Title: People ex rel. Green v. Grewal

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

____________________ 
* 
People ex rel. Green v. Walker (No. F065451); People ex rel. Green v. 
Stidman (No. F065689); People ex rel. Green v. Nasser (No. F066645); People ex 
rel. Green v. Elmalih (No. F066646). 
 
 
 
 
Filed 6/25/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE ex rel. LINDA GREEN, as 
) 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, etc., 
)  
S217896, S217979 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F065450 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
KIRNPAL GREWAL, 
)  
Kern County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. CV-276959, 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
CV-276958, CV-276961, 
 
 
) 
CV-276603, CV-276962 
[And four other cases.*] 
) 
(Consolidated) 
 
 
) 
 
Slot machines, sometimes called ―one-armed bandits‖ (although younger 
users might wonder why), have long been outlawed in California.  Under review 
are devices that resemble traditional casino-style slot machines in some ways and 
offer users the chance to win sweepstakes prizes.  Because they employ modern 
technology, the devices differ from traditional slot machines in some ways.  We 
must decide whether the devices come within the statutory definition of a ―slot  
2 
 
machine or device‖ in Penal Code section 330b.1  We conclude they do and affirm 
the judgments of the Court of Appeal, which reached the same conclusion. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
These facts are taken largely from the Court of Appeal opinions authored 
by Justice Kane. 
In these cases, which we have consolidated for argument and this opinion, 
the People of the State of California, by and through the District Attorney of Kern 
County, filed civil actions against defendants Kirnpal Grewal, John C. Stidman, 
Phillip Ernest Walker, Kamal Kenny Nasser, and Ghassan Elmalih, operators of 
Internet cafés in Kern County.  Three distinct, albeit similar, devices operated at 
several Internet café businesses are at issue here.  We will first describe the 
businesses and devices as they existed at the time of the hearings in the superior 
court, then the procedural background. 
A.  The A to Z Café; the OZ Internet Café and Hub  
Defendant Kirnpal Grewal owned the A to Z Café, and defendant Phillip 
Ernest Walker owned the OZ Internet Café and Hub (the OZ), both in Bakersfield.  
The record shows, and the parties agree, that Grewal‘s business operated a 
sweepstakes system essentially identical to that of the OZ.  Accordingly, we will 
discuss the OZ‘s system. 
Among other products, the OZ sold computer and Internet time (hereafter, 
Internet time) on computer terminals on its premises.  The OZ promoted the sale 
of Internet time and other products with a sweepstakes giveaway implemented 
                                              
1  
All further statutory citations will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.  As will be seen, section 330b refers to a ―slot machine or device.‖  
However, we will sometimes refer to what the section proscribes as simply a slot 
machine. 
3 
through a software system that a company known as Figure Eight Software 
provided.  Participants in the sweepstakes had the chance to win cash prizes 
varying from small amounts to a top prize of $10,000 as set forth in the 
sweepstakes‘ odds tables. 
OZ customers could purchase Internet time for $10 per hour.  When a 
customer purchased Internet time, an employee assigned the customer a personal 
identification number (PIN).  The employee created an account by which the 
customer could access the computers and Internet as well as play sweepstakes 
computer games.  Customers were not charged for Internet time while they were 
playing the computer sweepstakes games.  At the time of purchase, the customer 
received 100 ―sweepstakes points‖ for each dollar spent.  Walker stated that 
―[c]ustomers purchase product[s] consisting mostly of computer and Internet time 
at competitive prices and receive free sweepstake points in addition to the product 
purchased.‖  Additionally, a customer might receive 100 free sweepstakes points 
every day that the customer came into the OZ, and first-time customers received 
500 additional sweepstakes points.  These sweepstakes points could be ―used to 
draw the next available sequential entry from a sweepstake contest pool.‖  This 
could be done and the result revealed in one of three ways:  (1) asking an OZ 
employee to reveal a result, (2) pushing an instant reveal button at the computer 
station, or (3) playing computer sweepstakes games at the computer terminals that 
appeared similar to common games of chance. 
The sweepstakes rules provided that no purchase was necessary to enter the 
sweepstakes.  According to Walker, noncustomers could obtain free sweepstakes 
entries by asking an employee at the OZ or by mailing in a request. 
According to Walker, to access the computers, customers had to sign a 
―Computer Time Purchase Agreement‖ form.  On the form, the customers had to 
acknowledge that they understood the following matters before using the OZ 
4 
computers:  (1) that they were purchasing computer time and (2) the sweepstakes 
computer games were ―not gambling,‖ but were a ―promotional game‖ in which 
all winners were predetermined.  On the form, the customers affirmed that they 
understood ―[t]he games have no [e]ffect on the outcome of the prizes won,‖ but 
were merely an ―entertaining way to reveal [their] prizes and [they] could have 
them instantly revealed and would have the same result.‖ 
Walker‘s declaration explained what happened when a customer used the 
sweepstakes computer game:  ―If a customer utilizes the pseudo-interactive 
entertaining reveal interface the customer can encounter some games that have 
appearances similar to common games of chance.‖  However, before any 
―spinning wheels or cards‖ appeared on the screen, ―the sweepstakes entry has 
already been drawn sequentially from a pool of entries and is predetermined.  
There is no random component to the apparent action of the images in the 
interface even though it simulates interactivity.  Instead, the images will display a 
result that matches the amount of any prize revealed in the entries.  [Citation.]  [¶]  
As told to the customer in the rules and in disclaimers, the pseudo-interactive 
interface does not ‗automatically‘ or ‗randomly‘ utilize any play to obtain a 
result.‖ 
Walker also described in greater detail the operation of the software system 
the OZ used to run the sweepstakes.  His declaration stated that under that 
software system, the issue of whether customers had won a cash prize was 
determined when their entries were drawn from a sweepstakes pool.  Each such 
entry had a previously assigned cash prize of zero or greater.  Entries were drawn 
sequentially from one of 32 sweepstakes pools (also called ―multiple finite deals 
of entries‖) that the software company created.  The software company 
prearranged the entries in each pool in a set order or sequence, and the OZ had no 
control over that order or sequence or the corresponding results.  Access to a 
5 
particular sweepstakes pool was determined by how many points customers chose 
to use (or bet) at any one time.  Each pool had its own prizes and its own separate 
sequence of entry results.  When customers selected a sweepstakes pool, the 
software system assigned them the next available entry result in that pool, in 
sequence.  At that point, the result was established and could not be affected by 
the computer game play, which merely revealed the established result.  Walker 
stated that a specific sequential entry would yield the same result regardless of the 
method the customers used to draw and reveal it. 
B.  I Zone Internet Café 
Defendant John C. Stidman owned the I Zone Internet Café (I Zone) in 
Bakersfield.  Among other products, I Zone sold Internet time to the public for $20 
per hour, which customers could use on computer terminals located on the I Zone 
premises.  To promote the sale of Internet time and its other products, I Zone 
offered a sweepstakes to customers when they made a purchase.  Noncustomers 
might also enter the sweepstakes; that is, no purchase was necessary to enter.  To 
enter a sweepstakes without purchasing Internet time or other products, a person 
could receive up to four free entries from the cashier each day on request.  Four 
additional entries were available by mailing a form with a self-addressed, stamped 
envelope.  A company known as Capital Bingo provided a computer software 
system that effectuated the sweepstakes. 
Under the software system, a purchaser of Internet time or other products at 
I Zone received sweepstakes points for each dollar spent.  A customer also 
received sweepstakes points for the first purchase of the day and for being a new 
customer.  The customer received a white plastic card with a magnetic strip, which 
an I Zone employee activated at the register.  A customer swiping the card at an 
open computer terminal was given the option of using the Internet function or 
6 
playing sweepstakes computer games.  If the customer chose the games, the time 
playing them did not reduce the Internet time available.  Both options were touch-
screen operated and did not require a keyboard or mouse. 
In playing the sweepstakes computer games, I Zone customers used their 
sweepstakes points in selected increments (simulating bets) on games with names 
such as Buck Lucky, Tropical Treasures, or Baby Bucks.  According to the I Zone 
sweepstakes rules, each increment level available for play ―represents a separate 
sweepstakes.‖  Gambling-themed games resembling slot machines were 
prominently displayed on the I Zone terminals.  According to a detective 
investigating the business, ―[i]t appeared the subjects were playing casino-style 
slot machine games on the computers. . . .  The audible sounds were that of casino-
style slot machines.‖  The detective noted that on one occasion, no one was on the 
Internet, but instead ―all the people using the computer terminals were playing the 
sweepstakes games.‖  Participants in the sweepstakes had a chance to win cash 
prizes ranging from small amounts to a top prize of $3,000. 
In contending the sweepstakes games were not slot machines, Stidman 
presented evidence and argument regarding how they functioned.  His position 
was that the computer sweepstakes games were merely an entertaining way for 
customers to reveal a sweepstakes result.  A customer could also reveal a 
sweepstakes result by other means, such as by using a special function on the 
computer terminal or by asking an I Zone employee at the register to print out a 
result on paper.  As Stidman described it, ―[e]ach time a customer reveals the 
results of a sweepstakes entry, [regardless of the means used], the next available 
sweepstakes entry in the ‗stack‘ is revealed,‖ in sequence, from a prearranged 
stack of entries.  The ―next available sweepstakes entry‖ contains a predetermined 
result that would be the same regardless of which method was used to reveal it.  
Thus, when the customer engaged the sweepstakes computer games, the outcome 
7 
was determined by the particular sweepstakes entry that was being revealed at that 
time, not by the workings of the game itself.  That is, the game simply revealed the 
predetermined result of the next sequential sweepstakes entry. 
Stidman provided further documentary evidence of how I Zone‘s software 
system conducted the sweepstakes.  This evidence indicated there were three 
distinct servers:  (1) the ―Management Terminal,‖ (2) the ―Point of Sale 
Terminal,‖ and (3) the ―Internet Terminal.‖  As Stidman‘s counsel summarized in 
the trial court, ―It is at the Management Terminal where all sweepstakes entries are 
produced and arranged.  Each batch of sweepstakes entries has a finite number of 
entries and a finite number of winners and losers.  Once a batch of sweepstakes 
entries is produced at the Management Terminal, it is ‗stacked‘ . . . and then 
transferred to the Point of Sale Terminal in exactly the same order as when it left 
the Management Terminal.  Each time a customer reveals the results of a 
sweepstakes entry, either at the Internet Terminal or at the Point of Sale, the next 
available sweepstakes entry in the ‗stack‘ is revealed.  In other words, the Internet 
Terminal simply acts as a reader and displays the results of the next sequential 
sweepstakes entry in the stack as it was originally arranged and transferred from 
the Management Terminal — it is never the object of play.  In fact, exactly the 
same results [are displayed] for a specified sweepstakes entry whether the 
customer chooses to have the results displayed in paper format at the Point of Sale 
Terminal or in electronic format at an Internet Terminal.‖  Stidman‘s evidence 
indicated that neither the Point of Sale Terminal nor the Internet Terminal had a 
random number generator and could not be ―the object of play,‖ since those 
servers could not influence or alter the result of a particular sweepstakes entry, but 
merely displayed that result. 
8 
C.  Fun Zone Internet Café; Happy Land 
Defendant Kamal Kenny Nasser owned stores called the Fun Zone Internet 
Café, and defendant Ghassan Elmalih owned a store called Happy Land.  The 
stores sold, among other things, Tel-Connect and Inter-Connect prepaid telephone 
cards.  Defendants Nasser and Elmalih promoted the sale of telephone cards at 
their stores by offering sweepstakes to their customers.  Phone-Sweeps, LLC 
(Phone-Sweeps), a company based near Toronto, Canada, furnished the Tel-
Connect and Inter-Connect telephone cards.  Phone-Sweeps also provided the 
computer software system that operated defendants‘ sweepstakes programs, 
including the computer sweepstakes games. 
When customers purchased telephone cards or more time on their existing 
cards, they received 100 sweepstakes points for each dollar spent on prepaid 
telephone time.  Thus, a customer purchasing $20 in telephone time would receive 
2,000 sweepstakes points with the purchase.  Noncustomers could receive 
sweepstakes points; that is, no purchase was necessary to enter.  Persons over the 
age of 18 who entered defendants‘ stores could receive 100 free sweepstakes 
entries or points for that day.  Additionally, free points could be received by 
mailing in a request form. 
Customers could use their points by playing sweepstakes computer games 
on the terminals provided on the premises.  Time spent on the terminals playing 
the computer sweepstakes games did not reduce the customers‘ available 
telephone time.  Initially, customers gained access to the computer sweepstakes 
games by swiping their telephone card into an electronic card reader at the 
computer terminal.  More recently, customers manually entered the account 
number shown on the back of the telephone card at the terminal keyboard. 
Once the computer sweepstakes games were displayed, the customer was 
presented with a number of slot machine-style games activated by a touch screen.  
9 
The customers selected, based on available increments (such as 25, 50, or 100), 
how many points to use at one time.  The customer either lost the points played, or 
was awarded additional points (called ―winning points‖), which the system tracked 
and displayed on the screen.  If the customer finished with a positive number of 
winning points, the points were redeemable at one dollar per 100 points at the 
register.  For example, 2,400 winning points would result in a cash prize of $24.  
According to an odds table, within each pool of entries there were entry results 
that ranged from $0.01 to $4,200 (based on redeemable points won).  Customers 
not wishing to play the sweepstakes games could ask the cashier to do a ―Quick 
Redeem‖ at the register to reveal an immediate result. 
The system used to operate the sweepstakes program and computer 
sweepstakes games was an integrated system that formed a network of computers 
and servers.  The main Phone-Sweeps server was located in Canada and was 
electronically connected to the servers in Nasser‘s and Elmalih‘s places of 
business.  The server used in each place of business was, in turn, electronically 
connected to each of the numerous computer terminals that the customers used at 
that place of business to play the computer sweepstakes games. 
Each sweepstakes consisted of a finite pool or batch of entries.  Depending 
on the size of the retail store, the number of entries in a sweepstakes pool could be 
as high as 65 million.  The Phone-Sweeps main server in Canada created the 
pools.  The main server randomized the entries in each pool, put them into a set 
sequential order, and then delivered the pool in that sequential order to the ―Point 
of Sale‖ computer (or server) in the stores.  Neither Nasser nor Elmalih, nor their 
customers could change the sequence or contents (i.e., results) of the entries.  The 
main server in Canada could detect when the pool in any particular store was 
nearing the end, and then it created a new pool, in the same manner, and delivered 
it to the Point of Sale computer (or server). 
10 
Customers playing the computer sweepstakes games simply received and 
obtained the results of the next available entry or entries, in sequence.  Thus, the 
outcomes were predetermined by sequential entries, not by how the customers 
played the games.  Customers could not impact the result that was determined by 
the next available entry.  Additionally, neither the sweepstakes servers (i.e., the 
Point of Sale computers) nor the terminals where the computer sweepstakes games 
were played contained a random number generator or any other way to randomize 
or alter the sequence of the entry results. 
There was evidence that over a one-year period, customers actually used 31 
to 32 percent of the total telephone time that Phone-Sweeps sold through its 
licensees. 
D.  Procedural Background 
In May and June 2012, the Kern County District Attorney‘s Office filed on 
behalf of the People separate civil actions against each of the five defendants.  The 
complaints alleged that the defendants had violated antigambling provisions of the 
Penal Code in operating their respective businesses and sought injunctive and 
other relief under Business and Professions Code section 17200.  The pleadings 
cited provisions relating to unlawful lotteries (§ 319) and unlawful slot machines 
or gambling devices (§§ 330a, 330b, 330.1).  The superior court held evidentiary 
hearings on the People‘s motions for preliminary injunctions.  It granted 
preliminary injunctions prohibiting each defendant, pending further order of the 
court, ―from operating any business that includes any type of ‗sweepstakes,‘ ‗slot 
machines,‘ or ‗lottery‘ feature.‖  It entered formal written orders granting the 
preliminary injunctions against Grewal, Stidman, and Walker on August 1, 2012, 
and against Nasser and Elmalih on November 26, 2012. 
11 
Each defendant appealed separately from the preliminary injunction.  The 
Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals of Grewal, Stidman, and Walker, and, 
separately, the appeals of Nasser and Elmalih.  In two separate opinions, the Court 
of Appeal affirmed the trial court orders.  In each matter, it found the sweepstakes 
operations were illegal slot machines under section 330b.  We granted each of the 
defendants‘ petitions for review.  After the briefing was complete, we consolidated 
the two appeals for purposes of oral argument and opinion. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The sweepstakes operations at issue here were similar to each other, 
although they varied in some respects.  In each instance, the business sold a 
product (either Internet time or telephone cards) and, along with the product, 
provided the opportunity to play sweepstakes games, with the possibility of 
winning substantial cash prizes.  Customers could also receive a limited number of 
free sweepstakes entries per day or could receive more by mailing in a request 
form.  The customer had the option of either obtaining an instant sweepstakes 
result or playing games at a computer terminal to reveal the result.  To begin 
playing the sweepstakes games, the customer would swipe a magnetic card or 
enter a number at a computer terminal.  Those choosing to play the games had a 
choice of games resembling slot machines or casino-style games.  The 
sweepstakes operation was an integrated whole, with an outside company 
supplying the software to operate the game.  The outside company‘s software, 
which was connected to the computer terminals at the business, predetermined the 
result of each game.  Neither employees at the business nor the customers 
themselves had any control over the outcome.  The games themselves merely 
revealed the predetermined result; they had no influence on that result. 
The district attorney alleged that each of the sweepstakes operations 
violated several antigambling provisions, including three that concern slot 
12 
machines.  (§§ 330a, 330b, 330.1.)  The definitions of slot machines in these 
provisions are similar but not identical.  (Hotel Employees & Restaurant 
Employees Internat. Union v. Davis. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 593-594; People ex 
rel. Lockyer v. Pacific Gaming Technologies (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 699, 703, 
fn. 6 (Pacific Gaming Technologies).)  The Court of Appeal focused on section 
330b, finding it ―[a]rguably the broadest of the three.‖  It found that the operations 
at issue here were illegal slot machines under that section.  Defendants challenge 
that finding in this court.  Accordingly, the only provision before us on review is 
section 330b, and we will also focus on that section. 
Section 330b, subdivision (a), makes it unlawful to possess ―any slot 
machine or device, as defined in this section.‖2  Subdivision (d) of that section 
provides the definition:  ―For purposes of this section, ‗slot machine or device‘ 
means a machine, apparatus, or device that is adapted, or may readily be 
converted, for use in a way that, as a result of the insertion of any piece of money 
or coin or other object, or by any other means, the machine or device is caused to 
operate or may be operated, and by reason of any element of hazard or chance or 
                                              
2  
In its entirety, section 330b, subdivision (a), provides:  ―It is unlawful for 
any person to manufacture, repair, own, store, possess, sell, rent, lease, let on 
shares, lend or give away, transport, or expose for sale or lease, or to offer to 
repair, sell, rent, lease, let on shares, lend or give away, or permit the operation, 
placement, maintenance, or keeping of, in any place, room, space, or building 
owned, leased, or occupied, managed, or controlled by that person, any slot 
machine or device, as defined in this section. 
 
―It is unlawful for any person to make or to permit the making of an 
agreement with another person regarding any slot machine or device, by which the 
user of the slot machine or device, as a result of the element of hazard or chance or 
other unpredictable outcome, may become entitled to receive money, credit, 
allowance, or other thing of value or additional chance or right to use the slot 
machine or device, or to receive any check, slug, token, or memorandum entitling 
the holder to receive money, credit, allowance, or other thing of value.‖ 
13 
of other outcome of operation unpredictable to him or her, the user may receive or 
become entitled to receive any piece of money, credit, allowance, or thing of 
value, or additional chance or right to use the slot machine or device, or any check, 
slug, token, or memorandum, whether of value or otherwise, which may be 
exchanged for any money, credit, allowance, or thing of value, or which may be 
given in trade, irrespective of whether it may, apart from any element of hazard or 
chance or unpredictable outcome of operation, also sell, deliver, or present some 
merchandise, indication of weight, entertainment, or other thing of value.‖  
(§ 330b, subd. (d).) 
We must decide whether the defendants‘ sweepstakes operations come 
within this definition.  We are not the first court to grapple with this definition in 
recent years.  Numerous courts have found devices similar to the ones here to be 
slot machines under this definition. 
As the Court of Appeal summarized in Grewal below:  ―California courts 
have found section 330b to prohibit a variety of devices where prizes may be won 
based on chance.  In People ex rel. Lockyer v. Pacific Gaming Technologies, 
supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 699, a vending machine that dispensed telephone cards for 
$1 included a ‗sweepstakes‘ feature with audio-visual displays resembling a slot 
machine.  When customers purchased a phone card for $1, they were given a 
chance to win a cash prize of up to $100.  A ‗preset computer program‘ 
determined the results.  (Id. at pp. 701-702.)  The Court of Appeal held the 
vending machine was a prohibited slot machine under the plain language of 
section 330b, because ‗[b]y the insertion of money and purely by chance (without 
any skill whatsoever), the user may receive or become entitled to receive money.‘  
(Pacific Gaming Technologies, at p. 703.)  Similarly, in Trinkle v. Stroh [(1997)] 
60 Cal.App.4th 771, a jukebox that dispensed four songs for $1 was found to be a 
prohibited slot machine or device under section 330b because the operators also 
14 
received a chance to win a cash jackpot.  (Id. at pp. 779-781; see Score Family 
Fun Center, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1217, 1221-1223 
[holding that an arcade video game that simulated card games violated § 330b 
because operators could, as a matter of chance, win free games or extended 
play].)‖ 
A recent federal case applying California law to an Internet sweepstakes 
game provides another example.  (Lucky Bob’s Internet Café , LLC v. California 
Department of Justice (S.D. Cal., May 1, 2013, No. 11-CV-148 BEN (JMA)) 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62470, 2013 WL 1849270 (Lucky Bob’s).))  Lucky Bob‘s facts 
were similar to those of this case in many respects. 
As the Lucky Bob’s court described it, ―Customers were given 100 entries 
to the Sweepstakes for every $1 of purchased internet time.  [Citation.]  In 
addition, each customer was entitled to 100 free entries for every 24-hour period.  
[Citation.]  Customers were also able to mail a request for $1 worth of 
sweepstakes entries to World Touch Gaming, but this option was never used.  
[Citation.]  [¶]  Purchased internet time was loaded onto a player card, which the 
customer swiped into an electronic card reader located at an assigned computer 
terminal.  [Citation.]  The user would then select a method for revealing his 
winnings from the monitor located at the terminal.  First, a customer could 
immediately reveal whether he won a prize.  [Citation.]  Second, a customer could 
play one of the seventeen casino-style games, then reveal whether he had won a 
prize at the end of the game.  [Citation.]  Many of these casino-style games are 
commonly associated with slot machines.  [Citation.]  [¶]  Plaintiffs‘ equipment 
operated a sweepstakes gaming system that was manufactured and licensed by 
World Touch Gaming, Inc.  [Citation.]  The World Touch Gaming system 
predetermined prize outcomes based upon chance as set forth in predefined odds 
tables for the gaming system, prior to when customers revealed their game entries 
15 
on player terminals.  [Citation.]  Based upon the odds tables, a game‘s overall 
financial outcome would be set at the time the pool of outcomes was generated.  
[Citation.]  The system would then sequentially assign entries to patrons from the 
pool.  [Citation.]  Playing the casino-type games could not change the game 
entries‘ prize values.‖  (Lucky Bob’s, supra, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62470 at pp. 
*2-*3, 2013 WL 1849270, at p. *1.) 
The cash prizes in Lucky Bob’s ranged from 10 cents to $3,000.  The 
players did not use most of the Internet time they purchased.  ―At Lucky Bob‘s, a 
total of $1,225,055 was spent for 204,176 hours of internet time and 97.375% of 
the total purchased internet time was unused.‖  (Lucky Bob’s, supra, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 62470 at p. *3, 2013 WL 1849270, at p. *2.) 
Relying heavily on Pacific Gaming Technologies, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 
699, the Lucky Bob’s court found the device at issue to be an illegal slot machine 
under section 330b.  (Lucky Bob’s, supra, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62470 at pp. *6-
*10, 2013 WL 1849270, at pp. *2-*4.) 
In finding the devices at issue here to be slot machines, the Court of Appeal 
relied primarily on section 330b, subdivision (d)‘s plain language.  Doing so was 
appropriate, because the language the Legislature chooses best indicates its intent.  
(People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 935.)  We agree with the Court of 
Appeal‘s application of the statutory language to the facts. 
As the Court of Appeal discussed in the Grewal opinion, ―The first element 
specified in the statute is that ‗as a result of the insertion of any piece of money or 
coin or other object, or by any other means, the machine or device is caused to 
operate or may be operated . . . .‘  (§ 330b, subd. (d), italics added.)  Defendants 
argue that this element is lacking because no coin or similar object was inserted 
into a slot by customers at the computer terminal to cause the sweepstakes 
computer games to operate.  We reject that argument.  Here, the insertion of a PIN 
16 
[or, in Nasser, an account number] or the swiping of a magnetic card at the 
computer terminal in order to activate or access the sweepstakes games and 
thereby use points received upon paying money at the register (ostensibly to 
purchase a product) plainly came within the broad scope of the statute.  The statute 
expressly includes the catchall phrase ‗by any other means.‘  (§ 300b, subd. (d), 
italics added.)  Even though a coin, money or object (e.g., a token) was not 
inserted into a slot, the games were commenced by other means analogous thereto 
which effectively accomplished the same result and, therefore, this element is 
satisfied. 
―The second element of a ‗slot machine or device‘ articulated in section 
330b is that ‗by reason of any element of hazard or chance or of other outcome of 
operation unpredictable by him or her, the user may receive or become entitled to 
receive any . . . money . . . or thing of value . . . .‘  (§ 330b, subd. (d), italics 
added.)  This language describes the so-called chance element — that is, the 
requirement that any potential to win a prize must be based on hazard, chance or 
other outcome of operation unpredictable to the user of the machine or device. 
―Here, it is clear that defendants‘ customers may become entitled to win 
prizes under the software systems implementing defendants‘ computer 
sweepstakes games based on ‗hazard or chance or of other outcome of operation 
unpredictable‘ to the user.  (§ 330b, subd. (d).)  That is, we agree with the People 
that the chance element is satisfied.  Under California gambling law, ‗ ―[c]hance‖ ‘ 
means that ‗winning and losing depend on luck and fortune rather than, or at least 
more than, judgment and skill.‘  (Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees 
Internat. Union v. Davis, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 592.)  Since customers playing 
defendants‘ computer sweepstakes games can exert no influence over the outcome 
of their sweepstakes entries by means of skill, judgment or how well they play the 
17 
game, it follows that we are dealing with systems that are based on chance or 
luck.‖  (Fn. omitted.) 
In arguing their devices are not slot machines, defendants rely primarily on 
Trinkle v. California State Lottery (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1401 (State Lottery).  
That case involved a claim that the California State Lottery‘s ―use of electronic 
vending machines to dispense SCRATCHERS lottery tickets is an illegal use of 
slot machines.‖  (Id. at p. 1403.)  The game of Scratchers is a lottery that the 
California State Lottery is specifically permitted to operate.  (See Western Telcon, 
Inc. v. California State Lottery (1996) 13 Cal.4th 475, 481-482, 495.)  The 
California State Lottery sells the Scratchers lottery tickets in stores, sometimes 
using vending machines to do so.  (State Lottery, at pp. 1403-1405.) 
The Court of Appeal in State Lottery, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 1401, 
reached what the Court of Appeal in Grewal aptly described as the ―unsurprising 
conclusion that a vending machine that simply dispenses California State Lottery 
tickets in the sequential order that they were loaded into the machine is not an 
unlawful slot machine.‖  That conclusion was undoubtedly correct.  The tickets 
themselves were part of a lottery, itself a game of chance.  But the California State 
Lottery is permitted to operate the lottery.  Selling the tickets in vending machines, 
rather than from a sales clerk behind a counter, did not make the process an 
additional game of chance. 
The Legislature has specifically authorized the California State Lottery to 
dispense lottery tickets in vending machines.  (Gov. Code, § 8880.335.)  That 
section, however, authorizes using vending machines only if ―neither the operation 
or functioning of the ticket dispenser nor the operation or functioning of any 
component, subcomponent, part, chip, or program of the ticket dispenser, or of any 
device in direct or indirect communication with the ticket dispenser, may affect 
the probability that a ticket that is dispensed will have a prize value other than a 
18 
null prize value.‖  (Id., subd. (b), italics added.)  In other words, the Legislature 
authorized lottery ticket vending machines, but not machines integrated into a 
system that, taken as a whole, operates to determine winners and losers.  
Defendants here are doing something beyond what the California State Lottery is 
permitted. 
Thus, State Lottery, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 1401, is distinguishable from 
this case.  Defendants, however, latch onto certain language in State Lottery that, 
they argue, makes their devices lawful.  The State Lottery court described one of 
the statutory elements as being that ―the operation of the machine is unpredictable 
and governed by chance . . . .‖  (State Lottery, at p. 1410, italics added.)  It is 
unclear how significant the point is to this case, but as the Court of Appeal in 
Grewal noted, ―section 330b, subdivision (d), refers to chance ‗or‘ unpredictable 
outcome.‖  ―[U]se of the word ‗or‘ in a statute indicates an intention to use it 
disjunctively so as to designate alternative or separate categories.‖  (White v. 
County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680.) 
More significantly, State Lottery has language indicating that, for a device 
to be a slot machine, the machine the customers operate must itself generate the 
element of chance at the time of operation, somewhat like the spinning wheels of 
the original mechanical slot machines.  (State Lottery, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1411-1412.)  Defendants argue that their devices are not slot machines because 
the machines the customers operate to obtain the result do not themselves generate 
the element of chance at the time of operation.  The element of chance has already 
been generated, and customers playing the games merely receive the next result in 
a previously arranged, sequential order. 
The Court of Appeal in Grewal disagreed with the suggestion (unnecessary 
to State Lottery‘s holding) that the computer terminal which customers use to play 
the sweepstakes games must itself generate the chance or unpredictable outcome 
19 
at the time the customer plays the game.  ―Section 330b only requires that prizes 
may be won ‗by reason of any element of hazard or chance or of other outcome of 
operation unpredictable by him or her . . . .‘  (§ 330b, subd. (d).)  Under this broad 
wording, if the entries are arranged in a particular order beforehand, rather than 
rearranged each time the game is played, it will still suffice.  Either way, the next 
sequential entry/result that is dealt out by the software system will be, from the 
perspective of the player, by ‗chance or of other outcome of operation 
unpredictable by him or her . . . .‘  (Ibid.)  [¶]   . . .  The mere fact that winnings 
are based on a predetermined sequence of results programmed into the software 
system, rather than on a randomly spinning wheel (or the like), does not change 
the nature and character of devices herein, which as integrated systems function as 
slot machines.‖  (Fns. omitted.) 
The Court of Appeal ―treat[ed] each defendant‘s complex of networked 
terminals, software gaming programs and computer servers as a single, integrated 
system.  Under section 330b, subdivision (d), an unlawful ‗ ―slot machine or 
device‖ ‘ is not limited to an isolated or stand-alone piece of physical hardware, 
but broadly includes ‗a machine, apparatus, or device that is adapted‘ for use as a 
slot machine or device.  (Italics added.)  As defined in dictionaries, the ordinary 
meaning for the term ‗apparatus‘ includes ‗a group or combination of instruments, 
machinery, tools, or materials having a particular function‘ (Random House 
Webster‘s College Dict. (1992) p. 66), as well as ‗[t]he totality of means by which 
a designated function is performed or a specific task executed‘ (Webster‘s II New 
College Dict. (2005 (3d ed.) p. 54).  Here, each defendant‘s system of gaming 
software, servers and computer terminals plainly operated together as a single 
apparatus.  (§ 330b, subd. (d).)  While it is true that the end terminals or computer 
monitors used by patrons — if considered in isolation — may not intrinsically or 
standing alone contain all the elements of a slot machine, in each case they are part 
20 
of an integrated system or apparatus wherein the various parts or components 
work together so as to operate in a manner that does constitute an unlawful slot 
machine or device.‖ 3 
We agree.  Indeed, a contrary view would mean that, again to quote the 
Court of Appeal, ―even a casino-style slot machine would be legal as long as it 
was operated by a computer system that had previously arranged the sequence of 
entry results in a fixed order.  Such a computer system might conceivably 
frontload hundreds of millions of discrete entry results into a predetermined 
sequence.  A customer using that device would be surprised to learn that merely 
because there is a preset sequence, he is not playing a game of chance.‖  The 
Legislature cannot have intended and, more importantly, section 330b‘s language 
does not permit, the conclusion that a business in California may lawfully operate 
traditional Las Vegas-style slot machines — with spinning wheels and everything 
else one associates with slot machines — merely by inserting into them software 
created elsewhere that presets the results.  As the Court of Appeal aptly 
analogized, ―whether a deck of cards was shuffled the day before, or at the 
moment the player sits down at the table and places a bet, it is still a matter of 
chance whether the ace of spades is the next card dealt.‖ 
From all this, and as applicable here, we think the core elements of section 
330b, subdivision (d), can be distilled as follows:  A device that (1) rewards 
purchasers of usable products, including but not limited to, telephone and Internet 
time, with sweepstakes points, and (2) allows those purchasers to redeem their 
                                              
3  
We note that under some circumstances slot machines may be seized and 
ultimately disposed of.  (§ 330.3.)  Section 330.3 does not cross-reference section 
330b, subdivision (d)‘s definition of a slot machine.  We express no opinion on the 
separate question of to what extent the integrated components of a slot machine 
under section 330b may be subject to seizure under section 330.3.   
21 
sweepstakes points by playing games that award cash or other prizes of value, is a 
slot machine, where that device, (3) standing alone or used in conjunction with 
other electronic or mechanical components, (4) when operated by insertion of a 
PIN, account number, or magnetic card, or by any other means, (5) awards cash or 
other prizes of value to users, or entitles those users to such cash or other prizes of 
value, and (6) does so by arranging or prearranging winning sweepstakes entries in 
a manner that is unpredictable to the user. 
Pacific Gaming Technologies, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 699, supports this 
conclusion.  As the Court of Appeal in Grewal explained, in Pacific Gaming 
Technologies, ― ‗[a] preset computer program determine[d] the results of the 
sweepstakes.‘  (Id. at p. 702.)  The machine or device in that case (a ‗VendaTel‘ 
that distributed a telephone card to each customer while entering them in a chance 
to win a prize) had a ‗ ―10 percent payout structure‖ ‘ where it would ‗pay[] out 
$500 in prizes for every $5,000 paid into the machine‘ with ‗ ―predetermined 
winners‖ spread out over a period of time.‘  (Id. at p. 702, fn. 4.)  Under those 
facts, the Court of Appeal held that the users of the device became entitled to 
receive cash prizes ‗purely by chance (without any skill whatsoever).‘  (Id. at p. 
703, italics added.)  The same is true here.  Even if the sequence of entries has 
been electronically frontloaded into defendants‘ integrated system, patrons win 
cash prizes based upon ‗hazard or chance or of other outcome of operation 
unpredictable by [the patron]‘ in violation of section 330b, subdivision (d).‖  The 
court in Lucky Bob’s, supra, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62470, 2013 WL 1849270, 
reached a similar conclusion. 
Defendants argue that the devices are not slot machines because the 
element of consideration is lacking.  Again, we agree with the Court of Appeal‘s 
response to this argument.  ―We find the argument unpersuasive.  Unlike section 
319 (regarding lotteries), section 330b does not directly specify that consideration 
22 
is an element.  Therefore, it would seem that as long as the express statutory 
elements of section 330b are satisfied, no separate showing of consideration is 
needed.  In other words, to the extent that consideration is a factor under section 
330b, it is simply subsumed by the existing statutory elements.  Since those 
elements were shown here, nothing more was required.  (Trinkle v. Stroh, supra, 
60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.)  Other cases have essentially followed this 
approach by concluding that even if consideration is necessary in slot machine 
cases, its existence will be found where a connection exists between purchasing a 
product from a vending machine or device and being given chances to win a prize.  
(Id. at pp. 781-782; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Pacific Gaming Technologies, supra, 
82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 705-706.)  ‗ ―Once the element[s] of chance [and prize]‖ ‘ 
are added to a vending machine or device, it is reasonable to assume that ‗ ―people 
are no longer paying just for the product regardless of the value given that product 
by the vender.‖ ‘  (Trinkle v. Stroh, supra, at p. 782; accord, People ex rel. 
Lockyer v. Pacific Gaming Technologies, supra, at pp. 704-707.)  That is the case 
here as well, since points are given to play the computer sweepstakes games on 
defendants‘ terminals based on dollars spent in purchasing products — that is, the 
elements of chance and prize are added to the purchase.‖ 
―[T]his construction reflects the Legislature‘s recognition ‗that once the 
elements of chance and prize are added to a vending machine, the consideration 
paid from the player-purchaser‘s perspective is no longer solely for the product.‘   
[¶]  . . .   An otherwise illegal machine does not become legal merely because it 
plays music, gives a person‘s weight, vends food, etc.‖  (Trinkle v. Stroh, supra, 
60 Cal.App.4th at p. 782 [quoting the trial court in that case].) 
Defendants Nasser and Elmalih argue the systems do not operate by hazard 
or chance or some other unpredictable operation because users have the option of 
obtaining an immediate result without playing any of the computer games.  This 
23 
circumstance does not negate the elements that make the computer games illegal 
slot machines.  The fact that users need not swipe a card or enter a number into the 
computer terminal and then play a casino-style game in order to obtain a result, 
does not make the system any less of a slot machine when they do swipe the card 
or enter the number and do play the casino-style game.  When the user, by some 
means (here swiping a card or entering a number), causes the machine to operate, 
and then plays a game to learn the outcome, which is governed by chance, the user 
is playing a slot machine. 
Two additional circumstances in this case tend to confirm that defendants 
were actually conducting gambling enterprises of the type section 330b is intended 
to control.  First, although a device need not generate a random outcome at the 
time of play, we think it significant that these systems are specifically designed  to 
cultivate the impression that the user may receive a reward ―by  reason of any 
element of hazard or chance or of other outcome of operation unpredictable by 
him or her.‖  (§ 330b, subd. (d).)  In contrast, a lottery ticket vending machine is 
transparent insofar as the design itself conveys to the customer that the dispenser 
has nothing to do with the chance element.  A customer can watch the next ticket 
fall from its holder, a straightforward proposition imbued with no particular 
suspense; the appearance of chance comes into play only once the lottery ticket is 
in hand.  This distinction would seem to track the central policy rationale for 
categorizing defendants‘ systems as slot machines.  They are attempts to recreate 
the sensation of playing with a device that itself generates the chance element. 
Second, it is clear defendants‘ customers were not merely buying the 
product that made them eligible to play the sweepstakes games — Internet or 
telephone time — but also, and perhaps primarily, the sweepstakes games.  In 
Lucky Bob’s, the record showed that most of the Internet time ostensibly sold was 
never used.  (Lucky Bob’s, supra, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62470 at p. *3, 2013 WL 
24 
1849270, at p. *2.)  The record here is not as clear, but at least sometimes, 
customers who ostensibly bought Internet time seemed to spend more time playing 
the games than using the Internet.  The evidence shows that customers who 
ostensibly bought telephone cards never used some two-thirds of the purchased 
telephone time.  It is true, as defendants argue, that the businesses offered a 
limited number of sweepstakes entries for no charge.  But the customers were 
nonetheless clearly paying, at least in part, and, it appears, in large part, for the 
opportunity to play the casino-style sweepstakes games and win cash prizes.  Or, 
as the People put it, defendants‘ ―sweepstakes are actual games of chance played 
for money by patrons to win cash prizes.‖ 
Defendants make various other arguments against finding the devices to be 
slot machines.  They argue the Court of Appeal violated principles of stare decisis 
in not following State Lottery, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 1401.  But nothing about 
stare decisis prevents courts from fairly distinguishing cases.  State Lottery is 
entirely distinguishable.  Indeed, the various cases finding similar devices to be 
slot machines, which we are following, are closer on point. 
Defendants claim they had insufficient notice that their devices would be 
deemed slot machines.  They argue the so-called rule of lenity, ―whereby courts 
must resolve doubts as to the meaning of a statute in a criminal defendant‘s favor‖ 
(People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57), mandates a finding that the devices are 
legal.  The rule of lenity exists to ensure that people have adequate notice of the 
law‘s requirements.  But the rule applies only when two reasonable interpretations 
of a penal statute stand in relative equipoise.  ―[A]lthough true ambiguities are 
resolved in a defendant‘s favor, an appellate court should not strain to interpret a 
penal statute in defendant‘s favor if it can fairly discern a contrary legislative 
intent.‖  (Id. at p. 58.)  Here, there is no relative equipoise.  We can fairly discern 
25 
the Legislature‘s intent.  The devices at issue clearly come within section 330b, 
subdivision (d)‘s definition of a slot machine. 
Defendants also argue that any ruling that their devices are slot machines 
would be ― ‗an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of‘ ‖ a criminal statute that may 
only be applied prospectively.  (People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 742.)  
But all that we are reviewing at this time is the trial court‘s issuance of the 
preliminary injunctions.  An injunction operates in the future; it ―is aimed at 
preventing future conduct — conduct after the issuance of the injunction.‖  (Cal-
Dak Co. v. Sav-On Drugs, Inc. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 492, 496.)  We express no view 
on what other remedy, if any, might be appropriate in this case. 
Defendants also argue that the Legislature‘s inaction signals its approval of 
State Lottery, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 1401.  They note that the Legislature has 
amended section 330b multiple times since that decision but has not overruled it.  
―In some circumstances, legislative inaction might indicate legislative approval of 
a judicial decision.‖  (People v. Whitmer, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 741.)  It is unclear 
how this concept would apply here because the Legislature has overruled neither 
State Lottery, which is distinguishable, nor any of the cases finding devices similar 
to the ones here to be illegal slot machines.  For purposes of discussion, we may 
assume that the Legislature‘s failure to overrule State Lottery might indicate its 
approval of that case‘s holding.  But that holding was that the California State 
Lottery may sell lottery tickets in vending machines.  The Legislature‘s inaction 
does not signal approval of all of the analysis leading to that holding, and certainly 
not approval of defendants‘ view of how that analysis applies to this case. 
Defendants assert that the devices here have features in common with 
sweepstakes operated by national companies like Coca-Cola and McDonalds, and 
that a holding that the devices here are illegal slot machines would mean those and 
similar sweepstakes are also illegal slot machines.  How similar the devices here 
26 
are to other sweepstakes, and whether other sweepstakes would meet all of the 
elements set forth in section 330b, subdivision (d), is beyond the scope of this 
case.  Such questions would have to be decided in a case in which someone claims 
some other sweepstakes system is an illegal slot machine.  Like a New Mexico 
court confronted with a similar argument, ―we will not substitute our sufficiency 
of the evidence analysis with an evaluation of the numerous other sweepstakes-
type promotions conducted in New Mexico [or California] by other national 
companies who are not defendants in this proceeding.‖  (State v. Vento (N.M.App. 
2102) 286 P.3d 627, 634.) 
The parties also note that, during the pendency of this case, the Legislature 
amended Business and Professions Code section 17539.1 in a way that appears to 
prohibit sweepstakes games like those of this case.  (Stats. 2014, ch. 592, § 1, 
chaptering Assem. Bill No. 1439 (2013-2104 Reg. Sess.).)4  The meaning and 
application of this amendment is beyond the scope of this opinion.  But its 
existence does not make this matter moot; we are deciding whether the trial court 
                                              
4  
As amended, Business and Professions Code section 17539.1, subd. (a)(12), 
prohibits:  ―Using or offering for use any method intended to be used by a person 
interacting with an electronic video monitor to simulate gambling or play 
gambling-themed games in a business establishment that (A) directly or indirectly 
implements the predetermination of sweepstakes cash, cash-equivalent prizes, or 
other prizes of value, or (B) otherwise connects a sweepstakes player or 
participant with sweepstakes cash, cash-equivalent prizes, or other prizes of value.  
For the purposes of this paragraph, ‗business establishment‘ means a business that 
has any financial interest in the conduct of the sweepstakes or the sale of the 
products or services being promoted by the sweepstakes at its physical location.  
This paragraph does not make unlawful game promotions or sweepstakes 
conducted by for-profit commercial entities on a limited and occasional basis as an 
advertising and marketing tool that are incidental to substantial bona fide sales of 
consumer products or services and that are not intended to provide a vehicle for 
the establishment of places of ongoing gambling or gaming.‖ 
27 
properly issued a preliminary injunction after finding the devices to be illegal slot 
machines under section 330b. 
Defendants contend, however, that the recent legislation supports the 
argument that their devices are not unlawful slot machines under section 330b.  
They cite committee reports expressing the belief that currently the devices might 
not be prohibited.  For example, one report states, ―As long as there is a legitimate 
free method of entry into the sweepstakes or promotion, the consideration element 
is absent, and the ‗sweepstakes‘ is not an illegal lottery.  According to the Senate 
Governmental Organization Committee, it appears that most Internet cafés are not 
operating illegal lotteries under California law.‖  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1439 (2013-2014 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Aug. 21, 2014, p. 3.) 
Aside from the fact that this and similar committee reports refer to illegal 
lotteries and not illegal slot machines, at most they indicate a belief that devices 
like those of this case might not currently be prohibited, and they suggest the 
Legislature amended Business and Professions Code section 17539.1 to ensure 
that at least they would be unlawful in the future.  The reports do not, and cannot, 
restrict our interpretation of section 330b.  The judicial, not legislative, branch 
interprets statutes, and a legislative belief regarding the meaning of earlier 
legislation has little weight.  (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 780-781.)  
Nothing in the Legislature‘s recent action prevents us from applying section 
330b‘s plain language. 
28 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeal. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Grewal and People v. Nasser 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 3/10/14 – 6th Dist. (Nasser) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 224 Cal.App.4th 527 (Grewal) 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S217896 & S217979 
Date Filed: June 25, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kern 
Judge: William D. Palmer 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Weston, Garrou & Mooney, John H. Weston, G. Randall Garrou and Jerome H. Mooney for Defendants 
and Appellants Kimpal Grewal and Philip Ernest Walker. 
 
William H. Slocumb, Christopher T. Reid; Hunt Jeppson & Griffin and Tory E. Griffin for Defendant and 
Appellant John C. Stidman. 
 
Steven Graff Levine; Dowling Aaron, Daniel K. Klingenberger, Lynne Thaxter Brown and Stephanie 
Hamilton Borchers for Defendants and Appellants Kamal Kenny Nasser and Ghassan Elmalih. 
 
Downey Brand, Stephen J. Meyer, Tory E. Griffin and Kelly L. Pope for Net Connection Hayward, LLC, 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Lisa S. Green, District Attorney, Gregory A. Pulskamp and John T. Mitchell, Deputy District Attorneys, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Sara J. Drake, Assistant Attorney General, and William L. Williams, 
Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for Attorney General for the State of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Mark L. Zahner and Gary Koeppel, Deputy District Attorney, for California District Attorneys Association 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Mayer Brown and Donald M. Falk for Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians and Lytton Rancheria of 
California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Matthew J. Geyer; Bien & Summers, Elliot L. Bien and Jocelyn S. Sperling for GTech Corporation as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Liner, Joseph R. Taylor and Tiffany R. Caterina for California Gaming Association as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Reed Smith, Paul D. Fogel and Dennis Peter Maio for California State Lottery as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John H. Weston 
Weston, Garrou & Mooney 
12121 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 525 
Los Angeles, CA  90025 
(310) 442-0072 
 
Tory E. Griffin 
Hunt Jeppson & Griffin 
1478 Stone Point Drive, Suite 100 
Roseville, CA  95661 
(916) 780-7008 
 
Steven Graff Levine 
1112 Montana Avenue, #309 
Santa Monica, CA  90403 
(310) 497-1974 
 
Gregory A. Pulskamp 
Deputy District Attorney 
1215 Truxtun Avenue, 4th Floor 
Bakersfield, CA  93301 
(661) 868-1659