Title: Jones v. Lustig

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

185 Kan. 208 (1959)
341 P.2d 1018
WILLIAM B. JONES et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
FRANCIS LUSTIG and MARGUERITE LUSTIG, Appellees; MICHAEL ZUK, Doing Business As Rockhurst Plumbing and Heating Company, Intervenor-Appellant; and BERNARD GOLDSTONE et al., Defendants.
No. 41,344

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 10, 1959.
George A. Lowe, of Olathe, argued the cause, and Roy S. Lowe and Roy G. Lowe, both of Olathe, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
*209 Roy W. Cliborn, of Mission, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WERTZ, J.:
This was an action in which subcontractors sought to foreclose mechanics' liens for labor and materials supplied in the construction of a dwelling house.
Appellees, Francis and Marguerite Lustig, were the owners of the property on which the improvements were erected. Defendant Bernard Goldstone was appellees' contractor. Appellant, Michael Zuk, a subcontractor, doing business as Rockhurst Plumbing and Heating Company, filed his cross petition alleging that he furnished labor and material, in a specified amount, for the construction of the dwelling, and that he filed his mechanic's lien statement with the clerk of the district court within the statutory time. His cross petition further alleged that he served notice in writing of the filing of his mechanic's lien, together with a copy of lien statement, on one A.J. Granoff, who was at the time the agent and attorney for the appellees, and that said Granoff had authority to act on behalf of the Lustigs with respect to the property involved and to accept and receive for and on behalf of them all documents, instruments and matters pertaining to said property, including a copy of a notice of the mechanic's lien filed by appellant.
From an order of the trial court sustaining appellees' demurrer to appellant's cross petition on the ground he failed to allege service of notice in writing of the filing of his lien on the Lustigs, the owners of the property in question, appellant appeals.
Appellant contends the service of notice was sufficient, in that Granoff was appellees' agent and attorney and service upon him was, therefore, notice to appellees; that the appellees are estopped from raising the question of valid service of notice due to the fact Granoff asked appellant to serve the notice upon him instead of on appellees. Appellees contend the creation of a mechanic's lien is statutory and the statute must be strictly followed; that gaps in following statutory procedure cannot be bridged by estoppel.
The sole question presented for our determination is whether the service by appellant of the written notice of the filing of the mechanic's lien on Granoff, as agent and attorney for appellees, met the requirements of our statute.
Our mechanic's lien statute, G.S. 1949, 60-1403, provides:
It is conceded that appellant was a subcontractor and that he served no notice of the filing of his lien upon the appellee landowners personally. The question here presented has been long laid at rest in this jurisdiction. Our last pronouncement on this question is to be found in Clark Lumber Co. v. Passig, 184 Kan. 667, 339 P.2d 280, wherein we stated, in quoting with approval Powers v. Lumber Co., 75 Kan. 687, 90 Pac. 254:
Other decisions which have adhered to the mentioned rule are Baker v. Griffin, 120 Kan. 448, 243 Pac. 1057; Cobb v. Burford, 121 Kan. 199, 246 Pac. 1009; Lumber Co. v. Dettinger, 110 Kan. 114, 202 Pac. 622.
Appellant's right to enforce his lien was statutory and his action could have only been maintained upon a petition alleging compliance with the statute; one of the prerequisites of the statute to create and perfect such lien being the giving of a written notice to the owners of the property that such lien had been filed. (Clark Lumber Co. v. Passig, supra.)
In Lumber Co. v. Dettinger, supra, the lien claimant relied upon service of notice of filing his lien statement upon the owner's husband, who was also her guardian, she being confined in the state *211 hospital at Topeka. We held that notice served upon the husband-guardian was not notice to the owner, and stated:
Where the statute requires service on the owner of the notice of the filing of a mechanic's lien, the statutory language must be literally observed and notice must be served upon the owner himself. (36 Am. Jur., Mechanics' Liens § 128.) Our statute does not provide for service of the notice upon an alleged agent or attorney of the owner. In Clark Lumber Co. v. Passig, supra, 673, we said:
In view of what has been said, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. It is so ordered.