Title: Commonwealth v. Facella

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-10339 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH FACELLA. 
 
 
 
Essex.     May 5, 2017. - November 21, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Rebuttal, Prior misconduct, Hearsay, Expert 
opinion.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, New 
trial, Assistance of counsel, Hearsay, Argument by counsel, 
Capital case.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  
Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 15, 2002. 
 
 
The case was tried before David A. Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Brian J. Kelly for the defendant. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Joseph Facella, 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity 
and cruelty for beating his girl friend, Annette Soares, to 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
death in 2002.2  At trial, his defense was that an antiviral drug 
he was taking at the time of the killing rendered him unable to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
behavior to the requirements of the law.  To rebut this defense, 
the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant, before 
ever taking the drug, had beaten and threatened to kill two 
other women with whom he was romantically involved between 1978 
and 1989.  
 
The defendant makes four arguments on appeal:  (1) the 
trial judge erred by admitting evidence in the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief of the defendant's previous incarceration; (2) the 
trial judge erred by giving untimely limiting instructions 
regarding prior bad act evidence admitted in the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief;3 (3) the trial judge erred by admitting evidence 
of the defendant's prior bad acts in the Commonwealth's rebuttal 
case; and (4) this court should exercise its power under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E), to reduce the verdict or order a new 
trial.  Following oral argument, the defendant also filed a 
                     
 
2 The trial occurred in December 2005.  The defendant 
received the mandatory life sentence, and filed a timely notice 
of appeal.  The appeal was entered in this court in December, 
2008.  After a series of procedural delays, we heard argument in 
May, 2017. 
 
 
3 The defendant also initially disputed the substance of a 
limiting instruction that appeared to tell the jury that it 
"should credit" certain testimony.  However, at oral argument, 
the defendant conceded that a corrected version of the 
transcript rendered this argument moot. 
3 
 
 
motion for a new trial claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
 
After careful consideration of the defendant's arguments on 
appeal and in his motion for a new trial, we affirm the judgment 
of conviction, deny the defendant's motion for a new trial, and 
decline to exercise our power under § 33E.   
 
Background.  We begin by discussing the facts presented in 
the Commonwealth's case-in-chief as the jury could have found 
them.  We then discuss the defense case.  We reserve other 
facts, including the evidence admitted in the Commonwealth's 
rebuttal case, for later discussion.   
 
1.  Commonwealth's case-in-chief.  a.  Emergency room.  At 
around 9:30 P.M. on April 25, 2002, the defendant walked into 
the emergency room at the Merrimack Valley Hospital.  He told 
the triage nurse that he had "somebody" who "wasn't breathing" 
in the back seat of his motor vehicle.  Emergency room personnel 
immediately went outside and observed the victim lying face down 
and "wedged down tight" between the front and back seats of the 
vehicle.  The victim was topless, had no pulse, and was "very 
badly bruised . . . [a]ll over her body."  
 
Once the victim was removed from the car and brought inside 
the hospital, it became apparent that she had severe blunt force 
trauma to her face and head.  The swelling was so extreme that 
the victim's head was swollen to "twice or three times the 
4 
 
 
normal size" and her facial features were impossible to discern.  
A medical team immediately began resuscitation efforts.  
 
When hospital personnel asked the defendant what happened, 
he initially said that he had found the victim outside in that 
condition and that Billerica police were responsible.  The 
defendant repeatedly interrupted the resuscitation efforts to 
ask whether the victim would be alright.  A triage nurse 
testified that the defendant smelled of alcohol and appeared to 
be under the influence of alcohol, but not extremely so.  
 
Within one hour, the victim's pulse was restored, but she 
was breathing only with the assistance of a ventilator.  
However, testing showed that the victim had suffered serious 
brain injuries and had blood in her brain, so doctors decided to 
transfer her to a hospital in Boston for further treatment.  
 
b.  Police interviews.  Before the victim was transferred 
to Boston, Haverhill police arrived and spoke with the defendant 
about what happened.  He first told one detective that he had 
not seen the victim for at least three days beforehand, but that 
he thought she might have disappeared on a drinking binge.  The 
defendant said the victim had driven herself home, and then 
"came staggering into" the condominium they shared at around 
8:30 P.M. looking like she had been beaten up.  He said he 
helped her to the couch, then realized later that she was not 
breathing, so he drove her to the hospital.   
5 
 
 
 
The defendant then told police that he had found the victim 
"wandering around the back yard in this condition."  He said he 
helped her inside, laid her on the couch, and noticed a couple 
of hours later that she was not breathing.  The defendant told 
police a third version of events, in which the victim arrived 
home "beat up" and "drunk," at which point they had a 
conversation in the living room before she passed out on the 
floor.  Throughout the initial conversations with police, the 
defendant paced around the room, acted "very nervous," and 
frequently asked how the victim was and what was going to happen 
to him.   
 
At the hospital, police noticed that the defendant's hands 
and knuckles were swollen.  Police also noticed red marks on his 
knuckles, and dried blood on his ear, chest, shoulder, and arm.  
At that point, police advised the defendant of his Miranda 
rights, but he was not placed under arrest.  
 
The defendant subsequently followed police to the Haverhill 
police station, where he was interviewed for approximately sixty 
to ninety minutes.  The defendant agreed to speak with police, 
but refused to sign an advice of rights form.  His statements 
during the interview were essentially cumulative of other 
versions of events he had already told police.  The defendant 
denied having hit the victim.  
6 
 
 
 
After the interview, police and the defendant spoke with 
the Boston hospital and learned that the victim had been 
pronounced dead.  The defendant was arrested.  
 
c.  Autopsy.  The medical examiner testified to the 
numerous injuries that he observed during the autopsy.  In 
particular, the victim's head injuries included:  a four-inch 
contusion on the back of the head, bruising in the deep layers 
of the scalp, a hemorrhage underneath the scalp, a scrape or 
abrasion near the right eye, a contusion extending from the 
right eyelid onto the right side of the forehead, a two and one 
half inch contusion on the chin, a scrape on the lower lip, 
swelling and discoloration on the left side of the forehead, a 
contusion to the left ear, and multiple bruises inside the mouth 
and underneath the lips. 
 
The victim also suffered several wounds to other parts of 
her body, including:  hemorrhages in the neck, collar bone, jaw, 
trachea, and larynx areas; eight or more bruise sites on the 
back; contusions to the buttocks and thigh areas; and various 
bruising or contusions to the arms, hands, legs, and feet.  Some 
of these were consistent with defensive injuries.  
 
The medical examiner opined that the victim suffered 
multiple blunt force injuries to the head, and three or more 
separate impacts to the neck.  He concluded that she died from 
7 
 
 
brain hemorrhaging, which caused brain swelling, resulting in 
respiratory or cardiac arrest.  
 
d.  Other physical evidence.  Police observed injuries to 
the defendant as well.  They noted a scratch or abrasion beneath 
his tailbone, red marks and bruises on his arms and hands, a cut 
on his finger, along with bruising and other marks on his legs.  
Police also observed reddish-brown staining on the defendant's 
ear, left shoulder, and buttocks which later tested positive for 
blood.  
 
Additionally, police tested clothing, surfaces, and other 
items inside the condominium for the presence of blood.  Some 
facial tissues recovered from the fireplace, a stained men's 
gray shirt, discovered in a hamper, and the defendant's sneakers 
all tested positive for blood.  Among the surfaces that tested 
positive for blood were the kitchen floor, the kitchen sink, the 
carpet leading to and inside the living room, a second-floor 
wall, the master bedroom, and a second-floor office area.  A 
State police criminalistics expert testified about spatter and 
transfer blood stains observed on the defendant's blue jeans, as 
well as on the gray shirt and a tan jacket recovered from the 
condominium.  
 
e.  The day before the beating.  On April 24, 2002, the day 
before her death, the victim went to dinner at a Chinese 
restaurant with a friend and co-worker, Dawn Michelle Rippetoe.  
8 
 
 
The victim planned to spend the night at Rippetoe's house.  Over 
the course of the evening, the women consumed several alcoholic 
drinks.  The victim was also taking prescription medication for 
migraine headaches.  
 
After dinner, Rippetoe drove herself and the victim home in 
the victim's motor vehicle, but the vehicle ran out of gas a few 
hundred yards from Rippetoe's home.  The women walked the rest 
of the way and arrived at Rippetoe's home around 11:15 P.M.  The 
victim was "having a little difficulty walking" but Rippetoe 
said she was not "heavily intoxicated."  Rippetoe then went to 
sleep.  Shortly thereafter, the victim apparently left, but 
Rippetoe did not discover this fact until she woke up around 
5:30 A.M. the next morning.4 
                     
 
4 Dawn Michelle Rippetoe also testified that she first met 
the defendant a few months before the victim was killed, when 
she stayed the night at the victim's condominium in January, 
2002.  After going out for dinner and drinks, Rippetoe and the 
victim returned to the condominium sometime after 11 P.M. and 
went to sleep. 
 
 
Rippetoe was awoken the next morning by an argument between 
the victim and the defendant.  She heard the defendant threaten 
the victim, telling her that if Rippetoe had not been present, 
he would have killed the victim.  When Rippetoe interrupted, the 
defendant ran upstairs. 
 
 
The defendant came back downstairs, introduced himself to 
Rippetoe, and said he had behaved the way he did because he was 
taking interferon to treat his hepatitis C.  He told her that 
"he had done his research on interferon" and that he could have 
"gotten away with" killing the victim because "he could use 
[interferon] as an excuse for killing her." 
 
9 
 
 
 
At around 11:30 P.M. that evening, Billerica police were 
dispatched to the area of Farmers Lane in response to reports of 
a female wandering around in the woods, making noises.  The 
woman, later identified as the victim,  appeared intoxicated and 
was having trouble speaking and walking.  Police placed her in 
protective custody.  After transporting the victim back to the 
police station, she became belligerent and refused to answer 
booking questions.   
 
f.  The day of the beating.  The victim was released from 
protective custody the next morning between 8 and 8:30 A.M.  
Shortly after, Billerica officers responded to a call from a 
local Ford dealership.  The defendant had arrived at the 
dealership seeking assistance to change a flat tire, but an 
employee called police after smelling alcohol on the defendant's 
breath and observing him drink from a fifth of vodka.  An 
officer who responded to the call observed that the defendant 
was unsteady on his feet and smelled of alcohol.  After 
determining that the defendant was intoxicated, police placed 
him into protective custody.  On the ride back to the police 
                                                                  
 
Rippetoe also testified to telephone conversations between 
the defendant and the victim that Rippetoe overheard while 
working with the victim between January and April, 2002.  
Rippetoe described the defendant as "[v]ery aggressive, yelling, 
swearing and threatening to hurt [the victim]."  Rippetoe 
described seeing the victim, at several points during this time 
span, with bruises on her forearms and a black eye that she 
attempted to hide with sunglasses. 
10 
 
 
station, the defendant -- unprompted by the officer -- said, 
"How would you feel if your wife didn't come home last night?"  
 
At around 10 A.M., the victim learned that the defendant 
was in protective custody.  She requested that officers ask the 
defendant whether he would give her money and keys so she could 
get her car out of the impound.  The defendant agreed to provide 
$120 and the car key, but not a house key.  
 
At around 1 P.M., the victim returned to Rippetoe's home.  
The victim was crying, wearing mud-stained clothes, and appeared 
to be "in disarray."  Rippetoe offered her a cup of tea and a 
change of clothes, at which point she observed several bruises 
on the victim's back and arms.  
 
The defendant was released from protective custody at 
approximately 3:20 P.M.  When he learned that the victim had not 
come to pick him up, he became upset.  Police attempted to calm 
him down as he left the station, and they gave him directions 
back to the Ford dealership.  
 
Before 4 P.M., while still at Rippetoe's home, the victim 
telephoned the station to ask if the defendant had been released 
from custody yet.  Police confirmed that he had been released.  
Between 4:15 and 4:30 P.M, the defendant arrived back at the 
Ford dealership, paid the bill for the tire change, and left in 
his car.  
11 
 
 
 
The victim left Rippetoe's home at approximately 5:30 P.M.  
Sometime before she left, she called the defendant from her 
cellular telephone, while in Rippetoe's presence.  Rippetoe 
could hear the defendant "screaming, swearing, and threatening" 
the victim.  In particular, she heard the defendant say, "I'm 
going to f-ing kill you.  You got me in trouble with the police.  
I told you if you got me in trouble with the police I would kill 
you."  The victim appeared "hysterical" and "very upset" before 
she left.  
 
A neighbor whose condominium unit shares a wall with the 
unit in which the victim and the defendant lived, testified 
that, at around 5:30 P.M., she heard "some banging" from next 
door, which she said was unusual.  The noise lasted around five 
or ten minutes; at first, the neighbor believed it may have been 
"banging pipes" related to a kitchen repair.  She then heard two 
"definitely raised voices," one male and one female, but could 
not make out any specific words.  
 
2.  Defense case.  The defendant's case was built around 
the claim that, at the time of the killing, he had been taking 
interferon to treat a hepatitis C infection.  He presented 
testimony from two medical experts and three family members.   
 
The first medical expert, a physician specializing in 
gastroenterology, described how interferon works to combat 
hepatitis C.  He also described the known side-effects of 
12 
 
 
interferon, which include "mental and neurological side effects" 
such as depression, fatigue, lack of appetite, and -- most 
pertinent here -- irritability and aggression.  The expert 
estimated that around one-third of interferon patients 
experience some degree of depression or mood alteration, while 
around five to ten per cent experience increased irritability.  
 
The second medical expert, a psychiatrist and 
psychopharmacologist, described in more detail how interferon 
may disrupt normal serotonin functions in the brain, which in 
turn can result in mood changes, impulsivity, aggression, and 
difficulty modulating behavior.  He estimated that somewhere 
between twenty-five and forty-five per cent of interferon 
patients may experience behavioral side effects from serotonin 
disruption, and that these effects may last for months after 
taking interferon.  He opined that interferon may impair a 
person's capacity to, inter alia, weigh the pros and cons of his 
actions, refrain from committing certain acts, and form the 
intent to kill or injure. 
 
Members of the defendant's family testified that he began 
taking interferon in the fall of 2001.  They testified to 
various mood changes that they noticed following this treatment, 
including increased agitation, irritability, depression, and 
argumentativeness. 
13 
 
 
 
Although the focus of this testimony was the effect of 
interferon on the defendant in 2001 and 2002, there also was 
evidence in the form of medical records indicating the defendant 
had been treated with interferon for six months beginning around 
1994 or 1995.  The family members were not aware of this earlier 
treatment or were unsure whether they knew about it.  
 
Discussion.  1.  Evidence of defendant's prior 
incarceration.  The defendant argues that the judge erred by 
admitting, in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, evidence of his 
prior incarceration in the form of two letters that the 
defendant wrote to the victim while he was incarcerated.  The 
first, from October, 1999, was essentially a love letter.  In 
it, the defendant anticipated being "out for good," implored the 
victim to not "do anything to jeopardize my freedom once I am 
out," and encouraged her to save her money so they could travel.  
In the second, from June, 2000, the defendant accused the victim 
of being unfaithful to him and having "betrayed me in the most 
disgusting way possible" and having "destroyed me."  He 
threatened that the victim "must pay to the same extreme as the 
wrong you've done to me."  He also told the victim that she had 
"the arrogance of a pig" and warned her not to "blame what you 
did to yourself on the beating I gave you a year prior."  
In general, evidence of a defendant's previous 
incarceration may be admitted if it is offered for a purpose 
14 
 
 
other than to show the defendant's criminal propensity or bad 
character, and if the probative value outweighs the risk of 
unfair prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Foxworth, 473 Mass. 149, 
160 (2015).  "[W]e afford trial judges great latitude and 
discretion" with respect to the probative-unfairly prejudicial 
analysis, and "we uphold a judge's decision in this area unless 
it is palpably wrong."  Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 
752 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002).   
 
The challenged letters were plainly relevant for the 
proffered purpose of "showing the nature of the entire 
relationship" between the defendant and the victim, and to 
support the Commonwealth's theory of motive or intent on the 
night of the killing.  See Foxworth, 473 Mass. at 160-161 
(evidence of prior prison sentence relevant to motive, and to 
show nature and history of relationship); Commonwealth v. 
Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 573-575 (2005) (discussing probative 
value of evidence that demonstrated hostile nature of 
relationship between defendant and victim).  Moreover, we agree 
with the Commonwealth that the fact of the defendant's 
incarceration was inextricably intertwined with the contents of 
the letters.  In other words, sanitizing the letters to remove 
any references to the defendant's incarceration would have 
rendered them virtually incomprehensible and thereby defeated 
their obvious probative value.  Last, the judge forcefully 
15 
 
 
instructed the jury, immediately after the letters were read 
into the record, that they were not to consider the letters for 
any purpose other than to understand the defendant's motive or 
intent on the night in question, or to understand the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim.  The judge 
did not err in concluding that the probative value of the 
letters outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice.  See Foxworth, 
473 Mass. at 160-161; Butler, 445 Mass. at 576.   
 
2.  Limiting instruction.  Paula L. Capaldo, a friend and 
business partner of the victim, testified about a telephone call 
she received in November, 1997, at around 1 A.M.  During the 
call, the victim was "hysterical" and "crying," and said that 
the defendant had been repeatedly beating her and she did not 
think he was going to stop until he killed her.  The victim 
"begg[ed]" Capaldo for help.  When Capaldo said she would call 
the police, the victim said, "Please don't call the police.  
I'll be dead by then.  Please come help me."  
 
Capaldo then called the defendant's brother, and they both 
traveled to the victim's condominium.  When they arrived at 
around 1:30 A.M., Capaldo screamed for the victim, who appeared 
on a balcony and said, "He's coming to get me," and jumped off.  
Meanwhile, the defendant came out of the front door, and his 
brother pinned him down, telling Capaldo to "take [the victim] 
out of here right now."  Capaldo later observed that the 
16 
 
 
victim's face was swollen and bloodied and she was bleeding from 
the eyes, nose, chin, and mouth.  
 
The defendant argues that the judge erroneously failed to 
give a "contemporaneous" limiting instruction regarding 
Capaldo's prior bad act testimony.  Apparently, the defendant 
takes issue with the fact that the judge gave a limiting 
instruction immediately following Capaldo's direct examination 
rather than in the middle of it, immediately following the 
specific portions of her testimony related to the defendant's 
prior bad acts.  The timing of the limiting instruction was not 
erroneous.   
 
In general, "a judge has discretion as to the timing of 
instructions."  Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 526 
(2016), citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 24 (b), 378 Mass. 895 (1979).  
The defendant is correct that this court has looked favorably on 
contemporaneous limiting instructions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 202 (2004) (prejudice "sufficiently 
ameliorated" by limiting instructions "given immediately after 
the testimony and repeated during the final instructions").  But 
he cites no case, and we are aware of none, that would require a 
trial judge to give a limiting instruction in the middle of a 
witness's testimony.  Moreover, this is exactly the timing that 
the defendant, through counsel, requested.  At the close of 
Capaldo's direct examination, the judge told the jury in no 
17 
 
 
uncertain terms that the prior bad acts referenced in Capaldo's 
testimony could be used only for a limited purpose.  There was 
no error in the timing of this limiting instruction.   
 
3.  Rebuttal evidence of prior bad acts.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred in admitting prior bad act evidence 
in the Commonwealth's rebuttal case.  The defendant argues that 
this evidence was irrelevant to prove intent, lacked a temporal 
and substantive nexus to the crime, and overwhelmed the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief.   
 
In rebuttal the Commonwealth presented two witnesses.  The 
first, a former girl friend of the defendant, testified to the 
emotional and physical abuse she suffered during the course of 
their relationship, which spanned approximately 1978 to 1983.  
She described how the defendant inflicted upon her over a dozen 
black eyes, numerous bruises, and several cigarette burns on her 
hands, shoulder, and chest.  She testified that the defendant 
would strike her in the face whenever the songs by a former boy 
friend, who was a musician, came on the radio, and related one 
incident where the defendant beat her with a long metal bar 
because she had turned down the heat too low in their apartment.  
She said, "It didn't really seem to matter what would spark [the 
defendant's] temper."  She also testified that the defendant 
once threatened to kill her and, on another occasion, to "mess 
18 
 
 
up your face [so] bad that no one will ever want to look at you 
again."  
 
The second rebuttal witness was a former assistant district 
attorney who handled the plea colloquy in a prosecution of the 
defendant in 1990.  The witness authenticated a memorandum that 
he had prepared for the plea hearing, which the plea judge then 
read in open court, with the defendant objecting to or 
correcting certain facts with which he did not agree.  A 
redacted version of the memorandum was read into the record.  It 
described an incident in 1989 in which the defendant threatened 
to kill his former girl friend.  The defendant kicked her while 
wearing cowboy boots, dragged her by her hair, whipped her with 
a bullwhip, burned her with a cigarette, and "beat her 
repeatedly until she was covered with blood."  
As discussed above, evidence of prior bad acts "is not 
admissible to show a defendant's bad character or propensity to 
commit the charged crime."  Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 
122, 128 (2006).  However, it may be introduced, if relevant, 
for another purpose -- for example, to show "a common scheme, 
pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, identity, 
intent, or motive."  See Commonwealth v. Gollman, 436 Mass. 111, 
113-114 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 
224 (1986).  If offered for such a purpose, the trial judge must 
exercise his or her discretion to determine whether the 
19 
 
 
potential undue prejudice from the evidence outweighs its 
probative value.  See Gollman, supra at 114.  The judge's 
"decision to admit such evidence will be upheld absent clear 
error."  Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 550 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158–159 (2007).   
 
It is important first to clarify the purpose for which the 
Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence was admitted.  It was not, as 
various iterations of the defendant's argument suggest, admitted 
for propensity purposes, or to show a pattern of operation, or 
to show motive or intent in the usual sense.  Instead, it was 
offered for the narrow purpose of rebutting the defendant's 
theory that interferon diminished his capacity in a legally 
significant way.  See Butler, 445 Mass. at 575 (although not 
admissible to show pattern or course of conduct, to prove 
identity of defendant, or to prove intent, evidence was 
probative to demonstrate hostile nature of relationship between 
defendant and victim).  As the trial judge here succinctly 
stated, "If the defendant's saying, 'I killed her because of 
[i]nterferon,' and [the rebuttal evidence shows that] he almost 
killed somebody else in a horrible incident when he wasn't on 
interferon, then it rebuts the defense."5  Because the rebuttal 
                     
 
5 We do not dispute the defendant's contention that certain 
comments in the record suggest that this theory of admissibility 
was intermixed with other propensity-like arguments in favor of 
admitting the rebuttal evidence.  However, when read in their 
20 
 
 
evidence tended to disprove the defendant's theory of 
interferon's effects on him, it was relevant and admissible for 
that purpose.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2017).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 26–27 (2016) 
(defendant's mental state in days before shooting relevant to 
whether conduct was intentional, and not result of compulsive or 
illogical thoughts brought on by brain disease exacerbated by 
medications); Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 665 (2012) 
(prior bad act evidence may be admissible to rebut defendant's 
contentions made in course of trial [quotations and citation 
omitted]).   
 
It is within the context of this limited purpose that we 
must evaluate the defendant's arguments about the temporal and 
substantive nexus between the rebuttal evidence and the charged 
crime.  With respect to the temporal nexus, the conduct 
described in the Commonwealth's rebuttal case occurred between 
approximately thirteen to twenty-four years prior to the charged 
crime.  The defendant is correct that, typically, prior bad act 
evidence must share a relatively close temporal proximity to the 
charged crime.  See, e.g., Butler, 445 Mass. at 573, 575 
(approving admission of prior bad acts that occurred three years 
before charged crime, to show hostile nature of relationship 
                                                                  
entirety and in context, it is apparent that the evidence was 
admitted on a proper theory of admissibility. 
 
21 
 
 
between defendant and victim); Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 
811, 819 & n.8 (1990) (same, when prior bad acts occurred two 
and five days before victim was killed).  On the other hand, 
even a very close temporal nexus does not necessarily render 
evidence of prior bad acts admissible.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Anderson, 439 Mass. 1007, 1008 (2003) (passage of five months 
may render prior bad act "too remote to warrant admission"); 
Helfant, 398 Mass. at 228 n.13 ("time span of fifteen minutes 
may be too much").   
 
In short, "[t]here is no bright-line test for determining 
temporal remoteness of evidence of prior misconduct."   Id.  See 
Gollman, 436 Mass. at 115 ("no specific time limit on when a 
prior bad act can no longer be admissible").  Instead, the 
allowable age of prior bad act evidence often depends upon the 
strength of the "logical relationship" between the rebuttal 
evidence and the crime charged.  See Helfant, supra.  In this 
case, the "logical relationship" between the rebuttal evidence 
and the crime charged (vis-à-vis the defendant's interferon 
theory) was quite strong.  As discussed, the Commonwealth's 
rebuttal case hinged on demonstrating that the defendant's 
capacity to restrain himself from violence was not meaningfully 
affected by interferon.  According to medical records in 
evidence, the defendant's first course of interferon treatment 
occurred in 1994 or 1995.  Any rebuttal evidence, to be 
22 
 
 
relevant, would need to predate that treatment, and therefore 
would need to predate the charged crime by at least seven or 
eight years.  Under this unique timeline, the ordinary calculus 
about the age of a defendant's prior bad acts is dramatically 
altered.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 417 Mass. 830, 841-842 
(1994) (slightly more than two years between incidents "although 
near the limit, was not too great" in light of probative value 
of prior bad acts).  The rebuttal evidence here was relevant, 
and its "logical relationship" with the crime charged increased, 
precisely because it was old, in the sense that it predated the 
1994 or 1995 interferon treatment.6   
                     
 
6 The defendant further suggests that the 1997 incident 
testified to by Capaldo could have sufficed to rebut the 
interferon defense notwithstanding this timeline.  This was not 
argued at trial.  Even so, the argument fails for two reasons.  
First, prior bad act evidence does not necessarily become more 
prejudicial simply because it is not "necessary" to the 
Commonwealth's rebuttal case.  See Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 
475 Mass. 20, 28 (2016). 
 
 
Second, the argument is factually flawed because the 
defendant's expert witnesses never established a firm endpoint 
after which the psychological side effects of interferon would 
no longer manifest in a patient.  One witness said the 
psychiatric effects typically peak between the second and fourth 
months of treatment, but also suggested that sometimes they may 
last throughout an entire year.  The other expert testified only 
that the drug's psychological side effects may last "for 
months."  The defendant also introduced evidence that courses of 
interferon treatment "may last anywhere from six months to a 
year or more."  
 
 
Based on this evidence, the jury would have been warranted 
in finding that the defendant's first course of interferon 
treatment began as late as 1995, lasted into 1996, and caused 
side effects into 1997.  In other words, the evidence would 
23 
 
 
 
The defendant also argues that the rebuttal evidence lacked 
a substantive nexus, or "identicality," with the charged 
conduct.  He argues that although the injuries between at least 
one of his former girl friends and the victim were similar, they 
were not "so unique" as to overcome the undue prejudice of 
admitting the testimony.7  However, such similarity is more 
important when the prior bad acts are introduced on the issue of 
identity -- in other words, to support an inference that the 
                                                                  
permit an inference that, in 1997, the defendant remained under 
the influence of interferon.  Accordingly, the 1997 incident 
testified to by Capaldo would not necessarily rebut the 
defendant's theory that interferon diminished his capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to exercise self-
restraint. 
 
 
7 One specific iteration of this argument centers around the 
fact that the plea memorandum, which formed the basis for the 
1989 prior bad act evidence, stated that the defendant and his 
then-girl friend had engaged in consensual bondage in the course 
of their relationship.  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
various details of the 1989 attack, which were potentially 
related to the bondage aspect of the relationship, render the 
incident so dissimilar from the beating death of the victim that 
no evidence of this incident should have been admitted.  
 
 
As discussed in the text, such factual differences between 
the two incidents are less important where, as here, the prior 
bad act evidence was admitted not to show identity or a pattern 
of operation, but rather for the narrow purpose of rebutting the 
defendant's claim that interferon diminished his capacity to 
restrain himself from violence.  See Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 
Mass. 422, 433 (2002).  Although certain details of the 1989 
incident may have been more inflammatory than other prior bad 
act evidence in the rebuttal case, the 1989 incident had 
particular probative value for the admitted purpose, as it was 
the most recent pre-interferon illustration of the defendant's 
inability to restrain himself from extreme violence.  In these 
circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
admitting the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 
568, 576 (2005). 
24 
 
 
defendant was the perpetrator by demonstrating that a unique 
technique or distinctive pattern of conduct unites the prior bad 
acts and crime charged.  Compare Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 
Mass. 736, 744 (2008) (when offered to show identity, prior bad 
acts must have "meaningfully distinctive" similarities), with 
Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 433 (2002) (uniqueness or 
pattern not required where prior bad acts not offered to prove 
identity), and Butler, 445 Mass. at 575.  Here, identity was 
never an issue.  Rather, the defense hinged on whether, and to 
what extent, the defendant was in control of himself when he 
killed the victim.  In these circumstances, we are satisfied 
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining 
that the "logical relationship" between the rebuttal prior bad 
acts and the crime charged was strong enough to overcome the age 
of the evidence.  See Jackson, 417 Mass. at 841-842 (age of 
prior bad acts "not too great" given strong probative value of 
evidence).   
 
Of course, even where prior bad act evidence is otherwise 
admissible, see Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2017), the judge 
still must guard against the risk that such evidence will divert 
the jury's attention from the charged crime or otherwise 
unfairly prejudice the defendant.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 
(2017);  Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 129.  To that end, the defendant 
argues that the rebuttal evidence, due to its age, quantity, and 
25 
 
 
inflammatory nature, infected the case with undue prejudice that 
outweighed its probative value and overwhelmed the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief.   
 
This is a closer question, particularly with respect to the 
admission of two instances of prior bad acts, as opposed to only 
one.  But we cannot say that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in deciding it in the Commonwealth's favor.  
"Balancing the probative value of evidence against its possible 
prejudicial impact is a task committed to the discretion of the 
judge."  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 388 Mass. 98, 103 (1983).  
When asked to assess a judge's weighing of undue prejudice 
against probative value, it is not the role of this court to ask 
whether we would reach the same result as the trial judge.  See 
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 422 Mass. 236, 243 (1996).  Instead, we 
ask only whether the judge made a clear error of judgment in 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision, such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.  
See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Here, the trial judge's decision to admit both instances of 
prior bad acts in the Commonwealth's rebuttal case was made in 
the context of the defense.  In particular, the judge pointed to 
the testimony of one of the defendant's experts, who opined that 
accurately assessing the effects of a drug like interferon on a 
particular patient would turn, in part, on consideration of the 
26 
 
 
patient's "pre-existing history."  As the judge summarized it, 
"behavior . . . must be seen over a long period of time in order 
to get a sense of the impact of [i]nterferon on a particular 
individual."  With that purpose in mind, the two instances of 
the defendant's pre-interferon violent conduct demonstrated that 
the defendant's inability to control himself pre-interferon was 
not anomalous.  
 
Where, as here, a party offers inflammatory prior bad act 
evidence, a trial judge must exercise great care to limit, to 
the extent possible, the unfair prejudice arising from such 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 129–130  
(trial judge must "take care" to prevent prejudicial prior bad 
act evidence from "overwhelming" case [citation omitted]).  For 
instance, to guard against the potential for unfair prejudice a 
judge might limit the quantity of prior bad act evidence 
admitted, see Commonwealth v. Roche, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 380–
381 (1998), or permit only summary versions of the evidence, see 
Dwyer, supra at 130. 
 
The record makes clear that the judge was acutely aware 
that the Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence demanded careful 
analysis.  Compare Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 728–
729 (2005) (error when judge failed to exercise any discretion 
in determining admissibility of prior conviction).  In 
particular, it shows that he weighed the potential prejudicial 
27 
 
 
effect of admitting each instance of the defendant's pre-
interferon conduct.  Further, the judge controlled the potential 
undue prejudice from the admission of rebuttal evidence by 
conducting a voir dire examination of the first rebuttal 
witness, redacting portions of the plea memorandum that formed 
the basis for the second rebuttal witness's testimony, and 
declining to submit this memorandum to the jury.  See Helfant, 
398 Mass. at 225 (judge commended for sensitivity to potential 
for undue prejudice where she conducted voir dire and strictly 
limited scope of prior bad act testimony). 
 
The judge here also gave the jury forceful limiting 
instructions on the narrow purpose for which they could consider 
any of the prior bad act evidence, including the rebuttal 
evidence.  See Helfant, 398 Mass. at 226, 228 (judge gave 
"strong and forceful" limiting instructions, and "we must 
presume the jury followed them"); Commonwealth v. Chartier, 43 
Mass. App. Ct. 758, 765 (1997) (no substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice where limiting instruction for prior bad 
act evidence was forceful and to point).  Immediately following 
the direct examination of the first rebuttal witness, the judge 
spent what equaled approximately one and one-half pages of 
transcript reminding the jury that it could only use the 
rebuttal evidence, if at all, for the narrow purpose of 
rebutting the defendant's diminished capacity defense and not to 
28 
 
 
find him guilty of the crime charged.  Similarly, immediately 
after the second rebuttal witness, the judge again emphasized to 
the jury "in the strongest terms the concept of limited 
admissibility."  See Helfant, supra at 226; Chartier, supra. 
 
In balancing all of the considerations discussed above, we 
are satisfied that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
weighing the relevant factors and reached a decision within the 
range of reasonable alternatives.  See Butler, 445 Mass. at 576.  
There was no error. 
 
4.  Motion for a new trial.  Following oral argument, the 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial with this court.  See 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The motion presents four arguments 
alleging that trial counsel was ineffective because:  (1) he 
failed to object to certain hearsay testimony or request 
limiting instructions regarding prior bad act testimony in the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief; (2) he did not properly oppose or 
minimize the Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence; (3) he made an 
improper and prejudicial closing argument; and (4) he failed to 
obtain a second psychiatric evaluation of the defendant to 
bolster his interferon defense. 
 
Because the defendant has been convicted of murder in the 
first degree, we examine his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel under the rubric of § 33E "to determine whether there 
exists a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
29 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 187 (2001).  This standard 
is "more favorable" to the defendant than the general 
constitutional standard for determining ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  Accordingly, our analysis 
of the defendant's motion for a new trial focuses on "whether 
there was an error in the course of the trial (by defense 
counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, 
whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion."  Id. 
 
The defendant's first argument has two components.  
Primarily, he argues that his lawyer failed to object to two 
pieces of hearsay testimony pertaining to his trip to the Ford 
dealership.  In essence, the defendant argues that two police 
officers were permitted to testify, without objection, to 
hearsay statements regarding the defendant's "strange and 
belligerent conduct" at the Ford dealership and that their 
testimony placed uncharged prior bad act conduct by the 
defendant (operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol) before the jury.    
 
Even assuming this testimony was erroneously admitted, it 
would not likely have influenced the jury's conclusion because 
it was cumulative of other properly admitted testimony.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 743 n.22 (2011), cert. 
30 
 
 
denied, 132 S.Ct. 2693 (2012).  In particular, a dealership 
employee testified that he could "definitely smell alcohol" on 
the defendant's breath after he drove up to the dealership, and 
that the defendant "was a little irate when he came in."  The 
employee further testified that he saw the defendant "drinking 
something, so [he] assumed that [the defendant] was intoxicated" 
and called the police.  The employee later witnessed the police 
place the defendant in custody.  Thus, the same evidence to 
which the defendant now objects would have come before the jury 
notwithstanding defense counsel's lack of an objection to the 
testimony of the two officers. 
 
The defendant also argues that counsel inappropriately 
failed to request limiting instructions regarding the testimony 
of Rippetoe, Capaldo, and the victim's father about this 
conduct.  Again, even assuming this constituted error, counsel's 
inaction would not have had any influence on the jury's 
conclusion.  With respect to Rippetoe and Capaldo, the judge 
ultimately did instruct the jury on the limited purpose for 
which they could use the conduct to which these individuals 
testified.  See Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 
(2000) (presumption that jury understand and follow limiting 
instructions "ordinarily renders any potentially prejudicial 
evidence harmless").  With respect to the victim's father, the 
defendant correctly points out that the judge, at sidebar, 
31 
 
 
sustained counsel's objection to the father's testimony about 
the defendant being incarcerated for a period of time, but never 
communicated his ruling to the jury.  Regardless, this testimony 
was cumulative of other, properly admitted, evidence that 
informed the jury of the defendant's prior incarceration, as 
discussed above.  As a result, any error with respect to this 
component of the father's testimony would not have influenced 
the jury's conclusion.  See Dyer, 460 Mass. at 743 n.22.   
 
Second, the defendant argues that his lawyer failed to 
properly oppose or minimize highly prejudicial rebuttal evidence 
regarding the defendant's relationships with former girl 
friends, discussed above.  We have already decided that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting this evidence.  
That conclusion dispatches with those portions of the 
defendant's argument pertaining to counsel's failure to file a 
motion in limine or object to various aspects of the 
Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence.  This leaves one claim:  that, 
by cross-examining the first rebuttal witness and objecting to a 
redaction in the 1989 plea memorandum, defense counsel could 
have elicited the fact that the defendant's prior relationships 
involved aspects of sadomasochism or consensual bondage, and 
that the first witness may have been biased against the 
defendant because the defendant left her for another woman.  
According to the defendant, the jury's lack of access to this 
32 
 
 
information left them with an incomplete picture of the 
relationships in question and thereby prejudiced the defendant.  
 
Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, 
we are confident that even if counsel had elicited this evidence 
at trial, it would not likely have influenced the jury's 
verdict.  With respect to the first rebuttal witness, the 
defendant avers that their relationship included consensual 
sadomasochistic practices such as the witness "being tied up and 
whipped with a leather belt or paddle on every part of her 
body."  The defendant asserts that he asked his lawyer to cross-
examine the witness regarding these practices in order to 
"impeach her testimony that [the defendant] had inflicted 
unwanted or nonconsensual abuse on her."  However, even if this 
cross-examination had occurred, the witness testified to 
incidents of extreme and grossly disproportional violence that 
would have remained unexplained by the sadomasochistic practices 
described in the defendant's affidavit.  As discussed above, 
this witness testified that the defendant would strike her in 
the face whenever the songs of a former boy friend played on the 
radio, and detailed one incident where the defendant beat her 
with a long metal bar because she had turned down the heat too 
low in their apartment.  These incidents, along with the 
witness's testimony about the defendant's short temper and 
threat to kill her, overwhelmingly supported the Commonwealth's 
33 
 
 
rebuttal theory notwithstanding the potential evidence that 
sadomasochism played a role in their relationship or the 
possibility that the witness may have been upset with the 
defendant for leaving her.   
 
Similarly, the defendant argues that his violence in the 
1989 incident "mirrored" sadomasochistic activities in which he 
and this former girl friend consensually participated on a 
regular basis.  Even assuming that is so, the defendant 
acknowledges that he went "overboard" during this incident, a 
statement that is corroborated by the fact that the defendant 
pleaded guilty to a crime in connection with the event.  Thus, 
even if this component of the relationship was before the jury, 
it only would have bolstered the core of the Commonwealth's 
rebuttal argument:  that the defendant was unable to restrain 
himself from acts of extreme physical violence well before he 
ever took interferon.  Accordingly, there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 909, 914 (2013) (failure to request 
jury instruction not ineffective assistance resulting in 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice given 
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt); Commonwealth v. 
Griffith, 404 Mass. 256, 263 (1989) (counsel's tactics not 
ineffective assistance "[c]onsidering the overwhelming evidence 
against the defendant"). 
34 
 
 
 
Third, the defendant argues that counsel made an improper 
and prejudicial closing argument.  Specifically, he contends 
that counsel (1) offered personal opinions about the defendant's 
bad character, for example, stating that "he is a disgusting 
human being"; (2) vouched for the credibility of Rippetoe's 
testimony regarding the defendant's statement that he would have 
killed the victim if Rippetoe was not present; and (3) referred 
to facts not in evidence by suggesting to the jury that the 
defendant had abused other women not mentioned in any part of 
the case.   
 
These remarks, in context, are properly understood as 
furthering counsel's interferon-based defense strategy, and 
typically we do not characterize strategic decisions as 
ineffective assistance merely because they prove unsuccessful.  
See Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 272 (1991).  Further, 
the judge firmly instructed the jury to "keep in mind that the 
closing arguments of counsel [are] not evidence."  But most 
importantly, we are confident that these remarks, even assuming 
they were improper, did not likely influence the jury's verdict 
in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the 
Commonwealth's case.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 
109, 113, 115 n.9 (1977) (rejecting defendant's ineffective 
assistance claims based, in part, on counsel's remarks in 
closing argument).   
35 
 
 
 
As discussed above, the only live issue for the jury, in 
light of the defendant's interferon defense, was whether this 
drug precluded the defendant from forming the mental state 
required to sustain a conviction for murder in the first degree.  
We have already described in detail how the Commonwealth's 
rebuttal evidence supported the inference that the defendant was 
unable to control his violent behavior even before he took 
interferon.  Indeed, he admits as much in the aforementioned 
affidavit where he stated that he went "overboard" during the 
1989 incident.  In this context, it is clear that the contested 
remarks of defense counsel were not central to either the 
defendant's or the Commonwealth's theory of the case, and would 
have likely had no discernible influence on the jury's verdict.  
See Commonwealth v. Obershaw, 435 Mass. 794, 806-807 (2002) 
(improper statements by prosecutor in closing argument harmless 
in light of strength of Commonwealth's case).  If anything, 
these remarks indicate merely that "the basic trouble from the 
defense standpoint was weaknesses in the facts rather than any 
inadequacy of counsel."  Satterfield, 373 Mass. at 111. 
 
The defendant's fourth argument concerns counsel's failure 
to call a psychiatric expert to testify that the interferon 
affected the defendant.  In particular, the motion for a new 
trial includes an affidavit from a psychiatrist (who was not 
called to testify) offering the opinion that the defendant did 
36 
 
 
not have the capacity to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law when he attacked the victim because of 
the side effects of interferon.  Trial counsel explained that he 
was "dissatisfied" with this psychiatrist's approach to the 
case.  However, appellate counsel represents that trial 
counsel's main concern about presenting this expert -- that the 
defendant had used the drug Prozac as a defense in an earlier 
case, which largely mirrored his interferon defense in this case 
-- could have actually bolstered the second psychiatric expert's 
testimony.  Trial counsel's reason for not presenting the second 
psychiatric expert was, in the circumstances, a reasonable 
strategic decision.  Had the jury learned that the defendant had 
advanced a similar defense in another case, although involving a 
different medication, it could have further damaged trial 
counsel's ability to frame the defendant's aggression and 
violence as influenced by the interferon.  The potential effects 
of interferon on the defendant's capacity to conform his conduct 
to the law were thoroughly explored at trial.  The decision not 
to call the psychiatric expert was not manifestly unreasonable.  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674-675 (2015), S.C., 
478 Mass. 189 (2017).   
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our power under § 33E to reduce 
the verdict or order a new trial.  Having carefully reviewed the 
37 
 
 
entire record, we discovered nothing that warrants a reduced 
verdict or a new trial under § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.