Title: Jacobs v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 
 
2021 WY 104 
 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 22, 2021 
 
 
CHASITY LARAE JACOBS, 
 
Appellant 
(Defendant), 
 
v. 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 
 
S-20-0237 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County 
The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge  
 
Representing Appellant: 
Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Robin S. Cooper, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Cooper.  
 
Representing Appellee: 
Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 
General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Catherine M. 
Mercer, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Mercer.  
 
Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS*, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ. 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral argument. 
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 
final publication in the permanent volume. 
 
 
1 
DAVIS, Justice. 
 
[¶1] 
Chasity Jacobs was a passenger in her co-defendant’s vehicle when he led law 
enforcement on a high-speed chase through Cheyenne, Wyoming.  For her part in the 
crimes committed, she was convicted of one count of aiding and abetting attempted second-
degree murder, one count of reckless endangering, and one count of misdemeanor 
possession of methamphetamine.  She challenges the district court’s refusal to give her 
proposed jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of accessory to attempted 
voluntary manslaughter.  She also challenges the court’s sentence on the reckless 
endangering and misdemeanor possession counts.  We affirm but remand for correction of 
the district court’s written sentencing order. 
 
ISSUES 
 
[¶2] 
Ms. Jacobs presents two issues, which we state as follows: 
 
1. 
Did the district court err when it declined to give Ms. 
Jacobs’ proposed jury instruction on the lesser-included 
offense of accessory to attempted voluntary manslaughter? 
 
2. 
Did the district court’s written sentencing order on the 
reckless endangering and misdemeanor possession counts 
deviate from its oral pronouncement and exceed the maximum 
statutory sentences for those counts? 
 
FACTS 
 
[¶3] 
On May 3, 2019, Ms. Jacobs was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her co-
defendant, Dominique Childers.  In affirming Mr. Childers’ convictions, we described the 
events that led to the charges against Ms. Jacobs and him. 
 
On May 3, 2019, Trooper Adam Powell with the Wyoming 
Highway Patrol was on patrol on Interstate 25 north of 
Cheyenne. At approximately mile post 24, he observed two 
vehicles traveling southbound towards Cheyenne, both 
exceeding the posted 80-mile-per-hour speed limit. The first 
vehicle was going 96 miles per hour, and the rear vehicle was 
going 98 miles per hour. Trooper Powell turned around in the 
median and began to follow the two vehicles. 
  
Trooper Powell caught up to the first car, which had already 
slowed down. He activated his overhead lights, pulled it over, 
and instructed the driver to follow him so he could pull over 
 
2 
the second vehicle. At approximately mile post 18 he caught 
up to the second vehicle, which was a black Toyota sedan 
traveling at approximately 113 miles per hour. Trooper Powell 
activated his lights and sirens and attempted to pull the vehicle 
over, but the driver of the Toyota failed to comply, and a high-
speed chase ensued. 
  
The driver of the Toyota, later identified as Dominique 
Childers, continued to drive approximately 115 miles per hour 
and then exited the interstate at exit 13, Vandehei Avenue. Mr. 
Childers was still driving at a high speed when he hit the 
roundabout off exit 13, and then he returned to the interstate 
and continued southbound. He exited the interstate again at exit 
12, Central Avenue, and then drove through a stop sign and 
oncoming traffic onto the Interstate 25 on-ramp. Instead of 
continuing down the on-ramp, he swerved to the right side of 
the ramp and traveled through the median into the parking lot 
of the Wyoming Department of Transportation and the 
Wyoming Highway Patrol. 
  
After the Toyota drove through the parking lot, the driver’s 
door opened, and it came side-by-side with Trooper Powell’s 
pursuing vehicle. Trooper Powell was able to observe a male 
driver, later identified as Mr. Childers, and a female passenger, 
later identified as Chasity Jacobs. 
  
Instead of stopping, Mr. Childers continued to elude Trooper 
Powell. Trooper Powell continued pursuing the vehicle, which 
was then traveling eastbound on Central Avenue. At this point, 
Childers’ vehicle was missing a tire, and he was driving 
recklessly, even in the center lane of traffic at times. 
  
In an attempt to stop the vehicle before it entered the city limits 
and endangered more citizens, Trooper Powell attempted a 
tactical vehicle intervention. However, when he got his patrol 
car into position to perform the maneuver, he saw a silver pistol 
come out of the passenger window, and multiple rounds were 
fired in his direction. Consequently, he hit his brakes and 
distanced his vehicle from the Toyota. Mr. Childers continued 
on Central Avenue towards downtown Cheyenne with the 
trooper still in pursuit. 
  
 
3 
Shortly after the first shots were fired, Trooper Powell again 
had to swerve because an arm holding a pistol came out the 
driver’s window and shots were once more fired in his 
direction. As the chase continued, more shots were fired out 
the back of the Toyota, causing its back window to burst and 
Trooper Powell’s front windshield to spiderweb. As shots 
continued to be fired, Mr. Childers continued traveling towards 
the residential and commercial portions of Cheyenne, and more 
law enforcement officers joined the pursuit. 
  
At some point, Mr. Childers turned northbound on Central 
Avenue, going the wrong way on that one-way street. Lyndsey 
Smith and her husband were pulled to the side of the road in 
the far-left lane of Central Avenue at 17th Street. Ms. Smith 
testified that Mr. Childers attempted to avoid hitting her 
vehicle head-on by swerving towards the sidewalk, which 
caused him to instead hit the driver’s side of her vehicle and a 
planter and tree on the sidewalk. He continued to elude police 
after the collision, traveling through intersections and 
neighborhoods at a high rate of speed. 
  
At this point, Officer Mark Ehlman with the Cheyenne Police 
Department was directly behind Childers’ vehicle. Officer 
Geffery Eugene Mims of the Department was also pursuing the 
vehicle and calling out to his dispatcher each time shots were 
fired from Childers’ vehicle. 
  
At the roundabout connecting 19th Street, Pershing Boulevard, 
and Converse Avenue, Officer Ehlman witnessed more shots 
being fired in the direction of law enforcement officers and 
decided to attempt a stop to prevent injury to other vehicles or 
citizens. He drove up to the driver’s side of the Toyota, pointed 
his service weapon out his passenger window, and fired several 
times towards the driver. Mr. Childers swerved north and drove 
across a sidewalk and through a fence, and then crashed into 
an embankment at the Cheyenne Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center. 
  
Mr. Childers exited the vehicle with his hands in the air and 
got on the ground. Ms. Jacobs exited the passenger side, 
walked backward to the street, and also got on the ground. 
 
Childers v. State, 2021 WY 93, ¶¶ 3-13, 493 P.3d 168, 169-70 (Wyo. 2021).  
 
4 
 
[¶4] 
When they were apprehended, Mr. Childers had more than three grams of 
methamphetamine, and Ms. Jacobs had 2.5 grams.  The State charged Mr. Childers with 
two counts each of attempted first degree murder, felony property destruction, and 
misdemeanor property destruction, and one count each of felony possession of 
methamphetamine, reckless endangering, and eluding.  
 
[¶5] 
Law enforcement recovered two handguns from the Toyota, a Smith & Wesson 45-
caliber pistol and a Ruger 9mm pistol.  Based on video footage from Trooper Powell’s dash 
camera, a 45-caliber bullet recovered from a construction site along the route of pursuit, 
the presence of Ms. Jacobs’ DNA on the 45-caliber pistol and 9mm magazines, and 
statements Ms. Jacobs made in phone calls from the jail, the State charged Ms. Jacobs with 
one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of accessory to attempted first degree 
murder, and one count of reckless endangering with a firearm.  It also charged her with one 
count of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine.  
 
[¶6] 
Before trial, Ms. Jacobs pled guilty to the misdemeanor possession charge.  The 
cases against Mr. Childers and Ms. Jacobs were joined for trial, and a jury trial was held 
on the remaining charges from December 3, 2019 to December 10, 2019.  After the State 
rested, neither defendant testified or presented other evidence.  
 
[¶7] 
At the jury instruction conference, the district court indicated that it would instruct 
the jury on the elements of attempted first degree murder and the lesser-included offense 
of attempted second-degree murder.  Counsel for both Mr. Childers and Ms. Jacobs 
requested that the court also instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter.  The court denied the request on the ground that there was no evidence that 
either Mr. Childers or Ms. Jacobs acted under a heat of passion. 
 
 
In short, there is no rational evidence of a heat of 
passion under the same or similar circumstances. 
 
 
Somebody trying to – a police officer trying to pull over 
a defendant for speeding certainly is not the type of act that 
would arouse the type of passion in the mind of an ordinary, 
reasonable person in those same circumstances that would 
create the type of passion that is necessary to negate malice in 
this case. That’s the Court’s determination on that. 
 
[¶8] 
The jury found Ms. Jacobs not guilty of the attempted first- or second-degree murder 
of Trooper Powell, and not guilty of accessory to the attempted first-degree murder of 
 
5 
Trooper Powell.  It found her guilty of accessory to attempted second-degree murder and 
of reckless endangering with a firearm.1  
 
[¶9] 
The district court sentenced Ms. Jacobs to a term of twenty-five to thirty-five years 
on the accessory to attempted second-degree murder count.  It sentenced her to one year 
each on the reckless endangering and misdemeanor possession counts, to be served 
concurrent with each other and with the accessory count.  Ms. Jacobs timely appealed to 
this Court.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
Lesser-Included Offense Instruction 
 
[¶10] Counsel for Ms. Jacobs proposed a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense 
of voluntary manslaughter, which would have allowed the jury to consider the offense of 
accessory to attempted voluntary manslaughter in its deliberations.2  We therefore review 
the district court’s denial of the requested instruction de novo.  Hartley v. State, 2020 WY 
40, ¶ 6, 460 P.3d 716, 718 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Nickels v. State, 2015 WY 85, ¶ 9, 351 P.3d 
288, 290 (Wyo. 2015)). 
 
[¶11] A crime is a lesser-included offense if it meets the statutory elements test, meaning 
that its elements “are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.”  Nickels, ¶ 14, 351 
P.3d at 291 (quoting State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1134 (Wyo. 1993)); see also Cecil v. 
State, 2015 WY 158, ¶ 17, 364 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Wyo. 2015).  If a court determines that 
an offense meets the statutory elements test, it must then determine whether the evidence 
supports giving a lesser-included offense instruction.  Nickels, ¶ 15, 351 P.3d at 292.  
“[T]he quantum of evidence required to give a lesser included offense instruction is 
minimal and a requested instruction should be given ‘if there are in dispute factual issues 
that would permit a jury rationally to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and 
acquit the defendant of the greater.’”  Id. ¶ 16, 351 P.3d at 292 (quoting Keffer, 860 P.2d 
at 1136); see also Dean v. State, 2003 WY 128, ¶ 19, 77 P.3d 692, 699 (Wyo. 2003) (“[A] 
lesser-included offense instruction is not to be given in the absence of some minimal 
evidentiary support.”)). 
 
 
1 The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts against Mr. Childers except the two counts of attempted 
first degree murder.  With respect to those counts, the jury convicted him of the two lesser-included offenses 
of attempted second degree murder.  Mr. Childers appealed only his convictions for felony property 
destruction and felony methamphetamine possession, and we affirmed.  Childers, ¶¶ 32, 33, 493 P.3d at 
174. 
2 Instruction No. 15 read in part: “The offense of Accessory, Aid, and Abet—Attempt: Murder, First Degree, 
with which Defendant CHASITY JACOBS is charged in Count II, also includes the lesser offense of 
Accessory, Aid, and Abet—Attempt: Murder, Second Degree.” 
 
6 
[¶12] We have previously recognized that under the statutory elements test, voluntary 
manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.  Parkhurst v. State, 2019 
WY 63, ¶ 11 n.4, 443 P.3d 834, 837 n.4 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Sanders v. State, 7 P.3d 891, 
894 (Wyo. 2000)); see also Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1139 (“We hold, therefore, that the crime 
of voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of the crime of second degree 
murder.”); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 921-22 (Wyo. 1984) (recognizing that the offense 
of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of aiding and 
abetting first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 
149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  The question in this case then is whether there was the requisite 
minimal evidence to support giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 
 
[¶13] A person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter if “he unlawfully kills any human 
being without malice, expressed or implied, . . . [v]oluntarily, upon a sudden heat of 
passion.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2021). 
 
“Heat of passion” means such passion as naturally would be 
aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the 
same or similar circumstances as those in question which 
would cause him to act rashly, without reflection or 
deliberation, and from passion rather than from judgment. The 
heat of passion must be aroused suddenly, and the act resulting 
in death must occur while the defendant was acting under the 
direct and immediate influence of such heat of passion, and 
before sufficient time has elapsed to permit the heat of passion 
to cool. 
 
Farrow v. State, 2019 WY 30, ¶ 35, 437 P.3d 809, 820 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Wyoming 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction No. 21.05C). 
 
[¶14] Stated another way, “[v]oluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing in the heat 
of passion as a result of severe provocation.”  Shull v. State, 2017 WY 14, ¶ 29, 388 P.3d 
763, 770 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 155 (15th 
ed., Sept. 2016 update)), overruled on other grounds by Schmuck v. State, 2017 WY 140, 
¶ 31, 406 P.3d 286, 297 (Wyo. 2017).  The defendant must be “in a state of passion 
engendered in him by an adequate provocation (i.e., a provocation which would cause a 
reasonable man to lose his normal self-control).”  Shull, ¶ 60, 388 P.3d at 777 (quoting 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 15.2 (2d ed., Oct. 2016 update)); see also 
Taylor v. State, 2009 WY 31, ¶ 25, 203 P.3d 408, 413 (Wyo. 2009) (recognizing “extreme 
provocation and a sudden heat of passion” as “hallmarks of voluntary manslaughter”).  The 
severe or extreme provocation that causes a heat of passion or loss of control must have 
been produced by the victim’s actions.  Krucheck v. State, 702 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 
1985) (quoting State v. Fowler, 268 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Iowa 1978)). 
 
 
7 
[¶15] In this case, there is no evidence of an extreme or severe provocation.  Trooper 
Powell attempted to lawfully stop Mr. Childers for a speeding violation, and he and other 
officers continued that lawful pursuit when Mr. Childers failed to stop.  As a matter of law, 
a reasonable person would not lose her normal self-control or her ability to act from 
judgment rather than passion under such circumstances.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law § 15.2(b)(4) (3d ed., Oct. 2020 update) (“[A] lawful arrest cannot 
constitute sufficient provocation.”) (citing State v. Wood, 607 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 2004); State 
v. Madden, 294 A.2d 609 (N.J. 1972)).  Indeed, Ms. Jacobs herself has not argued on appeal 
that the actions of law enforcement were the provocation for her alleged heat of passion, 
and she in fact has not identified a provocation that she claims to have been sufficient to 
arouse a heat of passion. 
 
[¶16] Moreover, even if Ms. Jacobs had identified a legally sufficient provocation, her 
requested instruction would have been properly refused because she has pointed to no 
evidence that she had acted in a heat of passion.  For example, in Keffer, we held that the 
trial court erred in denying the prosecution’s request for a lesser included offense 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 860 P.2d at 1140.  We explained: 
 
With respect to the first question, the central factual dispute at 
Keffer’s trial was her intent. She admitted firing the gun at 
Jackson and killing him. If the jury accepted all of the State’s 
evidence, the killing was committed with malice. If the jury 
accepted Keffer’s evidence, she acted in self defense, and the 
homicide was justifiable. A middle ground, however, is easily 
seen. If the jury questioned the credibility of the co-employee’s 
testimony, which was strongly attacked by the defense during 
cross-examination, then the presence or absence of malice 
became an open question. Furthermore, the jury heard Keffer 
testify that she was “scared” as she withdrew the gun from a 
bedroom dresser. Keffer’s husband, also testified that Keffer 
was afraid. The jury was entitled to weigh such fear to 
determine if it was of “such a character or degree as to render 
the accused incapable of cool reflection” thus reducing a 
second degree homicide to manslaughter. 
 
Id. at 1139 (emphasis added). 
 
[¶17] In Jahnke, we also held that the evidence supported an instruction on the lesser-
included offense of voluntary manslaughter.  692 P.2d at 922. 
 
The jury in this case rationally could find Deborah Jahnke 
guilty of voluntary manslaughter while acquitting her of the 
greater charged offense of murder. When he testified, Richard 
 
8 
Jahnke characterized Deborah Jahnke as being very upset and 
crying after their parents had left and he had stated his 
intentions. He described her as looking like she was losing it, 
murmuring, shaking, and walking around the house nervously 
running her fingers through her hair as they prepared for their 
parents’ return. Deborah Jahnke was very upset when her 
request to “kill Mom” was refused. Deborah Jahnke’s 
statement and Richard Jahnke’s testimony both established that 
she had been directly involved in a violent family confrontation 
that evening, and that both had been victims of prior abuse at 
the hands of their father. From this testimony the jury could 
have found that Deborah Jahnke was acting “upon a sudden 
heat of passion” aroused by the earlier incidents which 
continued through her participation in the planning and 
accomplishment of what she characterized as the father’s 
execution. 
 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Bruce v. State, 2015 WY 46, ¶¶ 67-68, 346 P.3d 909, 929-
30 (Wyo. 2015) (upholding voluntary manslaughter conviction where witness testified that 
defendant was ranting and hollering after striking victim and told her he was angry because 
he thought victim was having sex with his girlfriend); State v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92, 116-
17, 276 P.2d 434, 443 (1954) (holding jury had no right to convict defendant of crime 
greater than voluntary manslaughter where uncontroverted evidence showed defendant to 
have been “in a highly upset, frightened, and confused emotional and impassioned 
condition,” when she shot victim). 
 
[¶18] In contrast to these cases, the record in this case is devoid of evidence that Ms. 
Jacobs was in an impassioned state.  In fact, the evidence was to the contrary.  The pursuit 
lasted twelve to fifteen minutes and thus was not a sudden occurrence.  During that period, 
Ms. Jacobs had the presence of mind to both fire and reload a weapon, acts that required at 
least some amount of deliberation.  See Sanders, 7 P.3d at 895 (“[F]ashioning a weapon 
from three separate components is not a hallmark of passion, but an indication of planning 
and deliberation.”).3 
 
3 In her brief on appeal, Ms. Jacobs argues (citations to record omitted): 
 
 
Although Ms. Jacobs said she was shooting too, there is no 
evidence of what pistol she was shooting. Ms. Jacobs [sic] DNA was only 
found on the 2 magazines for a 9mm weapon. It was not found on a pistol 
itself. Further, while there is evidence that her DNA was on the 9mm 
magazines, and that based on the number of rounds fired from the 9mm 
that it had to be reloaded in some fashion, there is still an open question of 
when her DNA was deposited on the magazines and whether it was her or 
Mr. Childers who did the reloading. These were disputed issues of fact as 
to what Ms. Jacobs did and was an issue to be determined by the jury.  
 
9 
 
[¶19] Ms. Jacobs does not confront these deficiencies in the evidence, and instead more 
generally argues that because she was an accessory to the attempted crime, it was important 
that the jury consider her separate individual intent in assessing her culpability.  She 
contends that the lesser-included offense instruction on accessory to attempted voluntary 
manslaughter would have so focused the jury’s assessment. 
 
[¶20] We do not disagree that Ms. Jacob’s individual intent as an accessory may differ 
from that of the principal.  “[T]he aider and abettor must share the principal’s criminal 
intent, but the prosecution is not required to prove that the aider and abettor possessed the 
identical intent to that possessed by the principal.”  Fales v. State, 908 P.2d 404, 408 (Wyo. 
1995) (citing Jahnke, 692 P.2d at 921).  “Individual culpability of the several parties to the 
crime is determined by the intent of each of them.” Jahnke, 692 P.2d at 922. 
 
[¶21] That Ms. Jacobs could theoretically have had an intent different from that of Mr. 
Childers does not, however, mean that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was required.  
“[A] lesser-included offense instruction should not be given in the absence of some 
minimal evidentiary support.”  Sindelar v. State, 2018 WY 29, ¶ 55 n.5, 416 P.3d 764, 777 
n.5 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Johns v. State, 2018 WY 16, ¶ 23, 409 P.3d 1260, 1268 (Wyo. 
2018)).  The question is not whether Ms. Jacobs could have had a different intent, but 
whether there was any evidence that she did, so as to support the requested lesser-included 
offense instruction. 
 
[¶22] In this case, the answer to that question is no.  Because there was no evidence of 
either an extreme provocation or that Ms. Jacobs acted in a heat of passion, an instruction 
on the lesser-included offense of accessory to attempted voluntary manslaughter would 
have done no more than improperly invite the jury to speculate as to Ms. Jacobs’ emotional 
state.  See Bruce, ¶ 80, 346 P.3d at 933 (“[A]n instruction is properly refused if it invites 
the jury to engage in speculation or conjecture.”).  The district court thus did not err in 
denying Ms. Jacobs’ requested instruction. 
 
 
 
 
 
First, we note that the evidence showed Ms. Jacobs’ DNA to be on the 45-caliber pistol.  More 
importantly, whether Ms. Jacobs was shooting and whether she reloaded the 9mm weapon are no longer 
open questions, as she suggests.  The jury found her guilty of aiding and abetting attempted second-degree 
murder, presumably based on its finding that she reloaded the 9mm weapon.  It also found her guilty of 
reckless endangering with a firearm, which required a finding that she “[e]ngaged in firing a weapon.”  Ms. 
Jacobs has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and we therefore 
need not revisit her role in the crimes.  We are concerned only with her state of mind when she took those 
actions, and in that regard the only question we must address is whether the record contained even minimal 
evidence of an extreme or severe provocation and that Ms. Jacobs acted in a heat of passion. 
 
10 
B. 
Legality of Ms. Jacobs’ Sentence 
 
[¶23] At the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Ms. Jacobs to “one year of 
incarceration” on the reckless endangering and misdemeanor possession counts.  In its 
written order, the court sentenced her to “a period of not less than one (1) year” on each of 
those same counts.  Ms. Jacobs contends that the written sentences on each of the counts 
were illegal because they exceeded the one-year statutory maximum imprisonment for each 
offense and failed to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement. 
 
[¶24] Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  
Wanberg v. State, 2020 WY 75, ¶ 28, 466 P.3d 269, 275 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Nitchman v. 
State, 2018 WY 116, ¶ 7, 428 P.3d 173, 175 (Wyo. 2018)). 
 
“An illegal sentence is one that exceeds statutory limits, 
imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same offense, 
or otherwise violates the constitution or the law.” Wanberg v. 
State, 2020 WY 75, ¶ 28, 466 P.3d 269, 275 (Wyo. 2020) 
(citing Palomo v. State, 2018 WY 42, ¶ 24, 415 P.3d 700, 705-
06 (Wyo. 2018)). If a discrepancy exists between the district 
court’s oral pronouncement and its written order, “the oral 
pronouncement prevails.” Id. (quoting Palomo, ¶ 26, 415 P.3d 
at 706). A written sentence that is inconsistent with the oral 
pronouncement is not necessarily illegal, but its inaccuracy 
must be corrected. Id. (citing Palomo, ¶ 27, 415 P.3d at 706). 
 
Brown v. State, 2021 WY 79, ¶ 9, 489 P.3d 1162, 1164 (Wyo. 2021). 
 
[¶25] Because the district court’s written sentencing order imposes sentences of not less 
than one year on the reckless endangering and misdemeanor possession counts, it arguably 
imposed open-ended terms on those counts.  The order thus improperly deviated from the 
one-year terms the court orally pronounced during sentencing.  Wanberg, ¶¶ 29-31, 466 
P.3d at 275-76 (remanding to district court to conform written sentencing order to oral 
pronouncement).  Additionally, because the written terms are open-ended, they also 
arguably exceeded the maximum one-year terms authorized by statute for each count, 
rendering them illegal.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504(c) (“Reckless endangering is a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year”); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) (possession of less than three grams of controlled substance in 
powder form is misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of “not more than twelve (12) 
months”).  Accordingly, we remand to the district court for clarification of its written 
sentencing order. 
 
 
 
 
11 
CONCLUSION 
 
[¶26] The district court did not err in denying Ms. Jacobs’ request for a jury instruction 
on the lesser-included offense of accessory to attempted voluntary manslaughter, but the 
court’s written sentencing order deviated from its oral pronouncement.  We therefore 
affirm Ms. Jacobs’ conviction but remand for correction of the court’s written sentencing 
order.