Title: Mondello v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mondello v. State1992 WY 177843 P.2d 1152Case Number: 91-17, 91-18Decided: 12/15/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Giuseppe 
MONDELLO, a/k/a Joe Mondello, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Mark 
Charles JONES, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 
 
Michael R. 
O'Donnell, Cheyenne (argued), for appellant 
Mondello.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and David Gosar, Appellate Counsel (argued), for appellant Jones. 

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is a conspiracy to 
sell drugs case in which there was no evidence that Giuseppe Mondello, a/k/a Joe 
Mondello (Mondello) and Mark Charles Jones (Jones) ever sold any drugs to 
anybody. There was no drug distribution ring. There was no one in the business 
of selling narcotics except the State's informant. Over a period of one and a 
half years, Mondello did no more than give money or pay money to buy drugs for 
himself. The case was made by a drug dealer who, in exchange for testifying to 
an agreement with Mondello and Jones to sell drugs, avoided prosecution for his 
acknowledged crime.

 
 

[¶2.]     In this consolidated 
appeal, Jones and Mondello appeal their convictions for conspiracy to deliver 
controlled substances, marijuana and cocaine. Proof of intent was established by 
evidence of a reverse sting operation mounted by police officers in which they 
sold one, but delivered two, ounces of cocaine to Mondello. The jury, being 
unable to agree, refused to convict Mondello of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute but convicted appellants of agreeing to sell cocaine and 
marijuana.

 
 

[¶3.]     We reverse both 
convictions.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant Jones raises 
the following issues:

 
 
I. Did the 
prosecutor's closing argument deprive the appellant [Jones] of a fair 
trial?

 
 
II. Should 
the verdict be set aside because it is not supportable by one of the two 
theories on which it was offered to the jury?

 
 
III. Is 
there insufficient evidence to support the verdict?

 
 
IV. Did the 
use of leading questions and inadmissable hearsay testimony deprive the 
appellant of a fair trial?

 
 
V. Did the 
cumulative effect of the errors deprive the appellant of [a] fair 
trial?

 
 

[¶5.]     Mondello raises the 
following issues on appeal:

 
 
1. Did the 
District Court's jury instructions deny the appellant due process and a fair 
trial by allowing the jury to convict on conspiracies which were not 
charged?

 
 
2. Did the 
conduct of the prosecutor deny the appellant due process and a fair 
trial?

 
 
3. Was the 
conduct of law enforcement so outrageous as to deny the appellant due 
process?

 
 
4. Was the 
evidence of conspiracy insufficient to allow the jury to consider the 
charge?

 
 

[¶6.]     The relevant facts of 
this case begin with a deal made around Thanksgiving 1988. Mondello gave a man 
named Ronnie Lee (Lee) $1,300.00 to obtain an ounce of cocaine for him. Lee, in 
turn, gave the money to a source named Dara Kenney. Lee never saw Dara Kenney, 
any cocaine, or the money again.

 
 

[¶7.]     Mondello was angered at 
Lee, who he held responsible for the loss. He subsequently paid several visits 
to Lee's house to demand repayment of the $1,300.00. On one of these visits, 
Mondello brought along a "friend" who Lee estimated was six feet tall or more 
and weighed 300 pounds. On another visit, Mondello told Lee that he could place 
a call "East" and arrange to "get guns" or have arms broken. Lee became 
frightened because he had no way to repay the money, so he went to the 
police.

 
 

[¶8.]     Lee was introduced to 
Officer Glick, a deputy sheriff on special assignment to work narcotics. It was 
agreed that Glick would pose as the person who was given Mondello's money. Glick 
and Lee met Mondello at Lee's residence, where Glick used the alias "Mike 
Melvin." Glick promised to repay Mondello the $1,300.00 Lee owed him in exchange 
for Mondello letting Lee "off the hook." Glick paid Mondello $300.00 from state 
confiscated funds at that time. Over the next few weeks, Glick paid Mondello 
another $700.00, leaving $300.00 due.

 
 

[¶9.]     Eight months later, 
during June 1989, Glick was reassigned by the sheriff's department, and his 
special assignment duties with narcotics came to an end. Essentially all that 
transpired during the eight-month period was repayment to Mondello of $1,000.00 
by the State. The Mondello case sat dormant for the next year, or until June of 
1990, when appellants Jones and Mondello met with a drug dealer named Chris 
Bascus (Bascus) at Bascus' home. Jones told Bascus that Mondello was looking for 
someone to get Mondello cocaine. Mondello wanted a supplier who could furnish 
him with an "eight ball" every other day. (An "eight ball" is 3 1/2 grams of 
cocaine. An ounce contains forty-eight grams.)

 
 

[¶10.]  Bascus, unknown to Mondello and Jones, 
had been arrested for selling cocaine and had turned informant for the 
government, i.e., cut a deal in which he would make a case against Mondello and 
avoid prosecution for his own crime. He testified at trial that the deal 
Mondello offered was to give Bascus $1,350.00 to buy an ounce of cocaine. Bascus 
was then to sell the cocaine and use the profits to buy more cocaine. Mondello 
would take back his stake in the form of either "an eight ball a week" for his 
personal use, or in cash. Bascus further testified that Mondello suggested that 
Bascus invest in and sell marijuana to build up his money supply faster. Bascus 
testified that Mondello was not interested in marijuana for his personal use, 
only cocaine. The plan also called for Jones to help sell whatever Mondello did 
not use. It was Bascus' testimony about this plan which formed the alleged 
conspiracy of which Mondello and Jones were convicted.

 
 

[¶11.]  Bascus informed the police of details of 
the plan. He then made a recorded telephone call to Mondello for the police 
department on June 12, 1990. Bascus told Mondello that "Mike" (Officer Glick) 
was back in Cheyenne and had "four big ones" (four ounces 
of cocaine) for Mondello. Mondello could pay for two ounces and would be 
"fronted" the other two to sell. Mike would set off the $300.00 still owed to 
Mondello against the price of the cocaine. Bascus told Mondello that Mike would 
only agree to front to Mondello, not Bascus, because Mike and Mondello knew each 
other. Bascus tried to arrange a rendezvous at the Flying J truck stop, but 
Mondello said he had to work and agreed only to have Jones call Bascus if he 
arrived that day.

 
 

[¶12.]  Bascus managed to reach Jones at home 
that same afternoon. Bascus was still calling from the tapped phone. The 
transcript of this conversation shows that Jones thought Mondello would be 
reluctant to go along with Bascus' plan. Bascus described Mike's offer of the 
four ounces of cocaine. Jones told Bascus that Mondello would not want to buy 
even two ounces. Bascus offered to chip in another $700.00 so that Mondello 
could buy two ounces. Jones told Bascus that Mondello only wanted "what he wants 
* * *. He don't even want to have nothing extra or nothing." Jones said Mondello 
was "just going to wait till somebody keeps getting 8ths, or more so he could, 
`cause that is what he wants * * *." Jones finally said he was willing to "go 
[along] for the ride," but he had to check it out with 
Mondello.

 
 

[¶13.]  Bascus again reached Jones later that 
day. Jones indicated that Mondello wanted Jones to go to meet Mike at the Flying 
J truck stop. However, Jones did not have access to a car. Bascus agreed to give 
Jones a ride. While they were travelling in Bascus' car, Bascus and Jones 
discussed Mike's offer again. Jones told Bascus that, although he wanted all 
four ounces, it was up to Mondello whether the transaction would be made because 
Mondello had the money. (This conversation was apparently not 
recorded.)

 
 

[¶14.]  Bascus and Jones ended up at Parkway 
Pizza, the business owned by Mondello and his wife. They were unable to discuss 
the drug transaction in detail because Mondello's wife was present. However, 
Jones later told Bascus that, during the visit to Parkway Pizza, Mondello gave 
Jones a total of $1,000.00 to buy cocaine: $300.00 from a cash register and 
$700.00 he had concealed in his sock.

 
 

[¶15.]  Jones and Bascus proceeded to the Time 
Out, a video arcade. On the way, they had a conversation concerning cocaine. 
Bascus was wearing a body mike, but the sound quality was so poor, the tape was 
not played for the jury except to demonstrate the poor sound quality. Neither 
Mondello nor Jones met with Mike (Officer Glick) that day.

 
 

[¶16.]  Later in the afternoon, Bascus placed a 
recorded call to Jones and informed him that Mike (Officer Glick) was not able 
to meet with them that day because it was raining and hailing in Denver, and 
Mike could not ride his motorcycle in the rain up to meet them. Bascus told 
Jones that he had instructed Mike to call Mondello. Jones remarked that "I don't 
think he [Mondello] will want it." Jones asked Bascus about "another place" 
where Bascus could obtain an ounce of cocaine. Bascus said he would 
try.

 
 

[¶17.]  Officer Glick, again posing as Mike 
Melvin, called Mondello at 4:30 p.m. that afternoon to apologize for not being 
able to make the delivery. Mike (Officer Glick) told Mondello that it had rained 
and that he was stuck in Denver because he could not ride his motorcycle 
safely in the rain. Mondello and Glick talked in coded language because of 
Mondello's (justified!) fear that his phone might be tapped. Glick suggested 
Mondello take "four cases" (ounces), and Mondello indicated he was interested in 
two. Mondello inquired as to the purity of the cocaine ("skim" v. "100% whole 
milk") and, when told that it was "100% whole milk," stated cryptically "[y]eah, 
people like better like that." The two agreed to a price of $900.00 per ounce 
for the cocaine.

 
 

[¶18.]  On the next day, Glick placed several 
calls attempting to get back with Mondello and to reach Jones. He finally was 
able to speak to Mondello. Mondello asked Glick if he had been able to contact 
Chris Bascus; Glick responded that he had. Mondello told Glick that the deal 
"look[ed] like it [was] up in the air" because there were "too many things 
around * * * [t]oo many bad guys." Glick then offered to sell Mondello just two 
ounces. Mondello was very reluctant; he expressed a fear that the sale would 
"put [Mondello] in jeopardy." Mondello told Glick to come back next week because 
he already had plenty of cocaine; Glick could perhaps bring five cases (ounces) 
the next week and leave them with Mondello for five days. Glick's impression of 
the conversation was Mondello seemed "a little * * * `cool' * * *. He didn't 
seem like he wanted to deal."

 
 

[¶19.]  Glick waited a week and then contacted 
Mondello again on June 20, 1990. Glick told Mondello that he had just received a 
call from Chris Bascus and that he was ready to meet Mondello out at the Flying 
J truck stop. Mondello offered to send either a member of his family or Chris 
Bascus out to meet Glick, but Glick stated he would much rather meet with 
Mondello. The two arranged for a meeting a half hour later at the Flying 
J.

 
 

[¶20.]  The day before, on the 19th, Chris Bascus 
had called Jones to let him know that Glick would be in town the next day. 
Bascus let Jones know that Glick would sell two ounces for $1,800.00. Jones said 
he would let Mondello know. Bascus exhorted Jones that he could "get rid of 
[i.e. sell] [the cocaine] fast." Bascus then told Jones he would like to get 
ahold of an "eighth." Jones said he would "check it out."

 
 

[¶21.]  Bascus called Jones back to ask if he had 
talked to Mondello and to advise him that Glick would be in town about 2:00 that 
day. Jones said he had not talked to Mondello but would attempt to do so and 
would call Bascus back. Bascus called twice more. On the second phone call, 
Jones told him he "didn't know" whether the transaction would work. Bascus said 
he would take one of the ounces, and Jones asked him if the price was two ounces 
for $1,500.00. Bascus responded in the affirmative.

 
 

[¶22.]  Jones called Bascus later that afternoon 
to advise him that he had $750.00, enough money to buy one ounce. Bascus 
responded that he did not know if Glick would deal with them for only one ounce. 
Bascus asked Jones to come up with another $750.00 for a second ounce. Jones 
said Mondello did not have it. Bascus said he would call Jones back, but he 
doubted the deal could go through for only one ounce. This was Bascus' last call 
to Jones.

 
 

[¶23.]  Officer Glick wore a body mike to the 
rendezvous with Mondello at the Flying J. Mondello was waiting at the 
information center, just north of the Flying J, and so Glick went to meet him 
there. Mondello stated he had six hundred dollars with him. Glick told Mondello 
that he had the cocaine packaged in two ounce lots and did not have a scale to 
divide them. Glick instructed Mondello to sell the other ounce and keep the 
money for him until his return; if Mondello did this, Glick promised to "furnish 
[Mondello] forever." Mondello showed some hesitancy, but accepted the two 
ounces. Glick kept up a steady stream of encouragements as Mondello left him: 
"make sure you get a good price"; "don't get less than two and a half an eighth 
for it"; "just remember to get a good price for that stuff." Then the police 
closed in on Mondello and arrested him.

 
 

[¶24.]  On July 2, 1990, the State filed an 
Information charging Jones with one count of conspiracy to deliver marijuana and 
cocaine under W.S. 35-7-1042 (June 1988 Repl.) and an Information charging 
Mondello with one count of conspiracy to deliver marijuana and cocaine under 
W.S. 35-7-1042 and with one count of possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver under W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i) (June 1988 Repl.). The trial court approved 
the State's motion for joinder of the defendants' trials and denied Mondello's 
motion for severance.

 
 

[¶25.]  At trial, the district court ruled 
inadmissible evidence of an alleged prior conspiracy in March of 1989 in which 
Mondello and Glick agreed to go together to New Jersey, where Mondello would introduce 
Glick to a "Columbian connection" who would supply them with cocaine. Mondello's 
attorney stated that he was not going to raise an entrapment defense at trial, 
and so the evidence of a prior conspiracy was not relevant to the issue of 
Mondello's predisposition to commit the crime charged.

 
 

[¶26.]  The consolidated trial was held September 
4-5, 1990. After six hours of deliberation on September 5 and a full day's 
deliberation on September 6, the jury had reached a guilty verdict on the 
conspiracy charges against both Jones and Mondello but was deadlocked on the 
possession with intent to distribute charge against Mondello. The court allowed 
the jury to announce its verdicts of guilty as to the charges of conspiracy to 
distribute marijuana and cocaine and then declared a mistrial as to the 
possession charge against Mondello. The court denied the defendants' motion for 
a new trial on October 15, 1990. It sentenced Mondello to 16 to 32 months 
imprisonment and Jones to 20 to 40 months imprisonment. Appellants took timely 
appeal from the court's sentencing orders.

 
 

[¶27.]  We reverse appellants' convictions 
because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the alleged 
conspiracy to distribute marijuana and cocaine. Because of the reversal on this 
issue, we need not consider the numerous other issues the parties raise, with 
the exception of Mondello's third issue, which raises important policy questions 
for this state.

 
 
Outrageous 
Government Conduct

 
 

[¶28.]  In Mondello's third issue, he alleges 
that his conviction must be reversed because the government's role in the 
conspiracy was so substantial that it violated his right to due process of law 
under the United States Constitution. See Hampton 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1976); United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
431-32, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1973). We have not previously 
recognized a defense of "outrageous government conduct" in Wyoming. We now hold that 
such a defense is available under the appropriate circumstances, but that the 
government's conduct in Mondello's case did not rise (or better "sink") to the 
level required for application of the doctrine.

 
 

[¶29.]  A review of the cases which established 
the doctrine is helpful to determine its parameters. In United States v. 
Russell, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing, processing, 
selling and delivering methamphetamine. A governmental agent had supplied the 
defendant with phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), a chemical essential to the 
manufacturing process. On appeal, the defendant conceded being predisposed to 
manufacture methamphetamine, thus foreclosing a "subjective" entrapment defense. 
He argued, however, that his conviction should be overturned because of an 
intolerable degree of governmental participation in the crime for which he was 
convicted. Although the Court refused to reverse Russell's conviction on these 
grounds, the majority stated in dicta that:

 
 
[W]e may 
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement 
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952) * * 
*.

 
 
Russell, 
411 U.S.  at 431-32, 93 S. Ct.  at 
1643.

 
 

[¶30.]  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183, 
25 A.L.R.2d 1396 (1952) is the infamous "stomach-pump" case in which the Supreme 
Court refused to allow evidence of drugs forcibly pumped from the defendant's 
stomach to be used to convict him. The conduct of police in that case was said 
to have "shocked the conscience" of the Court. Rochin, 342 U.S.  at 172, 72 S. Ct.  at 209. An "outrageous government conduct" test measured by Rochin 
criteria is, accordingly, confined to very narrow circumstances, where the 
police conduct is "violat[ive of] that `fundamental fairness, shocking to the 
universal sense of justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment." Russell, 411 U.S.  at 432, 93 S. Ct.  at 
1643.

 
 

[¶31.]  Three years after the Russell decision, 
in Hampton v. United States, 
the Court considered a challenge to a conviction for distributing heroin. The 
defendant objected to the trial court's refusal of his proposed "entrapment" 
instruction which would have informed the jury that they must acquit him if they 
found that the drugs he sold were supplied to him by the government. Like 
Russell, the defendant conceded that he was predisposed to sell heroin, but 
argued that he was entitled to the instruction because it reflected the 
outrageous government conduct rule mentioned in the Russell dicta. A plurality 
of the Court (Justices Rehnquist and White and Chief Justice Burger) saw no 
essential difference between the defendant's situation in Hampton and that in Russell, and affirmed Hampton's conviction. 
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment. Although 
they would not establish a per se rule of denial of due process when the 
government supplied contraband to the defendant, they could conceive of rare 
cases in which outrageous government conduct could be successfully asserted as a 
defense to a drug charge. Hampton, 425 U.S.  at 494-95, 96 S. Ct.  at 1652-53. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall in dissent, rejected 
the entire concept that entrapment is based on the "subjective" criteria of the 
defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Instead, they stated, courts 
refuse to convict an entrapped defendant because "`the methods employed on 
behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced.'" 
Hampton, 425 U.S.  at 496, 96 S. Ct.  at 1653, citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380, 78 S. Ct. 819, 824, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). Thus, five out of eight justices (Justice Stevens did not vote) 
stated that an "objective" defense based on government conduct was 
available.

 
 

[¶32.]  Despite the dicta in the Russell case and 
the concurring and dissenting opinions in Hampton, the United States Supreme Court has 
never applied an "outrageous government conduct" rule to actually overturn a 
defendant's conviction.1 Furthermore, although state and 
federal courts have at least paid lip service to the doctrine, the defense 
referred to in Russell and Hampton has not had broad application. In the words 
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the defense is "often raised but is 
almost never successful." United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1984). The murky bottom of the judicial seascape is littered 
with the wrecks of hopeful appeals in which defendants have launched claims of 
outrageous government conduct (in some cases much more egregious than that 
contended here) only to watch them sink after running aground on the difficult 
hurdle of proving the requisite level of outrageous conduct. A 1990 A.L.R. 
annotation, for example, lists over fifty federal drug decisions in which the 
actions of government agents were held not to have violated the defendant's 
right to due process. Only four cases are mentioned in which a due 
process/outrageous conduct defense was successful. Two of these were trial court 
decisions. T. Thomas, Annotation, What Conduct of Federal Law Enforcement 
Authorities in Inducing or Co-operating in Criminal Offense Raises Due Process 
Defense Distinct from Entrapment, 97 A.L.R.Fed. 273 § 3[a]-[g] 
(1990).

 
 

[¶33.]  The case most often cited by courts (and 
now by Mondello) in which an outrageous government conduct defense succeeded in 
the drug context seems to be United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 
376-78 (3rd Cir. 1978). In Twigg, the government initiated a conspiracy to 
produce methamphetamine, supplied the P-2-P needed, provided about 20 percent of 
the glassware needed and the site for the methamphetamine laboratory, and made 
arrangements with chemical supply houses to facilitate purchase of the other 
necessary materials. Twigg could not assert an entrapment defense because he was 
brought into the conspiracy by one of the conspirators rather than by a 
government agent. Neither could another defendant, Neville, assert entrapment 
who had been shown to be predisposed to commit the crime. Nevertheless, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed both convictions:

 
 
When Kubica 
[a government informant], at the instance of the DEA, reestablished contact with 
Neville, the latter was not engaged in any illicit drug activity. Using Kubica, 
and actively participating with him, the DEA agents deceptively implanted the 
criminal design in Neville's mind. They set him up, encouraged him, provided the 
essential supplies and technical expertise, and when he and Kubica encountered 
difficulties in consummating the crime, they assisted in finding solutions. This 
egregious conduct on the part of government agents generated new crimes by the 
defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges against him when, as 
far as the record reveals, he was lawfully and peacefully minding his own 
affairs. Fundamental fairness does not permit us to countenance such actions by 
law enforcement officials and prosecution for a crime so fomented by them will 
be barred.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
Twigg did 
not become involved in this criminal enterprise until March 1, 1977 - the day 
the laboratory went into operation. His reason for becoming involved was to 
repay a debt owed to Neville. Neville introduced Twigg to Kubica, and then Twigg 
and Kubica went shopping for additional supplies, which Kubica purchased. There 
is no evidence to suggest that Twigg was aware of the ultimate purpose of these 
errands until informed by Kubica after returning to the farmhouse. All actions 
taken by Twigg from that time until his arrest were at the specific direction of 
Kubica, the government agent. Twigg contributed nothing in terms of expertise, 
money, supplies, or ideas. It also appears that Twigg would not even have shared 
in the proceeds from the sale of the drug. In light of these facts, we hold that 
Twigg's conviction is also tainted by the conduct of the DEA agents and that 
fundamental fairness requires its reversal.

 
 
Twigg, 588 F.2d  at 381-82.

 
 

[¶34.]  Like the defendants in Twigg, Mondello 
cannot assert entrapment on appeal. At trial, Mondello gave up his right to the 
entrapment defense in exchange for the State being barred from using evidence of 
certain previous discussions between Mondello and Officer Glick. These 
discussions took place in March of 1989, around the time Glick first met 
Mondello and prior to the alleged conspiracy charged in this case. Mondello 
allegedly offered to introduce Glick to his "Columbian connection" in New Jersey, and to help 
Glick purchase three-quarters of a pound of cocaine. Had Mondello raised 
entrapment, the State would have been allowed to bring in these discussions as 
evidence of his predisposition to distribute cocaine. See Noetzelmann v. State, 
721 P.2d 579, 581 (Wyo. 1986) (entrapment is not available if 
defendant is ready to commit the offense, given the 
opportunity).

 
 

[¶35.]  The State now argues that in making this 
strategic decision at trial, Mondello also gave up the outrageous government 
conduct defense. The argument is that had Mondello retained the outrageous 
government conduct defense, the excluded evidence would have been admissible to 
show the pre-existence of a criminal enterprise, which the State merely joined 
in order to convict the perpetrators. However, the State has not shown how 
Mondello's isolated actions in March 1989 were part of an ongoing criminal 
enterprise connected with his subsequent actions. We find it unnecessary to 
consider whether evidence of Mondello's prior misconduct would have been 
admissible on the issue of outrageous government conduct when the defense was 
rejected as a matter of law. Under the circumstances, we hold that Mondello did 
not waive the defense of outrageous government conduct.

 
 

[¶36.]  Turning to the applicability of the 
defense, the evidence in this case shows that Mondello planned to buy one ounce 
of cocaine for his personal use. The government tricked him into buying two, and 
told him to sell one of them, when by all accounts he had no previous intention 
in the course of the alleged 
conspiracy to do so. As will be discussed below, this means there is 
insufficient evidence that Mondello conspired to sell marijuana and cocaine in 
the manner charged by the State, and his conviction must be reversed. However, 
the police conduct in tricking and cajoling Mondello is distinguishable from 
that in Twigg in that when the State became involved, Mondello and Jones had 
already sought out Bascus to purchase cocaine. Thus, the level of police 
involvement in the enterprise does not sink to the level of outrageous 
government conduct as defined in Twigg. Nor does the police conduct in using 
Bascus to arrange and perpetuate the alleged conspiracy itself sink to such 
level. See e.g., United 
States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 939, 102 S. Ct. 1429, 71 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1982) (holding 
similar conduct not to violate due process). Therefore, we hold that the 
outrageous conduct defense exists in Wyoming but that it does not apply under the 
circumstances of Mondello's case.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 

[¶37.]  Both Mondello and Jones next raise the 
issue of whether sufficient evidence exists to establish the conspiracy charged. 
Because we hold there is not sufficient evidence, we must reverse both 
convictions.

 
 

[¶38.]  Our standard of review of sufficient 
evidence for a jury's verdict was recently set forth in detail in Rathbun v. 
State, 802 P.2d 881, 882-83 (Wyo. 1990):

 
 
We examine 
whether the evidence most favorable to the State is sufficient to infer 
reasonably that a statute was violated as charged. Our examination involves a 
two stage process.

 
 
     When examining if the 
verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, we review the record to examine 
"all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State * * *." Mendicoa [v. 
State], 771 P.2d [1240,] 1243 [Wyo. 1989]. We examine the evidence from this 
perspective because we defer to the jury as the factfinder and assume they 
believed only the evidence adverse to the defendant since they found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We are aware the defendant's version 
argued for a finding of "not guilty" while the prosecutor's version argued for a 
finding of "guilty." Had the jury found the defendant's version credible, they 
would be bound to harbor reasonable doubt against the prosecutor's claim that 
the defendant was guilty. But they did not find the defendant's version credible 
and therefore found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not ask if "`the 
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us * * *,'" Id. at 1243 (quoting Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 
(Wyo. 1985)), 
because the answer to that question would require this court to weigh the 
evidence and determine who was most credible. That determination simply is not a 
function of this court. "[W]e are not to reweigh the evidence." Broom, 695 P.2d  
at 641.

 
 
     Second, after drawing 
into the open only the evidence adverse to the defendant, we examine whether 
that evidence permits the jury's inference that the defendant violated the 
elements of the statute as charged. Our focus is singular and only examines the 
reasonableness of the inference from 
premises admittedly adverse to the defendant. See Broom, 695 P.2d  at 642. 
[emphasis in original; some citations omitted]

 
 

[¶39.]  To prove a conspiracy under Wyoming's controlled 
substances conspiracy statute, it is not necessary to show that the parties to 
the conspiracy performed an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement. 
Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558, 561 n. 6 (Wyo. 
1989); Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Wyo. 1981). All that must be shown is that the 
parties agreed to commit an offense under Article V of the Controlled Substances 
Act. W.S. 35-7-1042. We have used the following language to describe the 
agreement which the prosecution must prove under the general conspiracy statute, 
which applies equally to conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance:

 
 
     One might suppose that 
the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like the agreement or 
"meeting of the minds" which is critical to a contract, but this is not the 
case. Although there continues to exist some uncertainty as to the precise 
meaning of the word in the context of conspiracy, it is clear that the 
definition in this setting is somewhat more lax than elsewhere. A mere tacit 
understanding will suffice, and there need not be any written statement or even 
a speaking of words which expressly communicates the agreement. * * 
*

 
 
     Because most 
conspiracies are clandestine in nature, the prosecution is seldom able to 
present direct evidence of the agreement. Courts have been sympathetic to this 
problem, and it is thus well established that the prosecution may "rely on 
inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators." 
[footnotes omitted]

 
 
W. LaFave 
and A. Scott, Criminal Law 460-61 (1972), quoted in Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 855 (Wyo. 
1987) and also in Bigelow, 768 P.2d  at 562.

 
 

[¶40.]  The charge against Mondello and Jones was 
conspiracy to deliver marijuana and cocaine. The only direct evidence of the 
claimed conspiracy was provided by Bascus' testimony concerning what he, Jones 
and Mondello agreed to. The State had Bascus on a drug-pushing rap, and he 
testified to get lenient treatment for himself. Significantly, Bascus admitted 
at trial that after the crucial conversation with Jones and Mondello in which 
they allegedly developed the conspiracy, he told Officer Farmer that Mondello 
had told him to "think about it for a couple of days," and that Mondello would 
get back to him. This suggests the parties were still in the negotiation stage, 
and had not yet reached agreement to actually buy or sell marijuana and 
cocaine.

 
 

[¶41.]  Mondello did not reinitiate contact with 
Bascus. It was Bascus who called Mondello and Jones repeatedly in the days 
afterward. In the course of these conversations, Jones repeatedly told Bascus 
that he would defer to Mondello's decision on whether a purchase would be made 
and made statements implying that Mondello only wanted enough cocaine for his 
personal use. Jones did say "I would go for the ride right now," referring to 
Bascus' offer of two ounces, but his statement in context indicated that his 
participation was conditional on Mondello's approval.

 
 

[¶42.]  At times, Mondello indicated a 
willingness to buy more than one ounce of cocaine and to sell the excess. 
However, there is no evidence linking Mondello's statements, which came in 
response to subsequent offers by Detective Glick, to the originally-charged 
conspiracy to sell marijuana and cocaine. Furthermore, the telephone 
conversations never show Mondello agreeing unequivocally to buy cocaine for 
reselling purposes. Nor does Jones agree, without conditions, in the telephone 
transcriptions. In fact, as late as the day before Mondello's arrest, Jones was 
still saying he would "talk to" Mondello about a deal for two ounces. The day of 
the arrest, in his last conversation with Bascus, Jones stated that Mondello only wanted one ounce, much to 
Bascus' disappointment.

 
 

[¶43.]  Officer Farmer testified that he heard 
Jones and Bascus discussing selling "eight balls" inside Parkway Pizza over a 
body mike Bascus was wearing. However, he admitted on cross-examination that the 
sole purpose of setting up Bascus in business was to insure a supply of eight 
balls for Mondello personally, and that it was "not impossible" that Bascus and 
Jones were discussing that when they spoke of eight balls.

 
 

[¶44.]  The evidence, then, shows that according 
to Bascus the parties discussed selling small quantities of cocaine and 
marijuana to support Mondello's habit at their initial meeting, but they never 
concluded an agreement to do so. If 
we believe Bascus, the initial meeting failed to produce anything but a 
tentative plan and a promise to discuss the plan further at a later date. The 
State then intervened, in tapped phone conversations with the defendants, with 
suggestions, proposals and counterproposals for purchases or sales of larger 
amounts of cocaine. The transcripts of these phone conversations are colored by 
Mondello's reluctance to buy the large amounts the State was pushing, his desire 
expressed through Jones to buy only for his own use, and Jones' reluctance to 
act without Mondello's consent. Noticeably absent from the calls is any further 
reference to the original, alleged conspiracy to distribute marijuana and 
cocaine.

 
 

[¶45.]  More importantly, the prosecution failed 
to tie the final "buy" by Mondello to the agreement Bascus reported. To do so 
based on the evidence presented would have been difficult. Perhaps recognizing 
this, at one point the prosecutor took a shortcut by arguing to the jury that 
Officer Glick's "delivery" of the cocaine to Mondello was the "delivery" 
intended in the originally-charged conspiracy. This argument was improper and 
was erroneous as a matter of law. It had the potential to mislead the jury and 
to thereby create reversible error. See United States v. Coward, 630 F.2d 229 
(4th Cir. 1980) (proof of conspiracy which differed from that charged confused 
the jury and required reversal).

 
 

[¶46.]  If the prosecutor's argument were 
believed, the jury could have found Mondello guilty of a conspiracy to deliver 
cocaine to himself. This is clearly wrong; 
we have stated that "[t]he [mere] purchaser of controlled substances [i.e. 
Mondello] commits the crime of `possession' and not `delivery.'" Wheeler v. 
State, 691 P.2d 599, 602 (Wyo. 1984). The purchaser is not an accomplice 
in a sale to himself. Id. Nor is he a conspirator to deliver to 
himself. For a conviction of conspiracy to deliver cocaine, there must be a 
showing that the conspirators agreed to make some further distribution of the 
cocaine. That is what is missing from this case.

 
 

[¶47.]  The jury obviously did not agree that 
Mondello possessed the cocaine he bought from Glick with intent to further 
deliver it, since they hung on the "possession with intent to deliver" count, 
causing a mistrial. The facts support the jury's reluctance to convict. When 
Mondello met with Officer Glick, he brought only enough money for one ounce of 
cocaine. This supports the defense's theory, which was that Mondello only 
intended to buy for his personal use. Glick had to persuade Mondello to accept 
two ounces instead of one by stating it was in one pack, he could not divide it, 
and by fronting Mondello the second ounce and telling him to sell it. Inherent 
in Glick's insistence was the recognition that Mondello planned to keep the 
other ounce, the one he intended to 
buy, for his own use.

 
 

[¶48.]  This is a case where the parties 
discussed buying cocaine and where one of them did so. They also discussed 
selling cocaine, mostly in discussions initiated by the government, but never 
agreed to nor did they sell any. Mere discussion without agreement is not a 
conspiracy. See United States v. Iennaco, 893 F.2d 394, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
("negotiations, solicitations and counteroffers" not agreement for purposes of 
conspiracy); United States v. Jones, 765 F.2d 996, 1003 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(defendant's proposals to undercover narcotics agent, which required acceptance 
the agent never gave, did not constitute a criminal conspiracy); United States 
v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1980) (unacceptable conditions 
attached to conditional agreement and "agreement to negotiate a purchase" rather 
than agreement to purchase did not constitute conspiracy); United States v. 
Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1134 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S. Ct. 2167, 48 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1976) (equivocal statements, without "fixed 
agreement" to participate did not justify conviction for 
conspiracy).

 
 

[¶49.]  In conspiracy, the agreement itself is 
the criminal act which is punished because it constitutes "a step toward the 
accomplishment of a specific anti-social act." Albert J. Harno, Intent in 
Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U.Pa.L.Rev. 624, 635 (1941). Since the agreement forms 
the actus reus, 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it exists in order to 
convict the defendant of conspiracy. The rule of evidence that an agreement may 
be inferred from surrounding circumstances must not be applied at the expense of 
the rule of law that an agreement must be established. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d  
at 891, quoting Developments in the Law of Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 
920, 933 (1959). Here, an agreement was not established based on the evidence 
proved at trial.

 
 

[¶50.]  Finally, we wish to discuss the State's 
conduct in this case. They had an admitted drug dealer, Chris Bascus. They knew 
Mondello wanted drugs for his own use. They could have charged Mondello with 
possession and use of illegal drugs. But the State apparently wanted a "big drug 
case." They used Bascus to make a case of possession with intent to sell and a 
conspiracy against Mondello, the user, and his friend Jones. Meanwhile, Bascus 
essentially got a free pass. The scenario may be analogous to a manufacturer who 
knowingly and fraudulently sells a defective product, is not prosecuted, and yet 
all of his customers are charged with conspiracy to buy and resell his 
product.

 
 

[¶51.]  We hold that there was insufficient 
evidence for either Jones' or Mondello's conviction of conspiracy. This decision 
is based on the prosecution's specific failure in this case to prove a 
conspiracy to deliver marijuana and 
cocaine. For this reason, appellants' convictions are 
reversed.

 
 

GOLDEN, J., files 
a specially concurring opinion.

 
 

THOMAS, J., files 
a dissenting opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Recently 
the United States Supreme Court faced this issue and, while the government's 
conduct in pursuing defendant was questioned, it reversed the conviction for 
violating federal child pornography laws based on the defense of "entrapment." 
The Court held that the government failed to prove that the defendant had the 
requisite predisposition to commit the crime prior to the intervention of 
governmental agents who sought to create the predisposition. Jacobson v. United 
States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174 
(1992).

 
 

GOLDEN, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶52.]  I specially concur. As the majority 
opinion notes, in conspiracy the criminal act that the state must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt is the agreement. In this case, the state's evidence did not 
prove the existence of the agreement.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶53.]  I must dissent from the disposition of 
this case according to the majority opinion. It is seldom a failure of logic 
like that manifested here is found in a court opinion. The majority carefully 
sets forth the material facts, and it states the applicable rules of law. It 
then misapplies those rules in such a way that it substitutes itself for the 
jury, not only reweighing the evidence, relying substantially on the version of 
the facts submitted by Mondello and Jones, but then deciding the case in this 
court, in effect, concluding it is not persuaded of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, which it describes as insufficiency of the evidence. It seems to me that, 
having discerned no unlawful conduct on the part of the officers, this court 
decided to rectify a situation that offended the court by nullifying the jury 
verdict. It then substituted its perception of the evidence for that of the jury 
and acquitted the defendants.

 
 

[¶54.]  I quote the material testimony from the 
majority opinion:

 
 
     Bascus, unknown to 
Mondello and Jones, had been arrested for selling cocaine and had turned 
informant for the government, i.e., cut a deal in which he would make a case 
against Mondello and avoid prosecution for his own crime. He testified at trial 
that the deal Mondello offered was to give Bascus $1,350.00 to buy an ounce of 
cocaine. Bascus was then to sell the cocaine and use the profits to buy more 
cocaine. Mondello would take back his stake in the form of either "an eight ball 
a week" for his personal use, or in cash. Bascus further testified that Mondello 
suggested that Bascus invest in and sell marijuana to build up his money supply 
faster. Bascus testified that Mondello was not interested in marijuana for his 
personal use, only cocaine. The plan also called for Jones to help sell whatever 
Mondello did not use. It was Bascus' testimony about this plan which formed the 
alleged conspiracy of which Mondello and Jones were 
convicted.

 
 
At 
1154-1155.

 
 
The court 
goes on to correctly state the standard pursuant to which the evidence is to be 
reviewed quoting from Rathbun v. State, 802 P.2d 881, 882-83 (Wyo. 1990), this 
language, which is repeated for emphasis:

 
 
We examine 
whether the evidence most favorable to the State is sufficient to infer 
reasonably that a statute was violated as charged. See Mendicoa v. State, 771 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Wyo. 1989); Seeley v. State, 
715 P.2d 232 (Wyo. 1986); Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166 (Wyo. 1979); and Cheng v. Com., 240 
Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990). Our examination involves a two stage 
process.

 
 
     When examining if the 
verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, we review the record to examine 
"all the evidence in the light most favorable to the [s]tate * * *." Mendicoa, 
771 P.2d  at 1243. We examine the evidence from this perspective because we defer 
to the jury as the factfinder and assume they believed only the evidence adverse 
to the defendant since they found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We are aware the defendant's version argued for a finding of "not guilty" 
while the prosecutor's version argued for a finding of "guilty." Had the jury 
found the defendant's version credible, they would be bound to harbor reasonable 
doubt against the prosecutor's claim that the defendant was guilty. But they did 
not find the defendant's version credible and therefore found him guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. We do not ask if "`the evidence establishes guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt for us * * *,'" Id. at 1243 
(quoting Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985)), because the answer to that 
question would require this court to weigh the evidence and determine who was 
most credible. That determination simply is not a function of this court. "[W]e 
are not to reweigh the evidence." Broom, 695 P.2d  at 641.

 
 
     Second, after drawing 
into the open only the evidence adverse to the defendant, we examine whether 
that evidence permits the jury's inference that the defendant violated the 
elements of the statute as charged. Our focus is singular and only examines the 
reasonableness of the inference from 
premises admittedly adverse to the defendant. See Broom, 695 P.2d  at 
642.

 
 
To the same 
effect are e.g., Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104 (Wyo. 1992); Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486 (Wyo. 1992); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987); DeSersa v. 
State, 729 P.2d 662 (Wyo. 1986); Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 1988); 
Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1988); Carson v. State, 751 P.2d 1315 (Wyo. 
1988); and Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 1988).

 
 

[¶55.]  The majority, immediately after reviewing 
the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, correctly 
reports:

 
 
     To prove a conspiracy 
under Wyoming's controlled substances conspiracy 
statute, it is not necessary to show that the parties to the conspiracy 
performed an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement. Bigelow v. 
State, 768 P.2d 558, 561 n. 6 (Wyo. 1989); 
Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Wyo. 1981). All that must be shown is that the 
parties agreed to commit an offense under Article V of the Controlled Substances 
Act. W.S. 35-7-1042. We have used the following language to describe the 
agreement which the prosecution must prove under the general conspiracy statute, 
which applies equally to conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance:

 
 
     One might suppose that 
the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like the agreement or 
"meeting of the minds" which is critical to a contract, but this is not the 
case. Although there continues to exist some uncertainty as to the precise 
meaning of the word in the context of conspiracy, it is clear that the 
definition in this setting is somewhat more lax than elsewhere. A mere tacit 
understanding will suffice, and there need not be any written statement or even 
a speaking of words which expressly communicates the agreement. * * 
*

 
 
     Because most 
conspiracies are clandestine in nature, the prosecution is seldom able to 
present direct evidence of the agreement. Courts have been sympathetic to this 
problem, and it is thus well established that the prosecution may "rely on 
inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators." 
[footnotes omitted]

 
 
     W. LaFave and A. 
Scott, Criminal Law 460-61 (1972), quoted in Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 855 
(Wyo. 1987) 
and also in Bigelow, 768 P.2d  at 562.

 
 
At 
1161-1162.

 
 

[¶56.]  In light of what the majority espouses as 
correct rules relative to proof of conspiracy and sufficiency of the evidence, 
the statement that, "[m]ore importantly, the prosecution failed to tie the final 
`buy' by Mondello to the agreement Bascus reported", at 1162, is a classic non 
sequitur. Since the rule is that there is no necessity for proof of an overt act 
to establish the conspiracy, why should the prosecution "tie the final `buy' by 
Mondello" to the charged conspiracy. That offense was complete upon proof of an 
agreement to violate the Controlled Substances Act. The testimony from Bascus 
that is quoted above certainly establishes such an 
agreement.

 
 

[¶57.]  Apparently recognizing, at least at a 
subliminal level, the difficulty with the logic, the majority, in direct 
violation of the rules pertaining to the standard for sufficiency of the 
evidence, quotes and describes other testimony the majority perceives as 
contradictory. In essence, the majority weighs the evidence and concludes the 
court is not persuaded of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a clear 
substitution of the court for the jury; an invasion of the jury's prerogative; 
and a violation of a fundamental rule of appellate jurisprudence. The further 
argument about the apparent inconsistency in the verdicts is nothing more than a 
judicial hare. It is entirely possible, if speculation is permitted, that the 
jury was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mondello received the 
cocaine from Glick for resale rather than personal use and, yet, was persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy was formed in June of 1990 for 
Mondello, Jones, and Bascus to market cocaine in order to finance Mondello's 
personal habit.

 
 

[¶58.]  I would affirm the judgments and 
sentences in this case.