Title: In re Roberts

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 7/21/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
S112505 
In re ORLANDO ROBERTS, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4  B161777 
 
on Habeas Corpus 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
____________________________________) 
Super. Ct. No. No. A330146 
 
 
In Los Angeles County, nearly 30 years ago, petitioner Orlando Roberts was 
convicted of first degree murder and other offenses and was sentenced, under the 
sentencing scheme then in effect, to an indeterminate term of life in prison.  As is 
typical of the majority of persons convicted in that county and other counties 
containing major metropolitan areas, since his commitment to state prison 
petitioner has been incarcerated at several locations in less populous counties 
within the state. 
Petitioner has been the subject of periodic evaluations by the Board of Prison 
Terms (Board) to determine his suitability to be placed on parole, and repeatedly 
has been found unsuitable for parole.  As a consequence, petitioner has filed 
numerous petitions seeking a writ of habeas corpus to overturn the Board’s 
findings of parole unsuitability and to obtain a parole date.  Generally, petitioner 
has filed his habeas corpus petitions in a court within the county in which he then 
was incarcerated.  Recently, the courts that have received his petitions have 
directed that petitioner file them in a court within another county. 
We granted review to resolve an issue involving the procedural framework 
within which the courts consider habeas corpus petitions that challenge the Board’s 
finding of parole unsuitability or denial of a parole date.  Under the procedure 
 
2 
generally applicable to habeas corpus petitions, the court in which such a petition 
initially is filed — within certain guidelines and with respect to various types of 
claims — has discretion to adjudicate the case or, in the event the court determines 
that resolution is more appropriate in another venue, to transfer the case for 
resolution to a court in another county.  Of course, the court in the second county 
has similar discretion to transfer the petition. 
As might be anticipated, when a habeas corpus petition raises a claim, such as 
a challenge to the denial of parole, that has not been addressed in our prior 
decisions directing resolution of particular types of claims by a court in a county 
having a particular connection with the petitioner, the courts of the various counties 
and appellate districts have not always agreed which is the most appropriate court 
to adjudicate the claim.  In that situation, the court that initially receives the 
petition frequently has ordered that it be refiled by the petitioner or directly 
transferred for resolution in another court.  In some instances, repeated transfers 
have been made, with consequential delay in the adjudication of petitions and 
discordant relations between the courts in the affected counties. 
Therefore, we decide in the present case whether a habeas corpus petition 
challenging the Board’s finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole should be 
filed in and adjudicated by a court within the county where petitioner was 
convicted and sentenced or instead in a court within the county where he currently 
is incarcerated.  As we shall explain, we conclude that such a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus must be filed in, and addressed by, the superior court in the county 
where petitioner was convicted and sentenced.  Although the conclusion we reach 
on this procedural point is contrary to that reached by the Court of Appeal, it is 
unnecessary to reverse the judgment of that court, because we do not disturb that 
court’s determination that the petition should properly be denied on the merits. 
 
3 
I 
In 1976, petitioner Orlando Roberts and an accomplice committed a home 
invasion robbery in which they shot two elderly victims, one fatally.  In Los 
Angeles County Superior Court, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder 
(Pen. Code, § 187), attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187), and robbery (Pen. 
Code, § 211), finding true the enhancement allegations that during the commission 
of the offenses a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. 
(a)(1)), that petitioner personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5), and that 
he committed great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7).1 
In February 1977, petitioner was sentenced in the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court under the indeterminate sentencing law then in effect to life in 
prison with the possibility of parole, with a minimum period of seven years’ 
incarceration.  (Former §§ 190, 1168, 3046, repealed by Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, 
§ 273, p. 5140; see fn. 6, post.)  In 1978, the Second Appellate District of the Court 
of Appeal in Los Angeles affirmed the judgment against petitioner, and this court 
denied his petition for review. 
Since that time, on at least eight occasions at regularly scheduled parole 
consideration hearings, petitioner has sought a parole date from the Board.  On 
each occasion the Board has denied his application, finding petitioner unsuitable 
for parole primarily because of the nature of the offenses, petitioner’s refusal to 
accept responsibility and insistence that he falsely was implicated in the crimes by 
his accomplice, and his prior conviction of manslaughter while a juvenile.2 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 
In October 1998, while incarcerated in San Diego County, petitioner again 
requested a parole date.  Following the denial of his request, petitioner filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court alleging that the Board had a duty to 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
4 
In May 1999, petitioner filed in San Diego County Superior Court a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the constitutional proscriptions against ex 
post facto laws and cruel and unusual punishment entitled him to have his prison 
term fixed as provided in the indeterminate sentencing scheme in effect at the time 
of his offenses.  The superior court stayed proceedings on the petition while similar 
litigation was pending before that court in other cases.  In April 2002, the court 
lifted the stay and, in a lengthy order, denied on the merits petitioner’s request for 
relief on habeas corpus.  Petitioner filed a “motion for rehearing.”  The court 
deemed the motion to be a motion for reconsideration, denied it, and in reliance 
upon In re Sena (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 836 (Sena) also directed petitioner to file 
any additional habeas corpus petitions challenging a determination of his 
unsuitability for parole in the county in which he had been convicted and 
sentenced —that is, either in the Los Angeles County Superior Court or the Second 
Appellate District of the Court of Appeal. 
Meanwhile, petitioner had been transferred to Chuckwalla Valley State Prison 
in Riverside County.  In March 2002, the Board conducted a hearing and again 
found petitioner unsuitable for parole. 
In October 2002, petitioner, as directed by the San Diego County Superior 
Court, filed in Los Angeles — this time in the Second Appellate District of the 
Court of Appeal — an original habeas corpus petition alleging that he was entitled 
to have a primary term fixed under the indeterminate sentencing law.  The 
appellate court decided the petition on the merits “to spare petitioner from being 
bounced back and forth” between the two appellate districts and denied relief on 
the ground that a primary term could not be fixed prior to a determination that 
                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
set a parole date.  In March 1999, we denied that petition.  (In re Roberts [Mar. 31, 
1999, S073745].) 
 
5 
petitioner was suitable for parole.  Expressly disagreeing with Sena, supra, 94 
Cal.App.4th 836, the Court of Appeal also advised that the proper venue for a 
habeas corpus petition challenging a determination of unsuitability for parole lies 
in the county and corresponding appellate district in which an inmate was 
incarcerated at the time of the denial of parole. 
Petitioner subsequently filed in this court a petition denominated a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, challenging the determinations of the Court of Appeal that 
he was ineligible to have a primary term fixed prior to a finding of suitability for 
parole and that he was required to file any petition based upon the denial of parole 
suitability in the venue in which he was incarcerated.  We ordered that petitioner’s 
petition be refiled nunc pro tunc as a petition for review, and thus deemed it timely.  
We granted review and limited the issue to be briefed and argued to the 
determination as to which court is the proper venue to adjudicate a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus challenging the denial of parole. 
II 
A 
To provide context for our discussion, we briefly trace the history of the 
procedural rules governing the choice of an appropriate venue to entertain a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Prior to its revision in 1966, the California 
Constitution conferred original habeas corpus jurisdiction upon the superior court 
of the county in which a criminal defendant was incarcerated.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
former § 5; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 344 (Griggs).)  
Following that revision, the California Constitution extended jurisdiction over 
original habeas corpus matters to all superior courts in this state.  (Cal. Const., art. 
VI, § 10.)  As a result, “there is now no territorial limitation on the power of a 
superior court to entertain a petition for habeas corpus relief.”  (Griggs, supra, 16 
Cal.3d at p. 346, fn. omitted.)  Moreover, because article VI, section 10 “grants 
identical original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to both the Court of 
 
6 
Appeal and the superior court, it follows that the 1966 constitutional revision also 
grants such statewide jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal.”  (In re Van Heflin 
(1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 131, 135, fn. omitted; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal 
Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Writs, § 12, p. 531.) 
In the wake of the constitutional amendment, this court issued several 
decisions providing “rules of judicial procedure to be followed by [the] superior 
courts in the exercise of [their] unlimited jurisdiction.”  (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d 
at p. 347.)  The applicable procedure generally has depended upon the nature of 
the relief sought in the petition.  (See, e.g., In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 624 [a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of a prior conviction 
must be filed initially in a court within the county of confinement and, if alleged 
facts establish a prima facie case, “the superior court in the county of confinement 
should then transfer the case to the court which imposed the sentence.”]; In re 
Haro (1971) 71 Cal.2d 1021, 1024-1026, & fn. 1 [following determination of a 
prima facie case, a petition challenging the validity of a prior conviction should be 
transferred to the sentencing court]; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 765, fn. 3 
[same]; cf. In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 88-89, fn. 9 [a petition filed in the 
county of confinement challenging the constitutional validity of a statute requiring 
prosecution approval for dismissal of a prior conviction should be transferred to the 
sentencing court prior to determination whether there is a prima facie case]; In re 
Montgomery (1970) 2 Cal.3d 863, 868-869, fn. 4 [a petition challenging the 
validity of a conviction based upon a retroactive decision of the United States 
Supreme Court should be transferred to a court in the county of conviction, if that 
county is not the one in which the petition was filed].) 
In Griggs, we provided additional guidance for courts in making the 
determination of which court should exercise its jurisdiction to hear and decide a 
habeas corpus petition.  We also confirmed the continuing validity of the 
procedural rules developed in the preceding cases, while at the same time 
 
7 
disavowing as dicta any language in those decisions implying “a continuing 
territorial limitation on habeas corpus jurisdiction.”  (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 
pp. 345-347.) 
Cautioning that the constitutional expansion of jurisdiction to consider the 
issuance of writs of habeas corpus did not signify that a superior court should give 
such consideration in every instance, we directed in Griggs that, in general, when a 
petitioner has complied with pertinent rules, the superior court in which the petition 
is presented should file and review the allegations of the petition in order to 
determine whether it states a prima facie case for relief.  (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d 
at p. 347.)  We explained that if the petition states a prima facie case, the superior 
court must determine whether to hear the matter on the merits.  (Ibid.)  “If the 
challenge is to a particular judgment or sentence, the petition should be transferred 
to the court which rendered judgment if that court is a different court from the 
court wherein the petition was filed . . . .”  (Ibid., italics added; Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 4.552 (b)(2)(A).)  “If the challenge is to conditions of the inmate’s 
confinement, then the petition should be transferred to the superior court of the 
county wherein the inmate is confined if that court is a different court from the 
court wherein the petition was filed.”  (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347, italics 
added; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.552 (b)(2)(B).)3 
                                              
3 
California Rules of Court, rule 4.552, which became effective January 2, 
2002, provides for the transfer of habeas corpus petitions to the proper superior 
court to hear the petition.  The rule provides in relevant part:  “(a)  Except as set 
forth in subdivision (b)(2), the petition should be heard and resolved in the court in 
which it is filed.  [¶]  (b)(1)  The superior court in which the petition is filed must 
determine, based on the allegations of the petition, whether the matter should be 
heard by it or in the superior court of another county.  [¶]  (2)  If the superior court 
in which the petition is filed determines that the matter may be more properly heard 
by the superior court of another county, it may nonetheless retain jurisdiction in the 
matter or, without first determining whether a prima facie case for relief exists, 
order the matter transferred to the other county.  Transfer may be ordered in the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
8 
In Griggs, we did not have occasion to define either of the above italicized 
phrases.  We did not “attempt . . . to state a general rule or all-inclusive specific 
rules which direct the proper procedural disposition in each instance,” and 
acknowledged that certain types of petitions do not fall within either of the 
described categories.  (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347.)  We advised that 
“unless there is substantial reason for transferring a petition it should be entertained 
and resolved in the court where filed.”  (Ibid.)  In applying those standards, we 
held that a habeas corpus petition — claiming that the Department of Corrections’ 
error in noting a prior conviction in its records prevented the petitioner’s 
assignment to work camp — could be resolved as efficiently by the court in the 
county where the petitioner was incarcerated as by any other court.  (Ibid.) 
B 
Among other functions, petitions for writ of habeas corpus traditionally have 
afforded the means to challenge determinations of unsuitability for parole or 
denials of parole.  (In re Streeter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 47, 49; see In re Rosenkrantz 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 658 (Rosenkrantz); 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, 
supra, Criminal Writs, § 54, p. 585.)  In applying the rules enunciated in Griggs for 
habeas corpus petitions generally to petitions that challenge parole-related 
                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
following circumstances:  [¶]  (A)  If the petition challenges the terms of a 
judgment, the matter should be transferred to the county in which judgment was 
rendered.  [¶]  (B)  If the petition challenges the conditions of an inmate’s 
confinement, it may be transferred to the county in which the petitioner is confined.  
A change in the institution of confinement that effects a change in the conditions of 
confinement may constitute good cause to deny the petition.  [¶]  (3)  The 
transferring court must specify in the order of transfer the reason for the transfer.  
[¶]  (4)  If the receiving court determines that the reason for transfer is inapplicable, 
the receiving court must, within 30 days of receipt of the case, order the case 
returned to the transferring court.  The transferring court must retain and resolve 
the matter as provided by these rules.” 
 
9 
determinations, the parties in the present case place very different emphasis upon 
particular aspects of our opinion.  Therefore, as an initial matter, we consider 
which aspect of the guidance we provided in Griggs is most relevant in deciding 
which is the proper court to resolve a habeas corpus petition challenging an adverse 
determination regarding parole. 
For his part, petitioner emphasizes our admonition in Griggs that a substantial 
reason should exist for the court in which a habeas corpus petition initially is filed 
to transfer the petition to another court for hearing and disposition.  Petitioner 
asserts that the court in which the petition is filed should determine, based upon the 
facts of the specific case, whether to transfer the petition to another court.  For 
example, a petition that presents a “major issue” related to an offense committed in 
a county other than the county in which the petition is filed properly would be 
transferred to a court in the former county. 
The Attorney General, on the other hand, emphasizes that in Griggs we 
discussed two types of challenges made in habeas corpus petitions — challenges to 
the judgment or sentence, and challenges to the conditions of confinement.  Citing 
considerations of judicial economy and efficiency, the Attorney General requests 
that we determine whether petitioner’s challenge to the Board’s finding that he is 
unsuitable for parole is analogous to a challenge to the judgment or sentence, or 
instead to a challenge to the conditions of confinement; thus we are asked to decide 
which court —the tribunal located in the county of sentencing or the one located in 
the county of incarceration — properly should decide such a petition.  The 
Attorney General agrees with the Court of Appeal that petitioner’s challenge to the 
finding of parole unsuitability more nearly corresponds to a challenge to the 
conditions of confinement, and that the court in the county of confinement 
therefore should have resolved the petition. 
As we stated in Griggs, generally speaking a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus should not be transferred to another court unless a substantial reason exists 
 
10 
for such transfer.  In general, a habeas corpus petition should be heard and resolved 
by the court in which the petition is filed. 
Nonetheless, we observe, as the Attorney General has pointed out, that the 
volume of parole hearings and consequently the volume of habeas corpus petitions 
seeking relief from unfavorable determinations related to parole, has expanded 
greatly in recent years and undoubtedly will continue to increase in view of 
enactments such as the Three Strikes Law.4  Moreover, as discussed below, it 
appears that recently the courts have engaged in, as one court termed it, a “tennis 
match” with respect to the decision to transfer parole-related habeas corpus 
petitions ― a circumstance suggesting that application of a case-by-case standard 
to this endeavor would perpetuate existing procedural impediments to the timely 
resolution of these petitions.  We therefore believe that considerations of judicial 
economy and efficiency weigh against a case-by-case approach and in favor of our 
making the determination which venue is proper in all such cases. 
Accordingly, we begin by examining which of two categories identified in 
Griggs — a challenge to a petitioner’s judgment or sentence, or a challenge to the 
conditions of his or her confinement — more nearly comprises or corresponds to a 
habeas corpus petition challenging the denial of a parole date, and thus which 
court — that located in the county of sentencing or that in the county of 
incarceration — properly should hear and decide such a petition. 
The Courts of Appeal whose divergence of opinion attracted our review have 
discussed the two categories identified in Griggs.  In Sena, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 
836, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life 
                                              
4 
For example, according to the Board’s Web site, in 1998 a total of 2,191 
parole hearings were held for persons who received sentences of life in prison.  
(Bd., Caseload Statistics, Lifer Hearing  [as of July 21, 2005].)  In 2003, a total of 4,498 parole hearings were 
held for life-term prisoners.  (Ibid.) 
 
11 
in Los Angeles County and thereafter was incarcerated in San Luis Obispo County.  
After the Board denied his request for a parole date, the petitioner challenged the 
denial by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County.  That court transferred the matter to the Superior Court of San 
Luis Obispo County.  After another round of transfers between the courts in San 
Luis Obispo County and Los Angeles County, the Court of Appeal issued an order 
to show cause “to stop this tennis match.”  (Id. at p. 838.) 
In Sena, the Court of Appeal held that the Board’s decision denying parole 
involved the underlying sentence rather than the conditions of confinement, and 
that consequently the sentencing court in Los Angeles County should hear and 
determine the habeas corpus petition.  (Sena, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 838-
840.)  The appellate court held, in the alternative, that the petition did not disclose 
any “ ‘substantial’ reason” for transfer from the court in which it initially was 
received, because the petitioner merely alleged that the prison term he already had 
served was sufficiently lengthy for a second degree murder conviction and that he 
was rehabilitated.  (Id. at p. 840.) 
The court in Sena reasoned that a parole decision is related to the sentence 
imposed, because “ ‘parole eligibility is considered an integral part of any sentence 
[citation].  [Citations].’  A petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking parole 
denial is a challenge to the length of sentence, i.e., the sentence itself.  It should be 
heard in the court which ‘rendered judgment.’  [Citation.]”  (Sena, supra, 94 
Cal.App.4th at p. 839.)  The court also observed that petitions raising similar 
claims had been held to challenge the underlying sentences and to be subject to 
adjudication in the sentencing court.  (Id. at p. 839, citing In re Oluwa (1989) 207 
Cal.App.3d 439, 443-444 [entitlement to custody credits]; In re Van Heflin, supra, 
58 Cal.App.3d at pp. 133-136 [erroneous inclusion of a prior felony conviction in 
the abstract of judgment].) 
 
12 
The Court of Appeal in the present case viewed the matter very differently.  It 
found that the Board’s determination of unsuitability for parole was unrelated to 
the validity of the underlying sentence, but rather was “prison based” because it 
concerned the prisoner’s continued incarceration, was made by a panel of the 
Board at the site of the prisoner’s confinement, and was based upon the prisoner’s 
“offenses, criminal record, prison conduct and readiness for parole, and potential 
danger to the community if released.” 
The present Court of Appeal concluded that therefore, the Board’s denial of 
parole suitability falls within a broad category — distinct from either of the two 
categories described in Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d 341 and instead identified in 
California Standards of Judicial Administration, former section 6.5, which 
provided that an appellate court ordinarily should deny, without prejudice, a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus based primarily upon facts occurring outside 
that appellate district, including petitions that question “the conditions of 
confinement or the conduct of correctional officials.”  (Italics added.)5  The 
appellate court concluded that because the Board’s conduct in denying parole 
constituted conduct of correctional officials identified with petitioner’s 
incarceration, a habeas corpus petition challenging the denial of parole suitability 
should be filed and adjudicated in a court in the county or corresponding appellate 
district where that official conduct primarily occurred — in petitioner’s case, the 
Fourth Appellate District, where he then was incarcerated. 
                                              
5 
California Standards of Judicial Administration, former section 6.5, adopted 
in 1985 and repealed effective January 1, 2005, stated:  “A Court of Appeal should 
ordinarily deny, without prejudice, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is 
based primarily on facts occurring outside the appellate district.  These include 
petitions that question (1) the validity of judgments or orders of trial courts located 
outside the appellate district, and (2) conditions of confinement or the conduct of 
correctional officials outside the appellate district.”  (See now, Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 60(e).) 
 
13 
Having considered the opposing views of these Courts of Appeal, we agree 
with the court in Sena that a challenge to the Board’s denial of suitability for parole 
should be adjudicated by a court in the county in which the petitioner was 
convicted and sentenced.  As we shall explain, in making a parole-related 
determination the conduct of the Board is not the equivalent of conduct of 
individual correctional officials.  In procedural and substantive terms, this type of 
determination is more analogous to the sentencing determination made by the court 
in the county where the judgment was rendered than it is to a decision affecting 
confinement.  As a practical matter, the Board’s parole determination is as readily 
reviewable by a court located in the county where the prisoner was sentenced as it 
is by a court located in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated, and 
significantly the Board’s determination is more appropriately reviewed by a court 
located in the county where he or she was sentenced.  Finally, important 
considerations of public policy support this conclusion. 
In order to understand the nature of the Board’s determination with respect to 
the matter of parole, we first consider the character of that agency.  The executive 
branch has “inherent and primary authority” over parole matters.  (Rosenkrantz, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 667.)  Within that branch, the Board is an “executive parole 
agency” that is an “arm of the Department of Corrections.”  (In re Dannenberg 
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1078 (Dannenberg); Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 
665.)6  The Board has limited authority over the duration of a prisoner’s 
                                              
6 
The former indeterminate sentencing law (ISL) established “an 
administrative framework for term-fixing and parole-granting” by creating the 
Adult Authority, an administrative agency within the Department of Corrections.  
(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 644; People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 
169, 174; former §§ 5001, 5075-5082; see Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 
1077-1078.)  The Adult Authority made the determination of suitability for parole, 
as well as (pursuant to statutory guidelines) the actual length of the term a 
defendant was required to serve.  (Former §§ 3020, 3040; Dannenberg, supra, 34 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
14 
confinement, whereas authority over the conditions of confinement is reposed in 
the Department of Corrections.7 
The Board’s status as an arm of the state’s correctional entity does not convert 
the parole decisions of the Board into the decisions of correctional officials.  The 
Board is a distinct entity, and the commissioners of the Board, who are authorized 
to conduct hearings and perform other duties related to parole matters, are not 
correctional officials.  (See, e.g., §5075 [appointment and composition of the 
Board], § 5076.1 [conduct of meetings and employment of deputies], § 5076.3 
[authority of the Board Chairman as head of a department to issue subpoenas], and 
§ 5080 [authority to request transfer of prisoners by the Department of 
Corrections].) 
                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Cal.4th at pp. 1077-1078; People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94; In re 
Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 434-435.) 
 
On July 1, 1977, the ISL was repealed and the Uniform Determinate 
Sentencing Act of 1976 (DSL) became effective.  (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, p. 
5140; see generally Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1077-1078.)  The Adult 
Authority was abolished and replaced by the Board.  (§ 5078.)  In In re Stanworth 
(1982) 33 Cal.3d 176, 181-188, we held that a life prisoner sentenced under the 
ISL and determined to be suitable for parole following enactment of the DSL was 
entitled to the benefit both of pre-DSL and post-DSL guidelines in the 
determination of a parole date.  Petitioner never has been determined to be suitable 
for parole. 
7 
The Board’s discretion under the DSL has been narrowed from that of its 
predecessor, but it remains broad.  (See Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1078-1080; In re Stanworth, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 182-185.)  The Board 
decides the actual confinement periods of life-term inmates within a statutory 
range.  (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1078; see § 3040.) The Board may 
not, by denying parole, retain a prisoner sentenced to a life-maximum term for a 
period grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the state 
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.  (Dannenberg, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1096; see In re Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 651, 
656.) 
 
15 
It is the Attorney General’s view, shared by amicus curiae Los Angeles 
County Superior Court, that because the Board is an executive agency rather than a 
judicial entity, the Board’s function is not comparable to that of a sentencing court 
and its parole determination is unrelated to a sentencing decision of the “court of 
commitment.”  In this view, a challenge to the Board’s parole determination, 
therefore, is not a matter for review by that court. 
As we noted at the outset, under the state Constitution the superior court of 
any county, including the county of commitment, has jurisdiction to review a 
habeas corpus petition challenging the Board’s parole determination.  Because 
there is no question that the court has jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of 
parole suitability, and we merely decide here the appropriate venue in which to 
adjudicate a challenge to that denial, the Board’s status as an executive agency 
rather than a judicial entity does not preclude our consideration of any features 
shared in common by a parole determination and a sentencing decision that favor 
review by the sentencing court. 
Amicus curiae Los Angeles County Superior Court also asserts that 
sentencing and parole are distinct and unrelated phases in the convicted person’s 
affiliation with the correctional system, and that therefore a court in the county 
where the petitioner is sentenced is in no better position than a court in the county 
where the petitioner is incarcerated to decide claims related to parole. 
It is apparent that a term of imprisonment and the onset of parole are distinct 
phases under the legislative scheme.  (§ 3000; Community Release Bd. v. Superior 
Court (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 814, 817.)  As amicus curiae observes, the general 
objectives of sentencing include protecting society, punishing offenders, deterring 
future crimes, and treating with uniformity those committing the same types of 
offenses (§ 1170, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410; 3 Witkin & Epstein, 
Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Punishment, § 251, p. 334), whereas the objective of 
parole is, through the provision of supervision and counseling, to assist in the 
 
16 
parolee’s transition from imprisonment to discharge and reintegration into society.  
(§ 3000, subd. (a)(1).) 
Generally speaking, however, a sentence contemplates a period of parole, 
which in that respect is related to the sentence.  (See § 1168, subd. (b) [the trial 
court shall not fix the term or duration of the sentence of life imprisonment], 
§ 3000, subd. (a)(1) [the sentence pursuant to § 1168 “shall include a period of 
parole, unless waived”], § 3000.1, subd. (a) [an inmate sentenced pursuant to 
§ 1168 to a maximum of life imprisonment shall remain on parole for life].)  In 
addition, the objectives of sentencing and parole are related; in essence, 
sentencing ⎯ by punitive incarceration ⎯ achieves mandatory separation of the 
offender from society.  At the conclusion of that phase, parole assists in returning 
the prisoner to society while simultaneously affording some measure of continuing 
protection to society. 
The Attorney General and amicus curiae Los Angeles County Superior Court 
also suggest that other features of the Board’s parole determination, including its 
timing and the factors it takes into account, establish that a prisoner’s challenge to 
a parole determination is more analogous to his or her challenge to the conditions 
of confinement.  We recognize that a challenge to an adverse determination 
regarding parole, in common with a challenge to the conditions of confinement, 
seeks review of the conduct of officials that occurs during the petitioner’s 
confinement.  Unlike a challenge to the conditions of confinement, however, a 
challenge to official conduct in denying parole suitability seeks review of a 
determination based upon evidence that is not related solely to the period or 
circumstances of confinement, but also to the petitioner’s behavior prior to 
confinement as well as to his or her likely behavior following confinement.8 
                                              
8 
The parties and amici curiae labor to characterize the Board’s parole 
decision as relating primarily either to the circumstances of the prisoner’s offense 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
17 
The particular factors employed in the Board’s evaluation of parole suitability 
do not dictate or suggest the appropriate venue for judicial review of the Board’s 
decision.  That is because, as we recognized in Rosenkrantz, the court’s review of 
the Board’s decision is circumscribed.  The court is authorized to review the factual 
basis of a decision by the Board denying parole “to ensure that the decision 
comports with the requirements of due process of law, but . . . in conducting such a 
review, the court may inquire only whether some evidence in the record before the 
Board supports the decision to deny parole based upon the factors specified by 
statute and regulation.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658; In re Powell 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 894, 901-902.)  Thus, a challenge to the Board’s determination 
may be reviewed as readily by a court in the county of commitment as by a court in 
the county of confinement. 
Other practical considerations, however, indicate that the court in the county 
of commitment is more suited to review the Board’s parole determination.  
Assigning the task of adjudicating habeas corpus petitions that challenge adverse 
parole determinations to the court in the county of commitment will have the 
beneficial effect of producing consistent review of such claims by one court, 
instead of review by a multitude of courts as the petitioner is relocated from one 
prison to another within the state.  In addition, it is likely that the prisoner under 
consideration by the Board will return to and have ties to the county in which he or 
                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
or the circumstances of confinement.  In fact, the Board reviews the offense 
committed, the judgment or sentence, the prisoner’s prior history of offenses, the 
prisoner’s conduct during the period of confinement, and his or her potential future 
conduct.  (§ 3041, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2281-2284, 2402, subds. 
(c), (d); see Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079, 1093-1095; 
Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 654, 679-683; cf., In re Van Heflin, supra, 58 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 136-137 [evidence of conditions of confinement generally is not 
germane at a parole hearing].) 
 
18 
she formerly resided at the time of the offenses that resulted in the commitment.  
We agree with amici curiae San Luis Obispo County Superior Court et alia that 
assigning venue to the court of commitment serves the goal of locating the review 
of parole decisions where the release of the prisoner is most likely to have an 
impact upon the community.  The local prosecutor and persons representing the 
victims often are the sole witnesses at the Board hearing, and they, along with 
persons interested in the prisoner’s welfare, may have the greatest interest in any 
court proceeding that reviews the Board’s determinations, as well as the greatest 
need to have that proceeding conducted in a venue that does not require extensive 
travel. 
Finally, important considerations of public policy support our conclusion.  
Within this state, certain counties ⎯ small in population and contributing a minute 
percentage of the felony convictions that occur statewide, but having large or 
numerous facilities for the incarceration of criminal defendants ⎯ process a 
disproportionate number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus relative to their 
population and their number of felony commitments.  In certain instances, the 
number of petitions filed in a small county is so large that a substantial portion of 
those petitions must be redirected for processing to neighboring sparsely populated 
counties, with an attendant adverse impact upon the resources of the affected 
counties. 
By contrast, certain other counties ⎯ large in population and in their 
number of felony convictions, but having comparatively few (or no) prison 
facilities ⎯ resolve a fraction of the habeas corpus petitions filed statewide by 
inmates in state custody that is small in relation to their share of the state’s 
population and total felony convictions.  Thus, such counties do not share 
 
19 
proportionately in expending the court resources required to adjudicate these 
petitions.9 
                                              
9 
For example, during the state fiscal year 2002-2003, Kings County’s share 
(773) of felony convictions statewide (120,011) was substantially less than one 
percent.  Kings County is the site of three large prison facilities:  California State 
Prison, Corcoran; California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, 
Corcoran; and Avenal State Prison.  During that fiscal year, 415 criminal petitions for 
writ of habeas corpus were filed by inmates in state custody in Kings County.  
(Judicial Council of Cal., 2004 Court Statistics Rep., State Caseload Trends, table 8b, 
Felonies – Filings and Dispositions by Outcome and County, Fiscal Year 2002-2003, 
p. 55.2; id., table 11f, Habeas Corpus — Criminal and “Other” Filings & Dispositions 
by County, Fiscal Year 2002-2003, p. 58.6, on line at 
 [as of July 21, 2005].) 
 
21 
conscious assignments of prospective jurors]; People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
436, 449 [in the exercise of supervisory power over the courts, directing trial courts to 
refrain from instructing juries pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.41.1 on the obligation of 
jurors to advise the court of certain juror conduct].) 
In light of the foregoing considerations, we direct that a petitioner who seeks 
to challenge by means of habeas corpus the denial of parole (or his or her 
suitability for parole) should file the petition in the superior court located in the 
county in which the conviction and sentence arose, and that the petition should be 
adjudicated in that venue.  We also direct that when a habeas corpus petition 
challenging the denial of parole or suitability for parole is filed in the superior 
court in a county other than that in which the petitioner’s conviction and sentence 
were imposed, the filing court should transfer the petition to the superior court in 
the county of commitment in the first instance, prior to any determination being 
made that the petitioner has made a prima facie case.  This practice is equitable and 
will serve to redress the disparity in the relative burdens imposed upon the 
resources of the various courts by this category of habeas corpus petition.   
 Based upon similar considerations, and again in the exercise of our inherent 
authority to establish rules of judicial procedure, we also direct that, among the three 
levels of state courts, a habeas corpus petition challenging a decision of the parole 
board should be filed in the superior court, which should entertain in the first instance 
the petition.  (Accord, In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 688, 692 [directing that in 
general, a section 1054.9 discovery motion related to a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus challenging a judgment of death or life without possibility of parole first 
should be made in the trial court that rendered the judgment]; Roma Macaroni 
Factory v. Giambastiani (1933) 219 Cal. 435, 436-438 [directing that applications for 
writ of mandate ordinarily “should first be made to the superior court”].) 
 
22 
III 
Because we have disagreed with the Court of Appeal solely with respect to its 
determination that the proper venue for the petition for writ of habeas corpus 
challenging the determination that petitioner is unsuitable for parole lies in the 
county and corresponding appellate district in which petitioner is incarcerated, and 
we do not disturb the Court of Appeal’s decision that petitioner is ineligible to have 
a primary term fixed prior to a finding of suitability for parole, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Roberts 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 104 Cal.App.4th 151 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S112505 
Date Filed: July 21, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Melinda J. Lasater 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Donald Specter, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Orlando Roberts. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Frances T. 
Grunder, Assistant Attorney General, and Julie L. Garland, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent the 
People. 
 
Frederick R. Bennett and Christine Zarifian for Los Angeles Superior Court as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Respondent the People. 
 
Rita Coyne Federman, Charles A. Piccuta; Dawn N. Pilimanu; Kathryn Houck; and William S. Bateman for 
San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Monterey County Superior Court, Kings County Superior Court 
and Solano County Superior Court as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Donald Specter 
Prison Law Office 
General Delivery 
San Quentin, CA  94964 
(415) 457-9144 
 
Julie L. Garland 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 Wes A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2604