Title: State of Maine v. Weddle

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2024 ME 26 
Docket: 
SRP-23-108 
Argued: 
January 10, 2024 
Decided: 
 April 16, 2024 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
RANDALL J. WEDDLE 
 
 
LAWRENCE, J. 
[¶1]  Randall J. Weddle appeals from the sentence the trial court (Knox 
County, Stokes, J.) imposed on two counts of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 203(1)(A) (2023), two counts of causing a death while operating under the 
influence (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A) (2023), and eleven other 
related charges.1  We affirmed the judgment of conviction in State v. Weddle, 
2020 ME 12, 224 A.3d 1035, and we now affirm the sentence imposed by the 
court. 
 
1  Weddle was also convicted of one count of causing injury while operating under the influence 
(Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1) (2023), one count of aggravated driving to endanger 
(Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1-A) (2023), one count of driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. 
§ 2413(1), and eight counts of violations of commercial motor carrier operator rules (Class E), 29-A 
M.R.S. § 558-A(1)(A) (2023).   
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
Facts 
 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and our 
2020 opinion affirming Weddle’s conviction, Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ¶¶ 3-9, 224 
A.3d 1035.  See Gordon v. State, 2024 ME 7, ¶ 2, 308 A.3d 228.   
 
[¶3]  “On March 18, 2016, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and 
medical rescue personnel responded to a major motor vehicle accident on 
Route 17 in Washington, Maine.”  Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ¶ 3, 224 A.3d 1035.  The 
accident involved five vehicles, one of which was engulfed in flames, and 
resulted in the death of two drivers.  Id.  After an investigation, officers 
determined that Weddle, the driver of a larger tractor trailer, had caused the 
accident.  Id. ¶¶ 3-7.  Hospital tests revealed that Weddle had alcohol in his 
system.  Id. ¶ 7.  Several days after the accident, officers found a 
three-quarters-full whiskey bottle and a shot glass in Weddle’s truck.  Id. ¶ 7.   
B. 
Procedure 
[¶4]  In June 2016, Weddle was charged by indictment with two counts 
of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), two counts of aggravated 
criminal 
operating 
under 
the 
influence 
(Class 
B), 
29-A 
M.R.S. 
§ 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A), one count of causing injury while operating under the 
 
 
3 
influence (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1), one count of aggravated 
driving to endanger (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1-A) (2023), one count of 
driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1), and eight counts of 
violating commercial motor carrier operator rules (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. 
§ 558-A(1)(A) (2023).  Id. ¶ 8.   
[¶5]  The court held a jury trial from January 23 to 29, 2018.  The jury 
found Weddle guilty of all counts.  On March 23, 2018, the court held a 
sentencing hearing.  The court conducted a Hewey sentencing analysis, see State 
v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993); 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C (2018),2 
regarding the manslaughter counts.  In setting the basic sentence at twenty 
years, the court considered the nature and circumstances of the crime.  17-A 
M.R.S. § 1252-C(1).  Specifically, Weddle had operated a commercial vehicle 
carrying a load of lumber when he was ill, fatigued, and taking prescription 
medication for which the use of alcohol was contraindicated; and he had alcohol 
above the legal limit in his system.3  He exceeded the fifty-mile-per-hour speed 
 
2  Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C has since been repealed and replaced.  See P.L. 2019, ch. 113, §§ A-1, 
A-2 (effective May 16, 2019) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602 (2023)).   
3  The court understood that Weddle’s prescription medication should not be taken in conjunction 
with the use of alcohol, because the two substances together can intensify the impairment of a 
person’s mental and physical faculties, the same faculties that would be critical to the operation of an 
80,000-pound, fully loaded tractor trailer.   
 
 
4 
limit by twenty to thirty miles per hour.  The court also looked at comparable 
cases provided by Weddle and noted that most, if not all, of the comparable 
cases involved passenger automobiles, not commercial vehicles.  The court 
noted the need to take account of “the difference between an automobile -- a 
passenger automobile and a commercial vehicle” weighing forty tons when 
fully loaded; the latter is “a massive projectile” that “carries with it the potential 
for lethality that is almost incalculable.”   
[¶6]  In setting the maximum sentence at thirty years, the court weighed 
mitigating and aggravating factors.  17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2).  For mitigating 
factors, the court considered Weddle’s work history and his letter of remorse.4  
For aggravating factors, the court considered the impact of the multiple-vehicle 
crash on the victims and their families, Weddle’s criminal history (including 
twelve prior OUI convictions, eleven speeding violations, and Weddle’s loss of 
licenses in different states), and the need to protect the public.  The court 
concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.   
[¶7]  The court set the final sentence at thirty years, with all but 
twenty-five years suspended, followed by four years of probation.  The court 
 
4  The court also observed, however, that Weddle did not exhibit significant acceptance of 
responsibility for the crash, and it did not accord him “much mitigation on that score.”   
 
 
5 
believed that a period of supervision following Weddle’s release from 
incarceration would protect the public.  The court imposed a range of terms of 
incarceration for the other counts to run concurrently with the two 
manslaughter sentences.   
[¶8]  Weddle did not timely apply for review of his sentence.  See M.R. 
App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20(b).  He filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 21, 
2020.  During the post-conviction review proceeding,5 the parties and the court 
agreed to allow Weddle to apply for review of his sentence, see 15 M.R.S. § 2130 
(2023) (permitting a post-conviction court to “grant[] the right to take an 
appeal from the criminal judgment”), which he did.  The Sentence Review panel 
granted his application to appeal his sentence.  See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-52 (2023).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶9]  On appeal, Weddle challenges both the legality and propriety of the 
sentence.6   
 
5  Pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2131(1) (2023) and M.R. App. P. 19(f), Weddle filed an appeal seeking a 
certificate of probable cause permitting our review of the post-conviction court’s denial of the 
remainder of his petition for post-conviction review.  On February 9, 2024, we entered the denial of 
his request for a certificate of probable cause.   
6  Although Weddle did not raise the legality of the sentence in his direct appeal, State v. Weddle, 
2020 ME 12, 224 A.3d 1035, the Sentence Review Panel and the Law Court have the statutory 
authority to review questions of legality in a discretionary sentence review.  See State v. 
Murray-Burns, 2023 ME 21, ¶¶ 12-17, 290 A.3d 542; 15 M.R.S. § 2152 (2023).   
 
 
6 
A. 
Legality of the Sentence 
[¶10]  Weddle first argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because 
it is not proportioned to the offense.  We review de novo the legality and 
constitutionality of a sentence.  State v. Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 13, 184 A.3d 880.  
We have established a two-part test to determine whether a sentence violates 
the Maine Constitution.7  State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶¶ 18-19, 21 A.3d 1033; 
Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 15, 184 A.3d 880; see Me. Const. art. I, § 9 (“[A]ll penalties 
and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense.”).  We consider “whether 
the sentence imposed is greatly disproportionate” and “whether it offends 
prevailing notions of decency, whether it shocks the conscience of the public, 
or our own respective or collective sense of fairness, or whether it is inhuman 
or barbarous.”  Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 18, 21 A.3d 1033 (alterations and 
quotation marks omitted).  “Because the Legislature is the voice of the 
sovereign people and thus expresses the people’s will, only the most extreme 
punishment decided upon by that body as appropriate for an offense could . . . 
be unconstitutionally disproportionate.”  See State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 23, 
993 A.2d 14 (citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 
7  The “United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Maine Constitution anticipates a 
broader proportionality review than the Eighth Amendment.”  State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 26, 
65 A.3d 1242; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 982 (1991).  
 
 
7 
[¶11]  When analyzing proportionality, we “begin by comparing the 
gravity of the offense [to] the severity of the sentence.”  Lopez, 2018 ME 59, 
¶ 16, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted).  “We have previously compared 
a defendant’s offense to his sentence by (1) evaluating where that defendant’s 
term of imprisonment fell within the range of incarceration time authorized by 
the Legislature, and (2) considering the facts of a case in conjunction with the 
commonly accepted goals of punishment.”  Id. (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).   
[¶12]  We examine the plain language and occasionally the legislative 
purpose and history of a classification of a crime to determine whether a 
defendant’s term of imprisonment fell within the range of incarceration time 
authorized by the Legislature.  See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 24, 993 A.2d 14; 
Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 20, 184 A.3d 880; cf. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶¶ 28-29, 21 A.3d 
1033.  Here, 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(2)(A) permits a maximum term of 
imprisonment of thirty years for manslaughter.  See 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A).  
Vehicular manslaughter was originally designated as a Class C offense, 
permitting a maximum term of imprisonment of five years.  See P.L. 1977, 
ch. 510, § 40 (effective October 24, 1977) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 203(3) 
(1977)); see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(C) (1975).  The Legislature amended the 
 
 
8 
statute to reclassify vehicular manslaughter as a Class B crime in 1989, and then 
in 1997 eliminated the distinction between vehicular manslaughter and other 
forms of manslaughter by classifying any manslaughter charge as a Class A 
crime.  P.L. 1989, ch. 505, § 1 (effective Sept. 30, 1989) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 203(3)(A) (1989)); P.L. 1997, ch. 34, § 1 (effective June 26, 1997) (codified at 
17-A M.R.S. § 203 (1997)).8  The evolving classification of manslaughter 
committed while operating a vehicle “signals the Legislature’s greater disdain 
for such serious criminal conduct” and its desire that such conduct be punished 
consistently with manslaughter committed in other ways.  Lopez, 2018 ME 59, 
¶ 20, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted).  Weddle’s sentence does not 
exceed the statutory maximum term of imprisonment of thirty years.  
See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 23, 993 A.2d 14. 
[¶13]  The court did not err in considering the facts of the case and the 
goals of punishment.  The court emphasized that Weddle was not only speeding 
while ill, fatigued, and under the influence of prescription drugs and alcohol but 
also behind the wheel of a large tractor trailer that the court characterized as a 
 
8  The Legislature passed the1997 change because, in State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170, 171-72 (Me. 
1995), we vacated a conviction of a Class A manslaughter, because the court did not provide to the 
jury an instruction of a Class B manslaughter charge.  See Summary of Legislation Before the Joint 
Standing Committees 7-8 (Aug. 1997) (“Public Law 1997, chapter 34 overrules State v. Berube to the 
extent that it makes all vehicular homicides a Class A crime.”).   
 
 
9 
“massive projectile,” “missile,” and “deadly weapon that’s traveling on the 
road.”  The sentence also observes the gravity of the crime’s effect on the 
victims and their families.  17-A M.R.S. § 1151(8) (2018).  Weddle’s sentence 
considers his criminal history, including double-digit numbers of prior OUI 
convictions and prior speeding violations, his history of losing driving 
privileges in multiple states, and the necessity for years of incarceration to 
deter further dangerous behavior by Weddle and to promote public safety.  Id. 
§ 1151(1).  We therefore conclude that the sentence is not greatly 
disproportionate to the offense,9 and proceed to analyze whether Weddle’s 
sentence offends prevailing notions of decency.   
[¶14]  A sentence close to the maximum, such as the one at issue here, is 
not necessarily “rare, extreme, or shocking,” because the Legislature accounted 
for the sentence when it set that maximum.  See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 24, 993 
 
9  Weddle cites some cases where defendants committed manslaughter while driving and received 
more lenient sentences to suggest that his sentence is grossly disproportionate.  See State v. Lowe, 
2015 ME 124, ¶¶ 2-7, 15, 124 A.3d 156 (sentence of eight years in prison with all but eighteen months 
suspended and three years of probation); State v. St. Louis, 2008 ME 101, ¶¶ 2-5, 951 A.2d 81 
(sentence of ten years in prison, with all but three and one-half years suspended, with six years of 
probation).  However, those cases involve passenger automobiles, not a tractor trailer “missile” as 
the court here described.  Lowe, 2015 ME 124, ¶¶ 2-7, 15, 124 A.3d 156; St. Louis, 2008 ME 101, 
¶¶ 2-5, 951 A.2d 81.   
In any event, we do not need to look at comparable sentences absent an inference of gross 
disproportionality.  See State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20 n.5, 21 A.3d 1033.  The facts here do not give 
rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, so we need not compare Weddle’s sentence to the 
sentences imposed in Lowe and St. Louis.   
 
 
10 
A.2d 14.  The surrounding facts and circumstances related to Weddle’s conduct 
support the conclusion that the sentence was not barbarous: Weddle should 
not have been driving a large, fully-loaded tractor trailer, but he did so, 
traveling at speeds twenty to thirty miles per hour over the posted speed limit, 
when he was ill, fatigued, and under the influence of prescription drugs and 
alcohol.  See, e.g., Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20, 21 A.3d 1033 (observing that when 
the manner in which a crime occurred is such that the Legislature could not 
have envisioned a much worse scenario for the commission of the offense, 
imposition of the maximum allowable sentence for such conduct “is not the 
rare, extreme, or shocking case that would offend either the Eighth Amendment 
or article I, section 9” of the Maine Constitution (quotation marks omitted)).   
B. 
Propriety of the Sentence 
[¶15]  Weddle next challenges the propriety of the sentence.  “We review 
the sentencing court’s determination of the basic sentence de novo for 
misapplication of legal principles and its determination of the maximum 
sentence [and the final sentence] for abuse of discretion.”  State v. Chase, 2023 
ME 32, ¶ 28, 294 A.3d 154 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).   
[¶16]  A court is bound by the process and factors prescribed in 17-A 
M.R.S. § 1252-C when sentencing a person convicted of a felony.  See State v. 
 
 
11 
Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993).  The Hewey analysis consists of 
three steps: (1) “determin[ing] a basic term of imprisonment by considering 
the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the 
offender”; (2) “determin[ing] the maximum period of imprisonment to be 
imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating 
and mitigating, appropriate to that case”; and (3) “determin[ing] what portion, 
if any, of the maximum period of imprisonment should be suspended.”  17-A 
M.R.S. § 1252-C.   
[¶17]  Contrary to Weddle’s arguments, the sentence imposed by the 
court is not excessively harsh.  At the sentencing hearing, the court conducted 
a sentencing analysis following the statutory procedure.10  The court 
considered both aggravating and mitigating factors in setting the maximum 
sentence at thirty years.  As a serious aggravating factor, the court considered 
Weddle’s criminal history—which included twelve OUIs and eleven speeding 
violations, multiple license suspensions, and other rules violations.  As the court 
noted, Weddle should not have been driving any vehicle, let alone a commercial 
vehicle.   
 
10  Weddle does not appear to challenge his basic sentence for a misapplication of principle.   
 
 
12 
[¶18]  The court misapplied no legal principles in setting the maximum 
sentence; although the court considered Weddle’s letter of remorse and work 
history as mitigating factors, his criminal history, the impact on victims, and the 
need to protect the public manifestly demonstrate that a maximum sentence of 
thirty years is not excessive.  The court carefully weighed the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances of Weddle’s case as required by section 1252-C(2) 
and did not abuse its discretion.  See, e.g., State v. Gatson, 2021 ME 25, ¶¶ 36-37, 
250 A.3d 137.   
[¶19]  The court then considered the appropriateness of suspending a 
portion of the sentence and placing Weddle on probation pursuant to section 
1252-C(3).  Although the court had doubts about Weddle’s prospects for 
rehabilitation given his lengthy criminal record, it ultimately decided that a 
long period of supervision for Weddle after his release would be important for 
him, see State v. Black, 2007 ME 19, ¶ 14, 914 A.2d 723, and serve to protect the 
public, see State v. Dalli, 2010 ME 113, ¶ 14, 8 A.3d 632.  The resulting final 
sentence was reasonable and conformed to the applicable sentencing factors, 
and was therefore not an abuse of discretion.   
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michelle R. King, Esq. (orally), Irwin & Morris, Portland, for appellant Randall J. 
Weddle 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Jeffrey Baroody, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Knox County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2016-474 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY