Title: KENYON v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENYON v. STATE2004 WY 10096 P.3d 1016Case Number: 02-253Decided: 08/27/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

HARLAND 
PIERRE KENYON,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintif).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Morgan.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Following 
a jury trial, Appellant Harland Pierre Kenyon was convicted of first degree 
premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole, 
aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and battery.  Kenyon was charged with and convicted of 
these crimes for domestic violence against a former girlfriend and the shooting 
death of her brother.  On appeal, 
Kenyon claims that the recent statutory amendment adding life imprisonment 
without parole as a penalty for first degree murder violates due process, that 
insufficient evidence supports his convictions, and that numerous trial errors 
warrant reversal.

 

[¶2]           
We 
hold that the life imprisonment without parole provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-101(c) (LexisNexis 2003) does not violate due process and Kenyon's 
convictions and sentences should be affirmed on all 
issues.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Kenyon 
presents the following statement of the issues for our 
review:

 

I.                     
Whether 
the life imprisonment without parole provision of W.S. § 6-2-101(c) is 
unconstitutional under the due process clauses of the United States Constitution 
and the Wyoming Constitution?

 

II.                   
Whether 
sufficient evidence did not exist to support Appellant's aggravated burglary 
conviction because it is not clear on what ground(s) the jury based its verdict 
of guilty?

 

III.                  
Whether 
the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the state's expert witness 
Katherine Conover, as said testimony was used by the State as improper character 
evidence against appellant, and constituted plain error?

 

IV.               
Whether 
the trial court erred in admission of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) and 
additionally whether the same evidence should have been deemed inadmissible 
under W.R.E. 403?

 

V.                 
Whether 
the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when he misled the jury on the 
facts necessary to find Mr. Kenyon guilty of kidnapping?

 

VI.               
Whether 
because of the numerous errors made during Mr. Kenyon's trial, cumulative error 
occurred?

 

The 
State rephrases the issues as:

 

I.                     
Does 
the provision of Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 6-2-101(c), which provides for a sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole for first degree murder, violate procedural due 
process under the United States and Wyoming Constitutions?

 

II.                   
Was 
the aggravated burglary charge set out in the instructions given to the jury 
supported by sufficient evidence?

 

III.                  
Did 
the trial court commit plain error when it allowed the testimony of the State's 
expert witness, Katharine Conover?

 

IV.               
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion when it admitted uncharged misconduct 
evidence under Wyo.R.Evid. 404(b)?

 

V.                 
Did 
the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument?

 

VI.               
Does 
cumulative error apply in this case?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
Kenyon 
and Danielle Kelley, both methamphetamine addicts, began living together in the 
summer of 2000.  The relationship 
was abusive, and Kenyon physically assaulted Kelley on numerous occasions.  In March of 2001, the couple was living 
in California, but because of the abuse she was suffering, Kelley moved to Cody, 
Wyoming, to live with her brother, Justin Ritter.  Kenyon soon found her, and the two 
reconciled in Cody.  At Mr. Ritter's 
invitation, Kenyon began living in the apartment with Kelley and Ritter. 

 

[¶5]           
On 
April 10, 2001, Kenyon and Kelley argued, and he choked Kelley until she lost 
consciousness several times.  Kenyon 
confined Kelley inside the apartment for two days, threatening to kill her if 
she went near a door.  She escaped 
while Kenyon was in the shower and was taken to the hospital but refused medical 
treatment.  Fearing that he would be 
arrested, Kenyon left Cody and called Kelley about a week later to apologize for 
the incident.  When she refused to 
renew the relationship, Kenyon called the apartment repeatedly.  Ritter would not let Kenyon speak to 
Kelley, and Kenyon threatened Ritter's life.  Ritter reported the threats to the 
police, applied for a restraining order, obtained a gun from his mother and 
blocked doors with shovels to prevent Kenyon from breaking into the 
apartment.  

 

[¶6]           
Kenyon 
drove to Cody and, on May 4, 2001, parked on another street away from the 
apartment, made sure no one was in the apartment, and then entered the apartment 
armed with a crowbar, which he traded for the gun that he found inside.  Kenyon may have had a key to Ritter's 
apartment, and although Ritter noticed the door was unlocked, Ritter and his 
fiancée, Amanda Payne, entered Ritter's apartment.  Ritter screamed, and Payne turned to see 
Kenyon pointing a gun at Ritter.  
Kenyon demanded to know where Kelley was and, when Ritter told him to 
leave, struck Ritter with a closed fist.  
Ritter told Kenyon that Kelley was in jail, and Kenyon struck him 
again.  Bleeding, Ritter stood to 
get a rag, and Kenyon put the gun inside of Ritter's mouth, forcing him to sit 
down, and again struck him.  Payne 
was crouched in a corner comforting her crying two-year-old son.  After Kenyon reached for some duct tape, 
saying he wanted to shut the kid up, Ritter went to the front door, opened it 
and told Kenyon to leave.  Kenyon 
ordered Ritter away from the door, again threatening to kill him.  Ritter told Payne to leave, and as she 
approached the door, Kenyon told her he would kill Ritter if she left.  Payne returned to the corner with her 
son.  Ritter again told her to 
leave, and as she started for the door she heard the gun discharge.  Ritter, shot in the chest, collapsed 
outside of his door.  Kenyon fled 
out the back door.  Ritter died soon 
after arriving at the hospital from a single gunshot wound to the chest.  Kenyon was arrested in Las Vegas, 
Nevada.  He admitted shooting Ritter 
but claimed it was an accident.  

 

[¶7]           
Kenyon 
was charged with committing first degree murder1 and aggravated burglary2 on or about May 4, 2001, and 
kidnapping3 and battery4 on or about April 8, 2001, and 
April 12, 2001.  The State later 
amended the first degree murder charge to describe its penalty as "death, life 
imprisonment without parole, or life imprisonment."  The State provided notice that it 
intended to offer W.R.E 404(b) and W.R.E. 609 evidence of twenty-one incidents 
involving nine people.  Upon defense 
objection, a hearing was held, and eight of these incidents were ruled 
inadmissible.  A jury trial was 
held, and Kenyon testified in his own defense.  He was convicted of first degree murder, 
aggravated burglary, kidnapping and battery.  Upon State notice of intent to seek life 
imprisonment without parole, Kenyon filed a motion, contending that § 6-2-101(c) 
violated the due process clause under the federal and state constitutions; 
federal precedent prohibits sentence enhancement without a jury finding; and a 
sentence of life without parole was not warranted. The district court ruled the 
statute was constitutional and sentenced Kenyon to life without parole for first 
degree murder, with lesser sentences for his other convictions.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 
Constitutionality of Statute

 
1.  Standard of Review

 

[¶8]                                   
One who attacks the constitutionality of a statute assumes 
the burden of establishing his contention clearly and beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In 
determining such issues we start with a presumption of constitutionality of the 
legislative enactment, and it is our rule of jurisprudence that we should 
resolve any reasonable doubts as to constitutionality by upholding the statute 
if possible. * * * With respect to his standing to raise such an issue the rule 
is that, with the limited exception of challenges to statutes that broadly 
prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment, a party must demonstrate the 
manner in which his own rights are adversely affected in light of the 
circumstances before the court in order to present his constitutional 
challenge.  

 

Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 426 (Wyo. 1984).

 

 

2.  Due Process Implications of Penalty of Life 
Without Parole

 

[¶9]           
The statute governing sentencing for first degree 
premeditated murder states:

 

A person convicted of murder in the first degree in a case 
in which the state seeks the death penalty shall be sentenced in accordance with 
the provisions of W.S. § 6-2-102.  In all other cases, including any case in 
which the state has determined not to seek the death penalty at any stage of the 
proceeding, the judge shall determine the sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole or life imprisonment taking into consideration any negotiated plea 
agreement and any evidence relevant to a determination of sentence which the 
court deems to have probative value.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(c) (LexisNexis 2003).

 

[¶10]      Kenyon contends that the statute is unconstitutional 
because it fails to guide the trial court in sentencing and denies this Court 
the ability to review the trial court's imposition of life imprisonment without 
parole; because it allows the trial court instead of a jury to sentence a 
defendant to life imprisonment without parole in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000); and because the State did 
not give notice to the defendant that it would be seeking life imprisonment 
without parole until just before the sentencing hearing.  

 

[¶11]      Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding and 
must satisfy the requirements of due process; however, sentencing does not implicate the entire spectrum of 
criminal trial procedural rights.  Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo. 1987) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S. Ct. 254, 257, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967)); Gardner v Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977)); see People v. Hansen, 786 N.E.2d 21, 24 (N.Y. 2003).  Outside of capital proceedings, sentencing 
must ensure that the information the sentencing court relies upon is 
reliable and accurate and that the defendant has an opportunity to respond to 
the facts upon which the court may base its decision.5  Christy, at 1207; Hansen, at 24.  In a number of cases, this Court has stated the approach to 
be taken with respect to sentence review.  "The standard that is invoked is that a 
sentence will not be disturbed as a violation of due process of law unless the 
defendant can show (1) an abuse of discretion; (2) procedural conduct 
prejudicial to him; and (3) either circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or some conduct that offends the public sense of fair 
play."  Alexander v. State, 823 P.2d 1198, 1203 (Wyo. 1992).  The sentencing 
court must properly inform itself with respect to the character of the defendant 
as well as the crime and its circumstances and follow the procedures provided in 
W.R.Cr.P. 32. MJP v. State, 706 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wyo. 1985). The punishment for a crime is within the 
legislature's province.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶40, 49 P.3d 975, ¶40 (Wyo. 
2002).  
Wilks summarized our standards:

 

"[W]e do not set aside a sentence if it is within the 
legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms in the absence of a clear abuse 
of discretion."  
Young v. State, 904 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1995).  Since the relevant statute sets a maximum 
term of life in prison, Mr. Wilks' sentence is within permissible limits. 
However, we still "maintain a window of reviewability, even when the trial court 
has imposed a legally prescribed sentence."  Smith v. State, 922 P.2d 846, 848 (Wyo. 1996).  Trial courts have broad discretion to 
determine the appropriate length of imprisonment.  We recently described the standard of an 
abuse of discretion as "reaching the question of reasonableness of the choice 
made by the trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  We confirmed the following definition:

"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among 
which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment 
exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously."

Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).

            
"In assessing the reasonableness of the sentence, consideration is to be 
given to the crime and its circumstances and the character of the 
criminal."  
Smith, 922 P.2d  at 848-49.   

 

Wilks, ¶40.

 

[¶12]      Kenyon concedes that he raises the issues of guidelines and 
notice for the first time on appeal but contends that these due process 
protections are of such a fundamental nature that the Court should take 
cognizance.  In 
a non-capital sentencing context, when our review demonstrates that the 
sentencing judge has met the due process standards stated above, an argument 
that the manner in which an additional non-capital penalty has been applied is 
not so fundamental in nature that we will address the statute's 
constitutionality when there has been a failure to raise the issues before the 
sentencing court and preserve them for our review. Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 
22, ¶¶11, 12, 18 P.3d 641, ¶¶11, 12 (Wyo. 2001).  Our review does show that the sentencing 
court afforded Kenyon due process, and we will not consider the guidance and 
notice issues for the first time on appeal.  The record shows that notice and opportunity 
to be heard were provided to Kenyon when, before trial, the State amended the 
Information to incorporate the penalty of life without parole, and after trial, 
the State filed a notice of intent to seek that penalty with adequate time for 
Kenyon to prepare for his sentencing hearing.  Kenyon did present evidence and witnesses at 
the hearing.  
He contends that the sentencing court abused its discretion by its 
sentence of life without parole; however, the trial court has broad discretion 
to sentence within the minimum and maximum sentence mandated.  The sentencing 
court set forth detailed reasons for its decision to impose the maximum sentence 
allowed, none of which were arbitrary or unreasonable.  We find no abuse of 
discretion.

 

[¶13]      Kenyon did challenge the sentencing scheme as violating 
Apprendi which held that other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶29, 75 P.3d 1016, ¶29 (Wyo. 
2003).  Kenyon 
contends that the life-without-parole provision is a sentence enhancement within 
the reach of Apprendi.  The statutory penalty of life without parole is one of 
three punishments for which no further factfinding is required once a jury has 
determined that the crime of first degree murder has been proved.  Because the statute 
does not require the finding of additional facts independent of those proving 
the underlying offense, the constitutional concerns addressed in Apprendi are not implicated.  The sentence of life without parole for the 
first degree murder conviction is affirmed.

 

 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 
1. Standard of Review

 

[¶14]      In reviewing Kenyon's sufficiency of the evidence claim, we 
utilize our usual standard:

 

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a 
criminal case, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the 
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful 
party's evidence. We have consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility 
to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury, . . . our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did.

 

May v. State, 2003 WY 14, ¶11, 62 P.3d 574, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).  

 

 

2.  Evidence of Aggravated Burglary

 

[¶15]      Kenyon was convicted of aggravated burglary under § 
6-3-301, which language has been set out earlier in this opinion.  Kenyon argues the 
State was required to show he entered Ritter's apartment with the intent to 
commit both larceny and a felony because the Information included both statutory 
alternatives in charging the crime of aggravated burglary.  In recent cases, we 
have established the rule that a "verdict must be set aside in cases where the 
verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible 
to tell which ground the jury selected."   Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
We have explained that "if a jury is instructed in the 
alternative, and if that jury returns a general verdict of guilty, then upon 
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, 
the record must support each alternative beyond a reasonable doubt."   Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶15, 57 P.3d 1242, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2002) (emphasis omitted).  
The Amended Information stated in relevant part:

 

On or about May 4, 2001, in Park County, Wyoming, without 
authority, [Kenyon did] enter or remain in a building, occupied structure, or 
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or 
a felony therein, and in the course of committing the crime of burglary became 
armed with or used a deadly weapon and/or knowingly or recklessly inflicted 
bodily injury on anyone, namely: Justin Scott Ritter . . . .

 

[¶16]      The State concedes that the Information does not accurately 
reflect the more limited theories upon which the State eventually elected to 
proceed at trial, and it did not amend the Information accordingly.  The State contends, 
however, that May permits avoiding reversible error if proper jury 
instructions are provided that are limited to the theories for which the State 
has presented evidence.  It contends that the instructions in this 
case did not include the theory that Kenyon entered Ritter's apartment with 
larcenous intent and the jury was therefore properly advised that the State was 
proceeding only on the theory that such entry was accompanied by intent to 
commit a felony and it did not have to prove larcenous intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
Because Kenyon was notified that the State was not proceeding on the 
theory that the aggravated burglary involved the intent to commit larceny, 
Kenyon was fairly informed of the charge against him so that he could adequately 
defend himself.  

 

[¶17]      We look to the jury instructions to determine whether the 
State specified the crime on which it is relying.  May, ¶¶27, 28.  A thorough review of the jury instructions in this case 
convinces us that the jury was, in fact, instructed that Kenyon entered the 
apartment with the intent to commit first degree murder or aggravated 
assault.  The 
relevant instructions stated:

 

Instruction No. 27

 

The elements of the crime of Aggravated Burglary, as 
charged in this case, are 

 

1.                  
On or about May 4, 2001

2.                  
In Park County, Wyoming

3.                  
The Defendant, Harland Pierre Kenyon

4.                  
Without authority

5.                  
Entered or remained in a building, or occupied 
structure

6.                  
With intent to commit therein the felony offense of first 
degree murder or aggravated assault, or both, and . . . .

 

 

Instruction No. 29

 

Before you can find the Defendant is guilty of aggravated 
burglary you must find that the Defendant entered the Ritter apartment intending 
all of the elements in one or more of the following three (3) sets.

1.                  
A person causes serious bodily injury

2.                  
To another

3.                  
Intentionally or knowingly

4.                  
Under the circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
the value of human life;

OR

1.                  
A person 

2.                  
Intentionally or knowing[ly]

3.                  
Causes bodily injury

4.                  
To another

5.                  
With a deadly weapon.

OR

1.                  
A person

2.                  
Purposely; and

3.                  
With premeditated malice

4.                  
Killed a human being, namely: Justin Scott Ritter . . . 
.

 

 

Instruction No. 30

 

To be convicted of the offense of aggravated burglary, Mr. 
Kenyon must have formed the intent to commit first degree murder or aggravated 
assault or both prior to his entry into the Ritter apartment.  It is not enough 
that he formed the intent required after he entered the apartment. 

 

 

[¶18]      The jury was provided with a general verdict, and it is 
unknown what specific alternative was selected.  The State therefore had the burden of proving 
each alternative beyond a reasonable doubt, and we shall review the sufficiency 
of the evidence accordingly.  Kenyon points out that it is unlikely the 
State met this burden because of the inconsistency created when the prosecutor 
argued to the jury that it did not have to find that Kenyon had the intent to 
commit first degree murder before he entered Ritter's apartment in order to find 
Kenyon guilty of first degree murder even though Instruction No. 30 stated 
otherwise.  
However, we agree with the State that immediately after the prosecutor 
argued the elements of first degree murder, he explained that Kenyon must have 
formed the intent to commit first degree murder before he entered the apartment 
to have committed aggravated burglary.  Under these facts, we agree with the State 
that it had only to prove that Kenyon formed the intent to commit first degree 
murder before he entered the apartment and not while he remained there.  Our review of the 
record shows that each of the alternative theories presented in the jury 
instructions was supported by sufficient evidence to sustain conviction.  Kenyon had called 
and threatened Ritter repeatedly in the two weeks preceding the shooting.  He drove to Cody 
and parked on another street away from the apartment, made sure no one was in 
the apartment and then entered the apartment armed with a crowbar which he 
traded for the gun that he found.  Kenyon may have had a key to Ritter's 
apartment, and because no sign of break-in was seen and Payne and Ritter noticed 
the door was unlocked, the jury could infer that Kenyon possessed the crowbar as 
a weapon, not an entry tool. Further, the jury could infer Kenyon's intent when 
he entered from Kenyon's subsequent actions.  The jury was properly instructed, and the 
evidence supported the jury determination that Kenyon committed aggravated 
burglary when he entered the apartment with the intent to commit first degree 
murder or aggravated assault.  

 

 

 

Admissibility of Evidence

 
1.         Standard 
of Review

 

[¶19]                                                      
Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and 
relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will 
generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion.  

We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as 
reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. 
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions 
drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to 
what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  
In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial 
court's determination. The burden is on the defendant to establish such 
abuse.  

 

Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶25 (Wyo. 
2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

 

[¶20]      No objection was made at trial regarding the specific 
testimony challenged upon appeal, and we must apply our plain error standard of 
review.  "Plain 
error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) 
there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the 
party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him."  
Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo. 1999)).

 

 

2.  Admissibility of Expert Testimony

 

[¶21]      During its case-in-chief, the State called Katherine 
Conover to testify as an expert witness concerning the "cycle of violence" that 
occurs between abusers and victims of domestic violence.  Kenyon contends 
that Conover also improperly testified to improper character and profiling 
evidence in violation of W.R.E. 404 when she described the characteristics of 
batterers as well as victims of domestic violence.  The State contends 
that Kenyon defended against the battery and kidnapping charges by claiming a 
mutually abusive relationship that caused him to act in self-defense against 
Kelley's battery; that Kelley could have left the apartment and was not 
kidnapped; and Kelley later returned to the apartment and resumed an intimate 
relationship with him.  Conover testified as an expert to explain why 
victims of domestic abuse often return to the abusive relationship.  
Battered-woman-syndrome testimony is admissible and helpful to the jury; 
however, it must not run afoul of W.R.E. 404(a) which provides in pertinent 
part:  

 

Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion. 

 

When battered-woman-syndrome testimony is raised by the 
State in its case-in-chief and relates to a defendant, as it did in the instant 
case, the "testimony draws close to commenting directly on what likely 
happened' and looks like character evidence after all.'" Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 55 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 351, at 637 (2d ed. 1994)).  Evidence concerning 
a defendant's involvement demands close scrutiny under the character evidence 
rules.  
Ryan, at 55. "This is so even if reference to the defendant may 
only be inferred from the testimony."  Id.

 

[¶22]      Our previous decisions found error in admitting this kind 
of expert testimony; however, the State asserts that Ryan and Skinner are distinguishable. In Ryan, this Court held the testimony pertaining to separation 
violence was inadmissible because the testimony "was introduced for the purpose 
of proving the defendant committed the act in contrast to his assertion that the 
victim committed suicide."  Skinner, ¶28 (explaining Ryan, at 56).  In Skinner, 
the defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a 
deadly weapon.  
The expert in Skinner explored "the general characteristics and conduct of 
batterers, with particular focus on the tendency for violence to escalate over 
time."  
Skinner, ¶¶28-29.  Because Skinner did not dispute that a simple 
assault occurred, the escalation evidence tended to imply that his history 
proved he had threatened her with a knife and committed aggravated assault.  Skinner ruled that evidence inadmissible.

 

[¶23]      In this case, Conover's testimony was an explanation for 
Kelley's irrational behavior in answer to Kenyon's specific defenses that her 
behavior proved he had not battered or kidnapped her.  An explanation of 
the victim's conduct is admissible, and to the extent that it describes 
characteristics of those in the relationship, those references are an integral 
part of admissible framework evidence and not character evidence.  Ryan, 988 P.2d at 54-55; see also Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 64-65 (Golden, J., dissenting and 
concurring).  
We find no error in admission of this testimony.

 

 

3.         
Admissibility of Evidence Under W.R.E. 404(b) and 403

 

[¶24]      Kenyon argues that the jury did not find the shooting to be 
accidental because it heard improper uncharged misconduct evidence from Kelley, 
Kenyon's former wife, and Kenyon's friend, Brian Inman, that was extremely 
prejudicial and inflammatory.  He concedes that procedurally, the trial 
court and the attorneys scrupulously complied with the mandates of this Court 
for admission or objection to W.R.E. 404(b) evidence; however, he claims that 
substantively the trial court erred in its admission under both W.R.E. 404(b) 
and W.R.E. 403.  
The evidence objected to by Kenyon was admitted following a proper 
hearing applying the factors of Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354-55 (Wyo. 1996).  Although Kenyon mentions Inman, he limits his 
argument to the many instances of abuse testified to by Kelley and his former 
wife.  Kenyon 
disagrees that any of this evidence was needed to prove a disputed factor such 
as intent; however, Kenyon denied that he intentionally shot Ritter and denied 
that he had battered or kidnapped Kelley.  The abuse evidence showed the course of 
conduct between Kenyon and both victims was relevant to rebut Kenyon's defenses 
to the charge and to tell the jury the entire sequence of events that led to the 
kidnapping and murder.  We find no abuse of discretion in admitting 
the evidence.

 

 

Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
1.         
Standard of Review

 

[¶25]      Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 
20, ¶¶22, 23, 63 P.3d 875, ¶¶22-23 (Wyo. 2003), sets forth our standard of review for this 
issue:

 

Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed 

"by reference to the entire record and hinge on whether a 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair 
trial.  
Similarly, the propriety of any comment within a closing argument is 
measured in the context of the entire argument.... [R]eversal is not warranted 
unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may 
have enjoyed a more favorable verdict." 

Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999)).  The burden of proof is assigned to the 
defendant. Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 (Wyo. 1990).  

Because no objection to the prosecutor's closing argument 
was made at trial, we review the claim under our plain error standard. Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 723-24 (Wyo. 1999).  "Plain error exists when 1) the record is 
clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him.'" Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 535 (quoting Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo. 1999)).  Prejudice results if [defendant] can show 
that he was not allowed a trial on its own merits.  Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 536.   Where the plain error elements are met, 
we may correct the error if it "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 931, 117 S. Ct. 303 (1996)).

 

 

2.         
Closing Argument

 

[¶26]      After the expert testified about battered women's syndrome, 
the prosecutor argued that Kelley had been kidnapped for the entire time she was 
in a relationship with Kenyon because of his control over her.  Kenyon alleges this 
argument confused the jury and it could have found him guilty of kidnapping 
without a showing that he exercised the physical control over her that was 
necessary to prove that offense.  The State contends that the prosecutor 
properly explained that Kelley's past abuse made her too afraid to leave her 
abuser and was not confusing.

 

[¶27]      In presenting a closing argument, the prosecutor is 
entitled to reflect upon the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from 
that evidence to assist the jury.  Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Wyo. 1982).  The prosecutor told 
the jury:

 

Dani Kelley was kidnapped, as the elements show, for that 
two and a half days.  
But do you know what?  Dani Kelley was kidnapped for eight months of 
this relationship.  
The defendant controlled her all eight months. 

 

Under the kidnapping statute, confinement is unlawful if it 
is accomplished by force or threat.  § 6-2-201(b)(i).  Kelley had not left 
the apartment during the kidnapping although the doors had been unlocked, and in 
attempting to explain this behavior, the prosecutor made the above 
argument.  We 
agree with the State that the prosecutor's analogy was not confusing and was an 
attempt to assist the jury in understanding Kelley's level of fear and resulting 
behavior.  
Kenyon has not demonstrated plain error by this single statement, and we 
find no error.  
Because we have found no error, we need not consider the issue of 
cumulative error.

 

[¶28]      The judgment and sentence is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101, murder in the first degree, states in pertinent part:

            
(a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, 
burglary, escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age 
of sixteen (16) years, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

            
(b) A person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by 
death, life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment according to law, 
except that no person shall be subject to the penalty of death for any murder 
committed before the defendant attained the age of sixteen (16) years.

            

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-301, aggravated burglary, states in pertinent part:

            
(a) A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or 
remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

            
* * * *

            
(c) Aggravated burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
less than five (5) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years, a fine of not 
more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both, if, in the course of 
committing the crime of burglary, the person:

            
(i) Is or becomes armed with or uses a deadly weapon or a simulated 
deadly weapon;

            
(ii) Knowingly or recklessly inflicts bodily injury on anyone; or

            
(iii) Attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.

            

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-201, kidnapping, states in pertinent part:

            
(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another 
from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the 
time of the removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with the 
intent to:

            
(i) Hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage;

            
(ii) Facilitate the commission of a felony;  or

            
(iii) Inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another.

            
(b) A removal or confinement is unlawful if it is accomplished:

            
(i) By force, threat or deception[.]

 

4Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-501(b) states:  
"A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a 
rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another."

 

5While our state 
Constitution can afford a broader scope of protection with regard to individual 
rights and liberties than its federal counterpart, Kenyon has preserved no 
grounds to impose any heightened due process procedures because he has not 
provided any independent state constitutional analysis.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶7 n.2, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶7 n.2 (Wyo. 
2002).