Title: Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

428 Nev, Advance Opinion SH
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JORGE HERNANDEZ, AN |
INDIVIDUAL; BRITTANY BURTNER,
AN INDIVIDUAL; KEVIN MCNEAL, AN
INDIVIDUAL; HEATHER NEELY, AN
INDIVIDUAL; AND SCOTT SIMON, AN
INDIVIDUAL,

Appellants,

vs.

‘THE HONORABLE KAREN P.
BENNETT-HARON, IN HER OFFICIAL,
CAPACITY AS CHIEF JUDGE OF LAS
VEGAS TOWNSHIP JUSTICE COURT
IN AND FOR CLARK COUNTY,
NEVADA; P. MICHAEL MURPHY, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS
CORONER AND DEPUTY PUBLIC.
ADMINISTRATOR OF CLARK
COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA; AND
CHRISTOPHER LAURENT, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN
‘THE OFFICE OF DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR CLARK COUNTY, A
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondents.

   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   

No, 59861

FILED

 

Appeals from a final district court order in consolidated cases

granting in part and denying in part declaratory relief and denying a

‘complaint for an injunction challenging the constitutionality of a county
ordinance. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joanna Kishner,

Judge.
Reversed,

1333741

 
 

‘Reisman Sorokac and Joshua H. Reisman, Anthony Stirling, and Robert
R, Warns, III, Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

|Garcia-Mendoza & Snavely, Chtd., and Eva Garcia-Mendoza and Luther
/M. Snavely, III, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

Allen Lichtenstein and Katrina M. Rogers, Las Vegas,
for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In this opinion, we address the constitutionality of the Clark
[County Code of Ordinance provisions that establish coroner's inquests into
jan officer-involved death. Appellants, five Nevada Highway Patrol
(Officers, contend that the inquest procedures and provisions violate their
|due process rights under the Nevada Constitution and that, by requiring
[justices of the peace to preside over the inquest process, the Clark County
Board of County Commissioners unconstitutionally impinged on the
Legislature's authority to establish the jurisdiction of justices of the peace.
Although we conclude that appellants’ due process arguments fail, we
determine that the code provision requiring that a justice of the peace
serve as presiding officer in coroner's inquest proceedings regarding
officer-involved deaths intrudes on the Legislature's exclusive authority
lover the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Because the code makes no
provision for anyone other than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding
officer in such proceedings, we conclude that the offending provision

 
i

 

cannot be severed, which requires the entire inquest scheme regarding
officer-involved deaths to be struck down,
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

‘The underlying coroner’s inquest proceeding was prompted
after appellants, Nevada Highway Patrol Officers, responded to an
incident that resulted in a man’s death, Before the inquest proceedings
against appellants commenced, the Clark County Board of Commissioners
amended the coroner's inquest ordinance. After appellants were notified
that a coroner's inquest had been initiated, appellants filed separate
complaints in the district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
challenging the validity of the amended ordinance based on asserted
constitutional violations. ‘The complaints were later consolidated.
According to the district court docket entries, appellants filed

 

Ja motion and application for both a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction, which Clark County respondents opposed.?- The
Jday before the scheduled pre-inquest conference was to begin, the district
court held a hearing on appellants’ application for a temporary restraining
lorder. ‘The district court subsequently entered an order granting the
request for a temporary restraining order, which prohibited the
respondents from going forward with the inquest proceeding until the
court ruled on the application for a preliminary injunction.

‘The parties have not included copies of this motion, the opposition
thereto, and the reply in their joint appendix. Similarly, respondents
submitted two supplemental filings related to this motion after the initial
hearing at which the temporary restraining order was granted. The joint
appendix, however, includes only three pages and two exhibits from one of
those filings.

 
‘Thereafter, the district court entered a written judgment
rejecting the majority of appellants’ claims and upholding all but one of
the Clark County code sections pertai

 

ing to inquest proceedings related
to officer-involved deaths. ‘The judgment also dissolved the temporary
restraining order and denied injunctive relief. These appeals followed.
This court subsequently granted, over respondents’ opposition, appellants’
emergency motion to stay the subject inquest proceedings and directed
expedited briefing. ‘The American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada was
/granted permission to file an amicus curiae brief in this matter and to
participate in oral argument, which was held before the en bane court in
Las Vegas.
CORONER'S INQUEST

‘The legal questions presented on appeal concern the validity of
the Clark County coroner's inquest procedures for officer-involved deaths
as amended by the Board of Commissioners, and thus, we begin by

 

Jexamining the relevant code sections before considering the parties’
arguments.

‘The board of county commissioners for any county in this state
is authorized by statute, NRS 244.163, to create a county coroner's office.?
Currently, Clark and Washoe Counties are the only counties in the state
to have coroner's offices. Clark County established its coroner's office and
set forth the coroner's duties and the procedures for coroner's inquests by
jenacting the Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances (CCCO), Title 2,
Chapter 2.12. Under the procedures set forth in this chapter, when an

2In those counties that have not created a county coroner's office, the
sheriff serves as the coroner, and any inquest is conducted according to
statute. NRS 259.020; NRS 259.050.

 

 
ney

 

officer-involved death occurs, the coroner calls an inquest and a presiding
officer is selected. CCCO § 2.12.080(c). An officer-involved death occurs
when an officer, while acting in his or her official capacity, uses force that
may contribute to the death of a person or the officer actively takes some
role in causing a vehicular accident that leads to a person’s death. CCCO
§ 2.12.010(p). An inquest is conducted when “circumstances support
reasonable grounds to suspect” that a death was unnatural. CCCO §
2.12.010(c). As regards the presiding officer, “the chief judge from the
township where the death occurred shall appoint a qualified magistrate,
as defined in section 2.12.010()), to sit as the presiding officer in the
inquest.” CCCO § 2.12,020(¢). A “[qlualified magistrate” is defined as “a
justice of the peace from any jurisdiction within Clark County who is an
attorney duly licensed to practice law in the state of Nevada.” CCCO §

 

\quest is conducted as an investigatory and fact finding
proceeding and not an adversarial proceeding.” CCCO § 2.12.080(m).
Before the inquest, the coroner provides the presiding officer
with a written overview of the case. CCCO § 2.12,080(f). Additionally, the
presic
other evidence that they determine to be relevant to the matter under
investigation. CCCO § 2.12.080(i). The county prosecutor also assists the

 

officer and the coroner compile copies of all records, exhibits, or

presiding officer with preparing for the inquest and works at the direction
lof the presiding officer, though in this role, the prosecutor serves as a
neutral presenter of facts and not as an advocate for any interested
parties. CCCO § 2.12.080(g). The presiding officer may appoint an

inquest ombudsperson, who is a licensed lawyer in Nevada, to represent

 
orn ie

 

the deceased's family throughout the proceeding. CCCO § 2.12.010(r);
COCO § 2.12.075(a).

Another integral part of the proceeding is an inquest panel,
which begins with 15 individuals who are selected by the Clark County
[jury commissioner. CCCO § 2.12.080(). From this group, the presiding
officer selects at random 7 persons to sit as the inquest panel. CCCO §
2.12.080(m). The presiding officer examines each person for bias,
prejudice, or any other good and sufficient reason for dismissal and takes
reasonable efforts to ensure that the panel is as diverse and
representative of the community as possible, CCCO § 2.12.080(mX1).

At the start of the inquest proceedings, the presiding officer
makes an opening statement indicating that the inquest is not adversarial
but is a fact-finding proceeding. CCCO § 2.12.080(m)(2). The presiding
officer provides instruction to the inquest panel regarding their conduct,
Joutside the proceeding, CCCO § 2.12.080(mX6), and prepares

 

interrogatories that the inquest panel will answer regarding questions of
fact. CCCO § 2.12.080(mX7); CCCO § 2.12.10. The fing

Pursuant to interrogatories do not bind the prosecutor's office or preclude

 

\g8 made

‘any future civil or criminal proceedings. CCCO § 2.12,140, It is under
‘these procedures that the coroner's inquest in question is to be conducted,
DISCUSSION

On appeal, appellants primarily argue that their due process
rights under the Nevada Constitution will be violated if they are forced to
participate in the coroner's inquest process under the procedures set forth
jin the Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances for inquests involving
officer-involved deaths. Appellants further contend that by designating
[justices of the peace to perform the duties of presiding officer in the
jcoroner’s inquest process, the Clark County Board of County

6

 
oH Be

 

Commissioners intruded upon the Nevada Constitution’s express
delegation of authority to the Legislature to establish the jurisdiction of
the justices of the peace. We address these arguments in turn.
Standard of review

In the absence of any factual dispute, this court reviews a
district court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory and injunctive relief
de novo. Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 942, 142 P.3d 339,
347 (2006); see also Secretary of State v, Give Nevada A Raise, 120 Nev.
481, 486 n.8, 96 P.3d 732, 735 n.8 (2004). In addition, this court reviews

 

de novo determinations of whether a statute is constitutional. Flamingo
Paradise Gaming v. Att'y General, 125 Nev. 502, 509, 217 P.3d 546, 551
(2009).

SThis case is ripe for our review because the alleged harm is
sufficiently concrete so as to yield an actual case or controversy. Herbst
Gaming, Inc. v. Secy of State, 122 Nev. 87, 887, 141 P.3d 1224, 1231
(2006) (noting that “{wjhile harm need not already have been suffered, it
must be probable for the issue to be ripe for judicial review”); Matter of
TR,, 119 Nev. 646, 651, 80 P.3d 1276, 1279 (2003) (“The factors to be
weighed in deciding whether a case is ripe for judicial review include: (1)
the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial review, and (2) the
suitability of the issues for review.”), In this case, the inquest proceeding
has already been initiated, and thus, as in T.R., the application of the
relevant code section to appellants is certain. Moreover, deferring ruling
on the constitutional challenges at issue here will harm appellants, as
they would be required to go through the inquest process without knowing
the extent of any available due process protections and whether the
individual presiding over the proceeding was constitutionally authorized
to do so.

 
‘The Clark County coroner's inquest proceeding does not ye upon due
process guarantees

Under Nevada's due process clause, “[nJo person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Nev.
Const. art. 1, § 8(5). Although appellants do not challenge the
constitutionality of the Clark County code under the federal constitution,
the similarities between the due process clauses contained in the United
States and Nevada Constitutions, Rodriguez v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 798,
808 n.22, 102 P.3d 41, 48 n.22 (2004) (recognizing that “(t]he language
Article 1, Section 8(5) of the Nevada Constitution mirrors the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution”), permit us to look to federal precedent for guidance as we

 

determine whether the procedures utilized in the inquest proceedings
regarding officer-involved deaths are consistent with the due process
clause set forth in Article 1, Section 8(6) of the Nevada Constitution,

“Due process’ is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are
undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts.”
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, (1960); accord Weaver v, State, Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 502, 117 P.3d 193, 199 (2005) (“What
constitutes adequate [due process] procedure(s] varies depending on the
circumstances of a particular case.”), The level of due process that must
be provided in a particular government proceeding depends on the effect
that the proceeding will have on a constitutionally protected interest.
Hannah, 363 U.S. at 442, When a government agency is conducting

 

proceedings, due process mandates that the protections afforded depend
on whether the proceedings result in a binding adjudication or a

determination of legal rights, in which case due process protections are
greater. Id, Such protections, however, need not be made available in

 

 
proceedings that merely involve fact-finding or investigatory exercises by
the government agency. Id. Determining whether particular due process
protections must be provided requires consideration of the constitutional
interest at stake, the type of proceeding being conducted, and the potential
that such protections will be unduly burdened by the proceeding. Id,
Appellants assert that the inquest proceedings impliedly put
their liberty and property interests at stake, as the proceedings involve an
examination of their roles in causing a death to determine whether
criminal laws have been violated in order to “furnish the foundation for a
‘criminal prosecution.” They insist that the overall purpose of the inquest
is to find them guilty of violating criminal laws and to brand them in
public as criminals. ‘To support this contention, appellants point out that
‘4 prosecutor participates in the inquest proceeding and that he or she has
input on the witnesses to be called, how the inquest will be conducted, the
scope of the issues, the scope of questioning, and the preparation of the

interrogatories. Noting that the inquest ordinance allows both the

 

deceased's family’s attorney and the inquest ombudsperson to participate
in the inquest process, appellants maintain that the deceased's family’s
attorney will seek to obtain admis:

 

mns from them that can be used in any
civil wrongful death action filed against them, and they argue that “it
defies rationality to assume that [his] prosecutorial zeal will not permeate
the entire proceeding.”*

“Appellants also argue that the inquest proceeding may be televised,
CCCO § 2.12.080(k), with information made immediately available to the
public, CCCO § 2.12.150, and that the damage that this may cause to their
reputation, jobs, or future criminal prosecution violates their due process
rights. Damage to one’s reputation by itself is generally not a
{constitutionally protected interest. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S, 693, 711-

continued on next page...

 

 
 

non

 

Respondents disagree with appellants’ contentions and assert
that there is no implication of due process protections where, as here, a
government body does not determine any civil or criminal liability; does
not make determinations depriving anyone of life, liberty, or property; and
only serves to find facts that may subsequently be used as the basis for
legislative or executive action.

Federal precedent

Our consideration of the due process issues presented by the
parties focuses on three federal court decisions addressing similar
concerns to those posed by appellants, We begin by considering the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Hannah v, Larche, 363 U.S.

continued
12 (1976); see_also Hannah v. Larche, 363 US. 420, 442-43 (1960)
(rejecting arguments that reputational harm and the possibility of
criminal prosecution require the provision of due process associated with
adjudicatory proceedings when the proceeding at issue is investigatory in
nature and stating that “such collateral consequences . . . would not be the
result of any affirmative determinations made by [the investigatory body]
and they would not affect the legitimacy of [its] investigative function”).
With regard to the impact of the inquest procedures on any subsequent
criminal proceedings, any pretrial publicity caused by the inquest that
results in prejudice in subsequent criminal proceedings may be remedied
like any other pretrial activity resulting in publicity. See State v. Roraff,
159 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Wis. 1968) (finding that “fiJt is not the source of
pretrial publicity which determines the prejudice and the remedy but the
nature, amount and the effect of such pretrial publicity”). The judicial
system remedies the negative effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity by
allowing for a change of venue or other remedial actions. See, e.¢., Sicor,
Inc._v, Hutchison, 127 Nev. __, __, 266 P.3d 608, 614-15 (2011)
(expanding the multifactor test for determining whether there is a reason
to believe that the party seeking a change of venue will not receive a fair
trial based on pretrial publicity in the community where the case
originated).

 

 

 

 

10

 
420 (1960), in which the Court articulated the test for determining
whether due process rights attach in a particular proceeding and
concluded that those rights traditionally associated with adjudicatory
proceedings do not attach in the context of an investigatory proceeding.
We then turn to the Court’s subsequent decision in Jenkins v, McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411 (1969), in which the Hannah test was applied to determine
that due process rights.do attach in the context of an adjudicatory
proceeding. Lastly, instruetional to our analysis is the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision in Aponte v, Calderon, 284
F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 2002), which provides a well-reasoned discussion of the
analysis in Hannah and Jenkins as it relates to determining whether due
process rights are implicated in a particular proceeding.

First, in Hannah, the Supreme Court addressed due process
challenges to rules of procedure adopted by the Commission on Civil
Rights under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 363 U.S. 420.

‘The case arose out of the commission's investigation of alleged voting

 

deprivations in Louisiana, Id, at 421. Registrars of voters and private
citizens were called to appear before the commission, Id, at 421-22. These
parties moved to enjoin the commission from conducting its hearing on the
basis that the commission's rules protected the identity of the persons
submitting the complaint and denied those summoned to testify from
‘cross-examining the persons who filed the complaints or from calling any
witnesses. Id, at 422, The Court considered the parties arguments that
the commission's procedures might irreparably harm those being
investigated by subjecting them to public disgrace or shame, the

possibility of losing their jobs, and even criminal prosecution. Id, at 442-
43, The Court noted that these arguments were conjecture, but the Court

 

 
mee

 

observed that “even if such collateral consequences were to flow from the
Commission's investigations, they would not be the result of any
affirmative determinations made by the Commission, and they would not
affect the legitimacy of the Commission's investigative function.” Id. at
443.

Concluding that the requirements of due process vary with the
type of proceeding involved, id. at 442, the Court noted that the civil rights
commission’s duties included investigating allegations that individuals
have been discriminatorily deprived of the right to vote, studying and
collecting information related to denials of equal protection of the laws,
and reporting its findings and recommendations to the President and
Congress. Id, at 440. From this information, the Court extrapolated that
the commission's function was “purely investigative and fact-finding”
because “lilt does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials or determine
anyone's civil or criminal liability... Nor does it indict, punish, or
impose any legal sanctions . .. [or] make determinations depriving anyone
of his life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 441. In sum, the Court concluded
mn’s] existence is to find facts

 

that “{tJhe only purpose of {the commi
which may subsequently be used as the basis for legislative or executive
action.” Id, Thus, the Court concluded that because the commi
was investigatory, the commission's procedures did not violate the due

 

jon's role

process right of those challenging the commission's proceedings. Id, at
451.

Nearly a decade later, in Jenkins v, McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411
(1969), the Court applied the Hannah test to determine whether a
Louisiana statute creating a body called the Labor-Management
Commission of Inquiry ran afoul of, among other things, the Fourteenth

2

 
4

 

Amendment's Due Process Clause. ‘There, the commission was charged
with investigating and determining whether probable cause existed
regarding certain criminal law violations and making suggestions as to
prosecution. Id, at 416-17. With regard to the proceedings, the
commission had the authority to call witnesses. Id, at 417. And while the
witnesses had the right to have counsel present and to offer advice, cross-
examination was limited. Id. at 417-18.

At the outset, the Jenkins Court noted that the stated purpose
of the commission at issue was to investigate and make findings of fact
“relating to violations or possible violations of criminal laws,” id. at 414,
and to supplement and assist the efforts of district attorneys and other
law enforcement personnel. Id, at 414-15. ‘The commission's authority
was specifically limited to criminal violations, and it could not take action
with regard to any strictly civil aspects of any labor problem. Id. at 415.
Although its adjudication of any criminal violations was not binding and
could “not be used as prima facie or presumptive evidence of guilt or
innocence in any court of law,” the commission’s findings could include
conclusions with regard to specific individuals and it could make
recommendations for future actions. Id, at 417. ‘The Court noted that the
‘commission was required to report its findings to the proper authorities “if
it finds there is probable cause to believe that violations of the criminal
Jaws have occurred.” Id.

‘Thus, in stark contrast to the investigatory agency at issue in
Hannah, the Jenkins Court held that the commission “very clearly
exercises an accusatory function; it is empowered to be used and allegedly
is used to find named individuals guilty of violating the criminal laws” and
“to brand them as criminals in public.” Id, at 427-28, Therefore, the Court

13

 
held that based on the commission allegedly making “an actual finding
that a specific individual is guilty of a crime, we think that due process
requires the Commission to afford a person being investigated the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, subject only to
traditional limitations on those rights.” Id. at 429.

Finally, in Aponte v, Calderon, 284 F.3d 184 (1st Cir, 2002),
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit synthesized the
distinction between the investigatory proceedings addressed in Hannah
and the adjudicatory proceedings discussed in Jenkins in resolving due
process issues pertaining to a commission created by executive order of the
Governor of Puerto Rico to address issues related to the use of public
resources and government corruption. Aponte, 284 F.3d at 186, 191-96.
The commission in Aponte was empowered to conduct investigations,
make factual findings, and ultimately issue recommendations with regard
to, among other things, “further proceedings, either administrative, civil,
or criminal, against certain persons.” Id, at 187. ‘The commission could
not, however, initiate or file civil, criminal, or administrative charges or
make adjudications of criminal liability or probable cause determinations.
Id.

In examining the constitutionality of the executive order
under Hannah and Jenkins, the Aponte court noted that the Supreme
Court “has steadfastly maintained [the] distinction between general fact-
finding investigations,” which do not implicate due process rights, “and

adjudications of legal rights” for which due process concerns may be
implicated. 1d, at 192-93. Applying this analysis to the issues before it,
the Aponte court concluded that without an adjudication of legal rights,
due process rights are not triggered, and because the commission at issue

 

 
ne

 

there did not and could not adjudicate legal rights, no adjudication could
occur, and thus, due process concerns were not triggered, even if the
possibility existed that the investigations could lead to criminal
prosecutions, Id. at 193-95.
Clark Count juest

‘Turning to the present case, we note that the Clark County
code provisions pertaining to the inquest procedures for officer-involved
deaths fail to provide a clear statement of purpose. See, e.g., Jenkins, 394
U.S. 416. The lack of an express purpose requires this court to review the
relevant information in the code to assess the nature and function of the
inquest proceeding and to glean from the delineation of the inquest duties
and procedures, set forth in CCCO § 2.12.080, whether and to what extent
due process protections are implicated. When the nature and function of
the inquest proceedings are examined in light of the analyses set forth in
Hannah, Jenkins, and Aponte, it becomes evident that the Clark County
proceedings only serve a fact-finding and investigatory function because
the proceedings do not result in an adjudication or determination of any of

 

appellants’ legal rights
findings which, in and of themselves, are not binding or entitled to

‘The sole product of the inquest process are factual

preclusive effect in any future proceeding.

Looking to the Clark County code, the inquest procedures
require the presiding officer to “insure that the inquest is conducted as an
investigatory and fact finding proceeding and not an adversarial
proceeding.” CCCO § 2.12.080(m). Thus, the presiding officer must,
among other things, make an opening statement indicating that the

 

inquest is a fact-finding, rather than an adversarial, proceeding, CCCO §
2.12.080(mX2), and must “prepare the set of interrogatories for the
inquest . . . [that] shall deal only with questions of fact and shall not deal

15

 
with questions of fault or guilt.” CCCO § 2.12.080(m\7). Further, section
212.140, entitled “Panel Interrogatories,” spells out what the end result of
the inquest proceeding will be. Under that section, “{alfter hearing the
testimony, the inquest panel shall deliberate in secret and answer” the
interrogatories prepared pursuant to section 2.12.08m\7), which “deal
only with questions of fact and shall not deal with questions of fault or
guilt.” CCCO § 2,12.140(a), The findings made pursuant to these
interrogatories, however, “shall not be binding on the district attorney's
office nor shall the findings have any preclusive effect in any future civil or
criminal proceeding.” Id.

These provisions, therefore, demonstrate that the inquest’s
function is “purely investigative and fact-finding” because no adjudication
or determination of liability occurs. Hannah, 363 U.S. at 441, The

 

quest’ panel does not “indict, punish, or impose any legal
sanctions... for] make determinations depriving anyone of his life,
liberty, or property’; its “only purpose... is to find facts which may
subsequently be used as the basis for legislative or executive action.” Id,
And unlike the statutes at issue in Jenkins, the inquest panel is not
authorized to make a recommendation to the district attorney or any other
law enforcement body. See generally CCCO § 2.12.080 (setting forth the
duties and procedures for the inquest); CCCO § 2.12.140(a) (addressing
panel interrogatories). More importantly, however, in contrast to the
probable cause determinations and findings of fact relating to violations or
potential violations of criminal law made by the commission at issue in

Jenkins, the interrogatories answered by the inquest panel in this case are
specifically prohibited from dealing with questions of fault or guilt. CCCO
§ 2.12,080(m)(7); CCCO § 2.12.140(a).

 

 
om ae

 

‘Thus, under Hannah, Jenkins, and Aponte, the inquest
process constitutes an investigatory, rather than an adjudicatory,
proceeding. As a result, due process protections are not triggered by the
inquest process.

Having concluded that the inquest at issue in this case is
investigatory, rather than adjudicatory, our analysis goes no further. We
therefore affirm that portion of the district court’s order rejecting
appellants’ due process arguments. We now turn to whether, by involving
justices of the peace in the inquest process, the Clark County Board of
County Commissioners has unconstitutionally intruded on the
Legislature's exclusive authority to determine the jurisdiction of the

justices of the peace.

 

Nev: tution

‘The Nevada Constitution expressly provides that only the
Legislature has the authority to determine, by law, the jurisdictional
limits of the justices of the peace. Specifically, Article 6, Section 8 of the
Constitution states that the Legislature “shall fix by law . .. the limits of
Gustices of the peace's) civil and criminal jurisdiction, according to the
amount in controversy, the nature of the case, the penalty provided, or any
combination of these.” To that end, the Legislature enacted NRS 4.370(1),

"The United States District Court for the District of Nevada recently
reached the same conclusion in addressing similar constitutional
challenges to the Clark County inquest proceedings brought by police
officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. See
Zaragoza_v. Bennett-Haron, No. 11-CV-01091-PMP-GWF, 2011 WL
609754, "8-9 (D. Nev. Dec. 5, 2011) (concluding that the inquest was
investigatory and did not. adjudicate any legal rights and, thus, did not
trigger the due process clause).

 

 

Ww

 
 

ee

which provides that the justice courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
have only the authority granted to them by statute. See State of Nevada
v.dustice Court, 112 Nev. 803, 805, 919 P.2d 401, 402 (1996); see also NRS
4.170 (providing that justices of the peace shall be conservators of the
peace in their respective townships and shall discharge such duties as may
be prescribed by law).

Appellants contend that by providing for the participation of
justices of the peace in the inquest process, the Clark County Board of
County Commissioners unconstitutionally intruded on the Nevada
Constitution's express delegation of power to the Legislature to determine
the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. Appellants recognize that the
Legislature granted justices of the peace the authority to participate in
inquest proceedings in certain circumstances. They assert, however, that
certain

 

atutory provisions regarding coroners set forth in NRS Chapter
259 do not apply in counties, like Clark County, where the county coroner
is appointed. Respondents and the Nevada ACLU disagree, arguing, in
essence, that NRS Chapter 259 should be viewed as authorizing justices of
the peace to participate in inquest proceedings regardless of whether the

coroner for a particular county is appointed.

©The ACLU suggests that, under CCCO § 2.12, a justice of the peace
is acting as a presiding officer of an investigatory body outside the purview
of the justice court and is not acting with the authority of a justice court,
magistrate, The ACLU has pointed to no authority that allows an entity
other than the Legislature to assign duties to the justices of the peace,
judicial or otherwise; nonetheless, justices of the peace are appointed as
presiding officers of the inquest by virtue of their positions as justices of
the peace.

18

 
 

“Bvery county in this State constitutes a coroner's district,
‘except a county where a coroner is appointed pursuant to the provisions of
NRS 244.163.” NRS 259.010(1). In those counties without an appointed
coroner, the sheriff serves as the de facto coroner. NRS 259.020. The
Legislature has provided procedures for the sheriff to operate under in
conducting an inquest, which includes the use of a justice of the peace:

If an inquest is to be held, the district. attorney
shall call upon a justice of the peace of the county
to preside over it. The justice of the peace shall
summon three persons qualified by law to serve as
jurors, to appear before the justice of the peace
forthwith at the place where the body is or such
other place within the county as may be
designated by him or her to inquire into the cause
of death,

NRS 259.050(4). ‘The Legislature has alternatively provided that instead
of using a sheriff as a coroner, a county may appoint a coroner. NRS
244.163(1). “The boards of county commissioners in their respective
counties may create by ordinance the office of the county coroner,
prescribe the qualifications and duties of the county coroner and make
appointments to the office.” Id. If a county chooses to create a coroner's
office, many of the statutory procedures, including the participation of a
justice of the peace, do not apply. See NRS 259.010(2) (“The provisions of
this chapter, except NRS 259.025 and 259.150 to 259.180, inclusive, do not
apply to any county where a coroner is appointed pursuant to the
provisions of NRS 244.163.”

 

Clark County has chosen to appoint a
coroner and the county has therefore created its own code scheme for
inquests. Under the Clark County code, only justices of the peace may
serve as the presiding officer for officer-involved death inquest
proceedings. See CCCO § 2.12.080(c) (providing that in cases involving

19

 

  
oo

 

officer-involved deaths, section 2.12.020(e) controls the selection of the
presiding officer); CCCO § 2.12.020(e) (stating that “[iJf the death is an
officer involved death, the chief judge from the township where the death
occurred shall appoint a qualified magistrate, as defined in Section
2.12.010(), to sit as the presiding officer in the inquest”); CCCO §
2.12.010() (defining “[qlualified magistrate” as “a justice of the peace from
any jurisdiction within Clark County who is an attorney duly licensed to
practice law in the state of Nevada”).

When construing a statute, this court looks to the words in the
statute to determine the plain meaning of the statute, and this court will
not look beyond the express language unless it is clear that the plain
meaning was not intended. City of Reno v, Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 127

Nev. _, _, 251 P.3d 718, 722 (2011); see also Berkson v, LePome, 126
Nev. __, __, 245 P.8d 560, 563 (2010) (holding that words in a statute

will be given their plain meaning). If the statute is ambiguous, however,
this court will “look to the provision’s legislative history and
the... scheme as a whole to determine what the. .. framers intended.”
We the People Nevada v, Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 874, 881, 192 P.3d
1166, 1171 (2008). “Statutory language is ambiguous if it is capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation.” In re Candelaria, 126 Nev. __,
_ 245 P.3d 518, 520 (2010). This court construes “statutes to preserve
harmony among them.” Canarelli v. Dist, Ct., 127 Nev. _, _, 265 P.3d
673, 677 (2011).

In rejecting appellants’ arguments that the code sections
providing for the participation of justices of the peace in the inquest
process unconstitutionally intrudes on the Legislature's authority, the
district court concluded that, even though “NRS 259.050 does not

20

 
rn ie

 

specifically apply to Clark County” because it has an appointed coroner,
the statutory language that permits justices of the peace to preside over
inquests in some counties indicates that it is permissible for any county,
including those with appointed coroners, to have a justice of the peace
preside over the inquest process. We disagree.

Here, NRS 259.0102) plainly provides that in counties with
appointed coroners, NRS 259.050 does not apply. And when NRS
250.010(2) and NRS 259.050(4) are read together, see Canarelli, 127 Nev.
at __, 265 P.3d at 677 (noting that this court construes “statutes to
preserve harmony among them”), these statutes clearly authorize justices
of the peace to participate in inquest proceedings only in counties where
the county coroner is not appointed. Because Clark County has an
appointed coroner, NRS 259.050(4) does not apply, and thus, justices of
the peace are not authorized to participate in Clark County inquest
proceedings.” NRS 259.010(2). 'To conclude otherwise would violate this
court's well-established maxim that the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. See Galloway v, Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d
237, 246 (1967); see also State, Dep't of Taxation v, DaimlerChrysler, 121
Nev. 541, 548, 119 P.3d 135, 139 (2005) (stating that “omissions of subject
matters from statutory provisions are presumed to have been
intentional”),

 

"While NRS 244.163 provides that the board of county
commissioners will prescribe the duties of the county coroner, it makes no
mention of prescribing the duties of any other actor, including justices of
the peace. Thus, nothing in NRS 244.168 can be construed as authorizing
the participation of justices of the peace in coroner's inquest proceedings
in counties with appointed coroners.

21

 
een Be

 

Because the Nevada Constitution vests the Legislature with
exclusive authority to determine the jurisdiction of justices of the peace,

see Nev. Const. art. 6, § 8, by providing for the participation of justices of

 

the peace in Clark County's inquest proceedings related to officer-involved
deaths, the Clark County Board of County Commissioners has
unconstitutionally impinged on the Legislature's constitutionally
delegated authority. As a result, based on our de novo review of the
district court’s decision, we conclude that the district court erred in
rejecting appellants’ declaratory relief claim as to this issue. See
Canarelli, 127 Nev. at __, 265 P.3d at 676 (stating that the district court's
conclusions of law, including statutory interpretations, are reviewed de
novo); Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Att’y General, 125 Nev. 502, 509, 217
P.3d 546, 551 (2009) (stating that this court reviews de novo
determinations of whether a statute is constitutional); Nevadans for
Nevada v, Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 942, 142 P.3d 339, 347 (2006) (providing
that in the absence of any factual dispute, this court reviews a district
court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory and injunctive relief de novo).
As we conclude that CCCO § 2.12.010(1) violates Nevada's Constitution by
including justices of the peace in inquest proce

 

\g8 related to officer-
involved deaths, we must determine whether the remaii
the code may stand.
‘The offending coroner's inquest provisions must be severed

‘This court has adopted a test for severability, pursuant to
which a statute is severable only “if the remaining portion of the statute,

‘ing portions of

  

standing alone, can be given legal effect, and if the Legislature intended
for the remainder of the statute to stay in effect when part of the statute is

severed.” Flamingo Paradise Gaming, 125 Nev. at 514-18, 217 P.3d at
22

 
mn

 

555-57 (addressing the severability of a statute enacted by ballot
measure).
By Ordinance 3920, the sections of Chapter 2.12 of the Clark

 

County code at it

 

jue in this case were amended. Although the actual
ordinance contained a severability clause, no such clause was codified or
included in Chapter 2.12 of the code, In Nevada counties, ordinances are
passed by bill. NRS 244.095. When an ordinance is amended, each
section of the previously existing ordinance is replaced by the
corresponding section of the newly enacted ordinance. Id, Additionally,
when a county codifies its ordinances into a county code, the ordinances
are to be arranged in chapters and sections. NRS 244.116(2), In Clark
County, the general ordinances of the county have been codified and are
published together as the Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances.
CCCO § 1.01.010; see NRS 244.116 (permitting each Nevada county's
board of commissioners to provide for the codification and publication of
the county's general ordinances in a county code). Thus, although the
severance clause is contained in the ordinance enacted by the board of
county commissioners, but has not been codified in the county code, we
will nonetheless consider the severance clause in determining whether an
unconstitutional portion of the code enacted by that ordinance can be
severed. Cf, Picetti v, State, 124 Nev. 782, 793-94, 192 P.3d 704, 712
(2008) (considering the effective date of a bill, which was not codified in
the resulting statute, in order to determine whether the Legislature
intended for the bill to apply retroactively).

It appears from the inclusion of the severability clause, as
Section 13 of Ordinance 3920, that the Clark County Board of County

Commissioners intended for the remainder of the code sections amended

23,

 
fn ae

 

by Ordinance 3920 to stay in effect if any part of the code amended by that
ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional. Here, the only language
providing for justices of the peace to serve in the inquest process is CCCO
§ 2.12.010(), which defines “qualified magistrate” as “a justice of the peace
from any jurisdiction within Clark County who is an attorney duly
licensed to practice law in the state of Nevada.” For cases regarding
officer-involved deaths, however, the code provides no alternative to
justices of the peace serving as presiding officers. Notably, under CCCO
§§ 2.12,080(c) and 2.12,020(e), a qualified magistrate—which must be a
justice of the peace under CCCO § 2.12.010(1)—must be appointed to serve
as presiding officer in inquests investigating officer-involved deaths.
‘Thus, striking down only CCCO § 2.12.010(1) would render the entire
inquest scheme for officor-involved deaths ineffective, as such proceedings
could not go forward without a presiding officer. We therefore conclude
that the remaining portions of the officer-involved inquest scheme cannot,
standing alone, be given legal effect and, as a result, the entire inquest
scheme for officer-involved deaths necessarily must be struck down.
Flamingo Paradise Gaming, 125 Nev. at 514-18, 217 P.9d at 655-57.
CONCLUSION

‘The Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances provisions
establishing and setting forth the inquest procedures for officer-involved
deaths do not implicate appellants’ due process rights. We conclude,
however, that to the extent that the code provisions pertaining to inquest
proceedings regarding officer-involved deaths require that the presiding
officer be a justice of the peace, these provisions unconstitutionally intrude
upon the Legislature's exclusive constitutional authority to determine the
Jurisdiction of justices of the peace. And because, in the case of officer-

involved deaths, the code makes no provision for anyone except a justice of

24

 
the peace to serve as presiding officer, we conclude that the entire inquest
scheme for officer-involved deaths necessarily fails® Accordingly, we

pNceardbet \ J.

Hardesty

reverse the district court's decision.”

We concur:

ae ny 0s Douglas of
Noh 3 7 3

Saitta Gibbohs

Pickering Parraguirre

"Based on our resolution of this matter, it is not necessary to address
the parties’ remaining appellate arguments.

'We vacate the stay of the coroner's inquest proceedings i
our May 10, 2012, order.

yposed by

  

noe 25