Title: State v. Smith

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSHUA DAVID SMITH
No. 234A08
FILED: 12 DECEMBER 2008
1.
Confessions and Incriminating Statements–-extrajudicial confession--corpus
delicti rule--first-degree sexual offense
The Court of Appeals did not err by reversing defendant’s conviction for first-
degree sexual offense based on insufficient evidence under the corpus delicti rule to corroborate
defendant’s extrajudicial confession when the victim twice denied that a first-degree sexual
offense ever occurred, because none of the State’s evidence was trustworthy to establish the
sexual act element of a first-degree sexual offense (that the victim’s lips, tongue, or mouth ever
touched defendant’s penis) when: (1) although the State argued defendant’s trial testimony
strongly corroborated the essential facts and circumstances surrounding the first-degree sexual
offense, the pertinent statements were vague; (2) even if the victim’s brother reported
defendant’s statements honestly and accurately, it cannot be said that the evidence was
independent from defendant’s extrajudicial confession, and defendant’s statements were more of
a report of a meeting with an officer rather than an actual confession; (3) it could not be
rationalized that defendant’s demeanor and alleged confession to the victim’s brother, minutes
after defendant’s extrajudicial confession, was of the caliber to qualify as the strong, substantial,
independent corroboration evidence required by Parker, 315 N.C. 222; and (4) the opportunity
evidence submitted by the State was not strong enough when no independent proof, such as
physical evidence or witness testimony, of any crime could be shown. 
2.
Indecent Liberties–-instruction--plain error analysis
The Court of Appeals erred by concluding the trial court’s indecent liberties
instructions constituted plain error, because: (1) the jury received the verbatim instructions on
indecent liberties taken from the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions; (2) there was strong
corroborating evidence to establish the trustworthiness of defendant’s extrajudicial confession as
to the indecent liberties charge; and (3) it was immaterial that the trial court did not give specific
instructions as to which of those acts were at issue when the jury could have found that
defendant’s acts during the first or second visit constituted an indecent liberty with a child.
3.
Appeal and Error–-remand--consideration of remaining assignments of
error
Our Supreme Court remanded this first-degree sexual offense and indecent
liberties case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s remaining assignments of
error as they relate to the indecent liberties conviction.  If, after reviewing defendant’s remaining
assignments of error the Court of Appeals finds no error, the case should be further remanded to
the Superior Court for resentencing as to the indecent liberties conviction.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON concurring in result only.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 190 N.C.
App. ___, 660 S.E.2d 82 (2008), reversing a judgment entered 27
July 2006 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Superior Court, Cleveland
County and remanding for a new trial on the charges of indecent
-2-
liberties with a child.  Heard in the Supreme Court 11 September
2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Chris Z. Sinha,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
McCotter, Ashton & Smith, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton,
III and Kirby H. Smith, III, for defendant-appellee.
BRADY, Justice.
Defendant Joshua David Smith was tried for first-degree
rape, first-degree sexual offense, and one count of indecent
liberties with a child.  The jury acquitted defendant of first-
degree rape, but convicted him of first-degree sexual offense, a
Class B1 felony, and indecent liberties with a child, a Class F
felony.  The trial court consolidated the offenses for purposes
of sentencing, and sentenced defendant to an active term of
imprisonment for 196 months to 245 months in the North Carolina
Department of Correction.  Defendant appealed his convictions to
the Court of Appeals, which, in a divided opinion, reversed his
first-degree sexual offense conviction and granted a new trial on
the indecent liberties charge.  The State has appealed two issues
as of right on the basis of the dissent in the Court of Appeals.  
First, we must consider whether there was substantial
corroborating evidence independent of defendant’s extrajudicial
confession sufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree
sexual offense.  We hold that under the corpus delicti rule,
there was not substantial independent evidence to corroborate the
extrajudicial confession sufficient to sustain the conviction for
first-degree sexual offense.  Second, we must determine whether
the trial court’s jury instructions regarding the indecent
liberties charge created confusion constituting plain error.  We
-3-
hold that the trial court did not err in its indecent liberties
instructions.  Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider
defendant’s remaining assignments of error.  
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
     On 14 April 2003, the Cleveland County Grand Jury
returned indictments charging defendant with first-degree rape,
first-degree sexual offense, and one count of indecent liberties
with a child.  Following a four-day jury trial in July 2006,
defendant was found not guilty of first-degree rape, but guilty
of first-degree sexual offense and indecent liberties with a
child.  Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a
majority of the court reversed his conviction for first-degree
sexual offense and remanded the charge of indecent liberties with
a child to the trial court for a new trial.  The case is before
us on the basis of the dissent at the Court of Appeals. 
The evidence presented at trial tended to show that in
December 2002, K.L.C., the victim, was twelve years old and lived
in Lawndale, North Carolina with her mother, grandmother, and
nineteen-year-old brother, Jonathan.  Defendant, who was then
twenty-one years old, also resided in Lawndale with his
girlfriend Cassie and their three-month-old daughter.  The couple
and Jonathan were friends.  Through this friendship, K.L.C.
became acquainted with Cassie.  Before Christmas 2002, K.L.C. had
only briefly met defendant on a single occasion.
Around the Christmas holiday, defendant and Cassie
visited Jonathan and K.L.C.’s residence on two consecutive
-4-
1 The dates of the visits are in dispute.  K.L.C. testified
that defendant visited her residence on 25 and 26 December 2002;
defendant testified that the visits occurred on 26 and 27
December 2002. 
evenings (the first visit and the second visit).1  During the
first visit, defendant, Jonathan, Cassie, and Jonathan’s fifteen-
year-old neighbor consumed alcohol defendant had purchased for
the party.  Jonathan and his neighbor also smoked marijuana. 
K.L.C. was present during this party, but was not drinking or
smoking.   At some point late in the evening, Cassie and Jonathan
left the residence, leaving K.L.C. to watch the extremely
intoxicated defendant.  
K.L.C. testified that while Jonathan and Cassie were
away, she and defendant were alone in Jonathan’s bedroom.  She
asserted that although defendant made inappropriate comments to
her, no sexual contact occurred.  Defendant testified that after
Jonathan and Cassie left, he passed out in a drunken stupor on
Jonathan’s bed, and later awakened to find K.L.C. between his
legs, attempting to fellate him.  Defendant testified he
immediately pushed her away.  From this testimony it is unclear
if K.L.C.’s mouth ever made contact with defendant’s penis.   
The next evening, another party was held at Jonathan
and K.L.C.’s residence.  During this second visit, Cassie and
defendant brought their three-month-old daughter.  The alcohol
and marijuana use continued; however, it is disputed in the
record as to whether the defendant was drinking.  As the evening
progressed, defendant and Cassie decided to spend the night at
Jonathan and K.L.C.’s residence but realized they would need more
diapers and formula for their infant.  The group decided
-5-
2 K.L.C. testified that Jonathan made her go with defendant
on this trip because Jonathan wished to be alone with Cassie.
Jonathan and K.L.C. both testified during trial that Jonathan and
Cassie were having an affair.  Jonathan testified that K.L.C.
decided to go with defendant to help take care of the baby.
3  Jonathan testified that he telephoned because he thought
defendant and K.L.C. had been gone too long, and he was worried
about his sister. 
defendant would leave with the infant to get the diapers and
formula and that K.L.C. would accompany him.2     
Defendant and K.L.C. traveled approximately two miles
to defendant’s residence.  K.L.C. testified that once there, she
followed defendant inside, carrying the infant in a car seat. 
She placed the car seat on the floor and then asked where the
restroom was located.  After defendant pointed to his bedroom,
she proceeded to the restroom and defendant followed her.  K.L.C.
testified that once they were in the bedroom defendant grabbed
her shoulders from behind, threw her on the bed, removed her
clothing, undressed himself, and then inserted his penis into her
vagina.  K.L.C. testified that despite her efforts to halt
defendant, she was unable to stop the rape until her brother
Jonathan telephoned the residence and left a message on
defendant’s answering machine.3  After this telephone call,
defendant took K.L.C. and the infant back to K.L.C. and
Jonathan’s residence.  At trial, Jonathan testified that he
thought K.L.C. and defendant were gone for at least forty-five
minutes.  
Conversely, defendant testified that no sexual
encounter of any kind occurred while K.L.C. and he were on their
errand.  Defendant stated that once they arrived at his
residence, he told K.L.C. to stay in the truck with the infant.  
-6-
When he went inside to get the formula and diapers, K.L.C. came
in with the infant and sat on the couch in the living room.  
Next, defendant went to the restroom, with the door closed, and
during this time Jonathan telephoned and left a message on his
answering machine.  After using the restroom, defendant
telephoned Jonathan’s residence and told Cassie that K.L.C., the
infant, and he were about to leave to return to Jonathan and
K.L.C.’s residence.  Defendant said he then prepared a bottle for
the infant and all three left his residence.  Defendant estimated
that he and K.L.C. were in his residence together for five
minutes.    
K.L.C. told her sister Amanda about the alleged rape a
week later.  Amanda informed K.L.C.’s mother, who then notified
law enforcement.  Detective Debbie Arrowood of the Cleveland
County Sheriff’s Department investigated the report.  On the
morning of 28 January 2003, Detective Arrowood questioned
defendant after he voluntarily arranged a meeting with her. 
Defendant told Detective Arrowood that he never had any sexual
contact with K.L.C.  Defendant then left her office, but he
voluntarily returned in the afternoon to speak with her again. 
Detective Arrowood testified that during the second interrogation
defendant made an extrajudicial confession.  She testified that
Joshua stated . . . he was at [K.L.C]’s house
a couple of days before [the second visit]
and he had been drinking.  Joshua stated he
was in Jonathan’s bedroom, who is [K.L.C.]’s
brother, and he was lying on the bed.  Joshua
stated [K.L.C.] came in the room and was
coming on to him.  Joshua told me that
[K.L.C.] took her pants off, [and] laid down
beside him on the bed.  Joshua stated
[K.L.C.] wanted him to do oral sex on her,
but he wouldn’t do it.  Joshua stated
[K.L.C.] unzipped his pants, took out his
penis, and tried to give him a blow job. 
-7-
Joshua stated that he couldn’t get it up
because he had been drinking, so [K.L.C.]
stopped.
Detective Arrowood also testified that defendant admitted, 
“‘Yes, it was a stupid mistake and it has ruined my life.’”   
The State also presented evidence that defendant made a
statement to Jonathan that he received fellatio from K.L.C. 
Jonathan testified that he traveled with defendant to Detective
Arrowood’s office and waited while defendant spoke with the
detective.  Jonathan stated that immediately after defendant came
out of the office he appeared upset and admitted to accepting
fellatio from K.L.C.  Jonathan testified that defendant was
apologetic. 
At trial, defendant testified that during his interview
with Detective Arrowood he was untruthful when he told her about
K.L.C. lying on the bed with him and asking for cunnilingus.  He
also denied making any statement to Jonathan that he let K.L.C.
attempt to give him fellatio or that he wanted her to do so.  
Detective Arrowood also testified to interviewing
K.L.C. about the alleged rape.  K.L.C. described the alleged
rape, but during her interview and at trial, K.L.C. stated that
prior to the alleged rape no sexual or indecent acts occurred
between her and defendant.  She also stated that no sexual
contact between her and defendant occurred after the alleged
rape. 
ANALYSIS
Two issues have been presented to this Court on appeal. 
First, we must decide if, under the corpus delicti rule, there
was substantial evidence independent of defendant’s extrajudicial
confession sufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree
-8-
sexual offense.  Next, we must determine if the jury instructions
on the charge of indecent liberties with a child constituted
plain error.  
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Under the Corpus Delicti Rule
[1] Defendant argues there was not sufficient evidence
under the corpus delicti rule to sustain his conviction for
first-degree sexual offense.  Under the corpus delicti rule, the
State may not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of a
defendant, but must produce substantial independent corroborative
evidence that supports the facts underlying the confession. 
State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985).  Before
applying this complex rule to the instant case it is necessary to
recite a brief history of how the corpus delicti rule developed
and understand its current application in North Carolina law. 
A. Historical Background of the Corpus Delicti Rule
 Throughout history, law-based societies have placed a 
high premium on ensuring that substantial proof of a crime exists
before imposing punishment on a defendant.  For instance,
Hammurabi’s Code of Laws, which is thought to date back to circa
2250 B.C., required one accusing another of a capital offense to
prove his case or else be put to death.  See Robert Francis
Harper, The Code of Hammurabi King of Babylon about 2250 B.C. § 1
(2d ed. 1904).   Elsewhere in the Code, witnesses are required to
attest to contracts and report the contents truthfully if a
dispute arises, or else face harsh legal punishment.  Id. at §§
11-15.  Similarly, the Torah, an ancient bases for Judeo-
Christian law, instructed on the testimony of witnesses.  As
Moses approached death, he reminded the Israelites of their
unique history and relayed rules that comprised Israel’s duties
-9-
under the Mosaic covenant.  See Deuteronomy 4:44-32:47.  In doing
so, Moses instructed Israel to seek justice to protect against
false witnesses.  Therefore, he instructed that “[a] matter must
be established by the testimony of two or three witnesses.”  
Deuteronomy 19:15 (NIV).  The Koran contains similar
instructions.  Generally, at least four witnesses are required to
testify before a woman can be punished for adultery under Islamic
law.  Koran 24:2-12.  These basic concepts can also be traced to
the Middle Ages.  For instance, in the late twelfth century,
accusatory proceedings required an accuser to present plena
probatio, or “full proof” of his charges.  James A. Brundage,
Medieval Canon Law 142-43 (1995).  Plena probatio was established
if two credible eyewitnesses could attest to the defendant’s
commission of the crime charged.  Id.  
Modern societies have also developed legal rules to
help ensure that defendants are only punished for crimes they
have actually committed.  To establish guilt in any criminal
case, it is the duty of the State to show that “(a) the injury or
harm constituting the crime occurred; (b) this injury or harm was
done in a criminal manner; and (c) the defendant was the person
who inflicted the injury or harm.”  1 Kenneth S. Broun et al.,
McCormick on Evidence § 147 at 600 (6th ed. 2006)[hereinafter 1
McCormick on Evidence].  It is generally acknowledged that the
corpus delicti rule was developed to address the first two duties
of the prosecuting authority.  Id.   
The term corpus delicti literally means “body of the
crime.”  Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law at 140
(3d ed. 1982)[hereinafter Criminal Law].  Legally, the corpus
delicti of an offense refers to the “fact of the specific loss or
-10-
injury sustained”:  in homicide, the dead body; in larceny, the
missing property; and in arson, the burnt residence.  7 John
Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2072, at 524
(James J. Chadbourn rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1978)[hereinafter 7
Wigmore on Evidence](emphasis omitted).  The corpus delicti rule
establishes that “no criminal conviction can be based upon
defendant’s extrajudicial confession or admission, although
otherwise admissible, unless there is other evidence tending to
establish the corpus delicti.”  Criminal Law at 142 (emphasis
omitted). 
The Corpus Delicti Rule in England
Legal scholars trace the modern concept of corpus
delicti to several seventeenth century English cases; the most
notable among them is Perry’s Case.  Id. at 142-43.  Perry’s Case
involved a defendant who confessed to the murder of a missing
English man.  14 T.B. Howell, A Complete Collection of State
Trials 1313-24 (London, T.C. Hansard 1816).  In his confession,
the defendant implicated both his mother and brother in the
homicide.  Id. at 1313-19.  All three were executed before the
alleged victim was discovered alive years later.  Id. at 1319-22. 
The public shock and horror resulting from this case and others
with similar circumstances spurred the beginnings of the corpus
delicti rule.   Criminal Law at 142.  Subsequent English courts
failed to specifically define the rule or its scope, but versions
of the law can be seen in English statutes dating back to the
second half of the eighteenth century.  One such statute,
documented in William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England, requires that a defendant’s confession to any treason
against the Crown be made in open court in order to convict.  4
-11-
William Blackstone, Commentaries 350 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1769).  Absent such public confession, at least two witnesses
were required to testify against the defendant.  Id.  Several
similar statutes emerged in the English courts, but no clear
doctrine developed, which left the law in “an unfortunate state
of obscurity, subject to much difference of opinion.” 7 Wigmore
on Evidence § 2070, at 509.  
The Corpus Delicti Rule in America
Since no definitive rule emanated from the English
courts, American courts were free to adopt versions of the corpus
delicti rule that were most fitting to the needs of the time. 
Id. § 2071, at 511.  American jurisprudence has consistently
valued witness testimony, as evidenced by the United States
Constitution.  Article III establishes that a conviction for
treason must be supported by “the testimony of two witnesses to
the same overt act, or on confession in open court.”  U.S. Const.
art. III, § 3.  Additionally, the Confrontation Clause provides
the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  It is believed that these
provisions were written at least partly in response to the
infamous seventeenth century trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in
which Raleigh was convicted based on the out of court confession
of Lord Cobham, who named Raleigh as his accomplice in a
conspiracy to overthrow the King of England.  Stanley A. Goldman,
Guilt by Intuition: The Insufficiency of Prior Inconsistent
Statements to Convict, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1986).  Some
suggest that Cobham’s confession was elicited by torture.  Id. 
In any event, Raleigh was denied the right to confront Cobham in
open court.  Id.  In addition to Article III, Section 3 and the
-12-
Confrontation Clause, the corpus delicti rule was seen by the
American courts as further protection for defendants from dubious
extrajudicial confessions.  1 McCormick on Evidence § 145, at
595-96.  
Instances of false confessions also spurred the legal
development of the rule.  The most famous of these involved two
brothers from Massachusetts, Stephen and Jesse Bourne.  Edwin M.
Borchard, Convicting the Innocent 15-22 (1932).  Years after the
disappearance of their brother-in-law, the two were accused of
his murder.  Id. at 18.  Jesse blamed his brother Stephen for the
murder, and eventually Stephen confessed to killing his brother-
in-law.  Id. at 16-18.  Stephen later retracted the confession
and professed his innocence, but he was still convicted and
sentenced to death.  Id. at 18.  However, before Stephen was
executed, the allegedly murdered brother-in-law appeared, alive
and well, and Stephen was released.  Id. at 19-20.   This case,
as well as others like it, cast a shadow of doubt on the
reliability of extrajudicial confessions.  Criminal Law at 143. 
As a result, different versions of the corpus delicti rule were
adopted throughout the country.  Now, all American jurisdictions
follow some version of the corpus delicti rule.  1 McCormick on
Evidence § 145, at 592. 
Historically, the legal justifications supporting the
corpus delicti rule have been threefold:  First, the rule
protects against those shocking situations in which alleged
murder victims turn up alive after their accused killer has been
convicted and perhaps executed.  Parker, 315 N.C. at 233, 337
S.E.2d at 493 (citing Julian S. Millstein, Note, Confession
Corroboration in New York: A Replacement for the Corpus Delicti
-13-
Rule, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1205, 1205 (1978) [hereinafter Note,
Confession Corroboration](citation omitted)).  Second, the rule
ensures that confessions that are “‘erroneously reported or
construed . . . , involuntarily made . . . , mistaken as to law
or fact, or falsely volunteered by an insane or mentally
disturbed individual’” cannot be used to falsely convict a
defendant.  Id. (quoting Note, Confession Corroboration at 1205). 
Finally, the rule is thought to promote good law enforcement
practices because it requires thorough investigations of alleged
crimes to ensure that justice is achieved and the innocent are
vindicated.  Id. (citing Note, Confession Corroboration at 1205). 
B. North Carolina’s Corpus Delicti Corroboration Evidence
Standard  
It has long been established in North Carolina that the
State may not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of a
defendant to prove his or her guilt; other corroborating evidence
is needed to convict for a criminal offense.  See State v. Long,
2 N.C. 360, 360, 2 N.C. 455, 456, 1 Hayw. 455 (1797) (per
curiam).  “[A] naked confession, unattended with circumstances,
is not sufficient.  A confession, from the very nature of the
thing is a very doubtful species of evidence, and to be received
with great caution.  . . .  [If] there are no confirmatory
circumstances . . . it is better to acquit the prisoner.”  Id. 
While it has been universally understood that other corroboration
evidence must accompany the extrajudicial confession, the quantum
and quality of this corroboration evidence have been debated
through the years.  As a result, corroboration evidence standards
vary from state to state.  In Parker, North Carolina joined the
national trend expanding the corpus delicti rule to allow a
-14-
defendant’s extrajudicial confession to sustain a conviction when
the trustworthiness of the confession is substantiated by
evidence aliunde.  315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487.  Parker held
that in noncapital cases, a conviction can stand if “the
accused’s confession is supported by substantial independent
evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness, including
facts that tend to show the defendant had the opportunity to
commit the crime.”  Id. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495.  Furthermore,
Parker emphasizes “that when independent proof of loss or injury
is lacking, there must be strong corroboration of essential facts
and circumstances embraced in the defendant’s confession.”  Id. 
C. Application of the Corpus Delicti Rule to the First-degree
Sexual Offense Conviction
A defendant is guilty of first-degree sexual offense if
the State proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) the
defendant engaged in a sexual act with a victim who is under the
age of thirteen, and (2) the defendant is at least twelve years
old and at least four years older than the victim.  See N.C.G.S.
§ 14-27.4 (2007).  A sexual act, as defined by statute, means
“cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse, but does
not include vaginal intercourse.  Sexual act also means the
penetration, however slight, by any object into the genital or
anal opening of another person’s body . . . .”  Id. § 14-27.1(4)
(2007).  Fellatio is defined as “any touching of the male sexual
organ by the lips, tongue, or mouth of another person.”  See,
e.g., State v. Johnson, 105 N.C. App. 390, 393, 413 S.E.2d 562,
564, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 332 N.C. 348, 421
S.E.2d 158 (1992); see also 1 N.C.P.I.––Crim. 207.45.1 (2008).  
-15-
In the instant case, a critical fact exists that
necessarily bears upon our analysis: the victim twice denied that
a first-degree sexual offense ever occurred.  When interviewed by
Detective Arrowood six weeks after the alleged events transpired,
K.L.C. stated that there was no sexual contact between defendant
and her on the night of the first visit.  Additionally, K.L.C.
testified at trial that during the first visit, she was alone
with defendant in Jonathan’s bedroom, and while defendant made
inappropriate comments to her, no sexual contact occurred on the
night of the first visit.  A victim of sexual violence,
especially a minor victim, is not required to testify to the
sexual offense in order for a conviction to stand.  See State v.
Cooke, 318 N.C. 674, 679, 351 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1987) (stating
that “there is no requirement that the victim testify before the
accused may be convicted”).  However, in this unique situation,
in which the victim explicitly denies that the offense ever
occurred, we believe it is imperative to adhere to Parker’s
emphasis that “strong” corroboration evidence supporting
defendant’s extrajudicial confession must be shown when proof of
injury or loss is otherwise lacking.  315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d
at 495.    
The State argues that under the corpus delicti rule,
defendant’s extrajudicial confession, along with several pieces
of corroborative evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction
for first-degree sexual offense.  However, none of the State’s
evidence is trustworthy to establish the sexual act element of a
first-degree sexual offense, that K.L.C.’s lips, tongue, or mouth
ever touched defendant’s penis.  In the extrajudicial confession,
defendant stated to Detective Arrowood that K.L.C. unzipped his
-16-
pants, removed his penis, and attempted fellatio, but that he
could not achieve an erection because of his alcohol consumption. 
From this confession alone a jury could not determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that K.L.C.’s mouth ever made contact with
defendant’s penis, which is a required element in a sexual
offense prosecution.  
 The State relies on three types of corroborative
evidence to sustain the extrajudicial confession.  First, the
State argues defendant’s trial testimony strongly corroborates
the essential facts and circumstances surrounding the first-
degree sexual offense.  At trial, defendant stated that on the
evening of the first visit, K.L.C. was between his legs and he
felt something touch his penis.  Like the extrajudicial
confession, this statement is also vague; it is not clear from
the record what this “something” was.  This testimony is
insufficient to strongly corroborate the essential facts and
circumstances of a “sexual act” necessary to convict defendant of
a first-degree sexual offense.  
Next, the State argues that evidence of defendant’s
statements to Jonathan made immediately following the
extrajudicial confession to Detective Arrowood, along with
Jonathan’s testimony about defendant’s demeanor at the time,
strongly corroborates the extrajudicial confession.  Jonathan
testified that defendant allegedly confessed that “he had let
[K.L.C.] give him oral sex.”  This testimony is not sufficient to
corroborate defendant’s extrajudicial confession under the corpus
delicti rule because defendant’s alleged statements are not
independent from the extrajudicial confession.  Jonathan
testified that on 28 January 2003, he accompanied defendant to
-17-
the police station and waited for him while he met with Detective
Arrowood.  During the meeting, defendant made his extrajudicial
confession.  Jonathan testified that immediately after the
meeting, defendant “was upset when he came out of Ms. Arrowood’s
office.” Jonathan further testified that after asking defendant
what happened in the office, defendant “admitted to having oral
sex with [K.L.C.].”  At trial, defendant denied ever making these
statements to Jonathan.   
Parker requires that the corroborating evidence
supporting defendant’s extrajudicial confession be substantial
and independent.  315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495.  Even if
Jonathan reported defendant’s statements honestly and accurately,
we cannot say the evidence is independent from defendant’s
extrajudicial confession.  Jonathan testified that the statements
were made immediately following defendant’s meeting with
Detective Arrowood.  Furthermore, the statements were elicited
after Jonathan asked defendant about what happened in the
meeting.  In this respect, defendant’s statements are more of a
report of the meeting than an actual “confession.”  Therefore,
because these statements were derived from the extrajudicial
confession given to Detective Arrowood just minutes before, they
have no more probative value than the extrajudicial confession
itself.  
Jonathan’s testimony describing defendant’s demeanor
also fails to meet Parker’s strong corroboration standard.  While
Jonathan did testify that defendant told him that “he was sorry,
that it wasn’t right, but it still don’t change the fact” after
the interview, these statements are neither substantial,
independent, nor strong because defendant allegedly made them in
-18-
the same mental condition and under the same stress of the
interrogation with Detective Arrowood.  If the extrajudicial
confession is suspect under the corpus delicti rule and cannot
stand alone to convict defendant, then we cannot rationalize that
defendant’s demeanor and alleged confession to Jonathan, minutes
after his extrajudicial confession, is of the caliber to qualify
as the strong, substantial, independent corroboration evidence
Parker requires.
The State last contends that under Parker, several
pieces of “opportunity evidence” are sufficient to sustain
defendant’s conviction for first-degree sexual offense.   The
State offers testimony from both defendant and K.L.C. that they
were alone together in Jonathan’s bedroom during the first visit,
as well as Jonathan’s testimony that he left K.L.C. with
defendant during the first visit. 
In Parker, this Court held that facts tending to show
the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime can be
considered as independent evidence to establish the
trustworthiness of the defendant’s confession.  315 N.C. at 236-
39, 337 S.E.2d at 495-97.  However, the opportunity evidence in
Parker differs from the case at bar.  In Parker, the defendant
was charged with armed robbery and first-degree murder of two
victims.  Id. at 224, 337 S.E.2d at 488.  The State was able to
produce significant independent evidence of both murders and of 
armed robbery, including the bodies of both victims and the
recovered property stolen from the first victim.  Id. at 224-25,
337 S.E.2d at 488-89.  However, no evidence of the second armed
robbery could be shown, other than the defendant’s extrajudicial
confession.  Id. at 227, 337 S.E.2d at 490.  This Court ruled
-19-
4 Nothing in K.L.C.’s testimony regarding the alleged rape
established the elements of a sexual-offense.  
that evidence showing the defendant had the opportunity to commit
the crime was sufficient under the corpus delicti rule to sustain
the second armed robbery conviction in light of the “overwhelming
amount and convincing nature of the corroborative evidence . . .
of more serious crimes committed against [both] victim[s] . . .
at the time of the robbery.”  Id. at 237-38, 337 S.E.2d at 496. 
The present case differs from Parker because no independent
proof, such as physical evidence or witness testimony, of any
crime can be shown.  Furthermore, in the case at bar, K.L.C., an
alleged living victim, gave two statements averring that the
sexual offense did not occur.  In light of these facts, the
opportunity evidence submitted by the State is not strong enough
to establish the corpus delicti of first-degree sexual offense
under Parker, namely, that a “sexual act” occurred between
defendant and K.L.C.4 
Because the State has not met its burden to provide
strong corroboration evidence relevant to the essential facts and
circumstances of defendant’s extrajudicial confession, the corpus
delicti of the first-degree sexual offense charge has not been
established, and the conviction cannot be sustained.
II. Jury Instructions on Indecent Liberties with a Child
[2] Defendant asserts that the jury instructions
regarding indecent liberties with a child were confusing and
misleading in that the trial court failed to specify the acts
underlying the indecent liberties charge.  Because defendant
failed to object to the instructions at trial, we consider only
-20-
whether the trial court committed plain error.  See N.C. R. App.
P. 10(c)(4). 
“A reversal for plain error is only appropriate in the
most exceptional cases.”  State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 138, 623
S.E.2d 11, 29 (2005), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 130,
166 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2006).  Plain error analysis should be applied
cautiously and only when “after reviewing the entire record, it
can be said the claimed error is a ‘fundamental error, something
so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice
cannot have been done.’”  State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300
S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676
F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1018 (1982)).  An appellate court “must be convinced that
absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different
verdict.”  State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83
(1986)(citing Odom, 397 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79). 
 The jury received the verbatim instructions on
indecent liberties taken from the North Carolina Pattern Jury
Instructions.  See 2 N.C.P.I.––Crim. 226.85 (2008).  When
instructing on indecent liberties, the judge is under no
requirement to specifically identify the acts that constitute the
charge.  See State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561, 563-67, 391 S.E.2d
177, 178-81 (1990).  In State v. Lawrence, this Court stated, “a
defendant may be unanimously convicted of indecent liberties even
if: (1) the jurors considered a higher number of incidents of
immoral or indecent behavior than the number of counts charged,
and (2) the indictments lacked specific details to identify the
specific incidents.”  360 N.C. 368, 375 627 S.E.2d 609, 613
-21-
(2006)(citing Hartness and State v. Lyons, 330 N.C. 298, 412
S.E.2d 308 (1991)).
Defendant contends that Hartness and Lawrence should
not control this issue because, in those cases, all of the
evidence offered at trial was ruled competent to support the
charges alleged.  He argues that this case differs because the
jury could have based its indecent liberties conviction solely on
the same acts that resulted in the sexual offense conviction,
which we have now found invalid under the corpus delicti rule. 
We disagree.  While the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to sustain the sexual offense conviction, it
withstands the corpus delicti rule as to the conviction for
indecent liberties with a child.  Therefore, even if the jury
based its conviction on the same facts as those underlying the
sexual offense charge, it was appropriate for them to do so. 
“[T]he crime of indecent liberties is a single offense
which may be proved by evidence of the commission of any one of a
number of acts.”  Hartness, 326 N.C. at 567, 391 S.E.2d at 180. 
A defendant is guilty of indecent liberties with a child if, 
being 16 years of age or more and at least
five years older than the child in question,
he either:
(1) Willfully takes or attempts to take
any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties
with any child of either sex under the age of
16 years for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire; or
(2) Willfully commits or attempts to
commit any lewd or lascivious act upon or
with the body or any part or member of the
body of any child of either sex under the age
of 16 years.
-22-
N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 (2007).  Defendant’s extrajudicial confession
alone establishes all of the elements of indecent liberties with
a child; thus, under the corpus delicti rule, the question
becomes whether independent corroborating evidence is strong
enough to prove the trustworthiness of the confession.  As
discussed above, Jonathan’s testimony regarding defendant’s
statements made immediately after the extrajudicial confession is
not evidence independent of the confession and is not sufficient
corroboration evidence.  However, after reviewing the entirety of
the record, we find there is strong corroborating evidence to
establish the trustworthiness of defendant’s extrajudicial
confession as to the indecent liberties charge.
First, defendant’s trial testimony mirrors his
extrajudicial confession in that he admits that during the first
visit, he was drunk and alone with K.L.C. on Jonathan’s bed with
his penis exposed.  This evidence strongly corroborates
defendant’s extrajudicial confession admitting to an indecent
liberty against K.L.C. and satisfies the requirements of the
corpus delicti rule.  The jury also heard K.L.C. testify that
defendant grabbed her by the shoulders, undressed her, and
exposed himself during the second visit.  Therefore, it was
proper for the jury to consider the confession, along with the
other evidence presented at trial, to determine if defendant
committed the crime of indecent liberties with a child.  Because
the jury could have found that defendant’s acts during the first
or second visit constituted an indecent liberty with a child, it
is immaterial that the trial court did not give specific
instructions as to which of those acts were at issue.  See
Lawrence, 360 N.C. at 375, 627 at 613.  After receiving correct
-23-
instructions on the law, the jury was unanimous in deciding that
defendant committed the offense of indecent liberties with a
child.  As such, we find no plain error and affirm defendant’s
conviction for indecent liberties with a child.  
CONCLUSION
Because we hold that there was insufficient evidence
under the corpus delicti rule to satisfy the “sexual act” element
of first-degree sexual offense, we affirm the Court of Appeals’
reversal of defendant’s conviction on that charge. 
We further hold that the jury instructions regarding
the indecent liberties charge were not confusing and did not
constitute plain error.  We thus reverse the portion of the Court
of Appeals’ opinion that concluded otherwise and granted
defendant a new trial on this issue. 
[3] The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to
address defendant’s remaining assignments of error based on its
finding that these matters were unlikely to occur at a new trial. 
Because we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision granting
defendant a new trial, we remand this case to that court for
consideration of defendant’s remaining assignments of error as
they relate to the indecent liberties conviction.  If, after
reviewing defendant’s remaining assignments of error the Court of
Appeals finds no error, we instruct that the case be further
remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing as to the
indecent liberties conviction. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON concur in the result only.