Title: JOSHUA TODD ALPHIN V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOSHUA TODD ALPHIN V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2010 WY 39228 P.3d 61Case Number: S-09-0085Decided: 04/01/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JOSHUA 
TODD ALPHIN,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

The 
Honorable Marv Tyler, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donna 
D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen; Deputy Attorney 
General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Cara Boyle 
Chambers, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this worker's 
compensation case, Appellant, Joshua Todd Alphin (Alphin), challenges the order 
of the district court which affirmed the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order" issued by a hearing examiner for the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.  Alphin contends that the 
hearing examiner abused his discretion and acted in a manner that was arbitrary, 
capricious or not otherwise in accordance with applicable law in denying 
Alphin's claim for benefits.  He 
also contends that the findings made by the hearing examiner were not supported 
by substantial evidence.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Alphin raises 
these issues:

 
 

I.              
Whether 
the [hearing examiner] abused his discretion, acted arbitrarily, capriciously or 
otherwise not in accordance with [law] when he denied [Alphin's claim for] 
benefits.

 
 

II.            
Whether 
the [hearing examiner's] decision denying benefits was supported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
The 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) asks:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the hearing examiner have sufficient evidence to support the finding that 
[Alphin's] low back injury was a preexisting condition which was not related to 
nor materially aggravated by his workplace injury of December 12, 
2005?

 
 

II.            
Was 
the hearing examiner's decision in accordance with the law and neither the 
result of arbitrary or capricious reasoning?

 
 
In 
his reply brief, Alphin responds:

 
 

I.              
Whether 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies when the hearing 
examiner acts without considering all the facts and 
circumstances.

 
 

II.            
This 
Court has the authority to review whether a lower court's action enforced an 
illegal contract even when raised for the first time on 
appeal.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      For purposes of 
context, we relate these preliminary facts and circumstances.  It is undisputed that Alphin was injured 
in the course and scope of his employment on December 12, 2005.  It is also undisputed that his employer, 
Black Horse Construction, Inc., convinced him to seek medical treatment outside 
the constraints of the Worker's Compensation Act because that was of significant 
benefit to the employer.  The 
employer paid for Alphin's medical treatment for a short period of time, but 
fired him because he was unable to work, due to his injury, and then 
discontinued making such payments on his behalf.  It was not until Alphin was incarcerated 
at the Wyoming State Penitentiary in mid-2006, that he filed a claim for 
benefits.

 
 
[¶4]      Alphin's claim 
was initially denied because it was not timely filed with the employer or with 
the Division.  However, at the 
hearing the Division conceded that, given the above-described circumstances, 
Alphin's claim was to be heard as if it had been timely filed and was to be 
decided on its merits.

 
 
[¶5]      The hearing 
examiner concisely identified the issue to be considered at the hearing:  "[W]hether or not Mr. Alphin can prove 
that his current low back condition and need for continued treatment is directly 
related to his December 2005 work injury (either as an acute new injury or a 
material aggravation of a preexisting condition)."

 
 
[¶6]      Alphin described 
his December 12, 2005, injury in his "Wyoming Report of Injury," which he filed 
on August 29, 2006, while incarcerated at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary:

 
 
            
On the injury date I was unloading a trailer of trash into the trash bin 
at the intersection of Luman and Burma Rd. when Juan brought the backhoe around 
to grab bigger pieces off the trailer.  
[M]y back was to him and the equipment and I could not see when the hoe 
on the backhoe slipped and I was standing beside the trailer and another 
employee Jose was on the trailer when the backhoe struck me and pinned me to the 
trailer.  The operator Juan backed 
off and helped me to the truck where we then notified a 
supervisor[.]

 
 
[¶7]      Alphin first saw 
Robert Berg, M.D., on December 13, 2005, in Pinedale.  He assessed Alphin's condition like 
this:  "Impression is severe left 
pelvic bone contusion and hip joint, muscle contusion of left thigh secondary to 
a backhoe accident."  He was also 
treated by Blane A. Woodfin, M.D., on December 13, 2005, and Dr. Woodfin's notes 
briefly described the injury Alphin reported.  Dr. Woodfin went on to 
say:

 
 
He 
was able to ambulate into the clinic here at Pinedale today and was seen by Dr. 
Berg.  He found evidence of no soft 
tissue injury to the abdomen or pelvis.  
The patient's complaints are centered about the anterior iliac area and 
the anterior aspect of the hip.  He 
has no past history of injury.  He 
does have an extensive history of lumbar spine problems, but has no current 
complaints of back pain.

 
 
[¶8]      Alphin testified 
that about three weeks after the event described above, he began experiencing 
severe back pain, although he reported no such pain immediately following the 
accident.  Alphin denied previous 
back injury, but he did concede that in late June of 2005, he did present at the 
Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County with low back pain.  The treatment he received at that time 
revealed that he had "moderate size disc herniations at L4-5 and L5-S1."  The attending physician's notes indicate 
that Alphin reported he "had four years of on and off low back pain since 
falling off a roof [in 2001]."  The 
attending physician also noted that after that June 2005 appointment, Alphin was 
given an epidural steroid injection to treat the back pain.  That did not produce the desired results 
and Dr. Ludwig F. Kroner  recommended "operative treatment."  Alphin further testified that after his 
last visit with Dr. Kroner, his back did get better, and that is when he began 
looking for work which, in turn, led to the job with Black Horse where he 
suffered the injury which is directly at issue in this 
case.

 
 
[¶9]      Alphin claimed 
that he did not hurt his back in the 2001 incident and that when he went to work 
for Black Horse, he was not experiencing any back problems.  Nevertheless, it was Alphin's intention, 
as well as that of Black Horse, that he not put significant strain on his back 
while working.  However, beginning 
several weeks after the injury involving the backhoe, Alphin was experiencing 
severe back pain.

 
 
[¶10]   The Division sent Alphin's medical 
records to Mark R. Rangitsch, M.D., for an evaluation.  Dr. Rangitsch provided this report to 
the Division:

 
 
Specifically, 
Mr. Alphin, apparently, has had longstanding lumbar spinal problems, dating back 
to, likely a fall, from a roof back in 2001.  He was treated for low back 
problems.  Actually, before the 
injury of 12/2005, Dr. Kroner had recommended surgical intervention to his 
lumbar spine.  At the time of his 
accident, he apparently did not injure his lumbar spine, per Dr. Berg's 
note.  He had epidural steroid 
injection for the lumbar spine, in June 2005.  And, again, he was recommended to have 
surgery prior to his accident of December 13, 2005.

 
 
Therefore, 
for your specific questions:

 
 

1.    
Did 
the patient have any apparent injuries to his lumbar spine on 12/13/2005?  It appears that he did not.  He had an injury to the left hip and 
pelvis, but not to the lumbar spine.  
And, actually, he was denying back pain at the time of his 
injury.

2.    
Is 
the patient's lumbar spine condition, or a need for lumbar spine treatment, due 
to the work incident on 12/13/2005, or more due to his lumbar spine degenerative 
disease, from his MRI scan noted on 6/24/2005?  I do not believe his current lumbar 
spine condition is due to any injury on 12/13/2005, but likely due to his 
longstanding problems prior to that point.

3.    
Did 
the work incident on 12/13/2005 cause a material aggravation to Mr. Alphin's 
preexisting lumbar spine condition and cause the need for future treatment?  I do not believe it 
did.

 
 
[¶11]   Alphin's treatment at the state 
penitentiary revealed that he was prescribed pain medication for his back 
problems.  Eventually, he was sent 
to see Kenneth Schulze, M.D., during August and September of 2007 for further 
evaluation of his back problems.  
Dr. Schulze had a new MRI done and compared it with the MRI done in Rock 
Springs in June 2005.  In an August 
19, 2007 letter to penitentiary medical staff, Dr. Schulze 
opined:

 
 
Comparing 
the 2005 with the 2007 MRI study there has been a marked increase in the disc 
herniation at L4-L5 with significant prolapse of disc material and inferior 
migration of that disc material.  
Nerve root impingement as described by Roy Hediger, M.D., is 
noted.

 
 
It 
is my recommendation that Joshua Alphin undergo a micro-laminotomy for disc 
excision to relieve the nerve root entrapment.

 
 
[¶12]   A part of Alphin's evidence 
included a letter sent to Dr. Schulze, dated October 24, 2007, asking that he 
answer several questions.  The 
answers given by Dr. Schulze are underscored below, but in the letter his 
hand-written answers are difficult to decipher:

 
 

1.    
Please 
summarize the history and treatment you have provided to Mr. Alphin, including 
your diagnosis.  Answer:  Attached (The document attached is 
the information quoted immediately above from Dr. Schulze's August 19, 2007 
letter.  In the briefs, the hearing 
examiner's findings, and in the district court's decision letter, the word 
"answered" is used, rather than "attached."  Our close examination of the document in 
question convinces us that the word is attached, although it makes no difference 
in the outcome of this case.)

2.    
Would 
it be unusual for Mr. Alphin's low back symptoms to appear shortly after the 
accident in the context of his initial complaints of hip and pelvic pain as set 
forth in Dr. Woodfin's treatment notes?  
Answer: No.

3.    
Did 
Mr. Alphin's work related injury in December of 2005 cause a material 
aggravation of any preexisting condition or was this a new injury?  Please state the basis of your opinion. 
 A material aggravation has been 
defined for the purposes of Wyoming law as:

"The 
work effort contributed to a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation 
or acceleration of the preexisting condition of the employee.  The injury is compensable if the 
employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to 
produce the injury or infirmity."  
Answer: Yes

[4.]       Please 
state whether in your opinion, based on a degree of medical probability, whether 
Mr. Alphin will require future medical care regarding those conditions causally 
related to his work related injury in December of 2005, and if so, the expected 
duration and cost for that treatment.  
Answer:  Yes.  Cannot tell you 
duration/cost.

[5.]       I have 
enclosed Dr. Rangitsch's record review report for your review.  Please state if you agree or disagree 
with Dr. Rangitsch's opinion and the basis of your opinion.  Answer:  Disagree.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶13]   Because of the issues raised here, 
there are three aspects of the applicable standard of review that we must 
apply.  In Dale v. S & S Builders, L.L.C., 2008 
WY 84, ¶¶ 22-24, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008) we detailed our revised 
statement of those standards:

 
 
Thus, 
in the interests of simplifying the process of identifying the correct standard 
of review and bringing our approach closer to the original use of the two 
standards, we hold that henceforth the substantial evidence standard will be 
applied any time we review an evidentiary ruling.  When the burdened party prevailed before 
the agency, we will determine if substantial evidence exists to support the 
finding for that party by considering whether there is relevant evidence in the 
entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  If the hearing 
examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, 
we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency's 
decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by considering 
whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
in the record as a whole.  See, 
Wyo. Consumer Group v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Wyo.1994); Spiegel, 549 P.2d  at 1178 (discussing 
the definition of substantial evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence").  If, in the 
course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence 
and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility 
or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under 
the substantial evidence test.  
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether 
we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude 
as it did, based on all the evidence before it.

 
 
            
The arbitrary and capricious standard remains a " safety net' to 
catch agency action which prejudices a party's substantial rights or which may 
be contrary to the other W.A.P.A. review standards yet is not easily categorized 
or fit to any one particular standard."  Newman, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d  at 172.  Although we explained the "safety 
net" application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in Newman, we will refine it slightly here 
to more carefully delineate that it is not meant to apply to true evidentiary 
questions.  Instead, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard will apply if the hearing examiner refused to admit 
testimony or documentary exhibits that were clearly admissible or failed to 
provide appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law.  This listing is demonstrative and not 
intended as an inclusive catalog of all possible circumstances.  Id.

 
 
            
There will be times when the arbitrary and capricious standard appears to 
overlap with some of the other standards.  
For example, a decision against the great weight of the evidence might 
properly be called arbitrary or capricious in everyday language.  However, the words "arbitrary" and 
"capricious" must be understood in context as terms of art under the 
administrative review statute and should not be employed in areas where the more 
specifically defined standards provide sufficient relief.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Were 
the Hearing Examiner's Credibility Determinations Sustainable under the 
Substantial Evidence Test

 
 
[¶14]   The hearing examiner made several 
determinations concerning credibility.  
The only witness to testify in person was Alphin.  To the extent the hearing examiner made 
credibility determinations with respect to him, those determinations are clearly 
sustainable under the substantial evidence test.  This is so because Alphin contradicted 
his own testimony several times.  He 
denied a back injury in 2001, although he appears to have at least suggested 
such an injury to Dr. Kroner.  He 
did not report a back injury to the physicians he saw on December 13, 2005.  Alphin's self-report of injury was 
generally inconsistent and we conclude that, considered in its totality, his 
testimony might well have been deemed not credible, in significant part, by the 
hearing examiner.

 
 
[¶15]   The hearing examiner also made 
credibility determinations as to documents used as exhibits.  In particular, he found Dr. Rangitsch to 
be more credible than Dr. Schulze, because Dr. Schulze's answers were 
incomplete, excessively terse, and he did not "explain," although some questions 
called for at least some explanation.  
The hearing examiner also scored Dr. Schulze for at least one significant 
inaccuracy in his summary of Alphin's medical history (the timing of his 
treatment with Dr. Kroner and the December 12, 2005 injury).  Both the district court and this Court 
have had the same materials available for examination as did the hearing 
examiner.  The hearing examiner 
couched his assessment of these matters as going to credibility, although they 
might more accurately be described as going only to the "weight" to be given the 
testimony in question.  To the 
extent the hearing examiner did discount the exhibits described above, we 
conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to sustain the hearing 
examiner's findings in those regards. 

 
 
Did 
the Hearing Examiner Properly Conclude That Alphin Did Not Meet His Burden of 
Proof

 
 
[¶16]   The principles governing a 
claimant's burden of proof are well established:

 
 
In 
order to be eligible to receive worker's compensation benefits, a claimant must 
have sustained an "injury" as defined by Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 
2001).  " Injury' means any harmful 
change in the human organism other than normal aging ... arising out of and in 
the course of employment while at work...." To demonstrate that an injury arose 
out of the course of employment, the claimant must establish a causal connection 
between the work-related incident and the injury.  Hanks v. City of Casper, 2001 WY 4, ¶ 6, 
16 P.3d 710, 711 (Wyo.2001).  The 
claimant bears the burden of proving this causal connection by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2001 WY 132, ¶ 19, 36 P.3d 1145, 1150 
(Wyo.2001).  "A preponderance of 
the evidence' is defined as proof which leads the trier of fact to find that 
the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence.' 
"  Matter of Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Thornberg, 913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 
1359 (Wyo.1979)).

 
 

Anastos 
v. General Chemical Soda Ash, 
2005 WY 122, ¶ 20, 120 P.3d 658, 665-66 (Wyo.2005).

 
 
      "Injury," as the 
term is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2003) of the 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, does not include any injury or condition 
preexisting at the time employment begins with the employer against whom a claim 
is made.  However, "in Wyoming an 
employer takes the employee as he finds him."  Lindbloom v. Teton International, 684 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Wyo.1984).  If an 
employee suffers from a preexisting condition, that employee may still recover 
if his employment substantially or materially aggravates that condition.  Id.  In Lindbloom, we cited with approval the 
widely accepted treatise, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, for the 
proposition that:

 
 
Preexisting 
disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim under the 
"arising out of employment" requirement if the employment aggravated, 
accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or 
disability for which compensation is sought. 

 
 
1 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, § 12.20, p. 273-276.  Larson goes on to 
say:

 
 
      Since the rule of 
law stated at the beginning of this section is so widely accepted, in practice 
most of the problems in this area are medical rather than legal.  * * * *  It will be found, then, that denials of 
compensation in this category are almost entirely the result of holdings that 
the evidence did not support a finding that the employment contributed to the 
final result.  Whether the 
employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the internal weakness or 
disease to produce the disability is a question of fact, not law, and a finding 
of fact on this point * * * * based on any medical testimony * * * * will not be 
disturbed on appeal.  

 
 

Id., 
§ 12.20, p. 313-16.

 
 

Boyce 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 9, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d 451, 454-55 (Wyo.2005).

 
 
      Expert opinion 
testimony ordinarily will be required to establish the link between the 
employee's work activity or injury and the preexisting disease or 
condition;  the expert need not 
state with specificity that the work activities or injury materially or 
substantially aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the preexisting disease 
or condition to necessitate the medical treatment for which compensation is 
sought; and the expert need not apportion between the work activity or injury 
and the preexisting disease or condition;  
the relative contribution of the work activity or injury and the 
preexisting disease or condition is not weighed.

 
 

Ramos 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2007 WY 85, ¶ 18, 158 P.3d 670, 677 (Wyo.2007) (citing Boyce, ¶¶ 11, 16, 105 P.3d at 
455-56).

 
 

Straube 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 
2009 WY 66, ¶ 15, 208 P.3d 41,47-48 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶17]   The hearing examiner's findings of 
fact mirrored those we have set out above.  
Alphin, of course, had the burden of proof in these 
proceedings:

 
 
The 
claimant has the burden of proving each of the essential elements of his claim 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. 
Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo.2000).  As a part of that burden, the claimant 
must prove a causal connection exists between a work-related injury and the 
injury for which worker's compensation benefits are being sought.  That determination involves a question 
of fact. Taylor, ¶ 9, 123 P.3d  
at 146; Morgan v. Olsten Temp.  Servs., 975 P.2d 12, 16 
(Wyo.1999).

 
 

Dale, 
¶ 35, 188 P.3d 563.

 
 
[¶18]   Alphin asserted that he did not 
hurt his back until the time he went to work for Black Horse.  However, the medical evidence was not 
entirely consistent with his claims in that regard, as we have set out more 
fully above.  Given these 
circumstances, the hearing examiner was required to sift through that evidence 
with great care:

 
 
[The 
claimant's] injury presented complex medical issues related to causation that 
would normally signify a need for the trier of fact to rely on the technical 
medical knowledge of an expert.  A 
finder of fact is not necessarily bound by an expert's medical testimony.  Morgan v. Olsten Temporary Services, 975 P.2d 12, 16 (Wyo.1999) (citing Forni v. 
Pathfinder Mines, 834 P.2d 688, 693 (Wyo.1992)).

 
 
It 
is the hearing examiner's responsibility, as the trier of fact, to determine 
relevancy, assign probative value and ascribe the relevant weight given to 
medical testimony.  [Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Wyo.1997)] (citing Matter of Workers' Compensation Claim of 
Thornberg, 913 P.2d [863] at 867 [Wyo. 1996]).  "The hearing examiner [is] also in the 
best position to judge the weight to be given to the medical evidence."  [Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d 1233, 1237 
(Wyo.1996); Latimer v. Rissler & 
McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo.1995)] "The trier of fact may disregard 
an expert opinion if he finds the opinion unreasonable or not adequately 
supported by the facts upon which the opinion is based."  Clark, 934 P.2d  at 
1271.

 
 

Morgan, 
975 P.2d  at 16.

 
 

Hicks 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 
2005 WY 11, ¶ 21, 105 P.3d 462, 471 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶19]   Moreover,

 
 
This 
Court has been equally clear in its requirements for the consideration to be 
given medical opinion testimony.  

 
 
When 
presented with medical opinion testimony, the hearing examiner, as the trier of 
fact, is responsible for determining relevancy, assigning probative values, and 
ascribing the relevant weight to be given to the testimony.... In weighing the 
medical opinion testimony, the fact finder considers:  (1) the opinion; (2) the reasons, if 
any, given for it; (3) the strength of it; and (4) the qualifications and 
credibility of the witness or witnesses expressing it.  

 
 

Decker, 
¶ 33, 124 P.3d  at 697 (quoting Baxter v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 2004 WY 138, ¶ 9, 100 P.3d 427, 431 (Wyo.2004) (quoting 
Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo.1999))).

 
 

Worker's 
Compensation Claim of Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 
2006 WY 65, ¶ 24, 135 P.3d 568, 576 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶20]   Alphin also advances what sounds 
like a "res ipsa loquitor" argument in support of his claims.  That is, the only reasonable conclusion 
that can be reached, given the record extant, is that a blow from a backhoe, 
such as that suffered by Alphin, requires that the fact-finder accept as a given 
that Alphin must have suffered the sort of back injury he claims to have 
sustained.  Although Alphin does not 
support this contention with pertinent authority, our inquiry reveals that the 
facts and circumstances of this case 
do not merit bringing that legal construct to bear.  See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationships § 362 
(Application of res ipsa loquitor doctrine) (2004).

 
 
[¶21]   Having gone through the exercise 
set out above, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the 
agency's decision to reject the evidence offered by Alphin after considering 
whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
in the record as a whole.

 
 
Applicability 
of the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard

 
 
[¶22]   Alphin contends that his ability to 
successfully prosecute his claim for worker's compensation benefits was so 
hampered by his side deal with Black Horse and his subsequent inability to get 
timely medical attention for his back problems, following the December 12, 2005 
incident, that this Court should apply the arbitrary and capricious safety net 
described in Dale.  We have carefully examined this 
contention, and we conclude that Alphin's circumstances are not ones that call 
into play that "safety net."

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   We affirm the district court's 
order which affirmed the hearing examiner's findings and 
conclusions.