Title: Yates v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

342 So. 2d 312 (1977) Phillip G. YATES v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 49496. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 16, 1977. Phillip G. Yates, pro se. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Catherine Walker, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before INZER, SUGG and LEE, JJ. LEE, Justice: This is a pro se appeal by Phillip G. Yates from an order of the Circuit Court of *313 George County denying his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Motion to Vacate Judgment. We affirm. On February 18, 1964, Yates was indicted for murder, armed robbery and kidnapping by the George County Grand Jury and he entered pleas of guilty to all three (3) indictments. A jury was impaneled to determine punishment on the murder charge, and the court sentenced him to death upon return of the jury verdict. Sentences were not imposed on the guilty pleas to armed robbery and kidnapping. This Court reversed the case, it was tried again, and Yates was sentenced to death a second time. For a period of eight (8) years the case was litigated in the State and Federal courts when finally, in 1972, the Federal court directed the State trial court to resentence Yates to a term prescribed by law, but for less than the penalty of death. Yates v. Cook, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2850, 33 L. Ed. 2d 746 (1972); Yates v. Breazeale, 466 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.1972). Appellant was resentenced on November 13, 1972, to life imprisonment on the murder charge, and, at the same time, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on the armed robbery charge, and to thirty (30) years imprisonment on the kidnapping charge, the sentences to run consecutively. He contends the judgments on the armed robbery and kidnapping charges should be vacated, or, in the alternative, he should be allowed to enter pleas of not guilty to those charges, and he assigns the following errors: (1) The charge of murder is a greater offense, and the charges of armed robbery and kidnapping are essential, interrelated elements of appellant's murder charge, therefore, the lesser charges are merged in the greater charge. (2) Appellant was not sentenced on the armed robbery and kidnapping charges for eight (8) years, thereby denying him the right to a speedy trial. (3) After a delay of eight (8) years appellant should have been allowed to change his plea from guilty to not guilty on the charges of armed robbery and kidnapping. Did appellant's three guilty pleas on charges of murder, armed robbery and kidnapping merge into the murder charge? Appellant was indicted [see Appendix] for murder under Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-19(1)(a) [Section 2215, Mississippi Code of 1942 amended 1974 to provide for capital murder]. That section follows: Subsection (c) is the felony-murder statute, and the argument of appellant assumes that he was indicted under that section resulting in double jeopardy to him in violation if his constitutional rights. Appellant's written confession introduced on the murder trial indicated that "[H]e got scared and did not know what to do, and he decided to kill Gordon." Yates v. State, 251 Miss. 376, 392, 169 So. 2d 792, 800 (1964). It is clear from that case Yates knew he was entering pleas of guilty to three (3) separate and distinct charges and indictments. This Court discussed double jeopardy in Burton v. State, 226 Miss. 31, 79 So. 2d 242 (1955): Appellant, in contending that he was convicted of a felony-murder, relies on State, ex rel. Wikberg v. Henderson, 292 So. 2d 505 (La. 1974). The case involved an attempted armed robbery in which the store owner was shot to death. The State admitted that it prosecuted under the felony-murder provision. After defendant's conviction of murder, the State later charged him with attempted armed robbery. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution barred a prosecution for attempted armed robbery, but stated: We are of the opinion that the robbery and kidnapping charges did not merge in the murder charge in this case, and there is no merit in this assignment of error. However, we do not hold or imply that where two crimes are connected in a chain of events or occur as part of the res gestae, the crime of capital murder may not be sustained under Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1976). Was appellant denied a speedy trial since he was not sentenced on the armed robbery and kidnapping charges for a period of eight (8) years? Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), discussed whether a defendant had been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and the Court set forth the following factors for that determination: (1) length of time, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. The showing of a mere lapse of time is not enough to establish denial of a speedy trial. Fleming v. United States, 378 F.2d 502 (1967). The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S. Ct. 481, 1 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1957). After plea of guilty, a defendant is in the custody of the court, and he so remains subject to being sentenced at a later term. The court retains full jurisdiction over him and the case. White v. State, 214 Miss. 235, 58 So. 2d 510 (1952). United States v. James, 459 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.1972), involved the conviction of a defendant in June, 1968, and the imposition of sentence in March, 1971. The Court said: In Scott v. United States, 434 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.1970), the Court stated: Yates served eight (8) years on death row while exhausting his remedies in the murder conviction. He made no request for sentence in the armed robbery and kidnapping cases as was required by Cummings v. State, 219 So. 2d 673 (Miss. 1969), and he was not prejudiced by failure of the court to impose sentence. We are of the opinion that this assignment is without merit. Should appellant have been permitted to change his plea of guilty to not guilty on the charges of armed robbery and kidnapping? Yates contends that before he was sentenced on the armed robbery and kidnapping charges, he made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The record does not support this contention. The judgments on said pleas state "... and he had naught to say." In Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So. 2d 642 (Miss. 1973), the Court stated: The matter of permitting a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea and to enter a plea of not guilty is within the sound discretion of the trial court, although that discretion should be exercised in favor of innocence and liberty, and, where the motion is timely made, the court should administer the law and hear the motion on its merits, if possible. Lambert v. State, 245 Miss. 227, 147 So. 2d 480 (1962). The motion should be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth that the defendant had a meritorious defense or was innocent of the charge or that he had pleaded guilty under mistake or duress, and where this procedure is not followed (which was not done here), the court cannot be put in error for declining to set aside the guilty plea. Langston v. State, 245 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1971). Yates was represented by competent counsel, and his rights were protected under the law. His pleas of guilty were not mere admissions of guilt, but were tantamount to convictions and were as conclusive as a jury verdict. We are of the opinion that there is no merit in this assignment. For the reasons stated, this Court affirms the lower court's denial of the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. AFFIRMED. GILLESPIE, C.J., PATTERSON and INZER, P. JJ., and SMITH, ROBERTSON, SUGG, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur. THE GRAND JURORS of the State of Mississippi, taken from the body of the good and lawful men of said County, duly elected, empanelled, sworn and charged, at the Term aforesaid of the Court aforesaid, to inquire in and for the body of the County aforesaid, in the name and by the authority of the State of Mississippi, upon their oaths present: That late of the County aforesaid, on the 27th day of January in the year of our Lord, 19 64 , in the County and State aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did, then and there, kill and murder one Jerry Gordon a human being, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.