Title: Jones v. Ogden Auto Body

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

646 P.2d 703 (1982) Floyd JONES, Plaintiff, v. OGDEN AUTO BODY and State Insurance Fund, Defendants. No. 17853. Supreme Court of Utah. April 29, 1982. Pete N. Vlahos, of Vlahos, Perkins & Sharp, Ogden, for plaintiff. Dale T. Browning, Ogden, for Ogden Auto Body. James R. Black, David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Frank V. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Industrial Commission. PER CURIAM: Plaintiff appeals the denial of workmen's compensation benefits for injuries he allegedly suffered in an industrial accident in early 1976. Plaintiff claims that he injured his right arm while working for Ogden Auto Body (hereafter "defendant"). He contends that what was later diagnosed as thrombosis resulted from a bruise incurred when he and *704 some co-workers were moving a "burnedout Vega clip" at defendant's shop. Plaintiff testified that he advised defendant shortly after the accident occurred and that he was instructed to file a claim with defendant's insurance carrier. When his injury did not improve, plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Commission in December, 1978. After a hearing on August 29, 1980, the administrative law judge recited the evidence adduced and ruled as follows: On appeal, plaintiff contends that this finding constitutes "an arbitrary disregard of the evidence," warranting reversal. The standard of review of an order of the Industrial Commission was recently stated in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, Utah, 631 P.2d 888 (1981) as follows: In the instant case, the evidence was in conflict as to whether the injury was the result of an accident at defendant's shop. Applying the foregoing standard, we are compelled to affirm the order of the Commission inasmuch as there is substantial evidence contained in the record which supports the findings. Defendant denied receiving any notification of the accident and plaintiff's own witness (a co-worker) was equivocal as to whether an identifiable accident even occurred. There is nothing in the medical records to indicate that the injury was caused by an industrial accident; rather, plaintiff was initially diagnosed as suffering from "spontaneous thrombosis of the right subclavian axillary vein." The hospital admission record which was signed by plaintiff clearly indicated that the condition was not caused by an industrial accident. Not until subsequent hospital admission on May 27, 1980, for an operation to correct the condition is there any mention of it being industrially related. Shortly after plaintiff terminated his employment with defendant, he applied for and received unemployment compensation based on the representation that he was able to work. Plaintiff also claims as a basis for reversal that the Industrial Commission's affirmance of the order of the administrative law judge violated plaintiff's constitutional right to due process. Specifically, plaintiff contends that he was not given a full and fair opportunity to be heard by the Commission and that it did not enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as required by U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-85. On March 11, 1981, plaintiff filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission alleging that the decision of the administrative law judge was contrary to the evidence. On June 4, 1981, the Commission (only two members sitting) ruled, in part, as follows: The Commission can, and apparently in this case did, adopt the findings of the administrative law judge. Whether a hearing is held and whether further findings are made is a matter of discretion with the Commission. In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 607 P.2d 807 (1980), we unanimously held as follows: The Commission's order is affirmed. No costs awarded.