Title: In re Sager Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re All Cases Against Sager Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1444.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1444 
IN RE ALL CASES AGAINST SAGER CORPORATION. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as In re All Cases Against Sager Corp.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1444.] 
(No. 2010-1705—Submitted September 21, 2011—Decided April 3, 2012.) 
Corporations—Suit against dissolved foreign corporation—Corporate-survival 
statute of state of incorporation applied—Appointment of receiver for 
marshaling of liability insurance and for acceptance of service of process 
denied. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 93567,  
188 Ohio App.3d 796, 2010-Ohio-3872. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The principal issue we confront in this appeal is whether the court 
of appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court to appoint a receiver 
for Sager Corporation for the purpose of accepting service of process and 
marshaling assets consisting of unexhausted liability-insurance policies for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
asbestos-related claims filed against Sager.  Sager was an Illinois corporation that 
filed for dissolution in 1998 and, pursuant to Illinois law, was no longer amenable 
to suit after 2003.  In characterizing its own opinion, the appellate court plainly 
stated, “The appeal before us has the peculiar procedural posture of the 
receivership being the only issue.”  188 Ohio App.3d 796, 2010-Ohio-3872, 936 
N.E.2d 1034, at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 2} When the trial court appointed a receiver for the Sager 
Corporation, it concluded that Sager’s conduct in Ohio vested the court with 
jurisdiction to wind up Sager’s affairs in Ohio and found that pursuant to R.C. 
1701.88(B), Sager had the capacity to be sued under Ohio law.  In affirming the 
trial court, the appellate court found that R.C. 2735.01(E) provided authority for 
the trial court to appoint a receiver for a dissolved corporation. 
{¶ 3} For the following reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is 
reversed.  Fundamental to our analysis is the principle that we must afford full 
faith and credit to laws in our sister states and that a dissolved foreign corporation 
that is no longer amenable to suit in its state of incorporation is likewise not 
amenable to suit in Ohio.  Thus, because these claims had not been commenced 
against Sager as of June 17, 2003, and no judgment had been entered against it, 
and because these claimants are now precluded from obtaining a judgment against 
Sager in this case, the appointment of a receiver to accept service of process and 
to marshal assets—including unexhausted liability-insurance policies—is barred. 
In conformity with constitutional requirements of due process and the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, the law of the state of incorporation controls whether a 
corporation is amenable to suit.  Here, we apply Illinois corporate law and 
conclude that claims filed against a dissolved Illinois corporation more than five 
years after dissolution are barred. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} The Sager Corporation, an Illinois corporation since 1921, 
manufactured protective clothing and other industrial products containing 
asbestos, such as gloves, aprons, leggings, jackets, and curtains, and sold some of 
these to United States Steel in Lorain, Ohio. 
{¶ 5} On June 17, 1998, Sager ceased its operations and filed for 
dissolution in the state of Illinois, commencing a five-year postdissolution period 
during which Illinois law permitted claims to be asserted against it.  That period 
ended on June 17, 2003. 
{¶ 6} On September 4, 2007, Commodore Bowens, suffering from 
mesothelioma, and executors of the estates of two deceased victims of 
mesothelioma filed suit in Ohio against Sager and more than 200 other entities for 
personal injury, loss of consortium, and wrongful death, alleging that their injuries 
stemmed from exposure to asbestos products. 
{¶ 7} On July 1, 2008, after having appeared and participated in 
discovery in the litigation, Sager moved for summary judgment, asserting that 
because it had been dissolved and because the five-year period for filing claims 
against it had expired, it was no longer amenable to suit.  In response, the law 
firm of Bevan & Associates, on behalf of all clients with asbestos-related claims 
pending against Sager, sought the appointment of a receiver to wind up Sager’s 
corporate affairs in Ohio, asserting that “Sager has insurance policies which have 
not been exhausted, and are assets of Sager.”  Sager opposed the motion, urging 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for a foreign 
corporation and arguing that even if it had jurisdiction, it should apply Illinois 
law, which provides that Sager is no longer amenable to suit, and also arguing that 
the appointment violated the Due Process, Commerce, and Full Faith and Credit 
Clauses of the United States Constitution. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
{¶ 8} The trial court, relying on R.C. 1701.88(B), appointed a receiver to 
accept claims and marshal corporate assets, including unexhausted insurance 
proceeds, and stated in its order, “The defunct corporation persists for the purpose 
of winding up its affairs in Ohio.” 
{¶ 9} Sager appealed the appointment to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals, which relied on R.C. 2735.01(E) and held that “there is no dispute that 
corporate assets exist notwithstanding Sager’s dissolution and that these assets 
may afford insurance coverage to Ohioans injured by exposure to Sager’s 
products,” so that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a 
receiver in this matter.”  188 Ohio App.3d 796, 2010-Ohio-3872, 936 N.E.2d 
1034, at ¶ 22.  The appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s application of 
Ohio law based on the occurrence of the injury in Ohio and further held that no 
due process violation had occurred because the appointment of a receiver “does 
not extend its corporate life; the receiver “ ‘will merely be a vehicle through 
which [the asbestos claimants] will seek recovery from the insurers.’ ” Id. at ¶ 21, 
quoting In re Texas E. Overseas, Inc., Del. Chancery, C.A. No. 4326-VCN, 2010 
WL 318266 (Jan. 26, 2010). 
{¶ 10} In its memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Sager posed the 
following proposition: “As a constitutional matter, and as a matter of Ohio 
statutes and precedent, whether a dissolved corporation is susceptible to suit must 
be determined by the law of its state of incorporation, not by the law of the forum 
state.”  However, in its brief and during oral argument, Sager asserted that R.C. 
2735.01 does not authorize an Ohio court to appoint a receiver to wind up the 
affairs of a foreign corporation or to accept service of process for it, a receiver 
may not resurrect a dissolved corporation when its only assets consist of liability-
insurance policies, a court may not base jurisdiction for a tort claim on the interest 
of claimants in unexhausted insurance policies, and subjecting a foreign 
corporation to suit contrary to the law of its state of incorporation violates the Due 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
Process, Commerce, and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the United States 
Constitution. 
{¶ 11} The claimants principally rely on Ohayon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Illinois, 91 Ohio St.3d 474, 747 N.E.2d 206 (2001), and 2 Restatement of the Law 
2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 146 (1971), urging that Ohio conflict-of-laws 
analysis requires application of Ohio law to determine whether their claims are 
barred, not the five-year corporate-survival period provided by Illinois law.  They 
also assert that nothing in the Ohio receivership statute limits its application to 
domestic corporations, and they claim that if Sager negligently exposed them to 
asbestos while doing business in Ohio, then they have a right to recover against its 
remaining asset—unexhausted insurance coverage in Sager’s liability policies—
regardless of whether it still exists as a corporation.  They further assert that Sager 
failed to argue to the trial court that the unexhausted insurance policies are not 
corporate assets and has therefore waived that argument, and they urge that 
Sager’s appearance in this case demonstrates that such insurance proceeds do 
exist. Finally, they maintain that subjecting Sager to the same laws applicable to 
domestic corporations does not violate the Due Process, Commerce, and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses, because Sager became subject to Ohio law by choosing 
to conduct business in this state. 
{¶ 12} The single matter, however, raised by this appeal is whether the 
appellate court properly affirmed the decision to appoint a receiver to accept 
service of process and marshal assets consisting of unexhausted liability-
insurance proceeds for a dissolved foreign corporation in this case. It did not. 
Law and Analysis 
Application of Law 
{¶ 13} Although the trial court relied on R.C. 1701.88(B) as authority to 
appoint a receiver, we recognize that R.C. 1701.98 restricts the provisions of R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
1701.01 to 1701.98 to domestic corporations, except as otherwise provided, and 
we are unaware of any provision extending its authority to foreign corporations. 
{¶ 14} The analysis of the court of appeals applying R.C. 2735.01(E) is 
more compelling because that section of the code authorizes a common pleas 
court to appoint a receiver when a corporation has been dissolved.  However, as 2 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 300, explains, “A state, 
without terminating the existence of a foreign corporation, may wind up its 
business in the State, subject to constitutional limitations.” (Emphasis added.)  
Thus, while the appellate court correctly recognized that a trial court has the 
authority to appoint a receiver for a foreign corporation to wind up its affairs in 
Ohio, that authority is limited by our obligation to afford full faith and credit to 
the laws of other states. 
{¶ 15} Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution mandates 
that full faith and credit be given “to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State.”   The court in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. 
Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259-260, 47 S.Ct. 391, 71 L.Ed. 634 (1927), dealing 
with a dissolved corporation, commented: 
 
[C]orporations exist for specific purposes, and only by legislative 
act, so that if the life of the corporation is to continue even only for 
litigating purposes it is necessary that there should be some 
statutory authority for the prolongation. The matter is really not 
procedural or controlled by the rules of the court in which the 
litigation pends. It concerns the fundamental law of the corporation 
enacted by the state which brought the corporation into being. 
 
See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 
95 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987) (“No principle of corporation law and practice is more 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations 
* * *”); Young v. JCR Petroleum, Inc., 188 W.Va. 280, 283, 423 S.E.2d 889 
(1992). 
Amenability to Suit 
{¶ 16} Sager Corporation contends that the law of Illinois controls 
whether it is amenable to suit in Ohio.  The claimants urge application of the 
discovery rule for their claims because their injuries occurred in Ohio, and 
therefore Ohio law should be applied.  They rely on Ohayon v. Safeco Ins. Co., 91 
Ohio St.3d 474, 747 N.E.2d 206 (2001), and 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, 
Conflict of Laws, Section 146, for the proposition that the rights and liabilities of 
the parties with respect to a tort are determined by the local law of the state where 
the injury occurred. 
{¶ 17} We have not previously considered this choice-of-law question in 
this context. 
{¶ 18} In support of the view that a dissolved foreign corporation is 
amenable to suit, claimants cite N. Am. Asbestos Corp. v. San Francisco Superior 
Court, 180 Cal.App.3d 902, 225 Cal.Rptr. 877 (1986), in which a California 
appellate court, relying on a California statute, held that a dissolved Illinois 
corporation could be sued in California.  We recognize that a contrary decision 
has been rendered by a different California appellate court in Greb v. Diamond 
Internatl. Corp., 184 Cal.App.4th 15, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 744 (2010), stating 
that this same statute permitting suit against a dissolved corporation does not 
apply to out-of-state corporations.  The conflict between these rulings is currently 
pending before the California Supreme Court, 237 P.3d 530, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 
(2010). 
{¶ 19} The claimants also cite Dr. Hess & Clark, Inc. v. Metalsalts Corp., 
119 F.Supp. 427, 429 (D.N.J.1954), which held that a dissolved Illinois 
corporation, licensed to do business in New Jersey, remained amenable to suit in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
New Jersey based a statute that “continues a domestic or foreign corporation after 
dissolution for the purpose of defending actions brought against it.”  Id. at 428.  
This latter case is distinguishable, as Ohio has no comparable statute continuing 
the life of foreign corporations doing business in Ohio. 
{¶ 20} In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. 
Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 58 S.Ct. 125, 82 L.Ed.147 (1937), the United States 
Supreme Court applied an Illinois corporate-survival statute in determining that a 
dissolved Illinois corporation lacked capacity to initiate a proceeding in a 
bankruptcy court.  The court explained: 
 
[A] private corporation in this country can exist only under the 
express law of the state or sovereignty by which it was created. Its 
dissolution puts an end to its existence, the result of which may be 
likened to the death of a natural person. There must be some 
statutory authority for the prolongation of its life, even for 
litigation purposes. 
 
Id., 302 U.S. at 124-125.  The court went on to examine the Illinois corporate-
survival statute, stating:  
 
It is plain enough, under the Illinois statute, that after the 
expiration of two years from the date of its dissolution, [the 
corporation] was without corporate capacity to initiate any legal 
proceeding—including a proceeding under section 77B [of the 
Bankruptcy Act], unless we are able to say that the statute, in its 
terms or in its application, is in conflict with section 77B. 
 
Id. at 126. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 21} The court concluded that state and federal law did not conflict, 
because  
 
[h]ow long and upon what terms a state-created corporation may 
continue to exist is a matter exclusively of state power.  The 
circumstances under which the power shall be exercised and the 
extent to which it shall be carried are matters of state policy, to be 
decided by the state Legislature. There is nothing in the Federal 
Constitution which operates to restrain a state from terminating 
absolutely and unconditionally the existence of a state-created 
corporation, if that be authorized by the statute under which the 
corporation has been organized. 
 
(Citations omitted.)  Id. at 127-128. 
{¶ 22} The court went on to hold:  
 
[T]he only power left to the corporation when this proceeding was 
brought was to finish pending cases begun within two years after 
its dissolution. With that exception, its corporate powers were 
ended for all time and for all purposes. It was without authority to 
purchase the certificate issued at the mechanic's lien foreclosure 
sale, or to adopt resolutions authorizing proceedings under section 
77B, or to bring a proceeding to effectuate a reorganization under 
that section. In respect of these matters the corporation was 
nonexistent. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 129-130. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10
{¶ 23} In accordance with Chicago Title, supreme courts in other states 
also apply the law of the state of incorporation in deciding whether a dissolved 
corporation has capacity to be sued in a forum state.  E.g., Casselman v. Denver 
Tramway Corp., 195 Colo. 241, 244, 577 P.2d 293 (1978) (“We hold that the 
question of whether a foreign corporation can be sued after dissolution depends 
upon the law of the state of incorporation”); Owens v. Allied Underwriters, 207 
La. 437, 450, 21 So.2d 490 (1945) (“Since the life of the corporation has been 
terminated under the laws of Texas, it no longer has the capacity to be sued in 
Louisiana”); Halliwell Assocs., Inc. v. C.E. Maguire Servs., Inc., 586 A.2d 530, 
531-532 (R.I.1991) (“since Halliwell Associates is a Massachusetts corporation, 
Massachusetts law governs the capacity of a Massachusetts corporation or its 
shareholders to sue or be sued”); Meehl ex rel. Eagle Indemn. Co. v. Barr 
Transfer Co., 305 Mich. 276, 283, 9 N.W.2d 540 (1943) (“There is no question 
but that the dissolution of a corporation is governed by the laws of the State 
granting its charter”); Gassert v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 392, 
393 (Minn.1979) (“We have held that the law of the state of incorporation applies 
to a dissolved corporation. Since it is undisputed that CMI is a Missouri 
corporation, the Missouri survival statute applies” [citation omitted]); Velasquez 
v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 510, 589 A.2d 143 (1991) (“The choice-of-law question 
regarding a corporation's capacity to be sued has been answered by reference to 
the laws of the state of incorporation since long before the rule's incorporation 
into the federal rules of civil procedure”); Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N.Y. 529, 540, 
58 N.E.2d 719 (1944) (the California survival statute “is entitled to recognition 
and enforcement by the courts of this State”); Wettengel v. Robinson, 288 Pa. 362, 
370, 136 A. 673 (1927) (“The Riverside Company being a West Virginia 
corporation, the law of that state governs the status and powers of the corporation 
and its directors after the surrender of its charter”); Floerchinger v. Sioux Falls 
Gas Co., 68 S.D. 543, 547, 5 N.W.2d 55 (1942) (applying New Jersey corporation 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
law); Miller Mgmt. Co. v. State, 140 Tex. 370, 373, 167 S.W.2d 728 (1943) (“The 
question of whether a foreign corporation continues in existence, after the 
surrender of its charter, for the purpose of pending suits is to be determined by the 
statutes and laws of the State in which the corporation was created”); Bazan v. 
Kux Machine Co., 52 Wis.2d 325, 333, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971) (“It is the rule 
that when a corporation becomes defunct by dissolution in the state of its creation, 
it is defunct in every other state unless such other state has also granted it a 
charter”). 
{¶ 24} In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(2) provides that “[c]apacity to sue 
or be sued is determined * * * for a corporation, by the law under which it was 
organized,” and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Citizens Elec. Corp. v. 
Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir.1995), has applied this 
rule in holding that Illinois law controls whether a dissolved Illinois corporation 
has capacity to be sued in federal court.  Accord Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 
165, 176-177 (2d Cir.2007) (applying Delaware survival statute). 
{¶ 25} Also, 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 
299(1), states, “Whether the existence of a corporation has been terminated or 
suspended is determined by the local law of the state of incorporation.”  Section 
299 has been cited with approval by the courts in Hood Bros. Partners, L.P. v. 
USCO Distrib. Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 1386, 1388 (11th Cir.1998), fn. 1; Cunard 
Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 458 (2d Cir.1985); 
Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo.1982); Willey v. Brown, 390 
A.2d 1039, 1042 (Me.1978); and Greb v. Diamond Internatl. Corp., 184 
Cal.App.4th 15, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 744 (2010). 
{¶ 26} We concur.  The question of whether a dissolved foreign 
corporation has the capacity to sue or be sued is a matter determined by the law of 
the state of incorporation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12
{¶ 27} In this case, then, we look to Illinois law because Sager 
incorporated there.  Ill.Ann.Stat., Chapter 805, Section 5/12.80, permits claims to 
be filed against a dissolved Illinois corporation for a period of five years 
following dissolution:  
 
The dissolution of a corporation * * * shall not take away 
nor impair any civil remedy available to or against such 
corporation, its directors, or shareholders, for any right or claim 
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action 
or other proceeding thereon is commenced within five years after 
the date of such dissolution. 
 
Applying this statute in Pielet v. Pielet, 407 Ill.App.3d 474, 496, 942 N.E.2d 606 
(2010), the court observed: “[O]nce the survival period has ended, the corporation 
ceases to exist. Since the corporation at that point no longer exists, it can no 
longer be subject to any claim, and any claims not raised against or by the 
corporation become forfeited.” 
{¶ 28} Claimants here cannot overcome the lack of existence of the Sager 
Corporation, nor can they deny the Illinois five-year survival statute, which 
allowed claims to be commenced against Sager only until June 17, 2003.  Because 
Sager no longer exists and because it no longer has the capacity to be sued, no 
judgment can be taken against it. 
Appointment of a Receiver 
{¶ 29} We next consider whether a court may appoint a receiver for a 
dissolved foreign corporation that is no longer amenable to suit as a vehicle to 
seek recovery directly from the corporation’s insurance carriers. 
{¶ 30} In State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs, 60 Ohio St.3d 69, 74, 573 
N.E.2d 62 (1991), fn. 4, we described a receiver as “ ‘[a]n indifferent person 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
between the parties to a cause, appointed by the court to receive and preserve the 
property or fund in litigation, and receive its rents, issues, profits, and apply or 
dispose of them at the direction of the court’ ” (emphasis added), quoting Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1268 (6th Ed.1990).  Thus, a receiver may preserve and 
administer assets pending the outcome of litigation. See R.C. 2735.04; 3 Ralph 
Ewing Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers, Section 756.1, at 
1419 (3d Ed.1959; 1992 reprint); accord Scandinavian-Am. Bank v. Wentworth 
Lumber Co., 101 Or. 158, 166, 199 P. 626 (1921).  And as the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated in In re Hawkins Mtge. Co., 66 F.2d 16, 18 (7th 
Cir.1933), “[a] receiver should not be appointed except where there are some 
assets to be administered.”   The question then remains as to whether the 
unexhausted liability-insurance proceeds are assets subject to receivership.  They 
are not. 
{¶ 31} In W. Broad Chiropractic v. Am. Family Ins., 122 Ohio St.3d 497, 
2009-Ohio-3506, 912 N.E.2d 1093, ¶ 28, we stated, “R.C. 3929.06(B) precludes 
an injured person from bringing a civil action against the tortfeasor's insurer until 
the injured person has first obtained a judgment for damages against the insured 
and the insurer has not paid the judgment within 30 days.”  In Hartford Acc. & 
Indemn. Co. v. Randall, 125 Ohio St. 581, 585, 183 N.E. 433 (1932), we 
explained that a tort claimant has only a potential interest in a liability-insurance 
policy covering claims against the insured and that potential interest “does not 
develop into a vested right until a judgment is secured.”  For this reason, it is only 
after a judgment has been secured against an insured that “ ‘[t]he amount of the 
policy to the extent of liability incurred by the insured is deemed to be an asset of 
the insured.’ ” Steffens v. Am. Std. Ins. Co. of Wis., 181 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Iowa 
1970), quoting 22 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Section 14565, at 608 
(1947). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14
{¶ 32} Because Sager lacks capacity to be sued, no judgment can be taken 
against it.  And without a judgment, R.C. 3929.06(B) precludes a direct action 
against the unexhausted proceeds from any liability-insurance policies and 
conditions the filing of a supplemental complaint against the insurer upon the 
entry of a final judgment. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, a receiver may not accept service of process on 
behalf of Sager, process defenses, or purport to marshal its assets consisting of 
unexhausted insurance proceeds, because the statute precludes that action until a 
judgment has been rendered that remains unpaid. 
{¶ 34} In Lilliquist v. Copes-Vulcan, Inc., 21 A.3d 1233, 2011 PA Super 
102 (Pa.App.2011), the trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of 
SVI, a dissolved Alabama corporation, in connection with Lilliquist’s asbestos 
litigation involving 54 entities.  An Alabama statute barred all claims not filed 
within a two-year period following publication of the notice of corporate 
dissolution. 
{¶ 35} The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of claims against SVI, 
including the request to appoint a receiver to manage SVI’s alleged assets 
consisting of insurance funds, holding that because all claims had been barred as a 
matter of law, no legal right existed for appointment of a receiver. 
{¶ 36} Likewise, in Gilliam v. Hi-Temp Prods. Inc., 260 Mich.App. 98, 
118, 677 N.W.2d 856 (2003), the Michigan Court of Appeals explained:  
 
[Insurance policies’] only value is the protection they provided 
from tort liability judgments. * * * If there have been no tort 
claims triggering claims for defense or indemnification by [the 
insured], or the deadline for the filing of any claims covered by the 
policies has expired, the policies are of no value.  They cannot be 
“distributed.” They are no longer assets of the corporation. 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
 
(Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 37} And further, in Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 89 Ill.App.3d 
569, 574, 411 N.E.2d 1153 (1980), the court also rejected an argument that an 
insurance policy belonging to a dissolved corporation is an “undistributed 
corporate asset,” stating: “No cause of action which accrues after dissolution may 
be brought against a dissolved corporation.  Thus, the existence of an insurance 
policy is irrelevant here.” 
Conclusion 
{¶ 38} The Sager Corporation filed for dissolution in Illinois in 1998, and 
the Illinois statute permitting claims to be filed against it required claims to be 
filed on or before June 17, 2003.  After that date, Sager was no longer amenable 
to suit.  The authority to appoint a receiver for a dissolved foreign corporation is 
subject to constitutional limitations, notably the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
obliging us to recognize Illinois corporation law as barring claims filed against 
Sager that were not pending on June 17, 2003.  Thus, the court is without 
authority to appoint a receiver to “accept the process of claims, process defenses 
and marshal assets” on behalf of the Sager Corporation, as the trial court ruled. 
{¶ 39} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} I dissent.  I would adopt the opinion of the court of appeals, which 
held that R.C. 2735.01(E) provides authority for the trial court to appoint a 
receiver for the dissolved Illinois corporation in this case.  The appointment of a 
receiver would allow the insurance policies that Sager Corporation paid for to do 
what Sager intended that they do: cover insured risks that arose in Ohio within the 
applicable coverage period.  The appointment of a receiver for that purpose would 
do no harm to the dissolved corporation or its shareholders, thus leaving the 
philosophical underpinnings of the Illinois survival statute unscathed. 
{¶ 41} In In re Texas E. Overseas, Inc., Del. Chancery, C.A. No. 4326-
VCN, 2009 WL 4270799 (Nov. 30, 2009), aff’d, In re Texas E. Overseas, Inc., 
998 A.2d 852 (Del.2010), a party petitioned the court to appoint a receiver for 
Texas Eastern Overseas (“TEO”), a corporation that had been dissolved for 15 
years and was beyond Delaware’s three-year survival period for claims against it, 
to obtain contribution from its insurers in the event that TEO was found liable for 
environmental pollution in a pending federal action.  The Delaware court 
addressed whether allowing the appointment of a receiver would undermine the 
purpose of its three-year limit on claims against dissolved corporations.  The court 
noted that the survival statute “was intended to balance the public policy interest 
of providing adequate time for potential claimants to bring suit against a dissolved 
corporation with the countervailing consideration of ‘allowing directors, officers, 
and stockholders to be free from claims relating to the dissolved corporation after 
sufficient time has passed.’ ” Id. at *5, quoting In re Dow Chem. Internatl. Inc., 
Del. Chancery, C.A. No. 3972-CC, 2008 WL 4603580, *2 (Oct. 14, 2008).  The 
court held that allowing the appointment of a receiver would not jeopardize those 
policy concerns, because any recovery would be limited to corporate assets, i.e., 
insurance proceeds, and that the receiver would have no claim to corporate assets 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
distributed in the dissolution process or any separate claim against former 
shareholders, directors, or officers. 
{¶ 42} Likewise, here, there is no threat to directors, officers, or 
stockholders of the Illinois corporation.  This court should thus conclude that the 
policy concerns of the Illinois survival statute would not be implicated by the 
appointment of a receiver to process insurance coverage for injured Ohioans. 
__________________ 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Bruce P. Mandel, and Max Thomas; and 
Troutman Sanders, L.L.P., and Patrick F. Hofer, for appellant. 
 
Bevan & Associates, L.P.A., Inc., Thomas W. Bevan, Patrick M. Walsh, 
and Joshua P. Grunda, for appellees. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, and 
Cary Silverman, urging reversal for amici curiae the Ohio Insurance Institute, 
Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., Property Casualty Insurers Association of 
America, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and American 
Insurance Association. 
 
Weston Hurd, L.L.P., Daniel A. Richards, Shawn W. Maestle, and 
Melanie R. Shaerban, urging reversal for the Ohio Association of Civil Trial 
Attorneys. 
______________________