Title: Gallipo v. City of Rutland

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

GALLIPO_V_CITY_OF_RUTLAND.91-320; 163 Vt 83; 656 A.2d 635

[Filed 16-Dec-1994]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                        No. 91-320


Raymond F. Gallipo                   Supreme Court

                                      On Appeal from
     v.                              Rutland Superior Court

City of Rutland, Fire Chief          February Term, 1994
Gerald Lloyd, and Gerald Lancour


Richard Walsh Norton, J.

Andrew Jackson, Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellant

Samuel Hoar, Jr., and Susan J. Flynn of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, for
  defendants-appellees


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.), Specially
     Assigned


     GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Raymond F. Gallipo appeals a grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants City of Rutland and Rutland Fire Chief Gerald
Lloyd, and the denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge.  We affirm
summary judgment in part and reverse in part, and we affirm the decision of
the administrative trial judge denying the motion to disqualify. 

     Plaintiff joined the Rutland Fire Department in 1962.  In November 1985,
when plaintiff was the most senior firefighter, a lieutenant's position
opened up in the department.  Chief Gerald Lloyd posted a notice of
requirements for the position, which included responsibility for 

 

supervision of the fire alarm and traffic system -- a responsibility not
included in the job description set forth in the personnel manual.  Plaintiff
was not selected for the position, nor was he selected for two subsequent
promotions, notices for which also included job requirements not listed in
the personnel manual. 

     In September 1987, plaintiff filed a complaint under the Vermont Fair
Employment Practices Act, 21 V.S.A.  495-496, alleging handicap
discrimination because the department had not promoted him due to his known
reading problem.  Plaintiff subsequently was assigned to menial tasks at the
firehouse, and for the first time in his career, received disciplinary
memoranda in his personnel file.  In January 1988, plaintiff filed a
complaint in superior court, alleging that defendants' failure to promote him
deprived him of a property right under 42 U.S.C.  1983, was an unlawful
employment practice under 21 V.S.A.  495, violated provisions of the City
charter and the City's personnel regulations, interfered with his contractual
and business relations, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon
him.  An additional count alleging that a fellow firefighter assaulted
plaintiff has been stayed by stipulation of the parties pending resolution of
this appeal. 

     Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on
all counts. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to disqualify Judge Richard
W. Norton, who had heard the summary judgment motion, and for a rehearing of
the summary judgment motion. Administrative Judge Stephen B. Martin denied
the motion, and this appeal followed. 

     Summary judgment will be granted if, after an adequate time for
discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an
essential element of the case on which the party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.  Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 254-55, 565 A.2d 1326,

 

1329 (1989).  In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we will affirm if
there is no dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact and if the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Cavanaugh v. Abbott
Laboratories, 145 Vt. 516, 520,