Title: Worthington v. Columbus

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Worthington v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 103, 2003-Ohio-5099.] 
 
 
CITY OF WORTHINGTON, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Worthington v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 103, 2003-Ohio-5099.] 
Municipal corporations — Eminent domain power of a chartered municipal 
corporation does not include the power to condemn property when the use 
proposed by the municipality will destroy its existing public use, unless the 
Ohio Constitution authorizes the acquisition either expressly or by 
necessary implication. 
(No. 2002-1106 — Submitted April 30, 2003, at the Ross County Session — 
Decided October 15, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 01AP-1119 and 01AP-
1120, 2002-Ohio-2330. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The eminent domain power of a chartered municipal corporation  vested by 
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution does not include the 
power to condemn property when the use proposed by the municipality 
will destroy its existing public use, unless the Ohio Constitution authorizes 
the acquisition either expressly or by necessary implication.  (Blue Ash v. 
Cincinnati [1962],173 Ohio St. 345, 19 O.O.2d 274, 182 N.E.2d 557; 
Northwood v. Wood Cty. Regional Water & Sewer Dist. [1999], 86 Ohio 
St.3d 92, 711 N.E.2d 1003, affirmed and followed.) 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, city of Worthington, initiated two separate actions 
claiming a right to exercise eminent domain over five acres of real property 
owned by the city of Columbus.  The property is situated within the municipal 
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corporate boundaries of Worthington and lies along the eastern edge of the 
Olentangy River on the boundary between Worthington and Columbus. 
{¶2} 
Columbus acquired the five acres of land in 1968 as part of a 38-
acre parcel.  The acquisition was financed with federal funds granted on the 
condition that the land be used as open space.  The land thereafter became known 
as Rush Run Park.  Another Columbus park, Antrim Park, is situated directly to 
the north and west of Rush Run Park, within Columbus. 
{¶3} 
Worthington first sought a declaratory judgment that would 
recognize its authority as a chartered municipal corporation to appropriate five 
acres of Rush Run Park.  Worthington owns the Walnut Grove Cemetery, which 
abuts the eastern boundary of the five acres at issue, and alleged that it has an 
immediate need to expand the cemetery.  Worthington hopes to sell grave sites on 
the land to the general public. 
{¶4} 
In response, Columbus asserted that it had acquired the land 
adjacent to the cemetery for use as a public park and has maintained the land 
continuously for that purpose.  Columbus denied that Worthington was entitled to 
acquire title to the property through eminent domain. 
{¶5} 
Thereafter, Worthington initiated separate eminent domain 
proceedings in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas by filing a petition to 
appropriate the five acres of property.  In response, Columbus denied that 
Worthington possessed a legal right to take its parkland for cemetery use, 
asserting that Worthington’s proposed use would destroy the existing public use 
of the land.  Columbus asserted that it currently uses the property as a public park 
and natural area as defined in R.C. 1517.01.1 
                                                 
1. 
R.C. 1517.01 defines “natural area” as an “area of land or water which either retains to 
some degree or has re-established its natural character, although it need not be completely 
undisturbed, or has unusual flora, fauna, geological, archeological, scenic, or similar features of 
scientific or educational interest.” 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶6} 
The trial court consolidated the two actions, and each party filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  The trial court determined that Worthington 
could not appropriate the five acres through eminent domain and entered 
summary judgment in favor of Columbus. 
{¶7} 
The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  Its judgment is 
before us upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
{¶8} 
In 1912, the people of Ohio amended the Ohio Constitution to 
provide, “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary 
and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” (Emphasis 
added.)  Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.  Article XVIII is commonly 
referred to as the Home Rule Amendment. 
{¶9} 
We have consistently held that the constitutional grant of “all 
powers of local self-government” to municipalities includes the power of eminent 
domain.  State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich (1953), 159 Ohio St. 13, 32, 50 O.O. 6, 110 
N.E.2d 778.  Worthington asserts a right to exercise eminent domain based solely 
on the power of local self-government vested in it by Section 3 of the Home Rule 
Amendment; it does not assert any statutory rights to employ eminent domain it 
may have.  Cf. R.C. Chapter 719.  Columbus counters that its prior and current 
use of the property for public purposes precludes the exercise of eminent domain 
by Worthington. 
{¶10} In Blue Ash, this court observed: “It is a general rule, and one of 
long standing, that when a condemnor, to which the power of eminent domain is 
given by law, seeks to exercise its power with respect to property already devoted 
to public use, its action may be enjoined if the proposed use will either destroy the 
existing use or interfere with it to such an extent as is tantamount to destruction, 
unless the law has authorized the acquisition either expressly or by necessary 
implication.”  Id. at 351, 19 O.O.2d 274, 182 N.E.2d 557.  This rule is commonly 
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denominated the “prior public use” rule or doctrine.  See, e.g., Las Cruces v. El 
Paso Elec. Co. (1998), 124 N.M. 640, 954 P.2d 72; Naiman, Judicial Balancing of 
Uses for Public Property: The Paramount Public Use Doctrine (1990), 17 
B.C.Envtl.Affairs L.Rev. 893, 896; Arena, The Accommodation of “Occupation” 
and “Social Utility” in Prior Public Use Jurisprudence (1988), 137 U.Pa.L.Rev. 
233. 
{¶11} Worthington asserts that the constitutional status of home rule 
precludes application of the prior public use doctrine to preclude it from taking 
property within its boundaries through eminent domain.  We disagree. 
{¶12} In Blue Ash, the court applied the prior public use doctrine in a 
case where a city attempted to condemn property it owned outside its corporate 
limits pursuant to Section 4, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution, commonly called 
the Utility Clause.2  This clause vests municipalities with power to acquire 
property “within or without its corporate limits, * * * by condemnation or 
otherwise,” for the purpose of providing public utility services to its inhabitants. 
(Emphasis added.)  Britt v. Columbus (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 1, 67 O.O.2d 1, 309 
N.E.2d 412, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶13} Worthington thus correctly argues that Blue Ash is factually 
distinguishable from the case at bar.  Blue Ash involved application of the prior 
public use doctrine to preclude a taking where the subject property was situated 
outside the corporate limits of the condemning municipality.  In this case, the 
condemning city seeks to take property located within its limits. 
                                                 
2.     {¶a} 
Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides: 
 
{¶b} 
“Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or 
without its corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of which is or is to be 
supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with others for any such product 
or service.  The acquisition of any such public utility  may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a 
municipality may acquire thereby the use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any 
company or person supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or produce of any 
such utility.” (Emphasis added.) 
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{¶14} The distinction does not further Worthington’s cause.  The Utility 
Clause grants specific authority to condemn property both within and without 
corporate limits.  Such an express grant of power would seem to present a 
stronger case for disregarding the prior public use doctrine than in a case where 
the power to condemn is grounded in the more indirect vesting of authority as a 
“power of local self-government.”  However, the court in Blue Ash nevertheless 
employed the doctrine to enjoin a taking that would have destroyed a prior, and 
existing, public use. 
{¶15} Moreover, the prior public use doctrine was subsequently  applied 
in Northwood v. Wood Cty. Regional Water & Sewer Dist. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 
92, 711 N.E.2d 1003.  In that case, a municipality claimed authority to condemn 
property located within its corporate limits based on the Utility Clause.  Precedent 
clearly supports the conclusion that the doctrine of prior public use applies in 
condemnation proceedings against property within and without the municipal 
limits of a condemning city. 
{¶16} Further, the Utility Clause does not apply to the case at bar as it did 
in both Blue Ash and Northwood.  Worthington does not seek to take title to part 
of Rush Run Park in order to provide its residents with utilities.  Worthington 
instead asserts authority to condemn property within its corporate limits as a 
prerogative of self-government pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio 
Constitution.  It argues that the prior public use doctrine should not be applied in 
these circumstances. 
{¶17} In both Blue Ash and Northwood, however, as in the case at bar, 
the authority of the condemning municipality to pursue eminent domain was 
grounded in a constitutional grant of power.  In contending that the precedent of 
Blue Ash and Northwood should not apply herein, Worthington argues that the 
powers of eminent domain provided by Section 3, Article XVIII are superior to 
the powers provided by Section 4.  We discern no justification for that conclusion. 
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{¶18} Worthington effectively asks us to reevaluate the prior public use 
doctrine under the home-rule governmental structure established by the Ohio 
Constitution and to overrule long-established Ohio precedent.  It argues that the 
theoretical justification for the prior public use doctrine does not exist where the 
power of eminent domain is grounded in a constitutional grant of authority, as the 
doctrine resulted from interpretation of statutes by which the state delegates to 
municipalities and other entities the eminent domain power it possesses as an 
incident of sovereignty.  These statutes, and the prior public use doctrine itself, 
predate the Home Rule Amendment.  Worthington argues that the power of 
eminent domain of a municipality flows directly from the Constitution itself and 
that statutory and common law cannot restrict it. 
{¶19} It is true that the prior public use doctrine arose as the result of   
interpretation of statutes vesting municipalities and other public entities with the 
power of eminent domain.  See 1A Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.2002) 2-55, 
Section 2.2 et seq.; Little Miami & Columbus & Xenia RR. Cos. v. Dayton (1872), 
23 Ohio St. 510, 1872 WL 91.  However, the doctrine has consistently been 
recognized in Ohio cases decided since adoption of the Home Rule Amendment.  
In addition to Blue Ash and Northwood, see in accord Cincinnati v. Louisville & 
N.R. Co. (1913), 88 Ohio St. 283, 295, 11 Ohio Law Rep. 94, 102 N.E. 951; 
Akron Bd. of Edn. v. Proprietors of Akron Rural Cemetery (1924), 110 Ohio St. 
430, 442-443, 144 N.E. 113; Richmond Hts. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. 
(1960), 112 Ohio App. 272, 83 Ohio Law Abs. 273, 11 O.O.2d 475, 166 N.E.2d 
143. 
{¶20} It is also true that the wisdom of the doctrine has been questioned 
and alternatives proposed.  See, generally, Naiman, 17 B.C.Envtl.Affairs L.Rev. 
893; Arena, 137 U.Pa.L.Rev. 233; Matteoni, The California Roadway—A More 
Necessary Public Use (1969), 20 Hastings L.J. 551.  However, the doctrine has 
provided a measure of reliability in resolving eminent domain proceedings in 
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Ohio.  While hypothetical facts may be posited in which the relative value of 
competing uses could render application of the doctrine unreasonable, we do not 
find the facts of the case at bar sufficient to warrant revision of our long-
established precedent. 
{¶21} Furthermore, defining the parameters of the power of eminent 
domain is a judicial function.  Blue Ash v. Cincinnati (1962), 173 Ohio St. 345, 
353,19 O.O.2d 274, 182 N.E.2d 557, citing Giesy v. Cincinnati, Wilmington & 
Zanesville RR. Co. (1854), 4 Ohio St. 308, 309, 1854 WL 81 (noting that “the 
courts possess full authority to determine * * * proper limits” of the power of 
eminent domain).  Implicit in Worthington’s argument is the premise that the 
exercise of eminent domain pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment is beyond the 
purview of judicial scrutiny. We reject this premise. 
{¶22} Accordingly, we hold that the eminent domain power of a 
chartered municipal corporation vested by Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution does not include the power to condemn property when the use 
proposed by the municipality will destroy its existing public use, unless the Ohio 
Constitution authorizes the acquisition either expressly or by necessary 
implication. 
{¶23} Worthington did not contradict evidence proffered by Columbus 
that its proposed use of the subject property as a cemetery would destroy the 
existing public use of the land as an open-space park.  The Ohio Constitution does 
not expressly or by necessary implication authorize a city to take property already 
used for public purposes in order to further a proprietary function like maintaining 
a cemetery.  Worthington’s claim to a right to take the property through eminent 
domain thus fails. 
{¶24} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, HARSHA, W. YOUNG and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
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PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
WILLIAM H. HARSHA III, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for 
COOK, J. 
 
WILLIAM W. YOUNG, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting for 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶25} Although I may well agree with the majority as to the ultimate 
disposition of the property at issue, I dissent.  My concern is with the application 
of the prior public use doctrine, which yields a mechanical “first use is best use” 
result to every inquiry.  I believe that the prior public use doctrine needs fine-
tuning so that property disputes between public entities can be resolved through a 
reasoned weighing of alternative possible uses. 
{¶26} The resolution of competing public uses for property should spring 
from the relative necessity of the competing uses.  The element of the necessity of 
an appropriation is a part of every eminent domain case (R.C. 163.05), and that 
element should be paramount in a dispute between public entities.  Unlike in cases 
between public and private entities, the condemnee should not have the burden of 
proof on the issue of the necessity of the taking.  A condemnor should have to 
prove a reasonable necessity for the taking.  A reasonable necessity could be 
proved by demonstrating that the condemnor’s use better serves the interests of 
the public or that the advantages to the condemnor of the taking largely exceed 
the disadvantages that would befall the condemnee. See 2 Lewis, A Treatment on 
the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States (3d Ed.1909), Section 440. 
{¶27} I believe that the public interest in these kinds of cases is too great 
to let them be decided without a contemplation of what result is, in fact, best for 
the public.  I am heartened to glean from the majority opinion that it believes that 
the prior public use doctrine may indeed need to be modified in the future, but just 
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not in this case.  However, I would remand this case to the trial court for a 
determination as to whether there is a reasonable necessity for Worthington’s 
proposed taking. 
__________________ 
 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., David C. Levine, John H. Burtch and Michael 
E. Minister, for appellant. 
 
Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., Columbus City Attorney, Daniel W. Drake, Chief 
Counsel, John C. Klein III and Jennifer S. Gams, Assistant City Attorneys, for 
appellee. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Robert M. Curry and Chad D. Cooper, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae Five Rivers MetroParks, Preservation Park District of 
Delaware County, Johnny Appleseed Metropolitan Park District, Medina County 
Park District, Centerville-Washington Park District, Washington Township Board 
of Trustees (Franklin County), Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District, O.O. 
McIntyre Park District, Wood County Park District, MetroParks Serving Summit 
County, Stark County Park District, and Metropolitan Park District of the Toledo 
Area. 
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