Title: State v. Hinton. ICA s.d.o., filed 08/26/2008 [pdf], 118 Haw. 419. Dissenting Opinion by J. Foley [pdf]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 12/17/2008. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/29/2009 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

00 --~

 

STATE OF HAWAI'T, Respondent /Plaintift-Appellant,

MARSHALL HINTON, Petitioner /Defendant-Appellee.

 

No. 27719

CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF AP!
(CR. NO. 04-1-2546)

MARCH 19, 2009

90:1 Hd 61 UN GUIE

 

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ., AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE BLONDIN, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

. On January 29, 2009, this court accepted a timely
application for a writ of certiorari, filed on December 17, 2008
by petitioner/defendant-appellee Warshall Hinton, seeking review
of the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) September 18, 2008
judgment on appeal, entered pursuant to its August 26, 2008
sunmary disposition order (SD0). Therein, the ICA vacated the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s' December 21, 2005 findings

‘The Honorable Richard K. Perkins presided over the underlying
proceedings

 

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of fact (FOFs), conclusions of law (COls), and order granting
Hinton’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. oral
argument was held on February 19, 2009,

Briefly stated, Hinton was indicted for allegedly
touching the then-thirteen-year-old complainant [hereinafter, the
complainant) on her genital area outside her clothing and was
subsequently tried by a jury for sexual assault in the third
degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

5 707-732(1) (b) (Supp. 2008).? However, the trial court declared
a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict
and, upon motion by Hinton, dismissed the indictment with
prejudice, pursuant to State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647 P.2d
705 (1982), discussed infra. On appeal by respondent /plaintiff-
appellant State of Hawai'i (the prosecution), a majority of the
ICA concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
Gismissing the indictment and, accordingly, vacated the trial

court's dismii

 

1. Judge Foley dissented, concluding that the
s{erial] court aia not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
indictment against Hinton.*

Hinton argues on application that ‘the ICA gravely

erred in concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in

2 as § 707-732(1) (b) provides: *A person commits the offense of
sexual assault in the third degree if... [t]he person knowingly subjects to
Sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes
such a person to have sexual contact with the person[.1”
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dismissing the case under Moriwake* inasmuch as the ICA
‘improperly incorporated [a] novel ‘separation of powers’
consideration" into its analysis that “conflict[s] with Moriwake
and its progeny.” Based on the discussion below, we hold that
the ICA erred in (1) injecting an additional “separation of
powers’ analysis into the Moriwake framework and (2) holding that
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the
indictment with prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse the Ica’s
judgment on appeal and affirm the trial court’s December 21, 2005
FOFs, COLs, and order granting Hinton’s motion to dismiss the
indictment with prejudice.
1. BACKGROUND

A. Relationship Between Hinton and the Complainant

Hinton and the complainant’s grandmother, Karen Dupont,
were involved in a ronantic relationship for approximately
twenty-seven years and, during that time, had two children
together, Hinton and Dupont’s relationship began when the
complainant's mother, Jeminis Dupont (Jeminis), was two-years-
old, and, although Hinton was not her biological father, Jeminis
referred to him as “Dad.* Likewise, the complainant referred to
Hinton as *Papa.*

At the time of the alleged assault, Hinton and Dupont
were no longer in a romantic relationship; however, they
apparently remained friends. Hinton often spent time at Dupont‘s

residence, visiting his biological children and working on cars

 
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that he kept there. Dupont estimated that Hinton spent "a couple
hours" two or three days a week at her house.
B. Indictment and Trial

On December 23, 2004, Hinton was indicted with one
count of sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of HRS

5 707

 

32 (1) (b), for allegedly placing his hand on the
complainant's genital area outside her clothes. A two-day jury
trial was held on September 12 and 13, 2005.

The prosecution’s main witness at trial -- the
complainant -- testified that, on December 7, 2004, she cane hone

from school to Dupont’s house in Salt Lake, where the complainant

 

was residing with her mother, Jeminis, and other family menbers.
Upon arriving at the house, the complainant saw Hinton and Dupont

outside the hou

 

on direct examination the complainant
testified as follows:
A {87 the complainant} {inton) told me to cone
behind the truck. And then he showed me the porno magazine,
(Q (Sy the prosecution) Now, how did you krow 12 was a
ine?

were naked people on the cover
holding this magazine?

      

A Tsincon
Q, Mow iong'do you think that he was holding it in
front Of you?
2 About five seconds:
Okay. “Mow id looking at this magazine sake you
feel?
A Awhward

> At the tine of the alleged assault, the complainant had only been
residing at the Dupont house for about six wonthe =~ since July 2004, For the
four years prior eo soving to the Dupont house, ‘the complainant had been
Living in New Jersey with a fanily mesber because of her mother’s drug use.

 

 
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@ Mow, what did you do to the magazine when (Hinton!
tried fo show it ta you?

D” T'Teoked away.

O mat dia you do after he showed you the magazine?

5 T'went into the ou

 

The complainant further testified that Hinton then followed her

into the house and told her to sit down next to him on the couch

 

in the living room. The complainant indicated that she and

Hinton were sitting *close* to one another so that they were

 

touching. when asked, ‘what happened after [she] sat down next

to [Hinton], the complainant testified that:

A (By the complainant} [Hiinton} grabbed my hand.
Q [By the prosecution} And what hand =~ which of your
hands did he grab?
‘she Jefe.
And which one of his hands did he grab your hand

 

wich?
the right.
‘Okay. "And how was he holding your hand?
Elke eriss-croas:
[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Your honor, may the record
reflect the witness is shoving intertwined fingers?
[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Thank you.
by [the prosecution) :
‘ow, where id [itinton] put your hands at first?
Gn hi dap.
Okay. Aad where exactly on his lap?
Like by his knee
Did he move your hands?
Yes
And where did he move your hands?
To my nant area.
Do you have any other words for your nani?
Private part
Okay. Want part of hie body couched your nani?
Bis band.
Bo you know how long his hand was on your nant?
Three seconds
Did he move hig hand at all while it was on your

nani?
What direction did he move his hand?
‘Up and down.
Mere you wearing clothes at the tine?

Okay. And was this under your clothes or over your

4

over

 
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2 hat happened after (Hinton] touched your nani?

A T'lee go of Ale hand and went into the kitchen,

Q How did you feel at this timer

Beira

@ Dia'=> aid {Hinton} follow you into the kitchen?

A Yes

0 Did'he say anything to you at this tine?

A He wanted me to flash my boobs:

Q Okay. How do you know that?

A fe'dia hand motion.

Q Okay. And could you describe what you mean by hand
motion?

A He wont up Like chat.

TPROSBCUTING ATTORNEY) :\ Your Honor, may the racord
reflect that the witness hag shown ewo fice from a lover
position to a higher position?
By [the prosecution]

‘So what did you think he wanted you to do?

Plas
Okay. And what @o you mean by flash?
Lift up sy shire.
Okay. "and did’ you do chat?

 

 

The complainant testified that Dupont then entered the kitchen
area, but that she (the complainant) did not immediately say
anything or tell anyone (including her mother or grandnother)
about what happened. About a week later, the complainant told
her mother’s friend, ‘Aunty Kelly," about the alleged Decenber 7,
2004 assault.

‘The complainant also testified that, on December 19,
2004 while riding in Hinton’s vehicle, Hinton made her watch a
DvD of “{pleople having sex.* she later reported the incident to
wer family menbers, and the police were called that evening. The
police searched Hinton’s vehicle and recovered a DVD player, but
no pornographic DvD was found. Although the December 19 incident
4id not give rise to criminal charges, the Decenber 7 alleged
Ameident, which was also reported to the police at that tine, led

to the instant case

 
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Dupont also testified for the prosecution. In her
testimony, she indicated that, on December 7, 2004, she ‘walked
in the house and [Hinton and the complainant] were sitting on the
couch talking, and [the complainant] was smiling and laughing.*
Dupont indicated that she believed the complainant was smiling
“‘cause [Hinton] was explaining to her about getting her a cell
phone for her for Christmas, and gifts, Christmas gifts.* Dupont
also indicated that, after the alleged December 7 incident was
reported to the police on December 19, 2004, she and Hinton asked
Jeminis and the complainant to move out of the Dupont house.
However, on cross-exanination, Dupont stated that, prior to the
alleged incident being reported to the police, she and Hinton
spoke with Jeminis and the complainant about leaving the hone.
Dupont indicated that both geminis and the complainant were very
upset that Dupont was kicking them out.‘

Aunty Kelly and Jeminis, among others, also testified
for the prosecution, essentially confirming the complainant's
testimony that she told Aunty Kelly about the alleged Decesber 7,

2004 as xanination, Jeminis

 

ult, Additionally, on eros:
admitted to methamphetamine use at or around the time of the

alleged incident. At the close of the prosecution’s case-in-

«ze was Hinton’s theory at trial that the complainant sade the
allegations ‘of abuse because she was angry about Hinton and Dupont telling her
and her mother to move out.
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chief, Hinton moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied
by the trial court

Hinton -- the only witness called by the defense --
testified on his om behalf and denied that he touched the
complainant on her genital area on December 7, 2004 or that he
asked her to flash him on that same day, Hinton testified as
follows regarding the events that allegedly occurred on

December 7:

Well, 1 wes working on a car at the time. And [the
complainant) cane up and she sald, Mi, papa. And then her
geandrother, (Dupont), went down to ack her why was she late
Coming hone’ from school: Aa far aa her explanation T don’
Feally know.

 

 

continved to work on the car. and afi
while i wad nor outside, so Twent in the house ou
Bathroom, 1 don’t know whether [the complainant] was on the
Couch or in the kitchen, Sut my daughter wae in he
Feom. "SoZ went to use’ the bethroom. And when'T came back
Sat, (the complainant] was asking me about a cell phone that
we were supposed co get her for Christmas|]

About that time, we was in the middie of a
conversation and sy cell phone ring, and was [linten’s
Gieliviend], ‘The birds was chirping and 2 could barely heer
What ahe wae saying, f ves ike, hello. And so 1 went

headed towards the door ‘Aad [the complainant]

puiting me back because she

ation about the telephone. So
Yiwar talking co sy girlfriend, and my phone began co 0
dead. “fo what f did vas 1 told her T would cal! her back,
After that I tung up the phone. aad [the complainant] was
pulling ne by my hand, so 7 turned, Constantiy talking to
Ber about the phon

‘Shortly after that, (Dupont) walks in, and T
ask ner to'get her house phone to call up [iinton’
Girlfriend], And then shortly after chat, she went and got
the phone ahd brought it back out to me(.j

yigez the phone and I step outside to call my
otritriend:

    

 

 

 

 

 

> finton also denied the allegations that he showed the complainant a
pornographic video in hie vehicle on the evening of December 19, 2004.

<2.
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‘The case was submitted to the jury on the afternoon of
September 13, 2005. on September 14, 2005, the jury sent a
communication (Communication No. 1) to the trial court, asking,
*[wlhat is the definition of the genitailia [sic] areas? is the
back of the hand on pubic hair considered touching the genitailia
{sic} area?]" The trial court -- upon consultation with counsel
-- responded:

As to your first question, the term ‘genitalia’ is
De Understood in Sta conmen or Gaual vse or meaning

‘As to your second quaation, this is for you co
determine based on the instructions you already have,

 

 

A few hours later, the jury sent another communication
(Communication No. 2), indicating that the jury was ‘deadlocked,
and asking ‘what should [it] do?” In response, the trial court
sent a question to the jury, asking: ‘Would further deliberation
of any length be reasonably likely to result in a unanimous
verdict?" The jury indicated "no" and submitted a note that
stated, *[wlith copies of police reports, written statements of
wittnesses [sic] and transcripts, we might be able to reach a
unanimous verdict. Otherwise no," On September 15, 2005, the
jury sent Communication No. 3 to the trial court, requesting to
hear the testimony of a number of witnesses, including the

complainant and Hinton. The trial court declined the jury's

 

request. Thereafter, the jury sent Communication No. 4, stating

that *{t]he jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict." The trial
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court determined that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked and
declared a mistrial.‘

on October 5, 2005, Hinton filed a motion to dismiss
the indictment with prejudice, pursuant to Moriwake, discussed
Anfza. The prosecution opposed Hinton’s motion to dismiss. A
hearing was held on October 12, 2005, and, subsequent to hearing
arguments by the parties, the trial court orally granted Hinton’s
motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. specifically,

the trial court reasoned that

such

 

(wlnder Moriuake, when faced with a motion to disni
as the one that has been filed in this case, (che trial
Court] mist look to a mimber of factors. the firs: is che
Severity of the offense charged. Now, this is a class C
felony.” It ie the least serious felony class ~~ or it is
within the Least serious felony class. I’m not minimizing
the offense itself, bat it ie the lowest level felony. And
fhat, to me, weighs against retrial. we've got A's and B's
fo deal with, "And there afe so apecial circumstances here
Eh tems of injury.” ‘There's nothing that i saw, ‘no physical
hharm to. the complainant, so T think looking at the offens
Steel! and the classifications the legislature has given ic,
that one weighs against retrial

‘The second Horivake factor concerns the sunber of
prior alstrials and the circustances of the jury
Seliberation therein so far as is knows. ‘well, we have only
one mistrial. Chief Justice Richardson, in a footnote,
Seems £0 say usually after a second hung jury mistrial, it's
probably 2 good idea to think seriously about dismissing =
Case. That sort of suggeste that doing it after one
Rlattial or doing it -~ or allowing @ trial after wo hung
Juries 1s probably less -- well, sore unusual. But still,
Let ne look at the circunatances of the deliberations.

1 don't know sho pur it in the moving papers, but
sonebody said twas eight co four for acquittal, It's not
so mich in the numbers. And there ig an indication that at
Teast. two people were going back and forth so it could have
been 50/50'at one point in tise. And in ay Judgment, that's
nore significant, the fact that they were evenly split, than
here it ended up at eight to four for acquittal, The jury
id sean £0 have problems following the evidence, but they’
(tore allowed to take notes, I'm not sure I saw many of them
tsking a lot of notes during the course of the trial. But

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

« we note that both trial counsel met with the jurors after they were
dismissed and lesrned that the vote was eight for acquittal and four guilty.

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al in all, the questions they asked and their trouble
Following the evidence makes ne feel that this factor weichs
favor of a retrial.

"The next Usrivake factor is the character of prior
trlais in terme of length, complexity, and similarity of
evidence presented. Well, we've only had one prior trial
Te wasn't very long, So { think that kind of weighs in
favor of retrial. It was not complex. In my judgment, it
was not a complicated trial, The key issue was credibility.
Te'was (Hinton) 's credibiiity versus [the complainant] and
her mother pretty much. So to me, chat factor weighs
against retrial.

Now, the Sext factor is che similarity of evidence,
and this iooks back at the prior trials, We've only got one
trial so we're not talking about similarity so I'm going to
Skip that one. i don’t think it applies £0 our case

‘The next factor ie the Likelihood of any substantial
Gifterence in a subsequent trial if allowed. And that one,
to me, is important, “(The prosecution] argues the phone
records, videotape, {") and. = clarifying the term
genitalia. “Te phone records -- well, let me say this much.
Svhew trial is noe to correct aistaxes that were made in the
first trial because that impacts the fairness factor. So T
tend to discount that. The video and the [prosecution]
being able to call {a witness] next tine around, T think Z
have to dSscount as well because 1 don't ehink (Hinton's
counsel] would get into that area again, and it is not
Independently admissible as far as T can seo.

"and, you know, the clarification of the term genitalia
is -- T don't know what else to do. Most people know what
that is, And if they didn’t, they could have asked us for a
Gefinition. But when we responded that that word was to be
Eaken in its ordinary comon meaning, we didn't get anymore
Guestions in that area. I think they were more concerned
ith whether just touching =~ 1 think there was a reference
fo pubie hair =~ was enough, To ne, they were looking at.
how serious the offense was rather than any confusion with
regard to what genitalia sean

I think all of these things considered that in the
next trial, the evidence would be substantially similar, Tt
would not differ all that much. So that one, rhat factor,
weighs against retrial.

fon the (trial) court’s evaluation of the evidence, 1
think “- and thie ie the [trial] court's pereonal view -~ s¢
Weighs in favor of retrial. But this factor should be, T
PHBE, discounted in view of the ‘auprenel court's opinion

in Gtdte ve Lincola(, 72 Haw. 480, 825 P.24 64. (1992)).
don't think the Trial] court's view of the evidesce should

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

+ Me note that the trial courts reference to ‘the videotape’ is not

the one related to the Decenber 13, 2004 incident, but a different
Spornographic" tape, Specifically, che complainant testified at trial that,
prior to the alleged Decesber 7, 2004 incident, Hinton had used her cancorder
and made a recording “of him playing with hineelf,~ hich video he left in the
complainant's camcorder. However, this videotape was never recovered by the
police or the prosecution. Indeed, at oral argunent, the prosecution conceded
That the subject videotape was not in their possession and, thus, ie would not
be Likely for it to be introduced at a subsequent trial.

 

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(Smphasis

cots, and

determine whether there's a retrial or not. 7 can cone
{nto balance, but I don't think the court should place too
much weight on that

‘And the final factor is the professional conduct and
Sgence of the respective counsel, particularly that of
the prosecuting attorney. You know I'don'e have —- T chink
both of you did a good job in this case, T think, a
of you seen to be Saying, that the professional conduc
@iilgence of counsel was fine, was adequate, appropriate, et
cetera. And I agree. And I think given that, that factor
weighs against retrial

 

 

   

 

 

‘you know, so 1've looked at all these things. and 1
haven't given “- well, have tp gay 1: Le a close fase

But all things considered. 1 think more of the tactore waich
aealnst a retrial. And so 1m going to grant the action to
‘Sienies:

added.)
on Decenber 21, 2005, the trial court entered its Fors,

an order, consistent with its oral ruling, granting

Hinton’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. of

particular relevance are the trial court's COLs, which stated:

1. The trial court has the inherent discretionary
apiiity to dianies an indictment with prejudice after
Balancing the vintarest of 1 e against fundanental
fairneat to a defendant as well as the orderly functioning
of the court aysten:

20" tn balancing these interest(s) the (eriat) court
shall consider the following factors: (1) the severity of
the offense charged; (2) the nunber of prior mistrials and
the ireunstances of the jury deliberations therein, so far
ae is know; (3) the character of prior trials in corns of
Tengen, conplexity(,] and similarity of evidence presented:
(2)"the likelihood of any substantial difference ina
fubsequent trial, if allowed; (5) the trial court's orn
evaluation of relative case strength; and (6) the
professional conduct and diligence of respective counsel,
particularly that of the prosecuting attorney.

3. Ag to the severity of the offense charged,
character of the trial, likelihood of any substantial
Gitference in a subsequent trial, and the professional
conduct and diligence of counsel, the (trial) court finds
fsiel that these factora weigh against retrial.

4." consequently, the (triai] court finds (sic) that
in balancing ali of the afore-sentioned [sic] factors, the
interest is] of the state do not outweigh the fundamental
fairness £0 0 defendant as well as the orderly functioning
of the court systen.

 

  

 

 

 

 

on January 20, 2008, the prosecution filed a timely notice of

appeal.

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C. Appeal Before the ICA

on direct appeal, the prosecution argued that "the
trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting (Hinton]‘s
motion to dismiss the indictement [sic] with prejudice’ inasmuch
as the trial court's COLs were “wrong” and its FOPs ‘in support
thereof [were] clearly erroneous." In response, Hinton contended
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the indictment with prejudice

on August 26, 2008, the ICA issued an SDO, vacating the
trial court’s December 21, 2005 FOFs, COLs, and order granting
Hinton’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, and
remanded the case for further proceedings. D0 at 8. As
discussed more fully infra, the ICA, citing to State v. Lincoln,
72 Haw. 480, 491, 825 P.2a 64, 70 (1992), and two out-of-state
cases, expressed concern that the trial court's dismissal of the
indictment with prejudice raised ‘separation-of-powers concerns.”
Ad, at 3. In that light, the ICA examined the six Morivake
factors and determined that -- contrary to the trial court's
conclusion -- such factors ‘weigh{ed) strongly in favor of a
retrial’ and that, therefore, the trial court abused ite
discretion in dismissing the indictment with prejudice. Id.
gudge Foley issued a dissent, indicating that, contrary to the
majority's view, *[tJhe [trial] court did not exceed the bounds
of reason or disregard rules or principles of law or practice,
and, therefore, the [trial] court did not abuse its discretion in

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dismissing the indictment against Hinton.” Id. at 3 (Foley, J,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Additionally, Judge Foley noted
that he “believe[d] that the majority’s ‘separation of powers
concerns’ [were] unwarranted." Id. at 3 n.1.

The ICA’s judgment on appeal was issued on Septenber
18, 2008. Thereafter, on January 29, 2009, this court accepted
Hinton’s application and heard oral argument on February 19,
2009.

IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW

*A [trial] court's ruling on a motion to dismiss an

indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

kau, 118 Hawai’

 

44, 51, 185 P.34 229, 236 (2008) (citation
omitted).

‘The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly
exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules oF
principles of law or practice to the substantial detrinent
bea party litigant. “the burden of establishing abuse of
Giscretion is on appellant, anda strong showing is required
fo eeeabiieh te

State v. Wong, 97 Hawai'i $12, 517, 40 P.34 914, 919 (2002)

  

(citation omitted) .

IIT. DISCUSSION

 

As previously stated, Hinton’s assignment of error is
grounded in his contention that the ICA ‘improperly incorporated

[a] novel

 

paration of powers’ consideration” into its analysis

 

which “conflictis] with Moriwake and its progeny’ and, therefore,
“failed to properly apply the abuse of discretion standard of

review.” More specifically, Hinton argues that the ICA's

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citation to Lincoln ‘as a segway to import a novel ‘separation of
powers’ factor from out-of-state cases, into Hawaii's established
Morivake analysis[,]" erodes the inherent constitutional power of
the trial court and disregards Moriwake.
A. The Relevant case Law
1. Moriwake

In Moriwake, this court was faced with, inter alia, the
issue ‘whether an indictment for manslaughter was properly
ismissed with prejudice following two hung jury mistrials on the
charge [of manslaughter]. 65 Haw. at 48, 647 P.2d at 708.
During the first trial, which lasted three days, the defendant
argued that he did not have the requisite state of mind to commit
the crime due to extreme intoxication. Id, at 49, 647 P.2d at
708. Following approximately ten hours of deliberations, the
jury informed the trial court that it could not reach a verdict,
and the trial court, after questioning the jurors, ‘concluded
that the jury was at an impasse and declared a mistrial sua
sponte." Id, Three months later, a second trial was conducted
on the same charge. Id, Again, the jury could not reach a
verdict, and the trial court declared a second mistrial. id.

‘Thereafter, the trial court

 

upon motion by the defendant --
Gismissed the indictment, reasoning, inter alia, that, ‘under the
circumstances of this case, a third trial would pose an undue

emotional, personal[,] and financial hardship on the defendant.”

“15+
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Id. at 50, 647 P.2d at 708. The prosecution appealed the trial
court’s dismissal. Id, at 50, 647 P.2d at 709

on appeal, this court, recognizing the ‘inherent or
implied powers of the court," id, at 55, 547 P.2d at 712, stated
that ‘the inherent poser of the court is the power to protect
itself; the power to administer justice whether any previous form
of remedy has been granted or not; the power to promulgate rules
for its practice; and the power to provide process where none
exists.” Id. (quoting In xe Bruen, 172 P. 1152, 1153 (wash.
1918)) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). This
court further stated that the "aspect of the judicial power which
the declaration of one or more mistrials because of cenuinely
deadlocked juries, even though the defendant's constitutional
rights are not yet implicated." Id, (emphasis added) (footnote

omitted). The Moriwake court also recognized that:

Fx an interest ia ns
‘the iudiciel orocess and in etauring fairness 19
os roceedinas Gndanencal
Hust pe-mubiect to the power and reaponaibiliny of the

Id. at 56, 547 P.2d at 712 (quoting State v. Braunsdorf, 297

N.W.24 808, 817 (Wisc. 1980) (Day, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
added) (format altered). “Simply put,’ the Moriwake court
stated, ‘it is a matter of balancing the interest of the state

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against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the added
ent of the orderly functioning of Ide

(emphasis added) (citation,

 

(ternal quotation marks, and
original brackets omitted). Based on the foregoing, the Moriuake
court laid out the following six factors, ‘which the trial court

should consider in undertaking [the aforementioned] balance," id.

 

at 56, 647 P.2d at 711

(2) the severity of the offense charged; (2) the number of
prior mistriais and the circumstances of the Jury
Geliberations therein, so far as is known; (3) the character
Of prior triais in terms of length, complexity(,] and
Sinilarity of evidence presented; (4) the likelihood of any
Substantial difference in a subsequent trial, if allowed;

(SI the trial coure’s own evaluation of relative case
strength: and (6) the professional conduct and diligence of
Feapective counsel, particularly that of the prosecuting
attorney,

 

Ud. at 56, 647 P.2d at 712-13 (citation omitted). Applying the
six factors to the case before it, the Moriwake court held that
it did “not perceive the trial court to have abused its
discretion in dismissing the indictment[.]" Id. at 57, 647 P.24
at 713.
2. Lincoln

Lincoln, like Moriwake, involved an appeal from the
Gismissal of an indictment; however, the procedural history of
Lincoln differs from that of Moriwake. The defendant in Lincoln
was initially charged with and tried on two counts of ‘murder for
hire* and one count of ‘attempted murder for hire." 72 Haw. at
482, 825 P.2d at 66. The jury convicted the defendant of all

three charges, but failed to find that the defendant perpetrated

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the cries “for hire" as was required by the statute. Id, On
appeal, the ICA determined that such failure was harmless and
affimmed the detendant’s convictions. Id. at 482-83, 625 P.2d at
66. However, the federal courts (the United States District
court for the District of Hawai'i and the United states Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) thereafter granted the defendant's
petition for habeas corpus and required that he be retried. Id,
at 483, 825 P.2d at 66-67. on retrial, the defendant was
convicted of only one of the charges. Id. at 483, 825 P.2d at
67. On appeal to this court, the defendant's conviction was
overturned inasmuch as the defendant's confrontation right was
violated at trial. id, In overturning the defendant's sole
conviction, this court explicitly remanded the case for a new
trial. Id, Upon remand (during the pretrial phase of the

scheduled third trial), the trial court granted the defendant's

 

motion for a judgment of acquittal and/or dismissal of the
Indictment as to the single murder count. Id, at 483-84, 625

P.2d at 67. In so doing, the trial court

 

citing this court's
decision in Moriwake -- based its ruling on its ‘inherent ability

to dismiss an indictment with prejudice in the administration of

 

justice. Id, at 484, 825 P.2d at 67. On appeal, this court
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment. Id. at
492, 825 P.2d at 71. Looking to the six Moriwake factors, the

Lincoln court stated:

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Except for the “case strength factor, we find little in the
[exial) court's decision to suppor: a dismissal of the
indictment. Furthermore, in Moiwake aa well aa in State v,
Alvey, 67 Haw. 49, 678 P.2d 5 (1984), we cautioned that a
Ertat' court's inkevent pover co disniss an thdictment ta not
2 broad power and tha: trial courts must recognise and weigh
the [prosecution's] interest in prosecuting crime against
fundamental falresa to the defendant. In Moriwske we aid,
swe think that the magnitude of the respective interests of
society and of criminal defendants which are implicated in
this area of the law requires that we more fully delineate
the paraneters within which thia discretion Le properly
exercised." 65 Haw. at 56, 647 P-2d at 712. Im alvey ve
made clear that, even if "there ae serious questions” about
Eimaterial elenont of a crine, Lt 1a not within the erial
Court's discretion to usurp the function of the trier of
fact before trial. 67 Hav. at 58 -n-6, 678 P.2d at 11 4.6.

Ta the ingtant cage, the (trial) court was not
confronted with the prospect of s third trial based on
evidence which had failed to convict a defendant to
previous tines. Rather, the trial court faced the prospect
bia ehird trial following two prior convictions, albeit
With a lesser quantum of evidence than previously available

it ig not for the trial court to'welah the evidence
in determining whether te proceed to trial.

Id. at 491-92, 825 P.2d at 70-71 (emphases added) (footnote

 

 

   

 

      

omitted). In other words, this court reasoned that “[iJt is the
duty of the trial court, on remand, to comply strictly with the
nandate of the appellate court” and ‘implicit in [this court’s]
remand was a finding that, on balance, the public’s interest and
the defendant's interest in fundamental fairness were served by
conducting a new trial. Id. at 485-86, 825 P.2d at 68.
B. The Ica‘s Analveia

Although recognizing the six Moriwake factors, the 7cA

 

joned that separation of powers concerns require that the
trial court's power to dismiss an indictment be used “only in
rare and unusual cases when compelling circumstances require such

a result to assure fundamental fairness in the administration of

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justice.*

stated:

sD0 at 3.

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$00 at 3 (citations omitted). Specifically, the ICA

‘hile the dismissal of en indictsant after one or more
nistrials should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, that
Elseretion ia limited in light of the “magnitude of the

 

 

feapective interests of society and of criminal defendants
Shien are implicaved in this area of the law(.]* (Morivake,

65 aw.) at 56, 647 P.24 at 712; gee State z, Lincoln, 72,
Maw. 80, 493, 825 P.24 64, 70. (1992) tavating that va trial
court's inherent power to digniss an indiccnent is not a
broad power and that trial courte must recognize and weigh
the state's interest in prosecsting crime against
Eindamental fairness to the defendant"). indeed, some
Courts have observed that digmiseal of an indictment in
these circunstances raises separation-of-powers concerns
Walch require that the power to dlanies be used sparingly

 

 

[wlecause of separatton-of-povers considerations
and the public's interest in the prosecution of
Those charged with criminal offenses, the trial
court's discretion to disniss cases. in the
interest of justice is necessarily Limited,
Generally, trial courts say dlomise prosecutions
Gh furtherance of justice agsinst the wishes of
the prosecutor only in rare and unusual c:

When compelling circumstances require such 2
Feault to assure fundamental fairness in the
Administration of justice

 

 

 

take v. Sauve, 666 A.24 1164, 1267 (ve, 1995) (citations
Setetea); State y. Gonzales, 69 7.34 581, 686 (NM. Ct. App.
3002) (whe long as the court's discretion in dismissing
Eiecessive prosecutions is limited and exercised with great
Caution, there i no separation of powers violation,

we Linit the discretion of trial courts so that they

may disnies criminal prosecutions only in the nost extreme
of casea-*)

 

 

In the light of the aforementioned separation of

powers principles, the ICA turned next to analyze each of the six

Moriwake factors as follows:

a

Severity of offense ‘The ICA reagoned that "the (prosecution!

charged

 

Contended thas Hinton was  sexusl predator,
While the defense portrayed him as an

 

{anocent vietim, there ie a strong societal
interest in having a jury resolve chat
Gisputel.)" ad. at 8. Thus, contrary to
the trial court, che ICA held that "this
factor weighs ih favor of a retrial."

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2

Munber of prior mistrials
and circumstances of jury
Geliberations therein, 60
far ag is known

‘The ICA agreed with the trial court “that
the jury had trouble following the evidencet
and, acterdingly, reasoned that ‘there [wes]
2 basis for concluding that another Jury
Would Be able to reach a verdict,” id. at
5

 

3

Character of prior trials
(length, complexity, &
similarity of evidence!

The ICA concluded that the fact that there
was “only one prior trial weighe
Significantly in favor of allowing a
Feerial." Ide at 6-7.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

@, Likelihood of any The IGA did not directly analyze ehls
Substantial difference in | factor, but stated vit does not appear
Zaubsequent trial, if | Likely’ that the (prosecution] will introduce
alowed significantly different evidence in another

trial." ide at 7

5. Trial court's own ‘The ICA concluded that the trial court's
evaluation of the View that Lincoln prevented it from weighing
Felative case strength | the evidence was erroneous. Id at 5-6

Nowever, the ICA did not present ite own
view of the relative case strength.

%. Professional conduct and |The ICA aid not address this factor.
Ailigence of respective
counsel, particularly
that of the prosecuting

In sum, the ICA concluded that:

There are substantial factors here weighing in favor of a
Fetrial: this isa serious offense, there is reason to
Gonciude that ancther jury could reach a verdict, and the
Getendant hes been subjected to only one trial. ‘There are
fone factors that weigh against a retrial, such as the fact
that it does not appear likely that the [prosecution] will
introduce significantly different evidence in another #riat
Walle tha is a legitimate consideration, ve believe that it
mist be tempered by the (erial] court's observation that the
Jury appeared confused by the testimony even though the
Eriat was not particularly complex. Thus, there is basis
for concluding that another jury could reach a verdict even
if the evidence is essentially the same. On balance, we
believe that che factors idenvified by Morivake weiss
strongly in favor of a retrial, and(,) accordingly, we
Conciude that the [trial] court abused its discretion in
Glenissing the Indictnent.

Td. at 7-8.

In his dissent, Judge Foley reasoned simply that the
trial court “applied the Yoriwake factors . . .{,] did not exceed

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the bounds of reason or disregard rules or principles of law or
practice, and, therefore, . . . did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the indictment against Hinton.” D0 (Foley, J.,
Gissenting) at 2-3. Additionally, Judge Foley noted that, in his
view, “the majority's ‘separation of powers concerns’ [were]
unwarranted” inasmuch as:

ra Moriwake, the Haw

 

Suprene Court stated:

(ile are cognizant of the deference to be accorded the

scuting attorney with regard to crininal proceedings
ich deference Le not without Bounds, Ag seated
sleewnere:

 

 

Society has a strong interest in punishing
criminal conduct. aut soclety algo haa an
Interest in protecting the integrity of the
judicial process and in ensuring fairness to
defendancs in judiclal proceedings. Where those
Fundamental interesta are threatened, the
Sdiseretion’ of the prosecutor mist be subj
to the poser and responsibility of che court.

 

 

(Worivake, 65 Haw.) at 56, 647 P.2d at 712 (quoting State v
297 W¥.24 808, B17 (Wis. 1980) (Day, Joy
Sasenting)

Id at 3nd.
c. ta ene"

Preliminarily, we address Hinton’s arguments regarding
the ICA’s “separation of powers concerns.* Specifically, Hinton
argues that the ICA erred inasmuch as it: (1) ‘use[d] dicta from
Lincoln to begin injecting novel separation of powers
considerations into the established Moriwake analysis” and, thus,
“radical{ly] depart led] from Moriwake and its progeny"; and
(2) ‘attempled) to elevate the ‘wishes of the prosecution’ factor
within the current Moriwake analysis and concomitantly
Giminish(ed) the trial court's discretion.” additionally, Hinton

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takes issue with the ICA‘s use of two out-of-state cases, Sauve
and Gonzales, which he claims “are clearly distinguishable and
inapposite.*

As previously indicated, the ICA, in its SD0, reasoned
that separation of powers concerns require that the power to
Gismiss be used ‘only in rare and unusual cases when compelling
circumstances require such a result to assure fundanental
fairness in the administration of justice." sD0 at 3 (citations
omitted). However, we believe, as did Judge Foley, that the ICA
najority’s separation of powers concerns are unwarranted.

Indeed, even the prosecution disavowed any reliance on, or
applicability of, Sauve or Gonzalez.

As indicated in Judge Foley's dissent, this court, in
Moxinake, explicitly stated that it was ‘cognizant of the
deference to be accorded the prosecuting attorney with regard to
criminal proceedings.’ SD0 (Foley, J., dissenting) at 3 n.1
(quoting Moriwake, 65 Haw. at 56, 647 P.24 at 712). However,
this court also pointed out that ‘such deference [was] not
without bounds," holding that, where society's fundamental
interests in protecting the integrity of the judicial process and

in ensuring fairness to defendants in judicial proceedings are

threatened, *the ‘discretion’ of the prosecutiion| must be
subject to the power and responsibility of the court." Morivake,

65 Haw. at 56, 647 P.2d at 712 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Nowhere in its opinion did the Moriwake court "limit

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the discretion of trial courts so that they may dismiss criminal
prosecutions only in the most extreme cases." SDO at 3 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as observed by
then-ICA Judge Acoba:

(this court’s} recognition of the trial court's inherent
power to dismise an indictment with prejudice {in Hariuake!
Bnd ite adoption of @ standard from the dissenting opinion
£297 W.w.24 808 (Wis. 1980),
oted the fajority's holding in that’ ca
£ Involved the prosecution's motion to diemi
Eharge of welfare fraud without prejudice since te was not
ready to proceed to trial. The trial court granted the
motion, but dismissed it with prejudice. Id. at 610. The
Bajority() held that() ‘trial courts of this'state do not
Possess the power to disniaa a criminal case with presudice
Delor to the attachment of Jeopardy except in the case of
Wolacion of a constitutional right toa speedy trial.” Id.
ae aie.

State v. Magee, 78 Hawai'i 33, 37 0.9, 689 P.24 1092, 1096 n.9

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

(app. 1995). In other words, by holding that the trial court has
the inherent power to dismiss an indictment upon “balancing the
interest of the state against fundamental fairness to a defendant
with the added ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court
systen,* 65 Haw. at 56, 647 P.2d at 712, the Moriwake court
implicitly rejected the view that the trial court's discretion
was limited to "extraordinary situations.

Inasmuch as the Moriwake court was clearly cognizant of
the deference to be given to the prosecution in pursuing criminal
indictments, as well as the other interests at stake when it
adopted the six-factor framework laid out in the opinion, any
*separation of powers concerns" are subsumed within such
framework. Accordingly, the ICa’s injection of an additional
*separation of powers" analysis into the six-factor

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Moriwake framework represents a departure from, and thus is in
contravention of, Hawaii’s case law. It is unnecessary to look
to cases outside this jurisdiction when Hawai" case law on the
igeue exists and, especially, when the existing case law is on
point.’ Moreover, because any separation of powers concerns are,
as indicated above, subsumed within the Moriwake analysis, the
ICA‘s analysis on this point was unnecessary. At oral argument,
the prosecution, in fact, conceded that any separation of powers
concerns were included withing the Moriwake factors.
Additionally, the ICA’s citation to Lincoln is
unavailing inasmuch as it is factually distinguishable and,
therefore, inapposite. This court’s decision in Lincoln was
based primarily on the fact that the case bad been remanded to

the trial court for a retrial; thus, the trial court was without

 

+ the ICA majority's decision to reach out to foreign jurisdictions and
adopt, the language expounded in gave and Gonzales in the face of controlling
Rawei's lew was a departure trom this court’ precedent, which the ICA ie
bound to follow. The ICA majority thereby disregarded the well-settled
principle that

Under the rule of stare decisis, where a principle has been
fussed upon by the court of last resort, it-te the duey of

Geoard to their views a4 to ies propriety, until the
Gecision bas been reversed or overruled by the court of last
esort or altered by legislative enactnent

Bobingon v. Arivosh{, 65 Maw. 631, 653, 658 P.24 287, 297 (2982) (emphasis
added) (format altercd) (citation omitted). When the ICA fails to follow
Brocedent, It casta the law in disarray, creating uncertainty for trial
Courts, the prosecution, and the defense. Indeed, the ICA has been
Gnconsictent'in its treateent of Nociwake. See State v. fumbawa, No. 27902
(app. Aug. 30, 2007) (SDO), cert. denied, No, 27902 (aw van. 25, 2008)
(Gpho.ding the trial cours’ diemissal of indictwente pursuant to\voriwake
over dissents separation of povers argunente relying on, inter alia, Sauve
and Gonzales). “In light of the fact that Hawai'i Aules of appellate Procedure
Rule 35-(2008) now permite sp0s to be cited for persuasive value, it is
eapecially inportant for the ICA to consistently follow precedent, which, i
the instant case, it failed to do.

 

 

 

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discretion to dismiss the indictment prior to the mandated
retrial. Conversely, Moriwake and the instant case deal with the
trial court’s discretion to dismiss an indictment after one or
more mistrials have been declared. ***

Based on the foregoing, we hold that, by injecting an
additional “separation of powers” analysis, taken from two out-
of-state cases, into the Moriwake framework, the ICA acted in
contravention of this jurisdiction’s case law. Accordingly, we
turn next to an examination whether the ICA, under Morivake,
erred in vacating the trial court’s December 21, 2005 FOFs, Cots,
and order.

D. Application of the Moriwake Factors:
1. The Severity of the offense charged

Here, Hinton was charged with sexual assault in the
third degree, which, as indicated by the trial court, is a
class C felony. The trial court found that this factor weighed
against retrial because (1) a class C felony ‘is the least
serious felony class" and (2) there were ‘no special
circumstances . . . in terms of injury," when “looking at the
offense itself.* Conversely, the ICA determined that this factor
weighed in favor of a retrial because, although “the statutory
classification of the offense is a legitimate reference point,”
the prosecution "contended that Hinton was a sexual predator,

while the defense portrayed him as an innoc:

 

victim" and that,
therefore, “[tJhere [was] a strong societal interest in having a

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jury resolve that dispute." SD0 at 4. We agree: however, the
same can be said for every criminal prosecution. Indeed, as the
Morivake court explicitly recognized, ~society has a strong
interest in punishing criminal conduct." 65 Haw. at 56, 547 P.24
at 712. Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court’s
determination that the severity of the offense factor weighs
against retrial did not “exceed the bounds of reason’ because,
when considered in light of, or as compared with, other felony
offenses (such as murder, rape, or kidnapping), the charged
offense is less serious. We do not suggest, however, that ‘less
serious’ equates with "not serious." we emphasize that, by
assessing sexual assault in the third degree as “less serious,”
it is not our intent to minimize the impact that a perpetrator’s
conduct has upon a victim or to suggest that society has less of
an interest in punishing such criminal conduct. In this case, we
hold -- contrary to the ICA -~ that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that the first Moriwake factor weighed
against retrial.
2. The Munber of Prior Mistrials and the

Circumstances of the Jury Deliberations Therein,

So Far as is Known

‘The trial court found that this factor weighed in favor
of a retrial because there had been only one trial and, although
the jury indicated that it was eight to four for acquittal at one
point, it seemed confused. The ICA agreed with the trial court’s
assessment “that the jury had trouble following the evidence" and

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additionally reasoned that, inasmuch as the case against Hinton
was ‘not a particularly complex case, . . . there [was] a basis
for concluding that another jury would be able to reach a
verdict." sb0 at 5, We agree with the ICA that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the second factor
weighed in favor of a retrial.

3. The Character of Prior Trials in Terms of Length,
Complexity and Similarity of Evidence Presented

The trial court determined that this factor weighed
against retrial because (1) the trial was not very complicated
and (2) the key issue was credibility -- Hinton’s versus that of
the complainant and her mother. The ICA disagreed with the trial
court’s assessnent of this factor and reasoned that "the fact
that there [had] been only one prior trial weighs significantly
in favor of allowing a retrial." $00 at 6. Specifically, the

ICA reasoned:

    
 

 

57, 647 Pr2d at 713, Concerns about the unfalraet
esting a defendant to the burden of multiple

3¢, 667 P.2d at 712, are lees strong when = defend
only been subjected to one prior trial

   

Id, at 6-7, The ICA seemed particularly troubled by the fact
that Hinton id ‘not cite[] any appellate decision from Hawai'i
or any other jurisdiction in which a dismissal after a single

mistrial based on a hung jury was affirmed." Id. at 7.

 

‘he ICA was correct that the Moriwake court ‘recognized

that dismissal could be appropriate after a single mistrial, (but

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that} the opinion implies that such dismissals would be rare.’
65 Haw. at 57, 647 P.2d at 713 (holding that, in certain
cixcunstances, “the preclusion of a second’ trial would be
appropriate). However, the fact that Hinton failed to cite toa
single appellate decision affirming a dismissal after only a
single mistrial is not fatal to his position. Indeed, such
dismissals are seemingly rare and should not be encouraged as a
conmon practice; nevertheless, the Moriwake court squarely placed
the discretion in the hands of the trial court to determine under
which "certain circumstances" dismissal after one or more
mistrials would be appropriate. Here, the trial court, in
weighing thie factor, found in favor of dismissal because (1) the

trial was not very complicated and (2) the key ii

 

credibility. The trial court’s determination was not
unreasonable, and, thus, we conclude, contrary to the ICA, that
the trial court's finding that the third factor weighed against
retrial was not an abuse of discretion.

4. The Likelihood of Any Substantial Difference in a
Subsequent Trial, if Allowed

The trial court believed that this factor was an
important factor and determined that the evidence submitted in a
subsequent trial, if allowed, ‘would be substantially similar.
ze would not differ all that much.* Apparently, the ICA agreed,
stating that "it does not appear likely that the (prosecution!

will introduce significantly different evidence in another

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trial.’ SDO at 7. Accordingly, we agree with the ICA that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this
factor weighed against retrial.
5. The Relative Case strength
With regard to the relative case strength factor, the

trial court stated:

 

che [trial] court's evaluation of the evidenc
think = and this io the (erlal] court’s personal view
weighs in favor of retrial. Bot this factor should be, T
think, discounted in view of the (supreme) court's opiton
fn Stace v. Lincoin(, 72 Faw, 460, 625 P-20 66 (1992)). 7
Teriai) court's view of the evidence should
Yel or not. “ie ean cone

 

 

 

     

 

(emphasis added.) tn our view, the trial court’s belief that
this factor should be “discounted” under Lincoln was based on an
incorrect reading of that case. In that regard, we believe the
trial court erred

We recognize, however, that the trial court stated
that, were it to evaluate the evidence, it would find that this
factor weighed in favor of retrial and, additionally, that it
believed that the relative case strength factor could *come into
balance,’ when weighing the Moriwake factors (although it would
not give this factor too much weight). Nothing in Morivake
indicates that all factors must be given equal weight or that
certain factors must be given more weight than others. We,
therefore, believe that, although the trial court did not issue a
specific finding or conclusion on this factor, it did consider
it. The record reflects that the trial court -- in its final

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analysis -- "balanced" the relative case strength factor and
determined it weighed in favor of retrial. We, therefore, hold
that the trial court's erroneous reading of Lincoln was harmless.

‘Thus, giving due deference to the trial court’s determination, we

 

hold that this factor weighs in favor of retrial

‘The Professional Conduct and Diligence of
Respective Counsel, Particularly That of the
Prosecuting Attorney

   

 

Here, the trial court determined that this factor
weighed against retrial inasmuch as the attorneys for both
parties "did a good job.* SD0 at 13. The ICA aid not contend
that this factor weighed in favor of retrial. In sum, the trial
court considered all of the factors enunciated in Morivake and,

recognizing that the circumstances presented ‘a close case,"

 

determined that, ‘in balancing all of the afore-mentioned
factors, the interests of the [prosecution] do not outweigh the
fundamental fairness to the defendant as well as orderly
functioning of the court system.*

Based on the. discussion supra, none of the trial
court's findings or conclusions ‘exceed the bounds of reason or
Gisregard rules or principles of law or practice." Thus, we
agree with Judge Foley that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the indictment against Hinton. Inasmuch

as the ICA majority determined otherwise, we hold that it erred.

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2v. concuszos
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ICA erred in
(2) snjecting an additional ‘separation of powers" analysis into
the Morinake framework and (2) holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in disnissing the indictnent with
prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s Septesber 18, 2008
judgment on appeal and affirm the trial court's Decenber 21, 2005
rors, cous, and order granting Hinton’s motion to dismiss the
indictment with prejudice.
Karen T. Nakasone, Dipl

Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner /defendant-

appellant Prsiles Crete uno

venus masse, —

32+