Title: LETITIA C. ABROMATS, PHILIP E. ABROMATS V. DON WOOD, BRENDA WOOD; DON WOOD, BRENDA WOOD V. LETITIA C. ABROMATS, PHILIP E. ABROMATS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LETITIA C. ABROMATS, PHILIP E. ABROMATS V. DON WOOD, BRENDA WOOD; DON WOOD, BRENDA WOOD V. LETITIA C. ABROMATS, PHILIP E. ABROMATS2009 WY 100Case Number: S-08-0195, S-08-0196Decided: 08/19/2009NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
LETITIA 
C. ABROMATS, PHILIP E. 
ABROMATS,Appellants(Plaintiffs)v.DON WOOD, BRENDA 
WOOD,Appellees(Defendants).

DON 
WOOD, BRENDA WOOD,Appellants(Defendants),v.LETITIA 
C. ABROMATS, PHILIP E. 
ABROMATS,Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants in S-08-0195 and Appellees in S-08-0196:

Philip 
E. Abromats of Philip E. Abromats, P.C., Greybull, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees in S-08-0195 and Appellants in S-08-0196:

Bradley 
T. Cave of Holland & Hart LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Hadassah M. Reimer of 
Holland & Hart LLP, Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Reimer.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Philip and 
Letitia Abromats request relief from summary judgment granted to Don and Brenda 
Wood, claiming that the district court erred when it found that one allegedly 
defamatory statement contained in a victim impact statement was not libel per se 
and that the other allegedly defamatory statement was protected by qualified 
immunity as a statement concerning a common interest.  The Woods, in their cross appeal, 
request that this Court uphold the dismissal of the Abromats' claims but ask 
that we find that neither of the statements constituted libel per se as a matter 
of law and that the Woods were entitled to protection under the doctrine of 
absolute immunity for witnesses in a legal proceeding.  We affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. 

 
 
ISSUE1

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court err when it found that statements by a victim published to a victims' 
services organization for the purpose of use in a criminal proceeding were 
protected by qualified immunity as statements made pursuant to a common interest 
but not absolutely immune from an action for libel as statements made by a 
witness pursuant to a legal proceeding?  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On March 2, 2006, 
Letitia Abromats was involved in a traffic accident in which she struck the 
Woods' car from behind.  The Woods' 
son was driving the vehicle at the time.  
As a result of the accident, Mrs. Abromats was charged with following too 
closely, driving under suspension, and driving without insurance.  Mrs. Abromats was scheduled to be 
arraigned on March 22, 2006.  The 
arraignment was rescheduled for April 5, 2006, and postponed again to May 3, 
2006, in part to give Mr. Abromats time to acquire his license to practice law 
in Wyoming so that he could represent his wife.  In the interim, Mrs. Abromats received 
two more citations for driving with a suspended license.  Because she was charged with three 
separate driving under suspension offenses, Mrs. Abromats was faced with the 
possibility of mandatory jail time under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-134(c) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  Mrs. Abromats 
was arrested for driving while under the influence on May 27, 2007.  Plea negotiations were protracted and 
there were a number of delays in the proceedings as the Abromats and the 
prosecutor attempted to resolve all the charges.  The case was not ultimately resolved 
until the court accepted a plea agreement and sentenced Mrs. Abromats on January 
11, 2007.

 
 
[¶4]      The Woods, as 
victims, were kept informed of the status of the criminal case by Crisis and 
Referral Emergency Services (C.A.R.E.S.), a victims' services organization.  The Woods and the Abromats did not have 
contact after the accident until the Woods received a letter from Mr. Abromats, 
dated August 31, 2006, stating that the Abromats wished to settle any damage 
claims.  In response to that letter, 
Mr. Wood called the Abromats but the discussion was not productive and did not 
lead to settlement.  In that phone 
call, Mr. Wood expressed his inclination to leave the matter to the criminal 
justice system and to seek restitution as a victim, rather than to file a civil 
suit.  Mr. Abromats then wrote to 
Mr. Wood inquiring as to what amount the Woods were going to claim for 
"restitution" and indicating that he required a release of liability as a 
condition of payment.  The Woods 
were advised not to release liability in case their son, who was injured in the 
crash, wished to recover for future treatment of his injuries upon reaching the 
age of majority.  Because they had 
decided to wait to see what restitution was ordered in the criminal case before 
pursuing any civil remedies, the Woods did not respond to Mr. Abromats' letter 
but submitted a claim for restitution to the court through 
C.A.R.E.S.

 
 
[¶5]      The plea 
negotiations on the criminal case then took a bizarre turn.  Mr. Abromats, as counsel for his wife, 
attempted to condition payment of restitution as part of the criminal plea 
agreement on a release of civil liability from the victims, the Woods.  Unfathomably, the prosecutor agreed to 
the condition.  The original plea 
agreement signed by the Abromats and the prosecuting attorney contained language 
that conditioned the payment of restitution to the Woods, as victims, on a 
release of civil liability for the Abromats.  A C.A.R.E.S. representative contacted 
the Woods and informed them that the Abromats were taking actions in the 
criminal proceedings to impede the Woods' rights in future civil 
proceedings.  The Woods then 
submitted a victim impact statement to the prosecutor through C.A.R.E.S., 
clarifying that they had not agreed to release Mrs. Abromats from civil 
liability.

 
 
[¶6]      Based on the 
victim impact statement, the Abromats sued the Woods for libel, slander, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Abromats eventually 
voluntarily dismissed the claims of slander and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  The remaining 
claim alleged that two statements in the victim impact statement were 
libelous.  The statements at issue 
were that the Woods' car was "hit at full speed" and

 
 
[t]here 
is a problem when the other driver and her husband can what seems to have so 
much power over our court system and what seems to be able to manipulate all the 
circumstances, when what took place is so evident and the answer seems so 
simple.  We wonder what is going 
on?

 
 
[¶7]      The Abromats' 
Complaint alleged publication of those statements to the county attorney and her 
staff, to the clerk of circuit court and her staff, to the judges involved and 
their staff, and to personnel at C.A.R.E.S.  The Woods brought a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) and the district court dismissed the claims involving 
publication to the county attorney and her staff, to the clerk of circuit court 
and her staff, and to the judges involved and their staff.  The district court found that the 
doctrine of absolute immunity for statements made by a witness in the course of 
legal proceedings protected any publication to members of the legal system.  The court could not, however, resolve 
the issue as to the publication of the statements to personnel at 
C.A.R.E.S.  The Woods brought a 
subsequent motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim of publication of 
the allegedly libelous statements to C.A.R.E.S.  The court granted summary judgment.  With respect to the first statement, the 
court found that the Abromats had not claimed special damages and that, 
therefore, the statement was not actionable because it did not constitute libel 
per se.  The court found that the 
second statement was protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity for 
statements made in common interest, and that the Abromats had failed to show 
malice on the part of the Woods, as required for such statements to be 
actionable.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW2

 
 
[¶8]      We review a grant 
of summary judgment using the same materials reviewed by the district court, and 
following the same legal standards.  
Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 
152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, 1224 (Wyo. 2002).  
"If we can uphold summary judgment on the record presented under any 
proper legal theory, we will."  Id.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court err when it found that statements by a victimpublished to 
a victims' services organization for the purpose of use in acriminal 
proceeding were protected  by 
qualified immunity as statements made pursuant to a common interest but not 
absolutely immune from an action forlibel as statements made by a witness 
pursuant to a legal proceeding?

 
 
[¶9]      Libel is a 
defamatory statement communicated in writing.  

 
 
A 
defamatory communication is one which tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, 
contempt, ridicule or scorn or which causes him to be shunned or avoided; one 
that tends to injure his reputation as to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill 
or confidence in which he is held.  
To be actionable, the defamatory or disparaging words must affect the 
plaintiff in some way that is peculiarly harmful to one engaged in his trade or 
profession.  

 
 

Lever 
v. Community First Bancshares, Inc., 
989 P.2d 634, 637-38 (Wyo. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  The question of whether a statement is 
protected by privilege or immunity and therefore cannot be grounds for a civil 
defamation suit is one of law, which we review de novo.  Id. at 638.   

 
 
The 
immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for their 
testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in English common 
law.  Some American decisions 
required a showing that the witness' allegedly defamatory statements were 
relevant to the judicial proceeding, but once this threshold showing had been 
made, the witness had an absolute privilege.  The plaintiff could not recover even if 
the witness knew the statements were false and made them with 
malice.

 
 
In 
the words of one 19th-century court, in damages suits against witnesses, "the 
claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of public policy, which 
requires that the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should 
be left as free and unobstructed as possible."  A witness' apprehension of subsequent 
damages liability might induce two forms of self-censorship.  First, witnesses might be reluctant to 
come forward to testify.  And once a 
witness is on the stand, his testimony might be distorted by the fear of 
subsequent liability.

 
 

Briscoe 
v. LaHue, 
460 U.S. 325, 331-33, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1113-14, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (citations 
omitted).  "A witness is absolutely 
privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications 
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as a part of a judicial 
proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the 
proceeding."  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 588 (1977).

 
 
[¶10]   The district court determined that 
the publication of the Woods' victim impact statement to members of the 
judiciary and their staff and with respect to the prosecutor's office was 
absolutely privileged under the concept of witness immunity.  The court concluded that the same 
immunity did not extend to the publication of that statement to C.A.R.E.S. 
because a victims' services organization is neither an attorney acting in 
furtherance of a court proceeding nor a direct part of the judicial branch.  The district court granted summary 
judgment instead on the theory that the statements were conditionally privileged 
under the doctrine of immunity for statements bearing on a common interest.  While we agree with that line of 
reasoning, we find that absolute immunity for witness statements does extend to 
this situation and we will dispose of the issue on that 
basis.

 
 
[¶11]   In Elmore v. Van Horn, 844 P.2d 1078 (Wyo. 
1992), we found that witness immunity extends to the preparation of affidavits 
by potential witnesses.  We adopted 
the reasoning of a federal court that said, 

 
 
This 
process of discovering, organizing, and understanding evidence is a vital part 
of the judicial process.  It is 
perhaps more essential to the court's truth-seeking function than the actual 
trial for without it there would be no grist for the mill.  The search for evidence often requires 
interviews with persons who may not actually testify at trial but who are 
nonetheless important to the process because they might know of someone else 
whose testimony would be more helpful.  
The possibility that they may be forced to defend a lawsuit for damages 
can only discourage such people from becoming involved.  The court's need for evidence demands 
that all participants in the process of gathering evidence for use at trial be 
immune from any liability for damages[.]

 
 

Id. 
at 1085 (quoting Collins v. Walden, 
613 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Ga. 1985), judgment aff'd, 784 F.2d 402 (11th Cir. 
1986)).  We reasoned that sworn 
statements of any kind are subject to penalties for perjury and that there are 
other remedies available for a person wronged by a witness acting in bad 
faith.  Id.  However, we have not limited the concept 
of immunity to sworn statements.  In 
Elmore, for example, we cited one 
case involving a doctor's report and another involving a letter from a 
psychiatrist, noting that statements contained therein had been found to be 
protected under the witness immunity doctrine.  Id. at 1085-86.

 
 
[¶12]   In this case, as the Abromats point 
out, the statement was not a sworn statement nor was it made in open court.  They also make much of the fact that 
victims of misdemeanors do not have a statutorily mandated right to file a 
victim impact statement in cases where the court does not order a presentence 
investigation.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-203(b)(xiv) 
through (xvii) (LexisNexis 2009).  
However, nothing in Wyoming law precludes a court from seeking or 
considering such a statement from a victim of a misdemeanor and we unequivocally 
refuse to adopt a policy that would discourage a victim from providing such a 
statement.  "We have consistently stated that a trial court has broad 
discretion to consider a wide range of information about the defendant and his 
crimes in imposing sentence."  Capellen v. State, 2007 WY 107, ¶ 16, 
161 P.3d. 1076, 1080 (Wyo. 2007). 
The victim of a crime is an integral part of many criminal 
investigations and we can think of few participants in the judicial process more 
in need of protection.  In addition, 
a court is required to seek information about restitution to victims under 
Wyoming law and the court and the prosecutor are required to communicate with 
the victim about that and other matters.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-9-102 through 7-9-107 (LexisNexis 2009); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-40-204 (LexisNexis 2009).  
It is vital that victims feel free to speak openly during that 
process.  

 
 
[¶13]   The Abromats argue that the Woods 
are not immune to a civil suit based on their publication of the victim impact 
statement to C.A.R.E.S., which is neither a court nor a prosecutor.  However, Wyoming law does create a 
statutorily defined role for "crime victim service providers" such as 
C.A.R.E.S.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-40-118(b) (LexisNexis 2009).3  Such service providers are an important 
conduit for information between the State and the victim.  Moreover, Wyoming has a strong public 
policy of protecting victims of crimes from harassment.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-205(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009) ("A victim or witness has the right to be free from any form 
of harassment, intimidation or retribution").  We therefore hold that the Woods' 
publication of statements to C.A.R.E.S. for submission to the court in an 
underlying criminal case cannot be used to support a civil suit for libel.  Where, as here, the document containing 
the victims' statements was prepared for the purpose of submission to the court, 
and it was not published to anyone for any reason outside that purpose, we hold 
that the statements contained therein are absolutely privileged as statements by 
a witness in the context of a judicial proceeding.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   Statements made by the victim of a 
crime to a crime victim service provider for submission to the court, which were 
not published to anyone else for any other purpose, cannot support tort 
liability for libel because a victim has absolute immunity as a witness when 
making statements in the course of the judicial proceedings.  The district court judgment is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
parties also raised the issue of whether the statements constituted libel per 
se.  Because we find that the 
statements are protected by absolute immunity, which protects the utterer from 
liability even if the statement in question is libelous, we do not address the 
nature of the statements.

 
 

2Some 
of the issues were raised in the context of the grant of summary judgment, while 
others were raised as part of the earlier grant of the motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  However, 
since we can affirm a summary judgment on any grounds appearing in the record, 
there is no need to apply the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard 
separately, as any claim that would not survive a motion to dismiss would 
necessarily fail to survive a motion for summary judgment as 
well.

 
 

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-40-118(b) reads:

 
 
(b)   For purposes of this section "crime 
victim service provider" means any program operated by a public agency or 
nonprofit organization or any combination thereof which provides comprehensive 
services to victims of crime, including but not limited 
to:

(i)     Crisis intervention 
services; 

(ii)     Informing victims and 
witnesses of the case status and progress; 

(iii)    Assistance in participating 
in criminal justice proceedings; 

(iv)    Performing advocate duties 
for crime victims; 

(v)    Assisting victims in 
recovering property damaged or stolen and in obtaining restitution or 
compensation for medical and other expenses incurred as a result of crime; 

(vi)    Developing community 
resources to assist victims of crime; 

(vii)   Assisting victims of crime in the 
preparation and presentation of claims under the Crime Victims Compensation 
Act.