Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Adusei

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Adusei, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3125.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3125 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. ADUSEI. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Adusei,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3125.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Charging clearly excessive fee and failing to set forth a 
contingent-fee agreement in writing—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2012-2075—Submitted February 6, 2013—Decided July 23, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-039. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Alexander Yaw Adusei Jr. of Columbus, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0082023, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
2007. 
{¶ 2} In an April 23, 2012 complaint, relator, Columbus Bar 
Association, charged Adusei with professional misconduct based on his 
representation of family members of decedent Joseph Addai in matters involving 
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Addai’s death and estate.  Specifically, Adusei was charged with misconduct for 
(1) collecting an illegal or clearly excessive legal fee, (2) failing to reduce a 
contingent-fee agreement to writing, and (3) creating a conflict of interest by 
representing multiple members of Addai’s family. 
{¶ 3} The parties stipulated, and the panel found, that Adusei’s conduct 
with regard to Addai’s death violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly 
excessive fee) and 1.5(c)(1) (requiring an attorney to have set forth a contingent-
fee agreement in a writing signed by the client).1  Relator withdrew the alleged 
conflict-of-interest violations, under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)-(c) (generally regulating 
a lawyer’s representation when a client’s interests will conflict, or when there is a 
substantial risk that they will conflict, with the lawyer’s own interests or those of 
another client or former client).  The parties stipulated that Adusei should be 
publicly reprimanded for his misconduct. 
{¶ 4} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
adopted the parties’ stipulations, but found an aggravating factor, and 
recommended that we publicly reprimand Adusei for his misconduct.  For the 
reasons that follow, we adopt the board’s findings of fact, and we agree that a 
public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this case. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} The parties stipulated that in June 2009, Joseph Addai was killed in 
an automobile accident in Columbus.  Adusei had met Addai through interactions 
with members of the Ghanaian community in Columbus, and he had represented 
Addai on occasional traffic matters in the past. 
                                                 
1 The stipulations, the hearing panel, and the board all cite Prof.Cond.R 1.5(c) generally, but only 
the first paragraph of the rule is at issue here.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1).  Adusei has not been 
charged with violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(2) (requiring a lawyer entitled to a contingent fee to 
prepare a closing statement to be signed by the lawyer and the client, detailing the lawyer’s 
compensation, any costs and expenses to be deducted, and any division of fees with a lawyer not 
in the same firm).   
January Term, 2013 
 
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{¶ 6} Soon after Addai’s death, Addai’s niece and nephew, along with 
two members of Addai’s village in Ghana (collectively, the “extended family”), 
approached Adusei to discuss issues involving Addai’s death and estate.  Adusei 
met with the extended family to discuss the possibility of returning Addai’s body 
to Ghana, cultural issues regarding the distribution of Addai’s assets, and legal 
issues related to Addai’s estate.  At the end of the meeting, the extended family 
expressed a desire to retain Adusei to assist with funeral arrangements and the 
possible transportation of Addai’s body to Ghana. 
{¶ 7} Adusei did not enter a written agreement with the extended family, 
but he did raise the issue of compensation.  The extended family did not have 
funds to compensate Adusei, but they verbally agreed that he would receive one-
third of any amounts recovered on behalf of Addai’s estate from any source.  The 
remaining two-thirds would be divided among Addai’s legal heirs.  Adusei did 
not discuss this arrangement with Addai’s children or widow, Mrs. Comfort 
Addai, all of whom resided in Ghana. 
{¶ 8} Subsequently, Adusei learned that Addai had a life insurance 
policy at the time of his death.  The policy named Mrs. Addai as the sole 
beneficiary, entitling her to receive a payout of $23,816.  Adusei attempted to 
arrange for Mrs. Addai and her children to travel to the United States to receive 
the money.  Those efforts proved unsuccessful, so Adusei traveled to Ghana 
himself. 
{¶ 9} Adusei met with Mrs. Addai on November 12, 2009.  At the 
meeting, Mrs. Addai executed a power of attorney in favor of Adusei.  Adusei and 
Mrs. Addai discussed fees, but they did not enter any written agreement.  Mrs. 
Addai did not agree to pay Adusei’s expenses for traveling to Ghana.  However, 
at the end of the meeting, Adusei believed that Mrs. Addai had agreed to pay a 
contingent fee. 
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{¶ 10} On March 29, 2009, Adusei received the proceeds of Addai’s 
insurance policy (and interest)—$24,005.10.  Of that amount, Adusei retained 
$7,956.77 as his fee and gave $1,300 to Addai’s extended family.  Mrs. Addai 
received the balance:  $14,748.33. 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated, and the panel and board found, that Adusei 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) by entering a contingent-fee agreement to collect life 
insurance proceeds.  In addition, the parties stipulated and the panel and board 
found that Adusei violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) by failing to reduce his 
contingent-fee agreement to writing. 
{¶ 12} On the recommendation of the panel and board, we adopt the 
stipulated findings of fact and misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 13} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 14} As discussed above, Adusei failed to reduce a contingent-fee 
agreement to writing.  Under that agreement, he collected nearly $8000 in fees 
simply for collecting and distributing insurance proceeds.  This is clearly 
excessive for the work Adusei performed. 
{¶ 15} As to aggravating factors, the panel and board rejected the 
stipulation that no aggravating factors are present in this case.  Instead, the panel 
and the board found clear and convincing evidence of a single aggravating 
factor—Adusei’s actions harmed a vulnerable client.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(h). 
January Term, 2013 
 
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{¶ 16} The parties stipulated to three mitigating factors, and the panel and 
board found clear and convincing evidence of each one.  Adusei had no prior 
disciplinary record, he cooperated with relator’s investigation, and he expressed 
remorse and made restitution to Mrs. Addai.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), 
(c), and (d). 
{¶ 17} The parties have stipulated, and the panel and board recommend, 
that the appropriate sanction for Adusei’s misconduct is a public reprimand. 
{¶ 18} Our decisions in cases involving similar violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5 indicate that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction here.  “[W]e have 
consistently issued public reprimands to attorneys for charging an excessive fee 
when the record also includes significant mitigating evidence.”  Geauga Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. Martorana, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2013-Ohio-1686, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 12.  See, 
e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 49, 2009-Ohio-5960, 918 
N.E.2d 992, ¶ 23-29 (attorney publicly reprimanded for charging excessive fees 
when mitigating factors included lack of prior disciplinary record, cooperation in 
the disciplinary investigation, and the attorney’s inexperience); and Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Randolph, 85 Ohio St.3d 325, 326-327, 708 N.E.2d 192 (1999) 
(attorney publicly reprimanded for charging excessive fees when mitigating 
factors included restitution and acceptance of responsibility). 
{¶ 19} By contrast, we have imposed harsher sanctions for charging an 
excessive fee when significant aggravating factors—such as not returning a 
client’s money—exist.  Martorana at ¶ 13.  For example, we imposed a six-month 
stayed suspension for charging an excessive fee in Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr, 131 
Ohio St.3d 210, 2012-Ohio-610, 963 N.E.2d 802, ¶ 19.  Like Adusei, the attorney 
in Carr caused harm to a vulnerable client by charging an excessive fee, had no 
prior disciplinary record, and fully cooperated in the disciplinary proceeding.  Id. 
at ¶ 16.  Unlike Adusei, however, the attorney in Carr did not make restitution, 
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failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, and was driven by a 
selfish motive.  Id. 
{¶ 20} As discussed above, Adusei made full restitution to his client, 
repaying the entire fee he collected and the amount he distributed to Addai’s 
extended family.  He acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct and 
cooperated with the relator’s investigation.  Under these circumstances, a public 
reprimand is an appropriate sanction for Adusei’s violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5(a). 
{¶ 21} Adusei’s additional violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) does not 
demand a harsher sanction.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Hackett, 129 Ohio St.3d 
186, 2011-Ohio-3096, 950 N.E.2d 969, we imposed a public reprimand upon an 
attorney who not only charged an excessive fee, but also violated Prof.Cond.R. 
5.6 (prohibiting a lawyer from offering or participating in an employment 
agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the 
relationship). 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, we publicly reprimand Alexander Yaw Adusei Jr. for 
collecting an illegal or clearly excessive legal fee and for failing to reduce a 
contingent-fee agreement to writing.  Costs are taxed to Adusei. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Barno Law, L.L.C., and Melissa A. Black; Benesch Friedlander Coplan & 
Aronoff, L.L.P., and James L. Ervin; and Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and 
A. Alysha Clous, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
James E. Arnold & Associates, L.P.A., and Alvin E. Mathews, for 
respondent. 
_________________________