Title: BEAULIEU v. FLORQUIST

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BEAULIEU v. FLORQUIST2004 WY 3186 P.3d 863Case Number: 02-276Decided: 03/25/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

WILLIAM 
N. BEAULIEU and APRIL D.

BEAULIEU; 
and WILLIAM N. BEAULIEU

and 
APRIL D. BEAULIEU, as parents and

natural 
guardians of minor children CHEYENNE

ROCHELLE 
BEAULIEU and SKILAR JONEA

BEAULIEU,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

BRUCE 
A. FLORQUIST and THE CITY

OF 
RAWLINS,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
Walter Urbigkit, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
Loyd E. Smith of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and BROOKS, 
D.J.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an 
appeal from a summary judgment granted to a municipality and its employee in a 
tort action because the appellants' claim failed to comply with the requirements 
of the Wyoming Constitution.  We 
affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      The parties 
have worded the issues in unnecessarily complex and argumentative fashion.  We find the dispositive issues to 
be:

 

1.         
Does Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 require a claim filed under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101, et seq. (Lexis 
1999), to be signed by the claimant?1

 

2.         
Does Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 require a claim filed under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act to be certified to under penalty of 
perjury?

 

3.         
Should the doctrine of judicial estoppel apply to bar any of the 
appellants' arguments?

 

4.         
If the claim in this case was defective, should it be saved by the 
equitable doctrines of equitable estoppel, waiver, or 
laches?

 

5.         
If the claim in this case was defective, should it be saved by the 
doctrine of substantial compliance?

 

6.         
Did the decision in Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, 20 P.3d 521 
(Wyo. 2001) (Beaulieu I), 
establish the "law of the case" so as to prohibit the appellees from contesting 
the validity of the second governmental claim?

 

 

[¶3]      This case is 
before us a second time.  The 
salient facts may be gleaned from our prior opinion.  On December 19, 1996, a vehicle driven 
by a Rawlins city employee, Bruce Florquist, struck a vehicle occupied by 
William N. Beaulieu, his wife, April D. Beaulieu, and their daughter, Cheyenne 
Rochelle Beaulieu.2  Within a week of the accident, a "Notice 
of Claim" appeared in the office of the Rawlins city attorney, asserting 
personal injury and property damage.  
After receiving a settlement offer from the city's insurer, Mr. Beaulieu 
hired an attorney, who filed a second claim with the city on June 29, 1998.  When there was no response from the 
city, the Beaulieus filed suit on June 14, 1999.  Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 4-6, 
20 P.3d  at 524-25.

 

 

[¶4]      Summary judgments 
are governed by W.R.C.P. 56.  Our 
standard for reviewing summary judgments has been recited many times and need 
not be repeated here.  See 
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 8-10, 20 P.3d  at 525-26.

 

 

            
Claimant's Signature Certified 
to Under Penalty of Perjury

 

[¶5]      In Beaulieu I, 
the district court granted summary judgment to the appellees on the ground 
that the lawsuit was time barred by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114.3  Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 7, 20 P.3d  at 525.  On appeal, this Court reversed because, 
inasmuch as the "Notice of Claim" that appeared in the city attorney's office in 
December of 1996 did not comply with any of the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 
16, § 7, it was not a valid claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, so 
the appellees could not rely upon the statute of limitations found in that 
Act.4  Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 13-17, 
20 P.3d  at 526-27.  We summarized our holding as 
follows:

 

            
We hold that the City of Rawlins is a political subdivision to which the 
requirements of art. 16, § 7 are applicable.  A valid claim against such a 
municipality must be in writing and certified under penalty of perjury, which 
means it must be signed.  Further, 
it must be presented to the officer or officers charged with the duty of 
auditing it.  Such claims are 
subject to the same rules that have been established with respect to claims 
against the State.  In any action 
against the municipality, it is necessary to allege with specificity that the 
claim was filed and the date it was filed.  
Obviously the document upon which the City of Rawlins relies in this case 
fails to satisfy those criteria.

 

Id., 
2001 WY 33, ¶ 17, 20 P.3d  at 527.

 

[¶6]      The claim at 
issue in Beaulieu I was an unsigned, undated "Notice of Claim" that 
"appeared" in the city attorney's office soon after the accident.5  Presently at issue is a second claim, 
this one having been signed by the Beaulieus' attorney and filed with the 
Rawlins City Clerk on June 29, 1998.  
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 6, 20 P.3d  at 525.  This "Governmental Claim," as it was 
entitled, was not signed by any of the claimants, nor was it certified under 
penalty of perjury.

 

[¶7]      The appellees 
challenged the second claim by renewing their motion for summary judgment.  The renewed motion contended that the 
second claim failed to satisfy the requirements for a governmental claim found 
in Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, as established by Beaulieu I, and that, 
therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  After hearing, the district court 
granted the motion.  Relying on 
Beaulieu I, the district court concluded that the second claim, not being 
signed by a claimant and not being certified under penalty of perjury, was 
invalid.  Furthermore, again citing 
Beaulieu I, the district court held that the proper filing of a claim is 
a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a 
complaint.

 

[¶8]      The district 
court was correct.  Beaulieu I 
made it clear that governmental claims must meet the requirements of Wyo. 
Const. art. 16, § 7, including the requirement that such claims must be signed 
and certified under penalty of perjury.  
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 13-18, 20 P.3d  at 526-27. 
Further, Beaulieu I made it just as clear that the claim "must be signed 
by the claimant or the charge of perjury could not lie."  Id., 2001 WY 33, ¶ 15, 20 P.3d  at 
527 (emphasis added).

 

[¶9]      Central to the 
district court's disposition of these first two issues was its conclusion that 
the signature and certification deficiencies in the second claim meant that a 
proper claim had not been filed with the governmental entity, and that, 
therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  We affirm that conclusion and add the 
following discussion to clarify the law in that regard.

 

[¶10]   Many cases have come before this 
court involving the statutory and constitutional requirements for making a claim 
against a governmental entity.6  In resolving the issues raised in those 
cases, we have created a rule whereby, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the district court, the complaint must allege the filing of a claim with the 
governmental entity and it must allege the date of that filing.  Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 
851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993); Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 102 (Wyo. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont 
County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 986 (Wyo. 
1991).

 

[¶11]   Many of our prior cases have dealt 
with the necessity of alleging such filing and the date of filing under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 2003), or similar statute, as a condition 
precedent to suit.7  See, for example, Garnett v. Brock, 
2 P.3d 558, 561 (Wyo. 2000); Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1117 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814 (1998); Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1996); Amrein, 
851 P.2d  at 771; Dee v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957, 959 (Wyo. 
1983); and Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 1983).  However, as 
early as Utah Const. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951, 953 (1933), we held that statutes granting the right to sue the state 
must be construed in consonance with the constitution, and that plaintiffs 
cannot comply with the constitution by reducing a claim to judgment and then 
filing that judgment as a claim against the state.  The gist of that dual holding is that a 
claim filed with the governmental entity must meet the constitutional, as well 
as the statutory, requirements.  In 
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d  at 526, we reiterated that 
precept:  "It never has been 
questioned that a claim against the State must comply with the requirements of 
Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7."  A 
logical inference from that statement is that, just as in the case of a 
plaintiff's failure to allege his claim's compliance with statutory 
requirements, failure to allege his claim's compliance with constitutional 
requirements results in a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.

 

[¶12]   Unfortunately, our precedent on 
this issue is not consistent.  Even 
in Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 14, 20 P.3d  at 527, where we recognized that 
governmental claims must meet constitutional requirements, we also noted that 
this court "has ruled that the execution requirements of art. 16, § 7 can be 
waived by failing to assert the issue in the trial court . . .."  That suggests that the constitutional 
requirements are not jurisdictional, because the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and is not waived even if not raised 
below.  Boyd, 909 P.2d  at 325 
(quoting United Mine Workers of America Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 
774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo. 1989)); Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Wyo. 1988); Bell, 662 P.2d  at 415.  We have, in fact, previously stated that 
the constitutional signature and certification requirements, unlike the 
statutory filing requirements, are not jurisdictional:

 

The 
State . . . contends that an omission of the correct certification results in a 
failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue can be raised at any time 
in the proceeding.  We do not agree 
with this contention.  The failure 
to verify or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect 
or an irregularity that is not jurisdictional.

 

Martinez 
v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 958 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶13]   We now believe that Martinez 
was wrongly decided and that it must be overruled.  The above-quoted statement from 
Martinez was supported by a citation to In re Bear River Irr. Dist., 
51 Wyo. 343, 65 P.2d 686 (1937).  
Bear River Irr. Dist., however, did not involve the filing of a 
governmental claim nor did it involve the signature and certification 
requirement of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.   Rather, Bear River Irr. Dist. 
concerned a petition for the organization of an irrigation district, and a 
provision in the statutory Code of Civil Procedure that required pleadings to be 
verified.  Bear River Irr. 
Dist.'s holding that the failure to meet that statutory verification 
requirement was "but a defect or irregularity" that was not jurisdictional 
simply should not be equated with the failure to comply with a constitutional 
signature and certification requirement for the presentation of a claim against 
a governmental entity.  In re 
Bear River Irrigation Dist., 65 P.2d  at 687.  Over a hundred years ago, we recognized 
the special significance of the signature and certification requirements when 
governmental claims are involved:

 

[I]t 
is plain that the purpose of requiring a full itemized statement was to hedge a 
county board about with such restrictions in the allowance of bills that the 
individual citizens and taxpayers might have the means of knowing the cause and 
validity of county expenditures, and that the requirement for verification has 
for its object a showing of good faith and honesty in the presentation of the 
bill, and some evidence of the truth, justness, and correctness of the 
claim.  As was said in a recent 
case, the provisions are "designed to protect the board from importunities to 
pass upon claims before they are presented in such a way as to be considered 
intelligently, to enable it to easily eliminate improper charges from claims, 
and to enable taxpayers to detect abuses in the allowance of 
claims."

 

Houtz 
v. Board of Com'rs of Uinta County, 11 
Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840, 842 (1902) (quoting Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 
113 Wis. 516, 89 N.W. 460 (1902)).

 

[¶14]   The rule that the timely filing of 
a proper claim with the governmental entity is a condition precedent to suit is 
a judicially created rule.  Awe, 
534 P.2d  at 102.  Heretofore, we 
have limited the application of that rule, when determining the presence or 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction, to the statutory requirements; that is, 
we have required only that the complaint allege the filing of the claim and the 
date of such filing.  We now hold, 
however, that the complaint must also allege compliance with the signature and 
certification requirements of the state constitution.  No proper claim has been filed if it 
does not meet those constitutional requirements, so the district court does not 
obtain subject matter jurisdiction until those constitutional requirements are 
met.  That, in effect, was the 
essence of the holding in Beaulieu I.

 

[¶15]   It is important to distinguish 
between the constitutional signature and certification requirements and the 
judicially created condition precedent requirement.  While we recognized as long ago as 
Utah Const. Co. that governmental claims must meet the constitutional 
requirements, we have not heretofore required that complaints allege such 
compliance.  It is our intention 
clearly to do so now.  Inasmuch as 
the courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over a governmental claim 
that has not met the constitutional requirements, it shall henceforth be 
incumbent upon the plaintiff in such a case to allege in his or her complaint 
not only compliance with statutory filing requirements, but compliance with 
constitutional signature and certification requirements.  This rule shall apply to all complaints 
filed after the date of publication of this opinion.8

 

            
Judicial 
Estoppel

 

[¶16]   The doctrine of judicial estoppel 
may be applied to foreclose a party from maintaining inconsistent positions in 
judicial proceedings.  Amoco 
Production Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Sweetwater, 2002 WY 
154, ¶ 17, 55 P.3d 1246, 1252 (Wyo. 2002).  When the position taken by a party in 
the first proceeding is successful, that position "rises to the dignity of 
conclusiveness.'"  Id. 
(quoting Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 930 (Wyo. 
2000)).  It has been the policy of this Court, 
however, to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel sparingly, and not in a 
highly technical manner that prevents litigation on the merits.  Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 
2003 WY 15, ¶ 22, 61 P.3d 1255, 1262 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Robertson v. 
TWP, Inc., 656 P.2d 547, 553 (Wyo. 1983)).  Furthermore, judicial estoppel does not 
apply to legal conclusions based on undisputed facts.  Board of County Com'rs for Sublette 
County v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶ 14, 55 P.3d 714, 720 (Wyo. 2002) 
(quoting Ottema v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 41, 
46 (Wyo. 1998)); 
Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Const., 939 P.2d 718, 723-24 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶17]   The appellees argue that, since the 
Beaulieus were successful in Beaulieu I in contending that the first 
claim was invalid because it did not meet the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 
16, § 7, they are judicially estopped from now contending that the second claim 
did not have to meet those requirements.  
 We disagree, and we 
decline to apply the doctrine.

 

[¶18]   It is true that the Beaulieus' 
position as to the first claim was that it was invalid for failure to meet the 
constitutional requirements.  But 
their present position as to the second claim is not necessarily contradictory 
to that position.  Rather, they now 
simply argue that the constitutional signing requirements can be met by the 
signature of an attorney.  Beyond 
that, the question of the constitution's signature requirements is a question of 
law to which the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not 
apply.

 

            
Equitable Estoppel, Waiver and 
Laches

 

[¶19]   This Court's mandate in Beaulieu 
I issued on April 17, 2001.  The 
appellees filed their renewed summary judgment motion on June 26, 2002.  Between those dates, the parties engaged 
in a nasty and extensive discovery battle, characterized by motions to compel, 
motions to strike, and motions to quash.  
The Beaulieus' equitable contention is that the primary assertion of the 
renewed motion, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because the second claim failed to meet the governmental claim requirements 
established in Beaulieu I, could have been raised much earlier, thereby 
obviating the trouble and expense of discovery.  The Beaulieus, stung by the passage of 
the period of limitations established in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 for the 
filing of a claim, raised the equitable defenses of equitable estoppel,9 waiver,10 and laches.11  The Beaulieus' equitable arguments were 
summarized in their appellate brief as follows:

 

In 
this case defendants failed to assert its [sic.] argument under the 
Wyoming Constitution until after the statute of limitations period had run.  Appellees acted as if the claims of each 
member of the Beaulieu family were valid and legitimate and participated in the 
comprehensive litigation-oriented activities as if the claims were valid 
including waiver of non-inclusion in the first summary judgment motion and then 
disregard of the opportunity to end the litigation during the fourteen-month 
litigative campaign after first appeal reversal.  Neither the Beaulieu family nor counsel, 
who is of course ultimately responsible, had any reason to expect that the 
claims were anything but valid given the language of the Governmental Claims 
Act, coupled with the failure of any action to have been taken in behalf of 
present Appellees by their attorney whom was also ultimately 
responsible.

 

[¶20]   The appellees raise three 
counterarguments.  First, citing 
Snake River Brewing Co., Inc. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 28, 39 P.3d 397, 407-08 (Wyo. 2002) and Thompson v. Board of County Com'rs 
of the County of Sublette, 2001 WY 108, ¶ 11, 34 P.3d 278, 281 (Wyo. 
2001), 
they point out that, as a general rule, estoppel will not lie against 
governmental bodies without a showing of affirmative misconduct.  Second, they contend that the Beaulieus 
were well aware of the applicability of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, inasmuch as 
they were the ones who raised the issue in regard to the first claim.  And third, the appellees argue that, 
given the age of the case, it was necessary to preserve testimony through 
discovery before another venture into the appeal process.12

 

[¶21]   The district court did not rule 
directly on any of the equitable defenses, but the grant of summary judgment to 
the appellees clearly incorporated a ruling against the Beaulieus on these 
theories.  Although we would prefer 
that the record contain specific rulings on each issue, we will affirm the 
district court because the record does not support the applicability of 
equitable estoppel, waiver or laches.  
It was not unreasonable for the appellees to proceed with discovery prior 
to filing another motion for summary judgment.  In fact, their estimation that another 
summary judgment process, followed by another appeal, could add another year or 
more to the case turned out to be prophetic.  Furthermore, this was not a situation 
where the appellees possessed superior knowledge of the state of the law.  The Beaulieus first raised the issue of 
the applicability of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 to claims under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, and successfully argued that position.  And most importantly, Beaulieu I, 
2001 WY 33, ¶ 15, 20 P.3d  at 527, 
left little doubt that the claim must be signed by the claimant and certified to 
under penalty of perjury:

 

The 
requirement is clear that an itemized statement in writing is to be filed, which 
is certified under penalty of perjury.   Such a statement must be signed by 
the claimant or the charge of perjury could not lie.

 

[¶22]   When the mandate in Beaulieu 
I issued, too much time had passed since the accident for the Beaulieus to 
file a new claim with the City of Rawlins.  
Nevertheless, the Beaulieus could have prevented the lengthy and 
expensive discovery process that followed by dismissing their complaint or by 
bringing the attorney signature issue before the district court on their own 
initiative.  The clear language of 
Beaulieu I quoted above certainly should have alerted them to the 
deficiency in their claim.  This 
simply is not a case where equity demands that the court step in to save 
them.  The appellees made no 
misrepresentations to the Beaulieus, there is no evidence that the appellees 
intended to give up their right to pursue the Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 
arguments, and it was not unreasonable to conduct discovery before embarking on 
a second appeal process.

 

            
Substantial 
Compliance

 

[¶23]   In their next argument, the 
Beaulieus cite Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Wyoming Highway Dept., 582 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1978), 
for the proposition that substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, 
with a governmental claims notice statute is sufficient.  In Rissler & McMurry Co., 582 P.2d  at 588, 
this Court held that failure to file a claim with the State Auditor, as required 
by statute, was not fatal where the claimant had filed the claim with the State 
Highway Department, as required by the Department's rules.  We applied the doctrine of substantial 
compliance in that situation because the primary purpose of noticeallowing the 
State an opportunity to investigate and negotiate claimswas preserved.13

 

[¶24]   The appellees' response to this 
argument is essentially a judicial estoppel argument.  They point out the Beaulieus' contention 
in Beaulieu I that Wyoming clearly requires strict, as opposed to 
substantial, compliance with statutory requirements, and they argue that the 
Beaulieus should not now be allowed to argue the opposite view of the 
law.

 

[¶25]   Neither in its decision letter nor 
in its order granting the summary judgment motion did the district court 
directly address the concept of substantial compliance.  The gist of the district court's 
decision, however, is that a claimant cannot comply with the constitutional 
signature requirements by submitting a claim signed only by his attorney.  We agree.  Whether viewed under a strict compliance 
standard or a substantial compliance standard, the fact remains that the primary 
purpose for the constitutional requirementsto make sure that governmental 
claims be sworn to by the claimantsimply cannot be accomplished through an 
attorney's signature.

 

            
Law of the 
Case

 

[¶26]   We described the 
law-of-the-case doctrine in Lyden By and Through Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451, 454 (Wyo. 1996):

 

            
The "law of the case" doctrine stands for the proposition that a court's 
decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding 
precedent to be followed in successive stages of the same litigation.  Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 
846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo.1993); see also 1B Moore's Federal Practice 
¶ 0.404[1] (2d ed.1991).  This 
doctrine is designed to avoid repetitious litigation and to promote consistent 
decision making; thus, it is related to res judicata, collateral estoppel and 
stare decisis.  Triton Coal, 
at 667.  Usually the "law of the 
case" doctrine requires a district court to adhere to its prior rulings, adhere 
to the rulings of an appellate court, or adhere to another judge's rulings in 
the same case or a closely related case.  
Triton Coal, at 668; see also 18 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: § 4478 
(1981).

 

[¶27]   The basis for the Beaulieus' 
law-of-the-case argument is not entirely clear, although in the following 
passage from their appellate brief, it appears they contend that, by its silence 
in Beaulieu I with respect to the validity of the Beaulieus' second 
claim, this Court impliedly found that claim to be valid:

 

            
Law of the case in this concept is similar to waiver or estoppel, but 
rather in a more technical sense involves the finality position previously 
related by Appellant that if the Supreme Court of Wyoming had determined to 
effectively conclude the Beaulieu family litigation in making the first 
decision, it would have so stated definitively there.  The Beaulieu family and their attorney 
postulate that the Supreme Court intended to do what was done.  Consequently it is argued under 
Triton and [Lyden] concepts that the decision and opinion to be 
rendered in Beaulieu II should be interpreted to do what was said in 
Beaulieu I which is again to remand the case and this time for trial to 
invalidate the dismissal by the District Court based on a sequential motion for 
summary judgment involving an issue to have been as clearly apparent that first 
time as it came to be in this present second appeal.

 

[¶28]   The law-of-the-case doctrine does 
not apply in this instance.  At 
issue in Beaulieu I was the validity of the first claim.  The issue at present is the validity of 
the second claim.  By no stretch of 
the imagination could it be said that, by failing to find the second claim 
invalid in Beaulieu I, we somehow found it to be valid.  If there is any role for the 
law-of-the-case doctrine in this case, it would be in its stare decisis 
sense.  That is, having said in 
Beaulieu I that a claim filed under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
must meet the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, including the 
requirement that it be signed by the claimant and certified to under penalty of 
perjury, we could hardly say in Beaulieu II that the opposite is 
true.

 

 

[¶29]   The Governmental Claim signed 
by the Beaulieus' attorney and filed with the City of Rawlins did not meet the 
signature and certification requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, and was 
therefore not a valid claim.  
Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
dismissal of the Beaulieus' complaint through summary judgment was 
appropriate.  The Beaulieus have not 
established the necessary facts to support application of the doctrines of 
equitable estoppel, waiver, laches, or substantial compliance, and the 
law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar the appellees from contesting the validity 
of the governmental claim.

 

[¶30]   Affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1There is no change in the relevant 
portion of the current 2003 codification of this act.

 

  2Mrs. Beaulieu was pregnant at the 
time of the collision.  Skilar Jonea 
Beaulieu was born subsequent to the accident.  The four members of the Beaulieu family 
are the appellants in this case.

 

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 
states:

 

Except 
as otherwise provided, actions against a governmental entity or a public 
employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 
30, 1979 which are subject to this act shall be forever barred unless commenced 
within one (1) year after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 
1-39-113.  In the case of a minor 
seven (7) years of age or younger, actions against a governmental entity or 
public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after 
June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act are forever barred unless commenced 
within two (2) years after occurrence or until his eighth birthday, whichever 
period is greater.  In no case shall 
the statute of limitations provided in this section be longer than any other 
applicable statute of limitations.  
In the absence of applicable insurance coverage, if the claim was 
properly filed, the statute shall be tolled forty-five (45) days after a 
decision by the entity, if the decision was not made and mailed to the claimant 
within the statutory time limitation otherwise provided 
herein.

 

  4Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 
states:

 

No 
money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law 
and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or 
demands against the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be 
audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified 
to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose 
duty it may be to audit the same.

 

  5The origin of this "Notice of Claim" 
appears to be a mystery.  It was not 
signed by any of the claimants and Mr. Beaulieu testified by affidavit that it 
was not prepared by him or any member of his family.  No one from the city knew when, or by 
whom, it was presented.  Mr. 
Beaulieu speculated that it was prepared by his insurance carrier to obtain 
reimbursement for property damage payments.  See Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 5, 
20 P.3d  at 524-25.

 

  6Eathorne v. Board of Trustees of 
Memorial Hosp. of Carbon County, 2001 WY 36, 21 P.3d 745 (Wyo. 2001); 
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, 20 P.3d 521; Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558 
(Wyo. 2000); Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
952 P.2d 1108 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814 (1998); Allen v. 
Lucero, 925 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1996); Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 
1996); Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769 (Wyo. 1993); 
Cranston v. Weston County Weed and Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1992); 
Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949 (Wyo. 1990); Duran v. Board 
of County Com'rs of Sweetwater County, 787 P.2d 971 (Wyo. 1990); Dee v. 
Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 1983); Board of Trustees of the 
University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1983); Rissler & 
McMurry Co. v. Wyoming Highway Dept., 582 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1978); Wyoming 
State Highway Department v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342 (Wyo. 1978); Awe v. 
University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1975), overruled on other 
grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 986 (Wyo. 1991); Price v. State Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946); Utah Const. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933); Town Council of Town of Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703 (1928); Houtz v. Board of Com'rs of Uinta County, 11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840 (1902).

 

  7Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 provides, 
in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)        No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission . . .

 

. 
. .

 

            
(c)        All 
claims against the state shall be presented to the general services division of 
the department of administration and information.  Claims against any other governmental 
entity shall be filed at the business office of that 
entity.

 

  8The summary judgment in the instant 
case is being affirmed because of the substantive failure to comply with the 
constitutional requirements, not because of the failure to allege 
compliance.

 

  9We recently described the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel in Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 2003 WY 
102, ¶ 34, 75 P.3d 640, 653 (Wyo. 2003):

 

"Equitable 
estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is 
absolutely precluded from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as 
against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has 
been led thereby to change his position for the worse.'"  Snake River Brewing Co., Inc. v. Town 
of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 28, 39 P.3d 397, 407-08 (Wyo.2002) (quoting 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 335 (10th 
Cir.1958)).  "Equitable estoppel 
arises only when a party, by acts, conduct, or acquiescence causes another to 
change his position."  Roth v. 
First Sec. Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 96 (Wyo.1984).  The elements of equitable estoppel are a 
lack of knowledge, reliance in good faith, and action or inaction that results 
in an injury.  Id.  Equitable estoppel is similar to 
promissory estoppel, but equitable estoppel is a tort doctrine that requires 
proof of misrepresentation.  B 
& W Glass, Inc. [v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.,] 829 P.2d 
[809,] 813 [(Wyo.1992)].

 

  10"Waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right."  
Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo. 
1991).  Waiver must be manifest in some 
unequivocal manner.  Amax Coal 
West, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 896 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Wyo. 
1995) (quoting Jackson State Bank v. Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 
1992)).

 

  11Laches is an equitable theory based 
on an unreasonable delay by a party in asserting a right.  Squaw Mountain Cattle Co., 804 P.2d  at 1297.  Laches is comprised of inexcusable 
delay, and injury, prejudice or disadvantage to others.  Moncrief v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 
775 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Wyo. 1989).  The party asserting the doctrine of 
laches must show that he relied on the other party's actions and changed his 
position in reliance thereon to his prejudice.  Murphy v. Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 
91 (Wyo. 1982).  The defense of laches is reserved for 
the rare case where a protracted acquiescence induces the undertaking of 
substantial activity in reliance thereon.  
First Nat. Bank of Lander v. First Wyoming Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 
592 P.2d 697, 702 (Wyo. 1979).

 

  12The accident occurred in December 
1996.  The lawsuit was filed in June 
1999.  The mandate in Beaulieu I 
issued in April 2001.  The case 
was four-and-a-half years old when jurisdiction was returned to the district 
court.

 

  13See Cranston, 826 P.2d  at 
257-58, 
for a considerably more limited view of the doctrine of substantial compliance 
in regard to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.  Cranston, 826 P.2d  at 
256-57, 
also describes the inapplicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the 
absence of assertions or representations by the governmental entity that were 
relied upon by the claimant in failing to meet claim filling 
requirements.