Title: County of Chesterfield v. Tetra Associates, LLC

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 082575 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
 
 
 February 25, 2010 
TETRA ASSOCIATES, LLC 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Michael C. Allen, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we address whether the circuit court 
erred by declaring that two Chesterfield County ordinances, 
which were relied upon by the County in rejecting a 
preliminary subdivision application, violated the Code of 
Virginia and were void. 
The issue in this case concerns the validity of three 
separate ordinance provisions in the Chesterfield County Code 
of Ordinances (1997) (County Code). 
The first ordinance provision is found in County Code 
§ 17-2, a definition section of the County’s Subdivision 
Ordinance, which defines “Subdivision, residential parcel” as 
the “division . . . of any parcel of land for residential use, 
into two or more parcels all of which are more than five 
acres.”  The second ordinance provision, also found in County 
Code § 17-2, defines “Subdivision, lot” as the “division of 
any parcel of land for residential or residential townhouse 
use, into two or more lots, any one of which is less than five 
acres . . . for the purpose [of] residential or residential 
townhouse use.”  The third ordinance provision is County Code 
§ 17-36(a), also in the County’s Subdivision Ordinance, titled 
“Recordation of subdivision plat prior to compliance with 
zoning ordinance prohibited,” which provides: 
Except as noted in sub-section (b), no plat for a 
lot subdivision shall be recorded unless the land is 
included within a residential, or townhouse 
residential zoning district, or is a residential use 
in a commercial zoning district as defined by 
chapter 19 of this Code. 
 
The validity of these ordinance provisions is decided in 
the context of two other County Code ordinance provisions.  
The first such ordinance is County Code § 19-123(a), in the 
County’s Zoning Ordinance, which provides that “Residential 
use” is a permitted “by right” use in the “A Agricultural 
District.”  The second ordinance is County Code § 19-128(f), 
also in the County’s Zoning Ordinance, which permits one acre 
lots in the Agricultural District, providing: 
Required lot area.  Each primary structure, together 
with accessory structures, hereafter erected shall 
be located on a lot having an area of not less than 
43,560 square feet [i.e. one acre] and a width of 
not less than 150 feet. 
 
Facts and Proceedings 
Tetra Associates, LLC (Tetra) owns a 7.071 acre parcel of 
land in Chesterfield County.  The property is zoned 
Agricultural pursuant to the County Code.  Tetra filed a 
 
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preliminary subdivision application to divide its property 
into five residential lots, with a minimum lot size of 43,560 
square feet (one acre) and a minimum lot width of 150 feet.  
The Planning Department reviewed the application and notified 
Tetra that its application must be modified to comply with the 
County Code.  Among its comments and suggestions, the Planning 
Department noted: 
This subdivision does not comply with Section 17-36 
of the Chesterfield County Subdivision Ordinance.  
Section 17-36 prohibits recordation of a plat for a 
lot subdivision unless the land is included within a 
residential or townhouse residential zoned district.  
This tentative [plat] is on land which is zoned 
Agricultural and therefore does not comply with 
Section 17-36 and must be rezoned for residential 
use. 
 
 
The Planning Department also noted: 
Based on the fact that this property is zoned 
Agricultural it cannot be subdivided as shown on the 
plat dated 1/12/05[.  B]ased on Section 17-36 of the 
Subdivision Ordinance the property must be zoned to 
a residential zone to divide it as shown.  Please 
contact the zoning group for information on the 
zoning process.1 
 
Tetra filed an action for declaratory relief, asking the 
circuit court to:  “[d]eclare that the County’s disapproval of 
                                                 
1 When Tetra’s preliminary subdivision application was 
denied, Tetra filed an amended application reducing the number 
of lots to four lots, each with a minimum lot size of more 
than one acre and a minimum lot width of 150 feet.  The 
Planning Department rejected this application with comments 
similar to the comments above.  However, even before the 
Planning Department’s comments were received by Tetra, Tetra 
instituted legal action. 
 
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the preliminary subdivision application is not properly based 
on the applicable subdivision ordinances and, as a result, is 
improper and void;” “[d]eclare . . . the County’s disapproval 
of the preliminary subdivision application to be arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable;” declare that County Code § 17-36 
is void; and declare that County Code § 17-2 is void “to the 
extent it requires that [Tetra’s property] be rezoned prior to 
being subdivided.”  The County filed a motion to dismiss, 
which the circuit court denied.  Thereafter, the parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment. 
The circuit court entered a final order granting Tetra’s 
motion for summary judgment.  The circuit court issued a 
letter opinion, in which the court stated that the County’s 
authority to establish ordinances for the subdivision of land 
derives from Code §§ 15.2-2240 through -2279.  Furthermore, 
the court noted that Code § 15.2-2241 provides “mandatory” 
provisions for subdivision ordinances, and Code § 15.2-2242 
provides “optional” provisions for subdivision ordinances.  
The circuit court stated that these two code sections 
“comprise the universe of powers granted to the County in the 
exercise of its authority to regulate the subdivision of 
land.”  The circuit court ruled that neither of these statutes 
allow the County to demand rezoning as a condition to 
subdivision approval, and accordingly ruled that County Code 
 
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§§ 17-2 and -36 were void.  The circuit court also ruled that 
the County’s disapproval of Tetra’s preliminary subdivision 
application on the basis of Tetra’s failure to comply with 
these provisions of the County Code was void and that the 
County was required to approve Tetra’s subdivision 
application. 
Discussion 
On appeal, the County argues that the circuit court erred 
when it ruled that County Code §§ 17-2 and -36 were void.  
According to the County, Code §§ 15.2-2201 through -2279 
“allow[] local governments to independently define what 
constitutes a subdivision and establish minimum subdivision 
parcel sizes.”  The County also asserts that the circuit court 
erred in ruling that the County required Tetra to rezone its 
property because, according to the County, County Code §§ 17-2 
and -36 do not require property to be rezoned as a condition 
to subdivision approval. 
The County contends that Code § 15.2-2201 and case law 
grant localities “‘clear’ authority to define subdivision[s] 
within their borders by lot size and number.”  The County 
asserts that the circuit court committed error by focusing its 
analysis solely on Code §§ 15.2-2241 and -2242, and not 
applying the related provisions appearing in Code §§ 15.2-2201 
though -2279.  By failing to do so, the County argues that the 
 
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circuit court failed to look at the entire statutory framework 
that provides localities the power to enact subdivision 
ordinances. 
The County also asserts that the circuit court 
misinterpreted this Court’s holding in Board of Supervisors v. 
Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. 497, 522 S.E.2d 610 (1999).  The 
County argues that Countryside is distinguishable from this 
case because the Planning Department’s denial of Tetra’s 
application was not improperly based on “zoning 
considerations,” but was based upon valid ordinances defining 
the term “subdivision” and regulating the subdivision of land. 
Finally, the County argues that the circuit court erred 
by ruling County Code §§ 17-2 and -36 void in their entirety.  
Rather, assuming the circuit court was correct in declaring 
the relevant sections of County Code §§ 17-2 and -36 void, the 
County asserts that the circuit court should have severed the 
offending portions of the ordinances from the valid portions, 
ruling only the offending portions void. 
Tetra responds that the circuit court did not improperly 
apply the rules of statutory construction because it properly 
considered Code §§ 15.2-2240 through –2279 and Countryside.  
Tetra contends that by creating separate rules for 
“Subdivision, lot” and “Subdivision, residential parcel” in 
County Code § 17-2, the County is attempting to regulate 
 
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subdivision of property in a manner not permitted under the 
limited authority granted by the Code of Virginia. 
Tetra argues that through the definition of “Subdivision, 
residential parcel,” the County attempts to dictate minimum 
lot size by requiring subdivided lots in the Agricultural 
District to be at least five acres.  Tetra contends that this 
violates the holding of Countryside because it effectively 
rezones Tetra’s property by imposing restrictions on uses that 
are otherwise allowed in the Agricultural District. 
Finally, Tetra argues that the circuit court’s order 
declaring County Code §§ 17-2 and -36 void is not 
impermissibly overbroad.  Tetra acknowledges that the circuit 
court stated that “the subject provisions of the subdivision 
ordinance are void and unenforceable,” and thus Tetra concedes 
that the circuit court only intended to invalidate the 
provisions in County Code § 17-2 defining “Subdivision, lot” 
and “Subdivision, residential parcel,” which the County relied 
upon in denying Tetra’s application, as well as subsection (a) 
in County Code § 17-36. 
We first address whether the County had the authority to 
enact the County Code sections that the circuit court has 
ruled void. 2  By enacting Code § 15.2-2201, the General 
                                                 
2 The County’s argument that Code §§ 15.2-2201 through –
2279, which comprise a portion of Chapter 22 of the Code of 
 
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Assembly conferred upon localities the power to enact their 
own definition of “subdivision.”  Nevertheless, localities’ 
power to define “subdivision,” and thereby regulate the 
subdivision of property, is limited.  We have previously 
stated that localities may not, “under the guise of a 
subdivision ordinance, enact standards which would effectively 
permit [localities] to rezone property in a manner 
inconsistent with the uses permitted by the property’s zoning 
classification.”  Countryside, 258 Va. at 504-05, 552 S.E.2d 
at 613-14.  Thus, our inquiry focuses on whether County Code 
§ 17-36(a), which prohibits lot subdivision in the 
Agricultural District, imposes restrictions on the subdivision 
of Tetra’s land which are otherwise permitted by the Zoning 
Ordinance governing the Agricultural District. 
County Code § 19-128(f) permits one acre lots in the 
Agricultural District.  By imposing a five acre minimum lot 
size in the Agricultural District through applications of 
County Code § 17-36(a) and the definitions of lot subdivision 
and residential parcel subdivision contained in County Code 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Virginia titled “Planning, Subdivision of Land and Zoning,” as 
well as this Court’s decision in Board of Supervisors v. 
Georgetown Land Co., 204 Va. 380, 131 S.E.2d 290 (1963), grant 
localities the authority to define the term “subdivision” does 
not address the issue in this case.  The issue is not whether 
the County has been granted the authority to regulate 
subdivision, but rather whether a locality’s subdivision 
ordinance can be applied to effectively rezone property. 
 
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§ 17-2, the County infringes upon the right to subdivide to a 
minimum one acre parcel of land in the Agricultural District 
even though a residence on a one acre lot is a permitted use 
in Tetra’s property’s current Agricultural zoning 
classification.  County Code § 17-36(a), by prohibiting a lot 
subdivision in the Agricultural District and requiring a 
residential parcel subdivision with a requisite five acre 
minimum lot size, effectively rezones Tetra’s property in a 
manner inconsistent with the uses permitted by Tetra’s 
Agricultural zoning classification.  The County is not 
permitted to use a subdivision ordinance to prohibit a use of 
Tetra’s property that is permitted by the property’s zoning 
classification.  258 Va. at 505, 522 S.E.2d at 614. 
We agree with Tetra that the circuit court correctly 
ruled that the County shall be required to process Tetra’s 
preliminary subdivision application.  The effect of County 
Code § 17-36(a) and the definitions of “Subdivision, lot” and 
“Subdivision, residential parcel” in County Code § 17-2 is to 
restrict the use of lot subdivisions to the residential zoning 
district, townhouse residential zoning district, and 
residential use in a commercial zoning district even though 
County Code §§ 19-123(a) and -128(f) permit residential use 
and one acre lots, respectively, in the Agricultural District.  
The County Code ordinance provisions at issue in this case do 
 
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not allow lot subdivisions with a minimum lot size of one acre 
in the Agricultural District, which exceeds the County’s 
authority granted by the General Assembly in drafting a 
subdivision ordinance.  Countryside, 258 Va. at 505, 522 
S.E.2d at 614.  Thus, County Code § 17-36(a) is void as 
violative of the Code of Virginia.  The definitions of 
“Subdivision, lot” and “Subdivision, residential parcel” as 
applied to a preliminary subdivision application in the 
County’s zoned Agricultural District are likewise violative of 
the Code of Virginia and void. 
We also hold that the circuit court, as it expressed in 
its final order, erred in declaring County Code §§ 17-2 and -
36 void in their entirety.  The circuit court’s order states, 
in pertinent part:  “§ 17-36 of the Chesterfield County 
subdivision ordinance is violative of the Code of Virginia and 
void [and] § 17-2 of the Chesterfield County subdivision 
ordinance is violative of the Code of Virginia and void 
. . . .”  Despite the agreement of the County and Tetra that 
only certain provisions of these County Code sections were an 
improper exercise of the County’s authority, the circuit 
court’s order, on its face, rules County Code §§ 17-2 and -36 
void in their entirety. 
County Code § 17-2, titled “Definitions,” provides a list 
of 86 definitions, only two of which Tetra claimed were void 
 
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as an improper exercise of the County’s authority.  Also, 
Tetra’s complaint regarding County Code § 17-36 is limited to 
subsection (a).  Thus, the circuit court should have focused 
its ruling on the relevant sections of County Code § 17-2 and 
-36, rather than declaring the entirety of these County Code 
sections void.  County Code § 1-3, titled “Severability of 
parts of Code,” provides: 
The chapters, articles, sections, paragraphs, 
sentences, clauses, phrases and words of this Code 
are severable. If any word, phrase, clause, 
sentence, paragraph, section, article or chapter of 
this Code is declared unconstitutional or invalid by 
the valid judgment or decree of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, such unconstitutionality or invalidity 
shall not affect any of the remaining chapters, 
articles, phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, 
sections and words of this Code. 
 
We have addressed the principle of “severability” in the 
context of challenges to laws passed by the General Assembly.  
In discussing the doctrine of severability as applied to 
constitutional challenges to an act passed by the General 
Assembly, we stated: 
The principle of severability is also applicable to 
the various provisions of an enactment.  The General 
Assembly expressly has provided that any 
unconstitutional provisions of an enactment will be 
severed from its remaining valid provisions, unless 
the enactment specifically states that its 
provisions may not be severed or that the provisions 
must operate in accord with one another. 
 
Marshall v. Northern Va. Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 428, 657 
S.E.2d 71, 76 (2008) (citing Code § 1-243). 
 
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Like the enactment by the General Assembly reviewed in 
Marshall, the County has explicitly provided that invalid or 
unconstitutional provisions of the County Code are severable.  
Thus, the circuit court erred in ruling County Code §§ 17-2 
and -36 void in their entirety. 
Conclusion 
The circuit court erred by declaring County Code §§ 17-2 
and -36 void in their entirety.  However, County Code §§ 17-
36(a) is void as an exercise of power not authorized by the 
General Assembly.  The definitions of “Subdivision, lot” and 
“Subdivision, residential parcel” are void as applied to 
Tetra’s preliminary subdivision application for a lot 
subdivision of its property located in the Agricultural 
District.  We will remand this proceeding to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
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