Title: Wauconda Fire Protection District v. Stonewall Orchards, LLP

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97317-Agenda 20-May 2004.
THE WAUCONDA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Appellee, v.

STONEWALL ORCHARDS, LLP, et al. (Lake County, Illinois, 							
Appellant).
Opinion filed March 24, 2005.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, the Wauconda Fire Protection District (District), sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Lake County,
Illinois (County), and Stonewall Orchards, LLP (Stonewall), after the
County approved new construction by Stonewall despite Stonewall's
noncompliance with a District ordinance. Defendants filed motions to
dismiss, which the circuit court of Lake County granted. The District
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded the cause to the circuit court. 343 Ill. App. 3d 374. We
granted leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. The issues now before us
are whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the matter before it and,
if so, whether the District's ordinance is enforceable against
Stonewall. We hold that jurisdiction is proper, and that the District's
ordinance is enforceable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which remanded the cause for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	Stonewall, a private entity, operates a golf course located within
the common boundaries of unincorporated Lake County and the
District. In November 1999, Stonewall submitted plans to the County
and the District for construction of a clubhouse on the golf course.
The initial plans provided for a sprinkler system. A revised version of
the plans did not. The County approved the revised plans and issued
a building permit to Stonewall in October 2001.
	During construction of the clubhouse, the District informed
Stonewall that a District fire protection ordinance required the
clubhouse to have a sprinkler system. The ordinance provides:
		"An automatic fire sprinkler system, approved by the
Wauconda Fire Protection District, shall be installed in all
new construction of buildings of the following use groups as
defined by the BOCA Building Code, 1993 Edition;
Assembly, Business, Education, Factory and Industrial, High
Hazard, Institutional, Mercantile, Residential R1, R2, R3, and
Storage." Wauconda Fire Protection District Fire Sprinkler
Ordinance, No. 98-0-5 (eff. November 27, 1998).
Unlike the District's sprinkler ordinance, the County's building code
does not require the installation of a sprinkler system in the clubhouse.
According to the County's code, structures such as the clubhouse,
which fall into the "Assembly" use group, are only required to contain
an "automatic fire suppression system" where the "fire area exceeds
10,000 square feet." BOCA National Building Code 1999, §904.2, as
amended by Lake County Ordinance Adopting the BOCA National
Building Code 1999 (eff. August 8, 2000).(1)
	In June 2002, around the time the clubhouse was nearing
completion, the District filed a complaint in the Lake County circuit
court seeking to enjoin the County from issuing Stonewall a
temporary occupancy permit for the clubhouse, and to enjoin
Stonewall from occupying the clubhouse, until Stonewall installed a
sprinkler system. The District cited section 11 of the Fire Protection
District Act (Act) (70 ILCS 705/11 (West 2002)) as the basis for its
authority to adopt and enforce its fire protection ordinance.
	The County and Stonewall filed motions to dismiss. They argued
the District had no authority under section 11 to adopt or enforce its
sprinkler ordinance. Section 11 states:
			"The board of trustees of any fire protection district
incorporated under this Act has the power and it is its legal
duty and obligation to provide as nearly adequate protection
from fire for all persons and property within the said district
as possible and to prescribe necessary regulations for the
prevention and control of fire therein. The board of trustees
may provide and maintain life saving and rescue equipment
services and facilities, including an emergency ambulance
service. Except in cities having a population of 500,000 or
more inhabitants and except in municipalities in which fire
prevention codes have been adopted, the board of trustees
has the express power to adopt and enforce fire prevention
codes and standards parallel to national standards."
(Emphasis added.) 70 ILCS 705/11 (West 2002).
Specifically, the County and Stonewall argued the County is a
municipality for purposes of section 11, and because the County has
adopted a fire prevention code, the County's code, not the District's
ordinance, applies to Stonewall. Alternatively, the County argued it
could not be compelled to enforce the District's ordinance by
withholding permission to occupy the clubhouse from Stonewall,
because section 11 does not provide fire protection districts with the
authority to require other governmental entities to enforce district
regulations.
	While the proceedings were pending against the County and
Stonewall, the County issued Stonewall a temporary occupancy
permit. Thereafter, the District filed an amended complaint. The
District sought to enjoin the County from issuing a final certificate of
occupancy to Stonewall. In addition, it sought a declaratory judgment
that the District has the authority to enact regulations within
unincorporated Lake County, and that the District's sprinkler
ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall.
	The circuit court granted defendants' motions to dismiss, and the
District filed notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellate court, with one
justice dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in part,
reversed it in part, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
343 Ill. App. 3d 374, 380. The appellate court reversed the judgment
of the circuit court as to the injunctive relief sought against Stonewall
and the declaratory relief sought against both defendants. It held that
the District's sprinkler ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall,
because the County is not a municipality for purposes of section 11.
343 Ill. App. 3d at 379. The court reasoned that other sections of the
Fire Protection District Act use the word "municipality" to refer to
cities, villages, and incorporated towns, not counties, and that the
definition of "municipalities" adopted by the Statute on Statutes
(Statute) (5 ILCS 70/1.27 (West 2002)) is consistent with that
understanding of the term. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 378-79. As to the
injunctive relief sought against the County, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the District
must enforce its ordinance against Stonewall without seeking
enforcement by the County. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 380. The appellate
court noted that while section 11 gives fire protection districts the
authority to enact and enforce fire prevention regulations, the statute
does not indicate that the legislature intended a fire protection district
to have the power to require a county to withhold an occupancy
permit. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 380.
	The County filed an "affidavit of intent" to file a petition for leave
to appeal to this court with the appellate court on October 22, 2003,
20 days after entry of the appellate court's judgment. On November
6, 2003, within 35 days after entry of the judgment, the County filed
its petition for leave to appeal with this court's clerk. The same day,
the clerk informed the County its petition could not be accepted by the
court because the October 22, 2003, "affidavit of intent" had not been
sworn and subscribed by a notary public. The County immediately
filed a motion seeking leave to file its petition for leave to appeal
instanter. On November 19, 2003, an order was issued granting the
County's motion, the effect of which was to extend the County's
deadline for filing its petition for leave to appeal to November 6,
2003, despite the invalidity of its affidavit of intent. We later granted
the County's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 315. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	The County challenges the appellate court's interpretation of
section 11. Before addressing the statutory interpretation issue on the
merits, we must consider the District's argument that this court does
not have jurisdiction to hear this matter because the County failed to
file a timely petition for leave to appeal.

I. Supreme Court Rule 315
	At the time the County filed its "affidavit of intent" to file a
petition for leave to appeal to this court,(2) Supreme Court Rule 315(b)
stated, in part:
			"[A] party seeking leave to appeal must file the petition for
leave in the Supreme Court within 21 days after entry of the
judgment of the Appellate Court, or within the same 21 days
file with the Appellate Court an affidavit of intent to file a
petition for leave, and file the petition within 35 days after the
entry of such judgment. *** The Supreme Court, or a judge
thereof, on motion, may extend the time for petitioning for
leave to appeal, but such motions are not favored and will be
allowed only in the most extreme and compelling
circumstances." 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b).
In the past, we have referred to this familiar rule in jurisdictional
terms. See, e.g., A.J. Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill. 2d 397, 403-04
(2001); Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490
(2002). In A.J. Maggio, we held we did not have jurisdiction to hear
the plaintiff's appeal because the plaintiff failed to file a petition for
leave to appeal within 21 days of the entry of the appellate court's
judgment on rehearing. A.J. Maggio, 197 Ill. 2d  at 403-04. Likewise,
in Roth, citing A.J. Maggio, we dismissed the cause before us on the
ground that leave to appeal was improvidently granted. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 497. There, because the defendant's affidavit of intent had no
legal effect, it was insufficient to extend the defendant's time for filing
a petition for leave to appeal, and without the extension, the
defendant's petition was untimely. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 497.
	The District now contends that because the County's "affidavit
of intent" was defective, and therefore had no legal effect, the
County's deadline for filing its petition for leave to appeal expired 21
days after the appellate court entered its October 22, 2003, judgment.
Accordingly, the District argues this court had no authority to grant
the County an extension for filing its petition for leave to appeal
outside the applicable 21-day filing period.
	The concept of jurisdiction encompasses a broad array of specific
doctrines that define and limit the power of courts. See, e.g., Black's
Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004) (defining various types of
jurisdiction). In a general sense, jurisdiction refers to "[a] court's
power to decide a case or issue a decree." Black's Law Dictionary
867 (8th ed. 2004). For this court, as well as the appellate court and
the circuit courts, the basis of that power is the Illinois Constitution.
	According to the Illinois Constitution, circuit courts have original
jurisdiction in "all justiciable matters," except when the supreme court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9.
The appellate court may exercise original jurisdiction when necessary
to complete the determination of any case on review. Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, §6. Appeals to the appellate court from final judgments of the
circuit courts are a matter of right, except when a case is directly
appealable to the supreme court or the judgment in question is a
judgment of acquittal after a trial on the merits in a criminal case. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. As to the jurisdiction of the supreme court,
the Constitution provides that the supreme court may exercise original
jurisdiction in cases relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition, or
habeas corpus (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(a)), and that it has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning the
redistricting of the General Assembly (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b))
and the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office (Ill. Const.
1970, art. V, §6(d)). Appeals to the supreme court from circuit court
judgments imposing the death penalty are a matter of right. Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, §4(b). In addition, appeals to the supreme court from
the appellate court are a matter of right if a federal or state
constitutional question arises for the first time in and as a result of the
action of the appellate court, or if the appellate court certifies that a
case decided by it involves a question of such importance that the
supreme court should decide the case. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b).
	The Constitution also vests the supreme court with supervisory
authority over all courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16. As part of this
supervisory authority, the supreme court may promulgate rules
governing the proceedings of the courts of this state. See Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, §16. The Constitution specifically enables the supreme
court to create rules governing appeals from the appellate court (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, §§4(c), 6) and direct appeals from the circuit
courts in cases other than those involving the death penalty (Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, §4(b)).
	Collectively, these constitutional provisions define the subject
matter jurisdiction of the circuit courts, the appellate court, and this
court, and allow this court to establish procedural rules governing the
exercise of that jurisdiction. The circuit courts and the appellate court
have no discretion to excuse compliance with the rules this court
establishes pursuant to its supervisory authority. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 150 (1994) ("neither the trial court
nor the appellate court has the 'authority to excuse compliance with
the filing requirements of the supreme court rules governing
appeals' "), quoting In re Smith, 80 Ill. App. 3d 380, 382 (1980). In
Mitchell, this court held the appellate court had no jurisdiction over
an appeal where the initial 30-day period for filing notice of appeal
under Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)) had elapsed, and where the
appellant failed to file a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal
pursuant to Rule 303(e) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(e)). Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d 
at 148-49. This court also approved the appellate court's reasoning
that the circuit court lacked the authority to extend the time for filing
a notice of appeal, because after 30 days had elapsed from the time the
circuit court entered its final order, the circuit court lost jurisdiction
over the matters resolved in that order. Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d  at 149-50. Similarly, in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536
(1984), this court held the appellate court had no jurisdiction over an
appeal where the appellant's notice of appeal was not timely filed
because the appellant filed a motion to reconsider prior to the date on
which judgment was formally entered by the circuit court, and the
motion did not extend the time within which the appellant could file
his notice of appeal. Archer Daniels, 103 Ill. 2d  at 538-39. In short,
as applied to the circuit courts and the appellate court, our rules are
jurisdictional and must be strictly observed.
	On the other hand, this court's supervisory authority includes the
discretion for this court to excuse compliance with the rules it
establishes in accordance with that authority. While our rules govern
the exercise of our jurisdiction, they do not place limitations upon it.
Only the Illinois Constitution limits this court's subject matter
jurisdiction. Our rules thus do not require this court to automatically
dismiss a matter when a litigant fails to strictly comply with their
provisions.
	We acknowledge that in A.J. Maggio we noted "[o]ur rules
demand strict compliance in the timely filing of appeals or affidavits
of intent as a matter of jurisdiction." A.J. Maggio, 197 Ill. 2d  at 403.
We also acknowledge reaffirming this proposition in Roth. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 496-97. Indeed, we do expect litigants to comply with our
rules. As we expressed in Roth, "our rules would have little force if
the legal community perceived that we, as a court, do not enforce the
rules or tailor them to fit the exigencies of the moment. *** [W]e
must emphasize that the supreme court rules are rules of procedure
and that it is incumbent upon litigants to follow them." Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 494-95. We do not, in any way, retreat from this position. We
clarify, however, that our rules regarding the filing of appeals and
affidavits require compliance "as a matter of jurisdiction" merely in the
sense that we will, within our discretion, enforce the consequences of
noncompliance to preserve the orderly exercise of our constitutionally
defined jurisdiction. They are not a jurisdictional bar in the sense that
a litigant's noncompliance automatically deprives us of the power to
adjudicate a matter brought before us. Therefore, we reject the
District's argument that we had no authority to allow the County to
file its petition for leave to appeal after the 21-day filing period had
elapsed. The extension was appropriate, and this case is now properly
before this court.
	We further note that this case is factually distinguishable from
A.J. Maggio and Roth. Neither of those cases presented circumstances
in which a litigant requested leave to file its petition for leave to
appeal instanter after expiration of the filing deadline. In A.J. Maggio,
the petitioner filed a second petition for rehearing with the appellate
court without regard for the possibility the second petition would not
stay the time period for filing a petition for leave to appeal. A.J.
Maggio, 197 Ill. 2d  at 399-400. Likewise, in Roth, the petitioner took
no measures to inform this court its affidavit of intent was defective.
Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 492.
	Moreover, this case is not one in which the County simply
ignored the rules of this court. The County did not, for instance, allow
the 35-day filing deadline to expire without filing its petition for leave
to appeal and then file a motion to extend the time for petitioning for
leave to appeal after the deadline. Here, to the contrary, the County
filed its petition for leave to appeal within the 35-day period allowed
after the filing of a valid affidavit of intent. Then, immediately upon
discovering the defect in its "affidavit," the County notified this court
of its situation and requested relief.

II. The Meaning of "Municipalities" in Section 11
	We now turn to the issue of whether the term "municipalities" in
section 11 of the Fire Protection District Act includes counties. We
review this statutory interpretation issue de novo. See Advincula v.
United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1996). The primary objective
of statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the intent of
the legislature. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001).
This inquiry properly begins by examining the language of the statute
at issue. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). In the absence
of a statutory definition, a term within a statute must be given its
ordinary and popularly understood meaning. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 496 (2002).
	The County argues that counties are "municipalities" for
purposes of section 11 and that, as a result, the County's fire
prevention regulations, not those of the District, apply to Stonewall.
The term "municipalities" is not defined in the Fire Protection District
Act. Accordingly, the County argues this court should interpret
section 11 in light of section 5-1063 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS
5/5-1063 (West 2002)) and the definition of "municipality" in the
Municipal Adoption of Codes and Records Act (Codes and Records
Act) (50 ILCS 220/1(a) (West 2002)). Section 5-1063 of the
Counties Code grants counties the authority to adopt regulations
governing building construction, including fire prevention regulations.
The Codes and Records Act authorizes a municipality to adopt a
national fire prevention code by reference and defines "[m]unicipality"
as "any fire protection district or other political subdivision of the
State of Illinois having power to legislate on the subject matters
mentioned in this Act." 50 ILCS 220/1(a) (West 2002). We find the
Counties Code and the Codes and Records Act to be inapposite
because of the direct applicability of the definition of "municipalities"
in the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/1.27 (West 2002)) to this case.
	The Statute on Statutes must be observed in interpreting a statute
unless doing so "would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
General Assembly or repugnant to the context of the statute." 5 ILCS
70/1 (West 2002). The Statute adopts the definition of
"municipalities" set forth in the Illinois Constitution (5 ILCS 70/1.27
(West 2002)), which provides:
			" 'Municipalities' means cities, villages and incorporated
towns. 'Units of local government' means counties,
municipalities, townships, special districts, and units,
designated as units of local government by law, which
exercise limited governmental powers or powers in respect to
limited governmental subjects, but does not include school
districts." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §1.
This definition of "municipalities" excludes counties. Counties fall into
the more general category of "units of local government," which,
notably, includes municipalities but treats them as distinct from
counties.	In this case, applying the Statute on Statutes' definition of
"municipalities" to interpret the meaning of "municipalities" in section
11 is consistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. The purpose
of the Fire Protection District Act is to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public by ensuring the provision of adequate fire
prevention and control services. See 70 ILCS 705/1 (West 2002).
Interpreting the exception in section 11 that exempts certain cities and
municipalities from the coverage of the Act not to include counties
comports with the legislature's intent to ensure the provision of fire
prevention and control services. Under this interpretation, in some
unincorporated areas, both fire protection district and county fire
protection regulations will apply, not simply one of the two. This
potential double coverage is consistent with ensuring adequate fire
protection.
	Applying the Statute on Statutes' definition of "municipalities"
to interpret the meaning of "municipalities" in section 11 is also
consistent with the context of the Fire Protection District Act. Various
sections of the Act refer to municipalities and counties as distinct
entities. See, e.g., 70 ILCS 705/1.02 (West 2002) (addressing
apportionment between municipalities and counties of the costs of
elections to organize fire protection districts); 70 ILCS 705/11e (West
2002) (distinguishing between county and municipal address number
systems for fire protection districts); 70 ILCS 705/14.14 (West 2002)
(distinguishing between counties and municipalities in addressing
disconnection from one fire protection district and transfer to
another). In addition, various sections of the Act use the word
"municipality" to refer specifically to cities, villages, and incorporated
towns. See, e.g., 70 ILCS 705/9 (West 2002) (addressing the subject
of "[a]cquiring apparatus from a municipality" in terms of acquiring
it from "any city or village or incorporated town"); 70 ILCS 705/11a
(West 2002) (indicating a fire protection district may contract with
any city, village, or incorporated town adjacent to it "for fire
protection service to be furnished by *** such municipality"); 70
ILCS 705/18 (West 2002) (referring to a city, village, or incorporated
town as a "municipality" in the context of disconnecting territory from
a fire protection district); 70 ILCS 705/19 (West 2002) (referring to
a city, village, or incorporated town as an "annexing municipality" in
the context of disconnecting territory from a fire protection district);
70 ILCS 705/21 (West 2002) (referring to a city, village, or
incorporated town as "such municipality" in the context of
disconnecting territory from a fire protection district). Taken together,
these sections of the Fire Protection District Act provide strong
evidence the legislature did not intend to categorize counties as
"municipalities" for purposes of the Act, but rather intended
"municipalities" to include cities, villages, and incorporated towns.
Therefore, the Statute's definition of "municipalities" as cities,
villages, and incorporated towns is consistent with the context of the
Act itself.
	In sum, we agree with the District and the appellate court that
section 11's reference to "municipalities" does not include counties.
For purposes of section 11, "municipalities" refers to cities, villages,
and incorporated towns, not counties. Under this interpretation, the
County is not a municipality, and the District's sprinkler ordinance is
enforceable against Stonewall.

III. Equal Protection
	The County further argues that interpreting "municipalities" to
exclude counties creates a classification that violates the equal
protection guarantee of the United States Constitution. See U.S.
Const., amend. XIV. Specifically, the County asserts that this
interpretation creates two classes of property owners treated
unequally on the basis of where they reside. Individuals and businesses
whose property is located in cities, villages, and incorporated towns
are not obligated to comply with a fire protection district's regulations
as long as their municipality has adopted its own fire prevention code.
On the contrary, individuals and businesses whose property is located
in the unincorporated areas of a county are obligated to comply with
a fire protection district's regulations, even if, as in this case, the
county in which they reside has adopted a comprehensive fire
prevention code. The County reasons that, under this interpretation of
the statute, residents of unincorporated areas that must comply with
fire protection district regulations are forced to bear a greater
economic burden than residents of cities, villages, and incorporated
towns.
	In conducting an equal protection analysis, we apply the same
standards under both the United States Constitution and the Illinois
Constitution. Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 124 (1993). The
guarantee of equal protection requires the government to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar fashion. Jacobson v.
Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). It does not
prevent the government from drawing distinctions between different
categories of people in enacting legislation, but it does prohibit the
government from doing so on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to
the legislation's purpose. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 322. Where
legislation does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification, the appropriate level of scrutiny is the
rational basis test. Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d  at 125. Under the rational basis
test, a court's review of a classification is limited and deferential.
Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1996).
The court simply inquires whether the means the statute employs to
achieve its purpose are rationally related to that purpose. Jacobson,
171 Ill. 2d  at 323. If any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to
justify the classification, it will not be construed as violating the equal
protection guarantee. Miller, 196 Ill. 2d  at 59.
	Section 11 of the Fire Protection District Act does not affect a
fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.
Therefore, section 11 is subject to the rational basis test. The purpose
of the Fire Protection District Act, as mentioned, is to protect the
public by ensuring the provision of adequate fire prevention and
control services. See 70 ILCS 705/1 (West 2002). If the term
"municipalities" is interpreted to mean cities, villages, and
incorporated towns, then section 11 creates a residency classification,
in that residents of cities, villages, and incorporated towns with fire
protection codes are not obligated to bear the cost of complying with
a fire protection district's regulations, but residents of the
unincorporated areas of a county are obligated to do so. Our inquiry
is thus whether this residency classification is rationally related to the
purpose of protecting the health, welfare, and safety of the public by
providing adequate fire prevention and control services. We find it is.
	In distinguishing between counties and municipalities in section
11, the legislature could reasonably have concluded that, as a general
matter, counties are less likely than municipalities to have
comprehensive fire prevention regulations in place, and that, as a
result, the residents of unincorporated areas run a greater risk of being
inadequately protected from fire-related hazards than the residents of
municipalities. To minimize the risk of inadequate protection, it was
reasonable for the legislature to devise a fire protection plan that, in
some instances, requires residents of unincorporated areas to comply
with both fire protection district and county fire prevention
regulations. Accordingly, the legislature's decision to exempt only
cities, villages, and incorporated towns with fire prevention codes
from the authority of fire protection districts-and thereby require
unincorporated area residents, but not municipal residents, to comply
with fire protection district regulations-was reasonably related to the
legitimate purpose of protecting the health, welfare, and safety of the
public by providing adequate fire prevention and control services.
Therefore, interpreting "municipalities"to exclude counties does not
raise any doubt as to the constitutionality of section 11.

IV. Injunctive Relief
	We have determined conclusively that, for purposes of section
11, "municipalities" does not include counties. As a result, the District
had the authority to enact its sprinkler ordinance within
unincorporated Lake County, and the ordinance is enforceable against
Stonewall. There remains to be decided the remedial issue of whether
the circuit court correctly denied the District's request to enjoin the
County from granting a certificate of occupancy to Stonewall. Neither
party explicitly addressed this issue in the briefs submitted to this
court, and we see no reason to disturb the conclusion of the circuit
court and the appellate court that issuing an injunction against the
County would be inappropriate in this case. If the County has
determined the clubhouse meets the requirements for obtaining a
certificate of occupancy, then it has the authority to issue the
certificate. See 55 ILCS 5/5-1063 (West 2002) (county board may
require occupants of commercial buildings outside limits of cities,
villages, and incorporated towns to obtain occupancy permits from
county). The District can enforce its sprinkler ordinance on its own
accord without interfering with the County's enforcement of its fire
prevention regulations.
	The issue of injunctive relief might be different if this case
presented a situation in which a fire protection district regulation
conflicted with a county regulation. We note, however, that it does
not. Both regulations at issue here can be applied without conflict.
The District's ordinance requires the installation of a sprinkler system
in the clubhouse, because the clubhouse falls within the set of use
groups listed in the ordinance. See Wauconda Fire Protection District
Fire Sprinkler Ordinance No. 98-0-5 (eff. November 27, 1998). The
County's building code, on the other hand, does not require a
sprinkler system, because the clubhouse does not exceed 10,000
square feet in area. See BOCA National Building Code 1999, §904.2,
as amended by Lake County Ordinance Adopting the BOCA National
Building Code 1999 (eff. August 8, 2000). The regulations establish
different fire protection standards for buildings falling within the same
"Assembly" use group. In this instance, however, the District's
regulation is simply more stringent than that of the County. We need
not resolve the question of what happens if a fire protection district
regulation and a county regulation conflict.

CONCLUSION
	We hold that the District's ordinance is enforceable against
Stonewall. The reference to "municipalities" in section 11 does not
include counties, and this interpretation of the statute does not raise
any doubt as to its constitutionality. The circuit court, however, was
correct to deny the District's request to enjoin the County from
issuing a certificate of occupancy to Stonewall. Accordingly, we
affirm the appellate court's judgment, which remanded this matter to
the circuit court for further proceedings.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.

	JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:
	I concur in the conclusion that this court has jurisdiction to
review this appeal and the ultimate holding that the District's
ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall. While I agree with the
outcome of this appeal, I write separately because I believe the
County's affidavit of intent to file a petition for leave to appeal
complies with Rule 315(b).
	The "Affidavit of Intent to File Petition for Leave to Appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court" in this case reads as follows:
			"Petitioner-Appellee, LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, by
and through its attorneys MICHAEL J. WALLER, State's
Attorney of Lake County, and DANIEL L. JASICA and
JOSEPH B. CHERVIN, Assistant State's Attorneys, hereby
states that it intends to file a Petition for Leave to Appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court from the Order dated October 2,
2003.
			JOSEPH B. CHERVIN hereby states under oath that it is
the intention of the Petitioner-Appellee to file a Petition for
Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court." (Emphasis
added.)
The document was signed by Joseph B. Chervin, one of the assistant
State's Attorneys representing the County.
	Today's opinion contains no analysis of the specific language of
this affidavit. Rather, it assumes that the affidavit was noncompliant
with Rule 315(b) because the attorney's signature was not notarized.
	In Robidoux, this court found that an affidavit stating it was
signed "under oath" met the requirements of Rule 191(a). Robidoux
v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 340-43 (2002). In Roth, I concurred with
the majority's holding that the affidavit of intent to file petition for
leave to appeal "[was] not an affidavit within the meaning of Rule
315(b) because it contain[ed] no recital that it was made under oath."
Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 498 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). However, in Roth, I disagreed with the majority's strict
enforcement of Rule 315(b)'s nonspecific attestation requirements
when this court "approved as minimally sufficient under Rule 191(a)
an affidavit containing no notary attestation or other independent
evidence that an oath was administered to the person who signed it."
Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 498 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), citing Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d  at 340. I specifically noted:
		"Neither Rule 191(a) nor Rule 315(b) refers directly to
notarization or oaths of averment or any other attestation
requirement necessary to render the subject document an
'affidavit.' " Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 498 (Kilbride, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
	Here, the attorney signed the document asserting it was made
under oath. The affidavit in this case is more akin to the affidavit in
Robidoux, asserting it was made under oath, than the affidavit in Roth,
lacking any such averment. Accordingly, I would hold that the
affidavit in this case sufficiently complied with Rule 315(b) and,
therefore, this court has jurisdiction to review the appeal.
	This court has treated compliance with Rule 315(b) as
jurisdictional. See slip op. at 5; slip op. at 19-20 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.). I agree with Justice Freeman
that compliance with our supreme court rules is jurisdictional under
section 4 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, §4), and the analysis in today's decision improperly turns to
section 16 of article VI (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16) (slip op. at 7).
Slip op. at 22-23 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.).
Freeman correctly points out that this court's "power to hear and
decide cases is separate and distinct from our supervisory power." Slip
op. at 23 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.).
Accordingly, I believe that this court has unnecessarily invoked its
supervisory authority to reach the merits of this appeal. I disagree,
however, with Justice Freeman's conclusion that the appeal should be
dismissed because this court lacks jurisdiction. Slip op. at 17
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.).
	At the heart of the jurisdictional issue in this appeal is the
uncertainty of the affidavit requirement. Filing an affidavit of intent to
file a petition for leave to appeal is, technically speaking, jurisdictional.
	I agree with Justice Freeman, however, that this court's
discretionary enforcement of Rule 315(b) is "profoundly unfair." Slip
op. at 18, 26 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.). In
my view, this court is attempting to overcome the unfairness of strictly
enforcing a nonspecific affidavit requirement by unnecessarily
exercising its supervisory authority.
	The real issue is not the application or enforcement of Rule
315(b). Rather, the unfortunate dilemma is this court's inconsistent
interpretation of the nonspecific affidavit requirements of our supreme
court rules. See Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d 324; Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 498
(Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
	Justice Freeman has offered a number of alternative proposals to
amend Rule 315(b). While I may agree with one or more of his
suggestions, I believe it may be more prudent merely to abolish the
"affidavit of intent" provision. Instead, Rule 315(b) should be
amended to provide that all petitions for leave to appeal must be filed
within 35 days unless extended upon order entered pursuant to a
timely motion as already provided by Rule 315(b). In the end, a simple
overhaul of affidavit requirements in general would be preferable to
this court's inconsistent interpretations of affidavits in Robidoux and
Roth. Litigants should not be required to search case law and incur
unnecessary fees and costs in unraveling the intricacies of our practice
rules to determine the affidavit requirements under a particular rule.
Rather, our rules should be clear and straightforward.
	For the foregoing reasons I specially concur.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	I cannot agree with the majority on the issue of jurisdiction. I
believe that the majority's resolution of this issue not only overrules
our own precedent and misconstrues our constitution, but establishes
a policy of Rule 315(b) enforcement which is profoundly unfair.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
	The facts in this case are straightforward. The appellate court
filed its opinion in this matter on October 2, 2003. Twenty days
thereafter, the County filed in the appellate court a document entitled
"Affidavit of Intent to File Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court." On November 6, exactly 35 days after the appellate
court issued its opinion, the County filed with this court its petition for
leave to appeal (PLA). Normally, the County's PLA would have been
timely, because filing an affidavit of intent allows a party to file its
PLA up to 35 days after the date the appellate court issues its opinion.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b). However the County's affidavit had not been
sworn and subscribed to by a notary public, a fact which serves as the
genesis of today's jurisdictional debate.
	On the day the County filed its PLA, a clerk in our clerk's office
noticed the faulty affidavit and contacted an assistant State's Attorney
for the County by telephone. Citing this court's decision in Roth v.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490 (2002), the clerk
informed the assistant that the PLA was untimely because the
improper affidavit did not extend the original 21-day period for PLA
filing and, as a result, the PLA could not be accepted for filing.
According to the affidavit of that assistant, the County sent a motion
to this court by overnight courier on Friday, November 7, seeking
leave to file its PLA instanter. The motion was filed with this court on
Monday, November 10. In the motion, the county asked this court to
allow it to file the PLA because the County had (i) attempted to
comply with this court's rules in good faith, (ii) attempted to rectify
promptly its error once the court called it to attention, and (iii)
extended considerable time and resources in preparing the PLA. The
County stated that although its purported affidavit "admittedly" failed
to "include a jurat executed by a notary public" that failure was
"inadvertent." The motion, heard by a single justice on behalf of the
entire court, was granted on November 19.(3)
	In its brief, the District argues that we should follow Roth and
dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted because the County's
PLA did not suffice to confer jurisdiction on this court. The District
points out that because the affidavit of intent was not sworn before a
notary public, it was ineffective to extend the time for filing the PLA,
and thus, the PLA failed to comply with the mandatory time
requirements established by the rules of this court. In response, the
County concedes that its affidavit was of no effect, but contends that
this court's order granting the motion to file the PLA instanter
extended the time for filing a PLA, as provided in Rule 315,
effectively waiving the time limits for the instant appeal.
	 The majority decides this issue in favor of the County, but on
grounds other than the County argued. The majority holds that
compliance with the rules for appeals to this court is not a
jurisdictional requirement, because this court is free to excuse
noncompliance with its own rules. The majority states that our rules
"do not place limitations upon" our jurisdiction. Slip op. at 8. I
disagree with the majority's analysis and conclusion for several
reasons.
	First, the majority is clearly overruling Roth. That case involved
a situation identical to the case at bar. There, as here, a litigant filed
a purported affidavit of intent with the appellate court, then filed a
PLA with this court within 35 days but more than 21 days after the
appellate court filed its opinion. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 492-93. There, as
here, no notary public witnessed the purported affidavit. And there, as
it should be here, we dismissed the appeal even though we had already
granted leave to appeal. The reason we did so was that the lack of
notarization rendered the first document a nonaffidavit, which meant
the PLA was late.(4) Therefore we dismissed the appeal because
" '[O]ur rules demand strict compliance in the timely filing of appeals
or affidavits of intent as a matter of jurisdiction.' " (Emphasis added.)
Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 496-97, quoting A.J. Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill. 2d 397, 403 (2001).
	The majority purports to reaffirm our decisions in Roth and A.J.
Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill. 2d 397, 403 (2001). See slip op. at 8.
But the majority's statement that our rules "are not a jurisdictional
bar" (slip op. at 8) could hardly be more clearly inconsistent with the
holding in Roth and A.J. Maggio that " '[o]ur rules demand strict
compliance in the timely filing of appeals or affidavits of intent as a
matter of jurisdiction.' " Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 496-97, quoting A.J.
Maggio, 197 Ill. 2d  at 403. Moreover, pardoning the County's clear,
unexcused noncompliance with our rules in this case-the County
offers no justification for its failure to file a proper affidavit-flies in the
face of our previous position that "our rules would have little force if
the legal community perceived that we, as a court, do not enforce the
rules or tailor them to fit the exigencies of the moment." Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 494. The majority's statement that we "do not in any way,
retreat from" the above statement in Roth (slip op. at 8) rings
startlingly hollow.
	But more troubling than the majority's utter disregard for our
precedent is its flawed constitutional analysis. The majority touches on
a number of constitutional provisions in its segue away from the clear
precedent of Roth and A.J. Maggio. Indeed, the majority mentions
nearly every provision having to do with the jurisdiction of Illinois
courts, even those which clearly have nothing to do with this case.
The majority notes the provisions relating to the original jurisdiction
of the circuit court, the appellate court, and the supreme court. Slip
op. at 6-7. The majority notes the constitutional provisions for appeals
from the circuit court to the appellate court and from the circuit court
to the supreme court. Slip op. at 6-7. The majority also notes the
circumstances-none of which are present in this case-in which there
is an appeal as of right from the appellate court to the supreme court.
See slip op. at 7. Yet, in remarkable defiance of the law of averages,
the majority never focuses its attention upon the single constitutional
provision relevant to our jurisdiction in this case, namely, appeals from
the appellate court to this court other than appeals of right.
	Instead, the majority veers off into a discussion of this court's
supervisory and general rulemaking authority. Slip op. at 7. Only in
this context, in passing, does the majority off-handedly mention that
the constitution "enables" this court "to create rules governing appeals
from the appellate court." Slip op. at 7, citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§4(c). But section 4 of article VI is the only possible source of
appellate jurisdiction in the instant case.
	This court's jurisdiction is defined by section 4 of article VI of
the Illinois Constitution, which is helpfully entitled "Supreme
Court-Jurisdiction." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4. Subsection (a)
defines our original jurisdiction, subsection (b) defines our jurisdiction
over direct appeals from the circuit court, and subsection (c)
establishes our jurisdiction to hear appeals from the appellate court.
See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§4(a), (b), (c). Therefore, because the
instant case involves an appeal from the appellate court, subsection (c)
is the only relevant provision. Accordingly, I believe it is worth setting
out in its entirety:
			"Appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court
are a matter of right if a question under the Constitution of
the United States or of this State arises for the first time in
and as a result of the action of the Appellate Court, or if a
division of the Appellate Court certifies that a case decided
by it involves a question of such importance that the case
should be decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
may provide by rule for appeals from the Appellate Court in
other cases." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§4(c).
The above provision is quite clear. "In other cases" than appeals as of
right, we have "jurisdiction" over appeals as we "provide by rule."
Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion (see slip op. at 8), our rules
are, in fact, inextricably bound up with our jurisdiction over appeals
from the appellate court. Indeed, the constitutional commentary
specifically states, in the comments on a similar provision in section
4(b), that our "jurisdiction" is "subject" to our "rule making powers."
See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b), Constitutional Commentary, at
369 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("the authority over the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction is subject only to the Court's rule making powers and not
to legislation").
	It is uncontroverted that there is no appeal as of right in the
instant case. Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal only as
we have provided by rule. And our rules do not provide for appeals
when PLAs are filed late because of a faulty affidavit of intent. See
Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 497. Thus, we do not have jurisdiction over such
appeals, as this court correctly held in Roth, following A.J. Maggio.
And, therefore, we ought to dismiss the instant appeal.
	I do agree with the majority that noncompliance with our rules is
not a jurisdictional defect in the context of appeals as of right. Our
constitution has directly granted us jurisdiction to hear those appeals
without any reference to our rules. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(c). But
in all other appeals from the appellate court-including, of course, the
instant case-our constitutional grant of jurisdiction explicitly
references only those appeals for which we have "by rule" provided.
	As I mentioned previously, instead of looking to that portion of
the constitution which defines our jurisdiction to hear cases, the
majority turns to section 16 of article VI, which grants this court
"[g]eneral administrative and supervisory authority over all courts."
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16. The majority notes that our general
rulemaking authority is derived from this section. The majority then
posits that because our rules are enacted pursuant to our supervisory
authority, that same supervisory authority must allow us to break
them. Slip op. at 8.
	 I believe this is an erroneous line of reasoning. First of all, our
authority to craft rules regarding appeals from the appellate court to
this court other than appeals as of right derives from section 4, not
section 16.(5) The constitutional commentary specifically notes that
"[s]ection 16 was not intended to alter the powers of the judicial and
legislative branches with respect to the rule making powers." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, §16, Constitutional Commentary, at 480 (Smith-Hurd 1993). As this court has previously recognized, our power to
hear and decide cases is separate and distinct from our supervisory
power. See Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts v. State &
Municipal Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, Local 726, 167 Ill. 2d 180, 192 (1995) (distinguishing supreme court's "authority to
hear and decide cases" from our "general administrative and
supervisory authority over the courts of this State"). Thus, even if the
majority were correct in its conjecture that our supervisory authority
permits us to break at will any rules we make pursuant to our
supervisory authority, that would not permit our action here, where
the rules in question were not established pursuant to our supervisory
authority. Moreover, even if this position were defensible, I would
strongly urge my colleagues to reject it for the reasons this court
endorsed in Roth and which the majority avows still to believe: " 'our
rules would have little force if the legal community perceived that we,
as a court, do not enforce the rules or tailor them to fit the exigencies
of the moment.' " Slip op. at 8, quoting Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 494-95.
Here, indeed, the majority is directly stating that we can-and showing
by our actions in this case that we will-tailor enforcement of our rules
to the exigencies or whims of the moment.
	It is true that we have previously issued opinions pursuant to our
supervisory authority. See, e.g., McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288
(1993). However, until today, this step has only been taken in the
most extraordinary circumstances requiring our supervision over the
court system. In McDunn, for example, two candidates were vying for
a single judgeship. The appellate court resolved this situation via the
somewhat surprising remedy of making them both judges. Both
parties having gotten what they wished, neither appealed. We
addressed the case nevertheless, because the appellate court's order
created an unacceptable situation in the circuit court, which it was
entirely appropriate-indeed, necessary-for this court to resolve
through our supervisory authority over the courts of this state. See
McDunn, 156 Ill. 2d  at 302. The few other occasions on which we
have exercised this power have involved similarly compelling
circumstances.
	By contrast, the instant case involves no matter which might be
said even remotely to require exercise of our supervisory authority. It
is a straightforward appeal involving a matter of statutory
construction, in a dispute having nothing to do with any Illinois court.
Our "general administrative and supervisory authority" over all Illinois
courts ought not to be construed as a license to ignore our rules
whenever we like. See slip op. at 7. It is an unusual and broad grant
of power, but it ought to be invoked with restraint, only when action
is required to maintain the integrity of the court system, not to decide
cases on a whim when litigants have flubbed our rules regarding
appeals. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16, Constitutional
Commentary, at 480 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (the addition of the words
"and supervisory" to section 16 "were intended to strengthen the
concept of central supervision of the judicial system" (emphasis
added)).
	There was a simple, well-established procedure by which the
County could have invoked this court's jurisdiction in an appeal from
the appellate court's decision. One step in that procedure had to be
taken within 21 days after the appellate court's decision: file either a
PLA in this court or an affidavit of intent in the appellate court. Rather
than filing a PLA, the County chose to file an affidavit of intent. The
affidavit requirement of Rule 315(b) is neither unclear nor onerous.
Any claim that the rule is unclear on its face would be irrelevant,
moreover, as this court issued its opinion in Roth in December of
2002, nearly a year before the County filed its "affidavit" in this case.
Our decision in Roth made it quite clear that this court's "jurisdiction"
turns on compliance with this court's rules, specifically the affidavit
requirement of Rule 315(b). Indeed, even more specifically, we made
clear that there were jurisdictional implications when a Rule 315(b)
affidavit of intent is not sworn before a notary public. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 497. This court had held with crystal clarity that the precise
transgression the County committed in this case was a jurisdictional
fault less than a year before the County committed its error.
	The majority champions the County's actions as a basis for the
result in this case. The majority characterizes the County's motion to
file its PLA instanter as a "measure[] to inform this court its affidavit
was defective" (slip op. at 9), and lauds the County because
"immediately upon discovering the defect in its affidavit, the County
notified this court of its situation and requested relief" (slip op. at 9).
This interpretation of events is bizarre at best. It seems a bit odd,
frankly, that I would even have to point out the entirely obvious fact
that this court informed the County of the situation, not the reverse.
The County did not somehow abstractly "become aware" of the defect
in the affidavit and take it upon itself to inform this court of a potential
jurisdictional problem of the County's own making. Rather, the
county simply filed a motion asking this court to excuse its defective
affidavit several days after the County received a telephone call from
this court which informed the County that its affidavit was defective.
It is logic worthy of Lewis Carroll to suggest that this filing-in the
wake of this court's notification to the County that the affidavit was
defective-was an effort to "inform this court that its affidavit was
defective" or to "notif[y] this court of its situation." The County did
not file its motion to file its PLA instanter until after the time for filing
the PLA had already passed, and then only because an employee of
this court took affirmative action to inform the County of its error.
	I acknowledge that dismissing an appeal because of a defective
affidavit is a harsh result. However, just two years ago, a majority of
this court in Roth agreed that dismissal was, in fact, the proper result
in such cases in light of our decision in A.J. Maggio. In both Roth and
A.J. Maggio, we spoke in terms which left no doubt that our rules
regarding appellate procedure had jurisdictional implications. If a
majority of my colleagues have changed their minds, and now believes
that such a result is indeed too harsh, then the solution, to me at least,
is obvious-we should amend Rule 315(b). There are a number of ways
in which we could go about amending the rule so as to avoid the result
from which the majority now recoils.
	Initially, I note that the onus of enforcing Rule 315's affidavit
requirement ought not to be on this court, but on the appellate court,
where the rule requires the document to be filed. In light of this, I
believe the initial problem in all of these cases is that the appellate
court is not paying sufficiently close attention to the purported
"affidavits" filed therein. As we pointed out in Roth, the affidavit of
intent not only gives notice to the opposing litigant, but also
automatically stays the appellate court mandate. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at
495, citing 155 Ill. 2d R. 368. In the aftermath of our decision in Roth,
the appellate court should have become more vigilant with respect to
the propriety of the affidavits of intent filed with it-and refused to
accept purported affidavits which fail to satisfy the requirements we
there made clear. Thus, if my colleagues wish to ameliorate the
harshness of the dismissal of appeals for affidavit defects, one way to
go about it would be to amend the rule to make explicit that the
appellate court must refuse to accept nonconforming affidavits in the
first instance. In conjunction, we could also amend Rule 315(b) to
permit litigants who file a faulty affidavit in the appellate court to seek
leave from the appellate court or a justice thereof to extend the time
for filing an affidavit of intent, in order that disputes over faulty
affidavits might be dealt with in the court in which they are filed.
	Another approach would be to set out specific requirements for
the affidavit within the body of Rule 315(b) so that litigants will know
what exactly we expect of them. See Roth, 202 Ill. 2d  at 496
(contrasting specificity of Rule 191 to the lack of specificity in Rule
315(b)). This would surely temper any concerns about the
"unfairness" of enforcing the rule. Or, as a final alternative, this court
could wholly do away with the affidavit requirement, or further retreat
from it as we did in December 2003, when we amended Rule 315 to
permit parties to file with the appellate court a verification by
certification (see 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2000)), as an alternative
to an affidavit of intent. See Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 26
(December 24, 2003), R. 315, eff. December 5, 2003.
	Each of the options I have outlined here would achieve the same
result as the majority does, ameliorating the harsh result in this case.
My suggestions would change the result by changing the rule,
however. This has a considerable advantage, to my mind, over the
majority's approach of interjecting uncertainty into the enforcement
of our rules, abandoning precedent, and misinterpreting our
constitution.
	The majority, caught between the Scylla (wishing to enforce our
rules) and Charybdis (the fact that our rules clearly require us to
dismiss the instant appeal), resolves its dilemma by holding that this
court may enforce our rules selectively, based on naught but whim.
The majority's solution is not only unwise, as I have demonstrated
above, but also unjust. After all, what conceivable basis is there for
excusing the County's late appeal in this case but refusing to excuse
the late appeal in Roth? Do Illinois governmental entities, such as the
appellant in this case, have a greater right to be heard than the private
litigant attempting to redress a perceived wrong in Roth? It would
appear so. For the majority's proffered distinction of Roth-that the
County asked us to excuse its noncompliance with our rules (see slip
op. at 8)-is a thin reed indeed. Bear in mind, Roth was the first case
to interpret the "affidavit" requirement of Rule 315(b). The appellant
had no reason to ask us to excuse its noncompliance, as it was not
clear that it had not complied-indeed, it had every reason to believe
that it had complied, given that the appellate court accepted its
affidavit and this court not only accepted the PLA for filing, but
actually granted leave to appeal. The only reason that the County
asked us to excuse its noncompliance in this case is the obvious fact
that this court took the affirmative step of contacting the County when
the PLA was filed-something we did not do for the private litigant on
whom the axe fell in Roth. We are clearly treating similarly situated
parties in strikingly different fashion for no good reason. Although we
may fend off an equal protection challenge by retreating behind the
cloak of exercising our discretion, I am not at all sanguine about the
manner in which the majority has chosen to resolve this case, given the
wealth of alternatives which do not flout our rules or prior precedent.
The majority's holding will, I fear, give rise to the appearance that we
are exercising our jurisdiction in manner at best arbitrary and
capricious, and at worst biased.
	Finally, I note that because it decides that compliance with our
rules is optional, the majority fails to address the argument of the
County that its PLA did, in fact, comply with our rules. This argument
is based on the provision in Rule 315(b) that "The Supreme Court, or
a judge thereof, on motion, may extend the time for petitioning for
leave to appeal, but such motions are not favored and will be allowed
only in the most extreme and compelling circumstances." 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(b). The County argues that by granting its motion to file its
PLA instanter, this court in effect extended the time that the County
was allowed for petitioning.
	I do not believe that the language of the rule supports the
County's position in this case. The problem is that the County's
motion was only filed after the normal time limits had already expired.
The plain language of the rule permits this court or a judge thereof to
"extend" the time for petitioning, not to "recreate" it. Had the County
filed its motion before the time limits had expired, matters would be
different-I would stand on the County's side on the jurisdiction issue.
But this court should not upend appellate practice by resuscitating
jurisdiction which has already been lost. To hold otherwise would do
away with any pretense of finality of appellate court judgments, for
any judge of this court could at any point in time-even years after a
final appellate court judgment-enter an order "extend[ing]" the time
for filing a PLA, permitting a litigant to reopen a matter long since
properly laid to rest. The better practice is that clearly contemplated
by our Rule 315(b): a party may request an extension of time by filing
a motion requesting it before the deadlines for filing have passed-thus
putting the other parties on notice that there may be additional
proceedings yet to come before this court.
	In his special concurrence, Justice Kilbride agrees that the
affidavit requirement is jurisdictional, but suggests that this court
ought to find that the affidavit in this case satisfied the affidavit
requirement because it contains the phrase "under oath." Slip op. at
16 (Kilbride, J., specially concurring). He believes this fact makes the
instant case less like Roth and more akin to this court's earlier
decision in Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 340-43 (2002). This
court distinguished Robidoux in Roth, however, noting that Rule 191,
the rule at issue in Robidoux, enumerated specific requirements for
affidavits submitted pursuant thereto-including that the affidavit be
sworn "under oath," but excluding any mention of notary attestation. 
By contrast, as Justice Kilbride notes, Rule 315(b) is wholly silent on
the issue of what is required of affidavits thereunder. Slip op. at 16
(Kilbride, J., specially concurring). Accordingly, in Roth, this court
concluded that in the absence of specific affidavit requirements within
the text of Rule 305(b) the traditional requirements of affidavits must
apply in the context of Rule 315(b)-including the requirement that
they be sworn and subscribed before a notary public. I believe this
analysis was correct. However, I agree with Justice Kilbride regarding
the harshness of dismissing appeals for noncompliance with Rule 315
as it stands, which is why one of the alternatives I suggested earlier in
this opinion was to amend Rule 315(b) to the same level of specificity
as exists in Rule 191. Therefore, although I welcome Justice Kilbride's
concurrence in my conclusion that the affidavit requirement of Rule
305 is jurisdictional, I must respectfully part company with him
regarding what is currently required for a document to constitute an
affidavit under Rule 315. 
	Our precedent dictates that we dismiss this appeal as
improvidently granted due to the County's failure to comply with Rule
315(b). If such a result is now deemed unworkable or undesirable,
then this court should use this case as a vehicle to amend Rule 315 so
that the problem is rectified for all future litigants. Because my
colleagues take neither of the above approaches, but instead opt to
allow ad hoc enforcement of this court's rules, I cannot join in their
opinion and I respectfully dissent.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.
1. The record in this case does not specifically mention which 
section of the County's building code governs installation of the sprinkler 
system in the clubhouse. The parties agree, and the appellate court noted, 
however, that the District's ordinance requires installation of a sprinkler 
system, and the County's building code does not. Moreover, the County does not 
dispute the assertion made by the District in its response brief that the County 
requires buildings exceeding 10,000 square feet in area to be equipped with a 
sprinkler system. After reviewing the BOCA National Building Code 1999 (BOCA 
Code) and the amendments to it adopted by Lake County, we have determined that 
section 904.2 of the BOCA Code, as amended by Lake County's ordinance to apply 
to buildings of 10,000 square feet, rather than buildings of 12,000 square feet, 
is the specific section of the County's building code at issue in this case.
2. 
Rule 315(b) was amended, effective December 5, 2003, to allow use of a 
"verification by certification under section 1109 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure of intent to file a petition for leave to appeal" in lieu of an 
affidavit. See Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 26 (December 24, 2003), R. 
315(b), eff. December 5, 2003. However, we need not decide whether the County's 
notice in this matter would have been in compliance with the amended rule, as 
the County's notice was filed prior to the effective date of the amendment.
3.                   
As will be made clear in the text, I strongly disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that it is appropriate for this court to excuse violations of our 
rules of appellate procedure on an ad hoc basis. But given that the majority 
intends to enforce our appeals "rules" on a case-by-case basis (see slip op. at 
8-9), I would hopeand I strongly urgethat at the very least, such decisions 
ought to be made by the full court, not a single justice. Given the majority's 
analysis, we will surely be charged with treating similarly situated parties in 
a different manner. (Indeed, as I shall discuss, this has already occurred, 
comparing the instant case to Roth.) But it would deal an even more severe blow 
to this court's legitimacy if we were to continue in the practice of allowing 
this particular decision to be made by a single justice and a court observer 
were able to demonstrate disparate treatment of such motions between judicial 
districts, based on the different personalities of the individual justices 
deciding the motions.
4. Under Rule 315(b), if an appellant 
files an affidavit of intent in the appellate court within 21 days after the 
appellate court files its opinion, the PLA is not due in this court until 35 
days after the appellate court files its opinion. Without a proper affidavit, 
however, the PLA must be filed in this court within 21 days after the appellate 
court files its opinion. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b).
5. The 
direction in section 16 that this court keep appeals "expeditious and 
inexpensive" clearly does not require this court to provide for appeals from 
every decision at every time. Rather, it is an admonition to this court that 
when an appeal can be brought, this court must do its best to clear the 
obstacles of time and money from its path.