Title: State v. Nietzold

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP21-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Robert K. Nietzold, Sr., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 545, 970 N.W.2d 590 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 28, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 10, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Vernon   
 
JUDGE: 
Darcy Jo Rood   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Philip J. Brehm and Philip J. Brehm Attorney at Law, Janesville. 
There was an oral argument by Philip J. Brehm.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak, Robert R. 
Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, for the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 22 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP21-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF81) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert K. Nietzold, Sr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAR 28, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   Plea agreements are a kind of 
contract.  And just like contracts, they can be breached, and 
breaches sometimes cured.  The central question in this case is 
whether a prosecutor cured the breach of a plea agreement when 
he initially recommended a specific term of imprisonment despite 
the State's agreement not to do so, but then retracted and 
corrected the mistake upon being made aware of the error.  We 
conclude that the breach was cured, and that defense counsel was 
not deficient for failing to object earlier to the errant 
remarks.  
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In 2019, Robert Nietzold, Sr. pleaded no contest to 
one count of repeated sexual abuse of a child.  He did so 
pursuant to a plea agreement in which the prosecutor was free to 
argue for prison, but agreed not to recommend a specific term of 
imprisonment.   
¶3 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the 
circuit court1 to impose a 27-year sentence, composed of 12 years 
of initial confinement as recommended by the presentence 
investigation 
report 
(PSI), 
and 
15 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision——five years longer than the PSI recommendation.2 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Darcy J. Rood of the Vernon County Circuit 
Court presided. 
2 The prosecutor argued as follows:  
So what is -- again, what's the magic number?  And as 
I've said before, that's a difficult position that 
this Court is in.  And a lot of times the PSI may be 
the best barometer because they do have their grids 
and their guidelines, and they understand throughout 
either this region, or at least the state, what -- I 
don't want to say typical, because there isn't a 
typical sentence, but at least -- you have to put a 
number on it eventually.  And the number that they 
came up with was 22, 12 of initial confinement and ten 
of extended supervision. 
Judge, I -- you know, again, whether that's the right 
number, not the right number, [the victim] was talking 
about the maximum term, which would be 40 years, 25 in 
and 15 out.  Again, I don't know what the number is.  
I don't know what the magic number is.  I think the 
number that the PSI put on is a reasonable number.  
I've looked at other sentences to -- again, when I say 
similar, at least the charge-wise, that that certainly 
is in the range in this area.   
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
After the prosecutor concluded, with the specific 
recommendation coming at the very end of his remarks, defense 
counsel began by pointing out the prosecutor's breach.  Counsel 
expressed 
that 
the 
State 
had 
agreed 
not 
to 
"make 
any 
recommendation with respect to any period of time."  The 
prosecutor immediately acknowledged his mistake: 
[Prosecutor]:  And, Judge, now that -- I wish [defense 
counsel] would have mentioned that.  And that's an 
accurate statement, Judge.  So -- 
The Court:  So you'll make no recommendation separate 
from that of the PSI. 
[Prosecutor]:  Well, not even that.  Just a prison 
sentence. 
The Court:  Okay.  All right.   
After the prosecutor corrected the State's recommendation in 
conformance with the plea agreement, defense counsel wrapped up 
                                                                                                                                                             
Judge, the only thing I would ask the Court to 
consider would be 15 years is the maximum time of 
extended supervision.  Maybe keep Mr. Nietzold on 
extended supervision for a 15-year period rather than 
the ten that's being requested. 
So I guess that's what I would ask that the Court 
consider, is a 27-year sentence with 12 years of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
15 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  That would be a -- depending upon 
potentially early discharge from prison at some point, 
that would be about 25 years out that he would be 
under some formal either incarceration or supervision, 
which I think just makes some sense in regards to the 
heinous nature of these crimes.  And so that’s what I 
would ask the Court to consider in regards to the 
sentence.   
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
4 
 
his argument and asked for two to three years of initial 
confinement.  Nietzold then briefly addressed the court.   
¶5 
Following a recess, the circuit court proceeded with 
its sentencing decision.  Halfway through, the court mentioned 
that the "state" recommended 12 years of initial confinement, 
leading to an extended colloquy with the prosecutor: 
The Court:  It's always so hard to put a number on 
what the sentence should be.  The state recommended 12 
years.  We say 12 years in -- 
[Prosecutor]:  Judge, recall that I didn't make a 
recommendation. 
The Court:  The state.  I meant DOC by the state, not 
you. 
[Prosecutor]:  Oh, I'm sorry. 
The Court:  I'm sorry.  I'm thinking of the DOC as the 
state, not [the prosecutor]. 
[Prosecutor]:  Department of Corrections. 
The Court:  Department of Corrections.  Thank you for 
clarifying that.  I would not want the record to state 
that, because I did not listen to what you were 
saying, essentially were echoing what the PSI said. 
[Defense counsel]:  Well, the record does -- 
The Court:  Other than asking for a longer extended 
supervision, but you didn't ask for any more -- 
[Prosecutor]:  Right, but, Judge, -- 
The Court:  -- confinement -- 
[Prosecutor]:  The negotiation -- 
The Court:  I understand. 
[Prosecutor]:  I was not to make any recommendation. 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
5 
 
The Court:  And you withdrew your recommendation. 
[Prosecutor]:  Yeah. 
The Court:  I get that.  I'm just saying it was DOC.  
It was DOC that made this recommendation.   
Thus, the court clarified that it was referring to the 
Department of Corrections' recommendation when invoking the 
"state," and that the court understood the prosecutor had 
withdrawn his earlier comments and was not arguing for a 
specific prison term.  In the end, the circuit court crafted its 
own sentence of 25 years consisting of 15 years of initial 
confinement and ten years of extended supervision.   
¶6 
Nietzold filed a motion for postconviction relief 
seeking resentencing based on the State's initial violation of 
the plea agreement.  The circuit court denied the motion without 
a hearing.  Nietzold appealed and the court of appeals reversed 
and remanded for resentencing before a new judge.  State v. 
Nietzold, No. 2021AP21-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 9, 2021).  The court of appeals reasoned that the 
prosecutor materially breached the plea agreement by commenting 
on the merits of the PSI's recommendation and by recommending a 
specific sentence.  Id., ¶14.  It found unpersuasive the State's 
arguments that the prosecutor withdrew his earlier comments and 
clarified the State's position.  Id., ¶15.  We granted the 
State's petition for review. 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
6 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶7 
Nietzold makes two arguments on appeal.  First, he 
contends the State materially and substantially breached the 
plea agreement and that this breach was not cured.  Second, he 
asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
earlier to the prosecutor's breach.  Neither argument prevails. 
A.  Curing The Prosecutor's Breach 
¶8 
A plea agreement is a species of contract——albeit one 
with constitutional boundary markers.3  State v. Smith, 207 
Wis. 2d 258, 271, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997); United States v. Diaz-
Jimenez, 622 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2010).  A plea agreement is 
breached when a prosecutor fails to abide by the negotiated 
sentencing recommendation.  Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 272.  As in 
contract law, mere technical breaches are generally not enough 
to afford a remedy.  Id.; State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 
289, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  A defendant seeking to vacate a plea 
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the breach 
was material and substantial.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289.   
¶9 
An initial breach, however, even if material and 
substantial, does not end the matter.  Some breaches may be 
cured.  In Puckett v. United States, the United States Supreme 
                                                 
3 Those accused of crimes have "a constitutional right to 
the enforcement of a negotiated plea agreement."  State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶37, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733.  
Given the constitutional rights defendants give up when entering 
a plea, "the accused's due process rights demand fulfillment of 
the bargain."  Id.  
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
7 
 
Court rejected the notion that an initial error——for example, 
"requesting a higher sentence than agreed upon"——is uncurable.  
556 U.S. 129, 139-40 (2009).  While some breaches cannot be 
cured, at least "some breaches may be curable upon timely 
objection——for example, where the prosecution simply forgot its 
commitment and is willing to adhere to the agreement."  Id. at 
140.   
¶10 This court has similarly said that some breaches can 
be cured.  In Smith, we held that the State breached the plea 
agreement when it recommended a term of imprisonment despite its 
agreement to make no specific recommendation.  207 Wis. 2d at 
272-73.  After explaining that this was a substantial and 
material breach, we added that the breach "was not remedied, 
because Smith's counsel failed to object to the breach."  Id.  
In other words, had the prosecutor been alerted to the error and 
corrected it, the initial breach may have been cured. 
¶11 General 
principles 
of 
contract 
law 
confirm 
the 
proposition that some material and substantial breaches are 
curable.  In an ordinary contract, we have said that "to cure a 
material breach means to engage in subsequent conduct that 
substantially performs or performs without a material failure."  
Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. DOT, 2010 WI 15, ¶45, 323 Wis. 2d 294, 
779 N.W.2d 423 (quoting another source).  If the breach is 
cured, it becomes nonmaterial.  Id., ¶44 (quoting another 
source).  In the context of pleas, courts have generally held 
that a material breach of a plea agreement may be cured if the 
prosecutor unequivocally retracts the error.  United States v. 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
8 
 
Ligon, 937 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2019); Diaz-Jimenez, 622 
F.3d at 696; see, e.g., United States v. Amico, 416 F.3d 163, 
165 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that government cured its plea 
breach by rapidly retracting it).   
¶12 In this case, the parties agree that only material and 
substantial plea breaches require a remedy, and that some 
breaches can be cured.  The parties further agree that the 
prosecutor materially and substantially breached the plea 
agreement by suggesting the PSI's recommendation was reasonable 
and recommending a specific prison term.  The dispositive 
question is whether the breach was cured. 
¶13 The terms of a plea agreement and the facts of the 
underlying conduct by the State in performance on that agreement 
are questions of fact.  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶5, 249 
Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733.  We accept a circuit court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
Whether a plea agreement has been breached, however, is a 
question of law we review independently.  Id.  In Williams, we 
held that not only is the existence of breach a question of law, 
so is whether a breach is material and substantial.  Id.  This 
is because an appellate court must independently determine 
whether a legal standard is met by the facts in a case.  Id.  
The same logic applies here.  While the facts giving rise to an 
attempted cure may be found by the circuit court, whether those 
facts cure the breach——meaning there is no longer a material 
breach entitling an accused to a remedy——must likewise be a 
question of law.  In other words, because materiality is a 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
9 
 
question of law, so too is cure.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Purser, 747 F.3d 284, 294 (5th Cir. 2014) (reviewing cure of a 
plea breach de novo). 
¶14 On this record, we conclude the prosecutor cured the 
breach.  To recap, the prosecutor materially and substantially 
breached the agreement by advocating for a specific term of 
imprisonment.   Moments after those offending comments, defense 
counsel informed the court of the prosecutor's error.  The 
prosecutor immediately acknowledged the blunder and modified the 
State's recommendation to an undefined prison term——exactly what 
Nietzold agreed to.  But that's not all.  The prosecutor doubled 
down when the circuit court made comments that initially 
suggested 
it 
may 
have 
forgotten 
or 
misunderstood 
the 
prosecutor's earlier correction.  When the court said that the 
"state" recommended 12 years, the prosecutor interjected and 
reminded the court that he was not arguing for a specific 
sentence length.  The court confirmed it understood, and 
explained that by "state" the court was referring to DOC's 
recommendation in the PSI.  We accept this as a finding of the 
circuit court that the prosecutor did withdraw his earlier, 
erroneous comments, and was recommending only an undefined 
prison term.  And we conclude the prosecutor's immediate and 
unequivocal retraction of his error——and subsequent actions 
affirming 
that 
retraction——constitute 
a 
sufficient 
cure, 
transforming 
the 
material 
and 
substantial 
breach 
into 
a 
nonmaterial breach.  After an initial error, Nietzold received 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
10 
 
what he bargained for:  the State recommended a prison term but 
not a specific length of time. 
¶15 Nietzold counters that we should look to the circuit 
court's comments after the prosecutor's cure as evidence that 
the court remained affected by the breach.  However, our inquiry 
here focuses on the prosecutor's conduct, not the court's.  See 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
¶16 Nietzold further argues that this kind of cure was 
"too little, too late" and cites Williams as support.  249 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶52.  We disagree.  The prosecutor in Williams 
"implied that had the State known more about the defendant, it 
would not have entered into the plea agreement."  Id., ¶47.  
That left the impression that she was "arguing against the 
negotiated terms of the plea agreement."  Id., ¶48.  The 
attempted retraction was therefore rather equivocal, coming with 
a "covert message to the circuit court that a more severe 
sentence was warranted than that which had been recommended."  
Id., ¶51.  Unlike in Williams, the prosecutor in this case never 
"raised doubts regarding the wisdom of the terms of the plea 
agreement."  Id., ¶50.  Rather, he cured the breach by 
unequivocally retracting it.    
¶17 In the end, Nietzold fails to counter the precedent 
establishing 
that 
even 
errors 
in 
an 
initial 
sentencing 
recommendation can be remedied.  See supra ¶¶8-10.  An error 
here occurred, but so did the necessary cure.  Nietzold 
sufficiently received the benefit of his plea bargain. 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
11 
 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶18 In the alternative, Nietzold argues his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to contemporaneously object when the 
prosecutor breached the agreement.  A defendant claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel must show "both that (1) 
counsel's representation was deficient, and (2) the deficiency 
was prejudicial."  State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶29, 401 
Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432.  We conclude Nietzold's counsel did 
not perform deficiently.  See id. ("Both prongs of the inquiry 
need not be addressed if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one."). 
¶19 Proving deficiency requires showing that "counsel's 
representation 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness considering all the circumstances."  Id., ¶30.  
We are "highly deferential to counsel's strategic decisions"; 
"counsel's performance need not be perfect, or even very good, 
to be constitutionally adequate."  Id.   
¶20 Here, defense counsel objected after the prosecutor 
finished his sentencing remarks, which concluded with the 
erroneous recommendation for a specific sentence.  Perhaps 
defense counsel would have done better to object earlier when 
the prosecutor first began considering an appropriate sentence 
length.  But this kind of imperfection does not rise to the 
level of constitutionally deficient performance in this case.  
As we have explained, counsel did raise the issue in a 
sufficiently timely way, enabling the prosecutor to cure his 
mistake.  In doing so, counsel ensured Nietzold received the 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
12 
 
benefit of his plea agreement.  This comes nowhere close to a 
Sixth Amendment violation.  Because his counsel did not perform 
below 
a 
constitutionally 
acceptable 
standard, 
Nietzold's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶21 The court of appeals determined that Nietzold was 
entitled to a new sentencing hearing.  We reverse.  Nietzold 
asks us to hold that the prosecutor failed to cure his breach by 
initially recommending a specific prison term in violation of 
the plea agreement.  The bell, Nietzold argues, cannot be 
unrung.  "But a mistake is not a bell, and usually can be 
corrected." 
 
Diaz-Jimenez, 
622 
F.3d at 
696. 
 
Here, 
the 
prosecutor corrected his mistake by unequivocally retracting it 
and abiding by the terms of the plea agreement.  Nietzold's 
alternative argument that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance for failing to timely object likewise fails.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No. 
2021AP21-CR   
 
 
 
1