Title: State v. Divito

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: May 12, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
CLAUDIA DIVITO,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC TC95-12218; CA A90618; SC S45761)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 10, 1999.
	John Henry Hingson III, Oregon City, argued the cause and
filed the petition for petitioner on review.
	Kaye McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief on the
merits were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Van Hoomissen, and
Durham, Justices.**
	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	Durham, J., concurred and filed an opinion.
	*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court. 152 Or App 672, 955 P2d 327 (1998).
	**Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
		VAN HOOMISSEN, J.		

		In this criminal case, the court is asked to construe
ORS 135.815 (1997), which provides, in part:
		"Except as otherwise provided in ORS 135.855 and
135.873, the district attorney shall disclose to the
defendant the following material and information within
the possession or control of the district attorney:
		"(1) The names and addresses of persons whom the
district attorney intends to call as witnesses at any
stage of the trial, together with their relevant
written or recorded statements or memoranda of any oral
statements of such persons." (1)
		Defendant was charged with driving while under the
influence of intoxicants (DUII).  ORS 813.010.  She seeks review
of a Court of Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's
pretrial order that excluded the testimony of a state's witness
as a sanction for an asserted violation of ORS 135.815(1) by the
state.  State v. Divito, 152 Or App 672, 955 P2d 327 (1998).  For
the reasons explained below, we affirm.
		We take the following facts from the Court of Appeals'
opinion and from the record.  A police emergency response
operator ("9-1-1" operator) dispatched State Police Trooper
Shephard to the scene of an accident.  Trooper Moore also arrived
at the scene.  The troopers found defendant in an intoxicated
state and arrested her for DUII.  Following defendant's arrest,
Moore went into a nearby video store and spoke with the manager,
Dean.  Dean told Moore that an unidentified man had come into the
video store and asked him to telephone 9-1-1 to report an
accident.  The man told Dean that, just minutes before, he almost
had been hit by a woman on the road, and the man pointed to a car
off the side of the road about 200 yards away.  The man said
that, after the near miss, he had looked to see if the woman was
injured.  The man said that the woman was intoxicated and that
she kept mumbling that she had to get home.  The man said that he
had told the woman that she should not drive and that he would
obtain help.  After listening to the man's report, Dean went into
his office and telephoned the 9-1-1 police emergency response
number.  When Dean returned, the unidentified man had left.  The
conversation in which Dean related the man's story to Moore
lasted about one minute.  
		Moore took notes of his conversation with Dean, but did
not write a police report.  Shephard's police report, which the
state furnished to defendant during pretrial discovery, contained
information about Moore's investigation, including the fact that
Moore had contacted a video store clerk.  However, Shephard's
report did not contain Dean's name or address, or disclose what
Dean had told Moore.  
		Pursuant to ORS 135.815(1) (1997), the district
attorney advised defense counsel that she intended to call Moore
as a witness at trial. 
		While reviewing her case the night before defendant's
trial, the district attorney wondered why the police report
contained nothing about any contact with a 9-1-1 operator.  She
telephoned 9-1-1 and reached a supervisor, who was able to
retrieve information about the call that the 9-1-1 operator had
received on the night of the accident.  Using that information,
the district attorney was able to identify and contact Dean that
night.  Dean told the district attorney about the unidentified
man who had come into the video store on the night of the
accident and what the man had reported.  At that time, the
district attorney decided to subpoena Dean to testify about the
unidentified man's statements as an "excited utterance."  See OEC
803(2) (setting out excited utterance exception to hearsay
rule). (2)  Dean was served with a subpoena later that night.  When
the district attorney learned that the subpoena had been served
on Dean, she telephoned defense counsel's office and left a
message disclosing her intention to call Dean as a witness.  
		The next morning, during a pretrial hearing, the
district attorney gave defense counsel a written summary of the
statement that Dean had made to her the night before.  Defendant
objected, arguing that the state had violated ORS 135.815(1)
(1997), because the district attorney had not disclosed the
information earlier.  
		Dean was the only witness at the pretrial hearing.  He
testified that, on the night of the accident, he had had a
conversation with Moore and that Moore had made notes during
their conversation.  Insofar as the record shows, that was the
first time that either the district attorney or defense counsel
learned that Moore had made notes during his conversation with
Dean. (3)  Defendant again objected, arguing that Moore "should have
turned [his notes] over to the prosecutor long before trial" and
that, "had he done so, the district attorney would have
discovered the existence of Dean and the substance of his
statement."  The district attorney responded that ORS 135.815(1)
(1997) did not require the state to disclose the notes at a time
when the state did not intend to call Dean as a witness or to
offer evidence through Moore about the unidentified man's
conversation with Dean.  The district attorney asserted that, in
compliance with ORS 135.845, she conveyed that information to
defense counsel as soon as she became aware of Dean's existence. (4) 

		The trial court ruled that the state's failure to
provide the defense with information about Dean's identity and
what Dean had told Moore was a discovery violation.  We set out
the court's ruling at length, because it is pivotal to the
appropriate disposition of this case.  The trial court found:  
			"The District Attorney's Office, in and of itself,
did everything they could do, in a timely fashion once
they were aware of this information. 
		"The problem, I find is one created by the police
officers in the beginning.  The DA's Office is in the
position of having to deal with what they get and not
to create that which the investigating officers didn't
complete. 
		"The police are indeed a branch of the State, and
to that extent, have some obligations in the discovery
area similar to that which the State has. 
		"There is no mention of any kind, in any report
made available to the defense, that anybody talked to,
identified or discovered this critical witness * * *.  
[T]he evidence is that [Dean] was visited by some
police officer who took notes that night.  So [Dean's]
identity and the information he had to offer, was known
to the State on the night of the event.  
		"Then, from my reading of the police reports,
while it's not crystal clear in there that there's a
dispatch call * * * there is some indication in there
that there was a dispatch call.  The 9-1-1 tape is
available to anybody * * *.  
		"So, the fact that there was a [Dean] at Hollywood
Video could have been discovered by the defense as
well.  What could never have been discovered by the
defense, without the police officer writing the proper
report, is what [Dean] was going to say.  * * *
		"So, I find, first, a discovery violation, not the
DA's office, but certainly through the police, who
neglected to write a pretty critical piece of
information up."
(Emphasis added.)  As a sanction, the court excluded Dean's
testimony about the unidentified man's statements. (5)  The state
appealed.  See ORS 138.060(3) (state may appeal pretrial order
suppressing evidence).
		A divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed. 
The majority concluded that the state had not violated ORS
135.815(1) (1997).  Focusing on the phrase "relevant 
* * * statements * * * of such persons," the court reasoned that
"relevant statements" are statements pertaining to testimony that
the district attorney intends to elicit from a witness at trial. 
Divito, 152 Or App at 679-80.  The court explained:
	"[A]n officer's notes become 'relevant statements'
within the meaning of [ORS 135.815(1) (1997)] when they
can be used for purposes of impeachment.  In order for
notes to be used for purposes of impeachment, they must
be relevant to some witness' testimony.  In this case,
Moore's notes about his contact with Dean were not
relevant to his testimony because the state did not
intend to offer evidence about the excited utterance
until it discovered the existence of Dean.  When it
made that discovery and formed the intention to call
Dean as a witness, it complied with the discovery
statutes."  

Id. at 683.  Because the court concluded that Moore's notes were
not discoverable, it did not address whether the notes were
within the "possession or control" of the district attorney under
ORS 135.815 (1997).  
		Three members of the court dissented.  The dissenters
agreed with the trial court that the state had violated ORS
135.815(1).  Id. at 684 (Armstrong, J., dissenting).  The
dissenters concluded that the legislature intended "relevant
statements" in ORS 135.815(1) to have a much broader scope than
the majority assumed:
		"[T]he legislature intended 'relevant written or
recorded statements or memoranda of any oral statement
of [persons to be called as witnesses]' to include any
information tending to prove or disprove the charges
against the defendant[.]"
Id. at 686 (Armstrong, J., dissenting).  We allowed defendant's
petition for review.  
		Defendant argues, as did the Court of Appeals'
dissenters, that the discovery rules should be read broadly to
include any information tending to prove or disprove the charges
against her.  Defendant asserts that ORS 135.815(1) (1997)
requires the state to disclose to a defendant either notes or
complete reports of a police officer that memorialize what
state's witnesses said to the officer concerning the facts that
gave rise to the prosecution of the defendant.  Defendant further
asserts that any material or information in the possession of the
police  automatically is deemed to be within the possession or
control of the district attorney, regardless of whether the
district attorney actually knows of its existence.  In support of
that latter assertion, defendant relies primarily on State v.
Warren, 304 Or 428, 746 P2d 711 (1987), which we discuss post. 
		At the outset, we emphasize that the rules relating to
reciprocal discovery are entirely statutory. (6)  The legislature
may abolish statutory discovery at any time and leave criminal
cases to be tried as they were before the enactment of the
discovery statutes.  Even if a defendant might find material and
information in the possession of the state helpful to the defense
generally, that material must be turned over to the defense only
if it falls within the statutory directive (or if it must be
disclosed for independent constitutional reasons).  Statutory
discovery is nothing more than what the legislature intended it
to be.  
		Turning to this case, the question presented is one of
statutory interpretation.  In interpreting a statute, this court
follows the methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  The first
level of analysis is the text and context of the statute.  Id.  
The text of the statutory provision itself is the starting point
for interpretation and is the best evidence of the legislature's
intent.  Id. at 610.
		This case is disposed of at that first level of
analysis.  By its terms, ORS 135.815 (1997) imposes discovery
obligations only on the district attorney.  The statute imposes
no separate discovery obligations on the police.  Moreover, ORS
135.815(1) (1997) does not require disclosure of material and
information unless it is a name, an address, a written or
recorded statement, or a memorandum of an oral statement.  The
statute further requires that, to be discoverable, the material
and information in question be within the "possession or control"
of the district attorney.  As noted, the Court of Appeals divided
over what it deemed to be the dispositive question in the case,
viz., whether Moore's notes were "relevant statements" within the
meaning of ORS 135.815(1) (1997) at the time when defendant
maintains that she was entitled to discovery.  We conclude,
however, that there is another, more fundamental reason, based on
the foregoing reading of the statute, for holding that the trial
court erred.
		The record shows that the district attorney was unaware
of Dean's existence until the night before trial and that she was
unaware that Moore had made notes during his conversation with
Dean until Dean testified to that effect at the pretrial hearing. 
The trial court implicitly accepted the district attorney's good
faith in the matter when it found that 
		"[t]he District Attorney's Office, in and of itself,
did everything they could do, in a timely fashion, once
they were aware of this information."  
The court nonetheless found a discovery violation, 
		"not [by] the DA's office, but certainly through the
police, who neglected to write a pretty critical piece
of information up."  
The trial court's justification for invoking the sanction under
the discovery statute was based entirely on the failure of the
police to include certain information in the reports that they
had submitted to the district attorney's office.
		Stating the trial court's rationale in those bald terms
leads to the following question:  Where in ORS 135.815 (1997) (or
in any other statute) is there a requirement that the police
place certain information in their notes or reports, at the risk
of having evidence suppressed if they do not?  The answer is
plain:  There is no such requirement.  Neither ORS 135.815 (1997)
nor, so far as we are aware, any other statute imposes discovery
obligations on the police.  And, even if there were some other
statute that imposed such a requirement, the court claimed
authority to rule as it did only under ORS 135.815 (1997).  It
follows that the trial court acted on the basis of a
misunderstanding of the law.
		The trial court appears to have based its ruling on the
following passage in State v. Warren, 304 Or 428, 433, 746 P2d
711 (1987):
		"In a prosecution, the prosecutor is responsible for
evidence in the possession of the police. * * * And, of
course, information that the prosecutor may obtain
directly is within the prosecutor's 'control' as well,
even if it was not in the prosecutor's physical
possession."
Those statements are correct, but must be understood in their
proper context.
		In Warren, a criminal defendant sought discovery of a
state agency's files that contained memoranda of statements by 
witnesses.  The state argued that, although the prosecutor was
entitled by statute to request copies of the files, the
prosecutor had not done so and, consequently, did not possess or
control the files within the meaning of ORS 135.815 (1997).  This
court, in the passage quoted above, disagreed, concluding that
the prosecutor's statutory right to obtain access to the files
amounted to "control" over the files under ORS 135.815 (1997). 
Significantly, Warren compelled the discovery of agency files
that already existed.  We do not read Warren to suggest that the
state's discovery obligation under ORS 135.815 (1997) includes a
duty to expand the scope of existing documents, such as police
reports, to incorporate additional information of which only the
police are aware.  The trial court's reliance on Warren for the
imposition of that kind of discovery obligation under ORS
135.815(1) (1997) was not justified.
		The trial court erred in finding a violation of ORS
135.815(1) (1997) and in imposing a sanction based on that
supposed violation.  Our identification of the trial court's
principal error means that the "relevant statements" issue over
which the Court of Appeals divided need not be considered here. 
Although we express no opinion concerning the Court of Appeals'
rationale, we affirm the decision of that court to reverse the
trial court's order and to remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings. (7)
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	DURHAM, J., concurring.
	I write separately to state the basis for my
concurrence with the court's disposition.
	I agree that ORS 135.815(1) (1997) does not impose on
police officers an obligation to incorporate into their police
reports all pertinent information of which they are aware
regarding a person who has witnessed or has information about a
crime. (8)  For that reason, the trial court erred in concluding
that the officers violated ORS 135.815(1) (1997) in failing to
include in their police reports a summary of Dean's statements to
Trooper Moore.
	The trial court's reliance on that reasoning obviated
the need for it to address separately another question that
defendant's motion raised.  That question is whether ORS
135.815(1) (1997) obligated the state to disclose Moore's notes
that he wrote during or after his conversation with Dean. 
Defendant's discovery request sought any notes that Moore might
have prepared.  The trial court found that Moore had made notes
of his exchange with Dean and that the information that Dean had
related to Moore was critically important to this case.
	My preliminary view is that Moore's notes fall within
the scope of ORS 135.815(1) (1997) because they constitute a
"memorand[um] of [an] oral statement" by the state's witness,
Dean.  Moore's notes are "relevant" to defendant's criminal
proceeding, within the meaning of ORS 135.815(1) (1997), because
the notes tend to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the proceeding -- namely,
whether defendant had driven while intoxicated -- more probable
or less probable than would be the case without the notes.  See
OEC 401 (defining "relevant evidence" in that manner).  The
legislature did not confine the scope of the requirement of
relevance in ORS 135.815(1) (1997) to statements or memoranda
that concern the anticipated trial testimony of a witness. 
	Moore's notes might have referred almost entirely to
inculpatory information, but, under the discovery statute, that
is beside the point.  The notes were in Moore's possession when
defendant sought discovery of them and, thus, were within the
prosecutor's control even if not in the prosecutor's physical
possession.  See State v. Warren, 304 Or 428, 433, 746 P2d 711
(1987) (applying that analysis).  Under ORS 135.815(1) (1997),
the significant fact is not that the prosecutor had no personal
knowledge of Dean until the eve of trial, but that, in response
to defendant's request for discovery, the prosecutor failed to
disclose a police officer's notes that were under the
prosecutor's control and that pertained to defendant's guilt or
innocence.
	However, and assuming that my tentative view of the
issue is correct, we cannot determine from the record whether the
trial court would have ordered the same sanction solely for the
state's nondisclosure of Moore's notes, because the trial court
relied on another rationale.  That fact precludes this court from
affirming the trial court on an alternative decisional basis. 
Our decision reserves the questions of the discoverability of
Moore's notes and any potential sanction for nondisclosure for
consideration by the trial court on remand.  State v. Divito,
____ Or ____, ____ n 7, ____ P2d ____ (May 12, 2000) (slip op at
12 n 7).  I agree with that disposition of those issues.
	For the foregoing reasons, I concur.

1. 	ORS 135.815 was amended by the 1999 Legislature.  Or
Laws 1999, ch 304, § 1.  The parties do not argue that that
amendment affects the analysis or outcome of this case.
2. 	This case has proceeded on the theory that the
unidentified man's statements qualify as an "excited utterance." 
Neither party has raised that question to this court, and we do
not consider it.

3. 	Moore's notes were not introduced into evidence at the
hearing and are not part of the record.

4. 	ORS 135.845 provides, in part:
			"(1) The obligations to disclose shall be
performed as soon as practicable following the filing
of an indictment or information in the circuit court
* * *.
		"(2) If, after complying with the provisions of
ORS 135.805 to 135.873, a party finds, either before or
during trial, additional material or information which
is subject to or covered by these provisions, the party
must promptly notify the other party of the additional
material or information."

5. 	The trial court denied the state the benefit of a
witness, rather than simply granting a continuance to permit the
defense to prepare for the new evidence, based on this reasoning:
		"[I]f we are ever going to get the reporting officers
to do the job that I think the statute requires them to
do so that the State can do the job that they're
required to do, it is not to set [the case] over to fix
it." 
(Emphasis added.) 	

6. 	ORS 135.815(1) (1997) is derived generally from the
more extensive provisions of the American Bar Association
Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, § 2.1
(approved draft 1970).  The enumeration of discoverable material
and information in ORS 135.815 (1997) is similar but not
identical to the prosecutor's disclosure obligations described in
§ 2.1 of the ABA Standards.  See John W. Osburn, Pretrial
Discovery Under The Oregon Criminal Procedure Code, 10 Willamette
L J 145 (1974) (reviewing each section of the pretrial discovery
article and reflecting on some of the policy choices). 

7. 	We express no opinion respecting what ruling would be
appropriate if, on remand, defendant wishes to see a copy of any
notes that Moore actually might have made of his conversation
with Dean.

8. 	ORS 135.815(1) (1997) provides:
			"Except as otherwise provided in ORS 135.855 and
135.873, the district attorney shall disclose to the
defendant the following material and information within
the possession or control of the district attorney:
		"(1) The names and addresses of persons whom the
district attorney intends to call as witnesses at any
stage of the trial, together with their relevant
written or recorded statements or memoranda of any oral
statements of such persons."