Title: Hot Springs County School Dist. No. 1 v. Strube Const. Co

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cite as: 1986 WY 67,  Wyo., 715 P.2d __

HOT SPRINGSCOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1, APPELLANT 
(APPELLANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
STRUBE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, A/K/A STRUBE CONSTRUCTION, INC., APPELLEE 
(APPELLEE).

 
 
 
 
STRUBE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, A/K/A STRUBE CONSTRUCTION, INC., APPELLANT 
(APPELLEE),

 
 
v.

 
 
HOT SPRINGSCOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1, APPELLEE 
(APPELLANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot SpringsCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
Representing Hot Springs 
County School Dist. No. 1.:

John A. Sundahl and Paul 
Kapp of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing Strube 
Const. Co.:

William L. Miller and 
Holly Brown of Cent. Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for 

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     A dispute between Hot 
Springs County School District No. 1 (School District) and the Strube 
Construction Company (Strube) as a result of Strube's providing additional 
materials not originally called for in the agreement between the parties during 
the course of construction of a football field and running track in Thermopolis, 
Wyoming, resulted in the entry of an arbitration award in favor of Strube, in 
the amount of $71,500, on September 22, 1983. The School 
District, on October 13, 1983, filed a petition for review, notice 
of appeal and complaint to vacate the award in the district court. Strube filed 
a response and a motion to affirm the award on October 21, 1983. The district 
court entered its judgment confirming the arbitration award on August 28, 1984. 
Both parties have appealed to this court - the School 
District from the confirmation of the award and Strube from the 
district court's refusal to grant interest on the award from the date it was 
entered by the arbitrators. We shall affirm the district court's decision in 
both instances.

 
 

[¶2.]     In its appeal, the 
School District has provided the following 
identification of the issues:

 
 
"1. Was there any 
agreement to arbitrate and, if so, was it for binding 
arbitration?

 
 
"2. Did the arbitrators 
lack jurisdiction to hear the matter?

 
 
"3. Did the arbitrators 
exceed their powers by disregarding the contractual provisions regarding written 
change orders and notice of their claims?"

 
 

[¶3.]     In addition, Strube, in 
its appeal, raises the following issue:

 
 
"Whether Strube 
Construction is entitled to receive interest on the arbitration award from the 
date of the arbitration award rather than the date the judgment confirming the 
award was entered."

 
 

[¶4.]     In May of 1982, the 
School District accepted Strube's bid to perform a portion of the construction 
work on a project calling for the replacement of an existing quarter-mile dirt 
track with a synthetic 400-meter track, and installation of a new football field 
in Thermopolis, Wyoming. The portion of the project awarded 
Strube included excavation and placement of base materials. During the course of 
construction, additional materials and labor not originally called for in the 
parties' contract were provided by Strube. Some of the additional costs 
engendered by this additional work were paid for by the School District pursuant 
to two change orders; however, the School 
District refused to honor all of the requests made by Strube for 
additional payment, and the present dispute ensued.

 
 

[¶5.]     For purposes of this 
opinion, an extensive discussion of the contentions of the parties is not 
helpful. The primary issues involved in the dispute concerned responsibility of 
payment for additional fill material provided by Strube at the request of 
another contractor to install a crowned field instead of a flat field originally 
called for in the project. The project architect and engineer, Wilkins 
International, Ltd., determined that these additional costs were not the 
responsibility of the School District as the 
additional materials were not called for under the project specifications, and 
no written change orders for such materials were approved in accordance with the 
contract procedures. Strube submitted an application for payment for these 
additional materials, to which the architect/engineer responded on July 9, 1982, 
by a letter in which Strube was notified that the application for additional 
amounts would not be paid at that time, and that the architect/engineer 
recommended to the School District that it make an application for "hearing by 
and resolution by arbitration."1 This decision was confirmed in a 
letter from the School District's 
superintendent to Strube dated July 16, 1982, which provided in 
part:

 
 
"Please consider this 
letter as our formal written demand for arbitration pursuant to Section 101.16 
of the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications, 1979 Edition, subject to 
formal approval by the Board of Trustees at their established meeting of July 
21, 1982. Of course your contract with the Board requires you to continue on the 
job while these items are under arbitration."

 
 

[¶6.]     A copy of this letter 
was not submitted to the American Arbitration Association as required to 
initiate arbitration proceedings before that group. In any event, Strube did not 
recognize its contract as incorporating the referenced section of the Wyoming 
Public Works Standard Specifications which required submissions of disputes to 
binding arbitration within 30 days, and continued to attempt to negotiate its 
claims directly with the School District. These 
negotiations were unsuccessful, and led to the architect/engineer writing a 
letter on September 21, 1982, terminating the contract "because of multiple 
violations of and/or breach of contract." In a follow-up letter dated October 1, 
1982, by the architect/engineer, some 25 asserted violations of the agreement by 
Strube were identified. A reading of this document reflects that relationships 
between Strube and the architect/engineer had deteriorated as a result of the 
dispute, and the architect/engineer was angered by Strube's attempts to 
negotiate directly with the School 
District.

 
 

[¶7.]     A formal request for 
arbitration was made by Strube in October of 1982 in letters to the School District and the American Arbitration Association. 
In the letter to the American Arbitration Association, a copy of which was also 
sent to the School District, Strube's attorney 
noted:

 
 
"* * * Strube 
Construction has never acknowledged or admitted the Wyoming Public Works 
Standard Specifications are part of the contract documents in this matter. 
Strube, however, submits the matter to arbitration voluntarily and in the event the Wyoming 
Public Works Standard Specifications are found to be applicable the matter would 
need to be arbitrated. Therefore, in order to get the matter resolved, Strube is 
submitting to arbitration." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶8.]     In response to Strube's 
demands for arbitration, the School District, 
through its attorney, in a letter to the American Arbitration Association dated 
November 10, 1982, opposed the demand for arbitration on the ground that the 
demand was untimely. In addition, the School 
District asserted a counterclaim against Strube and other 
contractors on the project in the event arbitration was allowed to 
proceed.

 
 

[¶9.]     In a second letter, 
dated December 16, 1982, the School District's 
present counsel entered his appearance on its behalf and requested that all 
further correspondence be directed through his office.2 This letter 
continued:

 
 
"It is my understanding 
that Strube withdrew its arbitration claim. It is my understanding that the 
position of the American Arbitration Association is that there is no longer a 
claim on the part of Strube. We have always claimed that Strube did not file the 
claim in time and therefore is barred. This becomes particularly true if Strube 
attempts to reassert the claim.

 
 
"The School District intends to proceed against its claims, but 
nevertheless, against Strube, his mining company as well as Hummer and Arrow 
[other contractors on the project] and their companies." (Bracketed material 
added.)

 
 

[¶10.]  Strube, in a letter dated December 21, 
1982, vigorously denied withdrawal of its arbitration claim, and requested that 
all the various claims and counterclaims be combined for resolution. In response 
to a request by the regional director of the American Arbitration Association, 
Strube's counsel, on January 7, 1983, wrote a letter clarifying Strube's 
position with regard to the American Arbitration Association's ability to 
proceed with arbitration. Strube reiterated its position that its contract with 
the School District did not include the 
provisions of the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications which required 
submission of disputes to binding arbitration within 30 days after such disputes 
arose. Further, Strube argued that, even if such submission was required, it had 
sought arbitration in a timely manner. A copy of this letter was sent to the 
School District's 
counsel.

 
 

[¶11.]  After the matter had been set for 
hearing, the School District filed its formal 
counterclaim against Strube, dated August 5, 1983. In this counterclaim, the 
School District acknowledged the existence of 
its contract with Strube and charged that Strube, without approval, had changed 
the project concept from one which did not require additional fill material to 
one requiring a large amount of such material. This action, the School District 
asserted, precipitated the additional claims made by Strube and the other 
contractors for additional compensation, and caused the School District to incur additional expenses of 
approximately $100,000. In addition, the School District asserted that some of 
the work done by Strube was performed negligently, and that Strube failed to 
timely complete its work resulting in damages to the School 
District in the amount of $80,000.

 
 

[¶12.]  The matter proceeded to hearing before a 
panel of three arbitrators, selected by the parties, beginning August 22, 1983. 
At the outset of this hearing, the School District made a motion to dismiss for 
the reason that Strube's demand for arbitration was not filed within 30 days as 
required by the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications, which 
specifications, the School District argued, 
were part and parcel of its agreement with Strube. The arbitrators denied the 
motion without setting forth their reasons, and the hearing resulted in entry of 
an award in favor of Strube in the amount of $71,500. The counterclaims asserted 
by the School District were 
denied.

 
 

[¶13.]  On October 13, 1983, the School District filed a Petition for Review, Notice of 
Appeal, and Complaint to Vacate Award. Strube's response to the petition for 
review and motion to affirm the award was filed in the district court on October 
21, 1983. On December 1, 1983, the district court granted the School District's motions to require filing of the record 
of the arbitration proceeding together with a transcript of the testimony at the 
hearing in the district court, establishing a briefing schedule and setting the 
matter for oral argument on March 15, 1984. Extensive briefs were filed by both 
parties, and the hearing was reset for May 3, 1984, at which time the district 
court heard argument by counsel. The district court entered its judgment 
confirming the arbitrators' award but refusing to grant interest from the date 
of entry of the award on August 28, 1984. Both parties have 
appealed.

 
 
I

 
 
WAS THERE AN AGREEMENT TO 
ARBITRATE?

 
 
A. Do the Arbitration Provisions of the 
Wyoming Public 
Works Standard Specifications Apply?

 
 

[¶14.]  The primary argument advanced by the 
School District throughout the various stages 
of its dispute with Strube is that Strube failed to file its demand for 
arbitration within 30 days from the date the architect/engineer rendered his 
decision denying Strube's claim for additional compensation as required by the 
Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications. The School 
District argues that its contract with Strube incorporated these 
specifications as part of its terms. The district court found that the agreement 
between the parties did not incorporate the specifications relied upon by the 
School District. We 
agree.

 
 

[¶15.]  The contract between the parties was 
signed on or about May 10, 1982. The only reference to the Wyoming Public Works 
Standard Specifications in the contract documents 
provides:

 
 
"All material and methods shall conform to the 
applicable portion of the Standard Specifications for Public Works, latest 
edition, (referred to as Standard Specifications hereinafter) unless otherwise 
specified or directed." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶16.]  This language does not purport to adopt 
the standard specifications in toto; rather, only the applicable portion dealing 
with material and methods is referenced. An examination of the specifications 
reveals that they are divided into 26 sections, ranging from General Conditions 
to Portland Cement Concrete Pavement. The majority of these sections describe 
the composition of materials and the manner of installation of such materials. 
By the language of the contract, the parties recite that they intended that 
"[a]ll material and methods shall conform to the applicable portion" of the 
specifications. This phrase is descriptive of the quality and manner of 
installation of materials, not the general conditions which contain the 
provision relied upon by the School District.3

 
 

[¶17.]  The parties to an agreement are free to 
incorporate by reference other documents as part of their contract, the terms of 
which are equally binding upon the parties. Busch Development, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d 65 (1982). In the present case, the 
contract between the parties did not incorporate the provision of the 
specifications the School District relies on. 
For this reason the School District's argument 
that Strube's demand for arbitration was untimely is not well taken. See also 
Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1171 (1969).

 
 
B. Did the Parties Otherwise Agree to Submit 
Their Dispute to Arbitration?

 
 

[¶18.]  As a secondary argument, it is urged by 
the School District that, if we agree that the 
contract documents did not include the arbitration provisions of the Wyoming 
Public Works Standard Specifications, then there is no arbitration provision in 
any of the contract documents and the arbitrators exceeded their powers by 
proceeding with arbitration. In its decision letter filed on July 23, 1984, the 
district court observed:

 
 
"Clearly the parties were 
not required by any written contract to submit their disputes to arbitration, 
nor did any Wyoming law require arbitration. No party, 
under Wyoming law is required to arbitrate disputes unless it has agreed to 
arbitrate that dispute, American National 
Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Authority, 562 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1977), Oil, Chemical, Atomic Workers v. American 
Oil, 528 F.2d 252 ([10th Cir. 1976]). There is no statutory authority in 
Wyoming 
requiring arbitration. Wyoming law does specify that in order for an 
arbitration provision to be enforcible [sic], it must be in writing, W.S. sec. 
1-36-103. Inasmuch as there was no contractual or statutory provisory requiring 
arbitration between these two parties the question becomes one of whether 
Appellant and Appellee agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. For the 
answer, an examination of the factual matters must be considered. Appellant, in 
a letter to Appellee demanded arbitration, early on however there was no request 
to the American Arbitration Association. Appellee did, however, file a written 
request for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on October 21, 
1982. Appellant filed its Motion to Dismiss, citing as grounds that Appellee was 
97 days late in said request. The Arbitrators heard the argument of counsel and 
denied the motion. After the denial, the parties then commenced the arbitration 
proceedings which lasted four days.

 
 
"At no time during the 
arbitration hearing did Appellant raise the issue or suggest that no arbitration 
agreement existed between the parties. A Motion to Dismiss for failure to timely 
request arbitration cannot be convoluted to mean that there was no agreement to 
arbitration. Appellant, in preparation for the arbitration hearing, corresponded 
with the American Arbitration Association, requested that certain persons be 
issued subpoenas and paid a filing fee, (letter dated August 4, 1983 from John 
Sundahl to American Arbitration Association). This Court finds there was an 
agreement to arbitrate the dispute and the agreement to arbitrate was outside 
the provisions of the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications. For that 
reason the arbitrators correctly heard the dispute and did not exceed their 
powers."

 
 

[¶19.]  An agreement to arbitrate need not be 
written and can arise as the result of the conduct of parties to an existing 
dispute regardless of whether or not they have previously contracted for 
arbitration. 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award § 12, pp. 528-529 (1962); and 6 
C.J.S., Arbitration § 8, p. 172 and § 17, p. 187 (1975). Other courts have 
recognized that a party, by participating in arbitration proceedings, can be 
deemed to have waived its objections to the arbitrability of the dispute. O'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance 
Company, 48 Cal. 2d 107, 308 P.2d 9 (1957); American Motorists Insurance Company v. 
Llanes, 396 Mich. 113, 240 N.W.2d 203 (1976); New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company 
v. Franklin, 160 N.J. Super. 292, 389 A.2d 980 (1978); National Cash Register Company v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 377, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951, 171 N.E.2d 302 
(1960); Coventry Teachers' Alliance v. CoventrySchool Committee, R.I., 417 A.2d 886 
(1980); and Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1242 (1970). The comments of the Colorado 
Supreme Court in People v. Crystal River 
Corporation, 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 429, 432 (1955), are 
typical:

 
 
"We think it is 
fundamental law that an individual or an agency of the state may not freely 
participate in the selection of arbitrators, in accordance with statute, attend 
the hearing, submit his evidence, hope for a favorable award, and in the event 
of an adverse finding, seek a review merely because the award is unfavorable to 
him. * * *"

 
 

[¶20.]  The School 
District argues that it did not waive its right to object to 
arbitrability, because it moved to dismiss the arbitration at the commencement 
of the hearing. In this respect we agree with the district court; a motion to 
dismiss for untimely filing cannot be reshaped into an objection to jurisdiction 
on the grounds there is no agreement to arbitrate. In reaching this decision, we 
are mindful of the provisions of § 1-36-104(a), W.S. 1977:

 
 
"On application of a 
party showing an arbitration agreement and the opposing party's refusal to 
arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration. If the 
opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court 
shall proceed summarily to determine the issue raised and shall order or deny 
arbitration accordingly."

 
 

[¶21.]  In the present case, the School District, 
throughout the arbitration proceedings, was aware of Strube's position that the 
agreement between the parties did not require arbitration, but that Strube was 
submitting to arbitration voluntarily to attempt to reach an expeditious 
resolution to its dispute with the School 
District. In submitting its counterclaim for consideration by the 
arbitrators, the School District's request for 
relief sought a resolution of all the disputes between the parties, including 
issues not raised by Strube. The School 
District was afforded a full and fair opportunity to test the proof 
advanced by Strube and to offer evidence in its own behalf on all the issues 
raised by the various claims and counterclaims. If the School District truly believed that there was no agreement 
to arbitrate, § 1-36-104(a) provided a speedy and conclusive method to have that 
question resolved. Under the circumstances present in this case, we have no 
difficulty in finding the School District by its participation waived its right 
to raise the issue of whether or not the dispute with Strube was subject to 
decision in the arbitration proceeding.

 
 

[¶22.]  The School 
District raises the specter of the effect its refusal to participate 
in the arbitration proceedings might have had in the event a reviewing court 
found there was, in fact, an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. In such 
instance, it is asserted that the opportunity to defend or be heard upon the 
merits of the case would be lost forever. While we believe that § 1-36-104(a) is 
designed to avoid this possibility, we find that a party who proceeds with 
arbitration over his explicit objections as to arbitrability is not foreclosed 
from raising the issue on a motion to confirm or vacate the award in the 
district court. Arrow Overall Supply 
Company v. Peloquin Enterprises, 414 Mich. 95, 323 N.W.2d 1 (1982); New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company 
v. Franklin, supra; Ben Gutman Truck 
Service, Incorporated v. Teamsters Local No. 600, 484 F. Supp. 893 (E.D.Mo. 
1980). As we have found, however, the School 
District did not object to arbitrability of the dispute but chose 
instead to participate in hopes of a favorable result.

C. Binding Arbitration 
Award?

 
 

[¶23.]  The last argument of the School District on the existence of an arbitration 
agreement is that any award by the arbitrators is not final and binding. In 
making this argument, the School District relies upon part of our decision in State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. 
Brasel & Sims Construction Co., Inc., Wyo., 688 P.2d 871, 876 (1984), 
wherein it is stated: 

 
 
"* * * The intention of 
the parties to submit their disputes to conclusive determination by a 
contractually designated agent should be made manifest by plain language. * * 
*"

 
 

[¶24.]  In that case, we were confronted with the 
contention that Brasel & Sims Construction Co., Inc., in its contract with 
the state highway commission, agreed to submit any disputes to the state highway 
commission for final and conclusive determination. During our discussion, we 
noted:

 
 
"Our holding in Brasel & Sims Construction Co., Inc. v. 
State Highway Commission of Wyoming, supra, does not prevent parties from 
agreeing to submit disputes to one of the parties to the contract and further 
agreeing to be bound by that party's decision. Such provisions are fairly common 
in construction contracts and are enforceable in court. United 
States v. 
Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 70 S. Ct. 288, 94 L. Ed. 256 
(1950). These provisions are valid because the court, not the agency, performs 
the judicial function of interpreting the terms of the contract and their legal 
effect in accordance with the familiar requirements of good faith and absence of 
collusion, fraud or mistake. United 
States v. Moorman, supra; 3A Corbin on Contracts, § 652, pp. 121-131. We 
recognized the validity of self-imposed prerequisites to the initiation of a 
suit in Brasel & Sims Construction 
Co., Inc. v. State Highway Commission of Wyoming, supra, [Wyo.], 655 P.2d 
[265] at 268 [1982]:

 
 
"`* * * Parties to a 
contract can create valid conditions precedent to the right to bring an action 
and the claim will not accrue until the condition has been 
performed.'

 
 
"To the same effect, see 
United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch 
Company, 328 U.S. 234, 66 S. Ct. 1000, 90 L. Ed. 1192 (1946); United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 820, 88 L. Ed. 1039, reh. denied 322 U.S. 768, 64 S. Ct. 1052, 88 L. Ed. 1594 
(1944)." 688 P.2d  at 875.

 
 

[¶25.]  In the present case, we are not concerned 
with a provision wherein the parties agreed that the decision of one of the parties or its agent would be the final and 
conclusive resolution of a dispute between them. Instead, the parties in this 
case submitted their dispute for resolution by an impartial third party, the 
arbitration board which they mutually selected. The School 
District and Strube chose to submit a number of issues for 
determination by voluntary arbitration. Little purpose would be served by such 
submission if the arbitrators' decision is without any binding effect. We will 
not assume that the parties intended a futile act when they submitted their 
dispute for arbitration.

 
 
II

 
 
DID THE ARBITRATORS ACT 
IN EXCESS OF THEIR POWERS?

 
 

[¶26.]  Arbitration is favored by public policy 
and this court. T & M Properties v. 
ZVFK Architects and Planners, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1040 (1983); Northern Supply Company 
v. Town of Greybull, Wyo., 560 P.2d 1172 (1977); Riverton Valley Electric Association v. Pacific Power and Light 
Company, Wyo., 391 P.2d 489 (1964). We have long 
recognized the value of voluntary arbitration as a mode of settlement of 
disputes in an inexpensive and expeditious manner, without resort to a tribunal, 
and conducted without the rigid formality of strict rules of law. T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects and 
Planners, supra, 661 P.2d  at 1043. No party, however, is required to submit 
to arbitration unless it has agreed to arbitration of that dispute. American National Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing 
Authority, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1017 (1977). Where the parties 
have chosen to submit their dispute to arbitration, we are reluctant to disturb 
the arbitrators' just solution to controversies. Northern Supply Company v. Town of Greybull, supra; Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers 
Union, Local 2-230 v. Great Lakes Carbon 
Corporation, Wyo., 376 P.2d 640 (1962). 

 
 

[¶27.]  Against this background, the School 
District argues that the arbitrators' award in this case should be set aside 
because the arbitrators ignored the provisions of its contract with Strube 
requiring that, prior to the performance of any additional work or providing 
materials not called for in the original agreement, Strube had to obtain a 
written change order signed by the architect/engineer and the School District. 
In the absence of a proper change order, the School 
District insists that there is no legal basis for the award, and the 
arbitrators committed a plain and manifest mistake of law. In making this 
argument, the School District asks that this 
court substitute its interpretation of the parties' agreement for that of the 
arbitration panel. This we cannot do. A court may not overturn the arbitrators' 
decision simply because the court believes its own interpretation of the 
contract would be the better one. W.R. 
Grace and Company v. Local Union No. 759, International Union of United Rubber, 
Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 
76 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983).

 
 

[¶28.]  No written findings and conclusions of 
law were made by the arbitrators in the present case. We do not know if the 
arbitrators intended their decision to be based on a legal rule, had mistaken 
the rule, or were merely attempting to balance the equities involved in order to 
arrive at a fair result. We have held that where the parties have bargained for 
a "fair result" in submitting their dispute to arbitration, we will not inquire 
into the legal basis for the arbitrators' decision. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers 
Union, Local 2-230 v. Great Lakes Carbon 
Corporation, supra, 376 P.2d  at 642-643.

 
 

[¶29.]  We have already decided that the parties 
agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. In order to upset the district 
court's decision upholding the arbitrators' award, the School District was 
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
award

 
 
"* * * was obtained by 
fraud, corruption, behavior beyond the bounds of natural justice, excess of 
authority, or a manifest mistake of fact or law appearing upon the face of the 
award * * *." Riverton Valley Electric 
Association v. Pacific Power and Light Company, supra, 391 P.2d  at 500, 
citing Waisner v. Waisner, 15 Wyo. 
420, 89 P. 580 (1907), and Oil, Chemical 
& Atomic Workers Union, Local 2-230 v. Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, 
supra.

 
 

[¶30.]  This burden was not met. The evidence 
before the arbitrators was such that it would support the view that Strube 
provided the additional materials in question at the request of and with the 
knowledge of the School District or its 
representatives. There was no evidence, and the School 
District does not argue, that the arbitrators' award was tainted by 
fraud or misconduct. While this court may not have decided the matter as the 
arbitrators did, that is not a proper basis to overturn their 
award.

 
 
III

 
 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERR IN REFUSING TO AWARD INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE ARBITRATION 
AWARD?

 
 

[¶31.]  Strube has also appealed from the 
district court's judgment, claiming that the court erred by not granting 
interest from the date of the arbitration award. We are asked to declare that an 
arbitration award is tantamount to a judgment for purposes of § 1-16-102(a), 
W.S. 1977, which provides:

 
 
"Except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section, all decrees and judgments for the payment of 
money shall bear interest at ten percent (10%) per year from the date of 
rendition until paid."

 
 

[¶32.]  The award of interest on judgments is in 
contravention of common law and is purely statutory. Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, 
Wyo., 526 P.2d 986 (1974); Wyoming Central 
Irr. Co. v. laPorte, 26 Wyo. 
522, 188 P. 360 (1920); Wyoming National 
Bank v. Brown, 7 Wyo. 494, 53 P. 291, (1898), reh. denied 9 
Wyo. 153, 61 P. 465 (1900). Statutes in derogation of common law, such as § 1-16-102(a), are 
strictly construed. Mahaney v. Hunter 
Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967). We do not believe 
our legislature intended that the provisions of § 1-16-102(a) apply to 
arbitration awards.

 
 

[¶33.]  In reaching this conclusion, we are not 
without guidance from the legislature. In the Uniform Arbitration Act itself, 
awards are not treated as judgments for purposes of enforcement until "the 
granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award" by the 
district court. Section 1-36-116, W.S. 1977.4 In addition, our legislature has 
specifically prohibited the entry of judgments against governmental entities, 
like the School District, which provide for 
prejudgment interest. Section 1-39-118(d), W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.5 Section 1-16-102(a) is a statute of 
general applicability in contrast to § 1-39-118(d). When a general statute 
conflicts with one of specific application, the specific is controlling. City of Rock 
Springs v. Police Protection Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980); White v. Board of Land Commissioners, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 76 (1979).

 
 

[¶34.]  The cases cited by Strube in support of 
its argument are not apposite. Those jurisdictions, by rule or statute, provide 
for prejudgment interest on arbitration awards. R.E. Bean Construction Co. v. Middlebury 
Associates, 139 Vt. 200, 428 A.2d 306 
(1980); Harsen v. Board of Education of 
Township of West Milford in County of Passaic, 132 N.J. Super. 365, 333 A.2d 580 (1975). In those jurisdictions, an arbitration award is treated as a 
liquidated claim from the date of entry. In its brief, Strube admits that the 
provisions of § 1-39-118(d) prevent the entry of a judgment against the 
School District which provides for prejudgment 
interest on even liquidated claims. In the absence of clear statutory allowance, 
we hold that such interest on arbitration awards against governmental entities 
is not available.

 
 

[¶35.]  Affirmed.

 
 

ROONEY, J., files a dissenting 
opinion in which THOMAS, C.J., 
joined.

1 The letter provides in 
part:

 
 
"(1) I feel we have 
reached an impasse on our attempts to resolve any claims submitted by you for 
anything other than your actual contracted amounts.

 
 
"(2) At this time I am 
categorically denying and rejecting any and all claims submitted by your firm 
for any and all work or charges other than those defined by 
contract.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(10) It is my opinion 
and recommendation to the owners that those claims you have submitted for 
payment above and beyond your contract amount be given no further consideration 
at this time."

2 The November 10, 1982, 
letter was written by different counsel.

3 Section 101.16, Wyoming 
Public Works Standard Specifications (1979), provides:

 
 
"All claims[,] disputes 
and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or 
the breach thereof except for claims which have been waived by the making or 
acceptance of final payment as provided by Section 101.14.11, Waiver of Claims, shall be decided by 
arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association then obtaining. This agreement so to 
arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration 
law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be 
entered upon it in any court having jurisdiction thereof.

 
 
"Notice of the demand for 
arbitration shall be filed in writing with the other party to the Agreement and 
with the American Arbitration Association, and a copy shall be filed with 
ENGINEER. The demand for arbitration shall be made within the 30-day period 
specified in Section 101.09.07, Decisions 
on Disagreements, paragraph two, where applicable, and in all other cases 
within a reasonable time after the claim, dispute or other matter in question 
has arisen, and in no event shall it be made after institution of legal or 
equitable proceedings based on such claim, dispute or other matter in question 
would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

 
 
"CONTRACTOR will carry on 
the Work and maintain the progress schedule during any arbitration proceedings, 
unless otherwise agreed by him and OWNER in writing."

4 Section 1-36-116, W.S. 
1977, provides:

 
 
"Upon the granting of an 
order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, the judgment shall conform 
and be enforced as any other judgment. Costs of the application, proceedings and 
disbursements may be awarded by the court."

5 Section 1-39-118(d), 
W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum. Supp., provides:

 
 
"No judgment against a 
governmental entity shall include an award for exemplary or punitive damages, 
for interest prior to judgments or for attorney's fees."

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶36.]  I can agree with much of that said in the 
majority opinion. Arbitration is favored by public policy and by this Court, and 
the arbitration provisions of the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications 
do not apply to the issues in this case. But statutory requirements for binding 
arbitration cannot be ignored.

 
 

[¶37.]  Section 1-36-103, W.S. 1977 (part of the 
Uniform Arbitration Act), provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"A written agreement to submit any 
existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable and 
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of the contract. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

 
 
Once it is determined 
that the arbitration provisions of the Wyoming Public Works Standard 
Specifications do not apply,1 which determination was properly 
made by the trial court and in the first part of the majority opinion, there no 
longer existed a written agreement to arbitrate the issue upon which the 
arbitration award was made. Section 1-36-103 is clear in its meaning and scope. 
An agreement to arbitrate must be in writing. It need not exist before the issue 
arises, but an enforceable agreement must be made at some point before the 
matter is submitted to arbitration, and such agreement must be in writing. 

 
 

[¶38.]  Such was recognized by the trial court. 
It said in part:

 
 
"Clearly the parties were 
not required by any written contract to submit their disputes to arbitration, 
nor did any Wyoming law require arbitration. * * * Wyoming 
law does specify that in order for an arbitration provision to be enforcible 
[sic], it must be in writing, W.S. sec. 1-36-103. * * *"

 
 
But that court went on to 
say that although the school district objected to the late request for 
arbitration, it was bound by the proceedings simply because it participated 
therein, thereby forming an agreement. The reasoning is not consistent. 
Participation is not a writing. Except for that in the Wyoming Public Works 
Standard Specifications, there was no other written agreement to 
arbitrate.

 
 

[¶39.]  A meeting of the minds as required for an 
enforceable agreement never existed - written or oral. Strube attempted to go in 
the back door for arbitration, after perhaps missing the deadline to do so as 
set forth in the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications. In its letter, it 
said in part:

 
 
"* * * Strube 
Construction has never acknowledged or 
admitted the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications are part of the 
contract documents in this matter. Strube, however, submits the matter to arbitration 
voluntarily and in the event the 
Wyoming Public 
Works Standard Specifications are found applicable the matter would need to be 
arbitrated. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

 
 
Obviously, Strube 
intended to arbitrate only if the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications 
were determined to be applicable.

 
 

[¶40.]  Likewise, the school district intended to 
arbitrate under such standard specifications with the contention that the 
deadline for arbitration contained therein was not met; but if it were determined that the 
deadline was met, the arbitration could proceed under the provisions of such 
standard specifications. Of interest is the fact that all of the procedural 
details necessary in an arbitration agreement as set forth in such standard 
specifications (choosing arbitrators, etc.) were followed except that concerning 
the 30-day filing deadline. The school district continually objected to the 
proceeding under the Wyoming Public Works Standard Specifications on the basis 
of a missed filing deadline. Its participation in the proceedings was with the 
understanding that its objection was overruled and that such proceedings were 
under the written agreement as set out in the Wyoming Public Works Standard 
Specifications. There was no agreement - meeting of the minds - to arbitrate, 
except that such be pursuant to the Wyoming Public Works Standard 
Specifications. With both the trial court and the majority opinion finding that 
the issue involved did not come within the purview of the Wyoming Public Works 
Standard Specifications, i.e., the arbitration agreement in these specifications 
did not cover this issue, there did not exist any agreement - written or oral - 
for arbitration of the issue.

 
 

[¶41.]  The trial court also 
stated:

 
 
"At no time during the 
arbitration hearing did Appellant raise the issue or suggest that no arbitration 
agreement existed between the parties. A Motion to Dismiss for failure to timely 
request arbitration cannot be convoluted to mean that there was no agreement to 
arbitration. * * *"

 
 
Obviously, a motion to 
dismiss, directed at the arbitration agreement which both parties believed would 
be that under which the arbitration would proceed, would imply the lack of any 
other agreement. The school district argued its motion to dismiss at the outset 
of the case, contending that there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. For 
example, it argued:

 
 
"The problem that Strube 
has is he is trapped. If the arbitration provisions [of the Wyoming Public Works 
Standard Specifications] apply, then he is out of time and he is clearly out of 
time. If the arbitration provisions don't apply, then he doesn't have any 
agreement to arbitrate, we shouldn't even been [sic] here in the first place. * 
* *"

 
 
Since the trial court and 
the majority opinion properly found the "arbitration provisions don't apply," 
the motion to dismiss was clearly on the basis that there was no enforceable 
agreement to arbitrate. There was no "convolution." A timely objection to this 
existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement was made before the hearing on 
the merits. The school district's participation in the arbitration hearing was 
in recognition that its motion to dismiss was improperly denied. To have refused to 
participate further at that point, relying upon reversal to correct the error, 
would not have been in accordance with the recognized procedures when a 
preliminary motion is not granted. An appeal can only be taken from a final 
order.

 
 

[¶42.]  However, the majority opinion goes even 
further in disregarding the statutory authority for binding arbitration. It 
holds that:

 
 
"An agreement to 
arbitrate need not be written and can 
arise as the result of the conduct of parties to an existing dispute regardless 
of whether or not they have previously contracted for arbitration. * * *" 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
This holding is in direct 
contradiction to the statutory authority for binding arbitration. Section 
1-36-103, quoted supra, authorizes such only on the basis of a written contract.

 
 

[¶43.]  The cases cited in the majority opinion 
to support the sweeping denunciation of the statutory language do not render 
such support. They concern the question of whether or not the issue for 
arbitration is within the scope of a contract recognized to have been written. They found that it was and, 
thus, uphold the arbitration. In other words, they concern that which was 
decided in the first part of the majority opinion - only they find the issue was 
in the scope of the written contract and not that it was not in such scope, as 
we properly find in this case.

 
 

[¶44.]  The distinction is exemplified by the 
language defining the scope of the A.L.R.3d annotation cited in the majority 
opinion to support the sweeping conclusion contained therein and quoted 
supra:

 
 
"This annotation 
discusses the circumstances under which a party's participation in an 
arbitration proceeding may result in waiver of that party's right to stay 
arbitration proceedings, or set aside or modify an arbitration award, on the 
ground that the issue in dispute was not an arbitrable issue. The term 
`arbitrability,' as used in this annotation, involves questions whether the issue in 
dispute was within the scope of a contractual arbitration clause of the contract 
or within the scope of a submission agreement." (Emphasis added.) Annot., 33 
A.L.R.3d 1242, 1243 (1970).

 
 
The quotation in the 
majority opinion from People v. Crystal 
River Corporation, 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 429 (1955), to support the 
sweeping conclusion quoted supra is likewise misplaced. The arbitration 
proceedings therein were pursuant to mandatory arbitration provided by statute. 
A statutory procedure exists in Colorado whereby a claim must be presented to 
the game and fish commissioner for loss of domestic animals killed or damaged by 
wild animals. If dissatisfied with the determination of the claim, the matter is 
submitted to a board of arbitrators, whose award "shall be final." The court 
held that the arbitrated question could not be relitigated in court. The 
quotation in the majority opinion is language used in this context and has no 
relevancy to the situation, as here, where there was no statutory requirement 
for arbitration - and no written agreement to do so.

 
 

[¶45.]  The other citations in the majority 
opinion given to support the sweeping conclusion quoted supra are likewise 
flawed.

 
 

[¶46.]  In National Cash Register Company v. 
Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 377, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951, 171 N.E.2d 302 (1960), there was a 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties and a subsequent strike 
settlement agreement between them. The court held that the arbitration clause in 
the original agreement applied to the supplemental strike settlement agreement. 
It did not hold, as here, that the issue was beyond that upon which there was a 
written agreement to arbitrate, but held that arbitration was nonetheless 
proper. Additionally, there was no objection to the proceedings before the 
hearing on the merits, as here.

 
 

[¶47.]  In O'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance 
Company, 48 Cal. 2d 107, 308 P.2d 9 (1957), the scope of the arbitration 
provisions of a labor agreement were in issue. The parties also entered into a 
written submission agreement to arbitrate the question as to the scope of the 
arbitration proceedings - quite different than in this case in which the school 
district objected to arbitration as being beyond the scope (as it was ultimately 
found to be) and wherein there was no written meeting of the minds to present 
the scope issue to the arbitrators for a final and binding decision thereon. In 
fact, one of the grounds for vacating an award is when "[t]he arbitrators 
exceeded their powers." Section 1-36-114(a)(iii), W.S. 
1977.

 
 
"* * * The courts are to 
decide the question of whether a grievance or dispute arises under the terms of 
the bargaining agreement and should be arbitrated, unless the agreement clearly 
demonstrates that the question is reserved to the arbitrator. [Citation.] 
Although this court has said that arbitration is favored, it is a matter of 
contract, and a party cannot be required to submit any dispute to arbitration 
which he has not agreed to submit. [Citation.]" Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line 
Company v. Smith, Wyo., 637 P.2d 1020, 1024 
(1981).

 
 
Having decided, in this 
case, that the issue was beyond that contained in the contract, arbitration 
should not be approved.

 
 

[¶48.]  In New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company 
v. Franklin, 
160 N.J. Super. 292, 389 A.2d 980 (1978), the court not only found that the 
scope of arbitration was limited by the contract (uninsured motorist endorsement 
which provided for arbitration as to liability of uninsured motorist tortfeasor 
and quantum of damages) and did not include the issue of coverage, but it held 
that:

 
 
"* * * [M]ere 
participation in the arbitration does not conclusively bar a party from seeking 
a judicial determination of arbitrability, even as late as the time of 
claimant's application to confirm the award. * * *

 
 
"* * * If the objection 
to the arbitrator's jurisdiction is made known, participation in the merits of 
the controversy does not dictate a finding of waiver. * * *" 389 A.2d  at 
984.

 
 
Again, the case involved 
a question as to the scope of the arbitration agreement, and the jurisdiction 
was questioned, as here, before the hearing on the merits. Having found the 
issue to be beyond such scope (as is done in the first part of the majority 
opinion), the New 
Jersey court did not go on to approve the arbitration 
award (as is approved here in the second part of the majority 
opinion).

 
 

[¶49.]  In American Motorists Insurance Company v. 
Llanes, 396 Mich. 113, 240 N.W.2d 203 (1976), the court 
rendered a four-paragraph per curiam opinion in which an arbitration award was 
upheld against the claim that the issue was not within the scope of the 
agreement. The holding was founded on the fact that the issue of arbitrability 
was not raised at arbitration. Again, the question was in relation to the scope 
of arbitration, and there was a written agreement to 
arbitrate.

 
 

[¶50.]  In the other case cited by the majority 
opinion to support the statement that "[a]n agreement to arbitrate need not be 
written," Coventry Teachers' Alliance v. 
Coventry School Committee, R.I., 417 A.2d 886 (1980), the court again 
examined the written contract and written submission to determine if the 
issue was within the scope thereof. It found that it was. The court again noted 
that both parties participated in the arbitration without objection. Here, the 
majority opinion properly finds the issue not to be within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement, and that there was no written agreement to arbitrate the 
issue. Also, here, there was an objection to jurisdiction prior to the hearing. 

 
 

[¶51.]  I would reverse the trial court and 
vacate the award since there was no written agreement to arbitrate the issue and 
such fact was brought to the attention of the arbitrators before a hearing on 
the merits.

1 If they were found to 
apply, then the consideration of the late filing of the demand for arbitration 
pursuant to the terms thereof would be in order.