Title: Sharsmith v. Hill

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sharsmith v. Hill1988 WY 136764 P.2d 667Case Number: 87-162Decided: 11/09/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE INJURY TO DOROTHY E. SMITH. DOROTHY E. SMITH, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

HUSKY TERMINAL RESTR., 
INC., APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District Court,LaramieCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

Roberta A. 
Coates, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Gregory C. 
Dyekman of Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Dorothy E. 
Smith (employee) challenges the trial court's order denying her temporary total 
disability benefits under W.S. 27-12-402 (June 1983 Repl.)1 She presents the following issues 
on appeal:

I. Whether the injury 
sustained by the Claimant arose out of and in the course of 
employment.

A. Whether there is a 
causal nexus between the accident of the Claimant and the course of 
employment.

B. Whether the accident 
occurred due to the employee acting outside the ultimate work to be done or 
whether the accident occurred when the employee used a prohibited method of work 
in her course of her employment.

II. Whether the trial 
court used the proper test in evaluating the evidence before 
it.

III. Whether the trial 
court erred in delaying its order pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 27-12-604(d) (1977), by 
delaying its order from the hearing of April 15, 1987 to issuing an order on 
February 1, 1988.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     In October of 1985, 
employee became a cashier for appellee Husky Terminal Restaurant, Inc. 
(employer), in Pine Bluffs, Wyoming. She held that position through 
mid-January 1986, when she was laid off temporarily and then rehired as a 
dishwasher. A few days later employer hired her to cook. She held that position 
through July 1986. One of her cooking duties during that time involved draining 
a five-gallon bucket of marinated chickens. She did this task many times between 
January and July of 1986. Sometime during this same time period she began to 
feel pain in her back. She was uncertain what caused this pain; neither party 
could say it was work related. She complained of back pain to her supervisor, 
Mr. Santini, and he told her to see a doctor. The doctor gave her muscle 
relaxers, and ordered rest and relaxation. This treatment did not stop the pain, 
and eventually she was admitted to a hospital for some bed rest. This treatment 
worked, and employee later returned to work at the restaurant as a waitress. Her 
doctor ordered her not to do any heavy lifting, particularly not to attempt to 
lift anything heavier than fifteen pounds.

[¶4.]     During the late summer 
of 1986, Mr. Santini and his supervisor, Mr. Olson, contacted employee's doctor 
to inquire about her ability to return to work as a fill-in cook at the 
restaurant. In early September employer received a letter from employee's doctor 
stating that employee's work must not include any lifting of objects heavier 
than fifteen pounds.2 At employee's hearing she testified 
that this letter was posted above the desk in the restaurant office after it was 
received. At the same hearing Mr. Santini testified that upon receiving this 
letter he met with employee and the assistant manager to discuss the medical 
weight restriction that had been imposed upon employee's work. This discussion 
concerned her reemployment as a fill-in cook at the restaurant conditioned on 
her agreement not to lift anything heavier than fifteen pounds. He also gave her 
instructions to have someone else lift any heavy items for her if that became 
necessary.

[¶5.]     After the lifting 
restriction was imposed, employee returned to the restaurant working as a 
fill-in cook. Employee testified that during this period she did ask other 
restaurant personnel to lift the marinating chickens for her. While working the 
October 10-11, 1986, night shift, employee found the bucket of marinating 
chickens in the walk-in cooler and tried to drain them by herself. Lifting the 
bucket, she injured her back. Employee's explanation for picking up the bucket 
was that the restaurant had become extremely busy during the early morning of 
October 11, 1987, and she had so much work to do that she just did not stop and 
remember that the bucket of marinating chickens was too heavy for her. She also 
testified that she had tried to awaken employer's temporary manager, Mr. 
Stockmeyer, who was sleeping in a trailer behind the building, to lift the 
bucket for her. She testified that, before lifting the bucket, she slapped on 
the door of his trailer on her way by it to dump some grease. Last, employee 
indicated she knew the chickens had to be drained before the next cooking shift, 
and she feared not draining them might endanger her job as a 
cook.

[¶6.]     Employer countered 
these explanations with testimony that the night of October 11, 1987, was not a 
particularly busy night at the restaurant with roughly sixty orders during a 
six-hour shift. Mr. Santini testified that it was not an extraordinary shift. 
Neither party introduced any evidence concerning when the orders came in during 
the course of the shift. Mr. Stockmeyer testified that he never heard employee 
slap the side of his trailer that night. None of the restaurant managers 
indicated that employee had a reason to believe her job was in jeopardy if she 
did not drain the chickens before going off her shift.

[¶7.]     After injuring her 
back, employee returned to her doctor at the urging of an assistant manager. She 
was treated with more bed rest, therapy, and pain medication, none of which 
relieved the pain. Eventually, employee's back was treated surgically. Her 
ability to work is now limited to light housework.

[¶8.]     Employee filed her 
claim for temporary total disability on October 28, 1986. Employer made a proper 
written objection on January 22, 1987, and a hearing was set for April 15, 1987. 
The testimony described above was heard at that hearing, which took place as 
scheduled. Based on the evidence introduced at the hearing, the district court 
issued a January 7, 1988, decision letter denying benefits. The order denying 
benefits was filed on February 3, 1988. This appeal followed. Culpable 
negligence is not an issue presented in this appeal since the district court 
expressly found that employee was not intentionally or culpably 
negligent.

[¶9.]     Employee's first issue 
is whether an employee who knows and understands specific work restrictions 
adopted for her safety, exceeds the scope of her employment and loses her rights 
to benefits under the worker's compensation statutory provisions by disregarding 
those restrictions. If the answer is "yes," we must also review this record to 
determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the district court's denial 
of benefits.

[¶10.]  For an injury to be compensable under the 
worker's compensation system as it existed at the time of employee's injury, the 
employee's injury must "arise out of and in the course of [the] employment. § 
27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement)." Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Wyo. 1986). The injury and the employment must 
also be causally connected. Id. The employee has the initial burden to 
prove these and all other essential elements of a claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence. In the Matter of Bagshaw, 753 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶11.]  Our standards of review in worker's 
compensation cases further require that we review the district court's factual 
findings by accepting the evidence of the successful party below as true. We do 
not consider conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party below, and 
we grant every favorable inference that can be fairly and reasonably drawn from 
the successful party's evidence. Id.; and 
Matter of Injury to Klevgard, 747 P.2d 509, 510 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶12.]  Precedent concerning the type of 
misconduct that is a deviation from the scope of a particular employment focuses 
on whether the employee knowingly does certain work specifically prohibited, as 
opposed to an employee's doing authorized work in an unauthorized way. Bill 
Lawley Ford v. Miller, 672 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. App. 1983); and Brown v. Arrowhead Tree Service, 
Inc., 332 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn. 1983). Professor Larson articulates this 
distinction as the difference between a work restriction on the ultimate work to 
be done and a work restriction concerning the method by which the ultimate work 
is to be done. 1A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 31.00 at 6-8 to 6-14 
(1985). See also Id., § 27.14 at 5-325 to 5-327 
(1985) (citing Hoover v. Ehrsam Company, 218 
Kan. 662, 544 P.2d 1366, 1370 (1976); Scheller 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 134 Ariz. App. 418, 656 P.2d 1279, 1281 (1982)); 
and Witt v. Marcum Drilling Company, 73 N.M. 466, 389 P.2d 403 (1964). A 
specific restriction on the ultimate work to be done can restrict a task of the 
same character as other tasks which are not prohibited, and still place the 
prohibited task outside the scope of an employment. See, e.g., Brown, 332 N.W.2d  
at 29; and Scheller, 656 P.2d  at 1280.

[¶13.]  This court has recognized this scope of 
employment rule but has never applied it directly. See Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 
207-208 (1943) (decided on the issue of culpable negligence). Although not 
quoting the rule, we used its rationale in Richard v. George Noland Drilling 
Company, 79 Wyo. 124, 331 P.2d 836, 839-840 (1958), where we affirmed a district 
court order denying benefits to a worker who was asphyxiated while sleeping on 
the floor of the oil drilling rig without his employer's 
permission.

[¶14.]  Considering this precedent, it is 
apparent that there are limited situations in which an employer can put on 
evidence to refute an employee's preponderance showing that the work causing her 
injury occurred within the scope of her employment because a work restriction 
was violated. We hold that an employee can be found to have acted outside the 
scope of employment by violating a work restriction when the following elements 
are shown: (1) the employer expressly and carefully informs the employee that 
she must not perform a specific task or tasks while in his employ; (2) the 
employee knows and understands the specific restriction imposed; (3) the 
employer has not knowingly continued to accept the benefit of a violation of the 
restriction by the employee; and, (4) the injury for which benefits are claimed 
arises out of conduct that clearly violates the specific 
restriction.

[¶15.]  In this case the presence of these four 
elements is supported by sufficient evidence. Before employee began working as a 
cook, which she was doing when she reinjured her back, her employer gave her 
specific and express instructions not to lift anything heavier than fifteen 
pounds. Her employer did not rehire her as a cook until it received written 
confirmation from her doctor of what her physical capabilities would be. Her 
employer discussed this with her and posted her doctor's letter above the 
manager's desk. Employee's own testimony was that she understood the restriction 
on lifting the bucket of chickens; further, she had asked other restaurant 
employees to drain the bucket of chickens for her on occasion before she injured 
herself at work. Employee considered this restriction on the night of her 
injury, as illustrated when she tried to awaken Mr. Stockmeyer to lift the 
bucket for her before she tried to lift it herself. Employee failed to present 
any evidence, other than her own opinion, to substantiate her fear that by 
failing to drain the chickens she might be fired. Employer was not shown to have 
accepted the benefit of any previous violation of the specific lifting 
restriction before employee injured herself lifting the bucket. The district 
court heard all of the testimony and determined that employee, despite her 
complete understanding of the lifting restriction, disregarded the restriction 
and caused the type of injury the restriction was intended to prevent. We must 
accept these findings of fact by the district court; they support the conclusion 
that employee's injury did not occur within the scope of her 
employment.

[¶16.]  Employee's second issue questions the 
test the district court used to evaluate the evidence it received at the 
hearing. We quote from the court's decision letter:

In arriving at my 
decision I have kept in mind the rule of construction, often repeated by the 
Supreme Court, that the Worker's Compensation statutes should be interpreted 
reasonably and liberally to protect the workers. At the same time it is 
necessary to keep in mind the rights of the employers who fund the system. A 
compelling observation was made by the Court in Bartley v. C-H Riding Stables, 
Inc., 206 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. 1973).

[T]o hold the employer 
liable for an injury incurred while performing a prohibited act is to force the 
employer to become a constant watchdog. No course would be available to the 
employer to prevent infractions save the firing of an employee doing a 
prohibited act.

Employee argues 
that this language shows some sort of trial court preference for employers over 
employees in worker's compensation decisions. We disagree. Through this 
language, the district court simply recognizes both the purpose behind the 
worker's compensation statutes and the practicalities faced by the district 
court in applying their mandate. We will not presume prejudicial error. 
Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1325 
(Wyo. 1984). 
To prevail on this issue, employee must show that this language resulted in 
prejudice to her case or that a different outcome was possible absent the 
considerations set out by the trial court in this language. Id. She has failed to do 
so.

[¶17.]  Employee's third issue alleges prejudice 
because the district court took this case under advisement at the April 15, 
1987, hearing, but did not issue a final order denying benefits until February 
1, 1988. We know W.S. 27-12-604(d) (June 1983 Repl.), 
provides:

(d) At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the judge shall enter an order pursuant to the verdict of the jury. 
If no jury was called, the judge shall render a decision upon the facts and law 
of the case pursuant to the provisions of this act, and make an order allowing 
or disallowing compensation as the law and evidence may 
warrant.

Employee argues 
that the spirit of the worker's compensation statutes is violated when a 
district court waits over eight months to issue its order under this statute. 
She then claims the delay itself is grounds for reversal of the order, but cites 
no authority upon which such a reversal would be based; further, her argument 
makes no showing of resultant prejudice. Accordingly, we need not consider this 
issue. See Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶18.]  AFFIRMED.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 27-12-101 through 
27-12-805 (June 1983 Repl.) was repealed and recreated as W.S. 27-14-101 through 
27-14-804 (June 1987 Repl.) 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Sp.Sess., ch. 3, § 
3.

2 The record shows that 
this letter was received into evidence at appellant's hearing as Employer's 
Exhibit A, and that no objection was made by appellant to its introduction. The 
letter does not appear in the record transmitted to this 
court.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶19.]  Dorothy Smith, worker's compensation 
claimant, alone as staff except for one waitress in a small town highway 
roadside all night restaurant, was handling a storm induced customer rush and 
preparing for the next day as cook, dishwasher and alternate 
cashier.

[¶20.]  It then happened, as she explained in 
trial testimony:

A. [Dorothy Smith] Just 
went back in there and started cooking, and then I was in the - I was in the 
process of doing some dishes and Edna hollered at me, so I ran back in there to 
see what she wanted. She just handed me an - eight tickets with about 15 orders 
on them, so I ran back into the walk-in, and that's when I discovered the 
chicken had not been drained. And Louie always told me that Saturday was a big 
chicken day and we had to have chickens.

Q. [Her attorney] So what 
did you do?

A. So, in the middle of 
my cooking - I went ahead and put my bacon and everything on the grill, all the 
stuff on the grill - then I ran back in the walk-in and picked up the chickens, 
and that's when it sounded like a rifle was going on in my 
back.

I never thought, I really 
didn't, of the consequences or anything, I just picked them up. I knew they had 
to be done and that nobody else did them.

[¶21.]  Her resulting worker's compensation 
claim, filed primarily to pay resulting medical bills, was contested by the 
employer. Additionally, Dorothy Smith was not re-employed following the 
restaurant injury. The contested hearing was held on April 15, 1987, an opinion 
letter of denial was written January 4, 1988 and an adverse order entered 
February 3, 1988.

[¶22.]  I dissent from the majority's approval of 
the denial for two reasons. First, the method test of the applicable legal 
principle for coverage should be applied. Secondly, in this record, there was 
absolutely no proof presented that Dorothy Smith directly violated work rules 
either by earlier dumping grease or later by lifting the chickens to 
drain.

[¶23.]  It was unquestioned that Dorothy Smith 
had a doctor-directed fifteen pound lifting limitation for work. There is no 
evidence that she intentionally disregarded the limitation in handling her night 
shift cooking responsibilities. Further on this record, there is judicial 
assumption, but absolutely no proof, that the container of chickens actually 
exceeded the fifteen pound weight limit.1

[¶24.]  We engage in little more than a matter of 
semantics without reasoned basis if we deny that what was done by Dorothy Smith 
was done in the interest of the employer, in a fashion normally to be done for 
the employer, and the activity was unquestionably within the cook's scope of 
employment. The record also lacks a scintilla of evidence that Dorothy Smith 
either considered or expected that injury would likely occur in task 
performance. The sole question is whether, when Dorothy Smith performed that 
service, rights to worker's compensation were forfeited by the unexpected injury 
occurrence.

[¶25.]  It is not to be questioned that the trial 
court could properly determine within the evidence of this case that if Dorothy 
Smith had taken the time to think out carefully her relative exposure to being 
fired for neglecting preparation of the chickens as necessary cooking work, 
weighed against other exposure from doing something with the chickens creating 
the possibility of re-injury, the re-weighing in retrospect could have 
accommodated a different original choice. What is to be seen in the record is a 
course of job-related business not controlled by thoughtful analysis of risk or 
benefit. It needed to be done, had not been done, so she did 
it.

[¶26.]  If co-worker sexist improprieties as an 
"injury" to a female employee are insulated by the liability immunity of 
worker's compensation, it is reasonable to determine that taking care of 
chickens for the next day's restaurant menu is likewise sufficient to afford "a 
casual connection * * * `when there is a nexus between the injury and some 
condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment.'" Baker v. 
Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 892 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 250 
(Wyo. 1977)). 
In this case, there really was no determinative factual conflict within the 
almost minuscule supply of evidence. At issue is the legal principle application 
to the injury causing, work place activity committed in the hurried sequence of 
job performance. The job restriction involved lifting something greater than 
fifteen pounds and otherwise had no direct relation to the procedure to drain 
the chickens or any other activities included as 
"cooking."

[¶27.]  I neither differ with the dual rules 
stated by the majority nor find the cases provided by the majority to actually 
support the ultimate decision made in this case on these facts to justify the 
denial rule selected. Those cited cases clearly represent the definable, 
prohibited work application, while this chicken-bucket case is clearly definable 
as a method case. Larson would capitalize this as the distinction between "thing 
and method." 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 31.21 at 6-21 (1985) (to 
cook or how to cook). However, the treatise then 
concludes:

Actually, as the review 
of cases below will show, this sophistry has had very little success, and the 
great weight of present authority respects the plain meaning of the distinction 
between method and ultimate objective.

1A Larson, 
supra, at 6-22. For this conclusion, there is recited a volume of case 
examples2 which I would find to be comparable 
to the cook who drains the chicken bucket.

[¶28.]  In the conceptually perfect, but actually 
imperfect world in which we live, it is axiomatic that pure accidents never 
occur and fault in some factor is always attendant to climactic occurrence and 
resulting injury. Somebody did something wrong or the event never would have 
occurred. It is into this undeniable character of events that worker's 
compensation laws were evolved, and Wyoming's constitutional amendment of 1914 was 
approved by the citizens of this state to furnish a substitute for negligence 
and fault theories of employee protection. No longer was the test to be 
liability since compensation for injury was only limited to (1) an incurrence 
within covered extra-hazardous employment if resulting injury was (2) the result 
of a cause which was not solely due to culpable negligence of the injured 
employee. Matter of Injury to Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986); Parker v. Energy Development Co., 691 P.2d 981 
(Wyo. 
1984).

One of the salutary 
purposes of worker's compensation acts is to provide specified benefits for 
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment regardless of fault of 
the employer or employee, except instances of willful misconduct or intentional 
injury.

Uninsured 
Employer's Fund v. Keppel, 1 Va. App. 162, 335 S.E.2d 851, 852 
(1985).

[T]he purpose of the 
Workers' Compensation Act is financial protection for an injured worker without 
regard to fault, * * *.

Patterson v. 
State Acc. Ins. Fund Corp., 64 Or. App. 652, 669 P.2d 829, 830 
(1983).

[¶29.]  A possible end run on the constitutional 
concept of worker's compensation benefits can be premised upon interrelating 
negligent performance to non-employment status. It is within this penumbra of 
employees' constitutional rights and employers' practical responsibility for 
discretionary work direction and control that the divergencies of prohibited 
work compared to unauthorized method of performance were developed as 
alternative tests for injury compensation or denial. My difference with the 
majority is not assignable to disputes about the rules and principles, but only 
which rule to apply in this case. Obviously, the differentiation invokes 
consideration of the fact sensitivity of compared cases. Again, in comparison, 
we are not faced with ignored directions to avoid involvement with draining 
chickens. "Don't lift too much" is quite different and clearly more generalized 
as in this case emplaced without furnished scales to weigh one's work so as not 
to exceed fifteen pounds for any lift during cooking.

[¶30.]  Wyoming cases on this general subject 
include Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203 (1943), where 
the employee trespassed into the mine haul road from approved walkways to be hit 
by the coal car and killed and Richard v. George Noland Drilling Company, 79 
Wyo. 124, 331 P.2d 836 (1958), where fatality resulted from the employee going 
to sleep in the butane-heated oil rig doghouse while in an intoxicated state as 
a place where the employee was inappropriately sleeping rather than working. Cf. 
Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. Svoboda, 573 P.2d 417 (1978) and Svoboda v. Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division, 599 P.2d 1342 (1979), also involving contended 
intoxication. Although both Hamilton and Richard were phrased in terms of 
culpable negligence, they would be better emplaced within the prohibited work - 
prohibited method context of present consideration by the 
courts.

[¶31.]  Furthermore, reading the cases cited by 
the majority leads us no closer to denial in this chicken-bucket case. Brown v. 
Arrowhead Tree Service, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1983), involved specific 
disregard of instructions not to become a tree-topper; Hoover v. Ehrsam Co., 218 
Kan. 662, 544 P.2d 1366 (1976), considered a man confined to absolutely no 
manual labor status who attempted a task requiring either a chain hoist or four 
men for ordinary performance to unstick industrial equipment; Scheller v. 
Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 134 Ariz. 418, 656 P.2d 1279 (App. 1982), related 
to a security guard directed to stay "on post" and who went chasing miscreants 
from an adjacent area and suffered injury in throwing his baton; and Witt v. 
Marcum Drilling Co., 73 N.M. 466, 389 P.2d 403 (1964), finds an injured and 
benefit-denied employee using a machine tool in violation of specific 
operational instructions with which he was familiar.

[¶32.]  To be compared with these clearly 
defined, ultimate objective cases are the numerous work method cases recited by 
1A Larson, supra, at § 31.22, where benefits were provided despite prohibited 
methods, tools or materials. Several of the more recent cases provide 
interesting relevance in application, Patterson, 669 P.2d 829, involved an 
employee injured in removing an unruly patient from employer's premises when he 
overstepped a prohibition of distance necessitating removal from the premises; 
Port Neches Independent School Dist. v. Soignier, 702 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App. 
1986), afforded compensation benefits to the injured employee who left the 
scaffold and attempted to paint from the basketball backboard itself; Uninsured 
Employer's Fund, 335 S.E.2d 851, employee continued roofing, although at least 
allegedly, was advised to discontinue when he reached the steep area until his 
supervisor returned; and Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 658 S.W.2d 948, 951 
(Mo. App. 1983), compensation was afforded for injury, although employee was 
directed not to use the forklift for certain cleaning activities on a specified 
Saturday, and when used, a large piece of equipment fell and employee was hurt 
in performance of what was found to be "part of the sphere of claimant's 
assigned duty [as] an act of cleaning up." The Missouri court in Smith, 658 S.W.2d  at 950 
(quoting Honnold on Workmen's Compensation Vol. 1, § 113) 
stated:

"There are prohibitions 
which limit the sphere of employment, and prohibitions which deal only with the 
conduct within such sphere. A transgression of the prohibition of the latter 
class leaves the sphere of employment where it was, and consequently will not 
prevent recovery of compensation."

[¶33.]  One of the often cited authorities is 
Hayes v. Ambassador Court, Inc., 58 N.J. Super. 215, 156 A.2d 11 (1959), where 
the employee, as an apartment manager, was injured when attempting to unfasten a 
stuck window for a tenant. Although argument existed whether the employee 
expected a tip from the tenant, the principle thesis was that, although the 
particular service was not necessarily authorized or directed, it was, as Larson 
says, "[a]n act outside of an employee's regular duties which is undertaken in 
good faith to advance the employer's interests, whether or not the employee's 
own assigned work is thereby furthered, is within the course of employment." 
Hayes, 156 A.2d  at 14 (quoting 1A Larson, supra, § 27.00 at 
5-314).

[¶34.]  In finding that the activity of draining 
the chickens was clearly within the sphere of employment, I would also follow 
the rule that a transgression, if one did occur, as a prohibition of 
weight-lifting, left the sphere of employment where it was and should not 
prevent recovery of compensation. Smith, 658 S.W.2d 948. We should not ignore 
the preclusively stated interpretive axiom of liberal construction to provide 
redress for employment related injury in exchange for denial of employee's 
common law rights of tort action. Matter of Johner, 643 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1982); Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 
1982).

[¶35.]  For any decision on Dorothy Smith's 
injury compensation, her work-place duty-directed injury calls into question 
whether the application of the denial principle of prohibited work should be 
applied or whether the benefit justifying principle of a prohibited method of 
work is appropriate. Prohibited work is the wrong rule, and consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 The employer obviously 
submitted requests for admission to Dorothy Smith since the answers are filed 
but the questions are not. Even guessing at the questions affords no evidence of 
a weight limitation violation during the late night activities of the cook. It 
is possible that the container did exceed the weight limit, but the employer 
failed to provide any proof. It is also possible that the sudden activity in 
handling the chickens would have caused the same result whether the weight was 
fourteen pounds, sixteen pounds or even more. On this record, there is no proof 
that the services were not performed in the interest of her employment duty. The 
only contentious doubt is whether she should have left that needed cooking task 
for the following shift.

2 Blair & Co. v. 
Chilton, 84 L.J.K.B. 1147, 8 B.W.C.C. 324 (1915) (sitting on a fender to operate 
a dangerous machine); Kilgore v. Fragola, 14 A.D.2d 612, 218 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1961) 
(operating meat-grinding machine with guard removed); Mawdsley v. West Leigh 
Colliery Co., 5 B.W.C.C. 80 (1911); In Re West, 313 Mass. 146, 46 N.E.2d 760 
(1943) (oiling machinery in motion); Kolaszynski v. Klie, 91 N.J.L. 37, 102 A. 5 
(1917) (using alcohol to light a fire); Merchant v. Pinkerton's Inc., 50 N Y2d 
492, 429 N.Y.S.2d 598, 407 N.E.2d 443 (1980) (carrying a gun); Macechko v. Bowen 
Mfg. Co., 179 App. Div. 573, 166 N.Y.S. 822 (1917) (reaching into a machine 
without stopping it); Gadsden Iron Works v. Beasley, 249 Ala. 115, 30 So. 2d 10 
(1947) (speeding up iron-moulding to do five hours' work in four); Case of 
Bennett, 140 Me. 49, 33 A.2d 799 (1943) (jumping a railing instead of following 
a stairway); Hartley v. North Carolina Prison Dept., 258 N.C. 287, 128 S.E.2d 598 (1962) (climbing a fence rather than walking 300 feet to the gate); Alabama 
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Berry, 226 Ala. 204, 146 So. 271 (1933); Pacific Employers 
Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 111 Colo. 470, 143 P.2d 267 (1943); Anderson v. 
Woesner, 66 Idaho 441, 159 P.2d 899 (1944) (getting on or off a moving vehicle); 
Morris v. James Bell Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 619, 160 A. 211 (1932) (riding on top of 
the cab of a truck); Smoot Sand & Gravel Corporation v. Britton, 152 F.2d 17 
(D.C. Cir. 1945); Siglin v. Armour & Co., 261 Pa. 30, 103 A. 991 (1918) 
(riding on running board of truck); Chicago Rys. Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 112, 114 N.E. 534 (1916) (leaving a trolley in such condition that it might 
move when connection made); Fickbohm v. Ryal Miller Chevrolet Co., 228 Iowa 919, 
292 N.W. 801 (1940) (washing car with inflammable liquid without disconnecting 
battery); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Burden, 94 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1937) (failing to 
use a respirator and getting lead poisoning from fumes); Kingsport Foundry & 
Machine Works v. Sheffey, 156 Tenn. 150, 299 S.W. 787 (1927) (using an emery 
wheel for a job which the employer had said was unsuitable); Imperial Brass Mfg. 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 306 Ill. 11, 137 N.E. 411 (1922) (using sulphuric 
acid to clean a urinal instead of Gold Dust); and Liner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
41 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 1949) (pouring gasoline into the tank of a motor while 
motor was running). 1A Larson, supra, at 6-22-24.