Title: People v. Shaw

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 80378-Agenda 1-May 
1998.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 
ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GREGORY SHAW, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 22, 
1998.-Modified on denial of rehearing June 1, 1999.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the 
court:
On October 5, 1994, defendant was charged in a 
six count indictment with armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1996)), felony 
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996)), first degree (knowing) murder (720 
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996)) and first degree (intentional) murder. 720 ILCS 
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996). A jury found defendant guilty on all counts, pursuant 
to a theory of accountability. Defendant requested a jury for his capital 
sentencing hearing, and at the close of the first phase of the hearing, the jury 
unanimously found him eligible for capital punishment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b), (g) 
(West 1996). In the second phase of defendant's sentencing hearing, the jury 
determined that no mitigating factors existed that were sufficient to preclude 
imposition of capital punishment (720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 1996)), and defendant 
was sentenced to death. Defendant's sentence has been stayed pending direct 
review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 
609(a). For the reasons which follow, we reverse defendant's convictions for 
armed robbery and felony murder, affirm his convictions for first degree 
(knowing) murder and first degree (intentional) murder; vacate defendant's death 
sentence; and remand this matter for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
A. The State's Theories
Defendant's convictions arise from the conduct 
of defendant and Elton Williams on September 28, 1994, culminating in the 
shooting death of Officer Timothy Simenson of the Crest Hill police department. 
At trial, the State developed the theory that defendant aided and abetted 
Williams in the armed robbery of William Chaney, even though defendant did not 
himself commit the robbery. The State introduced evidence to show that 
immediately following the robbery of Chaney, defendant acted as Williams' 
accomplice when Williams shot and murdered Simenson.
In a separate trial, a jury found Williams 
guilty of first degree (knowing) murder, first degree (intentional) murder and 
felony murder. He was sentenced to death for these crimes. On direct appeal to 
this court, we affirmed Williams' convictions and sentence. People v. 
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 306 (1998). The present appeal addresses only 
defendant's convictions and sentence.
B. The Evidence
Charles Pickens testified at trial that on the 
evening of September 27, 1994, Pickens and defendant drove together to 
defendant's mother's house in Pickens' automobile. En route to their 
destination, Pickens and defendant stopped at a liquor store. Pickens stated 
that defendant met Williams in the store. Defendant decided to leave the store 
with Williams and, as he left the liquor store at 6:30 or 7 p.m., Pickens saw 
defendant get into a small white car driven by Williams.
William Chaney testified that he arrived at his 
home, the Arbor Club apartment complex in Crest Hill, Illinois, shortly after 
midnight on September 28, 1994. As he parked his car in the parking lot, Chaney 
noticed a white car parked two spaces away from his own automobile. The engine 
of the white car was running. Chaney could not see inside the car.
When Chaney walked toward the entrance to his 
apartment building, he noticed Williams running toward him. Armed with an 
altered .22-caliber rifle, Williams ordered Chaney to surrender his wallet. 
Chaney tossed his wallet, which contained two $100 bills and Chaney's pay stub 
folded between the bills, to Williams.
Chaney then went directly into his apartment and 
called 911. It was 12:23 a.m. Chaney informed the Crest Hill police dispatcher 
of the robbery, provided a physical description of Williams, and the fact that a 
white car might be involved.
At the 911 operator's direction, Chaney returned 
to the parking lot and found a Crest Hill police officer, Tom Evanoff, in a 
squad car waiting for him. Evanoff and Chaney drove half a block to the 
intersection of Theodore and Burry Circle, located at the border of Crest Hill 
and Joliet, Illinois. Chaney recognized the white car he had earlier seen in the 
Arbor Club parking lot, now stopped at the intersection. Two Crest Hill police 
cars were parked directly behind the white car. Chaney estimated that 10 to 12 
feet separated the white car and the first police car behind the white car. The 
headlights of both police cars were illuminated.
Evanoff parked his squad car parallel to the 
first police car. From his unobstructed vantage point, Chaney observed two 
police officers standing at the white car with a third man, whom Chaney 
identified as the defendant. Chaney told Evanoff that he was not sure that 
defendant was the man who had robbed him. As Evanoff began to leave the squad 
car, Chaney saw one of the officers remove keys from the white car and walk to 
the car's trunk. Chaney noticed too that, when the officer started to open the 
trunk, defendant bent over the hood of the police car parked immediately behind 
the white car. As the trunk deck rose, Chaney saw a gun barrel emerge from the 
trunk and fire two shots. The officer that opened the trunk fell backward, and a 
man standing in the trunk of the white car aimed a rifle at the second officer. 
Chaney heard "rapid and loud" gunfire, and he lay down in the back of Evanoff's 
squad car. After the shooting stopped, Chaney sat up and saw the second officer 
place handcuffs on defendant.
Chaney further testified that he did not see 
defendant during the robbery at the apartment complex, and that he never saw 
defendant in the white vehicle. Chaney never saw a weapon in defendant's 
hands.
Crest Hill police officers Ralph Smith and 
Evanoff also described the events of September 28, 1994. Smith testified that he 
was about 1½ miles from the intersection of Theodore and Burry when he heard the 
first dispatch about the robbery on his radio. The radio message, directed to 
Evanoff, stated that a robbery had occurred a few minutes earlier at Arbor Club 
complex. The robbery suspect was described as a black male in his mid-twenties, 
wearing a black jacket. The dispatcher also mentioned there was a white car in 
the area. Smith then heard a second radio communication, indicating that Evanoff 
would proceed to the apartment complex to interview the robbery victim, and that 
a third officer, Timothy Simenson, had seen and intended to stop a white 
Chevrolet Cavalier automobile at the intersection of Theodore and 
Burry.
Smith drove to Theodore and Burry, arriving 
there in approximately 1½ minutes. At the scene, Smith testified that he parked 
his car behind Simenson's car. Smith shone a spotlight located on his car toward 
a white Chevrolet Cavalier automobile parked in front of Simenson's car. Smith 
joined Simenson and the driver of the white car, later identified as defendant, 
as they stood at the driver's side of the white car. Simenson directed defendant 
to go to the back of the white car. Defendant walked to the back of the car and 
without being ordered by either officer to do so, sat on the trunk deck. In the 
meantime, Simenson examined the interior of the white car, turned off the car 
engine, and returned to the back of the white car with the car keys in his hand. 
Simenson said he intended to open the trunk and told defendant to get off the 
trunk of the automobile. Defendant slid off the trunk but stayed near the back 
of the white car. Simenson again told defendant to move away and go with Smith 
to Simenson's car.
Smith walked behind defendant to Simenson's car, 
where defendant placed his hands on the front of the car and bent forward at the 
waist. Neither Smith nor Simenson had told defendant to do this, and Smith said 
he found defendant's actions "unusual." Because Evanoff had recently arrived at 
the scene and parked near Simenson's car, Smith told defendant to stand up and 
face Evanoff's car. Smith knew, from radio communications, that Evanoff was 
bringing Chaney with him to the scene to determine if Chaney could identify 
defendant.
As Smith and defendant stood with their backs to 
the white car, Smith heard the trunk of the white car open, followed by a 
gunshot. Smith testified that as he turned around, he heard a second shot, and 
saw Simenson falling backward "like a tree." Smith tried to aim his own weapon, 
but had to step to the right to avoid putting Simenson in his line of fire. As 
he moved, Smith saw a "male black, 20's," get out of the trunk and level a gun 
at him. Smith fired his weapon several times until the assailant fell to the 
ground. Smith and Evanoff placed handcuffs on defendant and Williams and 
summoned ambulances.
Smith testified that after the shooting ceased, 
he turned to find defendant "spread-eagled" on the hood of Simenson's car. He 
did not know at what point defendant moved from a standing position to lying on 
the hood of the police car.
Defendant never told or indicated to Simenson or 
Smith that anyone was in the trunk of the white car.
Evanoff testified that at approximately midnight 
on September 28, Simenson and Evanoff were parked in their respective cars in a 
parking lot in Crest Hill. At 12:24 a.m., Evanoff received a dispatch regarding 
an armed robbery at the Arbor Club apartment complex. The radio dispatcher 
described a "male black, 25 years of age, wearing a black jacket." The 
communication also mentioned that a white vehicle "might be 
involved."
Simenson and Evanoff immediately drove in the 
direction of Arbor Club. The officers saw a white Chevrolet Cavalier automobile 
driving toward them, with an African-American male behind the wheel. Simenson 
made a U-turn and followed the white car. Evanoff continued on to Arbor 
Club.
After Evanoff arrived at the apartment complex, 
Simenson radioed Evanoff and asked for more descriptive information regarding 
the robbery suspect. Evanoff relayed Chaney's description to Simenson and then 
decided that he would bring Chaney to the intersection of Theodore and Burry. 
Evanoff estimated that he spent approximately five minutes at Arbor Club. He 
arrived at the intersection of Theodore and Burry at 12:31 a.m.
As he arrived at the scene, Evanoff could see 
Smith, defendant and Simenson standing at the rear of the white car. He watched 
defendant and Smith walk to the front of Simenson's car. Defendant put his hands 
on the front of Simenson's car and bent his body over the automobile. When 
defendant stood up, Chaney told Evanoff, "I think that's the guy but I am not 
positive." Evanoff saw Simenson walk to the rear of the white car, put the key 
in the trunk lock and slowly raise the trunk deck, looking down into the trunk 
as he raised the lid.
According to Evanoff, an African-American male 
came out of the trunk, pointed a gun at Simenson's head and fired. Simenson's 
head was about one foot from the end of the gun barrel. Simenson's head jerked 
back and Evanoff heard a second shot. Evanoff said Simenson fell backward like a 
tree. Williams then jumped out of the trunk with both hands on his gun and 
"pointed down towards *** Smith."
Evanoff got out of his car, drew his own weapon 
and positioned himself behind the open door of his car. Evanoff started shooting 
and saw Williams' body jerk and fall.
An evidence technician employed by the Joliet 
police department, Gary Baggett, testified that in the early morning hours of 
September 28, 1994, he recovered Williams' clothes at St. Joseph Medical Center. 
From the pocket of Williams' pants, Baggett recovered two $100 bills, with a pay 
stub belonging to William Chaney folded between them.
Joseph Sapala, M.D., is a forensic pathologist. 
On September 28, 1994, he performed an autopsy on the body of Simenson. Sapala 
testified that Simenson received two gunshot wounds to the face: one in the 
right jaw and one in the lip. Based on stippling patterns formed by gunpowder at 
the jaw wound, Sapala determined that the gun was approximately 18 inches from 
Simenson's head when fired. One of the bullets entering Simenson's head traveled 
from the right front to the back of his head; the other traveled downward to the 
right side of the neck. Sapala opined that "even with the best medical 
treatment," the bullet that entered Simenson's lip would have proven fatal. He 
estimated the bullet that entered the jaw also had "a high degree of proving 
fatal." With the combination of the two wounds, Simenson had no chance of 
surviving. Sapala further testified that "[Simenson] would have been dead before 
he hit the ground from those two wounds."
ANALYSIS
In his appeal, defendant alleges several errors 
that occurred before and during his trial, and during the post-trial sentencing 
hearing. We address these issues in their chronological order.
PRETRIAL
A. Whether the Circuit Court Abused 
its Discretion by Excusing a Prospective Juror for Cause
Defendant asserts that the circuit court abused 
its discretion by granting the State's motion to dismiss prospective juror 
Jacqueline DePolo for cause. Defendant maintains that the trial court improperly 
refused to clarify DePolo's opinions regarding capital punishment. The State 
responds that the circuit court correctly exercised its discretion in gauging 
whether a venireperson would fulfill her obligation to abide by the court's 
instructions and her oath as a juror.
We repeat below the relevant colloquy that 
occurred between the circuit court and DePolo during voir dire. The 
question and response that defendant believes required clarification are set 
forth in italics.
Following a 
conference between counsel and the court, the court excused DePolo for cause and 
defense counsel objected:
A trial court may 
not exclude a prospective juror for cause because the juror voices general 
religious or conscientious reservations about capital punishment. People v. 
Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 401 (1995); People v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341, 362 (1993); People v. Seuffer, 144 Ill. 2d 482, 505 (1991). 
Removal for cause may occur only if "the juror's views would 'prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with 
his instructions and his oath.' " Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985), quoting 
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980); Seuffer, 144 Ill. 2d  at 505. There is no "set 
catechism" the circuit court must recite, nor does this court demand that the 
potential juror answer questions with meticulous precision before the trial 
court may rule on a motion to exclude for cause. People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 354 (1983), citing People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 356 
(1981); Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d  at 362-63. Rather, the responses of the 
venireperson must be viewed in their entirety. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d  at 
363; Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d  at 354. "The determination whether to allow a 
challenge for cause lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court 
[citation] and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion." 
People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 421-22 (1995).
All of the factors we are obliged to apply to 
defendant's argument compel a finding that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in excusing DePolo. DePolo's answers were unequivocal. She did not 
voice generalized qualms concerning capital punishment that would have required 
further questioning (see Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327), but answered 
affirmatively the court's direct question of whether her beliefs would impair 
her ability to fulfill her obligations as a juror. Moreover, the record 
indicates that the court considered DePolo's response in its full context. The 
circuit court observed that DePolo appeared to understand the question and 
answered it without hesitation. Additionally, because DePolo had asked for 
clarification of a prior question, the fact she did not seek further 
clarification on the question at issue could lead the court to conclude that she 
understood all other questions put to her.
Admittedly, and as the State concedes, DePolo 
gave contradictory responses. In one instance, she indicated that circumstances 
existed where she would consider voting in favor of sentencing defendant to 
death. Later, she stated that, regardless of the evidence in this case, she 
would automatically vote against the death penalty.
Nevertheless, it is precisely in situations such 
as this, where the cold record suggests an apparent contradiction, that we defer 
to the circuit court's discretion. People v. Holman, 132 Ill. 2d 128, 
148-49 (1989).
Here, the circuit 
court watched and heard DePolo as she answered the court's questions. The court 
specifically referenced DePolo's demeanor in justifying its decision to remove 
her for cause. This court cannot, on the record before it, substitute its 
speculations about DePolo's demeanor in place of the lower court's personal 
observations. Therefore, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion.
TRIAL
Defendant asserts that the circuit court made 
four erroneous rulings at trial. We proceed first to defendant's challenge to 
rulings relating to defendant's felony murder conviction and then to the alleged 
errors relevant to defendant's convictions for knowing and intentional 
murder.
A. Felony Murder
1. Whether the Circuit Court 
Erroneously Responded to a Question From the Jury During 
Deliberations
At trial, the circuit court instructed the jury 
in part that:
The court further 
instructed the jury that:
The court also 
tendered an instruction explaining the theory of accountability:
Following the 
commencement of jury deliberations, the court received the following note from 
the jury foreman: "Judge please answer. Please define the law as to when an 
armed robbery ends." Relying on People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89 
(1974), and over the objection of defense counsel, the court returned the 
following written response to the jury:
Defendant insists 
that the circuit court's response to the jury's question amounted to reversible 
error. The judge's answer mischaracterized the elements of armed robbery, 
defendant maintains. By informing the jury that the act of "escaping *** [is] 
part of the commission of the crime," the circuit court added an element to the 
armed robbery instruction and dictated a verdict against defendant on the armed 
robbery and felony murder charges.
Under certain circumstances, whether a trial 
court responds to a jury inquiry concerning instructions lies within the 
discretion of the court. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (1990). 
Where "[the jury] has posed an explicit question or requested clarification on a 
point of law arising from facts about which there is doubt or confusion," the 
court must answer the question. People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 229 
(1994); Reid, 136 Ill. 2d  at 39. "When a jury makes explicit its 
difficulties, the court should resolve them with specificity and accuracy." 
Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  at 229.
At bar, the circuit court met its duty to 
respond to the question, but failed in its obligation to do so accurately. In 
People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105-06 (1998), this court recently 
explained that the "felony-murder escape" rule, stated in Hickman, and 
repeated by the circuit court in this case to the jury, cannot be applied to 
defendants charged with crimes pursuant to a theory of 
accountability.
In Dennis, the State charged the 
defendant with armed robbery pursuant to an accountability theory. During 
deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the trial judge. The first question 
asked, " 'When is the commission of the offense complete?' " 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 92. As the court and counsel discussed possible 
responses to the question, a second written question was sent from the jury 
room, " 'When is the commission of the crime over?' " Dennis, 
181 Ill. 2d  at 92. The trial judge in Dennis, like the judge in this 
case, relied on Hickman in formulating his response, " '[Y]ou may 
consider the period of time and the activities involved in escaping to a place 
of safety.' " Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 92. The jury returned a 
guilty verdict.
This court reversed Dennis' armed robbery 
conviction, in part because the trial judge's answer to the jury's questions 
constituted reversible error. The Dennis court held that, by the plain 
terms of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1996)), 
accountability for another's crimes attaches only before or during the 
commission of the crime. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 101. Once the elements 
of the crime are fulfilled, no guilt by accountability may occur. 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 101. Applying this rule to the facts before it, 
the Dennis court held that a defendant may be held accountable for the 
commission of an armed robbery if, "either before or during the commission 
of the offense, he aided or abetted [the perpetrator of the armed robbery] 
in 'conduct which is an element of [the] offense.' " (Emphasis added.) 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 101.
Continuing, the Dennis court reiterated 
the elements of armed robbery in Illinois: "the taking of property 'from the 
person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent 
use of force' while 'armed with a dangerous weapon.' " Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 101, quoting 720 ILCS 5/18-1, 18-2(a) (West 1994). The offense of 
robbery is complete when force or threat of force causes the victim to part with 
possession or custody of property against his will. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  
at 102. The armed robbery extends into an escape from the crime only if force is 
used to effectuate the escape. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 103. When force 
and taking, the essential elements animating the offense, have ended, so has the 
crime of armed robbery. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 103.
Dennis acknowledged those authorities 
holding that, when a murder occurs during the course of an escape from a 
robbery, the escape is within the operation of the felony-murder rule. 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 104. Nonetheless, in light of the different 
purposes underpinning the theories of felony murder and accountability, the 
Dennis court declined to extend the felony murder escape rule to 
prosecutions grounded in an accountability theory of liability. Dennis, 
181 Ill. 2d  at 105. Felony murder depends solely on a cause and effect 
relationship between the crime committed and the resulting murder to impose 
liability. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 105. The object of the felony murder 
statute is to limit the violence that attends the commission of felonies, so 
that anyone engaging in that violence will be automatically subject to a murder 
prosecution, should a murder occur during the commission of a felony. 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 105. Whether the perpetrator intended 
to murder the victim during the course of a felony is irrelevant. 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 105.
In contrast, accountability depends entirely on 
the intent of the perpetrator for its viability. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 
105. Unless the accomplice intends to aid the commission of a crime, no 
guilt will attach. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 105. In summation, this court 
held: "The felony-murder escape rule contemplates neither knowledge nor intent. 
Thus, the rule is irreconcilable with our accountability statute and we decline 
to apply it in that context." Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 105-06.
Under this analysis, the Dennis court 
ruled, the trial court's response to the jury's queries regarding the completion 
of armed robbery was "erroneous." Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 107. The 
felony-murder escape rule is "not applicable for accountability purposes," and 
escape is not an element of armed robbery for which the defendant could be held 
accountable. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 107.
Moreover, this court found in Dennis 
that the circuit court's "instruction" injecting the felony-murder escape rule 
into the jury deliberations could not be dismissed as merely harmless error. 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 107. Error arising from the tendering of jury 
instructions is deemed harmless only if the submission of proper instructions to 
the jury would not have yielded a different result. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  
at 107; see also People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 137 (1991); 
People v. Fierer, 124 Ill. 2d 176, 187 (1988). The State cited evidence 
in Dennis which it believed demonstrated the defendant's accountability 
before and during the commission of the robbery. However, this court concluded 
that the jury's question to the judge asking when a robbery ends showed that the 
jury found such evidence unconvincing. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 
108.
Further, the court found "equally unavailing" 
evidence that the defendant was at the crime scene, that he failed to report the 
crime, and that his exculpatory testimony regarding the crime might have been 
incredible. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 108. Presence at the commission of 
the crime, even when joined with flight from the crime or knowledge of its 
commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 108. The court observed as well that the defendant's testimony that 
he knew nothing of the robbery until after the crime ended was uncontradicted, 
so that both the State's and the defendant's versions of the crime could appear 
equally plausible to the jury. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 109. Finally, and 
most importantly, the trial court's direction to " 'consider the period of 
time and activities involved in escaping to a place of safety' " clearly 
told the jury to consider escape as an element of the crime, so that, "[b]ut for 
the erroneous instruction, *** the result at trial might have been 
different." Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 109.
Even in the absence of exculpatory testimony 
from defendant in the instant appeal, we conclude that Dennis compels a 
reversal of defendant's conviction for armed robbery. First, the State 
introduced no proof of any intent by defendant to further the robbery of Chaney. 
The State's case that defendant aided and abetted Williams before or during the 
armed robbery rested on circumstantial evidence that showed, at best, only 
defendant's presence at and flight from the Arbor Club apartment complex. While 
this court also acknowledges the short time frame in which the robbery and 
murder occurred, we conclude, again, that the sequence of events establishes no 
more than defendant's presence with Williams at the Arbor Club complex and at 
the intersection of Theodore and Burry. As stated in Dennis, presence 
at the crime scene, even when coupled with flight, cannot alone establish 
accountability.
Second, the circuit court in this case directed 
the jury to consider escape from the crime scene as an element of armed robbery 
in even more explicit terms than the lower court in Dennis. Whereas the 
trial court in Dennis told the jury to " 'consider *** activities 
involved in escaping to a place of safety' " (Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 
at 92), the court in the case sub judice ordered the jury to consider 
escape as "part of the commission of the crime."
Like the jury in Dennis, the fact of 
the jury's question to the judge here demonstrated that the jury was unconvinced 
that defendant abetted Williams before the elements of armed robbery had been 
fulfilled by Williams. The possibility that the jury hinged its guilty verdict 
on defendant's participation in the escape from the crime is, in our view, 
equally as likely as a verdict based on defendant's assumed acts before Williams 
left Arbor Club. In sum, we cannot say that the verdict would have been the same 
even if the additional instruction had not been supplied by the court. See 
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 109 ("On this record, we do not find evidence in 
support of defendant's armed robbery conviction so clear and convincing as to 
render the erroneous instruction harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); 
Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  at 234. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's 
conviction for armed robbery.
By definition, a felony murder is a murder that 
occurs during the commission of certain felonies, including armed robbery. 720 
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996). Accountability for felony murder, in turn, exists 
only if defendant may be deemed legally responsible for the felony that 
accompanies the murder. See People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 547 
(1998) (accountability in and of itself is not a crime, but is a mechanism 
through which a criminal conviction may be obtained; a charge based on 
accountability necessarily flows from the principal crime at issue); People 
v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218, 234 (1992) ("Accountability, tied as it is to 
the crime charged, must comport with the requirements of that crime"). Because 
defendant is not accountable for the armed robbery of Chaney, he may not be held 
accountable for any murder occurring during the robbery. We therefore also 
reverse defendant's felony-murder conviction.
2. Whether the Circuit Court 
Erred in Denying Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict on the Felony-Murder 
Count
Defendant insists that the circuit court 
erroneously denied his motion for directed verdict on the felony-murder count. 
Because we have found reversible error in the circuit court's instruction to the 
jury on this count, we need not address this argument.(1)
B. Intentional/Knowing Murder
1. Whether the Circuit Court Improperly 
Submitted Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 5.03A to the Jury
Defendant criticizes the circuit court's approval of the 
State's instruction No. 11, regarding felony murder. Although we have reversed 
defendant's felony-murder conviction, defendant's argument calls into question 
defendant's convictions on all three murder counts, and therefore warrants our 
consideration.
Instruction No. 11 restates Illinois pattern jury 
instruction No. 5.03A (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03A 
(3d ed. Supp. 1995)). Defendant maintains that the instruction should be limited 
to cases charging defendant with only felony murder. Defendant argues too that, 
having received the State's instruction No. 11, the jury should have been 
informed that instruction No. 11 applied solely to the felony-murder count and 
not to the remaining murder counts. Defendant theorizes that the lack of a 
clarifying instruction misled the jury into believing that defendant could be 
convicted on any of the murder counts merely on proof that "defendant and 
Williams agreed to [commit] armed robbery *** even if [defendant] did not intend 
to kill Officer Simenson."
The State correctly observes that defendant waived this 
argument by neglecting to object to the instruction at the jury instruction 
conference. People v. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 362 (1996); People 
v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 209 (1990). By operation of Illinois Supreme 
Court Rule 615, however, we can review any question not otherwise properly 
preserved if we believe that plain error affecting a substantial right may have 
occurred. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d  at 363; 
Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d  at 209. In criminal cases, the plain error rule 
may be invoked in two instances: first, where the evidence in the case is 
closely balanced (Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d  at 363; Herrett, 137 
Ill. 2d at 209), and second, where to leave the error uncorrected raises a 
substantial risk that the accused was denied a fair trial, and remedying the 
error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process 
(Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d  at 363; Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d at 210). The 
error must be "so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process that the 
trial court could not cure the error by sustaining an objection or instructing 
the jury to disregard the error." Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d  at 
364.
We find that the plain error doctrine cannot be applied 
here. As discussed subsequently in this opinion, the evidence supporting 
defendant's convictions for knowing and intentional murder is so convincing as 
to remove any suggestion that the evidence is closely balanced. As we also 
explain below, instruction No. 11 contains a correct statement of the law, and 
was adequately supplemented by other instructions that fairly and completely 
stated the law applicable to this criminal case. No affront to the judicial 
process occurred that would substantiate a finding of plain error. Thus, we do 
not find plain error necessitating review.
Nevertheless, waiver merely limits the parties' ability to 
raise an argument, not this court's right to entertain an argument. People 
v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998). Consequently, we may, as we choose 
here, address the merits of this issue.
The State's instruction No. 11 reads:
Initially, we note that defendant does not 
contend that instruction No. 11 misstates the law of felony murder. By 
tendering an instruction derived from the Illinois pattern jury instructions, 
the State followed this court's preference for pattern instructions, provided 
the instruction accurately states the principle of law for which it is 
submitted. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 116 (1994); 134 Ill. 2d R. 
451(a). Additionally, this court approved IPI 5.03A as a statement of felony 
murder in People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 537 (1992).
Defendant's objection to instruction No. 11 chiefly arises 
from the committee note for IPI 5.03A, which advises that "[b]ecause the supreme 
court has approved this instruction to date only in the context of a felony 
murder case involving an alleged accomplice, the Committee believes this 
instruction should not be used in any other case." Illinois Pattern Jury 
Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03A, Committee Note (3d ed. Supp. 
1995).
In this appeal, we discern two reasons to decline the 
committee's suggestion. First, the phrase "any other case" in the comment is not 
entirely clear. The phrase might be construed to mean any case in which murder 
is charged pursuant to theories other than felony murder. However, it could just 
as easily refer to those cases in which accountability is inapplicable to the 
charge of felony murder.
In any event, we find that, in the case at bar, the 
committee's directive limiting use of the instruction to a particular fact 
pattern conflicts with a fundamental rule of law. As stated in Ramey, 
"[a]n individual instruction should not be judged in artificial isolation; 
rather, the instruction should be examined in light of the overall charge." 
Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 537. If all of the instructions, read together, 
completely and fairly state the law governing disposition of the case, no error 
occurs in instructing the jury. This is true even when the instruction 
complained of is, alone, superfluous or misleading. People v. Weaver, 
18 Ill. 2d 108, 116 (1959); People v. Marsh, 403 Ill. 81, 94 
(1949).
In the appeal at bar, the jury received complete and 
thorough instructions concerning first degree (knowing) murder and first degree 
(intentional) murder, in addition to instructions concerning armed robbery and 
felony murder. These same instructions clearly stated that the knowing and 
intentional murder charges were separate and distinct from the felony-murder 
charge.
Similarly, the jury received separate verdict forms for each 
crime charged against defendant. In addition to armed robbery, the jury received 
separate verdict forms for: "the offense of first degree murder intending to 
kill Timothy Simenson"; "the offense of first degree murder knowing the acts 
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Timothy Simenson"; 
"the offense of first degree murder while committing the offense of armed 
robbery."
Reading the instructions collectively, as we must 
(People v. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d 415, 433-34 (1981)), we find that no 
error occurred in the tendering of instruction No. 11. In their entirety, the 
instructions fully and fairly announced the law applicable to the theories of 
the State and defendant. People v. Terry, 99 Ill. 2d 508, 516 (1984); 
Weaver, 18 Ill. 2d  at 116; Marsh, 403 Ill.  at 94. Through the 
several instructions and verdict forms, the jury was informed, more than once, 
that defendant was charged under different theories of first degree murder. We 
also find the instructions facially clear and comprehensible. Defendant's 
concern that instruction No. 11 confused the jury is without merit.
2. Whether Certain Statements Made by the 
State During Closing Arguments Unfairly Prejudiced Defendant's 
Case
Defendant complains next of four statements made by the 
assistant State's Attorney during closing arguments. Each of the statements was 
intended to persuade the jury that Williams and defendant planned to shoot 
Simenson when he opened the trunk of the white car. Defendant correctly observes 
that his participation in the planning was essential to the State's 
accountability theory of liability against defendant. Defendant insists that the 
prosecutor's statements were not grounded in fact or in any reasonable 
inferences arising from the evidence admitted at the guilt/innocence phase of 
the trial.
In pertinent part, counsel for the State argued:
Defendant concedes that defense counsel 
failed to raise contemporaneous objections to any statement but the third. As to 
the first, second and fourth passages quoted above, defendant relies on the 
plain error doctrine to earn appellate review.
As previously explained, we apply the plain error doctrine 
only where the evidence of defendant's guilt is closely balanced, or where the 
alleged error is so substantial or so fundamental as to deprive defendant of a 
fair trial. People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 239-40 (1993); 134 
Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Convincing evidence was admitted at trial of defendant's 
accountability for knowing and intentional murder. Chaney, Evanoff and Smith 
recounted defendant's actions during the car stop at the intersection of 
Theodore and Burry. When told to go to the back of the white car by Officer 
Simenson, defendant sat on the trunk of the automobile, although he was not 
directed to do so. When Simenson told him to get off the white car, defendant 
slowly slid off, but remained leaning against it. Moreover, when Simenson said 
he was going to open the trunk and ordered defendant to walk to Simenson's 
police car, which was parked immediately behind the white car, defendant bent 
forward at the waist in order to lie on the hood of Simenson's car. As before, 
defendant was not directed by Smith or Simenson to do this.
These acts, combined with defendant's utter failure to alert 
the police to the presence of an armed man in the trunk of the white car, give 
rise to legitimate inferences that defendant not only knew that Williams 
intended to shoot the person who opened the trunk of the automobile, but also 
that defendant and Williams preplanned a signal to be delivered by defendant to 
Williams that the trunk was about to be opened.
From the foregoing, we find that the evidence supporting a 
theory of accountability for intentional and knowing murder was not closely 
balanced. Nor can we conclude that admission of the statements worked a 
substantial or fundamental unfairness on defendant: the State's closing argument 
was consistent with facts admitted at trial. Therefore, the plain error doctrine 
does not apply to the first, second and fourth statements.
In the alternative, defendant contends that his lawyer's 
failure to object to the State's remarks amounted to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show 
(1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance resulted in 
prejudice to defendant. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 320, citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 
693, 699, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2069 (1984). Because defendant must satisfy 
both prongs of the test, the failure to satisfy either element precludes a 
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. 
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 320.
We can dispose of defendant's ineffective-assistance charge 
on the "prejudice" prong alone. Any objection to the prosecutor's remarks would 
rightfully have been denied, since each statement was justified by evidence 
admitted at trial. Had defense counsel objected, therefore, the result would 
have been no different than the effect of his failure to object. No prejudice 
resulted from the defense attorney's purportedly ineffective 
assistance.
As to the third statement,(2) 
we are reminded that, generally, courts accord wide latitude to the prosecutor 
during closing argument, provided counsel grounds his argument in the evidence 
or in inferences fairly yielded by the evidence. People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 407 (1994); Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 240; People v. 
Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 105 (1984). The remarks by the State that defendant 
now calls into question were reasonably implied by the State's proof. No error 
occurred.
Equally unavailing is defendant's insistence that the only 
evidence supporting defendant's alleged accountability for Simenson's murder was 
introduced at the aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's sentencing 
hearing, and not at the guilt/innocence phase of defendant's trial. Defendant 
refers to the testimony of Timothy Beavers, who testified in aggravation on 
behalf of the State. Beavers averred that, while incarcerated with defendant at 
the Will County jail in October 1994, defendant told Beavers that defendant and 
Williams robbed two persons on September 28, 1994, and that they took between 
$100 and $200 from one of those individuals. In his testimony, Beavers also 
recounted defendant's statements that defendant and Williams decided to hide 
Williams in the trunk of their get away car because the police "would be looking 
for two people, not one." According to Beavers, defendant further told him that, 
in the event defendant and Williams were stopped in their flight by the police, 
Williams would "take care of business." Beavers interpreted this phrase as "do 
whatever you got to do."
Beaver's testimony may have been anticipated by the 
prosecutor when he used the phrase "take care of business" in his closing 
argument at the guilt phase. Nonetheless, the colloquialism is sufficiently 
commonplace that the attorney might not have used it as a reference to Beavers' 
statements. At the time the jury heard the prosecutor's argument, Beavers had 
not yet testified, so any impact the State intended by use of "take care of 
business" would have been lost on the jury. Most importantly, the State 
furnished more than adequate proof during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial 
that defendant aided and abetted Williams in Simenson's murder. Our review of 
the record satisfies us that "take care of business" at best emphasized the 
elements of accountability that the State had already proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
ELIGIBILITY PHASE
A. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Failing 
to Instruct the Jury That Defendant Was Not Eligible for the Death Penalty 
Unless the State Proved Defendant's Culpable Mental State
Defendant contends that this court should find defendant 
"not death eligible" because the jury was improperly instructed during the 
first, or "eligibility," phase of his sentencing hearing. Relying on Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982), and 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, 107 S. Ct. 1676 
(1987), defendant insists that a finding of eligibility for the death penalty 
preliminarily requires a determination by the jury that defendant possessed a 
culpable mental state during the commission of the crimes charged. Defendant 
maintains that the jury received no instructions at the hearing that would have 
permitted it to make such a finding and, therefore, that the death sentence must 
be vacated.
The State responds that defendant neglected to properly 
preserve this question for our review. Because we choose to address the merits 
of defendant's argument, however, we need not decide whether this element of 
defendant's appeal has been waived.
In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982), the United States Supreme Court compared the 
individual culpability of Enmund, who had been sentenced to death for felony 
murder under a theory of accountability, to the culpability of his accomplices, 
the persons who actually killed the victim during the course of the felony 
murder. The Enmund court observed that pursuant to the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment, criminal punishments cannot 
be excessively lengthy or severe in proportion to the crime charged. 
Enmund, 458 U.S.  at 788, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1146, 102 S. Ct.  at 3372. The 
Court said: "It is fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished 
more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.' " 
Enmund, 458 U.S.  at 798, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1152, 102 S. Ct.  at 3377, 
citing H. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 162 (1968). Facts introduced at 
Enmund's trial proved that Enmund neither "kill[ed nor] attempt[ed] to kill *** 
[and did not] warrant a finding that Enmund had any intention of participating 
in or facilitating a murder." Enmund, 458 U.S.  at 798, 801, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1152, 1154, 102 S. Ct.  at 3377, 3378-79. To treat the actual killers and 
Enmund alike for purposes of imposing a capital sentence ignored that their 
individual degrees of personal culpability were "plainly different" and violated 
the eighth amendment. Enmund, 458 U.S.  at 798, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1152, 
102 S. Ct.  at 3377.
The United States Supreme Court revisited the question of 
proportionality in capital sentencing in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987). There, defendants Ricky and 
Raymond Tison received the death penalty pursuant to Arizona statutes that (1) 
defined capital murder as a killing occurring during the perpetration of a 
robbery or kidnapping, and (2) held each participant in a robbery or kidnapping 
legally responsible for the acts of his accomplices. Tison, 481 U.S.  at 
141, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 134, 107 S. Ct.  at 1679-80. Like Enmund, neither Tison 
committed the murders in question, yet unlike Enmund, the Tisons' "degree of 
participation in the [underlying] crimes was major rather than minor, and the 
record *** support[ed] a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless 
indifference to human life." Tison, 481 U.S.  at 151, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 
140, 107 S. Ct.  at 1684. To the Tison Court, this "major participation 
in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life" 
(Tison, 481 U.S.  at 158, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 145, 107 S. Ct. at 1688), 
moved the Tisons' acts far beyond Enmund's conduct on the spectrum of personal 
culpability. Imposition of the death penalty in Tison did not violate 
the eighth amendment's prescriptions for proportionality, since the Tisons' 
purposeful criminal conduct justified a more serious punishment.
Whether the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury on defendant's personal culpability for the felony murder is, in the 
instant appeal, moot, since we have reversed defendant's conviction for that 
crime. As to defendant's convictions for intentional and knowing murder, we hold 
that the jury made the necessary finding of defendant's individual 
culpability.
The Enmund/Tison rule does not require 
that a finding of culpability be made at a particular stage of the sentencing 
hearing. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386, 88 L. Ed. 2d 704, 
716-17, 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 (1986). "The Eighth Amendment is satisfied so long 
as the death penalty is not imposed upon a person ineligible under 
Enmund for such punishment." Cabana, 474 U.S.  at 386, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 716, 106 S. Ct.  at 697. "At what precise point in its criminal process 
a State chooses to make the Enmund determination is of little concern 
from the standpoint of the Constitution." Cabana, 474 U.S.  at 386, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 717, 106 S. Ct.  at 697. Applying this standard to appeals in 
Illinois, we have ruled that the necessary findings of culpability can be made 
by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 456 (1988).
Turning to the present appeal, we hold that the jury made 
the requisite finding of defendant's personal culpability for Simenson's murder. 
By virtue of defendant's convictions for knowing and intentional murder, the 
jury necessarily found that defendant, with an intent to promote or facilitate 
the murder, knowingly aided or abetted Williams' intentional murder of Simenson, 
or aided or abetted acts creating a strong probability of death or great bodily 
harm to Simenson. These findings, compelled by instructions tendered to the 
jury, are, in our opinion, illustrative of a "reckless indifference to human 
life" (Tison, 481 U.S.  at 151, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 140, 107 S. Ct. at 1684) 
by defendant, and even of an intent that a " 'killing take place or that 
lethal force *** be employed.' " People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 48, quoting Enmund, 458 U.S.  at 797, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1151, 102 S. Ct.  at 3376. The guilty verdicts for knowing and intentional murder established 
defendant's culpable mental state for Simenson's death, even though Williams may 
have been the person that actually fired the shots that killed Simenson. See 
People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 529-30 (1995) (jury's guilt phase 
finding of the requisite mental state satisfies Enmund requirements). 
Therefore, the absence of instructions directing the jury to render a finding on 
defendant's personal culpability was not error.
Lastly, defendant cannot complain that his lawyer's failure 
to tender Enmund/Tison instructions denied defendant effective legal 
assistance. No prejudice could have flowed from that omission where defendant's 
mental state had already been determined by the jury.
AGGRAVATION/MITIGATION PHASE
A. Whether Introduction of Defendant's Armed Robbery 
Conviction Requires This Court to Vacate Defendant's Death Sentence
At the close of the first phase of defendant's sentencing 
hearing, the jury found defendant death-eligible based on a single statutory 
aggravating factor, namely, that Officer Simenson was a peace officer killed in 
the line of duty (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1) (West 1996)). The sentencing hearing 
proceeded to its second, or "aggravation/mitigation," phase, where the jury 
weighed factors favoring imposition of the death penalty against factors 
favoring mercy toward defendant. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 1996). One of the 
nonstatutory aggravating factors argued by the State in the second phase was 
defendant's conviction for armed robbery.
Defendant argues that, in light of our reversal of 
defendant's armed robbery conviction, the State introduced an improper 
aggravating factor before the jury which requires this court to vacate 
defendant's sentence. Defendant cites nine instances where counsel for the State 
argued the fact of defendant's armed robbery conviction to the jury during the 
aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's death penalty hearing. Defendant 
further directs our attention to an instruction that guided the jury's 
deliberations at the close of the second sentencing phase. The instruction 
informed the jury that it could consider as an aggravating factor "any other 
reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should be sentenced to 
death." The instruction also stated that aggravating factors could include 
factors not specifically listed elsewhere in the instructions. According to 
defendant, this instruction permitted the jury to weigh nonstatutory aggravating 
factors, such as the armed robbery conviction, against any mitigating evidence 
introduced by defendant. Defendant maintains that the jury's consideration of 
the armed robbery conviction as an aggravating factor impermissibly "tainted" 
his death sentence and compels us to vacate the sentence.
Defendant's argument raises two issues for our 
consideration. Preliminarily, we must decide whether the State's reference to 
defendant's armed robbery conviction constituted error. If we find error, we 
then must decide whether the error necessitates an automatic reversal and remand 
for resentencing or, alternatively, whether this court may resolve the error and 
resentence defendant without remanding the matter to the circuit 
court.
At the time the State's Attorney urged the jury to consider 
defendant's armed robbery, the armed robbery conviction was a fact. The 
conviction was also a pertinent event in defendant's criminal history, which the 
State was permitted to introduce as an aggravating factor and to rebut 
mitigating factors raised by defendant. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(1) (West 
1996).
Upon review, this court finds that at the guilt phase of 
defendant's trial, an improper instruction formed the basis for defendant's 
armed robbery conviction. We have held that this instruction was incorrect and, 
accordingly, reversed the conviction. During the second phase of defendant's 
sentencing hearing, however, the jury believed it had lawfully found defendant 
guilty of armed robbery. Moreover, defendant has only one armed robbery 
conviction in his criminal history, so there can be no dispute as to which 
conviction was referenced by the State. The fact the jury believed defendant was 
guilty of armed robbery, when legally in fact he was not, constitutes 
error.
Having determined that the jury incorrectly considered an 
armed robbery conviction as an aggravating factor at the second stage of the 
sentencing process, this court must now decide whether the error demands an 
automatic remandment for resentencing or whether this court may assume the 
sentencing responsibilities. Sentencing in state capital-punishment cases 
implicates at least three constitutional rights of a criminal defendant: the 
sixth amendment right to a fair trial, the eighth amendment right to be free of 
cruel and unusual punishment, and the fourteenth amendment right to due process. 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745, 746, 748, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725, 
736, 737, 738, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1446, 1447, 1448 (1990). Neither defendant's 
sixth amendment right to a jury trial nor his eighth amendment right to avoid 
cruel and unusual punishment requires this court to remand the proceedings for a 
new sentencing hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that decisions 
concerning punishment do not require a jury's deliberations. Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 1151, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376 
(1982). In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,459, 460, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340, 352, 352-53, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3161, 3162 (1984), the Court 
stated:
See also People v. Mack, 
167 Ill. 2d 525, 534 (1995).
Similarly, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this 
court interpret the eighth amendment as prescribing sentencing by a jury only. 
The eighth amendment demands that the "sentencing decision be based on the facts 
and circumstances of the defendant, his background and his crime." 
Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 748, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 738, 110 S. Ct.  at 1448. The 
"twin objectives" of the eighth amendment are "  'measured consistent 
application [of the death penalty] and fairness to the accused.' " 
Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 748, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 738, 110 S. Ct.  at 1448, 
quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8, 
102 S. Ct. 869, 874 (1982). Nothing inherent in the composition of a jury limits 
fair, consistent or informed sentencing to a jury. A reviewing court can just as 
easily master these functions, and in some instances, enjoys an advantage over 
juries in its knowledge of sentencing objectives compatible with the 
Constitution. See Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 749, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 738, 110 S. Ct.  at 1448. Consistent with the eighth amendment, therefore, a reviewing 
court may engage in a harmless error analysis, and determine whether, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the sentencing jury would have reached the same finding 
regardless of the introduction of the erroneous evidence, argument or 
instruction. Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 752-53, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 741, 110 S. Ct.  at 1450. A court of review can also "reweigh" aggravating factors against 
mitigating factors, replicating the deliberation asked of a jury at the 
sentencing phase. Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 749, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 738, 110 S. Ct.  at 1448.
Parenthetically, when the Clemons Court referred to 
a reviewing court's authority to "reweigh" evidence, the Court ascribed a very 
specific meaning to "reweigh." Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 745, 749, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 736, 738, 110 S. Ct.  at 1446, 1448. There are two types of state 
statutory schemes for imposing the death penalty. Under one type of statute, the 
trier of fact in a capital sentencing proceeding must consider only statutory 
aggravating factors, introduced at the eligibility phase, during deliberations 
at the aggravation and mitigation phase. Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1997). The jury must balance these factors against 
mitigation evidence and determine if the established aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating evidence. Williams, 125 F.3d  at 283. In the 
lexicon of capital sentencing case law, states that employ this scheme are 
called "weighing" states. Williams, 125 F.3d at 282-83; Hampton v. 
Page, 103 F.3d 1338, 1342 (7th Cir. 1997). The alternative, or 
"nonweighing," method allows the trier of fact to consider any relevant 
aggravating factor at the second stage of sentencing, including but not 
limited to the statutory aggravating, or eligibility, factors. 
Williams, 125 F.3d  at 283; Hampton, 103 F.3d  at 1342. Thus, 
the statutory aggravating factors "play no role in the sentencing process above 
the role of other evidence." Williams, 125 F.3d  at 283. Illinois is a 
nonweighing state. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (West 1996).
We find nothing in the eighth amendment analysis that would 
prevent a reviewing court in a "nonweighing" state from also assuming the 
sentencing functions of a jury. The determinative inquiry is whether the 
reviewing court, in performing the sentencing duties of a jury, actually 
fulfills those sentencing responsibilities in a meaningful manner. 
Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 750-52, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 739-40, 110 S. Ct.  at 
1449-50. In doing so, the court complies with the eighth amendment requirement 
that there be an individualized determination of whether defendant should be put 
to death, based on a consideration of defendant's circumstances and the facts 
surrounding his crime. Hampton, 103 F.3d  at 1343.
Protection of a criminal defendant's fourteenth amendment 
due process right, however, requires a separate analysis. Where a statutory 
sentencing scheme allows a criminal defendant to designate a jury as his 
sentencing body, the defendant acquires a liberty interest in having a jury 
deliberate his fate. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 65 L. Ed. 2d 175, 180, 100 S. Ct. 2227, 2229 (1980); People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 548 (1992). "The defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate 
expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent 
determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion [citation], 
and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against 
arbitrary deprivation by the State." Hicks, 447 U.S.  at 346, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 180, 100 S. Ct.  at 2229. A reviewing court may not usurp the jury's 
authority without stripping the defendant of his liberty interest. 
Hicks, 447 U.S.  at 346, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 180, 100 S. Ct.  at 
2229.
However, the United States Supreme Court has also ruled that 
this liberty interest may not be absolute. The scope of a criminal defendant's 
liberty interest in having a jury decide his fate pursuant to a capital 
sentencing statute is created by, and therefore is wholly dependent on, the 
terms of the sentencing statute. Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 747, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 737, 110 S. Ct.  at 1447; Hicks, 447 U.S.  at 346, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 
180, 100 S. Ct.  at 2229. If the statute allows a reviewing court to perform the 
sentencing function, then appellate resentencing would not violate defendant's 
due process rights. See Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 747, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 737, 
110 S. Ct.  at 1447.
In Clemons, 494 U.S. 738, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725, 110 S. Ct. 1441, a criminal defendant argued that Mississippi's capital sentencing act 
vested the defendant with a liberty interest in having a jury decide whether the 
defendant could be put to death. Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 747, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 737, 110 S. Ct.  at 1447. The State of Mississippi countered that it could 
perform the jury sentencing functions itself, thereby implying that any liberty 
interest bestowed on criminal defendants by its state sentencing scheme was not 
unqualified. Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 747, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 737, 110 S. Ct. 
at 1447. The Supreme Court refused to question Mississippi's construction of a 
Mississippi statute: if a state, in interpreting its own law, determines that 
its courts could engage in "appellate re-sentencing" without violating a liberty 
interest held by a defendant, then the United States Supreme Court was bound to 
yield to the state's construction of state law. Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 
747, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 737, 110 S. Ct.  at 1447; see also Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 534 ("We note that this due process right to sentencing by a jury does not 
necessarily preclude an appellate court from independently 're-sentencing' the 
defendant when, due to some error, the jury's sentencing decision cannot stand. 
Instead, the extent to which a reviewing court may engage in such re-sentencing 
would appear to depend on State law"). Following Clemons, we conclude 
that if a state sentencing statute permits appellate resentencing, and the 
appellate panel complies with the sentencing requirements, then defendant's 
liberty interest will not be imperiled when the reviewing court assumes 
sentencing responsibilities itself. Clemons, 494 U.S.  at 746-47, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 736-37, 110 S. Ct.  at 1447 .
In the instant appeal, we find that the Illinois capital 
sentencing statute does not permit a court of review to usurp the jury's role as 
sentencer without damaging defendant's due process rights. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 534; People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 550; 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) 
(West 1996). The statute plainly states that, if a defendant elects to have a 
jury perform the sentencing function, the jury and the jury alone will determine 
defendant's eligibility for death and whether any mitigating factor or factors 
should preclude capital punishment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 1996). By its terms, 
the Illinois capital sentencing statute does not permit this court to assume 
these responsibilities. Defendant has a liberty interest in having a jury "make 
particular findings relative to sentencing." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 
534.
We note that defendant's fourteenth amendment due process 
right does not preclude this court from applying a harmless error analysis to 
the State's erroneous introduction of the armed robbery conviction. The harmless 
error inquiry does not require this court to perform any of the jury functions 
described in the capital sentencing statute. Further, most errors of 
constitutional dimension are subject to a harmless error analysis. Only those 
constitutional violations that are "structural defects in the constitution of 
the trial mechanism," such as total deprivation of the right to trial counsel or 
absence of an impartial trier of fact, are per se error that 
necessitate remandment for a new proceeding. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 331, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991). Such 
error undermines the trial's fundamental function of determining the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 308, 310, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 
330, 331, 111 S. Ct.  at 1264, 1265. If, however, the error is in the nature of a 
"trial error," i.e., one which "occurred during the presentation of the 
case to the jury," then the error is subject to harmless error review. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 307-08, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 330, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1264. Such an error does not taint the fundamental truth-seeking function of the 
trial, and may be "quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 308, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 330, 
111 S. Ct.  at 1264. Error is harmless only if "it is proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant's conviction." 
People v. Dean, 175 Ill. 2d 244, 259 (1997).
After careful consideration of the record, we find that the 
erroneous introduction of defendant's armed robbery conviction to the jury at 
phase two of his capital sentencing hearing is in the nature of a trial error, 
so that it is subject to harmless error scrutiny by this court. However, we 
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that introduction of defendant's armed 
robbery conviction as an aggravating factor did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict.
The same jury that found defendant a candidate for the death 
penalty had, immediately preceding the sentencing hearing, found defendant 
guilty of the armed robbery. This was defendant's first and only armed robbery 
conviction and constituted a crime qualitatively different from the drug 
possession and burglary charges that dominated his criminal history. Defendant's 
record included arrests for possession of stolen property in 1985, for 
possession of cannabis in 1987, for residential burglary and for possession of 
cocaine and battery in 1990, for burglary in 1992, and for possession of drugs 
with intent to deliver and obstructing a peace officer in 1994. Additionally, 
defendant had pleaded guilty to the following crimes: a misdemeanor drug sale in 
1984, unlawful use of weapons in 1985, misdemeanor retail theft in 1990, and 
burglary in 1994. The 1994 guilty plea for burglary arose from a crime that 
occurred in 1992. For that incident, defendant received a three-year sentence in 
the Illinois Department of Corrections. According to Detective Robert 
Brenczewski of the Joliet police department, defendant was on parole from that 
sentence at the time of the Simenson murder.
Family and expert witnesses testifying at the 
aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's sentencing hearing indicated that 
defendant's personal history, while troubled, was unremarkable for extreme 
violence. Defendant's elder sister, Brenda Marshall, stated that defendant was 
the youngest of nine children, raised in a fun, loving home. Defendant's father 
died when defendant was 11, and when defendant was 9, defendant's elder brother, 
Ellis, died of a heart attack. Marshall said defendant had been very close to 
Ellis.
Marshall and defendant's mother made her children attend 
church, and attempted to impart the value of hard work to her children. Marshall 
testified that all of her other siblings work hard and work every 
day.
According to Marshall, defendant had been employed in the 11 
years preceding the trial. She stated he worked as a parking lot attendant for 
four years, but left that job for another, because he wanted to better himself. 
Marshall testified that defendant had also worked in a warehouse in Romeoville, 
and for the Sunny Hill Nursing Home, but she did not know what he did there. 
Defendant had talked to Marshall about wanting to work as a Will County 
sheriff.
Defendant occasionally lived with Marshall and her husband. 
Defendant "looked up to" Marshall's husband and helped him remodel Marshall's 
home.
Marshall has never seen defendant act violently or abuse 
drugs. She stated that his biggest problem is that he is a "follower." Defendant 
will do what others want him to do because he does not want to be called a 
"square."
Concerning defendant's relationship with his girlfriend, 
Kari, Marshall averred that, initially, their relationship was a good one. She 
said that defendant's son, Brandon, is a well-mannered child and an "A" student. 
However, Marshall asserted that defendant and Kari's mother, who resided with 
Kari, would drink excessively when defendant was at Kari's home, causing 
problems within the household.
Wade Hill, defendant's brother and 20 years defendant's 
senior, also testified. Since May 1992, Hill has seen defendant on at least a 
weekly basis, when defendant was not in jail. Defendant worked with Hill on 
construction projects, including some roofing projects in 1994. Hill described 
defendant as a reliable and good worker. In Hill's opinion, defendant has all 
the skills necessary to hold a job in the construction trade and could have 
earned a living using those skills.
Although Hill testified that he had never seen defendant 
abuse any substance other than alcohol, Hill conceded that defendant had a lot 
of friends who liked to drink. Hill said that defendant would gather with six or 
seven of these friends in an empty lot and drink beer or whiskey.
Veronica Files is Barbara Marshall's daughter and 
defendant's niece. She testified that before defendant was "in and out of 
prison," she would see him regularly, at least once a day. She said that during 
the time defendant was out of prison, but before September 28, 1994, defendant 
was working in a factory and seemed happy.
Files maintained that defendant was very close to her two 
sons and was very generous to her. She described defendant's relationship with 
his own son as close, and said father and son "interacted" "just about every 
day." Files believed that defendant's relationship with Kari turned bad only 
after Kari had a child by someone other than defendant.
Files never saw defendant in a fight, and believed he would 
avoid one if possible. She portrayed defendant as a follower, not a leader. He 
could be easily persuaded, depending on the situation.
Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, testified in 
mitigation. Gelbort examined defendant's police and Department of Corrections 
records, and conducted numerous tests on defendant individually.
Gelbort found defendant's "full scale IQ" to be 78, which 
Gelbort described as "upper end of borderline mentally deficient range of 
functioning." Test results showed defendant to be someone who was well behind 
his peer group in academic performance and had trouble focusing his attention 
and concentration. Defendant processes information more slowly than a normal 
person and has abnormal mental control, meaning a poor ability to focus on a 
subject. Defendant is also a person that will act on impulses that other persons 
would inhibit. Persons with defendant's personality profile have difficulty 
making it through school and difficulty holding a job. Their aspirations exceed 
what they can achieve, leading to frustration.
Defendant is in contact with reality. Defendant exhibits no 
signs of psychosis or schizophrenia. He is neither aberrant nor abnormal, with 
the exception that he lacks self-confidence and exhibits very low 
self-esteem.
Defendant tends to be a fairly passive person. While Gelbort 
admitted the existence of some aggressive behavior in defendant, he did not 
believe this behavior was significant, since defendant has never caused 
significant bodily harm to someone else. Defendant is most interested in making 
himself happy and feeling good. Gelbort described defendant as "more a follower 
than a leader." He is not skilled at anticipating the consequences of his 
actions.
Gelbort opined that he would not expect to find in someone 
with defendant's personality profile a person who would instruct another to 
shoot a police officer. Gelbort believed that, had there been two Gregory Shaws 
at the intersection of Theodore and Burry on the night of the murder, the murder 
would not have occurred. Gelbort interpreted defendant's actions on September 
28, 1994, as defendant's attempt to keep Elton Williams away from the police, 
because "if the two mixed there was going to be a problem."
Nevertheless, Gelbort conceded that defendant's IQ would not 
prevent defendant from planning an escape route from a robbery, nor would it 
prevent defendant from including in the plan an intent to "take care of 
business" in case he was caught.
Gelbort testified that defendant has expressed remorse for 
the murder of Officer Simenson. Defendant talked about the incident on many 
occasions, and displayed a heartfelt concern for "the children that will grow up 
without a father."
Two witnesses, William Beavers and Darryl Butler, testified 
at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the sentencing proceedings concerning 
defendant's alleged involvement in the armed robbery. Neither Beavers nor Butler 
testified at the liability phase of the trial. Beavers testified that, while 
incarcerated with defendant at the Will County jail, defendant told Beavers that 
defendant and Williams committed two armed robberies on the date in question. 
First, they robbed someone of $13 to buy cannabis, and then decided to rob 
someone else because they "needed more money." Darryl Butler testified that, on 
the evening of September 27, he was robbed in a parking lot approximately one 
mile from William Chaney's home. Butler was stopped by an African-American male 
who pointed a gun at Butler and demanded money. Butler gave him $13. The person 
that robbed Butler was not defendant, Butler said. Butler did not see a white 
car in the vicinity of the robbery. Although these were not the only witnesses 
to testify at the aggravation/mitigation phase, their testimony focused the 
jury's attention on the armed robbery that the State argued to the 
jury.
A review of the trial transcripts reveals that the State 
used the fact of the armed robbery conviction as more than just an aggravating 
factor. The State insisted that the conviction undermined defendant's contention 
that defendant lacked a significant criminal history and that he could yet be a 
law-abiding citizen.
We note that defendant's guilt for all his convictions-armed 
robbery, felony murder, knowing and intentional murder-rests entirely on a 
theory of accountability. William Chaney never saw defendant at the scene of the 
armed robbery. It is undisputed that Williams, not Shaw, fired the gunshots that 
killed Officer Simenson. In light of these considerations, we cannot say beyond 
a reasonable doubt that, even without the aggravating factor of an armed robbery 
conviction, the jury would have found an absence of mitigating factors to 
outweigh the aggravating factors favoring imposition of the death 
penalty.
Defendant urges the court to apply the rationale of 
People v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102 (1985), in vacating defendant's death 
sentence. We need not rely on Adams, however, since we find that the 
error alleged by defendant does not withstand harmless error 
scrutiny.
PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND
Defendant claims that additional errors occurred during his 
sentencing hearing. These issues may arise again on remand. Consequently, we 
address each alleged error seriatim. 
A. Whether the Circuit Court Erroneously 
Admitted Certain Portions of a Victim Impact Statement Into Evidence
Defendant argues next that he suffered irreparable harm from 
the introduction of a victim impact statement written and read by Susan 
Simenson, the widow of the victim. Defendant does not object to admission of the 
entire statement, only selected portions which, according to defendant, 
improperly characterized the crimes committed by defendant, and included an 
inappropriate recommendation of the type of sentence defendant should 
receive.
We disagree. As explained below, Mrs. Simenson's statement 
complied with constitutional restrictions on the content of victim impact 
statements. Moreover, choosing as we do to dispose of this issue on its merits, 
we can forgo two additional questions raised in the parties' briefs, namely, 
whether defendant waived any objection to Mrs. Simenson's testimony, and whether 
defense counsel rendered ineffective legal assistance.
The victim of a violent crime, including the spouse of a 
victim, may address the court regarding the impact which the criminal 
defendant's conduct has had upon the victim. 725 ILCS 120/3, 6 (West 1996). 
Admission of victim impact evidence does not violate the eighth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 736, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). Victim impact evidence is 
consistent with our legal tradition of examining the harm caused by a crime in 
order to determine both the elements of a criminal offense and the appropriate 
punishment that should follow from that crime. Payne, 501 U.S.  at 819, 
820, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 731, 732, 111 S. Ct.  at 2605, 2606. "Victim impact 
evidence is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority 
about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general 
type long considered by sentencing authorities." Payne, 501 U.S.  at 
825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 735, 111 S. Ct.  at 2608. Further, allowing a jury to 
consider such evidence at the sentencing stage merely balances the State's 
interest in having the jury fully informed of the value of the life lost against 
the interest of the criminal defendant in having the jury informed of mitigating 
factors that weigh against execution. Payne, 501 U.S.  at 822, 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 733, 735, 111 S. Ct.  at 2607, 2608. "[A] State may properly 
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral 
culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing 
phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant." Payne, 
501 U.S.  at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 735, 111 S. Ct.  at 2608.
In the case at bar, we find that the bulk of the statements 
to which defendant objects describe the impact the murder of Simenson had on his 
family, and thus fall squarely within the permissible range of victim impact 
evidence. In relevant part, Mrs. Simenson said:
We do not read the testimony quoted above 
as a request that the jury recommend that defendant be sentenced to death. In 
fact, substantially similar testimony by Mrs. Simenson was examined by this 
court in People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297 (1998), the direct appeal 
initiated by defendant's codefendant, Elton Williams. In that case, Williams 
insisted that, in the passage quoted below, Mrs. Simenson was improperly allowed 
to urge the jury to find Williams eligible for the death penalty.
This court did not construe the impact 
statement admitted in the Williams trial as recommending the death 
penalty to the jury. The court interpreted Mrs. Simenson's pleas for "closure" 
and a "quick verdict" as an appeal to bring an uncomfortable chapter in the life 
of her family to an end. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 325. Further, Mrs. 
Simenson did not intend to imply that failure to find Williams death-eligible 
would demonstrate a lack of support for the law enforcement community. Rather, 
the court read these remarks as being an expression of concern for the community 
at large. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 325.
Likewise, in the instant case, we interpret Mrs. Simenson's 
statements as a request that the jury deliberate quickly to end a painful ordeal 
for her family, and not an improper suggestion of a sentence for defendant. Mrs. 
Simenson's description of her husband as an officer may also fairly be construed 
as her assessment of the loss to the community as a result of the defendant's 
acts. In Payne, 501 U.S.  at 822, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 733, 111 S. Ct.  at 
2607, the United States Supreme Court included "loss to *** society which has 
resulted from the defendant's homicide" as an appropriate counterbalance to 
evidence adduced by a defendant in mitigation at the sentencing 
phase.
Similarly, the only instance we find of "characterizations" 
of the crime by Mrs. Simenson is the phrase "the selfish and violent actions of 
Gregory Shaw and Elton Williams." To the extent this phrase expresses the 
Simenson family's anger and sense of helplessness at the death of Officer 
Simenson, the phrase is consistent with the legislative purpose animating the 
victim impact statement statute. 725 ILCS 120/6 (West 1996). Any extra meaning 
that could be read into the phrase is, in our opinion, muted by the instruction 
given by the circuit court to the jurors not to allow sympathy, passion or 
prejudice to influence their deliberations.
B. Whether the Circuit Court Erroneously 
Permitted Argument That Reduced the Jury's Responsibility in Recommending the 
Death Penalty for Defendant
Over defendant's objection, the State made the following 
rebuttal argument during the aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's capital 
punishment hearing:
Defendant argues that the circuit court 
erred in failing to sustain defendant's objection to the italicized statements. 
Defendant interprets the State's remarks as an impermissible violation of 
defendant's eighth amendment right to have the jury bear sole responsibility for 
its capital sentencing decision. According to defendant, the State told the jury 
that it should feel no remorse about recommending the death penalty for 
defendant, because the police could have killed defendant immediately following 
Simenson's death.
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
comments made by the State's Attorney in closing argument in a capital 
punishment hearing. In that case, the defendant asserted that opposing counsel's 
assurances to the jury that any death sentence they recommended would be subject 
to automatic appellate review violated defendant's eighth amendment rights. The 
Supreme Court agreed.
The Caldwell Court observed that because of the 
severity of the death penalty, the eighth amendment subjects any capital 
sentencing determination to a high degree of scrutiny. Accordingly, many of the 
safeguards placed on the imposition of capital punishment are born of a concern 
that "the sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable 
exercise of sentencing discretion." Caldwell, 472 U.S.  at 329, 86 L. Ed. 2d  at 239, 105 S. Ct.  at 2639. Eighth amendment analysis "take[s] as a 
given" that capital sentencing bodies "[will] view their task as the serious one 
of determining whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the 
State." Caldwell, 472 U.S.  at 329, 86 L. Ed. 2d  at 240, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2640.
The Supreme Court enumerated several dangers inherent in the 
suggestion that a jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate 
court. Bound as it is to a record on appeal, a reviewing court cannot evaluate 
the intangibles of aggravating and mitigating evidence that only a jury is 
uniquely situated to decide. Caldwell, 472 U.S.  at 330, 86 L. Ed. 2d  at 
240, 105 S. Ct.  at 2640. Additionally, if it is led to assume that another court 
will scrutinize its decision, a jury might fulfill its obligations with less 
care or ground its decisions on factors unrelated to "legitimate sentencing 
concerns." See Caldwell, 472 U.S.  at 331-33, 86 L. Ed. 2d  at 240-42, 
105 S. Ct.  at 2640-42. In light of these dangers, the prosecutor's remarks in 
Caldwell were "fundamentally incompatible with the Eighth Amendment's 
heightened 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case.' " Caldwell, 472 U.S. 
at 340, 86 L. Ed. 2d  at 246, 105 S. Ct.  at 2645, quoting Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 
(1976).
This court has read Caldwell as "stand[ing] for the 
proposition that the prosecution may not lead a jury to believe that 
responsibility for a death sentence rests elsewhere, when State law places that 
responsibility on the jury." People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 205 
(1992). Also, as we examine prosecutorial arguments for constitutional 
violations, we must read the arguments in the context of the entire sentencing 
proceeding. See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 461 
(1993).
Contrary to defendant's interpretation of the State's 
rebuttal, the State did not suggest that the jury could relieve itself of 
responsibility for defendant's sentence. In fact, we discern quite the opposite 
message in the passage quoted above. The section opens with a reference to "the 
system," a theme the State then embellishes by reminding the jury how easily the 
police at the scene of the crime could have dispensed a "justice" of their own, 
had they wanted to do so. Instead, it is argued, the police allowed the system 
to function as intended, saving the determination of whether defendant will live 
or die for the jury, the body designated by our laws to execute this weighty 
responsibility.
These remarks are consistent with the State's repeated 
references, elsewhere in its closing arguments, that the jury would decide 
whether any mitigating evidence precluded imposition of the death penalty. Too, 
the jury was reminded of its responsibility in instructions that the circuit 
court read and tendered to the jury. The jurors' duty was made plain again in 
the verdict forms they took with them to their deliberations. We have previously 
found instructions, verdict forms and directions by counsel adequate indicia 
that the jury was not relieved of its singular responsibility of passing 
judgment on the defendant. See Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 462; 
Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 206.
C. Whether Defendant's Death Sentence is 
Excessive and Whether Illinois' Death Penalty is Unconstitutional
In light of our decision to vacate defendant's capital 
sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing, we need not address these 
issues.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we vacate defendant's convictions 
for felony murder and armed robbery. Defendant's remaining convictions for first 
degree murder are affirmed. We also vacate defendant's death sentence and remand 
this case for resentencing, pursuant to section 9-1 of the Criminal Code (720 
ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1996)).
Convictions affirmed in part 
and
vacated in part;
death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part:
I agree with the majority that we should vacate defendant's 
convictions for armed robbery and felony murder. I also agree that we should 
vacate defendant's death sentence on his convictions for intentional and knowing 
first degree murder and remand the cause to the circuit court for resentencing. 
I write separately because my reasoning differs in certain important respects 
from that of my colleagues.
Contrary to the majority, I believe that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in excusing Mrs. DePolo from the jury panel. It is true 
that she answered yes when the circuit court asked her whether her beliefs were 
such that she would automatically vote against the death penalty if defendant 
were found guilty. As the majority's discussion shows, however, this was 
actually the second time the same basic question had been put to her. The first 
time, the court asked her if her beliefs were such that she would not, under any 
circumstances, consider signing a verdict directing the court to impose the 
death penalty. To that question she had a very different answer. She gave an 
unequivocal "no." She had no such scruples against signing a verdict calling for 
death.
This initial negative response by Mrs. DePolo was fully 
consistent with all of her other answers to the court's questions. She stated 
without hesitation or qualification that she had "no strong feelings by reason 
of religion, morals or conscience against the infliction of the death penalty," 
that her feelings about the death penalty would not "prevent or substantially 
impair [her] ability to reach a fair and impartial decision as to whether the 
defendant was guilty," and that her views on the death penalty would not 
"prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror in 
accordance with the Court's instructions as to the law and [her] oath as a 
juror."
Under these circumstances, I fail to see how Mrs. DePolo's 
response to the court's second anti-death-penalty question can reasonably be 
viewed as anything other than an inadvertent misstatement. The questions were 
phrased in an awkward and cumbersome way. Even the trial judge was confused when 
he attempted to paraphrase what her answer meant. He initially characterized 
what DePolo said as indicating that she would automatically sign a death 
verdict, then caught himself and described her answer as stating the opposite, 
namely, that she would "refuse to sign a death penalty verdict," or, more 
accurately, that "she would automatically vote against the death 
penalty."
A potential juror's views on the death penalty will warrant 
removal for cause only if they substantially impair the performance of his or 
her duties as a juror. People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (1995). Mrs. 
DePolo's voir dire answers did not reveal her to be a person for whom 
that would be the case. To the contrary, taken in context and viewed in their 
entirety, Mrs. DePolo's responses indicated that her personal views would have 
no effect on her willingness or ability to honor her responsibilities as a 
juror. To the extent that one of her answers suggested otherwise, it was 
incumbent on the circuit court to ask appropriate follow up questions to clarify 
her position. This simple, common-sense precaution would not have caused any 
delay or inconvenience, and would have ensured that the jury selection process 
was free from taint. The circuit court's unwillingness to query Mrs. DePolo 
further was completely unjustified, and its exclusion of her from the jury panel 
was error. Our court has held:
For this reason, in addition to the reasons 
given by the majority, defendant's death sentence should be set aside and the 
cause should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
The majority would allow defendant to receive the death 
sentence following remand. To this extent, I dissent. For the reasons set forth 
in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), this state's 
present death penalty law does not meet the requirements of the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. 
VIII, XIV) or article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2). On resentencing, defendant should therefore receive a 
sentence other than death.
JUSTICE NICKELS, also concurring in part and dissenting in 
part:
With the exception of the first sentence ("I agree with the 
majority that we should vacate defendant's convictions for armed robbery and 
felony murder"), I join the partial concurrence and partial dissent of Justice 
Harrison. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Dennis, 
181 Ill. 2d 87, 110 (1998) (Nickels, J., dissenting), I would affirm defendant's 
convictions for armed robbery and felony murder. The evidence that defendant 
assisted Elton Williams in his immediate escape from the armed robbery of 
William Chaney is sufficient to sustain his convictions for those offenses under 
the principle of accountability.
1. 1In his reply brief 
and at oral argument, defendant articulated this question somewhat differently, 
seemingly suggesting that the State's failure to prove defendant's 
accountability for the felony murder required reversal of the guilty verdicts 
entered against defendant for knowing and intentional first degree murder. We 
find this argument puzzling, since the commission of the armed robbery and 
defendant's accountability for the same were relevant only to the charges 
against him for armed robbery and felony murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1996). 

2. 2The transcript of the State's closing 
argument indicates that the defendant did not contemporaneously object to this 
statement, but rather to two sentences stated shortly thereafter.
"ASS'T. STATES' ATTORNEY: So they had to have a little 
conversation, a little agreement. Hey, Greg, you drive, I'll do the 
shooting.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I am going to object. There is 
absolutely not one shred of evidence that [the assistant State's Attorney] is 
alluding to ***."
Even though defendant failed to timely object, we exercise 
our discretion to consider the merits of defendant's argument. See People v. 
McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 364 (1997).