Title: Ex parte Johnny Lee Self

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  September 10, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2021
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Ex parte Johnny Lee Self
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Johnny Lee Self
v.
State of Alabama)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-03-1269.60 and CC-03-1270.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-19-0978)
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MENDHEIM, Justice.
Johnny Lee Self petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Self v. State (No. CR-19-
0978, Jan. 29, 2021), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (table), a
3-2 decision affirming the Jefferson Circuit Court's summary dismissal of
Self's Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief.  We
granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision is in conflict with Barnes v. State, 708 So. 2d 217 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1997).  We conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision is in conflict with Barnes, and we reverse the Court of Criminal
Appeals' judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
In September 2003, Self pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree
sexual abuse, violations of § 13A-6-66, Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced
to 25 years' imprisonment; the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree is
a Class C felony.  Self did not appeal his guilty-plea convictions or sentences.
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On November 7, 2019, Self filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition
challenging his convictions and sentences.  In his petition, Self alleged
that he had been improperly sentenced to serve 25 years in prison because
the maximum sentence authorized for a Class C felony is 10 years, see
§ 13A-5-6(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, and, Self asserted, he "was not sentenced
as a [h]abitual [o]ffender."  Self also alleged "that nothing in the record
shows that his sentence was properly enhanced."  Self argued that the
trial court had lacked "jurisdiction to sentence [him] or render his
sentence because [the sentence] exceeds the maximum required by law."
On April 3, 2020, the State filed a response, arguing that Self's claim is
not a jurisdictional claim and is barred by the limitations period set forth
in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.
On June 9, 2020, the circuit court summarily dismissed Self's
Rule 32 petition.  The circuit court interpreted Self's claims in his Rule 32
petition as (1) a claim "that the State failed to adequately prove [Self's]
prior felony convictions that were used to enhance his sentence" and (2) a
claim "that the record does not reflect application of the Habitual Felony
Offender Act."  Based on that interpretation of Self's claims, the circuit
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court determined that Self's claims are not jurisdictional and, thus, are
barred by the limitations period set forth in Rule 32.2(c).  On June 25,
2020, Self filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's
judgment, which the circuit court denied.  Self appealed.
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Self argued that the circuit
court had erred when it summarily dismissed his illegal-sentence claim. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished memorandum decision,
stated:
"Self's claim, as pleaded, is a nonjurisdictional claim that is
subject to the grounds of preclusion set out in Rule 32.2, Ala.
R. Crim. P.  To be sure, an allegation that a sentence exceeds
the maximum authorized by law is a jurisdictional claim.  See,
e.g., Brand v. State, 93 So. 3d 985, 987-88 (Ala. Crim. App.
2011) (holding that a claim that a sentence exceeds the
maximum authorized by law is jurisdictional and, thus, not
subject to the grounds of preclusion set out in Rule 32.2, Ala.
R. Crim. P.).  Similarly, a claim that a defendant is not subject
to the Habitual Felony Offender Act ('HFOA') and a claim that
the HFOA was never invoked and applied are jurisdictional
claims.  See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 986 So. 2d 476, 477 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2007) (holding that a claim that a conviction for
child abuse is not subject to the HFOA is a jurisdictional
claim); and Horn v. State, 912 So. 2d 539, 543 (Ala. Crim. App.
2004) (Shaw, J., concurring specially) ('The jurisdictional issue
in Martin[ v. State, 687 So. 2d 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)], as
in this case, was whether the HFOA had been invoked and
applied to enhance the appellant's sentence.').
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"But Self did not allege that he is not subject to the
HFOA or that the HFOA was not invoked and applied in his
case.  Rather, Self alleged that he was not sentenced as a
habitual felony offender because 'nothing in the record shows
that his sentence was properly enhanced.'  (C. 43.)  Self's
claim, as properly characterized by the circuit court in its
order summarily dismissing Self's petition, is nothing more
than a claim that his sentence is 'unlawful' because the record
does not affirmatively show that he was sentenced under the
HFOA.  (See C. 13.)  It is well settled that such claims are
nonjurisdictional.  See, e.g., Murray v. State, 922 So. 2d 961,
963 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) ('[T]o the extent that Murray is
arguing that the record does not affirmatively reflect that he
was sentenced under the HFOA, that claim also does not have
jurisdictional implications and, thus, is also procedurally
barred by Rule 32.2(a)(5).').
"Because Self's HFOA claim is nonjurisdictional and
subject to the grounds of preclusion set out in Rule 32.2, Ala.
R. Crim. P., and because he filed his Rule 32 petition well
outside the limitations period set out in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.
Crim. P., the circuit court did not err when it found Self's claim
to be time-barred."
Standard of Review
This Court has stated that, "when the facts are undisputed and an
appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review
in a Rule 32[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] proceeding is de novo."  Ex parte White,
792 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001).
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Discussion
As noted above, this Court granted certiorari review to consider
whether the above-quoted portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals'
unpublished memorandum decision is in conflict with Barnes, supra.  In
Barnes, a Rule 32 petitioner alleged "that he was improperly sentenced to
serve fifteen years in prison, because the maximum sentence authorized
[under the applicable statute] is 10 years ... and he was not sentenced as
a habitual offender."  Barnes, 708 So. 2d at 218.  The trial court
summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that it was precluded by
operation of Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P.  On appeal, the Rule 32
petitioner argued "that his sentences exceed the maximum authorized by
law because he was not sentenced as a habitual felony offender."  Barnes,
708 So. 2d at 218.  The State argued that the Rule 32 petitioner's sentence
did not exceed the statutory maximum because, it said, the Rule 32
petitioner had been sentenced as a habitual felony offender.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals noted, however, that there was "no indication in the
record that the provisions of the Habitual Felony Offender Act applied in
th[at] case" or that the Rule 32 petitioner had been "sentenced as a
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habitual offender."  Id. at 218 and 219.  In addressing the Rule 32
petitioner's argument on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated
that the Rule 32 petitioner "essentially challenge[d] the legality of his
sentence."  Id. at 219.  Noting that an illegal sentence may be challenged
at any time, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the Rule 32
petitioner "ha[d] alleged facts that, if true, entitle[d] him to relief."  Id. 
The only fact that was in question in Barnes was whether the Rule 32
petitioner had been sentenced pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender
Act ("HFOA"), § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
stated that, "[i]f the [Rule 32 petitioner's] allegations [were] true, the
sentences exceeded the jurisdiction of the court and [were] therefore void." 
Id.
The present case appears to be identical to Barnes.  Self argued in
his Rule 32 petition that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to render
judgment or to impose the 25-year sentence on him because, he said, he
"was not sentenced as an [h]abitual [o]ffender under the [HFOA]."  Self
specifically alleged, as did the Rule 32 petitioner in Barnes, that "nothing
in the record shows that his sentence was properly enhanced."  The Court
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of Criminal Appeals appears to have isolated that last portion of Self's
argument -- that the record does not include any indication that he was
sentenced as a habitual felony offender -- to characterize his entire
argument as "nothing more than a claim that his sentence is 'unlawful'
because the record does not affirmatively show that he was sentenced
under the HFOA."  In so characterizing his argument, the Court of
Criminal Appeals relied upon Murray v. State, 922 So. 2d 961 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2005), to conclude that such an argument does not raise a
jurisdictional issue.  However, Murray is distinguishable from the present
case.
In Murray, a Rule 32 petitioner argued that "his sentence of life
imprisonment for [his] trafficking conviction was illegal because, he [said],
the sentencing order and the case action summary [did] not show that he
was sentenced under the Habitual Felony Offender Act ... and the State
did not present 'certified court documents' to prove his prior convictions." 
Murray, 922 So. 2d at 963.  The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that, "to
the extent that [the Rule 32 petitioner was] arguing that the record does
not affirmatively reflect that he was sentenced under the HFOA, that
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claim ... [did] not have jurisdictional implications and, thus, [was] ...
procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(5)."  Murray, 922 So. 2d at 963.  The
argument raised by the Rule 32 petitioner in Murray was related solely
to whether the record indicated that the Rule 32 petitioner had been
sentenced as a habitual felony offender; the Rule 32 petitioner in Murray
did not specifically allege that he had not been sentenced as a habitual
felony offender.
In the present case, however, Self specifically alleged, just as the
Rule 32 petitioner in Barnes did, that he had not been sentenced as a
habitual felony offender.  His further assertion that nothing in the record
indicates that he had been sentenced as a habitual felony offender simply
supports his main assertion.  A nearly identical argument was raised and
was considered to be jurisdictional in Coleman v. State, 927 So. 2d 883
(Ala. Crim. App. 2005), another case cited by Self.  In Coleman, a Rule 32
petitioner asserted that the sentence imposed against him exceeded the
maximum authorized by law.  "More specifically, [the Rule 32 petitioner]
alleged that he was sentenced without any enhancements being applied,
and, therefore, that his life sentence exceed[ed] the range of punishment
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for attempted rape in the first degree."  Coleman, 927 So. 2d at 884.  The
State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing, among other things,
that the Rule 32 petitioner was a habitual felony offender.  The Rule 32
petitioner filed a response to the State's motion, stating " 'that there [was]
nothing in the record to indicate hi[s] being sentenced as a habitual
offender.' "  Coleman, 927 So. 2d at 884.  Ultimately, the circuit court in
Coleman dismissed the Rule 32 petition.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 
"[The Rule 32 petitioner] asserted a facially meritorious claim,
i.e., that his sentence of life imprisonment exceeded the
maximum authorized by law for his conviction of attempted
first-degree rape -- a Class B felony -- and that he was
sentenced without the application of any enhancements.
Further, in response to the State's assertions that he was
sentenced pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act
('HFOA'), [the Rule 32 petitioner] stated that the record did
not contain any indications that he was sentenced pursuant to
the HFOA and attached documents to that response which he
contend[ed] support[ed] his assertion."
Coleman, 927 So. 2d at 887.  The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the
cause to the circuit court in that case for further proceedings, stating:
"If the circuit court determines that [the Rule 32 petitioner]
was not sentenced under the HFOA and, consequently, that
his sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, that
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court is authorized to resentence [the Rule 32 petitioner]
within the parameters of a conviction for a Class B felony.
Conversely, if the circuit court determines that [the Rule 32
petitioner] was properly sentenced under the HFOA, then [the
Rule 32 petitioner] is not entitled to any relief."
Coleman, 927 So. 2d at 888.
In the present case, as in Coleman and Barnes, and unlike in
Murray, Self asserted that he had not been sentenced as a habitual felony
offender.  The Court of Criminal Appeals mischaracterized Self's
argument as one asserting only that the record did not indicate that he
had been sentenced as a habitual felony offender.  However, in addition
to asserting that the record did not indicate that Self had been sentenced
as a habitual felony offender, Self specifically asserted that he had not
been sentenced as a habitual felony offender.  Under Coleman and Barnes,
such an argument is jurisdictional, and Self made specific assertions to
support his argument.  See also Adams v. State, 825 So. 2d 239 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2001) (stating that a claim in a Rule 32 petition that a
sentence is illegal because it was not entered under the HFOA is
jurisdictional and, thus, not subject to the procedural bars of Rule 32.2). 
If Self is able to demonstrate that he was not sentenced as a habitual
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felony offender, then he will be entitled to the relief he seeks.  Accordingly,
Self has demonstrated that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is in
conflict with Barnes.
Notably, the State offers no argument concerning whether the Court
of Criminal Appeals' decision is in conflict with Barnes; in fact, the State
does not even cite Barnes in its brief to this Court.  Instead, the State
urges this Court to "take this opportunity to correct its jurisprudence and
hold that an unlawful sentence does not deprive the sentencing court of
subject-matter jurisdiction."  The State's brief at p. 14.  This is the first
time in these proceedings that the State has raised the argument that an
illegal sentence does not raise a jurisdictional issue; we did not grant
certiorari review to consider that issue.  Because of the limited  scope of
our certiorari review, see Ex parte Cooper, 43 So. 3d 547, 551 (Ala. 2009)
(citing Ex parte Franklin, 502 So. 2d 828 (Ala.1987), for the principle that
this court can address only those issues that are pleaded in the petition
as grounds for certiorari review), we decline to consider at this time the
well-established principle that an allegation that a sentence exceeds the
maximum authorized by law is a jurisdictional claim.  See, e.g., Rogers v.
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State, 728 So. 2d 690, 690-91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that a claim
that a sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law is jurisdictional
and, thus, not subject to the grounds of preclusion set out in Rule 32.2). 
The issue was not raised until the State did so in its respondent's brief,
and this Court has not received adversarial briefing on the issue.
Conclusion
Based on the forgoing, we conclude that the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's summary denial of Self's
Rule 32 petition is in conflict with Barnes.  Accordingly, the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed; the summary denial of Self's
Rule 32 petition was improper.  On remand, the Court of Criminal
Appeals shall remand this cause to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with Barnes.  If the circuit court determines that
Self was not sentenced under the HFOA and, consequently, that his
sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, that court is
authorized to resentence Self within the parameters applicable to a
conviction for a Class C felony.  Conversely, if the circuit court determines
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that Self was properly sentenced under the HFOA, then Self is not
entitled to any relief.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, C.J., concurs specially.
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 
Although the main opinion remands this case "for further
proceedings consistent with Barnes [v. State, 708 So. 2d 217 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1997)]," I do not read the opinion as expressly approving the holding
of Barnes. Rather, I read the opinion as resolving the present conflict of
decisions in favor of Barnes, for purposes of this case only, solely because
Barnes is a published decision and the decision below is not.
This Court may review by certiorari a decision of one of the courts
of appeals that conflicts with one of that court's own prior decisions. Rule
39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P. In such a case of intra-appeals-court conflict,
we, as the higher court, are not bound by either of the conflicting
decisions. Moreover, even under the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis,
the appeals court is not bound by its prior decision; the court may overrule
its prior decision, see Wells v. State, 93 So. 3d 155, 166-67 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2011); Bittick v. Bittick, 297 So. 3d 397, 405 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App.
2019), either expressly or sub silentio. So, on certiorari review, nothing
entitles either conflicting decision to a presumption of correctness vis-à-vis
the other.
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In addition, within the structure of the Alabama Unified Judicial
System, an important function of this Court is to "say what the law is,"
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), for the benefit of
lower courts, attorneys, and the public. This duty derives from our
constitutional role, as "the highest court of the state," of exercising
"general supervision and control of courts of inferior jurisdiction," Art. VI,
§ 140(a) and (b), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). And certiorari review
based on an intra-appeals-court conflict affords us a key opportunity to
fulfill this role by resolving an issue on which a lower court's decisions
conflict.
For these reasons, when we grant certiorari review based on an
intra-appeals-court conflict, the matter before us for resolution is the issue
on which the decisions conflict. We may resolve the issue in favor of one
decision or the other, or we may determine that neither decision is correct
and opt for a third solution. What we may not do, in my view, is merely
determine that a conflict indeed exists and then reverse solely on that
basis without deciding the issue itself. To do so would be to avoid our duty
to say what the law is.
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I acknowledge that there are exceptions to this obligation. First, in
some cases, the parties present no argument on the issue in conflict; they
are content to merely focus on the fact of the conflict. Without argument
from the parties, it may be prudent for this Court to simply confirm that
a conflict exists and reverse and remand for the appeals court to resolve
it upon proper argument.
Second, in some cases, the appeals court's prior decision is published
but its conflicting decision is unpublished. A court of appeals may not
overrule a published decision in an unpublished one. This is because a
court of appeals may issue an unpublished decision only when "an opinion
in the case would serve no significant precedential purpose," Rules
53(a)(1) and 54(a), and because an unpublished decision has "no
precedential value," Rules 53(d) and 54(d). Thus, when an unpublished
decision conflicts with a prior published one, this Court may reverse the
unpublished decision based solely on this principle of "publication stare
decisis" rather than on the merits of the published decision.
The present case comes within the second exception. Barnes was a
published decision, whereas the decision below was unpublished. So this
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Court properly reverses the decision below based solely on its conflict with
Barnes. This means that this Court is neither resolving the issue raised
by the conflict nor approving Barnes. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal
Appeals remains free to reconsider Barnes in a future case.
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