Title: GLEN EDDIE GARCIA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GLEN EDDIE GARCIA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 159777 P.2d 603Case Number: 88-98Decided: 07/24/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
GLEN EDDIE GARCIA, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program, and David F. Askman, Student Intern, argued, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
LEIMBACK, District Judge.

LEIMBACK, District 
Judge.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from 
appellant's conviction for the burglary of a Cheyenne Convenience Plus store. A 
motion to suppress defendant's confession was filed prior to trial. A hearing 
was held, and the motion was denied. After the trial, defendant filed a motion 
for new trial contending that statements made by one juror to others during 
deliberations constituted an extraneous prejudicial presentation of evidence. 
This motion was also denied after a hearing on the matter. It is from this 
judgment and these denials that defendant appeals.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant presents 
three issues for our determination which are as follows:

I. Did the trial court 
err in failing to grant the defendant's motion to suppress, by requiring the 
defendant to assume the burden of going forward, and in failing to make 
requisite findings of voluntariness?

II. Did the trial court 
err in admitting into evidence a confession not proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence to be voluntary?

III. Did the trial court 
err in denying appellant's motion for new trial based on the improper 
presentation of extraneous prejudicial evidence to the 
jury?

[¶4.]     The State of Wyoming rephrases the 
issues in the following fashion:

I. Whether the district 
court correctly denied appellant's motion to suppress his 
confession?

II. Whether it was proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant's statement was voluntarily 
given? 

III. Whether it was 
proper for the trial court to deny appellant's motion for a new 
trial?

[¶5.]     The events leading up 
to appellant's burglary conviction transpired as follows. On the morning of 
March 21, 1987, the manager and the clerk of a Convenience Plus store in 
Cheyenne 
discovered that cash, checks, food stamps, and cigarettes had been taken from 
the store. Due to the fact that the store alarm had not sounded the previous 
evening and there was no sign of a forced entry into the store, the 
investigation suggested that the burglar had gained access to the store by using 
a set of store keys. The store clerk speculated that her keys were the ones used 
to gain access to the store because on the morning of the 21st they were not in 
the proper compartment in her purse and the front door to her home was unlocked, 
whereas it had been locked the previous evening. The clerk informed the police 
that her sister Juanita Taylor and her sister's boyfriend Glen Garcia knew where 
she kept the store keys. The police questioned Juanita Taylor about the 
burglary, but, due to lack of evidence, the case was closed on April 16, 1987. 
It was reopened after appellant confessed to committing the 
burglary.

[¶6.]     A sequence of events 
occurred before appellant made his confession on July 25, 1987. First, Juanita 
Taylor was arrested and incarcerated on June 23, 1987, for aiding and abetting 
an auto burglary. Subsequently, a Cheyenne police officer conversed with 
Juanita's mother and told her that if Glen Garcia would talk to the police about 
his involvement in the Convenience Plus store burglary, it might help Juanita to 
be released from jail. At about 5:00 p.m. on June 24, 1987, Glen Garcia 
approached the officer outside of the police station and inquired about Juanita. 
Again the police officer reiterated that Juanita might be released if Glen chose 
to state what he knew about the burglary. The following morning, after proper 
Miranda warnings were given, Glen Garcia confessed to committing the burglary. 
On the same day, the charges against Juanita were dismissed, and she was 
released from jail.

I. The initial contention 
is that the trial court should have granted the appellant's motion to suppress 
because the prosecution did not assume the burden of going forward. Instead, the 
appellant was required to present his witnesses first.

[¶7.]     This court recognizes 
that there is a clear distinction between the terms "burden of proof" and "the 
burden of going forward" with the evidence.

The phrase "burden of 
proof" is often used as meaning the necessity of establishing a fact to a 
legally required extent, or the necessity of finally establishing a 
fact.

Tench v. Weaver, 
374 P.2d 27, 29 (Wyo. 1962). The burden of proof never shifts 
from one party to the other at any stage in the proceeding. On the other hand, 
"going forward with the evidence" is a procedural obligation, and it can shift 
from party to party during the course of a trial. State v. Carter, 214 
Kan. 533, 521 P.2d 294, 297 (1974).

[¶8.]     The State always has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was 
voluntary. Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 308 (Wyo. 1977). On the other hand, the movant at 
the suppression hearing may be required to go forward with the evidence. The 
logical and traditional order of proof is to allow the defendant to present his 
evidence on the issue of the involuntariness and then let the State rebut the 
issue. The Illinois appellate court has expressly 
approved this procedure, and we will follow suit and hold that the State has the 
burden to establish that the confession was voluntarily made. It is, however, 
within the sound discretion of the trial court to reverse the order of proof 
requiring the defendants to present evidence before the State. People v. Allen, 
148 Ill. 
App.3d 200, 101 Ill.Dec. 514, 498 N.E.2d 838, 840 (1986).

[¶9.]     Appellant argued that 
the trial court failed to make requisite findings of voluntariness. This court 
has held that where the evidence of voluntariness is seriously in dispute, the 
trial court must expressly find that the statements were voluntary. Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 143 (Wyo. 1986). If the finding of voluntariness 
can be ascertained from the record, the court need not make an express finding. 
Dodge, 562 P.2d  at 310. The better practice is for the trial judge to expressly 
state that the statements were voluntarily made and why he determined that they 
were voluntary, rather than making a bold statement that the motion to suppress 
is denied. Dodge, 562 P.2d  at 309. This is due in part to the fact that the 
resolution of conflicting evidence is within the province of the trial court, 
and its findings must be given great weight when considered in light of its 
opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses. Marken v. Goodall, 478 F.2d 1052 
(10th Cir. 1973).

[¶10.]  Here, the evidence of the voluntariness 
of the confession was not in grave dispute; both Officer Olivo and appellant 
testified that the Miranda rights were properly waived. At the conclusion of the 
suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion and stated that the 
"court finds that the constitutional rights of the defendant in this particular 
case, in the course of obtaining this confession, have not been violated." We 
conclude that the trial court did make an express finding that the confession 
was made voluntarily.

II. Appellant argues that 
his confession was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence to be 
voluntary.

[¶11.]  The due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." The purpose of the clause is to 
exclude evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Constitution. 
Therefore, whenever the State obtains a confession it has the burden by a 
preponderance to demonstrate that the statement was not obtained in violation of 
the Miranda doctrine and that the statement was given voluntarily. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163, 
107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). A confession is not voluntary if extracted 
by threats or improper influences or promises. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897); State v. Stotler, 168 W. Va. 8, 282 S.E.2d 255 
(1981). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court holds that coercive police 
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 
voluntary within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.  at 167, 107 S. Ct.  at 522.

[¶12.]  Under Connelly, once the evidence 
establishes official coercion, a court must consider the effect of that coercion 
on the defendant's choice to confess. Unless coercive conduct caused the 
defendant to confess, the defendant voluntarily confessed and his statement is 
admissible. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.  at 157, 107 S. Ct.  at 517. We 
recognize that coercion can be mental as well as physical. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964). Additionally, the use of 
tricks or factual misstatements in and of itself does not render a confession 
involuntary. There must be coercion involved, and a misstatement of fact is not 
coercion. While a misstatement may affect the voluntariness of the confession, 
the effect of misstatement will be considered in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances. State v. Manning, 506 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.App. 
1987).

[¶13.]  In the past, this court has applied a 
two-part test to determine if the waiver of the right to remain silent was made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. First, the relinquishment of the 
right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free 
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. 
Secondly, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the 
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d  at 142. In determining whether the 
statement made by an accused is voluntary, the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation must be examined. Id.

[¶14.]  Furthermore, evidentiary rulings are 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. We defer to them absent 
appellant's clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company, Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 165 (Wyo. 1985); 
Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 
1988); Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital 
Corporation, 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988). We have defined an abuse of 
discretion as an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. 
Lawrence at 653; Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶15.]  Appellant argues that his confession is 
inadmissible because it was procured by the promise to release his girlfriend 
from jail. We realize that at times a promise for leniency presents a compelling 
basis for a court to determine that the confession is inadmissible. This is not 
the case presented here today.

[¶16.]  The circumstances in this case reveal 
that the appellant initiated the confession by seeking out the officer and 
inquiring how he could help his girlfriend out of jail. The police officer 
responded by telling the appellant that if he confessed to the burglary, the 
district attorney may act more favorably towards the appellant and his 
girlfriend. The appellant later called the police officer and stated that he 
wished to confess to the burglary. The following morning he went, on his own 
accord, to the station and made his statement. He was not arrested or subjected 
to prolonged or harsh interrogation techniques. He was given proper Miranda 
warnings, and he knowingly waived assistance of counsel. The appellant testified 
at the suppression hearing that he fully understood his Miranda rights and the 
ramifications of confessing to the crime. This was illustrated in the 
suppression hearing when appellant's attorney asked him if he had asked the 
officer if he was going to be charged with anything or arrested after he 
confessed to the crime. The appellant responded by 
stating:

No. I figured that I was, 
anyway. It's only obvious when you go into the police department and confess to 
something that's against the law, they are going to arrest you right on the 
spot. You know, I didn't even believe he wasn't going to arrest 
me.

[¶17.]  The circumstances in which appellant made 
his statement in this case do not provide sufficient grounds for holding that 
the statement was involuntary. The confession met the two-part test outlined 
above, in that it was not a result of police coercion or deception and appellant 
fully understood his rights and the consequences when he made his statement. If 
a misstatement was made, it did not constitute police coercion. Furthermore, the 
trial court is in the best position to view the credibility of the witnesses. 
The above circumstances are sufficient to find that the confession was 
voluntarily made. Absent abuse of discretion or plain error, we will not disturb 
its decision. Therefore, we will defer to the trial court's ruling and hold that 
the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the confession was 
voluntary.

[¶18.]  Moreover, the fact that the judge made a 
pretrial determination on the voluntariness of the confession did not undercut 
the appellant's prerogative to challenge the confession's reliability during the 
course of trial. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986). The jury was given two instructions concerning appellant's 
theory that the confession was involuntary. The jury had the opportunity to 
assess the evidence, the accuracy and voluntariness of the confession, which it 
did, and resolved the issue by finding the appellant guilty. Therefore, the 
appellant cannot demonstrate that admitting the confession was prejudicial error 
which has adversely affected a substantial right, Shields v. Carnahan, 744 P.2d 1115, 1117, (Wyo. 1987); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 934 (Wyo. 
1981), because he was given a meaningful opportunity to defend his 
position.

III. Finally, appellant 
argues that an extraneous statement made by one juror to the remaining jurors 
during the deliberation warrants a new trial.

[¶19.]  The Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guarantees a right to a jury trial by a panel of impartial jurors. 
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal 
standards of due process. Hence, the verdict must be based upon evidence 
developed at the trial. Turner v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 466, 471-472, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1965). When jurors consider extrinsic evidence, a new trial is 
required if the evidence poses a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the 
defendant. United 
States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (11th 
Cir. 1984).

[¶20.]  The Wyoming Rules of Evidence state that 
when an inquiry into the validity of a verdict is made, a juror may not testify 
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him 
concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be 
received. But a juror may testify on the questions of whether extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 
W.R.E. 606(b).

[¶21.]  Here, the controversy arose when the jury 
foreman notified the public defender that an extraneous statement had been made 
during the jury deliberation. The appellant was afforded a post-trial hearing, 
and the juror who made the statement was questioned about its contents. He 
testified that during the jury deliberation comments were made of why the 
defendant was wearing handcuffs and that he had responded by stating that the 
defendant had been in trouble before and that nothing further was said about the 
matter. When asked by the court how he knew that the defendant had been in 
trouble before, the juror stated that he saw the defendant at his wife's court a 
couple of times and that his wife worked at municipal court. No further 
testimony was elicited from the juror, and at the conclusion of the hearing the 
trial judge denied the motion for a new trial.

[¶22.]  In order to authorize a post-verdict 
inquiry there must be clear and substantial evidence, if not wholly conclusive 
evidence. King v. United 
States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1978). In 
this case there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of jury 
influence by prejudicial extraneous information so as to warrant a post-verdict 
inquiry. The jury was properly instructed to decide the case based upon the 
evidence produced. During the voir dire proceedings the juror was never directly 
asked if he knew the defendant or knew anything about him. Consequently, there 
is no proof that the juror possessed a preexisting bias against the defendant. 
Also, there was no evidence that an outside influence may have affected the 
juror's verdict or that the statement played any part in the jury's verdict - 
ingredients necessary to justify a juror inquiry. But, rather the juror's 
statement was a natural probable consequence of an innate curiosity of why the 
defendant was wearing handcuffs. After the statement was made, the jury 
continued with the resolution of the issues. The statement was simply part of 
the jury's deliberation. The fact that one juror was permitted to testify about 
what another juror had said during the deliberations constitutes an unwarranted 
intrusion into jury deliberations. United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 
(3rd Cir. 1983).

[¶23.]  Normal jury deliberations constitute no 
grounds for overturning a verdict nor indeed rendering a verdict invalid merely 
because the jurors' generalized knowledge about the parties or some other aspect 
of the case is an ingredient of the decision. It is not necessary that jurors be 
totally ignorant about a case, Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 151 (3rd Cir. 1975), because it is an impossible standard to require that 
the jury be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any external 
factors. United 
States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 
(2nd Cir. 1970).

[¶24.]  The United States Supreme Court states 
that

due process does not 
require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially 
compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally 
acceptable. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and 
protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is 
virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might 
theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to 
decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever 
watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such 
occurrences when they happen.

Smith v. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982). We find the Court's reasoning persuasive and applicable to 
the instant case and note that the appellant was afforded all the due process 
requirements mandated by law.

[¶25.]  Generally, the granting of a motion for 
new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision 
shall not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Daellenbach 
v. State, 562 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1977); Jones v. 
State, 568 P.2d 837 (Wyo. 1977). Although we conclude that the 
post-verdict inquiry was unfounded, there is no showing of prejudice to the 
appellant that would require a reversal in this instance.

[¶26.]  We have examined the record and find the 
court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and the motion for new trial 
for the reasons previously set forth. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.