Title: Commonwealth v. Chatman

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v. Record No. 992706  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  November 3, 2000 
CHRISTOPHER LYANCE CHATMAN 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we address a question of first 
impression in this Commonwealth, whether a 13-year-old 
juvenile has either a constitutional or statutory right to 
assert an insanity defense at the adjudicatory phase of a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Because we conclude that a 
juvenile does not have that right in such proceedings under 
either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
the statutes of this Commonwealth, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the 
availability of the insanity defense in such juvenile 
proceedings is essential to due process. 
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
Christopher Lyance Chatman was charged with delinquency 
in a petition alleging that he had committed the crime of 
malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51.  The City 
of Emporia Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court 
adjudged Chatman a delinquent upon finding that he had 
committed unlawful wounding.  Chatman appealed that finding 
to the Circuit Court of Greensville County.  See Code § 16.1-
296. 
 
In the circuit court, Chatman moved for a psychiatric 
evaluation to determine whether he was insane at the time of 
the offense.  In support of his motion, Chatman asserted that 
he “has a long history of mental illness and seeks a 
psychiatric evaluation to establish an insanity defense.”  He 
alleged that on the day of the offense, a medical doctor 
examined him and opined that Chatman displayed homicidal 
ideations.  Chatman further alleged that a licensed clinical 
psychologist evaluated him two days after the offense and 
diagnosed a “Schizophreniform Disorder.”1
At a hearing on Chatman’s motion, the Commonwealth did 
not contest that Chatman’s alleged mental problems would 
entitle him to a psychiatric evaluation to determine his 
sanity at the time of the offense if he were an adult.2  
However, the Commonwealth argued that, as a 13-year-old 
juvenile, Chatman had neither a due process right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
nor a statutory right to assert an insanity defense at the 
_______________________ 
1 Other than Chatman’s allegations, the record does not 
contain any reports from those mental health evaluators. 
 
2 The Commonwealth acknowledges this fact on brief before 
this Court. 
 
 
2
adjudicatory phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding.  The 
circuit court agreed with the Commonwealth and denied the 
motion.  After a bench trial on the petition charging 
delinquency, the court, in an amended order, found “the 
defendant guilty of the delinquency charge of unlawful 
wounding” and committed Chatman “to the Department of Youth 
and Family Services . . . .”3
Chatman then petitioned the Court of Appeals for an 
appeal from the circuit court’s judgment.  The Court of 
Appeals awarded the appeal, reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court, and remanded the case for a determination of 
whether Chatman is entitled to a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.5 and for further proceedings if 
the Commonwealth be so advised.  Chatman v. Commonwealth, 30 
Va. App. 593, 601, 518 S.E.2d 847, 851 (1999).  The Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that the provisions of the Code 
pertaining to the juvenile and domestic relations district 
courts do not expressly provide for or prohibit an insanity 
defense by a juvenile at an adjudicatory hearing.  However, 
the court found “no reasonable basis for concluding that an 
insanity defense is unavailable to a juvenile at a proceeding 
_______________________ 
3 The circuit court incorrectly referred to the 
“Department of Juvenile Justice” under its former name of 
“Department of Youth and Family Services.”  See Code § 16.1-
228. 
 
3
to adjudicate him or her delinquent as it would be to an 
adult defendant in a criminal trial.”  Id.  The Court of 
Appeals concluded that “the right to assert an insanity 
defense is an essential of ‘due process and fair treatment’ 
which is required at a juvenile delinquency adjudication.”  
Id.
 
The Commonwealth petitioned the Court of Appeals for 
rehearing and also requested a rehearing en banc.  The Court 
of Appeals denied both petitions, and we awarded the 
Commonwealth this appeal. 
FACTS 
Since the facts of the underlying offense are not 
essential to the issue on appeal, we will not discuss them in 
detail.  Both Chatman, who was 13 years old at the time of 
the offense, and the victim were students in a public school 
special education program.  They had exchanged angry words at 
school on January 22, 1997, and after school rode home 
together in a school vehicle.  When the vehicle stopped at 
Chatman’s house for him to exit, the victim also got out of 
the vehicle.  Chatman then pulled out a knife and stabbed the 
victim in the shoulder. 
ANAYLSIS 
 
Although the Court of Appeals based its decision on the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
 
4
Commonwealth argues that Chatman has neither a constitutional 
nor a statutory right to raise an insanity defense.  These 
are the two sources upon which Chatman relies to assert that 
he has such a right.  Consequently, we will address the 
arguments seriatim. 
In Virginia, we have recognized the defense of insanity 
as set forth in M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. and F. 200, 8 Eng. 
Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), since 1871.  Price v. Commonwealth, 228 
Va. 452, 459, 323 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1984); Dejarnette v. 
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 876-78 (1881); Boswell v. 
Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 874-76 (1871).  Under 
the M’Naghten definition, an accused must establish that he 
or she did not know the difference between right and wrong, 
or that he or she did not understand the nature and 
consequences of the acts in question.  Price, 228 Va. at 457-
58, 323 S.E.2d at 108-09.  If a defendant relies on the 
defense of insanity, the burden rests on the defendant “to 
prove to the satisfaction of the jury” that he or she was 
insane at the time of the offense.  Thompson v. Commonwealth, 
193 Va. 704, 711, 70 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1952). 
Chatman asserts that he has a right under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to assert this 
insanity defense.  Relying on the decisions of the Supreme 
Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and In re Winship, 
 
5
397 U.S. 358 (1970), Chatman argues that “the right to 
present an insanity defense goes to fundamental due process 
fairness and is not one of those rights that can be withheld 
from him.” 
The Commonwealth, however, disagrees and argues that, 
since the Constitution does not require states to recognize 
an insanity defense for adults charged with committing 
criminal acts, see Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 
(1992); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, (1968) (plurality 
opinion), it follows that a juvenile likewise does not have a 
right under the Due Process Clause to assert such a defense 
in a delinquency proceeding.  The Commonwealth contends that, 
even if the insanity defense were constitutionally guaranteed 
in adult criminal trials, the right to raise the defense 
would nonetheless still not apply in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.  Continuing, the Commonwealth asserts that, in 
contrast to those rights that were afforded to juveniles in 
Gault and Winship, the insanity defense is not fundamental to 
the factfinding process because sanity, unlike mens rea, is 
not an element of the offense.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth’s position. 
The question in Powell was whether a conviction for 
public drunkenness violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  In analyzing that question, 
 
6
the plurality’s opinion addressed the role of the states vis-
a-vis the Supreme Court in developing common law concepts to 
assess an individual’s accountability for criminal acts: 
 
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, 
mistake, justification, and duress have historically 
provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment 
of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal 
law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and 
medical views of the nature of man.  This process of 
adjustment has always been thought to be the province of 
the States. 
 
 
 
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court 
to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test 
in constitutional terms. . . . If a person in the 
‘condition’ of being a chronic alcoholic cannot be 
criminally punished as a constitutional matter for being 
drunk in public, it would seem to follow that a person 
who contends that, in terms of one test, ‘his unlawful 
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect,’ 
would state an issue of constitutional dimension with 
regard to his criminal responsibility had he been tried 
under some different and perhaps lesser standard, e.g., 
the right-wrong test of M’Naghten’s Case. 
 
392 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted).  Twenty-four years later 
in Medina, the view expressed in Powell concerning the role 
of the states in developing certain doctrines was expressed 
more succinctly with regard to the insanity defense.  The 
Court in Medina stated, “while the Due Process Clause affords 
an incompetent defendant the right not to be tried, we have 
not said that the Constitution requires the States to 
recognize the insanity defense.”  505 U.S. at 449 (citations 
omitted) (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 536-37); accord Golden 
v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000) (recognizing that, 
 
7
under Medina, there is no constitutional right to raise 
insanity defense; thus defendant may assert such defense only 
if provided by statute).4
The Court of Appeals did not discuss the decisions in 
Powell or Medina.5  Nor did it acknowledge the fact that the 
Supreme Court has never held that the Due Process Clause 
requires states to recognize the defense of insanity for an 
adult accused of committing a crime.  Yet, in Gault and 
Winship, the rights that were afforded to juveniles under the 
Due Process Clause, i.e., adequate written notice; advice 
concerning the right to counsel, retained or appointed; the 
right to confront evidence and to cross-examine witnesses; 
the privilege against self-incrimination; and the requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, were rights that were 
unquestionably available to adults in criminal proceedings.  
Neither the Court of Appeals nor Chatman has explained why a 
13-year-old juvenile should be granted a right under the Due 
_______________________ 
4 However, the Supreme Court has held that an incompetent 
defendant has a right under the Due Process Clause not to be 
tried.  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172-73 (1975); Pate 
v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966).  The General Assembly 
has established a procedure to determine if a juvenile is 
unable to understand the pending proceedings or to assist an 
attorney in a defense.  Code §§ 16.1-356 through –361. 
 
5 Similarly, the cases cited by the Court of Appeals from 
states that have held that a juvenile has a right under the 
Due Process Clause to assert an insanity defense at an 
 
8
Process Clause in a proceeding to adjudicate delinquency when 
that right is not constitutionally mandated for adults in 
criminal proceedings to adjudicate their guilt or innocence.6
The plurality in Powell recognized the difficulties in 
elevating the opportunity to assert an insanity defense to a 
right of constitutional dimensions.  Not all states that 
allow a defendant to raise an insanity defense utilize the 
M’Naghten test for insanity.  See, e.g., Hart v. State, 702 
P.2d 651, 657-58 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Wilson, 700 
A.2d 633, 638 (Conn. 1997); State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 
888-89 (Mont. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994).  
Thus, if due process includes the right to assert the defense 
of insanity, the Supreme Court would “be impelled into 
defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.”  
Powell, 392 U.S. at 536.  But, as the plurality said, 
“formulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not 
eliminate, [the] fruitful experimentation [with different 
standards], and freeze the developing productive dialogue 
between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold.”  
______________________ 
adjudicatory proceeding did not discuss Powell and were 
decided before Medina. 
6 The fact that the General Assembly has created a 
statutory mechanism for an adult to assert an insanity 
defense in a criminal proceeding, see Chapters 11 and 11.1 of 
Title 19.2, does not transform the insanity defense into a 
constitutional right for either adults or juveniles.  Chatman 
 
9
Id. at 536-37; see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-
01 (1952) (adoption of the irresistible impulse test is not 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” because “choice 
of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific 
knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the extent to 
which that knowledge should determine criminal 
responsibility”). 
Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that the circuit court violated Chatman’s due process 
rights when it denied his motion for a psychiatric 
evaluation, thereby preventing him from asserting an insanity 
defense at the adjudicatory proceeding on the petition 
charging Chatman with delinquency. 
Having disposed of Chatman’s constitutional claim, we 
now turn to his argument that he also has a statutory right 
to raise an insanity defense.  With regard to this issue, 
Chatman first notes that Chapter 11 of Article 16.1, dealing 
with juvenile and domestic relations district courts, does 
not contain any language prohibiting a juvenile from 
presenting such a defense.  Continuing, he posits that the 
use of the term “person” in Code §§ 19.2-168 and 16.1-278.11 
______________________ 
has not argued that he has a right under the Equal Protection 
Clause to raise an insanity defense. 
 
10
necessarily includes both adults and juveniles.7  Otherwise, 
the General Assembly would have used some term other than 
“person” in these two provisions.  We are not persuaded by 
Chatman’s arguments. 
We begin the statutory analysis by reviewing the 
provisions of the Code pertaining to the adjudication and 
disposition of a 13-year-old juvenile charged with 
delinquency.8  A “[d]elinquent child” is defined as “a child 
who has committed a delinquent act.”  Code § 16.1-228.  A 
“[d]elinquent act” is “an act designated a crime under the 
law of this Commonwealth . . . .”  Id.  When a juvenile is 
found to be delinquent, the juvenile court or the circuit 
_______________________ 
7 Code § 19.2-168 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n 
any case in which a person charged with a crime intends . . . 
to put in issue his sanity at the time of the crime charged 
. . . , he . . . shall give notice in writing to the attorney 
for the Commonwealth . . . .”  Irrespective of whether the 
term “person” includes both juveniles and adults, Chatman was 
not “charged with a crime.”  Instead, he was charged with 
delinquency. 
Code § 16.1-278.11 states, in pertinent part, that “[i]n 
cases involving a person who is adjudged mentally ill . . ., 
disposition shall be in accordance with the provisions of 
Chapters 1 (§ 37.1-1 et seq.) and 2 (§ 37.1-63 et seq.) of 
Title 37.1.” 
 
8 The provisions of Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 regarding 
juveniles 14 years of age or older are not relevant to our 
discussion because Chatman was 13 years old at the time of 
the offense at issue in this case.  Thus, he could not be 
tried as an adult. See Code § 16.1-269.1  Accordingly, the 
cases cited by the Court of Appeals and Chatman in which 
juveniles were transferred to circuit court for proper 
 
11
court has several available options with regard to making 
“orders of disposition for [the juvenile’s] supervision, care 
and rehabilitation.”  Code § 16.1-278.8.  One of those 
options, which is relevant to the present case, is to commit 
a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent to an 
appropriate hospital pursuant to the provisions of Code 
§§ 16.1-338 through –345 of “The Psychiatric Inpatient 
Treatment of Minors Act” when the court “reasonably believes” 
that the juvenile is mentally ill.  Code § 16.1-280.  The 
court’s authority under Code § 16.1-280 is, however, 
predicated upon a finding of delinquency.  Furthermore, 
§ 16.1-337 of “The Psychiatric Inpatient Treatment of Minors 
Act” provides that “[a] minor may be admitted to a mental 
health facility for inpatient treatment only pursuant to 
§§ 16.1-338, 16.1-339, or § 16.1-340 [of that act] or in 
accordance with an order of involuntary commitment . . . .”9  
(Emphasis added.) 
Notably, in contrast to the specific statutory 
provisions dealing with a juvenile’s incompetence to stand 
______________________ 
criminal proceedings as an adult are not relevant to the 
questions presented in this appeal. 
9 Code § 16.1-278.11 also provides that “[i]n cases 
involving a person who is adjudged mentally ill . . . , 
disposition shall be in accordance with the provisions of 
Chapters 1 (§ 37.1-1 et seq.) and 2 (§ 37.1-63 et seq.) of 
Title 37.1.”  To the extent, if any, that there is a conflict 
 
12
trial, see Code §§ 16.1-356 through -361, the Code does not 
contain any provision allowing the use of an insanity defense 
at the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding.  
Instead, the General Assembly elected to make a juvenile’s 
mental illness or insanity a factor to be considered during 
disposition after the juvenile had been adjudicated 
delinquent.  Code § 16.1-280.  “Courts ‘cannot read into a 
statute something that is not within the manifest intention 
of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself.’ ”  
Jordan v. Town of South Boston, 138 Va. 838, 844, 122 S.E. 
265, 267 (1924)(quoting 25 R.C.L. 963, § 218). 
Nevertheless, Chatman contends that the provisions of 
Chapters 11 (proceedings on questions of insanity) and 11.1 
(disposition of persons acquitted by reason of insanity) of 
Title 19.2 should be interpreted as applying to juveniles 
during an adjudication of delinquency.  In response, the 
Commonwealth points out that, under the provisions pertaining 
to the disposition of persons acquitted by reason of 
insanity, it is possible to have an indeterminate period of 
commitment for inpatient treatment.  Because of this 
possibility, the Commonwealth reasons that those provisions 
cannot apply to juveniles because the juvenile and domestic 
______________________ 
between this provision and the terms of Code § 16.1-337, that 
issue is not before us. 
 
13
relations district courts do not have jurisdiction over a 
juvenile beyond the juvenile’s 21st birthday.  We agree with 
the Commonwealth. 
When a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity at 
the time of the offense, the court must place the acquittee 
in the temporary custody of the Commissioner of Mental 
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services for 
an evaluation to determine whether that acquittee can be 
released or requires commitment.  Code § 19.2-182.2.  If an 
acquittee is mentally ill and in need of inpatient 
hospitalization, the court must commit the acquittee.  Code 
§ 19.2-182.3.  When an acquittee is committed for inpatient 
hospitalization, the committing court must conduct periodic 
assessments of the confined acquittee’s continuing need for 
such treatment.  Code § 19.2-182.5.  As the Commonwealth 
points out, the provisions of the Code dealing with the 
disposition of persons acquitted by reason of insanity do 
not, however, limit the length of time that an acquittee can 
be confined for inpatient treatment.  Thus, it is conceivable 
that an acquittee could be confined for inpatient treatment 
for many years or for the remainder of his or her life, if 
 
14
the acquittee continues to be mentally ill and in need of 
inpatient treatment.10  Code §§ 19.2-182.5(C) and –182.6(C). 
However, the juvenile and domestic relations district 
courts retain jurisdiction over a juvenile only until that 
juvenile attains the age of 21 years.  Code § 16.1-242.11  
Thus, if the statutory scheme governing the disposition of 
persons acquitted by reason of insanity were available to a 
13-year-old juvenile, that scheme’s indeterminate period of 
commitment for inpatient hospitalization could run afoul of 
the limited duration of the juvenile and domestic relations 
district courts’ jurisdiction.  If the General Assembly had 
intended for a juvenile such as Chatman to assert an insanity 
defense under Chapters 11 and 11.1 of Title 19.2, we believe 
that it would have resolved this conflict.  Thus, we conclude 
that Chatman does not have a statutory right to raise the 
_______________________ 
10 The factors that must be considered when initially 
committing an acquittee and also when reviewing the need for 
continued confinement are: (1) to what extent the acquittee 
is mentally ill or mentally retarded; (2) the likelihood that 
the acquittee will engage in conduct that presents a 
substantial risk of bodily harm either to other persons or to 
the acquittee; (3) the likelihood that the accquittee can be 
adequately supervised and treated as an outpatient; and (4) 
any other factors deemed relevant by the court.  Code § 19.2-
182.3. 
 
11 On appeal, a circuit court has the powers and 
authority granted to the juvenile and domestic relations 
district courts.  Code § 16.1-296(I).  
 
15
defense of insanity at the adjudicatory phase of his 
delinquency proceeding. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit 
court adjudicating Chatman to be delinquent.12
Reversed and final judgment. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
Today a majority of this Court permits Christopher 
Lyance Chatman, a 13-year-old juvenile who well may not have 
known the difference between right and wrong or not have 
understood the nature and consequences of his act, to be 
adjudicated a delinquent upon a finding that he committed the 
crime of unlawful wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51, 
and then to be committed to the Department of Juvenile 
Justice for an indeterminate period of time pursuant to Code 
§§ 16.1-278.8 and 16.1.285.  The majority permits this child 
to be adjudicated and committed by the trial court because it 
concludes that a 13-year-old child does not have a right to 
assert an insanity defense at the adjudicatory phase of a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding under either the Due Process 
_______________________ 
12 Chatman also argues on brief that the circuit court 
erred in not granting his motion for a psychiatric evaluation 
because the results of the evaluation might have been 
relevant to the disposition of his case.  However, Chatman 
did not present that argument to the circuit court.  Thus, we 
will not consider it on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
16
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the statutes of this 
Commonwealth.13  The majority permits this child to be so 
treated even though it acknowledges that this Court has 
recognized the defense of insanity for adults, under the so-
called M’Naghten Rule, since 1871.  See Boswell v. 
Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 874-76 (1871). 
The citizens of this Commonwealth and, indeed, the 
General Assembly may be rightfully troubled and surprised to 
learn that over the ensuing 129 years since 1871, according 
to the majority, this well-established common law right of 
adults has not been extended to 13-year-old juveniles charged 
with acts that would be crimes if committed by adults.  For 
my part, I cannot join in such a conclusion and, accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent. 
The Court of Appeals properly noted that the “Juvenile 
and Domestic Relations District Court Law [contained in 
Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 of the Code of Virginia] does not 
expressly provide for or prohibit an insanity defense at 
either an adjudicatory hearing in [juvenile] court or in an 
_______________________ 
13The majority states that “[t]hese are the two sources 
upon which Chatman relies to assert that he has [the right to 
assert an insanity defense].”  Indeed, as related by the 
majority, it was the Commonwealth that asserted this 
limitation in the trial court.  Regardless, we may not simply 
ignore the common law of this Commonwealth as the proper 
source of Chatman’s right. 
 
 
17
appeal to the circuit court upon a finding of delinquency.”  
Chatman v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 593, 597, 518 S.E.2d 
847, 849 (1999).  After referencing the various statutes that 
provide the mechanism for a criminal defendant to raise and 
prove an insanity defense contained in Chapter 11 of Title 
19.2, the Court of Appeals found “no reasonable basis for 
concluding that an insanity defense is unavailable to a 
juvenile at a proceeding to adjudicate him or her delinquent 
as it would be to an adult defendant in a criminal trial.”  
Id. at 601, 518 S.E.2d at 851.  The Court further concluded 
that “the right to assert an insanity defense is an essential 
of ‘due process and fair treatment’ which is required at a 
juvenile delinquency adjudication.”  Id.  The Court expressly 
noted that because Chatman was not yet 14 years of age at the 
time the charged offense was committed, he could not have 
been tried as an adult in the circuit court.  See Code 
§ 16.1-269.l.  Finally, the Court also noted that it 
expressed no opinion regarding Chatman’s disposition in the 
event he were to be found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Upon appeal to this Court, the majority carefully limits 
its holding to apply only to a juvenile under age 14.  
Undoubtedly this is so because under the pertinent statutory 
scheme age 14 is the critical age in determining whether a 
juvenile may be tried as an adult and under certain 
 
18
circumstances sentenced to incarceration as an adult.  See 
Code §§ 16.1-269.1 and 16.1-272.  The apparent significance 
of making this careful distinction in the majority’s analysis 
between age 13 and age 14 is that presumably there would be 
no question that when a juvenile 14 years old or older is 
tried as an adult, such a juvenile would have the same right 
as an adult to assert a defense of insanity to the charged 
offense. 
The majority, relying upon Code § 16.1-280, concludes 
that “the General Assembly elected to make a juvenile’s 
mental illness or insanity a factor to be considered during 
the [dispositional phase and] after the juvenile had been 
adjudicated delinquent.”  This statute, however, specifically 
addresses a case where the juvenile court “reasonably 
believes” that a juvenile “is mentally ill or mentally 
retarded.”  (Emphasis added).  Clearly this statute addresses 
the court’s dispositional options with regard to a juvenile’s 
mental condition at the time of the proceeding; the insanity 
defense, in sharp contrast, addresses the juvenile’s mental 
condition at the time the charged offense was committed.  
Thus, under the majority’s analysis, where a 13-year-old 
juvenile is proven to be insane at the time he or she 
committed the charged offense, but not mentally ill at the 
time of the adjudicatory hearing regarding that offense, that 
 
19
juvenile may nevertheless be adjudicated a delinquent.  
Surely there can be no such offense as being delinquent by 
reason of being insane. 
The United States Supreme Court’s statement that “while 
the Due Process Clause affords an incompetent defendant the 
right not to be tried . . ., we have not said that the 
Constitution requires the States to recognize the insanity 
defense,” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992), is 
not dispositive of the issue whether a 13-year-old juvenile 
has the right to assert that defense in this Commonwealth.  
Under well-established principles, that holding does not 
prevent this Commonwealth from extending the right to assert 
the insanity defense both to adults and to all juveniles as a 
matter of state law.  And in doing so, the Commonwealth is 
free, for purposes of state law, to find that “fundamental 
fairness” requires that both adults and juveniles be 
permitted to assert this defense.  In my view, the General 
Assembly, relying upon this Court’s long recognition of the 
insanity defense without express limitation to the age of the 
accused, also has not limited or restricted this defense to 
cases involving adults charged with criminal acts. 
The pertinent statutes contained in Chapter 11 of Title 
19.2 provide the mechanism for a criminal defendant to raise 
and prove an insanity defense.  The right to assert that 
 
20
defense, however, arises from this Court’s recognition of 
that right as a matter of the common law of this Commonwealth 
unless otherwise limited or restricted by statute.  Code 
§ 19.2-168 implicitly acknowledges the right for a juvenile 
to assert the insanity defense in the adjudicatory phase of 
the juvenile court proceeding.  The statute provides, in 
pertinent part, that “[i]n any case in which a person charged 
with a crime intends . . . to put in issue his insanity at 
the time of the crime charged . . . he, or his counsel, shall 
give notice in writing to the attorney for the Commonwealth 
. . . .”  (Emphasis added).14  The broad language in this 
statute does not limit its application to proceedings 
involving adult defendants.  A juvenile, even one 13-years-
old, is “a person.”  That conclusion is not merely a 
_______________________ 
14In footnote 7, the majority reasons that Code § 19.2-
168 is not applicable in Chatman’s case because “Chatman was 
not ‘charged with a crime.’  Instead, he was charged with 
delinquency.”  The fine distinction the majority thus 
attempts to draw between “a crime” and “delinquency” in this 
case is simply not supported in the pertinent statutes.  Code 
§ 16.1-228, in part, states that “ Delinquent act’ means (i) 
an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth” 
and a “ ‘Delinquent child’ means a child who has committed a 
delinquent act.”  Chatman was charged with having committed 
the crime of malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-
51.  Such a crime is designated a “violent juvenile felony.”  
See Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(6) and 16.1-269.1(C).  See also Code 
§ 16.1-278.8(14)(permitting a juvenile to be committed to the 
Department of Juvenile Justice if older than ten years of age 
for “an offense” which would be a felony or a Class 1 
misdemeanor if committed by an adult and the juvenile has 
 
21
simplistic one.  Certainly, the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and in In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358 (1970), are clear that for certain constitutional 
rights the juvenile in each of these cases was a “person” 
under the Due Process Clause.  In addition, because the 
insanity defense has been recognized as a part of the common 
law of this Commonwealth and has been deeply engrained in the 
practice of criminal law here since 1871, we can assume that 
the General Assembly intended “fair treatment” for both 
adults and juveniles when it enacted Code § 19.2-168 and, 
thus, used the term “person” in this statute to accomplish 
that purpose. 
Admittedly, it is mere speculation as to whether Chatman 
could successfully establish his insanity at the time of the 
charged offense.  Judicial experience reflects that the 
insanity defense is seldom successfully asserted.  However, 
the majority reasons, in part, that because the pertinent 
statutory scheme pertaining to the disposition of persons 
acquitted by reason of insanity conceivably could result in 
an indeterminate period of commitment, those provisions 
cannot apply to juveniles because the juvenile courts do not 
have jurisdiction over the juvenile beyond the juvenile’s 
______________________ 
previously been found to be “delinquent” based on such 
offenses). 
 
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21st birthday.  See Code §§ 19.2-182.2 through 19.2-182.6.  
There is, however, a significant difference between the 
existence of the right for the juvenile to assert an insanity 
defense on the one hand, and, on the other, in what manner 
the juvenile court upon acquitting the juvenile by reason of 
his or her insanity would apply the statutory provisions for 
the treatment of a person so acquitted. 
The answer to the “conflict” which the majority 
perceives in this statutory scheme, in my view, is that the 
acquitted juvenile would remain committed until his or her 
21st birthday only if he or she remained mentally ill.  Upon 
reaching his or her 21st birthday the acquitted juvenile 
would have to be released absent any further action by the 
Commonwealth.  In that regard, nothing would prohibit the 
Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and 
Substance Abuse Services, into whose custody the juvenile was 
originally committed, to file a petition in the appropriate 
court to have the person recommitted under the provisions of 
Chapters 1 and 2 of Title 37.1-1. 
Finally, and more importantly, the holding of the 
majority has the potential of considerable adverse impact on 
a juvenile who is subsequently found guilty of other criminal 
acts after having been adjudicated delinquent at age 13, or 
younger, for an offense committed while insane.  This is so 
 
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because the adjudication of delinquency for violating a 
criminal statute could then be used by the Commonwealth to 
effectively increase the juvenile’s punishment for the 
subsequent criminal acts.  See, e.g., Code § 16.1-278.8 
(permitting enhanced punishment were juvenile has been 
previously adjudicated delinquent); § 16.1-269.l(e) 
(permitting consideration of prior commitments to juvenile 
correctional centers in transfer of juvenile to circuit court 
to stand trial as an adult).  In short, while made in a 
different context, the familiar quote from Kent v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966), seems applicable.  There 
Justice Fortis observed that “[t]here is evidence . . . that 
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the 
worst of both worlds; that he gets neither the protection 
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative 
treatment postulated for children.” 
If such is the case for a 13-year-old juvenile with 
regard to the right to assert an insanity defense at the 
adjudicatory phase of the juvenile proceedings in this 
Commonwealth, then perhaps the General Assembly, in its 
wisdom, will determine that such is not “fair treatment” and 
legislate accordingly.  Again, for my part, I am compelled to 
believe that the common law of this Commonwealth, rather than 
the Due Process Clause or the various statutes addressed by 
 
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the majority, already protects such a child by affording the 
right to assert an insanity defense to any child charged with 
an offense that would be a crime if committed by an adult.
 
For these reasons, in my view, the Court of Appeals 
properly determined that Chatman was entitled to a mental 
health evaluation in anticipation of asserting an insanity 
defense.  Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
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