Title: Citizens Against Linscott v. Bonner County Board of Commissioners

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 47909 
CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT / 
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT, an 
unincorporated non-profit association 
organized under the laws of the State of 
Idaho, 
 
     Petitioner-Appellant- 
     Cross Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the 
State of Idaho, 
 
     Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
 
and 
 
FRANK E. LINSCOTT and CAROL 
LINSCOTT, INTERSTATE CONCRETE 
& ASPHALT COMPANY, 
 
     Intervenors-Respondents- 
     Cross Appellants. 
 
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Boise, February 2021 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: May 12, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION. THE 
COURT’S 
PRIOR 
OPINION 
DATED MARCH 22, 2021 IS 
HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bonner County. Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge.   
The decision of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for Appellant. Gary G. Allen argued. 
Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney for Respondent Bonner County. William S. Wilson 
argued. 
 
Finney & Finney, PA, Sandpoint, for Intervenors Linscott. John A. Finney argued. 
 
Winston & Cashatt, Coeur d’Alene, for Intervenors Interstate Concrete & Asphalt 
Company. Elizabeth A. Tellessen argued.  
_______________________ 
 
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BURDICK, Justice 
This is an administrative appeal concerning whether a conditional use permit issued 
pursuant to an amendment to county code is valid when the amendment is subsequently found 
void. In addition, this case presents questions concerning the limitations on actions for judicial 
review of agency action brought under the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act (“LLUPA”) and 
the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (“IDAPA”).   
Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant (“CAL”) challenges a conditional use 
permit (“CUP”) issued by the Bonner County Board of Commissioners (“the County”). The CUP 
was based on a recent amendment to Bonner County zoning ordinances (“the Amendment”) and 
authorized Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company (“Interstate”) to operate an asphalt batch 
plant within Frank and Carol Linscott’s gravel mine in Sagle, Idaho. In its petition for judicial 
review by the Bonner County district court, CAL challenged both the validity of the Amendment 
and the County’s decision to issue the CUP. The district court determined that CAL had standing 
to file its petition for judicial review of the CUP and that CAL had timely filed its petition. 
However, the district court concluded that it could not declare the Amendment invalid in a 
proceeding for judicial review under LLUPA and IDAPA. Accordingly, the district court upheld 
the County’s decision to grant the CUP, giving the County deference in applying its own land-
use ordinances.  
During the pendency of this appeal, CAL filed an action for declaratory relief before 
another district court judge to have the Amendment declared void. In that proceeding, the County 
admitted that the Amendment had been adopted without proper public notice and stipulated to a 
judgment and order declaring the Amendment void. On appeal of the administrative decision to 
this Court, CAL argues, inter alia, that the subsequent voiding of the Amendment also 
invalidates the CUP or that the CUP was not issued in conformity with Bonner County zoning 
laws.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual background. 
In the small community of Sagle, Idaho, Frank and Carol Linscott own and operate a 
gravel pit mine on approximately 139 acres of property encompassing two parcels of land. While 
the Linscotts’ property is currently zoned for rural use, the gravel pit predates the enactment of 
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Bonner County’s zoning code and is a grandfathered nonconforming use.1 In 1981, when Bonner 
County enacted its zoning code, the gravel mine was approximately seventeen acres and mining 
appeared to occur only on the northern parcel of land. Presently, that mine now occupies as many 
as 112 acres and seems to be conducted on both parcels of land.  
In nearby Sandpoint, Idaho, Interstate operates an asphalt batch plant in the north of the 
city. This batch plant has operated since 1987 and, over the years, Interstate has received special 
use permits from the County to conduct temporary asphalt operations at the Linscotts’ gravel pit. 
Operating the batch plant requires gravel from the Linscotts’ mine, which is accomplished by 
large gravel trucks making frequent back-and-forth trips between the two locations.  
B. The administrative proceedings. 
On August 8, 2018, the Linscotts and Interstate jointly filed for a CUP from the Bonner 
County Planning and Zoning Commission (“P&Z Commission”) to permanently relocate 
Interstate’s asphalt batch plant to the Linscotts’ gravel pit. They based their application on the 
Amendment, which conditionally permitted asphalt batch plant operations in a rural zone so long 
as they occurred in an “active gravel pit.” 
After receiving public comment, the P&Z Commission approved the CUP at a public 
hearing on November 15, 2018, issuing a written decision to that effect the next day. That 
decision was appealed to the County, which approved the CUP during a public hearing on 
January 11, 2019. The County issued a written decision approving the CUP on January 14. The 
County found that the use would be in an “existing gravel pit” and concluded that allowing the 
batch plant would comport with Bonner County Revised Code (“BCRC”) and the Bonner 
County Comprehensive Plan.  
Subsequently, CAL petitioned the County for reconsideration of its decision to issue the 
CUP, claiming it was deficient in eleven respects. Ultimately, the County only considered one of 
CAL’s asserted deficiencies—that granting the CUP would expand the gravel pit’s 
nonconforming use. The County again approved the CUP after considering CAL’s arguments at 
a public hearing on March 22, 2019, and issued a written decision to that effect on March 25. In 
that decision, the County determined that the gravel pit’s compliance with the nonconforming 
use provisions of BCRC was irrelevant to its decision to issue the CUP because the Amendment 
                                                 
1 The precise magnitude of this use and its compliance with the nonconforming use provisions of county zoning 
code is of significant dispute in this matter and discussed in full below.  
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only required an “active gravel pit.” The County also noted that the use would occur in an 
“active, legal nonconforming gravel mine.”  
C. Proceedings before the district court. 
On April 19, 2019, CAL attempted to file its petition for judicial review of the County’s 
decision on reconsideration in the Bonner County district court via the iCourt filing system. That 
filing was rejected because it did not include a case information sheet. A notification of the 
rejection was sent to CAL’s counsel on April 22. CAL attempted to refile a corrected petition for 
judicial review with a case information sheet, but that corrected petition was never received. 
CAL claims the submission failed due to either “a glitch in the iCourt system” or “an inadvertent 
‘mis-click’” by administrative staff for CAL’s counsel. Counsel for the County discovered the 
filing error on April 30 when he attempted to file a notice of appearance but was unable to locate 
an active case in the iCourt system. Counsel for the County then called Counsel for CAL on May 
1 to inform him of the mistake and CAL refiled the petition the same day. That petition for 
judicial review was accepted by the district court on May 1 but did not include a date relating 
back to the original April 19 filing.  
The County subsequently moved to dismiss CAL’s petition for judicial review as 
untimely because it was accepted by the district court nine days after the statutorily prescribed 
twenty-eight day filing period. The County also moved to dismiss the petition for judicial review 
on the basis that CAL had not served the Linscotts or Interstate, the other parties to the CUP 
proceedings. The district court heard oral argument on June 27, 2019, and issued a written 
decision denying the County’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that CAL’s attempt 
at refiling its petition in a timely fashion was “prevented by circumstances outside their control” 
and denied the motion to dismiss “in the interest of justice.” In addition, the district court 
declined to dismiss the petition for inadequate service, concluding that the County did not 
demonstrate any prejudice.  
With the petition for judicial review moving forward, both the Linscotts and Interstate 
filed a motion to intervene in the case to defend their interests in the CUP. The district court 
granted both motions.  
The district court fielded briefing from all four parties and heard oral argument on 
December 13, 2019. Broadly speaking, CAL’s arguments against the CUP fell into two 
categories: first, that the CUP was invalid because the Amendment, which conditionally 
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permitted asphalt batch plants in active gravel pits, had been unlawfully adopted; and second, 
that the County had not complied with its own ordinances in granting the CUP because it 
enlarged or expanded an existing nonconforming use. The County, the Linscotts, and Interstate 
(collectively “Respondents”) argued in favor of upholding the CUP on four bases: first, that CAL 
was barred from challenging the Amendment in a judicial review of agency action; second; that 
CAL lacked standing to challenge the County’s action; third, that CAL’s petition had not been 
timely filed or served; and forth, that the County had complied with its zoning ordinances when 
issuing the CUP.  
Ultimately, the district court issued an opinion and order affirming the County’s decision 
to grant the CUP. The district court reasoned that CAL had associational standing to pursue this 
action on behalf of its members because the members themselves had standing. Additionally, the 
district court determined that the time for filing the petition had not begun to run until the County 
issued its decision on reconsideration and that CAL had timely filed its petition. Considering the 
merits, the district court determined that it could not consider whether the Amendment was 
invalid in a proceeding for judicial review. Similarly, the district court concluded that it was 
powerless to render a legal conclusion as to the gravel pit’s compliance with the zoning code 
absent an underlying enforcement action from the County to that effect. Without a declaratory 
judgment action finding the Amendment invalid, or an enforcement action showing the gravel pit 
was out of compliance, the district court afforded deference to the County in interpreting its own 
ordinances and affirmed the issuance of the CUP.  
CAL timely appealed. Bonner County, the Linscotts, and Interstate cross-appealed.  
D. The declaratory judgment proceedings. 
After filing its notice of appeal, CAL filed a declaratory judgment action in Bonner 
County district court seeking to have it declare the Amendment void for having been adopted 
without public notice. During those proceedings, the County admitted that the Amendment had 
been adopted without proper notice and stipulated to an order and judgment declaring the 
Amendment void. On July 17, 2020, the district court entered an order and judgment declaring 
that the Amendment to BCRC conditionally permitting asphalt batch plants in an active gravel 
pit was void.  
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in concluding that CAL has standing? 
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2. Did the district court err in concluding that CAL filed its petition for judicial review 
within statutorily and judicially prescribed time limits? 
3. Did the district court err in refusing to dismiss the petition for judicial review because 
CAL did not serve the Linscotts or Interstate with the petition? 
4. Did the district court err in determining it could not consider the validity of the 
Amendment in a proceeding for judicial review? 
5. Does the subsequent stipulated order and judgment declaring the Amendment void have 
an impact on this action?  
a. May this Court properly consider the judgment declaring the Amendment void on 
appeal? 
b. Does the judgment declaring the Amendment void, if considered, also void the 
CUP issued pursuant to the Amendment? 
6. Did the district court err in concluding that the County’s interpretation and application of 
its zoning ordinances was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion? 
7. Are any of the parties entitled to an award of attorney’s fees?  
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (“LLUPA”), Idaho Code sections 67-6501 to 67-6539, 
provides for judicial review of the approval or denial of a land use application by an affected 
person aggrieved by a final decision. I.C. § 67-6521(1)(d). A judicial review of a land use 
decision shall follow the procedures outlined for judicial review of agency action as set forth in 
IDAPA. Id. Under LLUPA, when a challenged land use decision is made by a board of county 
commissioners, the board is treated as a government agency under IDAPA. In re Jerome Cnty. 
Bd. of Comm’rs, 153 Idaho 298, 307, 281 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2012). A district court acts in its 
appellate capacity when hearing a petition for judicial review under LLUPA, and this Court 
reviews the district court’s decision “as a matter of procedure” but “conduct[s] an independent 
review of the agency record.” Neighbors for Pres. of Big and Little Creek Cmty. v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs of Payette Cnty., 159 Idaho 182, 186, 358 P.3d 67, 71 (2015) (citations and quotations 
omitted). A district court’s decision to uphold a land use decision will be affirmed unless the 
petitioner shows both “that (1) the board erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67–
5279(3), and (2) the board's action prejudiced its substantial rights.” Id. (citation omitted). Idaho 
Code section 67-5279(3) requires that a board’s decision be affirmed unless 
the court finds that the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions 
are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
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(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  
I.C. § 67-5279(3).  
 
“The interpretation of a . . . zoning ordinance is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review.” 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 14, 343 P.3d 41, 43 (2015) 
(citing Dry Creek Partners, LLC v. Ada Cnty. Comm’rs, ex rel. State, 148 Idaho 11, 18, 217 P.3d 
1282, 1289 (2009)). However, “[p]lanning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong 
presumption of validity, including the agency’s application and interpretation of its own zoning 
ordinances.” Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 
126, 131 (2007) (citing Cowan v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 
P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006)). Additionally, questions of constitutional due process are questions of 
law over which this Court exercises free review. Neighbors for Pres. of Big and Little Creek 
Cmty., 159 Idaho at 186, 358 P.3d at 71.  
IV. 
ANALYSIS  
A. The district court did not err in concluding that CAL had standing. 
The Respondents’ arguments with respect to standing turn on two sub-issues. First, they 
contend that statutory amendments to Idaho business entity statutes made in 2015 abrogated 
associational standing for unincorporated nonprofit associations like CAL. Building on that 
argument, they argue that CAL, as a separate entity, is not an “affected person” as required for 
standing under LLUPA because it does not own real property. We conclude that CAL had 
associational standing to pursue this matter. 
1. Enactment of the Uniform Business Organizations Code did not change associational 
standing principles.  
In 2015, Idaho enacted the Uniform Business Organizations Code (“UBOC”). 2015 Idaho 
Sess. Laws 750. The UBOC is, first and foremost, an organizational statute, bundling multiple 
uniform business entity acts together into one title of the Idaho Code. To that end, UBOC 
includes the 2008 Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (“UUNAA”), as amended 
in 2011. See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws 897. Respondents focus on a portion of that act, which 
provides that “[a]n unincorporated nonprofit association is an entity distinct from its members 
and managers.” I.C. § 30-27-105(a). They argue that this language severed any connection 
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between an unincorporated nonprofit’s members and itself, and thereby abrogated the doctrine of 
associational standing as applied to unincorporated nonprofits.  
To the extent Respondents suggest that UUNAA—and its language concerning an 
unincorporated nonprofit’s entity status—is new to the Idaho Code as of 2015, they are mistaken. 
As noted above, Idaho’s adoption of the UBOC in 2015 was an organizational, not substantive, 
change in the law. And, on that note, UUNAA has been part of the Idaho Code in some form 
since 1993. See 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 953 (adopting the UUNAA) (originally codified at I.C. § 
53-701 to 53-717). The statutory language as it existed before adoption of UBOC provided that 
“[a] nonprofit association is a legal entity separate from its members for the purposes of 
determining and enforcing rights, duties, and liabilities in contract and tort” I.C. § 53-706(1) 
(2014). Both the language in the 2015 statutory amendments, and in the statutes as they existed 
before the adoption of UBOC, is an expression of the same departure from the common-law rule 
treating an unincorporated nonprofit association as an aggregate of its members. Compare Unif. 
Unincorporated Nonprofit Assoc. Act § 6 cmt. 1 (1996) (noting that the statutory language was a 
departure from the common law rule of aggregating members), with Unif. Unincorporated 
Nonprofit Assoc. Act § 5 cmt. (2011) (noting that the statutory language “is a reversal of 
traditional common law principles that treat . . . unincorporated entities under an aggregate 
theory”). Accordingly, we conclude that the enactment of UBOC in 2015 did not bring about any 
substantive change that would lead this Court to alter its application of the doctrine of 
associational standing to unincorporated nonprofit associations.  
2. CAL has associational standing to pursue this matter.  
Standing in Idaho has three fundamental tenets: 
1. The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the 
issues the party wished to have adjudicated. 
2. To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally 
must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that 
the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. 
3. A citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where 
the injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction. 
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) 
(alterations and quotations omitted) (citing Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 
P.2d 757, 763 (1989)).  
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When a nonprofit asserts standing on behalf of its members, this Court utilizes a test for 
associational standing derived from the United State Supreme Court. Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n, 
Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus, 127 Idaho 239, 241–42, 899 P.2d 949, 951–52 (1995) (quoting Bear 
Lake Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Bear Lake Sch. Dist. #33, 116 Idaho 443, 448, 776 P.2d 452, 
457 (1989)). Under that test, this Court recognizes that an association may have standing by 
virtue of its members when: 
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the 
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) 
neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit. 
In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 153 Idaho 298, 310, 281 P.3d 1076, 1088 (2012) (quoting 
Beach Lateral Water Users Ass’n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 604, 130 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2006)). 
A key inquiry under this test is “whether the association has alleged that at least one of its 
members face injury and could meet the requirements of standing on an individual basis.” Id. at 
308, 281 P.3d at 1086. LLUPA, in turn, limits standing to file a petition for judicial review to 
“affected person[s].” I.C. § 67-6521(1)(d). An affected person is defined as “one having a bona 
fide interest in real property” which could be adversely impacted by a land-use decision. I.C. § 
67-6521(1)(a). 
Below, the district court ruled that CAL satisfied the three-part associational standing 
test. Specifically, the district court found that CAL’s membership consisted of landowners 
immediately adjacent to the gravel pit, those landowners had demonstrated numerous potential 
injuries during the administrative proceedings, and the relief sought by CAL did not necessitate 
the participation of individual members. As such, the district court ruled that CAL had 
associational standing to pursue the petition.  
 
Upon independent review of the record, we affirm the district court’s ruling. The record 
shows that CAL is comprised of individuals owning property adjacent to or nearby the gravel pit 
and proposed asphalt batch plant. Those members have alleged adverse consequences from the 
grant of the CUP including poor air quality, diminished property value, and noise pollution. 
Thus, CAL sufficiently alleged that at least one of its members is an “affected person” as 
required by LLUPA. Further, as its name suggests, CAL’s opposition to the CUP is germane to 
its purpose of opposing the relocation of the Interstate asphalt plant to the Linscotts’ gravel pit. 
Finally, CAL seeks to have the County’s decision to approve the CUP reversed, which would not 
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require the individual participation of any member of CAL. Based on the above, we conclude 
that CAL had associational standing to pursue this matter and affirm the district court’s ruling in 
that regard.   
B. The district court did not err in concluding that CAL filed its petition for judicial 
review within statutorily and judicially prescribed time limits. 
The Respondents make two arguments assailing the timeliness of CAL’s petition for 
judicial review. First, they argue CAL’s first petition was rejected and that CAL did not 
subsequently take adequate remedial measures to obtain a filing that would relate back to the 
date of its original filing. Second, the Respondents argue that even if CAL’s initial filing was 
acceptable, it still fell outside the statutory timing requirements because reconsideration of a 
decision tolls the statutory clock rather than begins it. We disagree and conclude that CAL 
properly filed its petition for judicial review within the statutory time limit.  
1. CAL’s first petition for judicial review was erroneously rejected.  
At the time CAL filed its petition, the Idaho Rule on Electronic Filing and Service 
provided that “[t]he electronic filing of a document is accomplished when a filer submits a 
document electronically to the court and the electronic filing system receives the document.” 
I.R.E.F.S. (e)(1)(A) (2019). And, “for purposes of meeting the statute of limitations or any other 
filing deadlines” the date and time of the filing’s submission serves as the filing date, “even if 
[the filing is] placed into an error queue for additional processing.” I.R.E.F.S. 12(a)(1).2 
However, filings that do not comply with the requirements of the rule or court policy may be 
rejected and returned to the filer for correction. I.R.E.F.S. 13(a). If a filing has been rejected, the 
filer receives notice of the reason for the rejection and has three business days to correct and 
resubmit the filing so that it relates back to the original filing date. I.R.E.F.S. 13(c). When a 
rejected document is not corrected and resubmitted within three days, “the document will be 
deemed to have not been filed.” I.R.E.F.S. 13(a). And, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
84, a “failure to physically file a petition for judicial review . . . within the time limits prescribed 
by statute and these rules is jurisdictional and will cause automatic dismissal of the petition[.]” 
I.R.C.P. 84(n). 
Electronically filed documents maybe rejected if they do not comply with the rules or 
court policy. I.R.E.F.S. 13(a). In this case, CAL’s initial petition was rejected for lack of a case 
                                                 
2 For ease of citation, the now-in-force Idaho Rules for Electronic Service and Filing are used where the language 
does not vary from the law in place at the time of CAL’s initial filing.  
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information sheet. Every civil action must be accompanied by a case information sheet. I.R.C.P. 
3(a), (d). An administrative appeal, however, is not a civil action within the meaning of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a). Euclid Ave. Tr. v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 309, 193 P.3d 853, 
856 (2008) (citing McCoy v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 792, 797, 907 P.2d 
110, 115 (1995)). Instead, the procedures for judicial review of agency action are governed by 
the statute authorizing judicial review and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. Id. at 308–09, 193 
P.3d at 855–56. Neither the relevant statutes, nor Rule 84, requires a petition for judicial review 
to be filed with a case information sheet. See I.R.C.P. 84(c) (listing the required contents of a 
petition for judicial review and excluding a case information sheet).  
Therefore, CAL’s initial filing was erroneously rejected pursuant to the Idaho Rules for 
Electronic Filing and Service for lack of a case information sheet because no such sheet was 
required under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(c) or LLUPA. As such, CAL’s first filing was 
proper and the date of that filing is the operative date for application of the statutory twenty-
eight-day deadline. Because the initial filing was correct, we need not address CAL’s subsequent 
efforts to correct its rejected filing or whether those efforts satisfied the requirements of the 
Rules on Electronic Filing and Service. 
2. Because the twenty-eight-day filing period began when the County issued its decision 
on reconsideration, CAL’s petition was timely filed.  
Considering the twenty-eight-day deadline, the Respondents argue that it began to run on 
the date of the County’s decision to issue the CUP, January 14, 2019, and was only tolled by 
reconsideration of that decision. We find this argument unpersuasive as the statutory text and 
court rules make clear that the twenty-eight-day filing requirement begins following a decision 
on reconsideration.  
LLUPA provides, in pertinent part, that an affected person may file a petition for judicial 
review twenty-eight days “after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances.” I.C. § 
67-6521(1)(d). Here, the local ordinances set forth the procedures required to exhaust 
administrative remedies. See BCRC §§ 12-261 to 12-263. Relevant to this case, the ordinances 
provide that an affected person seeking judicial review must first file a motion for 
reconsideration and that “failure to seek reconsideration is also a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.” BCRC § 12-263. LLUPA has a provision to the same effect, which 
states that a person seeking judicial review must “first seek reconsideration of the final decision” 
within fourteen days and that the twenty-eight-day filing requirement “is tolled until the date of 
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the written decision regarding reconsideration[.]” I.C. § 67-6535(2)(b). Finally, LLUPA 
indicates that the procedures for judicial review of a land use action are the same as those set out 
in IDAPA. I.C. § 67-6521(1)(d).  
The procedures for judicial review under IDAPA require a petition to be filed within 
twenty-eight days “of the service date of the final order . . . or, if reconsideration is sought, 
within twenty-eight (28) days after the service date of the decision thereon.” I.C. § 67-5273(2). 
IDAPA also provides that its judicial review provisions apply “unless other provision[s] of law 
[are] applicable to the particular matter.” I.C. § 67-5270(1). Under IDAPA, a “provision of law” 
includes statutes and court rules. I.C. § 67-5201(17). 
As to applicable court rules, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84, which governs actions for 
judicial review of agency action, provides: 
[i]f the decision to be reviewed is issued by an agency with authority to reconsider 
its decision and a timely motion for reconsideration is filed, then the time for 
filing the petition for judicial review is terminated and commences to run from . . . 
the date of any decision on reconsideration. 
I.R.C.P. 84(b)(1)(B)(i). 
Based on the forgoing, we conclude that the twenty-eight-day filing requirement did not 
begin until the County issued its decision on reconsideration of the CUP. That decision was 
issued March 25, 2019. CAL successfully filed its petition for judicial review twenty-five days 
later on April 19. Thus, CAL met the statutory filing deadline and the district court had 
jurisdiction to consider the petition for judicial review of the CUP.   
C. The district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the petition for judicial review 
because CAL did not serve the Linscotts or Interstate. 
The Respondents argue that CAL failed to timely serve both the Linscotts and Interstate 
with its petition for judicial review and that the petition should have been dismissed as a 
consequence. We conclude otherwise and affirm the district court’s ruling that this error was 
harmless.  
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 governs petitions for judicial review of agency action 
and provides that “the petitioner must serve copies of the notice of petition for judicial review 
upon the agency whose action will be reviewed and all other parties to the proceeding before the 
agency[.]” I.R.C.P. 84(d). That rule further provides that, other than filing the petition, “[f]ailure 
of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review will not be deemed 
jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action or sanction as the district court 
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deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the petition for review.” I.R.C.P. 84(n). 
IDAPA is silent as to service requirements but does define a “party” as “each person or agency 
named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a 
party.” I.C. § 67-5201(13).  
This Court disregards “all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial 
rights.” Matter of Estate of Hirning, 167 Idaho 669, 677, 475 P.3d 1191, 1199 (2020) (quoting 
Matter of Doe, 163 Idaho 565, 571, 416 P.3d 937, 943 (2018)); see also I.R.C.P. 61. A right is 
substantial if it could impact the outcome of the litigation. Hirning, 167 Idaho at 677, 475 P.3d at 
1199 (citing Fonseca v. Corral Agric., Inc., 156 Idaho 142, 149, 321 P.3d 692, 699 (2014)). 
Here, as the applicants for the CUP, both the Linscotts and Interstate were parties before 
the agency as contemplated by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. Thus, CAL was required to 
serve them with its petition for judicial review. However, neither the Linscotts nor Interstate 
suffered any prejudice from the lack of service. Both parties were allowed to intervene early in 
the proceedings and had their positions heard and their issues resolved by the district court. CAL 
did not gain an appreciable advantage in the litigation and we cannot say that the failure to serve 
had a discernable effect on the outcome of the case. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 
ruling that the error was harmless.   
D. The district court did not err in determining that it could not consider the validity of 
the Amendment to BCRC section 12-336 on judicial review. 
In ruling on CAL’s petition for judicial review, the district court determined that it could 
not consider the validity of the Amendment authorizing asphalt batch plants in gravel pits 
because it was legislative action and a petition for judicial review cannot also include a 
declaratory action. CAL argues that the district court could properly consider the validity of the 
Amendment because the posture of the case would not require the district court to declare the 
Amendment void or invalid. CAL arrives at this conclusion by noting that LLUPA and IDAPA 
allow for the reversal of a land-use decision that is made “in excess of the statutory authority” or 
“in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions.” I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a)–(b) (This IDAPA 
provision is incorporated into a judicial review of a land use decision by the LLUPA, I.C. §§ 67-
6521(1)(d) and 67-6535(3)). In short, CAL argues that the district court could reverse the CUP as 
in excess of statutory authority or in violation of statutory provisions because it was based on a 
void Amendment, without having to technically declare the Amendment void. We disagree and 
affirm the district court’s ruling on this issue.   
14 
 
The “[p]romulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances is legislative 
action.” Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 67, 665 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1983) (quoting 
Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 101 Idaho 407, 409, 614 P.2d 947, 949 (1980)). A legislative 
land-use action is not subject to direct judicial review in the same manner as a land-use decision 
but may be challenged through a declaratory action. Id. at 66 n.2, 665 P.2d at 1076 n.2. “Actions 
seeking . . . declaratory relief may not be combined with petitions for judicial review under 
IDAPA.” Euclid Ave. Tr. v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 309, 193 P.3d 853, 856 (2008).  
We conclude the district court did not err in determining that it could not consider the 
validity of the Amendment on judicial review of the CUP. The enactment of the Amendment was 
a legislative action, and its validity may only be challenged by a declaratory action. Although 
CAL did not specifically seek to have the Amendment declared void in its petition for judicial 
review, the question of the CUP’s validity is inextricably linked with the validity of the 
Amendment. Indeed, the district court may not have been required to declare the Amendment 
void, but any legal conclusion it drew concerning the validity of the Amendment would likely 
have preclusive effect in other actions.3 Since there is no route by which the district court could 
consider the Amendment’s validity without offering some binding legal conclusion or an 
inappropriate advisory opinion on the subject, the district court did not err in to concluding that it 
could not consider the Amendment’s validity during the proceedings below.  
E. The subsequent order and judgment declaring the Amendment void, issued in a 
different action, also voids the CUP.   
After the district court’s decision on the petition for judicial review, CAL filed a 
declaratory judgment action seeking to have the Amendment declared void. That action resulted 
in a judgment and order stipulated to between CAL and the County declaring the Amendment 
void. The Respondents challenge the effect of this declaration in two ways. First, they contend 
that the order and judgment declaring the Amendment void is not properly before this Court 
because it is not part of the record on appeal. Next, they argue that regardless of the 
                                                 
3 Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel requires a showing of five elements: “(1) the party against whom the earlier 
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue 
decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be 
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior 
litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.” 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007) (citation omitted). Here, any legal 
conclusion the district court reached vis-à-vis the validity of the Amendment likely would have preclusive effect and 
be, in effect, a declaratory action.   
15 
 
Amendment’s subsequent invalidity, the Intervenors’ rights vested when they applied for the 
CUP and cannot now be disturbed by a declaration that the Amendment is void.  
1. This Court takes judicial notice of the judgment declaring the Amendment void.  
LLUPA incorporates the judicial review procedures of IDAPA. I.C. §§ 67-6521(1)(d) and 
67-6535(3). IDAPA provides that “[j]udicial review of disputed issues of fact must be confined 
to the agency record[.]” I.C. § 67-5277. Yet, courts may take notice of “official acts of the . . . 
judicial department[] of this state[.]” I.C. § 9-101(3). This Court may take judicial notice of the 
judgment declaring the Amendment void as an official act of the judicial department of this state 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 9-101(3). As such, we take notice that the Amendment has been 
declared void, and, therefore, we may consider what effect, if any, that declaration has on the 
CUP.  
2. The CUP is void because the Amendment is void ab initio. 
The Respondents argue that even if the Amendment is void, Interstate and the Linscotts 
had a vested right to have their CUP application reviewed according to the law in existence at the 
time they applied. Thus, we must address whether an ordinance adopted in excess of statutory 
notice procedures is void ab initio or merely voidable with respect to its prospective application.  
The Respondents are correct that Idaho has adopted the minority position that a land-use 
applicant’s rights are “measured under the law in effect at the time of the application.” S. Fork 
Coal. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bonneville Cnty., 117 Idaho 857, 861, 792 P.2d 882, 886 (1990) 
(citations omitted); see also Taylor v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 147 Idaho 424, 436, 210 
P.3d 532, 544 (2009). The policy undergirding this rule is “to prevent local authorities from 
delaying or withholding action on an application in order to change or enact a law to defeat the 
application.” Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436, 210 P.3d at 544 (citation omitted). Thus, the rule is an 
outgrowth of the well-established principle that legislation does not ordinarily have retroactive 
effect. See Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Ada Cnty., 101 Idaho 407, 412, 614 P.2d 947, 952 
(1980); see also Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 601, 448 P.2d 209, 215 
(1968) (reasoning that the rule to apply the ordinance in effect at the time of the application is “in 
accord with the general rule that legislation generally acts prospectively only”).  
Yet, this case presents a different factual situation than those cases that gave rise to 
Idaho’s rule. In all of the above cases, the Court considered the applicability of a subsequently 
enacted ordinance or comprehensive plan to a pending land-use application or zoning decision. 
16 
 
See, e.g., S. Fork Coal., 117 Idaho at 860, 792 P.2d at 885 (considering the applicability of a 
subsequently enacted ordinance to an application for a housing development); Taylor, 147 Idaho 
at 436, 210 P.3d at 544 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted comprehensive 
plan to a conditional re-zoning decision). In contrast, the question here is not whether a 
subsequently enacted provision of law should apply to the CUP application, but whether the 
subsequent declaration by a district court that the then-existing law was void invalidates the 
CUP.  
The Respondents’ arguments on this front are unavailing. Their proposed application of 
Idaho’s rule would turn the rationale for that rule on its head. Instead of protecting property 
owners from a government body enacting after-the-fact legislation, the Respondents would allow 
a county or municipality to cement unlawfully enacted ordinances into law so long as they filed 
an application under that void ordinance before it was challenged. More importantly, the 
Respondents’ arguments assume that the Amendment, though unlawfully adopted, had the force 
and effect of law at one time in the past. We hold otherwise.  
This Court has already answered the question of what effect an ordinance, adopted in 
violation of the notice requirements of LLUPA, has in Jerome County ex rel. Board of 
Commissioners for Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990). That case 
bears a striking resemblance to the case at hand. In Holloway, a landowner challenged a special 
use permit issued to a nearby property to operate a dairy. Id. at 682, 799 P.2d at 970. The 
landowner argued that the permit was invalid because it conflicted with an amendment to local 
zoning ordinances, adopted two years prior, that prohibited the operation of a dairy within 1,000 
feet of a home. Id. The dairy operator, in turn, argued that the amended ordinance was invalid 
because it was adopted in excess of the statutory notice requirements of Idaho Code section 67-
6509. Id. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the dairy operator and 
declared the amended ordinance void and unenforceable. Id. In affirming the district court’s 
ruling, this Court reasoned that “the statutory notice and hearing [is] necessary in order to satisfy 
the requirements of due process and may not be dispensed with.” Id. at 684, 799 P.2d at 972 
(quoting Citizens for a Better Gov’t v. Cnty. of Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 322, 508 P.2d 550, 552 
(1973)). Furthermore, this Court emphasized that “[i]t is a well settled principle that notice and 
hearing requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions precedent to the proper exercise of 
17 
 
the zoning authority,” in affirming the district court. Id. (quoting Citizens for a Better Gov’t, 95 
Idaho at 322, 508 P.2d at 552).  
We stay true to that well-settled principle today and hold that the Amendment, having 
been adopted in violation of Idaho Code section 67-6509, is void ab initio. The County did not 
satisfy the conditions precedent to exercising its statutory zoning authority. Therefore, the 
Amendment never had any force or effect. Accordingly, the law in existence at the time the 
Linscotts and Interstate applied for the CUP did not authorize the proposed use and the CUP is 
invalid.   
F. The district court erred in concluding that the County’s interpretation and 
application of its zoning ordinances was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. 
Although we hold that the CUP is void because it was based on the void Amendment, we 
address the County’s application of its zoning ordinances in issuing the CUP because that 
analysis is necessary for our decision to award attorney’s fees in this matter. The district court 
afforded the County deference in interpreting its own ordinances and ruled that it did not act 
arbitrarily, capriciously, nor did it abuse its discretion in concluding that it need not consider the 
Linscotts’ gravel pit’s compliance with nonconforming use ordinances. We disagree and 
conclude that the County’s application of its zoning ordinances was arbitrary and capricious.   
IDAPA provides that an agency decision may be overturned where that decision is “in 
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions” or “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion.” I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a), (d). LLUPA, in turn, requires that “[t]he approval or denial of 
any application . . . shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the . . . 
zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance[.]” I.C. § 67-6535(1).  
Bonner County’s zoning ordinances are contained in Title 12 of BCRC. See BCRC, tit. 
12. That title provides that a permit “shall not issue . . . unless the intended uses of the buildings 
and land conform in all respects with the provisions of this title.” BCRC § 12-130(A). Two 
chapters of that title form the backbone of the dispute between the parties.  
First, with respect to nonconforming uses, BCRC establishes that uses which were lawful 
before enactment of the zoning code may be continued so long as those uses are not “enlarged 
upon, expanded or extended, nor . . . used as grounds for adding other structures or uses 
prohibited elsewhere in the same district or zone.” BCRC § 12-340(D). Exceptions to the general 
prohibition on expanding nonconforming uses include: (1) “accumulated expansion by up to ten 
18 
 
percent” or (2) expansion by up to fifty percent with a conditional use permit so long as no 
additional land is acquired for the expansion. BCRC § 12-341(A). Finally, a nonconforming use 
can continue “so long as [it] remain[s] otherwise lawful” but the nonconforming use may not 
“extend[] to occupy a greater area of land than was occupied [when the grandfathered rights 
were established]” or “be moved in whole or in part to any portion of the lot or parcel other than 
that occupied [at the time the grandfathered rights were established].” BCRC § 12-343.  
Second, with regard to conditional use permits, the BCRC requires a finding that “there is 
adequate evidence showing that the proposal is in accordance with the general and specific 
objectives of the [C]omprehensive [P]lan and this [T]itle[.]” BCRC § 12-223. And, under the 
void Amendment, an asphalt batch plant is a conditionally permitted use in a rural zone “only in 
association with an active gravel pit.” BCRC § 12-336(22).  
In reaching its decision to approve the CUP, the County reasoned that the asphalt plant 
was a separate use from the gravel pit and concluded that the nonconforming use provisions of 
BCRC did not apply. The County determined that the Amendment only required “an active 
gravel pit,” not a gravel pit in conformity with the provisions of BCRC. As such, the County 
found, and no one disputes, that the Linscotts’ gravel pit is active and issued the CUP without 
considering whether the issuance of the CUP would violate the nonconforming use provisions of 
BCRC. CAL maintains that this interpretation of BCRC, and the decision to issue the CUP, is 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.  
The district court determined otherwise. While the district court acknowledged CAL’s 
“extensive argument concerning the gravel pit’s violation of Bonner County Ordinances,” it 
reasoned that since no conclusion had been reached on the gravel pit’s status below, it could not 
conclude on review that the gravel pit violated BCRC. Without a determination that the gravel 
pit violated BCRC, the district court afforded the County deference in its interpretation and 
application of its own ordinances and ruled the County did not err in granting the CUP. We 
conclude this deference was not warranted for the County’s unlawful machinations in approving 
the CUP.   
On appeal, as it did below, CAL has presented an extensive list of evidence supporting its 
position that the gravel pit does not comport with the nonconforming use provisions of BCRC. 
For instance, CAL argues that the gravel pit has expanded by between 230 and 500 percent since 
its grandfathered rights were created; the gravel pit has expanded on to additional parcels not in 
19 
 
use when the grandfathered rights were established; the gravel pit is not “otherwise lawful” 
because it has violated Idaho Department of Lands regulations and the Idaho Surface Mining 
Act; and that the addition of an asphalt batch plant would only further enlarge or expand the 
nonconforming use. In sum, CAL has presented a detailed account of how the Linscotts’ gravel 
pit is in violation of BCRC. However, the Respondents argue that a judicial finding that the 
Linscotts’ gravel pit violates BCRC, without any underlying enforcement action by the County, 
would violate their due process rights.  
While we agree with the Respondents that it is for the County to decide whether the 
gravel pit is in violation of BCRC, we need not make such a finding to conclude that the County 
acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious because it relied on an unreasonable 
interpretation of BCRC. For instance, BCRC states that no permit may be issued “unless the 
intended uses of the buildings and land conform in all respects with the provisions of [Title 12].” 
BCRC § 12-130(A). Title 12, which contains the County’s zoning ordinances, prohibits the 
expansion or enlargement of nonconforming uses with few exceptions, none of which are 
applicable here. BCRC §§ 12-340 to 12-343. Further, it requires that the County must find 
adequate evidence that the conditional use permit is in accordance with the objectives of the 
comprehensive plan and with the zoning code. BCRC § 12-223. 
Notwithstanding this language in BCRC, the County determined that the nonconforming 
use provisions of BCRC inapplicable. The County’s conclusion that legal status of the gravel pit 
was of no consequence in granting the CUP is belied by its statements indicating that the asphalt 
plant would be located in an “active, legal nonconforming gravel pit.” In addition, far from being 
a separate and distinct use, the application for the CUP indicated the asphalt plant “is really an 
accessory use to the existing mining use.” It appears from the record that one of the primary 
rationales for issuing the CUP was to relocate the batch plant closer to the mining operation upon 
which it relied. Thus, whether the CUP intensified or enlarged the use of the gravel mine is an 
inescapable question that the County failed to address. And, given the extensive evidence 
presented by CAL below, it is difficult to imagine how a factfinder could conclude that the 
gravel pit is in compliance with the nonconforming use provisions of BCRC. However, that is a 
factual question reserved for the County in the first instance. In any event, we conclude that the 
County acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious in refusing to address the gravel pit’s 
nonconforming status when considering the CUP application. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
20 
 
district court erred in affirming the County’s decision to grant the CUP because that decision was 
arbitrary and capricious.  
G. CAL is awarded attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. 
CAL seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-117 against the County and 
the Intervenors as parties aligned with the County. Interstate has requested fees under Idaho 
Code section 12-121 against CAL. Neither the County nor the Linscotts seek attorney’s fees in 
this matter but maintain that CAL is not entitled to any attorney’s fees award.  
1. Attorney’s fees under Idaho Code section 12-117. 
Idaho Code section 12-117 provides for the award of attorney’s fees “in any proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person . . . if [the 
court] finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” I.C. § 
12-117(1). Section 12-117 defines a political subdivision to include a county. I.C. § 12-
117(6)(d).  
In addition, CAL relies on Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 
133 Idaho 833, 993 P.2d 596 (1999), for the proposition that attorney’s fees under section 12-117 
may also be awarded against intervening parties. In Rural Kootenai, this Court looked to federal 
precedent interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and was persuaded to award costs 
against an intervening party under Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a) when the intervening party was 
very active in the appeal. 133 Idaho at 846, 993 P.2d at 609. Further, this Court clarified in 
Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173, 207 P.3d 149 (2009), that 
any suggestion in Rural Kootenai that section 12-117 could provide a basis for an attorney’s fees 
award for or against an intervenor was dicta. 147 Idaho at 177, 207 P.3d at 153. This Court went 
on to reason that section 12-117 requires as adverse parties a county and a person and “decline[d] 
to infer that the Legislature intended that one person might recover from another person under 
I.C. § 12-117 solely because of the presence of a governmental entity in the litigation.” Id. at 
177–78, 207 P.3d at 153–54. As such, Idaho Code section 12-117 does not provide a basis upon 
which CAL can recover attorney’s fees against either the Linscotts or Interstate, as they are not 
governmental entities.  
As between CAL and the County, however, we conclude that an award of attorney’s fees 
under 12-117 is warranted in this matter. Initially, we conclude that the County is not the 
prevailing party on appeal because the ultimate issue in this matter, the validity of the CUP, was 
21 
 
determined adversely to it. Next, we also conclude that the County acted without a reasonable 
basis in law. The County not only applied its own zoning ordinances in a manner that was 
arbitrary and capricious in issuing the CUP, but it also defended its application of those 
ordinances on appeal after stipulating that the Amendment was void. As such, we award CAL 
reasonable attorney’s fees against the County. 
2. Attorney’s fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. 
Interstate has requested attorney’s fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 against CAL. 
They assert that CAL acted “frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation” by ignoring the 
scope of judicial review of agency action and by advancing arguments concerning the void order 
and judgment.  
Idaho Code section 12-121 allows for the award of attorney’s fees for a prevailing party 
when a case or appeal has been “brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation.” I.C. § 12-121. In this matter, CAL is the prevailing party, having 
successfully challenged the County’s decision to issue the CUP. Moreover, Idaho Code section 
12-117 is the exclusive basis for awarding attorney’s fees in a matter with a person and a 
governmental entity as adverse parties. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 909, 277 P.3d 
353, 356 (2012) (citation omitted). Thus, even if Interstate were a prevailing party, it would not 
be entitled to attorney’s fees under section 12-121.  
3. Costs 
While we hold that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded against either Interstate or the 
Linscotts under Idaho Code section 12-117 because they are not governmental entities adverse to 
CAL, we conclude that the Intervenors should bear the burden of costs on appeal with the 
County.  
A prevailing party is allowed costs on appeal as a matter of course. I.A.R. 40(a). In 
Neighbors for Responsible Growth, we clarified that Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides the basis 
for an award of costs against intervening parties in an appeal from a land-use decision 
irrespective of the availability of attorney’s fees under section 12-117. 147 Idaho at 177, 207 
P.3d at 153 (awarding costs to a prevailing party against intervening parties after concluding that 
attorney’s fees were unavailable because the prevailing party was not adverse to a governmental 
entity). As such, we award CAL costs on appeal as a matter of course. Since the Intervenors 
22 
 
played an active part in this litigation, they shall share the burden of appellate costs with the 
County.  See Rural Kootenai, 133 Idaho at 846, 993 P.2d at 609. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The CUP 
authorizing the relocation of the Interstate asphalt batch plant to the Linscotts’ gravel mine is 
invalid because it is based on a void amendment to Bonner County Code. Further, the County 
acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious in refusing to address the gravel pit’s 
compliance with the nonconforming use provisions of BCRC. We award CAL reasonable 
attorney’s fees on appeal against the County. We also award CAL costs on appeal, to be shared 
among the County, Interstate, and the Linscotts.   
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.