Title: Anderson v. Town of Newbold

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP547 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael Anderson, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Town of Newbold, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 389 Wis. 2d 309,935 N.W.2d 856 
PDC No:2109 WI App 59 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 27, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 1, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick F. O’Melia   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court in which ROGGENSAKC, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Timothy B. Melms, Mary M. Hogan, and Hogan & Melms, 
LLP, Rhinelander. There was an oral argument by Timothy B. Melms 
and Mary M. Hogan. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief submitted 
by Daniel L. Vande Zande, Sam Kaufman, and Vande Zande & 
Kaufman, LLP, Waupun. There was an oral argument by Daniel L. 
Vande Zande. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was submitted on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Lakes, Inc., Big Portage Lake Riparian Owners 
Association, Blue Lake Preservation Association, Ballard-Irving-
White Birch Lakes Association, Inc., Deer Lake Improvement 
Association, 
Wildcat 
Lake 
Association, 
Lake 
Katherine 
Association, Inc. and Plum Lake Association by Christa O. 
Westerberg and Pines Bach LLP, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was submitted on behalf of Wisconsin 
Towns Association by Joseph Ruth, Shawano.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was submitted on behalf of Wisconsin 
Realtors Association and Wisconsin Builders Association by 
Thomas D. Larson, Madison. There was an oral argument by Thomas 
D. Larson. 
 
2021 WI 6 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP547 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV55) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael Anderson, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Newbold, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 27, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Michael 
Anderson, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
affirming the circuit court's order upholding the Town of 
Newbold's 
denial 
of 
Anderson's 
attempt 
to 
subdivide 
his 
property.1  Anderson's proposed subdivision was denied by the 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold, 2019 WI App 59, 
389 Wis. 2d 309, 935 N.W.2d 856 (affirming order of circuit 
court for Oneida County, Patrick F. O'Melia, Judge). 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
2 
 
Town because the two resulting lots would not meet the Town's 
applicable minimum shoreland frontage requirement as set by Town 
ordinance. 
¶2 
Anderson contends that the Town's minimum shoreland 
frontage requirement is unenforceable because it is a shoreland 
zoning regulation that the Town does not have the authority to 
enact.  The Town, on the other hand, argues that the requirement 
is a permissible exercise of its subdivision authority. 
¶3 
We conclude that the Town ordinance at issue is a 
permissible 
exercise 
of 
the 
Town's 
subdivision 
authority 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.45 (2017-18).2  The Town thus 
proceeded on a correct theory of law when it denied Anderson's 
request to subdivide his property in a way that would contravene 
the ordinance. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶5 
Anderson owns property on Lake Mildred in the Town of 
Newbold, which includes 358.43 feet of shoreline frontage.  
Seeking to subdivide his property into two separate lots, one 
with 195 feet of shoreline frontage and the other with 163.43 
feet, Anderson submitted a proposal to the Town. 
¶6 
At its November 3, 2016 meeting, the Town Plan 
Commission considered Anderson's proposal.  The commission 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
3 
 
recommended that the Town deny Anderson's proposal based on its 
failure to comply with the Town's subdivision ordinance.  
According to the commission's minutes, denial was recommended 
"because [the plan] does not comply with Town of Newbold On-
Water Land Division Standards 13.13 which requires a minimum 225 
foot lot width at the ordinary high water mark" of Lake Mildred.  
Adopting the commission's recommendation, the Town Board denied 
Anderson's proposed subdivision. 
¶7 
Anderson sought certiorari review of the Town's 
decision in the circuit court.  He contended that the Town 
proceeded on an incorrect theory of law by denying his proposal 
to subdivide his property.  Specifically, he relied on Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.692,3 
contending 
that 
this 
statute 
prevents 
municipalities from enforcing local shoreland zoning standards 
that are more restrictive than the standards that have been 
enacted on a state level.  Anderson argued that the Town of 
Newbold ordinance is invalid because it is more restrictive than 
state standards.  
¶8 
The circuit court issued a written decision, in 
several places referring to the case as a "close call."  
Although it stated that Anderson "makes a fairly strong case," 
it ultimately did not rule in his favor and affirmed the Town's 
decision.  The circuit court concluded that the Town ordinance 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.692(1d)(a) provides:  "An ordinance 
enacted under this section may not regulate a matter more 
restrictively than the matter is regulated by a shoreland zoning 
standard." 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
4 
 
at issue does not fall within the purview of Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692:  "It is not a zoning ordinance enacted under Wis. 
Stat. Ch. 59 at all; instead, it is a subdivision ordinance 
enacted under Wis. Stat. Ch. 236." 
¶9 
Recognizing a distinction between zoning ordinances 
and subdivision ordinances, the circuit court also observed an 
overlap 
between 
the 
two 
concepts 
that 
ultimately 
proved 
dispositive:  "Because there is a recognized overlap between 
these two functions (i.e. zoning and subdivision controls), Mr. 
Anderson's concern that 'the Town of Newbold is performing a 
zoning 
function' 
with 
its 
subdivision 
ordinance 
cannot 
ultimately prevail."  It reached this conclusion because "the 
statutory 'enacted under this section' language chosen by the 
legislature [in Wis. Stat. § 59.692] is difficult to apply to a 
local subdivision ordinance enacted under Wis. Stat. Ch. 236."   
¶10 Anderson appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court, upholding the Town's denial of Anderson's 
proposed subdivision.  State ex rel. Anderson v. Town of 
Newbold, 2019 WI App 59, 389 Wis. 2d 309, 935 N.W.2d 856.  The 
court of appeals recognized what it described as an "undeniable 
tension between Wis. Stat. §§ 59.692 and 236.45[,]" yet like the 
circuit court, it determined that "the Town has the authority to 
enforce the Shoreland Ordinance, which, again, was undisputedly 
enacted as a lawful exercise of the Town's subdivision authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 236.45."  Id., ¶¶21-22.  Anderson petitioned 
for review in this court. 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
5 
 
II 
¶11 This 
case 
arrives 
here 
on 
certiorari 
review.  
"Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test the 
validity 
of 
a 
decision 
rendered 
by 
a 
municipality, 
an 
administrative agency, or an inferior tribunal."  Ottman v. Town 
of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶34, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411.   
¶12 On certiorari review, we examine the decision of the 
Town Board, not the decision of the circuit court.  Oneida Seven 
Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 2015 WI 50, ¶42, 362 
Wis. 2d 290, 865 N.W.2d 162.  Our review is limited to (1) 
whether the municipality kept within its jurisdiction; (2) 
whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law; (3) whether its 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive, 
or 
unreasonable 
and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question.  Wisconsin Dolls, LLC v. Town of Dell 
Prairie, 2012 WI 76, ¶18, 342 Wis. 2d 350, 815 N.W.2d 690. 
¶13 In our review, we must interpret several statutes.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law this court 
reviews independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Shugarts v. Mohr, 2018 WI 
27, ¶18, 380 Wis. 2d 512, 909 N.W.2d 402. 
III 
¶14 We 
begin 
by 
setting 
forth 
necessary 
background 
regarding the statutory authority of various governmental 
entities to regulate land use and subdivision, with a specific 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
6 
 
eye 
to 
shorelands. 
 
Subsequently, 
we 
examine 
Anderson's 
arguments advanced in this case. 
A 
¶15 At issue is the validity of the Town's minimum 
shoreland lot size requirements found in Town of Newbold 
Ordinance 13.13.  In Ordinance 13.13.01, the Town sets forth the 
purpose and intent of the provision:   
The Town Board has determined that in order to enhance 
the quality of the division or subdivision of land 
within areas of the Town affecting properties having 
frontage on any of the lakes, flowages, ponds, 
navigable rivers and/or streams located within the 
Town, that standards more stringent than current 
County 
development 
standards 
be 
established 
as 
provided . . . . 
¶16 Accordingly, 
the 
Town 
set 
minimum 
lot 
frontage 
requirements for each lake within its borders.  As applicable to 
Lake Mildred, such minimum lot frontage is 225 feet.  Anderson 
challenges this regulation as outside the statutory authority of 
the Town to enact. 
¶17 In terms of this certiorari review, the issue focuses 
on the second prong of such review——whether the Town proceeded 
on a correct theory of law in enacting the above-cited minimum 
shoreland lot size requirement.  To determine whether the Town 
proceeded on a correct theory of law, we must interpret the 
relevant statutes that set the parameters for the regulation of 
land use controls by various governmental entities. 
¶18 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
7 
 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we need not further the 
inquiry.  Id.   
¶19 "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  We interpret statutory language "in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶20 The Wisconsin Statutes provide a framework for the 
regulation of land use by various governmental entities.  Such 
regulation can take the form of planning, zoning, or platting.  
Town of Sun Prairie v. Storms, 110 Wis. 2d 58, 68, 327 
N.W.2d 642 (1983).  This court has recognized that "[z]oning and 
planning must be viewed as complementary devices used in 
community 
planning." 
 
Id. 
(quoting 
E.C. 
Yokley, 
Law 
of 
Subdivisions, § 39 at 157-58 (2d ed. 1981)). 
¶21 Not all lands are treated equally in terms of 
community planning.  Indeed, the legislature has recognized that 
shorelands 
are 
subject 
to 
unique 
considerations. 
 
These 
considerations 
arise 
from 
the 
fact 
that 
shorelands 
abut 
navigable waters, the beds of which are held in trust by the 
State for all of its citizens.  Wis. Stat. § 281.31(1); Movrich 
v. Lobermeier, 2018 WI 9, ¶25, 379 Wis. 2d 269, 905 N.W.2d 807; 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
8 
 
R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 
628 N.W.2d 781.   
¶22 Because shorelands present unique considerations, they 
are treated differently for purposes of zoning.  The legislature 
has specifically stated that shoreland zoning regulations are 
"in the public interest."  Wis. Stat. § 281.31(1).4  In a full 
statement of policy, § 281.31(1) sets forth:   
To aid in the fulfillment of the state's role as 
trustee of its navigable waters and to promote public 
health, safety, convenience and general welfare, it is 
declared to be in the public interest to make studies, 
establish policies, make plans and authorize municipal 
shoreland zoning regulations for the efficient use, 
conservation, 
development 
and 
protection 
of 
this 
state's water resources.  The regulations shall relate 
to lands under, abutting or lying close to navigable 
waters.  The purposes of the regulations shall be to 
further 
the 
maintenance 
of 
safe 
and 
healthful 
conditions; 
prevent 
and 
control 
water 
pollution; 
protect spawning grounds, fish and aquatic life; 
control building sites, placement of structure and 
land uses and reserve shore cover and natural beauty. 
¶23 "The basic purpose of a shoreland zoning ordinance is 
to protect navigable waters and the public rights therein from 
the 
degradation 
and 
deterioration 
which 
results 
from 
uncontrolled use and development of shorelands."  Forest Cnty. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin has long been a national leader in shoreland 
protection through zoning.  The passage of the Navigable Waters 
Protection Law, Wis. Stat. § 281.31, made Wisconsin the "first 
state to enact zoning legislation specifically designed to 
protect public water resources through the regulation of land 
use activities on contiguous shorelands."  Tracy K. Kuczenski, 
Wisconsin's Shoreland Management Program:  An Assessment With 
Implications For Effective Natural Resources Management and 
Protection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1999). 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
9 
 
v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 678, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998) (citation 
omitted); see Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 16-17, 201 
N.W.2d 761 (1972).  Shoreland zoning also serves to balance the 
public and private interests in shoreland areas.  Paul G. Kent, 
On the Waterfront:  New Shoreland Zoning Laws, 90 Wis. Law. 14, 
15 (Jan. 2017). 
¶24 Although general zoning authority is granted to both 
counties and towns, see Wis. Stat. §§ 59.69, 60.61, the 
authority to enact zoning ordinances specific to shorelands lies 
with counties alone.5  Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1c); see Hegwood v. 
Town of Eagle Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2013 WI App 118, ¶9, 351 
Wis. 2d 196, 839 N.W.2d 111;6 Herman v. Cnty. of Walworth, 2005 
                                                 
5 For purposes of Wis. Stat. § 59.692, "shorelands" are 
defined as:  
[T]he area within the following distances from the 
ordinary high-water mark of navigable waters, as 
defined under s. 281.31(2)(d):   
1. One thousand feet from a lake, pond or flowage.  If 
the navigable water is a glacial pothole lake, this 
distance shall be measured from the high-water mark of 
the lake. 
2. Three hundred feet from a river or stream or to the 
landward side of the floodplain, whichever distance is 
greater. 
Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1)(b). 
6 In Hegwood, the court of appeals determined that "[t]he 
plain language of the statutory scheme evinces that by enactment 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 281.31 and 59.692, the legislature intended 
that towns would not have authority to regulate shorelands 
except where such regulation fell within the language of 
§ 59.692(2)(b)," a grandfather clause that no party argues 
applies here.  Hegwood v. Town of Eagle Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 
2013 WI App 118, ¶16, 351 Wis. 2d 196, 839 N.W.2d 111. 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
10 
 
WI App 185, ¶18, 286 Wis. 2d 449, 703 N.W.2d 720.  Section 
59.692(1c) provides in relevant part:  "To effect the purposes 
of s. 281.31 and to promote the public health, safety and 
general welfare, each county shall zone by ordinance all 
shorelands in its unincorporated area.  The requirements in this 
ordinance shall relate to the purposes in s. 281.31(1)." 
¶25 A county shoreland zoning ordinance enacted pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 59.692 cannot be more restrictive than the 
standards that have been enacted at the state level:  "An 
ordinance enacted under this section may not regulate a matter 
more restrictively than the matter is regulated by a shoreland 
zoning standard."7  § 59.692(1d)(a).  The previous sentence, 
however, "does not prohibit a county from enacting a shoreland 
zoning ordinance that regulates a matter that is not regulated 
by a shoreland zoning standard."  § 59.692(1d)(b). 
                                                                                                                                                             
As the court of appeals in the present case observed, 
subsequent to the Hegwood decision the legislature passed 2015 
Wis. Act 41.  See Anderson, 389 Wis. 2d 309, ¶11 n.2.  The court 
of appeals stated that this enactment "appear[s] to modify our 
decision in Hegwood to clarify that although towns do not have 
authority to enact a zoning ordinance that is specific to 
shoreland areas, they may still enact and apply a general zoning 
ordinance that applies in both shoreland and non-shoreland 
areas."  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. §§ 60.61(3r) and 60.62(5)).  Act 
41 does not affect our analysis and we need not interpret or 
further discuss the provisions it created. 
7 A "shoreland zoning standard" is defined as "a standard 
for ordinances enacted under this section that is promulgated as 
a rule by the department [of natural resources]."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692(1)(c); see Wis. Admin. Code § NR 115.05 (Jan. 2017). 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
11 
 
¶26 As stated, zoning ordinances are not the only means by 
which governmental entities can engage in community planning.  
The legislature has additionally given subdivision authority to 
certain entities. 
¶27 The authority to enact subdivision regulations arises 
from Wis. Stat. § 236.45.  Setting forth a litany of purposes in 
this statutory section, the legislature provided: 
The purpose of this section is to promote the public 
health, safety and general welfare of the community 
and the regulations authorized to be made are designed 
to lessen congestion in the streets and highways; to 
further the orderly layout and use of land; to secure 
safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to provide 
adequate light and air, including access to sunlight 
for solar collectors and to wind for wind energy 
systems; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid 
undue 
concentration 
of 
population; 
to 
facilitate 
adequate 
provision 
for 
transportation, 
water, 
sewerage, schools, parks, playgrounds and other public 
requirements; to facilitate the further resubdivision 
of larger tracts into smaller parcels of land.  The 
regulations provided for by this section shall be made 
with reasonable consideration, among other things, of 
the character of the municipality, town or county with 
a view of conserving the value of the buildings placed 
upon land, providing the best possible environment for 
human 
habitation, 
and 
for 
encouraging 
the 
most 
appropriate use of land throughout the municipality, 
town or county. 
§ 236.45(1). 
¶28 To accomplish the purposes listed in subsec. (1), Wis. 
Stat. § 236.45(2)(ac) grants to "any municipality, town or 
county that has established a planning agency" the authority to 
"enact ordinances governing the subdivision or other division of 
land that are more restrictive than the provisions of this 
chapter, except that no ordinance may modify in a more 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
12 
 
restrictive way time limits, deadlines, notice requirements, or 
other provisions of this chapter that provide protections for a 
subdivider."  Such ordinances "may include provisions regulating 
divisions of land into parcels larger than 1 1/2 acres or 
divisions of land into less than 5 parcels."  § 236.45(2)(am). 
¶29 Although 
they 
often 
work 
together, 
zoning 
and 
subdivision regulations provide separate and distinct means of 
regulating the development of land.  In Storms, the court 
considered the question of whether the Town of Sun Prairie had 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 236.45 to adopt an ordinance 
regulating minimum lot size.  110 Wis. 2d at 60.  Answering in 
the affirmative, the court explained that lot size regulation 
furthers several of the policy goals of ch. 236, including 
orderly layout and use of land, preventing overcrowding of land, 
avoiding undue concentration of population, providing the best 
possible environment for human habitation, encouraging the most 
appropriate use of land and providing for adequate light and 
air.  Id. at 65. 
¶30 The court further addressed the relationship between 
zoning and subdivision, indicating that both may deal with 
minimum lot sizes.  Id. at 67.  There are areas of overlap 
between the two powers, but there are also key differences.   
Both are aimed at the orderly development of a 
community.  Though zoning is aimed at controlling the 
uses of land and existing resources, subdivision 
regulations are designed to control the division of 
land and to assure that such developments thereon are 
designed to accommodate the needs of the occupants of 
the subdivision.   
No. 
2018AP547   
 
13 
 
Id. at 68 (quotation omitted).  "The purpose of zoning is to 
provide an overall comprehensive plan for land use, while 
subdivision regulations govern the planning of new streets, 
standards for plotting new neighborhoods, and the protection of 
the community from financial loss due to poor development."  Id. 
(quotation omitted). 
¶31 In 
other 
words, 
zoning 
and 
subdivision 
are 
"complementary land planning devices.  Subdivision control is 
concerned with the initial division of undeveloped land, while 
zoning more specifically regulates the further use of this 
land."  Id.  "The fact that minimum lot size may also be 
regulated by zoning ordinances does not detract from the power 
of local governments to exercise such power pursuant to ch. 236, 
Stats."  Id. at 70. 
¶32 Thus, Storms stands for the proposition that zoning 
and 
subdivision 
regulation 
are 
separate, 
yet 
sometimes 
overlapping, powers.  See also Wood v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 
24, ¶23, 260 Wis. 2d 71, 659 N.W.2d 31 (recognizing a similarity 
between the purposes of zoning and subdivision plat approval 
authority).  The Storms court was also careful to delineate that 
the two powers stem from separate enabling legislation.  "As 
long as the regulation is authorized by and within the purposes 
of ch. 236, the fact that it may also fall under the zoning 
power does not preclude a local government from enacting the 
regulation pursuant to the conditions and procedures of ch. 
236."  Storms, 110 Wis. 2d at 70-71. 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
14 
 
B 
¶33 With this necessary background in hand, we examine 
next Anderson's specific arguments. 
¶34 Anderson contends that the Town of Newbold Ordinance 
13.13 is a zoning ordinance in disguise that impermissibly 
regulates shorelands in a manner contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692.  He observes a dissonance in a statutory scheme that 
allows the Town to regulate shoreland property as an exercise of 
subdivision authority when it would be prohibited from doing so 
by means of its zoning authority. 
¶35 The essential question posed in this case is whether 
Town of Newbold Ordinance 13.13 is a zoning ordinance or a 
subdivision ordinance.  In other words, we must determine the 
source of the authority under which the ordinance was passed.   
¶36 This court has previously offered guidance and a 
framework of analysis for the determination of whether an 
ordinance springs from a governmental entity's zoning authority.  
See Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 2012 WI 7, 338 
Wis. 2d 488, 809 N.W.2d 362.  In Zwiefelhofer, the court 
addressed whether the Town of Cooks Valley's nonmetallic mining 
ordinance is a zoning ordinance so as to require approval of the 
county board.  Id., ¶2.   
¶37 In determining that the ordinance at issue was not a 
zoning ordinance, the court did not set a bright-line rule.  
Id., ¶8.  Instead, it used a functional approach where it 
"catalogue[d] 
the 
characteristics 
of 
traditional 
zoning 
ordinances 
and 
the 
commonly 
accepted 
purposes 
of 
zoning 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
15 
 
ordinances.  We then compare[d] the characteristics and purposes 
of the Ordinance to the characteristics and purposes of 
traditional zoning ordinances to determine whether the Ordinance 
should be classified as a zoning ordinance."  Id.   
¶38 In 
conducting 
such 
an 
analysis, 
"[n]o 
single 
characteristic or consideration is dispositive of the question 
whether the Ordinance is a zoning ordinance."  Id., ¶9.  Nor is 
the conclusion a result of a simple tally of the similarities 
and differences.  Indeed, a court may not "simply add up the 
number of similarities a challenged ordinance has to traditional 
zoning ordinances or the number of differences a challenged 
ordinance has from traditional zoning ordinances to determine 
whether a challenged ordinance is a zoning ordinance."  Id.   
¶39 The analysis must be specific to the ordinance at 
issue in the particular case.  "Some characteristics, under the 
circumstances of the case, may be more significant than others."  
Id. 
¶40 Characteristics of an ordinance that inform the 
determination of whether the ordinance is a zoning ordinance 
include:  (1) zoning ordinances typically divide a geographic 
area into multiple zones or districts, id., ¶36; (2) within the 
established districts or zones, certain uses are typically 
allowed as of right and certain uses are prohibited, id., ¶38; 
(3) zoning ordinances are traditionally aimed at directly 
controlling where a use takes place as opposed to how it takes 
place, id., ¶39; (4) traditionally classifying uses in general 
terms, zoning ordinances attempt to comprehensively address all 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
16 
 
possible uses in the geographic area, id., ¶40; (5) zoning 
ordinances 
traditionally 
make 
a 
fixed, 
forward-looking 
determination regarding what uses will be permitted as opposed 
to case-by-case determinations, id., ¶41; and (6) traditional 
zoning ordinances allow certain landowners whose land use was 
legal prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance to maintain 
their land use despite its failure to conform to the ordinance.  
Id., ¶42. 
¶41 This list is not intended to be exhaustive.  Id., ¶43.  
As the Zwiefelhofer court recognized, "[m]any jurisdictions, 
including Wisconsin, have certainly recognized the possibility 
that an ordinance need not fit the traditional mold perfectly in 
order to constitute zoning."  Id.  However, the characteristics 
identified 
constitute 
the 
"heart 
of 
traditional 
zoning 
ordinances."  Id. 
¶42 The Zwiefelhofer court further detailed both broad and 
narrow 
purposes 
of 
zoning 
ordinances. 
 
Broadly, 
zoning 
ordinances have the purpose of promoting the welfare of the 
community, regulating the growth and development of a city in an 
orderly manner, conserving property values, and encouraging the 
most appropriate use of land.  Id., ¶¶45-46.  These purposes 
provide little assistance to the analysis, however, due to their 
breadth and the fact that they "could apply to a far-reaching 
range 
of 
planning 
and 
regulation 
undertaken 
by 
local 
governments."  Id., ¶46.  More specific purposes of zoning 
include confining certain classes of buildings and uses to 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
17 
 
certain localities and separating incompatible from compatible 
land uses.  Id., ¶¶47-48. 
¶43 To determine whether the Town of Newbold ordinance at 
issue here is a zoning ordinance, we apply the Zwiefelhofer 
framework.  Our analysis of the Zwiefelhofer factors is framed 
by the statutory mandate to liberally construe subdivision 
ordinances in the Town's favor.  Specifically, Wis. Stat. 
§ 236.45(2)(b) provides that "[t]his section and any ordinance 
adopted pursuant thereto shall be liberally construed in favor 
of the municipality, town or county and shall not be deemed a 
limitation or repeal of any requirement or power granted or 
appearing in this chapter or elsewhere, relating to the 
subdivision 
of 
lands." 
 
This 
court 
has 
recognized 
that 
§ 236.45(2)(b) reserves to the Town "a broad area of discretion 
in implementing subdivision control" and constitutes a "grant of 
wide discretion which a municipality may exercise by ordinance 
or appropriate resolution."  City of Mequon v. Lake Estates Co., 
52 Wis. 2d 765, 774, 190 N.W.2d 912 (1971). 
¶44 Pursuant to the Zwiefelhofer framework, and through 
the lens of the required liberal construction, it is apparent 
that the Town's ordinance is not a zoning ordinance.  Most 
importantly, Town of Newbold Ordinance 13.13 has nothing to do 
with the use of land.  It says nothing of how Anderson can use 
his land, only that he cannot split into the portion he seeks.  
Indeed, the ordinance addresses minimum lot size, an area that 
this court has recognized can be addressed in both the zoning 
and subdivision contexts.  See Storms, 110 Wis. 2d at 70. 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
18 
 
¶45 Second, the Town of Newbold ordinance does not divide 
the land into any type of zone or district.  Although it 
contains different lot size requirements for areas bordering on 
various lakes within the Town, this does not make it a zoning 
ordinance.  The characteristics of a zoning ordinance recognized 
by the Zwiefelhofer court indicate that the hallmark of a zoning 
ordinance is some type of use restriction.  See Zwiefelhofer, 
338 Wis. 2d 488, ¶¶38-42.  No such restriction is present here. 
¶46 Driving the determination in the present case are the 
first two Zwiefelhofer factors——division of a geographic area 
into zones or districts and the allowance or prohibition of 
certain 
uses 
within 
those 
zones. 
 
See 
id., 
¶9 
("Some 
characteristics, under the circumstances of the case, may be 
more significant than others.").  We need not exhaustively 
analyze 
the 
remaining 
Zwiefelhofer 
factors 
because 
they 
presuppose that the ordinance in question regulates land use in 
some way.  As stated, Town of Newbold Ordinance 13.13 does not 
support such a presupposition. 
¶47 Thus, pursuant to the Zwiefelhofer factors, Town of 
Newbold Ordinance 13.13 is not a zoning ordinance.  It does not 
concern land use and it does not separate compatible and 
incompatible land uses, which is a key purpose of a zoning 
ordinance.  See id., ¶48. 
¶48 Because it is not a zoning ordinance, the restrictions 
on Town enactment of zoning ordinances set by Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692 do not apply.  Pursuant to § 59.692(1d), "[a]n 
ordinance enacted under this section may not regulate a matter 
No. 
2018AP547   
 
19 
 
more restrictively than the matter is regulated by a shoreland 
zoning standard."  Yet, the Town of Newbold ordinance at issue 
was not "enacted under this section," as it is not a zoning 
ordinance. 
¶49 Instead, Ordinance 13.13 is a subdivision ordinance 
enacted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.45.  As this court has 
previously determined, just because an area may be susceptible 
to regulation through zoning does not mean that regulation 
through subdivision is precluded.  Storms, 110 Wis. 2d at 70-71.  
Indeed, lot size may be regulated by use of both zoning and 
subdivision authority and there is nothing in ch. 236 to 
indicate that shoreland areas are exempt from subdivision 
regulation.  For the reasons stated, the regulation at issue 
here stems from subdivision authority and not zoning authority. 
IV 
¶50 We therefore conclude that the Town ordinance at issue 
is a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.45.  The Town thus proceeded on a 
correct theory of law when it denied Anderson's request to 
subdivide his property in a way that would contravene the 
ordinance. 
¶51 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
1 
 
¶52 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
This 
case 
considers the interplay of two different local government 
powers——the power to divide land and the power to zone——and even 
more importantly, how these powers may or may not be exercised 
by towns on shorelands.  The majority's analysis turns on 
whether the ordinance the Town of Newbold relied on to deny 
Anderson's proposed land division is a zoning ordinance or a 
subdivision ordinance.  After concluding it is a subdivision 
ordinance, 
the 
majority 
reasons 
that 
a 
town 
subdivision 
ordinance is not subject to the restriction that ordinances 
enacted under Wis. Stat. § 59.692 (2019-20)1——that is, county 
shoreland zoning ordinances——"may not regulate a matter more 
restrictively than the matter is regulated by a shoreland zoning 
standard."  § 59.692(1d)(a).  In other words, the Town is 
exercising subdivision authority, and § 59.692(1d)(a) does not 
prohibit the Town from regulating more restrictively.   
¶53 While I agree that the ordinance in question is a 
subdivision ordinance and that it is not subject to the 
restriction in Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1d)(a), I disagree with the 
ultimate conclusion because these are the right answers to the 
wrong questions.  The relevant and dispositive statutory 
provision in this case is § 59.692(2)(b).  It provides that the 
more restrictive provisions of any kind of town ordinance 
relating to shorelands, including a subdivision ordinance, only 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
2 
 
have effect if the ordinance creating those more restrictive 
provisions predated the county shoreland zoning ordinance.  
§ 59.692(2)(b).  Therefore, while towns have some zoning and 
subdivision authority over shorelands, their power to regulate 
more restrictively than provisions in a county shoreland zoning 
ordinance is preempted unless those more restrictive provisions 
predate the county shoreland zoning ordinance.  The Town does 
not contend § 59.692(2)(b) operates to save the more restrictive 
provision at issue here, and therefore it acted contrary to law 
in relying its ordinance to deny Anderson's proposed land 
division.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶54 The relevant facts are straightforward.  Michael 
Anderson owned a lakefront lot in the Town of Newbold with 
358.43 feet of riparian frontage.  He proposed dividing his lot 
into two, with riparian frontage widths of 195 and 163.43 feet, 
respectively.  The county shoreline zoning ordinance requires a 
minimum riparian frontage width of 100 feet.2  The proposed 
division therefore satisfied the requirements of the county 
shoreline zoning ordinance.  The Town, meanwhile, adopted an 
ordinance that has a separate, more restrictive 225-foot minimum 
riparian frontage width on the particular lake in question.  
Town of Newbold Ordinance 13.13.02.  On this basis, the Town 
denied Anderson's proposed division. 
                                                 
2 The county ordinance is not in the record, but the parties 
do not appear to disagree on this point. 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
3 
 
¶55 On appeal of this decision, we must decide whether the 
Town may enforce a minimum riparian frontage width more 
restrictive than the riparian frontage width regulations in the 
county shoreland zoning ordinance.  It may not. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶56 Anderson's claim is before us on a petition for 
certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1).  On certiorari, 
this court's 
review is limited to:  (1) whether the board kept 
within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on 
correct theory of law; (3) whether its action was 
arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented 
its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the 
order or determination in question.   
Snyder 
v. 
Waukesha 
Cnty. 
Zoning 
Bd. 
of 
Adjustment, 
74 
Wis. 2d 468, 475, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976).  The specific challenge 
here is whether the Town proceeded on a correct theory of law.  
This rests on an interpretation of the statutory powers of 
towns, which we review de novo.  See Wood v. City of Madison, 
2003 WI 24, ¶12, 260 Wis. 2d 71, 659 N.W.2d 31. 
¶57 The legislature has given various powers and duties to 
local government.  This litigation concerns two of them:  the 
power to zone and the power to subdivide.  These two powers are 
separate, but complementary and overlapping land planning 
devices.  Town of Sun Prairie v. Storms, 110 Wis. 2d 58, 68-69, 
327 N.W.2d 642 (1983).  The specific question in this case 
concerns 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
towns 
may 
exercise 
their 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
4 
 
subdivision 
powers 
on 
shorelands 
in 
ways 
that 
are 
more 
restrictive than a county shoreland zoning ordinance enacted 
under Wis. Stat. § 59.692. 
 
A.  General Statutory Background 
¶58 The power to divide undeveloped land or larger parcels 
of land into smaller parcels is of longstanding origins, even 
predating Wisconsin statehood.  See Stat. 1839, ch. 41, p. 159-
61.  The legislature granted local governments this power in 
Wis. Stat. § 236.45, extending it to "any municipality, town or 
county."  § 236.45(2)(ac).  Provided those governmental entities 
have a planning agency, they "may enact ordinances governing the 
subdivision or other division of land."  Id.  Generally 
speaking, the power to subdivide is broad and construed 
liberally.  § 236.45(2)(b) ("This section and any ordinance 
adopted pursuant thereto shall be liberally construed in favor 
of the municipality, town or county and shall not be deemed a 
limitation or repeal of any requirement or power granted or 
appearing in this chapter or elsewhere, relating to the 
subdivision of lands."). 
¶59 State law, however, treats navigable waters and their 
shorelands with special care.  Wisconsin Stat. § 281.31 of the 
Wisconsin statutes is entitled, "Navigable waters protection 
law."3  It explains that the regulation of shorelands is in 
                                                 
3 Chapter 281 of the Wisconsin statutes governs water and 
sewage generally. 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
5 
 
"fulfillment of the state's role as trustee of its navigable 
waters."  § 281.31(1).  In particular, "it is declared to be in 
the public interest" to "authorize municipal shoreland zoning 
regulations," among other things.  Id.  The purposes of these 
regulations include "control [of] building sites, placement of 
structure and land uses and reserve shore cover and natural 
beauty."  Id. 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 281.31 points to a statewide scheme 
for shoreland regulation.  It directs the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) to create "a comprehensive plan" for "municipal 
ordinances regulating navigable waters and their shorelands," 
and 
to 
"prepare 
and 
provide 
to 
municipalities 
general 
recommended standards and criteria for . . . navigable water 
protection regulations."  Wis. Stat. § 281.01(3); § 281.31(5), 
(6).  Subsection (7) mandates intergovernmental consultation and 
cooperation 
with 
the 
goal 
of 
"voluntary 
uniformity 
of 
regulations, so far as practicable."  § 281.31(7).  In other 
words, the hope is that the state can work with municipalities 
to achieve as much uniformity in shoreland regulations statewide 
as possible. 
¶61 This section also tells us what it means by the 
"regulations" it authorizes and discusses.   
"Regulation" means ordinances enacted under [Wis. 
Stat. §§] 59.692, 61.351, 61.353, 62.23(7), 62.231, 
and 62.233 and refers to subdivision and zoning 
regulations which include control of uses of lands 
under, abutting, or lying close to navigable waters 
for the purposes specified in sub. (1), pursuant to 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
6 
 
any of the zoning and subdivision control powers 
delegated by law to cities, villages, and counties.   
Wis. Stat. § 281.31(2)(e) (emphasis added).  Each of the 
enumerated statutes in this provision outline the power to zone 
by ordinance in shorelands.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 61.351 and 
61.353 discuss village shoreland zoning power, while Wis. Stat. 
§§ 62.23(7), 62.231, and 62.233 govern city zoning power 
generally and over shorelands.  And of course, Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692 involves county shoreland zoning ordinances based on 
statewide shoreland zoning standards.   
¶62 Connecting these dots, regulations under Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.31 refer to ordinances adopted under zoning provisions 
"and refers to subdivision and zoning regulations which include 
control of uses of lands under, abutting, or lying close to 
navigable waters."  § 281.31(2)(e) (emphasis added).  The 
reference to "subdivision" regulations here can only refer to 
Wis. Stat. § 236.45 because that is where that power is located.  
Thus, county and municipal regulations governing shorelands 
include both subdivision and zoning regulations. 
¶63 Lest the relevance of this be missed, Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.31 is not an otherwise unrelated section that occasionally 
references Wis. Stat. § 59.692.  These two sections are 
parallel, overlapping, and interdependent; one cannot be read 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
7 
 
without the other.4  We know this because the text says so in 
§ 281.13(8):  "This section and [§§] 59.692 [and the village and 
city shoreland zoning provisions] shall be construed together to 
accomplish 
the 
purposes 
and 
objective 
of 
this 
section."  
Multiple 
provisions 
reinforce 
this 
with 
cross 
referenced 
definitions, exclusions, and requirements.5  To state it plainly, 
we are instructed by the statutes to construe the county 
shoreland zoning powers in Wis. Stat. § 59.692 consistent with 
and together with Wis. Stat. § 281.31 in order to accomplish the 
statewide purposes of protecting navigable waters and their 
shorelands.   
 
B.  County Shoreland Zoning Ordinances & Town Power 
¶64 This brings us to the main question before us:  the 
power of towns to regulate in ways more restrictive than county 
shoreland zoning ordinances. 
¶65 Wisconsin towns have some zoning authority.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 60.61.  However, they have limited zoning power over 
shorelands on navigable waters.  Section 60.61(3r) provides that 
                                                 
4 For example, Wis. Stat. § 281.31(2)(f) defines shorelands 
by reference in part to Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1)(b).  Section 
281.31(2m) also indicates some areas where a required county 
shoreland zoning ordinance under § 59.692 does not apply.  These 
are two of many examples which lend contextual and structural 
support to reading these provisions together.  See State v. 
Powers, 2004 WI App 156, ¶12, 276 Wis. 2d 107, 687 N.W.2d 50 
(discussing 
cross-references 
as 
contextual 
and 
structural 
textual clues). 
5 The original versions of these statutes were enacted at 
the same time.  §§ 22, 42, ch. 614, Laws of 1965. 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
8 
 
towns "may enact a zoning ordinance . . . that applies in 
shorelands," but "[a] town zoning ordinance . . . may not impose 
restrictions or requirements in shorelands with respect to 
matters 
regulated 
by 
a 
county 
shoreland 
zoning 
ordinance . . . affecting the same shorelands."  § 60.61(3r)(b), 
(c); see also Wis. Stat. § 60.62(5).  The legislature gave 
primacy to county shoreland zoning ordinances in 1966.  § 22, 
ch. 614, Laws of 1965.  Therefore, a town's zoning power over 
shorelands is limited; it may not be more restrictive than a 
county shoreland zoning ordinance adopted pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692. 
¶66 Chapter 59 of the Wisconsin Statutes is dedicated to 
counties.  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.692 governs, as its title says, 
"zoning of shorelands on navigable waters."6  Subsection (1c) 
gives the basic requirement and its rationale.  Each county must 
"zone by ordinance all shorelands in its unincorporated area."  
§ 59.692(1c).  The reason for this requirement is "[t]o effect 
the purposes of [Wis. Stat. §] 281.31."  Id.  Consequently, 
ordinances must "relate to the purposes in [§] 281.31(1)."  Id. 
¶67 While the municipal zoning powers described in Wis. 
Stat. § 281.31 aim for voluntary uniformity, Wis. Stat. § 59.692 
mandates a degree of uniformity for shorelands regulated by a 
county 
shoreland 
zoning 
ordinance——including 
shorelands 
in 
towns.  Paragraph (1d)(a) provides that a county shoreland 
                                                 
6 This language is another explicit tie to Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.31, whose title says it is about protecting "navigable 
waters."  Compare Wis. Stat. § 59.692 with § 281.31. 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
9 
 
zoning ordinance "may not regulate a matter more restrictively 
than the matter is regulated by a shoreland zoning standard."  
§ 59.692(1d)(a).  And a "shoreland zoning standard" is defined 
as "a standard for ordinances enacted under this section that is 
promulgated as a rule by the department."  § 59.692(1)(c); see 
also § 59.692(1)(a) (defining "department" as DNR).  Thus, DNR 
will 
by 
rule 
specify 
certain 
matters——shoreland 
zoning 
standards——and county shoreland zoning ordinances may not be 
more restrictive than the specific standards adopted by rule.   
¶68 However, paragraph (1d)(b) allows counties to adopt 
shoreland zoning ordinances that regulate "a matter that is not 
regulated 
by 
a 
shoreland 
zoning 
standard." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.692(1d)(b).  Therefore, if the matter is not covered by one 
of the statewide shoreland zoning standards adopted by rule, a 
county retains power through a county shoreland zoning ordinance 
to regulate it. 
¶69 What, then, of the power of towns?  The statute 
tackles this question head-on in Wis. Stat. § 59.692(2)(b).  In 
my view, this provision is the dispositive statutory section 
governing this case. 
¶70 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.692(2)(b) provides:  "If an 
existing 
town 
ordinance 
relating 
to 
shorelands 
is 
more 
restrictive than an ordinance later enacted under this section 
affecting the same shorelands, it continues as a town ordinance 
in all respects to the extent of the greater restrictions, but 
not otherwise."  This provision means several things.  First, a 
"town ordinance relating to shorelands" that predates a later-
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
10 
 
enacted 
county 
shoreland 
zoning 
ordinance 
is, 
with 
one 
exception, no longer in effect.  A county shoreland zoning 
ordinance preempts the preexisting town ordinance regulating 
shorelands.  Second, the only exception to this rule is that the 
more restrictive provisions of a preexisting town ordinance 
remain in effect.  Third, by necessary implication, more 
restrictive 
provisions 
in 
a 
later-enacted 
town 
ordinance 
"relating to shorelands" may not take effect.  Only the more 
restrictive provisions of preexisting town 
ordinances are 
grandfathered in. 
¶71 These conclusions are dispositive in this case because 
this section does not limit itself to town zoning ordinances; it 
applies to any "town ordinance relating to shorelands."  The 
plain language includes ordinances of any type, including 
subdivision ordinances.  If there be any doubt on this point, 
paragraph (2)(bg) settles the matter.  It provides:  "A town may 
enact a zoning ordinance affecting the same shorelands as an 
ordinance 
enacted 
under 
this 
section, 
subject 
to 
the 
restrictions in ss. 60.61(3r) and 60.62(5)."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692(2)(bg).7  And again, Wis. Stat. §§ 60.61(3r) and 
60.62(5) authorize towns to enact zoning ordinances relating to 
shorelands, except that they may not regulate more restrictively 
on matters regulated by a county shoreland zoning ordinance.  
This means that paragraph (2)(b) cannot be referring to town 
zoning ordinances alone.  The language in (2)(bg) shows that the 
                                                 
7 This paragraph was created by 2019 Wis. Act 145.  
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
11 
 
legislature knows how to specify zoning ordinances if it wants 
to.  It plainly did not limit the restriction in (2)(b) to town 
zoning ordinances.8 
¶72 This 
reading 
is 
further 
reinforced 
by 
the 
administrative code.  As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 281.31 and 
Wis. Stat. § 59.692 do not stand alone.  They explicitly 
reference standards to be adopted by rule.  The relevant rule 
provisions are found in Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 115 (Jan. 2017).9 
¶73 Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 115.01 states the purpose 
and statutory grounding for this provision, and provides in 
relevant part: 
Section 
281.31, 
Stats., 
provides 
that 
shoreland 
subdivision and zoning regulations shall:  "further 
the maintenance of safe and healthful conditions; 
prevent and control water pollution; protect spawning 
grounds, fish and aquatic life; control building 
sites, placement of structure and land uses and 
reserve shore cover and natural beauty."  Section 
59.692, Stats., requires counties to effect the 
purposes of [§] 281.31, Stats., and to promote the 
public health, safety and general welfare by adopting 
zoning 
regulations 
for 
the 
protection 
of 
all 
shorelands in unincorporated areas that meet shoreland 
zoning standards promulgated by the department.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to establish minimum 
shoreland zoning standards for ordinances enacted 
under [§] 59.692, Stats., for the purposes specified 
in [§] 281.31 (1), Stats., and to limit the direct and 
                                                 
8 State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶32, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 
N.W.2d 447 ("When the legislature does not use words in a 
restricted manner, the general terms should be interpreted 
broadly to give effect to the legislature's intent."). 
9 All subsequent references to Wisconsin Administrative Code 
ch. NR 115 are to the January 2017 register date unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
12 
 
cumulative impacts of shoreland development on water 
quality; 
near−shore 
aquatic, 
wetland 
and 
upland 
wildlife habitat; and natural scenic beauty.  
§ NR 115.01 (emphasis added).  The broader import of these 
provisions is that they were written to mean something, to have 
statewide effect.  And the very first sentence makes clear that 
Wis. Stat. § 281.31, including its specific inclusion of 
ordinances adopted under Wis. Stat. § 59.692, is directed at 
limitations 
on 
both 
"shoreland 
subdivision 
and 
zoning 
regulations."  § NR 115.01 
¶74 The specific shoreland zoning standards referenced in 
Wis. Stat. § 59.692 are delineated in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
115.05.  They cover minimum lot sizes; building setbacks; 
vegetation; filling, grading, lagooning, dredging, ditching, and 
excavating; 
impervious 
surfaces; 
height; 
and 
nonconforming 
structures and uses.  § NR 115.05(1).  But the language of this 
section contains a broad and preemptive flair:  "The shoreland 
zoning ordinance adopted by each county shall control use of 
shorelands."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶75 Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 115.06 places additional 
review duties on DNR to ensure any county shoreland zoning or 
subdivision 
ordinance 
complies 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.692, 
including by issuing a certificate of compliance and providing 
advice and assistance to counties.  § NR 115.06(1), (2).  There 
is simply no reason to think the legislature meant to require 
county subdivision ordinances to comply with and go no further 
than the county shoreland zoning ordinance, only to have them 
superseded by a town subdivision ordinance.   
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
13 
 
¶76 The statutes and administrative rules point in the 
same direction:  a county shoreland zoning ordinance controls 
where it speaks, and other county or town ordinances may not be 
more restrictive——excepting a preexisting town ordinance's more 
restrictive provisions. 
¶77 Like the court of appeals, the majority relies on the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1d) that county shoreland zoning 
ordinances "may not regulate a matter more restrictively than 
the matter is regulated by a shoreland zoning standard."  
§ 59.692(1d).  Since a town subdivision ordinance is not a 
county shoreland zoning ordinance, the majority reasons that 
this section does not limit town subdivision authority.  I agree 
that the Town's ordinance is a subdivision ordinance.  But 
§ 59.692(2)(b) does not concern itself with this distinction.  
That provision limits the authority of a town to override the 
provisions in a county shoreland zoning ordinance regardless of 
whether the Town utilizes its zoning or subdivision authority.  
That is the on-point statute that decides this case. 
¶78 The practical effect of the majority's approach is to 
read the shoreland zoning restrictions out of the statutes, at 
least as applied to towns.  If towns can do via subdivision 
authority exactly the same things that the state says they 
cannot do, the state's legislative policy choice to limit the 
power of towns and require some baseline uniformity in county 
shoreland zoning ordinances over specific matters becomes a dead 
letter.  That is an absurd result; this is not the best way to 
read the governing law.  Section 59.692(2)(b), along with the 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
14 
 
associated provisions in Wis. Stat. §§ 281.31, 60.61 and 60.62, 
and in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 115 demonstrate that reading is not 
correct. 
 
C.  Application 
¶79 In this case, the Town of Newbold's subdivision 
ordinance adopts a more restrictive riparian frontage width (225 
feet) than that adopted in the county shoreland zoning ordinance 
(100 feet).  Under Wis. Stat. § 59.692(2)(b), this more 
restrictive provision cannot have effect unless it was adopted 
prior to the county shoreland zoning ordinance.  Counsel for the 
Town was asked at oral argument whether § 59.692(2)(b) applied, 
and counsel said it did not.  We have no other evidence in the 
record that suggests the Town's more restrictive provision was 
adopted 
prior 
to 
the 
county 
shoreland 
zoning 
ordinance.  
Therefore, the Town's more restrictive riparian frontage width 
requirement is preempted and without effect; the 100-foot 
riparian frontage width in the county shoreland zoning ordinance 
controls.  As a consequence, the Town proceeded on an incorrect 
theory of law when it denied Anderson's proposed land division 
based on its preempted ordinance provision.   
¶80 I would reverse the court of appeals on this basis and 
respectfully dissent. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2018AP547.bh 
 
 
 
1