Title: Milton v. Mitchell

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Milton v. Mitchell1988 WY 123762 P.2d 372Case Number: 87-95Decided: 10/04/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
JULIAN A. MILTON, JR., 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

CHARLES A. MITCHELL, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Kennard F. 
Nelson, Kirkwood, Copenhaver & Nelson, 
Laramie, for appellant.

William M. 
McKellar, Lathrop & Uchner, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J.*, 
Retired.

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The narrow question to 
be decided in this case is whether the phrase "scope of his duties" found in § 
1-39-114, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987), and used throughout the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-120, W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 
1987), is interchangeable with the term "scope of employment." Julian A. Milton, 
Jr. (Milton) filed an action against Charles A. 
Mitchell (Mitchell) seeking damages, in the alternative, for negligence in 
representing to Milton that he had been employed 
as a teacher in the Laramie school system, or for breach of an 
implied contract of employment. Mitchell moved for summary judgment, invoking 
the one-year statute of limitations prescribed in § 1-39-114, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1987). The district court found that Mitchell "was not acting outside 
the scope of his employment" in the course of his dealings with Milton, and it 
held that summary judgment was appropriate because Milton's action was filed 
more than one year after he filed a claim pursuant to § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1987). We conclude that "scope of employment" is a different standard 
from "scope of duty," and it is not properly invoked for purposes of applying 
the statute of limitations found in § 1-39-114, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987). We 
reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for a decision on the 
merits.

[¶2.]     In his brief, Milton states the issue in 
this way:

"Did the district court 
err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether 
or not a school principal was acting within the scope of his employment in 
confirming employment as a teacher to plaintiff, without approval by the board 
of education?"

Mitchell's Brief 
of Appellee restates the question very simply in this way:

"Whether the district 
court was correct in granting Mitchell's motion for summary 
judgment."

[¶3.]     Apparently, during his 
last year at the University of 
Wyoming, Milton was employed as an assistant coach for 
the football and track programs and as head coach for the skiing program by 
Albany County School District No. 1. That employment covered the school year of 
1983-1984. Early in the summer of 1984, Milton, who then had graduated and was 
certified as a teacher, was interviewed by Mitchell in connection with a 
potential teaching position at LaramieHigh 
School which included coaching responsibilities. 
Mitchell was the principal at LaramieHigh 
School. The interview of Milton by Mitchell was conducted at LaramieHigh 
School during normal business hours, and nothing suggests that 
Mitchell represented himself in any way other than as the principal of 
LaramieHigh School. At the end of 
the interview, Mitchell offered the teaching position to Milton and told Milton that the employment would have to be 
approved by the Board of Trustees. Mitchell stated, however, that such approval 
was "a mere formality," and Milton contends that he understood that the 
teaching position was his.

[¶4.]     Milton then discontinued his efforts to obtain teaching 
positions with other school districts and began preparing to teach and coach at 
LaramieHigh School. Sometime prior 
to June 14, 1984, Milton requested a verification 
of his employment, apparently for two purposes: he wished to establish that he 
was a resident for purposes of enrollment in a computer class at the University of Wyoming, and he also was applying for a 
home loan. About June 14, 1984, the following letter, which was signed by 
Mitchell, was furnished to Milton:

"TO WHOM IT MAY 
CONCERN:

"For the school year of 
1984-85, Mr. Julian A. Milton will be working in the Business Department of 
Laramie Senior High School in a teaching position."

Then, about 
mid-July, 1984, Milton was advised that the Board 
of Trustees had not accepted his application, which meant that he did not have a 
teaching position with LaramieHigh 
School.

[¶5.]     Section 21-3-110, W.S. 
1977 (July 1986 Repl.), requires:

"(a) The board of 
trustees in each school district shall:

"(i) Prescribe and 
enforce rules, regulations, and policies for its own government and for the 
government of the schools under its jurisdiction; * * *."

Consistently 
with this legislative mandate, the Board of Trustees for Albany County School 
District No. 1 had adopted "School District Rules, Regulations, and Statements 
of Policy." Pertinent provisions of those Rules, Regulations, and Statements of 
Policy specify:

"CHAPTER 
I

"BY-LAWS OF THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION

* * * * * 
*

"CHAPTER 
II

"SCHOOL DISTRICT RULES, REGULATIONS, AND STATEMENTS OF 
POLICY

* * * * * 
*

"The Board delegates all 
executive, supervisory and instructional authority to its employees as 
hereinafter specified; but retains all other authority over the schools as 
provided by law.

* * * * * 
*

"d. The Board shall have the following specific 
powers and responsibilities, together with all others provided by 
law:

* * * * * 
*

"(6) Employ a superintendent of schools, 
teachers, principals, other certified professional employees, and other 
personnel; and determine their salaries.

* * * * * 
*

"(14) Adopt policies for 
the operation of the district, consistent with the laws of the State of 
Wyoming.

* * * * * 
*

"Section 3. Superintendent of Schools. The 
Superintendent shall be the chief executive officer of the Board of Education 
and the administrative head of all divisions and departments of the school 
system.

* * * * * 
*

"The appointment of the 
Superintendent of Schools shall be the responsibility of the Board of Education. 
* * *

"It shall be the responsibility of the 
Superintendent of Schools to nominate for appointment all personnel employed by 
the school district. Whenever possible those who are to be the supervisors of 
the person to be employed shall be consulted during the selection 
process.

"The Superintendent shall recommend personnel 
for appointment, * * *.

* * * * * 
*

"CHAPTER 
III

"INSTRUCTIONAL 
PROGRAM

"Section 1. Principals. The chief administrative 
officer in each school shall be the Principal, and he shall be directly responsible to the 
Superintendent of Schools. The Principal shall be the educational leader in 
his building as well as the chief administrative officer.

* * * * * 
*

"Duties and 
responsibilities of the Principal shall be as follows:

* * * * * 
*

"b. Within the limits of the laws, Board 
regulations and policies, and administrative instructions from the central 
office, he shall be the final administrative authority in his 
school.

* * * * * 
*

"t. He shall perform such other duties as the 
Superintendent may direct.

* * * * * 
*

"CHAPTER 
VII

"PERSONNEL 
POLICIES

"1. Employment of Certificated Personnel. It 
is recognized that, to a great extent, the quality of instruction is related to 
the quality of personnel in the district. The district shall make a strong 
effort to recruit highly qualified personnel and to assign them to positions 
wherein they can make their maximum contribution.

* * * * * 
*

"b. Selection and 
Appointment. The recruitment and 
selection of personnel are responsibilities of the Superintendent of Schools. 
Insofar as is possible, the Superintendent of Schools shall consult with 
appropriate administrative staff members regarding candidates and receive their 
recommendations regarding the hiring of personnel. "Appointments shall be made 
by the Board of Education upon the recommendation of the Superintendent of 
Schools." (Emphasis added.)

These Rules, 
Regulations, and Statements of Policy are consistent with the powers provided 
for boards of trustees in § 21-3-111, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987), and there is 
no provision for delegation of the appointing authority to either the 
superintendent of schools or the principal of a school.

[¶6.]     Not quite a year later, 
Milton, on May 3, 1985, filed a claim with the Board of Trustees of Albany 
County School District No. 1, as prescribed by § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1987).1 The claim asserted that: Mitchell 
had offered Milton the teaching position, which was in the Business Department 
of Laramie High School, with additional duties of coaching the ski and track 
teams; Milton had accepted the offer of employment; Mitchell assured Milton that 
"the position was his and that the approval of the Board of Trustees was a mere 
formality;" Mitchell had signed and furnished to Milton a letter confirming the 
fact of employment; Milton had discontinued all efforts to obtain other teaching 
positions; and, on or about July 13, 1984, for reasons unknown to claimant, the 
Board of Trustees would not hire him. In paragraph five of the claim, Milton 
stated:

"The damages incurred by 
claimant were proximately caused by the negligence of Charles A. Mitchell, an 
employee of Albany County School District No. 1, who was acting within the scope 
and course of his employment or by the breach of the contract implied by the 
conduct outlined in paragraph 3 hereof."

While the denial 
of this claim is not documented in the record, the parties do not disagree with 
respect to the fact that it was denied.

[¶7.]     Presumably after the 
claim was denied, Milton, on July 2, 1986, filed an action in the 
district court against Mitchell personally, and the complaint alleged both 
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. The essential facts parallel those 
of the earlier claim. One contrasting allegation, however, was that, in the 
complaint, Milton charged that "[d]efendant's 
actions as above stated were outside the scope of his duties as principal of 
LaramieHigh School." Mitchell 
answered this complaint, generally denying most of Milton's allegations and 
raising several affirmative defenses included the defense of bar by the statute 
of limitations.

[¶8.]     Limited discovery was 
accomplished, and Mitchell filed a motion for summary judgment supported by his 
affidavit, excerpts from Milton's deposition, and a memorandum of law. 
The thrust of Mitchell's legal position was that Milton had failed to file the action within a 
year after the date his claim was filed in accordance with § 1-39-114, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1987), and that the action was barred by virtue of the statute.2 Mitchell also contended that there 
was no evidence demonstrating any genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
he acted within the scope of his employment in offering the teaching position to 
Milton and, in the absence of any such issue of fact, the statute of limitations 
provided in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act required that summary judgment 
be entered in his favor. Mitchell's motion was opposed by Milton who filed 
additional excerpts from his deposition, portions of the By-laws, Rules, 
Regulations, and Statements of Policy of the Board of Education, Albany County 
School District No. 1, Laramie, Wyoming, and his own memorandum of law. 
Milton's position was that the board documents 
demonstrated that a school principal had no authority to hire teachers and, for 
that reason, Mitchell was outside the scope of his employment when he assured 
Milton that he 
had been hired as a teacher. Milton contended that, because Mitchell was 
outside of the scope of his employment, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
including its statute of limitations, did not apply.

[¶9.]     In presenting their 
positions on the motion for summary judgment, Mitchell and Milton both argued 
the question of fraudulent misrepresentation. Mitchell contended that there was 
no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation, while Milton argued to the 
contrary. With respect to that claim, the district court entered a partial 
summary judgment in which it found there was no genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation, and Mitchell was 
entitled to judgment under the law. Subsequently, the court dismissed the claim 
of fraudulent misrepresentation by agreement of the 
parties.

[¶10.]  After Milton's response, Mitchell filed an Affidavit 
of Leonard Hall, an assistant superintendent of schools for Albany County School 
District No. 1, who was acting as the superintendent at that time. Hall's 
affidavit asserted his personal knowledge of the policies and procedures of the 
school district and, among other things, he said that Mitchell "acted within the 
scope of his employment as Principal of Laramie High School and within the scope 
of duties delegated to him by the Superintendent of Schools for Albany County 
School District No. 1."

[¶11.]  In its decision letter, the district 
court articulated the only remaining issue as:

"Was the defendant, 
Charles A. Mitchell, Principal of Laramie Senior High School, acting within the 
scope of his employment when he engaged in negotiations to hire the plaintiff, 
Julian A. Mitchell, Jr., as a teacher and coach? If so, the claim is barred 
because suit was not brought by the plaintiff, in compliance with the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, (W.S. 1-39-102, et seq.). If defendant exceeded the 
scope of his employment, then compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act is not required and plaintiff's claim is not barred and 
survives."

The decision 
letter went on to encompass a finding that Mitchell was acting on behalf of the 
school system and that he "had the right to participate * * * in the interview 
process and make recommendations and representations" regarding Mitchell's 
employment. In a dispositive vein, the decision letter then 
said:

"Though the defendant may 
have been inaccurate in his prediction that plaintiff would be employed by the 
School Board, he was not acting outside the scope of his employment when he made 
those representations to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court concludes the 
defendant was acting on behalf of the school system and under the expressed 
delegation by the Superintendent at all times during his contacts with the 
plaintiff."

Ultimately, the 
court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations 
controlled.

[¶12.]  The court then entered an order granting 
Mitchell's motion for summary judgment. It found that there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, incorporating by reference the reasons set forth in the 
decision letter. The order then concluded that, as a matter of law, the one-year 
statute of limitations had run prior to the filing of Milton's action. This 
appeal is taken from that order.

[¶13.]  In the district court and in this court, 
the parties have earnestly debated the question of whether Mitchell was acting 
in the "scope of his employment." Any reference to the phrase "scope of duties" 
appear to be almost incidental. The focus of the argument of the parties, 
coupled with the casual substitution by this court of "scope of employment" in 
discussing immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act,3 well may have mislead the district 
judge into the application of an erroneous legal standard.

[¶14.]  Both Milton and Mitchell rely upon Miller 
v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, 598 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1979), as the precedent that controls the 
disposition of this case. Milton insists that, under that case, the 
determination of whether Mitchell was acting in the scope of employment is a 
question of fact that must be submitted to the jury, foreclosing summary 
judgment. Mitchell acknowledges the general proposition that the question of 
whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment normally is a 
question of fact for the jury, but Mitchell contends that, if only one inference 
reasonably can be drawn from the facts, the question becomes one of law for the 
court, citing Combined Insurance Company of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 
(Wyo. 1978). 

[¶15.]  We discern a difference in purpose 
between the term "scope of employment," as applied in Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth 
Company, supra, and the term "scope of duties," as used in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. As the concept of scope of employment was presented in 
Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, supra, the question to be solved was the 
vicarious liability of a master for the conduct of his servant under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. In that case, the term "scope of employment" as 
set forth in 1 Restatement (Second) of Agency 2d §§ 228-236 at 504-524 (1958) 
was discussed. The opinion also cited and quoted from Combined Insurance Company 
of America v. Sinclair, supra. In 
resolving the question of vicarious liability, this court concluded that an 
employee acts within the scope of his employment:

"If, at the time of the 
accident, the employee is engaged in furthering the employer's business 
interests, and with respect thereto the employer has the right to control the 
details of the work and to discharge the employee for failing to follow orders 
without incurring liability, * * *." Combined Insurance Company of 
America v. Sinclair, supra, 584 P.2d  
at 1043.

[¶16.]  There is an obvious and marked difference 
between the criteria that are invoked to determine whether an employee is acting 
within the "scope of his employment" and those matters that are described in the 
statutory definition of "scope of duties." Section 1-39-103, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1987), the definition section of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
provides in subsection (a)(v):

"`Scope of duties' means 
performing any duties which a governmental entity requests, requires or 
authorizes a public employee to perform regardless of the time and place of 
performance; * * *."

This statutory 
standard is invoked to determine whether the provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act apply. The act has a dual effect. One is to avoid the 
potential defense of immunity to the claim of a third person. Equally important, 
however, is the protection afforded to the employee because, if the act applies, 
the employee is indemnified by the State of Wyoming, an automatic invocation of vicarious 
liability.

[¶17.]  The concept that is represented by the 
enactment of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is one of a limited waiver of 
immunity, and the statute appropriately is construed in a confined way. An 
analysis of the School District Rules, Regulations, and Statements of Policy, 
incorporated in the record, demonstrates that Mitchell could not have been 
requested, required or authorized to enter into a contract of employment for a 
teaching position with Milton. The Rules, Regulations, and Statements 
of Policy clearly assign that function to the Board of Trustees. Since Mitchell 
could not have been requested, required, or authorized to make a contract with 
Milton, if he did so, he could not have been acting within the scope of his 
duties as a public employee, and the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, including 
the one-year period of limitations found in § 1-39-114, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1987), would not apply.

[¶18.]  The concept of a statutory waiver of 
governmental immunity is not novel and, in view of the approach taken in other 
states, it is not likely that the Wyoming legislature intended the phrase "scope 
of duties" to be the same as "scope of employment." We note that other state 
legislatures have used different and broader definitions with respect to the 
extent of immunity provided to employees. See e.g., § 24-10-110, Colo. Rev. 
Stat. (Cum.Supp. 1987) (during the performance of the employee's duties and 
within the scope of his employment); § 6-904, Idaho Code Ann. (Cum.Supp. 1987) 
(within the course and scope of the employee's employment and without malice or 
criminal intent); § 2-9-305, Mont. Code Ann. (1987) (within the course and scope 
of the employee's office or employment); § 81-8,219, Neb. Rev. Stat. (1987) (act 
or omission of an employee exercising due care in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not the statute or regulation is valid, an act based upon 
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty whether or not the discretion is abused); § 
32-12.1-04, N.D. Cent. Code (Cum.Supp. 1987) (within the scope of the employee's 
employment or office); § 21-32-17, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. (1987 Rev.) (within 
the scope of the employee's employment or agency); § 63-30-4, Utah Code Ann. 
(1986 Repl.) (within the scope of the employee's employment or under color of 
authority).

[¶19.]  We recognize that, even if an erroneous 
standard was applied by the district court in concluding that Milton's claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations, we still could affirm the decision if it 
could be sustained on any legal grounds appearing in the record. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1987); DeWald v. State, supra; 
Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 1985). As we 
perceive this case, however, the affirmation would have to relate to the merits 
of Milton's 
claim. The record, from Milton's point of view, 
is that Mitchell assured him that he was employed as a teacher and coach for 
LaramieHigh School. Certainly, the 
letter which Mitchell signed lends credence to Milton's position. From Mitchell's point of 
view, he stated in his affidavit that he had not created an impression with 
Milton that he 
was acting in any manner other than that consistent with the Rules, Regulations, 
and Statements of Policy. He insists that his participation in the discussions 
with Milton was 
appropriate and did not contravene Board policy. Leonard Hall's affidavit would 
appear to support the Mitchell position in this regard. The only resolution that 
can be made of this dichotomy in perception of the facts is that, as to the 
merits of Milton's claim, there does appear to be a 
genuine issue of material fact.

[¶20.]  Mitchell also contends that, in any 
event, Milton is estopped from asserting that he acted outside the scope of his 
employment or, more correctly, the scope of his duties because of the allegation 
in Milton's claim that he had been injured due to Mitchell's actions as "an 
employee of Albany County School District No. 1, who was acting within the scope 
and course of his employment * * *." We acknowledge that this court does not 
look with favor upon a party's altering a position to suit the interests of his 
case. See Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 
1978); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1976). We note, however, that Milton did not assert in 
his claim that Mitchell was acting within the "scope of his duties" and, in this 
instance, the invocation of the doctrine of estoppel would not be appropriate 
because our rules of alternative pleading accommodate such inconsistent 
contentions. That specific approach is authorized by Rule 8(e), W.R.C.P., and is 
not the same as the changing of statements of fact in separate proceedings 
described in Gray v. Fitzhugh, supra.

[¶21.]  We reverse the summary judgment entered 
by the district court and remand this case for a consideration on the merits of 
the remaining claims set forth in Milton's complaint. The application of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, including the one-year statute of limitations, 
is not appropriate in this instance because the allegations of Milton's 
complaint, accepted as true, together with the supporting information considered 
by the district court in connection with the motion for summary judgment, failed 
to demonstrate that Mitchell acted within the "scope of his 
duties."

BROWN, J., Retired, filed a 
dissenting opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 1-39-113, W.S. 
1977, (Cum.Supp. 1987), provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
* * *."

2 Section 1-39-114, W.S. 
1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987), provides, in pertinent part:

"Except as otherwise 
provided, actions against a government entity or a public employee acting within 
the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are 
subject to this act shall be forever barred unless commenced within one (1) year 
after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 
1-39-113."

3 See DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986); Matthews v. Wyoming 
Department of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 
1986) (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827 (Wyo. 
1985); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, reh. denied 701 P.2d 1139 
(Wyo. 
1985).

BROWN, Justice,1 dissenting.

1 Chief Justice, Retired, 
June 30, 1988.

[¶22.]  I respectfully dissent. The trial court 
identified the issue in this case as:

Was the defendant Charles 
A. Mitchell, Principal of Laramie Senior High School, acting within the scope of 
his employment when he engaged in negotiations to hire the plaintiff, Julian A. 
Milton, Jr., as a teacher and coach? If so, the claim is barred because suit was 
not brought by the plaintiff in compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act (W.S. 1-39-102, et seq.). If defendant exceeded the scope of his employment, 
then compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is not required and 
plaintiff's claim is not barred and survives.

 

[¶23.]  In making his decision, the trial court 
analyzed the case and held as follows:

The Superintendent of 
Schools has the responsibility "to nominate for appointment all personnel 
employed by the School District ("Policies", 
Chapter 11, Section 3)["]. Furthermore, the Rules provide that: "Whenever 
possible those who are to be the supervisors of the person to be employed shall 
be consulted during the selection process," (Id.) and ". . . the superintendent has the 
responsibility to direct a program of recruitment and selection of personnel." 
[Id. at 
(d)].

The Principal of a school 
has specific duties and responsibilities outlined in Chapter III of the 
"Policies." The Principal serves as ". . . the supervisor of the teaching in his 
school." [Chapter III, Section 1(k)]. Additionally, under Chapter III, Section 
1, subparagraph "t" the Principal shall perform such other duties as the 
Superintendent may direct.

In this case, there is no 
question that the defendant was acting on behalf of the school system when he 
interacted with the plaintiff. He was not acting on his own. Plaintiff argues 
that while he may have been acting on behalf of the school system, in so doing 
he exceeded the scope of his prescribed duties. Again, this Court does not 
agree. Leonard Hall, Assistant Superin[ten]dent, filed an affidavit attesting to 
the Principal's role in the employment process. The Court concludes that under 
the aegis of Chapter III, Section 1, subparagraph "t," and by virtue of the 
delegation of the Superintendent, the defendant had the right to participate as 
he did in the interview process and make recommendations and representations 
regarding employment of the plaintiff.

Though the defendant may 
have been inaccurate in his prediction that plaintiff would be employed by the 
School Board, he was not acting outside the scope of his employment when he made 
those representations to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 
the defendant was acting on behalf of the school system and under the expressed 
delegation by the Superintendent at all times during his contacts with the 
plaintiff.

[¶24.]  I believe that the trial court correctly 
determined this case. I would affirm his decision.