Title: State v. Gadsden

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

266 S.E.2d 665 (1980) STATE of North Carolina v. John GADSDEN and Carl Gadsden. No. 112. Supreme Court of North Carolina. June 3, 1980. *668 Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Associate Atty. Gen. Evelyn M. Coman, Raleigh, for the State. Benjamin F. Clifton, Jr., Raleigh, for defendant-appellant John Gadsden. Kyle S. Hall, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant Carl Gadsden. BRITT, Justice. By his only assignment of error, defendant John contends the trial court erred in not submitting voluntary manslaughter as an alternative verdict as to him. He argues that if the jury had chosen to believe the state's evidence tending to show that he participated in the stabbing of Gordon, and then believed defendant Carl's testimony relating to self-defense, they could have found him as well as his brother guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We find no merit in the assignment. *669 It is well settled that the trial court is not required to charge the jury upon the question of a defendant's guilt of lesser degrees of the crime charged in the indictment when there is no evidence to sustain a verdict of defendant's guilt of such lesser degrees. State v. Redfern, 291 N.C. 319, 230 S.E.2d 152 (1976); State v. Griffin, 280 N.C. 142, 185 S.E.2d 149 (1971); 4 Strong's N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 115. In the case at hand the trial court in instructing the jury gave both defendants the benefit of defendant Carl's testimony regarding self-defense. The court charged: Thereafter, the court instructed the jury on the principles of heat of passion and excessive force and their relation to malice, a necessary element of second-degree murder. The instructions include the following: We hold that the trial judge did not err in failing to charge the jury that it might find defendant John guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The evidence presented by the state tended to show that he was guilty of murder or nothing. The evidence presented by defendant Carl tended to show that defendant John was not guilty of anything. The state's evidence tended to show *670 no provocation of defendants by Gordon. Defendant Carl's evidence tended to show that he was provoked into stabbing Gordon but that defendant John, although provoked, did not stab Gordon. The question of excessive force arises solely on the testimony of defendant Carl and he testified that defendant John did not use any force except to push Gordon away from him. There was no evidence to require submission of voluntary manslaughter as to defendant John. By his only assignment of error, defendant Carl contends the trial court erred to his prejudice in that it gave conflicting instructions to the jury. The assignment has no merit. In explaining the law with respect to acting in concert, the court instructed the jury as follows: Defendant Carl argues that since voluntary manslaughter was not submitted as an alternative verdict for his brother, the quoted instruction conflicted with the instructions relating to voluntary manslaughter as to him and that he was prejudiced by the conflict. The jury charge must be construed as a whole in the same connected way in which it was given; and "a disconnected portion may not be detached from the context of the charge and then critically examined for an interpretation from which erroneous expressions may be inferred". State v. Bailey, 280 N.C. 264, 185 S.E.2d 683, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948, 93 S. Ct. 293, 34 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1972), and cases therein cited. The quoted instruction was given very early in the charge when the court was instructing on second-degree murder. Much later in the charge the court gave clear instructions on voluntary manslaughter as related to defendant Carl, some of those instructions being set out above in discussing defendant John's appeal. In its final mandate the court again instructed clearly on what the jury would have to find in order to return a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter against defendant Carl. We hold that the charge, when considered as a whole, was free from prejudicial error. As to defendant John Gadsdenno error. As to defendant Carl Gadsdenno error. BROCK, J., did not participate in this decision.