Title: Raytrell K. Fitzgerald v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Raytrell K. Fitzgerald, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Raytrell K. 
Fitzgerald, 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County and the 
Honorable Dennis R. Cimpl, presiding, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS &  
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 13, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 20, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis R. Cimpl 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. concurs, joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant in 18AP1296-CR, and petitioner-
petitioner in 18AP1214-W, there were briefs filed by Colleen D. 
Ball, assistant state public defender. There were oral arguments 
by Colleen D. Ball. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Maura FJ Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
 
 
2
brief is Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Maura FJ Whelan. 
 
For the respondents, there was a brief filed by Abigail 
C.S. Potts, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
if Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an oral argument 
by Abigail C.S. Potts 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed in 18AP1296-CR on behalf 
of National Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers, Bazelon 
Center for Mental Health Law, National Disability Rights 
Network, and Disability Rights Wisconsin, by Jeffrey O. Davis, 
James E. Goldschmidt, Zachary T. Eastburn, and Quarles & Brady 
LLP, Milwaukee. 
 
 
1
2019 WI 69 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF4475) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Raytrell K. Fitzgerald, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Raytrell K. 
Fitzgerald, 
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County and the 
Honorable Dennis R. Cimpl, presiding, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Dennis R. Cimpl, Circuit Court Judge.  Vacated; and 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.    
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
2 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.  These consolidated cases1 
concern the standard under which a circuit court may order 
involuntary medication to restore a defendant's competency to 
proceed in a criminal case and the timing of the automatic stay 
of such orders established in State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, 382 
Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141.  The circuit court ordered Raytrell 
K. Fitzgerald to be involuntarily medicated pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14 (2017-18)2 to restore his competency to stand 
trial on a felony possession-of-a-firearm charge.  After the 
circuit court entered its order, this court released the Scott 
decision, 
subjecting 
involuntary 
medication 
orders 
to 
an 
automatic stay pending appeal.  Following a hearing on the 
impact of the Scott decision, the circuit court stayed its 
involuntary medication order but announced its plan to lift the 
stay in response to the State's motion.  As the case proceeded 
through the appellate courts, the circuit court never lifted the 
                                                 
1 Our decision resolves two cases, State v. Fitzgerald, 
2018AP1296-CR and State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee 
Cty., 
2018AP1214-W. 
 
We 
decide 
the 
merits 
of 
2018AP1296-CR by vacating the circuit court's order.  This part 
of our decision addresses the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14 and although the circuit court's order is moot, we 
declare rights relative to it and vacate the order because it is 
constitutionally infirm.  In 2018AP1214-W, we are equally 
divided regarding the appropriate disposition and therefore 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We consolidate the 
cases because the facts and procedural history of each are 
intertwined 
and 
collectively 
provide 
necessary 
background 
information for a full understanding of our decision.  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
3 
 
stay. 
Fitzgerald 
petitioned 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
a 
supervisory writ, arguing that the automatic stay begins upon 
entry of the involuntary medication order rather than upon 
filing a notice of appeal as the court of appeals ultimately 
held.  Because the court is equally divided on the writ matter, 
we affirm the court of appeals decision denying Fitzgerald's 
petition for a supervisory writ. 
¶2 
We do, however, address Fitzgerald's challenge to the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14 
based 
on 
its 
incompatibility with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).  
In Sell, the United States Supreme Court held that in limited 
circumstances the government may involuntarily medicate a 
defendant to restore his competency to proceed to trial, and it 
outlined four factors that must be met before a circuit court 
may enter an order for involuntary medication.  We hold that the 
standard for ordering involuntary medication set forth in 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) is unconstitutional to the extent it 
requires circuit courts to order involuntary medication based on 
the standard set forth in paragraph (3)(dm), which does not 
comport with Sell.  We conclude circuit courts may order 
involuntary 
medication 
to 
restore 
trial 
competency 
under 
§ 971.14 only when the order complies with the Sell standard.  
We vacate the circuit court's order for involuntary medication 
in this case because it is constitutionally insufficient.  
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
4 
 
I.   BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In October 2016, the State charged Fitzgerald with 
possession of a firearm contrary to a harassment injunction.3  
The circuit court ordered a competency evaluation, which showed 
Fitzgerald suffered from "Schizoaffective disorder" and lacked 
substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings or to 
be of meaningful assistance in his own defense.  In December 
2017, the circuit court signed an Order of Commitment for 
Treatment 
requesting 
an 
assessment 
for 
Fitzgerald's 
participation in the Outpatient Competency Restoration Program 
(OCRP).  Dr. Brooke Lundbohm, a psychologist, sent the circuit 
court an OCRP assessment letter in February 2018, concluding 
that Fitzgerald "is clinically appropriate for the Outpatient 
Competency Restoration Program at this time and has been 
admitted to the Program," despite Fitzgerald having a history of 
refusing to take prescribed medication.  In April 2018, Lundbohm 
informed the circuit court by letter that Fitzgerald's "status 
with the Outpatient Competency Restoration Program has changed," 
and he was "no longer clinically appropriate for participation 
in" OCRP due to safety concerns.  The letter also noted that 
Fitzgerald displayed a lack of motivation to participate in the 
program.  On that basis, the circuit court "deemed [Fitzgerald] 
no longer clinically appropriate for OCRP," remanded Fitzgerald 
                                                 
3 The 
charge 
alleged 
violations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 941.29(1m)(g) and 939.50(3)(g) (2015-16). 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
5 
 
to the Department of Health Services' (DHS) custody, and ordered 
a second competency evaluation under Wis. Stat. § 971.14.  
¶4 
In May 2018, Dr. Ana Garcia, a psychologist, conducted 
Fitzgerald's second competency evaluation and sent her report to 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
The 
report 
noted 
Fitzgerald's 
Schizoaffective Disorder diagnosis and explained he had been 
"treated 
with 
Seroquel 
(antipsychotic 
medication) 
and 
Benztropine (medication used to treat the side effects of 
psychotropic 
medications)." 
 
Garcia 
reported 
that 
when 
Fitzgerald refused to take his medication while hospitalized, 
"an injectable version of the medication could not be forced 
upon him" because no order to medicate involuntarily existed.  
If treated with medication, Garcia opined Fitzgerald would 
"likely . . . be restored to competency within the statutory 
period," and further noted that Fitzgerald was "incapable of 
expressing a rational understanding of the benefits and risks of 
medication or treatment."  Accordingly, Garcia concluded that 
Fitzgerald 
was 
"not 
competent 
to 
refuse 
medication 
or 
treatment," and recommended that treatment continue on an 
inpatient basis.  As to the anticipated effectiveness of the 
recommended treatment in restoring Fitzgerald's competency, 
Garcia noted in her report that "[t]reatment with antipsychotic 
medication is known to be effective in treating symptoms of 
psychosis, which is precluding [Fitzgerald's] competence to 
proceed" in his criminal case.  
¶5 
On June 18, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on 
whether to issue an order for involuntary medication under Wis. 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
6 
 
Stat. 
§ 971.14. 
 
During 
that 
hearing, 
Garcia 
testified, 
explaining why she believed the circuit court should issue an 
order for involuntary medication:   
• "Fitzgerald has continued to exhibit indications of 
psychotic symptoms" and was "unable to discuss his 
charges in a reasonable way."   
• "[W]e find psychotropic medication to help him better 
organize 
his 
thoughts, 
reduce 
the 
auditory 
hallucinations, and reduce the delusional beliefs."  
• Fitzgerald refused to take his medications and attempted 
to hide them in his room.   
Garcia testified that "as a psychologist, I don't prescribe 
specific 
medications" 
but 
"I 
do 
know 
that 
for 
treating 
schizophrenia 
and 
schizoaffective 
disorder, 
the 
primary 
treatment is an antipsychotic medication, and he had been 
prescribed" the generic version of Seroquel during his admission 
at Mendota Mental Health Institute.   
¶6 
Fitzgerald also testified at the hearing.  He thought 
he had been misdiagnosed, explained he had "been feeling really 
fine" without medication, and stated that he did not wish to 
submit to forced medication, expressing concerns about the 
dosage.   
¶7 
After the close of testimony, the circuit court 
ordered the administration of involuntary medication to restore 
Fitzgerald's competency.  The circuit court explained the basis 
for its order: 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
7 
 
[T]here is an important government interest at stake 
here and that is the fact that he's charged with a 
serious felony.  It may be a status offense, but the 
fact is he is alleged to be carrying a gun while under 
a prohibition for carrying a gun, and I recall the 
motion hearing that we had in this matter when the 
police approached him and searched him, which I found 
was a valid search.  And so, therefore, that is in my 
opinion 
an 
important 
government 
interest, 
the 
furtherance of this felony. 
The fact that he does not take his medication is 
not facilitating him to be restored to competency.  
That's what this is all about so he can stand trial on 
whether or not he is guilty of this very serious 
offense; therefore, the fact that he's not taking his 
meds and has to be given them involuntarily does 
further that interest and I think it's also a 
necessary reason to further that interest.  And we've 
got testimony from Dr. Garcia, who has reviewed his 
psychiatrist [sic] that the two meds or the medication 
that is prescribed for him is appropriate, and it was 
appropriate back in earlier 2013, when he was not 
taking and engaged in violence with his mother.[4]  
                                                 
4 Although the circuit court also listed several violent 
incidents outlined in Garcia's report and opined that "those 
things that I've read into the record I think exhibit that Mr. 
Fitzgerald, 
while 
not 
on 
the 
prescribed 
medications, 
is 
dangerous to himself and to others," the circuit court's written 
order for involuntary medication was not based on Fitzgerald's 
dangerousness.  Rather, the circuit court checked the box on the 
form order reflecting the following grounds for involuntary 
medication:  Fitzgerald was "mentally ill" and "charged with at 
least one serious crime," and the treatment was (1) "necessary 
to significantly further important government interests," (2) 
"substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial," (3) "substantially unlikely to have side effects that 
undermine the fairness of the trial," (4) "necessary because 
alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve 
substantially 
the 
same 
results," 
and 
(5) 
"medically 
appropriate."  The circuit court did not check the box 
indicating treatment was necessary because Fitzgerald was 
dangerous.  
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
8 
 
¶8 
On June 20, 2018, before Fitzgerald filed his notice 
of intent to pursue postdisposition relief, this court decided 
Scott, 
382 
Wis. 2d 476. 
 
In 
Scott, 
we 
exercised 
our 
superintending authority to "order that involuntary medication 
orders [under Wis. Stat. § 971.14] are subject to an automatic 
stay pending appeal."  Id., ¶43.  On June 25, 2018, Fitzgerald 
filed his "Notice of Intent to Pursue Postdisposition Relief" 
and two days later filed a letter informing the circuit court 
that his medication order was automatically stayed under Scott.5   
¶9 
On June 27, 2018, the circuit court held another 
hearing.  The circuit court granted the stay, but indicated that 
it would immediately lift the stay on the State's motion.  On 
June 28, 2018, the same day Fitzgerald filed his petition for a 
supervisory writ in the court of appeals, the circuit court 
"vacate[d] the [June 27] proceedings" related to the automatic 
stay.  The circuit court expressed uncertainty as to whether 
Scott's automatic stay occurs "after the appeal is filed or is 
it automatic when there's a notice of intent to appeal filed or 
is it automatic if there's merely an allegation that the 
defendant is going to file an appeal."  In order to "err on the 
side of caution," the circuit court ordered its June 18th 
involuntary medication order stayed and set the matter to be 
                                                 
5 The letter is dated June 25, 2018, and marked "Received 
06-25-2018" in the upper right corner.  Counsel asserts in the 
letter that it was being filed "simultaneously" with the Notice 
of Intent, but according to the electronic record, the letter 
was not filed until June 27, 2018. 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
9 
 
heard again in two weeks.  The circuit court reasoned:  "[i]f 
the appeal is not filed I will lift the stay because then 
clearly [the] Scott case doesn't apply," and "[i]f the appeal is 
filed the State can then file a motion to lift the stay." The 
circuit court then signed a written order granting a stay of the 
June 18th involuntary medication order, but on that same day, 
Fitzgerald filed a petition for a supervisory writ in the court 
of appeals, challenging the circuit court's plan to lift the 
automatic stay without requiring the State to make the showing 
required under Scott.  On July 9, 2018, Fitzgerald also filed a 
separate notice of appeal seeking review of the circuit court's 
June 18th Order for Commitment, specifically challenging the 
order for involuntary administration of medication. 
¶10 On July 12, 2018, the court of appeals denied 
Fitzgerald's petition for a supervisory writ.  State ex rel. 
Fitzgerald v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee Cty., No. 2018AP1214-
W, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. July 12, 2018).  Because the 
circuit court's stay remained in effect, the court of appeals 
concluded that "to the extent Scott establishes the automatic 
stay as a plain duty, the circuit court has complied."  Id. at 
5.  However, the court of appeals also concluded that 
"Fitzgerald was not entitled to an automatic stay until he 
actually had a pending appeal, and that did not happen until he 
filed the notice of appeal on July 9, 2018."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Fitzgerald petitioned for review of the court of 
appeals decision denying a supervisory writ, which we granted.  
Fitzgerald also petitioned to bypass the court of appeals for 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
10 
 
review of the June 18th underlying medication order, and we 
granted the bypass petition and ordered both cases to be argued 
on March 20, 2019.   
¶11 Before this court heard oral argument in Fitzgerald's 
cases, the circuit court found Fitzgerald competent and resumed 
the criminal proceedings.  Fitzgerald pled guilty to the 
underlying charge on January 11, 2019, and the circuit court 
sentenced him to time served.  Consequently, the State moved to 
dismiss as moot both of Fitzgerald's cases, but we denied the 
motion.  After oral argument, we consolidated the two cases for 
the purposes of disposition. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶12 The sole issue we resolve is the constitutionality of 
the standard for involuntary medication under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b). 
This 
court 
presumes 
the 
constitutionality of a statute and tasks a party challenging it 
with the "very heavy burden" of proving its unconstitutionality 
"beyond a reasonable doubt."  Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients 
and Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶¶25, 27, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 
914 N.W.2d 678 (quoted source omitted).  Citing Mayo, Fitzgerald 
urges us to "restore the balance of [constitutional] power 
between the judiciary and the legislature in Wisconsin" by 
employing the standard applied by the United States Supreme 
Court, which requires a "plain showing" or clear demonstration 
of unconstitutionality.  See id., ¶¶79, 90 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J. concurring) (quoted source omitted).  We need not 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
11 
 
resolve Fitzgerald's challenge to the prevailing standard of 
review for challenges to the constitutionality of a statute 
because 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) 
and 
(4)(b) 
are 
undoubtedly 
unconstitutional to the extent they require a circuit court to 
order the involuntary medication of a defendant when the Sell 
factors have not been met.  
B.  Analysis  
1.  Constitutional Principles 
¶13 Under the Due Process Clause, individuals have "a 
significant 
liberty 
interest 
in 
avoiding 
the 
unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs."  Washington v. Harper, 
494 
U.S. 
210, 
221 
(1990). 
 
"[O]nly 
an 
'essential' 
or 
'overriding' state interest" can overcome this constitutionally-
protected liberty interest.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79 (quoting 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992)).  In Sell, the 
United States Supreme Court addressed "whether the Constitution 
permits 
the 
Government 
to 
administer 
antipsychotic 
drugs 
involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant——in order to 
render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but 
nonviolent, crimes."  Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.  The Court held 
that it does, but only under particular circumstances: 
[T]he 
Constitution 
permits 
the 
Government 
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a 
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges 
in order to render that defendant competent to stand 
trial, 
but 
only 
if 
the 
treatment 
is 
medically 
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, 
and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
12 
 
necessary 
significantly 
to 
further 
important 
governmental trial-related interests.   
Id. at 179 (emphasis added).  Although permissible in certain 
situations, the Sell Court explained that the "administration of 
drugs solely for trial competence purposes . . . may be rare."  
Id. at 180.  The Court established a four-factor test to 
determine 
whether 
such 
medication 
is 
constitutionally 
appropriate. 
¶14 "First, a court must find that important governmental 
interests are at stake."  Id.  "[B]ringing to trial an 
individual accused of a serious crime" against a person or 
property is an important interest.  Id.  The Court did, however, 
emphasize that prior to entering an order for involuntary 
medication, courts "must consider the facts of the individual 
case in evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution."  
Id. 
¶15 "Second, the court must conclude that involuntary 
medication will significantly further" the government's interest 
in prosecuting the offense.  Id. at 181.  This means that a 
court 
"must 
find 
that 
administration 
of 
the 
drugs 
is 
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial" and "unlikely to have side effects that will interfere 
significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in 
conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair."  
Id.   
¶16 "Third, the court must conclude that involuntary 
medication is necessary to further those interests."  Id.  In 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
13 
 
other words, "[t]he court must find that any alternative, less 
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the 
same results."  Id.  In order to make this finding, the deciding 
court "must consider less intrusive means for administering the 
drugs, e.g., a court order to the defendant backed by the 
contempt power, before considering more intrusive methods."  Id.  
In other words, the Sell Court considered an order directed at 
the defendant, requiring him to accept medication or be found in 
contempt of court, to be less intrusive than ordering an entity 
like DHS to forcibly administer medication to the defendant. 
¶17 "Fourth, . . . the 
court 
must 
conclude 
that 
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in 
the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical 
condition."  Id.  The Sell Court explained that "[t]he specific 
kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as elsewhere" because 
"[d]ifferent kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce different 
side effects and enjoy different levels of success."  Id.  
¶18 The Court explained that "these standards . . . seek[] 
to determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is 
necessary significantly to further a particular governmental 
interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant 
competent to stand trial," and "[a] court need not consider 
whether to allow forced medication for that kind of purpose, if 
forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as 
[one] . . . related 
to 
the 
individual's 
dangerousness, 
or . . . health."  Id. at 181-82.  The Court explained that 
"[t]here are often strong reasons for a court to determine 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
14 
 
whether forced administration of drugs can be justified on these 
alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence 
question," in part because "the inquiry into whether medication 
is permissible, say, to render an individual nondangerous is 
usually more 'objective and manageable' than the inquiry into 
whether 
medication 
is 
permissible 
to 
render 
a 
defendant 
competent."  Id. at 182 (quoted source omitted).   
The medical experts may find it easier to provide an 
informed opinion about whether, given the risk of side 
effects, particular drugs are medically appropriate 
and necessary to control a patient's potentially 
dangerous behavior (or to avoid serious harm to the 
patient himself) than to try to balance harms and 
benefits related to the more quintessentially legal 
questions of trial fairness and competence. 
Id.   
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14 requires a circuit court to 
enter an order for involuntary medication to restore a criminal 
defendant's 
competency 
to 
proceed 
provided 
the 
statutory 
parameters are met.  Under the statute, the circuit court shall 
order a competency examination if "there is reason to doubt a 
defendant's competency to proceed."  § 971.14(1r)(a), (2).  The 
circuit court appoints "one or more examiners having the 
specialized knowledge determined by the court to be appropriate 
to examine and report upon the condition of the defendant."  
§ 971.14(2)(a).  "The examiner shall submit to the court a 
written report."  § 971.14(3).  Among other things, the report 
must include: 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
15 
 
(c) 
The 
examiner's 
opinion 
regarding 
the 
defendant's present mental capacity to understand the 
proceedings and assist in his or her defense. 
(d) If the examiner reports that the defendant 
lacks competency, the examiner's opinion regarding the 
likelihood that the defendant, if provided treatment, 
may be restored to competency within the time period 
permitted under sub. (5)(a). . . . 
(dm) If sufficient information is available to 
the examiner to reach an opinion, the examiner's 
opinion on whether the defendant needs medication or 
treatment and whether the defendant is not competent 
to refuse medication or treatment.  The defendant is 
not competent to refuse medication or treatment if, 
because of mental illness, developmental disability, 
alcoholism 
or 
drug 
dependence, 
and 
after 
the 
advantages and disadvantages of and alternatives to 
accepting the particular medication or treatment have 
been explained to the defendant, one of the following 
is true: 
1. The defendant is incapable of expressing 
an 
understanding 
of 
the 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
accepting 
medication 
or 
treatment and the alternatives. 
2. The defendant is substantially incapable 
of applying an understanding of the advantages, 
disadvantages and alternatives to his or her 
mental 
illness, 
developmental 
disability, 
alcoholism or drug dependence in order to make an 
informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse 
medication or treatment. 
§ 971.14(3)(c)-(dm) (emphasis added).   
¶20 After the report's submission, the circuit court must 
hold a hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4).  Unless the parties 
waive their opportunity to present additional evidence, the 
circuit 
court 
shall 
hold 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing.  
§ 971.14(4)(b).  If the State proves by clear and convincing 
evidence "that the defendant is not competent to refuse 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
16 
 
medication or treatment, under the standard specified in sub. 
(3)(dm), the court shall make a determination without a jury and 
issue an order that the defendant is not competent to refuse 
medication or treatment."  § 971.14(4)(b) (emphasis added).6  In 
other words, the circuit court "shall" order involuntary 
medication 
or 
treatment 
if 
the 
standard 
described 
in 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) is met:  either the defendant is "incapable of 
expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages" 
of medication or treatment or "substantially incapable of 
applying an understanding of" his mental illness "in order to 
make an informed choice" "to accept or refuse medication or 
treatment." 
 
The 
statute 
additionally 
provides 
"whoever 
administers the medication or treatment to the defendant shall 
observe appropriate medical standards."  § 971.14(4)(b). 
3.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) do not  
conform with Sell's constitutional parameters. 
¶21 As a preliminary matter, we explain this court's 
denial of the State's motion to dismiss Fitzgerald's cases on 
mootness grounds.  "An issue is moot when its resolution will 
have no practical effect on the underlying controversy."  
Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶11, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (quoted source omitted); see also City of Racine v. 
                                                 
6 When a defendant claims to be competent, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b) first requires the State to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant is not competent.  
Because Fitzgerald previously conceded he was not competent, 
that portion of the statute is not at issue.  
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
17 
 
J-T Enters. of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 691, 700, 221 N.W.2d 869 
(1974) ("This court has consistently adhered to the rule that a 
case is moot when 'a determination is sought which, when made, 
cannot have any practical effect upon an existing controversy.'" 
(quoted source omitted)).  As a general matter, we decline to 
reach moot issues.  J.W.K., __ Wis. 2d __, ¶12.  Fitzgerald is 
no longer subject to the medication order he challenges; he 
regained competency and pled guilty.  Therefore, the issues 
presented in reviewing that order are moot.  See Winnebago Cty. 
v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶31, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109 
(explaining that "when an appellant appeals an order to which he 
or she is no longer subjected," the case is moot). 
¶22 We may, however, decide an otherwise moot issue if it 
fits under one of the following exceptions:  (1) "the issues are 
of great public importance;" (2) "the constitutionality of a 
statute is involved;" (3) the situation arises so often "a 
definitive decision is essential to guide the trial courts;" (4) 
"the issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved by 
the court to avoid uncertainty;" or (5) the issue is "capable 
and likely of repetition and yet evades review because the 
appellate process usually cannot be completed and frequently 
cannot even be undertaken within a time that would result in a 
practical effect upon the parties."  G.S. v. State, 118 
Wis. 2d 803, 805, 348 N.W.2d 181 (1984); see also J.W.K., __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶12.  In this case, Fitzgerald challenges the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 971.14, which presents an 
issue of great public importance.  Additionally, competency 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
18 
 
restoration for the purpose of prosecuting a criminal defendant 
arises often enough to warrant a definitive decision in order to 
guide the circuit courts regarding the constitutional standard 
for ordering involuntary medication to restore a defendant's 
competency to proceed.  Accordingly, we choose to examine the 
constitutionality of § 971.14.7  We hold that § 971.14(4)(b) is 
unconstitutional to the extent it requires circuit courts to 
order involuntary medication based on the standard set forth in 
paragraph (3)(dm), which does not comport with Sell, 539 U.S. 
166. 
¶23 Fitzgerald 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14 
is 
inconsistent with the factors outlined in Sell, resulting in an 
unconstitutional violation of his protected liberty interest in 
avoiding involuntary medication.  He construes § 971.14 to 
"permit[] a court to commit a person accused of a crime for 
involuntary treatment . . . to restore competency based on his 
inability to understand, express or apply the advantages, 
disadvantages and alternatives to treatment or medication," 
without requiring the State to satisfy the Sell factors.   
¶24 The State contends that Wis. Stat. § 971.14 is 
constitutional, arguing that Sell requires an involuntary 
                                                 
7 Fitzgerald additionally argues that the circuit court 
incorrectly calculated his sentence credit during the hearing on 
the order for involuntary medication.  We do not review this 
issue because he pled guilty and was sentenced to time served; 
the issue is moot and review is unwarranted under the exceptions 
to dismissal for mootness.   
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
19 
 
medication order issued by a circuit court to meet the Sell 
standard and does not apply to a statute like § 971.14 governing 
the procedures the government must follow in order to obtain an 
involuntary medication order.  Even if Sell does control the 
statute, the State argues that § 971.14 is constitutional 
because its language partially encompasses the Sell factors, and 
"the circuit courts of the State of Wisconsin have been directed 
to comply with the Sell test when issuing orders for commitment 
and involuntary medication" using Form CR-206 (which lists the 
Sell factors), the Judicial Benchbook, and Wis JI——Criminal SM-
50 (2018).   
¶25 We 
hold 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b) 
is 
unconstitutional to the extent it requires circuit courts to 
order involuntary medication based on the standard set forth in 
paragraph (3)(dm), which does not comport with Sell.  Paragraph 
(4)(b) requires the circuit court to "issue an order that the 
defendant is not competent to refuse medication" if the State 
proves that the defendant is not competent to refuse treatment 
under the standard set forth in paragraph (3)(dm).  In general 
terms, paragraph (3)(dm) considers a defendant not competent to 
refuse treatment if he is either "incapable of expressing an 
understanding" of the proposed medication or treatment or 
"substantially incapable of applying an understanding" of his 
mental illness "in order to make an informed choice" regarding 
medication or treatment.  Under this statutory standard, a 
circuit court must order involuntary medication to restore trial 
competence regardless of whether the factors outlined in Sell 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
20 
 
are met.8  The mere inability of a defendant to express an 
understanding of medication or make an informed choice about it 
is constitutionally insufficient to override a defendant's 
"significant 
liberty 
interest 
in 
avoiding 
the 
unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs."  Harper, 494 U.S. at 
221. 
¶26 A comparison of the text of the statutory standard 
with the constitutional standard outlined in Sell illustrates 
how the statute falls short of protecting the significant 
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of 
psychotropic drugs.  Specifically, paragraph (3)(dm) does not 
require the circuit court to find that an important government 
"interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a 
serious crime" is at stake, as required by the first Sell 
factor.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14 merely 
requires the circuit court to find probable cause that the 
defendant committed a crime——not necessarily a serious one.  See 
§ 971.14(1r).  Nor does the statute require an individualized 
assessment of the circumstances surrounding the case, which may 
impact the circuit court's application of this factor.  Even for 
serious 
crimes, 
"[s]pecial 
circumstances 
may 
lessen" 
the 
                                                 
8 The statute directs that the circuit court "shall" issue 
the order for involuntary medication if paragraph (3)(dm) is 
met. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b). 
 
"Shall" 
is 
"presumed 
mandatory."  State ex rel. DNR v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶13 n.7, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114 
(quoted source omitted). 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
21 
 
importance of the State's interest in trying the case.  Sell, 
539 U.S. at 180.  For example, "[t]he defendant's failure to 
take drugs voluntarily . . . may mean lengthy confinement in an 
institution for the mentally ill——and that would diminish the 
risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one 
who has committed a serious crime."  Id.  In other words, the 
"facts of the individual case" determine the importance of the 
government's interest.  Id.  Paragraph (3)(dm) leaves no room 
for weighing such details.   
¶27 The directive to order medication under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) similarly fails to include consideration of the 
second Sell factor:  "that administration of the drugs is 
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial" and "unlikely to have side effects that will interfere 
significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in 
conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair."  
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.  While the expert's report must include 
"the examiner's opinion regarding the likelihood that the 
defendant, if provided treatment, may be restored to competency 
within the [statutory] time period,"9 paragraph (3)(dm) does not 
require the circuit court to conclude that medication is 
substantially likely to restore a defendant's competency or to 
consider whether side effects "will interfere significantly with 
the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial 
defense."  Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(d). 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
22 
 
¶28 As to the third Sell factor, the statute falls short 
of the constitutional prerequisite espoused in Sell requiring 
the circuit court to conclude that involuntary treatment is 
necessary to further important government interests.  This 
factor commands the circuit court to consider and rule out——as 
unlikely 
to 
achieve 
substantially 
the 
same 
results——less 
intrusive options for treatment as well as for administering the 
drugs. 
 
In 
contrast, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b) 
mandates 
involuntary medication if the State establishes pursuant to 
paragraph (3)(dm) the defendant's inability to either express an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of medication 
or to make an informed choice about it, regardless of the 
existence of less intrusive but nonetheless effective options.   
¶29 The fourth Sell factor requires the circuit court to 
conclude that medication is "medically appropriate" meaning "in 
the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical 
condition."  Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.  In contrast, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b) imposes an obligation on "whoever administers the 
medication 
or 
treatment 
to 
the 
defendant" 
to 
"observe 
appropriate 
medical 
standards." 
 
§ 971.14(4)(b) 
(emphasis 
added).  The State argues "appropriate medical standards" might 
encompass a consideration of the defendant's best medical 
interest but paragraph (4)(b) addresses the administration of 
medication or treatment, not whether such treatment should be 
ordered in the first place.  Nothing in the statute empowers the 
person administering the drugs to override the circuit court's 
order that the drugs be administered.  Sell requires the circuit 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
23 
 
court to conclude that the administration of medication is 
medically appropriate, not merely that the medical personnel 
administering the drugs observe appropriate medical standards in 
the dispensation thereof.   
¶30 The State's reliance on extrinsic materials to support 
the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) 
is unavailing.  Although circuit courts must use Form CR-206,10 
which lists the Sell factors,11 and the circuit court used that 
form to order the involuntary medication of Fitzgerald in this 
case, a judicially-created form cannot save a constitutionally 
infirm statute.  While Form CR-206 directs the circuit court to 
make findings consistent with Sell, the statute requires the 
circuit court to order treatment if the statutory standard is 
met, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
Sell 
findings 
are 
made.  
Likewise, the Special Materials to the jury instructions and the 
Judicial Benchbook cited by the State cannot alter or supplement 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.025(1) 
("In 
all 
criminal 
actions . . . the parties and court officials shall use the 
standard court forms adopted by the judicial conference."). 
11 Form CR-206 lists the Sell factors, but does not identify 
their source. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).  
Additionally, the form does not address the gaps between the 
standard in Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) and the 
constitutional principles set forth in Sell.  The judicial 
conference may wish to consider modifying this form to clarify 
that circuit courts must follow Sell regardless of whether the 
standard in § 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) has been met.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 758.18(1) ("The judicial conference shall adopt standard 
court forms for use by parties and court officials in all civil 
and criminal actions and proceedings in the circuit court[.]"). 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
24 
 
the statutory text enacted by the legislature, which binds the 
circuit courts.  See Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶33 
n.11, 312 Wis. 2d 530, 752 N.W.2d 820 (explaining that the 
Judicial Benchbook "is not intended to stand as independent 
legal authority for any proposition of law" and is merely "an 
informed and insightful discussion of practice"); State v. 
Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983) (explaining 
that special materials are "persuasive" authority).  We do not 
read words into a statute regardless of how persuasive the 
source may be; rather, we interpret the words the legislature 
actually enacted into law.  "Under the omitted-case canon of 
statutory interpretation, '[n]othing is to be added to what the 
text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso 
habendus est).  That is, a matter not covered is to be treated 
as not covered.'"  Lopez-Quintero v. Dittman, 2019 WI 58, ¶18, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 
(2012)).  "One of the maxims of statutory construction is that 
courts should not add words to a statute to give it a certain 
meaning."  Fond Du Lac Cty. v. Town of Rosendale, 149 
Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989).   
¶31 Application of the statutory mandate requires an order 
for involuntary medication based solely on the defendant's 
inability to express an understanding of treatment or make an 
informed choice of whether to accept or refuse it, resulting in 
the unconstitutional deprivation of the defendant's significant 
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
25 
 
medication.  The fortuity of circuit courts sometimes following 
Sell as a result of using Form CR-206, the special materials to 
the jury instructions, and the Benchbook despite Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14's contrary directive may ensure that certain court 
orders comport with the Constitution but cannot render the 
statute itself constitutional.   
¶32 To the extent Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) 
require circuit courts to order involuntary medication when the 
Sell factors have not been met, the statute unconstitutionally 
infringes the individual liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of anti-psychotropic drugs.  Our holding 
does not preclude circuit courts from ordering involuntary 
medication for purposes of restoring a criminal defendant's 
competency provided the circuit courts apply the standard set 
forth in Sell. 
¶33 Applying this holding to the present case, the State 
conceded at oral argument that the circuit court did not 
consider the side effects of the proposed medication or whether 
those 
side 
effects 
would 
interfere 
significantly 
with 
Fitzgerald's ability to assist in his defense.12  After reviewing 
the circuit court's decision, we agree with the State.  The 
circuit court never found, as it must, "that administration of 
the drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant 
                                                 
12 The box the circuit court checked on Form CR-206 listed 
the Sell factors, including the second factor, but the court 
never addressed the side effects on the record.  
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
26 
 
competent to stand trial" and "unlikely to have side effects 
that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability 
to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby 
rendering the trial unfair."  See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.  We 
therefore vacate the circuit court's order for involuntary 
medication. 
4.  Supervisory Writ 
¶34 In his petition for a supervisory writ, Fitzgerald 
argues this court should exercise its superintending authority 
and hold that the stay established in Scott begins automatically 
upon entry of the order for involuntary medication.  The State 
opposes his request, arguing that "Fitzgerald did not establish 
the requisite elements for a supervisory writ" and requests that 
we "decline to exercise [our] superintending authority" to grant 
relief to Fitzgerald.   The court is equally divided on the 
issue of when the automatic stay established in Scott begins.  
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
denying Fitzgerald's petition for a supervisory writ.  See State 
v. Garcia, 2019 WI 40, ¶1, 386 Wis. 2d 386, 925 N.W.2d 528 (per 
curiam) (affirming the court of appeals decision because the 
court was equally divided); see also, Gruhl Sash & Door Co. v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 173 Wis. 215, 215, 180 N.W. 845 
(1921) (explaining that where the supreme court is equally 
divided, the "established rule" is to affirm the court of 
appeals decision). 
III.   CONCLUSION 
No. 
2018AP1296-CR & 2018AP1214-W   
 
27 
 
¶35 Circuit courts may order involuntary medication to 
restore a defendant's competency to proceed in a criminal case, 
provided the four factors the United States Supreme Court 
established in Sell are met.  To the extent Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) require circuit courts to order 
involuntary medication when the Sell standard has not been met, 
the statute is unconstitutional.  Because the circuit court did 
not apply the Sell factors, we vacate the circuit court's order.   
¶36 Because the court is equally divided on Fitzgerald's 
petition to review the court of appeals decision denying his 
request for a supervisory writ, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.——The order of the circuit court is vacated; 
the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed by an equally 
divided court. 
¶37 SHIRLEY ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from participation 
before oral argument. 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP1296-CR & 20181214-W.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶38 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  The 
issue presented by this review is whether the circuit court 
unconstitutionally 
ordered 
Raytrell 
K. 
Fitzgerald 
to 
be 
involuntarily medicated because his mental condition prevented 
him from being competent to stand trial.  The majority opinion 
focuses its attention on Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) and opines 
that paragraph (3)(dm) is unconstitutional unless a gloss from 
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) is applied to the 
statute.1   
¶39 I agree that generally the Sell factors must enter 
into the circuit court's consideration of whether to order 
involuntary medication so as to render an incompetent defendant 
competent to stand trial.  However, there are occasions when a 
defendant who is not competent to stand trial also will be 
dangerous to himself or to others.  In those occasions, the Sell 
factors will not be relevant.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained: 
A court need not consider whether to allow forced 
medication for that kind of purpose, if forced 
medication is warranted for a different purpose, such 
as . . . the individual's dangerousness.   
Id. at 181-82 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225-26 
(1990)). 
 
Furthermore, 
determining 
whether 
medication 
is 
necessary to control dangerous behavior is often an easier task 
for a medical expert than it is for the expert to balance the 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶2.   
No.  2018AP1296-CR & 20181214-W.pdr 
 
2 
 
harms and benefits related to opining on legal competence.  Id. 
at 182.   
¶40 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.14 
addresses 
competency 
proceedings.  Paragraph (1r) instructs that "[t]he court shall 
proceed under this section whenever there is reason to doubt a 
defendant's competency to proceed."  The statute permits the 
court to order an examination of the defendant "for competency 
purposes 
at 
any 
stage 
of 
the 
competency 
proceedings 
by 
physicians or other experts."  § 971.14(2)(g)  
¶41 The record reveals that Fitzgerald was removed from 
outpatient treatment because of incidents of violent conduct in 
relation to others.  This was not the focus of the circuit 
court.  However, a statutory provision in addition to the forced 
medication found in Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) on which the 
majority opinion focuses, is found in paragraph (2)(f).   
¶42 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(2)(f) 
provides 
that 
a 
defendant who is charged with a crime, is incompetent and also 
is 
dangerous 
to 
himself 
or 
others 
is 
not 
affected 
by 
§ 971.14(3)(dm).  Instead, paragraph (2)(f) provides a different 
test for refusing medication.  It provides that a defendant "may 
refuse medication and treatment except in a situation where the 
medication or treatment is necessary to prevent physical harm to 
the defendant or others."  § 971.14(2)(f).  Therefore, if 
medication is ordered under paragraph (2)(f), as the United 
States Supreme Court has explained, the Sell factors do not 
apply.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 182. 
No.  2018AP1296-CR & 20181214-W.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶43 While I join the majority opinion's concern for adding 
a Sell gloss to our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) 
in order to preserve its constitutionality, I write to point out 
that if a defendant is dangerous to himself or others, ordering 
treatment for that condition, which will likely return the 
defendant to competency, does not employ the Sell factors.  
Because 
I 
am 
concerned 
that 
paragraph 
(2)(f) 
could 
be 
overlooked, I write in concurrence to point up its use when 
appropriate. 
¶44 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence.    
No.  2018AP1296-CR & 20181214-W.pdr 
 
 
 
1