Title: Miller v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
THOMAS RICHARD MILLER,
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§
No. 123, 2005
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Superior Court 
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for Sussex County in Cr.A. 
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Nos. S92-12-0044 & 0045.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Def. ID No. 92S05488DI
Submitted: May 31, 2005
Decided:
August 24, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 24  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s
th
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Thomas Richard Miller, filed an appeal from the
Superior Court’s order dated March 23, 2005, that denied his motion to compel.
The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Miller’s opening
brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.
See Robinson v. State, 291 A.2d 279 (Del. 1972) (permitting the acceptance of a
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guilty plea in the absence of an admission of guilt).
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(2)
On June 14, 1993, Miller entered a Robinson plea in the Superior
Court to charges of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree and
Burglary in the First Degree.   The Superior Court ordered a presentence
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investigation.  
(3)
Three days later, Miller filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
The following day, the Superior Court denied Miller’s motion.  The Superior
Court sentenced Miller to thirty years at Level V suspended after twenty-two
years for one year at Level IV followed by probation.
(4)
On August 12, 1993, Miller filed a motion for postconviction relief
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").  Miller claimed that
his defense counsel had withheld exculpatory information from him, and that
the Superior Court had erred when it did not allow him to withdraw the guilty
plea. 
(5)
Upon consideration of Miller’s postconviction motion, the
Superior Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing.  At the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court allowed Miller to withdraw his guilty
plea and scheduled the case for trial.
Miller v. State, 1995 WL 301379 (Del. Supr.).
2
In re Motion for Postconviction Relief, Def. ID # 92S05488DI, 1995 WL 656783
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(Del. Super. Ct.). 
Miller v. State, 1996 WL 526164 (Del. Supr.).
4
In re Miller, 1996 WL 111233 (Del. Super. Ct.).
5
3
(6)
On May 25, 1994, a Superior Court jury found Miller guilty of
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree and Burglary in the Second
Degree.  The Superior Court sentenced Miller to life imprisonment on the
sexual offense and to eight years at Level V on the burglary offense.  On direct
appeal, this Court affirmed Miller’s conviction and sentence.   
2
(7)
In 1995 and again in 2003, Miller filed motions for postconviction
relief.  Miller’s 1995 motion alleged sixteen grounds for relief, including
malicious prosecution and insufficient evidence.  After an evidentiary hearing,
the Superior Court denied Miller’s motion.   Miller’s appeal from that order
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was dismissed.   
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(8)
In 1996, the Superior Court denied, as moot, Miller’s “Motion for
State Mandamus.”  In the same decision, the Superior Court denied Miller’s
“Memorandum of Law in support of the Rule 61 Postconviction Relief” as
procedurally barred or as an untimely attempt to reargue the denial of the 1995
postconviction motion.   In 2001, the District Court denied Miller’s petition for
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Miller v. Snyder, 2001 WL 173796 (D. Del.).
6
In re Miller, 2003 WL 136243 (Del. Super. Ct.).
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Miller v. State, 2003 WL 1404365 (Del. Supr.).
8
Miller v. State, 2004 WL 65331 (Del. Supr.).
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a writ of habeas corpus that had sought relief on the bases of nine grounds,
including insufficient evidence and exculpatory evidence.6
(9)
Miller’s 2003 postconviction motion raised seven claims of relief,
including exculpatory evidence, insufficient evidence, vindictive prosecution,
and perjured testimony.  The Superior Court denied Miller’s motion on the
bases that the claims were procedurally barred as untimely, repetitive and
formerly adjudicated.   On appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s
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judgment.   In 2004, this Court also affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of
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Miller’s motion for correction of an illegal sentence.9
(10)
Turning to the present appeal, it appears that Miller’s motion to
compel sought to “compel” his release from prison on the bases of exculpatory
evidence, missing evidence and perjured testimony.  The Superior Court denied
Miller’s motion on the basis that “the issues raised had been previously ruled
upon by the Superior Court and the appellate courts.”
(11)
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Miller’s motion to compel.  In Delaware, Rule 61 is the exclusive remedy for
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(2). 
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
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Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
12
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
13
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seeking to set aside a final judgment of conviction.   Considering Miller’s
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motion to compel under the procedural requirements of Rule 61, it is clear that
Miller’s claims are barred as untimely,  repetitive  and formerly adjudicated.
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(12)
It is manifest on the face of Miller’s opening brief that this appeal
is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled
Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there was no
abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice