Title: Mercado v. Trujillo

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mercado v. Trujillo1999 WY 79980 P.2d 824Case Number: 98-286Decided: 06/08/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

PHILLIP 
MERCADO; JUANITA MERCADO; ANITA GARCIA; RAMONA ZARING; and MANUELLA OCHOA, 
Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

MARY TRUJILLO; ROSE ROMERO; VIRGINIA BOSCH; and 
ALFRIEDA GONZALES, Appellees (Defendants).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court 
of Laramie County Honorable Edward

L. Grant, 
Judge.

 

William D. Bagley, Bagley 
Law Office, Cheyenne, WY, and Mary B. Guthrie, Cheyenne, WY., Representing 
Appellants.

 Gegory C. Dyekman, Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, 
Cheyenne, WY, and Stephen F. Freudenthal, Cheyenne, WY., Representing 
Appellees.

 

       Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

 

       
HILL, Justice.

      [¶1]  Phillip Mercado, Manuella Ochoa, Anita 
Garcia, Juanita Mercado, and Ramona Zaring (collectively Appellants) appeal from 
a summary judgment order of the district court disposing of their claim that 
Mary Trujillo, Virginia Bosch, Rose Romero, and Alfrieda Gonzales (collectively 
Appellees) unduly influenced their mother's testamentary 
decisions.

 

     [¶2]  We affirm.

 

                                  
ISSUES

 

    [¶3]     The Appellants frame the issue on 
appeal in two parts:

 

Did the Trial Court Err When it Granted Summary 
Judgment, in Spite of the Disputed Material Facts?

 

Did the Trial Court Err When it Concluded That the 
Appellees Were Entitled to Summary Judgment as a Matter of 
Law?

 

 Appellee Rose Romero frames the issue in 
the form of a statement:

 

Summary Judgment was appropriately granted to Rose 
Romero because Appellants failed to submit any competent evidence of specific 
facts countering those facts presented by Appellees' regarding Antonia Mercado's susceptibility to subversion of her 
freedom of will.

 

Appellees Mary Trujillo, 
Virginia Bosch, and Alfrieda Gonzales presented the following statement of the 
issue:

 

Whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment to Appellees because there was no genuine issue of material fact on one 
of the four elements of undue influence: Antonia Mercado's condition 
was not such as to permit 
subversion of her will.

 

                                   
FACTS

 

     [¶4]  This dispute centers around changes made 
by the decedent Antonia Mercado (Antonia) in 1996 to her testamentary 
dispositions. The parties are all Antonia's children but for Appellee Alfrieda 
Gonzales, who is the decedent's granddaughter.

 

     [¶5]  In 1984, Antonia made a will which left 
her estate to all of her children on a per stirpes basis which meant that each 
child would receive an equal share of the estate or, if one of the children 
predeceased Antonia, their descendants would have split equally that child's 
share. On May 22, 1990, Antonia effected major changes in her testamentary plan 
by establishing a revocable trust with Antonia as trustee and her children, 
Appellees Rose Romero and Mary Trujillo and Appellant Juanita Mercado, as 
successor trustees in that order. The trust left Antonia's residuary estate, 
including investments and real estate, in equal shares to her children on a per 
capita basis, which meant that only the surviving children would have shared 
equally in the estate.

 

     [¶6]  In 1996, Antonia, at age ninety-five, 
made additional changes to her testamentary plan, which are the genesis of this 
dispute.  Accompanied by Appellees 
Rose Romero, Mary Trujillo, and Alfrieda Gonzales, Antonia went to her 
attorney's office to amend her trust. The upshot of the amendments was the 
disinheritance of the Appellants. A letter, which explained why she was taking 
this action, was provided to Antonia's attorney with directions to disclose its 
contents upon Antonia's death. The letter was dictated to Appellee Alfrieda 
Gonzales and signed by Antonia.  
Prior to Antonia's execution of the amendment on July 12, 1996, the 
attorney met with her alone to substantiate Antonia's desire to effectuate the 
changes in the trust.

 

     [¶7]  Antonia died on December 11, 1996, and 
on July 29, 1997, the Appellants instituted this action against the Appellees. 
Among the several causes of action alleged in the complaint, the only one that 
concerns us in this appeal is the claim that the Appellees used undue influence 
to affect Antonia's testamentary disposition.

 

     [¶8]  On April 17, 1998, the Appellees filed a 
motion for summary judgment. After considering the motion and the affidavits in 
support and opposition thereto, the district court granted the motion on the 
grounds that the Appellants "failed to put forth admissible evidence creating 
any genuine issue of material fact that Antonia Mercado's condition was such as 
to permit subversion of her freedom of will." Appellants take their appeal from 
that determination. Additional facts will be set forth hereafter, as 
necessary.

 

                            
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

     [¶9]  Our standard for the review of summary 
judgments is well established:

 

"`When a motion for summary judgment is before the 
supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as the district judge; and, if 
there is a complete record before us, we have exactly the same material as did 
he. We must follow the same standards. 
The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the 
correctness of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, 
depositions and other proper material appearing in the record. § Reno Livestock 
Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981). See 
also, Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334, 336 
(1983).

 

"A summary judgment should only be granted where it 
is clear that there are no issues of material facts involved and that an inquiry 
into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the application of law. Johnson v. 
Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975). A material fact is one which has legal 
significance.  Johnson v. Soulis, 
supra. It is a fact which would establish a defense. Wood v. Trenchard, Wyo. 550 P.2d 490 (1976). After the movant establishes a prima facie case the burden of 
proof shifts to the opposing party who must show a genuine issue of material 
fact, Gennings v. First Nat'l Bank of Thermopolis, Wyo., 654 P.2d 154 (1982), or 
come forward with competent evidence of specific facts countering the facts 
presented by the movant. Matter of the Estate of Brosius, Wyo., 683 P.2d 663 
(1984).  The burden is then on the 
nonmoving party to show specific facts as opposed to general allegations.  10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil § 2727, p. 538. The material presented must be admissible 
evidence at trial. Conclusory statements are not admissible. Bancroft v. 
Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980). We give the party defending the motion the 
benefit of any reasonable doubt." Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, 
Wyoming, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 95 (1984).

 

Nowotny v. L & B 
Contract Industries, 933 P.2d 452, 455 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Thomas by Thomas v. 
South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo. 
1985)).

 

                           
     DISCUSSION

 

     [¶10]  A testamentary disposition deliberately 
made by a person of sound mind is not to be lightly set aside. Matter of the 
Estate of Loomis, 810 P.2d 126, 128 (Wyo. 1991); Matter of Estate of Brosius, 
683 P.2d 663, 665 (Wyo. 1984). The burden of proving undue influence rests upon 
the contestant to provide clear proof that the decedent's free agency was 
destroyed, and the volition of another was substituted for theirs. Matter of the 
Estate of Loomis, 810 P.2d  at 128. A party asserting the exercise of undue 
influence must present competent evidence establishing:

 

"(1) the relations between the one charged with 
exercising the undue influence and the decedent affording the former an 
opportunity to control the testamentary act; (2) that the decedent's condition 
was such as to permit * * * subversion of h[er] freedom of will; (3) that there 
was activity on the part of the person charged with exercising undue influence; 
and (4) that such person unduly profited as beneficiary under the 
will."

 

Matter of Estate of Loomis, 
810 P.2d  at 128-29 (quoting Peterson v. McMicken, 72 Wyo. 444, 480, 266 P.2d 238, 252 (1954)).

 

      [¶11] In this 
case, the district court granted summary judgment for the Appellees solely on 
the basis that the Appellants had failed to offer admissible evidence creating a 
genuine issue of material fact that Antonia's condition was such "as to permit 
subversion of her freedom of will."  
Therefore, our concern is the evidence relevant to the second element of 
undue influence,1 and the focus will necessarily be 
on the decedent's condition at the time she made the changes to her 
trust.

 

     [¶12] In support of 
their motion for summary judgment, the Appellees offered the deposition of 
Antonia's attorney, who made the changes in the trust. The attorney testified 
that she met with Antonia alone. She indicated that although English was 
Antonia's second language, Antonia understood it very well. The attorney 
discussed the proposed changes with Antonia, including the letter that was 
dictated by her to Alfrieda Gonzales. That letter, setting forth the reasons why 
Antonia was making the changes to her trust, was signed by her in the attorney's 
presence. The attorney testified that it was her impression that Antonia knew 
exactly what she was doing, and that the changes in the trust reflected her 
intent.

 

     [¶13]  The Appellees also offered affidavits 
from three home health care providers who attended to Antonia during the time in 
question.  Each asserted that 
Antonia was an intelligent, independent person who was mentally sharp, and 
despite some health problems, Antonia was generally in good physical 
health.  In addition, affidavits 
from two neighbors and Antonia's investment advisor indicated that the contact 
these affiants had with Antonia led them to believe that she was intelligent and 
knew what she was doing. Finally, the Appellees offered the affidavit of 
Antonia's doctor in reply to the Appellants' materials in opposition to the 
summary judgment. The doctor affirmed that Antonia was "bright, intelligent and 
in charge of herself and her surroundings," and there was no indication of 
incompetency or domination.

 

     [¶14]  In opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, Appellants countered with their own affidavits containing statements 
relating the actions of the Appellees allegedly constituting undue influence. 
None of the Appellants, however, addressed how Antonia's condition rendered her 
susceptible to such influence.  
Indeed, one could peruse the entire content of the materials submitted in 
opposition to summary judgment and not find a single reference to Antonia's 
mental or physical condition at the time she made the changes to her trust. 
While Appellants' brief argues that Antonia was susceptible to influence, 
matters alluded to by attorneys at motion hearings or in briefs are not 
evidence.  Venable v. State, 854 P.2d 714, 716 (Wyo. 1993).

 

     [¶15]  Once the Appellees had introduced 
admissible evidence relating to the decedent's condition in support of their 
motion for summary judgment, the burden shifted to the Appellants to counter 
with admissible evidence raising issues of material fact. The Appellants 
completely failed to offer any evidence on this issue at all. Since the 
Appellants had failed to offer admissible evidence raising an issue of material 
fact on one of the required elements of their cause of action, the district 
court correctly granted summary judgment.

 

                 
               CONCLUSION

 

     [¶16]  In a typically thorough discussion of 
the general topic some 45 years ago, Chief Justice Blume included the following 
observations:

 

"No right of the citizen is more valued than the 
power to dispose of his property by will. No right is more solemnly assured to 
him by the law . . . . Next of kin and relatives, no matter how near they may 
be, cannot be said to have any natural right to the estate of the testator which 
can be             asserted against the 
legally executed will of the latter."

 

In re Nelson's Estate, 72 
Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238, 246 (Wyo. 1954) (quoting Isaac v. Halderman, 76 Neb. 
823, 107 N.W. 1016, 1019 (Neb. 1906)).

 

     [¶17]  So we conclude here. Antonia Mercado 
chose to exercise the right to dispose of her property, and altered her 
testamentary plan.  The record does 
not support the suggestion that she did so contrary to her competent, free will. 
We find that no genuine issue of material fact exists in relation to the 
condition of Antonia at the time she 
made the challenged changes to her trust entitling the Appellees to judgment as 
a matter of law. The summary judgment hereby is affirmed.

  

FOOTNOTES

1 
Appellants address each of the elements of undue influence in their brief. Since 
the district court's decision was based solely on the second element, we will 
assume, for purposes of this opinion, that sufficient admissible evidence 
relating to the other elements existed to defeat a summary judgment motion as to 
those elements.