Title: Dainton v. Watson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dainton v. Watson1983 WY 15658 P.2d 79Case Number: 5744Case Number: 5744Decided: 02/11/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
ELIZABETH 
DAINTON, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), WAYNE DAINTON AND JUANITA SOREM (DEFENDANTS), 

v. MINERVA C. 
WATSON, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF VERLIE O. ALTMAN, DECEASED, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF). 

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNiobraraCounty, George P. Sawyer, 
J.

Dennis C. Meier 
of Meier & Donovan Law Office, Lusk, signed the brief and appeared in oral 
argument on behalf of 
appellant.

Alfred G. 
Kaufman, Jr., Lusk, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of 
appellee.

Before ROONEY*, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**], and 
BROWN, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the judgment of the district court declaring a $20,000 bequest to Elizabeth 
Dainton (appellant) forfeited and denied pursuant to the terms of a no-contest 
or in terrorem clause1 in the will of Verlie O. Altman. 
The provision of that clause was invoked as a result of appellant's unsuccessful 
attempt to contest the validity of the will of Verlie O. Altman, deceased. We 
have already reviewed the will contest proceeding and have affirmed the jury's 
decision upholding the validity of the will. Matter of Estate of Altman, Wyo., 650 P.2d 277 (1982). The issue raised 
here is whether the district court erred in enforcing the terms of the will's in 
terrorem clause without first considering whether appellant contested the will 
in good faith and with probable cause to believe the will was 
invalid.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Verlie O. Altman died 
testate on May 4, 1981, at the ripe old age of eighty-five. Mr. Altman was 
unmarried and without issue at the time of his death. Nine days after his death, 
on May 13, 1981, appellee admitted Verlie O. Altman's Last Will and Testament to 
probate in Niobrara County, 
Wyoming. That will had been 
executed by Mr. Altman on July 7, 1977. The will was subsequently contested by 
appellant, Mr. Altman's sister, on the grounds of improper execution, 
incompetency of the testator, and undue influence. After a jury trial, the 
contest failed and the validity of the will was upheld and affirmed by this 
court as noted.

[¶4.]     After appellant's 
action to contest the will failed, appellee filed a petition for forfeiture in 
the district court asking that the bequest to appellant, appearing in the will, 
be forfeited pursuant to the in terrorem clause of the will. Additionally, 
appellee asked that the bequests to Wayne Dainton and Juanita Sorem also be 
forfeited under the same clause for appearing as witnesses in the will contest 
proceeding in behalf of appellant. Verlie Altman's bequests to Wayne Dainton and 
Juanita Sorem were not forfeited by the district court. That decision is not on 
appeal in that the attempted cross-appeal was dismissed for failure of the 
cross-appellant to timely file her brief. From the judgment of the district 
court ordering that appellant's bequest be forfeited and denied, appellant 
brings this appeal.

[¶5.]     Verlie Altman, in his 
will, made quite a number of specific bequests to family members and friends. 
Included in those bequests was one for $20,000 to his sister, appellant. Mr. 
Altman also included a no-contest or in terrorem clause in his will which is at 
issue here. It provided:

"SIXTH, I hereby direct 
that if any person entitled to any legacy, bequest, interest or estate shall 
directly contest or dispute the probate of this Will, or institute or become a 
party to instituting any proceedings, or act in the interest of any person who 
shall institute any proceedings, suit or action for the purpose of changing the 
effect of this Will wholly or in part, then and in that event all the legacies, 
bequests, estate or remainder interest declared in favor of such person by this 
Will or herein provided, shall immediately thereupon be revoked, cease and 
determine and become wholly void and of no effect."

[¶6.]     Specifically on appeal, 
appellant would have this court adopt a rule governing the enforcement of a 
no-contest or in terrorem clause similar to the rule found in § 3-905 of the 
Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.).

That section 
provides:

"A provision in a will 
purporting to penalize any interested person for contesting the will or 
instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is unenforceable if 
probable cause exists for instituting proceedings."

Appellant argues 
that public policy demands that such a rule be applied to this and similar cases 
where a will is contested in good faith and with probable cause to question the 
will's validity. Appellant contends that the district court erred in not 
reaching the question of appellant's motive in contesting the will before 
strictly construing the terms of the no-contest clause.

[¶7.]     Appellant made a 
similar public policy argument before the district court which that court 
rejected when it concluded as a matter of law:

"1. That the sixth 
paragraph of the Last Will and Testament of Verlie O. Altman, deceased, is 
valid. The law of origin of the Will contest portion of the Wyoming Probate Code 
is the state of California, and the state of California has held that similar 
provision in Wills provided for forfeiture of legacy in the event of a contest 
of Will by a legatee was not contrary to public policy, was valid and binding 
upon the legatee, and was to be given effect according to the intent of the 
testator.

"Counsel for Defendants 
argue that Section 3-905 of the Uniform Probate Code provides that such a 
provision is unenforceable if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings. 
The State of Wyoming has not adopted the Uniform Probate 
Code, nor has the legislature seen fit to adopt Section 3-905 of said 
code."

We agree with 
the position taken by the district court.

[¶8.]     In the first place, in 
considering a will, it is the long-accepted position of this court that intent 
of the testator must govern. Kortz v. American Nat. Bank of Cheyenne, Wyo., 571 P.2d 985 (1977); Hammer v. Atchison, Wyo., 536 P.2d 151 (1975); In re Gilchrist's Estate, 50 
Wyo. 153, 58 P.2d 431, reh. denied 50 Wyo. 153, 60 P.2d 364 (1936). In determining 
the testator's intent, we can only determine that intent from what the will 
says; we are not free to write terms in the will that do not, in reality, appear 
there. Kortz v. American Nat. Bank of Cheyenne, 
supra; Hammer v. Atchison, supra; Churchfield v. First Nat. Bank 
of Sheridan, Wyo., 418 P.2d 1001 (1966). We will not supply 
words for a testator where the will is clear and unambiguous. Kortz v. American 
Nat. Bank of Cheyenne, supra; Matter of Estate of 
Lendecke, 79 Wyo. 27, 329 P.2d 819 
(1958).

[¶9.]     In the case before us, 
the testator, Verlie O. Altman, quite unambiguously expressed his intent that 
anyone entitled to a bequest under his will who instituted proceedings 
contesting the validity of any part of the will would have his bequest revoked. 
Under our aforementioned rules governing the interpretation of wills it is quite 
obvious that the district court did not err in declaring the testator's bequest 
to appellant forfeited and denied. It would have been error for the district 
court to have done otherwise. The no-contest or in terrorem clause in Verlie 
Altman's will did not exempt those who challenged the will in good faith and 
with probable cause from its provisions. The will clearly said anyone who 
challenged the will would lose his or her share. Therefore, to have applied the 
terms of the will in the manner in which appellant suggests would require 
judicial construction where such construction would be clearly 
improper.

[¶10.]  We also note, as did the district court, 
that the will contest provisions found in the Wyoming Probate Code2 were taken from the California 
Probate Code and that those provisions retain their similarity. See, Gaunt v. 
KansasUniversity Endowment Ass'n of Lawrence, Kansas, 
Wyo., 379 P.2d 825 (1963). That being the case, this court has previously announced an 
inclination to follow California's precedent when dealing with will 
contest matters which are before us for the first time. The issue raised by 
appellant concerning no-contest clauses is one of first impression for us. The 
view of the California courts on the enforcement of 
no-contest or in terrorem clauses is in accord with the position we are taking 
here. In Estate of Friedman, 100 Cal. App. 3d 810, 161 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1979), a 
California court of appeals, faced with an argument nearly identical to the one 
made here by appellant, made this statement on the law in California as it 
regards no-contest clauses:

"* * * Our Supreme Court 
has repeatedly declared that a provision in a will providing for forfeiture of a 
legacy in the event of a contest of the will by the legatee is not contrary to 
public policy, is valid and binding upon the legatee, and is to be given effect 
according to the intent of the testator. [Citations.] This principle has been 
consistently applied by the intermediate appellate courts of this state. 
[Citations.] * * *" Id. 161 Cal. Rptr.  at 
313.

Although we are 
not bound by the decisions of the California courts, we are persuaded by their 
decisions that our holding on the issue is correct.

[¶11.]  In reaching our decision, we, like the 
district court, find additional strength for our position from the fact that our 
legislature has chosen not to incorporate § 3-905 of the Uniform Probate Code 
into the recently enacted Wyoming Probate Code. Chapter 54, Session Laws of 
Wyoming, 1980. 
The Wyoming legislature and the committee that helped draft the new probate code 
were no doubt aware of the Uniform Probate Code and all of its various 
provisions; yet they chose not to incorporate § 3-905 or anything like it into 
our statutes. Appellant urges us now to do what the legislature chose not to do; 
that is, to judicially implement the provisions of § 3-905 into the body of the 
probate law in Wyoming. That we will not 
do.

[¶12.]  Appellant argues that public policy 
demands that those who contest wills in good faith and with probable cause to 
believe that a will is invalid should be protected from strict enforcement of 
the terms of a no-contest clause. To strictly enforce no-contest clauses, 
appellant asserts is to create a device for the unscrupulous to manipulate 
estates to their benefit. That view pays little respect to the ability of our 
judicial system to discover any such unscrupulous acts. It also ignores the 
overriding policy of this court and the well-accepted principle elsewhere that a 
testator's intent as determined by the language in his will is 
controlling.

[¶13.]  Recently in our decision in In re Adoption of MM, Wyo., 652 P.2d 974, 978 
(1982), we discussed what public policy is. We said that "[i]n its general 
sense, public policy refers to the law of a state embodied in its constitution, 
statutes and judicial decisions." In Gaunt v. Kansas University Endowment Ass'n 
of Lawrence, Kansas, supra at 
826, this court said:

"Proceedings for 
disproving or contesting a will were unknown to the common law. The right of 
contest is a creature of statute and a contestant has such rights and only such 
rights as the law gives him. [Citations.]"

Thus, public 
policy in matters dealing with will contest proceedings must be determined from 
our legislature's enactments or more appropriately here from the absence of any 
such enactments. If public policy favors the adoption of provisions similar to 
those found in § 3-905 of the U.P.C., then it is for the legislature to make 
those provisions part of the probate law of Wyoming and not the courts. We do not intend 
to judicially do so.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Defined as a warning 
provision applied to legacies given upon condition that the recipient shall not 
dispute the validity or the dispositions of the will, the penalty being 
forfeiture of the bequest or devise if such a contest is initiated. Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th ed. 1979).

2 Section 2-6-301 et seq., 
W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement).

ROSE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶15.]  I agree with the result reached by the 
majority of the court in this appeal, but I have the need to express some 
additional thoughts with respect to appellant's contentions. This need comes 
from my concern that the majority opinion may be read to stand for the 
proposition that the testator can, through provisions in the will, threaten any 
beneficiary with forfeiture of his or her devise for bringing an action on the 
will. In my opinion, the case law upholding "in terrorem" clauses does not 
support the application of such forfeiture provisions in circumstances where the 
subject of the suit is to ascertain the intention of a testator as embodied in 
the will, rather than where the action is brought out of the beneficiary's 
desire to defeat that intent. Given this precedent, I wish to more thoroughly 
discuss the rationale behind the rule adopted in the majority opinion, and 
express my belief that the rule should not be applied except in circumstances 
which are similar to those found in this case.

[¶16.]  The authorities agree that the question 
of the enforceability of "in terrorem" clauses has been a highly debatable 
issue. On the one side are the courts which have adopted the view expressed by 
the appellant in his brief. That viewpoint is exemplified by the discussion 
appearing in In re Cocklin's Estate, 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129, 157 A.L.R. 584 
(1945). The Iowa Supreme Court quoted from one of its prior cases as follows: 

"Counsel for the 
legatees herein concede that the foregoing pronouncements are squarely against 
their contentions. They ask us to modify and overrule the majority opinion in 
Moran v. Moran to the extent necessary to make the position of this court that 
taken by Judge Evans in his dissenting opinion wherein he stated, at pages 469 
to 473 of 144 Iowa [451], at of 123 N.W. [202], 30 L.R.A.,N.S., 898, as 
follows:

"`Evans, C.J. 
(dissenting). Upon one branch of this case I am not able to concur in the 
majority opinion. The question whether a provision in a will forbidding any 
contest thereof under penalty of forfeiture of all legacies therein should be 
given unqualified effect is one upon which there is a diversity of opinion in 
the courts. The cases on the subject are comparatively few. It is perhaps true 
that the numerical majority of the courts which have passed upon the question 
have adopted the affirmative of the proposition, but some of these have done so 
with reluctance. I am convinced that the real merit of the argument is with the 
other view, and that such provision in a will is contrary to public policy, 
unless it be limited in its application to those contests wherein an element of 
bad faith enters. Under the law no will can become effective in any of its 
provisions until it shall have been admitted to probate by the court. Before 
admitting it to probate, it is the duty of the court to investigate the facts 
and circumstances attending its execution and bearing upon its validity, and to 
find judicially therefrom that such will was executed in due form, voluntarily, 
and understandingly by the purported testator. If the court should find 
otherwise, it must reject the will and refuse its probate. * * * Manifestly, in 
order to attain true judicial results, the court has need to learn true facts. 
These must come, if at all, from those who are or were in a position to know 
them. * * * If the court is to learn the truth from outside sources of 
information, it is manifestly important that the highway of information to the 
court be kept open, and that there shall be no lion in the way. But here is a 
forfeiture provision in the purported will itself which may be a roaring lion 
intended to terrorize every beneficiary of the will. Its demand is that no 
adverse evidence be volunteered. Its tendency is necessarily to suppress 
material facts, and thus to impede the administration of the law according to 
its true spirit. * * * And it does sometimes happen in very truth that a will 
regular in form, bearing the genuine signature of the testator in the presence 
of witnesses, is nevertheless not his will. On the contrary, it was framed and 
dictated by another, and the dying man mayhap put to it his listless hand 
without knowledge to comprehend or will to resist. Into such a will the proviso 
under consideration will hereafter surely find a place. The dictator of such a 
will will be more likely to incorporate such a provision in the will than would 
the testator himself. On principle, therefore, and in the interest of good 
public policy, it seems clear to me that the contest of a will in good faith and 
for probable cause should not be forbidden nor penalized, nor should it be 
permitted to work a forfeiture of a legacy.'" 17 N.W.2d  at 
132-133.

The opinion then 
goes on to observe that the tendency of the courts is to shift in favor of the 
position expressed in the above-quoted dissenting opinion. Upon noting this 
fact, the Iowa court proceeded to adopt the following 
rule:

"We see no occasion to 
interfere with the rule established by the Moran case that a testator may 
legally impose upon a legacy or devise a condition against attack upon the will, 
that such condition is valid irrespective whether the gift be of realty or 
personalty, and irrespective of the presence or absence of a gift over. However, 
we do modify and to that extent overrule that part of Moran v. Moran, supra, which holds such 
condition valid without regard to the cause or ground of contest. We now hold 
that such condition will not be enforced against one who contests the will in 
good faith and for probable cause." 17 N.W.2d  at 135.

On the other 
side are the courts that enforce the provisions of an "in terrorem" clause 
regardless of the good faith and probable cause of the contestant. The rationale 
behind this rule is as was expressed in Rossi v. Davis, 345 Mo. 362, 133 S.W.2d 363, 372, 125 A.L.R. 1111 (1939):

"After careful 
consideration of the question, we are of opinion that the conclusion reached by 
the Massachusetts court and in other decisions to like effect, as above 
indicated, is supported by the better reasons and rests upon the sounder logical 
foundation. It must be conceded that (subject to certain limitations or 
exceptions not here necessary to consider) a person may dispose of his property 
as he wishes. A prospective heir has, generally speaking, no vested right in his 
ancestor's property. If there be a will the legatee or devisee takes thereunder 
what the will gives him and subject to the conditions thereby imposed. He may 
contest the will and show, if he can, that it is not the will of his ancestor, whereupon 
the whole purported will falls. But if it be established that it is in fact the 
ancestor's will, then it would seem the will must stand, not in part but in 
toto. One cannot claim under a will and against it at the same time. He takes 
according to the will, or, so far as concerns the will, not at all. `It is a 
general principle of law that one cannot claim under a will and against it too, 
and one who accepts a beneficial interest under a will thereby adopts the whole 
will and renounces every right or claim that is inconsistent with the will.' In 
re Bernays' Estate [344 Mo. 135], 126 S.W.2d 209, 216, 122 A.L.R. 169, and cases 
cited. In a case such as we have before us the gift is made upon a condition 
which the courts generally hold is not opposed to public policy or morals nor to 
established rules of law, with a definite gift over to another in case of 
violation of the condition. To engraft upon the condition thus distinctly 
expressed by the maker an exception not expressed nor reasonably implicable from 
the language of the instrument is to nullify the will of the maker, if in fact 
it be his will. Whether or not it is in fact his will is a question which any 
legatee or devisee or beneficiary may submit to the arbitrament of the courts. 
He is not precluded by the no-contest clause from seeking redress in the courts. 
The courts are open to him to show, if he can, that the alleged will or 
instrument is not the will of his ancestor - is not valid - in which case the 
whole instrument falls. But if it be adjudged to be the will of the maker, why 
should it not be given effect as written, absent some prohibitive rule of public 
policy or established rule of law? The dissatisfied legatee or beneficiary has 
his day in court. He may, without legal restraint, submit to the court the 
question, is the purported instrument in fact the will of the maker? If it be 
adjudged that it is not, he wins. If it be adjudged that it is, he loses. But 
every litigant takes and must take the chance to win or lose in a lawsuit. There 
is no obligation on the part of a disappointed legatee or beneficiary to 
question the sanity of him from whom the gift comes - or, we may add, to 
question whether or not the purported instrument was the product of undue 
influence."

[¶17.]  Given this divergence of opinion, I must 
agree with the rule adopted by the majority opinion that the "in terrorem" 
clause is fully enforceable against the appellant in this case, whether or not 
she contested the will in good faith and with probable cause. Such a rule is 
supported by sound logic and, in my opinion, by the weight of authority. I 
realize that the number of decisions on each side are about the same, but, given 
our general rule giving full effect to the testator's intent, I agree with the 
result reached by the majority of the court. See: Annot., 125 A.L.R. 1135; 
Annot., 157 A.L.R. 596; Commerce Trust 
Company v. Weed, Mo., 318 S.W.2d 289, 301 (1958); Ivancovich v. Meier, 122 Ariz. 346, 595 P.2d 24, 30 (1979). 

[¶18.]  As expressed earlier, my concerns focus 
upon what I perceive as the possible overbreadth of the majority opinion. From 
my understanding of the authorities, we must distinguish between actual contests 
and other actions before we decide whether the "in terrorem" clause can be 
applied to the circumstances. I note the discussion in Lawrence v. Latch, Tex. App., 424 S.W.2d 260, 263, reh. denied, reversed on other grounds 431 S.W.2d 307, 310 
(1968):

"Apparent from the 
language found in Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204, 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932) is the 
rule of law that a suit brought in good faith and upon probable cause to 
ascertain the intention of a testator and the extent of his devise, and then, in 
turn, to enforce the terms of the will in 
accordance therewith, will not be considered as an effort to vary the 
purpose and intention of the will, or to destroy it, and in consequence to 
thwart the testator's intent."

Similarly, see 
Matter of Estate of Seymour, 93 N.M. 
328, 600 P.2d 274, 278 (1979):

"* * * No-contest 
provisions are valuable will devices. They serve to protect estates from costly 
and time-consuming litigation and they tend to minimize family bickering over 
the competence and capacity of testators, and the various amounts bequeathed. 
However, the function of the court is to effect the testator's intent to the 
greatest extent possible within the bounds of the law. To strictly construe 
no-contest provisions in the face of obvious indications of unresolved legal 
questions, such as were present in this case, could result in complete 
destruction of a testator's intent. Accordingly, where the circumstances upon 
which a will is based have changed substantially between the time of its 
execution and the time of its probate, courts should not discourage contests. 
The circumstances relative to the Seymour will were sufficiently changed to 
justify appellee Davis in seeking a judicial determination construing its 
meaning and effect." (Emphasis added.)

Finally, I rely 
on what was said in Alexander v. 
Rhodes, 63 Tenn. App. 452, 474 S.W.2d 655, 660 (1971), in quoting from Tate 
v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839, 844, 26 A.L.R. 755 
(1922):

"`If the action of a 
legatee is merely one to determine the true construction of the will, or of any 
of its parts, the action could not be held to breach the ordinary forfeiture 
clause, for the object of the action is 
not to make void the will, or any of its parts, but to ascertain its true legal 
meaning.' (Emphasis added.) [South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 
168, 101 A. 961 (1917).]"

[¶19.]  In my opinion, these authorities suggest 
that even under the rule announced in the majority opinion, "in terrorem" 
clauses are not to be applied in circumstances where the beneficiary's intent is 
not to void the will but rather to assist the court in determining the intent of 
the testator as expressed in the will submitted for probate. Thus, had the 
present dispute involved an attempt to forfeit the appellant's interest because 
she had brought an action claiming that the testator's will embodied a certain 
intent rather than claiming the will to be null and void, I would have held the 
"in terrorem" clause to be inapplicable. This rule, of course, would only apply 
upon a finding that the challenged "contest" had been brought in good faith and 
with probable cause.1

[¶20.]  Given the above authorities, I concur in 
the majority opinion only because the appellant's action on the will had as its 
purpose the defeat of the testator's intent as expressed therein. Had the action 
been one questioning the intent rather than the validity of the instrument, I 
suggest that the result should have been that proposed by the 
appellant.

FOOTNOTES

1 For a discussion of what 
constitutes a "contest" or attempt to defeat a will, see: Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 
198.