Title: EDWIN R. PALM v. MICKII L. PALM AND RONALD SARGENT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EDWIN R. PALM v. MICKII L. PALM AND RONALD SARGENT1989 WY 233784 P.2d 1365Case Number: 89-109Decided: 12/29/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
EDWIN R. PALM, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

MICKII L. PALM AND RONALD 
SARGENT, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFF AND MASTER).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

Robert L. 
Nelson, Cheyenne, for appellant.

E. James Burke 
and Rhonda Sigrist Woodard of Hanes, Burke & Woodard, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee 
Palm.

Ronald E. 
Triggs, Cheyenne, for appellee 
Sargent.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     We consider the 
confined issue of compensation awarded to a master following a divorce case 
appointment and subsequent removal by the district court for a pre-existing 
conflict. The issue extrudes from a hotly contested divorce proceeding about 
which dissatisfaction is apparent but from which no other appellate issues were 
pursued. We consider and affirm the compensatory award to the master of 
$2,660.1 In actual context, present 
litigants are the master, Ron Sargent, and the husband, Edwin R. Palm, 
Jr.

[¶2.]     Appellant, Edwin R. 
Palm, Jr., presents three issues: (1) authority and discretion of the district 
court to appoint a master; (2) propriety of compensating the master for partial 
performance before his disqualification; and (3) sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the amount awarded.

[¶3.]     After about seven years 
of marriage, Mickii Palm and Edwin R. Palm, Jr. came to split the sheets, but 
then tried to do it in near actuality during an acrimonious divorce lawsuit when 
all items of personal property seemed to invoke division and distribution 
contest. This is sometimes called the parakeet or grandfather clock divorce 
case. Incentive for argument was further added by the existence of a pre-marital 
property agreement initiating defensive claims of appellant 
that:

5. * * * the parties have 
acquired no real or personal property during the course of their 
marriage.

6. * * * any property 
division is governed by a Prenuptial Agreement executed by the 
parties.

[¶4.]     On February 22, 1988, 
the district court resolved general issues of divorce by a decision letter with 
an included proviso:

The division of property 
will be resolved after both parties have submitted additional documents as the 
Court has requested.

* * * * * 
*

After I receive[] the 
supplemental filings concerning the property division, I shall resolve the other 
issues remaining in this matter.

[¶5.]     Occurring next was the 
appointment of a master to divide personal property which the parties and their 
counsel had been unable to accomplish. Ron Sargent was named by district court 
order of April 7, 1988 which, as approved as to form by both litigants, 
provided:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER 
having come on before the Court upon the oral Motions of the parties to resolve 
personal property issues and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having reviewed several lists submitted to it in the Trial of the issues of this 
matter and having further reviewed the file herein and being fully advised does 
order as follows:

1. That the Court hereby 
appoints Ron Sargent as a Master for the purposes of listing the disputed 
personal property between the Plaintiff and Defendant and making recommendations 
regarding its ownership. That the costs of Mr. Sargent's services shall be borne 
and paid for by the defendant, Edwin R. Palm.

2. That the Master 
together with the Plaintiff and Defendant shall look at all personal property 
located in the home in which the Defendant is residing, all personal property 
which the Plaintiff has in her home and all personal property of the parties 
discovered to be elsewhere to determine the ownership of said 
property.

If the property is not in 
dispute as to ownership the party owning said property shall be allowed to take 
the property with him or her.

3. That disputed items of 
personal property shall be listed by the Master and he shall listen to the 
arguments of each of the parties concerning each piece of property and shall 
make his recommendation as to how the Court should distribute said items of 
disputed property.

4. The property which is 
determined by the Master and/or the Court to be marital property shall be listed 
separately. The parties shall accompany David Zwonitzer or another reputable 
auctioneer appraiser designated by Plaintiff to view the property and obtain an 
auction appraisal of the value of the property. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff 
the percentage of the auction appraised value of the property, without any 
amounts deducted for commission or costs, as the Court determines should belong 
to Plaintiff, and Defendant shall then be entitled to keep the property. If the 
Defendant chooses not to purchase the property, it should be auctioned and the 
proceeds divided between the parties in the percentages determined by the 
Court.

5. That the distribution 
of personal property as anticipated under this Order should be accomplished as 
soon as reasonably possible.

 

[¶6.]     On August 30, 1988, 
Sargent filed a master's report which listed everything down to mailing labels, 
cloth flowers and paper napkins in six separate lists, including more than 400 
defined items. In conjunction with filing the report, he also submitted a 
statement to appellant's attorney totaling $2,945 for services rendered to which 
immediate objection was taken. A hearing was held by an order to show cause in 
early December to consider the fee objection. While that proceeding was pending 
before final decision, appellant filed an objection to Sargent acting as master 
and a motion to set aside Schedule C and other property division 
recommendations. After a considerable amount of additional fussing and filings, 
the contested judgment for the master's fee was entered on March 13, 1989, from 
which this appeal is taken.2

[¶7.]     The divorce decree was 
entered September 28, 1988 and following entry of the master's fee order, the 
"Order Disqualifying Ron Sargent as Master, Setting Aside Schedule `C' and Order 
Granting Judgment and Attorneys Fees" was entered on April 11, 1989. Appeal was 
neither taken from the decree of divorce nor the April 11, 1989 disqualification 
order which, in itself, did not reconsider the March 13th compensatory 
award.

I. AUTHORITY AND 
DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO APPOINT A MASTER

[¶8.]     The mutual agreement by 
the parties for the appointment of a master was recognized in oral argument and 
briefing, as well as by attachments to the contested judgment with a concurrent 
understanding from the litigants that payment for services would be made by the 
husband. It is also established that both litigants knew in advance of the 
district court designation that the proposed master, Sargent, in the presence of 
the husband, had engaged at the request of the wife in taking a video tape 
inventory of personal property at the parties' residence. Following district 
court conference (not reported), the parties' proposal to appoint Sargent as 
master to divide the personal property was accepted by the district judge. 
Thereafter, objection was not taken by either party to the deputation or 
performance until appellant objected in December 1988 following his receipt of 
the master's bill for fees. 

[¶9.]     Any claim of abuse of 
discretion in assignment is foreclosed by failure to timely object or, as in 
this case, actual acceptance. If objection to the appointment is to be taken by 
a litigant, it must be made timely by filed objection and, if possible, before 
performance of the service as master is undertaken by the appointee. See B & 
W Cattle Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Hereford, 692 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App. 1985). United States v. 
Conservation Chemical Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 227 (W.D.Mo. 1985) 
states:

Whether the combination 
of circumstances which prompted the appointment of a Special Master constitutes 
an "exceptional condition" justifying the reference is a procedural matter to 
which personal objection should be made, unless as a matter of law the trial 
court abused its discretion concerning the appointment. * * * In particular, the 
nature of an objection to the appointment of a Special Master should be 
specifically stated, and a party has no right to rely on the objection of 
another. * * * In general, objections must be sufficiently specific to bring 
into focus the precise nature of the alleged error.

[¶10.]  The failure to make timely objection, 
either at the time of the order of reference or promptly thereafter, constitutes 
a waiver of error. Charles A. Wright, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 354 F.2d 710 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied 384 U.S. 960, 86 S. Ct. 1586, 16 L. Ed. 2d 673, reh'g denied 
385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 14, 17 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1966); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Central 
Transformer Corp., 308 F.2d 70 (8th Cir. 1962); Fisher v. Harris, Upham & 
Co., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). "Parties should object to a reference 
to a magistrate or a special master at the time the reference is made or within 
a reasonable time thereafter." Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 
469 U.S. 1036, 105 S. Ct. 511, 83 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1984). A litigant cannot claim error in exercised discretion unless 
disapproval of a proposed decision is recorded. Sharp v. Sharp, 671 P.2d 317 
(Wyo. 1983); Louth v. Kaser, 405 P.2d 276 
(Wyo. 1965); Debruyn v. Golden Age Club of 
Cheyenne, 399 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1965). A recent 
statement of the rule is that "[a] party cannot appeal from a judgment or order 
to which the party has [substantively] consented." State v. Coheley, 549 So. 2d 483, 483 (Ala. 
1989).

[¶11.]  Disposing of abuse of discretion, there 
remains the appellant's denial of the district court's actual delegation 
authority. See B & W Cattle Co., 692 S.W.2d 946. Our decision in Cross v. 
Cross, 586 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1978) and W.R.C.P. 53 (similar to 
F.R.C.P. 53) is dispositive. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use 
Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), cert. granted in 
part ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 863, 102 L. Ed. 2d 987, aff'd ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 106 L. Ed. 2d 342, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 28, 106 L. Ed. 2d 639 
(1989). The prerogative of the district court to appoint a master is not only 
established in general law, but is expressly provided by W.R.C.P. 53. On the 
comparable subject of receivership, appellant "having invoked the jurisdiction 
of the court to appoint a receiver of [his] property (the court having 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter), [he] will not thereafter be permitted to 
question the validity of such appointment for the want of jurisdiction." Spence 
v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, 5 S.W.2d 754, 756 
(Tex. App. 
1928). Appellant's abuse of discretion and authority arguments are 
unfounded.

II. ALLOWANCE OF ANY 
COMPENSATION

[¶12.]  The second issue addressed is any 
allowance of compensation for the receiver although authorized pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 53(a) where, after part or total performance, the designee is withdrawn 
on the basis of disqualification. We will decide this case on the narrow basis 
presented that arguable cause for disqualification was equally known to both 
litigants before district court action. If a litigant is to object to naming a 
particular person, objection becomes untimely where, after notice, the order of 
deputation is entered without objection.

[¶13.]  Correspondence in this record, written 
substantially in advance of any district court action, detailed the litigants' 
mutual understanding about the appointment of a master, the designation of 
Sargent and the husband's fee payment responsibility. As illustrative, a letter 
from counsel for wife to counsel for husband dated more than a month before the 
district court action stated:

I have discussed with 
Mickii Palm our proposal to allow Ron Sargent to be appointed Master in this 
matter with regard to the disposition of personal property. It is my 
understanding that Mr. Sargent would accompany Mr. and Mrs. Palm to the 
farmhouse in Albin and the barn in Nebraska and determine which items are in 
dispute with regard to their disposition. Each party would be able to take the 
items which the other party agrees belong to him or her. Mr. Sargent would make 
a list of the disputed items and make a recommendation to the Court with regard 
to the ultimate disposition of these items.

Mickii Palm is willing to 
agree to the appointment of Mr. Sargent as Master for the purposes set forth 
above. It is our further understanding that the Court would order Mr. Palm to 
pay the costs associated with Mr. Sargent's activities as a Master. If this 
arrangement is agreeable with your client, please prepare the necessary 
Stipulation and provide it to me for signature. Thank you.

[¶14.]  Since the facts relating to the cause for 
potential objection or disqualification were known to both parties in advance of 
the district court designation, we conclude their agreement for payment of costs 
of services rendered after the master's appointment continued until district 
court removal. Sharp, 671 P.2d 317. W.R.C.P. 53 provides the district court's 
general authority to approve a fee payment which was exercised by the district 
court order entered, leaving the reasonableness of the amount provided 
remaining.

III. REASONABLE LEVEL OF 
COMPENSATION

[¶15.]  An evidentiary hearing was held. 
Appellant before and since continues to assert, if anything is paid to the 
master, that the amount charged to him should be limited to benefit and not 
determined by a time and rate computation. This is described by this court and 
other tribunals as the lodestar test. See UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. 
v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989). Actually, his argument is 
three-fold: (1) under the circumstances of prior service performed for the wife, 
the appointed master should not be compensated in any amount when later 
disqualified before completion of task; (2) benefit to the litigants should be 
the measure of compensation if any is given; and (3) in any event, considering 
the nominal value of the personal property items, any award of $2,660 as a 
billing was completely unreasonable. Appellant specifically cites as his 
authority for abuse of discretion "Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 ILL 98 [113 N.E. 852] 
(ILL. 1916);" "Boone v. Boone, 3 NJ Misc. 291 [127 A. 819] (N.J. 1925)"; 
"Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 1954 134 NYS 2nd 686, (NY 1954) [205 Misc. 1095, 131 N.Y.S.2d 686, rev'd in part 284 A.D. 937, 134 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1954)];" and "89 ALR 
2nd 377 [Annotation, Amount of Master's Fee in Divorce Proceedings, 89 A.L.R.2d 
377 (1963)]."

[¶16.]  Those authorities lack persuasion in 
demonstrating that the district judge erred in award of compensation to the 
master pursuant to the W.R.C.P. 53 grant of authority and discretion. Rosenfield 
v. Rosenfield, 205 Misc. 1095, 131 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 rev'd in part 284 A.D. 937, 
134 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1954) approved the fee granted by the trial court as 
follows:

The court may [fix a 
non-statutory rate of compensation] * * * subject, only, to the implied 
condition that the rate actually fixed be a reasonable one depending on the 
length of time devoted, the skill and industry applied, and the importance of 
the matter involved, in a particular reference.

Boone v. Boone, 
3 N.J. Misc. 291, 127 A. 819 (1925) denied by statutory construction secretarial 
services charged to prepare the record in an amount in excess of a state 
provision confining fees to a folio based total. Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852, 856 (1916) reduced the compensation for the master which was 
billed at $35 per day by stating that the amount "which is about as much, or 
more, than the judge who tried the case receives for each day he is actually 
engaged in the duties of his office, and as a matter of common knowledge it is 
more than twice as much as was ever paid in Chicago for judges from other 
jurisdictions while employed in the courts of Cook county."3 Currence v. Currence, 123 W. 
Va. 599, 18 S.E.2d 656 (1941) does not add additional precedent since the $225 fee for the 
225 hours was not reversed.4

[¶17.]  Not only by the express provision of 
W.R.C.P. 53 but accompanied by a comprehensive body of law, the question of 
compensation is to be determined by the district court as a matter of 
discretion. In UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc., 774 P.2d 584, we recognized 
the lodestar concept for initial computation of time and rate to which variable 
factors may be applied within the discretional decision. We perceive from the 
evidence that the district court specifically followed this pathway for 
discretion and decision by relating circumstance to the itemized amount 
submitted and making adjustments found to be appropriate in the interest of 
fairness. The rule for the master's fee allowance is settled in Annotation, 
Amount of Master's Fee in Divorce Proceedings, 89 A.L.R.2d 377 (1963), where it 
is stated to be dependent upon the circumstances and proportional to the nature 
of the services rendered as determined to be reasonable within the discretion of 
the trial court. Evidence in this record for application of the district court's 
discretion supports the decision as to the extent and value of services 
provided.

[¶18.]  Testing trial court discretion in earlier 
times, it was said in Finance Committee of Pennsylvania v. Warren, 82 F. 525, 526-27 
(C.C.A.Ill. 1897):

The eighty-second rule in 
equity prescribed by the supreme court provides that "the compensation to be 
allowed to every master in chancery for his services in any particular case 
shall be fixed by the circuit court in its discretion, having regard to all the 
circumstances thereof." Our review of the decree complained of is therefore 
necessarily limited to the question whether the discretion of the court has been 
improvidently exercised. A master in chancery occupies, it is true, a position 
of responsibility and of trust. The court looks to him to execute its decree 
thoroughly, accurately, and in full response to the confidence extended to him. 
His compensation should be measured accordingly. He should be remunerated for 
the actual work done, and the time employed, and the responsibility assumed. The 
amount of compensation should be fixed with due regard to the magnitude of the 
interests involved, and to the responsibility of the position. The amount of 
such compensation, while it should be reasonable, and perhaps liberal, should 
not be exorbitant.

At issue in that 
case was the originally granted award of $4,000 resulting in a reduction by the 
appellate court to the 1897 total of $2,500. This concept for analysis was 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of 
New York, 259 U.S. 101, 42 S. Ct. 438, 66 L. Ed. 844 (1922). See also 9 C. Wright 
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2608 at 794 
(1971).

[¶19.]  This court similarly, in the early 
Wyoming case of Kilpatrick v. Horton, 15 
Wyo. 501, 
506-07, 89 P. 1035, 1036 (1907), established:

The question of the 
amount if any of such allowance in the absence of a statute fixing them 
[receivership fees] is within the jurisdiction of the court * * *, and should be 
judicially determined and allowed upon a basis of what is reasonable and 
commensurate with the services rendered and to be 
rendered.

[¶20.]  Here, the district court approved a fee 
award to the master of $40 per hour for general time and $25 per hour for travel 
time when adjudged to be reasonable after reduction of $280 relating to travel 
reimbursement time. In comparable terms, if we assess standards of a per hourly 
rate of payment for professional athletes or even the amounts ranging from a 
mechanic's rate to a specialist's fee, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the 
hourly rate awarded to this individual as an appointed agent of the district 
court. The court in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 427 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied 426 U.S. 935, 96 S. Ct. 2648, 49 L. Ed. 2d 386, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935, 96 S. Ct. 2648, 49 L. Ed. 2d 386, reh'g denied 429 U.S. 873, 97 S. Ct. 193, 50 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1976) 
summarized the view we find to be compatible with Wyoming rule and 
precedent:

The district court has 
broad discretion in fixing the amount of such compensation and in determining 
which of the parties to charge. F.R.Civ.P. 53(a). Here there is no basis for 
concluding that the district court abused its discretion. The grounds for the 
School Committee's objection is its belief that the reference to the masters was 
unnecessary and unwise and that the masters expended a great deal of time and 
energy fruitlessly. Assuming arguendo that these allegations would constitute 
grounds for setting aside the district court's order, we note that the district 
court reasonably reached contrary conclusions regarding the necessity and 
utility of the masters' work. We hold that there was no abuse of 
discretion.

[¶21.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 We are presented with 
another appellant's brief in which almost no record references are made to 
support identification of pleadings or contentions of fact. Kost v. Thatch, 782 P.2d 230 (Wyo. 
1989). Perhaps it will clarify if we repeat - facts are not established for 
appellate review unless references to the record are 
provided.

There may be a difference 
of $5 in the compensatory award to the master.

2 The order found in 
awarding $2,660 compensation:

THIS MATTER having come 
before the Court on the motion of the Master for an order to show cause why the 
Master's fees should not be paid, and on the Defendant's response to Master's 
motion herein, the Court finds as follows:

1. The parties agreed to 
appointment of a master and the movant, Ronald Sargent, was appointed Master in 
the above-entitled action by order of this Court dated 4 April 1988, and filed 
for record 7 April 1988.

2. The movant submitted 
his statement to defense counsel, consistent with that order hereinabove, on or 
about 12 September 1988, and payment for said statement was 
denied.

3. The movant Master 
filed Schedules A, B and C and the defendant has challenged Schedule C. Schedule 
C was set aside, new evidence adduced, because the Master was 
disqualified.

4. The Court finds that 
the Master discharged his duties responsibly, efficiently and in good faith, but 
sets aside the schedule because of the appearance of 
impropriety.

5. The Court finds that 
the movant, Ronald Sargent, performed his duties as Master in accordance with 
the order of this Court, and that his services were performed in anticipation of 
receipt of a fee for his services herein.

6. The Court finds that 
$40.00 per hour for time actually expended in the performance of his duties as 
Master is fair and reasonable.

7. The Court further 
finds that a fee of $25.00 per hour for travel fees is 
reasonable.

8. Even th[]ough the 
Master was disqualified, he nevertheless has provided valuable services to the 
parties, particularly in preparing Schedules A and B which were never challenged 
by defendant and also the work performed on Schedule C materially assisted the 
parties and the Court in the resolution of the dispute. Accordingly, the Master 
should in fairness be compensated for the value of his services and the Court 
finds that the Master has bestowed value upon the parties.

9. The Court has examined 
the statement of the movant, Ronald Sargent, herein and finds reasonable a 
reduction in fees from $40.00 to $25.00 per hour for travel time, reducing the 
statement by the sum of $280.00.

* * * * * 
*

11. The Court finds that 
defendant should pay the Master's fees especially in view of the correspondence 
attached.

3 A rule of this character 
in Wyoming 
would create singular problems considering the standard of present judicial 
salaries and hours of work now over seventy years later is between $20 and $30 
per hour.

4 In Currence, 18 S.E.2d  
at 658, the case concerned the interesting divorce problems of condonation when 
the wife, responding to being called a whore, responsively called her husband a 
son-of-a-bitch and

whereupon he reached for 
her throat and she seized an empty teakettle with which to protect herself, upon 
which the defendant struck her two or three times with his fist finally knocking 
her down, and kicking her two or three times as she lay on the floor against the 
wall; that at this time, the maid appeared from her room over the kitchen, and 
that, upon her intervention, the defendant retired from the room. The plaintiff 
says that the blows were of such a character as to leave wounds on her face and 
about her body; that she was badly injured and stunned, and that she and the 
maid went to the car for the purpose of getting a doctor's assistance when the 
defendant appeared and refused them the use of the automobile; that then she and 
the girl went to her mother's home for the night.

Unfortunately for her, 
they got back together for a time before she finally filed for divorce. She was 
then denied the divorce by application of the condonation defense. The court 
considered the time spent by the master excessive, but granted the fees 
requested at about one dollar per hour.