Title: Billings v. Wyoming State Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Billings v. Wyoming State Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides1992 WY 111837 P.2d 84Case Number: 91-227Decided: 09/03/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
John R. BILLINGS, d/b/a 
Open Creek Outfitters,

 Petitioner 
(Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF 
OUTFITTERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDES, 

Respondent 
(Respondent).

 

Andrew L. 
Breffeilh, Jackson, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, and Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
respondent.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

Cardine, J., issued specially 
concurring opinion.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Petitioner John 
R. Billings, d/b/a Open Creek Outfitters, appeals from Respondent Wyoming State 
Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides' decision to revoke Petitioner's 
1990 outfitter's license and to deny his 1991 license application.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

[¶3]      Petitioner raises 
the following arguments on appeal:

     I. The Board's 
conclusion of law that Petitioner violated § 23-2-416(a)(iv), and § 23-3-303(a), 
W.S. 1977 with spoiled game meat is unsupported by substantial 
evidence.

     II. The Board's 
conclusion of law that Petitioner violated § 23-2-416(a)(iv), and § 23-3-303(a), 
W.S. 1977 with spoiled game meat is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.

     III. The Board 
violated the Petitioner's constitutional rights against self-incrimination, 
against double jeopardy, to due process of law, and to equal protection of the 
laws.

     IV. The Board denied 
the Petitioner his constitutional and statutory right to counsel.

     V. The Board 
systematically violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

     VI. The Board 
systematically violated its own rules.

[¶4]      John R. Billings 
had operated Open Creek Outfitters for the previous ten years in the Open Creek 
drainage area of the Thorofare River in the Shoshone National Forest. The 
operation consisted of two camps staffed with various guides, wranglers, and 
cooks who provided the hunters with meals, horses, and sleeping accommodations. 
The hunters reached the camps by completing a rigorous thirty-two-mile pack trip 
into the wilderness. Once they were in camp, the hunters were taken on guided 
hunts for various big game animals in the Open Creek drainage area.

[¶5]      Following the 
1990 hunting season, the Board received several complaints from hunters 
dissatisfied with the quality and/or lack of services which Petitioner provided 
on hunts scheduled for the weeks of September 8 and October 14, 1990. Most 
significant among the complaints was the fact that the meat from several of the 
elk shot during the September hunt spoiled before Petitioner delivered it to a 
meat processor in Cody. Similarly, hunters on the October trip complained that 
Petitioner needlessly allowed the meat from a deer to spoil. A hearing examiner 
heard the complaints in a two-day hearing, after which he recommended that 
Petitioner's 1991 license application be rejected for needlessly allowing game 
animals to go to waste. The Board voted to adopt the hearing examiner's 
recommendation and his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rather 
than issuing an order, the Board notified Petitioner by letter that, on the 
basis of the hearing examiner's recommendation, it was revoking his 1990 license 
and denying his 1991 license application. Petitioner petitioned for a review in 
the district court, and the district court certified the matter to this Court 
for resolution pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

[¶6]      In his first 
issue, Petitioner contends that the Board's conclusions of law were not 
supported with substantial evidence as was required by Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (1990). Although Petitioner phrases the argument as being a 
lack of substantial evidence, the text of his argument addresses what, in our 
view, is the true threshold question: Whether the Board made sufficiently 
detailed findings of fact to support its action as was required by Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-110 (1990).

[¶7]      Section 16-3-110 
sets forth an agency's duty to support its action with sufficient factual 
findings:

     A final decision or 
order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or dictated 
into the record. The final decision shall include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of fact if set forth in 
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of 
the underlying facts supporting the findings.

(Emphasis 
added.) In prior cases, we interpreted this statute as imposing the duty upon 
the agency to "make findings of basic facts upon all of the material issues in 
the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are 
based." Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 555 (Wyo. 1968). See also Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' 
School, 813 P.2d 185, 201 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1992). A lack of findings of basic fact on all material 
issues precludes any rational basis for judicial review because this Court 
cannot determine the basis upon which each ultimate fact or conclusion was 
reached. In short, we must know the why. Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872, 879 
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1975). When 
the agency's findings do not adequately explain the justification for its 
position, we must remand the matter to the agency for the necessary supplemental 
findings. Mekss, 813 P.2d  at 202.

[¶8]      In this case, the 
Board based its decision to revoke Petitioner's license and to deny his license 
application upon the following conclusion of law:

     22. [Petitioner] violated W.S. 
23-2-416(a)(iv)[1] and W.S. 23-3-303(a) by allowing 
meat to needlessly go to waste. [Petitioner] did not make any special 
arrangements to pack out the meat when the weather was unseasonably hot during 
the September 8, 1990 trip. The unseasonable weather does not excuse an 
experienced outfitter to continually allow hunting while not taking precautions 
against the unseasonable heat. Furthermore, [Petitioner] did not pack out the 
meat shot by a hunter on the October 14, 1990 trip.

Wyo. Stat. § 
23-2-416(a)(iv) (1991) authorizes the Board to suspend or revoke an outfitter's 
license for violation of a significant wildlife law. Here, the Board concluded 
that Petitioner violated Wyo. Stat. § 23-3-303(a) (1991), which provides: 

     (a) No person shall 
take and leave, abandon or allow any game bird, game fish, or game animal  except trophy game animal, or edible 
portion, to intentionally or needlessly go to waste.

The language of 
§ 23-3-303(a) requires the Board to find first that Petitioner took a game 
animal and second that he needlessly or intentionally allowed it to go to waste. 
In an attempt to satisfy the statute's requirements, the Board made the 
following findings:

     10. Most of the 
hunters shot elk on the trip [referring to the September 8th trip]. Five out of 
six elk spoiled before delivery of the elk meat to the Cody 
processor.

. . . .

     13. During the October 
14, 1990 trip, one of the hunters shot and killed a deer. The deer meat was 
never found and packed out to the Cody processor plant.

These findings 
are insufficient to support the Board's conclusion that Petitioner violated § 
23-3-303(a) for two reasons. First, the Board failed to find that Petitioner 
took the animals which he allegedly allowed to go to waste. Second, the findings 
are not adequate to allow this Court to engage in a meaningful review of the 
Board's conclusion that Petitioner needlessly wasted wild game meat.

[¶9]      We will first 
address the Board's failure to adequately support its conclusion that Petitioner 
needlessly allowed the meat from game animals to go to waste. The Board's 
findings that the meat from five elk spoiled before it was delivered to the meat 
processor and that one deer was never found and packed out are not sufficient. 
To adequately support its conclusion, the Board must explain how Petitioner's 
action or inaction resulted in needlessly wasting wild meat. At a minimum, the 
Board should have made findings regarding the relevant time period; i.e., 
establishing when the kill was made, when the animal was brought into camp, and 
when Petitioner actually packed out the meat. Without knowing what Petitioner 
did or failed to do, we do not have an adequate basis upon which we can review 
the Board's conclusion.

[¶10]   In addition to its two cursory 
findings of fact, the Board states in conclusion of law number 22 that 
Petitioner did not make special arrangements to pack out the meat during the 
unseasonably hot September hunt and that he allowed hunting while not taking 
precautions against the heat. Although written as part of a conclusion of law, 
these statements are probably more accurately labeled as findings of fact. As 
findings of fact, these statements at least attempt to identify what Petitioner 
failed to do; however, they are still not sufficient to support the conclusion 
that Petitioner needlessly allowed the meat to spoil because they do not 
identify what special arrangements or precautions Petitioner failed to 
undertake.

[¶11]   As we previously mentioned, to 
violate § 23-3-303(a) one must not only needlessly allow wild game meat to go to 
waste, but one must also take the game animal in question. Our interpretation of 
the statute requires the Board to find that Petitioner took the deer and elk 
which spoiled. The Board disagrees with this position, arguing that § 
23-3-303(a) is applicable to Petitioner even if he did not take the animals. In 
support of its view that to violate the statute one does not need to take the 
animal, the Board points out that § 23-3-303(a) does not say "no hunter" may 
waste wild game meat but rather that it provides "no person" may waste wild 
meat. "Person" is broadly defined in Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-102(a)(viii) (1991) as 
"an individual, partnership, corporation, company, any other type of 
association, and any agent or officer of any partnership, corporation, company, 
or other type of association." Thus, according to the Board, this broad 
definition makes the statute applicable to Petitioner.

[¶12]   We agree with the Board that the 
statute applies to a broader class than just hunters. The problem with the 
Board's argument is that it ignores the words "take and" in the statute. Section 
23-3-303(a) is clear that: "No person shall take[2] and leave, abandon or allow 
any . . . game animal . . . to intentionally or needlessly go to waste." 
(Emphasis added.) The statute uses the conjunctive "and," meaning that, in order 
to violate the statute, a "person," as defined in § 23-1-102(a)(viii), must both 
take the animal and needlessly allow it to go to waste. The only way to read the 
statute as not requiring the same "person" to take the animal and also to allow 
its meat to go to waste is to omit the words "take and." Omitting "take and" 
would be contrary to our rule of statutory interpretation that every word in a 
statute must be given meaning and that statutes must be read so that no word is 
superfluous or inoperative. Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147, 150 (Wyo. 1991). 
Therefore, we hold that, to violate § 23-3-303(a), the same "person" who took 
the animal must also allow it to go to waste.

[¶13]   We recognize that, at least in an 
outfitter/hunter context, § 23-3-303(a)'s taking requirement may impede the 
statute's ability to prevent Wyoming's valuable game animals from needlessly 
going to waste. This is because, in most outfitter/hunter relationships, once 
the hunter shoots the animal, the outfitter is responsible for packing out the 
animal. A hunter who is completely dependent upon the outfitter to remove the 
animal cannot be guilty of needlessly allowing the meat to go to waste so long 
as he takes appropriate precautions within his control to preserve the meat. 
Conversely, the outfitter will also not be liable because he did not actually 
take the animal. This means incidents may occur when the outfitter would be 
responsible for allowing meat to go to waste because he did not pack out the 
animals quickly enough, yet the outfitter would escape liability under the 
statute. Despite this potential shortcoming, we cannot ignore the statute's use 
of the word "take." It is for the legislature, not this Court, to decide whether 
an outfitter who does not take the animal should be liable for wasting wild game 
meat.

[¶14]   Generally, the Board's failure to 
find that Petitioner took the animals and its inadequate explanation of how 
Petitioner needlessly wasted wild game meat would require our remanding this 
case for additional findings. Mekss, 813 P.2d  at 202. However, it would be 
futile for us to remand this matter because it is clear in this case that the 
hunters who employed Petitioner took the animals which spoiled, not 
Petitioner.

[¶15]   Having disposed of the case as 
discussed above, we do not need to consider the remaining issues raised by 
Petitioner.

[¶16]   Reversed.

CARDINE, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶17]   I cannot agree with the court's 
holding that Wyoming outfitters who provide guide and outfitting services are 
not subject to the penalties of W.S. 23-3-303(a), which makes unlawful allowing 
the waste of a game animal. Nevertheless, I concur in the reversal of the 
Board's decision.

[¶18]   Wyoming statute 23-3-303(a) 
pertaining to allowing animals to go to waste provides as follows:

No person shall take and 
leave, abandon or allow any game bird, game fish, or game animal except trophy 
game animal, or edible portion, to intentionally or needlessly go to 
waste.

[¶19]   The majority of this court reverses 
the decision of the Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides by 
holding that only the hunter who shoots big game can violate W.S. 23-3-303(a) 
because the hunter who shoots and kills the game is the "person" (and only 
person) who "takes" and leaves game "intentionally" or "needlessly" to "go to 
waste."

[¶20]   Wyoming statute 23-3-102(a)(vii) 
and (viii) provide, under general definitions, that

(vii) "Take" means hunt, 
pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess, or attempt 
to hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill, or 
possess;

(viii) "Person" means an 
individual, partnership, corporation, company, any other type of 
association, and any agent or officer of any partnership, corporation, 
company, or other type of association[.] [emphasis added]

[¶21]   The court in its majority opinion 
concludes that the term "other type of association" found in the above statute, 
because of the rule of ejusdem generis, must be an individual, 
partnership, corporation, or company. I disagree. Ejusdem generis as 
defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) is as follows:

Of the same kind, class, 
or nature. In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the 
"ejusdem generis rule" is, that where general words follow an enumeration 
of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such 
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held 
as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned. U.S. v. LaBrecque, D.C.N.J., 419 F. Supp. 430, 432. The 
rule, however, does not necessarily require that the general provision be 
limited in its scope to the identical things specifically named. Nor does it 
apply when the context manifests a contrary intention.

The rule 
requires that general words following words of a particular or specific meaning 
include persons or things of the same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned. The words specifically mentioned in defining "person" in 
W.S. 23-1-102(a)(viii) are business entities. Thus, it is patently clear that 
the words "other type of association" were intended by the legislature to 
include any other business-type association or arrangement under which game 
animals are taken.

[¶22]   We must invoke the rule that this 
court looks only to the intent of the legislature when enforcing or construing 
statutes. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 
(Wyo. 1991); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990); Rocky Mountain Oil and 
Gas Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1987). Legislative 
intent must be ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the 
statute. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219; Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 
806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991). The statutory language itself provides valuable 
insight into legislative intent. Pisano v. Shillinger, 835 P.2d 1136 (Wyo. 1992) 
(No. 91-138, published July 27, 1992). We normally accord some weight to the 
construction of a statute by an administrative agency unless the agency's 
construction is clearly erroneous. State ex. rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. 
Mahoney, 798 P.2d 836, 838 (Wyo. 1990). In interpreting a statute, every word, 
clause and sentence must be considered so that no part will be rendered 
inoperative or superfluous. Id.; Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988). 
Each element must be given meaning. If the language selected by the legislature 
is sufficiently definitive, that language establishes the rule of law. Any 
additional construction can be resorted to only if the wording is ambiguous or 
unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity with respect to the legislative 
purpose or mandate. Mahoney, 798 P.2d  at 219; Blue Cross Ass'n v. Harris, 664 F.2d 806, 809 (10th Cir. 1981).

[¶23]   I would hold that the language used 
in W.S. 23-3-303(a) and W.S. 23-1-102(a)(viii) is clear and unambiguous and that 
the obvious legislative intent was that "other type of association" would be any 
other monetary business arrangement or relationship between persons and, when 
applied to W.S. 23-3-303(a), includes as a person the business association of an 
outfitter with a client for a fee to provide the agreed contractual service for 
a big game hunt.

[¶24]   That the legislature intended that 
outfitters and guides who occupy a business relationship with a hunter would be 
subject to statutes prohibiting the intentional or needless waste of big game 
animals cannot be seriously disputed. The hunter who signs on with an outfitter 
for a big game hunt does so because he lacks equipment, supplies, horses, pack 
animals, camp site, knowledge of forest, wilderness and hunting areas, vehicles 
and other equipment, and because it would be unlawful for him as a nonresident 
to undertake such a hunt. The outfitter furnishes all that is needed for the 
hunt, including horses and pack animals. It is only the outfitter who will pack 
out the game taken. The hunter cannot, will not, and is not expected to pack out 
the game to prevent waste where he has entered into the business-type 
relationship as here for the hunt.

[¶25]   In this case, the hunter paid a fee 
of $3,000 for the hunt; and the outfitter, according to his written brochure and 
agreement, represented and agreed as follows:

     "Each camp is equipped 
with a large cook and dining tent where wholesome, hot meals are prepared by our 
cook. The menu is carefully planned to provide nutritious and satisfying food. 
The hunters' tents have bunks, foam pads, heating stoves and lanterns. There is 
also a guide's tent, grain and gear tent, corrals and hiking trails." * * 
*

* * * * * *

     * * * "The outfit is 
geared to handle up to four hunters per trip with two hunters per guide. We 
prefer small parties in order to provide more personal attention and quality 
hunting. However, if you have a party of five or six hunters and like to hunt 
together, we can easily accommodate you. Our horses and mules are kept in good 
condition and are ridden throughout the summer, ensuring you of a well cared 
for, gentle, and mountain-wise animal. All gear, tents, and equipment are well 
maintained and replaced when necessary.

     "After pulling out of 
the Thorofare country in early November, we hunt deer in the North Fork and 
South Fork Drainages of the Shoshone River. These areas are noted for producing 
trophy mule deer. We hunt the area daily and return to Cody each 
night."

* * * * * *

     "[We provide] 
Transportation to and from Cody airport, if necessary; transportation to and 
from trailhead; riding and pack animals; one guide per two hunters; 
meals; cook; field dressing of game; antler, cape and hide 
preparation as you specify; delivery of meat to Cody processor if you 
wish." [emphasis added]

[¶26]   The outfitter who enters into a 
business relationship with his client hunter to take game animals has entered 
into the business-type association defined in the statute and, therefore, is a 
"person" who under W.S. 23-3-303(a) violates Wyoming law when he takes and 
leaves a game animal to needlessly go to waste. As such, he is subject to 
perform the requirements and to the penalties imposed by W.S. 
23-3-303(a).

[¶27]   Nevertheless, I concur in the 
reversal of the Board's decision. It is not supported by substantial evidence 
and therefore is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion under W.S. 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A). The extensive record of this hearing tells us that an 
unusual set of occurrences and circumstances led to the unfortunate spoilage of 
this game meat. This hunt had hardly begun when three of the outfitter's 
employees unexpectedly quit his employment. The group packed back 32 miles to 
its base camps to begin the hunt. The weather was unseasonably warm, being in 
the 80 to 90 degree temperatures. There was compliance with the statute 
requiring that big game be packed to the camp within 48 hours. The attempt 
thereafter to pack the game to Cody, Wyoming encountered an unexpected heavy 
snow storm resulting in a day and a half being consumed in that effort. There 
was evidence that the game would have spoiled in any event because of the 
circumstances encountered. Contrary evidence was totally lacking. The Board 
could reach the conclusion and make the finding that it did - that the outfitter 
was in violation - only by its conclusion that he should have made "special" 
provision for packing out game animals. Failure to take special precautions that 
would have been necessary in these extreme unexpected circumstances was 
practically impossible and can hardly rise to the level of violation of W.S. 
23-3-303(a). The outfitter was acquitted of the criminal charge of violating 
this statute. I recognize that an alternative disposition in this case might be 
a remand to the Board to make additional findings. I would not oppose that 
resolution of the case. However, I am prepared at this time to concur in 
reversal of the Board's decision and do concur.

 FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. § 
23-2-416(a)(iv) (1991) provides:

     (a) The board may 
require payment of damages as provided by subsection (b) of this section or 
suspend or revoke a license issued under this act for any of the following 
causes:

. . . .

     (iv) Violation of any 
significant federal or state law or related regulations pertaining to wildlife, 
game and fish[.]

2 According to Wyo. Stat. 
§ 23-1-102(a)(vii) (1991), "take" means "hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, 
fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch, capture, 
shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess."