Title: Tuolumne Jobs & Small Bus. Alliance v. Superior Court

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 8/7/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
TUOLUMNE JOBS & SMALL 
) 
BUSINESS ALLIANCE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S207173 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F063849 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
) 
TUOLUMNE COUNTY, 
)  
Tuolumne County 
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. CV56309 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
When a city council receives a voter initiative petition meeting Elections 
Code requirements, it must do one of three things:  (1) adopt the initiative without 
alteration; (2) submit it to a special election; or (3) order an abbreviated report on 
the initiative.  Upon receipt of the report, it must then either adopt the initiative or 
hold a special election.  (Elec. Code, § 9214.)1  Several cases have held that 
provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21000 et seq.) do not apply to land use initiatives proposed by voters and 
adopted at an election.  In such cases, the abbreviated report provided for in the 
Elections Code furnishes the exclusive means of obtaining environmental review.  
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Elections Code unless otherwise 
specified. 
2 
(See, e.g., DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 793-795 (DeVita); 
Stein v. City of Santa Monica (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 458, 461-462 (Stein).) 
 
The question here is whether the result should be different if a city chooses 
to directly adopt a voter-sponsored initiative rather than hold a special election.  
The Court of Appeal distinguished between these two courses of action and held 
that a city may not adopt a voter initiative with potential environmental impacts 
unless it conducts a full CEQA analysis.  The language and legislative history 
behind the Elections Code statutes do not support this interpretation.  Accordingly, 
the judgment is reversed. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) 
operates a 130,166-square-foot store in the City of Sonora (City).  In 2007, Wal-
Mart sought to expand its store by approximately 27,491 square feet.  The new 
Wal-Mart “Supercenter” would sell groceries and be open 24 hours every day.  In 
December 2009, the City circulated for public comment a draft environmental 
impact report (EIR) for the expansion.  After a hearing, the City’s planning 
commission unanimously recommended that the EIR be certified and the project 
approved.  
 
Less than a week later, before the project was called for a vote, the City 
Council (Council) was served with a notice of intent to circulate an initiative 
petition.  The “Wal-Mart Initiative” proposed to adopt a specific plan for the 
contemplated expansion.  Its apparent purpose was to streamline approval for 
construction and operation of the Supercenter.  The Council postponed its vote 
while the initiative petition circulated.  The petition was ultimately signed by over 
20 percent of the City’s 2,489 registered voters.  
 
On September 20, 2010, the Council ordered that a section 9212 report be 
prepared to examine the initiative’s consistency with previous planning 
commission approvals for the Wal-Mart expansion.  At its next meeting, the 
3 
Council considered this report and countervailing arguments.  After weighing its 
options, the Council adopted the ordinance.  
 
The Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance (TJSBA) then sought a writ 
of mandate based on four causes of action.  The petition’s first claim, which is the 
subject of this appeal, asserted that the Council violated CEQA by adopting the 
ordinance without first conducting a complete environmental review.  TJSBA also 
challenged the validity of the initiative itself, on the grounds that it conflicted with 
the City’s general plan, improperly limited the City’s legislative power, and was 
impermissibly administrative, rather than legislative, in nature.  
 
Wal-Mart, the City, and initiative proponent James Grinnell demurred.  The 
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to all causes of action 
except TJSBA’s claim that the initiative improperly conflicted with the general 
plan.  TJSBA challenged these adverse rulings by writ petition in the Court of 
Appeal.  That court granted the writ as to the first cause of action, holding that 
when a land use ordinance is proposed in a voter initiative petition, full CEQA 
review is required if the city council adopts the ordinance rather than submitting it 
to an election.  It expressly disagreed with the only published authority on point, 
Native American Sacred Site & Environmental Protection Assn. v. City of San 
Juan Capistrano (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 961.  We granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
This case explores the intersection between the constitutional power of 
voters to enact laws by initiative and the environmental review generally required 
for laws potentially having a significant environmental impact.  Because we must 
decide a city government’s obligations in adopting a land use initiative proposed 
by voters,2 we begin our analysis with the laws governing initiatives. 
                                              
2  
TJSBA urges us to follow our decision in Friends of Sierra Madre v. City 
of Sierra Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 191, which held that local agencies must 
comply with CEQA before placing a land use initiative on the ballot.  However, 
Sierra Madre’s holding was specifically addressed to city-council-generated 
4 
A. 
Elections Code Provides the Exclusive Procedures for Voter Initiatives. 
 
In 1911, Californians amended our Constitution, reserving to themselves 
the powers of initiative and referendum.  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1; Associated 
Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 
(Associated Home Builders).)3  Voter initiatives have been compared to a 
“ ‘legislative battering ram’ ” because they “ ‘may be used to tear through the 
exasperating tangle of the traditional legislative procedure and strike directly 
toward the desired end.’ ”  (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State 
Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 228.)  In light of the initiative power’s 
significance in our democracy, courts have a duty “ ‘to jealously guard this right 
of the people’ ” and must preserve the use of an initiative if doubts can be 
reasonably resolved in its favor.  (Associated Home Builders, at p. 591; see 
Amador Valley, at p. 248.) 
 
The Legislature was authorized to establish procedures for city and county 
voters to exercise their right of initiative.  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 11; Associated 
Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)  It has done so.  In contrast to 
statewide initiatives, which may be placed directly on the ballot, the Legislature 
created an indirect process for city and county initiatives.  These can only be 
submitted to voters if they have been presented to, but not enacted by, the local 
legislative body.  (Thompson v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 555, 
                                                                                                                                      
 
initiatives.  “There is . . . a clear distinction between voter-sponsored and city-
council-generated initiatives.”  (Id. at p. 189.)  Whereas voters may justifiably 
assume that a city council has placed an initiative on the ballot only after careful 
study of its potential environmental impacts, they have no reason to believe a 
voter-sponsored initiative has undergone the same scrutiny.  (Id. at p. 190.)  Voters 
can therefore be expected to consider the potential environmental impacts of a 
proposal more carefully in deciding whether to support or oppose a voter-
sponsored measure.  (Ibid.)  The Sierra Madre opinion is thus inapposite here. 
3  
Because this case concerns a voter initiative, we do not discuss the voters’ 
related power of referendum except to note its availability as a means to repeal 
initiatives that have been adopted against the majority’s wishes.  (See post, at 
p. 14.) 
5 
561.)  “The intent of the Legislature in granting solely indirect initiative power to 
voters at the county level was to create the opportunity to spare the expense of a 
public vote.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 
 
The procedures for municipal voter initiatives are found in section 9200 et 
seq.4  Under section 9214,5 when a local body receives an initiative petition signed 
by at least 15 percent of the city’s registered voters, it must:  (1) adopt the 
initiative, without alteration, within 10 days after the petition is presented; 
(2) immediately submit the initiative to a vote at a special election; or (3) order a 
report pursuant to section 9212.  The report may examine the proposed initiative’s 
effects on land use, infrastructure, and “[a]ny other matters the legislative body 
requests” be included.  (§ 9212, subd. (a)(8).)  If ordered, the report must be 
prepared and presented within 30 days after the petition was certified as satisfying 
the signature requirement.  (§ 9212, subd. (b).)  Within 10 days after receiving the 
report, the legislative body must either adopt the ordinance or order an election 
pursuant to section 9214(b).  (§ 9214(c).) 
 
It is well established that CEQA compliance is not required before a 
legislative body submits an initiative to voters under section 9214(b).  (See 
DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 793-795; Stein, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 461.)  
The question here is whether the result should be different in the direct adoption 
context.  That is, must the legislative body obtain full CEQA review before it may 
directly adopt a voter initiative under section 9214(a)?  The answer is no.  Because 
CEQA review is contrary to the statutory language and legislative history 
pertaining to voter initiatives, and because policy considerations do not compel a 
different result, such review is not required before adoption of a voter initiative.  A 
                                              
4  
Other chapters of the Elections Code govern statewide initiatives (§ 9000 et 
seq.) and county initiatives (§ 9100 et seq.). 
5  
Hereafter, references to the subdivisions of this statute will be abbreviated 
as sections 9214(a), 9214(b), and 9214(c). 
6 
section 9212 report is the exclusive means for assessing the potential 
environmental impact of such initiatives. 
B. 
Statutory Language Precludes Application of CEQA. 
 
Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s 
intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose.  (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 
406 (Greg F.).)  We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable 
indicator of legislative intent.  (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 524, 529.)  “ ‘ “Words must be construed in context, and statutes must be 
harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.”  
[Citation.]  Interpretations that lead to absurd results or render words surplusage 
are to be avoided.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 
9.) 
 
The language of section 9214 makes no mention of CEQA.  Although this 
fact alone is not dispositive, the statutory language does not support imposing a 
CEQA requirement on the direct adoption procedures in section 9214(a). 
 
Requiring CEQA review before direct adoption would essentially nullify 
both subdivisions (a) and (c).  The plain language of section 9214 requires that 
city governments act quickly to either adopt a qualified voter initiative or hold a 
special election.  (§ 9214(a)-(b).)  The only other option is to order a report 
exploring potential impacts of the initiative.  (§ 9214(c); see § 9212.)  This report 
can only provide an abbreviated review because it must be produced within 30 
days after the initiative’s certification.  (§ 9212(b).)  Once the city receives the 
report, it must either adopt the initiative within 10 days or immediately order a 
special election.  (§ 9214(c).)  These short deadlines are consistent with other 
deadlines requiring public officials to act expeditiously on initiatives.  For 
example, once a proposed initiative is filed, the city attorney has only 15 days to 
prepare a ballot title and summary (§ 9203), and elections officials have only 30 
days to verify signatures on the petition (§§ 9114-9115, 9211). 
7 
 
In contrast to these condensed deadlines, CEQA review typically takes 
months.  The process starts with a preliminary review, in which the lead agency 
has 30 days to determine whether the proposed activity constitutes a “[p]roject” 
subject to CEQA.  (Pub. Res. Code, § 21065; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15060.)  If 
the activity is a project, and not exempt from CEQA, the lead agency must next 
conduct an initial study to determine whether the activity may have a significant 
effect on the environment.  (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15063.)  Depending on the 
extent and significance of potential environmental impacts identified in the initial 
study, the agency must prepare either an EIR, a mitigated negative declaration, or 
a negative declaration.  (Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21064, 21064.5, 21080, subds. (c), 
(d); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15063.)  Even if the lead agency determines a 
project is unlikely to have a significant environmental effect, CEQA requires 
public notice and a minimum of 20 to 30 days for public comment before a 
negative declaration can be adopted.  (Pub. Res. Code, § 21091, subd. (b).)  If an 
EIR is required, the lead agency must notify all responsible agencies and the state 
Office of Planning and Research.  These agencies then have 30 days to specify the 
scope and content of information to be included.  (Pub. Res. Code, § 21080.4; Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15082.)  With this input, the lead agency prepares a draft 
EIR (Pub. Res. Code, § 21100) and circulates it for public review and comment 
(Pub. Res. Code, § 21091; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15087).  The time required to 
prepare a full EIR varies.  The public review period must be at least 30 days.  
(Pub. Res. Code, § 21091, subd. (a).)  The lead agency must then prepare written 
responses to the public comments and incorporate the comments and responses 
into a final EIR.  (Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21091, subd. (d)(2), 21104, 21153; Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15088.)  If significant information is added, the EIR must be 
recirculated for another round of public review and comment before issuance of a 
final EIR.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15088.5, 15090.) 
 
Considering the time necessary for agencies to review the potential 
environmental impacts of a project and allow public review and comment, it 
8 
would be impossible for a city to complete CEQA review within 10 days before 
adopting a voter initiative.  (§ 9214(a).)  Although this period can be extended to 
40 days if the city obtains a section 9212 report, under no circumstances can a city 
delay action on a voter initiative beyond 40 days.  The deadlines in section 9214 
are mandatory.  As a result, if prior CEQA review is required, a city could never 
adopt a voter initiative under section 9214(a) if that initiative had any potential 
impact on the environment.  Direct adoption would be severely curtailed and, for 
many initiatives, no longer an option, because it would be impossible for cities to 
comply with both CEQA and the section 9214 deadlines.  (Cf. DeVita, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at p. 795 [irreconcilable deadlines make it impossible to conduct CEQA 
review before holding election on a voter initiative].) 
 
Requiring CEQA compliance before direct adoption would thus effectively 
nullify section 9214(a) for all voter initiatives with potential environmental 
impact.  It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that courts should give meaning 
to every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that would render any 
word or provision surplusage.  (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of 
Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 634; see People v. Shabazz 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67-69.)  “An interpretation that renders statutory language a 
nullity is obviously to be avoided.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
337, 357.)  Adding CEQA review to the procedures in section 9214(a) would 
render that provision inoperative for a great many voter initiatives.  The impact 
also spreads beyond subdivision (a).  If full CEQA review were required before an 
initiative could be adopted, the abbreviated report provided for by sections 9212 
and 9214(c) would be superfluous.  Cities could still obtain such a report, of 
course.  But, despite the plain language of section 9214(c) allowing direct 
adoption, cities’ only practical option after obtaining a report would be to submit 
the initiative to an election.  Moreover, if a city undertook full CEQA review of a 
voter initiative, the more cursory review available under section 9212 would be 
duplicative and unnecessary. 
9 
 
“The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it 
passes or amends a statute.  [Citations.]”  (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 407.)  
When the Legislature enacted CEQA in 1970, the statutory procedures for 
enacting voter initiatives were firmly in place, having been codified at 
section 9214(a) for nearly 60 years.  If the Legislature had intended to require 
CEQA review before direct adoption, despite the section 9214(a) deadlines, it 
could have easily said so.  It did not. 
 
Moreover, although CEQA is the later enacted and arguably more specific 
statute, a conclusion that CEQA prevails over contrary Elections Code procedures 
would impliedly repeal section 9214(a).  There is a strong presumption against 
repeal by implication.  (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 798.)  “ ‘Absent an 
express declaration of legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal “only when 
there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes 
[citation], and the statutes are ‘irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so 
inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.’ ” [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]”  (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 487.)  “Courts have 
also noted that implied repeal should not be found unless ‘. . . the later provision 
gives undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede the earlier . . . .’  [Citation.]”  
(Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. 
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 408, 420.)  Evidence that the Legislature intended CEQA to 
supersede direct adoption procedures is completely lacking.  The legislative 
scheme accommodates the concerns underlying CEQA by providing abbreviated 
review under sections 9212 and 9214(c).  (See post, at pp. 11-12.)  Moreover, 
because the timelines for initiatives and CEQA review are fundamentally 
incompatible, a requirement of CEQA review before direct adoption would leave 
local governments no choice but to submit most initiatives to election.  Then, no 
additional environmental review would result.   
 
Finally, even if time constraints permitted CEQA review, cities would be 
powerless to reject the proposed project or to require alterations in the project that 
10 
would lessen its environmental impact, no matter what the review showed.  
Section 9214 requires that local governments either adopt qualified initiatives or 
submit them to voters “without alteration.”  (§ 9214.)  Furthermore, initiatives 
adopted by a local government or voters may not be repealed or amended except 
by vote of the people, unless the initiative provides otherwise.  (§ 9217.) 
C. 
Application of CEQA to Voter Initiatives Is Contrary to Legislative Intent. 
 
To the extent statutory language is ambiguous or open to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, we may turn to legislative history for guidance.  
(Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103-1105.)  
Here, legislative history confirms that ordinances enacted by initiative, either 
directly or by election, are not subject to CEQA review. 
 
DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pages 794-795, discussed two Assembly bills 
that would have subjected initiative measures to environmental review.  One 
would have required environmental review after the approval of any initiative that 
proposed activity constituting a project under CEQA.  The initiative could then 
take effect only upon filing of an EIR or other CEQA document.  (See DeVita, at 
p. 794 [discussing Assem. Bill No. 4678 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.), as introduced 
Mar. 1, 1988].)  Another bill would have required an extensive environmental 
review and economic analysis by the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research 
before any local land use initiative could be submitted to voters.  (See DeVita, at 
p. 794 [discussing Assem. Bill No. 628 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.)].)  Neither bill was 
enacted.  (DeVita, at pp. 794-795.) 
 
Although proposed legislation may fail for many reasons, and only limited 
inferences can be drawn when a bill fails (see Granberry v. Islay Investments 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 746), we found this legislative history telling.  The repeated 
“defeat of attempts to impose more stringent environmental review requirements 
on land use initiatives provide[d] . . . corroboration that the Legislature did not 
intend such requirements to obstruct the exercise of the right to amend general 
plans by initiative.”  (DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 795.)  Instead, we concluded 
11 
the environmental review available under section 9111, the companion statute of 
section 9212,6 represents the Legislature’s attempt to balance the right of initiative 
with the goal of informing voters and local officials about the potential 
consequences of an initiative’s enactment.  (DeVita, at p. 795.)  This compromise 
allows local agencies to conduct an abbreviated environmental review and still act 
promptly on the initiative.  (See ibid.) 
 
The Legislature’s treatment of two other Assembly bills directly supports 
the conclusion in DeVita that local initiatives are subject to environmental review 
under sections 9111 or 9212 but not CEQA.  Assembly Bill No. 2003 (1987-1988 
Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill 2003) and Assembly Bill No. 2202 (1987-
1988 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill 2202) concerned the same subject and 
were introduced on the same day, March 6, 1987.  Their different outcomes are 
instructive about the breadth of environmental review the Legislature intends for 
initiatives. 
 
As originally written, Assembly Bill 2003 would have prevented a city or 
county clerk from “examin[ing]” a land use initiative petition unless it was 
accompanied by an EIR or negative declaration.  (Assembly Bill 2003, as 
introduced Mar. 6, 1987, p. 2.)  Later amendments required that local agencies 
conduct CEQA review and produce an EIR or negative declaration within 210 
days.  (Assembly Bill 2003, as amended May 4, 1987, p. 5.)  Only after this 
review could a local government adopt the initiative or submit it to an election.  
(Ibid.)  The Assembly Natural Resources Committee opposed the bill because it 
would have imposed time-consuming and costly procedural requirements on land 
use initiatives and potentially inhibited the initiative power.  It would also have 
                                              
6  
Section 9111 is identical to section 9212 except that it applies to initiatives 
at the county, rather than city, level.  Just like section 9214, section 9116 requires 
that county boards of supervisors either adopt a qualified initiative, put it before 
voters at a special election, or order an abbreviated report followed by direct 
adoption or election.  They are parallel statutory schemes addressing how 
initiatives must be handled at these different levels of government. 
12 
expanded CEQA’s application to encompass measures proposed by citizens.  
(Assem. Natural Resources Com., Analysis of Assembly Bill 2003, as amended 
Jan. 1, 1988, p. 3.)  The priority treatment of initiatives contemplated in the bill 
would also have interfered with ongoing local planning.  Its timelines for 
environmental review would have been difficult to satisfy, leading to potential 
litigation over the review’s adequacy along with further delay and expense.  (Ibid.)  
After this opposition was registered, Assembly Bill 2003 died in committee. 
 
Assembly Bill 2202, by contrast, passed handily.  Among other things, 
Assembly Bill 2202 enacted the predecessor to section 9212.  (Former Elec. Code, 
§ 4009.5, added by Stats. 1987, ch. 767, § 15, p. 2438 and repealed by Stats. 1994, 
ch. 920 [repealing and reenacting Elections Code].)  This provision authorized 
local governments to obtain a report on a proposed initiative measure’s fiscal 
impact, effect on planning, and “[a]ny other matters” of interest.  (Former Elec. 
Code, § 4009.5, subd. (a).)  The report had to be prepared and presented within 45 
days after initiative certification.  (Id., subd. (b).)  Legislative committee reports 
consistently observed that current law did not provide for any review of proposed 
initiatives by local agencies.  (E.g., Sen. Elections Com., Rep. on Assembly Bill 
2202, as amended June 30, 1987, p. 1; Assem. Com. on Elections, 
Reapportionment and Const. Amends., Rep. on Assembly Bill 2202, as amended 
May 4, 1987, p. 1.)  One committee report noted that Assembly Bill 2202 would 
allow cities and counties to obtain information on an initiative’s potential effects 
while they still had time to enact the initiative themselves.  (Assem. Ways and 
Means Com., Rep. on Assembly Bill 2202, as amended May 14, 1987, p. 2.) 
 
Thus, when faced with competing bills, the Legislature enacted the bill that 
gave local governments the option of obtaining an abbreviated review to be 
completed within the short time frame required for action on initiatives.  This 
option is now codified for municipal initiatives in sections 9212 and 9214(c).  As 
it had done with other similar attempts, the Legislature specifically rejected the 
bill that would have required CEQA review before a land use initiative could be 
13 
directly adopted or submitted to voters.  For over 25 years, the Legislature has 
enacted no law extending CEQA to initiatives.  This legislative history supports 
the conclusion that CEQA does not apply to any ordinances enacted by initiative, 
whether through an election or direct adoption. 
D. 
Direct Adoption Without CEQA Review Does Not Offend Public Policy. 
 
Finally, if statutory language and legislative history are unclear, courts may 
look to public policy as an aid in determining legislative intent.  (Coalition of 
Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)  
Direct adoption of a voter initiative without prior CEQA review does not so offend 
public policy that we must reconsider our analysis. 
 
Ever since the initiative power was added to the Constitution, the 
Legislature has given local governments the option to directly adopt voter 
initiatives rather than hold an election.  The original implementing statute stated 
that, when presented with a qualified voter initiative, “the legislative body shall 
either:  [¶] (a) [p]ass such ordinance without alteration at the regular session at 
which it is presented and within ten days after it is presented; or [¶] (b) [f]orthwith, 
. . . call a special election at which such ordinance, without alteration, shall be 
submitted to a vote of the electors of the city or town.”  (Stats. 1911, Ex. Sess. 
1911, ch. 33, § 1, p. 132.)  The government’s option to adopt an initiative without 
holding an election was also provided for in the original ballot measure adding the 
right of initiative to the Constitution.  The ballot material for the 1911 election 
explained that, after the Secretary of State transmitted a qualified initiative petition 
to the Legislature,“[t]he law proposed by such petition shall be either enacted or 
rejected without change or amendment by the legislature, within forty days from 
the time it is received,” subject to referendum if the law was enacted.  (Ballot 
Pamp., Special Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911) text of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 22, p. 2.)  “If 
any law so petitioned for be rejected, or if no action is taken upon it by the 
legislature within said forty days, the secretary of state shall submit it to the people 
for approval or rejection at the next ensuing general election.”  (Ibid.) 
14 
 
Direct adoption has thus been available to local governments from the 
outset of legislation by initiative.  The voters who amended the Constitution 
intended to empower their government to enact a qualified initiative immediately, 
without the need for an election and its attendant delay and cost.  The Legislature 
has consistently provided that option in statutes implementing the amendment. 
 
CEQA review is not required before direct adoption of an initiative, just as 
it is not required before voters adopt an initiative at an election.  Appellants warn 
that developers could potentially use the initiative process to evade CEQA review, 
and that direct adoption by a friendly city council could be pursued as a way to 
avoid even the need for an election.  Of course, the initiative power may also be 
used to thwart development.  (See, e.g., Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 
Cal.3d at pp. 589-590 [initiative prohibited issuance of residential building permits 
until certain standards were met].)  However, these concerns are appropriately 
addressed to the Legislature.  The process itself is neutral.  The possibility that 
interested parties may attempt to use initiatives to advance their own aims is part 
of the democratic process. 
 
Finally, voters have statutory remedies if direct adoption of an initiative 
results in the enactment of an undesirable law.  Section 9235 stays the effective 
date of most local ordinances for 30 days.  During this 30-day period, voters may 
circulate a referendum petition.  (See § 9237.)  If a city receives a “petition 
protesting the adoption of an ordinance” signed by at least 10 percent of the city’s 
voters, the effective date is suspended and the city must reconsider the ordinance.  
(Ibid.)  Upon reconsideration, the city may either repeal the ordinance in its 
entirety or submit the ordinance to voters in an election to be held within 88 days.  
(§ 9241.)  The Legislature has outlined clear procedures for voters to overturn an 
ordinance adopted against the majority’s will.  Whichever path a city chooses in 
dealing with a voter initiative, voters have the final say.
15 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal issuing a writ of mandate is reversed.  
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
BLEASE, J. *   
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 210 Cal.App.4th 1006 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S207173 
Date Filed: August 7, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Tuolumne 
Judge: James A. Boscoe 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Herum Crabtree, Brett S. Jolley; Dongell Lawrence Finney and John A. Lawrence for Petitioner. 
 
Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs and Mekaela M. Gladden for CREED-21 as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Trevor A. Grimm, Jonathan M. Coupal and Timothy A. Bittle for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent and Real Parties in Interest. 
 
K&L Gates, Edward P. Sangster, Megan Cesare-Eastman, Daniel W. Fox for Real Party in Interest Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. 
 
Roger A. Brown; Rutan & Tucker, John A. Ramirez, Robert S. Bower and Peter J. Howell for Real Party in 
Interest James Grinnell. 
 
Richard Matranga, City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest City of Sonora. 
 
Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai, Randy Riddle and Ivan Delventhal for League of California Cities as Amicus 
Curiae in behalf of Real Party in Interest City of Sonora. 
 
Benbrook Law Group, Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay for Citizens in Charge as Amicus 
Curiae in behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
M. Reed Hopper and Anthony L. Francois for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in behalf of Real 
Parties in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John A. Lawrence 
Dongell Lawrence Finney 
707 Wilshire Boulevard, 45th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 943-6100 
 
Edward P. Sangster 
K&L Gates 
Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1200 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 882-8200 
 
John A. Ramirez 
Rutan & Tucker 
611 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1400 
Costa Mesa, CA  92626-1931 
(714) 641-5100