Title: Graham v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

303 N.E.2d 274 (1973)
Ernest GRAHAM, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 370S56.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
November 15, 1973.
Rehearing Denied January 15, 1974.
*275 William C. Erbecker, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.[*]
This is an appeal arising from the denial of post conviction relief. Appellant was convicted at trial of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison. The conviction was affirmed by this Court in Graham v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 307, 268 N.E.2d 612. On April 24, 1972, the appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief which was heard and denied on December 27, 1972. From the overruling of his motion to correct errors, appellant instituted this appeal.
Appellant first contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in preparation for his original trial. Appellant is not impugning the competency of his trial attorney, but rather is alleging that his counsel was not afforded adequate time for preparation. The record discloses that the trial court appointed counsel on the morning the cause was set for trial. Appellant alleges that the court-appointed lawyer conferred with him only twenty (20) minutes prior to the trial's commencement. That fact appearing, without more, would unhesitatingly lead this Court to the conclusion that the right to effective counsel was impaired by lack of adequate preparation where the crime charged is murder. However, our examination of the instant facts does not end here. On the day that trial counsel was appointed, appellant was given the opportunity to continue his case to provide for adequate preparation time. The following colloquy took place between the trial court and the appellant.
Contrary to appellant's contention, he was not "forced to trial" with inadequate representation. The trial court gave the appellant more than ample opportunity to prepare for his defense through a continuance of the cause. The court repeatedly explained the appellant's right to postpone the trial in order to allow counsel to better assist him. Nevertheless, the appellant insisted upon an immediate trial.
The State argues that the appellant waived his right to adequate time for trial preparation by insisting upon an immediate trial on November 17, 1969. As we have previously stated, waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Langley v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538. Finding waiver of constitutional rights is not to be lightly undertaken. However, on the facts of this case, we agree with the State that appellant did waive his right to adequate time for trial preparation. Appellant was fully apprised of the possible consequences of rushing into trial. He responded affirmatively when queried as to whether he understood the choice he had made.
Appellant is also alleging that he was denied due process of law in that he was convicted upon perjured testimony. He contends that if certain taxicab records were produced, they would show that one of the State's witnesses was lying at trial. Appellant's contention amounts to a belated attempt to introduce evidence known to him at his earlier trial in order to controvert evidence which convicted him. Collaterally, the appellant attacks the character of the same witness, alleging, inter alia, that she is a heavy drinker. It is apparent that the appellant is not raising newly discovered evidence, but is instead attempting to re-argue the sufficiency of the evidence which convicted him. The sufficiency of the evidence was fully reviewed by this Court on the previous direct appeal. Graham v. State, supra. Post conviction relief is not a substitute for direct appeal. P.C. 1 § 1(b).
*278 Finding no error in the post conviction relief hearing, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
De BRULER, J., dissents with opinion.
DeBRULER, Justice (dissenting).
While I can readily agree with the majority's statement that a total preparation time of twenty minutes for the defense in a case involving a charge of murder would "impair" the right of effective assistance of counsel, I cannot conclude from the record here that there was a valid and sufficient waiver of this right.
I believe it is necessary for a proper analysis of the issues presented here that we recognize that the right which appellant was called upon to relinquish in this proceeding amounted to nothing less than an outright waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. It has been explicitly and repeatedly recognized by both the United States and Indiana Supreme Courts that adequate pre-trial preparation time is implicit in the constitutional right to counsel.
In Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, the Federal Supreme Court held that:
Several years later that Court again recognized this important aspect of the right to counsel and more clearly delineated the functions counsel was to perform in this critical pre-trial period:
This Court has been quite clear in its interpretation of adequate preparation time as it affects both the Article 1, § 13, right to counsel of the State Constitution as well as the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution:
In the later case of Lloyd v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 192, 170 N.E.2d 904, we stated:
See also Sweet v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745; Taylor v. State *279 (1949), 227 Ind. 131, 84 N.E.2d 580; Rice v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 523, 44 N.E.2d 829.
These cases demonstrate clearly that the appellant here relinquished not a mere incidental to his right to counsel but an aspect of that right which has been held to be essential to its fulfillment. That being the case any alleged waiver he may have exercised must reach the level of a waiver of a Sixth Amendment right.
The right to counsel is a right the waiver of which cannot be presumed from a silent record. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694; Carnley v. Cochran (1962), 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70.
In order for the waiver to meet constitutional standards it must be shown to have been made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461; Nacoff v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165; Mims v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 37, 262 N.E.2d 638.
With these standards in mind I do not believe that a waiver of a constitutionally recognized aspect of the Sixth Amendment which requires that a defendant and his attorney be given an adequate preparation time can be considered valid unless the defendant has been fully informed of the hazards of his decision. Since adequate preparation time has been held to be absolutely essential to, and implicit in, the right to counsel a court must inquire as to defendant's comprehension and understanding of what he is waiving.
The bare and conclusory waiver presented in the majority opinion here is clearly insufficient since it is without inquiry as to the appellant's understanding and comprehension of the implications of his decision. A defendant can waive this aspect of the Sixth Amendment only if he has an intelligent understanding of what an attorney can do for him. It is not sufficient that he may have a vague notion that lawyers are sometimes of assistance in such matters. The Constitution requires that a defendant have knowledge of exactly what he is foregoing by his waiver. The appellant should have been made aware that his decision to proceed to trial with a lawyer who has spent twenty minutes in preparation of his defense would result in his attorney being unacquainted with appellant's version of the facts; unacquainted with the State's theory of the case and unprepared for a theory of defense; unacquainted with pre-trial events; unacquainted with any potential defense witnesses; unacquainted with the State's witnesses and possible areas of cross examination; and without time to prepare special instructions which might be usefully submitted to the jury on the issues raised in the case.
Since I believe the alleged waiver set out above is totally insufficient to meet these high standards I must respectfully dissent.
[*]  This case was assigned to this office on September 21, 1973.