Title: Beam v. Almond

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

157 S.E.2d 215 (1967) 271 N.C. 509 Addie S. BEAM v. Edmond D. ALMOND and wife, Bertha J. Almond, Cleveland Savings and Loan Association, a corporation, and Lloyd C. Bost, Administrator of the Estate of Bayard Thurman Falls, Sr., Trustee, Deceased. No. 194. Supreme Court of North Carolina. October 11, 1967. *220 Joseph M. Wright and Reuben L. Elam, Shelby, for plaintiff appellant. Falls, Hamrick & Hobbs, by L. L. Hobbs, Shelby, for defendant appellees. PARKER, Chief Justice Judge Falls erred in allowing the motion to dismiss the present action and taxing the costs against the plaintiff. In Hayes v. Ricard, 251 N.C. 485, 112 S.E.2d 123, it is said: This is said in Walker v. Story, 256 N.C. 453, 124 S.E.2d 113: A judgment based on matters of practice or procedure is not a judgment on the merits. Hayes v. Ricard, supra. In United States v. California Bridge & C. Co., 245 U.S. 337, 38 S. Ct. 91, 62 L. Ed. 332, the Court said: So far as the record before us discloses, Judge Falls heard no evidence in the former action and heard no evidence in the second action. In the present action, Cleveland Savings and Loan Association, which, according to the allegations of the complaint in the present action, holds a note executed by defendants Almond and secured by a deed of trust upon the house and lot which is the subject matter of this action, in which deed of trust B. T. Falls, Sr., now deceased, was named as trustee, and Lloyd C. Bost, administrator of the estate of B. T. Falls, Sr., trustee, deceased, have been brought in as additional parties defendant. It is manifest that there has been no adjudication on the merits. Therefore, the former judgment in the first case is not a bar to the present action, and Judge Falls erred in dismissing the present action on the ground that plaintiff is now estopped by the judgment entered in the former action to prosecute the present action. Each party defendant in the present action filed a demurrer to the complaint in the present action, as set forth above. On motion of plaintiff, the instant action came on for hearing upon the demurrers filed by defendants at the 13 February 1967 Session of Cleveland County Superior Court. The Honorable W. K. McLean, judge presiding, entered an order overruling the demurrers and allowing defendants thirty days to file answers. According to the record before us, there was no exception taken to this order of Judge McLean. In the Supreme Court all the defendants herein filed a demurrer ore tenus upon the following grounds, in substance: (1) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Edmond D. Almond and wife, Bertha J. Almond, in that it fails to state with particularity the essential facts to constitute a cause of action for fraud, or a cause of action for undue influence, or a cause of action for mental incapacity; (2) the complaint attempts to allege an anticipatory breach of contract wherein the defendants Almond were to have possession of the land of the plaintiff in return for their promise to support her; however, no breach thereof is alleged; (3) the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defendant Cleveland Savings and Loan Association and its trustee, since upon the face of the complaint said defendant Savings and Loan Association is the bona fide holder of a first lien secured by a deed of trust for purchase money on the property which is the subject matter of this action, the loan having been made to defendants Almond to furnish them purchase money and that the prayer of the plaintiff will not in any wise affect the status of this lien; (4) several causes of action have been improperly united for that the plaintiff asks to unite an alleged cause of action to rescind her deed with alleged causes of action to destroy a lien held by another defendant, and a cause of action alleging the anticipatory breach of contract *222 between the plaintiff and the defendants Almond, which alleged causes of action are not separately stated, do not belong to one class and do not affect all parties named as defendants herein. This is said in 1 Strong's N.C.Index 2d, Appeal and Error, § 10: "A defendant may file a demurrer ore tenus in the Supreme Court on the ground that the complaint, together with any amendment thereto, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." On a demurrer ore tenus to the complaint, we take the case as made by the complaint. It is hornbook law that the office of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading, admitting for the purpose, the truth of factual averments well stated and such relevant inferences as may be deduced therefrom, but it does not admit any legal inferences or conclusions of law asserted by the pleader. It is also common knowledge of the Bench and the Bar that the court is required on a demurrer to construe the complaint liberally with a view to substantial justice between the parties, and every reasonable intendment is to be made in favor of the pleader. G.S. § 1-151; Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860, and cases cited. Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that at the time of the transaction complained of she was 70 years old, very ill, was a patient in a home for the aged, and was under the influence of heavy stimulants and drugs and therefore incapable of understanding what she was doing, all of which was well known to the defendants Almond; that said defendants Almond had gained ascendency and domination over her will through twelve years of friendship and by their persistent domination over her affairs; that they fraudulently procured her signature to a deed which she understood to be a contract in which she agreed to give defendants Almond her house and lot, which is the subject matter of this action, at her death in return for their promise to support her in her home for the rest of her life and to pay her burial expenses upon her death; and that her deed to the defendants Almond is without consideration, fraudulent and void, and should be cancelled. During the month of August, 1965, she learned that defendants Almond were attempting to sell her property and put her out of her own home. At this time she asked defendants Almond to explain, and was told by them that they had a deed for her home and had a right to sell it. Although fraud is not alleged in all of its elements with the particularity required by our decisions, Davis v. Davis, 256 N.C. 468, 124 S.E.2d 130; New Bern v. White, 251 N.C. 65, 110 S.E.2d 446, and although the complaint does not allege that the plaintiff relied on any misrepresentations and was induced thereby to act to her damage, 2 Strong's N.C.Index, Fraud, § 8, yet it is our opinion, and we so hold, that construing the complaint liberally with a view to substantial justice between the parties, G.S. § 1-151, in the light of the principles of law set forth in 2 Strong's N.C.Index 2d, Cancellation of Instruments, § 3, and 13 Am.Jur.2d, Cancellation of Instruments, §§ 13, 14, 29, and 30, it contains sufficient allegations of fact tending to show undue influence on the part of defendants Almond and mental incapacity as to plaintiff. However, plaintiff has not alleged restoration of her mental capacity as required by Davis v. Davis, 223 N.C. 36, 25 S.E.2d 181. The demurrer ore tenus filed in this Court by the defendants Almond is sustained with leave to plaintiff to file an amended complaint, if she so desires, as to them. The fourth ground of the demurrer ore tenus, to wit, improper joinder, filed in this Court by all the defendants will not be considered, for the reason that such a *223 question cannot be raised by demurrer ore tenus in the Supreme Court. Raleigh v. Hatcher, 220 N.C. 613, 18 S.E.2d 207; G.S. § 1-127(6); G.S. § 1-134. However, it appears that there has not been an improper union of several causes. G.S. § 1-123(1); Goodson v. Lehmon, 225 N.C. 514, 35 S.E.2d 623, 164 A.L.R. 510. These are the only allegations in the complaint in the present action in respect to defendants Cleveland Savings and Loan Association and Lloyd C. Bost, administrator of the estate of B. T. Falls, Sr., trustee, deceased, except in the prayer for relief which asks that the deed of trust to it be set aside and declared null and void: In Randolph v. Lewis, 196 N.C. 51, 144 S.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1474, the third headnote in our Reports states: The Court in its opinion said: In an annotation in 4 A.L.R. 864, at 864, it is said: The annotation cites in support of the text cases from 25 states of the United States, and England. It cites the North Carolina cases of Butner v. Blevins, 125 N.C. 585, 34 S.E. 629, and Davis v. Davis, 146 N.C. 163, 59 S.E. 659. See to the same effect Annot. 62 A.L.R. 1477; 36 Am.Jur., Mortgages, § 93. This is said in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 234: In order to render a deed void on the ground of mental incompetency, it should appear that the grantor was laboring under such a degree of mental infirmity as to make him incapable of understanding the nature of his act. 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 54 at 721. This is said in Davis v. Davis, 223 N.C. 36, 25 S.E.2d 181: The demurrer ore tenus in this Court states that the Cleveland Savings and Loan Association "is the bona fide holder of a first lien secured by a deed of trust *225 for purchase money on the property which is the subject matter of this action, the loan having been made to the defendants Almond and wife to furnish them purchase money." This is a speaking demurrer in this respect for such allegations of fact do not appear in the complaint. Construing the allegations in the complaint against Cleveland Savings and Loan Association and the trustee named in its deed, and in connection with the complaint as a whole, it is manifest that in respect to alleged fraud and alleged undue influence the complaint does not allege that the Cleveland Savings and Loan Association in any way participated in or had knowledge of the alleged fraud and alleged undue influence perpetrated upon plaintiff by the defendants Almond; and, in respect to mental incompetency, even if we concede, construing the complaint liberally with a view to substantial justice between the parties, that it contains allegations sufficient to allege that the plaintiff was suffering under such a degree of infirmity as to make her incapable of understanding the nature of her act when she executed the deed to the Almonds, yet the complaint does not allege any restoration of her mental capacity. The demurrer ore tenus interposed in this Court by the Cleveland Savings and Loan Association and Bost is sustained with leave to plaintiff to file an amended complaint, if she so desires, as to them. It is to be noted that Judge McLean overruled the demurrers to the present complaint filed by all the defendants in this action. We have taken this action in sustaining the demurrer ore tenus filed in this Court by all the defendants for the following reason: "If the cause of action, as stated by the plaintiff, is inherently bad, why permit him to proceed further in the case, for if he proves everything that he alleges he must eventually fail in the action." Amazon Cotton Mills Co. v. Duplan Corp., 246 N.C. 88, 97 S.E.2d 449; Maola Ice Cream Co. of North Carolina v. Mayola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910. It seems apparent from the record before us that the statutory procedure has not been followed to have a person appointed as substitute trustee in the deed of trust instead of B. T. Falls, Sr., deceased. G.S. § 36-18.1. The result is the judgment dismissing the action is reversed. The demurrer ore tenus filed in the Supreme Court by all the defendants is sustained with leave to plaintiff to file an amended complaint if she so desires.