Title: Wyoming State Bd. of Examiners of Optometry v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wyoming State Bd. of Examiners of Optometry v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc.1989 WY 2767 P.2d 969Case Number: 86-323Decided: 01/04/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

WYOMING STATE 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF OPTOMETRY, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
PEARLE 
VISION CENTER, INC., A CORPORATION, AND ROBERT L. HOLLY, O.D., AN INDIVIDUAL, 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
Steven F. 
Freudenthal, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & 
Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant 
(plaintiff).

 
 
Brent R. 
Kunz, Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, Trautwein & Barrett, Cheyenne, for appellee (defendants), Pearle Vision 
Center, Inc.

 
 
Dennis M. 
Grant, Grant & Osborn, Cheyenne, for appellee (defendant), Robert L. Holly, 
O.D.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     At issue in this case 
is whether a franchise agreement for the marketing of optical products and 
services, entered into between a certificated optometrist and a corporation, 
results in fee splitting or the employment of a "steerer," both in violation of 
§ 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S. 1977. Additional questions are raised as to whether the 
franchiser was engaged in the practice of optometry without a valid certificate 
of registration in violation of § 33-23-103, W.S. 1977, or, as a general 
business corporation, was engaged indirectly in the practice of optometry in 
violation of § 33-23-111(b)(iv), W.S. 1977. Section 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S. 1977, 
provides:

 
 
"(b) 
`Unprofessional and dishonest conduct' as used in this act is hereby declared to 
mean:

 
 
"(i) The 
loaning of his license by any licensed optometrist to any person; the employment 
of `cappers' or `steerers' to obtain business, `splitting' or dividing a fee 
with any person or persons, the advertising by any means whatsoever of 
optometric practice or treatment or advice in which untruthful, improbable, 
misleading or impossible statements are made; * * *."

 
 
Section 
33-23-103, W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"(a) It is 
unlawful for any person in the state of Wyoming to practice or attempt to 
practice optometry or to advertise, or hold himself out as qualified to fit or 
adjust any lenses or lens in any manner or form as an aid to human eyesight, 
without first obtaining a certificate to practice 
optometry."

 
 
Section 
33-23-111(b), W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"(b) It is 
unlawful:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(iv) For 
any person or persons not holding a certificate or any corporation, directly or 
indirectly, to practice optometry by employment of or contract with a person 
holding a certificate, or otherwise, provided that one holding a certificate may 
accept employment from a person, partnership, association or corporation to 
practice optometry with respect to the employees of such person, partnership, 
association or corporation."

 
 
The 
district court denied the injunctive relief sought by the Wyoming State Board of 
Examiners of Optometry (Board), holding that the arrangement between Pearle 
Vision Center, Inc. (Pearle), as the franchiser, and Robert L. Holly (Holly), a 
Board certificated optometrist as franchisee, did not transgress any of these 
statutory provisions. We are in accord with the judgment of the district court, 
and we affirm that judgment.

 
 

[¶2.]     As appellant, the Board 
states the following issues in urging a reversal of the district 
court:

 
 
"1. 
Consideration of all the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, stipulated 
exhibits, and evidence presented to the District Court discloses that the 
District Court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.

 
 
"2. 
Consideration of all pleadings, affidavits, depositions, stipulated exhibits, 
and evidence presented to the District Court discloses that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, and that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law."

 
 
Pearle, as 
appellee, restates the issues on appeal in this way:

 
 
"1. Whether 
Defendants Pearle and Holly, by virtue of their having executed a franchise 
agreement and attendant agreements, have established a relationship which places 
Defendant Holly under the direction and control of Defendant 
Pearle?

 
 
"2. Whether 
the relationship between Defendants Pearle and Holly constitutes indirect 
practice of optometry by a corporation in violation of W.S. § 
33-23-111(b)(iv)?"

 
 
Holly also 
defends the decision of the district court in his favor, and his statement of 
the issues is:

 
 
"1. Did the 
District Court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Robert L. 
Holly?

 
 
"2. Does 
the evidence presented to the District Court, in the way of pleadings, 
affidavits, depositions, exhibits and oral argument, support the district 
court's finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that 
Defendant, Robert L. Holly, was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law?"

 
 

[¶3.]     On September 16, 1985, 
the Board brought an action seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages 
against Holly and Pearle. This action followed the formal opinion of the 
Wyoming 
attorney general issued on August 20, 1985 which, in pertinent part, 
said:

 
 
"Section 
33-23-111(b)(iv), W.S. 1977, precludes a corporation from the practice of 
optometry in Wyoming. This restriction includes any attempt 
by a corporation to practice optometry indirectly through the services of an 
individual who holds a certificate to practice optometry. A franchise agreement 
between a corporation and an individual licensed to practice optometry gives the 
franchiser a certain amount of control over the licensed practitioner. 
Therefore, this form of corporate control is also prohibited by 
statute."

 
 
The Board 
alleged in its complaint that Holly and Pearle were engaged in fee splitting in 
violation of § 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S. 1977; Holly was employing Pearle as a 
"steerer" to obtain business in violation of § 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S. 1977; 
Pearle and/or Holly were engaged in "canvassing" in violation of § 
33-23-111(b)(i), W.S. 1977; Pearle was engaged in the practice of optometry 
without a valid certificate of registration in violation of § 33-23-103, W.S. 
1977; and Pearle, a general business corporation, was engaged indirectly in the 
practice of optometry in violation of § 33-23-111(b)(iv), W.S. 
1977.

 
 

[¶4.]     Holly and Pearle filed 
separate answers to the Board's complaint. In each answer, the respective 
defendant alleged that the relationship between Holly and Pearle was not 
prohibited by statute or, to the extent it might be prohibited by statute, the 
prohibition is unconstitutional. Discovery was pursued, and the several parties 
then moved for summary judgment on all issues. A hearing was set on the motions 
for summary judgment and, prior to that hearing, the Board withdrew its claim 
for monetary damages and dropped its allegations that Pearle and/or Holly were 
engaged in canvassing. The district court received briefs and heard oral 
argument and then granted summary judgment to Pearle and Holly on all remaining 
issues and denied the summary judgment sought by the 
Board.

 
 

[¶5.]     Pearle is a Texas corporation, and it 
owns and operates retail optical stores in several states. Holly was licensed as 
an optometrist in Wyoming in 1983. Early in 1985, Holly wrote to 
Pearle and suggested that he would be interested in acquiring a Pearle 
franchise. Several letters from Pearle to Holly explaining various arrangements 
by which Holly could acquire a Pearle franchise are included in the record. 
Ultimately, Holly and Pearle agreed to an arrangement that required Holly to 
enter into a sublease of office space and a separate franchise agreement with 
Pearle. The action filed by the Board challenged the relationship between Pearle 
and Holly pursuant to the franchise agreement. The complaint did not allege that 
the agreement is a sham, or that the true relationship between Pearle and Holly 
was anything other than what was set forth in the 
agreement.

 
 

[¶6.]     The sublease was for 
office space at the Frontier Mall in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Pursuant to the sublease, Holly 
agreed to pay Pearle a base rate and, in addition, a percentage of his total 
sales in excess of an established amount each month. Approximately two-thirds of 
the subleased office space was used for dispensing optical goods, and the 
remaining space was used by Holly to treat patients and perform optometric 
services. Pictures of the office demonstrate that a wall divided the two areas, 
separate entrances were available for each area in the office, and a common 
doorway provided internal access between the two offices.

 
 

[¶7.]     The franchise agreement 
provided for the purchase by Holly of a Pearle franchise. The total 
consideration was $155,000, and $15,000 was paid in cash with the remaining 
$140,000 financed by a ten-year loan from Pearle with an interest rate of three 
percent over the current prime rate. The purchase agreement for the franchise is 
a carefully drawn and detailed document. It sets forth the duties of the 
franchiser and the franchisee, and delineates the manner in which the franchisee 
is expected to operate the franchise. In forty-five pages, the agreement sets 
forth eighteen separate provisions with several subsections in each provision. 
The specific terms of both the sublease and the franchise purchase agreement 
will be discussed in connection with the disposition of the several 
issues.

 
 

[¶8.]     Essentially, the 
Board's two issues are treated together in a series of arguments. The first 
argument of the Board is that the trial court erred because it did not find that 
Holly and Pearle violated the provision of § 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S. 1977, which 
prohibits "`splitting' or dividing a fee." The Board supports its claim that 
Holly was "splitting" or dividing fees with Pearle by reference to a required 
royalty which the franchise agreement provided in favor of Pearle. In pertinent 
part, the franchise agreement provides:

 
 
"7.4 Franchise Royalty

 
 
"(A) Except 
as provided in paragraph 7.4(D), during the term hereof Franchisee shall pay 
Pearle a non-refundable monthly royalty equal to eight and one-half percent (8 
1/2%) of Franchisee's monthly Gross Revenues (as hereinafter defined) from the 
sale of goods and services at, from or in conjunction with the Pearle Vision 
Center. Royalties shall be paid monthly on or before the fifteenth (15th) day of 
the month following the month during which such goods or services were sold. In 
the event Franchisee's annual statement of Gross Revenues required pursuant to 
Paragraph 9.2 hereof discloses a deficiency in royalty payments paid for such 
year, Franchisee shall pay Pearle the amount of such deficiency at the time the 
annual statement is delivered. No portion of the royalties collected by Pearle 
shall be refundable under any circumstances.

 
 
"(B) Definition of Gross 
Revenues

 
 
"The term 
`Gross Revenues' as used in this Agreement shall include all sums charged 
(whether under third party reimbursement programs or to regular customers and 
patients and whether or not received in full at time of sale) for optical and 
ophthalmic goods, merchandise and services and (as permitted by law) optometric 
and ophthalmologic services and merchandise sold or provided at, from or in 
conjunction with the Pearle Vision Center licensed herein. The term Gross 
Revenues excludes federal, state, county, and city sales taxes or other similar 
taxes levied upon customers on the basis of sales transactions and Allowable 
Sales Deductions (as hereinafter defined). `Allowable Sales Deductions' include 
the balance due on customers' unclaimed orders, reimbursements and price 
adjustments to insurance carriers and governmental agencies and cash refunds to 
customers. Allowable Sales Deductions do not include monies lost on returned 
checks, credit card service charges or any other amounts not specifically 
included herein.

 
 
"(C) If 
Franchisee is not permitted by law to include in Gross Revenues sums charged for 
optometric or ophthalmologic services, or does not have access to information 
necessary to calculate such sums, then Gross Revenues for all purposes of this 
Agreement shall mean Gross Revenues as determined under 7.4(B) hereof (without 
including sums charged for optometric and ophthalmologic services) multiplied by 
1.2. Pearle and Franchisee agree that such resulting amount is reasonably 
equivalent to the Gross Revenues the Franchisee would have under paragraph 
7.4(B) hereof if Franchisee had included in Gross Revenues the sums charged for 
optometric and ophthalmologic services.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"7.7 Impossibility

 
 
"If, by 
operation of law or otherwise, the royalty described in Paragraph 7.4 above 
cannot be based upon Gross Revenues as herein defined, the parties shall 
thereupon renegotiate a royalty applicable to revenues from such products and 
services as may lawfully be included in Gross Revenues or an alternative fee, 
which shall be sufficient to pay Pearle a return equal to the royalty provided 
for herein."

 
 

[¶9.]     The franchise agreement 
unequivocally requires that monies received by Holly for optometric services be 
included in calculating the amount of royalty due under the agreement. Whether 
this requirement transgresses the statutory prohibition described as 
"`splitting' or dividing a fee" depends upon a conclusion with respect to the 
nature of the conduct the legislature intended to proscribe. See McArtor v. 
State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985); Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

[¶10.]  In determining the intention of the 
legislature, we first examine the language of the statute in light of the 
purposes sought to be accomplished. K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo. 1988); Amoco Production Company v. State Board of Equalization, 751 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1988); Hurst, 698 P.2d  at 1130; School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9 
and 10 in Campbell County v. Cook, 424 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1967). In considering the 
statutory language, words are accorded their plain and ordinary meaning unless 
some indication is present that the legislature intended a different meaning. 
Amoco, 751 P.2d  at 379; Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1982); Croxton v. Board of 
CountyCommissioners of NatronaCounty, 644 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1982). We assume the legislature intended 
to invoke a well-settled meaning of a word in the law at the time of its usage 
unless an unmistakable indication to the contrary is found. Sorenson v. State, 
604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1979); Johnson v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977).

 
 

[¶11.]  The purpose of legislation prohibiting 
the "`splitting' or dividing of a fee," as the context demonstrates in this 
instance, is to protect members of the consuming public; it is not to promote 
the economic welfare of optometrists. See People v. Sterling Optical Company, 26 
Misc.2d 412, 209 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1960); State ex rel. Sisemore v. Standard Optical 
Company of Oregon, 182 Or. 452, 188 P.2d 309 (1947); 
Golding v. Schubach Optical Company, 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937). When the express 
language of the statute is examined in the context of a purpose of public 
protection, it is clear that the activity which the legislature intended to 
prohibit is that which historically has been perceived as detrimental to the 
public welfare. That activity is described by invoking the slang terminology of 
"fee splitting," which is defined in Webster's Third International Unabridged 
Dictionary (1971) as "a dividing of a professional fee for a specialist's 
medical services with the recommending physician." That purpose would not extend 
to any conclusion that the legislature intended to prohibit every business 
relationship in which an optometrist agreed to pay a percentage of his 
optometric proceeds for a consideration furnished to him unless that 
consideration included providing patients or referring patients to the 
optometrist. See also, Lieberman v. Connecticut State Board of Examiners in 
Optometry, 130 Conn. 344, 34 A.2d 213 (1943).1

 
 

[¶12.]  The Board did not establish any facts 
sufficient to raise an issue with respect to whether Holly divides his fees with 
Pearle. The record establishes that Holly does not pay Pearle to send or direct 
patients to him. Considered in the context of the agreement, the royalty payment 
is for the privilege of operating the PearleVisionCenter. The fact that the 
consideration for that privilege is based in part upon a percentage of the 
proceeds derived from furnishing optometric services does not make it an 
agreement for "`splitting' or dividing a fee" any more than would a 
consideration for the sublease which was based in part upon a percentage of the 
optometrist's income. The Board concedes that this latter is not prohibited. 
Furthermore, this franchise agreement encompasses alternative methods for 
computing the appropriate royalty fee. We do not understand that the Board would 
argue that, should Pearle charge a set franchise fee for the operation of the 
PearleVisionCenter, Holly would be prohibited by the 
statute from paying the set fee with monies he received from patients for 
optometric services.

 
 

[¶13.]  In the absence of some evidence that 
Pearle in fact sent or referred patients to Holly for remuneration, the district 
court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to any practice of "`splitting' or dividing a fee." There, indeed, was 
evidence that Holly's optometric office was adjacent to the PearleVisionCenter which he managed, and there was a 
common doorway. The mere placement of an office in a clearly desirable business 
location, without more, could not lead to a conclusion that the statute was 
violated. We hold that the district court correctly entered summary judgment in 
favor of Pearle and Holly on that contention by the Board.

 
 

[¶14.]  We have not ignored the Board's 
perfunctory contention that Pearle's "advertising specifically directed or 
encouraged `patients' to go to Holly." This claim is more closely related to the 
Board's allegation that Holly employed "cappers" or "steerers" to obtain 
business. The Board did not present evidence by affidavit, or otherwise, to 
support this statement and, ordinarily, its resolution would be a finding of 
fact to be made by the appropriate arbiter if there were some evidence to pose a 
material issue in that regard. In the absence of evidence structuring an issue 
of material fact with respect to whether Holly paid Pearle to direct patients to 
him through Pearle's advertising, the trial court was not foreclosed from 
entering the summary judgment on the issue of dividing of fees. See Bettencourt 
v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

[¶15.]  The only evidence that might lead to an 
inference in this regard is copies of advertisements which were inserted in the 
record. A review of those advertisements discloses that the consumers are 
directed to Pearle and not to Holly for optometric services. Pearle and Holly 
each have a legitimate interest in promoting the services of Pearle and, 
therefore, both pay a portion of the advertising costs. In the advertisements 
introduced into the record, Holly's name is used only as the owner and operator 
of Pearle, although in one advertisement he is alluded to by a statement that a 
doctor of optometry "who is right next door" can give any customer a complete 
eye examination. These advertisements fall short of demonstrating, however, that 
Pearle, or Holly in collaboration with Pearle, encouraged or solicited patients 
for Holly's optometric services. All of the advertisements promote the 
activities of Pearle, and it would be a leap in logic to conclude that this 
demonstrated the division of Holly's fee for optometric 
services.

 
 

[¶16.]  The Board has not directed us to any 
statute, nor have we found one, which prohibits an optometrist from owning and 
operating an optical dispensing establishment. Holly, as owner of the store, has 
a legitimate interest in attracting customers by lawful means. The record does 
not lend itself to any conclusion that Holly is inhibited from using his own 
name to attract customers to his PearleVisionCenter. We note that the 
legislature has prohibited any advertising that consists of "untruthful, 
improbable, misleading or impossible statements * * *." Section 32-23-110(b)(i), 
W.S. 1977. It has not chosen, however, to prohibit optometrists from advertising 
and, if the optometrist may advertise his services, we can conceive no reason 
that would inhibit his joint advertisement of the services of his franchised 
optical dispensing store so long as the advertisements do not consist of 
"untruthful, improbable, misleading or impossible statements." The evidence of 
advertisements certainly did not structure a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to the division of fees.

 
 

[¶17.]  We must address the advertisements in the 
context of the Board's contention that Holly violated § 33-23-110, W.S. 1977, 
because he engaged in "the employment of `cappers' or `steerers' to obtain 
business * * *." The Board, in presenting this argument, relies upon the 
advertising contribution provision contained in the franchise agreement. It 
insists that this provision places Pearle in the position of steering customers 
to Holly. The essence of the accused provision, Section 8.1 of the franchise 
agreement, requires that Holly, the franchisee, make an advertising contribution 
of eight percent of gross monthly revenues to Pearle. Three-fourths of that 
amount, six percent of the gross monthly revenues, is used by Pearle for the 
purchase of advertising, both local and national, promoting the various Pearle 
Vision Centers, whether company-owned or franchises. One-fourth, two percent of 
gross monthly revenues, is used by Holly, the franchisee, for local advertising 
placed through Pearle's regional manager of marketing. Section 8.4 of the 
agreement also provides that Holly, as franchisee, may engage in advertising and 
promoting his PearleVisionCenter and the products and 
services offered at his own expense, but requires that the advertising be 
submitted to Pearle for its prior written approval.2 The essence of the Board's argument is that this 
advertising contribution is different from "advertising placed by an optometrist 
on a fee basis with radio station, newspaper, or through an advertising agency, 
where payment is independent of a percentage of the optometrist's gross revenues 
and the optometrist retains final authority on advertising content." We concede 
that the Board is correct; the advertising relationship between Pearle and Holly 
is different from that of a buyer and seller of advertising. We cannot concede, 
however, that the difference makes the relationship one prohibited by statute. 
Furthermore, we do not accept the contention that the retention by Pearle of the 
right to control the content of advertising constitutes prohibited activity 
because it has an interest in maintaining a uniform consistency in the 
advertisements utilizing its name.

 
 

[¶18.]  As we did in our consideration of the 
issue about "`splitting' or dividing a fee," we conclude that the legislature 
intended to prohibit a specific style of conduct that is harmful to the 
consuming public. In the statute, the words "cappers" or "steerers" were used to 
define the prohibited conduct. These words both have an established definition 
which we must assume that the legislature intended. Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 
4th ed. 1968) defines a "capper" as "a decoy or lure for purpose of swindling," 
citing Barron v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 109 Cal. App. 382, 293 P. 144, 145 (1930). Relying upon the same California case, Black's Law Dictionary, 
supra, then defines a "steerer" as "one who gains the confidence of the person 
intended to be fleeced and who may be said to steer or lead the victim to the 
place where the latter is to be robbed or swindled." See also People v. Simmons, 
125 A.D. 234, 109 N.Y.S. 190, 194 (1908) ("A `steerer' in slang vocabulary is a 
person of plausible manners and address, who gains the confidence of the person 
intended to be fleeced.") These words connote some element of fraud or deceit 
practiced upon an innocent victim. The Board has neither alleged nor 
demonstrated, in this regard, any facts which would serve to structure a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the presence of fraud, deceit, or overreaching on 
the part of Holly or Pearle. In the absence of some showing of fraud, deceit, or 
overreaching that was practiced upon and resulted in harm to the consuming 
public, Holly could not have been said to have employed Pearle as a "capper" or 
"steerer." As a matter of law, the district court ruled correctly in entering 
summary judgment in favor of Holly and Pearle on that claim of statutory 
violation.

 
 

[¶19.]  We turn finally to the contentions by the 
Board that Pearle was engaged in the corporate practice of optometry in 
violation of § 33-23-111(b), W.S. 1977, and that it was engaged in the practice 
of optometry without a valid certificate in violation of § 33-23-103, W.S. 1977, 
and the claim that the district court erred in ruling to the contrary. We first 
recall the relevant statutory provisions.

 
 

[¶20.]  Section 33-23-103(a) provides, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
"It is 
unlawful for any person in the state of Wyoming to practice or attempt to practice 
optometry or to advertise, or hold himself out as qualified to fit or adjust any 
lenses or lens in any manner or form as aid to human eyesight, without first 
obtaining a certificate to practice optometry."

 
 

[¶21.]  Section 33-23-111(b) provides, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
"It is 
unlawful:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(iv) for 
any person or persons not holding a certificate or any corporation, directly or 
indirectly, to practice optometry by employment of or contract with a person 
holding a certificate, or otherwise, provided that one holding a certificate may 
accept employment from a person, partnership, association or a corporation to 
practice optometry with respect to the employees of such person, partnership, 
association or corporation."

 
 

[¶22.]  Section 33-23-101 defines the practice of 
optometry as:

 
 
"(a) The 
practice of optometry is the employment of any means other than surgery for 
diagnosing and treating ocular pathology and for the measurement of the powers 
or range of human vision or the determination of the accommodative and 
refractive status of the human eye or the scope of its functions in general or 
the adaptation of lenses or frames for the aid thereof.

 
 
"(b) The 
provisions of this chapter do not prevent a duly licensed physician and surgeon, 
from treating or fitting glasses to the human eye, or a duly licensed physician 
and surgeon, oculist, or optometrist from filling prescriptions or orders, nor 
do they prevent the replacing, duplicating or repairing of ophthalmic lenses or 
the frames or fittings thereof by persons qualified to write or fill 
prescriptions or orders under the provisions of this act, nor prevent the doing 
of the merely mechanical work upon such lenses or upon the frames or fittings 
thereof by an optical mechanic."

 
 

[¶23.]  With respect to the claims asserted 
against Pearle, the Board's basic position is that the district court did not 
apply the statutory definition of optometry to the facts of this case in 
reaching its conclusion that Pearle was not practicing optometry in violation of 
Wyoming law. 
The Board asserts that, instead, the district court erroneously determined, 
first, the question of whether optometry should be considered a learned 
profession in Wyoming and, second, whether Holly was an 
employee of Pearle. The Board also argues that the district court failed to 
determine whether the franchise agreement had the effect of involving Pearle in 
the practice of optometry. 

 
 

[¶24.]  The premise of the Board's argument is 
the contents of the decision letter issued by the district court on October 14, 
1986. Our rule, however, is that we look to the final order rather than the 
decision letter to determine the findings and conclusions of the trial court. 
Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 
1987); DeRoche v. R.L. Manning Company, 737 P.2d 332 (Wyo. 1987). In this 
instance, the technique that the district court adopted was to specifically 
incorporate by reference its decision letter in its order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Holly and Pearle. Under these circumstances, we will review 
the reasoning and findings of the district court incorporated in its decision 
letter, but we still must uphold its decision on any legal grounds that the 
record is sufficient to sustain. Ferguson v. 
Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
 

[¶25.]  We do not understand the decision letter 
of the district court to be premised upon whether optometry should be considered 
a learned profession in Wyoming. When the letter is read in its 
entirety, it simply sets forth the proposition that, in general, a decision as 
to whether optometry is a learned profession or a mechanical art or craft may 
affect the level of scrutiny to be applied in determining whether a particular 
course of conduct constitutes the practice of optometry as defined in a 
particular statute, citing Annotation, What Constitutes Practice of "Optometry", 
88 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1963). In a similar vein, the district court noted that, in 
decisions in which courts have found a corporation to be practicing optometry 
without a valid certificate, a critical factor was the fact that the corporation 
employed optometrists in an optometric capacity in violation of a state statute, 
citing Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. State Board of Examiners in 
Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963); State of Iowa v. Plymouth Optical 
Company, 211 N.W.2d 278 (Iowa 1973). The decision letter is not premised upon 
the employment proposition either, and the district court did not state that it 
relied upon it in making its determination. A thorough reading of the entire 
decision letter discloses that the district court did make a proper 
determination as to whether Pearle was guilty of directly or indirectly 
practicing optometry, either through the technique of the employment of Holly or 
by virtue of the franchise agreement with him. In conclusion, the district court 
stated:

 
 
"[T]his 
court has determined that defendant Pearle is not guilty of indirectly or 
illegally practicing optometry, in that said corporate defendant has no control 
over any other functions specifically involved with the practice of optometry as 
that term is defined in the statute. Further, it is clear that defendant Pearle 
does not employ or pay defendant Holly for his services. All charges for 
examination by Holly are paid directly to him by the clients or 
patients."

 
 
It is 
apparent that the district court correctly invoked the criteria of the extent of 
control which Pearle could exert with respect to Holly's capacity as an 
optometrist. Whether Pearle had a greater degree of control by virtue of its 
relationship with Holly in his non-optometric services, that is those services 
provided at the PearleVisionCenter, is not important 
with respect to the Board's position.

 
 

[¶26.]  The Board finds fault with the reasoning 
of the district court, but it has not presented to this court any facts from the 
record or a legal theory which persuades us that the district court's 
determination was erroneous. The Board urges us to follow the decision of the 
California Court of Appeals in the case of California Association of Dispensing 
Opticians v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 143 Cal. App. 3d 419, 191 Cal. Rptr. 762 
(1983). This case is the primary authority relied upon by the Board in pursuing 
this litigation, and it was the premise of the attorney general's opinion upon 
which the Board acted. The California court 
held that a royalty provision similar to the one in the franchise agreement in 
issue here resulted in violations of the California statutes. The court's holding 
reached the proposition of division of fees as well as a conclusion that the 
arrangement was in violation of the statutory prohibition in California against the 
practice of optometry by a corporation through a licensed optometrist. The 
opinion discloses, however, that there are significant differences between the 
California statutes and the Wyoming statutes. The 
statute in California is more inclusive with respect to 
the prohibition of profit sharing between an optometrist and a lay person; the 
prohibition against profit sharing is broader and different from one that 
inhibits "`splitting' or dividing a fee." As we have indicated, we choose not to 
broaden the choice manifested by the legislature in Wyoming when it limited 
the prohibition as it did. We do not think that construction is necessary 
because the legislature in Wyoming did not manifest an intention to 
inhibit the freedom of an individual optometrist to engage in other legitimate 
business activities. We agree with the determination by the district court to 
reject the invitation of the Board to follow the California rule. Clearly, as the district 
court noted, the statutes in California are 
more extensive and more restrictive in terms of their prohibitions than the 
statutory scheme in Wyoming.

 
 

[¶27.]  In addition, our understanding of the 
California 
case persuades us that the court there failed to examine the appropriate factors 
in reaching its determination as to whether a corporation exercised sufficient 
control over an optometrist franchisee so that it, in effect, was engaged in the 
practice of optometry through the optometrist. The California court determined 
that corporate control was manifested by: (1) Pearle's right to approve the site 
of the office and improvements and fixtures therein; (2) the provision which 
permitted the franchisee to finance payment for the franchise through Pearle; 
(3) the provisions that required that the franchise fee and the advertising 
contributions be based on gross proceeds; (4) the provision that required the 
franchisee to submit to periodic audits by Pearle; (5) the franchise requirement 
that a franchisee stock Pearle's approved line of eyewear; and (6) the provision 
that made the franchisee's choice of laboratory equipment subject to Pearle's 
approval. All of these factors, relied upon by the California court, are 
factors of control that relate to the relationship between Pearle and its 
franchisee in non-optometric functions. The fact that Pearle exercises control 
over franchisees in their optical dispensaries does not govern with respect to 
whether Pearle has any right to control the practice of optometry and, 
therefore, could be held to be practicing optometry through the franchisee. A 
finding that Pearle is engaged in the practice of optometry because of a 
contractual relationship or employment of a licensed optometrist could only be 
premised upon facts demonstrating that Pearle exercised control over the 
optometrist in his practice of optometry. It is incumbent upon the Board to 
demonstrate facts that constitute a violation of the statute rather than only to 
assert a theory that the franchise arrangement could function in a way that 
would violate the statutes.

 
 

[¶28.]  An examination of the franchise agreement 
persuades us, as it did the district court, that Pearle does not exercise 
control over Holly in his practice of optometry. It does not set the fees he 
charges to his patients; it does not purport to control the manner in which he 
performs his optometric functions; it does not address his work schedule in the 
practice of optometry; it does not say anything about the patients whom he may 
or may not see; it does not send statements to Holly's patients; it does not 
receive payments made for Holly's optometric service from either the patients or 
Holly; nor does it purport to direct or control the conduct of Holly's practice 
of optometry in any other way. We conclude that the significant concern is 
control over the optometrist in his practice of optometry that might inhibit the 
freedom necessary for the optometrist to practice in a manner which assures that 
the interests of the patient are given primary consideration. That is the reason 
that the legislature may restrict the practice of optometry from corporate 
influence under its police power. The public is entitled to that protection. K N 
Energy, 755 P.2d  at 207; Matter of Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Company, 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987). We cannot conclude that the 
legislature intended to restrict the practice of an optometrist, or to prohibit 
a corporation from contracting with an optometrist, however, unless the 
arrangement permitted the corporation to exercise control over the optometrist 
in his optometric practice.

 
 

[¶29.]  In stating the facts in its brief, the 
Board listed the requirements under the franchise agreement which it perceived 
as demonstrating the control exercised by Pearle over Holly. That itemization of 
requirements under the franchise agreement supports our holding. Every one of 
the factors that the Board points to as demonstrating the extent of Pearle's 
control over Holly relates only to the non-optometric activities of Holly as a 
franchisee of Pearle. This franchise agreement entered into by Holly with Pearle 
is a carefully drafted document, which perhaps tests the permissible limits of 
rights which Pearle may incorporate in its franchising agreements in Wyoming. Even though it 
may test those legally permissible limits, this agreement does not transgress 
the statutory inhibitions. We recognize that activities under such a franchise 
agreement could be carried on in such a way as to infringe upon the statutory 
prohibitions, but the Board has not demonstrated facts showing improper 
activities to be present.

 
 

[¶30.]  The Board has called to our attention one 
advertisement which Holly placed that says, in part, "Our experienced doctor of 
optometry will give you a thorough eye exam * * *." It is not clear from the 
context whether Holly was held out as an employee of Pearle in this particular 
advertisement, and the Board has not included a claim of unlawful advertising in 
its theory of the case. We do agree that Pearle and Holly cannot justifiably 
argue that Holly is not an employee of Pearle if, at the same time, the 
advertisements published by either imply that Holly is an employee of Pearle. 
The fact is that Holly is not employed by Pearle, and it would be improper under 
§ 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S. 1977, for either to indicate to the public that Holly is 
employed by Pearle. The presence of this one advertisement, however, is not 
sufficient to affect our holding with respect to this 
case.

 
 

[¶31.]  We conclude that the district court did 
not err in granting a summary judgment in favor of Holly and Pearle. We are in 
accord with the rationale of the district court's determination, and we affirm 
the district court in its judgment.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 We 
conclude that cases in which the facts have been found to be sufficiently close 
to providing or referring patients or customers, and thus to involve fee 
splitting, are distinguishable. See e.g., State v. Abortion Information Agency, 
Inc., 69 Misc.2d 825, 323 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1971) (the provision by a corporation of 
salary and hospital facility to a doctor while the corporation billed patients 
for the doctor's services was held to constitute fee splitting); Hanks v. 
Hamilton, 339 So. 2d 1122 (Fla.App. 1976) (the written agreement between a broker 
and a non-registered real estate salesman pursuant to which the salesman was 
paid a specified commission for his sale of real property was held to be fee 
splitting).

 
 

2 The 
argument of the Board on this issue is premised essentially upon the franchise 
agreement requirement for an advertising contribution, and not on the content of 
the advertisements. A consideration of the content of the advertisements, 
however, does not disclose a statutory violation with respect to the 
relationship between Pearle and Holly. In this respect, it has no more 
significance than it had with respect to the suggestion that it demonstrated a 
division of fees.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶32.]  Application of economic realism should 
not leave question about the nature of this franchised eye care system 
constituting the corporate control and effectuated practice of optometry. To say 
otherwise is to ignore its clearly defined operational character.1 Essentially presented by this appeal is whether 
approval and summary judgment resolution was justified for the non-application 
of Wyoming 
statutes relating to the regulation of this category of health care provider. 
The consistency between denial to a trained anesthesiologist of the opportunity 
to pursue his educational capabilities in Paravecchio v. Memorial Hosp. of 
Laramie County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1088, 99 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1988) and this case, where by contract compulsion, detail 
and system operation, corporate franchise supervisory control of optometry is 
now justified, leaves me mystified.

 
 

[¶33.]  Likewise mystifying is the theory of 
summary judgment by which this decision is determined. Even if the majority 
renders decision on a matter of law by a stage five Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986) characterization or, perchance, factual resolution as stage six, 
genuine issues of material fact stand persuasively illustrated in concept and 
discussion from contractual documents and operational 
standards.

 
 

[¶34.]  In initial review, it is immediately 
apparent that this case is not novel, nor is appellee Pearle Vision Center, Inc. 
(Pearle Vision), as a national franchising corporation, a stranger to similar 
litigation. Cases of this type involving franchise optometry include, for Pearle 
Vision in its various entities, California Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. 
Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 143 Cal. App. 3d 419, 191 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983); Will 
Ross, Inc. v. Florida State Bd. of Optometry, 314 So. 2d 152 (Fla.App. 1975); 
Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Examiners in 
Optometry, 219 Ga. 856, 136 S.E.2d 371 (1964); Pearle Optical of Monroeville, 
Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 
(1963); Pearl Optical, Inc. v. Pearle Optical of Ga., Inc., 218 Ga. 701, 130 S.E.2d 223 (1963); Louisiana State Bd. of Optom. Exam. v. Pearle Optical of 
Alexandria, 248 La. 1062, 184 So. 2d 10 (1966); Louisiana Bd. of Optometry 
Examiners v. Pearle Optical of Alexandria, Inc., 177 So. 2d 164 (La. App.), writ 
granted 248 La. 426, 179 So. 2d 19 (1965), rev'd 248 La. 1062, 184 So. 2d 10 
(1966); and Small v. Maine Bd. of Registration and Examination in Optometry, 293 A.2d 786 (Me. 1972). See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Practice of 
"Optometry" 88 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1963).2 The 
conflict between corporate practice and individual responsibility of the 
certificated practitioner is not limited to optometry. In recent time, 
dentistry, as well as law, has sustained its conflicts. See an earlier 
regulatory confrontation, Barron v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 109 Cal. App. 382, 293 P. 144 (1930).

 
 

[¶35.]  Factual issues which relate to the status 
of the health care practitioner within the franchise system include: (1) 
authority and control; (2) whether optometry is a learned profession; (3) fee 
splitting; (4) usage of cappers and steerers; (5) percentage royalty, 
compensatory system; (6) effectuated corporate practice of optometry franchise 
system and contractual supervision; (7) whether statutory violation requires an 
employer/employee relationship; and (8) fundamental nature of relationship by 
virtue of financing control.

 
 

[¶36.]  A logical resolution of issues raised 
about police power regulation to resolve issues of both fact and law requires 
consideration of exercised commercial expertise and franchising systems. 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 563, 
reh'g denied 349 U.S. 925, 75 S. Ct. 657, 99 L. Ed. 1256 
(1955); Semler v. OregonState Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 55 S. Ct. 570, 79 L. Ed. 1086 (1935). Where this case presents a summary 
judgment, the detailed factual delineations by the majority define the obvious 
doubt in disposition justification.3 In 
economics, Pearle Vision is in the eye care business in a not dissimilar fashion 
from McDonald's hamburgers or Holiday Inn's motor hotels. The last listed sells 
a place to stay overnight with accouterments; McDonald's supplies fast foods; 
and Pearle Vision, the medical service of eye care diagnosis and equipment 
sales. The only differentiation develops in requirement to enforce a legislative 
policy that those who examine eyes and prescribe glasses should have a defined 
level of professional training and responsibility.

 
 

[¶37.]  In times past, the five-and-dime 
department stores had glasses, frames, separate lenses and, even on some 
occasions, refractory machines so that the customer could test himself. 
New JerseyState Board of Optometrists 
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 113 N.J.L. 287, 174 A. 353 (1934). Whether that practice 
still exists anywhere is not announced by this record, but certainly not to be 
found in Wyoming. Pearle Vision and similar national 
franchisers are the successor for accommodative sales of vision products by 
leasing heavy traffic retail store sites. Conjunctively, it was quickly 
recognized by management of franchising and company store operations that 
availability of personnel for examination is required for the eye glass 
merchandising operation.4 Consequently, in states 
where permitted, the franchiser secures licensed practitioners to provide the 
required operational mechanism for economic viability. This is achieved by 
selling a percentage rent, large sum advance fee franchise under a very detailed 
operational contract. Every aspect of the business operation, except standards 
set by occupation and certificating standards for the care of specific eye 
examinations, is subjected to regularized supervision and detailed documentary 
control.

 
 

[¶38.]  It is the operational economic entity 
that we must examine to evaluate conflict with the Wyoming health care 
regulatory statutes. It might not be different in precept from a system that 
would franchise lawyers' offices with included business of selling books, forms, 
wills, agreements and pro se pleadings.

 
 

[¶39.]  It is not acceptable that jurists, who 
may obtain their eye care from ophthalmologists, fail to recognize the health 
care responsibilities to the citizens of the state when provided by 
optometrists. The legislative purpose addressed in statute is not necessarily 
effectuated by the commercialization perspective of the Pearle Vision 
advertising program manual with cover slogan stating, "Nobody Cares for Eyes 
more than Pearle." A comprehensive analysis of the documentary detail in 
offering circular, operating plan, franchising agreement and financing 
arrangement leaves little doubt about the intrinsic operation of the franchising 
of eye care services and equipment for retail distribution. Any effort embraced 
by the majority to disassociate the licensed optometrist from the contrails and 
tentacles of the in-place system simply fails in factual analysis.5

 
 

[¶40.]  The abnormality implicit in present 
discussion and decision by the majority is disposition of a comprehensive course 
of business-professional certification case by approval of granted summary 
judgment contrary to the posture of the state licensing agent. The 
responsibility chargeable to the agency is to assure the competency of 
optometrists and to prevent conduct on their part which would do harm to the 
public. Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195 
(1935).

 
 

[¶41.]  The substantial analysis of some of the 
facts by the majority affords credence to the supposition that the summary 
judgment conclusion is justified since Pearle Vision's operation, whatever it 
may be in fact, does not inappropriately conflict with the strictures of 
Wyoming 
statute as a matter of law. Otherwise, on this record, there is no proper way to 
sustain the trial court as a finding of absence of a factual issue from the 
present record. Clearly, both the scope of the regulation, control and 
involvement of the corporate franchiser, as well as the specific opinion 
information of the affidavits by the Wyoming State Board of Examiners of 
Optometry (Board) reject any rational decision finding absence of any 
evidentiary conflict, including proffered characterization of the franchisee as 
in effect only an employee; albeit as it may be indentured in financial 
obligation.

 
 

[¶42.]  Under the criteria of the many decisions 
of this court and in order to achieve a conclusion of this action as a decision 
of law, Cordova, 719 P.2d 625, the issues between the parties must be resolved 
no matter how the relevant facts may be distributed so that only challenged 
questions of law are presented. Clearly, several questions of factual difference 
exist in this appeal, i.e., whether advertising was in fact steering, Akin v. 
Louisiana State Board of Optometry Exam., 150 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 1963); is 
Pearle Vision engaged in the practice of optometry by having a contractual 
percentage right to all of Dr. Holly's business income regardless of how 
generated from dispensary merchandising or by professional health care 
examination; and more conclusively, what is the net effect on the health care 
practitioner of the thirty-four causes for default as a factor of direct 
control.

 
 

[¶43.]  In the nature of the business enterprise, 
if the health care examinations are conducted at a sufficiently slowed sequence, 
the retail business operation will fail and financing and leasing default will 
occur. Consequently, in order for the practitioner to avoid default, there is a 
requirement of performance at not less than some definable speed irretrievably 
planted within the system in order to create the customers for the dispensing 
business. The web of operational relationships as considered within regulatory 
activity of the agency and the supervisory mandates of the legislation logically 
denies summary judgment disposition as a matter of law.

 
 

[¶44.]  Here, each party moved for summary 
judgment, so either is faced in resistance with a showing based on the 
nationally used franchising documents, a few affidavits and brief depositions 
that there was no genuine issue of fact for trial. Substantively, unless all of 
the affidavits submitted to the court are either considered to be inadmissible 
hearsay or conclusory, no other reason is perceived to justify that intimation. 
People v. Sterling Optical Co., 26 Misc.2d 412, 
209 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1960). Cf.State ex rel. Fatzer v. Zale Jewelry 
Co. of Wichita, 179 Kan. 628, 298 P.2d 283 (1956), where an 
extensive record was developed at trial.

 
 

[¶45.]  The relationship of the optometrist to 
the national franchiser and their relationship to the Wyoming licensing law 
lacks definition unless inquiry is made about the specifics of the contractual 
documents and operational processes. Pearle Vision is a well-organized and 
experienced franchiser, and as to be expected, provides comprehensive 
contractual documentation for analysis. The basic agreement signed between the 
optometrist and Pearle Vision as franchise documents are the franchise agreement 
of forty-six pages, a sub-lease for the shopping center premises which includes 
the shopping center lease between center management and Pearle Vision, a real 
property equipment lease, ownership of franchise certificate, a guarantee, a 
confidentiality agreement, a statement of assets to be purchased and fees to be 
paid, a loan agreement, and a promissory note. Financially, the transaction as a 
franchise relationship encompasses a percentage fee of gross business done as 
including not only merchandise sale of eyewear products, but also optometrist's 
services. Those include the franchise royalty of eight and one-half percent, 
advertising of eight percent and rent of eight percent on receipts in excess of 
$13,166.67 monthly. Consequently, the monetary relationship as a percentage fee 
is twenty-four and one-half percent of gross business, except that the rental 
fee is floored at a minimum business volume.

 
 

[¶46.]  The operation is constructed initially by 
Pearle Vision's acquisition of the shopping center space and lease and 
remodeling and construction of the facilities for the retail purpose of eye 
glass sales and optometry business. A $15,000 fee is charged to the prospective 
franchiser and the balance of Pearle Vision's construction costs and equipment 
purchases are secured by security agreements when sold to the operator by a 
financed installment obligation, including a three percent above prime monthly 
interest charge. Operationally, purchases of optical supplies and equipment are 
contractually controlled as directed to franchiser. Basic local and national 
advertising is composed and placed by Pearle Vision and exclusive occupation and 
management responsibility is imposed. Facility operation is supervised, 
including hours and method. Accounting, auditing and reporting is rigidly 
structured.

 
 

[¶47.]  The more singular facet of the 
relationship which determines the status of the parties is restrictions on 
sub-lease, resale and heirship, including an all inclusive first right of 
refusal on transfer. Extraordinarily confining and severe factors of default are 
enunciated by agreement which permits cancellation of the lease and the 
franchise. The Board fairly states that "Pearle's Franchise Procedure Manual 
contains in excess of 250 pages of detailed requirements with which [franchisee] 
must comply."

 
 

[¶48.]  With recognition of the status of trial 
court summary judgment disposition, it is fair to find some record justification 
and evidentiary support for the following statements in a certified public 
accountant expert witness affidavit filed by the Board:

 
 
12. The 
concept of the super store in optometrics provides for profits to be generated 
as a result of the sale and cross-sale of all services under the recognizable 
name of the retail operation.

 
 
13. 
According to the franchise agreement, Dr. Holly is not allowed to sell his 
investment, expand his optometric practice or perform any other optometric 
services without the written approval of Pearle Vision Center, 
Inc.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
15. Based 
on my research and information, it is my opinion that Dr. Holly is in the same 
position and under the same controls as that of any 
employee.

 
 
See 
California 
Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians, 191 Cal. Rptr. 762 and Zale Jewelry Co. of 
Wichita, 298 P.2d 283.

 
 

[¶49.]  The cases which relate in some fashion to 
the economic pursuit of merchandizing eyewear by affiliation with a licensed eye 
care examiner are near legion. Some differences are explainable by outdated 
attitudes about the health care nature of eye treatment. See Klein v. Rosen, 327 
Ill. App. 375, 
64 N.E.2d 225 (1945). Other divergences in general results are explained by 
statutory difference. A striking example of these kinds of opposite results are 
evidenced in the contact lens cases defining what cannot be done by the 
dispensing optician. Florida Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. Florida State Bd. 
of Optometry, 227 So. 2d 736 (Fla.App. 1969), aff'd in part and quashed in part 
238 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1970); State ex Inf. Danforth v. Dale Curteman, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1972); New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists v. Reiss, 83 N.J. 
Super. 47, 198 A.2d 816 (1964); State ex rel. Reed v. Kuzirian, 228 Or. 619, 365 P.2d 1046 (1961).

 
 

[¶50.]  To fashion a proper analysis of the error 
in the majority opinion, initial reference to Wyoming statutes is required. First and 
obviously, any recitation that under the statute optometry is not a learned 
profession is insupportable in fact and unjustified in legislative intent. 
Criteria for initial education, W.S. 33-23-109; continuing education 
certificate, W.S. 33-23-114; certification, W.S. 33-23-103; permitted use of 
pharmacological agents, W.S. 33-23-102; with special course requirements, W.S. 
33-23-109; leaves no statutory intention question as to the nature of the 
education and the health care expertise required for optometry practice. State 
ex rel. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Kuhwald, 372 A.2d 214 (Del. 1977), judgment rev'd 389 A.2d 1277 (Del.Supr. 1978); 
State ex rel. Londerholm v. Doolin, 209 Kan. 
244, 497 P.2d 138 (1972); McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937); Neill v. Bloch, 330 
Pa. 222, 199 A. 182 (1938). The seriousness of concern about the use of pharmacological 
agents by the optometrist in examination or treatment arose in enactment of 1977 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 17 and 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 139 now found in W.S. 
33-23-102 with education and expertise centered in issue. Wyoming moved further in 
required expertise with augmented function permitted to the licensee by 
legislative enactment.

 
 

[¶51.]  An interesting American history can be 
developed in analysis of the cases and authorities as eye examination moved from 
self-prescription in five-and-dime department stores to the increasing levels of 
professionalism and education as present requirement of optometrists. McMurdo, 
10 N.E.2d 139. At the same time, national franchisers or chains such as Pearle 
Vision moved into the dispensing and merchandising businesses for sale of the 
eye care products. Conflict between the medical doctors and their specialists, 
the ophthalmologists, with the optometrists, is defined in determination for the 
proper function of the optometrist on one side while conflict has escalated 
between the optometrist and merchandisers and/or opticians as the mechanic on 
the other side. It has been stated that the contrary results among some cases 
result from a foundational conflict of whether optometry is a learned profession 
or only a practitioner of trade like the optician. In present time, except by 
statement of the trial court and reference in the majority's opinion, continued 
discussion is a rarity since obviously adequate eye care requires examination 
expertise and that competency is recognized by certification requirements for 
the practitioner by detailed state statutes. Any denial of optometry as a 
learned profession within health care services is patent nonsense in modern 
terms. Lieberman v. ConnecticutState Board of Examiners in Optometry, 
130 Conn. 344, 
34 A.2d 213 (1943). The analysis of law and philosophy was well-stated in State 
ex Inf. McKittrick v. Gate City Optical Co., 339 Mo. 427, 97 S.W.2d 89, 90-91 
(1936):

 
 
The 
question for determination is whether the conduct of the respondents, as shown 
by the evidence, constitutes practicing optometry within the meaning of the 
optometry code.

 
 
A like 
question has been ruled by the courts of several of our sister states, and there 
is contrariety among their rulings upon it. The discordance appears to be due to 
differences in the terms of the statutes and public policy of the several 
states. * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
* * * it is 
apparent that, apart from specific legislative classification of optometry as, 
or use of terms implying the practice of optometry to be a profession, the one 
line of decisions seems to proceed on the theory that the legislative object as 
disclosed by the particular optometry code - the public policy of the particular 
state - was to preserve public health and welfare by requiring the practice to 
be kept on the plane of professional ethics and scientific learning, as in the 
so-called learned professions. The other line, on the normal plane of ethics and 
practical business economy. In a case of the latter class it is said that "the 
science of optometry, though it may require much preparation and skill, is not 
commonly known as one of the learned professions."

 
 
Forcefully 
stated in modern terms, the court in Eisensmith v. Buhl Optical Co., 115 W. Va. 
776, 178 S.E. 695, 697 (1934) (quoting from Commonwealth v. Houtenbrink, 235 
Mass. 320, 126 N.E. 669, 670 (1920)) related:

 
 
[T]he kind 
of work undertaken by the optometrist "bears such intimate relation to the 
health of mankind as to bring it within the power of legislative supervision 
through the exercise of the police power. Vision is essential to the highest 
usefulness of the individual. The eye is proverbially a delicate organ. It is 
closely connected with intellectual, nervous and physical functions. Advice as 
to its care and prescribing for the correction of its defects by tests and 
examinations without the use of drugs is closely connected with 
health."

 
 
See also 
Melton v. Carter, 204 Ark. 595, 164 S.W.2d 453 (1942); Lee Optical of Ga., Inc. 
v. Georgia State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 220 Ga. 204, 138 S.E.2d 165 
(1964); Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc., 133 S.E.2d 374; Kendall v. Beiling, 
295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (1943); and Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 (1938).

 
 

[¶52.]  The second clearly defined fact is that 
corporate practice of optometry is not permitted under Wyoming statutes, and if 
the essential nature of the business here presented is corporate practice of 
optometry, it is illegal. Wyoming statutes are specific and resort to a 
large volume of cases in similar result is not required. W.S. 33-23-111, in 
stating it is unlawful for "any corporation, directly or indirectly, to practice 
optometry * * *," says it all. Funk Jewelry Co. v. State ex rel. La Prade, 46 
Ariz. 348, 50 P.2d 945 (1935); State Board of Optometry v. Gilmore, 147 Fla. 
776, 3 So. 2d 708 (1941); State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 
881, 51 P.2d 995 (1935); Kendall, 175 S.W.2d 489; Dickstein v. Optical Service, 
Inc., 19 Misc.2d 495, 191 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1959); Stern v. Flynn, 154 Misc. 609, 
278 N.Y.S. 598 (1935); State ex rel. Sisemore v. Standard Optical Co., 182 Or. 
452, 188 P.2d 309 (1947); State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court 
for Chelan County, 17 Wn.2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943); Eisensmith, 178 S.E. 695.

 
 

[¶53.]  Finally, in conjunction with the issues 
of steerers,6 cappers, etc., we consider the 
essential nature of the business organization and relation and not the visage or 
tinting applied to camouflage what, in fact, exists. Akin, 150 So. 2d 807. The 
dedication of the Wyoming legislature to rights of freedom of 
choice in selection of licensed eye care practitioners is specifically addressed 
in W.S. 33-32-101:

 
 
No person, 
department, commission, board, official, employee, or agency of the state of 
Wyoming or any county, municipality, school district or other subdivision of the 
state of Wyoming, or any other state or county agency or any other governmental 
unit of any kind or character shall interfere with any patient's exercise of 
freedom of choice in the selection of practitioners licensed to perform 
examinations for refractions and visual training and visual corrections within 
the specific area for which their state licenses entitle them to 
practice.

 
 
That intent 
for freedom of choice is not confined to the text of that statute only but flows 
from the optometry code as found in the first criteria of unprofessional and 
dishonest conduct. "The loaning of his license by any licensed optometrist to 
any person; * * *." W.S. 33-23-110(b)(i). See further, W.S. 
33-23-110(b)(ix):

 
 
The board, 
when necessary for administration of this act, may clarify the definitions 
stated in this subparagraph (b) by unanimous action of the board, provided that 
the meaning and effect of this law shall not thereby be added to or 
diminished.

 
 

[¶54.]  In addition to the limitations provided 
by the unprofessional/dishonest conduct definition, the following specific 
proviso of W.S. 33-23-111(b)(iv) cannot be so casually ignored as the majority 
seeks to do:

 
 
For any 
person or persons not holding a certificate or any corporation, directly or 
indirectly, to practice optometry by employment of or contract with a person 
holding a certificate, or otherwise, * * *.

 
 

[¶55.]  Franchising of health care services, law, 
accounting or engineering can be no less appealing than nursing homes, hamburger 
sales and motel facilities.7 This difference is 
the individual responsibility of the practitioner to his client or patient that 
is implicit both in Wyoming statutes and pervasive precedent in 
the nature of an individual who is honored to be designated as a member of a 
true profession. The delineation presented by the courts is to determine where, 
by franchising services, the contractual control over the professional should be 
denied to the corporate environment. In my persuasion, that line was crossed 
substantially before the status is reached as evidenced by the intrinsic 
agreements and essential nature of this transaction between the optometrists and 
the franchiser provision.

 
 

[¶56.]  As stated in Lieberman, 34 A.2d  at 216 
(quoting from McMurdo, 10 N.E.2d at 142), it is

 
 
the 
principle which forbids a licensed member of a profession to practice among the 
public as the employee of an unlicensed person or corporation "recognizes the 
necessity of immediate and unbroken relationship between a professional man and 
those who engage his services."

 
 
See Zale 
Jewelry Co. of Wichita, 298 P.2d 283.

 
 

[¶57.]  There is a curious nonsequitur in the 
majority's reasoning to disregard the most extensive current authority, 
California Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians, 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, by a 
differentiation of California's more inclusive statutes. I 
disagree with the differentiation factually and with the denial of persuasion 
and authority. The only real factual difference is that opticians are licensed 
in California as the mechanics of eye glass manufacture and fitting, but the 
essential character of Wyoming statutes as related to the professional, the 
optometrist, is realistically identical. California has obviously had an administrative agency of 
more forcefulness in adoption of regulations, but the statutory premises that 
California has a long-standing public policy 
against permitting laypersons to practice any of the medical arts or to exercise 
control over decisions made by any healing art practitioners is not different 
from Wyoming.

 
 

[¶58.]  In enunciating the illegality that the 
court found, the specific facts that were demonstrated are identical, or at 
least similar, to the franchise documents which have been brought from 
California and other states to be used in 
Wyoming.

 
 
From the 
face of the franchising agreement it is clear Pearle had the power to control 
many facets of the optometrist's practice of optometry. For example, with 
respect to real property arrangements, Pearle must approve the site of the 
optometrist's office. If the franchisee is purchasing an existing site from 
Pearle, he must also purchase all improvements. If he wishes to obtain a new 
site, Pearle must approve all proposed leasehold improvements, furnishings, 
fixtures, inventory and supplies which are obtained from anyone other than 
Pearle.

 
 
Pearle also 
exercises a variety of controls over financial aspects of a franchisee's 
practice. According to the circular a franchisor may "finance" franchisees, and 
the franchisee must pay a substantial percentage of his gross income to the 
franchisor as both a "franchise fee" and as an advertising contribution. 
Franchisees must utilize the Pearle "system" relative to operating the practice 
and must use the franchisor's design specifications for offices. Furthermore, 
the franchisee is subject to periodic audits by the franchisor. Substantial 
penalties can be assessed if the audit is unfavorable to the 
franchisee.

 
 
A separate 
and distinct specie of control lies in the franchisor's control over a variety 
of treatment decisions to be made by the optometrist. A franchisee is required 
to stock all of Pearle's approved frame lines, to carry an inventory of 
prescription lenses and other optical goods and supplies approved by Pearle. 
Pearle has sole discretion to modify frame lines, and specifications for optical 
goods. Finally, the franchisee's choice of laboratory is limited to those 
approved by Pearle.

 
 
Reservation 
of this authority over an optometrist by a nonhealing arts practitioner is 
against public policy and clearly illegal.

 
 

Id. at 
768.

 
 

[¶59.]  The court goes on to consider control 
over advertisement, use of the name for the facility, profit-sharing and 
co-ownership arrangements, and gross royalty requirements which include services 
performed as a professional as further basis to define the transaction as an 
illegal corporate practice of a profession.

 
 

[¶60.]  The differentiation that the majority 
seems to make that the supervisory control over the franchise extends only to 
the dispensing and not to the examination is not accurate. Each and every factor 
of accounting, operation, management, lease restraints, and resale limitations 
fall equally upon both optical sales and health care activity since all 
documents relate equally and directly to both. If the franchise is rescinded and 
the lease is revoked, the optometrist and the businessman as a single entity is 
identically out of business, although the note remains unpaid and the 
non-competition covenant undiminished. Required monthly payments for purchase, 
rental franchise and advertising as computed upon optometric practice equally 
confines and controls professional services like merchandise sales. With 
unquestioned division of optometric service fees with Pearle Vision presented, 
the reasoning of this decision seems more than clouded in explaining how 
percentage fees escape exculpation. Lieberman, 34 A.2d 213; Hanks v. Hamilton, 339 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. App. 1976), cert. denied 352 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1977); State v. Abortion Information 
Agency, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 825, 323 N YS.2d 597 (1971). Cf. Natchez v. State, 721 P.2d 361 (Nev. 
1986), where an optometrist cannot be the employee of an 
opthamologist.

 
 

[¶61.]  The characterization in one of the 
Board's affidavits that Dr. Holly is essentially an employee of Pearle Vision, 
may be overstated (see, however, Zale Jewelry Co. of Wichita, 298 P.2d 283), 
since indentured agent might be more responsive. I would conclude, within the 
entirety of documented control and regulation, that there is an issue of fact to 
consider the existence of a violation by an uncertified corporation. Capitol 
Optical Co. v. State Board of Optometry, 220 Miss. 34, 70 So. 2d 15 (1954); 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Board of Optometry, 213 Miss. 710, 57 So. 2d 726 (1952); State ex rel. Bricker v. Buhl Optical Co., 131 Ohio St. 217, 2 N.E.2d 601 (1936); State ex rel. Loser v. National Optical Stores Co., 189 Tenn. 
433, 225 S.W.2d 263 (1949). To be weighed at trial is the reality. Dr. Holly is 
at will in business placement, actively controlled at continuous risk of 
default, and confined in transferability or resale. Control is not 
inappropriately defined either as he who calls the tune, or by the golden rule, 
he who has the gold rules.8

 
 

[¶62.]  Fundamentally we are taught by the wisdom 
of many preceding jurists that it is the essential operation which achieves 
regulatory significance - how, what and when - and the effect on a defined 
public interest. Rowe v. Standard Drug Co., 132 Ohio St. 629, 9 N.E.2d 609 (1937); 
National Optical Stores Co., 225 S.W.2d 263. See, however, Rowe v. Burt's Inc., 
31 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio App. 1939). Also see Zale Jewelry Co. of Wichita, 298 P.2d 283 and Goldman Jewelry Co., 51 P.2d 995. Compare for more limited contract, 
State v. Ballez, 102 Ariz. 174, 427 P.2d 125 (1967). See also 
Ritholz v. Arkansas State Board of Optometry, 206 Ark. 671, 177 S.W.2d 410 
(1944); State v. Plymouth Optical Co., 211 N.W.2d 278 (Iowa 1973); State v. 
Kindy Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N.W. 332 (1933); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
57 So. 2d 726; and Rithholz v. Com., 184 Va. 339, 35 S.E.2d 210 (1945). It is not 
labels, artifices or subterfuges which are sufficient to determine regulatory 
interest and prohibitory reaction. It is impermissible to incorporate to engage 
in optometry or to do individually what is forbidden to do directly. Buhl 
Optical Co., 2 N.E.2d 601. This subject was 
best stated in California Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians, 191 Cal.Rptr. at 
773:

 
 
Pearle by 
its franchise seeks to engage in the corporate practice of a profession. The 
rules against such practice should not be circumvented by technical agreements 
concerning the manner optometrists are engaged, designated or compensated by the 
franchisor. The confidential health care relationship requires the 
professional's undivided responsibility and freedom from commercial 
exploitation. This relationship is essential. The public would be jeopardized if 
a large corporation with pecuniary profits as its principal goal were allowed to 
dominate the field. (Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Exam., supra, 216 Cal. 285, 298, 
14 P.2d 67.)

 
 

[¶63.]  In Wyoming, Pearle Vision can neither legally 
practice optometry nor employ optometrists for the examination portion of the 
eye care service that it seeks to sell. Neill, 199 A. 182. This summary judgment 
disposition makes no sense, logically nor governmentally, in determining, as a 
matter of law, something factually which is probably contrary to what actually 
happens.

 
 

[¶64.]  The trial court grant of summary judgment 
favoring Pearle Vision should be reversed for trial on the 
merits.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 A 
confusion in terminology can be found in the numerous cases and by casual 
references to the participants in the eye care industry correctable by 
differentiating the optician from the optometrist, the O.D., as also different 
from the medical doctor, the M.D., who may practice in this specialty. 
Wyoming, differing from California, has no 
optician licensing law. See California Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. 
Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 143 Cal. App. 3d 419 (1983). 
Opticians do not examine eyes and would fall within the category of optical 
mechanics as differentiated in terminology by W.S. 33-23-101(b). In standard and 
accepted categorization, the structure of eye care personnel starts with the 
non-dispensing optician, as the mechanic; the dispensing optician who cannot 
conduct examinations, licensed in some states and not in others; the optometrist 
as a certificated professional with a specialized college degree requirement; 
and the medical professional practitioners, physicians, surgeons, and 
ophthalmologists (oculists). See definitions in Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 486, 75 S. Ct. 461, 463, 99 L. Ed. 563, reh'g denied 349 U.S. 925, 75 S. Ct. 657, 99 L. Ed. 1256 (1955); Stern v. Flynn, 154 Misc. 609, 278 N.Y.S. 598 (1935); New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. S.S. Kresge Co., 
113 N.J.L. 287, 174 A. 353 (1934).

 
 
Dr. Holly 
is licensed to be and conducts a professional practice as an optometrist as 
confined and controlled by the Wyoming licensing statute, W.S. 33-23-101, et 
seq.

 
 

2 The 
history of Pearle Vision, symptomatic of merchandized health care, is 
informative. Pearle was incorporated in 1962 by Stanley C. Pearle, O.D., as 
merged into Opticks, Inc. as an affiliate system in 1973. The entity was 
acquired by Will Ross, Inc. in 1969 and then merged into G.D. Searle & Co. 
in 1973 to become a wholly owned subsidiary. In 1983, drug supplier Searle, by 
establishment of Pearle's Health Services, Inc., which owns, as its affiliate, 
Pearle Vision Center, Inc., the litigant in this case, resold 55.4 percent of 
the outstanding common stock and retained as of the date of the circular found 
in the record, 44.3 percent. As of circular date of April 1, 1985, there were 
more than 800 retail optical stores doing business under the proprietary service 
mark Pearle Vision Centers, which include three types of franchises: (1) 
company-owned Pearle Vision Center (company-owned store); (2) a newly 
constructed Pearle Vision Center (new store); or (3) the owner of an existing 
optical store which may convert to Pearle Vision Center (owner-converted store). 
Within this categorization, the Cheyenne, Wyoming operation and licensing arrangement 
held by Dr. Holly, would be category (2), as a new store.

 
 

3 The 
comprehensive factual analysis by the majority would appear to define the modus 
decimandi for a factual inquiry sufficient to structure a genuine issue of a 
material fact in summary judgment concepts. However, the terminology of the 
majority calls this assumption into question in that in result, it appears that 
the majority determines that as matter of law the Wyoming legislature has 
not limited corporate practice of optometry within the character of contractual 
relations exercised by Pearle Vision.

 
 

4 It is 
naive to ignore the essential nature of the franchised eye care business. First, 
a need must be created and thereafter the need is met by the sale of materials 
for correction and appearance. Of the essence of the Pearle Vision operation, as 
well as other similar corporate approaches involving franchise arrangements, is 
the on-site availability of examination which is required to create the need 
from which the sales can be made. The predominant of the operation is the 
product sale. Documents available for this operation suggest that about 
twenty-five percent of gross volume receipts are derived from health care 
professional service and seventy-five percent from merchandise sale. If the cost 
of the merchandise is deducted as a gross profit computation, the totals are 
about one-third eye examination and two-thirds 
merchandising.

 
 
Although 
the self-starter for the corporate operation is eye examination, the determinate 
of the business purpose and principal activity is product sale. Seifert v. Buhl 
Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N.W. 784 (1936). The 
operational function for the franchised business is the direct reverse of the 
normalized ophthalmologist or optometrist who conducts a health care practice 
for the examination to be the predominant function and where, if provided, 
product sales is the adjunct. In the franchise system, the business purpose is 
merchandising while the essence of the independent ophthalmologist and 
optometrist activity is founded in providing a health 
care.

 
 
The 
business operation can become a police power regulatory concern properly 
addressed in legislation by controls, limitations and prohibitions to the degree 
that merchandising processes can supplant principles of individualized health 
care services.

 
 
The 
penumbra between optometry and effective private enterprise as unfettered by 
government and protection of citizens in receipt of health care services is a 
territory of decision clearly emplaced in legislative discretion by separation 
of powers. Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1.

 
 

5 A letter 
dated June 24, 1985 to Dr. Holly from a supervisor of franchise accounting 
stated:

 
 
There are 
several procedures contained in the Franchise Accounting Section which will help 
you to understand our weekly and monthly routine and the part you play. They are 
as follows:

 
 
1. XIII-2 
(Call-in): Every Monday morning you are asked to call in the previous week's 
sales to your supervisor.

 
 
See 
Confidentiality Agreement form of execution:

 
 
            
Signature: Robert L. Holly, O.D. 

            
Title: Optometrist 

            
Date: 7/29/85 

            
Franchisee: Robert L. Holly, O.D. 

            
Franchise Location:            
96701 967101 

                                                
Frontier Mall # I-1 

                                                
Cheyenne, WY

 
 
The 
Franchise Agreement, section 3.1, stated:

 
 
(B) 
Franchisee hereby expressly acknowledges that adherence to each and every 
provision of the Pearle System is reasonable, necessary and essential to 
maintain the uniform image and favorable reputation of each PearleVisionCenter and the success of Pearle's 
franchise program. Accordingly, Franchisee expressly agrees to comply with each 
and every requirement of the Pearle System during the term hereof, as the same 
may be modified or changed from time to time by Pearle in its sole 
discretion.

 
 
Section 
3.3, Goods and Services 
stated:

 
 
During the 
term hereof, Franchisee shall provide or shall cause to be provided at or in 
conjunction with the Location, the following goods and services and no other 
goods or services without Pearle's prior written approval:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
 (F) As permitted by law, optometric 
services, such as eye examinations and re-examinations, which services shall be 
provided by a duly licensed optometrist or 
ophthalmologist.

 
 
The 
contract also includes noteworthy restrictions on inventory and supplies, 
section 3.4; suppliers and services, section 3.5; required prior approval of 
other products, section 3.6; and specific ownership, non-transferability 
provisions without purchase and first right options held, retained by Pearle 
Vision. See Term; section 1.3; Grant of Successive Franchise (for succeeding 
terms), section 1.5; Assignment: Conditions and Limitations, section 14; Right 
of First Refusal, section 15; and Events of Default by Franchisee, section 
16.5.

 
 
Consequently, 
if the franchisee loses his optometrist's license, he loses his franchise and 
all the fruits of the singular investment required for involvement in the 
business.

 
 

6 See 
definition in People v. Simmons, 109 N.Y.S. 190, 194 
(1908):

 
 
A "steerer" 
in slang vocabulary is a person of plausible manners and address, who gains the 
confidence of the person intended to be fleeced. Century Dictionary, 
"Steerer."

 
 

7 The public 
interest was expressed:

 
 
            
f such a course were sanctioned the logical result would be that 
corporations and business partnerships might practice law, medicine, dentistry 
or any other profession by the simple expedient of employing licensed agents. 
And if this were permitted professional standards would be practically 
destroyed, and professions requiring special training would be commercialized, 
to the public detriment. The ethics of any profession is based upon personal or 
individual responsibility. One who practices a profession is responsible 
directly to his patient or his client. Hence he cannot properly act in the 
practice of his vocation as an agent of a corporation or business partnership 
whose interests in the very nature of the case are commercial in 
character.

 
 
Ezell, 198 S.E.  at 424.

 
 
A singular 
recognition that vision may not be seeing and that vision experts are not all 
the same is profiled in Roseman, Vision Overlooked, 93 Case & Com. 12 
(1988). His well-made point is the prevalence of operational blindness within 
much of our population, which may largely be the result of the insufficient or 
incompetent eye examinations.

 
 

8 The 
franchise agreement provides as events of default by a franchisee, which in 
result controls both hours and methods of operation of both dispensing and 
clinic, a right of termination by franchisor occurring upon any of the items of 
default which are enumerated in thirty-four provisions as specifics and 
generally circumscribed within the terminology of section 16.5(i) and (xxxiii) 
of the Franchise Agreement:

 
 
(i) Failure 
of Franchisee to maintain and operate the PearleVisionCenter in accordance with 
the specifications and standards of the Pearle System or as set forth in the 
Pearle Manual;

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(xxxiii) 
Default by Franchisee or default by any operator, shareholder, partner, member 
or affiliate of Franchisee under any Agreement to which Pearle and any such 
person or entity are parties, including but not limited to any franchise 
agreement, lease, sublease, loan agreement, promissory note or security 
agreement.