Title: METZER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

METZER v. STATE2002 WY 17659 P.3d 135Case Number: 02-21Decided: 10/12/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
   

 

JEFFREY 
ALLEN METZER,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Joseph Cole, 
Deputy Carbon County and Prosecuting Attorney, Special Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Cole.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ, and DONNELL, 
D.J.

 

DONNELL, 
District Judge.

 

[¶1]      Jeffrey Metzer 
appeals his convictions on two counts of aggravated burglary in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).  Mr. Metzer asserts that there was not 
sufficient evidence to convict him for aggravated burglary.  He further argues he was denied a fair 
trial by virtue of the State's failure to disclose a witness in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) and 
related cases.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellant 
raises two issues on this appeal:

1.         
[Was] there sufficient evidence to convict appellant of two counts of 
aggravated burglary?

2.                  
[Was] 
Appellant denied a fair trial by the State's failure to disclose a witness and 
information pertaining to other possible suspects in violation of Brandy 
[sic] v. Maryland?

 

The 
State phrases the second issue somewhat differently:

Was 
Appellant denied a fair trial by the State's failure to provide him a copy of a 
police report prior to trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On May 2, 2001 at 
about 5:00 p.m., Darlene Lovato returned to her home in Rawlins.  It was snowing at the time, and she 
noticed fresh footprints on her front porch.  She also noticed that the house was 
unusually cold when she entered.  
This drew her attention to an open back door where she observed a broken 
lock.  Further seeing her bedroom 
was in a state of disarray, she retreated to her car and called 
police.

 

[¶5]      Officer Mike Rose 
arrived on the scene and observed what he described as boot-type footprints near 
the back door, approximately size 11.  
He followed the tracks but eventually lost them on wet pavement.  He did not photograph or otherwise 
preserve this evidence.  An 
inventory of Ms. Lovato's property revealed that she was missing about $80 from 
a bowl in her living room, a moneybag containing some $300 in $2 bills, some 
silver coins, and a .38 caliber Colt revolver and nylon 
holster.

 

[¶6]      On the following 
day at about 11:45 a.m., John France left his home in Rawlins to go to 
lunch.  When he returned at about 
1:30 p.m. he saw water on a hallway floor and a music box on the bedroom 
floor.  The doors to the medicine 
cabinet in the bathroom and the linen closet were also standing open.  Once again, police were called and 
footprints of approximately size 9 to 11 were observed in the snow.  Missing from the France home were two $1 
bills and a .22 caliber Browning semiautomatic pistol.

 

[¶7]      Local merchants 
were contacted by police and asked to keep an eye out for anyone passing $2 
bills.  On May 6 a female customer 
passed a $2 bill and three silver dimes at a local Mini-Mart.  An alert clerk took down the license 
number and a description of the car, and at about noon on that day Appellant, 
while driving the subject automobile, was stopped by police.  Metzer admitted that his driver's 
license was suspended and was asked to step out of the car.  He was then asked whether or not he had 
anything in his pockets, whereupon he produced what was later determined to be 
60 $2 bills.  The officer suggested 
a detective might like to visit with him, at which point Mr. Metzer fled.  He was quickly apprehended and 
arrested.  The money and his boots, 
Nike lug-soled size 10, were taken into evidence.  A subsequent interview of Kristen 
Setright, the owner of the car Metzer had been driving, confirmed that she had 
passed the $2 bill and silver coins at the Mini-Mart.  A consensual search of her house turned 
up several silver dimes on the living room floor but no other incriminating 
evidence.

 

[¶8]      On June 20, 2001 
a local fisherman found a .22 caliber Browning semiautomatic pistol in shallow 
water on the north side of Teton Reservoir, a reservoir south of Rawlins.  Mr. France identified the weapon as 
his.  On July 21, 2001 children 
located a .38 caliber Colt revolver in a nylon holster, again in shallow water 
at Teton Reservoir about 100 yards from where Mr. France's pistol was 
found.  Ms. Lovato identified this 
gun as her missing revolver.  Both 
were rusty, indicating that they had been in the water for some time.  No fingerprints were recovered from the 
guns or from any of the bills found in Appellant's 
possession.

 

[¶9]      Trial was 
conducted in August of 2001.  There 
was no real issue with respect to any of the elements of aggravated burglary 
except for the identity of the burglar.  
Testimony on both counts indicated that the houses in question had been 
entered without authority of the owners on the dates and at the places alleged; 
that property had been stolen (thus inferring intent to commit larceny), and; 
that the burglar had become armed with a deadly weapon in each case, those 
weapons being the .22 caliber Browning and the .38 caliber 
Colt.

 

[¶10]   Testimony showed that Ms. Lovato 
had been relieved of 150 $2 bills and some silver coins, including dimes, in the 
burglary, and that Appellant had been apprehended with 60 $2 bills in his pocket 
only four days later.  The evidence 
showed that his girlfriend passed a $2 bill and three silver dimes on the same 
day and that $2 bills and silver coins were not commonly tendered at the local 
Mini-Mart.  Testimony also showed 
that Appellant attempted to flee when the issue of a detective came up, thus 
implying guilty knowledge.  
Appellant's boots and photographs of the tracks at the France burglary 
were provided to the jury for comparison and, while the footprint evidence at 
the Lovato burglary was less conclusive, the evidence found there did not 
exclude Appellant as the burglar.  
Also provided was evidence by which the jury might conclude both 
burglaries had been committed by the same person.  Most compelling were the two handguns, 
stolen from private homes during daylight hours within a day of each other and 
located in a reservoir within 100 yards of each other.

 

[¶11]   Appellant testified on his own 
behalf.  He admitted that he had 
been out of work and low on funds at the time of the burglaries.  He explained that he had received the $2 
bills in payment for a guitar he sold in Oregon about 18 months earlier to a man 
he barely knew by the name of Justin.  
He said that he had been at Ms. Setright's house packing for a move to 
Casper on May 2 and 3.  Finally, he 
indicated that he ran from the police because of his suspended driver's 
license.

 

[¶12]   Detective Ford of the Rawlins 
Police Department also testified at trial, and it was through him that Appellant 
learned of certain additional information he considers critical.  Detective Ford disclosed at trial that 
two other people were known to have passed $2 bills in Rawlins during the time 
at issue, one of them being a Mr. Rudy Makinen.  The detective had interviewed Mr. 
Makinen and eliminated him, in his own mind, as a suspect.  However, no report of this interview was 
delivered to the defense prior to the trial.

 

[¶13]   The State, realizing the problem 
here, immediately located Mr. Makinen and made him available for interview by 
the defense.  He was then called to 
testify by the defense.  He said he 
had purchased ten $2 bills from a Cheyenne railroader at George's Bar and Grill 
in Rawlins.  He believed they were 
all new bills from 1976 and were sequentially numbered.  Appellant moved for a mistrial on the 
grounds that the State had improperly withheld evidence.  The motion for mistrial was denied.  There is no indication that the defense 
requested a recess or additional time to investigate or try to learn the 
identity of the unknown railroader.

 

[¶14]   Defendant was convicted on both 
counts of aggravated burglary and sentenced on November 19, 2001 to concurrent 
terms of five to seven years each.

 

DISCUSSION

[¶15]   Metzer first alleges the 
evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions.

When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 
1302 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo. 
1989)).  We do not consider 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful 
party's evidence.  Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 1996).

 

Williams 
v. State, 
986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999).  The 
court does not substitute its judgment for that of the jury but rather 
determines only if a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or 
even could, have come to the same result as the jury did.  Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶16]   The following evidence concerning 
the identity of the burglar was presented to the jury in this 
matter:

 

1.  Two 
burglaries of private homes occurred during daylight hours. This is not a common 
event in Rawlins, yet these burglaries occurred only one day apart. Firearms and 
money, including in one case numerous $2 bills and silver coins, were stolen in 
each burglary.

 

2.  Footprints 
or tracks similar to the prints left by Appellant's boots were observed at each 
scene.

 

           
3.  The stolen firearms were located in a reservoir within 100 yards 
of each other, and both had apparently been in the water for quite some 
time.

 

           
4.  Appellant's girlfriend was observed passing a $2 bill and silver 
dimes only four days after the first burglary, and this was quite uncommon.  Appellant was captured on the same day 
with 60 $2 bills in his possession.  
Additional silver coins were found on the floor at his girlfriend's 
residence.  The $2 bills in 
Appellant's possession were not new and were not sequentially 
numbered.

 

           
5.  Appellant fled police when he was advised that a detective would 
like to speak to him.

 

           
6.  Although Appellant indicated that he had been painting and packing 
for two days before he was arrested, no sign of either was observed at his 
residence.  He was unable to 
produce, or even provide the full name of, the individual who allegedly paid him 
in $2 bills for his guitar, and he did not explain why he was walking around 
with this money in his pocket some 18 months after he obtained 
it.

            

          
7.  Appellant admitted he was nearly broke and unemployed at the time 
of the burglaries, thus providing a motive for same.

 

[¶17]   Appellant points to certain 
"missing" evidentiary items such as the lack of fingerprints, and he offers 
numerous alternative explanations for the presence of the firearms in the 
reservoir.  That is all well and 
good, but it is not the point.  We 
do not consider conflicting evidence offered by Appellant, and we consider all 
of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this case 
the State.  Given the undisputed 
facts that Appellant was in possession of a large number of $2 bills, an unusual 
currency to say the least, and that silver coins were discovered strewn on the 
floor at his girlfriend's house; that his boots left a print similar to those 
found at both scenes; that the modus operandi in both crimes was similar; 
that both firearms were recovered in the same location, thus indicating they 
were probably stolen by the same person; that Appellant fled from the police; 
that he provided no verification of his alibi; that the physical evidence 
actually contradicted his story; and that Appellant himself provided the 
motivation for these crimes, we conclude that the evidence was such that a 
reasonable jury might fairly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, as it did here, 
that both of the burglaries were committed by the same individual and that 
Appellant was that person.

 

[¶18]   Appellant also argues that he was 
deprived of a fair trial when the State failed to disclose evidence favorable to 
his defense, that being the existence and identity of Mr. Makinen.1  The State does not here dispute the fact 
that it failed to provide the evidence at issue, albeit mistakenly.  That is of no moment.  "In 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), 
the Supreme Court set forth the basic principle that the prosecution violates 
due process by suppressing favorable evidence that is material either to the 
guilt or to the punishment of the accused, irrespective of the good faith or 
bad faith of the prosecution.'"  Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶14, 
47 P.3d 981 ¶14 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶19]   The State argues, however, that 
there was no prejudice to Appellant because it promptly made Mr. Makinen 
available for interview, and Appellant called him to testify.  The State points out as well that, while 
Appellant moved for a mistrial, he did not ask for additional time to 
investigate or to interview Makinen.  
As in Davis:

 

We 
must determine, therefore, whether the government's failure to disclose evidence 
favorable to the defendant deprived the defendant of a fair trial under Brady 
by considering whether the "favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to 
put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the 
verdict."  Id. at 290, 119 S. Ct.  at 1952 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 435, 115 S. Ct. at 1566).  In order to establish a Brady 
violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed 
evidence, the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and the evidence was 
material.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 2000).

 

Davis 
¶16.

 

[¶20]   Evidence is "material" 
if:

"its 
suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."  Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 678, 105 S. Ct.  at 3381.  In Kyles, the 
Court further reviewed the meaning of materiality as it relates to the final 
result of the trial:

Bagley's 
touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a different result, 
and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant 
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the 
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a 
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A "reasonable probability" of 
a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary 
suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial."

 

Davis 
¶19.  (Emphasis in original.) (Citations 
omitted.)

 

[¶21]   Defendant's theory at trial was to 
the effect that someone else committed the burglaries, and evidence that someone 
else had been passing $2 bills in Rawlins would initially appear to be at least 
of significant interest.  However, 
this was one of those leads that, in the end, simply did not pan out.  There is no doubt that the State had an 
obligation to produce the evidence as part of the court's discovery order, and 
it would certainly have been better if this had been done in a timely 
manner.  However, the State promptly 
produced Mr. Makinen when his name came up at trial, and the defense had an 
opportunity to interview him at that time.  
Apparently, sufficient time was afforded the defense as no recess was 
requested.  More importantly, Mr. 
Makinen testified at trial, and the jury had the opportunity to hear what he had 
to offer.  His testimony indicated 
that the bills he purchased were new and sequentially numbered, unlike Ms. 
Lovato's bills, which were used and had been collected over a period of 
time.  While he could not identify 
the railroader from whom he bought the bills, there is no indication in the 
record that Appellant requested additional time to attempt to locate this person 
or that any new evidence concerning his identity has been discovered even 
now.  The jury had a full 
opportunity to hear Mr. Makinen's testimony, to evaluate his credibility, and to 
weigh it against Appellant's argument that it was just as likely that the 
unknown railroader had committed the crimes as Appellant.  They rejected this 
assertion.

 

[¶22]   We conclude that Appellant was not 
denied a fair trial because material exculpatory evidence was withheld.  Even had the evidence been entirely 
suppressed, we would be reluctant to conclude that it was material, as it did 
not call into question the physical evidence and uncontested facts upon which 
the jury clearly relied.  Hensley 
v. State, 2002 WY 96, 48 P.3d 1099 (Wyo. 2002).  Here, the jury actually heard the 
evidence at issue, and they rejected it.  
Appellant speculates that there might have been other more persuasive 
evidence had the State revealed Makinen's evidence earlier, but there is nothing 
in the record to support such a conclusion, and Appellant made no request for 
additional time to investigate when he had the opportunity.  We will not now join Appellant in this 
idle speculation.

 

[¶23]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

1We 
note that the evidence at issue was not completely suppressed, rather it was 
provided late.  Nevertheless, we 
consider the matter at the outset as though the jury never heard Mr. Makinen's 
testimony.