Title: Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bryant

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT     
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 38 
Docket: 
Cum-11-380  
Argued: 
February 15, 2012 
Decided: 
March 22, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and 
JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
 
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL A. BRYANT et al. 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
[¶1]  Michael A. Bryant, an owner and employee of Prime Cut Meat Market, 
assaulted another motorist in an apparent incident of road rage.  Prime Cut and its 
employees were insured by a policy issued by The Travelers Indemnity Company.  
The motorist and his wife appeal from the Superior Court’s (Cumberland County, 
Mills, J.) entry of summary judgment in favor of Travelers on its complaint for a 
declaratory judgment as to its duty to indemnify Bryant pursuant to the policy.  
They contend that the court erred in determining that Travelers had no duty to 
indemnify Bryant.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts are not in dispute on summary judgment.  On 
September 3, 2007, Bryant was traveling from a campground with his son, in a 
 
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truck that he owned, on Route 85 near Raymond.  The side of the truck was 
emblazoned with decals that said either “Prime Cut Meat Market” or “Meat 
Market.”  Bryant was co-owner of Prime Cut and was sometimes paid by the 
business as an hourly employee.  Bryant purchased the truck before his 
involvement with Prime Cut, and the truck was registered in his name.  Prime Cut 
did not pay or reimburse Bryant for the decals on his truck, nor did Prime Cut pay 
for the truck’s loan payments, gas, or maintenance. 
 
[¶3]  While stopped at a traffic light on Route 85, Bryant exited his truck and 
approached the driver’s side of Francis Latanowich’s vehicle, which was stopped 
just ahead of Bryant’s vehicle at an intersection.  Bryant struck Latanowich 
repeatedly in the head and chest1 because he “wanted [him] to know” that his 
driving had put other drivers, including Bryant, at risk.  In Bryant’s own words, he 
took “it upon [himself] to try to set [Latanowich] straight.” 
 
[¶4]  Latanowich and his wife, Donna, sued Bryant, Prime Cut, and their 
own automobile insurance carrier, Commerce Insurance Company, for, among 
other things, assault and battery, false imprisonment, negligence and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.2  Prime Cut successfully moved for summary 
judgment, and the Latanowiches stipulated to a partial dismissal with Commerce 
                                         
1  The Latanowiches denied this fact in their opposition to Travelers’s statement of material facts 
because Travelers cited the incorrect paragraph of the Latanowiches’ amended tort complaint. 
 
2  See Latanowich v. Bryant et al., 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 56 (May 13, 2010). 
 
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Insurance Company.  The Latanowiches and Bryant agreed to a settlement that 
included Bryant assigning all of his rights related to potential insurance coverage 
to the Latanowiches. 
 
[¶5]  On July 23, 2010, Travelers filed a complaint against Bryant and the 
Latanowiches seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify 
Bryant for claims arising from the altercation because Bryant was not an insured 
under its policy issued to Prime Cut for purposes of that conduct.  Travelers moved 
for summary judgment on its complaint.  The parties disputed only whether Bryant 
was leaving the campground to go to Prime Cut to check on the store’s freezers 
and the extent to which Bryant used his truck for work associated with Prime Cut. 
 
[¶6]  At the time of the incident, Prime Cut had a Store Pac Custom 
Insurance Policy with Travelers.  The declarations page of the policy indicates that 
Prime Cut’s business form is a partnership.  The policy states: 
 
SECTION II – WHO IS AN INSURED 
 
 
1.  If you are designated in the Declarations as: 
 
. . . 
 
 
b.  A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured.  Your 
members, your partners, and their spouses are also insureds, but only 
with respect to the conduct of your business. 
 
. . . 
 
 
2.  Each of the following is also an insured: 
 
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a.  Your “volunteer workers” only while performing duties 
related to the conduct of your business, or your “employees”, other 
than either your “executive officers” (if you are an organization other 
than a partnership, joint venture or limited liability company) or your 
managers (if you are a limited liability company), but only for acts 
within the scope of their employment by you or while performing 
duties related to the conduct of your business. . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
[¶7]  The court concluded that the policy language did not cover the 
incident, and it granted Travelers’s motion for summary judgment. The 
Latanowiches appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
[¶8]  We review the entry of a summary judgment de novo.   
Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Hankins, 2011 ME 82, ¶ 17, 25 A.3d 960.  We will 
uphold the summary judgment if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to 
the Latanowiches, “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  State v. Thompson, 
2008 ME 166, ¶ 7, 958 A.2d 887.  We review de novo whether the trial court made 
any errors of law in interpreting coverage under the insurance policy.  See Pelkey 
v. Gen. Elec. Capital Assurance Co., 2002 ME 142, ¶ 10, 804 A.2d 385.   
 
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[¶9]  Unambiguous contract language must be interpreted according to its 
plain meaning.  Cookson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2012 ME 7, ¶ 8, 34 A.3d 
1156.  “Any ambiguity in an insurance contract is construed strictly against the 
insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.”  Pelkey, 2002 ME 142, ¶ 10, 804 
A.2d 385 (quotation marks omitted).  “A provision of an insurance contract is 
ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations or if any 
ordinary person in the shoes of the insured would not understand that the policy 
did not cover claims such as those brought.”  City of S. Portland v. Me. Mun. 
Ass’n, 2008 ME 128, ¶ 7, 953 A.2d 1128 (quotation marks omitted).   
B. 
Policy Language 
 
[¶10]  The court did not err in concluding, based on the plain language of the 
policy, that Bryant was not insured either as a partner or as an employee of Prime 
Cut when he exited his truck at a traffic light and assaulted Latanowich.  Coverage 
for partners is provided “only with respect to the conduct of your business,” and 
employees are covered only for “acts within the scope of their employment . . . or 
while performing duties related to the conduct of your business.” 
 
[¶11]  Because his assault of Latanowich was not in “respect to the conduct” 
of Prime Cut’s business, Bryant was not insured as a partner when he assaulted 
another motorist.  Whether or not Bryant was en route to Prime Cut, his actions in 
 
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assaulting Latanowich were not taken “with respect to the conduct” of the meat 
market’s business.  See Thompson, 2008 ME 166, ¶ 7, 958 A.2d 887. 
 
[¶12]  Similarly, Bryant’s acts were not covered as those of an employee 
because the assault was not “within the scope of [his] employment” and did not 
constitute “performing duties related to the conduct” of Prime Cut’s business.  
Neither the assault nor Bryant’s motive for it were related to the conduct of Prime 
Cut’s business or within the scope of his employment with Prime Cut.  Cf. Mahar 
v. Stonewood Transp., 2003 ME 63, ¶ 17, 823 A.2d 540 (holding that a truck 
driver’s assault and threatening of a family was outside the scope of his 
employment because he “was not authorized to leave his truck to assault the 
[family], nor was he authorized to follow up the assault by harassing them on the 
highway [and his] . . . motive for assaulting and harassing the [family] was 
unrelated to any interest of [the employer]”).  Rather, Bryant took “it upon 
[himself] to try to set [Latanowich] straight.”  An ordinary person would not think 
that the policy’s language would cover his assault of another motorist, especially 
where the employee was off the clock and returning from a personal camping trip, 
and where the employee exited his vehicle in the middle of the road to “set 
[another driver] straight,” notwithstanding that the employee’s independently 
owned and maintained vehicle was marked with the name of his employer and that 
 
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he was on his way to the employer’s premises.  See City of S. Portland, 2008 ME 
128, ¶ 7, 953 A.2d 1128.  
 
[¶13]  Pursuant to the unambiguous language of the policy, the court 
correctly concluded that Bryant’s assault of Latanowich was not covered by the 
policy and properly entered summary judgment. 
 
The entry is: 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
John R. Veilleux, Esq., and Matthew T. Mehalic, Esq., Norman, Hanson & 
DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for appellants Francis and Donna Latanowich 
 
Laurence H. Leavitt, Esq., and Jonathan M. Dunitz, Esq., Friedman 
Gaythwaite Wolf Leavitt, Portland, for appellee The Travelers Indemnity 
Company 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Matthew T. Mehalic, Esq., for appellants Francis and Donna Latanowich 
 
Jonathan M. Dunitz, Esq., for appellee The Travelers Indemnity Company 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2010-359 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY