Title: Cardwell v. American Linen Supply

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cardwell v. American Linen Supply1992 WY 175843 P.2d 596Case Number: 92-110Decided: 12/11/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Elaine A. 
CARDWELL, Appellant (Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
AMERICAN 
LINEN SUPPLY, a Wyoming Corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Bruce N. 
Willoughby of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellant.

 
 
Judith A. 
Studer of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The appellant, Elaine 
A. Cardwell, contends that the district court erred in granting a summary 
judgment in favor of the appellee, American Linen Supply, on her assertion that 
she was discharged from her employment because she filed a worker's compensation 
claim. She also contends that her discharge was achieved in a manner contrary to 
the employee handbook issued by American Linen Supply and that the handbook 
constituted an employment contract.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Ms. Cardwell states 
these issues:

 
 
     Is the termination of 
the Plaintiff after filing a Workers' Compensation Claim contrary to the public 
policy of the State of Wyoming as set forth in W.S. § 
27-14-104?

 
 
     Was the termination of 
the Plaintiff contrary to the written policy of the Plaintiff contained in the 
Employe[e] Handbook which constitutes a contract of 
employment?

 
 
     Did the reason given 
for the termination of the Plaintiff that she could not perform her job follow 
the provisions of the Employee Handbook which constituted a contract of 
employment?

 
 

[¶4.]     In response, American 
Linen Supply asserts:

 
 
     1. Did the District 
Court correctly grant summary judgment to an employer in an employment 
termination case where the employee was, and is presently, physically unable to 
perform her former duties?

 
 
     2. Does an employee's 
handbook that contains progressive disciplinary procedures apply when an 
employee is discharged for physical inability to perform the work, as opposed to 
disciplinary reasons?

 
 
     3. Did appellant file 
a timely notice of appeal?

 
 

[¶5.]     Ms. Cardwell began 
working for American Linen Supply's predecessor in April 1980. She received an 
employee handbook from American Linen Supply on October 2, 1987. In 1988, Ms. 
Cardwell began having problems with her feet and sought medical attention. Her 
duties required her to stand on concrete floors for most of her work shift. 
American Linen Supply attempted to accommodate her medical problems by giving 
her chores which would allow her to sit for at least part of the day. Ms. 
Cardwell took a leave of absence from April 28, 1989, through June 4, 1989, in 
an attempt to relieve her tendinitis and other foot problems. On November 28, 
1989, she filed a worker's compensation claim and received temporary total 
disability benefits from November 29, 1989, through April 30, 1991. Ms. 
Cardwell's physician recommended that she not stand on concrete floors at all 
but, in any event, directed that she could not do so for more than twenty-five 
percent of the work day. Ms. Cardwell was discharged on December 8, 1989, 
because she was no longer physically able to perform the tasks available at 
American Linen Supply. American Linen Supply maintained that it simply did not 
have a job for someone who was not able to stand most of the day or work on 
concrete floors.

 
 

[¶6.]     We first address 
American Linen Supply's contention that the notice of appeal was not timely 
filed because Ms. Cardwell's post-judgment motion for reconsideration of the 
summary judgment order did not toll the running of the time for filing the 
notice of appeal. The district court entered the summary judgment order on March 
12, 1992, and Ms. Cardwell filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" on March 26, 
1992. Although the initial motion was not specifically so denominated on its 
face, it was clearly a motion to alter or amend the judgment as contemplated by 
W.R.C.P. 59(e) and was timely filed. On March 27, 1992, the motion was refiled 
in an amended form which included a specific reference to W.R.C.P. 59. On April 
20, 1992, the district court entered an order denying the motion. The notice of 
appeal was filed on April 30, 1992. W.R.A.P. 2.011 specifically provided that a motion 
to alter or amend a judgment tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. The 
notice of appeal was timely filed within fifteen days of the order denying the 
W.R.C.P. 59(e) motion.

 
 

[¶7.]     We next address Ms. 
Cardwell's contention that she was discharged contrary to public policy for 
having filed a worker's compensation claim. In structuring her argument, Ms. 
Cardwell relies upon this Court's decision in Griess v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corporation of Delaware, 776 P.2d 752 
(Wyo. 1989). 
We perceive that Griess has little, if any, application to the facts of this 
case. In that case, we held that an employee who was terminated from employment 
for having filed a worker's compensation claim, and who was not covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement, had a cause of action in tort against the 
employer. 776 P.2d  at 754. That ruling was founded upon public policy which 
emanated from Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-104(b) (1991). However, in Griess, the employer told the employees that 
they would not be called back to work if they filed worker's compensation claims 
for on-the-job injuries; thus, the employees were readily able to structure a 
prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Ms. Cardwell's assertion that she was 
terminated for filing her worker's compensation claim is just that - merely an 
assertion. She relies upon the juxtaposition of the date she filed her claim and 
the date she was terminated, which was some ten days later. She does not take 
into account that her difficulties in performing her duties continued for more 
than a year prior to her discharge and that American Linen Supply patiently 
accommodated her medical difficulties during that time period. As we said in 
Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc., 822 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 
1991):

 
 
There is a 
distinction between a termination for the exercise by the worker of his rights 
under the worker's compensation law and a termination for inability to do the 
work, even if such inability is caused by an accident requiring the exercise of 
worker's compensation rights. The disability and partial disability benefits of 
the worker's compensation law are in recognition of this 
distinction.

 
 

[¶8.]     The issues inherent in 
"retaliatory discharge" claims have been addressed in most jurisdictions by 
statutes or judicial decisions. See 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION § 68.36 (1987) and Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for 
Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 
32 A.L.R.4th 1221 (1984). Griess established the existence of such a cause of 
action in Wyoming, and Lankford serves as an example of 
a matter wherein a summary judgment was providently utilized. In meaningfully 
adjudicating the remedy recognized by Griess, especially absent legislative 
action in this regard within the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act itself, we 
must set some standards so as to avoid the appearance of incongruous results. 
Although premising it upon a statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently 
settled that very question in a manner which we find persuasive and adopt for 
use in Wyoming:

 
 
     A review of our prior 
decisions, especially in view of the apparent confusion generated in this case, 
persuades us that it is desirable and necessary to provide further guidance to 
the trial courts and to the litigants they serve in order to promote the orderly 
presentation and resolution of retaliatory discharge claims. We conclude that 
the jurisprudence developed in the law of employment discrimination, as it 
pertains to the order and burdens of proof, is particularly adaptable to the 
problems encountered in cases brought under [Wyoming's retaliatory discharge doctrine]. It 
should be emphasized that we are applying standards developed by the federal 
courts only to the degree specified and discussed in this opinion; we do not 
mean to signal the wholesale adoption and application of the federal law of 
employment discrimination to retaliatory discharge claims. . . 
.

 
 
     . . . The discharged 
employee must show employment, on the job injury, receipt of treatment under 
circumstances which put the employer on notice that treatment had been rendered 
for a workrelated injury, or that the employee in good faith instituted, or 
caused to be instituted, proceedings under the [Wyoming Worker's Compensation] 
Act, and consequent termination of 
employment. After a prima facie case is established, the burden then 
appropriately shifts to the employer to rebut the inference that its motives 
were retaliatory by articulating that the discharge was for a legitimate 
non-retaliatory reason. . . . Two of these reasons include the employee's 
inability to perform the assigned duties, or the bad faith pursuit of a 
compensation claim. The employer need not persuade the court that it was 
actually motivated by the proffered reasons. The employer's burden is a burden 
of production of relevant and credible evidence, not a burden of persuasion. It 
is sufficient if the employer's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact 
concerning whether it retaliatorily discharged the 
employee.

 
 
     To accomplish this, 
the employer must set forth clearly, through the introduction of admissible 
evidence, the reasons for the employee's termination. The explanation provided 
must be legally sufficient to justify entering judgment for the employer. If the 
employer carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima 
facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of 
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the employer serves two 
purposes - it meets the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate 
reason for the action, and it frames the factual issue with sufficient clarity 
to provide the worker with a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the 
reason offered by the employer for terminating the employee was not the true 
reason for the employment decision but was, rather, a pretext. The sufficiency 
of the rebuttal should be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these 
functions.

 
 
     However, the nature of 
the burden which shifts to the employer must be understood in connection with 
the employee's ultimate and intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the employer retaliatorily discharged the 
employee for exercising statutory rights under the Act remains at all times with 
the employee. The burden of persuasion never shifts and the employee bears the 
burden of persuasion that the reason given for termination was pretextual. This 
burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been 
the victim of retaliatory discharge. The employee may succeed in this, either 
directly by persuading the court that the discharge was significantly motivated 
by retaliation for her exercise of statutory rights, or indirectly by showing 
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence.

 
 
Buckner v. 
General Motors Corporation, 760 P.2d 803, 806-07 (Okla. 1988) (emphasis in 
original and footnotes omitted).

 
 

[¶9.]     The district court 
utilized a procedure very much akin to that used in Buckner. As noted earlier, 
Ms. Cardwell's "proof" was simply the juxtaposition of the date she filed her 
worker's compensation claim and the date she was discharged. Professor Larson 
describes the burden of proof for retaliation:

 
 
     Ordinarily the prima 
facie case must, in the nature of things, be shown by circumstantial evidence, 
since the employer is not apt to announce retaliation as his motive. Proximity 
in time between the claim and the firing is a typical beginning-point, coupled 
with evidence of satisfactory work performance and supervisory evaluations. Any 
evidence of an actual pattern of retaliatory conduct is, of course, very 
persuasive.

 
 
2A LARSON, 
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra at 13-187 to 
13-188.

 
 

[¶10.]  Ms. Cardwell showed proximity in time. 
However, the events leading up to her discharge dispel the notion that proximity 
in time may be read as being a retaliation. Ms. Cardwell was allowed leave from 
her job for extensive periods of time preceding her discharge. When she did 
work, she worked in a manner inconsistent with the employer's usual policy; 
i.e., all workers must perform tasks requiring a considerable amount of 
standing. American Linen Supply discharged Ms. Cardwell after making a 
substantial effort to find a solution which would enable Ms. Cardwell to work 
and, at the same time, allow American Linen Supply to maintain the production 
level consistent with the sound operating practices of its labor intensive 
business. We do not think that Ms. Cardwell met her burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. We are convinced that the employer 
demonstrated, without even the slightest rebuttal coming from Ms. Cardwell, that 
the discharge was motivated by Ms. Cardwell's inability to perform the 
assignments which her employer had, of necessity, delegated to her. The district 
court correctly granted the summary judgment in favor of American Linen Supply. 
Once the moving party has properly supported a motion for a summary judgment by 
affidavits, answers to interrogatories, or depositions, the party opposing the 
summary judgment cannot rely upon allegations or denials in his pleadings but 
must come forward with materials demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact 
for trial. RHF v. RMC (Adoption of JLP), 774 P.2d 624, 629 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 

[¶11.]  Finally, we address Ms. Cardwell's 
contention that the employee handbook created an employment contract whereby she 
could expect to be disciplined in accordance with its terms. We do not need to 
address this question in much detail. The employee handbook, as well as the more 
generous locally established policy concerning progressive discipline, dealt 
with the subjects of discipline and "violations of company policy." In context, 
discipline means, "punishment by one in authority esp. with a view to correction 
or training." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 644 (1986). In 
context, the phrase "violations" of company policy connotes an infringement or 
irreverence toward those policies. Id. at 2554. American Linen Supply evinced no 
intent to "punish" Ms. Cardwell because she became disabled. Indeed, its 
behavior was quite to the contrary. Nor did Ms. Cardwell's inability to work 
constitute "irreverence" toward the company's policy requiring employees to 
satisfactorily perform their assignments; thus, she could not have been subject 
to discipline or progressive warnings. Ms. Cardwell was medically incapacitated 
to a degree which rendered her incapable of performing the duties which American 
Linen Supply could make available to her. The extent to which the employee 
handbook constituted a contract, and we make no decision in that regard, was 
irrelevant to the resolution of this dispute.

 
 

[¶12.]  Affirmed.

 
 

CARDINE, J., filed 
a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Revised effective 
November 1, 1992.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶13.]  I concur in the result that summary 
judgment not be reversed because the appeal, not being timely filed, should be 
dismissed.

 
 

[¶14.]  First, I question that a Motion for 
Reconsideration is a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment under W.R.C.P. 59(e). 
The motion was not to alter or amend the summary judgment. It was a motion to 
reconsider which was to vacate or set aside the summary judgment. The court, 
without citation of authority, legal reasoning, or policy consideration, just 
blandly declares a motion not presented as a W.R.C.P. 59(e) motion to be a 
W.R.C.P. 59(e) motion, which in any event was not timely filed. This type of 
result-oriented decision adds confusion to our practice and should be 
avoided.

 
 

[¶15.]  Nor do I agree with the wholesale 
adoption of language from Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803 
(Okla. 1988), 
establishing a rule of law for burden of proof and defenses to a retaliatory 
discharge claim. First, burden of proof was never raised as an issue in this 
case, is not before us, and should not be the subject of an advisory opinion. 
Second, this was a summary judgment case, not a trial in which the burden of 
proof might be involved. Third, I would not hold that every discharge of an 
employee after filing a worker's compensation claim, without more, creates not 
only a retaliatory discharge lawsuit but shifts the burden of proof to the 
employer. Buckner, cited for the burden of proof rule which so enamors this 
court as to result in wholesale adoption, is another of those senseless, 
confusing rules that accomplishes nothing to further the creation of 
understandable, easily applied rules of law. Thus, it is said in Buckner that 
the worker need only establish termination after the filing of a worker's 
compensation claim (a prima facie case) and the burden of proof "appropriately shifts to 
the employer. . . ." Maj. op. at 599, quoting Buckner, 760 P.2d  at 806. Now, at 
this stage, the employer has the burden of proof and the employee has the burden 
of persuasion, for the adopted quote further states, "the burden of persuasion 
never shifts[,] and the employee bears the burden of persuasion that the reason 
given for termination was pretextual." Maj. op. at 599, quoting Buckner, 760 P.2d  at 807. The essence of the rule is that this is a type of prima facie case 
that carries no presumption; requires no evidence to rebut; and may not, even in 
the absence of employer rebuttal evidence, result in judgment, for the burden of 
persuasion remains with the employee. If the employee fails to persuade, no 
matter what the burden, judgment will be for the employer. That is no rule at 
all. It is nonsense.

 
 

[¶16.]  Were this question presented here, I 
would hold that the burden to prove a retaliatory discharge is always with the 
worker making the claim and does not shift to the employer. If the evidence of 
the worker making a claim of retaliatory discharge preponderates over that of 
the employer, the worker should prevail, otherwise he should 
not.