Title: Ex parte Thomas Chester Ray, Jr. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Thomas Chester Ray, Jr. v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 05/29/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1061459
____________________
Ex parte Thomas Chester Ray, Jr. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Thomas Chester Ray, Jr.
v.
State of Alabama)
(Etowah Circuit Court, CC-05-907.01;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-0912)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Thomas Chester Ray, Jr., was convicted of first-degree
sexual abuse, a violation of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-66(a)(1),
for an offense involving a child.  The trial court sentenced
1061459
2
Ray to 10 years' imprisonment.  On appeal, the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed Ray's conviction and sentence.  Ray
v. State, [Ms. CR-05-0912, April 27, 2007] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. Crim. App. 2007).  This Court granted Ray's petition for
a writ of certiorari.  The issue before us is whether the
trial court erred in admitting evidence relating to a prior
juvenile adjudication in Ohio in which Ray pleaded guilty to
an offense involving sexual contact with a child.
The alleged victim in the present case was 16 years old
at the time of the trial and approximately 9 to 11 years old
at the time of the alleged incidents made the basis of the
criminal charge.  She was described at trial as mentally
retarded, but the record also contains testimony that she was
in the 10th grade at the time of the trial, that she was on
the honor roll, and that she was involved in several
extracurricular activities.  There was testimony at the trial
that the victim and her siblings were removed from their
mother's custody by the Alabama Department of Human Resources
("DHR") in 2003 and were placed with the wife of Ray's brother
("the guardian"). 
The two incidents of alleged sexual abuse apparently
occurred sometime between 1998 and 2000 while Ray was living
with the victim's mother (to whom Ray was then married), the
1061459
Ray was not interviewed by the local police until July
1
2004.
3
victim, and her siblings, one of whom was the victim's twin
sister.  The victim testified that, on two occasions, Ray made
her rub his "privates."  She also testified that Ray told her
not to tell anyone or he would beat her.  The victim testified
that, to her knowledge, no similar incident occurred with her
twin sister. 
The guardian testified that the victim told her about the
alleged abuse in "the latter part of 2003."  The guardian
immediately informed DHR of the allegation.  During the
ensuing investigation, Ray was interviewed by the local
police, and he stated that he had never touched the victim in
a sexual way.   The investigating detective also asked Ray
1
about a previous juvenile adjudication that occurred in Ohio
in 1991, when Ray was 16 years old.  Ray admitted that he
pleaded guilty in an Ohio juvenile proceeding to a charge of
attempted rape of his then eight-year-old niece.  As part of
the Ohio adjudication, Ray completed a treatment program for
sex offenders.  During his interview with the local police,
Ray gave a handwritten statement that reads as follows: "The
things been said about me been [sic] sexual with [the victim]
1061459
4
are not true.  I have never touched her or let her touch me in
a sexual way."  
Before the start of the trial, Ray filed a motion in
limine to bar any reference to the juvenile proceeding in
Ohio.  The trial court directed the State not to refer to that
proceeding, and the State made no mention of it or the events
relating to it in its case-in-chief.
Ray testified in his own defense and was questioned on
direct examination about the written statement he gave to the
local police.  Ray testified as follows:
"Q. Did you have occasion to make a written
statement to ... law enforcement?
"A.  Yes, I did.
"Q.  And in essence, what did you say?
"A.  It basically said I have never touched the girl
in a sexual way the whole time I've known her.
"Q.  And I'm going to ask you one more time, did you
touch [the victim] in an inappropriate way?
"A.  Never.
"Q.  At any time?
"A.  Never."
(Emphasis added.)
During 
the 
State's 
cross-examination 
of 
Ray, 
the
following colloquy took place:
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5
"Q.  ....  [W]hat you wrote out for your statement
basically you said none of what had been said was
true, is that right?
"A.  Exactly.
"Q.  You never touched her or let her touch you in
a sexual way, is that correct?
 
"A.  That is correct.
 
"Q.  Just wouldn't do something like that would you?
"A.  Is that a question?
"Q.  Yes, it is.
"A.  No. No.
"Q.  And your family members and friends, you've
indicated don't have a problem with you being around
their children?
"A.  No.
"....
 
"Q.  What about back up in Cleveland?
"A.  No, they haven't.
"Q.  Does anybody there have a problem with you
being around their kids?
"A.  Sure don't." 
(Emphasis added.)
After the foregoing colloquy, Ray's counsel renewed,
outside the presence of the jury, Ray's motion in limine to
exclude any reference to the Ohio juvenile proceeding, and she
objected to any inquiry as to "incidents that happened while
1061459
As demonstrated by the testimony quoted above, the trial
2
court was mistaken in its recollection.  Ray did not "freely
respond" that he "wouldn't do something like that."  The State
specifically asked him if he "[j]ust wouldn't do something
like that would you?"  Ray answered with a simple "no" and did
not elaborate.  The remaining questions in this vein were also
answered with a mere denial, without elaboration. 
6
the defendant was a juvenile."  Those objections were
overruled, based primarily on the trial court's mistaken
recollection that Ray had "freely respond[ed] that he wouldn't
do something like that."  In doing so, the trial court stated:
"[T]he court was of the opinion that I would not let
her go into any of the other details of the
statement.  But when he freely responds that he
wouldn't do something like that, I think the
defendant has placed himself in a position that the
state's got to be able to respond when they do, in
fact done something like this and as a result has
undergone treatment for it.
"....
"If he would have just responded 'no,' that would
have been the end of it and we would be in the same
position that we were in before we started but his
response wasn't just, 'no,' he added the statement
and I wrote it down in quotation marks that he
wouldn't do something like that." 
(Emphasis added.)2
The trial court then allowed the prosecutor to ask Ray on
cross-examination before the jury about the oral statement Ray
made to the police at the same time he gave the written
statement:
1061459
Rule 609 governs the impeachment of a witness by evidence
3
of a criminal conviction.
7
"Q.  And during the course of your conversation with
[the detective] ... isn't it true that you admitted
that there was a prior occasion when you were in
Ohio wherein you had sexual contact with a niece who
was 8 years old at the time for which you underwent
sex offender treatment, is that correct?
"A.  Yes."
In addition, in rebuttal, the State elicited testimony from
the investigating detective to the effect that Ray, in his
oral statement to the detective, had admitted that when he was
a juvenile in Ohio, he had had sexual contact with his eight-
year-old niece and had undergone sex-offender treatment.  The
detective's testimony referred to the Ohio juvenile proceeding
as well as to the events on which that proceeding was based.
In the Court of Criminal Appeals, Ray argued that the
trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach him with
evidence of his juvenile adjudication in Ohio because, he
said, this evidence was barred by Rule 609(d), Ala. R. Evid.,
and by Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-72(b).  Rule 609(d) provides:
"Evidence of juvenile or youthful offender adjudications is
not admissible under this rule."   Section 12-15-72(b)
3
provides, in part: "The disposition of a child [in a juvenile
proceeding] and evidence given in a hearing in the court shall
not be admissible as evidence against him in any case or
1061459
8
proceeding in any other court whether before or after reaching
majority ...." 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Ray's conviction.
In reliance on Stockard v. State, 391 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1980),
the court concluded that the "completeness doctrine" allowed
the State to introduce the aforesaid evidence:
"Here, by specifically testifying during direct
examination about that portion of his statement in
which he denied committing the offense, Ray opened
the door to the introduction of the remaining
portion of the statement in which he freely admitted
that he had previously been charged with a prior
juvenile offense involving sexual contact."
___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis added).
Presiding Judge Baschab dissented.  She noted that, with
some limited exceptions, juvenile adjudications may not be
used to impeach a defendant who testifies at trial.  She
concluded that the majority's reliance on the completeness
doctrine was misplaced because (1) that doctrine allows only
the 
admission 
of 
the 
relevant 
remainder 
of 
an 
oral
conversation or of a document introduced by the other party,
i.e., it does not "allow[] carte blanche admissibility of the
remaining portions of statements" and (2) Rule 609(d) and
§ 12-15-72 specifically limit the admission of evidence
regarding juvenile adjudications.  ___ So. 3d at ___
(Baschab, P.J., dissenting).
1061459
9
Ray argues to this Court (1) that Rule 609(d) and
§ 12-15-72 prohibited the admission of evidence relating to
his 1991 juvenile adjudication in Ohio, and (2) that the
"completeness doctrine" is limited to the relevant portion of
the remainder of the oral conversation at issue.
We conclude that the completeness doctrine does not
support the admission of evidence regarding Ray's 1991
juvenile adjudication in Ohio or the incident made the basis
of that adjudication.  In Stockard, this Court explained the
doctrine as follows:
"The rule of admissibility has been explained in
McElroy's Alabama Evidence as follows:
"'It 
is 
generally 
said, 
although
sometimes loosely, that if one party proves
any part of an oral conversation or oral
statement, the other party has the right to
prove all that was said on the same
occasion [citing Logan v. State[, 291 Ala.
497, 282 So. 2d 898 (1973)]].  More
correctly stated, the general rule is that
only so much of the remainder of the
statement or conversation is admissible as
relates to the subject-matter of the part
brought out by the opponent.'
"C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 316.01
(1977).  Thus, relevancy to the subject matter
brought out is the standard by which a party might
call for the remainder of a conversation partially
proved by his opponent."
391 So. 2d at 1064 (emphasis added).
1061459
Rule 106 reads as follows:
4
"When a party introduces part of either a
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may
require the introduction at that time of any other
part of the writing or statement that ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with
it."
10
Thus, the "relevancy" test under the completeness
doctrine is, as Ray argues, a requirement that the part of the
oral conversation or statement sought to be admitted under the
doctrine "relates to the subject matter of the part [of the
oral conversation or statement] brought out by the opponent."
It is not, in other words, a test of the general relevancy to
the crime charged of the part of the conversation or statement
sought to be admitted.  See note 5, infra.
As also indicated by the Court's explanation in Stockard,
the completeness doctrine relates to oral conversations and
statements.  See also Rule 106, Ala. R. Evid., Advisory
Committee Notes (explaining that in the wake of the adoption
of Rule 106, the completeness doctrine continues to apply when
"one party proves any part of an unrecorded oral conversation
or oral statement").  On the other hand, Rule 106 now governs
the necessity for completeness with respect to written
statements.4
1061459
11
The present case does not present any issue under
Rule 106.  Although the first two questions and answers on
direct examination quoted above did involve Ray's describing
a part of the written statement he had given to law
enforcement, that fact avails the State nothing.  The
statement by Ray to the investigating detective regarding the
Ohio incident was not included in Ray's written statement.
Nor does the common-law completeness doctrine provide any
basis for affirming the judgment of the trial court here.  As
noted, after being asked to describe his written statement,
the following questions were put to Ray:
"Q.  And I'm going to ask you one more time, did you
touch [the victim] in an inappropriate way?
"A.  Never.
"Q.  At any time?
"A.  Never."
  
(Emphasis added.) These questions did not solicit any
testimony regarding any part of a prior oral conversation.
They did not call on Ray to describe, and in response to them
Ray did not describe, any part of his oral conversation with
the detective.  They are direct questions that were put to Ray
at trial, and that he answered at trial, as to whether certain
things were true.  
1061459
"Relevance" in the context of the completeness doctrine
5
does not mean relevance to the entire case; it is not an
"evidentiary Trojan horse" that allows the State to bypass
evidentiary rules prohibiting the admission of otherwise
highly prejudicial evidence merely because that evidence was
discussed during the same conversation as evidence that was
admitted. The Wisconsin Supreme Court put it this way:
"The rule of completeness ... should not be
viewed as an unbridled opportunity to open the door
to otherwise inadmissible evidence.  Under the rule
of completeness the court has discretion to admit
only those statements which are necessary to provide
context and prevent distortion. The circuit court
must closely scrutinize the proffered additional
12
Even if the completeness doctrine were apposite, Ray
would still prevail on this issue.  The completeness doctrine
"serves the purpose of allowing a party to explain or rebut
adverse inferences which might arise from the fragmentary or
incomplete character of the evidence introduced by his
adversary."  Ex parte Tucker, 474 So. 2d 134, 135 (Ala. 1985).
The portion of Ray's testimony during direct examination on
the basis of which the State seeks to invoke the completeness
doctrine consists of a bare denial of the crime in the present
case.  His testimony was not fragmentary or incomplete.  The
evidence of the 1991 Ohio incident does not "'relate[] to the
subject matter'" of the part of Ray's testimony "'brought out
by the [State's] opponent.'"  Stockard, 391 So. 2d at 1064
(quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 316.01
(1977)).5
1061459
statements to avert abuse of the rule.  ...  '[A]n
out-of-court statement that is inconsistent with the
declarant's trial testimony does not carry with it,
like some evidentiary Trojan Horse, the entire
regiment of other out-of-court statements that might
have been made contemporaneously.'"
State v. Eugenio, 219 Wis. 2d 391, 412, 579 N.W.2d 642, 651-52
(1998) (emphasis added).
13
In reaching our decision in this case, we also are
cognizant of the dictates of § 12-15-72(b), which as
previously noted, provides in relevant part that "[t]he
disposition of a child [in a juvenile proceeding] and evidence
given in a hearing in the court shall not be admissible as
evidence against him in any case or proceeding in any other
court whether before or after reaching majority ...."  See
also Rule 609(d); Ex parte McCorvey, 686 So. 2d 425, 425 (Ala.
1996) (holding that the trial court erred in permitting the
State to impeach a defendant's credibility as a witness by
referring to the defendant's probationary status as a youthful
offender, noting the "'long-standing policy of protecting the
anonymity of juvenile offenders'"). 
Finally, we reject the State's argument to this Court
that Ray "opened the door" to the admission of the contested
evidence by his answers to the prosecutor's questions on
cross-examination. First, the prosecutor's question as to
whether Ray "just wouldn't do something like that" is
1061459
14
sufficiently ambiguous that it should not be read as
soliciting a blanket denial of all past sexual misconduct
(i.e., the question could reasonably have been understood to
be about doing "something like that" to the victim in this
case).  More fundamentally, the State fails to explain how
Ray's answers could constitute "opening the door" when they
were direct responses to  questions asked by the prosecutor on
cross-examination.  In this regard, we find instructive the
opinion of this Court in Ex parte Woodall, 730 So. 2d 652,
661-62 (Ala. 1998):
"In its brief, the State attempts to justify the
admission of ... evidence showing the defendant's
specific prior violent conduct, by emphasizing that
the defendant testified on cross-examination that he
was not violent and that he sought to avoid physical
confrontations.  These broad assertions, the State
contends, opened the door to questions regarding his
character and permitted evidence of the prior bad
acts as impeachment.  We disagree.
"'Good or bad character of the accused is never
an issue upon which the state may offer evidence to
prove guilt unless the accused has first chosen to
make it an issue.'  C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama
Evidence, 
§ 
27.02(1) 
(5th 
ed. 
1996)(footnote
omitted).  '[T]he state cannot initiate the proving
of the defendant's bad character to prove his guilt.
"In a criminal prosecution, it is generally agreed
that the state is not allowed to introduce evidence
of the accused's bad character until the accused has
first entered evidence of his good character."'
Dockery v. State, 659 So. 2d 219, 220-21 (Ala. Cr.
App. 1994)(citation omitted).  See also Ala. R.
Evid. 404.
1061459
15
"The State's argument in this case is identical
to one rejected by the Court of Appeals of Georgia
in a case with similar facts.  In Arnold v. State,
193 Ga. App. 206, 387 S.E.2d 417 (1989), the
prosecutor 
had 
on cross-examination asked the
defendant three times whether he was a violent
person.  After the defendant responded by denying
that he was violent, the prosecutor asked the
defendant 
whether 
he 
had 
been 
convicted 
of
aggravated assault.  The defendant responded, 'Yes[,
but] that happened when I was young.'  193 Ga. App.
at 207, 387 S.E.2d at 418.  On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the prosecutor had improperly impeached
his testimony and had attempted to show bad
character.  The prosecutor countered by contending
that the questioning of the defendant regarding his
prior conviction was permissible on the basis that
the defendant had put his character in issue through
his answers, given on cross-examination, indicating
that he was not violent.  The Court of Appeals
rejected that argument and reversed the defendant's
conviction, stating:
"'[T]he defendant did not voluntarily place
his character in issue. He merely responded
to questions which placed his character in
issue....  This line of cross-examination
was 
obviously 
an 
endeavor 
to 
compel
defendant to respond to questions which
placed his character in issue and which
insured 
an 
excuse 
for 
the 
State's
introduction of evidence of defendant's
prior criminal record.  We disapprove of
this endeavor and adhere to the rule that
the State cannot rebut or question the
presumption of a defendant's good character
unless the defendant first chooses to place
his 
character 
in 
issue.... 
 
[S]ince
defendant did not voluntarily elect to
place his character in issue, the trial
court erred in allowing the State to
attempt to impeach defendant and place his
character in issue through the introduction
of evidence of defendant's prior criminal
record.'
1061459
16
"193 Ga. App. at 207-08, 387 S.E.2d at 419-20
(emphasis original).
"We conclude that the reasoning of the Arnold
court is persuasive here.  The justification the
State offered in this present case for the admission
of the evidence of the defendant's prior uncharged
violent 
conduct, 
i.e., 
that 
his 
answers 
on
cross-examination indicating that he was not violent
opened 
the 
door 
to 
questions 
regarding 
his
character, is due to be rejected.  It may not be
said that the defendant chose to put his character
at issue merely by responding to the prosecutor's
cross-examination designed to elicit testimony on
that subject."  
(Footnote omitted.)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, in the context
of the record before us, the evidence regarding Ray's juvenile
adjudication in Ohio and the incident made the basis of that
adjudication was not admissible under the completeness
doctrine and that the trial court erred in admitting that
evidence.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Smith, J., concurs in the result.
Stuart and Bolin, JJ., dissent.
Cobb, C.J., and Shaw, J.,* recuse themselves.
*Justice Shaw was a member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals when that court considered this case.