Title: Derek J. Harder v. Carol L. Pfitzinger

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 102 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1817 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Derek J. Harder and Jill M. Harder,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Carol L. Pfitzinger,  
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Shorewest Realtors, Inc., ABC Insurance  
Company, XYZ Insurance Company, Mary Kay  
Sheridan, Ronald Novak, and EFG Insurance  
Company,  
          Third-Party Defendants, 
 
Shorewest Realtors, Inc., Mary Kay  
Sheridan, David J. Pfitzinger, Revere,  
Ltd, d/b/a Revere Realty Ltd and Chicago  
Insurance Company,  
          Fourth-Party Defendants. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 24, 2004 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald J. Hassin 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there was a brief 
by Daniel W. Stevens and Stevens & Kroening, LLC, Brookfield, 
and oral argument by Daniel W. Stevens. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Paul M. 
Erspamer and Lisko & Erspamer, S.C., Waukesha, and oral argument 
by Paul M. Erspamer. 
 
 
2004 WI 102 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-1817  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 2330) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Derek J. Harder and Jill M. Harder,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Carol L. Pfitzinger,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Shorewest Realtors, Inc., ABC Insurance  
Company, XYZ Insurance Company, Mary Kay  
Sheridan, Ronald Novak, and EFG Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Third-Party Defendants, 
 
Shorewest Realtors, Inc., Mary Kay  
Sheridan, David J. Pfitzinger, Revere,  
Ltd., d/b/a Revere Realty, Ltd. and Chicago  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Fourth-Party Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   Derek Harder and Jill 
Harder have sought review of an order of the court of appeals 
dismissing their appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was 
No. 
03-1817   
 
2 
 
not filed within the statutorily prescribed time from the entry 
of the order for judgment.  The Harders assert that the order 
for judgment was not the final order because a judgment was 
entered subsequently. 
¶2 
To make a timely appeal of right, a litigant must 
appeal from a final judgment or a final order.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1) (2001-02).1  We conclude that when an order or a 
judgment is entered that disposes of all of the substantive 
issues in the litigation, as to one or more parties, as a matter 
of law, the circuit court intended it to be the final document 
for purposes of appeal, notwithstanding the label it bears or 
subsequent actions taken by the circuit court.  Because the 
order for judgment meets this criterion, it is a final order, 
and the time for appeal ran from February 28, 2003, when it was 
entered.  Therefore, the Harders' July 8, 2003 notice of appeal, 
filed 130 days after the entry of the order, was untimely.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In 1997, Derek J. and Jill M. Harder bought a house in 
Oconomowoc from Carol L. Pfitzinger.  Pfitzinger, a real estate 
agent, had purchased the house from an estate.  She made some 
cosmetic changes and repairs, including replacing the roof, and 
placed it on the market.  The Harders made an offer on the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
03-1817   
 
3 
 
house, subject to a physical inspection of the property by an 
inspector of their choice.   
¶4 
During the inspection to which the offer to purchase 
was subject, the inspector discovered a number of problems, 
including some potential structural problems.  The Harders were 
present during the inspection, and the inspector also discussed 
his findings and report with them.  The Harders and Pfitzinger 
then amended the offer to purchase, whereby the Harders waived 
the 
inspection 
contingency 
in 
exchange 
for 
Pfitzinger's 
agreement to make specified repairs.  Pfitzinger did so and the 
sale closed.  
¶5 
Four years after their purchase of the house, the 
Harders listed it for sale with Shorewest Realtors, Inc.  They 
completed the required real estate condition disclosure form 
indicating the house had no major problems except for some 
moisture and a crack in a basement wall.  The Harders received 
an offer; however, the buyers chose not to proceed with the 
transaction when a subsequent inspection revealed structural 
problems.  The Harders then sued Pfitzinger, claiming she had 
been aware of various defects and had failed to disclose them. 
¶6 
Pfitzinger sued Shorewest Realtors, Inc., Mary Kay 
Sheridan, 
Ronald 
Novak,2 
and 
three 
insurance 
companies.3  
                                                 
2 Ronald Novak later was dismissed by stipulation of the 
parties. 
3 The third-party complaint listed ABC Insurance Company, 
XYZ 
Insurance 
Company, 
and 
EFG 
Insurance 
Company, 
all 
fictitiously named companies, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.12. 
No. 
03-1817   
 
4 
 
Shorewest Realtors and Sheridan then sued David J. Pfitzinger, 
Revere, Ltd., and Chicago Insurance Co.  All defendants brought 
motions seeking summary judgment of dismissal.  The circuit 
court granted the motions and signed a document labeled, "Order 
for Judgment" on February 28, 2003.  The order was entered the 
same day.  The order dismissed all claims against all defendants 
with prejudice and with costs and also stated that "the entire 
action is hereby dismissed with prejudice." 
¶7 
On March 26, 2003, the attorneys for Shorewest and 
Sheridan served a notice of entry of order on the attorneys for 
all other parties.  The notice had attached to it the 
February 28, 2003 order dismissing the action.  By a letter 
dated April 8, 2003, the attorney for Pfitzinger sent a document 
captioned "Judgment" to the clerk for her signature and filing, 
together with a bill of costs.  The judgment was signed and 
entered by the clerk on April 22, 2003, when costs were taxed.  
The judgment addressed no substantive issues.  The Harders filed 
a notice of appeal on July 8, 2003, 130 days after the 
February 28, 2003 order, 104 days after being served with the 
notice of entry of order and 77 days after the April 22, 2003 
judgment taxing costs was entered.  Pfitzinger moved to dismiss 
the appeal as untimely.  The court of appeals granted the 
motion, and the Harders petitioned for review, which we granted. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
Deciding 
whether 
the 
Harders' appeal 
was 
timely 
involves the application of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  This is a 
No. 
03-1817   
 
5 
 
question of law that we review independently of the court of 
appeals.  See Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶12, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 677 N.W.2d 630.   
B. 
The Final Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) Document 
¶9 
The outcome of this case turns on our determination of 
which of two documents constitutes the final document in the 
circuit court litigation:  (1) the February 28, 2003 order for 
judgment or (2) the April 22, 2003 judgment.  Because the 
Harders filed their appeal July 8, 2003, 130 days after entry of 
the order4 for judgment and 77 days after the entry of the 
judgment,5 if the order is the final order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1), then the Harders' appeal is untimely filed; if the 
judgment is the final § 808.03(1) document, then it was timely.6   
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(1) provides in relevant part: 
APPEALS AS OF RIGHT.  A final judgment or a final order of 
a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of right 
to the court of appeals unless otherwise expressly 
provided by law.  A final judgment or final order is a 
judgment, order or disposition that disposes of the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the 
parties, whether rendered in an action or special 
proceeding . . . 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 807.11(2) provides, "An order is entered 
when it is filed in the office of the clerk of court."  
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(1)(b) states, "A judgment is 
entered when it is filed in the office of the clerk of court."   
6 An appeal of right must be filed within 45 days after the 
entry of the final order or judgment if notice of entry of order 
or judgment was given within 21 days after the entry of the 
order or judgment, or within 90 days of the entry of the order 
or judgment if no written notice of entry was given.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.04(1). 
No. 
03-1817   
 
6 
 
The dispositive phrase in § 808.03(1) is that which defines a 
final order or judgment as one that "disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties."  
Therefore, we must set forth the meaning of this phrase and 
apply it to answer the question presented by this appeal.  
¶11 The Harders claim Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) is ambiguous 
because it reasonably permits more than one interpretation.  
They contend that under § 808.03(1) a reasonable person could 
conclude that the time for appeal begins to run either from when 
an order is entered or from when a judgment is entered.  
Pfitzinger does not argue statutory construction principles, but 
instead, goes directly into a review of prior cases that have 
interpreted 
specific 
orders 
or 
judgments 
when 
applying 
§ 808.03(1).  We conclude that Pfitzinger's approach is the 
correct one for at least two reasons:  First, the focus of 
§ 808.03(1) is not on the label a document bears, but rather it 
is on what the document does; and second, we already have 
interpreted the phrase, "disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation," in numerous cases, such that if it ever were 
ambiguous, it can no longer be construed as such.  See State v. 
Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465, 471, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999).  
Therefore, the final decision in this case does not require us 
to determine anew what § 808.03(1) means.  Rather, our decision 
turns on the application of § 808.03(1) to the two documents in 
question. 
¶12 Our past decisions show that in evaluating a given 
document, we have interpreted the phrase, "disposes of the 
No. 
03-1817   
 
7 
 
entire matter in litigation" set out in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), 
as having two components:  (1) whether the document is final in 
the sense of substantive law in that it disposes of all of the 
claims brought in the litigation as to one or more of the 
parties; and (2) whether the document is final in the sense that 
it is the last document that the circuit court intended to issue 
in the litigation.  Radoff v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 109 Wis. 2d 
490, 494, 326 N.W.2d 240 (1982).  We have also concluded that an 
order may be final and appealable notwithstanding subsequent 
actions taken in the circuit court.  Id. at 493; Fredrick v. 
City of Janesville, 92 Wis. 2d 685, 688, 285 N.W.2d 655 (1979).  
As we have explained: 
The test of finality is not what later happened in the 
case but rather, whether the trial court contemplated 
the document to be a final judgment or order at the 
time it was entered.  This must be established by 
looking at the document itself, not to subsequent 
events. 
Fredrick, 92 Wis. 2d at 688. 
¶13 Furthermore, the label given a document by either the 
circuit court or the parties is not dispositive of the question 
of whether the document is a final order or judgment under Wis. 
Stat. § 808.03(1).  Thomas/Van Dyken Joint Venture v. Van Dyken, 
90 Wis. 2d 236, 241, 279 N.W.2d 459 (1979).  Rather, it is the 
text of the document that we must examine.  Radoff, 109 Wis. 2d 
at 493; see also Town of Fitchburg v. City of Madison, 98 
Wis. 2d 635, 647-48, 299 N.W.2d 199 (1980); Fredrick, 92 Wis. 2d 
at 688.  "[I]t makes little difference whether an appeal is from 
an order or judgment . . . .  It is essential, however, that the 
No. 
03-1817   
 
8 
 
document being appealed has been entered . . . and is final."  
Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin, § 4.1, 4-2 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Appellate 
Practice].   
¶14 It 
can 
be 
argued, 
as 
the 
Harders 
do, 
that 
traditionally there has been a distinction between a judgment 
and an order.  A judgment can be seen as that document that 
determines an action, whereas an order usually determines a 
special proceeding.  See State ex rel. Hanson v. DHSS, 64 
Wis. 2d 367, 378, 219 N.W.2d 267 (1974); Appellate Practice, 
supra, § 4.2, 4-3.  However, Wis. Stat. § 801.01, in applying 
the civil procedure chapters, including Wis. Stat. ch. 808, to 
all actions and special proceedings, blurs the distinction by 
noting 
that, 
in 
general, 
an 
action 
includes 
a 
special 
proceeding.  Therefore, any historic distinction between an 
order and a judgment is not dispositive of the question 
presented here.  
¶15 If there are no further documents in the circuit 
court's file and all substantive issues have been decided for 
one or more parties in an order or a judgment, there is usually 
less confusion about whether the time for appeal has begun to 
run, than when there is a subsequent court document.  Our prior 
cases have attempted to remove confusion about when the time 
limits in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) begin to run by explaining that 
a party may not assume that the last document in the file is the 
one that is referred to in § 808.03(1).  See Fredrick, 92 
Wis. 2d at 688.  We have cautioned that the label on the 
No. 
03-1817   
 
9 
 
document is not controlling.  Thomas/Van Dyken, 90 Wis. 2d at 
241.  However, confusion has continued.  Therefore, in order to 
clarify our past decisions in regard to determining when a 
document is final for purposes of § 808.03(1), we hold that when 
a circuit court enters an order or a judgment that decides all 
substantive issues as to one or more parties, as a matter of 
law, the circuit court intended that to be the final document 
for purposes of appeal, notwithstanding subsequent actions by 
the circuit court or the label the document bears. 
¶16 After having clarified the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1), we now turn our attention to the application of 
§ 808.03(1) to the order for judgment in this case.  The text of 
the order states, in relevant part: 
The Court having considered all of the pleadings 
and papers of record, including all moving papers and 
all papers filed in opposition thereto, and having 
heard and considered the positions of the parties as 
stated during oral argument;  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the 
reasons set forth on the record at the hearing, as 
follows:  
1.  The Motion for Summary Judgment of [fourth]-
party defendants David J. Pfitzinger, Revere, Ltd., 
d/b/a 
Revere 
Realty, 
Ltd. and 
Chicago 
Insurance 
Company be and hereby is granted, and the Fourth-Party 
Complaint be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice 
and with costs; 
2.  The Motion for Summary Judgment of third-
party 
defendants/fourth-party 
plaintiffs 
Shorewest 
Realtors, Inc. and Mary Kay Sheridan, be and hereby is 
granted, and the Third-Party Complaint be and hereby 
is dismissed with prejudice and with costs, which 
results 
in 
a 
dismissal 
without 
costs 
of 
the 
No. 
03-1817   
 
10 
 
counterclaim of third-party defendants against third-
party plaintiffs; and 
3.  The 
Motion 
for 
Summary 
Judgment 
of 
defendant/third-party plaintiff Carol L. Pfitzinger be 
and hereby is granted, and plaintiffs' complaint be 
and hereby is dismissed with prejudice and with costs. 
4.  The 
preceding 
orders 
in 
paragraphs 
one 
through three immediately above result in a dismissal 
of all claims against all parties that have been 
properly served, such that the entire action is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, and with costs as set forth 
in the immediately preceding paragraphs one through 
three. 
¶17 The order described the court's consideration of all 
pleadings, 
papers 
and 
oral 
argument, 
and 
from 
that 
consideration, the court's unequivocal order to dismiss all of 
the claims against each party, including the third-party and 
fourth-party claims, addressed 
all 
substantive 
issues and 
awarded costs to the prevailing parties.  In each paragraph of 
the order after describing the action taken, the circuit court 
stated that the motion "is hereby granted" or the claim of the 
plaintiffs as to specified parties "is hereby dismissed."  For 
example, paragraph four expressly provided that "all claims 
against all parties that have been properly served, such that 
the entire action is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and with 
costs."  In so stating, the circuit court addressed the 
substantive issues as final decisions, with nothing left to be 
decided as a matter of substantive law.  The only task that 
No. 
03-1817   
 
11 
 
remained after the circuit court issued the order for judgment7 
was the determination of the amount of costs.  This is generally 
a function of the clerk of court that does not further involve 
decision 
making8 
by 
the 
circuit 
court, 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.10(1), nor does it affect the finality of the order.  See, 
e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 2003 WI App 8, ¶7, 259 Wis. 2d 676, 
659 N.W.2d 106 (indicating that a judgment disposing of a claim 
is final though a request for costs is pending); see Appellate 
Practice, supra, § 4.7, 4-5 (indicating that a document is final 
if the judgment or order "leave[s] nothing to be done except 
taxing 
of 
costs 
and 
disbursements 
and 
enforcement 
by 
                                                 
7 The April 22, 2003 judgment from which the Harders 
appealed is only one paragraph in length and references the 
earlier order for judgment as the document that ended the 
litigation.  The judgment provides: 
The Court having issued its Order for Judgment, 
judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff 
[sic], Carol L. Pfitzinger, and her attorneys . . ., 
and against defendants [sic], Derek J. Harder and Jill 
M. Harder, jointly and severally, for dismissal of all 
claims, on the merits and with prejudice, together 
with statutory attorneys fees and taxable costs of 
$955.36. 
The judgment does not mention, except by reference to the order 
for judgment, the disposition of any of the third-party and 
fourth-party claims. 
8 There are times when the bill of costs is contested, as it 
was here in regard to the expert witness fees sought.  However, 
that subsequent determination, even when made by the circuit 
court, does not change what we hold was the intent of the 
circuit court.  See Campbell v. Campbell, 2003 WI App 8, ¶7, 259 
Wis. 2d 676, 659 N.W.2d 106. 
No. 
03-1817   
 
12 
 
execution");9 Thomas/Van Dyken, 90 Wis. 2d at 243 (concluding a 
judgment is final for purposes of appeal when it disposes of the 
entire 
action, 
"precluding 
further 
proceedings 
except 
enforcement by execution").  Accordingly, because it decided all 
substantive issues as to one or more parties, we conclude that 
the circuit court intended the February 28, 2003 order for 
judgment to be the final document for purposes of appeal, even 
though it was not the final document in the circuit court's 
file.    
¶18 Although we have suggested that careful drafting, 
including a statement in the final order or judgment that it is 
the final document for purposes of appeal would help avoid 
concerns about finality, Radoff, 109 Wis. 2d at 494-95, this 
issue has continued to be problematic because our advice has not 
been followed.  It appears to us that the person aggrieved by 
the final order or judgment may have the larger incentive to 
ascertain with certainty when the time for appeal begins to run 
because the right of appeal will be lost if documents are 
misconstrued, as happened in this case.  Accordingly, we stress 
again the desirability of drafting the final document——be it an 
order or judgment——to specifically state that it is intended to 
be the final document in the litigation for purposes of appeal.  
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(1)(c) states, "A judgment is 
perfected by the taxation of costs and the insertion of the 
amount thereof in the judgment."  Perfection of a judgment is 
required for a party to execute the judgment, see § 806.06(4), 
but it has no impact on the party's right to appeal.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), the judgment need only be entered.   
No. 
03-1817   
 
13 
 
However, even if it does not so state, we will conclude, as a 
matter of law, that the circuit court intended it to be the 
final document for purposes of appeal when it decides all 
substantive issues as to one or more parties, notwithstanding 
the label it bears or subsequent actions taken by the circuit 
court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶19 We conclude that when an order or judgment is entered 
that 
disposes 
of all 
of 
the substantive 
issues in the 
litigation, as to one or more parties, as a matter of law, the 
circuit court intended it to be the final document for purposes 
of appeal, notwithstanding the label it bears or subsequent 
actions taken by the circuit court.  Because the order for 
judgment meets this criterion, it is a final order, and the time 
for appeal ran from February 28, 2003, when it was entered.  
Therefore, the Harders' July 8, 2003 notice of appeal, filed 130 
days after the entry of the order, was untimely.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals.    
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶20 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
03-1817   
 
 
 
1