Title: CSP v. DDC

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CSP v. DDC1992 WY 160842 P.2d 528Case Number: C-91-10Decided: 11/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
CSP, 
formerly CSC, Appellant (Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

 
 
DDC, 
Appellee (Defendant),

 
 
John M. 
Burman, Faculty Supervisor, University of Wyoming Legal Services Program, and 
Kevin D. Huber, Student Intern, for appellant. Argument by Mr. 
Huber.

 
 
John M. 
Scorsine and William Ince, Legal Assistant, Rock Springs, for appellee. Argument by Mr. 
Ince.

 
 
Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     CSP appeals from an 
order of the trial court which denied her petition to modify her decree of 
divorce to give her custody of her minor children, FP and MJP. She specifically 
challenges the court's refusal to declare the non-existence of a father-child 
relationship between her ex-husband, DDC, and MJP. The trial court found that 
CSP was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from challenging the 
provision of a previously-stipulated modification establishing DDC's paternity 
of MJP.

 
 

[¶2.]     We affirm the order of 
the trial court.

 
 

[¶3.]     CSP states the issues 
in this way:

 
 
I. 
Whether the failure to comply with the Wyoming Parentage Statutes renders a 
determination of paternity void?

 
 
II. 
Whether an order of dismissal may be based on a void 
judgment?

 
 
III. 
Whether a party with "unclean hands" may invoke the doctrines of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel?

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellee's statement of 
the issues perhaps better identifies the issues to be considered as they relate 
to the particular facts and circumstances of this case:

 
 
I. 
Whether the stipulation agreement entered into by [CSP] and [DDC] and the 
resulting modification order entered by the District Court violate the Wyoming 
Parentage Act?

 
 
II. 
Whether the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial 
estoppel operate to prevent appellant from further litigating the issue of 
paternity of [MJP]?

 
 
III. 
Whether appellee is barred from asserting the equitable theories of res 
judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel by the unclean hands 
doctrine?

 
 
IV. 
Whether the district court committed reversible error in dismissing appellant's 
Motion to Modify Divorce Decree?

 
 

[¶5.]     No transcription of the 
proceedings in this case was made; instead, the essential facts are presented 
for our review by means of a "Settled and Approved Statement of Evidence and 
Proceedings." See W.R.A.P. 4.03. CSP is the mother of three children: NP, born 
May 8, 1984; FP, born September 20, 1985; and MJP, born (one month prematurely) 
on December 5, 1986. CSP married DDC, the appellee, on March 1, 1985. DDC is not 
the biological father of NP, who was born before the marriage. He is, however, 
the father of FP, who was born during the marriage.

 
 

[¶6.]     The parties were 
divorced on July 11, 1986. The divorce decree recited that one child, FP, had 
been born as the result of the marriage. The court awarded custody of FP to CSP. 
Approximately five months after the entry of the decree, MJP was born. Because 
MJP was born within 300 days (148 days to be exact) of the end of the marriage, 
DDC is presumed to be her natural father. W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i) (July 1986 
Repl.).

 
 

[¶7.]     CSP underwent some hard 
times after the divorce. She began receiving welfare in September 1986. By 
January 1988, she found herself and the children in an unhealthy living 
arrangement. She and her boyfriend were both using drugs, and her boyfriend was 
selling them. CSP arranged for her children to be taken 
care

of by 
relatives: NP went to live with CSP's father in Oklahoma, FP went to live with DDC, and MJP 
went to [¶8.]        live 
with CSP's mother, SG.

 
 

[¶9.]     CSP was later convicted 
of using marijuana.  She also failed 
to appear on a felony forgery charge in Nebraska. Apparently, these crises convinced 
her to try to fix her life situation. She returned to Wyoming, got off the 
drugs, and started to collect her children back together. She got NP and FP 
back, but her mother did not want MJP to return living with CSP because CSP was 
living in the home of DDC's mother.

 
 

[¶10.]  CSP's mother, SG, sent a letter to CSP 
threatening to start an adoption of MJP. When DDC and his mother learned of 
this, DDC took CSP to Mr. Pickett, the attorney who had represented him in the 
divorce from CSP. Mr. Pickett advised CSP that if she and DDC would stipulate to 
DDC being MJP's father, that might stop the adoption proceedings. CSP knew that 
DDC was not MJP's natural father, but she agreed to sign an acknowledgement of 
paternity which named DDC as the father. CSP claims Mr. Pickett was made aware 
that DDC was not MJP's father prior to the fiting of the acknowledgement with 
the court. This acknowledgement, along with a verified petition to establish 
paternity and a stipulation to modify the divorce decree, was filed with the 
court on November 10, 1988. That same date, the court signed an order adopting 
the stipulation to modify the divorce decree, which named MJP as a child of the 
marriage and granted physical custody of both children to 
DDC.

 
 

[¶11.]  CSP then retrieved MJP from SG. SG went 
ahead with the adoption proceedings for MJP, but abandoned them after CSP was 
granted temporary custody of MJP at a temporary custody hearing in the adoption 
proceeding. CSP thought that, since she had won at the adoption proceedings, the 
modification was no longer necessary and would not be 
filed.

 
 

[¶12.]  After reuniting all of CSP's children, 
CSP and DDC lived together briefly in the same house. However, they were soon 
driven apart by disagreements about the treatment of MJP, and by DDC's drinking. 
CSP became concerned when DDC, who had legal custody of MJP and FP because of 
the modification proceedings, said he might try, to take them away from her. CSP 
claims this is the first notice she had that the modification had been filed 
with the court and custody was now with DDC. She shifted her alliance from DDC 
back to SG. SG took CSP to her attorney, Mr. Finn, who she had employed in the 
abandoned adoption proceeding.

 
 

[¶13.]  Mr. Finn advised CSP that she had to 
return the children to DDC, and that her only means of keeping MJP would be to 
consent to adoption of MJP by SG. CSP signed the consent to adoption. However, 
she soon despaired of any action being taken by that route. Instead, she hired 
her trial counsel, Mr. Hjelmstad, to try, to "straighten out the mess." On March 
15, 1990, CSP filed a motion to modify the divorce decree and previous 
modification alleging that her previous consent to modification declaring DDC 
the father and granting him custody had been obtained by duress and 
fraud.

 
 

[¶14.]  Meanwhile, the State of Wyoming had filed a 
petition to establish paternity and support for MJP on November 15, 1989. With 
the petition, CSP filed an affidavit naming GM as the father of MJP and stating 
that she had had a sexual relationship with GM during her marriage to DDC.  GM filed an answer to the petition 
stating that he was not the father of MJP. The State of Wyoming filed a motion to 
dismiss the petition when it learned that DDC had been declared the father in 
the earlier divorce modification.

 
 

[¶15.]  Mr. Hjelmstad filed an objection to the 
State's motion to dismiss, contending that CSP's signature on the stipulation to 
modify the divorce decree had been obtained by fraud, duress and undue 
influence. On CSP's motion, the trial court consolidated the divorce and 
paternity cases, and ordered that paternity testing be performed. The tests 
showed that there was a 99.32% probability that GM was the father of 
MJP.

 
 

[¶16.]  After a hearing and written submission of 
closing arguments, the trial court entered a decision letter on July 23, 1991. 
The court found that CSP had voluntarily entered into the stipulation declaring 
DDC the father of MJP, and that her actions were free of the influence of fraud 
and deception. It held that she was prevented from raising the issue of MJP's 
paternity by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. After an 
order was entered on the court's decision letter, CSP took timely appeal to this 
court.

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant first argues that the 
stipulation she and DDC entered into was void for failure to comply with the 
procedural requirements of the Wyoming Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 et seq.  She claims that since the stipulation 
had the effect of adjudicating DDC's paternity of MJP, it was subject to the 
procedural rules for paternity actions. Specifically, appellant complains that 
the stipulation procedure was deficient in three respects: (1) MJP was not made 
a party to the action for paternity; (2) no guardian ad litem was appointed to 
represent her interests; and (3) no notice or opportunity to be heard in the 
paternity action was given to GM. See W.S. 14-2-107 (July 1986 
Repl.).

 
 

[¶18.]  We agree with CSP that the Wyoming 
Parentage Act provides the exclusive means of establishing the parent-child 
relationship between a child and his natural father. AEI v. JDM, 758 P.2d 22 (Wyo. 1988). There is no 
common-law authority for determination of paternity. Blanton v. Warn, 444 P.2d 325, 327 
(Wyo. 
1968).  Compliance with the 
statutory procedure is mandatory in actions for adjudication of paternity. Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811, 813 
(Wyo. 1989). 
However, these rules do not apply where, as here, paternity of a child presumed 
to be a child of the marriage is determined in a divorce action by consent of 
the parties. In Matter of Paternity of 
JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1261 (Wyo. 1991), we stated 
that:

 
 
While 
genetic testing, appointment of a guardian ad litem and an informal hearing are 
mandatory in the case of an initial, contested paternity determination, the Act 
does not mandate that the same procedures be used when paternity has already 
been established with the consent of the parties in a prior adjudication. * * * 
Where, as here, appellant and the mother agreed that the children were born of 
the marriage and this agreement was reflected in the divorce decree, there has 
been no violation of the mandatory language in the Act. The Act, as applied to 
the circumstances of this case, made appellant the "presumed father" and, as 
such, a blood test was not mandatory to establish paternity at the time of 
divorce. * * * [A]ppellant failed to exercise the statutory option of 
challenging his "presumed father" status in a parentage action joined with the 
divorce proceeding.

 
 

[¶19.]  We believe this same rule applies to a 
proceeding to modify a divorce decree to include a child conceived during the 
marriage but born afterward. Modifications of the custody and support provisions 
of a divorce decree are provided for by W.S. 20-2-113 (June 1987 Repl.), which 
states in part:

 
 
On the 
petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning 
the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires.

 
 

[¶20.]  The modification of a custody decree 
under this statute lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Gaines v. Doby, 773 P.2d 442, 446 
(Wyo. 1989), 
and cases cited therein. We will not disturb the modification unless there has 
been a grave abuse of discretion or violation of some legal principle. See Roberts v. Vilos, 776 P.2d 216, 217 
(Wyo. 1989). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that an action for custody and support 
of a child conceived during the marriage but born after the entry of a decree of 
divorce may be brought under a statute which authorizes modification of the 
decree, rather than under a paternity statute. See e.g., Perkins v. Perkins, 198 Neb. 
401, 253 N.W.2d 42 (Neb. 1977); Moore v. 
Moore, 231 Ore. 302, 372 P.2d 981 (Or. 1962); and see generally Annotation, Opening or Modification of Divorce Decree as 
to Custody or Support of Child Not Provided for in the Decree, 71 A.L.R.2d 
1370 § 19 (1960). We agree with the holding in these cases that the trial court 
has, as part of its continuing jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree, 
authority to declare valid a presumed parent-child relationship arising out of 
the marriage and to make orders of custody and support for the child conceived 
during the marriage, even after the divorce is Final.

 
 

[¶21.]  The incidental fact that MJP was born 
within five months of the divorce rather than during the marriage did not strip 
the court of its authority to make provision for her as a child of the marriage. 
Since this determination was made pursuant to a stipulation by the parties in 
their divorce action, it was not necessary to comply with the procedural norms 
of the Wyoming Parentage Act. JRW, 
814 P.2d 1256. To hold otherwise would open determinations of the parent-child 
relationship made in valid divorce decrees to unreasonable collateral attack on 
procedural grounds.

 
 

[¶22.]  CSP argues, however, that we must hold 
the modification void because GM, the child's natural father, was deprived of 
his due process right to notice of the paternity proceeding when DDC and CSP 
stipulated to paternity rather than adjudicating it through a proceeding under 
the Wyoming Parentage Act. CSP has no standing to make this argument for GM. We 
note, in any case, that GM had no right to such notice; W.S. 14-2-107 (July 1986 
Repl.) governing notice states that "each man presumed to be the father under W.S. 
14-2-102 and each man alleged to be 
the natural father may be made parties and shall be given notice of the 
[paternity] action * * *." GM was neither statutorily presumed to be the father 
of MJP, nor was he alleged to be her father in the petition for modification. 
Thus, he would not have been entitled to notice even had the proceeding been 
brought under the Act.

 
 

[¶23.]  We hold that the stipulation and order 
entered upon it was not invalid or void for failure to comply with the 
procedural requirements of the Wyoming Parentage Act.

 
 

[¶24.]  In her next issue, CSP argues that the 
trial court erred in applying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel to her petition to modify her divorce decree. This issue also is 
governed by our decision in Matter of 
Paternity of JRW, cited above. In JRW, the presumed father of two minor 
children stipulated in a property settlement agreement that both children were 
the issue of his marriage to his ex-wife. When the State later sued him for 
failure to pay child support, he attempted to bring a petition to declare the 
non-existence of the father/child relationship, which the trial court dismissed. 
On appeal, we held that the father was barred from bringing the action by 
failure to commence it within a reasonable time. We also held that his action 
was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial 
estoppel:

 
 
Because 
of the potentially damaging effect that relitigation of a paternity 
determination might have on innocent children, the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel are rigorously observed in the paternity 
context.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
In Matter of Estate of Newell, 765 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 
1988), we identified the four criteria used to determine the applicability of 
res judicata. They are: "'(1) the parties were identical; (2) the subject matter 
was identical; (3) the issues were the same and related to the subject matter; 
and (4) the capacities of the persons were identical in reference to both the 
subject matter and the issues between them.'" Id. at 1355 (quoting Matter of Swasso, 751 P.2d 887, 890 
(Wyo. 
1988)).

 
 

JRW, 814 P.2d  at 1265.

 
 

[¶25.]  In JRW, we found the Newell test satisfied under the 
circumstances. We also held that collateral estoppel was applicable because the 
paternity issue had been decided by stipulation of the parties and that judicial 
estoppel applied:

 
 
The 
doctrine [of judicial estoppel] arises where, as here, the parties identified 
the children as "issue of [the] marriage" in the divorce proceeding. As defined 
in Black's Law Dictionary 761 (5th ed. 1979), judicial estoppel binds a party by 
his judicial declarations and he

 
 
may not 
contradict them in a subsequent proceeding involving [the] same issues and 
parties.  * * *  Under this doctrine, a party who by his 
pleadings, statements or contentions, under oath, has assumed a particular 
position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an inconsistent position 
in a subsequent action.

 
 
Thus, 
where appellant affirmatively asserted in the property settlement agreement that 
both children were "of [the] marriage," he is estopped from his current 
inconsistent claim that neither child is his.

 
 
 JRW, 814 P.2d  at 
1265-66.

 
 

[¶26.]  The same factors which made res judicata, 
collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel appropriate in JRW are applicable here: a parent's 
assertion that a child was born of the marriage, made in a divorce proceeding, 
which that parent later seeks to repudiate. CSP seeks to distinguish this case 
from JRW, in that she claims that DDC 
is barred from employing these doctrines because of his "unclean hands" in 
perpetrating a fraud upon the court and in obtaining her signature on the 
petition for modification through fraud.

 
 

[¶27.]  With regard to the alleged fraud upon the 
court, we note that CSP was as guilty of "unclean hands" as was DDC.  She knew that GM, rather than DDC, was 
the probable natural father of MJP when she signed the petition to be filed with 
the court. She also must have known that the purpose of the petition was to stop 
the adoption, rather than to act in the best interests of the child, if that was 
its purpose as she now claims.  
Therefore, we cannot countenance her claim now that DDC has unclean hands 
because what was filed with the court was false or misleading; she was as guilty 
as he. Additionally, if we must balance equities in this situation, MJP's 
interests as the innocent party weigh heavily in the balance. We will not 
lightly reverse a finding of her legitimacy in favor of a stranger to her 
parents marriage. As was said in Moore v. 
Moore, 372 P.2d at 983:

 
 
The fact 
that plaintiff purposely concealed her pregnancy from the court cannot militate 
against the child's right to be supported by its father. In these proceedings the criterion for 
judgment is the child's welfare and not the fault of the parent. [emphasis 
added]

 
 

[¶28.]  CSP also claims that DDC has unclean 
hands because she was misled into signing the agreement through the ethical 
misconduct of DDC's attorney, Mr. Pickett. CSP claims that since Mr. Pickett was 
DDC's attorney, he could not adequately represent her conflicting interests in 
the modification action.  She draws 
our attention to Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b), which 
states:

 
 
A lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:

 
 
(1) the 
lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; 
and

 
 
(2) the 
client consents after consultation.  
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, 
the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantages and risks involved.

 
 

[¶29.]  The evidence shows that Mr. Pickett did 
indeed represent both DDC and CSP in the modification action. Regardless of what 
his formal agreements may have been concerning the representation, a 
representation of both parties was clearly created by implication. See Adger v. State, 584 P.2d 1056, 1060 
(Wyo. 1978) 
(representation may be created by implication).  Whether such a representation is created 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1346 
(Wyo. 1979), 
cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). Here, the Verified Petition for Order Establishing 
Paternity, the Acknowledgement of Paternity, and the Stipulation to Modify 
Divorce Decree were all signed both by DDC and CSP and prepared by Mr. Pickett. 
Therefore, we conclude that a joint or common representation was created, and 
that Rule 1.7 applies.

 
 

[¶30.]  Adherence to Rule 1.7 is especially 
important in the domestic relations context because

 
 
[i]n a 
common representation, the lawyer theoretically owes both parties a duty of confidentiality 
and loyal and diligent representation. These duties conflict when the parties' 
interests are as diametrically opposed as in most divorce 
situations.

 
 
F. 
Gibbard and F. Hartmeister, Mediation and 
Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases -- Practical 
Considerations, Ethical Concerns and Proposed Standards of Practice, 
XXVIILand & Water L.Rev. 
435, 452-53 (1992) (emphasis in original; footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

[¶31.]  The trial court found that the joint 
representation did not justify setting aside the stipulation or the modification 
entered on it because: (1) CSP was fully advised of the consequences of signing 
the agreement; (2) she had an independent attorney available; and (3) she 
contacted that attorney before action was taken. The stipulation shows that CSP 
did, indeed, confer with an independent attorney prior to signing the agreement. 
However, we do not find any evidence of what Mr. Pickett told CSP, if anything, 
concerning the conflict of interest between her and DDC and the advantages and 
disadvantages of common

representation. 
CSP claims he gave her no advice on these points.

 
 

[¶32.]  The question before us is whether the 
modification ought to be set aside based on all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the signing of the stipulation.  As previously mentioned, CSP telephoned 
her attorney from Mr. Pickett's office prior to signing the agreement. She also 
consulted with him by phone outside Mr. Pickett's office on at least one other 
occasion, presumably concerning the stipulation.  It must also be noted that the 
stipulation did benefit CSP, in that at the time she sought it, she was trying 
to reconcile with DDC and feared the adoption proceedings brought by SG. That 
circumstances would later ally CSP with SG and against DDC, might not reasonably 
have been anticipated when the stipulation was signed. We therefore hold that 
the opportunity to consult her own attorney, coupled with the benefit conferred 
on CSP, sufficiently removed any taint which may have been present due to the 
conflict-of-interest problem so that the modification must be allowed to 
stand.

 
 

[¶33.]  In addition to its findings concerning 
the validity and preclusive effect of the prior modification of the divorce 
decree, the trial court specifically found that CSP failed to establish a change 
of circumstances which would justify a modification of the divorce decree and 
its earlier modification. Our review indicates that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in making this finding.

 
 

[¶34.]  CSP's challenge to the agreement to 
modify is barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel. 
Her petition to modify was properly dismissed.