Title: STATE v SAWYER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13731 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, W A D E T U R N E R SAWYER, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert Yunck argued, Cut Bank, Montana For Respondent : Hooks and Sherlock, Townsend, Montana J e f f r e y M. Sherlock argued, Townsend, Montana F i l e d : Submitted: September 30, 1977 Decided: 9C-T l c 1 ' 5 - M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court: The s t a t e appeals from an order of the d i s t r i c t court, Broadwater County, suppressing evidence obtained in an inven- tory search of defendant's automobile. Defendant was apprehended August 14, 1976, a f t e r Under- sheriff Michael Walrod observed him making an i l l e g a l turn on the s t r e e t s of Townsend, Montana. Officer Walrod recognized defendant and proceeded with Ted Ingersoll, a forest service director who was accompanying the officer, t o look for de- fendant. They found defendant's car a t a bar parking l o t and noticed the car had a ten-day registration sticker which had expired. The officer found defendant i n the bar and informed him he was charged with reckless driving and improper vehicle registration, and that he would be ticketed a t the s h e r i f f ' s office. Officer Walrod rode t o the s h e r i f f ' s office with de- fendant, in defendant's car. A t the sheriff' s off ice Officer Walrod informed defendant bond would be $125; $100 for reckless driving and $25 for i m - proper vehicle registration. Defendant was unable t o meet the bond, so he was booked and placed i n the county j a i l . A t that time officers impounded defendant's automobile and made a complete inventory of its contents, discovering p i l l s they believed t o be amphetamines under the driver's seat. A s a result, defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs. The d i s t r i c t court suppressed the evidence obtained in the inventory, based on these conclusions of law: "1. That the action of the arresting officer, in setting bond without reference t o any schedule established by a judicial officer, was a violation of Section 95-1103, R.C.M. 1947, and resulted i n the i l l e g a l detention of the defendant. "2. That the inventory search of defendantt s vehicle was unreasonable in l i g h t of the Fourth Amendment t o the U.S. Constitution. 11 F i r s t , we consider the stae's contention the d i s t r i c t court erred i n its finding that b a i l was improperly s e t by a law enforcement officer. Although it is a constitutional and statutory requirement that b a i l be s e t by a judicial officer, section 95-1103, R.C.M. 1947, allows a peace officer t o accept b a i l i n limited circumstances: "Setting and accepting b a i l i n minor offenses. A justice of the peace or police judge may in h i s discretion establish and post a schedule of cash b a i l for offenses not amounting t o a felony. A peace officer may accept b a i l i n behalf of the justice of the peace or police judge in accordance with the schedule. * * *" The s t a t e argues there is no evidence in the record t o support the conclusion of the d i s t r i c t court that bond was not accepted "in accordance with the schedule" as required by section 95-1103. While the officer admitted he did not physically refer t o the bond schedule s e t by the justice of the peace, he explained: "A. O n the Reckless Driving charge 1 used what I assumed was correct, the correct bond, what the Highway Patrol had been using and what the Judge had been using i n the past . I t W e decline t o hold that a peace officer may not rely on h i s everyday experience and memory i n accepting bond i n behalf of a magistrate. There was no evidence the bond accepted by the officer i n the instant case was any different from that l i s t e d i n the bond schedule. The d i s t r i c t court finding of a violation of section 95-1103 is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, is the question of the constitutionality of the inventory search of defendant' s vehicle. The s t a t e freely admits the officers had no probable cause or even any suspicion that contraband might be found in the vehicle. N o search warrant was ever obtained. The inventory was conducted, according t o the officers who t e s t i f i e d , solely as a matter of standard police procedure for the protection of any valuable items which the owner may have l e f t i n the automobile. The constitutionality of such a search is a question of f i r s t im- pression in Montana. It is axiomatic that a search must comport with s t a t e and federal constitutional law. The reasonableness of an inventory search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti- tution was discussed in the recent United States Supreme Court decision South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L ed 2d 1000 (1976). The Court i n Opperman upheld, by a 5-4 majority, an inventory search of an abandoned automobile impounded for multiple overtime parking violations. The d i s t r i c t court in the instant case factually distinguished Opperman and found a violation of the Fourth Amendment. W e need not consider the Fourth Amendment issue because we view the Montana Constitution t o afford an individual greater protec- tion i n t h i s instance than i s found under the Fourth Amendment i n Opperman. The 1972 Montana Constitution, A r t . 11, Sections 10 and 11, provide: "Section 10. Right of privacy. The right of individual privacy is essential t o the well-being of a free society and s h a l l not be infringed without the showing of a compelling s t a t e interest. "Section 11. Searches and seizures. The people s h a l l be secure i n their persons, papers, homes and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. N o warrant t o search any place, or seize any person or thing s h a l l issue without describing the place t o be searched or the person or thing t o be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or affirma- tion reduced t o writing." The importance of the right of individual privacy t o the framers of the Montana Constitution i s obvious from these provisions. This Court has previously noted the significance of the explicit guarantee of the right of individual privacy contained i n Section 10, a s no comparable provision exists i n the United States Constitution. State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. It is also clear that an inventory search such a s the one considered here is a significant invasion of individual privacy. One of the officers t e s t i f i e d that the standard in- ventory search is no different in scope than a warranted search of an autoraobfle, As'was noted i n Mozzetti v. Superior Court, "It seems undeniable that a routine police inventory of the contents of an automobile in- volves a substantial invasion into the privacy of the vehicle owner. Regardless of professed benevolent purposes and euphemistic explication, an inventory search involves a thorough explora- tion by the police into the private property of an individual. I n that process suitcases, brief- cases, sealed packages, purses--anything l e f t open o r closed within the vehicle--is subjected without limitation to the prying eyes of authorities. * * *'I While we have recognized the difference, for constitutional purpoees, between an automobile and a home o r office, State v. Spielmann, 163 Mont. 199, 203, 516 P.2d 617 (19731, t h i s Court has also approved t h i s statement i n State v. Amor, 164 Mont. 182, 185, 520 P.2d 773 (1974), quoting Coolidge v. N e w Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461, 91 Sect. 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564, 580 (1971): ""Phe word "automobile" is not a talisman i n whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears, 111 A s a substantial infringement upon individual privacy, the inventory search must meet the "reasonableness" and "compelling s t a t e interest1'standards of the Montana Constitution. There are two basic justifications for an inventory search that could possibly have any application t o the instant case: (1) protection of the contents of the vehicle for the benefit of the owner; and (2) protection of the police from claims for l o s t property for which the police are responsible. While the f i r s t justification has merit in the case of an abandoned vehicle, it is particularly not helpful where, as here, the owner of the vehicle is present and can be questioned about valuable items and possible arrangements for t h e i r disposition. It would be anomalous t o justify a search of an automobile t o be for the owner's benefit, when the owner is available but does not consent t o the search. Surely the pro- perty owner is an adequate judge of the treatment of the pro- perty that would most benefit him. The inventory, then, must be based upon the protection of the officers from claims for l o s t property. While t h i s is a reasonable concern, it bears l i t t l e weight i n Montana. A s the custodian of an impounded vehicle, a police o r s h e r i f f ' s de- partment is a "gratuitous depositary" within the meaning of section 20-211, R.C.M. 1947. A s such, the depositary owes a duty of "slight Wre'' for the preservation of the property, and is l i a b l e t o the owner only for losses occasioned by "gross I I negligence. Boyd v. Harrison State Bank, 102 Mont. 94, 56 P.2d 724 (1936). Certainly t h i s duty would be satisfied by simply securing and taking an inventory of any valuable items i n plain view from outside the vehicle, rolling up the windows, locking the doors, and returning the keys t o the owner. Mozzetti v. Superior Court, supra. Viewed i n t h i s l i g h t , these justifications simply do not bear up under the countervailing force of the right of the individual t o privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches i n Montana. The Supreme Court of South Dakota, on the remand of State v. Opperman, (So.Dak.1976), 247 N.W.2d 673,675, asserted as a matter of s t a t e constitutional law: "* *' * noninvestigative police inventory searches of automobiles without a warrant must be restricted t o safeguarding those a r t i c l e s which are within the plain view of the officer's vision. * * *" This standard reasonably balances the needs of the police a s custodians of a lawfully impounded vehicle with the rights of privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures held by individuals i n Montana. W e adopt it a s applicable t o Montana constitutional law. I n the instant case the contra- band was found under a seat and admittedly was never in plain view. It was seized i n violation of the 1972 Montana Constitu- tion and was properly suppressed. To avoid misunderstanding, we wish t o note the limitations of our present hozding. W e i n no way l i m i t the right of an officer t o seize items i n plain view where the officer' s presence is justifiable. State v. Emerson, 169 Mont. 285, 546 P.2d 509, 33 St.Rep. 261 (1976); State v. Gallagher, 162 Mont. 155, 509 P.2d 852 (1973). This is not a case where there was any probable cause t o search o r where the search was i n any manner related t o the arrest. See: State v. Turner, 164 Mont. 371, 523 P.2d 1386 (1974); State v. Armstrong, 149 Mont. 470, 428 P.2d 611 (1967); State v. Houchin, 149 Mont. 503, 428 P.2d 971 (1967). W e hold only that where the sole justification for an inventory search is the fact i t is incident t o the lawful custody of an impounded vehicle and pursuant t o standard police procedure, such search must be limited i n scope t o a r t i c l e s i n plain view from outside the vehicle. The order of the d i s t r i c t court suppressing evidence is af f inned.