Title: State v. Stallings

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 2000-Ohio-164.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. STALLINGS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 98-640 — Submitted April 12, 2000 at the Geauga County Session — 
Decided July 19, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Common Pleas Court of Summit County, No. 97-05-
1118(A). 
 
On December 15, 1996, in Akron, Ohio, Michael Stallings, 
defendant-appellant, agreed with two gang accomplices, Marc Lee (“Lee”) 
and Donzell Lewis (“Lewis”), to rob Eric Beverly (“Beverly”), a reputed 
local marijuana dealer.  Lee furnished a shotgun to defendant, and defendant 
went with Lewis to an apartment belonging to Beverly’s girlfriend where 
Beverly was visiting.  Defendant entered, demanded money and marijuana 
from Beverly, and shot sixteen-year-old Rolisha “Michelle” Shephard.  
Defendant then left Akron and was arrested in May 1997 in Cleveland. 
 
The evidence reveals that a few days before December 15, 1996, 
Stacy Lewis (“Stacy Lewis”), who lived at the Edgewood Apartment 
complex in Akron, overheard her boyfriend, Marc Lee, age twenty (also 
known as “Locc Up”), talking with her fourteen-year-old cousin, Donzell 
Lewis, about a robbery.  However, because the intended victim knew both 
Lewis and Lee, they decided to get somebody else to rob the victim for them. 
 
Coincidentally, on December 15, defendant (also known as “St. 
Ides”) and Clara Redd, his girlfriend, along with another woman, were 
driving back to Cleveland from Columbus.  Around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. that 
day, defendant and his two friends stopped in Akron at Stacy Lewis’s 
apartment to see Lee, whom defendant knew as a fellow “Crips” gang 
 
 
2 
member from Cleveland.  Lee held the rank of an “OG” or “original 
gangster,” a leadership position in the Crips, and Lewis and defendant were 
“BGs” (baby gangsters), or ordinary soldiers. 
 
After defendant arrived at Stacy Lewis’s apartment, he agreed with 
Lee and Lewis to rob a neighborhood marijuana dealer, Eric Beverly.  Lee 
picked defendant as the gunman because he was unknown in Akron.  Their 
plan was to have Lewis, who had previously purchased marijuana from 
Beverly, secure entry to the apartment of Erika White, Beverly’s girlfriend, 
on the pretext of wanting to purchase marijuana.  Once Lewis got inside, 
defendant, armed with a shotgun, would force his way inside and rob 
Beverly.  Lee gave defendant a breakdown type, single-shot, sawed-off 12-
gauge shotgun to carry out the agreed-upon robbery.1  The plan was to carry 
out a “simple robbery,” and Lewis was to pretend that he was also a robbery 
victim. 
 
Sometime after 10:00 p.m., Lewis and defendant went to Erika 
White’s apartment.  Redd waited in her car, having been told that defendant 
left “to go buy some weed.”  Lewis knocked on the back door at Erika 
White’s apartment, and Kimberly White, Erika’s sister, answered the door.  
When Kimberly White opened the door, she recognized Lewis as Beverly’s 
friend, and called out to Beverly, who was sitting on the couch, “EJ, 
somebody want[s] you.”  When Kimberly White turned around, she noticed 
that another man, whom she did not know, was holding a gun. 
 
Then Kimberly White screamed and yelled, “He[’s] got a gun,” and 
tried to get her cousin, Michelle Shephard, who was also visiting the 
apartment with Kimberly White, to leave.  But Shephard did not leave, and 
instead picked up her fourteen-month-old son, Christopher Williams, who 
was sitting on the floor.  Kimberly White fled out the front door.  While 
 
 
3 
outside, she heard Shephard say, “Please.”  Kimberly White later identified 
defendant from a photo lineup as the gunman. 
 
Lewis testified that Kimberly White answered the back door, 
screamed, and then ran out the front door.  Beverly was asleep on the couch, 
and Shephard was the only other person in the apartment aside from 
Christopher and one other young child upstairs. 
 
Lewis also testified that after they entered, he stood against the wall 
and held his hands up, pretending that he was a robbery victim.  Defendant 
stood about three or four feet away from Beverly, pointed the shotgun at him, 
and told him, “Give me the money and the weed.”  Shephard, who was 
standing by the couch holding her son, asked Beverly to “give him the 
marijuana and the money.”  Lewis also told Beverly, “Give it to him.”  
Beverly never said anything; he was “just looking” at defendant.  According 
to Lewis, defendant then told Beverly, “Give me the money and the weed or 
I’m going to shoot your girlfriend.” 
 
While Lewis had his back turned, he heard a shot, turned around and 
saw Shephard on the ground.  Christopher, her baby, was also on the ground, 
crying.  Beverly went to help Shephard, and defendant left through the back 
door. 
 
In his testimony, Beverly claimed to remember very little of the 
events that evening, since he had been sleeping, drinking, and smoking 
marijuana.  Beverly recalled that Kimberly White and Shephard were at the 
apartment, but claimed he did not hear anyone come in or hear any gunshot.  
Beverly did hear “people hollering” and woke up to find Shephard lying on 
the floor bleeding.  He attempted to revive her and then left.  On cross-
examination, Beverly admitted that he had been charged with obstruction of 
justice because of his lack of cooperation. 
 
 
4 
 
The state presented other witnesses also.  Holly Setser, who lived at 
the Edgewood Apartments, heard a woman at 722 Edgewood screaming, 
“He’s got a gun.”  Then she heard a loud “pop” noise and saw a man carrying 
a “sawed-off shotgun” running across a parking lot.  When the man got in a 
parked car, the car took off.  While waiting in her car, Redd also heard a shot 
and saw defendant running to her car, carrying a gun like a “sawed-off 
shotgun.”  After defendant jumped in Redd’s car, he told her, “Get out of 
here.” 
 
Redd drove back to Stacy Lewis’s apartment, and defendant put the 
shotgun in the trunk.  Lee borrowed Redd’s car keys in order to retrieve the 
shotgun.  Defendant said he gave the shotgun back to Lee, but Lee denied 
receiving the shotgun, and police never recovered the weapon.  After an 
hour, Redd drove to Cleveland, and then she and defendant drove to Detroit, 
where Redd lived. 
 
When a police officer entered the crime-scene apartment, he first 
noticed a “nice big blast of [marijuana] smoke,” as well as wet, clean 
ashtrays.  Police found Shephard in the living room, lying on her back, with 
wounds on her left side and lots of blood.  Although she had no pulse, medics 
took her to a hospital.  Later, police discovered that Shephard’s son, 
Christopher, had been in the apartment and had blood coming from his ear.  
(The evidence suggests he was injured when his mother dropped him.)  
Within a few days, detectives knew defendant’s physical description, that he 
was called “St. Ides,” and that he was from Cleveland or Detroit.  Lewis also 
described that evening’s events to police, but did not disclose his 
participation in the robbery. 
 
The coroner found that Shephard had a large shotgun wound in her 
left arm and chest, causing “severe trauma to the chest, lungs, heart, veins * * 
* [and] bleeding was the cause of death.”  Her death was instantaneous, and 
 
 
5 
her life could not have been saved by any medical intervention.  The coroner 
found gunpowder stippling on the wound and concluded that the gun muzzle 
was about six inches away from Shephard when she was shot. 
 
Michael Roberts, a state forensic expert, examined the shirt that 
Shephard was wearing when she was shot.  A hole in the shirt was consistent 
with having been caused by a “loose-contact” gunshot wound, and Roberts 
concluded that the muzzle of the shotgun must have been touching the shirt. 
 
Following an extensive investigation, police discovered that “St. 
Ides” was Michael Stallings from Cleveland.  Following his arrest in May 
1997, defendant told police that he had stopped in Akron on December 15 to 
see Lee.  While there, he agreed to act as the gunman for a “weed lick,” i.e., a 
robbery of a local marijuana dealer.  Lee furnished him the shotgun, which 
was supposed to be unloaded.  According to defendant, the gun had a hair 
trigger and accidentally went off as defendant left the apartment.  Defendant 
asserted that he did not think the gun was operable, that he never meant to 
shoot Shephard, and that Shephard was about five feet away when she was 
shot. 
 
In a plea bargain, both Lewis and Lee pled guilty to certain felonies 
and testified at trial against defendant.  In his defense at trial, defendant 
testified that when he agreed to do the robbery, Lee gave him a sawed-off 
shotgun and told him the shotgun “wasn’t supposed to be loaded.”  After 
Lewis knocked on the door, he and Lewis went inside together.  According to 
defendant, Beverly was awake, but did not hand over any money or drugs.  
Lewis, standing by the wall, hands up, pretending to be a victim, also told 
Beverly to “Give him the money and the weed.”  Shephard also encouraged 
Beverly to give up the money and drugs by telling Beverly, “Give it to him, 
give it to him.” 
 
 
6 
 
After a while, defendant said he “realized [he] wasn’t going to stand 
here and constantly argue with this man about the money and marijuana; so, 
[he] turned around to leave, * * * heard something drop, * * * turned 
around[,] and that’s when the gun went off.”  He denied that he pulled the 
hammer back on the gun.  After he saw Shephard fall back, he left the 
apartment and went to Redd’s car. 
 
Defendant admitted that he pointed the shotgun at Beverly and twice 
told Beverly, “Give me the money and the weed,” but Beverly said nothing.  
Defendant denied that he ever threatened to shoot Beverly’s “girlfriend,” and 
denied that he ever saw a child in the room.  Defendant admitted, however, 
that Lewis told Beverly to give up the money or defendant would shoot his 
girlfriend. 
 
Defendant also denied that he loaded the shotgun or knew that it was 
loaded.  Defendant claimed that Lee told him the gun was unloaded, but he 
admitted he never checked to make sure.  Defendant asserted that he knew 
how the gun was loaded because he had seen Lee load it before.  “[I]t took a 
lot of work to shut it.”  He agreed that to load it you had to break the gun 
open, put the shell in, then close it, and that “it was hard to close.” 
 
Defendant testified that he was born in Cleveland in November 1976, 
and was twenty years old at the time of the offense.  He lived mostly in 
Cleveland and completed the 11th grade of high school.  His mother, brother, 
and sister live in Alabama, and his father is incarcerated in an Alabama 
penitentiary.  He joined the Crips gang when he was thirteen or fourteen and 
had been “running the streets” since he was eight or nine.  Although he has 
an OG tattoo, he was only a BG in the Crips.  Defendant agreed that he had a 
juvenile record including incarcerations at youth camps for various offenses.  
As an adult, he had been convicted of receiving stolen property and grand 
theft of an auto. 
 
 
7 
 
In defendant’s defense at trial, homicide detective Steven Geiger 
agreed that Lewis repeatedly lied to police by claiming he was not involved 
in the robbery. 
 
Despite not guilty pleas, defendant was convicted as the principal 
offender for the aggravated felony-murder of Shephard (Count I) with death 
specifications of murder in the course of aggravated robbery (specification 1) 
and aggravated burglary (specification 2).  He was also convicted of 
aggravated robbery (Count IV) and aggravated burglary (Count VI), along 
with accompanying gun specifications.2 
 
Following a hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty.  The 
trial court sentenced defendant to death for aggravated murder and to prison 
for the aggravated robbery and burglary.  Defendant now appeals directly to 
this court as a matter of right. 
__________________ 
 
Michael T. Callahan, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, Paul 
Michael and Philip Bogdanoff, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Lawrence J. Whitney and Renee W. Green, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  In this appeal, defendant advances sixteen 
propositions of law.  Finding none meritorious, we affirm his convictions.  
We have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstances against 
the mitigating factors, and compared his sentences to those imposed in 
similar cases, as R.C. 2929.05(A) requires.  As a result, we affirm 
defendant’s convictions and sentence of death. 
I 
VOIR DIRE ISSUES 
Incorrect statements of law (I, XVI) 
 
 
8 
 
In proposition of law I, defendant argues that during the voir dire 
examination, the trial court “consistently misstate[d] the law to the jury and 
violate[d] appellant’s due process rights.”  Admittedly, the trial court stated 
at various times during voir dire that “if [the jury] find[s] the mitigating 
factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances” then it should vote on 
various life sentences.  Both the prosecutor and defense counsel also 
sometimes used that formulation or comparable language. 
 
That formulation of the test is incorrect, since the correct test is 
whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors, a matter 
on which the prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) and (2).  The reverse formulation referring to 
mitigating factors outweighing aggravating circumstances is wrong, since it 
confuses the burden of proof.  Although referring to mitigation outweighing 
aggravating circumstances is a common, semantic mistake, it could under 
other circumstances constitute fatal error.  For example, if the aggravating 
circumstances and mitigating factors are in equipoise, the jury must 
recommend a life sentence.  Counsel and all trial judges should make strong 
efforts to avoid this mistake. 
 
However, defendant’s counsel never complained about this mistaken 
formulation at trial.  This failure “constitutes a waiver of any claim of error 
relative thereto, unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly 
would have been otherwise.”  State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 
OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  Accord State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804. 
 
We conclude that no outcome-determinative plain error occurred 
here.  First, the judge’s shorthand references to legal concepts during voir 
dire cannot be equated to final instructions given shortly before the jury’s 
penalty deliberations.  “[T]he trial judge need not at that early stage 
 
 
9 
completely instruct the jury[.]”  State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 
164, 694 N.E.2d 932, 953.  Second, the court during voir dire began any 
reference to the relevant weighing test by noting that the jury would have to 
find that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating factors before 
they could recommend the death penalty.  Third, both the trial judge and 
counsel would, as often as not, state the test completely and accurately during 
voir dire and omit any reference to mitigating factors outweighing 
aggravating circumstances. 
 
Finally, the parties understood and generally articulated the correct 
legal standard at the penalty phase.  The court’s penalty instructions correctly 
stated the applicable law, namely: “The State * * * has the burden of proving 
* * * beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances * * * 
outweigh the factors in mitigation[.] * * * Reasonable doubt is present when 
* * * you cannot say that you are firmly convinced that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.”  Both the death and the life 
verdict forms reflected the correct legal standard, and the jury’s signed death 
verdict reflected:  “We, the Jury, * * * FIND, by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.”  
Thus, we find that the jury understood the applicable sentencing standard and 
its sentencing responsibility.  State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 438, 
653 N.E.2d 271, 277-278. 
 
We have long recognized, “Notice of plain error * * * is to be taken 
with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent 
a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  Long at paragraph three of the syllabus.  
No such circumstances exist here.  State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 
378, 395, 721 N.E.2d 52, 68; Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d at 437, 653 N.E.2d at 277.  
The court’s penalty instructions and verdict forms were accurate, and we do 
 
 
10 
not believe that these inaccurate voir dire references to the weighing process, 
which occurred five weeks earlier, could have affected the trial result.3 
 
Defendant’s remaining complaints about the final instructions are 
addressed in connection with proposition of law VIII.  In sum, we reject 
proposition of law I. 
Ineffective assistance 
 
In proposition of law XVI, defendant argues that his counsel’s 
recitation in voir dire of an incorrect weighing standard, as well as his 
counsel’s failure to object to these references by others, constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, reversal of convictions on 
ineffective assistance requires that the defendant show, first, that “counsel’s 
performance was deficient” and, second, that the deficient performance 
“prejudiced the defense * * * so * * * as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 
136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
 
Counsel’s failure to object to such references, however, does not 
demonstrate performance “below an objective standard of reasonable 
representation.”  Bradley, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
As we recognized earlier, misquoting the statutory weighing process 
is a common mistake, although one that counsel should avoid.  Moreover, 
defendant has not established that such mistakes in this case, even if 
repeated, created “a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s 
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”  Bradley at 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  We do not believe that these shorthand 
comments about the weighing process, made weeks earlier during voir dire, 
affected the trial result because the trial court later instructed the jury fully 
and accurately as to the governing legal standard.  A jury is presumed to 
 
 
11 
follow the instructions given to it by the trial judge.  State v. Loza (1994), 71 
Ohio St.3d 61, 79, 641 N.E.2d 1082, 1102-1103; State v. Ferguson (1983), 5 
Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 5 OBR 380, 383, 450 N.E.2d 265, 268.  Finally, the 
jury’s signed verdict form reflected the correct legal standard.  See Hill, 73 
Ohio St.3d at 437, 653 N.E.2d at 277.  We reject proposition of law XVI. 
Dismissal of jurors for cause 
 
In proposition of law III, defendant argues that the trial court 
improperly “excused for cause jurors who express[ed] reservations about 
capital punishment but did not excuse for cause jurors who expressed very 
strong feelings in favor of capital punishment.” 
 
However, death-qualifying a jury “does not deny a capital defendant a 
trial by an impartial jury.”  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 
OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Accord Lockhart 
v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137.  The test 
for excluding prospective jurors based upon their death-penalty views “is 
whether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and 
oath.”  State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 
984, paragraph three of the syllabus, vacated and remanded on other grounds 
(1985), 474 U.S. 1002, 106 S.Ct. 518, 88 L.Ed.2d 452, following Wainwright 
v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.  This test 
applies to those prospective jurors who favor capital punishment, as well as 
those who oppose it.  See State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 86, 656 
N.E.2d 643, 659. 
 
Here, the record demonstrates that the views of those prospective 
jurors excluded would have substantially impaired the performance of their 
duties.  Cf. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 391, 721 N.E.2d at 65-66; State v. 
Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 30, 553 N.E.2d 576, 586.  Prospective juror 
 
 
12 
DiBartolomeo, when asked if she could follow the law on capital 
punishment, replied, “No, I could not.”  She could not vote for death “under 
any circumstances” and agreed her views would substantially impair her 
ability as a juror.  Defense counsel also noted that she would have “a real 
difficult time serving.”  Juror Barker did not “want to be a part” of capital 
punishment, agreed it would be “very difficult” to set aside her personal 
beliefs, and agreed those beliefs “substantially impair[ed]” her ability to 
serve as a juror. 
 
Juror Radabaugh, who was “completely against capital punishment,” 
could not be a part of any death recommendation, and agreed her views 
substantially impaired her ability to serve as a juror.  Defense counsel 
remarked, “[N]ot much we can do with that.”  Juror Owens did not believe 
that she could set aside her personal feelings, follow the law, or vote for the 
death penalty.  She could not vote for death under any circumstances.  
Defense counsel noted, “I see no rational objection here.”  Juror Hoot was 
“adamantly opposed” to the death penalty, and could think of no case in 
which she would vote for the death penalty.  Juror Prentice, initially passed 
for cause, was recalled because she had been crying and vomiting after 
thinking about the death penalty.  She stated that she “just couldn’t live with 
[herself]” if she voted for death, and there was “absolutely no way [she] 
could do it.” 
 
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing those 
jurors.  A “ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is manifestly arbitrary * * * so as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion.”  Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 31, 553 N.E.2d at 587.  Accord State v. 
Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 337, 715 N.E.2d 136, 146; State v. McNeill 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 445, 700 N.E.2d 596, 605.  Clearly, “deference 
must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.”  Wainwright, 
 
 
13 
469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853.  See, also, State v. 
Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 414, 280 N.E.2d 915, 
920-921. 
 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by retaining three other 
jurors (Chambers, Harmon, and Oviatt) who supported the death penalty.  
Admittedly, Juror Chambers thought that if someone took another’s life, he 
should forfeit his own life.  However, Chambers agreed to consider 
mitigating factors and to consider life sentences, including life without parole 
or with parole possible after twenty-five or thirty years.  Chambers denied 
that his views substantially impaired his ability to sit as an impartial juror.  
Again, defendant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion. 
 
Juror Harmon believed that “murder in cold blood is an automatic 
death sentence,” as well as murders for hire.  Also, Harmon thought that 
those who use a gun to commit a crime resulting in death should receive the 
death penalty.  However, defendant never challenged Harmon, thereby 
waiving any issue as to his selection.  Moreover, Harmon agreed to follow 
the law, instructions, and evidence, rather than his own opinion. 
 
Juror Oviatt supported capital punishment and thought that death was 
appropriate for murder committed during an armed robbery.  Oviatt, 
however, agreed she could return a life verdict.  She also agreed to consider 
mitigating factors, listen to “what both sides would have to say,” and follow 
the law even though she might have firm convictions otherwise.  In sum, 
Chambers, Harmon, and Oviatt all agreed to follow the law, thereby allowing 
them to serve as impartial jurors. 
 
Defendant has therefore not established that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying these challenges.  Cf. State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 5-8, 679 N.E.2d 646, 653-655.  Moreover, Chambers, Harmon, and 
Oviatt never sat on the jury, and defendant waived his final peremptory 
 
 
14 
challenge.  Defendant has thus no basis to complain.  “[E]rror in the denial of 
a challenge * * * for cause cannot be grounds for reversal when the 
defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges.”  State v. Getsy (1998), 
84 Ohio St.3d 180, 191, 702 N.E.2d 866, 880, citing State v. Poindexter 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 520 N.E.2d 568, 572.  Accord State v. Broom 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 287-288, 533 N.E.2d 682, 695.  We reject 
proposition of law III. 
Number of peremptory challenges 
 
We summarily reject defendant’s proposition of law IV.  The trial 
court correctly rejected his motion for twelve peremptory challenges.  State 
v. Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 530 N.E.2d 382, at paragraph two of the 
syllabus, and at 246, 530 N.E.2d at 395-396; Poindexter at the syllabus. 
State’s use of peremptory challenges 
 
We also summarily reject proposition of law V.  The use of 
peremptory challenges to remove jurors opposed to capital punishment is not 
improper.  State v. Dennis (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 428, 683 N.E.2d 1096, 
1104; State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 518-519, 605 N.E.2d 70, 76; 
State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 13, 529 N.E.2d 192, 198. 
II 
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
In proposition of law II, defendant attacks the weight and the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated murder, 
especially the evidence supporting the finding that he purposefully killed 
Shephard.  In a test for sufficiency, “the relevant question is whether, after 
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis sic.)  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573; State v. Jenks 
 
 
15 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
Therefore, we will examine the evidence to determine whether the average 
mind would be convinced of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
In addition, we have also conducted “a full weight-of-the-evidence 
review,” since this case is on direct appeal from the trial court.  State v. Smith 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 103, 684 N.E.2d 668, 684.  “This [separate] 
inquiry requires * * * [determining] whether the evidence produced attains 
the high degree of probative force and certainty required of a criminal 
conviction.  * * * [Is there] substantial evidence upon which a jury could 
reasonably conclude that all the elements have been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (Emphasis sic.)”  Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 193-194, 702 
N.E.2d at 882, citing State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 10 O.O.3d 340, 
383 N.E.2d 132, syllabus.  Weight of the evidence concerns “ ‘the inclination 
of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one 
side of the issue rather than the other.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Thompkins 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, 546, quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 1594. 
 
In reviewing the record as to both weight and sufficiency, we find 
that the evidence supports each essential element of aggravated murder, as 
well as the other offenses of which defendant  was convicted.  No identity 
issue exists; defendant testified that he held the shotgun during an armed 
robbery when Shephard was killed. 
 
The weight of the evidence particularly supports the jury’s finding 
that defendant purposefully killed Shephard.  Defendant claimed he did not 
know the gun was loaded, and did not intend to shoot Shephard.  However, 
he admitted that he carried the shotgun into the apartment, pointed it at 
Beverly, demanded money and drugs, and implicitly threatened to use it if 
 
 
16 
Beverly did not hand over money and drugs.  He even admitted that he knew 
how to load the shotgun.  In fact, according to Donzell Lewis, defendant told 
Beverly, “Give me the money and the weed or I’m going to shoot your 
girlfriend,” before defendant shot Shephard. 
 
Intent need not be proven by direct testimony.  State v. Lott (1990), 
51 Ohio St.3d 160, 168, 555 N.E.2d 293, 302.  Instead, intent to kill “may be 
deduced from all the surrounding circumstances, including the instrument 
used to produce death, its tendency to destroy life if designed for that 
purpose, and the manner of inflicting a fatal wound.”  State v. Robinson 
(1954), 161 Ohio St. 213, 53 O.O. 96, 118 N.E.2d 517, at paragraph five of 
the syllabus; State v. Eley (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 180, 672 N.E.2d 640, 
648. 
 
We find that defendant’s claim that he did not know the gun was 
loaded to be inherently suspect.  Defendant knew about that shotgun’s 
particular characteristics, including how to load it and that it was hard to 
close.  Defendant’s assertion that he just decided to leave after Beverly 
refused to hand over the money also lacks credibility.  According to Lewis, 
defendant specifically threatened to kill Shephard.  Finally, the physical 
evidence, the coroner’s testimony, and the testimony of a forensic expert 
established that defendant held the gun just inches away from Shephard when 
he fired the fatal shot.  This evidence flatly contradicts defendant’s pretrial 
claim that Shephard was five feet away when he shot her. 
 
After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, there 
is substantial, credible evidence to support the jury’s verdict and all essential 
elements of the crime have been met.  Defendant’s convictions are not 
against the weight of the evidence.  Additionally, the evidence is legally 
sufficient to sustain the convictions.  We reject proposition of law II. 
 
 
17 
III 
TRIAL PHASE INSTRUCTIONS 
Accident 
 
In proposition of law VI, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
rejecting his request for an instruction on accident.  However, the trial court 
did not commit prejudicial error by declining to instruct on accident. 
 
In this case, the trial court fully instructed the jury on the purpose 
element of aggravated murder.  Thus, the trial judge instructed the jury that 
defendant could not be convicted of aggravated murder unless the jury found 
that he “purposely caused” Shephard’s death, that “[p]urpose to cause the 
death is an essential element of * * * aggravated murder,” and that it “must 
be established in this case that at the time in question there was present in the 
mind of [defendant] a specific intention to cause [Shephard’s] death.”   The 
court also instructed that “[p]urpose is a decision of the mind to do an act 
with a conscious objective of producing a specific result.  To do an act 
purposely is to do it intentionally and not by accident.  Purpose and intent 
mean the same thing.”  This instruction advises the jury that if it finds that 
the shooting was the result of an “accident,” then the act could not have been 
done intentionally.  Finally, the court also told the jury that “unless 
[defendant] had the required purpose, he is not guilty of * * * aggravated 
murder.” 
 
Additionally, the defense claim of accident simply “constitutes a 
denial or contradiction of evidence offered by the prosecution to prove an 
intent to kill.”  State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 20, 62 O.O.2d 340, 
341, 294 N.E.2d 888, 890.  Here, the trial court instructed the jury on mistake 
of fact, as to whether defendant knew the gun was loaded, and on the lesser-
included offense of involuntary manslaughter.  If the jury had any reasonable 
doubt as to whether defendant purposefully killed Shephard, then it would 
 
 
18 
have found him guilty of that lesser-included offense.  The jury could not 
have reasonably acquitted him of wrongdoing in the killing, since he was 
engaged in a robbery at the time.  Accord State v. Bates (1976), 48 Ohio 
St.2d 315, 323, 2 O.O.3d 453, 457, 358 N.E.2d 584, 589, judgment vacated 
on other grounds by (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154. 
Use of a weapon 
 
In proposition of law VI, defendant also complains about standard 
instructions as to the use of a weapon.  The court instructed the jury as 
follows: “The purpose with which a person does an act or brings about a 
result is determined from the manner in which it is done, the means or 
weapon used, and all the other facts and circumstances in evidence.  If a 
wound is inflicted upon a person with a deadly weapon in the manner 
calculated to destroy life or inflict great bodily harm, the purpose to cause 
the death may be inferred from the use of the weapon.  The inference is not 
conclusive and purpose is determined from the facts and circumstances in 
evidence.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
The foregoing instruction accurately reflects the law and is consistent 
with our prior decisions.  The court said “inferred,” not “presumed,” and the 
word “may” is permissive, not mandatory.  Further, the court specifically 
instructed that any such “inference is not conclusive.”  Defendant’s general 
objection to the instruction lacks merit.  See Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 196, 702 
N.E.2d at 884; Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d at 81, 641 N.E.2d at 1104; State v. 
Montgomery (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 410, 414, 575 N.E.2d 167, 171.  Compare 
State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 45, 3 O.O.3d 18, 26, 358 N.E.2d 
1051, 1061, judgment vacated on other grounds (1998), 438 U.S. 911, 98 
S.Ct. 3147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155; Robinson at paragraph five of the syllabus.  See 
4 Ohio Jury Instructions (1997) 58, Sections 409.01(5) and (6). 
 
 
19 
 
Alternatively, defendant argues that the trial court should have 
adopted his suggestion and deleted from this instruction the words “or inflict 
great bodily harm.”  Generally, we agree that it is preferable to delete those 
words in this instruction in murder cases.  Some trial courts have done so in 
murder cases.  See Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d at 81, 641 N.E.2d at 1104; 
Montgomery, 61 Ohio St.3d at 415, 575 N.E.2d at 172.  In contrast, other 
trial courts in murder cases have included those words in this instruction.  
State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 49, 630 N.E.2d 339, 350. 
 
Under the facts of this case, we have concluded that any error was 
harmless.  Defendant shot Shephard with a shotgun held just a few inches 
from her chest.  The trial judge fully instructed the jury that it must find that 
defendant intended to kill Shephard for him to be found guilty of murder.  A 
jury instruction “must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.”  State 
v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772, 
paragraph four of the syllabus.  We reject proposition of law VI. 
 
In proposition of law VII, defendant raises other trial-phase 
instructional issues.  Yet, because defendant failed to request specific 
instructions or object at trial on these points, he waived all but plain error.  
Crim.R. 30(A); Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, 
syllabus; State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 
N.E.2d 1364.  As we discuss below, we find that no alleged deficiency 
clearly caused a different trial result or created a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.  Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804. 
Principal offender 
 
The trial court instructed that “principal offender means the one who 
directly caused the death,” but defendant argues that this definition was 
insufficiently elaborate.  Yet the instruction given, although brief, was 
consistent with prior definitions.  See, e.g., Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 197, 702 
 
 
20 
N.E.2d at 884 (“one who personally performs every act constituting the 
offense”); State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 371, 513 N.E.2d 744, 
746 (“actual killer”).  No outcome-determinative plain error occurred, since 
defendant held the shotgun and fired the fatal shot, and no evidence suggests 
that an accomplice shot Shephard.  See State v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
426, 438, 678 N.E.2d 891, 903; State v. Sneed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-
12, 584 N.E.2d 1160, 1168. 
 
Defendant also complains that the jury never specifically found that 
he was the principal offender.  However, the jury implicitly found that fact 
when it found defendant guilty of death-penalty specifications charging 
murder during robbery and burglary.  Those specifications charged defendant 
only as a principal offender in the murder and never alluded to the alternate 
statutory basis of “prior calculation and design.”  Also, the trial court 
instructed that to find defendant guilty of the specifications, the jury must 
find that he was the principal offender.  No other evidence was presented that 
pointed to anyone else as the shooter; even the defendant admitted he fired 
the fatal shot.  We find no error.  See R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); State v. Woodard 
(1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 623 N.E.2d 75, 79; State v. Bonnell (1991), 61 
Ohio St.3d 179, 184, 573 N.E.2d 1082, 1087. 
Unanimous verdict 
 
In proposition of law VII, defendant also argues that the court erred 
by not instructing the jury “that their verdict must be unanimous within the 
grouping,” referring to “prior calculation and design” and “principal 
offender.”  But that claim is inapplicable in this case.  As noted, “prior 
calculation and design” was never an issue in the case; it was not charged in 
the indictment, nor was it argued or instructed on.  Hence, no juror could 
have returned a verdict on the basis of prior calculation and design. 
Lesser-included offense 
 
 
21 
 
Defendant also contends in proposition of law VII that the trial court 
committed plain error by failing to instruct “that the jury need not be 
unanimous in rejecting a greater offense before considering a lesser offense.”  
That claim lacks any merit.  The trial court correctly instructed the jury, “If 
you find the State * * * failed to prove purpose in the aggravated murder 
count, or if you are unable to agree, you will continue your deliberation and 
consider the lesser and included offense of involuntary manslaughter.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
No improper “acquittal-first instruction” was given.  The court never 
suggested that the jury must unanimously find the accused not guilty of 
aggravated murder before considering the lesser offense of manslaughter.  
The trial court correctly instructed the jury.  See State v. Thomas (1988), 40 
Ohio St.3d 213, 220, 533 N.E.2d 286, 292-293, and at paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  Cf. State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 334, 667 N.E.2d 960, 
969-970; State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 638, 653 N.E.2d 675, 687. 
Reasonable doubt 
 
In proposition of law XIV, defendant argues that the trial court’s 
instructions on reasonable doubt at the trial phase were fatally deficient.  Yet, 
we have repeatedly rejected similar challenges.  State v. Frazier (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 323, 330, 652 N.E.2d 1000, 1008; State v. Van Gundy (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 230, 594 N.E.2d 604; State v. Nabozny (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 
195, 8 O.O.3d 181, 375 N.E.2d 784, paragraph two of the syllabus.  See, 
also, Victor v. Nebraska (1994), 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 
583. 
IV 
PENALTY ISSUES 
Instructions 
 
 
22 
 
In proposition of law VIII, defendant argues that the trial court erred 
in rejecting various penalty-phase instructional requests.  As discussed 
below, no prejudicial error occurred. 
Deliberations 
 
The court properly instructed the jury: “If all 12 members * * * find, 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances * * * 
outweigh the mitigating factors, then you must return such finding[.]  * * * 
On the other hand, if, after considering all of the evidence raised * * * you 
cannot unanimously agree that * * * the aggravating circumstances * * * 
outweigh the mitigating factors, then you’ll return your recommendation 
reflecting your decision.  In this event you will then proceed to determine 
which of three possible life imprisonment sentences to impose.” 
 
Contrary to defendant’s claims, the court did not create prejudicial 
error by declining to instruct that the jury “need not unanimously reach a 
verdict first on whether or not to impose the death penalty, before moving on 
to consider the three” possible life sentences.  The instructions given 
explicitly advised that if jurors were unable to unanimously agree to 
recommend death, they should consider life sentences.  The jury was thus 
implicitly advised that a single juror could prevent a death penalty and that if 
they were unable to agree, they could consider life sentences. 
 
Unlike State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 159-160, 661 
N.E.2d 1030, 1040-1041, the trial court here never instructed the jury that it 
had to unanimously reject the death penalty before it could consider a life 
sentence.  Instead, “[t]he jury was free to consider a life sentence even if 
jurors had not unanimously rejected the death penalty.” State v. Taylor 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 29, 676 N.E.2d 82, 95.  The instructions were 
consistent with R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), and no prejudicial error resulted from 
rejecting defense requests.  See Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 393-395, 721 
 
 
23 
N.E.2d at 67-69; State v. Smith (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 424, 437, 721 N.E.2d 
93, 109; State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 497, 709 N.E.2d 484, 496.  
Cf. Jones v. United States (1999), 527 U.S. 373, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 
370  (Eighth Amendment does not require jury members to be instructed as 
to the consequences of their failure to agree.). 
 
Nonetheless, we reiterate that trial courts should explicitly instruct, as 
we directed in Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d at 162, 661 N.E.2d at 1042, that a 
single juror “may prevent a death penalty recommendation by finding that 
the aggravating circumstances * * * do not outweigh the mitigating factors.”  
Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 394, 721 N.E.2d at 68. 
Reasonable doubt 
 
In proposition of law VIII, defendant also argues that the court erred 
by not instructing, as requested, that “[r]easonable doubt is present when you 
are not firmly convinced that death is the appropriate punishment.”  In fact, 
the trial court instructed the jury that “[r]easonable doubt is present when you 
are not firmly convinced that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors.”  The differences between these two instructions are 
minimal, the instruction given was accurate, and defendant’s claims of error 
lack any merit.  Cf. State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 131-132, 694 
N.E.2d 916, 923-924; Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 29, 676 N.E.2d at 96. 
Purpose 
 
Despite defendant’s claims in proposition of law VIII, the court need 
not have instructed in the penalty phase that “[a] person acts purposely when 
it is his intention to cause the death of the person killed.”  At the trial phase, 
the trial court fully instructed on purpose and intent and need not have 
repeated those instructions at the penalty phase where they were unnecessary. 
Evidence 
 
 
24 
 
In proposition of law VIII, defendant also argues that the court erred 
by rejecting his suggestion to instruct the jury to “disregard any testimony 
that was ruled inadmissible or successfully challenged[.]”   Yet that 
complaint lacks any merit.  The court did explicitly instruct the jury:  
“Statements and answers that had been stricken by the Court to which you 
were instructed to disregard must be treated as though you never heard them.  
You must not speculate as to why the Court sustained objections to any 
questions or what the answer might have been.  You must not draw any 
inference or speculate on the truth of any suggestion included in an 
unanswered question.” 
Recommendation 
 
In proposition of law VIII, defendant complains that the court erred 
by referring to the jury’s penalty verdict as a recommendation.  However, use 
of that term, while not preferred, accurately reflects Ohio law, does not 
diminish the jury’s overall sense of responsibility, and does not constitute 
reversible error.  State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 517-518, 684 
N.E.2d 47, 54; Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d at 77, 623 N.E.2d at 80-81; State v. 
Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 29, 528 N.E.2d at 1243. 
Improper outside influence on jury 
 
In proposition of law IX, defendant argues that the trial court should 
have declared a mistrial due to “a possibility that the impartiality of three * * 
* jurors was affected by an improper comment outside of the courtroom.” 
 
Following a lunch break during the trial, as jurors were walking up a 
staircase, “a tall black gentleman * * * said to the three of us [Clemens, 
Johnston, and Brettschneider] that ‘nothing short of the death penalty would 
be satisfactory’ and repeated it two or three times.”  After Clemens reported 
this incident, the trial court, in chambers with counsel and defendant, 
questioned the three jurors.  Clemens reported that she did not feel 
 
 
25 
threatened, that there was no other conversation, that nothing was said to 
other jurors, and that this incident would not affect her ability to be fair and 
impartial. 
 
Juror Johnston also reported that the man said, “Anything but the 
death penalty would be unacceptable.”  Although the incident was 
“somewhat ominous,” Johnston never felt threatened, and agreed that his 
impartiality or his ability to assess the man’s testimony if he were a witness 
would not be affected.  Juror Brettschneider heard a man say something, but 
Brettschneider “wasn’t paying attention,” did not know if the man was 
talking to them, and agreed his impartiality would not be affected.  The court 
denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial, finding the jurors answered the 
questions truthfully and honestly. 
 
After Eric Beverly testified later that day, defense counsel asserted 
they suspected Beverly was the man who approached the jurors.  Beverly 
told the prosecutor that he only said to jurors something like, “Do the right 
thing.” 
 
The trial court acted properly in this case by questioning the jurors 
and allowing counsel to question them.  “When a trial court learns of an 
improper outside communication with a juror, it must hold a hearing to 
determine whether the communication biased the juror.”  Phillips, 74 Ohio 
St.3d at 88, 656 N.E.2d at 661-662, citing Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 
209, 215-216, 102 S.Ct. 940, 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 84, and Remmer v. United 
States (1954), 347 U.S. 227, 229-230, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654, 656.  
Defendant has not complained about the conduct of the hearing.  Cf. State v. 
Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 64-65, 679 N.E.2d 686, 696-697. 
 
Instead, defendant argues that the jurors’ impartiality may have been 
affected.  However, “[i]n cases involving outside influences on jurors, trial 
courts are granted broad discretion  in * * * determining whether to declare a 
 
 
26 
mistrial or to replace an affected juror.”  Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 89, 656 
N.E.2d at 661.  Accord Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d at 526-527, 684 N.E.2d at 60.  
Also, the complaining party must show actual prejudice.  Id. at 526, 684 
N.E.2d at 60.  See, also, Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 945, 71 
L.Ed.2d at 85; United States v. Zelinka (C.A.6, 1988), 862 F.2d 92, 95; 
United States v. Sylvester (C.A.5, 1998), 143 F.3d 923, 933; Crim.R. 33(A).  
In this case, defendant has not demonstrated any such prejudice. 
 
Moreover, defendant has not established that the trial court abused its 
broad discretion.  The incident was momentary; the information given was 
Beverly’s personal opinion, not fact; only two jurors heard the remark; and 
each of the three jurors declared unequivocally that they would not be 
affected by the event.  “A juror’s belief in his or her own impartiality is not 
inherently suspect and may be relied upon by the trial court.”  Phillips, 74 
Ohio St.3d at 89, 656 N.E.2d at 661, citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217, 
102 S.Ct. at 947, 71 L.Ed.2d at 86, fn. 7. 
Appropriateness of death penalty 
 
In proposition of law XI, defendant argues that the death penalty is 
inappropriate and disproportionate in this case.  We have evaluated those 
claims in the sentence evaluation. 
V 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
We summarily reject defendant’s claims in propositions of law X, XI, 
and XII, which challenge the constitutionality of Ohio’s system of 
proportionality review.  See State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 39, 689 
N.E.2d 1, 16; State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 49-50, 584 N.E.2d 
1192, 1197; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 
N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We also reject defendant’s 
proposition of law XIII.  Ohio’s death penalty statute is constitutional “in all 
 
 
27 
respects.”  State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 253, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 
1060.  See Poindexter, 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
 
In proposition of law XV, defendant argues that the language, “[a]ny 
other factors that are relevant to the issue of * * * death” in R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7), “is unconstitutionally vague and may be understood by jurors 
as reason for imposing the death sentence.”  Here, defendant makes the novel 
argument that the open-ended feature of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), which allows 
the jury to consider “any other factors” as potential mitigating factors, is 
unconstitutional. 
 
However, defendant failed to raise this issue at trial and thereby 
waived all but outcome-determinative plain error.  Crim.R. 30(A); 
Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, at the syllabus; 
Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, vacated on 
other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1156. 
 
Moreover, no plain or other error exists.  Defendant’s arguments 
contradict crucial aspects of death-penalty jurisprudence.  In fact, error could 
be created if a court were to omit the “other factors” language.  A “ 
‘sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [must] not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’  (Emphasis sic.)”  
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 189, 15 OBR at 332, 473 N.E.2d at 288, quoting 
Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954,  2964-2965, 57 
L.Ed.2d 973, 990.  See, also, Skipper v. South Carolina (1986), 476 U.S. 1, 
106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (error to exclude evidence of defendant’s 
adjustment to incarceration); Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 102 
S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (error not to consider defendant’s upbringing and 
turbulent family history). 
 
 
28 
 
The court’s reference to the “any other factors” language of R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7) simply gave effect to the constitutional precept that the jury 
must be allowed to consider any relevant evidence the accused offers as 
mitigating.  The court did not mislead the jury into believing mitigating 
factors were nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.  We reject proposition 
of law XV. 
VI 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
Evidence at penalty hearing 
 
At the start of the penalty hearing, Brenda Shephard testified for the 
state that her daughter, Michelle Shephard, was in the tenth grade when she 
was killed.  Shephard had five brothers and Christopher, then fourteen 
months old, was Shephard’s son.  Shephard’s family will “miss her a lot,” 
and her father, who lives in Arkansas, loved her very much.  Since Shephard 
died, life has “been hard[.] * * * [T]he baby * * * couldn’t sleep at night * * 
* [and] would wake up * * * screaming and hollering[.]”  Brenda Shephard 
also testified that Christopher keeps asking for his mother although they told 
him she is gone. 
 
According to Karen Redmon, defendant’s cousin, his mother raised 
him in “the projects, bad neighborhoods” in Cleveland.  His mother would 
not work, but still neglected the children, defendant and a brother and sister.  
As a result, the “kids were filthy from head to toe” and half-starving most of 
the time.  They relied on friends to give them old clothes to wear.  Defendant 
said that he had been molested as a child, but his mother “didn’t believe 
him.”  Defendant was “real close, real close” to an Aunt Rosie, who looked 
after him when she could. 
 
Reverend John Wiseman, jail chaplain, believed that defendant has 
shown “a great deal of remorse” about what happened to Shephard and the 
 
 
29 
fact that her son will be raised without a mother.  Defendant participates in 
Bible study, accepts clergy visits, and would be able to lead a useful life in 
prison if his life is spared. 
 
Gerald Miles, the principal detective investigating this case, agreed 
that defendant cooperated by not resisting arrest, and admitted his name and 
involvement in the case when questioned.  While confessing, defendant was 
crying, and said he could not sleep and would “wake up in the middle of the 
night[,] reliving the incident and * * * screaming.”  Robert Cox, a parole 
supervisor, testified about the meaning of life without parole. 
 
Joseph Bendo, Ph.D., a psychologist, performed several tests on 
defendant and also interviewed him.  Bendo found that as a youth, defendant 
lacked structure or support and attended numerous elementary schools.  His 
mother neglected, humiliated, and degraded him, and he was also physically 
abused.  Throughout his life, defendant has suffered from asthma and 
attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  His IQ is below average, 
he reads at a third-grade level, he tends to be a follower, and he has a history 
of “very severe head injuries” and alcohol and drug abuse.  In 1989, one 
medical report stated that defendant suffered from “mild mental retardation” 
and some “psychotic-like symptoms.”  Another 1989 report described him as 
“undersocialized, troubled and bewildered,” and “inclined to fantasize.” 
 
Dr. Bendo found that defendant has a “strong sense of inadequacy,” 
and is “very much alienated from family and other social systems.”  Yet, 
defendant has a “spiritual side,” has been involved at times with church 
activities, and has strong remorse for the crime he committed.  Defendant, 
trained as a barber, could function well in prison.  Dr. Bendo believes that on 
December 15, defendant was “pretty much ordered or strongly encouraged to 
join the effort” already planned and was also under the influence of 
marijuana and alcohol. 
 
 
30 
 
In an unsworn statement, defendant expressed his remorse and sorrow 
to Shephard’s mother, her son, brothers, and other relatives and asserted he 
“never meant to kill” her.  He ran because he was scared, but hoped he would 
be convicted only of manslaughter, although he agreed the trial was fair.  He 
asked the jury to spare his life. 
 
At sentencing, Reverend Wiseman asserted that one juror wanted to 
visit defendant in jail and tell him that several jurors did not want to sentence 
him to death, but felt they had to do so given the trial court’s instructions.  
Defendant expressed his remorse to the court and asked again for a life 
sentence. 
Sentence evaluation 
 
After independent assessment, the evidence proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstances charged against defendant.  
The jury found and the evidence demonstrates that defendant purposely 
killed Shephard during an aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary in 
violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
 
We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense to be 
mitigating.  Defendant deliberately took a sawed-off shotgun into a home in 
order to rob those inside.  When the robbery plan was thwarted, he threatened 
and then shot a teenage mother holding her baby in her arms.  Then he fled 
the scene, offering no assistance to the victim.  Even defense counsel 
characterized this murder as “brutal, cruel, and senseless.” 
 
Defendant’s history and background do reflect some mitigating 
features entitled to weight.  Defendant was raised in deplorable, slum-like 
conditions, and his mother humiliated, mistreated, and neglected her 
children.  Thus, defendant, from an early date, lacked support and structure in 
his life, became alienated from society and his family, and turned to the 
streets and gangs.  His upbringing and difficult childhood deserve some 
 
 
31 
mitigating weight.  See State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 573, 
715 N.E.2d 1144, 1155. 
 
Dr. Bendo reports that defendant has also suffered throughout his life 
from asthma and ADHD.  He has a history of head injuries and a below 
average IQ.  At the time of the offense, Dr. Bendo believes defendant was 
strongly encouraged to commit the crime and was under the influence of 
alcohol and marijuana. 
 
Yet Dr. Bendo reports that defendant has a “spiritual side” and 
expressed strong remorse for the crime.  Defendant, in his unsworn 
statement, also expressed strong remorse.  Dr. Bendo believes that defendant, 
trained as a barber, could readily adapt to life in prison.  Defendant’s mental 
condition, his limited intellect, his remorse, and his adaptability to life in 
prison are given weight as “other factors” in mitigation.  R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  
See Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 348-349, 715 N.E.2d at 154; State v. Landrum 
(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 124-125, 559 N.E.2d 710, 729.  When finally 
arrested, defendant also cooperated with police, which we consider to be a 
mitigating “other factor” under (B)(7).  State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 
15, 34, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1145. 
 
The evidence does not support finding any statutory mitigating 
factors in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, 
or strong provocation); (B)(5) (lack of criminal record); or (B)(6) (accused 
not principal offender).  The factor in (B)(3) (impaired mental capacity) is 
inapplicable, since Dr. Bendo’s testimony did not establish such a mental 
disease or defect.  Defendant’s age, which was twenty at the time of the 
offense, is given some weight in mitigation.  See R.C. 2929.04(B)(4); State v. 
Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 431, 709 N.E.2d 128, 139. 
 
We find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstances, i.e., the murder was committed during a burglary and a 
 
 
32 
robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), do outweigh the combined mitigating factors.  
While defendant had a difficult childhood, he also had choices to make, and 
he received some guidance and assistance from concerned relatives.  Aside 
from ADHD, a relatively common disorder, no evidence exists of serious 
mental disturbances.  Additionally, defendant has clearly had previous 
opportunities to remove himself from gang activities.  His remorse, age, and 
belated cooperation with police are given modest weight. 
 
In contrast, the facts surrounding the aggravating circumstances show 
a brazen, callous robbery and burglary committed in connection with a brutal 
murder.  The facts show that defendant threatened and then killed a teenage 
mother when she was holding her child, in order to carry out the object of the 
burglary and robbery.  Thus, the death sentence in this case is appropriate. 
 
We have also concluded that imposing the death penalty in this case 
is neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared with similar felony-
murder cases involving a robbery.  Some of these defendants had strong 
mitigating evidence.  See, e.g., Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d at 430-431, 709 N.E.2d 
at 138-139 (twenty year old, neglected childhood, remorse); State v. 
Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 240-241, 703 N.E.2d 286, 296 
(eighteen year old, diagnosed “paranoid schizophrenic,” no prior criminal 
history); McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d at 453-454, 700 N.E.2d at 610-611 (troubled 
upbringing, nineteen year old, borderline intelligence); State v. Raglin 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 699 N.E.2d 482 (troubled upbringing, eighteen 
year old, mental problems); State v. Benge (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 661 
N.E.2d 1019 (troubled upbringing, prior good character, hard worker, lack of 
prior criminal convictions); Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 623 N.E.2d 75 
(troubled upbringing, nineteen year old); State v. Green (1993), 66 Ohio 
St.3d 141, 609 N.E.2d 1253 (terrible childhood, IQ of 66). 
 
 
33 
 
Additionally, the death penalty is not excessive or disproportionate 
when compared with other felony-murder cases of burglary in which the 
death penalty was imposed.  See, e.g., State v. O’Neal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 
402, 418-419, 721 N.E.2d 73, 89-90 (prior military service, hard worker, 
“mixed personality disorder”); Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 694 N.E.2d 916 
(nineteen year old, “chaotic” background, substance abuse); Campbell, 69 
Ohio St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339 (serious psychological problems from 
scarring); State v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1 (twenty-
one year old with no significant prior criminal record); Bonnell, 61 Ohio 
St.3d 179, 573 N.E.2d 1082; State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 571 
N.E.2d 97 (twenty-two year old); Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 559 N.E.2d 
710 (“child-like” twenty-three year old, no significant prior criminal history). 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK JJ., 
concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
In his pretrial statement, defendant said the shotgun was a 20-
gauge. 
 
2. 
Count II did not apply to defendant, and Count III (attempted 
murder) and Count V (aggravated robbery) were withdrawn before trial. 
 
3. 
Voir dire ended on January 12, 1998.  The jury recommended the 
death penalty on February 18, 1998. 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law Number One:  The court permits prejudicial 
error when it consistently misstates the law to the jury and violates 
appellant’s due process rights. 
 
 
34 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Two:  The conviction of the appellant 
for the charge of aggravated murder in this case is against the manifest 
weight of the evidence.  The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 
support appellant’s conviction for aggravated murder and should be reversed. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Three:  Appellant’s due process rights 
protected by Amendment 14, United States Constitution are violated when 
the trial court dismisses for cause jurors who express views against capital 
punishment. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Four:  It is error for the trial court to 
overrule an appellant’s motion for twelve (12) peremptory challenges to 
prospective juries. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Five:  It is error for the trial court to 
overrule defendant’s motion to prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude jurors who express concerns about capital punishment, in violation 
of defendant’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendmen[t] [rights] to 
the United States Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Six:  It is error for the trial court to fail 
to instruct the jury pursuant to the request of appellant on law pertinent to the 
case all in violation of appellant’s rights as guaranteed in the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Seven:  When the trial court commits 
plain error in its instructions to the jury in the first phase and in the verdict 
forms the appellant is denied a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Eight:  The trial court commits 
prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury as requested by the appellant in 
the second phase of this trial in violation of the appellant’s Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the United States Constitution. 
 
 
35 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Nine:  The trial court commits 
prejudicial error in violation of appellant’s due process rights as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in failing to 
grant a mistrial when there is a possibility that the impartiality of three (3) of 
the jurors was affected by an improper comment outside of the courtroom. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Ten:  It is error for a trial court to 
impose a death sentence when the death penalty law as currently applied in 
Ohio violates R.C. 2929.05(A) by requiring appellate courts and the Supreme 
Court, in conducting their R.C. 2929.04(A) review of ‘similar cases’ for 
proportionality, to examine only those cases in which a death sentence was 
imposed and ignore those in which a sentence of life with parole eligibility 
after twenty full years or life with a parole eligibility after thirty full years 
was imposed.  The current method also violates the rights to a fair trial and 
due process, results in cruel and unusual punishment, and implicates others 
of appellant’s protected rights as well, all as set forth in the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and in Sections 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, and 20, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Eleven:  It is prejudicial error to 
sentence defendant to the death penalty, when, based upon the law and the 
record of this case, the sentence of death herein is inappropriate and is 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, in violation of 
defendant’s rights as guaranteed to him by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Sections 5, 9, 10, and 16 of Article 
[I] of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Twelve:  The proportionality review that 
this court must conduct in the present capital case pursuant to Ohio Revised 
Code Section 2929.05 is fatally flawed and therefore the present death 
sentence must be vacated pursuant to the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
 
 
36 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections 5 and 10, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution and Ohio Revised Code 2929.05, in violation of 
defendant’s rights as guaranteed to him by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Sections 5, 9, 10 and 16 of Article 
[I] of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Thirteen:  R.C. 2903.01, 2929.02, 
2929.021, 2929.022, 2929.023, 2929.03, 2929.04 and 2929.05 as read 
together and as applied in this case violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 2, 9, 
10 and 16 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Fourteen:  The Due Process Clause is 
violated by a jury charge which permits a criminal conviction on proof less 
than beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Fifteen:  R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) is 
unconstitutionally vague and may be understood by jurors as reasons for 
imposing the death sentence. 
 
“Proposition of Law Number Sixteen:  The appellant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel is prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 
performance.”