Title: Board of Bar Examiners v. B.R.C.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012XX605-BA   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the conditional admission of B. 
R. C. 
 
Board of Bar Examiners, 
          Complainant-Respondent-Appellant, 
     v. 
B. R. C., 
          Respondent-Petitioner-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
BAR ADMISSION OF B.R.C. 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 9, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
         
 
COUNTY: 
       
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012XX605-BA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the conditional admission of 
B.R.C. 
 
Board of Bar Examiners, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
B.R.C., 
 
          Respondent-Petitioner-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 9, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.  Attorney's conditional 
license reinstated. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) appeals 
a referee's report recommending the court reinstate B.R.C.'s 
license to practice law subject to continued monitoring as 
required by the terms of his conditional admission.  B.R.C. is 
currently suspended for failure to comply with certain terms of 
his conditional admission.  We accept the referee's findings and 
conclusion that B.R.C. has satisfied character and fitness 
requirements for purposes of bar admission in this state and we 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
2 
 
reinstate B.R.C.'s license to practice law conditioned upon his 
continued monitoring by the Wisconsin Lawyers Assistance Program 
(WisLAP) until July 2, 2014. 
¶2 
This is the first time we have considered a petition 
for reinstatement filed by a lawyer who was suspended for 
failure to comply with terms of the lawyer's conditional 
admission.  In 2011, the court, at the behest of the BBE, 
adopted SCR 40.075, authorizing conditional admission.  See 
S. Ct. Order 08-13, 2011 WI 40 (issued June 8, 2011, eff. 
June 8, 2011).  This rule affords certain bar applicants who 
might otherwise have been denied admission to the bar because of 
character and fitness concerns the opportunity to practice law 
subject to various oversight mechanisms designed to protect the 
public.  B.R.C. was one of the early beneficiaries of this new 
rule. 
¶3 
B.R.C. graduated from a Wisconsin law school in the 
spring of 2011, and sought bar admission.  Aspects of his bar 
application, including a 2009 conviction for operating a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated, raised character and fitness concerns 
pertaining to his alcohol use.  Following an evaluation, the BBE 
offered B.R.C. conditional admission.  The terms of his 
conditional admission were set forth in a Consent Agreement For 
Conditional 
Admission 
(Consent 
Agreement). 
 
The 
Consent 
Agreement provided in relevant part that B.R.C. would be 
conditionally admitted for a period of two years during which he 
was required to abstain from alcohol use and to submit to 
monitoring 
by 
WisLAP 
to 
ensure 
his 
compliance 
with 
the 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
3 
 
conditions on his law practice.  Pursuant to the Consent 
Agreement, B.R.C. agreed, among other things, "[t]o submit to 
random urinalysis testing for alcohol or other drugs as 
determined appropriate by the Coordinator." 
¶4 
On December 27, 2011, B.R.C. accepted the offer of 
conditional admission and signed the Consent Agreement.  He was 
sworn in on January 18, 2012, and began practicing law. 
¶5 
On March 1, 2012, B.R.C. met with WisLAP manager Linda 
Albert who informed him that he also needed to execute a 
separate 
"monitoring 
contract" 
with 
WisLAP. 
 
The 
WisLAP 
Monitoring Contract contained some terms not mentioned in the 
Consent Agreement.1  B.R.C. also learned that he could be 
required to submit to hair follicle testing, fingernail testing, 
and blood testing, which are more expensive than the urine 
testing he had known would be required.  B.R.C. refused to sign 
the monitoring contract asserting that he should have been made 
aware of the WisLAP requirements before he executed the Consent 
Agreement.  The BBE was advised of B.R.C.'s refusal to sign the 
monitoring contract on March 12, 2012. 
¶6 
On May 11, 2012, the BBE voted to rescind B.R.C.'s 
conditional admission for his continued refusal to sign a 
monitoring contract and concomitant failure to submit to 
monitoring.  The BBE requested this court issue an order to show 
                                                 
1 For 
example, 
the 
monitoring 
contract 
contains 
the 
requirement that "[i]f leaving the area where he/she lives or 
practices (e.g. vacation, etc.) interferes with the terms of the 
Monitoring Contract, the Participant will obtain consent from 
the Monitor and/or WisLAP staff before leaving." 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
4 
 
cause as to why B.R.C.'s license should not be suspended.  The 
order issued and, on June 27, 2012, B.R.C. filed a response 
explaining his reasons for declining to sign the WisLAP 
Monitoring Contract and asking the court to reconsider its order 
to show cause. 
¶7 
By order dated July 2, 2012, this court informed 
B.R.C. that his license would be suspended if he did not sign 
the WisLAP Monitoring Contract within 14 days.  The order 
directed the BBE to reinstate B.R.C.'s conditional admission if 
he signed the monitoring contract.  We directed the BBE to 
ensure that applicants offered conditional admission receive a 
copy 
of 
the 
WisLAP 
Monitoring 
Contract 
before 
accepting 
conditional admission.  The BBE has since revised its procedures 
accordingly. 
¶8 
In July 2012, some six months after commencing the 
practice of law, B.R.C. signed a monitoring contract.  On the 
same day he signed the monitoring contract, B.R.C. received an 
e-mail from WisLAP advising him that it had changed its third-
party administrator, requiring a new contract be executed, which 
was provided.  The two monitoring contracts were identical 
except for the name of the administrator and the initiation date 
and completion date.  The dates on the first contract were from 
January 18, 2012 through January 18, 2014.  The dates of the 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
5 
 
replacement contract were from July 2, 2012 to July 2, 2014.  
B.R.C. signed the second contract.  Monitoring commenced.2 
¶9 
Shortly after signing the contract B.R.C. noted and 
challenged the revised completion date.  On July 20, 2012, the 
BBE director sent a letter to B.R.C. stating: 
It is my understanding that you executed a 
monitoring contract with WisLAP on July 16, 2012. The 
initiation date of the monitoring contract is July 2, 
2012. Accordingly, you will be monitored for two 
years, from July 2, 2012, to July 2, 2014, which is 
the Board's intent. Subject to that understanding, I 
will advise the court that you are compliant and I 
will seek to withdraw the request for your suspension. 
However, if you are seeking to "post date" your 
monitoring agreement to January 18, 2012, I will ask 
the court to impose the suspension on your license. 
¶10 B.R.C. timely replied to the BBE, arguing that he read 
the court's order to impose the original terms such that 
monitoring would end in January 2014, not July 2014.  B.R.C. did 
not address the fact that he had been practicing law for nearly 
six months without submitting to the WisLAP monitoring expressly 
required 
by 
his 
conditional 
admission. 
 
The 
BBE 
sought 
                                                 
2 B.R.C. moved to strike from page one of the BBE's reply 
brief the words "B.R.C. chose not to sign the agreement," 
arguing that B.R.C. had in fact signed both a monitoring 
agreement and a revised monitoring agreement.  We held the 
motion in abeyance pending our review of the record.  We dismiss 
the motion.  The abbreviated chronological summary in the BBE's 
reply brief did not adversely affect our consideration of 
B.R.C.'s case.  The court was aware, prior to B.R.C.'s 
suspension, 
that 
B.R.C. 
had 
signed 
two 
versions 
of 
the 
monitoring agreement in the wake of the court's July 2012 order 
and that B.R.C. later argued he was entitled to an earlier 
termination date. 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
6 
 
suspension. 
 
B.R.C. 
objected 
to 
the 
suspension 
request, 
reiterating his interpretation of the court's order. 
¶11 By order dated August 14, 2012, this court suspended 
B.R.C.'s license to practice law in Wisconsin for his continued 
refusal to abide by the terms of his conditional admission.3 
¶12 On October 12, 2012, B.R.C. filed a petition seeking 
reinstatement.  The BBE was directed to respond.  Additional 
filings ensued.  The BBE recommended B.R.C.'s suspension 
continue for one year, following which it would consider a 
reinstatement 
petition 
and 
evaluate 
his 
eligibility 
for 
conditional admission, but only if he underwent a comprehensive 
psychological evaluation including personality testing. 
¶13 B.R.C. 
opposed 
the 
request 
for 
a 
psychological 
evaluation and requested a hearing.  We appointed Referee John 
Nicholas 
Schweitzer 
to 
consider 
this 
novel 
reinstatement 
petition.  Referee Schweitzer conducted proceedings culminating 
in an evidentiary hearing on September 16, 2013.  He filed a 
report on October 16, 2013, recommending reinstatement subject 
to B.R.C.'s continued monitoring by WisLAP until July 2, 2014, 
and recommending B.R.C. bear the costs of this proceeding 
consistent with SCR 40.075(5). 
¶14 The BBE appeals.  The BBE asks this court to require a 
comprehensive psychological evaluation in order to ascertain 
                                                 
3 Nearly one year later, on August 6, 2013, B.R.C. objected 
to the manner in which his license suspension was identified on 
the State Bar of Wisconsin web site.  We held the objection in 
abeyance and now dismiss it as moot in view of our decision in 
this matter. 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
7 
 
whether 
other 
conditions 
may 
be 
warranted 
prior 
to 
reinstatement.  If the court deems reinstatement appropriate 
now, the BBE asks the court to require monitoring for two years 
following reinstatement.  B.R.C. asks the court to reinstate his 
law license without any conditions. 
¶15 We must determine whether B.R.C. has met his burden of 
demonstrating he has the requisite character and fitness to 
warrant reinstatement of his conditional license to practice law 
in Wisconsin.  The referee considered B.R.C.'s petition for 
reinstatement under SCR 40.064 and the guidelines established in 
BA 6.02,5 BA 6.03,6 and SCR 22.29.7 
                                                 
4 SCR 40.06 provides, inter alia, that: 
(1)  An 
applicant 
for 
bar 
admission 
shall 
establish good moral character and fitness to practice 
law. The purpose of this requirement is to limit 
admission to those applicants found to have the 
qualities of character and fitness needed to assure to 
a reasonable degree of certainty the integrity and the 
competence of services performed for clients and the 
maintenance of high standards in the administration of 
justice. 
. . . . 
(3)  An 
applicant 
shall 
establish 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the board that the applicant satisfies 
the requirement set forth in sub. (1).  The board 
shall certify to the supreme court the character and 
fitness of qualifying applicants.  The board shall 
decline to certify the character and fitness of an 
applicant who knowingly makes a materially false 
statement of material fact or who fails to disclose a 
fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by 
the applicant to have arisen in connection with his or 
her application. 
5 BA 6.02 provides: 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Relevant Conduct or Condition.  The revelation of 
discovery or any of the following should be treated as 
cause for further inquiry before the Board decides 
whether the applicant possesses the character and 
fitness to practice law: 
(a) unlawful conduct 
(b) academic misconduct 
(c) false statements by the applicant, including 
concealment or nondisclosure 
(d) acts 
involving 
dishonesty 
or 
misrepresentation 
(e) abuse of legal process 
(f) neglect of financial responsibilities 
(g) neglect of professional obligations 
(h) violation of an order of a court 
(i) evidence of mental or emotional impairments 
substantial enough to affect the applicant's ability 
to practice law 
(j) evidence of drug or alcohol dependency 
(k) denial of admission to the bar in another 
jurisdiction on character and fitness grounds 
(l) disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary 
agency or other professional disciplinary agency of 
any jurisdiction  
6 BA 6.03 provides: 
Use of Information.  The Board will determine 
whether the present character and fitness of an 
applicant qualifies the applicant for admission.  In 
making this determination . . . the following factors 
should 
be 
considered 
in 
assigning 
weight 
and 
significance to prior conduct: 
  
(a) the applicant's age at the time of the 
conduct  
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
9 
 
¶16 We affirm a referee's findings of fact unless they are 
found to be clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125; see also In re Bar Admission of Rusch, 171 
Wis. 2d 523, 528-29, 492 N.W.2d 153 (1992).  We review legal 
conclusions de novo.  Id.  This court retains the ultimate 
authority to determine who should be admitted to the bar of this 
state.  In re Bar Admission of Rippl, 2002 WI 15, ¶¶3, 16, 250 
Wis. 2d 519, 639 N.W.2d 553. 
¶17 Initially, the significant issue regarding B.R.C.'s 
character and fitness to practice law in Wisconsin was his 
alcohol use.  See BA 6.02 (j).  The referee noted that B.R.C. 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
(b) the recency of the conduct  
  
(c) the reliability of the information concerning 
the conduct  
  
(d) the seriousness of the conduct  
  
(e) the mitigating or aggravating circumstances  
  
(f) the evidence of rehabilitation  
  
(g) the applicant's candor in the admissions 
process  
  
(h) the 
materiality 
of 
any 
omissions 
or 
misrepresentations  
  
(i) 
the 
number 
of 
incidents 
revealing 
deficiencies  
7 Although the referee also considered the criteria set 
forth in SCR 22.29, he determined that rule offered limited 
guidance because it applies strictly to reinstatement following 
a disciplinary revocation or suspension, which is always for a 
specific period of time. 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
10 
 
has participated in the WisLAP monitoring program, first under a 
monitoring contract and later voluntarily, such that he has been 
monitored since July 2012.  The referee found that by all 
indications, B.R.C. has not used alcohol since entering the 
monitoring contract.8  The record supports these findings and we 
accept them. 
¶18 B.R.C.'s conduct during these proceedings led the BBE 
to request a psychological evaluation, inclusive of personality 
testing, the results of which would be utilized to determine 
what, if any, additional conditions should be imposed on him.  
The referee acknowledged that the BBE's concerns over B.R.C.'s 
personality and psychological health are understandable but 
ultimately concluded they are not "sufficiently well founded to 
require him to submit to psychological testing." 
¶19 On appeal, the BBE asks the court to require a 
psychological evaluation.  The BBE explains that it made this 
request based on "a long series of events that have occurred 
with B.R.C. over the course of the last two years" including 
his: 
[R]efusal 
to 
sign 
the 
monitoring 
contract, 
his 
persistent belief and attempts at trying to negotiate 
the terms of his monitoring contract and its timeline, 
his lack of understanding and insight as to why the 
Court suspended him, his contrition towards his 
monitor, but the opposite behavior towards the manager 
                                                 
8 The parties have characterized B.R.C. as a "voluntary 
participant" in the WisLAP monitoring program.  He has checked 
in more or less regularly and, as of the date of the hearing, 
had been tested for alcohol in his system 26 times, with no 
adverse result. 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
11 
 
of WisLAP, Ms. Albert, as well as his insistence that 
the Court and the BBE were persisting in violating his 
rights. 
¶20 First, as the referee observed, this case is not about 
whether the BBE's decision to offer B.R.C. conditional admission 
was 
appropriate. 
 
Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
40.075 
provides 
a 
procedural mechanism for an attorney who wishes to challenge the 
BBE's decision to offer conditional admission.  B.R.C. did not 
invoke that procedure.  Instead, he accepted conditional 
admission and became subject to the terms of the Consent 
Agreement which required monitoring by WisLAP.  Because he did 
not abide by those terms, the court ultimately suspended his 
conditional license to practice law.  All arguments pertaining 
to whether the BBE erred in offering conditional admission are 
superfluous; we will not address them. 
¶21 The referee considered both the initial dispute over 
signing the WisLAP Monitoring Contract and the ensuing dispute 
over the end date for that contract.  The referee noted that 
WisLAP and the BBE found that B.R.C.'s repeated objections were 
at least in part self-serving.  We agree.  While he was 
disputing the terms of his monitoring, B.R.C. kept practicing 
law for some six months with no monitoring or oversight in 
direct contravention of the essential terms of his conditional 
admission.  With respect to the end date of his monitoring, it 
begs credulity to think the court would simply excuse six months 
of noncompliance with oversight the BBE had deemed necessary to 
ensure he could be safely recommended to the public. 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
12 
 
¶22 On balance, however, the referee concluded that 
B.R.C.'s questions, conduct, and interpretation of this court's 
July 2, 2012 order were not entirely unreasonable, finding that 
there was "an element of principle" in his objections and noting 
that the BBE was directed to revise certain parts of its 
procedures as a result of this proceeding.  We accept and affirm 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusions, 
including 
his 
determination that the BBE's concerns are not sufficiently well 
founded to demonstrate a need for a psychological evaluation.  
We 
therefore 
decline 
to 
require 
B.R.C. 
to 
undergo 
a 
psychological evaluation as a condition or prerequisite of his 
reinstatement. 
¶23 The referee opined that completion of the two-year 
monitoring contract scheduled to end July 2, 2014, was a 
sufficient condition to impose on B.R.C.'s reinstatement.  On 
appeal, the BBE asks the court to require monitoring for two 
years from the date of reinstatement.  The BBE expresses a 
legitimate concern that B.R.C.'s voluntary compliance with 
monitoring while suspended is not an accurate proxy for whether 
he can manage alcohol together with the stress of legal 
practice. 
¶24 We agree that B.R.C. must complete the full two years 
of monitoring as his conditional admission originally required, 
with a monitor located in the Milwaukee area, if possible.  At 
this time, there is insufficient cause to warrant extending the 
conditions 
imposed 
on 
B.R.C. 
past 
July 
2, 
2014. 
 
See 
SCR 40.075(6).  If B.R.C. fails to comply with the terms of his 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
13 
 
monitoring contract before it terminates, the parties shall 
immediately advise the court and we reserve the right to 
reconsider this decision.  However, we accept the referee's 
conclusion that B.R.C. has demonstrated character and fitness 
sufficient to warrant his admission to the bar subject to 
successful 
completion 
of 
the 
monitoring 
contract. 
 
Upon 
completion of the monitoring contract he will be deemed 
admitted, without conditions. 
¶25 We caution B.R.C. that before he may practice law in 
Wisconsin again he must ensure he has satisfied the requirements 
applicable to all attorneys relating to continuing legal 
education (CLE), bar dues, assessments and fees.9  If B.R.C. 
cannot pay the full costs of this reinstatement proceeding 
immediately, an agreement may be reached with the BBE to enable 
him to pay the costs over time.10 
¶26 IT IS ORDERED that the conditional admission of B.R.C. 
to practice law in Wisconsin is reinstated subject to the 
                                                 
9 In its reply brief, the BBE advises the court that if 
B.R.C. is readmitted in 2014, he will be required to comply with 
the 2013-2014 CLE requirements by reporting 30 approved hours, 
including three hours of ethics and professional responsibility; 
or, if applicable, by electing the exemption available under 
SCR 31.04 (2) for that reporting period.  These are the standard 
reporting requirements for anyone who was admitted to the 
Wisconsin bar in 2012, and, more broadly, to those admitted in 
even-numbered years. 
10 On March 14, 2014, B.R.C filed a response to the 
statement of costs asking that no costs be assessed.  The BBE 
then filed a reply on March 19, 2014, maintaining that full 
costs are warranted.  We impose the full costs of this 
proceeding consistent with SCR 40.075(5). 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
14 
 
requirement that B.R.C. shall comply with the remaining term of 
the WisLAP monitoring contract that he signed in July 2012, with 
a termination date of July 2, 2014.  
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, B.R.C. shall pay to the Board of Bar Examiners 
the costs of this proceeding, which are $4,752.65 as of March 4, 
2014. 
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2012XX605-BA   
 
 
 
1