Title: State v. Maddasion

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

130 Ariz. 306 (1981) 636 P.2d 84 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James Lee MADDASION, Appellant. No. 5082. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 6, 1981. Rehearing Denied November 17, 1981. *307 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., Phoenix by Bruce M. Ferg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, for appellee. Harley D. Kurlander, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. Defendant, James Lee Maddasion, was convicted and adjudged guilty of unlawful sale of narcotics in violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 and unlawful possession of narcotic drugs for sale in violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.01 and sentenced to a prison term of not less than twenty years nor more than life. The case was appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, and the judgment was affirmed. See State v. Maddasion, 24 Ariz. App. 492, 539 P.2d 966 (1975). It was later determined that the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction in the matter. See A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4031 (formerly 13-1711); State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197, 608 P.2d 774 (1980). We therefore granted defendant's petition for post-conviction relief and sanctioned a delayed appeal to this court. There are two issues on appeal: The facts necessary to a determination of these issues are as follows. Three hours after a police informer had purchased a usable amount of heroin from the defendant, Agent Steve Bunting of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad obtained a telephonic search warrant pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1444(C). The warrant authorized a search of the defendant's business at 4812 S. 12th Avenue, Tucson, Arizona, and the people on the business premises. Over the telephone, Agent Bunting read the warrant's description of the persons to be searched: The warrant when issued read as follows: The warrant was executed and a search of the business uncovered five "rolls" of a substance later determined to be heroin. Next to the heroin was $980 in currency. The serial numbers of the currency matched those of the cash that had been given to the informer to carry out the sale. The defendant was arrested. The testimony of the informer, Gus Hudson, was central to the State's case. He testified at trial that he had participated in the arrest in the hope that the authorities would allow his brother-in-law, John Higgins, to get help for his drug addiction. *308 John Higgins was, in fact, given probation on the condition that he enroll in a drug rehabilitation program. From the judgment of guilt and the denial of his motion for new trial, defendant appeals. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT The defendant urges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the heroin seized in the search of his business, J&J Auto Sales. He argues that at the time the warrant was issued there was no probable cause to believe that there was any heroin on the premises. We disagree. Our Court of Appeals has stated: When an affidavit is based on information learned through an informer, it must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). The magistrate must be informed of the underlying circumstances which formed the affiant's belief that a crime had been committed. In addition, the affiant must disclose the basis of his belief that the informer was credible or his information reliable. State v. Watling, 104 Ariz. 354, 453 P.2d 500 (1969); State v. Adams, 18 Ariz. App. 292, 501 P.2d 561 (1972); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958). In the present case, the magistrate had ample information on which to base a finding of probable cause. The affidavit indicated that the informer was known to be reliable from his participation in three supervised purchases within the week. It further indicated that the defendant had agreed to sell heroin to the informer, but that he would have to go to his apartment to get the heroin. Agent Bunting had observed the defendant leave his business and return a short time later. Some three hours before making his statement, Bunting had recovered six "rolls" of heroin from the informer, who stated that he had purchased them from defendant. The affidavit continued that the defendant's business had been under surveillance since the sale and that no one had been seen leaving. There was probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed at the defendant's business, and that the fruits of the crime would be discovered by a search of the premises. The defendant, however, argues that the warrant was defective because Agent Bunting's affidavit was inadequate as to persons other than the defendant. We do not agree. Even if there were such a defect, it would not render the warrant invalid as to the defendant. The warrant, as it applied to the defendant and to the premises, contained an adequate description and was based on probable cause. The entire warrant would not be rendered invalid because portions of it might be vulnerable to challenge. State v. Watson, 113 Ariz. 218, 550 P.2d 89 (1976); State v. Snodgrass, 19 Ariz. App. 391, 507 P.2d 1003 (1973). "If a warrant is essentially valid, or is valid as to one command and not to another, the parts not essential or invalid may be treated as surplusage." Dow v. State, 207 Md. 80, 85, 113 A.2d 423, 425 (1955); see also State v. Masco, 103 N.J. Super. 277, 247 A.2d 136 (1968). In addition, the defendant has no standing or legitimate expectation of privacy which would enable him to challenge the validity of the searches of third parties. A Fourth Amendment challenge of the search warrant's validity must prove not only that the search was illegal, but that it was illegal as to the person making the challenge. The United States Supreme Court has stated: UNDISCLOSED INDUCEMENTS FOR HUDSON'S TESTIMONY Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because of newly discovered evidence that suggests there were promises made to Hudson by the government which were not disclosed to defense counsel or to the jury. We do not agree. At trial, Hudson testified as follows: Defendant contends, however, that there was an express promise made to Hudson regarding the treatment of Higgins in return for Hudson's testimony. At the motion for new trial, the defendant offered the affidavit of the prosecutor in the trial which stated: *310 Admittedly, the prosecutor has a duty of disclosure, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); Rule 15.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., and a failure to disclose evidence of a promise for a witness's testimony can be grounds for a new trial. Rule 15.1(a)(7), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.; State v. Holsinger, 115 Ariz. 271, 564 P.2d 1238 (1977). In the instant case, however, the testimony before the jury clearly indicates that there was some sort of "deal" involved. The additional information of specific promises would then have had little or no effect on the outcome of the trial. The alleged newly discovered evidence suggesting a specific arrangement between Hudson and the prosecution does not create an additional doubt of defendant's guilt. We find no error. Defendant further contends, however, that the "contingent" fee of $1,000 paid for Hudson's services as an informer and for his testimony is illegal. Although a fee paid to an informer is not necessarily improper, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: And the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: The distinction the Fifth and Ninth Circuits seem to be making is that a contingent fee paid to secure a conviction for a crime yet to be committed at the time of the fee agreement is improper, but if crimes are already being committed, then a contingent fee may be paid to discover the persons committing the crimes. We believe that the facts in the instant case fall in the latter category, since the defendant was already engaged in criminal activity and Hudson was being paid to discover evidence and testify as to that activity though the fee was not contingent upon a conviction. We do not believe that a contingent fee in itself should operate to void a conviction. As long as the facts are made known to the trier of fact, the informant's motivation is merely another factor to consider regarding his credibility. The right to cross-examination should cure any taint the contingent fee payment might create. We find no error. Affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur.