Title: Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

OKLA. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOC. v. STATE ex rel. OKLA. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT2011 OK 68Case Number: 108839; No. 108841Decided: 06/28/2011THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

OKLAHOMA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellant,v.STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Defendant/Appellee.
OKLAHOMA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellant,v.STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA OFFICE 
OF STATE FINANCE, Defendant/Appellee.
and
OKLAHOMA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Appellee 
and,STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT, Defendant/Appellee and,OKLAHOMA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Appellee and,STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. 
OKLAHOMA OFFICE OF STATE FINANCE, Defendant/Appellee,v.WORLD 
PUBLISHING COMPANY and THE OKLAHOMA PUBLISHING COMPANY, 
Intervenors/Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY
¶0 The Oklahoma Publishing Company (Oklahoman) and World Publishing Company 
(Tulsa World) (collectively, publishers), filed open records requests with the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of State Finance (OSF). Both 
the Oklahoman and Tulsa World sought release of birth dates of all state 
employees. In addition, the Tulsa World requested employee identification 
numbers. The Oklahoma Public Employees Association (OPEA) filed two suits 
against OPM and OSF, respectfully. Both petitions requested declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief barring the release of employees' birth dates. The second 
suit also sought to bar employee identification numbers from disclosure. The 
district court consolidated the causes. All parties filed motions for summary 
judgment. Relying on an opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General (AG), the trial 
court sustained OPEA's and OPM's motions. It ordered that: state agencies be 
given sixty (60) days notice to report their decisions on whether disclosure of 
date of birth requests would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy pursuant to 
AFFIRMED.
Kevin R. Donelson, Carole L. Houghton, FELLERS, SNIDER, BLANKENSHIP, BAILEY 
& TIPPENS, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Oklahoma Public Employees 
Association,Stephen J. Krise, Oklahoma Office of Attorney General, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, for State ex rel. Oklahoma Office of Personnel Management 
and Oklahoma Office of State Finance,Michael Minnis, Doerner, Saunders, 
Daniel & Anderson, L.L.P., Oklahoma City, OK, and S. Douglas Dodd, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, for the Oklahoma Publishing Company d/b/a The Oklahoman,J. Schadd 
Titus, Titus Hillis Reynolds Love Dickman & McCalmon, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 
World Publishing Company d/b/a Tulsa World,S. Douglas Dodd, Doerner, 
Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, L.L.P. Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Amici Curiae 
Griffin Television OKC, LLC, Griffin Television Tulsa, LLC, Oklahoma Press 
Association, Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press, and FOI 
Oklahoma,Gary J. James, Gary J. James & Associates, P.C., Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, for Oklahoma State Troopers Association,Wellon B. Poe, Joseph A. 
Claro, Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
Oklahoma Department of Public Safety,Thomas E. Prince, Prince Law Office, 
P.C., Edmond, Oklahoma, for Amicus Curiae, CompSource Oklahoma,Robert 
D. Nelon, Jon Epstein, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden and Nelson, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Amici Curiae Local TV, LLC d/b/a KFOR-TV 
(Channel 4) Oklahoma City, Ohio/Oklahoma Hearst Television, Inc. d/b/a KOCO-TV 
(Channel 5) Oklahoma City; Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. d/b/a KOKH-TV (Channel 
25) Oklahoma City, Scripps Media, Inc. d/b/a KJRH-TV (Channel 2) Tulsa, KTUL, 
LLC d/b/a KTUL-TV (Channel 8) Tulsa, Oklahoma Association of Broadcasters, 
Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc., Radio Television Digital News 
Association,Nancy Pellow, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Pro Se.

PER CURIUM: 
¶1 Although the above styled and numbered causes were consolidated in the 
trial court, they were appealed under separate numbers. On October 26, 2010, an 
order issued in case No. 108,841 making the causes companion cases for purposes 
of the appeal and requiring that separate records be filed. Today, we withdraw 
our order of October 26th and consolidate the matters for resolution by a single 
opinion.

¶2 One first impression issue is common to both causes: whether public 
employees' dates of birth are open records, subject to public disclosure, under 
the Open Records Act. The second first impression issue, raised only in 
cause No. 108,841, is whether employee identification numbers are also public 
records which may be released. Both questions require us to consider whether the 
information release would be a "clearly unwarranted invasion" of Oklahoma's 
public service, state employees' personal privacy under 

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 In response to a request by Senator Debbe Leftwich, the AG issued an 
opinion on December 8, 2009. The opinion provides that: 1) a public body has 
discretion to determine that disclosing a personnel record indicating the date 
of birth of the public employee is an unwarranted invasion of the employee's 
personal privacy under the Open Records Act, 

¶6 From July through September, 2010, all parties filed for summary judgment. 
The trial court sustained the summary judgment motions of OPM and OSF in an 
order filed on September 21st. It found that: employee identification numbers 
were not subject to disclosure by any state agency; the Attorney General 
correctly stated the law regarding the release of state employees' birth dates 
requiring a balancing test to determine if such a release amounted to an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and utilization of the balancing test 
did not violate the equal protection clause. The trial court also determined 
that the records of legislative staff are protected from release by 

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
¶8 Two preliminary issues which must be considered before we may determine 
the primary questions presented: whether the release of birth dates and employee 
identification numbers constitutes a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy" within the meaning of 
¶9 1) Title 52 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(A)2 contains a 
non-exclusivelist of examples of information, release of which, the 
Legislatureconsiders to be a clearly unwarrantedinvasion of State 
employees' personal privacy.
¶10 The OPEA contends that the birth dates and employee identification 
numbers of state employees are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 

¶11 In determining whether a statute applies to a given set of facts, we 
focus on legislative intent

¶14 Undoubtedly, the Legislature provided examples of information in 

¶15 2) Where a claim is made that disclosure of 
informationunder 52 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(A)(2) would constitutea 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personnel privacy, application of a 
case-by-case balancing test is utilizedto determine whether the information 
is subject to release. 
¶16 The OPEA and OSF advocate the adoption of a balancing test for 
determination of whether birth dates and employee identification numbers are 
subject to release under the Open Records Act. Under such a test, the public 
body must weigh the employees' interest in non-disclosure against the public's 
interest in obtaining the information. 
¶17 The publishers argue that application of a balancing test to determine 
whether a public employee's personal information outweighs the public's right to 
know is inappropriate. They contend that, if such a test is utilized, the 
news-gathering functions under the First Amendment would greatly overcome only a 
slight imposition on the personal privacy of public employees. The publishers 
point to a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision and to a Court of Civil Appeals' 
opinion providing that no balancing test may be utilized as support for their 
allegations. Those cases and the publishers' assertions are unconvincing. 
¶18 Two Oklahoma cases support the contentions that utilization of a 
balancing test to determine whether employee birth dates or identification 
numbers are subject to release under the Open Records Act is inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, at best, those decisions are persuasive only and do not bind our 
independent review of the issue.
¶19 Nichols v. Jackson, 
¶20 The Criminal Court held that the First Amendment right of access by the 
press to non-confidential court records precluded wholesale closure of the 
proceedings or sealing of the records. In reaching this result, provisions of 
the Open Records Act were considered. Relying on a Court of Civil Appeals' case, 
State ex rel. Oklahoma State Bd. of 
Medical Licensure and Supervision v. 
Migliaccio, 
¶21 In the same breath that the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated no 
balancing test would be allowed, it stated:
The Legislature has determined by statute that the public's interest is 
greater, except where specific statutory exemption is given. . . . However, 
such statutory provisions are always subject to interpretation to ensure 
compliance with constitutionally guaranteed rights. [Citations omitted. 
Emphasis supplied.]
Thereafter, in answering the question certified, the Criminal Court made it 
clear that it had, despite its pronouncement concerning Migliaccio, 
balanced Nichols' rights to counsel, due process, and fair trial against the 
public's right to know. The opinion provides in pertinent part:
The issues of closure of hearings and the sealing or [sic] records is a 
question of law, which in each instance is driven by the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case. The issue cannot be answered in a carte blanche 
approach and should be addressed on an ongoing basis based upon the current 
status of the proceedings. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of 
California for Riverside County, 

¶22 The Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over 
criminal cases.

¶24 The AG recommended public bodies utilize a balancing test weighing the 
public's right to know against the employee's right to privacy in determining 
whether public employees' birth dates should be released. In analyzing the 
weight to be given to the Attorney General's opinion, we note that, like 
opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals, the writings 
are considered as persuasive authority. Here, however, the Attorney General's 
analysis carries more weight in determining the issues before the Court. It does 
so because the Legislature has not acted since the opinion was promulgated. 
Undoubtedly, it did not do so because it understood that this Court considers 
the Legislature's silence as acquiescence or approval of the law as expounded in 
an Attorney General opinion.

¶25 The United States Supreme Court has recognized the privacy interest in 
keeping personal facts away from the public eye. It has also acknowledged that, 
in some instances, the duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures is rooted in the 
Constitution.

¶26 The Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) contains almost identical 
language to Oklahoma's Open Records Act providing that "files the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" may 
not be released for public scrutiny. In considering the federal act's language, 
the United States Supreme Court has determined that such statutory language 
requires the implementation of a balancing test where the individual's right to 
privacy is weighed against the public's right to know.

¶27 A number of other federal and state courts considering statutory language 
similar to that found in 
¶28 We find the analysis of the Supreme Court and other jurisdictions with 
statutory language similar to that found in 52 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(A)(2) 
persuasive. Therefore, we align ourselves with those courts and with the 
reasoning of the Attorney General and determine that where a claim is made that 
disclosure of information under 52 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(2)(2) would constitute 
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, application of a 
case-by-case balancing test should be utilized to determine whether personal 
information is subject to release.
¶29 Under the facts presented,where significant privacy 
interests are at stakewhile the public's interest either in 
employeebirth dates or employee identification numbersis minimal, 
release of such information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy" under 
¶30 The Supreme Court has held that information such as place of birth, 
date of birth, date of marriage, employment history, and comparable data 
are protected from disclosure as matters which constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.35 The vast majority of courts considering the issue of 
whether birth dates should be excluded from public disclosure under statutory 
language similar to that found in 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(A)(2) and in the FOIA 
align themselves with the Supreme Court's reasoning and hold that "disclosure 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."36 

¶31 Similarly, employee identification numbers, when balanced against the 
public's right to know, have been determined to be information whose release 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.37 Such information has been found to provide little, if 
any, knowledge to the public which would provide a better understanding of 
routine day-to-day governmental operations.38 Publication of the numbers has been considered to be 
highly offensive, because the disclosure could lead to public scrutiny of 
individuals concerning information unrelated to any governmental operation while 
constituting impermissible invasions of privacy.39 Furthermore, as has been argued here, public employees' 
identification numbers may provide unauthorized access to information contained 
on government computers.40 Finally, utilization of employee identification numbers 
has been shown to provide additional insight into financial dealings leaving 
individuals subject to identity theft.41 

¶32 Since September 11, 2001, the ramifications of identity theft have proven 
much more grave than previously thought. Identity theft, a huge problem in 
financial fraud and theft cases, now has implications for national security.42 The growing problem of identity theft is facilitated 
when birth dates are combined with other personal information.43 Simply combining the release of a person's age along 
with other factors may make the individual vulnerable to those targeting a 
certain age range for scams.44 With both a name and a birth date, one can obtain 
information about: an individual's criminal record; arrest record (which may not 
include disposition of the charges); driving record; state of origin; political 
party affiliation; social security number; current and past addresses; civil 
litigation record; liens; property owned; credit history; financial accounts; 
and quite possibly, information concerning an individual's complete medical and 
military histories; and insurance and investment portfolio.45 The release of a state employee's name along with an 
employee identification number may provide access to other exempt personal 
information.46 These same numbers may provide unauthorized access to 
information contained on government computers.47 

¶34 Although the publishers disclaim any intention of publishing the birth 
dates of State employees, they assert that providing the date of birth 
information is important to their ability to identify one state worker from 
another. This argument has been considered too "narrow and limited" on the 
public interest scale to tip the balance of interests in favor of disclosure.

CONCLUSION
¶36 Openness in government is essential to the functioning of a democracy. 
The greatest threat to privacy comes from government in secret.

¶38 In enacting 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 §27A.7(A)(2), the Oklahoma Legislature 
sought to construct an exemption which would require a balancing of an 
individual's right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of 
Oklahoma's Open Records Act. The device adopted to achieve that balance was the 
limited exemption where privacy was threatened for the clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.
¶39 We determine that the legislative language utilized in 

COLBERT, V.C.J., WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, GURICH, JJ. - 
CONCUR
TAYLOR, C.J., KAUGER, J. - DISSENT 
FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 1.27(d), Supreme 
Court Rules, 12 O.S. Supp. 2008 providing in pertinent part:

". . . The appellate court has the discretion sua sponte, or upon 
motion of a party, to consider any appeals including one or more appeals 
governed by Rule 1.36 as companion or consolidated appeals." [Emphasis in 
original.] 

2 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24 A. 7 providing in pertinent 
part:

"A. A public body may keep personnel records confidential:
. . . 2. Where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy such as employee evaluations, payroll deductions, employment 
applications submitted by persons not hired by the public body, and transcripts 
from institutions of higher education maintained in the personnel files of 
certified public school employees; provided, however, that nothing in this 
subsection shall be construed to exempt from disclosure the degree obtained and 
the curriculum on the transcripts of certified public school employees. . . 
.
D. Public bodies shall keep confidential the home address, telephone numbers 
and social security numbers of any person employed or formerly employed by the 
public body." 

3 White v. Lim, 2009 OK 79, fn.5, 224 P.3d 679; Welch v. Crow, 
2009 OK 20, ¶10, 206 P.3d 559; 
Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶9, 179 P.3d 606; Citizens Against 
Taxpayer Abuse, Inc. v. City of 
Oklahoma City, 2003 OK 65, ¶6, 73 P.3d 871. See also, Data Tree, 
LLC v. Meek, note 36, infra; Graham v. Alabama 
State Employees Ass'n, see note 57, infra. 

4 Our decision today does not create a privacy interest 
in violation of 51 O.S. 2001 
§24 A. 2 providing that the "Oklahoma Open Records Act shall not create, directly 
or indirectly, any rights of privacy or any remedies for violation of any rights 
of privacy; nor shall the Oklahoma Open Records Act, except as specifically set 
forth in the Oklahoma Open Records Act, establish any procedures for protecting 
any person from release of information contained in public records." We merely 
apply the exception, provided by the Oklahoma Legislature providing for refusing 
disclosure where a release would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy" pursuant to 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(A)(2), see note 2, supra. 

5 A.G. Opin. 09-33. Although not relevant to the cause 
presented, the opinion also provides that: 1) a vital statistics record, such as 
a birth certificate, is confidential and may not be disclosed except in specific 
circumstances as provided by the Public Health Code but that these provisions do 
not make confidential the birth date of an employee of a public body that is 
contained in any record that is not a vital statistics record; 2) the Driver's 
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2721-2725, does not make the birth date of 
an employee of a public body confidential; and 3) a public body make keep 
confidential a record indicating an employee's name placed on administrative 
leave with pay if, under the body's personnel policies, the action constitutes 
neither a final or disciplinary action, nor a final action resulting in loss of 
pay, suspension, demotion of position, or termination pursuant to 
51 O.S. Supp. §24A.7(B). The opinion also 
indicated that an agency could, but was not required to, give notice to 
employees allowing them to assert a privacy interest in the release of birth 
dates and employee identification numbers. CompSource contends that employees 
have no right to notice and an opportunity to object to a document's disclosure. 
This issue was considered in City of Lawton v. 
Moore, 1993 OK 
168, 868 P.2d 609 holding that the Legislature had superseded by statute an 
earlier decision in Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Oklahoma 
Horse Racing Comm'n, 1986 OK 24, 735 P.2d 548. Under the version of the Open Records Act 
considered in Tulsa Tribune, we interpreted the Act, as then cast, 
to require custodians of public records to give notice and the opportunity to be 
heard to any person whose interests would be affected by disclosure of public 
records. In Moore, we acknowledged the change in statutory language 
following the decision in Tulsa Tribune providing that "public 
bodies do not need to follow any procedures for providing access to public 
records except those specifically required by the Oklahoma Open Records Act." 
Title 51 O.S. 2001 
§24 A. 2. In consideration of this statutory change, still in effect today, we 
held that the Open Records Act did not grant public employees a right to notice 
and hearing, or any other procedural protection. Conversely, as Compsource 
recognizes, the public body must make the decision on disclosure. Just as the 
Open Records Act does not grant public employees procedural protections, it does 
not prohibit an agency from utilizing tools in its attempt to discern whether 
certain personal information should be released. In regard to the allegations 
that such notification efforts might treat individual employees differently 
creating an equal protection violation, we note only that, generally, this Court 
does not address a party's asserting vicariously the constitutional rights of 
others. Gens v. Cassidy School, 2008 OK 5, fn. 28, 177 P.3d 565; Barzellone v. Presley, 
2005 OK 86, fn. 32, 126 P.3d 588; Forest Oil Corp. v. 
Corporation Comm'n, 1990 OK 58, ¶31, 807 P.2d 774. Furthermore, our determination that birth 
dates and employee identification numbers are not subject to release makes 
consideration of the constitutional argument unnecessary. 

6 Nancy Pellow, the legislative staffer, appeared pro se. 
The Oklahoma State Troopers Association and the Oklahoma Department of Public 
Safety appeared as intervening plaintiffs. CompSource Oklahoma filed an 
amicus brief. 

7 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24 A. 3 providing in pertinent 
part:

"As used in this act:
. . . 2. 'Public body' . . . does not mean judges, justices, the Council on 
Judicial Complaints, the Legislature, or legislators . . ."
This exception is qualified to the extent that records are kept for the 
receipt and expenditure of any public funds. See, 51 O.S. 2001 §24 A. 4. Intervenor Nancy Pellow 
claims that, as a Senate staff member, she is entitled to the protection of the 
Open Records Act legislative exemption. Our determination that birth dates and 
employee identification numbers are not subject to release here makes 
determination whether all legislative staff employees records are exempt from 
release under §24 A. 3, this note, supra, unnecessary. Nevertheless, we note that 
the Attorney General has determined that, except when the document is created by 
a third-party public body or official, the Open Records Act does not require 
legislators to disclose documents in their possession created by third parties. 
AG Opin. 08-19. Although we have not had occasion to determine whether the 
exemption for the Legislature and legislators extends to their staff, we have 
acknowledged the exemption and noted its application to judges and Justices, 
generally. Nichols v. Jackson, 2002 OK 65, ¶1(12), 55 P.3d 1044. Furthermore, in an Open Records Request 
to the Court directed at staff-produced documents, we determined that records of 
judges and Justices are specifically excluded from the requirements of the Open 
Meetings Act and that judicial privilege shields the internal decisional process 
of the Court and internal court documents prepared by court personnel. 
Wallace v. Honorable Daman H. Cantrell, No. 
107,300, Order of October 1, 2009 relying on Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 805 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 821, 116 S. Ct. 80, 
133 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1995). 

8 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24 A. 7, see note 2, supra. 

9 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(D), see note 2, supra. 

10 Tyler v. Shelter Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 OK 
9, 
¶12, 184 P.3d 496; McClure v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2006 OK 42, ¶12, 142 P.3d 390; Nealis v. Baird, 
1999 OK 98, ¶55, 996 P.2d 438. 

11 Smicklas v. Spitz, 1992 OK 145, ¶8, 846 P.2d 362; Clifton v. Clifton, 
1990 OK 88, ¶7, 801 P.2d 693; Fuller v. Odom, 
1987 OK 64, P4, 741 P.2d 449. 

12 Tyler v. Shelter Mut. Ins. 
Co., see note 10, supra; McSorley v. Hertz Corp., 
1994 OK 120, ¶6, 885 P.2d 1343; Oglesby v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 1992 OK 61, ¶8, 832 P.2d 834. 

13 Hill v. Board of Education, 
see note 15, infra; Haney v. State, 1993 OK 41, ¶5, 850 P.2d 1087; Public Serv. Co. 
of Oklahoma v. State ex rel. Corp. 
Comm'n, 1992 OK 
153, ¶8, 842 P.2d 750. 

14 Minie v. Hudson, 1997 OK 26, ¶7, 934 P.2d 1082; Fuller v. Odom, see note 
11, supra; Darnell v. Chrysler Corp., 1984 OK 57, ¶5, 687 P.2d 132. 

15 See, Strong v. Laubach, 2004 OK 21, ¶11, 89 P.3d 1066; Hill v. Board of 
Education, 1997 OK 
107, 1997 OK 
111, ¶12, 944 P.2d 930. 

16 Oklahoma Ass'n for 
Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma 
City, 1995 OK 
62, ¶5, 901 P.2d 800, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029, 116 S. Ct. 674, 133 L. Ed. 2d 523 
(1995); Affiliated Mgt. Corp. v. State of 
Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 
1977 OK 183, 570 P.2d 335. 

17 Chicago Tribune Co. v. 
Board of Education of the City 
of Chicago, 332 Ill.App.3d 60, 265 Ill.Dec. 910, 773 N.E.2d 674 
(2002), appeal denied, 201 Ill. 2d 562, 271 Ill.Dec. 923, 786 N.E.2d 181 
(2002). 

18 The term "may" is ordinarily construed as permissive 
while "shall" is commonly considered to be mandatory. MLC Mortgage 
Corp. v. Sun America Mortgage Co., 
2009 OK 37, fn. 17, 212 P.3d 1199; See also, Osprey LLC v. 
Kelly-Moore Paint Co., Inc., 1999 OK 50, ¶14, 984 P.2d 194; Shea v. Shea, 
1975 OK 90, ¶10, 537 P.2d 417. 

19 Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
666 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1981). 

20 In re Mandel's Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1955); Erwin v. Steele, 228 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Civ.App. 1950); 
Charles Behlen Sons' Co. v. Richetts, 30 Ohio 
App. 167, 6 Ohio Law Abs. 543, 164 N.E. 436 (1928). 

21 Chicago Tribune Co. v. 
Board of Education of the City 
of Chicago, see note 17, supra. 

22 The Okla. Const. art. 7, §4 providing in pertinent 
part:

"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be coextensive with 
the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; except that the 
Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in 
criminal cases until otherwise provided by statute and in the event there is any 
conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall determine which court has 
jurisdiction and such determination shall be final. The original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law. . . ." 

23 In State ex rel. Oklahoma 
State Bd. of Medical Licensure and 
Supervision v. Migliaccio, 1996 OK CIV APP 37, 917 P.2d 483 a physician was disciplined by the Board 
of Medical Licensure and Supervision, following convictions in relation to 
filing of fraudulent medical claims. After the convictions were reversed, the 
physician sought expungement or sealing of records related to the disciplinary 
action. The appellate court held that the Board had no authority to either 
expunge or seal the records documents its actions in the physician's case. In 
reaching its determination, the Court of Civil Appeals stated that the Open 
Records Act does not allow the court to balance the individual's interests in 
records remaining private against the public's interest in access to records. 

24 The Okla. Const. art. 7, §4, see note 22, supra; 
Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand 
Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶6, 184 P.3d 546; State v. Blevins, 
1992 OK CR 4, ¶2, 825 P.2d 270. 

25 The Okla. Const. art. 7, §4, see note 22, supra; 
Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand 
Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, see note 24, supra. 

26 Opinions released for publication by order of the Court 
of Civil Appeals are persuasive only and lack precedential effect. Rule 1.200, 
Supreme Court Rules, 12 O.S. 2001, Ch. A5, App. 1; 20 O.S. 2001 §§30.5 and 30.14. 

27 Holdings in cases released by the Court of Criminal 
Appeals are not binding upon this Court although the rules announced therein may 
be considered persuasive. One Chicago Coin's Play 
Boy Marble Board, No. 19771 v. State 
ex rel. Adams, 1949 OK 251, ¶9, 212 P.2d 129. 

28 See, Movants to Quash 
Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 
note 24, supra. 

29 National Cowboy Hall of 
Fame & Western Heritage Center v. 
State ex rel. Oklahoma Human Rights 
Comm'n, 1978 OK 
76, ¶11, 579 P.2d 1276; Terry v. Edgin, 1977 OK 35, ¶9, 561 P.2d 60. 

30 United States Dept. of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1480, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1989); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
97 S. Ct. 869, 872, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1977). 

31 United States Dept. of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press, see note 30, supra; Hines v. 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, see note 51, infra. 

32 Department of Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1976). 

33 Oliva v. United States, see note 
36, infra; Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas, see 
note 36, supra; Data Tree, LLC v. Meek, see note 36, 
infra; Scottsdale Unified School District v. 
KPNX Broadcasting Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 955 P.2d 534 (1998); 
Kentucky Bd. of Examiners of 
Psychologists v. Courier- Journal & 
Louisville Times Co., 826 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1992); 
Versaci v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 4th 805, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92 (2005), rehearing denied (2005), review denied 
(2005); Chicago Tribune Co. v. Board of 
Educ. of the City of Chicago, see note 
17, supra; Doe v. Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 415, 528 N.E.2d 880; Mullin v. 
Detroit Police Dept., 133 Mich.App. 46, 348 N.W.2d 708 
(1984). See also, Graham v. Alabama State Employees 
Ass'n, note 3, supra [Rejected balancing test but instituted similar test 
based on "rule of reason." But see, Tacoma Public Library 
v. Woessner, note 37, infra; Capital City Press v. 
East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan 
Council, 96-1979, 696 So. 2d 562 (La 1997). 

34 Data Tree LLC v. Meek, see 
note 36, infra; Valentine v. Personnel Cabinet, see note 
36, infra. 

35 United States Dept. of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press, see note 30, supra; United 
States Dept. of State v. Washington 
Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 102 S. Ct. 1957, 72 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1982). 
See also, Sherman v. United States Dept. of 
the Army, 244 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2001). 

36 Associated Press v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, see note 51, infra; 
Morley v. United States Central Intelligence 
Agency, 699 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.C.C. 2010); Coleman v. Lappin, 
680 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.C.C. 2010); Salas v. Office of 
Inspector General, 577 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.C.C. 2008); In 
Defense of Animals v. Nat'l Inst. of 
Health, 543 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.C.C. 2008); Judicial Watch, 
Inc. v. Department of Justice, 361 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 
365 F.3d 1108 (2004); Oliva v. United States, 756 F. Supp. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas, 
___S.W. 3d ___, 2010 WL 4910163, rehearing denied (2011); Data 
Tree, LLC v. Meek, 279 Kan. 445, 109 P.3d 1226 (2005); 
Clymer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 601 N.W.2d 42 
(Iowa 1999); Scottsdale Unified School Dist. v. 
KPNX Broadcasting Co., see note 33, supra; Valentine 
v. Personnel Cabinet, 322 S.W.3d 505 (Ky.App. 2010); Hearst 
Corp. v. State of New York, Office 
of State Comptroller, 24 Misc.3d 611, 882 N.Y.S.2d 862 
(2009); Graham v. Alabama State Employees 
Ass'n, see note 57, infra; Garden Grove Police 
Dept. v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 4th 430, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (2001); Mullin v. Detroit Police 
Dept., see note 33, supra; Doe v. Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles, see note 33, supra. See also, Department 
of Justice v. Reporters Committee, 
489 U.S. 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468, 103 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1989); Justice v. Fuddy, 
___ P.3d ___, 2011 WL 1338824 (Hawaii App.) [Citizen's strong desire to 
personally verify President's eligibility to hold office did not constitute 
"compelling circumstances affecting health or safety of any individual.]; 
Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661 (R.I. 
1990); Annot., "What constitutes personal matters exempt from disclosure by 
invasion of privacy exemption under state freedom of information act?", 26 
A.L.R.4th 666 (1983). 

37 United America Financial, 
Inc. v. Potter, 531 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.C.C. 2008); Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. United States Dept. of 
Commerce, 337 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.C.C. 2004); Tacoma Public 
Library v. Woessner, 90 Wash. App. 205, 951 P.2d 357 
(1998) [Modified on rehearing on other grounds.]; Small v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 820 F. Supp. 163 (D.N.J. 1992). See 
also, Painting & Drywall Work 
Preservation Fund, Inc. v. Department of 
Housing & Urban Development, 936 F.2d 1300 
(D.C.Cir. 1991); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.C.C. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924, 
97 S. Ct. 2198, 53 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1977), aff'd, 736 F.2d 727 (1984); 
King County v. Sheehan III, 114 Wash. App. 325, 57 P.3d 307 (2002); F. Komuves, "We've Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation 
and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal 
Identifiers," 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 529 (1998). But see, 
Sun-Sentinel Co. v. United States Dept. 
of Homeland Security, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (S.D.Fla. 2006), 
aff'd, 489 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2007) [Employee identification numbers 
released for FEMA inspectors suspected of criminal activity. Factor of suspected 
activity sufficient to outweigh privacy interests.]. 

38 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. 
United States Dept. of Commerce, see note 37, 
supra; Hale v. Department of Justice, 973 F.2d 894 
(10th Cir. 1992). See also, S. Burgess, "Access to Federal Government Records 
Under FOIA," 05-12 Immigr. Briefings 1 (Dec. 2005). 

39 King County v. Sheehan III, 
see note 37, supra; Tacoma Public Library v. 
Woessner, see note 37, supra. 

40 King County v. Sheehan III, 
see note 37, supra. 

41 State v. Stearns, 196 Or.App. 272, 101 P.3d 811 (2004). See also, United America Financial, 
Inc. v. Potter, note 37, supra; State v. Sharma, 216 
Ariz. 292, 165 P.3d 693 (2007) [Individual utilized "scrambled" employee 
identification number along with other information to open bank accounts, obtain 
credit cards, and contract for utility services.]. 

42 State v. Woodfall, 120 Hawaii 387, 206 P.3d 841 (2009). 

43 See, Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts v. Attorney General, note 36, supra; 
Doe v. Conway, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 4860373 (Ky.App. 2010). 

44 Doe v. Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, see note 36, supra. 

45 Scottsdale Unified School 
Dist. v. KPNX Broadcasting Co., see note 36, supra. 

46 Tacoma Public Library v. 
Woessner, see note 37, supra. 

47 King County v. Sheehan III, 
see note 37, supra. 

48 See, Alva State Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Dayton, 1988 OK 44, 755 P.2d 635. 

49 Title 21 O.S. Supp. 2007 §1533.1 providing in pertinent 
part:

"A. It is unlawful for any person to willfully and with fraudulent intent 
[sic] obtain the name, address, social security number, date of birth, place of 
business or employment, debt, credit or account numbers, driver license number, 
or any other personal identifying information of another person, living or dead, 
with the intent to use, sell or allow any other person to use or sell such 
personal identifying information to obtain or attempt to obtain money, credit, 
goods, property, or service in the name of the other person without the consent 
of the person. . . .
E. Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section shall be 
guilty of identify theft. Identity theft is a felony offense punishable by 
imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections for a term of not 
less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, or a fine not to exceed One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Restitution to the victim may be ordered in addition to any criminal penalty 
imposed by the court. . . ." 

50 Clymer v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, see note 36, surpa; Hearst Corp. v. State, 
see note 36, supra. 

51 United States Dept. of 
Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 
510 U.S. 487, 114 S. Ct. 1006, 127 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1994); Associated Press 
v. United States Dept. of Justice, 549 F.3d 62 (2nd Cir. 2008); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. 
Department of Justice, see note 36, supra; Tacoma 
Public Library v. Woessner, see note 37, supra; 
Scottsdale Unified School Dist. v. KPNX 
Broadcasting Co., see note 33, supra. See also, Hines v. 
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 872 (Ky.App. 2001); Planned 
Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 347, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 642 (2000). 

52 Kimberlin v. Department of 
Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C.Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 891, 119 S. Ct. 210, 142 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1998); Coleman v. Lappin, 680 F. Supp. 2d 192, 199 (2010). 

53Valentine v. Personnel Cabinet, see 
note 36, supra. 

54 California v. Greenwood, 
486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988). 

55 Data Tree, LLC v. Meek, see 
note 36, supra. 

56 C.B.S., Inc. v. Block, 42 Cal. 3d 646, 230 Cal. Rptr. 362, 725 P.2d 470 (1986). 

57 Graham v. Alabama State 
Employees Ass'n, 991 So. 2d 710 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007). See 
also, State ex rel. Cartwright v. Oklahoma 
Industries Auth., 1981 OK 47, ¶14, 629 P.2d 1244. 

58 United States Dept. of 
Defense v. F.L.R.A., see note 51, supra. See also, 
Department of Air Force v. Rose, see note 32, 
supra. 

59 While the United States Supreme Court has expressed 
uncertainty regarding the precise bounds of the constitutional "zone of 
privacy," its existence is firmly established. At least two kinds of 
constitutionally-protected interests have been acknowledged. One is the interest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. The other is the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of decisions. The first of these is 
commonly referred to as "informational privacy." It is this aspect of privacy 
which is at issue here. In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1189, 120 S. Ct. 1244, 146 L. Ed. 2d 102 (2000); F. Chlapowski, "The Constitutional Protection of 
Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L.Rev. 133 (1991). 

60 In re Crawford, see note 59, supra; G. 
Barber, "Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the Public 
Interest in Privacy," 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L.Rev. 63 (2006). 

61 Title 52 O.S. Supp. 2005 §24A.7(A)(2), see note , 
supra. Although we reference federal jurisprudence, our decisions with regard to 
the state law questions are based on Oklahoma law which provides bona 
fide, separate, adequate and independent grounds for our decision. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). 

KAUGER, J., dissenting, with whom Taylor, C.J., joins:
¶1 This is a matter of statutory construction. The statute involved is the 
human resources statute within the Open Records Act. Although the Legislature 
has amended 51 O.S. supp. 2005 
§24 A. 7 three times since its inception in 1985, it has never chosen to include 
the date of birth.1 If the Legislature desires to do so, it certainly 
can.2 

FOOTNOTES

1 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2005 
§24 A. 7D provides:

D. Public bodies shall keep confidential the home address, telephone numbers 
and social security numbers of any person employed or formerly employed by the 
public body.
The statute was enacted in 1985, and amended in 1990, 1994, and most recently 
in 2005. 

2 The legislature included date of birth in the identity 
theft statute, 51 O.S. Supp. 2007 §1533.1A provides:

A. It is unlawful for any person to willfully and with fraudulent intent 
obtain the name, address, social security number, date of birth, place of 
business or employment, debit, credit or account numbers, driver license number, 
or any other personal identifying information of another person, living or dead, 
with intent to use, sell, or allow any other person to use or sell such personal 
identifying information to obtain or attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, 
property, or service in the name of the other person without the consent of that 
person.