Title: Acuity v. Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Acuity v. Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3092.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3092 
ACUITY, APPELLANT v. MASTERS PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Acuity v. Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 
2022-Ohio-3092.] 
Insurer of distributor of pharmaceutical products, including prescription opioids, 
does not owe a duty to defend its insured in lawsuits brought by 
governmental entities seeking economic damages for losses caused by the 
opioid epidemic—The insurance policies cover “damages because of bodily 
injury,” and the damages sought by the governmental entities do not fall 
within that coverage. 
(No. 2020-1134—Submitted September 8, 2021—Decided September 7, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-190176, 
2020-Ohio-3440. 
_____________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider whether appellant, Acuity, an insurer, 
owes a duty to defend its insured, appellee, Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc. 
(“Masters”), in several lawsuits brought by cities and counties in West Virginia, 
Michigan, and Nevada (“the governments”) for economic losses caused by the 
opioid epidemic.  The dramatic increase in the acceptance and use of highly 
addictive prescription opioids to treat chronic pain in recent years has contributed 
to the hundreds of thousands of opioid-related overdoses in the United States—now 
commonly referred to as the opioid-overdose epidemic.  Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Prescription Opioids, https://www.cdc.gov/opioids 
/basics/prescribed.html (accessed Apr. 27, 2022) [https://perma.cc/47KE-UGY9]; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Understanding the Opioid Overdose 
Epidemic, https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/basics/epidemic.html (accessed Apr. 27, 
2022) [https://perma.cc/Q96N-2DA2].  The underlying lawsuits represent a 
growing number of actions initiated by governmental entities against opioid 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers for their alleged improper marketing and 
inappropriate distributing of prescription opioids across the country. 
{¶ 2} Masters purchased several commercial general liability insurance 
policies from Acuity, and those policies impose on Acuity a duty to defend the 
insured against any suit seeking “damages because of bodily injury.”  The trial court 
concluded that Acuity does not owe Masters a duty to defend it in the underlying 
suits, because the governments seek damages for their own economic losses.  The 
First District Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that some of the governments’ 
economic losses are arguably “because of bodily injury,” and reversed the trial 
court’s judgment.  Because we conclude that Acuity does not owe Masters a duty 
to defend, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial 
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Acuity. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 3} Masters was a wholesale distributor of pharmaceutical products, and 
as part of its business, Masters filled and shipped orders of prescription opioids to 
pharmacies around the country.1  Twenty-two cities and counties in West Virginia, 
Michigan, and Nevada have sued Masters,2 as well as several pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, other distributors, and retailers.  These underlying suits are 
substantially similar to each other and share common allegations and claims against 
Masters.  The governments allege that Masters failed to monitor and report 
suspicious orders of prescription opioids and to implement measures to prevent the 
filling of improper prescriptions and that it thereby failed to maintain effective 
controls against the diversion of prescription opioids into the illicit market in 
violation of federal and state laws.  The governments claim that Masters’s conduct 
“greatly contributed to the vast increase in opioid overuse and addiction” and 
caused “a public-health and law-enforcement crisis” in their respective 
communities.  Based on these allegations, the governments assert claims for public 
nuisance, negligence, and, in a majority of the complaints, violations of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) Act, among other laws.  
They allege that Masters’s conduct contributed to the opioid epidemic that 
continues to plague their communities, resulting in the governments’ suffering 
economic losses, such as increased law-enforcement expenses, judicial 
expenditures, prison and public-works costs, emergency and medical-care-services 
costs, substance-abuse-treatment expenses, and lost economic opportunity. 
{¶ 4} Between July 26, 2010, and July 26, 2018, Masters purchased eight 
commercial general liability insurance policies from Acuity (each policy coving 
 
1. As of January 1, 2018, Masters is a shell company and is no longer in operation. 
 
2. The majority of these actions have been consolidated and transferred to a federal multidistrict-
litigation court in the Northern District of Ohio as part of the national prescription-opioid litigation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
one year).  The policies state that under certain circumstances, Acuity has a duty to 
defend Masters against lawsuits seeking “damages because of bodily injury” and a 
duty to indemnify Masters for damages it may be legally obligated to pay.  Acuity 
filed an action in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas for a declaratory 
judgment that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Masters in the underlying 
suits.  Masters counterclaimed for a declaration that Acuity owed both duties. 
{¶ 5} Both parties moved for summary judgment.  In support of its motion, 
Acuity argued that the underlying suits do not fall within the policy coverage, 
because the governments seek damages for their own economic injury, not for any 
bodily injury, and because Masters knew of the opioid epidemic prior to purchasing 
the policies from Acuity.  Masters countered that the policies provide coverage 
because the governments seek, at least in part, “damages because of bodily injury,” 
such as medical and treatment costs they have incurred because of opioid addiction 
and overdoses sustained by their citizens. 
{¶ 6} The trial court ultimately agreed with Acuity for two reasons.  First, 
it concluded that the complaints in the underlying suits do not seek “damages 
because of bodily injury,” because the governments seek damages solely for their 
own economic loss, not damages for any citizen’s opioid addiction.  And second, it 
found that Masters knew prior to the initial policy period of the alleged “bodily 
injury”—i.e., prescription opioid addiction—thereby precluding coverage under 
the policies’ loss-in-progress provisions.  It accordingly granted Acuity’s motion 
for summary judgment, denied Masters’s motion for summary judgment, and 
declared that Acuity did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify Masters in the 
underlying suits. 
{¶ 7} Masters appealed and argued that the trial court erred in determining 
that Acuity had no duty to defend it in the underlying suits.  The First District agreed 
and reversed the trial court’s judgment.  It concluded that the policies expressly 
provide for organizations, like the governments in the underlying suits, to claim 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
“economic damages, as long as the damages occurred because of bodily injury.”  
2020-Ohio-3440, ¶ 17.  Accordingly, it determined that the policies covered some 
of the governments’ alleged economic losses, such as medical expenses and 
treatment costs, because those losses are arguably “because of bodily injury”—i.e., 
because of physical harm from opioid addiction.  Id. at ¶ 30.  The First District 
further concluded that the policies’ loss-in-progress provisions did not preclude 
coverage, because it was unclear whether some of the governments’ damages were 
known to Masters prior to the initial policy period.  Id. at ¶ 50.  It therefore held 
that Acuity has a duty to defend Masters in the underlying suits, and it remanded 
the case for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Masters.  Id. at  
¶ 54. 
{¶ 8} We accepted Acuity’s discretionary appeal, which presents two 
propositions of law.  See 160 Ohio St.3d 1495, 2020-Ohio-5634, 159 N.E.3d 277.  
In its first proposition of law, Acuity argues that commercial general liability 
policies, such as those at issue here, cover an insured’s liability for an occurrence 
causing “bodily injury” to a specific, identifiable person and do not cover an 
insured’s liability for corporate conduct that allegedly caused governmental entities 
to sustain economic losses for increased governmental services.  In its second 
proposition, Acuity asserts that whether the loss-in-progress provision within the 
policies bars coverage turns on whether prior to the policy period the insured knew 
that the “bodily injury” had occurred, in whole or in part, and not on whether the 
insured knew of the damages claimed in the underlying suits.  Because we resolve 
this case on the first proposition of law, we need not consider Acuity’s second 
proposition. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
Analysis 
The commercial general liability policies 
{¶ 9} Between 2010 and 2018, Acuity issued eight commercial general 
liability policies to Masters, all of which include the following language regarding 
coverage for bodily injury:  
 
(a) [Acuity] will pay those sums that [Masters] becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or 
property damage to which this insurance applies.  [Acuity] will have 
the right and duty to defend [Masters] against any suit seeking those 
damages.  However, [Acuity] will have no duty to defend [Masters] 
against any suit seeking damages for bodily injury or property 
damage to which this insurance does not apply. 
* * * 
(b) This insurance applies to bodily injury and property 
damage only if:  
(1) The bodily injury or property damage is caused by an 
occurrence that takes place in the coverage territory;  
(2) The bodily injury or property damage occurs during the 
policy period; and  
(3) Prior to the policy period, no insured * * * knew that the 
bodily injury or property damage had occurred, in whole or in part.  
If [an]  insured * * * knew, prior to the policy period, that the bodily 
injury or property damage occurred, then any continuation, change 
or resumption of such bodily injury or property damage during or 
after the policy period will be deemed to have been known prior to 
the policy period. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
The above language is set forth under Section I, Coverage A(1) of the basic insuring 
agreement in each policy.  “Coverage A” in standard commercial general liability 
policies provides for bodily-injury and property-damage liability coverage.  See 20-
129 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Section 129.2 (2d Ed.2011). 
{¶ 10} The policies define “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness or 
disease sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any 
time.”  The policies do not define “damages,” but they do state that “damages 
because of bodily injury include damages claimed by any person or organization 
for care, loss of services or death resulting at any time from the bodily injury.”  
Coverage A (1)(b)(3) of the policies is often referred to as the “loss-in-progress” or 
“known-loss” provision.  See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mansfield Plumbing 
Prods., L.L.C., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 2011-COA-009, 2011-Ohio-4523, ¶ 10; 
Kaady v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 790 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir.2015). 
Applicable law 
{¶ 11} We review de novo a decision granting summary judgment based on 
the interpretation of an insurance contract.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 540, 2011-Ohio-1818, 948 N.E.2d 931, ¶ 12 (plurality opinion), citing 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 
N.E.2d 684 (1995).  An insurance policy is a contract whose interpretation is a 
matter of law, Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 
146 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus, and like any other contract, its terms are 
to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 
70 Ohio St.2d 166, 167-168, 436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982).  Courts must examine an 
insurance contract as a whole and presume that the language used in the policy 
reflects the intent of the parties.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 
2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11.  Consequently, courts cannot read 
insurance policies in an overly circumscribed fashion.  Sauer v. Crews, 140 Ohio 
St.3d 314, 2014-Ohio-3655, 18 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 13, citing Gomolka at 172. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
{¶ 12} An insurer’s duty to defend is both broader than and distinct from its 
duty to indemnify.  Ohio Govt. Risk Mgt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St.3d 241, 
2007-Ohio-4948, 874 N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 19, citing Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199 (1945), paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  When determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend, we look 
to the scope of the allegations of the underlying complaint filed against the insured.  
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 33 Ohio St.2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973), 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  “If the allegations state a claim that potentially or 
arguably falls within the liability insurance coverage, then the insurer must defend 
the insured in the action.”  Ward v. United Foundries, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 292, 
2011-Ohio-3176, 951 N.E.2d 770, ¶ 19.  But an insurer need not defend an action 
when all the claims are clearly and indisputably outside the policy coverage.  
Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill, 30 Ohio St.3d 108, 113, 507 N.E.2d 1118 (1987). 
{¶ 13} There is a growing and diverging body of case law on the issue 
before us: whether an insurance policy that provides coverage for “damages 
because of bodily injury” covers claims brought by governmental entities to recover 
economic costs they incurred as a result of the opioid epidemic.  Some courts have 
interpreted policy language that is nearly identical to the language at issue in the 
policies here and have held that similar opioid-related lawsuits filed by 
governmental entities invoked the insurer’s duty to defend because those entities 
sought “damages because of bodily injury.”  See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. H.D. 
Smith, L.L.C., 829 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir.2016); Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Am. Guar. & 
Liab. Ins. Co., 499 F.Supp.3d 147 (W.D.Pa.2020) (concluding that the insurance 
company had a duty to defend the insured distributor because the counties’ 
underlying lawsuits alleged bodily injuries such as opioid abuse, addiction, 
overdose, and death suffered by their citizens and sought to recover costs related to 
emergency medical treatment, detoxification and addiction services, and recovery 
treatment). 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
{¶ 14} But other courts have concluded that no duty to defend existed in 
such lawsuits because the governments sought to recover their own increased 
economic costs resulting from a public-health crisis and did not tie their claims to 
an individual opioid-related injury, which would require proof of that injury.  See, 
e.g., ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 270 A.3d 239, 253-254 (Del.2022); 
Westfield Natl. Ins. Co. v. Quest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., W.D.Ky. No. 5:19-cv-
00083-TBR, 2021 WL 1821702, *7 (May 6, 2021) (holding that because the 
governmental entities in the underlying suits did “not need to provide proof that 
[their] citizens or patients experienced any bodily injury,” they did not seek 
damages because of bodily injury). 
{¶ 15} Like the appellate court in its decision below, Masters heavily relies 
on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
H.D. Smith.  In that case, the Seventh Circuit interpreted a liability policy that, 
similar to the one before us, required the insurer to defend the insured against suits 
that seek damages “because of bodily injury.”  Id. at 773.  The state of West 
Virginia sued the insured pharmaceutical distributor for its role in the opioid 
epidemic and alleged that it had incurred “ ‘excessive costs related to diagnosis, 
treatment and cure of addiction’ ” and had provided “ ‘necessary medical care, 
facilities, and services for treatment of citizens’ who [could not] afford their own 
care.”  Id. at 775.  The Seventh Circuit concluded that the insurer had a duty to 
defend the pharmaceutical distributor in the underlying litigation because West 
Virginia alleged that its citizens had suffered opioid-related bodily injuries and the 
state sought to recover as damages the money it had spent caring for those injuries.  
Id. at 774.  In so holding, the court used an analogy involving a hypothetical West 
Virginian who suffered bodily injury because of his opioid addiction.  The 
hypothetical man’s mother spent her own money to care for her injured son and 
brought a suit against the pharmaceutical distributor seeking recovery of those 
costs.  The court noted that the insurer conceded that its policy would cover the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
mother’s negligence claim in that situation, and the court reasoned that a state’s 
seeking damages related to medical care and services it provided for its own citizens 
is no different than a mother’s seeking damages for her own losses she sustained in 
caring for her son.  Id. 
{¶ 16} In ACE Am. Ins. Co., the Delaware Supreme Court rejected this 
analogy.  In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the insurer owed no 
duty to defend the insured drugstore company against lawsuits filed by Ohio 
counties seeking “economic damages” for losses incurred as a “direct and 
proximate result” of the company’s failure to effectively prevent the diversion of 
prescription opioids into the illicit market.  270 A.3d at 241, 246.  The liability 
policy imposed a duty to defend against lawsuits seeking damages because of 
“personal injury,” which was defined in part as “bodily injury.”  Id. at 243.  The 
court acknowledged that the underlying parties brought direct claims asserting their 
own losses in both the Seventh Circuit’s hypothetical case and in its case.  Id. at 
253.  However, it determined that the cases differ because the hypothetical mother’s 
claim would require proof that the alleged harm caused by the insured was the 
immediate and direct result of her son’s injury, whereas the counties’ “alleged 
damages do not depend on proof of bodily injuries.”  Id. at 253-254. 
{¶ 17} The Delaware court reasoned that the policy required “more than 
some linkage between the personal injury and damages to recover ‘because of’ 
personal injury”—namely, that the underlying claims stem from a bodily injury and 
the damages sought be tied to that specific bodily injury.  Id. at 250.  Based on the 
nature of the allegations in the underlying complaints, the court determined that the 
counties’ claims were not tied to an individual injury but to a public-health crisis, 
because the counties sought damages for increased economic costs caused by the 
opioid epidemic.  Id. at 253.  It therefore concluded that the counties’ suits did not 
invoke the insurer’s duty to defend as the suits did not seek damages because of 
personal injury.  Id. at 253-254. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
The underlying complaints filed against Masters 
{¶ 18} With the above in mind, we begin with a review of the underlying 
complaints and the scope of the allegations against Masters.  As noted above, the 
underlying complaints filed by the various West Virginia, Michigan, and Nevada 
governmental entities are substantially similar and often use comparable, if not 
identical, language.  Because the allegations in the complaint filed by Genesee 
County, Michigan, against Masters mirror several of the important and relevant 
allegations set forth in the other underlying complaints, we use it as a 
representative. 
{¶ 19} Genesee County seeks damages for losses it suffered due to 
Masters’s failure “to effectively monitor and report suspicious orders of 
prescription opioids” and “to implement measures to prevent the filling of improper 
prescriptions.”  It claims that Masters’s conduct “greatly contributed to the vast 
increase in opioid overuse and addiction” and “directly caused a public-health and 
law-enforcement crisis,” thereby forcing Genesee County “to shoulder tremendous 
costs” and “an exorbitant financial burden.”  Accordingly, it seeks “damages [for 
losses] caused by the opioid epidemic,” including “increased emergency response 
costs,” “law enforcement and incarceration costs,” “addiction treatment costs,” and 
“medical costs,” as well as “accelerated economic blight,” which it claims has 
resulted in “diminished property values and a loss in tax revenue.” 
{¶ 20} Acuity argues that the underlying complaints demonstrate that the 
governments seek reimbursement for costs for increased governmental services 
provided to the public on account of the opioid epidemic, not for bodily injury 
experienced by any specific person or persons.  It emphasizes that any claim for 
damages on account of an injury sustained by society as a whole or by unidentified 
members of the public is insufficient to constitute a claim for “damages because of 
bodily injury.”  Accordingly, Acuity maintains that to be covered, a claim must 
seek damages either directly or derivatively for a bodily injury sustained by a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
person—neither of which, it contends, the governments claim in their underlying 
complaints.  Stated differently, because the governments’ claims for increased 
public-service costs are untethered to any one person’s bodily injury—but, rather, 
to the costs of the opioid epidemic generally—Acuity asserts that the underlying 
suits do not seek “damages because of bodily injury.”  It therefore asserts that the 
First District incorrectly interpreted the phrase “damages because of bodily injury” 
so broadly as to cover “any liability where bodily injury is a tangential factor.” 
{¶ 21} Masters counters that the governments’ complaints do include 
allegations regarding specific and identifiable persons who have experienced 
opioid-related bodily injuries.  It emphasizes that Pocahontas County, West 
Virginia, alleges that it “experienced 34 drug overdose deaths per 100,000 
population”; Saginaw County, Michigan, pleads that “116 opioid related 
hospitalizations” occurred in that county in 2013; and the city of Lansing, 
Michigan, claims that in 2015, its fire department administered 243 doses of 
Naloxone, a lifesaving, opioid-overdose-reversal drug.  Masters stresses that every 
dose of Naloxone was administered to a specific person and that every hospital and 
treatment-program admission was of a specific person, and it asserts that it is for 
these specific costs as to these specific persons that the governments pray for 
reimbursement in their complaints.  Masters therefore maintains that the losses for 
which the governments seek damages include the costs of medical care and other 
treatment they provided to their citizens suffering from opioid-related injury, 
illness, and death.  Based on these allegations, Masters asserts that the underlying 
suits fall within the definition of “damages because of bodily injury” set forth in 
the policies, which explicitly includes “damages claimed by any * * * organization 
for care, loss of services or death resulting * * * from the bodily injury.” 
{¶ 22} It is true that some of the complaints include allegations that the 
governments’ citizens sustained opioid-related injuries and that the damages sought 
by the governments include costs for providing medical care and treatment services.  
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
But the governments’ theories of relief in the underlying suits are not that specific 
opioid-related injuries sustained by their citizens occurred because of Masters’s 
alleged failure to prevent the improper diversion of prescription opioids and that 
the damages sought flow from the care of those specific opioid-related injuries.  For 
instance, Lansing, Michigan, does not claim that Masters’s allegedly negligent 
conduct proximately caused 243 Lansing citizens’ overdoses in 2015, which 
required the fire department to administer 243 doses of Naloxone, and Saginaw 
County does not claim that the conduct proximately caused 116 Saginaw County 
citizens’ hospitalizations in 2013.  Nor do the counties seek recovery for the 
medical care provided for those specific opioid-related injuries. 
{¶ 23} Rather, the governments’ theories of relief are that Masters’s alleged 
failure to prevent the improper diversion of prescription opioids was a “direct and 
proximate cause of the opioid epidemic” and the “economic damages” sought are 
based on that public-health crisis.  Stated differently, the governments seek 
damages for their own aggregate economic injuries caused by the opioid epidemic 
and not for any particular opioid-related bodily injury sustained by a citizen as a 
direct result of Masters’s alleged failures.  The governments repeatedly allege in 
their complaints that Masters has “created a serious public health crisis,” which is 
a public nuisance, and that they bring the underlying actions to force Masters to 
“take responsibility for the opioid epidemic that [it has] created.”  They also allege 
that the “opioid epidemic has caused [the governments] to suffer past, present, and 
future damages in the form of the increased expenses of providing public services 
that so far exceeds the normal, expected costs.” 
{¶ 24} The allegations in the governments’ complaints regarding the 
opioid-related overdoses, addiction, and injuries sustained by their citizens 
accordingly provide context for their public-nuisance, negligence, and RICO 
claims.  See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Richie Ents., L.L.C., W.D.Ky. No. 1:12-CV-
00186-JHM-HBB, 2014 WL 3513211, *5 (July 16, 2014) (reasoning that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
underlying claims that “persons suffered physical harm and death due to 
prescription drugs only explains and supports the claims of the actual harm 
complained of: the economic loss to the State of West Virginia”); Quest 
Pharmaceuticals, 2021 WL 1821702, at *7, quoting Health Care Indus. Liab. Ins. 
Program v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 566 F.3d 689, 695 (7th 
Cir.2009) (explaining that the allegations as to opioid-related injuries to citizens 
“merely ‘put a human touch’ on the claims”).  By highlighting the sheer number of 
opioid-related overdoses and hospitalizations that have occurred in their 
communities, the governments bolster their claims that Masters’s alleged failure to 
prevent the improper diversion of prescription opioids to the public has indeed 
created and perpetuated a public-health crisis in their respective jurisdictions and 
that the governments have in fact incurred “an exorbitant financial burden” in 
combatting that crisis.  To be sure, the opioid epidemic, as a public-health crisis, 
necessarily relates to bodily injuries, such as opioid addictions, hospitalizations, 
and deaths.  But allegations of bodily injury alone do not automatically bring an 
action within the coverage for “damages because of bodily injury.”  See Barron v. 
NCMIC Ins. Co., D.Mass. No. 17-cv-11969-ADB, 2018 WL 2089357, *6 (May 4, 
2018) (concluding that the insurer had no duty to defend its insureds 
[chiropractors], because, even assuming that the chiropractors’ patients had in fact 
been injured, the allegations did not “conceivably allow [the underlying plaintiff—
the patients’ insurer, who had paid the chiropractors’ allegedly fraudulent medical 
bills] to in any way recover for such an injury”). 
{¶ 25} In sum, the governments tie their alleged losses to the aggregate 
economic injuries they have experienced as a result of the opioid epidemic, not to 
any particular bodily injury.  With this in mind, we now consider whether, based 
on the plain language of the policies, the underlying suits seek “damages because 
of bodily injury,” thereby invoking a duty to defend. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
The plain language of the policies requires more than a tenuous connection 
between the damages sought and the bodily injury 
{¶ 26} Central to the question before us is how to interpret the phrase 
“damages because of bodily injury” as used in the commercial general liability 
policies at issue here.  Acuity, on the one hand, maintains that this phrase cannot 
be read broadly to include damages for increased economic costs that are untethered 
to any person’s bodily injury.  Masters, on the other hand, asserts that “because of” 
requires “only a causal connection between the bodily injury and the alleged 
damages” and that the underlying suits therefore fall within coverage since the 
governments seek damages because of the bodily injuries allegedly caused by 
opioids and sustained by their citizens. 
{¶ 27} Masters’s argument relies on the following premise: Acuity has a 
duty to defend because the governments allege that they have suffered economic 
loss caused by the opioid epidemic, which in turn was caused by the numerous 
opioid-related injuries sustained by their citizens.  By this, Masters asks us to 
interpret “damages because of bodily injury” so expansively as to include any suit 
in which the damages sought merely relate to bodily injury, regardless of whether 
the claims are in fact tied to any particular bodily injury sustained by a person.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we decline to adopt such an expansive interpretation. 
{¶ 28} The ordinary meaning of “because of” is “by reason of” or “on 
account of.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (2002).  Some 
courts have interpreted the phrase “because of bodily injury” broadly, and Masters 
relies on many of these cases.  See, e.g., H.D. Smith, 829 F.3d at 774; Natl. Assn. 
for the Advancement of Colored People v. Acusport Corp., 253 F.Supp.2d 459, 463 
(E.D.N.Y.2003) (concluding that a duty to defend existed when the underlying 
complaint filed against the insured, a wholesale distributor of firearms, sought 
“damages because of bodily injury,” including costs to establish firearm-related 
educational programs and to inspect gun dealers, because “there [was] a connection, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
however remote, between injuries to persons and liability for that injury of the 
insured”); Beretta U.S.A., Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 117 F.Supp.2d 489, 496 
(D.Md.2000).  We find these cases unpersuasive, however. 
{¶ 29} First, several of these cases do not apply Ohio law.  See, e.g., H.D. 
Smith at 773 (applying Illinois law); Acusport Corp. at 463 (applying either Illinois 
or New York law [explaining that the result would be the same under either]); 
Beretta at 493 (applying Maryland law).  And in fact, we cannot find a case in 
which Ohio courts have made the distinction that some courts in other states have 
between the phrases “because of bodily injury” and “for bodily injury” for purposes 
of commercial general liability policies, see, e.g., H.D. Smith at 774 (holding that 
the phrase “because of bodily injury” provides “broader coverage than [a liability 
policy] that covers only damages ‘for bodily injury’ ” [emphasis sic]).  Nor would 
such a distinction be relevant here, because the policies use the phrase “because of 
bodily injury” interchangeably with “for bodily injury” in Coverage A(1)(a) of the 
basic insuring agreement: “We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury * * *.  We will have the right 
and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages.  However, 
we will have no duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking damages for 
bodily injury * * * to which this insurance does not apply.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 30} Further, reading the insurance policy as a whole, as we must, see 
Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶ 11, the plain 
language of the policy does not support such a broad interpretation of “damages 
because of bodily injury.”  Coverage A(1)(a) outlines the obligation to pay and the 
duty to defend.  It further states, in Coverage A(1)(b), that the insurance applies to 
bodily injury only if (1) the bodily injury is caused by an occurrence in the coverage 
territory, (2) the bodily injury occurs during the policy period, and (3) prior to the 
policy period, no insured knew that the bodily injury had occurred, in whole or in 
part.  The third prong is the loss-in-progress provision, and it explains that if the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
insured knew prior to the policy period that the bodily injury had occurred, then 
“any continuation, change or resumption” of such bodily injury during or after the 
policy period will be considered to have been known prior to the policy period. 
{¶ 31} The repeated use of the phrase “the bodily injury” suggests that the 
damages sought in the underlying suit need to be tied to a particular bodily injury 
sustained by a person or persons in order to invoke coverage under the policies.  If 
the phrase were interpreted as broadly as Masters argues it should be, it would be 
rather difficult to determine whether the bodily injury occurred during the policy 
period, was caused by an occurrence in the coverage territory, or had occurred in 
whole or in part prior to the policy period. 
{¶ 32} The view that the damages in the underlying suit need to be tied to a 
particular bodily injury to invoke coverage is consistent with how courts have 
interpreted the loss-in-progress provision.  Generally, courts have viewed the loss-
in-progress provision narrowly based on its “continuing” language: if the insured 
knew prior to the policy period that the bodily injury or property damage occurred, 
“then any continuation, change or resumption of such bodily injury or property 
damage during or after the policy period” will be considered to have been known 
by the insured prior to the policy period.  (Emphasis added.)  See, e.g., Kaady, 790 
F.3d at 999; Quanta Indemn. Co. v. Davis Homes, L.L.C., 606 F.Supp.2d 941, 948-
949 (S.D.Ind.2009).  In Kaady, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit interpreted a loss-in-progress provision like the one here, but the underlying 
suit involved property damage.  That court noted that this provision precludes 
coverage if the insured “knew that the * * * ‘property damage’ had occurred, in 
whole or in part.”  (Emphasis and ellipsis sic.)  Id. at 998.  It explained that the use 
of the article “the” particularizes the subject that it precedes—i.e., property 
damage—and thus indicates that for the provision to preclude coverage, the claimed 
property damage in the underlying suit must be the same as the property damage 
known to the insured prior to the policy period.  Id.  Consequently, “an insured’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
knowledge of one type of damage to property doesn’t automatically constitute 
knowledge of any and all damage to the property.”  Id. at 998-999.  Any other 
interpretation, it reasoned, would eviscerate the provision’s “continuing” language: 
“[I]f the insured’s knowledge of any damage to any part of the structure 
automatically barred coverage of all damage to that structure, it wouldn’t matter 
whether the claimed damage was a ‘continuation, change or resumption’ of the 
known damage.”  Id. at 999.  The loss-in-progress provision therefore must be 
interpreted as precluding coverage if the claimed damage in the underlying suit is 
a “continuation, change or resumption” of that same damage known to the insured 
prior to the policy period.  Id. 
{¶ 33} We ultimately decline to reach the loss-in-progress provision’s 
application to the case here based on our resolution of Acuity’s first proposition.  
Nevertheless, this narrow interpretation of the loss-in-progress provision helps 
focus the lens by which to review the phrase “damages because of bodily injury.”  
Determining the loss-in-progress provision’s application necessarily requires 
examining whether the specific type of bodily injury alleged in the underlying suit 
was a continuation, change, or resumption of that same type of bodily injury 
allegedly known by the insured prior to the policy period.  See Quanta Indemn. Co. 
at 948-949 (holding that the known-loss provision precluded coverage because the 
insured knew of the brain-stem injury prior to the policy’s inception and the bodily 
injury alleged in the underlying suit was that exact same brain-stem injury [which 
allegedly resulted in death during the policy period]).  The bodily injury alleged in 
the underlying suit therefore must be a particularized injury in order to make the 
comparison necessary under the loss-in-progress provision. 
{¶ 34} To determine otherwise would be to conclude that “bodily injury” 
should be interpreted broadly in one part of the policy, i.e., Coverage A(1)(a), but 
narrowly in the following part, i.e., Coverage A(1)(b).  Applying such a broad 
interpretation in Coverage A(1)(a) would also beg the question: Why would the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
policy restrict coverage to bodily injury caused by an occurrence that takes place in 
the coverage territory, occurs during the policy period, and is not known to the 
insured prior to the policy period if the damages sought need not be tied to any 
particular bodily injury sustained by a person?  Moreover, applying a broad 
interpretation of “bodily injury” in Coverage A(1)(a) of the policy would severely 
dilute the application of Coverage A(1)(b), and it would seemingly contradict 
precedent from this court, see Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Anders, 99 Ohio St.3d 156, 
2003-Ohio-3048, 789 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 36 (explaining that the underlying suit fell 
outside the scope of coverage because the claimed negligent nondisclosure of the 
structural damage was not an “occurrence,” i.e., an accident, that resulted in the 
property damage, but instead “an accident that allegedly caused economic 
damages”). 
{¶ 35} “The concept of ‘bodily injury’ is obviously central to the meaning 
of Coverage A.”  20-129 Appleman, Section 129.2; see also Barron, 2018 WL 
2089357, at *6 (interpreting a similar liability policy and describing an “injury” as 
being “the crucial requirement for a claim to be covered under [the policy]”).  The 
significance of the term “bodily injury” to the meaning of the insuring agreement 
undermines Masters’s expansive view of the phrase “damages because of bodily 
injury.”  See Wohl v. Swinney, 118 Ohio St.3d 277, 2008-Ohio-2334, 888 N.E.2d 
1062, ¶ 22 (rejecting the appellees’ interpretation of the insurance policy because 
it “would render meaningless portions of the contract”).  Moreover, if the intent 
behind the liability policy had been to afford such broad coverage—with “damages 
because of bodily injury” encompassing any suit seeking losses that tangentially 
relate to a bodily injury sustained by a person—different language would have been 
used to make that intent clear.  See Stickovich v. Cleveland, 143 Ohio App.3d 13, 
37, 757 N.E.2d 50 (8th Dist.2001) (“The term ‘arising out of’ in a liability insurance 
policy affords very broad coverage.  This court has held that ‘arising out of’ means 
‘flowing from’ or ‘having its origin in’ ”); Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa, 134 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
Ohio St.3d 565, 2012-Ohio-5776, 983 N.E.2d 1317, ¶ 31 (“the phrase ‘relating to’ 
is plainly intended to be interpreted broadly”). 
{¶ 36} We therefore conclude that the phrase “damages because of bodily 
injury” in the policies before us requires more than a tenuous connection between 
the alleged bodily injury sustained by a person and the damages sought.  See ACE 
Am. Ins. Co., 270 A.3d at 250; Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Chester-Jensen Co., Inc., 
243 Ill.App.3d 471, 477, 611 N.E.2d 1083 (1993) (rejecting an insured’s assertion 
that its liability for the state’s economic losses due to state employees’ illness was 
covered by its insurance policy, because such an interpretation would “extend [the 
policy’s] reach so as to provide coverage for any liability where bodily injury is a 
tangential factor”).  A sufficient connection will likely be found to exist under 
standard commercial general liability polices when the damages sought in the 
underlying suit are for losses asserted by (1) the person injured, see, e.g., Fairless 
v. Acuity, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210165, 2022-Ohio-10 (holding that insurer 
had a duty to defend insured property-management company and property manager 
because complaint alleged that plaintiff sustained injuries on insureds’ negligently 
maintained premises), (2) a person recovering on behalf of the injured person, see, 
e.g., United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, M.D.Ga. No. 7:13-CV-164, 2015 WL 
3756046 (June 16, 2015) (holding that insurer had a duty to defend its insured, a 
day-care center, in lawsuit brought by parents seeking damages for injuries 
sustained by their minor daughter while under the day-care center’s supervision), 
or (3) a person or organization that directly suffered harm because of another 
person’s injury—in which case, the existence and cause of the injury must be 
proved, see, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Robert W. Setterlin & Sons, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 07AP-47, 2007-Ohio-5094 (holding that insurer had a duty to defend 
its insured, a general contractor, against a lawsuit brought by one of its 
subcontractors seeking damages for increased workers’ compensation premiums on 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
account of a bodily injury the general contractor’s negligence caused one of the 
subcontractor’s employees). 
The underlying suits do not seek “damages because of bodily injury” 
{¶ 37} Obviously, the governments’ claims in the underlying suits do not 
seek damages for bodily injury sustained by themselves.  Nor do they seek damages 
for bodily injury on behalf of their injured citizens.  In fact, the majority of the 
governments disclaim such injuries: “The damages Plaintiff has suffered are not 
derivative of third party’s injury or injuries”; “[n]or are [the plaintiff’s] damages 
derivative of harm visited upon third party persons or entities not named in this 
action.” 
{¶ 38} Further, the governments here do not seek damages because of any 
particular opioid-related injury sustained by a citizen.  Like the Delaware Supreme 
Court in ACE Am. Ins. Co., we find the Seventh Circuit’s hypothetical described 
above unhelpful and not comparable to the underlying suits here.  The mother in 
that hypothetical must demonstrate that her son was indeed injured by the insured 
pharmaceutical distributor’s allegedly negligent distribution of the product and that 
the financial harm to her (the money she spent caring for her son) was because of 
that injury.  See, e.g., Roberts v. Luneau-Gordon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 15212, 
1995 WL 703898, *5-6 (Nov. 29, 1995) (wherein the parents’ claims for medical 
expenses, loss of consortium, and negligent infliction of emotional distress failed 
because the parents could not prove that the doctor’s conduct proximately caused 
the injury to their child); Rouse v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 9 Ohio App.3d 206, 
212, 459 N.E.2d 593 (10th Dist.1983) (explaining that a parent may “recover from 
the wrongdoer the reasonable value of the care or attendance which he himself 
renders to his child as the result of a negligent injury”).  In other words, the 
hypothetical mother’s claim is tied to a particular bodily injury and depends on 
proof of bodily injury to her son.  ACE Am. Ins. Co. at 253; Quest Pharmaceuticals, 
2021 WL 1821702, at *7; see also Simmons v. Hertzman, 99 Ohio App.3d 453, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
459, 651 N.E.2d 13 (1st Dist.1994) (explaining that parents’ direct claim for 
medical expenses to care for their injured daughter failed because they did not 
allege that the injury was proximately caused by the allegedly negligent procedure).  
Consequently, the hypothetical falls within the third category of sufficient 
connection noted above; the mother is a claimant who suffered her own losses (i.e., 
medical expenses) because of another’s bodily injury (her son’s opioid addiction) 
and who must demonstrate the existence and cause of that injury to recover her 
losses. 
{¶ 39} Unlike the hypothetical mother, however, the governments in the 
underlying suits do not tie their alleged economic losses to particular bodily injuries 
sustained by their citizens but to the aggregate economic injuries they have 
experienced because of the opioid epidemic.  We therefore conclude that based on 
the scope of the governments’ allegations and the plain language of the policies, 
the underlying suits do not seek “damages because of bodily injury” and Acuity 
does not have a duty to defend Masters in the underlying suits.  To hold otherwise 
would be to conclude that a duty to defend exists simply because a consequence of 
the alleged public-health crisis is bodily injury, regardless of the fact that the 
underlying parties do not seek damages because of any particular bodily injury 
sustained by a person.  We find this to be an extraordinarily expansive view and 
one that gives us much pause given the potential floodgates it might open. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 40} Based on the scope of the allegations in the underlying complaints, 
we conclude that the governments do not seek “damages because of bodily injury.”  
Accordingly, we hold that Acuity does not owe Masters a duty to defend it in the 
underlying suits.  We reverse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals 
holding otherwise, and we reinstate the trial court’s decision granting summary 
judgment in favor of Acuity in its declaratory-judgment action. 
Judgment reversed 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
23 
and trial court’s judgment reinstated. 
KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J. 
_________________ 
STEWART, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 41} This case involves the interpretation of insurance policies, and as 
with any contract, insurance policies must be interpreted as written, Lubrizol 
Advanced Materials, Inc. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 161 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-1579, 160 N.E.3d 701, ¶ 13.  Under the plain language of the 
commercial general liability policies at issue in this case, defendant-appellant, 
Acuity, promised to defend its insured, plaintiff-appellee, Masters Pharmaceutical, 
Inc. (“Masters”), against suits seeking “damages because of bodily injury.”  
Because Acuity’s duty to defend Masters was triggered when cities and counties in 
West Virginia, Michigan, and Nevada filed lawsuits seeking damages that included 
costs for treatment and services for citizens of the government-plaintiffs in the 
underlying cases suffering from opioid-related addiction or disease, I would affirm 
the decision of the First District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 42} This court made clear, decades ago, that “where the insurer’s duty to 
defend is not apparent from the pleadings in the case against the insured, but the 
allegations do state a claim which is potentially or arguably within the policy 
coverage, or there is some doubt as to whether a theory of recovery within the policy 
coverage ha[s] been pleaded, the insurer must accept the defense of the claim.”  
Willoughby Hills v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 9 Ohio St.3d 177, 180, 459 N.E.2d 555 
(1984).  Moreover, “where provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably 
susceptible of more than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against 
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.”  Lane v. Grange Mut. Cos., 45 
Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 543 N.E.2d 488 (1989). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
{¶ 43} In its complaint for declaratory judgment and its motion for 
summary judgment, Acuity argued that it had no duty to defend Masters, because 
the governmental entities did not allege that they had sustained bodily injury.  The 
trial court agreed, granting Acuity’s motion for summary judgment and overruling 
Masters’s motion for summary judgment and issuing a declaratory judgment that 
Acuity does not owe Masters a defense for the underlying claims.  The court 
reasoned that Acuity does not have a duty to defend Masters in the underlying 
litigation, because the governmental entities are not seeking damages on behalf of 
their citizens who sustained losses because of bodily injury but instead are seeking 
damages solely for their own economic losses.  The court also held that Masters 
knew of prescription-opioid addiction before Acuity insured Masters, precluding 
any coverage under the loss-in-progress provision of the policies, which specifies 
that “[i]f [an] insured * * * knew, prior to the policy period, that the bodily injury 
* * * occurred, then any continuation, change or resumption of such bodily injury 
* * * during or after the policy period will be deemed to have been known prior to 
the policy period.”  Section I, Coverage A(1)(b)(3). 
{¶ 44} In reversing summary judgment in favor of Acuity and remanding 
the case to the trial court with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Masters, a unanimous court of appeals held that the governmental entities were 
indeed seeking their own economic losses but that some of those losses were 
arguably because of bodily injury, triggering the duty to defend.  It also held that 
coverage was not barred under the loss-in-progress provision, because Masters’s 
mere knowledge of the risk that the diversion of its products could contribute to the 
opioid epidemic, resulting in costs to the governmental entities, was not enough to 
bar coverage. 
{¶ 45} The commercial general liability policies that Acuity issued to 
Masters for the policy periods of July 26, 2010, to July 26, 2018, included the 
following language:   
January Term, 2022 
 
 
25 
 
(a) [Acuity] will pay those sums that [Masters] becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or 
property damage to which this insurance applies.  [Acuity] will have 
the right and duty to defend [Masters] against any suit seeking those 
damages.  However, [Acuity] will have no duty to defend [Masters] 
against any suit seeking damages for bodily injury or property 
damage to which this insurance does not apply. 
* * * 
(b) This insurance applies to bodily injury and property 
damage only if:  
(1) The bodily injury or property damage is caused by an 
occurrence that takes place in the coverage territory;  
(2) The bodily injury or property damage occurs during the 
policy period; and  
(3) Prior to the policy period, no insured * * * knew that the 
bodily injury or property damage had occurred, in whole or in part.  
If [an] insured * * * knew, prior to the policy period, that the bodily 
injury or property damage occurred, then any continuation, change 
or resumption of such bodily injury or property damage during or 
after the policy period will be deemed to have been known prior to 
the policy period. 
 
Section I, Coverage A(1).  The policies explain that “[d]amages because of bodily 
injury include damages claimed by any person or organization for care, loss of 
services or death resulting at any time from the bodily injury.”  And “bodily injury” 
is defined as “bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including 
death resulting from any of these at any time.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 46} In reversing the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstating the trial 
court’s summary judgment in favor of Acuity, the majority opinion concludes that, 
based on the allegations in the underlying complaints, the governmental entities do 
not seek “damages because of bodily injury” but instead seek damages for their 
own economic losses.  However, the policies potentially cover the losses alleged in 
the underlying suits, as medical expenses and treatment costs are arguably “because 
of” bodily injury.  In holding that Acuity has no duty to defend Masters in the 
underlying lawsuits, the majority opinion ignores blackletter law and the plain 
language of the policies.  Because we must construe the policies strictly against 
Acuity, the court of appeals was correct to reverse the summary judgment. 
{¶ 47} The underlying lawsuits allege that Masters acted negligently in 
failing to investigate, report, and refuse to fill suspicious orders of prescription 
opioids and failing to maintain effective controls against the diversion of 
prescription opioids, which contributed to the opioid epidemic and resulted in 
increased costs to the governmental entities.  More specifically, the governmental 
entities seek damages for the significant amount of money spent on their citizens 
for emergency medical treatment, ambulatory services, detoxification and addiction 
treatment, and inpatient hospital services, among other things. 
{¶ 48} The majority opinion disregards the plain language of the policies 
and finds that the phrase “damages because of bodily injury” does not actually mean 
what it says, concluding that the policies require “more than a tenuous connection 
between the alleged bodily injury sustained by a person and the damages sought.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Majority opinion, ¶ 36.  The majority asserts that if the intent 
behind the policies had been to afford such broad coverage that they cover “any 
suit seeking losses that tangentially relate to a bodily injury sustained by a person,” 
different language would have been used.  Id. at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 49} The majority’s assertion begs the question: what language would 
have been sufficient, when the policies expressly provide for that precise coverage 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
27 
(bodily injuries on or after July 26, 2010, that occurred in the governmental entities’ 
jurisdictions)?  Nothing in the policy language requires that the claimant bringing 
the suit seek to recover the costs of the claimant’s own bodily injury.  And had 
Acuity wanted to exclude coverage for losses claimed by entities because of bodily 
injury suffered by third persons, or claims brought by governmental entities, it 
could have said so, but it did not.  See Am. Fin. Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund. Ins. Co., 
15 Ohio St.2d 171, 174, 239 N.E.3d 33 (1968) (“an exclusion from liability must 
be clear and exact in order to be given effect”).  And the policies themselves cover 
liabilities to organizations (like governmental entities), which cannot personally 
suffer “bodily injuries.” 
{¶ 50} The majority focuses, however, on Section I, Coverage A(1)(b) in 
the policies to defend its conclusion, stating that “[t]he repeated use of the phrase 
‘the bodily injury’ suggests that the damages sought in the underlying suit need to 
be tied to a particular bodily injury sustained by a person or persons in order to 
invoke coverage under the policies.”  (Emphasis added in the majority opinion.)  
Majority opinion at ¶ 31.  But this interpretation adds words to the policies; the 
language in the policies does not specify who, or whether a particular claimant, 
must suffer the bodily injury for coverage.  And this court should not read into the 
contract a meaning that is not there.  See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tomanski, 27 
Ohio St.2d 222, 226, 271 N.E.2d 924 (1971) (“This court has refused to change the 
meaning of language contained in an insurance contract when that wording is 
directly applicable to the facts under consideration, and will not read into a contract 
meaning which was not placed there by an act of the parties”).  And if a claim is 
arguably within the policy coverage, an insurer must accept the defense of the 
claim.  Willoughby Hills, 9 Ohio St.3d at 180, 459 N.E.2d 555. 
{¶ 51} The majority rejects the reasoning in Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. H.D. 
Smith, L.L.C., 829 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir.2016), a case in which the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted nearly identical language in a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
commercial general liability policy and held that suits seeking damages “because 
of bodily injury” included a suit brought by West Virginia against the insured to 
recover as damages the money it had spent caring for drug-addicted West 
Virginians who suffered opioid-related injuries and could not pay for their own 
care, thus triggering the insurer’s duty to defend.  In an attempt to distinguish that 
case from the one before us, the majority opinion notes that H.D. Smith applied 
Illinois law.  But, as the First District correctly determined in this case, see 2020-
Ohio-3440, ¶ 22, the judgment comports with Ohio law.  See H.D. Smith at 773-
774 (explaining that it is the court’s job to compare the allegations in the complaint 
to the policy language to determine whether an insurer’s duty to defend is triggered 
and noting that the allegations must be liberally construed in favor of the insured).  
In H.D. Smith, the insurer made arguments similar to Acuity’s, alleging that West 
Virginia sought damages to recover its own losses and did not seek damages on 
behalf of its citizens, therefore precluding coverage.  The Seventh Circuit explicitly 
rejected this argument stating: “[S]o what?  [The insurer’s] argument is untethered 
to any language in the policy.”  Id. at 774; see also Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Natl. 
Shooting Sports Found., 226 F.3d 642, 2000 WL 1029091 (5th Cir.2000) (holding 
that an insurer’s duty to defend was triggered under a standard commercial general 
liability policy when a municipality filed a suit seeking to recoup expenses 
associated with the manufacture, marketing, promotion, and sale of firearms that 
were unreasonably dangerous, including the cost of increased police force and 
increased emergency care, and rejecting the insurer’s argument that the provision 
limiting coverage to claims for damages incurred “because of bodily injury” 
required that the plaintiff seeking damages be the one who suffered the loss). 
{¶ 52} The majority cites favorably ACE Am. Ins. Co. v Rite Aid Corp., 270 
A.3d 239 (Del.2022), a Delaware Supreme Court case that interpreted similar 
policy language narrowly to hold that an insurer had no duty to defend Rite Aid 
against lawsuits filed by two Ohio counties seeking to recover opioid-related 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
29 
economic damages.  In that case, the policy provided that the insurer had a duty to 
defend the insured against any suit seeking “damages because of ‘personal 
injury’ ”; the policy covered damages “claimed by a person or organization for care, 
loss of services or death resulting at any time from the ‘personal injury,’ ” and 
“personal injury” was defined to include “bodily injury.”  Id. at 242-243.  Despite 
this clear language, the Delaware Supreme Court limited coverage for losses 
because of personal injury to three categories of claims: claims asserted by the 
person injured, claims asserted by a person recovering on behalf of the person 
injured, and claims asserted by people or organizations that treated the person 
injured who demonstrate the existence of and cause of the injuries.  Id. at 247.  The 
dissenting opinion, however, applied the policy language as written and pointed out 
that the policy does not contain language limiting coverage in the way the majority 
held it did: “The policy covers damages claimed by any organization for the care 
of a person injured by Rite Aid.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 256 (Vaughn, J., 
dissenting).  The dissenting opinion recognized that the allegations in that case were 
arguably covered by the policy because the governmental entities sought damages 
for medical care for the injuries suffered by their citizens. 
{¶ 53} Here, the majority’s theory is untethered to any policy language and 
similarly restricts coverage for losses to three categories of claims (when no 
language in the policies support such a restriction): claims in which (1) the person 
seeking damages is the person injured, (2) the person seeking damages is recovering 
on behalf of the injured person, and (3) the person or organization seeking damages 
directly suffered harm because of another person’s injury—in which case, the 
existence and cause of the injury must be proved, majority opinion at ¶ 36.  But by 
adding these words to the policies, the majority opinion is not construing the 
language strictly against Acuity, which it is required to do, see Lane, 45 Ohio St.3d 
at 65, 543 N.E.2d 488 (“The insurer, being the one who selects the language in the 
contract, must be specific in its use”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
{¶ 54} Finally, the loss-in-progress provision of the policies is an exclusion 
that Acuity must prove applies to the facts of this case.  See Continental Ins. Co. v. 
Louis Marx & Co., Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 399, 401, 415 N.E.2d 315 (1980), quoting 
Arcos Corp. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 350 F.Supp. 380, 384 (E.D.Pa.1972) (“ ‘A 
defense based on an exception or exclusion in an insurance policy is an affirmative 
one, and the burden is cast on the insurer to establish it’ ”).  The exclusion at issue 
states, “This insurance applies to bodily injury and property damage only if * * * 
[p]rior to the policy period, no insured * * * knew that the bodily injury or property 
damage had occurred, in whole or in part.”  The First District held that the loss-in-
progress provision is a prerequisite to establishing coverage, rather than an 
exclusion to coverage and that, therefore, Masters has the burden to show that the 
provision does not apply.  2020-Ohio-3440 at ¶ 38.  But the loss-in-progress 
provision is not a prerequisite to establishing coverage.  See, e.g., Burlington Ins. 
Co. v. PMI Am., Inc., 862 F.Supp.2d 719, 734 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“the only 
appropriate avenue to introduce a loss in progress issue into an insurance dispute is 
when the policy at issue contains a loss in progress exclusionary endorsement”).  
Despite its incorrectly shifting the burden to Masters, the First District was 
nevertheless correct when it found that Masters’s mere knowledge of the risk that 
“prescription drugs it distributed wholesale could eventually be diverted into illegal 
channels far down the supply chain or be misused and abused by individuals” was 
not enough to bar coverage.  2020-Ohio-3440 at ¶ 44, 50. 
{¶ 55} By its plain terms, the loss-in-progress provision applies only if 
Masters had knowledge of an actual injury it caused before the policy period, not 
mere knowledge of a risk of injury generally.  See Buckeye Ranch, Inc., v. 
Northfield Ins. Co., 134 Ohio Misc.2d 10, 2005-Ohio-5316, 839 N.E.2d 94, ¶ 30 
(C.P.) (“Awareness by the [insured] of an act that might someday result in [injury] 
is not equivalent to knowledge of [injury]”).  Acuity argues that mere awareness of 
addiction in unidentified members of the public is enough to trigger the exclusion, 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
31 
but there is no evidence that prior to the time that Masters purchased the policies, 
it knew about the addictions, overdoses, and deaths caused by opioids that are 
alleged in the underlying suits.  See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s London, 813 F.Supp. 576, 585 (N.D.Ohio 1993) (“If knowledge of 
certain risks posed by a product were sufficient to infer intent by a manufacturer to 
injure consumers, then no manufacturer would ever be able to seek coverage from 
an insurer because every product has certain known dangers and risks”). 
{¶ 56} The majority declines to decide whether the loss-in-progress 
provision applies in this case, but the majority nevertheless interprets the provision 
narrowly and determines that “[t]he bodily injury alleged in the underlying suit  
* * * must be a particularized injury in order to make the comparison necessary 
under the loss-in-progress provision.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 33.  But the article 
“the” before “bodily injury” merely means that “the bodily injury” in the loss-in-
progress provision is the same bodily injury referred to earlier in the policy—or 
more specifically to this case, any opioid-related injury on or after July 26, 2010, 
that occurred in the governmental entities’ jurisdictions.  See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1477 (6th Ed.1990) (defining “the” as “[a]n article which particularizes 
the subject spoken of”).  Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation of the policy 
language attempts to add ambiguity that does not exist. 
{¶ 57} Because the plain language of the policies triggers Acuity’s duty to 
defend in the underlying lawsuits, I would affirm the judgment of the First District 
Court of Appeals.  Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., and Benjamin C. Sassé; Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., and 
Gary L. Nicholson; Dean & Fulkerson, P.C., and Karen Libertiny Ludden; and 
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., and John Chlysta, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., Paul A. Rose, and Amanda M. Leffler, for 
appellee. 
Reed Smith, L.L.P., and Jason E. Hazlewood, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae United Policyholders. 
Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, Richard M. Garner, David L. Lester, and 
James S. Kresge, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Insurance Institute. 
Weston Hurd, L.L.P., and Gary W. Johnson, urging reversal for amici curiae 
Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association, American Property Casualty 
Insurance Association, and National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies. 
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