Title: Commonwealth v. Padilla

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13411 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANTE S. PADILLA. 
 
 
January 18, 2024. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Bail.  Department of Youth Services.  
Statute, Construction.  Moot Question. 
 
 
This case is before us on three questions reported by a 
Superior Court judge, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as 
amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004).  The parties agree that the 
first and second questions have since been answered by this 
court's recent opinion in Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 
Mass. 552 (2022).  The third question asks for a determination 
whether G. L. c. 119, § 68, eighth par., which concerns the 
pretrial confinement of juveniles who have been charged with 
murder, is unconstitutional.  With some minor points of 
clarification, we agree that our opinion in Nicholas-Taylor, 
supra, controls the answers to the first and second questions.  
However, for the reasons discussed infra, we decline to answer 
the third question concerning the constitutionality of the 
statute, where the issue has become moot in the circumstances of 
this case.1 
 
1. Background.  The defendant was indicted in the Superior 
Court in Suffolk County for murder in the second degree, among 
other charges, when he was sixteen years old.  He was ordered 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed jointly by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice in support of the defendant.  We 
also allow the motion filed by the Department of Youth Services 
(DYS) seeking leave to respond to the amici.  See Mass. R. A. P. 
17 (b), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1635 (2019). 
2 
 
 
 
held without bail pending trial.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 68, eighth par., the court was required to commit him "to the 
custody of the sheriff" for his pretrial detention.  The Suffolk 
County sheriff entered into a "courtesy" arrangement with the 
Department of Youth Services (DYS), whereby the defendant would 
be held at a DYS facility until his eighteenth birthday. 
 
In advance of the defendant's eighteenth birthday, he was 
informed that, upon turning eighteen, he would be returned to 
the sheriff for placement in an adult facility for the remainder 
of his pretrial detention.  In an attempt to facilitate the 
defendant's continued placement with DYS, a judge in the 
Superior Court ordered that the defendant be released on 
personal recognizance on the murder charge, held on cash bail on 
one of the related nonmurder charges, and remain held by DYS 
pending further court order.  Thereafter, DYS entered the case 
as an interested party and moved for reconsideration of the bail 
order or, in the alternative, for the judge to report questions 
of law concerning the court's authority to impose such an order.  
The judge chose to report the following three questions to the 
Appeals Court: 
 
1.  "Does G. L. c. 119, § 68[,] allow a Superior Court 
judge to commit a person under age [eighteen] charged with 
committing murder in the first or second degree pursuant to 
G. L. c. 119, § 74[,] to DYS's care as a pre-trial detainee 
pending disposition of the murder charge(s)?" 
 
2.  "If the answer to question 1 is 'No,' can a Superior 
Court judge set bail on a charge related to, but other than 
murder in the first or second degree, charged pursuant to 
G. L. c. 119, § 74, whether severed or joined, such that a 
person under age [eighteen] is not held on bail on the 
murder charge and the last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, 
§ 68[,] does not apply, thus committing a person under age 
[eighteen] to DYS's care as a pre-trial detainee pending 
disposition of the murder charge(s)?" 
 
3.  "If the answer[s] to questions 1 and 2 are 'No,' is the 
last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 68[,] unconstitutional?" 
 
We subsequently transferred the matter from the Appeals 
Court on our own motion.2 
 
2 The defendant has since turned eighteen and pleaded guilty 
to, inter alia, the lesser charge of manslaughter, rendering 
this appeal moot.  DYS nonetheless urges the court to answer the 
3 
 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  First and second questions.  The 
parties assert, and we agree, that this court's recent opinion 
in Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 552 (2022), 
controls the answers to the first and second questions.  
However, in light of ambiguous phrasing that appears in both 
questions, we begin by clarifying their meaning. 
 
The first two questions are phrased in terms of the trial 
court judge's ability to commit an individual to "DYS's care" as 
a pretrial detainee.  The report from the Superior Court 
includes the parties' joint stipulation that the current 
practice of DYS is to accept pretrial "care" of juvenile 
defendants charged with murder until their eighteenth birthday.3  
See G. L. c. 119, § 68, first par. (permitting court to commit 
juveniles, other than those charged with murder, "to the care" 
of DYS prior to trial).  Taken together, these statements would 
seem to suggest that the first two reported questions concern 
the legality of DYS's current practice of housing pretrial 
detainees charged with murder until their eighteenth birthday.  
However, a closer review of the stipulated record4 indicates that 
this is not the issue at stake in the reported questions. 
 
Although DYS houses certain juvenile defendants charged 
with murder pretrial, it does not do so by court order but 
pursuant to an agreement with the county sheriff that is 
designed to accommodate Federal law.  As we noted in Nicholas-
 
reported questions, as did the defendant in his brief before the 
Appeals Court.  We agree that the questions raised are of public 
importance, and we recognize that the appeal has been fully 
briefed by both parties.  See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 
Mass. 562, 573 (2013); Commonwealth v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 250, 
253 (2005) (reaching reported questions about statute concerning 
pretrial detention where issue was of recurring importance, but 
very likely to evade review).  However, we decline to answer the 
third reported question for the reasons discussed in the last 
section of this decision. 
 
3 Throughout this opinion, we use the term "juvenile 
defendant" to refer to a defendant who was under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the commission of the offense.  See 
Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 552, 552 n.1 (2022). 
 
4 With the assent of the defendant, DYS has filed a motion 
to expand the record to include a supplemental appendix.  We 
hereby allow that motion. 
4 
 
 
 
Taylor, 490 Mass. at 554 & n.5, certain Federal grant programs 
generally restrict individuals under eighteen from having "sight 
or sound contact" with the adult population of a detention 
facility.  See 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11),(12),(13); 28 C.F.R. 
§ 115.14.  County sheriffs lack detention facilities that are 
capable of accommodating this requirement.  As a result, when a 
sheriff receives custody of a juvenile defendant charged with 
murder, the sheriff requests that DYS agree to temporarily hold 
the defendant on a "courtesy" basis.  Under a courtesy hold 
agreement, the juvenile defendant is held in a restrictive, so-
called "hardware secure" program within a DYS facility until his 
or her eighteenth birthday.  For the duration of the courtesy 
hold, the sheriff retains responsibility for the juvenile's 
court transportation and security, medical and dental care, and 
mental health treatment.  Since 2017, the average number of 
juvenile defendants held by DYS under this arrangement has 
hovered between four and five individuals. 
 
In the proceedings below, no party contested the ability of 
the Suffolk County sheriff to enter into a courtesy agreement 
with DYS to hold the defendant until he turned eighteen.  
Rather, the reported questions arose out of DYS's challenge to 
the bail order, issued shortly before the defendant's eighteenth 
birthday, placing him in DYS custody and ordering that he remain 
held at a DYS facility until further order of the court.  The 
judge below indicated that the questions were being reported for 
the purpose of assessing whether the defendant could "remain in 
DYS custody during the pendency of the charges after turning age 
[eighteen]."  Accordingly, we construe the first and second 
questions as concerning whether the judge has the authority to 
commit a juvenile defendant charged with murder to the custody 
of DYS. 
 
So construed, the first and second questions have been 
answered in the negative in this court's recent opinion in 
Nicholas-Taylor.  There, we observed that the plain language of 
G. L. c. 119, § 68, "is clear:  if a juvenile offender is 
charged with murder and held pending trial, he or she is to be 
committed to the custody of the sheriff."  Nicholas-Taylor, 490 
Mass. at 557.  A trial court judge may not seek to sidestep the 
statutory language by ordering that a juvenile defendant charged 
with murder be committed to the custody of DYS on a related 
nonmurder offense that has been properly joined.5  See id.  
 
5 We note that the second question is phrased in terms of 
setting bail on a related nonmurder charge, "whether severed or 
joined" with the murder charge.  Neither this case nor Nicholas-
5 
 
 
 
Rather, "where a juvenile defendant charged with murder and a 
nonmurder offense properly joined pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
9 (a)[, 378 Mass. 859 (1979),] is held by the Superior Court for 
trial, the plain language of G. L. c. 119, § 68, requires that 
the Superior Court judge commit the defendant to the custody of 
the sheriff."  Id. at 559.  Accordingly, the answers to the 
first and second questions are "No." 
 
b.  Third question.  The third reported question asks 
whether, "[i]f the answer[s] to questions 1 and 2 are 'no,' 
. . . the last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 68[,] [is] 
unconstitutional."  Put more simply, the third question asks 
whether G. L. c. 119, § 68, eighth par., is unconstitutional 
because it does not permit a Superior Court judge to commit a 
juvenile defendant charged with murder and held for trial to the 
custody of DYS. 
 
As a general matter, "[w]e do not decide constitutional 
questions unless they must necessarily be reached" (citation 
omitted).  Dinkins v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 486 Mass. 605, 
616 (2021).  And in the context of reported questions, we are 
reluctant to answer a question that calls for a "determination 
of the constitutionality of [a statute] in the abstract."  
Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 264–265 (1986) 
("It is a traditional and salutary practice of this court to 
decline to answer a constitutional question until the 
circumstances of a case are established and require an answer to 
the constitutional question").  This is particularly true where, 
as here, the constitutional question has become moot.  See note 
2, supra.  See also Matter of Sturtz, 410 Mass. 58, 60 (1991).  
Although this court has exercised its discretion to reach a moot 
constitutional question in certain circumstances, such as those 
involving an issue of "broad importance" where the unresolved 
question has resulted in ongoing uncertainty and confusion, we 
decline to do so here.  Commonwealth v. Feliz, 486 Mass. 510, 
513-514 (2020).  The defendant asks this court not to reach the 
issue, and DYS has not provided a compelling reason for this 
court to opine, in the abstract, as to the constitutionality of 
the statute.  Accordingly, we decline to provide an answer to 
the third reported question. 
 
Taylor concerned a charge that had been severed from the murder 
indictment, and neither party has briefed the issue.  Thus, we 
construe and answer the second question only insofar as it 
concerns related nonmurder charges properly joined with the 
murder indictment, without expressing an opinion as to severed 
charges.  See Nicholas-Taylor, 490 Mass. at 559. 
6 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  We answer "No" to the first and second 
questions, as we have construed them, and decline to answer the 
third question.  See Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 91 
(1985).  The report is discharged, and the case is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Katherine W. Briggs for Department of Youth Services. 
 
Eva G. Jellison for the defendant. 
 
Taylor Henley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.