Title: In re Adoption/Guardianship of C.E.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In re: Adoption/Guardianship of C.E., No. 77, September Term 2017.  Opinion by Getty, 
J.  
 
FAMILY LAW— TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS—FAMILY LAW 
ARTICLE § 5-323—UNFITNESS 
A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it declines to find the parents unfit and terminate 
parental rights even though it has found that the parents are unable to ever safely care for 
their child.  
 
FAMILY LAW—TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS—FAMILY LAW 
ARTICLE § 5-323—EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES  
A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it declines to find exceptional circumstances 
and terminate parental rights when the father refuses to sever his relationship with the 
child’s mother who is unfit to safely care for the child.  The mother had a lengthy history 
of serious mental illness that neither parent acknowledged, and the father sought to move-
in with the mother and frequently leave the child, alone in the mother’s care.  
 
FAMILY LAW—TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS—SUBSEQUENT 
ACTION  
A juvenile court errs as a matter of law when it changes a child in need of assistance 
permanency plan during a termination of parental rights hearing conducted pursuant to 
Maryland Code, Family Law Article, § 5-323 without issuing two separate orders pursuant 
to Maryland Code, Family Law Article, § 5-324.  Such error is not harmless when the 
juvenile court’s order applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the underlying 
termination of parental rights hearing.   
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. T16106011 
Argued: June 1, 2018 
Reargued: March 1, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 77 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
 
  
IN RE: ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP OF 
C.E. 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge,  
Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
 
Filed: June 6, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-06-06 
12:51-04:00
 
Before us is a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City declining to 
terminate the legal relationship between a mother, a father, and their child and ordering the 
child into the guardianship and custody of a relative.  We are asked to consider whether 
allowing this child to remain indefinitely in the custody of the third party, without 
terminating the parental rights of the father or of the mother, constitutes a proper exercise 
of judicial discretion when evidence was presented at the termination of parental rights 
hearing that neither parent possesses the ability to ever safely care for the child.  In 
reviewing this issue, we continue to follow this Court’s precedent of more than a decade 
and affirm that the pursuit of the best interest of the child remains the overarching goal 
when considering the termination of parental rights (“TPR”) pursuant to § 5-323 of the 
Family Law Article (hereinafter “FL”) of the Maryland Code.   
 
This Court first completed a comprehensive review of TPR proceedings in 2007, in 
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477 (2007).  Three years later, this 
Court, in In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90 (2010), reexamined TPR 
proceedings and confirmed the child’s best interest remains the prevailing standard as 
outlined in Rashawn H.  Following Rashawn H. and Ta’Niya C., this Court specifically 
reviewed the unfitness prong of FL §5-323, in In re Adoption/Guardianship of Amber R., 
417 Md. 701 (2011) and the exceptional circumstances prong of FL § 5-323, in In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201 (2018).        
 
Now, we seek to further clarify the circumstances under which a juvenile court must 
find that termination of parental rights is the proper recourse under either the unfitness 
2 
 
prong or the exceptional circumstances prong of FL § 5-323.1  We hold that in order to 
achieve the best interest of the child and to provide sufficient permanency for the child, it 
was an abuse of discretion for a juvenile court to decline to terminate the parental rights of 
the Father when a juvenile court finds that Father can never safely care for the child.  
Sufficient permanency for the child is not achieved when the child remains indefinitely in 
the guardianship and custody of a relative.  Furthermore, we hold the juvenile court abused 
its discretion when it failed to recognize an exceptional circumstance justifying the 
termination of the parents’ parental rights.  Finally, it was an error of law for the juvenile 
court to change a child in need of assistance (hereinafter “CINA”) permanency plan during 
a termination of parental rights hearing conducted pursuant to FL § 5-323 without issuing 
two separate orders pursuant to FL § 5-324.  Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment of 
the juvenile court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
BACKGROUND  
 
C.E. (hereinafter “C.E.” or “the child”) is a male child born in May 2014 to C.D. 
(hereinafter “Mother”)2 and H.E. (hereinafter “Father”).  C.E. was born two months 
                                                 
1 While pending in the Court of Special Appeals, C.E. filed a timely Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari before this Court in an effort to expedite permanency for C.E.  We granted 
certiorari on February 5, 2018.  
2 Mother does not appeal the juvenile court’s conclusion that there was clear and 
convincing evidence presented to support termination of her parental rights.  However, 
Mother has participated in the appeal, arguing along with Father, that the juvenile court’s 
findings, declining to terminate both of their parental rights due to Father and C.E.’s 
relationship, should be affirmed.  The following background involving the Mother is 
3 
 
premature and after birth was placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit of Johns Hopkins 
Hospital.  In time, he was transferred to the Mount Washington Pediatric Hospital.   
Immediately after C.E.’s birth, a Baltimore City Department of Social Services 
(hereinafter “the Department”) caseworker, Nia Noakes, responded to a “risk of harm” 
report and a request for a safety assessment of a newborn by Johns Hopkins Hospital.  As 
a part of the safety assessment, Ms. Noakes examined Mother’s home with both parents 
present.  Ms. Noakes also consulted the Department’s records to determine whether the 
family had a history with the Department.   
Ms. Noakes discovered that the Department had removed Mother’s other five 
children from her care over the past two decades.  See In re C.E., 456 Md. 209, 211 (2017).  
Mother first interacted with the Department in 1996.3  Id.  C.E. was Mother’s sixth child 
to be adjudged CINA.4  Id.  Mother has a well-documented history of mental illness causing 
her to lash out against her children.  Id.  Her “previous mental health diagnoses include 
paranoia, adjustment disorder, major depression, somatization disorder, borderline 
                                                 
included in this opinion to the extent that it is relevant to the findings of the Father, whose 
relationship to the child is at issue. 
3 The Court of Special Appeals has set forth these extensive interactions in at least five 
decisions.  See In re Joy D., 216 Md. App. 58 (2014); In re C.E., No. 925, Sept. Term, 
2015, 2015 WL 9183397 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 15, 2015), cert. denied 446 Md. 705 
(2016); In re Adoption/Guardianship of Joy D., No. 2307, Sept. Term, 2014, 2015 WL 
5821580 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 13, 2015), cert. denied, 445 Md. 20 (2015); In re Joy 
D., No. 1894, Sept. Term, 2013 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 2, 2014); In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of Malachi D., No. 3006, Sept. Term, 2010, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
Sept. 20, 2011), cert. denied, 424 Md. 56 (2011).  
4 The first CINA finding occurred in 1998 and the latest CINA finding, pertaining to C.E., 
took place in 2015.  
4 
 
personality disorder, mania, and bipolar affective disorder.”  Id.  Mother has also 
demonstrated “fits of rage.”  Id.  On numerous occasions, “juvenile courts repeatedly have 
found that [Mother] displayed a complete inability to care for her children, control her 
emotions, or effectively communicate with her children and the Department.”  Id. at 212.  
After the home visit and subsequent research, Ms. Noakes held a Family 
Involvement Meeting (“FIM”)5 to determine whether C.E. could be safely placed with 
either Mother or Father.  Concerned with Mother’s previous interactions with the 
Department, Ms. Noakes determined that C.E. would not be safe in her care.  The 
Department also learned that Father could not care for C.E. because Father resided in a 
senior housing complex that did not allow children to reside at the property except for a 
short-term duration of two weeks.   
The Department filed for emergency shelter care on July 10, 2014, in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City (hereinafter “juvenile court”)6 while C.E. was still at Mount 
Washington Pediatric Hospital.  In late June or early July 2014, Mother telephoned her 
cousin, Ms. B., and advised that she could not take C.E. home from the hospital and asked 
for permission to provide Ms. B.’s contact information to Mount Washington Pediatric 
                                                 
5 A FIM is a casework practice with the purpose of establishing “a team to engage families 
and their support network to assess the needs and develop service plans.  The goal is to 
develop service plan recommendations for the safest and least restrictive placement for a 
child while also considering appropriate permanency and well-being options for that 
child.”   
6 The judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was sitting as the juvenile court 
throughout this proceeding.  See Md. Code (2006, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial 
Proceedings, § 3-801(i). 
5 
 
Hospital and the Department.  Mother and Ms. B. had not been in contact for years prior 
to C.E.’s birth and had only reconnected when Mother found Ms. B. on Facebook.  Ms. B. 
and her husband, Mr. B. consented.  The Department reached out to Ms. B. and Mr. B. to 
conduct a background check and begin the placement process.  
After a hearing in July 2014, the juvenile court granted the Department’s request for 
temporary care and custody of C.E.  By July 15, 2014, Mr. and Ms. B. had successfully 
completed the necessary department requirements.  Upon C.E.’s hospital discharge on July 
21, 2014, the Department placed C.E. with them where he has remained throughout his 
entire life.   
During the summer of 2014, the Department facilitated the second FIM for both 
parents.  Father entered into a service agreement with the Department that was in effect 
from July 11, 2014 to September 11, 2014, and committed to finding housing where he 
could reside with C.E.  The Department also referred Father to the Center for Urban 
Families’7 parenting classes which occurred twice a week for three months.  Father initially 
did not attend the classes but he eventually completed the weekly ten-week course on 
positive parenting skills.  Father was also referred to Hebron House8 for anger management 
counseling.   
                                                 
7 The Center for Urban Families is located at 2201 North Monroe Street, Baltimore, 
Maryland 21217.  The organization’s mission is to strengthen Baltimore communities by 
helping fathers and their families achieve stability. 
8 Hebron House, Inc. is a community-based outpatient mental health clinic serving the 
Baltimore Area since 2003.  
6 
 
The Department continued to provide other services to the parents to achieve 
reunification with C.E.  The Department facilitated regular supervised visits between C.E., 
Mother, and Father.  The visits were scheduled weekly during 2014 and bi-weekly from 
2015 to 2017.  Initially the visits occurred supervised at the Mother’s home for three 
months.  However, the Department decided to move the visits to Department facilities due 
to environmental concerns.  The Department provided the supervision during the visitation 
period and both parents attended most of the scheduled visits.  These visits were 
occasionally marked with C.E.’s angry outbursts towards his Mother.  On other occasions, 
the visits were characterized as generally positive interactions with Father.    
After multiple postponements, the juvenile court found C.E. to be a child in need of 
assistance on June 16, 2015 and awarded custody to the Department for continued 
placement with his relatives, Mr. and Ms. B.  Additionally, the supervised visitation was 
continued and Father was ordered to submit to a clinical evaluation by Court Medical 
Services.9  Mother appealed the juvenile court’s findings to the Court of Special Appeals 
which affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court.  See In re C.E., No. 0925, Sept. Term, 
2015, 2015 WL 9183397 (Md. Ct. of Sp. App., Dec. 15, 2015) (“The juvenile court’s 
findings were supported by the evidence presented and the court’s CINA determination 
was supported by the law.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err nor abuse 
its discretion when it found C.E. to be CINA and committed him to the custody of the 
Department.”), cert. denied, 446 Md. 705 (2016).   
                                                 
9 On July 21, 2015, Father underwent this clinical evaluation.    
7 
 
On April 20, 2016, the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion to waive its 
obligation to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with C.E. pursuant to 
§ 3-812(d) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter “CJP”) of the 
Maryland Code.  Mother appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that the 
juvenile court’s decision to waive reasonable efforts for reunification was not appealable 
and therefore dismissed the appeal.  In re C.E., No. 0464, Sept. Term, 2016, 2016 WL 
7235560 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Dec. 14, 2016), aff’d, 456 Md. 209 (2017).  Following this 
Court’s determination on waiver, the Department filed a Petition for Guardianship with the 
Right to Consent to Adoption or Long-Term Care Short of Adoption.   
The termination of parents rights hearing took place in 2017 on the following dates: 
March 20, March 21, April 27, May 2, June 27, and July 5.  First, Ms. Noakes testified as 
a family services case worker with the Department.  She testified to her interactions with 
both parents immediately after C.E. was born and while the Department was determining 
whether to petition for shelter care and guardianship.  
Next, Brenda Harriel, Coordinator of Medical Services for the Juvenile Section, 
testified as an expert witness in clinical and forensic social work, with specialties in 
diagnosis and treatment of individuals with DSM-V10 mental health diagnosis and 
parenting skills assessments.  She evaluated Father in July of 2015.  In reaching her 
conclusion, she relied on her meeting with Father, court documents, and the Department’s 
                                                 
10 The DSM-V is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by 
the American Psychiatric Association. 
8 
 
family social history report.  Father refused to consent to the release any of his medical 
records.  She determined that Father presented with schizotypal personality disorder which 
features “cognitive or perceptual distortions . . . odd beliefs, peculiar behaviors, 
inappropriate or constrictive affect, and reduced capacity for close relations.”  She 
recommended no treatment for his personality disorder.  Ms. Harriel opined that Father 
would not be able to “provide proper care in a consistent, protective, and nurturing way.” 
Ms. Harriel also testified to her evaluation of Mother in 2010.  That evaluation was 
conducted during proceedings for one of Mother’s other children, J.D.  During that 
evaluation, Mother refused to answer questions, claiming her rights were being violated.  
From her behavior that day, Ms. Harriel observed symptoms of mania.  However, Ms. 
Harriel conceded that she had not evaluated Mother since 2010.   
 
Mr. and Ms. B. testified next.  They explained that C.E. is epileptic and continues 
to receive medication for his epilepsy as prescribed by a neurologist.  C.E. also exhibits 
delays in physical growth and has problems with communication, executive function, and 
attention deficit.  He has been characterized as very active, impulsive, quick to frustration, 
and aggressive.  They stated that at the time of the hearing, he was undergoing a formal 
diagnostic process at Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center to determine whether he is 
on the autism spectrum.  Ms. B. acknowledged C.E.’s challenges, but was satisfied with 
the progress he had made in their home.  She testified:  
C[E.]’s a good boy . . .  He get up, and eat, and do what he do.  He likes to 
be in his room.  His room is like his little castle.  He likes cartoons.  He likes 
playing the cool stuff.  He plays the guitar . . .  He likes to play.  He likes to 
run and jump.  [C.E.]’s [sic] very active. 
   
9 
 
When asked during each of their examinations whether they wished to adopt C.E., they 
both answered that they wished to adopt him. 
 
Laurie Higginbotham, the Clinical Social Worker Supervisor with the Department 
also testified and was accepted as an expert.  Ms. Higginbotham was asked to observe a 
visit and to give some suggestions to Father and Mother to improve visitation with C.E.  
After observing Father with C.E. during several visits, Ms. Higginbotham opined that 
Father sometimes interacted appropriately with C.E. but that caring for C.E. consistently 
would likely be too stressful for Father.  She noted that in her opinion, the Father would 
have difficulty sustaining enough energy for C.E.  Overall, she concluded that C.E. requires 
focus and attention that Mother and Father cannot provide for their child. 
 
After Ms. Higginbotham, Ms. Mary Ann Ervin, a Supervisor for the Department, 
testified.  Ms. Ervin was familiar with Mother due to Mother’s previous interactions with 
the Department.  Ms. Ervin explained some of the Department’s efforts toward attempting 
reunification between the parents and C.E.  Further, a variety of documents detailing the 
parents’ interactions with the Department were admitted into evidence.   
 
Next, Nkeiruka Udom, the assigned caseworker testified.  She was assigned to the 
case in 2017 after taking over for another caseworker.  Ms. Udom testified to some of the 
visits she witnessed between C.E. and his parents.  
After the conclusion of Ms. Udom’s testimony, Mother was called as a witness.  
Prior to the start of the hearing, the juvenile court had granted Mother’s request to have an 
accommodation and participate in the hearing through the telephone.  For her testimony, 
the juvenile court required Mother to appear by video conference so that the parties and the 
10 
 
juvenile court had the benefit of her demeanor during the examination.  Through video 
conference, Mother explained her visitations with C.E. and her interactions with the 
Department.  She believes the Department “took” C.E. only because of her prior 
interactions with the Department.  Mother also testified that she maintains her own 
residence but spends a substantial amount of time with Father at his residence.  She stated 
Father and Mother were looking to move to Delaware together.  Mother also testified that 
she does not have a good relationship with Mr. and Ms. B.   
As for her mental health, Mother stated, “I don’t have a mental illness, I have PTSD 
from legal abuse syndrome.”11  Mother commented that she was testifying in this matter 
against her health.  After Mother’s first day of testimony, the Court characterized her 
responses during cross-examination as “long,” “distorted,” “nonresponsive” narratives to 
the questions asked.  When cross-examination was to resume five days later, Mother did 
not appear.  Within those five days, Mother had been hospitalized and discharged for 
anxiety and chest-pains.  The juvenile court excused Mother from testifying that day and 
sought to reschedule Mother’s testimony when her health permitted.  Mother waived her 
appearance for the day.       
Father testified after Mother was excused.  Father and Mother began their 
relationship in 2010 and remain together.  Father was educated through the ninth grade and 
is employed full-time as a dishwasher.  He receives Supplementary Security Income for a 
                                                 
11 “Legal Abuse Syndrome” is not recognized in the DSM-V.  The theory is credited to 
authors such as Dr. Karin D. Huffer.  “Legal Abuse Syndrome” is known to Mother through 
her review of resources such as those propounded by Dr. Huffer.   
11 
 
disability.  C.E. is Father’s second-born son.  Father’s first child, who is now an adult, 
entered the foster care system during minority and was raised by Father’s sister.  Father 
acknowledges he did not participate in the raising of his first son.   
Since C.E.’s birth and through the termination of parental rights hearing, Father has 
resided in senior citizen housing.  His housing prohibits children from residing at the 
residence for longer than two weeks.  When asked whether he planned to live with Mother 
if C.E. was returned to him, Father responded “I would have to.”  He testified further that 
if C.E. was returned, he would exclusively rely on Mother to care for C.E. while he was at 
work.  Father does not believe Mother has any mental illnesses and he is adamant that he 
will not separate C.E. from Mother.  Father admitted past domestic violence with Mother, 
but testified that he had addressed that issue by attending classes at the Center for Urban 
Families.  As Mother did during her direct examination, Father testified to his sincere desire 
to reunite with C.E. 
The hearing resumed to permit C.E. to conduct cross-examination of Mother.  
Mother indicated she was not able to continue testifying and gave a narrative statement on 
the record without being sworn and without anyone’s ability to cross-examine Mother.12  
                                                 
12 At the end of the hearing that day, the juvenile court stated on the record that it was 
issuing an ordering regarding Mother’s narrative.  The juvenile court indicated the order 
would state, in part:  
Mother’s admission that she is the same . . . . she is the same advocate she 
was in the [J.D.] and [M.D.] case is found sincere and credible and is, in my 
view, an admission.  Her voluntary narrative statement on the record is 
unsworn and laced with unsupported sensational accusations against the 
Court, the attorneys, the parties and the Department of unconstitutional 
practices, racism, victimization, blame, none of which is appropriate to be 
12 
 
In order to achieve a resolution to the matter, C.E. waived his cross-examination of the 
Mother.  The hearing concluded that day.     
The Juvenile Court’s Findings 
 
The juvenile court denied the Department’s Petition for Guardianship with the Right 
to Consent to Adoption or Long-Term Care Short of Adoption.  The Court found that there 
was clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit but that there was only a 
preponderance of the evidence that Father was unfit.  Because it denied the petition for 
guardianship, the juvenile court did not terminate either Mother’s or Father’s parental 
rights.  Specifically, the juvenile court wrote, in part, in its opinion: 
[T]he Court concludes that there is not clear and convincing evidence that it 
is in [C.E.’s] best interest to terminate his parents’ parental rights; nor is there 
clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to [C.E.’s] welfare 
to continue his parents’ parental rights, diminished by a changed permanency 
plan of custody and guardianship to cousin [Ms. B.] and [Mr. B] without 
termination of parental rights.  The Court finds in denying the TPR at this 
time and simultaneously changing [C.E.’s] permanency plan to [custody and 
guardianship] without termination of parental rights is in [C.E.’s] best 
interest and welfare.  
 
The findings below show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is no 
likelihood [of] reunification of [C.E.] with Mother and/or Father can be 
achieved in the foreseeable future, in eighteen months, or indeed, ever.  
 
*** 
 
While adoption remains the gold standard of permanency where reunification 
is not safely possible, in this case the very strong commitment of [Mother]’s 
relatives, [][Mr. and Ms. B.], to his care, convince this Court that [C.E.] will 
                                                 
received as evidence and none of which was focused on the parenting, 
medical, educational and nurturing needs of the Respondents or the 
Respondent, age 3. 
13 
 
have the benefit of stability and permanence with the plan adopted here in 
childhood and into his adulthood.  
 
Father’s [sic] more likely than not unfitness to parent [C.E.] results from his 
lack of housing where [C.E.] can live in small part [].  Father’s mental health 
evaluation [] opines a diagnosis of Schizotypal Personality Disorder.  
However, that diagnosis is not convincing in the fact of the consistently 
reported good parenting time/visitation Father has shared with [C.E.]  
Furthermore, the limited factual and analytical basis in this record for that 
diagnosis [] causes the Court to give little weight to the mental health 
assessment, on which [the Department] and [C.E.]’s counsel make no 
comment in argument.  However, Father’s [sic] found more than likely 
unfitness rests in great degree upon his admitted nearly total reliance on 
Mother to parent [C.E.] when he is unavailable during extensive working 
hours.  While the provision of daycare to assist Mother is theoretically a safe 
plan for reunification, it is patently clear on this record that Mother’s mental 
health would not allow her to accept this support necessary for [C.E.’s] safety 
in Mother’s care.  Repeatedly, Mother decomposes into stress induced rage 
behaviors whenever a third party challenges the smallest aspect of her 
parenting conduct; [C.E.] can not and should not be subjected to this well 
established pattern of psychological abuse by Mother.  
 
While neither parent individually or together is able to care for [C.E.] the 
Court is convinced that [C.E.] knows his parents and displays a sufficient 
connection with them—particularly with Father—to raise safety concerns for 
the termination of that relationship which has not been overcome by any clear 
and convincing evidence otherwise.  
 
Both the unfitness found for [C.E.]’s parents (by clear and convincing 
evidence for Mother; merely a preponderance of the evidence for Father) and 
the exceptional circumstances found support the change of permanency plan 
to custody and guardianship without termination of parental rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
[I]n the three years [C.E.’s] CINA case and more recently this TPR case have 
been pending, parents have achieved very little to prepare a safe placement 
for [C.E.] in their care.  The entire record does support, by clear and 
convincing evidence, a finding that there is no likelihood those circumstances 
will change in the foreseeable future or ever.  So found.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
14 
 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding [the Department’s] efforts and Father’s 
relative compliance with service agreement requirements, Father’s senior 
housing that excludes [C.E.] from living there has not changed, and has no 
likely prospect of changing.  [C.E.] is not permitted by applicable regulations 
to be legally resident [sic] in Father’s apartment, by clear and convincing 
evidence, indeed undisputed evidence, on that issue.  Father is not shown by 
clear and convincing evidence to be an unfit parent on this record—but the 
Court does find it more likely than not Father is unable—unfit to parent 
[C.E.]  Additionally, the Exceptional Circumstances of his lacking housing 
and Father’s clear dependence on Mother for daycare while he is employed, 
coupled with the additional Exceptional Circumstances found below, 
convince this Court that it is in C.E.’s best interest for the permanency plan 
to be changed to custody and guardianship to [Mr. and Ms. B.] without 
termination of parental rights.  
 
*** 
 
Neither parent has contributed support for [C.E.’s] care and maintenance.  
 
Neither parent has displayed in visitation essential safe parenting skills—
including but not limited to mirroring, patience, and affirmation—that are 
needed by [C.E.] particularly in response to his now presenting possible 
autism spectrum behaviors, seizure disorder, and speech development 
delays.  
 
[Mr. and Ms. B.] provide [C.E.] safe stability in their care; in sharp contrast 
Mother’s erratic, angry, raging behaviors and stress dysregulation, and 
Father’s absence (employment schedule) would be a profoundly unstable 
emotional environment for [C.E.].  
 
 
Based on these findings, the juvenile court determined that it was in C.E.’s best 
interest to place C.E. in a guardianship with his extended family without terminating the 
parental rights of either parent.   
After noting timely appeals to the Court of Special Appeals, C.E. and the 
Department filed separate petitions for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on 
February 5, 2018.  Together, C.E. and the Department collectively pose the following five 
questions before this Court:  
15 
 
1. Whether a CINA child has a protected interest in achieving a timely 
permanency plan of adoption that transcends his parents’ right to raise him, 
where the three (3) year old child has resided in the same relatives’ home 
since birth and where the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that reunification is “unachievable . . . in the foreseeable future”?  
2. Whether it is error of law for a court to change a CINA child’s permanency 
plan in a [g]uardianship proceeding conducted pursuant to [FL] § 5-323? 
3. Whether the court’s application of its findings of exceptional circumstances 
to justify custody and guardianship to relatives instead of using the 
exceptional circumstances to support a grant of guardianship, was an error of 
law in contravention of the statute’s clear preference for adoption over 
custody and guardianship?  
4. Did the juvenile court err when it failed to find that Father was unfit to remain 
C.E.’s legal father in light of its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that there was no likelihood that Father would ever be able to safely care for 
C.E.?  
5. Did the juvenile court err as a matter of law in its exceptional circumstances 
analysis, by elevating an incidental “parental” relationship over C.E.’s best 
interests in achieving the permanence afforded by adoption? 
This Court heard oral argument on June 1, 2018 and an opinion was issued on 
August 13, 2018.  Our opinion affirmed the juvenile court’s findings as to Father, but 
reversed the juvenile court’s findings as to the Mother, concluding “it was error for the 
juvenile court to deny termination of Mother’s parental rights.”  On August 24, 2018, the 
Department, C.E., and the Mother filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Maryland 
Rule 8-605.  The Department and C.E. argued this Court could not order the termination 
of only one parent’s parental rights.  Mother also requested that this Court reconsider its 
16 
 
Opinion and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.13  In a reply, the Father adopted and 
joined the Mother’s motion.  
By Order on December 3, 2018, this Court withdrew its opinion and ordered 
supplemental briefing and additional argument on a single issue: “Whether the parental 
rights of both parents must be terminated to grant guardianship under FL §§ 5-323(b) and 
5-325(a)(1), [or] whether the termination of the parental rights of only one parent is 
required.”  In re Adoption/Guardianship of C.E., No. 77, Sept. Term, 2017, 2018 WL 
6288264 (Md. Ct. of App.  Dec. 3, 2018).  This Court heard oral argument on that 
supplemental issue on March 1, 2019.  
After consideration of the issue on reargument, we recognize that our current 
statutory scheme requires the termination of both parent’s parental rights.  There are only 
three possible scenarios that may culminate in a guardianship pursuant to Title 5, Subtitle 
3 of the Family Law Article: (1) both parents consent, (2) one parent consents, and the 
juvenile court terminates the parental rights of the other parent; or (3) neither parent 
consents, and the juvenile court terminates the rights of both parents.  When neither party 
consents and where a local department of social services files a petition for guardianship, 
a juvenile court only has two options: (1) to either grant the petition and terminate both 
parents’ rights; or (2) to deny the petition and refrain from terminating either parents’ 
rights.  The juvenile court’s judgment is comprised only of the grant or the denial of the 
                                                 
13 Mother also agreed with the Department and C.E. that this Court could not terminate the 
rights of a single parent.  
17 
 
petition for guardianship.  Where a juvenile court denies a petition for guardianship, the 
juvenile court’s judgment is wholly in the parents’ favor—even if the juvenile court finds 
that one parent is unfit.  Therefore, we erred in our now withdrawn opinion in which we 
terminated the Mother’s parental rights and kept the Father’s parental rights intact.   
 
Upon reconsideration of all of the issues before us, and for the reasons stated below, 
we conclude that in order to achieve the best interest of C.E. and to provide sufficient 
permanency for him, it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to decline to 
terminate Father’s parental rights when the juvenile court determined that based on the 
factors present, Father was unable to ever safely care for C.E.  Furthermore, while not 
necessary for a juvenile court to find if both parents are unfit, we also conclude that there 
was clear and convincing evidence of an exceptional circumstance that would warrant the 
termination of father’s parental rights in this matter.  Finally, the juvenile court committed 
an error of law when it changed C.E.’s CINA permanency plan during the termination of 
parental rights hearing conducted pursuant to FL § 5-323 in a single order.  Accordingly, 
we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
Standard of Review  
“Maryland appellate courts apply three different but interrelated standards of 
review” when reviewing a juvenile court’s decisions at the conclusion of a termination of 
parental rights proceeding.  In re Adoption/Guardianship of Cadence B., 417 Md. 146, 155 
(2010).  
18 
 
When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous 
standard of [Rule 8-131(c)] applies.  [Second,] [i]f it appears that the [court] 
erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily 
be required unless the error is determined to be harmless.  Finally, when the 
appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon 
some legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly 
erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
  
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 100 (2010) (alteration in original) 
(quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship of Victor A., 386 Md. 288, 297 (2005)).   
This Court is cognizant of the fact that: “[q]uestions within the discretion of the trial 
court are much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the decisions 
of such judges should only be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or 
abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.”  Cadence B., 417 Md. at 155 (quoting 
In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 583–84 (2003)).  Legal conclusions of unfitness and exceptional 
circumstances are reviewed without deference.  In reviewing whether the juvenile court 
abused its discretion, we are aware that juvenile courts must apply a statutory termination 
of parental rights directive to factual scenarios that are far from clear.  We are mindful that 
“to be reversed the decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center 
mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems 
minimally acceptable.”  Id. at 155–56 (quoting Yve S., 373 Md. at 583–84).  
Discussion 
 
 
The Termination of Parental Rights Process  
 
Parents have a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution to “make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 
19 
 
children.”  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).  However, this right is not absolute.  
When it is determined that a parent cannot adequately care for a child, and efforts to reunify 
the parent and child have failed, the State may intercede and petition for guardianship of 
the child pursuant to its parens patriae authority.  In re Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 33 (2009) 
(quoting In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705–06 (2001) (“The State of Maryland has a parens 
patriae ‘interest in caring for those, such as minors, who cannot care for themselves’ and 
‘the child’s welfare is a consideration that is of transcendent importance when the child 
might . . . be in jeopardy.’”).  The grant of guardianship terminates the existing parental 
relationship and transfers to the State the parental rights that emanate from a parental 
relationship.  In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 496 (2007).   
Ideally, the State will re-transfer the parental rights to an adoptive family.  Id.  
In Maryland, Title 5 subtitle 3 of the Family Law Article governs guardianship and 
adoption of children in need of assistance.  The expressed statutory purpose of the subtitle 
is to:  
(1) timely provide permanent and safe homes for children consistent with 
their best interests;  
(2) protect children from unnecessary separation from their parents;  
(3) ensure adoption only by individuals fit for the responsibility;  
(4) protect parents from making hurried or ill-considered agreements to 
terminate parental rights;  
(5) protect prospective adoptive parents by giving them information about 
children and their backgrounds; and  
(6) protect adoptive parents from future disturbances of their relationships 
with children by former parents. 
 
20 
 
FL § 5-303(b).  These express purposes illustrate the inherent tension in any termination 
of parental rights matter—to provide a child with permanency yet protect the parents from 
a hasty termination of their rights.  
The guardianship proceeding commences when the Department files a termination 
of parental rights petition.  FL § 5-313.  A petition is required unless each parent consents 
to termination.  In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50, 56 (2013) 
(citations omitted).  After a hearing14, a juvenile court has the authority to terminate 
parental rights upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent is unfit 
to remain in the parental relationship with the child or (2) exceptional circumstances exist 
that would make continuation of the relationship detrimental to the child’s best interest.  
FL § 5-323.  In determining whether to terminate parental rights, “a juvenile court shall 
give primary consideration to the health and safety of the child and consideration to all 
other factors needed to determine whether terminating a parent’s rights is in the child’s 
best interests[.]”  FL § 5-323(d).   
The juvenile court’s inquiry is different from that of a custody case.  The relevant 
question in a TPR proceeding is whether the parent is unfit to continue the parental 
relationship or whether there are exceptional circumstances that make the continued 
parental relationship detrimental to the child’s best interest.  In re Adoption/Guardianship 
of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 217 (2018) (emphasis added).  This is different from the custody 
                                                 
14 Hearings are conducted pursuant to FL § 5-318 
21 
 
analysis in which the court is looking at whether the custodial arrangement is in the best 
interest of the child.  Id. (emphasis added).  
In acknowledgment of the important rights at stake, we have previously described 
three elements of heightened protection provided to parents in a TPR proceeding.  See In 
re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 498 (2007).  First, we have 
recognized that there is the “presumption that the interest of the child is best served by 
maintaining the parental relationship, a presumption that may be rebutted only by a 
showing that the parent is either unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist that would 
make the continued relationship detrimental to the child’s best interest.”  Id. at 498.  
Second, this presumption can only be overcome if the State establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence of unfitness or exceptional circumstances to justify a TPR.  Id. at 499.  
This is a heavier burden than the preponderance of evidence standard utilized in a standard 
child custody case.  Id.  Third, the General Assembly provided factors that the juvenile 
court must expressly consider in determining whether termination is in the child’s best 
interest.  Id.  While a juvenile court is permitted to consider additional factors, the statutory 
factors are intended to provide the basis for any termination of parental rights.    
The requisite factors are codified in FL § 5-323(d).  FL § 5-323(d) is divided into 
four subparagraphs of factors that the court must use to assess both unfitness and 
exceptional circumstances.  Maryland’s guardianship statute does not define parental 
unfitness or exceptional circumstances.  However, the existing statutory scheme is the 
appropriate mechanism for the evaluation of parental fitness or the kinds of exceptional 
circumstances that would suffice to rebut the presumption for continuing the parental 
22 
 
relationship and justify the termination of that relationship.  In re Adoption/Guardianship 
of Amber R., 417 Md. 701, 715, (2011); In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 
Md. 90, 104 (2010) (“[T]he same factors that a court uses to determine whether termination 
of parental rights is in the child’s best interest under the TPR statute equally serve to 
determine whether exceptional circumstances exist.”); Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 499.  
The four subparagraphs of FL § 5-323(d) are divided by topic and include 
consideration of: (1) the services that the Department has offered to assist in achieving 
reunification of the child with the parents; (2) the results of the parent’s effort to adjust 
their behaviors so that the child can return home; (3) the existence and severity of 
aggravating circumstances; (4) the child’s emotional ties, feelings, and adjustment to 
community and placement and the child’s general well-being.15  Ultimately, these factors 
                                                 
15 Specifically, FL § 5-323(d) includes: 
(1)(i) all services offered to the parent before the child's placement, whether offered by a 
local department, another agency, or a professional; 
(ii) the extent, nature, and timeliness of services offered by a local department to 
facilitate reunion of the child and parent; and 
(iii) the extent to which a local department and parent have fulfilled their 
obligations under a social services agreement, if any; 
(2) the results of the parent's effort to adjust the parent's circumstances, condition, or 
conduct to make it in the child's best interests for the child to be returned to the parent's 
home, including: 
(i) the extent to which the parent has maintained regular contact with: 
1. the child; 
2. the local department to which the child is committed; and 
3. if feasible, the child's caregiver; 
(ii) the parent's contribution to a reasonable part of the child's care and support, if 
the parent is financially able to do so; 
(iii) the existence of a parental disability that makes the parent consistently unable 
to care for the child's immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs for 
long periods of time; and 
23 
 
                                                 
(iv) whether additional services would be likely to bring about a lasting parental 
adjustment so that the child could be returned to the parent within an ascertainable 
time not to exceed 18 months from the date of placement unless the juvenile court 
makes a specific finding that it is in the child's best interests to extend the time for 
a specified period; 
(3) whether: 
(i) the parent has abused or neglected the child or a minor and the seriousness of 
the abuse or neglect; 
(ii) 1. A. on admission to a hospital for the child's delivery, the mother tested 
positive for a drug as evidenced by a positive toxicology test; or B. upon the birth 
of the child, the child tested positive for a drug as evidenced by a positive 
toxicology test; and 
2. the mother refused the level of drug treatment recommended by a qualified 
addictions specialist, as defined in § 5-1201 of this title, or by a physician or 
psychologist, as defined in the Health Occupations Article; 
(iii) the parent subjected the child to: 
1. chronic abuse; 
2. chronic and life-threatening neglect; 
3. sexual abuse; or 
4. torture; 
(iv) the parent has been convicted, in any state or any court of the United States, 
of: 
1. a crime of violence against: 
A. a minor offspring of the parent; 
B. the child; or 
C. another parent of the child; or 
2. aiding or abetting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit a crime described 
in item 1 of this item; and 
(v) the parent has involuntarily lost parental rights to a sibling of the child; and 
(4)(i) the child's emotional ties with and feelings toward the child's parents, the child's 
siblings, and others who may affect the child's best interests significantly; 
(ii) the child's adjustment to: 
1. community; 
2. home; 
3. placement; and 
4. school; 
(iii) the child's feelings about severance of the parent-child 
relationship; and 
(iv) the likely impact of terminating parental rights on the child's 
well-being. 
 
24 
 
seek to assist the juvenile court in determining “whether the parent is, or within a 
reasonable time will be, able to care for the child in a way that does not endanger the child’s 
welfare.”  Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 500.  This is the appropriate inquiry because courts are 
required to afford priority to the health and safety of the child.  FL § 5-323.  As such, the 
best interest of the child is the overarching standard in TPR proceedings.  In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of Cadence B., 417 Md. 146, 157 (2010) (citing Ta’Niya C., 417 
Md. at 90) (“[T]he child’s best interest remains the ‘transcendent standard in adoption, 
third-party custody cases, and TPR proceedings.’”).   
Each TPR proceeding is a factual inquiry, requiring the juvenile court to render 
specific findings of fact to justify termination of a parent’s parental rights.  A juvenile court 
must specifically examine and consider each statutory factor.  “In addition to statutory 
factors, courts may consider such parental characteristics as age, stability, and the capacity 
and interest of a parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material, and 
educational needs of the child.”  In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 220 
(2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Pastore v. Sharp, 81 Md. App. 314, 320 (1989)).  
“[T]ermination is an alternative of last resort, and is not to be taken lightly.”  In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of Amber R., 417 Md. 701, 715 (2011)). 
  
In sum, in a termination of parental rights hearing, it is the role of the juvenile court:  
[T]o give the most careful consideration to the relevant statutory factors, to 
make specific findings based on the evidence with respect to each of them, 
and, mindful of the presumption favoring a continuation of the parental 
relationship, determine expressly whether those findings suffice either to 
show an unfitness on the part of the parent to remain in a parental relationship 
with the child or to constitute an exceptional circumstance that would make 
a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of 
25 
 
the child, and, if so, how.  If the court does that—articulates its conclusion 
as to the best interest of the child in that manner—the parental rights we have 
recognized and the statutory basis for terminating those rights are in proper 
and harmonious balance. 
 
H.W., 460 Md. at 219 (emphasis in original) (quoting Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 501).  
 
The Juvenile Court’s Findings: Termination of the Father’s Parental Rights 
 
At the onset, we note it is difficult to discern from the juvenile court’s order which 
factors were found by a preponderance of the evidence and which factors were found by 
clear and convincing evidence as to Father.  Further, the juvenile court never fully 
considered the exceptional circumstances prong as a separate legal conclusion from the 
unfitness prong.  Rather, the juvenile court used the exceptional circumstances prong in 
conjunction with unfitness to examine specific circumstances such as the parental bond or 
the Father’s relationship with Mother.  This was erroneous because the exceptional 
circumstances prong is a separate legal conclusion.  Thus, the prong requires a separate 
inquiry apart from unfitness.  If a juvenile court deems a parent fit, then the juvenile court 
is required to examine whether any exceptional circumstances exist that would make a 
continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interests of the child.     
In examining whether an exceptional circumstance exists, a juvenile court should 
look to whether there is a reason to terminate the parental relationship because the best 
interest of the child is not served through continuing the parental relationship.  Here, the 
juvenile court utilized this statutory basis as a shield to protect against the termination of 
parental rights, not as a potential separate legal conclusion apart from unfitness.  This was 
26 
 
in error because, as we have previously stated, unfitness and exceptional circumstances are 
two separate inquiries.  
In reviewing the remainder of the juvenile court’s order, we are able to discern that 
the juvenile court found: (1) that the Department had made reasonable efforts to enable 
reunification; (2) that neither parent exhibits “essential safe parenting skills;” (3) that 
Father lacked housing in which C.E. could reside; (4) that, on the whole, neither parent had 
accomplished a material change to the circumstances rendering C.E. a CINA; (5) that C.E. 
has fully adjusted to his placement with Mr. and Ms. B.; (6) that neither parent had 
contributed support for C.E.’s care and maintenance; and (7) that reunification with the 
natural parents is unachievable within the foreseeable future, if ever.  It is also clear that 
the Court’s sole factual finding that weighed in favor of continuation of Father’s parental 
rights was a determination that C.E. knew and was attached to Father.  In sum, as we 
understand the juvenile court’s order, almost every other factor delineated under FL § 5-
323(d) was found against Father with the exception of the finding that there is an 
“attachment” between Father and C.E. 
   
 
The Department and C.E. assert that in declining to terminate Father’s parental 
rights, the juvenile court failed to give appropriate consideration to the safety and welfare 
of C.E.  Further, the juvenile court ignored one of the goals of subtitle three, permanency, 
and failed to afford appropriate weight to the question of “whether the parent is, or within 
a reasonable time will be, able to care for the child in a way that does not endanger the 
child’s welfare.”  The Department and C.E. argue that the juvenile court afforded too much 
credit to the relationship between C.E. and his father in lieu of giving proper credit to the 
27 
 
other statutory factors.  C.E. and the Department contend that the juvenile court properly 
found Mother unfit by clear and convincing evidence.  Now, the Department and C.E. 
assert that there was ample evidence to find that Father was unfit or that exceptional 
circumstances existed by clear and convincing evidence to terminate his parental rights as 
well.  We agree.   
 
Permanency and Unfitness  
  
 
A CINA child’s statutory right to permanency is derived from Maryland’s 
incorporation of two federal statutes: the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980 (hereinafter “AACWA”), Public Law 96-272, codified at 42 U.S.C. 670 (1988) and 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”), Public Law 105-89, codified at 42 
U.S.C. Chapter 7, subchapter IV.  “ASFA’s emphasis on legally secure permanent 
placement is meant to provide the child with psychological stability and a sense of 
belonging and to limit the likelihood of future disruption of the permanent relationship.”  
LaShanda Taylor Adams, Backward Progress Towards Reinstating Parental Rights, 41 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 507, 515 (2017).   
The overriding theme of both the federal and state legislation is that a child 
should have permanency in his or her life.  The valid premise is that it is in 
the child’s best interest to be placed in a permanent home and to spend as 
little time as possible in foster care.  
  
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50, 84 (2013) (citing In re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 106 (1994)).  “Permanency for children 
means having ‘constant, loving parents,’ knowing ‘that their homes will always be their 
28 
 
home; that their brothers and sisters will always be near; and that their neighborhoods and 
schools are familiar places.’”  Id. at 82–83.  
The controlling factor in a termination of parental rights proceeding is not the 
natural parents’ interest in raising the child or the bond between the parent and child, but 
rather “what best serves the interests of the child. . . . in all cases where the interests of the 
child are in jeopardy the paramount consideration is what will best promote the child’s 
welfare, 
a 
consideration 
that 
is 
of 
‘transcendent 
importance.’” 
 
In 
re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561 (1994) (cleaned up).  In this case, 
the juvenile court overemphasized the bond between the Father and the child and failed to 
properly consider permanency and the ability of the father to successfully parent C.E in a 
stable 
environment. 
 
As 
such, 
this 
case 
is 
distinguishable 
from 
In 
re 
Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D., in which we found the parental relationship should 
not be severed when the fitness of the father was not at issue and there were no compelling 
exceptional circumstances.  412 Md. 442, 443 (2010).   
In Alonza D., the father appealed the termination of his parental rights.  Id.  The 
juvenile court considered the father fit, but ultimately concluded that exceptional 
circumstances—namely the six years the children were out of the care of their father during 
which the children developed a strong bond with their foster mother—warranted 
termination of his parental rights.  Id. at 448–49.  In weighing exceptional circumstances, 
the juvenile court did not find that a continued relationship with the father would be 
detrimental to the children or that he was currently unfit.  Id.  The father at the time of the 
hearing had secured housing and had achieved stability throughout other areas of his life.  
29 
 
On review we held “[p]assage of time, without explicit findings that the continued 
relationship with [the father] would prove detrimental to the best interests of the children, 
is not sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances.”  Id. at 463.   
In the matter before us, the record is replete with instances where a continued 
relationship with Father would cause detriment to C.E.’s health and welfare, especially 
with the extra care necessary for C.E.’s needs.  Additionally, while the father in Alonza D. 
was undoubtedly fit, the same cannot be said of C.E.’s Father.  Father has failed to secure 
housing that is suitable for C.E. and there are numerous concerns about Father sustaining 
energy levels sufficient to care for C.E.  The juvenile court should have found that a 
continued relationship with Father would be detrimental to C.E.’s health and welfare.  All 
of the statutory factors deserve equal consideration when weighing unfitness.  Father and 
C.E.’s relationship is only one factor to consider during the juvenile court’s evaluation.  
Here, the juvenile court impermissibly elevated the parent-child relationship as a factor 
that surpasses all others.   
As with the parent-child relationship, we decline to elevate permanency above all 
other factors as the Department and C.E. requested.  Permanency, like all the factors the 
General Assembly codified, is one aspect to consider in a TPR proceeding.  However, we 
do note that in this case, the juvenile court erred in its assessment of permanency. 
In reviewing permanency, we use In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941 as 
guidance.  335 Md. 99 (1994).  In No. 10941, this Court reversed the juvenile court’s 
findings that it was not necessary to terminate the mother’s parental rights to achieve 
30 
 
permanency because the child could remain in the custody of his grandparents.  Id. at 120.  
Specifically, the juvenile court found:  
The [c]ourt finds that it would be contrary to the Child’s best interest to be 
removed from the custody of the maternal grandparents.  The [c]ourt further 
finds that continued placement of the Child with the Grandparent’s [sic] does 
not require that the Mother’s parental rights be terminated.  The Child is 
presently in a stable environment with his grandparents and this environment 
provides him with the security and sense of belonging to a family that is the 
goal of adoption.   
 
Id. at 119–20.  This Court determined “[o]nly termination of parental rights and a 
subsequent permanent placement, such as adoption sought by the grandparents here, can 
provide [the child] with the permanency he needs and the Legislature intended.”  Id.   
 
Here, the juvenile court attempted to bypass the lack of permanency afforded to the 
child in No. 10941.  In conjunction with declining to terminate Father and Mother’s 
parental rights, the juvenile court altered C.E.’s permanency plan in the CINA matter to 
custody and guardianship with Mr. and Ms. B.  We will address the merits of this approach 
below but note here that the remedy deprived C.E. of the preferred permanency status as 
provided by statute.   
Custody and guardianship with a relative is considered a permanent placement for 
a CINA child.  Pursuant to CJP § 3-819.2(c), a child’s placement with a relative for custody 
and guardianship terminates the legal obligations and responsibilities of the Department.  
In considering the appropriate permanent placement, juvenile courts are guided by the 
hierarchy of permanency plans codified in CJP § 3-823(e)(1) and FL § 5-525.  Both statutes 
prioritize placement options in descending order: 1) reunification with the child’s parent or 
guardian; 2) placement with a relative for adoption; 3) placement with a relative for custody 
31 
 
and guardianship; 4) adoption by a nonrelative; and 5) custody and guardianship by a 
nonrelative.  Here, the juvenile court ignored the order of priority as well as our line of 
cases holding that when reunification with the child’s parents cannot be achieved, adoption 
is the next best option.  See No. 10941, 335 Md. at 120–21.16   
Custody and guardianship does not afford C.E. with the same permanency as 
adoption with a relative.  See In re Caya B., 153 Md. App. 63, 78 (2003) (“Parental rights 
are not terminated in such a situation: the parents are free at any time to petition an 
appropriate court of equity for a change in custody, guardianship, or visitation.”).  As in 
No. 10941, while there is no doubt that Mr. and Ms. B. currently desire to adopt C.E., if 
they are not his legal parents, they may decide later, for whatever reason, that they are no 
longer able to care for C.E.  335 Md. 99 at 120.  Especially with the additional 
administrative burdens that come with custody and guardianship as opposed to an adoption, 
custody and guardianship with Mr. and Ms. B. is not the preferred permanency solution.17  
“[T]ermination of parental rights is the necessary next step when reunion with the natural 
parent is not possible.”  No. 10941, 335 Md. at 120–21.  Here, the juvenile court found that 
Father could never safely care for C.E., and erred when not considering the effect of his 
                                                 
16 There may be instances when adoption is not the most appropriate permanency goal and 
a long-term placement is more appropriate.  See In re Adoption/Guardianship of Victor A., 
386 Md. 288 (2005).  We do not believe the record reflects that the juvenile court was 
presented with any compelling reason to continue long-term placement over the statutory 
preference in this matter.   
17 For example, FL § 9-104 states: “Unless otherwise ordered by a court, access to medical, 
dental, and educational records concerning the child may not be denied to a parent because 
the parent does not have physical custody of the child.” 
32 
 
inability to care for C.E. on C.E.’s permanency and how that relates to Father’s unfitness.  
Given these various factors, the trial court abused its discretion in declining to terminate 
father’s parental rights under the unfitness prong.  
Exceptional Circumstances  
 
Even assuming arguendo that Father was fit, there was also an important exceptional 
circumstance that the juvenile court failed to give sufficient consideration and that would 
have warranted the termination of parental rights in this matter.  When the juvenile court 
combined the fitness and exceptional circumstances analysis, the juvenile court did not 
fully examine this important statutory prong.      
In reviewing the exceptional circumstances basis, we are concerned with the 
continuing relationship between Father and Mother.  Father testified that he refuses to sever 
his relationship with Mother, that he will continue to live with Mother, and that he will rely 
solely on her for providing childcare to C.E. while he is at work.  Further, Father refuses 
to acknowledge Mother’s mental health conditions despite the fact that Mother is 
undoubtedly unfit to care or be left alone with C.E.  Father has adopted Mother’s mentality 
that the State is impermissibly seeking to impede on their rights to raise C.E.  These facts 
endanger C.E.’s health and welfare.     
We found cases similar to the case sub judice in our sister jurisdictions.  In State ex 
rel. Dept. of Human Services v. R.O.W., the Oregon intermediate appellate court reviewed 
a termination proceeding and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that 
the mother was unfit and that there was clear and convincing evidence the father was unfit 
33 
 
because the father refused to make the necessary adjustments to protect their minor child 
from the dangers of the mother’s care.  215 Or. App. 83, 85 (2007). 
In R.O.W., mother had cognitive limitations that prevented her from learning how 
to care for or appropriately respond to her child.  Id.  Father had some alcohol, drug, and 
mental health issues that were not disqualifying on their own to declare him unfit.  Id. at 
100.  However, the court concluded termination of his parental rights was warranted 
because those factors, in addition to his failure to obtain and maintain suitable housing and 
his failure to recognize the danger the mother posed to the child, “are directly and seriously 
detrimental to [the child] when considered in the context of his relationship with mother.”  
Id. at 100.  The Court recognized: 
Although father’s conduct or conditions might not support termination when 
considered in isolation, they are directly and seriously detrimental to [the 
child] when considered in the context of his relationship with mother.  
Father’s lack of effort to obtain and maintain a stable and suitable living 
situation—namely, one in which [the child] will be protected from the 
dangers she would face in mother’s care—renders him unfit to parent [the 
child].  Father historically has failed to recognize the importance of ensuring 
that mother is constantly supervised when [the child] is in her care and has 
demonstrated an unwillingness—and inability—to protect [the child] from 
mother. 
 
Id.  at 100–01. 
 
Further, in New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. M.M., New Jersey’s 
highest court reviewed whether the trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights 
when “the court concluded that the son was at risk because of the mother’s destabilizing 
influence on the home.”  189 N.J. 261, 267 (2007).  The court affirmed the trial court 
finding that the “father did not establish a safe and stable environment for his son.”  Id.  
34 
 
Mother was not capable of caring for her child.  Id.  Father, on the other hand, had overcome 
his troubled past and was dedicated to raising his son.  Id.  Despite the father’s fitness, the 
court determined that “although the father [did] not pose a direct threat to his son, the 
evidence demonstrate[d] that he did not provide for the son’s special needs or mitigate the 
effects of the harmful environment in which he intends to raise the son.”  Id. at 267.   
The Court, “mindful of the mother’s limitations” stated, “it is the father who 
established the dangerous situation at home, who maintains those conditions, and who is 
unable or unwilling to substantially alter those conditions.”  Id. at 282.  Further the Father 
did not seem to understand the limits of his son or made excuses for the behavior of the 
mother.  Id. at 284.  In support of their conclusion, the Court noted: 
Parental rights are individual in nature and due process requires that fitness 
be evaluated on an individual basis.  That said, the conduct of one parent can 
be relevant to an evaluation of the parental fitness of another parent. . . . The 
crucial inquiries are whether the parent’s association with others causes harm 
to the child and whether the parent is unable or unwilling to provide a safe 
and stable home.   
 
Id. at 289–90 (cleaned up).  The mother’s presence in the home was pertinent to the inquiry 
of whether father was placing the child into a risk of harm.  Id.  Therefore, the termination 
of the father’s rights was not in error.  
Similar to both R.O.W. and M.M., Father has not shown he can be a placement 
resource for C.E.  He refuses to sever his relationship with Mother and seeks to place C.E. 
exclusively in her care while he works.  He fails to recognize the threat Mother is to C.E.’s 
safety and welfare.  He does not acknowledge that Mother has any mental illness despite 
her formal diagnosis and lengthy history with the Department.  At no point in the record 
35 
 
has Mother proven that she is capable of safely caring for C.E., thus C.E. is placed in danger 
whenever in her care.18  Furthermore, he has refused to obtain a residence in which C.E. 
may permanently reside.  In reviewing these factors, the trial court abused its discretion in 
declining to find exceptional circumstances to terminate the Father’s parental rights.  
Father’s continued parental relationship with C.E. is detrimental to C.E.’s safety and 
welfare.  Thus, since his parents are not a placement resource, the juvenile court should 
have looked to the next best thing—termination of parental rights to permit guardianship 
and adoption.  
 
Additional Action during a Termination of Parental Rights Hearing 
  
All parties are in apparent agreement that the juvenile court erred in addressing the 
change in C.E.’s permanency plan in his CINA case in the same order denying the 
Department’s petition to terminate parental rights.  Father maintains, however, that any 
error is harmless, because the error could be rectified by separating the order into two 
distinct orders.  FL § 5-324(a) provides that, in a separate order accompanying an order 
denying guardianship, the juvenile court shall include any order under Title 3, Subtitle 8 
                                                 
18 Many cases of mental illness can be treated and managed and need not be cause for 
termination of parental rights.  In every case, the Department should work with parents 
with mental illness to provide resources to seek reunification of the parent and child first.  
Here, however, Mother has an extensive history of mental illness in which she refuses to 
seek appropriate treatment and has a history of lashing out and placing her children in 
danger.  Mother has shown time and time again that she is incapable of caring for her 
children.  Like both cases in our sister jurisdictions, the fact that the child is not sufficiently 
protected from the effects of the mental illness, not the mental illness itself, may indicate 
termination of the parental rights is the only option.   
36 
 
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article that is in the child’s best interests, e.g., an 
order with respect to a change in permanency plan.   
Here, the juvenile court did not comply with this directive because it did not issue a 
separate order changing C.E.’s permanency plan to long-term relative guardianship.  As 
such, the juvenile court’s opinion/order raises doubt as to whether the juvenile court 
reached its conclusions regarding the termination of parental rights and a change in the 
permanency plan in the proper manner—i.e. whether the two related but distinctly different 
concepts were afforded independent consideration.   
Reading the juvenile court’s opinion/order, it is difficult to differentiate the FL § 5-
323 termination of parental rights analysis from the analysis of the change of permanency 
plan.  A striking example of this lack of clarity is the juvenile court’s interwoven analysis 
of issues upon both a “more likely than not” or preponderance of the evidence standard, 
and a clear and convincing evidence standard.  In another instance, the juvenile court 
concluded that exceptional circumstances required a change of permanency plan when 
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances are required to terminate parental rights.  
To be sure, not every instance of procedural non-compliance constitutes reversible error.  
A juvenile court’s failure to issue separate opinions/orders may not, in and of itself, be 
sufficient grounds for reversal.  In this instance, however, it is not possible to conclude that 
the juvenile court conducted a separate analysis with respect to the termination of parental 
rights and a change in permanency plan.  As we are remanding this matter for further 
proceedings, the juvenile court will have the opportunity to remedy this error. 
37 
 
We also note that even though the juvenile court certainly had the authority to alter 
the CINA child’s permanency plan during a TPR hearing, a best practice for juvenile courts 
is to separate the proceedings into two hearings.  Separate proceedings are especially 
important in difficult factual situations such as this one.  If a juvenile court denies the TPR 
proceeding, a permanency placement review hearing should be scheduled in the original 
CINA case on a separate date.  This is optimal because a CINA permanency hearing and a 
TPR hearing are seeking to resolve related, but, ultimately distinct issues.  See In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of Cross H., 200 Md. App. 142, 152 (2011) (noting “the 
appropriate focus of the TPR hearing was not the potential suitability of the parental 
grandmother as a placement for [the child]—as this was an issue properly addressed in the 
CINA case—but rather, the fitness of [Mother] and [Father] as parents”).   
 The purpose of CINA proceedings is “[t]o provide for the care, protection, safety, 
and mental and physical development” of CINA children; “conserve and strengthen the 
child’s family ties;” “remedy the circumstances that required the court’s intervention;” and 
“achieve a timely, permanent placement for the child consistent with the child’s best 
interests.”  In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50, 75 (2013) (citing CJP 
§ 3-802(a)).  A TPR, conversely, is initiated once the Department is seeking to terminate 
the existing parental relationship.  Id.  In addition to separate purposes, TPR and CINA 
proceedings consider different factors and have different evidentiary burdens.  Id. at 77. 
In this matter, separate proceedings would have allowed Mr. and Ms. B to consider 
whether they wished to continue as C.E.’s guardian rather than as an adoptive resource.  
Further, the juvenile court could have determined the extent to which Mother and Father 
38 
 
were granted visitation and other aspect of the custody and guardianship.  We also believe 
this would have also likely remedied many of the issues with the juvenile court’s order that 
we have outlined above.  Therefore, we recommend separate proceedings in the future.   
CONCLUSION 
Overall, based on the juvenile court’s order, it is not possible to affirm the juvenile 
court’s decision declining to terminate Father’s parental rights.  We are concerned with the 
court’s findings as specified above and with the lack of clear articulation of the appropriate 
burdens of proof.  The finding that Father was not unfit is contradicted by the juvenile 
court’s finding that reunification with either Father or Mother was not attainable within the 
foreseeable future, if ever.  Further, exceptional circumstances existed, specifically the 
Father’s reliance on the Mother for housing and childcare for C.E., that would warrant 
termination of Father’s parental rights.  
In regard to the order, although the juvenile court purported to make this finding by 
a preponderance of the evidence, it is unclear why the juvenile court would be using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in assessing the termination of Father’s parental 
rights.  It is impossible to conclude that the juvenile court’s concurrent consideration of a 
change in the permanency plan did not affect the ultimate disposition of the termination of 
parental rights hearing.  Therefore, we shall direct that the judgment of the Circuit Court 
 
 
 
  
39 
 
for Baltimore City, sitting as a juvenile court, be vacated and that this case be remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.19   
   
ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR BALTIMORE CITY, SITTING AS 
A JUVENILE COURT, IS VACATED.  
CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH 
THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID 
BY APPELLANTS. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 We vacate the August 13, 2018 opinion that we withdrew by Order of this Court on 
December 3, 2018.  Thus we leave intact the juvenile court’s finding that Mother is unfit 
and on remand, the juvenile court may take any appropriate action with respect to the 
termination of Mother’s parental rights after further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion with respect to Father.