Title: Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Evans

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Evans, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4992.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4992 
OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. EVANS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Evans,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4992.] 
Judge misconduct—Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules for 
the Government of the Bar—One-year suspension, all stayed. 
(No. 2013-0231—Submitted March 13, 2013—Decided November 19, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-059. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Judge David Dean Evans, of Gallipolis, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0002043, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1972.  He currently serves as judge of the general and domestic-relations 
divisions of the Court of Common Pleas of Gallia County.  Relator, Ohio State 
Bar Association, charged Judge Evans with professional misconduct for failing to 
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disqualify himself from a case in which the judge had an admitted conflict with 
defense counsel. 
{¶ 2} The 
parties 
submitted 
a 
consent-to-discipline 
agreement 
recommending that Judge Evans be publicly reprimanded.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline rejected the agreement and 
remanded the matter for further proceedings before a three-member panel of the 
board.  On remand, the parties waived a hearing and submitted stipulations of fact 
and misconduct and jointly recommended a stayed six-month suspension.  The 
panel, and later the board, adopted the parties’ stipulations and recommended 
sanction.  No objections have been filed. 
{¶ 3} While “we ordinarily accept the panel’s and board’s conclusions as 
to the propriety of an attorney’s conduct or the appropriate sanction, and to that 
extent, our decisions reflect deference to their expertise,” as the ultimate arbiter of 
misconduct and sanctions in disciplinary cases, we remain free to exercise our 
independent judgment.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 39, 2009-
Ohio-317, 901 N.E.2d 798, ¶ 11.  Given the judge’s serious ethical violations and 
the significant harm caused by his misconduct, we impose a fully stayed one-year 
suspension. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} The Gallia County public-defender commission, through a separate 
public-defender corporation, employed Robert W. Bright to represent indigent 
criminal defendants in the Gallia County Common Pleas Court.  As the only judge 
of the general division of that court, Judge Evans presided over all felony cases in 
which Bright was appointed counsel. 
{¶ 5} In the matter that led to this disciplinary proceeding, Bright 
represented a defendant who had initially agreed to enter into a plea agreement 
but during the plea hearing decided against it.  Moments later, the defendant 
changed his mind again, but at that point, Judge Evans refused to accept the plea.  
January Term, 2013 
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Judge Evans again refused to accept the plea agreement three days later when 
Bright and the county prosecutor jointly requested that the judge allow a plea 
change. 
{¶ 6} Bright thereafter filed an 18-page motion requesting that Judge 
Evans accept the plea agreement and characterizing the judge’s refusal to do so as 
“an abuse of discretion” and “unreasonable and/or arbitrary and/or 
unconscionable.”  Although irrelevant to the pending matter, Bright also 
criticized, at length, some of Judge Evans’s other courtroom practices, such as the 
judge’s alleged use of a “drop-dead date” for pleas.  Judge Evans later described 
Bright’s motion as “scathing” and showing Bright’s “bias toward and contempt 
for the court,” and he sent a copy of the motion to disciplinary counsel. 
{¶ 7} Judge Evans also issued an entry overruling Bright’s motion and 
sua sponte removing Bright as counsel in the matter.  The entry stated:  
 
The Court finds that while Defense Counsel’s attitude 
toward the Court as expressed in the instant motion may not rise to 
the level of Professional Misconduct or to the level of being 
contemptuous, it certainly is not acceptable behavior.  By such 
conduct he has created conflict with the Court whereby in this case 
or for that matter any other case in the future, when he does not 
agree with a decision or ruling by the Court, instead of being 
critical 
by 
accusation 
of 
being 
arbitrary, 
unreasonable, 
unconscionable or of abusing discretion, he simply may accuse the 
court of being bias [sic] or prejudice [sic] as it relates to him.  The 
Court must not only avoid any impropriety, bias or prejudice but 
must avoid any appearance of such.  The expressions and attitudes 
of Defense Counsel as exhibited and announced in the instant 
motion toward this Court compromises [sic] the Court’s ability to 
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avoid any appearance of bias [or] prejudice, or to be fair and 
impartial as it relates to Defense Counsel regardless [of] how hard 
it tries or what strides it makes toward guaranteeing that there 
would be no bias, prejudice and that it would be fair and impartial. 
The Court finds in this case due to the conflict Defense 
Counsel has created with this Court and to protect the rights of 
Defendant, that Defense Counsel, Robert W. Bright should be 
relieved of further responsibility for representation of Defendant 
and that substitute counsel should be appointed. 
 
{¶ 8} Judge Evans next filed entries removing Bright as appointed 
counsel in 63 other criminal cases—even though none of the defendants in any 
case had requested Bright’s removal as their counsel.  The entry in each case 
stated that “Attorney Robert W. Bright is relieved of further obligation due to the 
conflict he has created with the Court” and “due to the Court’s inquiry to the 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio regarding Mr. Bright’s 
conduct.” 
{¶ 9} Judge Evans’s actions removed Bright’s entire caseload, and 
within a month of the judge’s entries, the Gallia County public defender 
terminated Bright’s employment, reasoning that it had “no other options,” since 
Bright could not practice in Judge Evans’s courtroom.  Disciplinary counsel 
ultimately decided against filing any charges against Bright based on Judge 
Evans’s grievance. 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree, that Judge 
Evans’s conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 (requiring a judge to disqualify 
himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including circumstances in which a judge has a 
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s counsel) and Gov.Bar R. 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
V(11)(E) (requiring that all proceedings and documents relating to review and 
investigation of grievances be private).  Relator did not pursue Count III of its 
complaint, and the board recommends dismissal of that charge.  Accordingly, 
Count III is hereby dismissed. 
Sanction 
{¶ 11} In determining the appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct, we 
consider the ethical duties violated, the injury caused, the existence of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B), and our precedent.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 2010-Ohio-3265, 931 
N.E.2d 558, ¶ 53, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Sargeant, 118 Ohio St.3d 322, 
2008-Ohio-2330, 889 N.E.2d 96, ¶ 28, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 89 
Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609 (2000). 
1.  Duties violated and injuries caused 
{¶ 12} “It is of utmost importance that the public have confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen, 79 
Ohio St.3d 494, 495, 684 N.E.2d 31 (1997).  For this reason, Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 
requires that a judge disqualify himself or herself from a case in which he or she 
has a personal bias or prejudice “concerning a party or a party’s lawyer” and also 
from “any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.” 
{¶ 13} Here, in Judge Evans’s own words, Bright’s motion created a 
“conflict” with the judge that “compromise[d] the Court’s ability to avoid any 
appearance of bias [or] prejudice, or to be fair and impartial * * * regardless [of] 
how hard it tries.”  The judge’s language indicates an actual personal bias 
concerning Bright—or at the very least, the existence of an appearance of bias or 
partiality.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 28-30, 630 S.E.2d 326 
(2006) (judge exhibited personal bias against an attorney by attempting to remove 
him as attorney for the defendant and peremptorily removing the attorney from 
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the court-appointed-attorney list).  Even if we concede that Bright’s motion was 
inappropriate or disrespectful to Judge Evans, there is no dispute that Judge 
Evans—not Bright—unilaterally declared that a conflict existed.  Contrary to the 
plain language of Jud.Cond.R. 2.11, Judge Evans cured the conflict by removing 
Bright as counsel in 64 cases, rather than disqualifying himself.  And in further 
violation of his ethical duties, Judge Evans, in his entries removing Bright, 
implied that Bright was the subject of a disciplinary investigation, even though 
disciplinary matters must be kept private and confidential until there has been a 
finding of probable cause or certification of a complaint.  Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E).  
In sum, the judge violated a fundamental principle of our judicial system and 
showed disrespect for our attorney-discipline process. 
{¶ 14} Judge Evans’s actions erode the public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of our judiciary.  But his misconduct resulted in a more concrete 
injury to Bright, who lost his job as a public defender and his privacy protections 
under Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E).  The judge’s misconduct also likely harmed Bright’s 
clients, who did not request his removal as their counsel. 
2.  Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 15} The board found the existence of one aggravating factor:  Judge 
Evans engaged in multiple offenses by filing an entry in 63 pending cases 
mentioning the possible disciplinary investigation into Bright’s conduct.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d).  As an additional aggravating factor, we find that 
Judge Evans’s misconduct caused harm to Bright and his clients.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h) (vulnerability of and resulting harm to victims of 
misconduct). 
{¶ 16} In mitigation, the board found (1) an absence of a prior disciplinary 
record, (2) an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, (3) full and free disclosure 
to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and 
(4) good character and reputation.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (d), and 
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(e).  As to the fourth factor, the parties stipulated that Judge Evans’s character and 
reputation “demonstrate his commitment to the judicial system and the citizens he 
serves,” but the record lacks any additional evidence supporting this stipulation.  
While we have no reason to doubt Judge Evans’s excellent reputation in his 
community, we give somewhat less weight to this factor without more evidence to 
support it.  Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012-
Ohio-4700, 979 N.E.2d 289, ¶ 23 (the judge, in a fully stipulated case, submitted 
many letters of reference attesting to his commitment to his community). 
3.  Applicable precedent 
{¶ 17} Neither the board nor the parties have cited any precedent 
supporting their recommendation of a stayed six-month suspension.  We find the 
following judicial- and magistrate-discipline opinions instructive:  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gaul, 127 Ohio St.3d 16, 2010-Ohio-4831, 936 N.E.2d 28 (stayed six-
month suspension for a judge’s making highly prejudicial and unnecessary 
remarks against a defendant and getting the media involved in a case by advising 
the media that he was going to issue an Amber Alert to locate a witness even 
though he knew he probably did not have the authority to issue such an alert); 
Elum (stayed six-month suspension for the judge’s undignified and discourteous 
manner toward litigants, unnecessary involvement in a police-department 
administrative investigation, and failure to act impartially in and to disqualify 
himself from a proceeding involving the police department with which the judge 
had a history of conflict); Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack, 133 Ohio St.3d 
192, 2012-Ohio-4309, 977 N.E.2d 598 (stayed one-year suspension for a 
magistrate’s pattern of misconduct in a single case, including acting in a 
discourteous and undignified manner, treating litigants with disdain, terminating 
hearings before the parties had presented all their evidence, and failing to timely 
resolve the matter); and Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 
2010-Ohio-3265, 931 N.E.2d 558, ¶ 53 (one-year suspension with six months 
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stayed for a judge’s multiple and repeated ethical violations in several matters, 
including conducting an improper investigation of a defendant, using undignified 
language toward counsel, failing to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, 
making improper remarks from the bench about county commissioners, using his 
position as a judge to obtain access to a prosecutor’s file, and improperly placing 
a defendant in a holding cell). 
{¶ 18} Judge Evans’s misconduct is comparable to the judicial 
misconduct in Gaul and Elum, in which both judges received stayed six-month 
suspensions.  However, a significant aggravating factor is present here that was 
absent in those cases:  i.e., harm to the victims.  Indeed, in Gaul, the board found 
that the victim of the judge’s misconduct “suffered no actual prejudice.”  Gaul, 
¶ 75.  See also Elum, ¶ 23 (harm to victim was not listed as an aggravating factor).  
However, that aggravating factor was present and considered in McCormack, in 
which an attorney received a stayed one-year suspension for his misconduct while 
serving as a magistrate.  McCormack, ¶ 19 (the magistrate’s misconduct “caused 
harm to vulnerable litigants who bore the time commitment and expense of 
multiple hearings for well over a year without movement toward the resolution of 
their conflict”).  On the other hand, Judge Evans’s misconduct does not rise to the 
level of that of Judge Campbell—either in the number of rule violations or the 
persistency of the misconduct—who received a one-year suspension with six 
months stayed.  Therefore, a lesser sanction than was imposed in Campbell is 
justified here. 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, we find that the midrange sanction is proper.  We 
have previously imposed sanctions harsher than that recommended by the board 
because of the harm caused by a judge’s misconduct.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Russo, 124 Ohio St.3d 437, 2010-Ohio-605, 923 N.E.2d 144, ¶ 31 
(rejecting the recommended sanction of a stayed six-month suspension and 
imposing a stayed one-year suspension because “a sanction more rigorous than 
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the board’s recommendation is required for the harm caused by respondent’s 
improprieties”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} Judges are subject to the highest standards of ethical conduct.  
Russo, ¶ 13, citing Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 151 
N.E.2d 17 (1958).  Given Judge Evans’s serious ethical violations and the 
significant harm caused by his misconduct, and having considered the aggravating 
and mitigating factors and sanctions imposed for comparable conduct, we 
conclude that a stayed six-month suspension, as recommended by the board, is too 
lenient and that a stayed one-year suspension is more appropriate.  Accordingly, 
Judge David Dean Evans is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for 
one year, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no 
misconduct during the suspension.  If Judge Evans fails to meet this condition, the 
stay will be lifted and Judge Evans will serve the entire one-year suspension.  
Costs are taxed to Judge Evans. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents with opinion. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would impose a six-month suspension, 
stayed, as recommended by the board. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 21} Judges in smaller counties encounter problems that those in larger 
counties are able to address rather easily.  When a judge in a large county has an 
irreconcilable conflict with an attorney, that attorney’s cases can be assigned to 
another judge.  In smaller counties, especially those like Gallia County that have 
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only one judge in the general division of the court, that simple resolution is not 
possible. 
{¶ 22} Judge David Evans, upon concluding that he and attorney Robert 
Bright had an untenable working relationship, filed entries removing Bright from 
all cases in which Bright had been appointed as counsel.  In my opinion, that was 
a reasonable reaction to the problem that he confronted.  It was better than having 
visiting judges assigned to a host of routine cases, better than having an 
antagonistic relationship between a judge and a public defender.  Better still 
would have been an amicable reconciliation; but the record suggests that that was 
not possible. 
{¶ 23} In the circumstances before us, it is more sensible for the attorney 
to give way than the judge.  Judge Evans was elected by the people of Gallia 
County to serve as their sole judge; however highly skilled, attorney Bright is an 
at-will employee.  Surely, when an irreconcilable conflict prevents them from 
working on cases, the elected judge should supersede the at-will employee. 
{¶ 24} This case is not like the cases to which this court compares it.  In 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 127 Ohio St.3d 16, 2010-Ohio-4831, 936 N.E.2d 
28, the judge made prejudicial and unnecessary comments against a defendant and 
informed the media that he was going to issue an Amber Alert for a missing 
witness when he knew that he probably did not have the authority to issue that 
alert.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012-Ohio-4700, 979 
N.E.2d 289, the judge treated litigants discourteously and unnecessarily involved 
himself in an administrative investigation into a police officer’s conduct.  In 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack, 133 Ohio St.3d 192, 2012-Ohio-4309, 977 
N.E.2d 598, the magistrate terminated hearings before all the evidence was 
presented and failed to timely resolve the matter before him.  In Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 2010-Ohio-3265, 931 N.E.2d 558, the 
judge failed to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, used his position as a 
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judge to obtain access to a prosecutor’s file, and improperly placed a defendant in 
a holding cell.  Judge Evans did none of these things.  He merely concluded that 
he and attorney Bright could not work together and then took steps to ensure that 
that fact didn’t result in his appearing to handle cases with prejudice. 
{¶ 25} The parties submitted a consent-to-discipline agreement that 
recommended that Judge Evans be publicly reprimanded.  That is an appropriate 
sanction.  Because this court issues a suspension, I dissent. 
____________________ 
Eugene P. Whetzel; Nolan, Sprowl & Smith and Edward M. Smith; and 
Jason M. Dolin, for relator. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, George D. Jonson, and Lisa M. Zaring, 
for respondent. 
________________________