Title: State ex rel. Hildreth v. LaRose

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may 
be cited as State ex rel. Hildreth v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3667.]  
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance 
sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to promptly notify the 
Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, 
Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that 
corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-Ohio-3667 
THE STATE EX REL. HILDRETH ET AL. v. LAROSE, SECY OF STATE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Hildreth v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-
3667.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Petitioners failed to file an initiative petition in 
compliance with R.C. 731.28 by replacing first page of part-petitions after 
obtaining signatures—Petition as filed does not comply with R.C. 731.31, 
because each filed part-petition includes a title that was not presented to 
electors who signed it—Secretary of state and county board of elections 
abused their discretion and disregarded the law in overruling relators’ 
protest—Writ sustaining relators’ protest and removing initiative from 
general-election ballot granted. 
(No. 2023-1213—Submitted October 6, 2023—Decided October 8, 2023.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relators, Marshall L. Blair Hildreth, 
Christopher N. Hildreth Blair, Sarah B. Lewis, Victoria Maddox, and Katelyn 
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Roby, seek a writ of mandamus compelling respondents, Ohio Secretary of State 
Frank LaRose and the Logan County Board of Elections, to sustain a protest and 
remove an initiative from the November 2023 general-election ballot.  We grant the 
writ. 
Background 
{¶ 2} Relators allege that in December 2022, a “drag queen dressed as an 
elf” participated in a Christmas parade on Main Street in the city of Bellefontaine.  In 
April 2023, a group of Bellefontaine residents started the process for proposing an 
ordinance regarding “drag artist(s) and drag shows.”  Under R.C. 731.32, the first 
step in the initiative-petition process was for the proponents to file a certified copy of 
the proposed ordinance with Bellefontaine’s city auditor.  One of the proponents, 
Danielle Stefaniszyn, filed the following document with the city auditor in April 
2023: 
January Term, 2023 
 
3 
 
{¶ 3} To qualify the initiative for the ballot, the proponents needed to 
circulate a petition and obtain valid signatures from at least 10 percent of the 
number of Bellefontaine electors who voted for governor at the most recent general 
gubernatorial election.  See R.C. 731.28.  Stefaniszyn, Devin Palmer, Skate 
Buchanan, Charles Palmer, Renee Price, and Julia Cook (collectively, 
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“petitioners”) began collecting signatures for the initiative petition in April 2023.  
On April 14, one of the relators took this picture of one of the part-petitions that 
was being circulated for signatures: 
 
{¶ 4} By July 2023, petitioners had obtained signatures on 27 part-
petitions.  R.C. 731.28 required petitioners to file the signed petition with the city 
auditor.  On July 26, petitioners filed a signed petition, consisting of 27 part-
January Term, 2023 
 
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petitions, with the city auditor.  It is undisputed that the filed part-petitions differed 
from the circulated part-petitions.  Before filing the petition, petitioners replaced 
the first page of each part-petition with a new first page that added language 
indicating that the proposed ordinance would amend Bellefontaine Codified 
Ordinance 1177.02.  This is the first page of one of the filed part-petitions: 
SUPREME COURT OF O1110

 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 5} On August 4, the city auditor forwarded the petition to the board of 
elections, which found that the petition contained a sufficient number of valid 
signatures. 
{¶ 6} On August 25, relators filed a protest with the board of elections, 
alleging that the part-petitions filed with the city auditor differed “substantively” 
from the ones that were circulated for signatures.  Relators argued in the protest 
that the board was required to invalidate the petition and remove it from the ballot.  
After a hearing on September 7, two board members voted to sustain the protest 
and two members voted to overrule it.  The board submitted the matter to Secretary 
LaRose for a tiebreaking vote.  See R.C. 3501.11(X). 
{¶ 7} On September 19, Secretary LaRose voted against the protest.  The 
secretary concluded that “the only relevant issue [was] whether the circulated part-
petitions contained the full and complete title of the proposed ordinance” and that 
the circulated part-petitions “did contain the full and correct copy of the title of the 
proposed ordinance, specifically: ‘The classification of drag artist(s) and drag 
shows as Adult Cabaret Performance.’ ”  (Boldface sic.)  The secretary stated that 
the words added to the filed part-petitions “are not the title of the proposed 
ordinance; rather, they are headings that explain what the proposed ordinance 
would do should it pass.” 
{¶ 8} Relators filed this mandamus action on September 21, seeking to 
compel respondents to sustain their protest.  On September 28, this court granted 
petitioners’ motion to intervene as respondents.  __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-
3463, __ N.E.3d __. 
Analysis 
Laches 
{¶ 9} The board of elections argues that relators’ claim should be denied 
under the doctrine of laches.  We decline to consider this argument because the board 
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waived its right to assert laches by failing to raise that affirmative defense in its 
answer to the complaint.  See Civ.R. 8(C). 
Mandamus 
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 
legal duty on the part of respondents to provide that relief, and (3) the lack of an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. Waters v. 
Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  Given the 
proximity of the November election, relators lack an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. Conrath v. LaRose, 170 Ohio St.3d 
222, 2022-Ohio-3594, 210 N.E.3d 504, ¶ 7.  To satisfy the first two requirements, 
relators must show that respondents engaged in fraud or corruption, abused their 
discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.  See id. 
{¶ 11} Relators’ main argument is that the petition must be invalidated 
because petitioners replaced the first page of the part-petitions, adding language to 
the petition after the signatures were collected.  They first argue that petitioners’ 
conduct violated R.C. 3501.38(I)(1), which provides that “[n]o alterations, 
corrections, or additions may be made to a petition after it is filed in a public office.”  
This argument lacks merit.  Petitioners did not file the petition with the city auditor 
in April 2023; under R.C. 731.32, they filed “a certified copy of the proposed 
ordinance.”  The petition was filed on July 26, and there is no evidence that anyone 
altered it after it was filed. 
{¶ 12} Relators also argue that the petition did not comply with R.C. 731.28 
and 731.31.  R.C. 731.28 prescribes a city auditor’s duties after receiving a petition 
that has been “signed by the required number of electors.”  R.C. 731.31 requires 
each part-petition presented to electors to “contain a full and correct copy of the 
title and text of the proposed ordinance.”  We hold that the petition did not comply 
with R.C. 731.28 or 731.31. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 13} As an initial matter, we note that Secretary LaRose misconstrued 
relators’ protest in making his tiebreaking vote.  Although relators’ protest focused 
on the fact that petitioners altered the part-petitions before filing the petition with 
the city auditor, Secretary LaRose analyzed the protest as if “the only relevant issue 
[was] whether the circulated part-petitions contained the full and complete title of 
the proposed ordinance.”  In this case, Secretary LaRose continues to suggest that 
the only issue that must be decided is whether the part-petitions included a title, 
even though relators’ argument focuses on the fact that petitioners altered the part-
petitions.  As discussed below, whether the new language constitutes a title is 
relevant, because the determination of that issue will inform whether the filed 
petition complied with R.C. 731.31.  But the issue is not whether the circulated 
part-petitions contained a title.  The ultimate issue is whether petitioners’ alteration 
of the part-petitions invalidates the petition. 
{¶ 14} We hold that petitioners, by replacing the first page of the part-
petitions after obtaining signatures, failed to file a petition in compliance with R.C. 
731.28.  Although R.C. 731.28 does not expressly prohibit the proponents of an 
initiative petition from altering the first page of each part-petition, by referring to a 
petition “signed by the required number of electors,” the statute inherently requires 
that the part-petitions that electors sign are the same ones that are later filed with 
the city auditor.  Indeed, the first pages of the filed part-petitions specify that “[t]his 
petition” must be signed by electors, and they state that “the undersigned” electors 
are proposing the title and text of the proposed ordinance.  The part-petitions as 
filed with the city auditor contravene R.C. 731.28 because they were not signed by 
any electors. 
{¶ 15} The filed petition also did not comply with R.C. 731.31.  The first 
two sentences of R.C. 731.31 provide: 
 
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Any initiative or referendum petition may be presented in 
separate parts, but each part of any initiative petition shall contain 
a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed ordinance 
or other measure, and each part of any referendum petition shall 
contain the number and a full and correct copy of the title of the 
ordinance or other measure sought to be referred.  Each signer of 
any such petition must be an elector of the municipal corporation in 
which the election, upon the ordinance or measure proposed by such 
initiative petition, or the ordinance or measure referred to by such 
referendum petition, is to be held. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The second sentence, by referring to “[e]ach signer of any such 
petition,” makes clear that R.C. 731.31 prescribes how a petition must be presented 
to the electors who sign it.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1732 (11th Ed.2019) 
(defining “such” as “[o]f this or that kind” and “[t]hat or those; having just been 
mentioned”).  R.C. 731.31 thus requires the title of a proposed ordinance to be 
included on each part-petition presented to electors. 
{¶ 16} The language added to the part-petitions in July specifies that the 
proposed ordinance would amend Bellefontaine Codified Ordinance 1177.02.  As 
shown above, that language is printed inside a box that is preceded by the prefatory 
statement, “The following is a full and correct copy of the title and text of the 
proposed Ordinance.”  (Emphasis added.)  The petition introduces the new 
language as a title, and we conclude that it is one. 
{¶ 17} There is no question that the title of a proposed ordinance is material 
to a petition.  A title “provides notice of the proposal to signers of an initiative 
petition.  More so than the text, the title immediately alerts signers to the nature of 
[the] proposed legislation.”  State ex rel. Esch v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 61 Ohio 
St.3d 595, 597, 575 N.E.2d 835 (1991).  Secretary LaRose recognized the 
January Term, 2023 
 
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significance of the information conveyed by the new language when explaining his 
tiebreaking vote.  He said that the new language “explain[s] what the proposed 
ordinance would do should it pass.”  The petition as filed does not comply with 
R.C. 731.31, because each filed part-petition includes a title that was not presented 
to the electors who signed it. 
{¶ 18} Secretary LaRose argues that the new language cannot be a title 
because the proposed ordinance that appeared on the circulated part-petitions 
already had a title.  According to Secretary LaRose, the first line of the originally 
proposed ordinance—“The classification of drag artist(s) and drag shows as Adult 
Cabaret Performance”—was the title.  The secretary emphasizes that this language 
has the quality of a title because it is a sentence fragment that, standing alone, does 
not define any terms or regulate conduct.  He also points out that unlike with 
referendum petitions, R.C. 731.31 does not require initiative-petition titles to 
include “the number and a full and correct copy of the title” of the ordinance.  As 
discussed above, however, these arguments mistake what is at issue.  The issue here 
is not whether the initiative petition would have been defective without the new 
language; it is whether the petitioners’ inclusion of the language after signatures 
had been collected invalidates the petition.  Even if we were to accept Secretary 
LaRose’s conclusion that the proposed ordinance already had a title, that fact would 
not obviate the problem created by petitioners’ alteration of the part-petitions and 
their addition of another title. 
{¶ 19} Secretary LaRose tries to downplay the significance of the new 
language, arguing that it is merely a “header” and that its inclusion is a “technical 
defect” in the petition.  We reject these arguments. 
{¶ 20} To start, there is no statutory basis for calling the new language a 
header.  The relevant statutes do not use that term.  As noted above, the petition 
itself introduces the new language as a title.  Moreover, as discussed above, the new 
language conveys material information about the nature of the proposed 
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ordinance—namely, that it would amend Bellefontaine Codified Ordinance 
1177.02.  Secretary LaRose suggests that the belated inclusion of that information 
is at most a “technical defect,” pointing to testimony at the hearing indicating that 
circulators presented a copy of Bellefontaine City Ordinance Chapter 1177 to every 
person who signed the petition.  But that testimony serves only to underscore the 
materiality of the information conveyed by the new language.  The evidence shows 
that petitioners themselves understood the importance of communicating how the 
proposed ordinance would change the city’s existing law.  By altering the part-
petitions and adding substantive language after signatures were collected, 
petitioners failed to comply with R.C. 731.28 and 731.31. 
{¶ 21} As a final matter, Secretary LaRose argues that we should deny the 
requested writ of mandamus because statutes governing the people’s initiative 
power should be “liberally construed” to permit the exercise of that power.  See 
State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft, 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (1992).  But the 
secretary has not shown that the relevant statutes are ambiguous.  We lack authority 
to look beyond plain statutory meaning “under the guise of * * * liberal 
construction.”  Morgan v. Adult Parole Auth., 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 626 N.E.2d 
939 (1994). 
{¶ 22} Secretary LaRose also asserts that we cannot substitute our 
judgment for his and that we must defer to his interpretation and application of the 
relevant election statutes.  However, we recently clarified that the judiciary is never 
required to defer to an administrative interpretation of the law.  TWISM Ents., 
L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4677, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 3; see also State ex rel. Ferrara v. 
Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 166 Ohio St.3d 64, 2021-Ohio-3156, 182 N.E.3d 
1142, ¶ 21 (“only the judiciary has ultimate authority to interpret the law”). 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 23} Secretary LaRose and the board of elections abused their discretion 
and disregarded the law in overruling relators’ protest.  Accordingly, we grant the 
requested writ of mandamus. 
Writ granted. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
The Steinhelfer Firm, L.L.C., and Tim Steinhelfer, for relators. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Erik J. Clark, Deputy Attorney General, and 
Amanda L. Narog, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Secretary of State 
Frank LaRose. 
Eric C. Stewart, Logan County Prosecuting Attorney, and Breanne N. 
Parcels, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Logan County Board of 
Elections. 
The Law Office of Josh Brown, L.L.C., and Joshua J. Brown, for 
intervening respondents. 
________________________