Title: Jackson v. True Temper Corp.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-515


Leslie Jackson                               Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Rutland Superior Court
True Temper Corporation
                                             June Term, 1990


Frank G. Mahady, J.

Christopher P. Sullivan, Rutland, for plaintiff-appellee

Keith J. Kasper of McNamara, Fitzpatrick & McCormick, Burlington, for
   defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.  Defendant employer appeals from a superior court judgment
awarding plaintiff attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $24,323.30.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter to the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
     Plaintiff sought a worker's compensation award from the Commissioner
of Labor and Industry for an injury that occurred while he was employed by
defendant.  Defendant contested compensability and prevailed in proceedings
before the Commissioner.  Plaintiff appealed to the superior court, where a
jury rendered a verdict in his favor on the question certified to the court
under 21 V.S.A. { 671.  Defendant appealed to this Court, and we affirmed
that verdict.  Jackson v. True Temper Corp., 151 Vt. 592, 563 A.2d 621
(1989).  Thereafter, plaintiff petitioned the superior court for payment of
costs and attorney's fees under 21 V.S.A. { 678(b), (FN1) claiming an hourly 
rate of $75 per hour for 283.25 hours of service, which included time spent
preparing and presenting his claim to the Commissioner and to the courts.
     Defendant filed no response to the petition, and its only opposition
was its assertion at a superior court hearing on the fee petition that Rule
10 of the Department of Labor and Industry (FN2) allows only $35 per hour.
Defendant did not contest either the reasonableness of the hourly rate or
the number of hours of service claimed.
     The court granted plaintiff's request for attorney's fees at the hourly
rate of $75.  The court stated:
          Customarily, the judiciary accords considerable defer-
          ence to the regulations adopted by an administrative
          agency under statute which that agency is charged to
          implement.  However, an agency may not adopt a regu-
          lation which is unreasonable and which defeats the
          intention of the legislature.  The clear legislative
          intent behind 21 V.S.A. 678(b) is to provide reasonable
          compensation to attorneys for claimants in such cases
          and to thereby assure the availability of legal services
          for such claimants.  Rule 10 provides for attorneys'
          fees which are far from reasonable in today's world and
          would defeat the purpose of ensuring legal services for
          claimants.

(Citations omitted.)  The present appeal followed.
     Defendant argues that the trial court intruded on the Commissioner's
prerogative by awarding attorney's fees at a rate higher than those allowed
by duly adopted regulations.  It contends that the trial court's rationale
boiled down to an assertion that the hourly rate set by the Commissioner
was "far from reasonable in today's world," and that no evidence supported
that assertion.
     Defendant's argument fails entirely for hours spent on appeals to the
superior court and to this Court.  Clearly 21 V.S.A. { 678(b), rather than
{ 678(a) or the rules adopted thereunder, applies to fee awards for judicial
appeals and gives the courts authority to set reasonable hourly rates.
Nothing in { 678(b) suggests that the court should be limited to the maximum
rate set by the Commissioner for matters before her.  Likewise, nothing in
Rule 10 establishes fees for court appeals; rather, it refers only to
proceedings before the Commissioner.
     Defendant correctly states that plaintiff did not present evidence
supporting the $75 hourly rate.  Because defendant only argued that Rule 10
governed the fee award both in proceedings before the Commissioner and in
court appeals, plaintiff and the court could reasonably have inferred that
defendant did not question the reasonableness of that rate.  Matters not
raised at trial may not be presented for the first time on appeal.  Garrow
v. Garrow, 150 Vt. 426, 431,