Title: In re Devers

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: January 22, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to 
the Conduct of

JOHN J. DEVERS,

Accused.

(OSB 93-175, 94-96; SC S39997)

	En Banc

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.

	Argued and submitted September 11, 1998.

	John J. Devers, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs in propria persona.

	Mary A. Cooper, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, argued
the cause and filed a brief for the Oregon State Bar.

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is disbarred, commencing 60 days from the date
of filing of this decision.

	PER CURIAM

	In this disciplinary proceeding, a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board found that the accused committed multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, namely, 
disciplinary rules (DR) 1-102(A)(3)(1) and 
DR 3-101(B)(2) and
suspended him from the practice of law for 15 months.  Because
that suspension was more than six months, this court
automatically reviews the trial panel's decision.  ORS 9.536(2);
Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1.  Our review is de novo.  ORS
9.536(3); BR 10.6.  On review, the Oregon State Bar (Bar)
contends that the accused's misconduct warrants disbarment.  For
the reasons that follow, we agree.  However, before turning to
the merits, we address procedural matters that potentially are
dispositive.

I.  DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

	The accused contends that he was denied due process of
law in three respects.  His first allegation is that he was 
denied due process of law when the trial panel chair denied his
motion to adjourn the trial panel hearing on November 20, 1996. 
The Bar responds that the chair of the trial panel did not abuse
his discretion in denying the accused's motion.

	The "essential elements" of due process in the context
of a lawyer discipline proceeding are notice and an opportunity
to be heard and defend "in an orderly proceeding adapted to the
nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the
cause."  In re J. Kelly Farris, 229 Or 209, 214, 367 P2d 387
(1961) (quoting Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 99 Utah 28, 96 P2d 722, 725 (1939)).  In order to
determine whether the accused's due process rights were violated
in this case, we must describe in some detail the context in
which the claimed deprivation occurred.

	On November 14, 1996, less than a week before the trial
panel hearing was to begin, the accused filed motions to have
counsel appointed to represent him and to reschedule the hearing
date.  At the outset of the hearing on November 20, he renewed
those motions.  He argued that the hearing should be adjourned
and rescheduled because, on November 11, he had discharged the
lawyer who had been representing him.  The accused contended that
he needed more time to prepare for the hearing in order to
respond to the Bar's witnesses and "to obtain counsel to assist
me in this matter."  He conceded that the charges against him,
which we discuss later in this opinion, had not changed during
the many months that the proceeding had been pending and that
there were "no surprises" on the list of witnesses that the Bar
planned to call at the hearing.  The accused also reiterated that
he would admit to the charges that he practiced law during the
period of his administrative suspension.  However, he contended
that, if the Bar planned to call witnesses to testify "as to
those admitted issues," he was entitled to attack their
credibility and needed more time to prepare to do so.  After
conferring off the record with the trial panel members, the trial
panel chair denied the accused's motion to adjourn and also
limited the testimony of the witnesses "to the extent there has
been an admission."

	On this record, we find no error.  The accused admitted
to practicing law during his administrative suspension, and the
trial panel chair limited the testimony of witnesses as noted
above.  The accused makes no argument about what impact, if any,
impeachment evidence might have had on issues of mitigation.

	The accused also contends that his due process rights
were violated when the trial panel denied his motion for
appointed counsel.  According to the accused, disciplinary
proceedings are quasi-criminal, and "[q]uasi-criminal proceedings
carry certain constitutional protections including the right to
counsel."  He contends that the right to be represented by
counsel includes the right to be represented by appointed
counsel.  The Bar responds that, although this court has not
addressed specifically whether accused lawyers have the right to
appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings, other
jurisdictions have rejected that argument.

	This case does not provide the opportunity to address
the merits of an accused's entitlement to appointed counsel in
disciplinary proceedings.  Even assuming that this court might
recognize such a right, where the right to appointed counsel
exists, the person asserting the right must be indigent.  See
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 25, 101 S
Ct 2153, 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981) (describing indigent litigants'
right to appointed counsel).

	Although the accused's motion for appointed counsel
stated that he "is currently without sufficient funds to retain
counsel," he presented no evidence of indigency and he makes no
claim in his brief to this court that he is indigent. 
Furthermore, the trial panel chair asked the accused at the
hearing whether he had the ability to retain counsel.  The
accused responded that he was "currently working out an
arrangement whereby counsel can be paid."  In the course of
asking that the hearing be postponed that day, the accused also
stated:

	"[I]f I can't come up with the money to retain counsel,
to whom I've already spoken about this, who has
indicated a willingness to involve himself if the
matter will be adjourned, then quite honestly I will be
back and I will ask the panel to appoint and the panel
has that obligation."  (Emphasis added.)

In sum, the record does not establish that the accused was
indigent.

		Finally, we address the accused's contention that his
due process rights were violated because he did not receive an
impartial adjudication because the trial panel erroneously denied
his motion to disqualify a panel member.  The Bar contends that
the accused's motion was untimely under BR 2.4(g).(3)

		The trial panel hearing ended on November 21, 1996.  On
May 3, 1997, almost six months later, the accused moved to
disqualify a trial panel member on the ground that she slept
during some of the testimony and at times "physically and
verbally assault[ed] panel members to obtain their concurrence in
denying relief sought by the Accused."(4)  The trial panel denied
the motion in its opinion, concluding that the trial panel member
had not engaged in "any inappropriate behavior."  Notably, the
accused did not object during the hearing when he asserts that he
observed the trial panel member sleeping, and he did not object
during the hearing when the member allegedly was intimidating the
other members into ruling against him.

		The Rules of Procedure do not specify a mechanism for
dealing with allegedly inappropriate behavior if it occurs during
a disciplinary hearing, but it is well established that, in trial
proceedings, objections must be made in a timely manner.  See,
e.g., State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 248, 809 P2d 81 (1991) (motion
for mistrial based on objectionable statements or conduct must be
made immediately after the statement or conduct).  An accused's
failure to raise an objection in a timely manner in a
disciplinary proceeding is unfair to the Bar and to the trial
panel.  In this case, if the accused had made timely objections,
the trial panel would have had an opportunity to respond to his
concerns and correct any improprieties.  Because the accused's
objections were not timely, we do not consider his argument that
he did not receive a fair adjudication.  Cf. State v. Hitz, 307
Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (claim of error must be presented
in a timely manner).

		We turn to the merits.

II.  MISCONDUCT

		The accused is charged with misconduct during three
periods of time -- a period of administrative suspension, a
period of disciplinary suspension, and the period when he sought
reinstatement to the Bar after the disciplinary suspension. 

A.  Administrative Suspension

		On April 20, 1993, the Bar suspended the accused from
the practice of the law for failure to pay his Professional
Liability Fund (PLF) assessment.  See 9.080(2)(a) (authority to
require active Bar members to maintain professional liability
insurance).  On July 6, 1993, the Bar suspended the accused for
failure to pay his Bar dues.  Several months later, the accused
paid both his PLF assessment and his Bar dues, and he was
reinstated effective October 11, 1993.  BR 8.4(a).

		Although the accused was administratively suspended
from the practice of law from April 20 until October 11, 1993, he
practiced law during that period of suspension by representing
two clients in ongoing litigation.  He disclosed to one client,
Hallock, that he was suspended, but Hallock wanted the accused to
continue to represent him.  The accused did not disclose his
suspension to his other client, Phillips.  

		The accused's representation of those two clients
during his administrative suspension forms the basis of five of
the Bar's causes of complaint.  The Bar alleges that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by failing to disclose his suspension and
that he violated DR 3-101(B) by continuing to practice law while
suspended.  The accused concedes that his conduct violated both
of those disciplinary rules.  We agree.  There is no need to
elaborate on each of the matters that formed the basis of the
complaint.

B.  Disciplinary Suspension

		In 1992, the State of Michigan suspended the accused
from the practice of law for four months for unethical conduct in
three matters.  The Oregon State Professional Responsibility
Board recommended that this court reciprocally suspend the
accused from the practice of law in Oregon based on his Michigan
suspension.  See BR 3.5 (providing for reciprocal discipline). 
On July 29, 1993, this court suspended the accused for six months
on a reciprocal basis.  In re Devers, 317 Or 261, 855 P2d 617
(1993).  However, the accused's request for reconsideration by
this court, which was denied on September 21, 1993, and his
motion to the United States Supreme Court to stay the appellate
judgment, which was denied on November 23, 1993, delayed the
effective date of that suspension.  The disciplinary suspension
became effective on November 29, 1993.  The accused admits that
he learned on November 30, 1993, that his disciplinary suspension
had become effective.  The Bar alleges that the accused practiced
law in two matters after November 30, 1993.  We consider each
matter separately.

		1.  Stine v. Hallock

		The accused was negotiating a settlement on Hallock's
behalf in a foreclosure action when he learned that his
disciplinary suspension had gone into effect.  He continued to
represent Hallock, with Hallock's consent, in the settlement
negotiations in that case.  He communicated with opposing
counsel, reviewed drafts of the settlement agreement, and
prepared a draft of that agreement.  The accused also signed the
final agreement, but crossed out his title, "Attorney for
Hallock," thereby giving the first hint to opposing counsel that
he was suspended from the practice of law.

		The Bar's third cause of complaint contains the
allegation that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 3-101(B) by 
failing to disclose his disciplinary suspension to
opposing counsel and by practicing law during his disciplinary
suspension.  The accused contends that the Bar failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he practiced law after
November 30.  Although the accused admits that he negotiated the
terms of the settlement on Hallock's behalf and that he drafted a
settlement agreement in the case, he contends before this court
that those activities do not constitute the practice of law. 
According to the accused, he acted merely as a scrivener when he
revised and redrafted the settlement agreement.

		This court has held that "any exercise of an
intelligent choice, or an informed discretion in advising another
of his legal rights and duties, will bring the activity within
the practice of the profession."  State Bar v. Security Escrows,
Inc., 233 Or 80, 89, 377 P2d 334 (1962); see also State ex rel
Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 284 Or 23, 31, 584 P2d 759 (1978) 
(drafting a contract is the practice of law).  The accused's
negotiation on Hallock's behalf required legal expertise and
informed discretion in order to represent Hallock's interests. 
Further, drafting the settlement agreement required the accused
to make legally informed judgments based on drafts that had been
prepared by two other lawyers (one who represented Stine and one
who represented a third party) and to exercise informed
discretion on Hallock's behalf.  For example, in order to protect
Hallock's interests, the accused inserted wording into the
agreement regarding a claim for labor and materials that Hallock
would have against the third party, including reasonable attorney
fees in enforcing the claim.  That is the work of a lawyer, not a
scrivener.  

		A lawyer has a continuing obligation to comply with all
pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
even during a period of suspension.  See In re Coe, 302 Or 553,
557-59, 731 P2d 1028 (1987) (suspension from the Bar does not
terminate the court's jurisdiction over a lawyer's conduct).  A
lawyer's intentional failure to disclose a suspension to a client
violates DR 1-102(A)(3), because it is a misrepresentation of a
material fact.  In re Whipple, 320 Or 476, 487, 886 P2d 7 (1994). 
Furthermore, a lawyer who fails to disclose a material fact to
opposing counsel and fails to correct a known erroneous
impression violates DR 1-102(A)(3).  In re Boardman, 312 Or 452,
456-57, 822 P2d 709 (1991).  The accused's suspension from the
practice of law was a material fact.  His intentional failure to
disclose his suspension to opposing counsel during negotiations
in the Stine v. Hallock matter was a misrepresentation of a
material fact under DR 1-102(A)(3), because he failed to correct
the erroneous impression that he was qualified to practice law. 
See generally In re Martin, 328 Or 177, 185, __ P2d __ (1998)
(phrase "conduct involving dishonesty" in DR 1-102(A)(3) "imports
with it a notion of knowledge or intentionality").  

		We find by clear and convincing evidence that the
accused violated violated DR 3-101(B) by practicing law during
his disciplinary suspension and that he violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
by not disclosing to opposing counsel that he was suspended from
the practice of law.

		2.  Hallock v. Sass

		When the accused learned of his disciplinary suspension
on November 30, 1993, he was representing Hallock in a civil
matter involving the construction of a home.  The accused
remained the lawyer of record in that case until January 6, 1994. 
In that capacity, at a minimum, he accepted pleadings and
discovery requests on Hallock's behalf.  On January 6, at the
outset of a pretrial conference, the accused informed the court
and opposing counsel that he would have to resign from the case
because he was suspended from the practice of law.

		The Bar's fourth cause of complaint contains the
allegation that the accused practiced law in this matter during
his disciplinary suspension and that he failed to notify opposing
counsel of his disciplinary suspension until January 6, 1994. 
The accused does not dispute the trial panel's finding that he
practiced law in the Hallock v. Sass matter, and we accept that
finding.  The accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by not disclosing
to opposing counsel between November 30, 1993, and January 6,
1994, the fact of his disciplinary suspension, and he violated DR
3-101(B) by practicing law while suspended during that 
period.(5)

C.  Reinstatement Application

		When his disciplinary suspension expired, the accused
submitted an application for reinstatement, on which he attested
that he had not engaged in the practice of law during the period
of his suspension.  In its sixth cause of complaint, the Bar
alleges that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by falsely
representing on his reinstatement application that he had not
practiced law during his disciplinary suspension.  The accused
responds that he did not practice law during his disciplinary
suspension or, in the alternative, that he did not knowingly make
a misrepresentation on his application for reinstatement because,
at the time he signed the reinstatement application, he believed
that his conduct in negotiating and drafting the settlement
agreement in the Stine v. Hallock matter was not the practice of
law.  The trial panel concluded that the accused was not credible
on this point, and this court gives weight to that assessment. 
See In re Brown, 326 Or 582, 598, 956 P2d 188 (1998) (court gives
weight to trial panel assessment of credibility).

		As discussed above, we find that the accused practiced
law during his disciplinary suspension in the Stine v. Hallock
matter.  The accused does not dispute the trial panel's findings
with respect to his practicing law in the Hallock v. Sass matter
during his disciplinary suspension.  The accused's testimony
regarding his conduct after November 30, 1993, resolves any doubt
about this matter:

	"* * * I went ahead and did things on behalf of Mr.
Hallock which constitute the practice of law while I
was suspended.  I have real conflict between my remorse
having done that and -- I don't want to say pride
because that's not the right word.  But being able to
look in the mirror and realize that I went ahead and
helped a client as best I could.  Tremendous personal
risk, obviously.  And I'm not the only one that is
going to pay the price for that.

		"* * * * * 

		"I was stupid from an attorney's perspective.  Not
 	only was I hanging myself out to dry, I wasn't getting 
	paid for it. * * *"

The record is replete with evidence that the accused practiced
law during his disciplinary suspension, knew that he did so, and
falsely represented to the contrary on his reinstatement
application.  We find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by
claiming on his reinstatement application that he did not
practice law during the period of his disciplinary suspension.

III.  SANCTION

	The accused committed multiple violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) and multiple violations of DR 3-101(B).  In determining
the appropriate sanction for that misconduct, we are guided by
the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and Oregon case
law.  See In re Donovan, 327 Or 76, 80, 957 P2d 575 (1998) (so
holding and illustrating process).  The court first considers
three factors to determine the appropriate sanction:  the duty
violated, the accused's mental state, and the actual or potential
injury sustained.  We then examine any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to determine whether that sanction should be
adjusted.  See ABA Standards 9.2 and 9.3 (describing aggravating
and mitigating factors to justify an increase or decrease in the
degree of discipline to be imposed).  Finally, we look to Oregon
case law.

A.  Duty Violated

	The accused's conduct in failing to notify those
concerned of his administrative and disciplinary suspensions
violated his duty of honesty to his clients, to the public, and
to the legal profession.  ABA Standards 4.0, 5.0, and 7.0.  The
accused also violated his duty to the public and to the legal
profession to refrain from the unauthorized practice of law.  ABA
Standards 5.0 and 7.0.  Finally, the accused violated his duty to
follow the terms of prior disciplinary orders.  ABA Standard 8.0.

B.  Mental State

	ORS 9.160 provides that "no person shall practice law
or represent that person as qualified to practice law unless that
person is an active member of the Oregon State Bar."  The
accused, like everyone else, is presumed to know the law.  See
Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 359-60, 839 P2d 217 (1992) 
(persons presumed to know legislative enactments relevant to
them).  As explained earlier, we have rejected the accused's
contention that he did not knowingly practice law while
suspended.  The ABA Standards provide that an act is intentional
if it is done with a conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
a particular result.  ABA Standards at 17.  We conclude that the
accused acted intentionally when he held himself out as eligible
to practice law when he was not eligible to do so and by not
disclosing to all his clients and opposing counsel that he was
suspended from the practice of law.  See In re Jones, 312 Or 611,
617-18, 825 P2d 1365 (1992) (experienced lawyer acted
intentionally when engaged in unauthorized practice of law); see
also In re Whipple, 320 Or at 487 (intentional failure to
disclose status to client).  We also conclude that the accused
intentionally made a misrepresentation on his reinstatement
application by declaring that he had not practiced law during his
disciplinary suspension.

C.  Injury Sustained

	Because the purpose of the lawyer discipline process is
to protect the public, actual injury is not required; the
potential for injury is sufficient.  ABA Standards at 25.  By
intentionally and repeatedly disregarding the disciplinary rules,
the accused harmed the legal profession.  Moreover, the
unauthorized practice of law inherently carries the potential to
injure the legal system.  See Whipple, 320 Or at 488 (so
stating); Jones, 312 Or at 618-19 (unauthorized practice of law
creates potential for injury to public and legal system). 
Although the trial panel found -- and we agree -- that the
accused's clients were not injured by his misconduct, the
potential for injury existed, because between April 30, 1993, and
October 11, 1993, the accused was not covered by legal
malpractice insurance, the purpose of which is to protect clients
from the consequences of professional error.

	Although the accused's misconduct implicates several
ABA Standards,(6) ABA Standard 8.1 is dispositive.  It provides
that disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:

	"(a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a
prior disciplinary order and such violation causes
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the
legal system, or the profession; or 	

	"(b) has been suspended for the same or similar
misconduct and intentionally or knowingly engages in
further similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, the legal
system, or the profession."

According to the Commentary to ABA Standard 8.1:

		"Disbarment is warranted when a lawyer who has
previously been disciplined intentionally or knowingly
violates the terms of that order and, as a result,
causes injury or potential injury to a client, the
public, the legal system, or the profession.  The most
common case is one where a lawyer has been suspended
but, nevertheless, practices law. * * *  

		"Disbarment is also appropriate when a lawyer
intentionally or knowingly engages in the same or
similar misconduct. * * *."  ABA Standards at 47
(emphasis added).

Disbarment clearly could be an appropriate sanction in this case. 
To determine whether that sanction should be imposed, we consider
aggravating and mitigating factors.

D.  Existence of Aggravating or Mitigating Factors

		We find the following aggravating factors.  The accused
has a prior disciplinary record in Michigan (an admonishment in
1979, orders of reprimand in 1987 and 1988, and a suspension in
1992) and in Oregon.  ABA Standard 9.22(a).  The accused
displayed a pattern of misconduct, manifested by repetition of
the same violations.  ABA Standard 9.22(c).  The accused
committed multiple offenses.  ABA Standard 9.22(d).  The accused
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of practicing law
while suspended by continuing to practice while he was suspended
and by disputing that his conduct was the practice of law.  ABA
Standard 9.22(g).  The accused has substantial experience in the
practice of law.  ABA Standard 9.22(i).

		We find the following mitigating factors.  The accused
suffered from personal problems, which were primarily financial
in nature.  ABA Standard 9.32(c).  After he discharged his 
lawyer and began to represent himself, which was near the date of
the trial panel hearing, the accused cooperated with the
disciplinary proceedings.  ABA Standard 9.32(e).  The trial panel
found that the accused has a good reputation.  ABA Standard
9.32(g).(7)

E.  Oregon Case Law

		The Bar relies on Jones for its argument that the
accused's misconduct warrants disbarment.  In that case, although
not referring to ABA Standard 8.1, the court held that
"[i]ntentionally continuing to practice law in the face of this
court's earlier suspension supports disbarment."  312 Or at 619. 
The court found a number of aggravating factors in Jones.  One of
the "most disconcerting" was Jones's refusal to recognize the
wrongfulness of his conduct.  Ibid.  The court found that the
mitigating factors -- the absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive and the presence of physical impairment -- were "not
sufficiently weighty to reduce the sanction" of disbarment. 
Ibid.

		Jones is very similar to this case.  Like the accused
here, the lawyer in Jones committed multiple violations of
disciplinary rules, including engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law after he had been suspended by this court.  Id.
at 613.  Like the lawyer in Jones, the accused attempts to
justify his misconduct by claiming that he was trying to protect
the interests of his client, Hallock, by practicing law while
suspended.  The accused's refusal to recognize the wrongfulness
of his misconduct is just as disconcerting here as the same kind
of conduct was in Jones.  Also like the lawyer in Jones, the
accused has substantial experience in the practice of law.

		The accused also refuses to recognize the actual injury
that he has caused to the legal profession and the potential
injury that his misconduct caused to his clients and the public. 
His disregard for the orders of this court is strong evidence of
his pattern of misconduct and his refusal to recognize the
wrongful nature of his conduct.

		As noted above, in Jones, the court concluded that the
mitigating factors were not sufficiently weighty to reduce the
sanction of disbarment.  The same is true here.  Like the lawyer
in Jones, the accused here suffered from personal problems,
albeit financial rather than physical.  The trial panel found
that the accused was motivated by what he felt to be the best
interests of his clients, just as the lawyer in Jones did not act
out of a dishonest or selfish motive.  Although the accused in
this case eventually cooperated with the Bar, he did so only
after he began to represent himself, which was less than a week
before the hearing.  The additional mitigating factor in this
case -- the accused's good reputation -- is not itself sufficient
to reduce the sanction of disbarment.  We conclude that the facts
of this case require disbarring the accused from the practice of 
law.(8)

		The accused is disbarred, commencing 60 days from the
date of filing of this decision.

1. 	DR 1-102(A)(3) provides:

		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to   
* * * [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation."

2. 	DR 3-101(B) provides:

		"A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction
where to do so would be in violation of regulations of
the profession in that jurisdiction."

3. 	BR 2.4(g) provides, in part:

		"The Bar and an accused * * * shall be entitled to
one peremptory challenge and an unlimited number of
challenges for cause as may arise under the Code of
Judicial Conduct or these rules.  Any such challenges
shall be filed in writing within seven days of written
notice of an appointment of a trial panel with the
regional chairperson for disciplinary proceedings and
the state chairperson * * * for cases involving
challenges to a regional chairperson. * * * The Bar and
an accused * * * may waive a disqualification of a
member in the same manner as in the case of a judge
under the Code of Judicial Conduct."

4. 	In its brief to this court, the Bar discusses the
additional issue of an alleged ex parte contact between the same
trial panel member and Bar disciplinary counsel before the
hearing in the accused's case.  In his reply brief, the accused
argues that that ex parte contact provides an independent basis
for granting his motion to disqualify the trial panel member. 
Because the alleged contact occurred before the hearing, the
accused's motion to disqualify on that basis should have been
made before the hearing.  The accused contends that it would have
been pointless for him to file a challenge before the hearing,
because the trial panel member in question was the regional
chairperson.  However, BR 2.4(g) provides that challenges to a
trial panel member who is a regional chairperson are decided by
the state chairperson. 

5. 	The Bar also asserts that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) in the Stine v. Hallock and Hallock v. Sass matters by
failing to notify the court of his suspension.  However, the Bar
makes no argument about when or in what manner a lawyer who is
suspended from the practice of law must provide such notice.  We
conclude that this is not an appropriate case for considering and
resolving that issue.

6. 	ABA Standard 4.62 provides:

	"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or
potential injury to the client."

ABA Standard 5.11(b) provides that disbarment is generally
appropriate when:

	"a lawyer engages in * * * intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice." 

ABA Standard 7.2 provides:

	"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a
duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system."

7. 	The accused argues that an additional mitigating factor
is that it took "an unconscionable period of time" for the case
to reach hearing.  The accused is correct that "delay in
disciplinary proceedings" may be a mitigating factor under ABA
Standard 9.32(j).  However, the record reveals that in this case
the accused shares responsibility for the delay.

8. 	Because the formal complaint in this case was filed in
1994, the accused may apply for reinstatement five years after
the effective date of this decision.  BR 6.1(e).