Title: The People v. George Quinones

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

1 Apprendi v New Jersey (530 US 466 [2000]). 
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 14  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
George Quinones, 
            Appellant.
William G. Kastin, for appellant.
Thomas S. Burka, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
This appeal presents another Apprendi1 challenge to New
York’s discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing
scheme.  The primary issue before us is whether, in light of
Cunningham v California (549 US 270 [2007]), this sentencing
scheme violates Apprendi and defendant’s due process and Sixth
Amendment rights.  We again uphold the constitutionality of New
York’s discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing scheme
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and further hold that defendant’s constitutional rights were not
violated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 21, 2004, at about 12:05 p.m., the police
received a radio run of a burglary in progress on the fifth floor
of a six-floor apartment building located in Brooklyn, New York. 
The building, which is part of a New York City Housing Authority
Development, had two stairwells (Stairwell A and Stairwell B). 
The stairwells met on the fourth floor and were connected by a
door.  The radio run included physical descriptions of two
perpetrators.  Within minutes of the radio run, two police
officers entered the building and split up, each going up one
stairwell.  On the fourth floor, the officer going up Stairwell A
looked into Stairwell B through the door window and observed
defendant, who matched the physical description of one of the
perpetrators, as he was coming down from the fifth floor carrying
a duffel bag.  At about this time, the other officer was coming
up Stairwell B.  Seeing this, defendant quickly changed direction
and proceeded to Stairwell A.  When defendant opened the door to
Stairwell A, he came upon the first officer and his eyes “popped
open” in surprise.  The officer asked defendant who he was and
what he was doing in the building.  Defendant, who was not a
resident of the building, tried to evade the officer, who, in
turn, tried to prevent defendant from leaving by reaching out and
grabbing his arm.  Defendant tried to break free by swinging at
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the officer with his other arm.  After a brief struggle, the
police subdued defendant and placed him under arrest.  One of the
officers went to the fifth floor (the floor defendant was coming
from) where he discovered that the door to apartment 5-I was
open, the lock on the door broken, the door frame damaged and the
apartment ransacked.  After taking defendant to a police precinct
for processing, the police officers searched the bag defendant
had been carrying and recovered burglary tools and property later
determined to be property stolen during the burglary.
Defendant, arguing that his arrest was the product of
an illegal stop and detention, and that everything flowing from
this illegality was tainted, moved to suppress the statement he
made to a police officer after his arrest (he confessed to
participating in the burglary as a “lookout”) and the property
recovered from his duffel bag.  Supreme Court held a
Dunaway/Huntley hearing and considered defendant’s arguments.  In
light of the evidence adduced at the hearing, including the fully
credited testimony of the arresting police officer, Supreme Court
rejected defendant’s arguments and denied the motion in its
entirety.
A jury ultimately convicted defendant of burglary in
the third degree (Penal Law § 140.20 [“(a) person is guilty of
(third degree burglary) when he knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime
therein”]), a class D felony which gives rise to an indeterminate
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sentence.  Under the Penal Law, the maximum term for such
sentence is at least three years and no more seven years (Penal
Law § 70.00 [2][d]).  Prior to sentencing, the People moved for
Supreme Court to sentence defendant as a discretionary persistent
felony offender.  In so moving, the People sought to treat
defendant’s class D felony as a class A-I felony (Penal Law §
70.10 [2]) and have defendant sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of 25 years to life (Penal Law § 70.00 [2][a];
[3][a][i]).  Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the
discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional under Apprendi and its progeny.
Supreme Court held a hearing pursuant to CPL 400.20 to
determine whether to adjudicate defendant a discretionary
persistent felony offender and impose a recidivist sentence.  As
set forth in CPL 400.20 (5), the court first concluded that
defendant was a discretionary persistent felony offender based on
defendant’s four prior felony convictions–-a 1983 robbery
conviction, a 1986 grand larceny conviction, a 1989 attempted
robbery conviction and a 1994 attempted criminal sale of a
controlled substance conviction (Penal Law § 70.10 [1][a]).  The
court determined that defendant was eligible to be sentenced as a
discretionary persistent felony offender and that a recidivist
sentence was warranted.  Defendant was sentenced to an
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2  The court noted that:
      
“[d]efendant’s background reveals a twenty-
year criminal history which includes four
felony convictions, three of which are
violent felonies. . . .  In addition,
[d]efendant has six misdemeanor convictions 
. . .  Thus, [d]efendant’s criminal record
establishes that he has made a career of
crime, that he lacks respect for people and
their property, and that he is a menace to
society.”
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indeterminate prison term of 18 years to life.2  The Appellate
Division unanimously affirmed, concluding, among other things,
that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain
defendant based on his “attempted flight” and “the temporal
proximity between the reported robbery and the officers’ arrival
on the scene.”  The court also concluded that in light of this
Court’s decisions in People v Rosen (96 NY2d 329 [2001]) and
People v Rivera (5 NY3d 61 [2005]), defendant’s Apprendi
challenge lacked merit.  A Judge of this Court granted defendant
leave to appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on two
grounds.  First, he argues that Supreme Court erred in not
suppressing his confession and the property recovered from his
bag because they were the product of an illegal stop and
detention.  Second, defendant claims ineffective assistance of
trial counsel based on his counsel’s failure to argue that even
if the stop and detention were legal, the recovered property
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should have been suppressed because of the illegality of the
warrantless search of defendant’s bag at the precinct.
Regarding defendant’s first contention, Supreme Court’s
determination that the police possessed reasonable suspicion to
stop and detain defendant (see People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210, 223
[1976]; People v Hollman 79 NY2d 181, 184-185 [1992]; People v
McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521, 525 [2001]), a mixed question of law and
fact, was not disturbed by the Appellate Division and is
supported by the record.  Accordingly, this determination is
beyond our further review (see People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470,
477-478 [1982]; People v Allen, 9 NY3d 1013, 1015 [2008]).  
With respect to defendant’s ineffective assistance
claim, we note that the facts surrounding the search of
defendant’s bag were not fully developed at the suppression
hearing.  Accordingly, it is not clear what counsel knew or did
not know regarding the search, such as whether the search was in
accordance with police inventory procedures.  Nor is it clear
that this argument would have resulted in suppression of the
evidence.  Therefore, on the record before us, we are unable to
determine that counsel’s assistance was ineffective.
Defendant also argues that his recidivist sentence
violates Apprendi.  Specifically, defendant asserts that in light
of Cunningham, the sentence violates his right to due process and
trial by jury, and New York’s discretionary persistent felony
offender sentencing scheme is constitutionally infirm. 
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3 The Apprendi rule seeks to preserve the jury's historic
role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at the trial
for an alleged offense (see Apprendi, 530 US at 477).  In further
support of the rule, the Supreme Court stated that:  
“structural democratic constraints exist to
discourage legislatures from enacting penal
statutes that expose every defendant
convicted of [an offense] to a maximum
sentence exceeding that which is, in the
legislature's judgment, generally
proportional to the crime. . . .  Our rule
ensures that a State is obliged to make its
choices concerning the substantive content of
its criminal laws with full awareness of the
consequences, unable to mask substantive
policy choices of exposing all who are
convicted to the maximum sentence it
provides”
 
(id. at 490, n 16).
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Defendant’s arguments are unavailing.
In Apprendi v New Jersey (530 US 466 [2000]), the
Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (Apprendi, 530 US at
490).  In so holding, the Apprendi Court’s goal was to prevent
legislative attempts to “remove from the [province of the] jury”
factual determinations that impact the maximum punishment
available for a statutory offense (id. [internal quotation marks
omitted]).3  Apprendi and its progeny are rooted in the United
States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, which provides every
person accused of a crime the right to “trial[] by an impartial
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No. 14
4 See Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584 (2002) (Court clarified
Apprendi rule by stating, “If a State makes an increase in a
defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a
fact, that fact--no matter how the State labels it--must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt” [536 US at 602]); Blakely v
Washington, 542 US 296 (2004) (Court stated:  1. the “‘statutory
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant” [542 US at 303], and 2.
“[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone
does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the
law makes essential to the punishment’ . . . and the judge
exceeds his proper authority” [id. at 304]); United States v
Booker, 543 US 220 (2005) (a judge’s determination of a fact that
elevates defendant’s sentence above the “statutory maximum,”
i.e., above the range authorized by a jury’s verdict or
defendant’s admission of guilt, violates the Sixth Amendment [543
US at 232]).
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jury,” and emanated from the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in
Almendarez-Torres v United States (523 US 224, 226-227 [1998]
[judicial factfinding of a defendant’s prior conviction and
consideration of same at sentencing is not a violation of the
Sixth Amendment]) and Jones v United States (526 US 227, 239-252
[1999] [Court recognized that judicial factfinding, outside the
finding of a defendant’s prior convictions, operating to increase
a defendant’s maximum punishment would diminish the role of the
jury, thus creating a genuine issue under the Sixth Amendment]).4
At issue in Apprendi was a New Jersey statutory scheme
that allowed a judge to increase a defendant’s punishment beyond
the maximum sentence range authorized for the crime of possession
of a firearm for an unlawful purpose based on the judge’s finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant also committed
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a crime with the intent to intimidate based on race, religion,
color, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation or handicap.  The
Supreme Court held that because this sentencing scheme (1)
removed what amounts to an element of a greater offense that
would ordinarily be submitted to the jury (and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt), and (2) allowed a judge to decide the fact
using a lesser standard of proof and, thereby, increase the
sentence beyond the permissible maximum sentence range, it
violated the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.
The common denominator of the sentencing schemes
invalidated or partially struck down in the wake of Apprendi is
that they provided for an increase to defendant’s punishment--
beyond the range authorized by the jury’s finding of guilt or
defendant’s admission--based on additional facts found by a judge
using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (see e.g., Ring
[sentencing scheme at issue provided that defendant convicted of
first degree murder could only be sentenced to life imprisonment
unless the judge determined the existence of aggravating factors
warranting the imposition of the death penalty]; Blakely
[sentencing scheme permitted an enhanced sentence beyond the
statutory maximum based on the judge’s finding that defendant
committed the crime with “deliberate cruelty”]; Booker [portion
of the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines required judicial
factfinding that could increase the maximum potential sentence of
a defendant]).  California’s determinate sentencing law (“DSL”)at
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issue in Cunningham was no different.
In describing California’s DSL, the Supreme Court noted
that
“[f]or most offenses, including Cunningham's,
the DSL regime is implemented in the
following manner.  The statute defining the
offense prescribes three precise terms of
imprisonment-a lower, middle, and upper term
sentence (e.g., Penal Code § 288.5 [a] [a
person convicted of continuous sexual abuse
of a child ‘shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for a term of 6, 12, or
16 years’; see also People v Black, 35
Cal.4th 1238, 1247 [2005]).  Penal Code §
1170(b) controls the trial judge's choice; it
provides that ‘the court shall order
imposition of the middle term, unless there
are circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation of the crime.’  ‘[C]ircumstances
in aggravation or mitigation’ are to be
determined by the court after consideration
of several items: the trial record; the
probation officer's report; statements in
aggravation or mitigation submitted by the
parties, the victim, or the victim's family;
‘and any further evidence introduced at the
sentencing hearing’ (ibid)”
(Cunningham, 549 US at 277).  In addition, the DSL
“directed the State's Judicial Council to
adopt Rules guiding the sentencing judge's
decision whether to ‘[i]mpose the lower or
upper prison term’ (Penal Code § 1170.3
[a][2]).  [Restating Penal Law] § 1170 (B),
the council’s rules provide that ‘[t]he
middle term shall be selected unless
imposition of the upper or lower term is
justified by circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation’ (Rule 4.420 [a]).  ‘Circumstances
in aggravation,’ as crisply defined by the
Judicial Council, means ‘facts which justify
the imposition of the upper prison term’
(Rule 4.405 [d] [emphasis added]).  Facts
aggravating an offense, the Rules instruct,
‘shall be established by a preponderance of
the evidence’ (Rule 4.420 [b]), and must be
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‘stated orally on the record’ (Rule 4.420
[e]).
The Rules provide a nonexhaustive list of
aggravating circumstances, including [facts
relating to the crime committed and
defendant].  Beyond the enumerated
circumstances, ‘the judge is free to consider
any “additional criteria reasonably related
to the decision being made”’ (Black, 35
Cal.4th at 1247 [internal citation omitted]). 
‘A fact that is an element of the crime,’
however, ‘shall not be used to impose the
upper term’ (Rule 4.420 [d]).  In sum,
California's DSL, and the rules governing its
application, direct the sentencing court to
start with the middle term, and to move from
that term only when the court itself finds
and places on the record facts-whether
related to the offense or the offender-beyond
the elements of the charged offense”
(id. at 278-279 [footnotes omitted]).
Because California’s DSL, by its plain terms,
authorized the judge, not the jury, to find facts exposing
defendant to an elevated upper term sentence, the Supreme Court
held that this sentencing scheme violated defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury and Apprendi (see id. at 274). 
Citing Blakely, the Cunningham Court made clear that
“broad discretion to decide what facts may
support an enhanced sentence, or to determine
whether an enhanced sentence is warranted in
any particular case, does not shield a
sentencing system from the force of our
[Apprendi] decisions.  If the jury's verdict
alone does not authorize the sentence, if,
instead, the judge must find an additional
fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth
Amendment requirement is not satisfied”
 
(id. at 290 [citing  Blakely, 542 US at 305]).  
Here, defendant argues that New York's discretionary
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persistent felony offender sentencing scheme suffers from the
same constitutional infirmity as California's DSL because the
“higher persistent felony offender range cannot be imposed
without the judicially-found fact that the 'nature and
circumstances' of the criminal conduct and the 'history and
character' of the defendant warrant lifetime supervision in the
public interest.”  Defendant’s view of New York’s sentencing
scheme is inaccurate.
The discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing
scheme is comprised of two statutes:  Penal Law § 70.10 and
Criminal Procedure Law § 400.20.  Under Penal Law § 70.10 (1)(a),
“[a] persistent felony offender is a person, other than a
persistent violent felony offender as defined in [Penal Law §]
70.08, who stands convicted of a felony after having previously
been convicted of two or more felonies.”  Penal Law § 70.10 (2)
further provides:
“When the court has found, pursuant to
[Criminal Procedure Law § 400.20] that a
person is a persistent felony offender, and
when it is of the opinion that the history
and character of the defendant and the nature
and circumstances of his criminal conduct
indicate that extended incarceration and
life-time supervision will best serve the
public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment
authorized [under Penal Law article 70] for
the crime of which such person presently
stands convicted, may impose the sentence of
imprisonment authorized by that section for a
class A-I felony.  In such event the reasons
for the court's opinion shall be set forth in
the record.”
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Criminal Procedure Law § 400.20 sets forth the
procedure for determining whether a defendant should be sentenced
as a persistent felony offender.  Under Criminal Procedure Law §
400.20 (1), 
“[s]uch sentence may not be imposed unless,
based upon evidence in the record of a
hearing held pursuant to this section, the
court (a) has found that the defendant is a
persistent felony offender . . ., and (b) is
of the opinion that the history and character
of the defendant and the nature and
circumstances of his criminal conduct are
such that [such sentence is] warranted to
best serve the public interest.”
At the hearing provided for under this sentencing scheme, the
burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant is a persistent felony offender (id. at 400.20 [5]). 
Once defendant has been proven to be a persistent felony
offender,
“[m]atters pertaining to the defendant's
history and character and the nature and
circumstances of his criminal conduct may be
established by any relevant evidence, not
legally privileged, regardless of
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, and the standard of proof with
respect to such matters shall be a
preponderance of the evidence”
(id.).  After the hearing, if the court “is of the opinion that a
persistent felony offender sentence is warranted, it may sentence
the defendant in accordance with [Penal Law § 70.10 (2)]” (id. at
400.20 [9]).  In sum, under New York’s discretionary persistent
felony offender sentencing scheme, once the People prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant is a persistent felony 
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No. 14
5 Applying Rivera, we have rejected, as meritless, four
challenges to the constitutionality of the discretionary
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offender (i.e., a twice-prior convicted felon), defendant is
eligible to be sentenced a discretionary persistent felony
offender and the court may consider defendant’s “history and
character” to determine whether a discretionary persistent felony
offender sentence is warranted.
This Court has on two occasions conducted an extensive
analysis regarding whether New York’s discretionary persistent
felony offender sentencing scheme violates Apprendi (see People v
Rosen, 96 NY2d 329 [2001], cert denied 534 US 899 [2001]; People
v Rivera, 5 NY3d 61 [2005], cert denied 546 US 984 [2005]).  In
Rosen, we held that upon proving that a defendant is a
twice-prior convicted felon, the sentencing court may review
defendant's history and character as well as the nature and
circumstances of defendant’s criminal conduct to determine
whether to impose a recidivist (enhanced) sentence (CPL 400.20
[5]) and that, under the discretionary persistent felony offender
statutes, prior felony convictions are the sole determinant of
whether a defendant is eligible for recidivist sentencing as a
persistent felony offender (Rosen, 96 NY2d at 335).  Rivera,
which was decided after Blakely and Booker, upheld Rosen (in
reasoning and result), the discretionary persistent felony
offender statutes and the recidivist sentence imposed (Rivera, 5
NY3d at 63).5  As we stated in Rivera,
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No. 14
persistent felony offender statutes (see People v Daniels, 5 NY3d
738 [2005]; People v West, 5 NY3d 740 [2005]; People v Leon, 10
NY3d 122 [2008]; People v Rawlins, 10 NY3d 136 [2008]).  Note,
Leon and Rawlins were decided after Cunningham.
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“the relevant question under the United
States Constitution is not whether those
facts were essential to the trial court's
opinion (CPL 400.20 [1] [b]), but whether
there are any facts other than the predicate
convictions that must be found to make
recidivist sentencing possible (see Blakely,
542 US at 303-304).  Our answer is no.  As we
explained in Rosen, the predicate felonies
are both necessary and sufficient conditions
for imposition of the authorized sentence for
recidivism; that is why we pointedly called
the predicate felonies the ‘sole’ determinant
(96 NY2d at 335).  By this unequivocal
statement, we meant, and today confirm, that
Criminal Procedure Law § 400.20, by
authorizing a hearing on facts relating to
the defendant's history and character, does
not grant defendants a legal entitlement to
have those facts receive controlling weight
in influencing the court's opinion.  The
statutory language requiring the sentencing
court to consider the specified factors and
to articulate the reason for the chosen
sentence grants defendants a right to an
airing and an explanation, not a result.
. . .
To reiterate our analysis in Rosen, a
defendant adjudicated as a persistent felony
offender has a statutory right to present
evidence that might influence the court to
exercise its discretion to hand down a
sentence as if no recidivism finding existed,
while the People retain the burden to show
that the defendant deserves the higher
sentence.  Nevertheless, once a defendant is
adjudged a persistent felony offender, a
recidivism sentence cannot be held erroneous
as a matter of law, unless the sentencing
court acts arbitrarily or irrationally”
(id. at 68 [footnote omitted]).
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The preceding discussion makes clear that California’s
DSL and New York’s discretionary persistent felony offender
sentencing scheme are fundamentally different.  The DSL accorded
judges discretion to find the facts necessary for the imposition
of an enhanced sentence (i.e., one beyond the relevant sentencing
range authorized by a jury’s verdict based on findings other than
a defendant's prior convictions).  That is, a defendant was only
eligible for an enhanced sentence upon a judicial determination
of certain facts other than recidivist status.  Thus, the DSL is
precisely the type of sentencing scheme that has been repeatedly
invalidated under Apprendi.
New York’s sentencing scheme, in contrast, is a
recidivist sentencing scheme.  That is, under New York’s scheme,
a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence based solely on
the existence of two prior felony convictions.  This fact alone
places the New York scheme outside the scope of the Apprendi
rule.  Another distinguishing feature of New York’s sentencing
scheme is that it is only after a defendant’s eligibility for an
enhanced sentence is determined that a judge is given the
discretion to choose the appropriate sentence within a sentencing
range prescribed by statute.  A common theme of the Apprendi
decisions is that sentencing schemes allowing for such discretion
are permissible under the Sixth Amendment.  For example, the
Apprendi Court stated that:    
“nothing in [the Sixth Amendment’s] history
suggests that it is impermissible for judges
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to exercise discretion-taking into
consideration various factors relating both
to offense and offender-in imposing a
judgment within the range prescribed by
statute.  We have often noted that judges in
this country have long exercised discretion
of this nature in imposing sentence within
statutory limits in the individual case”
(Apprendi, 530 US at 481; see Booker, 543 US at 235 [the Sixth
Amendment does not prohibit a judge from exercising his or her
discretion within a sentence range authorized by a jury’s verdict
or defendant’s admission of guilt–-such an exercise does not
impinge on the jurors’ role in determining the upper limits of a
defendant’s sentence]).  Regarding the discretion a sentencing
court must exercise, the Supreme Court further explained:
“Of course indeterminate [sentencing] schemes
involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge
(like a parole board) may implicitly rule on
those facts he deems important to the
exercise of his sentencing discretion.  But
the facts do not pertain to whether the
defendant has a legal right to a lesser
sentence-and that makes all the difference
insofar as judicial impingement upon the
traditional role of the jury is concerned. 
In a system that says the judge may punish
burglary with 10 to 40 years, every burglar
knows he is risking 40 years in jail.  In a
system that punishes burglary with a 10-year
sentence, with another 30 added for use of a
gun, the burglar who enters a home unarmed is
entitled to no more than a 10-year
sentence-and by reason of the Sixth Amendment
the facts bearing upon that entitlement must
be found by a jury”
(Blakely, 542 US at 309 [emphasis in original]).
Taking the foregoing into account, defendant’s argument
that the higher persistent felony offender range cannot be
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6 The exercise of a trial court’s sentencing discretion is
subject to review by the Appellate Division.  In the exercise of
its discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.20 [6]),
the Appellate Division “may conclude that a persistent felony
offender sentence is too harsh or otherwise improvident” (Rivera,
5 NY3d at 68-69).
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imposed without judicially-found facts regarding the “nature and
circumstances” of defendant’s criminal conduct and defendant’s
“history and character” misses the point.  Unlike the sentencing
schemes in Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, Booker and Cunningham, all of
which effectively provided for judicial factfinding of an
element(s) of an offense as a prerequisite to enhancing a
sentence beyond the relevant sentencing range, the New York
sentencing scheme, after a defendant is deemed eligible to be
sentenced as a persistent felony offender, requires that the
sentencing court make a qualitative judgment about, among other
things, the defendant’s criminal history and the circumstances
surrounding a particular offense in order to determine whether an
enhanced sentence, under the statutorily prescribed sentencing
range, is warranted.  Stated differently, New York’s sentencing
scheme, by requiring that sentencing courts consider defendant’s
“history and character” and the “nature and circumstances” of
defendant’s conduct in deciding where, within a range, to impose
an enhanced sentence, sets the parameters for the performance of
one of the sentencing court’s most traditional and basic
functions, i.e., the exercise of sentencing discretion.6 
Finally, the Cunningham Court considered and struck 
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down a sentencing scheme similar to those in Blakely and Booker. 
In so ruling, the Supreme Court did not expand the contours of
the Apprendi rule so that it would be applicable to New York’s
recidivist sentencing scheme (see Cunningham, 549 US at 281 [a
court’s application of the Apprendi rule must honor the
“longstanding common-law practice” that provide its foundation];
Oregon v Ice, ____ US ____, 129 S Ct 711 [2009], 2009 WL 77896 at
3 [Court stated that it “has not extended the Apprendi and
Blakely line of decisions beyond the offense-specific context
that supplied the historic grounding for the decisions”]).  
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Cunningham does
not render New York’s discretionary persistent felony offender
sentencing scheme unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took
no part.
Decided February 24, 2009