Title: Chasin v. Chasin

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROSALYN CHASIN, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID G. CHASIN, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 613, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. CN02-08613 
§  Petition No. 04-14905 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 12, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: December 4, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
 
This 4th day of December 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The respondent-appellant, Rosalyn Chasin (“Wife”), filed an 
appeal from the Family Court’s August 30, 2006 decision and order on the 
ancillary issues of property division, alimony, and counsel fees and its 
October 23, 2006 denial of her motion for reargument.  We find no merit to 
the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Wife and the petitioner-appellee, David 
G. Chasin (“Husband”), were married for approximately 40 years.  They 
divorced in July 2004.  In its 21-page decision and order dated August 30, 
2006, the Family Court found that the parties had a marital estate valued at 
$1,663,790.00 and divided the estate equally between them.  The Family 
 
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Court further determined that Wife would retain $131,141.00 as her separate 
property, as well as fourteen gold coins that had been given to her by 
Husband.  The Family Court denied Wife’s request for permanent alimony, 
ordered Wife to pay $2,662.50 in attorney’s fees to Husband for 
unreasonably delaying the litigation by asserting unsupported claims, and 
ordered Wife to pay a $100.00 fine for her disruptive behavior at the court 
hearing.   
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Wife claims that the Family Court erred as a 
matter of fact and law and abused its discretion in dividing the marital 
property, denying her request for alimony, and awarding counsel fees to 
Husband.  Specifically, she argues that her separate property should have 
been valued at $476,000.00 and that she should be awarded 80% of the 
marital estate, given the length of the marriage and the relative contributions 
of each party.     
 
 
(4) 
Under Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513, the Family Court must 
consider all relevant factors in dividing marital property and allocating 
marital debts, including the following: the length of the marriage, any prior 
marriages of the parties, the health and employment status of the parties, the 
impact of any alimony award, the opportunity of each party for future 
acquisitions of assets and income, the contribution of each party to the 
marital property, the value of the property awarded to each party, the 
economic circumstances of the parties, any acquisitions of property by gift, 
the debts of the parties, and the tax consequences of the property division. 
 
(5) 
Under Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512, the Family Court must 
consider all relevant factors in determining whether alimony will be 
awarded, including the following: the financial resources of the party 
seeking alimony, the time and expense necessary for the party seeking 
 
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alimony to find appropriate employment, the standard of living established 
during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, the physical and emotional 
condition of the parties, the contribution made by either party to the 
education and earning capacity of the other party, the ability of the other 
party to meet his or her needs while paying alimony, the tax consequences of 
alimony, and whether either party has foregone or postponed opportunities 
for education or employment during the marriage. 
 
(6) 
This Court’s review of appeals from the Family Court extends 
to a review of the facts and the law as well as a review of the inferences and 
deductions made by the judge.1  This Court will not disturb findings of fact 
unless they are clearly wrong and justice requires that they be overturned.2  
If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, the standard of review is 
abuse of discretion.3  Errors of law are reviewed de novo.4 
 
(7) 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, as well as 
the Family Court’s August 30, 2006 and October 23, 2006 decisions.  We 
find no legal error or abuse of discretion on the part of the Family Court with 
respect to its division of the marital property or its denial of Wife’s request 
for alimony.  Moreover, the Family Court acted within its discretion in 
awarding attorney’s fees to Husband5 and in imposing a fine upon Wife.  
Finally, the Family Court committed no error or abuse of discretion in 
denying Wife’s request for reargument.6  The Court concludes that the 
Family Court’s judgment should be affirmed on the basis of, and for the 
                                                 
1 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
2 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
3 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
4 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
5 Smith v. Francisco, 737 A.2d 1000, 1009 (Del. 1999). 
6 Bowen v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 879 A.2d 920, 921 (Del. 2005). 
 
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reasons set forth in, its well-reasoned decisions dated August 30, 2006 and 
October 23, 2006. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court is 
AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice