Title: State v. Leed

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

243 Ind. 402 (1962)
183 N.E.2d 607
STATE OF INDIANA
v.
LEED.
No. 30,236.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Opinion on Motion to Dismiss filed June 25, 1962.
Opinion on Merits filed November 14, 1962.
*403 Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Donald L. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, for appellant.
Albert B. Chipman, and Chipman & Chipman, of Plymouth, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, C.J.
The appellee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. Appellee was charged in the court below with failure to support his children. The trial court sustained a motion to quash an amended affidavit and the State prayed an appeal therefrom. The motion to dismiss the appeal is based upon the failure of the record to show any final judgment was rendered herein from which an appeal may be taken. Burns' § 9-2304 provides:
*404 The trial court on January 8, 1962 made an entry as follows:
It is contended this entry does not constitute a final judgment. On the other hand, it is stated that to remand the case back to the court to require it to go through the mere formality of stating that it is a final judgment and make an entry accordingly, could only serve to prolong a consideration of this case on the merits and could not possibly serve to benefit the appellee or the State.
In this case the proceeding, for all practical purposes, was ended in the trial court by the sustaining of a motion to quash and the failure of the State to file a further amended charge and in the action of the State in taking the appeal.
A similar situation existed in the case of The State v. Allen (1883), 94 Ind. 441. The record showed the following entry:
This court stated:
To the same effect is The State v. Swope (1863), 20 Ind. 106.
More recently, in the case of State v. Silver, (1962), 243 Ind. 67, 182 N.E.2d 587, the same question arose, and we there stated:
We believe a correct interpretation of Rule 2-3 compels us to deny the motion to dismiss for the reasons stated. The defendant shows no prejudice. We are reinforced in this decision by Burns' § 9-2320:
The appellee's motion to dismiss is overruled and the appellee is given thirty days within which to file an answer brief on the merits.
Jackson, Bobbitt, Landis and Achor, JJ., concur.
ARTERBURN, C.J.
This is an appeal by the State of Indiana as the result of the sustaining of a motion to quash an amended affidavit charging the appellee with the crime of non-support of his children. See: State v. Leed, 243 Ind. 402, 183 N.E.2d 607, decided June 25, 1962, in which a motion to dismiss was overruled.
Appellee's memo to his motion to quash in part states:
The question presented here is whether or not the father, who is charged with the non-support of his children, must be, under the statute, "living in this state" at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, or does that phrase refer to the location of the children? The statute reads as follows:
"Parents  Support of children  Penalty  Suspension of sentence.  The father, or when charged by law with the maintenance thereof, the mother of a child or children, under fourteen [14] years of age, living in this state who being able either by reason of having means or by personal services, labor or earnings, shall wilfully neglect or refuse to provide such child or children with necessary and proper home, care, food and clothing shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the state prison or reformatory for not more than seven [7] years nor less than one [1] year: Provided, That upon conviction the judge may suspend the sentence and, in the order suspending the sentence, may require the defendant to pay, *407 weekly or otherwise, as the court may determine, to the clerk of the court, for the support of the children, such sum as the court may deem necessary. Provided, further, That, upon the failure of such parent to comply with said order, he or she may be arrested by the sheriff or other officer and a warrant issued on the sworn complaint of a responsible person, or the praecipe of the prosecuting attorney, and brought before the court for sentence, whereupon the court shall pass sentence, or further suspend sentence, as may be just and proper." Acts 1913, ch. 358, § 2, p. 956; 1915, ch. 179, § 1, p. 654, being Burns' § 10-1402, 1956 Repl.
The charge follows substantially the wording of the statute as follows:
Courts are divided as to whether, under statutes containing no specific provision as to residence of the father, jurisdiction of a criminal offense of non-support of the children is defeated by the fact that the father has moved to another state or county during the period of time for which he is charged with non-support. See: Annotations, 44 A.L.R.2d 899.
We are not concerned here with the policy of the law and the argument made that the denial of jurisdiction in such cases encourages the evasion of a parental duty by a delinquent father. The Indiana statute does fix the jurisdiction by the phrase "living in this state." The question here is, to which antecedent does the phrase refer? Normally, in a sentence the grammatical constructions in such cases create a reference to the nearest antecedent. In this case it is the children and not the father to whom the reference is made. This construction has been followed in this state. The statute does not fix the jurisdiction by reference to the father's location or residence, but rather that of the children.
*409 In Groenendyk v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 697, 151 N.E. 730, this court reversed a trial court which refused to quash an indictment for the reason that the charge omitted the words of the statute "living in this state" and hence did not allege that the child was "living in this state." This court said:
In State v. Yocum (1914), 182 Ind. 478, 106 N.E. 705, the mother, following a decree of divorce in which she was granted the custody of the children, moved to another county where she could better provide for them and herself, while the father remained in the county of their original home. The appellant was charged by affidavit for non-support in the county to which the children and their mother had moved. This court held that jurisdiction with reference to the enforcement of the support order made in the divorce action was still with the original county in which the divorce was granted. However, the crime of non-support (as distinguished from civil contempt proceedings) was committed in the county to which the children had moved and were presently living. This court said:
Again, in Gilmour v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 454, 104 N.E.2d 127, this court had before it a similar situation. This court there said:
In view of the decisions in this state, we must hold that the phrase "living in this state" in the statute (Burns' § 10-1402) refers to the children and not to the father. The affidavit, being substantially in the words of the statute, is sufficiently definite as against the motion to quash. Crumley v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 396, 184 N.E. 533; Nicholas v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 463, 165 N.E.2d 149; Taylor v. State of Indiana (1957), 236 Ind. 415, 140 N.E.2d 104.
The order and judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to overrule the motion to quash and with further proceedings therein.
Landis, J., concurs.
Achor, J., concurs with opinion.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
Bobbitt, J., dissents without opinion.
ACHOR, J.
Because of the manner in which the statute we are called upon to construe [§ 10-1403, Burns' 1956 Repl.] is written, I believe it is subject to the construction urged by the appellee.
However, since this court in the case of Groenendyk v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 697, 151 N.E. 730, has placed a construction upon the statute adverse to that now urged by the appellee the precedent of which case is of long standing, and since the legislature has not seen fit to amend the act by placing different construction thereon, we must assume that the present legislative intention is consistent with the construction placed upon the act by this court in the case of Groenendyk v. State, supra, and that such construction is now controlling. In Re Batt's Estate (1942), 220 Ind. 193, 41 N.E.2d 365; Stout v. The Board of Commissioners of Grant County (1886), 107 Ind. 343, 8 N.E. 222.
NOTE.  Motion to dismiss reported in 183 N.E.2d 607. Opinion on merits reported in 186 N.E.2d 5.