Title: Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.1986 WY 73716 P.2d 334Case Number: 85-154Decided: 03/19/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TIMOTHY OGLE, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., 
AND WYOMING MACHINERY CO., APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

William D. 
Norman, Casper, 
for appellant.

Paul Kapp 
(argued) of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for Caterpillar Tractor 
Co.

Patrick J. 
Murphy (argued), and Stuart R. Day of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, 
Casper, for Wyoming Machinery 
Co.

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ., and GUTHRIE, J. Ret.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this products 
liability action, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
appellee Caterpillar Tractor Company, the manufacturer, and appellee Wyoming 
Machinery Company, the dealer. The court held that the applicable statutes of 
limitation barred the claims of appellant, Timothy Ogle, for negligence and 
breach of warranty, and that the suit could not be sustained because the 
caterpillar scraper which allegedly caused the accident had been altered after 
it left the hands of the manufacturer and dealer.

[¶2.]     The questions presented 
for our determination are:

(a) Whether appellant's 
causes of action in negligence and breach of warranty were filed within the 
limitation periods provided in §§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) and 34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977, 
respectively;

(b) Whether appellant's 
strict liability claim is recognized in Wyoming; and, if so, whether it was properly 
and timely filed; and

(c) Whether appellees' 
material alteration argument justified summary judgment against appellant on any 
of his claims for relief.

We affirm in 
part and reverse in part.

[¶3.]     On January 9, 1980, 
appellant was injured when he fell from the hood of a caterpillar scraper he was 
operating at a uranium mine in CarbonCounty. Appellant's employer, Utah 
International, had purchased the scraper in 1976 from appellee Wyoming Machinery 
Company. It had been manufactured by appellee Caterpillar Tractor 
Company.

[¶4.]     On January 9, 1984, 
exactly four years after his accident, appellant brought suit in the district 
court against Wyoming Machinery and Caterpillar Tractor stating three claims for 
relief. The first claim sounded in negligence and the second in breach of 
warranty. The third, although it did not use the words "strict liability," was 
intended by appellant to allege strict liability in tort. In it, appellant 
states that appellees put the scraper on the market representing that "it could 
be safely operated while doing the job for which it was intended," even though 
it was "unsafe for its intended use." He also alleged that he "was injured as a 
direct result of the defects herein alleged."

[¶5.]     In their answers, 
appellees raised the tort and warranty statutes of limitation as affirmative 
defenses. Sections 1-3-105 and 34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977. After discovery had 
begun, they moved for summary judgment on the same grounds. Caterpillar Tractor 
also added a third ground for summary judgment, arguing that the accident was 
caused by material alterations to the scraper made by Utah International after 
purchase.

[¶6.]     In support of their 
summary judgment motions, appellees filed affidavits, exhibits and depositions 
which established the date that the scraper was sold to Utah International, that 
appellant knew the scraper was dangerous before the accident occurred, and that 
some of its safety features - including a handhold, metal step, and non-slip 
tape - had been removed or worn down. Appellant did not file affidavits or 
contradicting exhibits but did submit a brief to the district court on the day 
the motion was argued.

[¶7.]     The court granted 
summary judgment holding that the statute of limitations on the warranty count 
(§ 34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977) had expired, that appellant had failed to produce 
affidavits showing that the negligence statute of limitations had not expired, 
and that the scraper had been altered after it was sold to appellant's employer. 
The court's order does not indicate why the court dismissed appellant's strict 
liability claim. The court might have dismissed the claim based on the statute 
of limitations or because of alterations in the scraper. It is also possible 
that because strict liability in tort has not yet clearly been adopted in 
Wyoming, the 
court read appellant's third claim as simply a redundant count alleging breach 
of warranty.

[¶8.]     We will discuss the 
propriety of summary judgment from the perspective of each of the three causes 
of action: negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort. We will then 
analyze the manufacturer's material alteration argument to determine whether it 
supports the district court's decision.1

NEGLIGENCE

[¶9.]     An injured person's 
negligence claim is forever barred if he does not bring an action within four 
years after the cause of action accrues. Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), W.S. 1977. A 
cause of action in negligence accrues when "the injured party knows or 
reasonably ought to know that some damage has resulted from the wrongful act." 
Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 
681 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1984). Appellant was injured on January 9, 1980 and knew of 
his injury immediately. He was required to file his complaint within four years 
of that date - i.e., on or before January 9, 1984. He filed his complaint on 
that day, and it was timely.

[¶10.]  The appellees did not produce affidavits 
or other materials showing that appellant suffered injuries more than four years 
before filing his complaint. Their claim that the statute had run was based upon 
an apparent misreading of our clear rule of law established in Anderson v. Bauer, supra. 
Thus, appellees argued that a negligence action can accrue before the damage 
element has occurred. They were wrong as a matter of law, and the district court 
was required to deny the motion even though appellant failed to supply any 
affidavits or exhibits of his own. A motion for summary judgment should not be 
granted simply because the nonmoving party fails to resist it. Metzger v. 
Kalke, Wyo., 709 P.2d 414 (1985). "A movant must 
first submit evidence which establishes a prima facie case * * * and show that 
it is `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (Citations omitted.) Shanor 
v. A-PAC, Ltd., Wyo., 711 P.2d 420 (1986), citing Rule 56(c), 
W.R.C.P. We reverse the court's summary judgment as to the negligence cause of 
action and remand for further proceedings on that claim. 

BREACH OF 
WARRANTY

[¶11.]  Wyoming has adopted the Uniform Commercial 
Code's statute of limitations for breach of contract in sales cases.2 Section 34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977 (§ 
2-725, Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)) states in pertinent 
part:

"(a) An action for breach 
of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause 
of action has accrued.

* * * * * 
*

"(b) A cause of action 
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of 
knowledge of the breach. A breach of 
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a 
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of 
the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues 
when the breach is or should have been discovered."

[¶12.]  On its face, this statute appears to bar 
appellant's warranty claim because appellant filed his complaint in 1984, more 
than four years after the scraper was tendered to his employer in 1976.3 Indeed, most jurisdictions apply 
the statute literally and hold that a breach of warranty action for personal 
injuries is barred when brought more than four years after tender.4

[¶13.]  A substantial minority of state courts 
divide warranty claims into those involving commercial damages and those 
involving personal injury. They apply a tort limitations period, accruing at the 
time the plaintiff discovers his injury, to the warranty claims for personal 
injury. It is important to note, however, that sixteen of these courts base 
their holdings on unique statutory schemes which differ from U.C.C. § 2-725 or 
contain an altered version of the statute itself. Williams v. West Penn Power 
Company, 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811, 817, n. 18 (1983). For 
example, the Alabama legislature has adopted its own 
version of U.C.C. § 2-725 which provides that if consumer goods are involved, a 
cause of action for breach of warranty accrues upon the date of personal injury 
rather than the date of tender. Simmons v. Clemco Industries, Ala., 368 So. 2d 509, 512 (1979); see also, e.g., Ouellette 
v. Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., Me., 466 A.2d 478 (1983); Franzen v. Deere and Company, Iowa, 334 N.W.2d 730 (1983). These 
legislatures have apparently modified U.C.C. § 2-725 because otherwise the clear 
language of the statute of limitations is a bar to all breach of warranty 
actions, including those for personal injury, if brought more than four years 
after tender of delivery of the product.

[¶14.]  Eliminating states which have adopted 
special statutory schemes, just two courts remain which have construed the 
official version of U.C.C. § 2-725 to provide a different statute of limitation 
for tort claims as opposed to commercial damage cases. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.4th 
915, 929-930, supra; Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Company, 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 
(1975). We would have to follow this small minority of courts in order to hold 
that the Wyoming version of U.C.C. § 2-725 (§ 
34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977) does not bar appellant's claim.

[¶15.]  The Wyoming legislature has adopted the official 
version of U.C.C. § 2-725 and has not amended the basic tort statute of 
limitations, § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), W.S. 1977, to expressly supersede § 
34-21-299.5 (U.C.C. § 2-725) in breach of warranty cases.5

[¶16.]  We agree with the construction of § 
34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977 (U.C.C. § 2-725, official version) that has been adopted 
by the majority of states and hold that a plaintiff bringing a breach of 
warranty action for personal injury must file his suit within four years of the 
date on which the warranted goods are tendered. This holding rests on more than 
just the plain language of the statute. It is supported by the statute's 
legislative history in Wyoming and by the intent of its original 
drafters.

[¶17.]  The Wyoming legislature adopted U.C.C. § 2-725 at 
the same time that it adopted U.C.C. § 2-318. Session Laws of Wyoming, 1961, ch. 219, 
§§ 2-318, 2-725. Section 2-318 (now codified at § 34-21-235, W.S. 1977) extended 
warranty protection to

"any person who may 
reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured by breach of the warranty."

The simultaneous 
enactment of §§ 2-318 and 2-725 indicates that the legislature intended the 
limitations period of § 2-725 to apply to personal injury actions created by § 
2-318. See Heller v. United States Suzuki Motor Corporation, 64 N.Y.2d 407, 488 
N YS.2d 132, 477 N.E.2d 434, 436 (1985). If the Wyoming legislature did not intend the UCC's 
explicit statute of limitations to apply to the breach of warranty actions 
involving tortious injury or damage, then it could have said so in the same 
manner as have many other state legislatures.

[¶18.]  In the absence of a legislative enactment 
providing otherwise, we think the plain language of § 34-21-299.5 (U.C.C. § 
2-725) should be followed. Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Company, 266 Or. 273, 
512 P.2d 776, 777 (1973). The statute purports to apply to the breach of "any" 
contract for sale. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Company, 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550, 554, 70 A.L.R.3d 304 (1974). It contains no language which indicates that 
it does not apply to a breach of warranty causing personal injuries. The UCC's 
breach of warranty action is a statutory cause of action which has both tort and 
contract aspects and which applies by its own terms when either economic or 
personal damages are suffered. Williams v. West Penn Power Company, supra, 467 A.2d  at 817. The broad statutory cause of action for breach of warranty is 
subject to the statutory limitations period provided by the statute. Johnson v. 
Hockessin Tractor, Inc., Del. Super. Ct., 420 A.2d 154, 158 (1980); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Company, supra, 512 P.2d  
at 778; Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594, 596 
(1970).

[¶19.]  The few courts that have refused to apply 
U.C.C. § 2-725 to warranty actions involving personal injury have pointed out 
that the statute could bar a plaintiff's suit before there is an injury making 
the suit actionable. They argue that no rational statute of limitations can run 
before a cause of action arises. E.g., Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Company, supra, 
235 N.W.2d  at 573. In essence, these courts assume that § 2-725 was intended to 
keep stale claims out of the court system, and they reason that it exceeds that 
function when it eliminates claims that are freshly 
matured.

[¶20.]  We disagree with the premise adopted by 
these courts. Section 2-725 was not intended to punish plaintiffs who allow 
their claims to grow stale. Instead, it was enacted to govern the out-of-court 
commercial conduct of sellers. The official comment to § 2-725 states in 
part:

"This Article takes sales 
contracts out of the general laws limiting the time for commencing contractual 
actions and selects a four year period as the most appropriate to modern 
business practice. This is within the normal commercial record keeping period." 
1976 Official Text.

[¶21.]  The drafters of § 2-725 apparently 
thought that manufacturers, dealers or other sellers should not be forced to 
indefinitely retain their warranty records. If a warranty action could be 
brought without regard to the date a product was tendered, then as a practical 
matter businessmen could never freely discard such records because of their 
importance in defending a warranty suit.6 In order to permit sellers to 
discard their warranty records within a reasonable time after sale, the drafters 
created a statute of limitations tied directly to the date of sale and not to 
the highly variable date of injury.

[¶22.]  It is also claimed that the application 
of U.C.C. § 2-725 to personal injury warranty actions creates variable 
limitations periods covering the three causes of action typically raised in a 
products liability suit. Our holding, according to these courts, creates one 
limitations period for negligence and strict liability and another for breach of 
warranty. Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Company, supra, 235 N.W.2d  at 574; Heavner v. 
Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412, 420 (1973). We do not see this as a 
significant problem. It is not difficult for a court to consider each claim 
separately and apply the appropriate limitations period to each one. Williams v. 
West Penn Power Company, supra, 467 A.2d  at 817. The courts already do this in 
many multi-count lawsuits. Moreover, it is far less complicated to split 
products liability cases by cause of action than it is to split breach of 
warranty claims based on the type of damage suffered. If we adopt the tort 
statute of limitations for warranty claims involving personal injury and the 
U.C.C. statute for warranty claims involving commercial loss, a case would 
inevitably arise in which both commercial and personal damages are suffered as a 
result of one breach of warranty. The warranty claim would have to be split into 
two parts for statute of limitations purposes, hardly a simplification. Johnson 
v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., supra, 420 A.2d  at 158.

[¶23.]  Finally, it is worth noting that an 
injured plaintiff whose warranty action is barred by U.C.C. § 2-725 can still 
bring an action in either negligence or strict liability within four years after 
the injury. As a practical matter, our reading of § 34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977, will 
prevent few, if any, deserving plaintiffs from seeking adequate redress for 
their injuries. Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Company, supra, 512 P.2d  at 
778-779.7

[¶24.]  In summary, we hold that a plaintiff must 
bring a breach of warranty action for personal injury within four years after 
the warrantied goods have been tendered. Here appellant failed to commence his 
action for breach of warranty within that time, and the summary judgment on the 
second cause of action is affirmed.

STRICT 
LIABILITY

[¶25.]  In its order, the district court outlined 
its reasons for granting summary judgment on appellant's negligence and breach 
of warranty claims. But the court did not state the reasons for granting summary 
judgment as to the strict liability claim. In their briefs, appellees have 
attempted to fill the gap by offering several rationales. First, they argue that 
strict liability in tort is not available as a cause of action in Wyoming since this court 
has declined to adopt the doctrine on several occasions. See, e.g., Buckley v. 
Bell, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1089 (1985). Second, they 
contend that appellant's third claim was merely a redundant breach of warranty 
claim which was filed after the warranty statute of limitations expired. Third, 
appellees raise the possibility that even if strict liability was properly pled 
in appellant's third count, it was barred by the general tort statute of 
limitations. Finally, according to appellees, material alterations in a product 
after sale can be a complete defense to strict liability in tort. They claim 
that their uncontradicted summary judgment exhibits prove that the scraper was 
materially altered prior to the accident.

[¶26.]  We will analyze each of these possible 
grounds for summary judgment because "[i]f the judgment against the appellant is 
sustainable on any basis, it must be affirmed." Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration 
Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452, 456 (1983). But before we 
can begin our analysis of the pleadings, the statute of limitations, and 
defenses raised, we must first determine whether the doctrine of strict 
liability is available to state a claim in Wyoming. We hold that it is. Today we join the 
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions and hold that strict liability 
in tort is a valid cause of action in Wyoming.8 It is truly an independent cause of 
action that can be successfully pled and proven without regard to a 
manufacturer's or seller's negligence and without regard to the UCC's 
restrictions on breach of warranty actions.

[¶27.]  While we recognize that some 
jurisdictions have departed from the parameters of the strict liability action 
that are set forth in § 402A, Restatement, Second, Torts, we believe that the 
restatement definition forms the best starting place from which the cause of 
action can evolve in Wyoming. The definition is reasonably complete 
and will allow the district courts and Wyoming lawyers to litigate these cases with 
some measure of confidence. In addition, many of the finer points that are not 
explicitly covered in § 402A or its official comments have been considered and 
resolved elsewhere. The district courts will enter well-charted territory on 
most strict liability issues that arise. We adopt Restatement, Second, Torts § 
402A (1965) which provides:

"402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for 
Physical Harm to User or Consumer 

"(1) One who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer 
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

"(a) the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

"(b) it is expected to 
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold.

"(2) The rule stated in 
Subsection (1) applies although

"(a) the seller has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and

"(b) the user or consumer 
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with 
the seller."

REASONS FOR STRICT 
LIABILITY

[¶28.]  As the Vermont Supreme Court noted when 
it adopted strict liability in tort, "[a]n extensive review of the history and 
development of the doctrine embodied in the Restatement would serve little 
purpose." Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110, 113 (1975). The history 
of the doctrine is well known and readily discoverable in basic torts treatises. 
See, e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on 
Torts §§ 96-97, at 681-692 (1984). On the other hand, although the policies 
supporting the adoption of § 402A have been discussed elsewhere, we think it 
worth noting some of the policies that we find persuasive. While these policy 
rationales are not exclusive, they should help guide the district courts and 
litigants who will inevitably grapple with strict liability 
law.

[¶29.]  When a defective article enters the 
stream of commerce and an innocent person is hurt, it is better that the loss 
fall on the manufacturer, distributor or seller than on the innocent victim. 
This is true even if the entities in the chain of production and distribution 
exercise due care in the defective product's manufacture and delivery. They are 
simply in the best position to either insure against the loss or spread the loss 
among all the consumers of the product. W. Prosser, The Assault upon the 
Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960); W. 
Keeton, supra, at 692-693; Restatement, Second, Torts § 402A, 
comment c (1965).

[¶30.]  There are many products liability cases 
in which the plaintiff must essentially show negligence in order to prove that a 
product is defective. And there are cases where the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur can provide the missing link to an otherwise solid negligence case. 
Under these circumstances, the strict liability action is unnecessary to ensure 
that the deserving plaintiff is made whole. There are cases, however, in which 
the negligence action proves inadequate. For instance, when a person is injured 
by a defect that causes the wheel of a car to come apart, it may be practically 
impossible to establish that the manufacturer's negligence caused the failure. 
Let us assume that 5,000,000 wheels for automobiles were manufactured and one 
was defective. The manufacturing, inspection, and testing procedures may have 
exceeded engineering standards. Due care was exercised and yet there was one 
defective wheel. Thus, there may have been an entire absence of negligence in 
the total manufacturing and sale of the product, yet a totally innocent person 
was injured when the defective wheel came apart. On these facts, that person 
justly ought to have a claim. But he can recover only if strict liability has 
been adopted and the fault requirement discarded. Manufacturers and distributors 
can easily and efficiently apportion the injured person's loss among themselves 
and ultimately among their customers, and that is better than affording no 
relief to the person injured. W. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, supra, 
at 1116-1117.

[¶31.]  The problems with the negligence cause of 
action when applied to products have been recognized for many years and courts 
and legislatures long ago responded by creating a cause of action in breach of 
warranty. E.g., §§ 34-21-230 through 34-21-235, W.S. 1977. Whenever strict 
liability in tort is suggested, those opposing the doctrine argue that the 
warranty action is adequate in products cases. This argument has consistently 
failed, however, because most courts have recognized

"that strict liability on 
`warranty' concepts based on implied misrepresentation or promise involving an 
objective manifestation of an intent to guarantee carries far too much luggage 
in the way of undesirable complications, and is more trouble than it is worth." 
W. Keeton, supra, at 692; see also Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1074 
(1967).

[¶32.]  Earlier in this opinion we discussed the 
commercial connotations of the warranty action which interfere with its 
usefulness to those suffering personal injury. We pointed out that the UCC's 
breach of warranty action carries a statute of limitations which begins to run 
on the date of tender and can bar an injured user from recovery before he 
suffers an injury. Because the statute is explicit and has some justification in 
a commercial setting, we declined to give it a strained interpretation that 
could have altered its impact in personal injury cases. We concluded that it was 
far better to recognize an independent strict liability action based on tort 
principles, which carries a tort statute of limitations, than it was to 
compromise the commercial code with unsound statutory construction.9

[¶33.]  The notice requirement of § 
34-21-270(c)(i), W.S. 1977 (U.C.C. § 2-607) is another requirement which causes 
difficulty in warranty actions for personal injury. The statute 
provides:

"(c) Where a tender has 
been accepted:

"(i) The buyer must 
within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach 
notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy."

In Western 
Equipment Company, Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., Wyo., 605 P.2d 806, 810 
(1980), we held that this statute means what it says in cases involving 
commercial damages. Perhaps we could interpret the section so that it does not 
apply in personal injury cases. But such a construction might diminish the 
effectiveness of the notice requirement in the commercial context where it 
serves a useful purpose. Again, the best solution to this statutory dilemma is 
to recognize strict liability in tort as an independent cause of action to which 
the statute does not apply. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 
(1962).

[¶34.]  A third piece of excess baggage carried 
by the UCC warranty action is the doctrine of disclaimer of warranties. An 
injured person's warranty action may be barred if the seller has properly 
disclaimed all express and implied warranties. The drafters of the U.C.C. have 
attempted to solve this problem by providing in § 2-719 that "[l]imitation of 
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is 
prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is 
commercial is not." Section 34-21-298(c), W.S. 1977. Unfortunately, § 
34-21-298(c) (U.C.C. § 2-719) is only a partial remedy because it applies only 
in cases of consumer goods. In the case at bar, where the scraper was not a 
consumer good, appellant's cause of action in warranty could have been barred by 
a disclaimer of warranty even though he did not personally bargain with the 
manufacturer and accept the disclaimer.10 We have explicitly held that a 
remote buyer cannot prevent the manufacturer from disclaiming warranties in his 
original contract with the original buyer. Western Equipment Company, Inc. v. 
Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., supra, 605 P.2d  at 810. Strict liability in tort, 
however, is not hampered by the disclaimer problem because it is not based on 
express or implied warranties created by the U.C.C.

[¶35.]  In summary, the cause of action for 
strict liability in tort is necessary because of the inadequacies of breach of 
warranty actions when applied to claims in tort for personal 
injury.

PLEADING STRICT 
LIABILITY

[¶36.]  Having decided that strict liability is a 
viable cause of action in Wyoming, we must next determine whether it was 
properly pled by appellant in his third claim for relief. Rule 8, W.R.C.P., 
establishes Wyoming as a notice pleading jurisdiction. 
Rule 8(a) states:

"A pleading which sets 
forth a claim for relief * * * shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, (2) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled."

Rule 8(e)(1) 
requires only that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and 
direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required." And perhaps 
most importantly, Rule 8(f) declares that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed 
as to do substantial justice."

[¶37.]  Taken together, these provisions of Rule 
8 require that plaintiff plead only sufficient facts to constitute a legal cause 
of action. Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580, 583 (1979). No particular 
words are required such as "strict liability" or "402A." Id.; Zaleskie v. Joyce, 
supra, 333 A.2d  at 114 (applying Rule 8); Boains v. Lasar Manufacturing Company, 
330 F. Supp. 1134 (D.Conn. 1971) (also applying Rule 8). The essential elements 
of the cause of action must be raised, at least indirectly, by the plaintiff's 
factual allegations. Harris v. Grizzle, supra, at 583.

[¶38.]  In the case at bar appellant was required 
to allege facts stating the following elements of the strict liability cause of 
action:

(1) That the sellers were 
engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the 
harm;

(2) that the product was 
defective when sold;

(3) that the product was 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer;

(4) that the product was 
intended to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it was sold; and

(5) that the product 
caused physical harm to the plaintiff/consumer. Restatement, Second, Torts § 
402A. See also Rossignol v. Danbury School of 
Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418, 424 
(1967).

[¶39.]  In his third cause of action, appellant 
alleged facts which indicated that appellees were engaged in the business of 
selling earth-moving equipment; that the scraper was unsafe for its intended use 
and defective in design; that the scraper was inherently dangerous to human life 
when sold; and that the defects in the scraper directly caused his injuries. The 
final element, that the scraper reached appellant without substantial change in 
the condition in which it was sold, is at least by implication contained in the 
pleadings. Appellees were given notice by the original pleading that strict 
liability would be an issue in the case. In responsive pleadings they alleged 
that the condition of the scraper had been altered after delivery. They 
presented affidavits and exhibits to support of their defense of alteration of 
the product and relied upon this claim in support of their motion for summary 
judgment. As we pointed out earlier, a pleading must fairly give notice of the 
claim, but it does not have to contain key phrases like "strict liability," or 
"402A" to give such notice.

[¶40.]  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced 
with an extremely vague complaint when it first adopted strict liability in tort 
but the court held:

"Since the plaintiff has 
broadly pleaded those facts necessary to a cause of action for defective 
products liability and since we are today adopting a new basis of liability, 
plaintiff will be permitted to amend his complaint to explicitly state a cause 
of action in trespass for defective products liability." Webb v. Zern, 422 
Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853, 854-855 (1966).

We conclude that 
in this case the pleadings are sufficient to state a claim in strict 
liability.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
FOR STRICT LIABILITY

[¶41.]  Our only statute of limitations question 
is whether appellant's strict liability claim was timely when originally 
filed.

"In actions grounded on 
strict tort liability, it has generally been held that a statute of limitations 
applicable to torts, negligence, personal injury, property damage, or similar 
wrongful acts should apply." 3 R. Hursh & H. Bailey, American Law of 
Products Liability § 17:8, at 70 (2d ed. 1975); see also, Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 
455, 458-465 (1979); Kirkland v. General Motors Corporation, Okla., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361 (1974).

This is because 
actions based on § 402A are tortious rather than contractual in nature. Adams v. 
Buffalo Forge Company, Me., 443 A.2d 932, 940 (1982); Restatement, 
Second, Torts § 402A, comment m (1965). In Wyoming the general torts statute, § 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), W.S. 1977, governs strict liability claims. It establishes a 
four-year limitations period which runs from the date of injury. Appellant's 
strict liability claim, like his negligence claim, was timely 
filed.

MATERIAL 
ALTERATIONS

[¶42.]  Appellees claim on appeal that the 
uncontradicted exhibits which they attached to their summary judgment motion 
showed that the scraper had been materially altered prior to the accident. 
Therefore, according to appellees, they were entitled to summary judgment on all 
three causes of action as a matter of law. The district court based its grant of 
summary judgment, at least in part, upon this ground. In its order the court 
concluded "[t]hat counsel for the Plaintiff admitted during the argument to the 
Court that the machine in question had been altered prior to the 
accident."

[¶43.]  We agree with appellee's general 
proposition that material or substantial alterations of a product after sale may 
constitute a defense to all three causes of action. Even if a product is 
defective, unmerchantable or negligently manufactured, the seller may not be 
liable for a plaintiff's injuries which are caused by unforeseeable alterations 
in the product rather than the original defects. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1251 
(1972). In the context of strict liability, this defense has been explicitly 
condified in Restatement, Second, Torts § 402A(1)(b) which provides that a 
manufacturer or seller is liable under 402A only if his product "is expected to 
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold." In negligence and warranty claims the material alterations 
defense is raised under the rubric of intervening or superseding cause. See 
generally W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 102, at 710-712 (1984); 
Comment, Substantial Change: Alteration of a Product as a Bar to a 
Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 Dickinson L.Rev. 245, 264 
(1975).

[¶44.]  Our difficulty with appellees' material 
alteration contention is factual, not legal. While we accept appellees' 
uncontradicted assertion that the scraper was altered,11 we do not think that appellees' 
exhibits eliminated all dispute regarding the materiality of those alterations. 
Appellees' summary judgment exhibits do not demonstrate how appellant actually 
slipped from the scraper and do not show what safety devices might have 
prevented the fall. And there is nothing in the record indicating that the 
safety devices which were removed would have been adequate to prevent the fall 
even if they had been left intact. Material alterations, like other issues of 
proximate cause, are ordinarily "`left to the jury for its factual 
determination.'" McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 
Wyo., 666 P.2d 408, 414 (1983); Karabatsos v. 
Spivey Company, 49 Ill. App.3d 317, 7 Ill.Dec. 158, 364 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1977). Appellees failed to establish the materiality of the 
alterations as a factual issue, so summary judgment on these grounds could not 
be granted as a matter of law, even though appellant failed to offer his own 
exhibits. See Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, Tex., 450 S.W.2d 827, 829 
(1970).

[¶45.]  The district court's dismissal of 
appellant's second cause of action for breach of warranty is affirmed. The 
dismissal of the first and third causes is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., 
requires that all appellate briefs contain a table of contents. Appellant has 
not included one in his brief. We have overlooked this rule violation because it 
has not interfered significantly with our ability to understand appellant's 
arguments. Members of the Bar should take note, however, that this rule 
violation might result in dismissal in the proper case. See 37 Gambling Devices 
(Cheyenne Elks Club and Cheyenne Music and Vending, Inc.) v. State, Wyo., 694 P.2d 711, 713 
(1985).

2 A breach of warranty is 
one form of breach of contract. Express and implied warranties are created and 
limited by §§ 34-21-230 through 34-21-235, W.S. 1977 (U.C.C. §§ 2-313 through 
2-318). Damages for breach of warranty are provided by § 34-21-293, W.S. 1977 
(U.C.C. § 2-714).

3 Appellant has not argued 
that there was an explicit warranty extending to future performance. Therefore, 
the discovery exception of § 34-21-299.5(b), W.S. 1977, does not apply. And, 
even if it did apply, appellant still missed the limitations period because, by 
his own admission, he discovered the breach of warranty prior to 1980, more than 
four years before he filed his complaint.

4 This is a heavily 
litigated point of law. Many state courts and many federal courts exercising 
their diversity jurisdiction have reached the issue. Because it is a matter of 
state law, the most authoritative decisions have come from state supreme courts, 
and of these courts, a clear majority takes the simple position that the 
limitations period provided in U.C.C. § 2-725 is a bar to all breach of warranty 
actions brought more than four years after tender of delivery, regardless of the 
type of damages suffered. Some of the states whose highest courts have taken the 
majority view are: Arkansas, General Motors Corporation v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d 602, 605 (1974); Delaware, Johnson v. 
Hockessin Tractor, Inc., Del. Super. Ct., 420 A.2d 154 (1980); Illinois, Berry 
v. G.D. Searle & Company, 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550, 70 A.L.R.3d 304 
(1974); New York, Heller v. United States Suzuki Motor Corporation, 64 N.Y.2d 407, 488 N.Y.S.2d 132, 477 N.E.2d 434 (1985); Oregon, Redfield v. Mead, Johnson 
& Company, 266 Or. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973); Pennsylvania, Williams v. West Penn Power Company, 502 
Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811 (1983); Tennessee, Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970); and, Texas, Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., Tex., 610 S.W.2d 456, 20 
A.L.R.4th 900 (1980). See also Annot., 20 A.L.R.4th 915, 920-921 
(1983).

5 The basic tort statute, 
§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), W.S. 1977, simply provides that suit must be brought within 
four years after the accrual of a cause of action based on "[a]n injury to the 
rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated." In 
comparison, Iowa's tort statute of limitations, 
which was held to explicitly supersede the Iowa version of U.C.C. § 2-725, reads as 
follows:

"`Actions may be 
brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes 
accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specifically 
declared:

* * * * * 
*

"2. * * * Those 
found on injuries to the person * * * whether based on contract or tort * * * 
within two years.'" Franzen v. Deere and Company, Iowa, 334 N.W.2d 730 
(1983), quoting Iowa Code § 614.1. (Emphasis added.)

6 This rationale does not 
apply to a strict liability suit where the key issue is whether the product was 
defective and where the existence of an express or implied warranty is 
irrelevant. A businessman would not be forced to retain old warranty records in 
order to defend a strict liability action. He might save other records involving 
design and manufacture of the product that are relevant to possible 
defects.

7 Later in this opinion we 
will discuss the viability of the doctrine of strict liability in Wyoming. Once a 
jurisdiction adopts strict liability in tort, the somewhat artificial warranty 
cause of action created by § 2-318 of the U.C.C. becomes of minor significance 
to the injured user of a defective product. In fact, it has been suggested that 
state legislatures relegate the UCC breach of warranty action to a purely 
commercial role where strict liability in tort is recognized. W. Keeton, Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts § 98, at 694 (5th ed. 1984).

8 The only four states 
other than Wyoming that have not adopted strict liability in tort by statute or 
decision are Delaware, Utah, Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of 
Columbia. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability 3-8 to 3-24 
(1985).

9 Several states that have 
adopted strict liability by statute have done so by explicitly amending their 
commercial codes. They have essentially stripped the commercial trappings - such 
as the statute of limitations, the notice requirement, and privity - from the 
warranty cause of action in personal injury cases. "The result is to provide a 
remedy as comprehensive as that provided by § 402A of the Restatement * * *." 
Swartz v. General Motors Corporation, 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1978); see 
generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.4th 791 (1982).

10 See § 34-21-909(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, for a definition of consumer goods.

11 In support of their 
motion, appellees offered depositions in which appellant outlined the various 
pieces of safety equipment on the scraper that had been altered since purchase. 
He described how friction tape had been worn away from a foothold and how a 
handhold and foothold had been removed. Moreover, at the hearing on the summary 
judgment motion, appellant's counsel admitted that there had been alterations in 
the scraper prior to the accident.

BROWN, Justice, 
concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I agree with 
that stated in the majority opinion except that pertaining to strict liability. 
This is not an appropriate case to determine that strict liability in tort is a 
valid cause of action in Wyoming.

1) Appellant did 
not properly plead strict liability.

2) There had 
been a substantial alteration in the 657 scraper since its delivery to the 
user.

In appellant's 
first cause of action he purports to allege negligence in design, manufacture, 
inspection and the sale of the caterpillar model 657B. In his second cause of 
action appellant purports to state a cause of action for breach of express and 
implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 34-21-101, et seq., W.S. 
1977. Appellant contends, and the majority agree, that a cause of action for 
strict liability is stated in appellant's third cause of action. Actually, in 
his third cause of action, appellant merely restates some of the requirements 
for a breach of warranty action under the U.C.C.

Pleadings should 
give notice to an adverse party what he may encounter. Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 (1963). We have held that 
the simplification of pleadings under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure does 
not eliminate the necessity of stating in clear terms the basis of relief 
sought. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Company v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir 
Company, Wyo., 
475 P.2d 548 (1970). The pleading party must give fair notice to the opposing 
party of the basis for relief. Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 
(1979). In his complaint appellant did not give appellees notice that strict 
liability was an issue.

The majority 
adopts Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); subsection (1)(b) requires 
that the product "reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold." Appellant claims he fell from the scraper 
because of inadequate or defective safety devices. The alleged defects 
were:

1) Lack of 
proper hand grips and toe-holds.

2) Lack of 
adequate non-skid surface materials.

3) A "buckle" or 
damage to the bumper upon which appellant stood.

In his 
deposition appellant admitted that the hand grips had been removed and the 
toehold modified after the machine came into the possession of the user. The 
non-skid tape was originally applied to the machine, but had worn off because of 
normal use or had been removed after it came into the user's possession. The 
"buckle" or damage to the bumper upon which appellant stood occurred after the 
machine came into the possession of the user. These changes pertain to the very 
safety features of which appellant complains. Therefore, it cannot logically be 
argued that these changes were not substantial and material. Substantial changes 
in the nature of the product precludes recovery under Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 402A(1)(b) (1965).

I would hold 
that appellant is precluded from asserting a strict liability claim under the 
circumstances of this case.