Title: Saddler v. State

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

66 Wn.2d 215 (1965) 401 P.2d 848 P.L. SADDLER, Respondent, v. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant.[*] No. 36768. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. May 6, 1965. The Attorney General and Edward E. Level, Assistant, for appellant. Murray & Hanna, by Robert F. Murray, for respondent. *216 HUNTER, J. Plaintiff (respondent), P.L. Saddler, was awarded two road-construction contracts by the state of Washington, defendant (appellant): contract No. 4645 (referred to as contract No. 1), for the construction of 8 miles of secondary state highway 7-C from its junction with primary state highway No. 7, east of Vantage in Grant County toward Othello; contract No. 4784 (referred to as contract No. 2), for the continued construction of highway No. 7-C, for a distance of approximately 20 1/4 miles. Separate actions were brought for the asserted breach of each contract, for the payment of work performed and not allowed by the state, and the actions were consolidated for trial in Thurston County. After a 5-week trial, tried without a jury, judgments were awarded the plaintiff in both actions. This appeal is taken from the awards in only those causes of action that concerned payment: (1) for claimed quantities of heavy excavation, and (2) for claimed excessive requirements by employees of the state in the finishing of the subgrade. Contract No. 1 provided for a unit price payment of 90 cents per cubic yard for the removal of solid rock. The trial court awarded an additional $11,878.30 for performance of this type of excavation. Contract No. 2 provided for a unit price of 42 cents per cubic yard for class A excavation. The trial court awarded an additional $26,517.75 for this class of excavation. For the cost of excessive finishing requirements in the completion of the subgrade, the trial court awarded $13,858.13 under contract No. 1 and $16,845.64 under contract No. 2. The trial court also directed the state to pay the plaintiff $5,404.59, which was withheld by the state from payments due the plaintiff in lieu of a penalty in that sum assessed against the plaintiff for delay in completion of the contract. The appeal involves a factual dispute which was resolved by the trial court after a consideration of all the evidence. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings. The real issue is whether the evidence considered by the trial court was properly before it in view *217 of standard specifications in the contracts. The state contends that the specifications are plain and unambiguous and that they expressly prohibit the consideration of evidence which was admitted over the state's continuing objection. The pertinent standard specifications in the contracts are as follows: The plaintiff does not dispute the state's determination of the gross yardage of material removed by the plaintiff, as estimated by the "cross-section" method. The disagreement concerns the state's classification of the total yardage excavated. It is the contention of the plaintiff that classification of the material within the gross yardage excavated involves the exercise of discretion; that the record discloses this discretion *219 was arbitrarily and capriciously exercised, and, that the plaintiff therefore was not restricted to the cross-section mode of measurement specified in the contract. Plaintiff relies on the rule as stated in Ward v. Smith, 140 W. Va. 791, 808, 86 S.E.2d 539 (1955), cited by the state: As a further justification for not using the cross-section method of measurement, the plaintiff contends that he did not realize it would be necessary to do his own cross-sectioning until it was too late. Plaintiff, in support of his contention that the classification of the gross yardage required the exercise of discretion, cites Romano Engineering Corp. v. State, 8 Wn.2d 670, 714, 113 P.2d 549 (1941), in which the question arose as to the classification of solid rock and class A material that had been excavated. We there said: The trial court, in its oral opinion, concluded that the plaintiff was correct in his contention that the classification of the quantities measured by cross-sectioning required the exercise of discretion: An examination of the contract shows that specification Sec. 9.01, supra, states: [1] We believe that the trial court correctly held that the measuring of quantities of classifications did require the exercise of discretion. However, such exercise of discretion by the Director of Highways (or his representative) would nevertheless be binding and final upon the plaintiff under specification Sec. 5.01, supra, in the absence of an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise thereof. Coyle Constr. Co. v. Skagit Cy., 177 Wash. 520, 32 P.2d 106 (1934); Ward v. Smith, supra. It is the plaintiff's contention that the state's representatives in charge were prejudiced against the plaintiff; that they exercised their discretion arbitrarily and unfairly, and that their judgment was unreliable; further, that this was the conclusion of the trial court after a consideration of all the acts of the state's representatives in charge, as gleaned from the entire record. [2] The state argues that the trial court made no finding to this effect. The record discloses no such formal findings were made; however, we are entitled to consider the oral opinion of the trial court, since it is not inconsistent with the findings. To comprehend fully the conclusions of the trial court in regard to the attitude of the representatives of the state and their judgment exercised in determining quantities and finishing requirements for the subgrade, it is necessary to recite the trial court's opinion at some length. The trial court stated: We are satisfied from the oral decision that the trial court determined that the state representatives in charge of the construction under contracts Nos. 1 and 2 were unreasonable and arbitrary in the exercise of their discretion; that their determinations were inaccurate and unreliable, and that it was necessary for the court to consider other evidence in order to determine classification of the quantities excavated. It is the plaintiff's contention that the record amply supports the foregoing conclusion of the trial court, which we will now discuss. *225 The plaintiff first contends that the arbitrary and capricious attitude and determinations of the state's resident engineer are demonstrated by the inaccuracy of the monthly estimates as to the progress of the work and his testimony in regard thereto. The estimate reports (exhibit No. 3) were prepared each month by the resident engineer during the progress of the construction contract. They were signed by the resident engineer, Del Therriault, with the certification, "I certify the above to be based upon actual measurements, and to be true and correct." (Italics ours.) Mr. Therriault, on the other hand, testified that they were only estimates for the purpose of making progress payments to the contractor for work performed and were not accurate. He testified as follows under cross-examination, referring to the first monthly estimate, from March 23 to April 20, 1954: The state contends that use of the monthly estimates is excluded by specification Sec. 2.02 in determination of quantities. We disagree. The estimates referred to in this section are those appearing in the contract. Specification Sec. 2.02 provides: The monthly estimates which the trial court considered are not in the plans or specifications, but are estimates which purport to reflect the actual work performed, based upon actual measurements which are certified to be true and correct. The first monthly estimate stated that 60,500 cubic yards of solid rock had been excavated. The estimates for the first 6 months, up to September 20, recited solid rock excavated as totaling 179,900 cubic yards. On September 20, the plaintiff, considering that the quantity of rock was overrunning his original estimate, purchased and put into operation an 80-D 2 1/2-yard power shovel that had the capacity of moving 200 cubic yards of rock per hour. He also purchased two 12-15 yard dump trucks to work with it. This equipment was in addition to the rock-moving equipment previously used, which was continued in use for the remaining 11 months of the job. The plaintiff testified that the record of operation of the 80-D shovel, alone, from September 20 was 854 hours, in solid rock, which, with the estimated *227 average of 200 yards per hour, amounted to an estimated 170,800 cubic yards. The solid rock removal recited in the monthly estimates for the succeeding 11 months, as certified by Mr. Therriault, totaled 46,681 cubic yards, as compared to the 179,900 yards allowed in the estimates for the first 6 months during the period the 80-D shovel was not in use. The plaintiff also points out the following testimony of the resident engineer, which he contends demonstrates the engineer's arbitrary and prejudicial attitude: The plaintiff further cites the following testimony which he contends demonstrates the unreasonable and arbitrary requirements the state representatives imposed in regard to the finishing of the subgrade: *230 We are satisfied that the record supports the trial court's conclusion as to the unreasonable and arbitrary determinations of the state representatives in charge of the construction contracts in question, and, particularly, as to the unreliability of the classification by the resident engineer of the quantity of solid rock excavated by the plaintiff, of which the trial court said it was convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt. [3] The trial court was, therefore, entitled to consider other evidence in the determination of the factual issues raised. Ward v. Smith, supra. The plaintiff further contends that the consideration of other evidence in determining the classification of the quantity of solid rock and class A material excavated was also justified on the basis of the following testimony, which the trial court was entitled to believe: The plaintiff, P.L. Saddler, testified as follows under direct examination: Harry Saddler, a superintendent for the plaintiff, testified as follows on cross-examination: [4] The record contains extensive testimony by powdermen with many years' experience in rock excavation, who gave their expert opinions as to the amount of powder required to blast a cubic yard to permit its removal. The testimony showed the solid rock removed to be a diced basalt that did not require the normal amount of powder because of its shattering propensities. According to the testimony, from six-tenths to eight-tenths of a pound of powder is required per cubic yard for its removal. The trial court considered this to have been the most conservative of the best evidence available, and determined the yardage by using further caution in adopting a formula of one pound of powder per cubic yard for solid rock removal. We find no error committed by the trial court under the circumstances of this case in adopting this formula. It was entitled to consider *232 the best evidence available. Brear v. Klinker Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Wn.2d 443, 374 P.2d 370 (1962). We hold that its award for solid rock removal is supported by the record. Having concluded that the trial court was entitled to consider other evidence than that based on cross sectioning, its determination of the quantity of class A excavation was purely a question of fact, which also is supported by the record. Romano Engineering Corp. v. State, supra. Since we have held that the testimony supports the trial court's determination that the state representatives in charge at the jobsite were unreasonable and arbitrary, the plaintiff was not bound by specification Sec. 5.01, supra, relating to finality of determination by the Director of Highways (his representative in this case). Coyle Constr. Co. v. Skagit Cy., supra. The award for the cost incurred by the plaintiff resulting from the excessive finishing requirements is a question of fact and is supported by the record. [5] No error was assigned by the state to the trial court's direction that the amount be paid to the plaintiff that was withheld from payments to plaintiff in lieu of penalties for delay in the completion of the contracts. The state argues, however, that under specification Sec. 8.03, this return of the penalties constitutes an extension of time for the completion of the contract; that in Goss v. Northern Pac. Hospital Ass'n, 50 Wash. 236, 96 Pac. 1078 (1908), under a similar contract, we held that no other remedy was available where an extension of time was provided for the contract's completion. The Goss case is not apposite. Recovery here is predicated on a breach of the contract by reason of the unreasonable and arbitrary determinations and requirements of the state's representatives. We do not consider the plaintiff's cross-appeal for the reason that it was untimely filed. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL and HALE, JJ., and SOULE, J. Pro Tem., concur. July 14, 1965. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 401 P.2d 848.