Title: Cranston v. Cranston

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cranston v. Cranston1994 WY 77879 P.2d 345Case Number: 93-188Decided: 08/18/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Michael 
Dean CRANSTON,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Julie 
Ann CRANSTON,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price II, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Carol 
Seeger and Michael A. Maycock of Maycock Law Offices, P.C., 
Gillette.

Representing 
Appellee:

Deborah 
D. Michaels of Michaels, Michaels & Wilson, Gillette.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY** 
and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 5, 1994.

** 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      A father, 
contending that he should benefit from a provision of Wyoming's child support 
guidelines, brings this appeal. The father sought a modification of his child 
support obligation based on a provision which states a presumptive level of 
child support when both parents share physical custody of their children. The 
shared physical custody provision applies when each parent keeps the children 
overnight for more than twenty-five percent of the year and both parents 
contribute to the expenses of the children in addition to the payment of a child 
support obligation. The district court found that although the father paid a 
child support obligation and the children stayed overnight with the father a 
sufficient percentage of the year, the father did not contribute to the expenses 
of his children in a "substantial and meaningful" way. The father argues the 
district court erred in its interpretation of the shared physical custody 
provision. The father also maintains that the evidence supported a finding in 
his favor.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, the 
father, presents two issues:

1. 
Whether the District Court erred in interpreting W.S. § 20-6-304(d) to require a 
"substantial and meaningful" contribution of expenses by the parents before the 
joint presumptive support obligation is applicable.

2. 
Whether the District Court ruled against the weight of the evidence in finding 
that the Appellant did not make "substantial and meaningful" contributions to 
the expenses of his minor children, therefore, not apply the joint presumptive 
support obligation as required in W.S. § 20-6-304(d).

[¶4]      Appellee 
rephrases:

1. 
Whether it was reversible error for the district court to interpret W.S. § 
20-6-304(d) to require a "substantial and meaningful" contribution by both 
parents to the expenses of the children in addition to the payment of child 
support.

2. 
Whether "substantial and meaningful" is a proper standard to apply. 

3. 
Whether the district court ruled against the weight of the evidence in finding 
that the appellant did not meet the necessary contributions test and therefore 
appellant could not apply the joint presumptive support obligation formula 
stated in W.S. § 20-6-304(d).

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      Michael Dean 
Cranston (the father) and Julie Ann Cranston (the mother) married in 1982 and 
had two children. The district court granted a divorce in 1990 awarding legal 
and physical custody of the children to the mother. The district court granted 
visitation rights to the father which were subsequently modified and increased. 
The divorce decree ordered the father to pay child support equal to thirty 
percent of his gross disposable income, minus a $450.00 monthly living 
allowance. The father was also ordered to maintain a health insurance policy 
covering the children. Any health care costs which were not covered under the 
insurance policy were to be shared equally by the father and the 
mother.

[¶6]      Three years after 
the divorce, the father filed a petition to modify the child support obligation. 
The father maintained he was entitled to reduce his monthly support payments 
from $546.59 to $198.50 under the shared physical custody provision of the child 
support guidelines. The father reported that the children now stayed overnight 
with him in excess of the amount required by the shared physical custody 
provision. Additionally, the father claimed he had paid substantial funds for 
medical expenses of the children.

[¶7]      At the June 28, 
1993 hearing, the father, appearing pro se, presented uncontroverted documentary 
evidence that in 1992, the children stayed overnight with him for a total of 101 
days or twenty-eight percent of the year. The father also introduced documentary 
evidence showing he had paid his required share of uninsured orthodontic costs. 
In addition, documentary evidence showing miscellaneous payments to a child care 
provider and for two magazine subscriptions was presented. The father argued 
that he also had expenses for groceries, gas, housing, clothing, gifts, and toys 
during the time the children stayed with him, although he presented no evidence 
of these expenses.

[¶8]      The mother 
testified that since the divorce, she has maintained the children's primary 
residence. The mother declared that she provided all the children's clothing, 
personal hygiene items, bicycles and toys, even when the children were staying 
with the father. In addition, the mother testified she paid for any 
extracurricular activities of the children, including swimming and karate 
lessons. According to the mother, the father has refused to share in those 
expenses. The mother also maintained supplemental health care coverage for the 
children which has paid for some services not covered by the father's health 
insurance program.

[¶9]      Since the father 
established that the children stayed overnight with him for more than the 
requisite percentage of the year, the district court found the determinative 
factor in granting or denying a modification of the child support obligation to 
be the father's contribution to the expenses of the children. The district court 
concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that the father had made a 
"substantial and meaningful" contribution to the children's expenses. Instead, 
the evidence disclosed that the father made no substantial contributions beyond 
the support obligations contained in the divorce decree.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶10]   The district court has continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce or modify the terms of a child support 
obligation.

(a) 
In granting a divorce or annulment of a marriage, the court may make such 
disposition of the children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the 
well-being of the children. * * * Either parent may petition to enforce or 
revise the decree. The court which entered the decree has continuing subject 
matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the decree concerning the 
care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the circumstances 
of the parents and the benefit of the children requires.

 Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-2-113(a) (1994). Under the Child Support Enforcement Act, Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 20-6-101 through 20-6-401 (1994), any party may petition for a modification 
of a child support order by alleging that the application of the child support 
guidelines will result in a twenty percent change in the monthly support amount. 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-306. The party may also allege that a substantial change in 
circumstances has occurred creating the need for a modification of the child 
support order. Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶11]   When a district court decision on a 
modification of a child support obligation is challenged on appeal, this court 
limits its review to a determination of whether the district court abused its 
discretion or violated a legal principle. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Wyo. 1992); Harrington v. Harrington, 660 P.2d 356, 360 (Wyo. 
1983). "Abuse of discretion occurs when a court exceeds the bounds of reason or 
commits an error of law." Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 
1993). See also Crawford v. Crawford, 828 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Wyo. 1992) and 
Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶12]   Wyoming's child support guidelines, 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-6-301 through 20-6-306 (1994) (hereinafter child support 
guidelines), provide a means to calculate the amount of child support which is 
"rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be awarded in 
any proceeding to establish or modify temporary or permanent child support 
amounts." Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-302(a). The child support guidelines consider the 
combined income of both parents and the number of children that a child support 
obligation will benefit. Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(a). Deviation from the 
presumptive child support obligation is permitted when a finding is made by the 
district court that it would be unjust or inappropriate to follow the child 
support guidelines. Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-302(b). In determining whether to deviate 
from the child support guidelines, the district court may consider an open-ended 
list of factors, including: the amount of time the children spend with each 
parent; the value of the services contributed by either parent; special health 
or educational needs; and other factors the district court considers relevant. 
Id.

[¶13]   At issue in this proceeding is the 
language of the shared physical custody provision of the child support 
guidelines, which provides:

(d) 
When each parent keeps the children overnight for more than twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the year and both parents contribute to the expenses of the 
children in addition to the payment of child support, a joint 
presumptive support obligation shall be determined by use of the tables. After 
the joint presumptive child support obligation is derived from column three of 
the tables, that amount shall be divided between the parents in proportion to 
the net income of each. The proportionate share of the total obligation of each 
parent shall then be multiplied by the percentage of time the children spend 
with the other parent to determine the theoretical support obligation owed to 
the other parent. The parent owing the greater amount of child support shall pay 
the difference between the two (2) amounts as the net child support 
obligation.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-6-304(d) (Cum.Supp. 1993) (hereinafter shared physical custody 
provision) (emphasis added).

[¶14]   We are asked to consider the 
meaning and constraint of language which speaks of a child's welfare in terms of 
a mathematical formula. The father argues that the shared physical custody 
provision must be strictly applied. Under his interpretation, if a parent pays a 
child support obligation and keeps the children overnight for the required 
percentage of the year, the parent has, by definition, contributed to the 
expenses of the children. Therefore, the father argues that the shared physical 
custody provision requires a reduction in the amount of the child support 
obligation. Ultimately, the father advocates a view that the assessment of child 
support should be "almost administrative and ministerial in nature." The 
district court, according to the father, abused its discretion in not accepting 
this interpretation. We consider the father's interpretation of the child 
support guidelines to be erroneous. 

[¶15]   To give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in enacting a particular statute, we must consider the "`ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 
845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 
133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). However, the words must not be separated from the 
context in which they are used. Therefore, statutes are construed in pari 
materia, so the legislature's intention is gathered from the whole of the 
enactments being considered. Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 
1042-43. See also B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 816 (Wyo. 1992). If a statute communicates a plain meaning with its 
choice of language and is unambiguous, permitting reasonable persons to agree on 
its meaning, this court may not resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation. 
Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1043-44.

[¶16]   The shared physical custody 
provision is part of a statutory scheme that encourages both parents' 
involvement in the financial maintenance of their children. Wyo. Stat. § 
20-6-304. Often misunderstood by parents embittered by divorce, "child support" 
represents a legal obligation of the parents to the children. "[C]hild support 
is for the benefit of the children as [a parent's] obligation to contribute to 
the upbringing of [the] children. A support payment is the children's money 
administered in trust by [the custodial parent] for their benefit." Macy v. 
Macy, 714 P.2d 774, 777 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶17]   In Hasty, 828 P.2d  at 97-99, 
we examined the intent of the legislature in enacting child support guidelines. 
We noted that, nationally, critics have challenged inequities in the manner in 
which child support awards are determined and the increasing burden inadequate 
or unpaid child support awards create for public assistance programs. Id. 
at 97. As a result, Congress passed the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 
1984, Pub.L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.), to require the states to develop child support 
guidelines. Hasty, 828 P.2d  at 97 n. 2. Eventually, Congress passed the 
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which required the states to view 
the guidelines as "rebuttably presumed correct." Hasty, 828 P.2d  at 97. 
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 667(b)(2) (West 1991) (codifying rebuttable presumption 
that amount of child support required by guidelines is the correct amount of 
child support to be awarded). Wyoming's child support guidelines are a response 
to these federal initiatives and "embody the shift from ad hoc judicial 
discretion to presumptive standards in the establishment of child support 
awards." Hasty, 828 P.2d  at 97.

[¶18]   Despite the father's arguments, a 
presumptive standard is not a mandatory standard. Id. at 99. The 
legislature recognized that the individual circumstances of each child's welfare 
and the ability of each parent may require the district court to exercise 
discretion in establishing a child support obligation. Pauling, 837 P.2d  
at 1077. See Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-302(b). Therefore, the district court is 
not required to strictly apply the child support guidelines. Underkofler v. 
Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Wyo. 1992); Hasty, 828 P.2d  at 
99.

[¶19]   Inherent in the child support 
guidelines are assumptions about the care of the children. For example, one 
assumption is the children are living primarily with one parent but staying 
overnight with the other parent in an ordinary visitation arrangement, such as 
every other weekend, a portion of the summer and during some holidays. Nash 
v. Mulle, 846 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tenn. 1993) (applying Tennessee child support 
guidelines). If visitation patterns vary from these ordinary arrangements, the 
child support guidelines may need to be adjusted. Id. The legislature 
gave specific permission to the district court to deviate from the child support 
guidelines to account for the amount of time the children spend with each 
parent. Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-302(b)(ix).

[¶20]   The shared physical custody 
provision represents an adjustment to the assumptions of the child support 
guidelines by the legislature. The intent of the shared physical custody 
provision is to apportion the child support obligation between the parents in 
proportion to the amount of time the children spend with each parent. Wyo. Stat. 
§ 20-6-304(d). See In re Marriage of Quam, 813 P.2d 833, 835 (Colo. App. 
1991) (applying Colorado child support guidelines). The unambiguous language of 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(d) contains three requirements. First, each parent must 
keep the children overnight for more than twenty-five percent of the year. 
Second, both parents must "contribute to the expenses of the children." Third, 
the contribution of both parents to the expenses of the children must be "in 
addition to the payment of child support * * *."

[¶21]   The father argues the district 
court erred by requiring evidence of a "substantial and meaningful" contribution 
by both parents to the expenses of the children in addition to the payment of 
child support. In Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 75 (Wyo. 1982), 
this court addressed a similar argument concerning language of an adoption 
statute that referred to a parent's failure to "contribute to the support of the 
children." See Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) (Cum.Supp. 1994). The 
non-consenting parent argued that he had contributed to the support of the 
children by providing a number of gifts. Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d  at 75. However, the district court disagreed that "`trifling gifts'" 
actually resulted in a contribution to the support of the children. Id. 
(quoting Bulman v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 144 Neb. 342, 13 N.W.2d 403, 408 (1944)). After examining decisions in workers' compensation and 
social security cases with similar statutory directions, we determined that to 
prevent adoption, a non-consenting parent must present evidence of contributions 
to the support of the children that are "substantial" or "regular" or 
"constitut[e] a material factor" in the children's support. Id. at 76. We 
find this logic persuasive.

[¶22]   We agree with the district court 
that the intent of the legislature in the shared physical custody provision 
requires that both parents must "contribute to the expenses of the children" in 
a substantial manner. Id. at 75. The ordinary meaning of "contribute" 
includes giving something to discharge a joint obligation. Black's Law 
Dictionary 328 (6th ed. 1990). A contribution which is slight or far below what 
would be expected will not discharge an obligation. Therefore, both parents 
contribute "substantially" to the expenses of the children by providing 
something worthwhile, of real worth and importance, as distinguished from 
providing for expenses which are merely nominal or without value to the 
children. Black's Law Dictionary 1428 (6th ed. 1990).

[¶23]   A parent who keeps the children 
overnight the required percentage of the year and pays a child support 
obligation has not satisfied the three requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(d). 
Evidence must also support a finding that both parents substantially contributed 
to the expenses of the children. The legislative intent to encourage both 
parents' involvement in the financial maintenance of their children requires 
this degree of participation. Otherwise, a potentially onerous burden would be 
imposed on one parent. It must be remembered that many expenses of maintaining 
the children's primary residence, including mortgage or rent, continue unabated 
during visitation periods with the other parent. Compart v. Compart, 417 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Minn.App. 1988). Only when both parents contribute 
substantially to the expenses of the children is the intent of Wyo. Stat. § 
20-6-304(d) served.

[¶24]   We note that the legislature, 
during the pendency of this appeal, acted to clarify its intent. During the 1994 
legislative session, Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(d) was amended to provide, in 
pertinent part:

When 
each parent keeps the children overnight for more than forty percent 
(40%) of the year and both parents contribute 
substantially to the expenses of the children in addition to the 
payment of child support, a joint presumptive support obligation shall be 
determined by use of the tables.

Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 89, § 1 (1994). While these changes do not impact this decision, 
the amendment offers further evidence of the legislative intent to require both 
parents to substantially contribute to the expenses of the children. See 
Dunnegan v. Laramie County Com'rs, 852 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Wyo. 1993) (noting 
evidence of legislative intent provided by amendment to statute). 

[¶25]   The father argues he has satisfied 
the three requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(d), including providing evidence 
of a "substantial" contribution to the expenses of the children. The district 
court determined the evidence did not support the father's 
position:

The 
evidence in this case does not indicate such substantial and meaningful 
contribution by the [father]. Instead, the evidence shows no substantial 
contributions by the [father] beyond child support. The [mother's] evidence 
showed that she is routinely providing substantially all clothing, toys, and 
personal care items for the children even while they are in the [father's] 
care.

We 
agree with the district court.

[¶26]   In reviewing a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we accept the evidence of the successful party as 
true and give all favorable inferences to that evidence. Hill v. 
Zimmerer, 839 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo. 1992). We leave out of consideration 
entirely the conflicting evidence of the unsuccessful party. Kadrmas v. 
Valley West Homeowner's Ass'n, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 1993); Hill, 
839 P.2d  at 981.

[¶27]   The mother established that she 
maintained the children's primary residence and provided for all of the 
children's necessities, including clothing and toys. She also provided clothing, 
personal hygiene items and toys for the children to use during their visits with 
the father. The mother also paid for extracurricular activities the children 
participated in, even during their stays with the father.

[¶28]   The only substantial contribution 
to the expenses of the children the father documented was his payment of a share 
of uninsured orthodontic costs. This payment, however, was required by the terms 
of the divorce decree. The mother had to make an equal payment. These uninsured 
medical payments are merely other forms of the child support obligation shared 
by both parents.

[¶29]   Otherwise, the father provided 
evidence of only nominal contributions to the expenses of the children, 
including child care costs and magazine subscriptions. The father offered no 
evidence that he had increased expenses for a larger apartment or home to 
provide the children with living space while they were in his custody. The 
father offered no evidence of increased food, heating, or utility expenses while 
the children were in his custody. Finally, the father offered no evidence of 
providing for the needs of the children with clothing, toys or other necessities 
at any time. Without evidence of expenses the father incurred while the children 
were in his custody, the requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(d) are not 
satisfied. See In re Marriage of Redford, 776 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Colo. App. 
1989) (holding that under Colorado child support guidelines, evidence must be 
submitted regarding additional expenses resulting from shared physical custody). 
Therefore, the father failed to establish that he contributed substantially to 
the expenses of the children.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶30]   The payment of a child support 
obligation is not a discharge from other parental responsibilities. To the 
extent that a mathematical formula can, the child support guidelines furnish a 
place to begin the exercise of discretion which is inherent in protecting the 
welfare of the children following a divorce. However, the child support 
guidelines are not a panacea. They do not provide sanctuary for parents seeking 
to escape responsibility for their children's welfare which may not be 
quantified in a statute but is still imperative.

[¶31]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.