Title: STATE EX REL STEWART v DISTRICT CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 79-73 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 - STATE EX REL. DONALD STEWART, JR., Petitioner, VS. DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al., Respondents. - ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Petitioner: D. Michael Eakin, Hardin, Montana For Respondents: James E. Seykora, County Attorney, Hardin, Montana Submitted: March 3, 1980 Decided: APR 1 - 1 9 & Filed: - /If.W/ erk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. This is a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n , super- v i s o r y c o n t r o l , o r o t h e r appropriate r e l i e f i n the dissolu- t i o n of a marriage between members of t h e Crow Tribe. Respondent f i l e d a memorandum b r i e f opposing t h e p e t i t i o n , and upon receiving a r e p l y b r i e f from p e t i t i o n e r , w e assume j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r d e c i s i o n a l purposes without o r a l argument. P e t i t i o n e r Donald Stewart f i l e d a divorce a c t i o n a g a i n s t Tana Cordelia Stewart i n t h e T r i b a l Court i n August 1979, requesting custody of t h e couple's two c h i l d r e n , Donald, age 3 , and Oli-Ann, age 2. There i s no showing of any s e r v i c e of s a i d a c t i o n upon Tana nor any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t anything occurred following p e t i t i o n e r ' s complaint. The p e t i t i o n e r sets f o r t h t h a t t h e Crow Tribe never ceded j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e S t a t e of Montana b u t has i t s own divorce code adopted by t h e Tribe J u l y 8, 1978. I n October 1979 Tana f i l e d a divorce a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , asking f o r custody of t h e two c h i l d r e n and $150 p e r month c h i l d support. A hearing was held on t h e matter before t h e Honor- a b l e Diane Barz, who ordered t h a t c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of t h e couple's c h i l d r e n be given t o Tana during pendency of t h e a c t i o n , t h a t a 1977 Chevrolet truck belonging t o Tana be returned t o h e r , and t h a t p e t i t i o n e r pay $150 per month support during pendency of t h e a c t i o n . W e note t h a t both p e t i t i o n e r Donald and h i s wife Tana a r e e n r o l l e d members of t h e Crow Tribe, a s a r e t h e i r c h i l - dren, t h a t they l i v e a t Crow Agency, Montana, within t h e e x t e r i o r boundaries of t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , and t h a t both par- t i e s a r e employees of t h e Crow Tribe. Donald f i l e d t h i s p e t i t i o n promptly a f t e r h i s wife f i l e d her divorce a c t i o n and a f t e r t h e D i s t r i c t Court re- fused t o dismiss Tana's a c t i o n f o r lack of s u b j e c t matter and personal j u r i s d i c t i o n . O n October 26, 1979, t h e D i s - t r i c t Court denied p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o dismiss and as- sumed j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e marriage. P e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e s he has no speedy, adequate remedy a t law, t h a t he is faced with two s e p a r a t e a c t i o n s , and t h a t an appeal from the r u l i n g of t h e District Court does n o t o f f e r t h e p e t i t i o n e r an adequate remedy t o avoid d u p l i c i t o u s a c t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , p e t i t i o n e r notes t h a t t h e r e i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of having c o n f l i c t i n g custody decrees, thereby s u b j e c t i n g t h e c h i l d r e n t o continued custody l i t i g a t i o n . Tana argues t h a t although t h e Crow Tribe does have a Law and Order Code covering domestic r e l a t i o n s , t h a t code was n o t approved by t h e Secretary of I n t e r i o r and is n o t v a l i d . She appears t o r e l y on an ordinance adopted i n 1953 by t h e Crow Tribe t h a t gave j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e S t a t e of Montana. That ordinance was approved by t h e Secretary of I n t e r i o r . The i s s u e before us i s whether t h e T r i b a l Court i s c u r r e n t l y exercising j u r i s d i c t i o n o r has exercised j u r i s - d i c t i o n i n such a manner a s t o preempt state j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r members of t h e Crow Tribe l i v i n g within t h e e x t e r i o r boundaries of t h e Crow ~ e s e r v a t i o n . Before considering t h e above i s s u e , w e must dispose of t h e argument t h a t because t h e 1978 Crow Uniform Divorce Act was n o t signed by t h e Secretary of I n t e r i o r , the Act i s n o t e f f e c t i v e . W e f i n d on t h e b a s i s of a l e t t e r of t h e s o l i - c i t o r f o r t h e Department of I n t e r i o r dated October 13, 1976, t h a t no approval i s necessary. The S o l i c i t o r s t a t e d : "We recommend t h a t no a c t i o n be taken e i t h e r t o approve o r disapprove of t h e o t h e r t h r e e Crow Ordinances. . . s i n c e t h e Crow T r i b a l Constitu- -- t i o n does n o t r e q u i r e t h e i r approval b~ t h e --- - Department f o r them t o become e f f e c t i v e . Depart- --- mental a c t i o n , accordingly, e i t h e r way would be a g r a t u i t o u s a c t without l e g a l significance. Our determination t h a t no approval i s required would not, of course, f o r e c l o s e t h e Department from taking a p o s i t i o n i n any subsequent liti- g a t i o n challenging t h e v a l i d i t y of these ordi- nances. W e should evaluate each such lawsuit on a case-by-case b a s i s , and might decide t o support t r i b a l a u t h o r i t y i n t h e absence of Departmental approval of these ordinances." (Emphasis supplied.) Memorandum of S o l i c i t o r t o Secretary of Department of I n t e r i o r , Octo- ber 13, 1976, p. 2. W e note t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n i t s b r i e f c i t e d 25 C.F.R. S 1 1 . 1 , a s r e q u i r i n g approval by t h e Department of I n t e r i o r . Such approval i s n o t required once a t r i b e has enacted a law and o r d e r code t o r e p l a c e t h e C.F.R. provi- sions. 25 C.F.R. l l . l ( d ) . The Crow Tribe has adopted a comprehensive t r i b a l code and, t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t governed by t h e provisions of 25 C.F.R. §11. The S o l i c i t o r noted con- cerning s e c r e t a r i a l approval, ". . . However, t h a t Section [25 C.F.R. l l . l ( e ) ] i n our view a p p l i e s only t o modifica- t i o n s of t h e C.F.R code (while t h e Department continues t o administer a C.F.R. 'Court of Indian Offenses') and does n o t bar t h e t r i b e from e x e r c i s i n g its governmental power t o adopt a s e p a r a t e code and t o e s t a b l i s h a t r i b a l c o u r t with- o u t S e c r e t a r i a l consent." Memorandum of S o l i c i t o r , supra, p. 6 , footnote 8. Here, t h e provisions r e l i e d on by t h e D i s t r i c t Court questioning t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e t r i b a l code a r e i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e Crow Tribe. The Crow T r i b a l Code, being found duly enacted, gives t h e Crow T r i b a l Court exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage a c t i o n s between members r e s i d i n g within t h e e x t e r i o r boundaries of t h e r e s e r v a t i o n . Having so found here, unlike our finding in ~arrivee v. Morigeau (1979), Mont. , 602 P.2d 563, 36 St-Rep. 1798, under the principles of comity we should abstain and leave to the Tribal Court the decisional task of divorce matters between tribal members of the Crow Tribe. In so doing, we should reduce the "inter-governmental friction" likening the "competing interests" of the State and the tribes to a "Pullman type abstension situation." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co. (1941), 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971. See also, Fisher v. District Court (1976), 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106. This Court in State ex rel. Iron Bear v. Dist. Ct. (1973)r 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292, held: "Before a District Court can assume jurisdiction in any matter submitted to it, it must find sub- ject matter jurisdiction by determining: (1) whether federal treaties and statutes applicable have preempted state jurisdiction; (2) whether the exercise of state jurisdiction would inter- fere with reservation self-government; and (3) whether the Tribal Court is currently exercising jurisdiction or has exercised jurisdiction in such a manner as to preempt state jurisdiction." 162 Mont. at 346, 512 P.2d at 1299. It would appear from the material submitted that the Tribal Court, since the adoption of 1978 Crow Uniform Divorce Act, is exercising exclusive jurisdiction over its tribal members living on the reservation. This being the case, we find that Williams v. Lee (1959), 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, is controlling. The Court held in Williams: ". . . to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." 358 U.S. at 223, 79 For t h e above-stated reasons and a f t e r a c a r e f u l con- s i d e r a t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a b l e law, we hold t h a t p r o h i b i t i o n i s t h e proper remedy i n t h i s case and w e order t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court dismiss t h e a c t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n , Cause No. DR-79-114, e n t i t l e d " I n R e t h e Marriage of Tana Cordelia Stewart and Donald Stewart, J r . " I n s o doing, w e hold t h i s r u l i n g i s l i m i t e d i n e f f e c t t o t h e Crow Indian Reservation. W e concur: ?AJ J- h & Chief J u s t i c e