Title: Bhakta v. County of Maui. S.Ct. Order Amending the Opinion of the Court, filed December 13, 2005, filed 12/30/2005 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

  

-000-

ee
SYOTSNA BHAXTA,

individually and as Personal Representative
Of the Estate of MITESH BHAKTA, Deceased; NIKHIL BHAKTA,
Qiminor, by his Next Friend, CANDACE TURNER; DEWAL SHAH,
‘Thdividvally and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of MEGHAL SHAH, Deceased; DAXA BHAKTA, Individually
‘and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
BHUPENDRA BHAKTA, Deceased; CATHY M. ARENDS, Individually
nd as Personal Representative of the Estate of
DONALD ARENDS, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants;

COUNTY OF MAUI, STATE OF HAWAI'I,
‘Defendante-Appellees,

 

and

ng RY €} asia

a
JOHN DORS 1-5, JOHN DOB CORPORATIONS 1-5, JOHN DOE
PARTNERSHIPS 1-5, ROE NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 1-5,

‘Gnd ROE GOVERNUENTAL AGENCIES 1-5, Defendants.

a

No. 24780

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. No. 99-0074(1))

DECEMBER 13, 2005
MOON, ¢.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

‘his negligence action arises out of the drowning
deaths of four men, Meghal Shah, Mitesh Bhakta, Bhupendra Bhakta,
and Donald Arends [hereinafter, collectively,

the decedents], at
Ke'anae Landing on the north shore of the island of Maui, Hawai'i
(between Psia and Hana). On May 5, 1999, plaintiffs-appellants
Dewal Shah (Dewal), gyotena Bhakta (Jyotena), Daxa Bhakta (Daxa),
and Cathy Arends (Cathy), the wives of the decedents
(hereinafter, collectively, the widows), filed their first
amended complaint, individually and as personal representatives

of their respective husband's estate, and Nikhil Bhakta, the son

 

of Mitesh Bhakta [hereinafter, the widows, the decedenta’
estates, and Nikhil Bhakta are collectively referred to as

Plaintiffs], alleging negligence against the County of Maui (the

 

County), the State of Hawai'i, and Doe defendants. Following a
jury-waived trial, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, the
Honorable Artemio C. Baxa presiding, entered final judgment on
November 21, 2001 in favor of defendant-appellee state of Hawai'i
(the state) .*

Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment entered in
favor of the State, challenging the trial court's; (1) Decenber
26, 2000 order denying their motion for summary judgnent; and
(2) Novenber 5, 2001 findings of fact (FOF), conclusions of law
(COL), and order. On appeal, Plaintiffs raise ten points of
error, discussed infra, essentially raising issues regarding the
State’s duty to warn the Plaintiffs of, and failure to protect
them from, the dangerous ocean and man-made conditions at Ke'anae

Landing, as well as evidentiary matters. Plaintiffs challenge

By the tine of trial, the state was the only remaining defendant
inasmuch as the County had been previously dlemiseed via eurmary judgment

 
approximately fifty of the 115 FOFs and Cots issued by the trial
court.? For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ contentions
jack merit, Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s tinal
judgment -
T. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Racksround

‘as explained in greater detail below, the events on
January 30, 1997 leading to the drowning of the decedents Pesan
when Meghal Shah (Meghal), a tourist from Georgia, was allegedly
swept into the ocean while standing at the Ke'anae Landing area.
pesides the individuals who were with him (hereinafter, the
Georgia Group], other individuals passing by on the highway
thereinafter, the Utah group] and local residents living nearby
congregated at the landing area to help.

2. Ke'anae Landing

‘the State owns the land upon which Ke'anae Landing is
Jecated. Originally constructed around 1917, Ke'anae Landing
consisted of a wooden pier and was once a commercial wharf, but
the pier was destroyed during tidal wave in 1946-

today, Ke'anae Landing, considered a historical site,
consists of an upper landing area with concrete stairs descending
approximately six feet to a lover concrete landing area at the

> qe should be noted that, although Plaintiffs dispute many of the
trial court's Fors a2 being contrary to the evidence, they failed to. ©
eriah coure’s fore in their seatenent of points of exror. heir contentions
Sith Peepect co the latter PO! cherbfore, waived. eg Hawai'i Rules of
with fevpesrocedure (HRAP) Rule 20(b) (4), ("Pointe RoE presented in accordance
AEERlthis ection will be disregarded{.]")

 

 

  

 
edge of the ocean. The upper landing area is constructed atop
the natural lava rock coastline, approximately six feet above sea
level. A small, unmarked, and unpaved dirt area is located
adjacent to the upper landing area where vehicles can pull off
the road and park. According to the trial testimony, surfers and
divers now use Ke'anae Landing as an access to the ocean and,
periodically, small boats are launched from the landing area.
2. The Georgia Group

On the afternoon of January 30, 1997 (at a little after

 

2:00 pem.), married couples Meghal and Dewal,? Mitesh Bhakea
(4itesn) and Jyotana, Bhupendva (Bhupendra) Bhakta and Daxa
Ihereinafter, collectively, the Georgia group] arrived at Ke'anae
Landing. They were residents of Georgia, vacationing in Hawai'i,
and had been sightseeing at various locations on Maui before
arriving at Ke'anae Landing. They parked their van in the dire
area adjacent to the upper landing area, exited the vehicle, and
took several photographs of the ocean and the landing area.
Meghal then walked down a concrete pathway leading to
the upper landing area; Dewal followed him. Meghal asked Dewal
to take a picture of him while he stood in front of a pylon or
boat tie structure located on the pathway. Meghal then walked
down the stairs leading to the lower landing area. Dewal began
to follow him, but turned and ran back to the pathway after some

water splashed on her. When Dewal locked back towards the lower

> Dewal subsequently remarried in 1999 and is now Dewal shah Patel

 
landing area, she could no longer see Meghal. Subsequently,
Dewal went down the pathway and stopped, whereupon she saw Megha?
in the water and told the rest of the Georgia group.‘ At that
point, Mitesh and Bhupendra went down to the lower platform to

assist Meghal as he attempted to awim back onto the landing are:

 

As Mitesh and Bhupendra were trying to help Neghal, the water

 

pulled Meghal away from the landing area. At some point, Mitesh
jumped inte the water. When Mitesh reached Meghal, he grabbed
Meghal on one side and started pulling Meghal toward the lower

platform. At that point, Daxa went down to the lower platform to

 

give Bhupendra some rope that she had found. Dewal then saw
Bhupendra throw the rope to Mitesh, who was able to grab onto it.
once Dewal saw Mitesh and Bhupendya pulling Meghal, who, by that
time, was not responding, she headed away from the landing area.

‘The Utah Group

 

While Mitesh and Bhupendra were helping Meshal, Jyotsna
and Daxa headed away from Ke'anae Landing in search of

assistance. Daxa flagged down a van passing on the highway
adjacent to Ke'anae Landing that was occupied by two married
couples: Donald and Cathy Arends and Billy and Pauline Crump.
Following in a second van were two other married couples: c.

Wayne and Carene Erickson and Stephen and Judy Kenyon. All four

 

‘me trial court found, which Plaintiffs dispute, that [Jt ie
unknown how Meghal Shah entered the water." Plaintiffs aesert that they
proved Megral wag swept into the ocean by a wave. However, the State mentions
Phat Deval testified that she did not recall how Neghal got into the ocean,
‘whether the waves swept hin in, whether he jumped in, or shether he slipped
Inte the ocean.

 

 
couples were visiting from Utah (hereinafter, collectively, the
Utah group] .
After parking their vans, Donald Arends (Donald), a

fireman, immediately rushed to the landing are

 

By this time,
Meghal had stopped swimming and was floating face down in the
water, and Mitesh and others were pulling Meghal onto the lower
platform.

4. The Local Residents of Maui

Wnile menbera of the Utah and Georgia groups were
helping Meghal, local Maui reaidente Harry "Bobo" Pahukoa, IIT
(Bobo), J.D. Pabukoa (J.D.), Sam Holi (Sam), Guy Akiu (Guy), and
Ben “Kino* Morton (Kimo) were at the residence of Harry Pahukoa,
11, which 4a located about a quarter-mile from Ke'anae Landing.
Sometime in the afternoon of January 30, 1997, a tour van driver
came up to the Pahukoa residence, shouting for someone to call
vo11." Sam immediately drove to Ke'anae Landing with Kimo and
J.D., arriving in less than thirty seconds, and they all
proceeded to the lower platform to help bring Meghal out of the
water. At this point, several members of the Georgia group, the
Utah group, and the three Maui men (Sam, Kimo, and J.D.) were on
the lower platform attempting to help Meshal.
once Meghal was pulled onto the lower platform, Sam

suggested that they move Meghal up to higher ground. However, at

+ Bobo {a a Life-Long resident of the Ke'ande area and was familiar
vith the ocean and e'snae Landing. Bobo and J.0. are the sons of Harey
Fahukon 1. dam, vho han lived ih the Xe'anae area since 1992, ie the

brother-in"lav of Bobo and J.D. (married to their sister). Guy is the cousin,
of Bobo and 9.9. Kino ia Bebo's friend.

 

 
that same instant, Donald called out that he knew how to perform
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and went down to the lower
platform. As Donald began to perform CPR, a wave struck the

landing area, sweeping everyone who was on or near the lower

 

platform into the ocean, that is, Meghal, Mitesh, Bhupendra,
Donald, Cathy, Billy, Sam, J.D., and Kimo,

While the above-described events were occurring, Bobo
and Guy were still at the Pahukoa residence as Bobo was getting
some rope and two life vests before heading to the landing area

At gome point, Bobo's friend, J.J. Hueo (J.J.), ale> arrived at

Ke'anae Landing with hie surfboard. By the time Bobo, Guy, and

 

J.J. veached the landing area, all of the nine people referred to
above were in the water.

Bobo was able to pull his brother, J.D., out of the

 

water with the rope. Bobo then jumped into the water, wearing
one life vest and carrying the other. Bobo swam over to Donald
and one of the Georgia men and gave then the life vests. Bobo
then rescued Billy and brought him to the upper landing area
where the others could hold onto him. A few minutes later, Bobo
re-entered the water, taking J.J.’s surfboard, and rescued cathy.
Unfortunately, Bobo and the other Maui residents could
rescue only J-D., Billy and Cathy; Meghal, Mitesh, Bhupendra, and
Donald either drowned or sustained fatal injuries from being

thrown onto the rocks by the waves.
5. Ocean and Weather Conditions on January 30, 1997
According to the trial court’s undisputed FOFs, the

ocean and weather conditions on January 30, 1997 were as follows

 

60. At 6126 a.m. on January 30, 1997, the Maui civil
Defense Agescy issued High’ surt Advisory #3, which
stated as follows:

‘burton west and north shores this sorning will be
Hieing § to 12 feet. The buoy that is northwest of
Kaus'l indicates that these waves should arrive by
Ridnorning on the western islands. Telands east of
Gah waTl see saven thar are slightly lower arriving
Gi. At Tnr45 a.m. On January 30, 1997, the Maui Civil
‘agency. iseued High Sure Advisory Ws. Inst

‘weuel 12 sours, High Surf Advisory #4 was

Geeued approximately three hours after High Surf

Advisory #3 Because there was a higher surf size

Bigh Surf Advisory #4 cautioned as follows:

“surf heights on the north shore of O'ahu and Kaua'i
are presently Jo to 12 feet. Swelle passing at sucy 1
‘west of Kaua'i indicate that the surf ehould

Hise as igh ag 10 to 25 feet this afternoon on the
north shored [sic] and about 6 to 10 feet on west
fhoree, delands east of Oanu will see waves that are
Siigntiy lower arriving this afvernoon

62. The areas on Maul targeted by the advisories included
Fala('and Bockipa to Mona (Lig. che Kearse Landing

 

     

 

   

 

62, Sandra Hue(o] had lived in xe'anse for twenty-six (26)
years. Ne. sue(o) testified that on the moraing of
January 30, 1957, she went co her hone cn the Ke'anse
Peninsula located approximately 20 co 75 feet from the
Re‘anse Landing, and that the weather that morning was
rainy, cloudy[,) and miecy,

B. Procedural History
on January 29, 1999, Jyotena, individually and as

beneficiary and legal representative of Mitesh Bhakta, and Nikhil
Bhakta, a minor, by his next friend Candace Turner, filed the
instant negligence action against the County and the State. on
May 5, 1999, an amended complaint was filed, naming the widows,

individually and as personal representatives of their respective

 

husbande’ estates, and Nikhil Bhakta, the son of Mitesh Bhakta,

 
as plaintiffs. The amended complaint alleged that the County and

 

the state,

on or before January 30, 1997, knew, or in the exercise of
Peasonable cave should have known, that wave, water or other
Aquatic conditions of or in the Pacific Ocean adjacent to
 Ke'anae Landing, vas/vere potentially dangerous to

Asitors of the area) including [tne decedents)

jaid defendants, and/or any of them, failed to ade
ara or protect plaineiffe or any of them, or others, of or
from the aforesaid dangerous aquatic conditions:

    

      

on May 4, 2000, the County moved for summary judgment
on the ground that it neither owned nor occupied the landing
area, Neither the State nor Plaintiffs opposed the County's
motion, On August 30, 2000, the trial court granted the County's
motion, dismiseing all claims against the County.

on October 23, 2000, Plaintiffs moved for sunmary
judgment against the state on the bases that the state was
negligent in failing to warn of and protect the Plaintiffs from
the dangerous ocean and man-made conditions at Ke'anae Landing.
on December 26, 2000, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion
for sunmary judgnent on the ground that the existence of genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.

A jury-waived trial againet the State commenced on July
9, 2001, which included a site inspection of Ke'anae Landing
conducted by the trial court on July 16, 2001, pursuant to a
stipulation of the parties. Trial was concluded on July 18,
2001.

on August 6, 2001, the State filed a motion for
judgment, which the trial court granted on Novenber 5, 2003,

issuing FOFs, COLe, and an order granting judgment as to all

 
claims and all parties in favor of the State and against

Plaintiffs. tn pertinent part, the trial court concluded that

 

Act 190 (relating to public land liability immunity) relieved the

State of any liability to Plaintiffs. In the alternative, the

 

trial court concluded that the State did not have any common law

 

duty to warn of any dangerous conditions because the extremely
dangerous ocean conditions at Ke'anae Landing on January 30, 1997
were open and obvious to persons of ordinary intelligence. tn

support of its ruling, the trial court entered the following

 

relevant FOFs, which Plaintiffs disput.

9. There wag no evidence that any drownings occurred at
Ke'anae Landing prior te January 30, 1937.

20, There waa no evidence that the State was aware or
Should nave bean guare of any drownings of near~
Gromings occurring at Ke'anae Landing prior to
Samuary 30, 1957.

 

‘he Court finds that the parking area adjacent to ()
Ke'snae Landing ig not 2 Geate-naintained parking let,
Due a mall dire turn off whore vehicles can pull off
the road or make U-turns; the Court further finds that
the landing and surrounding area was neither defective
nor dangerous.

 

 

G41 "fia, Hue fo) costities that as she drove to her home and
passed () Ke'anae Landing, she noticed that the oceen
Sonditions by the landing vere rough and that the

 

 

6s. Mae Eified that she noticed that
there was white water as the water hit the rocks and
she could hear che vaves hitting the rocks. she sa
the water coming over the rock wall between the
landing and Xe'anae Boat Ramp.

66. Ma. Hue tole

 

 

12 conditions

‘morning of

30, 1997(,] and worsened ar the day

progressed

67. Mr. [Bobo] “Pahukoa testified that he is able to see
the ocean from the backyard of his house at Ke'anse,
and that if the waves were crashing near his howe, ‘the
Conditions at {) Ke'anae Landing would be the wane.

6s. According to [Bobo], on January 30, 1997, he had been
Working on his eruck at Ais house and saw that the
‘Scean conditions near his hone were rougn. (Bobo)
Eectitied that che rough ocean conditions existed from
the moraing hours and ehat he could hear the waves
breaking and crashing upon the rocks at the landing

  
 

 

   

 

 

-10-
n

2.

1.

16.

80.

nen (Bobol arrived at [Ke'anze] Landing, he saw that
the area by the landing was wet and water was hitting
fe “fe"cotnd hear the waves crashing When he arrived
at the Landing, and estimated that they were breaking
EE six to seven feet.

{Bobo} est inated that the biggest waves he saw on that
day were at least 15 feet high

faves of the magnitude witnessed by (Bobol would be
Gutrenely dangerous at {) Keanae Landing, given Dr,
Mark Merrifield’s teatinony that a ten-fcot wave could
ath up on the upper landing

Br. crigg’s testimony that the people in the Utah and
Georgia Groups lacked experience and understanding
fegarding the ocean and its sets and lulls, and
therefore that the dangers were deceptive and not oper!
and obvious to them, was refuted by che testimony of
Senbers of the Utah Group.

Ke sudy Kenyon's van approached (} Kelanse Landing,

she thought it was stupid fer Meghal shan to be
Svinning out “in that” because ir seened rough, there
Sire lava rocks around, and it was not a good place C0
ein.

Garene Erickson wondered why Meghal shah was swiaming
{nthe water because it aincet looked like @ whirlpool
and there was a lot of lava rocks.

Sayne Erickeon did not find (] Kelanse Landing to be
pretty or picturesque. The ocean was not calm, and
Ehere was no “giase-like sheen") rather, it was
Earbelene and churning.

Stephen Kenyon observed the water looked quite rough
25 he drove the second van containing menbers of the
Btah Group down the road on the Ke'anse Peninsula
Billy Crump of the Urah Group testified chat when the
Utah Group arrived at the scene, che waves coming in
were big and breaking off the rocks, and it was noley.
Nr. ‘ceunp described the ocean Conditions when ne first
palled off the highway ae [] Ke'enae Landing a
follows:

“Tt wae rough, There was big waves way out there, but
ab far as the Lava rock, yes, the waves Just coming in
Gnd banging off che rocks. that’s way T said to
Syeelt, why in the bell 1a that guy down there
elesing.”

Aa the Ueah group was driving to Hana, Pauline Crump
Could’ see the ocean and it aid not 1eok bad. By
Comparison, the ocean at (] fe'anae Landing looked
Eade wre. Crump testified “ie was pounding the rocks
and that. You could see it.”

Ka the Urah Group wae driving down to the Ke'anae
Penineuls, Pauline Crump said it vas raining a little
fore than it had been earlier and you could see the
Saver pounding the side of the rocks.

Dr, Grigg" opinion that the lull tive between the
Sete were five to ten minutes, and that the water was
Galn between sets, is not credible.

Mark Merrifield, h.D., the {] State's expert in
Seeanography, opined that 2 lull tive of five to ten
inutes between sete on January 30, 1997, seemed to be
Guite long. Moreover, Dr. Merrifield algo testified
that it would mot have been completely calm between
[ull periods, which ne defined as the time during
“hicn wave heights did not exceed five feet

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

e1n-
95.

‘Therefore, even if it had been ten minutes between the
ten feet waves, the actual calm periods betwen waves
would’ have Iasted less chan a minute. De. Merrifield
Opined that anywhere from 70 to 75¥ of the waves on
Sanuary 30, 1897 were greater than four feet, and
would aggressively impact the landing.

 

Br. Grigg conducted a dye test to deternine the ocean
currents at Xe'anae Landing and found there was a
shiriposl effect or current. Dr. Grigg ceetitied that
this whirlpool effect would have kept Meshal shan in
that area and made it difficult for him co cone co.
Shore. Dr. Grigg testified that it was this whirlpool
effect [that] caused Megha! Shah to drow

 

 

 

According to Dr. Grigg, if a person was walking down
fhe landing ares, that’ person would see the landing aa
St exists and that there wae no guard railing, Dr
Grigg further stated that’s peracn would also see that
there vas nothing to protect him or her if that person
ere at the bottom sf the Landing’

‘The evidence denonstrates that i2 was the extrenely
dangerous ocean conditions which caused the death of
the decesents

The evidence denonstrates that the extrenely dangerous
Ocean conditions which caused the deaths of che
Gecedents were open and obvious to persons of ordinary
intelligence:

Even though the decedents were not from Hawai'i and
from landlocked states on the continental United
States, persons of ordinary intelligence, as were
these decedente, would and ehould have known that the
ocean conditions on the day of the incident were
extrenely dangerous

In the photographs admitted . . ., churning, murky
water, large wave action, and whitewash are seen next
fo {)'Ke'anae Landing seconds before the tragic
Sneddent began.

 

 

‘he Court finde chat according to evidence adduced at
trial, specifically evidence of che bigh surf and
choppy wave conditions, the extremely dangerous
Conditions in the ocean were open and obvious to
persons of ordinary intelligence on the day of the
Eneigent.

The testinonies of Deval shah Patel, Daxa Bhakta, and
Syotana shakes Patel that the ocean’ conditions at
Kelanae Landing on January 30, 1997 were calm is not
credible. th addition to photographic evidence of the
pen and obvious nature of the extrenely dangerous,
Nave conditions, the Court finds creaible th
Eestinony of witnesses Sandra Hue(ol, Harry “Bobo
Pahukoa, TIT, Sam Holi, and Billy Crimp, all of whom
Eeutifiod that the ocean conditions at {) Keanae
Landing on the day of the incident were rough.

 

 

 

 

‘The trial court also entered the following relevant COLs, which

Plaintiffs also dispute:

 
99. Act 190 ie the applicable law in this cage, and (the!
State wae not required to reise it es an affirmative
defense in ita Answer.

jd.” Ae set forth in the plain language of Act 190(€) ,
ithe! State doe not have a duty co warn of dangerous
natural conditions in the ocean on beach acc
coastal sccesses, or in aress that are not
beach parks.

ios. Act 190 limits [the] state's duty to warn of dangerous
Datural conditions, specifically shore breaks and
Strong currenta in'the ocean, to situations when these
‘Seean conditions occur adjacent to public besch parks
operated by (the) state.

 

 

dog.” Under Act 190, [the] state aid not have « duty to warn
Plaistifés of dangerous natural conditions in the
Ocean, specifically the shore break, the strong
Catreat hear the landing, and the high surf abutting
() Ke'anae banding!

107, Act 190 relieves (the) State of any liability to (]
Plaineises:

ios, Even aeauning that Act 190 41d not apply in thie
ction, [the] State did not have any comon law duty
fo warn of the extrenely dangerous natural conditions
In the ocean at) Keanae Landing that caused the
deaths of the decedencs.

 

 

ind.” Getendant seate, as omer and occupier of ] Ke'ena
Landing, a piece of state properey abutting the ocean,
Shed a Guty"co warn Plaincifes of extremely dangerous
Sonditions in the ocean, which were!” (3) not known oF
SEvious co persone of ordinary intelligence; and (2)
Sn’the exercise of reasonable cere ought to have been
known to the oecspier.

nit, Recording to the evidence adduced at trial, the
Crtrenely dangerous conditions in the ocean were open
SN Gbvidus co persons of ordinary’ intelligence on the
Sty Sf the incident.

in.” Since the danger wae open and obvious, [the] state aid
ot ove s duty to Plaintiffs to warn of the extrenely
Gangerous condition that caused the deaths of the
decedent

1n4, Based upoa the evidence presented, this court finds that
Plaintifes did not meet their burden of proof to show that
Ordinary care vas not used by [the] state

   

 

on November 21, 2001, final judgment was entered in favor of the
State. Plaintiffs timely appealed on December 19, 2001.

TI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Motion for Summary Judgment

‘This court reviews a circuit court's grant or denial of

 

summary judgment de novo. Brice v. AIG Hawai'i Ins. Co., 107

213+
Hawai'i 106, 110, 111 P.3d 1, 5 (2005) (citation omitted). The
standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is well

settled:

[slumary judgnent is appropriate if the pleading:
Geposicions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together wich the affidavite, if any, show that there
{eno genuine iosue as to any material fact and that the
noving party is entitled to judguent as a matter of law. A
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect
ef establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of
‘of action oF defen srted by the parties. The
re must be viewed in ight most favorab:
Bon-moving party. In other words, we must view all of the
evidence and the inferences dravm therefron in the Sight

most favorable co the party Opposing the motion,

  

 

     

 

Id. (brackets in original) (citation omitted). Moreover,
“summary judgment must be used with due regard for its purpose
and should be cautiously invoked so that no person will be
improperly deprived of a trial of disputed factual issues.”

Miller v. Manuel, 9 Haw. App. 56, 65-86, 828 P.2d 286, 292 (1991)

(brackets, citation and internal quotation marks omitted) .

B. Findings of Fact

‘This court reviews the trial court’s FOFs under the

clearly erroneous standard. Ueoka v. Szymanski, 107 Hawai'i 386,
393, 114 P.34 892, 899 (2005) (citations omitted) .

An) (FOP) ie clearly erroneous when, despite evidence
to support the finding, the appellate court is Left with
Gefinive and firm conviction in reviewing the entire
evidence that a mistake has been committed. A(a) (POF) ie
iso clearly erroneous when the record lacks substantial
Evidence to support the finding. We nave define
jubstantial evidence as credible evidence wien ie of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
Feasonable caution to support a conclusion:

ome: , 104 Hawai'i 43, 51, 85 P.3d 150, 158 (2004)

(citing Beneficial Hawai'i, Inc, v. Kida, 96 Hawai'i 289, 305, 30

P.3d 895, 911 (2002).

 

 

    

-14-
C. Conclusions of Law

‘This court reviews the trial court’s CoLs de novo.
Rremer, 104 Hawai'i at $1, 85 P.3d at 158. “A COL is not binding
upon an appellate court and is freely reviewable for its
correctness.” Allstate Ins, Co, v. Ponce, 105 Hawai'i 445, 453,
99 P.3d 96, 104 (2004) (citations and internal quotations marks
omitted). Moreover, “[a] COL that is supported by the trial
court's [FOFs] and that reflecte an application of the correct
rule of law will not be overturned.” Id, (brackets in original)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
D. Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo by this
court. Blair v. Ing, 95 Hawai'i 247, 253, 21 P.3d 452, 458
(2001) (citations omitted). ‘When construing a statute, our
foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily
from the language contained in the statute itself." Taylor-Rice
va State, 105 Hawai'i 104, 108, 94 P.3d 659, 663 (2004)
(citations omitted). Moreover, “[iJt is a cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are
plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look
beyond that language for a different meaning. Instead, our sole
duty is to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious
meaning." T-Mobile USA, Inc. v, County of Hawai'i Planning
Comm’n, 106 Hawai'i 343, 352-53, 104 P.3d 930, 939-40 (2005)
(citation omitted) .

<15-
.  Evidentiary Rulings:

(]ifterent standards of review must be applied to
trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of
evidence, depending on the requirenents of the particular
Fule of evidence at issue. When application of a particular
evidentisry rule can yield only one correct result, the
Proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong

fandara. Where the evidentiary ruling at Leaue concerns
niseibility based upon relevance, under. (Hawa
Rules of Bvidence (NR)] Fules 401 and 402, the proper
Standard Of appellate review i the right/wong standard

 

 

 

 

In_xe Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 460, 979 P.2d 39, 56
1999) (citations omitted) (ellipses and some brackets in
original) (some brackets added). However, “(e]videntiary
decisions based on HRE Rule 403, which require a ‘judgment call’

on the part of the trial court, are reviewed for an abuse of

 

discretion." id, (citation and quotation marks omitted) .
“(t]he extent of cross-examination is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be the

clearly prejudicial to the complaining

 

subject of reversal unl
party." Kekua v, Kaiser Found, Hosp., 61 Haw. 208, 221, 601 P.2d
364, 373 (1979) (citations omitted).

Tt is well-settled that the “admissibility of expert
testimony ie reviewed for abuse of discretion." Mivanoto v. lum,

104 Hawai'i 1, 7, 84 P.3d 509, 515 (2004) (quoting Craft

 

Peebles, 78 Hawai'i 267, 301, 893 P.2d 138, 152 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The appellant bears the burden of
showing that the trial court’s decision “clearly exceeded the
bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or

practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant." Hac

n16-
vw. Univ. of Hawai‘i, 102 Hawai'i 92, 102, 73 P.34 46, 55 (2003)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) .
iT. pIscuSSION

A. Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs sought summary judgment with respect to:
(1) their claims that the State was negligent in failing to warn
and protect them against the dangerous conditions at Ke'ana
Landing; (2) the widows’ claims of negligent infliction of

emotional distress; and (3) the loss of consortium claims of the

 

 

widows and Mitesh’s son, Nikhil Bhakta. On appeal, Plaintiffs
contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion.

‘he State argues that, under the "Morgan rule,” the
trial court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,
which was based on ite finding that genuine issues of material
fact existed, ia not reviewable on appeal. The Morgan rule was
adopted by this court in Larsen v, Pacesetter Systems, Inc.,
Haw, 1, 837 B.2d 1273 (1992). Therein, this court stated:

At an early atage in che development of th
eumary judgnent, the rule developed that an ords
the motion could not be appealed if denial was based on the
presence of factual questions for the jury, but could be

Eppealed if based on questions of law. J+ Rothschild,
se Pract w Yorks A Review of

 

Judicial Experience undar the Civil Practice Act, 23 Col. u,
Rev, €i8, €48 (1923). This rule seans to explain the
holding in organ v. American University, 534 A.24 323 (D.C.
dpe. 1989), the case upon wich plaintiff relies for its
Aescrtion that denials of summary judsnente are
lnceviewable. In Morgan, the court reasoned that where
susmary judgnent was denied because of the existence of
fesues of fact and the case was subsequently decided by the
ory ceversel on appeal would allow w decision based ¢x

evidence, £0 prevail over one reached on more. Idk. at
316. Significantly, however, the court also ruled that any
egal rulings sade’ by the trial court at summary judgment
Ebuld be reviewed on appeal id. at 327

 

 

 

oat
Id, at 17-18, 637 P.2d at 1282-83 (underscored emphases in
original) (bold emphasis added). In Laxsen, the defendant
appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiffs’ implied warranty claim. Id, at 17,
837 P.2d at 1282. The defendant’s appeal of the denial came
after a jury trial on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs. Id.
This court noted that it was “clear from the record that the
issue argued and decided on sunmary judgment -- whether the
defect asserted by plaintiff was actionable -- was a question of
law." Id. at 18, 837 P.2d at 1283. Thus, this court held that
the defendant was entitled to a review of the trial court’s
denial of its motion for summary judgment. id,

im Gump v, Walmart Stores, Inc., 93 Hawai'i 428, 5 P.3d
418 (App. 1999), att’ = ev! other
grounds, 93 Hawai'i 417, 5 P.3d 407 (2000), the Intermediate
Court of Appeals (ICA) applied the dual framework established by
Larsen, ice., “that a denial of summary judgment based on the
presence of factual issues is not reviewable, while a denial
based on questions of law ie." Id. at 437, 5 P.3d at 427
(citation omitted). In applying the dual framework, the ICA
stated:

The order denying [defendant's] motion for summary

judgment as to the negligence claim is reticent as co the

Reasons underlying the trial court's decision. No findings

of fact or conclusions of law were filed thereon, and none
Rul

  

of Civil Procedure (iRCP) Rule

 

a

 

Were. require:
52a)

‘The transcript of the hearing on the motion provide
however, sone inkling as to the basis of the court's deni
A perusal of the transcript reveals two possible, but
mutually exclusive Bases: (1) that what consticutes
Constructive notice of the specific instrumentality of the

 

 

 

-18-
accident (the french fry, in this cage) is always a matter

Of tact for the Jury, and (2) that what constievces

Soostructive notice ean Senue involving Wal-Mart's genera

Rode of operation, in and of itself and without primary

Teterence’ to the specific instrumentality of the’ accident
he to the first basis, the court queried:

Tn't that to be lefe co the fact finder if that’s
reasonable? jinas Sf your client noticed every bour of eve
Gay, would you say that we atill had no notice Because we
inspected at the end of the day. Whether that’s reasonable
or not, shouldn't that be left co the fact finder?

‘he'to the second basis, the court stated:

Tf the possessor should have known of the unreasonable
risk .". ‘ing dnpose a duty to the person using the land to
take reasonable steps to eliminate the unreasonable risks.
‘The argument 1s if the person knows oF should have knows
that food itens would be taken out on the floor and
Shouldn't this be a factual question to determine whether
the land omer, in ehis case Mebonald’s, took reasonable
Stops to eliminate this unreasonabse cick?

Because che court denied sumary judsvent on the
negligence clains based upon an issue of isaue= of law,
Giseilied trom ehe transcript. and enumerated above, we are
peraitted, under Jarsan, to review the denial.

 

 

 

 

Gump, 93 Hawai'i at 437-36, 5 P.3d at 427-28 (ellipses in
original). Larsen’s dual framework is in line with the majority
of federal and state jurisdictions. See Lumy, City & County of
Honolulu, 963 F.2d 1167, 1170 n.1 (Sth Cir. 1992) (adhering “to
the majority view that in the ordinary case where a motion for
summary judgnent has been denied because the trial court
determined that issues of fact had to be tried, there is no
useful purpose in reviewing the pretrial ruling on summary
judgment after a plenary trial on the merits’); Evans v. Jensen,
655 P.2d 454 (Idaho App. 1982) (holding that it is the general
rule that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not
reviewable on appeal froma final judgment; any legal rulings
made by the trial court affecting that final judgment can be
reviewed at that time in light of the full record); Kiesau v.

Rantz, 686 N.W.24 164 (Iowa 2004) (holding that after a full

-19-
trial on the merits, @ previous order denying a motion for
summary judgment is no longer reviewable).

in the present case, the order denying Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment stated that the motion was denied
“because there [were] genuine issues of material fact.” In their
memorandum in support of their motion, Plaintiffs contended that
they were entitled to surmary judgment because there was no

ispute that: (1) the landing site was dangerous; (2) the state

 

had a duty to either remove the dangerous conditions or warn of

them; and (3) the State neither removed the dangerous conditions

 

or warned of them, in breach of its duty. In response, the state

 

argued that summary judgment was improper because it had no duty
to warn inasmuch as: (1) Ke'anae Landing was not a state beach
park; and (2) the conditions relating to the landing site were
known or obvious. The state also maintained that the question
regarding causation, i.e., whether the conditions of the landing
site or the ocean caused the incident, was for the jury, not the
court, to determine. the transcript of the hearing on the motion
sheds Light as to the basis of the trial court’s denial of
Plaintiffs’ motion. The trial court stated:

[2)f (Act 190] says the State owes a duty to exerciee
reasonable care and warn park users about dangerous
Conditions which are not known or reasonably discoverable by
Persons of ordinary intelligence, but che state is not
Liable for dangerous conditions under its control, if as you

say this is dangerous, chen ig there nota material dispute
genuine iasue of material fact here as

here as to whether
aot iret vane 1 are)

 

 

 

if, = think there should be, even basically from your
own Submiesions, bat you, yourself, characterize it ae
dangerous

 

-20-
Based upon those -- the first one I mentioned, at
ie fron what ‘the Court can conclude, there are genuine

of sing to env the
motion.

(Emphases added.) Inasmuch as the trial court denied summary

    

 

judgment based upon the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact, we hold that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a review of the
denial of their motion for eunmary judgment.
B. act 190

Act 190, entitled *A Bill for an Act Relating to Public
Land Liability Immunity," was enacted in 1996. 2996 Haw. sess.
L. Act 190, at 434-37. The purpose of the legislation was to
vestablish a process in which the State and counties can provide
both meaningful and legally adequate warnings to the public
regarding extremely dangerous natural conditions in the ocean
adjacent to public beach parks." Id., § 1 at 434-35. Act 190
took effect on July 1, 1996, and was to be repealed on June 30,
1999. Id., § 7 at 437. The repeal date was later extended from
June 30, 1999, to June 30, 2007. See 1999 Haw. Seas. L. Act 101,
§ 2 at 370; 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 170, § 2 at 610.

Section two of Act 190 provides in pertinent part:

(a) the State or county operating 2 public beach park shall
have a duty to warn the public specifically of dangerous
shorebreak or strong current in the ocean adjacent to a
public Beach park if these conditions are extrerely
Sangerous, typical for the specific beach, and if they pose
| risk of ‘serious injury or death.

   

ici either the state nor 2 county shall have @ duty to warn
on Beach acces that a

ot public beach parks of dangerous natural conditions in
the ocean.

(f) Neither the state nor any county shall have a duty co
warn of dangerous natural conditions in the ocean other than
ae provided in ehis section

     

-21-
1996 Haw. Sess. L. Act 190, § 2(a), (e), and (£) at 435.

1, The Trial Court’s Conclusion that Act 190 is not
an Affirmative Defen: .

With respect to the Plaintiffs’ contention that the
State was required to affirmatively declare ite reliance on Act
190 in its answer to the complaint, the trial court concluded:

98. Act 190 ie the applicable law in this ca
Defendant state was not required to raie
Sftizmacive defense in its Answer’

   

ini. [elven assuming that Defendant state was
feguires to raise Act 190 ae an affirmative defense in
ite Answer, under Rule 15(b) of the Hawai Rules of
Civil Broceas
‘rae immaterial. becaus tried by the
Caprese of implied coneent of the parties

 

 
 

In challenging the aforementioned COLe on appeal,
Plaintiffs maintain that Act 190 is an affirmative defense and
argue that, because the state failed to raise Act 190 in ite
answer to the complaint, the State’s reliance on the act is
untimely. In response, the State alleges that Plaintiffs’
arguments mst be rejected because the State first raised the
applicability of Act 190 in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment, filed octeber 23, 2000, and that, therefore,
there was no prejudice to Plaintiffs by the state's filing of its
motion for judgment on the basis of Act 190.

Act 190 establishes the state's duty to warn of
dangerous natural conditions in the ocean. Duty is the first of
the four well-established elements of a claim for relief founded

on negligence; to wit:

-22-
(2) Aduty or obligation, recognized by
requiring the defendant to conform to a cez!
Conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
Fiske;

(2) fa] failure on the defendant’s part co conform to
the standard required: a breach of the duty;

(3) [a] reasonably close causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury; and

(4) fa}etual lose or damage resulting to the interests
of another,

Dos Parents No. 1 v. State, Dep't of Educ., 100 Hawai'i 34, 68,
58 P.3d 545, 579 (2002) (quoting Dairy Road Partners v. Island

   

 

 

Ins. Co., 92 Hawai'i 396, 419, 992 P.2d 93, 114 (2000)) (emphasis
added) .

As discussed more fully infra, Act 190 establishes that
the state (1) has a duty to warn of dangerous conditions in the
ocean adjacent to a public beach, but (2) has no duty to warn of

dangerous natural ocean conditions on beach accesses, coastal

 

accesses, or in other areas that are not public beach parks. In
the context of this case, Act 190 essentially negates an element
of Plaintiffs’ negligence action, i.e., duty. “A defense is not
affirmative where it ‘merely negates an elenent of the
plaintiff’e prima facie case.’" Hadar v. Concordia Yacht
Builders, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1082, 1089 (8.D.N.¥. 1995) (quoting

Marino v. Otie gna'a Corp., 839 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.
1988)). In other words, *[bJecause the alleged lack of duty

 

would merely negate an element of the plaintiff's claim, it is

not appropriately considered an affirmative defense." Etienne v.

  

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 217, 221 (D. Conn. 2000); see
also Yroegh v. J &M Forklift, 651 N.E.2d 121, 126 (I11. 1995)

(The absence of duty is not an affirmative defense. It attacks

-23-
the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim. Rather than

giving color to the cause of action, it negates one of the

 

action’s basic elements." (Citation omitted.)).

Moreover, “lack of duty” is not one of the enumerated

 

required to be affirmatively pled pursuant to HRCP Rule

 

(0) ;* nor does the "defense" of lack of duty fall under the

 

residual clause of Rule 8(c), which includes as an affirmative

defense “any other matter constituting an avoidance or

 

affirmative defense." HRCP Ryle B(c). Plaintiffs’ argument is,

therefore, without merit. Accordingly, we hold that COL No. 99

 

is correct. Assuming this court agrees, the validity of COL No,

 

 

101 need not be addressed inasmich as it was rendered on the

yumption that Act 190 is an affirmative defense.

 

2, Applicability of act 190
Plaintiffe challenge the following three cole made by
the trial court regarding the applicability of Act 190:

103. As set forth in the plain language of Act 190(e),
Defendant state dose not have = duty to warn of
dangerous natural conditions 1n the ocean on beach
accesses, coastal accesses, or in areas that are not
public Beach parke

aos. Act 190 limes Defendant state's duty to warn of
Gangerous natural conditions, specifically shore
breaks and strong currents ih the ocean, to situations
When these Scean conditions occur aajacent to public
Beach parks operated by Defendant St

 

 

* mace Rule 6(c) provides in pertinent part:

In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption
Of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptey, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow
jervant, laches, License, payment, ‘release, res judicata, stacuee of
Frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.

      

-24-
106. Under Act 190, Defendant state did not have 2 duty to
warn Plaintifés ef dangerous natural conditions in the
Scean, specifically the shore Dresk, the strong
Current near the landing, and the high surt abutting
the Ke'anse Landing.

 

Plaintiffs allege that these COLs are wrong because the language
of Act 190 § 2(e) is not plain, but ambiguous in scope
Alternatively, they argue that, assuming arguendo that the
language is plain, it does not apply in the present case. The
State counters that “Act 190 unequivocally relieves the state of
any duty to warn of dangerous natural conditions in the ocean in
areas that are not public beach parks," and, even assuming
arguendo that Act 190 is ambiguous, any distinctions between
natural and man-made structures was not intended by the
legislature to be included in Act 190.

Ae previously stated, section 2 of Act 190 states:

(a) The state or county operating a public beach park shall
have a duty to warn the pubite specifically of dangerous
Shorebreak or strong cusvent in the ocean edjacent 0 a
public Beach park if these conditions are extrenaly
Sangerous, typical for the specific beach, and if they pose
O'rlek of ‘serious injury or death

 

(ej Weither the state nor 2 county shall have a duty to warn

on ‘coastal at
‘not public Beach parks of dangerous natural conditions in
the ocean.

(2) Neither the State nor any county shall have a duty to
"rn of dangerous natural conditions in the ocean other than
Provided in this section.

 

 

1996 Haw. Sess. L., Act 190 § 2 at 435 (emphases added).
Based on the plain language of the act, section 2(a)
applies solely to “public beach parks.” Plaintiffs and the state
agreed that Ke'anae Landing is not a public beach park and that
Ke'anae Landing does not fall under the jurisdiction of the

Division of State Parks. To the extent COL No. 104 tracks the

-25-
language in section 2(a), COL No. 104 reflects the correct rule
of law and, thus, should not be overturned.

Plaintiffs next argue that section 2(e) does not apply
because “ocean conditions were not the sole danger to Plaintiffs
and the decedents; the conditions of Ke'anae Landing itself were
Gangerous, which are not dangerous natural conditions in the

Section 2(e) of Act 190 plainly states that the state
(and counties) shall not have a duty to warn of “dangerous

eal

 

natural conditions in the ocean" at “beach accesses, co!

accesses, or in areas that are not public beach parks.”

 

Plaintiffs, however, maintain that section 2(e) ig ambiguous in

scope because it is unclear to what extent section 2(e) abrogates:

 

the “Littleton rule” and the “Richardson rule* with respect to

the state.
In Bixmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, inc., 73
Haw. 359, 833 P.24 70 (1992), this court reaffirmed the rule
enunciated in Littleton v. State, 66 Haw. 55, 656 P.2d 1336
(1982), with respect to the state’s common law duties as the
omer and occupier of the ocean water. As this court explained

in Bixmingham, the Littleton rule is that the state,

fas the omer and occupier of the ocean water and all the
Beach area up to the high water mark adjacent to @ municipal
beach park, does not ove a duty to persons injured as a
result of water-related activities, sinless che "facts are
Sinilar to Agate (v. Matauda, 55 Haw, 394, 519 P.24 1240
(3974)], or analogous thereto.” To determine whether there
are facts sinilar to Agate, the court must determine: (3)
ing the injury was a dangerous
inmacural, ‘avea of the water-related
activity; and (2) whether the state had actual or
constructive knowledge of the condition. If the court

 

 

-26-
determines both that a dangerous unnatural condition existed
Gna chat the State bad actual or constructive knowledge of
the condition, then the State has a duty to warn of the
Sondicion by taking whatever measures, if any, are
Secsonably available to rectify and prevent the condition,

 

 

Bixminchan, 73 Haw. at 378, 833 P.24 at 80 (emphases in
original). Generally, under the Littleton rule, 2 duty to warn
would arise only if (1) a dangerous unnatural condition caused
the injury at issue and (2) the State had actual or constructive
notice of the condition. Whereas the Littletun rule addresses
unnatural conditions in the ocean. Ac* .90, § 2(e) addresses
natural conditions in the ocean, Thus, the Littleton rule is
inapplicable in the context of the instant case. It is
undisputed that the ocean waves were a cause of the decedents’
deaths. As this court haa previously stated, ‘{a] wave is 3
naturally occurring phenomenon of the ocean,” and, by its very
nature, it “cannot be an unnatural condition." Id, at 379, 833
P.2d at 80.
‘The Richardson rule, which is set forth in Richardson

v. Sport shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 680 P.2d 169
(1994), arises from this court’s decision in Corbett v, AOAO of

2 Bayview nts, 70 Haw. 415, 772 P.2d 693 (2989). in
Corbett, this court announced the following rule with respect to

landowner liability:

{212 a condition existe upon the land which poses an
Unreagonable risk of har to persone using the lané, then
the possensor of the land, if the possessor knows, or should
have known of the unteasonable risk, owes a duty to the
persone using the land to take reasonable steps to eliminate
Phe unreasonable risk, of adequately to warn the users
against it

 

-27-
Corbett, 70 Haw. at 417, 772 P.2d at 693. Under the State Tort
Liability Act, the State is liable “in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 662-2 (1993). Thus, under the
Richardson rule, the state, as a landowner, owes a duty to
exercise reasonable care when (1) a condition poses an
unreasonable risk of harm and (2) the State knows or should know
of the unreasonable risk. If both prerequisites are met, then
the state‘s duty is to (1) take reasonable steps to eliminate the
unreasonable risk or (2) adequately warn users against the risk.
As previously indicated, the State owns the land upon

which Ke'an

 

Landing is located. Moreover, section 2(e) of Act
190 imposes no duty upon the state to warn of dangerous natural
soastal accesses, or in

" (Bmphasia added.) By

ocean conditions at “beach acce:

 

areas that are not public beach park

 

arguing in their opening brief that, “{hlad the state not
constructed a pathway and a stairway leading to a platform at the
ocean's edge, there would be no access to the ocean at this
location" (emphasis added), Plaintiffe essentially concede that
Ke'anae Landing constitutes a “coastal access.” Inasmuch as Act
190 controls, we reject Plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to the
Littleton and Richardson rules. Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court correctly concluded that Act 190 relieves the state
of any duty to warn Plaintiffs of any dangerous ocean conditions

at the Ke'anae landing area.

-28-
3, The Trial Court’s Conclusion that Act 190 Relieves
The state of Any Duty to Warn of the “Extremely
Dangerous” Ocean Conditions at Ke‘anae Landing

 

on appeal, Plaintiffs agree with the trial court’s
pumevous FOPs and COLs that the ocean conditions at Ke'anae
Landing on January 30, 1997, were “extremely dangerous.”
plaintiffs, however, argue that COL No. 110 is contrary to
Hawai'i) law. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that:

pefendant State, as owner and occupier of {7 Ke'ana
Detendant Srtcee of State property abutting the ocean, oved
Landing. ee piaincités of extremely dangerous conditions
gn cuey EO En gich were: (2) not known oF obvious £0

1 ee cf ordinary intelligences and (2) im the exercise oF
persone, of Cree aught to have been known to the occupier.

   

plaintiffs claim that thie court, in Exiedrich vi
pepartment of Transportation, 60 Haw. 22, S86 7,24 1037 (2978),
held that “landowners -- government landowners in particular --
have a duty to warn of or protect against open and obvious
dangers that are extrenely dangerous." The state argues that the
common law principles relied upon by Plaintiffs were preempted in
Hawai'i by the enactment of Act 190.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Plaintiffs have

 

misstated the holding in Friedrich. Exiedrich merely erates
that,
(wihere the governsent maintains land upon which the public

(ylbore £05 ng entitied co enter, it say reasonably assume
are invited S0¢ fhe pusiie will not be harned by known oF
EbaE Mengergers which are ot extreme, and which any
obvious, dangers on exereieing ordinary attention, perception,
remtondeliigence could be expected tO avoid.
Jaa at 36-37, 586 P.2d at 1040 (citation and internal quotation
marke omitted). Although Exiedrich did not decide whether

Hawai'i law imposes @ duty to warn of obvious but extrene

-29-
Kaczmarcayk v. City and County of
Honolulu, 65 Haw. 612, 656 P.2d 89 (1982), held that an occupier

dangers, this court

 

of land fronting the shoreline of the ocean has

4a duty to warn users . . . of extremely dangerous conditions
fn the ocean along its beach frontage which were not known
oF obvious to persons of ordinary intelligence, and which
Sere known or in the exereiue Of reasonable care ought £0
have been know to the (occupier)

 

Id. at 615, 656 P.2d at 92. COL No. 110 appears to track thie
court's holding in Kaczmarcavk.

Act 190 imposes a similar limited duty to warn of ocean
conditions that are extremely dangerous. As previously stated,
section 2(a) of Act 190 provides:

‘The state or county operating a public beach park
shall have a duty to warn the public specifically of
Gangerous shorebreak or strong current in the ocean adjacent
to a public beach park if these conditions are extremely
dangerous, typical for the specific beach, and if they pose
a'risk of serious injury or Geath

1996 Haw. Sess. L. Act 190, § 2(a) at 435 (emphasis added).
Under the plain language of section 2(a), the State is required
to warn of “extremely dangerous" ocean conditions (1) that occur
at public beach parks, (2) if these conditions are typical for
the specific beach, and (3) if they present a risk of serious
injury or death. In the present case, inasmuch as Ke‘anae
Landing is not @ public beach park, the state did not have a duty
to warn of any “extremely dangerous" ocean conditions at Ke'anae
Landing. Moreover, in promulgating Act 190, the legislature

expressly provided that the State and counties are not subject to

 

any other duty to warn of dangerous natural ocean condition:

“other than as provided in [Act 190.1" 1996 Haw. Sess. L. Act

 

-30-
190, § 2(f) at 435 (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument
that the State has a common law duty to warn of “extremely
dangerous” ocean conditions at Ke'anae Landing is without merit.
To the extent that Exiedrich and Kaczmaxczyk may be read as
conflicting with the legielature’s decision to limit the state

and counties’ duty to warn of “extremely dangerous conditions” at

 

only public beach parks, we believe that Exiedrich and
Kacumarczyk are superseded by Act 190. Accordingly, we hold that
the state, as the owner and occupier of Ke'anae Landing and its
surrounding ocean water, did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs to warn
them of the extremely dangerous ocean conditions at Ke‘anae
Landing.
4. The Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusions that

the Ocean Conditions at Ke'anae Landing Were Open

and Obviously Dangerous

‘The trial court made numerous FOFs and COLs regarding
the rough, open, and obvious ocean conditions at Ke'anae Landing.
With respect to these Fors and COLe, Plaintiffs essentially argue
that the evidence clearly shows

that Plaintiffs arrived at Ke'anae Landing during # Lull
period, in which there were no vaves and the ocean appeared
Pelatively cal. ‘thus, even if there were openly and
Obviously rough waves at Kelanae Landing at any other time
Guring the day, Plaintiffs aid not see then.

 

 

However, as stated earlier, Act 190 supersedes Kacmarcavk’s

 

holding with respect to the State and counties’ duty to warn
users of extremely dangerous conditions in the ocean along its
beach frontage (1) which were not known or obvious to persons of

ordinary intelligence, and (2) which were known or in the

<31-
exercise of reasonable care ought to have been known to the State
or county. Inasmich as Act 190 eliminates the need to determine
whether ocean conditions were not known or obvious to persons of
ordinary intelligence, the trial court’s FOFs and CoLs with
respect to the open and cbvious nature of the ocean conditions

 

ry, but nevertheless not clearly erroneous or

wrong.

5. The Trial Court's Pindings with respect to Prior
Drowning Incidents Occurring at Ke'snae Landing
Prior to January 30, 1997

Plaintiffs allege that the trial court impliedly found
that the State did not have notice of any dangerous conditions at
Ke‘anae Landing, based on FOF Nos. 9 and 10, which state:

9. There was no evidence that any drownings occurred at
Ke'snae landing pricr to January 30, 1987.

10, There was no evidence that the State was aware or
should have been aware of any drownings or near”
Gromings occurring at Ke'anse Landing prior to
Sanuary 30, 1957.

 

on appeal, Plaintiffs assert that they

ere got roautred to prove that the State had any notice of
the dangers at Ke'anee Landing because
Hhous vary dangere. ‘bven if thoy were Foqulted to prove
notice, they were fot required to prove actual notice
Piaintitfe proved that the deate bad constructive notice of
the dangers at the landing because the state knew how ehe
public used the lending and

tions yf theresore,
fave aintained the site to make it reasonably safe for it
intended use, Last, the State had constructive notice that
[therel were prior dromings st Ke'anae Landing, ‘and even if
it did not, it needed co have constructive knowleage only of
the dangers at the site, not of whether the exact sane
injury had occurred there before

 

The State should

 

 

   

 

(Emphases added.) Although Plaintiffs argue that the state
“created the dangerous conditions that caused the events of

Uanuary 30, 1997" (emphasis added), they fail to define exactly

-32-
what “dangerous conditions" the State had created. The only
conditions mentioned by Plaintiffs in their challenge to FOF Nos.

9 and 10 are the “ocean conditions." However, Plaintiffs surely

 

could not have intended to assert that the state somehow created
the hazardous ocean conditions. It appears that Plaintiffa may
be attempting to argue that the man-made conditions at Ke'anae
Landing, i.¢., the concrete platform areas and stairway, wer
dangerous. such argument is similar to their contentions
regarding the risks associated with the landing area itself. See
discussion infra

Because section 2(e) of Act 190 does not impose any
duty on the State to warn of dangerous natural conditions in the
ocean at coastal accesses, beach accesses, or in areas that are
not public beach parks, the trial court's FOF Nos. 9 and 10 were
unnecessary, but nevertheless not clearly erroneous.

c. The ed re ASS: aw nd
Inaelt

1. Plaintiffs’ Claim that the State had a Duty to
Warn of the Conditions Associated with the Landing
Area Itself

 

Plaintiffs submit that, under the Richardson rule, the
State, as the owner and occupier of Ke'anae Landing, had a duty
to Plaintiffs to take reasonable steps to eliminate unreasonable
risks or warn them against the risks associated with the landing
area itself, The State argues that, if,

as Plaintiffs urge, Act 190 de interpreted such that it does
because Ke'anae Landing vas a
lute would be inapplicable under
uation, Significantly, under Plaintiffs’
srpretation, it could be argued in almost. any

  

 

-33-
situation involving a drowning that the natural ocean
Conditions were not the sole proximate cause, but that @
beach or ocean access wae a contributing factor, and chat
Kot 190 therefore should not apply.

 

 

In response, Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he court was
+. required to bifurcate the State’s duties between the duty

to warn of dangerous natural conditions in the ocean[] and the

 

duty to warn of or protect against the dangers of Ke Landing
itself. Act 190 protects the State only against the former.”
‘The trial court specifically found in FOF No. 17 that

“the landing and surrounding area was neither defective nor

 

dangerous.*? Plaintiffs assert that FOF No. 17 ia: (2) contrary

to FOF No. 86 and (2) contrary to the substantial evidence in the

 

record. FOF No. 86 states

According to Dr. Grigg, if a person was walking down the
Landing avea, thet person would see the landing se it existe
fand that there was ho guard railing. Dr. Grigg further
Stated that 2 person would also sce that there was nothing
fo protect him or ner if that person were at the Botton of
the landing.

 

Plaintiffs submit that, *[tlo the extent that FOF 66 implies that
the dangerous conditions at Ke'anae Landing were open and
obvious, it is contrary to FOF 17." Plaintiffs algo argue that
they presented evidence at trial that there were dangerous
conditions at the landing area itself and that the State failed

to eliminate those risks:

> For to. 27 states, in ite entirety:

‘The Court finds that the parking area adjacent to {] Fe'anae
Landing ie not a state-naintained parking lot, but a small
dirt turn off where vehicles can pull off the road or make
U-turas; ‘the court further finde that the landing-and
aUErOUIding area was neither defective nor dancersus.

 

dea.)

 

(imphasie

o34-
br. Richard Grigg testified that 1f the state did sot wish
fo erect warning eigns, it could eliminate the rieke of
Saves sueeping over the lover platform ay restricting access
Thereto br removing the structures. noth Me. [Herbert]
Bogert and urs (Patrick) Durkin (Piaintifts’ expert
Witnesses] testified a to how Ke'anae Landing is dangerous
na what the state could do to eliminate those dangers, auch
railings, barriers, cables, and demolition... . (tlhe
fe intended for Neghal to ee the lending just ashe was;

Jr such use was dangerous co nim and others. The
State had superior knowledge of this danger, yet i did
hothing fo elisinate the risk, although it could have easily
done 50,

 

  
  

      

(citations to record omitted.)

The State asserts, inter alia, that “there was
substantial contradictory evidence, including but not limited to
the court's own site inspection conducted pursuant to {]
Plaintiffs’ request.? Plaintiffs’ challenge to FOF No. 17 is
without merit.

As this court has noted, even where testimony as to

 

particular facts ie uncontradicted, “questions of fact always

involve a question of credibility to be resolved by the trier of

 

facts." Siko v. Seauirant, 51 Haw, 118, 129, 452 P.2d 447, 448
(1969). This court must, therefore, “generally accept the
determination of the court which had the opportunity to observe
the deneanor of the witnesses during the direct and cross-
examinations." Id, at 119-20, 452 P.2d at 448, Moreover, the
admissibility and weight to be given to expert testimony dealing

directly with an ultimate question which the trial court, as the

+ the state algo mentions that the deposition testimony of Plaintiffs’
expert, Herbert Bogert, cannot be considered by the trial court because his
Seposition was never received into evidence. Although the index to the record
Of appeal shows that Bogert’s deposition was not admitted into evidence, a
form affixed to Bogert’s deposition itself states that his deposition was
fasiteed into evidence on Auguet 3, 2001, by the clerk of the trial court.

 

o35-
trier of fact, was required to decide is ordinarily left to the
Giscretion of the trial court. Exiedrich, 60 Haw. at 38, sas
P.2d at 1041. This court's analysis in Friedrich is particularly
sDluninating:

We need not consider vhat limitations may exist on the
freedom of a trier of fact to reject uncontradicted expert
testimony. "Here the testimony offered by [plaintitf-
appellant) went only to the question whether a guardrail or
s'warning sign was necessary to nake the pler reasonably

‘Opinion of iplaintitf-appeliant]'e
Superts on this issue desir directly with an ultimate

ourt was required to decide as the
sid that such testimony

 

     

   

 

Aging, 56 Haw. 135, 147-38, 531 7.20 648, 657-56 (1975)
Rithough the testimony was admitted by the trial court, ‘the
Weight to be accorded co it was clearly to be determined by
the court. Ne conclude that” (plainti#f-appellant)'s
Challenges to the findinge of Fact are without mere

 

Id, at 38, 586 P.2d at 1042
Likewise, in the present case, the trial court, as the
trier of fact, was faced with the question whether railings,
barriers, cables, and/or demolition of the landing were necessary
to make Ke'anae Landing reasonably safe for visitors. Implicit
in the trial court’s finding that the “landing and surrounding
area was neither defective nor dangerous” is the trial court's
apparent belief that any renedial modifications to the landing
area, including denolition, were not necessary. The trial
court’s finding is premised upon its own viewing of Ke'anae
Landing and several pictures exhibiting the conditions of the
landing area seconds before Meghal was seen in the ocean.
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the trial
court's finding that the landing area was neither defective nor
dangerous. see State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 256, 375, 60 P.3d

-36-
306, 325 (2002) (holding that a jury view, whether by @ jury oF @
judge as the trier of fact, constitutes independent evidence)

hue, we hold that the trial court's finding that the landing

 

area was neither defective nor dangerous was not clearly
erroneous.
2. plaintiffs’ Claim Alleging the Failure of the

Beate to Protect Plaintiffs Against the Alleged

Dangers of the Landing Area Itself

on appeal, Plaintiffs argue that FOF No. 3 is
erroneous. FOP No. 3 states in relevant part: “Plaintiffe filed
their First Anended Complaint against Defendant state on May 6,
iss, alleging that Defendant state had a duty to warn of
dangerous ocean conditions at {] Ke'anae Landing.” Plaintiffs
contend that this finding is erroneous “ro the extent that it
Qieregarde Plaintiffs’ claim that the state failed to protect
then from the dangers at Ke'anae Landing.” Plaintiffs argue that
chey asserted clains for both the State's failure to warn of
unreasonable risks and its failure to eliminate those risks, and,
as a result, the trial court failed to enter any FOP or COL with
eeopect to Plaintiffs’ “failure to eliminate siske* claim. Thus,
plaintiffs submit that the trial court erred when it entered
tinal judgnent as to all clains in favor of the State.

tn response, the State argues that Plaintiffs failed te
prove that the landing area itself was unreasonably dangerous.
based on the analysis provided supra, we agree.

the allegation in Plaintiff's amended complaint at
igsue here specifically stated:

o37-
[oln or before January 30, 1997, knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care ahould have knows, that wave,
Mater or other aquatic conditions of or in the Pacific ocean
Adjacent £0,
dangerous to vie
Gecedente] ; further, 2

  
    

failed to adequately warn ot protect plaineit#s or any of
‘khen,ox_ others, of or fron the aforesaid dangerous aquatic

‘sonditions
(Bmphasis added.) Plaintiffs, on appeal, incorrectly

characterize the claims they alleged in their complaint
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the defendants failed to
adequately protect plaintiffe from the “aforesaid dangerous
aguatic conditions." (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch as “aquatic*
means “living or growing in water,” Plaintiffs actually alleged
that the defendants failed to protect then from water-related
conditions, not the man-made conditions of the landing area
itself, as they argue on appeal. The Random House College
Dictionary 67 (1st ed. 1979)

Additionally, the trial court concluded that ‘Act 190
relieves the Defendant state of any liability to Plaintiffs.»
COL No. 107. on appeal, Plaintiffs argue that, although Act 190
does relieve the State of its duty to warn Plaintiffs, it does
ot relieve the State of its “alternate duty under common law
premises liability ‘to take reasonable steps to eliminate the
unreasonable risk.’* However, the landing area itself was found
to be neither defective nor dangerous, and, as discussed supra,
such finding was supported by substantial evidence.
Consequently, we hold that FOF No. 3 is not clearly erroneous and

that COL No. 107 is correct.

-38-
Plaintiffs maintain that FOF Nos. 84 and 87 and COL
Nos. 108 and 113 are erroneous and/or wrong because the trial
court did not consider the ‘undisputed evidence that Ke'anae
Landing contributed to the decedents’ deaths." Essentially, the

trial court concluded that it was the “extremely dangerous ocean

 

conditions which caused the deaths of the decedents.” Plaintiffs
argue that the trial court’s findings and conclusions are
“contrary to Hawai'i law on causation." In support, Plaintiffs

assert that: (1) but for the unnatural landing area, *Neghal

 

would not have been standing where a wave could sweep him out
into the ocean"; and (2) ‘one cannot see the lower platform at
Ke'anae Landing until he . . . moves almost all the way down the
pathway. . . . Thus, anyone who has never visited the site would
not know that the lower platform exists, and would not know that
a wave could sweep over it, unless he . . . is on or near the
lower platform at such a discreet moment in time.” Plaintiffs

submit that, because Ke'anae Landing itself ‘was a substantial

 

factor contributing to Meghal’s death," Act 190, § 2(e) does not

 

apply to the instant
In reaponee, the State contends that Plaintiffs raise
‘irrelevant argunenta on the issue of causation.” The state also
argues that Plaintiffs have no evidentiary support for their
assertion that the landing area itself was dangerous. As

previously discussed, the State, as the owner and occupier of

-39-
Ke'anae Landing and its surrounding waters, did not owe any duty
to Plaintiffs. We, therefore, need not reach the issue of
causation inasmuch as Plaintiffs have failed to meet one the four
essential elements of negligence, i.e. duty. See Takavana vi
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 82 Hawai'i 486, 498-99, 923 P.24 903, 915-16
(2996) (stating that in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a
negligence claim, the plaintiff is required to prove all four of

the necessary elements of negligence: (1) duty; (2) breach of

 

 

duty: (3) causation; and (4) damages) .
B, Various Other Findings Made by The Trial Court:

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court nade
numerous other erroneous FOFs, As discussed below, their
contentions are without merit.

First, Plaintiffs allege that FOF Noe. 21, 22, 24, and

25 are erroneous because these findings rely on Exhibit 8-7,

 

which was never admitted into evidence. Plaintiffs’ argunent is
without merit. The trial court’s exhibit list clearly indicates
that Exhibit S-7 was admitted into evidence on July 17, 2001, at
10:02 a.m.

Second, Plaintiffs challenge FOF No. 35, which states:
“It is unknown how Megha! Shah entered the water.” Plaintiffs
allege that this finding is erroneous because “the state never
Gisputed Plaintiffs’ assertion that a wave swept Meghal into the
ocean.” The State maintains that not only did Plaintiffs not
prove that a wave swept Meghal into the ocean, Dewal (Meghal’s
wife) testified that she was unsure how Meghal entered the water:

-40-
 

 

   

 

 

 

° defense counsel]: [W]hen you tured around, Meghal
wan gone?
a: By Bewel Shah]: Yeah. He was on the -- he was down
there:
@: Excuse ne. What I am referring to is after the
Splash, and you turned -- and you turned your back,
ready gone?
Q:) * You later learned he had -- he was in the water? You
sd later?
a .
(emphases added.) Based on Dewal’s testimony, there is

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that it
was unclear how Meghal entered the water. Sea In xe Jane Dos,
Bornon June 20, 1995, 95 Hawai'i 163, 196-97, 20 P.3 616, 629-
30 (2001) (noting that testimony of a single witness, if found
credible by the trier of fact, suffices as substantial evidence
to support an FOF).

Third, Plaintiffs claim that FOF No. 26 is erroneous

because there is no evidence in the record to support it. FOF

 

No. 26 provides in pertinent part: “The Georgia Group then
stopped at the Ke'anae Arboretum, where . . . Meghal Shah
spontaneously dove into a foreign pool and invited the others to
Join him; no one did. The Ke'anae Arboretum is located just a
few minutes from [] Ke'anae Landing.” It is unclear from the
record whether Meghal did dive into a pool at Ke'anae Arboretum.
However, even if the trial court’s finding is found to be clearly
erroneous, Plaintiffs fail to argue how this finding, if
erroneous, affected the outcome of the trial court’s decision.

See HRS § 641-2 (1993) (No judgment, order or decree shall be

wane
reversed, amended or modified for any error or defect unless the
court is of the opinion that it has injuriously affected the

substantial rights of the appellant.”); Torres v. Torres, 100

 

Hawai'i 397, 412, 60 P.3d 798, 813 (2002) (noting that in order
for a court’s erroneous finding to constitute reversible error,
appellant must indicate how the erroneous finding affected the
outcome of the trial court's decision).

And, lastly, Plaintiffs dispute two FOFe with respect

to Bobo’s testimony, FOF Nos. 68 and 70 provide:

 

68. According to [Bobol, on January 30, 1997, he had been
Gorking on is truck and sav that the ocean conditions:
hear his hone were rough. (Bobo) testified that the
ough ocean conditions existed from the moraing hours
and that he could hear the waves breaking and ersehing
Spon the rocks ae the landing

 

 

70, ” inobo] estimated that the biggest waves he
Gay were at least 13 fect high

won hat

 

Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence in the record to
support these FOFs. Again, even assuming these findings are
clearly erroneous, Plaintiffs fail to denonstrate how these
findings affected the outcome of the trial court's decision. see
HRS § 641-2; Torres, 100 Hawai'i at 412, 60 P.3d at 613.
F. Plaintiffs’ Remaining Contentions

Plaintiffs contend that: (1) they were not allowed to
introduce evidence of the state’s admissions that Ke'anae Landing
is dangerous; (2) they were not allowed to fully cross-exanine
the State’s witnesses; and (3) the State’s oceanography expert
was allowed to testify as to ocean conditions at Ke'anae Landing
on January 30, 1997, when such testimony went beyond the scope of
the expert's pretrial expert report. Having concluded that the

-42-
State did not owe any duty to Plaintiffs, we need not address
Plaintiffs’ remaining evidentiary contentions,
Iv. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s

Noverber 21, 2001 final judgment in favor of the State.

On the briefs: Yor

Amold T. Phillips IZ, :

for plaintiffs-appellanta Bite Plane
Miriam P, Loui and Peuri COAL arb
Marcie C. L. Laderta,

Deputy Attorneys General,
for defendant -appellee
State of Hawai'i

Game Day bo

 

-43-