Title: Butler v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Louis Ricardo BUTLER v. STATE of Arkansas

95-981                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 28, 1996


1.   Juveniles -- limited jurisdiction of circuit court. --
     Arkansas Code Annotated  9-27-318 (Repl. 1993) specifically
     provides, and the supreme court has consistently held, that
     the circuit court has jurisdiction over a juvenile aged
     fourteen or fifteen only when the juvenile is charged with one
     or more of the offenses enumerated in section 9-27-318(b)(1);
     any other charges against the juvenile must be dismissed by
     the circuit court for lack of jurisdiction.

2.   Juveniles -- circuit court never had jurisdiction of theft
     charges -- theft counts dismissed. -- Where the three theft
     charges filed against appellant were not among those
     enumerated in Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(b)(1), and where the
     prosecutor did not file the charges in juvenile court and then
     move to transfer them to circuit court, the circuit court
     never had jurisdiction of those charges; therefore, the three
     counts of theft of property filed against appellant in circuit
     court were dismissed.

3.   Juveniles -- denial of transfer from circuit to juvenile court
     -- standard of review -- appellant did not meet burden of
     proof. -- A circuit court's decision to deny transfer of an
     appellant's case to juvenile court will not be reversed unless
     it is clearly erroneous; furthermore, it is the movant's
     burden to prove that the transfer to juvenile court was
     warranted; this was a burden that appellant did not meet.

4.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- determination that juvenile
     should be tried as adult must be supported by clear and
     convincing evidence. -- Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-
     318(f), the determination that a juvenile should be tried as
     an adult must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

5.   Evidence -- clear and convincing evidence defined. -- Clear
     and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof
     that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction
     regarding the allegation sought to be established.

6.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors to be considered. --
     Under Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e), the circuit court shall
     consider the following factors when making the decision to
     retain jurisdiction or transfer the case to juvenile court:
     (1) the seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was
     employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense; (2)
     whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of
     adjudicated offenses that would lead to the determination that
     the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing
     rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat
     and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such
     efforts; and (3) the prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor that reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.

7.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors need not be given
     equal weight -- serious and violent nature of charged offenses
     warranted denial of transfer to juvenile court. -- Although a
     circuit court must consider all of the factors listed in Ark.
     Code Ann.  9-27-318(e), the circuit court need not give each
     of the factors equal weight; it is permissible to give
     substantial weight to the criminal information; indeed, the
     criminal information, on its own, is sufficient to establish
     that the offense charged is of a violent and serious nature,
     thus satisfying the first element listed in section 9-27-
     318(e); moreover, proof of each factor need not be introduced
     against the juvenile in order for the circuit court to retain
     jurisdiction; the fact that the offenses charged were serious
     in nature and committed with the use of violence was
     sufficient to warrant a denial of transfer of appellant's case
     to juvenile court.       

8.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- use of violence --
     sufficient reason for circuit court's denial of transfer. --
     The use of violence in the commission of a serious offense is
     a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to
     retain jurisdiction of a juvenile's case; although it is
     possible to commit the offense of aggravated robbery without
     the actual employment of violence, the supreme court found
     that was not the case in the three incidents with which
     appellant was charged; here, the circuit court could easily
     have found that the evidence presented satisfied the first
     factor provided in Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e), and this
     factor alone would have been sufficient reason for the circuit
     court's denial of transfer.   

9.   Juveniles -- appellant's association with use of weapon was
     sufficient to satisfy violence criterion. -- The fact that
     appellant may not have held a gun in each of the robberies did
     not change the nature of the charges pending against him; it
     was of no consequence that appellant may or may not have
     personally used a weapon because his association with the use
     of a weapon in the course of the crimes was sufficient to
     satisfy the violence criterion; the testimony of a police
     detective, coupled with the factual basis set out in the
     felony information, provided sufficient grounds for the
     circuit court to find that the offenses committed were serious
     and that violence was employed by appellant during their
     commission.

10.  Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- circuit court's denial on
     aggravated robbery counts not clearly erroneous. -- The
     supreme court held that there was ample evidence from the
     record with which to affirm the circuit court's denial of
     transfer of appellant's case to juvenile court; where the
     remaining charges against appellant consisted of three counts
     of aggravated robbery (a Class Y felony, the most serious
     level of offense), and where violence was employed through
     appellant's use of deadly weapons to cause a threat of death
     or serious physical injury to the victims, the supreme court
     could not say that the denial of transfer with respect to the
     three counts of aggravated robbery was clearly erroneous.

11.  Appeal & error -- even constitutional issues will not be heard
     for the first time on appeal. -- Even constitutional issues
     will not be heard for the first time on appeal.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Fourth Division; John W.
Langston, Judge; affirmed in part; reversed and dismissed in part.
     University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law Legal
Clinic, by: Spencer R. Robinson, Rule XV Law Student, and Gerard F.
Glynn, Rule XV Supervising Attorney, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 5-28-96   *ADVREP*SC5*





LOUIS RICARDO BUTLER,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,



95-981



APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION,
NO. CR 94-2875,
HON. JOHN W. LANGSTON, JUDGE,



AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
DISMISSED IN PART.





     Appellant, Louis Ricardo Butler, appeals the order of the
Pulaski County Circuit Court, denying transfer of his case to
juvenile court.  This interlocutory appeal is provided in Ark. Code
Ann.  9-27-318(h) (Repl. 1993).  Jurisdiction is properly in this
court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(12).
     A felony information was filed in circuit court charging
appellant and Myron Antonio McClendon with three counts of
aggravated robbery, Class Y felony, in violation of Ark. Code Ann.
 5-12-103 (Repl. 1993), and three counts of theft of property, two
being Class A misdemeanors and the other being a Class B felony, in
violation of Ark. Code Ann.  5-36-103 (Repl. 1993).  The
information reflects that the charges stem from three separate
instances, taking place on July 7, 1994, July 10, 1994, and
August 11, 1994, involving appellant and McClendon robbing three
different pizza delivery personnel at gun point with the purpose of
 committing a theft.  Appellant was born April 23, 1979, and was
thus fifteen years of age at the time of the alleged offenses.
     After the state filed the felony information, a delinquency
petition was filed against appellant in juvenile court concerning
the robbery which occurred on August 11, 1994.  The record reflects
that the state mistakenly filed the last aggravated robbery
incident in juvenile court, not realizing that charges arising out
of all three robberies had already been filed in circuit court. 
The state had also filed an unrelated delinquency petition alleging
that appellant had committed the offenses of residential burglary,
Class B felony, and theft of property, Class A misdemeanor, on
July 13, 1994.    
     Appellant moved to transfer the charges pending in circuit
court to juvenile court.  The circuit court conducted a hearing on
appellant's motion, during which hearing testimony was heard from
appellant's parents, Mr. Louis Butler Sr. and Mrs. Lady Williams,
appellant's counselor, Mr. Sanford Tollette, and the police officer
who investigated the three robberies, Detective Todd Armstrong, of
the Little Rock Police Department.  
     Mr. Butler testified that his son began having trouble when he
and his mother were divorced in 1988, and that before the divorce,
appellant had been in advanced classes at school.  Mr. Butler
stated that after the divorce, appellant had been placed in
alternative schooling at the Joseph Pfeifer Kiwanis Camp, and that
he had begun to show progress within three or four weeks. 
Mr. Butler stated that his son was a good kid and that he knew
right from wrong.  Mr. Butler expressed concerns for appellant's
safety should he be sentenced to prison, and stated that sentencing
appellant to prison would not help to rehabilitate him.
     Mrs. Williams also testified that appellant had only begun to
have trouble since the divorce of his parents, and that because of
his troubles, she had put appellant in a program at Pinnacle Point
Hospital, in addition to the Pfeifer camp, and she had attempted to
place him in the New Futures program.  Mrs. Williams stated that
prison would not be a good place for appellant because he needs
rehabilitation.  Mrs. Williams concluded by saying that appellant
was not a violent person, but when he consumes alcohol, his
personality changes completely.  
     Sanford Tollette, director of the alternative classroom
program for kids at risk at the Pfeifer camp, took the stand next
on behalf of appellant.  Mr. Tollette stated that appellant had
been assigned to his program in November 1988, and that he had
completed the thirty-day program.  Mr. Tollette stated that
appellant had continued to come back to the program over the next
three years as part of the summer camp, and that he eventually
became an honor camper.  Mr. Tollette stated that he felt appellant
was a good kid with a good heart, and that the seriousness of the
offenses had made an impression on him.  
     The last witness to testify at the hearing was Detective
Armstrong, who described each of the robberies for the court. 
Detective Armstrong stated that on July 7, 1994, pizza was ordered
from Pizza 4 Less and upon the driver's arrival, two black males--
one armed with a shotgun and the other with a handgun--robbed the
deliveryman of two pizzas and cash.  Detective Armstrong stated
that on July 10, 1994, pizza was again ordered from Pizza 4 Less
and when the driver arrived, he was asked to come inside.  The
detective noted that on this occasion the robbery had taken place
at appellant's father's residence.  Once the driver was inside the
residence, Detective Armstrong continued, the deliveryman was
robbed of his pizzas with the use of a sawed-off shotgun. 
Regarding the third and last robbery, which occurred on August 11,
1994, Detective Armstrong stated that pizza was ordered from Pizza
Hut and upon the driver's arrival, he was approached by two black
males, one of whom was armed with a rock or brick and threatened
the deliveryman.  Upon the threat being made with the weapon,
Detective Armstrong stated, the deliveryman fled his vehicle, while
one of the suspects got into the vehicle and left.  Detective
Armstrong further testified that he had interviewed appellant
concerning the crimes, and that appellant had confessed his
participation in two of the three robberies.  Before leaving the
witness stand, Detective Armstrong identified appellant for the
record.
     At the conclusion of Detective Armstrong's testimony, the
state submitted the two previously mentioned juvenile delinquency
petitions against appellant as evidence, and the court received
them into the record.  The circuit court subsequently denied
appellant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court at a
later hearing.  Appellant now brings this interlocutory appeal.  
     In support of this appeal, appellant raises three points:
First, that the circuit court erred in not dismissing the three
counts of theft of property charged in the felony information, as
they are not listed among those offenses enumerated in section 9-
27-318(b)(1); second, that the circuit court erred in denying the
motion to transfer the case to juvenile court as there was not
clear and convincing evidence that appellant should be tried as an
adult; and third, that the circuit court erred by failing to
provide a sufficient statement of the court's findings to
demonstrate that each of the elements set out in section 9-27-
318(e) was considered.  We affirm the circuit court's ruling
denying transfer to juvenile court as to the three counts of
aggravated robbery, but we reverse the denial as to the three
counts of theft of property.
           I.  Jurisdiction of Non-enumerated Offenses
     Appellant argues that because he was only fifteen years old at
the time the offenses were allegedly committed, the circuit court
did not have jurisdiction over the three counts of theft charged in
the information because theft of property is not among those
charges enumerated in section 9-27-318(b)(1).  Appellee concedes
this error.  We agree that the denial of transfer as to the three
charges of theft of property was error.
     Section 9-27-318 specifically provides, and this court has
consistently held, that the circuit court has jurisdiction over a
juvenile aged fourteen or fifteen only when the juvenile is charged
with one or more of the offenses enumerated in section 9-27-
318(b)(1).  Any other charges against the juvenile must be
dismissed by the circuit court for lack of jurisdiction.  See,
e.g., State v. Gray, 319 Ark. 356, 891 S.W.2d 376 (1995); Banks v.
State, 306 Ark. 273,