Title: Commonwealth v. Diaz Perez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-10581 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAVID NICANOR DIAZ PEREZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 4, 2019. - February 3, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  
Practice, Criminal, New trial, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 1, 2003. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 30, 2017, was heard by 
her. 
 
 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (John P. 
Pappas, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In 2003, the defendant was charged with murder in 
the first degree and possession of a firearm without a license 
in connection with a fatal shooting.  His first trial ended in a 
mistrial when the jury were unable to reach a verdict.  His 
2 
 
 
second trial, at which the defendant had different counsel, 
ended in convictions.  At both trials, the Commonwealth relied 
on the testimony of two eyewitnesses to identify the defendant 
as the shooter.  During the first trial only, however, an alibi 
witness testified that he had been inside a building with the 
defendant when the shooting took place on a street outside the 
building.  After his convictions, the defendant moved for a new 
trial, arguing that his second attorney's failure to call or 
even investigate this witness amounted to constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The second trial judge 
agreed and granted the motion.  The Commonwealth appealed from 
the allowance of a new trial.  Because we discern no abuse of 
discretion or clear error of law in the judge's decision, we 
affirm and remand for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  On March 22, 2003, the victim, 
Quirico Romero, was fatally shot at a baby shower.  The baby 
shower was attended by roughly one hundred guests (including the 
defendant), many of whom did not know one another.  The event 
was held inside a hall, and featured both a disc jockey and an 
open bar.  As midnight approached and the event concluded, the 
guests began to gather outside.  An argument then broke out 
between the shooter, his companion, and another guest in the 
street outside the hall.  This argument escalated into physical 
violence.  Eventually, the shooter produced a gun, firing it 
3 
 
 
once into the air and then twice more.  The victim, who also had 
been outside but who had not been involved in the initial 
confrontation, attempted to flee after the first shot was fired.  
He was shot in the back and later died of his injuries. 
 
b.  Proceedings at trial.  On July 1, 2003, the defendant 
was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree and 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  His first trial began in May 
of 2006.  A mistrial was declared because, after more than a 
week of deliberation, the jury were still unable to reach a 
verdict.  After the first trial, the defendant was appointed new 
counsel.  On June 12, 2007, the jury at the defendant's second 
trial, which involved the same prosecutor but a different judge, 
found him guilty of both charges.  Accordingly, he was sentenced 
to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the 
murder conviction.  He also received a concurrent sentence of 
from four to five years for the firearm charge. 
 
The principal factual issue at each trial was whether there 
was sufficient evidence to identify the defendant as the 
shooter.  The Commonwealth produced no physical or forensic 
evidence directly tying the defendant to the crime;1 it relied 
                                                          
 
 
1 The Commonwealth did introduce shell casings and other 
ballistics evidence tying the bullet that killed the victim to a 
gun recovered two months after the shooting in an unrelated 
matter.  No evidence connected the defendant with either the 
person who was found with this weapon or the weapon itself. 
 
4 
 
 
almost exclusively on eyewitness testimony.  While investigating 
the shooting, the police prepared a photographic array 
containing the defendant's photograph.2  This array was shown to 
six individuals who claimed to have witnessed the shooting or 
the preceding altercation.  Only two of them identified the 
defendant as the shooter.3  Neither witness had seen the 
defendant before the baby shower, and only one of them claimed 
to have seen the defendant actually fire the gun.  Both 
witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter at trial and 
were cross-examined.  The Commonwealth also introduced 
corroborating eyewitness testimony regarding the shooter's 
appearance, including his ethnicity,4 height, and attire. 
 
One of the witnesses testified at the defendant's first 
trial but not at the second:  Analdi Sanchez.  Sanchez asserted 
that he had been inside the hall with the defendant when the 
shooting occurred.  He also denied having seen the defendant 
with a gun.  On cross-examination, the Commonwealth identified 
gaps in Sanchez's memory.  The prosecutor also questioned 
                                                          
 
 
2 The arrays did not contain the photograph of any other 
guest at the event. 
 
 
3 The defendant also asserts that "wanted" posters featuring 
his face had been distributed prior to these identifications. 
 
 
4 Most of the guests were Puerto Rican or Dominican.  The 
defendant is Puerto Rican, and multiple eyewitnesses testified 
that the shooter was Puerto Rican as well. 
5 
 
 
Sanchez about his claim that he had not spoken with the 
defendant about the shooting, and his reluctance to come forward 
with his testimony until contacted by a defense investigator. 
 
c.  Subsequent procedural history.  Following his 
convictions, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in 
this court.  His appeal has remained stayed due to various 
delays.  In March 2017, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial in this court, and that motion was remanded to the 
Superior Court.  Represented by yet another attorney, the 
defendant argued that the failure of his second trial counsel 
(successor counsel) to call Sanchez or to investigate Sanchez's 
prior testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, 
and therefore violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  Sitting as the motion judge, 
the judge who had presided at the defendant's second trial 
conducted evidentiary hearings on June 28 and August 6, 2018. 
 
The judge found that successor counsel had spoken with the 
defendant's previous counsel to obtain the defendant's case file 
after being appointed to represent him in July 2006.  Upon 
reviewing the file, successor counsel knew that the defendant's 
first trial had ended in a mistrial and that it had turned on 
the reliability of eyewitness testimony.  The file, however, did 
not contain a trial transcript.  So, in October of 2006, 
6 
 
 
successor counsel filed a motion to obtain transcripts from the 
first trial. 
 
Before the second trial began, successor counsel met with 
the defendant's mother.  His mother mentioned that Sanchez had 
testified and might be available to do so again, but she did not 
explain the substance of Sanchez's testimony.5  Successor counsel 
thus had "no idea" that Sanchez's testimony placed the defendant 
away from the scene of the shooting when it happened.  She did 
not hire a private investigator to locate or talk to Sanchez, or 
make any effort to contact him or to ascertain the content of 
his testimony, a decision the judge called "inexplicabl[e]."  
While counsel ultimately did put Sanchez on her witness list, 
she testified at the evidentiary hearing that her practice was 
to provide the names of all possible witnesses so that potential 
jurors could hear them. 
 
Two weeks before the second trial began, the trial 
transcripts still had not arrived.  Only then did successor 
counsel move for a continuance.  Her motions did not mention 
Sanchez or explain that she needed the transcripts to understand 
his testimony; the motions were denied.6  The transcripts arrived 
                                                          
 
 
5 Analdi Sanchez did not testify before the grand jury. 
 
 
6 Successor counsel had no explanation for why she did not 
mention Sanchez or renew her motion for a continuance as the 
trial approached.  When pressed on this issue at the evidentiary 
hearing, she admitted that "Sanchez just slipped through, and he 
7 
 
 
at the eleventh hour:  the certification for the transcript 
volume containing Sanchez's testimony is dated May 31, 2007, 
which is the very day that the second trial began.  At trial, 
successor counsel had the transcripts, but she did not call 
Sanchez or attempt to show that he was unavailable in order to 
introduce his prior testimony.  At the evidentiary hearing, 
counsel acknowledged that she could have taken either course of 
action, and she could not explain why she had not. 
 
Based on these findings, the judge concluded that successor 
counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Applying the traditional standard this court set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), the judge 
reasoned that counsel's failure to investigate Sanchez fell 
short of the standard of competence expected from an ordinary 
lawyer, and that this failure deprived the defendant of a 
substantial ground of defense.  The judge described the 
Commonwealth's case as "far from overwhelming," noting that only 
two out of six eyewitnesses presented with the photographic 
array had identified the defendant as the perpetrator.  She also 
observed that the incident took place at night following a party 
where alcohol had been consumed.  Accordingly, she wrote that 
evidence "placing the defendant elsewhere when the shooting 
                                                          
 
shouldn't have.  He should not have. . . .  Frankly, I didn't 
think much about him . . . ." 
8 
 
 
occurred would necessarily be important."  The judge was not 
persuaded that issues with Sanchez's testimony, including 
inconsistencies between his account of events and those given by 
other witnesses, would have negated the impact of the testimony; 
such issues were for the jury to decide.  In September of 2018, 
the judge therefore allowed the defendant's motion for a new 
trial.  The Commonwealth then appealed. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth contests both that 
successor counsel was ineffective and that any error on her part 
prejudiced the defendant.  Even if we found its arguments 
persuasive, which we do not, the Commonwealth has not shown that 
the judge abused her discretion in allowing the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  "The trial judge upon motion in 
writing may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that 
justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  The decision to allow a new 
trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion and "will not be 
reversed unless it is manifestly unjust."  Commonwealth v. 
Gorham, 472 Mass. 112, 117 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Nieves, 429 Mass. 763, 770 (1999).  Accord Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 461 (2014) (decision on motion for new 
trial is reviewed for "significant error of law or other abuse 
of discretion" [citation omitted]).  "We afford particular 
9 
 
 
deference to a decision on a motion for a new trial based on 
claims of ineffective assistance where the motion judge was, as 
here, the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 
316 (2014). 
 
Taking this deferential approach, this court is called upon 
to determine whether successor counsel erred in failing to 
investigate Sanchez's testimony and whether that failure likely 
influenced the jury's verdicts.  In general, a motion judge may 
consider numerous factors to decide whether "justice may not 
have been done" and a new trial is warranted.  See Commonwealth 
v. Brescia, 471 Mass. 381, 390–391 (2015), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Lombardi, 378 Mass. 612, 616 (1979) (mentioning four 
factors).  See also Commonwealth v. Maynard, 436 Mass. 558, 570 
(2002).  If the motion for a new trial is based on a 
constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
judges are guided by a prejudicial error standard.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Epps, 474 Mass. 743, 756–757 (2016), citing 
Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96; Brescia, supra at 388–390 & n.10, 391 
& n.11.  To assess whether such an error occurred, a judge 
ordinarily is called upon to apply the standard set forth in 
Saferian, supra.  Here, the judge applied this standard and 
found it met. 
In cases of murder in the first degree, however, we do not 
apply the Saferian standard in our own review of ineffective 
10 
 
 
assistance of counsel claims; rather, "we apply the more 
favorable standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and review [the] 
claim to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 
62 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 472 
(2018).  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681–682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  "That is, we determine 
[(1)] whether defense counsel erred in the course of the trial 
and, [(2)] if so, whether that error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Seino, supra.  We address each of these elements in 
turn. 
 
b.  Whether counsel erred.  The initial issue is whether 
successor counsel erred in failing to call Sanchez or to 
investigate his testimony.  Both the Massachusetts and Federal 
Constitutions require defense counsel "to conduct an independent 
investigation of the facts."  Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 
519, 529 (2003), citing Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96, and 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).  While 
defense counsel need not investigate every possible lead, any 
decision not to investigate or to limit an investigation must be 
supported by reasonable professional judgment.  See Commonwealth 
v. Long, 476 Mass. 526, 532 (2017); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 433 
Mass. 93, 102 (2000).  Absent a reasonable investigation, 
11 
 
 
defense counsel lacks sufficient information to evaluate his or 
her strategic options and to make decisions in the best 
interests of the client.  See Long, supra. 
 
The requirement of a reasonable investigation includes a 
duty to pursue witnesses with potentially exculpatory testimony.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Farley, 432 Mass. 153, 156 (2000), 
S.C., 443 Mass. 740 (2005). Discharging this duty requires, "if 
necessary[,] drawing on experts or investigators for help."  
Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass. 150, 160 (2015).  Here, the 
judge found that, although successor counsel was aware of 
Sanchez and that he had testified at the first trial, she made 
no attempt to locate or to speak with him, either personally or 
through a private investigator, nor did she discuss his 
testimony with the defendant's previous counsel.  As a result, 
successor counsel lacked the ability to determine whether 
calling Sanchez as a witness might have bolstered the 
defendant's case, or weakened that of the prosecution.  As the 
judge reasoned, "With no knowledge about [Sanchez's] prior 
testimony, [successor counsel] was not making a strategic 
decision; that would have required some knowledge of what 
Sanchez had to say." 
It is irrelevant that successor counsel may have had access 
to and read a transcript of Sanchez's testimony on the day that 
the second trial began; due to her inadequate investigation 
12 
 
 
before trial, she lacked both the preparation and the time to 
make effective use of this testimony, or to make an informed 
deliberation as to its reliability.  See Commonwealth v. Lang, 
473 Mass. 1, 19 (2015) (Lenk, J., concurring) ("Our case law 
does not support [an] assessment of counsel's strategic 
decisions in isolation from [a] constitutionally inadequate 
investigation"). 
In any event, successor counsel was unable to explain her 
decision not to call Sanchez or to attempt to introduce his 
testimony after she had obtained the transcripts.  Commonwealth 
v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704 (2000), is instructive.  There, counsel 
failed to call a witness whose testimony contradicted the 
Commonwealth's theory of how events unfolded.  See id. at 718.  
This witness had testified at the trial of an alleged 
accomplice, who was acquitted; the witness did not testify at 
the trial of the defendant, who was convicted of murder in the 
first degree.  See id. at 704, 717.  Because the motion judge 
found "no credible explanation for not calling [the witness]," 
we affirmed the judge's conclusion that counsel had been 
ineffective.  Id. at 718.  Similarly, Sanchez provided testimony 
contradicting the Commonwealth's theory of the case at the 
defendant's first trial, and a mistrial was declared.  So, at 
least some credible explanation from successor counsel was 
required as to why Sanchez was not called at the second trial.  
13 
 
 
No such explanation was given, and successor counsel testified 
explicitly that she had none.  
 
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the judge was 
unreasonable in finding successor counsel's performance 
ineffective, much less that the judge abused her discretion. 
 
c.  Prejudice from error.  Having determined that successor 
counsel erred, we turn to the impact of this error on the jury.  
"We review to determine whether 'better work might have 
accomplished something material for the defense,' Commonwealth 
v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977), or whether any error 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, 
[Wright, 411 Mass. at 682]."  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 
Mass. 168, 184 (2000).  To demonstrate such a likelihood, it is 
sufficient for the defendant to show that "any such error 'was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 698 (2016), quoting Wright, supra.  
Accord Alcide, 472 Mass. at 158.  "One type of situation in 
which such a showing may be made is where counsel neglected 
evidence that another person committed the crime, and that 
evidence, if developed, might have raised a reasonable doubt 
about whether the defendant or someone else had killed the 
victim" (quotations and citations omitted).  Id.   
 
"Where a defendant moves for a new trial based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing adequately to 
14 
 
 
investigate a potential . . . defense, the judge may not deny 
the motion based on the judge's own assessment of a potential 
expert's credibility or based on the general observation that 
juries routinely reject [such a] defense[]."  Lang, 473 Mass. at 
21 n.1.  See Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 281 n.5 
(1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 225 (2003).  We have stressed that "[a] 
judge weighing whether a new trial is warranted in light of 
these and similar factors . . . must focus on the probable 
effect of the circumstances on the jury's decision-making, and 
not on his or her own 'personal assessment of the trial record,' 
see Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 411 (1992), in order 
to 'preserve[] . . . the defendant's right to the judgment of 
his peers.'  Id."  Brescia, 471 Mass. at 391. 
Here, whether "better work" might have been done is not 
entirely theoretical:  the defendant's first trial, at which 
Sanchez testified that the defendant had been inside with him 
when the shooting occurred, resulted in a mistrial.  At each 
trial, the primary evidence against the defendant consisted of 
two eyewitness identifications.  As the second trial judge 
stated, "any evidence that would undercut these two 
identifications by placing the defendant elsewhere when the 
shooting occurred would necessarily be important." 
The importance of Sanchez's testimony also must be put in 
context.  The judge appraised the Commonwealth's case as "far 
15 
 
 
from overwhelming."  The case did not rely on forensic or other 
physical evidence.  It did not turn on incriminating statements 
by the defendant.  Instead, this case centered on eyewitness 
testimony.  "[M]istaken eyewitness identification is the primary 
cause of erroneous convictions, outstripping all other causes 
combined, and . . . suggestive identification procedures are the 
primary cause of mistaken identifications."  Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 293 (2006) (Cordy, J., dissenting) 
(noting also that "[o]f the first 163 exonerations secured 
through the use of [deoxyribonucleic acid] evidence, for 
example, we know that seventy-seven percent of the convictions 
were the product of mistaken eyewitness identifications").  See 
id. at 293 nn.2–3 (identifying numerous studies calling 
reliability of eyewitness testimony into question).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 Mass. 731, 746 (2012), quoting Martin, 
supra at 293 & n.4.  Indeed, the research on mistaken eyewitness 
identification is now so broadly accepted scientifically that we 
have required that instruction on the five principles of 
eyewitness identification, as identified in studies on mistaken 
eyewitness identification, be included in the model jury 
instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 364-378 
(2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 (2018), quoting Martin, supra at 
293, and cases cited.  See generally Model Jury Instructions on 
Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. 1051 (2015). 
16 
 
 
Here, the Commonwealth relied primarily on the nighttime 
recollections of eyewitnesses in the chaotic aftermath of a 
party where alcohol had been served.  The eyewitnesses were 
shown a photographic array that displayed the face of only one 
guest from the baby shower:  the defendant.7  The two eyewitness 
who identified the defendant as the shooter did not know him, 
and four other eyewitnesses who were shown the photographic 
array did not identify the defendant as the shooter.  See Gomes, 
470 Mass. at 364-378.  Given these imperfections in the 
Commonwealth's case, affirmative testimony that the defendant 
could not have been the shooter might have had a significant 
impact on the jury's deliberations. 
The Commonwealth argues that, in determining whether 
Sanchez's testimony might have influenced the jury, the judge 
did not consider adequately Sanchez's credibility.  We disagree.  
The question before us is whether the missing testimony likely 
could have influenced the jury's verdicts, not whether the jury 
must have believed it.  See, e.g., Gomes, 470 Mass. at 364-378; 
Roberio, 428 Mass. at 281–282.  Thus, in evaluating whether 
Sanchez's testimony might have factored into the jury's 
deliberations, it would have been "error for the judge to deny 
                                                          
 
 
7 The defendant also has implied that these eyewitnesses 
might have been prompted by "wanted" posters featuring his face.  
See note 3, supra. 
17 
 
 
the motion for a new trial based on [her] assessment of the 
[witness's] credibility."  Roberio, supra.  Rather, as the judge 
correctly held, once a judge has determined that the testimony 
of a witness proffered by the defendant is not "so devoid of 
credibility as to render it unworthy of belief," Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 311-312 (1986),8 "the issue of credibility 
[is] for a jury, not the judge," to determine.  Roberio, supra 
at 281. 
The two cases cited by the Commonwealth do not undermine 
the principle that credibility assessments are for the jury.  
Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertions, the Appeals Court's 
determination that there was prejudicial error in Commonwealth 
v. Hampton, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 168-171 (2015), did not rest 
on the defendant's claim of self-defense; its holding was that 
                                                          
 
 
8 We note that this is not a case of a witness who recants 
his or her testimony many years after the fact, compare 
Commonwealth v. Tobin, 392 Mass. 604, 618 (1984), where a judge 
should give "serious consideration" to whether any reasonable 
juror possibly could credit that testimony in deciding whether 
it warrants a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 377 Mass. 
814, 838 (1979), S.C., 409 Mass. 110 (1991); Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 393 Mass. 523, 537 (1984).  In cases of recantation, 
where the trial otherwise was determined to have been fair, 
considerations of finality weigh more heavily.  See Commonwealth 
v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306–308 (1986).  By contrast, an 
"ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the 
crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is 
reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the 
appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower."  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 
18 
 
 
"[w]here, as here, the only issue at trial was whom to believe, 
and the witness was the defendant's sole corroborating witness, 
the question of the witness's credibility should have been left 
to the jury."  Id. at 171.  So too in this case. 
The Commonwealth also points to Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 414, 
which suggested that if "undisclosed evidence . . . lacks 
credibility . . . , the failure to disclose that evidence does 
not warrant the granting of a new trial."  This was dicta:  the 
court in Tucceri affirmed an order for a new trial based on the 
prosecution's failure to disclose photographs indicating that 
the defendant's facial features did not match the victim's 
description of her attacker.  See id. at 414–415.  Here as well, 
the evidence in question (if believed) would tend to suggest 
that another person was responsible for the crime.   
As the Commonwealth acknowledges, there are no reported 
decisions of this court in which the dicta in Tucceri has been 
interpreted to permit a judge to evaluate a witness's 
credibility under the second prong of Saferian.9  To the 
contrary, we have held that, particularly where "a case is 'a 
weak one for conviction,'" Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
 9 Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 411, 413 (1992), 
did not involve a charge of murder in the first degree; 
accordingly, this court applied a variant of the Saferian 
standard, which is less protective than that of Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).   
19 
 
 
607, 623 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Bennett, 43 Mass. App. 
Ct. 154, 162 (1997), "the determination that the evidence likely 
was a real factor in the jury's deliberations demands a new 
trial.  We have justified this approach as 'preserv[ing], as 
well as it can in the circumstances, the defendant's right to 
the judgment of his peers,' since it ensures that the court's 
analysis turns on 'what effect the omission might have had on 
the jury,' rather than on 'what . . . impact the late disclosed 
evidence has on the judge's personal assessment of the trial 
record,'" Cowels, supra, quoting Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 411. 
Here, cognizant of all that had happened at trial, the 
judge determined that Sanchez's testimony "necessarily [would] 
be important" to the jury's deliberations.  This statement 
functions as an implicit finding that a reasonable jury could 
have credited the testimony.  The judge therefore did not abuse 
her discretion in deciding that, rather than substituting her 
own judgment, it should be left to the jury to assess the value 
of Sanchez's testimony. 
As a result, the judge neither erred nor abused her 
discretion in finding that Sanchez's testimony likely would have 
influenced the jury's decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed.