Title: DONALD CRANMER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USEDAS AUTHORITYINANY OTHER CASE INANY COURTOF THIS STATE. DONALD CRANMER APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE 99-CR-00108 2KY . CONST. § 110(2)(b). 2000-SC-0778-MR 1 . INTRODUCTION RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLIS MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE A Nelson Circuit Court Jury found Appellant guilty of First-Degree Assault, Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI), and found him to be a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) . The jury recommended a twenty (20) year sentence for the assault conviction, enhanced to forty (40) years because of the PFO finding . In addition, Appellant received a thirty (30) day sentence and five hundred dollar ($500) fine for the DUI conviction .' The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's recommendation, and Appellant thus appeals to this Court as a matter-of-right.2 After a review of the record, we find that the trial court committed reversible error by ' Appellant was originally charged with First-Degree Wanton Endangerment, which was dismissed at trial, and Operating a Vehicle with No Insurance, which was dismissed at arraignment . admitting habit evidence, and therefore, we reverse the assault conviction and remand that charge to the Nelson Circuit Court for retrial . We affirm the DUI conviction . II. BACKGROUND On the evening of October 27, 1999, a vehicle operated by 17 year-old James Derek Lyvers was struck from the rear by a truck driven by Appellant . Lyvers testified that after finishing his shift at 9 :00 p.m. at the local Winn Dixie in Nelson County, where he worked part-time, he was traveling on Route 245 to return home . He was stopped at the intersection of Route 245 and Spencer-Mattingly Road, waiting to turn left onto Spencer-Mattingly Road, when the collision occurred . Seriously injured in the accident, Lyvers spent twenty (20) days in the hospital ; he has no independent recollection of the events that evening . Deputy Tommy Rosel, the investigating officer at the scene, testified that Appellant maintained that as he came around a curve, Lyvers's vehicle was stopped in his lane of the highway with no lights on and he struck it in the rear end . 3 The sole eyewitness to the collision, commercial truck driver Joseph Antle, was approaching the two vehicles from the opposite direction on Route 245 . He testified that, as he was coming over the hill on that road ,4 he saw that Lyvers's car was stationary, headlights and turn signal on, waiting for the car in front of Antle's truck to pass so Lyvers could make a left hand turn . Antle observed Appellant's vehicle approaching behind Lyvers's vehicle at approximately 55 miles per hour. He testified that he kept thinking, "Are they [Appellant] going to stop?" Pulling over into the 3At trial, Appellant testified that he did not make this specific statement to the police officer at the scene . He testified that his statement was, "I just told [Deputy Rosel] that I saw no lights on ; if he had them on, I didn't see them ." 4 Antle's characterization of the landscape near the scene of the accident was that it was, "an incline down into a little hollow ." emergency lane on the shoulder of Route 245, Antle watched as Appellant's vehicle smashed into the rear of Lyvers's vehicle, causing Lyvers's vehicle to spin around, cross the yellow line, and come to a stop behind his truck in the emergency lane on the opposite side of the highway. Antle approached the damaged vehicles ; he detected the smell of liquor near Appellant's vehicle, and observed behavior that suggested Appellant was intoxicated . Deputy Tommy Rosel arrived at the scene of the accident within a few minutes of the collision to find that the fire department had responded and was attempting to extricate Lyvers from his vehicle . After approaching the Appellant, Deputy Rosel noticed that he reeked of alcohol, had red eyes, slurred speech, and was unsteady on his feet . Deputy Rosel testified that he proceeded to give the Appellant two (2) field sobriety tests that he failed . As a result of Appellant's unsatisfactory performance on these tests, coupled with a horizontal gaze nystagmus test showing jerky eye movement, Deputy Rosel concluded that the Appellant was under the influence of alcohol and placed him under arrest . Following the arrest, Deputy Rosel examined the accident scene and Appellant's vehicle . He noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from Appellant's truck and a spilled cup with ice lying in the driver's side floorboard, as well as a cooler containing a number of beers in the back of the truck . Deputy Rosel noted that eighteen-foot skid marks were left on the highway leading up to the point of impact and that the road surface was dry and clear . Officer Thomas Blair, another law enforcement officer on the scene, also noticed the odor of alcohol around Appellant's vehicle, a spilled substance in the floorboard he believed to be whiskey, and a cooler in the back of the truck . Appellant was transported to the Nelson County Detention Center where he was given a breath alcohol test that showed an alcohol concentration of 0 .195, which represents a concentration of nearly twice the legal limit at the time .5 At his request, Appellant was then driven to the Flaget Memorial Hospital for a blood alcohol test . The attending physician, Dr. Charles Parrish, examined Appellant and ordered the blood test . Although not noting in his report that the Appellant smelled of alcohol, Dr. Parrish testified at trial that Appellant's response to a horizontal gaze nystagmus test indicated intoxication . The blood test showed an alcohol concentration of 0.218 . Because of his injuries, Derek Lyvers has no memory of the accident . However, after direct and cross-examination and in response to a juror's question, which was objected to by Appellant's lawyer, the trial court asked Lyvers if it was his habit to turn his headlights on when he got in his vehicle after work . Judge : Derek, the juror wants to know if before this accident, when you got off from work and got in your vehicle, were you in the habit of turning your lights on? Lyvers : Yeah, I usually make it my habit to turn my lights on, my signal and stuff . At the request of Appellant's lawyer, the trial court then admonished the jury as follows : "In conjunction with that [answer], let me give you an admonition now." "What 5 At the time, KRS 189A.010(1) provided : A person shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle anywhere in this state : (a) While the alcohol concentration in his blood or breath is 0.10 or more based on the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A .005 . KRS 189A.005 defined "alcohol concentration" as meaning "either grams of alcohol per 100 mililiters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath ." he [Derek Lyvers] did prior to this accident does not mean, necessarily mean, that he did the same thing on the night of the accident, but you can consider that evidence as only habit or, or as a question of habit." 111111. ADMISSIBILITY OF LYVERS'S HABIT EVIDENCE Appellant argues that the admission of evidence regarding Lyvers's habit of usually turning on his headlights at night and activating his turn signal was in error . We agree . Appellant relies upon this Court's ruling in a line of cases highlighted by Johnson v. Commonwealth 7 as authority for his argument that habit evidence in both criminal and civil proceedings is inadmissible in Kentucky . We recently revisited this issue in Burchett v . Commonwealth . 8 Although only a plurality of three justices agreed that a person's habit is not actually probative of his or her conduct on a particular occasion, a majority of four justices, however, agreed that habit evidence did not become admissible with the adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the habit testimony in this case, i .e . , Derrick Lyvers's "habit" of usually turning on his headlights when driving at night and using turn signals, was inadmissible .9 The issue of whether the headlights and turn signal on Derek Lyvers's vehicle were illuminated was an important, if not the most important factual issue in the case . 6 Prior to Lyvers's answer to the question, Appellant's attorney noted his objection and moved for a mistrial ; the trial court overruled the objection and the motion . Ky., 885 S.W .2d 951 (1994) citing Louisville & N .R . Co . v . Adms' Adm'r , Ky ., 265 S .W . 623 (1924) . 8 Ky., 98 S .W.3d 492 (2003) . 9 We would note that although the trial court admonished the jury as to their consideration of the complained of evidence, the admonishment itself simply re- enforced the harm that Appellant's lawyer sought to avoid by the admission of the habit evidence . Appellant was found guilty of First-Degree Assault,' ° and under the trial court's instructions, the jury was required to believe : Additionally, the instructions defined "Wantonly", in accordance with its statutory definition," as follows : A . That in this county on or about October 27, 1999, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, [Appellant] caused serious physical injury to James Derek Lyvers by driving a motor vehicle into a vehicle occupied by Lyvers ; AND B . That in so doing, [Appellant] was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby injured James Derek Lyvers under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life . "Wantonly" - A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists . The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation . A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto . The trial court also instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of Second- Degree Assault12 and Fourth-Degree Assault . 13 To find Appellant guilty under these 1° KRS 508.010 provides in relevant part : (1) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when : (b)Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person . 11 KRS 501 .020(3) . 12 KRS 508 .020 provides in relevant part : (1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when : instructions, the jury was required to find that Appellant's conduct in causing injury to Lyvers was either wanton or reckless . 14 From the evidence at trial, the jury could reasonably conclude that, by choosing to drive while he was intoxicated, Appellant acted wantonly with respect to the risk of an injury automobile accident . However, before the jury could convict Appellant of any assault offense under the trial court's instructions, it also had to exclude Lyvers's alleged failure to illuminate his car lights and to employ his turn signal as the accident's cause . Stated otherwise, if the jury concluded that Appellant's intoxication was not actually a factor in the ultimate automobile crash and instead believed that the cars collided because Lyvers failed to utilize his lights and turn signal, the jury could not make the finding required by the instructions, i .e . a finding that, by driving his vehicle into Lyvers's vehicle, Appellant was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life . Stated otherwise, the jury could find Appellant's conduct wanton in the (c) He wantonly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument . 13 KRS 508 .030 provides in relevant part : (1) A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree when : (a) He . . . wantonly causes physical injury to another person; or (b) With recklessness he causes physical injury to another person by means of . . . a dangerous instrument. 14 KRS 501 .020(4) "Recklessly" - A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists . The risk must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation . abstract, but still have reasonable doubt as to whether Appellant "wantonly caused" Lyvers's injuries. The jury's determination of this important factual issue hinged on whether the jury believed Appellant's testimony or the testimony of Joseph Antle . In other words, it was Appellant's word versus the word of Joseph Antle. Thus, we cannot say that the admission of the evidence concerning Lyvers's habit of illuminating his vehicle's headlights at night and using his vehicle's turn signals did not have any weight with the jury in the resolution of that factual issue.15 In fact, the habit evidence may have very well tipped the scales in favor of the Commonwealth on this important factual issue. We, therefore, hold that the admission of the habit evidence was reversible error, and we remand for a new trial on the assault issue . IV . OTHER ISSUES Although we reverse and remand on the assault conviction, we will briefly address other issues that may arise on retrial . We note, however, that several allegations of error by Appellant are rendered moot by our holding that the admission of the habit evidence requires a new trial, and we will not address those issues . 16 A. ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS Advancing a similar habit-evidence objection, Appellant challenges the medical technologist's testimony that, although she could not specifically remember checking the accuracy of the blood alcohol-testing machine, she had probably done so because 15 See RCr 9 .24 . 16 Our reversal on the admission of the habit evidence renders the following allegations of error by Appellant moot : Argument IV (failure to grant continuance), which is relevant only to the assault charge, is mooted because Appellant's lawyer will now have time to fully investigate whether Appellant has a history of black-outs ; and Argument V (prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, e.g ., vilification of Appellant and it was her standard practice . She testified that she routinely conducted control procedures on the equipment each and every time prior to a blood alcohol test . Although this too is habit evidence, it is admissible on the preliminary question concerning the admissibility of the blood test . Under KRE 104(a), 17 trial courts are not bound by the rules of evidence - except those with respect to privileges - in deciding preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence . Thus, the trial court was allowed to rely on the technician's habit statement that it was her routine to follow such procedures in determining the admissibility of the blood test results . 18 Appellant also asserts that the disclaimer listed on the blood alcohol test results precluded its use at trial since it calls their reliability into question . The generic disclaimer read : "Specimen analysis performed without chain of custody handling . Results should be used for medical purposes only and not for any legal or employment purposes ." We agree with the Commonwealth that the patent purpose of these two sentences was to state the obvious in distinguishing between a medical and legal standard, not to prevent further use in a legal proceeding. The disclaimer warns that it is not the responsibility of the hospital to preserve the chain of custody of the blood . The disclaimer itself does not preclude use of the test results . Of course, the making comments not supported by the evidence) should not reoccur upon retrial; otherwise, the Commonwealth will run the risk of yet another reversal . " KRE 104 : "Preliminary Questions . Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) of this rule . In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." '$ This preliminary hearing is conducted in the presence of the jury, unless the interest of justice requires otherwise . KRE 104 (c) . We would note that the technologist is subject to cross-examination in the jury's presence on the procedure that she followed in running the test on the Appellant's blood . Commonwealth is required to show a sufficient chain of custody, i.e . , integrity, of Appellant's blood sample.'9 B. INFORMATION OF PRIOR OFFENSE DURING PFO PROCEEDING During the penalty-phase closing argument, the prosecutor, reading from a indictment, informed the jury that the indictment - one (1) of Appellant's four (4) previous felony convictions - was for Attempted Murder : When you get back into the jury room what I'd ask you to do is take a look at these documents . First one, exhibit two (2), on the indictment tells you what this defendant is charged with . Says on or about the 27th day of March 1992 in Nelson County, the above named defendant committed the offense of attempted murder by shooting a firearm in a residence in which [victim] was an occupant, and struck him in the arm . Because Appellant was not convicted of Attempted Murder but of a lesser offense ,2° Appellant's lawyer objected and moved for a mistrial . The trial court overruled correspond with the final judgment in a criminal matter . Relying on Bray v . Commonwealth, 21 Appellant argues that reading from the indictment was reversible error . And, indeed, this Court in Bray stated : The indictment which is sought to be used in establishing PFO status shall not be used, except for so much of it as may be necessary to establish the date of the commission of 19 KRE 901 ; R . LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 11 .00 111, at 592- 594 (3d ed . Michie 1993) . 21 Ky., 703 S .W .2d 478 (1985) . - 1 0- prior Appellant's mistrial motion and admonished the jury that indictments do not necessarily 2° Appellant was indicted for two (2) counts of Attempted Murder under Indictment No . 92-CR-033 . On the first count, the one mentioned by the prosecutor, Appellant was convicted of the lesser offense of Assault under Extreme Emotional Disturbance, and on the second count, he was convicted of the lesser offense of First-Degree Wanton Endangerment . the crime referred to in the judgment of conviction on that particular indictment .22 Bra , however, was rendered prior to the 1986 General Assembly's enactment of KRS 532 .055,23 the Truth-In Sentencing statute . The effect of this statute as to information that the jury is now permitted to hear was recently and thoroughly explained in Maxie v . Commonwealth .24 In Maxie , a prior indictment for First-Degree Wanton Endangerment was introduced into evidence as an exhibit during the combined PFO/truth-in-sentencing phase of the trial . The defendant objected to its introduction 22 Id at 480 . 23 KRS 532 .055 provides in relevant part : (2) Upon return of a verdict of guilty or guilty but mentally ill against a defendant, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing before the jury, if such case was tried before a jury. In the hearing the jury will determine the punishment to be imposed within the range provided elsewhere by law . The jury shall recommend whether the sentences shall be served concurrently or consecutively. (a) Evidence may be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing including : 1 . Minimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor; 2 . The nature of prior offenses for which he was convicted ; 3 . The date of the commission, date of sentencing, and date of release from confinement or supervision from all prior offenses ; 4 . The maximum expiration of sentence as determined by the division of probation and parole for all such current and prior offenses ; 5 . The defendant's status if on probation, parole, conditional discharge, or any other form of legal release ; 7 . The impact of the crime upon the victim, as defined in KRS 421 .500, including a description of the nature and extent of any physical, psychological, or financial harm suffered by the victim ; (c) Upon conclusion of the proof, the court shall instruct the jury on the range of punishment and counsel for the defendant may present arguments followed by the counsel for the Commonwealth . The jury shall then retire and recommend a sentence for the defendant . (3) All hearings held pursuant to this section shall be combined with any hearing provided for by KRS 532.080 . 24 Ky., 82 S .W.3d 860 (2002) . and its reading by the jury, arguing prejudice because the details of the prior conviction were not necessary to the PFO charge and served no other purpose than to show he was a violent person ; however, the trial court ruled that the indictment was admissible, citing truth-in-sentencing reasons . In affirming the trial court, this Court stated : Prior to the enactment of KRS 532.055, the Truth-In- Sentencing Statute, the law generally was that the only evidence admissible during the PFO phase of a trial was that necessary to prove'the defendant's status as a persistent felony offender. . . . Appellant relies upon the language in Bray v . Commonwealth , wherein we stated : On retrial, we expect the indictments for the former conviction will not be read to the jury . It is the judgment of conviction which establishes the prior conviction, not the indictment . The indictment which is sought to be used in establishing PFO status shall not be used, except for so much of it as may be necessary to establish the date of the commission of the crime referred to in the judgment of conviction on that particular indictment . However, following the 1986 enactment of KRS 532.055, which created bifurcated trials in felony cases, the jury is permitted to hear evidence in the sentencing phase of trial that would not have been admissible during the guilt phase . KRS 532 .055(2)(a)(2) provides that evidence may be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing including "[t]he nature of prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor." Further, KRS 532 .055(3) states that "All hearings held pursuant to this section shall be combined with any hearing provided for by KRS 532 .080 [Persistent Felony Offender Sentencing] ." In his dissent in Reneer, Justice Leibson expressed serious concern with the combined sentencing/PFO hearing authorized by KRS 532 .055(3) : The "nature of prior offenses" is a much broader term than present limitations applicable to the use of prior felonies in PFO proceedings . At present, evidence is limited to designating the offense involved, but none of - 1 2- 25 Id . at 864-866 . the details of the nature of the prior offenses are admitted . As a practical matter it is impossible to follow the statutes and decisions applicable to the PFO procedure and the provisions of the new statutes in a single proceeding, because they are in direct conflict . The majority decision proposes that "the jury in the combined bifurcated hearing could be instructed to (1) fix a penalty on the basic charge in the indictment ; (2) determine then whether the defendant is guilty as a persistent felony offender, and if so; (3) fix the enhanced penalty as a persistent felony offender." The practical effect of this is inherently abusive . The jury hears, at the same time, evidence that is now permissible in setting a sentence for the underlying offense but which is improper for deciding (a) whether a person is guilty as a PFO, and (b) if so, the proper enhanced penalty as a PFO. Notwithstanding, the Reneer majority concluded that such information was relevant and essential so that jurors are not required to "sentence in a vacuum without any knowledge of the defendant's past criminal record or other matters that might be pertinent to consider in the assessment of the appropriate penalty." Given the language of KRS 532.055(3) and the Reneer decision, the trial court properly held that the details of the indictment were admissible. Further, we find nothing in the language of the indictment that exceeds the scope of evidence held to be admissible in Robinson v. Commonwealth . The indictment provided nothing more than a "general description" of the crime with which Appellant was charged .25 Although the defendant in Maxie was convicted of the offense charged in the indictment and Appellant was convicted of a lesser included offense, we do not see this as distinguishing Maxie from this case because, as in Maxie , the indictment here -13- provided only a general description of the facts concerning the crime charged . The only difference between the crime charged and the crime of which Appellant was convicted is the lack of intent by the Appellant to cause the victim's death. The physical facts are still the same, i .e., Appellant shot another person . Accordingly, in this case, we find no error in the jury being provided a general description of the previous crime by the prosecution reading from the indictment . We hastily add several caveats, however. We see no need to inform the jury that the charge was Attempted Murder; so, upon retrial, the jury should not be informed of that fact . We would also add that neither the indictments nor former convictions should be admitted into evidence as exhibits for the jury to review during the trial or to take with them to the jury room upon retiring for deliberations . The indictments and the resulting judgments of convictions should only be admitted into evidence as "court exhibits." As court exhibits, the exhibits would remain with the clerk and not be published to the jury . The prosecutor, however, would then be permitted to read : (1) portions from the indictment necessary to establish the date of the commission of the crime referred to in the judgment of conviction on that particular indictment, and (2) portions from the judgment of conviction necessary to establish the resulting conviction and sentence . The trial court would then admonish the jury that the portions read by the prosecutor shall be considered as evidence in the penalty phase of the trial . By introducing an indictment and judgment of conviction only as court exhibits, the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant is virtually eliminated, especially the risk of the jury being informed of a charge that did not result in a conviction . The prosecutor would also be permitted to read from the indictment the general description of the crime 26 See RCr 9.72 . -1 4- charged, subject, however, to the trial court's discretion to prevent any undue prejudice to the defendant . C . QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES Appellant asserts that, by asking questions of the witnesses posed to him by members of the jury, the trial judge violated KRE 614(c) .2' Appellant claims that KRE 614(c) restricts the medium for submitting juror questions to written form only . The procedure used at trial for juror questioning of witnesses was as follows : upon the completion of the questioning of a witness by both parties, a juror wanting to ask a question of the witness would approach the bench and state his/her question ; the attorneys were allowed to discuss the question and make objections to the court ; and if the question was allowed, then the trial court asked the question of the witness . With a strikingly similar fact pattern, we disposed of an analogous challenge in Commonwealth v . Collins .28 In Collins , we failed to reverse, opting to : [D]efer to the discretion of the trial court in determining that the juror's questions were properly submitted . While there might have been a technical violation herein, as these questions were not submitted in writing, if any error occurred, it was harmless . As in Collins , we fail to observe reversible error in the instant case. All questions from jurors were required to pass muster by the judge, thereby comporting with the same stringent standards and restrictions imposed upon questions from counsel during direct or cross-examination . The only distinction is the origination of the questions, as the judge remained an effective watchdog over their propriety . Jury inquiry of witnesses is 27 Rule 614 . Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court (c) Interrogation by juror . A juror may be permitted to address questions to a witness by submitting them in writing to the judge who will decide at his discretion whether or not to submit the questions to the witness for answer . 28 933 S .W.2d 811 (1996) . - 1 5- hardly an innovative or newly emerging trial practice in the Commonwealth, and it has been used for some time "in the interest of justice and to enhance understanding of the facts and issues . ,29 We also espoused in Slaughter3° that "the jury - of all people - has the right to have questions - proper questions - answered ." Although the rule requires the submission of written questions, and thus it was error for the trial court to deviate therefrom, we hold that it was harmless error to allow jury questions in the manner permitted by the trial court.3, Appellant attempts to distinguish the instant case from Collins , stating that the ruling hinged on the absence of prejudicial questions, a fundamental distinction from the case at bar . We disagree . Regardless of whether a juror's question is verbally submitted to the trial court or submitted in writing by the juror, a showing of prejudice may warrant reversal . Stated otherwise, as long as no prejudice is shown, a technical violation of the rule is not reversible error . We would note, however, that the rule has a valid purpose, i.e. , not placing the lawyers in the awkward and possibly prejudicial position of possibly having to object to a juror's question in the presence of the juror and/or other members of the jury ; therefore, juror questions should be submitted in writing . Although the rule requires the written submission of juror questions to the trial court, and that is certainly the preferred method, we do not find that allowing juror questions in the manner employed in this case was reversible error . On retrial, however, we would expect full compliance with the rule . 29 Slaughter v . Commonwealth , Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407 (1987) . 31 Id at 414. 3' RCr 9.24 . - 1 6- V . CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we affirm the finding of guilty of the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated and reverse the judgment of the Nelson Circuit Court as to the assault charge and remand for a new trial . Lambert, C.J . ; Johnstone, Keller and Stumbo, concur. Cooper, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Emily Holt Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : A . B . Chandler III Attorney General of Kentucky Samuel Floyd Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204 V ,$ixyrrntr 01'11urf of ~rufurhV 2000-SC-0778-MR DONALD CRANMER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE 99-CR-00108 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART I respectfully dissent for the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Burchett v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 98 S .W .3d 492, 502-13 (2003) . RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Graves, and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join this opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part .