Title: DHW v. John Doe

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 47534 
 
In the Interest of:  John Doe I, 
A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE, 
 
     Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE (2019-39), 
 
     Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, February 2020 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: April 16, 2020 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Shoshone County. Barbara A. Duggan, Magistrate Judge.  
 
The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Daniel K. Sheckler, Sheckler Law Office, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant 
John Doe. 
 
Denise L. Rosen, Deputy Idaho Attorney General, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent, 
State of Idaho. 
 
_____________________ 
 
STEGNER, Justice. 
 
This case arises from an appeal of the termination of a father’s right to parent his son. John 
Doe I (Child) was removed from the care of his paternal grandmother (Grandmother) and his 
father, John Doe (Father) after a referral was made to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
(the Department). The Department petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father failed to 
attend scheduled hearings, ceased communicating with the Department, and only sporadically 
contacted his attorney. Father’s counsel sought several continuances, but eventually the 
termination trial proceeded. Following trial, the magistrate court found that Father had failed to 
comply with the case plan and was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. The magistrate 
court found it was in Child’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father’s main 
 
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argument on appeal is that the magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing the Department 
to amend its petition to terminate by adding a separate, alternate basis for termination, and by 
granting only a two-week continuance to Father to respond to this alternate theory. For the reasons 
set out below, we affirm the decision of the magistrate court. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Child’s removal from home and the first year of proceedings. 
On September 23, 2017, the Department received a referral about three-year-old Child. In 
2016, Child had been placed by the Department with his paternal grandmother (Grandmother) 
pursuant to an out-of-home safety plan.1 Grandmother made the September 2017 referral because 
of her concerns that Child was exhibiting behavior involving self-injury, and because she did not 
want permanent guardianship of Child.2 Grandmother indicated that she would return Child to the 
care of his parents. Grandmother’s guardianship of Child was dissolved on October 2, 2017. 
On November 3, 2017, the Department received information that Child was now living 
with his maternal great-grandmother (Great-Grandmother). Within two weeks, the local police 
department contacted the Department, expressing concern that Child was in his mother’s (Mother) 
company while she was publicly under the influence.3 When contacted, Great-Grandmother 
reported that Mother was living with her and Child. Mother stated she had no interest in working 
with the Department. Approximately three weeks later, Great-Grandmother told the Department 
that she also could not take care of Child. She reported that Mother had “taken off with a new 
boyfriend” and that Child had been returned to Grandmother. When Grandmother was contacted, 
she admitted that Father cared for Child at night while she watched Child during the day, and 
reported that Father was in the process of being evicted from his trailer. She reiterated that she 
could not take care of Child. On December 1, 2017, the Department filed a motion seeking an 
order of removal to place Child in the Department’s custody. The magistrate court granted this 
motion, and Child was placed in shelter care. 
                                                 
1 The record does not clearly indicate why the earlier out-of-home safety plan was necessary, but at the time of the 
2017 referral, Father and Mother were not in compliance with the case plan to have Child returned to either of them. 
As of December 2017, the Department had received eight prior referrals related to the family, with three assessments 
for neglect. Although Mother and Father never married, they had been involved in a relationship for more than fifteen 
years. This relationship was described by Mother as turbulent, involving frequent incidents of domestic violence. 
2 These self-injuring behaviors included Child banging his head on the ground. This behavior was also witnessed by 
Child’s future foster parents, in which he would hurt himself by scratching his own face, hitting his head on the wall, 
and throwing himself down on the ground. This behavior would increase following visits with Mother and Father. 
3 The record does not reveal what substance Mother was under the influence of, but Mother’s self-reported substance 
of choice is methamphetamine, which she had used regularly from young adulthood. 
 
3 
The shelter care hearing was held on December 5, 2017. Father was present at this hearing. 
Father did not agree with Child being in the Department’s custody, and left the hearing while 
Grandmother testified. Grandmother repeated that she could not take care of Child. She observed 
that Child appeared very insecure when he stayed with Father, preferring the stability at 
Grandmother’s house. Grandmother characterized the relationship between Father and Mother as 
“chaotic and violent,” expressing significant concern about Father’s ability to provide a stable 
home environment because Father had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, and she did 
not know if he was taking his medications. At the close of the hearing, the magistrate court 
determined that it was in Child’s best interests to stay in the custody of the Department pending 
an adjudicatory hearing. 
The adjudicatory hearing was held on January 4, 2018, and continued to January 8, 2018. 
Father was present at this hearing. The owner of the trailer park in which Father lived testified, 
stating that Father had been formally evicted but had not yet been removed from the property. The 
trailer park owner stated he was concerned for his own safety when he interacted with Father. 
Grandmother testified again, repeating her concerns regarding Father’s ability to parent based on 
his deteriorating mental health. Father also testified at this adjudicatory hearing, stating that while 
he had several disabilities, they did not affect his ability to parent. He said that he had not seen a 
doctor for his paranoid schizophrenia in about nine months. 
At the close of the January 8, 2018, adjudicatory hearing, the magistrate court determined 
that Child lacked a stable home environment. The court observed that Mother’s substance abuse 
and Father’s untreated mental illness were issues that needed to be addressed before Child could 
be returned to either of them. Accordingly, Child was to remain in the Department’s custody. A 
case planning hearing was set for February 5, 2018, but counsel for Mother and Father did not 
receive proper notice, and the hearing had to be continued. Once again, on February 12, 2018, the 
case planning hearing was continued because neither parent had met with their respective attorneys 
regarding the proposed case plan. 
The case planning hearing was finally held on February 14, 2018. Mother and Father were 
present. The magistrate court observed that neither parent had contributed to the proposed case 
plan during the Family Group Decision-making Meeting. The case plan identified several areas of 
concern for Father, in particular Father’s (1) unstable housing situation and (2) untreated mental 
 
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illness.4 While Mother agreed to adopt the case plan, Father refused to sign the plan, arguing that 
there was no basis for requiring drug and alcohol evaluation. He did not agree to have the results 
of any psychological evaluations forwarded to the Department. He also demanded a different 
attorney. The magistrate court granted Father’s request to dismiss his appointed counsel. Father 
would then be appointed a conflict public defender in May 2018. Notwithstanding Father’s 
objections, the magistrate court adopted the case plan. 
Neither parent participated in visits with Child for the first four months that Child was in 
the custody of the Department. However, Father participated in several visits between April and 
late June 2018, during which Father lived in Grandmother’s home.5 Over the course of the three 
in-home visits, the assigned social worker (Social Worker) observed “a very sharp decline in the 
quality of the home, the consistency of the visit[s] in the home, and [Father’s] overall mental 
stability.” During the second visit, for example, Father was very distant, would not make eye 
contact with Child or with Social Worker, and began to make inappropriate comments to Child 
about the circumstances of Grandmother’s death. During the third visit, the lower level of 
Grandmother’s split-level home was entirely flooded. Again Father appeared distant and 
disengaged during the visit. At the end of the third visit, Child ran away and hid under a bed, and 
Social Worker observed Father grab Child by his legs to pull him out from underneath the bed. As 
Social Worker took Child to the car, Father began to grab all of Child’s possessions still in 
Grandmother’s home, and threw them into Social Worker’s car, making comments like, “[d]on’t 
worry, I’m going to come get you. We’re going to a new home in Elko, Nevada.” Child exhibited 
pronounced self-injury at the end of these visits, scratching his own face with his fingernails. 
Father participated in two community visits, which also deteriorated in quality. The first 
occurred in early June 2018, and was held in a local park. The second community visit occurred 
on June 29, 2018, and ended with law enforcement involvement. Father arrived late to the visit, 
and reacted in an “intimidating” manner when asked about a recent UA, which had tested positive 
                                                 
4 Father had previously been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and was the subject of several 
referrals to the Department, some of which had been made by Father himself. These included Father’s reports that 
there were lasers outside his trailer, that he was being wiretapped, and that there were holes in his trailer where 
unknown people had been “gang banging it.” Father had also called the child abuse hotline to report he had been raped 
by a member of the NSA. Father had further contacted his landlord to report that there was a woman crawling around 
and under his trailer, planting drugs. Equally of concern to the Department was a bizarre February 2018 package that 
Father had mailed to the safety assessor at the Department, including a check for one hundred thousand dollars signed 
by Father. The check was made out to “KIDNAPPERS” with the memo, “Ransom 4 [Child].” 
5 Grandmother died sometime in early 2018, although the precise date is unclear from the record. 
 
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for methamphetamine.6 When Father was informed by Social Worker that the visit would end in 
fifteen minutes, Father became “very angry and yelled obscenities” at Social Worker. Social 
Worker gave Father the fifteen minutes promised. However, when Father was told that he needed 
to have his friends pick him up, Father became furious, and despite Social Worker’s attempts to 
calm him down, became verbally and physically aggressive while trying to take Child away from 
Social Worker. Social Worker called 911 while Father continued to shout. Social Worker 
ultimately was able to buckle Child into his car seat, despite Father charging at and throwing toys 
at him. When police arrived, Father was arrested for misdemeanor battery, and subsequently spent 
time in jail. A no-contact order prohibiting contact with Social Worker was also entered against 
Father. 
B. The second year of proceedings and Father’s failure to engage with the Department, 
court proceedings, or Child. 
According to the Department, Father ceased all contact with the Department on June 29, 
2018. Although the Department tried to keep him apprised of the case plan requirements, he 
refused all visits and certified mail from the Department. He also did not visit Child after the visit 
on June 29, 2018. 
Father was present at the August 6, 2018, review hearing, during which Father’s counsel 
confirmed that he had been sharing reports from the Department with Father. However, at the 
October 15, 2018, review hearing, Father was not present; Father’s counsel stated that Father had 
not been in contact with him. Father did not appear for the November 19, 2018, permanency status 
hearing, and Father’s counsel stated that all mail to Father had been returned. At the February 4, 
2019, review hearing, Father’s counsel again stated he had not heard from Father and did not know 
why Father was not present. 
The Department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on 
February 25, 2019. By this time, Father had not been in contact with the Department or shown up 
in court for more than six months. On March 11, 2019, an affidavit of service was filed, stating 
that the Department’s petition and summons had been personally served on Father a week prior on 
March 4, 2019. However, the e-filing of this petition to terminate did not include the second page 
of the petition, and the return of service did not indicate how many pages had been served 
                                                 
6 Despite being referred on nine different occasions to produce a urine sample, this was the only test Father actually 
provided, and as noted, it was positive for methamphetamine. 
 
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on Father. 
A status hearing was held on May 13, 2019, at which Father did not appear. Father’s 
counsel stated he had not reviewed the petition with Father due to having had no contact with him. 
At this time, the termination trial was set for June 26, 2019. Father filed an answer to the petition 
to terminate on June 10, 2019; this filing was the first recognition by any party that the second 
page of the petition to terminate was missing. 
The termination trial began on June 26, 2019. Father again was absent. Father’s counsel 
stated he had received a phone call from Father a few weeks earlier, during which Father had 
provided him with a new address. However, Father did not want that address revealed, and instead 
wanted to appear telephonically at the termination trial. The magistrate court denied Father’s 
motion to make a telephonic appearance, observing that Father “ha[d] received at the outset of the 
case what his rights, responsibilities, and potential outcomes could be. [Father] was duly served, 
[and] made aware of the petition for termination.” 
Before testimony began, the Department offered several exhibits into evidence, including 
the case plan.7 The case plan was admitted without objection from Father. 
The Department put on testimony from the foster parent, who was cross-examined by both 
Mother’s and Father’s counsel. The Department then called Social Worker to testify. During the 
direct examination of Social Worker, the Department sought to ask Social Worker questions about 
the case plan, which had been previously admitted. Father’s counsel objected on the basis of 
relevance to this line of questioning, arguing that the original basis for termination was inability 
to discharge parental responsibilities, “not for failure to follow a case plan.” The magistrate court 
overruled the objection, reasoning that the case plan’s contents were “related to the ability or 
inability to discharge parental responsibilities and potentially what the [D]epartment identified as 
areas of concern.” 
During a brief recess in the termination trial, Father’s counsel received a phone call from 
Father. After the recess was over, Father’s counsel moved for a continuance because Father wanted 
to present evidence. The Department asked the magistrate court to deny it for lack of good cause. 
The magistrate court detailed how Father had not participated in the proceedings. When the court 
asked Father’s counsel for evidence or information that would support a request for a continuance, 
                                                 
7 In describing the case plan exhibit, the Department characterized it as “a copy of the case plan for the mother.” 
However, the case plan described areas of concern and tasks for both Mother and Father. 
 
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Father’s counsel stated that he could not provide any affidavit of counsel to support good cause. 
Father’s counsel nonetheless stated that Father was disabled and out of state, but wanted to testify 
that he could provide a stable home life with financial security for Child. 
The magistrate court denied this requested continuance, stating that Father had received 
notice, but had “made his choice to be absent . . . to not further assist counsel.” The court pointed 
out that Father had not maintained contact with the Department for nearly a year. Accordingly, the 
magistrate court found Father had failed to establish good cause to continue the trial. 
The Department’s examination of Social Worker proceeded. Father’s counsel also cross-
examined Social Worker. After redirect examination, the Department indicated that it had no 
further witnesses. However, the Department then moved to amend its petition for termination, 
specifically to add an additional, separate basis to terminate as a result of Father’s purported failure 
to comply with the case plan. The Department’s counsel argued that “the evidence provided today 
supports that amendment. There is not prejudice from the State’s position for the  
defendant. . . . He’s not been a participant. He is fully aware that there was a case plan that he was 
to comply with and he did not.” 
Father’s counsel opposed the amendment, arguing that he had “received a petition that 
sought termination of his parental rights on very narrow, specific grounds being failure to 
adequately parent.” He contended that the Department’s argument was “speculative” because it 
did not include any evidence about Father in the prior year. Father’s counsel also maintained that 
if the amendment were permitted, a continuance should be permitted to allow Father to respond. 
 
The magistrate court pointed out that I.R.C.P. 15(b)(1) states that a court should freely 
permit an amendment. In discussing prejudice to Father’s case, the court pointed out that the case 
plan had been admitted by stipulation at the beginning of the termination trial,8 and that Father had 
been given full opportunity to engage in the case plan, but had chosen not to do so. Further, 
Father’s counsel had been given full opportunity to cross-examine Social Worker about the case 
plan. 
 
At this point, a brief recess was allowed during which the magistrate court reviewed the 
petition for termination. The magistrate court only then became aware of the missing page in the 
petition for termination. The magistrate court then granted the Department’s motion to amend the 
                                                 
8 Although the magistrate court referred to the case plan as having been admitted by stipulation, it was admitted 
without objection. 
 
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petition, but also granted another continuance because there was no evidence as to how many pages 
had been delivered to Father. The magistrate court granted the continuance for two weeks, asking 
Father’s counsel if that was sufficient. When Father’s counsel expressed concern about having 
enough time to provide notice to Father, the court noted that Father’s counsel had Father’s physical 
address and could have him personally served, followed by certified mail, “[s]o you give your 
client the complete amount of time available to him.” Father’s counsel agreed, and the court 
authorized expenditure for a courier service to serve Father. The continuation of the trial was 
scheduled to resume July 10, 2019, two weeks later. The court admonished Father’s counsel that 
this date was “a hard date for [Father] to appear.” 
 
On July 10, 2019, the termination trial continued. Father was again not present. Father’s 
counsel explained that he had mailed Father notice, spoken with Father on the phone, and discussed 
the contents of the amended petition with him. However, Father had ceased communication shortly 
after their phone call. Father’s counsel moved for a continuance, arguing that under Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a continuance would give Father more opportunity to contest the 
evidence against him. 
The magistrate court denied this motion. The magistrate court first observed that the matter 
had been pending for 586 days, noting that while the administrative burden was low in continuing, 
the interest of the government in providing “security, safety, stability, . . . long-term ability for the 
best interest of the child to be served” was very high. 
Father’s counsel had no witnesses or evidence to submit. After the Department rested, 
Father argued in closing that the evidence relied on by the Department was “somewhat 
speculative” regarding Father’s ability to discharge his responsibilities: “There just hasn’t been 
enough contact with him to prove that beyond clear and convincing evidence.” The matter was 
then submitted to the court. 
C. The magistrate court’s decision and termination of Father’s right to parent Child. 
On October 21, 2019, the magistrate court entered its findings of facts, conclusions of law, 
and memorandum decision. The magistrate court identified the two grounds for termination as (1) 
Father’s inability to discharge parental responsibilities, and (2) Father’s failure to comply with the 
case plan. The magistrate court then detailed the evidence presented as to Father’s lack of 
compliance with the case plan. Relying on the testimony of Social Worker and the case plan, the 
magistrate court identified the areas in which Father had failed to comply with the case plan: (1) 
 
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failure to establish stable housing; (2) failure to address his untreated mental illness; (3) failure to 
comply with the law; and (4) failure to abstain from use of illegal substances. 
The magistrate court found that Father had failed to sufficiently comply with the case plan. 
The court found that Father had provided no information about his housing status, and had not 
shown that he had obtained a psychological evaluation or was receiving treatment for his 
previously diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia. The court also detailed Father’s visits with Child, 
observing that Father had not been involved with Child’s medical or well-being appointments. The 
court found that Father had not substantially complied with the task requiring him to comply with 
local, state, and federal law, noting that Father had over forty criminal cases, eleven active 
warrants, and seven protection orders issued against him. The court also found that Father’s failure 
to perform random drug tests, except for one which was positive for methamphetamine, was failure 
to substantially comply with the case plan. The court concluded that “[i]t would be completely 
unsafe to the child to return to [Father].” 
 
The magistrate court also found that the Department established neglect under the 
definition in Idaho Code section 16-1602(31). See I.C. § 16-1602(31)(b) (defining a “neglected” 
child as one “[w]hose parents . . . are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child 
and, as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety 
or well-being”). The magistrate court found that Father was unable to discharge his parental 
responsibilities by clear and convincing evidence, and that Father’s “inability to parent will 
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate time.” The magistrate court observed that Father had not 
visited Child for over a year, and had engaged in distressing behavior during his last visit. 
There is no indication of regular gainful employment and there is nothing in the 
record that supports him addressing his own mental health issues. [Father’s] 
criminal record and unwillingness to address his pending warrants is not irrelevant 
to his parenting. His criminal record is a component of his character, and is 
predictive of how he will behave in the future. . . . [Father] has not demonstrated 
he can be a stable caretaker for [Child]. [Father] has not worked with the 
Department to address concerns with substance use nor his mental health. 
The magistrate court then found that it was in Child’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental 
rights. 
 
Father timely appealed. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“[T]his Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend the 
 
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pleadings for an abuse of discretion.” Zeyen v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist. No. 25, 165 Idaho 
690, 694, 451 P.3d 25, 29 (2019) (citation omitted). Likewise, “[a] trial court’s decision to grant 
or deny a continuance will not be overturned unless the decision was an abuse of discretion.” In 
Interest of Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 146, 426 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2018) (citing Estate of Ekic 
v. Geico Indem. Co., 163 Idaho 895, 897, 422 P.3d 1101, 1103 (2018)). 
Whether a trial court has abused its discretion is an inquiry into “whether the trial judge: 
(1) [c]orrectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 
163 Idaho 856, 867, 421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018). 
On appeal, this Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s decision to terminate 
parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support 
the decision. Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court is required to conduct 
an independent review of the magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgment because the magistrate court 
has the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to 
detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the parties. 
In re Doe I, 165 Idaho 33, 39, 437 P.3d 33, 39 (2019) (quoting Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare 
v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 41, 244 P.3d 180, 185 (2010)). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Department to 
amend its petition to terminate. 
The Department’s original petition was e-filed; however, the electronic document did not 
contain the second page of the petition. Consequently, this page is also missing from the record on 
appeal. However, the third page—which was present in the e-filing—contained the following 
grounds for removal: 
a. The parents are unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability 
will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period and will be injurious to the 
health, morals or well-being of the child and/or; 
b. Termination is in the best interest of the child[.] 
At the June 26, 2019, termination trial, after the Department examined its last witness, it 
also moved to amend its petition 
to include a grounds for termination – actually the neglect by failing to comply with 
the case plan, which is subsection 16-2002(3)(b) at this point. It’s – the evidence 
 
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provided today supports that amendment. There is not prejudice from the State’s 
position for the defendant. He has filed an unverified answer. He’s not been a 
participant. He is fully aware that there was a case plan that he was to comply with 
and he did not. 
Over objection by Father’s counsel, the magistrate court granted the motion to amend. The 
magistrate court also allowed a two-week continuance. 
 
On appeal, Father’s counsel argues that the language of the petition “was inadequate to 
give Father notice that he was on trial for failure to follow the case plan.” Father argues that it was 
an abuse of discretion for the magistrate court to allow the petition to be amended “when the issue 
was not tried by the express or implied consent of the [F]ather, and when Father’s defense on the 
merits was prejudiced” by the decision. Father argues that the amendment did not help the 
Department prove the original basis for termination—Father’s inability to discharge his parental 
responsibilities. Father also argues that he was prejudiced because he was unprepared to litigate 
the additional basis for termination, i.e., that he was unable to conduct discovery, investigate, or 
subpoena witnesses. 
The Department argues that the magistrate court properly permitted the amendment under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(1). First, the Department argues that Rule 15(b)(1) properly 
applied because Father had objected to admission of evidence—the case plan—on the basis that it 
was irrelevant to the originally pleaded grounds for termination.9 Second, the Department further 
argues that the magistrate court correctly concluded that Father had not established prejudice to 
his case, quoting the magistrate’s court’s lengthy reasoning. 
In response, Father contends—without providing any authority—that “[a] motion to amend 
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(b)(1) may only be made when doing so will aid in the 
presentation of the merits of a theory previously plead, albeit inadequately plead.” Because “the 
merits were the original claim that Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities[,]” 
Father argues that “an entirely new theory” could not be added by amendment under Rule 15(b)(1). 
Alternatively, Father contends that the magistrate court did not exercise reason in its analysis of 
prejudice under Rule 15(b)(1). Father asserts that the magistrate court should have evaluated 
                                                 
9 As noted above, the case plan was originally admitted without objection; however, when the Department sought to 
examine Social Worker during the termination trial, Father’s counsel objected to use of the case plan in this manner 
as irrelevant to the original grounds for termination as to Father’s rights. Accordingly, on appeal the Department’s 
argument focuses on Father’s objection to the evidence as the trigger for a Rule 15(b)(1) motion to amend the petition 
to terminate.  
 
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Father’s “inability to prepare and present evidence on a new theory on such short notice—not the 
likelihood of how the evidence will be weighed by the [magistrate court].” 
 
Rule 29 of the Idaho Juvenile Rules states that “[t]he Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
apply to C.P.A. proceedings to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules, statutes, 
or the law.” I.J.R. 29. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides for the amendment of pleadings 
during and after trial. See I.R.C.P. 15(b). A pleading may be amended based on an objection at 
trial if “a party objects that evidence is not within the issues raised in the pleadings[.]” I.R.C.P. 
15(b)(1). Amendment should be freely permitted “when doing so will aid in presenting the merits 
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence would prejudice that party’s 
action or defense on the merits.” Id. However, where “an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried 
by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the 
pleadings.” I.R.C.P. 15(b)(2). In that instance, “[a] party may move, at any time, even after 
judgment, to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue. 
But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue.” Id. These are two separate 
factual scenarios: one is triggered by a party’s objection at trial, while the other requires a trial 
court to find that the issue has been tried by the parties’ express or implied consent. See generally 
I.R.C.P. 15(b). 
 
Father’s argument that an amendment under Rule 15(b) must “aid in the presentation of 
the merits of a theory previously plead, albeit inadequately plead[,]” is unconvincing. As early as 
1970 we held that “I.R.C.P. 15(b) does not bar amendments which change the cause of action or 
theory of the case.” Cameron Sales, Inc. v. Klemish, 93 Idaho 451, 455, 463 P.2d 287, 291 (1970). 
The extent to which we examine the differences between what has been pleaded and what has not 
is limited to the prejudice inquiry; for example, we held that Rule 15(b) permitted the addition of 
a claim for a prescriptive easement to a claim of adverse possession, reasoning that the “unpleaded 
theory relie[d] on less evidence than [the] pleaded theory and result[ed] in less relief to the moving 
party.” Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 484, 129 P.3d 1223, 1233 (2006). 
Further, given our liberal notice pleading standard, it does not make sense to limit Rule 
15(b) amendments to only those narrow instances where addition of an unpleaded issue will assist 
in litigating the merits of a previously pleaded issue. “The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases 
to be decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements.” Id. at 483, 129 P.3d 
at 1232 (citation omitted); see also Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807, 229 P.3d 1164, 
 
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1169 (2010) (citation omitted) (“The technical rules of pleading have long been abandoned in 
Idaho[.]”). Were we to follow Father’s view, we would dramatically reduce the effectiveness of 
Rule 15(b). Accordingly, we reject Father’s argument that an amendment to the petition should 
only be permitted if the amendment were associated with a theory that had been originally pleaded. 
Such a holding would eviscerate the ability to amend a pleading. 
 
Neither are we convinced that the magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing the 
petition to terminate to be amended. The magistrate court recognized it had discretion in the matter. 
The magistrate court acted within the boundaries of its discretion, identifying the legal standards 
it was constrained by when it identified the governing rule as I.R.C.P. 15(b)(1). The court acted 
consistently within the boundaries of its discretion, in particular the guidance of I.R.C.P. 15(b)(1) 
that it “should freely permit an amendment[,]” while also granting a continuance to allow Father 
to meet that evidence. See I.R.C.P. 15(b)(1). 
The magistrate court also applied reason when it found that allowing the case plan evidence 
would not prejudice Father’s action or defense. The court reasoned that the case plan had been 
previously admitted and Father’s counsel had had a full opportunity to question the case plan and 
Father’s compliance with it. The magistrate court pointed out that Father had refused to engage in 
planning or complying with the case plan, observing that Father’s counsel had been “placed in a 
unique position by [his] client’s failure to engage[.]” Nonetheless, the magistrate court concluded 
that the case plan was reasonable and that Father failed to establish prejudice. Even on appeal, 
Father’s counsel has failed to identify prejudice other than in the abstract. The magistrate court did 
not abuse its discretion in its decision. It follows that the evidence Father could have presented to 
challenge the second basis for parental termination (neglect through failure to follow the case plan) 
would have been the same as evidence that Father presented to challenge the first basis (inability 
to discharge parental responsibilities). Father had every opportunity to participate in and craft the 
case plan, and Father’s counsel had every opportunity to cross-examine Social Worker to establish 
whether Father had complied with it. In essence, Father’s position is that the magistrate court 
should somehow blind itself to Father’s lack of engagement in this process. To reject the 
amendment would not result in a decision on the merits. See I.R.C.P. 15(b)(1). Accordingly, we 
affirm the magistrate court’s decision permitting the petition for termination to be amended. 
B. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s second request 
for a continuance to respond to the amended petition. 
After permitting the Department to amend its petition to terminate, the magistrate court 
 
14 
also granted a continuance for two weeks so that Father could respond to the evidence against him. 
When asked if this was sufficient, Father’s counsel equivocated: 
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I will – I will send notice to my 
client. I would anticipate that there would be seven days for mailing. I will make 
effort to contact him by telephone although – 
THE COURT: You have his physical address. You can have him served by 
a process server in a much shorter period of time, and you can follow that up with 
a certified mail service. 
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: I certainly will. 
THE COURT: So you give your client the complete amount of time 
available to him. 
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: That makes sense, your Honor. Thank you for 
the suggestion. 
Further, the magistrate court authorized Shoshone County to pay for a courier service. Father did 
not raise any additional concerns that two weeks was insufficient to respond to the additional 
ground for termination in the amended petition. The magistrate court stated unequivocally that 
Father should be present, and that if Father appeared and there was a need for additional time for 
Father to present evidence, the court would make that time available. 
 
At the subsequent termination proceeding, on July 10, 2019, Father failed to appear. 
Father’s counsel stated that he had been in contact with Father for a few days after the June hearing, 
but had lost contact in the preceding week. Father’s counsel stated, however, that Father had 
“wanted as much time as he could have to respond to these allegations.” Father’s counsel asked 
for a continuance, arguing that due process would be violated were it not granted. The magistrate 
court denied this motion, acknowledging first that the right to a parent-child relationship is a 
fundamental right. The magistrate court also recognized that it would be a small burden on the 
Department to continue the hearing, but pointed out that the Department also had an interest in 
adjudicating the case in Child’s best interests. The magistrate court rhetorically asked how long 
the case should be extended to see if Father would appear. The magistrate court then denied the 
motion to continue. 
 
On appeal, Father argues that the length of time given for the first continuance—two 
weeks—was insufficient. Father argues that because the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
for twenty-one days for a party to respond to a pleading, that the fourteen days allowed were 
insufficient because they did not give Father reasonable opportunity to investigate, conduct 
discovery on the new issue, and to marshal evidence. Father further argues that because the denial 
of the continuance prejudiced his substantial rights, this Court should reverse the magistrate court. 
 
15 
 
The Department counters that Father and his counsel were informed of what would occur 
if Father did not appear. The Department asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
because it recognized its discretion, acted within the boundaries of its discretion, and provided a 
well-reasoned analysis in weighing the options. In response, Father asserts that conditioning the 
continuance on Father’s physical presence did not show an exercise of reason, and consequently 
reflected an abuse of discretion. 
 
“The decision whether to grant a motion to continue trial is within a trial court’s sound 
discretion.” In re Doe (2016-31), 161 Idaho 393, 397, 386 P.3d 916, 920 (2016) (citation omitted). 
“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to 
violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, 
particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” State v. 
Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 448, 511 P.2d 263, 265 (1973) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 
575, 589 (1964)). 
 
As a preliminary matter, the magistrate court granted Father’s first motion to continue. 
Father did not sufficiently object to the length of the continuance granted, and provided no reason 
to the magistrate court as to why two weeks would be inadequate. “[B]oth the issue and the party’s 
position on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.” 
See State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). Accordingly, Father has not 
preserved his challenge to the length of time afforded after his first requested continuance. 
As to Father’s second motion to continue at the subsequent termination trial, the magistrate 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion to continue. The magistrate court 
recognized its discretion in deciding whether to grant a continuance. The magistrate court also 
addressed Father’s due process arguments, addressing the relevant factors identified in Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), before concluding that due process did not require a continuance. 
The magistrate court also pointed out that Father had placed his own counsel in the position of 
arguing for a continuance without indicating why the continuance would be necessary. Given the 
record before the magistrate court, Father’s refusal to communicate with the Department, his 
failure to appear at the various hearings, and the unsupported reasons Father provided for a 
continuance, we cannot say that the magistrate court abused its discretion.10 Accordingly, the 
                                                 
10 We are unpersuaded by Father’s argument that the magistrate court “conditioned” granting a continuance on Father’s 
presence at the hearing. The length of the July 10, 2019, hearing was explicitly predicated upon how much evidence 
 
16 
magistrate court’s decision to deny Father’s second motion to continue was not an abuse of 
discretion, and we affirm. 
C. Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s decision 
terminating Father’s parental rights on the basis that Father was unable to discharge 
his parental responsibilities. 
Following the trial, the magistrate court issued a lengthy memorandum decision with 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order terminating Father’s parental rights. In it, the 
magistrate court held that both grounds for termination had been established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
 On appeal, Father challenges the magistrate court’s finding that Father was unable to 
discharge his parental responsibilities. Father argues that it was speculative to conclude anything 
about Father’s present abilities to discharge his parental duties based on outdated information. In 
response, the Department points to Social Worker’s testimony, arguing that the evidence available 
that Father had neglected his son was essentially uncontradicted. Father counters, arguing that 
substantial evidence does not support the magistrate court’s decision because the evidence “was 
so stale.” Father argues that the only available evidence was from 2018, “only giv[ing] a mere 
suspicion of [Father’s] inability to discharge parental responsibilities at the time of the 2019 
hearing.” 
“Termination is only appropriate if an enumerated ground for termination exists and 
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho 103, 110, 320 P.3d 
1262, 1269 (2014) (citation omitted); see also I.C. § 16–2005(1). One such enumerated ground is 
the inability of a parent to discharge his parental responsibilities when “such inability will continue 
for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of 
the child.” I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). 
It is well established that appellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh evidence. See, 
e.g., State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 388, 146 P.3d 649, 654 (2006). Instead, we defer 
to the trial court’s unique ability to “accurately weigh the evidence and judge the 
demeanor of the witnesses” and take into account the trial court’s “superior view 
of the entire situation.” [Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 809, 992 P.2d 1205, 1209 
(1999)] (citations omitted). Moreover, magistrate courts have “broad discretion in 
                                                 
Father’s counsel had to present for his case. Further, the magistrate court clearly set out contingencies in the event 
more time was needed in order for Father to present evidence. What Father needed to establish prejudice in his case 
was evidence, and Father did not assist his counsel in procuring or presenting any. Accordingly, Father’s counsel 
submitted no showing of what could have been presented if given more time. Father’s counsel has made no showing 
as to what evidence Father was prevented from presenting as a result of the magistrate court’s scheduling of this 
matter. Father’s claims of prejudice are unsubstantiated. 
 
17 
determining whether evidence is or is not too remote” to be relevant to a termination 
action. In re Dayley, 112 Idaho 522, 525, 733 P.2d 743, 746 (1987). 
State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). 
 
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s determination that 
Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. First, although the circumstances for 
Child’s original removal from Mother and Father are unclear from the record, Child had already 
been placed with Grandmother pursuant to an out-of-home safety plan when the referral giving 
rise to this case was made. Grandmother’s primary concern in this September 2017 referral was 
that it would not be safe to put Child in Father’s care, given his impending eviction and mental 
instability. Father was referred for drug testing nine times, and only performed one such urinalysis, 
during which he tested positive for use of methamphetamine. Despite acknowledging his diagnosis 
of paranoid schizophrenia, Father never established that he was receiving treatment or taking 
medication to control it. Following Father’s eviction from his housing, his only consistent housing 
was at Grandmother’s house following her death, and the quality of this home environment 
declined dramatically over the three months he lived there. Father only engaged with the 
Department for visitation for a period of three months, during which the quality of his visits were 
observed to sharply deteriorate. Ultimately, Father was incarcerated as a result of a criminal assault 
on Social Worker during a visitation with Child. After this incarceration, Father refused to contact 
the Department or cooperate in Child’s case in any way. Except for when Father was jailed, he 
could not establish where he was, what he was doing, or that he had any means of providing for 
himself, much less for Child. Father also had multiple active warrants out for his arrest, evidence 
that Father’s stints in jail and run-ins with the legal system were likely to continue at least for some 
extended time. 
 
Although Father complains on appeal that the evidence relied on by the magistrate court 
was too distant in the past to support the court’s decision, we disagree for multiple reasons. First, 
we defer to a magistrate court’s decision about what evidence is “too remote.” Doe, 144 Idaho at 
842, 172 P.3d at 1117. The “remoteness” of evidence speaks to the weight of evidence, not its 
relevance. See id. We do not reweigh evidence on appeal. In re Dayley, 112 Idaho at 525, 733 P.2d 
at 746. Second, “[s]ubstantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Matter of Doe I, 165 Idaho at 39, 437 P.3d at 39 
(quotation omitted). A reasonable mind would accept the available evidence to support the 
conclusion that Father’s rapid decline between April and June 2018 showed his inability to 
 
18 
discharge his parental responsibilities. Third, the bare minimum for discharging parental 
responsibilities is presence in a child’s life. After June 29, 2018, Father effectively removed 
himself from Child’s life. He did not appear for a year’s worth of hearings, demonstrating that he 
did not have Child’s best interest as a main priority. See In re Doe (2014-17), 157 Idaho 694, 703, 
339 P.3d 755, 764 (2014). He did not stay in contact with his counsel over long stretches of time. 
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s decision that Father was 
unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate court’s 
order terminating Father’s parental rights. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, BEVAN and MOELLER CONCUR.