Title: Flanary v. Milton

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LINDA FLANARY 
 
v.  Record No. 010220 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 11, 2002 
DOSS JACKSON MILTON, JR. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 
Donald A. McGlothlin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether an oral property 
settlement agreement between spouses made during a deposition 
taken in furtherance of an action for divorce is valid. 
 
Linda and Ross E. Flanary married on February 5, 1982 and 
separated on July 7, 1995.  Mrs. Flanary filed for divorce on 
the grounds of desertion and/or cruelty and Mr. Flanary filed a 
cross-bill seeking a divorce based upon desertion.  On April 17, 
1997, during Mrs. Flanary's deposition taken in conjunction with 
the divorce proceedings, an oral agreement between the parties 
was recited into the record by the parties' attorneys.  The 
agreement provided that Mrs. Flanary, in exchange for a lump sum 
payment of $45,000, would release "any interest in any assets [] 
in [Mr. Flanary's] possession and/or name and in further release 
of any interest or any rights she has to any additional or 
future spousal support."  Mrs. Flanary agreed to this 
arrangement and agreed that it would serve as "a full and final 
settlement of all rights accrued by virtue of this marriage."  
Mr. Flanary died the day after the deposition.  The divorce 
proceeding was subsequently dismissed. 
 
Mrs. Flanary filed a petition of surviving spouse, pursuant 
to Code § 64.1-151.1, for determination of the appropriate 
family allowance, exempt property, and an elective share of the 
augmented estate.  Mr. Doss Jackson Milton, Jr., as executor of 
Mr. Flanary's estate (the Executor), filed a responsive pleading 
asserting that Mrs. Flanary was estopped from pursuing these 
claims because she contracted away all her marital interests in 
Mr. Flanary's estate in the oral agreement made during her 
deposition.  Following briefing and oral argument of counsel, 
the trial court concluded that the oral agreement was valid and 
effectively released "not only any marital rights [Mrs. Flanary] 
may have had as to equitable distribution, spousal support or 
property, but also any inchoate right to inherit from or 
otherwise participate in the distribution of the estate of Mr. 
Flanary."  The trial court entered a final decree dismissing 
Mrs. Flanary's petition.  We awarded Mrs. Flanary an appeal. 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the oral 
agreement made in conjunction with the divorce proceeding is 
valid.  The General Assembly has identified agreements between 
spouses involving rights and obligations arising from the 
marital relationship as a unique category of agreements subject 
to specific requirements.  Code § 20-155 provides that: 
 
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Married persons may enter into agreements with each 
other for the purpose of settling the rights and 
obligations of either or both of them, to the same 
extent, with the same effect, and subject to the same 
conditions, as provided in §§ 20-147 through 20-154 
for agreements between prospective spouses, except 
that such marital agreements shall become effective 
immediately upon their execution.  However, a 
reconciliation of the parties after the signing of a 
separation or property settlement agreement shall 
abrogate such agreement unless otherwise expressly set 
forth in the agreement. 
 
Code § 20-150 identifies the various subjects that such 
agreements may properly address, including the parties' rights 
regarding spousal support and disposition of property upon 
separation or divorce.  The agreement at issue purported to 
settle, among other things, spousal support and property rights.  
However, the agreement was not in writing, nor was it signed by 
the parties as required by Code § 20-149.  
 
The Executor, relying on Richardson v. Richardson, 10 Va. 
App. 391, 392 S.E.2d 688 (1990), asserts that Code § 20-155 does 
not apply to the agreement at issue.  The Court of Appeals in 
Richardson held that "compromises and settlement agreements to 
pending litigation which incidentally include issues of property 
and spousal support" are not within the purview of Code § 20-155 
and, thus, do not need to comply with the requirement that such 
agreements be in writing.  Id. at 398, 392 S.E.2d at 691.  We 
disagree. 
 
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Statutes must be read according to their plain meaning, 
giving effect to the language that the legislature chose to use.  
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985); 
Bott v. Hampton Roads San. Dist. Com., 190 Va. 775, 783, 58 
S.E.2d 306, 309 (1950).  Code § 20-155 by its terms applies to 
agreements between spouses affecting the "rights and 
obligations" arising from the marital relationship.  While 
agreements made in contemplation of settling litigation can be 
enforced even though not reduced to writing, see, e.g., Snyder-
Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376, 457 S.E.2d 36 (1995), 
nothing in the language of Code § 20-155 exempts from its 
application a property or spousal support agreement made in 
contemplation of resolving a pending divorce action.  Nor can 
such an exemption be read into the statute.  Courts are not 
allowed to write new words into a statute plain on its face.  
Porter v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 183 Va. 108, 113, 31 
S.E.2d 337, 339 (1944). 
 
Additionally, collateral statutes within the Premarital 
Agreement Act clearly contemplate marital agreements entered 
into for the purpose of resolving a pending divorce action.  The 
language of Code § 20-150(3) specifically includes agreements 
made regarding the disposition of property upon "marital 
dissolution" within its provisions.  Furthermore, the 1998 
amendment to Code § 20-155 anticipates agreements made during 
 
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proceedings for dissolution of a marriage, by providing that a 
signed separation or property settlement agreement is abrogated 
if the parties reconcile unless otherwise specifically provided 
in the agreement.  For these reasons, we reject the Executor's 
arguments and the rationale and holding of Richardson upon which 
he relies. 
 
We hold that Mrs. Flanary's oral agreement made in 
conjunction with the divorce proceedings was subject to the 
provisions of Code § 20-155.  The agreement was not in writing 
and not signed by the parties, as required by statute.  
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the agreement to be 
valid and in dismissing Mrs. Flanary's petition as surviving 
spouse for determination of family allowance, exempt property, 
and an elective share of Mr. Flanary's augmented estate.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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