Title: Guenther v. State

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

188 So. 2d 594 (1965)
Carl Francis GUENTHER
v.
STATE of Alabama.
3 Div. 58.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 27, 1965.
Opinion Extended on Denial of Rehearing July 14, 1966.
*595 Crenshaw, Wright, Long & Franco, Montgomery, for appellant.
Richmond M. Flowers, Atty. Gen., and Peter M. Lind, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.
Carl Francis Guenther was charged with robbery by a warrant and affidavit filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Alabama. Upon determining that Guenther was 17 years of age, the Court of Common Pleas transferred the case to the Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court.
This appeal is from a decree of the Juvenile Section of the Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, finding appellant, Carl Francis Guenther, age 17, could not be made to lead a correct life and could not be properly disciplined under the provisions of Sec. 364, Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940, and was incorrigible as defined in said section, and from an order transferring the cause to the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Alabama, to be proceeded against according to law as an adult.
In his assignments of error, appellant contended that the court below erred in allowing testimony concerning the alleged crime which was the basis of the arrest, and in finding that appellant could not be made to lead a correct life, and could not be properly disciplined under the provisions of Section 364, Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940, and in finding that appellant was incorrigible. However, in his brief, appellant recognizes the applicability of Sec. 372(1), Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940, to this case, and, in effect, waives assignment of error No. 5, which assigned as error the admittance of evidence relative to the alleged robbery.
The appellant's other contention is that the court erred in finding Guenther incorrigible and transferring the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Alabama, to be tried according to law. This transferral is authorized by Sec. 364, Title 13, supra, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
As stated in appellant's brief:
The appellee contends that the finding of the lower court, sitting in equity, with reference to the delinquency of a minor is not revisable by the Supreme Court in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
*596 We cannot agree with appellee that the transferral under Sec. 364, supra, is a discretionary matter. This same contention was made in Stapler v. State, 273 Ala. 358, 141 So. 2d 181. There, this Court, in reviewing Sec. 364, stated:
Then followed a historical review of Sec. 364, supra, and an interpretation of the meaning, with the conclusion that:
We see no point in repeating here what was so recently said in the Stapler case, supra, as to the interpretation of Sec. 364, supra.
The question then is whether or not the juvenile court judge made a thorough investigation and made a finding supported by proof that Carl Francis Guenther could not be made to lead a correct life and could not be properly disciplined under the provisions of the juvenile statute.
It would add nothing to this opinion to recite the evidence. Suffice it to say, we have given it our most careful consideration. We feel that the court made a thorough investigation under the facts of this case. Although the court was not able to conduct a complete investigation of the home and environment of the appellant due to the fact that appellant is from Michigan, the court did have the testimony of acquaintances of appellant; a report of the Port Huron, Michigan, Probation Officer and Juvenile Judge; testimony in regard to the crime of which appellant is accused. This testimony, contrary to the contention of appellant, is admissible on the issue that was before the court, the only condition being that the crime be connected to the child in question. The case of Stapler v. State, supra, in fact, states that such testimony is relevant at a hearing like the one below only for the purpose of determining delinquency. We feel that under the facts outlined above, this constituted a thorough investigation.
As to the findings of the court, it is to be noted that testimony was taken orally before the trial judge. In such circumstances, this court has followed a consistent policy of not disturbing the trial judge's conclusion on the facts unless his decree is palpably wrong. Meares v. Meares, 256 Ala. 596, 56 So. 2d 661; Meadows v. Hulsey, 246 Ala. 261, 20 So. 2d 526.
In Meares v. Meares, supra, the court said:
"* * * As stated in the Sneed Case, supra [248 Ala. 88, 26 So.2d (561) 562], `The personal contact of the trial court with the litigants and the witnesses gives the trial court an *597 opportunity for personal observation which we do not have, and which accounts for the presumption we accord to its decrees. * * *.'"
The judge below had the accused before him, he observed his demeanor, and he heard the testimony relative to the alleged robbery. He thereupon determined that the appellant was not correctable through the juvenile court and that he should stand trial as an adult as provided by Sec. 364, Title 13, supra. We cannot say that this finding was contrary to the great weight of the evidence or that it was palpably wrong. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the court below and order that Guenther stand trial as an adult for the charged crime.
Affirmed.
SIMPSON, MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
On rehearing, the appellant insists that the trial judge erred in considering evidence in regard to the crime of which appellant is accused in determining the issue that the minor cannot be made to lead a correct life and cannot possibly be disciplined under the provisions of the juvenile statute, and that there is no evidence in the record to support the order of the trial judge, nor the order of affirmance by the Supreme Court.
It is true that some of the language used in our cases is a bit confusing, but when read in proper context on the issues involved in each case, we think the language used is plain enough.
Ex parte State ex rel. Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17 So. 2d 449, was an original proceeding by the state on relation of Sam Echols, a minor, by his next friend, Alice Echols, for a writ of prohibition to Joe M. Pelham, Jr., as Judge of the First Judicial Circuit, against proceedings in equity on appeal to the circuit court from an order of the juvenile court committing relator to the care and custody of the Superintendent of the Boys' Industrial School as an incorrigible child, or for a writ of mandamus to transfer the case to the law docket.
The writs were separately and severally denied. It was there said:
The use of the word "only," emphasized above, means that where the issue presented is only that of juvenile delinquency, evidence touching the alleged homicide is admissible. And, in the Echols case, supra, the court was discussing not only juvenile delinquency vel non but the issue touching the correctional and disciplinary measures authorized by law in such cases. Title 13, Sec. 361, Code 1940. Section 362 contemplates an appeal to the circuit court, in equity, where the issues involved are tried de novo.
In the instant case, there were two issues before the juvenile court, i. e., the issue of delinquency vel non, and also the issue of the corrigibility, or incorrigibility, of the infant. On appeal to the circuit court, in equity, these two issues are tried de novo. On the trial in equity, after appeal from the juvenile court, these two issues will be before the trial court, and the evidence touching the commission of the crime is admissible on both issues, and the juvenile court was not in error in admitting this evidence. When so considered, there was ample evidence to support the finding of the juvenile court on both issues. The cases of Stabler v. State, 273 Ala. 358, 141 So. 2d 181, and Duck v. State, 278 Ala. 138, 176 So. 2d 497, in so far as they conflict with what we have said above are hereby overruled.
Opinion extended and application for rehearing overruled.
LAWSON, SIMPSON, MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
GOODWYN and COLEMAN, JJ., dissent.