Title: People v. Gambrell

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

429 Mich. 401 (1987)
415 N.W.2d 202
PEOPLE
v.
GAMBRELL
Docket No. 79846.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
Decided November 13, 1987.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Don W. Atkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Susan M. Meinberg) for the defendant.
PER CURIAM:
The issue in this case is whether the circuit court erred in its decision that an expert witness called by the defendant was unqualified to testify as an expert. We hold that the trial court did err, and we therefore reverse the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.
*402 I
In the early morning hours of December 21, 1983, the defendant and his 2 1/2-year-old daughter were in a motel room that was consumed by fire. The defendant's daughter died.
The defendant was charged with alternative counts of first-degree murder: one count alleged premeditated murder, the other alleged felony murder. The felony-murder count alleged that the murder had taken place in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an arson. MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548.
The defendant was found guilty of felony murder at the conclusion of a June, 1984, jury trial. He was then sentenced to the mandatory term of life in prison.
After the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,[1] the defendant filed in this Court a delayed application for leave to appeal. In lieu of granting the application, we ordered the prosecutor to show cause why the defendant's conviction should not be reversed on several grounds, including that the trial court had erred in refusing to qualify the defendant's expert witness. People v Gambrell, 428 Mich 886 (1987). The prosecutor has filed an answer to our show-cause order, and the defendant has replied.
II
At trial the defendant testified that he had been drunk on the evening of the fatal fire. The gist of his testimony was that he did not know how the fire started, but that it had surely been an accident of some sort.
*403 To support his testimony that the fire had not been set intentionally, the defendant called a proposed expert witness. The witness testified that he is both an attorney and a registered professional engineer. He had been a chemical engineer for approximately twenty years prior to the defendant's trial. The witness testified that he had worked as a research engineer for a chemical company, as chief engineer of "a thermal convection corporation," and as a consulting engineer. When asked by defense counsel what experience he had had as an expert in fire cases, the witness provided the following testimony:
A. Yes, I have.
Q. How many times?
Q. When was the last time?
Q. Prior to that?
Q. You did testify in court?
A. I did, very competently.
*405 The assistant prosecutor argued that the witness was not qualified as an expert. ("He may be a qualified lawyer, but not qualified to state any opinions on the origins of fires.") After excusing the jury, the trial court said that it was "waiting to hear something that is going to relate to his expertise to arson, and I haven't heard anything yet." The trial court asked the witness whether he had "done any arson investigation at all." The witness responded:
The trial court then asked the witness whether he had previously been qualified as an expert:
Mr. Dorf: Didn't you give depositions?
The Court: Where did you testify?
There was further discussion. Defense counsel explained the difficulties that he had had in investigating the case, including the fact that the burned motel room had been restored to its original condition before he was able to have an arson *407 investigator check the scene. The trial court eventually concluded that the witness' testimony would be excluded. The trial court invited the witness to assist trial counsel in locating a different expert.
III
In People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 105-106; 387 NW2d 814 (1986), we explained the principles that govern a trial court's discretionary decision whether to admit expert testimony. In the course of that discussion, we said that "the witness must have sufficient qualifications `as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in the search for truth.' McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 13, p 33." We also quoted MRE 702, which provides that expert testimony can be provided by "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education...."
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, it is well settled that the determination of a witness' expert qualifications is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless it can be shown that the court abused its discretion. People v Hawthorne, 293 Mich 15, 23; 291 NW 205 (1940). In this case, the Court of Appeals has held, without detailed explanation, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
We disagree. The proposed expert is a chemical engineer who testified that he had lectured in both the public sector and the private sector on combustion, and had worked with the Detroit Fire Department in cases involving gasoline explosions or potential explosions. He had worked with arson investigators and had "dealt with the low point of burns, with flashpoints, of materials both open and closed, coupled with the different ignition temperatures *408 of different materials, the melting points of metals, the evidence left after fires, the tracks left by the formation of combustion products, the phenomenon of paralysis." The witness is clearly qualified to testify as an expert on the defendant's behalf. As in Hawthorne,[2] a finding of expertise is not foreclosed by the fact that the witness has developed his expertise in a career that has followed a path different than the careers of the prosecution's arson experts. Gaps or weaknesses in the witness' expertise are a fit subject for cross-examination, and go to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility.
When the parties began discussing this matter out of the presence of the jury, the trial court opened the conversation by saying:
This case does not involve an attorney who has simply become a self-made expert through the sort of study that is frequently required in order to try medical malpractice cases or other cases involving technical or scientific knowledge. We therefore need not decide today whether it is possible for an attorney to be qualified as an expert in a technical field solely as a result of involvement in such cases as an attorney. The witness is a chemical engineer with an academic and employment-related background for the expert testimony he proposed to give. As we have indicated, challenges to the precise origins of his expertise are matters that go to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility.
*409 IV
The defendant's conviction must be reversed because of the improper exclusion of the witness' expert testimony. This error is not harmless, because in this case the exclusion of the expert witness crippled the defendant's presentation of his defense that the fire was not set purposefully. In light of this disposition, we find it unnecessary to examine the other issues raised by the defendant in this appeal.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Wayne Circuit Court, and we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for a new trial. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
RILEY, C.J., and LEVIN, BRICKLEY, CAVANAGH, BOYLE, ARCHER, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred.
[1]  People v Gambrell, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided November 10, 1986 (Docket No. 80369).
[2]  In Hawthorne, this Court held that lack of a medical degree did not bar a witness from qualifying as an expert on insanity.