Title: Watker v. VT Parole Board

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-083


Brian Watker                                 Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Washington Superior Court
Vermont Parole Board
                                             November Term, 1989


Alan W. Cheever, J.

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and Jeffrey Dworkin, Prisoners'
  Rights Office, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Thomas J. Rushford,
  Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Barney, C.J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned


     MORSE, J.  This appeal from a superior court judgment upholding a
parole board decision finding plaintiff in violation of parole conditions
and imposing new conditions causes us to reevaluate the standard of review.
We reject plaintiff's claims that the board's ruling was not supported by
substantial evidence and that his right to confrontation of witnesses was
violated during the revocation hearing, and we therefore affirm.
     On July 20, 1988, the Vermont Parole Board held a hearing to determine
whether plaintiff violated two conditions of parole: (1) committing an act
punishable under law, and (2) failing to lead an orderly and industrious
life.  The factual basis for the alleged violations was that plaintiff
assaulted his cohabitant, Vicki Magoon, while they were living at 14 Foster
Street, Barre, Vermont.  The State's evidence consisted of a police
officer's affidavit and testimony from a parole officer.  Plaintiff
testified on his own behalf.
     The parole officer testified that he received the affidavit from the
police officer.  The affidavit stated that at about 1:15 a.m. on June 17,
1988, a dispatcher received two complaints about a couple fighting on Foster
Street.  When the officer arrived in the area, he found Magoon, who was
eight-and-one-half-months pregnant, walking barefoot down Granite Street in
the rain, while carrying a one-and-one-half-year-old child in her arms.
Magoon was taken to the police station, where the officer observed a
circular welt on her left cheek as well as scabbing and contusions extending
around the front of her neck.  An officer examined her back and found
multiple bruise marks.  Magoon stated that plaintiff had beaten her.  The
officer then went to 14 Foster Street and found plaintiff in bed.  Plaintiff
told the officer that he had been asleep all evening.
     Plaintiff testified that he had reviewed his parole officer's report
and the investigating officer's affidavit.  He denied attacking Magoon and
stated that she had been with a friend, Diane Gaylord, on the night of the
incident, while he was at home in bed.  He also testified that Magoon had
visited his lawyer, Robert Paolini, and had told him that her allegation of
assault that night was untrue.  Plaintiff, however, did not call Magoon,
Gaylord, or Attorney Paolini as witnesses at the parole violation hearing.
Following plaintiff's testimony, the parole officer testified that he also
interviewed Magoon and she had told him that plaintiff had beaten her.
     The parole board found that plaintiff had violated the conditions of
his parole as alleged.  He sought review in the superior court under
V.R.C.P. 75, arguing that the board's conclusion was not based on
"sufficient, competent evidence."  The superior court concluded that the
hearsay evidence combined with the board's determination to "totally reject
. . . [plaintiff's] testimony" was sufficient to allow revocation of parole.
It also found that plaintiff had not raised his constitutional right of
confrontation below and therefore declined to consider it on appeal.
                I.  Substantial Evidence
     The parole board may continue or revoke parole if "the alleged
violation is established by substantial evidence."  28 V.S.A. { 552(b)(2).
This Court has stated that "mere uncorroborated hearsay does not constitute
substantial evidence" sufficient to support an administrative adjudication.
Baxter v. Vermont Parole Board, 145 Vt. 644, 648,