Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 116 Ohio St.3d 110, 2007-Ohio-5588.] 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SQUIRE. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 116 Ohio St.3d 110, 2007-Ohio-5588.] 
Judges – Misconduct – Pattern of intemperate behavior and disrespect for 
attorneys and litigants – Refusal to conduct hearings in accordance with 
law—Abuse of judicial power – Failure to conduct proceedings in a fair, 
impartial, and timely manner – Pattern of improper ex parte 
communications – Failure to recuse when appropriate – Two-year 
suspension, one year stayed. 
(No. 2007-0492 — Submitted July 10, 2007 — Decided October 25, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-087. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} This court admitted respondent, Carole H. Squire of Columbus, 
Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0031715, to the practice of law in Ohio in 1977.  
In November 2000, respondent was elected to the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch, her term 
commencing January 2001.  In a complaint filed on October 10, 2005, and 
amended on March 2, 2006, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent 
with four counts of misconduct involving 40 violations of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct and 12 violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
{¶ 2} Relator’s allegations implicated incidents from 2003 through 2006.  
A three-member panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the cause, conducting eight days of proceedings during August, 
September, and October 2006.  From the testimony of 28 witnesses, the parties’ 
factual stipulations, 125 stipulated exhibits, and numerous other exhibits, a 
unanimous panel made findings of misconduct with respect to all counts of the 
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complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of 
law for 12 months, with six months stayed on condition of no further disciplinary 
violations within the one year period of suspension.  The board accepted the 
panel’s findings of misconduct as to all counts, but recommended that respondent 
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years with one year of 
the suspension stayed. 
Count One 
{¶ 3} Count One involves proceedings before respondent regarding the 
cases of Allison v. Patterson and Patterson v. Allison. Respondent granted Teresa 
Allison’s petition for an ex parte civil protection order (“CPO”) against Brent 
Patterson, the father of the couple’s child.  When Allison later filed an amended 
petition requesting that the couple’s minor child be included as a protected party 
under the CPO, respondent was required by R.C. 3113.31(D)(1) to hold an ex 
parte hearing on a CPO the same day the petition was filed.  Respondent told the 
parties that she was going to conduct an “investigation” and that she was going to 
consult with Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”). 
{¶ 4} Respondent repeatedly refused to make a decision and refused 
repeated requests for a hearing, telling Allison’s counsel, attorney Lorie 
McCaughan, “I’m not going to do that, and if you don’t like it, you can appeal 
me.  You’re not going to run my courtroom.”  When McCaughan and co-counsel 
Jenifer Thompson reiterated their position that the statute required a hearing 
within 24 hours, respondent stated that “every law was made to be moved 
around.” Respondent required McCaughan to check back repeatedly during the 
following three days to learn whether respondent had talked to FCCS and was 
ready to hear the cases. 
{¶ 5} Due to a guardianship, Patterson had custody of the minor child at 
that time.  Concerned about the welfare of the child because respondent would not 
rule on the CPO, McCaughan and Thompson filed for an emergency custody 
January Term, 2007 
3 
order (“ECO”).  The ECO was assigned to Judge Preisse, who was duty judge that 
week in juvenile court.  Judge Preisse granted the ECO, giving emergency 
temporary custody of the child to the mother, Allison. 
{¶ 6} That same day, November 7, 2003, McCaughan and Thompson 
filed a complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus in the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals to attempt to force respondent to make a decision on Teresa 
Allison’s amended ex parte CPO.  The court of appeals and the parties, including 
respondent, agreed that the court would not issue the writs if respondent would 
hold the hearing immediately on the record. 
{¶ 7} Later that day, the ECO was served on Patterson, who was sitting 
with the paternal grandmother and the child in respondent’s private conference 
room.  The attorney who served Patterson escorted the child to another floor to 
await the mother’s arrival, but was soon advised to return to the courtroom.  As 
soon as respondent saw the child, she snatched her by the arm abruptly, screamed, 
“No, no, no” at McCaughan, and said that the ECO was invalid and that she was 
going to bring kidnapping charges. 
{¶ 8} After escorting the child into her chambers, respondent returned to 
the courtroom, where she stated that she did not care what anybody said, the child 
was only going home with her father.  Respondent then proceeded to hold a 
hearing, the nature of which was not clear and which respondent refused to 
clarify.  Respondent announced that she had spoken with a representative of 
FCCS “on at least three or four occasions.”  Later in the hearing, she stated that 
she had talked to FCCS “on at least seven or eight occasions” in the previous two 
days and had concluded that because FCCS was not treating the Allison and 
Patterson cases like emergencies, neither would she.  Respondent also stated that 
she had heard information about the case from the child’s grandmother outside the 
presence of Allison’s attorneys. 
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{¶ 9} At various times during the proceeding, respondent stated that she 
had granted Patterson’s cross-filing and then stated that she had not yet done so, 
but that she intended to.  When McCaughan attempted to cross-examine 
Patterson, respondent acted as Patterson’s advocate, answering questions that 
were directed to him, then questioning Patterson herself and instructing him 
whether to answer. 
{¶ 10} At the end of the proceedings, no decisions were rendered in either 
case, but three days later respondent awarded temporary custody to the paternal 
grandmother, who was not a party to either the CPO or the ECO, until November 
12, 2003.  This entry was in direct contravention of Judge Preisse’s ECO granting 
custody of the child to the mother, Allison, and contravened R.C. 
3113.31(E)(1)(d) by allocating parenting rights that had already been established. 
{¶ 11} Despite respondent’s pronouncement at the November 7 hearing 
that the matter would not be reconvened until November 12, she summoned 
counsel and the parties to appear before her on November 10.  McCaughan 
explained that Allison could not be present and stated that they could not go 
forward with Allison’s amended ex parte petition.  McCaughan asked to be 
excused from the courtroom, but respondent ordered her to stay.  Respondent then 
went off the record and berated McCaughan, made rude and contradictory 
statements, and eventually stood in front of McCaughan, shaking her finger at her, 
screaming, “You’re nothing but a liar.” 
{¶ 12} McCaughan filed an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 
2701.03 on November 12, 2003, with the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking 
respondent’s disqualification from Allison v. Patterson, case No. 03 DV-10-786, 
and Patterson v. Allison, case No. 03 DV-11-806.  Filing an affidavit of 
disqualification operates to stay all proceedings pending before a judge.  R.C. 
2701.03(D)(1).  However, respondent refused to be served with the affidavit, even 
January Term, 2007 
5 
though McCaughan and Thompson later learned that the Supreme Court of Ohio 
had faxed the affidavit to respondent prior to the hearing scheduled for that day. 
{¶ 13} Later, without explanation, respondent indicated that she would 
hear Patterson v. Allison.  In spite of repeated attempts by Allison’s counsel to get 
respondent to terminate the proceedings due to the affidavit of disqualification, 
respondent refused to recuse herself.  Respondent repeatedly detailed her ex parte 
efforts to “investigate” the case, stating that she was “calling [FCCS] day to day. 
We have records of multiple calls.”  Throughout these proceedings, the attorneys 
repeatedly asked respondent to clarify what motion was before the court.  Allison 
was present in court, but was not prepared to proceed, as she had not received 
notice that respondent intended to conduct on that day the full hearing that had 
been scheduled for nearly two weeks later, on November 24, 2003. 
{¶ 14} Respondent permitted Patterson to present testimony in support of 
his own petition for a CPO.  At various times, respondent interrupted Patterson’s 
testimony and interjected her own version of the case.  When asked whether they 
wished to question Patterson, McCaughan repeated that she and Thompson could 
not participate in the proceedings and attempted to restate her previously stated 
objections.  Respondent would not permit counsel to object or be excused. 
{¶ 15} Respondent then stated she would hear Allison’s amended petition.  
Respondent refused to allow Allison’s counsel to speak with Allison and refused 
to allow Allison to check the hallway for her witnesses.  Allison stated that she 
did not wish to proceed without counsel and that she was confused about what 
was happening.  Respondent told Allison she could proceed or her case could be 
dismissed. 
{¶ 16} Ultimately, Allison acted pro se although respondent required her 
counsel to remain in the courtroom.  Respondent continually interrupted Allison, 
badgered her as she tried to present her case, and refused to allow her to leave the 
stand to retrieve documents or to have her attorneys bring them to her.  Allison 
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repeatedly stated that she was confused and did not understand what respondent 
wanted from her.  At one point when Allison again tried to ask respondent what 
she wanted, respondent answered, “I don’t care.  Whatever.  I don’t care.” 
{¶ 17} Ultimately, respondent filed a judgment entry continuing 
Patterson’s CPO.  Respondent added the following language to the order: “[Minor 
child] is to remain in the care of Claudine Shelfo [the paternal grandmother] and 
is not to have unsupervised visits with either Petitioner father or Respondent 
mother.  Said visits shall only occur by agreement of petitioner and respondent 
and approved by the court.” 
{¶ 18} Allison’s counsel, Thompson, testified that in January 2004, 
respondent contacted her and told her that she “had caused [respondent] to send a 
child to the wrong home, that she sent a child home with a mentally-ill mother, 
and that [respondent] had made the wrong decision based on the fact that she had 
to deal with [Thompson’s] case and spend so much time with [Thompson], and 
that [Thompson] would have to answer to God for [her] actions in this case, and 
that she had made her peace with God, and that God would deal with [Thompson] 
in the end.”  She also stated that if Thompson “continue[d] down this road that 
[she] would have to pay for [her] actions, and that [Thompson] needed to learn to 
be courteous in the courtroom.” 
Analysis 
{¶ 19} The board concluded that respondent had engaged in a series of 
transgressions that violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  By failing to follow Ohio law with regard to the ex 
parte CPO petitions, respondent violated the following Canons of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct: Canon 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary); Canon 3(B)(1) (a judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to 
the judge except those in which disqualification is required); and Canon 3(B)(2) 
(a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it).  
January Term, 2007 
7 
Further, the respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
{¶ 20} By contacting FCCS repeatedly and engaging in ex parte 
communications with Patterson, his mother, the child, and Jenifer Thompson, 
respondent violated Canon 3(B)(7) (a judge shall not initiate, receive, permit, or 
consider communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or 
their representatives concerning a pending proceeding) and Canon 4 (a judge shall 
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s 
activities). 
{¶ 21} In her interactions with Allison and her attorneys, respondent 
repeatedly violated Canon 3 (a judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently); Canon 3(B)(4) (a judge shall be patient, dignified, and 
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge 
deals in an official capacity and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, and of 
staff, court officials, and others subject to the court’s direction and control); and 
Canon 3(B)(5) (a judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice); 
and Canon 4. 
{¶ 22} By refusing to consider the matters brought before her in the 
matters of Allison v. Patterson and Patterson v. Allison, respondent violated 
Canon 3(B)(8) (a judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, 
and fairly) and Canon 4, and DR 1-102(A)(5). 
{¶ 23} By refusing to timely disqualify herself and in insisting upon 
conducting the November 12, 2003 hearing knowing that an affidavit of 
disqualification had been filed, respondent violated Canon 3(E)(1) (a judge shall 
disqualify herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which the 
judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer or 
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personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding) and 
Canon 4, and DR 1-102(A)(5). 
{¶ 24} Respondent argues that R.C. 3113.31 does not require a ruling on 
the day that the petition for a civil protection order is filed, but merely a hearing.  
The reason for the hearing is to expedite a decision on the ex parte petition, given 
the emergency nature of the proceedings.  While it is true that the decision 
whether to grant a CPO is within the discretion of the trial court, as concluded by 
the board, respondent simply refused to make a decision at all.  Respondent’s 
failure to make a decision to grant or deny the amended petition for an ex parte 
CPO denied the parties their rights to the protections of R.C. 3113.31. 
{¶ 25} Respondent challenges the board’s conclusion that she acted 
improperly when she conducted a hearing and issued an order changing the 
custody provisions previously ordered by Judge Preisse in granting an ECO.  
Respondent questions how the board can find fault with her holding a hearing and 
making a decision after she was ordered to do so by the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals.  Judge Preisse’s involvement in respondent’s case would not have been 
necessary but for respondent’s failure to make a ruling on the case.  Further, 
respondent was aware of Judge Preisse’s order and even stated that she had 
retrieved Judge Preisse’s order from the clerk’s office and that she “deliberately 
didn’t give it to [Patterson], deliberately didn’t allow him to have a copy, and I 
didn’t feel it was appropriate.”  The court of appeals mandated that respondent 
hold a hearing, not that she make improper rulings. 
{¶ 26} Moreover, respondent contends that she could not make various 
decisions she was being asked to make due to the need for investigation.  
However, respondent’s so-called attempts at “investigations” resulted in ex parte 
communications with Franklin County Children Services and Claudine Shelfo, the 
child’s grandmother. 
January Term, 2007 
9 
{¶ 27} As for respondent’s contention that multiple filings within a short 
period of time made managing the case difficult, many of the filings made during 
this time were due, in part, to respondent’s failure to rule on the petition before 
her.  Finally, with regard to respondent’s failure to terminate the proceedings after 
McCaughan and Thompson filed an affidavit of disqualification, respondent 
argues that R.C. 2701.03(D)(2)(a) vests a judge with discretion to proceed if the 
affidavit was filed less than seven days prior to a scheduled hearing.  Respondent 
ignores well-established precedent holding that the requirement can be set aside 
when it is demonstrated that compliance with the seven-day requirement is 
impossible.  See, e.g., In re Disqualification of Leskovyansky (1999), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 1210, 723 N.E.2d 1099.  Clearly, in this case, compliance with the seven-
day requirement was impossible because instances of respondent’s bias occurred 
less than seven days before the scheduled hearing. 
{¶ 28} Consequently, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect to Count One. 
Count Two 
{¶ 29} In Count Two, the complaint alleges that Susan Lantz represented 
Gregory Camburn in divorce proceedings in respondent’s court.  Camburn filed a 
petition for an ex parte CPO, case No. 01 DV-01-051, asking that Camburn and 
his two small children be protected from Camburn’s wife, Maria.  On the day the 
petition was filed, Lantz and her client were called into respondent’s courtroom.  
After briefly speaking to Camburn, respondent stated that she needed to conduct 
an “investigation.”  Respondent then called the maternal grandparents from her 
telephone on the bench, engaging in an ex parte communication with the maternal 
grandmother about the children and the need for protection.  Following the call, 
respondent telephoned Maria Camburn’s attorney and informed his office that 
Maria’s husband was seeking an ex parte CPO.  Respondent then granted a CPO 
protecting Camburn, but not the children. 
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{¶ 30} Ten days later, Lantz filed a petition for an emergency custody 
order for the two children.  When Lantz attempted to enter respondent’s 
courtroom, respondent’s bailiff stopped her and said, “We’re really not open for 
business.  You’ll have to come back.”  Lantz attempted to give the motion to the 
bailiff to give to respondent, but the bailiff went back inside the courtroom and 
locked the door. 
{¶ 31} Later, when Lantz was able to speak with respondent about the 
ECO, respondent flipped through the petition and told Lantz that she needed 
additional evidence.  Lantz left the courthouse, gathered additional evidence, and 
returned about an hour later, where she learned that respondent had left for the 
day.  In respondent’s absence, Lantz presented the petition for the ECO to Judge 
Lias, the duty judge for that week, who signed the order granting custody to Greg 
Camburn. 
{¶ 32} At the full hearing on the ex parte CPO and at the review hearing 
on the ECO, respondent refused to allow Lantz to speak and refused to allow a 
record to be made of the proceeding.  Before a scheduled hearing later that day, 
Lantz filed motions for recusal in both the divorce and CPO cases.  Respondent 
refused to recuse herself, repeatedly denied Lantz a record of the proceedings, and 
refused to allow her to make a proffer. 
{¶ 33} After respondent left the courtroom, Lantz attempted to call a 
colleague for guidance.  When respondent returned minutes later, Lantz hung up.  
Respondent immediately found Lantz in contempt.  Respondent continued to 
refuse to allow a record of the proceedings, refused to allow Lantz to represent 
Camburn, and gave Camburn 30 minutes to secure new counsel.  Respondent did 
allow the court reporter to transcribe a partial record of the events, including her 
finding Lantz in contempt.  The transcript contains portions of Lantz’s attempted 
proffer, but it is clear from the transcript that portions of the proceedings were 
January Term, 2007 
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conducted off the record because of respondent’s refusal to go on the record.  
Ultimately, Lantz made her proffer and secured new counsel for Camburn. 
{¶ 34} Respondent falsely stated on the record, in the presence of 
Camburn’s new attorney, that respondent had ordered the children to be present 
on several occasions.  Further, respondent terminated the ECO, stating that she 
had heard extensively from Mr. Camburn, when in fact, Camburn had not been 
allowed to provide testimony.  Moreover, respondent stated that she had also 
heard from Lantz on multiple occasions on behalf of Camburn, when Lantz was 
never permitted to address the court on behalf of her client.  And respondent 
falsely stated that the call respondent had made to the maternal grandparents was 
“by agreement of Ms. Lantz and her client at the time.” 
{¶ 35} Respondent subsequently set aside the ex parte CPO, granted sole 
temporary custody of the Camburn children to Maria, and scheduled a review 
hearing for February 10.  A second purpose of this hearing was to address the 
Lantz contempt matter.  When Lantz’s attorney, Thomas Tyack, arrived at the 
hearing with his client, respondent’s bailiff read him a statement from respondent 
informing him that based on Lantz’s “inappropriate” behavior, Lantz would not 
be permitted to be present in the courtroom for the custody matter unless she 
apologized to respondent.  Lantz could, however, be present for the contempt part 
of the hearing. 
{¶ 36} When the hearing commenced and it became apparent that 
respondent was proceeding on the custody issue, Tyack became concerned, as 
Lantz was present with him.  He rose and addressed respondent, asking that the 
message that the bailiff had given him be read into the record.  Respondent 
declined.  When Tyack tried to insist, respondent accused him of a lack of respect.  
When Tyack asked whether respondent wanted Lantz to leave the courtroom, 
respondent denied ever having said that Lantz could not be present for both the 
custody and contempt matters.  She then contradicted herself by stating that Lantz 
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could not stay for the custody part of the hearing unless she apologized, but would 
not permit her to leave when she proceeded on to the custody matter. 
{¶ 37} Shortly after the hearing, Lantz appealed the contempt order.  
Despite the fact that respondent was still the judge of record in the Camburn 
custody matter, respondent contacted Maria Camburn’s parents and her daughter 
ex parte to obtain affidavits from them in support of her version of the events 
surrounding the contempt citation. 
{¶ 38} Two months later, this court disqualified respondent from all of the 
Camburn matters.  In re Disqualification of Squire, 110 Ohio St.3d 1202, 2005-
Ohio-7157, 850 N.E.2d 709.  Eight months later, the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals reversed respondent’s order of contempt and held that respondent had 
abused her discretion by holding Lantz in contempt.  Camburn v. Camburn, 
Franklin App. No. 05AP-152, 2005-Ohio-6502. 
Analysis 
{¶ 39} By failing to follow Ohio law with regard to the ex parte CPO 
petitions, respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5), the board found.  By contacting 
the parent of a party via telephone and gathering evidence without the 
participation of opposing counsel during what should have been an ex parte 
proceeding, by contacting that party’s attorney via telephone and informing him 
of what is legally intended to be an ex parte proceeding, and by contacting the 
parents of a party and the party’s minor child in order to obtain affidavits to file in 
the court of appeals without the participation of attorney Susan Lantz and her 
client, respondent violated Canon 3(B)(7), Canon 4, and DR 1-102(A)(5), 
according to the board. 
{¶ 40} The board concluded that in her interactions with Gregory 
Camburn, Susan Lantz, and Thomas Tyack, respondent had repeatedly violated 
Canon 3, Canon 3(B)(4), and Canon 3(B)(5). 
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13 
{¶ 41} The board concluded that by refusing to consider the matters 
presented to her regarding the petition for an ex parte CPO filed by Greg 
Camburn and his original motion for an ECO, respondent had violated Canon 
3(B)(8) and DR 1-102(A)(5), according to the board. 
{¶ 42} By refusing to timely disqualify herself and in insisting upon 
conducting the February 10, 2005 hearing after the affidavit of disqualification 
had been filed, respondent violated Canon 3(E)(1), Canon 4, and DR 1-102(A)(5), 
according to the board. 
{¶ 43} Respondent contends that it was proper for her to investigate the 
allegations in the Camburn case.  Again, Ohio law does not require or permit 
respondent to conduct her own investigation of circumstances underlying the 
petition for a CPO or permit respondent to delay her decision in order to conduct 
or require such an investigation. 
{¶ 44} As for respondent’s ex parte communications with the maternal 
grandmother of the child in this case, respondent argues that nothing in the law 
prevented a reasonable inquiry.  However, as with Count One, there is nothing in 
R.C. 3113.31 that permits respondent to make such improper ex parte 
communications. 
{¶ 45} With regard to respondent’s false statement on the record that she 
had already heard from Mr. Camburn, respondent contends that often the lawyers 
and clients come to the bench and speak freely in front of the court and that she 
had in fact heard from Mr. Camburn in that way.  The evidence indicates that 
respondent actually heard from Mr. Camburn on only one occasion, the day he 
filed his petition for an ex parte CPO.  There was no evidence supporting 
respondent’s assertion that she had heard from Mr. Camburn “extensively” or that 
she had asked him a “series of questions.” 
{¶ 46} As for respondent’s insistence that Lantz was overzealously 
representing her client by repeatedly presenting herself in respondent’s courtroom 
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and filing numerous motions, as with Count One, had respondent followed the 
law and made a ruling on the petition for an ex parte CPO the day that it was 
presented to her as required by law, it would not have been necessary for Lantz to 
return to respondent’s courtroom and make various filings attempting to compel 
respondent to fulfill her judicial obligations.  Finally, respondent argues again that 
she did not recuse herself after the affidavit of disqualification was filed in this 
case because it was filed too late, less than seven days prior to the scheduled 
hearing.  For the reasons stated above, compliance with the seven-day 
requirement was impossible because instances of respondent’s bias occurred less 
than seven days prior to the date of the scheduled hearing. 
{¶ 47} Accordingly, we adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the board with respect to Count Two. 
Count Three 
{¶ 48} Count Three involves proceedings before respondent regarding the 
divorce case of Audra Fleming and Dr. Ronald Fleming.  Dr. Fleming was 
represented by attorney Michael Winston, but attorney Kim M. Halliburton-
Cohen was retained to serve as co-counsel.  On June 14, 2004, Halliburton-Cohen 
filed a motion to continue the hearings scheduled for June 15 and 16, attaching a 
letter from Dr. Fleming’s employer stating that Dr. Fleming would be unable to 
attend those hearings.   
 
{¶ 49} On June 15, 2004, Halliburton-Cohen spoke to Ms. Fleming’s 
counsel, attorney Peggy Blackmore, and learned that respondent had held an ex 
parte conversation with Blackmore about the continuance.  When Halliburton-
Cohen and Blackmore appeared for the scheduled hearing that day, respondent 
was absent.  Respondent telephoned the bailiff and indicated that she wished to 
speak on the telephone to Blackmore only.  Halliburton-Cohen objected, insisting 
that a record be made of this ex parte conversation.  Respondent’s bailiff repeated 
this objection back to respondent via the phone and then told Halliburton-Cohen, 
January Term, 2007 
15 
“The Judge says she doesn’t care.”  Blackmore held the phone out so that 
Halliburton-Cohen could hear the conversation between her and respondent. 
{¶ 50} Respondent appeared in her courtroom about an hour later and 
made several misstatements regarding Fleming v. Fleming.  For example, despite 
Halliburton-Cohen’s explanation that she was co-counsel with attorney Winston 
and that she was appearing on behalf of Dr. Fleming, respondent repeatedly 
insisted that she could not proceed without Winston because he had not requested 
leave to withdraw as counsel and because Halliburton-Cohen “doesn’t know any 
of the history” of the case. 
{¶ 51} Respondent would not permit Halliburton-Cohen to address the 
motion for a continuance.  Respondent falsely claimed that her bailiff had left 
telephone messages for each counsel on the date of the scheduled hearing stating 
that the hearing would go forward despite the motion for continuance.  
Respondent told Halliburton-Cohen that if she spoke, respondent would eject her 
from the courtroom. 
{¶ 52} When Halliburton-Cohen and Blackmore attempted to direct the 
court’s attention to substantive pending matters, respondent repeatedly returned to 
the issue of Winston’s allegedly unexcused absence from her courtroom.  After 
several more inquiries concerning Winston’s absence, respondent then continued 
the case to the next day, believing that she could not go forward without Winston. 
{¶ 53} Winston appeared at the courthouse the next morning and told 
Halliburton-Cohen that he had spoken to respondent, who had demanded his 
presence and called Halliburton-Cohen a “pit bull.” 
{¶ 54} Halliburton-Cohen described respondent’s demeanor during the 
proceedings that occurred off the record that day as “bizarre,” “angry,” and 
“[c]hildish.”  Respondent berated Winston for saying he could not be there that 
afternoon and threatened to find him in contempt if he did not show up.  
Halliburton-Cohen was present and repeatedly requested that a record be made of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the proceedings, but respondent either denied her requests or ignored them.  
Ultimately, respondent told Winston, “You will be here.  You will be here.  You 
will be here.”  She then left the bench, came over to counsel’s table, and took 
Winston by the arm, saying, “I’m trying to tell you something.” 
{¶ 55} Respondent then faxed a letter to Dr. Fleming at his place of 
employment before the afternoon session on June 16, 2004, and did not provide a 
copy of this letter to the attorneys beforehand.  Respondent also called Dr. 
Fleming’s place of employment and spoke with his office manager, informing her 
that if Dr. Fleming was not at court that afternoon, she would send a police escort 
for him. 
{¶ 56} In the afternoon session on June 16, 2004, Winston appeared with 
his attorney and informed the court that he was no longer counsel for any party in 
the case.  Winston stated that he was not aware of an order requiring his 
attendance on June 15 or June 16.  After making a lengthy statement concerning 
Winston’s absence from the prior hearing, Dr. Fleming’s absence, and her ex 
parte communications with Dr. Fleming, respondent admitted that she had 
threatened Winston with contempt if he did not appear. 
{¶ 57} At various points in the hearing, respondent indicated that she had 
“released” Winston from the case and then contradicted herself. When 
Halliburton-Cohen tried to clarify an objection for the record, respondent 
threatened her with a $100 fine if she spoke again.  Ultimately, respondent held 
Halliburton-Cohen in contempt, but never journalized the contempt finding. 
{¶ 58} Respondent repeated her frustration with Winston for being absent 
from the hearing the day before and refused to accept Winston’s explanation that 
his co-counsel, Halliburton-Cohen, was properly present in his stead.  Respondent 
refused to allow Winston to consult with his attorney, and she denied Halliburton-
Cohen’s motion for recusal and request for a hearing. 
January Term, 2007 
17 
{¶ 59} Shortly 
after 
Halliburton-Cohen 
filed 
an 
affidavit 
of 
disqualification against respondent in this court, respondent filed an entry 
disqualifying herself from the Fleming case and all other cases in which 
Halliburton-Cohen was or would become counsel of record.  However, the board 
found that respondent’s entry of disqualification contained false and inflammatory 
statements.  For example, although the entry accurately states that attorney 
Winston filed a motion to withdraw from the Fleming case, the entry falsely 
states, “In consideration of the exhorbitant [sic] amount of time and grace 
extended to the Defendant throughout the pendency of the case, the undersigned 
declined Attorney Winston’s motion to withdraw.”  In reality, respondent had 
granted Winston’s motion to withdraw nearly a year and a half earlier. 
Analysis 
{¶ 60} The board concluded that during respondent’s interactions with 
Halliburton-Cohen and Winston during the hearings held on June 15, 2004, and 
June 16, 2004, in Fleming v. Fleming, respondent had repeatedly violated Canon 
3, Canon 3(B)(4), Canon 3(B)(5), and Canon 4. 
{¶ 61} The board further concluded that by engaging Ms. Fleming’s 
attorney in a conversation regarding the disposition of the motion to continue 
without the participation of Dr. Fleming’s attorney, respondent had violated 
Canon 3(B)(7) and Canon 4. 
{¶ 62} The board found that by refusing to appropriately consider all 
matters before her with regard to the motion for continuance filed by Dr. Fleming 
and presented to the court by his attorney, respondent had violated Canon 3(B)(8) 
and Canon 4, as well as DR 1-102(A)(5). 
{¶ 63} The board concluded that by personally contacting Dr. Fleming’s 
place of employment regarding a matter pending before her, respondent had 
violated Canon 2 (a judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at 
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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impartiality of the judiciary), Canon 3(B)(4), Canon 3(B)(7), and Canon 4, as well 
as DR 1-102(A)(5). 
{¶ 64} The board concluded that in her entry disqualifying herself from 
the Fleming case and all other cases in which Halliburton-Cohen was or became 
counsel of record, respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 
Canon 2, Canon 3(B)(4), and Canon 4. 
{¶ 65} Regarding the panel’s finding that respondent had spent two days 
insisting that Dr. Fleming and Winston be present in court, respondent asserts that 
Halliburton-Cohen conceded that a local rule required parties to be present but felt 
that she had the right to ignore the rule.  But Loc.R. 3(D) requires attendance of 
parties only at status conferences and pretrial hearings.  Moreover, respondent 
never cited the local rule during her two days of insistence, but rather, waited until 
her disciplinary proceedings. 
{¶ 66} Respondent also contends there was no evidence that she did 
anything inappropriate toward the parties or their attorneys in the Fleming case.  
The panel noted that respondent (1) stated that she “didn’t care” when 
Halliburton-Cohen asked to hear a telephone call between respondent and 
opposing counsel, (2) repeatedly refused to permit Winston and Halliburton-
Cohen to address the court, (3) threatened to hold Winston in contempt if he did 
not appear in her courtroom despite the fact that he was not legally required to be 
there, (4) called Haliburton-Cohen a “pit bull” to Winston, and (5) called Dr. 
Fleming’s place of employment and threatened that she would send a police 
escort for him if he was not at court that afternoon. 
{¶ 67} Respondent contends that Winston’s attorney, Christopher Cooper, 
testified that he never saw respondent do anything inappropriate in the Fleming 
case, and in fact, believed that Winston was inappropriate in his behavior to the 
court.  However, as relator points out, Cooper saw less than 20 to 30 minutes of 
January Term, 2007 
19 
one of the hearings on one of the days in question.  The events that constitute the 
majority of the misconduct in Count Three took place over two days and 
approximately ten to 14 hours.  Moreover, even if the attorneys in respondent’s 
courtroom were being disrespectful toward her, respondent still had an obligation 
to conduct herself in a courteous and dignified manner. 
{¶ 68} Respondent’s characterization of her ex parte communication with 
opposing counsel as procedural is misplaced.  Further, her ex parte 
communication with Dr. Fleming’s employer and threatening of Dr. Fleming were 
clearly inappropriate.  Finally, as for her disqualification in the Fleming case, 
respondent argues that the board penalized her for disqualifying herself when, in 
fact, the violations arose from her false statements in the disqualification entry. 
{¶ 69} Therefore, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law of the panel with respect to Count Three. 
Count Four 
{¶ 70} Count Four involves proceedings before respondent in the cases of 
Tylee Delibro and Carol Barbee, which are separate and unrelated. 
Delibro 
{¶ 71} FCCS filed a complaint in September 2004 alleging that four-year-
old Tylee Delibro was an abused, neglected, and dependent child.  Attorney 
Richard Innis, on behalf of the Ponca Nation of Oklahoma, filed a motion to 
transfer the case to the Ponca Tribe’s juvenile court in Ponca City, Oklahoma, on 
the basis that the child was of Native American heritage.  All parties agreed that 
the matter should be transferred, and prior to the hearing on the motion, FCCS 
arranged to have a social worker fly to Columbus to pick up the child. 
{¶ 72} On the date that the social worker from Oklahoma was to arrive, 
Magistrate Goodrich approved the motion to transfer, and Innis immediately took 
the order up to respondent’s courtroom for her signature.  Innis explained the 
urgency of the matter to respondent, informing her that a social worker from 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Oklahoma was arriving at the airport momentarily to pick up the child, to which 
respondent replied, “That’s his emergency, not mine.” 
{¶ 73} Innis explained that this was an administrative decision, that all of 
the parties were in agreement that the child could not leave the county without the 
signed order, and that time was of the essence.  Respondent informed Innis that 
she had to make “an independent investigation.”  Innis stated that he could get all 
parties up to her courtroom immediately, to which respondent replied, “I’m going 
to lunch.”  When Innis informed respondent that he would have everyone 
involved back in her courtroom at 1:30, respondent replied, “Fine,” and left. 
{¶ 74} Innis, the Oklahoma social worker, the guardian ad litem, the 
mother’s attorney, and the FCCS caseworker were present at 1:30, but respondent 
did not return.  Given that time was of the essence and that respondent was 
nowhere to be found, the parties located Judge Preisse, who reviewed the 
paperwork and signed the entry. 
{¶ 75} After Judge Preisse signed the entry, she asked Innis to write a 
letter stating what occurred that day, and Innis did.  Judge Preisse forwarded the 
letter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, with Innis’s permission.  After filing 
an entry of recusal from all of Innis’s cases and then an entry revoking that 
recusal, respondent filed a second entry of recusal, falsely stating that Innis had 
told respondent that he was directed by Judge Preisse to write a letter in exchange 
for Judge Preisse’s signature on the entry.  Further, respondent indicated falsely 
that Innis had lied to her about Judge Preisse’s instructions. 
Barbee 
{¶ 76} Attorney Innis also represented Carol Barbee in an uncontested 
divorce proceeding before respondent.  The final hearing was scheduled before 
respondent a few months after the Delibro matter.  Respondent took the bench 40 
minutes late, called Innis to the bench and accused him of misrepresenting the 
facts to the court in the Delibro case, and stated that Innis had no integrity and 
January Term, 2007 
21 
was not fit to practice law.  Respondent then told Innis that she was going to 
recuse herself from any further cases involving Innis, and she refused to hear 
Barbee’s scheduled final divorce hearing.  After being made aware of the 
situation with respondent, Judge Lias promptly heard the case and signed the 
decree. 
Analysis 
{¶ 77} The board concluded that in her interactions with attorney Innis on 
January 23, 2006, disparaging him in open court in the presence of his client, 
Carol Barbee, and in respondent’s subsequent judgment entries of recusal, 
reinstatement, and second recusal, respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 1-
102(A)(5), Canon 3(B)(4), Canon 3(B)(8), and Canon 4. 
{¶ 78} Respondent’s argument that the emergency in the Tylee Delibro 
case arose from the parties’ lack of planning is both implausible and irrelevant.  
All parties in the matter agreed that the case would be transferred to the Ponca 
tribal court for further proceedings.  Under federal law, unless there is an 
objection by specified parties, jurisdictional transfer is mandatory.  Section 1911, 
Title 25, U.S.Code.  The entry presented to respondent on September 30, 2005, 
for her signature by attorney Innis was an agreed entry. 
{¶ 79} Respondent refused to sign the entry, stating that it was “not [her] 
emergency,” left the bench for lunch, and then did not return to her courtroom 
when she said she would.  Respondent argues that she was back in the courthouse 
less than 30 minutes after Judge Preisse was asked to intervene.  But clearly the 
parties did not know when she would return, and the matter was urgent. 
{¶ 80} Accordingly, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions 
of law with respect to Count Four. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶ 81} The panel found that respondent had committed multiple offenses 
and engaged in a pattern of misconduct.  “The testimony and exhibits before the 
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22 
panel establish Respondent’s pattern of ignoring clear procedural and substantive 
requirements of the law necessarily to be followed by a judge for prompt, fair, and 
impartial decision of issues presented for her judicial decision; a pattern of 
intemperate, unjudicial conduct in proceedings brought before her; a pattern of 
failure to follow the law and of blaming other judges, lawyers and litigants for the 
consequences of her failures and actions; a pattern of rationalizing and revising 
the facts of past events to excuse her own conduct or to blame others by making 
baseless allegations of wrongful or malicious actions and motives of others; a 
pattern of judicial over-reaction and abuse of judicial power to hold or threaten to 
hold lawyers in contempt of court; a pattern of ex parte communication with 
parties, counsel and witnesses and of improper judicial investigations; and a 
pattern of failure or refusal to recuse herself as judge in proceedings where her 
impartiality and bias was manifested.” 
{¶ 82} Moreover, the panel concluded that respondent had engaged in 
multiple offenses, submitted affidavits with self-serving statements and opinions 
contradicting both the record of proceedings and the otherwise unrebutted 
testimony of others, and has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her 
conduct.  In fact, respondent’s testimony on cross-examination was rambling, 
confused, confusing, and unresponsive and revealed a respondent who not only 
believes that she did nothing wrong, but believes that she is to be admired. 
{¶ 83} For example, when discussing her repeated attempts to call FCCS 
to conduct her “investigations,” she stated, “I sat there in my office – I went 
Saturday and Sunday.  I sat there and I called like every three minutes, just kept 
on.”  She spent seven pages of transcript in a rambling attempt to answer the 
question: “[D]id you raise your voice at any time to Lorie McCaughan or Jenifer 
Thompson?”  She spent more than ten pages making evasive and confused 
statements in response to the question, “As you reviewed it today, Judge, is there 
anything in Exhibit 18 that is not correct?”  Moreover, at one point in her 
January Term, 2007 
23 
testimony, respondent, citing the effects of hypoglycemia, admitted that during 
the November 7, 2003 hearing in the Allison/Patterson case, “[She] was in a fog.” 
She testified, “I was so confused. I had no idea what to do. * * * I think the record 
pretty much will establish what I’m saying, that I couldn’t figure out what was 
going on. * * * I think it was obvious I was confused because I was trying to – to 
respond to things that were out of my control even though I was supposed to be 
the one in control.” 
{¶ 84} In response to a question about whether she had reviewed 
transcripts from Fleming v. Fleming, respondent stated:  
{¶ 85} “I doubt it.  I doubt it.  See, the thing about it is – this is – this may 
sound odd, and I’m a thorough person, but I’ve been buried in the politics in this 
court for five years now, * * * and you have to make tough choices, and if I really 
feel there’s nothing in integrity about something, if I just know it’s not— I just 
know in my heart and gut this is not integrity, I’m not going to spend a lot of time 
on it, because I see people manipulating the system, I feel like they win if I divert 
my attention from serving those who are left out and poor and abused.  They win. 
{¶ 86} “* * * So my point is if I divert my attention to defending myself  - 
I believe vengeance is mine, sayeth the Lord – I’m not going to spend my time 
responding to frivolous things.” 
{¶ 87} Respondent appears to argue that what the board characterized as 
misrepresentations and false statements were really her beliefs when she made 
them.  The board concluded: “While Respondent generated by affidavit and 
judgment entry a persistent flow of self-serving statements and opinions of events 
contradicting both records and the otherwise unrebutted testimony of others and 
has based her defense in large part upon mischaracterization of her own actions 
and the actions and motives of others, the panel does not find that such were 
created solely for the purpose of deception of the panel, the Board and the Court 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
in this disciplinary proceeding, but, rather, exemplify one of the principal causes 
of and proof of the complaints underlying this proceeding. 
{¶ 88} “* * *  
{¶ 89} “Respondent’s testimony on cross-examination discloses not an 
acknowledgment of the wrongful nature of her own conduct, but perpetuates her 
attitude of avoiding direct answers to questions calling for categorical answers by 
what may be described as a persistent, rambling, confused, confusing and 
unresponsive discourse on Respondent’s trials and tribulations caused by the 
malicious conduct of others she accuses of seeking to frustrate her personally and 
cause her to fail in her pursuit of her pure and lofty motives.  Much of her 
testimonial digression contained misinformation, sophistry, distraction, falsehood 
and irrelevancy.” 
Mitigating Circumstances 
{¶ 90} As for mitigation, the panel noted that respondent had no prior 
disciplinary record, has generally cooperated in the disciplinary process, and 
generally enjoyed a reputation for good character in the community and among 
her friends and acquaintances.  Although the panel noted that no evidence was 
received or offered by either party indicating that respondent’s misconduct might 
have resulted from substance abuse, mental or physical illness, or emotional 
disorder, the panel also noted that respondent appeared to consider herself to be 
the victim of scheming and malevolence by her fellow judges, the complaining 
lawyers, some of her own counsel, and perhaps others unnamed, unknown, and 
unrevealed who have or had political or other malicious motives for complaining 
about her conduct.  As the panel noted, however, no evidence was presented to 
the panel from which that conclusion realistically might be drawn. 
Sanction 
{¶ 91} The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for one year, with six months stayed, on condition of no further 
January Term, 2007 
25 
disciplinary violations within the one-year period of suspension.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline considered the matter on February 
9, 2007, and adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the panel.  
However, given the extent and nature of the judicial misconduct seriously 
affecting the administration of justice, the board concluded that a longer 
suspension was required for the protection of the public.  Thus, the board 
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period 
of two years, with one year stayed. 
{¶ 92} Respondent objects to the board’s findings and to the board’s 
recommended sanction.  Respondent contends that she violated neither the Code 
of Judicial Conduct nor the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
{¶ 93} In determining the appropriate sanction to impose on respondent 
for her violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Disciplinary Rules, “ ‘we 
consider the duties violated, respondent’s mental state, the injury caused, the 
existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and applicable precedent.’ ”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kaup, 102 Ohio St.3d 29, 2004-Ohio-1525, 806 N.E.2d 
513, ¶ 11, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 
733 N.E.2d 609. 
{¶ 94} Respondent violated duties owed under the Code of Judicial 
Conduct and Disciplinary Rules, including duties to the public, with two 
violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and ten violations of DR 1-102(A)(5), and to the 
judiciary, by violations of Canons 1 and 2, 24 violations of Canon 3, and 13 
violations of Canon 4. 
{¶ 95} Respondent’s misconduct personifies the expression “justice 
delayed is justice denied.”  Respondent’s misconduct and, most notably, her 
failure to make rulings in pending cases demeaned attorneys and litigants in her 
court, causing them to seek justice in the courtrooms of other judges on 
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26 
respondent’s bench.  Respondent’s fellow judges had to perform her duties as 
well as their own when she refused to rule on pending motions. 
{¶ 96} The board relied on three judicial discipline cases in arriving at 
respondent’s recommended sanction.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 649, 710 N.E.2d 1107, Judge Ferreri was suspended from the 
practice of law for 18 months with the final 12 months stayed, with six months’ 
actual suspension without his judge’s pay, for three incidents of intemperate, 
derogatory remarks to the news media about other judges.  Judge Ferreri was 
found to have violated Canon 2, Canon 3(B)(9), Canon 3(C)(1), and Canon 4, 
Gov.Jud.R. I(2), Gov.Bar R. IV(2), and DR 8-102(B). 
{¶ 97} Like Judge Ferreri, respondent has argued that many of her actions 
or inactions were out of concern for the children appearing in her courtroom and 
involved in the cases at bar.  However, this court observed that “strong feelings do 
not excuse a judge from complying with the judicial canons and the Disciplinary 
Rules.”  Id. at 654, 710 N.E.2d 1107. 
{¶ 98} Moreover, respondent argued at oral argument that somehow 
decisions of judges of “specialized courts” that lie within the discretion of the 
judge should not be subject to sanction.  Respondent’s argument misses the point.  
First, respondent is not a judge of a specialized court.  By “specialized” court, we 
must assume, respondent refers to what are usually termed “problem-solving 
courts,” such as drug courts, mental health courts, and elder courts.  See In re 
Certification of Need for Additional Judges (Fla.2002), 806 So.2d 446, 451.  
Respondent is a judge in a domestic relations court, which is a court that exists in 
all of Ohio’s 88 counties.  To conclude that domestic relations judges are unable 
to hold themselves to a high standard simply due to the nature of the cases over 
which they preside is an affront to the domestic relations judges throughout Ohio, 
who go about their jobs each and every day making decisions in the same 
environment in which respondent operated.  Furthermore, clearly there is no 
January Term, 2007 
27 
lowering of professionalism standards for “specialized” courts.  Respondent’s 
argument is devoid of reason. 
{¶ 99} The second case the board relied on was Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Karto (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 760 N.E.2d 412.  Judge Karto was suspended 
from the practice of law for six months for abuse of the judicial power to punish 
for contempt, exhibiting bias without recusing himself, and conducting a juvenile 
hearing in the absence of the juvenile’s counsel.  Judge Karto was held to have 
violated Canons 1, 2, and 3, and several subsections of Canon 3 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct, as well as DR 1-102(A)(5).  Similarly to respondent, Judge 
Karto failed to journalize a contempt order, so the party was left with no ability to 
appeal.  Id. at 110, 760 N.E.2d 412. 
{¶ 100} The board concluded, and we agree, that respondent’s 
misconduct was more extensive than that of Judge Karto and was more closely 
aligned with the pattern of misconduct demonstrated in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286.  Judge O’Neill 
was suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the second year stayed 
on conditions. 
{¶ 101} The board noted that Judge O’Neill engaged in coercive tactics 
to improperly influence disposition of criminal cases in her court; engaged in a 
pattern of misrepresentation in her interaction with other judges, litigants, court 
personnel, and attorneys; and acted in a discourteous, unbecoming, and 
unprofessional manner toward her staff, court personnel, attorneys, probation 
officers, and members of the public.  For this misconduct, O’Neill was found to 
have violated Canons 1, 2, 3, and 4, and several subsections of Canon 3 of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as DR 1-102(A)(4) and (A)(5).  Id. at ¶ 20, 28, 
and 40. 
{¶ 102} Judge O’Neill, like respondent, engaged in “a pattern of rude, 
undignified, and unprofessional conduct that included abusive verbal outbursts, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
unjustified expulsions from the courtroom, and berating or humiliating persons in 
the presence of others.”  Id. at ¶30.  Like respondent, Judge O’Neill claimed that 
she had sufficient justification for her actions or offered versions of facts that 
completely contradicted that of other witnesses.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 103} This court noted in O’Neill:   
{¶ 104} “ ‘Because they are so important to our society, judges must be 
competent and ethical, and their actions must foster respect for their decisions as 
well as for the judiciary as a whole.  Given that they hold positions of 
considerable authority and are entrusted with a great deal of power and discretion, 
judges are expected to conduct themselves according to high standards of 
professional conduct.  * * *  
{¶ 105} “ ‘Judges should exercise their judicial functions with integrity, 
impartiality, and independence. They should perform their work with a high 
degree of competence, and should treat litigants, witnesses, attorneys, and others 
who appear before them with courtesy and respect. * * * In sum, they should 
inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor to the judiciary.’ ”  Id., 103 
Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57-58, quoting Shaman, 
Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics (3d Ed.2000) 1-2. 
{¶ 106} In the case at bar, the board concluded that “[r]espondent’s 
persistent pattern of legal errors and her inability to recognize them for what they 
are and accept responsibility for them demonstrates her continuing lack of judicial 
temperament and judgment.”  Respondent argued at oral argument that many of 
these violations occurred while she was a judge and because she lost her re-
election bid in 2006, she should not be sanctioned so harshly.  However, the fact 
that respondent was not re-elected does not excuse her violations of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct while she served as a judge.  A violation of the Disciplinary 
Rules or the Code of Judicial Conduct could occur in the first year of a sitting 
judge’s elected term.  If we were to permit the elections process to “take care” of 
January Term, 2007 
29 
judicial misconduct, the judge in that instance would be left unchecked for five 
years until the next election. 
{¶ 107} Moreover, “ ‘[t]he worst of judges may run the best of 
campaigns and be reelected.’ ” Sankar, Disciplining the Professional Judge 
(2000), 88 Cal.L.Rev. 1233, 1250, quoting Testitor & Sinks, Judicial Conduct 
Organizations 2 (1980) 1.  This court cannot ignore its duty to protect the public 
from judicial misconduct by relying solely upon the election process.  Nor does 
respondent’s suggestion remedy the fact that respondent’s violations involving 
deception clearly affect not just her ability to be a judge, but her ability to practice 
law.  Moreover, attorneys lose their jobs over disciplinary violations, too, but the 
disciplinary process is in place to protect the public from an attorney who will 
otherwise practice in another setting.  Judges and former judges are no different. 
{¶ 108} Finally, respondent contended at oral argument that the 
appropriate response to respondent’s conduct is the appellate process, not the 
disciplinary process.  However, respondent clearly violated multiple canons of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct as well as multiple rules of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  Moreover, often, as documented above, respondent either delayed 
decisions or made no decision at all in time-sensitive situations.  In such cases, 
there would either be no judgment from which to appeal or an appeal would be an 
inadequate remedy for the harm done. 
{¶ 109} Respondent’s lack of insight into her own behavior is key to her 
inability to overcome her shortcomings at this time.  As relator observed, 
regardless of whether respondent believed that what she said was accurate, 
respondent’s version of events was persistently in “marked contrast” to the actual 
events.  And the fact that respondent chose not to discover the truth or was 
incapable of doing so and instead chose to impose her will upon the persons 
assigned to her courtroom is indisputable evidence of what the board termed “her 
continuing lack of judicial temperament and judgment.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶ 110} Statements such as “[i]f you don’t like it, you can appeal me,” 
“every law was made to be moved around,” and “[y]ou’re nothing but a liar,” or 
telling a party that she did not care what the party said to her, saying, “I don’t care 
about any order, this child is not going anywhere except with Dad,” telling an 
attorney who complained about ex parte communications with opposing counsel 
that she “doesn’t care” about her objection, refusing to sign a transfer order and 
telling the attorney, “That’s his emergency, not mine,” are but a few examples of 
respondent’s intemperance. 
{¶ 111} Moreover, her statements reflect her displacement of blame for 
her own conduct, such as, “You have an Administrative Judge telling attorneys to 
go in and disrespect a Judge in egregious fashion.”  Further, referring to another 
judge, respondent testified that “this is a very political thing, and truth doesn’t 
matter to these people, and they are ruthless.” 
{¶ 112} Respondent’s intemperance and complete disrespect for litigants 
and attorneys who appeared before her, coupled with her total failure to take 
responsibility for her misconduct, mandate the sanction in this case.  We adopt the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  Respondent is hereby suspended 
from the practice of law for two years, with 12 months stayed on condition that 
respondent commit no further disciplinary violations within the two-year period 
of suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would suspend respondent for one year, with six 
months stayed. 
___________________ 
January Term, 2007 
31 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Kerger & Associates and Richard M. Kerger; Percy Squire Co., L.L.C., 
and Percy Squire; and Blank Rome L.L.P. and Nathaniel Jones, for respondent. 
______________________