Title: Mayor & Town Council of Elsmere v. DiFrancesco

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MAYOR and TOWN COUNCIL of the 
TOWN OF ELSMERE, DELAWARE 
consisting of RICHARD A. HEROLD, 
JOHN JAREMCHUK, PATRICIA L. 
FRANTZ, TOM NOVAK, CHARLES 
McKEWEN, JOANNE PERSONTI, and 
JOHN PASQUALE, 
 
Respondents Below- 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DIFRANCESCO, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 360, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 06A-06-001 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 13, 2007 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: September 21, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Rule to Show Cause.  DISCHARGED. 
 
Edward M. McNally, Esquire and Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, 
Esquire, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for appellants. 
 
 
Thomas C. Marconi, Esquire, Losco & Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
 
The appellants filed this appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court 
that granted appellee John DiFrancesco’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  In 
granting the writ, the Superior Court held that the Mayor and Town 
Council’s decision to deny DiFrancesco’s application to subdivide his single 
real estate lot into two lots was arbitrary and capricious because 
DiFrancesco’s lot was zoned to permit two residences and his application 
complied in all other respects with the applicable zoning requirements.  The 
Superior Court, therefore, remanded the matter to the Town Council “for 
action consistent with this opinion.” 
After the appellants filed their notice of appeal, the Clerk of this Court 
issued a notice to appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be 
dismissed as interlocutory.  In their response, the appellants contend that the 
appeal is from a final judgment and is not interlocutory because, although 
the Superior Court issued an order of remand, the further action required of 
the Town Council by the Superior Court’s opinion was the “purely 
ministerial”1 act of granting DiFrancesco’s subdivision application.    
For purpose of appeal, a Superior Court order of remand may be 
either “final” or “interlocutory,” depending upon the nature of the actions 
                                                 
1 Violent Crimes Comp. Bd. v. Linton, 545 A.2d 624, 625 (Del. 1988). 
 
3
directed on the remand.2  If the actions on remand are purely ministerial, for 
example, where a Board is directed to enter a specific decision, the judgment 
is final.3  However, if the further actions to be taken on remand are not 
merely ministerial, e.g., taking additional testimony and making new factual 
findings, the order is interlocutory.4   
In this case, while the Superior Court’s opinion does not direct the 
Town Council to take any specific action on DiFrancesco’s application, we 
do not read the opinion to permit the Town Council to reconsider the 
application or to take any further action other than granting the subdivision.  
Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court’s order is a final judgment 
because its remand to the Town Council was for the purely ministerial 
purpose of having the Town Council grant DiFrancesco’s application.5  
Consequently, the rule to show cause shall be discharged.  The Clerk of the 
Court is directed to issue a brief schedule. 
                                                 
2 McClelland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 9 Storey 114, 214 A.2d 847 (Del. 1965). 
3 Id. at 848. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.