Title: Commonwealth v. Morris

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12835 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEROME MORRIS. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     November 7, 2022. - July 25, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & 
Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Electronic Surveillance.  Telephone.  
Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of 
constitutional rights.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Tape recording, Redirect examination.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, 
Admissions and confessions, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 2, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J., and the cases were tried before 
Gregg J. Pasquale, J. 
 
 
Cathryn A. Neaves for the defendant. 
 
Mary Nguyen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Jerome Morris, was convicted 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation in connection with the August 2014 shooting of the 
2 
 
victim, Quentin Phillip.1  Following a verbal altercation with 
the victim outside a bar in Brockton, the defendant walked away, 
retrieved a firearm from a friend, and converged on a vehicle in 
which the victim and his three friends were sitting.  The victim 
was seated in the rear passenger's seat; the defendant took aim 
at the rear passenger's seat window and fired at least two shots 
at the window.  One hit the victim in the chest, killing him.  
The defendant, who was caught on a video surveillance camera 
arguing with the victim and then retrieving a firearm just prior 
to the killing, admitted to discharging the firearm at the 
vehicle's window during a police station interrogation following 
his arrest and waiver of his Miranda rights; the surveillance 
camera footage and a recording of the interrogation were 
introduced at trial.  The defendant argued at trial that the 
killing occurred in self-defense, contending that he believed 
the victim was armed. 
 
On his direct appeal, the defendant contends that his 
statement at the police station should have been suppressed 
because police officers impermissibly recorded it without his 
express consent, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 99 (wiretap 
statute).  In addition, he maintains that the statement should 
 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm and unlawful discharge of a firearm within 500 feet of 
a building. 
3 
 
have been suppressed because he was not informed promptly of his 
right to make a telephone call and only was permitted a call 
after his interrogation, in violation of G. L. c. 276, § 33A.  
He further asserts that the prosecutor improperly referred to 
omissions in his statement to police officers.  The defendant 
also asks the court to exercise its authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new 
trial.  Finally, the defendant requests that we vacate his 
conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm in light of our 
recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 
(2023).  We affirm the convictions other than the unlawful 
possession conviction and discern no reason to grant relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts are 
supported by the evidence admitted at trial.  Certain details 
are reserved for discussion of specific issues. 
 
i.  Surveillance footage and witness testimony.  Shortly 
after 2:10 A.M. on August 9, 2014, the victim was fatally shot 
in the chest while seated in the rear passenger's seat of a 
vehicle that was exiting the parking lot of a Brockton bar. 
 
Approximately twenty minutes prior to the killing, the 
victim and the defendant verbally argued outside the bar.  
During the confrontation, which lasted several minutes, the 
victim looked angry, but the defendant appeared calm.  The 
4 
 
victim called the defendant a "bitch" in an aggravated tone.  
Surveillance footage of the argument captured the victim waving 
his arms and appearing to push the defendant. 
 
The defendant and the victim separated; the victim went to 
a vehicle with his friends.  The victim initially stood outside 
the vehicle, seemingly frustrated and angry.  The victim then 
sat in the rear passenger's seat, talking to his friends, and 
making plans for where next to go.  The vehicle doors were 
closed, and the windows, which were "very" tinted, were shut.  
The victim asked one friend to "pass [him] that"; the friend 
responded by telling the victim, "Chill."  The victim said, "I 
don't trust these n*ggas," a phrase he repeated multiple times. 
 
Meanwhile, the defendant retrieved an item, later 
determined to be a firearm, from one of his friends in the 
parking lot.  With the firearm in hand, the defendant walked 
toward the vehicle in which the victim's group were sitting. 
 
The victim's group, which had been waiting in the vehicle 
for another friend, soon learned that the friend would not join 
them; the defendant silently approached the rear passenger's 
window next to where the victim was sitting.  The victim either 
was using his cell phone or was talking to the other passengers 
about their plans.  The victim had his hand in his pocket.  He 
5 
 
was not facing the window.2  Upon noticing the defendant 
approaching, the victim said, "What's wrong with these dudes?" 
and one of the victim's friends either warned, "[Y]our people's 
coming to the door," or asked, "What does he want?"  As the 
vehicle was slowly driven out of the parking lot, the defendant 
fired multiple gunshots into the rear passenger's side window; 
one bullet struck the victim in the chest. 
 
The defendant fled.  Surveillance footage shows the 
defendant handing the firearm to someone and continuing to run 
away. 
 
Minutes later, the victim arrived at a hospital, where he 
was pronounced dead.  The cause of death was a gunshot wound to 
the chest. 
 
The victim was not seen with a firearm that night, no 
firearm was seen or found in the vehicle, and no gunshot residue 
was found on the victim's hands. 
 
ii.  Defendant's statement.  The defendant was identified 
from the surveillance footage by the mother of one of his 
children.  He was arrested, and after being given the Miranda 
warnings and waiving his rights, the defendant was interviewed 
at a police station.  The interrogation was audio and video 
 
 
2 A medical examiner later testified that the victim was 
shot from the front, but at an angle, with the bullet entering 
the top of his right chest and exiting the bottom of his left 
chest. 
6 
 
recorded; a redacted copy of the recording was played for the 
jury.  In the interrogation, the defendant admitted that he 
fired two shots at the vehicle window, behind which sat the 
victim. 
 
The defendant explained that, prior to the shooting, he 
"went outside to talk with" the victim after the victim "called 
[him] outside."  The victim asked the defendant if the two of 
them "had a problem"; the defendant responded that if they did, 
he "would've [already] did [sic] something to [the victim]."  
The victim called the defendant "soft" and a "bitch," and he 
stated that the defendant would not have done anything.  At that 
moment, the defendant offered to fight the victim; but the 
victim refused, asserting that he did not want to ruin his 
night.  The victim also said, "I'm a see you when I see you," 
"You already know what time it is with me," and "When I see you, 
it's on."  The victim told the defendant that he "stays with 
it," which the defendant understood to mean that the victim had 
a firearm that night. 
 
The defendant claimed that he was worried that something 
would happen to him -- that he would be "caught in the 
crossfire" -- and that he "just honestly thought about [his] 
kids."  The defendant explained that the victim was "a shooter," 
unlikely to engage in hand-to-hand fighting; the defendant did 
7 
 
not want someone like that "on [his] back . . . [t]rying to 
shoot at [him] while [he's] with [his] family." 
 
The defendant continued, asserting that he saw the victim 
behind a vehicle looking at him, "acting mad shifty," and 
"making motions . . . like he was about to do something" or 
"take cover."  The defendant thought the victim was "acting 
kinda funny like he got somethin' or somethin'," as if "he had a 
weapon."  The defendant claimed that he was going to leave, 
because he did not have a weapon and he thought that the victim 
did, but he was worried that the victim was waiting for him. 
 
The defendant said that he had told his friends what had 
transpired with the victim; they asked him if he was going to 
"let that shit ride."  Responding, he said he was not going to 
"try to run up on somebody [he felt] as though had a weapon on 
him."  One of the defendant's friends offered the defendant a 
firearm, which he took, saying, "Let me see it.  I'm gonna go 
see what's up."  The defendant walked to the passenger's side of 
a vehicle and shot twice at the rear window, behind which sat 
the victim.  The defendant then handed the firearm to someone 
and fled. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on one 
count of murder, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; one count of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a); and one count of unlawful discharge of a firearm 
8 
 
within 500 feet of a building, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 12E.  The defendant filed a motion to suppress his postarrest 
statement to investigators, which was denied after an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a redacted recording 
of the defendant's interrogation.  The jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation; the defendant was sentenced to life without 
parole.3  The defendant timely appealed, and subsequently filed 
in this court a motion for a new trial, submitting arguments 
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 208-209 
(1981).4 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant raises several 
issues, as set forth supra.  We address each in turn. 
 
a.  Motion to suppress statements made to investigators.  
The defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying his 
 
 
3 The defendant also was found guilty of unlawful possession 
of a firearm and unlawful discharge of a firearm within 500 feet 
of a building.  The defendant was sentenced to a term of from 
two and one-half years to two and one-half years and a day in 
State prison, concurrent with his life sentence, as to the 
former, and to a term of three months in the house of correction 
as to the latter, deemed served at the time of sentencing. 
 
 
4 See Moffett, 383 Mass. at 208 ("If appointed counsel, on 
grounds of professional ethics deems it absolutely necessary to 
dissociate himself or herself from purportedly frivolous points, 
counsel may so state in a preface to the brief," but still 
should "present the [points] succinctly in the brief"). 
 
9 
 
motion to suppress his postarrest statements to investigators on 
two grounds, discussed infra.  "In reviewing a decision on a 
motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings 
absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [the] 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (citation and 
quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
429, 431 (2015).5  We review video footage independently.  See 
Commonwealth v. Yusuf, 488 Mass. 379, 380-381 (2021).  And "[w]e 
review questions of statutory interpretation de novo."  
Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 331 
(2021). 
 
i.  Recording under wiretap statute.  The defendant argues 
that the recording of his police station statement, after police 
officers read to him, and he waived, his Miranda rights, was a 
"secret recording" prohibited by the wiretap statute.  
 
 
5 We supplement the motion judge's subsidiary findings with 
"evidence from the record that 'is uncontroverted and undisputed 
and where the judge explicitly or implicitly credited the 
witness's testimony.'"  Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 431, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 
Mass. 818 (2008).  We do so "only so long as the supplemented 
facts 'do not detract from the judge's ultimate findings.'"  
Jones-Pannell, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 
121, 127-128 (2015).  
 
10 
 
Accordingly, he maintains that his motion to suppress the 
recording should have been allowed.6 
A.  Wiretap statute.  The wiretap statute makes it a crime 
to "willfully commit[] an interception . . . of any . . . oral 
communication."  G. L. c. 272, § 99 C 1.  The term 
"interception" is defined as "to . . . secretly record . . . the 
contents of any . . . oral communication through the use of any 
intercepting device by any person other than a person given 
prior authority by all parties to such communication."  G. L. 
c. 272, § 99 B 4.  A defendant whose oral communications have 
been intercepted in violation of the statute may bring a motion 
to suppress the contents of unlawfully intercepted 
communications and evidence derived therefrom.  G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99 P. 
 
B.  Motion judge's findings and video footage.  The motion 
judge made the following findings of fact.  The defendant was 
arrested at approximately 12:30 P.M. and taken to the Brockton 
police station and into an interview room, where an 
interrogation began at 1:11 P.M.  The defendant was advised of 
 
 
6 The defendant also argues cursorily that the investigators 
failed to inform the defendant of the camera in order to "lull[ 
the defendant] into a false sense of security that they were 
having a 'cozy chat.'"  The defendant cites nothing in the 
record to buttress this allegation, and the tenor of the 
interrogation, as reflected in the recording, does not support 
the defendant's claim of an illicit scheme. 
11 
 
his Miranda rights and his right to a prompt arraignment; he 
indicated that he understood his rights and signed written 
waivers of these rights.  The interrogation, which was recorded 
by an audio-visual electronic recording device in the 
interrogation room, lasted a little longer than one hour. 
The recording device did not look like a traditional 
camera; instead, its physical structure resembled a thermostat 
or motion sensor.  The defendant was not notified that his 
statement was being recorded by electronic means.  There was no 
sign indicating that there was a recording device in the 
interrogation room.  The motion judge rejected the 
Commonwealth's suggestion that a small sign on the door between 
the garage and adjacent police station, which stated "Audio 
Monitoring on These Premises," was sufficient to notify the 
defendant that his interrogation was being recorded by 
electronic means.7 
 
Although finding that the defendant did not receive actual 
or constructive notice of the electronic recording, the motion 
 
 
7 In discussing the defendant's Miranda waiver, the motion 
judge noted that the defendant "has extensive experience with 
the criminal justice system," having signed Miranda waivers on 
six prior occasions.  Each of these occasions occurred after the 
court's decision in Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 
423, 447-448 (2004) (expressing "preference that [custodial 
interrogations] be recorded whenever practicable").  The 
officers knew of at least some of the defendant's prior criminal 
justice system history. 
12 
 
judge concluded that, because the defendant was advised that 
anything he said could and would be used against him in court, 
the recording was not surreptitious eavesdropping in violation 
of the wiretap statute. 
 
In addition, the interrogation footage captured each 
officer taking written notes during portions of the 
interrogation.  Before the defendant's admission that he twice 
shot at the victim, the defendant was prompted by one police 
officer:  "This is where the people that listen to your story 
later on determine whether you really care about someone other 
than yourself, and you want to tell the truth and . . . be 
remorseful . . . and explain what you did and why you did it.  
That's where your role comes in now."  A short while later, the 
officer added, "[I]f you're not gonna tell the truth, it's not 
gonna look good for you." 
 
C.  Recording of interrogation.  The defendant's argument 
requires us to construe the wiretap statute and determine 
whether the statute criminalizes the electronic recording of a 
defendant's voluntary statement to police officers under 
circumstances where the defendant understands that the statement 
can and will be used against him and nonetheless decides to 
proceed with the interrogation, the defendant is informed that 
the interrogation presents an opportunity to relay his narrative 
for future listening, and the defendant understands that 
13 
 
officers are recording the statement (or parts thereof) in 
writing.  This requires a legal determination, which we consider 
de novo, Pesa, 488 Mass. at 330-331; Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 
431, based on the factual findings by the motion judge. 
Our opinion in Commonwealth v. Rainey, 491 Mass. 632 
(2023), is instructive.  There, unbeknownst to the person giving 
a statement to police officers (a victim of domestic violence), 
her voluntary statement was recorded by an electronic recording 
device -- a body-worn camera.  Id. at 634.  Nonetheless, the 
victim, like the defendant in this case, understood that her 
statement was being preserved; indeed, the victim, like the 
defendant here, spoke to the police officers for the purposes of 
memorializing her statement, and the video footage shows police 
officers taking written notes during portions of her statement.  
Id. at 635, 643-644.  The defendant in Rainey, like the 
defendant here, nonetheless maintained that the recording was a 
"secret recording" in violation of the wiretap statute because 
the victim was unaware of the police officer's electronic 
recording device.  Id. at 640. 
 
We acknowledged in Rainey that "subsection 99 C of the 
wiretap statute could be construed literally as the defendant 
suggests" to criminalize the recording of the victim's voluntary 
statement.  Id. at 642.  However, given the absurdity of such a 
result, we declined to adopt such a construction because "in the 
14 
 
absence of more specific statutory language to that effect 
. . . , we [were] unwilling to attribute that intention to the 
Legislature."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 
816, 832-833 (1996).  Rather, we concluded that the statute did 
not prohibit the admission of the recording in question because 
"nothing in the wiretap statute as a whole, including its 
codified preamble, evince[d] an intent to prohibit recording a 
victim's volunteered report of a crime where . . . the victim 
was aware that officers already were memorializing her report in 
writing."  Rainey, supra at 643.  Indeed, as we explained, the 
"legislative focus [of the wiretap statute, as set forth in the 
statute's preamble,] was on the protection of privacy rights and 
the deterrence of interference therewith by law enforcement 
officers' surreptitious eavesdropping as an investigative tool."8  
Id., quoting Gordon, supra at 833.  See Gordon, supra 
 
 
8 "In pertinent part, the preamble of the wiretap statute 
codified the Legislature's finding that 'organized crime' 
existed in the Commonwealth and was 'a grave danger to the 
public welfare and safety.'  G. L. c. 272, § 99 A.  The 
Legislature concluded that '[n]ormal investigative procedures' 
were 'not effective in the investigation of illegal acts 
committed by organized crime' and that 'law enforcement 
officials must be permitted to use modern methods of electronic 
surveillance, under strict judicial supervision, when 
investigating these organized criminal activities.'  Id.  The 
preamble also codified the Legislature's recognition that 'the 
uncontrolled development and unrestricted use of modern 
electronic surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the 
privacy of all citizens of the [C]ommonwealth.'  Id."  Rainey, 
491 Mass. at 643 n.20. 
 
15 
 
(concluding, in view of legislative purpose of wiretap statute, 
that it does not prohibit recording of booking procedures in 
police station).9  See also Rainey, supra at 642 (collecting 
cases turning to preamble to inform analysis of wiretap 
statute).  The Legislature, we concluded, did not have in mind 
the type of voluntary statement given by the victim, much less 
to sanction criminally the conduct of police officers who 
preserved the victim's voluntary statement to them.  Rainey, 
supra at 643-644. 
 
Similarly, here nothing in the statute as a whole, 
including its codified preamble, supports the conclusion that 
the Legislature intended to criminalize the police officers' 
recording of the defendant's voluntary statement, which the 
 
 
9 Our decision in Gordon did not rest, as the defendant 
suggests, on the ground that the electronic recording in that 
case "did not capture or reveal the defendants' thoughts or 
knowledge about some fact or subject."  Gordon, 422 Mass. at 
833.  Indeed, it is pellucid that the wiretap statute does not 
use the content of the recording as a trigger for a violation.  
See G. L. c. 272, § 99 C 1 ("Proof of the installation of any 
intercepting device by any person under circumstances evincing 
an intent to commit an interception . . . shall be prima facie 
evidence of a violation . . ." [emphasis added]).  Our reasoning 
in Gordon, as we explained in Rainey, centered on the 
Legislature's intent, as evinced in the wiretap statute's 
preamble, see note 8, supra, to prohibit surreptitious 
eavesdropping, see Rainey, 491 Mass. at 643, citing Gordon, 
supra at 832-833; because the Legislature did not appear to have 
in mind the recording of a booking procedure at the police 
station, we did not adopt the literal construction urged by the 
defendant, Gordon, supra at 832-833. 
 
16 
 
defendant understood was being preserved for future use in 
connection with the investigation of the crime about which the 
defendant was speaking voluntarily.  The recording "was not used 
as an investigative tool to secretly eavesdrop on an otherwise 
private conversation";10 rather, it captured the defendant's 
"voluntary statement to police officers, which [the defendant] 
knew was being memorialized by them in writing."  Rainey, 491 
Mass. at 643-644.  Indeed, the officers explained to the 
defendant that the interrogation provided him an opportunity to 
tell his own story, and the defendant proceeded to do so knowing 
 
 
10 We agree with the defendant that the relevant question 
for purposes of the wiretap statute is not whether the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See Rainey, 491 Mass. 
at 644 n.21; Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 506 (1976) 
("we would render meaningless the Legislature's careful choice 
of words if we were to interpret 'secretly' as encompassing only 
those situations where an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy").  Thus, our conclusion does not rest on 
a determination whether the defendant's rights under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights were violated.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 489 Mass. 292, 295 (2022) (defendant 
may challenge search or seizure under Fourth Amendment or art. 
14 only if defendant has reasonable expectation of privacy).  
The wiretap statute evinces the Legislature's intent to provide 
broader protections than those provided by the State and Federal 
Constitutions.  Accordingly, our analysis is guided by the 
Legislature's intent as set forth in the words of the statute, 
in the context of the statute as a whole.  See Harvard Crimson, 
Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 
749 (2006) ("Courts must ascertain the intent of a statute from 
all its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates, 
and must interpret the statute so as to render the legislation 
effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense"). 
 
17 
 
that the statement would be preserved for later review.  In 
particular, the defendant was warned that his statements could 
and would be used against him in a court of law and was reminded 
that individuals would "listen" to his statement.  Presumably, 
he also saw the police officers, who were seated next to him, 
taking notes during his statement.11  Regardless of whether the 
defendant recognized the electronic recording device as a 
thermostat, motion sensor, or camera, it strains credulity to 
conclude that the defendant did not understand that his 
statement was being memorialized.  "The resulting video footage 
was not a clandestine recording precluded by the wiretap 
 
 
11 We do not, as the concurring justice suggests, ignore 
that the wiretap statute prohibits both secretly hearing and 
secretly recording.  See G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4 (defining 
"interception" as to "secretly hear" or "secretly record").  Our 
decision does not rest on the fact that the officers heard the 
defendant's statement.  As in Rainey, we simply decline to 
attribute to the Legislature an intent to prohibit 
electronically recording a defendant's voluntary statement in 
circumstances where the defendant knows that his statement is 
being recorded by other means -- here, by use of a writing 
implement and paper.  See Rainey, 491 Mass. at 644 n.22, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Moody, 466 Mass. 196, 209 (2013) ("'record' as 
used in the wiretap statute should be given its plain and 
ordinary meaning to 'mean, "to set down in writing" or "to cause 
[sound, visual images] to be transferred to and registered on 
something by electronic means in such a way that the thing so 
transferred and registered can . . . be subsequently 
reproduced"'").  See Moody, supra ("secretly record" as used in 
wiretap statute "includes the interception of text messages by 
viewing and transcribing them for use at a later date" [emphasis 
added]).   A reading requiring suppression under the 
circumstances is without any foundation in the Legislature's 
intent, as expressed in the codified preamble. 
18 
 
statute; rather, it merely preserved the statement (albeit 
through an alternative, electronic medium) that the [defendant] 
voluntarily gave to law enforcement officers and which []he 
understood was being recorded by them by means of paper and 
pen."  Id. at 644.  See Commonwealth v. Ashley, 82 Mass. App. 
Ct. 748, 762 (2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 838 (2013) (wiretap 
statute did not criminalize use of camera in police station 
interrogation room to record defendant's volunteered statement 
to officers when officers "repeatedly expressed their intention 
to get it 'down on paper' and memorialize the interview").  
Accord Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 Mass. 594, 602 & n.9 (2001) 
(contrasting "clandestine recording" prohibited by wiretap 
statute with "good practice" of electronic recording of police 
interrogations based on presumption "that, when police 
interrogations are electronically recorded, the suspect is aware 
that the interrogation is being preserved"). 
 
ii.  Denial of right to telephone call.  The defendant next 
maintains that his statement should have been suppressed because 
he was denied his right to make a telephone call in violation of 
G. L. c. 276, § 33A.  Section 33A provides: 
"The police official in charge of the station or other 
place of detention having a telephone wherein a person is 
held in custody, shall permit the use of the telephone, at 
the expense of the arrested person, for the purpose of 
allowing the arrested person to communicate with his family 
or friends, or to arrange for release on bail, or to engage 
the services of an attorney.  Any such person shall be 
19 
 
informed forthwith upon his arrival at such station or 
place of detention, of his right to so use the telephone, 
and such use shall be permitted within one hour thereafter 
(emphasis added)." 
 
Although the statute does not set forth a statutory remedy for a 
violation of the defendant's right, we have applied the 
exclusionary rule to evidence gathered as a result of a 
violation of the statute where the defendant can show that the 
violation was intentional.  See Commonwealth v. Walker, 466 
Mass. 268, 278 (2013); Commonwealth v. Alicea, 428 Mass. 711, 
716 (1999); Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 502 (1972). 
 
A.  Motion judge's findings.  The motion judge made the 
following findings of fact.  After the defendant, at the 
Brockton police station, waived his Miranda and prompt 
arraignment rights, at 1:13 P.M., the defendant was advised that 
he would be afforded a telephone call when he was taken to 
booking; but the defendant was not told when he would be taken 
to booking.  More than one hour later, toward the end of the 
interrogation, an officer asked the defendant if he wanted to 
call his parents; the defendant responded that he would like to 
call his children and the mothers of his children, but "not 
right [then]."  The defendant soon thereafter was taken to 
booking and advised of his right to make a telephone call. 
 
The defendant had prior experience with the criminal 
justice system.  In particular, on ten prior occasions, after 
20 
 
being arrested and booked at the Brockton police station, the 
defendant had been informed of, and utilized, his right to make 
a telephone call. 
 
The motion judge concluded that G. L. c. 276, § 33A, was 
violated because the defendant neither was advised of his right 
to make a telephone call upon his arrival at the police station 
nor afforded the right to use a telephone within one hour of his 
arrival.  The motion judge found that the violation, however, 
was unintentional, relying on the testimony of the police 
officers, corroborated by the video footage, that they promptly 
informed the defendant of his Miranda and arraignment rights.  
The motion judge also relied on the defendant's "prior 
experience with the criminal justice system," specifically his 
prior bookings.12  Accordingly, the motion judge denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
B.  Unintentional violation of telephone call right.  The 
defendant contends that the motion judge's finding that the 
violation of G. L. c. 276, § 33A, was unintentional was 
erroneous.  We review the finding of the motion judge, who 
directly heard the testimony of the arresting officers, for 
clear error.  Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 431.  See Ashley, 82 
 
 
12 The motion judge made no finding as to whether the 
officers knew of this criminal history, outside of the 
defendant's outstanding probation arrest warrant. 
21 
 
Mass. App. Ct. at 759 (reviewing judge's rejection of 
intentional motive for clear error).  In support of this 
argument, the defendant points to the evidence that one of the 
police officers told the defendant that he would have the 
"opportunity" to make a telephone call later but did not, at 
that time, inform him of his "right" to make a telephone call.  
He maintains that the statutory violation, in conjunction with 
the electronic recording of his statement, constituted an 
intentional plan to extract a confession.  The defendant also 
contends that the motion judge erred in relying on his prior 
arrest history, including his prior exercise of his statutory 
right to make a telephone call; this history, the defendant 
asserts, has no bearing on the question whether the officers 
intentionally violated the statute. 
 
We have concluded previously that a finding that a 
violation of § 33A was unintentional may be supported by 
evidence that officers informed a defendant of other rights.  
See, e.g., Walker, 466 Mass. at 278-279 ("The judge's reliance 
on the fact that the [officers] informed the defendant of . . . 
other rights is not misplaced, nor was the judge's consideration 
of the defendant's prior experience in the criminal justice 
system").  We also have concluded that, where the defendant 
previously has been informed of his right to a telephone call 
because, inter alia, the defendant has "prior experience in the 
22 
 
criminal justice system," the motion judge's consideration of 
the prior experience in determining whether to impose the 
exclusionary remedy is apt.  See id.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 490 (2005) (where defendant "told the 
investigating officer that he knew his rights and had been 
arrested before" and defendant previously was seated across from 
large poster explaining telephone rights, "it was reasonable for 
the officer to assume that [the defendant] was well aware of his 
right to make a telephone call"). 
 
The defendant points to nothing in the record to support 
his contention that the violation was intentional, let alone 
that it was part of an illicit scheme.13  Contrast Jones, 362 
Mass. at 500 (applying exclusionary rule to preclude admission 
of defendant's statement where defendant was not allowed to make 
telephone call despite repeatedly asking for opportunity).  A 
detainee's rights under § 33A are important.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 266 (1982), and cases 
cited.  However, without more than the fact of the violation 
itself, the defendant has not carried his burden to show that 
 
13 The defendant's additional reliance on the electronic 
recording of his statement is misplaced.  As discussed supra, 
the record shows the defendant was given Miranda warnings, 
waived them, and understood that his voluntary statement was 
being preserved. 
23 
 
the motion judge clearly erred in finding that the officers' 
conduct was not intentional. 
 
b.  Prosecutor's comments on defendant's omissions.  During 
the redirect examination of one of the police officers who had 
conducted the defendant's interrogation, the prosecutor asked, 
"During [the defendant's] lengthy interview with you, did the 
defendant ever say he saw a gun in the car that night?"  The 
investigator answered that he had not.  Then, during her closing 
statement, the prosecutor referenced this testimony, stating: 
"At that point in time [the victim] doesn't point a gun at 
him, doesn't shoot at him, doesn't threaten him, nothing; 
and you know that because the defendant says none of that 
in his statement.  He has the opportunity there in the 
statement to tell everything." 
 
"The police practically beg him, tell us everything you can 
to help you.  Tell us every detail.  They even at the end 
say, you know, we're going to go do booking but if you 
think of anything, we can come back.  Tell us everything.  
He never says that [the victim] pointed a gun at him or 
threatened him or that he saw a gun."  (Emphases added.)14 
 
 
14 During the interrogation, the defendant did not say that 
he saw the victim with a gun, but he did say that the victim 
"was a shooter," was "making motions," and was "acting kinda 
funny like he got somethin' or somethin' . . . actin' like he 
had a weapon."  Toward the end of the interrogation, one of the 
investigators stated, "Tell me what we don't know.  Tell me what 
we didn't ask you that we should've asked you."  The 
investigator asked multiple times whether there was anything the 
defendant wanted to "add or subtract" to his story or otherwise 
change, then or after booking.  It is a reasonable inference 
that, if the defendant had seen the victim with a firearm, he 
would have said so, rather than limiting his account to these 
statements.  See Commonwealth v. Doughty, 491 Mass. 788, 799 
(2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 189 
 
24 
 
 
The defendant contends that these statements violated his 
privilege against self-incrimination, protected by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The Commonwealth maintains 
that, because the defendant waived his Miranda rights and 
decided to proceed with the interrogation, it was not improper 
for the prosecutor to identify inconsistencies between omissions 
during the post-Miranda interview and the trial defense.15  The 
defendant did not object to either the direct examination 
testimony of the officer or the closing statement; accordingly, 
we review to determine whether either was improper and, if so, 
whether it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Alemany, 488 Mass. 499, 511 
(2021). 
 
"'A defendant's silence after the police have given the 
warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-479 
(1966), may not be used against the defendant' to impeach an 
 
(2014) ("a prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the 
evidence").  
 
 
15 In opening, the defense counsel contended that, based on 
certain facts to be introduced in evidence, such as the victim 
asking a friend to hand him something, the jury should ask, "Was 
there a gun in the car?"  And in closing, the defense counsel 
argued that the police investigation was "a very shoddy way to 
look for evidence of a gun in that car," and again focused on 
the victim asking his friend to pass him something and putting 
his hand in his pocket, inferring that the victim had a gun. 
25 
 
exculpatory explanation subsequently offered at trial."  
Commonwealth v. Guy, 441 Mass. 96, 103 (2004), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 797 (1996).  See Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) ("the use for impeachment 
purposes of [defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process 
Clause").  However, where a defendant voluntarily chooses to 
speak to police officers and waives his Miranda rights, "[w]hat 
the defendant thereafter [chooses] to say or not say to each 
officer on the subject [can] properly be commented on by the 
prosecutor to expose inconsistencies."  Guy, supra at 104.  "A 
defendant cannot have it both ways.  If he talks, what he says 
or omits is to be judged on its merits or demerits, and not on 
some artificial standard that only the part that helps him can 
be later referred to."  Id. at 104-105, quoting United States v. 
Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 503 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1067 (1978).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Belton, 352 Mass. 263, 
270, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 872 (1967) ("The remark complained 
of was not in effect directed at the defendant's silence while 
under arrest but rather at an inconsistency in his alibi which 
had been brought out during the trial"). 
26 
 
 
The defendant does not now dispute that he voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights.16  Accordingly, the prosecutor 
permissibly commented on the inconsistency between the 
defendant's position at trial that the victim had a firearm and 
that the defendant acted in self-defense, on the one hand, and 
his statement to the interrogating police officers that he 
believed the victim was armed based only on his knowledge of the 
victim and the victim's movements prior to the shooting, on the 
other. 
 
The defendant misapprehends our decision in Commonwealth v. 
Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 559 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 806 (1986).  
There, we held that the defendant's failure to volunteer that he 
was innocent could not be used against him to imply tacit 
admission of guilt.  Id. at 559-560.  We have distinguished 
"asking the jury to infer guilt from the fact that a defendant 
had not spontaneously volunteered his innocence during an 
interrogation" from commenting on omissions in the defendant's 
statement to officers.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thompson, 431 
Mass. 108, 118, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000), citing Haas, 
 
 
16 The defendant pressed this argument below, but has 
dropped it on appeal, and for good reason.  His primary 
challenge to the validity of the Miranda waiver was that he was 
only advised that he was under arrest on his probation warrant, 
but the motion judge found that he was informed that he was 
under arrest for murder as well, and there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the finding was clearly erroneous. 
27 
 
supra at 558-559 ("proper for the prosecutor to comment on the 
fact that the defendant did not ask appropriate questions" about 
what had happened to victim, his wife, during "far-ranging 
statement").  A prosecutor may comment on "the fact that the 
defendant did not inform the police at any time of certain 
important details of [his story] which was presented at trial," 
where the defendant told some details to the police.  Belton, 
352 Mass. at 270.17  "The defendant had a constitutional right to 
silence, not a right to tell a story and then avoid explaining 
crucial omissions by stating they were an exercise of the right 
 
 
17 Nor are we persuaded that the reasoning of Commonwealth 
v. Rivera, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 859, 862 (2005), cited by the 
defendant, suggests a different holding.  See id. ("The 
defendant certainly was under no burden spontaneously to 
volunteer potentially exculpatory information in his statement 
to police").  There, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's 
failure to mention during his interrogation that there were 
witnesses to the event; not mentioning witnesses during the 
interrogation was not inconsistent with presenting witnesses at 
trial.  Id.  By contrast, here, the defendant specifically told 
officers that he believed that the victim was armed based on the 
victim's prior statements and his movements in the car; he did 
not mention, as a basis for his belief that the victim was 
armed, that he actually saw that the victim carrying a firearm.  
At trial, the defendant's position was that one of the reasons 
he thought the victim was armed was that the victim actually had 
a firearm.  The prosecutor's comment on the inconsistency was 
fair.  See Commonwealth v. Lodge, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 419 
(2016) ("Contrary to the defendant's claim, because the 
defendant waived his right to remain silent, and made a 
voluntary statement about the [issue], the concerns outlined in 
[Haas] do not apply here"). 
 
28 
 
to silence."  Commonwealth v. Sosa, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 106, 113 
(2011). 
 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a review of 
the entire record, we discern no error warranting relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.18 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's convictions of 
murder in the first degree and unlawful discharge of a firearm 
within 500 feet of a building.  We vacate and set aside the 
defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm.19  
The defendant's motion for a new trial is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
18 We have considered the additional arguments in the 
defendant's brief filed pursuant to Moffett, 382 Mass. at 207-
208, and we conclude that they do not warrant granting his 
motion for a new trial. 
 
 
19 "[T]he defendant's rights under the Second Amendment [to 
the United States Constitution] and his rights to due process 
were violated when he was convicted of unlawfully possessing [a 
firearm] although the jury were not instructed that licensure is 
an essential element of the crime."  Guardado, 491 Mass. at 693. 
"[O]ur holding [in Guardado] applies prospectively and to those 
cases that were active or pending on direct review as of the 
date of the issuance of [New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. 
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)]."  Guardado, supra at 694.  As to 
whether retrial shall be permitted, that issue is currently 
pending before the court and is scheduled for oral argument in 
September 2023.  See Commonwealth vs. Guardado, No. SJC-13315.  
The rescript in this opinion shall be stayed pending our 
decision in that case. 
BUDD, C.J. (concurring).  I agree that the motion judge was 
correct to deny the defendant's motion to suppress and that the 
defendant's convictions should be affirmed.  I write separately 
because, in my view, the plain and unambiguous language of the 
wiretap statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4 (§ 99), should apply 
even where police officers adhere to other legal requirements, 
such as providing a Miranda warning.  Applying the plain 
statutory language in this case, I conclude that the officers 
violated § 99.  Nevertheless, because the officers did not 
deliberately record the defendant without his knowledge during 
his confession, his statements need not be suppressed. 
1.  Interpretation.  Subject to limited, enumerated 
exceptions,1 § 99 proscribes the secret recording of "the 
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of 
any intercepting device by any person other than a person given 
 
1 In summary, the act contains exceptions for (1) employees 
or agents of common carriers, (2) persons possessing or using an 
intercommunication system in the ordinary course of their 
business, (3) United States investigative and law enforcement 
officers acting pursuant to the laws of the United States and 
within the scope of their authority, (4) any person authorized 
by warrant to make interceptions, (5) investigative or law 
enforcement officers acting to ensure the safety of another 
officer or agent who is undercover or serving as a witness for 
the Commonwealth, (6) financial institutions communicating with 
their corporate or institutional trading partners in the 
ordinary course of business, and (7) law enforcement officers 
investigating certain offenses in connection with organized 
crime.  See G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4 & 7, D.  Neither the 
Commonwealth nor the court asserts that any of the statute's 
exceptions apply in this case. 
2 
 
prior authority by all parties to such communication" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
370 Mass. 502, 503 n.1 (1976), S.C., 391 Mass. 749 (1984).  If 
none of the enumerated exceptions applies, "any person" includes 
law enforcement.  See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 470 Mass. 133, 140 
(2014) (noting that law enforcement may record with only one-
party consent when investigating certain designated offenses in 
connection with organized crime).  "Intercepting device" is 
defined as "any device or apparatus which is capable of 
transmitting, receiving, amplifying, or recording a wire or oral 
communication."  G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 3.  As we observed in 
Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc., 487 Mass. 655, 658 (2021), 
the statute does not define "secretly."  We therefore adopt its 
plain language meaning, which includes "something kept hidden or 
unexplained."  Id., quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 1122 (11th ed. 2020). 
With the all-party consent provision and the act's 
applicability to "any person," including law enforcement 
officials unless authorized, the Legislature has placed tight 
controls on secretly recording oral communications.  
Accordingly, this court has both consistently underscored the 
act's broad prohibition against secretly recording conversations 
except as authorized by the statute and maintained that the 
relevant inquiry under § 99 is whether individuals being 
3 
 
recorded "have actual [or constructive] knowledge of the 
recording," which may be "proved where there are clear and 
unequivocal objective manifestations of knowledge" in the 
speakers' statements or conduct.  Jackson, 370 Mass. at 507.  
See, e.g., Curtatone, 487 Mass. at 657-658; Commonwealth v. 
Moody, 466 Mass. 196, 208-209 (2013) (noting broad definition of 
"interception" under § 99); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 
289, 297 (2011) ("clear legislative intent" to limit 
availability of wiretapping in criminal investigations); id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 279 (1981), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982) ("we have stated that the one-party 
consent exception is 'a narrow exception to the broad statutory 
prohibition against warrantless surveillance'").  See also 
Tavares, supra, quoting Thorpe, supra ("Legislature proceeded on 
the premise that electronic surveillance is anathema except 
within certain narrowly prescribed boundaries").  It is 
undisputed that the defendant did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge that he was being recorded.  Given the 
language of the statute, and our prior precedent interpreting 
it, this finding is sufficient to conclude that an interception 
was made. 
As a practical matter, a textual application of the statute 
in this case simply would mean that an individual being 
questioned by police must be given actual or constructive notice 
4 
 
that he or she is being audio recorded (even where the 
individual is aware that officers are taking notes and officers 
have provided a Miranda warning).  See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 
Mass. 594, 605 (2001) (no violation of § 99 occurs when 
recording is done in plain view even if actual notice is not 
given).2  As this result is not illogical, we need not attribute 
intent to the Legislature where the statutory language speaks 
for itself.  See Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 
Mass. 134, 138 (2013) (where statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent and 
should be enforced unless application would lead to absurd 
result); Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of 
the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 
(2006) (where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our 
 
2 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
has held that the application of the act to prohibit secret 
recording of police in carrying out their public duties violates 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See 
Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 833-840 
(1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 560 (2021) (Project 
Veritas).  However, this conclusion was specific to the context 
of civilians recording police officers in the performance of 
their public duties.  See id. at 831, quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 
655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) ("the 
[F]ederal constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech protects 
the right to record 'government officials, including law 
enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a 
public space,' even when the recording, which there involved 
both audio and video, is undertaken without the consent of the 
person recorded").  See also Project Veritas, supra at 836-840.  
The analysis in Project Veritas does not apply here, where the 
subject of the secret recording is not a government official. 
5 
 
inquiry ends).  In fact, advising suspects that their interview 
is being recorded is standard practice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alleyne, 474 Mass. 771, 785 (2016) (citing § 99 B 4, C 1, in 
clarifying that "[p]ermission to record an interview is not 
required so long as the interviewee has actual knowledge of the 
recording"); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 445 
(2004) (citing § 99 in noting suspect may refuse to allow 
recording).3 
Nor does Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816 (1996), 
counsel us to go beyond the text in this case.  In Gordon, we 
held that the videotaping of the defendants' booking at a police 
station did not violate § 99, even though the defendants had no 
knowledge of the taping.  Id. at 832.  In reaching that 
conclusion, we alluded to the act's "legislative focus . . . on 
the protection of privacy rights and the deterrence of 
interference therewith by law enforcement officers' 
surreptitious eavesdropping as an investigative tool."  Id. at 
833.  With that context in mind, we decided that the Legislature 
did not intend the act to apply to the recording of an 
administrative booking, where the "videotape did not capture or 
reveal the defendants' thoughts or knowledge about some fact or 
 
3 Indeed, an officer in this case testified that it is good 
practice for the police to inform those being interviewed that 
they are being recorded. 
6 
 
subject, but at best served only to exhibit the defendants' 
bearing and manner of speaking which were relevant on the 
question of their intoxication or sobriety at the time of the 
assaults" in question.  Id.  But Gordon readily is 
distinguishable from the present case because, here, the 
defendant's interrogation, not his booking, was recorded, and 
the recording plainly did capture the defendant's thoughts or 
knowledge about a fact or subject, namely, his actions, state of 
mind, and other circumstances during the night of the murder.  
Moreover, neither Gordon nor any of the cases decided since 
suggests that we intended to overrule Jackson.  Instead, our 
decisions have continued to follow Jackson in focusing on 
whether a speaker has knowledge of the recording as the standard 
for determining whether a recording has been made "secretly" in 
violation of the act.  See, e.g., Curtatone, 487 Mass. at 659 
(defendant did not secretly record telephone call in violation 
of act, where plaintiff knew that he was being recorded); 
Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 705-706 (2008) 
(recording that is made with actual knowledge of all parties is 
not "an interception" under § 99); Hyde, 434 Mass. at 600-601 
(where no exceptions apply, recording made without knowledge or 
consent of all parties violates act even if no reasonable 
expectation of privacy). 
7 
 
2.  Contemporaneous note-taking.  For its part, the 
Commonwealth argues, and the court agrees, that because the 
defendant was aware that the officers were taking notes on his 
statement, and that his words could be used against him in 
court, the recording of the defendant's interview does not 
amount to the kind of "surreptitious eavesdropping" prohibited 
by § 99.  However, nowhere does the statute state, or even 
imply, that memorializing speech through a nonintercepting 
method, such as pen and paper, creates latitude to contravene 
the statute's prohibition on memorializing speech through the 
use of an intercepting device without notice. 
The statute broadly defines "intercept" as to "secretly 
hear" or "secretly record."  G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.  There is 
no doubt that the defendant was aware that he was being heard by 
the officers who were present and that his words were being 
memorialized through pen and paper.  However, it also is 
uncontested that the defendant neither was informed nor 
otherwise made aware that he was being recorded.  To determine 
that there is no "interception" where the "hearing" is not 
secret, but the recording is, ignores the phrase "to record" 
included in the definition of "interception."  See Commonwealth 
v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620, 623 (2012) ("In statutory 
interpretation, '[n]one of the words of a statute is to be 
regarded as superfluous'" [citation omitted]).  Thus, the 
8 
 
statute apparently contemplates circumstances in which one 
openly hears a conversation and secretly records it through the 
use of an intercepting device.  Such conduct is a violation of 
the statute based on its plain language. 
Although strict, the Legislature passed one of the most 
stringent wiretap statutes in the nation by design.  See Hyde, 
434 Mass. at 599 n.5 (discussing other States' wiretap laws); 
Jackson, 370 Mass. at 506 & n.6.  The preamble evinces this 
strictness by highlighting two concerns of the Legislature's 
that it attempted to balance in enacting the wiretap statute:  
(1) law enforcement's ability to use "modern methods of 
electronic surveillance, under strict judicial supervision," to 
investigate organized crime and (2) protecting "the privacy of 
all citizens of the commonwealth."  G. L. c. 272, § 99 A; 
Commonwealth v. Ennis, 439 Mass. 64, 68 (2003). 
To effectuate this balance, the statute details the very 
limited circumstances in which law enforcement may record a 
member of the public without his or her knowledge or consent.  
See Hyde, 434 Mass. at 599 ("The commission clearly designed the 
1968 amendments to create a more restrictive electronic 
surveillance statute than comparable statutes in other States").  
Again, neither the Commonwealth nor the court contend that any 
of these circumstances are present in this case.  Bearing in 
mind the broad coverage of § 99 and the narrowness of its 
9 
 
exceptions for law enforcement activities, we should not infer 
that the Legislature intended to exempt police officers from 
informing a member of the public that they are being recorded so 
long as the officers adhere to other, unrelated legal 
directives. 
In accordance with our prior precedent, in determining 
whether the recording of the defendant's interrogation in this 
case was made "secretly" in violation of § 99, we should focus 
on whether the defendant knew that his interrogation was being 
recorded.  The motion judge's findings that the defendant was 
not advised and did not have constructive notice of the 
recording have not been challenged.  Thus, absent evidence of 
clear error, these findings conclusively should establish that 
the recording was made in violation of the statute. 
3.  Remedy.  Although I conclude the interview was 
intercepted, as the term is defined in § 99, the statute "does 
not . . . require the suppression of all communications 
intercepted in violation of its provisions."  Commonwealth v. 
Santoro, 406 Mass. 421, 423 (1990).  As "[t]he Legislature has 
left it to the courts to decide whether unlawfully intercepted 
communications must be suppressed," id., I would affirm the 
motion judge's decision to deny the defendant's motion to 
suppress, as the court does today. 
10 
 
Exclusionary rules "are intended to deter future police 
conduct in violation of constitutional or statutory rights."  
Id.  As such, this court has had occasion to affirm the denial 
of a motion to suppress recordings made in violation of the act 
where no deterrent purpose would be served by requiring 
suppression.  See id.  As one of the officers testified at 
trial, it was standard practice to inform those being 
interviewed that they were being recorded, and he had done so 
with another witness whom he had interviewed in the case. 
Moreover, as the court notes, the motion judge found that 
the officers promptly had reviewed the defendant's Miranda and 
arraignment rights with him at the outset of the interview.  
Additionally, it is undisputed that, after being given his 
Miranda warnings, the defendant openly admitted to firing two 
shots into the car window where the victim was sitting, and the 
defendant does not contend on appeal that his confession was 
coerced.  No deterrent purpose would be served by granting 
suppression in these circumstances.4 
 
4 While § 99 defines "interception" as secretly hearing or 
recording the contents of any wire or oral communication through 
the use of any intercepting device, the act only penalizes 
individuals who commit willful interceptions.  See G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99 B 4, C 1.  As there is nothing to suggest that the officers 
in this case willfully recorded the defendant without his 
knowledge, they would not be subject to § 99'ssignificant 
penalties, which further supports the contention that no absurd 
result would come from adhering to the statute's plain text in 
 
 
this case.  See Commonwealth v. Brennan, 481 Mass. 146, 154 
(2018) ("Wilful conduct is that which is 'intentional rather 
than accidental . . .'" [citation omitted]).