Title: GUILLERMO MARQUEZ-GUITIERREZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GUILLERMO MARQUEZ-GUITIERREZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 155167 P.3d 1232Case Number: 06-117Decided: 09/26/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
GUILLERMO 
MARQUEZ-GUITIERREZ,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry 
Rogers, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After 
approximately 180 pounds of marijuana were discovered in the van in which 
Guillermo Marquez-Guitierrez was a passenger, he was arrested.  A jury found Marquez-Guitierrez guilty 
on three counts of drug-related charges.  
He claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
the marijuana because he was illegally detained and there was no reasonable 
suspicion present.  We hold that the 
district court did not err, and affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      
Marquez-Guitierrez phrases the issue as follows:

 
 
Did the 
District Court err in Denying [Marquez-Guitierrez's] Motion to Suppress the 
Evidence When [he] was Illegally detained and There was no Reasonable Suspicion 
to Detain [him] Until he Consented to A Search of His 
Vehicle?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On November 19, 
2004, Wyoming State Trooper Scimone was on duty, traveling westbound on I-80 in 
Albany County, Wyoming.  
He observed a Ford Econonline van without a front license plate traveling 
eastbound.  As the van passed, 
Trooper Scimone noticed that the van had a rear plate from Illinois.  Recognizing that Illinois requires both 
front and rear plates, the trooper turned around to apprehend the van.  Upon reaching the van, Trooper Scimone 
first confirmed that it did not have a front plate.  Then the trooper noticed that the van 
had substantially decreased its speed, from about 73 mph when he first observed 
it, to 63-65 mph.  The trooper then 
watched the van weave inside its own lane, drive onto the fog line, and then 
over the center dividing line.  
After monitoring the van for some time, the trooper initiated a traffic 
stop at 4:14 p.m.

 
 
[¶4]      As he approached 
the passenger side of the vehicle, the trooper noticed Marquez-Guitierrez in the 
passenger seat.  Neither he nor the 
driver, Chris Cardona, made eye contact with the trooper.  Cardona provided Trooper Scimone with a 
driver's license and registration, but no proof of insurance was produced.  As Cardona passed the documentation over 
Marquez-Guitierrez, the trooper noticed both men's hands 
shaking.

 
 
[¶5]      Cardona then 
accompanied Trooper Scimone back to his patrol car.  The trooper went back to the van and 
proceeded to ask Marquez-Guitierrez a few questions.  He informed Trooper Scimone that the two 
men were from the Los Angeles area and that they 
were on their way to Illinois to drop off the van and visit 
relatives.  Marquez-Guitierrez also 
told the trooper that the van belonged to someone else, and that neither he nor 
Cardona knew the city they were traveling to, only the exit number off of I-80, 
which was their destination.  During 
their conversation, Trooper Scimone also noticed a cell phone in the center 
console and air fresheners throughout the van.

 
 
[¶6]      Meanwhile, during 
Trooper Scimone's and Marquez-Guitierrez's conversation, Trooper Mann 
arrived.  After the conversation 
with Marquez-Guitierrez ended, Trooper Scimone asked Trooper Mann to call for a 
drug dog.  At this point, Trooper 
Scimone reasoned that he wanted the dog there in case there was consent to 
search  in other words, asking for the dog at this point in the stop would 
simply save some time.

 
 
[¶7]      Trooper Scimone 
then returned to his patrol car, which was still occupied by Cardona.  He ran an NCIC check on the van, and a 
warrant check for both travelers.  
He also processed paperwork for the warning ticket he planned to issue to 
Cardona.  During these several 
minutes of paperwork, Trooper Scimone and Cardona made small talk about cars, 
football, and Wyoming wildlife.  Interspersed in the conversation were a 
couple of travel questions, to which Cardona responded that he was simply 
helping to drive, but that he did not know who owned the van.  Fourteen minutes into the stop, at 4:28 
p.m., Trooper Scimone asked Trooper Mann to return Cardona's documentation, and 
then informed him, "Things will get wrapped up in a 
second."

 
 
[¶8]      However, Trooper 
Scimone was not done questioning Cardona.  
He asked him if there were any drugs or alcohol in the van.  Cardona denied there being any drugs or 
alcohol present.  Next, the trooper 
informed Cardona that he was going to issue a warning ticket for having no front 
license plate or proof of insurance and for weaving.  At 4:31 p.m., the trooper told Cardona 
they could be on their way, and that they were "good to 
go."

 
 
[¶9]      As Cardona exited 
the patrol car, he asked Trooper Scimone what he needed to do about the warning 
ticket.  The trooper told him to 
simply consider the ticket a "souvenir" and nothing needed to be done about 
it.  The trooper then asked Cardona 
if he could ask him a few more questions, to which he agreed.   The trooper asked to search the 
vehicle and Cardona agreed.  He was 
told a dog would be there soon to "take a quick sniff," and that the men could 
be on their way.

 
 
[¶10]   While waiting for the dog, Trooper 
Scimone asked more questions relating to paperwork for the consent search, what 
Cardona did for a living, and the presence of drugs in the vehicle.  Eventually, Marquez-Guitierrez also 
returned to the vehicle.  Neither 
Marquez-Guitierrez nor Cardona attempted to revoke the consent to 
search.

 
 
[¶11]   Approximately thirty-three minutes 
after the vehicle was pulled over, and approximately sixteen minutes after the 
consent to search was given, the drug dog arrived.  The dog indicated the presence of drugs 
both outside and inside the van.  
The ensuing search of the van revealed approximately 180 pounds of 
marijuana, which was packaged and concealed between the roof and the interior 
headliner.  Both men were 
immediately arrested and charged with three counts of drug-related charges.1

 
 
[¶12]   Following a jury trial, 
Marquez-Guitierrez was found guilty of all three charges and sentenced.  On January 26, 2006, he timely appealed 
the Judgment and Sentence that was entered on January 10, 2006, specifically 
challenging the denial of his Motion to 
Suppress.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶13]   Our standard of review when 
analyzing the denial of a motion to suppress is well 
known:

 
 

Rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  We will not disturb such 
rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when 
it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.  Factual findings 
made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  
Because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess 
witness credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and 
conclusions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination.  Whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation 
of constitutional rights presents a question of law and is reviewed de 
novo.

 
 

Dettloff 
v. State, 2007 
WY 29, ¶ 11, 152 P.3d 376, 381 (Wyo. 2007) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
ARGUMENT

 
 
[¶14]   Marquez-Guitierrez claims on appeal 
that because he had no reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, Trooper Scimone 
impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop, that the consent to search 
the vehicle was tainted by the illegal detention, and that these errors violated 
both the federal and state constitutions.2  The State responds that the detention 
was permissible under both constitutions because the trooper had a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
including that "overcompensation" of reducing the vehicle's speed to well-below 
the speed limit, extreme nervousness on the parts of both the driver and 
Marquez-Guitierrez, the presence of multiple air fresheners in the van, and the 
unusual travel plans of the men.

 
 
State 
Constitutional Analysis

 
 
[¶15]   Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution requires searches and seizures to be reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.  O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 26, 
117 P.3d 401, 409 (Wyo. 2005).  
Whether a search or seizure is reasonable is a question of law to be 
decided from the totality of the circumstances.  Id. ¶ 25, 117 P.3d  at 409.  Accordingly, we must analyze the 
reasonableness of the detention under all of the circumstances, and whether or 
not the trooper had reasonable suspicion to justify the intrusive measures 
used.

 
 
[¶16]   The district court held that the 
detention was reasonable here because the observations made by the trooper 
supported his reasonable suspicion and allowed for continued detention.  Those observations included: (1) both 
the driver's and passenger's refusal to look at the trooper while he was 
traveling beside them and that they slowed to well below the speed limit; (2) 
both the driver and passenger having "extreme nervousness;" (3) the presence of 
multiple air fresheners; (4) the presence of black duffel bags in the rear of 
the vehicle; (5) the driver's and passenger's confusion as to their destination; 
(6) the inability of both the driver and passenger to produce more information 
as to their destination other than an exit number; and (7) the fact that they 
were traveling from a source city (Los Angeles) to a destination area (the 
Midwest).

 
 
[¶17]   The district court also commented 
on the trooper's questions during the initial stop.  The court stated:

 
 
Trooper 
Scimone clearly asked questions that were in no way related to the purpose of 
the stop, but most of these were asked while he was completing the paperwork on 
the warning tickets.  While these 
questions may have been utilized to prolong the length of the stop in some small 
part, they were not utilized in forming any reasonable suspicion to proceed with 
the detention.  While Campbell [v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d 781, 785 (Wyo. 2004)] stands for the rule that an officer generally may 
not ask the detained motorist questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop,' 
Id. at 
¶ 12.  Campbell was addressing a question about 
controlled substances, not idle chit chat.  
This Court believes it would be stretching Campbell too far 
to say that an officer cannot engage in idle conversation while awaiting the 
arrival of a K-9 in a situation where that officer already had reasonable 
suspicion to proceed with the detention.

 
 
[¶18]   We agree with the district 
court.  In fact, we recently said in 
Marinaro v. State, 2007 WY 123, 
¶ 8, 163 P.3d 833, 835 (Wyo. 2007)3:

 
 
In that 
regard, we will further note that the United States Supreme Court held in 
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-101, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 1470, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005) that, during the course of a legal detention of an individual, law 
enforcement officers may pose questions to that person that are unrelated to the 
underlying purpose of the seizure and that are not independently justified by 
reasonable suspicion. Following Muehler, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently held that suspicionless questioning of a motorist by a law 
enforcement officer during the course of a traffic stop regarding weapons and 
contraband is not a Fourth Amendment violation so long as it does not extend the 
duration of the traffic stop.  
United 
States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 
1268-69 (10th Cir. 2007).

 
 
[¶19]   Marquez-Guitierrez contends that 
Cardona was improperly removed from the van and placed in the patrol car.  At that point, Marquez-Guitierrez 
contends that no reasonable suspicion existed, and the trooper was embarking on 
a "fishing expedition" to find reasonable suspicion.  Yet, even prior to the trooper's removal 
of Cardona,4 the record shows that the trooper 
had noticed that the vehicle slowed to well below the acceptable speed limit; 
that both men were extremely nervous;5 that there were multiple air 
fresheners present; and that there were large black duffel bags in the rear of 
the vehicle.  Upon further 
discussion with Cardona in the patrol car, the trooper was then able to discern 
more information that further added to his already articulable reasonable 
suspicion.

 
 
[¶20]   From our review of the record, we 
conclude that the district court's conclusion is supported by the evidence 
presented below.  The totality of 
the circumstances in this case accumulated in such a way that the trooper became 
increasingly suspicious that both the driver and passenger of the vehicle were 
involved in illegal activity.  
Although any of these circumstances alone may not have justified the 
detention, all of them together 
support the conclusion that Trooper Scimone had reasonable suspicion to believe 
criminal activity was afoot, thus warranting the further detention and that 
detention did not violate the Wyoming Constitution.

 
 
[¶21]   Before leaving this issue, we 
address, as we did in Negrette v. State, 
2007 WY 88, ¶ 17, 158 P.3d 679, 683 (Wyo. 2007) that Marquez-Guitierrez substantially 
relies on O'Boyle to support his 
argument that his detention was unreasonable.  We said about O'Boyle, 

 
 
In 
O'Boyle, a driver was stopped for going four miles per hour over the 
speed limit and then was questioned extensively about subjects having nothing to 
do with the reason for the stop or his travel plans, including what courses his 
son was taking in college, whether he lived on campus and the name of the 
college mascot. The obtrusive questioning in O'Boyle occurred despite the 
trooper's admission that he did not have a reasonable suspicion of other 
criminal activity beyond the speeding violation.

 
 

Negrette, 
¶ 17, 158 P.3d  at 683.  As in 
Negrette, O'Boyle is also 
distinguishable in this case "both by the extensiveness of the questioning and 
the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id.  Here, Trooper Scimone asked a limited 
number of questions that were relatively restrained in their subject 
matter.  Unlike the sixty questions 
asked in O'Boyle, many of which were 
unrelated to the stop, the trooper here asked questions that were for the most 
part related to travel plans.  Also, 
those questions were, in part, based upon the trooper's general doubts about 
their travel plans, given that two California residents were driving a van 
cross-country that neither one owned, had any connection with, and were only 
traveling to an exit number.  
Neither Cardona nor Marquez-Guitierrez was subjected to "persistent and 
sustained questioning that unreasonably expanded the scope of the stop."  O'Boyle, ¶ 32, 117 P.3d  at 
412.  O'Boyle is factually 
unlike this case and does not support Marquez-Guitierrez's 
argument.

 
 
[¶22]   We next turn to 
Marquez-Guitierrez's contention that his consent to the search of his vehicle 
was involuntary.  Specifically, he 
argues that his consent was involuntary because it was preceded by an unlawful 
detention.  This argument fails 
because we have already held that the detention prior to consent was 
lawful.  We reasoned in O'Boyle that:

 
 
A waiver 
of constitutional rights under our constitution must appear by clear and 
positive testimony, and, if a search or seizure is based upon the proposition 
that consent was given, there should be no question from the evidence that 
consent was really voluntary and with a desire to invite search, and not done 
merely to avoid resistance.  
Acquiescence and nonresistance have not been deemed sufficient under 
Wyoming law to 
establish consent.  

 
 

O'Boyle, 
¶ 38, 117 P.3d  at 412. 

 
 
[¶23]   Here, consent to search was 
actually given by the driver, not Marquez-Guitierrez.  However, because both Marquez-Guitierrez 
and Cardona had apparent authority over the van,6 we consider this issue here.  Marquez-Guitierrez argues that because 
"Trooper Scimone never told Mr. Cardona he could refuse to answer the additional 
questions, could refuse the search, or that he was free to leave," that his 
acquiescence to the search did not actually constitute consent, per O'Boyle.  O'Boyle, ¶ 44, 117 P.3d  at 
413.  Contrary to 
Marquez-Guitierrez's argument, Trooper Scimone did tell Cardona that he was free 
to go and, in fact, opened the patrol car so that he could exit the 
vehicle.

 
 
[¶24]   It is also evident that the consent 
was voluntary, given the facts that are borne out by the record.  First, at the time Trooper Scimone 
requested permission to search, all documents had been returned to both 
men.  Marquez-Guitierrez was in the 
van, and Cardona was told he was free to go  he extended the interaction between 
himself and Trooper Scimone by asking a question about the warning ticket.  It was at that juncture that the trooper 
asked Cardona if he could ask him a couple more questions.  Cardona agreed, and then agreed to the 
trooper's request to search the van.  
Cardona himself testified at the suppression hearing that Trooper Scimone 
released him before requesting consent to search, that the trooper was 
easy-going and non-threatening, and that he was not coerced or intimidated into 
giving consent.  Accordingly, no 
constitutional violation occurred.

 
 
Federal 
Constitutional Analysis

 
 
[¶25]   We have described our Fourth 
Amendment analysis as follows:

 
 

In 
determining whether a traffic stop detention was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, we apply the two-part inquiry established in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S.  at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, that is: 1) was the initial stop justified, 
and 2) were the officer's actions during the detention "reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
instance[?]"  In making this 
inquiry, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected bright-line rules and focused 
instead on a fact-specific reasonableness inquiry.  Under the Fourth Amendment, the 
government has the burden of demonstrating that a seizure was sufficiently 
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative 
seizure.

 
 

O'Boyle, 
¶ 46, 117 P.3d  at 414 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶26]   Marquez-Guitierrez does not 
challenge the appropriateness of the initial stop.  Our analysis, therefore, centers on 
whether or not the trooper's actions during the detention were reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances justifying the interference in the first 
place.  We have summarized the 
standards applicable under this prong of the Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) analysis 
as follows:

 
 

An 
officer's actions during a traffic stop must be reasonably related to the 
purpose of the stop.  Absent valid 
consent, a reasonable suspicion of other unlawful activity or reasonable 
suspicion that a detainee is armed, an officer may not expand an investigative 
detention beyond the scope of the stop, ask questions unrelated to the stop or 
"embark on a fishing expedition in the hope that something will turn up."  The relevant question is whether the 
scope of the stop was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and 
the burden of proving reasonableness lies with the 
government.

 
 

O'Boyle, 
¶ 49, 117 P.3d  at 415 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶27]   After being stopped for not having 
two license plates as necessitated by Illinois law, Marquez-Guitierrez was seized 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  We must determine under the totality of 
the circumstances whether or not the trooper's actions during the detention were 
reasonably related in scope to the stop.

 
 

[¶28]   In making this determination, we 
are guided by the following principles: 1) A detention must be carefully 
tailored to the reason for the stop; 2) an officer may request the detainee's 
driver's license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration or rental papers, 
run a computer check and issue a citation or warning; 3) an  officer may 
make reasonable inquiry into travel plans to the extent necessary to put the 
traffic violation in context; 4) absent reasonable suspicion of other illegal 
activity or that a detainee is armed, the officer may not ask questions 
unrelated to the stop; and 5) an officer may expand the scope of the detention 
only with valid consent or a reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity or 
that the detainee is armed.  O'Boyle, ¶ 55, 117 P.3d  at 416.

 
 

[¶29]   Here, we 
conclude that the scope of the detention initially was appropriately tailored to 
the reason for the stop.  Before 
obtaining consent to search or deploying the drug dog, Trooper Scimone knew that 
both men were California residents, were 
occupants of a van registered in Illinois, that neither man owned the van, and 
that they were traveling to an exit number on the interstate.  This, combined with their nervousness, 
the presence of air fresheners, overcompensation in reducing the driving speed, 
and avoidance of eye contact, amounted to reasonable suspicion enough to justify 
Trooper Scimone's decision to expand the scope of the stop.  Accordingly, we hold that the detention 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

 
 
[¶30]   We affirm the district court's 
order denying the motion to suppress, as we do the judgment and 
sentence.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The charges 
were: (1) Possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, marijuana, 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007); (2) 
Possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (c)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2007);  and (3) 
Conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031 (a)(ii) and 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 
2007).

 
 

2The driver 
of the vehicle, Cardona, consented to the search of the 
vehicle.

 

3We note that 
the cases mentioned in this citation involved federal, not state, constitutional 
claims.

 
 

4Typically, 
a reasonable investigation of a traffic stop may include asking for the driver's 
license and registration, requesting the driver to sit in the patrol car, and 
asking the driver about his destination and purpose.  United 
States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 
1994).  See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977); State v. 
Butcher, 137 
  
       Idaho 125, 
131, 44 P.3d 1180, 1186 (Idaho App. 2002)  ("During a lawful traffic stop, the 
officer may instruct the driver to exit the vehicle or to remain inside.  This procedure is within the police 
officer's discretion and is not otherwise 
unlawful.")

 
 

5"It is 
generally accepted that nervousness upon the initial confrontation is normal and 
the telling information is whether the citizen calmed after the initial few 
minutes of the encounter.  Extreme 
and continued nervousness, however, is entitled to somewhat more weight.'"  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 21, 
64 P.3d 700, 708 (Wyo. 2003) (citations omitted).

 
 

6While 
Cardona was in the driver's seat of the van when it was stopped, it was clear 
that both were driving to         
              
       Illinois, that neither man claimed to be "in 
charge" of the vehicle, and that neither man actually owned the vehicle but were 
both using it with permission of the owner.