Title: MP v. State in Interest of CP

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MP v. State in Interest of CP1998 WY 129965 P.2d 1155Case Number: C-97-5Decided: 10/08/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

MP, 
Appellant (Respondent),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, in the Interest of the Minor Child, 
CP, Appellee (Petitioner).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Washakie County, Gary P. Hartman, J.

 

Edward G. Luhm of Scott, 
Shelledy and Luhm, P.C., Worland, for Appellant 
(Respondent).

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. Wilde, Assistant 
Attorney General; and Donna A. Murray, Special Assistant Attorney General, 
Cheyenne, for Appellee (Petitioner).

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of expedited 
conference.

 

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant claims insufficient evidence exists to 
support the determination of the district court, sitting as a juvenile court, 
that her child, C.P., was neglected. Finding ample evidence of neglect, we 
affirm.

 

                                        
     I. 
ISSUE

 

[¶2] As stated by appellant, 
the mother, the issue is:

 

Whether the District Court erred when it adjudicated 
CP to be a medically neglected child?

 

[¶3] Appellee, the State of 
Wyoming, states the issue as:

 

I. 
Was there sufficient evidence for the district court to determine CP was a 
medically neglected child?

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶4] On March 28, 1997, C.P. 
arrived for visitation with his father in such an alarming medical condition 
that the father almost immediately took the child to the hospital. C.P., who was 
fifteen months old at the time, was hospitalized in Hot Springs County Hospital 
for three days with pneumonia. He was discharged to appellant's care on March 
31, 1997, but went home with his paternal grandmother, who was his regular 
babysitter. At the time of discharge, prescriptions for medication ordered by 
the attending physician were given to appellant, along with verbal instructions 
on their proper administration.

 

[¶5] Appellant did not 
obtain the prescribed medication. On April 2, 1997, appellant took C.P. to stay 
with her cousin in Worland, Wyoming, intending to leave C.P. with the cousin for 
approximately one month. On the morning of April 3, 1997, the cousin contacted 
the local Department of Family Services (DFS) and requested assistance in 
dealing with C.P.'s medical condition. A DFS caseworker contacted appellant in 
Thermopolis, Wyoming and informed her that DFS intended to take C.P. into 
protective custody if his prescribed medication was not provided to the cousin 
by 5:00 p.m. that day. The caseworker also told appellant that help was 
available through DFS if she needed it. Appellant responded that she would be 
working past 5:00 p.m., but would send her sister to Worland with the 
medication.

 

[¶6] The sister arrived with 
a sack of over-the-counter medication, but not the prescribed medication. C.P. 
was taken into the protective custody of DFS and placed in regular foster care. 
The caseworker took C.P. to his physician, who prescribed an antibiotic for the 
pneumonia and ointment for a severe diaper rash. On April 4, 1997, a petition 
alleging neglect was filed in Washakie County, and the juvenile court ordered 
that C.P. be temporarily placed with his father.

 

[¶7] After an adjudicatory 
hearing, the juvenile court found C.P. to be a neglected child and ordered a 
predispositional report and home study. DFS' temporary custody of C.P. was 
continued, as was his temporary placement in the home of his natural father. A 
disposition hearing was held following receipt of the predispositional report 
and home study1 at which a reunification plan was 
established. This appeal of the neglect finding followed.

 

                                      
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶8] In reviewing a record 
for sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of neglect, 
we:

 

"1. Give considerable deference to the trial court's 
determination because it has the advantage to judge the demeanor and 
intelligence of the witnesses;

 

2. 
Examine the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee and resolve all 
conflicts in evidence for appellee;

 

3. 
Assume as true the evidence in appellee's favor, disregard entirely appellant's 
evidence in conflict with appellee's evidence, and give to appellee's evidence 
every favorable inference that may fairly be drawn."

 

In Interest of N.M., 794 P.2d 564, 565 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Matter of RJP, 761 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Wyo. 
1988)).

 

                                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

[¶10] Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-201(a)(xvi) (Cum.Supp. 1996) defines a neglected child:2

 

          
"Neglected child" means a child:

 

(A) Whose custodian has failed or refused to provide 
adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical or any 
other care necessary for the child's well being * * *;

 

(B) Who has been abused by the inflicting or causing 
of physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or mental 
health or welfare of the child * * * or substantial risk thereof * * 
*[.]

 

[¶11] Appellant argues two 
bases for reversal of the juvenile court's decision that her child was 
neglected. First, she argues there was no expert medical evidence to prove C.P. 
was in imminent danger or at substantial risk of physical injury; and second, 
she is being punished for poverty despite making diligent efforts to obtain the 
money for C.P.'s medication from another source.

 

                             
A. THE NEED FOR MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY

 

[¶12] The thrust of 
appellant's argument is that evidence of imminent danger or substantial risk of 
physical injury is necessary to prove neglect; that this proof requires medical 
evidence in the form of expert testimony and medical documentation; and that, 
since none was presented, the State failed to prove its case. This argument 
might have some appeal had C.P. been alleged to be a neglected child as defined 
by Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B). However, the petition alleging neglect 
quotes subsection (A) of that statute, which requires proof that appellant 
failed to "provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or 
medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the child's well being." 
Specifically, the petition alleges appellant left C.P. with a babysitter without 
providing prescribed medical care.

 

[¶13] The State's burden of 
proof in an adjudication of neglect is by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-225(a) (Repl. 1994) and In Interest of N.M., 794 P.2d  at 565. 
In this case, the State was required to prove it was more likely than not that 
appellant had failed to provide her son with medical care necessary for his well 
being. Expert testimony is permitted where "scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue * * *."  W.R.E. 702. Whether in any given case expert 
testimony is necessary "depends upon a variety of factors readily apparent only 
to a trial court, and we must depend heavily on its judgment." Lyden By and 
Through Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451, 455 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶14] The record is clear 
that three days after C.P.'s discharge from the hospital for treatment of 
pneumonia, appellant still had not provided the medication prescribed. The 
juvenile court was capable of understanding the evidence before it without the 
aid of expert testimony. A determination that prescription medication is 
necessary to the well being of a toddler recently discharged from the hospital 
does not require specialized knowledge.

 

[¶15] The State met its 
burden of proof.

 

                          B. 
APPELLANT'S INABILITY TO AFFORD THE MEDICATION

 

[¶16] Throughout her 
testimony at the adjudicatory hearing and in her brief to this court, appellant 
decries what she perceives as unfair treatment because of her poverty. She 
asserts that she was unable to afford the prescribed medication and that she 
made a diligent effort to obtain it over the three days between C.P.'s discharge 
from the hospital and DFS' intervention. The record does not support either of 
these contentions.

 

[¶17] Appellant testified 
she had less than $10.00 when C.P. was discharged on March 31, 1997. She claimed 
to have contacted many people in an effort to borrow enough money to purchase 
the medication. Since her efforts at borrowing money were unsuccessful, she 
argues that as of April 3, 1997, she remained financially unable to fill C.P.'s 
prescription. Appellant ignores her testimony that she "probably" earned around 
$10.00 per day in tips from her bartending job on March 31st, April 1st, and 
April 2nd.  The permitted, if not 
mandatory, inference to be drawn from this evidence is that, by April 3rd when 
DFS was asking her to provide the medication, appellant should have had 
approximately $40.00 in her possession.

 

[¶18] There is nothing in 
the record to explain why this $40.00 was not enough. Appellant testified she 
did not know what medication was prescribed, and she had made no effort to learn 
what it would cost. There is no evidence of how her money was spent or why it 
was not used to buy the medication.

 

[¶19] Nor does the record 
support appellant's claim that she made a diligent effort to provide C.P.'s 
medication. While appellant may have contacted numerous people seeking to borrow 
money, she did not contact C.P.'s father nor did she seek help from either the 
child's physician or the treating hospital. Most significantly, however, 
appellant did not pursue assistance from DFS, even after the DFS caseworker had 
told her assistance was available. Rather than demonstrating diligence to 
provide her son with medication, the record shows that appellant chose not to take 
advantage of help she knew was available.

 

[¶20] The juvenile court did 
not err in finding C.P. to be a medically neglected child.

 

                                          
V. CONCLUSION

 

[¶21] The only evidence 
lacking in this record is that needed to support appellant's arguments. There is 
more than sufficient evidence that C.P. was a medically neglected child, and the 
juvenile court's finding is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
predispositional report and home study indicates that appellant has three other 
children, all of whom live with their natural fathers. It also expresses the 
caseworker's concern with appellant's lack of stability in relationships, living 
arrangements, and employment, and her refusal to take responsibility for C.P.'s 
medical condition.

  

2This 
section was amended effective July 1, 1997. We look to the statute in effect at 
the time of the alleged acts. See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 612 (Wyo. 
1993) and Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Wyo. 
1992).