Title: Boemio v. Boemio

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Thomas Boemio v. Cynthia Boemio, No. 57, September Term, 2009
FAMILY LAW – ALIMONY – USE OF INDEPENDENT GUIDELINES IN
ADDITION TO REQUIRED STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS WHEN
FASHIONING AN AWARD
Following 21 years of marriage, husband filed for divorce.  During a trial to determine the
amount of alimony and child support the husband would pay, the Circuit Court conducted
the statutory analysis required under Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Section 11-106 of
the Family Law Article.  In an effort to transform those statutory factors into a final monetary
award, the court also consulted an alimony formula promulgated by the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers.  The court acknowledged that this formula was subject to the
twelve statutory considerations in Section 11-106, and applied it accordingly.  Ultimately,
the trial court determined that indefinite alimony of $3,000 per month was appropriate.  The
husband appeals that judgment and contends that the trial court erred in consulting guidelines
that were not expressly included in the Code.  Maryland’s alimony statute permits courts to
consider “all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award, including [the twelve listed
in the statute.]” Thus, courts are not limited to the twelve enumerated in Section 11-106 of
the Family Law Article.  We hold that, given the difficulty of translating predominantly
qualitative factors into a numerical award, courts may consult guidelines developed by a
reliable and neutral source that do not conflict with or undermine any of the considerations
expressed in the statute when determining the amount and duration of alimony.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 54876-FL 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 57
September Term, 2009
THOMAS BOEMIO 
v.
CYNTHIA BOEMIO 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Adkins, J.
_________________________________
Filed:   May 11, 2010
1Although the case name lists both parties as “Boemio,” Respondent is now known
by her maiden name, Cynthia Seixas.
2According to its website, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
(“AAML”) is a national organization consisting of approximately 1600 lawyers who have
practiced at least ten years, maintain high ethical standards, and are recognized to be
specialists in the field of matrimonial law.  See About the Academy – American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers, http://www.aaml.org/go/about-the-academy/ (last visited Apr. 27,
2010).  Its mission is to “encourage the study, improve the practice, elevate the standards and
advance the cause of matrimonial law, to the end that the welfare of the family and society
be protected.”  See AAML, Considerations when Determining Alimony, Spousal Support or
Maintenance 1 (2007).  The organization also professes “[t]o provide leadership that
promotes the highest degree of professionalism and excellence in the practice of family law.”
See About the Academy – American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers,
http://www.aaml.org/go/about-the-academy/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
In this case, we must determine whether a Circuit Court erred in consulting non-
legislative guidelines as an aid when determining the amount and duration of an alimony
award pursuant to Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Section 11-106 of the Family Law
Article (“FL”).  We hold that the consultation of guidelines promulgated by a reliable and
neutral source that do not conflict with or undermine any of the considerations expressed in
the statute is permissible.
During divorce proceedings between Petitioner Boemio and Respondent Seixas,1
Seixas petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for an award of alimony.  The
court, after considering the twelve factors listed in FL Section 11-106(b) and consulting
guidelines produced by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers2 (“AAML”),
determined that Seixas was entitled to indefinite alimony of $3,000 per month.  Boemio
appealed the judgment.  The Court of Special Appeals (“CSA”) affirmed the award, and we,
in turn, affirm the intermediate appellate court.
2
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner Boemio and Respondent Seixas were married on October 12, 1985 in the
District of Columbia and shortly thereafter made their home in Silver Spring, Maryland.  The
couple had two children within the first five years of the marriage.  In 1988, Boemio earned
a Master’s of Business Administration in finance from George Washington University.  This
was his second post-graduate degree, as he had already earned a master’s degree in
economics prior to the marriage.  The same year he began his MBA studies, Boemio obtained
a position at the Federal Reserve Board.  He remains in the Board’s employ to this day,
leaving only to take a two-year assignment with a Swiss bank.
Seixas had completed high school and one year of college instruction.  For much of
the marriage, she worked as a retail manager for CVS.  That job, however, required 45 to 55
hour work weeks and was, according to Seixas, “very stressful” and “physically strenuous[.]”
Consequently, she took a less demanding administrative assistant position, along with a
$10,000 pay cut.  Boemio’s six figure salary and Seixas’ supplemental income afforded the
couple what the trial court characterized as a “securely middle class” existence.  It was
“comfortable, but not extravagant.”  They incurred little consumer debt and managed to pay
off the mortgage on their Silver Spring home.
Middle class comfort, however, did not make for a successful marriage.  Boemio
moved out of the marital home in January 2006.  Divorce proceedings began on May 26,
2006, when Boemio filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland.  In June 2007, Seixas filed an Amended Countercomplaint for Absolute Divorce,
3
seeking use and possession of property, child support, alimony, and other relief.
During a two-day trial before the Honorable Michael D. Mason, Seixas claimed that
she was not self-supporting and needed alimony to maintain herself.  Boemio argued that
Seixas was able to support herself without alimony.  The court delivered its decision via oral
opinion on July 19, 2007.  It found that Seixas would not be able to maintain her accustomed
lifestyle without alimony and that an unconscionable disparity existed and would continue
to exist between the two parties.  Thus, the trial court awarded Seixas $3,000 per month in
indefinite alimony. 
Boemio appealed the ruling, arguing to the CSA that the trial court erred in its
alimony award as to amount and duration by 1) consulting spousal support guidelines
proposed by the AAML in addition to the factors set out in FL §11-106(b), and 2) looking
only to the parties’ disparate incomes in determining duration.  In an unreported opinion, the
CSA rejected Boemio’s allegations and affirmed the trial court.  The court found that
Boemio’s claims concerning the AAML guidelines were contrary to the record, given that
the trial court gave a fully articulated FL §11-106(b) analysis in addition to stating that the
AAML guidelines were not authoritative and did not control the court’s decision.  As for
Boemio’s contention concerning the duration of Seixas’ alimony award, the CSA found that
the trial court considered circumstances beyond income in determining Seixas’ need for
indefinite rather than rehabilitative alimony. 
Boemio petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which we granted to answer the
following question: 
3These are as follows:
(continued...)
4
Did the trial court erroneously rely upon “alimony guidelines”
which are not authorized by statute or rule in determining the
amount and duration of alimony awarded to the appellee?
Because we answer in the negative, we will affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate
court.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“An alimony award will not be disturbed upon appellate review unless the trial judge’s
discretion was arbitrarily used or the judgment below was clearly wrong.” Solomon v.
Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 196, 857 A.2d 1109, 1120 (2004) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328
Md. 380, 385, 614 A.2d 590, 593 (1992)).  “[A]ppellate courts will accord great deference
to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when
conducting divorce proceedings.”  Tracey, 328 Md. at 385, 614 A.2d at 593.  “Thus, absent
evidence of an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s judgment ordinarily will not be disturbed
on appeal.”  Solomon, 383 Md. at 196, 857 A.2d at 1120.
II. Analysis
Title 11 of the Family Law Article governs alimony.  See FL §§ 11-101 to 11-112.
In particular, FL Section 11-106 guides courts when crafting the amount and duration of an
alimony award.  In making this determination, a trial court must consider the twelve factors
enumerated in FL Section 11-106(b).3  Additionally, FL Section 11-106(c) permits a court
(...continued)
(b) Required considerations. – In making the determination, the
court shall consider all the factors necessary for a fair and
equitable award, including:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be
wholly or partly self-supporting;
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking
alimony to gain sufficient education or training to
enable that party to find suitable employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties
established during their marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary,
of each party to the well-being of the family;
(6) the circumstances that contributed to the
estrangement of the parties;
(7) the age of each party;
(8) the physical and mental condition of each
party;
(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is
sought to meet that party's needs while meeting
the needs of the party seeking alimony;
(10) any agreement between the parties;
(11) the financial need and financial resources of
each party, including:
(i) all income and assets, including
(continued...)
5
(...continued)
property that does not produce
income;
(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205
and 8-208 of this article;
(iii) the nature and amount of the
financial obligations of each party;
and
(iv) the right of each party to
receive retirement benefits; and
(12) whether the award would cause a spouse who
is a resident of a related institution as defined in §
19-301 of the Health - General Article and from
whom alimony is sought to become eligible for
medical assistance earlier than would otherwise
occur.
6
to award indefinite alimony, if it finds that:
(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking
alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial
progress toward becoming self-supporting; or
(2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much
progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be
expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be
unconscionably disparate.
Boemio contests the trial court’s indefinite alimony award of $3,000 per month to Seixas.
Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred by “abandon[ing]” an analysis of the
twelve factors required under subsection (b) and the considerations in subsection (c), and
7
instead relied exclusively on the AAML guidelines to fashion the award.  Before responding
to Boemio’s contentions, we will review the trial court’s findings.
Regarding the first factor, the trial court found that, with a current annual income of
$41,000, Seixas was unlikely to become entirely self-supporting.  That income was unlikely
to increase because Seixas possessed only a high-school diploma and lacked the computer
skills necessary to advance to a more lucrative administrative assistant position.  The trial
court also concluded that, despite her previous experience in retail, it would be unreasonable
to expect Seixas to return to a similar position because the hours would interfere with her
ability to raise her minor child.  The trial court noted that the second factor did not apply in
this case because Seixas did not request rehabilitative alimony.
The third factor required the court to analyze the standard of living of the parties
during the marriage.  The trial court described the parties as “securely middle class[,]” living
a lifestyle that was “comfortable, but not extravagant.”  Before the separation, they owned
their home in Silver Spring without a mortgage, and could afford to send their youngest child
to private school.  The couple was “very frugal, [putting] a lot of effort towards saving
money for retirement, saving money for the future, saving money for their children’s
education.”
The Circuit Court considered the duration of the marriage as required by FL Section
11-106(b)(4), which was just over twenty-one years.  The court then turned to the fifth factor,
and considered the monetary and nonmonetary contributions of both parties during those
twenty-one years.  It found that the parties’ contributions to the marriage corresponded with
8
their job earnings and responsibilities.  Initially, while Seixas was working in a retail
management position that “placed enormous demands upon her time,” Boemio and Seixas’
parents provided most of the care for the couple’s two children.  The roles changed as
Boemio’s job at the Federal Reserve Board demanded more of his time and required him to
travel frequently.  Seixas responded to this shift by changing careers and taking a significant
pay cut so that she could adopt the role of primary caregiver.
The Circuit Court also found that neither party was at fault for the estrangement.
Rather, the two simply “grew apart.”  Throughout the marriage, the couple maintained lives
independent of each other and “didn’t do a whole lot of things together unless they directly
related to the family.”  Thus, the couple likely separated, the Circuit Court surmised, because
they had nothing in common.
With regard to the eighth factor, at the time of the trial Boemio and Seixas were 49
and 48 years old, respectively.  Both parties were largely mentally and physically healthy.
Seixas had developed a cataract problem, which she intended to have surgically corrected.
The ninth factor required the court to consider Boemio’s ability to provide alimony.
The court calculated Boemio’s income and then subtracted from that amount taxes and
necessary expenses, including college tuition for the couple’s youngest child.  These
computations netted a surplus income of $7,332 a month.
Regarding the tenth factor, the parties had not entered into any enforceable contracts
with each other.  A verbal, informal agreement did exist, however, whereby both would assist
their youngest son in obtaining a college degree.
4As neither party was a resident of an institution as defined in Section 19-301 of the
Health - General Article,  the twelfth factor did not apply.
9
The Circuit Court then calculated the financial needs and resources of each party.  It
considered Boemio’s $7,332 monthly disposable income.  After analyzing Seixas’s income
and expenses, including the primary care of the couple’s youngest child, the court found that
she was living with a deficit of $1,726 per month.  The court also assessed the value of the
couple’s assets, as required by FL Section 11-106(b)(11).4
The sole reference to the AAML guidelines occurred following the court’s analysis
of the eleventh factor.  At that point, the court was attempting to craft an alimony award that
properly incorporated both the quantitative and qualitative considerations of FL Section 11-
106. The judge was careful to explain that he referred to the guidelines “for informational
purposes only[,]” and that they did not control the court’s decision.  He added that the
guidelines were not authoritative, and were “subject to all of the factors” articulated in the
Family Law article.
The AAML guidelines consist of two formulas, one to calculate the amount of an
alimony award, and the other to establish its duration.  See Mary K. Kisthardt, Re-thinking
Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or
Maintenance, 21 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 61, app. A (2008).  The guidelines also
provide “deviation factors” that may signal a necessary adjustment to the recommended
5The AAML guidelines list the following ten circumstances as “deviation factors:”
1) A spouse is the primary caretaker of a dependent minor or a
disabled adult child;
2) A spouse has pre-existing court-ordered support obligations;
3) A spouse is complying with court-ordered payment of debts
or other obligations (including uninsured or unreimbursed
medical expenses);
4) A spouse has unusual needs;
5) A spouse’s age or health;
6) A spouse has given up a career, a career opportunity or
otherwise supported the career of the other spouse;
7) A spouse has received a disproportionate share of the marital
estate;
8) There are unusual tax consequences;
9) Other circumstances that make application of these
considerations inequitable;
10) The parties have agreed otherwise.
Mary K. Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating
Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 61, app. A
(2008).
10
amount or duration.5  Id.  To compute the amount of alimony, the adjudicator is to take 30%
of the payor’s gross income and subtract from it 20% of the payee’s income.  Id. at 78.  This
amount, however, cannot exceed 40% of the combined gross income of the parties when
added to the gross income of the payee.  Id.  To determine the duration of the award, the
11
AAML guidelines suggest multiplying the length of the marriage by one of the following
factors: for zero to three years, a factor of 0.3; for three to ten years, a factor of 0.5; for ten
to twenty years, a factor of 0.75; and for more than twenty years, permanent alimony.  Id. at
app. A.  In this case, the formulas produced a permanent alimony award of $3,816 per month.
The trial court, however, rejected that amount as too much. Instead it awarded Seixas $3,000
per month.
Boemio objects to the Circuit Court’s consultation of the AAML guidelines. He
contends that they improperly influenced the court’s decision as to the amount and the
duration of the alimony.  We address these arguments below.
A. Amount
Boemio contends that the trial court inappropriately supplanted its analysis of the FL
Section 11-106(b) factors with the AAML formula.  He bases this argument on the court’s
decision to award $3,000 per month, notwithstanding it’s determination that Seixas’s
monthly deficit was only $1,729.  In Boemio’s view, the court did not articulate any findings
that would justify an increase of $1,271 per month over Seixas’s monthly deficit.
Boemio’s attack on use of the AAML guidelines seems premised on the assumption
that the court’s award must be capped at an amount that the court determines to be a spouse’s
reasonable needs for day to day living, without regard to saving, funding a retirement, or one-
time expenses.  In the vast majority of divorce cases, courts’ awards will be capped in such
a way by necessity – the increase in expenses when a couple lives apart rather than together
is not matched by a correlating increase in income.  But this is not always true. 
12
Here, for example, in light of the pattern of savings demonstrated during the marriage,
the Circuit Court was free to decide that it was fair and equitable to award Seixas an amount
of alimony higher than what would suffice to pay her existing monthly bills. The Circuit
Court explained its exercise of discretion by saying, with respect to her current financial
statement:
[T]hat’s a very artificial and unrealistic view of her needs,
because it looks at her current situation, based upon the fact that
her husband left the family home, and took certain actions that,
sort of, imposed this condition upon her.  So that . . .  she had no
house payment.  And yet, clearly, the house is going to be sold.
She’d have to buy a house.  Under the current situation, it
doesn’t make any provision for her to . . . be able to have any
savings.  And yet, clearly, this was a family that, instead of
buying things, was very good about saving money.  And that’s
part of the lifestyle.  They devoted their energies towards . . .
saving for the rainy day. Saving for the future.  And under the
financial statement, that’s not provided for. 
They went out to the theater. That’s not provided for under her
current situation.  She’s not doing that. She’s not going to the
movies.  So that’s why I found that the financial statement, as
prepared, really doesn’t permit her to maintain the lifestyle that
she enjoyed during the course of the marriage.
We see two points made by the Circuit Court in its analysis set forth above: (1) expenses
shown on Seixas’s financial statement were not static, and (2) savings, which were not
included on the financial statement, were part of the pattern of the couple’s lives during the
marriage.  The Circuit Court acted within its discretion in declining to limit its award to the
monthly expenses it found Seixas needed based on her current financial statement. 
 
Additionally, as FL Section 11-106(b) requires, a court must consider, in making its
award, the monetary and non-monetary contributions of the parties to the family as well as
13
the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage.  Here, the court found
that Seixas’s sacrifices during the marriage enabled Boemio to advance his career and
succeed financially.  The record reflects that Seixas reduced her earnings by leaving higher
paying jobs in order to have more time to devote to the children.  This is a legitimate and
important consideration.
The second prong of Boemio’s attack on the court’s use of the AAML guidelines is
more direct – he insists that because the court noted what the alimony award would have
been under the guidelines, it must have relied exclusively on the AAML guidelines to
calculate the final judgment.  We are not persuaded by his logic.  The Circuit Court clearly
engaged in the required considerations under Section 11-106(b).  Boemio conveniently
ignores the court’s statements that the guidelines were “not authoritative[,]” were used “for
informational purposes only[,]” and “[did not] control the Court’s decision.”  Nor does he
acknowledge the court’s express rejection of the $3,816 amount as “excessive.”  In short,
Boemio has failed to prove his charge that the court completely discarded its obligatory FL
Section 11-106(b) analysis.
To be sure, the Circuit Court consulted the AAML formulas, and a careful reading of
the transcript compels the conclusion that the AAML guidelines played a role in its decision.
“Playing a role” is different from being the exclusive or dispositive criterion.  Yet, we still
must decide whether a court’s substantive consideration of these guidelines, along with the
FL Section 11-106 factors, is a legitimate exercise of the Circuit Court’ s discretion.
It is well-settled that Section 11-106 does not preclude a trial court from considering
14
other factors in addition to the twelve mentioned.  See Solomon, 383 Md. at 195 n.15, 857
A.2d at 1120 n.15 (“The twelve factors included in the test are non-exclusive . . . .”).  As the
introductory language of subsection (b) provides, “[i]n making the determination, the court
shall consider all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award, including [the twelve
listed].”  See FL § 11-106(b)(emphasis added); see also Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md.
App. 132, 143, 740 A.2d 125, 130 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 164, 747 A.2d 645 (2000)
(“As the prefatory language in subsection (b) makes plain, the court is not restricted to a
consideration of the factors that are expressly listed.”).  While the statute provides factors,
it gives the court little guidance on how to translate them into dollars.  We believe that if  the
guidelines reasonably direct the court to a fair and equitable award without supplanting or
frustrating any one of the twelve enumerated statutory considerations, a court may refer to
them as an aid in translating its statutorily mandated analysis into a dollar amount.
In deciding whether use of monetary guidelines like the AAML’s will supplant or
frustrate the statutory guidelines, we first consider what role monetary guidelines will play
when applied in the context of a statute directing use of evaluative factors, but without
direction as to how they translate into a monetary amount.  Commentators have addressed
the practical difficulties for judges and litigants when such statutory criteria are the only
resource available:
Of the three financial issues raised by divorce – asset division,
child support, and spousal maintenance – the question of
alimony is typically the least predictable and the most
contentious . . . .  On the issue of child support, while there
remains room for bargaining by higher-income parents, most
6This language is similar to the fifth factor presented in FL Section 11-106(b): “the
contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family[.]”
Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 11-106(b)(5) of the Family Law Article.
15
couples settle within the shadow, if not by strict application, of
statutory child support guidelines.  Only with regard to alimony
is there no fixed frame of reference for discussions.
Spousal support negotiations are particularly difficult because
of the absence of any objective standard for judging fairness or
predicting outcomes.  Statutes simply list factors for trial
courts to consider without providing any guidance as to how
the judge should weigh or apply them.  Without predictable
judicial parameters, the parties cannot readily assess the risks
and benefits of pushing forward to trial, thereby making private
resolutions problematic.
* * *
At first reading, these legislative guidelines for awarding
alimony appear fair and appropriate.  Closer inspection,
however, reveals that the statutory criteria are so broad,
idiosyncratic, or unclear in purpose or direction that they
actually provide little practical guidance for – or limitation upon
– judicial discretion.
The majority of the statutory factors are laudable but imprecise,
such as the instruction for a judge to take into account “a history
of the contributions to the marriage by each party.”[6]
* * *
[T]he statutes are [also] uniformly silent as to the manner in
which the factors should be utilized to calculate an award.  Not
a single jurisdiction among those that list multiple alimony
considerations ranks the factors’ relative significance or weight.
Not a single statute explains how judges should apply the
criteria.  The result is that both the trial and appellate courts look
to a hodgepodge of factors, weighing them in an unspecified and
unsystematic fashion, rendering it impossible for couples or
their counsel to predict with any degree of certainty what the
actual alimony award might or should be.
Robert K. Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income Adjustment
7See also Victoria M. Ho & Stephanie A. Sussman, Appellate Court Trends in
Permanent Alimony for “Gray Area” Divorces: 1997-2007, 82 Fla. Bar J. 45, para. 19 (2008)
(“The research and analysis relating to permanent alimony cases over the past 10 years is
both an informative and frustrating endeavor. Any preconceived notion that more predictable
trends would have emerged over time did not hold true. In fact, it seems like the more
appellate decisions that are handed down on this subject, the more unpredictable alimony
awards become....The only firm conclusion one can make in this exhaustive review of
alimony awards in Florida is that the trier of fact will take all facts presented to him or her
and will fashion a decision based on all the equities. Absent alimony guidelines, this area will
always be difficult to predict as equity is often – like beauty – in the eye of the beholder.”)
8The Maricopa County Guidelines explain that “they are intended to provide the court
and the parties with a starting point for discussion, negotiation, or decision making” and are
not meant to “replace the court’s obligation to consider the specific evidence and statutory
factors.”  Cullum v. Cullum, 160 P.3d 231, 235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
16
Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 23, 23, 32-33 (2001) (quotation
marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added) (footnote added).7
 
  Numerous courts across the country have resorted to non-legislative formulas as aids
in crafting alimony awards.  See generally Virginia R. Dugan & Jon A. Feder, Alimony
Guidelines: Do They Work?, 25 Fam. Advoc. 20 (2003) (describing the alimony guidelines
developed in twelve different jurisdictions, including California, Florida, Maine, Michigan
and Texas).  For example, Maricopa County, Arizona,8 frames its alimony awards around a
“duration factor,”which is 0.015 times the number of years of the marriage.  Id. at 20.  That
number is then multiplied by the difference in the parties’ incomes to render the final amount.
Id.  In Kansas, several counties use what is known as the “Johnson County Guidelines,”
which provide that alimony should be twenty percent of the difference between the parties’
gross monthly incomes when there are minor children and twenty-five percent of the
9None of the guidelines mentioned above are required by statute, but are instead
applied at the discretion of the respective courts.
17
difference when there are no children.  Id. at 21.  The Fairfax County Virginia Bar
Association recommends that spousal support equal thirty percent of the payor’s income
minus fifty percent of the payee’s income in cases where there is no child support.  See
Kisthardt, supra, at 77.  Where there is child support being paid, the formula is twenty-eight
percent of the payor’s income minus fifty-eight percent of the payee’s income.  Id. 
These guidelines provide predictability for both counsel and clients, increasing litigant
satisfaction: “Experienced attorneys in California, where guidelines have been used [since
1977], have found clients accept the concept of guidelines much more readily than broad
ranges of results when guidelines are not used.” See Hon. Robert E. Gaston, Alimony: You
Are the Weakest Link! Part 2, 10 Nev. Law. 36, 37, 38 (2002) (quoting George Norton, “The
Future of Alimony: A Proposal for Guidelines,” Alimony, New Strategies for Pursuit and
Defense, Section of Family Law, American Bar Association (1988)).  We do not mention
these examples to indicate that the specific numeric formulas are necessarily right for
Maryland.  We use them to demonstrate that many courts, with statutes setting forth
evaluative criteria, have considered it beneficial to utilize monetary guidelines as an aid in
reaching their decisions.9
 The AAML guidelines were the result of more than two years of data-gathering by
10The AAML Commission was created in 2003 by AAML President Sandra Joan
Morris.  See Kisthardt, supra, at 61.  The Commission was tasked with critically reviewing
the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations (2002), to analyze those principles, and to make recommendations
consistent with AAML’s mission.  Id. (noting that the AAML was designed “to encourage
the study, improve the practice, elevate the standards and advance the cause of matrimonial
law, to the end that the welfare of the family and society be protected.”).
18
the AAML Commission.10  See Kisthardt, supra, at 78.  After extensively reviewing
guidelines beings used in jurisdictions around the country, the Commission discovered that
the common denominators in all were the income of the spouses and the duration of the
marriage.  Id.  Thus, the AAML guidelines focused on those two factors.  Id.  The formula
was then tested against seven other guidelines that were being used or had been proposed,
and the result fell within the norm.  Id.  Also, “[r]ecognizing that certain circumstance[s]
would render an award based solely on the [AAML formula] unfair, the Commission also
included factors that would suggest a deviation.”  Id.  As the AAML explained in the
introduction to the guidelines, “[t]he proposed considerations are designed to be used in
conjunction with state statutes that first determine eligibility for an award.  They are not
intended to replace existing state public policy regarding eligibility for an award.”  See
AAML, Considerations when Determining Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance 2
(2007).
We believe that the AAML recommendations are the product of a careful study by a
professional organization of  knowledgeable practitioners, which are reasonable in approach,
and do not supplant FL Section 11-106 or frustrate its goals.   We consider these, and other
11Recently, the Kaufman Center for Family Law produced its own set of guidelines
(“Kaufman Guidelines”), which are specifically tailored to address the twelve factors listed
in FL Section 11-106(b).  See Kaufman Center for Family Law, Kaufman Alimony
Guidelines, available at http://www.kaufmanalimonyguidelines.org/how.html (last visited
Apr. 27, 2010).  The Kaufman Guidelines “rank alimony cases along a [linear] continuum
of strength of the case from the case that is least justifiable for alimony to the case that is
most justifiable.”  Kaufman Center for Family Law, Kaufman Alimony Guidelines, available
at http://www.kaufmanalimonyguidelines.org/theory.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).  The
two primary elements of the guidelines are (1) the claimant’s present or potential ability to
support herself or himself, and (2) the degree to which the marriage affected the claimant’s
ability to support herself or himself.  Id.  The guidelines are presented in a web-based
program, whereby the user answers certain factual questions, and the Kaufman calculator
computes the strength of the case and recommends the amount and duration of alimony.  Id.
The Women’s Law Center of Maryland provides the computer program free of cost to
attorneys and the judiciary.  These guidelines are not intended to supplant ML Section 11-
106(b), and as indicated, are tailored to that section.  In affirming the Circuit Court’s use of
the AAML Guidelines in this case, we are by no means suggesting that the AAML
Guidelines are preferable to the Kaufman Alimony Guidelines.  The latter were not released
until 2008 and, thus, were unavailable for use at the time this case was tried.
12Use of these guidelines was not a surprise to the litigants or counsel. During a
pretrial meeting, the trial court made counsel aware of its intention to consult the AAML
guidelines. 
19
legitimate and neutral guidelines, helpful to judges making alimony awards in Maryland.11
Therefore, we conclude that the court did not err in consulting those guidelines after
conducting its statutory analysis.12  Rather, the court made an effort to be fair and equitable,
as well as being mindful of the benefits of consistency in alimony awards for family law
practitioners, litigants, and judges.  We wish to be clear, however, that our decision in this
case does not mandate the use of any guidelines by circuit courts in performing their Section
11-106 analyses.  As we explained in Solomon, “each case must be evaluated on its facts and
not on some fixed minimum or universal standard.”  383 Md. at 198, 857 A.2d at 1122.
20
Thus, in applying FL Section 11-106(b), circuit court judges may wish to consult no
monetary guidelines, one particular set of guidelines, or a combination of guidelines.  The
knowledge, experience and judgment of the circuit court judges are the best determinants for
making awards that are “fair and equitable” under FL Section 11-106(b).
B. Duration
Boemio also challenges the trial court’s award of indefinite alimony under FL Section
11-106(c).  He contends that the Circuit Court should have ordered alimony for a fixed
period of time which would be sufficient to rehabilitate Seixas and allow her to be self-
supporting.  FL Section 11-106(c)(2) permits a court to award indefinite alimony, as
compared with fixed-term alimony if “the respective standards of living of the parties
[would] be unconscionably disparate” after “the party seeking alimony [has] made as much
progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected . . . .”
The Circuit Court explained its decision to award indefinite alimony, reinforcing some
of the points we have described above, and found an unconscionable disparity in the spouses’
respective standards of living:
[R]eturning to the issue of the needs of the parties, based upon
what I said, that is, that the analysis was done based upon what
she needs, given the circumstances that she is currently in.  
I do find that that is not reflective of the style that the parties
maintained during the course of the marriage. And that, to
maintain the style to which the parties were accustomed during
the course of the marriage, she would need additional funds. 
The current situation reflects no house payment.  There’s little,
if any going out to the movies.  There’s no provision for her to
21
create any savings.  And, as I said, this family was a frugal
family.  Instead of having a lot of things that they purchased,
they saved a lot of money.  They saved for the future.  And she,
now, is unable to do that, based upon her current situation under
the analysis that I made, using the figures that I used. 
So, I do think that it is not appropriate to simply just look at that
as the only figures to be considered in this case. 
What I have concluded is that she’s rehabilitated to the extent
that she could be rehabilitated. . . . [T]he extent of her
professional accomplishment, she’s probably already reached.
That is, administrative assistant.  
[H]er husband makes approximately $180,000, as I’ve already
indicated. Has a master’s in business administration that he got
during the course of the marriage.  And I think he will certainly
get his cost of livings, presumably as would she.  But he has the
ability to  continue to perform, to continue to succeed.  And so
I find, under the circumstances, that to simply leave them in
their current status would leave an unconscionable disparate
income in their relative standards of living.  And that, under
those circumstances, therefore, an award of permanent alimony
is warranted.
(Emphasis added).  Our task is to decide whether the Circuit Court made any clearly
erroneous factual findings, or abused its discretion in making this decision.   See Solomon,
383 Md. at 196, 857 A. 2d at 1120.  (“The determination of whether an unconscionable
disparity exists, according to section 11-106(c) of the Family Law Article, is a finding of
fact, reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.”).  An alimony award “will not be
disturbed upon appellate review unless the trial judge's discretion was arbitrarily used or the
judgment below was clearly wrong." Tracey, 328 Md. at 385, 614 A.2d at 593.
This is not to say that a trial court cannot be overturned in making an alimony award.
13As we explained,
The Circuit Court concluded that there was an unconscionable
disparity in the Solomons' incomes and standards of living and,
therefore, awarded Mrs. Solomon indefinite alimony. The Court
of Special Appeals upheld this determination and it has not been
challenged in this Court. Yet, the Court of Special Appeals
reversed the Circuit Court's determination of the amount of the
indefinite alimony awarded. This is the only aspect of the
indefinite alimony award currently in controversy.   
Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 197, 857 A.2d 1109, 1121 (2004).
14The CSA in Simonds said: “[i]n the case at bar, the [C]ircuit [C]ourt (1) made
inconsistent findings of fact on the question of appellee's present income, and (2) made no
findings of fact on the question of appellee's future income. Under these circumstances, it
was ‘error to  deny [appellant's] request [for indefinite alimony] without explicitly discussing
the disparity issue.’”  Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md. App. 591, 611, 885 A.2d 158, 170 (2005)
(citing Kelly v. Kelly, 153 Md. App. 260, 279, 836 A.2d 695 (2003)).  The Kelly Court
further explained that
No case . . .  requires that indefinite alimony be granted simply
because the dependent spouse is able to show that his or her
income is only thirty percent of that of the non-dependent
spouse.  And, indefinite alimony is not necessarily required
simply because there exists a gross disparity of income. But
when indefinite alimony is denied and such a disparity exists, it
is error to deny the request without explicitly discussing the
disparity issue.
153 Md. App. at 279, 836 A.2d at 706.
22
In Solomon we affirmed the holding of the CSA that the trial court erred in failing to award
a sufficient amount of alimony to eliminate that disparity. 13  In Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md.
App. 591, 611, 885 A.2d 158, 170 (2005), the CSA vacated an alimony award because the
trial court did not make sufficient factual findings about the FL Section 11-106(b) factors.14
15Dan B. Dobbs, in a general discussion on equity, has asked
Is equity to be applauded because it is flexible and attends to the
(continued...)
23
See also, e.g., Lee v. Andochick, 182 Md. App. 268, 957 A.2d 1038 (2008) (reversing
indefinite alimony award because wife, who earned $267,000.00 per year, established
disparity in income, when husband earned $1,760,282, but “fail[ed] to explain how her
standard of living would be unconscionably disparate if no alimony award was made[,]”
when husband was six million dollars in debt); Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md. App. 575, 588-92,
565 A.2d 361, 367-70 (1989) (denial of alimony vacated with instructions to consider
imbalance between wife’s highest salary of $17,500 and husband’s income of $ 115,000 plus
bonuses). 
 
“Unconscionably disparate” standards of living is the threshold test for awarding
indefinite alimony under FL Section 11-106(c)(2). Although there are numerous decisions
by the Court of Special Appeals addressing “unconscionable disparity,” there are only a few
issued by this Court.  See Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 857 A.2d 1109 (2004); Blaine
v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d 413 (1994); Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 614 A.2d 590
(1992); Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 520 A.2d 1080 (1986).  While the appellate
decisions have provided guidance, no cohesive rubric has emerged in either appellate court
to frame or add definition to the bare statutory term. We think this is so because the statute,
at its core, relies on principles of equity, which are flexible and not conducive to black-letter
restatement.15  
(...continued)
individual case? Or deplored because it fails to explain itself or
to give reasons that can be applied to like-situated parties and
that can be justified in principle?  It is no doubt both.  Great care
is required to make the system respect the full legal and moral
rights of parties.
Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 117-18 (2d ed. 1993)
16The 1980 Report was developed for the benefit of the legislature by the Governor’s
Commission on Domestic Relations Laws.  Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 526, 520 A.2d
1080, 1085 (1987).
24
Alimony itself is fundamentally equitable:
Generally speaking, alimony awards, though authorized by
statute, are founded upon notions  of equity, equity requires
sensitivity to the merits of each individual case without the
imposition of bright-line tests.  The 1980 [Governor's
Commission] Report[, which proposed Maryland’s alimony
statute,16] specifically stated its belief that “different ills call for
different remedies”; and that “the matter of relative standards of
living [is] to be resolved, as it seems to us it must be, on a
case-by-case basis.”
Tracey, 328 Md. at 393, 614 A.2d at 597 (citing Wallace v. Wallace, 290 Md. 265, 284, 429
A.2d 232, 243 (1981)) (footnote added). As such, “no hard and fast rule can be laid down,
and . . .each case must depend upon its own circumstances . . . .” Alston v. Alston, 331 Md.
496, 507, 629 A.2d 70, 75 (1993).  Furthermore, we said in Tracey:
We have previously defined the purpose of the statute as
providing for an appropriate degree of spousal support in the
form of alimony after the dissolution of a marriage.  In regard to
the appropriateness of such support, the statute itself requires
that the trial court weigh all factors relevant to “a fair and
equitable award.” [FL] Section 11-106(b). The statute
elsewhere invokes the equitable concept of unconscionably
25
disparate standards of living. [FL] Section 11-106(c)(2).  Its
sister provision governing the extension of an alimony period
permits the court to act  to avoid “a harsh and inequitable
result.” [FL] Section 11-107(a)(1).  We conclude from these
provisions that the paramount goal of the legislature was to
create a statutory mechanism leading to equitably sound
alimony determinations by judges. 
328 Md. at 388, 614 A.2d at 594-95 (emphasis added) (some citations omitted); see also
Solomon, 383 Md. at 197-98, 857 A.2d at 1121 (reiterating the equitable nature of alimony
and quoting from Tracey); Blaine, 336 Md. at 66, 646 A.2d at 421 (stating that a number of
enumerated statutory factors are equitable and reflect “concepts, for the most part [that are]
already in existence in Maryland common law . . . .”).
In Solomon, Judge Harrell explained:
It is well settled in Maryland that the statutory scheme generally
favors fixed-term or so-called rehabilitative alimony, rather than
indefinite alimony. Underlying Maryland's statutory preference
is the conviction  that the purpose of alimony is not to provide
a lifetime pension, but where practicable to ease the transition
for the parties from the joint married state to their new status as
single people living apart and independently.  Nonetheless,
rehabilitative alimony alone may not be appropriate in every
case.
Solomon, 383 Md. at 194-95, 857 A.2d at 1119 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  As
we explained in Blaine, FL Section 11-106 includes “provisions for indefinite alimony
[which] serve as a restraint upon the doctrine of rehabilitative alimony....”  Blaine, 336 Md.
at 70, 646 A.2d 423.
Turning now to Boemio’s specific arguments, we start with his contention that the
trial court’s award should be reversed because there was only disparity in income and no
17See e.g., Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 382, 614 A.2d 590, 592  (1992) (26 years);
Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. 350, 361, 809 A.2d 18, 24 (2002) (30 years); Innerbichler v.
Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 213, 752 A.2d 291, 294 (2000) (14 years); Digges v.
Digges, 126 Md. App. 361, 363, 730 A.2d 202, 203 (1999) (26 years); Crabill v. Crabill, 119
Md. App. 249, 258, 704 A.2d 532, 536 (1998) (18 years); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 103 Md.
App. 452, 455, 653 A.2d 994, 995 (1995) (26 years);  Blaine v. Blaine, 97 Md. App. 689,
693, 632 A.2d 191, 193 (1993) (18 years); Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md. App. 183, 189-90,
570 A.2d 874, 877-78 (1990) (19 years); Bricker v. Bricker, 78 Md. App. 570, 576, 554 A.2d
444, 447 (1989) (25 years); Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md. App. 710, 718, 493 A.2d 1096, 1100
(1985) (30 years); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md. App. 299, 300-01, 462 A.2d 1208, 1210-11
(1983) (22 years).  
26
demonstration of unconscionable disparity in the parties’ standards of living.  Boemio
contends that “the trial court’s task in determining the length of the alimony award was made
easier by its simplistic, yet erroneous, application of the AAML guidelines which instruct
that a marriage of twenty years requires indefinite alimony.”  
Our response to this argument is two-fold.  First, as we explained above, the Circuit
Court used the AAML guidelines as a tool, but did not consider itself bound by them, and
it clearly considered the FL Section 11-106(b) factors.  Second, the statute itself directs that
judges must consider the length of the marriage as part of their evaluations.  It is obvious,
then, that the legislature decided that a long marriage called for more alimony than a short
one. 
To award indefinite alimony in a twenty-year marriage is not at all unusual.  There has
long been a pattern in Maryland cases reflecting the implied statutory directive that a long
marriage is more likely to result in indefinite alimony.17  Indeed, it is fair to say that length
of the marriage is a key factor, outweighing several of the others listed in FL Section 11-
27
106(b), in determining what is unconscionably disparate.  Thus, the trial court’s use of the
twenty-year benchmark from the AAML guidelines for its award of indefinite  alimony is not
at all inconsistent with Maryland law. 
Boemio also contends that the court awarded indefinite alimony because it found that
the parties had “an unconscionable disparity in income[.]”  He uses this excerpt from the
Circuit Court’s opinion to support his argument that the court focused on income rather than
the disparate standards of living, as required by FL Section 11-106(c).  This, however, was
not a complete quotation of what Judge Mason said.  The full sentence as stated by the
Circuit Court judge was, “And so I find, under the circumstances, that to simply leave them
in their current status would leave an unconscionable disparate income in their relative
standards of living.” (Emphasis added).  This sentence demonstrates that the court fully
understood the standard set by FL Section 11-106(c)(2).  
Boemio continues with his challenge, insisting that the Circuit Court was overly
focused on income (along with length of marriage) to the exclusion of the other statutory
factors.  To be sure, trial courts must make findings about all of the 11-106(b) factors, and
all factors must be considered.  But we also must be pragmatic in recognizing that a disparity
in income is necessarily going to play a highly significant role in making a finding that “the
respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.”  FL § 11-
106(c).  In this context, “standards of living” means how well the respective parties can live
18Boemio argues that since the separation, he resides in a two-bedroom apartment in
Switzerland with a monthly rental of $1,438.76 and engages in modest spending habits so
as to incur little personal debt.  Thus, according to Boemio, the parties’ lifestyles do not
diverge as dramatically as their salaries. The choice of the payor spouse to live in an
apartment between the separation and trial will not dictate what the court will determine to
be as “the respective standards of living” under FL Section 11-106.  If the court relied only
on a snapshot of the parties’ lives it would be too easy for a party to manipulate the result.
When a court compares standards of living, it should project those standards for the future,
based on all of the available evidence.
19We went on to say that
Although we do not adopt a standard that unconscionable
disparity exists based on a particular percentage comparison of
(continued...)
28
based on their respective financial means.18
  In Solomon, we recognized a line of older cases from this Court and the CSA,
indicating that the difference in income is an important factor in assessing whether an
unconscionable disparity exists:
There are several cases in which Maryland appellate courts
found unconscionable disparity based on the relative percentage
the dependent spouse’s income was of the other spouse’s
income.  See Tracey, 328 Md. at 393, 614 A.2d at 597 (28
percent); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 103 Md. App. 452, 464, 653
A.2d 994, 999 (1995) (43 percent); Blaine v. Blaine, 97 Md.
App. 689, 708, 632 A.2d 191, 201 (1993), aff'd on other
grounds, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d 413 (1994) (23 percent); Rock
v. Rock, 86 Md. App. 598, 613, 587 A.2d 1133, 1140 (1991) (20
– 30 percent); Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md. App. 183, 186, 570
A.2d 874, 880 (1990) (46 percent); Bricker v. Bricker, 78 Md.
App. 570, 577, 554 A.2d 444, 447 (1989) (35 percent); Benkin
v. Benkin, 71 Md. App. 191, 199, 524 A.2d 789, 793 (1987) (16
percent); Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md. App. 710, 717, 493 A.2d
1096, 1099 (1985) (20 percent); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md.
App. 299, 307, 462 A.2d 1208, 1214 (1983) (33 percent).[19]
(...continued)
gross or net income, the relative percentages in these cases offer
some guidance here in assessing whether the amount of the
indefinite alimony award alleviated adequately the
unconscionably disparate situation found to exist in the present
case.
Solomon, 383Md. at 176, 857 A.2d at 1121-22.
20Boemio started his studies for the degree in 1984, the year before the marriage, and
finished them in 1988, three years after it.
29
383 Md. at 198, 857 A.2d at 1121 (footnote added).
The Circuit Court’s decision to find that the disparity in standards of living was
unconscionable was consistent with this settled law.  Currently, Boemio earns four times
what Seixas earns, and Judge Mason found that Seixas was unlikely to be capable of earning
substantially more than that.  As shown above, Maryland cases have awarded indefinite
alimony where the income disparity has been considerably less drastic.  See  Digges v.
Digges, 126 Md. App. 361, 389-90, 730 A.2d 202, 218-19 (1999) (discussing numerous
cases where indefinite alimony was awarded when the parties seeking alimony earned less
than half of the other spouses’ incomes).
But the trial court’s decision here was based on more than just income differential.
The court considered the parties’s lifestyle before the separation, characterizing it as
“securely middle class”and “quite a comfortable lifestyle.”  It also noted that Boemio’s
Masters in Business Administration, which would enable him to advance in his career even
beyond his current level, was acquired  during the marriage.20  See Solomon, 383 Md. at 201,
30
857 A.2d at 1123 (“[The wife's] work in the home no doubt contributed to [the husband's]
success in building his professional career.”)  The family model of one parent serving as the
primary caregiver and the other serving as the primary breadwinner can work well, with
benefits to all, until divorce.  But when divorce occurs, the primary breadwinner is likely to
suffer less monetary loss than the caregiver parent, while both will share in the priceless
benefit of having children.  This asymmetry is certainly a legitimate consideration in
determining unconscionability.
Judge Mason summed up his decision to award permanent alimony as follows:
He makes more than four times what she makes.  Under the
circumstances, I find, and considering the duration of the
marriage, which is significant, the fact that he acquired the
MBA during the marriage.  The fact that she obviously provided
him a lot of support and assistance during the marriage, which
allowed him to succeed the way that he did succeed, that an
award of indefinite alimony in the amount of $3,000 a month is
appropriate.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding indefinite alimony based on these
factors.  The court had evidence of a relatively lengthy marriage, the payor spouse acquiring
an advanced degree with the support of the payee spouse during the marriage, the recipient
spouse leaving more lucrative employment to care for the children, a comfortable middle
class lifestyle that permitted accumulation of savings by the parties during the marriage, and
a large income disparity thereafter.
CONCLUSION
Judge Mason  diligently conducted the alimony analysis mandated by FL Section 11-
31
106 when determining the amount of the award, and did not abuse his discretion when he
consulted the AAML guidelines to refine his analysis and arrive at the sum of $3,000 per
month.  Furthermore, the Circuit Court’s finding that an unconscionable disparity existed
between the parties’ standards of living so as to warrant indefinite alimony did not depend
on clearly erroneous factual findings, nor was it an abuse of discretion.  Thus, we affirm the
CSA’s decision to affirm the Circuit Court.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.