother that this man was involved in the death of his fiancé and 
Olsen believed that the man would try to kill Olsen's ex-wife and daughter.  Olsen finished 
packing, loaded his truck with his belongings and the murder weapon, returned to 
his mother and talked about his options of either running or turning himself 
in.  Olsen told 
her his third option was to kill her and his father. When she responded that he 
would not do that, he said there was a fourth option to which Mrs. Olsen did not 
respond.  Olsen 
told his mother he was going to Colorado, and left.  He called her a few 
minutes later on his cell phone, reporting that the police had apparently found 
the bodies of his victims.  Mrs. Olsen, a police dispatcher, then 
contacted police and turned in her son.

 

[¶7]           
The State's direct examination of Mrs. Olsen at trial 
disclosed that in 1990 she had learned that her son had been engaged to a girl 
who had died in a car accident.  She had run a driver's license check on 
Olsen's fiancé that indicated that the license had expired and not been 
renewed.  In 
her continued direct examination, Mrs. Olsen disclosed that on the night of the 
murders she believed Olsen was intoxicated, agitated, and was slurring his 
speech.  She 
also disclosed during her direct examination, that in March of 1993, Olsen 
suffered an aneurysm that she believed changed his disposition.  On the night of the 
murders, Olsen had taken a relatively new drug to control seizures.   Apparently, 
Olsen's heavy drinking after his aneurysm ruptured had caused him to suffer 
seizures.  

 

[¶8]           
A customer discovered the three bodies at the Little Chief 
Bar at 12:05 a.m. and reported the discovery to the police.  The police were 
investigating the crime when Mrs. Olsen reported to police that her son had 
confessed committing the crime to her.  Worland police issued a teletype identifying 
Olsen as the suspect in the triple homicide and describing his vehicle.  Instead of heading 
to Colorado, as he had told his mother, Olsen traveled east.  At 4:20 a.m., he 
was spotted as he drove through Buffalo, Wyoming.  The officer followed him for a considerable 
distance as other officers positioned themselves for an arrest, and did not 
notice erratic driving by Olsen, but did notice Olsen was driving slowly and 
drifting onto the shoulder of the highway, both of which are indicators of drunk 
driving. Olsen was stopped and arrested without incident. A gun, later 
identified as the murder weapon, was in plain view in Olsen's vehicle.  The arresting 
officer read Olsen his Miranda rights, placed him in the back of the patrol car 
and waited at the arrest site for the arrival of an agent from the Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI).  During the half-hour wait, he and Olsen 
engaged in a conversation that the officer recorded on an audiocassette. Olsen 
repeated his gambling debt story and stated he had shot three people in the 
head.

 

[¶9]           
Olsen was taken to Buffalo and interrogated by DCI Agent 
Kevin Hughes during the drive. That recorded interview was conducted at 5:10 
a.m. and Olsen again repeated his gambling debt story. During a recorded 
interview conducted at 7:05 a.m. at the Buffalo judicial center, Olsen claimed 
that he did not remember confessing to his mother or telling the gambling debt 
story, continued to admit that he had shot three people in the back of the head, 
but now explained that his motive for killing them was fright and 
intoxication.  
During a recorded interview conducted at 8:40 a.m., Olsen detailed his 
actions before the robbery, stating that he had parked on the side street of the 
Little Chief Bar, had locked his vehicle to prevent the stealing of his cell 
phone, entered the bar and observed the two customers and one bartender, 
proceeded directly to the restroom and, after using it, returned to the bar with 
his gun drawn.  
He placed the two male customers on the floor on their stomachs.  He ordered the 
bartender to place money in a sack and then placed her on the floor next to the 
two customers.  
He then shot each of them in the back of the head, firing three 
shots.  He 
claimed that he had not planned the robbery, did not remember the actual 
shootings, and had no motive for the murders other than drunkenness. Agent 
Hughes testified that, on the afternoon of the January 21, he returned Olsen to 
Worland.  
During that drive, Olsen provided more details in an unrecorded 
conversation.  
Olsen told Hughes that when he ordered the bartender to give him all the 
money, she "bitched at him, and said, you are not going to get away with 
this.'"   
Other than this statement, none of the three victims resisted him in any 
way.  Hughes 
testified that Olsen told him during this unrecorded statement that the 
bartender's words scared him as he realized that the people could identify him, 
and he shot them. Olsen also told Hughes that he needed money because he was two 
months behind on his child support and because the rings were going out in his 
pickup. Olsen stated that after the robbery and before entering the convenience 
store, he had placed part of the robbery money in his wallet and part of it in 
the sun visor of his vehicle and used a $50 bill to pay for gasoline, coke and 
snacks at the store.

 

[¶10]      The arresting officer, a certified Intoximeter operator, 
gave Olsen two Intoximeter tests, one at 7:33 a.m. which read .063 alcohol 
concentration, and another at 7:34 which read .061 alcohol concentration.  Olsen consented to 
blood and urine tests that were conducted at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of January 
21. Olsen's truck was towed to Buffalo and searched after a warrant issued later 
that morning.  
Olsen was videotaped between 11:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. on the day of 
January 21 identifying the money stolen and other items found in his truck.  Later that 
afternoon, Olsen requested a lawyer, and the interrogations ceased.

 

[¶11]      Counsel was appointed to defend Olsen, and charges were 
filed.  The 
State filed notice that it would seek the death penalty.  Pretrial rulings 
permitted the state prosecutor to have the assistance of a United States 
attorney at trial. Hearings were held on Olsen's motion to suppress his 
statements to police and the evidence seized from his truck on grounds that he 
was too intoxicated to have voluntarily consented to the search.  That motion was 
denied.  Olsen 
also moved to suppress statements made on the afternoon of January 21 following 
equivocal statements about needing an attorney.  That motion was also denied when the trial 
court found that all questioning ceased after Olsen explicitly requested an 
attorney.  
Before trial, Olsen's mental health was examined by doctors, including a 
Dr. Gummow, who indicated that Olsen suffered from brain damage. The State filed 
a pretrial motion demanding to know whether Olsen would be changing his plea of 
not guilty to a plea of not guilty by reason of mental defect.  During the hearing 
on the motion, defense counsel did not change the plea but reserved the right to 
do so should an expected final report indicate the necessity.   Ultimately, 
Olsen did not change his plea.

 

III.  Prosecution's Case  

 

[¶12]      Appointed defense counsel filed numerous pretrial motions 
concerning both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, and several 
hearings were conducted in July and August. Defense counsel secured a continuing 
objection to the denial of its motions.   Pretrial rulings rejected the idea of 
separate juries for the bifurcated proceeding, and on August 25, 1997, voir dire 
began that incorporated death qualification of the panel.  Voir dire lasted 
four days. Voir dire ended when defense counsel agreed to fewer peremptory 
challenges; the trial court did not record the parties' peremptory 
challenges.

 

[¶13]      At trial, other than the witnesses who testified about 
Olsen's actions before the murders, the prosecution presented the testimony of 
investigating officers at the crime scene; Olsen's mother about her son's 
actions and statements that night; a witness claiming to have seen Olsen 
observing the Little Chief Bar days before the robbery; and Olsen's recorded 
interviews with the arresting officer and DCI agents.  Forensic evidence 
established that all three victims had been found in a prone, face-down position 
and shot at least once in the back of the head.  All had died from gunshot wounds.  There were 
indications that one victim had attempted to get up and was shot a second time, 
meaning that Olsen had fired a total of four shots. Another victim had a foot 
imprint on his back, indicating that Olsen may have braced himself during the 
shootings. Diagrams of the bar were displayed, and the prosecution later argued 
that they showed that Olsen had threaded his way through tables and chairs to 
reach the victims, although before doing so he was standing by a sliding glass 
door exit. The bartender's teenage daughter had been asleep in the home attached 
to her mother's work establishment and testified that she heard three loud 
noises in rapid succession followed by a fourth noise a few seconds later 
between 11:15 p.m. and midnight. The murder weapon, money from the robbery, and 
receipts dated between January 6th and 8th were recovered from Olsen's vehicle 
after his arrest. The bartender, Emma McCoid, was thirty-six years old when she 
died.  The 
customers killed that night were Kyle Baumstarck, twenty-six years old, and 
Arthur Taylor, forty-seven years old.  

 

IV.  Defense Case

 

[¶14]      During his voir dire opening statements, defense counsel 
told the prospective juror panel that Olsen admitted his guilt, and the single 
issue before them was whether he had committed first degree murder or second 
degree murder. Defense counsel explained that intoxication was a defense to 
first degree murder, and he intended to show that Olsen did not premeditate the 
murders. In pretrial rulings, the trial court indicated that it intended to 
qualify forty-five prospective jurors and permit each side fifteen 
peremptories.  
On August 29, thirty-five jurors had been qualified and both sides agreed 
to forego additional voir dire and exercise ten peremptory challenges.  Olsen is on record 
as approving this strategy.

 

[¶15]      Through cross-examination of State witnesses, the defense 
established that Olsen had been drinking heavily the day of the robbery and 
murders, and, despite his many confessions, did not admit planning either the 
robbery or the murders.  It was established that after Olsen left the 
last bar before the crime, he had nothing else to drink, showing that his 
intoxication level remained high almost eight hours since he had last had a 
drink.  He had 
consistently claimed that his only motive was fright and intoxication.  After the State 
rested, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal which the trial court 
denied.

 

[¶16]      The defense presented witnesses who testified that on the 
night of the crime Olsen's eyes were strange and he was very intoxicated. The 
defense introduced dart game score sheets, which the State conceded in closing 
arguments indicated that Olsen did not play very well that night. Other 
witnesses testified they had observed Olsen drinking far more than what 
prosecution witnesses had observed; and another defense witness testified to 
seeing Olsen driving erratically on the night of the crime. The defense 
presented a forensic toxicologist, extrapolating that, based on Olsen's level of 
intoxication over seven hours after his last drink, his level of intoxication at 
the time of the crime could have been as high as .37 and was probably no lower 
than .106.  
This expert explained the correlation between levels of intoxication and 
effect on cognitive ability.  Before the defense presented its final 
witness, Olsen, the trial judge, and counsel met out of the presence of the jury 
and recorded Olsen's waiving his right to testify.  At that time, 
defense counsel placed on the record Olsen's concern that Dr. Gummow had not 
been called to testify during the defense's case-in-chief and his statement that 
he agreed with the decision not to call her during the guilt phase of his 
trial.

 

[¶17]      The last defense witness, Olsen's mother, testified to 
establish that on the days he had been observed watching the Little Chief Bar, 
he was in Colorado.  
The defense rested, and the State did not offer any rebuttal 
evidence.  
Before closing arguments and out of the presence of the jury, Olsen, 
counsel, and the trial judge met to record defense objections to a number of 
jury instructions.

  

V.  Closing Arguments

 

[¶18]      The instructions were read to the jury and included 
instructions on first degree murder, felony murder, second degree murder, 
aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and larceny.  The State delivered its closing argument, 
explaining the verdict form and the lesser included offenses.  In its theory of 
the case, the State argued to the jury that the issue really is, "was it done on 
purpose, purposely, the act done intentionally or deliberately, and not 
accidentally."  
The State argued that, in the time period immediately preceding the 
robbery and during the robbery, Olsen's actions were a series of deliberate acts 
that proved the robbery and murders were premeditated, and not the result of a 
"drunken, drug-crazed, brain-damaged guy."  It also argued that the manner in which Olsen 
carried out the murders proved premeditation, rather than accident. In 
addressing the defense's forensic toxicology evidence, the State pointed out 
that the defense expert had not personally observed Olsen's behavior that night, 
and the observations of those who had personally observed it did not support the 
expert's conclusions that Olsen did not know what he was doing that night or was 
incapable of forming intent. The State argued that Olsen's gambling debt story 
and other actions when confronted by his mother and police were not indicative 
of intoxication or alcoholic amnesia, but showed that Olsen remembered what had 
happened that night and consciously decided to deal with it and provide an 
explanation for his behavior.

 

[¶19]      In its closing argument, the defense contended that the 
eyewitness testimony established that Olsen was intoxicated on the night of the 
crime.  
Regarding the eyewitness who claimed to have seen Olsen suspiciously 
observing the Little Chief Bar days before the robbery, the defense pointed out 
that his story was inconsistent between his police interview and his testimony, 
pointed out that the vehicles he described Olsen sitting in did not exist, 
argued that the motel and pawn shop receipts and Mrs. Olsen's testimony 
established that Olsen was in Colorado on the dates he was allegedly seen, and 
argued that the witness had not seen Olsen.   Moving to the forensic toxicologist's 
testimony concerning the effect of alcohol on a person, defense counsel noted 
that Olsen's actions and statements that night were consistent with someone who 
behaved as though very intoxicated and whose behavior changed with 
sobriety.  
Under the defense's theory, Olsen told his gambling debt story while very 
intoxicated and, after sobering for many hours, forgot about it in a manner 
consistent with the expert's testimony. The defense also pointed out that the 
jury had been instructed that intoxication can negate specific intent, and 
because the unrefuted expert testimony established Olsen's intoxication level, 
the State had not proved Olsen's intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense 
ended by asking the jury for a verdict of second degree murder.

 

[¶20]      In a very brief rebuttal, the State reminded the jury that 
the defense's expert made assumptions which did not preclude them from deciding 
that Olsen formed the specific intent to kill.  The State also reminded the jury that later 
that same night when Olsen was just as intoxicated, Olsen considered killing his 
parents and made the decision that he would not do so.

 

[¶21]      The trial judge then had three names selected from the jury 
to serve as alternates.  The remaining jurors retired to deliberate, 
ultimately returning a verdict finding Olsen guilty of three counts of 
premeditated, first degree murder, three counts of first degree felony murder, 
and one count of aggravated robbery.  The jury was polled, confirmed their verdict, 
and was then excused for the weekend with instructions to return the following 
Monday prepared for sequestration.

 

VI.  Sentencing Phase

 

[¶22]      The sentencing phase began with an opening instruction to 
the jurors, explaining their duty in a death penalty sentencing hearing.  In its opening 
statement, the State touched upon the gravity of the jury's task, and then 
discussed the five statutory aggravating circumstances it would prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt:

 

1)  Olsen knowingly created a great risk of death 
to two or more people;

2)  the murders were committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest;

3) the murders were especially atrocious or cruel, being 
unnecessarily torturous to the victims; 

4) Olsen poses a substantial and continuing threat of 
future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of criminal violence; 
and

5) Olsen committed first degree murder while engaged in 
committing a robbery.  

The State informed the jury that the law required it to 
consider the nature of the crime and the individual characteristics of Olsen and 
arrive at a moral decision of whether the penalty should be life imprisonment or 
death.

 

[¶23]      In its opening statement, the defense also spoke to the 
jury concerning the moral aspect of its decision.  Previewing its mitigating evidence, defense 
counsel discussed Olsen's brain malformation that had existed since birth, and 
how, during the malformation's development, it had deprived areas of Olsen's 
brain of blood.  
Defense counsel stated that an expert neurologist, a neuropsychologist, 
and a psychiatrist would discuss the brain malformation and its various effects 
such as causing Olsen's intellectual level to decline during school, and 
altering his behavior in his late teens until the aneurysm ruptured in 
1993.  The 
defense evidence would show that after the rupture, the brain injury and Olsen's 
alcoholism and depression prevented him from having the capacity to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.  Defense counsel stated that he would present 
other statutory mitigating circumstances for the jury's 
consideration.

 

[¶24]      During the State's case-in-chief of the sentencing phase, 
witnesses described Olsen's previous misconduct involving guns.  Olsen's former 
brother-in-law testified that in 1996 Olsen had stolen several items from him, 
including a rifle and a handgun that was identified as the murder weapon. A 
former bartender testified that in 1995, Olsen showed her a handgun and pointed 
it at her.  She 
became angry and ordered him to put it away and leave the bar, which he did. She 
did not report the incident to police and admitted that she did not like Olsen 
because he had made sexual advances to her.  Another witness testified that in 1990, he 
and Olsen had become involved in a physical altercation.  Olsen got in his 
car and pointed a handgun at him but put the weapon down when the witness told 
him to.  The 
witness pulled Olsen from the car and struck him a couple of times. Olsen then 
got back in his car and left. The witness did not report the incident to police 
and volunteered the information shortly before jury selection.

 

[¶25]      The sheriff of Sheridan County testified that Olsen had 
been arrested for impersonating a federal officer and possession of a handgun 
without a permit in May of 1991. Olsen was playing pool in a bar wearing a large 
gun in a shoulder holster and had told a bartender that he was a federal agent 
and, later, a DCI agent.  The manager called police, and Olsen was 
arrested. The next witness testified that, six years earlier, he and Olsen 
belonged to a shooting club whose members would shoot pistols on Wednesday 
afternoons. On at least two occasions after Olsen became upset at missing shots, 
and when others teased him, he threatened to shoot them.  Those threatened 
confiscated his gun. Everyone involved had drunk about a six-pack of beer each, 
and the gun was never pointed at anyone.  The witness considered Olsen a loyal, but 
strange, friend who had very few friends.  Another witness testified that six years 
earlier an intoxicated Olsen disrupted a party after a wedding by fighting with 
the witness. Olsen was asked to leave because he was wearing a gun in a holster 
and made remarks that he could shoot somebody at any time.  He did not remove 
the gun during the fight, and it was taken away from him.

 

[¶26]      During testimony, the trial court learned that a juror's 
father had died and released that juror from sequestration. The trial court 
proposed to select a juror from one of the alternates at the end of the 
sentencing phase.  
The defense objected because the alternate had not been part of the guilt 
phase deliberations and objected to the court's proposed method of 
selection.  The 
court released the juror from sequestration, denied Olsen's motion for a 
mistrial, and following closing arguments, selected an alternate juror by a 
lottery system,.

 

[¶27]      Testimony resumed, and the State called DCI agent, 
Hughes.  He 
testified that in unrecorded conversations with Olsen, Olsen told him that, 
after the robbery and murders, he planned to kill any officer who tried to stop 
him, but when he saw five or six converge on him, he surrendered.  In Hughes' opinion, 
it was an irrational and ridiculous statement from a suspect who was otherwise 
cooperative. Hughes testified that Olsen stated later that same day, that he did 
not remember making that statement and, on numerous occasions, Olsen claimed 
that he did not remember saying something that he had said a little while 
previously.  
Hughes believed Olsen was sincere in his belief that he did not 
remember.

 

[¶28]      The State next called the director for the Victims of 
Violence Center who read a statement from the mother of victim Emma McCoid, 
identified photographs of the three victims, and then read a statement about 
victim Art Taylor prepared by his ex-wife. Victim Kyle Baumstarck's mother then 
read a statement that she had prepared.

 

[¶29]      The State called a Marine officer to testify that Olsen had 
been court-martialed while in the Marines and escaped from the brig. Defense 
cross-examination revealed that the brig was not guarded, and, although the 
Marines had brigs which operated like a jail, Olsen was not placed in one. The 
next State witness testified that Olsen was never at the brig, but confined to a 
barracks, and Olsen's escape consisted of him going out of his bedroom window to 
a hotel where he met a girl, and was found watching TV. 

 

[¶30]      Because of scheduling problems, the court allowed the 
defense to interrupt the State's case-in-chief on two occasions.  Defense counsel 
called Olsen's father who testified that he left when Olsen was three when he 
and Olsen's mother divorced; he saw Olsen twice after the divorce; had his 
parental rights terminated when Olsen was eight years old; and had no further 
contact with his son until Olsen was twenty-two. Olsen's mother remarried, and 
Olsen and his sister were adopted by his stepfather.  His family now also 
included one half-sister, who is afflicted with cerebral palsy, and three 
stepsiblings. Olsen's stepfather described Olsen as a happy, good child, never 
in legal trouble, who once saved his sister's life, but became an alcoholic 
after joining the Marines. Later, after Olsen suffered the aneurysm, he observed 
him to stammer, slur his speech and saw a change in his demeanor.  Although medical 
doctors advised Olsen against drinking, Olsen's alcoholism actually worsened, 
and one time he was drinking so heavily he suffered a seizure and required 
medical attention.  
His stepfather witnessed that he was very depressed, was impulsive, 
self-destructive and violent, and his marriage ended in an acrimonious divorce. 
On cross-examination, the State pointed out that the stepfather had previously 
stated to DCI agents that, as a child, Olsen was a perfectionist, frequently 
frustrated.  He 
did not remember stating that Olsen's temper disappeared after the ruptured 
aneurysm. 

 

[¶31]      Olsen's grandfather described Olsen's close relationship 
with his grandparents and the care he gave them when they were ill.  Next, the defense 
called the mitigation specialist, Mary Goody, who read an affidavit from a 
friend who served with Olsen in the Marines, and who was now a campus police 
officer.  The 
friend described Olsen as a heavy drinker, immature, self-destructive, unstable 
and often depressed.  
He believed that Olsen had personality and mental health issues that 
caused problems from which this friend and others tried to protect Olsen.  He described Olsen 
as a loyal friend. Another friend who served in the Marines with Olsen beginning 
in 1988 agreed that he was a good, loyal friend, often unstable and depressed, 
and when drinking, was irrational, impulsive and would act without 
thinking.  This 
friend described several instances when Olsen's self-destructive behavior was 
outrageous, such as throwing his car keys after an accident, and breaking the 
windshield and kicking out lights and the fender of his own car after receiving 
a traffic ticket. 

 

[¶32]      The defense presented several experts.  Dr. Charles 
McMahon, a neurology expert, had performed an MRI scan and an 
electroencephalogram on Olsen and examined other CT and MRI scans and medical 
reports performed on Olsen since 1993. These computer-generated medical 
diagnostic images indicated an arteriovenous malformation (AVM), a congenital, 
organic condition, abnormal because it causes Steal's Syndrome by draining blood 
from an artery to a vein without supplying any useful part of the brain that the 
blood vessel would normally supply.  Dr. McMahon testified that AVM can impair 
cognitive functions of the brain if the adjacent area of the brain cannot 
function properly because it has been deprived of blood. He produced medical 
reports showing that Olsen's AVM rupture and hemorrhaging basically caused a 
stroke, and the jury was shown the 1993 CT scans depicting brain injury. 

 

[¶33]      The evidence revealed that, immediately after the rupture, 
Olsen was comatose and required a surgical procedure to remove the AVM.  He was hospitalized 
for several weeks, suffered extensive loss of the right side of his body, could 
not speak and had emotional control problems in the hospital.  Before 
rehabilitation was cut short by lack of insurance, Olsen received speech, 
physical, and occupational therapies and was seen by a psychiatrist and a 
psychologist. He was not allowed to drive or be alone with his daughter. The 
hemorrhaging and AVM permanently injured Olsen's brain.  The part of his 
brain that was injured, the corpus callosum, is the structure that carries 
messages from one hemisphere to the other. 

 

[¶34]      As part of his neurological examination, Dr. McMahon tested 
Olsen for concrete thinking abilities and determined that Olsen performed 
deficiently because of permanent injuries to the brain. The State's 
cross-examination revealed the possibility that Olsen's deficient performance 
was due to chronic alcoholism.  Dr. McMahon believes that an I.Q. greater 
than seventy is normal intelligence but did not test Olsen's intelligence.  He stated that an 
AVM can be diagnosed before rupture because it causes mental deficits before 
bursting. 

[¶35]      The next defense expert, Dr. Linda Gummow, a psychologist 
specializing in neuropsychology, with publications on stroke, cognitive 
rehabilitation, and the effects of injury on behavior, gave Olsen 
neuropsychological examinations in February and August of 1997.  Reviewing other 
tests, Dr. Gummow learned that Olsen suffered a steady decline in overall 
ability beginning in his early elementary years, a gradual decline through his 
high school years with a sharper decline after the AVM rupture.  School records 
indicated that Olsen had no behavioral problems, was a cooperative, motivated 
and good student and did not have any legal difficulties.  Gummow determined 
that the decline was primarily due to the AVM brain injury becoming symptomatic 
as the brain was injured from abnormal circulation and oxygen deprivation over a 
period of years.  
She also identified external factors such as Olsen's moving from 
Portland, Oregon, to Worland as contributing to the decline. Test scores in 
August improved, and Gummow attributed this to alcoholism recovery. She 
determined that Olsen suffered from severe depression and anxiety, attributable 
to the brain injury and alcohol. 

 

[¶36]      Dr. Gummow testified that Olsen's first problems involving 
the legal system occurred in the military.  The Marine Corps identified him as an 
alcoholic with a death wish.  At that time, his personality and demeanor 
began to change from cheerful and witty to the beginnings of a loner with bad 
judgment and unpredictably physically violent.  She believed that external factors and the 
increasingly symptomatic AVM caused the change.   

 

[¶37]      After the rupture, Olsen's alcoholism, reckless behavior, 
numerous accidents, and mood swings continued. After the rupture, no further 
reports that Olsen was a witty, cheerful, and bright person were found.  Instead, Olsen was 
observed to be a quiet, reserved person, difficult to communicate with and 
viewed by some people as scary.   She found reports that Olsen did not 
understand that he generated fear and did not always remember his actions.  Alcohol began to 
dominate his life, affecting him in ways already impacted by the AVM and its 
rupture. 

 

[¶38]      Dr. Gummow testified that individuals with brain injuries 
are more prone to accidents. Olsen was in numerous car accidents, rollovers, 
broadside accidents, and industrial accidents.  Dr. Gummow listed a number of stresses Olsen 
was experiencing at the time of the crime.  Because of these and the brain injury that 
was affecting him throughout, it was her opinion that he was suffering from 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  She also classified the brain injury itself 
as a mental or emotional disturbance that impacted judgment and caused 
impulsivity and explosive anger.  She testified she believed that on the night 
of the murders, he realized the criminality of what he was doing, but duress 
caused him to be unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.  She also 
believed that Olsen was no longer dangerous because alcohol had been removed 
from his life.

 

[¶39]      Upon cross-examination, the State established that Olsen's 
reading and math scores had not changed since the military, indicated individual 
scores that did not show a trend of decline, and pointed to scores that were 
high for anti-social behavior, anger, passive-aggressiveness, and some type of 
borderline schizophrenia.  Olsen had admitted to Dr. Gummow that he 
remembered shooting the victims.  Dr. Gummow did not know if Olsen could have 
conformed his conduct to the requirements of the law if he had seen a police 
officer before the shootings.  She did not base her opinion on the facts of 
this case, although she believed some are consistent with her opinion. 
Concerning her opinion that Olsen exhibited features of hemispheric 
disconnection syndrome, an inability to integrate experience with emotion, 
inability to plan and synthesize cognitive information, and inability to plan 
and organize, Dr. Gummow conceded that she had not considered Olsen's prior 
misconduct with weapons.  The State also questioned Dr. Gummow as to 
whether she had rendered other opinions in court cases without having relevant 
facts. 

 

[¶40]      Upon redirect, Dr. Gummow provided further information 
regarding other court cases, clarifying that a judge had decided differently 
about another defendant's competency to stand trial.  She stated that 
Olsen does not have an anti-social personality, and discounted the notion that 
Olsen's memory of the events of that night indicates that he is lying when he 
does not remember some parts of it. 

 

[¶41]      The defense's next expert witness, Dr. William S. Logan, a 
medical doctor and a forensic psychiatrist, examined Olsen in June of 1997.  Dr. Logan testified 
that he reviewed Olsen's history and found that he had an astounding number of 
accidents, heavy alcohol consumption, and shortly after suffering the AVM 
rupture, began engaging in reckless, impulsive behavior. Dr. Logan described the 
many different ways that Olsen's life deteriorated after the AVM rupture.  He concurred with 
Dr. Gummow's opinion that Olsen's brain injury caused his thinking to be 
divorced from his emotions; becoming overwhelmed emotionally and unable to 
coordinate that with problem-solving.  He stated that Olsen has neither an 
anti-social personality nor a narcissistic personality. 

 

[¶42]      In Dr. Logan's opinion, there was no question that Olsen 
had planned the robbery of the Little Chief Bar; however, drinking, depression, 
and the head injury caused him to be under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance at the time of the homicides. He agreed with Dr. Gummow 
that Olsen knew that what he was doing on the night of the murders was wrong, 
agreed that at one level, Olsen had control of his behavior that night, but did 
not have control of his behavior in terms of using some kind of judgment or in 
reacting in a more rational way to his desperation. Dr. Logan believed Olsen 
presented no future danger.   Olsen's former employer testified that 
he was a good employee.  Olsen made a statement in allocution, and the 
defense's final witness was Olsen's mother, who made a plea for his life. 

 

[¶43]      In rebuttal, the State presented its own forensic 
psychiatrist, Dr. Breck LeBegue. The defense objected to his expert testimony 
because he had not examined Olsen.  This expert testified that the most reliable 
test of how brain-damaged someone is following an AVM rupture is comparing 
demonstrated abilities before and demonstrated abilities afterwards, and opined 
that poor performance on a test cannot alone lead to a diagnosis of brain 
abnormality.  
On defense counsel's cross-examination, Dr. LeBegue stated that he was 
not board certified in neuropsychology, but conceded that, as a psychologist, he 
administered tests to evaluate and conceded that a number of tests listed by 
defense were standard neuropsychological tests. 

 

[¶44]      Next, the State presented Dr. Marcus Einhorn, a 
psychologist.  
The defense objected to his expert testimony because he was not 
board-certified in neuropsychology.  This expert testified only to the fact that 
poor performance on the Halstead Reitan battery test might not be attributable 
to brain damage.  
On cross-examination, the defense simply asked if he were testifying 
about one test and asked nothing further.

 

[¶45]      The State then called Dr. Stephen Golding, a forensic 
psychologist. The defense objected to him because he was not an expert in 
neuropsychology.   He testified that a "gap," i.e., whether a mental deficit impacted abilities at a 
particularly relevant point in time, cannot be determined simply by testing; one 
must have direct observation. The defense did not cross-examine. 

 

[¶46]      At the conclusion of the evidence, the defense made 
numerous objections to the court's rejection of its proposed jury instructions 
and verdict form, and objected to the jury instructions and verdict form that 
were given by the trial court. 

 

[¶47]      In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 

 

Nothing is a fact in this case unless you decide it 
is.  Just 
because somebody said something does not make it a fact. . . . You can reject 
anything anyone said if you don't believe that they were credible. . . . [N]ow 
for the first time the defense has a burden of proof as to the mitigating 
circumstances.  
They have to prove that something is more likely than not or more 
probable than not, or 51 percent on each mitigating circumstance.  Hold them to that 
burden of proving that something is mitigating.  Just because somebody says it is, doesn't 
mean it's proven.  
You need to consider the evidence, all of the evidence . . . in 
mitigation.  
You have to consider it, you have to think about it, you have to discuss 
it.

 

Explaining that the jury must consider mitigating 
circumstances and aggravating circumstances to arrive at a reasoned moral 
judgment, the prosecutor cautioned the jury that non-statutory aggravating 
evidence can only be considered in rebutting mitigating evidence.

 

[¶48]      The prosecutor argued that these murders were no accident 
or mistake because the evidence showed that Olsen placed the gun directly 
against a skull and shot, and because defendant left a footprint on the back of 
one victim as he positioned himself to shoot another victim.  The State argued 
that defendant's motive was to kill witnesses to avoid going to jail, and argued 
that Olsen made decisions and choices based on a selfish and violent character, 
rather than due to any inabilities caused by brain damage.  The prosecutor then 
listed every decision it contended Olsen made on the night of the murders.  The prosecutor 
argued that defense experts' opinions on Olsen's decision making that night were 
not credible because the defense experts did not rely on the decisions actually 
made by Olsen. The prosecutor claimed that Olsen demonstrated his ability to 
function at the time in question by planning a robbery, deliberately murdering 
witnesses, leaving the crime scene, and then purchasing, rather than stealing, 
gas, which proved he could conform his actions to the law, then packing, and 
fleeing.  The 
prosecutor argued that the jury could reasonably conclude that Olsen was 
functioning because he made too many decisions, and he remembered making those 
decisions.  

 

[¶49]      The prosecution pointed out that defense experts had 
admitted that Olsen knew his actions were wrong and argued that credible 
forensic experts would not have ignored Olsen's behavior on that day.  The prosecutor 
argued that testing Olsen a month after the murders while jailed was unreliable, 
inappropriate testing that had produced unreliable results.  The prosecutor 
contended that the defense experts were over dramatizing the fact that Olsen was 
accident-prone and those experts had manipulated the testing to show that his 
test scores trended in a decline, claiming that Olsen's scores were 
college-level.  
The State also contended that the facts disproved AVM brain damage 
because Olsen's condition improved while denied alcohol in jail.   The State 
concluded by arguing that  "this case is too terrible, too tragic, for 
any lesser penalty than the maximum. . . . There is absolutely no mitigating 
this." 

 

[¶50]      Defense counsel stated that the person before the jury 
today was a different man from what he had once been and this second Olsen "lost 
[his values]. . . . He committed one of the most atrocious acts that we can 
conceive of" but was worth saving.  Defense counsel explained that mitigating 
circumstances are the circumstances about his character that would serve to 
lessen his sentence.  
He argued that by imposing three life sentences on Olsen, the jury was 
assured that he would never be released from prison and that a death sentence is 
never required; the defense had presented mitigating evidence that demanded 
those life sentences, and it was the appropriate moral response.  Defense counsel 
then described what Olsen's life would be like if imprisoned for 
life.

 

[¶51]      The defense pointed out that it had not used the experts to 
say that Olsen was insane or to try to excuse or to justify what he did, but 
these experts did testify that mitigating circumstances existed and the death 
penalty was not warranted.  He argued that the State was wrong that the 
experts had ignored facts from that evening or that the experts could not be 
believed.  All 
of Olsen's actions on the night of the murders were explained to be the result 
of the combined effect of his brain injury, alcoholism, and depression that left 
Olsen unable to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.  Defense counsel 
listed the mitigating circumstances that were unrefutedly established by the 
evidence:

 

1.  Unrefuted that he is loved by his family.

2.  Unrefuted that he is a loving father.

3.  Unrefuted about AVM.

4.  Unrefuted that his intelligence has declined 
to low average.

5.  Unrefuted that he is a model prisoner, 
unrefuted that he is not future dangerous.

6.  Unrefuted that he is loyal to his 
friends.

7.  Unrefuted that he had a high level of alcohol 
in his system at the time of the offense.

8.  Unrefuted that he is young.

9.  Unrefuted that he saved his sister's 
life.

10.  Unrefuted that his capacity to conform his 
conduct to the requirements     of the law was substantially 
impaired.

11.  Unrefuted that he was under the influence of 
extreme or emotional disturbance.

12.  Unrefuted that he cooperated and confessed 
and has the ability to be constructive in prison.

13.  Unrefuted that he was self-destructive and 
suffering from marital problems and depressed.

14.  Unrefuted that this was only a robbery, not 
other crimes.

15.  Debatable whether he had a significant 
criminal history, but nothing as a youth and no felony convictions.  

 

Explaining that mitigating evidence means that the jury 
does not have to impose death, defense counsel provided the jury with this 
definition:

 

It all boils down to after you look at the mitigation, 
after you look at the aggravation, to this very simple question that Mr. Green 
asked of Dr. Logan.  
I have the exact wording of that because I have the page of this 
transcript so I can go to it.  It all boils down to this very simple 
question, this very simple answer.  The question by Mr. Green:

"Q.  But your considerations might also not have 
any bearing at all on what really happened that night; would you agree with 
that?"  Logan's 
answer:

"A.  Well, I don't think he would have robbed that 
store if he wasn't depressed, and if he wasn't drinking, and if he hadn't had 
the head injury.  
But if you remove all three of those things, I don't think he would have 
been there that night."

Ladies and gentlemen, that's mitigation. It doesn't excuse 
it, it doesn't justify it, but certainly, ladies and gentlemen, it argues very 
strongly in favor of a life sentence. 

 

[¶52]      In the State's rebuttal, it argued that many of these 
unrefuted mitigating facts did not lessen Olsen's blame for the murders.  Concerning the 
expert testimony that he did not have the capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law, the prosecutor argued that the real test was Olsen's 
"demonstrated capability" based upon what he did and not upon expert testimony. 

 

[¶53]      The jury was instructed on five statutory aggravating 
factors, including 

 

1) Olsen created a great risk of death to two or more 
persons; 

2) the murders were committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; 

3) the murders were especially atrocious or cruel, 
being unnecessarily torturous to the victims; 

4) Olsen posed a substantial and continuing threat of 
future dangerousness or was likely to commit continued acts of criminal 
violence; and

5) Olsen killed another human being purposely and with 
premeditated malice and while engaged in the commission of a robbery.  

 

The trial court instructed the jury that

 

atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; cruel means 
designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even 
enjoyment of, the suffering of others.  What is intended to be included in this 
circumstance are those murders where the actual commission of the crime was 
accompanied by such additional acts of serious physical or mental abuse of the 
victims as to set it apart from the normal first degree murder; that is, a 
particularly consciousless [sic] or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victims. 

Torture may mean extreme mental anguish or distress.  In finding mental 
anguish or distress you may consider the victims' uncertainty as to his or her 
ultimate fate immediately prior to their deaths.  

 

The jury was also instructed on twenty-one mitigating 
factors and told it could unanimously find that a mitigating circumstance 
existed; could unanimously find that a mitigating circumstance did not exist; or 
an individual juror could find that a mitigating circumstance existed.  The jury was also 
instructed that either the jury unanimously or a juror individually could write 
in a mitigating circumstance found to exist which was not listed on the verdict 
form.  

 

[¶54]      During deliberations, the jury asked whether Olsen would 
ever have a chance for parole for any possible reason or reasons if sentenced to 
three life terms. The court instructed the jury that executive clemency would 
exist for Olsen.  
Defense counsel objected to the instruction and requested that the jury 
be instructed as to the laws of parole, that in Wyoming, one serving a life 
sentence is not eligible for parole.  The trial court overruled the objection. 

 

[¶55]      The jury returned a verdict finding that, for each victim, 
the following statutory aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable 
doubt:

 

1) Olsen created a great risk of death to two or more 
persons;

2) the murders were committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest;

3) the murders were especially atrocious or cruel, 
being unnecessarily torturous to the victims;

4) Olsen killed another human being purposely and with 
premeditated malice and while engaged in the commission of a robbery.

 

[¶56]      The jury found that no mitigating circumstances were 
unanimously found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence.  Individual jurors 
did find that two of the listed mitigating circumstances existed, and individual 
jurors wrote in six other mitigating circumstances found to exist that were not 
listed on the verdict form.1  The jury sentenced Olsen to death for each of 
the three murders.  
After resolving numerous post-trial motions, the trial court entered a 
judgment and sentence of death.  This direct appeal followed.

 

                                                                  
DISCUSSION

 

[¶57]      The qualitative difference between a death sentence and all 
other punishments requires a correspondingly higher level of reliability.  Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1986, 100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988); see also 
Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 86 (Wyo. 1991).  Capital sentencing determinations are 
therefore subject to our heightened scrutiny of all issues under the usual 
standards of review.  
See Engberg, 820 P.2d  at 86.  The rigorous review of all alleged trial and 
structural error properly lies with the particular state's court of highest 
authority because later proceedings are limited to review of constitutional 
error. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1560, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995); and id. at 
457, 115 S. Ct.  at 1577 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  We are required to make an independent review 
as provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103 (Michie 1997) (emphasis 
added):

 

(a) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death is 
subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Wyoming within one hundred 
twenty (120) days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire 
record, unless the time is extended for an additional period not to exceed sixty 
(60) days by the supreme court for good cause shown.  Such review by the 
supreme court shall have priority over all other cases.

(b) Within ten (10) days after receiving the transcript, 
the clerk of the trial court shall transmit the entire record and transcript to 
the supreme court of Wyoming together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a report prepared by the trial judge.  The notice shall 
set forth the title and docket number of the case, the name of the defendant and 
the name and address of his attorney, a statement of the judgment, the crime and 
punishment prescribed.  The report shall be 
in the form of a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the supreme 
court of Wyoming.

(c) The Supreme Court of Wyoming shall consider the 
punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way of appeal.

(d) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine 
if:

(i) The sentence of death was imposed under the influence 
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;

(ii) The evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of 
an aggravating circumstance as enumerated in W.S. 6-2-102 and mitigating 
circumstances.

(iii) Repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 171, § 2.[2]

(e) In addition to its authority regarding correction of 
errors, the court, with regard to review of death sentences, may:

(i) Affirm the sentence of death;

(ii) Set the sentence aside and impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment; or

(iii) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for 
resentencing. 

 

A.   Special Prosecutor

 

[¶58]      In his first issue concerning the guilt phase of his trial, 
Olsen contends that the State's use of a federal prosecutor as a special 
prosecutor in his state trial confused and impermissibly influenced the 
jury.  He 
contends that the jury was led to believe that the United States government had 
a special interest in prosecuting and executing him, resulting in an unfair 
trial against him.  
He also contends that the federal prosecutor's involvement violated the 
prohibition in Wyo. Const. Art. 6, § 19 against federal officials simultaneously 
holding a state position to which salary, fees or perquisites are attached.  The State contends 
that neither the record nor the law supports these claims.  

 

[¶59]      Before trial, Olsen's counsel filed a motion to disqualify 
the special prosecutor, claiming his due process rights would be violated by the 
prosecutorial overmatch of his counsel and raising the state constitutional 
issue. The trial court denied his motion and permitted his continuing objection 
to the participation of the special prosecutor.  This issue presents a question of law.  Questions of law 
are reviewed de novo, and rulings in accordance with the law are affirmed.  Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 137 (Wyo. 
1995).  

 

[¶60]      Article 6, § 19 of the Wyoming Constitution plainly and 
unambiguously declares:

 

No member of congress from this state, nor any person 
holding or exercising any office or appointment of trust or profit under the 
United States, shall at the same time hold or exercise any office in this state 
to which a salary, fees or perquisites shall be attached.  The legislature may 
by law declare what offices are incompatible.

 

The legislature has authorized, by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
18-3-302(c) (Michie 1997), the government's hiring an assistant 
prosecutor:

 

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent 
the county commissioners of any county or consolidation of counties from 
employing one (1) or more attorneys to appear and prosecute or defend or assist 
the county and prosecuting attorney in behalf of the people of the state or such 
county or consolidation of counties in any action or proceeding, whether civil 
or criminal.  
In such case, the nature and necessity of the employment shall appear in 
the record of the board or boards.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
prevent the board of county commissioners of a county which has consolidated 
from independently employing one (1) or more attorneys to serve their respective 
counties.

 

Olsen contends that documentation showed that the special 
prosecutor continued his official federal office in violation of the 
constitutional provision, incurred fees as a special prosecutor, and received 
the perquisite of experience in a death penalty trial.  He asserts that 
because this constitutional provision bars a federal prosecutor from serving as 
a special prosecutor in a state court trial, his sentence should be vacated and 
either a life sentence imposed or a remand for a new sentencing occur.  The State disputes 
all of these claims and argues that the temporary special prosecutor is not a 
state officer within the meaning of the constitutional provision according to a 
five-part test set out in Pfister v. Niobrara 
County, 557 P.2d 735, 742 (Wyo. 
1976), and he must be considered a public employee. 

 

[¶61]      In State v. Jefferis, 26 Wyo. 
115, 123, 178 P. 909, 910 (Wyo. 
1919), this court interpreted this constitutional provision as declaring, "in 
effect, that an office of profit in this state and an office or appointment of 
trust or profit under the United States are incompatible." Jefferis considered the case of a state judge who 
joined the United States Army for a few months in 1918.  At the end of that 
period, he returned and resumed his duties as a judge and submitted a request 
for pay.  The 
state auditor denied his pay request, and the question presented to the court 
was whether the elected office of judge had been vacated so as to deprive him of 
the right to the claimed salary.  In answering this question, this court had to 
consider the effect of Article 6, § 19, and agreed with the Pennsylvania 
construction that the Constitution makes these offices incompatible, but it does 
not prescribe a penalty or a forfeiture.  Id. at 135-36, 
178 P.  at 915 (citing DeTurk v. Commw., 129 Pa. 151, 
18 A. 757 (1889)).  
Because this provision and others had not abrogated the applicable 
common-law rule,3 we determined that the provision itself would 
not prohibit payment of the salary.  

 

[¶62]      Jefferis' determination that this provision does not prescribe a 
penalty or forfeiture is applicable to this case and satisfies us that Olsen is 
incorrect in claiming that his conviction is reversible because a federal 
prosecutor acted as a state prosecutor in a state trial.  He does not direct 
us to any common-law rule or any authority requiring reversal because of the 
dual role played by this particular prosecutor.  Olsen does contend, however, that because the 
jury was told of the assistant's capacity as a United States Assistant Attorney 
in order to determine whether any jurors knew him or had dealings with him, the 
federal prosecutor's presence and this information impermissibly influenced the 
jury by suggesting the federal government had an interest in seeking the death 
penalty for him.  
He claims that informing the jury of the federal government's involvement 
in the case was prejudicial error warranting reversal of his conviction.  

 

[¶63]      We review whether the sentence of death was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.  § 
6-2-103(d)(i).  
Olsen offers no authority that the special prosecutor's introduction as a 
United States Attorney and presence prejudiced him, and our research indicates 
that error, including constitutional error, has been limited to the use of 
special prosecutors with a financial or personal interest in the 
prosecution.  
See State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775, 780-83 
(Tenn. Cr. App. 1997)(collecting cases).  We find no such error here.

 

B.  Prospective Jurors

 

[¶64]      Olsen contends that two prospective jurors were improperly 
excused from the jury in violation of the constitutional standard set by the 
United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412, 420, 105 S. Ct. 844, 850, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985).  The proper standard for determining when a 
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on 
capital punishment is whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath." Id. at 424, 105 S. Ct.  at 
852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1980)).  The Witt standard 
is codified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-105(a)(iii) (Michie 1997) (emphasis 
added):

 

§ 7-11-105. General grounds for challenging jurors.

(a) The following is good cause for challenge to any person 
called as a juror in a criminal case:

(i) That he was a member of the grand jury which found the 
indictment;

(ii) That he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused, or is biased or prejudiced for or against the 
accused;

(iii) In a case in which the death penalty may be imposed, 
he states that his views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially 
impair performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his oath or 
affirmation and the instructions of the court;

(iv) That he is a relation within the fifth degree to the 
person alleged to be injured, or attempted to be injured, by the offense charged 
or to the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, or to the 
defendant;

(v) That he has served on a petit jury which was sworn in 
the same cause against the same defendant, and which jury either rendered a 
verdict which was set aside, or was discharged after hearing the evidence;

(vi) That he has served as a juror in a civil case brought 
against the defendant for the same act;

(vii) That he has been subpoenaed as a witness in the 
case.

(b) The same challenges for cause shall be allowed in 
criminal prosecutions that are allowed to parties in civil cases.

Witt limits the State's power to exclude jurors based on their 
views of capital punishment; however, the Witt 
standard does not permit jurors unable to act impartially in accordance with the 
statutory scheme.  
Witt, 469 U.S.  at 422-24, 105 S. Ct.  at 
851-52.  We 
review a trial court's factual determination that a juror is in violation of 
that standard under an abuse of discretion standard.  Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶65]      In this case, the State's voir dire of prospective juror 
Phyllis Roseberry revealed that she personally opposed the death penalty. The 
prosecutor then limited himself to questions such as whether this opinion would 
change if a family member were killed. Roseberry explained that she 
distinguished between killing someone in defense of herself or others and 
killing as a punishment.  She stated that she could not think of any 
circumstances where she could vote for the death penalty, and the State then 
challenged her for cause. Explaining to her that the law allowed the death 
penalty and eliciting her responses that she would follow the law, defense 
counsel asked if she:

 

Q.        . . . fit 
in that category of people who may oppose the death penalty but would follow the 
Court's instructions regarding the imposition of the death penalty?

* * * *

A.        . . . I 
would not follow -- I would not want to follow the Judge's instructions on that. 
. . . I would feel more strongly about telling you I don't believe in voting for 
the death penalty. 

* * * *

Q.        
Right.  
You may not want to follow the Judge's instructions, the fact is you 
would follow the Judge's instructions; isn't that a fact?

A.        If I was 
in that circumstance and that was the law I would do whatever the law 
said.
 

Defense counsel then opposed the challenge for cause, and 
the trial court conducted voir dire by first reading an instruction explaining 
the law for determining when a defendant was eligible for the death 
penalty.  In 
response to Mrs. Roseberry's question about whether the death penalty was 
mandatory, the trial court instructed her that a defendant becomes eligible for 
the death penalty when an aggravating circumstance is found, but that the death 
penalty is never mandatory.  Upon learning that the death penalty is never 
mandatory, Mrs. Roseberry responded:

 

A.        Eligible, 
but not mandatory.

Court:  Right, that's correct.

A.        I can tell you if it 
got to that stage my position would be life imprisonment. . . .

Court:  Could you ever vote for the death penalty in 
a proper case where the aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt?  
Would you vote -- could you vote for the death penalty?

A.        If it's 
discretionary that you could also vote for life imprisonment, no.

Court:  So are you saying that as a result of your 
beliefs that you could not bring yourself to consider the imposition of the 
death penalty under any circumstances?

A.        If 
there's another option, that's right.

Court:  Okay.  Counsel, the Court believes that from the 
juror's responses here that she demonstrates to this court's satisfaction that 
her views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as 
a juror in accordance with the oath and her instructions.

 

Mrs. Roseberry was then excused by the court, and defense 
counsel objected. 

 

[¶66]      The record shows that defense counsel's apparent 
rehabilitation of Mrs. Roseberry was revealed to be nothing more than her 
agreement that she would vote for the death penalty if mandatory under the 
law.  When the 
trial court's further questioning caused her to realize that jury instructions 
permitted the discretionary option of imposing a life sentence instead of a 
death sentence, she responded that she would never impose a death sentence.  Although the trial 
court did not specifically ask if she would not follow her oath and the court's 
instructions, it did establish that she would not follow the law under any 
circumstances.  
This voir dire was sufficient for the trial court to apply the Witt standard to her responses and conclude that she 
should be excluded for cause.  The Witt standard 
was correctly applied for this juror, and we find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's determination that this prospective juror had established cause 
for exclusion.

 

[¶67]      Olsen contends that a prospective juror, Ms. Starbuck, was 
also improperly excluded.  Ms. Starbuck stated on her juror 
questionnaire that she did believe in the death penalty; however, when 
questioned during voir dire she was reluctant to serve on a death penalty case. 
The State reserved its decision, and defense counsel asked her if she could 
follow the court's instructions.  She responded, "I don't know that I could"; 
"I would rather not"; and "I just don't know."  In response to the State's question whether 
her feelings about the death penalty would impair her ability to be fair and 
impartial, she responded, "probably would."  The trial court then took up voir dire and 
asked Ms. Starbuck if after hearing all the evidence and instructions, she would 
be willing to consider the imposition of the death penalty in a proper case, or 
in this case.  
She answered that she would not want to have to.  The trial court 
then asked if she would vote for the death penalty in a proper case if the case 
has proved the aggravating circumstance, and she responded that she did not 
think so.  
Finally, the court asked if her beliefs would prevent her from imposing 
the death penalty under any circumstances, and she responded affirmatively.  The court found 
that her responses satisfied it that her views would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of her duties as a juror in accordance with her 
instructions and oath and excused the juror.  Defense counsel objected to the exclusion on 
grounds that her questionnaire indicated she did not have views about imposing 
the death penalty and the trial court had improperly elicited answers that she 
could not vote for the death penalty in this particular case. 

 

[¶68]      The record shows that Ms. Starbuck was inconsistent 
concerning her views about the death penalty, but indicates the trial court's 
questioning clarified that Ms. Starbuck did oppose the death penalty and would 
not be able to properly follow the court's instructions.  The record does not 
indicate that Ms. Starbuck believed the court had asked her how she would vote 
on this particular case.  The trial court properly applied the Witt standard and did not abuse its discretion in 
excusing this juror.

 

C.  Ineffective Assistance of Trial 
Counsel

 

[¶69]      Olsen contends that his trial counsel failed to provide 
effective assistance of trial counsel in three areas:

 

1) when counsel admitted guilt and never gave the jury the 
opportunity to consider the defense of mental illness during the guilt phase; 

2) when counsel failed to impeach Division of Criminal 
Investigation Agent Kevin Hughes; and

3) when counsel failed to pursue a change of venue even 
when faced with waiving peremptory challenges in order to impanel a 
jury.

 

[¶70]      During voir dire of the jury panel, defense counsel told 
the entire venire of prospective jurors:

 

Ladies and gentlemen, before we start I'm going to tell 
you, I'm going to admit to you, that the issue in this case will not involve who 
did the shootings.  
That won't be the issue.  We admit, ladies and gentlemen, that Martin 
Olsen shot all three of the individuals concerned in this case; Emma McCoid, 
Kyle Baumstarck, Art Taylor.  That he did that on the evening of January 
the 20th, we admit that, that he shot them.  They were facedown and he shot them in the 
back of the head.  
That he took money from that establishment and he left.  He was ultimately 
captured near Buffalo.  We admit all those facts, ladies and 
gentlemen, they are facts.  They are there.  He's confessed to 
it, many of you pointed that out in the questionnaires, that he's confessed to 
it.  He's not 
only confessed to police officers he's confessed to his mother.

So before we start, I wanted to get that on the table.  That won't be an 
issue.  
Okay.  
Do all of you understand then what I just told you?  Do all of you 
understand that?  
What will be an issue in this particular case, ladies and gentlemen, is 
the degree of guilt.  
That's why we're here.  

 

Later, counsel explained that he would use an intoxication 
defense to establish that Olsen could not have formed the requisite intent for 
first degree murder and was admitting to second degree murder.  Olsen's specific 
contention on appeal is that counsel conceded his guilt without pursuing the 
affirmative defense allowed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(a) (Michie 1997), a 
plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§  7-11-304(a) 
(Michie 1997) defines this defense as:

 

A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the 
time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he 
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  As used in this 
section, the terms mental illness or deficiency mean only those severely 
abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's 
perception or understanding of reality and that are not attributable primarily 
to self-induced intoxication as defined by W.S. 6-1-202(b).

 

Olsen contends that Dr. Gummow's testimony during the 
sentencing phase that Olsen could not conform his conduct to the law permitted 
this affirmative defense to the crime charged and should have been presented 
during the guilt phase of the trial.  A hearing was held on the State's motion for 
demand for notice of defense of mental illness or deficiency, and defense 
counsel informed the court that, based on two examinations, the defense did not 
anticipate changing the plea from not guilty to not guilty by reason of mental 
deficiency.  
The State contends that the hearing and a third examination show Olsen's 
defense counsel actively explored this potential defense by three expert 
examinations and reasonably concluded that the statutory definition of this 
affirmative defense was not established for presentation during the guilt 
phase.  Quoting 
from the testimony of the three experts, the State asserts that we can determine 
that the evidence did not meet the statutory definition of this affirmative 
defense and defense counsel's tactical decision was reasonable.  

 

[¶71]      Because neither the record nor this appeal suggest 
otherwise, we assume that Olsen consented to a trial strategy of admitting 
during voir dire to shooting the victims either to avoid the death penalty 
through convictions for second degree murder or to reduce culpability in the 
sentencing phase.  
Before trial, defense counsel arranged three psychiatric examinations for 
Olsen by a neuropsychologist, a neurologist, and a psychiatrist.  None of the three 
testified during the guilt phase, but all three did testify during the 
sentencing phase on various issues concerning mitigating circumstances, 
including whether Olsen could have conformed his conduct to the requirements of 
the law.  The 
testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to decide whether Olsen's mental 
state on the night of the robbery and murders should mitigate against the death 
penalty.  

 

[¶72]      In the guilt phase, the defense admitted Olsen shot the 
victims but contended that Olsen's intoxication prevented him from forming 
specific intent to commit first degree murder, and argued the jury should 
convict for second degree murder.  Olsen now contends that Dr. Gummow's 
testimony provided for this additional, compatible defense and contends that it 
was compatible with all other defenses.  Before the defense rested, however, the 
record shows that Olsen agreed with defense counsel's decision not to have Dr. 
Gummow testify during the guilt phase.  

 

A criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel 
is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and is 
guaranteed by the Wyoming Constitution in Article 1, Section 10.  Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 608-09 (Wyo. 
1992).

We have adopted the standard for determining whether a 
defendant received effective assistance of counsel from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984):

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.  
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.  
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.  

Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 
2604).

 

Miller v. State, 942 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶73]      Olsen does not refer us to any decision from any 
jurisdiction holding that an attorney must submit multiple, compatible defenses 
or risk error for ineffective assistance.  It has been held, however, that in a capital 
case the decision to present evidence of mental illness is within the sound 
strategic judgment of counsel.  People v. 
Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 297 (Colo. 
1997); see also People v. Welch, 976 P.2d 754, 787 (Cal. 1999).  Olsen also does not refer us to any authority 
holding that the failure to advance an additional, plausible defense at the 
guilt phase of a capital murder trial is professionally incompetent, 
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.  

 

We do not evaluate the efforts of counsel from a 
perspective of hindsight but, rather, we endeavor to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding counsel's challenged conduct and evaluate the 
professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  "We invoke a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment."  Gist [v. State], 737 P.2d 
[336,] at 342 [(Wyo.1987)] (citations omitted).  The burden is upon the defendant to overcome 
this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged action or 
failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial strategy.  

Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶74]      Olsen has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that 
his trial counsel was deficient when he considered having Dr. Gummow testify at 
the guilt phase, but deliberately chose to present her testimony at sentencing, 
and counsel secured Olsen's approval of this strategy; therefore, we cannot 
conclude that there was ineffective assistance of counsel.

 

[¶75]      Our independent review requires that we examine whether 
trial counsel's admission of guilt to the shootings violates the rule that "the 
admission by counsel of his client's guilt to the jury[] represents a 
paradigmatic example of the sort of breakdown in the adversarial process that 
triggers a presumption of prejudice."  United States v. 
Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1511 (10th 
Cir. 1995).  
Wyoming recognizes that there are cases of deficient performances where 
prejudice is presumed. Herdt v. State, 816 P.2d 1299, 1301-02 
(Wyo. 1991).  Williamson's holding is based on the 
following rationale:  

 

The Sixth Amendment provides "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel for his 
defence."  U.S. 
Const. amend. VI.  
While a defendant must ordinarily prove deficient performance by counsel 
coupled with a showing of prejudice in order to prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), there is a narrow class of cases where 
the particular circumstances "are so likely to prejudice the accused that the 
cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified."  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984) (footnote omitted).  If a defendant can 
prove such circumstances actually existed, prejudice will be presumed.  Id. at 659-62, 104 S. Ct.  at 2047-49.

There is no question but that the sort of conduct alleged 
here, i.e., the admission by counsel of his client's 
guilt to the jury, represents a paradigmatic example of the sort of breakdown in 
the adversarial process that triggers a presumption of prejudice.  See, e.g., United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991); Jones v. State, 
110 Nev. 730, 877 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (1994) (quoting Brown v. 
Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381, 396 (W.D.N.C.1988), cert. 
denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S. Ct. 2220, 109 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1990)).  Whether such an admission actually occurred 
is necessarily fact-intensive.  The focus must be on whether, in light of the 
entire record, the attorney remained a legal advocate of the defendant who acted 
with "undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service'" to the 
defendant.  See Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 624 (10th 
Cir. 1988)(quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725, 68 S. Ct. 316, 324, 92 L. Ed. 309 (1948)).

 

Williamson, 53 F.3d  at 1510-11.  Usually, concession of guilt issues involves 
a failure of defense counsel to secure the client's consent to employ this 
particular strategy because:

 

When counsel concedes a client's guilt during the 
guilt-innocence phase of trial in spite of the client's earlier plea of not 
guilty and without the defendant's consent, counsel provides ineffective 
assistance of counsel regardless of the weight of evidence against the defendant 
or the wisdom of counsel's "honest approach" strategy.  Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v, Sowers, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1981); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 
175, 337 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1985).  The gravity of the consequences of a decision 
to plead guilty or to admit one's guilt demands that the decision remain in the 
defendant's hand.  
An attorney cannot deprive his or her client of the right to have the 
issue of guilt or innocence presented to the jury as an adversarial issue on 
which the state bears the burden of proof without committing ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  "The adversarial process protected by the 
Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have counsel acting in the role of an 
advocate'.  The 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to 
require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial 
testing." U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984).  A lawyer may make a tactical determination of 
how to run a trial, but the due process clause does not permit the attorney to 
enter a guilty plea or admit facts that amount to a guilty plea without the 
client's consent.

 

Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1056 (Nev. 1994) (quoting Brown v. 
Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381, 396 (W.D.N.C.1988), rev'd on 
other grounds, Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1989)) (some citations omitted).  See Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶76]      The Eighth Circuit has considered similar facts and 
concluded that admitting the act but denying the requisite mental state by an 
intoxication defense to first degree murder charges is not the functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea.  Nielson v. 
Hopkins, 58 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1995); Parker v. Lockhart, 907 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1990).   We agree with 
that analysis and find that the concession here was, tactically, a reasonable 
attempt to avoid a first degree murder conviction in light of Olsen's several 
confessions that he had shot the victims.  We find no error.

 

2.  Impeachment 
Evidence

 

[¶77]      Olsen contends that defense counsel failed to impeach 
testimony about an alleged confession with evidence that was presented to 
defense counsel and made a part of the record seriously damaging the credibility 
of one of the law enforcement agents.   He contends that the substance of the 
impeachment evidence would have placed serious doubt on the law enforcement 
agent's testimony of an alleged confession by Olsen.  The State contends 
that because Olsen confessed a number of times to several different witnesses, 
officers, and agents, no question was presented as to whether he had admitted 
guilt. 

 

[¶78]      The record shows that after defense counsel learned from a 
newspaper article that Agent Hughes had resigned his position following an 
investigation, the defense subpoenaed the personnel records of Agent Hughes, and 
DCI moved to quash that subpoena.  The trial court held a hearing on the State's 
motion to quash the subpoena and reviewed the records in 
camera. The trial court denied the State's motion and permitted the defense 
a copy of an internal investigative report critical of the agent. Because the 
State had not yet decided whether Hughes would be a witness at trial, the State 
requested that the use of the sensitive material be limited for the time being 
to the hearing on the motion to suppress.  The court agreed and reflected that agreement 
in its order.  
At the motions hearing, Hughes was cross-examined about Olsen's 
unrecorded statements and claimed that Olsen later confirmed those statements on 
tape after reaching Worland.  The tape is not part of the record.  The rest of the 
cross-examination focused on whether Hughes had made that recording after Olsen 
requested an attorney, and no mention is made of the report on Hughes. 

 

[¶79]      At trial, tapes of Olsen's various statements to police 
were played for the jury.  Taped statements were made to the arresting 
officer, to Hughes on the drive from the arrest scene to Buffalo, and several 
times at the Buffalo detention center. In all of these recorded conversations, 
Olsen consistently maintained that he did not know why he had shot the victims. 
Hughes then drove Olsen back to Worland and testified about an untaped 
conversation that he had with Olsen during that drive.  In his recount of 
Olsen's statements during that conversation, Hughes provided evidence that Olsen 
picked the Little Chief Bar because it was out of the way; that the bartender 
"bitched at him" and told him that he would not get away with it; and that Olsen 
said he had committed the murders because he got scared that the patrons would 
identify him and so he shot them. The testimony constitutes evidence supporting 
premeditated first degree murder as well as the aggravating circumstance that 
Olsen murdered the victims to eliminate witnesses to the crime and avoid or 
prevent his arrest.  

 

[¶80]      During cross-examination at trial, the agent was not 
questioned about the report although he confirmed that he was alone with Olsen 
when the statements were made and conceded that the unrecorded statements 
contradicted the many recorded statements made by Olsen. Although the defense 
subpoenaed several people who had made statements in the Hughes' investigation, 
none were called as witnesses. The State contends that it was a reasonable 
tactical decision not to attack the agent because Olsen had confessed so many 
times. Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1025 (Wyo. 
1993).  

 

[¶81]      Olsen, however, never confessed to these specific facts to 
anyone except Hughes, and these specific facts eliminated the plausibility of 
Olsen's intoxication theory negating specific intent and provided sufficient 
evidence that his dominant motive was eliminating witnesses and was thus guilty 
of the aggravating circumstance of murder to prevent or avoid a lawful arrest. 
Our independent examination of the investigation report on Hughes indicates that 
it would have impeached Hughes' credibility and veracity, and the record does 
not detail the reasons for defense counsel's failure to use the report as 
impeachment.  
After Olsen's conviction, appellate counsel did not request an 
evidentiary hearing to ascertain defense counsel's reasoning.  An ineffectiveness 
claim should not be brought on appeal where the trial record is insufficient to 
determine the claim.  
Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 
1994); Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 692 (Wyo. 
1993).  Despite 
the lack of record, we do not find that the assumption that counsel's 
performance was deficient leads to the conclusion that the defense was 
prejudiced.  To 
show that deficient performance prejudiced his defense, the defendant must 
demonstrate that, when the totality of the circumstances is considered, there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 
of the trial.  
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 146 (Wyo. 
1986).

 

[¶82]      Although Olsen's defense theory was that he was too 
intoxicated to have formed specific intent, he admitted to facts showing that he 
planned the robbery and committed premeditated first degree murder for the 
purpose of eliminating witnesses.  Hughes' testimony notwithstanding, Olsen's 
admitted actions represent evidence that was more than sufficient to support the 
jury's finding of guilt in both the guilt and sentencing phases.  We find no 
error.

 

3.  Change of 
Venue

 

[¶83]      Defense counsel filed a change of venue motion because of 
prejudicial pretrial publicity, but the motion was denied subject to renewal. 
After four days of voir dire, defense counsel agreed to waive five peremptory 
challenges after qualifying thirty-five jurors. Originally, forty-five jurors 
were to be qualified, and each side would have fifteen peremptory 
challenges.  
Olsen contends that the length of voir dire and the inability to qualify 
forty-five jurors should have induced defense counsel to renew his motion for a 
change of venue.  
The State contends that defense counsel indicated he was satisfied with 
the thirty-five jurors already selected, nothing in the record indicates that 
counsel could not qualify additional jurors, and Olsen told the court that he 
agreed with counsel's decision.  

 

[¶84]      In determining whether a change of venue should be granted 
because of publicity,

 

the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered; 
[and] the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury must be considered along with 
the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire 
examination.

 

Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 208 (Wyo. 1986).  Olsen does not refer us to any part of the 
record or any publicity indicating that the lengthy voir dire was primarily 
attributable to jurors prejudiced by publicity.  See Harvey v. State, 
835 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Wyo. 
1992).  Our 
review of the record indicates that the length of voir dire was primarily 
attributable to the amount of time defense counsel devoted to individually 
questioning prospective jurors about their death penalty and intoxication 
defense views, rather than a concern with prejudicial publicity that would have 
warranted renewing the motion for a change of venue.  Jury selection was 
lengthy and careful.  
Nothing in the record supports the contention that defense counsel was 
frustrated in its attempts to seat a fair and impartial jury, and the record 
does not show any prospective juror comments or responses that warranted 
renewing the change of venue motion. Defense counsel is not required to make a 
motion without a basis.  See Murry, 713 P.2d  at 212.  We find no error.

 

D.  Sufficiency of the Evidence of 
Premeditation

 

[¶85]      Under the defense theory of the case, the sole issue for 
determination at trial was whether Olsen had committed premeditated first degree 
murder or second degree murder.  Olsen presented an intoxication defense to 
negate the specific intent element of premeditated first degree murder.  He contends that 
the State's evidence was insufficient to establish premeditation.

 

[¶86]      To determine whether sufficient evidence of a crime exists, 
we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Wyo. 
1995).  Our 
standard of review in first degree murder cases, with special attention to the 
distinction between first and second degree murder, is not whether the evidence 
is sufficient for us, but whether, when viewed favorably to the state, it was 
enough on which a jury could form a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
Id.  In evaluating evidence of premeditation, 
we use the following analytical framework:

 

Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation 
and deliberation "falls into three basic categories:  (1) facts about * * 
* what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant 
was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result 
in, the killing--what may be characterized as planning' activity; (2) facts 
about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from 
which the jury could reasonably infer a motive' to kill the victim, which 
inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3) would * * * support 
an inference that the killing was the result of a pre-existing reflection' and 
careful thought and weighing of considerations' rather than mere unconsidered 
or rash impulse hastily executed';  (3) facts about the nature of the killing 
from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and 
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 
preconceived design' to take the victim's life in a particular way for a 
reason' which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or 
(2)."  Verdicts 
of first degree murder typically are sustained when there is evidence of all 
three types and otherwise require at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or 
evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3).  

 

Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 494-95 (Wyo. 1992) (citations and emphasis omitted). 

 

[¶87]      The State presented evidence characterized as planning 
activity by showing that Olsen's initial confessions claimed that he had shot a 
man who had followed him into the Little Chief Bar trying to collect a gambling 
debt and two innocent witnesses, and then later changed his story and confessed 
to planning a robbery that ended with the murder of witnesses.  The second element 
is satisfied by the evidence of robbery as robbery is sufficient motive to 
justify an inference of premeditation.  Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 496.  
Finally, we consider the last category of evidence, "nature of the 
killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so 
particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed 
according to a preconceived design.'"  In Lovato, we 
determined that the murder there took place in an exacting manner from which the 
jury could infer it was premeditated when the evidence showed that Lovato fired 
a volley of shots from a point of relative safety, then fired more shots into 
the deceased, and then, gangland style, fired another shot or two, at point 
blank range into the victim's head.  Lovato, 901 P.2d  
at 1134.  Here, 
Olsen walked into the bar and went into the restroom to see if any customers 
were inside.  
He returned to the bar area, ordered the two male customers to the floor, 
robbed the bar, and then ordered the bartender to lay down on the floor.  Stepping on the 
back of one victim, he fired three shots from close range into the backs of the 
victims' heads.  
He fired one shot at point blank range into the back of the bartender's 
head.  We find 
these murders took place in an exacting manner from which the jury could infer 
premeditation.  
Applying Bouwkamp's analysis, there is 
sufficient evidence of the categories of motive and the nature of the killings 
to establish premeditation.

 

E.  
Summary

 

[¶88]      In summary, with respect to the several issues raised by 
Olsen pertaining to his trial, we find no error in the State's use of a special 
prosecutor, trial defense counsel's performance, and the sufficiency of the 
evidence of premeditation.  Additionally, we find no error in the trial 
court's excusing two prospective jurors for cause.

 

A.  Constitutionality of Wyoming's Death Penalty 
Statute

 

[¶89]      In his first issue relating to the sentencing phase of his 
trial, Olsen contends that Wyoming's death penalty statute is ambiguous and, 
therefore, unconstitutional.  His precise concern is its lack of guidance 
in determining the effect of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
deciding between a death sentence and a life sentence.  The State contends 
that the statute complies with the mandates of the pertinent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court (the Court).

 

1.  Background of Federal 
Precedent

 

[¶90]      In 1972, the Court declared all death penalty statutes 
unconstitutional as constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972).  The basis for 
that conclusion was explained through five concurring opinions.  Four years later, 
when new statutory schemes from various states were presented to the Court, 
several plurality decisions pinpointed the precise deficiency of the previous 
statutes to be the untrammeled discretion permitted juries in deciding whether 
to impose or withhold the death penalty.  In those opinions, the Court upheld Georgia, 
Florida, and Texas' new statutory schemes and struck down two other states' 
statutes, namely, North Carolina's scheme which mandated the death sentence, and 
Louisiana's statutory scheme which required a sentencer to consider lesser 
offenses even when not a scintilla of evidence supported that lesser 
charge.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976);  Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 
428 U.S. 325, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974 (1976).  In 1977, we 
considered the constitutionality of Wyoming's death penalty statute.  In declaring it 
unconstitutional because it mandated the death penalty, we noted that

 

[t]o constitutionally exact a death penalty the statute 
must contain standards provided by the legislature controlling the exercise of 
the discretion of the sentencing authority, which are totally lacking in our 
statute.  The 
lessons of Gregg v. Georgia, Roberts v. Louisiana, Jurek v. Texas, Proffitt v. Florida, 
and Woodson v. North Carolina demonstrate that to successfully withstand 
attack upon constitutional grounds there must be provided in the statute 
standards to guide and control the exercise of discretion by the sentencing 
authority in its determination of the propriety of the application of the death 
sentence, or the alternative of a term of life imprisonment.  There must further 
be provided a procedure by which the fact finder can consider and examine any 
and all aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the character and situation 
of the individual defendant, upon which the final determination is made.  A proper record of 
the findings which are used as the basis for the infliction of this penalty must 
be preserved to enable a reviewing court to determine the reasonableness and the 
propriety of the application of such sentence.  The Wyoming statute under scrutiny does not 
meet these requirements.

 

Kennedy v. State, 559 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Wyo. 1977) (citations omitted).

[¶91]      In the following years, thirty-eight states passed death 
penalty statutes and, as various issues came before the Court, the conceptual 
basis of aggravating and mitigating circumstances' role in a jury's reasoned 
moral response was further defined, evolving into the principle that 

 

a capital sentencing scheme must "genuinely narrow the 
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found 
guilty of murder."

 

Engberg, 820 P.2d  at 90 (quoting Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983)).  Besides its mandate that a statute limit the 
jury's discretion, the Court required the admission of all relevant mitigating 
evidence:

 

There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases 
governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a statute that 
prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating 
weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances 
of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty 
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe 
penalty.  When 
the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible 
with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

 

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978).  The Court 
emphasized that a sentence of death is not a fact-finding exercise, but, 
instead, must reflect an ethical judgment about the "moral guilt" of the 
defendant and the reasoned moral response of the sentencer.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 327-28, 
109 S. Ct. 2934, 2951, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989); see Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3378, 43 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982). 

 

[¶92]      In 1994, the Court explained these complementary doctrines 
of its capital punishment jurisprudence in Tuilaepa v. 
California, 512 U.S. 967, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1994).  The Court explained that its decisions 
require that a jury's discretion in sentencing defendants to death must be 
genuinely narrowed; however, once that is accomplished, the jury must be allowed 
the widest possible discretion to not choose death.  To accomplish these 
constitutional requirements, there are two different aspects of the capital 
decision-making process: the eligibility decision and the selection 
decision.  Id. at 971, 114 S. Ct.  at 2634.  A defendant is 
eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case when the trier of fact finds 
one aggravating circumstance or its equivalent at either the guilt or sentencing 
phase.  Id. at 972, 114 S. Ct.  at 2634.  Aggravating 
circumstances must meet two requirements: the circumstance may not apply to 
every defendant convicted of murder; it must apply only to a subclass of 
defendants convicted of murder (genuine narrowing), and the circumstance must 
not be unconstitutionally vague.  Id., 114 S. Ct.  at 
2635.  

 

[¶93]      The selection decision determines whether an eligible 
defendant should receive the death penalty and requires an individualized 
determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the 
circumstances of the crime. Id. The individualized 
determination requirement is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating 
evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of 
the crime.  Id. The eligibility decision requires an answer to the 
factual question of "what was the rationale for imposing a sentence of death" 
while the selection decision does not necessarily have to answer a factual 
question, but can be open-ended in assessing the defendant's culpability.  Id. at 973, 114 S. Ct.  at 2635. The Court observed that 
the objectives of the eligibility and selection inquiries can be in some tension 
but the principle common to both decisions is that the State must ensure that 
the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in 
the sentencing decision.  Id.  This is the 
controlling objective when examining eligibility and selection factors for 
vagueness and the reason why neither can be too vague.  Id. 

 

[¶94]      It is on the issue of invalid aggravating circumstances 
that the Court began to develop decisions based on whether it considered a 
particular statutory scheme as weighing or nonweighing.  The Court has 
declared that, on review, the distinction between weighing and nonweighing 
schemes is not one of "semantics," but is one of "critical importance."  Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231-32, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1137, 117 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1992); Hopkinson v. 
State, 664 P.2d 43, 60 (Wyo. 
1983) (Hopkinson II) ("The scales must not be tipped 
by impermissible factors leaving us in a quandary as to what the jury would have 
done had impermissible factors not been present."); see 
also Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 170-72 
(Wyo. 1981) (Hopkinson I).  In a "weighing" 
state, where the aggravating and mitigating factors are balanced against each 
other, it is constitutional error for the sentencer to give weight to an 
unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor, even if there are other valid 
aggravating factors.  
Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 46, 113 S. Ct. 528, 534, 121 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1992).  In a "nonweighing" state, aggravating 
circumstances serve only to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty and 
not to determine punishment, and the invalidation of one aggravating 
circumstance does not necessarily require the appellate court to vacate a death 
sentence and remand to a jury.  Zant, 462 U.S.  at 890, 103 S. Ct.  at 2749-50.  

 

[¶95]      Because weighing states require sentencers to balance 
aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances, one invalid 
aggravating circumstance requires the reviewing court to either remand the case 
for a new sentencing determination, reweigh the evidence itself, or conduct 
harmless error analysis to decide if, beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence 
would have been the same despite the invalid aggravating circumstance.  By contrast, in 
nonweighing states 

 

the jury must find the existence of one aggravating factor 
before imposing the death penalty, but aggravating factors as such have no 
specific function in the jury's decision whether a defendant who has been found 
to be eligible for the death penalty should receive it under all the 
circumstances of the case.  Instead, . . . , "in making the decision as 
to the penalty, the factfinder takes into consideration all circumstances before 
it from both the guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial. These 
circumstances relate both to the offense and the defendant."  

 

Stringer, 503 U.S.  at 229-30, 112 S. Ct.  at 1136 (quoting Zant, 462 U.S.  at 872, 103 S.Ct. at 2740). If the 
reviewing court concludes that the sentencer found at least one valid 
aggravating circumstance and that the invalid factor did not affect the 
sentencer's determination in imposing the death penalty, the sentence may stand 
despite an invalid aggravating circumstance.  Stringer, at 232, 
112 S. Ct.  at 1137; Zant, at 881, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2745.  The 
Court said:

 

Assuming a determination by the state appellate court that 
the invalid factor would not have made a difference to the jury's determination, 
there is no constitutional violation resulting from the introduction of the 
invalid factor in an earlier stage of the proceedings.  But when the 
sentencing body is told to weigh an invalid factor in its decision, a reviewing 
court may not assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been 
removed from death's side of the scale.   When the weighing process itself has 
been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at the 
trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an 
individualized sentence.  This clear principle emerges not from any 
single case . . . but from our long line of authority setting forth the dual 
constitutional criteria of precise and individualized sentencing.

 

Stringer, at 232, 112 S. Ct.  at 1137.  In this particular case, both Olsen and the 
State describe Wyoming's current statute as a weighing statute; however, while 
Olsen contends this statutory language unconstitutionally fails to properly 
channel the sentencer's discretion and allows arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty, the State argues that the weighing/nonweighing distinction is important 
only to this court's reviewing process.

 

[¶96]      We have not considered the death penalty statute since it 
was amended in 1989, although we held the previous version was constitutional in 
Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 152.    Hopkinson I considered a statute that instructed that 
aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt must outweigh any and 
all mitigating circumstances.  If this conclusion is reached, the defendant 
can be sentenced to death.  Id. at 153.  Specifically, at 
that time the statute required the jury to determine "[w]hether sufficient 
mitigating circumstances exist . . . which outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances found to exist."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(d)(i)(B) (Michie 
1977).  The 
1989 amendment to the statute removed the weighing language and now reads, in 
pertinent part: 

 

The jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances unanimously found to exist, and each individual juror may also 
consider any mitigating circumstances found by that juror to exist.  

 

§ 6-2-102(d)(ii). Both parties contend that Wyoming's 
statute should be considered "weighing" although it does not use that specific 
term.  Both 
contend it is weighing because the statute limits the jury's consideration to 
statutorily-defined aggravating factors by the express language in § 
6-2-102(d)(ii), which states that the jury must unanimously determine whether 
the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment based upon the 
consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances found to exist. The State argues that 
"consider" is a synonym of "weigh" and the jury's discretion is 
"channeled."  
The defense contends that the statute is too unclear to be constitutional 
because it does not give the jury guidance or direction "on how the aggravators 
and mitigators" should be "considered."  The defense claims this "nonweighing" element 
causes the statute to be ambiguous, the court cannot determine legislative 
intent, and the statute must be declared unconstitutionally vague.  Using dictionary 
definitions, the State contends that the statutory language, "consider 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances," is a directive that the jury is to 
weigh them in some fashion and affords it discretion to evaluate this evidence 
in whatever manner it chooses.  

 

[¶97]      Our earlier discussion of the differences between weighing 
and nonweighing statutory language indicates that Wyoming's statutory language 
does not impose a nonweighing scheme. Olsen contends that eliminating the 
directive "outweigh" requires finding the statute too ambiguous to be 
constitutional.  
Proffitt specifically addressed the issue of 
whether a statute is constitutional when it gives no guidance as to how the 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances should be weighed in any specific 
case.  The 
Court responded:

 

While these questions and decisions may be hard, they 
require no more line drawing than is commonly required of a factfinder in a 
lawsuit.  For 
example, juries have traditionally evaluated the validity of defenses such as 
insanity or reduced capacity, both of which involve the same considerations as 
some of the above-mentioned mitigating circumstances.  While the various 
factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do not have numerical 
weights assigned to them, the requirements of Furman 
are satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled 
by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against 
imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and 
capriciousness in its imposition.

The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida 
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the various aggravating 
circumstances to be weighed against the mitigating ones.  As a result, the 
trial court's sentencing discretion is guided and channeled by a system that 
focuses on the circumstances of each individual homicide and individual 
defendant in deciding whether the death penalty is to be imposed.  

 

[¶98]      The Florida scheme considered in Proffitt, however, specifically instructed the jury to 
determine if the aggravating circumstances "outweighed" the mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the death penalty.  Olsen complains that the Wyoming statute 
fails to include this directive while limiting the jury's deliberations to 
discrete statutory aggravating circumstances. He contends a statute that 
contains components of both a weighing and a nonweighing statute is 
unconstitutionally vague for failing to comply with federal requirements that 
the sentencing jury's discretion be properly channeled.  

 

[¶99]      In Richmond v. Lewis, the Court 
ruled that Arizona was a "weighing" state despite the absence of the term.  Richmond, 506 U.S.  at 47, 113 S. Ct.  at 534-35.  The provision in 
question stated:

 

In determining whether to impose a sentence of death . . . 
the court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
included in . . . this section and shall impose a sentence of death if the court 
finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances . . . and that there are no 
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for 
leniency.

 

Id.  As previously discussed, when an invalid aggravating factor 
is used in a weighing state, the reviewing court must either reweigh, remand, or 
conduct a harmless error review.  The Court ruled that the Arizona Supreme 
Court's failure to reweigh required that the judgment be reversed and 
remanded.  Id. at 52, 113 S. Ct.  at 537.

 

[¶100]  
In Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), Richmond was interpreted 
to mean that the United States Supreme Court's weighing/non-weighing distinction 
does not turn simply on whether the word "weighing" appears in a state's 
statute.  Id. at 1477.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
said:

 

Instead, the distinction can be understood functionally in 
one of two ways.  
First, when a jury "is specifically instructed to weigh statutory 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances," and its decision is tied to the 
outcome, the decisional process necessarily becomes infected by the improper 
consideration.  
In states where no such procedure is mandated, the factor need not infect 
the process; the jury is under no obligation to weigh the factor as part of its 
calculus.  
Second, when a jury is limited to the consideration of discrete 
aggravating factors, consideration of an invalid factor may allow consideration 
of something--the circumstances supporting the factor--that could not have 
otherwise been considered.  In contrast, when a jury is permitted to 
consider any evidence it deems relevant in aggravation, the consideration of an 
invalid factor adds only an improper label--the state's "aggravating factor" 
imprimatur--to underlying circumstances which could have been taken into account 
anyway.

Consequently, the Supreme Court's weighing/ nonweighing 
distinction may involve both procedural and substantive components.  Procedurally, is 
the sentencer restricted to a "weighing" of aggravation against mitigation?  Substantively, is 
the sentencer prevented from considering evidence in aggravation other than 
discrete, statutorily-defined factors?  Our review of federal and state court 
decisions reveals that where both constraints are present, the regimes involved 
are uniformly treated as weighing; where neither is present, the regimes are 
uniformly treated as non-weighing; and where one but not the other is present, 
disagreement has arisen.

 

Id. at 1477-78 (citations and footnotes omitted).

 

[¶101]  
The Williams approach has been 
adopted by the Washington State Supreme Court, and we too apply its approach and 
conclude that we agree with both parties that the Wyoming statute constitutes a 
weighing statute.  
State v. Brown, 940 P.2d 546, 592 (Wash. 
1997).  We 
reach this conclusion despite the absence of weighing language because the 
Wyoming statute permits the sentencer to consider only those aggravating 
circumstances enumerated in the statute and does not permit the jury to consider 
nonstatutory aggravating evidence as aggravating circumstances.  Our conclusion 
necessarily raises the issue of whether the jury must be instructed to determine 
if the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances before the 
death penalty is imposed.  The State contends that it is obvious the 
jury is going to weigh all those circumstances found to exist in some fashion; 
however, in our later discussion of mitigation, we conclude that the State's 
concession does require the jury to be instructed using the term 
"outweigh."

 

[¶102]  
Our conclusion that the statute must be considered a 
weighing statute does not require that we find that the Court's constitutional 
precedent mandates that the statute, itself, direct the jury to find that 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or be 
unconstitutional.  
In reviewing Georgia's nonweighing scheme, the Court, as it had in Proffitt, held that the Constitution does not require a 
state to adopt specific standards for instructing the jury in its consideration 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Zant, 462 U.S.  at 
890, 103 S. Ct.  at 2750.  We conclude that federal precedent does not 
require that we find unconstitutional a statute containing elements of both 
weighing and nonweighing statutes, so long as Wyoming's death penalty statute 
genuinely narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty and 
provides for an individualized determination and appellate review. 

 

[¶103]  Changing the statutory term from "weigh" to "consider" did 
not transform the statutory scheme from weighing to nonweighing, and we hold 
that Wyoming's death penalty statute is a constitutional, weighing statute.   We reach this 
conclusion despite the absence of weighing language because the Wyoming statute 
permits the sentencer to consider only those aggravating circumstances 
enumerated in the statute and does not permit the jury to consider nonstatutory 
aggravating evidence as aggravating circumstances.  Because the statute 
requires that the sentencing jury consider those aggravating circumstances and 
all relevant mitigating evidence to reach a decision of death or life 
imprisonment, the jury should be instructed that it must find that any 
aggravating circumstance found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt must outweigh 
all mitigating circumstances.

 

B.  Statutory Interpretation

 

[¶104]  
In his next several issues, Olsen contends that, under 
Wyoming's death penalty statutory scheme, the trial court improperly applied 
certain aggravating circumstances; improperly admitted nonstatutory aggravating 
evidence although the statutory language prohibits it; and did not properly 
instruct the jury on the process for consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that is specified by the statutory language.  
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, and we have approved 
this understanding of that rule: 

"The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal 
statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident 
statutory purpose. * * *  Nor does it demand that a statute be given 
the narrowest meaning';  it is satisfied if the words are given their 
fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers."

 

Dover v. State 664 P.2d 536, 540 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting United States v. 
Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145, 96 S. Ct. 335, 347, 46 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1975)).

 

[¶105]  
Ordinarily, this rule of statutory interpretation requires 
that we give effect to the legislative intent of a statute as perceived from its 
plain language.  
However, our early decisions recognized that, in providing for the death 
penalty as a sentence, the Wyoming Legislature was restrained by constitutional 
provisions and guarantees.  Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 51.  We 
found that the most important reason for holding the statutory scheme 
constitutional to be the fact that these constitutional provisions and 
guarantees were incorporated into the death penalty sentence as a condition of 
its availability.  
Id. at 54.  The primary purpose behind those 
constitutional requirements is the Court's mandate that a constitutional death 
penalty statutory scheme provide standards establishing a meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which 
it is not. Furman, 408 U.S.  at 313, 92 S. Ct.  at 2764 
(White, J., concurring). When constitutional jurisprudence has sought to limit 
either the availability or the extent of state action, we have applied strict 
construction to the particular statute.  See Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 377 (Wyo. 
1996); Simms v. Oedekoven, 839 P.2d 381, 385 (Wyo. 
1992).  Because 
the availability of the death penalty is constitutionally limited, it is 
appropriate to strictly construe the statute against application of the death 
penalty.  This 
task is made easier by a readily discernible effort on the part of the Wyoming 
Legislature to distinguish the most culpable of homicides from all other 
homicides in applying the death penalty statute.  Through the narrow language of statutorily 
enumerated aggravating circumstances, the legislature has chosen to restrict the 
pool of defendants eligible for the death penalty and evidenced a plain intent 
that it apply to few first degree premeditated murders.  

 

C.  Aggravating Circumstances

 

[¶106]  
The Wyoming Legislature has statutorily enumerated 
aggravating circumstances to "narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty" and "channel" the discretion of the sentencing authority.  Engberg, 820 P.2d  at 90; Zant, 462 U.S.  at 877.  The legislature's use of enumerated 
aggravating circumstances satisfies the Court's command that because "there is a 
required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed," rational criteria "narrow the decisionmaker's judgment 
as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the 
threshold."  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1774, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987). 

 

[¶107]  
The Court, however, has made clear that statutory 
aggravating circumstances that enable the sentencer to distinguish those who 
deserve capital punishment from those who do not are insufficient; the narrowing 
device "must provide a principled basis" for making this distinction.  Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1993). "If the sentencer fairly could 
conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the 
circumstance is constitutionally infirm."  Id. (emphasis in 
original).  An 
aggravating circumstance that is so vague as to leave the sentencer without 
sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor is 
invalid.  Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 2928, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1992); Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1990).4  "A limiting 
instruction can be used to give content to a statutory factor that is itself 
too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer' only if the limiting 
instruction's own definitions are constitutionally sufficient,' that is, only 
if the limiting instruction itself provides some guidance to the 
sentencer.'"  
Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 3, 111 S. Ct. 313, 314, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990) (quoting Walton, 497 U.S.  at 654, 110 S.Ct. at 3057).

 

[¶108]  
As amended in 1989, Wyoming's death penalty statute 
provides that:

 

§ 6-2-102. Presentence hearing for murder in the first 
degree; mitigating and aggravating circumstances; effect of error in 
hearing.

(a) Upon conviction of a person for murder in the first 
degree the judge shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine 
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.  The hearing shall 
be conducted before the judge alone if:

(i) The defendant was convicted by a judge sitting without 
a jury;

(ii) The defendant has pled guilty; or

(iii) The defendant waives a jury with respect to the 
sentence.

(b) In all other cases the sentencing hearing shall be 
conducted before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt or, if the 
judge for good cause shown discharges that jury, with a new jury impaneled for 
that purpose.

(c) The judge or jury shall hear evidence as to any matter 
that the court deems relevant to a determination of the sentence, and shall 
include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
enumerated in subsections (h) and (j) of this section.  Any evidence which 
the court deems to have probative value may be received regardless of its 
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant 
is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements, and provided 
further that only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to 
the defendant or his counsel prior to his trial shall be admissible.

(d) Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge 
shall give the jury appropriate instructions, including instructions as to any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as defined in subsections (h) and (j) 
of this section, or proceed as provided by paragraph (iii) of this 
subsection:

(i) After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall 
deliberate and render a sentence based upon the following:

(A) Whether one (1) or more aggravating circumstances exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt as set forth in subsection (h) of this section;

(B) Whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, mitigating 
circumstances exist as set forth in subsection (j) of this section; and

(C) The mere number of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances found shall have no independent significance.

(ii) Based upon the considerations in paragraph (i) of this 
subsection, the jury shall unanimously determine whether the defendant should be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment.  The jury shall consider aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist, and each individual juror 
may also consider any mitigating circumstances found by that juror to exist;

(iii) In nonjury cases, the judge shall determine if any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist and impose sentence within the 
limits prescribed by law, based upon the considerations enumerated in 
subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of paragraph (i) of this subsection.

(e) The death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least 
one (1) of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this 
section is found.  
In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation.  If the jury cannot, 
within a reasonable time, agree on the punishment to be imposed, the judge shall 
impose a life sentence.  The jury, if its verdict is a sentence of 
death, shall designate in writing signed by the foreman of the jury:

(i) The aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it 
unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt;

(ii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which it 
unanimously found by a preponderance of the evidence; and

(iii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which 
any individual juror found by a preponderance of the evidence.

(f) Unless the jury trying the case recommends the death 
sentence in its verdict, the judge shall not sentence the defendant to death but 
shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as provided by law.  Where a 
recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the defendant to 
death.

(g) If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of 
error only in the presentence hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall 
apply only to the issue of punishment.

(h) Aggravating circumstances are limited to the 
following:

(i) The murder was committed by a person:

(A) Confined in a jail or correctional facility;

(B) On parole or on probation for a felony;

(C) After escaping detention or incarceration; or

(D) Released on bail pending appeal of his conviction.

(ii) The defendant was previously convicted of another 
murder in the first degree or a felony involving the use or threat of violence 
to the person;

(iii) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death 
to two (2) or more persons;

(iv) The murder was committed while the defendant was 
engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit, any aircraft piracy or the 
unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

(v) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;

 (vi) The murder was committed for 
compensation, the collection of insurance benefits or other similar pecuniary 
gain;

(vii) The murder was especially atrocious or cruel, being 
unnecessarily torturous to the victim;

(viii) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial 
officer, district attorney, former district attorney, defending attorney, peace 
officer, juror or witness, during or because of the exercise of his official 
duty;

(ix) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the 
victim was less than seventeen (17) years of age or older than sixty-five (65) 
years of age;

(x) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the 
victim was especially vulnerable due to significant mental or physical 
disability;

(xi) The defendant poses a substantial and continuing 
threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of criminal 
violence;

(xii) The defendant killed another human being purposely 
and with premeditated malice and while engaged in, or as an accomplice in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting 
to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping.

(j) Mitigating circumstances shall include the 
following:

(i) The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activity;

(ii) The murder was committed while the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;

(iii) The victim was a participant in the defendant's 
conduct or consented to the act;

(iv) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed 
by another person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively 
minor;

(v) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the 
substantial domination of another person;

(vi) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired;

(vii) The age of the defendant at the time of the 
crime;

(viii) Any other fact or circumstance of the defendant's 
character or prior record or matter surrounding his offense which serves to 
mitigate his culpability. 

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102 (Michie 1997).

 

[¶109]  
Olsen contends that three of the four aggravating factors 
of which he was convicted were, as a matter of law, improperly applied to the 
facts of his case. The aggravating factors submitted to the jury were: (1)  Olsen created a 
great risk of death to two or more persons; (2)  the murders were committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (3)  the murders were especially atrocious or 
cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the victims; (4) Olsen posed a 
substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or was likely to 
commit continued acts of criminal violence; (5)  Olsen killed another human being purposely 
and with premeditated malice and while engaged in the commission of a 
robbery.  The 
trial court instructed the jury that

 

atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; cruel means 
designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even 
enjoyment of, the suffering of others.  What is intended to be included in this 
circumstance are those murders where the actual commission of the crime was 
accompanied by such additional acts of serious physical or mental abuse of the 
victims as to set it apart from the normal first degree murder; that is, a 
particularly consciousless [sic] or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victims.   

Torture may mean extreme mental anguish or distress.  In finding mental 
anguish or distress you may consider the victims' uncertainty as to his or her 
ultimate fate immediately prior to their deaths.  

 

1.  Atrocious or Cruel 
Aggravating Circumstance

 

[¶110]  
The first aggravating circumstance which Olsen complains 
was improperly applied states the "murder was especially atrocious or cruel, 
being unnecessarily torturous to the victim."   Part of extensive 1989 amendments to 
the statute, this aggravating circumstance previously read, "especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel," and survived a vagueness challenge in Hopkinson I when we held 
that the statutory language provided the jury adequate guidance when imposing 
the death penalty.  
Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 153-54.  That decision 
focused on the "especially heinous" portion of the statute's wording and found 
that the murder to be so classified must demonstrate that the consciencelessness 
of the defendant is not only an outrage but also a dangerous and unrestrainable 
threat to society. It found Florida's interpretation instructive:

  

That court has recognized that while it is arguable "that 
all killings are atrocious, * * * [s]till, we believe that the Legislature 
intended something especially' heinous, atrocious or cruel when it authorized 
the death penalty for first degree murder."  As a consequence the court has indicated that 
the eighth statutory provision is directed only at "the conscienceless or 
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim."  We cannot say that 
the provision, as so construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged 
with the duty of recommending or imposing sentences in capital 
cases."

 

Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 154 (quoting Proffitt, 428 U.S.  at 255-56, 96 S.Ct. at 2968) 
(citations omitted).   In further support, Hopkinson I concluded that the "especially heinous" 
aspect of the term was intended to achieve the proper state purpose of 
protecting society by sanctioning the death penalty to those individuals who not 
only may, but probably will, kill again.  Id.  The Hopkinson II jury was 
instructed:

 

One of the aggravating circumstances set forth in this case 
is that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  To assist you in 
your evalution of this aggravating circumstance, heinous means extremely wicked 
or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; cruel means 
designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even 
enjoyment of, the suffering of others.  What is intended to be included in this 
circumstance are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the murder 
was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the 
normal murder; that is, a consciousless [sic] or pityless [sic] crime which is 
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.  

 

Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 72.

 

[¶111]  
A similar narrowing construction had been approved in Proffitt, 428 U.S.  at 255-56, 96 S. Ct.  at 2968. Later, 
however, the Court invalidated the use of vaguely defined aggravating factors as 
violative of the Eight Amendment, including the "especially heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel" aggravating circumstance, and the  "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman" aggravating circumstance.  Maynard v. 
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64, 108 S. Ct. 1853 1859, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988); Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1764-65, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980).  Maynard stated 
that, although not specifically limited to this construction, if the "especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance were limited to murders 
involving "some kind of torture or physical abuse," it would be constitutionally 
acceptable.  Maynard, 486 U.S.  at 365, 108 S. Ct.  at 1859.  The next year, the 
1989 amendment to Wyoming's death penalty statute eliminated the use of heinous 
and limited those first degree murders deserving the death penalty to those 
"especially atrocious and cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the 
victim."  
Despite this specific history indicating the legislature intended to 
limit this aggravating circumstance as discussed in Maynard, Olsen contends that it is unconstitutionally 
vague and improperly applied to him.  The State contends that the trial court 
properly limited this circumstance by the instruction defining the terms of the 
aggravating circumstance, thus curing any vagueness issue, and that this 
aggravating circumstance applies to execution-type slayings.

 

[¶112]  
"Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances 
defined in capital punishment statutes are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment 
and characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to 
inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result 
leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion held 
invalid in Furman v. Georgia."  Maynard, 486 U.S.  at 361-62, 108 S. Ct.  at 1858.

 

[¶113]  
The State's view receives some support from decisions of 
the Court assessing and approving Arizona's limitation of its "especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" factor by equating "cruel" with infliction of 
"mental anguish or physical abuse."  Walton, 497 U.S. 
at 654-55, 110 S. Ct.  at 3057-58.  In Shell v. Mississippi, however, 
the Court ruled that the following instruction limiting "especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel" was constitutionally insufficient:

 

The word heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; 
atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed to 
inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the 
suffering of others.

 

Shell, 498 U.S.  at 2, 111 S. Ct.  at 313.  In a brief per 
curiam decision, the Court summarily ruled that this attempt to narrow the 
construction of a facially invalid aggravating circumstance violated Maynard and Godfrey.  Id. at 3, 111 S. Ct.  at 314.  The distinction 
between Shell and Walton 
apparently rests not only upon Arizona's limitation of its "especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" factor by defining that "a crime is committed in 
an especially cruel manner when the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or 
physical abuse before the victim's death," and that "mental anguish includes a 
victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate," but also upon the Arizona Supreme 
Court's willingness to limit its application.  Walton, 497 U.S. 
at 654-55, 110 S. Ct.  at 3057-58.

 

[¶114]  
The facts of Walton 
establishing substantial mental anguish before the victim's death were that 
Petitioner Walton and his two codefendants, Robert Hoover and Sharold Ramsey, 
went to a bar in Tucson, Arizona, on the night of March 2, 1986, intending to 
rob someone at gunpoint.  They encountered Thomas Powell, a young 
Marine, in the bar parking lot.  After robbing him, they forced him into his 
car and he was driven out to a remote area of the desert.  Id. at 644, 110 S. Ct.  at 3052.

 

Powell could not be certain of his fate, but as the city 
lights grew dim behind him, his fears for his life must have multiplied.  He was so clearly 
terrified by the time they stopped that Sharold Ramsey tried to reassure him 
that they would not hurt him.  But even if Powell took temporary refuge in 
her assurances, he soon realized that they meant to kill him.  The defendant and 
Hoover forced Powell to lie face down on the ground outside the car while they 
argued over his fate.  
Although they had agreed to tie him up, the defendant, armed only with a 
gun but no rope to tie him, marched Powell off into the darkness, telling his 
companions to turn up the radio.  The implication was clear to Powell, who was 
so upset that he urinated on himself and begged the defendant not to kill 
him.  This 
evidences that Powell suffered great mental anguish both during the car ride 
when his fate was uncertain and in his final march into the desert when his fate 
had become certain.  

 

State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1033 (Ariz. 1989).  Powell was shot and left for dead; however, 
he survived another six days alone in the desert.

 

[¶115]  
In Walton, the Arizona Supreme 
Court demonstrated that it limits the cruelty circumstance to situations where 
the suffering of the victim was intended by or foreseeable to the killer 
because, on direct appeal, it rejected the State's argument that the six days 
that Powell suffered after being shot constituted cruelty within the meaning of 
the statute when the evidence showed that the killer intended to kill the victim 
immediately.   
The court was further assured that Arizona appropriately applied its 
narrowing construction based upon those facts of Walton which did establish intentional infliction of 
substantial mental anguish.  

 

[¶116]  
The limiting instruction submitted to Olsen's jury is 
structurally similar to aspects of the instructions submitted in Hopkinson and Walton in 
that it defines some terms of the aggravating circumstance "especially atrocious 
and cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the victim."  It is dissimilar 
because both Hopkinson and 
Walton defined terms of the aggravating circumstance  "especially 
heinous, atrocious or cruel."  For the limiting instruction submitted to the 
Olsen jury to be proper, it must be decided that the change to the statutory 
language in the 1989 amendment did not change in meaning.  The legislative 
intent of the change, however, was to change the meaning of this particular 
aggravating circumstance.  First, it eliminated the use of "heinous" and 
limited those first degree murders deserving the death penalty to those 
"especially atrocious and cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the 
victim."  
Plainly the second phrase describes the first phrase and is deliberately 
joined to mean that the murder was "especially atrocious and cruel" because it 
was "unnecessarily torturous to the victim."  This change evidences an apparent legislative 
intent to establish torture as a core element of this particular aggravating 
factor.  This 
interpretation finds support when we consider, as we must, that in Maynard, published the year before the amendment, the 
Court approved a limited application of the aggravating circumstance to murders 
involving "some kind of torture or serious physical abuse."   Each term of 
this aggravating circumstance does not establish separate, aggravating factors 
having an independent core meaning as the Olsen jury was instructed. Strictly 
construed, the standard set by this aggravating fact will be met by those 
murders which are accompanied by intentionally inflicted torture, either 
physical or mental, distinguishable from the usual, the ordinary, the normal 
sort of homicide in the typical murder case.  See Hopkinson II, 
664 P.2d  at 73.

 

[¶117]  
Having determined that this term plainly limits itself to 
murders involving intentionally inflicted torture as was described in Hopkinson II, we do not find that the term is facially 
invalid for vagueness under our limiting construction.  Olsen's jury, 
however, was improperly instructed that each word of the term "especially 
atrocious or cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the victim" established 
separate, aggravating factors having an independent core meaning other than 
torture.  Under 
our interpretation of the state statute, this instruction is improper and 
reversible error.  
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 747, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1447-48, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1990) (state's interpretation of its own 
law controls).  
In this case, there was no evidence of physical torture, and Olsen's jury 
was presented with argument that conviction was appropriate under this 
aggravating circumstance because "uncertainty as to his or her ultimate fate" 
constituted mental torture.  Our task is to determine whether the evidence 
shows that this mental torture was intentionally inflicted to an extreme 
degree. 

 

[¶118]  
Our standard of review for whether sufficient evidence 
supports a jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance is the same that is 
used in determining sufficiency of evidence of guilt.  Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 57-58.

 

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine 
whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record 
evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  But 
this inquiry does not require a court to "ask itself whether it believes that 
the evidence at the trial established guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."  Instead, the 
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

Id. (citations and emphasis omitted).

 

[¶119]  
Relying upon Olsen's statements, the State describes the 
murders as establishing that mental anguish was caused by Olsen's having the 
victims lay down on the floor and wait to be shot, and that the mental anguish 
must have increased for at least two of the victims after the first victim was 
shot.  This set 
of facts does not establish any intentional infliction of mental torture that 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt the murders were "especially atrocious or 
cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the victim."  The facts of Hopkinson II establish the extreme degree of physical 
torture contemplated by the statutory language.  In that case, the evidence was that, before 
death, the murder victim, while tied down, received over 140 burns on his body, 
including his eyes; five knife cuts on his neck and breasts; a bullet wound; 
bludgeoning; and extreme physical torture that could only have been 
intentionally inflicted over several hours.  The facts of Walton discussed earlier establish the extreme degree 
of mental torture contemplated by Wyoming's statutory language.  In comparison, the 
evidence of this case establishes a degree of mental anguish that, while 
significant, is not sufficient to be atrocious by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Were we 
to decide otherwise, we would not be upholding the clear legislative intent to 
limit Wyoming's death penalty to the most culpable of murderers.  

 

[¶120]  
We next consider Olsen's challenge to the aggravating 
circumstance that he "knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more 
persons."  We 
have upheld application of this factor in Engberg v. 
State, 686 P.2d 541(Wyo. 1984), 
finding:

 

The testimony in this case further demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Engberg seriously endangered the lives of Kay Otto and 
other persons present in the parking lot at the time of the robbery and murder, 
as well as that of his victim, Vernon Rogers.  In shooting errantly at persons in parked 
vehicles in the lot, Engberg manifested an utter disregard for lives of innocent 
persons.  This 
evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Engberg knowingly created a 
great risk of death to two or more persons.

 

Id. at 557.

 

[¶121]  
The State did not present any evidence or suggest that 
there were other bystanders involved who were threatened with grave harm as 
Olsen shot his intended victims.  In applying this aggravating circumstance to 
Olsen, the State argued its basis was the harm inflicted upon the victims of his 
crime in a multiple homicide.  The State defends its application by 
referring us to decisions in the jurisdictions of Oklahoma, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, providing an interpretation that "where there is more than one 
victim, where they are in the same building, room, or place, and within the same 
time frame, their killing may be said to have created a great risk of death to 
two or more persons."  
In contrast, Arizona has limited similar language to "those factual 
situations where a grave risk of death has been created which threatens persons 
other than the intended victims."  Arizona v. Tison, 
633 P.2d 335, 351 (Ariz. 1981).

 

[¶122]  
The State's contention that the legislature intended the 
death penalty to apply to multiple homicide comports neither with the plain 
language of the statutory circumstance because the legislature could easily have 
included "multiple homicide" language, nor with an intent to restrict use of the 
death penalty to the most culpable of murderers.  States that have included multiple homicide 
as an aggravating circumstance do so in addition to the inclusion of the 
aggravating circumstance of creating a great risk of death to others, and they 
use explicit, plain language.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(8) 
(2001);5 Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(3) (1999);6 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-11-103(5)(l) 
(2000);7 Idaho Code § 19-2515(h)(2) (1997).8

 

[¶123]  
Strictly construing the Wyoming statute, we do not find 
that the statutory language of this aggravating circumstance evidences a 
legislative intent that all multiple homicides will be subject to the death 
penalty.   
Instead, we find that the use of the terms "risk" and "persons" was given 
its proper application in Engberg's factual 
situation of placing bystanders in a parking lot at great risk of death by 
errant shooting.  
The State concedes that bystanders' lives other than the intended victims 
were not directly endangered during Olsen's crimes.  It was reversible 
error to submit an instruction on this aggravating factor to the 
jury.

  

3.  Purpose of Avoiding 
or Preventing a Lawful Arrest Aggravating Circumstance

 

[¶124]  
Olsen was charged with committing the murders "for the 
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from 
custody."  In 
applying this aggravating circumstance to Olsen, the State contended the 
evidence showed that after the bartender told him that he would not get away 
with his crime, Olsen realized the witnesses in the bar could identify him and 
he then executed them. Olsen contends that application of the aggravator under 
these circumstances permits it to be valid in any homicide case, because in 
virtually every homicide there is a witness silenced, and an arrest thus 
potentially prevented.  He points out that such application would 
call into question the constitutional validity of the aggravator because 
"[t]here [would be] no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the 
death penalty is imposed, from the many cases in which it was not,"  citing Godfrey, 446 U.S.  at 433, 100 S. Ct.  at 1767.  He urges that no 
evidence establishes and this court cannot find that the dominant motive for the 
murder was the elimination of witnesses.  He contends that the aggravating circumstance 
is properly limited to those cases where it is the dominant motive, as 
illustrated by those situations involving an imminent arrest or those cases 
where the victim of the murder is a witness to an earlier independent 
crime.  

 

[¶125]  Hopkinson II and Hopkinson III considered 
the application of this factor.  This court found the evidence established 
that the victim was an accomplice murdered because he was to testify before a 
grand jury about Hopkinson's role in an earlier multiple murder.  Hopkinson v. State, 696 P.2d 54, 70 (Wyo. 
1985) (Hopkinson III); Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 58-59.  The State contends 
that limiting this factor to witnesses in an ongoing investigation as in Hopkinson would make this aggravating circumstance 
practically indistinguishable from the aggravating circumstance in § 
6-2-102(h)(viii).9

 

[¶126]  
Again, our task is to strictly construe the plain language 
of this aggravating circumstance, giving it a constitutional construction if 
possible, and giving effect to legislative intent.  We have already 
determined that it is the legislative intent to limit application of the death 
penalty to the most culpable of crimes.  Plainly, the legislature intended that the 
death penalty apply to those murders motivated to avoid or prevent a lawful 
arrest or effect an escape from custody although the murders also occurred 
during commission of a robbery, the aggravating circumstance articulated in § 
6-2-102(h)(xii).10

 

[¶127]  
The evidence supports finding that the only motive for the 
execution-type killings after the victims had cooperated and the robbery was 
accomplished was as Olsen admitted, namely, to eliminate identification 
witnesses. The statutory language is exactly similar to Florida's statutory 
language which has been held to encompass application of this provision to the 
murder of a witness to a crime.  Riley v. State, 
366 So. 2d 19, 22 n.4 (Fla. 1978).  Riley established 
that the mere fact of a death is not enough to invoke this factor when the 
victim is not a law enforcement official.  Id. at 22.  In a later 
decision, when confronted with evidence that use of a silencer on a gun 
suggested a motivation to avoid arrest and detection, Florida rejected that 
argument, holding that motive would not be assumed and requiring that the 
evidence must clearly show that the dominant or only motive for the murder was 
the elimination of witnesses. Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278, 1282 (Fla. 1979).  Florida has consistently found that 
"[s]tanding alone, the fact that the victim could identify the murderer does not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the elimination of a witness was a dominant 
motive for the killing."  Bruno v. State, 
574 So. 2d 76, 81-82 (Fla. 1991); see also Floyd v. 
State, 497 So. 2d 1211, 1214-15 (Fla. 1986); Bates v. 
State, 465 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla.1985).   We hold that these rules should apply 
for this aggravating circumstance under Wyoming's statute.  Olsen's concern 
that in virtually every homicide there is a witness silenced, and an arrest thus 
potentially prevented, does not arise when the State is required to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the dominant motive is to eliminate witnesses to a 
crime.  

 

[¶128]  
In this case, sufficient evidence supports finding that 
this aggravating circumstance existed.  Olsen stated that none of the victims 
resisted him during the robbery and the robbery was accomplished before he shot 
them.  Olsen 
stated that he shot the victims because they could identify him.  This evidence 
established that Olsen's dominant motive for the murders was to eliminate the 
witnesses to his crime of robbery and established for the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance of murder to avoid or prevent a 
lawful arrest.

 

[¶129]  
Olsen contends that after he was convicted of premeditated 
first degree murder and felony murder, the premeditation and robbery elements of 
those crimes were used to establish the "premeditated felony murder" aggravating 
circumstance in violation of Engberg.  The State 
contends that Engberg is distinguishable because it 
is limited to those cases where an underlying felony is used to convict a 
defendant of felony murder only; in this case, Olsen was also convicted of 
premeditated first degree murder, thus Engberg does 
not apply. We agree with the State. 

 

[¶130]  Engberg's rationale is that when an element of felony murder is 
itself listed as an aggravating factor, the Furman/Gregg constitutional requirement of narrowing 
the class of persons to be sentenced to death is not met.  Engberg, 820 P.2d  at 90.  Engberg defined 
aggravation as:

"Any circumstance attending the commission of a crime or 
tort which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious 
consequences, but which is above and beyond the 
essential constituents of the crime or tort itself."

 

Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 60 (5th ed. 1979)).  In Engberg, the robbery established an essential element 
of the crime of felony murder and of two aggravating circumstances: the murder 
was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony, and 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.  Id. at 89.  Engberg's holding was very specific:

 

We now hold that where an underlying felony is used to 
convict a defendant of felony murder only, elements of the underlying felony may 
not again be used as an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase.  

 

Id. at 92.  Olsen was convicted of both felony murder and 
premeditated first degree murder, and Engberg does 
not apply.  We 
disagree with Olsen's claim that permitting this aggravating factor does not 
narrow the class of persons to be sentenced to death.  Once Olsen was 
convicted of premeditated first degree murder, this aggravating circumstance 
constitutionally submitted the question of whether he was eligible for the death 
penalty on the basis that he was engaged in the commission of a robbery.  The trial court did 
not err in instructing the jury to consider this aggravating 
circumstance.

 

5.  Summary

 

[¶131]  
We have invalidated two of the four aggravating 
circumstances for which Olsen was convicted.  Although he was properly convicted of two 
aggravating circumstances, his sentence cannot be affirmed.  "An automatic rule 
of affirmance in a weighing state [is] invalid under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982), for it would not give 
defendants the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing 
of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances."  Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 752, 110 S. Ct.  at 1450.

 

[¶132]  We vacate the sentence of death and remand for a new 
sentencing hearing.

 

D.  Mitigating Circumstances

 

[¶133]  
Olsen advises that his second argument, that the statute is 
unconstitutional, applies only if Wyoming is a nonweighing state.  Having determined 
that Wyoming is a weighing state, we will not further consider this issue.  However, Olsen 
submits two challenges to the instructions the jury received on mitigating 
circumstances, and we now turn to them.  

 

1.  Law of Mitigating 
Circumstances

 

[¶134]  
Olsen's sentencing jury was instructed to consider whether 
twenty-one specifically listed mitigating circumstances existed by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Although the existence of a number of these 
mitigating circumstances was unrefuted, and would reasonably be expected to have 
been considered in the jury's weighing process, the jury did not unanimously 
find that any of these specifically listed mitigating circumstances 
existed.  Olsen 
contends that improper instructions precluded the jury from considering relevant 
mitigating evidence in its consideration of an appropriate penalty.  The federal 
standard for determining whether jury instructions satisfy these principles is 
"whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 
challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant evidence."   Boyde v. 
California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1990).  To determine this issue, we apply our 
well-established standard of review:

 

[A] trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the 
general principles of law applicable to the case before it.  A trial court is 
given wide latitude in instructing the jury, and we will not find reversible 
error as long as the instructions given to the jury correctly state the law and 
adequately cover the relevant issues.  Baier v. State, 
891 P.2d 754, 756 
(Wyo.1995).

When determining whether the charge to the jury properly 
expressed the issues actually raised by the evidence, we look at the charge in 
its entirety, reading all of the instructions together. Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 663 (Wyo. 
1993); Baier, 891 P.2d  at 756; Hatheway v. State, 623 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 
1981).  Jury 
instructions should inform the jury about the applicable law so the jury may 
apply that law to its findings on the material factual issues. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 (Wyo. 
1997). "It is critical that instructions correctly articulate Wyoming law 
because it is from the instructions that a jury decides if someone is to be 
found guilty or not guilty."  Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 548 (Wyo. 
1990).

 

Brett v. State, 961 P.2d 385, 389 (Wyo. 1998).

 

"The general rule in reviewing questions involving 
instructions is that the trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the 
instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be found as 
long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire 
trial fairly and adequately cover the issues." Brown v. 
State, 817 P.2d 429, 438 
(Wyo.1991) (quoting Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 
1987)). The standard of review for a requested-but-refused jury instruction is 
established by Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo. 1990) 
and Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192 
(Wyo.1990).  
"The refusal to allow an instruction requested by the defendant when due 
process requires the defendant's instruction be given is reversible error per 
se."  Oien, 797 P.2d  at 549. "[A] defendant has the right to 
have instructions on his theory of the case or his theory of defense presented 
to the jury if the instructions sufficiently inform the jury of the theory or 
defense and if competent evidence exists which supports the law expressed in the 
instructions."  
Thom, 792 P.2d  at 195.  Evidence is 
competent if a reasonable jury would conclude that it supports the defendant's 
position, even if, in the opinion of the court, the evidence is weak, 
inconclusive, or unworthy of belief.  Goodman v. State, 
573 P.2d 400, 409 
(Wyo.1977). In determining whether evidence is competent to support an 
instruction on a defense theory of the case, evidence is to be viewed in a light 
favorable to the defendant and taken as true.   Chavez-Becerra 
v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67 
(Wyo.1996).

 

Swartz v. State, 971 P.2d 137, 140 (Wyo. 1998).  

 

[¶135]  
The specific instructions that Olsen challenges are 
Instruction No. 12, which instructed the jury that it "may consider whether a 
defendant has established the existence of any mitigating factors," and 
Instruction No. 13, which instructed that the jury "may consider any fact or 
circumstance of Martin Olsen's character or prior record or matter surrounding 
his offense which serves to mitigate his culpability."  Olsen challenges 
the discretionary language presented by the term "may," contending that the 
statutory language and constitutional principles require mandatory language such 
as "shall."  
The State contends that the mandatory consideration was apparent from 
Instruction No. 3 which defined a mitigating factor as "any aspect of a 
defendant's character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, which 
might indicate, or tend to indicate, that the defendant should not be sentenced 
to death;" Instruction No. 10 which instructed that if the jury found the 
existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, it "must 
consider any mitigating evidence;" and the verdict form which included 
instructions that the jury consider any mitigating factor that it unanimously or 
individually found to exist.  Olsen contends that the jury's failure to 
find any of the mitigating factors specifically listed on the verdict form 
despite the fact that each was established upon reasonable testimony, and many 
were unrefuted, or did not involve credibility, establishes the inadequacies of 
Instruction Nos. 12 and 13.  The State replies that the completed verdict 
form where the jury determined that no specifically listed mitigating factor was 
unanimously agreed upon, but individual jurors found some of the specifically 
listed factors and wrote in others, proves the jury understood the instructions 
and did consider the mitigating evidence and the mitigating circumstances 
proposed by Olsen.

 

[¶136]  
The State's response is similar to statements made by the 
Court in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 118 S. Ct. 757, 139 L.E.2d 702 (1998).  In Buchanan, the 
issue was whether the Eighth Amendment required States to instruct juries on the 
concept of mitigation or adopt specific standards for instructing juries on 
mitigating circumstances.  We disagree with the State that Buchanan resolves this issue, because, here, Olsen has 
presented the issue of whether, considering the jury instructions as a whole, 
the jury instructions properly complied with the Eighth Amendment requirement 
that the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to 
consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317-18, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2946-47, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989); Eddings, 
455 U.S.  at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77; Lockett, 438 U.S.  at 604-05, 98 S. Ct.  at 2964-65.  Additionally, 
Wyoming's death penalty statute specifies the process for consideration by a 
sentencing jury.  
The State tells us that process required by the statute for considering 
mitigating circumstances is

 

the distinction between mitigating evidence and mitigating 
circumstances must be noted.  Mitigating circumstances are aspects of a 
defendant's character or the crime which show, although he is qualified for the 
death penalty, that it should not be imposed. On the other hand, mitigating 
evidence is all relevant proof which a defendant might offer in an attempt to 
establish the existence of mitigating circumstances. In evaluating mitigating 
evidence, to determine whether mitigating circumstances exist, Wyoming juries 
are logically required to make two findings: 1) that the proposed character 
trait of the defendant or his crime has been proven to exist and 2) that those 
proven characteristics have mitigating value and reduce the defendant's 
culpability. Once a jury so determines that mitigating circumstances exist, it 
is then required to decide whether those circumstances are such that a death 
sentence is not appropriate.  

 

[¶137]  
Similarly, the Court has said that mitigating evidence is 
always relevant to the sentencer to determine the appropriate sentence.  A jury's unanimous 
decision that mitigating circumstances do not exist does not make the evidence 
irrelevant.  McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1232, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990).

 

The mitigating circumstances not unanimously found to be 
present by the jury did not become "irrelevant" to mitigation merely because one 
or more jurors either did not believe that the circumstance had been proved as a 
factual matter, or did not think that the circumstance, though proved, mitigated 
the offense.

 

Id. at 440-41, 110 S. Ct.  at 1232.  Imposing the death 
penalty must be "directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal 
defendant," and must "reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's 
background, character, and crime."  California v. 
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S. Ct. 837, 841, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).  Consequently, a 
judge's instructions during sentencing phase proceedings may not preclude the 
jury "from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."  Lockett, 438 U.S.  at 604, 98 S. Ct.  at 2964-65. "[I]t is 
not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the 
sentencer.  The 
sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in 
imposing sentence."  
Penry, 492 U.S.  at 319, 109 S. Ct.  at 
2947.

 

[¶138]  
It appears that the closest description of the process the 
State asserts the jury was to engage in is found in Instruction No. 14, which 
states in pertinent part:

 

After you have completed your findings as to the existence 
or absence of any aggravating or mitigating factors, you will then engage in a 
decision process.  
In determining whether a sentence of death is appropriate, all of you may 
consider any aggravating factors that you unanimously found to exist -- and each 
of you may consider any mitigating factors that you individually find to 
exist.

If you unanimously conclude that the aggravating factors 
found to exist are sufficient to justify a sentence of death, you may consider 
whether any mitigating factors exist before you impose a sentence of death.  Keep in mind, 
however, that regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and 
mitigating factors, you are never required to impose a death sentence. 

 

The precise statutory language concerning the jury's 
process of considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is:

 

(d) Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge 
shall give the jury appropriate instructions, including instructions as to any 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, . . . :

(i)After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall 
deliberate and render a sentence based upon the following:

(A) Whether one (1) or more aggravating circumstances 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt as set forth in subsection (h) of this 
section;

(B) Whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, mitigating 
circumstances exist as set forth in subsection (j) of this section; and

(C) The mere number of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances found shall have no independent significance.

(ii)Based upon the considerations in paragraph (i) of this 
subsection, the jury shall unanimously determine whether the defendant should be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment.  The jury shall consider aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist, and each individual juror 
may also consider any mitigating circumstances found by that juror to 
exist[.]

 

§ 6-2-102(d).  As can be seen, the instruction uses 
substantially the same wording as the statute; however, the trial court 
apparently attached no significance to the statutory phrase "the jury shall 
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances" and this phrase is noticeably 
absent from the instruction.  We realize that instructing the jury that it 
"shall" consider aggravating factors may confuse a jury or impermissibly suggest 
that a death penalty is required.  If the trial court's purpose  in using "may" as 
many times as it did in this instruction and in Instruction Nos. 12 and 13 was 
to convey to the jury that it was not required to impose the death penalty, we 
find that purpose served by the last sentence of Instruction No. 14.  

 

[¶139]  The statutory phrase "the jury shall consider aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances" is significant under Wyoming's death penalty 
statutory scheme.  
This phrase describes the process intended to distinguish between a 
penalty of life imprisonment and death.  Having unanimously found those aggravating 
circumstances that exist beyond a reasonable doubt and those mitigating 
circumstances that exist by a preponderance of the evidence, it is the jury's 
duty to engage in a process to determine which of the two penalties, life 
imprisonment or death, is justified and appropriate in a particular case.  That the statute 
intends this consideration to be a "mental balancing process," "a reasoned 
judgment," and a consideration of the "substantiality and persuasiveness" of all 
of the circumstances is clear from its prohibition that the mere numbers of each 
are not to be considered.  See People v. 
Brown, 726 P.2d 516, 532-33 (Cal. 1985) (citing State v. 
McDougall, 301 S.E.2d 308, 326 (N.C. 1983); State v. 
Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973); State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 
1982)).  
Olsen's proposed Jury Instruction No. 6 in part accurately describes the 
process intended by this phrase:

 

A consideration of circumstances and factors is a 
thoughtful process that is not totally objective, it requires each juror to 
respond in human terms to sentencing evidence in assessing the appropriate 
penalty for this defendant.  You must decide how compelling or persuasive 
the totality of the mitigating factors are when compared against the totality of 
the aggravating factors.  You cannot be governed or influenced by mere 
sentiment of passion or prejudice, however, you may consider mercy, and decline 
to impose the death penalty after a thoughtful consideration of this 
evidence.

 

After reviewing instructions from other states as well as 
Olsen's proposed instruction, we believe a more accurate instruction would 
be:

 

The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary 
scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them.  You are free to 
assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all 
of the various factors you are permitted to consider.  In weighing the 
various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is 
justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating 
circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.  In reaching a 
reasoned, moral judgment about which penalty is justified and appropriate, you 
must decide how compelling or persuasive the totality of the mitigating factors 
are when compared against the totality of the aggravating factors.  You cannot be 
governed or influenced by sentiment, passion or prejudice, however, you may 
consider mercy, and decline to impose the death penalty after a thoughtful 
consideration of the evidence.  To return a judgment of death, each of you 
must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of a 
life sentence.

 

See California Jury Instructions, Criminal §8.88 at 517-18 
(6th ed. 1996).

 

[¶140]  
In examining all of the other submitted jury instructions, 
we see that Olsen's jury received inconsistent instruction in the steps of the 
statutory process it is to engage in and no useful instruction in how it is to 
engage in this statutory process.  We recommend that the trial court instruct on 
the principles just set forth.  

 

[¶141]  
We also do not find that the jury was appropriately 
instructed on the definitions of "aggravating" and "mitigating."  In Instruction No. 
3, these terms are defined as:

An aggravating factor is a specified fact or circumstance 
which might indicate, or tend to indicate, that the defendant should be 
sentenced to death.  
A mitigating factor is any aspect of a defendant's character or 
background, or any circumstance of the offense which might indicate or tend to 
indicate that the defendant should not be sentenced to death.  

 

A more useful instruction would be:

 

An aggravating factor is a specified circumstance attending 
the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its 
injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the crime 
itself.  A 
mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does not justify 
or excuse the crime in question, but may be considered as an extenuating 
circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.

 

See California Jury Instructions, 
supra, at 517.

 

[¶142]  
We hold that the jury instructions about mitigating 
circumstances do not correctly state the law mandated by § 6-2-102(d), and this 
failure is reversible error.   Upon remand for resentencing, jury 
instructions should reflect the intended statutory process and clarify the 
jury's decision process in comparing the totality of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.

 

2.  Burden of Proof

 

[¶143]  
The statutory language mandates that the jury determine the 
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances before determining the 
appropriate punishment.11  The statute's language that aggravating 
circumstances be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigating circumstances 
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence references burdens assigned to 
factual issues.  
The Court has held that states are free to structure and shape 
consideration of mitigating evidence "in an effort to achieve a more rational 
and equitable administration of the death penalty." Boyde, 494 U.S.  at 377, 110 S. Ct.  at 1196.  The Court has also 
held that burdening the defendant with the preponderance of the evidence 
standard does not violate constitutional principles, so long as a state's burden 
to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances is not lessened.  Walton, 497 U.S.  at 649-50, 110 S. Ct.  at 3055.  Here, the statute 
does not expressly assign the burden to the defendant, and Olsen contends the 
district court erred in assigning the burden to him in jury 
instructions.

 

[¶144]  
The statute does not expressly read that it is the State 
which is to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances or that it is the 
defendant who is to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances; 
nevertheless, we assume that the legislature intended that the respective 
burdens be assigned to each.  Generally, the defendant is assigned the 
burden of coming forward with evidence in his behalf because he is in the best 
position to do so.  
Walton established that a statute which 
assigns the preponderance of the evidence standard to the defendant's mitigating 
evidence does not violate the constitution. We conclude that the legislature 
intended to assign those burdens as it would in the guilt phase.  The State bears the 
burden of proving an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
defendant has the burden of producing proof of mitigating circumstances as he 
would with an affirmative defense.12 

 

[¶145]  
In the next step outlined in § 6-2-102(d)(ii), the jury is 
to "consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances."  As previously 
determined, the legislature intended for the jury to engage in a statutory 
process of identifying the circumstances proved to exist and then deliberate 
whether the totality of the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison to the totality of mitigating circumstances as to warrant the death 
penalty.  This 
language can only be read to require that in the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial the burden of proof necessary for a verdict of death over life 
imprisonment is on the State.  See State v. 
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 
1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting State v. 
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1347-48 
(1977)).  If 
the jury is to be instructed to "weigh," the defendant must produce proof of 
mitigating circumstances; however, just as in affirmative defenses, the burden 
of negating this mitigating evidence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains 
with the State.  
Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Wyo. 
1998).  

 

3.  Failure to Instruct 
on Mitigating Circumstance of Duress

 

[¶146]  
In his seventh issue, Olsen contends that the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury that he was under extreme duress as 
permitted in § 6-2-102(j)(v) which states, "[t]he defendant acted under extreme 
duress or under the substantial domination of another person."  Olsen contends that 
Dr. Gummow testified on both direct and cross-examination that it was her 
opinion that Olsen was acting under duress at the time of the crimes.

 

When an instruction has been offered presenting the 
defendant's theory of the case, or defense, that instruction or a similar 
instruction must be presented to the jury if it is supported by competent 
evidence.  Stapleman [v. State], 680 
P.2d [73] at 75 [(Wyo. 1984)] (citing Goodman v. 
State, 573 P.2d 400, 408 
(Wyo.1977); Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127 
(Wyo.1970)).  
We look to the record to determine if competent evidence presented at 
trial required an instruction presenting the defendant's theory.  Stapleman, 680 P.2d  at 75.   In reviewing 
the record for competent evidence, we view the evidence in a light as favorable 
to the accused as is justifiable.  Id.; Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 95 
(Wyo.1988).  
The instruction must be given if a jury could reasonably conclude the 
evidence supports the defendant's position, even if the court deems the evidence 
to be weak or unworthy of belief.   Stagner v. 
State, 842 P.2d 520, 523 
(Wyo.1992).

 

Brett, 961 P.2d  at 389.  Because the law requires the trial court to 
accurately instruct the jury on the applicable law that is supported by 
evidence, Olsen asserts the failure to instruct his jury on this statutory 
mitigating circumstance was reversible error.  Dr. Gummow's testimony provided sufficient 
evidence to permit an instruction on this mitigating circumstance, and it was 
error to refuse the instruction.

 
4.  Adequacy of the 
Verdict Form

 

[¶147]  
Wyoming's death penalty statute imposes a process on the 
jury deliberations to permit consideration of the defendant's individuality and 
appellate review.  
It requires a verdict form stating the aggravating circumstances found to 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt, the mitigating circumstances found to exist by 
a preponderance of the evidence, and the ultimate sentence that should inform 
how the jury considered those existing circumstances. 

 

[¶148]  
In this case, the jury did not unanimously find that any 
mitigating circumstances existed by a preponderance of the evidence.  Our review of the 
evidence indicates that many of these mitigating circumstances were proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence and were uncontradicted by the State.  The purpose of 
mitigating evidence should be clear to a sentencing jury, namely, that this is 
the selection stage of the process ensuring the constitutionally required 
consideration of the individual characteristics of the defendant.  In the appellate 
review process, it must be apparent that the jury, through the verdict form, 
considered any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.  In the selection 
phase, the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse 
to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. The failure of 
this jury to unanimously find that any of these uncontradicted mitigating 
circumstances existed strongly indicates that when the the jury considered the 
evidence, it may have failed to consider those mitigating circumstances proved 
by a preponderance.  
Had the jury unanimously found the existence of the specifically listed 
mitigating circumstances set forth on the verdict form and still imposed the 
penalty of death, our appellate review could satisfactorily conclude that jury 
consideration occurred and appropriately determined death.

 

[¶149]  
In a previous argument, the State informed us that the 
statutory language of § 6-2-102(d) requires that the jury must engage in a 
two-step process when making its sentencing decision:  The jury must 
determine if the mitigating evidence supporting the mitigating circumstance has 
proved that circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence; and if so, it must 
then decide whether the proven mitigating circumstance requires sentencing the 
defendant to a life sentence, rather than to a death sentence.  We agree that these 
are the two questions posed; however, the format of this verdict form does not 
provide for a two-step decisionmaking process.  Parts I and II of the verdict form require 
the jury to mark each aggravating and mitigating circumstance found to exist and 
decide the first question.   Part III of the verdict form entitled 
"SENTENCE" states:

 

Instructions: Your verdict as to the appropriate sentence in this case 
shall be based on your findings, as set forth in Parts I and II of this verdict 
form.  With 
respect to aggravating factors, your deliberations are confined to those which 
you have marked with an "X" in Column "A" of Part I.  You may not impose 
the death penalty unless you have unanimously found that at least one 
aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  With respect to 
mitigating factors, you must consider those unanimously found to exist and 
marked with an "X" in Column "A" of Part II.

Each of you may also consider any mitigating circumstance 
which you individually found to exist, as indicted [sic] with an "X" in Column 
"C" of Part II.  
The mere number of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances found shall have no independent significance.  While your sentence 
should reflect your individual assessments as to the significance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances on this case, you must be unanimous in your 
decision to assess the death penalty.

VERDICT:

                                                                      
COUNT I

We, the jury, having been duly empaneled and sworn to try 
the above cause, and having made the above findings with respect to aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in accordance with the instructions of the court, 
do hereby impose the following as the appropriate sentence in this case: (Mark 
one)

______________________           
LIFE IMPRISONMENT

______________________           
DEATH PENALTY

                                                                          
****

 

Part III of the verdict form does not provide for 
consideration and determination of the second step of the decision-making 
process.  
According to the statutory language, and the State's earlier argument, 
after the jury determines the existence of aggravating circumstances and 
mitigating circumstances, the jury should be instructed to consider the totality 
of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating 
circumstances.   
If the jury finds that no aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the jury should find that the sentence is life 
imprisonment.  
If the jury finds that at least one aggravating circumstance has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but the mitigating circumstances outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances, the jury should find that the sentence is life 
imprisonment.  
If the jury finds that at least one aggravating circumstance has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the aggravating circumstance(s) 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the jury should find that the sentence is 
death.  The 
jury is never required to impose a sentence of death.

 

[¶150]  
The State has the burden of proving aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and a defendant has the burden of 
proving mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.  Jury instructions 
should properly describe the jury's decision-making process and properly reflect 
the State's burden of proof.  Equally important, an adequate verdict form 
should accurately reflect the State's burden of proving aggravating 
circumstances and rebutting mitigating circumstances.  Finally, the 
evidence supported a jury instruction on the mitigating circumstance of 
duress.  We 
conclude that Olsen's jury was not properly instructed on the law of mitigating 
circumstances as intended by Wyoming's death penalty statute.  We vacate the 
sentence of death and remand for a new sentencing hearing.  

 

E.  Role of Victim Impact and Mercy Plea Evidence 

 
1.  Admissibility of 
Victim Impact Evidence 

 

[¶151]  
Four months before trial, Olsen's counsel filed three 
motions addressing the subject of the prosecution's introduction of victim 
impact evidence, which is evidence relating to the personal characteristics of 
the victim and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2604, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991).  In the first motion, Olsen asked the court 
not to allow the introduction of such evidence.  He asserted that victim impact evidence is 
aggravating evidence which is not explicitly listed among and is not directly or 
indirectly related to the twelve aggravating circumstances enumerated in § 
6-2-102(h); the strict capital sentencing procedure set forth by the legislature 
in § 6-2-102 is binding on the sentencing authority (in this case, the jury); 
that procedure contains no explicit provision allowing the jury to consider any 
non-statutory aggravating circumstance; and admission of such evidence at the 
sentencing phase would violate his right to due process and fundamental fairness 
as guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution and Sections 6 and 10 of Article 1 of the Wyoming 
Constitution and would risk the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
sentence contrary to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Sections 14 and 15 of Article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution. 

 

[¶152]  
In the second motion, Olsen asked the court not to allow 
the introduction of victim impact evidence under the authority of Rule 32(c)(1) 
of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-101 
through 103, the general victim impact statutes, because they apply to victim 
impact evidence submitted to the court, when acting as the sentencing authority, 
not to the jury, as the sentencing authority as in this case, and because the 
procedural rule conflicts with § 6-2-102(h), the explicit capital sentencing 
procedure. 

 

[¶153]  
In the third motion, Olsen asked the court to review before 
trial all victim impact evidence that the prosecution intended to introduce at 
the capital sentencing proceeding in order to ensure that such evidence as the 
court might allow was within constitutional and statutory limitations, was of 
probative value, and was not out-weighed by its unfairly prejudicial or 
inflammatory nature.  

 

[¶154]  
In responses filed several months later, the prosecution 
asked the court to deny each of Olsen's three motions.  Relying on the Payne decision, the prosecution stated that Olsen's federal 
constitutional arguments were untenable, leaving for the court's determination 
only whether Wyoming law permitted the capital sentencing jury's consideration 
of victim impact evidence. Although the prosecution recognized that the specific 
question whether under Wyoming law victim impact evidence was admissible in the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial was one of first impression in Wyoming, the 
prosecution asserted that such evidence was likely admissible under the 
authority of § 6-2-102(c), a provision of the capital sentencing scheme, and § 
7-21-101 through 103, the general victim impact statute.13  In particular, the 
prosecution pointed to the first sentence of § 6-2-102(c), which 
reads:

 

             
The judge or jury shall hear evidence as to any 
matter that the court deems relevant to a determination of the sentence, and 
shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances enumerated in subsections (h) and (j) of this section.

 

(emphasis added.)  According to the prosecution's argument, the 
emphasized language in subsection (c) is sufficiently "open-ended" to allow the 
jury to consider evidence as to any matter in addition to the statutorily 
enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Thus, "any matter" 
arguably is broad enough to embrace the matter of victim impact, according to 
the prosecution. 

 

[¶155]  
A few days before the court's hearing on Olsen's three 
motions, Olsen submitted additional briefing in further support of his 
motions.  At 
the court's hearing on Olsen's three motions, the court heard further argument 
from Olsen's counsel and the prosecution on the question before ruling.  Ruling on the three 
motions, the court denied Olsen's two motions which sought to prevent the 
prosecution's introduction of victim impact evidence and granted Olsen's motion 
which sought the court's review of the evidence before its introduction.  Announcing its 
rulings, the court said:

 

            
The court had great concern concerning these motions dealing with the 
victim impact in this matter.  The court is cognizant of the Supreme Court 
case of Payne v. Tennessee, and has recognized that the trend appears to be that the 
decider of the penalty is entitled to certain evidence which should come for 
[sic] that body, be it the court or the jury for determination of whether the 
death penalty should or should not be imposed.

            
The court is concerned in this particular case absent of Wyoming statutes 
specifically requiring those kinds of things to be given to a jury in a death 
penalty case; however, it would appear that the trend in this country is that 
the decider should be entitled to have certain evidence before it.

            
In that regard pursuant to the holding in Payne v. Tennessee, the court is going to allow certain victim impact 
statements, but those are going to be limited.  That is 1) evidence about the victim and 2) 
about the impact of the murder on the victim's family which the court believes 
is relevant to the jury in this case.

            
The court will not allow any family members for characterization or 
opinions about the crime, or the Defendant, or the appropriate sentencing.  The court believes 
that those, of course, would violate the Defendant's right under the Eighth 
Amendment.

            
The court is also going to ask that these statements be in written form 
prior to testimony so that the court can have a judicial review of those items 
prior to the time such statements or testimony is given to a jury in the death 
penalty phase, if the case should go that far. 

 

[¶156]  After the guilt phase of the trial and before the start of 
the sentencing phase, Olsen's counsel renewed the objection to the prosecution's 
introduction of the victim impact evidence; the court allowed Olsen to have a 
continuing objection.  
Olsen also objected to having a witness read the victim impact statements 
before the jury, expressing the belief that such a reading would inject a factor 
of emotionalism into the proceeding.  Olsen's counsel requested that the court read 
the statements to the jury; the court denied that request, ruling that the 
victim who prepared the statement would read it.  Olsen's counsel requested, and the court 
granted, a continuing objection to the ruling.  

 

[¶157]  
During the State's case-in-chief in the sentencing phase, 
the prosecution introduced into evidence three victim impact statements.  Jan Rosenbach, 
director of the Victims of Violence Center in Worland, read to the jury the 
statements of Dolly Sorenson, victim Emma McCoid's mother, and June Marx, victim 
Arthur Taylor's ex-wife.  Beverly Baumstarck, mother of victim Kyle 
Baumstarck, read her statement to the jury. Copies of these statements are 
attached as Appendix B to this opinion.  The prosecution also introduced into 
evidence, over Olsen's objection, a photograph of each victim.  

 

[¶158]  
During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor 
commented on the matter of victim impact:

 

The harm, the circumstances of the crime, the immensity, 
the total enormity of the evil done here is incalculable.  I cannot put it 
into words, the rippled effect of what this man did.  He not only ruined 
this family, the Taylor family, he ruined, severely impacted, I'm not going to 
say ruined because they are tough people, he impacted the Baumstarck family, he 
impacted the McCoid family.  

 

During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor made a 
final comment on the matter of victim impact:

 

Kyle and Art and Emma were loved as well and loved back 
too.  They 
don't get to do that anymore. 

 

[¶159]  
Raising the victim impact issue on appeal, Olsen presents 
essentially the same arguments as he did below.  He contends that the trial court's ruling 
allowing the prosecution's introduction of victim impact evidence during the 
capital sentencing phase of the trial was erroneous for three reasons.  First, Payne did not automatically re-write Wyoming's death penalty 
statute to authorize the introduction of such evidence.  Payne held only that the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution did not bar such evidence if a state chose to authorize its 
introduction.  
In Payne's wake, the Wyoming legislature, unlike the legislatures of 
several states, did not amend the death penalty statute to explicitly authorize 
such evidence in the sentencing phase.  Second, the language used by the legislature 
in the death penalty statute and the historical development of that statute 
demonstrate that such evidence must play no part in the sentencing phase of a 
capital case.  
And, third, neither Wyoming's general victim impact statute, § 7-21-101 
through 103, nor the case law interpreting it authorize such evidence for 
capital sentencing purposes.  

 

[¶160]  
The State counters Olsen's position with essentially the 
same arguments it presented below.  The State agrees with Olsen that Payne left it to a state to determine whether to authorize such 
evidence in the sentencing phase.  The State claims, however, that Payne never indicated that a state had to make that 
determination by way of a statute.  According to the State, that determination 
could be accomplished by either legislation, court rule, or judicial 
decision.  The 
State claims that, in Payne's wake, the Wyoming legislature did not have to amend the 
pertinent statutes to explicitly authorize such evidence.  Explaining this 
claim, the State reasons:  in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987), the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred victim impact evidence 
in the sentencing phase of a capital case; before the Court overruled Booth in Payne in 1991, the Wyoming legislature enacted the present 
versions of Wyoming's death penalty statute and general victim impact statute; 
when the legislature enacted these statutes, it is presumed to have known that 
Booth barred victim impact evidence and, therefore, the reach of 
these statutes was constitutionally limited; in 1991, when Payne overruled Booth, the constitutional limitation on the reach of those 
statutes was removed; therefore, only if the legislature had intended to codify 
the Booth limitation in the wake of Payne would the legislature have to amend these 
statutes.

 

[¶161]  
The State contends also that, in light of dicta in 
Payne that victim impact is a matter relevant to the capital 
sentencing authority's determination of the punishment to be imposed, language 
in a subsection of Wyoming's death penalty statute, § 6-2-102(c), can be read to 
authorize the sentencing authority's consideration of victim impact in 
determining punishment.  The first sentence of § 6-2-102(c) reads 
(emphasis added):

 

            
The judge or jury shall hear evidence as to any 
matter that the court deems relevant to a determination of the sentence, and 
shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances enumerated in subsections (h) and (j) of this section.

 

[¶162]  
The State contends that the emphasized language in 
subsection (c) authorizes a trial court in any given capital case to decide what 
"matters," in addition to "matters relating to any of the" explicitly 
statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances, are deemed 
relevant to a determination of the punishment.  Further, the State implicitly contends that a 
trial court in any given capital case could decide, as the justices in the 
Payne majority did, that victim impact is just such a "matter" 
relevant to the punishment determination and allow evidence as to that "matter" 
to be introduced.

 

[¶163]  Taking another tack, the State also claims that the import 
of Wyoming's general victim impact statute, § 7-2-101 through 103, is that 
victim impact testimony is relevant to any sentencing decision and must be 
considered in a capital case when the sentencing decision is committed to the 
trial court instead of a jury.

 

[¶164]  
We have carefully reviewed and considered the trial court's 
decision and the parties' respective arguments.  As shall be explained, we hold that existing 
Wyoming law does not authorize the introduction of evidence of victim impact 
during the sentencing phase of a capital case.

 

[¶165]  
We have previously identified the division of the 
government's powers among the three departments in the criminal law area.  Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 415 (Wyo. 1990).  In Billis, we recognized that "[i]n its exercise of the legislative 
power, the legislative department has the exclusive power to determine and 
declare what acts shall constitute crimes and to prescribe punishments for those 
crimes." Id.  
In Booth, the Court held that Maryland's statute explicitly 
authorizing the admissibility of victim impact statements in the capital 
sentencing phase violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  
Booth, 482 U.S.  at 509, 107 S. Ct.  at 2536.  The dissenting 
justices, who four years later would be among the majority in Payne, wrote that the legislature's judgment to allow a capital 
sentencing jury to consider victim impact evidence

 

is entitled to particular deference; determinations of 
appropriate sentencing considerations are peculiarly questions of legislative 
policy, . . . and the Court should recognize that in a democratic society 
legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and 
consequently the moral values of the people. 

 

Id. at 515, 107 S. Ct.  at 2539 (White, J., dissenting, joined 
by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, and Scalia, J.J.) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).

 

[¶166]  
In Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
observed that "Congress and most of the States have, in recent years, enacted 
similar legislation to enable the sentencing authority to consider information 
about the harm caused by the crime committed by the defendant."  Payne, 501 U.S.  at 821, 111 S. Ct.  at 2606.  In her concurring 
opinion in Payne, Justice O'Connor likewise noted that "[m]ost States have 
enacted legislation enabling judges and juries to consider victim impact 
evidence."  
Id. at 831, 111 S. Ct.  at 2612 (White and Kennedy, J.J., 
joining).  
Similarly, Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in that case stated 
that the Eighth Amendment "permits the people to decide (within the limits of 
other constitutional guarantees) what is a crime and what constitutes 
aggravation and mitigation of a crime."  Id. at 833, 111 S. Ct.  at 2613 (O'Connor and Kennedy, J.J., 
joining).  
Interestingly, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion may lead one to 
conclude that the Payne majority had characterized victim impact evidence as 
"relevant aggravating evidence."  Id. ("The Court correctly observes the injustice of requiring 
the exclusion of relevant aggravating evidence during capital sentencing, while 
requiring the admission of all relevant mitigating evidence.")

 

[¶167]  
In light of the above and foregoing recognition that 
determinations of appropriate sentencing considerations are "peculiarly 
questions of legislative policy," we must reject the State's presumption that a 
determination whether victim impact evidence should be permitted in capital 
sentencing proceedings could be accomplished by means other than legislative 
enactment.  We 
reject the presumption that such a determination may be accomplished through 
court rule or judicial decision.  If the long march of death penalty 
jurisprudence means anything, it is that it is the legislature's obligation to 
carefully structure a statutory procedure which achieves the twin goals of 
individualized sentencing and channeled discretion in the sentencing authority 
and which avoids arbitrary and capricious action by that sentencing 
authority.  
Obviously, at the heart of that statutory procedure lies those matters 
which are deemed relevant to a determination of the sentence.  Those matters can 
only be identified and authorized by the legislative representatives of the 
people, not by the courts.

 

[¶168]  
We turn now to the question whether the Wyoming legislature 
in either the death penalty statute or the general victim impact statute has 
made a determination that victim impact is a matter relevant to a determination 
of the sentence of death or life imprisonment.  As we begin our analysis of this question, we 
must keep in mind several well-recognized imperatives.  We begin with the 
recognition so well expressed by Justice Stewart thirty years ago:

 

The penalty of death differs from all other forms of 
criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.  It is unique in its total 
irrevocability.  
It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic 
purpose of criminal justice.  And it is unique, finally, in its absolute 
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.

 

Furman, 408 U.S.  at 306, 92 S. Ct.  at 2760 (Stewart, J., 
concurring).  
Another well-recognized imperative is that we strictly construe penal 
statutes.  
Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 224 (Wyo. 1997).  Penal statutes "cannot be enlarged by 
implication or extended by inference or construction."  Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271, 1284 (Wyo. 1995).  "[A]mbiguity in a criminal statute should be 
resolved in favor of lenity."  ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 310 (Wyo. 1992).  We also recognize the presumption that 

 

the legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of 
existing law and with reference to other statutes and decisions of the 
courts.  Such 
legislation should, therefore, be construed in a way that creates a consistency 
and harmony within the existing law.

 

Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wyo. 1984).  Moreover, we have recognized that where a 
general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, precedence is 
given to the terms of the more specific statute.  Id. at 1153 (quoting Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S. Ct. 909, 914, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1978)).  

 

[¶169]  
With these several imperatives in mind, we now look at both 
the capital sentencing statute, § 6-2-102, and the general victim impact 
statement statutes, § 7-21-101 through 103.  The capital sentencing statute has been the 
law in substantially the same form since 1977.  1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws  ch. 122, § 1; 1982 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 75, § 3; 1983 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 1; 1989 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 171, § 1; and 1999 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 134, § 1; 2001 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 96, § 2, ch. 98, § 1.  More pertinently, the particular broad 
language in the first sentence of § 6-2-102(c) upon which the State relies 
appeared in the statute in 1977 and has remained there ever since.  On the other hand, 
the general victim impact statement statute became law in 1990.  1990 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 112, § 1.  
The Wyoming legislature enacted the general victim impact statement 
statute with full knowledge of the existing capital sentencing statute and the 
Booth decision of 1987 which had held victim impact evidence 
inadmissible in capital sentencing.  Although the victim impact statement is the 
specific subject of the general victim impact statement statute, the capital 
sentencing statute addresses the specific subject of the capital sentencing 
procedure which differs in kind from all other forms of criminal punishment; 
that penalty is truly unique.  The general victim impact statement statute 
does contain language which suggests it may be applicable in a death penalty 
case.  In that 
regard, the word "crime" in the statute carries the broad definition of a 
felony, i.e., "crimes which may be punished by death or by imprisonment 
for more than one (1) year."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-101(a)(i) (Michie 
1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-101 (Michie 1997).  Further, the word "victim" includes "a family 
member of . . .  
a homicide victim."  § 7-21-101(a)(iii).  This language 
notwithstanding, the statute also contains other language which suggests the 
statute applies only in non-capital sentencing cases.  In that regard, a 
crime victim submits the written statement to the department of corrections and 
the statement is appended to the defendant's presentence report.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-21-103(a)(ii) (Michie 1997); in capital sentencing, however, there is no 
presentence report.  
Instead, there is a full blown trial before the sentencing authority, at 
the conclusion of which the range of sentencing options is extremely 
narrow:  life 
imprisonment or death.  Further, the statement "submitted to the 
court . . . shall be among the factors considered by the 
court in determining the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant . . . 
."  § 
7-21-103(b) (emphasis added).  In capital sentencing, however, a jury, not a 
court, may be the sentencing authority, as in the instant case.  § 6-2-102(b), (c), 
(d), and (e).  

 

[¶170]  
In the final analysis, we must conclude that the general 
victim impact statement statute is inapplicable to a capital sentencing 
case.  The 
legislature has seen fit to set forth the capital sentencing procedure in a 
specific statute, recognizing that the imposition of the death penalty is unique 
and differs in kind from all other forms of punishment.  That specific 
statute is comprehensive in the detailed procedures that must be carefully 
followed and in those special considerations which the sentencing authority, 
whether judge or jury, must take into account in determining the sentence.  The general statute 
must give way to the special.

 

[¶171]  
We now turn to that special capital sentencing statute to 
see whether the legislature has there made a decision that victim impact is a 
matter relevant to a determination of the sentence of death or life 
imprisonment.  
As previously noted, the State relies on the first sentence of § 
6-2-102(c) as the authority for the sentencing authority's consideration of 
victim impact in determining punishment in a capital case.  That sentence 
reads:

 

           
The judge or jury shall hear evidence as to any 
matter that the court deems relevant to a determination of the sentence, and 
shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances enumerated in subsections (h) and (j) of this section.

 

§ 6-2-102(c) (emphasis added).  As noted a few 
lines ago, the emphasized language has been in the statute since 1977, long 
before "victim impact" evidence made its appearance in United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  
Such evidence "was still unheard of when Lockett was decided."  Payne, 501 U.S.  at 858, 111 S. Ct.  at 2626 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (as Justice Stevens recognized, "this type of evidence made its 
first appearance [in Supreme Court jurisprudence] in 1987 in Booth . . . .").  In Wyoming jurisprudence, victim impact 
evidence made its first appearance in 1990 in the general victim impact 
statement statute discussed previously.  Thus, from a historical perspective, we 
cannot accept the notion that the legislature in 1977 intended the emphasized 
language on which the State relies to carry the concept of victim impact.  

 

[¶172]  
Obviously, the words "victim impact" are missing from the 
statutory provision.  
Instead, we have only the "empty-vessel" words "any matter that the court 
deems relevant to a determination of the sentence."  The State's 
proposition is that, by using these "empty-vessel" words, the legislature 
intended for trial court judges to exercise discretion from one capital case to 
another as to what "matter" would fill the vessel.  It might be "victim 
impact" one day and some other "matter" the next.  But, as we know from experience, trial court 
judges might differ from court to court and from capital case to capital case in 
their respective relevancy determinations.  For example, not all judges agree that victim 
impact is relevant to a determination of the sentence in a capital case.  Booth and Payne were not unanimous decisions.  In State v. Carter, 888 P.3d 629, 651-53 (Utah 1995), the Utah justices held that victim impact evidence 
was neither relevant nor of probative force in capital sentencing.  In Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130, 145-47 (Pa. 1996), guided by the 
fundamental principle of statutory construction that penal provisions must be 
strictly construed, the Pennsylvania justices held that "[t]he imposition of 
capital punishment may not rest on a mere supposition that the Legislature 
intended victim impact evidence to be considered by a jury, but only upon the 
clear and unambiguous language of the death penalty statute." Id. at 146. The possibility of differing relevancy 
determinations on the most important decision we as a law-abiding society call 
upon courts and juries to make runs against the grain of the goal of channeled 
exercise of discretion in death penalty sentencing.

 

[¶173]  
Moreover, the State would have us read § 102(c) in 
isolation from other provisions of the death penalty statute.  This we may not 
do.  Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 564 (Wyo. 2000); Demeulenaere v. State, 995 P.2d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2000).  We must read every subsection of a statute in 
context of all others in order to ascertain the meaning of the whole 
statute.  
Keller v. Merrick, 955 P.2d 876, 879 (Wyo. 1998).  General provisions and specific provisions in 
a statute should stand together, if possible; but a specific provision in 
conflict with a general provision in another part of a statute must govern, 
unless the statute as a whole clearly shows a contrary intention, and must be 
given effect, even though the general provision is sufficiently broad to include 
the subject to which the specific provision relates.  Edelman v. Edelman, 68 Wyo. 30, 48-49, 228 P.2d 408, 414 
(1951).  
Section 102(c) may not be read in isolation from § 102(d)(i) and (ii) 
which specifically command that the jury shall render a sentence based upon only 
the existence of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, with no 
mention of "any other matter that the court deems relevant to a determination of 
the sentence."  
Thus, § 102(d)(i) and (ii) are specific about the basis of the sentence 
and must be given effect over § 102(c)'s generality, even though the latter 
provision is broad enough to include the subject of the basis of the sentencing 
authority's determination of the sentence.  Had the legislature intended to include "any 
matter the court deemed relevant to a determination of the sentence" as a basis 
for the sentence determination, it easily could have included such language 
within § 102(d)(i) and (ii).  The American Law Institute did just that in § 
210.6(2) of its proposed official draft in 1962:

 

            
In the [capital sentencing] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to 
any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. 
. . .

* * * *

            
The Court, in exercising its discretion as to sentence, and the jury, in determining upon its verdict, shall take into 
account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in 
Subsections (3) and (4) and any other facts that it 
deems relevant . . . .

 

Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962, and 
changes of July 30, 1962) (emphasis added) (as quoted in the appendix to 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 222-224, 91 S. Ct. 1454, 1475, 28 L. Ed 2d 711 (1971)).

 

[¶174]  
It is interesting that, in the aftermath of Payne, a number of state legislatures amended their capital 
sentencing statutes to explicitly authorize the admission of victim impact 
evidence.14  For example, as noted in Commonweath v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania legislature amended its statute to read 
in pertinent part:

 

(2) In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the 
victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the 
victim is admissible.  
Additionally, evidence may be presented as to any other matter that the 
court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be 
imposed.  
Evidence shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances specified in subsections (d) and (e), and information 
concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the 
family of the victim.  
Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be limited to those 
circumstances specified in subsection (d).

 

42 Pa. C.S.A. §9711(a)(2) (enacted October 11, 1995, to be 
effective sixty days thereafter) (as quoted in Fisher, 681 A.2d  at 149 n.2) (Cappy, J., concurring).  The Florida 
legislature likewise amended its capital sentencing statute in 1992 by adding a 
subsection, which reads:

 

Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence 
of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the 
prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence.  Such evidence shall 
be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being 
and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death.  Characterizations 
and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall 
not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence.

 

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(7) (West 2001).  Even the United 
States Congress made victim impact evidence a subject of statute, as 18 U.S.C. 
3593(a) provides that in a death penalty case the prosecution shall give notice 
that it is seeking a death sentence based upon certain aggravating factors which 

 

may include factors concerning the effect of the offense on 
the victim and the victim's family, and may include oral testimony, a victim 
impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and 
scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and 
any other relevant information.

 

18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (Lexis 2001).  The federal statute 
goes on to provide that 

 

[a]t the sentencing hearing, information may be presented 
as to any matter relevant to the sentence . . . . The government may present any 
information relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided 
under subsection (a).

 

Id.  
(In United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1491 (D. Colo. 1996), Chief Judge 
Richard Matsch said of victim impact evidence that it "is the most problematic 
of all of the aggravating factors and may present the greatest difficulty in 
determining the nature and scope of the information' to be considered.  Congress expressly 
provided for victim impact consideration in the Death Penalty Statute but it did 
not put any limits on what can be considered.")  See also United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 817 (4th Cir. 2000) (The 
Federal Death Penalty Act allows victim impact evidence as a non-statutory 
aggravating factor.)  
In the final analysis, we must conclude that the Wyoming Legislature has 
not made the decision in § 102(c) that victim impact is a matter relevant to a 
determination of the sentence of life imprisonment or death.  

 

[¶175]  
Because the Wyoming Legislature has not provided in either 
§ 7-21-101 through 103 or § 6-2-102(c) that victim impact is a matter relevant 
to a determination of the sentence in the sentencing phase of a capital case, we 
hold that the trial court erred in its ruling which allowed the prosecution to 
introduce victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of this capital 
case.

 

[¶176]  
In Harlow, decided today, after holding that the trial court had 
erred in admitting victim impact evidence, we undertook a harmless error 
analysis.  
Harlow, 2003 WY 
47, ¶43. We noted the discussion in Grossman v. Florida, 525 So. 2d 833, 842-45 (Fla. 1988) on the question whether 
the erroneous introduction of victim impact evidence is subject to harmless 
error analysis. Id. We believe that discussion is sound and agree with the 
Florida Court's conclusion that harmless error analysis on a case-by-case basis 
is appropriate.  
In the instant case, however, that analysis is unnecessary because we are 
reversing and remanding for re-sentencing based on other errors.  At that 
re-sentencing trial, victim impact evidence shall be inadmissible.

 

[¶177]  
Olsen planned to have four witnesses testify about their 
knowledge of his character and their belief that a sentence of life imprisonment 
was appropriate.  
Two were friends from the Marines, one of whom is now a police officer, 
the others, his biological father and his adoptive father.  After a hearing was 
held on the State's motion in limine to preclude pleas for Olsen's life by his 
family, friends or associates, the trial court ruled it would allow one witness, 
presumably his mother, to make a plea for his life.  Olsen's mother 
testified and identified various photos of him as a child and a mother's day 
gift that he had given her as a child.  In concluding her testimony, defense counsel 
asked her, "Do you want Marty to die?" She responded, "No.  I think we've 
suffered enough."

 

[¶178]  
Olsen contends the trial court erred in precluding relevant 
mitigating evidence about his character by other witnesses.  He asserts that his 
witnesses' opinion of the appropriate punishment for him in light of their 
unique knowledge of his character is relevant mitigating evidence.  The State contends 
that a plea for a capital defendant's life is not admissible evidence because it 
does not pertain to that defendant's background, character, record, or the 
specific circumstances of the offense.

 

[¶179]  
To be constitutional, a capital sentencing scheme must 
allow the sentencing authority to consider any relevant mitigating evidence 
regarding the defendant's character and background and the circumstances of the 
offense.  Boyde, 494 U.S.  at 377, 110 S. Ct.  at 1196.  Wyoming's statute 
defines a number of mitigating circumstances and includes a "catch-all" 
mitigating circumstances category permitting "[a]ny other fact or circumstance 
of the defendant's character or prior record or matter surrounding his offense 
which serves to mitigate his culpability." § 6-2-102(j)(viii).  The plain language 
of this subsection indicates that this list is only a guide and not exclusive, 
signifying that in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial the trial court 
has broad discretion to allow any evidence relevant to mitigating circumstances, 
and that, generally, a trial court will be within its discretion in admitting 
all mitigating evidence relating to the individual defendant.  

 

[¶180]  
Character is generally considered the sum of those 
attributes and features that make up and distinguish an individual.  Merriam Websters 
Collegiate Dictionary 191 (10th ed. 2000).  The question before 
us is whether a witness's opinion as to whether the defendant should receive the 
death penalty is relevant mitigating evidence of the defendant's character.  Olsen does not 
provide direct authority on the issue, and we found only two decisions 
addressing the issue.  
In State v. Moore, 585 A.2d 864, 894 (N.J. 
1991), that court determined that 

 

[a] witness's opinion on what punishment is appropriate 
reveals only the witness's own state of mind.  It cannot reveal defendant's character beyond 
whatever may be inferred from admitted testimony on the witness's love for 
him.

 

That decision recognized, however, that although a trial 
court has the discretion to exclude a witness's opinion on an appropriate 
punishment,

 

it is uniquely natural and human for some witnesses, 
especially close family members, to wish to plead for mercy.  Given the 
impermissible inferences that might arise if a close relative did not plead for mercy while testifying, it was within the 
trial court's discretion to permit the testimony of one such as defendant's 
mother, as long as it was not cumulative.

 

Id.  Georgia approaches the issue differently and applies the 
following rule:

 

although a defendant may present witnesses who know and 
care for him and are willing on that basis to ask for mercy on his behalf, a 
defendant may not present witnesses to testify merely to their religious or 
philosophical attitudes about the death penalty.  Nor is a defendant entitled to present the 
opinion of a witness about what verdict the jury "ought" to reach.

 

Childs v. State, 357 S.E.2d 48, 60 (Ga. 1987) (citations omitted); State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 318 (S.C. 1991); see also Barnes v. State, 496 S.E.2d 674, 688-89 (Ga. 
1998).

 

[¶181]  
By limiting mitigating evidence to that which is relevant 
to a defendant's character, it appears that Wyoming's statute intended to 
prohibit pleas for the defendant's life, pleas for mercy, and a witness's 
opinion about the appropriate sentence.  Like victim impact evidence, such pleas and 
opinion are not evidence relevant under Wyoming's death penalty statutory 
scheme.  
However, we agree with the New Jersey court that, where a trial court 
determines that impermissible inferences would arise if family or friends were 
not to make a plea for mercy, it should permit the testimony unless unduly 
cumulative under the constitutional rule that evidence must not unfairly 
prejudice the defendant in a death penalty proceeding.  Gregg, 428 U.S.  at 204, 96 S. Ct.  at 2939.  In this case, Olsen 
contends that limiting his witnessess' testimony did prejudice him, and although 
it does not appear that permitting all four witnesses to make pleas based upon 
their unique experiences would have been unduly cumulative, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in limiting Olsen to his mother's testimony.  

 

[¶182]  
Denying a defendant's request to present pleas for mercy 
must be distinguished from the role of mercy in a death penalty proceeding.  The United States 
Supreme Court has long recognized that the purpose of a sentencing jury's 
consideration of mitigating circumstances is not to justify or excuse, but to 
grant discretion to consider those circumstances which in fairness or mercy may 
be considered as extenuating or reducing a defendant's degree of moral 
culpability or blameworthiness.  California v. 
Brown, 479 U.S.  at 542-43, 107 S. Ct.  at 840.    In California v. Brown, the Court decided that instructing 
the jury not to be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" did not inhibit the jury's 
consideration of mercy or sympathy based upon the evidence produced during the 
sentencing phase.  
Id.  The task for a trial court is to "determine 
whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and considered in combination 
with the prosecutor's closing argument, adequately informed the jury of its 
responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence introduced by the 
respondent." Id. at 546, 107 S. Ct.  at 841-42 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).   The task of appellate review is to 
ensure a reliable decision has resulted.  Id. at 543, 107 S. Ct.  at 840. 

 

 F.  Jury Instructions

 

[¶183]  
In pretrial rulings, the trial court ruled that the State 
was not entitled to a mental and/or medical examination to rebut mitigating 
evidence and the trial court would issue an instruction to cure any comment on 
Olsen's right to silence. During the motion hearing, Olsen objected to the 
proposed instruction on the grounds that the instruction itself was an improper 
comment on the right to silence. The jury was 
instructed:

 

The law does not allow the State a psychological or 
psychiatric evaluation of the Defendant. 

 

[¶184]  
On appeal, Olsen renews his contention that the instruction 
was an improper comment on his right to silence and served to impeach the 
credibility of the defense experts in violation of Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 
1995).  The 
State contends that the instruction was not a comment on the right to silence 
but intended to serve the purpose of eliminating the possibility that the jury 
would attribute to Olsen the failure of the State's experts to conduct an 
examination to Olsen.  

 

[¶185]  
A line of United States Supreme Court cases has held that a 
capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination 
precludes the State from subjecting him to a psychiatric examination concerning 
future dangerousness without first informing the defendant that he has a right 
to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him at a 
sentencing proceeding.  Ochoa v. State, 
848 P.2d 1359, 1365 (Wyo. 
1993); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 681, 109 S. Ct. 3146, 3147-48, 106 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989) (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 461-69, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 1872-76, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981)); see 
also Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988).  The United States Supreme Court has found a 
violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this same 
situation. Ochoa, 848 P.2d  at 1365; Powell, 492 U.S.  at 681, 109 S. Ct.  at 3148.  The questioned 
instruction correctly states the law in a limited fashion, and we presume that 
the trial court's intent in informing the jury of the law was to protect against 
the jury's drawing improper inferences.

 

[¶186]  
We do not agree with Olsen's contention that the 
instruction violates Tortolito's prohibition against 
using the constitutional right of silence as evidence of guilt.  Olsen's guilt had 
been adjudicated, and this sentencing instruction did not reference his silence 
or imply that a State examination would have revealed evidence contrary to that 
provided by the defense's experts.  We find no error.

 

2.  Consideration of 
Counsel's Argument in Sentencing Decision

 

[¶187]  
In Instruction No. 21, the trial court instructed the jury 
to consider argument from counsel in reaching its decision.  Olsen contends that 
this court has held that argument from counsel is not evidence and error 
occurred in instructing the jury.  Apparently, the jury instruction conference 
was not recorded and objections to instructions were placed on the record after 
conclusion of the conference.  Both parties agree that this issue must be 
reviewed under plain error.  

 

[¶188]  
Instruction No. 21 states:

 

Both the defendant and the State may present argument as to 
the significance of any factors and or evidence presented in the trial or 
sentencing phase.  
You may consider said arguments in reaching a reasoned decision as to 
finding whether an aggravating factor or mitigating factor exists or in the 
significance attached to said mitigating or aggravating factor. 

 

The State contends that this instruction is not plain error 
because it does not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  In the State's 
view, the entire purpose of closing argument is to explain the evidence and to 
offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence.  Considering the 
instructions as a whole, the jury was instructed several times not to consider 
argument as evidence, and in the State's opinion, this remedied any error and cleared up any confusion that may have 
existed in the jurors' minds.  We agree with the State's position that 
giving this instruction did not create reversible error.  

 

3. Instruction in Response to Jury 
Question About Parole

 

[¶189]  
After a short time deliberating during the sentencing 
phase, the jury sent a note to the court asking:  

 

If sentenced to three life terms would the Defendant ever 
have a chance for parole for any possible reason or reasons? 

 

Despite defense counsel's objections, the district court 
answered this question with this supplemental instruction:  

 

Under the laws of the State of Wyoming, the governor has 
the power to grant reprieves, commutation and pardons after conviction for all 
offenses except treason and cases of 
impeachment.  
This means that the governor has the power to commute each life sentence 
to a term of years.  
If the governor were to commute each life sentence to a term of years 
then and only then could the parole board consider the possibility of parole for 
the person serving the life sentence.

 

Olsen contends that his due process rights under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the court committed two errors by 
submitting this instruction: 1) the response to the question placed information 
before the jury which he had no opportunity to explain or deny; and 2) it failed 
to inform the jury that an inmate serving a life sentence is ineligible for 
parole under Wyoming law.  In pretrial motions and instructions, the 
defense had proposed instructing the jury that Olsen could not be paroled while 
serving a life sentence.  The State contends that the trial court did 
instruct the jury that a person could not be paroled from a life sentence in 
this instruction when it stated "[i]f the governor were to commute each life 
sentence to a term of years."  

 

[¶190]  
A defendant is sentenced either "to death or life 
imprisonment" under § 6-2-102(a).  Before 1996, § 7-13-402(a) read:     

    

§ 7-13-402. General powers and duties of board; eligibility 
for parole; immunity.

(a) The board may grant a parole to any person imprisoned 
in any institution under sentence, except a life 
sentence, ordered by any district court of this state, provided the person 
has served the minimum term pronounced by the trial court less good time, if 
any, granted under rules promulgated pursuant to W.S. 7-13-420.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a) (Michie 1995) (emphasis 
added).  In 
1994, the Wyoming Constitution was amended to read:

 

Notwithstanding Article 4, Section 5 of this Constitution, 
the legislature may by law create a penalty of life imprisonment without parole 
for specified crimes which sentence shall not be subject to commutation by the 
governor.  The 
legislature may in addition limit commutation of a death sentence to a sentence 
of life imprisonment without parole which sentence shall not be subject to 
further commutation.  
In no event shall the inherent power of the governor to grant a pardon be 
limited or curtailed.

 

Wyo. Const. Art. 3, § 53.  In 1996, the Legislature created § 6-10-301 
stating:

§ 6-10-301. Life imprisonment without parole.

(a) Pursuant to article 3, section 53 of the Wyoming 
constitution, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is created for 
specified crimes designated in the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982.

(b) A person sentenced to life imprisonment without parole 
shall not be eligible for parole and shall remain imprisoned under the 
jurisdiction of the department of corrections during the remainder of his life 
unless pardoned by the governor.

(c) A sentence specifically designated as a sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole is not subject to commutation by the 
governor.  A sentence of life or life imprisonment which is not 
specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is 
subject to commutation by the governor.  A person sentenced to life or life 
imprisonment is not eligible for parole unless the governor has commuted the 
person's sentence to a term of years.

 

1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws. ch. 73, § 1 (emphasis 
added).

 

[¶191]  
Section 7-13-402(a) was amended from "except a life 
sentence" to "except a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a life 
sentence . . . ."  
1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws. ch. 73, § 2.  At the time of the crime, the only statutes 
imposing "life imprisonment without parole" were the sexual assault statute, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306(d) (LexisNexis 2001), and the indecent liberties with 
a minor statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(b) (LexisNexis 2001).15

 

[¶192]  
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not 
unconstitutional for a court to tell the jury about the possibility of executive 
clemency.  California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1009, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3457, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1171, 1186 (1983).  Despite the State's assurance that this 
instruction does inform the jury that Olsen would not be eligible for parole, it 
does not.  It 
explains executive clemency to them, but we agree with Olsen that the 
instruction is insufficient under Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994), because it did not inform the jury of Olsen's 
immediate statutory ineligibility for parole.  Id. at 171, 114 S. Ct.  at 2197-98.  

 

[¶193]  
Just as in Olsen's case, future dangerousness was an issue 
in Simmons; however, the trial court refused to 
instruct the jury that defendant was statutorily ineligible for parole should it 
elect to impose a life term in prison rather than the death penalty.  The plurality 
opinion reversing the judgment observed that "[t]he Due Process Clause does not 
allow the execution of a person on the basis of information which he had no 
opportunity to deny or explain.'"  Id. at 161, 114 S. Ct.  at 2192.  
It held that in a capital penalty trial, when the prosecution puts the 
issue of defendant's future dangerousness in issue and the defendant is legally 
ineligible for parole, it is a denial of due process to reject the defendant's 
request to instruct the jury on a natural question raised by the issue of future 
dangerousness, that is, whether defendant is legally eligible for parole should 
the jury elect to impose a term of life in prison.  Id. at 168-69, 114 S. Ct.  at 2196.  Justice O'Connor, 
writing for herself and two other justices, concurred in the judgment, 
indicating that in a case of statutory ineligibility for parole, when future 
dangerousness had been put in issue, due process requires that the jury be 
informed, either through argument or instruction, of the defendant's statutory 
ineligibility for parole.  Id. at 
2200-01.

 

[¶194]  
Accordingly, Olsen's jury should have been instructed that, 
under the statute, a sentence of life imprisonment means that he would not be 
eligible for parole.  

 

G.  Sentencing Phase Jurors

 

[¶195]  
Olsen makes three separate claims relating to the jury that 
determined his sentence.  Before trial, the trial court denied motions 
to allow a second jury to be impaneled for the sentencing phase of the trial or, 
in the alternative, to conduct voir dire before beginning the sentencing 
phase.  Olsen 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion as good cause existed to 
grant the motions.  
After the guilt phase, and after one day into the sentencing phase, a 
juror was excused and replaced with an alternate for the sentencing phase of 
trial.  Olsen 
contends that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial and claims that the 
procedure used to select the alternate juror was contrary to W.R.Cr.P. 24(e), 
and violated his right to a fair trial.

 

1. Second Jury

 

[¶196]  
Under Wyoming's death penalty statute, the sentencing 
hearing is to be conducted before the jury that determined the defendant's 
guilt.  Upon a 
showing of good cause, the judge can discharge that jury and impanel a second 
jury.  § 
6-2-102(b).  
The trial court has an affirmative duty to ensure that a jury of 
competent, fair, and impartial persons is impaneled; however, the conduct of 
voir dire and the impaneling of a jury are functions committed to the discretion 
of the trial court, and we do not reverse the exercise of discretion by a trial 
court absent clear abuse.   Russell v. 
State, 851 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Wyo. 
1993).  

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among 
which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria;  it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  

 

Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998). 

 

[¶197]  
Olsen contends that good cause was shown by advising the 
trial court that the death qualification voir dire process in a capital case 
produced preconceived notions by the jurors that prejudiced him in the guilt 
phase.  
Specifically, he claims that knowing that death is being sought frames 
the minds of the jurors around the theory that he should not live because the 
crime of which he stands accused is so atrocious.  The State contends that federal and state 
decisions have concluded that "death qualification" does not violate a 
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury.  The State cites to 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968); Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1994); and Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 
1979).  

 

[¶198]  
Olsen's contention is a general attack on the validity of a 
single jury in a death penalty case.  Whether a bifurcated death penalty trial 
should be conducted by a single jury is a matter of legislative policy, and the 
plain language of the statute permits a single jury absent a specific showing of 
good cause.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the pretrial 
motions, and our review of the record does not indicate that defense counsel was 
unable to draw a fair and impartial jury. Defense counsel conducted an extensive 
voir dire of both the entire panel and numerous individuals in chambers, 
thoroughly questioning the panel, and we can only conclude that the jury was 
fair and impartial.  

 

[¶199]  
We also find that there were no grounds for a 
mistrial.  The 
decision to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the district 
court and will not be reversed unless an abuse of that discretion is shown to 
have prejudiced the defendant. Craver v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1997).  A juror was 
released from sequestration after the court learned that his father had 
died.  An 
alternate juror was selected by a lottery system at the end of the presentation 
of evidence in the sentencing phase. Alternates had heard all of the evidence 
during the guilt phase of the trial, had heard the one day of evidence presented 
during the sentencing phase of the trial, and had been sequestered along with 
the rest of the jurors. Defense counsel immediately requested a mistrial, 
arguing that because the alternate juror was not privy to the deliberations 
during the guilt phase of the trial, Olsen would be deprived of due process of 
law.

 

[¶200]  
Olsen contends that the portion of § 6-2-102(b) stating 
that "the sentencing hearing shall be conducted before the jury which determined 
the defendant's guilt" does not permit substituting an alternate juror after a 
determination of guilt, but before the penalty deliberations.   The State 
contends that, alternate jurors, including those selected for a bifurcated, 
death penalty trial, are essential constituents of a trial jury.  See Parks v. State, 600 P.2d 1053 (Wyo. 
1979).  
Pointing to W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) and W.R.Cr.P. 2, the State contends that any 
procedural conflict within the statute is governed by the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  
See Hopkinson v. State, 704 P.2d 1323, 1329 (Wyo. 
1985) (Hopkinson IV).

 

[¶201]  
W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) provides the method for selecting alternate 
jurors:

 

(e) Alternate jurors. -- The court may direct that not more 
than six jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impanelled to sit 
as alternate jurors.  
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace 
jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become 
or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties.  Alternate jurors 
shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be 
subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and 
shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular 
jurors.  An 
alternative juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 2 provides:

 

These rules are intended to provide for the just 
determination of every criminal proceeding.  They shall be construed to secure simplicity 
in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable 
expense and delay.

 

The State contends that reading these rules together, and 
in light of the purpose served by alternate jurors as set forth in Parks, it seems clear that the term "verdict" used in 
Rule 24(e) must be read in a broad sense to refer to a final jury decision on 
any matter specifically committed to it.  Not only must it be read to refer to a 
determination of the defendant's guilt of a crime, but also to a jury's separate 
determination of a matter of the sort typically involved in bifurcated 
proceedings -- such as a defendant's habitual criminal status or the propriety 
of the death penalty.  
We agree with the State that this was precisely the intent of the statute 
and, pursuant to such a view, a capital case jury may be said to retire to 
consider its verdict twice, once for the guilt phase and once for the sentencing 
phase, and alternate jurors are authorized to serve in sentencing phase 
deliberations even if they did not serve during the guilt phase, so long as the 
replacement is made before the jury retires to begin sentencing phase 
deliberations.  
The legislative intent of the statutory phrase "the jury which determined 
defendant's guilt" includes properly substituted alternates, and we find no 
error in denying the motion for a mistrial. 

 

3.  Selection of 
Alternate Juror

 

[¶202]  
The sentencing phase of Olsen's trial began on September 8, 
1997.  On 
September 9, 1997, the trial court was informed that the father of one of the 
jurors had died. The trial court excused the juror from service and, following 
the conclusion of evidence, replaced him with one of the alternate jurors as 
required by W.R.Cr.P. 24.  To accomplish this, the trial court placed 
the names of the alternate jurors in the clerk's drum and the clerk picked a 
name out of the drum, just as it had when selecting the three alternates after 
the guilt phase of the trial. 

 

[¶203]  
Olsen objected to this method of selecting the replacement 
juror.  Olsen 
contends the procedure used to select the alternate juror was contrary to 
W.R.Cr.P. 24 and violated his right to a fair trial.  These contentions 
require interpretation of W.R.Cr.P. 24.  Interpretation of procedural rules is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  See Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 137 (Wyo. 
1995); Vanasse v. Ramsey, 847 P.2d 993, 999 (Wyo. 
1993) (court rules have the force and effect of a statute and are to be 
construed in the same manner).  

[¶204]  
W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) provides the method for selecting alternate 
jurors:

 

(e)  Alternate jurors. 
--  The court 
may direct that not more than six jurors in addition to the regular jury be 
called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.  Alternate jurors in the order in which they 
are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to 
perform their duties.  
Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same 
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall 
take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and 
privileges as the regular jurors.  An alternate juror who does not replace a 
regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its 
verdict.  Each 
side is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise 
allowed by law if one or two alternate jurors are to be impanelled, two 
peremptory challenges if three or four alternate jurors are to be impanelled, 
and three peremptory challenges if five or six alternate jurors are to be 
impanelled.  
The additional peremptory challenges may be used against an alternate 
juror only, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by these rules may not 
be used against an alternate juror.

 

[¶205]  
Olsen maintains the trial court failed to follow Rule 24 in 
three ways.  
First, he claims that because the trial court did not choose the 
alternate jurors until the end of the guilt phase of the trial, he was not able 
to exercise his right to use his peremptory challenges on the alternate 
jurors.  In a 
second, related argument, Olsen claims the lottery system the trial court used 
to select the alternate jurors denied him the opportunity to use his peremptory 
challenges on the alternate jurors.  Finally, Olsen argues the trial court 
violated the rule when it failed to replace the excused juror with the 
"alternate juror who was first called."  Review of the record and the rule convinces 
us the trial court did not err in its handling of the selection of alternate 
jurors or replacement of the excused juror.  

 

[¶206]  
W.R.Cr.P. 24 allows the trial court to direct that not more 
than six jurors be called to sit as alternate jurors.  In the case at bar, 
the trial court directed that three alternate jurors would be seated, in 
addition to the twelve regular jurors mandated by the rule.  Although the trial 
court was prepared to allow the parties fifteen peremptory challenges, the State 
and Olsen agreed to limit themselves to ten peremptory challenges each. Defense 
counsel explained that he had determined the remaining members of the jury pool 
contained at least six undesirable jurors and he would prefer to keep the jury 
pool at thirty-five rather than trying to distill ten more potential jurors from 
the pool. Olsen does not challenge the trial court's decision to seat three 
alternate jurors.  

 

[¶207]  
At the end of the guilt phase of the trial, but before 
deliberation, the trial court directed the court clerk to select three names 
from the clerk's drum.  Those three individuals became the alternate 
jurors.  
Understandably, the trial court waited until the guilt phase was 
completed and the jury was about to deliberate before selecting the alternate 
jurors.  In 
order to obtain the most attentive panel of jurors, it is certainly prudent to 
delay the selection of alternates until all of the evidence has been heard.  Human nature 
instructs us that the jurors might be less attentive if they knew they were 
alternates at the beginning of the trial.  

 

[¶208]  
The rule requires the trial court to provide two additional 
peremptory challenges to each party when three alternate jurors are to be 
impanelled.  
W.R.Cr.P. 24(e).  Olsen relies on the language in the rule 
which provides that additional "challenges may be used against an alternate 
juror only" to argue that the trial court should have selected the alternate 
jurors before the evidentiary portion of the trial commenced so he could use his 
allotted peremptory challenges on the three alternate jurors.  However, simple 
math illustrates that the rule could not be applied as Olsen contends.  

 

[¶209]  
The trial court told the parties it would allow three 
alternates to serve on the jury.  W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) allows each party two 
additional peremptory challenges when three alternates are to be impanelled for 
a total of four peremptory challenges.  If the rule required the trial court to 
permit peremptory challenges of the alternate jurors after they were selected, 
as Olsen suggests, all three alternate jurors could be eliminated before the 
four peremptory challenges were exhausted.  The trial court did not inhibit Olsen's 
ability to use his peremptory challenges in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 24 when it 
selected the alternate jurors just prior to deliberation on the guilt phase of 
the trial.

 

[¶210]  
In his next claim of error, Olsen contends "[a]lternate 
jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace [disqualified] 
jurors" means the trial court was required to replace the excused juror with the 
first alternate juror called when the three alternates were selected before 
deliberation on the guilt phase.  Once again, we find the trial court acted 
prudently when it waited until a replacement juror was needed before it 
determined which juror would be selected for that duty.  In order to ensure 
an attentive alternate juror panel, we hold that the trial court properly 
determined the rule allowed it to select the replacement juror when an alternate 
juror was needed, and not before.  The replacement juror sitting on the panel 
for the sentencing phase was, in fact, the first juror selected from the clerk's 
drum when the trial court found it necessary to use one of the alternate 
jurors.  The 
trial court properly drew the alternate juror "in the same manner . . . as the 
regular jurors."  
W.R.Cr. P. 24(e).

 

H.  Lethal Injection is Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment

 

[¶211]  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-904 (Michie 1997) mandates that the 
punishment of death be administered by a continuous intravenous injection of a 
lethal quantity of chemicals.  In a pretrial motion, Olsen requested the 
trial court to strike the State's request for the death penalty, claiming lethal 
injection is unconstitutional because it constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.  
Olsen also requested an evidentiary hearing to allow him the opportunity 
to question persons who witnessed Wyoming's last execution by lethal injection. 
The trial court ruled that this court has held that lethal injection does not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment and denied the motion for an evidentiary 
hearing.  

 

[¶212]  
On appeal, Olsen contends that the trial court erred in 
denying an evidentiary hearing on the matter where he would have presented 
expert testimony establishing it as cruel and unusual punishment.  He gives several 
examples of the manner in which lethal injection executions were carried out and 
which caused lengthy delays before death occurred and caused convulsions and 
apparent pain.  
The State contends Olsen asked to question witnesses at that execution 
and to learn the specific procedures used.  Because this court had affirmed denials of 
similar requests made before the last execution, the State contends the trial 
court properly denied the motions.  The State also contends that Olsen is making 
the argument that if lethal injection is carried out incorrectly, that injection 
method could be painful, but that this assertion is contrary to 
authority.

 

[¶213]  
Capital punishment in and of itself does not violate the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  The assertion that execution by lethal 
injection, as provided for in § 7-13-904(a), constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment was rejected by this court as contrary to pertinent authority. Hopkinson v. State, 798 P.2d 1186, 1187 (Wyo. 
1990) (Hopkinson V).  Olsen's assertions that his examples show 
that lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment do not constitute the 
required examination of objective factors necessary 
to reach such a conclusion.  See Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-69, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974-75, 106 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1989); McCleskey 
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1771, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987).  We find the court did not err in denying 
Olsen's motions.

 

I.  Repeal of Statutory Proportionality 
Review

 

[¶214]  
The statutory provision in the death penalty statute 
requiring this court to conduct a proportionality review was repealed by the 
legislature in 1989.  
1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 171, § 2.  Although Olsen raises no issue concerning the 
repeal, we will address whether we are constitutionally required to conduct such 
a review.  

 

[¶215]  
In Hopkinson II, we considered 
the issue whether Wyoming's death penalty statutes were unconstitutional because 
of the review procedures granted to this court.  Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 50.  In 
resolving the issue we noted 

 

that the Wyoming Legislature in providing for the death 
penalty as a sentence in the case of first degree murder was "restrained by 
[federal] constitutional provisions and guarantees."  This necessitated 
incorporating into the death penalty sentence constitutional restraints as a 
condition to its availability.

 

Id. at 51.  We said:

 

When this court is presented with a constitutionally based 
challenge to a statute, it presumes the statute constitutional.  Any doubt must be 
resolved in favor of constitutionality.  Before we strike it down we must find that it 
clearly violates some constitutional principle, state or federal. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has said that, even when a serious doubt of 
constitutionality is present, courts should "ascertain whether a construction of 
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S. Ct. 285, 296, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932).

The most important reason for holding that §§  6-4-102(g) and 
6-4-103 are constitutional is that they are an important and necessary part of 
the total sentencing structure.  In that regard, the opinion of Justices 
Stewart, Powell and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia, 
supra, 428 U.S.  at 198, 96 S. Ct.  at 2937, in announcing the judgment of the 
Court said:

"As an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness 
and caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for automatic appeal of all 
death sentences to the State's Supreme Court.  That court is required by statute to review 
each sentence of death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence 
of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate 
compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases.  § 27-2537(c) (Supp. 
1975).  

In short, Georgia's new sentencing procedures require as a 
prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific jury findings as 
to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant.  Moreover, to guard 
further against a situation comparable to that presented in Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972)], the Supreme Court of Georgia compares each death 
sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure 
that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate.  On their face these 
procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. 
No longer should there be no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases 
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is 
not.'  408 
U.S., at 313 [92 S. Ct.  at 2764] (WHITE, J., concurring)."

 

Again, 428 U.S. at page 204, 96 S. Ct.  at 2939, the Court 
explained:

 

"Finally, the Georgia statute has an additional provision 
designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously 
selected group of convicted defendants.  The new sentencing procedures require that 
the State Supreme Court review every death sentence to determine whether it was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 
factor, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, and "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the 
crime and the defendant."  §  27-2537(c)(3) (Supp.1975). * * *"

 

Then at page 206, 96 S. Ct.  at 2940, the Court went on to 
say:

 

"The provision for appellate review in the Georgia 
capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the proportionality review 
substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die 
by the action of an aberrant jury.  If a time comes when juries generally do not 
impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review 
procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will 
suffer a sentence of death."

 

Finally, at page 207, 96 S. Ct.  at 2941, the Court 
said:

 

"* * * In addition, the review function of the Supreme 
Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted 
our decision in Furman are not present to any 
significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here."

The concurring opinion of Justice White, with whom Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, also stressed the state supreme 
court review of the death penalty as "[a]n important aspect of the new Georgia 
legislative scheme * * *."  

In Proffitt v. Florida, supra, 
428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913, the Court, in approving the Florida death penalty 
statutes, called attention to the provision § 921.141(4), F.S.A., by stating 
that this automatic review provision is designed to assure that the death 
penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group of convicted 
defendants.  
While the provision is not structured in the same fashion as that of 
Georgia, it was held by the United States Supreme Court that the manner in which 
the Florida Supreme Court reviews each death sentence does ensure similar 
results in similar cases, citing State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla., 1973).

The certiorari petition in Proffitt 
asserted that such a skimpy provision made the role of the state supreme 
court necessarily subjective and unpredictable.  The United States Supreme Court responded to 
that by stating:

 "* * * While it may be true that that court 
has not chosen to formulate a rigid objective test as its standard of review for 
all cases, it does not follow that the appellate review process is ineffective 
or arbitrary.  
In fact, it is apparent that the Florida court has undertaken responsibly 
to perform its function of death sentence review with a maximum of rationality 
and consistency.  
For example, it has several times compared the circumstances of a case 
under review with those of previous cases in which it has assessed the 
imposition of death sentences. By following this procedure the Florida court has 
in effect adopted the type of proportionality review mandated by the Georgia 
statute.  And 
any suggestion that the Florida court engages in only cursory or rubber-stamp 
review of death penalty cases is totally controverted by the fact that it has 
vacated over one-third of the death sentences that have come before it.  * * *" Id., 428 U.S.  at 258-259, 96 S. Ct.  at 2969.

We conclude and hold that the action of the Wyoming State 
Legislature in specifying the nature of our review does not purport to take away 
any of our powers or jurisdiction.  The judicial function of making the requisite 
determinations on review are [sic] left to this court.  It would be 
something else if the legislature enacted a statute whereby the legislature 
would review the trial proceedings; it then would be exercising powers properly 
belonging to the courts.  We consider the challenged statutory sections 
to be a proper exercise of legislative power to provide for the sentencing of 
convicted first degree murders.  This does not mean that under the Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure we could not conduct the same review as that 
directed by the legislature.  If we disregarded the legislative directions, 
we would still be required to conduct a review within the standards set out in 
Gregg and Proffitt, as 
did the Supreme Court of Florida.

 

Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 54-56 (some citations and footnotes 
omitted).  

 

[¶216]  
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided that a 
statutorily mandated proportionality review was not a constitutional 
requirement. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45, 50-51, 
104 S. Ct. 871, 876, 879, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1984).   Proportionality review had previously 
been approved by the Court as a safeguard against discriminatory, wanton and 
freakish imposition of the death penalty; however, the Court determined that no 
decision mandated the review.  Id. at 45, 104 S. Ct.  at 876-77.  
If a sentencing scheme provided safeguards that adequately directed and 
limited the jury's discretion, it would be constitutional without a 
proportionality review.  Id. at 50-51, 104 S. Ct.  at 879.

 

[¶217]  Pulley reviewed the safeguards of the California sentencing scheme 
at issue and determined the safeguards in place served to assure thoughtful and 
affective appellate review, focusing upon the circumstances present in each 
particular case.  
Id. at 53, 104 S. Ct.  at 881.  The Court found 
this determination was proved by the fact the California Supreme Court had 
reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment in another case where the evidence 
did not support the findings of special circumstances.  Id.

 

[¶218]  
Accordingly, the Wyoming Legislature's repeal of this 
statutory provision does not render the Wyoming death penalty 
unconstitutional.  
As we made clear in Hopkinson, however, this 
court reviews death sentences independently of the legislative mandate.  As seen in Pulley, the Court continues to consider a state supreme 
court's willingness to set aside death sentences when warranted as an important 
indication that the constitutional safeguards are in place and effective.  Our review of each 
death sentence must be sufficient to permit vacating an arbitrary, unjust death 
sentence if warranted.  

 

[¶219]  
A constitutional death penalty sentencing scheme must 
ensure the availability of meaningful judicial review as a final safeguard that 
improves the reliability of the sentencing process.  Throughout this opinion, we have applied the 
final safeguard provided in § 6-2-103:

 

(c) The Supreme Court of Wyoming shall consider the 
punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way of appeal.

(d) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine 
if:

(i) The sentence of death was imposed under the influence 
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;

(ii) The evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of 
an aggravating circumstance as enumerated in W.S. § 6-2-102 and mitigating 
circumstances.

(iii) Repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 171, § 2.

(e) In addition to its authority regarding correction of 
errors, the court, with regard to review of death sentences, may:

(i) Affirm the sentence of death;

(ii) Set the sentence aside and impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment; or

(iii) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for 
resentencing.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103 (Michie 1997).

 

[¶220]  
We have determined that prejudicial errors occurred when 
the jury considered improper aggravating circumstances; the jury was not 
properly instructed on the statutorily required decision-making process, the law 
of mitigating circumstances and the mitigating circumstance of duress; the jury 
was not provided an adequate verdict form; and victim impact evidence was 
improperly admitted.

 

[¶221]  
In Hopkinson I this court 
remanded for a new sentencing hearing because this court determined it would not 
decide whether a different result would have occurred if the improper 
aggravating circumstances had not been present during the weighing process.  Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 171.  We vacate Olsen's 
sentence of death and remand for a new penalty hearing on this basis and because 
of the errors discussed above.  

  

APPENDIX A

Appellant's Statement of the Issues

Constitutional Issues:

Argument I

The Wyoming death penalty statute is unconstitutional.

Argument 2

Section 6-2-102 of the Wyoming statutes is unconstitutionally restrictive on 
the use of mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase.

Instruction Issues Addressing the Penalty Phase:

Argument 3

Due to improper instruction, the jury refused to consider 
Appellant's mitigating evidence.

Argument 4

The court's response to the jury's question about executive 
clemency violated Appellant's due process rights as it was incomplete and 
provided the jury with information which Appellant had no opportunity to deny or 
explain.

Argument 5

It was an improper comment on Appellant's right to remain 
silent when the jury was instructed that the law did not allow the state a 
psychological or psychiatric evaluation of Appellant.

Argument 6

Contrary to the Wyoming death penalty statute, the trial 
court instructed the jury the defendant bore the burden of proving mitigating 
factors.

Argument 7

The absence of statutory mitigating factors in the jury 
instructions prevented the jury's consideration of constitutionally relevant 
evidence.

Argument 8

It was plain error for the trial court to instruct the jury 
to consider argument from counsel in reaching its decision in the penalty 
phase.

Argument 9

The verdict form was substantively and procedurally 
defective denying Appellant his due process right to a fair determination of 
his 
sentence.

Additional issues addressing the penalty phase:

Argument 10

The trial court impermissibly allowed introduction of 
victim impact statements at Appellant's capital sentencing

Argument 11

Application of the "atrocious and cruel" aggravator is 
improper in this case.

Argument 12

Application of "preventing a lawful arrest" aggravator is 
improper.

Argument 13

Application of "risk of death to two or more" aggravator is 
improper.

Argument 14

Application of the "premeditated felony murder" aggravator 
impermissibly allowed elements of the homicide to be used to establish an 
aggravating circumstance.

Argument 15

Reversal required because invalid aggravator(s) used to 
sentence Appellant to death.

Argument 16

The district court improperly excluded mitigating evidence 
of Appellant's character.

Argument 17

The victim impact statements admitted at Appellant's 
capital sentencing violated the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.

Jury issues:

Argument 18

Appellant's due process right to an impartial jury was 
denied when the trial court dismissed two jurors for cause over defense 
counsel's objection.

Argument 19

The trial court erred when it allowed a jury other than one 
allowed by statute to decide the Appellant's sentence in the penalty phase.

Argument 20

The procedure used by the district court to select the 
alternate juror was contrary to Rule 24, W.R.Cr.P., and denied Appellant his 
right to a fair trial.

Argument 21

The trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
Appellant's motions for a second jury to decide punishment or in the alternative 
to conduct voir dire directly before the penalty phase.

Trial phase issues:

Argument 22

The district court violated the Wyoming constitution by 
allowing an assistant United States attorney to function as special 
prosecutor.

Argument 23

The evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for 
premeditated first degree murder.

Argument 24

Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
I Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.

Punishment issues:

Argument 25

Lethal injection, Wyoming's method 
of execution, is cruel and unusual punishment.

Appellee's Statement of the Issues

I.          
Whether the trial court properly dismissed two jurors for cause?

II.          
Whether Appellant's penalty phase jury was properly selected?

III.         Whether 
the Wyoming Constitution was violated by allowing an assistant United States 
Attorney to function as a special prosecutor?

IV.        Whether 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction of premeditated 
first degree murder?

V.        Whether 
Appellant received effective assistance of counsel?

VI.        Whether 
Wyo.  
Stat.  § 
6-2-102 is unconstitutional?

VII.       Whether the 
jury relied upon improper aggravating circumstances to sentence Appellant to 
death?

VIII.      Whether the jury was 
properly instructed regarding mitigating evidence?

IX.        Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded Appellant's witnesses 
from pleading for his life?

X.        Whether 
the trial court properly allowed victim impact statements to be read during the 
penalty phase?

XI.        Whether 
the giving of penalty phase Jury Instruction No. 25 constituted an improper 
comment on Appellant's exercise of his right to silence?

XII.       Whether the 
trial court properly instructed the jury it could consider argument from counsel 
relating to the significance of evidence in reaching its decision in the penalty 
phase of trial?

XIII. Whether the trial court properly answered the jury's 
question regarding the possibility of parole on a life sentence?

XIV.     Whether the sentencing phase 
verdict form was substantively defective or was the timing of its submission to 
the jury was procedurally improper?

XV.      Whether lethal 
injection is cruel and unusual punishment?

  
APPENDIX B

[Prosecutor]:  Could you state your full name and 
occupation?

A.        Jan 
Rosenbach, I'm the director for the Victims of Violence Center here in 
Worland.

Q.        And as 
part of your duties, have you been in contact with the victims in this 
particular case?

A.        Yes, I 
have.

Q.        And are you familiar 
with the mother of Emma Lou McCoid?

A.        Yes, I am.

Q.        Could you tell the 
jury who that person is, please?

A.        Dolly 
Sorrensen is Emma Lou's mother, and she lives in Basin.

* * * *

Q.        
Okay.  
And did she prepare a statement?

A.        Yes, she 
did.

Q.        Have you 
discussed it with her?

A.        Yes, her 
and I have talked about her reading this, and she finds it difficult to do 
so.

Q.        And so do 
you have that statement with you now?

A.        Yes, I 
do.

* * * *

Q.        Could you 
read the statement for the jury, please?

A.        
Certainly.  
"I am the mother of Emma Lou McCoid.  Unless you are a parent of someone who has 
been taken away, you will not know the pain I feel inside my heart.  There is an empty 
spot in my heart and life that will never be filled again.

            
Each of my children held a part of my heart and had his or her own place 
special to them.  
With Emma's untimely and uncalled for death, there is just a pain of loss 
and a pain of unanswered questions.  A pain for her children," excuse me, "a pain 
for her children, for myself, for her family and for her in her last minutes of 
life.

            
As her mother I can find comfort in the memories of special things a 
mother remembers and holds in her heart, but there should have been time to make 
more memories and share more things.  My daughter was young with the hopes of years 
ahead of her to enjoy her life, her children, her family, and just to be here 
among us going about her daily activities.  This was her right, and it all ended when 
this person took my daughter from us.  He can't take the memories from me.

            
It is hard to realize that there is no getting her back for one last 
look, hug, laugh, or any of the things we shared.  Just as I miss my child, Emma's children miss 
their mother, and they are left with a great emptiness.  Emma will not know 
her grandchildren, because of the act of this one person. 

            
I treasure our good times shared and will help her children and 
grandchildren to come to realize how she loved them and would have loved 
them.  My loss 
could fill pages, but nothing will bring my baby girl, Emma McCoid, back to 
us.

            
It is very difficult to express my feelings this way, because it is not 
easy to sort out all my feelings.  I will always be her mother no matter where 
she is and what separates us from each other, but I had every reason to expect 
that we would be together right here until it would be my own time to leave the 
world at God's calling.

            
I expected to enjoy many more times with her, to make more memories, and 
to watch as she grew older, finished raising her own children, and watch her 
with her own grandchildren.  This is the way it should be right now.

            
Everything changed that night in January.  The shock to my body and my heart when I got 
the news of her death was overwhelming, and then I have to learn that this young 
man killed her for no reason, made it too much to bear.

            
Emma was my daughter and part of me as much as my arms and legs are.  I nursed her, 
watched her grown, and shared the good times and the bad times.  Now this part of me 
is gone and there's an empty ache there.  You can only know  you can only know how it 
hurts if you have had to bury one of your own children.  The feelings are 
beyond explaining, because they are around each day.

            
I had her and all my memories and all the things a mother holds in her 
own heart about each of her children.  This has all had a terrific impact on 
me.  I have 
trouble sleeping and sometimes I just don't know what to do with how I 
feel.  It isn't 
like I lost her to cancer, or in a way that a person can see some 
reasoning.  
Sincerely, Dolly Sorrensen."

* * * *

Q.        Ms. 
Rosenbach, did you also  were you also involved in a statement from  regarding 
Mr. Taylor?

A.        Yes, I 
received 

Q.        Do you 
have it with you?

A.        Yes, I 
do.

Q.        Could you 
tell the jury where that came from, please?

A.        This came 
from June Marx.  
June Marx was Art Taylor's ex-wife.

* * * *

Q.        Could you 
read the statement, please?

A.        Yes.  "You asked me to 
tell you who Art Taylor was.  That was an astronomical task.  Many tries in this 
essence escapes me.  
I could send you photos, and you could see him, work shirt and jeans, the 
inevitable cap, a grin that made his eyes light up, and made you feel like 
smiling back.  
When I met him, he was 26 years old, and I told Momma, that's the guy I'm 
going to marry.

            
Marry him I did on June 1, 1976.  There were four, too short years before 
alcohol drove us apart.  Loving him, I couldn't watch the addiction 
destroy him.  
So I divorced my friend, lover, business partner, and the most special 
man I ever met.  
He was 26, no children of his own when he embraced five children and 
their mother to help them grow.  Honest, fair, and hard-working.  He taught by 
example and with love.  

            
He took my sons and made them into men.  He took them hunting and fishing, he showed 
them how to fix a sagging fence, build a foundation, and how to relax after a 
day's work.  He 
made them face mistakes and he celebrated their successes.  Art hired on at 
Lucky Mac in March of 1976, and in July he became the head shovel mechanic.  He had no heavy 
equipment experience before he hired on, but he stuck with his supervisor, Ted 
Hailey, and learned all he could, and upon Ted's retirement, Art took his 
place.

            
He was broke and driving an old '67 pickup when he came to Wyoming, but 
always dreamed of his own business and success.  He fell down many, many times, but he got up 
and started over one more time than he fell.  He loved country music, and he loved to 
dance.  He had 
a fine voice and was rarely refused as a dance partner.  He could win hearts 
and friends anywhere.

            
Art served in Viet Nam, and though he thought it was a no-win war, he 
said, "I had to go, I live here."  He rarely talked of his experience there, but 
you knew he had deep feelings regarding that time.  He went to the 
airport with my 18-year-old when he joined the Navy, and he had tears in his 
eyes, "Be a man, son," and he hugged a son he raised, but never fathered.

            
Over the years Art and I remained friends, and for many of those years, I 
remained June Taylor.  
I did so because no one else measured up.  He was so much of what I needed in my life, 
and I couldn't bring myself to change for less.  No, he wasn't a saint, he was a man, faults 
and all.  I had 
to go when I left him, but I left a lot of myself there with him.  We talked of 
getting back together, but there was still the same old problem, Black 
Velvet.

            
Who was Art Taylor, the love of my life, the most sentimental poet ever, 
and I kept letters to prove it.  One of the hardest working people I've ever 
known.  A 
father who had no children, but he made several young people stronger because of 
his example.  
Art was the son of two wonderful, aging people who are deprived of his 
help when they can no longer do for themselves.  His mom calls me, because we can cry 
together, laugh together, and rejoice that we had him for a while.

            
When I think of all the losses that occurred on January 20th, I want to weep for the shattered dreams, the 
dreams of his folks, my children, and others whose life Art had touched.  Sincerely, June 
Taylor Marx."

* * * * 

Q.        Could you 
state your name, please?

A.        Beverly 
Baumstarck.

Q.        And could 
you tell the jury your relationship with Kyle Baumstarck?

A.        Kyle's 
mother.

Q.        Could you 
read your statement, please?

A.        "Kyle was 
a caring, loving, giving person.  He was the second of my four children.  Wes, Kyle, and 
Sandy were born in less than two and a half years, and Melinda was born three 
and a half years after Sandy.  He was the most quiet of all, and content to 
play alone or do what the others wanted.  Kyle and Sandy were only 11 months apart in 
age and went through all 12 years of school together.  They were kind of 
like twins.  
School was hard for him, but he liked going to be with the other 
kids.  He 
didn't cause any problems in school and was liked by all, specially 
teachers.

            
After graduating from high school, he attended classes at Job Corp in 
Rapid City, South Dakota.  He was liked by everyone, and he cam home 
with several certificates for volunteer work and other accomplishments.  Kyle's father 
passed away just at the time he completed his one-year training in Rapid 
City.  He was 
content to stay on the farm with me for over a year and work in Linton before 
getting on with his own life.  During that time he, along with the other 
children, helped me move into town.  Since he was living with me, he made many 
more trips and carried more boxes than anyone else.  I don't know what I 
would have done without him.

            
Shortly after I moved to town my dad passed away, then he went to stay 
with his grandmother and work near her farm for two years until she was 
comfortable being alone.  He wasn't sure what he wanted to do, so he 
came back home again and worked for a rancher near Linton.  During that time, I 
moved to Bismarck, and he was my right hand again.  He went to Job Corp 
in Minot in 1994 for additional training for another year before moving to 
Denver for a year.

            
During that year only Melinda and I saw him once.  I was so happy he 
was back with the family in December.  Little did we know it would not last 
long.  I had 
planned on taking my vacation in June and planned on seeing both of my sons in 
Worland.  He 
liked kids and was looking forward to getting married and having a family 
someday.  He 
always had patience and enjoyed spending time with his younger cousins.  He would stop to 
visit aunts and uncles whenever he could.

            
I miss Kyle very much and will for the rest of my life.  I can just see him 
walk through the door and hear his cheerful, "Hi, Mom."  I will also miss 
having another daughter-in-law and grandchildren.  Wes lost his only brother, and Sandy and 
Melinda now have only one brother.  Wes' wife, Christy, had little time to spend 
with Kyle, she was just getting to know him.

            
A parent should not have to bury a child, especially for such a senseless 
reason.  
Sincerely."

FOOTNOTES

1The verdict form does not 
specify how many individual jurors believed a mitigating circumstance 
existed.

2Before it was repealed, 
this section read: "The sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant." Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 556 (Wyo. 
1984).  Engberg noted that a proportionality review is not 
constitutionally mandated as decided in Pulley v. 
Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871, 79 L. Ed.2d  
29 (1984), but is statutorily mandated.  Engberg at 
554.

3The applicable common-law 
rule required acceptance of a resignation by proper authority before it is 
effective to divest an incumbent of public office.  Jefferis, 26 Wyo. at 136, 178 P.  at 915.

4Arizona's procedure which 
had required the trial judge to find whether statutory factors existed that 
qualified a defendant for capital punishment was declared constitutional in Walton.  That ruling was placed in doubt by the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), which ruled that factual findings that 
increase the maximum penalty must be considered an element of the offense and 
determined by a jury.   Walton was overruled in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002), when the United States Supreme 
Court held that Arizona's sentencing procedure was unconstitutional because it 
allowed the trial judge to make the factual determination that at least one 
aggravating factor existed that permitted imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 2443.

5"8.  The defendant has 
been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in § 13-1101, which 
were committed during the commission of the offense."

6"(3)  The defendant, in 
this proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the 
first or second degree."

7"(l)  The defendant 
unlawfully and intentionally, knowingly, or with universal malice manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, killed two or more 
persons during the commission of the same criminal episode."

8"(2)  At the time the murder was committed the 
defendant also committed another murder."

9§ 6-2-102(h)(viii) provides:

The murder of a judicial 
officer, former judicial officer, district attorney, former district attorney, 
defending attorney, peace officer, juror or witness, during or because of the 
exercise of his official duty.

10§ 6-2-102(h)(xii) provides:

The defendant killed 
another human being purposely and with premeditated malice and while engaged in, 
or as an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight 
after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, 
burglary or kidnapping.

11The State defines 
"mitigating evidence" and "mitigating circumstances" differently.  The Olsen jury was 
given instructions and a verdict form using the term aggravating and mitigating 
"factor."  A 
mitigating "factor" was defined as "any aspect of a defendant's character or 
background, or any circumstance of the offense, which might indicate, or tend to 
indicate, that the defendant should not be sentenced to death." An aggravating 
"factor" was defined as "a specified fact or circumstance which might indicate, 
or tend to indicate, that the defendant should be sentenced to death." 

12However, just as with affirmative defenses, the ultimate 
burden of negating such defenses by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains with 
the State.

The decision in Martin was 
based on a specific legislative enactment.  In upholding the authority of a state to 
place the burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the United States Supreme Court recognized "a 
majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative 
defenses," and only Ohio and South Carolina require the defendant to prove an 
affirmative defense. Martin [v. Ohio], 480 U.S. [228] at 
232, 236, 107 S. Ct. 1098 [94 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987)].  As early as 1889, in Trumble v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 280, 21 P. 1081, 1083 (1889), 
we rejected the proposition that the defendant carries the burden of proving the 
charged conduct was justifiable or excusable.  In Scheikofsky, 
following Trumble, we found the instructions as a 
whole were sufficient to place the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt on the State, but stated "[t]he inclusion of the specific 
statement of the burden of proof would have been preferable * * *."  Scheikofsky [v. State], 636 P.2d [1107] at 1112 [(Wyo. 1981)].   In Small [v. State], 689 P.2d 
[420]at 423 [(Wyo. 1984)], we clearly stated: "When self-defense is properly 
raised the jury should be specifically instructed that the state has the burden 
to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt."

The fact that this case involved a charge of aggravated 
assault rather than homicide, and defense of others rather than self-defense, 
does not change the burden of proof.  The reason for instruction as to the burden 
of proof when self-defense is raised is equally applicable to the defense of 
others. As an initial proposition, the burden is on the defendant charged with 
aggravated assault to establish a prima facie case on every element of his 
alleged legal justification.  See Amin [v. State], 811 P.2d [255] 
at 260-61 [(Wyo. 1991)]; Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 826 
(Wyo.1991); and Leeper [v. 
State], 589 P.2d [379] at 383 [(Wyo. 1979)].  However, once the defendant does so, the 
court must give instruction on the State's burden to negate this defense beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  
See State v. Acosta, 123 N.M. 273, 939 P.2d 1081, 1087, cert. granted, 123 N.M. 215, 937 P.2d 76, cert. quashed, 124 N.M. 312, 950 P.2d 285 (1997) (error 
in failure to instruct on state's burden of proof when self defense or defense 
of others properly raised; element of aggravated battery is "unlawfulness" of 
act). . . .

Defense of others as justification for the infliction of 
harm on another is applicable not only to an actual assailant, but also to those 
acting in concert with the assailant to the extent the defensive force used is 
necessary and reasonable.  The defendant has the burden of showing the 
facts necessary for each element of his legal justification for his actions when 
charged with aggravated assault.  Once a prima facie case is demonstrated, the 
State must prove the absence of legal justification beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Here, 
the district court failed to instruct the jury on the defense submitted by 
Duckett.  We, 
therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial.

Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Wyo. 1998) (footnote omitted).

13Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 (Michie 1997) states:

§ 7-21-103. Submission of victim impact statement to 
sentencing court. 

(a) Prior to imposition of sentence or any correction or 
reduction of sentence in a felony case, an identifiable victim of the crime may 
submit a victim impact statement to the court:

(i) By appearing, with or without counsel, to present an 
oral victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing or at any subsequent 
hearing for correction or reduction of sentence; or

(ii) By submitting a written victim impact statement to the 
department of corrections, which shall be appended to the presentence report of 
the defendant, or by submitting a written statement to the court in the case of 
any subsequent hearing for correction or reduction of sentence.

(b) Any victim impact statement submitted to the court 
pursuant to this section shall be among the factors considered by the court in 
determining the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant or in determining 
whether there should be a correction or reduction of sentence.

(c) Any failure to comply 
with the terms of this chapter shall not create a cause for appeal or reduction 
of sentence for the defendant, or a civil cause of action against any person by 
the defendant.

14In addition to 
Pennsylvania and Florida, ten other states revised their death penalty statutes 
after Payne to provide for consideration of victim 
impact evidence during capital sentencing proceedings; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-602 
(Michie Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-11-103 (West Supp. 1996); La. 
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.2 (West Supp. 1997); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.030 
(Vernon Supp. 1997); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-302 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:11-3 (West 1995); Okla. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws 
Ann. § 23A-27A-2(2) (Supp. 1997); and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 
1996).

15In 2001, § 6-2-101(b) was 
amended to include "life imprisonment without parole."  2001 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 96, § 2.  
However, the amendment is not applicable to this case.