Title: Friedman v. Nev. Dist. Court

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

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127 Nev., Advance Opinion 7D
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

DANIEL E. FRIEDMAN, No. 57245
Petitioner,
‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE T.
ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR., DISTRICT
JUDGE, FAMILY COURT DIVISION,
Respondents,

and
KEVYN Q. FRIEDMAN,
Real Party in Interest.

FILED

Nov 23 20H

Ren

Original petition requesting this court to issue a writ of
mandamus or prohibition to prohibit the family court from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction.

Petition grantee.
Willick Law Group and Marshal S. Willick, Las Vegas,
for Petitioner.

Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury & Standish and Thomas J. Standish and
Jennifer Poynter-Willis, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest,

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION
By the Court, PICKERING, J.
‘This interstate child custody dispute traces back to a
stipulated Nevada divorce decree. ‘The decree incorporated the parents’

 
agreement that Nevada would have exclusive jurisdiction over future child
custody disputes, When such a dispute arose, the mother returned to the
Nevada decree court to resolve it, By then, both parents and their
children had moved to California. With everyone gone from Nevada, the
father maintains that Nevada lacks subject matter jurisdiction. He has
initiated competing custody proceedings in California,

‘The question presented is whether the Nevada district court
can proceed or should defer to California, ‘The answer lies in the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which
Nevada and California have both adopted. Under the UCCJEA, California
appears to have jurisdiction as the children’s “home state,” and Nevada
cannot proceed unless California determines that Nevada is the more
convenient forum. If asked to make an inconvenient/more appropriate
forum determination, the California court could, under the UCCJEA,
consider a number of factors, the parties’ agreement to litigate in Nevada
being one of them. But under the UCCJEA, the decision is California's.
Because California has not declined jurisdiction, the Nevada district court
erred in asserting it. We therefore grant writ relief.

L

Daniel Friedman and Kevyn Wynn, formerly known as Kevyn
Friedman, were divorced in Nevada in November 2008. They had three
young children. ‘The decree, which was stipulated, provided for joint legal
custody. Addressing relocation and physical custody, the decree provided
for Kevyn and the children to move from Nevada to Idaho and, perhaps
eventually, California. While in Idaho, Kevyn was to have primary
physical custody. However, per the agreement incorporated into the

original decree, this would change to joint physical custody, with Kevyn

 

 
and the children to move from Idaho to California, when and if Daniel
obtained work in California.

All ran smoothly for a time, Daniel found work in California
and moved there from Nevada; Kevyn and the children followed,
However, the parents were not able to work out a schedule for joint
physical custody. On August 12, 2010, almost two years after the original
decree was entered, Kevyn applied to Nevada's district court for an order
awarding her primary physical custody of the children, Daniel opposed
Kevyn’s motion and challenged the district court's jurisdiction to
adjudicate the child custody dispute. On August 30, 2010, Daniel

 

registered the original decree in California, secking joint physical custody.

‘The Nevada district court rejected Daniel's challenge to its
subject matter jurisdiction and, on September 1, 2010, provisionally
granted Kevyn the primary physical custody order she sought.) A written
order followed on November 9, 2010. The order found, among other
things, that Daniel “moved from the State of Nevada no later than
September 2009, but more likely in June or July 2009 [and that Kevyn]
and the children have resided in the State of California at least from
September 2009 forward. Therefore, the children and Mother and Father
have not lived in Nevada since September 2009.”

Under section 202(a)(2) of the UCCJEA (NRS 1254.315(1)(b),
reprinted infra note 3), a court loses exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over
a prior child custody determination on finding that “the child, the child’s

‘The order was based on an unsigned agreement prepared during a
mediation in which the parents participated, attempting to resolve their
child custody differences.

 
parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the)
State,” The district court recognized that, under the UCCJEA, its finding
that Kevyn, Daniel, and the children had become California residents
“would suggest that Nevada would lose jurisdiction.” But the court
deemed the parents’ agreement to a Nevada forum controlling, In this
regard, the original decree stated: “(T]he parties have agreed that the
children's ‘home state’ shall always be considered to be Nevada, and
jurisdiction over all issues pertaining to the custody of and each party's
timeshare with the children shall be exclusively with... this Court (i
the Family Court in Clark County, Nevada).” The underlying settlement

 

 

agreement amplified this provision: “Specifically, it is the parents’ intent
that no court other than this Court and the courts of the State of Nevada
shall have jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter to consider
any issue pertaining to the custody and/or support of the parent[s'] minor
children, including, but not necessarily limited to, any motion or action
that may be filed by either parent secking a change of custody [or] a
change in the parent(s] timeshare arrangement as set forth in
this... Agreement.”

In the district court's view, the parties’ agreement to a Nevada
forum trumped the UCCJEA. It therefore “reject{ed] the notion that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction ...to resolve disputes arising out of
custody.” It further held that Daniel was judicially estopped to deny
jurisdiction. The district court noted the pending California proceeding,
but dismissed its significance, stating that “[tJ]he California Court can
determine that it may request this Court to defer jurisdiction.”

 

 
Daniel petitions this court for a writ of prohibition and/or
mandamus, directing the Nevada district court to stand down from its
assertion of jurisdiction in this case.

ci
A

‘The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the UCCJEA in 1997 “to deal with the problems of
competing jurisdictions entering conflicting interstate child custody
orders, forum shopping, and the drawn out and complex child custody
legal proceedings often encountered by parties where multiple states are
involved.” [In re Custody of A.C., 200 P.3d 689, 691 (Wash. 2009) (citing
UCCJEA prefatory note, 9/1A U.L.A. 651; UCCJEA § 101 emt, 9/2A
U.LA. at 657). The UCCJEA prescribes “uniform standards to be applied
to determine whether a state has jurisdiction—initial or exclusive and
continuing—over custody matters.” Sidell v, Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 505 (R.L
2011). It “seek{s] a world in which there is but one order at a time for
child... custody and visitation.” 1d. (quoting Model Unif. Interstate
Family Support Act, comment to art. 6, § 611 (2008); see In re Marriage of
Nurie, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 217 (Ct. App. 2009) (avoiding concurrent
jurisdiction is a “major aim” of the UCCJEA).

Every state except Massachusetts has adopted the UCCJBA.
9/1A U.L.A. 113-14, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted
(Supp. 2011)? Nevada did so in 2003, codifying the UCCJEA as NRS
Chapter 125A. 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 199, §§ 1-59, at 990-1004. Unless the

2Although not yet listed in the Table, Vermont adopted the UCCJEA,
in 2011. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1061-1096 (2011).

 

 
jurisdictional facts are disputed—they are not in this case—eubject matter
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA involves questions of law, which receive de
novo review. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. _, __, 221 P.3d 699, 704
(2009), Although de novo, our review properly includes decisions from
other UCCJEA states so

 

to harmonize our law with theirs. See NRS
125.605 (‘In applying and construing the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, consideration must be given to the need
to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among
rates that enact it.”),
B,

The UCCJEA forms the exclusive basis for determining
jurisdiction of this interstate child custody dispute. NRS 125A.305(2); Cal
Fam. Code § 342100); see Inte Custody of A.C,, 200 P.3d at 691. Nobody
disputes that Nevada had jurisdiction under NRS 1254.05 to make the
initial child custody determination when it entered the divorce decree.
Ordinarily, this would give Nevada “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction”
under NRS 125A.315.8 However, NRS 125A.316(1)(b) provides that

®NRS 126A.316 reads in full as follows:

1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS
125A.335, a court of this state which has made a
child custody determination consistent with NRS
125A,305 or 125A.325 has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over the determination until:

(@) A court of this state determines that the
child, the child's parents and any person acting as
a parent do not have a significant connection with
this state and that substantial evidence is no
longer available in this state concerning the child's

continued on next page

 

 

 

 
os

 

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceases when “[a] court of this state or a
court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents and
any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.” ‘The
district court made such a jurisdiction-ending determination in this case
when it found that Kevyn, Daniel, and the children no longer resided in
Nevada.t

-continued

care, protection, training and _personal
relationships; or
(b) A court of this state or a court of another
state determines that the child, the child's parents
and any person acting as a parent do not presently
reside in this state.
2. A court of this state which has made a
child custody determination and does not have
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to this
section may modify that determination only if it
has jurisdiction to make an initial determination
pursuant to NRS 125.305.
This statute replicates the UCCJEA section 202, which California has
adopted as California Family Code section 3422

“NRS 125A.315(1)(a) provides an alternative basis for extinguishing
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction: if the court with such jurisdiction
“determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a
parent do not have a significant connection with” the state and
“substantial evidence” “concerning the child’s care, protection, training
and personal relationships” is no longer available in the state.
Paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) are joined by “or,” not “and.” We thus reject
Kevyn's argument that exclusive, continuing jurisdiction remains unless
the separate tests stated in each paragraph are both met. See Anderson v,
State, 109 Nev. 1129, 1134, 865 P.2d 318, 321 (1993) (when the

continued on next page

 

 
Once exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceases, a court can
modify its prior child custody determination “only if it has jurisdiction to
make an initial (child custody] determination pursuant to NRS 125A.305."
NRS 125A.15(2); see UCCJEA § 202 emt, 9/IA U:LA. 673 (1999)

 

([U]nless a modification proceeding has been commenced, when the child,
the parents, and all persons acting as parents physically leave the State to
live elsewhere, the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceases.”). Under NRS
125A.305(1), with certain exceptions not relevant here, a Nevada court has
jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if Nevada
“is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding,” NRS 125A.305(1)(a), or “a court of the home state of the child
has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the
more appropriate forum pursuant to NRS 125A.365 or 126A.375,” NRS
125A.305(1)(b), and the criteria established in NRS 125A.305(1)(b)(1) and
(2) are met.5 NRS 125A.315(2), in other words, directs the parties back to
NRS 125A.305(1), once continuing, exclusive jurisdiction ceases. But NRS

~ continued

Legislature uses “the disjunctive ‘or,’ and not the conjunctive ‘and,” the
statute “thereby requir{es] one or the other, but not necessarily both”).

°As the Washington Supreme Court noted in In re Custody of A.C.
200 P.3d at 691 n.3, the UCCJEA “might have more accurately used the
term ‘exclusive venue’ instead of ‘subject matter jurisdiction,” since
subject matter jurisdiction “concerns the type of controversy, not the facts
of an individual case,” and normally does not arise by virtue of one court
declining jurisdiction in favor of another otherwise not empowered to
exercise it. Like the Washington Supreme Court, for consistency, we
nonetheless use the statutory language of subject matter jurisdiction.

 

 

 
125A.805(1)'is phrased in terms of “the commencement of the proceeding,”
raising a further question, in the modification context, as to the
“proceeding” to which the statute refers,

‘The relevant “proceeding” for purposes of determining the
“date of the commencement of the proceeding” in a matter referred back to
NRS 125A.305(1)(a) by NRS 125A.15(2) is not the original divorce
proceeding. Rather, it is the post-divoree motion concerning custody or
visitation that controls. This is implicit in NRS 125.055, which defines
“child custody proceeding” to mean “a proceeding in which legal custody,
an issue,” and NRS

125A.065, which defines “commencement” to mean “the filing of the first

 

physical custody or visitation with respect to a chi

pleading in a proceeding.” It also comports with the decisional law of
other states that have adopted the UCCJEA:

‘To hold that “the proceeding” refers to the original

dissolution action would confer perpetual

jurisdiction over matters of custody to the courts of

the state which granted the dissolution, regardless

of whether the parties or child had any further

connection with that state[,] a result that is

contrary to the underlying purpose of the

UCCJEA.... [We [therefore] must interpret

“commencement of the proceeding” to mean the

recent, post-divorce proceeding concerning the

custody of the child.
Sidell, 18 A.3d at 506 (quotation and citations omitted); In re A.C.S., 157
8.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. App. 2004) (jurisdiction must be determined according
to facts in existence when motion to modify custody is filed).

Under the UCCJEA, the district court thus was bound to
revisit its subject matter jurisdiction when Kevyn filed her August 2010

motion. Although entitled “motion for confirmation of custody and

timeshare pursuant to decree of divorce,” Kevyn's motion, if granted,

 

 
would have changed Daniel's physical custody of the children from one
week each month to three weekends per month and every Wednesday;
maintained primary physical custody with Kevyn, contrary to the initial
arrangement’s plan to achieve joint physical custody when everyone
moved to Los Angeles; and altered holiday timeshare arrangements.
These requests initiated a new proceeding, NRS 125A.055, seeking to
modify the existing custody and visitation order, and required a fresh
jurisdictional analysis under NRS 125A.305(1).

Kevyn concedes that, by August 2010, California had become
the children’s “home state” as defined by the UCCJEA. See NRS.
125A.085(1) (“home state” means “[t]he state in which a child lived with a
parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive
months... immediately before the commencement of a child custody
proceeding”). This concession, given the district court's finding that the
parents and the children presently reside in California, at minimum,
established Daniel's pending California proceeding as “a child custody
proceeding... commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction
substantially in accordance with the provisions of [the UCCJEA].” NRS
125A.356(2); see NRS 125A.305(1)(a); NRS 125A.315(1)(b); Cal. Fam, Code
§§ 3421(a)(1), 3422; In re Marriage of Nurie, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 220,
questioned on other grounds in In re Marriage of Akula, 935 N.E.2d 1070,
1078 (Il. App. 2010) Under NRS 125A.365(2), having made this
determination, the Nevada district court was required to “stay its
proceeding[,] communicate with the [California] court [, and if the

“This case does not present the issue that led Akula to question
Nurie, on which we express no opinion.

 

 
oH Se

California court] does not determine that the court of this state is a more
appropriate forum, . .. dismiss the proceeding.”

‘The district court declined to follow the tightly scripted moves
the UCCJBA directs, Instead, it accepted Kevyn's argument that the
parties’ agreement to a Nevada forum for future child custody disputes
removed her family from the UCCJEA. But this position is unsustainable.
NRS 125A.305(2) states that NRS 125A.305(1) “is the exclusive
jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of
this State.” Since the UCCJEA deems this to involve “subject matter
jurisdiction, an agreement of the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court
that would not otherwise have jurisdiction under this Act is ineffective.”
UCCJEA § 201 cmt, 9A U.LA, 678 (1999); Sidell, 18 A.3d at 608
(rejecting the argument that the decree state remained the children’s
“home state” and retained continuing jurisdiction over future custody
disputes based on an agreement in the marital settlement agreement;
“litigants may not vest the Family Court with jurisdiction by agreement or
se”); In.xe Custody of A.C,, 200 P.3d at 693 n.8 (“an agreement to

confer jurisdiction under the UCCJEA statute

 

other

not effective”).

 

 

‘Hendry v. Hendry, 771 A.2d 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001),
on which Kevyn relies, does not advance her cause, Hendry was decided
under the UCCJEA’s predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA). While the UCCJEA retained the central concepts of the
UCCJA, see UCCJEA prefatory note, 9/A U.LA. 650 (1999), “it
substantially revised and clarified both the statutory text and the official
commentary with the goal of allowing the courts to develop a new and
truly uniform body of decisional law to govern interstate child custody
disputes. Accordingly, courts must avoid a reflexive reliance on pre-
UCCJEA case law in interpreting even quite similar provisions of the
UCCJEA in order to prevent the inadvertent reincorporation of the defects

continued on next page . .

 

 
om

 

‘The UCCJEA gives forum selection agreements a role to play
in child custody proceedings, but it is a supporting, not a lead, role. Thus,
a court with UCCJEA jurisdiction may “declino[ | to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that [another state] is the more appropriate forum,” see
NRS 125A.305(1)(b), (©); Cal. Fam. Code § 3421(a)(2), (8), and in doing so
may consider “[aJny agreement of the parties as to which state should
assume jurisdiction.” NRS 125A.365(2)(e); see UCCJEA § 207(b)(5), 9/TA
ULL.A. 682 (1999), But this does not salvage the district court's assertion
of agreement-based jurisdiction here, The decision to decline jurisdiction
or

 

\convenient/more appropriate forum grounds is for the court of the
state that has UCCJEA jurisdiction to make, not the state to which
deferral is pressed. NRS 125A.365(1) (“A court of this state which has

jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of this chapter to make a child

 

custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction ....”), Since
Nevada's exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceased when it found Kevyn,
Daniel, and the children no longer resided in Nevada, it cannot determine
that another state with apparent jurisdiction—here, California—should
decline jurisdiction. See Krebs v. Krebs, 960 A.2d 637, 643-44 (Md. Ct.
Spee. App. 2008).

This is critical: To allow the state without home
state jurisdiction to conduct the [inconvenient/
‘more appropriate forum] hearing would lead to the
jurisdictional competition the drafters sought to
avoid. Thus the equitable arguments that mother

continued

 

and failings of the UCCJA into the new uniform act.” Staats v. McKinnon,
206 S.W.3d 532, 547 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (footnote omitted).

12

 
xi ee

 

wishes to pursue are not eliminated, but are
merely re-directed to the home state. If she
chooses, mother can ask the [home state] court to
relinquish jurisdiction.

Id, at 644 (quotation omitted). Accord Horgan v, Romans, 861 N.E.2d 209,
213 (II. Ct. App. 2006) (forum selection agreement may be considered in
declining jurisdiction but it is not dispositive).

And so it is here. Kevyn and Daniel agreed to Nevada as the

 

forum of choice for future child custody or visitation disputes, Such an
agreement is a factor a court having jurisdiction under the UCCJEA may
consider in making an inconvenient/more appropriate forum
determination. But in declaring itself possessed of jurisdiction and
offering that “{t}he California Court can determine that it may request
this Court to defer jurisdiction,” the district court got things precisely
backward. It was up to the Nevada court and/or the parties to ask the
California court to decline jurisdiction, not the reverse.

c
The foregoing disposes of Kevyn's further argument, citing
Vaile v. Dist. Ct, 118 Nev. 262, 44 P.3d 506 (2002), that Daniel is

judicially or equitably estopped from contesting Nevada's jurisdiction. A
court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA does not
that the defendant specifically
and voluntarily elected the tribunal. It is a well-established principle that

acquire it by estoppel. “It matters not

 

‘no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a
court’ where the court has no authority to act.” Sidell, 18 A.3d at 508
(quoting Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 US. 694, 702
(1982); see In re A.CS,, 157 S.W.3d at 15 (subject matter jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA cannot be waived or conferred by agreement or
estoppel or “judicial admission”).

13

 
Vaile is not to the contrary. In that case, Scotlund (husband)
filed for divorce in Nevada and represented to the district court that he
had resided in Nevada for the jurisdictionally required six weeks before
filing. 118 Nev. at 267, 44 P.3d at 510. Cisilie’s (wife) answer
corroborated that Scotlund was a resident of Nevada. Id, at 273, 44 P.3d

 

at 514. Relying on these representations, the district court granted the
divorce. Id, at 267, 44 P.3d at 510. More than two years later, Cisilie
moved to set aside the divorce as fraudulently obtained, arguing that
Scotlund had not resided in Nevada for the statutorily required six weeks.
Id, at 268, 44 P.3d at 511. Although Nevada did not have statutory
subject matter jurisdiction to grant the divorce, this court judicially
estopped Cisilie from contesting jurisdiction, given that she admitted
Scotlund’s residency allegations in her answer. Id, at 273-74, 44 P.3d at
5M.

Significantly, the estoppel in Vaile only applied to the parents’
divorce. The child custody arrangements remained governed by the
UCCIA (the governing child custody statute at the time). We held the
child custody portions of the divorce decree void for want of jurisdiction,
regardless of the parents’ representations, thus denying jurisdiction by
estoppel under the UCCJA. Id, at 275, 44 P.3d at 515. (Unlike Cisilie,
Daniel did not make conflicting representations on key matters of fact; the
parties’ residence simply changed, as the parties acknowledged might
occur.)

Kevyn’s equitable estoppel argument also cannot justify the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction outside the UCCJEA. Adoption
House, Inc. v. AR., 820 A.2d 402, 405 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003) (under the
UCCJEA subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel); In

 

 
re Jaheim B., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 604, 507 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Subject matter
jurisdiction... cannot be conferred by . . . estoppel.”); Rosen v, Rosen, 664
8.E.2d 743, 749 (W. Va. 2008) (same). She argues that she detrimentally
relied on Daniel's promise to abide by the agreement Nevada would retain
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction no matter where the parties moved.
Whatever its merits, this argument needs to be made to the California
court, in the context of a motion asking that court to decline jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA’s inconvenient’more appropriate forum provisions, not
to a Nevada court, seeking to porsuade it to arrogate jurisdiction to itself
that it statutorily does not have. As in Krebs, “the equitable arguments
that mother wishes to pursue are not eliminated, but are merely re-
directed to {what she concedes is the children’s] home state.” 960 A.2d at
644 (quotation omitted).
UL

This court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition
and mandamus. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4. A writ of prohibition may issue to
“arrest[ ] the proceedings of any tribunal ... when such proceedings are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal.” NRS 34.320. A
writ of mandamus may issue “to compel the performance of an act which
the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station.” NRS 34.160. The writ may issue “in all cases where there is not
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” NRS
34.330. “Normally, this court will not entertain a writ petition challenging
the denial of a motion to dismiss but we may do so where, as here, the

issue is not fact-bound and involves an unsettled and potentially
significant, recurring question of law.” Buckwalter v. Dist. Ct., 126 Nev.
__. _. 284 P.8d 920, 921 (2010).

 

 
ox te

 

‘The UCCJEA has been described as a “pact” among the states,
seeking to promote comity and “to reduce conflicting orders regarding
custody and placement of children.” In re Custody of A.C., 200 P.3d at
691. The district court's assertion of exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
based on the original decree exceeds its authority under NRS 125A.805(1)
and NRS 125A.315, which is enough to justify issuing a writ of
prohibition. But there is an even more significant jurisdictional excess in
this case: The district court's failure to stay its proceedings and to respect
c

proceed or to decline jurisdiction under the UCCJEA’s inconvenient/more

 

mnia’s prerogative, as the home state, to determine whether to

appropriate forum provisions, NRS 125A.355(2). If the California court—
“the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with
the provisions of [the UCCJEA] does not deters
state”—the Nevada district court

1e that the court of this

 

 

‘a more appropriate forum, the court
of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.” NRS 125A.355(2) (emphasis

added). That California has thus far, as a matter of comity, declined to

 

proceed in the face of the district court's assumption of jurisdiction does
not militate against issuance of writ relief, as Kevyn and the dissent
suggest. It argues in favor of the writ, for unless the writ issues, Novada
will have committed the very jurisdictional offense the UCCJEA
interdicts.

Here, the district court resolved to exercise jurisdiction over a
child custody proceeding despite recognizing that, statutorily, it was
without jurisdiction. Prohibition lies to restrain the unauthorized
exercise of jurisdiction, see Westpark Owners’ Ass'n v, Dist. Ct., 123 Nev.
349, 366, 167 P.3d 421, 426 (2007), especially when invoking jurisdiction
would upset the dictates of nationwide public policy. Mineral County ¥.

16

 
State, Dep't of Conserv, 117 Nev. 235, 243, 20 P.8d 800, 805 (2001). And,
while discretionary, issuing writs to ensure that courts comply with the
subject matter jurisdiction laws embodied by the UCCJEA is proper. See
State ex rel, Ferrara v. Neil], 165 S.W.3d 539, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)
(applying the UCCJA); Stephens v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 P.3d
1026, 1030 (Mont. 2006); Rosen v, Celebrezze, 883 N.E.2d 420, 430-31
(Ohio 2008).

As Daniel has no adequate legal remedy, we therefore grant

 

the petition for the writs of prohibition and mandamus and direct the
clerk of this court to issue alternative writs of prohibition and mandamus
directing the district court to stand down from its assertion of jurisdiction
in this case except to the extent permitted by NRS 125A.355(2) and to
dismiss this case unless the California court declines jurisdiction in favor

of Nevada.
0, J,
Pickering.

 

 
om

CHERRY, J., dissenting:
I would concur with the dissent filed by my colleague, Justice

 

Gibbons, a8 I too believe that the extraordinary relief requested by the
petitioner is not warranted at this time.

I would add that the unique set of facts presented in this case
should cause our court to take a closer look at NRS 125A.315 and
202 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(1997) to enable fair and just exceptions to the loss of jurisdiction to

ction

 

modify child custody arrangements when both parents have stipulated to
Nevada having exclusive jurisdiction over all child custody matters.
With the above in mind, I cannot agree to grant the petition.

 

 
ns

GIBBONS, J., dissenting:

I would deny the petition requesting this Court to issue a writ

 

of prohibition to prohibit the family division of the district court from
exercising subject matter jurisdiction.

Extraordinary writs may only issue in cases “where there is
peody and adequate remedy” at law. NRS 34.170; NRS

  

not a pl

 

34.330. The issuance of extraordinary writs is discretionary, not a matter

of right. Vallev Health Systems v, Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. —— 262
P.3d 676, 678 (2011). In this case, the parties executed a parenting

 

agreement which was incorporated into the decree of divorce. Therefore,
the divorce decree provides that Nevada has exclusive jurisdiction. At
various times, the record reflects that the parties have resided in the
states of Nevada, Idaho and California.

[At this time the Superior Court of the State of California has
not agreed to exercise jurisdiction. Therefore, the extraordinary relief
requested by the petitioner is not warranted at this time.

Wd J.

Gibbons