Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: BRIERLEY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: BRIERLEY2002 WY 12152 P.3d 564Case Number: 01-166Decided: 08/14/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 

LYNN J. 
BRIERLEY, 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 Appellee(Respondent).

 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Sweetwater 
County

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kennard 
F. Nelson of Kirkwood Nelson Schilling & Winn, P.C., Laramie, 
Wyoming 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

* Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference 

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
After 
suffering a compensable injury in 1999, Appellant Lynn J. Brierley suffered 
chronic, intense pain.  In 2000, he 
unsuccessfully attempted suicide, inflicting injuries that generated medical 
costs.  Brierley filed claims for 
these costs and for temporary disability benefits, which Appellee Workers' 
Compensation Division denied.  After 
a contested case hearing, the hearing examiner upheld the denial of benefits, 
concluding that Brierley failed to prove his compensable injury caused a mental 
injury that resulted in the attempted suicide.  Our review of the entire record reveals 
that Brierley received a diagnosis that his physical condition had caused a 
major depression, which had "adequate symptoms to stand alone as a DSM-IV 
diagnosis."  Brierley was also 
diagnosed with anxiety and pain disorder consistent with standards found in the 
DSM-IV.  The diagnosis was made by a 
licensed clinical psychologist who later testified that it was probable and 
logically sound to find that the injury that had caused Brierley's pain and 
depression resulted in the attempted suicide.  This clear and convincing evidence 
proves that Brierley's attempted suicide was the result of a mental injury 
suffered subsequent to a compensable physical injury.

 

[¶2]           
We 
reverse and remand for entry of an order granting 
benefits.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Brierley 
presents this issue for our review:

 

The 
Hearing Examiner's conclusion that Lynn J. Brierley failed to prove his 
self-inflicted gunshot wound was a direct and proximate result of his 
compensable work related injuries of March 28, 1999 was arbitrary, capricious 
and not in accordance with law in that it was clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.

 

The 
Division rephrases the issue as:

 

Did 
Appellant's compensable injury produce a mental injury so severe that his 
suicide attempt was not a willful act?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
On March 
28, 1999, Brierley sustained compensable, work-related injuries to his lumbar 
spine and lower back while acting within the course and scope of his duties as a 
boilermaker for his employer, I.P.C. Industrial Power, at the Jim Bridger Power 
Plant in Sweetwater County, Wyoming.  
Since then he has suffered chronic and unrelenting pain as a direct 
result of his work-related injuries and has been unable to work.  His treating physician, Dr. Bosworth, a 
family practitioner, diagnosed him as suffering from a depression caused by the 
pain from his work-related injuries.  
On April 5, 2000, Brierley was referred for a psychological examination 
to obtain an opinion whether he was a suitable candidate for back surgery.  Brierley was examined by Dr. Hart, 
Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, and, during an interview with Dr. Hart, 
Brierley described his physical and mental conditions and stated he had suicidal 
thoughts.  In a written report that 
was admitted at the hearing, Dr. Hart made the following statement; however, 
this statement was not referred to by the hearing examiner in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law:

 

After 
integrating the data obtained through my review of the medical record with the 
insights from my clinical interview and the results of the psychometric testing, 
I have arrived at the following psychological diagnoses.

 

1.                  
Anxiety 
Disorder, NOS.  The DSM-IV code is 
300.0.  This 
diagnosis allows for a mixed condition of depression and anxiety.  Typically, it is used when neither 
construct meets all the criteria.  I 
am using it in a different sense in that I believe Mr. Brierley has 
vulnerability to psychological intensity and anxiousness, but his physical 
condition has exacerbated that vulnerability and brought on a major depression, 
which, in fact, does have adequate symptoms to stand alone as a DSM-IV 
diagnosis.  I am wanting to show the 
interconnection between these two psychological conditions by using this present 
DSM-IV 300.00 diagnosis.  I should 
note the severity of these symptoms puts him in the moderate to severe 
range.  Presently, the condition is 
severe with respect to depression.

 

2.                  
Pain 
Disorder Associated with Psychological Factors and a Medical Condition.  The DSM-IV code is 307.89.  The ICD.9 code is 724.4.   

 

Dr. 
Hart's final opinion was that Brierley was not a good candidate for back 
surgery.  

 

[¶5]           
On June 
9, 2000, Brierley shot himself in the abdomen, inflicting injuries that he 
survived.  He filed a claim for 
medical and temporary total disability benefits that was denied by the 
Division.  The matter then went to 
hearing.  In its findings of fact, 
the hearing examiner stated the parties' positions:  Brierley contended the self-inflicted 
gunshot wound injuries were caused by his work-related injuries and compensable 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi), while the Division contended the 
gunshot injuries were the result of his willful intent to injure or kill himself 
and, therefore, were not compensable under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(B)(II).

 

[¶6]           
Dr. 
Bosworth appeared at the hearing and testified.   The hearing examiner found that, 
although Dr. Bosworth was not a licensed psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, 
Dr. Bosworth's opinion was that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, 
the claimant's chronic pain and inability to return to work caused or 
substantially contributed to the claimant's becoming depressed.  Dr. Hart did not testify at the hearing, 
but a transcript of an earlier deposition containing Dr. Hart's testimony was 
entered into evidence.  Relying upon 
a portion of Dr. Hart's deposition testimony, the hearing examiner found that 
Dr. Hart was unable to opine with "any reasonable degree of psychological 
probability that the claimant's self-inflicted gunshot wound was the direct 
result of his work-related back injury."  
The hearing examiner quoted the following:

 

There's 
a linkage there that you could make inferentially, but I'm not sure I can go 
clear back to that.  I believe that 
his suicide gesture was due to depression and anxiousness associated with his 
failure  his perception of his inability to care for his family and function as 
a whole man.  I believe that those 
thoughts came from the pain experiences that he had secondary to a very bad, bad 
back, a back which I believe was not just caused by a single incident.  

 

The 
hearing examiner does not quote the entire statement but skips to 
this:

 

Now, the 
logic flows in that sequence of things, since I've already ruled out the fact 
that he had not had major depression in the past, at least I didn't have 
documentation of that and I don't think anybody else has, either, that he didn't 
have collateral problems along the way, other than financial pressures which may 
have been the result of not being able to work which may have been the result of 
pain.  Then the pain, the inability 
to function, the depression, the suicide gesture.  But you've got to make that 
connection.  I can't just link, 
automatically say, hey, he killed himself because he's got pain because of an 
injury. 

 

In its 
conclusions of law, the hearing examiner stated:

 

6.         
In State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. Ramsey, 
839 P.2d 936 (Wyo. 1992), the Supreme Court held that an employee's suicide 
is compensable if a work-related injury "produces mental derangement and the 
mental derangement produces suicide."  
Id. at 940, quoting 1A Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 36.00 at 6-160 (1990).  
If still good law, however, the claimant failed to produce sufficient 
evidence to prove that his work-related injury produced mental 
derangement.

7.         
After Ramsey, supra, the legislature amended W.S. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) to provide, in pertinent part, that: "Injury" does not include 
any mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, it 
occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the phsycial injury and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a diagnosis by 
a licensed psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist meeting criteria 
established in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual 
of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association.  

In 
this case, however, the claimant failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that his compensable work-related injury caused a compensable mental 
injury that, in turn, caused the self-inflicted gunshot wound.  After weighing the evidence and opinions 
of Dr. Bosworth and Dr. Hart, the Office concludes that the claimant has failed 
to prove that his self-inflicted gunshot wound was the direct and proximate 
result of his compensable work-related injuries of March 28, 1999.  

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Benefits were denied, and 
this appeal followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶7]           
Judicial 
review of agency action is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2001):

 

            
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

* * 
*

            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

            
* * *

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute. 

 

Sechrist 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2001 WY 
45, ¶7, 23 P.3d 1138, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).  

 

[¶8]           
The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act are questions of law over which our review authority is 
plenary.  Conclusions of law made by 
an administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the 
law.  We do not afford any deference 
to the agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency 
in either interpreting or applying the law. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶8, 26 P.3d 1029, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2001).  

 

[¶9]           
We 
recently held that the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of 
review in appeals from Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act (WAPA) contested 
case proceedings when factual findings are involved and both parties submit 
evidence.  Newman v. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶22, 49 P.3d 163, ¶22 (Wyo. 
2002).   We further held that 
when only the party with the burden of proof submits evidence in the contested 
case proceeding and that party does not ultimately prevail, the arbitrary or 
capricious standard governs the judicial review of that agency decision. 
Id.  Even if the factual 
findings are found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency 
decision may be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons.  Id. at ¶23.  We do not examine the record only to 
determine if there is substantial evidence to support the board's decision, but 
we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the hearing 
examiner could have reasonably made its finding and order upon all of the 
evidence before it.  Id. at 
¶24, ¶25.  Because only Brierley 
presented a case-in-chief, we apply the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.

 

Statutory 
Interpretation

 

[¶10]      
The 
State contends that the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 
(a)(xi)(B)(II) requires this Court's overruling Ramsey and holding that 
the legislature intended that any injury resulting from a suicidal act is not 
compensable.  Our well-established 
rules of statutory interpretation were recently summarized to 
be:

 

We 
decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  If we determine that 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.  In effectuating the plain 
language of the statute, we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.  We construe the statute 
as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari materia.   If, on the other hand, we 
determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of 
statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent.  

 

Sechrist,¶10.  

 

[¶11]      
In the 
part of the statute referenced by the Division, the statute 
provides:

 

(xi) 
"Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging 
and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business.  "Injury" does not 
include:

            
(A) Any illness or communicable disease unless the risk of contracting 
the illness or disease is increased by the nature of the 
employment;

            
(B) Injury caused by:

            
(I) The fact the employee is intoxicated or under the influence of a 
controlled substance, or both, except any prescribed drug taken as directed by 
an authorized health care provider; or

            
(II) The employee's willful intention to injure or kill himself or 
another.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis 
added).

            
 

Brierley 
relies upon a subsequent part of that same statutory provision, subsection (J), 
which was first enacted in 1994 after the Ramsey decision and 
provides:

 

"Injury" 
does not include:

 

* * * 
*

(J) Any 
mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, it occurs 
subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury and it is established 
by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a diagnosis by a licensed 
psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist meeting criteria established in 
the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association.  In no event shall benefits for a 
compensable mental injury be paid for more than six (6) months after an injured 
employee's physical injury has healed to the point that it is not reasonably 
expected to substantially improve.

            

[¶12]      
This 
particular provision requires the claimant to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the compensable physical injury caused the mental injury.  Sechrist, ¶11.1 We agree with the hearing 
examiner's conclusions that Ramsey decided that suicide is compensable 
"if the injury produces mental derangement and the mental derangement produces 
suicide," and that this holding applies to attempted suicide.  The State's contention that Ramsey 
ignored legislative intent and should be overruled would require that we 
ignore the plain intent of the latter legislative amendment, which we are 
prohibited from doing.  
Additionally, we are required to harmonize all parts of the statute.  Plainly, the meaning of  "injury does not include . . . [i]njury 
caused by . . . [t]he employee's willful intention to injure or kill himself or 
another" refers to those situations preceded by or simultaneous with a 
compensable physical injury.

 

[¶13]      
The 
State contends that Ramsey was the result of the disfavored liberal 
construction rule.  As we explained 
in Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Div., 991 P.2d 1228, 1242 (Wyo. 1999), the rule of liberal construction of a 
statute in favor of the claimant is applied when the statute at issue is silent 
as to the issue presented and precedes the legislature's 1994 amendment to the 
preamble of the workers' compensation statutes. Therefore, our statutory 
construction in this case "should be accomplished to afford coverage wherever 
that end may be achieved without unreasonably extending the clear language of 
the statute."  Id. (quoting 
Wright v. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 952 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 
1998).  After the effective date of 
the current statute, workers' compensation statutes can no longer be interpreted 
in favor of coverage but will be interpreted in a way that gives effect to the 
legislative intent and preserves the historic compromise between workers and 
employers. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div. v. Summers, 
987 P.2d 153, 157 (Wyo. 1999).  Our 
conclusion in this case, however, is driven by the plain language of the 
statute.  Thus, the rule of liberal 
construction does not come into play.  
This statute is not silent as to the issue presented and must be 
interpreted in accordance with its plain language to effectuate legislative 
intent.  Moller v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 702, 706 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

 

[¶14]      
We 
recently held that whether the employee has shown by a preponderance of evidence 
that he has received a diagnosis satisfying the statute's specific requirements, 
a diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist that meets the criteria 
for that mental disorder in the specified manual by the American Psychiatrists 
Association, presents a question of fact.  
The different burden of proof mandated by the statutory language applies 
to the provision's requirement that the employee show by clear and convincing 
evidence that he has suffered a compensable mental injury caused by a 
compensable physical injury.  
Sechrist, ¶11.  Here, 
the hearing examiner heard the testimony of Dr. Bosworth, a treating physician, 
whose opinion was that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the 
claimant's chronic pain and inability to return to work caused or substantially 
contributed to the claimant's becoming depressed.  The hearing examiner then had the 
written report of Dr. Hart's psychological diagnoses of major depression 
combined with anxiety, a diagnosis commonly considered more serious than just 
that of depression, and pain disorder with both diagnoses made in accordance 
with the statutory requirements.  
Finally, the hearing examiner had the deposition testimony of Dr. 
Hart.  We shall again quote the part 
of that testimony that the hearing examiner found significant; however, because 
its meaning changes when read in context, we quote it in more 
depth:

 

There's 
a linkage there that you could make inferentially, but I'm not sure I can go 
clear back to that.  I believe that 
his suicide gesture was due to depression and anxiousness associated with his 
failure  his perception of his inability to care for his family and function as 
a whole man.  I believe that those 
thoughts came from the pain experiences that he had secondary to a very bad, bad 
back, a back which I believe was not just caused by a single incident.  But when you've got degenerative disk 
disease from L2 clear to the sacrum, you've had a whole series of battering your 
back to death.

And so I 
believe his pain is a function of a whole series of things exacerbated by a 
specific injury, pulling out those welding rods.  And that led to the whole process of 
evaluating treatment options and care as accepted by the Worker's Comp 
program.  And then, at some point, I 
guess  I don't know  he's probably declared MMI and sent on his 
way.

That he 
couldn't function physically as he had in the past led to the depression.  That inability to function mixed with 
his own perception of what he needed to be as a man, which was preexisting kind 
of perception of life, led to his suicide gesture.

Now, the 
logic flows in that sequence of things, since I've already ruled out the fact 
that he had not had major depression in the past, at least I didn't have 
documentation of that and I don't think anybody else has, either, that he didn't 
have collateral problems along the way, other than financial pressures which may 
have been the result of not being able to work which may have been the result of 
pain.  Then the pain, the inability 
to function, the depression, the suicide gesture.  But you've got to make that connection. 
I can't just link, automatically say, hey, he killed himself because he's got 
pain because of an injury.

                                                            
* * * *

Q.                
Okay. 
And understanding that, Doctor, that I'm not asking for a guarantee, I'm asking 
you, based upon what is most probable, the most probable scenario based upon 
your experience, your training, your interviews and testing of Mr. Brierley, and 
your review of the records from the University of Utah Medical Center, whether 
or not the chain of events set in motion by the injury of March 28 of 1999 are 
the cause of Mr. Brierley's suicide attempt.

 

A.                 
Having 
worked in the workers' compensation field for 11 years, that argument is more 
supported than refuted.  There is 
more probability that the injury was a major component to the pain, to the 
dysfunction and inability to work, to the depression, to the anxiety.  And then because he was not 
psychologically strong enough, for one reason or another, he thought, I guess, 
that he needed to take his life.  So 
the logic is pretty sound, probably more on the likelihood to be that scenario 
than not.

 

"Clear 
and convincing evidence is something more than a preponderance, but less than 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  It 
is the kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable."  
Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo. 1999) 
(citation omitted).  When presented 
with medical opinion testimony, the hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is 
responsible for determining relevancy, assigning probative value, and ascribing 
the relevant weight to be given to the testimony.  Id. "In weighing the medical 
opinion testimony, the fact finder considers:  (1) the opinion;  (2) the reasons, if any, given for 
it;  (3) the strength of it; and (4) 
the qualifications and credibility of the witness or witnesses expressing 
it."  Id. at 
329-30.

 

[¶15]      
In the 
order denying benefits, the hearing examiner stated that Brierley had failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that his compensable work-related injury 
caused a mental injury that, in turn, caused the self-inflicted gunshot wound, 
and that, after weighing the evidence and opinions of Dr. Bosworth and Dr. Hart, 
the hearing examiner concluded that the claimant had failed to prove that his 
self-inflicted gunshot wound was the direct and proximate result of his 
compensable work-related injuries of March 28, 1999. 

 

[¶16]      
When, as 
here, a hearing examiner decides that the only party presenting evidence and 
charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is 
reviewed under the "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
not in accordance with law" standard of § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A).  Newman, at ¶22.  The hearing examiner, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses.  Id. at ¶26, ¶31. 
 A hearing examiner's 
findings of fact are accorded deference, and the hearing examiner's decision 
will not be overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence. Id. Demonstrating evidentiary contradictions in the 
record does not establish the ruling was irrational, but we do examine 
conflicting evidence to determine if the agency reasonably could have made its 
finding and order based upon all of the evidence before it.  Bando, 980 P.2d  at 331. 

 

[¶17]      
Dr. 
Bosworth stated unequivocally that Brierley's compensable injury caused pain and 
depression that led to the suicide attempt.  Dr. Hart's lengthy opinion, reduced to 
its essence, was "that the truth of the contention is highly probable," which 
satisfies the clear and convincing standard.  The hearing examiner's decision is based 
upon only a portion of the evidence before it and is contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.  
The order denying benefits is reversed and remanded for entry of an order 
granting benefits.

FOOTNOTES

1Subsection (j) requires that the 
evidence establish a diagnosis by the proper authority in accordance with the 
criteria of the DSM-IV.  
Sechrist held that this requirement of subsection (j) could be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence.