Title: Donald William Dufour v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-262 
____________ 
 
DONALD WILLIAM DUFOUR,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 3, 2011] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order concluding that 
Donald William Dufour is not mentally retarded pursuant to Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 3.203 and 3.851.  The final order concerns postconviction 
relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was imposed, and we 
therefore have jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the 
Florida Constitution.  We affirm the order of the postconviction court. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Background and the Direct Appeal Proceedings 
 
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Several homicides produced Dufour‘s incarceration.  In early September of 
1982, the body of Zack Miller was found in an orange grove in Orlando.  As the 
investigation of Miller‘s death was proceeding, Dufour was involved in the 
robberies and murders of Daniel King and Earl Wayne Peeples in Jackson, 
Mississippi, in October of 1982.  See Dufour v. State, 453 So. 2d 337, 338 (Miss. 
1984).  After being detained in Mississippi on the charges related to the King and 
Peeples murders, Dufour was arrested by Florida law enforcement officers for the 
first-degree murder of Miller.  While the capital proceedings related to the Miller 
death progressed, Dufour pled no contest to the murder of Edward Wise, which 
had occurred in Orlando on July 4, 1982, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.   
A capital jury unanimously found Dufour guilty of the murder of Zack 
Miller and recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed in 1984.  
See Dufour v. State, 495 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 1986) (Dufour I).1  On direct appeal, 
this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.  See 495 So. 2d at 156.  The Court 
detailed the circumstances surrounding the Miller murder as follows: 
                                          
 
1.  In sentencing Dufour to death, the trial court found no mitigating 
circumstances and four aggravating circumstances: (1) Dufour was previously 
convicted of another capital felony; (2) the murder was committed while Dufour 
was engaged in the commission of an armed robbery; (3) the murder was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; and (4) the 
murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification.  See Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 49 
(Fla. 2005) (Dufour III).   
 
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State witness Stacey Sigler, [Dufour‘s] former girlfriend, testified that 
on the evening of September 4, 1982, the date of the murder, [Dufour] 
announced his intention to find a homosexual, rob and kill him.  He 
then requested that she drop him off at a nearby bar and await his call.  
About one hour later, [Dufour] called Sigler and asked her to meet 
him at his brother‘s home.  Upon her arrival, [Dufour] was going 
through the trunk of a car she did not recognize, and wearing new 
jewelry.  Both the car and the jewelry belonged to the victim. 
[Dufour] had met the victim in the bar and driven with him to a 
nearby orange grove.  There, [Dufour] robbed the victim and shot him 
in the head and, from very close range, through the back.  Telling 
Sigler that he had killed a man and left him in an orange grove, he 
abandoned the victim‘s car with her help. 
According to witness Robert Taylor, a close associate of 
[Dufour], [Dufour] said that he had shot a homosexual from 
Tennessee in an orange grove with a .25 automatic and taken his car. 
Taylor, who testified that he had purchased from [Dufour] a piece of 
the stolen jewelry, helped [Dufour] disassemble a .25 automatic pistol 
and discard the pieces in a junkyard. 
State witness Raymond Ryan, another associate of [Dufour], 
also testified that [Dufour] had told him of the killing, and that 
[Dufour] had said ―anybody hears my voice or sees my face has got to 
die.‖  Noting [Dufour‘s] possession of the jewelry, Ryan asked him 
what he had paid for it.  [Dufour] responded[,] ―You couldn‘t afford 
it.  It cost somebody a life.‖  Ryan further testified that he had seen 
[Dufour] and Taylor dismantle a .25 caliber pistol. 
Henry Miller, the final key state‘s witness, testified as to 
information acquired from [Dufour] while an inmate in an isolation 
cell next to [Dufour].  In return for immunity from several armed 
robbery charges, Miller testified that [Dufour] had told him of the 
murder in some detail, and that [Dufour] had attempted to procure 
through him witness Stacey Sigler‘s death for $5,000. 
 
Id. at 156-57.   
 
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On direct appeal, Dufour raised sixteen issues.  See id. at 157-64.2  This 
Court denied fifteen of the claims, but held that the trial court erroneously found 
that the murder had been committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest 
because the evidence failed to establish the requisite proof of intent.  See id. at 163.  
Nevertheless, this Court upheld the sentence of death based on the three remaining 
aggravating factors and the complete lack of mitigation.  See id.   
Postconviction Proceedings 
                                          
 
2.  Dufour advanced that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress evidence seized during a search of his residence; (2) the testimony of 
Henry Miller should have been suppressed; (3) the trial court erred in denying 
several motions for mistrial; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the 
cross-examination of state witness Robert Taylor; (5) the trial court erred in 
allowing a detective to read into evidence portions of a statement made by Robert 
Taylor in 1982; (6) a mistrial was required after certain comments in the 
prosecutor‘s closing argument impermissibly directed the attention of the jurors to 
Dufour‘s decision to not testify; (7) the trial court committed reversible error in 
finding Dufour‘s absence during a pretrial motions hearing voluntary and 
conducting the hearing in his absence; (8) the trial court erred in denying his 
motions for a continuance; (9) the trial court erred in declining to impose sanctions 
for an alleged violation by the prosecution of the provisions of Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(3); (10) the trial court erred in forcing Dufour to wear 
leg shackles during the trial; (11) the trial court erred in denying Dufour‘s motion 
for mistrial; (12) the trial court erred in denying Dufour‘s proposed special 
instructions on the jury‘s sentencing recommendation; (13) the trial court erred 
during the penalty phase by admitting into evidence extensive details of the 
Mississippi murders committed by Dufour; (14) the trial court erred in denying 
Dufour‘s motion to strike death as a possible penalty because the charging 
indictment had failed to allege the aggravating factors possibly subjecting him to 
the death penalty; (15) the trial court erred in finding that the avoid arrest 
aggravating factor was established; and (16) the trial court erred in finding that the 
cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance was established.  See 
Dufour I, 495 So. 2d at 157-64. 
 
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In 1992, Dufour filed an initial motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.850, and he amended the motion in 2001.  See Dufour v. State, 905 
So. 2d 42, 50 (Fla. 2005) (Dufour III).  Dufour raised multiple claims, but only one 
is tangentially relevant to the present appeal—whether the failure of the court-
appointed psychiatrist to conduct appropriate tests for organic brain damage and 
mental illness violated due process.  See id.  In 2003, the circuit court denied 
Dufour‘s motion, and Dufour appealed the order to this Court, asserting ten issues.  
See id.3  In addition, Dufour filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that 
presented four issues.  See id.4   
                                          
 
 
3.  Dufour contended that (1) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to investigate and present a defense of voluntary intoxication and in failing 
to strike jurors during the guilt phase; (2) his penalty phase counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance; (3) he received an inadequate mental health evaluation; (4) 
he was prejudiced by the cumulative impact of improper evidence; (5) his trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the sentencing jury was misled by 
comments, questions, and instructions that inaccurately diluted the jury‘s sense of 
responsibility for their role in the sentencing process; (6) the State committed 
fundamental error by destroying exculpatory physical evidence; (7) Florida‘s death 
penalty statute was unconstitutional; (8) section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes 
(1981), was facially vague and overbroad; (9) the rule prohibiting Dufour‘s 
lawyers from interviewing jurors was unconstitutional; and (10) the combination of 
procedural and substantive errors cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial.  See id. 
at 50 n.1.  
 
4.  Dufour asserted that (1) his appellate counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance during his direct appeal; (2) the cold, calculated, and premeditated jury 
instruction was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) his death sentence was 
unconstitutional because the jury did not render a verdict on each element of the 
capital offense; and (4) the combination of procedural and substantive errors 
cumulatively deprived Dufour of a fair trial.  See id. at 50 n.2.  
 
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While the initial postconviction appeal was pending, Dufour filed a motion 
for postconviction relief that sought a determination of mental retardation pursuant 
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203.  Correspondingly, Dufour filed a 
motion requesting this Court to relinquish jurisdiction to the circuit court.  We 
denied the motion to relinquish jurisdiction without prejudice to Dufour filing a 
motion seeking relief under rule 3.203 within sixty days after his pending 
postconviction and habeas proceedings became final.  See Dufour v. State, Nos. 
SC03-1326 & SC04-232 (Fla. Apr. 14, 2005) (unpublished order).  On the same 
day, we issued a decision that affirmed the circuit court‘s denial of Dufour‘s 
motion for postconviction relief and denied his habeas petition.  See Dufour III, 
905 So. 2d at 48. 
In accord with this Court‘s order, Dufour filed a timely motion pursuant to 
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and 3.851 that asserted his conviction 
and sentence of death are contrary to the reasoning and holding in Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which established that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded.  Moreover, Dufour contended that 
section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2004), violates both the United States 
Constitution and the Florida Constitution.  The circuit court appointed two expert 
psychologists to evaluate Dufour:  Dr. Harry McClaren on behalf of the State and 
Dr. Valerie McClain on behalf of the defense.  Dufour retained Dr. Denis Keyes as 
 
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an expert, and the State presented the expert testimony of Dr. Sidney Merin, who 
had previously testified on behalf of the State during the 2002 postconviction 
hearing.  
The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing during which the 
evidence presented established Dufour‘s deplorable and difficult childhood.  When 
Dufour was two years old, his family moved from New York to Orlando, Florida.    
Before moving to Florida, Dufour‘s father was afflicted by polio and was also 
injured in an accident that required a steel plate to be placed in his head.  The 
resulting physical disability impacted his demeanor, and Dufour‘s father developed 
depression.  Thereafter, Dufour‘s father became an alcoholic, spending most of his 
days drunk and releasing the anger he felt for his life on his family through 
physical abuse.  As a result, Dufour witnessed domestic violence throughout his 
childhood and was the victim of physical abuse by his father.   
Dufour‘s father died while Dufour was a teenager, and his mother remarried.  
In maintaining the new household, Dufour‘s mother assigned the children chores, 
such as doing their own laundry, cleaning their room, cooking lunch, and washing 
the dishes.  Dufour and his older brothers would also perform yard work and mow 
the grass.  Dufour was able to accomplish each of these tasks.  Dufour also 
possessed a license to drive and was able to drive without limitation.  He appeared 
to understand the various traffic signals, although his friends sometimes 
 
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characterized him as a poor driver.  Additional evidence indicated that Dufour had 
participated in legal proceedings concerning a forfeiture of a vehicle purportedly 
owned by Dufour.   
 With regard to the ability of Dufour to maintain a home and provide self-
care, throughout his life, Dufour has primarily resided with his parents, brothers, 
and friends.  For example, Dufour and his former girlfriend, Stacy Sigler, decided 
to reside in an apartment together.  Although in conflict with other evidence, Sigler 
testified that Dufour leased the apartment and handled the rent.  Sigler testified that 
while she was at work, Dufour decorated the apartment for her.  She further stated 
that Dufour possessed the ability to maintain a clean kitchen, but that their kitchen 
would not pass a ―white glove‖ test.  She testified that Dufour was able to select 
his own apparel and dress appropriately.  In addition, Dufour was able to 
independently accomplish proper hygiene activities daily, such as brushing his 
teeth and showering.   
The evidence also established that Dufour possessed the ability to be self-
sufficient and live independently of his friends and family.  After committing the 
capital offenses in Mississippi, Dufour obtained food and secured boarding and 
lodging unaided by others.  See Dufour v. State, 453 So. 2d 337, 339 (Miss. 1984).  
Specifically, Dufour negotiated with management at a boarding house that he 
would care for an elderly invalid who resided there in exchange for board and 
 
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lodging.  See id.  When Dufour learned that he had been implicated in the 
Mississippi homicides, he arranged to change his identity by having his dark hair 
cut and dyed blond.  See id.  Thereafter, he remained in seclusion at the boarding 
house to avoid detection by law enforcement for approximately two weeks until he 
eventually left the premises and was ultimately arrested.  See id.   
In the view of Dufour‘s stepsister, Dufour was not mentally retarded and 
possessed intelligence equal to her own.  During Dufour‘s teenage years, his 
stepsister observed him reading and believed that he could interpret the material.  
This was in contrast to Dufour‘s older brother John, who was described by family 
members as intellectually slow and who attended a school that assisted profoundly 
mentally retarded students who engaged in aggressive, violent behavior, or 
physically acted out in class.   
Despite his stepsister‘s observations of his reading ability, other evidence 
demonstrated that Dufour had an ―abysmal‖ academic performance in school.  
Initially established by his performance in first grade, this fact was further proven 
by his many failing grades throughout his education.  For instance, he had to repeat 
the second grade due to his academic performance, and he still did not accomplish 
passing grades during his second attempt.  In light of his poor grades, he was 
―socially promoted,‖ or ―placed‖ for the rest of elementary school.  The term 
―placed‖ indicated that although the student advanced to the next grade level, the 
 
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student had not successfully achieved the curricular requirements to be promoted.  
In addition, Dufour was enrolled in basic classes, which were the lowest level of 
coursework in his school.  However, other evidence suggested that this poor 
performance in school could be related to other factors, such as Dufour‘s 
deplorable conditions at home, sexual abuse, and frequent abuse of alcohol and 
other narcotics.  For example, Dufour informed a mental health expert that he spent 
the majority of his time in high school selling and consuming drugs instead of 
focusing on academics.   
The evidence demonstrated that Dufour still struggles with proper spelling 
and grammar.  As an adult, Dufour would read children‘s books to his friend‘s 
children, but struggled with some of the words.  In addition, various materials 
purported to be authored by Dufour contained misspellings and grammatical errors.  
Despite these difficulties, Dufour successfully completed medical requests in 
prison for a special diet and medicine to treat Hepatitis C, with which he was 
diagnosed.  However, there was conflicting evidence as to whether Dufour 
engaged the assistance of others in completing these requests.  
The evidence further indicated that Dufour possesses proficiency in 
mechanical projects.  In junior high, Dufour earned his highest grades in physical 
education and shop.  After two years in junior high school, Dufour transferred to a 
vocational school.  Subsequently, while incarcerated during the 1970s for a 
 
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burglary conviction, Dufour obtained his General Educational Development (GED) 
diploma and completed a small engine repair course.  In addition to successfully 
completing the course, Dufour served as an aide to the instructor of the course.  
Dufour also assisted in organizing and teaching a motorcycle repair course at the 
correctional institution.  Dufour displayed other mechanical skills as a youth by 
refurbishing a motorcycle.    
In addition to his mechanical skills, testimony established that Dufour 
possessed ―street smarts,‖ which is a shrewd awareness of how to survive as a 
result of living or working in a difficult environment.  Dufour was also described 
as possessing the ability to easily persuade and interact with people.  
With regard to Dufour‘s health, he began to abuse drugs and alcohol from a 
very young age.  According to his older brother, if Dufour was awake, he was 
using alcohol or drugs.  When bringing his father alcohol, Dufour would sip from 
the beer.  He would also take beer from the refrigerator while his parents slept.  By 
the third grade, Dufour would consume a six-pack of beer.  By the fourth grade, he 
began abusing marijuana daily.  Starting in the fifth grade, he experimented with 
inhalants such as toluene and glue on a daily basis.  In junior high, his drug use 
escalated to include many psychedelic and sedative drugs.  Dufour‘s brother 
recalled that Dufour‘s arm would be covered in scars or infected from injecting 
various types of narcotics into his veins with a needle.   
 
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In addition to the drug and alcohol abuse, Dufour unsuccessfully attempted 
to establish that he suffered from organic and traumatic brain damage.  Although 
there was some testimony with regard to incidents in which Dufour was injured, 
such as vehicular and physical accidents, none of this testimony established or 
substantiated that the accidents resulted in injury to his brain.  Moreover, Dufour 
failed to present any evidence or medical records documenting any injuries to his 
brain.  
The evidence also developed Dufour‘s employment history.  He secured 
employment at roofing and painting companies but would only hold the position 
for a few months at a time.  Further, Dufour‘s former lover employed him as a 
chauffeur.  At one point, a neighbor‘s husband attempted to secure employment for 
Dufour working with drywall.  However, when Dufour arrived at the construction 
site, it became apparent that he had no experience with drywall and he was 
terminated.  Dufour‘s brother also attempted to secure employment for Dufour as a 
yard assistant, but Dufour would often stop attending work.  Other evidence 
established that Dufour‘s difficulty in maintaining employment was a result of his 
dissatisfaction with the type of positions he obtained.  In sum, Dufour failed to 
maintain stable employment. 
 
With regard to Dufour‘s ability to maintain healthy relationships, as a child, 
Dufour was sexually abused by an adult man in his twenties.  In seventh grade, 
 
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Dufour began to engage in sexual relations with women.  During junior high 
school, he engaged in alcohol-related sexual activities simultaneously with 
multiple, older sexual partners.  When Dufour was in his late teenage years, his 
stepsister accused him of rape.  When he was approximately sixteen years old, 
Dufour‘s mother sent him to live with his older brother in Gainesville.  Dufour 
became heavily involved in a predominantly homosexual ―party‖ scene.  During 
this period, one of his brother‘s friends raped him.  Dufour spent much of this time 
intoxicated and would exchange sexual favors for special favors from older men.  
For example, the older men would use Dufour to solicit younger boys.     
 
Later in life, he shared a romantic relationship with Stacy Sigler, which 
included Sigler working as a prostitute and sharing her proceeds with Dufour.  
Sigler and Dufour would have sex with multiple partners, including Dufour‘s 
brothers.  While with Sigler, Dufour planned and executed a trip for the couple to 
Houston, Texas.  Sigler did not know who had booked the plane tickets, 
reservations, or other arrangements, and there was no evidence presented as to how 
the tickets were purchased.  However, Dufour was in possession of the tickets and 
navigated the airport, such as finding the correct gate and flight for the duo.  He 
also made all ground transportation arrangements, including paying for the 
transportation.  Further, Dufour ushered Sigler to the locations that he wanted to 
visit without consulting others.   
 
- 14 - 
 
Dufour presented testimony to establish that no property receipts or library 
records existed from Florida‘s death row to indicate that Dufour utilized the library 
resources or engaged in intellectual and strategic games.  In addition, a death row 
inmate testified that Dufour required assistance in writing inmate requests for 
canteen supplies and appeared to have very poor hygiene.  For instance, the inmate 
testified that Dufour did not understand that he had to wash his clothes.  Instead, 
Dufour assumed that the sweat from his workouts cleaned his clothing.  However, 
the State presented testimony with regard to contrasting property receipts which 
established that while incarcerated, Dufour possessed items such as paperback 
books, playing cards, a traditional dictionary, and a bible dictionary.   
Both defense experts, Dr. Keyes and Dr. McClain, concluded that Dufour 
was mentally retarded.  Both state experts, Dr. Merin and Dr. McClaren, concluded 
that Dufour was not mentally retarded.  The experts tested the intellectual 
functioning of  Dufour and obtained the following scores:  Dr. McClain—(a) 
Verbal IQ - 68; (b) Performance IQ - 72 (c) Full Scale IQ - 67; Dr. McClaren—(a) 
Verbal IQ - 65; (b) Performance IQ - 65; (c) Full Scale IQ - 62; Dr. Merin‘s 
original test scores—(a) Verbal IQ - 85; (b) Performance IQ - 64; (c) Full Scale IQ 
- 74.  Each of the experts reviewed and commented on the testing conducted by the 
other experts.  With regard to Dr. Merin‘s intelligence testing for the 2002 
 
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proceeding, all of the experts noted that there were administration and scoring 
errors.   
Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court concluded that Dufour 
did not establish by either clear and convincing evidence or a preponderance of 
evidence that he was mentally retarded.  Dufour now appeals that decision. 
ANALYSIS 
The Mental Retardation Determination 
Dufour challenges the circuit court‘s determination that he is not mentally 
retarded in accordance with the definition set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.203 and section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2005).  In 2001, the 
Legislature enacted section 921.137, which barred the imposition of death 
sentences on the mentally retarded and established a method for determining which 
capital defendants are mentally retarded.  See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001).  The 
following year, the United States Supreme Court held that execution of mentally 
retarded offenders constitutes ―excessive‖ punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment, but left ―the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the 
constitutional restriction‖ to the states.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 321 
(2002).   
In response to this authority, this Court promulgated Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.203, which specifies the procedure for presenting claims of 
 
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mental retardation as a bar to a death sentence.  The statute and rule are 
substantially similar with regard to the definition of mental retardation.  Rule 
3.203(b) provides: 
As used in this rule, the term ―mental retardation‖ means significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from 
conception to age 18.  The term ―significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning,‖ for the purpose of this rule, means 
performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean 
score on a standardized intelligence test authorized by the Department 
of Children and Family Services in rule 65G-4.011 of the Florida 
Administrative Code.  The term ―adaptive behavior,‖ for the purpose 
of this rule, means the effectiveness or degree with which an 
individual meets the standards of personal independence and social 
responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and 
community. 
 
Accord § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).5  From this authority, we derived a three-
prong standard that the defendant must establish to be categorically excluded from 
the death penalty based on mental retardation.  Specifically, Dufour must have 
presented evidence of the following: (1) significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) 
manifestation of the condition before the age of eighteen.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.203(b); § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat.  Clear and convincing evidence means evidence 
                                          
 
5.  Both the rule and the statute have been amended since 2005, but those 
amendments did not alter the relevant substance of the prior rule and statute.  See 
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 26 So. 3d 534, 536 
(Fla. 2009) (correcting citation and references to time periods); ch. 2006-195, § 23, 
Laws of Fla. (effective June 12, 2006) (amending title and substituting ―Agency 
for Persons with Disabilities‖ for ―Department of Children and Family Services‖).   
 
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that is precise, explicit, lacking in confusion, and of such weight that it produces a 
firm belief, without hesitation, about the matter in issue.  See In re Standard Jury 
Instructions In Civil Cases-Report No. 09-01, 35 So. 3d 666, 668 (Fla. 2010).  
Moreover, a defendant must establish all three elements, and the failure to prove 
any one prong would result in the determination that the defendant is not mentally 
retarded.  See Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009).   
When reviewing determinations of mental retardation, we examine the 
record for whether competent, substantial evidence supports the determination of 
the trial court.  See Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 14 (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 
712 (Fla. 2007); Johnston v. State, 960 So. 2d 757, 761 (Fla. 2006)).  This Court 
cannot ―reweigh the evidence or second-guess the circuit court‘s findings as to the 
credibility of witnesses.‖  Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007) (citing 
Trotter v. State, 932 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (Fla. 2006)).  However, to the extent that 
the circuit court decision concerns any questions of law, we apply a de novo 
standard of review.  See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712.   
Intellectual Functioning 
Under Florida law, the first element of a mental retardation determination 
requires that the person exhibit ―significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning,‖ which is defined as ―performance that is two or more standard 
deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test‖ specified by the 
 
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Department of Children and Family Services.  See § 921.137(1).  The Department 
has designated the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale and the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS) as the approved tests.  See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65B-4.032.  On the 
WAIS, a score of 70 is two standard deviations from the mean.  Accordingly, 
―significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning‖ correlates with an IQ of 
70 or below.   
Dufour‘s scores on the WAIS-III were as follows:  Dr. McClain—(a) Verbal 
IQ - 68; (b) Performance IQ - 72 (c) Full Scale IQ - 67; Dr. McClaren—(a) Verbal 
IQ - 65; (b) Performance IQ - 65; (c) Full Scale IQ - 62; Dr. Merin‘s original test 
scores—(a) Verbal IQ - 85; (b) Performance IQ - 64; (c) Full Scale IQ - 74.  The 
circuit court determined that Dufour had not proven by clear and convincing 
evidence that he possesses significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning.  The court noted that the results of the scores indicated that Dufour is 
at, or near, the mildly mentally retarded range.  However, the court considered the 
scores in conjunction: ―Taking Dr. McClain‘s score of 67, which is approximately 
halfway between the scores of Dr. McClaren and Dr. Merin, the band of 
confidence still ranges from 62 to 72, with the upper range being above the Cherry 
cut-off score of 70.‖  Further, the court noted that some test results suggested the 
possibility of malingering and that Dufour had reasonable motivation to perform 
poorly to avoid execution.  
 
- 19 - 
As to the weight of the expert testimony, the circuit court found that some 
testing irregularities had occurred with Dr. Merin.  The court also found that the 
diagnoses of mental retardation by Drs. McClain and Keyes were not persuasive, 
and that Dr. McClain had discounted her own test results.  The court considered 
that Dr. McClaren did not believe the validity of his own scoring results because 
the scores were contrary to the expected practice effect and Dufour did not appear 
to be making his best effort, due to either malingering or illness.   
On appeal, Dufour advances somewhat inconsistent positions with regard to 
the application of Cherry.  On one hand, he asserts that the circuit court‘s 
application of the standard error of measurement to Dr. McClain‘s score violates 
Cherry.  On the other, Dufour maintains that this Court should reconsider and 
recede from Cherry because it violates Atkins.  We reject Dufour‘s request that this 
Court reconsider Cherry.  Although all of the experts testified that a standard error 
of measurement must be applied to intelligence scores, this Court has consistently 
interpreted the plain language of section 921.137(1) to require the defendant to 
establish that he or she has an IQ of 70 or below.     
Both section 921.137 and rule 3.203 provide that significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning means ―performance that 
is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a 
standardized intelligence test.‖  One standard deviation on the WAIS-
III, the IQ test administered in the instant case, is fifteen points, so 
two standard deviations away from the mean of 100 is an IQ score of 
70.  As pointed out by the circuit court, the statute does not use the 
word approximate, nor does it reference the SEM.  Thus, the language 
 
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of the statute and the corresponding rule are clear.  We defer to the 
plain meaning of statutes. 
 
Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712-13; see also Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 142; Phillips v. State, 984 
So. 2d 503, 510 (Fla. 2008); Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 329 (Fla. 2007); 
Brown, 959 So. 2d at 148-49; Johnston, 960 So. 2d at 761; Burns v. State, 944 So. 
2d 234, 245 (Fla. 2006); Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 666-67 (Fla. 2006); 
Trotter, 932 So. 2d at 1049; Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005).  
Most recently, in Nixon, this Court considered and rejected a similar request to 
reconsider and recede from Cherry.  See Nixon, 2 So. 2d at 142-43.  Despite 
advancing reasonable arguments with regard to standard psychological practices 
for testing and measuring intellectual functioning, Dufour has not demonstrated a 
reason to overturn this Court‘s interpretation of the plain language of section 
921.137. 
However, we find merit to Dufour‘s first argument on this issue because the 
circuit court incorrectly applied the standard error of measurement to the IQ score 
that resulted from Dr. McClain‘s evaluation of Dufour.  Nothing in our prior 
precedent suggests that the plain language of the statute applies solely to capital 
defendants.  As Dufour asserts, it would be unduly prejudicial for the statute to be 
interpreted to allow the State or the circuit court to benefit from the standard error 
of measurement but to prohibit the defendant from doing so.   
 
- 21 - 
In this posture, it is important to note that this Court cannot ―reweigh the 
evidence or second-guess the circuit court‘s findings as to the credibility of 
witnesses.‖  Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007) (citing Trotter v. 
State, 932 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (Fla. 2006)).  Here, the circuit court did not 
completely discredit the reliability of the IQ scores.  Although the circuit court 
noted the concerns with malingering and set forth specific issues with each 
expert‘s evaluation, the court ultimately stated that it found some credibility to the 
testimony supporting each score.  Consequently, the postconviction court 
concluded that it had to consider all the scores together but incorrectly applied the 
standard error of measurement to the middle score.  In light of the legal error, this 
Court cannot parse from the record the amount of credibility to apportion to each 
score based on the postconviction court‘s vague statement that it found some 
credibility to the testimony supporting each score.  Consequently, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the circuit court‘s determination of 
Dufour‘s intellectual functioning.  Specifically, the language of the order does not 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
circuit court‘s conclusion that Dufour failed to establish subaverage intellectual 
functioning.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986).  
Accordingly, the circuit court‘s legal error with regard to the standard error of 
measurement cannot be deemed harmless as to the intellectual functioning element.    
 
- 22 - 
Adaptive Behavior 
Despite our conclusion as to the intellectual functioning element, we affirm 
the circuit court‘s determination that Dufour failed to establish that he 
demonstrates deficient adaptive functioning.  As described in section 921.137(1) 
and rule 3.203(b), the term adaptive behavior ―means the effectiveness or degree 
with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social 
responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.‖  The 
definition in section 921.137 and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 states 
that the subaverage intellectual functioning must exist ―concurrently‖ with 
adaptive deficits to satisfy the second prong of the definition, which this Court has 
interpreted to mean that subaverage intellectual functioning must exist at the same 
time as the adaptive deficits, and that there must be current adaptive deficits.  See 
Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 2007).     
After considering the testimony of all the witnesses, the postconviction court 
found that Dufour failed to present by either clear and convincing evidence or a 
preponderance of the evidence that Dufour has deficits in adaptive behavior to a 
level necessary to support a finding of mental retardation.  The circuit court 
accepted much of the factual evidence presented by Dufour, but determined that 
the evidence established that the reason for his behavior was the consequence of 
intense drug use and deplorable home conditions which included sexual and 
 
- 23 - 
physical abuse.  The circuit court‘s consideration of an alternative explanation for 
Dufour‘s adaptive behavior demonstrates that Dufour failed to meet his burden of 
proof.   
In addition, competent, substantial evidence supports this conclusion.  
Virtually all of the witnesses testified with regard to Dufour‘s extensive drug use.  
Dufour‘s self-reporting in earlier psychological evaluations and the deposition 
testimony of Dufour‘s family established that Dufour suffered from sexual abuse 
as a child and engaged in atypical sexual relationships from a young age.  Dufour‘s 
brothers testified as to the physical abuse Dufour suffered at the hands of his 
father.  Moreover, testimony established that Dufour only attended high school to 
sell drugs, which provides an alternative explanation for his low grades.  His 
father‘s abuse, his family‘s poverty, and his early substance abuse provided an 
explanation for Dufour‘s poor performance in school.  In sum, the circuit court 
determined that the teacher‘s testimony with regard to Dufour‘s grades did not 
outweigh or refute the alternative explanations for Dufour‘s poor academic 
performance, nor did it sufficiently establish that this performance was attributable 
to mental retardation.   
The postconviction court also considered that this Court upheld the circuit 
court‘s finding of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in a 
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.  In Phillips v. State, 984 So. 2d 503, 
 
- 24 - 
512 (Fla. 2008), this Court held that ―[t]he actions required to satisfy the CCP 
aggravator are not indicative of mental retardation.‖  Accordingly, the circuit court 
correctly applied this Court‘s precedent in consideration of one of the aggravating 
circumstances of the Miller murder.  
Additionally, there is significant conflict in the evidence with regard to 
Dufour‘s adaptive behavior.  For instance, Dufour advanced that he did not meet 
the standard of personal independence expected of his age, cultural group, and 
community because he had always been cared for by others and had never 
possessed the responsibility of handling bills.  Conversely, the evidence with 
regard to Dufour‘s independent actions in Mississippi demonstrated his proficiency 
to care for himself and his ability to engage in well-thought-out actions to avoid 
arrest.  See Dufour, 453 So. 2d at 339.  Moreover, Stacy Sigler testified that 
Dufour handled the leasing of their apartment and paid the rent.  Dufour also 
accomplished the chores assigned by his mother, such as laundry, cleaning his 
room, cooking lunch, washing dishes, and maintaining the yard.  Whereas Dufour 
presented testimony demonstrating that he lacked proper hygiene skills, the State 
established that Dufour was able to select his own apparel, dress appropriately, and 
independently accomplish proper hygiene activities such as brushing his teeth and 
showering. 
 
- 25 - 
Further, Dufour asserted that his poor grades in elementary school 
established deficient adaptive functioning.  However, prison records demonstrate 
that Dufour successfully achieved a GED diploma and assisted as an aide in a 
small engine repair course in addition to virtually organizing and developing the 
curriculum for a motorcycle repair course.  With regard to his employment history, 
Dufour contended that he had never maintained meaningful employment for more 
than a few months.  On the other hand, the State presented testimony which 
established that Dufour‘s difficulty in maintaining employment was a result of his 
dissatisfaction with the type of positions he obtained.  Furthermore, Dufour 
advanced that the absence of a chessboard in his prison property records indicated 
that he lacked the ability to engage in intellectual and strategic games.  In contrast, 
the State presented evidence that while incarcerated, Dufour possessed items such 
as paperback books, playing cards, a traditional dictionary, and a bible dictionary.  
Accordingly, the conflicts in the evidence substantiate the determination of the 
circuit court that Dufour failed to satisfy his burden with regard to the adaptive 
behavior element. 
In disagreeing with the circuit court‘s determination that Dufour lacks a 
deficit in adaptive behavior, the dissent misdirects attention as to the manner in 
which a trial court should evaluate whether an individual has a deficit in adaptive 
behavior.  The dissent ignores the direct evidence and places the focus in 
 
- 26 - 
evaluating adaptive behavior exclusively on the individual‘s alleged limitations, 
rather than evaluating the evidence fairly and impartially.  In evaluating whether 
Dufour has a deficit in adaptive behavior, the dissent would not permit the circuit 
court to even consider the clear evidence that a deficit does not exist.  If this Court 
adopted the dissent‘s methodology and required trial courts to only consider a 
defendant‘s limitations in determining a deficit, according to the dissent, the mere 
assertion of a limitation would be sufficient to produce a deficit.  This would 
render the second prong of section 921.137‘s definition of mental retardation 
automatically satisfied and, as a consequence, superfluous.  By attempting to shift 
the focus to only Dufour‘s alleged limitations in defining a deficit, the dissent also 
fails to recognize that the circuit court acted within its province as a fact-finder in 
determining that Dufour did not have a deficit in adaptive behavior.  Specifically, 
in making its determination, the circuit court utilized the proper methodology of 
examining all evidence pertaining to a possible deficit in adaptive behavior for 
Dufour, including evidence of Dufour‘s strengths that clearly rebutted allegations 
of his limitations.  It did not, as the dissent contends, improperly weigh Dufour‘s 
strengths against his limitations.   
Rule 3.203 mandates the circuit court‘s methodology.  That rule states that a 
trial court, as the fact-finder in deciding a motion to determine mental retardation, 
―shall conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a determination of mental 
 
- 27 - 
retardation.‖  During that hearing, the trial court does not weigh a defendant‘s 
strengths against his limitations in determining whether a deficit in adaptive 
behavior exists.  Rather, after it considers ―the findings of experts and all other 
evidence,‖ Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(e), it determines whether a defendant has a 
deficit in adaptive behavior by examining evidence of a defendant‘s limitations, as 
well as evidence that may rebut those limitations, see, e.g., Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 
511-12 (holding that a trial court‘s order finding a lack of a deficit in adaptive 
behavior was supported by competent, substantial evidence of the defendant‘s 
strengths that refuted the defendant‘s purported limitations).  If evidence of a 
strength rebuts evidence of a perceived limitation, that limitation may not serve as 
justification for finding a deficit in adaptive behavior.  See, e.g., id.   
 
For example, here, the dissent points to witness testimony and the 
assessment of medical doctors in contending that Dufour has a deficit in adaptive 
behavior because of a profound inability to live independently in society. 
Specifically, the dissent points to allegations and opinions of Dufour‘s limitations 
with regard to personal financial accounting, academic failures and menial jobs, 
and his failure to maintain personal-adult relationships.  The dissent suggests 
further that Dufour has asserted limitations in communication, self-care, home 
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional 
academics, leisure, and work.   The dissent also highlights allegations of Dufour‘s 
 
- 28 - 
limitations with regard to reading and inadequacies in spelling and grammar as 
significant evidence of Dufour‘s deficit in adaptive behavior.   
 
The circuit court, however, in properly examining whether the evidence 
supported or rebutted Dufour‘s alleged limitations, determined that a deficit in 
adaptive behavior did not exist.  A deficit in adaptive behavior did not exist based 
on the evidence, and that evidence rebutted Dufour‘s alleged limitations and the 
notion that Dufour has a deficit in adaptive behavior.  Specifically, Dufour‘s 
handling of the leasing of his apartment, payment of rent, administration of 
household chores, and daily maintenance of personal hygiene refuted the 
contention that he has an inability to live independently in society.  Dufour‘s 
ability to live independently in society was also exemplified by the evidence 
showing his serving as an aide in an engine repair class in addition to virtually 
organizing and developing the curriculum for a motorcycle repair shop.  Dufour‘s 
preparing and executing lesson plans alone were reflective of his cogitative ability 
as a fully-functioning, contributing member of society. 
Further rebutting Dufour‘s alleged limitations was his work to secure a GED 
diploma.  This refutes the notion that he has a deficit in literacy and an inability to 
communicate efficaciously in society. The specifications of the GED have changed 
slightly throughout the years as different versions of the test have been issued.  
Compare Archived Information, Educational and Labor Market Performance of 
 
- 29 - 
GED Recipients, http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/GED/backgrd.html, with Florida 
Literacy Coalition—Get your G.E.D., Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.floridaliteracy.org/ged_information__faq.html.  Nevertheless, to obtain 
a GED diploma, an individual has always been required to successfully master an 
intensive examination.  See Archived Information; Florida Literacy Coalition, 
supra.  The test sections of the GED exam involve a battery of questions that 
generally emphasize the ability to read, write, think, and solve mathematical 
problems.  See Archived Information, supra.  According to the American Council 
on Education, the GED Tests attempt to assess academic skills and knowledge 
typically developed in a four-year program of high school education.  See 
American Council on Education—History of the GED Tests, 
http://www.acenet.edu/Content/NavigationMenu/ged/about/ 
history_GED_Tests.htm.  Successfully passing a GED exam has traditionally been 
no simple matter. 
By successfully mastering this rigorous test, Dufour exhibited individual 
cognitive strengths that rebutted his asserted limitations of poor academic 
performance, difficulty reading, struggles with spelling and grammar, and inability 
to communicate and live independently in society.  Dufour‘s GED diploma is 
therefore clear evidence of how evidence of a personal strength rebuts an alleged 
 
- 30 - 
limitation and is direct proof that a deficit in adaptive behavior does not exist in 
fact.   
The dissent is incorrect with regard to the record concerning the GED 
evidence.  Contrary to the dissent‘s assertion that the State did not present evidence 
with regard to the significance of Dufour obtaining a GED, the GED evidence was 
presented by the State directly in support of its argument that Dufour lacked a 
deficit in adaptive behavior.  Both Dr. Merin and Dr. McClaren, whose testimony 
the State relied upon to establish that Dufour did not have a deficit in adaptive 
behavior, discussed the relevance of Dufour obtaining a GED.  Dr. Merin testified 
that in his mental health evaluation of Dufour, he examined prison progress reports 
which stated that Dufour had excelled while in prison, where he participated as an 
instructor in small engine and motorcycle repair classes, and where he obtained his 
GED.  See Transcript of Record at 2804-05.  For Dr. Merin, this demonstrated that 
Dufour was a ―very capable type of individual‖ who could function well and 
―solve problems whether they be social problems or maybe mechanical problems,‖ 
and that Dufour was ―definitely capable of college work.‖  Transcript of Record at 
2805-06.  The dissent has ignored this part of the record.   
Dr. McClaren testified that the GED obtained by Dufour signified the 
absence of a deficit in adaptive behavior and demonstrated an aptitude for college 
work.  See Transcript of Record at 3047-48, 3094.  Dr. McClaren also specifically 
 
- 31 - 
opined during cross-examination by Dufour‘s counsel that obtaining a GED was 
―suggestive of Mr. Dufour‘s ability to function at a higher level.‖  Transcript of 
Record at 3094.  Dr. McClaren further attested during cross-examination that 
Dufour admitted to him that he cheated on the GED, see Transcript of Record at 
3094-95, which displays a mental aptitude by Dufour that negates his assertion that 
he has a deficit in adaptive behavior.  
The State advanced the ―GED‖ argument from its first pleading.  Dufour‘s 
GED information was in the attachments to the State‘s response to Dufour‘s rule 
3.851 postconviction motion.  See State‘s Answer to Rule 3.851 Motion at 75, 78; 
State‘s Amended Answer to Rule 3.851 Motion at 250, 253.  It was addressed 
during the evidentiary proceeding below when the State entered a copy of Dufour‘s 
GED certificate into evidence to corroborate the testimony of Dr. McClaren.  See 
Transcript of Record at 3047-48.  Moreover, in the State‘s answer brief on appeal 
the GED was advanced in support of its argument that this Court should affirm the 
trial court‘s finding that Dufour did not have a deficit in adaptive behavior.  See 
State Answer Brief at 60.  In fact, in Dufour‘s initial brief on appeal, he 
acknowledged that Dr. McClaren relied on Dufour‘s successful completion of the 
GED exam in partial support of his conclusion that Dufour did not have a deficit in 
adaptive behavior.  See Dufour‘s Initial Brief at 35. 
 
- 32 - 
Furthermore, Dufour presented evidence of his GED during his initial rule 
3.850 postconviction proceeding in Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2005).  
There, he offered the testimony of a mental health expert, Dr. Robert Berland.  See 
id. at 61.  Dr. Berland testified with regard to Dufour‘s good prison record.  See id.  
Dufour attempted to use that testimony to establish that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failure to present Dufour‘s good prison record as mitigation 
evidence during the penalty phase.  See id.  During Dr. Berland‘s testimony, he 
testified that Dufour had received his GED certificate and, at the time he obtained 
it, he demonstrated an ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, 
but that a subsequent head trauma, suffered after that incarceration and before 
Dufour committed murder, had stymied Dufour‘s ability to conform his conduct.  
See Transcript of Record at 494-95, 509-10.   
The presentation of evidence with regard to Dufour obtaining a GED 
certificate commenced in Dufour‘s initial postconviction proceeding, and persisted 
during this postconviction proceeding in the form of both evidence and argument 
by the State, negating the assertion of the dissent that the significance of Dufour‘s 
GED was not presented or was not properly argued by the State.  The dissent 
fallaciously attempts to bolster its argument by contending that the State failed to 
present evidence with regard to the specific version of the GED that Dufour 
earned.  This argument is misleading at best.  During the evidentiary proceeding, 
 
- 33 - 
the State entered into evidence an exact copy of the specific GED earned by 
Dufour.  See Transcript of Record at 3047-48; Record of Exhibit K1 at 5240.  That 
GED therefore logically served as the specific basis for the testimony the State 
introduced regarding the rigors Dufour had to specifically overcome, and the 
individual aptitude he had to show, to earn a GED.   
In addition, the circuit court concluded that Dufour failed to establish that he 
is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence.  Preponderance of 
evidence is defined as evidence ―which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be 
proved is more probable than not.‖  State v. Edwards, 536 So. 2d 288, 292 n.3 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1988).  The extensiveness of the evidence concerning Dufour‘s drug use 
and abusive childhood and the conflicting evidence with regard to his adaptive 
behavior provides competent, substantial evidence in support of the circuit court‘s 
conclusion under the lesser standard.  The fact that the circuit court attributed 
Dufour‘s behavior to an alternative explanation demonstrates that there is another, 
equally likely reason for his behavior other than mental retardation.  Therefore, 
Dufour did not present evidence that demonstrates the existence of mental 
retardation as required.  See id.   
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s order because competent, 
substantial evidence supports the circuit court‘s determination that Dufour has 
failed to establish the adaptive behavior deficiency element of section 921.137 and 
 
- 34 - 
rule 3.203.  A defendant must establish all three of the elements and the failure to 
prove any single element results in a determination that the defendant is not 
mentally retarded.  See Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 142.  In light of our holding that 
competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court‘s determination that 
Dufour‘s behavior is attributable to factors other than mental retardation along with 
the conflicting evidence on whether deficiency exists, we do not address the last 
prong of the test, which is whether the subaverage intellectual functioning and 
deficient adaptive behavior manifested prior to the age of eighteen.  See id. at 145; 
Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 509 n.11, Jones, 966 So. 2d at 329-30; Trotter, 932 So. 2d at 
1049 n.5.     
Constitutionality of Section 921.137(4) 
Dufour asserts that the circuit court unconstitutionally applied the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in evaluating whether Dufour is mentally retarded.  
He advances that the decisions in Atkins and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S 348, 
363 (1996), demonstrate that this burden violates his due process rights under the 
Florida and United States Constitutions.  Here, the circuit court found that Dufour 
failed to demonstrate deficient adaptive behavior under either the clear and 
convincing or the preponderance of the evidence standard.  Because we hold that 
competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court‘s determination with 
regard to adaptive behavior deficiency under the lower standard, we decline to 
 
- 35 - 
reach the constitutional challenge raised by Dufour.  See Singletary v. State, 322 
So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975) (―[C]ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of 
statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on 
other grounds.‖); see also Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 145; Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 509 n.11; 
Jones, 966 So. 2d at 329-30; Trotter, 932 So. 2d at 1049 n.5.     
Evidentiary Issues  
Dufour next contends that the circuit court improperly allowed a number of 
documents to be admitted into evidence and improperly allowed a former defense 
expert to testify for the State.  In reviewing this issue, a circuit court‘s admission of 
evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.  See Medina v. State, 
466 So. 2d 1046, 1050 (Fla. 1985).  We hold that even if the circuit court abused 
its discretion, any error is harmless because the language of the order demonstrates 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the challenged evidence did not contribute to the 
postconviction court‘s conclusion that Dufour failed to establish mental 
retardation.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986).  Thus, there 
is no reasonable possibility that the asserted errors affected the court‘s 
determination.   
However, we note two things.  First, the postconviction court afforded 
judicial notice to the 2002 postconviction proceeding and certain letters within the 
court file.  In Florida, a court may take judicial notice of various matters including 
 
- 36 - 
―[r]ecords of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or 
of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.‖  § 90.202(6), Fla. Stat. 
(2007).  However, the fact that a record may be judicially noticed does not render 
all that is in the record admissible.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, 
Inc., 586 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).  For instance, the court‘s authority 
to take judicial notice of records cannot be used to justify the wholesale admission 
of hearsay statements within those court files, such as through police reports or 
letters.  See Stoll v. State, 762 So. 2d 870, 876 (Fla. 2000) (―We have never held 
that such otherwise inadmissible documents are automatically admissible just 
because they were included in a judicially noticed court file.‖).  In Stoll, we held 
that ―documents contained in a court file, even if that entire court file is judicially 
noticed, are still subject to the same rules of evidence to which all evidence must 
adhere.‖  Id. at 877.  In so holding, we noted the observations of another appellate 
court that there has been a  
seemingly widespread but mistaken notion that an item is judicially 
noticeable merely because it is part of the ―court file.‖  Court files are 
often replete with letters, affidavits, legal briefs, privileged or 
confidential data, in camera materials, fingerprint records, probation 
reports, as well as depositions that may contain unredacted gossip and 
all manner of hearsay and opinion. 
 
Ptasznik v. Schultz, 679 N.Y.S. 2d 665, 666-67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (citations 
omitted).  ―[N]one of these [items] are rendered admissible merely because they 
are part of the court file.‖  Stoll, 762 So. 2d at 877 (citing Ptasznik, 679 N.Y.S. 2d 
 
- 37 - 
at 667).  Thus, while the court may take judicial notice of documents in a court file 
that were properly placed there, this notice would not make the contents of the 
documents admissible if they were subject to challenge, such as when a document 
is protected by privilege or constituted hearsay.  In addition, taking judicial notice 
of an entire prior proceeding may be expeditious for the current proceedings, but it 
does not allow the substance of the underlying materials to be entered into 
evidence without compliance with the rules of evidence.   
 
Furthermore, the manner in which documents were introduced through the 
expert testimony was problematic.  The State introduced copious documents that 
the experts relied upon during their evaluation of Dufour and, during the expert 
testimony, projected these documents on a screen in the courtroom where the trier 
of fact (i.e., the judge in this bench proceeding) could view the entirety of the 
substance of the document.  The documents came from many unidentified sources 
and included prior psychological evaluations, inmate grievance requests, multiple 
police reports, and evidence from the 2002 proceeding.  Dufour challenged the use 
of these documents, asserting that the State was utilizing the expert witness as a 
conduit to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence and that the State had not 
established a foundation for the documents‘ admissibility outside the fact that the 
documents were possibly consulted by the expert witness as a basis for an opinion.  
In addition, Dufour advanced that publishing the documents through the projector 
 
- 38 - 
screen amounted to the documents‘ admission in open court for everyone to read 
without the proper predicate being established, and that the projection of the 
documents with altered highlighted portions constituted improper bolstering and 
leading.   
In general, the challenged documents fell into the following categories: (1) 
those that had been admitted into evidence in the 2002 proceedings; (2) those that 
had been admitted during the course of the 2008 hearing; and (3) those that were 
introduced solely for identification and were not admitted into evidence.  For the 
documents of which the court took judicial notice, the court expressly noted in its 
order that the documents from the 2002 hearing were not considered in its 
determination.  Accordingly, the error, if any, in the admission of such evidence 
was harmless.  See Capitoli v. State, 175 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) 
(―Since the trial judge, sitting without a jury, stated that he based his findings 
exclusively upon such evidence and that he disregarded the challenged evidence, 
the error, if any, in the admission of such evidence was harmless.‖).  For the 
documents that were admitted into evidence during the evidentiary hearing, but 
were not part of the prior judicially noticed proceeding, the court‘s order does not 
indicate that any of these documents were considered in its determination.  Thus, 
there is not a reasonable possibility that any error in admitting these documents 
affected the circuit court‘s determination.   
 
- 39 - 
For the last set of documents, the postconviction court allowed the State to 
project the documents relied upon by Dr. McClaren onto a screen in the courtroom.  
In forming opinions, experts can rely on information which is not itself admissible, 
under section 90.704, Florida Statutes (2004), which provides: 
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by, or made known to, the expert at 
or before the trial.  If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the 
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
 
Although experts may testify as to the things on which they rely, experts cannot 
bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not 
testify because ―[s]uch testimony improperly permits one expert to become a 
conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination.‖  
Schwarz v. State, 695 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).  To allow an expert to 
do so would cause any probative value of the testimony to be ―substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, [or] misleading 
the jury.‖  Id. at 455 (quoting § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1995)).  Further, an expert‘s 
testimony may not be used as a basis to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence.  
See Linn v. Fossum, 946 So. 2d 1032, 1037 (Fla. 2006).  Under these 
circumstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the 
challenged documents to be published on the screen.  However, we hasten to 
 
- 40 - 
remind attorneys and judges that the rules of evidence must be applied before the 
substance of any document may be admitted for consideration by the trier of fact.   
 
Second, the continuous failure to state on the record the identification and 
exhibit numbers for evidence, along with the references to evidence from prior 
proceedings without any indication of its identifying information, created 
unnecessary hardship for this Court in conducting our review.  Without an 
attorney‘s diligence in creating a clear and comprehensible record, an appellate 
court is left to piece together the evidentiary record to properly review the 
proceeding.  Thus, it is important for attorneys to ensure that the record reflects 
identifying information as to which piece of evidence is being referenced and 
addressed during the proceeding because an appellate court‘s perspective of a 
proceeding is limited by the contents of the record.   
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court‘s determination that Dufour has not 
established that he is mentally retarded.   
 
It is so ordered.  
LEWIS, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
- 41 - 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
The sole issue in this appeal concerns the propriety of the trial court‘s 
determination that Dufour was not mentally retarded.  Because of significant errors 
in the trial court‘s evaluation of Dufour‘s IQ and adaptive functioning, we should 
remand to the trial court for a reevaluation of the evidence regarding the IQ and 
adaptive functioning prongs using the correct legal standards.  In our emerging 
jurisprudence on the evaluation of mental retardation in connection with the death 
penalty, we must be certain that we are utilizing objective and scientifically 
acceptable measures for evaluation of both IQ and deficits in adaptive behavior.    
I therefore agree with the majority that the trial court erred in its evaluation 
of Dufour‘s IQ and that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  I 
disagree, however, that we should affirm based on the failure of Dufour to prove 
deficits in adaptive behavior because, as discussed below, the trial court made 
three significant errors when analyzing this prong.  I also dissent from the portions 
of the majority opinion that utilize non-record evidence of the specific 
requirements and difficulty of the GED given to Dufour in order to refute the 
existence of Dufour‘s adaptive functioning deficits.  This evidence concerning how 
rigorous the specific version of the GED that Dufour took was neither presented 
nor argued by the State and accordingly I am concerned that Dufour was deprived 
of the opportunity to refute the majority‘s conclusions regarding the significance 
 
- 42 - 
and difficulty of the specific version of the GED that Dufour took.  This potential 
problem with the record evidence regarding the rigors of a specific version of the 
GED could be avoided by remanding for a reevaulation by the trial court of all the 
evidence, thereby providing the parties an opportunity to be heard.6  
As to the trial court‘s error in evaluating the IQ, the trial court accepted Dr. 
McClain‘s score of 67 as the most reliable but then applied the standard error of 
measure to the score, adding five points.  In this case, it would therefore appear 
that a likelihood exists that Dufour‘s IQ is significantly subaverage.  Thus, the two 
other prongs of the three-part test for mental retardation become important to 
evaluate: concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior in at least two areas and onset 
before age 18.   
Although I agree that there may be cases where we could affirm the trial 
court based on findings on adaptive functioning alone, I do not agree that this is 
one of those cases.  In this case, there is reason to question the trial court‘s 
evaluation of adaptive functioning because the trial court failed to focus on 
                                          
 
 
6.  Contrary to the majority‘s characterization, I do not dispute that the State 
presented evidence that Dufour obtained his GED or that the experts used this 
information in evaluating whether Dufour is mentally retarded.  However, the 
majority relies on non-record sources in discussing the rigors and specific 
requirements of the version of the GED that Dufour took in 1978—information 
which was not presented by Dr. Merin or Dr. McClaren.  I take issue only with the 
non-record evidence that is utilized in the majority opinion.  See majority op. at 
28-29.   
 
- 43 - 
―deficits‖ in adaptive behavior, failed to properly evaluate Dr. Keyes‘ objective 
testimony of deficits in adaptive behavior, and rejected the evidence relating to 
deficits in adaptive behavior based on an ―alternative explanation‖ for the deficits.  
I will explain each of my concerns in turn. 
In my view, the trial court first erred by failing to focus on Dufour‘s 
established ―deficits in adaptive behavior.‖  In other words, the focus in evaluating 
adaptive behavior should be on the individual‘s limitations, rather than his or her 
demonstrated adaptive skills.  This proposition is supported both by the American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities‘ (AAIDD) definition of 
mental retardation, as well as the language of section 921.137, Florida Statutes 
(2006), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203.  See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2006) (―[T]he term ‗mental retardation‘ means significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and 
manifested during the period from conception to age 18.‖ (emphasis added)); Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.203(b) (―[T]he term ‗mental retardation‘ means significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in 
adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.‖ 
(emphasis added)).   
In stating that the focus is on an individual‘s limitations, I do not mean that a 
court is precluded from reviewing the full picture or considering whether a deficit 
 
- 44 - 
does or does not exist.  In fact, courts must review all available evidence in order 
to determine this prong.  But a court cannot reject a determination that deficits 
exist simply because a defendant has strengths in certain other areas.  In other 
words, possessing certain adaptive skills in one area does not eliminate the 
possibility that the defendant has deficits in other areas.   
Section 921.137(1) defines adaptive behavior as ―the effectiveness or degree 
with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social 
responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.‖  
§ 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2006).  For the purpose of implementing the adaptive 
behavior prong, since the enactment of the statute, Florida courts have adopted the 
analytic framework set forth in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  See 
Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 143 (Fla. 2009); Phillips v. State, 984 So. 2d 503, 511 
(Fla. 2008); Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326-27 (Fla. 2007).  Specifically, when 
defining mental retardation, the United States Supreme Court explained deficits in 
adaptive behavior as ―limitations in two or more of the following applicable 
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, 
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and 
work.‖  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (quoting Am. Ass‘n on Mental Retardation, 
 
- 45 - 
Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 
1992)).7 
In finding that Dufour is not mentally retarded based on his failure to 
establish deficits in adaptive behavior, the trial court relies significantly on the 
adaptive skills Dufour does possess, rather than his deficits.  For example, the trial 
court stated in its findings on adaptive behavior: 
Mr. Dufour does not read or write much, if at all.  He does not play 
chess in the Department of Corrections.  He does not have good 
hygiene habits.  In the past, he drove a car and possessed a driver‘s 
license.  He participated in teaching a small engine repair class while 
in prison in the 1970‘s.  He could be good with children.  He was 
capable of interacting in social situations, and could be friendly and 
engaging.  He appeared to understand discussions with his trial 
counsel. 
                                          
 
 
7.  Atkins adopted this framework from the AAIDD‘s 1992 definition of 
mental retardation, which was substantially similar to the definition of mental 
retardation set forth by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (2000) 
(DSM-IV): (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is 
accompanied by (2) significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two 
skill areas (communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use 
of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, 
health, and safety); and (3) the onset must occur before age 18.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
308 n.3 (quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. 
2000)).  However, unlike the AAIDD definition, the DSM-IV definition still 
distinguished between degrees of mental retardation (i.e., mild, moderate, severe, 
and profound).  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; J. Gregory Olley & Ann W. Cox, 
Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Adult Forensic Cases: The Use of the 
Adaptive Behavior System—II, in Adaptive Behavior Assessment System-II, 
Clinical Use & Interpretation 383 (Thomas Oakland & Patti L. Harrison ed., 2008). 
 
- 46 - 
This approach to assessing adaptive behavior is at odds not only with the 
statutory definition itself but also with the current consensus within the scientific 
community as to the proper method for assessing adaptive behavior in the criminal 
justice context.  Specifically, the AAIDD and the DSM-IV stress that the focal 
point of adaptive behavior should be on the individual‘s limitations rather than 
demonstrated adaptive skills.  An important reason for this policy is that ―[t]he 
skills possessed by individuals with mental retardation vary considerably, and the 
fact that an individual possesses one or more that might be thought by some 
laypersons as inconsistent with the diagnosis (such as holding a menial job, or 
using public transportation) cannot be taken as disqualifying.‖  James W. Ellis, 
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 
Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 11, 21 n.29 (2003). 
The AAIDD, in its amicus brief to this Court, explains that the significant 
limitations in adaptive behavior must be based on objective measurements and not 
weighed against adaptive strengths.  The purpose of the adaptive functioning prong 
is to ascertain whether the measured intellectual score reflects a real-world 
disability, as opposed to a testing anomaly.  Thus for this prong, the 
diagnostician‘s focus must remain on the presence of confirming deficits.  
Accordingly, the AAIDD has specifically noted that ―assessments must . . . assume 
that limitations in individuals often coexist with strengths, and that a person‘s level 
 
- 47 - 
of life functioning will improve if appropriate personalized supports are provided 
over a sustained period.‖  Am. Ass‘n on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, 
Definition of Intellectual Disability, http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm?nav 
ID=21 (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).8  Further, as the AAIDD correctly explains, 
much of the clinical definition of adaptive behavior is much less relevant in 
prisons, and in fact, a person with mental retardation is likely to appear to have 
stronger adaptive behavior in a structured environment such as a prison than in 
society.  The amicus brief of the AAIDD further points out that ―[s]tereotypes and 
lay assumptions about people with mental retardation can cloud or distort 
individual assessment.‖   
The failure to take an objective approach to deficits in adaptive behavior can 
result in the perpetuation of misunderstanding mental retardation.  In State v. 
White, 885 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio 2008), the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the trial 
court‘s finding that White failed to prove significant deficiencies in adaptive 
behavior.  In its opinion, the court focused on concerns similar to those advanced 
by the AAIDD as to improperly focusing on an individual‘s demonstrated adaptive 
                                          
 
 
8.  The AAIDD has explicitly stated that ―[m]ental retardation and 
intellectual disability are two names for the same thing.  But intellectual disability 
is gaining currency as the preferred term.‖  Am. Ass‘n on Intellectual & 
Developmental Disabilities, FAQ on Intellectual Disability, 
http://www.aaidd.org/content_104.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).  However, the 
term ―mental retardation‖ is the term that is generally contained in current federal 
and state laws. 
 
- 48 - 
skills and placing too much importance on lay testimony regarding White‘s 
demonstrated adaptive skills: 
The mentally retarded are not necessarily devoid of all adaptive skills.  
Indeed, ―they may look relatively normal in some areas and have 
certain significant limitations in other areas.‖  Mildly retarded persons 
can play sports, write, hold jobs, and drive.  Dr. Hammer testified that 
in determining whether a person is mentally retarded, one must focus 
on those adaptive skills the person lacks, not on those he possesses.   
The trial court‘s analysis appears to disregard this testimony.  
For example, the trial court‘s opinion mentions twice that White was a 
licensed driver.  However, Dr. Hammer testified that a mildly retarded 
individual can qualify for a driver‘s license and that licensed-driver 
status is not a good criterion for distinguishing between people who 
are and are not retarded. 
 
 
. . . . 
The trial court‘s analysis was also misdirected in stressing that 
White‘s family and peers did not perceive White to be lacking in 
adaptive behavior skills.  Both experts testified that laymen cannot 
easily recognize mild mental retardation. . . . 
. . .  In light of [Dr. Hammer‘s] unrebutted testimony, the 
impressions of White‘s peers . . . lend no support to the findings of the 
trial court. 
 
White, 885 N.E.2d at 914-15 (emphasis added).  While the Ohio Supreme Court 
recognized that a trial court is the trier of fact, the court concluded that the trial 
court abused its discretion in making this determination by disregarding ―credible 
and uncontradicted expert testimony in favor of . . . the court‘s own expectations of 
how a mentally retarded person would behave.‖  Id. at 915.   
 
In this case, the trial court likewise erred in failing to properly evaluate Dr. 
Keyes‘ objective testimony in regard to deficits in adaptive functioning.  Although 
the trial court stated that Dr. Keyes provided a ―great deal of substantive 
 
- 49 - 
information about mental retardation‖ and found that his opinion was entitled to 
moderate weight and was ―very useful in arriving at a legal conclusion,‖ these 
findings are in seeming contradiction to the trial court‘s ultimate findings that the 
defendant failed to produce sufficient evidence that his adaptive behavior is 
impaired to the degree necessary to support a finding of mental retardation, either 
under the clear and convincing standard or under the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.  The trial court does not explain whether it found the State‘s 
expert witnesses to be more credible on the topic of adaptive behavior.  Further, 
the trial court does not appear to provide an underlying reason for discounting any 
of Dufour‘s lay and expert witness testimony regarding adaptive behavior.   
In this regard, there was significant evidence supporting a claim of deficits 
in adaptive functioning.  Dr. Keyes conducted adaptive functioning testing on 
Dufour and as part of the assessment, interviewed Dufour, two inmates on death 
row whose cells were adjacent to Dufour‘s, and two individuals who knew Dufour 
prior to the age of 18.  On the tests administered by Dr. Keyes, Dufour ultimately 
scored more than two standard deviations below the mean on the General Adaptive 
Composite, which is consistent with mental retardation.  Further, various witnesses 
established that Dufour never lived alone, always relied on others for help and 
support, was not in charge of paying bills, never held a job for more than a few 
months, and never had a checking account, and that the jobs he did hold were 
 
- 50 - 
menial, he was easily led around and influenced by others, and he was always 
more comfortable playing with children.  Even State witness Dr. McClaren agreed 
that Dufour‘s history of academic failure and menial jobs, along with his history of 
poor relationships, could be consistent with a diagnosis of mental retardation.  The 
evidence demonstrates that Dufour has significant adaptive functioning limitations 
in communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-
direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.   
The testimony also established that Dufour demonstrated ―abysmal‖ 
academic performance in school.  He failed kindergarten and had to repeat second 
grade.  He never passed second grade, but instead was ―placed‖ for the remainder 
of elementary school.  Dufour was also in the lowest level of classes, i.e., basic.  
Dufour‘s basic English teacher in seventh grade, Joyce Jones, described Dufour‘s 
mental abilities as below average and thought he was ―very possibly‖ mentally 
retarded.  She also described him as immature, ―like a little kid.‖  She did not 
remember Dufour having any friends.  Dufour did not graduate from vocational 
technical school.  Further, evidence demonstrated that Dufour has difficulty with 
spelling, punctuation, and grammar and reads at a basic level.   
While there is evidence that Dufour learned to perform small-engine repair 
while incarcerated, even the State‘s expert witness Dr. Merin acknowledged that 
people with mental retardation can also be taught carpentry skills, how to fix 
 
- 51 - 
complex items, work in a stockroom, and drive an automobile.  While I 
acknowledge evidence that the defendant obtained his GED is relevant to the 
court‘s inquiry, this fact alone does not eliminate a finding that Dufour was 
mentally retarded, especially in light of his overall academic performance and his 
uncontroverted significantly subaverage IQ of under 70.  Additionally, the majority 
opinion discusses the significance and difficulty as to the specific version of the 
GED that Dufour was given based on non-record evidence, which neither the State 
nor its witnesses presented or discussed.  Attributing significance to the GED that 
was not specifically argued, based on non-record evidence, deprives Dufour of the 
opportunity to explain or counter these conclusions. 
Finally, and importantly, the trial court committed a significant error in its 
analysis of this prong by rejecting the deficits in adaptive behavior based on an 
―alternative explanation‖ for the deficits.  Specifically, the trial court found any 
deficits in Dufour‘s adaptive behavior were not caused by mental retardation, but 
were the consequence of intense drug use and his ―deplorable home environment.‖  
The majority perpetuates the error by accepting these findings.  Contrary to the 
trial court and the majority, nothing within the plain language of section 921.137 or 
rule 3.203 requires proof as to the causation of deficits in adaptive functioning—
only that the defendant has such deficits.  In determining whether a defendant has 
shown mental retardation, this Court is confined to the statutory definition of 
 
- 52 - 
―mental retardation‖ and is not at liberty to add additional requirements or 
exceptions to the definition.   
Nothing within the statutory requirements or within the clinical definition of 
mental retardation supports the theory that determining the cause of the deficits is a 
part of the inquiry in determining mental retardation.  Moreover, the trial court 
does not rely on any expert opinion to support its conclusion that alternative 
explanations can disqualify a person who otherwise would be considered mentally 
retarded based on meeting each prong in the statutory definition of the term.  
 The statute and rule define mental retardation as a condition that meets the 
above three prongs, without specifying the origin of the disability.9  In this case, 
Dr. Keyes, a very qualified expert in mental retardation, explained that Dufour has 
numerous risk factors for mental retardation: traumatic brain injury before the age 
of 18, malnutrition, an impaired childcare giver (his alcoholic abusive father), lack 
of adequate stimulation, domestic violence, and child abuse.   
Specifically, there was evidence that after he was born, Dufour suffered 
from traumatic brain damage from an unidentified source, lacked adequate 
stimulation, was abused as a child, and suffered multiple head injuries, both before 
                                          
 
 
9.  In fact, approximately forty to fifty percent of the causes of mental 
retardation have no identifiable origin.  See Am. Ass‘n on Intellectual & 
Developmental Disabilities, FAQ on Intellectual Disability, 
http://www.aaidd.org/content_104.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).   
 
- 53 - 
and after the age of 18.  Further, Dufour started using alcohol and drugs at a very 
young age, including inhaling toluene or glue at the age of ten.  In other words, his 
―deplorable home environment‖ and intense drug use may have been contributing 
factors to his mental retardation, but those risk factors are not a basis to reject a 
finding of mental retardation. 
The Eighth Amendment‘s protection against execution afforded to mentally 
retarded individuals does not depend on the cause of the mental retardation. 
Further, a trial court‘s approach relating to alternative explanations has the 
potential to place a significant and unnecessary roadblock in front of a defendant 
who is attempting to establish mental retardation.  A capital defendant who 
attempts to establish that he is mentally retarded may have multiple risk factors for 
mental retardation in his or her background such as abusive childhood (with 
physical and sexual abuse), lack of childhood stimulation (including abandonment 
and neglect by parents), and substance abuse.  The linchpin for the deficits in 
adaptive behavior and significantly subaverage IQ is that both of these prongs must 
have been manifested before the age of 18.  The cause of the deficits in adaptive 
behavior is not part of the inquiry as long as the defendant can prove he meets all 
three prongs.  
In conclusion, I believe that this Court would be well-served in remanding 
this case for a reevaluation of the evidence presented so that we can be assured that 
 
- 54 - 
findings regarding mental retardation are based on solid, scientifically acceptable 
explanations.  While it may very well be that the totality of the circumstances 
supports a finding that Dufour is not mentally retarded, this review should occur 
after the trial court reevaluates the IQ and adaptive behavior prongs.  Therefore, for 
the reasons expressed above, I would remand for a reevaluation of the evidence by 
the trial court.  
QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concurs. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Lawrence Kirkwood, Judge – Case No. 82-5467 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Maria D. Chamberlin and 
Marie-Louise Samuels-Parmer, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Joe Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Scott A. Browne, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
Gretchen S. Sween, of Dechert, LLP, Austin, Texas, and George G. Gordon of 
Dechert, LLP, Philadelphia, PA., on behalf of The American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae