Title: Boatwright v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

272 So. 2d 137 (1973)
Kenneth L. BOATWRIGHT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 42214.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 17, 1973.
Robert W. Pope, of Pope, La Barbera & Sabella, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
MELVIN, Circuit Judge.
This is a direct appeal from a judgment adjudging defendant guilty of murder and a sentence of death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Const., art. V, § 4, F.S.A. Pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), this Court, in Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972), reduced the sentence from death to life imprisonment, retaining jurisdiction to determine the issues raised in the case sub judice. The trial court, the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, gave the Florida Standard Jury Instruction 2.10(a), relating to the subject of alibi, and appellant contends that the giving of such charge is error.
The appellant, who will be referred to herein as "defendant," strongly urges that the instruction referred to collides with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and with Fla. Const., art. I, § *138 7, F.S.A., in that, he contends, such instruction has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to him as to his nonpresence at the material time and place in question.
The defendant's failure to object to the giving of the alibi charge does not preclude further review here if the assigned error constituted denial of due process. State v. Smith, 240 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1970). We, therefore, examine the charge complained of.
The alibi charge given by the trial court is here restated:
This charge is a statement of the substance of Florida Standard Jury Instruction 2.10(a), Alibi, approved by this Court:
The defendant relies upon Smith v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 482 (N.D.Ga. 1970), and State v. Kubicek, 5 Wash. App. 293, 486 P.2d 1098 (1971), and Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, p. 116, (8th Cir., 1968) in support of his contention that the alibi charge here complained of served to shift to him the burden of persuasion or the burden of proof. In Smith v. Smith, supra, the Court held to be invalid a Georgia charge on the subject of "[a]libi as a defense must be established to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury," and concluded that such charge had the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in violation of due process.
In State v. Kubicek, supra, a similar instruction was found to be in violation of due process. In Stump v. Bennett, supra, the Iowa trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of establishing his alibi by a preponderance or the greater weight of the evidence bearing upon it. Such charge was crushed against the due process clause.
In Smith v. Smith, supra, upon which the defendant relies, the Court observed:
The Court then noted:
The Florida charge here reviewed is in harmony with the law so stated in Falgout v. United States, supra, and Smith v. Smith, supra, and is not vulnerable to the assault upon it here made by the defendant.
Defendant's remaining assignments of error are equally without merit.
The judgment and sentence, as modified, are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.