Title: In re Manriquez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

SEE DISSENTING OPINIONS 
 
Filed 7/26/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 ) 
In re ABELINO MANRIQUEZ 
) 
 
 
) 
S141210 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Petitioner Abelino Manriquez filed an original habeas corpus petition in 
this court seeking relief from his multiple murder convictions and death sentence.  
We issued an order to show cause with respect to petitioner’s claim that 
prejudicial juror misconduct occurred when a juror did not timely disclose a 
history of childhood abuse. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the referee found the juror’s nondisclosure 
was neither intentional nor deliberate, and that the juror was not biased against 
petitioner; as such, there was no prejudicial juror misconduct.  We agree generally 
with the referee’s findings, and therefore hold that petitioner is not entitled to 
relief. 
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner was sentenced to death in 1993 after a jury convicted him of four 
counts of first degree murder and found true, among other things, the special 
circumstance of multiple murder.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  We 
unanimously affirmed petitioner’s guilt verdict and death sentence.  (People v. 
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547 (Manriquez).) 
 
2 
Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition, his first, in 2006, and amended 
it in 2008.  In claim 2 of the petition, he alleged the jury foreperson, C.B., had 
committed misconduct by concealing having been physically and sexually abused 
as a child.  A pretrial juror questionnaire had asked prospective jurors whether 
they experienced any violent and criminal acts, and Juror C.B. generally 
responded in the negative.  Petitioner produced C.B.’s posttrial juror questionnaire 
and a declaration, in both of which she had described being raped and beaten as a 
child — facts that were not disclosed on her pretrial questionnaire. 
We issued to the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation an order to show cause why we should not grant petitioner relief on 
the ground of juror misconduct.  After considering the Attorney General’s return 
and petitioner’s traverse, we ordered a reference hearing.  The order directed the 
referee to address four questions: 
1.  What were Juror C.B.’s reasons for failing to disclose her childhood 
abuse on her juror questionnaire and during voir dire at petitioner’s trial?   
2.  Was the nondisclosure intentional and deliberate?   
3.  Considering Juror C.B.’s reasons for failing to disclose these facts, was 
her nondisclosure indicative of juror bias? 
4.  Was Juror C.B. actually biased against petitioner? 
We appointed William C. Ryan, Judge of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, as the referee.  The referee conducted an evidentiary hearing in 
which Juror C.B. testified.  The referee then filed a 14-page report with 
recommendations.  Petitioner and the Attorney General filed postreport briefing, 
and petitioner presented his objections to the referee’s report. 
II.  TRIAL EVIDENCE 
A lengthy recitation of the facts of petitioner’s crimes is unnecessary; they 
are contained in our prior decision.  (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 552-
 
3 
568.)  It is sufficient for our purposes to note the jury convicted petitioner of 
murdering four people on separate occasions, which made him eligible for the 
death penalty. 
More relevant to our analysis is the evidence presented during the penalty 
phase.  During its case in aggravation, the prosecution presented evidence of 
petitioner’s involvement in three additional killings, and that petitioner had raped a 
friend’s babysitter at gunpoint.  (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 568-570.)  
“The defense evidence in mitigation was introduced through the testimony 
of five of [petitioner’s] relatives, each of whom described the deprivation and 
abuse [petitioner] suffered as a child in rural Mexico.  The witnesses testified that 
[petitioner’s] childhood was marred by extreme cruelty, vicious beatings, grinding 
poverty, forced labor, and a lack of care, education, affection, or encouragement 
by the adults in [petitioner’s] life. 
“Cecilia Manriquez Solis, [petitioner’s] first cousin, testified that she and 
[petitioner] resided as children on a ranch they shared with her grandmother and 
[petitioner’s] father, in Mexico.  The area in which the ranch was located lacked 
electricity, a school, church, store, or regular law enforcement, and none of the 
residences on the ranch had windows or doors.  The children worked from 3:00 
a.m. to approximately 5:00 p.m. — farming, planting, and collecting firewood and 
water, every day of the year except Good Friday.  During the few years that Solis 
and [petitioner] resided together at the ranch, she observed him beaten several 
times, ‘sometimes two to three times per day.’  These beatings included one 
occasion when [petitioner] was seven years of age:  he was tied to a tree and 
beaten with a whip, and Solis recalled that ‘my grandmother got tired of hitting 
him, so my uncle, his father continued to hit him.’  On other occasions [petitioner] 
was beaten with a whip or a belt.  Such beatings occurred on a daily basis.  Once 
[petitioner] was hog-tied and left all night in a storage bin for corn.  Solis never 
 
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saw [petitioner] receive any sign of love or affection from his grandmother or his 
father. 
“Cresencia Tamayo, [petitioner’s] aunt, also resided at the ranch when 
[petitioner] was a young child, and testified that [petitioner’s] chores also involved 
retrieving the ‘cattle, beasts, burros . . . .’  [Petitioner] was sent on errands, and if 
he failed to perform he ‘would be hit or beaten’ by his father, uncles, or 
grandmother, several times ‘all over with the belt’ or with a rod or stick. 
[Petitioner] and the other children worked each day of the year and never were 
allowed to play except ‘for a little while’ on Good Friday.  ‘There were no toys, 
[and] [t]here was no Christmas.’  Rarely was any sort of affection shown to 
[petitioner]. 
“Joaquina Ward, who described herself as a half sister to [petitioner’s] 
cousin Cecilia Manriquez Solis, testified that she also resided at the ranch for a 
few months when [petitioner] was a child.  She recalled that the children ‘were 
treated poorly’ and that ‘[w]hen they didn’t do what they were told to do, they 
were hit,’ [petitioner] more often than the other children.  On one occasion, Ward 
encountered [petitioner] ‘tied by the legs and the hands,’ because ‘he had been 
sent up to the hills to retrieve some firewood; and because he did not bring the 
kind that his father had asked for, he was punished.’  Ward untied [petitioner], 
after which ‘he went down and turned into a little ball, and he stayed there crying.’  
She never saw anyone act affectionately toward [petitioner]. 
“Juan Manriquez, [petitioner’s] cousin, testified that he resided with 
[petitioner] at the ranch and that the children were prohibited from playing; when 
they did, they were beaten with ‘either a rod or a whip.’  Manriquez recalled that 
[petitioner] was beaten ‘for any reason,’ two or three times per day, ‘and we could 
hear his screaming when he was being beaten.’  On one occasion, [petitioner] was 
caught bathing with his cousin, which led to another beating while [petitioner] was 
 
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tied up.  When the boys’ grandmother caught them eating fruit, she ‘burned our 
feet so we couldn’t run away and so we wouldn’t do it again.’  [Petitioner] 
attempted to run away numerous times, which in turn led to his being beaten. 
Ultimately, [petitioner] was able to run away and find his mother. 
“Lorenza Sanchez, [petitioner’s] half sister, testified that when [petitioner] 
was approximately 12 or 13 years of age, he came to live with her and their 
mother at the home where their mother was employed, at which time Sanchez first 
learned she had a half brother.  They resided together for approximately four or 
five years, during which time they moved to a larger ranch — one that had a 
school — but [petitioner] did not attend the school, because he spent his time 
assisting other individuals in harvesting corn.  During this period, [petitioner’s] 
mother cohabitated with a man who beat Sanchez and her sister, actions that 
[petitioner’s] mother witnessed, angering [petitioner] who once threw a brick at 
the man.  Sanchez did not recall her mother showing any affection toward 
[petitioner].”  (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 570-571.) 
III.  HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
In support of petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct, the following evidence 
was presented. 
A.  At Petitioner’s Trial 
Before the start of petitioner’s 1993 trial, prospective jurors received 
written questionnaires.  The prospective jurors signed the completed 
questionnaires under penalty of perjury. 
In pertinent part, Question 63 of the questionnaire asked, “Have you or 
anyone close to you been the victim of a crime, reported or unreported?”  On Juror 
C.B.’s questionnaire, the “No” answer was checked but crossed out, and the “Yes” 
 
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answer was checked.  C.B. wrote, “Home was robbed” one time, and listed her 
“[r]oommate before we lived together” as the victim. 
Question 64 asked, “Have you or any relative or friend ever experienced or 
been present during a violent act, not necessarily a crime?”  Juror C.B. checked 
“No.” 
Question 65 asked, “Have you ever seen a crime being committed?”  Juror 
C.B. checked “No.” 
Question 66 asked, “Have you ever been in a situation where you feared 
being hurt or being killed as a result of violence of any sort?”  Juror C.B. checked 
“No.” 
Juror C.B. did not otherwise disclose any history of abuse, being a victim, 
or experiencing or seeing violence or a crime.  During voir dire, neither party 
examined her about these topics.  Because petitioner had peremptory challenges 
remaining when C.B. was in the jury box, he could have challenged her, but did 
not.  C.B. served as the jury’s foreperson. 
B.  After Petitioner’s Trial 
A voluntary posttrial questionnaire asked, among other things, for 
suggestions that could be used to improve trials in the future.  Juror C.B. wrote, 
“The mitigating circumstances offered during the sentencing phase [were] actually 
a detriment in most of the [jurors’] minds, especially mine.  I grew up on a farm 
where I was beat[en], raped, [and] used for slave labor from the age of [five 
through] 17.  I am successful in my career and am a very responsible Law abiding 
citizen.  It is a matter of choice!”  (Underscoring in original.) 
In a voluntarily given 2007 declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, 
Juror C.B. wrote, “Some of the questions on the [pretrial juror] questionnaire 
seemed to have no purpose.  Superficial questions about where you were brought 
 
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up, or your education, or income should be no one’s business.  I do not remember 
if questions were asked about whether we were victims of a crime.”  She added, 
“As to the mitigating evidence, I recall that [petitioner] grew up on a farm and was 
abused.  I told the other jurors about what I had heard about farms in Mexico.  But, 
I was regularly beaten from age three to age [17] while I lived with a foster mother 
on a farm in Pennsylvania. . . .  At the farm there was also a home for aged people 
and one of the residents raped me when I was five.  Having been through abuse 
myself, I do not view abuse as an excuse.  I told the other jurors about my 
experience and my belief that childhood abuse was not an excuse.  [¶]  The abuse 
issue was discussed in the penalty deliberations.  A couple of other jurors also had 
rough childhoods.  I remember that one of the jurors . . . said he had a stepfather 
who would beat him once in a while.  [¶]  I had heard that life on farms in Mexico 
was real tough, with long work hours and very little food.  Again, I did not accept 
this as an excuse and said so.” 
In a voluntarily given 2012 declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, 
Juror C.B. wrote, “When I was filling out the [pretrial] juror questionnaire, I 
answered the questions as honestly as I could.  I did not attempt to conceal any 
information from anybody.  When I answered the questionnaire, I was not thinking 
about the abuse I suffered as a child, because those are not memories I keep at the 
forefront of my mind.  It was only after [petitioner] presented evidence of his 
childhood abuse as mitigating circumstances that I thought about the abuse I 
suffered as a child.  [¶]  Specifically, when I was asked in questions 63 through 66 
of the [pretrial] juror questionnaire . . .  I did not think that those questions were 
about things that happened to me during my childhood.  Instead I believed the 
questions were asking about things that happened to me as an adult.  That is the 
reason I did not disclose the fact that I was raped when I was five years old, or 
abused as a child.”  She explained, “I did not try to conceal the fact that I had been 
 
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raped and abused as a child, and freely shared that information with my fellow 
jurors during the penalty phase deliberations after [petitioner] offered evidence of 
his own abusive childhood as mitigating circumstances.”  She stated, “I was not 
biased against [petitioner], and based all of my decisions on the evidence that was 
presented during the trial.” 
C.  Evidentiary Hearing 
Juror C.B. testified at the evidentiary hearing, and her testimony was 
consistent generally with her posttrial questionnaire and declarations.  C.B. was 
born in Pennsylvania, where as a child she lived on a farm.  She testified that “in 
the [1950s] when I grew up, abuse was not a crime.  Kids were abused all the time.  
And using kids for hard labor was very common.” 
Juror C.B. also testified about being physically abused by more than one 
person from the age five to approximately age 13 or 14.  She had feared being hurt 
during her abusive upbringing.  With respect to the sexual abuse, she testified to 
having been “molested.”  Before petitioner’s trial, she had shared her childhood 
experiences with “only really close friends.” 
Juror C.B. had “several days” to complete the juror questionnaire.  Before 
answering Questions 63 through 66, she thought about how to respond.  During 
that process, her childhood experiences “did not come to mind.”  She understood, 
at the time of petitioner’s trial, that the questions had no time parameters, that is, 
they were not confined to violent or criminal acts experienced only during 
adulthood. 
With respect to Question 64, which asked about experiencing a violent act, 
Juror C.B. testified it was an important question that was not unduly invasive.  She 
also understood that, under the “standards” at the time of petitioner’s trial, 
molesting a five-year-old child was a criminal act and an act of violence, and that 
 
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physically abusing a child was also an act of violence.  When answering Question 
64, however, Juror C.B. did not disclose her childhood abuse because “the 
question indicated a violent act not necessarily a crime, and I did not consider my 
childhood a violent act.”  Similarly, she “did not consider anything in my life as 
criminal acts.”  She elaborated:  “I did not consider myself a victim of a crime.  I 
was a victim of circumstance.  And that being said, I never thought of myself as 
having been a victim of any kind.  So [at petitioner’s trial], I did not even think 
about the fact that I had been criminally assaulted . . . .  [¶]  And as far as the 
molestation, it was a one-time thing, it never happened again.  It went into the 
recesses of my mind.  And it was not even thought of . . . until the very end of this 
whole trial.”  C.B. did not consider her childhood molestation to be an act of 
violence because “you had to be there.  When you are growing up and that’s your 
environment, you take it in stride.” 
Juror C.B. testified that, at the time of petitioner’s trial, she completed the 
juror questionnaire honestly.  She acknowledged, however, that in hindsight she 
should have answered both Question 64 and the inquiry regarding fear of being 
hurt in the affirmative. 
Juror C.B. further testified that the penalty phase “triggered” her childhood 
memories.  Specifically, she testified, “I know we’re not supposed to say what 
other people were saying, but there was another [juror] who brought it up himself 
about having been beaten quite often by his father, and all of these things triggered 
in my mind my own abuse.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  [W]e shared our life experiences for the 
jury’s benefit to show we are productive people, we don’t commit murders.”  She 
told the other jurors:  “I had been raised in an abusive environment and had been 
molested, raped when I was five, and that I did not feel that was an excuse to 
become an unproductive, violent person in my adulthood.” 
 
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Prior to the trial, Juror C.B. knew nothing about petitioner.  She learned 
about petitioner’s childhood for the first time during the penalty phase.   
IV.  DISCUSSION 
“Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a 
presumptively final criminal judgment, ‘the petitioner bears a heavy burden 
initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them.’  
[Citation.]  To obtain relief, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence the facts that establish entitlement to relief.”  (In re Cowan (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 235, 243.) 
The law concerning juror concealment is settled.  As this court explained in 
In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97 at page 110 (Hitchings), “[w]e begin with the 
general proposition that one accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial 
by impartial jurors.  [Citations.]  ‘ “The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors 
is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the 
Constitution.” ’ ”   
We have also explained the important role of the voir dire process:  “The 
impartiality of prospective jurors is explored at the preliminary proceeding known 
as voir dire.  ‘Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant 
that [his or her] Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.  
Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove 
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s 
instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.  [Citation.]  Similarly, 
lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant’s right to exercise peremptory 
challenges where provided by statute or rule . . . .’ ”  (Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th 
at p. 110.)   
“A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir 
dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits 
 
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misconduct.”  (Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 111.)  Such misconduct includes 
the unintentional concealment, that is, the inadvertent nondisclosure of facts that 
bear a “ ‘ “substantial likelihood of uncovering a strong potential of juror bias.” ’ ”  
(In re Boyette (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 889 (Boyette).) 
“Once a court determines a juror has engaged in misconduct, a defendant is 
presumed to have suffered prejudice.  [Citation.]  It is for the prosecutor to rebut 
the presumption by establishing there is ‘no substantial likelihood that one or more 
jurors were actually biased against the defendant.’ ”  (People v. Weatherton (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 589, 600; see People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 819.)  In other 
words, a concealment creates a presumption of prejudice, but it can be rebutted by 
a showing that there is no substantial likelihood of actual bias.  Whether the 
prosecutor has discharged his or her burden is for the court to decide. 
An unintentional concealment caused by an honest mistake during voir 
dire, however, “cannot disturb a judgment in the absence of proof that the juror’s 
wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror’s actual bias.  Moreover, the juror’s 
good faith when answering voir dire questions is the most significant indicator that 
there was no bias.”  (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 300 (Hamilton); see 
Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 890 [the unintentional nature of a juror’s 
nondisclosure “supplies sufficient support” for the ultimate finding of no 
substantial likelihood of actual bias].)  Hamilton’s holding acknowledges the 
possibility that, in a rare case, a court ultimately may determine that a juror’s 
innocent concealment masked a substantial likelihood of actual bias.  
“Although juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice [citations], 
we determine whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct 
by applying a substantial likelihood test.  That is, the ‘presumption of prejudice is 
rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular 
case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding 
 
12 
circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no 
substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the 
defendant.’  [Citation.]  In other words, the test asks not whether the juror would 
have been stricken by one of the parties, but whether the juror’s concealment 
(or nondisclosure) evidences bias.”  (Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 889-890; see 
Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 295; People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578 
(plur. opn.); Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 118-120.) 
 “The standard is a pragmatic one, mindful of the ‘day-to-day realities of 
courtroom life’ [citation] and of society’s strong competing interest in the stability 
of criminal verdicts.”  (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296; see McDonough 
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 555 (plur. opn.) [“To 
invalidate the result of a 3-week trial because of a juror’s mistaken, though honest, 
response to a question, is to insist on something closer to perfection than our 
judicial system can be expected to give”].) 
Stated somewhat differently, with respect to a claim of concealment, a 
habeas corpus petitioner bears the initial burden of showing that a juror did not 
disclose requested material information.  If such a nondisclosure is shown, a 
presumption of prejudice arises.  An intentional concealment is strong proof of 
prejudice, while a showing that the nondisclosure was unintentional may rebut the 
presumption of prejudice.  Whether any nondisclosure was intentional is not 
dispositive; an unintentional nondisclosure may mask actual bias, while an 
intentional nondisclosure may be for reasons unrelated to bias.  The ultimate 
question remains whether petitioner was tried by a jury where a substantial 
likelihood exists that a juror was actually biased against petitioner. 
A juror is actually biased if she or he has “a state of mind . . . in reference 
to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with 
entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.”  
 
13 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).)  As explained in the plurality opinion in 
People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th 561 at pages 580 to 581, “[w]hat constitutes 
‘actual bias’ of a juror varies according to the circumstances of the case.  
[Citation.] . . .  ‘ “[L]ight impressions, which may fairly be presumed to yield to 
the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair 
consideration of the testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but . . . 
those strong and deep impressions which close the mind against the testimony that 
may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and resist 
its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him [or her].” ’ ”   
With these principles in mind, we turn to the questions we posed to the 
referee and the responses he provided.  The referee acts as “ ‘an impartial fact 
finder for this court.’ ”  (Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 887.)  “ ‘The referee’s 
factual findings are not binding on us, and we can depart from them upon 
independent examination of the record even when the evidence is conflicting.  
[Citations.]  However, such findings are entitled to great weight where supported 
by substantial evidence.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We generally defer to a referee’s determination 
of witnesses’ credibility “ ‘ “because the referee has the opportunity to observe the 
witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 877.)  We 
“independently review the referee’s resolution of legal issues and of mixed 
questions of law and fact.”  (In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126, 149 (Crew).) 
A.  Evidentiary Objections  
Preliminarily, petitioner challenges some of the referee’s evidentiary 
rulings. 
1.  Evidence Code Section 1150 
Petitioner’s habeas corpus counsel, when inquiring how Juror C.B. reacted 
at the trial during the penalty phase, asked her, “[W]hen you heard evidence of 
 
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[petitioner’s] abuse from working on the farm, did you think, well, so was I?”  
Citing section 1150 of the Evidence Code, the referee struck C.B.’s response. 
Although petitioner objects to the referee’s ruling, it was correct:  
“Evidence of a juror’s mental process — how the juror reached a particular 
verdict, the effect of evidence or argument on the juror’s decisionmaking — is 
inadmissible.”  (Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 894 [citing Evid. Code, § 1150, 
subd. (a)].)  Petitioner correctly notes that “the rule against proof of juror mental 
processes is subject to the well-established exception for claims that a juror’s 
preexisting bias was concealed on voir dire.”  (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 
pp. 298-299, fn. 19.)  The question actually posed to Juror C.B., however, inquired 
about her thoughts as she was hearing petitioner’s evidence, and thus solicited 
quintessential evidence of her mental process.  It plainly was not directed at C.B.’s 
state of mind during voir dire.  And it inquired about neither her purported 
preexisting beliefs nor her purported concealment; rather, it solicited evidence of 
how petitioner’s presentation of his case in mitigation was affecting her 
decisionmaking process.  Moreover, petitioner’s contrary suggestion 
notwithstanding, the question did not attempt to solicit an admission from C.B. 
that, due to her own impressions and opinions, she was unable to render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented.  We therefore overrule petitioner’s objection to 
the referee’s ruling on this question. 
2.  Evidence of Bias 
Over petitioner’s objection, respondent’s counsel asked Juror C.B. if she 
was biased against petitioner “at any time while you were a sitting juror in this 
trial?,” and she responded, “No, sir, I was not.”   She conceded, however, that she 
did not know the legal definition of “bias.”  The referee in turn found that C.B. 
 
15 
was not biased against petitioner in part due to her testimony that she was not 
biased. 
Petitioner challenges this testimony and finding, first noting Juror C.B. is 
not a lawyer, and that she conceded she did not know the legal definition of 
“bias.”  Petitioner also contends the referee prevented the parties from exploring 
her understanding of the meaning of “bias”:  When C.B. was asked if she was 
biased against petitioner, petitioner’s counsel objected, arguing in relevant part 
that the question called for a legal conclusion.  The referee overruled the 
objection, determining that the question was “not asking as a matter of law [but] 
asking as a matter of fact.” 
We agree with petitioner that the referee’s findings could not properly be 
based solely on Juror C.B.’s belief that she was not biased against petitioner.  
People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60 (Allen and Johnson), in which 
the trial court dismissed a juror for refusing to deliberate, is instructive.  In finding 
that the juror was not deliberating, the trial court relied in part on the other jurors’ 
opinions that the juror in question was refusing to deliberate.  In the course of 
concluding that the trial court had committed reversible error, we observed that a 
court “cannot substitute the opinions of jurors for its own findings of fact.”  (Id. at 
p. 75.)   
And, as petitioner notes, jurors are sometimes unaware of their own biases, 
or are reluctant to admit to having biases.  Accordingly, when assessing Juror 
C.B.’s possible bias, we will not consider the referee’s finding that C.B. believed 
she was not biased to the extent the referee relied on C.B.’s assessment of her own 
bias.  As we will explain, however, the record as a whole before us contains 
substantial evidence that supports the referee’s findings, including his findings 
regarding C.B.’s credibility and his ultimate finding that she was not actually 
biased. 
 
16 
B.  Questions Posed 
We note at the outset that the referee found Juror C.B. to be a credible 
witness; specifically, that she testified in a “direct, responsive, thoughtful and 
consistent manner” to the questions posed, and “was not evasive, uncooperative or 
defensive.”  The referee also found C.B’s credibility was enhanced by her 
voluntarily completing the posttrial questionnaire and by voluntarily complying 
with the parties’ pre-reference hearing requests for more information.  In other 
words, the referee reasoned, if C.B. had a “hidden agenda,” she simply could have 
remained silent. 
Petitioner contends the referee’s findings, including the findings concerning 
Juror C.B.’s credibility, are not supported by substantial evidence.  We will 
address each question, the referee’s findings, and petitioner’s contentions in turn. 
1.  Question One:  What Were the Reasons for Nondisclosure? 
Our first question inquired about Juror C.B.’s reasons for not disclosing her 
childhood abuse.  At the time of petitioner’s trial, Juror C.B. understood that 
sexually abusing a child was a criminal and violent act; she also understood that 
physically abusing a child was a violent act.  The referee found, however, that 
C.B. did not disclose the childhood abuse that she had personally suffered because 
she did not consider her childhood experiences to have been criminal or violent 
acts.   
The referee further found that the experience of being a child in the 1950s 
supported Juror C.B.’s explanation why she did not initially disclose her childhood 
experiences.  Juror C.B. testified her childhood experiences did not come to mind 
when she was completing the pretrial juror questionnaire because she “did not 
consider [her]self a victim of a crime.”  The referee reasoned that her belief her 
childhood experiences were neither crimes nor acts of violence “is consistent with 
 
17 
how society viewed and treated abuse of children 60 years ago, as distinct from 
how society now views and treats such abuse.”   
The referee accepted Juror C.B.’s explanation and found no conflict in her 
testimony.  In doing so, the referee noted that C.B. acknowledged she had been 
present during a violent act, that is, her childhood sexual and physical abuse.  She 
also acknowledged the questionnaire did not have any time parameters, and were 
not specifically limited to her adult experiences.  Nonetheless, the referee 
concluded, because C.B. did not consider herself the victim of a crime or a violent 
act, her childhood experiences did not come to mind when she was completing the 
pretrial juror questionnaire. 
In sum, the referee found that, in her mind, Juror C.B.’s childhood sexual 
and physical abuse were not criminal and violent acts, but rather were simply a 
part of life.  As such, and despite their presumably traumatic nature, he 
determined, when completing the pretrial juror questionnaire, C.B. did not believe 
they constituted crimes or acts of violence. 
Petitioner challenges the referee’s findings regarding both Juror C.B.’s 
credibility and her reasons for not disclosing her childhood experiences.  Because 
the two findings are inextricably linked, we will discuss them together, and, as we 
will explain, we adopt these findings. 
Fundamentally, petitioner rejects Juror C.B.’s explanation that Questions 
63 through 66 did not trigger any memories of her childhood experiences.  Her 
explanations could not be credible, he contends, because they were inconsistent 
and therefore not all true. 
Petitioner notes Juror C.B. acknowledged that the questionnaire did not 
contain any time parameters, that is, it was not limited to events that occurred 
during adulthood.  Yet, in her 2012 declaration, which she reaffirmed during the 
evidentiary hearing, C.B. expressed the belief that the questionnaire applied only 
 
18 
to events during her adulthood.  Similarly, she acknowledged that sexually 
abusing a child is a criminal and violent act, and that physically abusing a child is 
a violent act.  But her personal sexual and physical abuse was, in her eyes, neither 
a criminal nor a violent act. 
Petitioner is correct that Juror C.B.’s responses cannot all be reconciled.  
For example, she could not have believed the questionnaire both had no time 
parameters and was limited to events that occurred during her adulthood.  But the 
referee appears to have resolved her seemingly contradictory responses by 
acknowledging that societal beliefs about the treatment of children in the 1950s 
might have differed from contemporary attitudes.1  That is, it would appear C.B. 
                                              
1  
Petitioner contends Juror C.B’s beliefs, as well as the referee’s findings, 
regarding societal views in the 1950s about children are “unsupported.”  Her 
beliefs undoubtedly were formed and supported by her own personal experiences, 
by those of the people around her, and by the changes she has experienced.  And it 
would appear her beliefs are shared by others.  (E.g., Lukens, The Impact of 
Mandatory Reporting Requirements on the Child Welfare System (2007) 5 Rutgers 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 177, 191 [“Until the mid-1960s, identification by [child 
protective services] agencies of children suffering from mistreatment by their 
families was a haphazard project”]; Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure 
to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes (2001) 
53 Hastings L.J. 1, 42 [“By the second half of the twentieth century, child 
protection had become an important component of state and federal social 
agendas, ultimately resulting in the complex network of criminal and civil policies 
and agencies that now regulate various aspects of family relationships”], 51 [“[I]t 
was not until the mid-twentieth century that regulation of child labor became a 
fixture of American life, after many decades of bitter struggle”].) 
 
Petitioner’s concerns regarding the referee’s finding about the changes in 
societal views are more well-founded.  Other than Juror C.B.’s testimony, the 
record contains no evidence regarding the changes in societal views about child 
labor and child abuse.  And, without additional evidence, such a generalized 
finding by the referee regarding the evolution of societal views is vague as to what 
is exactly being found, and also as to how such changes could be quantified or 
measured.  (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h) [a court may take judicial notice of 
“[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable 
 
 
19 
reasonably could believe that what might once have been treated as a “private 
matter” would likely today involve the criminal justice system and child protective 
services.  Under this view, because C.B. did not believe her childhood experiences 
were violent or criminal acts, they would not have come to mind, regardless of the 
questionnaire’s time parameters.  And her answers support this finding.  For 
example, when she was asked to explain her belief that the questionnaire was 
limited to events during adulthood, she responded, “I did not consider anything in 
my life as criminal [or violent] acts.”   
Petitioner seizes upon Juror C.B.’s statement that she “did not consider” 
any events in her life to have been criminal or violent acts to infer that, when 
completing the questionnaire, she in fact did recall her childhood experiences but 
then intentionally chose not to disclose them.  He argues that contradicts her 
testimony that her childhood experiences did not come to mind until her memories 
were triggered during the penalty phase.  We decline petitioner’s invitation to read 
her testimony so literally.  The totality of the evidence indicates that C.B. did not 
recall her childhood experiences until the penalty phase, notwithstanding her use 
of the word “consider” in describing her thought processes while completing the 
juror questionnaire. 
In light of the alleged inconsistencies in Juror C.B.’s declaration and 
testimony, petitioner urges that we not defer to the referee’s finding that she was a 
                                                                                                                                                              
of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably 
indisputable accuracy”].) 
 
Regardless, because Juror C.B. reasonably could have formed an opinion 
on the matter, and her opinion helps explain the consistency in her responses and 
her testimony, we need not address any finding the referee may have made on the 
general topic of societal views, other than to note substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole supports his finding that C.B. was consistent and therefore 
credible.  
 
20 
credible witness, but we decline the request.  Boyette is instructive on this point.  
In Boyette, we ordered a reference hearing on a claim that a juror had engaged in 
misconduct by failing to disclose on a pretrial juror questionnaire his or his 
relatives’ criminal histories and substance abuse problems.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, the juror gave inconsistent reasons for his nondisclosure, but the referee 
ultimately found the juror had unreasonably albeit honestly misunderstood the 
questions.  (See Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 872-884.)  We deferred to the 
referee’s credibility findings because “ ‘we assume the referee considered those 
discrepancies, along with [the witness’s] demeanor, while testifying, before 
concluding he was a credible witness.’ ”  (Id. at p. 877.)  We assume the referee 
did likewise when evaluating C.B.’s credibility. 
Petitioner’s contrary contentions notwithstanding, we also agree with the 
referee that Juror C.B.’s disclosure of her childhood experiences on the posttrial 
questionnaire suggested she did not have a “hidden agenda,” which thus further 
enhanced her credibility.  People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313 supports our 
conclusion.  In Ray, a juror realized during the trial that he had a passing 
acquaintance with the victim’s daughter, and he informed the trial court of this 
fact.  We affirmed the trial court’s decision not to further inquire into the juror’s 
possible bias because, among other reasons, if the juror “had formed improper 
opinions about the case and intended to act in ways prejudicial to the defense, 
common sense suggests that [the juror] would have simply remained silent.”  
(Id. at p. 344.)  Petitioner is correct that, unlike the juror in Ray, C.B. did not 
disclose her childhood experiences until after the trial had ended.  Petitioner is also 
correct that the timing of her disclosure frustrated petitioner’s opportunity to 
explore C.B.’s possible biases while his trial was still in progress.  But neither of 
those points refutes the referee’s finding that she was credible. 
 
21 
Petitioner nonetheless argues that if Juror C.B.’s reasons for her belated 
disclosure about her childhood were sincere, she could and should have made her 
disclosure during deliberations, if not sooner.  Even were we to agree that C.B. 
would have been more credible had she made her disclosure earlier, that does not 
necessarily render unbelievable her reasons for not disclosing until she did.  
Moreover, C.B. had the opportunity to refrain altogether from disclosing her 
childhood experiences, or from disclosing after the penalty phase verdict that she 
had discussed her experiences during deliberations.  As she herself noted, she was 
testifying at the evidentiary hearing as a consequence of her voluntary disclosures 
on the posttrial questionnaire. 
Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s assertion that the referee’s findings 
regarding Juror C.B.’s credibility are unsupported by substantial evidence.  
Instead, we conclude that, in light of the evidence presented, including the 
referee’s assessment of C.B.’s demeanor while testifying, the referee reasonably 
accepted her explanation that she did not consider her childhood experiences when 
answering Questions 63 through 66, notwithstanding any possible tension between 
certain portions of her testimony. 
Juror C.B.’s testimony, taken as a whole, shows she believed society 
formerly viewed criminal or violent acts committed on children differently from 
how it does today.  As she repeatedly explained, when she was growing up, “abuse 
was not a crime.  Kids were abused all the time.  And using kids for hard labor 
was very common.”  Her stated beliefs about childhood abuse appear not to have 
been limited to her own personal experiences, but also included similarly situated 
children, and thus supported her assertion that she did not consider her experiences 
so extraordinary as to have been within the contemplation of the pretrial juror 
questionnaire.  We therefore accept the referee’s findings with respect to the first 
question because they are supported by substantial evidence. 
 
22 
2.  Question Two:  Was the Nondisclosure Intentional and Deliberate? 
The second question we posed to the referee inquired whether Juror C.B.’s 
nondisclosure was intentional and deliberate.  Preliminarily, we note that an 
intentional nondisclosure is strong proof that can sustain the presumption of 
prejudice raised by juror concealment. 
C.B. specifically testified that, while completing the questionnaire, she tried 
to recall if she had been a victim of a crime but “nothing came to mind.”  For the 
reasons set forth in answering our first question, the referee also found that Juror 
C.B.’s nondisclosure of her childhood experiences was neither intentional nor 
deliberate.  Specifically, the referee found that C.B.’s childhood experiences “did 
not come to mind” while she was completing the questionnaire, and that she 
therefore believed she had honestly and accurately answered Questions 63 through 
66.  Notwithstanding the “seeming clarity” of the questions posed, the referee 
found that she answered the questions “in good faith” and “with no intent to 
conceal or deceive.” 
Petitioner challenges these findings.  He contends the questionnaire was 
clear, Juror C.B. had sufficient time to consider her answers, and her testimony 
regarding her nondisclosure was “inconsistent and incoherent.”  As we will 
explain, however, we disagree with petitioner because there is sufficient evidence 
that Juror C.B.’s nondisclosure was unintentional. 
In support of his position, petitioner cites People v. Blackwell (1987) 
191 Cal.App.3d 925 (Blackwell).  In Blackwell, the defendant claimed she was a 
victim of alcohol-triggered domestic violence and had killed her husband in self-
defense, but the jury rejected her defense and found her guilty of second degree 
murder.  A juror who had indicated during voir dire that she had had no personal 
experience with domestic violence or alcoholism admitted after the verdict that her 
former husband had physically abused her when he was drunk.  (Id. at p. 928.)  
 
23 
The Court of Appeal concluded that, if voir dire questioning is specific enough to 
elicit the undisclosed information and a juror nevertheless fails to disclose, this 
constitutes a prima facie case of juror concealment or deception.  (Id. at p. 929.)  
From this, petitioner contends Juror C.B.’s failure to answer sufficiently specific 
questions also constitutes concealment. 
Blackwell, however, is distinguishable and ultimately does not help 
petitioner.  The Court of Appeal also observed in that case that nothing in the 
juror’s declaration indicated that she misunderstood or was confused by the voir 
dire questioning, or that her failure to disclose the domestic abuse was due to an 
oversight or forgetfulness.  (Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 930.)  In other 
words, the Blackwell court reasoned that the juror’s nondisclosure was intentional 
because the questions were clear and no reason was given for not understanding 
the questions or not providing a responsive answer; the only supported inference 
was that the juror “was aware of the information sought and deliberately concealed 
it by giving false answers.”  (Ibid.)  Regardless of the clarity of the juror 
questionnaire in petitioner’s case, Juror C.B., unlike the Blackwell juror, provided 
the reasons for her nondisclosure.  C.B. repeatedly and consistently explained that 
she believed her childhood experiences were not applicable to the questions posed 
and therefore they did not come to mind.  The referee found her explanation to be 
credible, and we have adopted the referee’s findings in this regard. 
As the referee noted, “the Blackwell court found that the biased juror . . . 
had intentionally concealed information that should have been elicited on voir 
dire, and had committed misconduct.  Such is not the case here as there was no 
intentional concealment.”  We have adopted the referee’s finding that C.B. did not 
intentionally conceal her abuse, and we therefore reject petitioner’s suggestion that 
the mere failure to answer a seemingly clear question alone rendered C.B.’s 
testimony incredible or otherwise indicated intentional concealment.  (See Boyette, 
 
24 
supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 872-884, 889-890 [a juror’s unreasonable but honest 
failure to answer clear questions was not prejudicial misconduct].) 
Petitioner argues there is further support for his position in People v. 
McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148.  We observed that “[i]n view of the traumatic 
nature of the event and the specificity of the questions,” it was highly unlikely that 
a juror’s failure to disclose having been assaulted with a knife during an attempted 
rape and then pursued and stabbed by her assailant was inadvertent.  (Id. at p. 1176 
[discussing the facts of People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926 (Diaz)].)  Our 
brief discussion of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Diaz, however, was aimed 
merely at contrasting the gravity of the undisclosed incident in that case with the 
relatively benign one that had occurred in McPeters, in which a juror belatedly 
realized he had failed to timely disclose a passing acquaintance with the victim’s 
husband.  Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion, we have never established a rule that 
a juror’s nondisclosure of a sufficiently traumatic event always is intentional and 
serves as indisputable evidence of concealment. 
Petitioner further supports his position with citation to Weathers v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, in which we held the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial in a medical 
malpractice lawsuit on the ground of prejudicial juror misconduct.  In Weathers, 
two jurors had told the other jurors that Kaiser was a “ ‘good hospital’ ” and that a 
verdict for the plaintiff would “ ‘endanger[] the whole hospital system.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 107.)  We affirmed the trial court’s order, noting that “[i]t is apparent . . . that 
the court concluded that the [jurors’] concealment [during voir dire] was 
intentional.”  (Id. at p. 110, fn. 5.)  Here, the referee found the concealment was 
inadvertent, a finding that we have concluded is supported by substantial evidence.  
Moreover, there were other acts of juror misconduct in Weathers that were not 
present in petitioner’s trial.  For example, during deliberations one of the jurors in 
 
25 
question had brought up the fact that the plaintiff was an African American 
woman and remarked that “ ‘where he came from, they don’t “even let a black 
woman into the courtroom.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 107.) 
Similarly unhelpful to petitioner is Young v. Gipson (N.D.Cal. 2015) 163 
F.Supp.3d 647, a federal district court case granting relief in a capital habeas 
matter.  The petitioner in that case had been sentenced to death for three first 
degree murders, two of which involved robberies at gunpoint.  (See People v. 
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1165.)2  The federal district court found merit to 
the petitioner’s claim of prejudicial juror misconduct based on a juror’s 
affirmative misrepresentations on a juror questionnaire and during voir dire 
questioning.  The questionnaire inquired about familiarity with the locations where 
the offenses occurred.  In answering the questionnaire, the juror denied any 
knowledge of the locations, and stated during voir dire that he had heard of some 
of the street names but had never been to where the crimes occurred.  In a 
postverdict declaration, however, the juror stated that he knew the neighborhood 
“well.”  (He also indicated that he had been a member of the National Rifle 
Association since he was a teenager, despite denying any such membership on his 
juror questionnaire.)  The federal district court granted habeas corpus relief, 
finding that the juror had not answered honestly the questions posed during jury 
selection.3  (Young v. Gipson, at pp. 729-732 & fn. 25.)  The juror in that case was 
                                              
2  
This court affirmed the judgment in the automatic appeal (People v. Young, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1166), and later summarily denied the petitioner’s habeas 
corpus claim of prejudicial juror misconduct.   
3  
The juror had disclosed on the questionnaire that he, like some of the 
victims, had been robbed at gunpoint.  In the juror’s later declaration, he specified 
that he was robbed at a location that was approximately one-half mile away from 
one of the crime scenes.  Because the juror had disclosed being robbed yet served 
 
 
26 
personally familiar with the locations where the offenses had occurred, and then 
concealed that familiarity from the court and the parties.  In contrast, Juror C.B. 
had no personal familiarity with the circumstances of petitioner’s childhood; 
although she had some general knowledge about Mexican farms, nothing either on 
the pretrial questionnaire nor during voir dire would have alerted her to the 
possible relevance of such knowledge. 
Petitioner also relies on Sampson v. United States (1st Cir. 2013) 724 F.3d 
150 (Sampson).  In Sampson, the defendant had pleaded guilty to capital crimes, 
but federal law required a jury to be empaneled to determine the penalty.  The jury 
imposed the death penalty, but the defendant presented evidence during habeas 
corpus proceedings that one of the jurors willfully had concealed information 
during voir dire.  The First Circuit, in affirming the district court’s decision 
vacating the death penalty, ruled that the juror had failed to honestly answer 
material voir dire questions; indeed, the juror admitted to being deliberately 
dishonest during voir dire.  (Id. at pp. 164-168.)  Sampson therefore does not aid 
petitioner because the federal courts had found that the juror repeatedly and 
deliberately lied on her pretrial questionnaire and during voir dire, whereas Juror 
C.B.’s nondisclosure was much more limited and unintentional. 
Petitioner finally contends Juror C.B.’s testimony that she carefully 
considered her pretrial questionnaire answers, and that she could not recall being a 
victim of any crime, is simply not credible due to the traumatic nature of her 
childhood.  We reject this contention because, as we have explained, we have 
adopted our referee’s finding that she was a credible witness.  We therefore further 
                                                                                                                                                              
on the jury, the district court’s findings about his honesty presumably referred 
only to the nondisclosure of his personal familiarity with the area. 
 
27 
reject petitioner’s suggestion that the timing of C.B.’s disclosure necessarily 
indicates that she intentionally concealed her childhood experiences. 
Petitioner posits that Juror C.B.’s testimony indicates other possible 
motives for her nondisclosure.  For example, she testified that she thought some of 
the questions on the questionnaire were unduly invasive, and that until the trial she 
rarely had discussed her childhood experiences.  Although we agree with 
petitioner that those sentiments could have been possible motives for intentional 
concealment, we also agree with the referee’s finding, supported by substantial 
evidence, that C.B.’s nondisclosure with respect to these questions was 
unintentional. 
We therefore conclude that, in light of the evidence presented, including the 
referee’s ascertainment of C.B.’s demeanor while testifying, the referee reasonably 
found that her nondisclosure was neither intentional nor meant to conceal or 
otherwise deceive.  Accordingly, we accept the referee’s findings with respect to 
the second question because they are supported by substantial evidence. 
3.  Question Three:  Did the Nondisclosure Indicate Bias? 
The third question we posed to the referee inquired whether Juror C.B.’s 
nondisclosure indicated juror bias.  She testified that, prior to the trial, she knew 
nothing about petitioner.  She learned about petitioner’s childhood for first time 
during the penalty phase. 
Having found Juror C.B.’s explanation for her nondisclosure to be credible, 
the referee found that her nondisclosure did not indicate juror bias.  According to 
the referee, C.B.’s responses on the pretrial questionnaire and her testimony during 
the evidentiary hearing indicated “she was attempting to provide full and honest 
answers, and that her nondisclosure was inadvertent.”  Based on his review of the 
whole record, the referee concluded that no juror bias existed. 
 
28 
Petitioner challenges these findings.  He contends it is “irrelevant” that 
Juror C.B. knew nothing about petitioner prior to his trial.  We disagree.  If pretrial 
publicity, the pretrial juror questionnaire, or voir dire had alerted her to the 
possibility that his harsh upbringing would be an issue at trial, conceivably her 
memories about her own experiences might have been triggered earlier.  That is, if 
C.B. had a reason to anticipate the importance of her own childhood experiences 
while completing the pretrial questionnaire or participating in voir dire, her 
nondisclosure may have indicated an attempt to conceal her own experiences, 
which could in turn indicate juror bias.  Although her lack of knowledge regarding 
petitioner’s upbringing earlier in the case is not dispositive of the issue of bias, it 
does bolster her explanation that it was only during the penalty phase in which 
memories of her own experiences were first “triggered.” 
Petitioner notes that the pretrial questionnaire was not limited to 
prospective jurors’ experiences as adults.  But it is also true that the questionnaire 
did not inquire specifically about childhood experiences.  Moreover, there is no 
evidence before us to suggest that Juror C.B. specifically discussed her childhood 
experiences with anyone while she was completing her pretrial juror 
questionnaire, during voir dire, or during the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial. 
As petitioner acknowledges, this court has previously expressed doubts that 
a juror’s honest mistake during the voir dire process can lead to the impeachment 
of a verdict for juror bias.  (See Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 300; see also 
Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 890.)  Because we have accepted the referee’s 
findings that Juror C.B. answered the pretrial juror questionnaire in good faith, we 
similarly accept the referee’s finding that her nondisclosure was not indicative of 
bias.   
Petitioner asserts that, unlike the jurors in Boyette and Hamilton, Juror 
C.B.’s nondisclosure hid her actual bias.  These decisions ultimately do not help 
 
29 
him, however.  In Boyette, the juror failed to disclose his or his relatives’ criminal 
histories and substance abuse problems and yet there was no evidence linking 
these personal experiences with how that juror judged the defendant’s case.  
(Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 889-890.)  Similarly, the juror in Hamilton 
inadvertently failed to fully disclose her exposure to pretrial publicity, yet there 
was no indication that the undisclosed exposure influenced her ability to evaluate 
the evidence in the case.  (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 300-301.) 
Again, in light of the evidence presented in this matter, and the referee’s 
assessment of Juror C.B.’s demeanor while testifying, the referee reasonably 
found that she had made an honest mistake while completing the pretrial juror 
questionnaire, which was not itself indicative of bias.  A juror could, of course, 
intentionally conceal information for reasons other than bias, such as 
embarrassment or the desire to protect someone else.  But nothing in the record 
before us suggests C.B. had any such motives while completing the questionnaire 
or during voir dire. 
Our inquiry, however, does not end here.  Although a finding of intentional 
nondisclosure would sustain the initial presumption of prejudice caused by juror 
concealment, substantial evidence supports the referee’s findings that Juror C.B.’s 
unintentional nondisclosure indicates a lack of bias.  We acknowledge, however, 
the possibility that C.B.’s honest mistake nonetheless hid a bias.  We therefore 
must determine the ultimate issue — that is, whether petitioner has shown there is 
a substantial likelihood that C.B. was actually biased against petitioner. 
4.  Question Four:  Was Juror C.B. Actually Biased? 
In light of his findings regarding the first three questions, the referee also 
found that Juror C.B. was not actually biased against petitioner.  Relying on 
People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758 (Wilson), the referee found C.B. had 
 
30 
properly evaluated “the penalty phase evidence through the prism of her life’s 
experiences,” and was not actually biased in doing so. 
Petitioner contests the referee’s finding that Juror C.B. was not actually 
biased against him.  Citing the well-established rule that impartial jurors must set 
aside their personal impressions or opinions and render a verdict based solely on 
the evidence presented in court, he contends Juror C.B. was unable to do this.  We 
have exercised our independent review (see Crew, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 149) 
and, for the reasons explained below, we conclude that petitioner has not shown a 
substantial likelihood that C.B. was actually biased. 
Petitioner preliminarily challenges the referee’s finding that his trial 
counsel invited the jurors to consider their own life experiences.  During the 
penalty phase closing arguments, trial counsel asked, “And before you judge him, 
put yourself in his place.  Would you be the person you are today?  No question 
you wouldn’t be.  Would you do the things he did?  Maybe, maybe not.”  The 
referee inferred that Juror C.B. “simply accepted the invitation made by 
petitioner’s counsel,” did put herself in petitioner’s place, and judged him 
negatively.  Although the reasonableness of this particular inference is debatable, 
it is also not determinative of the ultimate issue of whether C.B. was actually 
biased against petitioner, and we therefore place no weight on this particular 
finding. 
Relying on Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at page 936, petitioner next 
contends that the possibility of prejudice is greater if the misconduct is committed 
by the jury foreperson — as Juror C.B. was for petitioner’s trial — due to the 
influence that role may wield during jury deliberations.  C.B. testified she and 
another juror shared their childhood experiences with the rest of the jury, but the 
record before us does not (and, indeed, under Evidence Code section 1150, 
cannot) reveal the influence, if any, these disclosures had on the jurors’ 
 
31 
deliberative processes.  Nor is there any indication in the record that the other 
jurors voted as they did simply because C.B. was the foreperson, and not, for 
example, because of the persuasiveness or strength of her opinion, the severity of 
the evidence in aggravation, or for any of innumerable other reasons unrelated to 
C.B.  We therefore decline petitioner’s invitation to automatically ascribe any 
significance to C.B.’s status as the jury foreperson. 
We also note petitioner supports much of his argument with decisions 
finding prejudicial juror misconduct based on jurors’ exposure to, referencing, or 
disseminating information that was not presented during the trial.  Those cases are 
unavailing, however:  A juror’s impermissible reliance on extrajudicial 
information (that is, new facts) is different from a juror’s more permissible 
reliance on her or his life experiences when evaluating the evidence presented at 
trial.  (See Allen and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 76-78; Wilson, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 831 [“Nor was [the juror’s] statement that he ‘knows’ more abuse 
occurred than was presented to the jury an instance of relying on facts not in 
evidence. . . .  He merely drew [a permissible] inference from the evidence 
presented, drawn from his own life experiences, that more abuse probably 
occurred than was shown”].) 
Jurors are actually biased if they cannot act “with entire impartiality, and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, 
subd. (b)(1)(C).)  A juror may, for example, harbor a general bias against a class 
of witnesses.  In People v. Thomas (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1477 at page 1482, for 
instance, the Court of Appeal upheld the mid-deliberations dismissal of a juror 
who believed, “based upon personal experience, that police officers in Los 
Angeles generally lie.”  And in People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038 at 
pages 1048 to 1054, we similarly upheld the mid-deliberations removal of a juror 
who also had a general bias against law enforcement officers.  In Allen and 
 
32 
Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 78, however, this court explained that although 
such categorical prejudgment of a class of witnesses is unacceptable, a juror may 
properly draw on her or his life experiences when determining whether a particular 
witness is credible.  And here, there is no evidence that Juror C.B. found any class 
of witnesses to be incredible (or particularly credible).  Indeed, there is no 
indication that she expressed doubt regarding the credibility of any witness, or 
otherwise questioned that petitioner had suffered childhood abuse.  Rather, she 
came to a conclusion as to the weight to be given to the evidence that was 
presented. 
Petitioner finds support for concluding that Juror C.B. was actually biased 
in the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Larue (Hawaii 1986) 722 P.2d 
1039 at pages 1042 to 1043.  There, the court held that prejudicial juror 
misconduct occurred when a juror’s own experience of being molested as a child, 
which she inadvertently did not disclose during voir dire and revealed for the first 
time during deliberations, caused her to find the young sexual assault victims to be 
credible.  We express no opinion on the correctness of Larue’s holding.  Instead, 
we observe that Juror C.B. did not rely on her personal experiences to vouch for a 
witness’s credibility, and she did not otherwise engraft her own childhood 
experiences onto those of the mitigation witnesses’ experiences. 
Petitioner nonetheless identifies two possible bases in which the 
information Juror C.B. did not disclose during voir dire may have shown she was 
actually biased against him.  First, C.B. was sexually abused as a child and 
therefore victimized by conduct similar to conduct described by the penalty phase 
evidence that petitioner had raped a woman.  Second, C.B. had childhood 
experiences similar to petitioner’s, which led her to reject this aspect of his case in 
mitigation. 
 
33 
With respect to the first basis, that Juror C.B. was the victim of conduct 
substantially similar to that petitioner was accused of committing, the record 
before us indicates there was evidence during the penalty phase trial that petitioner 
had raped a friend’s babysitter at gunpoint (see Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
pp. 569-570), and that C.B. had once been raped or sexually assaulted as a child.  
There are differences between the two incidents, however.  For example, petitioner 
had used a weapon during the rape whereas there is no evidence that C.B.’s 
assailant did.  In addition, C.B.’s assault occurred decades before petitioner’s trial, 
and there is no evidence in the record before us that the incident continued to 
traumatize her.  Nonetheless, we accept petitioner’s contention that the two 
incidents were sufficiently similar as to present a possibility of bias. 
In support of his position, petitioner relies upon Diaz, supra, 
152 Cal.App.3d 926, in which the defendant was charged with assault with a 
deadly weapon while armed with a knife.  A juror in the case did not disclose 
during voir dire that she had previously been assaulted at knifepoint during an 
attempted rape.  The juror revealed her prior attack to court personnel, who 
described the juror as being “ ‘prejudiced as to violent crimes.’ ”  (Id. at p. 931.)  
After a midtrial hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the juror, and the defendant was later convicted.  (Id. at pp. 930-931.)  A divided 
panel of the Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that “when a juror has been 
victimized by the same type of crime” as the defendant is accused of having 
committed, there is a “probability of bias.”  (Id. at p. 939.) 
In Diaz, after the prosecution had rested its case, the juror related her 
experiences to a bailiff and a court clerk.  When the court asked the bailiff his 
impression of the juror’s impartiality, the bailiff stated, “ ‘My opinion, she is 
prejudiced as to violent crimes, especially [against] women.  She is obsessed with 
rape, with victims, and the men who perpetrate this act.  I cannot honestly say that 
 
34 
she would be an impartial juror as to violent crime. . . .  [S]he does have a very 
acute obsession with rape.’ ”  (Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 931.)  Setting 
aside the questionable propriety of a trial court soliciting its personnel’s 
“impressions” of a juror (as opposed to limiting their testimony to what they had 
observed), the record before us does not show that Juror C.B. had any sort of 
similar “obsession.”  To the contrary.  C.B. testified that, until the trial, she rarely 
had discussed her childhood experiences.  And the referee found her not to be 
defensive.  In sum, while a similarity between a juror’s life experience and a crime 
alleged against a defendant certainly may create a possibility of bias, the impact 
the sexual assault had on C.B. does not create a substantial likelihood of actual 
bias. 
Petitioner also refers to Sampson, the federal capital murder case in which a 
juror concealed, among other information, that her ex-husband had abused her and 
threatened her.  Petitioner seizes upon the First Circuit’s statement that “[w]hen a 
juror has life experiences that correspond with evidence presented during the trial, 
that congruence raises obvious concerns about the juror’s possible bias.  
[Citations.]  In such a situation, the juror may have enormous difficulty separating 
her own life experiences from evidence in the case.”  (Sampson, supra, 724 F.3d at 
p. 167.)  Again, Juror C.B.’s inadvertent nondisclosure does not implicate the 
same possibility of bias as the circumstances presented in Sampson, in which the 
juror intentionally concealed information during voir dire and the posttrial 
proceedings regarding juror misconduct.  Moreover, the juror in Sampson lied 
about life experiences that were so painful that she “ ‘could not discuss those 
matters candidly, unemotionally or, often, coherently’ ” at the evidentiary hearing 
conducted years after the events had occurred (and years after the defendant’s 
trial).  (Ibid.)  The Sampson juror’s difficulty in separating her own life 
experiences from the evidence in that case was manifest.  C.B.’s testimony, in 
 
35 
contrast, was “direct” and “responsive,” and there is no indication in the record 
that she ever was overcome with emotion or was otherwise incoherent.  Although 
there is evidence that C.B. applied her life experiences when interpreting 
petitioner’s mitigation evidence, the record does not support the inference that she 
had any difficulty separating her own experiences from the evidence in 
petitioner’s case.  We therefore decline petitioner’s invitation to follow Sampson. 
With respect to the second basis for finding actual bias, that Juror C.B. had 
childhood experiences similar to petitioner’s that led her to reject this aspect of his 
case in mitigation, we have some doubts regarding the purported similarities in 
their respective experiences.  The evidence before us regarding the details of 
C.B.’s childhood is somewhat scant:  she was raised by a foster mother and had a 
“rough childhood” because she worked as “slave labor” on a farm in 
Pennsylvania.  She explained that as soon as she was old enough, she had to work 
on the farm.  The farm also had a home for retired people, and she was required to 
cook, clean, and otherwise care for the residents.  She worked sometimes before 
school, after school, and during the entire weekend.  She was often physically 
abused, and a resident of the home for retirees once had sexually assaulted her.  In 
contrast, petitioner as a child worked on a farm in rural Mexico for 14 hours a day, 
364 days a year.  He did not attend school because there were none.  And unlike 
C.B., petitioner also provided examples of some of the extreme cruelty he suffered 
at the hands of his relatives, such being tied to a tree and whipped, being hog-tied 
for an entire night in a storage bin, or having the soles of his feet burned so he 
could not run away.  We have no doubt both suffered greatly.  And certainly C.B. 
believed their childhood to be similar.  But she also did not consider her 
experience to be unique.  She explained that another juror also disclosed during 
deliberation that he had been beaten as a child.  We do not view petitioner’s and 
 
36 
C.B.’s experiences as comparable as petitioner insists, which lessens somewhat 
the likelihood of bias on this basis. 
Petitioner contends nonetheless that Juror C.B.’s personal experiences 
improperly affected how she viewed petitioner’s evidence in mitigation.  As he 
points out, after petitioner’s trial C.B. plainly and repeatedly stated that she did not 
consider petitioner’s childhood abuse to be an excuse or mitigating because, 
although she too had been abused, she had not committed crimes.  But there is no 
evidence before us as to when C.B. determined that childhood abuse was not a 
sufficiently mitigating factor. 
Petitioner observes that the juror in Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 925, 
the case involving the juror who had committed misconduct by concealing her 
personal experiences with an abusive ex-husband, had relied on those experiences 
to reject the defendant’s self-defense theory.  The juror there, who had been able 
to escape her ex-husband without resorting to violence, stated in a declaration that 
she “ ‘was personally able to get out of a similar situation without resorting to 
violence,’ ” and therefore believed that the defendant should have been able to do 
the same had she wanted to.  (Id. at p. 928.)  Petitioner asserts that, like the 
Blackwell juror, Juror C.B. was biased against him because she did not consider 
his life experiences to be an excuse or justification for his criminal behavior.  
Blackwell does not assist petitioner, however, because there, the Court of Appeal 
concluded the juror had intentionally given false answers during voir dire, which 
strengthened the presumption of prejudice.  In addition, no evidence was presented 
in that case to rebut the presumption of prejudice.  (Id. at pp. 930-931.)  The same 
cannot be said here. 
More fundamentally, as the referee noted, jurors generally are expected to 
interpret the evidence presented at trial through the prism of their life experiences.  
(Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 823.)  In Wilson, also a death penalty case, both 
 
37 
the defendant and one of the jurors were African American.  During voir dire, the 
juror testified he would not be biased either for or against the defendant due to 
their being of the same race.  (Id. at pp. 821-822.)  During the penalty phase 
deliberations, the juror explained to the other jurors that he found the defendant’s 
mitigating circumstances compelling because, being an African American, he 
believed he had some insight into the negative family dynamics and harsh 
circumstances of the defendant’s upbringing that non-African American jurors did 
not possess.  (Id. at p. 814.)  The trial court discharged the juror for misconduct, 
finding in relevant part that he had concealed his bias during voir dire and 
improperly considered race-based biases instead of the evidence presented.  (Id. at 
p. 820.) 
We held in Wilson that the trial court had abused its discretion in removing 
the juror, and vacated the penalty phase verdict.  We noted that, unlike “the 
factfinding function undertaken by the jury at the guilt phase, ‘the sentencing 
function [at the penalty phase] is inherently moral and normative, not factual; the 
sentencer’s power and discretion . . . is to decide the appropriate penalty for the 
particular offense and offender under all the relevant circumstances.’  [Citations.]  
Given the jury’s function at the penalty phase under our capital sentencing 
scheme, for a juror to interpret evidence based on his or her own life experiences 
is not misconduct.”  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 830.)  Because the penalty 
phase is less amenable than the guilt phase to burden of proof calculations (e.g., 
People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 489), “a penalty phase juror properly 
considers ‘personal religious, philosophical, or secular normative values’ in 
making a penalty determination.”  (People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 
1, 60; accord, People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 564.)  And such considerations 
plainly contemplate jurors drawing upon their varied backgrounds and experiences 
when making these moral and normative decisions. 
 
38 
This different kind of decisionmaking distinguishes petitioner’s case from 
Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 925, in which there was a substantial likelihood 
that the challenged juror had decided the defendant was guilty of murder because 
she believed it would have been possible for the defendant to have escaped her 
abusive husband without resorting to violence.  In other words, there was a 
substantial likelihood the Blackwell juror had refused to decide whether the 
defendant’s subjective fears were reasonable under the facts actually presented, 
but rather had judged the defendant by the facts of her own personal 
circumstances.  In contrast here, there is no evidence before us to indicate that 
Juror C.B. did not believe petitioner was actually abused as a child, or that she had 
determined whether he was abused by comparing their respective childhoods.  
Instead, C.B. decided that the abuse petitioner did suffer was not sufficiently 
mitigating so as to warrant sparing him the death penalty. 
In addition, petitioner’s contrary contentions notwithstanding, Juror C.B.’s 
life experiences of childhood labor conditions on farms did not constitute 
“specialized information,” nor did we intend in Wilson to restrict the scope or type 
of life experiences upon which jurors may rely.  And to the extent petitioner 
contends C.B. committed additional misconduct by sharing her experiences with 
her fellow jurors, Wilson, again, anticipates that, as part of the deliberative process 
during the penalty phase, jurors will share with each other their reasons for 
accepting or rejecting the evidence that was presented:  “[R]elying on an 
understanding, based on personal experience, of the effects of certain social 
environments and family dynamics on a young person growing up, when this 
understanding illuminates the significance or weight an individual juror would 
accord to related evidence in a particular case, is not misconduct.”  (Wilson, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 831.) 
 
39 
Although the juror in Wilson had some experiences similar to those of the 
defendant, notably, the juror was not a victim of any crime.  As such, we are 
mindful that certain life experiences may create impermissible biases and others 
will not.  And some jurors properly will use their life experiences to help shape 
their opinions, although other jurors may have been so affected by their life 
experiences that they have difficulty separating their own experiences from 
evidence of others’ comparable experiences. 
Gonzales v. Thomas (10th Cir. 1996) 99 F.3d 978 is instructive.  In 
Gonzales, the defendant was convicted of, among other things, forcible rape.  
During voir dire, one of jurors denied having been involved in a “ ‘similar’ ” 
“ ‘incident,’ ” but during deliberations she revealed that, decades earlier, she had 
been “ ‘date raped’ ” when she was 19 years old and in school.  (Id. at p. 982.)  
The federal district court ruled the juror had not been dishonest during voir dire 
because she genuinely perceived differences between her own experiences and the 
defendant’s charged crimes.  (Id. at pp. 984-985.)  And, on appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit rejected the argument that a rape victim as a matter of law cannot be an 
impartial juror in the trial of an accused rapist. (Id. at p. 989 [“To hold that no rape 
victim could ever be an impartial juror in a rape trial would, we think, insult not 
only all rape victims but also our entire jury system . . . ”].)  It then compared the 
juror’s experiences with the charged crimes, noted the juror’s relative lack of 
longstanding trauma and the passage of time, and rejected the defendant’s 
contention that she was biased against him.  (Id. at pp. 990-991.) 
The same is true with Juror C.B.:  Nothing in her background rendered her, 
as a matter of law, unable to sit as a juror in petitioner’s case, and the record 
before us does not show that her childhood experiences made her predisposed to 
vote for the death penalty in petitioner’s case.  Rather, C.B.’s good-faith attempt to 
honestly answer the juror questionnaire rebuts the initial presumption of prejudice 
 
40 
created by her nondisclosure because it shows her lack of intentional misconduct.  
And petitioner’s contention of a substantial likelihood of actual bias is unavailing 
in light of the totality of circumstances:  (1) posttrial, C.B. voluntarily disclosed 
her childhood experiences; (2) she cooperated during the habeas corpus 
investigation; (3) she was calm, “forthright and candid” during the evidentiary 
hearing, and she displayed no defensiveness, zealotry, or obsession; (4) her 
experiences were only somewhat similar to petitioner’s; (5) there was a notable 
passage of time between her experiences and petitioner’s trial; and (6) there is no 
evidence that her life experiences had compromised her ability to evaluate the 
evidence before her. 
In addition, there is no evidence in the record before us that Juror C.B. 
could not or would not deliberate with her fellow jurors; rather, her undisputed 
testimony indicated that she participated in the jury’s deliberations.  Nor is there 
any evidence that she had prejudged the case or otherwise entered deliberations 
with an impermissibly closed mind:  Because jurors may form preliminary 
assessments about the case, that these assessments are not later swayed by their 
fellow jurors’ opinions is not necessarily a form of prejudgment indicative of bias.  
(See Allen and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76.) 
Although it was misconduct for Juror C.B. not to answer the pretrial juror 
questionnaire accurately, there is no substantial likelihood she was actually biased 
against petitioner.  Rather, as permitted, C.B. applied her life experiences when 
she interpreted petitioner’s mitigating evidence and weighed it against the 
evidence in aggravation, that is, his four convictions of first degree murder, as well 
as evidence of his involvement in three additional killings and raping a friend’s 
babysitter at gunpoint.  As such, we reject petitioner’s suggestion that C.B. was 
predisposed to reject the defense mitigation evidence, or was otherwise unable to 
act impartially. 
 
41 
We therefore accept the referee’s findings (except as otherwise indicated) 
with respect to the fourth question because they are supported by substantial 
evidence, and we independently conclude that petitioner has not shown a 
substantial likelihood that Juror C.B. was actually biased against petitioner.4  
Accordingly, petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas corpus 
relief on his claim of prejudicial juror misconduct. 
A similarity between a juror’s life experiences and some aspect of the 
litigation may so call into question a juror’s impartiality as to warrant exercising a 
peremptory challenge or otherwise discharging that juror.  And because voir dire 
is intended in part to allow the parties to explore the prospective jurors’ possible 
biases, we acknowledge that Juror C.B.’s nondisclosure deprived petitioner of the 
opportunity to do so.  Regardless of her misconduct, however, the “ ‘ “criminal 
justice system must not be rendered impotent in quest of an ever-elusive 
perfection. . . .  [Jurors] are imbued with human frailties as well as virtues.  If the 
system is to function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount of imperfection 
short of actual bias.” ’ ”  (Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 897.)  Such is the case 
here. 
 
                                              
4  
Petitioner also argues that Juror C.B. was impliedly biased, if not actually 
biased.  We recognize that there is nonprecedential federal case law concerning 
the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial and impartial jury that have implied bias 
even in situations when actual bias has not been shown.  Indeed, a number of 
federal courts have implied bias “on the basis of similarities between the juror’s 
experiences and the facts giving rise to the trial.”  (Gonzales v. Thomas, supra, 99 
F.3d at 987; see Hunley v. Godinez (7th Cir. 1992) 975 F.2d 316, 319 [collecting 
cases in which courts have presumed bias because “the prospective juror has been 
the victim of a crime or has experienced a situation similar to the one at issue in 
the trial”].)  But even were we to adopt this approach, it would not alter our 
conclusion in this case. 
 
42 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We discharge the order to show cause.5  Because our order to show cause 
and our reference order were limited to this claim, we do not here address any 
other claims set forth in the habeas corpus petition, but instead resolve them by 
separate order.  (See Crew, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 153-154.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
                                              
5  
Petitioner’s related request under Penal Code section 1181 to reduce his 
sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole is denied for the 
reasons stated in our opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
Petitioner Abelino Manriquez was sentenced to death by a jury that 
included a member who was decidedly unpersuaded by Manriquez’s mitigation 
evidence based on the physical and emotional abuse and deprivation he suffered as 
a child growing up on a farm.  Nothing about this raises any eyebrows — until one 
realizes that the skeptical juror herself, in her own words, “grew up on a farm 
where I was beat[en], raped, [and] used for slave labor from the age of [five 
through] 17.”  This juror, C.B., described herself as “successful in my career” and 
as “a very responsible Law abiding citizen.”  “Having been through abuse 
myself,” she said, “I do not view abuse as an excuse.” 
How, one might wonder, did this juror escape notice by defense counsel 
during jury selection and end up serving on the jury (as the foreperson no less) — 
despite items on the juror questionnaire that asked prospective jurors whether they 
had ever been a victim of crime or had ever experienced or witnessed a violent 
act?  The answer is that Juror C.B. did not give accurate answers to these 
questions and, as a result, did not give either party any reason to inquire into her 
abusive childhood.  Juror C.B.’s nondisclosure, though unintentional, was 
misconduct giving rise to a presumption of prejudice.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) 
Today’s opinion says prejudice from juror misconduct occurs in these 
circumstances only when the record reveals a substantial likelihood of actual bias.  
That standard is readily satisfied here.  As Justice Franson cogently explains, there 
is a substantial likelihood — in light of Juror C.B.’s own account of how she 
 
2 
approached this case — that her predetermined mindset based on her childhood 
experiences prevented her from giving individualized consideration to the 
childhood abuse evidence actually presented in this case.  This alone requires 
reversal of the penalty judgment. 
But actual bias is not the only form of cognizable prejudice here.  Juror 
misconduct during voir dire can also result in prejudice by distorting a defendant’s 
consideration of which jurors to peremptorily strike and what defense strategy to 
adopt.  Indeed, that is what happened in this case. 
There are stark similarities between Manriquez’s early life experiences and 
Juror C.B.’s.  Both grew up on farms for the majority of their childhood, where 
they were often subjected to vicious beatings and forced into manual labor for 
long hours.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3, 6–7.)  Both had traumatic experiences 
marring their childhood:  At the age of seven, Manriquez was once tied to a tree 
and lashed with a whip by his grandmother and uncle.  On another occasion, he 
was hog-tied and left in a corn storage bin overnight.  (Id. at p. 3.)  At the age of 
five, Juror C.B. was raped by a resident of the farm where she lived.  (Id. at p. 7.) 
Juror C.B. failed to disclose any of this, despite being asked questions 
designed to reveal this information during jury selection.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 5–7.)  Because of Juror C.B.’s misconduct, Manriquez was denied important 
knowledge about Juror C.B.’s disposition toward one of his main theories at the 
penalty phase.  Had Juror C.B. revealed her prior experiences and disposition 
toward those experiences, any competent counsel would have struck her from the 
jury with a peremptory challenge.  Indeed, why would any competent defense 
attorney keep on this jury a person who had herself grown up on a farm, was 
“ ‘used for slave labor,’ ” “ ‘regularly beaten,’ ” and “ ‘raped’ ” on the farm, and 
yet believed adamantly, despite those experiences, that “ ‘childhood abuse was not 
 
3 
an excuse’ ”?  (Id. at pp. 6–7.)  There is no question that Juror C.B.’s misconduct 
impaired Manriquez’s right to exercise peremptory strikes. 
In addition, Juror C.B.’s misconduct likely had a prejudicial effect on 
Manriquez’s arguments at trial.  One of his principal mitigation arguments was 
that his childhood was “ ‘marred by extreme cruelty, vicious beatings, grinding 
poverty, forced labor, and a lack of care, education, affection, or encouragement 
by the adults in [his] life.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)  Defense counsel said to the 
jury during penalty phase closing arguments:  “ ‘And before you judge him, put 
yourself in his place.  Would you be the person you are today?  No question you 
wouldn’t be.  Would you do the things he did?  Maybe.  Maybe not.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 30.)  It is inconceivable that competent counsel would have made this statement 
if counsel had known of Juror C.B.’s past experiences and attitude toward those 
experiences, as the statement played right into Juror C.B.’s firm belief that her 
similar childhood trauma did not prevent her from becoming a “ ‘successful’ ” and 
“ ‘very responsible Law abiding citizen.’ ”  (Id. at p. 6.)  In sum, because of Juror 
C.B.’s omissions at voir dire, Manriquez was not afforded a fair opportunity to 
exercise peremptory strikes or appropriately craft his trial strategy. 
Today’s opinion says we must uphold the verdict if, in light of the entire 
record and the nature and circumstances of the misconduct, there is “ ‘ “no 
substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the 
defendant.”  [Citation.]  In other words, the test asks not whether the juror would 
have been stricken by one of the parties, but whether the juror’s concealment (or 
nondisclosure) evidences bias.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11–12, quoting In re 
Boyette (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 889–890.)  But this limited inquiry does not 
adequately safeguard a defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
As the court recognizes:  “ ‘ “Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring 
the criminal defendant that [his or her] Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
 
4 
will be honored. . . .  [L]ack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant’s right to 
exercise peremptory challenges where provided by statute or rule . . . .” ’ ”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 10, quoting In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110 [originally 
quoting Rosales-Lopez v. U.S. (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188].)  “A juror who conceals 
relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir dire examination thus 
undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct.  [Citations.]  [¶] 
Without truthful answers on voir dire, the unquestioned right to challenge a 
prospective juror for cause is rendered nugatory.  Just as a trial court’s improper 
restriction of voir dire can undermine a party’s ability to determine whether a 
prospective juror falls within one of the statutory categories permitting a challenge 
for cause [citations], a prospective juror’s false answers on voir dire can also 
prevent the parties from intelligently exercising their statutory right to challenge a 
prospective juror for cause.  [¶] Such false answers or concealment on voir dire 
also eviscerate a party’s statutory right to exercise a peremptory challenge and 
remove a prospective juror the party believes cannot be fair and impartial.  We 
have recognized that ‘the peremptory challenge is a critical safeguard of the right 
to a fair trial before an impartial jury.’  [Citation.] . . . ‘[J]uror concealment, 
regardless whether intentional, to questions bearing a substantial likelihood of 
uncovering a strong potential of juror bias, undermines the peremptory challenge 
process just as effectively as improper judicial restrictions upon the exercise of 
voir dire by trial counsel seeking knowledge to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges.’  [Citations.]  ‘The denial of the right to reasonably exercise a 
peremptory challenge, be it by either the trial court or a juror through concealing 
material facts, is not a mere matter of procedure, but the deprivation of an absolute 
and substantial right historically designed as one of the chief safeguards of a 
defendant against an unlawful conviction.’  [Citations.]”  (In re Hitchings, at 
pp. 111–112; see Ex parte Dobyne (Ala. 2001) 805 So.2d 763, 772 [“The form of 
 
5 
prejudice that would entitle a party to relief for a juror’s nondisclosure or 
falsification in voir dire would be its effect, if any, to cause the party to forgo 
challenging the juror for cause or exercising a peremptory challenge to strike the 
juror.”].) 
People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926 is instructive.  The defendant 
was accused of committing an assault with a knife and causing great bodily injury.  
(Id. at p. 930.)  During voir dire, a juror concealed the fact that she had been 
attacked at knife point during an attempted rape.  (Id. at pp. 930–931.)  On the last 
day of trial, the juror told court personnel of the knife attack.  (Id. at p. 931.)  
Defense counsel asked the trial court to dismiss the juror, but because defense 
counsel refused to proceed with 11 jurors, the trial court denied the motion, and 
the defendant was convicted.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding 
that the juror’s concealment prevented defense counsel from fairly evaluating 
whether to use a peremptory challenge.  (Id. at p. 936 [“there is a strong inference 
of potential prejudice to defendant in his selection of a jury”].) 
To see even more clearly the inadequacy of today’s prejudice inquiry, 
suppose multiple jurors, not just Juror C.B., had made similar misrepresentations 
during voir dire that were directly relevant to Manriquez’s mitigation arguments.  
And suppose those jurors are found not actually biased under the same inquiry that 
leads the court to find Juror C.B. not actually biased.  In such a case, the 
defendant’s right to exercise peremptory challenges would be illusory, and his 
opportunity to craft his trial strategy and arguments to the jury would be rendered 
a farce.  Under the reasoning of today’s opinion, such a defendant would have no 
recourse — a result plainly at odds with basic notions of a fair trial. 
 
6 
Because Juror C.B.’s misconduct resulted in prejudice to Manriquez during 
jury selection and during the penalty phase of his trial, I would grant his petition 
for relief from the penalty verdict.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I CONCUR:  
 
FRANSON, J.* 
 
                                              
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by 
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY FRANSON, J.P.T. 
I join in Justice Liu’s dissenting opinion.  I write separately to address an alternate 
ground, which assumes the majority opinion adopted the appropriate legal standard for 
balancing a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment and state constitutional rights to a 
trial by an impartial jury against society’s interest in the finality of criminal judgments.1  
Applying that standard, the majority concluded there was no substantial likelihood that 
Juror C.B. was actually biased against petitioner.  I respectfully dissent from that 
conclusion. 
As outlined extensively in People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, the details 
of petitioner’s crimes are horrific, and overwhelming evidence was presented at trial to 
support his guilt.  Petitioner presented a minimal defense of one law enforcement officer, 
who presented hearsay testimony from a witness to one of the killings, comprising six 
pages of reporter’s transcript.  (Id. at p. 567.)  By this, he essentially conceded his guilt 
and focused his efforts to avoid a death sentence by presenting evidence of his traumatic 
childhood physical and mental abuse as mitigating circumstances.  The role of 
petitioner’s childhood abuse in his mitigation arguments is crucial to the ultimate issue of 
actual bias.  
                                              
1  
The question of the proper standard for analyzing a juror’s failure to disclose 
material information during voir dire has produced a variety of approaches among the 
lower federal court and state courts.  (See Lafave et al., 6 Criminal Procedure (4th ed. 
2015) § 24.9(f), p. 681 [jury misconduct]; Loewy, When Jurors Lie: Differing Standards 
for New Trials (1995) 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 733 [survey and analysis of the various 
standards courts use in determining whether a juror’s nondisclosure requires a new trial] 
(Loewy).)  Part of the variety in approaches results from how lower courts apply 
McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, a civil case that did 
not involve the Sixth Amendment and produced a three-way split on the standard to be 
used.  (See Loewy, supra, at pp. 739-741.)   
 
2 
 
 
With this backdrop, I address the second basis mentioned by the majority for a 
finding of actual bias—C.B.’s rejection of petitioner’s traumatic childhood experiences as 
mitigating circumstances.  In my view, the record establishes a substantial likelihood that 
(1) C.B. had a predetermined state of mind in reference to the case—specifically, the 
material issue of whether the childhood abuse that petitioner suffered could be a 
mitigating circumstance—and (2) C.B. relied on her strongly held belief that petitioner’s 
childhood abuse was not an excuse to reject the petitioner’s case in mitigation without 
giving individualized consideration to the evidence actually presented.  Therefore, I 
conclude the record demonstrates a substantial likelihood of actual bias. 
I. 
JUROR MISCONDUCT, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION AND ACTUAL 
BIAS 
I agree that C.B.’s unintentional failure to disclose material information about her 
childhood was juror misconduct that raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 10-11.)  When determining whether the prosecution has rebutted the 
presumption of prejudice that arises from juror misconduct, the court must independently 
determine from the entire record, including the nature of C.B.’s misconduct and “all the 
surrounding circumstances,” whether there was no substantial likelihood she was actually 
biased against petitioner.  (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657; Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 11; In re Boyette (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 890 (Boyette).)  “All the surrounding 
circumstances” refers to C.B.’s statements, demeanor, and childhood experiences, but 
does not include the facts of the crimes.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.)  The substantial 
likelihood test is an objective standard.  (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 118.)   
In the context of juror misconduct in a criminal proceeding, “[a]ctual bias” is 
defined as “the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the 
case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire 
impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.”  (Code Civ. 
 
3 
 
 
Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 273-274.)  This 
definition of actual bias extends beyond hatred of or ill will toward a defendant 
personally or a class of which he or she is a member.  As relevant here, actual bias exists 
when a juror “ha[s] been so affected by [her] life experiences that [she] ha[s] difficulty 
separating [her] own experiences from evidence of others’ comparable 
experiences.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 39.)  To be sure, “jurors generally are expected to 
interpret the evidence presented at trial through the prism of their life experiences.”  (Id. 
at p. 36.)   But here it is evident from C.B.’s comments about the similarity between 
petitioner’s abusive childhood and her own abusive upbringing on a farm that C.B. had 
“difficulty separating her own experiences from the evidence in petitioner’s case.”  (Id. at 
p. 35.) 
II. 
APPLICATION OF DEFINITIONS TO THE FACTS 
The existence of a state of mind on the part of C.B. on the issue of whether the 
childhood physical and mental abuse suffered by petitioner could constitute mitigating 
circumstances is not contested.  During oral argument, the Attorney General 
acknowledged that C.B. had a “predetermined opinion” that petitioner’s abuse was not an 
excuse.  The Attorney General equated this to a predetermined mindset.  Similarly, the 
majority acknowledges that “C.B. plainly and repeatedly stated that she did not consider 
petitioner’s childhood abuse to be an excuse or mitigating because, although she too had 
been abused, she had not committed crimes.”   (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36.) 
C.B.’s declarations clearly establish her state of mind on petitioner’s childhood 
abuse.  In her 2007 declaration, C.B. described the abuse she suffered, compared it to 
petitioner’s childhood abuse, and stated that “[h]aving been through abuse myself, I do 
not view abuse as an excuse.”  Also, based on her own experience of childhood abuse, 
C.B. openly acknowledged her “belief that childhood abuse was not an excuse” and that 
she communicated this belief to the other jurors.  Furthermore, C.B.’s 1993 response to a 
 
4 
 
 
posttrial questionnaire explained the basis for her belief by describing her childhood 
circumstances and stating:  “I am successful in my career and am a very responsible Law 
abiding citizen.  It is a matter of choice!”  These statements plainly identified C.B.’s 
belief—that is, her state of mind—that the kind of childhood abuse petitioner suffered, 
which she believed to be similar to her own experience, did not constitute an excuse or a 
mitigating circumstance.2 
 
Further, C.B.’s predetermined state of mind about petitioner’s childhood abuse 
prevented her from considering the evidence actually presented.  Her attitude toward such 
abuse cannot be described as “ ‘ “light impressions, which may fairly be presumed to 
yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair 
consideration of the testimony.” ’ ”  (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 581.)  The categorical 
and emphatic manner in which C.B. repeatedly stated her belief, based on her own 
experience, that “childhood abuse was not an excuse” and her sharing these beliefs and 
experiences with her fellow jurors indicates that C.B. held “ ‘ “strong and deep 
impressions which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition 
to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  Most notably, 
there is no indication in the record that C.B. was ever open to evidence that might run 
counter to her own experience or that C.B. actually considered the evidence presented at 
trial in evaluating the particular circumstances of petitioner’s individual case, as opposed 
to making an unqualified judgment based on her own experiences. 
                                              
2  
In contrast to the present case, courts often are required to draw inferences to 
determine a person’s state of mind.  Here, C.B.’s own statements provide direct evidence 
of her state of mind and the reasons that particular state of mind existed prior to the 
trial—that is, was predetermined.  Accordingly, this is not a situation where we are 
required to apply an objective standard and draw inferences about whether extraneous 
evidence resulted in a predetermined state of mind.  (Cf. Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
p. 892 [information jurors acquired by watching a movie did not establish a substantial 
likelihood of bias during penalty phase].)   
 
5 
 
 
Accordingly, an evaluation of C.B.’s own undisclosed experiences of childhood 
abuse and the opinion she formed based on that experience are sufficient to establish a 
substantial likelihood that she could not impartially consider the evidence presented by 
petitioner.   
The majority evaluates the evidence in the record differently and describes C.B.’s 
thought process by stating “C.B. decided that the abuse petitioner did suffer was not 
sufficiently mitigating so as to warrant sparing him the death penalty.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 38)  In addition, “C.B. applied her life experiences when she interpreted petitioner’s 
mitigating evidence and weighed it against the evidence in aggravation.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 40.)  But these characterizations of C.B.’s decisionmaking are conspicuously 
bereft of any citation to C.B.’s own comments about how she actually responded to 
petitioner’s evidence.  Her comments do not reveal deliberative consideration of 
petitioner’s individualized circumstances based on the evidence actually presented.  They 
instead reveal a categorical application of a predetermined mindset based on C.B.’s own 
experiences. 
The majority also concludes the evidence that C.B. was prevented from acting 
impartially was outweighed by her honesty, forthrightness, cooperation, the fact that her 
childhood experiences were “only somewhat similar,” there was a notable passage of 
time between her experiences and the trial, and there was no evidence that her 
experiences had a traumatic or life-changing impact on her.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.)  
As to the passage of time, C.B.’s undisclosed childhood events, however distant, 
obviously and strongly shaped her personal views, which led her to “plainly and 
repeatedly state[] that she did not consider petitioner’s childhood abuse to be an excuse or 
mitigating [factor].”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36.)  Thus, the passage of time does not 
reduce to insignificance the likelihood that C.B. applied her belief that abuse is not an 
excuse to categorically reject petitioner’s childhood abuse as a mitigating circumstance.  
 
6 
 
 
Moreover, although the majority characterizes C.B.’s and petitioner’s childhood 
experiences as “only somewhat similar,” the crucial fact is that “certainly C.B. believed 
their childhood to be similar.”  (Id. at p. 35, italics added.) 
The majority places great weight on the finding that C.B.’s nondisclosure was 
unintentional.3  As evidenced by her honesty and candor in explaining her reasons for not 
disclosing her traumatic childhood, it is clear that C.B. did not appreciate that her mindset 
might disqualify her from sitting as a juror.  Therefore, she was very open about her 
background and thoughts.  Many people do not appreciate their personal bias or 
prejudices, and are therefore very open and honest about their thoughts and opinions.  
Such honesty does not lessen the likelihood that her vocalized state of mind prevented her 
from acting impartially—that is, weighing the evidence offered in mitigation instead of 
rejecting it based on a predetermined state of mind.  
In evaluating the likelihood that C.B. actually weighed the evidence of petitioner’s 
childhood abuse or, alternatively, categorically rejected it because abuse is not an excuse, 
I conclude there is a substantial likelihood C.B. applied her predetermined state of mind 
and categorically rejected that evidence in deciding to impose the death penalty.  While 
C.B. might have undertaken an actual weighing of the evidence, there is a substantial 
likelihood she did not.  The existence of this substantial likelihood is supported by (1) her 
own statements describing her mental process; (2) the similarity she perceived between 
her own experiences and petitioner’s; (3) the categorical and unequivocal nature of her 
belief that childhood abuse is not an excuse; and (4) the fact she openly communicated 
her childhood experiences and her resulting belief to the other jurors.  This evidence 
reasonably supports the inference that she considered them relevant to the case in 
                                              
3   
But irrespective of whether the nondisclosure was intentional or not, the 
presumption of prejudice is justified because the harm caused by the nondisclosure was 
the same—it hid C.B.’s predetermined mindset.   
 
7 
 
 
mitigation.  In contrast to People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, the evidence in this 
case is not readily susceptible to the inference that the juror’s life experience was used to 
interpret or weigh the evidence presented.  Here, there is a substantial likelihood C.B.’s 
life experience produced a specific attitude or prejudgment that led her to assign no 
mitigating weight to petitioner’s childhood abuse without giving individualized 
consideration to the evidence actually presented. 
In sum, the presumption of prejudice is not rebutted by a showing that there was 
no substantial likelihood of actual bias against the case in mitigation presented by the 
petitioner.  Although the facts of the underlying crimes and the evidence in aggravation 
are horrendous, these facts are not relevant in determining C.B.’s mindset.  A penalty 
phase verdict tainted by a substantial likelihood a juror was actually biased against a 
defendant must be reversed, “no matter how convinced we might be that an unbiased jury 
would have reached the same verdict.”  (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 579.)  I would 
grant the petition, vacate the judgment insofar as the penalty of death was imposed, and 
allow a retrial of the penalty phase.4 
 
                                              
4  
Before adopting a particular interpretation and application of statutory language, 
courts test that interpretation by considering the consequences that flow from it.  (See 
Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1291.)  This court’s 
interpretation and application of the definition of “actual bias” contained in Code of Civil 
Procedure section 225, subdivision (b)(1)(C) is subject to this test.  One of the 
consequences of the majority’s view of “actual bias” is that a juror with C.B.’s state of 
mind relating to childhood abuse and privation could not be challenged for cause based 
on actual bias.  Thus, a defendant—even one whose case in mitigation is based primarily 
on evidence of childhood abuse and privation—would be compelled to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to avoid empaneling a juror who would categorically reject 
childhood abuse and privation as mitigating circumstances.  In my view, such a result 
during the voir dire process could unduly impinge a defendant’s constitutional right to an 
impartial jury. 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FRANSON, J.*  
 
I CONCUR: 
 
LIU, J.  
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the 
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Manriquez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S141210 
Date Filed: July 26, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert Armstrong 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Bingham McCutchen, Nora C. Cregan, Sarah Esmaili, Edward J. Donnelly, Todd A. Pickles, Tracy R. 
Roman, John R. Reese, Marta Miyar Palacios, Tom Clifford, Sujal Shah, Olivia Para, Dustin Brown, 
Robert A. Brundage, Elisa M. Cervantes, Nitin Jindale and Monica A. Hernandez for Petitioner Abelino 
Manriquez. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Robert R. 
Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Lance E. 
Winters, Assistant Attorneys General, Keith H. Boron, Sharlene A Honnaka, Jaime L. Fuster, Timothy M. 
Weiner and Kimara A. Aarons, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the People. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert A. Brundage 
Bingham McCutchen 
Three Embarcadero Center 
San Francisco, CA  94111-4067 
(415) 393-2000 
 
Kimara A. Aarons 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6092