Title: State v. Lynaugh

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                          Nos. 91-030 and 91-159


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Bernard J. Lynaugh                           Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

                                             November Term, 1991


Dean B. Pineles, J.

Robert M. Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Attorney, St.
  Johnsbury, for plaintiff-appellant

Deborah T. Bucknam, St. Johnsbury, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     Morse, J.  Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI)
and obtained suppression of his breath test in the criminal case and a dis-
missal of the civil suspension proceeding.  The trial court granted this
relief because it found that the police had misled defendant about his right
to counsel.  The State took an interlocutory appeal from the suppression
order and a direct appeal of the dismissal, both consolidated here.  We
reverse.
     The facts are undisputed.  During defendant's processing for DUI, an
officer read to him a so-called "implied consent" form which contained
information on the right to talk with a lawyer before agreeing or refusing
to take a breath test.  Defendant declined to consult an attorney, and
agreed to take the test which produced a result of .21 percent blood-alcohol
content (BAC).
     The implied consent form outlined the criminal and civil consequences
for submitting to the breath test when the  result reveals a BAC above the
legal limit: "If the results of this test indicate that you are under the
influence of alcohol or other drugs, you will be subject to Criminal Charges
and your license or privilege to operate will be suspended for at least 90
days."  This language is almost identical to the statute setting forth the
information that a processing officer is obligated to convey to a person
suspected of being under the influence.  23 V.S.A. {1202(d)(3).
     The first part of the sentence relates to criminal consequences, and
the second relates to the recently enacted civil suspension law, which
imposes a ninety-day license suspension following a determination that a
defendant had a .10 BAC or higher at the time of operation.  23 V.S.A. {
1205(a). (FN1) Before enactment of the civil suspension law, a license in a case
like this could be suspended only following a criminal conviction for DUI or
a judicial determination that the processing officer had reasonably
requested a test which the defendant refused.
     The implied consent form, however, did not fully describe the
procedural consequences when the operator submits to the breath test and the
results show impairment.  Section 1205(a) provides that the operator's
license shall be summarily suspended upon affidavit of the law enforcement
officer showing that there were reasonable grounds to believe the operator
was under the influence and the test result indicated a BAC of .10 at the
time of operation, unless the operator requests a hearing.  The form did not
contain this information.  Instead, it explained that when the suspect
refuses to submit to the test, the suspect is given the opportunity for a
hearing to determine if the officer's request was reasonable.  The trial
court reasoned that the absence of this information affected defendant's
decision to waive counsel.  The court stated:
One could logically, but incorrectly, infer that there
was no . . . court procedure [similar to the one for
refusing the test] when a sample is provided.  Indeed,
the wording of the form suggested that, when a sample is
provided, any license suspension would be the result
only of a criminal proceeding: "If the results of this
test indicate that you are under the influence . . .,
you will be subject to Criminal Charges and your license
or privilege to operate will be suspended for at least
90 days".

The court concluded that the State failed to prove that defendant had made a
knowing waiver of his right to consult counsel in deciding whether to take
the test.  The court, however, never concluded as a matter of fact that
defendant did not actually make a knowing waiver of his right to counsel.
     We hold that the form, as written, adequately apprised defendant of the
civil consequences of submitting to a breath test.  The absence of infor-
mation on the opportunity for a hearing does not alter the effect of the
information that defendant did receive.  He was told that he risked a
license suspension if the test result was adverse; he declined the
assistance of counsel, and took the test.  Defendant received all the
advice required by { 1202(d), and we decline to require more.
     We also conclude that defendant did not satisfy his burden of
demonstrating prejudice arising from the reading of the implied consent
form.  See State v. Hamm, 2 Vt. L.W. 427, 428 (1991) (DUI defendant has "the
burden of production on the issue of prejudice . . . [and must] introduce
some evidence that any deficiency in the advice . . . received was
prejudicial").  Defendant presented no evidence that he was prejudiced by
the receipt of incomplete information in making his decision to waive
assistance of counsel before taking the test.  In fact, in his motion to
suppress, defendant's counsel stated that a lawyer would have "likely
advised him to take a blood test in order to protect his rights."     
     We agree that the decision whether to take a breath test should "not be
lightly decided."  State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 636,