Title: State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Andrews

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Andrews1983 WY 109671 P.2d 1239Case Number: 83-26Case Number: 83-26Decided: 10/31/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, AND WAYNE FLAGG, 
STATE HEARING EXAMINER, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS),

v.

FRANK E. ANDREWS, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER).

Appeal from the 
District Court, FremontCounty, W.J. Nicholas, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Ron Arnold, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellants.

F.M. 
Andrews, Jr., Riverton, for 
appellee.

Before RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ., and GUTHRIE, Justice, Retired.[fn**]

* Retired June 13, 
1983, but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case 
pursuant to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

[fn**] ROONEY, C.J., having recused himself, 
GUTHRIE, J., Retired, was assigned pursuant to order of the court entered 
January 2, 1979.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]      The primary 
question presented by this appeal is whether that portion of § 31-5-1201(c), 
W.S. 1977, which states: "Convictions shall not be considered pursuant to W.S. 
31-276.26(b)(i) [§ 31-7-127(b)(i)] for driver license revocations for speeding 
violations of less than seventy-five (75) miles per hour," prevents the Motor 
Vehicle Division within the Department of Revenue and Taxation and under the 
State Tax Commission, appellant herein, from including as a moving violation for 
purposes of a suspension proceeding pursuant to § 31-7-127(b)(i), W.S. 1977, a 
violation for driving 63 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone. The district 
court in a review of the suspension proceeding for the driver's license of Frank 
E. Andrews, appellee herein, held that such a violation could not be included. 
We disagree with the determination by the district court, and we shall reverse 
on that ground. The appellee also asserts that the determination of the district 
court should be sustained upon other lawful grounds. We shall hold that the 
decision of the district court cannot be affirmed based upon the other lawful 
grounds urged by the appellee.

[¶2.]      The single issue 
asserted by the appellants is stated in their brief as 
follows:

"WHETHER W.S. 
31-5-1201(c) EXEMPTS ANY CONVICTIONS OF LESS THAN 75 MILES PER HOUR FOR SPEEDING 
VIOLATIONS IN ZONES OF LESS THAN 55 MILES PER HOUR."

The appellee 
does not make a counterstatement of the issue, but has encompassed in his brief 
a rather lengthy summary of the argument which reads as 
follows:

"A.: THE LOWER COURT 
CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE LIMITATION OF SEC. 31-5-1201(c).

"B: THE JUNE 8, 1982 
`NOTICE' BY THE MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION WAS IN FACT AN EX-PARTE ORDER OF 
SUSPENSION, ISSUED WITHOUT NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING, IN VIOLATION OF 
SECTION 31-127 W.S. 1977 (THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACT); SECTION 9-4-101 ET SEQ. 
(ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT); SECTION 13, CHAPTER 2 OF THE RULES AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, ALL REQUIRING NOTICE AND 
OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING BEFORE THE SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE 
LICENSE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF ARTICLE 1 SECTION 6 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING AND THE 5TH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

"C: NEITHER THE 
ORIGINAL ORDER OF SUSPENSION OF JUNE 8, NOR THE REVIEW ORDERS OF AUGUST 25 AND 
OCTOBER 10, CONTAINED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, SEPARATELY 
STATED, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 9-4-110 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
ACT.

"D: THE DIVISION'S 
ORDER OF JUNE 8 WAS MADE WITHOUT A `REVIEW OF ALL THE FACTORS TO DETERMINE THE 
DEGREE OF DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS AND PROPERTY BY THE LICENSEE' AND 
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

"E: NEITHER THE STATE 
HEARING EXAMINER NOR THE TAX COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY TO ALTER, AMEND OR MODIFY 
THE LICENSE SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
DIVISION.

"F: SECTION 9(c), 
CHAPTER II OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND 
TAXATION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS.

"G: SECTION 31-7-127 
W.S. 1977 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 6, ARTICLE I, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING AND 
IS VOID."

As 
previously noted, the position of the appellee is that if this court does not 
agree with the construction given by the district court to § 31-5-1201(c), 
supra, the case still should be affirmed based upon those grounds set forth in 
paragraphs B through G of his summary of the argument.

[¶3.]      The record 
discloses that the appellee was convicted, in each instance upon a guilty plea, 
of four speeding violations which occurred between December 7, 1981, and May 6, 
1982. On December 21, 1981, he was convicted in the municipal court in 
Casper, Wyoming, of driving 46 miles per hour in a 
30-mile-per-hour zone on December 7, 1981. On March 19, 1982, he was convicted 
in the county court of NatronaCounty of driving 63 miles per hour in a 
50-mile-per-hour zone on February 28, 1982. This particular conviction is the 
one which raises the question of statutory interpretation. On May 3, 1982, he 
was convicted in the NatronaCounty court of driving 89 miles per hour 
in a 55-mile-per-hour zone on April 24, 1982. Finally, on May 13, 1982, he was 
convicted in the municipal court of the city of Casper of driving 42 miles per hour in a 
30-mile-per-hour zone on May 6, 1982.

[¶4.]      On June 2, 1982, 
the appellee was sent a form letter from the Motor Vehicle Division which set 
forth the convictions on December 21, 1981, March 19, 1982, and May 13, 1982, 
and advised him that his license was in jeopardy because a further conviction 
might be grounds for suspension of his license as an habitually reckless or 
negligent driver. Ironically, while the Motor Vehicle Division did not have that 
information, the fourth conviction already had occurred when the warning letter 
was sent. Thereafter, on June 8, 1982, a "Notice of Opportunity for Hearing and 
Proposed Order of Suspension" was sent to the appellee signed by Daniel C. 
Leach, Jr., Director, Motor Vehicle Division.

[¶5.]      This latter 
communication is the one which led to the suspension of the appellee's driver's 
license by the Motor Vehicle Division as affirmed by the Wyoming Tax Commission. 
The document first points out that the appellee's driver's license file showed 
that he had been convicted of the four speeding violations described above, all 
since December of 1981. It encompasses a finding that these convictions show the 
appellee to be an habitually reckless or negligent driver and that his driving 
privileges should be suspended for 90 days. There follows an order that the 
appellee's driver's license be suspended for 90 days commencing July 8, 1982, 
and demand is made upon him for surrender of the license by that date. The last 
paragraph of the notice of opportunity for hearing and proposed order of 
suspension advised the appellee that within 20 days of the date of the order he 
could demand a hearing which, if demanded, was to be held before the Hearing 
Examiner.

[¶6.]      Through counsel 
the appellee did request a hearing which demand was received by the Motor 
Vehicle Division on June 16, 1982. This was acknowledged by a form which advised 
the appellee that he would be notified later of the day, time, and location of 
the hearing. He also was informed that his driving privileges would remain in 
full force until the hearing, when a final decision would be made by the Hearing 
Examiner. On July 16, 1982, a notice of hearing was sent to the appellee setting 
the matter for hearing on July 30, 1982. The hearing was continued at the 
request of the appellee, and it was held on August 25, 
1982.

[¶7.]      At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the Hearing Examiner upheld the 90-day suspension which had been 
proposed by the Motor Vehicle Division in the notice of opportunity for a 
hearing and proposed order of suspension sent on June 8, 1982, except that he 
adjusted the period of suspension to run from September 25, 1982, until December 
24, 1982. In addition, the hearing examiner granted the appellee a probationary 
driver's license for the period of his probation. The probationary driver's 
license permitted him to drive a vehicle for purposes of his employment as a 
landman for an oil company, subject to the condition that no further moving 
violations occur and that he complete a traffic safety seminar. The written 
order suspending appellee's license from September 25, 1982, through December 
24, 1982, and granting a probationary license subject to the conditions set 
forth above was signed on September 7, 1982. On September 7, 1982, the appellee 
filed his notice of appeal to the Wyoming Tax Commission from the order of the 
Hearing Examiner.

[¶8.]      On September 9, 
1982, the appellee was advised that a hearing had been granted before the 
Wyoming Tax Commission. It was set for Monday, September 27, 1982. This appeal 
was pursued in accordance with § 31-7-105(c), W.S. 1977,1 pursuant to 
regulations which were adopted by the Wyoming Tax Commission in response to the 
decision of this court in Yeik v. 
Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 
(1979).

[¶9.]      In the meantime, 
on September 20, 1982, the appellee had filed a civil action in the District 
Court of the Ninth Judicial District of the State of Wyoming in and for FremontCounty. In that action, the appellee 
sought an injunction against the State of Wyoming acting through the Tax 
Commission and the Motor Vehicle Division; he sought prohibition against the 
same defendants; and he sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the 
grounds for suspension or revocation of license adopted in the rules and 
regulations of the Department of Revenue and Taxation and the statute 
authorizing the revocation were void and that the statute and the rules and 
regulations were unconstitutional. The primary significance of the independent 
action is that an order for a preliminary injunction was signed by the district 
judge on September 24, 1982, and entered on October 5, 1982, which enjoined the 
enforcement of the June 8, 1982, order of the Motor Vehicle Division and the 
September 7, 1982, order of the Hearing Examiner during the pendency of the 
civil action.

[¶10.]    The hearing by the Wyoming 
Tax Commission pursuant to the appeal from the Hearing Examiner was held on 
September 27, 1982, and the Wyoming Tax Commission entered its Findings and 
Order on October 25, 1982. In its Findings and Order, the Wyoming Tax Commission 
affirmed the orders of the Motor Vehicle Division and the Hearing Examiner, but 
modified them so as to provide that the 90-day period of suspension would 
commence on October 10, 1982. On November 5, 1982, the appellee then filed his 
petition for review of the administrative action in the District Court of the 
Ninth Judicial District in and for FremontCounty.

[¶11.]    The parties then agreed to 
consolidate the civil action and the administrative appeal in the district court 
on the grounds that there were common questions of law and fact and that a 
single trial on all questions would be beneficial to all the parties. The 
appellants had filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on October 6, 1982, 
but they withdrew that motion and filed an answer. The order of the district 
court incorporating the stipulation of the parties to consolidate the cases and 
setting the matter for hearing on December 22, 1982, was entered on November 12, 
1982, the day the stipulation was filed. Perhaps it goes without saying that 
because of the preliminary injunction issued by the district court and the 
disposition made of the case by the district court, the driver's license of the 
appellee has not been suspended up until this time.

[¶12.]    On December 30, 1982, the 
district court entered its Judgment, Decree, and Order of Reversal. The district 
judge found that § 31-5-1201(c), W.S. 1977, exempted from consideration in a 
driver's license revocation proceeding all convictions for driving less than 75 
miles per hour in those speed zones controlled by § 31-5-301(b)(iii), and that 
this exemption included those instances in which the speed limit had been 
altered from 55 miles per hour to 50 miles per hour pursuant to § 31-5-301(c), 
which provides:

"(c) The maximum 
speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized in W.S. 
31-131 [§ 31-5-302] and 31-132 [§ 31-5-303]."

The district 
court decided that the "50-mile hour zone" violation relied upon by the 
department must be considered for purposes of § 31-5-1201(c), W.S. 1977, as one 
occurring in a 55-mile-per-hour zone established in § 31-5-301(b)(iii), W.S. 
1977. The adjudicative portion of the order of the district court provided as 
follows:

"1. The motor vehicle 
division of the department of revenue and taxation of the State of Wyoming 
wrongfully considered an alleged speeding violation of less than 75 miles per 
hour for the purpose of driver license revocation of petitioner's driver[']s 
license.

"2. The 
department[']s order of suspension of June 8, 1982 and the hearing examiner[']s 
final order of August 25, 1982 are erroneous, and are hereby reversed and set 
aside.

"3. The said motor 
vehicle division of the department of revenue and taxation of the State of 
Wyoming is enjoined from considering petitioner[']s record of conviction of the 
offense of speeding dated March 19, 1982 for a violation said to have occurred 
February 28, 1982 in reference to any driver license revocation 
proceeding."

It is from 
this order that the State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
Motor Vehicle Division, and Wayne Flagg, State Hearing Examiner, take their 
appeal.

[¶13.]    Preliminarily we must 
consider a suggestion of mootness on the part of the appellee. As a matter of 
judicial propriety and restraint, the court has a duty to determine whether this 
appeal should be dismissed for mootness. The applicable rule is that when we 
have notice of facts which have the effect of making any determination of a 
question unnecessary, or which would render any judgment we might pronounce 
ineffectual, the appeal should be dismissed. Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 620 P.2d 139 (1980); Shaffer v. Lee, Wyo., 616 P.2d 779 
(1980); In the Matter of Estate of 
Frederick, Wyo., 599 P.2d 550 (1979); Belondon v. State ex rel. Leimback, 
Wyo., 379 P.2d 828 (1963); Cheever v. 
Warren, 70 Wyo. 296, 249 P.2d 163 (1952); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Jones, 61 Wyo. 
350, 157 P.2d 993 (1945); and Scott v. 
Ward, 49 Wyo. 243, 54 P.2d 805 (1936). Furthermore, we note that in three 
cases decided on the same day this court dismissed appeals taken in actions 
involving temporary revocations of drivers' licenses where it appeared that 
during the pendency of the appeal the revocation period had run and the doctrine 
of mootness prevailed. House v. Wyoming 
Highway Department, 66 Wyo. 1, 203 P.2d 962 
(1949); Blackmon v. Driver's License 
Division, Highway Department of Wyoming, 66 
Wyo. 8, 203 P.2d 965 (1949); and Morad v. Wyoming Highway Department, 66 
Wyo. 12, 203 P.2d 954 (1949).

[¶14.]    We conclude, however, that 
this case should not be dismissed on the grounds of mootness. The rule requiring 
dismissal under circumstances similar to those found in the instant case is not 
absolute. In Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway 
Department, 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818 (1956), the court noted 
that the case technically was moot because the period for which Eastwood's 
license had been revoked had expired while the appeal was pending. The court, 
however, found that the principles involved were of sufficient public interest 
and importance to merit full discussion. The court then proceeded to rule upon a 
reserved constitutional question concerning the validity of the statute which 
then was in effect.

[¶15.]    Furthermore, while the 
appellee's license, according to the order of the Wyoming Tax Commission, was 
suspended for a 90-day period which expired on January 10, 1983, the district 
court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the suspension of the 
appellee's license during the pendency of the action below. That injunction 
became permanent upon entry of the final order of the district court. 
Consequently, the license suspension period relating to the appellee effectively 
has been tolled until the disposition of this appeal. Because this case, like 
Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway Department, supra, raises a significant question of 
public interest and importance which could be of a continuing nature, and 
because of its importance with respect to the enforcement of this state's motor 
vehicle code, we conclude that the instant appeal should not be dismissed on the 
ground of mootness.2

[¶16.]    We turn then to the primary 
substantive issue raised by the appellants. As we have noted previously, the 
fact upon which the district court entered its judgment, decree and order of 
reversal relates to the charge of driving 63 miles per hour in a zone in which 
the posted limit was 50 miles per hour on February 28, 1982. The appellee 
entered a plea of guilty to that charge on March 19, 1982, and was fined $36 
plus $10 court costs. The traffic citation which encompassed the charge against 
the appellee recites that it was issued for a violation of § 31-5-301(c), W.S. 
1977. The holding of the district court was that the Motor Vehicle Division 
could not rely upon this conviction in its administrative proceedings to suspend 
the appellee's driver's license pursuant to § 31-7-127(b)(i), W.S. 1977, which 
provides:

"The division is 
hereby authorized to suspend the license of any driver for a period not to 
exceed twelve (12) months, upon a showing by its records or other sufficient 
evidence that the licensee:

"(i) Is an habitually 
reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle, such fact being established by 
a record of moving violations, accidents or by other evidence; * * 
*"

[¶17.]    As we understand the 
rationale of the district court, it was bottomed upon the proposition that the 
general speed limits in Wyoming are established by § 31-5-301(b), W.S. 
1977, which provides as follows:

"Except when a 
special hazard exists that requires lower speed for compliance with paragraph 
(a) of this section, the limits specified in this section or established as 
hereinafter authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive 
a vehicle on a highway at a speed in excess of such maximum 
limits:

"(i) Twenty (20) 
miles per hour when passing a school building, or the grounds thereof, or a 
school crossing, during school recess or while children are going to or leaving 
school during opening or closing hours, and providing that the presence of such 
school building, ground thereof, or school crossing is indicated plainly by 
signs or signals conforming to the provisions hereof;

"(ii) Thirty (30) 
miles per hour in any urban district;

"(iii) Fifty-five 
(55) miles per hour in other locations."

The court 
then concluded that the significance of § 31-5-301(c), W.S. 1977, in providing 
that, "the maximum speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as 
authorized in W.S. 31-131 [§ 31-5-302] and 31-132 [§ 31-5-303]," is that any 
other speed limit set by state or local authority has to be "altered" from the 
general statewide speed limits established pursuant to subsection (b) of the 
statute.

[¶18.]    The district court then 
relied upon § 31-5-1201(c), W.S. 1977, which provides:

"Every person 
convicted of a violation of W.S. 31-130(b)(iii) [§ 31-5-301(b)(iii)] may be 
fined a maximum of one dollar ($1.00) per mile for each mile per hour in excess 
of fifty-five (55) miles per hour and up to and including seventy-four (74) 
miles per hour, and assessed a maximum of five dollars ($5.00) for court costs. 
Persons convicted of exceeding speeds above seventy-four (74) miles per hour 
shall be fined at the discretion of the judge but not less than twenty-five 
dollars ($25.00) nor more than the maximum penalties provided by subsection (b) 
of this section, with assessed court costs. Convictions shall not be considered pursuant 
to W.S. 31-276.26(b)(i) [§ 31-7-127(b)(i)] for driver license revocations for 
speeding violations of less than seventy-five (75) miles per hour." 
(Emphasis added.)

The district 
judge concluded that the 50-mile zone had been "altered" from a 55-mile zone, 
and, consequently, a violation of that altered speed limit could not be counted 
for purposes of suspension of the appellee's driver's 
license.

[¶19.]    It is our conclusion that 
reliance by the appellee and by the district court upon § 31-5-1201(c), W.S. 
1977, plainly is misplaced in an instance in which the statutory provision 
violated is not the general 55-mile-per-hour provision found in § 
31-5-301(b)(iii), W.S. 1977. We are guided by the principle that the court may 
not construe a statute in such a manner as will enlarge, stretch, expand or 
extend it to matters not falling within its express provisions. Matter of TRG, Wyo., 665 P.2d 491 (1983); LoSasso v. Braun, Wyo., 
386 P.2d 630 (1963). It is our duty to ascertain the intention of the 
legislature as completely as possible from the language used in the statute 
itself. Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982); Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979); and Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo., 
551 P.2d 687 (1976). It follows that the statutory exclusion contained in § 
31-5-1201(c), supra, comes into effect only if the speed limit specifically set 
in § 31-5-301(b)(iii), supra, has been 
violated.

[¶20.]    The fallacy in the district 
court's approach to this problem apparently lies in its conclusion that speed 
limits which are set pursuant to § 31-5-302, W.S. 1977, or § 35-5-303, W.S. 
1977, must be altered from a 55-mile-per-hour limit as permitted under § 
31-5-301(c), W.S. 1977. This does not comport with the clear language of § 
31-5-302, W.S. 1977, which provides in pertinent part:

"Whenever the 
superintendent determines upon the basis of an engineering and traffic 
investigation that a maximum speed greater or less than that authorized herein 
is required for safe and reasonable vehicle operation under the conditions found 
to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any part of the state 
highway system, the superintendent may 
determine and declare a reasonable and safe maximum limit thereat, which 
will be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof were erected. * * 
*" (Emphasis added.)

Substantially similar 
language is found in § 31-5-303(a), W.S. 1977, which 
provides:

"(a) Whenever local 
authorities within their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an 
engineering and traffic investigation that the maximum speed permitted or 
established under sections 31-130 [§ 31-5-301] and 31-131 [§ 31-5-302], Wyoming 
Statutes 1957, as amended and reenacted by sections 1 and 2 of this act [Laws 
1959, ch. 55] is greater or less than is reasonable and safe under the 
conditions found to exist upon a highway or part of a highway the local authority may determine and 
declare a safe and maximum limit thereon which: * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

The clear 
language of these statutes connotes the authority to establish safe maximum 
speed limits which conceptually were not altered from the 55-mile-per-hour limit 
set forth in § 31-5-301(b)(iii). The record in this case is silent as to how the 
50-mile-per-hour speed limit which the appellee violated was established. That 
information is not necessary to our decision in this case because Andrews 
acknowledged the validity of the 50-mile-per-hour speed limit when he pleaded 
guilty to that charge.

[¶21.]    The legislative history of §§ 
31-5-301, W.S. 1977, and 31-5-1201(c), W.S. 1977, bolsters our conclusion in 
this regard. Both of these provisions were included in the bill which 
established a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. S.L. of Wyoming 1976, Ch. 23, § 1. Prior to the adoption of 
that statute, the statutory predecessor of § 31-5-301(b), W.S. 1977, authorized 
speeds of 75 miles per hour on all four-lane divided highways and 65 miles per 
hour on other locations not within school zones or urban districts. Section 
31-130, W.S. 1957, Cum.Supp. 1975. The 1976 legislative enactment did not in any 
way affect the provision found in § 31-5-301(c), W.S. 1977. Yet we find that the 
initial language of the statutory provision containing the exemption refers 
specifically to "every person convicted of a violation of W.S. 31-130(b)(iii) [§ 
31-5-301(b)(iii)]." The conviction which the district court abrogated for 
purposes of driver's license suspension was not one obtained pursuant to § 
31-5-301(b)(iii), W.S. 1977, and the district court did err in its holding that 
the Motor Vehicle Division relied upon an excluded violation in suspending the 
appellee's driver's license.

[¶22.]    The appellee vigorously urges 
upon us, however, the rule that the judgment of a district court should be 
affirmed upon any proper ground shown by the record. See, e.g., Agar v. Kysar, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1350 (1981); Wightman v. American 
National Bank of Riverton, Wyo., 610 P.2d 1001 (1980); White v. Wheatland Irrigation District, Wyo., 
413 P.2d 252 (1966). We have on a number of occasions recognized the rule which 
the appellee asserts. We therefore must examine the contentions of the appellee 
as set forth in his summary of the argument in the light of these 
rules.

[¶23.]    We turn first to his 
arguments that:

"THE JUNE 8, 1982 
`NOTICE' BY THE MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION WAS IN FACT AN EX-PARTE ORDER OF 
SUSPENSION, ISSUED WITHOUT NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING, IN VIOLATION OF 
SECTION 31-127 W.S. 1977 (THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACT); SECTION 9-4-101 ET SEQ. 
(ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT); SECTION 13, CHAPTER 2 OF THE RULES AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, ALL REQUIRING NOTICE AND 
OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING BEFORE THE SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE 
LICENSE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF ARTICLE 1 SECTION 6 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING AND THE 5TH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,"

and

"NEITHER THE ORIGINAL 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION OF JUNE 8, NOR THE REVIEW ORDERS OF AUGUST 25 AND OCTOBER 
10, CONTAINED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, SEPARATELY STATED, AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 9-4-110 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
ACT."

[¶24.]    The statutory provisions 
pursuant to which the Motor Vehicle Division proceeded are found in § 
31-7-127(b), W.S. 1977, and § 31-7-127(c), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1983), which 
read as follows:

"(b) The division is 
hereby authorized to suspend the license of any driver for a period not to 
exceed twelve (12) months, upon a showing by its records or other sufficient 
evidence that the licensee:

"(i) Is an habitually 
reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle, such fact being established by 
a record of moving violations, accidents or by other 
evidence;

"(ii) Has permitted 
an unlawful or fraudulent use of his license.

"(c) Except as 
provided in subsection (e) of this section, before suspending or revoking the 
license or driving privilege of any person as authorized in this section, the 
division shall immediately notify the licensee in writing and upon his request 
shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing as early as practicable within 
forty-five (45) days after receipt of the request, at a time and place specified 
by the division. Upon the hearing, the motor vehicle director or his duly 
authorized agent may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance 
of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers in accordance with 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 to 16-3-115] and may 
require a reexamination of the licensee. Upon hearing, the division shall either 
rescind its order of suspension or, good cause appearing therefor, may continue, 
modify or extend the suspension of the license or revoke the license; provided 
that this discretion shall be limited to cases where undue hardship would result 
from a failure to extend such privilege, and provided further that this 
extension of privilege shall be extended only once to any person in a ten (10) 
year period."

[¶25.]    The substance of the notice 
given to the appellee has been set forth above. The appellee relies essentially 
upon the concurring opinion of Justice Raper in Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor 
Vehicle Division v. Shipley, Wyo., 579 P.2d 415 (1978). He also asserts that 
the procedure used does not comport with the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act now found in § 16-3-107, W.S. 1977. It does not appear that any 
substantial right of the appellee was violated by the procedure used by the 
Motor Vehicle Division in this instance. In White v. Board of Trustees of 
Western Wyoming Community College District, Wyo., 648 P.2d 528 (1982), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 732, 74 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1983), Justice Raper discussed for the court the constitutional 
requirements relative to notice. The conclusion to be drawn is that if the 
person entitled to notice has a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the 
opposing party and to meet them, and is put on inquiry with respect to any 
contentions that might be doubtful, he has received the notice required by 
constitutional law. The procedure utilized by the Motor Vehicle Division of the 
Wyoming Tax Commission in this instance was adequate for that 
purpose.

[¶26.]    Following the opinion of this 
court in Yeik v. Department of Revenue 
and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979), the Wyoming Tax Commission adopted 
"Rules of Practice and Procedure for Appeals Before the Wyoming Tax Commission 
Involving Driver's Licenses, Financial Responsibility, Registration, and Other 
Related Matters." The essential effect of the adoption of those rules and 
regulations is that the requisite administrative finality is not present for 
appeal to the district court until the appeal to the Wyoming Tax Commission has 
been pursued and concluded. This procedure then results in a final order of the 
Wyoming Tax Commission. The final order in this case is in the Findings and 
Order entered on October 25, 1982. It is from this order that the appeal is 
taken to the district court, and it is the only order which must be examined to 
determine if it meets the requirements of § 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, as construed by 
this court in Pan American Petroleum 
Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550 (1968), and those cases which have followed. We are satisfied from our 
examination of the Findings and Order entered by the Wyoming Tax Commission on 
October 25, 1982, that it did make the requisite findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, separately stated, as required, and that the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law which were entered are sufficient to permit the 
judicial branch of government to exercise its review 
function.

[¶27.]    The last four contentions 
made by the appellee are:

"THE DIVISION'S ORDER 
OF JUNE 8 WAS MADE WITHOUT A `REVIEW OF ALL THE FACTORS TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE 
OF DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS AND PROPERTY BY THE LICENSEE' AND WAS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE."

"NEITHER THE STATE 
HEARING EXAMINER NOR THE TAX COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY TO ALTER, AMEND OR MODIFY 
THE LICENSE SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
DIVISION."

"SECTION 9(c), 
CHAPTER II OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND 
TAXATION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS."

"SECTION 31-7-127 
W.S. 1977 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 6, ARTICLE I, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING AND 
IS VOID."

[¶28.]    Here the appellee attacks the 
propriety of what he characterizes as an unconstitutional delegation of 
authority from the legislature to the executive department, referring 
specifically to § 31-7-127(b)(i), W.S. 1977. The appellee also attacks the rules 
and regulations of the department of revenue and taxation relating to grounds 
for suspension or revocation of a driver's license as found in Ch. II, § 9(c), 
which reads as follows:

"A person who is an 
habitually reckless or negligent driver. Upon a showing of the records of the 
Division that a person has been convicted of three (3) moving violations within 
a one (1) year period, such record shall be cause for a review by the Division 
of all factors to determine the degree of disregard for the safety of lives and 
property, and may, in the judgment of the Division, be grounds for suspension of 
the person's license as an habitually reckless or negligent driver. If the 
record shall be insufficient upon which to adjudge the person as an habitually 
reckless or negligent driver, the person shall nevertheless be given notice in 
writing of the review conducted, and as to the possible consequences of further 
convictions becoming a part of the driving record. A moving violation is an act 
of control or lack of control by the driver of a motor vehicle while the vehicle 
is in motion, which results in a conviction."

[¶29.]    We note that the appellee, 
according to the transcript in this record of the hearing before the Wyoming Tax 
Commission, was content to have a perfunctory and pro forma hearing apparently 
being concerned only with getting the issue into the judicial system for review. 
We conclude that in acquiescing in such a procedure, the appellee has waived any 
claims he might otherwise have to the failure of the Motor Vehicle Division of 
the Wyoming Tax Commission to consider any proper evidence. We then turn to Spiegelberg v. Wyoming Highway Department, Wyo., 
508 P.2d 18 (1973), a case decided under earlier versions of these same 
statutory provisions. This opinion deals with a statutory version of the 
regulatory provision which was applied here. The holding of the court is more 
than sufficient to sustain the procedure in vogue currently, and by a footnote 
the court specifically approved the concept that four speeding violations would 
be sufficient to indicate "an habitually reckless or negligent driver" and that 
the Wyoming Tax Commission might properly draw such an inference. Consequently 
we rule against the appellee with respect to his contentions that there was not 
sufficient support by substantial evidence of the degree of disregard for the 
safety of others and property by the appellee, that the regulation is arbitrary 
and capricious and void for vagueness, and that there is an unconstitutional 
delegation of power to the executive 
department.

[¶30.]    With respect to the authority 
to amend or modify the license, we find no authority in the appellee's brief for 
this proposition. The provisions of § 31-7-127(c) are specific with respect to 
the authority of the division upon hearing, to continue, modify or extend the 
suspension, and that authority must extend to the Hearing Examiner as its agent. 
Logic persuades us that the Wyoming Tax Commission can do what one of its 
departments can do, and we hold against the appellee in this regard 
also.

[¶31.]    For the foregoing reasons, 
the order of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
district court for entry of an order dissolving its injunction and remanding the 
matter back to the Wyoming Tax Commission so that an appropriate period of 
suspension can be established.

[¶32.]    GUTHRIE, Justice, Retired, concurs in 
the result.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 31-7-105(c), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"Any order of the 
hearing examiner is subject to a hearing before the Wyoming tax commission in 
accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 to 
16-3-115]."

2 We do not reach the 
question of whether the district court was properly vested with jurisdiction to 
consider the civil action filed during the pendency of appellee's administrative 
appeal. See Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas 
Association v. State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163 
(1982); and City of Cheyenne v. Sims, Wyo., 
521 P.2d 1347 (1974).