Title: In re Wyllie

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: FEBRUARY 23, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of WILLIAM B. WYLLIE,
Accused.		
(OSB 97-84, 98-35; SC S47249)
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted November 6, 2000.
	William B. Wyllie, Crescent Lake, argued the cause and filed
the brief in propria persona.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
	Before Gillette, Durham, Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs,
Justices.* 
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for four
months, with the period of suspension to run consecutively to the
period of suspension imposed on the accused in In re Wyllie, 327
Or 175, 957 P2d 1222 (1998). 
	*Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Carson, C. J., and  
De Muniz, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	PER CURIAM
	In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar (Bar) filed four causes of complaint against the accused,
alleging a total of eight violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rules (DRs), including DR 5-105(E)
(current client conflict); DR 9-101(A) (failure to deposit client
funds into trust account); DR 2-106(A) (charging or collecting
illegal or excessive fee); DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); DR 2-110(A)(2)
(improper withdrawal); DR 6-101(B) (neglect of legal matter); DR
7-101(A)(1) (intentionally failing to seek lawful objectives of
client); and DR 7-101(A)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out
contract of employment). (1)  A trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board concluded that the Bar had proved that the accused violated
the first three rules listed above, but that the Bar had failed
to prove the remaining charges by clear and convincing evidence. 
The trial panel suspended the accused from the practice of law
for eighteen months.  Because the trial panel held that the
accused should be suspended for more than six months, this
court's review is automatic.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.1; BR 10.4.  On
de novo review, ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6, the Bar asks this court to
find the accused guilty of all the charges and to disbar him. 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the accused violated DR
5-105(E), DR 9-101(A), and DR 2-106(A), and we suspend him from
the practice of law for four months.
FACTS

	Many of the facts in this case are contested, as we
note below.  On March 26, 1996, Billy Wayne Yother, Jr. (Yother
junior), his sister Laura Yother, and his girlfriend Denise
Szlavich (collectively, the defendants) were indicted for
burglary and assault in connection with an altercation with
Szlavich's former husband and his girlfriend over the physical
custody of Szlavich's child.  Both Szlavich's former husband and
his girlfriend were injured.  The defendants were arraigned on
April 18, 1996, and their trial was scheduled for September 17,
1996.  The defendants filed affidavits of indigence.  The court
appointed Reid to represent Yother junior, Bispham to represent
Laura Yother, and Hickam to represent Szlavich.  Those lawyers
remained counsel of record throughout the criminal proceedings,
and each recommended that his client plead no contest to reduced
charges.
	The accused had represented Billy Wayne Yother, Sr.
(Yother senior) in the past on other matters.  After the
defendants had been indicted, and in response to their lawyers'
recommendations that they plead no contest to reduced charges,
Yother senior contacted the accused.  Yother senior and the
defendants met with the accused on April 8, 1996, for
approximately one hour.  The defendants told the accused that
their trial date was September 17, 1996.  The Bar contends that,
at that meeting, the defendants retained the accused to represent
them on the charges at trial.  The accused responds that Yother
senior retained him to provide a second opinion about whether the
defendants should plead no contest, and that he gave Yother
senior his opinion orally.
	The defendants had an appointment to meet with the
accused on April 22, 1996, but they failed to appear.  The next
day, however, they met with the accused for approximately one
hour.  The Bar contends that, at that meeting, the accused
informed the defendants that he would require a retainer fee of
$500 each to represent them.  The accused did not enter into a
written retainer agreement with the defendants.  According to the
accused, no written retainer was required, because Yother senior
had retained him to provide a second opinion about whether the
defendants should plead no contest and the accused frequently did
not have retainer agreements with established clients. 
	On May 1, 1996, the accused sent a bill to Yother
senior for $1,850.  It reflected a charge of $150 for the April 8
"conference with client x3;" $50 for a "missed appointment" on
April 22; $150 for the April 23 "conference with client x3;" and
a "[r]equested retainer fee" of $1,500 dated April 23. 
Apparently, the accused's hourly fee was $150.
	On May 6, 1996, the accused received $600 in cash. 
Yother junior believes that his mother provided that money;
Szlavich contends that she provided it from her income tax
return.  The accused deposited the money into his personal
account rather than into a client trust account.  On June 29,
1996, the accused received another $150, which he also deposited
into his personal account.  Yother junior testified that he and
Szlavich had paid the accused the $150.  On August 1, 1996, the
accused sent Yother senior a bill for $1,100.  That bill
acknowledged payment of $750, and it did not indicate that the
accused had done any additional work on the case. 
	On September 11, 1996, the accused apparently met with
one or all of the defendants for approximately 30 minutes.  On
October 1, 1996, the accused sent Yother senior a bill that
acknowledged receipt of $750 and reflected a charge of $75 for
"conference with client ½" on September 11.  The October 1 bill
reflected a balance due of $1,175, for a total of $1,925 for the
accused's services.  
	Before that, on September 12, 1996, the trial court had
held "readiness hearings" to confirm that the defendants and the
state were prepared for trial on September 17, and the parties
reported that they were ready.  On September 16, Yother junior
called the accused.  The accused told Yother junior there was
nothing he could do for the defendants at trial, because he would
need more time to prepare if he were going to represent them at
trial.  
	The next day, before the trial began, Bispham told the
trial court that he just had learned that Laura Yother and Yother
junior had hired the accused to represent the defendants at
trial.  Reid and Hickam then conferred with their clients and
confirmed what Bispham had said.  At the defense lawyers'
request, the trial court then placed a telephone call to the
accused.  The court reported to the defendants and their lawyers
that the accused had said that he had been retained only in an
"advisory capacity" and that he was not representing the
defendants at trial.  The trial court also noted that the
defendants had not terminated their lawyer-client relationships
with their appointed counsel.  After a brief recess, each of the
defendants expressed a desire to enter a plea of no contest to
the charge of assault in the third degree.  After making
inquiries about whether the pleas were knowing and voluntary, the
trial court also confirmed that none of the defendants was
relying "upon any legal support from [the accused]" and that the
accused "was not [the] attorney of record" for any of them.  The
trial court accepted the defendants' no contest pleas and placed
them on probation.
	On September 23, 1996, the deputy district attorney
(DDA) who had prosecuted the cases against the defendants wrote
to the Bar suggesting that the accused may have had an
inappropriate fee arrangement with the defendants.  On October 1,
1996, assistant disciplinary counsel, Cooper, wrote to the
accused explaining the DDA's concerns and asking him to respond. 
In a letter dated October 2, 1996, the accused stated that he had
been retained to provide a second opinion about whether the
defendants should plead no contest to some of the charges and
explained that his fee had been based on the amount of time he
worked on the case.  The accused also stated that, on September
11, 1996, he had asked the defendants to have their court-appointed counsel contact him, but none had done so.  The accused
further stated that Yother junior had called the accused the day
before trial, and that the accused had told him that he could not
prepare for trial and appear on one day's notice.  The accused
also repeated what he had told the trial court, namely, that he
was not the attorney of record and that he had not agreed to
represent the defendants at trial. 
	On April 25, 1997, the Bar referred the matter to the
Clackamas/Linn/Marion Local Professional Responsibility Committee
(LPRC), asking it to investigate.  The LPRC subsequently
recommended that the Bar dismiss charges relating to the fee
matter that the DDA had raised but that it prosecute the accused
on several other charges.
	On August 25, 1997, Cooper wrote to the accused that
the Bar would institute formal disciplinary proceedings against
him related to the DDA's letter of September 23, 1996.  She
stated that the complaint would allege violations of DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 2-106(A), DR 2-110(A), DR 5-105(E), DR 6-101(B), DR
7-101(A)(1), DR 7-101(A)(2), and DR 9-101(A), but she did not
identify what conduct the Bar relied on to support those
allegations.  Eight months later, on April 27, 1998, the Bar
filed its complaint alleging violations of the rules that Cooper
had listed in her letter of August 25, 1997.  Approximately a
year later, on April 8, 1999, the Bar filed an amended complaint
alleging violations of the same rules.  
	The accused answered on June 10, 1999, denying the
charges and asserting, as an affirmative defense, that there had
been unreasonable delay in prosecuting the matter and that the
delay had caused "serious detriment" to his defense.  The trial
panel rejected the accused's affirmative defense.  After a
hearing on November 2, 1999, the trial panel found that the
accused had an attorney-client relationship with the three
defendants and that, in undertaking to represent all three, he
had a current client conflict, because Szlavich, as the parent of
the child involved in the custody dispute, "stood in a materially
different position with respect to her potential defenses to the
criminal charges against her" than the other two defendants.  The
trial panel also found that the accused had agreed to charge the
defendants on an hourly basis for time expended, that his fee was
excessive in relation to the work he performed, that he had been
"sloppy" and "careless" in failing to place the $750 fee he
received in his client trust account, but that he had not
converted client funds intentionally.  
	The trial panel also found that the Bar had failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the accused had agreed
to represent the defendants at trial.  Accordingly, it concluded
that the accused was not guilty of improperly withdrawing,
neglecting a legal matter, or intentionally failing to seek the
lawful objectives of his clients or to carry out his contract of
employment.  The trial panel also found that the Bar did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had
engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in
connection with the fees he charged or collected from the
defendants.  The trial panel concluded that the accused should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of 18 months and
that he should be required to make restitution of $375 in excess
fees.
	On review, the Bar asks this court to uphold the trial
panel with respect to its findings of guilt, reject the panel's
dismissal of the other charges, and increase the sanction imposed
to disbarment.  We begin with the third cause of complaint.   
	THIRD CAUSE OF COMPLAINT:NEGLECT AND DESERTION
	The Bar alleges that the accused violated DR 2-110(A)(2), DR 6-101(B), DR 7-101(A)(1), and DR 7-101(A)(2) by
withdrawing from employment without taking reasonable steps to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to his clients, neglecting a legal
matter entrusted to him by failing to prepare for and appear at
the defendants' trial, and failing to carry out a contract of
employment.  The Bar acknowledges that those charges turn on
resolution of the primary factual dispute in this case, namely,
whether the accused agreed to represent the defendants at trial. 
	The Bar relies on Yother junior's and Szlavich's
testimony that they thought that the accused was going to
represent them at trial and that the accused discussed trial
strategy with them.  It also relies on the fact that the
defendants met with the accused only a week before trial and that
Laura Yother and Szlavich expressed shock and disappointment the
day of trial when they learned that the accused was not going to
be there.  
	Only two of the defendants, Yother junior and Szlavich,
talked to the LPRC investigator or testified at the hearing.  As
the trial panel noted, their testimony consisted primarily of
short affirmations of Bar counsel's leading questions.  Their
testimony was short on detail about the conversations that the
accused had with them, beyond their repeated assertions that they
thought that the accused would represent them at trial even
though each had appointed counsel.  According to the LPRC
investigator's report, Yother junior and Szlavich stated that the
accused spent a lot of time in his meetings with them boasting
about his successes in court in criminal proceedings and
discussing the individual abilities and weaknesses of the lawyers
in the Linn County district attorney's office.  They attributed
his talk to the fact that the accused is "an old man."  Their
dismissive attitude toward the accused in their interview with
the LPRC investigator stands in marked contrast to their
testimony before the trial panel that they had believed before
their criminal trial that the accused was taking care of
everything for them and that he would make a surprise appearance
on the day of trial to assure that they were not convicted.  We
agree with the trial panel that Yother junior's and Szlavich's
testimony was not persuasive.
	In addition, the record reveals that, despite 
inconsistencies in his testimony on other matters, the accused
never wavered in his assertion about the scope of his
representation in the criminal matter.  On September 17, 1996, he
told the trial court that he had been retained only to provide a
second opinion about whether the defendants should plead no
contest to reduced charges; he wrote the same to Cooper on
October 2, 1996; he told the same thing to the LPRC investigator
in July 1997; and he testified to the same effect in his
deposition on July 13, 1999, and before the trial panel on
November 2, 1999.
	Finally, the defendants had appointed counsel to
represent them at trial, a fact of which the accused was aware. 
The accused testified that he attempted to contact Bispham to
discuss the charges against the defendants, but Bispham did not
return his telephone calls.  The accused also stated in his
deposition that, if he had been retained to represent the
defendants at trial, there would have been a substitution of
counsel.
	Based on our review of the record, we agree with the
trial panel that the Bar has failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused agreed to represent the
defendants at trial.  Accordingly, the predicate for the Bar's
third cause of complaint is missing, and we conclude that that
cause of complaint must be dismissed.  We turn to the Bar's
contention that the accused nonetheless violated DR 5-105(E).
FIRST CAUSE OF COMPLAINT:CURRENT CLIENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST

	The Bar contends that, even if the accused agreed only
to provide a second opinion about whether the defendants should 
plead no contest, he had a lawyer-client relationship with them,
their interests were in likely conflict, and the accused was
required, but failed, to comply with the requirements of DR 5-105(E).  That rule provides:
		"Current Client Conflicts - Prohibition.  Except
as provided in DR 5-105(F), a lawyer shall not
represent multiple current clients in any matters when
such representation would result in an actual or likely
conflict."
An "actual conflict of interest" exists when the lawyer "has a
duty to contend for something on behalf of one client that the
lawyer has a duty to oppose on behalf of another client."  DR 5-105(A)(1).  A "likely conflict of interest" exists in all other
situations "in which the objective personal, business or property
interests of the clients are adverse."  DR 5-105(A)(2).  DR 5-105(F) permits representation of multiple current clients "when
such representation would not result in an actual conflict and
when each client consents to the multiple representation after
full disclosure."  Only likely conflicts may be waived after full
disclosure; actual conflicts are not waivable.  Full disclosure
requires the lawyer to explain to the client the potential
adverse impact of the multiple representation, advise the client
to seek independent legal advice about whether consent should be
given, and contemporaneously to confirm the disclosure in
writing.  DR 10-101(B).   
	The threshold question is whether the accused had a
lawyer-client relationship with the defendants.  The trial panel
found that he did.  A lawyer-client relationship may be inferred
from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties.  In re
Wittemyer, 328 Or 448, 456, 980 P2d 148 (1999).  A lawyer-client
relationship may be found based on the putative client's
objectively reasonable belief that a relationship has been
established.  Id.  However, the putative client's subjective
belief must be accompanied by evidence that the lawyer understood
or should have understood that the relationship existed.  Id. 
	In this case, the defendants had an objectively
reasonable belief that the accused had been retained to provide
them -- not just Yother senior -- with legal advice, and the
accused understood that the relationship existed.  The accused
met with the defendants three times; Yother senior was present
only at the first meeting.  According to the accused, he
conducted research on the defendants' behalf, and he gave them
advice about whether they should plead no contest. (2)  Yother
junior and Szlavich paid the accused at least $150 of the $750 he
received for his legal advice.  We conclude that the accused had
a lawyer-client relationship with the defendants.
	We turn to whether the accused violated the rules
against current client conflicts when he undertook to provide the
defendants with advice about whether they should plead no
contest.  This court has explained that a lawyer who is asked to
represent multiple clients who have potentially differing
interests must weigh carefully the possibility of impaired
judgment or divided loyalty and that employment should be refused
if there is the slightest doubt about whether the employment will
involve a conflict of interest.  See In re O'Neal, 297 Or 258,
264, 683 P2d 1352 (1984) (so stating and citing authorities).  A
conflict exists when a lawyer is in a position where the exercise
of the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of
one client would be adversely affected by the differing interests
of the other clients.  In re Porter, 283 Or 517, 524, 584 P2d 744
(1978).  When a conflict exists, "the fact that representation
may not include going to trial does not solve the problems
inherent in such conflicts."  O'Neal, 297 Or at 263. 
	In this case, the defendants had been charged in a
single indictment with first-degree burglary and third-degree
assault for unlawfully entering a dwelling and injuring
Szlavich's former husband and his girlfriend.  Their court-appointed lawyers had advised each of them to plead no contest to
reduced charges.  Yother senior and the defendants retained the
accused to give them a second opinion about whether the court-appointed lawyers were giving the defendants good legal advice.
	The accused testified that, in his view, each of the
defendants had a different defense and he told both Yother senior
and the defendants that their defense positions were
"substantially different."  Among other things, the accused
reasoned that, as to Yother junior and Laura Yother, there was a
serious question about their legal right to try to retrieve
Szlavich's child from the child's father.  As to Szlavich, by
contrast, the accused believed that she might have been entitled
legally to exert force in the effort to retrieve her child.  The
accused also testified that he understood that the availability
of different defenses for each of the defendants created a likely
current client conflict of interest, and he advised them orally
of the specific nature of the conflicts that could arise based on
their assertion of those defenses.  However, the accused did not
advise the defendants of the conflict in writing, and he did not
advise them to seek independent counsel to determine whether they
should consent to his representing them for the purpose of giving
a second opinion about whether they should plead no contest.  The
accused reasoned that he did not need to advise the defendants to
seek independent counsel because "[t]hey already had counsel, so
that wasn't necessary." 
	On this record, we conclude that the accused had a
likely current client conflict of interest when he agreed to
provide the defendants a second opinion about whether they should
plead no contest to reduced charges.  As the custodial parent of
her child, Szlavich might have had defenses available to her that
were not available to Yother junior or to Laura Yother.  
Moreover, one or all of the defendants could have argued that it
was either or both of the others, not him or her, who injured the
victims.  See In re Jeffery, 321 Or 360, 370-71, 898 P2d 752
(1995) (likely conflict of interest where accused represented co-defendants in criminal matter, clients had potential interest in
convincing trier of fact that one defendant was less culpable
than the other, and each client had potential interest in
obtaining favorable plea agreement in exchange for testimony
against other).  Whether it was advisable for any or all the
defendants to plead no contest to reduced charges depended on
their respective defense strategies, and the possibility existed
that the defendants' interests were adverse to one another
regarding those strategies.  The accused had a likely current
client conflict of interest that he was required to disclose
fully under DR 5-105(E).
	The accused's contention that he was excused from fully
disclosing the likely conflict of interest among the defendants
because the defendants already were represented by appointed
counsel is not well taken.  The defendants' counsel were
appointed to represent them on the criminal charges, not to
advise them whether they should consent to the accused's
continued representation in light of the likely conflict.  The
accused was not excused from providing the full disclosure
required by DR 10-101(B).  We hold that the accused violated DR
5-105(E).
FOURTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT:CHARGING AND COLLECTING A CLEARLY EXCESSIVE FEE

	The Bar contends that the accused violated DR 2-106(A)
by billing Yother senior for $1,925 and for collecting $750 when
he had worked only two-and-one-half hours on the case at a rate
of $150 per hour.  DR 2-106(A) provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or
clearly excessive fee."  The accused's response is twofold. 
First, he contends that the October 1, 1996, bill reflecting a
remainder due of $1,175, clearly was an error that he would have
corrected if it had been brought to his attention.  Second, the
accused contends that, notwithstanding that the bills indicated
that he had worked only two-and-one-half hours on the case, he
had spent an additional three to four hours doing research that
was not reflected in the bills and for which he was entitled to
payment at the rate of $150 per hour.  Because he was paid only
$750 and never sought to collect any more after October 1, 1996,
the accused contends that he did not collect an excessive fee.	As explained earlier, the accused did not enter into a
written fee agreement with Yother senior or with the defendants. 
However, the accused told Cooper, in his letter of October 2,
1996, and the LPRC investigator that he was providing his
services on an hourly basis.  The accused also told the LPRC
investigator that his secretary had made a mistake in billing
Yother senior for his time rather than charging his time against
the $1,500 retainer fee.  Finally, the accused's secretary
testified that the accused charged "by the hour" for criminal
cases. 
	The only evidence in the record that contradicts the
conclusion that the accused charged an hourly fee in this case is
the accused's testimony that he had charged Yother senior a
nonrefundable retainer fee of $1,500 for his services.  However,
in his briefing to this court, the accused does not dispute that
he charged an hourly fee; he argues only about how many hours he
worked on the defendants' case.  We conclude that the accused
agreed to work for an hourly fee, and we turn to whether he was
entitled to charge or to collect more than $425 for his services.
	The accused told the LPRC investigator that the total
amount of time that he had spent on the case was two-and-one-half
hours, the same amount of time that was reflected in the three
bills he sent to Yother senior.  At the hearing, the accused
testified that he spent three or four hours doing research on the
case, but he produced no records at any time during these
proceedings to document that fact.  Indeed, the accused claims to
have destroyed the Yother file in May 1998, even though the
original complaint in this matter had been filed a month earlier. 
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the accused
worked two-and-one-half hours on the case.  At his hourly fee of
$150, plus $50 for a missed appointment, the accused was entitled
to collect a fee of $425.  Even viewed in the light most
favorable to the accused, he charged a fee of $1,850, and he
collected a fee of $750.  The accused violated DR 2-106(A) by
charging and collecting an excessive fee.
SECOND CAUSE OF COMPLAINT:CONVERSION 

	Finally, the Bar contends that the accused violated DR
9-101(A) when he deposited the $750 that he received directly
into his personal account before he had earned it.  DR 9-101(A)
provides, in part:
		"All funds of clients paid to a lawyer * * * shall
be deposited and maintained in one or more identifiable
trust accounts * * *.  
		"* * * * *
		"(2)  Funds belonging in part to a client and in
part presently or potentially to the lawyer * * * must
be deposited therein but the portion belonging to the
lawyer * * * may be withdrawn when due unless the right
of the lawyer * * * to receive it is disputed by the
client in which event the disputed portion shall not be
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved."
Moreover, the Bar contends that the accused knowingly "helped
himself" to client funds to which he was not entitled.  By doing
so, the Bar contends, the accused also violated DR 1-102(A),
which provides: 
		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
		"* * * * *
		"(3)  Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]"
The accused responds that he had earned more than $750 by the
time he received that sum, because he had done more than two
hours of work on the case by June 29, 1996.
	This court has explained that conduct akin to theft is
not a prerequisite to a finding of conversion.  In re Martin, 328
Or 177, 184-85, 970 P2d 638 (1998).  An actor who mistakenly
believes that his or her conduct is legal nonetheless can commit
conversion.  Id. at 184.  However, to violate DR 1-102(A)(3),
there must be evidence -- or an inference that reasonably follows
from the evidence -- that a lawyer had the necessary intent to
appropriate funds.  Id. at 189.
	We already have found that the accused performed his
services on an hourly basis and that he spent only two-and-one-half hours on the case, notwithstanding his testimony that he
also had performed three or four hours of research.  The
accused's billing reflects that he worked on the case for two
hours in April 1996 and that he charged $50 for a missed
appointment on April 22, 1996.  The accused received payments of
$600 on May 5, 1996, and $150 on June 29, 1996.  When the accused
received those payments, he had earned only $350 -- reflecting
two hours of work at $150 per hour and a charge for the missed
appointment -- but he deposited both payments into his personal
account.  The accused violated DR 9-101(A).
	We turn to the Bar's contention that the accused
knowingly converted client funds in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). 
According to the Bar, the accused intentionally had adopted a
system "whereby all funds received by his office would be treated
as his own property unless he specifically told his secretary
otherwise."  The accused's secretary testified that she informed
the accused every time money came into the office.  It follows,
the Bar asserts, that the accused knowingly "helped himself to
(and has since refused to refund) client funds."
	The Bar's argument reduces to the proposition that,
because the accused apparently did not have appropriate
procedures in place for handling client funds generally, he
knowingly misappropriated client funds in this case.  That
argument proves too much.  It is true that the accused's
testimony to the LPRC investigator and at the hearing was
inconsistent about how much time he expended on this case, that
his bills to Yother senior never reflected more than two-and-one-half hours of work, and that the accused never produced records
that would establish that he performed three or four hours of
research before receiving the payments in May and June of 1996. 
However, it also is true that, when the LPRC investigator showed
the accused the bills that the accused had sent to Yother senior,
the accused immediately acknowledged that there were errors in
them and said that he would have corrected them if Yother senior
had brought them to his attention.  Moreover, at the time that
the accused met with the LPRC investigator, the only matter that
he knew was being investigated was the fee matter that the DDA
had raised.  It is not surprising that, at that time, the accused
did not attempt to locate the notes he believes he kept regarding
his research on possible defenses the defendants might have.  On
this record, we agree with the trial panel that carelessness and
sloppiness, rather than dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, best depict the accused's conduct.  The Bar
did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
SANCTION

	This court follows a well-established methodology in
determining the appropriate sanction for violations of the
disciplinary rules.  See In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 652-53, 968
P2d 367 (1998) (describing methodology).  Consistent with that
methodology, we refer to the American Bar Association Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA
Standards). 
	1.  Duty Violated
	The accused violated his duty to preserve client
property, ABA Standard 4.1, and to avoid conflicts of interest,
ABA Standard 4.3.  The accused violated duties he owes to the
legal profession by charging and collecting an excessive fee. 
ABA Standard 7.0.  
	2.  Mental State
	Under the ABA Standards, an act is "knowing" if it is
engaged in with the awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct, but without the conscious objective
or purpose to accomplish a particular result.  ABA Standards at
17.  An act is "negligent" if the lawyer fails to heed a
substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will
follow that is a deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.  Id.  For the
reasons that we have discussed earlier in this opinion, we
conclude that the accused acted knowingly regarding the conflict
of interest that existed among the defendants.  He acted
negligently in charging and collecting an excessive fee, and in
converting client funds.
	3.  Injury Sustained
	The accused's conduct caused actual injury to his
clients, because he collected an excessive fee from them.  See
ABA Standards at 17 (defining injury).  That injury was mitigated
to some extent, because the accused never sought to collect the
full amount that he billed to Yother senior.  The accused's
failure to disclose fully the conflict of interest created by the
different defenses that might have been available to the three
defendants caused potential injury.  See id. (defining potential
injury).  The Bar has not demonstrated any actual injury to the
defendants, however.  There is no evidence that the defendants
were not represented competently by their appointed counsel or
that the outcome of their criminal cases would have been
different if the accused had disclosed completely the conflict of
interest.
	4.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
	There are several aggravating factors.  First, the
accused has committed prior disciplinary offenses leading to his
being suspended twice from the practice of law.  ABA Standard
9.22(a).  He was suspended for one year for refusing to
participate in and comply with a remedial program to deal with
his alcoholism.  In re Wyllie, 326 Or 447, 952 P2d 550 (1998)
(Wyllie I).  He was suspended for an additional two years for
misrepresenting his compliance with MCLE requirements and failing
to cooperate with the Bar investigation.  In re Wyllie, 327 Or
175, 957 P2d 1222 (1998) (Wyllie II).  Offenses that have been
adjudicated before imposition of the sanction in the current case
are aggravating factors.  In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d
149 (1997).  
	Prior offenses receive a varying amount of weight as
aggravating factors depending on several factors, including the
similarity of the prior offenses to the current offenses and the
timing of the current offenses; specifically, whether the accused
had been sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the
current offenses.  See id. (identifying nonexhaustive list of
factors).  The Bar does not contend that alcoholism contributed
in any way to the accused's misconduct in this matter.  Wyllie I
thus is dissimilar to the offenses in this case.  Wyllie II
involved misconduct that occurred in 1995, but the complaint in
that matter was not filed until February 1997.  The accused had
not been sanctioned for the violations at issue in Wyllie II when
he engaged in the misconduct at issue in this proceeding. 
Although the accused's prior offenses were serious and resulted
in lengthy suspensions, under this court's case law, we do not
give them much weight in determining the appropriate sanction in
this case.  See In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 227-28, __ P3d __
(2000) (so demonstrating).  However, we may take those
suspensions into account in determining the starting date, should
a suspension be imposed in this case.
Other aggravating factors are that the accused engaged
in a pattern of misconduct, ABA Standard 9.22(c), by continuing
to represent the defendants without fully disclosing a likely
current client conflict of interest and by repeatedly charging
and collecting an excessive fee.  The accused committed multiple
offenses, ABA Standard 9.22(d), by not fully disclosing a current
client conflict of interest, by charging and collecting an
excessive fee, and by converting client funds; he refused to
acknowledge any wrongful conduct, ABA Standard 9.22(g); he has
substantial experience in the practice of law (having been
admitted to practice in 1960), ABA Standard 9.22(i); and he has
refused to refund the amount that he overcharged for his
services, ABA Standard 9.22(j). (3)  There are no mitigating
factors. (4) 
	In light of the duty violated, the accused's mental
state, the injury and potential injury the accused's conduct
caused, the multiple aggravating factors, and the lack of
mitigating factors, the ABA Standards suggest that a suspension
is appropriate.  See ABA Standard 4.12 (suspension generally
appropriate when lawyer knows or should know is dealing
improperly with client property and causes injury or potential
injury to client); ABA Standard 4.32 (suspension generally
appropriate when lawyer knows of conflict of interest and does
not fully disclose conflict, causing injury or potential injury
to client); ABA Standard 7.2 (suspension generally appropriate
when lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that violates duty owed
to profession and causes injury or potential injury to client,
public, or legal system).  
	5.  Case Law
	The Bar relies solely on this court's case law
involving intentional violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) (or its
predecessor, DR 1-102(A)(4)) for its argument that the accused
should be disbarred.  The Bar identifies no cases that are
relevant to determining the appropriate sanction for the
violations at issue here: knowing failure to disclose fully a
client conflict of interest, negligently charging or collecting
an excessive fee, and negligently converting client funds.
	In In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 164, 734 P2d 877 (1987),
this court explained that a violation of DR 5-105, by itself,
justifies a 30-day suspension.  No lesser suspension is warranted
here, as the accused's misconduct involves more than failing to
disclose fully a likely current client conflict of interest.  In
In re Claussen, 322 Or 466, 487-88, 909 P2d 862 (1996), this
court suspended for 12 months an experienced lawyer who violated
DR 5-105 in addition to other intentional misconduct.  The
accused's conduct here is not as serious as the conduct in
Claussen, suggesting that a 12-month suspension is not called for
in this case.  The accused's other disciplinary violations in
this instance resulted from his sloppy and careless office
practices, not from intentional or knowing misconduct. 
Nonetheless, charging and collecting an excessive fee, and
converting client funds are serious ethical violations.  See In
re Adams, 293 Or 727, 740, 652 P2d 787 (1982) (60-day suspension
for charging excessive fee and two other ethical violations). 
Lawyers should make sure to reach an early, clear understanding
of fees with their clients.  See In re Potts/Trammel/Hannon, 301
Or 57, 74, 718 P2d 1363 (1986) (so stating).  
	In cases where, as here, the lawyer is found to have
violated DR 9-101(A), but not DR 1-102(A)(3), this court has
imposed suspensions ranging from 63 days to six months, depending
on the circumstances.  See In re Starr, 326 Or 328, 348-49, 952
P2d 1017 (1998) (identifying factors in addition to violation of
DR 9-101(A) affecting length of suspension).  On the facts of
this case, which include two other serious violations of
disciplinary rules, we conclude that a suspension of four months,
to run consecutively to the accused's previous three-year
suspensions, is the appropriate sanction.
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
four months, with the period of suspension to run consecutively
to the period of suspension imposed on the accused in In re
Wyllie, 327 Or 175, 957 P2d 1222 (1998). 



1. 	The Bar also filed a fifth cause of complaint, which
the trial panel dismissed.  The Bar does not seek review of the
panel's dismissal of that cause of complaint. 

2. 	The accused testified that he also called Yother senior
and gave him an oral opinion about whether the defendants should
accept plea bargains. 

3. 	Although failure to make restitution may be considered
as an aggravating factor under ABA Standard 9.22(j), we find no
authority, and the Bar does not identify any, for the trial
panel's order that "the accused make restitution of $375 to the
parties who paid his fees in the Yother matter."  

4. 	As noted, the accused raised delay as an affirmative
defense to the charges.  Under ABA Standard 9.32(j), delay may be
considered as a mitigating factor, but it is not an affirmative
defense.