Title: Siliski v. Allstate Insurance Co.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Siliski v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2001-127); 174 Vt. 200; 811 A.2d 148

[Filed 15-Aug-2002]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 05-Sep-2002]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2001-127


  Joseph J. and Doreen H. Siliski	         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Rutland Superior Court


  Allstate Insurance Company,	                 January Term, 2002
  James J. Guiel, Peggy Dumont and 
  Michael Gannon

  Richard W. Norton, J.

  Ritchie E. Berger, Craig S. Nolan and Afi Ahmadi of Dinse, Knapp &
    McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

  Bret P. Powell of Powell, Orr & Bredice, P.C., Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellee Allstate Insurance Co.

  Marc B. Heath and David E. Bond of Downs Rachlin & Martin, PLLC,
    Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee Guiel.

  Thomas F. Heilmann of Heilmann, Ekman & Associates, Inc., Burlington, for 
    Defendant-Appellee Gannon.


  PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Gibson, J. (Ret.),
            Specially Assigned

        
       MORSE, J.   Plaintiffs Joseph and Doreen Siliski, individually and as
  guardians and next best friend of Chase Siliski, appeal from the superior
  court's summary judgment in favor of defendants Allstate Insurance Company,
  James Guiel, Michael Gannon and Peggy Dumont.  The Siliskis brought suit
  against defendants for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of
  emotional distress.  They did so based on a counterclaim asserted by Dumont
  in a personal injury 

 

  action by the Siliskis against her following an automobile accident
  involving Dumont and the Siliskis' son Chase, which Dumont later
  voluntarily dismissed.  They argue on appeal that the trial court not only
  erroneously determined as a matter of law that the counterclaim giving rise
  to the Siliskis' malicious prosecution claim did not terminate in the
  Siliskis' favor, but also that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
  law in their favor on this issue.  Furthermore, they argue that the trial
  court erroneously determined as a matter of law that the counterclaim,
  which the Siliskis assert also gives rise to a claim for intentional
  infliction of emotional distress, was privileged and, in the alternative,
  failed to meet the threshold of conduct so extreme and outrageous as to
  establish a prima facie case.  Defendants Allstate and Guiel have filed
  cross-appeals with regard to two discovery issues decided adversely to them
  in the event that we reverse the trial court's summary judgment.  We
  affirm. (FN1) 

       Although there were numerous filings before the trial court prior to
  its grant of summary judgment, the actual record evidence before the court
  was considerably more circumscribed and demonstrates that the following
  material facts are not in dispute: On January 2, 1995, there was an
  accident involving Peggy Dumont and Chase Siliski, who was eight years old
  at the time.  Dumont was operating an automobile, and Chase was on foot. A
  Vermont State Police report filed shortly after the accident concluded that
  the accident was caused by Chase's failure to look before crossing the
  road.  Chase suffered a broken leg and an abrasion on his head from the
  collision.  Dumont was pregnant at the time of the accident, and, two to
  three days after the accident, Dumont suffered a miscarriage.

 
          
       Chase's parents brought suit against Dumont individually and on
  Chase's behalf.  Because Dumont was insured by Allstate, Allstate provided
  Dumont with defense counsel.  The attorney hired by Allstate asserted a
  counterclaim on Dumont's behalf, which was subsequently amended.  Among
  other things, each party claimed the other had caused the accident.  More
  specifically, Dumont's amended claim alleged that as a result of the
  accident, as well as the Siliskis' allegations against her - contrary to
  Chase's statements at the time of the accident - she had suffered damages.

       The parties proceeded to engage in discovery.  Sometime after
  Allstate's attorney filed the counterclaim, Allstate's casualty claim
  manager, Frank Corso, learned of its filing.  He instructed the staff claim
  analyst handling the case, James Guiel, to tell the attorney to withdraw
  his representation with respect to the counterclaim because Allstate had
  retained him only to provide a defense and he was concerned about potential
  conflicts arising from the dual representation.  Guiel did so.
   
       The attorney was unable to find replacement counsel to take over
  Dumont's claim.  After discussing the status of the counterclaim with
  Dumont, the attorney filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim without
  prejudice.  In it, he cited the potential conflict arising from his dual
  representation and requested that the dismissal be without prejudice so
  that Dumont could file the claim at a later date should she find
  replacement counsel.  The Siliskis filed a motion in opposition, requesting
  that the dismissal be with prejudice.  They argued that Dumont had waived
  her privilege not to assert the counterclaim under V.R.C.P. 13(a)(3)
  (amended 1999) (excepting from compulsory counterclaims claims arising in
  actions covered by liability insurance which would require separate
  counsel), and thus Dumont's ability to reassert the claim would be barred
  by res judicata.  They also argued that her claim would be barred by
  collateral estoppel, citing this Court's decision in Berisha v. Hardy, 144
  Vt. 136,