Title: Christine Morden v. Continental AG

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0073 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Christine Morden,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross- 
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
Thomas Morden,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin Health  
Organization and Compcare,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Continental AG,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
Mr. P's Ideal Tires Corporation,  
 
Defendant.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  226 Wis. 2d 561, 596 N.W.2d 501 
 
 
 (Ct. App. 1999, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 16, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 30, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Francis T. Wasielewski 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross appellant-
petitioner and the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Robert A. Slattery, Alan E. Gesler, and Slattery & 
Hausman, Ltd., Waukesha, and M. Nichol Padway and Padway & 
Padway, Ltd., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert A. Slattery. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross respondent 
there was a brief by Frank J. Daily, Francis H. LoCoco, Daniel J. 
LaFave and Quarles & Brady, LLP., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Frank J. Daily. 
 
2000 WI 51 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No.  98-0073 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Christine Morden,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Thomas Morden,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin Health  
Organization and Compcare,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Continental AG,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
Mr. P's Ideal Tires Corporation,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Christine and Thomas Morden 
(the Mordens) seek review of an unpublished, per curiam decision 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
2 
of the court of appeals1 that reversed a judgment of nearly $7 
million entered in their favor by the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Francis T. Wasielewski, Judge.  The circuit 
court ordered the judgment after a jury found Continental AG 
(Continental) negligent in the design or manufacture of two mud 
and snow tires mounted on the rear of the Mordens' vehicle. 
¶2 
This action arose from an accident in which Christine 
Morden suffered spinal cord injuries that rendered her a 
quadriplegic.  In March 1991 Christine was traveling with her 
family to a Florida vacation in a Volkswagen (VW) Vanagon.  She 
and her husband, Thomas, had shared the driving responsibilities 
during the course of the 23-hour drive from Milwaukee.  Shortly 
before entering Florida, Christine took over at the wheel.  When 
the Vanagon crossed an overpass, the Mordens felt a dip in the 
road and heard a pop.  They assumed that their tires had blown 
out.  Christine Morden lost control of the Vanagon.  The Vanagon 
rolled over onto the grass median, landing on its left side.  
The roof of the vehicle crushed, and Christine Morden was not 
able to move. 
¶3 
The 
Mordens 
pursued 
both 
negligence 
and 
strict 
liability claims against Continental for the testing, design, 
and manufacture of the rear tires.  The Mordens also sought 
recovery from VW, the manufacturer of the Vanagon, Ernie von 
Schledorn Imports, Inc. (EvS), the dealer that serviced the 
                     
1 Morden v. Continental AG, No. 98-0073, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1999).  
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
3 
Vanagon, and Mr. P's Ideal Tire Corp. (Mr. P's), the retailer 
that sold the tires to the Mordens.  Less than two weeks before 
the jury trial began, the Mordens reached an agreement with VW, 
under which the Mordens received a settlement of $500,000 in 
exchange for a covenant not to sue VW. 
¶4 
After a four-week trial, the jury unanimously found 
Continental negligent in the design or manufacture of the tires. 
 It also determined that Continental was strictly liable for 
producing tires that were unreasonably dangerous.  The circuit 
court, however, found the strict liability verdict defective 
because the same 10 jurors did not agree on answers to the 
questions relating to strict liability and damages.  The jury 
also concluded that Christine Morden was negligent in the 
operation of the vehicle and that her negligence was a cause of 
the accident.  Although the jury decided that Thomas Morden was 
negligent in the maintenance or selection of the tires, it 
answered that Thomas Morden's negligence was not a cause of the 
accident.  The jury determined that Mr. P's and EvS were not 
negligent.  The jury did not hear evidence about the covenant-
not-to-sue agreement with VW, and therefore the court submitted 
no question about VW's negligence to the jury.  The jury awarded 
$10,467,408 in damages to Christine Morden and $1,237,830 to 
Thomas Morden.  It also apportioned 50 percent of the causal 
negligence to Continental and the other 50 percent to Christine 
Morden.   
¶5 
The circuit court approved the jury's verdict, with 
the exception of the strict liability determination, and entered 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
4 
a judgment on the Mordens' negligence claim.  Taking into 
account the 50 percent negligence allocated to Christine and 
adding additional costs and interest, the circuit court ordered 
that Continental pay $6,206,699.91 to Christine Morden and 
$636,328.04 to Thomas Morden.  
¶6 
Continental appealed.  The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the evidence presented at the trial was not 
sufficient to maintain the jury's finding that Continental was 
negligent.  The court concluded that the Mordens had not proved 
that Continental breached a duty of care to them.  The court 
reasoned that the Mordens failed to present evidence that 
Continental knew or should have known the design or manufacture 
of the tires was unsafe.  
¶7 
We frame four issues in this case.  First, the Mordens 
ask this court to address numerous questions underlying the 
broad issue of whether the evidence offered at trial was 
sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Continental was 
negligent in the design or manufacture of the tires.  Second, 
the Mordens would like us to determine whether the jury returned 
a defective verdict for the strict liability claim.  The Mordens 
present this second issue as an alternative to the first and ask 
us to consider it only if we affirm the court of appeals on the 
negligence claim.  Third, the Mordens propose that this court 
revise the rules of appellate procedure to prevent the court of 
appeals from filing per curiam, unpublished decisions in complex 
cases that reverse judgments entered after a jury verdict.  
Fourth, in its cross-response, Continental maintains that the 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
5 
circuit court erred when it did not advise the jury about the 
covenant not to sue negotiated between VW and the Mordens.  
Continental argues that the exclusion of this evidence prevented 
it from receiving a fair trial.  Consequently, Continental asks 
that we grant its request for a new trial if we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶8 
We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Continental was 
negligent.  Under a reasonable view of this record, we find 
credible evidence to support the determination of the jury.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.  Because we decide 
this case based on this first issue, we do not reach the 
Mordens' second, alternative issue relating to the validity of 
the strict liability verdict.  Similarly, we do not address the 
third issue pertaining to the scope of per curiam opinions 
because our decision today reverses the decision of the court of 
appeals.  For the fourth issue, we hold that the circuit court 
appropriately exercised its discretion when it declined to admit 
the evidence of the covenant not to sue.  We also find a new 
trial is not warranted because Continental has not shown that 
the real controversy at issue was not tried or that the trial 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
FACTS 
¶9 
The record in this case is extensive and reflects the 
protracted and acrimonious nature of the litigation.  Although 
the underlying facts are not in dispute, the parties challenge 
the inferences and conclusions drawn from those facts. 
No. 
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6 
¶10 On March 21, 1991, Christine and Thomas Morden left 
Milwaukee in their 1985, four-cylinder, VW Vanagon with two of 
their children, Melissa and Matthew, for a spring vacation in 
Florida.  They had made this trip about 15 times before in the 
years between 1977 and 1990, usually timing the vacation so that 
it would coincide with the Easter holiday.  The Mordens hoped to 
spend one week to ten days in Bonita Springs, a Gulf-side 
location where their parents have cottages.   
¶11 The Mordens began the trip at about 6:00 p.m. on the 
Thursday preceding Easter.  Christine worked as a daycare 
provider, and the Mordens waited to depart until the client 
parents had picked up their children at the end of the day.  
Thomas returned from his job at 8:00 a.m. that morning after 
completing a 24-hour shift as a firefighter for the Milwaukee 
Fire Department.  Neither he nor Christine slept during the day 
of the departure, but Thomas testified that he was not tired and 
that he typically was able to sleep at work during an 11-hour 
period between fire calls.  Each Morden expected to sleep during 
those portions of the trip when the other drove. 
¶12 The Mordens planned to drive straight through to their 
Florida destination, taking turns at the wheel in 200-mile 
shifts between tanks of gas.  Thomas Morden estimated they would 
travel between 26 and 28 hours.  They had driven straight 
through in this manner during their previous 15 road trips to 
Florida.   
¶13 Thomas Morden loaded the Vanagon for the vacation.  
Having made the trip before, he testified that over time the 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
7 
family had been taking fewer things with them.  In addition to 
four suitcases, Thomas Morden packed a 10-pound microwave oven, 
a cooler containing a 12-pack of soda, a few board games, and 
pillows and blankets.  He also mounted a Lazer, a one-person 14-
foot sailboat, to the roof of the Vanagon.  The Lazer is a flat-
decked, fiberglass craft, similar to a surfboard, that weighs 
about 135 pounds.2  Thomas Morden also attached a Hobie Cat, a 
lightweight sailboat consisting of a canvas stretched across two 
catamaran pontoons, to a trailer at the rear of the Vanagon.  VW 
had advertised a Vanagon/Hobie Cat package in the mid-1980s.  
One such promotion, apparently targeting VW retailers, featured 
a Hobie Cat perched on the roof of a Vanagon and promised that 
"these Vanagons will be sailing out of your showroom."3  Although 
VW promotional materials were not shown to Thomas Morden during 
the 
trial, 
Thomas 
recalled 
seeing 
a 
Vanagon/Hobie 
Cat 
                     
2 Thomas Morden testified that The VW Owner's Manual 
recommended securing no more than 200 pounds to the roof of the 
vehicle.  
3 The 1986 Fall/Winter issue of Volkswagen Parts and Advice 
featured on its cover a Vanagon parked on a beach alongside a 
small, one-person sailboat that resembles the Lazer Thomas 
Morden described and another sailboat akin to the Hobie Cat.  
The photo description stated that: 
[T]he cover picture tells the Vanagon story . . . a 
passenger 
van 
with 
versatility, 
reliability 
and 
durability that combine to make the Vanagon the single 
smartest purchase you can make to meet your personal 
transportation needs (Note: Cover photograph of the 
Vanagon GL is for promotional purposes only.  Off-road 
use is not recommended.) 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
8 
advertisement, and he believed that the Vanagon was designed for 
the purposes advertised, namely family trips and vacations.   
 
¶14 During 
the 
drive, 
the 
Mordens 
traveled 
through 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia.  They had 
followed this route on previous trips, and, depending on the 
date of the Easter holiday, the Mordens occasionally ran across 
inclement weather.  For instance, the family once encountered 
nearly eight inches of snow one spring near Atlanta.  Taking 
into account the potential conditions and the fact that the 
holiday fell early in the calendar that year, Thomas decided it 
was better to leave snow tires on the Vanagon.  
 
¶15 When the Mordens reached the last stop in Georgia 
before the Florida border, Christine assumed the driving 
responsibilities from Thomas.  They had been on the road for 
roughly 
23 
hours 
and 
were 
about 
360 
miles 
from 
their 
destination.  During that time, the Mordens experienced no 
problems with the Vanagon or its tires.  Thomas Morden did not 
notice any swaying of the trailered Hobie Cat.  Thomas explained 
that he had traveled so many times with the Hobie Cat in tow 
that he would check the trailer during stops, walking around to 
verify that it was tied down properly.4  He conceded, however, 
that the Hobie Craft "waddled a bit" if a semi-trailer passed 
alongside the Vanagon.   
                     
4 The Mordens had towed the trailer for approximately seven 
years without any mishaps.   
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
9 
¶16 Christine had been driving for about 30 minutes on 
Interstate 75 when the Mordens noticed heavy traffic as they 
approached Florida.  Thomas Morden was not able to see the 
speedometer from his position in the passenger seat, but he 
estimated that the Vanagon was traveling anywhere from 55 to 65 
miles per hour, moving with the flow of traffic.  The posted 
speed limit was 65 miles per hour.  Another driver traveling on 
the interstate, Scott Leonhard, testified that his cruise 
control was set at 72 miles per hour and that he and the Vanagon 
occasionally passed each other.   
¶17 As Christine continued down Interstate 75, she drove 
onto an overpass.  Thomas and Christine Morden felt a "dip" in 
the asphalt when the Vanagon crossed the overpass and returned 
to the highway.  After passing the dip, the Mordens heard a 
"pop" and assumed that the tires had blown.  Witness Leonhard 
observed the back of the van lift up off the ground.  To the 
Mordens, the Vanagon felt as if it were fishtailing on ice, 
light in the rear and lacking stability.  Christine slowed down 
to 35 or 40 miles per hour and made slight steering maneuvers, 
keeping her feet off the brake and gas pedals.  She continued in 
this manner for about a distance of three blocks, when the 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
10
Vanagon lost control.5  At that point, the vehicle rolled to its 
right side, swerved left, slid, and then bounced and rolled to 
the grass median, coming to rest on the left, the driver's side.  
 
¶18 Thomas Morden noticed that Christine was down low, 
lying on her left side behind the steering wheel.  At first, she 
told Thomas that she was okay, but she was not able to move or 
to lift herself from the vehicle.  Christine Morden was wearing 
a three-point restraint seat belt.  The belt allowed slack to 
travel down through the restraint to her lap.  Consequently, 
when the accident occurred, Christine's head hit the roof of the 
vehicle.  The roof of the Vanagon also caved in over her head.  
After paramedics removed the driver's seat and extricated 
Christine, she was transported 75 miles by helicopter to a 
hospital in Jacksonville, Florida.  The Morden family learned 
that Christine suffered a spinal cord injury that resulted in 
paralysis.  Christine Morden now is a quadriplegic.  
¶19 After the crash, Florida State Trooper Harry Fouraker, 
the accident investigation officer, inspected the area around 
the overpass and noticed nothing on the road surface that could 
have caused the accident.  Upon looking at the Vanagon, Trooper 
                     
5 Although witness Leonhard conceded that he could not see 
the Vanagon's tires at the time of the accident, he observed 
nothing to suggest that the vehicle lost control because of the 
blowout.  Rather, Leonhard attributed the loss of control to an 
abrupt lane change and the swaying of the trailer.  Leonhard 
observed the Hobie Cat trailer swaying severely before the 
accident.  A second witness reported to police that he saw no 
swaying, weaving, or signs that the driver, Christine Morden, 
suffered from fatigue.  
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
11
Fouraker saw that its rear tires were blown out and punctured 
and that the tires' sidewalls were ripped.  The Mordens' 
accident reconstruction expert, Morrie Shaw, later testified 
that both wheels on the Vanagon had ruptured simultaneously and 
suggested that a bump or dip in the overpass triggered the 
rupture.  Similarly, Continental quality assurance engineer 
Victor Bleumel, who inspected the tires, hypothesized that the 
tires struck something that precipitated the blowout.6  
¶20 Trooper Fouraker found the damaged tires unique and 
suggested 
to 
Thomas 
Morden 
that 
they 
deserved 
further 
investigation.  The officer made no similar recommendation about 
the Hobie Cat trailer, the Lazer sailboat, or the Vanagon 
itself.  Fouraker did characterize the loading of the vehicle as 
more consistent with a "mini-move" than a family vacation, but 
reconstruction expert Shaw calculated that the actual loaded 
weight of the Vanagon was less than the load capacity of the 
rear tires by a total of 1,178 pounds.  Similarly, Mr. P's tire 
consultant, Donald Avila, testified that loading had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the failure of the tires.  
 
¶21 The rear tires that blew out on Interstate 75 were 
Continental mud and snow tires that Thomas Morden purchased from 
Mr. P's in November 1989, about one and one-half years before 
the accident.  Previously, Michelin tires were mounted on the 
rear wheels of the Mordens' vehicle.  Morden read the Vanagon's 
                     
6 Victor Bleumel did not testify at the trial.  His 
deposition was read into the record by the Mordens.   
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
12
Owner's Manual, which instructed owners to purchase tires with 
the same specifications when making replacements.  In fact, 
Morden had worked as a VW mechanic at two different dealerships 
during the early 1970s.  Thomas Morden was not able to locate 
the same type of Michelin replacement tires.  When Morden 
acquired the Continental tires, he knew that they were bigger 
than what the Owner's Manual recommended, but he testified that 
he was "told they would work."  Thomas Morden also explained 
that he thought he "was getting a bigger, stronger tire that 
would work on the back of the car."  
¶22 As far as Morden knew, the Continental tires were a 
comparable size to the Michelins and thus would suit the 
Vanagon.  Tire consultant Avila found the dimensions of the 
tires and their loading capacity appropriate for the Vanagon.  
Similarly, the owner of Mr. P's and the employee who sold the 
tires to Thomas Morden stated that the Continental tires were 
acceptable.  Reconstruction expert Shaw and the Mordens' tire 
expert, John Taylor, disagreed, however, and stated that Morden 
had bought the wrong tires for the vehicle.  
¶23 When Morden purchased the tires, the invoice stated 
that the tires came from "old stock."  Both tires had been 
manufactured at the same plant in 1979 and were in Mr. P's stock 
for about 10 years.  Taylor admitted that he had no information 
about where or how the tires were stored during that 10-year 
interval, whether they were stored properly, or whether they had 
been used before.  Taylor suspected, however, that the tires had 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
13
only 12,000 to 20,000 miles on them.  Avila testified that the 
age and storage of the tires did not affect their failure.  
¶24 Thomas Morden did not know that the Continental tires 
carried a maximum tire inflation pressure rating of 36 pounds 
per square inch (psi).  Visually, the tires had looked fine to 
Morden from the day he purchased them until the accident, but he 
could not recall ever checking the pressure personally to 
determine whether the tires were overinflated or underinflated. 
 An employee of Tech Lube, a garage that serviced the Vanagon, 
stated that the vehicle's tires were inflated to 45 psi, or 25 
percent beyond the maximum rating of 36 psi, just three months 
before the accident.  The Mordens' own tire expert, Taylor, 
observed that the vehicle had been driven with overinflated 
tires for some time.  Taylor agreed that overinflation can 
contribute significantly to separation between the steel belts 
in radial tires.  On the other hand, tire consultant Avila 
explained that overinflation did not cause these tires to 
rupture.  
 
¶25 Steel-belted radial tires contain two belts, a top 
belt and a bottom belt, that adhere together.  The area between 
the belts is vulnerable:  When driven, the tires experience high 
centrifugal forces that tend to pull the two belts apart as the 
tires whirl.  Progressive belt separations can lead to the 
sudden failure of a tire.  If the belts pull apart, the tire can 
split open and flatten.  
 
¶26 To perform properly, steel-belted radial tires rely on 
adhesion between the belts to ensure that they do not separate. 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
14
 As tires age, they normally undergo some loss of adhesion.  A 
nylon device, the "cap ply," functions as an additional adhesive 
to prevent belt separation.  The cap ply wraps over the steel 
belts, runs around the circumference of the tire like an 
athletic bandage, and holds the belts down together.  The cap 
ply also prevents the tire from expanding in size as the tire 
makes its revolutions.  According to tire expert Taylor, 
manufacturers usually do not install cap plies in normal 
passenger tires, such as mud and snow tires, unless the tires 
are likely to experience a problem with belt separation.  
 
¶27 The weakest point of a cap ply is the splice, the area 
at which one end of the cap ply joins or overlaps the other end. 
 Cap plies can join in one of two ways:  (1) A "single wrap" 
design creates one layer of nylon cording with an area of 
overlap at the point of unison; or (2) a "double wrap" design 
winds the nylon cording around the belts twice so that the 
splice overlap covers the entire area of the belts.  Although a 
1974 patent for steel-belted radial tires acknowledged that 
single-wrapped cap splices were "known in the art," Taylor 
testified that double-wrapped cap splices were already in use in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  Taylor explained that the double wrap 
makes 
the 
splice 
area 
less 
critical 
by 
minimizing 
the 
possibility that the cap ply will pull apart at the splice.  
Double-wrap splices, Taylor suggested, eliminate the weaknesses 
usually associated with a single splice.  
 
¶28 The Continental tires that ruptured on the Mordens' 
vehicle featured a single-wrap cap splice.  The record does not 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
15
reveal whether Continental tested the strength of the single-
wrap cap splice on the type of mud and snow tires mounted on the 
Vanagon.  Taylor testified that both tires failed by splitting 
"right at this cap splice."  Continental's quality control 
engineer, Victor Bleumel, conducted a physical and x-ray 
examination of the tires.  Bleumel found a row of "bubbles" 
running along the inside of the tire from roughly a 12 o'clock 
to a four o'clock position.  The extent of the bubbles coincided 
with the length of the belt separation.  Taylor explained that 
the length of these bubbles, which were not visible from outside 
the tire, suggested that the belt separations had been present 
in the tire "for a good portion of its life" and had been 
growing larger as the tire was used.  
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶29 The 
Mordens 
filed 
a 
suit 
for 
damages 
against 
Continental, VW, Mr. P's, and EvS.  On August 1, 1997, 11 days 
before the trial commenced, the Mordens negotiated a covenant 
not to sue with VW.  They agreed not to sue VW in exchange for a 
$500,000 settlement.  Over a series of motions in limine, the 
circuit court ruled that evidence of this settlement was not 
admissible.  The court reasoned that the evidence would be 
admissible only if it would show that the alignment or testimony 
of a party in the case had changed as a result of the agreement.  
¶30 As the trial reached the end of its fourth week, the 
circuit court submitted a Special Verdict of 16 questions to the 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
16
jury.7  The Special Verdict asked the jury to determine the 
negligence of Continental, Mr. P's, and EvS, as well as 
                     
7 The Special Verdict stated: 
1.  Was the defendant, Continental Tire, negligent in 
the design or manufacture of the 215/70 mud and snow 
tires which were on the rear of the Vanagon at the 
time of the accident? 
ANSWER:  Yes 
 
2.  If you answered Question No. 1 "yes", then answer 
this question:  Was such negligence of Continental 
Tire a cause of the accident? 
ANSWER:  Yes 
 
3.  Were the 215/70 mud and snow tires when they left 
the possession of Continental Tire in such defective 
condition as to be unreasonably dangerous to a 
prospective user? 
ANSWER:  Yes 
 
4.  If you answered Question No. 3 "yes", then answer 
this question:  Was such defective condition a cause 
of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes 
 
5.  Was the defendant, Mr. P's Ideal Tires, negligent 
with respect to the selection and [/or] sale of the 
215/70 mud and snow tires? 
ANSWER: No 
 
6.  If you answered Question No. 5 "yes", then answer 
this question:  Was such negligence of Mr. P's Ideal 
Tires a cause of the accident? 
ANSWER:  ____ 
 
7.  Prior to the accident, was the defendant Ernie Von 
Schledorn negligent with respect to the maintenance of 
the tires on the Vanagon? 
ANSWER:  No 
 
8.  If you answered Question 7 "yes", then answer this 
question:  Was such negligence of Ernie Von Schledorn 
a cause of the accident? 
ANSWER:  ____ 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
17
                                                                  
 
9.  Was the plaintiff, Christine Morden, negligent 
with respect to her operation of the Vanagon at and 
immediately prior to the occurrence of the accident? 
ANSWER:  Yes 
 
10.  If you answered Question No. 9 "yes", then answer 
this question:  Was such negligence of Christine 
Morden a cause of the accident? 
ANSWER:  Yes 
 
11.  Prior to the accident, was plaintiff Thomas 
Morden negligent with respect to the selection and 
[/or] maintenance of the tires on the Vanagon? 
ANSWER:  Yes 
 
12.  If you answered Question 11 "yes", then answer 
this question:  Was such negligence of Thomas Morden a 
cause of the accident? 
ANSWER:  No 
 
13.  Assuming that the total negligence which caused 
the accident to be 100%, what percentage of that 
negligence do you attribute to: 
 
A.  Continental Tire 
(If you did not answer either Question No. 2 or No. 4, 
or answer both "No", then insert "0".) 
ANSWER:  50% 
 
B.  Mr. P's Ideal Tires 
(If you did not answer Question No. 6 or answered it 
"No", then insert "0".) 
ANSWER:  0% 
 
C.  Ernie Von Schledorn 
(IF you did not answer Question No. 8 or answered it 
"No", then insert "0".) 
ANSWER 0% 
 
D.  Christine Morden 
(If you did not answer Question No. 10 or answered it 
"No", then insert "0".) 
ANSWER:  50% 
E.  Thomas Morden 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
18
Christine and Thomas Morden.  Because VW was dismissed without 
                                                                  
(If you did not answer Question No. 12 or answered it 
"No", then insert "0".) 
ANSWER:  0% 
 
TOTAL:  100% 
 
14.  Regardless of how you have answered any of the 
preceding questions, please answer the following:  
What sum of money, if any, will fairly and reasonably 
compensate Christine Morden for any damages sustained 
by her as a natural and probable consequence of the 
March 22, 1991 accident with respect to: 
 
A.  Past medical, hospital and care expenses: 
ANSWER:  $416,843.00 
(answered by the Court) 
 
B.  Future medical, hospital and care expenses: 
ANSWER:  $2,850,000 
 
C.  Past loss of earnings from self-employment: 
ANSWER:  $75,000 
 
D.  Future loss of earning capacity: 
ANSWER:  $125,565 
 
E.  Past and future pain, suffering and disability: 
ANSWER:  $7,000,000 
 
15.  Regardless of how you have answered any of the 
preceding questions, please answer the following:  
What sum of money, if any, will fairly and reasonably 
compensate Thomas Morden for damages sustained by him 
as a natural and probable consequence of any injuries 
of his wife in the March 22, 1991 accident with 
respect to: 
 
A.  Past and future nursing care and attendant 
services provided to his wife: 
ANSWER:  $487,830 
 
B.  Loss of consortium of Christine Morden: 
ANSWER:  $750,000 
 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
19
objection, the Special Verdict questions did not address whether 
VW was negligent.  The Special Verdict also required the jury to 
apportion the percentage of causal negligence among Continental, 
Mr. P's, EvS, Christine Morden, and Thomas Morden. 
¶31 After five days of deliberation, on September 12, 
1997, the jury unanimously found Continental negligent in the 
design or manufacture of the tires and concluded that this 
negligence was a cause of the accident.  For the strict 
liability claim, 10 jurors found that the tires were in an 
unreasonably dangerous, defective condition when the tires left 
Continental's possession.  Two jurors dissented from this 
answer.  Ten jurors also determined that this defective 
condition was a cause of the accident.  Again two jurors 
dissented.  On the damages question, a different juror disagreed 
with the jury's answer.  Both Mr. P's and EvS were found not 
negligent.  The jury concluded that Christine Morden was 
negligent with respect to her operation of the Vanagon, and it 
found that her negligence was a cause of the accident.  Although 
the jury also found Thomas Morden negligent in the selection or 
maintenance of the Continental tires, it did not find his 
negligence a cause of the accident.  The jury apportioned 50 
percent of the negligence to Continental and 50 percent to 
Christine Morden.  The jury awarded $10,467,408 in damages to 
Christine Morden and $1,237,830 to Thomas Morden.  
¶32 The circuit court considered motions after verdict.  
Continental asked the court to overturn the jury verdict on the 
negligence claim and to find the strict liability verdict 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
20
defective.  The court agreed with Continental on the strict 
liability claim because the same 10 jurors had not agreed about 
all questions.  The court reasoned the strict liability verdict 
was defective under Giese v. Montgomery Ward, 111 Wis. 2d 392, 
401, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983), which requires that five-sixths of a 
jury must agree on all questions to support judgment on a 
particular claim.  
¶33 The 
court 
declined, 
however, 
to 
overturn 
the 
negligence verdict. Instead, the court adopted the jury's 
verdict as its own.  The court agreed that it was "reasonably 
foreseeable" to Continental that the design or manufacture of 
the tires posed an "unreasonable risk of injury."  The court 
observed that John Taylor had testified about Continental's 
failure to install the double-wrap cap splice.  Furthermore, 
other manufacturers commonly use double-wraps in the tire 
industry.  The court also responded to Continental's argument 
that the jury overlooked evidence that Christine Morden was 
negligent in the manner in which she drove the Vanagon by 
explaining 
that 
product 
misuse 
speaks 
to 
contributory 
negligence, and plaintiffs are not required to prove that they 
were free from negligence.  Evidence of misuse was presented at 
trial, and the jury allocated 50 percent of the negligence to 
Christine Morden.  
¶34 Finally, the court addressed Continental's request for 
a new trial.  Continental argued that the decision not to admit 
evidence of the VW agreement was prejudicial to its case.  The 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
21
court stood on the rulings it had made in earlier proceedings 
and declined the motion for a new trial.  
 
¶35 The circuit court entered an order for judgment on 
November 24, 1997.  The judgment provided that Continental must 
pay $6,206,699.91 to Christine Morden and $636,328.04 to Thomas 
Morden.  These sums represented the amount of the total verdict 
of the jury, reduced by 50 percent, plus taxable costs and 
interest accrued on the award in the interval between the 
verdict and the judgment.  
 
¶36 Continental appealed.  The court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court, holding that the evidence presented at the 
trial was not sufficient to maintain the jury's finding that 
Continental was negligent in the design and manufacture of the 
tires.  Morden v. Continental AG, No. 98-0073, unpublished slip 
op. at 2, 7.  The court accepted Continental's argument that it 
had not breached its duty of ordinary care.  In so holding, the 
court asserted that the Mordens failed to present evidence that 
Continental knew or should have known that the tires were 
unsafe.  The existence of safer, alternative manufacturing 
methods, the court said, is not sufficient to establish that a 
defendant created a product with a lack of ordinary care.  Id. 
at 4, 6 (citing Locicero v. Interpace Corp., 83 Wis. 2d 876, 
890, 266 N.W.2d 423 (1978)).  Rather, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant knew or should have known that the design or 
manufacture of the failed tires was unsafe.  Although the court 
acknowledged that the Mordens' tire expert testified that the 
tires ruptured because a separation occurred between the belts 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
22
in the radial tires, it concluded that the expert had not 
pinpointed whether that defect arose during the manufacturing 
process or in the course of the vehicle's operation.  
 
¶37 After the court of appeals issued its decision, the 
Mordens filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the court to 
reconsider its decision on the negligence issue and remand the 
case for a retrial on the strict liability claim.  Morden v. 
Continental AG, No. 98-0073, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
May 27, 1999).  The court of appeals denied the request and held 
that the Mordens had waived the right to a retrial for two 
reasons.  First, the Mordens failed to ask the circuit court to 
reinstruct the jury on the strict liability questions and to 
seek further deliberations.  Id. at 3.  Second, the Mordens did 
not raise the defective verdict as a basis for seeking a new 
trial on the strict liability claim during the motions after 
verdict. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT JURY VERDICT 
 
¶38 We begin our analysis of the first issue, namely 
whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's 
verdict in the negligence claim, by addressing the standard of 
review.  Our review of a jury's verdict is narrow.  Appellate 
courts in Wisconsin will sustain a jury verdict if there is any 
credible evidence to support it.  Meurer v. ITT Gen. Controls, 
90 Wis. 2d 438, 450, 280 N.W.2d 156 (1979); Giese, 111 Wis. 2d 
at 408.  Moreover, if there is any credible evidence, under any 
reasonable view, that leads to an inference supporting the 
jury's finding, we will not overturn that finding.  Ferraro v. 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
23
Koelsch, 119 Wis. 2d 407, 410-11, 350 N.W.2d 735 (Ct. App. 
1984), aff'd, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985); Wis. Stat. 
§  805.14(1).8 
¶39 In applying this narrow standard of review, this court 
considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's 
determination.  Meurer, 90 Wis. 2d at 450; Stunkel v. Price 
Elec. Coop., 229 Wis. 2d 664, 668, 599 N.W.2d 919 (Ct. App. 
1999).  We do so because it is the role of the jury, not an 
appellate court, to balance the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight given to the testimony of those witnesses.  Meurer, 90 
Wis. 2d at 450.  To that end, appellate courts search the record 
for credible evidence that sustains the jury's verdict, not for 
evidence to support a verdict that the jury could have reached 
but did not.  Wheeler v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 142 Wis. 2d 
798, 809, 419 N.W.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Gonzales v. 
City of Franklin, 137 Wis. 2d 109, 134, 403 N.W.2d 747 (1987)). 
 If we find that there is "any credible evidence in the record 
on which the jury could have based its decision," we will affirm 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(1) provides: 
(1) TEST OF SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.  No motion 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a 
matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer in a 
verdict, 
shall 
be 
granted 
unless 
the 
court 
is 
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
finding in favor of such party. 
 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1989-90 
volumes unless indicated otherwise. 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
24
that verdict.  Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 184, 368 
N.W.2d 676 (1985).  Similarly, if the evidence gives rise to 
more than one reasonable inference, we accept the particular 
inference reached by the jury.  Meurer, 90 Wis. 2d at 450; 
Ferraro, 119 Wis. 2d at 410-11.  This court will uphold the jury 
verdict "even though [the evidence] be contradicted and the 
contradictory evidence be stronger and more convincing."  Weiss 
v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 390, 541 N.W.2d 753 
(1995).  
 
¶40 The standard of review in this case is even more 
stringent because the circuit court approved the jury's verdict. 
 We afford special deference to a jury determination in those 
situations in which the trial court approves the finding of a 
jury.  Kuklinski v. Rodriguez, 203 Wis. 2d 324, 331, 552 N.W.2d 
869 (1996).  In such cases, this court will not overturn the 
jury's verdict unless "there is such a complete failure of proof 
that the verdict must be based on speculation."  Coryell v. 
Conn, 88 Wis. 2d  310, 315, 276 N.W.2d 723 (1979). 
¶41 Having addressed the standard of review, we now turn 
to the heart of the negligence issue by examining whether there 
is credible evidence in the record to support the jury's 
determination.  Given the narrow standard of review in this 
case, we undertake our analysis by viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the jury verdict and by accepting the 
particular inferences drawn by the jury. 
¶42 Wisconsin case law allows plaintiffs to seek recovery 
from a manufacturer for the defective design of a product under 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
25
a strict liability theory and/or a negligence theory.  Sharp v. 
Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 595 N.W.2d 382 (1999) (citing 
Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975) 
(Heffernan, J., concurring)).  The coexistence of the two 
theories has sparked confusion and criticism because both rely 
on an underlying product defect.  See id. at 19; see also Erik 
J. Pless, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Statute: Applying 
It To Liability Cases Brought Under A Strict Liability Theory, 
Wisconsin Lawyer (August, 1998).  Nonetheless, negligence and 
strict liability continue to offer separate avenues to recovery: 
 This court recently declined to overrule Greiten, the case in 
which Justice Heffernan's controlling concurrence set forth the 
key distinctions that separate the two types of claims.  See 
Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 16-17. 
¶43 The proof required in a strict liability claim differs 
from the quantum of proof in a negligence claim.  Under a strict 
liability theory, the plaintiff must prove the five elements set 
forth in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 
(1967).9  In Greiten, this court summarized these elements to the 
                     
9 In Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 
(1967), this court set forth the five elements of a strict 
liability claim:   
[T]he plaintiff must prove 
(1) that the product was in defective condition when 
it left the possession or control of the seller, 
 
(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer, 
 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
26
effect that, "It is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that 
the product reached him in a dangerously defective condition."  
Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 601.  Claims brought under a strict 
liability theory thus focus on the condition of the product.  
Tanner v. Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 357, 365 n.3, 596 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 
728, 734-35, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974)).  Strict liability requires 
a showing that the condition of the product was unreasonably 
dangerous or otherwise posed an extraordinary form of danger.  
Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 19. 
¶44 In a negligence action, by contrast, it is not 
necessary to show that the condition of the product reached the 
level of unreasonable dangerousness.  Id. at 7, 16-17; Greiten, 
70 Wis. 2d at 603.  In that respect, the plaintiff's required 
proof appears less onerous at first glance.  On the other hand, 
under a negligence theory, a plaintiff will not prevail by 
showing only that a product was defective.  The principles of 
negligence law hinge on a defendant's conduct, and therefore the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant was at fault.  D.L. v. 
                                                                  
(3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) 
of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, 
 
(4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling 
such product or, put negatively, that this is not an 
isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the 
principal business of the seller, and 
 
(5) that the product was one which the seller expected 
to and did reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition it was when he 
sold it. 
 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
27
Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 610, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983); see also 
Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 603.   
¶45 A negligence action requires the proof of four 
elements:  "(1) A duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) 
a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the 
conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage as a 
result of the injury."  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 
418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).   
¶46 Working under this standard of proof, the first 
question we ask is whether the Mordens satisfied the first 
element by showing that Continental owed a duty of care to them. 
 See id. at 419.  Wisconsin has long recognized that each 
individual owes a duty of care to others: 
 
The duty of any person is the obligation of due care 
to refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable 
harm to others even though the nature of that harm and 
the identity of the harmed person or harmed interest 
is unknown at the time of the act. 
Id. at 419-20 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 
99 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).  The duty of care of a 
defendant is established when we can state that it was 
foreseeable that the defendant's act or omission could harm or 
injure another person.  Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 
228 Wis. 2d 44, 55, 996 N.W.2d 456 (1999).  The first element, 
duty of care, therefore pivots on foreseeability.  Id. at 55-56.  
¶47 When assessing foreseeability, our courts do not 
require the plaintiff to prove that a particular injury is 
foreseeable; rather, it is sufficient to show that "some injury 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
28
could reasonably have been foreseen."  Fischer v. Cleveland 
Punch & Shear Works Co., 91 Wis. 2d 85, 97, 280 N.W.2d 280 
(1979). 
 
Moreover, 
the 
test 
of 
foreseeability 
expects 
manufacturers to "anticipate the environment which is normal for 
the use of his product."  Tanner, 228 Wis. 2d at 367 (quoting 
Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 896, 275 
N.W.2d 915 (1979)).  Consequently, the duty of care requires 
manufacturers to foresee all reasonable uses and misuses and the 
consequent foreseeable dangers, id. at 368 (citing Schuh, 63 
Wis. 2d at 742-43), and to act accordingly. 
¶48 To establish that Continental owed a duty of care to 
the Mordens, we therefore must determine whether there was any 
credible evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding 
that Continental knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care, 
should have known, that the tires posed a foreseeable risk of 
injury.  This analysis requires us also to consider whether 
Continental could have foreseen that dangers would result if the 
Mordens misused the tires. 
¶49 The court of appeals in this case held that the 
Mordens failed to prove that Continental owed a duty of care to 
the 
Mordens 
because 
they 
did 
not 
present 
evidence 
that 
Continental knew or should have known that the tires were 
unsafe.  We respectfully disagree.  Credible evidence presented 
at trial suggests that the Continental tires evinced a belt 
separation problem that made a rupture possible.  Tire expert 
Taylor testified that manufacturers do not install cap plies in 
tires unless they are likely to experience belt separation:  
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
29
"[T]he existence of the cap ply indicates that they were using 
that to overcome the problems of keeping the steel belts 
together."  Taylor explained that, "Normally you don't see a cap 
ply in a normal passenger tire except if it's needed in order to 
keep the separation resistance of the tire at acceptable 
levels."  The cap ply functions as "a Band-Aid to fix a problem" 
and keeps the belts together to reduce separations.  Based on 
this testimony, the jury could have concluded that the presence 
of the cap ply in the tire design indicates that Continental had 
actual knowledge of a belt separation problem, and that 
Continental could have foreseen that a belt separation was 
possible.  The rupture of the tires on the Mordens' vehicle was 
not a "most unusual and highly coincidental circumstance[ ] that 
had to be present for somebody to be injured."  Greiten, 70 
Wis. 2d at 598; see also Fischer, 91 Wis. 2d at 95.  It is not 
unusual to foresee that if tires are inclined to rupture, they 
are more likely to rupture and cause injury when a vehicle is 
traveling at high speeds. 
¶50 The jury in this case also could have concluded 
reasonably that Continental foresaw misuse of the tires.  
Continental's 1988 Tire Guide alerts owners to refer to the tire 
information placard "for the correct tire size and inflation 
pressure."  The Guide also notes that "replacement tires must 
have adequate load carrying capacity," and it outlines the 
proper load/inflation ratios for popular American automobile 
tire sizes.  Continental's inclusion of this information 
relating to load and tire inflation, designed "to assure 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
30
satisfactory tire performance," reveals that the manufacturer 
foresaw at least some types of consumer misuse. 
¶51 From the testimony and evidence presented at trial, 
the jury could have inferred that Continental knew or should 
have known that the tires foreseeably were prone to belt 
separations and that misuse of the tires would pose a risk of 
foreseeable injury.  Under the deferential standard of this 
review, we find that it was reasonable for the jury to infer 
that Continental owed a duty of care to the Mordens. 
¶52 Having established that Continental owed a duty of 
care, we now apply our standard of review to the second element 
of the negligence analysis by considering whether the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that Continental breached its 
duty of care. 
¶53 In determining whether a defendant breached the duty 
of care, we hold the defendant to the standard of ordinary care: 
 
Ordinary care is the degree of care which the great 
mass of mankind ordinarily exercises under the same or 
similar circumstances.  A person fails to exercise 
ordinary care when, without intending to do any harm, 
he 
does 
an 
act 
or 
omits 
a 
precaution 
under 
circumstances 
in 
which 
a 
person 
of 
ordinary 
intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee 
that such act or omission will subject the person of 
another to an unreasonable risk of injury. 
State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 732, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999) 
(quoting Wis JICriminal 1260); see also Wis JICivil 1005.   
¶54 Product manufacturers are held to this same standard 
of ordinary care.  Smith v. Atco. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383, 94 
N.W.2d 697 (1959).  In gauging the liability of a manufacturer, 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
31
we ask whether a "reasonably prudent person in the shoes of the 
defendant manufacturer" would exercise the same degree of care. 
 Id.  In a negligence claim against a manufacturer, "the 
plaintiff is simply required to prove that the defendant failed 
to exercise ordinary care and the act or omission complained of 
was the cause, in the legal sense, of the plaintiff's injury."  
Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 601; see also Fischer, 91 Wis. 2d at 92. 
¶55 To date, our courts have held that a showing by a 
plaintiff that better methods of manufacture exist does not 
conclusively prove that a defendant created the product with a 
lack of ordinary care.  Morden v. Continental AG, No. 98-0073 
unpublished slip op. at 4; Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 602; Locicero, 
83 Wis. 2d at 890.  Under this approach, negligence usually 
attaches only when the plaintiff can prove that the defendant 
selected the more dangerous route of manufacture knowing that it 
was unsafe.  Locicero, 83 Wis. 2d at 890. 
¶56 Manufacturers nonetheless are held to the "reasonable 
person" standard of customary methods of manufacture in a 
similar industry.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 616-17.  Although 
nonconformance with industry custom is not conclusive proof of a 
failure to exercise ordinary care, it does provide evidence to 
the jury about whether the defendant reasonably could have done 
something to prevent the harm.  Id. at 619; see also Fischer, 91 
Wis. 2d at 97.  Evidence of "the custom in the industry (what 
the industry was doing) and the state of the art (what the 
industry feasibly could have done) at the time" of the design or 
manufacture 
is 
relevant 
to 
the 
jury's 
determination 
of 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
32
negligence.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 616-17.  Given evidence of 
industry practices, the jury can make the determination whether 
the manufacturer reasonably and economically could have chosen 
an alternative course of conduct.  Id. at 619. 
¶57 The jury in this case reasonably could have concluded 
that Continental's failure to take the available precaution of 
using a double-wrap cap splice constituted a lack of ordinary 
care, even if the record is silent about whether Continental 
conducted tests on the single-wrap cap splice.  Existing 
technology addressed the danger of belt separation in the 
manufacture of radial tires.  A 1974 steel-belted radial tire 
patent states that:  "It is known that many types of tires, 
especially radial ply carcass tires . . . often fail at high 
speeds because separations occur in the shoulder zones of the 
tires where the edges of the belt plies are located."  Taylor 
testified that the single-wrap cap splice was not effective in 
preventing the underlying adhesion problem, adding that the 
double-wrap technology designed to eliminate belt separation had 
been known and generally used in the tire industry since the 
1960s and 1970s.  The patent acknowledges that single-wrap cap 
splices are "known in the art" but adds that such a design "does 
not, however, disclose a structure which overcomes either the 
problem of tire distortion and ply separation at high speeds."  
The patent alone may not establish the standard in the tire 
industry.  Taken together, however, the patent and Taylor's 
testimony 
illustrate 
industry 
knowledge 
and 
address 
what 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
33
feasibly could have been done at the time of the tire's 
manufacture.   
¶58 From this evidence, the jury could have reasoned that 
Continental should have chosen an alternative design to prevent 
the harm caused by belt separation.  Consequently, credible 
evidence exists that could have led the jury to infer that 
Continental breached its duty of ordinary care.  The inference 
is not the only one that a jury could reach from the evidence; 
nonetheless, an appellate court reviewing a jury verdict must 
accept the particular inference drawn by the jury.  Meurer, 90 
Wis. 2d at 450; Ferraro, 119 Wis. 2d at 410-11. 
¶59 We next apply our standard of review to the third 
element of the negligence analysis by determining whether there 
is credible evidence to support the jury's conclusion that there 
was a causal connection between Continental's manufacture of the 
tires and Christine Morden's injuries. 
¶60 The element of causation turns on "whether the 
defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the 
injury."  Nieuwendorp v. American Family Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 2d 
462, 475, 529 N.W.2d 594 (1995).  Our inquiry into causation 
focuses on the nexus between the design or manufacture of the 
tires and Christine Morden's injuries.  To discern whether such 
a nexus exists, we must determine whether the defendant's 
actions were a "cause-in-fact" of the injuries.  If they were, 
we explore whether the conduct of the defendant was a "proximate 
cause" of the harm sustained by the plaintiff.  Proximate cause 
involves public policy considerations for the court that may 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
34
preclude the imposition of liability.  See Miller v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 264, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  
After the determination of the cause-in-fact of an injury, a 
court 
still 
may 
deny 
recovery 
after 
addressing 
policy 
considerations, or legal cause.  Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 
526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  This case, however, does not 
turn on proximate cause.  Because legal cause is not at issue in 
this case, we focus our attention on the question of cause-in-
fact. 
¶61 In this case, the jury found that the design or 
manufacture of the tires was a cause-in-fact of the accident.  
In addition, 10 members of the jury concluded that the tires 
left the possession of Continental in such defective condition 
as to be unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user and that 
the defective condition was a cause of the accident.  Although 
the circuit court discarded the strict liability verdict in this 
case, the jury's answers to Questions 3 and 4 of the Special 
Verdict prevent Continental from now relying upon the kind of 
inconsistency in the jury verdicts at issue in Sharp, 227 
Wis. 2d at 18-19. 
¶62 Trooper Fouraker testified that the two rear tires of 
the Morden vehicle had drawn his attention.  The failed tires 
were the unique thing he saw in his investigation.  Accident 
reconstruction expert Shaw concluded that the two failed tires 
had undergone a belt separation.  According to tire expert 
Taylor, a degeneration of the adhesion between the radial belts 
caused the separation.   
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
35
¶63 Taylor 
hypothesized 
that 
the 
adhesion 
problems 
occurred either in the manufacturing process or in the operation 
of the tires.  He described potential manufacturing difficulties 
ranging from excessive heat to inadequate materials, to dust.10  
Taylor acknowledged that post-manufacturing problems, including 
the operation and maintenance of the tires, also could have 
affected adhesion.  These problems included heat, age, speed, 
and overinflation of the tires.  More than one factor could have 
affected adhesion.  These problems were foreseeable, whether the 
                     
10 During the trial, Taylor testified:   
In the manufacturing process it depends on the control 
of the materials involved, whether they are correctly 
formulated, whether they are processed properly.  If 
they are processed too hot, what can happen is your 
coating, the rubber on here, if it's too hot, the 
material starts to cure prematurely and then when you 
build the tire, bond it together, it doesn't bond 
properly.  Instead of getting the meld together, they 
will not meld properly and they will during the life 
of the tires cause separation. 
 
Conversely, if the material, if it's a tire that's not 
built often, a lot of times some of the materials have 
been gathered.  Because all the components come from 
different stations around the plant, if they age too 
long, they start to cure.  Again, with the same 
results, lack of knitting of the two belts properly.  
So aging is another property.  Just plain collecting 
dust.  All these things should be covered.  The 
materials should be covered in the manufacturing 
process because it gets dust on it.  Anything that can 
contaminate the surface 
will lead 
to 
separation 
problems, 
and 
then 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
other 
components is important because you have to protect 
this area.  The material needs to have protection of 
antioxidants in it, and antioxidants are chemicals 
that retard the influence of oxygen on rubber. 
 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
36
adhesion problems began before or after the tires left the 
Continental plant.  Taylor stated that each tire was defective 
because "the adhesive stem splice wasn't sufficient to take care 
of the tire during its life."   
¶64 The two failed tires were made in the same plant at 
the same time.  They were identical in design.  The tires failed 
at the same time in exactly the same waythe cap ply around each 
tire split at the same spot, the cap ply splice. 
¶65 Taylor testified that the belt separations in the two 
tires were of long-term duration.  Hence, the jury could have 
concluded that the separations did not occur on the date of the 
accident because of speed or the dip in the highway.  The speed 
of the Vanagon, the weight it was carrying, the highway dip, and 
other factors simply exacerbated the intense pressure that the 
already separated belts were putting on the "only structure[s] 
that [were] really left holding the tire[s] together," namely, 
the single wrap cap plies.  As a result, they came apart, and 
the tires ruptured. 
¶66 Taylor attributed the belt separation to Continental's 
use of the single-wrap cap splice.  The tires blew out because 
the "cap ply splice was not strong enough to hold the tire 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
37
together."  Taylor therefore concluded that tires would not have 
failed had Continental used the double-wrap cap splice.11 
¶67 Similarly, the deposition of a Continental employee, 
read to the jury at trial, could have led the jury to infer that 
the tires would not have ruptured but for the failure of the 
single-wrap cap splice and the ensuing belt separations.  
Continental's quality control engineer, Victor Bleumel, observed 
that both tires split open at the weak juncture of the cap ply 
splice.  Bleumel inspected the tires by way of physical and x-
ray examination, and he found bubbles inside the tires that 
coincided with the area of the belt separation.  He stated that 
the belt separation was a cause, "one factor," contributing to 
the failure of both rear tires and agreed that the tires 
probably would not have failed absent the separation.  
¶68 The failure of both rear tires simultaneously at 
exactly the same points within the tires buttressed tire expert 
Taylor's belief that a design or manufacturing defect caused the 
tire failure.  Morrie Shaw, the Mordens' accident reconstruction 
expert, also testified that the simultaneous rupture of the 
tires precipitated the vehicle's loss of control.  Similarly, 
the director of quality assurance for Continental, Dr. Rainer 
                     
11 Counsel for Continental conceded at trial that John 
Taylor's 
testimony 
supported 
the 
conclusion 
that 
belt 
separations caused the tires to fail:  "I can assure the Court 
that there is an enormous amount of testimony from Mr. Taylor on 
that very point, that there are belt separations, that the 
separations are what caused the tires to come apart when it hit 
the bump.  The record is replete in those references."  
No. 
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38
Stark, indicated that belt separations lead to tire failure, and 
the sudden failure of two tires simultaneously posed an 
increased risk of danger.  
¶69 Mr. P's tire consultant, Donald Avila, presented 
conflicting testimony.  He stated that "the tires had nothing to 
do with" the Mordens' accident, arguing that "the driver did 
something improper that caused the driver to lose control of the 
vehicle."  Notwithstanding this testimony, we usually uphold a 
jury verdict when credible evidence supports that verdict, even 
if that evidence is contradicted by stronger and more convincing 
evidence.  Weiss, 197 Wis. 2d at 388-90.  
¶70 Continental contends 
that 
a 
claim 
for 
negligent 
manufacture or design cannot prevail "solely on the failure of 
the tires" when the plaintiff "failed to exclude other potential 
causes."  It argues that the design of the tires does not give 
rise to an inference of negligence because other factors, such 
as the age of the tires and their misuse, were not eliminated as 
causes of the accident.  For instance, Continental maintains 
that the manner in which the Mordens loaded the vehicle, 
overinflated its tires, and drove the vehicle caused the Vanagon 
to bottom out and led the tires to fail simultaneously.  
¶71 We disagree for two reasons.  First, the standard of 
review in this case requires us to accept the inferences drawn 
by the jury unless those inferences are completely speculative 
and unfounded.  They are not.  The jury heard ample evidence 
that the Mordens may have misused the Vanagon.  The Mordens' own 
experts, Taylor and Shaw, testified that Thomas Morden purchased 
No. 
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39
the wrong tires for the Vanagon, and Taylor conceded that this 
constituted misuse of the tires.  The Tech Lube employee who 
serviced the vehicle explained that the tires were overinflated 
three months before the Mordens departed on their vacation, and 
Thomas Morden himself conceded that he did not check the tire 
pressure personally.  Taylor agreed that overinflation could 
contribute significantly to the loss of adhesion between the 
belts.  But the jury also heard expert testimony that minimized 
the effect of these factors. 
¶72 The 
jury's 
answers 
to 
the 
two 
Special 
Verdict 
questions about Thomas Morden's negligence suggest that the jury 
did not exclude other factors leading to the accident.  To 
answer those questions, the jury must have pondered testimony 
that the Continental tires were not the proper ones for the 
Vanagon, that the tires may have been overinflated, that Thomas 
may have overloaded the vehicle, and, perhaps, that he did not 
secure the Hobie Craft well enough to prevent the trailer from 
swaying.  The jury factored this evidence into the equation 
because it determined that Thomas Morden was negligent in the 
selection or maintenance of the tires.  The jury did not 
conclude, however, that his negligence was a cause of the 
accident.  These conclusions contradict the suggestion that the 
jury failed to consider causes other than the negligent design 
and manufacture of the tires. 
¶73 Second, product misuse, whether in the maintenance or 
operation of a vehicle, speaks to the affirmative defense of 
contributory negligence.  Schuh, 63 Wis. 2d at 740-41.  A 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
40
negligence claim does not turn on a plaintiff's ability to 
exclude other possible causes, and a finding of negligence does 
not 
necessarily 
address 
the 
only 
cause 
of 
an 
accident.  
Accidents, as Judge Wasielewski remarked, can have more than one 
cause, and plaintiffs are not required "to show freedom from 
their own negligence as part of their own case."  Instead, "If 
they were negligent, it's the job of the defendant to allege 
contributory negligence and to prove it."  
¶74 The jury in this case did not attribute the sole cause 
of the accident to Continental's negligence.  Rather, it 
discerned that more than one cause led to Christine Morden's 
injuries.  The jury found Christine Morden negligent with 
respect to her operation of the vehicle and determined that her 
negligence was a cause of the accident.  Thus, the jury 
apparently considered witness Leonhard's testimony that the 
Vanagon was traveling at a speed of about 72 miles per hour and 
changing lanes abruptly, and it may have taken into account tire 
consultant Avila's opinion that the driver of the vehicle did 
something improper that caused the Vanagon to lose control.  
¶75 The jury is free, as it did here, to assign a 
percentage of responsibility to the plaintiff for the harm he or 
she sustained because apportionment of negligence usually is a 
question of fact for the jury.  See Peters v. Menard, Inc., 224 
Wis. 2d 174, 193, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999).  The contributory 
negligence statute does not bar recovery to a plaintiff whose 
percentage of causal negligence is less than 51 percent.  Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045.  The jury apportioned 50 percent of the 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
41
negligence to Continental and the other 50 percent to Christine 
Morden.  Consequently, the statute does not preclude Christine 
Morden from recovering damages.  
¶76 The 
jury 
was 
unanimous 
in 
its 
decision 
that 
Continental's negligence was a cause of the accident.  Viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we 
believe that a jury could infer that Continental's failure to 
implement the double-wrap cap splice design was a substantial 
factor in the accident and constituted a cause-in-fact of 
Christine Morden's injuries.  
¶77 Our review of the negligence claim concludes by 
addressing briefly the fourth element of the analysis, namely 
proof that an actual loss or damage resulted from the accident. 
 The Mordens presented abundant evidence of the actual losses 
they sustained.  As the trial court observed, "[t]he damages 
here could be fairly termed as catastrophic."  A good share of 
the testimony by Thomas and Christine Morden focused on the 
debilitating nature of Christine's injuries and the care she 
requires.  We have no doubt that the record supports the jury's 
finding that Christine, a quadriplegic, sustained an actual 
loss. 
¶78 Considering the evidence in a manner that is most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that the record 
reveals credible evidence to sustain the jury's determination 
that Continental was negligent in the design or manufacture of 
the tires.  Under any reasonable view of the evidence, the jury 
could have inferred that the Mordens satisfied the burden of 
No. 
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42
proving each of the four elements of the negligence claim.  This 
is not a case in which there was a complete failure of proof 
that would lead us to find that the jury must have based its 
verdict 
on 
impermissible 
speculation 
or 
conjecture. 
 
We 
therefore uphold the judgment of the circuit court that approved 
the verdict of the jury and reverse the court of appeals.   
¶79 Because we reverse the court of appeals on this first 
issue, we do not reach the Mordens' second alternative issue, 
namely the finding of the circuit court that the strict 
liability verdict was defective.  Similarly, we do not address 
the third issue presented by the Mordens that asked us to 
consider the situations in which the court of appeals may file 
unpublished, per curiam opinions. 
CONTINENTAL'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL 
¶80 Having concluded that the evidence at trial was 
sufficient to sustain the determination of the jury, we now turn 
to the issue Continental presents to this court, namely whether 
Continental is entitled to a new trial because the exclusion of 
evidence of the covenant not to sue prejudiced the jury and 
resulted in an unfair trial.  We conduct this analysis in two 
parts, first looking at the scope of a trial court's discretion 
in 
making 
evidentiary 
rulings 
and 
then 
turning 
to 
the 
circumstances 
under 
which 
this 
court 
will 
exercise 
its 
discretion to grant a new trial. 
¶81 The 
standard 
for 
reviewing 
a 
circuit 
court's 
evidentiary ruling requires us to determine whether the court 
exercised its discretion appropriately.  Grube v. Daun, 213 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
43
Wis. 2d 533, 542, 570 N.W.2d 851 (1997) (citing State v. Pharr, 
115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983)).  In Grube, we 
commented that when we are asked to review evidentiary rulings, 
"we look not to see if we agree with the circuit court's 
determination, but rather whether the trial court exercised its 
discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in 
accordance with the facts of record."  Id.  If the circuit court 
applied the proper law to the pertinent facts and provided a 
reasonable basis for its ruling, we will conclude that the court 
acted within its discretion.  Id.; see State v. Gray, 225 
Wis. 2d 39, 48, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).  Here, we conclude that 
the circuit court's decision to exclude the evidence of the 
covenant was an appropriate exercise of its discretion. 
¶82  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.08 governs the admission of 
evidence of a settlement or agreement.  The statute provides:  
 
Compromise and offers to compromise.  (1)  Evidence of 
furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or 
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a 
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting 
to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either 
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove 
liability for or invalidity of the claim or its 
amount.  Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.  
This subsection does not require exclusion when the 
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as 
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 
contention 
of 
undue 
delay, 
proving 
accord 
and 
satisfaction, novation or release, or proving an 
effort 
to 
compromise 
or 
obstruct 
a 
criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
This statute precludes the admission of settlement evidence to 
show liability or prove the invalidity of a claim at issue.  The 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
44
last sentence permits admission of settlement evidence if that 
evidence is offered for other enumerated purposes, but it does 
not require the admission of such evidence. 
¶83 Consistent with this statute, a party may offer 
settlement evidence to prove the prejudice or bias of a 
witness.12  Anderson v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 337, 
350, 564 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Hareng v. Blanke, 90 
Wis. 2d 158, 167-68, 279 N.W.2d 437 (1979)).  The party may 
demonstrate prejudice or bias by showing that a witness changed 
his or her testimony or that the posture of a settling party was 
significantly different as a result of the settlement.  Id. 
¶84 In this case, Continental argued to the circuit court 
that the testimony of the accident reconstruction expert, Shaw, 
changed as a result of the settlement because Shaw did not 
testify about the crashworthiness of the VW Vanagon.  In 
response, the circuit court examined the last sentence of the 
rule and reasoned that there was no showing of witness bias by a 
change in testimony; rather, "[t]he only thing that's been shown 
is the testimony has been omitted."  After all, the court said, 
it was not appropriate for Shaw to testify about crashworthiness 
                     
12 In Anderson v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 337, 
341, 564 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1997), the circuit court advised 
the jury that the plaintiffs had settled their claims with a 
series of defendants.  The jury thereafter returned a verdict 
that Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc. was not negligent.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court had erred by advising 
the jury of the plaintiffs' settlement with other defendants, 
but it did not reverse the court because "there is sufficient 
evidence for the jury to conclude that Alfa-Laval was not 
negligent." 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
45
when no question about crashworthiness was put to him.  Thus, 
the court allowed mention of the covenant only for the purposes 
of showing bias insofar as the testimony of a witness had 
changed.  This colloquy demonstrates that the circuit court 
exercised its discretion appropriately by applying the proper 
law to the pertinent facts and by offering a reasonable basis 
for its conclusions. 
¶85 Continental argues that the circuit court misconstrued 
the rule by reading it too narrowly.  Continental maintains that 
Wis. Stat. § 904.08 should be read expansively to include the 
admission of settlement evidence for purposes other than those 
enumerated 
in 
the 
last 
sentence. 
 
Section 
904.08 
is a 
modification of Federal Rule of Evidence 408.  The third 
sentence of § 904.08 is more expansive than Federal Rule 408 in 
that it adds the phrase "proving accord and satisfaction, 
novation or release" to the list of the enumerated purposes that 
justify the admission of settlement evidence.  The Judicial 
Council Committee's Note to Rule 904.08 cites cases that 
"admonish 
trial 
courts 
to 
be 
cautious 
in 
determining 
admissibility."  59 Wis. 2d at R91 (1973).  Because the purposes 
enumerated in our rule already go beyond Federal Rule 408, 
§ 904.08 should not be expansively construed.  See also In 
Matter of Estate of Ruediger, 83 Wis. 2d 109, 127, 264 N.W.2d 
604 (1978).  Consequently, this court would find it hard to 
overrule a circuit judge who thoughtfully articulated a narrow 
construction of the rule. 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
46
¶86 Continental also relies on Johnson v. Heintz, 73 
Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976), a case in which this court 
concluded that "the trial court should have allowed appellants 
to identify which insurance companies were aligned with which 
parties and to further introduce the fact of settlement" to the 
jury.  Id. at 300.  Despite this observation, Johnson cautioned 
that admission of evidence pertaining to settlement details 
would undermine the purpose of § 904.08 and render the statute 
meaningless.  Moreover, although the last sentence of § 904.08 
authorizes circuit courts to admit settlement evidence under 
certain circumstances, the rule does not require a court to 
admit that evidence.  Thus, when parties have the opportunity to 
question the consistency of a witness's testimony, the exclusion 
of settlement evidence "can in no way be prejudicial."  Id. at 
301.  In such cases, the error does not warrant sanction of a 
new trial.  Id. 
¶87 Having considered the discretion of the circuit court 
in making evidentiary rulings, we now turn to the circumstances 
under which this court will consider granting a new trial.  This 
court approaches a request for a new trial with great caution.  
Grube, 213 Wis. 2d at 553.  We are reluctant to grant a new 
trial in the interest of justice, and thus we exercise our 
discretion only in exceptional cases.  Gonzalez, 137 Wis. 2d at 
133; State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 35, 398 N.W.2d 763 
(1987).  Where, as here, the circuit court has denied the 
parties' motion for a new trial, we recognize that "a circuit 
court is in a better position than an appellate court to 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
47
determine whether confidence in the correctness of the outcome 
at the original trial or hearing has been undermined."  State v. 
McCallum, 
208 
Wis. 2d 
463, 
491, 
561 
N.W.2d 
707 
(1997) 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶88 Bearing 
this 
cautionary 
approach 
in 
mind, 
we 
concurrently acknowledge the inherent and express authority that 
this court has to review requests for a new trial independently. 
 See id. at 491 n.13; Grube, 213 Wis. 2d at 553.  In determining 
whether parties are entitled to a new trial, this court "is not 
strictly limited by its erroneous exercise of discretion" 
standard of review.  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 491 n.13 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  Rather, Wis. Stat. § 751.06 
grants us the authority to "direct the entry of the proper 
judgment or remit the case to the trial court for the entry of 
the proper judgment or for a new trial" in a discretionary 
review of the case.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  Under § 751.06, 
this court may grant a new trial under one of two prongs: If (1) 
"it appears from the record that the real controversy has not 
been fully tried;" or (2) "it is probable that justice has for 
any reason miscarried."13   
¶89 We turn then to the first statutory prong and address 
whether the record reveals that the real controversy in this 
                     
13 The statutes extend the same discretionary authority to 
the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. § 752.35.  We have held that 
with respect to "the discretionary power to reverse under secs. 
751.06 and 752.35 the powers of the supreme court and the court 
of appeals are coterminous."  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 
18, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  
No. 
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48
case was not fully tried.  This court has recognized that there 
are two circumstances under which it is possible that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried:  (1) "when the jury was 
erroneously 
not 
given 
the 
opportunity 
to 
hear 
important 
testimony that bore on an important issue of the case;" and (2) 
"when the jury had before it evidence not properly admitted 
which so clouded a crucial issue that it may be fairly said that 
the real controversy was not fully tried."  State v. Hicks, 202 
Wis. 2d 150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996). 
¶90 In this case, Continental questions the decision of 
the circuit court to exclude the evidence of the covenant not to 
sue.  We examine Continental's request for a new trial, 
beginning with the first possible circumstance of the first 
prong, namely that the jury was not given the opportunity to 
hear important testimony that bore on an important issue in this 
case.  We find that the exclusion of the VW agreement did not 
diminish the jury's ability to hear testimony.  
¶91 This case is distinguishable from those situations in 
which this court previously has found that the exclusion of 
evidence prevented a full trial of the real controversy.  In 
Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 172, we held that a defendant in a sexual 
assault case was entitled to a new trial because the real 
controversy, which centered on the defendant's identity, had not 
been fully tried.  In Hicks, the defense counsel failed to 
secure the DNA evidence that could have excluded the defendant 
as the donor of a hair specimen critical to the identification 
of the assailant.  Id. at 152, 157.  The DNA evidence, we 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
49
concluded, bore substantially on the defendant's identity and 
therefore obscured an issue crucial to the case.  Id. at 161.   
¶92 The identity of the defendant was also at issue in 
Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 651, 245 N.W.2d 654 (1976).  A 
witness identified Richard Garcia as the person who had been 
present at a shooting.  Id. at 653.  At trial, Garcia denied his 
presence and provided an alibi but did not disclose that a 
friend actually participated in the incident and that the friend 
would have testified that Garcia was not involved in the crime. 
 Id. at 654.  In granting a new trial, we held that the 
identification of the defendant and his alibi were central to 
the dispute and that the testimony of the participating friend 
therefore was "very material and significant."  Id. at 655-56. 
¶93 In State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 327 N.W.2d 662 
(1983), a sexual assault case, the central issue hinged on the 
credibility of the defendant vis-à-vis the credibility of the 
victim.  The defendant in Cuyler testified on his own behalf, 
and his attorney attempted unsuccessfully to introduce the 
testimony of police officers who could address the defendant's 
character.  Id. at 136.  We held that the real controversy was 
not fully tried because the circuit court excluded critical 
testimony about credibility, a determinative issue in the case. 
 Id. at 141.  
¶94 Generally, this court does not grant a new trial 
unless it finds that the exclusion of the evidence "so clouded a 
crucial issue" that it prevented the jury from reaching a fair 
and just result.  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160.  The facts of this 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
50
case do not present the type of exceptional circumstances that 
clouded the issues in Hicks, Garcia, or Cuyler.  Our decision to 
grant new trials in those cases bore immediately on the central, 
sole issue at hand.  Here, evidence concerning the VW agreement 
did not go to the central issue in this case or prevent this 
case from being fully tried.  We therefore find that under the 
first prong of the statutory test, this case does not present 
circumstances so exceptional that they warrant a new trial. 
¶95 We next consider the second statutory prong for a new 
trial, under which this court may exercise its discretion to 
grant a new trial when "it is probable that justice has for any 
reason miscarried."  To grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice, we must find that "there has been an apparent 
miscarriage of justice and it appears that a retrial under 
optimum circumstances will produce a different result."  Garcia, 
73 Wis. 2d at 654.  Thus, unlike the first statutory prong, this 
second prong requires an appellate court to find that there is a 
substantial probability of a different result on retrial.  
Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 16-17, 19.  
¶96 We are not persuaded that admission of the evidence in 
this case would, under optimum circumstances, have produced a 
different result.  In Wisconsin, our established case law 
provides that a covenant not to sue does not affect a 
nonsettling joint tortfeasor.  Imark Indus., Inc. v. Arthur 
Young & Co., 148 Wis. 2d 605, 622, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989).  
Rather, the whole cause of action simply remains against the 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
51
nonsettling defendants.  Id.  The nature of the case against 
Continental did not alter as a result of the VW agreement. 
¶97 Our review of the record does not reveal that 
admission of the VW agreement would have yielded a different 
result at trial.  Even under optimum circumstances, it is not 
clear that the agreement with VW, the manufacturer of the 
vehicle, had any impact on the determination of the jury that 
Continental was negligent in the design or manufacture of the 
tires.   
¶98 Continental argues that by failing to disclose the 
agreement, the circuit court deprived Continental of its 
opportunity to impeach the Mordens' witnesses.  In particular, 
Continental points to the bias created by the fact that Shaw, 
the reconstruction expert, did not testify about the Vanagon's 
crashworthiness.  We disagree.  Shaw's pretrial opinions about 
the vehicle were before the circuit court, and Continental's 
lawyers could have asked Shaw whether he thought the roof or the 
tires caused the injuries.14  At trial, Shaw testified that the 
roof of the Vanagon caved in, and Continental's lawyers could 
have used that testimony to probe into more about the vehicle. 
¶99 Continental has not shown that admission of the VW 
agreement evidence would have produced a different result at 
trial.  On the contrary, admission of the evidence could have 
                     
14 As the trial court remarked:  "It's a basic law of 
evidence, though, that you can put in evidence for your case on 
cross-examination of somebody else's witness.  It's done all the 
time."   
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
52
had a prejudicial effect by implying that the Mordens had 
reached a monetary settlement with one defendant, making it less 
compelling to find in their favor as against Continental.15  We 
therefore conclude that Continental has not satisfied the second 
statutory prong for a new trial. 
¶100 The circumstances under which this court will exercise 
its discretion to grant a new trial are exceptional.  Hicks, 202 
Wis. 2d at 161.  Taking into account the appropriate discretion 
exercised by the trial court in its review of this evidentiary 
issue, 
we 
are 
not 
persuaded 
that 
this 
case 
presents 
circumstances 
exceptional 
enough 
to 
overcome 
our 
usual 
reluctance to grant a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
¶101 In conclusion, we hold that the record contains 
sufficient, 
credible 
evidence 
to 
sustain 
the 
jury's 
determination that Continental was negligent in the design or 
manufacture of the tires.  We further hold that Continental is 
not entitled to a new trial on the basis of the exclusion of the 
evidence of the covenant not to sue.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
                     
15 "Introducing 
settlement 
evidence 
is 
a 
potentially 
incendiary device, one that could lead the jury to conclude that 
the plaintiffs have received ample compensation from the real 
malefactors and no further recovery is necessary."  Daniel J. 
LaFave, 
The 
Admissibility 
of 
Settlement 
Evidence 
in 
Multidefendant Tort Cases, Wisconsin Lawyer (June 1998).  
No. 
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53
 
 
No. 
98-0073  
 
 
1