Title: Maine v. Bragg

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 102 
Docket: 
Kno-11-488 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
May 24, 2012 
Decided: 
August 2, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
TAMMY A. BRAGG 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
 
[¶1]  Tammy Bragg appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating 
under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A) (2011), entered by the 
Superior Court (Knox County, Hjelm, J.) following a jury trial.  Bragg contends 
that the court erred when it refused to suppress statements she made at the scene of 
the accident and at the police station.  We affirm the judgment.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
  
[¶2]  On the evening of March 11, 2009, Tammy Bragg went off a rural road 
in Rockport while driving her car home from a restaurant.  Not long thereafter, 
Sergeant Travis Ford came across the accident while on routine patrol. 
 
[¶3]  When Ford approached Bragg’s vehicle, Bragg assured him she was 
not injured.  After verifying that Bragg wanted a wrecker, Ford called for one to 
 
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remove the car.  Ford asked Bragg to produce her license and to describe how she 
went off the road.  Bragg stated that she was not sure how she went off the road but 
thought that she might have hit a patch of black ice. 
[¶4]  After asking Bragg for her insurance information, Ford had her sit in 
his cruiser while he copied down her information.  According to Ford, he detected 
the odor of alcohol on Bragg while she was retrieving her insurance information.  
Inside the cruiser, he “noticed she was speaking with like a thick tongue, slightly 
slurred speech,” and again smelled alcohol on her breath.  In response to Ford’s 
inquiry, Bragg stated that she had consumed two margaritas at dinner.  While in 
the cruiser, Ford conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus test to determine Bragg’s 
sobriety.  During the test, Ford observed that Bragg’s eyes were “kind of red, 
glassy-looking, or watery-looking.”  Following this test, he asked Bragg to recite a 
portion of the alphabet, as well as to count backwards from sixty-seven and to stop 
at fifty-two.  According to Ford, Bragg did not stop at the points she was supposed 
to in both tests and “jumbled” some of the letters of the alphabet.  At some point 
during these tests, the wrecker arrived at the scene. 
 
[¶5]  About the time Ford finished conducting these tests, Bragg’s husband 
arrived.  After asking for permission to leave the cruiser, Bragg exited the vehicle 
and walked towards her husband.  Ford noted that she seemed unsteady.  At this 
 
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point, Ford advised Bragg that she was under arrest and transported her to the 
Camden Police Station to take an intoxilyzer test. 
 
[¶6]  At the police station, Bragg took the intoxilyzer test, and her blood 
alcohol content (BAC) was .13%.  When Ford informed Bragg of the test results 
and that the presumptive level of intoxication in Maine is .08%, Bragg responded 
that she had thought when she ordered the second margarita at dinner it was 
probably a bad idea.  Bragg was charged with operating under the influence 
(Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A). 
 
[¶7]  On June 1, 2009, Bragg filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that 
the statements she made in the cruiser and at the police station were given without 
the necessary Miranda warnings.  At a hearing on May 20, 2010, the Superior 
Court denied the motion regarding whether the statements should be suppressed for 
lack of Miranda warnings. The court found that Bragg was not in custody when 
she made her first statements at the scene of the accident.  Additionally, the court 
determined that the alphabet and counting field sobriety tests “were not 
interrogation for Fifth Amendment purposes.”  As for the statements made after 
Bragg’s formal arrest, the court determined that the officer’s statement to her about 
the test result was “not the functional equivalent of a question.”  The case 
proceeded to a jury trial, which was held on September 14, 2011, and Bragg was 
 
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found guilty of Class D operating under the influence.  The court ordered her to 
pay an $800 fine and suspended her license for ninety days.  This appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  “In order for statements made prior to a Miranda warning to be 
admissible, the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
statements were made while the person was not in custody, or was not subject to 
interrogation.”  State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 23, 829 A.2d 247; see also 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-77 (1966).  Whether a person was in 
custody depends on “whether a reasonable person, standing in the defendant’s 
shoes, would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation 
and leave.”  Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 26, 829 A.2d 247 (quotation marks omitted).  
A trial court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, 
while “the ultimate determination of whether the statement should be suppressed” 
is reviewed de novo.  State v. Dominique, 2008 ME 180, ¶ 10, 960 A.2d 1160  
(quotation marks omitted). 
A. 
Statements Made at the Accident Scene 
 
[¶9]  On appeal, Bragg contends that, when she made the statements to Ford 
at the accident scene concerning the amount of alcohol she had consumed and 
underwent sobriety tests, she was in custody and was entitled to Miranda 
warnings.  Conversely, the State argues that the court properly concluded that 
 
5 
Bragg “was the subject of what was essentially a roadside stop which was brief and 
temporary.”  In other words, the State argues that Bragg was subject only to an 
investigatory detention, more commonly known as a Terry stop.  See State v. 
Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶¶ 11-12, 995 A.2d 238.  This distinction is key because, 
as a general rule, “persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in 
custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.”  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
439-40 (1984). 
[¶10]  “To qualify as a mere Terry stop, a detention must be limited in scope 
and executed through the least restrictive means.”  Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶ 12, 
995 A.2d 238 (quotation marks omitted).  Brief investigatory detentions are 
justified when they are based on “specific and articulable facts,” and can be solely 
for safety concerns as part of the “community caretaking function[]” of police 
officers, which includes “investigat[ing] vehicle accidents in which there is no 
claim of criminal liability.”  State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319-20 (Me. 1989) 
(quotation marks omitted).  As we said in State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 10 n.4, 
759 A.2d 1085, “[a] brief restriction on a citizen’s right to walk (or drive) away is 
usually referred to as a detention or a stop in order to distinguish the more limited 
restriction from a restriction commensurate with arrest.” 
[¶11]  Here, Ford initially approached Bragg when he happened upon her car 
that was off the road and facing the opposite direction of traffic, indicating that she 
 
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had been in an accident.  After inquiring as to whether she was safe and needed a 
wrecker, Ford then asked for her license and insurance information in conjunction 
with his investigation into the accident.  Upon smelling alcohol on Bragg’s breath 
and noticing other signs of intoxication, he administered sobriety tests.  As the trial 
court stated, “[Bragg] was detained [for] Fourth Amendment purposes, but not for 
Fifth Amendment purposes, which would trigger Miranda.”  This brief detention to 
investigate is consistent with the characteristics of a Terry-type stop that does not 
rise to the level of custody for Fifth Amendment purposes.  See Berkemer, 
468 U.S. at 439-40. 
[¶12]  This situation is distinguishable from the recent case of State v. 
Prescott, 2012 ME 96, ¶¶ 3-7, --- A.3d ---, where an officer took the defendant 
back to the accident scene from her home before another officer asked her 
questions regarding the accident and administered sobriety tests.  We noted that 
Prescott was not subject to “a simple Terry stop involving a brief, limited intrusion 
into Prescott’s liberty, as likely would have been the case had Prescott been with 
her car when police arrived and the same sequence of events had then taken place,” 
id. ¶ 13, but rather was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes, id. ¶ 16.  Bragg 
presents exactly the scenario contemplated in Prescott.  Unlike Prescott, who was 
taken back to the scene of the accident, Bragg was already at the scene of the 
accident when Ford began his initial investigation.  During this detention, Ford 
 
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noted the smell of alcohol on Bragg and observed that she was slurring her words 
while giving him her insurance information, and as a result he administered 
sobriety tests.  The trial court correctly held that this situation did not amount to 
custody for Miranda purposes. 
[¶13]  Because Miranda was not required, it is not necessary to address 
Bragg’s argument regarding the testimonial nature of her responses to alphabet and 
counting sobriety tests.  Even if Bragg had been in custody, however, her 
additional contention that the alphabet and counting tests were testimonial would 
not be persuasive, as a defendant’s performance on field sobriety tests is 
nontestimonial in nature.  State v. Millay, 2001 ME 177, ¶ 15, 787 A.2d 129. 
B. 
Statements Made at the Police Station 
 
[¶14]  Bragg also contends that Ford’s statement to her that her test result 
was a BAC of .13%, in conjunction with his statement that the presumptive 
intoxication level in Maine is .08%, was the functional equivalent of direct 
questioning and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 
[¶15]  For Miranda warning purposes, an interrogation “encompasses not 
only direct questions, but also . . . any words or actions on the part of the police 
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”  
Dominique, 2008 ME 180, ¶ 12, 960 A.2d 1160 (quotation marks omitted) 
 
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(alteration in original); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) 
(stating that “interrogation” for Miranda purposes includes both direct questioning 
and the functional equivalent).  Because the parties agree that Bragg was in 
custody at the time she took the intoxilyzer test and made her incriminating 
statement, “[t]he State . . . bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a Miranda warning was not required.”  State v. Brann, 
1999 ME 113, ¶ 12, 736 A.2d 251. 
[¶16]  Although we have not yet addressed this exact issue, other courts have 
recognized that simply presenting a defendant with evidence against her does not 
necessarily constitute an interrogation for Miranda purposes.  See, e.g., 
Caputo v. Nelson, 455 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that other courts 
have determined that not all declaratory statements by police regarding the 
evidence and charges qualify as interrogation); United States v. Payne, 
954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Innis definition of interrogation is not so 
broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory statements by police 
officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence 
relating to those charges.”);  Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(citing Payne with approval and holding that a trial court did not erroneously admit 
the defendant’s statements in response to “a matter-of-fact communication of the 
evidence against [the defendant]”); but see United States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 
 
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466-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the district court properly excluded statements 
made by a defendant where he was shown surveillance photographs after invoking 
his right to silence).  Although Bragg argues that the information was given in such 
a manner as to be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, Ford’s 
statement that her blood alcohol level was over the state limit was, in this context, 
“a matter-of-fact communication of the evidence.”  See Easley, 433 F.3d at 974.  
As the State correctly points out, pursuant to Maine law, Bragg was entitled to that 
information at her request.  See 29-A M.R.S. § 2521(9) (2011) (“On request, full 
information concerning a test must be made available to the person tested or that 
person’s attorney by the law enforcement officer.”).  Given that Bragg was entitled 
to that information, the officer’s simple statement relating that information, though 
unrequested, does not constitute a statement reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. 
[¶17]  Because Bragg was not subject to interrogation for Fifth Amendment 
purposes, the court’s suppression decision is affirmed. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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On the briefs: 
 
Robert J. Levine, Esq., Strout & Payson, P.A., Rockland, for appellant 
Tammy Bragg 
 
Geoffrey Rushlau, District Attorney, Prosecutorial District Six, Rockland, 
for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Knox County Superior Court docket number CR-2010-142 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY