Title: New Jersey in the Interest of A.R.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of
the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.)

                      State in the Interest of A.R. (A-67-16) (078672)

Argued February 26, 2018 -- Decided July 11, 2018

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

       In the sexual assault trial of fourteen-year-old “Alex,” the family court admitted into
evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) -- the tender-years exception to the hearsay rule --
the video-recorded statement that seven-year-old “John” gave to police, in which he alleged
that Alex had sexually touched him on a school bus. John, who suffers from severe
developmental disabilities, who during out-of-court and in-court questioning was unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and who was declared incompetent as a witness by
the court, was permitted to testify pursuant to the incompetency proviso of N.J.R.E.
803(c)(27). The Court considers that determination, as well as the family court’s
adjudication of Alex as delinquent of committing sexual assault.

       Fourteen-year-old Alex was charged in a juvenile delinquency complaint with
committing sexual assault “by contact” on seven-year-old John. The complaint specifically
alleged that Alex “on one occasion rubbed [John’s] penis with his hand.” The alleged assault
occurred on a bus transporting eighteen special-needs children home from summer school.

        The family court conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements
John made to a detective. John’s mother’s cousin (“Grace”) testified that on July 3, 2014,
she went to the bus stop to pick up John. While walking home, John told Grace that “[Alex]
touched his belly button and pee-pee.” Grace did not ask any follow-up questions. Grace
later called John’s mother and had no further discussion with John about the subject. John’s
mother reported the incident to the police five days later. Detective Abromaitis testified
about his fourteen-minute recorded interview from July 21, 2014.

        The interview began with Detective Abromaitis introducing himself. In response to
the first question, “What’s up,” John stated, “[Alex] touched my pee-pee.” John indicated
that the touching occurred “[u]nderneath my clothes.” However, when John showed the
detective where he was touched using anatomical dolls, without prompting, he stated, “He
touched at me by accident.” On an anatomical drawing, John referred to his “butt” as both
his belly button and his behind, and at one point he referred to his navel as his “dingaleg.” In
response to a leading question, John recalled that he was at home when the touching
occurred, until the detective asked another leading question, and then John recalled that he
was on the bus. John told the detective that he lived with “Chowder and Clarence” (cartoon
characters), his “mom,” his friend Jacob, and “dragons, too.”
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         The family court ruled that John’s recorded statement would be admissible at trial,
provided that John was available to testify. The next day, at the bench trial, John had
difficulty responding to simple questions in an accurate or truthful way. The court concluded
that John was not “competent to testify.” Nevertheless, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), the
court allowed the prosecutor to proceed with John’s direct examination. John could convey
little reliable information. Although it was undisputed that John took a bus to summer
school, he responded to a question about how he went to school by stating, “I was walking
on the street.”

        Although the family court found that John lacked “competency” as a witness, it
declined to exclude from evidence John’s statements to the detective or to dismiss the case.
The State recalled John to the stand. He continued to have difficulty answering simple
questions. For example, he stated “It’s right,” if the prosecutor referred to a spider as a
flower, and in response to a leading question, indicated that the color black might be red.
John stated that Alex, whom he identified in the courtroom, touched him on “my clothes, my
pee-pee and my butt.” However, John stated that a little boy named Alex sat near him and
that the little boys and big boys were separated on the bus.

       The defense presented three witnesses. The bus aide stated that the “big kids,” such
as Alex, sat in the back of the bus and the “small kids” sat in the front -- and that she sat in
the middle, separating the two groups. She maintained that Alex did not sit with John. The
school bus driver corroborated the seating arrangement and did not see or hear anything that
gave him concern. The transportation liaison confirmed that two children named Alex were
on the bus that day, one of whom went to elementary school and the other to high school.

        The family court adjudicated Alex delinquent. Alex appealed. The Appellate
Division held that John was effectively unavailable for cross-examination, and therefore the
admission of his statement to the detective violated Alex’s federal confrontation rights. 
447 N.J. Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2016). The panel did not address any state-law evidentiary
claims and remanded to the family court to assess whether the State’s remaining evidence is
sufficient to prove the adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 525. The Court
granted the State’s petition for certification. 
230 N.J. 425 (2017).

HELD: The Court reverses Alex’s delinquency adjudication on state-law grounds,
concluding that the video-recorded statement did not possess a sufficient probability of
trustworthiness to justify its introduction at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). Striking the
juvenile’s recorded statement from the record does not leave sufficient evidence in the record
to support, on any rational basis, the adjudication of delinquency against Alex. Accordingly,
the sexual assault charge must be dismissed. The Court concludes that the incompetency
proviso of the present version of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) is flawed and remands that rule for
review to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence.

1. The Court does not address the constitutional issues reached by the Appellate Division
because this matter can be resolved by resort to New Jersey’s evidence rules, and courts
should not reach a constitutional question unless imperative to the litigation. (pp. 18-19)
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2. The source of the current tender-years exception, including its incompetency proviso, is
State v. D.R., 
109 N.J. 348 (1988). In D.R., the Court recognized that, in a child-sex-abuse
prosecution, “testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of the [State’s]
case,” and determined that the evidence rules needed an additional “exception[] to the
hearsay rule . . . .” Id. at 358. The Court also expressed concern that a child’s incompetency
would present an insurmountable obstacle to the admission of the child-victim’s out-of-court
statement. Id. at 369-70. That concern gave rise to the incompetency proviso. (pp. 19-22)

3. The incompetency proviso proposed in D.R. and adopted as a rule read as follows: “no
child whose statement is to be offered in evidence . . . shall be disqualified to be a witness
. . . by virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) [of the competency rule].” Id. at 378. It
rendered inoperative only paragraph (b) of the competency rule; it did not allow a child
deemed incompetent under paragraph (a) to testify. With the 1993 renumbering of the Rules
of Evidence, the reference to paragraph (b) was removed. The proviso now reads: “no child
whose statement is to be offered in evidence . . . shall be disqualified to be a witness in such
proceeding by virtue of the requirements of [the competency rule].” The consequences of
this expansion are significant and far-reaching because it permits the testimony of a child
victim not only incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth (paragraph b) but also
incapable of distinguishing between fantasy and reality and of expressing himself in a
manner to be understood by a judge or jury (paragraph a). The record concerning the
promulgation of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) provides no clear explanation for the removal of the
reference to paragraph (b). Accordingly, the Court requests that the Supreme Court
Committee on the Rules of Evidence consider whether N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) should be
amended. (pp. 22-26)

4. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), as presently constructed, did not authorize the admission of John’s
video-recorded statement. Before admitting a child’s out-of-court statement, the trial court
must determine whether “there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy.” N.J.R.E.
803(c)(27). The Court has identified “a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to evaluating
the reliability of out-of-court statements made by child victims of sexual abuse, including
[the] mental state of the declarant . . . .” State v. P.S., 
202 N.J. 232, 249 (2010). Clearly, one
consideration in assessing a child’s mental state must be whether the child is able to
distinguish between fantasy and reality and whether the child can communicate in a way that
shows the child has the mental capacity to tell the truth and to be understood by the trier of
fact. A judicial declaration that a child is incompetent to testify should also have some
bearing on determining the admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statement. Given the
totality of the circumstances, the trustworthiness of John’s video-recorded statement is not
supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. John’s video-recorded statement was
wrongly admitted into evidence. (pp. 27-33)

5. After excising from the record John’s video-recorded statement, the remaining evidence --
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State -- is insufficient to support a
sexual-assault adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. The remaining evidence consists of
John’s incompetent testimony and Grace’s hearsay testimony that, as John walked home with
her after exiting the bus, he said, “[Alex] touched his belly button and pee-pee.” The
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statement does not tell us whether the alleged touching was accidental, which of the two
Alexes did the touching, or when and where the incident occurred. In addition, no competent
evidence corroborates John’s single statement made to Grace. The remaining evidence is
insufficient to support the sexual-assault adjudication against Alex. (pp. 33-35)

       REVERSED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.

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                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
67 September Term 2016
                                                 078672

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE
INTEREST OF A.R., a minor.

         Argued February 26, 2018 – Decided July 11, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division, whose opinion is
         reported at 
447 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div.
         2016).

         Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for appellant State of New
         Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
         attorney; Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney
         General, of counsel and on the briefs).

         Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel,
         argued the cause for respondent A.R. (Joseph
         E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
         Alison S. Perrone, on the briefs).

         Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for
         amicus curiae John J. Gibbons Fellowship in
         Pubic Interest and Constitutional Law at
         Gibbons P.C. (Gibbons, attorneys; Lawrence
         S. Lustberg and J. David Pollock, on the
         brief).

    JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In the sexual assault trial of fourteen-year-old Alex, the

family court admitted into evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27) -- the tender-years exception to the hearsay rule --

the video-recorded statement that seven-year-old John gave to

police, in which he alleged that Alex had sexually touched him

                                1
on a school bus.1   John, who suffers from severe developmental

disabilities, who during out-of-court and in-court questioning

was unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and who

was declared incompetent as a witness by the court, was

permitted to testify pursuant to the incompetency proviso of

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).   According to the proviso, “no child whose

statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to [N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27)] shall be disqualified” to testify, even though the

child witness is deemed incompetent under the requirements of

N.J.R.E. 601.

     Based on John’s recorded statement, his incompetent

testimony, and an utterance he made to his mother’s cousin, the

family court adjudicated Alex delinquent of committing sexual

assault.

     The Appellate Division found that John’s incompetency, as

evident from his inability to answer truthfully even simple

questions, rendered him unavailable for cross-examination.     The

Appellate Division therefore determined that the admission of

the juvenile’s in-court testimony and the video-recorded

statement violated Alex’s confrontation rights under the Sixth

Amendment, as articulated in Crawford v. Washington,