Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jeffery J. Drach

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 94 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP237-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jeffery J. Drach, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross 
Appellant, 
     v. 
Jeffery J. Drach, 
          Respondent-Appellant- Cross 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DRACH 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 23, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 26, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent, there were 
briefs filed by Dean R. Dietrich, Alyson D. Dieckman, and 
Dietrich VanderWaal, S.C., Wausau. There was an oral argument by 
Dean R. Dietrich. 
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross-appellant, there were 
briefs filed by Brenda K. Sunby, William J. Weigel, and Office 
of Lawyer Regulation, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
William J. Weigel.  
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 94
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP237-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jeffery J. Drach, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent- 
          Cross Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffery J. Drach, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant- 
          Cross Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 23, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This disciplinary matter comes to the 
court on Attorney Jeffery J. Drach's appeal and the Office of 
Lawyer 
Regulation's 
(OLR) 
cross-appeal 
of 
a 
report 
and 
recommendation of Referee Robert E. Kinney.  The referee based 
his report in part on a stipulation between Attorney Drach and 
the OLR, in which Attorney Drach admitted four counts of 
misconduct and agreed to make a $1,540 restitution payment to 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
2 
 
one of the two clients involved in this matter.  After holding 
an evidentiary hearing to address the appropriate level of 
discipline, the referee filed a report concluding that Attorney 
Drach committed three of the four charged counts of misconduct, 
and recommending a public reprimand.  The referee further 
recommended that this court order Attorney Drach to pay the full 
costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which are $26,449.93 as 
of November 9, 2020, and pay restitution beyond the stipulated 
amount; specifically, a total of $2,744 to the two clients 
involved in this matter, plus interest.   
¶2 
Through his appeal, Attorney Drach challenges the 
referee's recommended public reprimand; he claims his misconduct 
merits only a private reprimand.  Attorney Drach also asks the 
court to reduce the amount of costs in this case by 50 percent.  
Finally, Attorney Drach argues that the restitution award 
against him should not depart from the stipulated amount:  
$1,540 to one of the clients involved this matter.   
¶3 
In its cross-appeal, the OLR argues that the referee 
erred in recommending the dismissal of one of the four 
misconduct charges.  The OLR further argues that Attorney 
Drach's misconduct merits a public reprimand and an award of 
full costs, as the referee recommended.  The OLR does not seek 
restitution beyond the stipulated amount.   
¶4 
After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 
Drach's appeal and the OLR's cross-appeal, we agree, in part, 
with the referee's recommendations.  We accept the referee's 
factual findings based on the parties' stipulation.  We agree 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
3 
 
with the referee that one of the charged counts of misconduct 
should be dismissed, but we reach this conclusion for reasons 
different from those stated by the referee.  We agree with the 
referee that Attorney Drach committed the remaining counts of 
misconduct, and that this misconduct merits a public reprimand.  
We hold that Attorney Drach should pay the full costs of this 
matter, and we impose restitution in the stipulated amount of 
$1,540.  
¶5 
The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with 
the filing of a three-count complaint in February 2018, which it 
later amended in a four-count complaint in June 2018.  Attorney 
Drach denied any professional misconduct in his answers to both 
the original and amended complaints.   
¶6 
The case proceeded through discovery and was set for a 
disciplinary hearing in April 2019.  About two weeks before the 
scheduled hearing, Attorney Drach entered into a stipulation in 
which he admitted all four misconduct charges.  He also agreed 
to pay——and in fact later paid——$1,540 in restitution to one of 
the aggrieved clients.   
¶7 
The parties requested, and the referee held, an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
regarding 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline.  Attorney Drach appeared as the only witness.  In 
post-hearing briefing, the OLR asked for a public reprimand, and 
Attorney Drach asked for a private reprimand. 
¶8 
In August 2019, the referee filed his report.  He 
accepted the parties' stipulation, which set forth the following 
underlying facts. 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
4 
 
¶9 
Attorney Drach has practiced law in Wisconsin since 
1975.  He operates Drach Elder Law Center LLC (hereafter, the 
"Drach firm") in Wausau, WI. 
¶10 Attorney Drach has a disciplinary history.  In 2002, 
he received a public reprimand for failing to consult with a 
client as to the objectives of representation; failing to keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to 
promptly comply with the client's reasonable requests for 
information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation; and representing a client when 
that representation conflicted with his responsibilities to 
another client.  See Public Reprimand of Jeffery J. Drach, No. 
2002-9 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium. 
wicourts.gov/app/raw/000962.html).  In 2008, Attorney Drach 
received a private reprimand for failing to adequately supervise 
the conduct of a non-lawyer employee, which in turn led to 
conduct by the non-lawyer employee that would have constituted 
professional incompetence had Attorney Drach engaged in the 
conduct himself.  Private Reprimand No. 2008-26 (electronic copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/ 
002152.html). 
¶11 The instant case involves Attorney Drach's misconduct 
in two client matters, described below. 
Mr. and Mrs. P. and their adult son, R. 
¶12 The first client matter at issue involved a family 
comprised of an elderly couple, Mr. and Mrs. P., and their adult 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
5 
 
son, R.  R. had always lived with Mr. and Mrs. P.; he never 
lived independently.  Mr. P.'s health was declining.   
¶13 In 2011, Mr. and Mrs. P. entered into three flat fee 
agreements with the Drach firm:   
 a "Life Planning Agreement," for $975, which Mr. and 
Mrs. P. paid in full in February 2011;  
 an "Asset Preservation Planning Agreement," for $5,975, 
which Mr. and Mrs. P. paid in full in May 2011; and  
 an 
"Implementation 
of 
the 
Asset 
Preservation 
Plan 
Agreement," for $2,275, which Mr. and Mrs. P. paid in 
full in May 2011.   
¶14 In August 2011, the Drach firm sent Mr. and Mrs. P. an 
itemized bill, labeled "Life Planning," for $975.  There were 
several problems with this bill.  First, Mr. and Mrs. P. had 
already paid a flat fee for "life planning" services (e.g., 
drafting powers of attorney and living wills).  Second, although 
the bill was labeled as concerning "Life Planning," the actual 
itemized work on the bill did not concern life planning, but 
rather related to transferring assets to a trust——an area of 
work that was not covered by any of the engagement agreements 
between Attorney Drach and Mr. and Mrs. P.  Third, Attorney 
Drach's and his staff member's hourly rates were not set forth 
in the bill.  Mr. and Mrs. P. nevertheless paid the bill in 
full.     
¶15 In June 2014, the couple's adult son, R., called 
Attorney Drach's firm with news that Mrs. P. was in rapidly 
failing health.  This development forced revisions to the estate 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
6 
 
plan that Attorney Drach had prepared for Mr. and Mrs. P., which 
was based on the assumption that Mr. P. would predecease Mrs. P.  
Within a few days of R.'s phone call, Attorney Drach's staff 
went to Mrs. P.'s hospice bed with revised estate planning 
documents.  But Mrs. P. had already lost consciousness, and she 
died shortly thereafter.  
¶16 In the months following Mrs. P.'s death, Attorney 
Drach worked on asset preservation and trust administration 
matters on Mr. P.'s behalf.  Attorney Drach did not have a 
written hourly fee agreement with Mr. and Mrs. P. for either 
category of work.  During this time period, the Drach firm 
issued bills to Mr. P. totaling $6,632.40 for asset preservation 
work and $4,537.22 for trust administration work. 
¶17 In November 2014, R., in his capacity as power of 
attorney for his father, Mr. P., signed a flat fee agreement for 
the Drach firm to help prepare a medical assistance application 
for his father.  The Drach firm charged a flat fee of $6,500 
plus out-of-pocket costs.  The following month, the Drach firm 
withdrew this amount from client funds held in trust. 
¶18 Despite having a flat fee agreement in place for 
medical assistance application work, the Drach firm sent Mr. P. 
a bill in March 2015 with medical-assistance-related billing 
entries for eight dates in November and December 2014.  These 
entries, which totaled $1,540, appeared on a bill related to the 
Drach firm's asset preservation work.  
¶19 On November 12, 2014, the Drach firm obtained R.'s 
permission by telephone to pay $11,169.62 for services rendered 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
7 
 
between June 24, 2014 and October 31, 2014.  The Drach firm 
withdrew this amount from client funds held in trust one day 
later, on November 13, 2014.  The Drach firm did not provide the 
required notice in writing five days in advance of the trust 
fund withdrawal.  Nor did the Drach firm provide a written trust 
account balance to R. in November 2014, when the legal bill was 
paid.   
¶20 On December 16, 2014, the Drach firm again called R. 
to obtain permission to pay an additional $11,945 in legal fees 
from the trust account.  The Drach firm explained in a December 
18, 2014 letter that this $11,945 amount represented fees for 
trust administration work, asset preservation work, and the 
$6,500 flat fee for work on Mr. P.'s medical assistance 
application.  On December 23, 2014, the Drach firm withdrew 
$11,945 from client funds held in trust.  The firm did not 
provide R. with an accurate accounting in writing of what was 
being paid from the trust account, nor was he notified when the 
funds would be withdrawn from trust.  Of the fees listed in the 
December 18, 2014 letter, $2,322 was for asset preservation work 
that had not yet been done; the firm had estimated the amount of 
fees needed to finish the asset preservation work by multiplying 
the expected amount of time the Drach firm's attorneys and staff 
planned to work on the file by his/her hourly rate.  R. was 
never informed that a portion of the bill was based on estimated 
future fees. 
¶21 As 
a 
result 
of 
these 
actions, 
Attorney 
Drach 
stipulated to the following counts of misconduct: 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
8 
 
Count One:  By billing medical assistance application 
work as hourly charges within asset preservation 
billings 
when 
there 
was 
an 
existing 
flat 
fee 
agreement, Attorney Drach violated SCR 20:1.5(a).1 
Count Two:  By charging an additional $975 for life 
planning work when the work was actually for the 
transferring of assets without disclosing to Mr. and 
Mrs. P. the basis or rate of the hourly fees, by 
failing to enter into a written fee agreement for 
asset preservation work in 2014, and by failing to 
enter into a written fee agreement for representation 
relating to trust administration, in each instance, 
Attorney Drach violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(l).2 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides:  
 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular  employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
2 SCR 20:1.5(b)(l) provides:  
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
9 
 
Count Three:  By failing to provide R. with the 
anticipated date of withdrawal of funds from trust to 
pay fees in November and December 2014, by failing to 
provide a written trust account balance in November 
2014, by failing to provide an accurate written trust 
account balance in December 2014, and by estimating 
future non-contingent fees and withdrawing them from 
the trust account before they were earned in December 
2014, in each instance, Attorney Drach violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(g).3 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The scope of the representation and the basis or 
rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will 
be responsible shall be communicated to the client in 
writing, before or within a reasonable time after 
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer 
will charge a regularly represented client on the same 
basis or rate as in the past.  If it is reasonably  
foreseeable that the total cost of representation to 
the client, including attorney's fees, will be $1000 
or less, the communication may be oral or in writing.  
Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or 
expenses shall also be communicated in writing to the 
client. 
3 Former SCR 20:1.15(g), effective through June 30, 2016, 
provided:  
 
(1) Notice to client. At least 5 business days 
before the date on which a disbursement is made from a 
trust account for the purpose of paying fees, with the 
exception of contingent fees or fees paid pursuant to 
court order, the lawyer shall transmit to the client 
in writing all of the following: 
a. An itemized bill or other accounting showing 
the services rendered; 
b. Notice of the amount owed and the anticipated 
date of the withdrawal; and 
c. A statement of the balance of the client's 
funds 
in 
the 
lawyer 
trust 
account 
after 
the 
withdrawal. 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
10 
 
G.L. 
¶22 The second client matter at issue involved Attorney 
Drach's representation of G.L.  G.L. was an elderly woman with 
two adult daughters, J.T. and J.E., and a husband with 
Alzheimer's disease.  G.L.'s daughter, J.T., worked at the Drach 
firm for two years, from January 2007 to February 2009, doing 
typing and bookkeeping work.   
¶23 In 2007, G.L. signed a flat fee agreement with the 
Drach firm for Estate Planning/Life Planning, Asset Preservation 
Planning, and Implementation of the Asset Preservation Plan.  
The flat fee was $12,000, plus out-of-pocket costs.  Attorney 
Drach completed the work encompassed in the flat fee agreement 
in 2010. 
¶24 In November 2014, 
G.L.'s daughter, J.T., became 
gravely ill.  J.T. was G.L.'s power of attorney.  In that 
capacity, J.T. requested that Attorney Drach review G.L.'s 
existing documents to ensure that G.L.'s affairs were in order.   
¶25 Attorney Drach met with J.T. at her home on November 
10, 2014.  He did not have J.T. sign any agreement setting forth 
the nature of the legal work that he was going to perform, nor 
did he discuss with her whether the legal work would be done on 
a flat fee or hourly basis.  J.T. passed away several days after 
Attorney Drach met with her. 
¶26 In February 2015, Attorney Drach sent G.L. a bill for 
additional estate planning work in the amount of $7,659.  He 
issued this bill without a written hourly fee agreement in 
place.  The bill did not itemize the time spent by each attorney 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
11 
 
or staff member or show the hourly rates for Attorney Drach or 
his staff.  Attorney Drach had never discussed with J.T. or G.L. 
the fact that his and his staff's hourly rates had increased 
since he had last done trust administration work on G.L.'s 
behalf several years earlier. 
¶27 In late 2014, G.L. retained a different lawyer to 
represent her with respect to her estate planning and trust 
administration matters.  On March 30, 2015, Attorney Drach 
provided G.L.'s new counsel with G.L.'s $7,659 bill, which, 
again, did not include an hourly rate breakdown nor a detailed 
itemization of the time spent by each attorney or staff member.  
On April 24, 2015, pursuant to a request by G.L.'s new counsel, 
Attorney 
Drach 
provided 
counsel 
with 
a 
detailed 
billing 
statement that included an itemization of work done on the file 
and disclosed the current hourly rates for Attorney Drach and 
his staff. 
¶28 As 
a 
result 
of 
these 
actions, 
Attorney 
Drach 
stipulated to the following counts of misconduct: 
Count Four:  By doing legal work on G.L.'s file in 
2014 and 2015 for estate planning without a written 
fee agreement and by failing to communicate in writing 
any changes to the basis or rate of the hourly fees 
related to the trust administration legal work, in 
each 
instance, 
Attorney 
Drach 
violated 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1). 
¶29 As mentioned above, the referee filed his report after 
holding 
a 
hearing 
on 
sanctions. 
 
Despite 
the 
parties' 
stipulation to all four counts of misconduct, the referee 
recommended dismissal of stipulated Count One, which, again, 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
12 
 
alleged that by billing Mr. and Mrs. P. for medical assistance 
application work as hourly charges within asset preservation 
billings when there was an existing flat fee agreement for 
medical assistance application work, Attorney Drach violated 
SCR 20:1.5(a) (forbidding lawyer from making an agreement for, 
charging, or collecting "an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses").  The referee reasoned that, although 
Attorney Drach billed in excess of the amount set by the flat 
fee agreement for medical assistance application work ($6,500), 
there was no testimony or other evidence in the record to show 
that the total amount actually billed (the $6,500 flat fee, plus 
$1,540 in hourly billings, equaling $8,040) was an unreasonable 
amount.  Thus, in the referee's view, there was no violation of 
SCR 20:1.5(a).  "[F]or a violation of SCR 20:1.5(a) to lie, it 
must be shown that the attorney fees charges were too high," the 
referee wrote.  Without such a showing, Attorney Drach's billing 
practices could only be a breach of the fee agreement, not 
misconduct.   
¶30 As to the remaining counts, the referee determined 
that the stipulated facts supported legal conclusions that 
Attorney Drach had engaged in the misconduct alleged in Counts 
Two, Three, and Four.   
¶31 Turning to the issue of appropriate discipline, the 
referee found that Attorney Drach's overall course of conduct 
featured more aggravating factors than mitigating factors.  On 
the aggravating side, the referee noted that Attorney Drach's 
prior disciplinary cases, from 2002 and 2008, are somewhat 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
13 
 
remote from today, but much less remote from the time the 
offenses at issue here were committed.  Attorney Drach committed 
multiple offenses.  The victims were particularly vulnerable.  
Attorney Drach had trouble seeing, or acknowledging, that what 
he did was wrong, and he tended to blame his employees for his 
ethical troubles.  His substantial experience in the law (more 
than 40 years) should have counseled against his actions, 
particularly 
his 
tendency 
to 
forego 
written 
engagement 
agreements.  On the mitigating side, he cooperated with the OLR.  
He also agreed to pay $1,540 in restitution to the P. family.   
¶32 The referee further recommended that Attorney Drach 
should pay full costs, as well as restitution beyond the 
stipulated amount.  Specifically, the referee recommended a 
restitution award of $2,744, comprised of the stipulated $1,540 
to R., plus a payment to G.L. of $1,204, which equals the 
difference between the amount Attorney Drach actually billed her 
at his undisclosed higher rates and the amount he would have 
billed her at the lower rates at which he had billed her years 
earlier.  The referee further recommended that Attorney Drach 
pay interest on these restitution amounts. 
¶33 As mentioned above, both Attorney Drach and the OLR 
have appealed from the referee's report.  We turn first to the 
arguments in Attorney Drach's appeal.   
¶34 Attorney Drach argues that the referee correctly 
recommended the dismissal of Count One, which, again, alleged 
that by billing Mr. and Mrs. P. for medical assistance 
application work as hourly charges within asset preservation 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
14 
 
billings when there was an existing flat fee agreement for 
medical assistance application work, Attorney Drach violated 
SCR 20:1.5(a).  Although Attorney Drach stipulated to the 
misconduct alleged in Count One, he insists on appeal that the 
facts underlying this count show no more than clerical errors, 
and that in any event, there is no evidence to show that the 
cumulative amount he charged for his services was unreasonable. 
¶35 Attorney Drach does not challenge the referee's 
determinations of misconduct on Counts Two, Three, and Four, but 
he insists his misconduct should result in the imposition of a 
private reprimand——not a public reprimand, as the referee 
recommended.  He argues that that his misconduct amounted to 
nothing more than "technical" violations of our ethical rules, 
complained about by "disgruntled family members."  He claims 
that his failures to enter into fee agreements with Mr. and Mrs. 
P. and with G.L. were acts of "care and compassion" because it 
would have been inappropriate to have conversations about fees 
with R. while his mother was dying, or with G.L.'s power of 
attorney, J.T., while J.T. was gravely ill.  Attorney Drach also 
claims that that the referee failed to appropriately acknowledge 
certain mitigating factors, namely:  (1) his cooperation with 
the OLR; (2) the visible place he holds in the legal community; 
and (3) the purported fact that, if he is publicly reprimanded, 
he may be forced to resign certain professional designations or 
positions.  As for his previous disciplinary problems, he claims 
they are too old, and too distinguishable, to have relevance 
here.   
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
15 
 
¶36 Turning to restitution and costs, Attorney Drach 
argues that the referee erred in recommending restitution 
payments that the OLR never sought.  Attorney Drach also objects 
to the imposition of full costs.  He suggests that a reduction 
in costs——50 percent, his counsel proposed at oral argument——
would be appropriate.  He claims that "at the time that OLR 
initiated its investigation, it alleged that Attorney Drach had 
engaged in far more serious and pervasive misconduct that what 
was ultimately alleged."  According to Attorney Drach, this 
extensive investigation, combined with the lengthy litigation 
involved in this case, show that the OLR "has pursued an 
unjustified campaign against [him].  In the interest of 
fairness, the Court should adjust the costs to reflect a more 
realistic prosecution of the case."   
¶37 In its appellate briefing, the OLR argues that the 
referee's recommendation of a public reprimand is appropriate 
and supported by the evidence.  As an initial matter, the OLR 
disagrees with the referee's recommendation that this court 
should dismiss Count One.  It submits that the referee's belief 
that the existence of an SCR 20:1.5(a) violation depends on the 
reasonableness of the amount ultimately charged the client is 
inconsistent with the language of the rule.  The rule provides 
that the amount of fees involved is simply one of the eight 
factors set forth in the rule.  See SCR 20:1.5(a)(4).  There is 
no language in the rule that states that the entire fee must be 
found to be unreasonable in order to make a finding of an 
SCR 20:1.5(a) rule violation.  
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
16 
 
¶38 The OLR also argues that Attorney Drach's insistence 
that it would have been improper to discuss fees with his 
clients at or near the time of a family member's serious illness 
or death displays a disregard of the ethical rule requiring 
written fee agreements.  The OLR points out that many lawyers 
regularly deal with families in crisis, especially in personal 
injury, wrongful death, and probate-type cases, and yet a 
written communication about what a lawyer is going to charge a 
client in this situation is mandated by the ethical rules.  The 
OLR further notes that in situations where raising the topic of 
fees may come across as insensitive, the rules allow some 
flexibility, as the communication in writing can be "before or 
within a reasonable time after commencing the representation."  
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1). 
¶39 The OLR also argues that Attorney Drach's previous 
disciplinary matters are pertinent here.  His 2008 private 
reprimand, for example, was based on his general failure to 
supervise his office staff in the execution of estate planning 
documents.  The instant case reveals a similar pattern of 
misconduct; i.e., a failure to put protocols in place to ensure 
that matters are being properly handled within his office. 
¶40 Turning to the issue of restitution and costs, the OLR 
does not seek restitution beyond the stipulated amount of 
$1,540.  The OLR insists, however, that costs should not be 
reduced.  The OLR reports that while it is true that it 
investigated matters and charges that were ultimately not 
pursued in the disciplinary complaint, it did not include any 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
17 
 
costs attributable to time spent by investigators in the costs 
reported in this case.  Moreover, the OLR notes, Attorney Drach 
stipulated to all four of the misconduct counts alleged by the 
OLR.  Attorney Drach failed to explain how or why the OLR acted 
inappropriately in pursing this matter.   
¶41 The matter is now before this court to review the 
referee's report and recommendation, informed by the parties' 
arguments made in their briefs and at oral argument.  When 
reviewing a referee's report and recommendation, we affirm the 
referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, 
but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 
basis. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 
126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the 
appropriate level of discipline to impose given the particular 
facts of each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, 
but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶42 Guided by these standards, we conclude that Attorney 
Drach committed the rule violations alleged by the OLR in Counts 
Two, Three, and Four——just as the OLR complaint alleged, the 
parties stipulated, and the referee determined.  By his 
undisputed failure to enter into written fee agreements with his 
clients, his failure to communicate to G.L. in writing the 
changes to his firm's hourly rates, and his failure to provide 
Mr. and Mrs. P.'s adult son, R., with timely notices of the 
withdrawal of funds from trust and an accurate accounting of 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
18 
 
trust fund balances, Attorney Drach violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) 
and SCR 20:1.15(g). 
¶43 We agree with the referee that Attorney Drach did not 
commit the misconduct alleged in Count One, but for different 
reasons from those expressed by the referee.  We disagree with 
the referee's conclusion that it is ethically permissible for a 
lawyer who has agreed to a flat fee to demand that the client 
make payments beyond that amount for legal work within the scope 
of the agreement, so long as the total amount billed is not 
shown to be excessively high.  Clients enter flat fee agreements 
with the expectation that the flat fee is a reasonable 
calculation of all of the work to be done.  We decline to hold 
that SCR 20:1.5(a), which mandates reasonable fees, permits a 
lawyer to unilaterally switch from a flat fee agreement to a 
flat-fee-plus-hourly-fee arrangement for work covered by the 
flat fee agreement.  Billing a client using such an unagreed-to 
and 
inherently 
contradictory 
fee 
structure 
hardly 
seems 
"reasonable" for purposes of SCR 20:1.5(a), regardless of the 
total amount billed.   
¶44 We 
are 
persuaded, 
however, 
by 
Attorney 
Drach's 
argument that he did not engage in this kind of inappropriate 
billing practice here.  Rather, it appears undisputed that 
Attorney Drach's clerical staff mistakenly entered, on a single 
bill in an hourly billing matter, time entries for eight dates 
concerning work that should have been billed as part of a flat 
fee billing agreement.  When asked at the sanctions hearing in 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
19 
 
this matter why he did not correct these errors while reviewing 
the bill, Attorney Drach testified: 
[W]hat I usually review for is typos and grammar. I 
review for appropriate descriptions in the narrative.  
This was done at a time when we were scrambling to 
make sure that [Mr. P.] got eligible [for Medicaid]. 
So I think I reviewed this, but . . . I obviously 
didn't pick up on the fact that there were some 
medical assistance entries there.   
Attorney Drach agreed to reimburse the P. family for the amounts 
billed in the mistaken time entries (a total of $1,540), and he 
has, in fact, done so.   
¶45 On 
these 
particular 
facts, 
we 
do 
not 
find 
an 
SCR 20:1.5(a) 
violation. 
 
While 
an 
attorney's 
fee 
must 
unquestionably be reasonable, we decline to hold that the 
issuance of a single bill containing some inadvertently included 
time entries rises to the level of misconduct contemplated by 
SCR 20:1.5(a). 
¶46 We are left, then, with determining the appropriate 
sanction for the misconduct alleged in Counts Two, Three, and 
Four.  In making this determination, we reject Attorney Drach's 
insistence that this court should view his failure to enter 
written fee agreements with his clients as an act of compassion, 
not misconduct.  As explained above, Attorney Drach argues that 
he was loathe to discuss fee arrangements with his clients in 
times of illness or recent family loss.  That is not a winning 
excuse for a lawyer's failure to get written fee agreements in 
place——especially for an elder law lawyer such as Attorney 
Drach.  Illness, death, and the family turmoil associated with 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
20 
 
these events are integral parts of Attorney Drach's practice.  
They do not give him an excuse to bypass explicit ethical 
requirements.  To the contrary, the distressing circumstances in 
which his clients often find themselves make it only more 
important that Attorney Drach have clear, written fee agreements 
in place——as did not happen here.   
¶47 We note, too, that this is the third time that 
Attorney Drach has been the subject of a disciplinary action.  
Given 
that 
he 
has 
already 
been 
privately 
and 
publicly 
reprimanded, one could argue that the next logical step is a 
suspension. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Gorokhovsky, 2013 WI 100, ¶26, 351 Wis. 2d 408, 840 N.W.2d 126 
("Now that we already have privately and publicly reprimanded 
Attorney Gorokhovsky, imposing yet another reprimand would 
unduly depreciate the seriousness of his misconduct and the need 
to deter him from continued unprofessional behavior.")  But a 
suspension seems too harsh; while Attorney Drach has engaged in 
unprofessional billing practices, there is no evidence of deceit 
or any course of conduct designed to collect fees for work not 
performed.   
¶48 A public reprimand, however, fits comfortably within 
our case law.  See, e.g., Public Reprimand of James T. Runyon, 
No. 
2017-5 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002958.html) 
(imposing 
public reprimand on previously disciplined lawyer for, among 
other things, failing to provide a client with a written 
communication explaining the representation's scope or required 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
21 
 
fee information, failing to notify the client before removing 
fees from his trust account, failing to communicate his fee in 
writing, and withdrawing an advanced fee before it was earned); 
see also Public Reprimand of Jerry T. Delcore, No. 2017-2 
(electronic copy available at https://compendium.wicourts.gov/ 
app/raw/002929.html) (imposing public reprimand on previously 
disciplined lawyer for providing a client with inconsistent and 
confusing information regarding the rate and basis of her fees, 
and for failing to provide the client with notices and 
accountings required under former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)(a) and (b) 
for advanced fee payments).   
¶49 Although Attorney Drach claims that a public reprimand 
will hurt his standing in the elder law community, we have 
previously made clear that a possible detrimental impact on an 
attorney's ability to practice is not an appropriate factor in 
establishing a level of discipline. See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Lamb, 2011 WI 101, ¶31, 338 Wis. 2d 1, 806 
N.W.2d 439. 
¶50 Finally, the court must consider the issues of 
restitution and costs.  At oral argument, the OLR made clear 
that it does not now, and did not previously, seek restitution 
beyond the amount that Attorney Drach has already paid ($1,540).  
We accede to the OLR's judgment on this issue.   
¶51 As to costs, we reject Attorney Drach's request for a 
50 percent reduction in awardable costs as undeveloped.  In 
proceedings before the referee, Attorney Drach objected to the 
OLR's requested costs in a conclusory fashion, and did not state 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
22 
 
what he considered to be a reasonable amount of costs.  See 
SCR 22.24(2).4  His request for a 50 percent reduction came only 
at oral argument, unsupported by any explanation as to why this 
figure is reasonable beyond a claim that the OLR engaged in 
overbroad litigation against him——a perplexing argument given 
his stipulation to all of the counts that the OLR charged.  
Under SCR 22.24(1m), the court's general policy is that upon a 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.24(2) provides:   
In seeking the assessment of costs by the supreme 
court, the director shall file in the court, with a 
copy to the referee and the respondent, a statement of 
costs within 20 days after the filing of the referee's 
report or a SCR 22.12 or 22.34(10) stipulation, 
together with a recommendation regarding the costs to 
be assessed against the respondent.  If an appeal of 
the referee's report is filed or the supreme court 
orders briefs to be filed in response to the referee's 
report, 
a 
supplemental 
statement 
of 
costs 
and 
recommendation regarding the assessment of costs shall 
be filed within 20 days of the date of oral argument 
or, if no oral argument is held, the filing date of 
the last brief on appeal.  The recommendation should 
explain why the particular amount of costs is being 
sought.  The respondent may file an objection to the 
statement of costs and recommendation within 21 days 
after service of the statement of costs.  A respondent 
who objects to a statement of costs must explain, with 
specificity, the reasons for the objection and must 
state what he or she considers to be a reasonable 
amount of costs.  The objection may include relevant 
supporting documentation. 
 
The office of lawyer 
regulation may reply within 11 days of receiving the 
objection. In proceeding before a referee the referee 
shall make a recommendation to the court regarding 
costs.  The referee should explain the recommendation 
addressing the factors set forth in SCR 22.24 (lm). 
The referee shall consider the submissions of the 
parties and the record in the proceeding. No further 
discovery or hearing is authorized.  
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
23 
 
finding of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs upon 
the respondent. 
The court may, in the exercise of its 
discretion, reduce the amount of costs, but we find no 
justification in this case for a deviation from the court's 
general policy. 
¶52 IT IS ORDERED that Jeffery J. Drach is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶53 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Jeffery J. Drach shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$26,449.93 as of November 9, 2020. 
¶54 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this decision. 
¶55 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2018AP237-D   
 
 
 
1