Title: LARRY DEAN SINNING, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LARRY DEAN SINNING, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 193172 P.3d 388Case Number: S-07-0081Decided: 12/11/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
LARRY 
DEAN SINNING, JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. 
Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.        

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Larry Dean Sinning, Jr., pled guilty to 
one count of forgery and one count of conspiracy to commit forgery.  The district court sentenced him to a 
period of incarceration in the Wyoming State Penitentiary but recommended him 
for the boot camp program at the Wyoming Honor Conservation Camp.  Later, the district court modified Mr. 
Sinning's sentence so that, upon successful completion of boot camp, his 
original sentence would be suspended and he would be placed on probation.  One of the conditions of probation was 
that he be accepted into and complete an Adult Community Corrections (ACC) 
program.

 
 
[¶2] Mr. 
Sinning did not complete the program as required and, after a hearing, the 
district court entered an order revoking his probation and reinstating the 
original sentence.  He appeals the 
probation revocation order, claiming that the State did not produce any evidence 
showing why he was terminated from the ACC program.  Absent evidence of the reason, he 
argues, the State failed to show he willfully violated the conditions of 
probation. 

 
 
[¶3]      We affirm the 
revocation. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶4]  The issue for our determination is 
whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Sinning's 
probation. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5] In 
September of 2004, Mr. Sinning was charged with two counts of forgery in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(a)(ii)(b) (LexisNexis 2005) and one count 
of conspiracy to commit forgery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) 
and 6-3-602(a)(ii)(b) (LexisNexis 2005).  
On January 13, 2005, Mr. Sinning pled guilty to conspiracy to commit 
forgery and one count of forgery.  
The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 30 to 60 months 
in prison, but recommended him for boot camp.  After Mr. Sinning completed boot camp, 
the district court modified his sentence by suspending the balance of his prison 
term and placing him on probation on the condition that he attend and complete 
an ACC program.  In accordance with 
the district court's order, Mr. Sinning was placed at Community Alternatives of 
Casper (CAC) in March of 2006.   

 
 
[¶6]  On October 16, 2006, the State filed a 
petition to revoke Mr. Sinning's probation.  The State alleged that Mr. Sinning had 
been terminated from CAC in violation of the conditions of his probation.  CAC disciplinary hearing documents 
contained in the record indicate that he was terminated because, as part of an 
alleged plan to rob an Arby's restaurant, he set off a fire alarm at CAC.      

 
 
[¶7]  In response to the State's petition, the 
district court convened two separate hearings, the first to adjudicate whether 
or not Mr. Sinning was required to complete the CAC program as a term of 
probation and failed to fulfill that requirement, and the second to determine 
whether his violation of the probation condition should result in 
revocation.  After the adjudicatory 
hearing, the district court concluded Mr. Sinning did not complete the CAC 
program as ordered.  Following the 
dispositional hearing, the district court concluded Mr. Sinning's probation 
should be revoked.  Therefore, the 
district court entered an order revoking probation and re-imposing the original 
concurrent sentences.        

           

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]  A district court's decision to revoke 
probation and impose a sentence is discretionary and will not be disturbed 
unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion.  Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1225 
(Wyo. 
1996).  A district court has broad 
discretion in sentencing matters, including decisions to grant or revoke 
probation.  Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 56, ¶ 12, 44 P.3d 943, 947 (Wyo. 2002).  We review the 
district court's decision to determine whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did.  Mapp, 929 P.2d  at 1225.  
All that is necessary to uphold a district court's decision to revoke 
probation is evidence that it made a conscientious judgment, after hearing the 
facts, that a condition of probation was violated.  Id.  However, the district court's decision 
must be based upon verified facts and the defendant must be afforded due 
process.  Anderson v. State, 2002 WY 46, ¶ 25, 43 P.3d 108, 118 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]  Probation revocation proceedings are 
governed by W.R.Cr.P. 39.  In 
addressing such proceedings under the rule, we have said:

 
 
            
The proceedings for probation revocation consist of a two-part 
process.  The first part, the 
adjudicatory phase, requires the district court to determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence whether a condition of probation was violated.  The second, dispositional phase, is 
triggered only upon a finding that a condition of probation was violated.  In this phase, the district court must 
deliberate not only upon the violation, but also the reasons the conditions were 
originally imposed and the circumstances surrounding the violation.  After consideration of all these 
factors, the district court must then determine the appropriate consequences of 
the probationer's violation.  

 
 
            
In the adjudicatory phase, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 
and the Wyoming Rules of Evidence apply.  
In the dispositional phase, only general due process protections continue 
to attach and the rules of evidence are suspended.

 
 

Mapp, 929 P.2d  at 1226 (citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶10]  In applying Rule 39, we have said that 
notice to a probationer of the grounds for revocation is fundamental and failure 
to provide such notice is a defect affecting a substantial right.  Anderson, ¶ 26, 
43 P.3d  at 118.  In addition to the 
requirements contained in Rule 39, we have said that in order to revoke 
probation for the violation of a condition of probation not involving the 
payment of money, the violation must either be willful or threaten the safety of 
society.  Id.  Willfulness is determined at the 
dispositional phase of the proceedings.  
Mapp, 929 P.2d  at 
1228.

 
 
[¶11] In 
Mapp, we applied these standards 
under circumstances quite similar to those presented in the case at bar.  Mr. Mapp, like Mr. Sinning, was placed 
on probation conditioned upon his completion of the CAC program.  Before Mr. Mapp had completed the 
program, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation to which it attached 
an affidavit signed by his supervisor stating that Mr. Mapp was terminated from 
the program because he failed to take prescribed medication and was unmanageable 
without it. 

 
 
[¶12] At 
the adjudicatory hearing, the supervisor testified that Mr. Mapp was terminated 
from CAC before having completed the program.  Mr. Mapp testified that he was 
wrongfully terminated on the basis of untrue statements made by a CAC 
employee.  The district court 
concluded that Mr. Mapp did not complete the CAC program and his probation 
should be revoked.  

 
 
[¶13]  On appeal, Mr. Mapp claimed the district 
court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because it relied solely 
on hearsay allegations contained in a CAC report about which the State's only 
witness testified he had no personal knowledge.  The report was filed with the court but 
was not admitted into evidence during the direct examination of the State's only 
witness.  Mr. Mapp argued there was 
a failure of proof because the State presented no evidence that he failed to 
take his medication and the only support for the State's claim was the hearsay 
report contained in the court file.  

 
 
[¶14]  On appeal, this Court held that the 
adjudicatory phase of the revocation proceeding ended once it was established 
that Mr. Mapp did not complete the CAC program.  We said, "The reasons for Mr. Mapp's 
failure to complete the program were appropriately considered in the second, 
dispositional phase, of the proceeding."  
Id. at 
1227.  Thus, the State was not 
required to present evidence in the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings 
showing that Mr. Mapp's failure to take required medication led to his 
termination from the program.  
Additionally, we said, "when the [district] court * * * turns its 
attention to the second stage of the revocation hearing, hearsay evidence will 
be useful in determining whether or not to revoke probation in light of the 
prior finding of a probation violation."  
Id.   

 
 
[¶15]  During the dispositional phase of the 
proceeding, Mr. Mapp had the opportunity to demonstrate that his termination 
from CAC was not his fault and his probation should not be revoked.  The district court considered his 
testimony together with the information contained in the CAC report and 
concluded revocation was appropriate.  
The record indicated Mr. Mapp had notice of the factual allegations 
contained in the report and ample opportunity to procure the testimony of the 
witnesses named in the report but chose instead to rely on his own testimony to 
challenge the accuracy of the allegations in the report.  On appeal, this Court found no denial of 
due process or abuse of discretion and upheld the 
revocation.

 
 
[¶16]  We are presented with almost the same 
circumstances here.  The State filed 
a petition for revocation together with an affidavit signed by Mr. Sinning's 
probation supervisor stating that he had violated the terms of his probation in 
that he had been terminated from CAC before completing the program.  At the adjudicatory hearing, the State 
called the probation supervisor to testify that Mr. Sinning did not complete the 
CAC program.  As in Mapp, her testimony ended the 
adjudicatory phase because it established that Mr. Sinning did not complete the 
program upon which his probation was conditioned.  

 
 
[¶17]  Accordingly, the district court issued 
an adjudication letter finding that Mr. Sinning did not complete an ACC program 
as ordered.  The district court 
further stated in the letter that a disposition hearing would be scheduled at 
which time, in accordance with Mapp, 
Mr. Sinning would have an opportunity to demonstrate that his termination from 
CAC was not his fault and should not result in revocation.  The district court subsequently entered 
an order on adjudication in accordance with his letter.  

 
 
[¶18]  After the order on adjudication was 
entered, the State filed with the district court the CAC termination report 
containing the details of Mr. Sinning's termination, as also occurred in Mapp.  The report detailed problems Mr. Sinning 
had during his time at CAC, including having been fired from one job for 
frequently being late and not showing up at all on two occasions; having a 
questionable relationship with his manager while working at Arby's restaurant 
(the manager called in time extensions for Mr. Sinning when the manager was not 
at work and even after the manager was no longer employed by Arby's); and an 
arrest for driving with an expired license at a time when he was supposed to be 
at work.  The problems culminated 
with reports to a CAC supervisor by two other residents that Mr. Sinning was 
planning to rob Arby's and, in order to carry out his plan, intended to pull a 
fire alarm at CAC, walk out with the other residents in response to the alarm 
and not return.  According to the 
termination report, CAC personnel contacted law enforcement, and officers were 
at the facility on the evening the residents reported Mr. Sinning intended to 
carry out his plan.  The fire alarm 
was pulled, and the officers arrested Mr. Sinning.  The report stated that Mr. Sinning was 
terminated from the program "based on actions that lead CAC staff to believe 
[he] was trying to follow through with his threat to rob Arbys."   

 
 
[¶19]  Prior to the disposition hearing, the 
State also filed two letters with the district court, one from the deputy county 
attorney to defense counsel and the other from Mr. Sinning's probation agent to 
the deputy county attorney disclosing the names of the CAC residents who made 
the reports concerning Mr. Sinning's plan to rob Arby's and pull the fire 
alarm.  These letters were in 
response to defense counsel's argument at the adjudicatory hearing that the 
termination report should not be considered because it contained untrustworthy 
hearsay from CAC residents whom Mr. Sinning had no way of challenging because 
they were not identified.  Defense 
counsel indicated that if the names were disclosed, the defense could proffer 
discovery and subpoena them as witnesses.    

 
 
[¶20] At 
the disposition hearing, the State presented no evidence and Mr. Sinning 
testified on his own behalf.  He 
denied any intention to rob Arby's and denied pulling the fire alarm.  He also testified that the CAC resident 
who initiated the report against him had been very angry with him and they had 
not spoken for approximately two weeks before the fire alarm incident.  His defense was, in essence, that the 
resident who made the report to CAC lied.  
Defense counsel informed the district court that the defense made a 
tactical decision to have Mr. Sinning refute the allegations rather than 
subpoenaing the resident to testify.     

 
 
[¶21]  Following the second hearing, the 
district court issued a disposition letter.  The letter began by noting that the 
court had reviewed the file, the pre-sentence investigation report and the 
evidence presented in the revocation proceeding.  The court further noted that the State 
had the burden of proving the violation alleged in the petition by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  The 
court stated:

 
 
Here, 
the court finds that the better weight of the testimony and evidence support the 
fact that defendant was terminated from the ACC program, that the reason for his 
termination was a good one, and that the reason for termination was within 
defendant's control.

 
 
            
[Mr. Sinning] has offered his own testimony, in essence attempting to 
refute the basis for his expulsion from ACC.  Based on the totality of the evidence 
the court finds [Mr. Sinning]'s testimony improbable.  [Mr. Sinning] would have the court 
believe that, by virtue of some conspiracy, the staff in conjunction with other 
residents of the ACC, fabricated a rather elaborate and detailed scheme to have 
[Mr. Sinning] terminated from the program after some seven 
months.

 

            
The court has also taken the time to review the ACC termination report 
filed with the court on December 4, 2006.  
Certainly, that report stands for the proposition that, apart from the 
main reasons for termination, [Mr. Sinning] did not have a trouble-free stay at 
the ACC.  Rather, the report 
indicates several instances of deception by [Mr. Sinning], some of which he 
admitted. 

 
 
The 
district court subsequently entered an order revoking Mr. Sinning's 
probation.   

 
 
[¶22]  In Mapp, we reiterated that the differing 
evidentiary requirements in the first and second phases of a probation 
revocation proceeding contemplate the admission of hearsay evidence to assist 
the court in the dispositional determination.  Here, as in Mapp, the district court considered 
hearsay in the form of the CAC termination report and the pre-sentence 
investigation report.  Here, as in 
Mapp, Mr. Sinning had notice of the 
factual allegations contained in the CAC report and the opportunity to procure 
the testimony of the witnesses named in the report prior to the disposition 
hearing.  He chose to rely instead 
solely on his own testimony to challenge the allegations in the report.  Mr. Sinning, therefore, was not denied 
due process by the district court's consideration of the report. 

 
 
[¶23]  In addition to the termination report, 
the district court also considered Mr. Sinning's testimony.  Where non-hearsay is presented, we defer 
to the district court's opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses 
and make necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Mapp, 929 P.2d  at 1227.  As reflected in its disposition letter, 
the district court did not find Mr. Sinning's testimony credible, deduced that 
his story was improbable and inferred that he willfully pulled the fire 
alarm.  

 
 
[¶24]  The record presents abundant evidence 
that the district court made a conscientious judgment to revoke Mr. Sinning's 
probation.  The testimony during the 
adjudicatory phase was uncontestedMr. Sinning failed to successfully complete 
the CAC program.  During the 
dispositional phase, Mr. Sinning's testimony did not persuade the district court 
that the information contained in the CAC termination report should be 
disregarded.  As we have 
said:

 
 
A probation 
revocation hearing is not a trial on a new criminal charge. It is 
simply an extension of the sentencing procedure resulting from the conviction of 
the basic charge, coupled with the requirement that the probationer be 
afforded due process of law before being deprived of the conditional right to liberty granted 
by probation.

 
 

Mapp, 929 P.2d  at 1226.

 
 
[¶25]  Mr. Sinning was afforded due process of 
law prior to the revocation.  In 
considering whether to revoke his probation, the district court was entitled to 
look to the CAC report and other reports submitted to the court by authorized 
agencies for guidance.  These 
reports together with Mr. Sinning's testimony support the district court's 
determination that his probation should be revoked and the original sentence 
reinstated.  

 
 
[¶26]  Affirmed.