Title: In re Marriage of Reynolds

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
Ryan H. Cassman 
Cathy M. Brownson 
Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C.  
Carmel, Indiana 
  
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE  
 
Eric J. Benner 
Laurie D. Johnson 
Boje, Benner, Becker, Markovich & Hixson, LLP  
Noblesville, Indiana 
  
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 29S04-1612-DR-00636 
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 
THOMAS TODD REYNOLDS, 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
v. 
TRICIA REYNOLDS, 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, No. 29D03-0904-DR-00515 
The Honorable William J. Hughes, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A04-1505-DR-00265 
December 6, 2016 
David, Justice.   
 
At issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found Father in contempt 
for failing to provide Mother certain income documentation as required by the parties’ dissolution 
decree and agreed order of modification.  We hold that it did not. Specifically, we hold that: 1) 
Mother’s motion for rule to show cause was specific enough to excuse strict compliance with the 
contempt statute and protect Father’s due process rights; 2) Father waived his objections to the 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 06 2016, 4:07 pm
 
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evidentiary findings of the trial court when he agreed to a summary proceeding with no objection; 
and 3) under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court was not required to give Father 
an opportunity to purge himself of contempt. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In 2010, Thomas Todd Reynolds (Father) and Tricia Reynolds (Mother) divorced. The 
dissolution decree established a child support obligation to be paid by Father and required that 
upon written request from Mother, Father make certain tax documents available for inspection. In 
2013, the trial court entered an agreed modification order wherein Father’s obligation was 
modified to account for Father’s fluctuating income. This modification order required that Father 
pay a set weekly sum as well as make quarterly payments based upon a percentage of his income.  
The order further required that Father provide documentation of his income and a payment 
calculation to Mother quarterly, beginning in the first quarter of 2013.  
 
In March 2014, Mother served a written request for production of documents on Father 
requesting tax information for Father for the years 2011-2013. In May 2014, after receiving no 
response from Father, Mother’s counsel followed-up on the discovery requests in an attempt to 
informally resolve the discovery dispute.  In June 2014, Mother filed her motion to compel Father’s 
discovery responses.  The trial court granted Mother’s motion to compel, ordered Father to respond 
to Mother’s request for production of documents and set a compliance hearing.  During an August 
compliance hearing, the court dismissed Mother’s motion to compel as moot, finding no petitions 
for modification or contempt before the court.   
Shortly thereafter, Mother filed a Verified Motion for Rule to Show Cause (“Contempt 
Motion”), alleging Father should be held in contempt for failing to comply with the dissolution 
decree and the agreed modification order regarding production of certain income and tax 
documents.  During the pendency of the Contempt Motion, Mother continued to actively seek the 
requested documents.  For instance, she served another request for production on Father, again 
requesting his tax documents for 2011-2013, and in October 2014, she attended a document 
inspection at the office of counsel for Father in effort to obtain the requested documents.  While 
Father provided some of the requested documents, he did not provide all of them or make them 
 
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available at the inspection, and thus, Mother’s counsel sent correspondence to Father’s counsel 
outlining the documents that had still not been produced.  
 
In November 2014, Mother filed another motion to compel.  The trial court granted 
Mother’s motion to compel and set the matter for a compliance hearing.  Father filed a motion to 
set aside the order compelling discovery and to dismiss the rule to show cause.     
 
In December 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the parties’ outstanding motions. The 
parties agreed to present argument in summary fashion. Ultimately, the court found Father in 
contempt for failing to provide Mother tax documentation from 2010 forward pursuant to the 
parties’ dissolution decree.  As sanctions for contempt, the trial court ordered that Father produce 
the requested documents within thirty (30) days and further ordered that Father pay $3,000 of 
Mother’s attorney fees.  Father’s consolidated motion to correct errors, or, in the alternative, 
motion for relief under Trial Rule 60(B) was denied after a hearing.  Father then appealed.  
 
 
On appeal, Father argued that the trial court abused its discretion by finding him in 
contempt and ordering him to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney fees.  Specifically, he argued that 
the trial court did not issue a proper rule to show cause, that mother’s motion for rule to show 
cause did not provide him with proper notice under the contempt statutes and that he did not 
willfully violate the terms of the dissolution decree or agreed modification order.  Mother 
responded that Father did not provide all of the tax documents required by the dissolution decree 
and agreed modification order despite her repeated requests. She further argued that her motion 
sufficiently notified Father of the accusations against him and that Father waived any argument 
regarding notice because he did not raise the issue at the trial court.  
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court for abuse of discretion in a memorandum 
decision for two reasons: 1) the trial court did not strictly comply with the rule to show cause 
statute; and 2) the trial court failed to give Father a way to purge himself of contempt.  Reynolds 
v. Reynolds, 2016 WL 612763 at *6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).    
 
 
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We now grant transfer and affirm the trial court, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals 
opinion.   Ind. App. Rule 58(A). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
“It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in 
contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.”  Steele-Giri v. 
Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 202 
(Ind. 2012)). We will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or 
inference therefrom to support the finding.” Id. The trial court has the inherent power to “maintain 
[ ] its dignity, secur[e] obedience to its process and rules, rebuk[e] interference with the conduct 
of business, and punish[ ] unseemly behavior.” Id. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
1. The Motion for the Rule to Show Cause contained sufficient factual detail so as to 
excuse strict compliance and protect Father’s due process rights. 
 
Contempt of court generally involves disobedience of a court or court order that 
“undermines the court’s authority, justice, and dignity.” In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d 129, 131 (Ind. 2014) 
(citing State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ind. 1990)). There are two kinds of contempt:  direct 
contempt and indirect contempt.  Id. Indirect contempt, which is at issue in this case, involves 
those acts “committed outside the presence of the court ‘which nevertheless tend to interrupt, 
obstruct, embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice.’” Id. at 32. (quoting 6 Ind. Law 
Encyc. Contempt §2 (1958)).  
 
Indiana has codified the procedural requirements for finding indirect contempt at Ind. Code 
section 34-47-3-5, which provides:  
 
(a) 
In all cases of indirect contempt, the person charged with indirect 
contempt is entitled: 
 
 
(1) 
before answering the charge; or 
 
 
(2)  
being punished for the contempt; 
to be served with a rule of the court against which the 
contempt was alleged to have been committed. 
 
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(b)  
The rule to show cause must: 
(1)  
clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to 
constitute the contempt; 
(2)  
specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable 
certainty, as to inform the defendant of the nature and 
circumstances of the charge against the defendant; and 
(3) 
specify a time and place at which the defendant is required 
to show cause, in the court, why the defendant should not be 
attached and punished for such contempt. 
(c) 
The court shall, on proper showing, extend the time provided under 
subsection (b)(3) to give the defendant a reasonable and just 
opportunity to be purged of the contempt. 
(d) 
A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until the facts 
alleged to constitute the contempt have been:  
 
 
(1) 
brought to the knowledge of the court by an information; and 
(2) 
duly verified by oath of affirmation of some officers of the 
court or other responsible person. 
 
This statute “[e]ssentially . . . fulfills the due process requirement that a contemnor be 
provided with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.”  In re Contempt of Wabash Valley 
Hosp., Inc., 827 N.E.2d 50, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Our Court has previously held that alleged 
contemnors are guaranteed certain due process and procedural rights, but we have not yet had 
reason to elaborate on these requirements.  See In re Marriage of Neiswinger, 447 N.E.2d 257, 262 
(Ind. 1985).  
 
Generally, a court’s authority to find a person in contempt rests on whether a trial court has 
strictly complied with the statutory requirements set forth in the rule to show cause statute. In re 
Paternity of J.T.I, 875 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  Our courts have found, however, 
that strict compliance with the statute may be excused if “it is clear the alleged contemnor 
nevertheless had clear notice of the accusations against him or her . . .”  Id. See also Lasater v. 
Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re Contempt of Wabash Valley Hosp., Inc., 
827 N.E.2d at 63-64.  Examples of this “clear notice” exception include when a contemnor receives 
a copy of an original contempt information that contains detailed factual allegations of contempt 
or if the contemnor admits the factual basis for a contempt finding.  In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 
N.E.2d at 451. 
 
 
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In this case, although Father disputes the notice he received, we are satisfied that Father’s 
due process rights have been preserved in this case.  Mother’s Motion for Rule to Show Cause 
contained detailed factual allegations that Father failed to comply with provisions of the 
dissolution decree and agreed modification order. The Motion also incorporated by reference 
Mother’s request for production of documents to show which documents had been requested.  
 
Admittedly, under a plain reading of the rule to show cause statutes, the contemnor is 
entitled to be “served with a rule of the court against which the contempt was alleged to have been 
committed.” Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5(a).  We are not convinced, however, that a trial court itself 
must bear the burden of articulating the specific facts alleging contempt in its Order to Appear and 
Show Cause when a moving party has already done so and has properly served the defendant with 
the contempt motion.  As our Court of Appeals recently held, due process is only denied when 
neither a court order nor a motion for rule to show cause contain sufficient factual detail about the 
allegations of contempt. See Stanke v. Swickard, 43 N.E. 3d 245, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).  In 
this case, the motion for contempt was sufficient to provide Father with proper notice.   
 
 2. 
Father has waived his objections to the evidentiary findings of the trial court 
because he agreed to proceed in summary fashion and the trial court’s factual 
determinations are supported by the evidence. 
 
Summary proceedings “allow the court to base its findings and conclusions upon the 
arguments of counsel and limited evidence.” Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 739 (Ind. 2015). 
They also allow parties that agree on most of the relevant facts to expedite the resolution of the 
case. Id.  
 
Both Father and Mother agreed to proceed in summary fashion in this case. During the 
summary proceeding, Father argued that he did not fail to provide income and tax documents to 
Mother upon her request.  As discussed above, Father did not argue insufficient notice of the 
allegations in support of a contempt finding; instead, Father argued in his Motion to Correct Errors 
that “some of the background in this case… got lost in the shuffle in the summary presentation.”1 
(Tr. at 32.)  We construe this argument as an objection to the form of the proceedings. 
                                                 
1 Father seems to recognize his mistake in agreeing to a summary proceeding when he also notes in his 
Motion to Correct Errors, “I guess in hindsight Your Honor maybe we should have more aggressively gone 
 
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However, if Father believed that he could not ascertain the specific factual allegations 
underlying the contempt proceeding or that a full evidentiary hearing was necessary, he should 
have objected to a summary proceeding.  See Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 741 (finding that when a litigant 
believes a full evidentiary hearing is necessary, he or she must make that objection known rather 
than agree to a summary proceeding). We have previously upheld “the general principle that 
objections not contemporaneously raised are waived.” Id. (citing Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 
1146, 1152 (Ind. 2000)). Appellants may not sit idly by and raise issues for the first time on appeal. 
Id. (citing Trout v. Trout 638 N.E.2d 1306, 1307 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).  Accordingly, because 
Father raised no objections to the form of the proceeding, the issue becomes whether the trial 
court’s finding of contempt was an abuse of discretion. See Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. 
 
Our standard of review requires that we reverse the trial court only if there is no evidence 
to support a finding of indirect contempt. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124.  Father argues that the 
dissolution decree simply required him to make documents “available” rather than “produce” the 
documents and that the facts before the trial court did not support a finding of contempt.  
 
However, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Father in 
contempt because there was evidence that Father did not produce certain tax documentation as 
required by parties’ dissolution decree.  Based on the arguments presented at summary trial, the 
trial court found that, although Father did produce some of the requested information including his 
Federal 1040 tax returns for 2010, 2011, and 2012, he did not provide all appropriate tax 
information from those years to Mother or otherwise make the documents available for inspection. 
This is despite multiple discovery requests from Mother. Whether the dissolution decree required 
Father to “make available” the documents or “produce” them is immaterial.  Father had multiple 
opportunities over the course of many months to produce or make the requested documents 
available to Mother. 2   He failed to do so.   Further, the trial court’s order explicitly states that 
                                                 
after the Rule to Show Cause that was filed. . .We didn’t want to bring before this [c]ourt just a who’s right 
on some issue that we thought was frankly a lay down issue.” (Tr. at 38). 
2 As discussed above, Mother requested documents in March 2014, reminded Father’s counsel of this 
request in May 2014, filed a motion to compel discovery of documents in June 2014, served Father with a 
another request for production of documents in August 2014 and filed another motion to compel discovery 
in November 2014.  
 
8 
 
Father “did not make such information available to [Mother] for inspection.” (Appellant’s App. 
21.)  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Father failed to abide by 
the divorce decree.   
 
With respect to the sanctions imposed by the trial court, our courts have held “trial court[s 
have] inherent authority to award attorney’s fees for civil contempt.” Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 
N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); see also Thomas v. Woollen, 266 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. 1971); 
J.S. v. W.K., 2016 WL 3442375 at *5-6 (Ind. Ct. App. June 23, 2016); and Ind. Code section 31-
16-11-13). Here, the sanctions for this contempt included providing the requested documentation 
to Mother within thirty days and paying $3,000 of Mother’s attorney fees. We defer to the trial 
court’s finding that these fees were reasonable in light of the circumstances and find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in this instance.  
 
3. 
The trial court was not required to give Father an opportunity to purge himself. 
 
The Court of Appeals addressed subsection (c) of the contempt statute sua sponte in its 
memorandum decision, finding the trial court erred by not giving Father the opportunity to purge 
himself of contempt.4 Reynolds at *5. At the outset, we reemphasize that the purpose of civil 
contempt is to coerce action by the contemnor for the benefit of the aggrieved party; civil contempt 
is not meant to punish the contemnor.  See Deckard v. Deckard, 841 N.E.2d 194, 203 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2006). See also Crowl, 678 N.E.2d at 831.  Furthermore, the “purge” portion of the statute 
has typically only applied to cases where the trial court has ordered jail time to coerce action by 
                                                 
3 Ind. Code section 31-16-11-1(a) reads, in relevant part:  
 
 
(a) The court periodically may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for: 
 
(1) the cost of the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this 
chapter…;  
 
(2) attorney’s fees… 
 
(emphasis added).  
 
4 Ind. Code section 34-47-3-5(c) reads: “The court shall, on proper showing, extend the time provided under 
subsection (b)(3) to give the defendant a reasonable and just opportunity to be purged of the contempt.” 
 
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the contemnor.5  See Stanke, 43 N.E.3d at 249; Reed v. Cassady, 27 N.E.3d 1104, 1114 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2015); In re Paternity of M.P.M.W., 908 N.E.2d 1205, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); In re 
Paternity of C.N.S., 901 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). This is likely because jail time 
is generally punitive in nature and civil contempt orders avoid punishing the contemnor by 
allowing the party to be purged of contempt.  Henderson v. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 
n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  However, the trial court did not order Father to serve any jail time in this 
case. 
 
Further, subsection (c) of the rule to show cause statute contains the modifier “on proper 
showing” before the clause allowing the defendant an opportunity to be purged of contempt.  Thus, 
Father must show the court why he should be allowed to purge the contempt before the court 
allows the opportunity to purge.  The Court of Appeals did not make mention of how this 
subsection would apply in this case. Accordingly, because it is not clear that Father made the 
proper showing and he was not facing jail time, we are unpersuaded that it would be necessary for 
the trial court to outline the ways in which Father may be “purged of the contempt.”  We note that 
presumably Father could have produced or permitted inspection of the requested information prior 
to the parties appearing in court, but he failed to do so.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of the standard of review and because: 1) Father received sufficient notice of the 
specific factual allegations underlying the contempt proceeding; 2) Father did not object to a 
summary proceeding and the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings; and 3) 
the trial court was not required to offer Father an opportunity to purge his contempt under these 
circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father in contempt 
for not producing certain tax documents pursuant to the parties’ dissolution decree and the agreed 
order of modification.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.   
 
 
                                                 
5 This is not to say that the purge portion of the statute could never apply in absence of jail time.  We only 
hold that it does not apply under the facts and circumstances of this case.   
 
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Rush, C.J., Rucker and Massa, J.J., concur.   
 
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slaughter, J., dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to reinstate the indirect contempt against 
Father. A key procedural protection within the governing contempt statute applies here. See Ind. 
Code § 34-47-3-5. Specifically, Father was entitled “to be served with a rule of the court” that 
“clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the contempt”. Id. §§ 34-47-
3-5(a), 5(b)(1). Given the trial court’s acknowledged failure to issue a rule to show cause in 
accordance with this statutory prerequisite, I would reverse its contempt order. 
 
The Court overlooks this omission by concluding the statute merely codifies the minimal 
constitutional “due process requirement that a contemnor be provided with adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.” Supra at *5 (quoting In re Contempt of Wabash Valley Hosp., Inc., 827 
N.E.2d 50, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). According to the Court, it suffices that Mother’s motion for 
rule to show cause “contained detailed factual allegations that Father failed to comply with 
provisions of the dissolution decree and agreed modification order.” Supra at *6. I am unable to 
join the Court’s opinion because I believe the legislature is entitled to require that alleged 
contemnors receive greater procedural protections than the minimum constitutional requirements 
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
There can be no mistaking the legislative mandate here. The statute’s opening words 
command that the procedural requirements recited in this chapter apply “[i]n all cases” of indirect 
contempt. I.C. § 34-47-3-5(a). The statute’s plain meaning required the trial court to issue a rule 
to show cause detailing the factual basis for Father’s alleged contempt. Because the court failed to 
do so, its contempt order should not stand. I respectfully dissent from our decision excusing the 
trial court’s noncompliance and reinstating Father’s contempt.