Title: State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SLIWINSKI, EXR., APPELLANT, v. BURNHAM UNRUH, 
JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-
Ohio-1734.] 
Prohibition — No patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction — Judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2007-2228─Submitted April 9, 2008 ─ Decided April 16, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 23947. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for a 
writ of prohibition.  Appellant seeks to prevent a trial court judge from conducting 
a sanctions hearing and enforcing entries dismissing a defendant from the case 
and awarding costs and attorney fees.  Because the trial court judge does not 
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to do so, we affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
Sliwinski v. Village at St. Edwards, 
Summit C.P. No. CV-2006-10-6432 
{¶ 2} In 2006, appellant, Mary Sliwinski, the executor of the estate of 
Alice Sekerak, filed a complaint in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas 
alleging claims of negligence, wrongful death, and medical malpractice against 
Robert E. Norman, M.D., and The Villages at St. Edwards, a nursing home.  After 
appellee, Judge Brenda Burnham Unruh, denied the nursing home’s motion for 
summary judgment, the nursing home filed a motion pursuant to R.C. 2323.42(B), 
requesting the common pleas court to find that appellant lacked a good-faith basis 
to continue prosecuting the case against it and, based on that finding, to dismiss 
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the claim against it and award expenses, attorney fees, and costs.  In her response 
to the motion, appellant claimed that the motion should be denied because she had 
“an excellent good faith basis upon which to continue the case.” 
{¶ 3} In September 2007, Judge Burnham Unruh granted the nursing 
home’s motion after determining that appellant’s “own experts are unable to 
establish proximate causation” for the claims against the nursing home.  Upon 
appellant’s request for clarification, Judge Burnham Unruh issued a new entry 
noting that as a result of the previous entry, no claims remained pending against 
the nursing home and that the nursing home would be entitled to attorney fees and 
costs, with an evidentiary hearing scheduled to determine the amount. 
Court of Appeals Case 
{¶ 4} In November 2007, appellant filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Summit County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Burnham 
Unruh from conducting any further hearings on the award of attorney fees and 
costs and from enforcing her entries granting the nursing home’s good-faith 
motion.  Shortly thereafter, the court of appeals dismissed the complaint sua 
sponte. 
{¶ 5} This cause is now before the court upon appellant’s appeal as of 
right. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 6} Appellant asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing her 
prohibition complaint.  A court can dismiss a complaint sua sponte and without 
notice if the complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the 
facts alleged in the complaint.  State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 7} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, appellant had to 
establish that (1) Judge Burnham Unruh was about to exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and (3) 
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denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists 
in the ordinary course of law.  Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 14.  Appellant sufficiently 
alleged that Judge Burnham Unruh exercised judicial authority in granting the 
nursing home’s good-faith motion and dismissing the claims against the nursing 
home. 
Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction:  R.C. 2323.42 
{¶ 8} For the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, “unless 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, a tribunal having general 
subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law 
by appeal.”  State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-
6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 9} Appellant claims that under R.C. 2323.42, Judge Burnham Unruh 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to award costs and fees and to 
dismiss the claims against the nursing home.  R.C. 2323.42 prescribes 
“procedures in civil actions upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic 
claim in which a court must determine, upon a defendant’s motion, whether or not 
there is a reasonable good faith basis upon which the particular claim is asserted 
against that defendant, and the court must award the defendant certain court costs 
and attorneys’ fees if no reasonable good faith basis is found.”  Legislative Bill 
Analysis to 2002 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 281, Bill Summary, 124th General Assembly, 
www.lsc.state.oh. us/analyses. 
{¶ 10} “Upon the motion of any defendant in a civil action based upon a 
medical claim * * *, the court shall conduct a hearing regarding the existence or 
nonexistence of a reasonable good faith basis upon which the particular claim is 
asserted against the moving defendant.”  R.C. 2323.42(A). 
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{¶ 11} If, after the hearing, the court “determines that there was no 
reasonable good faith basis upon which the plaintiff asserted the claim in question 
against the moving defendant or that, at some point during the litigation, the 
plaintiff lacked a good faith basis for continuing to assert that claim, the court 
shall award all of the following in favor of the moving defendant: 
{¶ 12} “(1) All court costs incurred by the moving defendant; 
{¶ 13} “(2) Reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the moving defendant 
in defense of the claim after the time that the court determines that no reasonable 
good faith basis existed upon which to assert or continue to assert the claim; 
{¶ 14} “(3) Reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in support of the good 
faith motion.”  R.C. 2323.42(C). 
{¶ 15} Appellant asserts that R.C. 2323.42 patently and unambiguously 
divested Judge Burnham Unruh of jurisdiction in two respects.  Appellant first 
claims that the trial court’s jurisdiction under the statute could not vest until the 
close of discovery because R.C. 2323.42(A) provides that the “defendant shall file 
the motion not earlier than the close of discovery in the action and not later than 
thirty days after the court or jury renders any verdict or award in the action.” 
{¶ 16} Appellant’s claim lacks merit.  R.C. 2323.42(A) does not specify a 
jurisdictional requirement.  “As a general rule, a statute providing a time for the 
performance of an official duty will be construed as directory so far as time for 
performance is concerned, especially where the statute fixes the time simply for 
convenience or orderly procedure.”  State ex rel. Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 
Ohio St. 467, 32 O.O. 542, 66 N.E.2d 531, paragraph three of the syllabus; State 
ex rel. Ragozine v. Shaker, 96 Ohio St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992, 772 N.E.2d 
1192, ¶ 13.  In fact, R.C. 2323.42(A) does not direct the court to act within any 
specified time.  Cf. State ex rel. Madsen v. Foley Jones, 106 Ohio St.3d 178, 
2005-Ohio-4381, 833 N.E.2d 291, ¶ 8. 
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{¶ 17} Appellant next asserts that R.C. 2323.42(C) does not list dismissal 
as one of the dispositive options of the court when it makes a finding that the 
plaintiff’s claim lacks a good-faith basis. Therefore, appellant asserts, Judge 
Burnham Unruh patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to do so. 
{¶ 18} Again, appellant’s claim lacks merit.  R.C. 2323.42(C) does not 
expressly prohibit a court from dismissing a claim that it determines to lack a 
good-faith basis.  In fact, under R.C. 2323.42(D), a defendant that intends to file a 
good-faith motion must first serve a “ ‘notice of demand for dismissal and 
intention to file a good faith motion’ ” on the plaintiff.  (Emphasis added.)  This 
language implies that a court has authority to dismiss the claim against the 
moving defendant if it determines that no reasonable good-faith basis exists for 
the plaintiff to have asserted the claim or to continue asserting the claim.  In fact, 
it would be unreasonable to conclude that a claim that lacks a good-faith basis 
could not be dismissed or denied.  See State ex rel. Todd v. Felger, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 207, 2007-Ohio-6053, 877 N.E.2d 673, ¶ 10 (court has duty to construe 
statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd result). 
{¶ 19} In addition, trial courts have inherent authority under certain 
circumstances to dismiss claims even without a motion.  Scott, 112 Ohio St.3d 
324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14 (“Sua sponte dismissal without 
notice is warranted when a complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously 
cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint”); Stiriz v. Motorists Mut. Ins. 
Co. (Mar. 29, 2002), Fulton App. No. F-01-010, 2002 WL 479826, * 7 (trial court 
did not err in dismissing a meritless claim prior to trial without any pending 
dismissal motion). 
{¶ 20} Appellant next contends that if R.C. 2323.42 is construed to permit 
dismissal of her medical claims against the nursing home, it is unconstitutional.  
Appellant raised this issue in her complaint in the court of appeals (“Such would 
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obviously conflict unconstitutionally with the Supreme Court’s Civil Rule 56 
significantly different summary judgment procedures”). 
{¶ 21} Appellant’s contention does not raise a patent and unambiguous 
lack of jurisdiction because R.C. 2323.42 is presumed constitutional, and 
constitutional challenges to legislation are normally resolved in an action in the 
ordinary course of law in a common pleas court rather than in an action for 
extraordinary relief in this court.  Scott, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 
859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 18; State ex rel. Beane v. Dayton, 112 Ohio St.3d 553, 2007-
Ohio-811, 862 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, in the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of 
jurisdiction, appellant has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by 
way of appeal from any adverse final order entered by Judge Burnham Unruh in 
the underlying case.  Insofar as appellant claims that because the judge’s orders 
are not yet appealable, she lacks an adequate remedy at law, it is well settled that 
“neither prohibition nor mandamus may be employed as a substitute for an appeal 
from interlocutory orders.”  State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
47, 51, 676 N.E.2d 109; see also State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 
Ohio St.2d 55, 63 O.O.2d 88, 295 N.E.2d 659, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
Court of Appeals Journal Entry Signed by Two Judges 
{¶ 23} In her final claim, appellant asserts that the court of appeals’ 
dismissal of her complaint in prohibition is void because it was signed by only 
two judges.  She cites Section 3, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which 
specifies that in appellate districts having more than three judges, “three judges 
shall participate in the hearing and disposition of each case.” 
{¶ 24} We rejected a similar claim in State ex rel. Baran v. Fuerst (1990), 
55 Ohio St.3d 94, 96, 563 N.E.2d 713: 
{¶ 25} “We find that Baran has failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support his assertion that only two [court of appeals] judges participated in the 
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case below.  All that he offers by way of proof is the journal entry and opinion, 
which was signed by Presiding Judge Nahra and reflected the concurrence of 
Judge Dyke.  But the number of judges participating in a case may be greater than 
the signatures on a journal entry would indicate.  The Rules of Appellate 
Procedure do not specify that each participating judge must sign entries.  To the 
contrary, all that is required is the signature of one judge.  See App.R. 22(A), 
which provides that ‘[a]ll judgments shall be in the form of a journal entry signed 
by a judge of the court and filed with the clerk.’  (Emphasis added.)” 
{¶ 26} Appellant’s citation of Sup.R. 36.1 does not require a contrary 
result.  That rule involves the court of appeals’ duty to make available to the 
parties in a case the names of the judges assigned to hear the case before the case 
is either orally argued or submitted to the court without oral argument.  The rule 
does not require that court of appeals’ judgment entries contain the names of all of 
the participating judges. 
{¶ 27} Therefore, in accordance with Baran, the court of appeals’ 
dismissal of appellant’s complaint against the nursing home is not void. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly determined 
that appellant’s prohibition complaint lacked merit.  Appellant raises what are 
best described as potential errors in the judge’s exercise of jurisdiction, which 
should be raised on direct appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.  See, e.g., 
Jimison v. Wilson, 106 Ohio St.3d 342, 2005-Ohio-5143, 835 N.E.2d 34, ¶ 11.  
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
John Wood, for appellant. 
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Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Corina 
Staehle Gaffney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________