Title: Rector and Visitors of UVA v. Carter

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
THE RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
RECORD NO. 030258 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
January 16, 2004 
TINA MARIE CARTER 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 
Edward L. Hogshire, Judge 
 
 
The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 
("UVA") appeal an interlocutory order of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Charlottesville pursuant to Code § 8.01-670.1.  On 
appeal, UVA argues that the Virginia Tort Claims Act (Code 
§§ 8.01-195.1 through –195.9) provides for limited waiver of the 
sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth but leaves intact the 
sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth's agencies. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
This case arises from a medical malpractice action brought 
by Tina Marie Carter ("Carter") alleging negligence in the 
insertion of an epidural catheter.  Carter timely filed a motion 
for judgment against the University of Virginia Health System 
("UVHS"), and a resident physician.  The resident physician 
filed a plea of sovereign immunity and was dismissed as a party. 
UVHS then moved for summary judgment asserting it is not capable 
of being sued because it is not a legal entity.  In response, 
Carter moved to amend her motion for judgment to substitute UVA 
as the sole defendant in place of UVHS.  The trial court granted 
Carter's motion to amend.  The Commonwealth is not named as a 
party defendant in Carter's pleadings. 
 
UVA filed a plea of sovereign immunity, which the trial 
court denied by order dated October 26, 2001.  With Carter's 
consent, UVA moved the trial court to certify an interlocutory 
appeal from that order pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-670.1.  
The trial court entered the order of certification dated January 
29, 2003.  We granted UVA this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Virginia Tort Claims Act (the "Act"), provides that: 
the Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money 
. . . on account of . . . personal injury or death 
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of 
any employee while acting within the scope of his 
employment under circumstances where the Commonwealth 
. . ., if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant for such . . . injury or death. 
 
Code § 8.01-195.3 (emphasis added).  UVA argues that the Act 
provides an express, limited waiver only of the Commonwealth's 
sovereign immunity but does not disturb the sovereign immunity 
of the Commonwealth's agencies.  We agree. 
 
Absent an express statutory or constitutional provision 
waiving sovereign immunity, the Commonwealth and its agencies 
are immune from liability for the tortious acts or omissions of 
their agents and employees.  Patten v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
654, 658, 553 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2001); Baumgardner v. 
 
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Southwestern Va. Mental Health Inst., 247 Va. 486, 489, 442 
S.E.2d 400, 401 (1994).  "In 1981, the General Assembly stated 
in the Act an express, limited waiver of the Commonwealth's 
immunity from tort claims."  Patten, 262 Va. at 658, 553 S.E.2d 
at 519; see also Baumgardner, 247 Va. at 489, 442 S.E.2d at 402.  
The limited waiver provided for in the Act will be strictly 
construed because the Act is a statute in derogation of the 
common law.  Patten, 262 Va. at 658, 553 S.E.2d at 519; 
Baumgardner, 247 Va. 486, 489, 442 S.E.2d at 402. 
 
Under the plain language of the Act, the Commonwealth (and 
certain "transportation districts" not here relevant) are the 
only entities for which sovereign immunity is waived.  See Code 
§ 8.01-195.3 (stating that "the Commonwealth shall be liable for 
claims for money").  The Act contains no express provision 
waiving sovereign immunity for agencies of the Commonwealth, 
which we have stated repeatedly is a mandatory requirement 
before waiver occurs.  Id.  As an agency of the Commonwealth, 
UVA is entitled to sovereign immunity under the common law 
absent an express constitutional or statutory provision to the 
contrary.  There is no such waiver in the Act or elsewhere.  See 
James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 51, 282 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1980) 
(noting that UVA is entitled to the sovereign immunity granted 
to the Commonwealth under the common law). 
 
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Carter argues that Code § 8.01-195.4, which states that 
"the Commonwealth shall be a proper party defendant" in all 
actions brought against the Commonwealth under the Act, implies 
that the Commonwealth is not a necessary party to litigation 
under the Act.  Because of the strict construction accorded to 
statutes in derogation of the common law and the lack of an 
express provision limiting the immunity of the Commonwealth's 
agencies, we decline to adopt this view.  The Act's waiver of 
the Commonwealth's immunity would make the Commonwealth both a 
proper party, and given UVA's immunity, a necessary party to a 
claim by Carter. 
 
Carter points out that Code § 8.01-195.6 requires 
plaintiffs bringing suit under the VTCA to file a written 
statement "which includes the time and place at which the injury 
is alleged to have occurred and the agency or agencies alleged 
to be liable."  The fact that the statute refers to "the agency 
or agencies alleged to be liable," serves as proof, Carter 
argues, that the sovereign immunity of those entities has been 
waived.  However, this language does not expressly waive 
agencies' sovereign immunity or even mention the concept.  
Moreover, as Carter admits, Code § 8.01-195.6 is simply a notice 
requirement apprising the Attorney General or the Director of 
the Division of Risk Management of the essential facts of the 
claim. 
 
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Finally, Carter asserts that "[i]t is axiomatic that the 
'Commonwealth' can act, and thus can commit torts, only through 
its agencies and employees."  The reality, of course, is that 
"agencies" are nothing more than administrative divisions of the 
Commonwealth and do not, in and of themselves, act.  Ultimately, 
only an agency's employees can commit torts.  Yet, since 
enactment of the VTCA, we have held on multiple occasions that 
employees of the Commonwealth are entitled to sovereign 
immunity.  See e.g., Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 88, 431 S.E.2d 
642, 646 (1993); Gargiulo v. Ohar, 239 Va. 209, 215, 387 S.E.2d 
787, 791 (1990); Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 83, 372 S.E.2d 
608, 611 (1988).  The VTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the 
Commonwealth only. 
 
If the General Assembly desired in the Act to waive the 
sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth's agencies in addition to 
the immunity of the Commonwealth, it could have easily done so.  
It did not.  Given the Act's lack of an express waiver of the 
common law sovereign immunity afforded the Commonwealth's 
agencies, UVA retains its sovereign immunity from the claim 
brought by Carter.  Accordingly, the trial court was in error 
when it failed to grant UVA's plea of sovereign immunity in its 
October 26, 2001 order. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
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For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the trial 
court's order denying UVA's plea of sovereign immunity.  The 
case will be remanded for entry of an order sustaining the 
defendant's plea of sovereign immunity and dismissing the case. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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