Title: State v. P.S.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 9 
Docket: 
Aro-19-110 
Submitted 
On Briefs: December 17, 2019 
Decided: 
January 23, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.1 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
P.S. 
 
 
MEAD, J.  
[¶1]  In this consolidated appeal, P.S. challenges the disposition imposed 
by the District Court (Fort Kent, Soucy, J.) in three juvenile matters.  Specifically, 
P.S. argues that the court abused its discretion or otherwise erred in ordering 
that he be committed to Long Creek Youth Development Center (Long Creek) 
for an indeterminate period up to age eighteen.  See 15 M.R.S. §§ 3313(1)-(2), 
3314(1), 3316(2), 3402(1)(B) (2018).2  Because our language in State v. J.R., 
2018 ME 117, ¶¶ 24, 27, 191 A.3d 1157, could be read to suggest that a court 
imposing an indeterminate commitment of a juvenile to a Department of 
                                         
1  Although Justice Hjelm participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified. 
 
2  Title 15 §§ 3313(1)-(2), 3314(1) (2018) have since been amended, though not in any ways that 
affect this case.  See, e.g., P.L. 2019, ch. 474, §§ 1-2 (effective Sept. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 15 M.R.S. 
§§ 3313(2)(F), 3314(1)(E)). 
 
 
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Corrections facility must specify a commitment no shorter in duration than up 
to the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday, and the trial court may have proceeded 
under such a belief, we take this opportunity to clarify the law, vacate the 
dispositional orders, and remand for the court to revisit the disposition 
pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§ 3314(1), 3316(2). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the “record of the proceedings 
in juvenile court.”  15 M.R.S. § 3405(2) (2018).  On June 4, 2018, when P.S. was 
fourteen, he was adjudged to have committed criminal trespass (Class E), 
17-A M.R.S. § 402(1)(B) (2018).  The court imposed a disposition of a thirty-day 
confinement, all suspended; a one-year term of probation; and forty hours of 
community service to be completed within two months.  Soon after, the State 
filed its first motion for probation revocation, alleging that P.S. had violated 
probation conditions by possessing alcohol, failing to complete the forty hours 
of community service, and refusing to comply with a curfew.  P.S. admitted to 
violating the conditions of his probation, at which time the court (Nelson, J.) 
partially revoked his probation and ordered that he complete forty hours of 
community service within thirty days. 
 
 
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[¶3]  The State filed second and third motions for probation revocation 
on November 15 and December 11, 2018.  In addition to the allegations that P.S. 
violated the conditions of his probation, the State charged four new 
misdemeanors: criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A) (2018), for 
destroying his mother’s artwork; domestic violence assault (Class D), 
17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2018), for assaulting his sister; assault (Class D), 
17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2018), for assaulting a student at school; and criminal 
mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A), for damaging a school laptop. 
[¶4]  On March 4, 2019, the court (Soucy, J.) held a hearing to consider the 
State’s motions for probation revocation and the four new charges.  At the 
hearing, P.S.—who was not yet fifteen years old—admitted to all four new 
offenses and the probation violations.  The State advocated for the court to 
impose a disposition of indeterminate commitment until age eighteen.  
P.S. argued for a thirty-day confinement.  The court revoked P.S.’s probation 
and imposed a disposition of commitment to Long Creek for an indeterminate 
period up to age eighteen.  The court stated,  
[T]ypically I think we could set you up with really intensive 
services in the community . . . and I think, in fact, we’ve tried to do 
some of that. . . .  But ideally we’d have other services available as 
well that are perhaps a bit more assertive and are a bit more local.  
We don’t have those services, and I’m satisfied there is no 
 
 
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alternative but to commit you to Long Creek, and I don’t think a 
shock sentence is going to do it.  It’s going to be [until] age 18.  
 
 
[¶5]  P.S. timely appealed the disposition.  See 15 M.R.S. § 3402(1)(B).3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  In a comprehensive list, 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1) outlines the 
dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court, including home 
supervision under court-imposed conditions, participation in a supervised 
work or service program, a period of confinement not to exceed thirty days, and 
commitment to a juvenile correctional facility.  15 M.R.S. § 3314(1)(A), (B), (F), 
(H).  Section 3316(2)(A) expounds on juvenile commitments to the Department 
of Corrections that are ordered under section 3314(1)(F) and provides in 
relevant part,  
A commitment of a juvenile to a Department of Corrections juvenile 
corrections facility pursuant to section 3314 must be for an 
indeterminate period not to extend beyond the juvenile’s 
18th birthday unless the court expressly further limits or extends the 
indeterminate commitment, as long as the court does not limit the 
commitment to less than one year nor extend the commitment 
beyond a juvenile’s 21st birthday and as long as an order does not 
result in a commitment of less than one year, unless the 
commitment is for an indeterminate period not to extend beyond 
the juvenile’s 21st birthday. 
                                         
3  In addition to briefs from the parties, we were provided a joint brief from a group of 
organizations serving as amici curiae pursuant to M.R. App. P. 7A(e).  The organizations that signed 
onto the amicus brief in support of P.S. include the ACLU of Maine Foundation, Maine Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Disability Rights Maine, and GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders. 
 
 
 
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15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A) (emphases added). 
 
[¶7]  In other words, if the juvenile court decides to order the 
commitment of a juvenile to a Department of Corrections facility pursuant to 
section 3314(1)(F), that indeterminate commitment will be for a period up to 
the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday, unless the court decides to limit or extend 
the commitment within the bounds of section 3316(2)(A).  Relevant to the 
present matter, the court could not have limited P.S.’s commitment to a period 
of “less than one year.”  15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A).  In sum, the statute provides 
the court a range of discretion for calculating a juvenile’s period of 
commitment. 
 
[¶8]  Although we cannot be certain of the court’s understanding, the 
record gives us reason to believe that, once the court decided to commit P.S. to 
Long Creek, it may have felt compelled to order him committed up to his 
eighteenth birthday.  At the hearing, the court stated that it believed there was 
“no alternative but to commit [P.S.] to Long Creek” until he reached age 
eighteen.  Further, P.S. advocated for a thirty-day confinement at the hearing, 
and it appears that his attorney may have misunderstood the court’s ability to 
limit a commitment to somewhere between at least one year and P.S.’s 
 
 
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eighteenth birthday.4  Given these observations, the court may have operated 
under the belief that its indeterminate sentence must extend until P.S.’s 
eighteenth birthday and that it was without discretion to impose a lesser period 
of commitment. 
 
[¶9]  We acknowledge that our language in State v. J.R. may have 
contributed to such a belief—one that, if held by the juvenile court, would have 
resulted in an incorrect application of the law.  In J.R., we stated, “The length of 
the institutional disposition ordered by the court was mandated by statute as 
an indeterminate period not to exceed J.R.’s eighteenth birthday.”  
2018 ME 117, ¶¶ 24, 27, 191 A.3d 1157 (“By imposing the minimum term 
permissible for an indeterminate commitment to Long Creek, the court acted 
within its discretion and did not err in applying the mandates of section 3313 
to J.R.’s specific needs.” (emphasis added)).  We recognize that the two 
quotations above, when removed from the context of J.R., could lead to the 
                                         
4  At the hearing, P.S.’s attorney requested a thirty-day confinement, stating, “[P]art of the reason 
why we picked 30 days is because that’s the only alternative we have short of indeterminate 18[.]  
[I]f there was a two-month, three-month thing, we might be talking that.  But this is what we have, so 
it—I blame the [L]egislature for that drafting decision.”  Similarly, P.S.’s initial brief mentioned only 
the option of a thirty-day confinement and did not argue in the alternative that the court should have 
limited the indeterminate-up-to-age-eighteen disposition to a commitment of somewhere between 
at least one year and P.S.’s eighteenth birthday.  Following the State’s failure to submit a brief, we 
ordered further briefing and invited amici curiae briefs.  After that order, P.S. and the amici curiae 
advanced the argument that the court had the prerogative to expressly limit P.S.’s commitment to a 
period of one year.  See 15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A) (2018). 
 
 
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conclusion that the juvenile court lacks the discretion to impose an 
indeterminate commitment of between at least one year and a juvenile’s 
eighteenth birthday. 
 
[¶10]  Because the issue was not raised by the parties in J.R., we did not 
discuss section 3316’s language allowing the court to “expressly further limit[] 
or extend[]” a juvenile’s indeterminate commitment.  15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A).  
Further, J.R.’s age rendered the issue of judicial discretion less meaningful than 
in this case.  J.R.’s indeterminate disposition up to the age of eighteen meant 
that he would spend up to eighteen months at a juvenile facility.  
J.R., 2018 ME 117, ¶ 24, 191 A.3d 1157.  In contrast, given P.S.’s relative youth 
at the time of the hearing, P.S.’s commitment could last almost thirty-nine 
months, more than three years.  Thus, the potential for a shorter period of 
commitment is a more pertinent issue here than it was in J.R. 
 
[¶11]  We clarify today that the language of J.R. does not constrain a 
juvenile court’s discretion to impose a shorter period of indeterminate 
commitment than up to a juvenile’s eighteenth birthday pursuant to 15 M.R.S. 
§ 3316(2)(A), so long as that commitment is for at least one year.  We cannot 
determine on this record whether the District Court believed it was compelled 
to impose a commitment extending until P.S.’s eighteenth birthday.  
 
 
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Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter for the court to 
readdress the disposition pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§ 3314(1), 3316(2), 
specifically acknowledging the full range of discretion provided to the court in 
section 3316(2)(A) and the Legislature’s directive to prioritize the least 
restrictive juvenile disposition that is appropriate, see J.R., 2018 ME 117, ¶ 12, 
191 A.3d 1157 (citing 15 M.R.S.A. § 3002 (2003) Commentary 1979).  In its 
review, the court may decide to reimpose P.S.’s up-to-age-eighteen 
commitment, or it may exercise its discretion to limit his indeterminate 
commitment within the direction of the statute.  See 15 M.R.S. §§ 3002, 
3313(1)-(2), 3314(1), 3316(2) (2018). 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John W. Tebbetts, Esq., Tebbetts Law Office, LLC, Presque Isle, for appellant P.S. 
 
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and James G. Mitchell, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., 8th 
Prosecutorial District, Caibou, for appellee State of Maine 
 
Emma E. Bond, Esq., Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., and Meagan Sway, Esq., ACLU of 
Maine Foundation, Portland, for amicus curiae ACLU of Maine Foundation 
 
Peter Rice, Esq., and Jeffrey M. Skakalski, Esq., Disability Rights Maine, Augusta, 
for amicus curiae Disability Rights Maine 
 
 
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Mary Bonauto, Esq., GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, Portland, for amicus 
curiae GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders 
 
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq., Maine Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
 
 
Fort Kent District Court docket numbers JV-2018-12, JV-2018-20, and JV-2018-21 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY