Title: Rosser v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARCUS ROSSER, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 41, 2019 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No.  N1407011336 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: September 20, 2019 
Decided: 
October 28, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Marcus Rosser, has appealed the Superior Court’s denial 
of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that in May 2015, a Superior Court jury found 
Rosser guilty of Assault First Degree; two counts of Possession of a Firearm During 
the Commission of a Felony; Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon; Robbery First 
Degree; and Aggravated Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited 
(“APFBPP”).  After a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced 
 
2 
Rosser to a total period of forty years of incarceration, to be suspended for probation 
after serving eighteen years in prison.   
(3) 
The evidence presented at trial reflected that, around 8:00 p.m. on July 
13, 2014, Ronald Maddrey encountered Rosser, who was an acquaintance of 
Maddrey’s, at a 7-Eleven convenience store in New Castle, Delaware.  Rosser was 
driving a silver SUV.  Maddrey agreed to sell marijuana to Rosser at a different 
location.  Maddrey and Rosser then drove their vehicles to a nearby apartment 
complex.  As Maddrey approached Rosser’s SUV, Rosser pulled out a gun and shot 
Maddrey in the arm.  During a police interview after the shooting, Maddrey 
identified Rosser as his assailant. 
(4) 
Later that same evening, a teenager named Tyler Buchanan was outside 
a different New Castle convenience store when a man in an SUV beckoned 
Buchanan to approach the vehicle.  Buchanan did not comply, and he made a rude 
hand gesture when the man started to drive away.  The man then returned, and as 
Buchanan walked toward the vehicle, the man brandished a gun at Buchan and 
robbed him of a pack of cigarettes.  Later, in the early morning hours of July 14, 
2014, the police showed Buchanan a photographic array.  Buchanan identified 
Rosser as the man who robbed him at gunpoint. 
(5) 
Shortly after the Buchanan robbery, a police officer observed an SUV 
matching the description of Rosser’s SUV near the apartment complex where 
 
3 
Maddrey had been shot.  The officer stopped the vehicle and arrested Rosser.  The 
police searched the SUV and seized a revolver with one bullet missing.  Both 
Maddrey and Buchanan testified at trial and identified Rosser as their assailant.  
Rosser did not testify at trial.  This Court affirmed on direct appeal.1 
(6) 
Following his conviction, Rosser filed several motions, including a pro 
se motion for postconviction relief in which he asserted that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance.  The Superior Court appointed postconviction 
counsel to represent him.  After reviewing the record, postconviction counsel 
concluded that there were no meritorious grounds for relief and moved to withdraw 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7).  After additional submissions, 
including an affidavit from trial counsel addressing the claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the motion for postconviction relief was referred to a 
Commissioner for a report and recommendation under Superior Court Criminal Rule 
62.  
(7) 
The Commissioner entered a report and recommendation in which she 
concluded that Rosser’s motion for postconviction relief was without merit and 
recommended that the court deny the motion for postconviction relief and grant 
postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw.2 After de novo review, the Superior 
                                               
 
1 Rosser v. State, 2016 WL 1436604 (Del. Apr. 5, 2016). 
2 State v. Rosser, 2018 WL 6432985 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2018) (Commissioner’s report and 
recommendation). 
 
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Court adopted the Commissioner’s recommendations.3  Rosser has appealed to this 
Court. 
(8) 
On appeal, Rosser argues that the Superior Court erred by ruling that 
his trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by (i) failing to request a 
“missing evidence” jury instruction; (ii) stipulating that Rosser was a person 
prohibited from possessing a firearm and failing to file a motion to sever the 
APFBPP charge from the other charges; and (iii) failing to adequately investigate 
the case.  To the extent that Rosser has not raised or briefed on appeal other claims 
that he presented to the Superior Court, those claims are deemed waived and will not 
be addressed by the Court.4 
(9) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion.5  We review de novo constitutional claims, including claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.6  In order prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) his defense counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding 
                                               
 
3 State v. Rosser, 2018 WL 6721365 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2018). 
4 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150 (Del. 1993). 
5 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 
6 Id. 
 
5 
would have been different.7  Although not insurmountable, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.8  A 
defendant must also make concrete allegations of actual prejudice to substantiate a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.9   
(10) First, Rosser argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not 
request a Lolly instruction based on the State’s failure to collect the stolen cigarette 
pack, which the robber tossed into the street after taking it from Buchanan at 
gunpoint.  A Lolly instruction “tells the jury, in a case where the State has failed to 
collect or preserve evidence which is material to the defense, to assume that the 
missing evidence would have tended to prove the defendant not guilty.”10  Rosser 
contends that the police officers who investigated the Buchanan robbery negligently 
failed to collect the cigarette pack, which might have contained material evidence of 
the robber’s identity, in the form of DNA or fingerprints.   
(11) Rosser has not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable 
representation or demonstrated actual prejudice concerning this claim, because he 
                                               
 
7 Harris v. State, 2018 WL 3239905, at *2 (Del. July 2, 2018) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
8 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
9 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
10 Baynum v. State, 133 A.3d 963, 967 (Del. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).  See Deberry v. 
State, 457 A.2d 744 (Del. 1983) (holding that the State, including its police agencies, is obligated 
to preserve evidence that is material to a defendant’s guilt or innocence and that, when the State 
fails in this duty, the defendant is entitled to an inference that the evidence would be exculpatory); 
Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992) (extending Deberry to a claim involving a police failure 
to gather evidence). 
 
6 
has not shown that the cigarette package was material to his guilt or innocence.  
“Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that it will affect the 
result of the proceeding.”11  In Lolly, the police failed to collect blood that was left 
behind when a burglar entered a residence through a booby-trapped window; there 
were no eyewitnesses to the burglary and the blood likely would have contained 
evidence material to the identification of the perpetrator.12  In this case, in contrast, 
the victim identified Rosser as the perpetrator, and it is mere speculation that the 
cigarette pack might have provided any evidence regarding the robber’s identity.13 
(12) Second, Rosser contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by agreeing, with Rosser’s assent, to stipulate that Rosser was a person 
prohibited from possessing a firearm and by failing to seek to sever trial of the 
APFBPP charge from trial on the other charges.  A defendant making an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim based on a failure to seek severance of charges “must 
show that joinder of the offenses was sufficiently prejudicial that it was objectively 
unreasonable for defense counsel not to move for severance.”14  Moreover, 
“[j]oinder of person-prohibited charges with other charges is appropriate when the 
                                               
 
11 Cook v. State, 2000 WL 1177695, at *4 (Del. Aug. 14, 2000). 
12 Lolly, 611 A.2d at 958. 
13 See Cook, 2000 WL 1177695, at *4 (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
request a Lolly instruction concerning blood observed in a getaway car; the blood was not material 
to the defendant’s claim of misidentification because the defendant was identified by 
eyewitnesses). 
14 Moody v. State, 2018 WL 4676706, at *2 (Del. Sept. 24, 2018) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
7 
charges are ‘based on the same act or transaction[,] constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan.’”15   
(13) Joinder was appropriate here, and Rosser therefore cannot show that it 
was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel not to seek severance.  Rosser was 
charged with Aggravated Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, which 
required the jury to conclude that, while Rosser possessed the firearm, he caused 
serious physical injury to Maddrey.  The APFBPP charge was therefore part of the 
“same act or transaction” as the other charges arising from the Maddrey incident, 
and counsel did not act unreasonably by not seeking severance.  Moreover, in these 
circumstances, there is no reason to believe that severance of the charges would have 
resulted in a different outcome.  Similarly, the Superior Court did not err by 
determining that trial counsel’s advice to Rosser to stipulate to his person-prohibited 
status in order to prevent the jury from hearing evidence regarding Rosser’s prior 
convictions was not unreasonable or substantially prejudicial.16 
(14) Third, Rosser asserts that his trial counsel failed to adequately 
investigate the case.  Specifically, he contends that trial counsel did not attempt to 
                                               
 
15 Brooks v. State, 2018 WL 5980577, at *2 (Del. Nov. 13, 2018). 
16 See id. at *3 (stating that stipulation to person-prohibited status was a reasonable trial strategy 
because it minimized the effect of the defendant’s criminal history on the trial and that, “[v]iewed 
together, trial counsel’s decisions to forgo a severance motion so that Brooks faced one trial and 
to stipulate that Brooks was a person-prohibited were neither objectively unreasonable nor 
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant relief under rule 61”). 
 
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develop a justification defense based on the statements of “Nas,” an acquaintance of 
Rosser’s and Maddrey’s who interacted with Rosser and Maddrey at the 7-Eleven 
store shortly before the Maddrey shooting.  In his affidavit in response to Rosser’s 
postconviction motion, trial counsel indicated that in his view the evidence did not 
support a self-defense claim, because Rosser never admitted shooting Maddrey and 
there was no evidence that Maddrey was the aggressor in the confrontation or that 
he possessed a weapon.17  In support of his claim of ineffective assistance, Rosser 
has submitted a transcript of an interview that a defense investigator conducted with 
Nas.  Nas told the defense investigator that he was speaking to Maddrey at the 7-
Eleven store when Rosser arrived.  Nas stated that Rosser was acting erratically, and 
that Rosser referred to Maddrey as “the enemy” and threatened to “shoot all y’all 
up” before speeding off in his vehicle.18  Nas also stated that he called Rosser later 
to check on him and Rosser said “Man, I think I messed up.  I messed up.”19  The 
Nas interview is not exculpatory, and therefore does not support a conclusion that 
trial counsel’s determination not to pursue a justification defense fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, or that Rosser was prejudiced by that 
determination.20 
                                               
 
17 Appendix to Opening Brief at A-50. 
18 Appendix to Opening Brief at A-20-22. 
19 Appendix to Opening Brief at A-27. 
20 See Tice v. State, 1995 WL 715854, at *3 (Del. Nov. 13, 1995) (rejecting claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on failure to call victim as a defense witness because further testimony 
 
9 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                               
 
from the victim “potentially could have done more harm than good” to the defense and the 
defendant had “failed to substantiate to any degree how [the victim’s] testimony during the defense 
portion of trial would have changed the outcome of the trial in [the defendant’s] favor”); Slater v. 
State, 1995 WL 89955, at *4 (Del. Mar. 1, 1995) (“[A]lthough Slater complains about counsel’s 
failure to call certain witnesses, he offers no proof of the exculpatory testimony they could have 
provided.  In sum, it does not appear from the record that counsel’s representation was below an 
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”).