Title: Halifax Hospital Medical Center v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-683 
____________ 
 
HALIFAX HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, etc., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., 
Appellees. 
 
April 18, 2019 
 
LAWSON, J. 
 
Halifax Hospital Medical Center, a special tax district, appeals a circuit court 
judgment denying validation of revenue bonds.  We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 
3(b)(2), Fla. Const., and affirm, holding that Halifax is not authorized to carry out 
the project for which it sought to issue the bonds. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Halifax was created by a special act of the Legislature in 1925.  Ch. 11272, 
Laws of Fla. (1925); ch. 79-577, § 2, Laws of Fla.  Since that time, Halifax’s 
enabling act has undergone many revisions and amendments.  Ch. 79-577, 79-578, 
84-539, 89-409, 91-352, 2003-374, Laws of Fla.  Halifax’s current enabling act is 
 
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chapter 2003-374, Laws of Florida, and section 3 of this act constitutes Halifax’s 
charter.  Halifax’s charter provides geographic boundaries for Halifax within 
Volusia County, grants Halifax certain authority to “establish, construct, operate, 
and maintain . . . hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities and 
services,” and authorizes Halifax to issue bonds “for the purposes set forth in this 
act.”  Ch. 2003-374, § 3(1), (5), (8). 
 
In the proceedings below, Halifax sought validation of bonds that it intended 
to issue for the purpose of financing the construction of a hospital outside the 
geographic boundaries established in the special act.  The proposed hospital would 
have been located in Deltona, Florida, and operated by Halifax with the 
expectation that Deltona residents would constitute the majority of the hospital’s 
patients.  Before filing the complaint for bond validation, Halifax agreed to 
undertake this project by entering into an interlocal agreement with the City of 
Deltona pursuant to section 163.01, Florida Statutes (2017), the Interlocal Act.1  
An intervenor challenged Halifax’s complaint for bond validation, arguing that 
Halifax lacks the authority to operate a facility in Deltona because Deltona is 
outside Halifax’s geographical boundaries.  The circuit court agreed and denied the 
complaint for bond validation.  Halifax appealed that ruling to this Court, invoking 
                                          
 
 
1.  The full title of section 163.01 is the Florida Interlocal Cooperation Act 
of 1969. 
 
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our mandatory jurisdiction to review final orders entered in proceedings for the 
validation of bonds.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.; § 75.08, Fla. Stat. (2017).   
Consistent with its arguments below, Halifax and its amici argue that Halifax 
possesses authority to operate a hospital anywhere it desires outside its boundaries 
so long as there is a demonstrated need for the facility and so long as Halifax 
demonstrates that it can do so profitably, thereby increasing revenue available to 
serve the needs of the district.  In the alternative, Halifax contends that the 
interlocal agreement it entered with City of Deltona pursuant to the Interlocal Act 
serves as a sufficient grant of authority to build and operate the hospital. 
ANALYSIS 
 
As a “special tax district,” ch. 2003-374, §§ 1, 3(1), 3(16), Halifax has only 
the powers granted to it by legislative enactment, either expressly or by necessary 
implication.  See Bd. of Comm’rs of Jupiter Inlet Dist. v. Thibadeau, 956 So. 2d 
529, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“[I]ndependent special districts are created by the 
legislature, and, like agencies, their powers are limited to those granted them.” 
(citations omitted)); State, Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation v. Falls Chase Special 
Taxing Dist., 424 So. 2d 787, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (“An agency has only such 
power as expressly or by necessary implication is granted by legislative 
enactment.”); see also City of Cape Coral v. GAC Utils., Inc. of Fla., 281 So. 2d 
493, 496 (Fla. 1973).  Because the scope of Halifax’s authority is a matter of 
 
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statutory construction, we review the issue de novo.  City of Parker v. State, 992 
So. 2d 171, 175-76 (Fla. 2008).2 
 
Statutory Analysis 
A court’s determination of the meaning of a statute begins with the language 
of the statute.  Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018) (citing Holly v. Auld, 
450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).  If that language is clear, the statute is given its 
plain meaning, and the court does not “look behind the statute’s plain language for 
legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction.”  City of Parker, 992 
So. 2d at 176 (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 
2005)). 
 
 
                                          
 
 
2.  Halifax urges us to defer to its interpretation of chapter 2003-374 under 
the principle that an agency is entitled to deference concerning its interpretation of 
any statute it is charged with administering.  We decline to afford that deference.  
Halifax’s position implicates a recent amendment to article V, section 21 of the 
Florida Constitution, providing that courts of this state shall not defer to an 
agency’s statutory interpretation.  The parties disagree over the applicability of that 
amendment to this case.  However, we need not resolve that dispute for the 
purposes of this case because the statute at issue is unambiguous.  Even before this 
new constitutional provision we did not apply the deference principle to 
unambiguous statutes.  See, e.g., GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 
2007) (“[It is only] when a statutory term is subject to varying interpretations and . 
. . has been interpreted by the executive agency charged with enforcing the statute 
[that] this Court [would have] follow[ed] a deferential principle of statutory 
construction . . . .”). 
 
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The General and Special Laws Defining the Scope of Halifax’s Authority 
 
Our analysis necessarily begins with chapter 189, Florida Statutes, the 
general law authorizing special districts.  In addition to serving as the common 
authority for special districts in general, chapter 189 is expressly cited as the 
foundation for Halifax’s creation in the special law creating Halifax.  Ch. 2003-
374, § 1, Laws of Fla.   
Chapter 189 “provide[s] general provisions for the definition, creation, and 
operation of special districts.”  § 189.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).  According to 
chapter 189, a special district is “a unit of local government created for a special 
purpose, as opposed to a general purpose, which has jurisdiction to operate within 
a limited geographic boundary and is created by general law, special act, local 
ordinance, or by rule of the Governor and Cabinet.”  Id. § 189.012(6) (emphasis 
added).  Because the very essence of a chapter 189 “special district” is statutorily 
prescribed as operation within “a limited geographic boundary,” § 189.012(6), that 
inescapably becomes the default authority for all special districts.  In other words, 
although the Legislature certainly can grant a special district authority to operate 
outside of its defined geographic boundary, that extraordinary grant of authority 
would need to be express and unambiguous—clear enough to demonstrate that the 
Legislature has created a special district that will operate with a power not 
generally contemplated for chapter 189 special districts.   
 
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Chapter 2003-374 does not contain an express grant of authority for Halifax 
to operate hospitals outside the geographic boundaries established for the district 
and, when the relevant language is considered as a whole, only authorizes Halifax 
to operate within the district.  Chapter 2003-374 provides in relevant part: 
The district may establish, construct, operate, and maintain such 
hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities and 
services as are necessary.  The hospitals, medical facilities, and other 
health care facilities and services shall be established, constructed, 
operated, and maintained by the district for the preservation of the 
public health, for the public good, and for the use of the public of the 
district.  Maintenance of such hospitals, medical facilities, and other 
health care facilities and services in the district is hereby found and 
declared to be a public purpose and necessary for the general welfare 
of the residents of the district. 
 
Ch. 2003-374, § 3(5) (emphasis added).  Halifax seeks to isolate the first sentence 
of this provision, arguing that because the first sentence does not expressly limit its 
authority to “construct, operate, and maintain” medical facilities to the district’s 
geographic boundaries, it acts as a grant of authority to do so outside of its 
boundaries.3  As already discussed, that reading would be contrary to chapter 189, 
                                          
 
 
3.  Halifax attempts to bolster this argument using a backwards approach to 
statutory construction.  Before acknowledging the language currently in effect, 
Halifax quotes its 1925 enabling act and then traces the history of legislative 
revisions in an effort to dictate how the 2003 act should be read.  We reject 
Halifax’s approach.  Nat. Auto Serv. Ctrs., Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498, 
504 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“The interpretation of a statute begins ‘with the plain 
meaning of the actual language’ the statute employs.” (quoting Diamond Aircraft 
Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013))); see also Rollins v. 
 
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and clearly insufficient to overcome the general rule stated in that chapter—which 
is that special districts are created to operate within their defined geographic 
boundaries.   
In addition, it would be inappropriate to isolate the first sentence from the 
rest of the paragraph.  Trafalgar Woods Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Cape 
Coral, 248 So. 3d 282, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (“[U]nder a longstanding 
fundamental principle applicable to statutes and ordinances, ‘words, phrases, 
clauses, sentences and paragraphs of a statute may not be construed in isolation[.]’  
Rather, the sentence must be read in the context of the entire provision.”  (citation 
omitted)).  Specifically, the second sentence references the “hospitals, medical 
facilities, and other health care facilities” authorized for construction, operation, 
and maintenance (in the first sentence), and explains that these facilities are being 
authorized “for the use of the public of the district.”  More importantly, the first 
sentence itself only authorizes Halifax to construct, operate, and maintain facilities 
“as are necessary.”  Necessary to what?  Read in context, these words can only 
reasonably be understood to mean necessary to fulfillment of the public purpose 
for which the district is being created, which the third and last sentence explains as 
follows:  “Maintenance of such hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care 
                                          
 
Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 299 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]hen the statutory language is 
clear, legislative history cannot be used to alter the plain meaning of the statute.”). 
 
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facilities and services in the district is hereby found and declared to be a public 
purpose and necessary for the general welfare of the residents of the district.” 
(Emphasis added.)  Read together, this language is plain: it grants Halifax the 
authority to construct, operate, and maintain health care facilities within its district, 
which is defined according to the geographic boundaries in section 1 of Halifax’s 
charter.  Ch. 2003-374, § 3(1).4 
 
For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that the Legislature has not 
authorized Halifax to establish, construct, operate, or maintain the out-of-district 
Deltona hospital for which it sought to issue revenue bonds.  We now turn to 
Halifax’s argument that any lack of authority is cured though the Interlocal Act and 
its interlocal agreement with the City of Deltona. 
 
                                          
 
 
4.  In addition to attempting to infer the authority to operate extraterritorially 
from various provisions beyond section 5, Halifax contends that its enabling act 
incorporates chapter 617, Florida Statutes, by reference and that this reference, 
combined with the power granted in the enabling act for Halifax to establish 
corporations, ch. 2003-374, § 3(3), gives Halifax the authority to establish and 
operate a hospital in Deltona.  Halifax gleans this conclusion from sections 
617.0301 and 617.0303(8)-(9), Florida Statutes (2018), which authorize the 
creation of corporations for any lawful purpose and grants a nonprofit corporation 
the authority to operate anywhere in the United States and to acquire property 
anywhere.  Halifax’s reliance on these provisions is misplaced.  Not only must 
Halifax’s activities serve its stated purpose, see, e.g., § 189.012(6), but also, the 
bounds of Halifax’s authority to create and establish a corporation is not what is at 
issue, as the bonds were not sought for the purpose of creating a corporation, but 
for the purpose of financing a hospital outside its geographic boundaries. 
 
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The Interlocal Act 
 
Under the Interlocal Act, “[a] public agency,” including a special district, 
“may exercise jointly with any other public agency of the state, of any other state, 
or of the United States Government any power, privilege, or authority which such 
agencies share in common and which each might exercise separately.”                     
§ 163.01(3)(b), (4), Fla. Stat. (2017).  The purpose of the Interlocal Act is “to 
permit local governmental units to make the most efficient use of their powers by 
enabling them to cooperate with other localities on a basis of mutual advantage and 
thereby to provide services and facilities in a manner and pursuant to forms of 
governmental organization that will accord best with geographic, economic, 
population, and other factors influencing the needs and development of local 
communities.”  § 163.01(2).  It is “intended to authorize the entry into contracts for 
the performance of service functions of public agencies.”  § 163.01(14).   
By its terms, the Interlocal Act requires that any “power, privilege, or 
authority” that an agency commits to perform be one that it “might exercise 
separately” in the absence of an interlocal agreement.  See § 163.01(4).  Because 
Halifax does not have the independent authority to establish and operate a hospital 
in Deltona, it does not gain this authority under the Interlocal Act.   
 
Halifax contends that failing to recognize that the Interlocal Act grants it the 
authority to act outside its geographic boundaries will strip the Interlocal Act of 
 
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meaning.  However, the Interlocal Act expressly states its effect: “to authorize the 
entry into contracts for the performance of service functions of public agencies.”   
§ 163.01(14).  Our decision does not deny this effect, and we cannot give the 
Interlocal Act a greater effect than its provisions establish.  See Holly, 450 So. 2d 
at 219 (explaining that this state’s courts are “without power to construe an 
unambiguous statute in a way which would extend . . . its express terms or its 
reasonable and obvious implications” (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of 
Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968) (emphasis omitted))).  
Additionally, Halifax’s primary argument ignores the reality that the federal 
government, Florida’s state government, as well as the primary local governmental 
subdivision of the State—counties—do have overlapping geographic boundaries 
with all special districts, and that many other local governmental entities have 
overlapping geographic boundaries as well.  Given these realities, it is hardly true 
that the Interlocal Act will be stripped of all meaning unless we construe it as 
authorizing all special districts to operate outside of their geographic boundaries, 
as they deem appropriate, by interlocal agreement. 
 
Halifax further argues that section 163.01(9)(a) shows that the Legislature 
contemplated that the Interlocal Act would lift geographic restrictions on agency 
action, as this subsection references extraterritorial activity.  Specifically, section 
163.01(9)(a) provides as follows: 
 
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All of the privileges and immunities from liability; exemptions from 
laws, ordinances, and rules; and pensions and relief, disability, 
workers’ compensation, and other benefits which apply to the activity 
of officers, agents, or employees of any public agents or employees of 
any public agency when performing their respective functions within 
the territorial limits for their respective agencies shall apply to the 
same degree and extent to the performance of such functions and 
duties of such officers, agents, or employees extraterritorially under 
the provisions of any such interlocal agreement. 
 
This language, standing alone, does not confer the authority that Halifax seeks.  
The Interlocal Act applies broadly to any public agency, “including, but not limited 
to, [a] state government, county, city, school district, single and multipurpose 
special district, single and multipurpose public authority,” and others.                     
§ 163.01(3)(b).  Some of these public agencies have broader powers than a special 
district, which is confined only to the powers granted expressly or by necessary 
implication in a legislative enactment, Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So. 
2d at 793.  Even a special district can have the power to operate outside its 
geographic boundaries when that power is provided by the special district’s 
enabling act.  Also, while a municipality generally cannot exercise extraterritorial 
powers, it can do so when authorized by law.  Art. VIII, § 2(c), Fla. Const.; Op. 
Att’y Gen. Fla. 2008-01 (2008); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2003-03 (2003).  Therefore, 
the fact that the Interlocal Act contemplates that some functions under interlocal 
agreements will be performed extraterritorially does not mean that the Legislature 
granted all public agencies the right to act extraterritorially. 
 
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In fact, interpreting the Interlocal Act to have such an effect would render 
other statutes superfluous.  Most notably, section 166.0495, Florida Statutes 
(2018), authorizes “[a] municipality [to] enter into an interlocal agreement 
pursuant to s. 163.01 with an adjoining municipality or municipalities within the 
same county to provide law enforcement services within the territorial boundaries 
of the other adjoining municipality or municipalities.”  See also § 288.9604(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2018) (authorizing the Florida Development Finance Corporation “to 
function within the corporate limits of any public agency with which it has entered 
into an interlocal agreement for any of the purposes of this act”).  When drafting 
section 166.0495, the Legislature was clearly aware of the Interlocal Act, and yet, 
it perceived the need to create section 166.0495 to authorize extraterritorial 
operation of ordinary municipal functions under an interlocal agreement.  Even if 
the language of Halifax’s enabling act and the Interlocal Act were ambiguous, we 
would avoid any construction of them that would render other statutes superfluous.  
See Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So. 2d 993, 1000 (Fla. 1999).   
CONCLUSION 
 
Because neither Halifax’s enabling act nor the Interlocal Act gives Halifax 
the authority to operate outside its geographic boundaries, the circuit court 
properly denied the bond validation.  In reaching this decision, we have not 
overlooked the concerns that Halifax and its amici raise about the effect of a 
 
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determination that Halifax cannot operate extraterritorially.  However, this Court is 
not the proper forum for a policy decision as to whether Halifax or any other 
special district should be allowed to operate extraterritorially.  See Holly, 450 So. 
2d at 219.  In any event, we note that this decision is based on the specific 
language of Halifax’s enabling act, which we are not authorized to rewrite or 
construe contrary to its plain meaning.  See Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 
So. 3d 311, 313-14 (Fla. 2016).  For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s 
order denying bond validation. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County - Bond Validations 
 
Christopher A. France, Judge - Case No. 2018-CA-030059 
 
Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, and Katherine M. Clemente of 
Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellants 
 
Martin B. Goldberg, Jason A. Coe, Jonathan L. Williams, Nicholas A. Ortiz, and 
Christopher K. Smith of Lash & Goldberg LLP, Miami, Florida; and Raoul G. 
Cantero of White & Case LLP, Miami, Florida 
 
 
for Appellees 
 
 
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Clifford B. Shepard of Shepard, Smith, Kohlmyer & Hand, P.A., Maitland, 
Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Florida League of Cities, Florida Association of Counties, 
Inc., Florida Association of Special Districts, County of Volusia, a Political 
Subdivision of the State of Florida, City of Deltona, City of Largo, City of 
Safety Harbor, Osceola County, and Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority 
 
Kimarie R. Stratos, Maria R. Caldera, and Mallory L. Gold of Memorial 
Healthcare System, Hollywood, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae South Broward Hospital District d/b/a 
Memorial Healthcare System