Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JIMMY MASS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
 
  
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C 
hief Just ice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 5, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 115820  
JIMMY MASS, a/k/a KOOL AID,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
Defendant was convicted, on an aider and abettor theory,  
of (1) delivery of 225 grams or more but less than 650 grams  
of a mixture containing cocaine1 and with (2) conspiracy to  
commit that offense.2  
We granted leave to determine  
whether knowledge of the amount of the controlled  
1MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii).  
2MCL 750.157a.  
substance was a necessary element of the delivery 
and conspiracy charges, and, if so, whether the 
prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove 
this element and whether the omission of it from  
the jury instructions deprived defendant of a fair 
trial.3  
As explained below, we conclude that the amount of a  
controlled substance is an element of a delivery offense, but  
that knowledge of the amount is not an element of a delivery  
charge.
 However, consistent with People v Justice (After  
Remand), 454 Mich 334; 562 NW2d 652 (1997),and Apprendi v New  
Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), we  
also hold that knowledge of the amount of a controlled  
substance is an element of a conspiracy to deliver charge.  
I. Evidence Presented at Trial  
An undercover state police officer testified that in  
early 1996 he purchased crack cocaine six times from Monolito  
Blackstone.  As detailed below, the officer told the jury that  
defendant assisted Blackstone in completing a seventh sale.  
On March 19, 1996, the officer visited Blackstone’s  
apartment and advised that he wished to purchase ten ounces4  
of cocaine.  Blackstone began making phone calls. Jimmy Mass,  
who lived across the hall, then arrived.  Blackstone told Mass  
he needed “ten ounces” and asked if he knew anyone who they  
3462 Mich 877 (2000).  
4Ten ounces is roughly 280 grams.  
2 
“could get ten ounces from.” Mass said “you should have told  
me 
earlier” 
and 
began making telephone calls from Blackstone’s  
bedroom.  He then returned and advised Blackstone that “his  
man was not there.”  
On March 25, 1996, the officer again phoned Blackstone  
and indicated that he still wanted to purchase ten ounces of  
cocaine.  Blackstone told the officer to meet him the next  
morning at his apartment.  At that meeting, Blackstone made a  
phone call and advised he would have to travel to Detroit to  
get the cocaine.  Before the meeting ended the officer gave  
Blackstone $3,700, one half of the agreed upon price as a down  
payment, and they agreed to meet in the afternoon.  At 2:00  
that afternoon the officer was told by Mass that Blackstone  
was not coming back, but that he would direct the officer to  
a meeting place with Blackstone.  The officer responded by  
expressing some hesitation about that arrangement, and  
indicated he wanted to speak with Blackstone. To facilitate  
this, Mass took the officer to his own apartment where he  
telephoned Blackstone and handed the phone to the officer.  In  
that 
conversation, 
Blackstone told the officer that the police  
had followed him to Detroit and that defendant would bring him  
to a place where the sale could be completed.  Mass and the  
officer then got into the officer’s car, and, under Mass’  
direction, they drove to a house in Monroe.  As they  
3  
 
proceeded, Mass gave the directive to the officer to pull over  
because he believed a car had been following them.  Moreover,  
when the officer for his part indicated that things did not  
seem right, Mass reassured him that Blackstone had the  
officer’s “stuff” and that “that part of it was straight.”  
Mass also confided to the officer that if Blackstone had taken  
him with him to Detroit that he would have made sure the  
police did not follow.  
Upon arrival at the house, Mass got out of the car and  
began looking up and down the street in the manner of a  
lookout.  Meanwhile Blackstone came out from behind the house,  
got in the car, and handed the officer a package and said  
“here is your ten ounces.”5  The officer then paid Blackstone  
the balance of the purchase price, and drove off  alone  
leaving Mass and Blackstone together in front of the  
residence.  
 At the close of the prosecution’s case, defense counsel  
moved for a directed verdict with regard to the delivery and  
conspiracy charges.  The trial court denied the motion stating  
that a question of fact existed for the jury. Defendant did  
not testify or present any evidence.  In his closing argument  
defense counsel argued that Mass was a “sad sack, who should  
pick better friends” but that he had only been present [when  
5Later testing showed the cocaine weighed 246.4 grams.  
4 
Blackstone had delivered the drugs] and was not part of any  
conspiracy.  Following jury instructions,6 the jury convicted  
Mass as charged on both counts.7  
II. The Court of Appeals Opinion resolving defendant’s appeal  
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions in  
a divided opinion.8  The majority rejected defendant’s claim  
that 
the 
evidence 
was insufficient because the prosecution had  
presented no evidence that he had knowledge of the quantity of  
cocaine to be delivered. It concluded that knowledge of the  
amount of cocaine was not an element of either the delivery  
charge or the conspiracy charge.  The Court also rejected  
defendant’s assertion that People v Justice, supra, required  
6Defense counsel’s sole jury instruction objection 
concerned 
the 
giving 
of 
a 
circumstantial 
evidence 
instruction.  
7The trial court found substantial and compelling reasons  
to depart from the presumptive twenty- to thirty-year 
sentences and imposed a ten- to twenty-year sentence for each 
conviction.  The prosecutor appealed the sentences and the 
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 14, 1998 (Docket 
No. 203651). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
had failed to specifically articulate reasons why the factors 
it 
identified 
provided 
“substantial 
and 
compelling” 
reasons 
to 
except the sentences from the presumptive sentences. It also  
held the trial court had failed to articulate additional  
justification for the extent of the departure.  The Court  
indicated that it was conceivable that a departure sentence 
would be appropriate at resentencing.  The trial court  
postponed resentencing defendant until further order of the 
Court. It appears the trial court is awaiting resolution of 
defendant’s appeal in this Court before going forward with the 
resentencing.  
8238 Mich App 333; 605 NW2d 322 (1999).  
5 
proof of knowledge of the quantity of controlled substances  
for 
a 
conspiracy 
conviction.  Alternatively, the majority said  
that, even if Justice required the prosecutor to prove that  
defendant knew the quantity of cocaine involved to support the  
conspiracy conviction, the evidence was sufficient to show  
that Mass knew the quantity of cocaine to be delivered.  
The Court also indicated there was no flaw in the jury  
instructions, even though the instructions did not appraise  
the jury that the prosecution had to prove that defendant knew  
the quantity of cocaine involved in the transaction.  It  
concluded that, because knowledge of the quantity of drugs is  
not an element of the crimes charged, the jury instructions  
did not constitute error.  Alternatively, the majority  
indicated that if knowledge was an element, any error had been  
forfeited where there had been no objection to the  
instructions 
and 
the 
alleged 
error 
was 
not 
outcome  
determinative.  
Judge Hoekstra dissented with respect to the conspiracy  
conviction 
because 
he 
believed 
Justice 
required 
the  
prosecution to prove defendant had the specific intent to  
deliver the statutory amount of at least 225 grams.  He opined  
that conspiracy was a different offense than delivery and  
that, while knowledge of the quantity of drugs involved is not  
an element of a possession charge, it is an element of a  
6  
 
 
conspiracy charge.  Judge Hoekstra concluded that defendant  
was entitled to a new trial regarding his conspiracy  
conviction because the jury instructions regarding this  
offense neglected to include one of its elements.  
III. Standards of Review  
Whether 
knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance  
is a necessary element of a crime is a legal question and we  
review legal questions de novo. People v Morey, 461 Mich 325,  
329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).  
The test for determining whether evidence was sufficient  
to establish an element of a crime is found in People v  
Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 365-368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979).  The test  
requires us to view the evidence in a light most favorable to  
the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact  
could have found the element of the crime was proven beyond a  
reasonable doubt. Id.9  
We review forfeited error, such as the failure to  
instruct a jury regarding one element of an offense, to  
determine whether “the error seriously affected the fairness,  
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).  We  
reverse if it did.  
9This test is more exacting than the former “any  
evidence” standard that Hampton disapproved. Id.  
7  
 
IV. This Court’s Opinion in People v Justice10  
In Justice the 
defendant had been charged with conspiring  
with another to possess with the intent to deliver more than  
650 grams of cocaine and was also charged with conspiring with  
yet another person to possess with the intent to deliver more  
than 225 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine.  The  
prosecution had presented evidence at the preliminary  
examination of several deliveries of cocaine that were  
aggregated to reach the charged amounts.  
In the course of determining that the prosecution had  
presented sufficient evidence to justify binding over the  
defendant for trial, this Court stated: (1) there had to be  
probable cause to believe that the defendant and the  
coconspirator shared the specific intent to accomplish the  
substantive offenses charged and (2) that the evidence showed  
that the defendant and the coconspirator had a specific intent  
to deliver the statutory amount as charged. 
Justice,  
supra. at 337.  
The Court stated its holding as follows:  
To be convicted of conspiracy to possess with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance, the 
people must prove that (1) the defendant possessed 
the specific intent to deliver the statutory 
minimum 
as 
charged, 
(2) 
his 
coconspirators  
10The Court’s opinion in Justice was authored by Justice 
Riley and joined by Justices Weaver, Boyle, Brickley, and 
Chief Justice Mallet.  
8  
 
possessed the specific intent to deliver the  
statutory minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant  
and his coconspirators possessed the specific 
intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum  
as charged to a third person.  [Id. at 349  
(emphasis added).][11]  
V. Whether Knowledge of the Amount of a Controlled Substance 
is a Necessary Element of a Delivery Charge?  
MCL 333.7401(1) provides:  
Except as authorized by this article, a person 
shall not manufacture, create, deliver[12], or  
possess with intent to manufacture, create, or 
deliver a controlled substance, a prescription 
form, 
an 
official 
prescription 
form, 
or 
a  
counterfeit prescription form. 
A practitioner 
licensed by the administrator under this article 
shall not dispense, prescribe, or administer a 
controlled substance for other than legitimate and 
professionally 
recognized therapeutic or scientific 
purposes or outside the scope of practice of the 
practitioner, licensee, or applicant.  
Subsection (2) establishes four ranges: (1) if less than  
fifty grams are involved, a defendant faces a sentence of not  
less than one year nor more than twenty years or lifetime  
probation; (2) if fifty grams or more but less than 225 grams  
11Justice 
Cavanagh 
dissented. 
 
He 
indicated 
that 
he 
agreed 
with the majority that to bind defendant over for trial the 
prosecution 
had 
to 
show defendant and the coconspirator shared 
the specific intent to accomplish the substantive offenses, 
but he dissented because the majority did not require that 
both conspirators possess the specific intent to deliver the 
charged amounts from the time of the formation of the  
conspiratorial agreement. Id. at 363.  
12The terms “deliver” and “delivery” mean “the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer from 1 person to another 
of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency 
relationship.” MCL 333.7105(1).  
9  
 
 
 
  
are involved, a defendant faces not less than ten years nor  
more than twenty years; (3) if 225 grams or more but less than  
650 grams are involved, a defendant faces not less than twenty  
years nor more than thirty years; and (4) if 650 grams or more  
are involved, a defendant faces life or any term of years not  
less than twenty years.13  Hence, subsection (2) increases the  
applicable prison term as the amount of the controlled  
substance increases.  
A plain reading of MCL 333.7401 makes the amount of a  
controlled substance an element of a delivery offense.  The  
amount is an element because the level of crime is dependent  
upon application of subsection 2. 
Indeed, not until  
subsection (2) does the statute specifically refer to crimes,  
“felonies” in this case, that depend on the weight of the  
controlled 
substance 
involved.  
Moreover, 
the 
MCL 
333.7401(2).  
phrase “[a] person who violates this section . . .” suggests  
the determination whether a crime has been committed involves  
application of both subsections (1) and (2).14  
13See, e.g., People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1; 609 NW2d 557  
(2000); People v Fields, 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 (1995).  
14Further support of the conclusion that quantity is an 
element of the delivery offense is the related possession 
statute, MCL 333.7403, which is similarly structured as MCL 
333.7401.
 Subsection (2) of MCL 333.7403 differentiates 
between misdemeanors and felonies.  Thus, under MCL 333.7403, 
one cannot determine the level of crime committed (felony or 
misdemeanor) unless one examines subsection (2).  
10  
 
 
  
  
 
It is even more evident that subsection (2) of MCL  
333.7401 entails the elements of separate offenses because  
subsection (2) covers various drug types as well as  
prescription forms.  For example, within subsection (2)(a),  
the elements of the offense are described as they relate to  
schedule 1 or 2 drugs, while subsection (2)(b) describes a  
separate offense as it relates to schedule 3 drugs, and  
subsection (2)(c) describes the offense as it relates to  
schedule 4 drugs.  
All these textual clues support the  
conclusion 
that 
the 
amount and nature of controlled substances  
are elements of a delivery offense under MCL 333.7401.15  
Having determined that quantity is an element of the  
delivery offense, we turn to the question whether knowledge of  
15In contrast, under the federal counterpart, 21 USC 841, 
subsection (b) provides “any person who violates subsection  
(a) of this section . . . .” (Emphasis added.) This phrase 
shows that the crime is articulated in subsection (a), while 
subsection (b) specifies how a person who violates subsection 
(a) is to be sentenced. 
Clearly, MCL 333.7401 is  
distinguishable 
from 
21 USC 841 on this structural difference. 
Historically, federal courts have construed 21 USC 841 as 
providing that “the quantity of drugs involved . . . is not a  
substantive element of the crime which must be charged and 
proved at trial.”  United States v Dorlouis, 107 F3d 248, 252  
(CA 4, 1997) (emphasis added).  However, as explained in part 
VIII of this opinion, Apprendi has changed this. 
The  
concurrence’s overreliance on federal case law fails to  
appreciate the fact that in Michigan, pursuant to our statute, 
the amount of a controlled substance is part of a delivery 
offense, whereas under the federal statute, apart from 
Apprendi, this is not the case. Hence, we disagree that the 
instant case is “indistinguishable” from those addressed by 
federal conspiracy law. Slip op, p 7.  
11  
 
 
  
the amount is an element of a delivery offense.  
The Court of Appeals held that knowledge of the amount of  
cocaine involved is not an element of a charge of delivery of  
cocaine, citing People v Cortez, 131 Mich App 316, 331; 346  
NW2d 540 (1984),16 and People v Northrup, 213 Mich App 494,  
498; 541 NW2d 275 (1995).17  
It is also the case that this Court stated as follows in  
People v Quinn, 440 Mich 178, 189; 487 NW2d 194 (1992):  
[A] defendant need not know the quantity of 
narcotics to be found guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance under MCL 333.7401; MSA  
14.15(7401).  
We hold, consistent with the text of the statute, the  
Court of Appeals holdings, and our prior statement in Quinn,  
that knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is not  
an element of a delivery charge.18  This holding is, of course,  
consistent with the fact that delivery of a controlled  
substance is a general intent crime.  People v Maleski, 220  
Mich App 518, 522; 560 NW2d 71 (1996).  
VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding the Delivery 
Conviction  
16Remanded on other grounds 423 Mich 855 (1985).  
17Accord People v Hamp, 170 Mich App 24, 35; 428 NW2d 16 
(1988), vacated in part 437 Mich 865 (1990).  
18As explained later in this opinion, we are satisfied  
that Apprendi is inapplicable to this conclusion so long as 
the jury does in fact determine as it did here, the amount of 
controlled substances that was actually delivered.  
12  
Defendant cites the following language from People v  
Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 568; 540 NW2d 728 (1995):  
To support a finding that a defendant aided 
and abetted a crime, the prosecutor must show that 
... (3) the defendant intended the commission of 
the crime or had knowledge that the principal 
intended its commission at the time he gave aid and 
encouragement.  
Defendant 
argues from this language that the evidence may  
show he intended a cocaine delivery, but that the evidence was  
insufficient to show he intended the crime of delivery of at  
least 225 grams of cocaine or had knowledge Blackstone  
intended to deliver at least 225 grams of cocaine at the time  
he aided the delivery.  
The aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39 provides:  
Every person concerned in the commission of an 
offense, whether he directly commits the act  
constituting the offense or procures, counsels, 
aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be 
prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall 
be punished as if he had directly committed such 
offense.  
The “requisite intent” for conviction of a crime as an  
aider and abettor “is that necessary to be convicted of the  
crime as a principal.”  People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261, 278; 378  
NW2d 365 (1985). 
Accordingly, it was enough for the  
prosecution to show that Mass, as with the principal offender  
Blackstone, knowingly delivered or aided in the delivery of  
some amount of cocaine, as long as the jury later determined  
13  
 
 
that at least 225 grams of cocaine were in fact delivered.  
The prosecution simply did not need to show that defendant  
knew that the amount of cocaine involved in the instant  
delivery was at least 225 grams to secure Blackstone’s  
delivery conviction or Mass’ conviction for aiding and  
abetting in the delivery of at least 225 but less than 650  
grams of cocaine.  Conviction of a crime as an aider and  
abettor does not require a higher level of intent with regard  
to the commission of the crime than that required for  
conviction as a principal.  Id. To the extent that the cited  
language 
from 
Turner 
may suggest otherwise, it is disapproved.  
Because the evidence showed defendant knew he was aiding  
and abetting Blackstone in a delivery of cocaine and the  
amount of cocaine delivered exceeded 225 grams, the evidence  
was sufficient to convict defendant of delivery of 225 grams  
or more but less than 650 grams of cocaine.  
VII. Whether Knowledge of the Amount of the Controlled 
Substance was a Necessary Element of the Conspiracy to 
Delivery Charge?  
MCL 750.157a provides:  
Any person who conspires together with 1 or 
more persons to commit an offense prohibited by 
law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner 
is guilty of the crime of conspiracy punishable as 
provided herein . . . .  
Conspiracy is a specific-intent crime, because it  
requires both the intent to combine with others and the intent  
14  
  
 
 
 
to accomplish the illegal objective.  People v Carter, 415  
Mich 558, 567-568; 330 NW2d 314 (1982).19  
As previously indicated, one of the charges defendant  
faced was conspiring with Blackstone to deliver 225 grams or  
more but less than 650 grams of cocaine.  
In Justice this Court held that to be convicted of  
conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled  
substance, the prosecution had to prove that (1) the defendant  
possessed 
the 
specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum  
as charged, (2) his coconspirators possessed the specific  
intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, and (3)  
the defendant and his coconspirators possessed the specific  
intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged  
to a third person.  Id. at 349.  
This Court specifically held that a defendant could not  
be guilty of conspiring to possess with the intent to deliver  
19While 
we 
do 
not dispute the concurrence’s point that the 
agreement necessary to form a conspiracy does not rise to the 
level of the “meeting of the minds” concept from contract law, 
the statute does require an agreement to commit a prohibited 
offense.
 If no such agreement is reached, the conspiracy 
statute has not been violated. Thus, although the government 
need not prove commission of the substantive offense or even 
that the conspirators knew all the details of the conspiracy, 
US v Rosa, 17 F3d 1531, 1543 (CA 2, 1994), it must prove that 
“the intended future conduct they . . . agreed upon include[s] 
all the elements of the substantive crime.”  US v Rose, 590 
F2d 232, 235 (CA 7, 1978).  Here, the substantive crime 
involved at least 225 grams of cocaine.  Thus, the prosecution 
was required to show the defendant agreed to deliver, not just 
any amount, but at least this amount.  
15  
 
 
more than 650 grams of cocaine unless the prosecution was able  
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, not just that the  
defendant had conspired to possess with an intent to deliver  
some amount of cocaine, but rather, had conspired to possess  
with an intent to deliver the statutory minimum of 650 grams.  
The Court of Appeals majority stated:  
A reasonable interpretation of the phrase,  
"the specific intent to deliver the statutory 
minimum as charged," is that the defendant must 
possess 
the 
specific 
intent 
to 
deliver 
the  
controlled substance, and that the quantity of the 
substance must then meet the statutory minimum. To 
interpret this phrase to require proof that the 
defendant knew the exact quantity of the controlled 
substance would lead to unreasonable results. For  
example, a defendant could be found guilty of a 
delivery offense without knowing how much cocaine 
was involved, while avoiding all criminal liability 
for conspiracy merely because, although he knew 
that he was agreeing to deliver cocaine, he did not 
know how much cocaine was to be delivered.  Or, a 
defendant could avoid conspiracy liability because, 
although he knew the rough extent of the amount of 
cocaine involved in a drug transaction, he did not 
know 
the 
exact 
measurement 
with 
scientific  
precision, i.e., whether 224 or 226 grams of 
cocaine were involved.  [Id. at 337.]  
We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeals  
interpretation of this Court’s holding in Justice. 
This  
Court’s holding unambiguously calls for the prosecution to  
prove (in a conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver  
charge), not just that the defendant conspired to possess with  
intent to deliver some or any amount of cocaine, but “the  
statutory minimum as charged.”  
16  
 
  
We also disagree with the Court of Appeals that  
a defendant could be found guilty of a delivery 
offense without knowing how much cocaine was  
involved, while avoiding all criminal liability for 
conspiracy merely because, although he knew that he 
was agreeing to deliver cocaine, he did not know 
how much cocaine was to be delivered. Id.  
This analysis is in error because it fails to recognize  
that if one conspires to deliver an unspecified amount of  
cocaine one would, at a minimum, be guilty of conspiring to  
deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine. Thus, a defendant  
would not, as stated by the Court of Appeals, “avoid all  
criminal liability”; rather, he would be convicted of a felony  
and could face a twenty-year term of incarceration.  
We further disagree with the Court of Appeals that  
a defendant could avoid conspiracy liability 
because, although he knew the rough extent of the 
amount of cocaine involved in a drug transaction, 
he did not know the exact measurement with  
scientific precision, i.e., whether 224 or 226 
grams of cocaine were involved.  Id. at 337.  
Once again, this analysis is flawed.  If the prosecution  
proved to a jury that a defendant had conspired to deliver a  
significant amount of cocaine, but the jury was not sure if  
the defendant knew 224 grams or 226 grams were involved, the  
jury would properly convict such a defendant of conspiracy to  
deliver more than 50 grams but less than 225 grams of cocaine.  
Such a defendant would not avoid conspiracy liability.  
Rather, such a defendant would be properly convicted of a  
17  
  
 
felony and would face at least a presumptive ten- to twenty­
year term of incarceration.20  
Further, the Court of Appeals analysis improperly  
suggests that a conspiracy conviction must be tied to the  
amount of cocaine that was eventually delivered.  This will  
not always be the case.  The gist of a conspiracy is the  
unlawful agreement.  People v Asta, 337 Mich 590, 611; 60 NW2d  
472 (1953).  Indeed, the purpose of the conspiracy need not be  
accomplished. Id. In People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 712; 564  
NW2d 13 (1997), this Court noted that it has “repeatedly held”  
that conspiracy is separate and distinct from the substantive  
crime that is its object.  The Court of Appeals erroneous  
assumption that the amount of cocaine actually delivered is  
the amount a defendant conspired to deliver could, in some  
instances, improperly work to a drug dealer’s benefit.  For  
example, if wiretap evidence showed a drug dealer asked  
someone to help him deliver 700 grams of cocaine and the  
person agreed (and both parties actually intend to deliver 700  
grams), such a person would be guilty of conspiring to deliver  
more than 650 grams of cocaine, even if no sale took place or  
20To reiterate, the prosecution is not required to show 
the defendant knew the precise or specific amount. However, 
if the prosecution charges a defendant with conspiracy to 
deliver a controlled substance above the lowest amount of less  
than 50 grams, it must submit evidence showing the defendant 
agreed to commit the more serious offense.  
18  
 
 
  
 
 
 
if the amount of cocaine that was actually delivered turned  
out to be less than 650 grams.21  
The prosecution argues that Justice should not be  
applicable here because (1) the crime charged in Justice was  
the specific intent crime of possession with intent to  
deliver,22 whereas the crime herein was the general intent  
crime of delivery, and (2) Justice involved multiple small  
transactions that were aggregated, whereas the case at bar  
involved only one transaction.23  It has also been suggested  
that Justice was wrongly decided and that we should hold that  
knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is not an  
element of a conspiracy offense.24  We find unpersuasive these  
21  
22While delivery of a controlled substance is a general 
intent crime, People v Maleski, supra, possession with intent 
to deliver is a specific intent crime. People v Crawford, 458 
Mich 376, 417, n 19; 582 NW2d 785 (1998) (Boyle, J., 
dissenting).  
23The prosecutor indicates that the overall objective of 
a conspiracy case which involves numerous deals is not as 
clear in cases involving one transaction, so the “additional 
element of intent in those cases is justified.”  
24We agree that such a holding might be supported by 
United States v Feola, 420 US 671; 95 S Ct 1255; 43 L Ed 2d 
541 (1975), where the United States Supreme Court held the 
crime of conspiracy to assault a federal officer did not 
require a criminal intent greater than that necessary to 
convict for the substantive offense of assaulting a federal 
officer. Feola is neither directly on point nor controlling.  
In contrast, People v Justice is on point and controlling, 
absent a decision to overrule the case. Indeed, in Feola a  
holding that knowledge was an element would have led to  
(continued...)  
19  
 
 
 
 
criticisms of and efforts to distinguish Justice. 
We are  
satisfied that Justice properly concluded that knowledge of  
the amount of a controlled substance is an element of the  
crime of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, and  
that this holding is consistent with a correct interpretation  
of our controlled substance and conspiracy statutes.25  This  
is because our conspiracy statute, MCL 750.157a, makes it a  
crime to conspire with another to commit “an offense.” And,  
as previously explained, there are four separate delivery  
offenses depending on the amount of contraband involved.  The  
fact that Justice required the prosecution to establish the  
24(...continued) 
dismissal of the federal charges.  We do not face such a  
situation in that the prosecution will always be able to argue 
for a conspiracy to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine 
charge if there is no evidence regarding the amount of cocaine 
the conspirators agreed to deliver.  It is also the case that  
Feola is not without its critics.  See, e.g., US v Cordoba- 
Hincapie, 825 F Supp 485, 510-511 (ED NY, 1993).  In any  
event, 
notwithstanding 
Feola, 
we 
believe 
Justice 
and  
Apprendi preclude us from determining that knowledge of the  
amount is not an element of a conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance charge.  
25The concurrence indicates that Justice correctly 
required the prosecution to show the defendant intended to 
engage in the prohibited conduct, slip op, p 14, but then 
“inexplicably” concluded the defendant had to possess the 
specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum charged. 
Slip op, p 15.  We see nothing inexplicable in the conclusion. 
What the concurrence fails to recognize is that “the  
prohibited conduct” is not just agreeing to deliver some 
amount of cocaine, but agreeing to commit one of four delivery 
offenses and those offenses are in four ranges depending on 
the amount with which the prosecution charges the defendant.  
20  
 
 
 
statutory charged amount is fully consistent with requiring  
the prosecution to prove which delivery offense a defendant  
conspired to violate and with the fact that conspiracy is a  
specific 
intent 
crime.26 Moreover, as explained below, we find  
Apprendi provides independent support for this conclusion.  
To make our position clear, if a conspiracy to deliver  
and a delivery charge are coupled (and the proofs for the  
delivery demonstrate the weight of the substance delivered)  
such proofs may suffice to demonstrate defendant’s knowledge  
of the amount for the conspiracy charge.  This is because a  
prosecutor is free to argue, and the jury would be free to  
find, if it was persuaded, given all the circumstances, that  
defendant had knowingly conspired to deliver the same amount  
that was actually delivered.  
VIII. Apprendi v New Jersey  
Mr. Apprendi was convicted in state court of possession  
of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, an offense punishable by  
imprisonment from five to ten years. However, at sentencing  
the trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence,  
that Apprendi had committed the crime with a purpose to  
intimidate individuals because of their race.  This finding  
26Thus, we reject the concurrence’s claim that we have 
somehow “add[ed] an element” to a statute.  Slip op, p 20. 
Rather, we believe it is the concurrence that would refuse to 
require the prosecution to prove an element required under our 
conspiracy and delivery statutes.  
21  
 
  
served to increase the sentence under New Jersey’s “hate  
crime” law to imprisonment from ten to twenty years.  The  
United States Supreme Court held as a matter of federal  
constitutional law that  
[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[Apprendi, supra at 490.][27]  
The Court explained that it does not matter that a  
particular fact is designated as a “sentencing factor.”  
Rather,  
the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of 
effect—does 
the 
required 
finding 
expose 
the  
defendant to a greater punishment than that  
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict? [Id. at  
494.]  
Before Apprendi, federal courts generally held that the  
quantity of drugs was not an element of the federal drug  
offenses.  The prevailing approach appeared to be that the  
trial court determined by a preponderance of the evidence the  
“reasonably foreseeable” quantities of contraband that were  
within the scope of the criminal activity that the defendant  
jointly undertook.  United States v Pagan, 196 F3d 884, 891  
(CA 7, 1999).  Quantity was a matter for the trial court at  
sentencing. 
United States v Doggett, 230 F3d 160 (CA 5,  
27The four dissenting justices characterized the Court’s 
opinion as “a watershed change in constitutional law.”  
Apprendi, supra at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
22  
 
 
 
2000).  
However, 
the 
Federal Courts of Appeals have recently, and  
repeatedly, held that, under Apprendi, drug quantity is an  
element of a controlled substances offense, and that the  
element must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a  
reasonable doubt if the quantity “increases the penalty for a  
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” 
Doggett,  
supra.  Accord, United States v Fields, 242 F3d 393 (CA DC  
2001)28 (drug quantity is an element of the offense where a  
factual determination of the amount of drugs at issue may  
result in a sentence that exceeds a maximum sentence  
prescribed 
in 
the 
applicable statute); 
United States v 
Aguayo- 
Delgado, 220 F3d 926 (CA 8, 2000).  
As stated in Doggett, supra at 163:  
Notwithstanding 
prior 
precedent 
of 
this  
circuit and the Supreme Court that Congress did not 
intend drug quantity to be an element of the crime 
under 21 USC 841 and 846, we are constrained by 
Apprendi to find in the opposite.  
In United States v Page, 232 F3d 536 (CA 6, 2000), the  
defendant was charged in federal court with conspiracy to  
distribute cocaine. There was no mention of the quantity in  
the indictment, and the jury made no findings regarding  
quantity.  On the basis of a trial court determination at  
sentencing that more than 1.5 kilograms were attributable to  
28Clarified on rehearing, 2001 WL 640631 (June 12, 2001).  
23 
 
the defendant, the court imposed a thirty-year sentence.  This  
was ten more years than the prescribed statutory maximum.  The  
Court stated:  
As instructed in Apprendi, a defendant may not  
be exposed to a greater punishment than that 
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict. The jury 
merely 
found 
that 
defendants 
conspired 
to  
distribute 
and 
possess 
to 
distribute 
some  
undetermined amount of crack cocaine.  As such,  
defendants 
cannot 
be 
exposed 
to 
the 
higher 
penalties under § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B).  Rather, the 
maximum sentence that may be imposed on this count 
is 20 years pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C). [Id. at  
543.]  
Even though the issue had been forfeited, the Court granted  
the defendant relief because the error resulted in imposition  
of a sentence ten years longer than the sentence could have  
been without the error. The Court said this affected Page’s  
substantial rights and the fairness of the proceeding was  
undermined 
since 
the 
error 
affected 
the 
outcome 
by  
substantially increasing the sentence.29  
IX. The delivery instructions  
As to his delivery conviction, defendant claims the  
29In United States v Flowal, 234 F3d 932, 938 (CA 6, 
2000), another Sixth Circuit case addressing Apprendi, the 
court stated:  
Because 
the 
amount 
of 
drugs 
at 
issue  
determined the appropriate statutory punishment, a 
jury should have determined the weight of drugs 
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Accordingly, the 
prosecution is only entitled to the punishment 
provisions of the crime whose elements it has 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
24 
 
 
United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Apprendi,  
supra, requires that the jury had to determine whether he knew  
Blackstone intended to deliver at least 225 grams of cocaine  
before he could properly be convicted of delivery of 225 grams  
or more of cocaine. We disagree.  
The trial court instructed the jury on the delivery  
offense as follows:  
The defendant is charged with the crime of 
Illegally Delivering More Than 225 grams But Less 
Than 650 grams of a Mixture Containing a Controlled 
Substance, Cocaine.  To prove this charge the  
prosecutor must prove each of the following 
elements, beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that 
the defendant delivered a controlled substance.  
Second, that the substance delivered was cocaine. 
Third, that the defendant knew he was delivering 
cocaine.  Fourth, that the substance was in a  
mixture that weighed 225 or more grams, but less 
than 650 grams. [Emphasis added.]  
This 
instruction 
complied 
with 
our 
determination 
that 
the  
amount of a controlled substance is an element of a controlled  
substance offense.  Further, this instruction did not violate  
Apprendi because the jury was instructed that it could not  
find defendant guilty of the delivery charge unless the  
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the  
substance delivered weighed 225 grams or more.  The jury  
necessarily found that at least 225 grams of cocaine were  
delivered when it convicted defendant of the delivery charge.  
Hence, defendant’s delivery conviction was proper.  
25  
X. The conspiracy instructions  
However, we find that a different conclusion is required  
regarding 
the 
conspiracy instructions.  Because of Justice 
and  
Apprendi, the jury should have been instructed that it could  
not find defendant guilty of conspiracy to deliver 225 grams  
or more, but less than 650 grams of cocaine unless it found  
defendant conspired to deliver, not just any amount of  
cocaine, but at least 225 grams.  
After initially telling the jury it “must take the law as  
I give it to you,” the trial judge gave the following  
instruction regarding the conspiracy offense:  
The defendant is charged with the crime of 
Conspiracy to Commit the Delivery of Cocaine. 
Anyone who knowingly agrees with someone else to 
commit the Delivery of Cocaine is guilty of  
Conspiracy.  To prove the defendant’s guilty the 
prosecutor must prove each of the following 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, that 
the defendant and someone else knowingly agreed to 
commit Delivery of Cocaine. . . .  
Notably absent from the conspiracy instruction was the fact  
that the jury had to find that defendant had conspired, not  
just to deliver some amount of cocaine, but at least 225  
grams.  This was a violation of Justice. 
This was also an  
Apprendi error because one can only be certain that the jury  
concluded that the conspiracy involved less than 50 grams.  
While the amount eventually delivered may, in a given case, be  
circumstantial evidence of the nature of agreement, it is  
26  
 
  
always necessary for the jury to be charged that it must  
decide the nature of the agreement.  The statutory maximum  
penalty for conspiring to deliver less than fifty grams of  
cocaine subjects a defendant to a maximum sentence of twenty  
years, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv).  Yet, conviction of conspiring  
to deliver at least 225 grams of cocaine exposed defendant to  
a greater punishment of thirty years imprisonment. 
MCL  
333.7401(2)(a)(ii).  Thus, the failure to have the jury  
determine that the conspiracy involved at least 225 grams of  
cocaine exposed defendant to a thirty-year sentence, which is  
in excess of the prescribed maximum twenty-year sentence  
applicable for a conspiracy to deliver less than 50 grams of  
cocaine.  
XI. Forfeited Error  
The defendant did not object to the erroneous conspiracy  
jury instruction. Because of this, the error was forfeited.  
The standard that must be met to support reversal of a  
conviction for nonstructural constitutional error is the same  
standard as for forfeited non constitutional error, that is,  
the reviewing court “should reverse only when the defendant is  
actually innocent or the error seriously affected the  
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial  
proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.”  
Carines, supra at 774; People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 57; 610  
27  
 
 
 
 
NW2d 551 (2000). 30  
Here, the trial court omitted an element from its  
conspiracy instruction, i.e., the requirement that the  
prosecution 
show 
that 
defendant 
specifically 
agreed 
to 
deliver  
at least 225 or more grams of cocaine.  We conclude that this  
error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public  
reputation of defendant’s trial.  
Although defendant never argued that he may have  
conspired to deliver less than 225 grams of cocaine, a  
properly instructed jury may have so concluded.  Given the  
judge’s instructions, it is clear that the jury effectively,  
and only, determined defendant had conspired to deliver less  
than 50 grams of cocaine.  We find it would seriously affect  
the fairness and integrity of defendant’s trial to allow a  
conviction of a more serious offense than the one determined  
by the jury to stand.  Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s  
conspiracy to deliver 225 grams or more but less than 650  
30In Neder v United States, 527 US 1; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 
L Ed 2d 35 (1999), the Supreme Court observed that most 
constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis 
and applied the harmless error rule to a trial court's failure 
to instruct on an element of an offense. Apprendi did not  
recognize or create a structural error that would require 
reversal per se.  United States v Swatzie, 228 F3d 1278, 1283  
(CA 11, 2000). A constitutional error is harmless if “it is  
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” 
Neder,  
supra, 119 S Ct 1830.  See also Swatzie, at 1283 (“error in 
Neder is in material respects indistinguishable from error  
under Apprendi”).  
28  
  
 
 
grams of cocaine and remand for entry of a conviction  
consistent with the jury verdict, i.e., conspiracy to deliver  
less than 50 grams of cocaine conviction.31  
XII. Response to the concurrence  
It is important to point out, before responding to the  
differences, where we agree with the concurrence.  We both  
agree that a delivery of a controlled substance does not  
require, for a conviction, knowledge of the amount delivered.  
We also agree that the conspiracy jury instructions were  
flawed, requiring defendant be granted a new trial on the  
conspiracy charge.  Our principle difference with the  
concurrence however, is whether a charge of conspiracy to  
deliver cocaine in a given amount, standing alone, can be  
proven without some evidence that the agreement was for the  
delivery of that amount of cocaine.  
To articulate this in the theoretical terms of the  
criminal law, the concurrence would effectively convert the  
specific intent crime of conspiracy into a general intent  
crime.  Consider the following: if there were a conspiracy to  
deliver cocaine, with no evidence suggesting the amount of  
31However, if the prosecuting attorney is persuaded that 
the ends of justice would be better served, upon notification 
to the trial court before resentencing, defendant may be 
required to face a new trial on the original conspiracy charge 
with proper jury instructions.  People v Jenkins, 395 Mich  
440, 443; 236 NW2d 503 (1975).  
29  
 
 
 
 
 
cocaine, under the concurrence view the prosecution could  
charge the conspirators with conspiracy to deliver more than  
650 grams of cocaine if it later develops that this amount was  
in fact delivered.  Such view is in our opinion inconsistent  
with the plain language of our conspiracy statute, which makes  
conspiracy a specific intent crime.32  Indeed, it is just this  
point—that conspiracy is a specific intent crime that animated  
the Justice decision. Moreover, this conclusion is reinforced  
by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi.  
The concurrence accuses the Justice majority, and now us,  
of “imposing” or “adding” a knowledge requirement into  
conspiracy charges.  We disagree. 
The concurrence fails to  
give full consideration to the fact that MCL 750.157a requires  
that a conspirator must agree to commit “an offense.”33  This  
32In response to the concurrence’s claim that we are 
somehow requiring the law to engage in “mind-reading,” slip 
op, p 25, we simply note that we are only requiring the 
prosecution to prove the elements of a specific intent crime, 
and the law has always required some evidence from which the 
jury might determine the defendant’s mens rea in such cases.  
33See, e.g., US v Piper, 35 F3d 611, 615 (CA 1, 1994) (The 
government must prove that the defendant possessed both “an 
intent to agree and an intent to effectuate the commission of 
the substantive offense”) (emphasis added). "Establishing a 
conspiracy requires evidence of specific intent to combine 
with others to accomplish an illegal objective."  People v  
Blume, 443 Mich 476, 481; 505 NW2d 843 (1993). In the case at 
bar, “the offense” was conspiracy to deliver at least 225 
grams of cocaine, not conspiracy to deliver cocaine without 
reference to an amount.  Defendant could not conspire to 
deliver at least 225 grams of cocaine unless he knew and 
(continued...)  
30  
 
 
 
 
means we must determine what is “an offense.”  If the  
underlying offense is a mere act (like forgery), rather  
than being one that is graduated to be more severe as the act  
is 
more 
antisocial 
(such 
as 
delivery 
of 
controlled  
substances), then to determine if one of the more severe  
offenses has been proved, the element making it more severe  
must be shown.  Thus, if the conspiracy is to deliver cocaine,  
unless the prosecution wants to settle for the lowest charge  
of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams, the  
prosecution must show the conspiracy involved either 50 to 224  
grams or 225 to 649 grams or more than 650 grams.  Because in  
Michigan a conspiracy to deliver cocaine charge can be  
established by a mere agreement34 to deliver cocaine that  
encompasses all the elements of the crime conspired to be  
committed, there need not be an act in furtherance of the  
conspiracy for a defendant to be guilty of conspiring to  
deliver some amount of cocaine.  Thus, in a mere agreement  
33(...continued) 
intended the delivery to be at least 225 grams. 
A person 
cannot conspire with another to commit the offense of delivery 
of at least 225 grams of cocaine unless he knows what he has 
agreed to accomplish. Thus, we reject the claim that we have 
“added” an element because a knowledge of the amount element 
arises out of the language of the conspiracy statute itself.  
34This is in contrast with general federal conspiracy 
statute, 18 USC 371, which does require an overt act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.  Blume, supra at 507(Boyle, J.,  
dissenting).  
31  
  
 
  
without an overt act conspiracy scenario, unless the  
prosecutor can show that this “thought, or plan, crime”  
included a knowledge of the amount conspired about, only a  
conviction of less than fifty grams can be obtained.  Said  
another way, if the amount agreed to is not an element of a  
conspiracy to deliver at least fifty grams of cocaine, how  
will that element be established and who will make that  
necessary fact finding?  The answer to that question in the  
federal system is that historically the judge made that  
determination at sentencing.  That ended with Apprendi,  
however. 
After Apprendi the fact of the amount has to be  
decided by the jury.  As we are today determining to continue  
the approach that Justice outlined, we are acting in harmony  
with Apprendi.  
What this all means is that while both the majority and  
the concurrence agree with respect to a delivery charge that  
the amount delivered may establish, without more, the element  
of the amount, this approach will not always work in  
conspiracy cases.  The reason is that it is not necessary for  
a deliver to take place in order for a conspiracy to delivery  
charge to be brought,35 and, even when a delivery follows after  
a conspiracy to deliver is formed, the conspiracy may have  
35Conspiracy 
is 
separate 
and 
distinct 
from 
the 
substantive 
crime that is its object. People v Denio, supra at 712.  
32  
  
 
been for more or less than the amount that is actually  
delivered.36 
It is just this problem with which the  
concurrence fails to grapple.  
The concurrence contends that our reaffirmation of  
Justice will have “serious[] detrimental consequences for  
Michigan’s criminal justice jurisprudence,” slip op, p 2, and  
that “it is likely that in some unknown, but probably quite  
significant, number of drug prosecutions the prosecutor will  
be unable to maintain a conviction that is above the statutory  
maximum for the lowest level delivery offense.”  Slip op, p  
30. We cannot agree.  
First, regardless of the effect, we must comply, as we  
have attempted to do, with our conspiracy and delivery  
statutes (not to mention Apprendi which is a constitutionally  
based ruling).  Moreover, regarding the prediction that there  
will be unfortunate implications from continuing the rule of  
Justice, we are unaware of any drop off in drug conspiracy  
prosecutions as a result of Justice. It should also be noted  
that our reaffirmation of Justice does not impose any  
restraint on a prosecutor’s ability to obtain conspiracy to  
deliver less than 50 gram convictions which carry a maximum  
twenty year prison term that must be served consecutive to any  
36However, 
a 
prosecutor is free to argue that the evidence 
proves the conspiracy was for the amount that was actually 
delivered.  
33  
  
delivery conviction that may be obtained.  MCL 333.7401(3).  
This is clearly a significant disincentive to engage in such  
conduct and a major tool in the law enforcement arsenal.37  
XIII. Conclusion  
A defendant may be properly convicted of delivery of 225  
grams or more but less than 650 grams of cocaine on an aiding  
and abetting theory, even if he does not know the amount of  
drugs to be delivered, as long as the jury finds that at least  
225 grams of cocaine were delivered.  
Pursuant to Justice and Apprendi, a defendant charged  
with conspiracy to deliver 225 grams or more but less than 650  
grams of cocaine is entitled to have the jury instructed that  
the defendant is guilty only if the prosecution has proved  
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant conspired to deliver,  
not just some amount of cocaine, but at least 225 grams of  
cocaine.  
Accordingly, as explained above, defendant’s delivery  
conviction  is affirmed and the conspiracy to deliver at least  
225 grams of cocaine is reversed.  This matter is remanded to  
37The concurrence says it is for the Legislature and not 
this Court to determine what is a significant disincentive for 
particular conduct.  Slip op, p 30, n 12. 
Surely, the 
concurrence does not mean to suggest that it is improper for 
this Court to remark the obvious.  In any event, we certainly  
believe 
our 
opinion 
today 
respects 
the 
Legislature’s 
determinations 
of 
the 
increased 
disincentives 
for 
larger 
scale 
drug trafficking.  
34  
 
 
 
 
 
allow the trial court to enter a conspiracy to deliver less  
than 50 grams of cocaine conviction and sentencing on this  
count (subject to the condition noted in footnote 31), and  
also so the Court of Appeals ordered resentencing on the  
delivery conviction may occur.  Affirmed in part and reversed  
in part.  
CAVANAGH, KELLY, and YOUNG, 
JJ., concurred with TAYLOR, J.  
35  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 115820  
JIMMY MASS, a/k/a KOOL AID,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).  
I 
agree 
with 
the majority’s analysis and conclusion that,  
while the amount of a controlled substance is an element of a  
delivery offense pursuant to MCL 333.7401, a defendant’s  
knowledge of such amount is not.  However, with regard to  
whether knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is  
an element of a conspiracy to deliver offense, I respectfully  
concur in the result only and write separately to express my  
concern that the majority’s analysis, which concludes that  
defendant’s knowledge of the amount is an element of a  
conspiracy to deliver offense, broadens the plain language of  
both the delivery statute, MCL 333.7401, and the conspiracy  
statute, 
MCL 
750.157a.  Further, the majority’s conclusion, in  
my judgment, has seriously detrimental consequences for  
  
 
  
 
 
Michigan’s criminal justice jurisprudence.  
I. PEOPLE V JUSTICE  
In 
concluding 
that defendant’s knowledge of the amount is  
an element to a conspiracy to deliver charge, the majority  
first relies on People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334;  
562 NW2d 652 (1997).  As the majority correctly points out,  
the Justice Court held that, in a conspiracy to possess with  
intent to deliver charge, the prosecutor has the burden of  
proving that “the defendant possessed the specific intent to  
deliver the statutory minimum as charged . . . .”  Id. at 349.  
In my judgment, this holding misstated the law in that it  
impermissibly broadened the plain language of both the  
delivery statute, MCL 333.7401, and the conspiracy statute,  
MCL 750.157a, by requiring a higher level of criminal intent  
than set forth by those statutes. Instead, a careful review  
of these statutes indicates that, in a conspiracy to deliver  
charge, the prosecutor only has the burden to prove that  
defendant had the intent to agree, and the specific intent to  
commit the substantive offense, in essence, to deliver a  
controlled substance.1  The majority correctly concludes that  
1  
Interestingly, in Justice, supra, this Court also 
stated that, in order to bind the defendants over on a 
conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver charge, the 
prosecutor must show probable cause that the “coconspirators 
shared the specific intent to accomplish the substantive  
offenses charged.” Id. at 337 (emphasis added). However, as 
will be discussed, below at 8, when the Justice Court applied 
this general rule to the substantive offense, it somehow 
(continued...)  
2  
 
knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is not an  
element of a delivery charge. However, I fail to understand  
why it nevertheless concludes that, when a defendant is  
charged with conspiracy to deliver, knowledge of the amount  
suddenly becomes an element. If knowledge is not an element  
of a delivery charge, how is it properly transformed into an  
element of a conspiracy to deliver offense?  In my judgment,  
under the facts of this case, it cannot.  
A. General Conspiracy Law  
At common law, the crime of conspiracy was complete upon  
formation of the unlawful agreement.  Developments in the  
law—Criminal conspiracy, 72 Harv L R 922, 945 (1959).  
Michigan’s approach to conspiracy law mirrors that of the  
common law.  In Michigan, “[a]ny person who conspires together  
with one or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by  
law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty  
of the crime of conspiracy . . . .”  MCL 750.157a. 
This  
common-law approach to the crime of conspiracy, however, is  
not the approach followed in a majority of jurisdictions.  
Today, most state conspiracy statutes, as well as the federal  
government 
general 
conspiracy statute, 18 USC 371, require the  
1(...continued) 
concluded that the “defendant [must] possess[] the specific 
intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged . . . .” 
Id. at 349.  
3  
  
 
 
additional element of an overt act.2  An overt act is defined  
as some act taken by one of the conspirators in furtherance of  
the conspiracy. Marcus, Prosecution and Defense of Criminal  
Conspiracy Cases, ch 2.08, at 2-71.  The requirement of an  
overt act serves two principal purposes.  First, some believe  
that an overt act requirement is desirable so that a  
conspirator 
is 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to change his  
mind and to withdraw from the conspiracy. “The provision of  
the statute, that there must be an act done to effect the  
object 
of 
the 
conspiracy, merely affords a locus poenitentice,  
so that before the act [is] done either one or all of the  
parties may abandon their design, and thus avoid the penalty  
prescribed by the statute.” United States v Britton, 108 US  
2  Developments in the Law, supra at 945-46. 
Compare 
with the federal government’s subsequent specific-subject 
conspiracy statutes that no longer have an overt act  
requirement.  See, e.g., the RICO conspiracy statute, 18 USC  
1962(d), and the drug conspiracy statute, 21 USC 846. 
Additionally, even despite the absence of an overt act 
requirement in the drug conspiracy statute, federal drug 
conspiracy prosecutions do not require that a defendant have 
knowledge of the amount of the controlled substance.  Instead, 
as will be discussed in part III, all that is necessary for a 
conviction on the substantive drug offense and the conspiracy 
offense is merely proof of the amount of the controlled 
substance. See, e.g., United States v Fields, ___ US App DC 
___, ___; 242 F3d 393, 396 (2001), clarified on rehearing 2001 
WL 640631 (June 12, 2001 (stating that “it is now clear that, 
in drug cases under 21 USC 841 & 846, before a defendant can 
be sentenced to any of the progressively higher statutory 
maximums that are based on progressively higher quantities of 
drugs specified in 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the government must 
state the drug type and quantity in the indictment, submit the 
required evidence to the jury, and prove the relevant drug 
quantity beyond a reasonable doubt”).  
4 
 
  
 
  
199, 204-05; 2 S Ct 531; 27 L Ed 698 (1883).  In addition, the  
overt act requirement serves to make certain that society does  
not intervene prematurely, i.e., at a time when there is not  
a sufficiently imminent danger that the object crime will be  
attempted or completed.  Marcus, supra at 2-74. “The function  
of the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution is simply to  
manifest that the conspiracy is at work” and is not a project  
resting solely in the minds of the conspirators.3  2 LaFave &  
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 6.5, at 95.  Thus, the  
overt act requirement ensures that the agreement to commit an  
unlawful objective has reached a sufficiently advanced stage  
to warrant preventative action.  
In practice, prosecutors rarely charge individuals with  
a conspiracy until a substantial overt act has taken place.  
Marcus, supra at 2-76.4  Indeed, it is frequently the case  
that the completed substantive offense itself will be  
identified as the overt act for purposes of the conspiracy  
charge. 
Id. at 2-76, n 18. 
This is readily evident in  
federal conspiracy cases that rely on the general conspiracy  
statute.  See, e.g., United States v Feola, 420 US 671; 95 S  
3  Such a concern, in particular, appears to animate the 
majority opinion and is a concern most relevant to what I will 
describe as the “pure” Michigan conspiracy, one in which there  
has been no overt act. See note 6.  
4  As a practical matter, there is little evidence that 
charging practices are any different on the part of Michigan 
prosecutors, despite the absence of an overt act requirement.  
5  
  
 
 
Ct 1255; 43 L Ed 2d 541 (1975).  Indeed, in the case before  
us, the substantive offense itself was completed, in effect  
constituting the overt act in furtherance of the unlawful  
objective.  As explained in the majority opinion, defendant  
was convicted, on an aider and abettor theory, of delivery of  
225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of a mixture  
containing cocaine.  Because an overt act was, in fact,  
evident in this conspiracy, namely, the completed offense,  
this case is indistinguishable from the universe of  
conspiracies that are addressed by federal conspiracy law.  
Thus, I believe that the principles applied in these cases are  
highly relevant to the resolution of this case.5  
5  Although Michigan law allows for the prosecution of 
drug conspiracies in which the evidence shows that the 
conspirators merely agreed to commit an offense prohibited by 
law, MCL 750.157a, even absent an overt act, such a “pure” 
Michigan conspiracy is, as we have noted, not before us. 
Indeed, such “pure” conspiracies are rarely before us, given 
the considerable problems of proof that these conspiracies 
must surmount.  This concurrence takes no position with regard 
to the knowledge requirements of the “pure” conspiracy case, 
which, as the majority points out, involves a variety of 
unique concerns. 
What is before us is the far more  
commonplace conspiracy in which there has been some overt act, 
therefore rendering the conspiracy, and its elements, 
indistinguishable from the typical federal conspiracy.  It  
seems 
altogether 
relevant, 
where 
conspirators 
in 
Michigan 
have 
acted in furtherance of a conspiracy by taking overt acts 
toward its ends, to look to federal law for whatever guidance 
such law might provide in determining whether a conspirator 
must have knowledge of the amount of the controlled substance 
in which he or she is trafficking.  
Here the substantive offense was, in fact, completed. 
However, I am unaware of the law of any jurisdiction that 
distinguishes between the conspiracy in which an overt act has 
(continued...)  
6  
  
B. People v Feola  
In Feola, supra, the United States Supreme Court  
considered an issue similar to that presented in this case.  
There before the Court was whether the crime of conspiracy to  
assault a federal drug officer required a criminal intent  
greater than that required to convict for the substantive  
offense.  Specifically, the Court sought to determine whether  
the defendant had to “know” that the intended victim was, in  
fact, a federal officer.  
In the years before Feola there had been a split among  
the federal circuit courts.  In a majority of the circuits,6  
the courts held that, in a conspiracy to commit a federal  
substantive offense, a defendant need not have knowledge of  
the attendant circumstances embodied in the substantive  
offense.  For example, in United States v LeFaivre, 507 F2d  
1288 (CA 4, 1974), the United States Court of Appeals for the  
Fourth Circuit was asked to determine whether, in a conspiracy  
to violate the travel act, 18 USC 1952, the defendant needed  
to have knowledge of the use of interstate facilities in order  
to be found guilty on the conspiracy charge.  In answering  
5(...continued) 
occurred, and that in which the underlying criminal offense 
has been completed.  Therefore, in my judgment, the law set 
forth in this concurrence properly applies wherever there has 
been an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy, without 
regard to whether the substantive offense has been completed.  
6  Marcus, supra at 2-110.  
7  
  
  
this question in the negative, the Fourth Circuit reasoned  
that 
“[w]hether 
or 
not 
certain 
conspirators 
actually  
anticipate the use of facilities in interstate commerce when  
they plan their unlawful activity of gambling, bribery, etc.,  
add[s] 
absolutely 
nothing to the dangerousness of their scheme  
to the public weal.”  Id. at 1299; see also United States v  
Polesti, 489 F2d 822 (CA 7, 1973); United States v Roselli,  
432 F2d 879 (CA 9, 1970).  Conversely, the Court of Appeals  
for the Second Circuit rejected the majority view.  In United  
States v Cangiano, 491 F2d 906 (CA 2, 1974), the court  
analyzed whether the defendant, in a conspiracy to transport  
obscene materials in interstate commerce, must have knowledge  
that the business would use interstate facilities.  In  
answering this question in the affirmative, the court stated  
that, 
because 
specific intent is required to prove conspiracy,  
“the proper charge requires that the element of actual  
knowledge be found by the jury.”  Id. at 910. 
The United  
States Supreme Court sought to finally resolve the knowledge  
issue in Feola, supra.7  
7  The majority asserts that “Feola is neither directly  
on point nor controlling.”  Although I agree that Feola is not  
dispositive, I nevertheless believe, as stated supra at 7, 
that the principles applied in general federal conspiracy 
cases are highly persuasive in our resolution of this type of 
controversy. In particular, Feola is instructive because of  
the 
substantial 
similarities 
of 
the 
substantive 
and 
conspiracy 
statutes in these cases.  Further, I am aware of no federal or 
state case law, before or after Apprendi, which has deviated 
from these federal conspiracy principles.  See, e.g., State v  
(continued...)  
8  
 
1. The Substantive Offense  
To resolve the question whether a defendant must know  
that his intended victim is a federal officer in a conspiracy  
to assault a federal officer, the Court first examined the  
elements of the substantive offense, 18 USC 111.  In pertinent  
part, the substantive offense at issue in Feola stated:  
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, 
impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person 
designated in section 1114 of this title while 
engaged in or on account of the performance of his 
official duties, shall be fined not more than 
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or 
both.  
* * *  
Among the persons “designated in section 1114” of 
18 USC is “any officer or employee . . . of the 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.” [Feola,  
supra at 673, n 1.]  
7(...continued) 
Aviles-Alvarez, 561 NW2d 523 (Minn App 1997)(holding that 
“[w]hile the amount is an essential element of the crime, the 
defendant’s knowledge of the amount is not an essential  
element”).  
The majority also asserts that, if the Feola Court held  
that knowledge of the federal officer’s identity was an 
element of the substantive offense, this would have led to a 
dismissal of the federal charges, and that “[w]e do not face 
such a situation” in the instant case.  Whether or not the  
charges would have been dismissed was of no relevance to the 
Feola holding, nor is it of apparent relevance to the instant 
holding.  Instead, the Court in Feola, as this concurrence 
does today, grounded its decision in the plain language of the 
substantive and the conspiracy statutes, as well as in the 
purposes underlying criminal conspiracy law.  
9  
After analyzing the language of the statute, the Court  
concluded that § 111 “cannot be construed as embodying an  
unexpressed requirement that an assailant be aware that his  
victim is a federal officer.”  Id. at 684; United States v  
Lombardozzi, 335 F2d 414, 416 (CA 2, 1964).  Instead, the  
Court found that the statute required an “intent to assault,  
not an intent to assault a federal officer.”  Feola, supra at  
684.  The requirement that the victim be a federal officer was  
merely an element of the substantive offense that need not be  
specifically known to the defendant.  Thus, to prove the  
substantive offense, the government only needed to establish,  
among other things, that the victim was a federal officer, not  
that the defendant knew that the victim was a federal officer.  
In the case before us, MCL 333.7401 provides in pertinent  
part:  
(1) [A] person shall not manufacture, create, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
create, or deliver a controlled substance . . . .  
(2) A person who violates this section as to:  
(a) A controlled substance classified in schedule 1 
or 2 that is a narcotic drug . . . and:  
(i) Which is in an amount of 650 grams or more 
of any mixture containing that substance is guilty 
of a felony and shall be imprisoned for life 
. . . .  
(ii) Which is in an amount of 225 grams or 
more, but less than 650 grams, . . . shall be 
imprisoned for not less than 20 years nor more than 
30 years.  
(iii) Which is in an amount of 50 grams or  
10 
 
 
 
more, but less than 225 grams, . . . shall be 
imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 
20 years.  
(iv) Which is an amount less than 50 grams 
. . . shall be imprisoned for not less than 1 year 
nor more than 20 years . . . .  
A review of this statute indicates that a defendant must  
have the intent to deliver a controlled substance, not an  
intent to deliver an amount that falls within a particular  
statutory range.  Subsection (1) clearly states that “a person  
shall not . . . deliver . . . a controlled substance.” Such  
an interpretation of this language does not mean that the  
amount is not an element of the offense. It is. Rather, such  
an interpretation simply means that a defendant need not  
specifically know the amount in order to be convicted of this  
offense. This conclusion, in my judgment, is in accord with  
the majority’s determination that, while the amount of a  
controlled substance is an element to a delivery charge,  
knowledge of the amount is not.  
2. The Conspiracy Statute  
The Feola Court then turned to “consider whether the rule  
should be different where persons conspire to commit” the  
substantive offense at hand.  Id. at 686. With regard to the  
conspiracy 
offense, 
the 
defendant 
specifically 
urged 
the 
Court  
to conclude that  
the Government must show a degree of criminal 
intent in the conspiracy count greater than is 
necessary to convict for the substantive offense; 
he urges that even though it is not necessary to  
11  
show that he was aware of the official identity of 
his assaulted victims in order to find him guilty 
of assaulting federal officers, . . . the  
Government nonetheless must show that he was aware  
that his intended victims were undercover agents, 
if it is successfully to prosecute him for  
conspiracy to assault federal agents. Id. at 686­
87.  
To resolve whether the defendant was correct in his analysis,  
the Court examined the text of the conspiracy statute.  It  
explained that, if a knowledge requirement exists, it would  
have to be found within the text of the conspiracy statute, 18  
USC 371.  
The conspiracy statute at issue in Feola made it unlawful  
to “conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United  
States.” Feola, at 687. On the basis of this language, the  
Court stated that “[a] natural reading of these words would be  
that since one can violate a criminal statute simply by  
engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that  
offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the  
prohibited conduct.”  Id.  In other words, the Court found  
that “there is nothing on the face of the conspiracy statute  
that would seem to require that those agreeing to the assault  
have a greater degree of knowledge.” Id. at 687.  
Similar to the federal conspiracy statute, Michigan’s  
conspiracy statute prohibits an individual from “conspir[ing]  
. . . to commit an offense prohibited by law . . . .”  MCL  
750.157a.  A review of the language of the conspiracy statute  
reveals that a conspiracy to commit an offense prohibited by  
12  
 
  
 
law requires nothing more than: 1) an intent to agree; and 2)  
an intent to engage in the prohibited conduct.  See also  
People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 310; 220 NW2d 465 (1974). In  
Justice, this Court apparently agreed with this general rule.  
As noted previously, the Justice Court stated that “in order  
to bind defendant over on the two counts of conspiracy there  
must be probable cause to believe that defendant and the  
coconspirators shared the specific intent to accomplish the  
substantive offenses charged.” 
Justice, supra, at 337  
(emphasis added); see also id. at 345-347. The Justice Court  
accordingly proceeded to set forth the substantive offense at  
issue, MCL 333.7401. 
Then, without analysis of the  
substantive offense, Justice inexplicably concluded that the  
“defendant 
[must] 
possess[] the specific intent to deliver the  
statutory minimum as charged . . . .”  Id. at 349. Such a  
conclusion, in my judgment, was erroneous because, as noted  
previously, the language of MCL 333.7401, does not require  
that a defendant harbor the intent to deliver an amount that  
falls within a particular statutory range.8  
8  The majority asserts that I “fail[] to appreciate the 
fact that in Michigan, pursuant to our statute, the amount of 
a controlled substance is part of a delivery offense . . . .” 
See  slip op at 12.  I respectfully disagree. As stated supra 
at  12, I believe that the relevant element of the delivery 
offense concerns the amount, not knowledge of the amount, of 
a controlled substance, and that this former element must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecutor.  
13  
 
The majority asserts that, by concluding that a defendant  
need not possess the intent to deliver the statutory minimum  
as charged, I am “convert[ing]” a specific intent crime into  
a general intent crime.  Respectfully, I disagree. 
Again,  
conspiracy involves: i) an intent to agree, and ii) an intent  
to engage in prohibited conduct.  “One of these intents may  
exist without the other.”  LaFave, supra at 76. Clearly, two  
or more individuals may intend to agree on some matter without  
also having an intent to engage in prohibited conduct.  For  
example, A and B agree to burn certain property and A knows  
the property belongs to C, but B believes that the property  
belongs to A himself.  In this scenario, there is no intent to  
engage in prohibited conduct on B’s part because B believes  
that the property belongs to A.  In the instant case, however,  
the conspirators clearly had the intent to agree and the  
additional intent to engage in prohibited conduct—the delivery  
of a controlled substance.  Thus, as in Feola, the specific  
intent attributes of a conspiracy remain intact.  
3. Rejecting the Second Circuit Approach  
Next, the Feola Court turned to its own case law to  
determine whether a defendant was ever required to possess  
specific knowledge of the attendant circumstances when  
charged with a conspiracy to commit a federal offense.  The  
Supreme Court identified prior case law that repudiated such  
a position.  Citing In re Coy, 127 US 731, 8 S Ct 1263, 32 L  
14  
 
 
 
Ed 274 (1888), and United States v Freed, 401 US 601, 91 S Ct  
1112, 28 L Ed 2d 356 (1971), the Feola Court stated that  
historically it has “declined to require a greater degree of  
intent 
for 
conspiratorial 
responsibility 
than 
for  
responsibility for the underlying substantive offense.”  Id.  
at 688.  
The Court then turned to United States v Crimmins, 123  
F2d 271 (CA 2, 1971), the first case that set forth the  
principle that the government must prove knowledge of the  
attendant circumstances embodied in the substantive offense in  
order for a defendant to be liable when charged with a  
conspiracy.  In Crimmins, supra, the defendant was charged  
with conspiracy to receive stolen bonds that had been  
transported in interstate commerce.  18 USC 371; 18 USC 415.  
The Second Circuit held, that in order to be convicted of  
conspiracy to commit the substantive offense, it was necessary  
that the defendant actually know that the bonds crossed  
interstate lines.  Crimmins, supra at 273-274.  To accept the  
view that a defendant need not have knowledge of the attendant  
circumstances would, according to the Crimmins court, “enlarge  
their agreement beyond its terms as they understood them.”  
Feola, supra at 689, citing Crimmins, supra. To emphasize its  
conclusion, the Crimmins court set forth what has become the  
well-known traffic light analogy.  
While one may, for instance, be guilty of 
running past a traffic light of whose existence one  
15 
  
 
 
is ignorant, one cannot be guilty of conspiring to 
run past such a light, for one cannot agree to run 
past a light unless one supposes that there is a 
light to run past. [Id. at 273.]  
Although the Feola Court found this analogy “seductive,”  
it concluded that it was clearly “bad law.” Id. at 689-690.  
The Court asserted that the traffic light analogy was relevant  
only for the category of offenses for which no mental state  
was required regarding any of the elements.  Id. at 690; see  
also LaFave, supra at 82.  These cases must be distinguished  
from offenses, such as 18 USC 111, that “require a certain  
mental state as to some elements of the crime but not as to  
others.” 
LaFave, supra; Feola, supra at 691-92; see also  
United States v Franklin, 586 F2d 560 (CA 5, 1978); United  
States v Beil, 577 F2d 1313 (CA 5, 1978); State v Brown, 94  
Wash App 327; 972 P2d 112 (1999).  
Indeed, like the substantive offense in Feola, MCL  
333.7401 is an offense that requires a certain mental state  
regarding some elements of the crime, but not others.  A  
defendant need only have the intent to deliver a controlled  
substance, MCL 333.7401(1), and then the substance must be in  
a mixture or in an amount that falls within one of the  
enumerated ranges, MCL 333.7401(2).  
The majority ascribes significance to the fact that the  
instant offense is one that is “graduated to be more severe as  
the act is more antisocial . . . .”  In the majority’s view,  
the element making the offense more severe must be shown to be  
16  
  
 
 
  
  
known by the defendant.  I do not see the point. In Feola,  
the offense at issue was similarly “graduated.”  See also  
Franklin, Beil, and Brown, supra. The element that did not  
require the mental state in Feola was the same element that  
increased the severity of the crime.  The defendant did not  
need to be aware of the element that ultimately determined the  
severity of the crime.  Instead, the prosecutor only needed to  
prove the existence of particular facts concerning the federal  
officer’s identity and to connect these facts to the  
conspiracy. 
Similarly, in this case, where defendant has  
conspired to deliver a controlled substance and where there  
has been an act in furtherance of this objective, he need not  
have been aware that the amount of the controlled substance  
fell within a particular statutory range in order to be  
convicted of the more severe crime.  Instead, all that is  
necessary is that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable  
doubt that the amount fell within a particular statutory  
range, and connect this amount to the conspiracy.  Because  
neither the plain language of MCL 333.7401 nor MCL 750.157a  
require that a defendant specifically know the amount of  
controlled substance, the majority is impermissibly adding an  
element to two otherwise straightforward criminal statutes.  
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 414-415; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).9  
9  Interestingly, the majority uses a similar analysis to  
Feola in 
its 
discussion concerning the sufficiency of evidence 
(continued...)  
17  
 
4. The Purposes Underlying Conspiracy Law  
Finally, the Feola Court emphasized that requiring  
knowledge of the attendant circumstances would be wholly  
inconsistent with the purposes of the conspiracy statute.  Id.  
at 693.  The Court, first, opined that conspiracy law serves  
as a means to protect society from the dangers incident to  
group criminal activity. Id.; see also LaFave, supra at 68.  
Given the level of criminal intent necessary to 
sustain conviction for the substantive offense, the 
act of agreement to commit the crime is no less 
opprobrious and no less dangerous because of the 
absence of knowledge of a fact unnecessary to the 
formation of criminal intent.  Indeed, unless 
imposition 
of 
an 
“antifederal” 
knowledge 
requirement  
9(...continued) 
necessary for defendant’s aiding and abetting conviction.  
Defendant argued that, under the aiding and abetting statute, 
the prosecutor must show sufficient evidence that defendant 
“intended the crime of delivery of at least 225 grams of 
cocaine or had knowledge [that coconspirator] Blackstone 
intended to deliver at least 225 grams of cocaine at the time 
he aided the delivery,” not merely sufficient evidence that 
defendant intended a cocaine delivery.  Slip op at 14.  After  
reviewing the statute, the majority holds that the requisite 
intent for a conviction under the aiding and abetting statute 
“is that necessary to be convicted of the crime as principle.” 
Id. Applying this standard, the majority finds that “it was 
enough for the prosecutor to show that Mass, as with the 
principal 
offender 
Blackstone, 
knowingly 
delivered 
or 
aided 
in 
the delivery of some amount of cocaine, as long as the jury 
later determined that at least 225 grams of cocaine were in 
fact delivered.  The prosecutor simply did not need to show 
that defendant knew that the amount of cocaine involved in the  
instant delivery was at least 225 grams to secure . . . Mass’ 
conviction for aiding and abetting in the delivery of at least 
225 but less than 650 grams of cocaine.  Conviction of a crime  
as an aider and abettor does not require a higher level of 
intent with regard to the commission of the crime than that 
required for conviction as a principal.”  Id. at 14-15. In my 
judgment, the same reasoning holds true for conviction on a 
conspiracy to deliver offense.  
18  
 
serves social purposes external to the law of 
conspiracy of which we are unaware, its imposition 
here would serve only to make it more difficult to 
obtain convictions on charges of conspiracy, a 
policy with no apparent purpose. [Feola, at 693­
694.]  
Similarly, Michigan’s conspiracy statute serves as a  
means of addressing the special dangers associated with group  
activity.  
“[C]ollective 
criminal 
agreement-partnership 
in 
crime-presents a greater potential threat to the 
public than individual delicts.  Concerted action  
both increases the likelihood that the criminal  
object will be successfully attained and decreases 
the probability that the individuals involved will 
depart from their path of criminality.  Group 
association for criminal purposes often, if not 
normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more 
complex than those which one criminal could  
accomplish.  Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial 
group limited to the particular end toward which it 
has embarked. 
Combination in crime makes more  
likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the 
original purpose for which the group was formed.  In  
sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not 
confined to the substantive offense which is the  
immediate aim of the enterprise.” [People v Denio, 
454 Mich 691, 704; 564 NW 2d 13 (1997), quoting 
People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 570; 330 NW 2d 314  
(1982).]  
Because Michigan conspiracy law also seeks to protect society  
from the danger of concerted action, it is not relevant  
whether each defendant has knowledge that the amount of the  
controlled substance fell within a particular statutory range.  
The agreement to commit a drug offense, and an act in  
furtherance of that agreement, “is no less opprobrious and no  
less dangerous because of the absence of knowledge of a fact  
unnecessary to the formation of criminal intent.”  Feola,  
19  
  
 
 
supra, at 693.  A participant in a conspiracy knows that  
delivery of any amount of drugs is unlawful.  Imposition of a  
knowledge requirement would only serve, without apparent  
rationale, to make it more difficult to obtain conspiracy  
convictions that are above the levels of punishment for the  
lowest level delivery offense.  
Further, the Feola Court observed that conspiracy law  
also serves as a means of intervention against individuals who  
manifest a disposition to criminality.  Feola, supra at 694;  
see also LaFave, supra at 68. “[A]lthough the law generally  
makes criminal only antisocial conduct, at some point in the  
continuum between preparation and consummation, the likelihood  
of a commission of an act is sufficiently great” to justify  
intervention. Feola, supra at 694. At this point “[c]riminal  
intent has crystallized, and the likelihood of actual,  
fulfilled commission warrants preventive action.”  Id.  
Because of this, the Supreme Court again did not see how the  
imposition of a knowledge element would relate rationally to  
this purpose.  “Given the level of intent needed to carry out  
the substantive offense, we fail to see how the agreement is  
any less blameworthy or constitutes less of a danger to  
society solely because the participants are unaware which body  
of law they intend to violate.”  Id.  Thus, the Court stated  
that imposition of a knowledge requirement would render it  
more difficult to serve the purpose behind the law of  
20  
 
 
 
conspiracy without serving any other apparent social policy.  
The Court concluded its analysis by expressly rejecting a  
result that would, in the context of a conspiracy to commit a  
federal offense, require that a defendant have knowledge of  
the attendant circumstances, instead holding that “where  
knowledge of the facts giving rise to federal jurisdiction is  
not necessary for conviction of a substantive offense  
embodying a mens rea requirement, such knowledge is equally  
irrelevant to questions of responsibility for conspiracy to  
commit that offense.” Id. at 696.  
As in Feola, conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance,  
and an act in furtherance of this objective, entail a sufficient  
threat to the social order to be sanctionable in the manner  
determined by the Legislature.10  The fact that a conspirator is  
unaware that the amount of the controlled substance fell within  
a particular statutory range does not make the agreement any  
less threatening, or the conduct of the conspirator any less  
blameworthy.  It is enough that defendant or a coconspirator  
acted in furtherance of their agreement to deliver a controlled  
substance.  
Further, it is important to highlight that the agreement  
necessary in a conspiracy is not akin to the “meeting of the  
10  Indeed, in this case, the offense was carried out to 
completion, although any overt act would have been legally 
sufficient to demonstrate the imminence, or the “clear and 
present” nature, of the threat to the social order.  
21 
 
 
minds” premises of traditional contract law.  LaFave, supra at  
71.  It is not necessary that each conspirator have knowledge  
of each of the details of the object offense.  Id.; People v  
Cooper, 326 Mich 514, 521; 40 NW2d 708 (1950) (recognizing that  
“[i]t is not necessary to a conviction for conspiracy that each  
defendant have knowledge of all its ramifications”).  A mere  
tacit understanding about the object offense will suffice.  
LaFave, supra at 71.   In other words, all that is needed is a  
generalized agreement to engage in an unlawful objective.  
Marcus, supra at 2-4. There need not be a specific agreement  
to commit a 200-gram, a 400-gram or a 600-gram conspiracy, nor  
will the law engage in mind reading in an effort to determine  
the innermost strategic objectives of each of the individual  
coconspirators and punish a single conspiracy with multiple  
levels of punishment depending upon the outcome of such mind  
reading.  The need only for generalized agreement is premised  
on the fact that conspiracies are inherently clandestine in  
nature.
 
Because 
of 
this 
secret 
nature, 
individual  
coconspirators may have relatively little knowledge of the  
conduct or actions of even their own coconspirators; indeed,  
efforts may frequently be undertaken to limit the dissemination  
of information concerning strategies and tactics on a “need to  
know” basis.  
Thus, in a conspiracy to deliver case, such as the instant  
one, all that the prosecutor would need to show regarding a  
22  
defendant’s intent is a generalized agreement to deliver a  
controlled substance, i.e., the unlawful objective.  That the  
amount falls within a particular statutory range is the sort of  
detail that is simply not required to be known by a defendant  
who enters into the criminal agreement that constitutes the  
conspiracy.  Thus, because the crime of conspiracy focuses on  
the formation of criminal intent in pursuit of a substantive  
criminal offense, and because a defendant need not know each of  
the attendant details of the conspiracy, imposition of a  
knowledge requirement, a requirement not within the plain  
language of the conspiracy (or delivery) statute, would  
undermine the early intervention premises of conspiracy law.  
In conclusion, I believe the Justice Court impermissibly  
expanded the plain language of both the delivery statute and the  
conspiracy statute to require a higher level of culpability on  
the part of a defendant than that embodied in those statutes.  
There is nothing within the text of either of these statutes  
that would compel a finding that a defendant must have knowledge  
of the amount of the controlled substance in a conspiracy to  
deliver charge.  Thus, I respectfully disagree with the  
majority’s statement that “Justice properly concluded that  
knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is an element  
of the crime of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and  
that this holding is consistent with a correct interpretation  
23  
 
 
of our controlled substance and conspiracy statutes.”  Slip op,  
at 20.  
III. APPRENDI V NEW JERSEY  
In concluding that knowledge of the amount is an element  
of a conspiracy to deliver charge, the majority also relies on  
Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d  
435 (2000). As the majority states, Apprendi holds that  
[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at  
2362-2363.  
I respectfully disagree that this holding “provides independent  
support for [the majority’s] conclusion.”  Slip op at 22. The  
clear language of the Apprendi holding does not impose a  
knowledge requirement.  Instead, Apprendi stands for no more  
than what the stated rule declares—it only proscribes the use  
of nonjury factual determinations to increase a defendant’s  
sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the lowest level  
delivery offense enacted for the offense charged.  In this case,  
the fact or circumstance that would increase the defendant’s  
sentence beyond the statutory maximum is the amount of the  
controlled substance, not knowledge of the amount.  Thus,  
pursuant to Apprendi, the prosecutor in cases of this type must  
prove the amount of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Further, 
the 
majority 
cites several 
federal 
cases 
that 
were  
decided after Apprendi to justify its holding that knowledge of  
24  
 
 
 
the amount is an element to a conspiracy to delivery charge.  
However, not one of the cited cases stands for the proposition  
that defendant must have knowledge of the amount in order to be  
convicted of either the substantive narcotics offense or  
conspiracy to commit the substantive offense.  Rather, all that  
is necessary is proof of the amount.  See United States v  
Doggett, 230 F3d 160, 164-165 (CA 5, 2000) (holding that “if the  
government seeks enhanced penalties based on the amount of drugs  
. . . the quantity must be stated in the indictment and  
submitted to a jury for a finding of proof beyond a reasonable  
doubt”); United States v Page, 232 F3d 536, 543 (CA 6 2000)  
(holding that the jury needed to find a specific quantity before  
this defendant could be imprisoned to a term exceeding the 20­
year statutory maximum); United States v Fields, ___ US App DC  
___, ___; 242 F3d 393, 396 (2001), clarified on rehearing 2001  
WL 640631 (June 12, 2001) (holding that “the Government must  
state the drug type and quantity in the indictment, submit the  
required evidence to the jury, and prove the relevant drug  
quantity beyond a reasonable doubt” before defendant can be  
sentenced 
to 
any 
of 
the 
progressively 
higher maximum 
penalties).  
Additionally, there appears to be no state case law addressing  
this issue subsequent to the Apprendi holding.  Thus, the  
majority’s opinion is the first apparently to rely on Apprendi  
in order to set forth this “knowledge of the amount”  
requirement.  
25  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Also, the reaffirming of Justice, will continue to  
severely affect the manner in which the prosecutors of this  
state proceed on these types of offenses.  By holding that  
knowledge of the amount of the controlled substance is an  
element of a conspiracy to deliver charge, prosecutors are  
burdened with the additional hurdle of having to prove a  
defendant’s specific knowledge of the amount of a controlled  
substance—a hurdle, whatever its substantive merits, that the  
Legislature did not prescribe in the text of the applicable  
statutes.  In light of this additional hurdle, it is likely that  
in some unknown, but probably quite significant, number of drug  
prosecutions the prosecutor will be unable to maintain a  
conviction that is above the statutory maximum for the lowest  
level delivery offense.  This is because the inherent nature of  
these crimes involve agreements between individuals to deliver  
“a lot of,”  “some,” or “all that you can get” of a controlled  
substance. 
Thus, because a defendant’s knowledge that the  
amount of the controlled substance fell within a particular  
statutory range will be lacking in many instances, prosecutors,  
under these circumstances, will only be able to secure a  
conviction on the lowest delivery amount, in essence, for an  
amount less than 50 grams.11
 As a result, the sanctions  
11  The 
majority 
believes 
that 
maintaining 
convictions 
for 
conspiracy to deliver less than 50 grams of a controlled 
substance affords a “significant disincentive” to engage in 
drug trafficking involving larger amounts.  Slip op at 36. 
(continued...)  
26 
determined to be appropriate for drug crimes by the Legislature  
will not be carried out.  In my judgment, the Legislature  
intended what it said in MCL 333.7401, namely, that a defendant  
is responsible for whatever quantity of drugs he delivers  
regardless of whether he knew that the amount fell within a  
particular statutory quantity range.  
IV. APPLICATION  
When applying the plain language of the delivery and  
conspiracy statutes, as well as the holding of Apprendi, supra,  
to the facts of this case, I believe that error occurred below  
because the prosecutor failed to prove the quantity (that the  
substance weighed 225 or more grams, but less than 650 grams)  
beyond a reasonable doubt in the context of the conspiracy to  
deliver charge.  
In pertinent part, the jury instructions stated:  
The defendant is charged with the crime of 
Conspiracy to Commit the Delivery of Cocaine. Anyone 
who knowingly agrees with someone else to commit the 
Delivery of Cocaine is guilty of Conspiracy.  To  
prove the defendant’s guilt the prosecutor must prove 
each of the following elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  First, that the defendant and someone else 
knowingly agreed to commit Delivery of Cocaine.  
Second, that the defendant specifically intended to 
commit or help commit the crime.  Third, that this 
agreement took place, or continued during the period  
11(...continued) 
However, it is not this Court’s role to determine what is or 
is not a “significant disincentive” for particular conduct; 
that is the Legislature’s role.  And the Legislature has 
determined in MCL 333.7401 that the appropriate disincentives 
for larger-scale drug trafficking are those set forth in that 
statute.  This Court’s duty is to respect this determination.  
27  
 
from March Nineteenth to March Twenty-Seventh, 
Nineteen Ninety-Six. . . .  To find the defendant  
guilty of conspiracy, you must be satisfied, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that there was an agreement to 
deliver–to deliver cocaine.  
These instructions clearly omitted any reference to a  
particular amount of a controlled substance.  Yet, on the basis  
of these instructions, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to  
deliver more than 225 grams, but less than 650 grams, of  
cocaine.  Conviction on this amount exposed defendant to a term  
of imprisonment of twenty to thirty years, significantly above  
the one-to-twenty-year term provided for a conviction on an  
amount that is less than 50 grams.  MCL 333.7401. 
The jury  
instructions should have set forth the requisite substance  
amount in a fashion similar to that set forth to prove the  
substantive offense, in essence, “that the substance was in a  
mixture that weighed 225 or more grams, but less than 650  
grams.” Slip op at 27.  Absent an express jury finding on the  
substance amount, we cannot be certain that the jury found that  
defendant conspired to deliver an amount of drugs greater than  
50 grams.  From defendant’s guilty verdict, one can only  
conclude with assurance that the jury concluded that defendant  
delivered some amount of drugs.  And pursuant to Michigan law  
delivery of any amount of drugs is a crime. MCL 333.7401(2)(iv).  
Accordingly, as with the majority, I would reverse defendant’s  
conspiracy to deliver 225 grams or more, but less than 650  
grams, of cocaine and remand for entry of a conviction  
28  
  
  
 
consistent with the jury verdict, in essence, conspiracy to  
deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine.  
V. CONCLUSION  
In summary, I believe that the majority’s conclusion that  
knowledge of the amount is a necessary element in a conspiracy  
to deliver charge is inconsistent with the plain language of  
both the delivery statute and the conspiracy statute.  Where  
there is an agreement to commit the unlawful act of delivery of  
a controlled substance and some act in furtherance of that  
agreement,12 it is impermissible to require an element of a crime  
that goes beyond this language.  Second, the United States  
Supreme Court decision in Apprendi, supra, does not provide  
support for imposition of the knowledge requirement.  Instead,  
the Apprendi holding establishes the amount of the controlled  
substance as an element of the offense if the amount operates  
to increase the penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed  
statutory maximum.  Third, the majority’s holding will severely  
affect the manner in which the  prosecutors of this state  
proceed on these types of crimes.  By holding that knowledge of  
the quantity of a controlled substance is an element to a  
12  Again, although Michigan statutory law allows for the 
prosecution 
of 
drug 
conspiracies where the evidence shows that 
the conspirators have merely agreed to commit an offense 
prohibited by law, without an overt act, MCL 750.157a, this is 
not the case before us–indeed, it is rarely the case before 
us-and this concurrence takes no position with regard to the 
need for a conspirator to have knowledge of the specific 
amount of drugs in such “pure” Michigan conspiracies.  
29  
 
conspiracy to deliver charge, prosecutors, in some uncertain  
number of cases, will be unable, for little apparent reason, to  
maintain a conviction on this offense that is above the  
statutory maximum for the lowest level delivery offense because  
evidence concerning a defendant’s knowledge in a great number  
of cases will be lacking.  This is not, in my judgment, what the  
Legislature intended.  Instead, the Legislature intended what  
it said—that a defendant who conspires to deliver is responsible  
for whatever quantity of drugs he agrees to deliver regardless  
of whether he knew that the amount fell within a particular  
statutory quantity range.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, J., concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
30