Title: Hartley v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1470 
____________ 
 
KENNETH HARTLEY, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[June 18, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying Kenneth 
Hartley’s second successive postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence 
of death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), 
Florida Constitution.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s denial of relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We described the facts of this case in greater detail on direct appeal.  Hartley 
v. State (Hartley I), 686 So. 2d 1316, 1318-19 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
 
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825 (1997).  The facts relevant here are that Hartley and his codefendants—Ronnie 
Ferrell and Sylvester Johnson—were separately tried and “convicted of the first-
degree murder, robbery, and kidnapping of seventeen-year-old Gino Mayhew (the 
victim).”  Id. at 1318.  Ferrell was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder 
conviction, and Johnson received a life sentence.  Id.  The record evidence 
established that “[o]n April 22, 1991, the victim was selling crack from his 
Chevrolet Blazer at an apartment complex.”  Id.  The three codefendants 
approached the Blazer, and Hartley held a gun to the victim’s head, forcing him 
into the driver’s seat.  Id.  Hartley then sat in the back seat behind the victim—with 
Ferrell in the front passenger seat—and forced the victim to drive to a remote 
location.  Id. at 1318, 1323.  Johnson followed them in another vehicle.  Id. at 
1318.  The next day, the police found the Blazer parked in the remote location, 
containing the victim’s body slumped over in the driver’s seat with four bullet 
wounds to the head and one in the shoulder.  Id.  During his incarceration, Hartley 
provided details of the murder to several of his cellmates and admitted committing 
the murder.  Id. at 1318-19. 
Hartley’s trial resulted in a jury recommendation of death by a nine-to-three 
vote, and the trial court sentenced Hartley to death.  Id. at 1319.  The trial court 
 
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found six aggravators1 and “minimal mitigation.”  Id.; see also Hartley v. State 
(Hartley II), 990 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Fla. 2008) (“The court assigned great weight 
to each aggravator and found that each, standing alone, outweighed the little 
mitigation the court found and to which it assigned only slight weight.”).  On direct 
appeal,2 we found that the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator, but 
affirmed Hartley’s conviction and sentence, finding any error harmless.  Id. at 
1323-24.  Thereafter, Hartley’s first postconviction motion3 was denied by the trial 
                                          
 
 
1.  These were prior violent felony; committed during a kidnapping; 
committed to prevent lawful arrest; committed for pecuniary gain; heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). 
 
2.  On appeal, Hartley claimed that the trial judge: (1) erred in admitting a 
police officer’s statement regarding a robbery committed against the victim two 
days before the victim was murdered; (2) improperly excluded the testimony of a 
witness regarding a letter purportedly containing a confession by another 
individual as to this crime; (3) improperly denied Hartley’s motion for mistrial, 
which was based on improper prosecutorial statements during opening; (4) 
improperly excluded testimony from Sidney Jones concerning the name of the 
police officer to whom he reported; (5) erred in finding that the State had a race-
neutral reason for excluding a prospective juror; (6) erred in excusing a prospective 
juror for cause because the juror was against imposition of the death penalty; (7) 
erroneously instructed the jury on the aggravating circumstance of CCP; (8) erred 
in finding the murder to be CCP; (9) erroneously doubled the aggravating factors 
of committed for pecuniary gain and committed during the course of a kidnapping; 
(10) erroneously instructed the jury on the aggravating circumstance of HAC; and 
(11) erred in finding the murder to be HAC.  Hartley I, 686 So. 2d at 1319. 
 
3.  Hartley raised the following claims in that motion: 1) that Hartley was 
denied an adversarial testing; 2) that all claims in the original motion, filed by 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-North, warranted relief; 3) that newly 
discovered evidence showed that trial witness Sidney Jones had a “testifying 
relationship” with the State; 4) that Hartley’s incriminating statements to cellmates 
 
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court, and we affirmed.  Hartley II, 990 So. 2d at 1011, 1016.  The trial court also 
denied Hartley’s first successive postconviction motion, asserting a claim under 
                                          
 
should have been suppressed; 5) that there was no reliable transcript; 6) that the 
State introduced nonstatutory aggravators; 7) that the State withheld material 
evidence; 8) that the HAC aggravator was unsupported by the evidence; 9) that the 
HAC instruction was unconstitutionally vague; 10) that the CCP and pecuniary 
gain instructions were unconstitutionally vague and the findings unsupported by 
the evidence; 11) that the prosecutor misled the jury about its sentencing role; 12) 
that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that “no one has the right to violate 
the rules that we all share”; 13) that the trial court erred in admitting “gruesome” 
photographs; 14) that the trial court erred in giving the expert witness instruction; 
15) that the trial court refused to find nonstatutory mitigation; 16) that the standard 
jury instructions diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell 
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); 17) that the jury instructions on aggravating 
factors were constitutionally inadequate; 18) that the prosecutor improperly argued 
the victim impact evidence; 19) that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on 
the credibility of a State witness; 20) that the trial court erred in instructing that a 
majority could render a sentence recommendation; 21) that the trial court allowed 
the State to argue lack of remorse; 22) that the defendant’s execution is 
unconstitutional because he was a juvenile; 23) that the one-year time limit in 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 is unconstitutional; 24) that Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which precludes juror interviews, is 
unconstitutional; 25) that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 
on its face and as applied; 26) that penalty phase jury instructions 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Hartley; 27) that Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); 
28) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call certain 
penalty phase witnesses, failing to call alibi witnesses, failing adequately to 
question jurors and remove biased jurors, failing to present mitigation, failing to 
use a mental health expert and to establish available mitigation, and failing to 
present mitigation evidence that Hartley saved another inmate’s life; and 29) that 
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain public records.  Hartley 
II, 990 So. 2d at 1011 n.3.  On appeal from the trial court’s denial of that motion, 
this Court only addressed the three claims that Hartley did not expressly waive.  Id. 
at 1011. 
 
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Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009), and we affirmed the denial.  Hartley v. 
State (Hartley III), 91 So. 3d 848 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 758 (2012).  The 
instant motion is Hartley’s second successive postconviction motion and asserts 
that Hartley must be resentenced to life based on the newly discovered evidence 
that his codefendant, Ronnie Ferrell, subsequently received a life sentence.  As 
such, the procedural history for Ferrell’s case is also relevant here.  On direct 
appeal, we affirmed Ferrell’s convictions for first-degree murder, armed robbery, 
and armed kidnapping, and his death sentence for the first-degree murder 
conviction.  Ferrell v. State (Ferrell I), 686 So. 2d 1324, 1326 (Fla. 1996).  On 
postconviction, however, the postconviction court granted Ferrell a new penalty 
phase hearing, and we affirmed.  Ferrell v. State (Ferrell II), 29 So. 3d 959, 964-65 
(Fla. 2010).  On remand, the State agreed to waive the death penalty, and Ferrell 
acknowledged under oath that he was not the shooter in this case.  Ferrell was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
ANALYSIS 
“Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s decision on a motion based on 
newly discovered evidence will not be overturned on appeal.”  Mills v. State, 786 
So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 2001).  Where the newly discovered evidence is a 
codefendant’s subsequent life sentence, “the defendant must show: ‘1) the life 
sentence could not have been known to the parties by the use of due diligence at 
 
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the time of trial; and 2) the codefendant’s life sentence would probably result in a 
life sentence for the defendant on retrial.’ ”  Ventura v. State, 794 So. 2d 553, 571 
(Fla. 2001) (quoting Groover v. State, 703 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 1997)).  The 
parties here agree that Ferrell’s life sentence constitutes newly discovered 
evidence, but disagree as to whether it would result in a life sentence for Hartley 
on retrial.  The postconviction court found that such result is not likely because 
Hartley was the more culpable codefendant in that he played a dominant role in the 
crime and was the triggerman who actually killed the victim.  Therefore, the court 
denied Hartley’s motion. 
We also reject Hartley’s argument and affirm the postconviction court’s 
denial of relief, as Hartley has not shown that Ferrell’s life sentence would 
probably result in a life sentence for Hartley on retrial.  Hartley was more culpable 
as both the triggerman and dominant actor in the crime.  See, e.g., Stein v. State, 
995 So. 2d 329, 341-42 (Fla. 2008); Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 849-50 (Fla. 
2007); Ventura, 794 So. 2d at 571.  Hartley is therefore not entitled to relief. 
Hartley argues that he is entitled to a reduced sentence because the trial court 
and this Court already found Hartley and Ferrell to be equally culpable, and 
equally culpable codefendants must be treated alike.  Hartley is correct that at 
Ferrell’s first sentencing hearing, Judge Oliff—the original sentencing judge in 
both Ferrell’s and Hartley’s cases—found Ferrell to be equally culpable to Hartley.  
 
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However, Ferrell’s original sentence was vacated as a result of his successful 
postconviction motion, and he received a new penalty phase.  Ferrell II, 29 So. 3d 
at 964-65, 984-88.  As such, the trial court’s prior findings no longer stand, 
especially given that a trial court is not obligated to make the same findings on 
resentencing as at the original sentencing.  Phillips v. State, 705 So. 2d 1320, 1322 
(Fla. 1997) (“Phillips’ resentencing proceeding was a ‘completely new 
proceeding,’ and the trial court was therefore under no obligation to make the same 
findings as those made in Phillips’ prior sentencing proceeding.” (quoting King v. 
Dugger, 555 So. 2d 355, 358-59 (Fla. 1990)). 
Additionally, Hartley misconstrues our findings in Ferrell’s direct appeal 
case.  Specifically, Hartley quotes from our opinion that “[a]lthough not considered 
in aggravation, the trial judge noted that Ferrell was just as culpable as the shooter 
because he used his friendship with the victim to lure the victim to his death.”  
Ferrell I, 686 So. 2d at 1327.  Hartley also cites the following passage: 
[T]he sentence of death in this case is appropriate even though Ferrell 
was not the shooter and even though Johnson received a sentence of 
life-imprisonment.  First, Ferrell played an integral part in planning 
and carrying out the murder.  Moreover, Ferrell used his friendship 
with the victim to lure him to his death.  Johnson merely provided the 
getaway vehicle after the crime was committed.  We have previously 
determined that death is the appropriate sentence under similar 
circumstances. 
 
Id. at 1331.  However, these passages do not constitute a finding that the trial 
court’s finding of equal culpability is supported by competent, substantial 
 
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evidence.  Rather, the first quote simply describes the trial court’s findings, and the 
second quote discusses proportionality, with no mention of Hartley or his 
culpability as compared to Ferrell’s.  Hartley’s arguments misconstrue our prior 
opinion and rely on trial court findings that were vacated on postconviction. 
CONCLUSION 
We find that Hartley is not entitled to relief because as the triggerman and 
dominant actor, he was the more culpable codefendant.  We hereby affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of Hartley’s second successive postconviction 
motion. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Lance Manning Day, Judge - Case No. 161991CF008144AXXXMA 
 
Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Estero, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Patrick M. Delaney, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee