Title: Owens v. Brochner

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

474 P.2d 603 (1970) Dean S. OWENS, Plaintiff in Error, v. Ruben BROCHNER and John J. Rowe, Defendants in Error. No. 24211. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. September 21, 1970. *604 Paul A. Morris, Boulder, Walter L. Gerash, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Yegge, Hall & Evans, Richard D. Hall, Denver, for defendant in error, Ruben Brochner. Lawrence M. Wood, Denver, Hutchinson, Black & Hill, James W. Buchanan, Boulder, for defendants in error, John J. Rowe. KELLEY, Justice. This matter is here for review on writ of error to the District Court of Boulder County. The parties are aligned here as they were in the trial court. Owens, the plaintiff, filed a complaint against Dr. Brochner for malpractice on June 12, 1967, and joined Dr. Rowe as a defendant on March 6, 1968. The operation from which the complaint arose was performed April 27, 1965. The lawsuit terminated in the trial court by the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants based upon the two-year statute of limitations. C.R.S. 1963, 87-1-6. Admittedly, more than two years had elapsed between the date of the operation and the filing of the complaint. The question for our determination is whether the "cause of action accrued" as of the date of the surgery as the trial court held, or when the plaintiff discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the alleged negligence of the defendants. The second alternative is known as the "discovery rule." For the reasons set forth in this opinion we disagree with the trial court. The only issue before us is one of law. Although other courts and law review articles have aligned Colorado with those jurisdictions applying the "discovery rule," the precise question before us has not previously been considered by this court. A brief statement of the factual context within which the issue arises will suffice for our discussion. The complaint alleged that on April 25, 1965, Brochner negligently diagnosed a malignant tumor in plaintiff's brain, and on April 27, 1965, performed unnecessary surgery to remove the tumor; that plaintiff was not aware of the professional negligence of Dr. Brochner until March or April, 1967, at which time he was informed of the true facts by "competent" doctors. The amended complaint, in which Dr. Rowe, a pathologist, was joined as a party defendant, alleged that on the date of the surgery he negligently diagnosed brain tissue to be malignant (Astrocytoma Grade II), when, in fact, it was normal. The statute on which the trial court based its summary judgment, C.R.S. 1963, 87-1-6, in material part reads: When does a cause of action accrue in a professional negligence case? Our alignment with the "discovery" jurisdictions, as noted above, is the result of two prior decisions. Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982, and Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372. *605 In Rosane, the doctor, who allegedly left a sponge in the plaintiff after surgery, pleaded the statute of limitations. We there stated: There is no difference, in our view, as far as the wronged plaintiff is concerned, whether the negligence of the defendants was concealed or for some other valid cause the plaintiff failed to learn of the negligence, unless, of course, the plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the negligence at the time of its occurrence. Thirteen years after Rosane this court considered the problem again in Davis v. Bonebrake, supra. In Bonebrake the complaint was filed two years and two months after an operation on the plaintiff. A sponge was left in the plaintiff's abdomen. The defendant admitted the operation but, as a first defense, denied any negligence. As a second defense, the defendant asserted the statute of limitations as a bar to the action. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved for a "judgment of dismissal" on the basis of the statute of limitations. Pertinent to the issue, this court in Bonebrake stated: It is clear that Colorado does not follow the rule of strict construction. In situations where the defendant physician has concealed his negligence the cause of action does not accrue until the patient discovers the negligence, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it. Rosane v. Senger, supra. In Bonebrake, whether or not the plaintiff actually knew or had reason to know of the cause of her injuries prior to the date of the alleged discovery was held to be a question for the jury. In Bonebrake, the issue of "discovery" turned on the question of fraudulent concealment. Bonebrake, therefore, teaches that whether the statute of limitations bars a particular claim is a fact question. Although Rosane and Bonebrake, on their facts, deal with a foreign body (sponge) and concealment, we think the language of the court, particularly in Rosane, points the way to the application of the "discovery rule" in the context of the facts in this case. Approximately ninety per cent of the states have statutes of limitation which hinge on the word accrued. Estep and Van *606 Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort Cases, 62 Mich. L.Rev. 753, 756 (1964). The Oregon Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the word in interpreting its statute in Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996: See, also, Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277. There are a number of reasons why the word "accrued" should be equated with the "discovery rule"; first, the injustice of barring the plaintiff's action before he could reasonably have been aware that he had a claim is patent. See, also, Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507, (N.D.). Second, in balancing the equities between the doctor and the patient, we feel that the burden placed on the doctor is much less than the great injustice the patient would suffer. As the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated, in Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 150, 433 P.2d 220, See, also, Iverson v. Lancaster, supra; and Wilkinson v. Harrington, R.I., 243 A.2d 745, where the Supreme Court of Rhode Island states: Defendants have argued that the discovery rule is and should be applied only to foreign object cases. We believe the same rule should be applied regardless of the type of negligence involved. Again, in the Yoshizaki case the court states: Another case which rejected the contention that the discovery rule should be applied only to foreign objects cases is Wilkinson v. Harrington, supra. A final argument which the defendants raise is that there was no "fraudulent concealment" by the doctors. However, this argument is not relevant under the facts as alleged in the instant case. The fraudulent concealment issue would be applicable, for example, where a plaintiff discovers an injury and then is reassured by the doctor that nothing is wrong. Thus we hold that in a professional negligence case the cause of action "accrues" when the patient discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the doctor's negligence. The plaintiff in this case should have his day in court to show, if he can, that he began the action within two years after he discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the alleged negligence of the doctor. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein expressed. DAY, HODGES and LEE, JJ., concur.