Title: Lands v. Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: June 25, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1191074
____________________
Steve D. Lands
v.
Betty Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court
(CV-16-900303)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Steve D. Lands appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of
Betty Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking ("Lucky B") in a suit he filed seeking
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damages for injuries sustained on the job.  The Morgan Circuit Court
entered summary judgment in favor of Lucky B on both of Lands's claims
against it -- negligence and wantonness -- because it held that Lucky B did
not owe Lands a duty.  We affirm the judgment as to the wantonness
claim.  But because Lands made a prima facie case of negligence and
demonstrated genuine issues of material fact, we reverse the judgment as
to that claim and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Facts and Procedural History
Tennessee Valley Land and Timber, LLC ("TVL&T"), contracted
with Lands to haul timber for processing at various locations in the
Southeast.  Kenneth Ward, the owner of TVL&T, provided Lands with a
1994 Peterbilt 379 Truck ("the truck") to make the deliveries.  According
to Lands, when Kenneth first provided the truck, he told Lands that it
was sometimes difficult to start.  If the truck would not start, Kenneth
instructed Lands to use a "hot-wire" method, which required Lands to use
a 12-inch piece of partially exposed wire to "jump" the truck while its
ignition was left in the on position.  
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Although TVL&T allowed Lands to use the truck for work, the truck
was owned by Lucky B.  The truck bore the logo of Lucky B's Trucking and
was registered by Lucky B with the United States Department of
Transportation.  Betty Ward, Kenneth Ward's wife, owns Lucky B's
Trucking.  Betty kept the truck garaged at her home and had an
understanding with her husband regarding use of the truck.  Despite this
arrangement, there was no lease of the truck between the spouses or their
respective businesses.
On the morning of September 25, 2015, Lands delivered logs to a
sawmill for TVL&T using the truck.  When he returned to Betty's home
to garage the truck, Kenneth told Lands that he needed him to attach the
truck to a trailer across the street and take it to another work site.  After
Lands drove the truck across the street, it died and would not restart. 
This was not the first time Lands had experienced this problem with the
truck.  On at least two prior occasions, he had to use the hot-wire
procedure to start the truck after the engine died; he did so both times
without incident.
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Lands put the truck in neutral, engaged the parking brake, and got
out of the truck to use the hot-wire method.  With both feet on the front-
wheel axle and a cigarette lighter in hand, he lifted the hood and
connected the 12-inch piece of wire to the firewall solenoid.  The truck
jumped back to life and sent Lands to the ground.  The truck then rolled
over Lands, severing the muscles in the lower half of his leg.  
Lands sued Lucky B, TVL&T, and other entities in the Morgan
Circuit Court.  Specifically, Lands sued Lucky B for negligence and
wantonness.  The essence of Lands's claims was that Lucky B, as the
owner of the truck, had a duty under statute, regulation, and common law
to inspect the truck and maintain it in safe condition.  By failing to inspect
and maintain it, he argued, the truck fell into disrepair and triggered the
sequence of events that caused his injuries.  
After a period of discovery, the defendants moved for summary
judgment.  Lands filed an opposition to the motion, which he supported
with, among other things, the affidavit of Whitney Morgan, a specialist in
commercial-motor-vehicle safety compliance; his own deposition
testimony; Kenneth's deposition testimony; and Betty's deposition
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testimony.  The trial court granted the summary-judgment motion on the
claims against Lucky B but denied it on the claims against the other
defendants.  In its order, the trial court explained that it was granting
Lucky B's summary-judgment motion because Lucky B did not owe Lands
a duty.  Following disposal of the claims against the other defendants via
settlement, Lands appealed. 
Standard of Review
Lands appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Lucky B. 
This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo.  EBSCO Indus., Inc. v.
Royal Ins. Co. of America, 775 So. 2d 128, 130 (Ala. 2000).  We apply the
same standard a trial court uses to determine if the evidence presented
creates a genuine issue of material fact.  Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. ECO
Pres. Servs., L.L.C., 788 So. 2d 121, 126 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Bussey v.
John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988)).  Under that standard, if
the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present substantial
evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists.  Bass v. SouthTrust
Bank of Baldwin Cnty., 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989).  We have
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defined "substantial evidence" as "evidence of such weight and quality
that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). 
Finally, " '[i]n determining whether a summary judgment was properly
entered, [this Court] must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant.' "  Webb v. Henderson, 594 So. 2d 103, 103 (Ala. 1992)
(citation omitted).
Analysis
The trial court granted Lucky B's summary-judgment motion
because it held that Lucky B did not owe Lands a cognizable duty as a
matter of law.  We disagree.  And while we may affirm the trial court's
judgment for any reason supported by the record -- so long as the
requirements of due process have been satisfied -- see Smith v. Mark
Dodge, Inc., 934 So. 2d 375, 380 (Ala. 2006), there is no ground on which
to affirm the summary judgment on the negligence claim.  The
wantonness claim, however, was properly disposed of.
A. Lands's Negligence Claim
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Lands's first claim against Lucky B was for negligence.  To make out
a prima facie case of negligence, Lands needed to establish "a duty, a
breach of that duty, causation, and damage."  Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc.
v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 679 (Ala. 2001).  To be entitled to
summary judgment, Lucky B needed to show that there was no genuine
issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.  See West, 547 So. 2d at 871.  It failed to do so.  Lands established a
prima facie case of negligence against Lucky B -- including the duty
element -- and demonstrated genuine issues of material fact necessitating
jury resolution.  The additional grounds argued by Lucky B on appeal lack
merit.
1. Duty
Before the trial court and on appeal, Lands has argued that Lucky
B owed him a duty imposed by statute, regulation, and common law.  In
essence, he argued that regulations promulgated by the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA") and incorporated into the
Alabama Code by reference, see § 32-9A-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, imposed
a duty on Lucky B to inspect the truck and maintain it in a safe condition. 
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The trial court disagreed and based its decision to grant Lucky B's
summary-judgment motion on what it said was the lack of a duty owed by
Lucky B to Lands. 
a. Applicable Regulations and Statutes
In a negligence action, it is possible for a legal duty imposed by
statute or regulation to inform the common-law standard of reasonable
care or to supplant it entirely.  See Parker Bldg. Servs. Co. v. Lightsey ex
rel. Lightsey, 925 So. 2d 927, 930-931 (Ala. 2005).  "A violation of [a
safety] statute or ordinance can, therefore, be evidence of negligence
under certain circumstances."  Murray v. Alabama Power Co., 413 So. 2d
1109, 1114 (Ala. 1982).  "The decision of whether a violation occurred,
whether such violation was negligence, and whether such negligence was
the proximate cause of the injuries complained of will ... be left ... to the
jury."  Id.1  
1This is not to be confused with the doctrine of negligence per se,
which is not argued by Lands.  Here, Lands relies on a statute to make out
a prima facie case of negligence as opposed to using a statutory violation
to conclusively establish, as a matter of law, duty and breach.  See Sparks
v. Alabama Power Co., 679 So. 2d 678, 685 (Ala. 1996) (holding that the
case "did not involve the concept of ... negligence per se ....  Rather, the
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Here, Lands argues that Lucky B's duties were informed by FMCSA
regulations.  Specifically, he cites 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(a), which provides:
"Every motor carrier ... must systematically inspect, repair, and maintain,
or cause to be systematically inspected, repaired or maintained, all motor
vehicles ... subject to its control."  As used in 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(a), a "motor
carrier" includes the term "employer" as that term is defined elsewhere in
the FMCSA regulations.  49 C.F.R. § 390.5.  And "employer" means "any
person engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce who owns or
leases a commercial motor vehicle in connection with that business."  Id. 
These regulations have been expressly incorporated into Alabama law by
statute.  § 32-9A-2(a)(1), Ala Code 1975 (providing that, subject to
exceptions not applicable here, "no person may operate a commercial
motor vehicle in this state, or fail to maintain required records or reports,
in violation of the federal motor carrier safety regulations as prescribed
by the U.S. Department of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. ... Parts 390-399 and
trial judge simply informed the jury that it was to determine whether [the
decedent] violated the statute, whether the violation was negligent
behavior under the circumstances of the case, and, if so, whether the
violation proximately caused his death.").
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as they may be amended in the future").  Further, the FMCSA has
promulgated an additional regulation declaring that "[a] motor vehicle
shall not be operated in such a condition as to likely cause an accident or
a breakdown of the vehicle."  49 C.F.R. § 369.7(a).  
We have held that the purpose of regulations like these is to
eliminate the " 'problem of a transfer of operating authority, with its
attendant difficulties of enforcing safety requirements and fixing financial
responsibility for damage and injuries to shippers and members of the
public.' "  Phillips v. J.H. Transp., Inc., 565 So. 2d 66, 70 (Ala. 1990)
(quoting Transamerican Freight Lines v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., 423
U.S. 28, 37 (1975)).  Simply put, the regulations are designed to prevent
motor carriers from shirking responsibility if someone gets hurt in an
accident involving a commercial motor vehicle. 
To determine if the regulations apply to Lucky B -- and therefore
inform its duty -- we must decide whether Lucky B is a "motor carrier" as
defined by the FMCSA.  It is.  An entity qualifies as a "motor carrier" if,
among other things, it falls under the definition of "employer."  To be an
"employer," an entity must: (1) be "engaged in a business affecting
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interstate commerce" and (2) "own[] or lease[] a commercial motor vehicle
in connection with that business."  49 C.F.R. § 390.5.  Lands presented
substantial evidence demonstrating that Lucky B meets both
requirements.  
Lucky B meets the first requirement because it engaged in a
business affecting interstate commerce.  It should be noted that, under the
text of the pertinent regulation, Lucky B need not be directly involved in
interstate commerce; it must merely be "engaged in a business affecting
interstate commerce."  49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (emphasis added).  Nevertheless,
the scope of what qualifies as "interstate commerce" is broad.  See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding the regulation of purely
intrastate production and consumption of wheat was within Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce because the covered subject
exerted a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce).  The
United States Supreme Court has held that, under Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce, Congress may regulate (1) the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities, persons, or things in
interstate commerce -- even if the threat sought to be remedied may come
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from purely intrastate activities; and (3) activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
608-09 (2000) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994)).  
This Court, applying United States Supreme Court precedent, has
identified factors that indicate whether an activity involves interstate
commerce.  Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129, 1132-35 (Ala. 2003)
(citing and discussing, among other cases, Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,
539 U.S. 52 (2003)) (holding that purchase of a car hauler sufficiently
affected interstate commerce to trigger the Federal Arbitration Act).  The
Wolff Motor Co. Court held that the transaction in that case involved
interstate commerce for four reasons: (1) the commercial enterprise
regularly dealt in interstate commerce; (2) the commercial enterprise
purchased goods that had moved in interstate commerce; (3) the general
type of transaction at issue was of the sort subject to Congress's commerce
power; and (4) the item at the heart of the dispute -- a car hauler -- was an
instrumentality of interstate commerce.  Id. 
The factors present in Wolff Motor Co. are present here.  The record
establishes that Lucky B's Trucking is a trucking business that routinely
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allowed another company, TVL&T, to use the truck.  TVL&T, using Lucky
B's truck, made timber deliveries to the sawmills of companies
incorporated in Delaware, New York, and Georgia, with principal places
of business in Oregon, New York, and Georgia, respectively.  Lucky B
insured the truck through National Indemnity Company, which is
headquartered and incorporated in Nebraska.  These facts satisfy the first
factor because Lucky B participated in and facilitated transactions
throughout the country.  
While there is no evidence that Lucky B purchased goods that moved
in interstate commerce (factor two), the truck itself was actually used to
move timber through interstate commerce (factor three).  Specifically, on
at least one occasion, TVL&T used the truck to deliver timber taken from
Lincoln County, Tennessee, to a sawmill in Eva, Alabama.  Additionally,
under factor three, long-haul trucking of goods traveling through
interstate commerce is an area that Congress is entitled to regulate.  See
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.  And that is precisely what Lucky B 
facilitated when it allowed TVL&T to use the truck to haul timber cut in
one state to another state.
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Finally, under factor four, the truck is a textbook example of an
instrumentality of interstate commerce.  See Wolff Motor Co., 869 So. 2d
at 1135 (quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588-90 (3d Cir.
1995)) (" '[M]otor vehicles are "the quintessential instrumentalities of
modern interstate commerce." ... Commuters, salespeople and haulers rely
upon motor vehicles daily to maintain the flow of commerce ....' "). 
By allowing the truck to carry lumber for the purpose of transacting
with companies throughout the country, Lucky B surely "engaged" in the
business in which the truck was being used.  TVL&T never assumed
exclusive possession or control of the truck through any contract or lease,
leaving the responsibility for the truck, under federal regulations, with
Lucky B.  Viewed in totality, Lucky B engaged in a business that affected
interstate commerce. 
We turn to the second requirement for constituting an "employer":
owning or leasing a commercial motor vehicle in connection with the
business engaged in interstate commerce.  It is undisputed that Lucky B
owned the truck.  The truck bore the logo and the United States
Department of Transportation number of Lucky B's Trucking.  And the
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truck was undoubtedly "connected" to the lumber-hauling business
because it was the very truck used by Lands to make the deliveries.  Cf.
Phillips, 565 So. 2d at 66 (holding that the presence of the defendant's
federally required decal on the side of a truck was sufficient evidence to
establish that the defendant maintained control of the truck).  Lucky B
therefore satisfies the second requirement, making it an "employer" and
bringing it within the definition of "motor carrier," thus triggering the
application of the federal regulations.
Lucky B was required under both federal regulations and Alabama
statute to "systematically inspect, repair, and maintain, or cause to be
systematically inspected, repaired, and maintained, all motor vehicles ...
subject to its control."  49 C.F.R. § 396.3(a); § 32-9A-2(a)(1).  Lands is
entitled to use the regulations and the statute incorporating them into
Alabama law to establish his prima facie case for negligence. 
b. Common-Law Duty to Inspect and Maintain
Lands also points to the common-law duty of vehicle owners to
inspect their vehicles and maintain them in safe condition.  This Court
has held that "[i]f the use of [an] instrumentality threatens serious danger
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to others unless it is in good condition, there is a duty to take reasonable
care to ascertain its condition by inspection."  Motor Terminal & Transp.
Co. v. Millican, 244 Ala. 39, 43, 12 So. 2d 96, 99 (1943).  More specifically,
in discussing motor vehicles, the Millican Court noted: 
" '[T]he owner or operator of a motor vehicle must exercise
reasonable care in the inspection of the machine, and is
chargeable with notice of everything that such inspection
would disclose. This rule applies where the operator is the
owner of the vehicle or rents it from another, or permits
another to use it, or lets it to another for hire. But in the
absence of anything to show that the appliances were
defective, the owner or driver is not required to inspect them
before using the car or permitting it to be used.' "
Id. (quoting Huddy Automobile Law, Vol. 3-4, p. 127 et seq).  These
statements bolster what the regulations and statute already established. 
c. Foreseeability
Lucky B, on the other hand, primarily rests its appellate argument
on foreseeability.  It argues that it was not foreseeable to Lucky B that
Lands would exit the truck after it broke down, stand on the axle with a
cigarette lighter in hand, and attempt to restart the engine via a piece of
loose, exposed wire.  But this conception of foreseeability is too narrow
based on the alleged duty and breach.
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" 'Foreseeability does not require that the particular consequence
should have been anticipated, but rather that some general harm or
consequence should have been anticipated.' "  City of Birmingham v.
Benson, 631 So. 2d 902, 907 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Thetford v. City of
Clanton, 605 So. 2d 835, 840 (Ala. 1992)).  "[T]he test is not what [the
defendant] in fact knew, but whether it was reasonably foreseeable that
a failure to maintain the [device] in a safe condition could cause injury to
a third party."  Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So. 2d 1204, 1209 (Ala.
1999).  Here, it is certainly foreseeable that a failure to maintain a long-
haul truck according to safety regulations would result in an injury to a
third party -- especially the driver of that vehicle.  Protecting the public
and the driver is precisely the reason trucking safety regulations exist. 
See Phillips., 565 So. 2d at 70 (quoting Transamerican Freight Lines, 423
U.S. at 37) (" ' "The purpose of the [automotive] rules is to protect the
industry from practices detrimental to the maintenance of sound
transportation services ..." and to assure safety of operation.' ").
The facts of this case pose a stark contrast to one of our more recent
cases, DeKalb-Cherokee Counties Gas District v. Raughton, 257 So. 3d
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845 (Ala. 2018) (plurality opinion), in which a plurality of this Court held
that there was insufficient evidence of foreseeability.  In Raughton, the
plaintiff sued for negligence relating to injuries he had sustained when a
gas-district employee was dumping refuse at a city landfill.  Id. at 846. 
The plurality specifically noted in its analysis that "[t]here was no
testimony or other evidence indicating that performing the maneuver
violated any formal safety standards."  Id. at 848.  See also Butler v. AAA
Warehousing & Moving Co., 686 So. 2d 291 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment for a defendant because, among other
reasons, a forensic engineer testified that the hazard at issue did not
violate any applicable safety standards).  
The same cannot be said here.  Lands presented the affidavit of
Whitney Morgan, who provides consulting services to entities about
commercial-motor-vehicle safety compliance -- specifically, compliance
with FMCSA regulations.  His work includes inspections of trucks for
compliance with relevant safety standards and regulations.  In his
affidavit presented to the trial court, Morgan stated that, in his opinion,
which was formed after reviewing the evidence, "Lucky B was in violation
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of the [safety regulations] for requiring or permitting the vehicle to be
operated, which caused and/or contributed to the cause of Mr. Lands's
injuries."  This, combined with the other testimony Lands supplied,
established an absence of compliance with the safety regulations.
d. Responsibility Not Shifted by a Lease
In its order, the trial court relied on its finding of fact that the truck
was leased by Lucky B to TVL&T to relieve Lucky B of liability.  This
finding was clearly erroneous.  The FMCSA regulations permit authorized
carriers to use vehicles they do not own only when there is "a written
lease granting the use of the equipment and meeting the requirements
contained in [49 C.F.R.] § 376.12."  49 C.F.R. § 376.11(a) (emphasis
added).  This comports with the regulations' overall goal of apportioning
responsibility among motor carriers.  To comply with the FMCSA
regulations, a written lease must contain language providing that "the
authorized carrier lessee shall have exclusive possession, control, and use
of the equipment for the duration of the lease.  The lease shall further
provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall assume complete
responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the
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lease."  49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1).  There is no written lease between Lucky
B and TVL&T in the record.  And testimony in the record confirms the
absence of a lease -- Betty testified that she did not know if the truck was
leased, and Kenneth testified that TVL&T did not lease any trucks.
In sum, Lands met his burden of providing substantial evidence that
Lucky B owed a duty to him.  The trial court erred by holding otherwise.
2. Breach
Contrary to what Lucky B argues, Lands presented substantial
evidence that Lucky B breached a duty owed to him.  Lands's argument
is that Lucky B's failure to inspect and maintain the truck in compliance
with federal regulations and a state statute constituted the breach.  To
support this argument, Lands submitted Morgan's affidavit to the trial
court as part of his response to the defendants' summary-judgment
motions.  As reflected in his affidavit, Morgan reviewed the testimony of
Betty, the testimony of Lands, and a photograph of the truck.  After his
review of those materials, he testified: 
"[I]t is my opinion (to a reasonable degree of certainty) that the
Peterbilt truck tractor owned and operated by [Lucky B] ... and
provided to Steve Lands to drive at the time he was injured on
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September 25, 2015 was in such a condition that it should not
have been in service because it was in violation of the
applicable safety regulations and standards, due to the fact
that it was not properly inspected, repaired and maintained as
required."
This was the only evidence before the trial court regarding Lucky B's
compliance with FMCSA regulations.  
There is no evidence in the record that Lucky B even attempted to
inspect, maintain, or repair the truck as required by Alabama law.  In
fact, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Lands, indicates
the opposite.  See Webb, 594 So. 2d at 103.  Thus, we cannot say, as a
matter of law, that Lucky B did not breach a duty in the manner in which
it maintained the truck. 
3. Proximate Cause
Lucky B also raises the possibility that a lack of proximate cause
supports the trial court's judgment.  Although the sequence of events in
this case is unusual, the resulting injury here is not the kind that takes
the question of proximate cause away from the jury. 
It is well established that proximate cause is generally a jury
question.  Giles v. Gardner, 287 Ala. 166, 169, 249 So. 2d 824, 826 (1971). 
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"[I]t is only when the facts are such that reasonable men must draw the
same conclusion that the question of proximate cause is one of law for the
courts."  Id.  Like the duty analysis, proximate cause accounts for
foreseeability, which has been labeled "the cornerstone of proximate
cause."  Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 293 Ala. 484, 498, 306 So. 2d 236,
249 (1975).  An injury is deemed foreseeable if it is the " ' " ' "natural,
although not the necessary and inevitable, result of the negligent
fault." ' " ' "  Looney v. Davis, 721 So. 2d 152, 162 (Ala. 1998) (quoting
Lawson v. General Tel. Co. of Alabama, 289 Ala. 283, 289, 267 So. 2d 132,
138 (Ala. 1972)).  "Thus, generally a defendant may be found liable if some
physical injury of the general type the plaintiff sustained was a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct, even though
the extent of the physical injuries may have been quite unforeseeable." 
Id. (emphasis added).
What is foreseeable can be broader than what the defendant actually
knew.  Lance, 731 So. 2d at 1209.  Foreseeability encompasses  " 'all
consequences which a prudent and experienced person, fully acquainted
with all the circumstances, at the time of his negligent act, would have
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thought reasonably possible to follow that act, including the negligence of
others.' "  Looney, 721 So. 2d at 159 (internal citation omitted).  
The record contains substantial evidence of proximate cause that
requires jury resolution.  Lands presented the affidavit of Morgan, who
said that the truck was, in his opinion, not compliant with FMCSA
regulations and unsafe to drive.  Lands also supplied his own testimony
that he was taught the hot-wire method by Kenneth and that he had used
it on at least two prior occasions before the accident.  Under our
proximate-cause framework, which presumes Lucky B was " 'fully
acquainted with all [these] circumstances, at the time of [its] negligent
act,' " Looney 721 So. 2d at 159,  it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that
Lucky B is not responsible for "some physical injury of the general type
[Lands] sustained."  Id. at 162.  A reasonable person, aware that the truck
was noncompliant with safety regulations, that the truck had broken
down on multiple occasions while being used by TVL&T, and that
TVL&T's agents hot-wired the truck on those occasions to restart it, could
have foreseen a resulting injury.  Lands satisfied his burden to the point
where a jury should be allowed to resolve the issue.
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4. Contributory Negligence As a Matter of Law
In several sections of its brief, Lucky B contends that the judgment
below can stand because Lands was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law.  That is a high hurdle that Lucky B cannot clear at this stage
based on the record before us. 
The question of contributory negligence is "normally one for the jury"
to decide.  Wyser v. Ray Sumlin Constr. Co., 680 So. 2d 235, 238 (Ala.
1996).  To obtain summary judgment based on contributory negligence,
the moving party must show two things: (1) that the plaintiff put himself
in danger's way and (2) that the plaintiff had a conscious appreciation of
the danger at the moment the incident in question occurred.  Hannah v.
Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839, 860 (Ala. 2002).  Further,
"[w]e protect against the inappropriate use of a summary judgment to
establish contributory negligence as a matter of law by requiring the
defendant on such a motion to establish by undisputed evidence a
plaintiff's conscious appreciation of the danger."  Id. at 861 (emphasis
added).  
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Here, there is no evidence -- let alone undisputed evidence -- that
Lands consciously appreciated the risk when he attempted to hot-wire the
truck after it broke down.  Looking at the evidence in the light most
favorable to Lands, see Webb, 594 So. 2d at 103, he used a method that he
had used twice before without incident -- and this method was shown to
him and endorsed by his employer.  While a jury may be entitled to find
that Lands's use of the hot-wire method was contributory negligence that
bars his recovery, Lucky B was required at the summary-judgment stage
to present "undisputed evidence [of the] plaintiff's conscious appreciation
of the danger."  Id.  Lucky B did not make that showing.  Therefore, the
summary judgment cannot stand on that basis. 
B. Lands's Wantonness Claim
The trial court granted Lucky B's summary-judgment motion
regarding Lands's wantonness claim.  This was correct.
The evidence required to prove a negligence claim is distinct from
the evidence required to prove wantonness.  Armstrong v. Hill, 290 So. 3d
411, 418 (Ala. 2019).  " ' "Negligence is usually characterized as an
inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness, a lack of due care; whereas
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wantonness is characterized as ... a conscious ... act." ' "  Tolbert v. Tolbert,
903 So. 2d 103, 114-15 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex parte Anderson, 682 So. 2d
467, 470 (Ala. 1996)).  We have held that wantonness involves "the
conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing
of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting
to do an act, injury will likely or probably result."  Ex parte Essary, 992
So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007).
In this case, Lands did not present substantial evidence
demonstrating that Lucky B acted "knowing of the existing conditions" of
the truck "while ... being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an
act, injury [would] likely or probably result."  Id.  In the absence of such
evidence, Lucky B is entitled to summary judgment on the wantonness
claim.
Conclusion
Lands has made out a prima facie case of negligence.  While
questions about causation and his own possible negligence remain, Lands
is entitled to have those questions answered by a jury.  We therefore
reverse the trial court's summary judgment on that claim and remand the
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1191074
case for further proceedings.  The same, however, cannot be said for
Lands's wantonness claim.  Even viewed in the light most favorable to
Lands, see Webb, 594 So. 2d at 103, the record lacks the evidence of
heightened culpability required to prove wantonness.  The judgment as to
that claim is accordingly affirmed. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
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