Title: ROBIN MURDOCK and CAROL MURDOCK, a/k/a ROBERT B. MURDOCK AND CAROL R. MURDOCK V. DAVID D. ZIER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBIN MURDOCK and CAROL MURDOCK, a/k/a ROBERT B. MURDOCK AND CAROL R. MURDOCK V. DAVID D. ZIER2006 WY 80137 P.3d 147Case Number: 05-231Decided: 06/30/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROBIN 
MURDOCK and CAROL MURDOCK, a/k/a ROBERT B. MURDOCK AND CAROL R. 
MURDOCK,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
DAVID D. 
ZIER,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Thomas 
P. Keegan of Bormuth Law Associates, L.C., Cody, 
Wyoming;* Scott Kolpitcke of Copenhaver, Kath, 
Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Kolpitcke.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Matthew 
D. Winslow of Winslow Law Firm, P.C., Cody, 
Wyoming;** Laurence W. Stinson of Bonner 
Stinson, P.C., Powell, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Stinson.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Order 
Allowing Substitution of Counsel entered January 4, 2006

** Order 
Allowing Substitution of Counsel entered December 28, 2005

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      David Zier and 
Robin and Carol Murdock (as husband and wife) own adjoining tracts of land.  Because of a mistaken property boundary 
line, Mr. Zier is in possession of, and has continuously used, a small parcel of 
land to which the Murdocks possess title.  
Mr. Zier brought an action to quiet title in himself, claiming title 
through adverse possession.  The 
district court granted summary judgment on Mr. Zier's petition to quiet 
title.  The Murdocks appeal.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Murdocks 
present four issues for this Court's review:

 
 
1.  Whether the Court below erred in finding 
that the offer to purchase the property and the Appellee's recognition of 
superior title interrupted any period of adverse possession and negated the 
necessary elements of hostile intent or claim of right? 
[sic]

 
 
2.  Whether the burden shifting framework 
set forth in Hillard v. Marshall 
abrogates long-established Wyoming law that hostile intent under claim of 
right or color of title is a required element to prove adverse 
possession?

 
 
3.  Whether Rule 408 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence is applicable to the offer to purchase where there was no actual 
dispute and there was no claim of right?

 
 
4.  Whether the Appellee has failed to 
present a prima facie case, thus 
entitling the Appellants to summary judgment and a decree of ejectment and writ 
of possession?  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Murdocks and 
Mr. Zier own adjoining tracts of land, Tract 10 and Tract 11, respectively.  The Murdocks bought Tract 10 on 
September 3, 1982, while Mr. Zier bought Tract 11 in March 1991.  Both 
tracts of land have been, and continue to be, used generally for agricultural 
and grazing purposes, customary uses of land in that area.  Mr. Zier's 
tract is situated roughly to the east of the Murdocks' tract.  A county 
road, established in 1952, runs between the two properties.  At the time 
the road was dedicated, the respective predecessors in interest to the Murdocks 
and Mr. Zier acknowledged that the road was the proper boundary between the two 
properties.  In fact, the record indicates that the boundary, as 
represented by the county road, has not changed since 1918. 

 
 
[¶4]      It is undisputed 
that, until 1998, both the Murdocks and Mr. Zier believed the county road to be 
the proper boundary line between the two properties.  Mr. Murdock believed he owned the 
property up to the west half of the county road and Mr. Zier owned the land up 
to the east half of the county road.  
In 1998, Mr. Zier had his property, Tract 11, surveyed.  The survey 
revealed a discrepancy between the land Mr. Zier had historically used and the 
legal description of his tract.  A strip of land on the east side of the 
county road fell within the deed description of Tract 10, and not Tract 11 as 
had always been presumed.  It is 
this strip of land, comprised of approximately 1.4 acres, that is the subject of 
the instant dispute.

 
 
[¶5]      It is undisputed 
that the Murdocks did not know they had an interest in any property on the east 
side of the county road until the survey.  
Mr. Murdock testified that from 1982, when he bought Tract 10, until 
2004, the disputed parcel was used continuously and openly by Mr. Zier and his 
predecessors in interest for agricultural and grazing purposes.  In 1982, 
Tract 11 was owned and being used by Earl Sullivan.  Mr. Murdock testified that Mr. Sullivan 
used the disputed parcel to grow corn and graze cattle.  In 1987, the Wyoming Farm Loan Board 
bought Tract 11. The Board immediately leased the property to Randy Olson, the 
term of the lease being from 1987 until 1991.  Mr. Murdock testified that he saw Mr. 
Olson growing hay and grazing livestock on the disputed parcel.  Mr. Zier bought Tract 11 from the Board 
in 1991.  Mr. Zier used the disputed 
parcel for growing crops, grazing cattle and depositing "junk."  Mr. Zier also owns a small building 
situated on the disputed parcel.  At 
no time did Mr. Zier or his predecessors in interest ask the Murdocks for 
permission to use the disputed parcel.  
At no time did Mr. or Mrs. Murdock ever give consent for the use of the 
disputed parcel.  At no time did the Murdocks ever share in the profits or 
rents from the disputed parcel.  

 
 
[¶6]      In 1998, upon 
learning of the discrepancy between the true and assumed boundary lines, Mr. 
Zier offered to purchase title to the disputed parcel from the Murdocks.  Purchase terms, however, could not be 
agreed upon and nothing more was said about the matter.  Mr. Zier continued to use the disputed 
parcel as before.  He did not ask 
permission from the Murdocks for his continued use, nor did the Murdocks 
expressly give permission or object to Mr. Zier's continued use. 

 
 
[¶7]      This state of 
affairs continued until 2004, when the Murdocks gave Mr. Zier notice that they 
intended to fence off the disputed parcel for their own use.  Mr. Zier brought the instant petition to 
quiet title, claiming ownership through adverse possession.  The Murdocks, as the record title 
owners, counterclaimed for ejectment.  
Mr. Zier moved for summary judgment.  After a hearing, his motion was granted, 
and the district court ordered the title to the disputed parcel be quieted to 
Mr. Zier.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶8]      This Court 
invokes its usual standard for review for summary judgments when reviewing a 
summary judgment granting a petition for a declaratory judgment.  Laughter v. Board of County Comm'rs for 
Sweetwater County, 2005 WY 54, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo. 2005); Pullar v. Huelle, 2003 WY 90, ¶ 6, 73 P.3d 1038, 1039-40 (Wyo. 2003); Goglio v. 
Star Valley Ranch Ass'n, 2002 WY 94, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Wyo. 
2002).  When a motion for summary 
judgment is before this Court, assuming there is a complete record, we have 
exactly the same duty and materials as did the district court and must follow 
the same standards.  Pullar, ¶ 6, 73 P.3d  at 1039; Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶ 
10, 67 P.3d 627, 630 (Wyo. 2003).  
Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56, summary judgment can be granted only when no 
genuine issues of material fact are present and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  

 
 
[¶9]      This Court 
evaluates the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment, giving that party all the favorable inferences 
which may be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, depositions, and 
other materials appearing in the record.  
Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 
101, ¶ 9, 118 P.3d 429, 433 (Wyo. 2005).  
Questions of application of the law, including identification of the 
correct rule, are considered de 
novo.  We accord no deference to 
the decision of the district court on questions of law.  Board of CountyComm'rs v. Geringer, 941 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo. 1997).  If the summary judgment can be affirmed 
under any proper legal theory supported by the record, we will do so.  Fontaine v. Board of CountyComm'rs of ParkCounty, 4 P.3d 890, 892 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
Adverse 
Possession

 
 
[¶10]   On appeal, the Murdocks are 
challenging the district court's application of the doctrine of adverse 
possession.  Title to land is 
obtained through adverse possession if possession is "actual, open, notorious, 
exclusive, and continuous for the statutory period, hostile, and under color of 
title or claim of right."  City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 
Wyo. 494, 502, 273 P. 908, 910 (1929); see Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 2002).  
Possession is hostile when the possessor holds and claims property as his 
own, whether by mistake or willfully.  
See Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 805 
(Wyo. 1986), overruled on other grounds, Ferguson Ranch, 
Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991).  The statutory period in Wyoming is ten 
years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-103 
(LexisNexis 2005).  

 
 
[¶11]   In the proceedings below, Mr. Zier 
primarily argued that, by possessing the disputed parcel since he bought Tract 
11 in 1991, he obtained title to the disputed parcel in 2001.  In the alternative, Mr. Zier argued that 
he should be allowed to tack his time of adverse possession with the period of 
adverse possession by his predecessors in interest.  Title to the disputed parcel would 
thereby have vested in him at an even earlier date.  The Murdocks did not dispute that Mr. 
Zier actually used the disputed parcel of land openly, notoriously, exclusively 
and continuously from the time Mr. Zier bought Tract 11.  Rather, the main defense presented by 
the Murdocks was that Mr. Zier, by offering to purchase title in 1998, 
acknowledged their superior title to the property.  By doing so, argue the Murdocks, Mr. 
Zier interrupted the running of the ten year statutory period for the maturation 
of a claim for adverse possession by destroying the hostile nature of his 
possession of the disputed parcel.  

 
 
[¶12]   The district court found that Mr. 
Zier "should prevail on his adverse possession claim for the period running from 
1991 to 2004."  Regarding the 
argument put forward by the Murdocks, the district court found that Mr. Zier's 
1998 offer to purchase the disputed parcel "does not nullify the years of 
adverse possession which took place in this case."1 Because of its holding that Mr. 
Zier adversely possessed the disputed parcel from 1991 until 2004, it expressly 
declined to address Mr. Zier's argument that he be allowed to tack his adverse 
possession with that of his predecessors in interest.

 
 
[¶13]   We agree that there is no issue of 
material fact and Mr. Zier is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  In fact, given the fifty plus years of 
possession and use of the disputed parcel by the owners of Tract 11, this case 
presents such a classic case of adverse possession that, "if we failed to uphold 
the judgment herein, we should practically be driven to the position that our 
statute permitting title to be acquired by adverse possession means little or 
nothing."  Sturm, 39 Wyo. at 503, 273 P.  at 
911.  Our reasoning, however, is 
slightly different from that of the district court.  Under the specific facts of this case, 
the evidence unequivocally establishes that Mr. Zier acquired title to the 
disputed parcel by adverse possession in 1992.

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Zier acquired title by tacking 
his period of adverse possession with that of his immediate predecessors in 
interest.  Under the doctrine of 
"tacking," "where there is privity between persons successively in possession 
holding adversely to the true title continuously, the successive periods of 
occupation may be united to make up the time prescribed by statute."  Bryant v. Cradle, 18 Wyo. 64, 87, 104 P. 23, 27 (1909); see Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. 
Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1137 (Wyo. 1982).  Privity in this case was never 
questioned.  The record chain of 
title to Tract 11 establishes privity between Mr. Zier and his predecessors in 
interest back to 1938. Each owner of Tract 11 put the subsequent owner of Tract 
11 in actual physical possession of the disputed parcel.  

 
 
[¶15]   The remaining question is whether 
Mr. Zier's predecessors in interest adversely possessed the disputed 
parcel.  The law of adverse 
possession in a mistaken boundary case was established by Justice Blume in our 
previously cited case of City of Rock 
Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908 (1929):

 
 
In 
conclusion on this point: The law contemplates that rights in land may be lost 
to another by means of adverse possession.  
We are not the judges of the wisdom of that.  The prime object in prescribing how much 
adverse possession shall be made manifest, of what elements or requisites it 
shall be composed, is to advise the real owner that his ownership is in danger, 
and the law has deemed the time fixed as sufficiently long, so as to give him 
ample opportunity to protect his right; and if he fails to do so, when thus 
advised, within the time fixed, he is considered as having acquiesced in the 
transfer of ownership.  Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742.  Bearing this in mind, it is 
a reasonable rule that, when a man has occupied a piece of ground, though under 
a mistaken belief as to the true boundary, for the period prescribed by law, 
openly, notoriously, exclusively, and in a manner plainly indicating that he 
acted as owner thereof, the presumption should be, in the absence of explanatory 
circumstances showing the contrary, that he occupied the land adversely and 
under a claim of right, casting the burden of explaining such possession upon 
the person who disputes his right.  

 
 
39 
Wyo. at 517, 
273 P.  at 915-16.  See Davis, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d  at 1270; Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Wyo. 1995). 

 
 
[¶16]   In this case, the deposition 
testimony of the Murdocks reveals that, from the time they bought Tract 10 in 
1982, they had actual knowledge that the disputed parcel was in continuous use 
by the record owners of Tract 11 or their lessees.  From 1982 until 1998, the Murdocks 
believed they owned the property up to their (west) half of the county road and 
that Mr. Zier and his predecessors in interest owned the property up to their 
(east) half of the county road.  
Consistent with this belief, the Murdocks did not attempt to exercise any 
control over the disputed parcel nor did they give permission to anyone to use 
the parcel.  For their part, no 
owner of Tract 11 sought permission from the Murdocks for their use of the 
disputed parcel.

 
 
[¶17]   The undisputed testimony thus 
establishes that, from at least 1982 forward, the successive owners of Tract 11 
used the disputed parcel openly, notoriously, exclusively and in a manner 
plainly indicating that they were acting as owner thereof.  This use was not permissive and was done 
under a claim of right.  All the 
requisite elements of adverse possession are met.2  Once all the elements of adverse 
possession are met, the possessor is vested with a fully new and distinct 
title.  No judicial action is 
necessary.  Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 935 
(Wyo. 1983); Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 51, 112 P.2d 570, 577 (1941).  Relying on the 
Murdocks' positive deposition testimony that the disputed parcel was possessed 
adversely to their interest since they bought Tract 10 in September 1982, the 
statutory period for adverse possession ran in September 1992.  September 1992, then, is when Mr. Zier, 
as the then current possessor, became vested with new title to the disputed 
parcel.  

 
 
[¶18]   The Murdocks argue that Mr. Zier 
should not be allowed to tack the time of possession of his predecessors in 
interest onto his time of adverse possession because there is no information in 
the record establishing the use of the property by the Wyoming Farm Loan 
Board.  We disagree.  The record reflects that the Wyoming 
Farm Loan Board bought Tract 11 in 1987 and immediately leased the property to 
Mr. Olson.  Mr. Olson took 
possession of the property and used the property, including the disputed parcel, 
for agricultural and grazing purpose.  
This use continued until the Board sold Tract 11 to Mr. Zier in 
1991.  The Murdocks also claim that 
the Board did not take the disputed parcel under color of title.  It has long been established in 
Wyoming, 
however, that, color of title is not necessary when there is actual 
possession.  Trefren v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 325-26 
(Wyo. 1993); Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 
623 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Wyo. 1981); Sturm, 39 Wyo. at 502, 273 P.  at 910; Bryant, 18 Wyo. at 86, 104 P.  at 
27.  

 
 
[¶19]   Once it is understood that Mr. Zier 
was vested with legal title to the disputed parcel in 1992, the argument 
presented by the Murdocks that Mr. Zier interrupted the statutory period in 1998 
is not well-founded.  The statutory 
period had already run.3  Once vested, title "can only be divested 
by conveyance, descent or operation of law."  Sanders v. Lidle, 674 P.2d 1291, 1293 
(Wyo. 
1984).  It is settled that "an 
acknowledgment of the title of a prior owner does not serve to divest a title 
previously acquired by adverse possession."  Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 341-42 
(Wyo. 
1966).  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The undisputed evidence establishes 
that Mr. Zier and his predecessors in interest possessed the disputed parcel 
adversely to the interest of the Murdocks since the Murdocks bought Tract 10 in 
1982.  Legal title therefore vested 
in Mr. Zier in 1992.  Mr. Zier's 
offer to purchase title to the disputed parcel in 1998, after the mistaken 
boundary line was discovered, had no effect on his vested title.  In light of our determination that title 
vested in Mr. Zier in 1992, we need not further address the issues raised by the 
Murdocks.  The decision of the 
district court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Since the 
district court clearly accepted the offer to purchase title as evidence for 
purposes of the motion for summary judgment, Issue 3 presents a purely 
hypothetical question, which we will in no event address. 

 

2In this case 
it matters little what presumption is applied or who has the burden of 
production since the evidence supporting the elements of adverse possession 
between 1982 and 1992 is undisputed and 
unambiguous.

 
 

3The offer has no 
relevance to the intent of Mr. Zier and his predecessors in interest during the 
running of the statutory period since it is undisputed that they used the 
disputed parcel during this time under the belief that they owned the 
parcel.  Cf. Miller, 717 P.2d  at 805 ("A party's 
conduct after the time he claimed to have acquired title by adverse possession 
might be said to have little relevance, but this court believes that such later 
conduct also indicates his intent during the period of asserted adverse 
possession.")