Title: Pak v. Hoang

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Pak, et al., v. Hoang
No. 14, September Term, 2003
Headnote:
The provision of the Maryland Security Deposit Act, Md. Code (1974, 2003
Repl. Vol.) § 8-203(e)(4) of the Real Property Article, is remedial in nature
and allows for the awarding of all attorney’s fees associated with a tenant’s
suit under this provision, necessitated by a landlord including post-judgment
motions and appeals.  In this case, the trial judge was not correct in his belief
that § 8-203 left him powerless to award post-judgment attorney’s fees.
Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery C ounty
Case #207158
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 14
September Term, 2003
Ho Pak and Lisa Leone Pak
v.
Minh-Vu Hoang
Bell, C. J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Raker, J., dissents.
Filed:   November 18, 2003    
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in
the hearing and conference of this case
while an active member of this Court; after
being recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
1 The townhouse was also owned by Mr. Thanh Hoang, respondent’s husband, but Mr.
Hoang was not named as a party to this litigation.
2   Hereinafter, unless noted otherwise, all statutory references will be to this section
of the Maryland Code.  Section 8-203(e)(4) states:
“§  8-203. Security deposits.
. . .
   (4)  If the landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to return any part
of the security deposit, plus accrued interest, within 45 days after the
termination of the tenancy, the tenant has an action of up to threefold of the
withheld amount, plus reasonable attorney’s fees.
This case arises out of a landlord and tenant dispute.  In December of 1999, Minh-Vu
Hoang, respondent, filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery
County, against Ho and Lisa Pak, petitioners, seeking $25,000.00 in damages for a breach of
lease.  Petitioners were tenants in a townhouse owned by respondent.1
Petitioners prayed a jury trial and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County.  Petitioners then filed counterclaims alleging that respondent had
breached the lease and had not returned their security deposit in violation of the Maryland
Security Deposit Act, Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 8-203 of the Real Property
Article.2  In July of 2000, the Circuit Court granted petitioners’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissed with prejudice respondent’s claim and entered judgment against
respondent as to petitioners’ counterclaims.  On October 31, 2000, after a damages hearing,
the Circuit Court entered a judgment of $7,378.91 in favor of petitioners.  This sum included
petitioners’ attorney’s fees up to that point.
Petitioners then filed post-judgment discovery motions in an effort to aid in their
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recovery of the judgment against respondent, to which there was no response.  Petitioners then
filed a Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents in Aid of Execution. In an order dated May 23, 2001, the Circuit Court granted
the motion.  Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Civil Contempt and for the Entry of
Appropriate Relief on July 23, 2001, in response to respondent’s failure to comply with the
Circuit Court’s May 23rd order.  Following a September 20, 2001 hearing, the Circuit Court
entered another order directing respondent to fully and completely respond to the
interrogatories and request for documents.  A compliance review hearing was set for October
29, 2001.  After respondent failed to appear at the October 29th hearing, the Circuit Court
issued a writ of body attachment for respondent’s arrest.  Respondent was arrested and
released on her own recognizance.
On December 6, 2001, there was a hearing in the Circuit Court on petitioners’ Petition
for Civil Contempt.  The court found respondent in civil contempt and sanctioned respondent
with 30 days of incarceration subject to a purge provision, i.e., respondent could purge the
contempt with her complete compliance with the court’s order regarding petitioners’ Motion
to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in Aid of
Execution.  The Court set a compliance hearing for January 14, 2002.  On December 6, 2001,
petitioners filed a Motion for Supplemental Award of Attorney’s Fees from respondent.
Respondent paid the original judgment and all interest then due on January 11, 2002,
one business day before the compliance hearing was to take place, by delivering a check to
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petitioners’ counsel.  At the January 14th hearing, the court noted that the supplemental
attorney’s fees motion was outstanding and set a final hearing on that motion for February 15,
2002.  The Circuit Court denied petitioners’ Motion for a Supplemental Award of Attorney’s
Fees and a final order was issued on August 23, 2002.
Petitioners appealed that decision to the Court of Special Appeals.  The Court of
Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion issued on January 21, 2003, affirmed the decision
of the Circuit Court.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court, and, on May 7,
2003, we granted the petition.  Pak v. Hoang, 374 Md. 358, 822 A.2d 1224 (2003).
Petitioners present four questions for our review:
“I.
Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Maryland Rules where a judgment debtor has
willfully violated court orders and has been found in contempt.
II.
Whether the Circuit Court has the power to award supplemental
attorney’s fees pursuant to a court’s inherent powers as recognized in Klupt v.
Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 728 A.2d 727 (1999).
III.
Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental
attorney’s fees incident to its contempt powers.
IV.
Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Maryland Security Deposit Act, Maryland Code
3 While the questions presented to this Court within petitioners’ Petition for Writ of
Certiorari differ in form from these questions, they are substantively the same.
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Real Estate, § 8-203, and to enforce a judgment entered pursuant to that Act.”3
We answer petitioners’ fourth question in the affirmative and hold that pursuant to the
Maryland Security Deposit Act the Circuit Court has the authority to award attorney’s fees
earned in enforcing a judgment rendered under that statute and has the authority to award
attorney’s fees in respect to appeals defending any such judgment.  Attorney’s fees earned in
the filing of post-judgment motions and appeals fit within § 8-203(e)(4)’s phrase “reasonable
attorney’s fees” of the remedial Maryland Security Deposit Act.  The trial courts have
discretion to award such fees.  As we reverse on petitioners’ fourth question, we need not
address the remaining questions.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals.
I.  The Trial Court’s Decision
On February 15, 2002, at the hearing on petitioners’ Motion for Supplemental Award
of Attorney’s Fees, the trial court stated:
“I think that [respondent’s] conduct is reprehensible.  I think that she
really has done whatever she could to throw roadblocks in the way of the other
side.  I think that she has defied the orders of this court.  She has done a lot of
things that I take a very dim view of, and I think that she ought not get away
with those things.
“My problem, however, is that this was a judgment which was entered
against her.  She did everything she could to avoid complying with the
discovery to aid in the enforcement of that judgment, but ultimately she did pay
the amount of that judgment.
“The contempt finding . . . was a contempt finding with regard to the
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discovery that was intended to help enforce the judgment.
“It seems to me that once the amount of that judgment is paid, that the
thrust of that -- the contempt finding disappears.
. . . 
“So, as much as, in fairness, I would like to go ahead and impose a
sanction for that contempt . . . I don’t think it would be enforceable.
“. . . I wish there were a greater sanction than that that could be imposed on her.
I don’t feel that I can.
“There is also a request that has been made for supplemental attorney’s
fees under the security deposit statute, and my reading of that statute is that the
attorney’s fees that were awarded at the time are really the only attorney’s fees
you can get.
“. . . I don’t read the statute to say that you can go back and award supplemental
attorney’s fees later when you have difficulty enforcing the judgment that was
entered the first time.
“So, I’m not going to award supplemental attorney’s fees, and I am not
going to impose any part of the 30 days [jail sentence] which I believe Judge
Rupp had imposed.
“I regret that I am not going to do either one of those things, because I
think in fairness [respondent] probably deserves them, but I work within the
statutes and the rules I have to work with and that is where I come out.”
[Alterations added.]
II.  Discussion
The determinative issue on review in this case is whether courts have the authority to
award attorney’s fees pursuant to the Maryland Security Deposit Act (the Act), specifically
under § 8-203(e)(4), which are earned after a judgment has been rendered in the trial court and
in pursuit of collection of that judgment.  We hold that the remedial nature of the Maryland
Security Deposit Act permits a trial court to award post-judgment attorney’s fees under the
Act in order to ensure full vindication of tenants’ rights to recover security deposits owed to
them as contemplated by the statute.
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A.  Standard of Review
When we interpret statutes, this Court has annunciated that the “‘paramount goal . .
. is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute at issue.’”  Moore
v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003)(quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325,
335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000)).  We may ascertain the legislative intent of a statute by
analyzing its plain language and by considering its context within the statutory scheme as a
whole.  Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566; see also In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711,
782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001).  Where “‘the words of a statute, construed according to their
common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning,’
we ‘will give effect to the statute as it is written.’” Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566
(quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994)).  In discerning
the legislative intent where the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we look beyond
the statute’s plain language.  Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566; see also In re Mark
M., 365 Md. at 711, 782 A.2d at 346.  If a statute’s language is found to be ambiguous, then
it is appropriate to analyze the legislative history and other relevant factors, such as “a bill’s
title and function paragraphs, amendments . . . and other material that fairly bears on the
fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal,” which may reveal the intent or general
purpose of the statute.  Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566 (quoting In re Anthony R.,
362 Md. 51, 58, 763 A.2d 136, 140 (2000)(internal citation omitted)).  The Court must be
careful, however, to avoid a “[c]onstruction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical,
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unjust, or inconsistent with common sense.”  Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d
887, 895 (1999) (alteration added) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d
590, 594 (1992)); see also Moore, 372 Md. at 677-78, 814 A.2d at 566.
B.  Section 8-203(e)(4)
The specific statutory provision at issue in the case sub judice is Md. Code (1974, 2003
Repl. Vol.), § 8-203(e)(4) of the Real Property Article, which states:
“(e) Return of deposit to tenant; interest. . . . 
 . . .
   (4)  If the landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to return any part
of the security deposit, plus accrued interest, within 45 days after the
termination of the tenancy, the tenant has an action of up to threefold of the
withheld amount, plus reasonable attorney’s fees.”
The parties do not dispute that trial courts may require a landlord to pay the tenant’s attorney’s
fees incurred prior to and at trial; they agree that the statute is clear and unambiguous as to
that point.  The plain language of § 8-203(e)(4), however, is silent, and thus, it is asserted,
ambiguous, as to whether post-judgment attorney’s fees, i.e., fees for post-judgment discovery
motions and appeals, come within the provision permitting the awarding of  “reasonable
attorney’s fees.”  Petitioners urge this Court to broadly construe the phrase “the tenant has an
action of up to threefold of the withheld amount, plus reasonable attorney’s fees” to include
attorney’s fees occurring after judgment has been rendered, i.e., post-judgment motions and
appeals.  Petitioners argue that such an interpretation serves the remedial purpose of the
statute, while a contrary interpretation would frustrate that same purpose.
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While this Court has never addressed the alleged remedial nature of § 8-203(e)(4), we
have defined what is meant by remedial in construing other statutes and rules.  In Langston
v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 408-09, 754 A.2d 389, 395-96 (2000), this Court stated the following,
inter alia, in determining a statute to be remedial:
“‘Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a
remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the
enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries. They also
include statutes intended for the correction of defects, mistakes
and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of
the state. The definition of a remedial statute has also been stated
as a statute that relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and
does not affect substantive or vested rights.
“‘Every statute that makes any change in the existing body
of law, excluding only those enactments which merely restate or
codify prior law, can be said to “remedy” some flaw in the prior
law or some social evil.’ [Footnotes omitted.]
3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, supra, § 60.02, at
152; see also 2 id. § 41.09, at 399 (‘The statutes which fall into this category [of
remedial statutes] are ones that describe methods for enforcing, processing,
administering, or determining rights, liabilities or status.’).
“The appellate courts of this state have also defined remedial legislation. For instance,
in [State of Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278
Md. 120, 125, 360 A.2d 1, 5 (1976)], we said that ‘[a]n act is remedial in nature when it
provides only for a new method of enforcement of a preexisting right.’ (Citing [Kelch v.
Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 145, 36 A.2d 544, 545 (1944)]; Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 98, 166
A. 593 (1933)).  ‘Under Maryland law, statutes are remedial in nature if they are designed to
correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to
the public good.’ Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co., 86 Md. App.
533, 550, 587 A.2d 569, 577 (1991) (citing State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737,
745 (1974)), rev’d on other grounds, 326 Md. 663, 607 A.2d 8 (1992).”  [Alterations added.]
See also Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 556-57, 766 A.2d 98, 110 (2001)(determining
the retroactivity of the remedial rule, Maryland Rule 15-207(e) and quoting to Langston).  We
recognized the remedial nature of another section of the Residential Lease Subtitle of the Real
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Property Article in Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 541 A.2d 1314 (1988), where we interpreted
§ 8-211 of the Real Property Article, entitled, “Repair of dangerous defects; rent escrow.”  We
specifically recognized the remedial nature of § 8-211(n) due in part to the fact that the Act
provided “remedies not available at common law.”  We stated:
“In short, we have before us remedial legislation.  When the legislature
enacts a statute designed, as the Act is, to provide remedies not available at
common law, it is not desirable that construction should be mindlessly guided
by a slogan, such as ‘statutes in derogation of the common law must be
narrowly construed.’ Statutes of this nature ‘are remedial and designed to close
a gap in the preexisting law. . . .’ A court should not permit ‘a narrow or
grudging process of construction to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to
be remedied. . . .’”
Neal, 312 Md. at 693-94, 541 A.2d at 1318 (citations omitted).  Section 8-203 serves a
similar, remedial purpose – to provide tenants with a remedy not provided for under common
law.
We also have discussed the remedial nature of several other Maryland statutes.  See,
inter alia, Livering v. Richardson’s Restaurant, 374 Md. 566, 574, 823 A.2d 687, 691
(2003)(Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act); Friolo v. Frankel, 373 Md. 501, 517-18, 819
A.2d 354, 364 (2003)(Wage and Hour Law); Caffrey v. Dep’t of Liquor Control for
Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 306, 805 A.2d 268, 288 (2002)(Maryland Public
Information Act); Smith v. Borello, 370 Md. 227, 235, 804 A.2d 1151, 1155 (2002)(survival
and wrongful death statutes); Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 134, 775
A.2d 1249, 1256  (2001)(domestic abuse statute); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 252, 674
A.2d 951, 955 (1996)(domestic abuse statute).  We have said that once we have determined
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that a statute is remedial in nature that it “‘must be liberally construed . . . in order to
effectuate the [statute’s] broad remedial purpose.’” Caffrey, 370 Md. at 306, 805 A.2d at 288
(quoting A.S. Abell Publg. Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071
(1983))(alteration added).  
The right of a tenant to sue a landlord for the return of a security deposit first appeared
in its current form in Md. Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) Art. 21 § 8-213, see 1973 Md. Laws,
Chap. 2, and was recodified into the Real Property Article of the Maryland Code in 1974, see
1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 12.  The statute itself, and the title clauses to the predecessor and
current chapter laws, do not directly speak to the remedial nature of the provisions related to
landlord-tenant security deposits.  We therefore look to whether § 8-203(e)(4) “‘provide[s]
a remedy, or improve[s] or facilitate[s] remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights
and the redress of injuries.’”  Langston, 359 Md. at 408, 754 A.2d at 395 (alterations
added)(internal citation omitted).  Furthermore, we look to whether § 8-203(e)(4) provides
for “‘the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the
administration of the state’” and whether § 8-203(e)(4) is “‘a statute that relates to practice,
procedure, or remedies and does not affect substantive or vested rights.’” Id. at 408-09, 754
A.2d at 395 (internal citations omitted). 
Section 8-203(e)(4) provides a remedy to tenants who believe that their landlord has
4 In addition to § 8-203(e)(4), see also Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 8-
203.1(a)(7) of the Real Property Article (stating “that failure of the landlord to comply with
the security deposit law may result in the landlord being liable to the tenant for a penalty of
up to 3 times the security deposit withheld, plus reasonable attorney’s fees”); 62 Op. Att’y
Gen. 523 (Md. 1977)(stating, in reference to another section of the Residential Lease
Subtitle, § 8-211, that  “[t]he thrust of the State’s rent escrow statute is to provide tenants
with additional judicial remedies in support of a limited, implied warrant of
habitability”)(alteration added).  
5 Petitioners state in their brief that the $2,500 security deposit for respondent’s
“upscale townhouse in Bethesda, Maryland” was “likely in the upper range of security
deposits handled by Maryland’s District Courts.” The Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s (HUD) report on fair market rents for the fiscal year 2003 supports this
contention.  See 67 Fed. Reg. 61405 (September 30, 2002).  Pursuant to that report, for a
two-bedroom rental in the greater Baltimore area (including Anne Arundel, Baltimore,
Carroll, Harford, Howard, Queen Anne’s Counties and Baltimore City) the average rent is
$844 per month. Id.  The average for Columbia is $952 per month.  Id.  For the greater
(continued...)
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improperly failed to return to them their security deposits.4  The statute sets out a clear
procedure and time line for the return of security deposits; the landlord must return the deposit
with interest within 45 days after the termination of the lease.  In addition to compensating
the tenants’ direct injury, § 8-203(e)(4) provides for treble damages “of up to threefold of the
withheld amount.”  This punitive measure, although capped at three times the withheld
amount, illustrates the Legislature’s concern regarding the protection of tenants’ rights and
remedies against improper landlord actions.
This inclusion of a treble damage clause recognizes the difficulties often encountered
by tenants seeking the return of security deposits from landlords.  Litigation arising under §
8-203(e)(4) applies only to residential leases.  It generally involves only relatively small sums
of money in the context of other civil litigation.5  Section 8-203 (b)(1) sets the maximum
5(...continued)
Washington, DC area (including Calvert, Charles, Frederick, Montgomery and Prince
George’s Counties) the average is $1154 per month.  Id.  The average for Cumberland
(Allegany County) is $535 per month.  Id.  And for Cecil County, the average is $752 per
month (including the greater Wilmington-Newark area).  Id.  Doubling the highest of those
averages for metropolitan areas of Maryland, $1154 for the greater Washington, DC area,
still does not equal the security deposit imposed in this case, and thus illustrates that this case
represents the higher range of security deposits in Maryland.
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amount of a security deposit a landlord may charge as no more than “the equivalent of two
months’ rent per dwelling unit, regardless of the number of tenants.”  A landlord not returning
a security deposit, when she is required to do so, forces the tenant to bring suit.  The
Legislature recognized that the results of tenants’ cost-benefit analyses in respect to balancing
the costs of litigation against the amount of recovery, might be an impediment to the rights
of tenants to seek the return of their security deposits and could result in tenants not
recovering monies rightfully owed to them.  The statute’s imposition of attorney’s fees
recognizes the problem and addresses it by allowing for an additional remedy for tenants.  The
remedy provided for by § 8-203(e)(4) creates a procedure by which tenants can recover
monies that are rightfully theirs; it is remedial in nature.
As we hold that § 8-203(e)(4) is a remedial statute, we look to whether the liberal
construction given to remedial statutes allows for the inclusion of post-judgment attorney’s
fees within the phrase “reasonable attorney’s fees,” as  stated in § 8-203(e)(4).  We hold that
§ 8-203(e)(4)’s “reasonable attorney’s fees” provision includes fees for post-judgment
motions necessitated by the landlord’s refusal to satisfy the judgment.  First, logic supports
6 Even if a landlord’s appeal was made in a good faith belief that it was warranted, the
added cost in post-judgment or appellate attorney’s fees alone could create an unreasonable
disparity for a successful tenant.  For example, if an apartment rents for $500 per month, the
maximum amount that a landlord could hold as a security deposit is two times that amount,
or $1000.  The trial judge may award the tenant up to three times that amount plus interest.
If, as in the case sub judice, the case is appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and then to
this Court, the cost of prosecuting an effective appeal may nullify the judgment of the trial
court even if the trial court had awarded the maximum amount under the statute.  Therefore,
even where a landlord acts in good faith when appealing, if the tenant ultimately prevails the
statute contemplates that judges have discretion to award attorney’s fees relative to that
appeal.  The addition of deliberate delays and contemptuous behavior by the landlord, as in
this case, would only add additional costs to the litigation and, unless recoverable, would
further diminish the statutory remedy afforded to tenants.
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such a result.  Section 8-203(e)(4) eliminates some of the potential disparity between certain
tenants and landlords in disputes regarding security deposits.  An interpretation excluding
post-judgment attorney’s fees from § 8-203(e)(4) during a tenant’s direct attempt to enforce
collection of a judgment against such a landlord or a tenant’s defense of a judgment during
the appellate process, might effectively defeat the tenant’s right to fully recover from the
landlord.  As occurred in this case, and potentially in many cases, especially those where the
security deposit is a relatively small amount, a landlord could delay, impede and actively
thwart the collection of the judgment until it is no longer cost effective for the tenant to pursue
collection of a judgment.6  The statute allows for “reasonable attorney’s fees” incurred in an
action for a return, i.e., actual collection, of security deposits.  Until a security deposit,
including attorney’s fees, is actually returned it is still in the process of being collected.  The
statute encompasses attorney’s fees associated with “collection.”  Considering the costs of the
appellate process,  precluding, categorically, the recovery of appellate attorney’s fees might
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effectively render meaningless the remedy created by the Legislature.
Looking to another Maryland remedial statute for guidance supports our holding that
“reasonable attorney’s fees” under the Act may include post-judgment attorney’s fees.  The
case of Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 745 A.2d 1026 (2000), is somewhat
similar in that, albeit as dicta, we recognized that remedial statutes providing for attorney’s
fees might encompass post-judgment fees.  In Admiral Mortgage, this Court answered the
question of whether it was appropriate for a jury to determine the attorney’s fee award
pursuant to Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 3-507.1 of the Labor and Employment
Article.  Section 3-507.1 states:
“§  3-507.1. Action to recover unpaid wages.
(a)  In general. – Notwithstanding any remedy available under § 3-507
of this subtitle, if an employer fails to pay an employee in accordance with § 3-
502 or § 3-505 of this subtitle, after 2 weeks have elapsed from the date on
which the employer is required to have paid the wages, the employee may bring
an action against the employer to recover the unpaid wages.
(b) Award and costs. – If, in an action under subsection (a) of this
section, a court finds that an employer withheld the wage of an employee in
violation of this subtitle and not as a result of a bona fide dispute, the court may
award the employee an amount not exceeding 3 times the wage, and reasonable
counsel fees and other costs.” [Emphasis added.]
This Court, in Admiral Mortgage, held that § 3-507.1 was a remedial statute.  In holding that
attorney’s fees should be awarded by the trial judge and not the jury, this Court stated in
Admiral Mortgage:
“Attorneys’ fees and costs are another matter.  For one thing, they may continue
to accrue after the verdict is rendered, if post-trial motions or appeals are filed,
so the jury cannot determine them definitively.  Attorneys’ fees, moreover,
when allowed, have traditionally been set by the judge, who is usually in a far
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better position than a jury to determine what is reasonable.”
Admiral Mortgage, 357 Md. at 547-48, 745 A.2d at 1033 (emphasis added).  Admiral
Mortgage clearly implies that, in respect to remedial statutes, courts may allow post-judgment
attorney’s fees.  See also Friolo, 373 Md. at 517-18, 819 A.2d at 364 (stating,
“Unquestionably, the provisions for counsel fees in § 3-427(d) and § 3-507.1(b) are remedial
in nature and should therefore be given a liberal interpretation.  Courts must keep that in mind
when deciding whether to award a fee.”)(citations omitted).  The Circuit Court in the case sub
judice was in error in believing that he did not possess the power to award attorney’s fees
pursuant to § 8-203(e)(4) for work done on post-judgment motions and for work done in
respect to appeals.
Federal fee-shifting cases provide additional support for the imposition of post-
judgment attorney’s fees in cases similar to the case sub judice.  See Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 558-60, 106 S. Ct. 3088,
3094-96, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439, 451-53 (1986); Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738 (1st Cir.
1984)(listing other United States Circuit Court decisions that have allowed the award of post-
judgment monitoring fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Assoc. for Retarded Citizens of North
Dakota v. Schafer, 83 F.3d 1008, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1996)(recognizing that “it is generally
accepted that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to post-judgment fee awards for legal services
necessary for reasonable monitoring of the decree”); Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d 1450, 1452
(9th Cir. 1993)(providing for the award of attorney’s fees “for certain post-judgment
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proceedings” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492, 1495-96
(10th Cir. 1989)(upholding a trial court’s post-judgment award of attorney’s fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1988, for the monitoring of compliance with a consent decree regarding prison
conditions and other post-judgment proceedings).  Albeit that it involved administrative
enforcement of a judicial decree, some of the rationale of Delaware Valley, supra, would
equally apply to judicial enforcement of court judgments.  The United States Supreme Court
stated:
“Although it is true that the proceedings involved in Phases II and IX
were not ‘judicial’ in the sense that they did not occur in a courtroom or involve
‘traditional’ legal work such as examination of witnesses or selection of jurors
for trial, the work done by counsel in these two phases was as necessary to the
attainment of adequate relief for their client as was all of their earlier work in
the courtroom which secured Delaware Valley’s initial success in obtaining the
consent decree. . . . Instead, Delaware Valley filed suit to force the
Commonwealth to comply with its obligations under the Clean Air Act to
develop and implement an emissions inspection and maintenance program
covering 10 counties surrounding two major metropolitan areas. To this end,
the consent decree provided detailed instructions as to how the program was to
be developed and the specific dates by which these tasks were to be
accomplished.
“Protection of the full scope of relief afforded by the consent decree was
thus crucial to safeguard the interests asserted by Delaware Valley; and
enforcement of the decree, whether in the courtroom before a judge, or in front
of a regulatory agency with power to modify the substance of the program
ordered by the court, involved the type of work which is properly compensable
as a cost of litigation under § 304. . . .
. . . 
“Given the common purpose of both § 304(d) and § 1988 to promote
citizen enforcement of important federal policies, we find no reason not to
interpret both provisions governing attorney’s fees in the same manner. We
hold, therefore, that the fact that the work done by counsel . . . did not occur in
the context of traditional judicial litigation does not preclude an award of
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reasonable attorney’s fees under § 304(d) for the work done during these
portions of the present action.”
Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 558-60, 106 S. Ct. 3094-96, 92 L. Ed. 2d 452-53 (citations
omitted).  Although it involved administrative enforcement, Delaware Valley’s rationale is
particularly pertinent to this case.  The federal statutes discussed in that case had the purpose
of ensuring private citizens “a meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights.”  Id. at 559,
106 S. Ct. at 3095, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 453.  In this case, § 8-203(e)(4) similarly provides tenants
with a meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights against landlords improperly
withholding tenants’ security deposits.  As post-judgment monitoring was needed to ensure
the citizens’ rights in Delaware Valley, post-judgment motions and appeals were necessary
to ensure that petitioners could enforce their judgment in this case.  The actions of respondent
in this case illustrate how easily a landlord can prevent a tenant from vindicating the tenant’s
rights under the statute in the absence of an award for post-judgment attorney’s fees.  Thus,
awarding attorney’s fees for post-judgment motions and appeals can not only be reasonable,
but may often be necessary.
Cases from other states additionally support our interpretation of § 8-203(e)(4), as
several courts have held that similar attorney’s fees provisions of security deposit statutes
apply to post-trial motions and/or appeals.  In Martin v. Allen, 193 Colo. 395, 566 P.2d 1075
(1977), the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed a lower court decision refusing to allow
attorney’s fees for an appeal.  In holding that a tenant could be awarded attorney’s fees for an
appeal relating to that state’s security deposit statute, the court stated that the Colorado statute:
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“authorizes the award of treble the amount of a security deposit and reasonable
attorney’s fees when a landlord willfully fails to return the deposit within thirty
days of termination of the leasehold.  This statute, salutary in nature, is
designed to assist tenants in vindicating their legal rights and to equalize the
disparity in power which exists between landlord and tenant in conflicts over
such relatively small sums.  To deny attorney’s fees to tenants who are forced
to prosecute an appeal would undercut the objectives of these provisions.
Landlords, by the simple expedient of an appeal, could effectively discourage
tenants from obtaining legal redress.  We, therefore, hold that tenants who are
successful on appeal are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.”
Id. at 396, 566 P.2d at 1076.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 340
N.W.2d 506 (1983), held that the actual recovery of damages is the benchmark of success for
a tenant in a landlord-tenant dispute pursuant to the Wisconsin’s security deposit act.  The
provision in dispute in Shands, which is similar to the one in the case sub judice, stated:
“‘Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation by any other
person of any order issued under this section may sue for damages therefore in
any court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover twice the amount of such
pecuniary loss, together with costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.’”
Id. at 355 n.2, 340 N.W.2d at 507-08 n.2 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5)(emphasis added)).
The Shands court stated:
“A tenant action brought under sec. 100.20(5) . . . is not successful until
he or she has actually recovered damages and attorney fees.  The trial court’s
decision may have to be defended, or an adverse decision protested, in an
appellate forum.  The same purposes and policy interests we identified for the
original action attach to the appeals process.  To permit the recovery of attorney
fees for successful appellate work is simply to recognize that an attorney’s
effort at that stage is as essential to the tenant’s success as is an attorney’s work
at the trial court level.  Furthermore, we recognize that, if attorney fees were not
recoverable on appeal, landlords could defeat the statutory purposes by the
simple expedient of an appeal, which will be prohibitively expensive for many
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tenants; similarly, tenants would have little incentive to pursue a meritorious
claim on appeal where they had not prevailed at the trial court level.  In short,
to deny attorney fees to tenants who need to pursue appellate review to enforce
their rights would undercut the salutary objectives of the statute.
“In light of these important interests, we find no reason to interpret sec.
100.20(5), Stats., as limiting the award of attorney fees to the original trial court
litigation.  Accordingly, we hold that a tenant who has suffered pecuniary loss
because of a violation of Wis. Adm. Code Ch. Ag 134 shall recover reasonable
attorney fees for appellate review undertaken to attack or defend a trial court’s
decision in the suit.”
Id. at 359, 340 N.W.2d at 509 (emphasis added).  See also  Schaefer v. Murphey, 131 Ariz.
295, 299, 640 P.2d 857, 861 (1982)(awarding, in a landlord-tenant dispute, attorney’s fees for
an appeal as well as for trial work pursuant to a state statute allowing for the recovery of
attorney’s fees to the successful party); see generally L’Esperance v. Benware, 830 A.2d 675,
679 (Vt. 2003)(although not the issue on appeal, the trial court included “post-judgment
attorney’s fees” for work performed on post-trial motions in a landlord-tenant dispute under
Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act).
As in Shands, supra, denial of attorney’s fees in the case at bar would diminish the
remedial nature of § 8-203(e)(4).  Petitioners were not successful in recovering the original
judgment against the landlord until after the filing of several post-judgment motions.  These
post-judgment motions and the accompanying attorney’s fees were necessary for petitioners
to receive their full remedy under the statute, i.e., recovery on their judgment against
respondent.  Without the post-judgment motions, and subsequent appeals by petitioners,
respondent could have successfully thwarted § 8-203(e)(4)’s purpose merely by refraining
from repaying the security deposit.  Interpreting § 8-203(e)(4) to not include post-judgment
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attorney’s fees might encourage similar actions by landlords in the future, thus further
frustrating the remedial purpose of § 8-203(e)(4).  As a result, we hold that the inclusion of
post-judgment attorney’s fees under § 8-203(e)(4) may be “reasonable” and in accord with
§ 8-203(e)(4)’s remedial purpose.
Respondent argues that a holding by this Court that § 8-203(e)(4) authorizes the
awarding of post-judgment attorney’s fees would be the practical equivalent of this Court
adding the following emphasized language to the statute:
“(e)(4)  If the landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to return any
part of the security deposit, plus accrued interest, within 45 days after the
termination of the tenancy, or if a landlord fails to pay a judgment entered
pursuant to this subsection, or if a landlord fails to respond to post-judgment
discovery propounded by a tenant having a judgment entered pursuant to this
subsection, the tenant has an action of up to threefold of the withheld amount,
plus reasonable attorney’s fees.”
Respondent’s contention is misplaced.  Our interpretation does not add language to the statute;
it is merely an interpretation of “reasonable attorney’s fees” in light of § 8-203(e)(4)’s
remedial nature.
III.  Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold that although § 8-203(e)(4) is silent as to whether “reasonable
attorney’s fees” includes  fees earned in the pursuit of post-judgment motions to collect the
judgment from a landlord and appeals incurred in an effort to defend and collect a judgment
in favor of a tenant, the remedial nature of § 8-203(e)(4) necessitates that a court has the
power to include such fees in the award.  Reasonable attorney’s fees under § 8-203(e)(4) may
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include post-judgment attorney’s fees in order to avoid rendering the remedy provided in §
8-203(e)(4) relatively meaningless.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS  REVERSED AND
THE IS CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
VACATE THE ORDER OF THE
C I R C U I T  
C O U R T  
F O R
MONTGOMERY COUNTY DENYING
A SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD OF
ATTORNEY’S 
FEES 
AND 
TO
REMAND 
THE 
CASE 
TO 
THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE RESPONDENT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 14
September Term, 2003
HO PAK and LISA LEONE PAK
v.
MINH-VU HOANG
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   November 18, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the  hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.  
-1-
Raker, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.  I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals
and of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, denying counsel fees in this case for
noncompliance with a post-judgment discovery order.  Respondent’s abhorrent conduct was
not a violation of the Security Deposit Act.  Petitioner recovered counsel fees that were
permissible under the Security Deposit Act.  There is no other provision for the recovery of
fees under that Act.  The general rule regarding counsel fees applies—that a party may not
recover attorney fees and expenses of litigation in his or her claim against the other party
defendant unless it arises from specific statutory provisions or the contract of the parties.
See Bausch & Lomb v. Utica Mutual, 355 Md. 566, 590, 735 A.2d 1081, 1094 (1999).
The majority holds that petitioner is entitled to counsel fees because, as a remedial
statute, it must be construed liberally, and that liberal construction includes recovery of
counsel fees to enforce the judgment.  I disagree.  The majority has expanded significantly
the concept of fee-shifting, with no indication of where it will end.