Title: In re Child of Raul R.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 94 
Docket: 
Cum-18-515 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 30, 2019 
Decided: 
June 11, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF RAUL R. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Raul R. and Jessie H. appeal from a judgment of the District Court 
(Portland, Eggert, J.) terminating their parental rights to their child.  Both 
parents challenge the court’s parental unfitness determinations and contend 
that the Department of Health and Human Services failed to meet its obligation 
to provide reunification services pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A) (2018).  The 
mother additionally argues that her due process rights were violated when the 
court commenced the termination hearing—as previously scheduled—in her 
absence and with the knowledge that she had been arrested while travelling to 
the hearing.  We affirm the judgment. 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by clear 
and convincing evidence that both parents (1) are unable to protect the child 
from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time 
that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (2) are unable to take 
 
 
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responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet 
the child’s needs, and (3) failed to make good faith efforts to rehabilitate and 
reunify with the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2018).  The 
court also determined that termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the 
child’s best interest.  See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2018).    
[¶3]  The court found the following facts by clear and convincing 
evidence, all of which are supported by competent record evidence.  See In re 
Child of Adam E., 2018 ME 157, ¶ 2, 197 A.3d 527.   
At the time this case began on August 31, 2016, [the child] 
was 3 ½ years old.  He . . . [was] living in a household scarred by 
domestic violence.  At the time [the child’s] mother was unable to 
protect him from the violence occurring in the home.  [The child’s] 
father was the perpetrator of the violence which was severe. . . .   
 
Mother had filed for a Protection from Abuse Order earlier in 
2016, but had later dismissed the action.  Police also became 
involved and felony domestic violence charges were brought 
against [the] father.  Neither of these actions were successful in 
stopping the violence as father violated his bail conditions and 
returned to the home where the violence continued.  [The child] 
was protected from the violence only when he was removed from 
the home and placed with his maternal grandparents.    
 
. . . For sentencing [the father] . . . had a choice of a suspended 
sentence with nine months in jail and probation, or serving a 
straight sentence in the Department of Corrections custody of three 
years.  He chose the three[-]year sentence which has resulted in 
him being in prison for all or most of the time that [the child] has 
been in Department custody and will keep him in prison until 
July 22, 2019.  He has had no contact with [the child] during this 
 
 
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time.  He was also not always residing with [the] mother and [child] 
during the time from [the child’s] birth until his placement in 
Department custody and therefore has not been a consistent 
presence in [the child’s] life.  At the time of the father’s release from 
prison, [the child] will be over six years old, and if this case were 
still proceeding, it would be almost three years old. . . .  
 
[¶4]  The court also found that the mother has untreated mental health 
issues that have significantly affected her ability to meaningfully engage in 
visits, meetings with the Department, and evaluations for various programs.  
Her behavior, as well as her lack of attendance, resulted in her visitation with 
the child being suspended in December 2017; visitation was never 
reestablished.1  The mother engaged in mental health counseling for a few 
months, but she was discharged by the counselor for missing seven sessions.  
When the Department tried to help her reengage in mental health counseling, 
she refused to see a counselor chosen by the Department and stated that she 
did not need counseling.  The mother’s own efforts to get into counseling have 
also been unsuccessful.  The mother’s behavior further affected her 
rehabilitation and reunification efforts after she tested positive for drugs in 
                                         
1  The court found that “[a]t Family Team Meetings[, the] mother would often lose control and yell 
and curse at others such that the meetings would end.  The same behavior was also present at 
supervised visits with [the child] to the extent that visits were suspended in December 2017 and have 
never been reestablished.”  The evidence also shows that the visits were canceled because the mother 
missed three visits, and due to the occurrence of a “serious incident” at the last visit.    
 
 
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2017,2 and was required by the Department to complete substance abuse 
treatment.  Although the Department made referrals and the mother started 
various programs, her behavior caused her to be discharged before she was 
able to complete any of the them.   
[¶5]  In March 2018, the mother started—but did not complete—a court 
ordered diagnostic evaluation.  The psychologist was unable to perform the 
psychometric portion of the testing due to the mother’s “emotional 
dysregulation.”    
[¶6]  Based on the foregoing, the court ultimately concluded, 
The hoped[-]for partnership [between the mother and the 
Department] was not successful because of mother’s inability to 
regulate her emotions and to reasonably discuss and plan for the 
programs she needed to complete.  The Department tried to 
arrange the programs but mother failed to follow through to 
become enrolled, or failed to be admitted by the programs because 
of her own behavior. . . .    
 
After [approximately] twenty[-]seven months that this case 
has been open, [the] mother has not completed any of her mental 
health counseling, parenting education, or substance abuse 
counseling.  She has not had a Department sanctioned visit with 
[the child] in almost a year . . . .  Mother herself describes her 
residence as “here, there, and everywhere” which certainly does 
not describe a situation where one can safely house a child. . . .   
 
                                         
2  A drug screen was ordered after a Department caseworker suspected that the mother might be 
using drugs, which came back positive for marijuana, cocaine, benzoylecgonine, amphetamines, 
methamphetamines, and alcohol.   
 
 
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[The child] is presently living with [foster] parents . . . .  After 
improving and doing well in the home of his grandparents, he 
continues to make great strides in his development in his new 
home. . . .  He is fitting into the [foster] parents[’] household well 
and they are willing to adopt him.  The [c]ourt finds that it is in his 
best interest[] that the parental rights of his parents be terminated 
at this time.  
 
 
The Guardian ad litem also recommends that the parents’ 
rights be terminated at this time so that [the child] can be free to 
be adopted.    
 
[¶7]  Reviewed for clear error, the record contains competent evidence 
to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of both 
parents’ parental unfitness.  See In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶ 18, 159 A.3d 824.  
[¶8]  The parents also contend that the court’s findings as to parental 
unfitness are unsupported by the record because the Department failed to 
provide services outlined in the reunification plans.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4041.  
Contrary to the parents’ contentions, the evidence in the record shows that the 
Department did provide services, but the parents did not sufficiently 
participate in the counseling and rehabilitation services they were offered.  
Moreover, even if we were to accept the parents’ contentions that the 
Department failed to provide services, that failure would be “merely a factor in 
the unfitness analysis and does not preclude termination of parental rights.”  
In re Children of Jessica D., 2019 ME 70, ¶ 6, ---A.3d ---.  Because the court’s 
 
 
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findings of parental unfitness are supported by ample record evidence, the 
court did not err.  
 
[¶9]  Finally, the mother contends that the court violated her due process 
rights by denying her motion to continue and then commencing the termination 
hearing—as previously scheduled—in her absence, with the knowledge that 
she had been arrested.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A.  “We 
review a court’s decision to deny a motion to continue for abuse of discretion.  
When due process is implicated, we review such a procedural ruling to 
determine whether the process struck a balance between competing concerns 
that was fundamentally fair.”  In re Arturo G., 2017 ME 228, ¶ 14, 175 A.3d 91 
(citation omitted). 
[¶10]  “In termination cases, where fundamental interests are at stake, 
due process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right 
to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and 
evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.”  In re Child of James R., 2018 ME 50, ¶ 17, 
182 A.3d 1252.  Due process, however, “does not require that a parent be 
physically present at the termination hearing, as long as notice of the hearing 
was given in a manner calculated to give actual notice and the parent had an 
 
 
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opportunity to be heard.”  In re Child of Tanya C., 2018 ME 153, ¶ 10, 
198 A.3d 777.   
[¶11]  “When incarceration is not involved and a parent fails to appear, 
courts generally discern no abuse of discretion or violation of due process in 
proceeding with the hearing if the parent’s absence was occasioned by 
circumstances voluntarily created by that parent.”  In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, 
¶ 19, 55 A.3d 463.  When, on the other hand, “a parent is known to be 
incarcerated in advance of a hearing, the court must, upon request by the 
parent, provide a meaningful opportunity for the parent to participate in the 
hearing whether in person, by telephone or video, through deposition, or by 
other means that will reasonably ensure an opportunity for the parent to be 
meaningfully involved in the hearing.”  Id. ¶ 20.   
[¶12]  The mother in this matter was arrested on her way to the hearing, 
and thus missed the first day of the hearing, but was present for the second day.  
She contends that because she was deprived of her “right to respond to claims 
and evidence” on the first day of the hearing, her due process rights were 
violated.    
[¶13]  Although the mother contends that she was personally unable to 
respond to claims and evidence on the first day, “she had the opportunity—
 
 
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through her attorney—to respond to claims and evidence.”  In re Child of 
Danielle F., 2019 ME 65, ¶ 6, --- A.3d ---.  Further, the mother could have, either 
in her testimony on the second day or in an offer of proof, explained how her 
participation on the first day of the hearing “would have affected the court’s 
determinations that [s]he was parentally unfit,” In re Kaylianna C., 
2017 ME 135, ¶ 11, 166 A.3d 976, but she failed to do so.  Lastly, the mother did 
not seek to present additional evidence during or after the hearing.  See In re 
A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 23, 55 A.3d 463.  Therefore, the mother failed to show that 
she was prejudiced by her partial absence.  The court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the mother’s motion to continue, and the mother was not 
deprived of due process when the court commenced the hearing in her absence.  
See In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d 450, 453-54 (Me. 1986).  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Angela M. Thibodeau, Esq., Holmes Legal Group, LLC, Wells, for appellant father 
 
Molly Butler Bailey, Esq., Strike, Gonzales & Butler Bailey, Portland, for 
appellant mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number PC-2016-73 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY