Title: In Re Ashworth

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

287 So. 2d 843 (1974)
In the Matter of Honorable Virgis M. ASHWORTH, Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Alabama.
Misc. No. 428.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 10, 1974.
*844 PER CURIAM.
Hon. Virgis M. Ashworth, a circuit judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit has filed a petition with this court to have a judicial determination as to the prior service time to which he is entitled to be credited as a basis for retirement status under the provisions of the Judicial Retirement Act passed by the 1973 general session of the Alabama Legislature, which Act was approved by the Governor on 18 September 1973 as Act No. 1163.
The prior service for which Judge Ashworth has claimed credit is as follows:
The total of non-judicial time credit claimed by Judge Ashworth is therefore 16 years, 7 months, and 12 days. There can, of course, be no question concerning Judge Ashworth's service as a circuit judge beginning 16 January 1971 and continuing so long as he remains in office.
The Board of Control of the Retirement System through Mr. Charles A. Holston, Retirement System Executive, has notified Judge Ashworth that the three year time period claimed by him toward retirement credit for the period of time from 1 October 1942 to 1 October 1945, for service as Deputy Circuit Solicitor for Bibb County, has been recommended for disallowance. The basis of this recommended disallowance is that Section 195(1)(e), Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940, provides:
It is apparently the view of the Board of Control that since Judge Ashworth's service as Deputy Solicitor of Bibb County terminated more than three years prior to his assuming judicial office, this claimed credit of time cannot be allowed.
The Board also recommended that Judge Ashworth be allowed only two years and six months as credit for prior legislative service, stating:
As provided in Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act, Judge Ashworth has filed a petition with this court to have a judicial determination relative to the recommendations of the Retirement Board disallowing credit for retirement purposes of his service as Deputy Solicitor of Bibb County, for the period of time from 1 October 1942 to 1 October 1945, and also disallowing credit for legislative service for more than two years and six months, instead of the eight years to which he asserts he is entitled.
It is Judge Ashworth's contention that the provisions of Act No. 1873, passed in *845 the Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature of 1971, and approved 20 September 1971, and which for convenience may be found as Section 260(11b), Title 13, Revised Code of Alabama 1958, when read with Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act, entitles him to the credits toward retirement under the Judicial Retirement Act.
Act No. 1873, relating to Supernumerary District Attorneys, in parts pertinent to this review reads:
That part of Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act pertinent here is as follows:
Under the Supernumerary District Attorneys Act above mentioned, Judge Ashworth would be entitled to credit for all of the periods of prior service claimed by him toward supernumerary status as a district attorney in as much as there is no requirement that a period of time claimed as deputy circuit solicitor must have terminated within three years of a claimant becoming a circuit judge. Nor is there any limitation in the Act on the period of time claimed for service in the legislature, but the Act provides that a district attorney may claim as time served his service as a judge of a court of record, county solicitor, or any other county-wide elective office. A member of the Alabama House of Representatives, at the time of Judge Ashworth's service in said body, was a county-wide elected official of Bibb County.
Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act very clearly provides that any circuit judge holding office at the effective date of the Act, "who is entitled to credit for prior service toward earning supernumerary status in a position other than circuit judge, shall be entitled to have all such service credited toward retirement under this bill * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
Thus when the above quoted provisions of Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act are read in light of Act No. 1873 (Supernumerary District Attorneys Act), the conclusion is necessitated that Judge Ashworth is entitled to all of the prior service he has claimed toward credit in determining his retirement status.
*846 The reason assigned by the Retirement Board for recommending disallowance of the credit claimed by Judge Ashworth for his three year service as County Solicitor for Bibb County is that such service terminated three years before Judge Ashworth assumed his office as circuit judge, and such service is not allowable under the provisions of Section 195(1)(e) of Title 13 of our Code.
An examination of Section 195(1)(e) shows that it is in the article dealing solely with "Supernumerary Circuit Judges." Judge Ashworth is not seeking to establish time credit toward supernumerary circuit judge status, but is seeking to have credited service time under the Supernumerary District Attorneys Act to which he would have been entitled in determining his status as supernumerary district attorney. If entitled to such credit under the Supernumerary District Attorneys Act, and we think it clear that he would be, then under the above mentioned provisions of Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act, he is entitled to have this prior service in a non-judicial office credited toward retirement status under the Judicial Retirement Act.
We also note that in refusing to recommend more than two years and six months credit for legislative service, rather than the eight year service credit to which Judge Ashworth would be entitled under the Supernumerary District Attorneys Act above referred to, the Retirement Board has expressed the view that it felt that the intent of the Judicial Retirement Act, as evidenced in Section 10 of said Act, was "to limit legislative service credit to two years and six months, if the incumbent is to retire under the Judicial Retirement Act, its provisions should be primary."
Section 10, above mentioned, in parts pertinent to this determination reads:
We are in accord with the observation of the Retirement Board that the provisions of the Judicial Retirement Act should be primary. However, the legislative intent in enacting the Judicial Retirement Act is to be determined from an examination of all of the sections of the Act rather than determining such intent from only one section of the Act. This for the reason that the well settled rule of construing statutes is that every word and each section thereof must be given effect, if possible, and construed with other sections in pari materia. Ex parte Darnell, 262 *847 Ala. 118, 94 So. 2d 863; State ex rel. Moore v. Strickland, 289 Ala. 488, 268 So. 2d 766.
If there is a conflict in the provisions of the same Act, the last provision in point of arrangement must control. Wilkins v. Woolf, 281 Ala. 693, 208 So. 2d 74.
However, we do not consider that there is a conflict between Section 9 and Section 10 of the Judicial Retirement Act.
Section 9 authorizes the crediting of prior service accumulated toward earning supernumerary status, and provides that all such service is to be credited toward retirement status.
On the other hand, Section 10, after dealing with the matter of the transfer of contributions and acquired retirement time under the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama to the Judicial Retirement Fund, authorizes a justice or judge holding office at the time of the effective date of the Judicial Retirement Act to obtain service credit for time served in a legal or a judicial position, if he was a former member, or could have become a member, of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama, and additionally to obtain credit for a maximum of two years and six months for service in the legislature. If an incumbent judge elects to claim such service credit, then he must pay into the Judicial Retirement Fund a sum equal to four and one-half percent of his then annual salary for each year he elects to count toward gaining judicial retirement.
Section 10 therefore relates to service credit other that that earned toward gaining supernumerary status as may be provided in other codal provisions.
Judge Ashworth, having notified this court in writing of the service for which he desires to be credited, and for which he would be entitled to credit toward supernumerary status as a district attorney, it is our conclusion, and we judicially determine for the reasons above set out that Judge Ashworth is entitled to have the services he claims credited toward retirement under the Judicial Retirement Act.
The Clerk of this Court is directed to notify the Board of Control of the State Employees' Retirement System of this determination.
All Justices concur.