Title: Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP858   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Vicki L. Blasing, 
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Zurich American Insurance Company and Menard, 
Inc., 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
Jefferson County Human Services Department, 
          Defendant, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Intervenor-Respondent-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 346 Wis. 2d 30, 827 N.W.2d 909 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 27   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, ZIEGLER, GABLEMAN, JJJ., dissent. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the intervenor-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by David J. Pliner, Chester A. Isaacson, and Corneille Law 
Group, LLC, Madison, and oral argument by David J. Pliner. 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there were briefs by Jeffrey 
S. Fertl, Melissa J. Lauritch, and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey S. Fertl.  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Jonathan T. Smies, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance. 
  
 
 
 
     2014 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP858 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV71) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Vicki L. Blasing, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Zurich American Insurance Company and Menard, 
Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Jefferson County Human Services Department, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Intervenor-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of 
the circuit court for Jefferson County, William F. Hue, Judge, 
and remanding the cause for further proceedings.1  The circuit 
court granted American Family Insurance Company's motion for 
summary judgment, ruling that American Family had no duty to 
defend or indemnify under its automobile liability insurance 
policy.  The court of appeals reversed the order of the circuit 
court, holding against American Family.  We affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Vicki Blasing, the plaintiff, was injured when lumber 
that was being loaded into her pickup truck by an employee of 
Menard, Inc. fell on her foot.  Vicki Blasing is the named 
insured in the American Family policy.   
¶3 
The plaintiff, a named insured, brought a tort action 
for personal injury damages against Menard and Zurich American 
Insurance Company.  The plaintiff did not sue the Menard 
employee.  Menard's potential liability is vicarious liability 
for the torts of its employee.  Menard claims its employee is an 
insured under the American Family policy, as a permissive user 
of the plaintiff's pickup truck.  Menard is insured under a 
                                                 
1 Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 27, 346 
Wis. 2d 30, 827 N.W.2d 909. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
3 
 
separate general liability insurance policy issued by Zurich 
Insurance to Menard.    
¶4 
Let us begin by stating what is and what is not at 
issue before the court.   
¶5 
The ultimate question before the court is whether 
American Family has a duty to defend and indemnify Menard when 
the injury was to the named insured under the American Family 
policy and the alleged tortfeasor (a Menard employee) was a 
permissive user of the vehicle insured under the American Family 
policy.      
¶6 
What is not before the court are the merits of the 
personal injury action; the plaintiff's personal injury action 
has been stayed pending resolution of this insurance policy 
dispute.   
¶7 
What is not before the court are the obligations of 
Zurich Insurance under its general liability insurance policy 
insuring Menard and the respective duties of American Family and 
Zurich Insurance if the court holds that American Family has a 
duty to defend and indemnify in the present case.  The Zurich 
Insurance policy is not in the record, and the parties are not 
debating Zurich Insurance's obligations in isolation or in 
relationship to the obligations of American Family.  Any such 
dispute between American Family and Zurich Insurance is for 
another day.  The parties apparently agree that the Zurich 
Insurance policy will fully cover Menard's liability, if any, 
for damages, if any, incurred by the plaintiff.   
No. 
2012AP858   
 
4 
 
¶8 
The issue presented in the present case, simply 
stated, is whether American Family is obliged under the policy 
it sold to the named insured-plaintiff in the present case to 
defend and indemnify an alleged tortfeasor when the tortfeasor 
is a permissive user of the insured vehicle and the plaintiff-
injured victim is the named insured.2     
¶9 
In order to answer this question, the court must 
address three separate inquiries. 
¶10 First: Do the alleged tortfeasor's actions constitute 
a "use" of the pickup truck under the American Family liability 
policy?  
¶11 Second: Does American Family's automobile liability 
insurance policy require American Family to defend and indemnify 
a permissive user tortfeasor when the injured victim is the 
named insured under the policy?  The key and sole argument made 
by American Family and by the non-party Wisconsin Insurance 
Alliance is that interpreting American Family's policy to 
provide a permissive user tortfeasor defense and indemnity for 
injury to the named insured creates an absurd result. 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals similarly stated the issue as 
follows:  "The question here is whether American Family must 
defend Menards and provide coverage if it is determined that the 
Menards employee negligently injured Blasing."  Blasing v. 
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 27, ¶1, 346 Wis. 2d 30, 827 
N.W.2d 909. 
The court of appeals concluded that American Family has a 
duty to defend and indemnify Menard in the present case under 
its policy.  Blasing, 346 Wis. 2d 30, ¶31. 
The dissent addresses issues not argued or briefed. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
5 
 
¶12 Third: The third question as phrased by American 
Family is as follows:  "Does the concept of a permissive user 
under the Omnibus Statute, [Wis. Stat.] § 632.32(3)(a) [2011-
12],3 require an injured person's own liability insurer to defend 
and indemnify the tortfeasor who injured the insured, [when] the 
tortfeasor has its own liability insurance?" (Emphasis and 
footnote added.)  This statement of the issue speaks in terms of 
the concept of the omnibus statute and other insurance coverage 
available to the permissive user tortfeasor.  
¶13 Zurich 
Insurance 
phrases 
the 
question 
somewhat 
differently, referring directly to the omnibus statute and 
omitting any reference to the permissive user having its own 
liability insurance:  "Does the omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3)(a), require that an automobile insurer defend and 
indemnify a negligent tortfeasor who injures the named insured, 
                                                 
3 The omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), provides as 
follows: 
Required provisions.  Except as provided in sub. (5), 
every policy subject to this section issued to an 
owner shall provide that: 
(a) Coverage provided to the named insured applies in 
the same manner and under the same provisions to any 
person using any motor vehicle described in the policy 
when the use is for purposes and in the manner 
described in the policy. 
(b) Coverage extends to any person legally responsible 
for the use of the motor vehicle. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-2012 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
6 
 
where the tortfeasor was a permissive user of the insured 
vehicle?"       
¶14 The court of appeals answered the first two questions 
in the affirmative and answered the third question by stating, 
"[P]ermissive user coverage is required in this case by the 
omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.32."4   
¶15 American Family asks us to reverse the court of 
appeals and hold that the American Family policy does not cover 
the liability of a permissive user tortfeasor who injures a 
named insured because such a result is absurd; "insurance 
policies should be given a reasonable interpretation and not one 
which leads to an absurd result."5   
¶16 We are not convinced by American Family's argument 
that the result that the court of appeals reached and that we 
reach is absurd.  Rather, the American Family policy explicitly 
provides coverage in the present case: The policy promises to 
cover any insured for liability for damages to any person.  It 
does not exclude recovery by an injured victim who happens to be 
                                                 
4 Blasing, 346 Wis. 2d 30, ¶3. 
5 Olguin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 160, 165, 237 
N.W.2d 694 (1976).  An interpretation is absurd when the 
application of a policy to a specific fact pattern would produce 
an unreasonable result.  See Bethke v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2013 WI 16, ¶¶55-56, 345 Wis. 2d 533, 825 N.W.2d 482 (holding 
that an unambiguous policy could still be held to require 
coverage if doing otherwise would lead to an unreasonable 
result); Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, ¶91, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 
833 N.W.2d 685 (refusing on absurdity grounds to interpret a 
policy in such a way that defies "common sense").  For a general 
discussion of the case law on absurdity, see 1 Arnold P. 
Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law § 1.34 (6th ed. 2010). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
7 
 
the named insured or who happens to be another insured under the 
policy. 
¶17 Our case law demonstrates that our holding today is 
not novel and has not been viewed as absurd or unreasonable in 
past cases.  Several Wisconsin cases have held that the named 
insured under an automobile liability insurance policy is not 
precluded from recovering on the policy when an additional 
insured, while using the vehicle within the terms of the policy, 
inflicts injury upon the named insured.6  Indeed, Wisconsin case 
law has followed what appears to be the majority rule 
"recognizing 
that 
the 
named 
insured 
under 
an 
automobile 
liability insurance policy may recover from the insurer when 
injured by another insured under the policy."7  "In the greater 
                                                 
6 "Being an additional insured does not bar one from 
recovery from the insurer for the negligence of the insured."  
Blashaski v. Classified Risk Ins. Corp., 48 Wis. 2d 169, 176, 
179 N.W.2d 924 (1970).  See also Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 477 N.Y.S.2d 657 (App. Div. 
1984); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Am., 140 
N.Y.S.2d 670 (App. Div. 1955) (listing additional cases from 
other jurisdictions holding the named insured's policy covers 
injury to the named insured). 
7 L.C. Di Stasi, Jr., Automobile Liability Insurance Policy 
as Covering, in the Absence of Specific Exclusion, Personal 
Injury or Death of, or Loss Sustained by, Named or Additional 
Insured, 15 A.L.R. 3d 711, §§ 2, 3[a] (1967) (citing Archer v. 
Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 219 Wis. 100, 261 N.W. 9 (1935), reh'g 
denied, 219 Wis. 103, 262 N.W. 257 (1935)). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
8 
 
number of cases, the courts . . . have sustained the right of 
the named insured . . . to recover under an automobile liability 
policy for an injury to . . . such insured."  7A Steven Plitt et 
al., Couch on Insurance 3d § 110:14 (2013).   
¶18 Because we dispose of the instant case based on the 
text of the American Family policy, we need not and do not 
address the third question, namely whether exclusion of coverage 
of injury to the named insured contravenes the omnibus statute. 
An answer to this question would require us to determine the 
validity of a hypothetical provision in a hypothetical policy.  
We do not know the exact policy exclusion language or the facts.   
¶19 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I 
¶20 This case requires us to interpret and apply an 
insurance policy and a statute to undisputed facts.  The 
interpretation of a statute and insurance policy and their 
application to undisputed facts ordinarily present questions of 
law that this court decides independently of the circuit court 
                                                                                                                                                             
Two jurisdictions have apparently ruled that named insureds 
are not covered for injuries resulting from the actions of 
permissive user tortfeasors.  See MacBey v. Hartford Accident & 
Indem. 
Co., 
197 
N.E. 516 
(Mass. 
1935); 
Cain 
v. 
Am. 
Policyholders' Ins. Co., 183 A. 403 (Conn. 1936).  Compare 
MacBey (holding that a named insured was not covered for 
injuries sustained while the car was operated by a permissive 
user), with Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., 279 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Mass. 1972) (holding that the 
omnibus clause's use of the words "'by any person' includes the 
insured"). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
9 
 
or court of appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.  
Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, ¶21, 350 
Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226; Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, 
¶35, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 833 N.W.2d 685.8   
¶21 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using 
the same methodology as the circuit court.  Schinner, 349 
Wis. 2d 529, ¶36.  Summary judgment is proper when the record 
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Schinner, 349 Wis. 2d 529, ¶36. 
II 
¶22 The 
facts 
surrounding 
the 
alleged 
incident 
and 
injuries are undisputed for purposes of this review.  On 
September 16, 2008, the named insured-plaintiff, Vicki Blasing, 
visited a store owned and operated by Menard, Inc. in the 
Village of Johnson Creek, Jefferson County, Wisconsin, to pick 
up lumber she had purchased at Menard.  She drove her 1990 
Chevrolet pickup truck to the store and parked it in a 
lumberyard area.     
¶23 An employee of Menard used a forklift to place the 
purchased lumber into the plaintiff's pickup truck, which was 
insured by the American Family policy.  The plaintiff stood near 
the rear passenger side of her truck.  While the employee was 
                                                 
8 Courts "construe ambiguities in coverage in favor of the 
insureds and narrowly construe exclusions against insurers."  
Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶16, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 
N.W.2d 857. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
10 
 
attempting to place the lumber into the pickup truck, some of 
the lumber fell and hit the plaintiff's foot.     
¶24 The plaintiff initiated a personal injury action 
against Menard and Zurich Insurance, Menard's insurer, on 
January 24, 2011, for injuries arising out of the falling lumber 
incident, alleging both common-law negligence and a violation of 
the Wisconsin Safe Place Statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11.  It 
appears to be undisputed that the Zurich Insurance policy will 
fully indemnify Menard and fully compensate the plaintiff for 
her injuries if the plaintiff proves her case against Menard on 
its merits.   
¶25 Menard tendered its defense to American Family on May 
31, 2011, arguing that it was an insured under the terms of the 
American Family policy.  American Family agreed to defend Menard 
under a reservation of rights.   
¶26 American 
Family 
subsequently 
intervened 
in 
the 
plaintiff's tort action against Menard and Zurich Insurance.  It 
moved for summary judgment, requesting a ruling that American 
Family is not required to defend or indemnify Menard for the 
activities of the Menard employee under either the American 
Family policy or the omnibus statute.   
¶27 Menard and Zurich Insurance moved for declaratory 
judgment, seeking a declaration that American Family has a duty 
to indemnify and defend Menard under the permissive user 
provisions of the American Family policy and under the omnibus 
statute.   
No. 
2012AP858   
 
11 
 
¶28 The circuit court granted American Family's summary 
judgment motion and denied Menard's motion for a declaratory 
judgment, reasoning that the parties to the policy did not 
contemplate that there would be coverage for a permissive user 
tortfeasor 
injuring 
the 
named 
insured 
premium-paying 
policyholder.   
¶29 The court of appeals reversed the order of the circuit 
court, holding that American Family had a duty to defend and 
indemnify Menard under the American Family automobile liability 
policy insuring the plaintiff and under the omnibus statute. 
III 
¶30 We first determine whether the tortfeasor's actions 
constituted a "use" of the pickup truck under the American 
Family automobile liability insurance policy. 
¶31 The American Family policy provides coverage to 
permissive users.  The American Family policy includes the 
following relevant coverage language: 
We will pay compensatory damages an insured person is 
legally liable for because of bodily injury and 
property damage due to the use of a car or utility 
trailer. 
We will defend any suit or settle any claim for 
damages payable under this policy as we think proper 
(emphasis added). 
¶32 The American Family policy defines "bodily injury" to 
mean bodily injury to, sickness, disease, or death of any 
person.  In other words, the policy does not exclude bodily 
injury to a named insured or any other insured. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
12 
 
¶33 The policy goes on to define "insured person" or 
"insured 
persons" 
to 
mean 
the 
named 
insured 
(i.e., 
the 
policyholder), the named insured's relatives, or persons using 
the insured car with the named insured's permission, as follows: 
Insured person or insured persons means: 
1.  You or a relative. 
2.  Any person using your insured car. 
3.  Any other person or organization.  This applies 
only to legal liability for acts or omissions of: 
a.  Any person covered under this Part while 
using your insured car. . . . 
¶34 The policy enumerates some users who are not insureds 
under the policy, such as persons using the vehicle without the 
permission of the policyholder or persons exceeding the scope of 
the permission.  None of these persons is involved in the 
present case.  The alleged user in the present case is the 
Menard employee who dropped the lumber.  
¶35 The 
policy 
defines 
"use" 
to 
mean 
"ownership, 
maintenance, or use" and provides that American Family will 
indemnify and defend an insured person for "bodily injury and 
property damage due to the use of a car or utility trailer."      
¶36 The courts have had several opportunities to interpret 
the phrase "use of a vehicle" under both insurance policies and 
the omnibus statute.   
¶37 Courts have interpreted "use" broadly.  Use is not 
limited to the driving of the vehicle.  "One does not have to be 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
13 
 
driving or operating an automobile to be using it."9  Our courts 
have interpreted "use" of a vehicle to include a wide range of 
non-driving activities, including:  unloading a rifle from the 
vehicle, 
Allstate 
Ins. 
Co. 
v. 
Truck 
Ins. 
Exchange, 
63 
Wis. 2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205 (1974);10 loading and unloading a 
vehicle, Amery Motor Co. v. Corey, 46 Wis. 2d 291, 297, 174 
N.W.2d 540 (1970); gesturing to a child to assist her in 
crossing a road, Garcia v. Regent Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 287, 481 
N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992); shooting game from the insured 
vehicle, Kemp v. Feltz, 174 Wis. 2d 406, 497 N.W.2d 751 (Ct. 
App. 1993); and loading a scrapped dump truck tailgate into a 
pickup truck under uninsured motorist coverage, Austin-White ex 
rel. Skow v. Young, 2005 WI App 52, 279 Wis. 2d 420, 694 
N.W.2d 436.  
¶38 A lead case defining "use" in an insurance policy is 
Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514 (1976).  In 
Lawver, the victim was injured when a rope and pulley system 
attached to a truck owned by the insured gave way.  The dispute 
centered on whether the insured's negligence in using the rope 
                                                 
9 Blashaski, 48 Wis. 2d at 174 (citing Kanios v. Frederick, 
10 Wis. 2d 358, 103 N.W.2d 114 (1960)) (giving hand signals to 
traffic from a stopped vehicle); Wiedenhaupt v. Vander Loop, 5 
Wis. 2d 311, 92 N.W.2d 815 (l958) (loading a parked truck)). 
10 "Persons actively engaged in loading and unloading the 
automobile in the commonly accepted meaning of those words are 
considered to be using or operating the automobile . . . ." 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 63 Wis. 2d 148, 155, 
216 N.W.2d 205 (1974) (quoting Amery Motor Co. v. Corey, 46 
Wis. 2d 291, 297-99, 174 N.W.2d 540 (1970)). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
14 
 
and pulley system connected to the truck qualified as use of the 
truck under the policy.   
¶39 The Lawver court explained that the question presented 
was whether the vehicle's connection with the conduct that gave 
rise to the injuries (and the negligence connected therewith) 
was sufficient to bring the conduct within the risk for which 
the parties to the insurance policy reasonably contemplated 
there would be coverage.11  The Lawver court then stated that the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties to the insurance policy 
is usually determined by examining whether the alleged use is 
reasonably consistent with the inherent use of the vehicle.  The 
Lawver court declared:  "This question [of the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties] is usually resolved by determining 
whether the alleged 'use' is one which is reasonably consistent 
with the inherent nature of the vehicle."12   
                                                 
11 "To determine if an accident arises out of the use of an 
automobile, the criterion is whether the activity is reasonably 
contemplated by the parties and consistent with the inherent 
purpose of an automobile."  1 Anderson, supra note 5, § 2.50. 
See also 8 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on 
Insurance 3d § 111.31 (2005) ("'Use' of a vehicle includes more 
than driving or riding in an automobile; it extends to utilizing 
the vehicle as an instrumental means to an end in any manner 
intended or contemplated by the insured."). 
12 Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 416, 238 N.W.2d 514 
(1976). 
"When a policy does not include the terms loading and 
unloading, the issue is whether the act in question was a 
natural and reasonable incident or a consequence of the use of 
the vehicle."  1 Anderson, supra note 5, § 2.51. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
15 
 
¶40 In Lawver, the court concluded that the injuries arose 
out of use of the truck, reasoning that when the insured vehicle 
is a pickup truck in a farm setting, it is reasonable to expect 
that it will be put to a variety of uses beyond the ordinary 
transportation of persons and goods from place to place, and 
that within the range of reasonable uses is its use as a power 
source in performing necessary farm repairs.13  
¶41 Similarly, we conclude that loading an insured pickup  
truck with lumber is reasonably contemplated by the insured and 
insurer 
because 
it 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
ordinary 
transportation of persons and goods inherent in the purpose of 
the pickup truck.  Thus, we conclude that under the American 
Family policy, the Menard employee was a permissive user and as 
such 
was 
an 
insured 
under 
the 
American 
Family 
policy.  
Accordingly, we answer the first question in the affirmative. 
IV 
¶42 We now address the second issue:  Does American 
Family's policy require American Family to defend and indemnify 
a permissive user tortfeasor when the injured victim is a named 
insured under the policy?        
¶43 American Family relies solely on the argument that if 
the court requires American Family to defend and indemnify 
Menard, the result would be absurd, thus violating a cardinal 
                                                 
13 Lawver, 71 Wis. 2d at 416. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
16 
 
rule of interpretation:  A court's interpretation should avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.14   
¶44  The court of appeals concluded that the result is not 
unreasonable or absurd.  We agree with the court of appeals, but 
we acknowledge, as did the court of appeals, that holding 
against American Family in the present case might appear to some 
to be anomalous, and we address a perceived anomaly.   
¶45 One way of stating the anomaly is that American Family 
would be required to defend and possibly indemnify a tortfeasor 
who has injured the premium-paying named insured policyholder.  
The court of appeals recognizes that this result can be viewed 
as troubling because "an injured policyholder bringing suit 
against a tortfeasor would face an attorney supplied by her own 
insurance company, and . . . an eventual payout might come from 
her insurer."15   
¶46 Put in perspective, this result is neither troubling 
nor anomalous.  American Family drafted the policy, which the 
named insured accepted.  In the policy, American Family "has a 
                                                 
14 See Bethke, 345 Wis. 2d 533, ¶¶55-56 (holding that an 
unambiguous policy could still be held to require coverage if 
doing otherwise would lead to an unreasonable result); Schinner, 
349 Wis. 2d 529, ¶91 (refusing on absurdity grounds to interpret 
a policy in such a way that defies "common sense").  For a 
general discussion of the absurdity case law, see 1 Anderson, 
supra note 5, § 1.34. 
15 Blasing, 346 Wis. 2d 30, ¶30. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
17 
 
contractual duty to defend its insured . . . ."16  An insured 
under the American Family policy is the Menard employee.  Thus, 
the result we reach is in accord with the policy. 
¶47 American Family is not representing both the injured 
insured and the tortfeasor in the present case.  The injured 
named insured must hire her own attorney to represent her 
against any tortfeasor; thus, American Family would not be 
representing or assisting the injured named insured in her 
lawsuit against the tortfeasor regardless of whether the 
tortfeasor was or was not an insured under the American Family 
policy.   
¶48 Similarly, if the named insured were injured in a car 
collision with a third party who also had American Family 
liability automobile insurance, the named insured would face an 
attorney supplied by her own insurance company.17  In such a 
case, both the injured named insured and the tortfeasor are 
paying premiums that support the defense of the tortfeasor 
against the injured named insured.  This result may happen with 
some frequency and is not viewed as absurd.  
                                                 
16 Mowry v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 129 Wis. 2d 496, 
527-28, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986) (citing Gross v. Lloyds of London 
Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 84, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984); U.S. 
Guarantee Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Wis. 317, 321, 12 
N.W.2d 59 (1943)). 
17 The court of appeals concluded that, "as American Family 
admits, a policyholder generally understands that his or her own 
insurance company may provide a defense to parties with 
interests adverse to the interests of the policyholder."  
Blasing, 346 Wis. 2d 30, ¶24.      
No. 
2012AP858   
 
18 
 
¶49 A second way of stating the anomaly is that an 
automobile liability insurance policy ordinarily covers the 
liability of an insured for injury to third parties who are not 
insureds under the policy, rather than liability of an insured 
for an injury to an insured.18  In other words, ordinarily the 
liability provisions of an automobile liability insurance policy 
do not insure the insured against an injury to the insured. 
¶50 But in the instant case the named insured plaintiff is 
not making a claim against American Family for her injuries.  
The plaintiff is suing Menard and Zurich Insurance for her 
injuries as a third-party victim of Menard's tort, not as an 
insured under the American Family policy.  The plaintiff's claim 
against Menard depends on Menard's liability to her as the 
third-party victim of Menard's tort.  American Family is 
defending its insured, the Menard employee, against liability 
for injury to a person who for purposes of this lawsuit is a 
third party to the policy, not a named insured.         
¶51 A third way of stating the anomaly is that providing 
coverage under an automobile liability insurance policy for a 
permissive user tortfeasor who allegedly negligently injures a 
named 
insured 
seems 
to 
provide 
greater 
coverage 
to 
the 
permissive user than to the named insured herself.  In other 
words, providing coverage in the present case to the permissive 
                                                 
18 A policy could, of course, include first-party coverage 
such as medical-payments coverage or uninsured and underinsured 
automobile liability insurance, but none of these provisions is 
at issue here. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
19 
 
user seems to give the permissive user coverage when injuring 
the named insured but would not give the named insured coverage 
when the named insured injured herself.  The named insured 
cannot be liable to herself.19  If the plaintiff in the present 
case had injured herself while loading her pickup truck at 
Menard, 
the 
American 
Family 
policy 
would 
not 
have 
been 
triggered.  Thus it appears that the permissive user receives 
coverage for an injury to the named insured, when the named 
insured cannot receive coverage for an injury to herself. 
¶52 Yet a closer look reveals that the coverage for the 
permissive user is no broader than for the named insured.  No 
insured (including the named insured or a permissive user) is 
covered for negligently inflicted self-injury.  If the named 
insured had injured herself, her injury would not be covered, 
and if the permissive user had injured himself, his injury 
similarly would not be covered.  The American Family policy 
treats all insureds alike, including a named insured and the 
permissive user, covering all of them for liability for injury 
to another, regardless of whether the victim is also an insured.   
¶53 A fourth way of describing the anomaly is that the 
Menard employee and Menard have liability insurance coverage 
with Zurich Insurance covering any possible liability to the 
plaintiff.  American Family places great emphasis in its 
absurdity argument on the fact that Menard and the Menard 
employee are covered by Zurich Insurance.  It is not clear 
                                                 
19 See Blashaski, 48 Wis. 2d at 175-76. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
20 
 
whether American Family would be making the same argument that 
it has no duty to defend or indemnify if Zurich Insurance were 
not capable of fully indemnifying Menard and capable of paying 
the plaintiff's damages.  It is not for this court in the 
present case to assign relative responsibility to the insurance 
companies for indemnification or defense.  The only issue before 
us is whether American Family's policy provides coverage in the 
instant case.  The issue before us at this stage of the 
proceedings is independent of the existence of the Zurich 
Insurance coverage and multiple applicable liability policies. 
¶54 With regard to all four claimed anomalies, their roots 
are in the language of the American Family policy itself. The 
policy provides coverage to a permissive user tortfeasor for 
liability for personal injury to all persons.  The policy does 
not except or exclude an insured's liability for an injury to 
another insured.     
¶55 Our case law demonstrates that our holding today is 
not novel and has not been viewed as absurd or unreasonable in 
past cases.  Several Wisconsin cases have held that the named 
insured under an automobile liability insurance policy is not 
precluded from recovering on the policy when an additional 
insured inflicts injury upon the named insured while using the 
vehicle within the terms of the policy.20  Indeed, as we have 
                                                 
20 See also Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 477 N.Y.S. 2d 658 (1984); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 140 
N.Y.S. 2d 670 (listing additional cases from other jurisdictions 
holding the named insured's policy covers injury to the named 
insured). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
21 
 
stated previously, Wisconsin case law has followed what appears 
to be the majority rule "recognizing that the named insured 
under an automobile liability insurance policy may recover from 
the insurer when injured by another insured under the policy."21  
"In the greater number of cases, the courts . . . have sustained 
the right of the named insured . . . to recover under an 
automobile 
liability 
policy 
for 
an 
injury 
to . . . such 
insured."  7A Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance 3d 
§ 110:14 (2013).    
¶56 The Wisconsin rule is best illustrated by Archer v. 
General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100, 261 N.W. 9 
(1935), reh'g denied, 219 Wis. 103, 262 N.W. 257 (1935).  In 
Archer, the wife and husband were both named insureds on their 
automobile liability insurance policy.  While the husband was 
driving, the wife suffered injuries when their car collided with 
a train.  The wife sued her husband and the railway company for 
damages.  After she recovered a judgment against her husband, 
she began an action against their insurer to recover the amount 
of the judgment.  The insurer argued that because the wife was a 
named insured, she could not recover for her injuries under the 
policy.  The court was unconvinced by the insurer's reasoning, 
stating that by the terms of the policy, protection is as much 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Being an additional insured does not bar one from recovery 
from the insurer for the negligence of the insured."  Blashaski, 
48 Wis. 2d at 176. 
21 See note 7, supra.  
No. 
2012AP858   
 
22 
 
for the benefit of the wife as it is for any other person not 
named in the policy: 
Plaintiff makes no claim in this case on account of 
the policy having been issued to her.  Her claim is 
based upon the fact that she has a claim against her 
husband, who is insured against loss by reason of the 
ownership and use of the automobile. 
It is true . . . that a third party has no greater nor 
more extensive right under the terms of the policy 
than the original parties to the contract, but there 
is no limitation contained in the policy which 
excludes the right of recovery by the plaintiff under 
the facts of this case . . . . 
Archer, 219 Wis. at 103.  In Archer, that the victim was a named 
insured and that the tortfeasor was a named insured were 
irrelevant.  The victim brought the claim as a third-party 
rather than as a named insured.22 
 
¶57 In the case at bar, the injured victim, the plaintiff, 
like the injured victim in Archer, is also the named insured.  
The injured victim brings her claim in the instant case, as in 
Archer, as a third-party victim, not as the named insured.  
Adhering to the principles of Archer, we conclude that under the 
facts and circumstances of the instant case, the plaintiff's 
                                                 
22 "If the plaintiff and her husband had been held jointly 
liable and she had paid the judgment and was seeking to recover 
contribution from her husband, the arguments made on behalf of 
the defendant here would have greater validity."  Archer v. Gen. 
Cas. Co. of Wis., 219 Wis. 100, 103, 261 N.W. 9 (1935), reh'g 
denied, 219 Wis. 103, 262 N.W. 257 (1935)). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
23 
 
identity as the named insured does not affect the coverage 
American Family affords to the permissive user tortfeasor.23   
¶58 The rule in favor of coverage of the permissive user 
tortfeasor regardless of the identity of the victim as the named 
insured is further buttressed by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Truck 
Insurance Exchange, 63 Wis. 2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205 (1974).   
¶59 In the Allstate case, a passenger in an insured 
vehicle shot and killed the named insured driver when the 
passenger removed a hunting rifle from the insured vehicle.  
Clearly the insured driver, had he removed the rifle himself and 
injured himself, would not have been indemnified under his 
automobile 
liability 
insurance 
policy. 
 
Yet, 
the 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
driver's 
automobile 
liability 
policy 
afforded coverage to the permissive user passenger who allegedly 
negligently killed the named insured driver when the widow of 
the named insured brought a wrongful death action against the 
permissive user.   
¶60 When the injured party was an insured but not the 
named 
insured, 
courts 
have 
concluded 
that 
the 
liability 
insurance policy provided coverage to the permissive user 
tortfeasor who injured an insured.  
¶61 In 
Nelson 
v. 
Ohio 
Casualty 
Insurance 
Co., 
29 
Wis. 2d 315, 139 N.W.2d 33 (1966), both the injured person and 
                                                 
23 See also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 140 N.Y.S.2d 670 (citing 
Archer and holding that insurer of passenger-owner was liable 
for damages authorized driver became obligated to pay for 
injuries 
sustained 
by 
passenger-owner, 
despite 
fact 
that 
passenger-owner was named insured under policy). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
24 
 
the tortfeasor were employees of the city of Hartford.  The 
injured person was unloading a garbage truck, while the 
tortfeasor was driving it.  The court held that the city's 
insurance policy was required to defend and indemnify the 
permissive user tortfeasor.  Although the case was decided on 
different grounds, the victim's status as another insured did 
not trouble the Nelson court.       
¶62 In several cases, an automobile liability insurance 
company has been required to defend and indemnify a permissive 
user tortfeasor who injured an insured while loading or 
unloading a covered vehicle.  The fact pattern is similar in a 
number of cases.  A truck driver parks his truck to be loaded or 
unloaded; during the loading or unloading the truck driver is 
injured by a person who negligently loads or unloads the truck.  
The 
general 
principle 
of 
according 
automobile 
liability 
insurance coverage to permissive users who cause injury to an 
insured has been applied.  See, e.g., Ermis v. Fed. Windows Mfg. 
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 549, 97 N.W.2d 485 (1959); Lukaszewicz v. 
Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 335, 168 N.W.2d 581 (1969); 
Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 201 N.W.2d 52 (1972). 
¶63 Our case law demonstrates that although an injured 
person cannot recover under an automobile insurance liability 
policy for self-inflicted injury, an injured person who is an 
insured can recover under an automobile insurance liability 
policy if injured by a fellow insured.  Coverage is not based on 
the identity of the victim absent language in the policy stating 
otherwise. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
25 
 
V 
¶64 The parties frame the third question differently, as 
we explained in paragraphs 12 and 13 above.  Both parties can, 
however, be interpreted as asking:  Does the omnibus statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(3), 
require 
an 
automobile 
liability 
insurance policy to provide a permissive user tortfeasor 
coverage when the permissive user injures a named insured?   
¶65 The omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), provides 
as follows: 
Required provisions.  Except as provided in sub. (5), 
every policy subject to this section issued to an 
owner shall provide that: 
(a) Coverage provided to the named insured applies in 
the same manner and under the same provisions to any 
person using any motor vehicle described in the policy 
when the use is for purposes and in the manner 
described in the policy. 
(b) Coverage extends to any person legally responsible 
for the use of the vehicle. 
¶66 We need not and do not decide whether in light of the 
omnibus statute an automobile liability insurance policy may 
exclude coverage of liability for personal injuries suffered by 
the named insured.  We cannot rule on a proposed exclusion 
without knowing the precise language of the exclusion and the 
facts to which the exclusion is applied.  
¶67 Nevertheless, we note that the court has decided a 
number of cases in which the parties dispute the validity of 
exclusion clauses under the omnibus statute.  See, e.g., Schenke 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 301, 16 N.W.2d 817 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
26 
 
(1944); Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596, 34 N.W.2d 793 (1948);24 
Musselman v. Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 266 Wis. 387, 63 N.W.2d 691 
(1954); Havlik v. Bittner, 272 Wis. 71, 74 N.W.2d 798 (1956); 
Bauman v. Gilbertson, 7 Wis. 2d 467, 96 N.W.2d 854 (1959); 
Ottinger v. Falkenberg, 11 Wis. 2d 506, 105 N.W.2d 560 (1960).25  
¶68 In Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596, 601, 34 N.W.2d 793 
(1948), the named insured was a passenger in an automobile 
driven by another with his permission.  The named insured was 
hurt in an automobile collision and sought to recover against 
his own automobile liability insurance company for damages 
caused by the negligence of the permittee driver.  The insurance 
policy had an exclusion providing that the policy did not apply 
to bodily injury of a named insured.  The insurance company 
contended that because the provision was a general exclusion of 
coverage 
that 
applied 
equally 
to 
the 
named 
insured 
and 
additional insureds, it did not violate the omnibus statute.  
                                                 
24 The court in Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596, 34 N.W.2d 793 
(1948), 
distinguished 
Archer 
v. 
General 
Casualty 
Co. 
of 
Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100, 261 N.W. 9 (1935), which accorded 
coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, from 
Munsert 
v. 
Farmers 
Mutual 
Automobile 
Insurance 
Co., 
229 
Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938), which did not accord coverage for 
liability for injury to a named insured, on the ground that the 
policy in Munsert contained such an exclusion clause. 
25 For a collection of cases on provisions of an automobile 
liability insurance policy excluding from coverage injury or 
death 
of 
an 
insured, 
see 
Jonathan 
M. 
Purver, 
Validity, 
Construction, 
and 
Application 
of 
Provision 
of 
Automobile 
Liability Policy Excluding from Coverage Injury or Death of 
Insured, 46 A.L.R. 3d 1061 (1972).   
No. 
2012AP858   
 
27 
 
¶69 The Frye court upheld the exclusion, reasoning that 
the 
exclusion 
did 
not 
necessarily 
result 
in 
giving 
the 
additional insured (the permittee driver) less protection than 
was given the named insured.  The court emphasized the language 
in what is now subsection (3)(a) of the omnibus statute, 
reasoning that the clause did not necessarily result in giving 
to an insured less protection than the policy gave to the named 
insured.   
¶70 The Frye court explained:   
The additional assured is not protected in case 
plaintiff is the named assured.  Neither, however, is 
the named assured protected in that same situation.  
The mere fact that the situation does not come up in 
respect to the named assured because he is ordinarily 
driving his car and injured by his own negligence 
appears to us to be wholly immaterial.  Nobody can or 
does receive protection against liability for injuries 
to the named assured. The named assured is excluded 
from protection as well as the additional assured.26 
¶71 In dissent in Frye, Justice Fairchild explained that 
the named insured as a passenger had a cause of action against 
the driver for his injuries due to the driver's negligence.  
Nevertheless, the exclusion did not indemnify the permittee 
driver for the damages that the named insured may recover 
against the driver.  Yet the legislature had said that insurance 
policies shall extend equal coverage to anyone driving the car 
with the owner's permission.  Had the named insured been the 
driver, he would have been indemnified for all damages recovered 
against him, But the permittee driver was not indemnified for 
                                                 
26 Frye, 253 Wis. at 601. 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
28 
 
liability for all damages recovered against him.  According to 
Justice Fairchild, such an exclusion would "defeat the avowed 
purpose of the statute."27 
¶72 The parties seem to think that whether the permissive 
user has other insurance coverage affects the validity of a 
hypothetical policy exclusion under the omnibus statute.  We do 
not know whether the arguments about the omnibus statute change 
if the permissive driver is not fully insured under a policy 
other than the policy acquired by the named insured.     
¶73 Past cases inform us that we should not rule on the 
omnibus statute without the exact language of the exclusion 
proposed, the facts of the case, and briefs and oral argument——
none of which is present here with regard to this issue.  This 
court does not issue advisory opinions based on non-existent 
facts.28   
¶74 In sum, American Family asks us to reverse the court 
of appeals and hold that the American Family policy does not 
cover the liability of a permissive user tortfeasor who injures 
a named insured.  We are not persuaded to do so.  Such a holding 
contravenes the terms of the American Family insurance policy 
and settled case law of this state.  Our case law makes no 
distinction between injured parties who are named insureds and 
                                                 
27 Frye, 253 Wis. At 605 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). 
28 See State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 
22, 264 N.W. 627 (1936). 
No. 
2012AP858   
 
29 
 
other insureds.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.  
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶75 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   I write 
in dissent because, based on the pleadings and the materials 
submitted in the summary judgment and declaratory judgment 
motions, I conclude that the majority opinion erroneously 
decides that American Family Insurance Company, Vicki Blasing's 
automobile liability carrier, must assume the defense and 
indemnification of Menard, Inc. that was initially undertaken by 
Zurich American Insurance Company, Menard's liability carrier.1  
The majority opinion errs because it does not fully address the 
issue American Family presented:  "Does the concept of a 
permissive user under the Omnibus Statute, § 632.32(3)(a), 
Stats., require an injured person's own liability insurer to 
defend and indemnify the tortfeasor who injured the insured, and 
where the tortfeasor has its own liability insurance?"2  It also 
errs in failing to follow proper summary judgment procedure.   
¶76 I conclude that the majority opinion should not avoid 
American Family's stated issue, but rather, address it and 
conclude that when a direct action has been commenced against 
the insurer of a named defendant, as is the case here, the 
defendant's insurer must provide the defense unless that insurer 
first can prove there is no coverage for any of the claims made.  
Public policy requires that order of proceeding in the case at 
hand to meet American Family's stated issue and to prevent the 
conversion 
of 
Blasing's 
personal 
automobile 
policy 
into 
comprehensive liability insurance for Menard.   
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶8.   
2 American Family brief, p. 1. 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶77 By 
ignoring 
American 
Family's 
stated 
issue 
and 
Blasing's 
direct 
action 
claims 
against 
Zurich3 
and 
then 
permitting Zurich and Menard to shift the court's focus to 
whether Menard's employee was a "permissive user" of Blasing's 
vehicle under the policy American Family issued to Blasing,4 the 
majority opinion contravenes basic summary judgment principles 
and decides disputed issues of material fact relative to 
Blasing's direct action against Zurich.5     
¶78 I would reverse the court of appeals and remand the 
matter to the circuit court, with Zurich providing the defense 
to Blasing's claims because Zurich has provided nothing to 
disprove Blasing's allegation that Zurich insured Menard for her 
claims.  Because the majority opinion chooses not to address 
American Family's stated issue and then ignores Blasing's direct 
action against Zurich in this summary judgment proceeding and 
erroneously converts Blasing's automobile liability policy into 
comprehensive liability insurance for Menard, I respectfully 
dissent.6  
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶74. 
4 Id., ¶5. 
5 Complaint, ¶2; Zurich's and Menard's answer, ¶2.   
6 The majority opinion misperceives the dissent when it 
asserts that "[t]he dissent addresses issues not argued or 
briefed."  Majority op., ¶8 n.2.  The focus of American Family's 
question and of the dissent are whether an injured party's 
automobile policy should be converted into liability insurance 
for a tortfeasor who has insurance of its own for the accident.    
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶79 This lawsuit against Menard involves Blasing's safe-
place claims, which are based on Menard's conduct, and her 
common law negligence claim, which seeks to impose vicarious 
liability on Menard based on Menard's employee's conduct.  This 
dispute is not about whether an injured person will be 
compensated for the injuries sustained.  Rather, it concerns who 
will defend Menard and if Blasing is successful, who will pay.7   
¶80 Stated otherwise, we are concerned with 
whether 
American Family's automobile liability policy, for which Blasing 
paid, will be converted into comprehensive liability insurance 
for Menard, by causing American Family to defend and indemnify 
Menard.  It is also about whether Blasing's direct action 
against Zurich will be overlooked by focusing on the coverage 
provisions of Blasing's automobile policy, rather than on the 
summary judgment procedure applicable to motions under Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08.  Accordingly, it is critically important to 
recognize that the context in which this case arises includes a 
tortfeasor who has its own insurance and a direct action claim 
against the tortfeasor's insurer.  It is this context that 
drives my dissent from the majority opinion.  
¶81 Blasing's injuries arose on September 16, 2008, when 
she purchased boards from Menard and proceeded to a loading area 
                                                 
7 It is also about Erickson v. Menard, Inc., La Crosse 
County Case No. 10CV324, which is pending in La Crosse County 
and presents the same issue, i.e., whether Menard will be 
permitted to convert an injured party's automobile liability 
policy into comprehensive insurance for Menard.  Petition for 
Review, p. 19.   
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
4 
 
to have them placed in her vehicle.  She was standing near the 
rear passenger side of her vehicle as a Menard employee began to 
load the boards with a forklift.  During the loading, some of 
the boards fell onto Blasing's foot, causing her injury.   
¶82 On January 24, 2011, Blasing sued Menard based on two 
theories:  (1) liability for Menard's violations of the safe-
place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.01 et seq.; and (2) liability 
for the acts of its employee in negligently handling the boards 
while loading Blasing's vehicle.  Blasing also brought a direct 
action against Zurich, Menard's liability carrier.  She did not 
sue the Menard employee who loaded the boards onto her vehicle. 
¶83 On 
March 7, 
2011, 
Zurich 
and 
Menard 
answered, 
admitting that Zurich "issued a policy of liability insurance" 
to Menard, but denying Blasing's allegations of safe-place 
violations and negligence.8   
¶84 On May 31, 2011, Menard tendered its defense to 
American Family, who was Blasing's automobile liability carrier 
at the time of the accident.  Menard's tender ignored Blasing's 
safe-place claims.  Instead, Menard focused on the common law 
negligence claim and contended that its employee was "using" 
Blasing's vehicle with her permission while loading the boards; 
and therefore, there was coverage for Blasing's injuries under 
her own automobile liability policy due to the requirements of 
the omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).   
¶85 On August 2, 2011, American Family moved to intervene 
in the action to defend against Menard's tender.  On January 23, 
                                                 
8 Zurich answer, ¶¶2-12. 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
5 
 
2012, American Family moved for summary judgment that it had no 
duty to defend or indemnify Menard for Blasing's claims.  
American Family submitted the automobile liability policy it 
issued to Blasing for court interpretation.   
¶86 On January 24, 2012, Menard and Zurich moved for 
declaratory judgment asking the court to summarily hold that 
American Family had a duty to defend and indemnify Menard for 
liability arising from Blasing's claims.  Although documents 
were submitted in support of their motion, Zurich chose not to 
submit the liability policy it admitted that it issued to 
Menard.  Therefore, Zurich's liability policy is not in the 
record for us to interpret.    
¶87 The circuit court granted American Family's motion, 
holding that it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Menard for 
Blasing's injuries under her automobile liability policy.  The 
circuit court concluded that it would not have been within the 
reasonable expectation of Blasing when she purchased the 
American Family policy that American Family would defend 
tortfeasors who injured her and provide indemnity to Menard if 
Blasing succeeded on her claims against Menard and Zurich.  The 
circuit court found Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 
514 (1976), most persuasive.   
¶88 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed, 
concluding 
that 
American Family had both a duty to defend and to indemnify 
Menard, relying largely on the omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3).  Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 27, 
¶33, 346 Wis. 2d 30, 827 N.W.2d 909.  
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶89 In this review of summary judgment, we apply the same 
standard of review as did the court of appeals and the circuit 
court, but benefitting from their analyses.9  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I 
Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  
Summary judgment begins with a review of the complaint to 
determine whether it states a claim.  Westphal v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 569, 669 N.W.2d 166.  
Next, "we review the answer to determine whether it joins a 
material issue of fact or law."  Id.  If we determine that issue 
has been joined, we examine the submissions of the parties to 
determine whether there are material facts in dispute that would 
require a trial and whether the evidence is sufficient to decide 
the legal issues that have been joined.  See id.   
B.  Blasing's Claims 
1.  Safe-place violations 
¶90 Blasing sued Menard for violations of the safe-place 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.01 et seq.  Blasing alleged that she 
was a frequenter or invitee within the meaning of the safe-place 
statute and that Menard: 
a. Failed to furnish a place for employees, 
frequenters, and/or invitees, which was safe, as that 
term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 101.01; 
                                                 
9 Actions for declaratory judgment relief may be determined 
in summary judgment proceedings.  Northernaire Resort & Spa, LLC 
v. Northernaire Condo. Ass'n, 2013 WI App 116, ¶12, 351 Wis. 2d 
156, 839 N.W.2d 117 (concluding that a motion for declaratory 
judgment is better described as one for summary judgment). 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
7 
 
b. Failed to furnish and use safety devices and 
safeguards and failed to adopt and use methods and 
processes reasonably adequate to render the subject 
property safe, as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.01; 
c. Failed to do every other thing reasonably 
necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and 
welfare of employees, invitees and/or frequenters at 
the subject property where the Plaintiff, Vicki L. 
Blasing, was injured;  
d. Failed to properly construct the subject 
property/parking 
lot/surrounding 
areas, 
inspect, 
maintain, repair, safeguard, and warn so as to render 
the subject property safe, as those terms are defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 101.01[.] 
¶91 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 101.11, "[e]very employer and 
every owner of a place of employment or a public building . . . 
shall so construct, repair or maintain such place of employment 
or public building as to render the same safe."  Accordingly, a 
safe-place claim may be based on the allegation that an employer 
or owner of a place of employment or public building failed to 
maintain the building as safely as the nature of the facility 
would reasonably permit.  Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica 
LLC, 2014 WI 72, ¶30, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __; Megal v. 
Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention Bureau, Inc., 2004 WI 98, 
¶22, 274 Wis. 2d 162, 682 N.W.2d 857.  What constitutes a safe-
place violation depends on "the facts and conditions present, 
and the use to which the place 'was likely to be put.'"  Gross 
v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 47, 212 N.W.2d 2 (1973) (citations 
omitted). 
¶92 Blasing's 
safe-place 
claim 
arises 
from 
Menard's 
policies and facilities at the time the boards were loaded onto 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
8 
 
her vehicle.10  This claim is grounded in a failure of Menard, 
not in a failure of its employee.  See Megal, 274 Wis. 2d 162, 
¶9.  Blasing's safe-place claims do not constitute use or 
operation of her vehicle.  Cont'l Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Carriers 
Ins. Co., 55 Wis. 2d 533, 536-37, 200 N.W.2d 584 (1972) 
(concluding that unsafe loading and unloading facilities that 
violated the safe-place statute were not part of the act of 
unloading and therefore, did not constitute use or operation of 
a vehicle).  In addition, there are different tortfeasors for 
Blasing's two claims.  Menard is the putative tortfeasor for 
Blasing's safe-place claim, while Menard's employee is the 
putative tortfeasor for her negligence claim, as explained 
below. 
¶93 In Amery Motor Co. v. Corey, 46 Wis. 2d 291, 174 
N.W.2d 540 (1970), we also concluded that unsafe loading 
facilities are not part of loading or unloading a vehicle.  We 
explained that faulty construction of the premises "was not a 
part of the loading and unloading operation but resulted in a 
condition of the premises which would normally be covered under 
a comprehensive liability policy on the premises."  Id. at 300.  
We said that "loading and unloading coverage added to an 
automobile liability policy . . . was not intended to take the 
place of comprehensive insurance on the premises."  Id. at 301.   
¶94 In Sampson v. Laskin, 66 Wis. 2d 318, 224 N.W.2d 594 
(1975), we again considered the differing factual predicates 
between safe-place claims and those based on the "use" of a 
                                                 
10 Complaint, ¶¶8-12.  
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
9 
 
vehicle.  There, prior to the accident, two employees were 
loading barrels of waste material from an elevator into a truck 
owned by their employer.  Id. at 321.  In order to get the last 
of the barrels into the truck, they employed a bypass switch on 
the elevator so it rose without the door being closed.  Id. at 
322.  When they raised the elevator to the level of the truck 
bed, there was an 18-inch gap between the truck and the elevator 
floor on which the barrels sat.  Id.  In an effort to move the 
barrels from the elevator over the gap and into the truck, the 
employees placed a loose sheet of metal as a make-shift bridge 
over the gap.  Id.  Unfortunately, as the employees were using 
this makeshift bridge, it slipped and both employees fell 26 
feet into the pit of the elevator.  Id. at 322-23.   
¶95 The injured employee and the estate of the deceased 
employee sued the owners of the building alleging violations of 
the safe-place statute because of the availability of the bypass 
switch that the plaintiffs used to override a safety feature of 
the elevator.  Id. at 326.  The jury found for the plaintiffs 
and that determination was not appealed.  Id.   
¶96 The defendant-owners, in turn, filed a third-party 
complaint against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company under the 
automobile liability policy issued to the plaintiffs' employer, 
into whose truck the barrels were being loaded.  Id. at 334.  
The defendant-owners claimed that they were covered under the 
automobile policy because the accident occurred during the 
loading of the truck.  Id.  In dismissing the defendant-owners' 
claim under the automobile policy, we explained that the 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
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"[l]oading and unloading coverage, added to an automobile 
liability policy, . . . 'was not intended to take the place of 
comprehensive insurance on the premises,' particularly not so in 
safe-place cases."  Id. at 336 (citation omitted).   
¶97 Other jurisdictions also adhere to our view that safe-
place claims based on loading and unloading facilities and 
policies are excluded from use or operation of a vehicle 
"because the owner's duty to maintain a safe place 'was not a 
step in the specific operation of unloading a truck.'"  Amery, 
46 Wis. 2d at 301 (citation omitted).11   
¶98 Accordingly, safe-place violations are not part of 
loading or unloading a vehicle or a "use" of a vehicle.  Id.  
Therefore, in regard to Blasing's safe-place claims, there is no 
basis for coverage under Blasing's automobile policy. Sampson, 
66 Wis. 2d at 335-36; Continental, 55 Wis. 2d at 536-37; Amery, 
46 Wis. 2d at 301.   
2.  Common law negligence  
¶99 Blasing also sued Menard for the common law negligence 
of its employee in loading boards onto her vehicle.  On that 
claim, Menard has potential liability based on vicarious 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which 
imposes liability on an employer for the acts of its employee 
within the scope of the employee's employment.  Brown v. Acuity, 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 WI 60, ¶27, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96; 
                                                 
11 See also Suter, Loading and Unloading, 31 Insurance 
Counsel Journal 112 (Jan. 1964); Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Balt. & Ohio R.R., 240 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1963). 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
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Peters v. Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 174, 193 n.8, 589 N.W.2d 395 
(1999).   
¶100 Respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability based 
on the existence of a master-servant relationship.  Kerl v. 
Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶4, 273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 
N.W.2d 328.  "Vicarious liability under respondeat superior is a 
form of liability without fault."  Id.  Vicarious liability may 
result from the right to control the activities of another, such 
as is found in the control of an employee by an employer during 
the scope of the employee's employment.  Lewis v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 60, ¶12, 243 Wis. 2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 
484; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958).   
¶101 There is a difference between an employer's vicarious 
liability for an employee's conduct and the conduct of the 
employee, himself.  For example, an employer who is liable due 
to the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a tortfeasor;12 
rather, the employer's liability stems from the particular type 
of agency relationship created when the employee is acting 
within the scope of his employment.  See Schinner v. Gundrum, 
2013 WI 71, ¶47 n.13, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 833 N.W.2d 685; 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958); see also St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MAG Mut. Ins. Co., 433 S.E.2d 112, 113 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993).13   
                                                 
12 A tortfeasor is "[o]ne who commits a tort," i.e., a 
legally cognizable wrong.  Black's Law Dictionary 1627 (9th ed. 
2009). 
13 See also 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1832 (2014); 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 (2006). 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
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¶102 In Schinner, we recently explained that an employer,  
is subject to the liability for damages flowing from 
the tortious conduct of its employee.  This liability 
is imposed upon [the] assured by law under the rule of 
respondeat superior.  Although the [employer] may be 
held liable for such tort, it cannot be said that [the 
employer] committed the assault.  
Schinner, 349 Wis. 2d 529, ¶47 n.13 (quoting Fox Wis. Corp. v. 
Century Indem. Co., 219 Wis. 549, 551-52, 263 N.W. 567 (1935)).  
The conclusion that an employer who has vicarious liability 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a tortfeasor is 
consistent with our conclusion that vicarious liability under 
respondeat superior is liability without fault.  Kerl, 273 
Wis. 2d 106, ¶4.   
¶103 It is only the common law negligence claim for which 
there potentially could be coverage under the American Family 
policy.  American Family focuses on this claim with two facts 
that are significant, one of which the majority does not 
address.  American Family questions whether the "concept of use" 
should be applied to the insured's policy under the omnibus 
statute when (1) the insured is injured by a tortfeasor and (2) 
the tortfeasor has insurance of its own.   
¶104 The second fact, that the tortfeasor has its own 
insurance for the accident, is extremely significant because the 
omnibus statute has as its purpose assuring that accident 
victims have insurance coverage.  Nordahl v. Peterson, 68 Wis. 
2d 538, 551, 229 N.W.2d 682 (1975); Venerable v. Adams, 2009 WI 
App 76, ¶14, 318 Wis. 2d 784, 767 N.W.2d 386.  Therefore, 
construing the "concept of use" narrowly under the policy to 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
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exclude those tortfeasors who injure the insured and also have 
their own insurance will not conflict with the omnibus statute's 
purpose of providing insurance coverage to injured persons 
because of Zurich's insurance policy.  
C.  Summary Judgment 
¶105 Zurich moved for summary declaration that American 
Family has the duty to defend and indemnify Menard.  Consistent 
with summary judgment methodology, I begin with an examination 
of the complaint to determine what it alleges in regard to the 
duty to defend and indemnify.  See Admanco, Inc. v. 700 Stanton 
Drive, LLC, 2010 WI 76, ¶28, 326 Wis. 2d 586, 786 N.W.2d 759.  
The complaint shows that Blasing sued Menard.  She also brought 
a direct action against Zurich, as is permitted by Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.34.  Backus Elec., Inc. v. Petro Chem. Sys., Inc., 2013 WI 
App 35, ¶12, 346 Wis. 2d 668, 829 N.W.2d 516.  In regard to 
Menard, Blasing pled safe-place violations based on allegations 
that Menard did not make the loading facility as safe as it 
would reasonably permit.  She also pled a common law negligence 
claim based on the acts of Menard's employee during the scope of 
his employment.  In regard to Zurich, she claimed that Zurich 
provided insurance to Menard and its employees "against the 
liability of the type" for which she had claimed, i.e., for 
safe-place violations and for negligence.  Blasing adequately 
stated her claims.14   
¶106 The second step in summary judgment determinations is 
to examine the answer.  Admanco, 326 Wis. 2d 586, ¶28.  Zurich 
                                                 
14 Complaint, ¶2.  
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
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admits that it "issued a policy of liability insurance" to 
Menard, with unstated conditions.15  Accordingly, issues of 
material fact were joined in regard to whether Zurich insured 
Menard for the alleged safe-place violations and the negligence 
claim set out in the complaint.   
¶107 The third step in summary judgment methodology is to 
examine the materials submitted by the moving party to see 
whether that party has made a prima facie showing that there are 
no material issues of fact in dispute and that that party should 
prevail on a question of law without a trial.  Id.  In regard to 
Zurich, it submitted no evidence that it does not insure Menard 
"against the liability of the type" set out in the complaint, 
i.e., safe-place violations and vicarious liability for common 
law negligence.   
¶108 Instead, Zurich artfully shifted all court focus to 
American Family's automobile liability policy, which prevented a 
summary judgment analysis of Blasing's direct claim against 
Zurich.16  Zurich's skillful approach also prevented the court 
from fully addressing the issue American Family presented for 
our review.  However, when I apply summary judgment procedures, 
it becomes apparent that Zurich has not met the standard 
necessary to negate Blasing's direct action claim that Zurich 
                                                 
15 Answer, ¶2.  
16 Menard has used this same approach in other venues to 
shift its insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify for harm 
a Menard employee caused to a customer who had automobile 
liability insurance.  See Menard, Inc. v. Country Preferred Ins. 
Co., 992 N.W.2d 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
15 
 
insured Menard for Blasing's claims.  Summary judgment should be 
denied and Zurich must proceed to defend Menard unless it first 
can prove that the liability policy it admits it provided to 
Menard covers none of Blasing's claims.   
¶109 If Zurich's obligations to defend and indemnify Menard 
are not determined before this matter proceeds, Zurich and 
Menard will have succeeded in converting American Family's 
automobile liability policy into a comprehensive liability 
policy for Menard because American Family will have to shoulder 
a defense to claims, at least one of which falls outside of the 
scope of its policy and the omnibus statute.  See Sampson, 66 
Wis. 2d at 336.  Failing to first address Zurich's obligations 
also will prevent court consideration of the issue American 
Family presented for our review:  "Does the concept of a 
permissive user under the Omnibus Statute, § 632.32(3)(a), 
Stats., require an injured person's own liability insurer to 
defend and indemnify the tortfeasor who injured the insured, and 
where the tortfeasor has its own liability insurance?"   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶110 In conclusion, I write in dissent because, based on 
the issue American Family submitted for our review, the 
pleadings and the materials submitted in the summary judgment 
and declaratory judgment motions, I conclude that the majority 
opinion 
erroneously 
decides 
that 
American 
Family, 
Vicki 
Blasing's automobile liability carrier, must assume the defense 
and indemnification of Menard that was initially undertaken by 
Zurich, Menard's liability carrier.  The majority opinion errs 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
16 
 
because it does not fully address the issue American Family 
presented:  "Does the concept of a permissive user under the 
Omnibus Statute, § 632.32(3)(a), Stats., require an injured 
person's own liability insurer to defend and indemnify the 
tortfeasor who injured the insured, and where the tortfeasor has 
its own liability insurance?"  It also errs in failing to follow 
proper summary judgment procedure. 
¶111 I conclude that the majority opinion should not avoid 
American Family's stated issue, but rather, address it and 
conclude that when a direct action has been commenced against 
the insurer of a named defendant, as is the case here, the 
defendant's insurer must provide the defense unless that insurer 
first can prove there is no coverage for any of the claims made.  
Public policy requires that order of proceeding in the case at 
hand to meet American Family's stated issue and to prevent the 
conversion 
of 
Blasing's 
personal 
automobile 
policy 
into 
comprehensive liability insurance for Menard.   
¶112 By 
ignoring 
American 
Family's 
stated 
issue 
and 
Blasing's 
direct 
action 
claims 
against 
Zurich 
and 
then 
permitting Zurich and Menard to shift the court's focus to 
whether Menard's employee was a "permissive user" of Blasing's 
vehicle under the policy American Family issued to Blasing, the 
majority opinion contravenes basic summary judgment principles 
and decides disputed issues of material fact relative to 
Blasing's direct action against Zurich.     
¶113 I would reverse the court of appeals and remand the 
matter to the circuit court, with Zurich providing the defense 
No.  2012AP858.pdr 
 
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to Blasing's claims because Zurich has provided nothing to 
disprove Blasing's allegation that Zurich insured Menard for her 
claims.  Because the majority opinion chooses not to address 
American Family's stated issue and then ignores Blasing's direct 
action against Zurich in this summary judgment proceeding and 
erroneously converts Blasing's automobile liability policy into 
comprehensive liability insurance for Menard, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this dissent. 
 
 
 
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