Title: Michaels v. Whitaker

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONNA H. MICHAELS,1 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 157, 2007 
 
Respondent Below-  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
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Court Below:  Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
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for Kent County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
JOSEPH E. WHITAKER 
 
 
§ 
No. CK05-01716 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Petitioner Below-  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 14, 2007 
   Decided:  September 18, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 18th day of September 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) Appellant Donna Michaels appeals a Family Court Order awarding 
primary placement of Karen Whitaker with Joseph Whitaker, Karen’s father, and 
granting Michaels, Karen’s mother, supervised visitation.2  Michaels makes three 
arguments on appeal.  First, Michaels contends that the Family Court assigned too 
                                          
 
1 The Court assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 In Case No. 158, 2007, Michaels appeals another Family Court Order granting custody of her 
son to George Gregory, the boy’s father.  Michaels filed a motion to consolidate before trial.  
That motion was opposed by Whitaker and ultimately denied by the Family Court on September 
15, 2006. 
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much weight to the testimony of Dr. Theodore Wilson.  Second, she argues that the 
Court improperly considered inadmissible hearsay evidence.  Third, Michaels 
asserts that the Court failed to consider the wishes of the child.  We find no merit 
to her arguments and affirm. 
(2) Karen Whitaker was born on January 3, 1998.  Michaels, Whitaker and 
Karen lived together until Karen turned four.  From 2003 to 2005, Michaels was in 
and out of hospitals for treatment for her depression after attempting to commit 
suicide several times.  Throughout this time, with the exception of a brief period of 
time in 2004, Whitaker was the sole caretaker for Karen.3 
(3) Karen resided with Michaels for a brief period in 2004.  That ended, 
however, when Michaels allegedly set fire to her home.  As a result, Michaels was 
admitted to a VA hospital for mental health issues and Karen returned to 
Whitaker’s residence.  After Michaels committed her fourth or fifth suicide attempt 
in 2005, Father petitioned the Family Court for Emergency Custody, which the 
court granted.  Michaels filed a Motion for Temporary Visitation on August 1, 
2005 and a Motion to Modify Custody on February 23, 2006.  Following a one-day 
trial on December 6, 2006, the Family Court ordered joint custody of Karen with 
                                          
 
3 Whitaker also cared for another child of Michaels during this time.   
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Whitaker having primary placement and Michaels having supervised visitation.  
This appeal followed. 
(4) In determining where the child should primarily reside, the trial court is 
to determine the best interest of the child.4  Section 722 sets forth eight factors for 
the court to balance in making its determination.  Because the factual 
circumstances of each proceeding differs, so will the amount of weight given to 
one factor or combination of factors.5  Consequently, it is “quite possible that the 
weight of one factor will counterbalance the combined weight of all other factors 
and be outcome determinative in some situations.”6  Absent misapplication of the 
law, our standard of review is abuse of discretion.7  It is well-established that “this 
Court will not substitute its own opinion for the inferences and deductions made by 
the Trial Judge where those inferences are supported by the record and are the 
product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”8 
(5) Michaels first contends that the trial judge assigned too much weight to 
the testimony of Whitaker’s expert, Dr. Theodore Wilson, in light of the fact that 
he never physically examined Michaels.  “When the determination of facts turns on 
a question of credibility and the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of 
                                          
 
4 13 Del. C. § 722(a). 
5 Fisher v. Fisher, 691 A.2d 619, 623 (Del. 1997). 
6 Id.  
7 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 187-88 (Del. 1991). 
8 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
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witnesses appearing before him, those findings of the Trial Judge will be approved 
upon review, and we will not substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact.”9  
Dr. Wilson was a stipulated expert.  His testimony was based on the records of 
Michaels’ expert, Dr. Samuel Romirowsky.  The court’s credibility determinations 
regarding the testimony were not an abuse of discretion. 
(6) Next, Michaels argues that the trial judge improperly relied on an 
criminal complaint when it assessed the eighth statutory factor.10  Michaels, 
however, did not raise any hearsay objection to the admission of the complaint.11  
Therefore, we review for plain error.12  Plain error exists when the error is “so 
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of 
the trial process.”13  Such errors must be apparent on the face of the record and be 
so “basic, serious and fundamental in their character” that they “clearly deprive an 
accused of a substantial right, or . . . show manifest injustice.”14  The Family Court 
did not rely solely on the complaint in assessing this statutory factor.  Further, the 
evidence of the incident was admitted properly through at least one other witness at 
                                          
 
9 Wife (J. F. V.) v. Husband (O. W. V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
10 13 Del. C. § 722(a)(8). 
11 The complaint was issued as part of a binder containing all of the evidence used by Dr. 
Romirowsky in his evaluation.  The trial judge specifically asked counsel if she objected to the 
admission of the binder.  She stated that she did not have any objection. 
12 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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trial.  Consequently, the admission of the complaint did not result in any clear 
prejudice that would deprive Michaels of a substantial right or manifest injustice.  
Even if there had been an objection, any error was harmless. 
(7) Finally, Michaels argues that the Family Court misapplied the second 
factor, the child’s wishes.  She also claims that the court failed to consider Dr. 
Romirowsky’s testimony that Karen wished to reside with her mother.  The trial 
judge was “impressed” with Dr. Wilson’s testimony regarding Michaels’ mental 
stability, which he described as “compelling” and expressly accepted the 
conclusions of Dr. Romirowsky over Dr. Wilson.15  Moreover, the trial judge 
expressly considered the wishes of the child in his Order.  Specifically, the trial 
court stated that the child “told the Court that she enjoys activities with both 
Mother and Father.  She stated that Father helps her with her homework every 
night.  She also stated that she would like to see her half-brother [Brian] more 
often.”  The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in considering this factor. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
15 Whitaker v. Michaels, No. CK05-01716, at 6, 9 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 27, 2007).