Title: State v. Lee

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Kai Ruchell Lee
No. 81, September Term 2001
HEADNOTE:
FOURTH AMENDMENT; SEARCH; WARRANT; KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE;
EXCLUSIONARY RULE; INEVITABLE DISCOVERY; INDEPENDENT
SOURCE
Evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, executed without knocking and announcing
the police presence prior to forcing the door to the premises, is not admissible pursuant to
either the inevitable discovery or the independent source exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 81
September Term, 2001
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
KAI RUCHELL LEE
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
  
Filed:    April 23, 2003
The sole issue, which the State of Maryland, the petitioner, raises in this Court is
whether evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, executed without knocking and announcing
the police presence prior to forcing the door to the premises, is admissible pursuant to the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.  The Circuit Court for Harford
County denied the motion to suppress, filed by the respondent,  Kai Ruchell Lee, ruling that
the possibility of the destruction of the cocaine recovered was an exigent circumstance that
justified the unannounced entry.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed.  Lee v. State, 139
Md. App. 79,  774 A.2d 1183 (2001).   It held that the failure to knock and announce,
without justification, rendered the entry, albeit with a valid warrant, unreasonable and
requires exclusion of the evidence seized.   Id. at 94, 774 A. 2d at 1192.   Application of the
doctrine of inevitable discovery under the circumstances of this case, the intermediate
appellate court concluded in response to the State’s motion for reconsideration, “would
render the knock - and - announce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless.”  Id.
We granted the writ of certiorari at the petitioner’s request and, for the reasons that follow,
we shall affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.  
I.
During the month of August, 1998, the respondent made two separate sales of
cocaine to a confidential informant, acting at the direction of the Baltimore County Police.
After subsequent police surveillance, a warrant  to search the respondent’s  home in Harford
County was obtained from a District Court judge.  The warrant did not contain a “no-knock
1 Whether Maryland permits the issuance of “no-knock” warrants has not been
questioned and, thus, is not an issue in the instant case.
2According to the  Maryland State Police Property Record, the weight of the
cocaine was 29.1 grams.   On the other hand, the Property Received As Evidence By
Circuit Court For Harford County indicates the weight of the cocaine to be 26 grams.  
We shall use the evidence amount.
2
clause;” authorizing entry, even by force, without first knocking and announcing police
presence.1    
The Court of Special Appeals described the search as follows:
“Early on a weekday morning late in September 1998, a large
combined task force of law enforcement officers from the Baltimore County
Police Department, the Harford County Sheriff’s Office, the Harford County
Police Department, and the Maryland State Police, assembled in front of a
single-family, colonial style home in a residential area of Harford County.
The task force, which arrived in several cars and trucks, surrounded the home,
while eight Harford County deputy sheriffs, wearing black hoods and fatigue
style uniforms, battered down the door of Lee’s home with a two handled
“ram,” which is essentially a pipe filled with concrete.  Once inside, the task
force ‘secured the premises’ by dispersing throughout the house.  Task force
officers handcuffed two adults found upstairs in the master bedroom, gathered
three small children from other bedrooms, and then herded all five members
of the household together in the downstairs family room.  The task force
leader, a Maryland State Police trooper, and the Harford County deputy
sheriffs then summonsed the remaining task force officers to enter and search
the entire house.”
Lee, 139 Md. App. at 81 - 82, 774 A.2d at 1185.  Seized in the search were  a clear plastic
bag containing 26 grams of cocaine2; four smaller baggies containing a total of 6.6 grams
of cocaine; $1,369 dollars in U.S. currency; a rental agreement; and a 1986 white Chevy
Astro Van.  The respondent, who acknowledged that the cocaine seized was his, was
arrested and charged with possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous
3
substance.
Before trial, the respondent moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search.
He asserted that the search was invalid because the task force, lacking a reasonable
suspicion to believe exigent circumstances existed to permit its doing so, failed to knock and
announce its presence before entering his home.  The motion was denied by the Circuit
Court for Harford County.   The court reasoned:
“[The police] make a determination that they are going to enter without first
knocking.  They make that determination based on the hand-to-hand buys that
were known....They make that determination based on the ease with which
evidence may be destroyed.  They make that determination on the basis of the
fact that they had a reasonable expectation they would find cocaine in that
location and that Mr. Lee was known to them.
*     *     *     *
“So when I look at the fact that they arrived there, [the officer] brings the
warrant, they have a discussion about what they are going to do and they
make a decision, at that time, based on those factors, that they are going to
enter without first knocking and the reason is...because of the ease with which
the evidence could be destroyed.  When I look at the totality of the
circumstances in this case I have no reason to doubt that that was a tactical
decision they made and based on the totality of the circumstances it was an
appropriate one.”
The respondent noted an appeal of that judgment to the Court of Special Appeals,
which, as we have seen, reversed.  The intermediate appellate court held that the failure of
the police to knock and announce their presence prior to entering the respondent’s residence
was not justified by exigent circumstances:
“It is clear that, although Maryland law and the opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States presumptively require knocking and announcing
 [3] Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914,131 L. Ed. 2d 976                  
               (1995).
            [4] Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615             
               (1997).
4
before entry when searching with a proper warrant, the law also forgives the
failure to do so when there are legally sufficient exigent circumstances.  It is
equally clear that there is no blanket or per se exception for drug searches.
Rather, in each case, the police must articulate a reasonable suspicion, based
upon, particularized facts, that exigent circumstances exists which justify not
knocking and announcing. 
*     *     *     *
“At the suppression hearing, the only witnesses to testify were two Maryland
State Police troopers called by the State, one of whom testified primarily
about having taken a statement from the appellant and not about the conduct
of the search.  The other trooper, who led the task force, candidly admitted
that the only reason he had for not knocking and announcing was that this was
a cocaine case, and he always battered down the doors in cases where the
object to be seized was narcotics, such as cocaine, that could be easily
‘flushed down the toilet.’  The trooper testified that the only exceptions would
occur, hypothetically, if the quantity of drugs exceeded the occupant’s ability
to dispose of them, or the occupants were not at home.  The State was unable
to elicit from the task force leader any particularized evidence about Lee,
Lee’s home, or anything else that would qualify as exigent circumstances, as
contemplated by Wilson [3] and Richards.[4]”
Lee,  at 89 - 90, 774 A.2d at 1189 - 90.
The State filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the court to address whether
exclusion of the evidence was required in view of the inevitable discovery doctrine, arguing
that, in any event, it would have been discovered inevitably pursuant to the validly issued
search warrant.  Although the Court of Special Appeals granted the motion for
reconsideration, it rejected the  inevitable discovery argument.    That exception should not
[5] See People v. Stevens, 597 N. W. 2d 53, 56 (Mich. 1999).
5
be applied in the case sub judice, the intermediate appellate court opined, because:
“To apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule in this
instance would render the knock-and-announce provision of the Fourth
Amendment meaningless.  The application of inevitable discovery in such
cases negates the rule against per se exceptions to the knock-and-announce
requirement.  The United States Supreme Court has twice unanimously
affirmed the requirement to knock and announce.  In light of two rulings from
the nation’s highest court, finding this requirement to exist in both our
common law and the Constitution, it would be wrong and utterly inconsistent
for Maryland, in effect, to expunge this requirement and establish such an
exception as was created in Michigan,[5] by attaching the doctrine of
inevitable discovery to violations of the well established knock-and-announce
requirement.”
Id.  at 94, 774 A. 2d at 1192.
We granted the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lee, 366 Md. 246, 783
A.2d 221 (2001), to address this case of first impression.  In its petition, the State did not
challenge the determination by the intermediate appellate court that there were no exigent
circumstances at the time of the unannounced entry.  Thus, we will address only whether the
doctrine of inevitable discovery applies under the facts of this case.   Stated differently, all
we shall decide is the correctness of the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that the evidence
seized should have been suppressed. 
II.
A.  The Knock and Announce Rule
6The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109, enacted in 1917, provides:
“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house,
(continued...)
6
It is well settled in Maryland, and long has been so, that a police officer executing
a search warrant “must give proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied
admittance before he can use force to break and enter” the premises to be searched.  Henson
v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22, 204 A. 2d 516, 518-19 (1964); Goodman v. State,178 Md.
1, 8, 11 A.2d 635, 639 (1940) (“A demand is necessary prior to the breaking in of the doors
only where some person is found in charge of the building to be searched.”); Frankel v.
State, 178 Md. 553, 561, 16 A.2d 93, 97 (1940) (citing Cornelius on Search and Seizure, 2nd
Ed., sec. 218, for “the rule that an officer, in executing a warrant to enter a house, which
warrant is valid on its face, may break open the doors if denied admittance, but a demand
is necessary prior to breaking doors when the premises are in charge of someone.”).    In
Henson, the appellant argued, inter alia, “that the police officers who executed the search
warrant broke open the door of the house being searched without first announcing who they
were and making demand that entry be granted, and that this was illegal and vitiated all that
followed.” 236 Md. at 520, 204 A.2d at 518.   Characterizing the claim as the extension of
“the old rule,” id. at 521, 204 A. 2d at 518, and one “of long standing,” id. at 522, 204 A.
2d at 519, which has been codified in federal law and a number of the states, id., citing
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 n. 8, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 1195 n. 8,  2 L. Ed. 2d 1332,
1338 n. 8 (1958),6 the Court stated the reasons underlying the rule: “the law abhors
 
6 (...continued)
 or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.” 
7The passage from Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B.1603), in its
entirety reads:
“In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open)
may break the party’s house, either to arrest him or to do other execution of
the K[ing]’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter.   But before he breaks it
he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open
doors ..., for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or
breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by
which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no
default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he
had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it.” 
Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as relevant, declares:
“That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to
the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of
July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have
been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been
introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of
all Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and
sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent
with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the
revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.”  
8Judge Raker subsequently summarized the purpose of the knock and announce
(continued...)
7
unnecessary breaking or destruction of any house,” 
id., citing Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
194 (K.B. 1603)7 and “the dweller in the house would not know the purpose of the person
breaking in, unless he were notified, and would have a right to resist seeming aggression on
his private property.”  Id., citing Launock v. Brown, 106 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B. 1819).8    The
8(...continued) 
rule:
“The policy reasons underlying the announcement rule were to prevent
sudden, unannounced invasions of the privacy of citizens, to prevent the
needless destruction of property, and to safeguard the officer who might
otherwise be killed by a ‘fearful householder’ unaware of the officer’s
identity or purpose.”          
                                                      
Irma S. Raker, The New “No Knock” Provision and its Effect on the Authority of the
Police to Break and Enter, 20 Am. U. L. Rev. 467, 469 (1970 - 71).
8
Court observed, however, that  “the rule often has been made subject to qualifications and
exceptions even in states with statutes, so that by judicial decision announcement and
demand are not a requisite where the facts make it evident the officers' purpose is known
or where they would frustrate the arrest, increase the peril of the arresting officer or permit
the destruction of evidence.” Id.   For that proposition, it cited, among other authorities,
Miller, 357 U.S. at 309, 78 S. Ct. at 1195, 2 L. Ed.2d at 1338.
The Court held that the entry by breaking and without warning in that case was
“reasonable, permissible and legal and the evidence seized was admissible against the
appellant.”   236 Md. at 524, 204 A. 2d 520.  Supporting that holding was the Court’s
conclusion that, “[p]racticalities and exigencies in searches for narcotics require the element
of surprise entry, for if opportunity is given all evidence easily may be destroyed during the
time required to give notice, demand admittance and accept communication of denial of
entry,” id. at 523, 204 A. 2d at 519, and the testimony of the officer in charge of those
executing the warrant, that his “experience in the past twelve years [has been] when you
9
knock on a door when you suspect drugs being on the premises, they are often disposed of
by flushing down the toilet or thrown out in some manner.”  Id. at 523, 204 A. 2d at 519-
520.   As to the former, the Court quoted, with approval, Kaplan, Search and Seizure, A
No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 474, 502 (1961):
“... it would seem that the perfection of small fire-arms and the development
of indoor plumbing through which evidence can quickly be destroyed, have
made [statutes requiring notice and entry before the use of force to enter] ...
a dangerous anachronism.  In many situations today ..., a rule requiring
officers to forfeit the valuable element of surprise seems senseless and
dangerous.”
As Henson indicates, the Supreme Court of the United States has commented on the
vintage of the knock and announce rule.    Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34, 115
S. Ct. 1914, 1916-18, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976, 980-82 (1995); Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S.
585, 589, 88 S. Ct. 1755, 1758, 20 L. Ed. 2d 828, 833 (1968); Miller, supra, 357 U.S. at
306-08, 78 S. Ct. at 1194, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1337-38.   In Miller, after the Court traced the
history of the rule, it concluded that “[t]he requirement of prior notice of authority and
purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be
given grudging application.”  357 U.S. at 313, 78 S. Ct. at 1198, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1340.
Although the entry in that case was “tested by criteria identical with those embodied in 18
U.S.C. § 3109,” id. at 306, 78 S. Ct. at 1194, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1336, the Miller Court observed
that Congress “codif[ied] a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law.”  Id. at 313, 78 S.
Ct. at 1198, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1340.  See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933-34, 115 S. Ct.  at 1917-18,
131 L. Ed. 2d at 982; Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 591 n.8, 88 S. Ct. at 1759 n. 8, 20 L. Ed. 2d at
10
834 n. 8.   In both Miller and Sabbath, the Court held inadmissible evidence obtained as a
fruit of an arrest effected in violation of the knock and announce rule.    In neither case was
the remedy of exclusion of the evidence challenged.
Despite the vintage of the knock and announce rule and its deep roots in Anglo-
American jurisprudence, it was not until Wilson that the Supreme Court “constitutionalized”
the doctrine, by squarely holding that the knock and announce principle “is an element of
the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  514 U.S. at 934, 115 S. Ct.
at 1918, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 982.   In that case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, having rejected
the accused’s argument that the knock and announce principle is required by the Fourth
Amendment and “concluded that neither Arkansas law nor the Fourth Amendment required
the suppression of the evidence, id. at 930, 115 S. Ct. at1916, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 980, affirmed
the accused’s drug convictions.   The High Court reversed, holding:
“Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of
announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was
among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search
or seizure.  Contrary to the decision below, we hold that in some
circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
Id.  at 934, 115 S. Ct. at 1918, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 982    It cautioned, however, that the
“flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of
announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.  Id. at 934, 115 S. Ct.
at 1918, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 982.  Indeed, the Court acknowledged that considerations of
11
officer safety and the ease with which drugs may be destroyed “may well provide the
necessary justification” for unannounced entries.   Id. at 937, 115 S. Ct. at 1919, 131 L. Ed.
2d at 984.   Consequently, the Court characterized its  opinion to “simply hold that although
a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers enter
without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry.”  Id. at 936, 115 S. Ct. at 1919, 131 L. Ed. 2d at
984.   Rather than “attempt a comprehensive catalog of the relevant countervailing factors,”
it left “to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an
unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 936, 115 S. Ct. at
1919, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 984.
That the High Court intended the determination of the factors that inform the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry to be made on a case by case basis has
subsequently been confirmed.   In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416,
137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997), that Court  addressed whether a blanket exception to the knock
and announce rule was permissible when police execute a search warrant in felony drug
investigations.  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, concluding that Wilson did not preclude
per se rules with respect to the knock and announce requirement, reaffirmed a pre -Wilson
holding that police officers need never knock and announce their presence when executing
a search warrant pursuant to a felony drug investigation.    Id. at 387-88, 117 S. Ct. at 1418,
137 L. Ed. 2d at 620.   The High Court reversed.    Although reiterating what was
12
recognized in Wilson, “that the knock-and-announce requirement could give way ‘under
circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence’ or ‘where police officers have reason
to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given,’” id. at 391,
117 S. Ct. at 1420, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 622, and characterizing as “indisputable” the fact that
“felony drug investigations may frequently involve both of these circumstances,” id. at 391,
117 S. Ct. at 1420, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 622-23, the Court rejected the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s rationale for adoption of the per se rule, identifying two “serious concerns”:
“First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization.  For
example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer
safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose
these risks to a substantial degree.  For example, a search could be conducted
at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection
with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy
evidence.   Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for were
of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly.   In
those situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence
and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests
intruded upon by a no-knock entry.   Wisconsin’s blanket rule impermissibly
insulates these cases from judicial review. 
“A second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category exception to
the knock-and-announce requirement is that the reasons for creating an
exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others.  Armed
bank robbers, for example are, by definition, likely to have weapons, and the
fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much difficulty.  If a per
se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that
included a considerable – albeit hypothetical – risk of danger to officers or
destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.” 
Id.  at 393-94, 117 S. Ct at 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d 623-24 (footnote omitted).     The Court
concluded:
9Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A. 2d 516 (1964), discussed supra, in
particular the discussion at 236 Md. at 523-25, 204 A. 2d at 519-20, was identified by the
Court in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 390 n.1, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1420 n. 1,137 L.
Ed. 2d 615, 622 n. 1 (1997), as a case predating Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 115
S. Ct. 1914, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995) that concluded “that simple probable cause to
search a home for narcotics always allows the police to forgo the knock-and-announce
requirement.”    It follows that, to the extent that Henson sanctioned a per se rule in drug
cases, it is no longer good law.
13
“Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present
circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral
scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to
knock and announce in a particular case.  Instead, in each case it is the duty
of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and
circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-
announce requirement.”
Id. at 394, 117 S. Ct. at 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624.    It held:
“In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction
of evidence.   This standard -- as opposed to a probable cause requirement --
strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement
concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual
privacy interests affected by no-knock entries.”  
Id. at 394, 117 S. Ct. at 1421-22, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624.9 
The issue this case presents, whether the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule, enunciated in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed.
2d 377 (1984), renders evidence seized during a search conducted in violation of the knock
and announce rule admissible was made to, but not decided by, the Wilson Court. 
Declining to address it and a companion argument based on the “independent source”
14
doctrine, the Court explained:
“Respondent and its amici also ask us to affirm the denial of petitioner’s
suppression motion on an alternative ground: that exclusion is not a
constitutionally compelled remedy where the unreasonableness of a search
stems from the failure of announcement.   Analogizing to the ‘independent
source’ doctrine applied in Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 805, 813-
816, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599[, 608-09], 104 S. Ct. 3380[, 3385-86] (1984), and the
‘inevitable discovery’ rule adopted in Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 440-
448, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377[, 385-90], 104 S. Ct. 2501[, 2507-11] (1984),
respondent and its amici argue that any evidence seized after an unreasonable,
unannounced entry is causally disconnected from the constitutional violation
and that exclusion goes beyond the goal of precluding any benefit to the
government flowing from the constitutional violation.    Because this remedial
issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow
question on which we granted certiorari, we decline to address these
arguments.”  
Wilson, 514 U. S. at 937 n.4, 115 S. Ct. at 1919 n.4, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 984 n.4.
A different, but nevertheless similar, argument was presented to the Court, but
rejected, in Richards:
“The State asserts that the intrusion on individual interests effectuated
by a no-knock entry is minimal because the execution of the warrant itself
constitutes the primary intrusion on individual privacy and that the individual
privacy interest cannot outweigh the generalized governmental interest in
effective and safe law enforcement.    See also Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 16 (‘occupants’ privacy interest is necessarily limited to the
brief interval between the officers’ announcement and their entry’).    While
it is true that a no-knock entry is less intrusive than, for example, a
warrantless search, the individual interests implicated by an unannounced,
forcible entry should not be unduly minimized.    As we observed in Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. at 927, 930-932, 131 L. Ed. 2d 977, 115 S. Ct. 1914
(1995), the common law recognized that individuals should have an
opportunity to themselves comply with the law and to avoid the destruction
of property occasioned by a forcible entry.   These interests are not
inconsequential.
10The respondent submits that, insofar as it is being advanced as a separate ground
for reversal, the “independent source” theory is not preserved for our review, having been
raised for the first time in the State’s brief to this Court.   The State submits to the
contrary.   Denying reliance on the theory as a separate matter, it argues, instead, that,
under the facts of this case, where the warrant constituted the independent source by
virtue of which the drugs inevitably would have been and, indeed, were discovered,
notwithstanding the illegal entry, the two doctrines are inextricably intertwined.  It relies
on the close relationship between “independent source” and “inevitable discovery,” citing
cases recognizing this to be so.  Murray v. United States, 487 U. S. 533, 539, 108 S. Ct.
2529, 2534, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472, 481- 82 (1986) (“inevitable discovery” rule “is in reality
(continued...)
15
“Additionally, when police enter a residence without announcing their
presence, the residents are not given any opportunity to prepare themselves
for such an entry.    The State pointed out at oral argument that, in Wisconsin,
most search warrants are executed during the late night and early morning
hours. ... [t]he brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant
may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of
bed.”
520 U. S. at 393 n. 5, 117 S. Ct. at 1421 n. 5, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 623 n. 5.
B.  Independent Source/Inevitable Discovery
The State challenges the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that “[t]o apply
the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule in this instance would render the
knock-and-announce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless.”  
Lee, 139 Md. App.
at 94, 774 A. 2d at 1192.    In support of its position, it proffers two related reasons: “[t]he
search warrant in this case served as an independent source for seizure of the cocaine in
Lee’s residence, rendering the seizure causally disconnected from the entry violation, and
the cocaine inevitably would have been discovered pursuant to that warrant.”  (Petitioner’s
brief, at 6-7).    In other words, the State relies on the “independent source”10 and “inevitable
         
10 (...continued)
an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would
be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible
if it inevitably would have been discovered”); Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 536, 781 A.
2d 787, 815 (2001); State v. Wagoner, 24 P. 3d 306, 310 (N. M. 2001); United States v.
Leake, 95 F. 3d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1318 n.1
(7th Cir. 1993).
Although not mentioned by name in its Petition for Certiorari, when the closeness 
of the interrelationship between the doctrines is taken into account, see People v. Tate,
753 N. E. 2d 347, 352 (Ill. App. 2001) (having rejected the “independent source”
argument, noting “[t]he same reasoning defeats the State’s inevitable discovery argument. 
The inevitable discovery doctrine is an extrapolation of the independent source
doctrine”), and the substance of the arguments actually made are considered, we believe
that the State is correct, the “independent source” argument has been preserved and,
therefore, must be addressed on the merits.   The question presented in the “cert” petition
proceeded on two premises, that “the evidence seized was not the product of the failure to
knock and announce and would inevitably have been discovered.”   This question is
consistent with the question the State presented in its brief.   The underlying premise of
that question was that the evidence was  seized pursuant to a valid search warrant and,
thus, was not, for that reason, “the product of the failure to knock and announce, and
would inevitably have been discovered.”   Moreover, the State argued in the “cert”
petition that “[i]nasmuch as the warrant was independent of any illegal entry, the
evidence discovered inevitably would have been found during the independent police
search pursuant to a valid warrant.”
11Although the interrelationship between inevitable discovery and independent
source is close, they are analytically distinct.   As one court has observed:
 
“The inevitable discovery doctrine applies where evidence is
not actually discovered by lawful means, but inevitably would
have been. Its focus is on what would have happened if the
illegal search had not aborted the lawful method of discovery.
The independent source doctrine, however, applies when the
evidence actually has been discovered by lawful means. Its
focus is on what actually happened--was the discovery tainted
by the illegal search?”
United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1318 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993).   See Williams v.            
State, 372 Md. 386, 410 - 11, 813 A. 2d 231, 245 - 46 (2002).
16
discovery” exceptions11 to the exclusionary rule.    
17
Having reviewed the prerequisites of the “independent source” and “inevitable
discovery” doctrines, the State concludes that “[t]he inevitable discovery rule thus  presents
a factual causation question: Would the evidence have been found, absent the illegal
conduct?”   Answering that question, it submits:
“Turning to the facts of this case, the warrant to search Lee's residence
was premised on probable cause to believe that Lee was involved in the
distribution of cocaine and that drugs and related paraphernalia would be
discovered in his home. The police had a valid warrant that would have
allowed them to thoroughly search Lee's residence, and 
any containers therein,
and that search would have taken place regardless of whether the police first
knocked and announced themselves at the door. What difference would those
few seconds have made to the search? None. There is no question that the
officers were going to enter. There is no question that the officers were going
to search. There was no evidence that the occupants of the residence were
poised to destroy the contraband in those few seconds that would have made
the difference between compliance and noncompliance with the knock and
announce rule. ... Indeed, ‘[i]t is hard to understand how the discovery of
evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police
arrive with a warrant; an occupant would hardly be allowed to contend that,
had the officers announced their presence and waited to enter, he would have
had time to destroy the evidence.’ United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715,716-
17 (7th Cir. 1998).”
(Petitioner’s brief, at 9-10) (Footnote omitted).
The State readily acknowledges that, “[n]umerous state and federal cases have
declined to apply the inevitable discovery or independent source exceptions to the
exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations.”  Id.  at 11.    It is not persuaded by
those cases, characterizing them as proceeding “on the same  misguided premise as the Court
of Special Appeals[,] that to do so would render the knock and announce rule meaningless.”
Id.  What those cases ignore, the State maintains, is that application of either or both of the
12 Recently, the Court of Appeals of Utah held that the independent source doctrine
could apply to knock and announce violations, State v. Zesiger, 2003 Ut. App. 37, at P17,
65 P.3d 314(Utah 2003), noting, in the process, that the trial court, in categorically
holding otherwise, cited no cases explicitly rejecting that application, id. at P13, 65 P. 3d
314 and distinguishing United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1993), on which
the trial court relied, on the basis that the issue was not specifically decided in that case. 
Id. 
18
doctrines to knock and announce cases does not vitiate the knock and announce rule; rather,
“The rule stands; only the remedy differs.” People v. Hoag, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1198, 1214
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (concurring opinion).
Not surprisingly, the State is more persuaded by those cases that, distinguishing the
rule from the remedy, have applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to knock and announce
violations, notably, in addition to the concurring opinion in Hoag, supra, People v. Vasquez,
602 N. W. 2d 376, 379 (Mich. 1999); People v. Stevens, 597 N. W. 2d 53, 56 (Mich. 1999);
Richardson v. State, 787 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. App. 2001) (concurring opinion); People v.
Lamas, 229 Cal. App.3d 560, 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); United States v. [Kip] Jones, 214 F.
3d 836, 838 (7 th Cir. 2000); United States v. [Dennis] Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir.,
1998);  United States v. Hidalgo, 747 F. Supp. 818, 832 (Mass. D. Ct. 1990).12     
Stevens is illustrative.    There, the Supreme Court of Michigan, having determined
that the police violated the knock and announce rule by their method of entry into the
defendant’s home to execute the validly issued search warrant - knocking and waiting only
a few seconds before forcibly entering - and thus violated the Fourth amendment, addressed
whether that violation required exclusion of the evidence seized. 597 N. W. 2d at 55.  
Although acknowledging the pronouncements of  the Supreme Court in Wilson, at 934, 115
19
S. Ct. at 1918, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 982 (“[I]n some circumstances, an officer’s unannounced
entry into a home [notwithstanding a valid warrant] might be unreasonable under the Fourth
amendment.”) and in United States v. Ramirez, 523 U. S. 65, 71, 118 S. Ct. 992, 996, 140
L. Ed. 2d 191, 198 (1998) (“The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth
Amendment analysis ... governs the method of execution of the warrant.”), Stevens, 597 N.
W.2d at 58, and that “the exclusionary rule is sometimes needed to deter police from
violations of constitutional and statutory protections, even at a great cost to society,” id. at
62, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that, in that case, “the evidence would have been
discovered despite any police misconduct,” id. at 62, and that “the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule should be available to the prosecution.”  Id.    
As to the latter holding, the court reasoned, consistent with the Nix statement of the
purpose of the exclusionary rule in the inevitable discovery context, id. at 61:
“Given that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, allowing the
evidence in does not put the prosecution in any better position than it would
be in had the police adhered to the knock-and-announce requirement. 
However, excluding the evidence puts the prosecution in a worse position than
it would have been in had there been no police misconduct.”
Id. at 62.    
The former holding is premised on a violation of the knock and announce rule having
no effect on the validity or the execution of the warrant.   As to that, the court opined that the
knock and announce requirement “does not control the execution of a valid search warrant;
rather, it only delays entry,” id. at 63, one purpose of which “is to allow the occupants a
‘brief opportunity ... to order [their] personal affairs before the [officers] enter.’”  
Id., quoting
20
United States v. Kane, 637 F. 2d 974, 977 (3rd Cir. 1981).    Adopting the rationale, stated
in dicta in United States v [Dennis] Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir., 1998), i.e., 
“It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could
be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police arrive with a warrant; an occupant
would hardly be allowed to contend that, had the officers announced their
presence and waited longer to enter, he would have had time to destroy the
evidence,”  
id. at 64, the court explained:
“The officers were armed with a valid search warrant. Defendant does not
argue that the officers' search exceeded the scope of that warrant. It was not
the means of entry that led to the discovery of the evidence, but, rather, it was
the authority of the search warrant that enabled the police to search and seize
the contested evidence. Therefore, the searching and seizing of the evidence
was independent of failure to comply with the ‘knock and announce’ statute.
“As in Jones, the discovery of the evidence in the present case was inevitable,
regardless of the illegalities on the police officers' entry into defendant's home.
One of the purposes of the statute is to allow a defendant a brief opportunity
to put his personal affairs in order before the police enter his home.    United
States v Kane, supra at 977. It is not meant to allow the defendant the time to
destroy the evidence. In the present case, the police did not exceed the scope
of the search warrant. Therefore, they would have discovered the contested
evidence, unless the defendant had been afforded the opportunity to destroy
the evidence. The timing of the police officers' entry into the home in no way
affected the inevitability of the discovery of the evidence.”
Id.    In addition to [Dennis] Jones, supra, the court relied on United States v. Stefonek, 179
F. 3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999).    With respect to the appropriate sanction for the knock and
announce violation, the court opined:
“There are both state and federal sanctions for such violations that serve as
deterrents for police misconduct that are less severe than the exclusion of the
evidence.    Additionally, exclusion of the evidence will put the prosecution in
a worse position than if the police misconduct had not occurred.”
13The prohibition of the exclusionary rule “extends as well to the indirect as the
direct products” of unconstitutional conduct.   Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471,
484, 83 S. Ct. 407, 415, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 453 (1963).   Thus, it does not matter whether
that evidence is “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or
seizure [or] evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit
of the poisonous tree.’”  Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S. Ct. 3380,
3385, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599, 608 (1984), citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383[, 34 S.
Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 2d 652,] (1914) and quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338,
341[, 60 S. Ct. 266, 268, 84 L. Ed. 2d 307, 311] (1939).   See Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533, 536-37, 108 S. Ct. 2529[, 2532], 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 [, 480](1988) ( the
exclusionary rule prohibits evidence “that is the product of the primary evidence, or that
is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which
           (continued...)
21
Id. at 64.
Critical to the State’s argument, whether premised on inevitable discovery or
independent source, is the presence of a valid warrant, lawfully obtained, which is separate
and distinct from its manner of execution, as well as the search itself.   Armed with such a
warrant, the argument, like the argument that carried the day in Stevens, proceeds on the
premise that “where the police are in possession of a valid warrant, and yet are somehow
deficient in the manner of announcing their entry as they execute the warrant, it is only their
entry, not the search itself that suffers from a taint of unreasonableness.    In essence, [the
argument is] ... that , where the entry is unlawful or unreasonable, the remainder of the search
is nonetheless lawful because it occurs pursuant to a ... lawfully obtained and valid warrant.”
Stevens, 597 N. W. 2d at  69 (Cavanagh, J, dissenting). 
Generally, evidence obtained as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible.13  The primary reason for excluding such evidence is to “curb
 
13 (...continued) 
the connection with the unlawful search becomes ‘so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint’”); Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 539; 781 A.2d 787, 817 (2001) (applying the
exclusionary rule analysis to evidence derived from an unlawful wiretap in determining
that “the trial judge properly drew the line between the taint of the original illegality...and
found attenuation from the taint....”).
22
improper police conduct, which it accomplishes by disallowing the use of the evidence
illegally obtained.”  Brown v. State, 364 Md. 37, 44, 770 A.2d 679, 683 (2001) (Bell, C.J.
dissenting).  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 - 43, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2508, 81 L. Ed.
2d 377, 386 - 87 (1984); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1689, 6 L. Ed.2d
1081, 1087 (1961); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L. Ed.2d
1067, 1083 (1976); One 1995 Corvette VIN No. 1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 128, 724 A.2d 680, 687 (1999) (acknowledging that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to curb improper police conduct); Potts v. State, 300 Md.
567, 582, 479 A.2d 1335, 1343 (1984).   On the other hand, although the State is not
permitted to profit from its illegal activity, “neither should it be placed in a worse position
than it would otherwise have occupied,” Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S. Ct. at 2535, 101 L.
Ed. 2d at 483, when evidence, or knowledge of that evidence, is gained from an independent
and lawful source, that evidence is admissible.   Id. at 538, 108 S. Ct. at 2533 - 34, 101 L.
Ed.2d  at 481.     See also Segura, 468 U.S. at 805, 104 S. Ct. at 3385, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 609,
in which the Court, quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S. Ct. at 417, 9 L. Ed.2d at 455,
in turn quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182,
23
183, 64 L. Ed. 2d 319, 321 (1920), reiterated that “the exclusionary rule has no application
[where] the Government learned of the evidence ‘from an independent source.”’   Thus, if
the State can show that the source of the evidence was “wholly independent of any
constitutional violation,” Nix, 467 U. S. at 443, 104 S. Ct. at 2508, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387, then
that there was an illegal search that took place at some point during a criminal investigation
will not render the evidence in question inadmissible.   That was the case in Segura.
In Segura, having probable cause to believe that Segura and another were engaged in
selling narcotics, the police arrested Segura.  Taking  him to his apartment, they  knocked
without announcing that they were police officers.  When the door was opened, the police
entered the apartment and conducted a limited security sweep for other persons, in the
process of which drug paraphernalia was seen in plain view.  The occupant of the apartment,
Colon, was then arrested, but two of the police officers remained in the apartment awaiting
the securing of a search warrant.   The warrant was obtained 19 hours later; however, the
information on the basis of which the warrant was issued was neither derived from, nor
related to the initial police entry nor obtained during that entry, but, rather, “constituted an
independent source for the discovery and seizure of the evidence ... challenged.” 468 U. S.
at 814, 104 S. Ct. at 3390, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 615.   Executing the warrant, the police seized both
the paraphernalia they had seen earlier and cocaine discovered during the later search.  Id.,
468 U.S. at 799 - 801, 104 S. Ct. at 3383,  82 L. Ed. 2d at 605 - 06.  Finding no exigent
circumstances justifying the initial warrantless, unannounced entry, the United States District
24
Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that the entry was illegal.   It thus
granted Segura’s motion to suppress all of the evidence seized, the paraphernalia seen on the
initial warrantless entry as well as the cocaine seized after the warrant was issued.  Id. at 802,
104 S. Ct. at 3383 - 84, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 606.
The  Second Circuit affirmed that ruling with respect to  the paraphernalia seized prior
to the issuance of the warrant, holding that it was properly suppressed, but reversed with
respect to the cocaine seized under the warrant.  Id. at  802-803, 104 S. Ct. at 3384, 82 L. Ed.
2d at 607.   The former ruling, not having been challenged by the Government, was not
before the Supreme Court.   Id. at 802 - 03 n.4, 104 S. Ct. at 3384 n.4, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 607
n.4.   With respect to the cocaine seized pursuant to the warrant, concluding that to do so
would not weaken the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule because “officers who enter
illegally will recognize that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry
may be suppressed... ,” id. at 812, 104 S. Ct. at 3389 , 82 L. Ed. 2d at 613, the Court held that
it was admissible.    It reasoned that, as to that cocaine, “[w]hether the initial entry was illegal
or not is irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence because there was an
independent source for the warrant under which that evidence was seized,” id. at 813-14, 104
S. Ct. at 3390, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 614, and that was because it “was discovered the day following
the entry, during the search conducted under a valid warrant; it was the product of that
search, wholly unrelated to the prior entry.” Id. at 814, 104 S. Ct. at 3390, 82 L. Ed. 2d at
615.  
25
Murray, supra, is factually similar.   There, without a warrant and there being no
exigent circumstances, federal agents illegally entered a warehouse, observing, as a result,
bales of marijuana in plain view.   487 U. S. at 535, 108 S. Ct. at 2532, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 479.
They left without disturbing the evidence.   Keeping the warehouse under surveillance, but
without including the observations made during the illegal entry in the affidavit for the
warrant, the agents obtained a warrant for the search of the warehouse.   Id. at 536, 108 S.
Ct. at 2532, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 479.   Therefore, eight hours after the initial warrantless entry,
the agents reentered the warehouse and seized the bales of marijuana they had previously
observed.  Id.  The Circuit Court of Appeals, assuming the initial entry to have been illegal,
affirmed the District Court’s denial of  Murray's motion to suppress the marijuana and thus
the  rejection of the claim that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was tainted by the
prior illegal entry.  Id.  Noting that “[s]o long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely
independent of an earlier, tainted one (which may well be difficult to establish where the
seized goods are kept in the police's possession) there is no reason why the independent
source doctrine should not apply,” id. at 542, 108 S. Ct. at 2535, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 483, the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further fact finding.  Id. at
543 - 44, 108 S. Ct. at 2536, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 484.   In that regard, the court observed:
“The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the search pursuant to the warrant
was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible
evidence at issue here.  This would not have been the case if the agents'
decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the
initial entry ... or if information obtained during that entry was presented to the
Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant.” 
14This Court, in Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 813 A.2d 231 (2002), considered,
“whether evidence seized from a motel room following an entry by police is admissible in
evidence on the grounds that it was seized as a result of an independent source or that it
inevitably would have been discovered.”  Id. at 394, 813 A. 2d at 236.   In that case,
having arrested an individual, Berry, who was staying at a motor inn, the police decided
to apply for a search warrant for Berry’s room in the named motor inn.   While the
application was being prepared and pending issuance of the warrant, other officers  went
to the motel.   They approached the subject rooms and knocked on the door, responding,
“maintenance,” to the inquiry as to who was there.   When the occupant looked through
the window, but did not open the door and instead was heard to run from the door, the
officers kicked in the door and  entered, in the process smelling marijuana and seeing
marijuana, in plain view.   They subsequently arrested the defendant and, while searching
him found cocaine on his person, in his pajamas.   The police did not search further until
they executed the warrant, which was subsequently issued.  The application for that
warrant included the information learned from the warrantless entry.   No issue of the
violation of the knock and announce rule was alleged, simply that the seizures of
evidence from the defendant’s person and from motel rooms were illegal.  Id.  At 395 -
98, 813 A. 2d at 236 - 38.    The trial court, finding “‘the State has failed to demonstrate
that there was sufficient information for probable cause and even if so found, no exigent
circumstances existed that would justify an ‘impoundment’ of the hotel rooms and its
occupants without a warrant,’” id. at 398 - 99, 813 A. 2d at 239, agreed and, thus,
suppressed the evidence.  Although affirming the exigency finding, the Court of Special
Appeals nevertheless reversed, concluding that   there was probable cause even without
the tainted information and that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied.   We reversed,
pointing out that “[i]n the instant case, the independent source doctrine is inapplicable
because the State has failed to identify any evidence that was seized pursuant to the
search warrant.”  Id. at 414, 813 A. 2d at 248. 
 
26
Id. at 542, 108 S. Ct. at 2536, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 483 - 84 (footnote omitted). 
The identical argument as that made by the State has been rejected, as the State itself
acknowledges, by the majority of the courts considering it in the knock and announce
context.14   See United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir 2000); United States v.
Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984 - 85 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790 (6th Cir.
27
1996);  United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1993);  United States v.
Becker, 23 F.3d 1537, 1541 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Shugart, 889 F. Supp. 963, 973
- 75 (E.D. Tex 1995), aff'd. United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1997);
Mazepink v. State, 987 S.W.2d 648, 657 (Ark. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas v.
Mazepink, 528 U. S. 927, 120 S. Ct. 321, 145 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1999); State v. Taylor, 733
N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ohio App. 1999); People v. Tate, 753 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Ill. App. 2001). See
also, District of Columbia v. Mancouso, 778 A.2d 270, 275 n.10 (D.C. 2001);
Commonwealth v. Mason, 637 A.2d 251, 257 (Pa. 1993)(concurring opinion) (independent
source doctrine should be strictly limited to a source which is “truly independent from both
the tainted evidence and the police or investigative team which engaged in the misconduct
by which the tainted evidence was discovered” ).
In Dice, the court, characterizing it as an attempt “to recast evidence that is in fact the
direct fruit of an unconstitutional search as indirect evidence from an independent source,”
and labeling it a misunderstanding of the doctrine, 200 F. 3d at 985, emphatically rejected
the independent source rule argument.   It distinguished Segura and Murray as two search
cases, in which the second search, conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, “was independent
of the illegal initial search.”   The court emphasized that, in Segura,  the Supreme Court did
not alter the lower court’s finding that the items seen during the initial illegal entry were
inadmissible.  Id., citing Segura, 468 U.S. at 804, 104 S. Ct. at 3385, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 608. 
By contrast, it explained:
28
“In this case, there was but one entry, and it was illegal.  The officers seized
the evidence in question directly following that illegal entry. Knock-and-
announce caselaw in this circuit and others makes very clear that such
evidence is inadmissible as the direct fruit of that search. See, e.g., [United
States v.] Bates, 84 F.3d [790,] 795 [(6th Cir. 1996)]. This is so even if that
entry would have otherwise been legal because it was made pursuant to a valid
search warrant. Indeed, the knock-and-announce rule presupposes that the
entry is for a valid purpose - - it merely prescribes the method by which that
entry should be made in order best to protect the interests of the private
resident. In other words, a knock-and-announce violation deems a search
illegal due to the unlawful method in which it was executed even if the search
were legal in its purpose and authority (as demonstrated by a valid warrant).
The admissible evidence from cases such as Segura and [United States v.]
Moreno [, 758 F. 2d 425 (9th Cir. 1985)] all arose from searches which had
both a valid warrant (purpose) as well as a legal entry (method).  Here, we only
have the former.”
Id.    The court concluded:
“Finally, we reject the Government's position because it would completely
emasculate the knock-and-announce rule.  As stated supra, the requirement
that officers reasonably  wait is a crucial element of the knock-and-announce
rule. To remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce
violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift move
gut the constitution's regulation of how officers execute such warrants.”
Id. at 986. 
A similar rationale was employed by the court in Tate:
“The requirement that the source be ‘genuinely independent’ and the product
of a ‘later, lawful seizure’ cuts against the State's argument here that the valid
search warrant triggers the independent source doctrine. That the information
supporting the warrant was known before the illegal entry was made is
irrelevant. The State cannot escape from the record here: that the otherwise
valid search warrant was executed in violation of the fourth amendment. The
violation is directly connected to the illegal entry.  A contrary conclusion
would render the ‘knock and announce’ requirement meaningless and allow
the exception to swallow the rule. ‘Given the longstanding common law
29
endorsement of the practice of announcement’, we conclude that independent
source does not apply under these facts.”
753 N.E.2d at 352, quoting respectively Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S. Ct. at 2535, 101 L.
Ed. 2d at 483 and Wilson, 514 U.S. at  934, 115 S. Ct. at 1918, 131 L. Ed.2d at 982.    That
is also the reasoning of the 8th Circuit in Marts.   Responding to the argument made by the
dissent that the independent source doctrine was applicable to that case, the court opined that
such application would make the knock and announce rule meaningless: “an officer could
obviate illegal entry in every instance simply by looking to the information used to obtain the
warrant.   Under the dissent’s reasoning, officers, in executing a valid search warrant, could
break in doors of private homes without sanction.”  986 F. 2d at 1220. The court concluded
that, since the warrant in that case, although legally obtained, was executed in violation of
the knock and announce rule and the independent source doctrine requires that the search
warrant and the evidence seized pursuant to it be totally unrelated to the illegal entry, the
execution of the warrant was directly related to the illegal entry.  Id.
We are persuaded by this reasoning and, so, hold that the independent source doctrine
does not render evidence seized in violation of the knock and announce rule admissible.   To
hold otherwise, we agree with the courts that have so concluded, would be to strike a fatal
blow to the knock and announce rule.
30
In Nix, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that “when ... the evidence in question would
inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there
is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.” 467 U. S. at 448, 104
S. Ct. at 2511, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 390.   In that case, the police violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and as a result found the body of the young girl that the
defendant had kidnaped and killed.  467 U. S. at 435-37, 104 S. Ct. at 2504 - 05, 81 L. Ed
2d at 382-83.   Following the reversal of his conviction for that misconduct, the defendant
was retried, but this time the prosecution did not use the defendant’s statements or offer
evidence that the defendant had directed the police to the body, id. at 437, 104 S. Ct. at 2506,
81 L. Ed. 2d at 383; instead, in order to “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the [girl’s body] ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,” id.
at 444, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 , 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387 - 88, it presented detailed testimony regarding
the search that had taken place, the team's search methods and the likelihood of what would
have happened had searchers not been told the location of the body.     Id. at 448 - 49, 104
S. Ct. at 2511 - 12, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 390 - 91.  On that evidence, the Court concluded that “it
is clear that the search parties were approaching the actual location of the body, and we are
satisfied ... that the volunteer search teams would have resumed the search had Williams not
31
earlier led the police to the body and the body inevitably would have been found.”   Id. at
449-50, 104 S. Ct. at 2512, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 391.
This Court has recognized “the existence of the inevitable discovery doctrine and its
basic requirements,”  Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 165, 423 A.2d 552, 557 (1980), decided
four years before Nix, and applied it, Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 654-656, 612 A.2d 258,
270-71 (1992), most recently in Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 415 - 18, 813 A.2d 231, 248
- 51 (2002).   In Stokes, we stated that the doctrine “permits the government to cleanse the
fruit of poison by demonstrating that the evidence acquired through improper exploitation
would have been discovered by law enforcement officials by utilization of legal means
independent of the improper method employed,”  289 Md. at 163, 423 A. 2d at 556, citing
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 at 620-628; LaCount and Girese, The “Inevitable
Discovery” Rule, an Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 Alb.
L. Rev. 483 (1976); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit--the Fourth Amendment and the
Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 307, 313 - 321 (1964), and that to invoke it,  
“‘[T]he prosecution must establish, first, that certain proper and predictable
investigatory procedures would have been utilized in the case at bar, and
second, that those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery
of the evidence in question.”’  
Id., quoting LaCount and Girese, supra at 491.   We emphasized that to establish inevitable
discovery required proof, instead of simply speculation:
32
“‘It is not enough to show that the evidence ‘might’ or ‘could’ have been
otherwise obtained.  Once the illegal act is shown to have been in fact the sole
effective cause of the discovery of certain evidence, such evidence is
inadmissible unless the prosecution severs the causal connection by an
affirmative showing that it would have acquired the evidence in any event.  In
order to avoid the exclusionary rule, the government must establish that it has
not benefitted by the illegal acts of its agents; a showing that it might not have
so benefitted is insufficient.”’  
Id.  at 164, 423 A.2d at 557, quoting Maguire, supra at 315.  
In Oken, we applied the inevitable discovery doctrine.  327 Md. at 654 - 56, 612 A.2d
at 270 - 71.  There, the trial court, having found that they would inevitably have been
discovered, admitted into evidence the  pair of tennis shoes the defendant was wearing at the
time of his arrest, over the defendant’s objection that they were seized as a result of
information obtained during an illegal search of a room he had occupied while staying at an
inn in Maine.  That finding was based on testimony by the manager of the inn where the
search occurred as to certain predictable and customary cleaning procedures at the inn that
would have uncovered the evidence in Oken’s room absent the initial illegal entry by the
police.  Id. at 654 - 55, 612 A. 2d at 270 - 71.   We concluded “that the State presented ample
evidence demonstrating that the items in [Oken’s room] would have been inevitably
discovered through lawful means, and therefore the motion judge’s ruling was not clearly
erroneous.”  Id.  at 655, 612 A.2d at 271.
We also applied the doctrine of inevitable discovery in Williams.   There, police
officers illegally entered Williams’ motel room while another officer was obtaining a
warrant, seizing marijuana and cocaine and arresting Williams.  372 Md. at 395 - 96, 813
33
A.2d at 236 - 37.  While we affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that, after
excising the tainted information from the application for the warrant - the police had included
their observations from the warrantless, illegal entry -  there was probable cause for the
search of the motel rooms, emphasizing the fact intensive nature of the inevitable discovery
inquiry and the need for proof rather than speculation, we concluded that the State had “not
met its burden under the inevitable discovery doctrine.”  372 Md. at 426 - 28, 813 A. 2d at
255 - 56.
As is the case with the State’s independent source argument, to which it is identical,
essential to the State’s inevitable discovery argument is the fact that the State had obtained
a search warrant for the search of the respondent’s premises and that the existence of the
warrant and the manner of its execution, and in particular, the manner of gaining entry, be
viewed and considered as separate and distinct.    The argument proceeds: because the police
had a valid warrant that could have been executed without a violation of the knock and
announce rule, the evidence seized pursuant to its execution in violation of that rule
“inevitably” would have been discovered; because the evidence could have been seized by
properly executing the warrant, that it was not executed properly can not prevent its
admission into evidence.   So viewed, the State’s argument would follow naturally and
logically.  That, as we have seen, is the thrust of Stevens, the leading case espousing the
argument that the State proffers. 
34
We are not persuaded.   In fact, as we see it, there are at least two ways in which the
application of the inevitable discovery rule to a knock and announce violation runs counter
to established Supreme Court knock and announce jurisprudence.   Having held that the
manner of the police’s entry into premises is a factor to be considered when assessing the
reasonableness of a search and seizure and that an unannounced entry, under some
circumstances, might be unreasonable, Wilson, 514 U. S. at 934, 115 S. Ct. at 1918, 131 L.
Ed. 2d at 982, the Wilson court stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement
of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores
countervailing law enforcement interests,” id.,  thus requiring a “case-by-case evaluation of
the manner in which a search was executed.”  Richards, 520 U. S. at 392, 117 S. Ct. at 1420,
137 L. Ed. 2d at 623.   Requiring a case by case evaluation of how a search was effected is
the very antithesis of a per se rule.    
In Richards, the Court considered just such a per se rule, a Wisconsin rule, pursuant
to which there was a blanket exception for felony drug cases.  The Court rejected the per se
rule, instead reaffirming the requirement of a case-by-case reasonableness inquiry:
“[I]n each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to
determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified
dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” 
Id. at  394, 117 S. Ct. at 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624.    It reasoned:
“If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation
that included a considerable--albeit hypothetical--risk of danger to officers or
destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.”
35
Id.  
To apply the inevitable discovery rule, on the Stevens rationale, whenever there is a
valid warrant, to render admissible, any evidence seized in execution of that warrant in
violation of the knock and announce rule is, in effect, to create a blanket exception to that
rule for all cases involving valid search warrants, see Vasquez, 602 N. W. 2d at  378 (“In
light of our recent decision in People v. Stevens, 460 Mich. 626, 597 N.W. 2d 53 (1999) we
need not decide whether the police violated the constitutional and statutory knock-and-
announce-requirement under the circumstances of this case. Even if such a violation
occurred, suppression of the evidence is not the appropriate remedy”); Langford, 314 F. 3d
at 894 (“Whether the police complied with the rule in this case is in dispute, but the dispute
need not be resolved because we hold that violation of the rule does not authorize exclusion
of evidence seized pursuant to the ensuing search”), precisely what Richards prohibits.    This
is exactly what the High Court has said we may not do. See Shugart, 889 F. 2d at 974;
Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at 656 - 58; Hoag, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1198, 1227, 100 Cal. Rptr.
2d 556, 576 (2000) (Sims, Acting P.J., dissenting); Stevens,  597 N.W.2d at pp. 70 - 71
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting).   As Justice Cavanagh stated in dissent: 
“While [the Wisconsin] rule dealt with a blanket prospective preclusion of
certain situations from a knock and announce requirement, and [the inevitable
discovery rule] deals with a blanket preclusion from the application of the
exclusionary rule, the actual effects of such rules are identical: the courts
would be prevented from ever applying the exclusionary rule when faced with
an unreasonable violation of the knock and announce principle.”
36
Stevens, 597 N. W. 2d at 70.   “The rule stands; only the remedy differs,”  Hoag, 83 Cal.
App. 4th at 1214, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 567 (Morrison, J., concurring), is not a sufficient
answer.  It “ignores the reality that an unenforceable rule - one whose violation has no
adverse consequences for the violator - is in effect no rule at all.”  Id. at 1233, 100 Cal.
Rptr.2d at 581 (Sims, Acting P. J., dissenting.).
By holding that the knock and announce principle is an element of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment and that “the method of an officer’s entry into the dwelling”
is a factor to be considered when determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure,
Wilson, 514 U. S. at 934, 115 S. Ct. at 1918, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 982, the Court quite clearly
indicated that more than the validity of the warrant must be assessed, rather that the entry into
the premises is itself is to be considered.   This was reconfirmed by Richards, as we have
seen, when it rejected the blanket rule exception to the knock and announce rule.  520 U.S.
at 390 n. 1, 394,117 S. Ct. at 1420 n.1, 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 622 n.1, 624.   Applying the
inevitable discovery rule, in total disregard of the knock and announce principle disregards
this aspect of Wilson.
Cases in which the inevitable discovery argument has been presented, decided
subsequently to Stevens, for the most part, have not adopted the Stevens rationale or reached
the result that it did.   To be sure, United States v. Langford, 314 F. 3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Espinoza, 256 F. 3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001) and Mitchell v. Stegall, 2002 U. S.
Dist. Lexis 24630 (2002) reached the result the Stevens court reached, but only Langford and
15In United States v. Rhiger, 315 F. 3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2003), rather than inevitable
discovery in the knock and announce context, the issue was the propriety of the trial
court’s finding that there were exigent circumstances justifying the police entry into the
defendant’s home.   After “[e]valuating [the] facts under the objective standard of a
‘prudent, cautious and trained officer,’” id. at 1289, the court affirmed that finding,
concluding that the “purchase and possession of materials used to manufacture
methamphetamine, the strong odor of cooking methamphetamine emitting from the
Brown residence, and Agent Mallory’s knowledge of the inherent dangerousness of an
active methamphetamine lab, establishes that reasonable grounds existed for the agents to
believe there was an immediate need to protect the public by entering the home and
discontinuing he lab’s production.”  Id. at 1289 - 90.
37
Stegall referred to Stevens and purported to follow it.15   Stegall was a case in which the
accused sought issuance of a writ of habeas corpus upon, among other grounds, that the
accused’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to file a motion to suppress
evidence seized in the execution of a warrant in violation of the Michigan knock and
announce statute.   2002 U. S. Dist. Lexis 24630 at *9.  In rejecting that argument, the court
observed:
“[E]ven if the police violated the knock and announce statute, such evidence
would have been admissible under the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding in
Stevens, pursuant to the inevitable discovery rule.   Petitioner is therefore
unable to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress the evidence based upon a violation of Michigan’s knock
and announce statute, because he is unable to show that such a motion would
have successfully led to the exclusion of this evidence.” 
Id. at *13.    Espinoza was an appeal by the Government of an order suppressing evidence
seized from the defendant’s apartment during the execution of a search warrant in violation
of the knock and announce rule.   Stating that “[t]he exceptions to the knock and announce
requirement are not pertinent to our review in this case,” 256 F. 3d at 723, the court
38
considered the propriety of applying the exclusionary rule to the violation in that case. 
Concluding that “[t]he appropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule to a particular case
is in large part the product of weighing and balancing [the] competing interests,” of
deterrence and social costs, id. at 724, and having weighed them and determined that the
violation in that case did no harm to any of the interests that the Fourth Amendment protects,
it held that exclusion of the evidence would be a disproportionate sanction.  Id. at 725 - 29.
See  United States v. Langford, 314 F. 3d at 895 (“The fruits of an unlawful search are not
excludable if it is clear that the police would have discovered those fruits had they obeyed
the law. That is the ‘inevitable discovery’ rule...without it the exclusionary remedy would
over deter; and it is fully applicable here”).
On the other hand, Dice, supra, United States v. Holmes, 183 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. Me.
2002); District of Columbia v. Mancouso, 778 A. 2d 270 (D. C. App. 2001); Tate, supra;
Taylor, supra and Price v. State, 2002 Tex. App. Lexis 8436 (2002), all reached the opposite
result, after having directly considered and rejected an inevitable discovery argument. 
Moreover, although denying the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis of the good faith
exception, which was premised on a violation of the knock and announce rule, the court in
United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Mass. 2001) rejected the Government’s
inevitable discovery argument.  Id. at 123.   It reasoned:
“The inevitable discovery doctrine is inapposite, for two reasons. First, it
requires that the legal means for the inevitable discovery be ‘truly
independent.’ United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 1986).
Here, there was only one search, and no other independent means of discovery
39
appeared on the horizon. Compare United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 978
(1st Cir. 1994) (holding that inevitable discovery applied to search of
uninsured, impounded car because subsequent inventory search of vehicle
would have revealed contraband). Second, the doctrine requires that its
application must not significantly weaken Fourth Amendment protections.  See
Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 744. Were ‘inevitable discovery’ to apply here, there
would essentially be no exclusionary remedy in cases of improper no-knock
entry. This would significantly weaken, if not nullify, this important rule.”
Id. n. 2.  See also Carroll v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ [slip op. at 18]
(2003) (applying the exclusionary rule where the police purposefully refrained from seeking
a “no knock” warrant, but nevertheless forcibly entered the premises to execute the warrant
without knocking and announcing).
 In Dice, although the argument was made only indirectly, the court addressed it,
pointing out in the process:
“To prevail under that doctrine, the government must show ‘that the evidence
inevitably would have been obtained from lawful sources in the absence of the
illegal discovery.’ ...  This requires the government to proffer clear evidence
‘of an independent, untainted investigation that inevitably would have
uncovered the same evidence’ as that discovered through the illegal search. ...
 Here, the government has not done this.   In fact, the record evinces that there
was only one investigation into Dice’s activity, and that investigation
culminated in the illegal entry we are now scrutinizing.”
200 F. 3d at 986 - 87.   The argument in Holmes was that the inevitable discovery rule should
apply to any search where the police have a valid warrant and the evidence would have been
discovered even if the police had waited longer before entering the premises.    183 F. Supp.
2d at 110.    The court rejected that argument and, although there was a valid warrant in that
case, noted that the government had not asserted an independent and legal means by which
40
the evidence inevitably would have been discovered.    Id. at 111. The court also commented
on the effect of the government’s argument: “The Government appears to suggest that no
improper execution of a valid search warrant would necessitate suppression - this proposal
would render unnecessary any analysis of the proper execution of search warrants.”    Id.
An argument very similar to that adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court was made
in Price:
“According to the State, the cocaine would have been acquired either way,
whether the appellant had notice of the entry or not, as the warrant was its own
independent source. Thus, as the State argues, the police would have lawfully
entered the premises under the warrant whether or not the authorities had
knocked and announced. According to this logic, the evidence would have
likewise been inevitably discovered as a subsequent entry pursuant to the
warrant would have superseded the no-knock entry”
2002 Tex. App. Lexis 8436 at *20.   Rejecting the argument, relying on Marts and Dice, the
court stated:
“In making this argument, the State relies on the existence of the warrant to
establish the evidence was discovered by means independent of any possible
illegality. However, the very warrant the State relies on as an independent
source was the warrant that was unlawfully executed. The search warrant,
although legally obtained, was executed in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and its execution was directly connected to the illegal entry. ...If the execution
of the warrant was illegal, the State cannot invoke that very warrant as an
independent source of the illegal entry.”
Id. at *22 - *23 (citations omitted).    See Tate, supra, 753 N. E. 2d at 352 (holding that the
same reasoning   applied to the resolution of the independent source doctrine also applies to
the inevitable discovery rule); Mancouso, supra, 778 A. 2d at 275 (noting that application of
the inevitable discovery rule to the facts of that case “would nullify our prior suppression
41
holdings in West [v. United States, 710 A.2d 866 (D. C. 1998)] and Griffin [v. United States,
618 A. 2d 114 (D. C. 1992)] ... , which also involved valid search warrants, and we as a panel
deem ourselves bound by them.”); Mazepink, supra., 987 S. W. 2d at 657 (“We reject the
State's argument that exclusion of the evidence is not appropriate because the evidence would
have been inevitably discovered by legal means (the search warrant) despite the illegal
entry”); Taylor,  733 N.E.2d at  312 (holding that “the inevitable discovery doctrine does not
apply where the evidence was gathered directly as a result of a constitutional violation and
appellee cannot show the evidence could have been gathered from an alternative legal
method or procedure...[and][i]f this court would apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to
this case the knock and announce rule would cease to have any meaningful deterrent value”).
See also State v. Lee, 836 S.W.2d 126, 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), (refusing to apply the
doctrine of inevitable discovery to the discovery to evidence seized pursuant to a warranted
search that failed to provide the proper knock and announcement concluding that it “cannot
envision how evidence contained in a private residence can be discovered without benefit of
a properly executed search warrant”).
The State’s reliance on [Dennis] Jones, supra, 149 F. 3d 715, the rationale of which
the Stevens court found persuasive, 597 N. W. 2d at 64, and [Kip] Jones, supra, 214 F.3d 836
is misplaced.   To be sure, the court in [Dennis] Jones did comment that “[i]t is hard to
understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’
once the police arrive with a warrant;” 149 F. 3d at 716 - 17, but as noted by the dissenting
16That is not in dispute.   See United States v. Langford, 314 F. 3d 892, 894 (7th
Cir. 2002), in which the court reiterated the statement and indicated that it was being
raised to a holding.
42
justice, who forcefully and eloquently pointed out the flaws in the majority decision, it was
inapplicable to the Stevens case, 597 N. W. 2d at 66 (Cavanagh, J. dissenting), just as it is
inapplicable to the case sub judice.   Having noted that the statement was dictum,16 Justice
Cavanagh explained its inapplicability:
“[T]he question before the court in Jones was whether evidence that had been
seized by other officers from a defendant as he exited a residence should
somehow be suppressed on the basis of a purported subsequent knock and
announce violation that occurred after the seizure of the evidence.   While the
court felt the need to briefly discuss the state of knock and announce law in the
course of its four paragraph opinion, the most important sentence followed the
one quoted above.   ‘But because the entry at the front door played no role in
the chain of events leading to Jones’ seizure on the lawn, we, too, can leave the
inevitable-discovery question for another day.’ [Jones, 149 F. 3d at 717].
Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not, in Jones, apply the inevitable discovery test
to a knock and announce violation.   Rather, it reached the conclusion, fairly
obvious from the factual recitation above, that there was simply no causal link
between the entry and the prior seizure of evidence.”
Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted).   With respect to the context in which the statement was
made, in addressing the argument that a defendant could not be heard to claim  that he would
have used the time the announcement gave to destroy the evidence, Justice Cavanagh pointed
out:
“The obvious correctness of that statement ... seems to have a tendency to lead
both some courts and advocates (both the majority and the appellate prosecutor
here apparently falling within that group) to ignore the fact that the  exigent
circumstances exception exists precisely to preclude the favoring of this sort
of wrongdoing, and to fail to grasp the application of the prosecutor’s
43
concession of an absence of exigent circumstances to remove this entire case
from any inquiry of this sort.”
Id. at 67 n.12.
Similarly, [Kip] Jones is not an application of the inevitable discovery rule in the
knock and announce context.    As the Seventh Circuit itself acknowledged, “Jones does not
contend that the officers violated 18 U. S. C. sec. 3109 or the fourth amendment ... by giving
insufficient notice before using the battering ram.”  214 F. 3d at 837.   Thus, the discussion
of the  inevitable discovery of the evidence despite the claim of illegal entry is pure dictum.
As indicated, there was a vigorous dissent to the Stevens majority opinion.  It
challenged the very premise of the majority opinion’s application of the inevitable discovery
rule and questioned its adherence to Supreme Court precedents.   Characterizing this opinion
as “absolutely correct,” and the Stevens Majority opinion as the “Alice-in-Wonderland
version of inevitable discovery,”  Professor LaFave has equated the Stevens dissent with the
observation by the Dice court that “to remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-
and-announce violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift move
gut the constitution’s regulation of how officer’s execute such warrants.”   5 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment§ 11.4 (3rd ed.  1996,
2001 Supp.).   Other commentators agree.  See Robin L. Gentry, “Why Knock?  The Door
Will Inevitably Open: An Analysis of People v. Stevens and the Michigan Supreme Court’s
Departure from Fourth Amendment Protection, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1659, 1689 - 90 (2000);
Jenny Dobrovolec, “People v. Stevens: The Michigan Supreme Court Applies the Inevitable
44
Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule When Officers Violate the Knock and
Announce Statute,” 78 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 569 (2001). 
Because application of  the  inevitable discovery doctrine to the facts sub judice would
read the knock and announce requirement of the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution
and, thus, permit forcible and unannounced entry in every search pursuant to a valid warrant,
whether exigent circumstances exist or not, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals. 
JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.