Title: Rariden v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

242 Ind. 689 (1961)
177 N.E.2d 736
RARIDEN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,929.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 6, 1961.
Rehearing denied April 17, 1962.
*690 Frank A. Symmes and Charles W. Symmes, both of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Richard M. Givan, Assistant Attorney General and Richard C. Johnson, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
*691 JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal from a conviction of first degree murder and a sentence of life imprisonment rendered by the Jackson Circuit Court on September 28, 1959, following the return of the jury's verdict on September 23, 1959.
Appellant was indicted by the grand jury of Lawrence County, Indiana, on November 6, 1958, for murder in the first degree of one Bert Butler. By change of venue filed by appellant the cause was sent to Jackson County, Indiana, and cause submitted to trial by jury starting September 14, 1959. After his conviction and sentence, appellant filed a written motion for a new trial on October 21, 1959, which motion was overruled on January 5, 1960, and an appeal was duly perfected in this court on March 30, 1960.
The indictment, based on Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 1, p. 447, being § 10-3401, Burns' 1956 Replacement, in pertinent part reads as follows:
*692 To the indictment the appellant filed a motion to quash, which in pertinent part reads as follows:
Appellant's motion to quash was overruled on November 20, 1958.
After the trial and conviction appellant filed his motion for a new trial; such motion for a new trial contained thirty-four specifications and of necessity will have to be dealt with here very briefly.
The remaining specifications 20 through 34, related to the ruling of the court in sustaining objections to the questions asked by the defendant on cross-examination of State's witnesses, and the overruling of defendant's objections to questions asked the State's witnesses on cross-examination. Such of these specifications as we deem necessary for a determination of the issues in this cause will be discussed hereafter.
*693 The appellant appeared as a witness in his own behalf and testified to the events leading up to the killing. In substance the testimony of the appellant was to the effect that on the afternoon of October 20, 1958, someone fired several shots on his farm which stampeded his cattle. That he, at that time, was preparing to go to the bank at Bedford and to visit his mother; that he had on his person a check payable to his wife in the sum of approximately $10,000 which had been indorsed and which he intended to deposit in the bank. That among other things he had placed a pistol in his car preparatory to going into town. That when he heard the shots he went out to the woods to see who was there and on arriving at the woods saw an individual whom he identified as the deceased, yelled at him, and that that person fired several shots into the limbs over his head and then ran off. Appellant returned to his home, got into his car and drove to the home of the decedent, finding that the decedent was not at home, waited in his car until the decedent appeared walking towards his house carrying a rifle. The appellant and decedent got into an altercation over the events occurring on appellant's farm. The decedent was standing by the side of the car and appellant claims that decedent first struck him on the arm with the butt of the rifle, then attempted to reverse the same, at which time appellant grabbed the rifle, decedent stood back and appellant thought that he was preparing to shoot him. Appellant then fired one shot with the revolver, striking decedent and causing him to fall to the ground. Appellant further testifies that he went to the home of a neighbor, immediately after the shooting and before leaving the premises in his car, told the neighbor that he had better call the doctor and the decedent's wife as he *694 had been compelled to shoot him. On being asked as to how badly injured the decedent was, appellant stated that he thought he was not very badly hurt, but that someone should do something for him. Appellant then drove back to his home, got his wife, and they drove to the home of appellant's mother in the town of Bedford where appellant was later arrested.
The State's evidence was to the effect that about 5:40 P.M. on the afternoon of October 20, 1958, Zelbert Hawkins, then Sheriff of Lawrence County, was called to the home of Bert Butler located some four or five miles from Bedford near the town of Eureka on State Road No. 158. The Sheriff and the Coroner, one Dr. Wynn, proceeded to the Butler home. On arrival they found Butler lying face down on the lawn in front of his house, about two or three feet from the road. Dr. Wynn examined the body and declared that Butler was dead. Pathological examination showed that death was caused by a bullet which entered the left side of deceased's body and passed through his heart. The bullet removed from the body of decedent was identified as a 32 caliber full jacketed bullet. Next to the body of the deceased was a 22 caliber rifle.
Bert Butler's widow testified that he returned from work a few minutes past 3:00 o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th, and that he left the house about 15 minutes later taking with him his 22 caliber rifle. The next time she saw her husband he was lying dead on the front lawn near the road.
James Quackenbush testifying for the State stated that he lived five miles west of Bedford on the Tripleton Road; that appellant came to his home at about 5:20 P.M. on October 20, 1958, and stated that it had *695 been necessary for him to run Butler off of his farm that afternoon, but that he did not catch him. Appellant then got into his car and drove to Butler's home where he awaited his arrival. That when Butler returned and he remonstrated with him about hunting on his farm, Butler hit him on the arm with the butt of his gun he was carrying. The witness then testified that appellant told him that Butler turned around to shoot and that appellant grabbed the gun which went off, and that at this point appellant shot Butler with the revolver.
Lula Quackenbush, wife of the witness, James Quackenbush, testified substantially to the same facts as her husband.
Grady Kee also testifying for the State, testified that he was the deceased's next door neighbor, that he saw Butler standing near the road in front of Butler's house, that Butler was at the top of the slope in the yard at the time, and there was a car parked just off the road adjacent to where Butler was standing. He then walked to the back of his house, then returned to where he could see Butler and the car, then again went to the back of the house where he heard a blast. The witness was engaged in changing his clothes and only investigated after talking to his wife. On going to Butler's yard he found his body, and while bending down to feel if Butler had any pulse, discovered the 22 rifle. He testified that he picked up the rifle, examined it, and then placed it beside Butler's feet.
Margie Kee, wife of Grady Kee, also testified for the State, her testimony being that while sitting in her front room she heard two voices and a blast. She states that one of the voices was loud and angry and that she had not previously heard this voice. Shortly *696 after the blast, while watching out her picture window, she remembered seeing a car pass by the front of her house. She could not describe the car other than noticing that it was not black. She testified that she had a phone call from James Quackenbush four or five minutes after hearing the blast, and that she investigated and saw Butler's body lying on his property in front of his home.
James Canada testified for the State that he saw appellant sitting in his two tone green car by Mr. Ikerd's farm between 5:15 and 5:30 P.M. on the evening of October 20th. He further stated that he saw Butler nearing his property at that time and that Butler was carrying a rifle.
Several other witnesses including Mildred Knight, Genieve Quackenbush and Winifred Quackenbush stated that they had seen the deceased that afternoon and that at that time he was carrying a gun.
Edward East, a boy 14 years of age, at the time of the trial, testified that on the evening of the 20th of October, 1958, he saw Bert Butler crossing the driveway to the East home going towards Butler's yard, that at that time a car pulled up in front of the Butler premises and stopped next to Butler who then engaged in a conversation with the driver. The following account was given of that conversation:
This witness stated that he was about 75 feet from the person who was talking and that he could hear, but could not see the person clearly because his vision was obscured by bushes. The prosecutor then asked:
In view of some of the objections interposed to the curtailment of the witness, Edward East, on cross-examination, we think it pertinent to include here a part of the cross-examination as follows:
If any testimony, as depicted by the record, displays the quality of being singularly damaging to the appellant's cause, it is the testimony of this witness, Edward East. He came closest to being an eye witness to the shooting of anyone who testified. At the time of trial, the boy was 14 years of age. The shooting and death of Butler occurred on October 20, 1958, the trial took place in September, 1959. It appears from the record that the first time Edward East apprised any of the authorities of his knowledge of the homicide was during the trial of the cause. He was a young teenager, who for some reason remained silent for almost a year on an event which probably caused great excitement in his community. The imagination of a mature person is often stimulated by unusual happenings of great magnitude, so it is reasonable to speculate on the increased likelihood that the mind of a 14 year old boy would be susceptible to stimulation by a homicide in his community.
The issue raised by the alleged curtailment of the cross-examination of this witness then is whether the trial court improperly curtailed the examination of the witness. Cross-examination is an absolute right, a denial of this right is reversible error. *703 Bryant v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 274, 278, 118 N.E.2d 894; Marjason v. State (1948), 225 Ind. 652, 653, 75 N.E.2d 904. The scope of the cross-examination of a witness is well stated in Blue v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 394, 403, 67 N.E.2d 377, cert. denied, (1947), 330 U.S. 840.
One question in this regard is whether or not question nineteen was proper examination. The witness had previously answered the two preceding questions in the negative, and where it does not appear that the situation would be changed by the elicited testimony, nor the attitude of the jury be affected by the answer sought, it is in the sound discretion of the trial court as to what extent the cross-examination will be allowed. Kelley v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 148, 153, 78 N.E.2d 547; Ray v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 706, 709, 95 N.E.2d 212, cert. denied, (1951), 340 U.S. 938.
Appellant complains that reversible error occurred upon the refusal of his tendered instruction No. 12. The instruction concerned the reconciliation of the testimony in favor of the theory of appellant's presumed innocence. There are two other instructions on the presumption of innocence *704 and one on reconciliation of conflicting testimony. Appellant cites Scheerer v. State (1925), 197 Ind. 155, 149 N.E. 892, on the proposition that the jury should in the same instruction be apprised of the need to reconcile the testimony, if possible, in favor of the defendant's innocence. In that case the instructions singled out the defendant's testimony for special scrutiny, thus being clearly erroneous. At page 160 the court states "[w]hen a defendant testifies in a criminal case in his own behalf, his testimony must be considered as the testimony of any other witness and weighed in the same manner, ..." There is no contention in the case at bar that the court instructed otherwise. Appellant further alleges that there was no instruction on the situation where the lack of evidence could be considered. The Court's instruction No. 14 covers this point. The instructions are to be considered as a whole, and if the law pertinent to the evidence is covered by other instructions, the refusal of one certain instruction is not error. Peltz v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 518, 520, 112 N.E.2d 853; Bange v. State (1958), 237 Ind. 422, 434, 146 N.E.2d 811; Lenovich v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 359, 364, 150 N.E.2d 884.
Were this case being tried in a court of first impression, where we had an opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh their testimony, we might arrive at a different result than that obtained in the case at bar, but on appeal we are bound by the rule that if there be sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment of the trial court, and the record fails to disclose any reversible error, we resolve all questions in favor of the validity of the decision of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Bobbitt, J., concurs.
*705 Landis, C.J., and Achor, J., concur in result.
Arterburn, J., dissents.
NOTE.  Reported in 177 N.E.2d 736.