Title: Torres v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANGEL TORRES, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 12, 2009 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§ 
ID No. 0611014952 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 29, 2009 
        Decided:  August 24, 2009 
         
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Michael W. Modica, Esquire, (argued) Wilmington, Delaware for appellant.   
 
 
James T. Wakley, Esquire and Danielle J. Brennan, Esquire (argued), Department 
of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Defendant-Appellant Angel Torres appeals from his Superior Court 
conviction for two counts of trafficking cocaine over 100 grams and two counts of 
delivery of cocaine.  Torres makes six arguments on appeal.  First, he contends that 
the prosecutor improperly threatened a witness who provided favorable testimony 
for Torres, by stating to the witness during redirect examination: “one lie gets you 
another ten years in prison.”  Second, Torres argues the prosecutor vouched for the 
credibility of that same witness by emphasizing the consequences of a lie under his 
plea agreement.  Third, Torres contends the trial court erred by denying his motion 
for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence 
to find that the “substance” in question was cocaine and that it weighed over 100 
grams.  Fourth, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion under 
Delaware Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b) by allowing the State to admit 
evidence of a separate drug transaction.  Fifth, Torres contends that the trial court 
committed plain error by admitting his prior history of illegal cocaine transactions, 
because it violated the court’s prior orders and directions excluding such evidence. 
Finally, he argues the cumulative effect of all the errors deprived him of a fair trial.  
We find no merit to his arguments and affirm. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Torres was charged with multiple drug related offenses stemming from drug 
transactions with Raul Morales.  The case against Torres centered on three 
 
3
transactions in which Torres allegedly supplied cocaine for Morales, a cocaine 
dealer who was under surveillance by the Delaware State Police (the “DSP”).  In 
October 2006, the DSP set up a wiretap on Morales’s phone and placed a Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device in his truck.  During their surveillance 
of Morales, the DSP intercepted phone conversations between Morales and Torres, 
which led them to conduct surveillance on Torres as well.  At trial, the State’s 
primary evidence consisted of recorded conversations between Morales, Torres, 
and Mark Grillo (a prospective buyer), suggesting proposed drug transactions. 
On October 21, 2006 the DSP intercepted a phone call between Torres and 
Morales at approximately 1:00 p.m.  During that call, Torres asked Morales: “Is 
your driveway cleaned?”  Morales responded that his truck was parked in the 
driveway.  When Torres asked for it to be moved, Morales suggested that he would 
come to him, because someone was working on his house.  The DSP then followed 
Morales to Torres’s home, which was now also under surveillance, and observed 
Morales walk into the home, stay awhile, and then leave. 
Two hours later Morales called Torres and stated “I measured those things 
and they were all off.”  Torres, sounding concerned, replied “oh hell no.”  Morales 
confirmed his prior statement and said “on each thing, with the thing, it was 404.”  
Torres, apparently growing more concerned, instructed Morales on how to weigh 
the substance: “Listen to me.  Listen to me.  Each one, they’re doubled right?  You 
 
4
gotta take them out of one and throw them – just one without plastic is 126 
even….”1  Morales then informed Torres he was playing a prank on him, and that 
the weight of the substance was not an issue.  At trial, Morales testified that he 
received 500 grams of cocaine from Torres on October 21; however, police never 
recovered the cocaine from the delivery. 
On October 25, 2006, Grillo called Morales to see if he could “set something 
up maybe for like tomorrow or Friday.”  Grillo placed an order for eighteen ounces 
(approximately half a kilogram) with Morales.  Morales accepted the order and 
agreed to make the delivery two days later.  Morales then called Torres to order a 
half-kilogram of cocaine to be ready by October 27.  On October 27, Torres called 
Morales to inform him the cocaine would be separated in plastic bags and ready for 
delivery by 2:00 p.m., but at about 2:00 p.m., Torres called Morales to inform him 
the full order would not be delivered.  Morales agreed to make up the difference 
from his own supply and Torres delivered the cocaine to Morales around 5:30 p.m.  
At trial, Morales testified that he received “a little less than 500 grams” of cocaine 
from Torres on October 27.  On November 4, the DSP executed a search warrant at 
Grillo’s home and seized 434.12 grams of cocaine. 
On November 1, 2006, Michael Willhide called Morales requesting to 
purchase a kilogram of cocaine. After ending his conversation with Willhide, 
                                          
 
1 Morales testified that “thing” referred to the bag, that “404” referred to 4½ ounces or 127.6 
grams, and “126” referred to 1.26 ounces, or 35.71 grams. 
 
5
Morales called Torres requesting an “entierro,” which Morales explained meant “a 
whole key” or a kilogram of cocaine.  Morales then picked up the requested 
cocaine in Philadelphia and delivered it to Willhide in Newark.  The DSP later 
searched Willhide’s home and discovered more than a kilogram of cocaine. 
Torres was arrested and indicted for two counts each of trafficking cocaine 
in excess of 100 grams and delivery of cocaine, stemming from the October 21 and 
27 drug transactions.  Torres was not charged in connection with the November 1 
transaction; however, the State provided notice that it intended to present the 
November 1 transaction as evidence of uncharged misconduct pursuant to D.R.E. 
404(b) to show a “common scheme or plan.”  Torres objected and the trial judge 
ruled that the uncharged transaction was “relevant to the motive and plan” and that 
it was not unfairly prejudicial. 
The State’s primary witness at trial was Morales, who had entered into a 
plea agreement with the State in which he would receive sentencing consideration 
in exchange for providing substantial assistance in identifying his co-conspirators 
and testifying truthfully at their trial.  Morales testified that he got his cocaine 
supply from Torres and, after hearing several recordings of phone calls, testified 
that he made pickups from Torres on October 21 and October 27.  However, on 
cross-examination, Morales testified that he did not recall any drug transactions 
with Torres on October 21 or on October 27, and explained that he would have to 
 
6
hear the phone calls from those dates.  Upon inquiry by defense counsel, Morales 
also admitted that, under his plea agreement with the State, he faced spending the 
rest of his life in jail if he failed to tell the truth. 
On redirect, the prosecutor embarked on the following line of questioning: 
Q: Mr. Morales, let’s – to borrow the parlance, let’s cut through 
everything now.  One lie gets you another decade. –  
*     *     * 
Q: One lie gets you another ten years in prison, is that your 
understanding? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That’s what’s at risk with your testimony here today. 
A: Right. 
Q: You don’t know if that’s going to be pulled, but one lie could pull 
it and everything is done. 
A: Right. 
 
Immediately following this exchange, the prosecutor played a recording of two 
phone calls between Torres and Morales.  Morales subsequently identified one 
recording as pertaining to the delivery of 500 grams of cocaine from Torres on 
October 21, and the other as pertaining to the delivery of “a little less than 500 
grams” of cocaine from Torres on October 27.  Then, in response to the 
prosecutor’s question, Morales admitted that on October 21 and October 27 he 
received half a kilo of cocaine in Delaware. 
During summation, the prosecutor again addressed the plea agreement 
Morales made with the State: 
 
7
Raul Morales pled guilty. He came in here to testify, having pled 
guilty, and he agreed to testify with a larger prison sentence looming 
over his head if he were not truthful. [The trial judge] just told you 
that you are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and that 
you can give credit to those portions of the testimony that you believe 
and you can disregard those portions of the testimony you find not to 
be credible. 
 
The State would suggest to you that Raul Morales came in here trying 
to walk a tightrope, a tightrope of his own making on which his faith 
and that of his buddy Angel Torres rested.  He had to testify 
truthfully, but he did not want to throw his lifelong friend off of his 
tightrope, so he tried not to remember.  He tried to wiggle, he tried to 
mumble, but when he was asked by [defense counsel] “Cut to the 
chase, did you make drug transactions with Angel Torres on October 
21st and October 27th,” your recollections will be what is important, 
but the State would suggest Raul Morales’ answer was “I’d have to 
listen to the phone calls.”  And he’s right, the phone calls tell it. 
 
In Torres’s summation, defense counsel also highlighted Morales’ plea 
agreement to show that Morales was biased:  
Raul Morales, under oath, and with his, basically looking at life in 
prison, testifies I can’t remember that that happened that day. And the 
phone calls themselves show that there was so many different things 
going on probably in so many different places, that he’s probably 
absolutely right.  
 
Now, it wasn’t until on cross [the prosecutor] reminded Mr. Morales 
that, something to the effect of, [s]o you have ten years hanging in the 
balance here, so did Angel Torres give you drugs on that day? And the 
answer, of course, was yes. But again, the State avoided asking really 
what this is about, when and – well, not when on that case, but where, 
where did it happen, because they didn’t want to hear the answer. 
 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor again addressed the plea agreement: 
 
 
 
8
You heard that there was a reference to ten years.  He actually talked 
about that earlier in his testimony, that he could get ten more years in 
prison, with what?  One lie.  If he lies once, he goes to jail for ten 
years.  And with that on him in the end, he said, yes, that was 500 
grams on that date, the 21st, and then six days later on October 27th, 
the 439 grams.   You can understand where Raul Morales is coming 
from.  You can even sympathize with his situation. 
 
At the close of the State’s case, Torres moved for judgment of acquittal on 
all charges, contending in part, that there was insufficient evidence that the 
October 21 transaction involved cocaine.2 The court denied the motion, explaining:  
It’s far from a clear situation … I think there’s sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to allow the issue to be submitted to the jury.  
 
We have the defendant in possession of the substances that have been 
analyzed to be cocaine on October 27, as well as November 1. We 
have the purchaser of the cocaine on the 27th who distributed it and 
had been buying from Morales for a period of time without complaint 
from any of his customers. We have Morales’s testimony that he 
always obtained his cocaine from the defendant. And that is not the 
strongest case in the world, but it creates at least a prima facie case. It 
can go to the jury as to the charges on October 21. 
 
The jury found Torres guilty of all charges.  Ultimately, the trial judge 
sentenced Torres to a mandatory minimum sentence of sixteen years at Level V.  
This appeal followed. 
                                          
 
2 The court commented that, “other than the statements of Mr. Morales, we don’t know if it was 
cocaine or not.” Furthermore, neither side specifically asked Morales, “How do you know it 
really was” cocaine? The court also stated:  
The other issue is whether that’s a distinct separate quantity of cocaine apart from 
the cocaine this is the basis for the October 27. Obviously, if it’s the same 
cocaine, that can’t be a different charge. 
But I don’t have anything that shows a disposition of the cocaine that, according 
to this evidence, was in Raul’s possession on the 21st. I don’t have any evidence 
that he delivered it to anyone. 
 
9
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Torres claims that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor (1) intimidated Morales 
into changing testimony favorable to Torres by threatening Morales on redirect 
examination with the condition in his plea agreement that he testify truthfully; and 
(2) improperly vouched for Morales’s credibility during summation by 
emphasizing the fact that, pursuant to his plea agreement, Morales would face an 
additional ten years in prison if he lied. 
Because Torres did not object to the asserted prosecutorial misconduct at 
trial, and the trial judge did not intervene sua sponte, we review the alleged 
misconduct for plain error.3  In a plain error review of prosecutorial misconduct, 
we first review the record de novo to determine whether misconduct occurred.4  If 
we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.  If, however, the 
prosecutor did err, the next step of our analysis is to apply the Wainwright 
standard, which requires the error to be “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights 
as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”5  Further, we find 
plain error only for “material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, 
which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly 
                                          
 
3 See Hardy v. State, 962 A.2d 244, 247 (Del. 2008); Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 151 (Del. 
2006).  See generally Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1986) (plain error standard). 
4 Baker, 906 A.2d at 150. 
5 Id. at 150 (quoting Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 (emphasis added in Baker). 
 
10
deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest 
injustice.”6  If we determine that plain error occurred under the Wainwright 
standard, we will reverse without reaching the third step of our analysis.7 
If the alleged misconduct does not satisfy Wainwright, we consider, as 
required by Hunter v. State,8 whether the prosecutor’s statements are repetitive 
errors that require reversal because they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial 
process.  Under the Hunter analysis, we may reverse, but need not do so, even if 
the prosecutorial misconduct would not warrant reversal under the Wainwright 
standard.9  However, other options are available to remedy even egregious 
misconduct, such as referring the matter to the Attorney General or the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel.10 
A. 
The prosecutor did not “threaten” Morales. 
Torres contends that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor 
signaled to Morales that he needed to recant his cross-examination testimony in 
order to avoid jeopardizing his plea agreement with the State, and threatened 
Morales with: “One lie gets you another decade.… One lie gets you another ten 
years in prison…. That’s what’s at risk with your testimony today.”   
                                          
 
6 Id. 
7 Baker, 906 A.2d at 150. 
8 815 A.2d 730, 732 (Del. 2002); accord Baker, 906 A.2d at 150. 
9 Id. at 737-38; accord Baker, 906 A.2d at 150. 
10 Baker, 906 A.2d at 150. 
 
11
In Washington v. Texas,11 the United States Supreme Court held a 
defendant’s right to call witnesses to establish a defense is a fundamental element 
of due process.  In Webb v. Texas,12 the United States Supreme Court found a 
denial of due process where the trial judge threatened the sole defense witness with 
perjury charges, likely conviction, a multiple-year sentence, and negative review 
by a potential parole board.  However, the United States Supreme Court did not 
address whether a mere warning to a witness of the consequences of perjury would 
constitute reversible error. 
In United States v. Pierce,13 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal held that such 
a warning of the consequences of perjury does not constitute reversible error.  The 
Sixth Circuit noted that:  
[Webb] does not stand for the proposition that merely warning a 
witness of the consequences of perjury demands reversal.  “Judges 
and prosecutors do not necessarily commit a Webb type violation 
merely by advising a witness of the possibility that he or she could 
face prosecution for perjury if his or her testimony differs from that he 
or she has given previously.”  In fact, the government has an 
                                          
 
11 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (finding defendant denied Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses by statutes providing that principals, accomplices, or accessories 
in same crime cannot be introduced as witnesses for each other, thus denying defendant right to 
call witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had 
personally observed and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to defense). 
12 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (finding trial judge’s threatening remarks effectively drove witness off the 
stand and deprived petitioner of due process when judge warned witness of his right to refuse to 
testify and of necessity to tell the truth, but also implied that he expected witness, who had a 
prior criminal record, to lie and assured him that if he lied he would be prosecuted and time 
would be added to his present sentence and that result would be to impair his chances of parole.). 
13 62 F.3d 818, 832 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim of misconduct by prosecution for merely 
warning a witness of the consequences of perjury). 
 
12
obligation to warn unrepresented witnesses of the risk that the 
testimony they are going to give can be used against them.  “Where, 
however, the substance of what the prosecutor communicates to the 
witness is a threat over and above what the record indicates is 
necessary, and appropriate, the inference that the prosecutor sought to 
coerce a witness into silence is strong.14 
 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that governmental conduct must amount to a 
substantial interference with a witness’s free and unhampered determination to 
testify before a due process violation will be found.15   
There was no such substantial interference here.  Taken in context with 
defense counsel’s inquiry on cross-examination into Morales’s plea agreement, the 
prosecutor’s questioning was simply an attempt to clarify the terms of Morales’ 
plea agreement.  Defense counsel’s questioning incorrectly suggested to the jury 
that Morales faced a life sentence if he testified in violation of the plea agreement.  
That inquiry overstated the penalty to Morales for lying.  In fact, as the prosecutor 
clarified, Morales only faced an additional ten years in prison if he failed to testify 
truthfully.  Moreover, Morales did not change his testimony in response to the 
prosecutor’s clarification.  Throughout his testimony, Morales was evasive, 
maintaining that he did not recall anything about the drug transactions with Torres 
until specifically confronted with the various taped phone conversations.  We find 
                                          
 
14 Id. at 832 (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 997 F.2d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Jackson, 935 
F.2d 832, 847 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
15 Id. at 833; see also U.S. v. Heller, 830 F.2d 150, 153-54 (11th Cir. 1987) (government 
intimidation deprived defendant of an important defense witness and induced witness to provide 
false testimony against defendant).  
 
13
no merit to Torres’s claim that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s 
redirect examination. 
B. 
The prosecutor did not improperly “vouch” for Morales. 
 
Torres also contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by vouching 
for the credibility of Morales during the course of his redirect examination of 
Morales by emphasizing the consequences of a lie under his agreement with the 
State, and compounded that error during closing argument and rebuttal.  Torres 
argues that the prosecutor’s repeated reference to the plea agreement and his 
repeated statement that “one lie gets you another 10 years in prison” was 
impermissible because it was an indication to the jury that Morales lied on cross-
examination, and, by emphasizing the consequences of a “lie,” signaled to the jury 
that the prosecutor was taking steps to remedy false testimony.  
Prosecutors are prohibited from vouching for the credibility of a witness by 
stating or implying personal knowledge of the truth of the testimony, beyond that 
which can be logically deduced from the witness’ trial testimony.16  Improper 
vouching occurs when the prosecutor implies some personal knowledge that the 
witness has testified truthfully.17 
                                          
 
16 Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d 522, 530 (2001). 
17 White v. State, 816 A.2d 776, 779 (Del. 2003); Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940, 942-43 (Del. 
2001) (“As a general rule, prosecutors may not express their personal opinion or beliefs about the 
credibility of witnesses or about the truth of testimony.”). 
 
14
As noted above, the prosecutor’s reference to the plea agreement during 
redirect was not a threat, but an attempt to eliminate confusion about the plea 
agreement created during cross-examination.  Therefore, there was no error to 
compound during summation.  Nor did the summation or rebuttal contain improper 
vouching standing alone.  During the State’s opening summation, the prosecutor 
reminded the jury of the plea agreement between Morales and the State, Morales’s 
testimony, and the recorded phone conversations between Morales and Torres that 
were entered into evidence.  Each was a fact in evidence in this case.  In no way 
did the prosecutor imply that he possessed knowledge outside the evidence 
presented at trial.  On rebuttal, the prosecutor revisited the plea agreement in order 
to respond to Torres’s use of the agreement during summation in an attempt to 
suggest he was biased, and thus, impeach Morales.  In this context, the prosecutor 
did not suggest he held any additional personal knowledge that Morales was telling 
the truth, he merely argued that the existence of the plea agreement was likely to 
incentivize Morals not to lie, rather than merely inculpate Torres. 
To the extent that Torres suggests that the prosecutor improperly used the 
word “lie,” this argument is without merit.  We have held that the use of the word 
“lie” should be used sparingly when describing the testimony of a witness.18 
                                          
 
18 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981).  In Hughes, we explained that “a witness or a 
party may be mistaken, uninformed, or erroneous in his facts or conclusions in many ways, and 
yet not be a liar; labeling a witness as a ‘liar’ or to argue that he has ‘lied’ is to say something 
 
15
Nevertheless, there is no blanket prohibition on the use of the word “lie.”  Here, 
the word “lie” was not used inappropriately, because the prosecutor was not 
suggesting Morales lied to the jury; rather the prosecutor used the word “lie” in 
discussing the tension Morales faced between fulfilling the plea agreement and 
Morales’ reluctance to testify against Torres, his lifelong friend. 
III. Sufficiency of Evidence 
Torres next contends that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it 
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.  We review the court’s denial of a 
motion for judgment of acquittal de novo to determine “whether any trier of fact, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find [the 
defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.”19 
Torres challenges the sufficiency of evidence adduced to support only the 
charges stemming from the October 21 transaction.  In order to find Torres guilty 
of trafficking cocaine over 100 grams, the jury was required to find that he 
knowingly sold, manufactured, delivered, or brought into this State, or was 
                                                                                                                                        
quite different about his testimony.  The characterization of testimony as a ‘lie’ … is necessarily 
to say that the witness made ‘an untrue statement with intent to deceive.’”  Thus, “unless, (a) [it] 
is a legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence, and (b) the prosecutor relates 
his argument to specific evidence which tends to show that the testimony or statement is a lie,” it 
is impermissible.  Id. 
19 Comer v. State, --- A.2d ----, 2009 WL 2243963 (Del. July 28, 2009); Pennewell v. State, --- 
A.2d ----, 2009 WL 2170494, at *1 (Del. July 21, 2009); Brown v. State, 967 A.2d 1250, 1252 
(Del. 2009). 
 
16
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of 100 grams or more of cocaine.20  
In order to find Torres guilty of delivering cocaine, the jury was required to find 
that he delivered, or possessed with the intent to deliver, cocaine.21  Torres argues 
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the substance he 
delivered on October 21 was cocaine, and that it weighed in excess of 100 grams. 
The State never recovered the substance delivered on October 21; therefore 
there could be no chemical testing or expert testimony establishing the identity and 
weight of the substance.  Instead, the State offered the testimony of Morales, who 
testified that he was a drug dealer who dealt in large quantities of cocaine—“from 
a kilo to a half a kilo,” that Torres was his supplier, and that when he picked up 
cocaine from Torres, he brought it home and weighed it on a scale.  Although 
Morales was a reluctant and uncooperative witness who repeatedly denied 
remembering what he said and what he did on certain days, when confronted with 
the recordings from the wiretapped phone calls, he testified that he received 500 
grams of cocaine from Torres on October 21 and “a little less than 500 grams” of 
cocaine from Torres on October 27.  Taken in the light most favorable to the State, 
this testimony alone was sufficient to establish both that the substance was cocaine 
and that it weighed in excess of 100 grams.22 
                                          
 
20 16 Del. C. § 4753A(a)(2)c. 
21 16 Del. C. § 4751(a). 
22 Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 188, 195 (Del. 2008).  In Wright, we held that any “lay witness with 
familiarity and experience with the drug in question may testify and establish the drug’s identity 
 
17
Torres argues that there was no testimony from Morales as to how he knew 
that the substance was cocaine.  He argues that, in the past, we have required 
evidence establishing a lay witness’ familiarity with cocaine, such as prior use or 
dealing, or knowledge based upon appearance, smell or other factors, before 
finding the witness qualified to offer his opinion that the substance was cocaine.23  
Torres asserts that no such evidence was offered here.  We disagree. 
Morales testified that he had been dealing in cocaine for approximately a 
year before his arrest.  He explained that he would pick up the cocaine from 
Torres, bring it home, and weigh it on a digital scale.  Additionally, Morales 
demonstrated familiarity with the manner in which cocaine is distributed, including 
testimony as to how it is packaged for delivery, and the price structure.  In 
addition, there was evidence that Grillo had been buying cocaine from Morales for 
a period of time without complaint from any of his customers that the substance 
was counterfeit.  This circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish that 
Morales’s opinion was based on his own perception of and personal experience 
                                                                                                                                        
by factors other than the witness’s personal use.”  Id. at 195.  In that case, the witness, who had 
supplied the substance in question to the defendant, identified the substance as cocaine based on 
his experience as a cocaine dealer and his ability to smell the substance.  Id. at 190-91.  We 
found that this lay opinion testimony was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
infer the substance to be cocaine.  Id. at 195. 
23 Wright, 953 A.2d at 190-91; see also Campbell v. State, 974 A.2d 156, 168-69 (Del. 2009) 
(holding that a drug user may be competent to testify about the identity of a controlled substance 
under Delaware Rule of Evidence 701 as long as the State “lays a foundation that the witness’ 
testimony is rationally based on his own perception of and personal experience with the 
substance and not on scientific, technical or specialized knowledge.”). 
 
18
with the substance.  Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State, the evidence is sufficient to support Torres’s convictions for trafficking and 
delivery of cocaine stemming from the October 21 transaction. 
IV. Evidence of Uncharged Misconduct 
Torres also contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion by 
allowing the State to present evidence of the November 1 drug transaction as 
evidence of uncharged misconduct.  Torres contends the prejudicial value of this 
evidence outweighs its probative value under 404(b).  Torres also argues that the 
court abused its discretion by allowing the State to elicit testimony from Morales 
that he was dealing cocaine for a year prior to his arrest involving amounts from a 
half kilogram to a kilogram, and that Torres was his supplier.  Torres contends that 
this evidence was overly broad because it was not confined to the timeframe at 
issue in the prosecution and did not directly relate to any of the approved wiretap 
conversations or events of October 21 or October 27. 
An abuse of discretion arises when the trial judge “has . . . exceeded the 
bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, [or] . . . so ignored recognized rules 
of law or practice so as to produce injustice.”24  We have outlined a two-step 
analysis to be applied when the “defendant’s appeal is grounded on allegations that 
the [trial judge] erred as a matter of law or abused his discretion in submitting 
                                          
 
24 Edwards, 925 A.2d at 1284 (quoting Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994)).   
 
19
claims to the jury and in admitting certain evidence.”  “[We] will first consider 
whether the specific rulings at issue were correct.  If [we] find error or abuse of 
discretion in the rulings, [we] must then determine whether the mistakes 
constituted significant prejudice so as to have denied the appellant a fair trial.”25   
A. 
The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the November 1 
transaction. 
 
The State provided notice prior to trial that it was going to present evidence 
of Torres’s involvement in the November 1 transaction pursuant to Rule 404(b) to 
show a “common scheme or plan” to traffic and deliver cocaine with Morales.  
Following Torres’s objection, the judge ruled that the evidence was admissible 
because it “was relevant to motive and plan” and was not unfairly prejudicial. 
Although evidence of uncharged misconduct is generally inadmissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of uncharged 
misconduct may be admissible for other purposes, “such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident.’”26  We adopted an inclusive approach to this rule in Getz v. State,27 
explaining that “the proponent is allowed to offer evidence of [] misconduct for 
any material purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the 
                                          
 
25 Id. at 1284-85 (citing Charbonneau v. State, 904 A.2d 295, 304 (Del. 2006)) . 
26 DEL. R. EVID. 404(b). 
27 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988). 
 
20
part of the defendant to commit the charged crime.”  Such evidence is admissible 
when it has “independent logical relevance” and when “its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”28  To summarize these 
requirements, we set forth five preconditions to admit evidence of other crimes 
under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in 
dispute in the case; (2) the evidence must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned 
by Rule 404(b), or to any other purpose not inconsistent with the basic prohibition 
against evidence of bad character or criminal disposition; (3) the uncharged 
misconduct must be proved by plain, clear, and conclusive evidence; (4) the 
uncharged misconduct must not be too remote in time from the charged offense; 
and (5) the evidence must be weighed in terms of its probative value versus its 
unfairly prejudicial effect.29  In addition, “[b]ecause such evidence is admitted for a 
limited purpose, the jury should be instructed concerning the purpose for its 
admission as required by Delaware Rule of Evidence 105.”30 
                                          
 
28 Id. at 730; accord DEL. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence.”); DEL. R. EVID. 403 
(“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”). 
29 Id. at 734. 
30 Id.; accord DEL. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to 1 party or for 1 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon 
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
 
21
Applying the Getz factors, this decision was not an abuse of discretion.  
First, the evidence of the uncharged November 1 drug transaction had independent 
logical relevance, because it tended to make it more probable that Torres supplied 
Morales with large amounts of cocaine.  This was material to identifying Torres as 
part of a trafficking scheme.  Second, the purpose of the evidence was to show a 
common scheme or plan to traffic in, and deliver, cocaine—a purpose permitted 
under Rule 404(b).  Third, the transaction was proven through plain, clear, and 
convincing evidence.  The State presented evidence of the transaction through 
Morales’s trial testimony, wiretapped phone calls, and the actual cocaine seized 
from Willhide’s apartment.  Fourth, the uncharged misconduct was not too remote 
in time from the charged offenses.  The November 1 delivery occurred only days 
after the charged offenses on October 21 and October 27.  The November 1 
delivery also took place in the course of the same ongoing dealer-distributor 
relationship between Morales and Torres.   
Torres argues that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.  He asserts that the probative value of the evidence is not strong 
because the State did not need the evidence of the uncharged November 1 
transaction, because the State’s case rested on the jury’s determination of 
Morales’s credibility.  We disagree.  The evidence of the November 1 transaction 
was critical to the State’s case against Torres because (1) it tended to establish 
 
22
Torres’s intent by showing a continuing plan to distribute cocaine; and (2) the 
wiretapped phone conversations between Morales and Willhide helped decode the 
language used between Morales and Torres to accomplish their drug distribution.   
Torres also claims that the evidence would likely be misused by the jury for 
an improper purpose, such as to find that Torres had a propensity for dealing drugs, 
or to bolster the credibility of Morales.  While evidence of uncharged misconduct 
inherently carries the danger of being used improperly, the danger was not high in 
this case because the evidence of the November 1 transaction is consistent with 
Morales’s earlier testimony and the wiretapped calls played for the earlier 
transactions.  Furthermore, this danger of misuse is properly dealt with by a 
limiting instruction.31  Here, Torres rejected the subsequent acts instruction offered 
by the trial court.  Therefore, Torres has waived any objection to the potential 
misuse of this evidence by the jury that might have been cured by such a limiting 
instruction.32 
B. 
The trial court did not err in allowing the State to elicit testimony from 
Grillo and Willhide as to the amount of cocaine they received from Morales 
in the past. 
 
At trial, the State elicited testimony from Morales that he had been dealing 
cocaine in amounts in excess of a half kilogram for more than a year and that 
                                          
 
31 See DEL. R. EVID. 105; Getz, 538 A.2d at 734. 
32 SUP. CT. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review.”); Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
23
Torres was his supplier.  After performing a Getz analysis, the trial court sustained 
Torres’s objecting, finding that the unfair prejudice of the evidence substantially 
outweighed its probative value.  The court explained that the focus of the State’s 
evidence had to be on the transactions referred to in the wiretaps.  The next day, 
the State elicited testimony from Morales and that he had a history of selling large 
amounts of cocaine to Grillo and Willhide, and that Torres was his supplier.  Later, 
the prosecutor elicited testimony from Grillo that he had a history of regularly 
purchasing large amounts of cocaine from Morales prior to his arrest.  Defense 
counsel objected and the court admonished the prosecutor to focus on the charged 
transactions.  The prosecutor continued to inquire as to Grillo’s prior practice of 
drug transactions with Morales and was admonished again.  Torres asserts that the 
prosecutor continued to elicit such testimony from Grillo after the second 
admonition and, shortly thereafter, elicited similar evidence from Willhide.  Torres 
claims that this testimony was in violation of the court’s previous order, was not 
subjected to a Getz analysis and could only serve to lead a jury to conclude that 
because Torres sold drugs in the past, he likely acted in conformity with that 
character in the present case.   
Torres contends it was improper for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to 
elicit testimony about the amounts of cocaine the witnesses received from Morales 
in the past.  Since the prosecutor established that Torres was the source of Morales’ 
 
24
cocaine, it was improper to present to the jury that Torres was the source of the 
cocaine regularly purchased by Grillo and Willhide.  Torres argues it was unfairly 
prejudicial and likely interpreted by the jury to believe that Torres had a significant 
prior history of drug dealing.  Torres contends this evidence did not relate to any of 
the transactions referred to in the wiretap, and was in violation of the judge’s 
ruling.  He also argues that the prosecutor’s pattern of overreaching by 
intentionally eliciting past drug dealing disregarded the court’s repeated 
instructions made it more probable that the jury drew improper inferences and 
likely disregarded his presumption of innocence.  
The State responds that its theory at trial was that Torres was part of a 
cocaine distribution chain and sold to Morales who, in turn, would sell to 
downstream dealers, such as Grillo and Willhide.  Since police only found cocaine 
in the possession of Willhide and Grillo, the State argues that in order to establish 
Torres’ guilt, the prosecution was required to demonstrate the cocaine ultimately 
found in the possession of Grillo and Willhide came from Torres.  According to the 
State, the evidence was not admitted to show [Torres’] bad character, but to set the 
context of the [cocaine dealing relationship].”33  The State denies having violated 
the trial court’s ruling because the prosecution did not “delve into any transactions 
‘not referred to in the wiretaps.’” 
                                          
 
33 Ashley v. State, 1993 WL 397604 at *2 (Del.).  
 
25
When the prosecutor’s questioning of Grillo strayed to more general 
inquiries regarding the relationship between Grillo and Morales, Torres objected, 
the trial judge asked the prosecutor to move on to transactions associated with the 
wiretapped calls, and the prosecutor complied.  Torres did not object at any other 
time; therefore, we must review these for plain error.34 
The trial judge’s ruling on Torres’s objection specifically related only to 
evidence of Morales’s past relationship with Torres, not Grillo or Willhide.  A 
reading of the transcript of Grillo and Willhide’s direct examination indicates that 
the prosecutor’s line of questioning was focused on ascertaining the amount of 
cocaine that Grillo and Willhide received from Morales on October 27 and 
November 1, respectively.  In an effort to elicit this testimony, the prosecutor 
occasionally inquired how the amount at issue on those dates compared to the 
amounts the witnesses typical received from Morales.  The prosecutor also 
established that both Grillo and Willhide had received cocaine from Morales 
before and inquired as to whether they were aware that Torres was Morales’s 
supplier.  This testimony was intended to establish the relationship between Grillo, 
Willhide and Morales, and Morales and Torres, in order to provide context to the 
jury.  Although an objection could have been presented to the trial court, the trial 
                                          
 
34 SUPR. CT. R. 8. 
 
26
court did not commit plain error in allowing the prosecutor to elicit this relevant 
information from Grillo and Wilhide. 
V. Cumulative effect of all errors denied due process 
Torres contends that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case denied 
him a fair trial and due process.  Torres did not present a cumulative error 
argument to the Superior Court; therefore his claim is now reviewed for plain 
error.35  We have held that the cumulative impact of errors in a trial may be the 
basis for reversing a conviction, even where one error, standing alone, would not 
be the basis for reversal.36  However, because we find that there was no error in 
this case, a cumulative error analysis is not warranted. 
VI. Conclusion 
The judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
                                          
 
35 SUPR. CT. R. 8. 
36 See Wright v. State, 405 A.2d 685, 690 (Del. 1979); Robelen Piano Co. v. Di Fonzo, 169 A.2d 
240, 248 (Del. 1961).