Title: Alexander v. Scott

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

529 So. 2d 951 (1988)
Sue Ann ALEXANDER
v.
Mike SCOTT and Gerald Cannon.
87-106.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 1, 1988.
John I. Cottle III of Bowles & Cottle, Tallassee, for appellant.
Stanley K. Smith of Porterfield, Scholl, Bainbridge, Mims & Harper, Birmingham, for appellees.
*952 HOUSTON, Justice.
Plaintiff, Sue Ann Alexander, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendants Gerald Cannon and Mike Scott in this action to recover damages for personal injuries. We reverse and remand.
On August 26, 1985, the plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint in the Circuit Court of Lee County, seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained on September 12, 1984, when her left hand was injured in a machine owned by her employer, Dexter Lock, Inc. The complaint stated a cause of action against two named defendants, including an insurance company that allegedly had a duty to perform safety inspections for Dexter Lock; and Ken Cochran, the plaintiff's immediate supervisor. The complaint also named a number of fictitious defendants, including:
On November 19, 1986, the plaintiff amended the complaint, substituting Gerald Cannon and Mike Scott for fictitious defendants "A," "B," "C", and "E". Cannon and Scott filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's action against them was time barred. The trial court granted the summary judgment and made it final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R. Civ.P. The plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff added Cannon and Scott to the original suit after the statute of limitations for negligence actions would have expired.[1] Therefore, in order for the plaintiff's action against these defendants not to be time barred, the substitutions must relate back under Rule 9(h), Ala.R.Civ.P., pursuant to Rule 15(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.
The plaintiff contends that the substitutions of Cannon and Scott comply with the requirement of Rules 9(h) and 15(c), and, therefore, relate back to the time of the filing of the complaint. She argues that a cause of action against the fictitious defendants was stated within the body of the complaint and that she was ignorant of the identity of those fictitious defendants, in the sense of not having knowledge at the time of the filing of the complaint sufficient to identify Cannon and Scott as parties also intended to be sued.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff had knowledge of their names and positions of authority with Dexter Lock. They argue that she had sufficient knowledge on the date of her injury of a potential cause of action against them. We disagree.
*953 The defendants submitted the plaintiff's deposition testimony in support of their motion for summary judgment. A careful reading of that testimony reveals to us that, until the plaintiff took the depositions of Kenneth Cochran and Jimmy F. Allen, Jr., she basically knew only the defendants' names and that they held positions of authority at Dexter Lock. The plaintiff submitted her affidavit and the affidavit of her lawyer in opposition to the defendants' motion. The plaintiff's affidavit, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Her lawyer's affidavit, in pertinent part, states:
In Welch v. Jones, 470 So. 2d 1103, 1110 (Ala.1985), the Court, quoting the special concurring opinion of Justice Jones in Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 347 (Ala.1980), stated:
"`Liability of a co-employee must be predicated upon the breach of a personal duty owed to the injured employee and not upon general administrative responsibilities of the third-party co-employee defendant. It is insufficient, for example, to merely allege and prove a generalized duty of a co-employee to provide the injured employee with a reasonably safe place to work. An employee is not liable for injuries to another employee because of the failure of the employer to furnish a safe place to work or suitable appliances or instrumentalities. 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 578 n. 33, and accompanying text at 350.
"`The burden is upon the injured party to prove with specificity the defendant's delegated or assumed duty and its breach for which recovery is sought. The position he occupies, without more, *955 cannot serve as a basis for a co-employee's liability.'"[2]
(Emphasis in Fireman's Fund.)
Our review of the record indicates that until the plaintiff took the depositions of Kenneth Cochran and Jimmy Allen, she basically knew only the names of Scott and Cannon and that they held positions of authority at Dexter Lock.[3] We have held, under similar facts, that such limited knowledge is insufficient to import knowledge of a potential cause of action, see Dannelley v. Guarino, 472 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 1985). The plaintiff's deposition testimony does show that she had knowledge of a generalized duty on the part of Cannon and Scott to provide all of the employees of Dexter Lock with a reasonably safe place to work. This knowledge, however, was insufficient to require the plaintiff to name them as defendants prior to October 15, 1986. Welch v. Jones, supra. Rule 9(h) was not intended to excuse ignorance of the identity of a cause of action, but it was intended to excuse ignorance of the name of the party against whom a cause of action is stated. Dannelley v. Guarino at 986. The plaintiff did not have sufficient information until October 15, 1986, when she took the depositions of Kenneth Cochran and Jimmy Allen, to know that Cannon and Scott might be liable for her injuries.
Because the plaintiff stated a cause of action against the fictitious parties in the body of her complaint and because she had no knowledge until October 15, 1986, that Cannon and Scott were, in fact, parties intended to be sued, we hold that the amendment to the complaint related back to the date of the original filing and, consequently, that the cause of action stated against Cannon and Scott is not barred by the statute of limitations.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Section 6-2-39(a)(5), prior to its repeal by 1984-85 Ala.Acts No. 85-39, effective January 9, 1985, provided a one-year statute of limitations for actions "for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section." The January 9, 1985, amendment repealed § 6-2-39, the traditional one-year statute. Those actions covered by that statute were transferred to § 6-2-38, the traditional two-year statute. See Lovell v. Acrea, 500 So. 2d 1082 (Ala.1986).
[2]  But see Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988), in which this Court recently upheld the statutory grant of immunity to co-employees from suits arising out of their negligent or wanton acts.
[3]  The plaintiff's deposition testimony does indicate that she was aware that Connon was the plant's manager.