Title: State v. Ortiz

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

158 Ariz. 528 (1988) 764 P.2d 13 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jose Francisco ORTIZ, Appellant. No. CR-87-0278-AP. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. November 1, 1988. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and R. Wayne Ford, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. John M. Antieau, Phoenix, for appellant. *529 CAMERON, Justice. I. JURISDICTION Defendant, Jose Francisco Ortiz, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release for twenty-five years. A.R.S. § 13-703(A). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4035. II. ISSUES We must answer three questions on appeal: III. FACTS Defendant and the victim, Anna Ramirez, had been a couple for the past six years and had lived together for the last three years. During this relationship, they had two children. As a result of unhappy differences, Anna moved out taking the children with her. Approximately three weeks later on 14 February 1986, the defendant went to the factory where Anna worked and tried unsuccessfully to talk to her. On 17 February 1986, defendant returned and confronted Anna in the parking lot. An argument ensued. Defendant fired several shots at Anna wounding her. She managed to crawl under a parked truck, but defendant followed her. He knelt down and after further discussion, fired twice at the victim, killing her. Defendant's version of what happened, contained in his trial testimony, is as follows: Of the numerous eye witnesses, none testified that Anna slapped or kicked the defendant. The testimony also indicated that the defendant fired the first shots after Anna had turned away from him and started to run. Anna died from two gunshot wounds, one of which the defendant inflicted after she crawled under the truck. Defendant fled the scene and went to Mexico. Nine months later, defendant returned to Arizona and was arrested. Defendant appeals from a jury verdict and judgment of guilty of first degree murder and a sentence of life imprisonment. IV. VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S MIRANDA WARNINGS Neither Officer Martinsen nor any of the others who participated in the custodial *530 interrogation after defendant's arrest could speak Spanish. Officer Martinsen was aware that defendant's primary language was Spanish, yet never asked defendant whether he wished to have a Spanish speaking interpreter present. However, the court granted such a request for the trial. The defendant has an IQ of 80 and a vocabulary at the third grade level. The defendant contends that, although he had some knowledge of English, he did not understand the technical terms that Officer Martinsen used nor did he understand all of the questions that Martinsen asked. In particular, defendant contends he did not understand Officer Martinsen when he attempted to explain what a lawyer was and did. State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 513, 733 P.2d 1090, 1096 (1987). Relevant to that proof are the "`defendant's background, experience and conduct.'" Id. (quoting State v. Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 495, 667 P.2d 191, 195 (1983)). We might be persuaded by defendant's allegations were it not for the fact that the police taped defendant's conversation with Officer Martinsen. The trial court used the tape in reaching its decision as to whether or not to suppress the statements. The tape is part of the record in this court and we also listened to it. In addition, the record contains a reporter's transcript of the tape which, as the trial court noted, was an accurate transcript. The transcript reads in part: After listening to the tape, we are satisfied that not only did the defendant understand what Officer Martinsen said to him, but that he made his statements voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. We find no error. At trial, Dr. Otto Bendheim, psychiatrist, and Dr. Robert Block, psychologist, testified regarding defendant's mental condition. The defendant called both doctors. Dr. Bendheim testified: Defense counsel, claiming that the state had "opened the door," sought permission to ask questions concerning other aspects of his mental condition at the time of the offense. He stated: The trial court denied defendant's request. Later Dr. Block testified on cross-examination by the state: In cases involving an insanity defense, expert testimony concerning the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime is admissible. State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 100, 664 P.2d 637, 644, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 858, 104 S. Ct. 180, 78 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1983). However, in cases not involving an insanity defense, an expert witness ordinarily may not give an opinion concerning the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime. See State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 628 P.2d 580, 583-84 (1981). In the instant case, the defendant had withdrawn his insanity defense. Even so, the defendant did not object to testimony by the psychiatrist that defendant knew right from wrong at the time of the crime. Moreover, such testimony was not prejudicial because the law presumes a defendant knows right from wrong at the time of the crime. A.R.S. § 13-502; see also State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41, 45, 672 P.2d 1311, 1315 (1983). Defendant, however, wanted to question the expert witnesses about defendant's probable mental state and particularly his "impulsivity" at the time of the crime. In *533 State v. Rivera, we noted the distinction that is drawn between a person's continuing "general personality trait" (about which expert testimony is admissible) and a person's "probable state of mind at the time of the offense," which is for the jury to determine. State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 514, 733 P.2d 1090, 1097 (1987). Rivera, 152 Ariz. at 514, 733 P.2d at 1097. In the instant case, the court strictly followed Christensen and allowed testimony concerning the defendant's ability to reflect or premeditate generally, but not testimony concerning intent at the time of the crime. We believe that the questions asked Dr. Block concerning defendant's ability to premeditate were permissible because they focused on the defendant's general personality trait rather than his probable mental state at the time of the offense. We find no error. VI. ERROR IN INSTRUCTION The trial court instructed the jury on: The trial court denied defendant's request for instructions on: The defendant raises four questions regarding the instructions. A. REFLECTION The trial judge gave the following instruction on first degree murder: After some deliberation, the jury requested a definition of the term "reflection" contained in the instruction. Defendant requested that the judge instruct the jury that "reflection" included "meditation." The trial judge disagreed and instructed the jury as follows: We agree with the trial judge. At the trial, the judge indicated the inclusion of "meditation" in the definition would have erroneously conveyed to the jury that reflection require "some long and deep meditating thought." This is inconsistent with the element of first degree murder that *534 only requires premeditation. We find no error. B. SECOND DEGREE MURDER The court's instruction as to second degree murder stated: This instruction follows R.A.J.I. (Criminal) 11.04. Defendant contends that the second degree murder instruction was erroneous because it omitted the mental state of "recklessly," which is included in the statute that reads: A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). A party is entitled to any instruction reasonably supported by the evidence. State v. Shumway, 137 Ariz. 585, 588, 672 P.2d 929, 932 (1983). In the instant case, the evidence supported a second degree murder instruction. There was, however, no evidence that this was a reckless shooting. The trial court was correct when it concluded: "[T]here is no way in the world that reasonable people could come to the conclusion that it is the result of recklessness." We agree. There was nothing in the evidence that would support an instruction of "recklessly." It would have been erroneous to give such an instruction. We find no error. C. MANSLAUGHTER The court instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2), as follows: Defendant contends that there was no evidence of a "cooling-off" period. Defendant ignores the fact that he testified that Anna had slapped him, and that he then went back to his car to get the gun. There was also time for a cooling-off between the time the defendant fired the first and the second sets of shots. After Anna sought safety under the pickup, defendant testified that he tried to take her hand before she started "insulting" him. All of these facts support an instruction on the "cooling-off" period. We find no error. D. RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER Defendant contends it was error not to include an instruction on reckless manslaughter. We disagree. Defendant's testimony indicated that the murder was anything but reckless. He stated, "she slapped me ... I went back to the car because I had [the gun] in the car. I brought it out and I shot it.... I was boiling by then. Then I shot.... [S]he started insulting me [and] ... she kicked me, that's when I unloaded the pistol [in her]." His conduct was deliberate and not reckless. We find no error. Even if it had been error, it would have been harmless. State v. White, 144 Ariz. 245, 247, 697 P.2d 328, 330 (1985); see also State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 591 (Iowa 1976). VII. RELIEF We have reviewed the record for fundamental error as required by A.R.S. § 13-4035, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). We find no error. The conviction of first degree murder and the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release for twenty-five years are affirmed. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and HOLOHAN and MOELLER, JJ., concur.