Title: County of Fairfax v. Century Concrete Services

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 961854         October 31, 1997 
 
CENTURY CONCRETE SERVICES, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 15.1-549 
prohibits a county from paying interest on a judgment. 
 
Fairfax County executed a contract with Century 
Concrete Services, Inc.  Pursuant to the terms of the 
contract, Century agreed to perform certain construction 
work on a landfill basin.  A dispute arose between Century 
and the County.  Century filed a motion for judgment against 
the County and was awarded a judgment in the amount of 
$60,340.00 plus prejudgment and judgment interest.  The 
County appeals that portion of the judgment which awarded 
interest. 
 
The County argues that the trial court erred by 
entering an order which requires the County to pay interest. 
 The County asserts that Code § 15.1-549 prohibits the 
County from paying interest on a judgment.  Century responds 
that Code § 15.1-549 does not bar the award of interest.  We 
agree with the County. 
 
Code § 15.1-547 authorizes a county's board of 
supervisors to issue and approve warrants to pay all valid 
claims that may be asserted against a county.  Code § 15.1-
549, which imposes certain limitations upon the issuance of 
warrants, states in relevant part: 
 
 
"No board of supervisors shall order any 
warrant issued for any purpose other than the 
payment of a claim received, audited and approved 
as required by § 15.1-547. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
No interest shall be paid on any county 
warrant. 
 
 
Any clerk, deputy clerk or member of any 
board of supervisors who shall violate or become a 
party to the violation of any of the provisions of 
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
in addition thereto shall be guilty of malfeasance 
in office." 
 
 
In Lynchburg v. Amherst County, 115 Va. 600, 80 S.E. 
117 (1913), we considered whether a city was entitled to a 
jury instruction which would have permitted a jury to make 
an award of prejudgment interest against a county.  We 
stated: 
 
 
"As a rule, the common law did not imply a 
promise to pay interest, and interest could not be 
recovered, save where it was expressly contracted 
for. . . .  While the courts in this State, aided 
by the legislature, have established a different 
doctrine as between natural persons and private 
corporations, viz., that it is but natural justice 
that he who has the use of another's money should 
pay interest on it . . . yet, so far as we know, 
it has never been held by this court that a claim 
asserted against the State or a county bears 
interest where there is no provision in the 
statute or authorized agreement creating the 
liability for the payment of interest.  Not only 
is there no statute or precedent for the payment 
of interest on claims like those asserted in this 
case, but clause 2, section 834 of Pollard's Code 
[the precursor to Code § 15.1-549], which provides 
for the examination, settlement and allowance of 
all accounts chargeable against the county and for 
the issuance of warrants therefor when settled and 
allowed, expressly declares that no interest shall 
be paid by any county on any county warrant.  If 
the board of supervisors had allowed the claims of 
the city, or any of them, and issued a warrant 
therefor, and the county afterwards refused to pay 
the claim and litigated its liability, as it had 
the right to do . . . and judgment had been 
rendered against it for the amount of the warrant 
so issued, by the plain terms of the statute, it 
would not have been chargeable with interest.  
This being so, it is difficult to see upon what 
ground the county would be liable for interest on 
the same claims when disallowed by the board of 
supervisors." 
 
Id. at 608-09, 80 S.E. at 120. 
 
The rationale that we invoked in Lynchburg v. Amherst 
County is equally pertinent here.  The County pays its 
construction claims by ordering the issuance of warrants, 
payable on demand, which may be converted to negotiable 
checks.  See Code § 15.1-547.  That portion of the trial 
court's judgment awarding interest against the County is 
erroneous because Code § 15.1-549, which is similar to the 
statute that we considered in Lynchburg v. Amherst County, 
specifically states that "[n]o interest shall be paid on any 
county warrant."  And, consistent with our reasoning in 
Lynchburg v. Amherst County, in the absence of a specific 
statutory authorization, we will not permit a judgment 
creditor to obtain an award of interest against a county 
because to do so would enable that judgment creditor to 
circumvent the express prohibition against an award of 
interest contained in Code § 15.1-549.   
 
Moreover, Code § 15.1-549, which prohibits payment of 
interest in these circumstances, provides that any clerk, 
deputy clerk, or member of any board of supervisors who 
violates the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor and guilty 
of malfeasance in office.  Certainly, the language in this 
statute is a strong command from the General Assembly that 
the County cannot pay either prejudgment or post-judgment 
interest on any claim against it.   
 
It is true, as Century asserts, that Code § 8.01-382 
permits a litigant to recover interest against a party in 
certain instances.  That Code section states in relevant 
part: 
 
 
"In any action at law or suit in equity, the 
verdict of the jury, or if no jury the judgment or 
decree of the court, may provide for interest on 
any principal sum awarded, or any part thereof, 
and fix the period at which the interest shall 
commence.  The judgment or decree entered shall 
provide for such interest until such principal sum 
be paid.  If a judgment or decree be rendered 
which does not provide for interest, the judgment 
or decree awarded shall bear interest from its 
date of entry, at the rate as provided in § 6.1-
330.54, and judgment or decree entered 
accordingly; provided, if the judgment entered in 
accordance with the verdict of a jury does not 
provide for interest, interest shall commence from 
the date that the verdict was rendered."  
 
 
Contrary to Century's assertion, however, Code § 8.01-
382 simply has no application here.  We must apply Code 
§ 15.1-549 in this appeal because it is a statute of 
specific application which takes precedence over Code 
§ 8.01-382, a statute of general application.  "'[W]hen one 
statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another 
deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific 
manner, . . . where they conflict, the latter prevails.'"  
Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, 241 Va. 89, 94-95, 
400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991) (quoting Virginia Nat'l Bank v. 
Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)); City 
of Winchester v. American Woodmark, 250 Va. 451, 460, 464 
S.E.2d 148, 153 (1995).
*T
 
Finally, Century, relying upon City of Richmond v. 
Blaylock, 247 Va. 250, 440 S.E.2d 598 (1994), says that this 
Court held that "an award of prejudgment interest against 
the City of Richmond, although denied, was properly within 
the discretion of the court under Va. Code § 8.01-382."  
Blaylock is not pertinent to our resolution of this appeal. 
 The litigants in Blaylock did not, and indeed, could not, 
assert that Code § 15.1-549 precludes an award of interest 
against the City of Richmond because Code § 15.1-549 is 
applicable to counties only.  Furthermore, in Blaylock, the 
trial court refused to award prejudgment interest, and we 
did not decide whether a city could be required to pay such 
interest.  Blaylock, 247 Va. at 253, 440 S.E.2d at 599. 
 
We will reverse that portion of the trial court's 
judgment which awards interest against the County, modify 
the judgment accordingly, and enter final judgment in favor 
of Century.   
 
Reversed in part, modified and final judgment
                     
     
*In view of our holding, we need not address the 
litigants' remaining arguments.