Title: SCOT EUGENE GAITHER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATEDBYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURT OF THIS STATE. SCOT EUGENE GAITHER AuvrMt Crurf of A 2004-SC-0474-MR FACTUAL BACKGROUND RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE THOMAS O . CASTLEN, JUDGE 02-CR-00446 nA COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appellant, Scot Eugene Gaither, was convicted by a Daviess Circuit Court jury of first-degree manslaughter, kidnapping, theft by unlawful taking of property valued less than $300, and tampering with physical evidence . The jury recommended a life sentence without the possibility of parole, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly . Appellant prosecutes a pro se appeal to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110 (2)(b) . James Parson, Sr., was reported missing on August 30, 2001 . The next day Parson's family received a telephone call claiming Parson was being held for ransom . Since several calls concerning ransom were made to Parson's home, the Kentucky State Police (KSP) and the FBI began surveillance . As a result of the surveillance, Appellant was arrested while making a ransom call at a pay telephone . r Appellant was indicted for the murder, kidnapping, and robbery of Parson, Appellant's former business partner . Appellant testified that on the day of Parson's disappearance, Parson drove Appellant to a rural area and held Appellant at gunpoint . According to Appellant's testimony, during a struggle for the weapon, the gun discharged and Parson was shot . Appellant left Parson for dead in a roadside ditch, then drove Parson's van to Evansville, Indiana, where it was abandoned in a shopping mall parking lot . Appellant argued he acted in self-defense, and that he was mentally ill at the time . Appellant raises fifteen claims of error on appeal . While we find most of Appellant's claims are unpreserved for our review, we address each error in light of the severity of the punishment involved . Because several arguments relate to the same issue, we have combined some of the arguments presented individually in Appellant's brief. I . Appellant argues he was entitled to a Remmer hearing after the trial court learned a witness for the Commonwealth discussed the case during a break in the trial . Remmer v . United States , 347 U .S . 227, 74 S.Ct . 450, 98 L.Ed . 654 (1954) . This issue is not properly preserved for review . Nevertheless, we find no error because there is nothing to suggest that any jurors heard comments from Appellant's ex-girlfriend . This Court determined the propriety of a Remmer hearing in Bowlingv . Commonwealth , 168 S .W .3d 2 (Ky . 2004), stating "a hearing is required `only when the alleged contact presents a likelihood of affecting the verdict,' and bias is not implied, but must be demonstrated by the moving party." Id. at 10 (quoting and citing United States v. Frost , 125 F .3d 346, 347 (6th Cir. 1997)) . During voir dire, the trial judge admonished both jurors and witnesses against speaking about the case . Witness Patricia Zamorano, Appellant's ex-girlfriend, testified regarding a conversation she had with Appellant after his arrest . A bailiff told the trial judge that Zamorano was overheard discussing the case in the break room during lunch . The trial judge questioned Zamorano, who admitted she discussed the case with family members, but no jurors were present . The trial resumed, and no jurors reported hearing any comments about the case. Appellant made no objection, and there was no indication that any juror heard Zamorano's statement . As such, a Remmer hearing was not required . II. Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to admonish the jury after playing an inaudible cassette tape . The Commonwealth played an audiotape of conversations between Appellant and the victim's daughter, Leigh Ann Dukes . Appellant placed collect phone calls to Ms . Dukes from jail, and she recorded the conversations . Appellant objected to the recording because it was inaudible and prejudicial . The trial judge ultimately stopped the tape after ten minutes because only Ms . Dukes' side of the conversation was audible . The trial judge has discretion whether to exclude a recording that is inaudible . Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Ky . 1988) . After review of the record, we find no evidence the trial court abused its discretion . Furthermore, contrary to Appellant's argument, the judge was not required to admonish the jury sua sponte . 3 Hall v . Commonwealth , 817 S .W .2d 228, 229 (Ky . 1991), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v . Ramsey , 920 S .W .2d 526 (Ky . 1996) . Appellant's objection to the tape was sustained, and he did not request further curative relief . Consequently, there was no reversible error . III. Appellant claims the trial court erred in allowing the jury to listen to an audiotape during deliberations . This argument is unpreserved and without merit . The cassette tape was a recording by KSP detectives of phone calls made by Appellant to the victim's family . At trial, the tape was properly authenticated and admitted into evidence without objection . Additionally, the jury heard the tape in open court during the testimony of the victim's son . After review of the record, it is apparent there is no error in allowing the jury to hear the tape during deliberations, as it was properly admitted evidence . See Burkhart v . Commonwealth , 125 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Ky . 2003). IV. Appellant's fourth and fifth claims of error are combined for discussion in this section as both relate to jury selection . Appellant first contends the Commonwealth discriminated against prospective jurors who had mental health issues . Appellant points out that the Commonwealth used two peremptory challenges to strike jurors who had received psychiatric treatment in the past . We find this claim entirely speculative and without merit . Furthermore, this claim is unpreserved, as Appellant failed to object to the Commonwealth's use of peremptory challenges . Moreover, Appellant accepted the final composition of the jury panel . Appellant also asserts error because a peremptory challenge was "wasted" on a prospective juror who should have been struck for cause, thereby allowing a "biased" juror to sit on the jury . Prospective juror S .O . disclosed during voir dire that she babysat for the victim's grandchild on a few occasions . S .O . further noted that she had no personal or social relationship with the family and her ability to be impartial was not impaired . This Court recently held that provided the jury that hears the case is impartial a biased juror being removed via peremptory challenge is harmless error . Mor_ an v . Commonwealth , ---S .W.3d---, slip op . at 10 (Ky . 2006) . Accordingly, there is no error, as S .O . did not sit on Appellant's jury . Appellant also claims a biased juror was impaneled . During voir dire, Juror C.E . stated she knew the Commonwealth's Attorney and his staff because her son was prosecuted and convicted of a felony. Appellant did not object to C .E . serving on the panel, and there is no evidence C.E . was incapable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict . RCr 9.36 . Consequently, we find no error in jury selection. V . In this section Appellant's enumerated claims six, eight, and nine are combined as all relate to his mental illness defense. Appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to conduct a pretrial Daubert hearing to determine whether Dr. Steven Free was qualified to testify. Daubert v . Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals . Inc . , 509 U .S . 579, 113 S .Ct . 2786, 125 L .Ed .2d 469 (1993) . Dr . Free is a licensed psychologist employed by Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), and he conducted two court-ordered competency evaluations of Appellant . Dr . Free was called in rebuttal following the testimony of Appellant's expert . "We decline to speculate on the outcome of an unrequested Daubert hearing, or to hold that the failure to conduct such a hearing sua sponte constitutes palpable error." Tharp v . Commonwealth , 40 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Ky . 2000) . In this case, Appellant's expert testified at length regarding the findings in Dr . Free's report . Consequently, it was likely that Dr . Free would be called in rebuttal, and it is apparent Dr . Free was qualified to testify regarding the tests administered at KCPC . Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a pretrial Daubert hearing . Appellant next alleges the Commonwealth improperly confused the jury by utilizing the testimony of Dr. Free and the KCPC competency evaluation to rebut Appellant's mental illness defense . After review of the record, it is clear that both parties emphasized the difference between competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility for the charged crimes . Furthermore, Appellant's expert witness relied on the KCPC evaluation to "back up" his findings and read aloud from the KCPC report during his testimony . Consequently, we find no error in the Commonwealth's use of competency evidence to rebut the mental illness defense. Appellant also asserts the combination of the two preceding errors effectively relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of proof and precluded a verdict of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) . It appears Appellant essentially argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict . We find this argument unpreserved, as it was not raised in Appellant's motion for directed verdict at the close of evidence . However, even if the issue were preserved, Appellant does not have a viable claim. "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a 6 directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v . Benham , 816 S .W .2d 186, 187 (Ky . 1991) . We do not find the jury's verdict clearly unreasonable, and the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to support the jury's decision in this case . VI . The next issue raised by Appellant is prosecutorial misconduct . Appellant asserts seven different errors on the part of the Commonwealth . We first examine the comments to which Appellant entered an objection . Appellant objected to the Commonwealth "badgering" Appellant's expert witness on cross-examination, and he also objected to perceived misstatements of law in closing argument . In West v . Commonwealth , 780 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Ky . 1989), this Court stated that defense counsel's failure to move for a mistrial signaled that the requested admonition was a sufficient remedy for the prosecutor's improper comments . In the case at bar, Appellant's defense counsel merely objected to the improper statements, and sought no further remedy in the form of an admonition or mistrial . "[I]t is clear that a party must inform the court of the error and request the relief to which he considers himself entitled . Otherwise the issue may not be raised on appeal ." Id . at 602 . Accordingly, we presume the relief granted by the trial court was satisfactory . Appellant next urges palpable error review of comments made during the cross- examination of Appellant, questioning of the lead police detective, and additional comments made during the Commonwealth's closing argument . Relief may be granted for palpable error under RCr 10 .26 only if "manifest injustice" results from an error affecting the "substantial rights" of a party . We do not find that Appellant's claim reaches the level of palpable error in this case. Furthermore, even if the claim were preserved, it is without merit . To warrant reversal, prosecutorial misconduct must be so egregious "as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair." Partin v. Commonwealth , 918 S .W .2d 219, 224 (Ky . 1996) . The reviewing court "must focus on the overall fairness of the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor." Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S .W .2d 407, 411-12 (Ky . 1988) . The evidence reveals that Appellant received a fundamentally fair trial in this case . Consequently, we find no reversible error due to prosecutorial misconduct . VII . Appellant next claims he was denied the right to present mitigation evidence because the punishment phase combined the capital sentencing and truth-in-sentencing hearing . Appellant concedes this issue is unpreserved . The record also reflects Appellant requested that his attorney not present any mitigating evidence but instead ask the jury to consider the death penalty . At any rate, Appellant's argument is without merit because review of the record clearly shows Appellant's parents testified as mitigation witnesses during the penalty phase . Likewise, the jury was instructed on mitigating circumstances when determining Appellant's punishment . We also note Appellant suffered no prejudice as a result of combined sentencing proceedings . Accordingly, there is no reversible error. VIII. Appellant claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to fully investigate Appellant's potential neurological impairment and 8 failed to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct . We decline to address Appellant's assertions of ineffective assistance at this time, as this issue has not yet been presented to the trial court . See Humphrey v. Commonwealth , 962 S .W .2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998) . IX . Appellant claims the trial court erred by failing to apply the kidnapping exemption statute, KRS 509 .050 . Appellant also alleges the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on first-degree unlawful imprisonment . After a review of the record, we find both claims are unpreserved and without merit . During Appellant's first motion for directed verdict, counsel told the trial court he was not arguing that the exemption applied, and the trial court agreed . Likewise, Appellant was not entitled to an instruction on unlawful imprisonment as a lesser-included offense to kidnapping . "[T]o support a lesser included instruction the posture of the evidence must be such as to create a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of the higher or lower degree ." Tipton v. Commonwealth , 640 S .W .2d 818, 820 (Ky . 1982) . In this case, both counsel agreed there was no evidence warranting an unlawful imprisonment instruction . The trial court agreed and instructed only on kidnapping . Accordingly, there is no error. X. Appellant contends the kidnapping instruction was unconstitutional because it allowed the jury to base guilt solely on the fact the victim was not released alive. This claim is unpreserved and without merit . After a review of the record, we note the kidnapping instruction properly enumerates each element of the offense and requires an affirmative finding by the jury on all elements . Accordingly, there is no error. XI . Appellant claims he was denied a fair trial because the lead detective improperly bolstered the testimony of other witnesses and impermissibly reviewed notes while testifying . Appellant concedes this claim is unpreserved and requests review as palpable error. We find no evidence the testimony was improper. Detective Ballard referred to his notebook for the specific dates and times ransom telephone calls were made to the victim's family . Furthermore, Appellant acknowledges the detective was allowed to sit at counsel table during the trial . Accordingly, there is no palpable error. XII . Appellant claims the trial court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to reopen its case in rebuttal after stating the case was closed . The Commonwealth's Attorney announced closed, but retracted his statement within one minute upon realizing he failed to call Dr . Free as a rebuttal witness . Appellant objected to the reopening of the case, but the trial court allowed the testimony . The trial court noted Appellant suffered no prejudice because Dr . Free was expected to testify, and the time that elapsed was brief . It is within the discretion of the trial court to allow a party to reopen its case for additional evidence. Davis v . Commonwealth , 795 S .W .2d 942, 947 (Ky . 1990) ; RCr 9.42 . It appears Appellant likely suffered no harm due to the reopening of the Commonwealth's case, especially considering Appellant's expert had previously 10 testified regarding portions of Dr . Free's report . Consequently, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion . For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the Daviess Circuit Court . Graves, Johnstone, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J .J . concur . Lambert, C .J ., concurs in result only . Cooper, J ., dissents without an opinion . APPELLANT PRO SE Scot Eugene Gaither Kentucky State Penitentiary P O Box 5128 Eddyville, KY 42038-5128 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General Ian G.Sonego Assistant Attorney General Matthew Robert Krygiel Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601 CONCLUSION