Title: Aquino v. United Property & Casualty Co.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12705 
 
WENDA AQUINO  vs.  UNITED PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 4, 2019. - January 21, 2020. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Insurance, Homeowner's insurance, Joint insured, Coverage, 
Burning of insured property. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 1, 2018. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Seth H. Hochbaum for the plaintiff. 
 
David F. Hassett (Michael S. Melville also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Michael L. Snyder for Metropolitan Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company. 
 
Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, Patrick 
M. Groulx, & John G. Mateus for Massachusetts Academy of Trial 
Attorneys. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The plaintiff, Wenda Aquino, owned a home as a 
tenant in common with her fiancé, Kelly Pastrana.  Both were 
named coinsureds on a homeowners' insurance policy issued by 
defendant United Property & Casualty Insurance Company 
(insurer).  Pastrana set fire to the home intentionally without 
any involvement on the part of the plaintiff.  Despite the 
plaintiff's lack of involvement, the insurer denied the 
plaintiff's claim for coverage, relying on an intentional loss 
exclusion in the policy that barred recovery when any coinsured 
intentionally caused a loss.  A Superior Court judge granted in 
part the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment against 
the insurer, finding the intentional loss exclusion as written 
in the policy violated the standard policy language mandated 
under G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, but allowing the plaintiff to 
recover only one-half of the coverage limit due to her and 
Pastrana's equal interests under their insurance policy and 
Pastrana's forfeiture of his interest. 
 
The two dispositive questions at issue in this appeal are 
related:  first, whether an innocent coinsured may collect on a 
standard fire insurance policy when another coinsured 
intentionally sets fire to the insured premises, and second, if 
the coinsured may recover, how to determine the extent of that 
recovery.  We conclude that the standard fire insurance policy 
set by statute imposes several, rather than joint, rights and 
3 
 
 
obligations on the insureds, and the insurer's redrafting of the 
statutorily defined policy language to make either insured 
responsible for the actions of the other in setting the fire was 
in violation of the statute.  We reach this conclusion 
notwithstanding a 1938 decision of this court, Kosior v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601 (1938), which denied 
equitable relief for an innocent coinsured spouse whose husband 
deliberately set fire to the house to recover insurance 
proceeds.  We conclude that the Kosior case, which contains 
little analysis and appears to be based on outdated assumptions 
about the marital relationship and the legal rules associated 
therewith, is distinguishable, even if it remains good law.  The 
holding in that case, however, provides a good faith basis for 
the insurer's decision to deny coverage in the instant case, 
precluding recovery by the plaintiff under G. L. c. 93A. 
 
We hold that the policy proceeds in this case are 
severable, and that the plaintiff is entitled to only one-half 
of the insurance proceeds.  Finally, we conclude that the 
walkway, the stairway, the railings, and the retaining wall fall 
under the policy's coverage for the plaintiff's dwelling.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court judge, 
granting in part and denying in part the parties' cross-motions 
for summary judgment. 
4 
 
 
 
1. Background.  In 2014, the plaintiff and her fiancé, 
Kelly Pastrana, purchased a two-family residential dwelling in 
Chelsea (property) as tenants in common.1  Both the plaintiff and 
Pastrana are listed on the deed and mortgage for the property.  
On July 5, 2016, the insurer issued a homeowners' insurance 
policy to the plaintiff and Pastrana effective September 3, 2016 
(policy).  Both the plaintiff and Pastrana were named insureds 
on the policy.  In the policy, "you" and "your" refer to the 
"named insured in the Declarations," but there is not otherwise 
an express definition of "the named insured." 
The policy provided for fire insurance.  Fire insurance in 
Massachusetts is governed by the standard policy statute, which 
provides that "[n]o company shall issue policies or contracts 
which . . . insure against loss or damage by fire or by fire and 
lightning to property or interests in the commonwealth, other 
                                                          
 
 
1 The certificate of title to the property states that the 
plaintiff and her fiancé owned the property as tenants in 
common.  Moreover, "in this Commonwealth a conveyance or devise 
to several always creates a tenancy in common unless the deed or 
the will expressly provides for a joint tenancy," as "[j]oint 
tenancy and its doctrine of survivorship are not in harmony with 
the genius of our institutions, nor are they much favored in 
law" (citation omitted).  Cross v. Cross, 324 Mass. 186, 188 
(1949).  See G. L. c. 184, § 7 ("A conveyance or devise of land 
to two or more persons . . . shall create an estate in common 
and not in joint tenancy, unless it is expressed in such 
conveyance or devise that the grantees or devisees shall take 
jointly, or as joint tenants, or in joint tenancy, or to them 
and the survivor of them, or unless it manifestly appears from 
the tenor of the instrument that it was intended to create an 
estate in joint tenancy"). 
5 
 
 
than those of the standard forms herein set forth . . . ."  
G. L. c. 175, § 99.  That standard form provides for an 
exclusion of coverage when there is loss by fire "caused, 
directly or indirectly, by . . . neglect of the insured to use 
all reasonable means to save and preserve the property at and 
after a loss."  G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth.  Further, a company 
"shall not be liable for loss occurring . . . while the hazard 
is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the 
insured."  Id.  Finally, the standard form provides, in relevant 
part:  "In consideration of the provisions and stipulations 
herein or added hereto and of             dollars premium this 
company . . . does insure . . . to the extent of the actual cash 
value of the property at the time of loss, [but not in] any 
event for more than the interest of the insured, against all 
loss by fire . . . ." (emphasis added).  Id. 
The policy issued did not, however, track the standard form 
language, particularly the intentional loss exclusion language.   
The policy provision here states, in part: 
"Section I - EXCLUSIONS 
 
"A.  We do not insure for loss caused directly or 
indirectly by any of the following.  Such loss is 
excluded regardless of any other cause or event 
contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the 
loss.  These exclusions apply whether or not the loss 
event results in widespread damage or affects a 
substantial area. 
 
". . . 
6 
 
 
 
"8.  Intentional Loss 
 
"Intentional Loss means any loss arising out of any 
act an 'insured' commits or conspires to commit with 
the intent to cause a loss.  In the event of such 
loss, no 'insured' is entitled to coverage, even 
'insureds' who did not commit or conspire to commit 
the act causing the loss." 
 
The policy further provides:  "[e]ven if more than one person 
has an insurable interest in the property covered, [the insurer] 
will not be liable in any one loss . . . [t]o an 'insured' for 
more than the amount of such 'insured's' interest at the time of 
loss . . . ." 
Other relevant aspects of the policy did not raise issues 
of conflict with the statute.  Coverage A of the policy insures 
"[t]he dwelling on the 'residence premises' . . . including 
structures attached to the dwelling," providing a coverage limit 
of $622,000.  Coverage B of the policy insures "other structures 
on the 'residence premises' set apart from the dwelling by clear 
space.  This includes structures connected to the dwelling by 
only a fence, utility line, or similar connection."  The policy 
limit for Coverage B is $62,200. 
 
On May 22, 2017, a fire totally destroyed the home, and 
damaged the walkway, the patio, the stairway, the retaining 
wall, and the wrought iron railing.  Pastrana intentionally set 
the fire.  Emergency responders were incapable of fighting or 
suppressing the fire due to an exchange of gunfire between 
7 
 
 
Pastrana, who remained in the home, and emergency responders.  
Pastrana died at some point during the blaze.  The plaintiff was 
innocent of any involvement in the fire. 
 
After the fire, the plaintiff asserted claims under the 
policy for destruction of the dwelling; destruction of the 
driveway, the walkway, the patio, the retaining wall, the 
stairs, and the railing on the property; loss of personal 
property in the dwelling; loss of rental income and additional 
living expenses; costs associated with the enforcement of 
"ordinance law" against the plaintiff as the owner of property 
containing a fire-damaged and unsafe structure; destruction to 
landscaping, trees and shrubs; and debris removal.  In a letter 
to plaintiff dated August 18, 2017, the insurer denied its 
liability for the plaintiff's claims, citing Pastrana's 
intentional setting of the fire and the policy's intentional 
loss exclusion. 
 
After the insurer denied liability, counsel for the 
plaintiff wrote the insurer a demand letter pursuant to G. L. 
c. 93A on December 15, 2017, claiming that the insurer violated 
G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 9, and G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9), by issuing 
a policy with less coverage than what is required under the 
language of the standard fire policy, G. L. c. 175, § 99, 
Twelfth, and thereby denying the plaintiff the coverage she is 
guaranteed under Massachusetts law.  Counsel for the insurer 
8 
 
 
responded on January 5, 2018, disputing that its policy was 
inconsistent with the Massachusetts standard fire policy. 
 
Plaintiff commenced an action against the insurer on 
February 1, 2018, bringing claims for declaratory judgment, 
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, 
waiver, reformation of the policy to comply with G. L. c. 175, 
§ 99, Twelfth, and unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices 
under G. L. c. 176D and G. L. c. 93A.  On her claim for 
declaratory judgment, plaintiff requested that the court find 
that the intentional loss exclusion of the policy was void for 
its failure to conform with and for impermissibly restricting 
coverage mandated by the Massachusetts standard fire policy; 
that Pastrana's alleged intentional act of arson suspended 
insurance coverage under the policy only as to him, and not as 
to the plaintiff; and that the driveway, the stairs, the 
walkway, the foundation, and the retaining wall situated on the 
property fell within Coverage B of the policy, and not within 
Coverage A. 
 
The insurer filed its answer on March 21, 2018, which it 
amended on May 22, 2018.  On May 9, 2018, the plaintiff moved 
for partial summary judgment on her counts for declaratory 
judgment, breach of contract, and reformation of the policy.  On 
the same day, the insurer simultaneously opposed the plaintiff's 
9 
 
 
motion and filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all 
counts of the plaintiff's complaint.  Subject to their 
respective coverage positions, the parties agreed that the loss 
in value for the dwelling was $622,000, and that the total 
damages, including the lost value of the dwelling, were 
$890,600.2 
 
In allowing in part and denying in part the parties' 
motions, the judge agreed with plaintiff that the intentional 
loss exclusion provision of the policy was unenforceable as 
written, and had to be reformed in accordance with G. L. c. 175, 
§ 99, Twelfth.  The judge also found that the insurer committed 
a breach of the terms of the policy, as reformed, by failing to 
provide coverage to the plaintiff.  The judge then granted a 
declaratory judgment that the driveway fell under Coverage B, 
but he rejected the plaintiff's argument that the walkway, the 
retaining wall, the stairs, and the wrought iron railing also 
were protected by Coverage B.  The judge dismissed the claim for 
violations of G. L. c. 93A but otherwise denied the insurer's 
motion for summary judgment.  In ruling on the cross motions for 
                                                          
 
 
2 This was the total property damage if certain structures 
besides the driveway were included in Coverage B rather than 
Coverage A of the policy.  It also included damages covered by 
other provisions of the policy that were not in dispute.  The 
parties agreed upon a total amount of damages of $845,770.41 if 
the structures besides the driveway were deemed to be covered by 
Coverage A and not Coverage B. 
10 
 
 
summary judgment, the judge found that the plaintiff should 
recover for one-half of the losses caused by the fire, 
concluding that "Pastrana's act of purposefully burning the 
property [forfeited] his share of recovery under the [p]olicy."  
The plaintiff appealed, and the insurer cross-appealed.  We 
granted direct appellate review. 
 
2. Discussion.  a.  Standards of review.  "Summary judgment 
is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been 
established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law" (quotation and citation omitted).  Surabian 
Realty Co. v. NGM Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 715, 718 (2012).  The 
interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law 
subject to de novo review.  Id.  We must "ascertain the fair 
meaning of the language used, as applied to the subject matter" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  McNeill v. Metropolitan Prop. 
& Liability Ins. Co., 420 Mass. 587, 589 (1995).  In this 
context, where the policy provisions are dictated by statute, 
"the rule of construction resolving ambiguities in a policy 
against the insurer is inapplicable" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id.  See Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 408 
Mass. 70, 83 (1990) ("We refrain from construing [the policy] 
language against [the insurer], considering that the words find 
their source in . . . statutory provisions"); 16 R.A. Lord, 
11 
 
 
Williston on Contracts § 49:16 at 151-152 (4th ed. 2014) ("the 
rule of liberal construction in favor of the insured is 
inappropriate when the wording of a particular clause in an 
insurance policy is mandated by statute [because] a clause 
required by statute is not included in the policy as a result of 
the insurer's superior bargaining power"). 
 
No material facts are in dispute in the instant case:  the 
parties have stipulated that the plaintiff is innocent of any 
wrongdoing, and it is undisputed that Pastrana was responsible 
for intentionally setting fire to the home.  Further, the 
question whether the plaintiff's insurance policy comports with 
G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, as a matter of law does not require 
the resolution of any disputed facts, but turns on the language 
of the statute and the policy.  Finally, determining whether the 
policy's coverage for the dwelling (Coverage A) or for "Other 
Structures" (Coverage B) governs the walkway, the patio, the 
retaining wall, the stairs, and the wrought iron railing does 
not require resolving any disputed issues of material fact, but 
involves the interpretation of the language of the policy and 
applying that language to the undisputed facts of this case. 
 
b.  Mandatory minimum coverage under G. L. c. 175, § 99, 
Twelfth.  Where language in a statutorily defined insurance 
policy is in conflict with the statute, that language is 
unenforceable.  See Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 384 
12 
 
 
Mass. 171, 177 (1981).  The insurer cannot limit coverage to a 
scope narrower than what the Legislature envisioned.  Id.  For 
the reasons that follow, we hold that the policy language here 
conflicts with the mandatory insurance coverage provided for in 
G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, and must be reformed. 
 
The Massachusetts standard fire insurance policy is defined 
by G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth.  See Ideal Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 
Zichelle, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 50, 53 (2001).  The initial 
legislation governing the standard form of fire insurance 
policies came in the wake of the great Boston fire in 1872:  the 
legislation was first enacted in 1873 and became mandatory in 
1881, when "it became evident that uniformity in policy 
provisions was lacking but desirable."  Id. 
 
As explained supra, the standard fire policy statute 
requires the use of standard forms.  Those forms provide for an 
exclusion of coverage when there is loss by fire "caused, 
directly or indirectly, by . . . neglect of the insured to use 
all reasonable means to save and preserve the property at and 
after a loss."  G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth.  Further, the 
standard forms provide that a company "shall not be liable for 
loss occurring . . . while the hazard is increased by any means 
within the control or knowledge of the insured."  Id.  These 
provisions of § 99, Twelfth, govern a scenario in which the 
insured intentionally sets fire to insured property, and allow 
13 
 
 
the insurer to exclude coverage for this intentional conduct.  
See, e.g., Lane v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 96 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (2001) 
(analyzing and applying identical statutory language to case 
where insured's son intentionally set fire to insured's home).  
The statute does not include further definition of the meaning 
of "the insured."  See G. L. c. 175, § 1. 
 
At issue is the significance of the difference in the use 
of an indefinite article in the policy exclusion and a definite 
article in the statute:  the policy provides an exclusion for 
"loss arising out of any act an 'insured' commits or conspires 
to commit with the intent to cause a loss," whereas the statute 
provides an exclusion for "loss occurring . . . while the hazard 
is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the 
insured" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth.  The 
policy provides further clarification of this distinction by 
adding an additional sentence:  "In the event of such loss, no 
'insured' is entitled to coverage, even 'insureds' who did not 
commit or conspire to commit the act causing the loss." 
 
The distinction in the use of the words "an insured" and 
"the insured," although subtle on its face, is not without 
difference, and has been extensively analyzed by numerous courts 
and scholars, who have concluded that an intentional loss 
exclusion referencing "the insured" offers more protection than 
14 
 
 
an exclusion referencing "an insured" or "any insured."  As 
explained by one of the foremost commentators: 
"[W]here a policy precludes recovery as a result of 
fraud on the part of 'the' insured, the recovery is 
precluded only as to the insured who committed the 
fraud and the innocent coinsured is allowed to 
recover.  On the other hand, where a policy precludes 
recovery as a result of fraud on the part of 'any' 
insured, the effect of the fraudulent acts of one 
insured preclude recovery as to all insureds and an 
innocent coinsured is thereby precluded from 
recovery." 
 
13A Couch on Insurance § 197:38 at 197-82 -- 197-83 (3d ed. rev. 
2019).  See Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 
1990) ("The words 'an insured' in the above exclusion means an 
unspecified insured who commits arson.  In short, if any insured 
commits arson, all insureds are barred from recovering"); 3 A.D. 
Windt, Insurance Claims & Disputes:  Representation of Insurance 
Companies & Insureds, § 11:8 at 11-181 & n.5 (6th ed. 2013), 
collecting cases ("Most exclusions are written to apply to 
actions taken by 'the' insured [and are thus] inapplicable as to 
any insured that did not engage in the proscribed actions").  
See also Shepperson v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 312 
F. Supp. 3d 183, 196 (D. Mass. 2018), and cases cited. 
 
With the significant exception of Kosior, 299 Mass. 601, 
which we discuss in detail infra, courts in the Commonwealth 
have correctly focused on this distinction.  See, e.g., Norfolk 
& Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cleary Consultants, Inc., 81 
15 
 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 40, 52 (2011) ("Because of its reference to 'the 
insured,' the exclusion must be applied individually to each 
insured for whom coverage is sought, looking at both the 
causation and knowledge components of the exclusion in relation 
to that insured").3 
 
Uniformity in the drafting and interpretation of fire 
insurance provisions is also an important consideration.  It was 
a driving force behind the original passage of the statutory 
mandate.  See Ideal Fin. Servs., Inc., 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 53.  
Similarly, this court has stated that it has an "interest in 
giving [G. L. c. 175, § 99,] the same treatment that is given to 
identical language in policies issued in other States."  Pappas 
Enters., Inc. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 422 Mass. 80, 83 
(1996).  Such uniformity is promoted by interpreting the 
                                                          
 
 
3 As the judge below noted, there are also Superior Court 
decisions that have addressed this issue.  See Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. vs. Gonzalez, Mass. Sup. Ct., No. ESCV20151794B (June 8, 
2017) ("when 'the insured' is given its plain and ordinary  
meaning, it unambiguously refers only to the named insured who 
has violated the terms of the policy[, whereas] a policy 
exclusion that uses the language 'an insured' or 'any insured' 
unambiguously creates a joint obligation as to all named 
insureds" [citations omitted]); Hall vs. Preferred Mut. Ins. 
Co., Mass. Sup. Ct., No. HDCV201400781 (May 1, 2015) ("the 
Legislature chose to use the term 'the insured' in lieu of a 
more inclusive term, such as 'any insured,' or a more 
restrictive term, such as 'named insured'"); Barnstable County 
Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Dezotell, Mass. Sup. Ct., No. 200500361 (July 
20, 2006) ("The Intentional Act exclusion terms may very well be 
construed to exceed the scope of exclusion permitted under the 
term 'the insured' in the statute"). 
16 
 
 
standard language "the insured" in our statutory exclusion in a 
manner consistent with its common understanding and the great 
weight of authority in the case law.  See, e.g., Streit v. 
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 863 F.3d 770, 773-774 (7th Cir. 
2017); Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 688-
689 (Minn. 1997); Lane, 96 N.Y.2d at 5; 13A Couch on Insurance, 
supra at § 197:38. 
For these reasons, we conclude that by using the article 
"the" and not "an" before the word "insured" in the statutory 
exclusion, the Legislature provided for several rather than 
joint rights and obligations.  Had the Legislature intended to 
preclude recovery for innocent coinsureds, it would have drafted 
the statutory exclusion to apply to "an insured" rather than 
"the insured."  See, e.g., Postell v. American Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 48 (Iowa 2012) (acknowledging that Iowa 
Legislature amended its standard policy language to replace "the 
insured" with "an insured" in five places and to " revise[] 
language about intentional acts in standard fire policy language 
which are noncompensable"). 
 
c.  The Kosior case.  We now address the 1938 decision of 
this court in Kosior, 299 Mass. 601.4  In that case, the 
                                                          
 
 
4 The continuing viability of the Kosior decision was 
questioned but not decided by this court in Baker v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 382 Mass. 347 (1981), another case where an 
innocent coinsured sought to recover under his policy when his 
17 
 
 
plaintiff and her husband owned land and buildings as tenants in 
common.  Id. at 602.  The husband set fire to the buildings with 
the intent to defraud the insurance companies, but the plaintiff 
was not involved at all.  Id.  The policy insuring the property, 
under which the plaintiff was a coinsured, contained the 
following provision:  "[I]f the insured shall make any attempt 
to defraud the Company, either before or after the loss, the 
policy shall be void."  Id.  The plaintiff brought her suit in 
equity, attempting to avoid the technical pleading requirement 
at the time that her husband be required to join in the action.  
Id.  See Butler, Jr. & Freemon, Jr., "The Innocent Coinsured:  
He Burns It, She Claims -- Windfall or Technical Injustice?", 17 
Forum 187, 191 (1981-1982).  The plaintiff did so after 
conceding that she had no case at law.  Kosior, supra.  In a 
brief and somewhat cryptic decision, the court concluded that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief.  Id. at 603. 
The plaintiff in Kosior did not present an argument 
concerning the meaning of the words "the insured."  The court 
also glossed over the issue, focusing instead on the fact that 
                                                          
 
wife committed arson.  The plaintiff in that case argued his 
wife was insane at the time she set the fire, id. at 348, and 
the court declined to "reach the issue whether the rule that an 
innocent insured is barred from recovery by the intentional 
burning of the property by another insured is still sound 
policy."  Id. at 353 n.9, citing Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 
299 Mass. 601 (1938). 
18 
 
 
the husband and wife were jointly insured under the policy.  In 
its holding, the court stated: 
"We think the policy in question was joint and that 
the plaintiff cannot recover.  The act of her husband 
in burning the insured buildings was an act of the 
'insured,' and as such it was a fraud upon the 
defendants which rendered the policies void in 
accordance with their terms." 
 
Id. at 604.  This holding, however, directly followed the 
court's statement that "[c]ases dealing with policies which by 
their express terms permit of a severance of interest of the 
insured are not in point."  Id.  It appears to us that neither 
party, nor the court, focused on the question before us, which 
is whether the Legislature's use of the term "the insured" in 
the standard policy exclusion provided for joint as opposed to 
several rights and obligations. 
 
We stress that in Kosior, the court engaged in very little 
analysis of the actual terms of the policy when concluding that 
the contract imposes a joint obligation.  Instead, the court 
appears to have relied on the fact that the policy was written 
in the name of both the husband and the wife when holding that 
the plaintiff had a joint obligation under the contract.  In the 
absence of contractual analysis, we are concerned that this 
approach may have been based, at least in part, on outdated 
conceptions of the marital relationship and the legal rules 
associated with those conceptions.  See Note, The Problem of the 
19 
 
 
Innocent Co-insured Spouse:  Three Theories on Recovery, 17 Val. 
U. L. Rev. 849, 858 (1983) (under theory of recovery embraced in 
Kosior, often referred to as "the old rule," "courts deny 
recovery concluding that the contract is joint, yet are often 
unclear as to how they arrive at this decision" [footnote 
omitted]).  See also Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 
565, 567 (1959) ("What is material is the fact that the 
insurance was written in the joint names of Mr. and Mrs. Klemens 
and they have a joint obligation to comply with the terms of the 
policy"), overruled by Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 
461 (1982).  "Because the policies were usually written in the 
names of both spouses, these courts [applying the old rule] had 
little difficulty concluding that the rights and obligations 
under the policy were joint."  Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 590-591.  
This "'oneness' fiction" is "repugnant to the general rule of 
law that, a wife is not vicariously liable for the criminal acts 
of her husband merely because of the existence of the marital 
relationship."  Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 
398, 401-402 (Del. 1978).  It also reflects a dated conception 
that their property interests are generally not separable.  See 
Vance, supra at 591, quoting Note, supra at 861-862 (under "old 
rule," because "the property interests of a husband and wife are 
regarded as inextricably intertwined, the [insurance policy] 
interests also are considered inseparable").  See also duPont v. 
20 
 
 
duPont, 33 Del. Ch. 571, 574 (1953) ("The quaint old legal unity 
concept of marriage gave the husband an absolute interest in his 
wife's personal property including choses reduced to possession. 
. . .  The result may be inelegantly and imprecisely expressed 
thus:  'What was his was his but what was hers was his also'" 
[citations omitted]). 
 
The old rule and the results of applying it were therefore 
criticized as "harsh and poorly reasoned," Hosey v. Seibels 
Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751, 754 (Ala. 1978), as 
well as inequitable and "in need of reexamination" (citation 
omitted), Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591.  Courts critical of the old 
rule emphasized that "the reasonable person does not expect 
arson to be imputed as a result of the intentional acts of the 
spouse," id. at 592, quoting Note, 17 Val. U. L. Rev. at 868, 
and "[v]icarious liability is not an attribute of marriage," 
Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 483 (1982), quoting 
Shearer v. Dunn County Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d 240, 249 
(1968).  Further, "[w]hether the rights of obligees are joint or 
several is a question of construction," and jointly naming the 
insureds on the policy is not enough to establish a joint 
obligation under the entirety of the contract.  Hoyt v. New 
Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 243 (1942).  Given the 
lack of contractual analysis in the Kosior decision and our 
concerns that the court's assumptions in that decision about 
21 
 
 
joint obligations may have reflected outdated conceptions of the 
marital relationship, we decline to conclude that the Kosior 
decision controls the present case. 
Rather, we conclude that the fact that an insurance 
contract has more than one named insured is the beginning, and 
not the end, of the analysis in determining whether insurance 
rights and obligations are joint or several.  This is true for 
all insureds, including those married or otherwise involved in a 
domestic relationship.  See Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 485-486 ("In 
Klemens [a case involving a husband and wife] this court 
concluded without analysis that if there are several insureds, 
the joint nature of the insurance contract gives rise to joint 
interests and obligations on the part of each policyholder.  The 
courts following the modern rule discard this conclusory maxim 
and turn instead to the language of the policy to determine 
whether the rights of the insureds are joint or several").  See 
also Hoyt, 92 N.H. at 243.  Recovery depends on the policy 
language itself and the contract law applicable to that 
language, and cannot be based on dated conceptions of the 
marital relationship.5  See Steigler, 384 A.2d at 401-402; Note, 
                                                          
 
 
5 The approach we adopt here has been considered by 
commentators to reflect the "best reasoned rule," Vance, 457 
N.W.2d at 592, and has been followed by a majority of 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Hosey, 363 So. 2d at 754; Watts v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1246, 1258 (2002); 
Steigler, 384 A.2d at 402; American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 
22 
 
 
17 Val. U. L. Rev. at 868.  Because the reformed language of the 
policy in this case must conform with the statutorily mandated 
language, we focus on that statutory language and the insurance 
policy considerations important to the Legislature. 
 
Under the language of G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, as 
discussed supra, the rights and obligations of the insureds are 
several.  In the statutory exclusion, the words "the insured" 
are used, not "an insured."  There also is good reason why the 
Legislature would not want to hold the innocent insured 
responsible for the intentional acts of the other insured.  See 
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 143 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1981), quoting Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 130 N.J. 
Super. 350, 354 (1974) ("the responsibility or liability for the 
fraud -- here, the arson -- is several and separate rather than 
joint, and the husband's fraud cannot be attributed or imputed 
to the wife, who is not implicated therein").6  Had the 
                                                          
 
426 N.E.2d 136, 144-145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Hildebrand v. 
Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 331 (Me. 1978); 
Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 688; Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 488-489. 
 
 
6 Our interpretation of G. L. c. 175, § 99, comports with 
the principle that insurance is intended to cover fortuitous 
losses, and "losses are not fortuitous if the damage is 
intentionally caused by the insured."  Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 
483-484.  Under our interpretation of that principle, the 
question of fortuitousness should "be examined from the point of 
view of the person making the claim," particularly because 
"[t]he law does not require us to foresee the criminal act of 
another."  American Economy Ins. Co., 426 N.E.2d at 142. 
23 
 
 
Legislature intended to narrow the obligation of the insurer, we 
conclude it would have used the alternative "an insured" 
formulation.  This reading of the statutory language also is 
consistent with our emphasis on the importance of uniformity of 
interpretation, which is promoted by adopting, as explained 
supra, the clear majority rule across the country.  See Pappas, 
422 Mass. at 83.  See also Streit, 863 F.3d at 774 and cases 
cited; Shepperson, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 196.  Uniformity of 
provisions, at least within the State, was also a driving force 
of the original legislation. 
 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the insureds' 
rights and obligations are several under the reformed policy, 
and we affirm the decision of the judge below to allow the 
plaintiff to recover notwithstanding her coinsured's intentional 
acts. 
 
d.  The extent of recovery for an innocent coinsured.  
Having concluded that the rights and obligations of the insured 
under the exclusion clause are several, not joint, and that the 
innocent insured is not responsible for the intentional fraud of 
the insured who intentionally set the fire, we consider next 
whether the insurable interest protected by the insurance 
contract is severable.  We conclude that it is.  We also 
conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to recover fifty percent 
of the proceeds for the loss here.  Our interpretation is 
24 
 
 
informed by the insurable property rights at issue and confirmed 
by the statutorily prescribed insurance contract language. 
 
To insure real property, there must be an "insurable 
interest" in that property.  See Womble v. Dubuque Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 310 Mass. 142, 144 (1941).  That interest must be 
tangible, but it need not be a title interest in the property.  
Queen v. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 345 
(1992).  "By the law of insurance, any person has an insurable 
interest in property, by the existence of which he receives a 
benefit, or by the destruction of which he will suffer a loss, 
whether he has or has not any title in, or lien upon, or 
possession of the property itself" (citation omitted).  Womble, 
supra.  See 3 Couch on Insurance § 41:11 (rev. 2011) ("Any right 
that may be enforced against the property and that is so 
connected with it that its injury or destruction will cause loss 
is an insurable interest"). 
In the instant case, there is no question that the 
plaintiff and her fiancé had a tangible, insurable interest in 
the property they insured.  They held title to the insured 
property as tenants in common.  A tenancy in common is clearly 
an insurable interest.  What we must decide is whether the 
insurable interest here was severable so as to warrant division 
of the proceeds, and if so, how much the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover.  In the instant case, the property right is readily 
25 
 
 
divisible and the statutorily prescribed language in the 
contract allows such division. 
As a tenant in common, the plaintiff had an "undivided 
fractional interest and the right to possession and use of the 
entire property" up until her cotenant's death.  Brady v. City 
Council of Gloucester, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 691, 695 (2003).  A 
tenancy in common does not, however, have the incidence of 
survivorship:  when one tenant in common dies, his fractional 
interest in the right to possession and use of the entire 
property passes to his or her heirs at law -- not the other 
tenant in common.  West v. First Agric. Bank, 382 Mass. 534, 536 
n.4 (1981).  A tenant in common only "has an insurable interest 
to the extent of his or her interest in the property," whereas 
"[a] spouse who holds a tenancy by the entirety has an insurable 
interest in the whole premises."  3 Couch on Insurance §§ 42:44-
42:45. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff's insurable interest was 
limited to her rights as a tenant in common at the time of the 
loss.  At the time of the loss, her cotenant was dead.  As a 
tenant in common, she had no right to inherit his share.  Even 
if the fiancé had innocently died in the fire, the plaintiff 
would not have been entitled to the entire proceeds.  Rather, 
the plaintiff and the fiancé's heirs would have split the 
26 
 
 
proceeds: the heirs would have been entitled to the fiancé's 
share upon his death.  See West, 382 Mass. at 536 n.4. 
In these circumstances "it is generally recognized [that] 
an innocent tenant in common can recover a pro rata share of 
fire insurance proceeds."  Steigler, 384 A.2d at 401.  Thus, an 
action brought by tenants in common to recover under an 
insurance policy "may, for all practical purposes, be treated as 
. . . separate actions for the recovery of each [tenant in 
common's] share."  Hoyt, 92 N.H. at 244.  See Finch vs. Owners 
Ins. Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. CV 616-169 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2017) 
("Tenants in common . . . do have fractional shares. . . . Thus, 
Plaintiff's recovery may be limited to the forty-percent 
interest she holds in the house" [citation omitted]) 
We recognize that the insurable property interest informs 
but does not define the contractual right to recovery.  The 
contract as prescribed by statute defines that interest.  In the 
instant case, the statutory language confirms that the interest 
is severable and that the plaintiff's interest is fifty percent.  
Under the standard form contract prescribed by statute, the 
coinsured fiancé had no right to recover his insured interest in 
the property, as he was responsible for the fire and the damage 
it caused.  When he intentionally set fire to the dwelling, he 
completely lost his right to recover his insured interest.  The 
standard form contract prescribed by statute, as well as the 
27 
 
 
public policy it represents, is designed to prevent the guilty 
coinsured from recovering the insured interest he has lost due 
to his wrongdoing.  See Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 488 ("courts 
adopting the modern rule have fashioned it to effectuate the 
public policy that guilty persons must not profit from their own 
wrongdoing").  Conversely, the insurer has no obligation under 
the statute to compensate the guilty coinsured for the loss.  
See G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth. 
 
Where the tenant in common set fire to the property, we do 
not discern any intention in the policy prescribed by statute to 
allow the innocent cotenant to enhance her own insured interest 
in the property.  As a tenant in common, she does not inherit 
his share.  The standard form prescribed by statute also 
provides:  "In consideration of the provisions and stipulations 
herein or added hereto and of            dollars premium this 
company . . . does insure            to the extent of the actual 
cash value of the property at the time of loss, . . . [but not] 
in any event for more than the interest of the insured, against 
all loss by fire . . ." (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 175, § 99, 
Twelfth.  The standard form contract as prescribed by statute 
thus recognizes that the insured is limited to recovering his or 
her own interest.  Here, the plaintiff's interest in the insured 
property as a tenant in common means the plaintiff is only 
entitled to recover fifty percent. 
28 
 
 
The effect of the guilty coinsured's loss of his rights on 
the innocent coinsured's right to recover is thus clear.  The 
guilty cotenant has forfeited his right to recover, but he has 
not enhanced the plaintiff's insured interest.  The standard 
form policy prescribed by the statute sought neither to blame 
nor benefit the innocent coinsured, as her rights and 
obligations were severable from the guilty coinsured:  she was 
not responsible for the other insured's intentional acts and 
thus would not lose the right to recovery altogether; nor would 
she be allowed to benefit from them, and receive a one hundred 
percent recovery. 
We therefore conclude, as did the judge below, that the 
standard form contract prescribed by statute insures only to the 
extent of the insurable interest, which here is a tenancy in 
common.  Although the insurance contract did not expressly 
reference the tenancy in common, it did not in any way suggest 
that the insured's respective rights in the insurable interest 
were anything but equal.  It also provided that the guilty 
coinsured forfeited his rights when he set the fire.  Therefore, 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover a fifty percent interest in 
the lost property.  Our holding, as explained supra, is informed 
by the insurable property interest they had as tenants in common 
29 
 
 
and confirmed by the standard form insurance policy language 
prescribed by statute.7 
 
e.  Claims under G. L. c. 93A.  General Laws c. 176D, § 3, 
identifies unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business 
of insurance, including unfair claim settlement practices.  
Engaging in any unfair or deceptive act enumerated in G. L. 
c. 176D, § 3, amounts to a violation of G. L. c. 93A.  See G. L. 
c. 176D, § 2; Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 461 Mass. 
486, 494-495 (2012).  However, "[a]n [insurer] which in good 
faith denies a claim of coverage on the basis of a plausible 
interpretation of its insurance policy cannot ordinarily be said 
                                                          
 
 
7 We recognize that a different set of considerations are 
implicated when the innocent insured has survivorship rights in 
the property. See West v. First Agric. Bank, 382 Mass. 534, 536 
n.4 (1981) (describing survivorship rights for joint tenants and 
tenants by entirety).  Upon the death of the guilty insured, the 
innocent insured has inherited the guilty insured's insurable 
interest in the property and she is the only insured still 
entitled to recover the insurance proceeds under the insurance 
contract.  Where the innocent insured has survivorship rights, 
her interests in the property covered by the insurance policy 
are thus different, and this has convinced some, but not all, 
courts in other states to allow for a full recovery.  Compare 
American Economy Ins. Co., 426 N.E.2d at 140 ("There is no 
difficulty in ascertaining [the plaintiff's] interest in the 
entireties real estate.  As the surviving spouse she owns it 
all"), with Steigler, 384 A.2d at 402 (awarding one-half of 
damages within limits of contract to plaintiff, who owned 
property as tenant by entirety, as insureds' insurable interests 
were nonetheless still separable under contract).  Regardless, 
we need not and do not decide today the more difficult question 
presented when the innocent coinsured with survivorship rights 
seeks to recover one hundred percent of the proceeds when the 
guilty coinsured dies in the fire he or she sets. 
30 
 
 
to have committed a violation of G. L. c. 93A."  Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co. v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 419 Mass. 462, 468 (1995).  
Additionally, "[a] plausible, reasoned legal position that may 
ultimately turn out to be mistaken -- or 
simply . . . unsuccessful -- is outside the scope of the 
punitive aspects of the combined application of c. 93A and 
c. 176D."  Guity v. Commerce Ins. Co., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 
343 (1994). 
 
The plaintiff contends that, by misrepresenting facts of 
the insurance policy, refusing to pay her claims, failing to 
effectuate a prompt and fair settlement of the claims, and 
compelling the plaintiff to institute litigation to recover 
amounts due under the policy, the insurer engaged in unfair 
claim practices and therefore violated G. L. c. 93A.  The 
plaintiff also argues that, by issuing a policy that contradicts 
the prescribed provisions of G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, the 
insurer committed a per se violation of G. L. c. 93A. 
 
We hold that when the insurer denied coverage, it did so on 
the basis of a plausible, reasoned legal position that 
Massachusetts law denies an innocent coinsured recovery when her 
coinsured intentionally set fire to the premises, even though 
that position turned out to be mistaken.  At the time the 
insurer was asked to honor the plaintiff's claims under the 
policy, Kosior was the primary guidance available from this 
31 
 
 
court.  Although the standard language referencing "the insured" 
that appears in the statutorily mandated intentional loss 
exclusion had been interpreted by most jurisdictions and the 
foremost commentators to impose several rather than joint 
obligations to allow innocent coinsureds to collect under their 
policies, Kosior, as explained supra, was at best cryptic and 
confusing on this point and could be interpreted in good faith 
to support the insurer's contrary construction.8  Therefore, in 
denying the plaintiff coverage and drawing the plaintiff into 
litigation, the insurer was not acting unfairly or deceptively 
for purposes of G. L. c. 93A or c. 176D. 
A more difficult question is presented by the issuance of 
the policy that contained language that departed from the 
statutory language.  The statute required that the statutory 
language be used.  See G. L. c. 175, § 99 ("No company shall 
issue policies or contracts which . . . insure against loss or 
damage by fire . . . other than those of the standard forms 
herein set forth . . .").  Although the insurer could in good 
faith believe that it was simply clarifying the language to 
conform to its understanding of Kosior, it did so to its 
                                                          
 
 
8 The insurer's good faith interpretation of Massachusetts 
law is reinforced by the fact that the court in Kosior, when 
imposing joint obligations, analyzed the language "the insured" 
in the insurer's policy, which is the language used in the 
standard fire insurance form statute.  See Kosior, 299 Mass. at 
604; G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth. 
32 
 
 
advantage and, as we concluded supra, incorrectly.  See Kosior, 
299 Mass. at 603-604.  See also Shepperson, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 
200 ("[t]he very existence of the legal debate" surrounding 
G. L. c. 175, § 99, and various theories of recovery for 
innocent coinsureds "militates in favor of dismiss[ing] 
[plaintiff's] c. 93A, § 9[,] claim"). 
That being said, the policy language could not have caused 
any damages here, as the insurer had the right to contest the 
claim based on Kosior regardless of that language.  The 
plaintiff here would have had to hire counsel in any event to 
recover under the policy, as this was not a situation where the 
insurer raised a meritless defense.  The plaintiff also 
successfully sued and recovered all that she was entitled to 
under the policy.  In sum, even if there was a conceivable 
violation of G. L. c. 93A by issuing the policy language in 
contravention of G. L. c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, this violation 
caused no harm, and the c. 93A claim was properly dismissed.  
See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 417 Mass. 
115, 125 (1994) ("The absence of proof of causation is fatal 
to . . . G. L. c. 93A and G. L. c. 176D claims"); Van Dyke v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 671, 678 (1983) ("any 
omission by [the insurer] to comply with G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9), 
did not cause any injury to or adversely affect the  
plaintiffs"). 
33 
 
 
 
We therefore affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's G. L. 
c. 93A claims. 
 
f.  Applicable coverage under the terms of the policy.  The 
plaintiff seeks to obtain additional coverage for her losses by 
invoking Coverage B of the policy, which governs "Other Structures."  
The plaintiff seeks coverage under Coverage B for the walkway, the 
patio, the retaining wall, the stairs, and the wrought iron railings 
on the premises.  The question is thus whether these named areas 
constitute "Other Structures" within Coverage B, or whether they are 
instead considered part of the dwelling governed by Coverage A. 
 
This inquiry turns on whether the structures are "attached to 
the dwelling," in which case they fall under Coverage A, or whether 
they are "set apart from the dwelling by clear space," in which case 
they fall under Coverage B.  Addressing this question does not 
involve the resolution of any disputed material facts.  Instead, we 
must interpret the policy's terms and apply that interpretation to 
the undisputed facts of this case. 
 
Absent an ambiguity, the terms of an insurance policy will be 
construed "in their usual and ordinary sense."  Surabian Realty Co., 
462 Mass. at 718.  Policies are construed "as a whole, without 
according special emphasis to any particular part over another."  Id.  
Here, the coverage language is not mandated by statute, such that, 
"[w]hen the policy language is ambiguous, doubts as to the intended 
meaning of the words must be resolved against the [insurer] that 
34 
 
 
employed them and in favor of the insured. . . . This rule of 
construction applies with particular force to exclusionary 
provisions" (quotations and citations omitted).  Boazova v. Safety 
Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350-351 (2012).  "However, an ambiguity is 
not created simply because a controversy exists between the parties, 
each favoring an interpretation contrary to the other."  Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 419 Mass. at 466. 
 
That the policy does not define what "attached" means in 
Coverage A, or the "clear space" needed for a structure to be 
included under Coverage B, does not mean that these terms are 
ambiguous.  See Adamo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 219 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 
1294 (2013).  If their usual and ordinary meaning can be determined, 
the provisions are not ambiguous.  We also construe policies as a 
whole.  Surabian Realty Co., 462 Mass. at 718.  In so doing, the 
provisions of the policy concerning different coverage types should 
be read together in a way that does not render either coverage 
meaningless.  Id. 
 
In Porco v. Lexington Ins. Co., 679 F. Supp. 2d 432, 438 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), the court analyzed the same language concerning 
coverage that we have before us in the present case.  The court found 
that the Coverage B section of the policy for "Other Structures" 
covered a swimming pool on plaintiffs' property.  Id. at 439.  The 
court found that the pool deck constituted a "clear space" between 
the swimming pool and the home.  Id.  Additionally, the pool could 
35 
 
 
not fall under Coverage A, which required that a structure be 
"attached" to the home; under the definition of "attached," "more is 
required than that the two objects be adjacent to or even touch each 
other . . . .  Some form of connection is required beyond mere 
spatial proximity."  Id. at 438.  Accepting "the broader definition 
of 'attached'" as "'joined or fastened to something,'" id. at 437, 
the court held that the pool did not fall under Coverage A since "the 
pool is indisputably not joined or fastened to the dwelling."  Id. at 
438.  Further, "the fact that the pool deck is between the stairs and 
the pool, even if they touch each other, does not change the 
analysis."  Id. 
 
In coming to this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiffs' 
argument that all connected manmade structures are perforce 
"attached": 
"If the patio is joined or fastened to the dwelling, 
as it would seem to be, then that might distinguish 
the patio from a lawn or other obviously clear space 
separating the house from other structures.  However, 
a dwelling might well be connected to a patio, and the 
patio to a walkway, and a walkway to a dog house or a 
mail box, but it would be absurd to conclude that the 
dog house and mail box are 'attached' to the dwelling. 
Plaintiff's implicit argument that manmade structures 
that are all connected to each other have a property 
of being 'attached' must, therefore, be limited in 
some way." 
 
Id.  The court also made clear that a concrete space could still 
constitute "clear space" for purposes of Coverage B:  "While the 
clear space is a concrete [pool deck], rather than grass, it 
36 
 
 
still provides separation from the house" (citation omitted).  
Id. at 440. 
 
In Arch vs. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 88-5421 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1988), the court came to the same 
conclusion about a pool that was approximately twelve feet from 
the house.  The court held that, "under the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the language in the policy describing an 'other 
structure,'" the dwelling and the pool were "separated by the 
twelve feet of clear space provided by the patio."  That finding 
was "bolstered by the fact that the pool and the dwelling do not 
share a common foundation or roof." 
 
In this case, the driveway on the right side of the 
dwelling -- referred to as the tenants' driveway -- does not 
abut or touch the dwelling.  As such, there is a clear space 
between it and the house.  Nor does anything attach it to the 
dwelling.  Nothing fastens it to the house; instead, it sits on 
its own concrete slab independent of the home.  Therefore, the 
driveway is a separate structure that falls under the purview of 
Coverage B. 
 
The walkway, however, touches and abuts the dwelling.  
Based on the photographs in the record, the walkway also appears 
to be attached to the dwelling, in that it shares the same 
concrete slab.  Similarly, the stairway is attached, as it 
touches and abuts the dwelling in such a way that it appears to 
37 
 
 
have a seamless connection with the outer wall and foundation of 
the dwelling.  The railings are an integral part of the stairway 
and walkway.  Moreover, the retaining wall seems to be one unit 
with the stairway and walkway:  based on the photographs in the 
record, the retaining wall has a clear connection with the 
stairway, which in turn is continuously connected to the 
attached wall of the dwelling and the walkway.  The photographs 
thus show the walkway, the stairway with its railings, and the 
retaining wall as one structure with a unified connection to the 
home.  For these reasons, the walkway, the stairway, the 
railings, and the retaining wall are not separated by "clear 
space" to qualify for coverage under Coverage B, but are 
attached to the dwelling so as to fall under Coverage A. 
 
We also agree with the judge below that there remains a 
material question of disputed fact regarding the coverage for 
the patio.  While part of the patio appears to be separated from 
the dwelling by the walkway, the debris in the photographs in 
the record obscures the back portion of the home, such that it 
is unclear whether the patio is attached to the dwelling.  We 
therefore agree with the judge that the issue of coverage for 
the patio is not ripe for summary judgment at this stage. 
 
Conclusion.  The statutory standard policy under G. L. 
c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, requires insurers to impose only several 
obligations on their insureds.  The policy language at issue 
38 
 
 
here imposes joint obligations on all coinsureds by denying 
recovery to any coinsured for the intentional loss caused by any 
other coinsured.  As such, the policy does not comply with G. L. 
c. 175, § 99, Twelfth, and must be reformed accordingly to allow 
the plaintiff to recover under the policy.  The plaintiff's 
insurable interest under the policy is severable from her 
coinsured's, but the plaintiff is entitled only to one-half of 
the insurance proceeds.  To the extent the insurer denied the 
plaintiff recovery, it did so based on a reasonable 
interpretation of Massachusetts law governing whether an 
innocent coinsured may recover if her coinsured intentionally 
set fire to the insured property, and thus did not violate G. L. 
c. 93A.  The walkway, the stairway, the railings, and the 
retaining wall are attached to the dwelling as to fall under 
Coverage A.  The judgment of the Superior Court is therefore 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.