Title: Neighbors v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
GARY EARL NEIGHBORS  
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
v. Record No. 062460 
      
 
     September 14, 2007 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY 
Daniel R. Bouton, Judge 
 
 
Gary Earl Neighbors appeals from the judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Orange County which denied his appeal from the 
General District Court of Orange County’s refusal of his 
petition for a writ of coram nobis.  Neighbors contends the 
circuit court erred when it ruled that it did not have 
jurisdiction to consider his appeal and that a writ of coram 
nobis was “not the proper vehicle to challenge” Neighbors’ 
guilty plea.  For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court in part, affirm the judgment 
in part, and enter final judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Neighbors was arrested for violating Code § 18.2-479.12 but 
entered an Alford plea to the reduced charge of resisting arrest 
                                                 
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
August 16, 2007. 
2 Code § 18.2-479.1 states that “[a]ny person who 
intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a law-enforcement 
officer from lawfully arresting him, with or without a warrant, 
is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”  
2 
in the General District Court of Orange County on June 14, 2004.3  
Neighbors was convicted and fined $50.  After the statutory 
period to appeal his conviction to the circuit court had expired 
under Code § 16.1-132, Neighbors filed a pleading styled 
“Petition in Form of Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Motion to 
Revoke/Vacate Plea” in the district court on September 30, 2004.  
Neighbors contended in the petition that when he originally 
entered his guilty plea, he “did not have the requisite capacity 
to enter a plea” because he was “taking heavy doses of 
medication at the time the plea was given.” 
The general district court denied the petition by order 
which stated that Neighbors’ “Petition for a Writ Coram Nobis 
and Motion to Revoke/Vacate Plea does not lie within the 
jurisdiction of the General District Court.”  Neighbors timely 
appealed the general district court’s order to the circuit court 
which denied the appeal by an order dated August 25, 2006.  The 
circuit court’s order stated: 
[T]he Circuit Court does not have appellate 
jurisdiction of this matter under [Code §] 16.1-132 
. . . as the time to perfect an appeal from the 
General District Court in a criminal matter has 
elapsed, the matter before the Court is civil in 
nature, the matter is not an appeal of a bond 
                                                 
3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (U.S. 
1970) (An “Alford plea” is where a defendant asserts his 
innocence but admits that sufficient evidence exists which could 
likely convince a judge or jury to find the defendant guilty).  
See also Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 565, 636 S.E.2d 452, 
454-55 (2006) (describing effect of Alford plea in Virginia). 
3 
forfeiture and other appeal rights conferred under 
[Code §] 16.1-132 are applicable; and 
 
[U]nder [Code §] 16.1-106 [Neighbors] does not 
have a right to appeal an order or judgment from the 
General District Court to the Circuit Court, as this 
matter although civil in nature, is not a matter in 
which the amount in controversy is of greater value 
than fifty dollars; 
[A] writ of coram nobis in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia is not the proper vehicle to challenge the 
insanity/incapacity of the defendant in regards to 
their plea of guilt and that the Circuit Court has no 
jurisdiction to correct errors in the record of the 
General District Court of the matters and issues as 
asked by [Neighbors] in [his] writ of coram nobis 
. . . . 
Neighbors assigned error to the circuit court’s judgment 
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a general 
district court under Code § 16.1-106 for the denial of a writ of 
coram nobis.  In addition, he assigned error to the circuit 
court’s judgment that “a Writ of Coram Nobis is not a proper 
method of challenging Neighbors’ incapacity at the time the plea 
was entered.”4  We awarded Neighbors this appeal. 
                                                 
4 Neighbors also asserted a third assignment of error: 
The Circuit Court erred when it stated the Circuit 
Court could not correct matters on the record of the 
General District Court because it is inherent in the 
grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Circuit Court 
that the Circuit Court would have the power to correct 
matters of fact of the inferior tribunal especially 
considering that civil matters on appeal to the 
Circuit Court are ruled upon in de novo proceedings. 
We do not need to reach this assignment of error because 
our disposition of the other assignments of error is 
dispositive.   
4 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  Introduction 
 
In Dobie v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 762, 96 S.E.2d 747 
(1957), we explained the genesis and function of a writ of coram 
vobis.5 
 
The writ of error coram vobis, or coram nobis, is 
an ancient writ of the common law. It was called coram 
nobis (before us) in King’s Bench because the king was 
supposed to preside in person in that court.  It was 
called coram vobis (before you – the king’s justices) 
in Common Pleas, where the king was not supposed to 
reside.  The difference related only to the form 
appropriate to each court and the distinction 
disappeared in this country when the need for it 
ended. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 311, p. 561, n. 28. Mr. 
Minor says the proper designation here is coram vobis. 
IV Minor's Inst., 3 ed., Part I, pp. 1052-3. 
 
The principal function of the writ is to afford 
to the court in which an action was tried an 
opportunity to correct its own record with reference 
to a vital fact not known when the judgment was 
rendered, and which could not have been presented by a 
motion for a new trial, appeal or other existing 
statutory proceeding.  Black's Law Dict., 3 ed., 
p. 1861; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1606 b., p. 145; 
Ford v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 718, 229 S.W.2d 470.  It 
lies for an error of fact not apparent on the record, 
not attributable to the applicant’s negligence, and 
which if known by the court would have prevented 
rendition of the judgment.  It does not lie for newly-
discovered evidence or newly-arising facts, or facts 
adjudicated on the trial.  It is not available where 
advantage could have been taken of the alleged error 
at the trial, as where the facts complained of were 
known before or at the trial, or where at the trial 
                                                 
5 For purposes of this opinion, we will use the term coram 
vobis, as recognized in Code § 8.01-677.  Coram vobis shall be 
deemed to include the term coram nobis and both shall be 
considered to be the same proceeding in modern pleading and 
practice. 
5 
the accused or his attorney knew of the existence of 
such facts but failed to present them.  24 C.J.S., 
Criminal Law, § 1606 at p. 148; 49 C.J.S., Judgments, 
§ 312 c., pp. 563, 567. 
198 Va. at 768-69, 96 S.E.2d at 752.  As a common law writ, 
coram vobis has been substantially limited by the General 
Assembly through Code § 8.01-677, which provides that “[f]or any 
clerical error or error in fact for which a judgment may be 
reversed or corrected on writ of error coram vobis, the same may 
be reversed or corrected on motion, after reasonable notice, by 
the court.”  We recognized the restriction of a writ of error 
coram vobis only to clerical errors and certain errors in fact 
in Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S.E.2d 351 (1967), when we 
reviewed the statutory predecessor to Code § 8.01-677:  
 
Our statute is in simple, clear and unambiguous 
language, and we read it to mean what it says. It does 
not provide that it may be used to obtain a writ of 
error, or an appeal, or for any purpose other than to 
correct a “clerical error or error in fact.”  It does 
not supplant the writ of habeas corpus. If its 
provisions should be widened, the enlargement should 
be effected by the legislature.  
208 Va. at 74, 155 S.E.2d at 356.6 
 
With this historical and statutory background in mind, we 
now turn to Neighbors’ assignments of error. 
                                                 
6 Blowe considered Code § 8-485 (1950), predecessor to 
current Code § 8.01-677.  The primary text of the two statutes 
is nearly identical. 
6 
B.  Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court 
 
Neighbors contends on appeal that at the time of his 
general district court plea on the resisting arrest charge, “the 
various, medically prescribed medications he was taking rendered 
him incompetent and thus unable to grasp the gravity of his 
situation and to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter 
a plea of guilt.”  Although Neighbors contends the general 
district court erred in holding it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the petition, the issue on appeal is whether the 
circuit court erred in concluding that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the general district court.  
Neighbors argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that 
the writ of coram vobis was not a subject embraced by Code 
§ 16.1-106 regarding civil cases for which an appeal lies from 
the general district court to the circuit court.7  He contends 
that Code § 16.1-106, when read in light of our decision in City 
of Virginia Beach v. Siebert, 253 Va. 250, 483 S.E.2d 214 
(1997), does bring a writ of coram vobis proceeding within the 
ambit of Code § 17.1-513, which explicates the jurisdiction of 
the circuit courts. 
                                                 
7 While a writ of coram vobis may be applicable in criminal 
or civil proceedings, see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 
507-09 (1954), the parties do not dispute that the petition for 
the writ in this case is a civil proceeding. 
7 
 
The Commonwealth responds that because Code § 16.1-106 “on 
its face does not remotely suggest that coram nobis is among the 
categories of cases appealable from courts not of record to 
circuit courts,” the circuit court was therefore without 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.  We agree with Neighbors on 
this issue. 
Code § 17.1-513 sets forth the jurisdiction of the circuit 
courts and provides, in pertinent part:  
[Circuit courts] shall have appellate 
jurisdiction of all cases, civil and criminal, in 
which an appeal, writ of error or supersedeas may, as 
provided by law, be taken to or allowed by such 
courts, or the judges thereof, from or to the judgment 
or proceedings of any inferior tribunal.  
As Code § 17.1-513 recites, the circuit court would have 
appellate jurisdiction in this case if the appeal on denial of a 
writ of coram vobis is an appeal “as provided by law.”  The 
circuit court apparently reasoned in the case at bar that it 
lacked jurisdiction over Neighbors’ appeal because “this matter 
although civil in nature, is not a matter in which the amount in 
controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars,” and thus 
was not “as provided by law” for purposes of Code § 17.1-513. 
 
The circuit court’s reference to an amount in controversy 
requirement is set forth in Code § 16.1-106, which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
From any order entered or judgment rendered in a 
court not of record in a civil case in which the 
8 
matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty 
dollars, exclusive of interest, any attorney's fees 
contracted for in the instrument, and costs, or when 
the case involves the constitutionality or validity of 
a statute of the Commonwealth, or of an ordinance or 
bylaw of a municipal corporation, or of the 
enforcement of rights and privileges conferred by the 
Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et 
seq.), or of a protective order pursuant to § 19.2-
152.10, there shall be an appeal of right, if taken 
within ten days after such order or judgment, to a 
court of record. 
We have “interpret[ed] the monetary controversy provision of 
Code § 16.1-106 as language intended to exclude a right of 
appeal in those civil cases involving an insignificant monetary 
controversy.”  Siebert, 253 Va. at 253, 483 S.E.2d at 216.  
However, the jurisdictional exclusion of cases involving a 
monetary amount of less than $50 is not language which 
forecloses the right of appeal for cases that are non-monetary 
in nature.  In that regard, Siebert is instructive in the 
application of Code § 16.1-106 (and derivatively Code § 17.1-
513) to the case at bar. 
 
In Siebert, the City of Virginia Beach appealed a general 
district court judgment dismissing a charge of refusal to take a 
blood or alcohol test by Siebert to the circuit court.  253 Va. 
at 251, 483 S.E.2d at 215.  The circuit court dismissed the 
City’s appeal by concluding Code § 16.1-106 excluded a civil 
refusal case from its jurisdiction because such a case was not a 
monetary controversy for more than $50 or otherwise enumerated.  
9 
Id. at 251-52, 483 S.E.2d at 215.  We reversed the circuit court 
and held Code § 16.1-106 did not exclude the right of appeal in 
civil cases from the general district court to the circuit 
court, in part, because we read the monetary limitation to apply 
only to cases involving money, not a categorical exclusion of 
all non-monetary civil cases.  Id. at 253-54, 483 S.E.2d at 216. 
 
Thus, we know from Siebert that the circuit court’s 
restriction of Code § 16.1-106 in this case to only monetary 
cases was erroneous.  There is no restriction to an appeal of a 
petition for a writ of error coram vobis from the general 
district court to the circuit court because it is a non-monetary 
civil proceeding.  Accordingly, the appeal of the denial of a 
writ of coram vobis is within the jurisdiction of a circuit 
court under Code § 17.1-513. 
 
The circuit court thus erred in determining it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the judgment of the general 
district court.  However, notwithstanding the circuit court’s 
holding, its judgment enunciated an alternative holding on the 
merits of Neighbors’ claim, which we now review because that 
holding is dispositive of this case. 
C.  Application of a Writ of Coram Vobis 
 
Assuming the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his 
appeal, Neighbors contends the circuit court also erred in 
ruling his guilty plea could not be challenged by a writ of 
10 
coram vobis based on his claim of lack of capacity.  The 
Commonwealth responds that the circuit court was correct in this 
regard because Neighbors had other remedies including a timely 
appeal under Code § 16.1-132 or a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  The Commonwealth also responds that our jurisprudence 
in Dobie and Blowe recognizes Code § 8.01-677 has significantly 
restricted the use of a writ of coram vobis. 
 
Code § 8.01-677 makes clear that the limited purpose of a 
writ of coram vobis is to correct only “clerical error” or 
certain “error in fact.”  As we noted earlier, this Court 
explained in Blowe that the writ of coram vobis should not be 
used “for any purpose other than to correct a ‘clerical error or 
error in fact.’ ”  208 Va. at 74, 155 S.E.2d at 356.  This 
limited application has not been extended to serve as a writ of 
error to bring the original judgment under review, Dobie, 198 
Va. at 771, 96 S.E.2d at 753, or to permit a change of a 
defendant’s plea after trial.  Blowe, 208 Va. at 76, 155 S.E.2d 
at 357-58.  The purpose of the writ does not involve correcting 
errors of fact “where the facts complained of were known before 
or at the trial, or where at the trial the accused or his 
attorney knew of the existence of such facts but failed to 
present them.”  Dobie, 198 Va. at 769, 96 S.E.2d at 752.  
 
Neighbors’ general allegation that he suffered from some 
undefined lack of capacity due to medication at the time of his 
11 
guilty plea is not a clerical error.  Neither is it a claim of 
an error in fact.  Accordingly, under the record in this case, a 
writ of coram vobis would not lie as a means by which Neighbors 
could collaterally challenge his guilty plea.  The circuit court 
did not err in that portion of its judgment which determined the 
writ of coram vobis was thus not available to Neighbors. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse that part of the 
circuit court’s judgment holding Neighbors did not have a right 
of appeal to the circuit court.  We will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court that a writ of coram vobis would not lie in 
this case to enable Neighbors to challenge his guilty plea, and 
therefore we will enter final judgment in favor of the 
Commonwealth. 
                                             Affirmed in part,  
                                             reversed in part, 
 and final judgment.