Title: Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1This proceeding was originally styled as a proposed amendment to the Rules of Judicial
Administration and the minimum standards were initially entitled: "Minimum Standards for
Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases."  We agree with the suggestion that the standards be made a
part of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and therefore the Minimum Standards for
Attorneys in Capital Cases shall be located at Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112.
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. 90,635
____________
IN RE: AMENDMENT TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE--RULE 3.112 MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES.1
[October 28, 1999]
ANSTEAD, J.
This matter originally came before the Court for consideration of a proposed
rule concerning the competency and qualifications of lawyers appointed to
represent indigent defendants in capital cases where the services of the public
defender are not available.  In 1998 we deferred consideration of this issue pending
legislative study.  See In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., 711 So.
2d 1148, 1149-50 (Fla. 1998).  We now address the issue after receipt of a
unanimous recommendation by a legislative study commission that this Court,
2See Report of the Commission on Legislative Reform of Judicial Administration
(hereinafter Commission Report).  The Commission "unanimously recommends to the Legislature
that the matter of standards be left to the court to adopt."  Commission Report at 6.
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rather than the legislature, adopt standards for lawyers in capital cases.2  Today we
take an important step in ensuring the integrity of the judicial process in capital
cases by adopting a rule of criminal procedure to help ensure that competent
representation will be provided to indigent capital defendants in all cases.  
In its formal report, the Commission on Legislative Reform of Judicial
Administration declared:
     Competent counsel to represent defendants in cases
where the death penalty may be imposed is essential to
assure that the death penalty is imposed fairly and
without undue delay.  In 1989 the American Bar
Association promulgated minimum standards for counsel
in death penalty cases, urging states to adopt similar rules
or standards.  To date, of the 40 states with death penalty
statutes, 19 have instituted some form of minimum
guidelines or standards or have created an agency to
promulgate standards of the appointment and
representation of counsel at either the trial or appellate
level or both in capital cases.  Florida is the largest state
without any rule or legislation imposing minimum
standards on counsel appointed to represent defendants in
death penalty cases.
Commission Report at 4.  This Court has a continuing obligation to ensure the
integrity of the judicial process in all cases.  Our overview is especially important
in death penalty cases.  Hopefully, few would disagree that capital cases are 
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among the most intricate and complex cases in the legal system today.  As one
commentator notes:  "They involve a unique separate sentencing phase, a complex
body of law that is specific to death cases, and complicated and convoluted
doctrines that limit appellate review for errors committed at trial."  Michael D.
Moore, Note, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and
Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death-
Eligible Defendants, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1617, 1639 (1996).  Recently, in
recognition of our responsibility, we addressed a concern over the qualifications of
judges handling death penalty cases.  See In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of
Judicial Admin., Rule 2.050(b)(10), 688 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1997).  There, we added a
new rule to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration to ensure that judges
presiding over capital cases would possess "the experience and training necessary
to handle the unique demands of such proceedings."  Id. at 320.  Today, we act on
the same concerns that prompted our earlier action.  
Based on our ongoing concerns as to the quality of the judicial process in
capital cases, this Court in 1997 appointed a select committee of highly qualified
and experienced judges and lawyers to study and recommend for our review
minimum standards to ensure the competency of court-appointed lawyers in 
3The Court wishes to express its appreciation to those who submitted comments and
advice concerning the rule adopted today.  We are especially appreciative of the work of the
distinguished members who researched and prepared the proposed standards: Judge Philip J.
Padovano, Judge Susan Schaeffer, Judge Joseph P. Farina, State Attorney Jerry Hill, Public
Defender Marion Moorman, Carey Haughwout, Esq., and Professor John F. Yetter.
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capital cases.3  The committee provided us with an initial set of proposed standards
which we identified in an opinion, In re Proposed Amendment to Florida Rules of
Judicial Administration--Minimum Standards for Appointed Counsel in Capital
Cases, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S407 (Fla. July 3, 1997), wherein we directed that the
proposed standards be published in The Florida Bar News.  Numerous constructive
comments and concerns were subsequently received and were duly forwarded to
the committee.  The committee then redrafted the proposed minimum standards in
a constructive effort to address the comments.  After exhaustive work, and based
largely upon standards already in place around the country and within the various
judicial circuits in this State, the committee produced a rule which responds to the
competing concerns of high standards and practicality in application.  This Court
then heard oral arguments in which interested persons were again provided an
opportunity to address the proposed standards.
Today we accept the committee's recommendations, with two minor
exceptions. The majority of comments focused on standard (d), which, as initially
proposed by the committee, mandated the appointment of two lawyers during the
4As initially proposed by the committee, this standard was identified as Minimum
Standard G, which required trial courts to appoint both lead counsel and cocounsel in all cases in
which the death penalty was sought.  See In re Proposed Amend. to Rules of Judicial Admin., 22
Fla. L. Weekly at S407.  In conforming the standards to the rules of criminal procedure, however,
Minimum Standard G has been renumbered as paragraph (d).
5For example, the Commission on Legislative Reform of Judicial Administration
recommended that two counsel be appointed upon a showing of good cause.  The Commission
Report states:
     There is at present no requirement that two counsel be afforded to defendants
facing the imposition of the death penalty.  Public Defenders who appeared before
the commission and the Capital Collateral Crimes Representative who addressed
the commission all explained that the complex nature of the sentencing phase of a
death penalty case made appointment of two counsel, one to handle the guilt phase
and one to handle sentencing, a matter of effective representation of the defendant. 
The Deputy Attorney General also indicated that a two-lawyer requirement was
appropriate and would be in the state's interest.  Judge Belvin Perry, commission
member and Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, told the commission that
not all cases required two counsel, although most of the testimony indicated that if
a case were going to trial, two counsel were essential.
Commission Report at 6.
6In determining whether appointment of cocounsel is needed, trial courts should consider
all relevant circumstances of the particular case, as well as the practices of the public defender 
and state attorney's offices in allocating resources to capital cases.  In exercising discretion, trial 
courts should consider, for example, whether a defendant, if represented by the public defender's   
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trial proceedings.4  Although we are in agreement with the committee's legitimate
concerns in recommending this provision to ensure adequate and competent
representation for capital defendants, we also agree with the views expressed by
others that the trial court should retain some supervisory authority over the decision
to appoint cocounsel.5  Therefore, while the standards we adopt today provide that
two lawyers should ordinarily be appointed, we leave the ultimate decision to the
discretion of the trial court.6  
office, would have the same resources available.  Capital defendants, who by virtue of conflict or
other reason, must be represented by appointed private counsel, should, of course, receive no less
resources for their defense than those defendants represented by the public defender.
7See American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 57, 63 (1989) ("These attorneys should receive appointments if
the appointing authority is satisfied the defendant or inmate will be provided with the same
quality of representation as clients represented by attorneys who met the experiential criteria.").
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We also recognize that it is possible that some counties in the state may not
have enough lawyers available who meet the technical requirements of the
standards.  Therefore, we are adding to the proposed standards a provision which
permits trial courts in exceptional circumstances to appoint attorneys who may not
satisfy the technical requirements of the standards, but in whom the appointing 
trial court has complete and unqualified confidence as to the quality of
representation.7  
Under our procedural and adversarial system of justice, the quality of
lawyering is critical.  For that reason, trial judges responsible for the appointment
of counsel in cases where the very life of the defendant is at risk must take care to
appoint well-qualified lawyers.  As Justice Ehrlich has earlier noted with respect  
to appellate counsel in capital cases:
     Appointment of appellate counsel for indigent
defendants is the responsibility of the trial court.  We
strongly urge trial judges not to take this responsibility
lightly or to appoint appellate counsel without due
recognition of the skills and attitudes necessary for
effective appellate representation.  A perfunctory
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appointment of counsel without consideration of
counsel's ability to fully, fairly, and zealously advocate
the defendant's cause is a denial of meaningful
representation which will not be tolerated.  The gravity of
the charge, the attorney's skill and experience and
counsel's positive appreciation of his role and its
significance are all factors which must be in the court's
mind when an appointment is made.
Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla. 1985).  This Court has an
inherent and fundamental obligation to ensure that lawyers are appointed to
represent indigent capital defendants who possess the experience and training
necessary to handle the complex and difficult issues inherent in death penalty
cases.  This Court, over the years, has reviewed countless ineffective assistance of
counsel claims alleging incompetence of counsel at both the trial and appellate
levels.  This experience demonstrates that we cannot ignore the compelling need to
focus attention on the initial process whereby private counsel are appointed, in
order to improve the quality of the process and minimize later claims of
incompetency.  
While we would be naive in believing we could completely eliminate the
problem by enacting a rule, we can at least act constructively in formulating a
process that gives special attention to our concerns.  We do so today to ensure that
the appointive process is specifically designed to provide for the appointment of
competent counsel.  The responsibility of the trial court to ensure that only well
8We recognize that extending the minimum standards to the public defenders will require
appropriate revision of the standards announced herein.  The necessity and extent of the changes
will depend, in large part, on the comments and input we receive by the date specified in this
opinion.    
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qualified counsel are appointed is central to this process.  The integrity of the
process and our society's confidence in the outcome of capital proceedings rests on
our allegiance and commitment to the highest standards of our justice system.  We
call upon all judges and lawyers, prosecutors and defense counsel alike, to apply
the highest standards of professionalism and ethics to their roles and
responsibilities in capital litigation.
We have also determined, preliminarily, and in accordance with the views
expressed by Justice Lewis in his concurring opinion, that these standards should
be extended to lawyers practicing law within the offices of the public defenders in
order to ensure that competent counsel is provided to all indigent capital
defendants.  However, we recognize that we have not previously announced our
consideration of this issue or asked for comments on such an extension of the rule
from those who will be affected, including the public defenders of Florida.  For 
this reason, we direct all interested persons to file comments on this issue by
December 31, 1999, so that we may consider this issue and determine the need for
any oral presentations well in advance of the July 1, 2000, effective date of this
rule.8
9We also concur in the views expressed by Justice Lewis in his separate opinion that we
have an obligation to investigate and consider establishing standards for all counsel, including
public defenders, privately retained counsel, and others who represent capital defendants during
any phase of the proceedings.  For that reason we are requesting the select committee previously
appointed to assist us to reconvene, and after appropriate investigation and study, to make
recommendations to this Court as to whether we should adopt additional standards as suggested
by Justice Lewis.  All persons having an interest in this issue should be in contact with the select
committee.
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Accordingly, together with the changes discussed and specified herein, the
Court hereby adopts Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112, Minimum
Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases.9  The new rule setting forth the 
Minimum Standards as revised by this Court is attached as an appendix to this
opinion along with the comments of the committee.  This rule shall become
effective and apply to the appointment of counsel made after July 1, 2000.  This
delay in implementation is necessary in order to give the circuit courts a fair
opportunity to prepare for and comply with the rule and to give attorneys a fair
opportunity to meet the educational requirements of the rule.  We urge The Florida
Bar and other organizations involved in criminal justice to accept the 
responsibility for making educational opportunities available in order to qualify
attorneys for capital litigation.  Of course, we emphasize that these standards only
apply to capital cases in which the State is seeking the imposition of the death
penalty.  They need not be applied in cases where the State has formally  
renounced any intention to seek that penalty.  
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It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which SHAW, ANSTEAD,
PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in result only.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS RULE.
LEWIS, J., specially concurring.
I concur with the majority's establishment of minimum standards for conflict
counsel in death penalty cases as well as our announced intention to extend these
standards to public counsel.  These standards are essential prerequisites if we are 
to ensure a fundamentally fair adversarial process in this most serious class of
criminal cases.  However, for the reasons expressed below, I believe that the time
has arrived for further consideration of expanding the net of protection if our
underlying purpose is truly to ensure that competent representation is provided to
capital defendants in all cases.   
First, I wholeheartedly agree that we cannot exclude public defenders and
capital collateral representatives from these meaningful requirements.  Although 
all of these categories are within those provided by the government, if we exclude
those lawyers, we would be left with only history and continued good faith to
assure us that the majority of capital defendants, i.e., those represented by public
10According to one commentator's research, an interesting, if unintended, effect of rule 24
has been a decrease in death penalty case filings since the rule's enactment on January 1, 1992. 
See Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana
Experience and its Implications for the Nation, 29 Ind. L. Rev. 495 (1996).  Interviews of
prosecutors by Professor Lefstein, a former chairman of the Indiana Public Defender
Commission, reveal that rule 24 has "put some economic judgment" into death penalty filing
decisions because of the increased costs incurred by counties in capital cases.  Further,
prosecutors and defense attorneys agree that other factors attributable to rule 24 also account for
this decline in filings, including the increased time defense attorneys devote to capital cases; the
greater resources at their disposal, such as expert witnesses; and the resulting pressure on
prosecuting offices to devote more of their scarce resources to capital cases.  Id. at 511.  Based on
subject interviews and the analysis of empirical information, Professor Lefstein concludes:
By improving the quality of defense services in Indiana capital
cases, some of the factors that influence prosecutors in exercising
their unfettered discretion to seek or not to seek the death penalty
have become more evident.  Both the objective and interview data
presented in this Article strongly suggest that in deciding upon the
death penalty prosecutors evaluate more than just the aggravating
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defenders and some later by capital collateral representatives, would have counsel
with credentials that meet the minimum standards established today.  Further, I
believe we have an obligation to the public to continue to analyze, through either
this type of rule or rules of professional responsibility, whether privately retained
counsel should be included where death may be imposed.  It may be time for us to
further consider expansion of the protective measures where the ultimate sanction
for the losing defendant is a death sentence. 
We should also take note of the commendable practices of other states. 
Notably, several other jurisdictions that have adopted minimum standards for
counsel in capital cases draw no distinction between appointed private attorneys
and public defenders.  See Ind. R. Crim. P. 24 (1999);10 Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13(3)
and mitigating factors specified for the jury's consideration.  The
ability of defense counsel, the cost of the prosecution, and the
burden on the prosecutor's staff, are among the extra-legal factors
that prosecutors take into account.  These findings, in turn, raise
significant and enduring questions about the basic fairness of the
scheme for capital punishment in Indiana and other states.
Id. at 533 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
11Similar to the Indiana rule, the reference to public defenders in the Tennessee rule is
included within a subsection titled "Minimum Qualifications and Compensation of Counsel in
Capital Cases."  Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13(3).
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(1998); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.8(B.) (Michie 1998).  Indeed, the Indiana rule
specifically provides that "[s]alaried or contractual public defenders may be
appointed as trial counsel in a capital case" so long as the public defender's
caseload does not exceed a set maximum and other trial dates are not too close in
time to the capital trial.  See Ind. R. Crim. P. 24(B)(3)(c).  The reference to public
defenders is included under the subsection titled, "Appointment of Qualified Trial
Counsel," and thus necessarily carries the same experience requirements for that
class of attorneys as well as private attorneys appointed to represent capital
defendants.  In the same vein, the only caveat in the Tennessee rule regarding
public defenders concerns the schedule of compensation which is inapplicable to
employees, such as the public defenders, already paid by the state.  See Tenn. Sup.
Ct. R. 13(3)(i).11  It is now time for further exploration of whether sufficient
reasons exist which prevent Florida from joining these states in instituting some
form of blanket minimum standards for any lawyer representing an indigent
12I recognize the valid constitutional concerns voiced at oral argument regarding
application of these standards to public defenders.  See Art. V, § 18, Fla. Const. (providing that
"[i]n each judicial circuit a public defender shall be elected for a term of four years, who shall
perform duties prescribed by general law").  However, the public defender's status as an elected
public official should not command abandonment of this Court's constitutional duty to ensure the
due process rights of capital defendants, guard against the imposition of excessive punishments,
and adopt rules of practice and procedure.  See Art. I, §§ 9, 17; art. V, § 2, Fla. Const. 
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defendant in a capital case.  Our consideration of the problems in this area should
not terminate simply upon the adoption of these provisions, but the discussion and
self-analysis must continue.  This is one aspect of capital case litigation to which
this Court must be ever vigilant with the momentous consequences involved.12        
As a final note, I certainly agree with the majority's comment concerning the
numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought before this Court and
the corresponding need "to focus attention on the initial process whereby private
counsel are appointed, in order to improve the quality of the process and minimize
later claims of incompetency."  Majority op. at 7.  We must also come to an
understanding that the issue of counsel competency is a theme that dominates all
involved in capital case litigation.  In a recent symposium, former Pennsylvania
Attorney General Ernest D. Preate, Jr., made the following observation:
I am a prosecutor, of course, and I believe in the
death penalty.  But, let me just add quickly, that on the
subject before us this morning, counsel competency, my
position is a bit different than the stereotypes. [The
several other prosecutors present and I] agree that there is
a problem with counsel competency in death penalty
cases.  I think we all have to do something about it if we
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are to achieve justice for all.  We need to have better
qualified defense counsel and you've already heard the
arguments put forward that suggest and demand that that
be the standard.  But we need to have better qualified
prosecutors, too.  I believe that in too many of our capital
cases, there is ineffective assistance of counsel on both
sides . . .  If you examine the cases as I have, you'll
see–and this is anecdotal evidence but there is, in my
view, a sufficient ground to make the statement–that the
defense counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel is not
necessarily a mistake that the defense counsel originally
made, but a mistake by the prosecutor.  The prosecutor
did something he or she shouldn't have done and the
defense counsel failed to object or failed to take
advantage of it.  So the defendant is convicted and put on
death row for years before he wins a new trial or a new
sentencing proceeding based upon the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.  You see, that's not fair. 
It's not fair to the defendant; not fair to the people that 
the prosecutor represents or the surviving members of 
the victim's family.
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., in The Death of Fairness?  Counsel Competency and Due
Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1105, 1120-21 (1994) (emphasis
added).  This intellectually honest and candid assessment rings true in Florida, as
this Court has previously addressed circumstances of prosecutorial misconduct
which it has described as serious and which was neither challenged nor rebutted 
by defense counsel.  See, e.g., Ruiz v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S157, S158 (Fla.
Apr. 1, 1999) (condemning two instances of unobjected to prosecutorial
misconduct as "cross[ing] the line of acceptable advocacy by a wide margin" and
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as a "blatant appeal to jurors' emotions"); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 n.8,
419-22 (Fla. 1998) (noting that defense counsel registered no objections to
prosecutor's penalty phase argument and detailing numerous, egregious examples
of prosecutorial misconduct).  Accordingly, I wholeheartedly concur with the
majority opinion's admonition for "all judges and lawyers, prosecutors and defense
counsel alike, to apply the highest standards of professionalism and ethics to their
roles and responsibilities in capital litigation."  Majority op. at 8 (emphasis added). 
We must also be ever vigilant to continue monitoring and evaluating our system
and levels of education, experience, examination, and trial practice for counsel to
assure our citizens a judicial process that truly renders justice by its conduct and
not simply by eloquent words.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
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APPENDIX
Rule 3.112  Minimum Standards for Attorneys 
in Capital Cases
(a) Statement of Purpose.  The purpose of these rules is to set minimum
standards for conflict attorneys to help ensure that competent representation will be
provided to indigent capital defendants in all cases.  Minimum standards that have
been promulgated concerning representation for defendants in criminal cases
generally and the level of adherence to such standards required for noncapital cases
should not be adopted as sufficient for death penalty cases.  Counsel in death
penalty cases should be required to perform at the level of an attorney reasonably
skilled in the specialized practice of capital representation, zealously committed to
the capital case, who has had adequate time and resources for preparation.  These
minimum standards for capital cases are not intended to preclude any circuit from
adopting or maintaining standards having greater requirements.
(b) Definitions.  A capital trial case is defined as any first-degree murder
case in which the State has not formally waived the death penalty on the record.  A
capital appeal case is any appeal in which the death penalty has been imposed.  A
capital postconviction case is any case where the defendant is still under a 
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sentence of death.
(c) List of Qualified Counsel.  
(1) Every circuit shall maintain a list of counsel qualified for appointment in
capital cases in each of three categories: 
(A) lead trial counsel; 
(B) trial cocounsel; and
(C) appellate counsel.  
No attorney may be appointed to handle a capital trial or appeal unless duly
qualified on the appropriate list.
(2) The conflict committee for each circuit is responsible for approving and
removing attorneys from the list pursuant to section 925.037, Florida Statutes. 
Each circuit committee is encouraged to obtain additional input from experienced
capital defense counsel.
(3) No attorney may be qualified on any of the capital lists unless he or she
has attended within the last year a continuing legal education program of at least
ten hours' duration devoted specifically to the defense of capital cases.  Continuing
legal education programs meeting the requirements of this rule shall be offered by
the Florida Bar or another recognized provider and should be approved for
continuing legal education credit by the Florida Bar.  The failure to comply with
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this requirement shall be cause for removal from the list until the requirement is
fulfilled. 
(d) Appointment of Counsel.  A court must appoint lead counsel and, upon
written application and a showing of need by lead counsel, should appoint
cocounsel to handle every capital trial in which the defendant is not represented by
retained counsel or the Public Defender.  Lead counsel shall have the right to select
cocounsel from attorneys on the lead counsel or cocounsel list.  Both attorneys
shall be reasonably compensated for the trial and sentencing phase.  Except under
extraordinary circumstances, only one attorney may be compensated for other
proceedings.
(e) Lead Counsel.  Lead trial counsel assignments should be given to
attorneys who:
(1) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or
admitted to practice pro hac vice; and
(2) are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least five years of
litigation experience in the field of criminal law; and
(3) have prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer than nine jury trials of
serious and complex cases which were tried to completion, as well as prior
experience as lead defense counsel or cocounsel in at least two cases tried to
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completion in which the death penalty was sought.  In addition, of the nine jury
trials which were tried to completion, the attorney should have been lead counsel in
at least three cases in which the charge was murder; or alternatively, of the nine
jury trials, at least one was a murder trial and an additional five were felony jury
trials; and
(4) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal courts of the
jurisdiction; and 
(5) are familiar with and experienced in the utilization of expert witnesses
and evidence, including but not limited to psychiatric and forensic evidence; and
(6) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which
exemplify the quality of representation appropriate to capital cases.
(f) Cocounsel.  Trial cocounsel assignments should be given to attorneys
who:
(1) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or
admitted to practice pro hac vice; and
(2) who qualify as lead counsel under paragraph (e) of these standards or
meet the following requirements:
(A) are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least
three years of litigation experience in the field of criminal law; and
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(B) have prior experience as lead counsel or cocounsel in no
fewer than three jury trials of serious and complex cases which were
tried to completion, at least two of which were trials in which the
charge was murder; or alternatively, of the three jury trials, at least one
was a murder trial and one was a felony jury trial; and
(C) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal
courts of the jurisdiction; and 
(D) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and
commitment which exemplify the quality of representation appropriate
to capital cases.
(g) Appellate Counsel.  Appellate counsel assignments should be given to
attorneys who:
(1) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or
admitted to practice pro hac vice; and
(2) are experienced and active trial or appellate practitioners with at least
five years of experience in the field of criminal law; and
(3) have prior experience in the appeal of at least one case where a sentence
of death was imposed, as well as prior experience as lead counsel in the appeal of
no fewer than three felony convictions in federal or state court, at least one of
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which was an appeal of a murder conviction; or alternatively, have prior 
experience as lead counsel in the appeal of no fewer than six felony convictions in
federal or state court, at least two of which were appeals of a murder conviction;
and 
(4) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the appellate courts of the
jurisdiction; and
(5) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which
exemplify the quality of representation appropriate to capital cases.
(h) Exceptional Circumstances.  In the event that the trial court determines
that counsel meeting the technical requirements of this rule is not available and that
exceptional circumstances require appointment of other counsel, the trial court
shall enter an order specifying, in writing, the exceptional circumstances requiring
deviation from the rule and the court's explicit determination that counsel chosen
will provide competent representation in accord with the policy concerns of the
rule.
Comments
Introductory Statement.  These standards are based on the general premise
that the defense of a capital case requires specialized skill and expertise.  The
Supreme Court has not only the authority, but the constitutional responsibility to
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ensure that indigent defendants are provided with competent counsel, especially in
capital cases where the State seeks to take the life of the indigent defendant.  The
Supreme Court also has exclusive jurisdiction under Article V section 15 of the
Florida Constitution to "[r]egulate the admission of persons to the practice of law
and the discipline of persons admitted."  Implied in this grant of authority is the
power to set the minimum requirements for the admission to practice law, see In re
Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1977), as well as the
minimum requirements for certain kinds of specialized legal work.  The Supreme
Court has adopted minimum educational and experience requirements for board
certification in other specialized fields of the law.  
The experience and continuing educational requirements in these standards
are based on existing local standards in effect throughout the state as well as
comparable standards in effect in other states.  Specifically, the committee
considered the standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases in the
Second, Sixth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Circuits, the statewide
standards for appointing counsel in capital cases in California, Indiana, Louisiana,
Ohio, and New York, and the American Bar Association standards for appointment
of counsel in capital cases.
These standards are intended to apply only in those cases in which the court
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is appointing a lawyer in place of the public defender.  Nothing expressed herein
should be interpreted as an infringement of the defendant's right to select retained
counsel.  
Furthermore, these standards are not intended to establish any independent
legal rights.  For example, the failure to appoint cocounsel, standing alone, has not
been recognized as a ground for relief from a conviction or sentence.  See Ferrell v.
State, 653 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1995); Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994);
Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994).  Rather, these cases stand for the
proposition that a showing of inadequacy of representation in the particular case is
required.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  These rulings are
not affected by the adoption of these standards.  Any claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel will be controlled by Strickland.
(d) Appointment of Counsel.  At the time of appointment of qualified
counsel, the trial court should conduct an inquiry relating to counsel's availability
to provide effective assistance of counsel to the defendant.  In assessing the
availability of prospective counsel, the court should consider the number of capital
or other cases then being handled by the attorney and any other circumstances
bearing on the attorney's readiness to provide effective assistance of counsel to the
defendant in a timely fashion.
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The American Bar Association Standards and many other state standards
require the appointment of two lawyers at the trial level in every prosecution that
could result in the imposition of the death penalty.  The committee has modified
this requirement by eliminating certain provisions that may be unnecessary or
economically unfeasible.  Paragraph (d) minimizes the potential duplication of
expenses by limiting the compensable participation of cocounsel.  In addition, the
standard adopted herein requires an initial showing by lead counsel of the need for
cocounsel and, while the standard suggests that cocounsel should ordinarily be
appointed, the ultimate decision is left to the discretion of the trial court.  
The committee emphasizes that the right to appointed counsel is not 
enlarged by the application of these standards.  The court should appoint conflict
counsel only if there is a conflict and the defendant otherwise qualifies for
representation by the Public Defender.  A defendant who is represented by 
retained counsel is not entitled to the appointment of a second lawyer at public
expense merely because that defendant is unable to bear the cost of retaining two
lawyers.  As previously noted, these standards apply only to those cases in which
the defendant is indigent and unrepresented and not to a case in which the
defendant has retained private counsel.
-25-
Original Proceeding - Florida Rules of Judicial Administration
Philip J. Padovano, Judge, First District Court of Appeal, Tallahassee, Florida; Robert
H. Dillinger, Public Defender, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, Florida, James
Russo, President, Viera, Florida, and Robert D. Trammell, General Counsel,
Marianna, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Public Defender Association; James T.
Miller, Jacksonville, Florida, and James Reich, Chairman, Ocala, Florida, on behalf
of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and J. Chaney Mason,
President; and Diana M. Tennis, Winter Park, Florida,
for Petitioners
The Honorable Marguerite H. Davis, Former Chair, Rules of Judicial Administration
Committee, Judge, First District Court of Appeal, Tallahassee, Florida; Robert A.
Butterworth, Attorney General, and Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, and
Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Sheryl G.
Wood, Chair, West Palm Beach, Florida, on behalf of The Florida Bar Government
Lawyer Section; John J. Copelan, Jr., County Attorney for Broward County, Anthony
C. Musto, Chief Appellate Counsel, Robert E. Hone and Edward G. Labrador,
Assistant County Attorneys, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; George L. Dorsett, Assistant
County Attorney, Orange County, Orlando, Florida; Linda W. Chapin, Orange 
County Chairman, Orange County Board of County Commissioners, Orlando,
Florida; Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant County Attorney, Palm Beach County, West
Palm Beach, Florida; David De La Paz, House Justice Council Attorney, Tallahassee,
Florida; The Honorable Victor D. Crist, Representative District 60, Temple Terrace,
Florida; Peter Warren Kenny, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel and Martin J.
McClain, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Miami,
Florida;  J. Michael Shea, Tampa, Florida; Ira D. Karmelin, West Palm Beach,
Florida; The Honorable Randy Ball, State Representative, District 29, Tallahassee,
Florida; Herbert W. A. Thiele, County Attorney and Patrick T. Kinni, Assistant
County Attorney, Leon County, Tallahassee, Florida; The Honorable Judy M.
Pittman, Chief Judge, The Honorable Don T. Sirmons, Administrative Judge of
Criminal Division, and The Honorable Dedee S. Costello, Circuit Judge, Fourteenth
Circuit, Panama City, Florida; Philip J. Massa, West Palm Beach, Florida; Katherine
Fernandez Rundle, State Attorney, and Penny H. Brill, Assistant State Attorney,
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida; Claire K. Luten, Chair, Criminal Law
Section of The Florida Bar, Clearwater, Florida; Robert A. Ginsberg and Jason Bloch,
-26-
Assistant County Attorneys, Dade County, Miami, Florida; Steven M. Potolsky, Past
President of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers/Miami, Miami,
Florida; Eddie J. Lewis, Chairman, Bradford County Board of County Commissioners,
Starke, Florida; James L. Ley, County Administrator, Sarasota Board of County
Commissioners, Sarasota, Florida; Lonnie N. Groot, Deputy County Attorney, Board
of County Commissioners of Seminole County, Sanford, Florida; Betty Strifler, Clerk
of the Circuit Court, Citrus County Board of County Commissioners, Inverness,
Florida; Ira Mae Hewatt, Chairman, Board of County Commissioners, Santa Rosa
County, Milton, Florida; The Honorable Alfred Lawson, Jr., Florida House of
Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida; Eddy Hillhouse, Chairman, Suwannee County
Board of County Commissioners, Live Oak, Florida; Rick Crews, Chairman, Holmes
County Board of County Commissioners, Bonifay, Florida; Patricia M. Glass,
Manatee County Board of County Commissioners, Bradenton, Florida; Barry R.
Evans, County Administrator, Board of County Commissioners, Escambia County,
Pensacola, Florida; The Honorable Pat Thomas, 3rd District, The Florida Senate,
Tallahassee, Florida; Raymond Williams, Board of County Commissioners, Franklin
County, Apalachicola, Florida; John L. Driggers, Chairman, Board of County
Commissioners, Dixie County, Cross City, Florida; Walter B. Olliff, Jr., Chairman,
Board of County Commissioners, Hardee County, Wauchula, Florida; Richard Swartz,
Jr., Vice Chair, Board of County Commissioners, Lake County, Tavares, Florida; Gary
D. Charles, Sr., Chairman, Board of County Commissioners, St. Lucie County, Fort
Pierce, Florida; Gary K. Oldehoff, County Attorney, Board of County Commissioner,
Martin County, Stuart, Florida; and James S. Benjamin, President, Broward
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
       Responding