Title: Southport Commons, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP130 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Southport Commons, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 207,944 N.W.2d 46 
PDC No:2020 WI App 26 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 8, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Alan Marcuvitz, Smitha Chintamaneni, Andrea H. Roschke, 
Adam S. Bazelon, and Von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by Smitha Chintamaneni and Alan MarcuvitzI. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general; with whom 
on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse. 
 
2021 WI 52 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP130 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV345) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Southport Commons, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Southport 
Commons, LLC (Southport), seeks review of a published court of 
appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's grant of the 
Department of Transportation's (DOT) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.1  Southport asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
                     
1 Southport Commons, LLC v. DOT, 2020 WI App 26, 392 
Wis. 2d 207, 944 N.W.2d 46 (affirming the order of the circuit 
court for Kenosha County, David M. Bastianelli, Judge). 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
2 
 
determining that its notice of claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c) (2017-18)2 was not timely filed. 
¶2 
Wisconsin Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) provides that a property 
owner damaged by the construction or maintenance of a highway or 
railroad grade must file a notice of claim "within 3 years after 
the alleged damage occurred" as a prerequisite to filing a 
lawsuit.  Southport contends that its notice of claim, filed 
within three years of when the damage was discovered, is 
sufficient.  Alternatively, Southport asserts that the damage to 
its land occurred continuously over time and that the actual 
time the damage occurred in this case was undetermined and 
requires remand to the circuit court for fact finding. 
¶3 
DOT 
disagrees, 
arguing 
that 
"occurred" 
is 
not 
synonymous with "discovered" and that under a plain reading of 
the statute, Southport's notice of claim was not timely filed.  
It further contends that Southport did not raise its alternative 
argument in the circuit court or court of appeals, and as a 
result this court should not consider it. 
¶4 
We conclude that "occurred" in the context of Wis. 
Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) does not mean "discovered."  The notice of 
claim period in § 88.87(2)(c) begins to run when the damage 
happens or takes place.  
¶5 
Further, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Southport 
failed 
to 
meaningfully develop in the circuit court or court of appeals an 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
3 
 
argument that the damage to its property occurred gradually over 
a period of years.  Instead, it argued only that the notice of 
claim requirement is triggered by discovery.  As a consequence, 
Southport did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the date of damage, and the circuit court properly granted DOT's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶7 
The facts set forth below are taken from Southport's 
verified petition-complaint.  Because we are reviewing the 
circuit court's determination of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, we address first whether the complaint states a claim 
and we assume these facts as alleged are true.3 
¶8 
Southport owns land in Kenosha County that contains 
approximately 45.22 acres of vacant land.  The property is now 
severed by an Interstate 94 frontage road. 
¶9 
In 2008 and 2009, DOT engaged in a construction 
project to relocate the frontage road, which was formerly 
located entirely east of the property.  The new location of the 
road resulted in the bisection of the property. 
¶10 Prior to the construction project, the property was 
surveyed.  The result of the survey was the identification and 
delineation of three areas of wetlands on the property. 
                     
3 See Helnore v. DNR, 2005 WI App 46, ¶2, 280 Wis. 2d 211, 
694 N.W.2d 730. 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
4 
 
¶11 Construction was completed in 2009, and in 2016 
Southport obtained a new survey and new wetland delineation in 
an attempt to determine the feasibility of future commercial 
development on the site.  The new wetland delineation, which is 
dated July 20, 2016, "identifies a significant increase in the 
size and amount of wetlands on the Property, resulting from 
DOT's Construction Project."  Specifically, the new report 
identifies six distinct wetland areas, including three areas of 
wetlands that did not exist prior to the construction project, 
and a significant increase in the size of the three previously 
existing wetlands. 
¶12 Southport alleged that before obtaining the post-
construction wetland delineation, it had no knowledge of the 
creation of new wetlands or the expansion of existing wetlands 
on the site.  It further alleged that the new and expanded 
wetlands caused significant damage to the property. 
¶13 On March 2, 2017, Southport filed a "Notice of Claim 
and Claim Against the Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c)."  DOT did not respond to 
the Notice of Claim and Claim, effectively denying it.   
No. 
2019AP130   
 
5 
 
¶14 Subsequently, 
Southport 
filed 
suit 
against 
DOT, 
claiming inverse condemnation.4  Specifically, it alleged: 
DOT's faulty construction during DOT's Construction 
Project and continued faulty maintenance of 120th 
Avenue has impeded, and continues to impede, the 
general flow of water in an unreasonable manner so as 
to cause an unnecessary accumulation of waters and an 
unreasonable discharge of waters onto the Property, 
which has directly resulted in the creation of the New 
Wetlands and Larger Wetlands on the Property, thus 
severely 
damaging 
Southport 
by 
rendering 
large 
portions of the Property undevelopable and impinging 
on Southport's ability to develop the Property. 
In Southport's estimation, such change in its land amounted to a 
taking for which it sought just compensation. 
¶15 DOT answered the complaint and subsequently moved for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The motion was based on the 
assertion that Southport failed to file its notice of claim 
within three years of when the damage occurred as Wis. Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c) requires.  In response, Southport contended that 
§ 88.87(2)(c), as interpreted in Pruim v. Town of Ashford, 168 
Wis. 2d 114, 483 N.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1992), allows a notice of 
claim to be filed within three years after the damage is 
discovered, and that its notice of claim was therefore timely. 
                     
4 "Inverse condemnation is a procedure by which a property 
owner petitions the circuit court to institute condemnation 
proceedings."  Maple Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove 
Ests. Sanitary Dist., 2019 WI 43, ¶13 n.9, 386 Wis. 2d 425, 926 
N.W.2d 184. 
 
"It 
'allows 
a 
property 
owner 
to 
institute 
condemnation proceedings against anyone who possesses, but fails 
to exercise, the power of condemnation.'"  Id. (quoting Koskey 
v. Town of Bergen, 2000 WI App 140, ¶5, 237 Wis. 2d 284, 614 
N.W.2d 845); see Wis. Stat. § 32.10; Wis. Const. art. I, § 13. 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
6 
 
¶16 The circuit court granted DOT's motion.  Relying on 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c), it determined 
that "[t]he statute is plain on its face.  It does say 
occurred."  Further, the circuit court stated that the damage 
occurred in 2009 at the latest and that accordingly the notice 
of claim was not timely filed. 
¶17 Southport appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court in a published decision.  Southport Commons, 
LLC v. DOT, 2020 WI App 26, 392 Wis. 2d 207, 944 N.W.2d 46.  
Like the circuit court, the court of appeals focused on the 
legislature's choice to use the word "occurred" rather than 
"discovered."  It determined that "[w]hen the legislature 
intends to have a statutory limitation period begin to run when 
damage is discovered, as opposed to when it occurs, the 
legislature has no problem explicitly stating so."  Id., ¶9.  
Further, the court of appeals concluded that Pruim, relied upon 
by Southport, "does not control [its] decision in this case" 
because "the issue and circumstances before [it] in Pruim were 
significantly different from those before [it] now."  Id., ¶10.  
Southport petitioned for review in this court. 
II 
¶18 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
determination that the circuit court properly granted DOT's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  A judgment on the 
pleadings is essentially a summary judgment decision without 
affidavits and other supporting documents.  McNally v. Capital 
Cartage, Inc., 2018 WI 46, ¶23, 381 Wis. 2d 349, 912 N.W.2d 35.  
No. 
2019AP130   
 
7 
 
Judgment on the pleadings is proper only if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact.  Id.  Whether judgment on the pleadings 
should be granted is a question of law we review independently 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Id., ¶24. 
¶19 In our review, we interpret and apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c).  Statutory interpretation and application are 
likewise questions of law we review independently of the 
determinations made by the circuit court and court of appeals.  
Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶24, 379 
Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784. 
III 
¶20 We begin by interpreting the word "occurred" in Wis. 
Stat. § 88.87(2)(c).  Subsequently, we examine the pleadings and 
arguments made in this case and apply our interpretation of 
§ 88.87(2)(c) to the facts at hand. 
A 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 88.87 "was enacted to regulate the 
construction and drainage of all highways in order to protect 
property owners from damage to lands caused by unreasonable 
diversion or retention of surface waters due to the construction 
of highways or railroad beds."  Lins v. Blau, 220 Wis. 2d 855, 
859, 584 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1998).  It "imposes a duty on 
governmental entities to refrain from impeding the general flow 
of surface water or stream water in any unreasonable manner so 
as to cause either an unnecessary accumulation of waters 
flooding 
or 
water-soaking 
uplands 
or 
an 
unreasonable 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
8 
 
accumulation and discharge of surface waters flooding or water-
soaking lowlands."  Id. at 859-60 (internal quotation omitted). 
¶22 Paragraph (2)(c) creates a remedy for property owners 
who claim damages from a violation of Wis. Stat. § 88.87.  Id. 
at 860.  It also establishes certain procedures to be followed 
in making a claim.  Van v. Town of Manitowoc Rapids, 150 
Wis. 2d 929, 930, 442 N.W.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1989). 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) addresses when a claim 
must be filed: 
If a city, village, town, county or railroad company 
or the department of transportation constructs and 
maintains 
a 
highway 
or 
railroad 
grade 
not 
in 
accordance with par. (a), any property owner damaged 
by the highway or railroad grade may, within 3 years 
after the alleged damage occurred, file a claim with 
the 
appropriate 
governmental 
agency 
or 
railroad 
company.  The claim shall consist of a sworn statement 
of the alleged faulty construction and a description, 
sufficient to determine the location of the lands, of 
the lands alleged to have been damaged by flooding or 
water-soaking.   
It further delineates the post-filing process: 
Within 90 days after the filing of the claim, the 
governmental agency or railroad company shall either 
correct the cause of the water damage, acquire rights 
to use the land for drainage or overflow purposes, or 
deny the claim.  If the agency or company denies the 
claim or fails to take any action within 90 days after 
the filing of the claim, the property owner may bring 
an action in inverse condemnation under ch. 32 or sue 
for such other relief, other than damages, as may be 
just and equitable. 
¶24 Southport contends that by filing its notice of claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) within three years of the time 
the damage was discovered, it fulfills the statutory requirement 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
9 
 
that the notice be filed within three years of when the damage 
occurred.  DOT disagrees, arguing that "occurred" is not 
synonymous with "discovered." 
¶25 To resolve this dispute, we must interpret the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c).  Statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we need 
not inquire further.  Id.   
¶26 Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning.  Id.  We also interpret statutory language 
"in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶27 We therefore begin with the language of the statute, 
and specifically the phrase, "within 3 years after the alleged 
damage occurred," with our focus being on the word "occurred."  
The parties each advocate for a different definition of the 
word.  Southport proffers "to be found to exist or appear."  
DOT, in contrast, puts forth "something that takes place" or 
"something that happens." 
¶28 "For 
purposes 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
or 
construction, the common and approved usage of words may be 
established by consulting dictionary definitions."  State v. 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
10 
 
Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998).  The court 
of appeals did just this when it determined that "[d]amage 
'occurs' when it happens or takes place."  Southport Commons, 
392 Wis. 2d 207, ¶7 (citing Occur, Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary (unabr. 1993)). 
¶29 We agree with both the approach and the result of the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals correctly determined 
that in common and ordinary usage, something "occurs" when it 
happens or takes place.  See Occurrence, Black's Law Dictionary 
1299 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "occurrence" as "[s]omething that 
happens or takes place").  This is certainly a more common 
definition for "occur" than that offered by Southport.  It is 
the "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning" of a word that 
governs.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. 
¶30 It is not only the dictionary that supports such a 
determination, but it is also our case law.  We have previously 
stated that "[t]he ordinary and common meaning of 'occurrence' 
is 
'something 
that 
takes 
place; 
something 
that 
happens 
unexpectedly and without design.'"  Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. 
Emp.'s Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 741, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984).  
The common usage of the word "occurred" thus has no element of 
discovery as Southport contends. 
¶31 When the legislature wants to make discovery the 
trigger for a statutory filing requirement, it knows how to do 
so.  Indeed, it has done so in other areas of the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  For example, in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m), the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations, the legislature set forth 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
11 
 
that an action "shall be commenced within the later of:  (a) 
Three years from the date of the injury, or (b) One year from 
the date the injury was discovered or, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have been discovered, except that an 
action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 
years from the date of the act or omission."  Further examples 
of discovery as a trigger for a filing deadline abound in the 
Wisconsin Statutes.5   
¶32 Unlike 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m), 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c) does not contain any reference to "discovery."  
The legislature is presumed to "carefully and precisely" choose 
statutory language to express a desired meaning.  Indus. to 
                     
5 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 411.506(2) ("A cause of action 
for default accrues when the act or omission on which the 
default or breach of warranty is based is or should have been 
discovered by the aggrieved party, or when the default occurs, 
whichever is later."); 893.51(2) ("An action under s. 134.90 
shall be commenced within 3 years after the misappropriation of 
a trade secret is discovered or should have been discovered by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence."); 893.555(2) ("[A]n 
action to recover damages for injury arising from any treatment 
or operation performed by, or from any omission by, a long-term-
care provider . . . shall be commenced within the later of:  (a) 
Three years from the date of the injury.  (b) One year from the 
date the injury was discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been discovered . . . ."); 893.80(1p) ("In 
any such action, [a claim to recover damages against any 
political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision 
or 
agency 
thereof for the negligent inspection of any property, premises, 
place of employment or construction site for the violation of 
any statute, rule, ordinance or health and safety code,] the 
time period under sub. (1d)(a) shall be one year after discovery 
of the negligent act or omission or the date on which, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence the negligent act or omission 
should have been discovered.") 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
12 
 
Indus., Inc. v. Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc., 2002 WI 51, ¶19 
n.5, 252 Wis. 2d 544, 644 N.W.2d 236 (citation omitted).  From 
this, we conclude that the legislature chose not to include a 
discovery provision in § 88.87(2)(c), and it would be error to 
read one in.  See Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 
336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316 ("We decline to read into the 
statute words the legislature did not see fit to write."). 
¶33 This result is further supported by the legislative 
history of Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c).  See State v. Wilson, 2017 
WI 63, ¶23, 376 Wis. 2d 92, 896 N.W.2d 682 (explaining that 
"legislative history and other authoritative sources may be 
consulted to confirm a plain meaning interpretation").  As set 
forth by the court of appeals in Lins, in 1993 the legislature 
amended § 88.87(2)(c), lengthening the claim period from 90 days 
to three years.  Lins, 220 Wis. 2d at 861; see 1993 Wis. Act 
456, § 109. 
¶34 According to the Legislative Council Special Committee 
Note 
accompanying 
the 
enactment 
of 
this 
change, 
"[t]he 
legislature made this change with the intent to provide the 
landowner with 'sufficient time to discover the damage.'"  Lins, 
220 
Wis. 2d at 
861 
(quoting 
Legislative 
Council 
Special 
Committee Note, 1993 Wis. Act 456, § 109).  This Note indicates 
that the legislature had deemed three years to be "sufficient 
time to discover the damage" and that after that time had passed 
discovery would not trigger the notice of claim period.  As DOT 
argued in its brief, "[t]his change would have been unnecessary 
if the notification period does not begin until the damage is 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
13 
 
discovered."  The legislature thus did not intend an open-ended 
claim period such as that for which Southport advocates.6 
¶35 Despite the plain language of the statute, Southport 
contends that the court of appeals' decision in Pruim, 168 
Wis. 2d 114, compels an opposite result.  In Pruim, the 
plaintiff filed a notice of claim and eventually sued the Town 
of Ashford for negligently constructing and maintaining a road 
shoulder, which the plaintiff identified as a continuing 
nuisance.  Id. at 117.  The court was presented with the 
question of whether the limitation period of Wis. Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c) (then 90 days) began to run when the injury was 
discovered or if it "reset" at each occurrence of a continuing 
nuisance.   
¶36 It 
determined 
that 
the 
former 
was 
the 
correct 
formulation——"ninety days from the date first discovered."  Id.  
In arriving at its conclusion, the Pruim court seemingly used 
the words "occurred" and "discovered" interchangeably.  For 
example, 
the 
opinion 
stated 
with 
respect 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                     
6 An open-ended claim period would further run counter to 
the general purpose of notice of claim statutes.  Generally, the 
purposes of notice of claim statutes are to allow governmental 
entities to investigate and evaluate potential claims and to 
afford them the opportunity to compromise and settle claims, 
thereby avoiding costly and time-consuming litigation.  Yacht 
Club at Sister Bay Condo. Ass'n v. Village of Sister Bay, 2019 
WI 4, ¶20, 385 Wis. 2d 158, 922 N.W.2d 95.  An open-ended claim 
period would not provide governmental entities with sufficient 
information to allow them to budget for either a settlement or 
litigation, and would thus undermine this purpose.  See id., 
¶37. 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
14 
 
§ 88.87(2)(c), "[t]he statute is unambiguous.  The notice of 
claim must be made within ninety days after the damage occurred 
and is discovered, and the claims for relief are limited to 
inverse condemnation or any sort of equitable relief short of 
damages."  Id. at 119.   
¶37 The Pruim court continued:   
We have no hesitancy in concluding that the ninety-day 
provision did not contemplate allowing a new cause of 
action each day the damage continues.  To the 
contrary, the statute contemplates the opposite.  We 
read the statute to say that when the damage is first 
discovered, the time begins to run.  To read it any 
other way would be contrary to the unambiguous 
language of the statute and clearly contrary to the 
intent expressed by the committee.   
Id. at 123 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, Southport asserts 
that 
under 
Pruim, 
"discovery" 
triggers 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c)'s notice of claim period. 
¶38 At first blush, the above-cited passages from Pruim 
support Southport's argument.  After all, the Pruim court used 
the phrase "first discovered" rather than "first occurred."  
However, that argument falls apart when the circumstances that 
gave rise to the claim in Pruim are closely examined. 
¶39 To explain, the landowner in Pruim discovered the 
damage in the immediate aftermath of its occurrence.  See id. at 
122 (explaining that "it is undisputed that Pruim discovered the 
damage right after the heavy rainstorm of March 13, 1990").  
Within that context, the court's use of the phrase "occurred and 
is 
discovered," 
along 
with 
its 
use 
of 
the 
two 
terms 
interchangeably, makes sense.  However, the Pruim court did not 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
15 
 
address the question raised in the instant case, i.e., when the 
notice of claim period begins when discovery happens long after 
the damage occurs.  Pruim is distinguishable on its facts, and 
thus it does not control the outcome here. 
¶40 We therefore conclude that "occurred" in the context 
of Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) does not mean "discovered."  The 
notice of claim period in § 88.87(2)(c) begins to run when the 
damage happens or takes place. 
B 
¶41 We turn next to examine the pleadings and arguments 
made in this case and apply our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c) to the facts at hand. 
¶42 Our review is guided by the methodology for evaluating 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  "We determine first 
whether the complaint has stated a claim."  McNally, 381 
Wis. 2d 349, ¶23.  "If so, we next examine the responsive 
pleading to ascertain whether an issue of material fact exists."  
Id.   
¶43 Judgment on the pleadings is proper if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact.  Id.  "A factual issue is 
genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."  Id., ¶24. 
¶44 As an initial matter, Southport's complaint states a 
claim 
for 
inverse 
condemnation. 
 
To 
state 
an 
inverse 
condemnation claim, a property owner must allege a property 
interest sufficient to make them an owner, an occupation or 
taking of the property, and that the condemnor has failed to 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
16 
 
exercise its condemnation powers.  See Maxey v. Redevelopment 
Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 387, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980).  
Southport alleges that it is the sole owner of the property at 
issue, that DOT has occupied and taken portions of Southport's 
property through faulty construction and maintenance of the 
frontage road, and that DOT did not exercise its power of 
condemnation. 
 
This 
is 
sufficient 
to 
state 
an 
inverse 
condemnation claim. 
¶45 Following the judgment on the pleadings methodology, 
we surmise next whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 
as to the date of the damage.  Southport's complaint alleges 
that the damage to its land was discovered in 2016.  However, it 
makes no allegation regarding the date the damage is alleged to 
have occurred.  The complaint states:  "During approximately 
2008 through 2009 DOT proceeded with a construction project 
that, inter alia, relocated the I-94 frontage road, which was 
formerly located entirely east of the Property, to a new 
location resulting in the bisection of the Property by the new 
frontage road . . . ." 
¶46 With no allegation that the damage occurred within the 
three years prior to the filing of the notice of claim, and no 
supporting materials placing such a fact in issue, we must 
determine that judgment on the pleadings was properly granted by 
the circuit court.  In other words, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to the date of the damage because Southport did 
not allege such a factual dispute.  Southport put all of its 
eggs in the basket of "discovery" and did not meaningfully 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
17 
 
develop in either the circuit court or court of appeals any 
argument that the damage occurred surreptitiously over time.7  As 
such, it would be improper for this court to rely on such a 
basis here. 
¶47 Further, it would not have taken much to raise an 
issue of material fact.  In response to DOT's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, Southport could have filed an 
affidavit placing the date of damage in issue and thus converted 
the motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary 
judgment.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.06(3); Schuster v. Altenberg, 
144 Wis. 2d 223, 228, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988) ("[A] motion for 
judgment on the pleadings will be converted to a motion for 
summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented 
to the court.").  Similarly, it could have alleged surreptitious 
damage over time in the complaint or moved to amend the 
complaint after DOT filed its motion. 
¶48 This is not to say that Southport needs to allege 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) in its complaint in 
                     
7 At oral argument, the court questioned Southport's counsel 
as follows:   
Your focus was not on when the damage occurred.  
Therefore, you didn't plead when the damage occurred 
because 
your 
whole 
approach 
was 
when 
it 
was 
discovered.  So when it occurred isn't all that 
important to you.  When it was discovered is the 
linchpin of your pleadings and also your argument in 
the circuit court, is that correct? 
Counsel answered in the affirmative. 
No. 
2019AP130   
 
18 
 
order to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  See 
Maple Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Ests. Sanitary 
Dist., 2019 WI 43, ¶49, 386 Wis. 2d 425, 926 N.W.2d 184 (citing 
Rabe v. Outagamie Cnty., 72 Wis. 2d 492, 498, 241 N.W.2d 428 
(1976)).  But when DOT filed its motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, Southport needed to do something to create a factual 
dispute.  Arguing only that "occurred" means "discovered" was 
not sufficient. 
IV 
¶49 In sum, we conclude that "occurred" in the context of 
Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) does not mean "discovered."  The notice 
of claim period in § 88.87(2)(c) begins to run when the damage 
happens or takes place. 
¶50 Further, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Southport 
failed 
to 
meaningfully develop in the circuit court or court of appeals an 
argument that the damage to its property occurred gradually over 
a period of years.  Instead, it argued only that the notice of 
claim requirement is triggered by discovery.  As a consequence, 
Southport did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the date of damage, and the circuit court properly granted DOT's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
¶51 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶52 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  This 
decision adjudicates Southport Commons, LLC's claim for inverse 
condemnation based on the Department of Transportation's (DOT) 
construction and continued maintenance of the frontage road for 
I-94, 
a/k/a 
120th 
Avenue, 
which 
Southport 
avers 
caused 
accumulations of water that damaged its property.  The DOT moved 
for Judgment on the Pleadings, and the circuit court dismissed 
Southport's Verified Complaint,1 after concluding that it failed 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2  As I explain 
below, 
this 
was 
an 
erroneous 
legal 
conclusion 
because 
Southport's Verified Complaint sufficiently alleged a claim for 
inverse condemnation.   
¶53 However, a review of the transcript from the circuit 
court proceedings shows that the circuit court's judgment was 
not grounded in its conclusion that a claim for inverse 
condemnation had not been made within the four corners of 
Southport's Verified Complaint.  But rather, the circuit court 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 88.87(2)(c) 
and 
concluded 
that 
Southport had failed to file a claim with DOT "within three 
years after the alleged damage occurred."  The circuit court 
                     
1 Verification requires, "A formal declaration made in the 
presence 
of 
an 
authorized 
officer, 
such 
as 
a 
notary 
public . . . where one swears to the truth of the statements in 
the document.  Traditionally, a verification is used as a 
conclusion for all pleadings that are required to be sworn."  
Black's Law Dictionary, 1698 (9th ed. 2009).   
2 R.28:22. 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
2 
 
defined "occurred" as "happened," and because DOT's construction 
concluded in 2009, the circuit court concluded the damages 
happened when construction was concluded.  Thereafter, the 
circuit court applied the three year notice provision in 
§ 88.87(2)(c) to Southport's takings claim as though it were a 
statute of repose.3  The court of appeals affirmed dismissal on 
the same grounds, Southport Commons, LLC v. DOT, 2020 WI App 26, 
¶16, 392 Wis. 2d 207, 944 N.W.2d 46, and the majority repeats 
that error for a third time.4 
¶54 Southport's 
Verified 
Complaint 
avers 
that 
damage 
resulted both from DOT's construction and from DOT's maintenance 
of the frontage road it constructed.5  Southport was not required 
to plead when damage occurred in order to make a valid claim for 
inverse condemnation.  Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 
94 Wis. 2d 375, 397, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980) (concluding that Wis. 
Stat. § 32.10, the statute that establishes the requirement for 
inverse condemnation, sets no fixed date for evaluation).   
¶55 The Answer says nothing about when "damage occurred."  
DOT simply "denies that construction of Project ID #1032-14-74 
and its continued maintenance of 120th Avenue have directly 
caused both the alleged new wetlands and the alleged larger 
                     
3 R.28:22.  
4 Majority op., ¶4.  
5 Verified Complaint, ¶¶7, 10, 15, 17, 19, 28.   
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
3 
 
wetlands."6  This allegation created an issue of fact about 
whether DOT's actions were a cause of Southport's damages.   
¶56 As the movant, DOT had the burden to prove that it was 
entitled to judgment on the pleadings.  Furthermore, failing to 
comply with a notice of claim statute is an affirmative defense 
Maple Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Ests. Sanitary 
Dist., 2019 WI 43, ¶3, 386 Wis. 2d 425, 926 N.W.2d 184 
(concluding that "noncompliance with the notice of claim statute 
is an affirmative defense that must be set forth in a responsive 
pleading").  DOT, as the proponent of the affirmative defense, 
had the burden of proof on that defense.  See State ex rel. 
Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶38, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 
N.W.2d 900 (concluding that the "State has the burden of proof 
in regard to all the elements of its laches defense").  The 
pleadings do not provide the proof necessary for DOT to prevail 
on its affirmative defense. 
¶57 Maybe Southport would lose when the facts were 
developed, but maybe not.  However, this is not a case that can 
be decided on the pleadings.  The Verified Complaint clearly 
states a claim for inverse condemnation, as the majority opinion 
initially acknowledges.7  Southport's claim is grounded in an 
alleged governmental taking without just compensation, and it 
follows the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 32.10 in regard to 
claims for inverse condemnation.  As we have explained many 
                     
6 Answer and Affirmative Defense, ¶17.   
7 Majority op., ¶44.   
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
4 
 
times, a claim for inverse condemnation arises from rights of 
property owners that are protected by two constitutions.  
Brenner v. New Richmond Reg'l Airport Comm'n, 2012 WI 98, ¶¶37–
40, 343 Wis. 2d 320, 816 N.W.2d 291.   
¶58 I write in dissent because basic rules of civil 
procedure that control when judgment on the pleadings may be 
granted have been disregarded by three courts.  In addition, the 
majority 
opinion 
creates 
a 
new 
element 
for 
an 
inverse 
condemnation claim and converts an affirmative defense into a 
pleading requirement for Southport.  When this court disregards 
basic rules of civil procedure, changes pleading rules and 
overrules precedent of this court without so much as a by-your-
leave in order to obtain the outcome it prefers, it causes 
confusion throughout the court system that goes far beyond 
Southport's claim for inverse condemnation.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶59 The only factual allegations about water damage to 
Southport's property were set out in the Complaint, whose 
allegations were made by a sworn statement, i.e., in a verified 
complaint, as Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) and Wis. Stat. § 32.10 
required.  Southport repeatedly averred that damage to its 
property occurred both from DOT's faulty construction and from 
DOT's faulty maintenance of the frontage road it constructed.8   
                     
8 Verified Complaint, ¶¶7, 10, 15, 17, 19, 28. 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶60 In regard to its claim for inverse condemnation, 
Southport averred that it is the "sole owner of the Property."9  
That during "approximately 2008 through 2009 DOT proceeded with 
a construction project that . . . relocated the I-94 frontage 
road," a/k/a 120th Avenue.10  Following DOT's construction, there 
was a "significant increase in the size and amount of wetlands 
on [Southport's] Property."11  Southport also averred that "DOT's 
Construction Project and its continued maintenance of 120th 
Avenue has directly caused both the New Wetlands and the Larger 
Wetlands."12  That "the wetlands created on the Property as a 
result of DOT's Construction Project and ongoing maintenance of 
120th Avenue" damaged Southport's Property.13  "DOT's faulty 
construction during DOT's Construction Project and continued 
faulty maintenance of 120th Avenue has impeded, and continues to 
impede, the general flow of water in an unreasonable manner so 
as to cause an unnecessary accumulation of waters and an 
unreasonable discharge of waters onto the Property."14   
¶61 Most of DOT's Answers to the Verified Complaint were 
either denials or denials based on insufficient knowledge.15  DOT 
                     
9 Id., ¶7.    
10 Id., ¶10.   
11 Id., ¶15.   
12 Id., ¶17.   
13 Id., ¶19.   
14 Id., ¶28.   
15 Answer and Affirmative Defense, ¶¶1, 2, 5-7, 11–22, 28–
32. 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
6 
 
made no allegation of when damage occurred.  DOT does admit that 
Southport filed a claim with DOT, but "denies that the notice of 
claim and claim were timely filed."16  DOT also lists eight 
affirmative defenses:  failure to state a claim, sovereign 
immunity, circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 
statutes 
of 
limitation, 
laches, 
contributory 
negligence, 
superseding cause and failure to mitigate damages.17  Therefore, 
based on the four corners of the pleadings of both parties, it 
is only Southport who avers, as general statements, that damage 
began with DOT's construction and continued due to DOT's 
maintenance of the road it constructed.    
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶62 DOT moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06(3).  "A judgment on the pleadings is 
essentially a summary judgment minus affidavits and other 
supporting documents."  Commercial Mortg. & Fin. Co. v. Clerk of 
Cir. Ct., 2004 WI App 204, ¶10, 276 Wis. 2d 846, 689 N.W.2d 74.  
When reviewing a decision on such a motion, we begin by 
independently examining the complaint to determine whether a 
claim has been stated.  Id.  If a claim has been stated, then we 
examine responsive pleadings to determine whether issues of 
material fact or law have been joined.  Id.  Because complaints 
are to be liberally construed, "we may dismiss the claim only if 
                     
16 Id., ¶23.  
17 Id., ¶¶A–F.   
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
7 
 
it is 'quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff 
recover.'"  Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 
663, 571 N.W.2d 393 (1997).    
¶63 The circuit court said that it dismissed Southport's 
complaint for failing to state a claim.18  Whether a complaint 
fails to state a claim is a question of law that we 
independently decide.  Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales 
Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶10, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205; Hausman, 
214 Wis. 2d at 662.  During our review, "we are concerned only 
with the legal sufficiency of the complaint."  Kohlbeck v. 
Reliance Const. Co., Inc., 2002 WI App 142, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 235, 
647 N.W.2d 277.  
¶64 A review of the record shows that the circuit court 
actually did not conclude that the Verified Complaint failed to 
state a claim for inverse condemnation.  Rather, the circuit 
court concluded, at DOT's urging, that Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) 
created a three-year statute of repose starting when DOT 
completed the construction project on Southport's property.  
Because Southport filed its notice of claim with DOT after that 
three-year period, the circuit court dismissed its inverse 
condemnation claim.  The majority opinion does the same thing.19 
B.  Legal Issues 
1.  Inverse Condemnation 
                     
18 R.28:22.     
19 Majority op., ¶¶45, 46. 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶65 Southport's claim is for inverse condemnation.  A 
claim for inverse condemnation is made pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10 and has four elements:  (1) the plaintiff owned the 
property at issue; (2) actions by a person with condemnation 
power; (3) those actions permanently damaged or took plaintiff's 
property; (4) failure of the condemnor to bring a direct 
condemnation proceeding.  Andersen v. Vill. of Little Chute, 201 
Wis. 2d 467, 478, 549 N.W.2d 737 (1996); Maxey, 94 Wis. 2d at 
386. 
¶66 Here, Southport alleged that it owned the property at 
issue.20  That DOT possessed the power of condemnation.21  That 
DOT re-constructed the frontage road for I-94, a/k/a 120th 
Avenue, on its property.22  DOT's construction and continued 
maintenance of 120th Avenue caused a "significant increase in 
the size and amount of wetlands on [Southport's Property]."23  
That "DOT has taken Southport's Property and/or occupied 
Southport's Property for drainage and/or with drainage easements 
(the 
'Taking') 
without 
properly 
exercising 
its 
power 
of 
condemnation, including the payment of just compensation for the 
Taking."24  
                     
20 Verified Complaint, ¶7.  
21 Id., ¶4.  
22 Id., ¶10.  
23 Id., ¶¶15, 17. 
24 Id., ¶29. 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶67 There can be no question that the Verified Complaint 
stated a claim for inverse condemnation.  The majority opinion 
initially agreed with my conclusion, as it explains in paragraph 
44: 
Southport alleges that it is the sole owner of the 
property at issue, that DOT has occupied and taken 
portions 
of 
Southport's 
property 
through 
faulty 
construction and maintenance of the frontage road, and 
that DOT did not exercise its power of condemnation.  
This is sufficient to state an inverse condemnation 
claim.[25] 
¶68 However, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
then 
morphs 
into 
discussing a fact that Southport was not required to plead in 
order to state a claim for inverse condemnation.  The majority 
opinion is creative in how it gets around basic rules of civil 
procedure.  First, it concludes that Southport stated a claim 
for inverse condemnation,26 then it adds a new requirement to 
pleadings for inverse condemnation.  The majority opinion says,  
Following the judgment on the pleadings methodology, 
we surmise next whether a genuine issue of material 
fact 
exists 
as 
to 
the 
date 
of 
the 
damage . . . [Southport] makes no allegation regarding 
the date the damage is alleged to have occurred.[27]  
Because Southport did not allege "the date of the damage," the 
majority grants what it labels judgment on the pleadings to DOT.  
The majority states, 
With no allegation that the damage occurred within the 
three years prior to the filing of the notice of 
                     
25 Majority op., ¶44. 
26 Id.   
27 Majority op., ¶45 (emphasis in majority opinion). 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
10 
 
claim, and no supporting materials placing such a fact 
in issue, we must determine that judgment on the 
pleadings was properly granted by the circuit court.  
In other words, there is no genuine issue of material 
fact as to the date of the damage because Southport 
did not allege such a factual dispute.[28] 
¶69 The reader should take note that the majority opinion 
actually is making two legal determinations that are quite 
different from what one would ascertain by simply reading the 
quoted words.  First, the majority opinion has added a new 
required element for an inverse condemnation claim, the date the 
damage occurred.  There is no support for this in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10 
which 
establishes 
the 
elements 
of 
an 
inverse 
condemnation claim, or for that matter, in the reasoning of the 
majority opinion.  It is just a way to get the result the 
majority prefers.  Second, the majority opinion converted an 
affirmative defense, noncompliance with a notice of claim 
statute, into a pleading obligation for a plaintiff in an 
inverse condemnation claim.  All of this is new law that has no 
legal foundation, ignores basic rules of civil procedure and, in 
regard to the conversion of the affirmative defense, is in 
direct conflict with our decision in Maple Grove, as I explain 
below.   
2.  Affirmative Defense 
¶70 Due to prior court decisions, and now the majority 
opinion, central to my review is the notice of claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) that DOT contends Southport did not timely 
accommodate.  We have examined notice of claim statutes in the 
                     
28 Majority op., ¶¶45, 46. 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
11 
 
past and have concluded that "noncompliance with the notice of 
claim statute is an affirmative defense that must be set forth 
in a responsive pleading."  Maple Grove, 386 Wis. 2d 425, ¶3.   
¶71 In Maple Grove, it was alleged that the plaintiff, 
Country Club, did not timely comply with the notice of claim 
required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  Id., ¶1.  On that basis, 
the circuit court dismissed Country Club's claim even though 
Sanitary District did not raise noncompliance with the statute 
in responsive pleadings.  Id.  On review, we concluded that 
"noncompliance 
with 
the 
notice 
of 
claim 
statute 
is 
an 
affirmative defense that must be set forth in a responsive 
pleading."  Id., ¶3.  Because Sanitary District did not do so, 
we concluded that failing to comply with the notice of claim 
statute could not be raised as a defense to Country Club's 
inverse condemnation claim.  Id.    
¶72 Maple Grove teaches that timeliness of compliance with 
a notice of claim statute was DOT's issue to raise as an 
affirmative defense.  Id.  And, as an affirmative defense, it 
was DOT's burden to prove that notice was not timely.  See Red 
Top Farms v. DOT, 177 Wis. 2d 822, 826, 503 N.W.2d 354 (1983) 
(concluding that the burden of proof for the affirmative defense 
rested on DOT).   
¶73 Under our liberal pleading rules, one could stretch 
the Answer, which never mentions Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) or 
Wis. Stat. § 32.10, to encompass raising a § 88.87(2)(c) 
affirmative defense.  However, Southport averred that it timely 
complied with the notice of claim statute, and as we explained 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
12 
 
in Maple Grove and Red Top Farms, it was DOT's affirmative 
burden to prove that Southport did not do so.  Maple Grove, 386 
Wis. 2d 425, ¶34; Red Top Farms, 177 Wis. 2d at 826.   
¶74 In our review of DOT's motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, we begin with the Verified Complaint.  Southport 
repeatedly averred that damage to its property occurred both 
from DOT's faulty construction and from DOT's faulty maintenance 
of the frontage road it constructed.29  Southport also alleged, 
"DOT's faulty construction during DOT's Construction Project and 
continued faulty maintenance of 120th Avenue has impeded, and 
continues 
to 
impede, 
the 
general 
flow 
of 
water 
in 
an 
unreasonable manner so as to cause an unnecessary accumulation 
of waters and an unreasonable discharge of waters onto the 
Property."30 
 
Southport 
alleged 
continuing 
damage 
due 
to 
construction and due to maintenance of 120th Avenue.   
¶75 The Answer and Affirmative Defense do not mention Wis. 
Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) or state a date on which "damage occurred."  
Notwithstanding that omission, DOT convinced the circuit court, 
court of appeals and now those in the majority opinion that 
"occurred" means "happened" and that the damage happened when 
construction 
was 
complete 
in 
2009. 
 
Three 
courts 
have 
disregarded the rules of civil procedure relative to motions for 
judgment on the pleadings by failing to accept the averments in 
                     
29 Verified Complaint, ¶¶7, 10, 15, 17, 19, 28. 
30 Id., ¶28.   
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
13 
 
the Verified Complaint and to evaluate defensive pleadings 
fairly.   
¶76 In that latter regard, DOT's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings actually was a motion for judgment on its 
affirmative defense.  Intertwined with that defense are factual 
questions about DOT's ongoing maintenance of 120th Avenue and 
whether that maintenance factually affected Southport's damage.  
There also are legal questions about the meaning of "occurred" 
in Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) during construction and how that 
term is interpreted when continued damage is alleged to have 
been caused by DOT's on-going maintenance of 120th Avenue.   
¶77 It is not possible to decide the legal questions of 
statutory interpretation before deciding the factual questions 
about which types of actions by DOT caused damage to Southport.  
Therefore, DOT's affirmative defense cannot be determined solely 
by review of the pleadings.  Accordingly, DOT did not carry its 
burden as proponent of the affirmative defense and its motion 
should have been denied.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶78 This is not a case that can be decided on the 
pleadings.  I write in dissent because basic rules of civil 
procedure that control when judgment on the pleadings may be 
granted have been disregarded by three courts.  In addition, the 
majority 
opinion 
creates 
a 
new 
element 
for 
an 
inverse 
condemnation claim and converts an affirmative defense into a 
pleading requirement for Southport.  When this court disregards 
basic rules of civil procedure, changes pleading rules and 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
14 
 
overrules precedent of this court without so much as a by-your-
leave in order to obtain the outcome it prefers, it causes 
confusion throughout the court system that goes far beyond 
Southport's claim for inverse condemnation.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.     
¶79 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
 
No.  2019AP130.pdr 
 
 
 
1