Title: SCOTT v. McTIERNAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SCOTT v. McTIERNAN1999 WY 29974 P.2d 966Case Number: 98-113Decided: 03/22/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

Sam 
J. SCOTT and Mona R. Scott, Appellants (Petitioners),

v.

John McTIERNAN and Donna Dubrow; and Board of Control 
of the State of Wyoming, Appellees (Respondents).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court 
of Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, J.

 

  

Tom C. Toner and John G. 
Fenn of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellants.

 Kim D. Cannon and Anthony Wendtland of Davis & 
Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming, Representing Appellees McTiernan and 
Dubrow.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; Thomas J. 
Davidson, Deputy Attorney General; and S. Jane Caton, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, Representing Appellee Board of Control.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

   * 
Retired November 2, 1998

 

    
MACY, Justice.

   
[¶1]      Appellants Sam Scott and Mona Scott (the 
Scotts) petitioned for a review of the order in which Appellee Board of Control 
of the State of Wyoming (the board) concluded that the Scotts had abandoned a 
portion of their water rights. The district court certified the case to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court.

 

  [¶2]      We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

  [¶3]    The Scotts present the 
following issues on appeal:

 

1. Can a senior appropriator's water rights be 
abandoned on the petition of a junior appropriator who deliberately blocked and 
destroyed ditches to prevent the senior appropriator from receiving irrigation 
water during the five year[ ] period immediately preceding the filing of the 
abandonment petition and who during that five year period assured the senior 
appropriator that he would restore the ditches?

 

2. Was the Board's conclusion that only 14.1 acres of 
the Shallcross property were irrigated in the five years immediately preceding 
the filing of the abandonment petition supported by substantial evidence and 
sufficiently detailed findings of fact?

 

3. Was the Board's conclusion that only 7.6 acres of 
Tracts 3 and 4 between the Northeast 22 Draw and Smith Creek were irrigated 
supported by substantial evidence and sufficiently detailed findings of 
fact?

 

4. Did the Board correctly conclude that the No. 3 
right did not apply to the 10.1 acres south of Smith Creek in Tracts 3 and 
4?

 

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶4]      The Scotts owned property in Sheridan 
County, and Appellee John McTiernan and Appellee Donna Dubrow (John's wife) 
(collectively referred to as McTiernan), owned a ranch which neighbored the 
Scotts' property. At one time, McTiernan's property and the Scotts' property 
were owned in common.  McTiernan and 
the Scotts held water rights in Smith Creek to irrigate their respective 
properties.

 

 [¶5]        The Scotts owned part of the John 
Ross Appropriation, which was a territorial water right with the priority date 
of May 1882 and was the number three priority on Smith Creek.1 Two parcels of land owned by the 
Scotts were irrigated by the John Ross Appropriation: (1) Tracts 3 and 4; and 
(2) the Shallcross property. The 
adjudicated point of diversion for the John Ross Appropriation was the Ross No. 
1 Ditch. A prior common owner of McTiernan's property and the Scotts' property 
developed a complex system of diversions and ditches to utilize his water 
rights. As a result, the John Ross Appropriation was not actually diverted 
through the Ross No. 1 Ditch but was, instead, diverted through several other 
points of diversion.  The Scotts' 
irrigation water for Tracts 3 and 4 was, therefore, conveyed in ditches across 
McTiernan's property.

 

  [¶6]      In 1991, McTiernan started deliberately 
preventing water from flowing down the ditches to Tracts 3 and 4. McTiernan also 
filled in ditches which had previously conveyed water to the Scotts' property in 
order to facilitate the movement of his side-roll sprinklers. McTiernan's ranch 
manager and another McTiernan employee assured the Scotts that the ditches would 
be replaced.

 

  [¶7]      On August 29, 1996, McTiernan filed a 
petition with the board for a declaration of abandonment of the John Ross 
Appropriation. McTiernan claimed that the water from the John Ross Appropriation 
had not been beneficially used in the five years immediately preceding the 
abandonment petition. The Scotts reciprocated by filing a petition for a 
declaration of abandonment of several of McTiernan's water rights. The board 
consolidated the abandonment petitions for a hearing.

 

  [¶8]      The superintendent of Water Division 
Number Two held a contested case hearing in the summer of 1997 on the 
consolidated petitions. On January 5, 1998, the board entered an order which 
granted McTiernan's petition in part and denied it in part and which granted the 
Scotts' petition in part and denied it in part. With respect to McTiernan's 
petition, the board ruled that part of the John Ross Appropriation had been 
abandoned. The board reduced the John Ross Appropriation from 1.78 cubic feet 
per second for the irrigation of 125 acres to 0.46 cubic feet per second for the 
irrigation of 32 acres.  
Specifically, the board determined that, during the preceding five years, 
the Scotts had irrigated only 17.9 acres of Tracts 3 and 4 and 14.1 acres of the 
Shallcross property.

 

  [¶9]      The Scotts petitioned the district court 
for a review of the board's decision. McTiernan did not, however, appeal from 
the board's abandonment decision regarding his water rights. The district court 
certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

 

                         
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶10] 
  When we review cases which 
have been certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), 
we apply the appellate standards which are applicable to the court of the first 
instance. Union Telephone Company, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Commission, 
907 P.2d 340, 341-42 (Wyo. 1995). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997) 
governs judicial review of administrative decisions. W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); 
Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

  [¶11] 
  In reviewing an agency's 
findings of fact, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the 
findings. DeWall v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 960 P.2d 502, 503 (Wyo. 1998). "Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions." Id. We affirm an agency's conclusions of law when they are in 
accordance with law. Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency has not invoked and 
properly applied the correct rule of law, we correct the agency's errors. Weaver 
v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 855 (Wyo. 1998); Gneiting v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

  [¶12] 
  An administrative agency is 
charged with the duty of supporting its action with adequate findings of fact. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (Michie 1997). Section 16-3-110 states in pertinent 
part:

 

A 
final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in 
writing or dictated into the record. The final decision shall include findings 
of fact and conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of fact if set forth 
in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and             
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the 
findings.

 

  In discharging its duty under § 
16-3-110, the agency must "make findings of basic facts upon all of the material 
issues in the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or 
conclusions are based." Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 555 (Wyo. 1968). See also Billings v. 
Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides, 837 P.2d 84, 86 (Wyo. 
1992). This Court needs to know "why" an agency decided the way it did. 
Billings, 837 P.2d  at 86; Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872, 879 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc. v. Ward, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1975). When an agency does not make adequate 
findings of basic fact, we do not have a rational basis upon which to review its 
ultimate findings and conclusions. Billings, 837 P.2d  at 86; see also Schulthess 
v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 558-59 (Wyo. 1992). In cases where the findings do not 
adequately explain the rationale for the agency's decision, we remand the matter 
to the agency so that it can make additional findings.  Billings, 837 P.2d  at 
86.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  A. 
Lands North of Smith Creek

 

  [¶13] 
  The Scotts contend that the 
board should not have determined that they abandoned the John Ross Appropriation 
as it applied to the land north of Smith Creek in Tracts 3 and 4. They claim 
that they did not voluntarily abandon their water right but that they were, 
instead, forced to discontinue using the water because McTiernan blocked the ditches. The appellees 
counter by arguing that a literal reading of the abandonment statute supports 
the board's decision. We agree with the Scotts.

 

  [¶14] 
  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-401 
(Michie 1997) governs the abandonment of water rights. That statute provides in 
pertinent part:

 

(a) Where the holder of an appropriation of water 
from a surface, underground or reservoir water source fails, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for the beneficial 
purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an adjudicated or 
unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is considered as 
having abandoned the water right and 
shall forfeit all water rights and privileges appurtenant 
thereto.

 

Section 41-3-401(a). "[W]e 
have long adhered to the rule that adjudicated water rights will not be set 
aside unless justified by clear and convincing evidence." Wheatland Irrigation 
District v. Pioneer Canal Co., 464 P.2d 533, 537 (Wyo. 
1970).

 

  [¶15] 
  In finding of fact number 
24, the board stated:

 

24. THAT the evidence was persuasive that Scott was 
prohibited from receiving water by the upstream actions of McTiernan on 
McTiernan's own property blocking and closing in ditches which could have 
supplied Scott water and which did supply water to Scott's land when the 
properties were all in one ownership. 
The testimony is clear, however, that Scott failed to exercise his remedies to 
this aggression. Although it is questionable whether or not water administration 
authorities could have forced reopening of the ditches in response to a call, 
Scott did not ask.  Nor did he seek 
court assistance in providing him trespass authority to enter McTiernan's lands 
to open his ditch; nor did he seek administrative permission to change his point 
of diversion (except on the Shallcross parcel) to facilitate capture of his 
Priority No. 3 water right at locations accessible to him.

 

  [¶16] 
  This Court has stated 
numerous times that an abandonment of a water right must be voluntary. See, 
e.g., Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4, 95 P.2d 74, 80 (1939); Horse Creek 
Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572, 577 (1939); 
Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535, 541(1937). A water right cannot be declared to be 
abandoned when the nonuse of the water was "caused by facts not under the 
appropriator's control." Scherck, 95 P.2d  at 80. See also Yentzer v. Hemenway, 
440 P.2d 7, 13 (Wyo. 1968). Applying this principle, we have ruled that an 
abandonment of a water right did not occur when the appropriator's failure to 
use his water was due to: (1) a disastrous flood which prevented the 
appropriator from using his ditches and dams, Ramsay, 69 P.2d  at 541; (2) the 
inability to obtain water, Horse Creek   Conservation Dist., 92 P.2d  at 577; 
and (3) the shortage of water, Yentzer, 440 P.2d  at 13; Scherck, 95 P.2d  at 80. 
Similarly, a United States circuit court concluded that, under Wyoming law, an 
appropriator did not abandon his water right when he was prevented from 
obtaining water because of the unlawful diversions of water by upstream users. 
Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423, 434 (C.C.D.Mont. 1906).

 

  [¶17] 
  The board argues that the 
cases which hold that an abandonment must be voluntary are no longer apposite. 
It claims that those cases were decided prior to the legislature's inclusion of 
the language in § 41-3-401(a) which states that abandonment occurs when an 
appropriator "fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use" his water. 
(Emphasis added.) The board maintains, therefore, that an abandonment no longer 
has to be voluntary because § 41-3-401(a) states that an abandonment can occur 
even if the appropriator's nonuse is not intentional. In other words, the board 
equates "intentional" with "voluntary."

 

  [¶18] 
  The legislature merely 
acknowledged the existing case law when 
it included the "intentionally or unintentionally" language in its 1973 version 
of the abandonment statute.2 Wyo. Stat. § 41-47.1 (Supp. 1973). 
We ruled in a 1960 case that an appropriator may forfeit his water right by 
nonuse regardless of whether or not he intended to abandon that right. Ward v. 
Yoder, 355 P.2d 371, 375-77 (Wyo. 1960); see also Van Tassel Real Estate & 
Live Stock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo. 333, 54 P.2d 906, 910, cert. denied, 
299 U.S. 574, 57 S. Ct. 38, 81 L. Ed. 423 (1936).

 

  [¶19] 
  The cases which state that 
an abandonment must be voluntary can be reconciled with the law which states 
that intent is not required. An appropriator can abandon his water right by 
nonuse regardless of whether or not his failure to use the water was 
intentional. Section 41-3-401(a); Ward, 355 P.2d  at 375-77. An abandonment 
cannot occur, however, if the appropriator's nonuse was not voluntary because 
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from using his water. Yentzer, 
440 P.2d  at 13; Scherck, 95 P.2d  at 80. An associate professor of law at the 
University of Wyoming College of Law recognized this distinction in a 1989 
article in the Land and Water Law Review.  
Mark Squillace, A Critical Look at Wyoming Water Law, 24 Land & Water 
L.Rev. No. 2 307, 336 (1989). He stated that, although intent to abandon does 
not need to be shown, failure to use the water must be voluntary in order for an 
abandonment to occur. Id.

 

  [¶20] 
  The board acknowledged 
McTiernan's aggression against the Scotts but concluded that the Scotts should 
have taken affirmative action to counter the aggression. Similarly, both the 
board and McTiernan argue that the Scotts' claim that their nonuse was 
involuntary is irrelevant because the Scotts did not diligently attempt to use 
the John Ross Appropriation. In advancing that argument, the appellees ignore 
the uncontradicted evidence that McTiernan's employees assured the Scotts that 
the ditches would be restored and, thereby, led the Scotts to believe that it 
was not necessary for them to take affirmative action to protect their water 
rights. The Scotts were surprised when McTiernan filed an abandonment petition 
against them.

 

  [¶21] 
  This Court has considered 
the relative equities and conduct of the parties to abandonment actions in 
previous water rights cases. See, e.g., Lewis v. State Board of Control, 699 P.2d 822, 829-30 (Wyo. 1985); Sturgeon v. Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 281 P.2d 675, 684 
(1955). In Lewis, we held that an abandonment did not occur where the junior appropriators illegally 
refused to abide by the water officials' regulatory orders and, thereby, 
prevented the senior appropriator from receiving and using his water. 699 P.2d  
at 829-30.

 

  [¶22] 
  The Scotts' failure to use 
their water right was the result of McTiernan's deliberate actions to prevent 
them from receiving their water. Accordingly, the Scotts did not voluntarily 
abandon their water right. The board's decision that the Scotts had abandoned 
the John Ross Appropriation as it applied to the land in Tracts 3 and 4 north of 
Smith Creek is, therefore, reversed. Our determination on this issue is also 
dispositive of the Scotts' third issue because both issues concern the same 
lands.

 

  B. 
Shallcross Property

 

  [¶23] 
  The Scotts maintain that 
the board's conclusion that only 14.1 acres of the Shallcross property were 
irrigated during the five years immediately preceding McTiernan's filing of the 
abandonment petition was not supported by substantial evidence or by 
sufficiently detailed findings of fact. McTiernan argues that sufficient 
evidence and adequate findings of facts supported the board's determination. We 
agree with the Scotts that the board's findings of fact concerning the 
Shallcross property were inadequate.

 

 [¶24]     The Scotts claimed that they 
irrigated twenty-five acres of the Shallcross property in 1996. McTiernan 
conceded that the Scotts had irrigated three acres of the Shallcross 
property.  The board addressed the 
Shallcross property in finding of fact number 23. That finding stated in 
pertinent part:

 

SW 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 24, Township 57 North, Range 
87 West (Shallcross property):

 

Bruce Barton, a McTiernan witness, testified at the 
public hearing that he observed irrigation in the SW 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 24, 
Township 57 North, Range 87 West, shown as 3.0 acres in green on Exhibit No. 30 
submitted as evidence at the public hearing. Robert Mullinax, John Dahlke and 
Roy Powers testified at the public hearing that they observed the "big gun" 
operating on the Shallcross parcel in different locations which total an 
additional 11.1 acres of irrigation, shown on Exhibits X-3 and 44 submitted as 
evidence at the public hearing.

 

The board accordingly 
concluded that only 14.1 acres of the Shallcross property had been irrigated, 
and it ruled that the Scotts abandoned the remainder of the water 
right.

 

  [¶25] 
  The board relied on the 
testimony of Robert Mullinax, John Dahlke, and Roy Powers, together with 
Exhibits X-3 and 44, to justify its determination that the Scotts had irrigated 
only 11.1 acres in addition to the three acres conceded by McTiernan. Exhibits 
X-3 and 44 are maps which depict the Shallcross property.

 

  [¶26] 
  Mullinax was an irrigation 
equipment contractor who visited the Scotts' property around August 15, 1996, to 
give them an estimate for installing an irrigation pipeline. He testified that 
he saw a big gun sprinkler operating on the Shallcross property north of the 
Smith Creek subdivision access road. He drew a circle on Exhibit X-3 to show the 
area where he saw the sprinkler operating. Mullinax testified that he also saw 
irrigation pipe laid out on the west side of the big gun sprinkler. He stated 
that a big gun sprinkler waters a circular area with a 130-foot radius. Mullinax 
hypothesized that the big gun sprinkler could, therefore, water approximately 
three-quarters of an acre on each set.3

 

  [¶27] 
  Dahlke, a hydrographer 
commissioner for the board, also testified at the hearing. In July 1996, he 
observed a big gun sprinkler operating on the Shallcross property both north and 
south of the subdivision road. Dahlke drew six circles on Exhibit 44 to show 
where he saw the sprinkler operating. He went on to state that he observed "a 
minimum of Seven or eight" acres of the Shallcross property being irrigated in 
1996.

 

  [¶28] 
  Powers owned land which 
neighbored the Scotts' land, and he occasionally traveled on the subdivision 
road through the Shallcross property. He testified that, in 1996, he saw the 
Scotts operating the big gun sprinkler on the Shallcross property south of the 
subdivision road. Powers marked Exhibit 44 to show the location of the big gun 
sprinkler.

 

  [¶29] 
  The appellees argue that 
the board's conclusion that the Scotts irrigated 11.1 acres can be extrapolated 
from Mullinax's, Dahlke's, and Powers' testimony. The board claims that it 
accepted Sam Scott's testimony that he made nine sets with the big gun sprinkler 
during the 1996 irrigation season.  
It then used Mullinax's testimony that the big gun sprinkler watered a 
circular area with a radius of 130 feet to calculate a total acreage of 10.98 
acres,4 or, as the board states, 
"approximately 11.1 acres."

 

  [¶30] 
    The board's 
argument is obviously an attempt to justify its decision in hindsight. In its 
findings of fact, the board did not state that it relied on Sam Scott's 
testimony to support its conclusion that 11.1 acres bad been irrigated. 
Furthermore, if it had truly used this rationale to reach its conclusion, it 
would have determined that Scott had irrigated 10.98 or, if it had rounded the 
number up, 11.0 acres. The board's calculation simply does not support its 
conclusion that the Scotts irrigated an additional 11.1 acres of the Shallcross 
property.

 

  [¶31] 
  McTiernan takes a different 
approach to justify the board's conclusion. McTiernan argues that the 11.1-acre 
conclusion can be derived by using Mullinax's statement that each big gun set 
covers approximately three-quarters of an acre and taking that figure times 
twelve to fourteen sets. McTiernan does not explain the source of its twelve- to 
fourteen-set figure, and no such figure is readily discernable from Mullinax's, 
Dahlke's, or Powers' testimony. We cannot, therefore, accept McTiernan's 
rationale to justify the board's finding.

 

  [¶32] 
  The appellees have not 
convinced us that the board's factual findings in this case are sufficient. 
Furthermore, "a litigant's brief or oral argument is no substitute for a proper 
agency decision." Schulthess, 832 P.2d  at 559. There may be a sufficient factual 
basis for the board's determination that the Scotts irrigated only 1.1 acres of 
the Shallcross property in addition to the three acres conceded by McTiernan; 
however, that factual basis was not included in the formal findings of fact. We, 
therefore, remand this case with directions that the board make additional 
findings of fact concerning the Shallcross property. Billings, 837 P.2d  at 
86.

 

  C. Land 
South of Smith Creek

 

  [¶33] 
  The Scotts claim that the 
board incorrectly determined that a 10.1-acre parcel in Tracts 3 and 4, which 
was located south of Smith Creek, was "doubl[y] appropriated" and was not part 
of the John Ross Appropriation. The appellees argue that the board's 
determination that the 10.1-acre parcel was not part of the John Ross Appropriation was correct. We agree 
with the appellees.

 

 [¶34]     The board's finding of fact number 
23 stated in relevant part:

 

Scott contended in its Reply Brief that 15.5 acres 
located in this quarter quarter south of Smith Creek are part of the John Ross 
Appropriation.  This parcel of land 
has been historically and is presently being irrigated through the Morrill Ditch 
under Permit No. 17531, as evidenced by the 
recent adjudication for Scott by 
the State Board of Control of 10.1 acres in the SW 1/4 NW 1/4 of Section 24, 
Township 57 North, Range 87 West under Permit No. 17531, and, therefore, is not 
part of the John Ross Appropriation.

 

The lands irrigated under 
the John Ross Appropriation were described in a blanket land description as 
follows:

 

    
        
Township 57 North, Range 87 West

 

            
Section 24: NW 1/4 NW 1/4

                                     
S 1/2 NW 1/4

                                     
SW 1/4 NE 1/4

 

This description includes 
160 acres, but the John Ross Appropriation allowed for irrigation of only 125 
acres. The actual 125 acres were not specified in the adjudication documents. 
The 10.1 acres which the board found were not part of the John Ross 
Appropriation were in the SW 1/4 NW 1/4 of Section 24. They were, therefore, 
included within the original description of the lands under the John Ross 
Appropriation.  Nevertheless, 
because the blanket description of the John Ross Appropriation included an 
additional thirty-five acres, there was 
obviously some land within the description that actually was not irrigated under 
the John Ross Appropriation.

 

  [¶35] 
  In 1929, a previous common 
owner of the Scotts' and McTiernan's properties received a permit to irrigate 
98.1 acres with water from the Morrill Ditch. The description of the land which 
was to be irrigated under this appropriation included the 10.1 acres in the SW 
1/4 NW 1/4 of Section 24. Accordingly, the 10.1 acres were described in both the 
John Ross Appropriation and the Morrill Appropriation.5

 

 [¶36]     The board has authority to define 
or quantify water rights when the original adjudication documents are not 
completely clear on the scope of the water rights. See Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. 
Board of Control, 714 P.2d 759, 762-64 (Wyo. 1986). It was, therefore, within 
the board's power to determine exactly what lands fell under the John Ross 
Appropriation.

 

 [¶37]     The Scotts maintain that, in order 
for there to be 125 acres of irrigated lands within the 160 acres described in 
the John Ross Appropriation, the 10.1 acres south of Smith Creek had to be 
included in that right. The board determined, however, that this land had 
historically been irrigated by the Morrill Ditch, and the Scotts do not direct 
us to evidence in the record which contradicts that determination. The lay of 
the land reveals that the 10.1 acres could not have been irrigated out of the 
Ross No. 1 ditch because the ditch was located on the north side of Smith Creek 
and the 10.1 acres at issue here are located on the south side of the creek. The 
board's determination that the 10.1 acres in the SW 1/4 NW 1/4 of Section 24 
were not part of the John Ross Appropriation is, therefore, supported by 
substantial evidence.

 

                             
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶38] 
  The board incorrectly 
determined that the Scotts had abandoned the John Ross Appropriation as it 
applied to the lands north of Smith Creek in Tracts 3 and 4. That part of the 
board's decision is, therefore, reversed. The board's findings of fact 
concerning the Shallcross property are inadequate, and, consequently, we remand 
the decision to the board for additional findings of fact. We affirm the board's 
conclusion that the John Ross Appropriation did not apply to the 10.1 acres 
south of Smith Creek because substantial evidence supports the board's 
determination.

 

  [¶39] 
  Affirmed in part, reversed 
in part, and remanded.

 

            

 

FOOTNOTES

1 Jeanne 
Moore also owned part of the John Ross Appropriation.  After McTiernan filed the abandonment 
petition, Ethan Dubrow acquired the Moore property.

  

2 Prior 
to the 1973 creation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-47.1 (Supp. 1973), the relevant 
abandonment statute stated in part:

 

[I]n 
case the owner or owners of any such ditch, canal or reservoir shall fail to use 
the water therefrom for irrigation or other beneficial purposes during any five 
successive years, they shall be considered as having abandoned the same, and 
shall forfeit all water rights, easements and privileges, appurtenant thereto. . 
. .

 

  Wyo. Stat. § 41-47 
(1957).

  

3 
According to our calculations, a sprinkler which watered a circular area with a 
130-foot radius would actually water 1.219 acres rather than three-quarters of 
an acre per set. We reached this conclusion as follows: Area of a circle = pi 
(3.1416) multiplied by the radius squared. In this case, we have: 3.1416 times 
130 feet squared = 3.1416 times 16,900 = 53,093 divided by the number of square 
feet in an acre (43,560) = 1.219 acres per set.

  

4 The irrigated area may be calculated as follows: Area of a 
circle = pi (3.1416) multiplied by the radius squared. In this case, we have: 
3.1416 times 130 feet squared =  
        3.1416 times 16,900 =   
      53,093 divided by the number of square feet 
in  an acre (43,560) =      1.219 acres per set 
times 9 sets =         10.97 acres. We assume 
that the difference between our calculation and the board's calculation is due 
to differences in rounding.

  

5 The 
Scotts argue that the 10.1 acres were not "doubl[y] appropriated" until 1996 
when McTiernan filed a proof of the Morrill Appropriation. They claim that 
McTiernan did not have the right to file a proof of appropriation for their 
property.  The propriety of the 
Morrill Appropriation is not properly before us at this time; the Scotts cannot 
collaterally attack the Morrill Appropriation in this case. Our decision in this 
case is, therefore, limited to the issues properly before this 
Court.