Title: West v. Wyoming State Treasurer

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

West v. Wyoming State Treasurer1991 WY 166822 P.2d 1269Case Number: 90-159Decided: 12/20/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
GLO C. 
WEST, INDIVIDUALLY, AND GLO C. WEST AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF ELBERT LEROY WEST, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

WYOMING STATE TREASURER, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District Court, LaramieCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 Jack Gage, 
argued of Gage & Moxley, Cheyenne, and 
Carolina A. Papa, Laramie, for appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., and Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and LEIMBACK, District Judge.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     Appellant sought a 
declaratory judgment that she was not required to reimburse, out of a third 
party $399,000 wrongful death recovery, two-thirds of the $72,316.51 worker's 
compensation benefits paid to decedent's survivor beneficiaries. The trial court 
held that the third party wrongful death recovery was subject to a statutory 
lien requiring reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits and further that 
the State was not obligated to file a creditor's claim in the decedent worker's 
estate.

 [¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 [¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues as follows:

"1. The 
lien provisions of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Statute 
conflict with the Provision of Wyoming's Wrongful Death Statute that no debts of 
the decedent may be satisfied from proceeds in a wrongful death action. The 
issue is, which statute language will prevail?

"2. 
Extant Wyoming case law requires a claimant, 
including the State of Wyoming, to file a claim against an estate in 
order to collect from an estate. The Worker's Compensation Division failed to 
file a claim. Is the Division therefore foreclosed from enforcing its 
lien?"

 [¶4.]     On July 8, 1986, Elbert 
Leroy West was hauling lumber from FoxPark to Casper, when the eighteen-wheel semi tractor/trailer he was 
driving rolled over near Casper. Mr. West was crushed in the cab of the 
truck and received serious injuries. He was taken to the hospital in NatronaCounty, where he died on July 17, 1986. 
Mr. West was survived by his widow, Glo Christie West, two sons who were 
emancipated and no longer lived in the home, and an unmarried minor daughter who 
still resided in the family home.

 [¶5.]     At the time of the 
accident, Mr. West was employed by Jem Supply and Equipment Company (Jem). Jem 
contested an award of worker's compensation benefits to Mr. West arguing that he 
was an independent subcontractor. The question of worker's compensation coverage 
was then litigated in the Albany County District Court. The court determined 
that Mr. West had suffered a compensable, work-related injury while employed by 
Jem. It awarded worker's compensation benefits to Mr. West and to his estate as 
follows:



Total 
      Medical

$15,687.69

Total 
      Temporary Disability

226.46

Total 
      Court Costs

1,529.92

Total 
      Death Award

  54,872.44

Total 
      Benefits Awarded

$72,316.51

[¶6.]     Glo West, as personal 
representative of Mr. West's estate, filed a wrongful death action against third 
party Brent & Wicklund Forest Products, Inc. (Brent & Wicklund). The 
suit alleged that Brent & Wicklund was liable for damages for Mr. West's 
death. Mrs. West negotiated a structured settlement with Brent & Wicklund, 
having a present value of $399,009.00.

 [¶7.]     Based on the 
settlement, the Wyoming State Treasurer requested reimbursement of $48,211.01, 
or two-thirds of the worker's compensation benefits paid on account of Mr. 
West's injuries and death. Although Mrs. West had published notice to creditors 
in the probate proceedings, the Treasurer did not file statutory notice of claim 
against Mr. West's estate for reimbursement. 

 [¶8.]     On May 23, 1989, Mrs. 
West filed this action for declaratory judgment in which she argued that the 
Treasurer did not have a right to reimbursement. After receiving memoranda from 
both parties, the trial court on May 11, 1990, issued findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order finding that the wrongful death statute, when read 
in pari materia with the worker's 
compensation statutes, did not prohibit a lien for reimbursement of worker's 
compensation benefits on the proceeds of third party wrongful death recovery. It 
ruled that the Treasurer had a valid lien against the settlement proceeds in the 
amount of $48,211.00. Mrs. West filed timely appeal from this 
order.

 [¶9.]     The State's lien and 
right to reimbursement in this case were obtained under the former W.S. 
27-12-104 (June 1983 Repl.), which provided as follows:

"(a) If 
an employee covered by this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] receives an 
injury under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than 
the employer to pay damages, the employee if engaged in extrahazardous work for 
his employer at the time of the injury is not deprived of any compensation to 
which he is entitled under this act. He may also pursue his remedy at law 
against the third person. If the employee recovers from the third person in any 
manner including judgment, compromise, settlement or release, the total 
proceeds, without regard to the types of damages alleged in the third-party 
action, of the recovery shall be divided as follows:

"(i) 
After deducting the reasonable cost of recovery or collection not to exceed 
one-third (1/3) of the recovery, one-half (1/2) of the remainder shall be 
immediately paid to the injured employee, his personal representative or other 
person granted the recovery and up to one-half (1/2) shall be paid to the state 
treasurer in reimbursement for the total amount of all awards received or in 
absence of a disclaimer of any unpaid balances to be received by the injured 
employee under this act including all monies paid to him or in his behalf, less 
the state's pro rata share of costs of recovery or collection. The state 
treasurer shall credit and apportion the reimbursement to the accounts from 
which the awards were paid, pro rata if necessary. Any balance remaining shall 
be paid to the employee, his personal representative or other person granted the 
recovery.

"(b) If 
an injured employee has received compensation under this act, the state through 
the state treasurer has a right and interest in all actions for damages brought 
by any injured employee against a person other than his employer, and shall be 
served by registered or certified mail with a copy of the complaint filed in the 
suit.

"(c) If 
there is a settlement, compromise or release entered into by the parties in 
claims against a person, other than the employer, the attorney general 
representing the state treasurer shall be made a party in all such negotiations 
for settlement, compromise or release. The attorney general and the director, 
for purposes of facilitating compromise and settlement, may in a proper case 
authorize acceptance by the state of less than the state treasurer's claim for 
reimbursement. The proceeds of any judgment, settlement, compromise or release 
are encumbered by a lien in favor of the state to the extent of the total amount 
of the state treasurer's claim for reimbursement under this act. The lien shall 
remain in effect until the proceeds have been distributed to the parties 
entitled thereto in accordance with these provisions.

"(d) If 
the injury causes the death of the employee, the rights and remedies in this 
section inure to and the obligations are binding upon the personal 
representative of the deceased employee for the benefit of his or her 
dependents."

 [¶10.]  Appellant attacks the State's right to 
recover worker's compensation under this statute on several grounds. First, she 
argues that this statute, as applied to her case, conflicts with the Wrongful 
Death Act provision shielding recovery from creditors when the deceased is 
survived by a widow. Wyoming Statute 1-38-102 (June 1988 Repl.), dealing with 
wrongful death actions, provides:

"(b) If 
the deceased left a husband, wife, child, father or mother, no debt of the 
deceased may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained in any 
action brought under the provisions of this section."

Appellant 
contends that since Mr. West left a wife when he died, no "debt" of his may be 
satisfied out of the proceeds of her wrongful death settlement with Brent & 
Wicklund. The Wyoming State Treasurer's claim for reimbursement of worker's 
compensation benefits, she argues, represents such a "debt" of the 
deceased.

 [¶11.]  The State responds that there is no 
conflict because monies paid to the injured worker do not constitute "debts of 
the decedent." We agree with the State that these two statutes can be harmonized 
and that the reimbursement claim and lien are not barred by the Wrongful Death 
Act.

 [¶12.]  Our rules for construing statutes are 
well established.

"`If 
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must abide by the plain 
meaning of the statute, but where a statute is ambiguous, the court will resort 
to general principles of statutory construction in an attempt to ascertain 
legislative intent. Furthermore, it is a fundamental rule of statutory 
interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, 
and sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous.'" 
Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Wyo. 1991), quoting Deloges v. State ex rel. Worker's Comp. 
Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988) (citations 
omitted).

Furthermore, 
"[l]egislative intent should be ascertained, as nearly as possible, from the 
language of the statute viewed in the light of its object and purpose." Moncrief v. Harvey, 816 P.2d 97, 105 (Wyo. 1991). See also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991). Statutes relating to the same 
subject are read together to ascertain legislative intent. Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1387 
(Wyo. 
1991).

 [¶13.]  At issue is whether the claim and lien 
for reimbursement can be included in the meaning of the phrase "no debt of the 
deceased may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained [under 
the Wrongful Death Act]." The Wrongful Death Act does not contain a definition 
of "debt of the deceased," and we have located no case law defining that term. 
However, we find the definition of "debt" contained in the probate code useful 
because it deals with debts of a decedent under similar 
circumstances.

 [¶14.]  Wyoming Statute 2-1-301(a)(ix) (July 1980 
Repl.) defines "debt" for purposes of the probate code as follows: "`[d]ebts' 
include liabilities of the decedent which 
survive, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise." (emphasis added) 
As the State points out, the obligation for reimbursement of wrongful death 
proceeds is not a liability of the decedent since it only comes into existence 
after the decedent is dead and others 
receive an award from a third party on account of his death. Furthermore, the 
lien attaches only to the wrongful death recovery and not to other assets of the 
decedent's estate. Thus, the State's claim for reimbursement cannot be 
considered a "liabilit[y] [or debt] of 
the decedent" under either the language of W.S. 1-38-102 or the probate code 
definition. Neither the decedent nor his estate in general are liable for 
repaying worker's compensation, and so it is not "his" debt. We therefore hold 
that the wrongful death proceeds in this instance are not protected by the 
wrongful death provision which shields them from "debts of the 
decedent."

 [¶15.]  Appellant next argues that W.S. 27-12-104 
does not apply to the "death benefit" portion of worker's compensation benefits 
paid to Mr. West's estate because it was not "received by" the employee, Mr. 
West, or paid "in his behalf." See 
W.S. 27-12-104(a)(i). We agree with the State that the death benefit was paid on 
Mr. West's behalf. When a covered worker dies, worker's compensation replaces 
his salary by paying his dependents. This benefit is obviously designed to 
replace income which the worker would have earned for his dependents had he been 
alive.

 [¶16.]  Furthermore, the plain language of W.S. 
27-12-104 shows a legislative intent to include the death benefit in the 
reimbursement and lien provisions. Wyoming Statute 27-12-104(c) states that 
"[t]he proceeds of any judgment, settlement, compromise or release are 
encumbered by a lien in favor of the state to the extent of the total amount of 
the state treasurer's claim for reimbursement under this act." (emphasis added) 
Wyoming Statute 27-12-104(d), quoted above, clearly contemplates recovery in 
cases where the worker has died:

"If the 
injury causes the death of the employee, the rights and remedies in this section 
inure to and the obligations are binding upon the personal representative of the 
deceased employee for the benefit of his or her 
dependents."

Reading 
these statutes together, we reject appellant's contention that W.S. 27-12-104 
does not apply to the death benefit.

 [¶17.]  Finally, appellant argues, since evidence 
of the decedent's medical bills is not admissible into evidence in a wrongful 
death suit, a jury will be unaware that these expenses will be deducted from its 
verdict by worker's compensation recovery. Appellant argues this has the effect 
of burdening a widow, who is limited to recovery for damages for "care, comfort 
and society," with her deceased husband's medical bills, since their cost will 
be deducted from her recovery. While this may be true, if there were no worker's 
compensation, appellant would still be liable for her husband's medical bills, 
or at least for the reasonable value of the services provided him. The Family 
Expenses Doctrine, codified in our statutes at W.S. 20-1-201 (June 1987 Repl.), 
states that

"[t]he 
necessary expenses of the family and the education of the children are 
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, for 
which they may be sued jointly or separately."

The 
State merely seeks recoupment of what it has already paid out. Our 
interpretation of the plain language of W.S. 27-12-104, allowing the State to 
seek recoupment under these circumstances, is correct even though the surviving 
spouse may not recover these expenses from a third party. Nor can we, in the 
absence of unconstitutionality, simply disregard what the legislature has 
provided in order to achieve a sought-after result.

 [¶18.]  What appellant really asks in this case 
is for a double recovery. She wants compensation benefits from the State and a 
third party tort recovery for the same loss. Appellant argues that the two 
recoveries are not for the same loss, because W.S. 1-38-102(c) specifically 
provides wrongful death damages for the survivor's loss of "probable future 
companionship, society and comfort." Appellant thus attempts to distinguish 
non-economic damages under the Wrongful Death Act from economic "damages" under 
the Worker's Compensation Act. However, such a distinction is unjustified, since 
the Wrongful Death Act allows recovery for both economic and non-economic 
damages: "The court or jury, as the case may be, in every such action may award 
such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just." W.S. 
1-38-102(c).

 [¶19.]  As we said in a slightly different 
context in Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel. 
Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 569 P.2d 95, 99 (Wyo. 1977):

"`It is 
equally elementary that the claimant should not be allowed to keep the entire 
amount both of his compensation award and of his common-law damage recovery. The 
obvious disposition of the matter is to give the employer [here, the State] so 
much of the negligence recovery as is necessary to reimburse him for his 
compensation outlay, and to give the employee the excess. This is fair to 
everyone concerned: the employer [the State], who, in a fault sense, is neutral, 
comes out even; the third person pays exactly the damages he would normally pay, 
which is correct, since to reduce his burden because of the relation between the 
employer and the employee would be a windfall to him which he has done nothing 
to deserve; and the employee gets a fuller reimbursement for actual damages 
sustained than is possible under the compensation system alone.'" (quoting A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 
71.20 at 14-2, 14-3 (1976).)

 [¶20.]  Interpreting a previous version of W.S. 
27-12-104, we also said in Jackson v. 
Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 521 P.2d 571, 573 
(Wyo. 1974), that it.

"makes 
clear the lawmakers' intent that an employee is not entitled to a double 
recovery for injuries and provides that the industrial accident fund shall be 
reimbursed for the total amount of all awards received by an employee * * 
*."

 [¶21.]  Industrial accidents are a tragedy, 
particularly those leading to loss of life. We are aware that no amount of money 
can ever truly reimburse Mrs. West and her children for the loss of their 
husband and father. However, our statute requires that the State be reimbursed 
from wrongful death proceeds for worker's compensation it has paid. This 
reimbursement is not a "debt of the decedent" so as to immunize the wrongful 
death recovery from reimbursement. Although we are not unmindful of the loss 
suffered by Mrs. West and her children, any change in our statutory arrangements 
must come from the legislature.

 [¶22.]  As was said in Martinez v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 132 
Wis.2d 11, 390 N.W.2d 72 (1986), in which the court interpreted a third party 
reimbursement provision similar to our own:

"The 
Worker's Compensation Act is a legislatively created substitute for the common 
law rather than a supplement thereto. Moreover, worker's compensation is wholly 
statutory and questions regarding public policy should be determined by the 
legislature, not the courts. In addition, `worker's compensation laws constitute 
an all-pervasive legislative scheme which attempts to effect a compromise 
between the employer and the employee's competing interests. Worker's 
compensation laws are economic regulations whereby the legislature has balanced 
competing societal interests.'" Martinez 390 N.W.2d  at 74 (citations omitted).

 [¶23.]  We now turn to appellant's second issue. 
It concerns whether the State was required to file a creditor's claim with Mr. 
West's estate. Wyoming Statute 2-7-201 (July 1980 Repl.) requires the personal 
representative of a decedent's estate to publish notice to creditors.1 This notice informs creditors that 
they must file notice of any claim against the estate with the clerk of court 
within three months of the first date of publication or unless otherwise allowed 
or paid the claim will be forever barred. Wyoming Statute 2-7-703(a) (July 1980 
Repl.) similarly provides that "all claims whether due, not due or contingent, 
shall be filed in duplicate with the clerk within the time limited in the notice 
to creditors and any claim not so filed is barred forever." Wyoming Statute 
2-7-703 is a "nonclaim statute." Such statutes bar creditors' claims for failure 
to file within a time period fixed by notice in the probate proceeding. See Kuntz v. Kinne, 395 P.2d 286, 288 
(Wyo. 1964). 
There is no dispute that Mrs. West, as personal representative of her husband's 
estate, properly published notice to creditors, or that the State failed to file 
notice of claim. 

 [¶24.]  Appellant argues that the State's claim 
for reimbursement is a "claim" within the meaning of these statutes. Therefore, 
appellant reasons, the State's failure to file a creditor's claim within the 
stated time period means the State is "forever barred" from asserting its claim 
for reimbursement against the wrongful death proceeds, now a part of the 
decedent's estate. Proper resolution of appellant's contention requires that we 
consider two sub-issues: (1) whether wrongful death proceeds are part of the 
decedent's estate, so as to require creditors seeking recovery against them to 
file a claim against the estate; and, if so, (2) whether the State's claim for 
reimbursement constitutes a "claim" within the meaning of the probate 
statutes.

 [¶25.]  We begin with a determination of whether 
wrongful death proceeds are part of the decedent's estate. If they are not, then 
the procedural bar of W.S. 2-7-703(a) cannot apply to an action for a debt 
brought against them. Wyoming Statutes 2-7-703(a) and 2-7-201 deal only with 
creditor claims against the decedent's 
estate.

 [¶26.]  The State cites DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479 
(Wyo. 1977) 
for the proposition that wrongful death recoveries do not become part of the 
decedent's estate. DeHerrera 
concerned the survival of an action for personal injuries brought by the 
decedent prior to his death. The decedent had died from causes unrelated to the 
injury complained of. We held that under the survival statute the decedent's 
action for personal injuries could survive his death and be carried on by the 
administrator of his estate. To explain our holding, we discussed the difference 
between a wrongful death action and an action carried on under the survival 
statute.

"The 
amount recovered [in a wrongful death action] does not become a part of the 
decedent's estate and is not liable for debts of the estate or subject to estate 
administration. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo. 1975, 541 P.2d 39, 
42.

"* * * 
[T]he wrongful death statute creates a new cause of action for the benefit of 
designated persons who have suffered the loss of a loved one and provider." DeHerrera, at 482.

 [¶27.]  The Jordan 
case, alluded to in DeHerrera, 
concerned the question of whether a decedent's illegitimate child could recover 
damages for the wrongful death of his or her parent. In the course of answering 
this question, we explained why wrongful death proceeds do not become a part of 
the decedent's estate:

"The 
Wyoming 
statute authorizing wrongful death actions is part of the civil code of this 
state and not a part of the probate code. The designation of an administrator is 
no more than a statutory device to provide a party for a civil action to collect 
damages and pay them over to the persons entitled. * * * The amount of recovery 
does not become a part of the decedent's estate. Tuttle v. Short, 1930, 42 
Wyo. 1, 18, 
288 P. 524, 529, 70 A.L.R. 106, 112. This is true even though the administrator 
or executor must bring the action. Bircher v. Foster, Wyo. 1963, 378 P.2d 901, 
902." Jordan, 
541 P.2d  at 42.

 [¶28.]  DeHerrera and Jordan, were followed by Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 
(Wyo. 1984). 
In Wetering, the issue was whether 
the surviving brothers and sisters of the decedent could bring an action for 
wrongful death. The 1973 amendment to what is now W.S. 1-38-102 did not identify 
those persons for whose benefit a wrongful death action could be brought. We 
concluded that those persons were identified in the statute on intestate 
distribution.

 [¶29.]  There follows the court's pronouncement 
that wrongful death recovery, although "treated" as part of the probate estate, 
would be subject to "special rules as to distribution." Wetering, at 1061. Although these 
"special rules" were not defined, it is clear from the context that they were 
those provided in the intestacy statute as well as exemption from creditors' 
claims as provided in the wrongful death statute. Thus, the nonclaim bar of W.S. 
2-7-703 does not apply to the State's right to recovery of moneys which are not 
a "debt of the decedent." Therefore, there is no requirement that the State file 
a claim with the estate.

 [¶30.]  Since we have decided that the nonclaim 
statute does not apply, it is unnecessary to consider the second subissue in 
order to affirm judgment for the State on the "filing of claim" issue. However, 
we do note that the chief case cited by appellant concerning the government's 
obligation to conform to the nonclaim statute, State ex rel. State Board of Charities & 
Reform v. Bower, 362 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1961), reh. denied 363 P.2d 791 (1961), holds 
that a governmental reimbursement claim made against the deceased's estate is subject 
to the nonclaim statute. Since as discussed above in this case the claim was 
against the wrongful death proceeds in particular rather than against the 
decedent's estate in general, Bower 
cannot be considered controlling precedent.

 [¶31.]  The order of the trial court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The version of this statute cited 
here was declared unconstitutional by this court in Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173 
(Wyo. 1989), 
because it failed to require adequate notice to claimants. Neither party raises 
unconstitutionality as an issue in this case, and the record does not disclose 
whether the State should have received or did receive notice beyond publication. 
We stated in Hanesworth that our 
determination of unconstitutionality would not apply retroactively to probate 
proceedings finalized under the old publication system prior to April 19, 1988. 
We do not have information in the record as to when probate of Mr. West's estate 
was finalized. We do know that first publication was made on December 3, 1987, 
and that the three-month period thus expired on March 3, 1988. Since 
unconstitutionality is not raised and there is not an adequate record to pass on 
it, we will not consider the question of whether the State's failure to file a 
claim could be excused because of constitutionally-inadequate 
notice.

Wyoming 
Statute 2-7-205(a), effective February 24, 1989, has cured the unconstitutional 
infirmity of 2-7-201. Hanesworth, at 
176, n. 4.

LEIMBACK, 
District Judge, dissenting.

 [¶32.]  I disagree with the majority on the issue 
of whether wrongful death proceeds are part of the estate, so as to require 
creditors to file a claim with the estate. The majority relies on DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479 
(Wyo. 1977) 
for the proposition that wrongful death proceeds are not part of the decedent's 
estate. This approach disregards Wetering 
v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984) 
(modified on other grounds Butler v. 
Halstead by and through Colley, 770 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1989)), in which we 
said that under the current wrongful death statute:

The 
only proper way to effectuate [the intent of the legislature] is to treat the 
proceeds of the judgment [in a wrongful death action] as being subject to 
administration as part of the probate estate, but with special rules as to 
distribution.

This is 
clearly a different result than that which pertained prior to 1973 [when the 
wrongful death statute was amended] in which the judgment in a wrongful death 
action did not become a part of the decedent's estate and was not subject to 
debts or administration. DeHerrera v. 
Herrera, supra. * * * We further must assume that the legislature did not 
intend futile acts and that its amendment of the statute indicated some change 
in the existing law was intended. DeHerrera v. Herrera, 
supra.

Wetering, 682 P.2d  at 1061 (citations 
omitted).

 [¶33.]  The majority attempts to distinguish Wetering by emphasizing the language 
that wrongful death recovery is subject to "`special rules as to distribution.'" 
(Majority at 1275, quoting Wetering, 
682 P.2d at 1061). It writes that "it is clear from the context [in Wetering] that they were those provided 
in the intestacy statute as well as exemption from creditors' claims as provided 
in the wrongful death statute." (Majority at 1275). The majority completely 
ignores the language in Wetering to 
the effect that the legislature intended to change the law regarding whether 
wrongful death judgments should be subject to debts or administration. I read Wetering to mean simply that the 
"special rules as to distribution" are these:

1. The 
statute providing for intestate descent and distribution defines the class of 
persons on whose behalf a wrongful death action may be brought. See W.S. 2-4-101 
(Supp. 1991).

2. As 
each person benefitted by the wrongful death action may prove his respective 
damages, W.S. 1-38-102(c), the distribution of wrongful death proceeds will be 
in accord with the amount of each beneficiary's proven damages rather than with 
the intestate distribution formula prescribed by W.S. 
2-4-101.

Unlike 
the majority, I do not believe it is at all "clear from the context" that the 
"special rules" in Wetering extend to 
exemption from creditors' claims in the wrongful death 
statute.

 [¶34.]  If one combines the majority's conclusion 
that a lien for reimbursement of death benefits is not a "debt" of the decedent 
with the language in Wetering 
indicating that wrongful death judgments are part of the probate estate, the 
logical conclusion is that the Worker's Compensation Division may assert a lien 
for reimbursement against a wrongful death judgment. The remaining issue is 
whether the Division is foreclosed from enforcing its lien because it failed to 
file a claim against the estate. I submit that the Division is foreclosed from 
collecting the debt from assets in the hands of decedent's personal 
representative.

 [¶35.]  W.S. 2-7-703(a) (Supp. 1991) (as amended 
to provide for notice to creditors as mandated by Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. 
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988)) states in 
part, "all claims whether due, not due or contingent, shall be filed in 
duplicate with the clerk within the time limited in the notice to creditors and 
any claim not so filed is barred forever." The legislature has mandatorily 
barred creditors' claims against the estate of a decedent probated in this 
state, unless such claims are presented and filed within the definitely limited 
time prescribed by the statutes. Matter 
of Estate of Peterson, 75 Wyo. 416, 296 P.2d 504, 505 (1956). Thus, a 
probate court's order decreeing that the personal representative pay the claim 
out of the funds of the estate is an order made in excess of its jurisdiction. 
Id.

 [¶36.]  The case of State ex rel. State Board of Charities & 
Reform v. Bower, 362 P.2d 814, reh'g 
denied, 363 P.2d 791 (Wyo. 1961), is particularly relevant. In Bower, the state filed a claim against 
the decedent's estate to recover costs for her care in the WyomingStateHospital. The state filed its claim well 
after the time limit specified in the statute for filing of creditors' claims. 
We held that, regardless whether the estate was required to reimburse the state 
for the decedent's care, the state's claim was time-barred. We 
noted:

The 
question presented here * * * is whether the liability for [the cost of care at 
the State Hospital] may be satisfied from the assets of the deceased without the 
State's observing the procedural conditions precedent which have been imposed by 
the State's own legislature. Had it been the legislative purpose to exempt the 
State from compliance with those precedent procedures, it might easily have done 
so. The failure to except the State from the barring provision of the statute 
makes necessary the plain implication that the law-making arm of the State's 
government did not intend that the State should be relieved of the requirement. 
* * * If the legislature did not see fit to say the door should be left open 
indefinitely for the State to come forward with its legitimate claim against the 
estate, it would be highly improper for this court to read into its statute an 
exception which the enactment did not see fit to incorporate within 
it.

Id. at 822-23. 
The majority attempts to avoid the clear import of Bower by holding that a wrongful death 
judgment is not part of the decedent's estate. But once we accept the 
proposition in Wetering that such a 
judgment is part of the estate, Bower 
teaches that the state, like all other creditors of the estate, must honor the 
requirements of the Wyoming Statutes.

 [¶37.]  "[T]he object of probate proceedings in 
connection with estates of deceased persons is to wind up the affairs of a 
decedent in an orderly manner and to make distribution of assets remaining to 
persons entitled as speedily as is practicable." Lo Sasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 
(Wyo. 1963). 
Permitting creditors to file claims years after the decedent's death frustrates 
this object. See Bower, 362 P.2d  at 
822. Thus, Wyoming has imposed the limitation on the time 
within which a creditor may assert claims against an estate. The majority's 
result would contravene both the object of winding up a decedent's affairs 
rapidly and the clear intent of the legislature.

 [¶38.]  The Worker's Compensation Division may 
not be entirely foreclosed from collecting on its lien. It is unclear from the 
record whether the Division received proper notice of the probate of decedent's 
estate. The Division has conceded that it had notice. Yet if it was not given 
proper notice, the failure of notice would constitute a denial of due process. 
See Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services, Inc., 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340. "[S]tate 
action affecting property must generally be accompanied by notification of that 
action[.]" Id. at 484, 108 S. Ct.  at 1344 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 
(1950)). Probate of an estate is state action for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. Tulsa 
Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U.S.  at 487, 108 S. Ct.  at 1345-46. A statute which bars untimely-filed claims affects property. 
Id. at 488, 108 S. Ct.  at 1346. Thus, a creditor must be given notice by mail or other means to 
ensure actual notice. Id. at 489-91, 
108 S. Ct.  at 1346-48.

 [¶39.]  Wyoming has recognized the need for notice 
articulated in Tulsa Professional 
Collection Services, Inc. The legislature has amended the Probate Code to 
provide for the type of notice Tulsa 
Professional Collection Services, Inc. requires. W.S. 2-7-205 and 2-7-703 
(Supp. 1991). We have held that Tulsa 
Professional Collection Services, Inc. does not apply retroactively to 
probate proceedings rendered final before that case was decided on April 19, 
1988. Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 177 (Wyo. 
1989). A probate proceeding becomes final when the court issues the decree of 
distribution. Id. at 177-78. 
However, the probate of West's estate was not yet final as of April 19, 1988. 
Our concern in Hanesworth was that 
retroactive application would disturb many longsettled property rights. Since 
the rights arising out of the probate of decedent's estate in this case were 
still unsettled at the time Tulsa 
Professional Collection Services, Inc. was decided, our fears in Hanesworth would not arise here. Thus, 
if the Worker's Compensation Division did not receive "actual notice" within the 
meaning of Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services, Inc. and Mullane, then 
termination of its claim would violate due process, and failure to file in a 
timely manner would not foreclose the Division's claim.

 [¶40.]  Even if the Division received proper 
notice, it may still have recourse. Statutes providing that creditors timely 
file claims against a decedent's estate or be forever barred do not invalidate 
debts which are otherwise valid and subsisting. Estate of Peterson, 296 P.2d  at 505. 
Such statutes merely bar the collection or payment of the debt from assets 
subject to the probate estate. Id. A claim 
which has been forever barred for failure to timely file may be required to be 
paid out of other assets not within the decedent's estate, such as out-of-state 
assets. Id. Thus, the 
Division may still recover the death benefits paid to decedent's family if 
decedent had assets outside of Wyoming, and the policy against double 
recovery may still be effectuated. However, the Division must look elsewhere 
than to the judgment for wrongful death.