Title: State v. John R. Maloney

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 15 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2180 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
John R. Maloney,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 141 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 N.W.2d 620 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2005 and February 10, 2006 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2005 and November 9, 2005 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Peter Naze   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Lew A. Wasserman and Kies & Wasserman, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Lew A. Wasserman. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2180  
(L.C. No. 
98CF693) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John R. Maloney, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 10, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   John Maloney ("Maloney"), 
the petitioner, originally sought review of a decision by the 
court of appeals affirming a circuit court order denying his 
motion for postconviction relief.1  In his postconviction appeal 
and initial review before this court, he contended that he was 
afforded ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  We rejected 
Maloney's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but 
                                                 
1 State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, 275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 
N.W.2d 620 (affirming an order of the circuit court for Brown 
County, Peter J. Naze, Judge). 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
2 
 
retained jurisdiction to determine "[w]hether this court has 
authority to remand to the circuit court for a motion for post-
conviction relief based upon the interest of justice," and, 
"[i]f so, whether this court should act upon that authority and 
remand" this case for that purpose.  State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 
74, ¶¶2-3, 45-46, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 398 N.W.2d 583 ("Maloney I"). 
¶2 
We conclude that this court has the authority to use 
its power of discretionary reversal to remand to the circuit 
court for a motion for postconviction relief in the interest of 
justice, notwithstanding the fact that the argument was raised 
by this court sua sponte.  However, because Maloney's brief and 
oral argument failed to allege sufficient material facts, and no 
such facts currently exist within the record, to warrant a 
remand for an evidentiary hearing in the interest of justice, we 
conclude that Maloney is not entitled to relief on the basis of 
this record. 
I 
¶3 
We discussed the facts of Maloney's case in Maloney I, 
281 Wis. 2d 595, ¶¶4-13.  We summarize only the facts that are 
relevant to this review. 
¶4 
John 
Maloney, the 
defendant, and 
Sandra Maloney 
("Sandra") were married in 1978.  In 1997, John moved out of the 
family's home and filed for divorce.  Sandra's body was found on 
her living room couch on February 11, 1998.  According to the 
Green Bay medical examiner, her death was caused by the 
combination of blunt force trauma to the back of her head, 
strangulation, and suffocation.  The couch, along with Sandra's 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
3 
 
body, had been set on fire.  Preliminary reports from the Green 
Bay Fire Department and the Brown County Arson Task Force 
labeled the fire an accident, although the fire was ultimately 
deemed arson.  The investigators concluded that Sandra's death 
was a homicide.  John Maloney became a suspect.   
¶5 
Because Maloney was a police officer with the Green 
Bay Police Department, Brown County District Attorney John P. 
Zakowski recused himself from the investigation.  Joseph Paulus, 
then-District 
Attorney 
for 
Winnebago 
County, 
and 
Vincent 
Biskupic, then-District Attorney for Outagamie County, were 
appointed as Special Prosecutors.   
¶6 
Throughout the course of the investigation, Tracy 
Hellenbrand, who was dating Maloney at the time of Sandra's 
death, 
cooperated 
with 
the 
authorities 
by 
recording 
conversations with Maloney.  Conversations that took place in 
Las Vegas between Maloney and Hellenbrand were videotaped, under 
supervision of Wisconsin authorities, with Hellenbrand's consent 
and 
cooperation. 
 
These 
recordings 
contained 
inculpatory 
statements by Maloney regarding the death of Sandra. 
¶7 
Based on the videotaped conversations in Las Vegas, 
Maloney was arrested and charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide, arson, and mutilation of a corpse, all in connection 
with Sandra's homicide.   
¶8 
At trial, the State relied heavily on the recordings 
of the conversations between Maloney and Hellenbrand in Las 
Vegas to demonstrate Maloney's guilt.  Maloney attempted to 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
4 
 
challenge 
the 
admissibility 
of 
the 
videotapes 
but 
was 
unsuccessful.   
¶9 
Maloney maintained his innocence throughout the trial 
and asserted that Hellenbrand was responsible for the murder.  
The jury convicted Maloney of all three charges.  Maloney 
appealed, renewing his challenge to the admissibility of the 
videotapes.  The court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Maloney, 
No. 1999AP3069-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 
2000).   
¶10 Maloney then filed a motion for postconviction relief 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (1997-98).2  In his postconviction 
motion, Maloney claimed he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel.  The circuit court denied Maloney's motion.  The court 
of appeals affirmed.  State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, 275 
Wis. 2d 557, 685 N.W.2d 620.  We accepted review.   
¶11 Shortly before we heard oral arguments for Maloney I, 
the Wisconsin Department of Justice informed this court that the 
CBS news program "48 Hours" devoted a segment of its March 26, 
2005, show to the investigation and prosecution of Maloney by 
Joseph Paulus, and attached a transcript of the program.  
Maloney did not object to the court receiving the transcripts.  
The transcripts of this television show discussed that in 2004, 
Joseph Paulus, the former District Attorney of Winnebago County 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
5 
 
and Special Prosecutor in Maloney's case, had been convicted of 
misconduct while in office.3 
¶12 In Maloney I, 281 Wis. 2d 595, ¶45, we concluded that 
Maloney had failed to carry the burden of demonstrating 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Despite this conclusion, two 
questions were raised sua sponte by this court following oral 
argument: 1) "[w]hether this court has authority to remand to 
the circuit court for a motion for post-conviction relief based 
upon the interest of justice" even though no party had raised or 
made this argument; and 2) "whether this court should act upon 
that authority and remand" for that purpose.  Id., ¶¶3, 46.  We 
retained jurisdiction to address these two questions.  We now 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
II 
¶13 We begin by examining whether this court has the 
authority to remand the case to the trial court for a motion for 
postconviction relief based upon the interest of justice, and, 
if so, whether the court's authority is adversely affected 
because this court, not the parties, raised the argument sua 
sponte.     
¶14 There is no question that this court has both inherent 
power and explicit statutory authority to reverse a conviction 
in the interest of justice "if it appears from the record that 
                                                 
3 According to the written Factual Basis For Plea, Paulus 
accepted bribes totaling more than $48,000 over the course of 
two years, from June 1998 to June 2000, in connection with 22 
cases that he prosecuted as district attorney.  See United 
States v. Paulus, 331 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 (E.D. Wis. 2004).   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
6 
 
the real controversy has not been fully tried," or if there has 
been a miscarriage of justice.4  Wis. Stat. § 751.06.5  See also 
                                                 
4 This court has concluded that the two prongs are 
distinctive.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 456 
N.W.2d 797 (1990).  "[A] new trial may be ordered on either of 
two grounds: (1) whenever the real controversy has not been 
fully tried or (2) whenever it is probable that justice has for 
any reason been miscarried."  Id. (citation omitted). 
Under the first prong of the "interest of justice" 
analysis, the real controversy has not been tried if the jury 
was not given the opportunity to hear and examine evidence that 
bears on a significant issue in the case, even if this occurred 
because the evidence or testimony did not exist at the time of 
trial.  State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160-61, 549 N.W.2d 435 
(1996) (citations omitted).   
In order to grant a discretionary reversal because "it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried," the second 
prong, there must be a substantial probability of a different 
result on retrial.  State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 401, 
424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) (citing State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 
741, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985)).  See also State v. D'Acquisto, 124 
Wis. 2d 758, 765, 370 N.W.2d 781 (1985) (quoting Lock v. State, 
31 Wis. 2d 110, 118, 142 N.W.2d 183 (1966)).  As such, the 
defendant must meet a higher threshold in order for this court 
to grant a new trial under the second prong.   
5 The statute reads, in full: 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice.  
Wis. Stat. § 751.06.   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
7 
 
State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶113, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 
N.W.2d 98; 
State 
v. 
Hicks, 
202 
Wis. 2d 150, 
159-60, 
549 
N.W.2d 435 (1996); Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 17-20, 456 
N.W.2d 797 (1990).  This court has recently reaffirmed that our 
inherent power to reverse in the interest of justice is not 
limited to a direct appeal.  Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶110. 
¶15 The State acknowledges that this court has the 
authority, in aid of its jurisdiction, to remand cases to the 
circuit court for fact-finding hearings.  See, e.g., State v. 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 213-14, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997); State 
v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1, 31-32, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990).      
See also Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 108, 293 N.W.2d 
155 (1980) ("When an appellate court is confronted with 
inadequate findings and the evidence respecting material facts 
is in dispute, the only appropriate course for the court is to 
remand the cause 
to the 
trial court 
for 
the 
necessary 
findings.") (citation omitted).  The State thus concedes that it 
appears that this court has the authority to retain jurisdiction 
and remand this matter to the circuit court, even in a 
collateral proceeding, for a motion for postconviction relief 
based upon the interest of justice, should Maloney file such a 
motion.  We agree with the State that we possess the authority 
to remand this matter to the circuit court for a motion for 
postconviction relief based upon the interest of justice.   
¶16 We also conclude that a defendant's failure to assert 
that the court should exercise its authority to remand the case 
is not a procedural bar to the defendant if the defendant is 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
8 
 
entitled to relief.  Wisconsin law expressly allows this court 
to reverse a conviction "regardless of whether the proper motion 
or objection appears in the record."  Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  In 
evaluating whether a case should be retried in the interest of 
justice, 
this 
court 
"consider[s] 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances" to "determine whether a new trial is required to 
accomplish the ends of justice."  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160 
(citing State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 735-36, 370 N.W.2d 745 
(1985)).  Because we have the authority to reverse a conviction 
and order a new trial even when the defendant fails to request 
this action, we conclude that we similarly have the authority to 
use our power of discretionary reversal to remand to the circuit 
court for a motion for postconviction relief in the interest of 
justice, notwithstanding the fact that the argument was raised 
by this court sua sponte. 
III 
¶17 Concluding that we have the authority to remand a case 
to the circuit court for a postconviction motion in the interest 
of justice, we examine whether we should do so in this case.   
¶18 We are reluctant "to grant a new trial in the interest 
of justice upon our own motion."  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 161 
(citing Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 651, 655, 245 N.W.2d 654 
(1976)).  See also Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114 (citing 
Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶87, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 
N.W.2d 659).  We exercise our discretionary authority only in 
exceptional cases.  Id.  In order for this court to remand a 
case, an appellant must allege sufficient material facts that, 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
9 
 
if true, would entitle him or her to relief.  See, e.g., State 
v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶¶2, 42, 56, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 
N.W.2d 62; State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 309-10, 548 
N.W.2d 50 
(1996). 
 
"[I]f 
the 
defendant 
fails 
to 
allege 
sufficient facts [] to raise a question of fact, or presents 
only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief," then 
the circuit court may deny the motion without a hearing, thereby 
rendering a remand unnecessary.  See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 
309-10 (quoting Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 
N.W.2d 629 (1972)) (other citations omitted).    
¶19 We note that Maloney's postconviction motion did not 
allege that he was entitled to a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  This court raised the issue because of materials that 
had been submitted to it prior to the first oral argument in the 
case.  Thus, he has failed to allege any, much less sufficient, 
facts to raise a question of fact implicating the interest of 
justice before either the trial court or this court.   
¶20 Nevertheless, issues raised prior to and during the 
first oral argument in Maloney I prompted this court to ask the 
parties to brief: 
(1) Whether this court has authority to remand to the 
circuit court for a motion for post-conviction relief 
based upon the interest of justice.  
(2) If so, whether this court should act upon that 
authority and remand as described above. 
Maloney I, 281 Wis. 2d 595, ¶¶3, 46.   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
10 
 
¶21 In his response to our request, Maloney suggests that 
he is entitled to relief in the interest of justice because the 
jury was precluded from evaluating critical evidence: former 
Winnebago County District Attorney Joseph Paulus, who was the 
Special Prosecutor in this case, accepted bribes in 22 cases in 
exchange for giving defendants more favorable treatment.  As 
noted above, Paulus was convicted of misconduct in his capacity 
as District Attorney in 2004.  United States v. Paulus, 331 
F. Supp. 2d 727 (E.D. Wis. 2004).  Paulus admitted accepting 
bribes in cases involving misdemeanor and traffic charges, and 
one felony charge.  Id. at 729-30.  According to the federal 
district court, "[a]ll of the bribes were received from a single 
attorney who had agreed to pay one-half of his retainer to 
Paulus in return for the favorable treatment of his clients."  
Id. at 730.  His behavior was characterized by the federal court 
as "systematic or pervasive corruption . . . striking at the 
heart of the system of justice we have in this country."  Id. at 
735. 
¶22 What Maloney has failed to establish, however, is how 
Paulus's misconduct had any impact on his trial.  Paulus's 
corruption is only relevant if it affected the presentation of 
evidence, or lack thereof, during Maloney's trial.     
A 
¶23 Maloney alleges that Paulus was not only accepting 
bribes in the 22 cases for which he was convicted, he alleges 
that Paulus also unlawfully tampered with evidence during his 
prosecution of Maloney.  Maloney asserts that his attorney's 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
11 
 
strategic decision to argue that Tracy Hellenbrand was the 
actual perpetrator of the crimes against Sandra, and the 
decision not to argue that Sandra's death was an accident, was 
driven by Paulus's manipulation of the evidence.  Maloney 
contends that Paulus's actions prejudiced the defense in 
preparation for trial by manipulating the reporting of the cause 
of death and by tampering with other evidence, and that Paulus's 
actions now raise significant questions regarding: 1) the 
reliability of the Las Vegas videotapes shown to the jury; 2) 
the reliability of the experts' conclusions that Sandra's death 
was a homicide and that the fire was caused by arson; and 3) the 
reliability of the medical examiner's conclusions as to the 
cause of Sandra Maloney's death.   
¶24 First, 
Maloney 
implies 
that 
Paulus 
strategically 
edited the videotapes of Maloney and Hellenbrand’s conversations 
in Las Vegas, altering the tapes to implicate Maloney in the 
death of Sandra.6  Maloney relies on affidavits of Jeanne Anthony 
Brant, a news reporter for WHBY radio in Appleton who, in March 
2004, examined numerous records relating to Maloney's case.7  In 
her affidavits, Brant alleges that the State and Forensic Video 
disagree with regard to the editing of the videotapes.  Brant's 
affidavits note that Bryan Del Monte, the employee of Forensic 
Video who was paid to assist in the editing of the Las Vegas 
                                                 
6 The parties dispute the extent of Special Prosecutor 
Paulus's involvement in the editing of these tapes.   
7 The affidavits were not raised before the circuit court as 
part of Maloney's postconviction motion. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
12 
 
tapes, informed her that Paulus had significantly edited the 
videos.  In her affidavit, Brant also contends that the original 
bill for Del Monte's editing was $27,645.99, but that the final 
bill was only $5,500.99.  According to Brant's affidavit, 
Special Prosecutor Biskupic told her the earlier bill was a 
draft of a bill and the $5,500.99 was the corrected bill for 
work actually completed.  Yet, Brant asserts in her affidavit 
that Del Monte informed her that the $27,645.99 was not a draft, 
that the original bill reflected services actually rendered, but 
that they reduced the charges because they were informed the 
prosecution would not be using much of their work.   
¶25 In addition, Maloney provided this court with two 
evaluations from individuals who reviewed the original tapes and 
the enhanced tapes.8  These evaluations concluded that the 
"enhanced" tapes, which were shown to the jury, were of a 
significantly reduced quality as compared to the original tapes.  
The evaluations also alleged that portions of the transcripts 
were not accurate when compared to the original tapes.   
¶26 Second, 
Maloney 
implies 
that 
Paulus 
withheld 
information that initial reports from the Green Bay Fire 
Department and the Brown County Arson Task Force actually 
labeled the fire an accident.  Maloney asserts that withholding 
this 
evidence 
regarding 
investigators' 
preliminary 
beliefs 
                                                 
8 The evaluations were provided by Michael Syverson, Owner, 
Kolb Syverson Communications, Appleton, Wisconsin (July 8, 2005) 
and Loraine Henes, Henes & Henes Court Reporting Service, 
Appleton, Wisconsin (July 6, 2005).  These were also not raised 
in the circuit court.   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
13 
 
caused the defense to make the strategic decision against 
arguing that Sandra's death was an accident.   
¶27 Maloney further alleges that Paulus withheld this 
information from Dr. Gregory Schmunk, a Brown County Medical 
Examiner, and other investigators.  Maloney implies that 
withholding this evidence 
impacted 
the 
medical 
examiner's 
autopsy.   
¶28 Maloney notes that this court recognized in Maloney I 
that Dr. Schmunk had indicated that the evidence that initial 
reports labeled the fire an accident was withheld from him, 
which may have affected his ruling.  Maloney I, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 
¶5 n.3.9  Maloney also provided this court with a review of the 
autopsy.  The review was conducted by Dr. James D. Dibdin and 
completed on January 21, 2002.  Dr. Dibdin concluded that "the 
conclusion that Ms. Maloney's death was caused by strangulation 
cannot be sustained." 
¶29 In addition, Maloney suggests that a preliminary 
report by investigators, dated February 12, 1998, indicated that 
investigators believed the fire was caused by careless use of 
smoking 
materials, 
and 
that 
this 
was 
withheld 
from 
the 
                                                 
9 In State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶5 n.3, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 
398 N.W.2d 583 ("Maloney I"), we stated: 
Initial reports from the Green Bay Fire Department and 
the Brown County Arson Task Force actually labeled the 
fire an accident. Dr. Gregory Schmunk, the medical 
examiner in the case, has since indicated that this 
evidence was withheld from him, which may have 
affected his ruling. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
14 
 
investigating team.  Maloney implies that the conclusions by the 
State's fire expert were erroneous.  Maloney provides this court 
with a July 4, 2002, report evaluating the fire evidence by Dr. 
James G. Munger, Ph.D., MIFireE, CFPS.  Dr. Munger's evaluation 
alleges that the State's investigation did not follow the 
systematic approach of the scientific method, asserts that the 
State's hypothesis regarding the cause of the fire constitutes 
"junk science," and concludes that the fire was caused by the 
misuse of smoking materials.    
¶30 Third, Maloney contends that Paulus asked the medical 
examiner to delay issuing a death certificate for Sandra until 
the criminal investigation was completed.  Maloney draws this 
court's attention to a letter from Paulus to Dr. Schmunk.  In 
this letter, Paulus requests that Dr. Schmunk refrain from 
issuing a death certificate because, according to Paulus, 
issuing a death certificate might compromise the integrity of 
the investigation into Sandra Maloney's death.10  Maloney 
concludes that Paulus must have believed that Dr. Schmunk was 
not "on board" with Paulus's theory of the cause of Sandra's 
death.   
B 
¶31 Upon review of the record, we find that Maloney has 
not alleged sufficient material facts to justify remanding the 
case for an evidentiary hearing.   
                                                 
10 We note that Maloney does not allege that any Wisconsin 
statute would preclude a medical examiner from postponing the 
issuance of a death certificate.   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
15 
 
¶32 Maloney and his counsel viewed the videotapes in 
preparation for and during trial.  The defense raised no 
objections about the editing of the tapes or the transcripts of 
the edited tapes provided to the jurors.  At trial, Maloney's 
attorney stated that he had no objection to allowing the jurors 
to read the transcripts while they viewed the edited video 
because they were "pretty good" and "right on."   
¶33 Furthermore, Maloney was a party to the recorded Las 
Vegas conversations.  Had the editing significantly altered the 
exchange between Maloney and Hellenbrand, Maloney could have 
objected at trial.  He did not.   
¶34 Maloney now suggests that Paulus's editing of the 
tapes was unlawful manipulation of evidence.  Maloney apparently 
bases this suggestion on the fact that Paulus has been convicted 
of accepting bribes in other cases.  However, Maloney fails to 
allege sufficient material facts that link Paulus's misconduct 
in other cases to the handling of evidence in this case.  Absent 
any such link, we conclude that Maloney's allegations, his 
reliance on the affidavits, and the recent evaluations of the 
tapes, fail to justify remand on the basis of this record.   
¶35 In addition, a review of the record demonstrates that 
the preliminary conclusion by the investigators that the fire 
was an accident was actually addressed at trial.  Among other 
evidence, the jury evaluated testimony by Daniel G. Hughes, a 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
16 
 
private fire investigator hired as an expert by the State,11 
regarding his conclusions as to the cause of the fire.  Hughes 
was asked about and dismissed the preliminary conclusions that 
the fire was an accident.12  Maloney's attorney made a strategic 
decision and argued that Hughes's conclusions were in error 
because Hellenbrand was the actual perpetrator and that the 
evidence demonstrated that a novice set the fire, not someone 
like 
Maloney 
who 
had 
extensive 
experience 
with 
arson 
investigations.13  The jury ultimately convicted Maloney.   
¶36 These 
allegations 
regarding 
the 
preliminary 
conclusions as to the cause of the fire are an attempt by 
Maloney to reargue his case using a different theory of defense.  
Maloney has failed to present sufficient material facts that 
                                                 
11 We note that, at trial, the defense recognized that 
Maloney had attempted to hire Hughes, but that the prosecution 
had already retained him as their expert.   
12  During the State's direct examination of Hughes, Special 
Prosecutor Biskupic questioned Hughes about the February 12, 
1998, report.  Hughes explained to the jury that, in his 
professional opinion, the preliminary conclusion that the fire 
was an accident was fully inconsistent with the evidence.  
Hughes based his opinion on the fact that the evidence 
demonstrated that there may have been more than one point of 
origin of the fire, that there had been "trailers" between the 
sources of the fire and the couch, and that someone had placed 
other smoking materials around the house to make it look like a 
careless use of smoking materials fire.  
13 On direct and cross-examination of Hughes, Maloney's 
defense attorney raised concerns with the conclusions drawn by 
Hughes 
and 
attempted 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
an 
amateur, 
Hellenbrand, had set the fire, as opposed to Maloney, who had 
significant 
experience 
working 
with 
fires 
as 
an 
arson 
investigator.   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
17 
 
would lead this court to conclude that Paulus's behavior 
amounted to misconduct that caused his attorney to choose one 
theory of defense over another.   
¶37 In Maloney I, we concluded that Maloney had "failed to 
demonstrate deficient performance."  Maloney I, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 
¶45.  Maloney's trial counsel decided to argue that Tracy 
Hellebrand, and not John Maloney, had murdered Sandra Maloney.  
Maloney's trial counsel decided against arguing that Sandra had 
died an accidental death.  Because we concluded that Maloney 
failed to prove his trial counsel's decisions were deficient, we 
conclude that, without more, he is not entitled to relief.  This 
court's power of discretionary reversal does not allow a 
defendant to obtain a new trial in an attempt to present a 
different defense theory years after the one presented by 
competent counsel failed to persuade the jury.  See Buel v. La 
Crosse Transit Co., 77 Wis. 2d 480, 496, 253 N.W.2d 232 (1977) 
("When there are alternative causes of action and one makes a 
choice, there is little room for arguing the real issue has not 
been tried").  See also State v. Hubanks, 173 Wis. 2d 1, 29, 469 
N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1992).   
¶38 Finally, in his briefing and oral argument in this 
case, Maloney does not allege sufficient material facts that 
support his conclusion that Paulus believed Dr. Schmunk was not 
"on board," and fails to assert how Dr. Schmunk would change his 
conclusions regarding his professional opinion as to what caused 
Sandra Maloney's death.  As this court said in Bentley and 
Nelson, conclusory allegations do not entitle a defendant to 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
18 
 
relief in the interest of justice.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309, 
313;14 Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 496-98.15     
¶39 We recognize that during Maloney's initial trial, the 
jury did not have the opportunity to review evidence of Paulus's 
misconduct because it did not yet exist; Paulus was charged and 
convicted subsequent to Maloney's trial.  Maloney asserts that 
the interest of justice mandates a retrial so that the jury has 
the opportunity to hear and evaluate information regarding 
Paulus's misconduct in this case.  Yet, because Maloney fails to 
present facts that Paulus's conduct in this case was unlawful, 
or that there exists any connection between Paulus's misconduct 
in the 22 particular cases to which Paulus admitted accepting 
bribes and Paulus's actions in prosecuting Maloney's homicide 
                                                 
14 "This court has long held that the facts supporting plea 
withdrawal must be alleged in the petition and the defendant 
cannot rely on conclusory allegations, hoping to supplement them 
at a hearing."  State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 548 
N.W.2d 50 (1996). 
15 In Nelson, this court stated that 
if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment 
and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must 
hold 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
However, 
if 
the 
defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his 
motion to raise a question of fact, or presents only 
conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief, the trial court may in the exercise of its 
legal discretion deny the motion without a hearing. 
Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 
(1972) (emphasis added).    
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
19 
 
case, no basis exists that would support a remand in this 
matter.   
¶40 This 
case 
is 
distinguishable 
from 
Hicks16 
and 
Armstrong.17  In those cases, this court reversed the defendants' 
convictions because newly discovered DNA evidence discredited 
                                                 
16 In State v. Hicks, this court ordered a new trial because 
the jury had not been made aware of DNA evidence which arguably 
excluded the defendant as the assailant in a sexual assault case 
where the identity of the assailant was a central issue.  Hicks, 
202 Wis. 2d at 163-72.  Hicks was convicted of burglary, 
robbery, and two counts of sexual assault.  Id. at 152.  
Postconviction DNA testing of hairs found at the scene and on 
defendant Hicks revealed inconclusive results with regard to the 
source of some of the hairs, and conclusively excluded Hicks as 
the source of one of the pubic hairs.  Id. at 156.  Hicks 
appealed, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 
157.  The trial court denied Hicks' appeal, concluding that it 
was not reasonably probable that testimony regarding the new DNA 
evidence would result in a different verdict.  Id.  The court of 
appeals reversed, finding ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Id. at 152.  This court affirmed on other grounds, using its 
discretionary reversal powers because it concluded that the real 
controversy had not been fully tried.  Id. at 152-53.   
17 The defendant in Armstrong appealed his conviction under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06, asserting that he was denied due process 
"because the jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of 
proof to him."  State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶111, 283 
Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98 (citation omitted).  The circuit 
court denied Armstrong's appeal, and the court of appeals 
affirmed, concluding that it did not have the statutory 
authority of reversal because it was not permitted "to go behind 
a § 974.06 order [by the trial court] to reach the judgment of 
conviction."  Id., ¶112 (citation omitted).  We reversed the 
court of appeals, concluding that because the jury had not been 
given DNA evidence found at the scene of the murder that 
excluded Armstrong, and because the State had relied upon 
physical evidence as affirmative proof of Armstrong's guilt, the 
real controversy had not been tried.  Id., ¶2.  We vacated the 
judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial in the interests 
of justice.  Id.     
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
20 
 
physical 
evidence 
that the 
State 
had 
relied 
on 
in its 
prosecution. 
 
Hicks, 
202 
Wis. 2d at 
159; 
Armstrong, 
283 
Wis. 2d 639, ¶¶2, 139, 146, 155-56.  As in Hicks and Armstrong, 
new information has come to light in this case: the prosecutor 
in Maloney's case unlawfully accepted bribes in 22 other cases 
in which Paulus served as the prosecutor.  However, unlike Hicks 
and Armstrong, where the newly discovered evidence compromised 
evidence on which the prosecution relied, Maloney has alleged no 
facts that would substantiate allegations that evidence on which 
the prosecution relied was compromised.  Maloney has not 
presented this court with any objective factual assertions that, 
if true, would lead to the conclusion that Paulus unlawfully 
altered the tapes or manipulated any evidence to Maloney's 
detriment.  We cannot conclude that Paulus's misconduct in other 
cases, without more, demonstrates Paulus's misconduct in this 
case.  Consequently, we conclude that Maloney has not asserted 
facts to justify a remand for a motion for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
¶41 We recognize that this case raises concerns regarding 
the integrity of Wisconsin's system of administration of 
criminal justice.  Maloney raises serious allegations in 
contending that a prosecutor may have acted unlawfully in his 
prosecution of a homicide case.  Indeed, concerns that Paulus 
may have mishandled the Maloney investigation led the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice to open an independent investigation into 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
21 
 
the death of Sandra Maloney.18  Though Maloney has failed to 
allege sufficient material facts to support allegations that 
Paulus acted unlawfully in his prosecution of Maloney, if any 
current or future investigations uncover evidence that Paulus's 
actions in prosecuting Maloney constituted misconduct, Maloney 
may file his motion to the trial court raising such misconduct 
at that time.   
IV 
¶42 We conclude that this court has the authority to use 
its power of discretionary reversal to remand to the circuit 
court a motion for postconviction relief in the interest of 
justice, even though the issue was first raised by this court, 
sua sponte.  We further conclude, however, that Maloney failed 
to allege sufficient material facts, and no such facts currently 
exist within the record, to warrant a remand for an evidentiary 
hearing in the interest of justice.  We therefore conclude that 
Maloney is not entitled to relief on the basis of this record.  
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The Wisconsin Department of Justice has conducted an 
independent investigation into the possibility of other criminal 
conduct committed by Paulus while he was the Winnebago County 
District Attorney.  Maloney's case was one of the cases under 
review.  Maloney I, 281 Wis. 2d 595, ¶10 n.6; Paulus, 331 F. 
Supp. 2d at 736.  It appears from comments at oral argument that 
there may be one or more additional investigations pending. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
 
 
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