Title: State v. Lawrence P. Peters, Jr.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Lawrence P. Peters, Jr.,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 154 
Reported at:  237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 28, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 12, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Shawano 
 
JUDGE: 
Earl Schmidt 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Jane Krueger Smith, Oconto Falls, and oral argument by 
Jane Krueger Smith. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by William L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 74 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1940-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lawrence P. Peters, Jr.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This case concerns the extent to 
which a defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction in 
a subsequent criminal case where the prior conviction is used to 
enhance the sentence for the subsequent crime.  Earlier this 
term, in State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 
528, we followed Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) 
and held that a defendant generally may not collaterally attack 
a prior conviction in a subsequent criminal case where the prior 
conviction enhances the subsequent sentence.  There is an 
exception, however, for a collateral attack based upon an 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
2 
alleged violation of the defendant's right to counsel.  Hahn, 
238 Wis. 2d at 903-04; see also Custis, 511 U.S. at 495-96. 
¶2 Defendant Lawrence P. Peters, Jr. was charged with fifth 
offense operating after revocation of license (OAR).  In order 
to prevent the progressively higher penalties that flow from 
repeat OAR offenses, Peters moved to invalidate his second OAR 
conviction, alleging that the no contest plea upon which it was 
based was entered without counsel by closed-circuit television 
from the county jail, in violation of his statutory and 
constitutional rights.  
¶3 
The circuit court entertained the collateral challenge 
and held that any error related to the closed-circuit television 
plea was harmless.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding 
that while the defendant's statutory procedural rights had been 
violated, no constitutional violation requiring reversal had 
occurred.  State v. Peters, 2000 WI App 154, ¶10, 237 Wis. 2d 
741, 615 N.W.2d 655. 
¶4 
We view this case as falling within the right-to-
counsel exception to the general rule against collateral attacks 
on prior convictions.  We hold that Peters may, in the context 
of 
this 
prosecution 
for 
fifth 
offense 
OAR, 
collaterally 
challenge his second OAR conviction, because the no contest plea 
upon which it was based was entered without counsel.  We do not 
address the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of 
closed-circuit television guilty or no contest pleas.  We 
reverse and remand for consideration of whether Peters knowingly 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
3 
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before pleading no 
contest to second offense OAR.  
I 
¶5 
The facts are undisputed.  On April 14, 1999, Peters 
was cited for fifth offense OAR contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(1).1  Peters moved to invalidate his second OAR 
conviction in an effort to prevent its use for penalty 
enhancement purposes in the fifth offense prosecution.    
¶6 
Peters' second offense OAR conviction was entered in 
Shawano County Circuit Court on April 4, 1996, at an initial 
appearance conducted by the Honorable Earl W. Schmidt, Jr.  The 
prosecutor and the judge were present in the courtroom.  Peters, 
who was incarcerated in the Shawano County Jail, appeared by 
closed-circuit television without counsel.   
¶7 
The transcript reflects that at the beginning of the 
initial appearance, the prosecutor offered a plea bargain on the 
second offense OAR and a companion drunk driving charge.  After 
the prosecutor announced the plea offer, the circuit court 
addressed Peters briefly about his right to counsel: 
 
THE COURT: Now, the Court advises you, Mr. Peters, 
that you have a right to an attorney.  If your income 
and assets are at the level the State Public Defender 
sets, the State Public Defender would represent you.  
You may, however, waive your right to an attorney and 
proceed without one.  But if you wish to have an 
attorney, the Court would take steps for you to go out 
and get one.  Do you wish to have an attorney? 
 
                     
1 All statutory references are to the 1995-96 edition, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
4 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir. 
 
THE COURT: You want to proceed without one? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. 
¶8 
Peters then entered no contest pleas and was sentenced 
on the OAR and drunk driving charges, consistent with the plea 
bargain.  He did not directly challenge either conviction by 
postconviction motion or appeal. 
¶9 Three years and two OAR convictions later, after 
receiving his fifth OAR citation and facing the prospect of the 
enhanced penalties that accompany repeat OARs, Peters moved to 
invalidate the 1996 OAR conviction, focusing his argument on 
alleged statutory and constitutional infirmities in the closed-
circuit television proceeding.  Peters claimed that his no 
contest plea, entered without counsel and by "live audio-visual 
means," violated his right to be present at plea and sentencing 
and his right to have the court personally address him and to 
personally address the court.  He also claimed that his waiver 
of counsel was inadequate under State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 
194, 201, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  
¶10 The circuit court, the Honorable Thomas G. Grover, 
allowed the collateral challenge but declined to invalidate 
Peters' 1996 OAR conviction.  The court concluded that the plea 
and sentencing by closed-circuit television "probably" violated 
statutory procedural requirements, but found the violation 
harmless.  The court also held that because Klessig was decided 
after Peters' 1996 case, the rules it established for waiver of 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
5 
counsel did not apply.  The court did not otherwise evaluate the 
voluntariness of the defendant's waiver of counsel.   
¶11 Peters then pled no contest to fifth offense OAR.  
This time he appealed.  Hahn had not yet been decided, and so 
the court of appeals applied State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 485 
N.W.2d 237 (1992), which held that a defendant may collaterally 
challenge a prior conviction if the challenge implicates a 
constitutional right that would affect the reliability of the 
prior conviction.  Peters, 237 Wis. 2d at ¶6.  The court of 
appeals affirmed, finding a statutory but not a constitutional 
violation.  Id. 
¶12 The court of appeals concluded that the plea and 
sentencing by closed-circuit television violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1), which guarantees a defendant's right to be present 
in the courtroom at arraignment and imposition of sentence 
(among other points in the criminal process).  The court 
concluded, however, that this statutory violation did not 
"automatically translate into a constitutional violation."  Id. 
at ¶10.  The court rejected Peters' argument that a no contest 
plea entered without counsel by closed-circuit television from 
the county jail is inherently coercive and therefore unreliable. 
 Id. at ¶13.  Instead, the court concluded that because the 
hearing was otherwise 
procedurally 
correct, 
the 
statutory 
violation did not render the 1996 OAR conviction unfair or 
unreliable.  Id.  We accepted review. 
II 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
6 
¶13 The threshold question in this case is the extent to 
which Peters is entitled to collaterally attack his second OAR 
conviction in this prosecution for fifth offense OAR.  This is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  See State v. Woods, 117 
Wis. 2d 701, 715-16, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).   
¶14 The court of appeals applied Baker, which was limited 
by our recent decision in Hahn.  We held in Hahn that a 
defendant generally may not collaterally attack the validity of 
a prior conviction during an enhanced sentence proceeding 
predicated on the prior conviction unless the offender alleges a 
violation of his constitutional right to counsel.  Hahn, 238 
Wis. 2d at 903. 
¶15 Our decision in Hahn was based upon Custis, in which 
the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant does not 
have a constitutional right to collaterally attack a prior 
conviction used to enhance a subsequent criminal sentence unless 
he alleges a violation of his right to counsel under Gideon v. 
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d at ¶29; see 
also Custis, 511 U.S. at 496.  We noted in Hahn that we were 
"bound as a matter of federal constitutional law" by the primary 
holding of Custis, and that the Supreme Court's concerns about 
ease of administration and finality of judgments weighed in 
favor of a bright-line rule against collateral attacks, with the 
limited exception of right-to-counsel violations.  Hahn, 238 
Wis. 2d at ¶¶28-29. 
¶16 We noted, however, that a defendant "may use whatever 
means available under state law to challenge the validity of a 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
7 
prior conviction on other grounds in a forum other than the 
enhanced sentence proceeding.  If successful, the offender may 
seek to reopen the enhanced sentence."  Id.  That is, a 
defendant may directly rather than collaterally challenge a 
prior conviction used to enhance a subsequent sentence, and if 
successful, apply to the court to have the enhanced sentence 
adjusted.  We added that "[i]f the offender has no means 
available under state law to challenge the prior conviction on 
the merits, because, for example, the courts never reached the 
merits of this challenge under State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 
Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), or the offender is no longer 
in 
custody 
on 
the 
prior 
conviction, 
the 
offender 
may 
nevertheless seek to reopen the enhanced sentence."  State v. 
Hahn, 2001 WI 6, ¶2, 241 Wis. 2d 85, 621 N.W.2d 902, modifying 
2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528.   
¶17 After oral argument in this case, the United States 
Supreme Court issued two opinions expanding the Custis bar on 
collateral challenges to prior convictions used to enhance 
subsequent sentences.  In Daniels v. United States, ___ U.S.___, 
121 S.Ct. 1578 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a federal 
prisoner may not challenge his federal enhanced sentence by 
postconviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that 
a prior state conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.  In 
Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, ___ U.S. ___, 121 
S.Ct. 1567 (2001), the Court held that a state prisoner may not 
challenge his state enhanced sentence by federal habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the ground that a prior state 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
8 
conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.  Both decisions 
maintained the exception, preserved in Custis, for alleged right 
to counsel violations. 
¶18 Peters focuses his argument here on the Sixth Amendment 
and due process implications of conducting a plea and sentencing 
hearing by closed-circuit television from jail.  Whether the 
defendant is entitled to mount this sort of constitutional 
challenge to a prior conviction collaterally rather than 
directly (or at all) depends upon an interpretation of the 
above-quoted language in Hahn, and the influence, if any, of the 
Supreme Court's recent opinions in Daniels and Lackawanna 
County.  We do not address this issue, however, because the 
record reflects an arguable right-to-counsel violation, which is 
clearly established as an exception to the rule against 
collateral attacks on prior convictions. 
¶19 Peters premised his right-to-counsel argument in the 
circuit court on an alleged violation of Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 
201.  In Klessig, we mandated "the use of a colloquy in every 
case where a defendant seeks to proceed pro se to prove knowing 
and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel."  Id. at 206.  
That is, Klessig requires the circuit court to address the 
defendant personally and specifically: 
 
[T]o ensure that the defendant: (1) made a deliberate 
choice to proceed without counsel, (2) was aware of 
the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation, (3) was aware of the seriousness of 
the charge or charges against him, and (4) was aware 
of the general range of penalties that could have been 
imposed upon him . . . If the circuit court fails to 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
9 
conduct such a colloquy, a reviewing court may not 
find, based on the record, that there was a valid 
waiver of counsel. 
Id. 
¶20 The circuit court properly noted that Klessig had not 
yet been decided when Peters waived counsel and was convicted of 
second offense OAR in 1996, and therefore the specific four-part 
colloquy was not required.  The circuit court did not, however, 
go on to evaluate whether Peters' waiver of counsel was valid 
under the law prevailing at the time. 
¶21 In Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 563-64, 292 N.W.2d 
601 (1980), we held that: 
 
[I]n order for an accused's waiver of his right to 
counsel to be valid, the record must reflect not only 
his deliberate choice to proceed without counsel, but 
also 
his 
awareness 
of 
the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages of self-representation, the seriousness 
of the charge or charges he is facing and the general 
range of possible penalties that may be imposed if he 
is found guilty.  Unless the record reveals the 
defendant's deliberate choice and his awareness of 
these facts, a knowing and voluntary waiver [of 
counsel] will not be found. 
Pickens required an examination of the totality of the record in 
order to determine the validity of a waiver of counsel.  We do 
not have a complete record before us on the 1996 OAR conviction 
and therefore cannot determine the validity of Peters' waiver of 
counsel under Pickens. 
¶22 Accordingly, because this prosecution for fifth offense 
OAR is predicated in part on a prior OAR conviction that was 
obtained when Peters was not represented by counsel, we conclude 
that it falls within the right-to-counsel exception to the 
No. 
99-1940-CR 
 
 
10
general rule against collateral attacks on prior convictions 
used to enhance subsequent penalties.  We reverse and remand to 
the circuit court for consideration of whether the record in the 
1996 case reflects a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel 
under Pickens.   
 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
    
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
No. 
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