Title: Hess v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Hess v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 389, 2005-Ohio-5408.] 
 
 
HESS ET AL., APPELLEES, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN  
RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Hess v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 389, 2005-Ohio-5408.] 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act — Damages — Section 55, Title 45, U.S.Code 
—  Apportionment of damages among settling and nonsettling defendants 
— Nonsettling defendant not entitled to reduction of judgment by 
proportionate share of damages attributable to settling defendants — 
Nonsettling defendant is entitled to pro tanto credit of amounts paid by 
settling defendants. 
(No. 2003-2035—Submitted January 11, 2005—Decided October 26, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 80717, 153 Ohio App.3d 565, 2003-Ohio-4172, 795 N.E.2d 91. 
__________________ 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} Twenty-eight former employees of defendant-appellant, Norfolk 
Southern Railway Company, filed a master complaint in the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(“FELA”), Sections 51-60, Title 45, U.S.Code, alleging that Norfolk had 
negligently exposed them to asbestos at its Spencer, North Carolina, facility, 
which caused them to contract various forms of pneumoconiosis.  Four of the 
cases, i.e., those brought by plaintiffs-appellees Lee McAdoo Hess, Lester L. Poe 
Sr., Charlie Leon Miller, and Baxter Lovelace Wyatt, all of whom have since died 
of lung cancer, were consolidated for trial under Civ.R. 42(A). 
{¶ 2} Before trial, Norfolk proposed instructions that would require the 
jury to apportion damages according to degree of fault, weighing the railroad’s 
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negligence in exposing appellees to asbestos not only against appellees’ own 
negligence, but also against the negligence of non-FELA defendants who 
contributed to appellees’ injuries.  Specifically, Norfolk requested an instruction 
that the jury must “determine the percentage to which [each] plaintiff’s non-work 
related factors, if any, contributed to his injuries” and that the court would 
decrease the amount of any award by that percentage.  Norfolk relied on 
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde (1994), 511 U.S. 202, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 
148, an admiralty case, for the proposition that an “FELA employer whose 
employee has been injured partially by [the] employer’s negligence and partially 
by other causes must pay only for those injuries attributable to its negligence,” or 
in other words “is required to pay only its proportionate share of damages.” 
{¶ 3} During trial, the court precluded Norfolk from arguing that third 
parties not before the court, including other employers and asbestos 
manufacturers, may have caused or contributed to appellees’ injuries.  The trial 
court allowed the jury to apportion responsibility only between Norfolk and 
appellees based on comparative fault.  On October 15, 2001, the jury returned 
verdicts in favor of each appellee, ranging from $510,000 to $1.07 million, but 
found each appellee partially responsible for his lung cancer.1 
{¶ 4} Norfolk filed two interrelated posttrial motions.  In one, Norfolk 
requested a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A), arguing that the trial court 
erroneously excluded evidence that each of the plaintiffs had separately sued the 
asbestos manufacturers and that these entities were responsible, at least in part, for 
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. 
                                                 
1. 
The jury awarded $1.07 million to Hess, $510,000 to Miller, $570,000 to Poe, and 
$905,000 to Wyatt.  The jury found Hess and Wyatt 25 percent responsible and Miller and Poe 50 
percent responsible for their lung cancer. 
 
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3 
{¶ 5} In the other motion, Norfolk argued, in essence, that since the trial 
court did not allow for apportionment of damages among potential tortfeasors, the 
railroad is now “entitled to a set-off of any damages which the Plaintiffs may 
recover in their claims against the manufacturers.”  To this end, Norfolk requested 
a stay of any entry of judgment until the claims against the manufacturers have 
been resolved.  Otherwise, Norfolk argued, the plaintiffs will obtain a double 
recovery. 
{¶ 6} Norfolk later discovered that appellees had already settled with 
some of the asbestos manufacturers before trial.  The parties agree that Hess 
received settlement proceeds totaling $12,682, that Poe received $4,900, Miller 
$3,450, and Wyatt $9,000.2 
{¶ 7} Based on this discovery, Norfolk modified its motions for new trial 
and setoff.  Norfolk now cited McDermott, supra, for the proposition that “a non-
settling defendant is not liable for damages caused by third parties or joint 
tortfeasors with whom a plaintiff has already reached a settlement.”  Norfolk 
argued that in FELA cases involving pretrial settlements with joint tortfeasors, the 
nonsettling defendant is liable only for its proportionate share of the damages and 
the plaintiff’s award must be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the 
settling defendants.  Thus, Norfolk sought a new trial to allow the jury to 
apportion damages among the settling and nonsettling defendants, or, in the 
alternative, a full setoff of the settlement amounts received by the plaintiffs. 
                                                 
2.  
Since the various settlements involved trust payment plans established in conjunction with 
class-action asbestos litigation and related bankruptcy proceedings, the actual amount of settlement 
funds available for and received by appellees under these plans bore little resemblance to the 
scheduled payments or “liquidated value” of the settlements.  None of the parties contend that 
some amount other than the actual settlement payments made under these agreements is relevant to 
the issues raised in this case. 
 
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{¶ 8} The trial court denied both motions and, after adjusting the verdicts 
for appellees’ comparative negligence and other factors not relevant here, entered 
final judgments totaling approximately $1.86 million.3 
{¶ 9} Norfolk appealed to the Eighth Appellate District, asserting eight 
assignments of error, including that “[t]he trial court erred in failing to allow 
apportionment of liability of damages under FELA and by not allowing set-offs.”  
Soon after, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Norfolk & W. Ry. 
Co. v. Ayers (2003), 538 U.S. 135, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261.  In that case, 
the Supreme Court rejected Norfolk’s argument that the FELA authorizes an 
apportionment of damages between railroad and nonrailroad causes and held that 
the FELA permits an employee to recover his or her full damages from the 
railroad, regardless of whether the injury was also caused in part by a third party.  
Id. at 165-166, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow the jury to consider the degree of 
fault of anyone besides Norfolk and appellees.  Hess v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 153 
Ohio App.3d 565, 2003-Ohio-4172, 795 N.E.2d 91, at ¶ 56. 
{¶ 10} However, the court of appeals did not explicitly consider Norfolk’s 
argument that the question of setoff is governed by federal law, particularly 
McDermott, supra.  Instead, the court simply determined that former R.C. 
2307.31(A) precluded setoff because the settling defendants were not 
codefendants at trial, were not adjudicated liable, and did not admit liability. Id. at 
¶ 57.  Norfolk moved for reconsideration, arguing that R.C. 2307.31 is 
                                                 
3. 
As adjusted by the trial court, Hess’s net recovery amounted to $705,746.92 ($1,070,000 
minus a $129,004.11 remittitur for medical expenses minus 25 percent for his comparative 
negligence), Miller’s amounted to $248,853.88 ($510,000 minus a $12,292.23 remittitur for 
medical expenses minus 50 percent for his comparative negligence), Poe’s equaled $322,343.69 
($570,000 plus a $74,687.38 additur in medical expenses minus 50 percent for his comparative 
negligence), and Wyatt’s net damages totaled $585,025.18 ($905,000 minus a $124,966.42 
remittitur for medical expenses minus 25 percent for his comparative negligence). 
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5 
inapplicable “because federal law governs the measure of damages and the right to 
a set-off in a FELA action.”  That motion was summarily denied. 
{¶ 11} The cause is now before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal on proposition of law No. I only. 
{¶ 12} Norfolk’s first proposition of law states: 
{¶ 13} “Federal common law determines the amount of set-off to be 
applied to a verdict for monetary damages against a non-settling railroad 
defendant in a FELA case.” 
{¶ 14} In this proposition, Norfolk is not simply asking us to hold that 
federal law governs whether and how a nonsettling employer in an FELA action is 
to receive credit for settlements with other tortfeasors.  It is also asking us to 
decide a question not yet addressed by the United States Supreme Court, which is 
whether the “proportionate share rule” adopted in McDermott for admiralty cases 
applies in FELA actions.  Arguing that McDermott’s proportionate-share rule is 
entirely compatible with the joint-and-several-liability rule recently announced in 
Ayers for FELA cases, Norfolk seeks a new trial to allow the jury to apportion the 
responsibility of the settling defendants so that Norfolk’s total liability can be 
properly reduced.  We address these issues in turn. 
I 
GOVERNING LAW 
{¶ 15} Section 51, Title 45, U.S.Code provides that every common carrier 
by railroad shall be liable in damages to any employee who suffers work-related 
injury or death “resulting in whole or in part” from the railroad’s negligence.  In 
discussing the act’s laudable aims, the high court explained: 
{¶ 16} “Cognizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in 
the death or maiming of thousands of workers every year, Congress crafted a 
federal remedy that shifted part of the ‘ “human overhead” ’ of doing business 
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from employees to their employers.  Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 
54, 58 [63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610] (1943).  * * *  In order to further FELA’s 
humanitarian purposes, Congress did away with several common-law tort 
defenses that had effectively barred recovery by injured workers.  Specifically, the 
statute abolished the fellow servant rule, rejected the doctrine of contributory 
negligence in favor of comparative negligence, and prohibited employers from 
exempting themselves from FELA through contract; a 1939 amendment abolished 
the assumption of risk defense.”  (Citation omitted.)  Consol. Rail Corp. v. 
Gottshall (1994), 512 U.S. 532, 542-543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427. 
{¶ 17} Although the FELA is not a workers’ compensation statute, in that 
some showing of fault is required, id. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427, 
“the special features of this statutory negligence action * * * make it significantly 
different from the ordinary common-law negligence action.”  Rogers v. Missouri 
Pacific RR. Co. (1957), 352 U.S. 500, 509-510, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493.  
Specifically, “[t]he statute supplants [the common-law duty of the master to his 
servant] with the far more drastic duty of paying damages for injury or death at 
work due in whole or in part to the employer’s negligence.  The employer is 
stripped of his common-law defenses and for practical purposes the inquiry in 
these cases today rarely presents more than the single question whether negligence 
of the employer played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the 
subject of the suit.”  Rogers at 507-508, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. 
{¶ 18} It follows that “[o]ne of the purposes of the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act was to ‘create uniformity throughout the Union’ with respect to 
railroads’ financial responsibility for injuries to their employees.”  Norfolk & W. 
Ry. Co. v. Liepelt (1980), 444 U.S. 490, 493, 100 S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689, fn. 5, 
quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1386 (1908) 3.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has long 
emphasized that uniform application of the FELA is “essential to effectuate its 
January Term, 2005 
7 
purposes” and that “[s]tate laws are not controlling in determining what the 
incidents of this federal right shall be.”  Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown RR. 
Co. (1952), 342 U.S. 359, 361, 72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398.  Thus, “[a]s a general 
matter, FELA cases adjudicated in state courts are subject to state procedural 
rules, but the substantive law governing them is federal,” St. Louis Southwestern 
Ry. Co. v. Dickerson (1985), 470 U.S. 409, 411, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 84 L.Ed.2d 303, 
including “principles of common law as interpreted and applied in the federal 
courts.”  Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kuhn (1931), 284 U.S. 44, 47, 52 S.Ct. 
45, 76 L.Ed. 157. 
{¶ 19} “It has long been settled that ‘the proper measure of damages 
[under the FELA] is inseparably connected with the right of action,’ and therefore 
is an issue of substance that ‘must be settled according to general principles of law 
as administered in the Federal courts.’ ”  Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. 
Morgan (1988), 486 U.S. 330, 335, 108 S.Ct. 1837, 100 L.Ed.2d 349, quoting 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly (1916), 241 U.S. 485, 491, 36 S.Ct. 630, 60 
L.Ed. 1117.  In other words, “questions concerning the measure of damages in an 
FELA action are federal in character * * *, even if the action is brought in state 
court.”  Liepelt, supra, 444 U.S. at 493, 100 S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689. 
{¶ 20} The issue becomes, therefore, whether credit for third-party 
settlements is a question of “the proper measure of damages” under the FELA. 
{¶ 21} The United States Supreme Court has held that an issue involves 
“the proper measure of damages” and is therefore governed by federal law when 
resolution of the issue has an appreciable effect on the employee’s recovery and 
the employer’s liability.  See, e.g., Morgan, supra, 486 U.S. at 335, 108 S.Ct. 
1837, 100 L.Ed.2d 349 (federal law governs prejudgment interest because that 
interest is “designed to make the plaintiff whole and is part of the actual damages 
sought to be recovered”).  See, also, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly (1916), 
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241 U.S. 485, 491, 36 S.Ct. 630, 60 L.Ed. 1117 (federal law governs whether 
decedent’s estimated future earnings should be reduced to present cash value); 
Liepelt, supra, 444 U.S. at 492-493, 100 S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (federal law 
governs whether jury must be instructed that award is not subject to income tax 
and whether evidence of taxes on decedent’s earnings was properly excluded). 
{¶ 22} At least one court has held that the instant issue of whether a 
railroad’s right to receive credit for settlements is controlled by federal rather than 
state law.  Schadel v. Iowa Interstate RR., Ltd. (C.A.7, 2004), 381 F.3d 671.  The 
availability of a credit was characterized as affecting the plaintiff’s right to 
recover the full amount of damages from the railroad alone, regardless of the 
responsibility of any other tortfeasor, settling or nonsettling.  Id. at 676.  Since this 
question affects the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery, the Schadel court held that 
federal law applies.  The court cited the rationale in Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 123 
S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261, as the basis for that conclusion. 
{¶ 23} We agree.  Clearly, the question of whether and how a settlement 
with a joint tortfeasor should affect the nonsettling railroad’s liability concerns the 
measure of damages under the FELA and, therefore, is governed by federal law.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed insofar as it pertains 
to this issue. 
II 
EFFECT OF THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT ON LIABILITY 
OF NONSETTLING RAILROAD 
A 
Statutory Text 
{¶ 24} In deciding the present issue, we must “turn first to the statute” for 
guidance.  Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall (1994), 512 U.S. 532, 542, 114 S.Ct. 
January Term, 2005 
9 
2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427.  Appellees direct our attention to Section 55, Title 45, 
U.S.Code, which provides: 
{¶ 25} “Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose 
or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any 
liability created by this chapter [Section 51 et seq., Title 45, U.S.Code], shall to 
that extent be void:  Provided, That in any action brought against any such 
common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter, such 
common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any 
insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured 
employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which 
said action was brought.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 26} Appellees argue that since Section 55 expressly provides for setoff 
in only “a single instance,” i.e., where the railroad “has contributed or paid to any 
insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured 
employee,” it necessarily “prohibits all other forms of set-off.”  Thus, the 
argument goes, setoff for third-party settlements should not be recognized in 
FELA cases because it has been specifically prohibited by Congress.  We cannot 
concur. 
{¶ 27} Section 55 was primarily designed to bar the various schemes that 
railroads had contrived to exempt themselves from paying full damages for 
employee injuries, including preinjury liability releases and contractual 
stipulations that an employee’s acceptance of benefits from the employer’s relief 
fund would amount to a release and satisfaction of all claims against the railroad.  
See Duncan v. Thompson (1942), 315 U.S. 1, 5-6, 62 S.Ct. 422, 86 L.Ed. 575; 
Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington RR. Co. v. Schubert (1912), 224 U.S. 603, 
612-613, 32 S.Ct. 589, 56 L.Ed. 911.  See, also, 40 Cong.Rec. 7917 (1906) 
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(statement of Sen. Daniels); 42 Cong.Rec. 4527 (1908) (statement of Sen. 
Dolliver); H.R.Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908) 6-9, 30-75. 
{¶ 28} The setoff proviso ensured that the railroad’s liability under the 
FELA “survived the acceptance of benefits,” while “permitting a set-off of any 
sum the company had contributed toward any benefit paid to the employee.”  
Schubert, 224 U.S. at 613, 32 S.Ct. 589, 56 L.Ed. 911.  The proviso “in part 
codifies the common law collateral source rule which prevents a tortfeasor (the 
employer) from reducing its liability by payments that the injured party (the 
employee) has received from sources collateral to the tortfeasor.”  Folkestad v. 
Burlington N., Inc. (C.A.9, 1987), 813 F.2d 1377, 1380. 
{¶ 29} Under common law, a tort defendant is generally entitled to set off 
the full amount of compensation that the plaintiff receives from benefit sources 
affiliated with that defendant.  “For example, if the defendant’s medical pay 
insurance makes payments to the plaintiff for medical costs, the defendant is 
entitled to a credit [for those payments] against his liability.”  Dobbs, The Law of 
Torts (2000) 1060, Section 380.  Section 55 modifies the common law to the 
extent that “the railroad is entitled to set off only the premiums [paid by the 
employer], not what the premiums bought [for the plaintiff].”  Blake v. Delaware 
& Hudson Ry. Co. (C.A.2, 1973), 484 F.2d 204, 207 (Friendly, J., concurring). 
{¶ 30} The setoff proviso differs, therefore, from the collateral-source 
rule, as it permits a premiums-only reduction for employer-purchased benefits.  
Viewing Section 55 in this context, we hold that it does not prohibit an FELA 
employer from receiving a setoff for amounts paid in settlement by a fellow 
tortfeasor. 
 
{¶ 31} It is well established at common law that apart from the collateral-
source rule, a partial satisfaction received from one of two joint tortfeasors serves 
to diminish the liability of the nonsettling defendant.  Dobbs, supra, at 1082-1085, 
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Section 388 (credits to nonsettling tortfeasors); 3 Harper, James & Gray, The Law 
of Torts (1986) 36-37, Section 10.1 (earlier satisfaction by one cotortfeasor 
reduces liability of others).  See, also, Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th Ed.1984) 
333, 335-336, Section 49; Annotation, Manner of Crediting One Tortfeasor with 
Amount Paid by Another for Release or Covenant Not to Sue (1964), 94 A.L.R.2d 
352. 
{¶ 32} In Lucht v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. (W.D.Mich.1980), 489 
F.Supp. 189, the injured worker successfully argued that Section 55 precluded the 
railroad from setting off certain no-fault collateral benefits, but conceded that the 
railroad is entitled to set off amounts received by the employee under a prior 
settlement with another tortfeasor.  In Downer v. CSX Transp., Inc. (1998), 256 
Va. 590, 595-597, 507 S.E.2d 612, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that 
Section 55 does not apply to prohibit a railroad from setting off against the 
judgment amounts already received by the employee in settlement with a second 
tortfeasor. 
{¶ 33} We conclude that Section 55, Title 45, U.S.Code does not prohibit 
the credit Norfolk seeks. 
B 
Federal Common Law 
{¶ 34} But the question remains whether federal common law precludes 
such a credit in FELA actions.  Gottshall, supra, 512 U.S. at 558, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 
129 L.Ed.2d 427 (Souter, J., concurring).  The act itself does not address the effect 
of a plaintiff’s settlement with nonrailroad tortfeasors on the amount of recovery 
from a nonsettling railroad defendant.  Norfolk directs us to a line of federal 
admiralty cases, arguing that this authority has historically been relied upon in 
FELA cases and offers a helpful guide to the federal common law on the setoff 
issue in this case.  Norfolk points out that Ayers explicitly cited admiralty cases to 
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support its conclusion that joint and several liability applies to FELA cases.  Id., 
538 U.S. at 163-164, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261. 
{¶ 35} Before McDermott, 511 U.S. 202, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 
148, the federal circuits oscillated between two alternatives in admiralty cases:  
(1) providing the nonsettling defendant with a reduction of the judgment by the 
comparative share of fault attributable to the settling defendant (the proportionate-
share credit) and (2) giving the nonsettling defendant a setoff for the actual dollar 
amount of the settlement (the pro tanto or dollar-for-dollar credit).  See, e.g., Self 
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (C.A.11, 1987), 832 F.2d 1540, 1547-1548 
(pro tanto approach); Martin v. Walk, Haydel & Assoc., Inc. (C.A.5, 1984), 742 
F.2d 246, 249 (proportionate-share method). 
{¶ 36} In McDermott, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the 
question of “how a settlement with less than all of the defendants in an admiralty 
case should affect the liability of nonsettling defendants.”  Id., 511 U.S. at 207, 
114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 148.  The court began with the premise that “when a 
plaintiff settles with one of several joint tortfeasors, the nonsettling defendants are 
entitled to a credit for that settlement.”  Id. at 208, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 
148.  In analyzing the question of how that credit should be calculated, the court 
adopted the proportionate-share rule.  The court reasoned that when a plaintiff 
settles with one of the tortfeasors, “the plaintiff’s recovery against the settling 
defendant has been limited not by outside forces, but by its own agreement to 
settle.  There is no reason to allocate any shortfall to the other defendants, who 
were not parties to the settlement.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Id. at 220-221, 114 S.Ct. 
1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 148. 
{¶ 37} While Norfolk contends that its liability in this case should be 
recalculated in accordance with the principles in McDermott, it has been unable to 
muster a single case decided before or after McDermott in which the 
January Term, 2005 
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proportionate-share credit was applied to a claim arising under the FELA.  In fact, 
at least one federal circuit has held that McDermott’s proportionate -hare approach 
to settlements is inconsistent with the FELA’s recovery-facilitating purposes and 
that the pro tanto approach “is the correct one for a FELA case.”  Schadel, supra, 
381 F.3d at 678. 
{¶ 38} Nevertheless, Norfolk argues that FELA jurisprudence is derived in 
large part from admiralty law and that admiralty courts have applied the 
proportionate-share rule.  None of the cases cited by Norfolk, however, so much 
as allude to the FELA or to any FELA-related decision.  And as we will explain, 
the language of the FELA itself compels rejection of the proportionate-share rule.  
We therefore decline Norfolk’s invitation to adopt admiralty principles in this 
case.  The FELA must be our guidepost. 
{¶ 39} Therefore, we find Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 
L.Ed.2d 261, to be the more useful authority.  While it does not address the 
narrow issue presented here—the effect of a settlement on nonsettling 
defendants—it is an FELA case and therefore analyzes its related issues in the 
very specific FELA context occupied by the instant case. 
{¶ 40} In Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261, six 
plaintiffs brought an FELA action against Norfolk, their former employer, 
alleging that Norfolk had negligently exposed them to asbestos, which caused 
them to contract the occupational disease asbestosis.  Norfolk requested an 
instruction directing the jury to apportion damages between Norfolk and other 
non-FELA employers who may have contributed to the plaintiffs’ disease. The 
trial court instructed the jury, however, not to make a deduction for the 
contribution of nonrailroad asbestos exposures, but to assess full liability against 
Norfolk if it found that Norfolk’s negligence contributed, however slightly, to the 
plaintiffs’ injuries.  The jury returned total damage awards for each plaintiff, some 
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of which were reduced for the claimants’ comparative negligence from smoking 
and for settlements with non-FELA entities.4  
{¶ 41} In finding that “the FELA does not authorize apportionment of 
damages between railroad and nonrailroad causes,” the Supreme Court explained 
that “[n]othing in the statutory text instructs that the amount of damages payable 
by a liable employer bears reduction when the negligence of a third party also 
contributed in part to the injury-in-suit.”  Id., 538 U.S. at 159-160, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 
155 L.Ed.2d 261. The high court further explained: 
{¶ 42} “The statutory context bolsters our reading, for interpreting § 1 
[Section 51, Title 45, U.S.Code] to require apportionment would put that 
provision in tension with the rest of the statute.  As recounted earlier, * * * several 
of the FELA’s provisions expand a railroad’s liability by abolishing common-law 
defenses that limited employees’ ability to recover against their employers.  
Among the innovations, the Act expressly directs apportionment of responsibility 
between employer and employee based on comparative fault.  See § 53 [Title 45, 
U.S.Code].  The statute expressly prescribes no other apportionment. 
{¶ 43} “Essentially, then, Norfolk asks us to narrow employer liability 
without a textual warrant.  Reining in employer liability as Norfolk proposes, 
however, is both unprovided for by the language of the FELA and inconsistent 
with the Act’s overall recovery facilitating thrust.”  Id. at 161, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 
L.Ed.2d 261. 
{¶ 44} Finally, after recognizing that the common-law rule when the 
FELA was enacted was joint and several liability, the Supreme Court observed: 
{¶ 45} “[R]eading the FELA to require apportionment [of damages among 
multiple tortfeasors] would handicap plaintiffs and could vastly complicate 
                                                 
4. 
Whether this reduction for settlements was proper under the FELA was not addressed in 
Ayers. 
January Term, 2005 
15 
adjudications, all the more so if, as Norfolk sometimes suggests, * * * 
manufacturers and suppliers, as well as other employers, should come within the 
apportionment pool.  See Sinkler [v. Missouri Pacific RR. Co. (1958)], 356 U.S. 
[326], at 329 [78 S.Ct. 758, 2 L.Ed.2d 799] (‘The cost of human injury, an 
inescapable expense of railroading, must be borne by someone, and the FELA 
seeks to adjust that expense equitably between the worker and the carrier.’).  Once 
an employer has been adjudged negligent with respect to a given injury, it accords 
with the FELA’s overarching purpose to require the employer to bear the burden 
of identifying [i.e., seeking contribution from] other responsible parties and 
demonstrating that some of the costs of the injury should be spread to them.”  Id. 
at 165, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261. 
{¶ 46} Although Ayers does not directly address the specific issue in this 
case, we are comfortable applying its broad principles to deciding the effect of 
settlements on nonsettling FELA defendants.  It is true, as Norfolk argues, that a 
proportionate-share approach to settlements is not generally inconsistent with 
joint and several liability.  But we do not read Ayers as merely reaffirming the 
well-established principle of joint and several liability.  Instead, Ayers recognizes 
that in enacting and amending the FELA, Congress was much more concerned 
with assuring the employee’s complete recovery than it was with fairness in loss 
allocation among multiple tortfeasors.  With its relaxed standard of causation and 
elimination of common-law defenses, the FELA builds on the premise that the 
inevitable loss due to workplace injuries should be absorbed by the industry.  By 
ensuring full recovery against a railroad whose negligence played only the 
slightest part in an employee’s injury or death, while providing for apportionment 
of responsibility only between employer and employee based on comparative 
fault, the statute plainly envisions that the employer may be forced to shoulder 
disproportionate liability when other parties are partially at fault. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 47} Moreover, even if McDermott could properly be extended to FELA 
cases generally, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the jury to apportion 
damages between Norfolk and the asbestos manufacturers.  The record does not 
reveal any argument by Norfolk that McDermott required setoff or that the 
proportionate-share rule applied to settlements.  In fact, long after Norfolk 
discovered the settlements, it was still insisting that it was entitled to a pro tanto, 
dollar-for-dollar setoff.  Thus, even if McDermott were applicable, the 
circumstances of this case would hardly justify a new trial to allow for a 
proportionate-share adjustment. 
{¶ 48} Based on all the foregoing, we hold that Norfolk is not entitled to a 
proportionate-share reduction of the judgment.  Norfolk is entitled to a pro tanto 
credit for those settlements under federal law.  Schadel, supra, 381 F.3d at 678. 
{¶ 49} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court to apply the 
appropriate credit.5 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
 
                                                 
5. 
In this regard, we draw the trial court’s attention to McDermott, supra, 511 U.S. at 211, 
114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 148, where the Supreme Court, in discussing the appellate court’s 
application of the pro tanto method, indicated that applying a pro tanto credit for the amount of 
settlement after reducing the judgment by the comparative share of damages attributable to 
McDermott and the settling defendants amounted to giving the nonsettling defendant a “double 
credit.” 
January Term, 2005 
17 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 50} I concur with the holding that federal law, rather than former R.C. 
2307.31, governs the issue whether Norfolk is entitled to a setoff of settlement 
amounts received by the appellees. 
{¶ 51} Having reviewed the controlling Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(“FELA”) and the precedent established by the United States Supreme Court in 
interpreting it, I dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that Norfolk is 
entitled to a pro tanto credit for those settlements in arriving at the final amount of 
the judgment against it.  Both the trial court and the court of appeals disallowed a 
setoff.  I would affirm their judgments because under federal law, Norfolk may 
not be credited in the amount of those payments.  Recognition of a credit would 
exempt Norfolk from a portion of its liability to the appellees, in contradiction of 
the express language of the FELA. 
{¶ 52} The FELA provides that “[e]very common carrier by railroad while 
engaging in commerce between any of the several States * * * shall be liable in 
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in 
such commerce, or, in the case of the death of such employee, to his or her 
personal representative * * * for such injury or death * * * resulting in whole or in 
part * * * by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its * * 
* equipment.” (Emphasis added.) Section 51, Title 45, U.S.Code. 
{¶ 53} The FELA further provides: 
{¶ 54} “Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose 
or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any 
liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any 
action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the 
provisions of this chapter, such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has 
contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the 
injury or death for which said action was brought.” (Emphasis sic.)  Section 55, 
Title 45, U.S.Code. 
{¶ 55} Thus, Section 51 expressly provides that a common carrier is liable 
for the amount of damages sustained by its employee if caused “in whole or in 
part” by the carrier.  Section 55 expressly provides that a carrier cannot exempt 
itself from that liability by “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever.”  
This language precludes application of any common-law rules, to the extent they 
may have existed at the time of the adoption of the FELA, that provide a setoff in 
an amount of settlement payments from a joint tortfeasor. 
{¶ 56} I agree with the majority that McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde (1994), 
511 U.S. 202, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 148, is not relevant to the issue before 
us.  McDermott involved a claim by an owner of a crane against the crane’s 
manufacturer where the plaintiff’s offshore platform deck and the crane itself 
were damaged when the crane’s main hook and supporting slings broke. It was 
decided based on the federal common law of admiralty.  It did not involve a 
statutory FELA claim asserting that the negligence of a common carrier caused, in 
whole or in part, injury to or death of an employee.  I find Sections 51 and 55, 
Title 45, U.S.Code, controlling in the FELA case before us.  Those statutes did 
not apply in McDermott. 
{¶ 57} We are instead bound to follow the latest interpretation of the 
FELA by the United States Supreme Court in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers 
(2003), 538 U.S. 135, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261.  The court unanimously 
concluded in Ayers that damages may not be apportioned among joint tortfeasors 
according to the degree of fault attributed to each tortfeasor.  Id. at 159-166, 123 
S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261.  The majority recognized that the FELA expressly 
directs apportionment of responsibility between employer and employee based on 
January Term, 2005 
19 
the comparative fault of only those two parties and that the statute “expressly 
prescribes no other apportionment.” Id. at 161, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261.  
It refused to “narrow employer liability without a textual warrant,” id., 
characterizing Norfolk’s view as “an untenable reading” of congressional silence 
on the issue of apportionment. Id. 
{¶ 58} Congress did, however, specifically address the matter of setoffs 
where amounts have been “paid to the injured employee * * * on account of the 
injury or death for which said action was brought.” Section 55, Title 45, 
U.S.Code.  It authorized a setoff benefiting the employer only in those instances 
where the carrier has “contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or 
indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee.”  Id.  Even then, 
Congress provided for setoff only in the amount of premiums paid by the 
carrier—not the full amount of benefits received. 
{¶ 59} Norfolk seeks a reduction in the final judgment of damages for 
which it is liable based on the fact that settlement payments by other tortfeasors 
were previously made to the appellees.  In so doing, it asks for adoption of a rule 
of contribution referred to by the Seventh Circuit as “claim reduction.”  In re Oil 
Spill by Amoco Cadiz (C.A.7, 1992), 954 F.2d 1279, 1315.  That rule provides 
that by “accepting a settlement from any party, the plaintiff forgoes the ability to 
collect from the remaining defendants any damages attributable to the settling 
party’s share of fault.”  Id. 
{¶ 60} A claim-reduction approach is inconsistent with Section 55, Title 
45, U.S.Code.  Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has on more than one 
occasion refused to incorporate a claim-reduction rule into federal common law 
when urged to do so.  Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1979), 
443 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 61 L.Ed.2d 521; Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc. (1981), 451 U.S. 630, 637-638, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
(“Some amici and commentators have suggested that the total amount of the 
plaintiff’s claim should be reduced by the amount of any settlement with any one 
co-conspirator; others strongly disagree.  * * * Regardless of the particular rule 
adopted for allocating damages or enforcing settlements, the complexity of the 
issues involved may result in additional trial and pretrial proceedings, thus adding 
new complications to what already is complex litigation”). 
{¶ 61} I am sympathetic to Norfolk’s argument that denial of a setoff 
representing settlement amounts received by an FELA claimant could result in the 
claimant receiving sums exceeding the amount of damages a jury finds was 
sustained.  However, the United States Congress and the United States Supreme 
Court have settled that issue.  In Ayers, the court observed that the “FELA’s 
express terms, reinforced by consistent judicial applications of the Act, allow a 
worker to recover his entire damages from a railroad whose negligence jointly 
caused an injury (here, the chronic disease asbestosis), thus placing on the railroad 
the burden of seeking contribution from other tortfeasors.”  Id., 538 U.S. at 141, 
123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261.  Moreover, the possibility that a plaintiff might 
recover sums in excess of a jury award in an FELA case has long existed based on 
application of the traditional collateral-source rule, which Section 55 largely 
preserves.  As emphasized by the court in Ayers, the issue whether public policy 
warrants FELA reform, including reform in the application of the FELA to 
asbestos cases, is a matter for Congress and not the courts.  Id., 538 U.S. at 166, 
123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Kevin E. McDermott and Mary Brigid Sweeney, for appellees Ralph E. 
Seaford and Horace T. Thomas. 
January Term, 2005 
21 
Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Kevin C. Alexandersen, Monica A. 
Sansalone, and Holly M. Olarczuk-Smith; Burns, White & Hickton, L.L.C., and 
David A. Damico, for appellant. 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., Charles F. Clark, and Robin G. 
Weaver, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Association of American Railroads. 
_______________________