Title: State v. Thompson

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

360 P.2d 637 (1961) 68 N.M. 219 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cecil THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 6795. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 21, 1961. Neal & Neal, Hobbs, James Warden, Carlsbad, for appellant. Hilton A. Dickson, Jr., Atty. Gen., Boston E. Witt, Norman S. Thayer, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee. COMPTON, Chief Justice. The appellant was charged by an information containing two counts; the first, assault with the intent to kill one Jack Kasem; and the second, assault with a deadly weapon upon the said Jack Kasem. He was convicted of the latter offense, and he appeals. The first point urged for a reversal of the judgment relates to the admission into evidence a threat purportedly made by the appellant against Kasem some time prior to the alleged assault. Appellant testified in his own behalf and, on cross-examination, the assistant district attorney asked him, "Did you ever communicate a threat against the life of Jack Kasem on or about December 10, 1958 to a Mr. Curley Maples or a man named Maples whose nickname is Curley Maples?", to which the appellant replied, "There has never been a threat made against Jack to anyone." In rebuttal Maples was called as a witness, and the record discloses the following proceedings: Appellant contends that the question propounded to him and his answer thereto did not afford adequate foundation for the introduction of Maples' testimony in rebuttal. The statute is controlling. Section 20-2-2, 1953 Comp., reads: In construing the statute we held in State v. Fletcher, 36 N.M. 47, 7 P.2d 936, 938, as follows: The correctness of the above holding was reaffirmed in Maestas v. Christmas, 63 N.M. 447, 321 P.2d 631, and from a consideration of the quoted testimony we *639 must conclude that there is prejudicial error in this case. The statutory provisions are mandatory and it is clear that the question propounded to appellant on cross-examination failed to meet the statutory test, particularly as to the place, the occasion, and the circumstances attending the making of the supposed statement to Maples concerning Kasem. This was required in order that appellant could have denied it, explained, or reconciled it with his present testimony. It follows, therefore, that the court erred in admitting the testimony of Maples for impeachment. The state strongly insists that Maples' testimony, though inadmissible for impeachment purposes, nevertheless, is admissible to show appellant's intent to commit the crime with which he is charged, and that it was the province of the trial court to determine the order of proof. True, the order of proof is a matter within the discretion of the trial court but this rule is not applicable here. The state's case had been closed and Maples' testimony was inadmissible in rebuttal for any purpose. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law and cases cited. For the reasons stated, the judgment must be reversed; however, upon a retrial another question raised here will likely be renewed in the lower court. Consequently we will dispose of it. The appellant complains of the action of the trial court in refusing to permit him to interrogate prospective jurors on voir dire as to their attitude and frame of mind so as to aid him, as he claims, in the proper exercise of his peremptory challenges. An examination of the record discloses that the questions propounded related principally to the doctrine of reasonable doubt, and the right of self-defense. There was no error in this regard. A juror's personal view as to the law or what it should be is not a proper subject of inquiry on voir dire examination; he is bound by the law received from the court. State v. Douthitt, 26 N.M. 532, 194 P. 879, and cases cited. See also McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 146 A.2d 194; People v. Jefferson, 84 Cal. App. 2d 709, 191 P.2d 487. Questions dealing with instructions have also been argued, but, in view of the conclusion announced, we need not discuss them. The judgment will be reversed with direction to grant appellant a new trial. It is so ordered. CARMODY and NOBLE, JJ., concur. CHAVEZ and MOISE, JJ., not participating.