Title: Palato v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Palato v. State1999 WY 133988 P.2d 512Case Number: 97-76Decided: 10/12/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ROBERT GENARO PALATO, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

SHELLIE JO COTTAM, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the W.R.A.P. 
11 Certification from the District Court of Converse County, Honorable Barton R. 
Voigt, Judge.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, 
for appellant Palato. Harry G. Bondi of Harry G. Bondi Law Offices, P.C., 
Casper, WY. Argument presented by Ms. Domonkos and Mr. Bondi, for appellant 
Cottam.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Thomas A. Burley, Converse County Attorney; 
and Bruce Horton, Deputy Converse County Attorney. Argument presented by Mr. 
Horton, representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
involves a certified question arising out of two criminal actions currently 
pending in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District of Wyoming. Both 
defendants are alleged to have conspired with a government agent to deliver a 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 (Lexis 1999), 
raising the issue of whether Wyoming follows a unilateral or bilateral approach 
with respect to conspiracies involving controlled substances. This court agreed 
to answer the following certified question of law:

Can a defendant 
be found guilty under W.S. § 35-7-1042 of conspiring to deliver a controlled 
substance when the only other member of the alleged conspiracy is a government 
agent?

We hold that the 
legislature intended for Wyoming to follow the bilateral approach with respect 
to drug conspiracies, and thus answer the certified question 
"no."

FACTS

[¶2]      The relevant 
facts are undisputed. Appellants Robert Genaro Palato and Shellie Jo Cottam are 
defendants in separate criminal actions before the Eighth Judicial District 
Court. Appellant Palato is alleged to have conspired with a special agent of the 
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation to have a third-party deliver to the 
agent three-quarters of an ounce of marijuana. Appellant Cottam is alleged to 
have conspired three separate times to deliver methamphetamine to a confidential 
informant. Palato was charged with one count and Cottam with three counts of 
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1042. In each instance, the only members of the alleged conspiracy were the 
appellants and a government agent. Both appellants filed a motion to dismiss 
with the district court, which prompted the certified question set out 
above.

DISCUSSION

[¶3]      The question we 
must resolve is whether Wyoming's controlled substances conspiracy statute, § 
35-7-1042, embraces the unilateral or bilateral theory of conspiracy. "Under a 
unilateral formulation, the crime is committed when a person agrees to proceed 
in a prohibited manner; under a bilateral formulation, the crime of conspiracy 
is committed when two or more persons agree to proceed in such manner." Miller 
v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 896 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (N.D. 1992)). Therefore, under a unilateral theory, a conspiracy 
count is viable even when one of the participants is a government agent or is 
feigning agreement. Miller, at 897; Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., 
Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(d) (1986).

[¶4]      This court 
recently considered the unilateral-bilateral question as it pertains to our 
general conspiracy statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 (Lexis 1999). Miller. 
Based on the language and legislative history of the statute, as well as public 
policy considerations, we held that § 6-1-303 adopts the unilateral approach to 
conspiracy. Id. Our evaluation of those same considerations, and others, leads 
us to conclude that the legislature had a different intent when it enacted § 
35-7-1042.

[¶5]      This court's 
primary focus when interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's 
intent upon enactment. Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 953 (Wyo. 1996). "The 
initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation * * * is an inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed, according to 
their arrangement and connection." Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & 
Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 
117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). If the language of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and need not consult rules of statutory 
construction. "[W]hile a determination that the meaning is not subject to 
varying interpretations will usually end our inquiry, we may resort to extrinsic 
aids of interpretation, such as legislative history and rules of construction, 
to confirm our determination." Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Wyo. 
1994) (citing Parker, 845 P.2d at 1045).

[I]n 
ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute * * * the court * * * 
must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the 
law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would 
enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking 
body.

Carter v. 
Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 279, 291, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942); see also 
Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1044. We presume that the legislature enacts statutes with 
full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. 
Parker, at 1044.

[¶6]      Wyoming's 
controlled substances conspiracy statute provides:

Any person who 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article [the Wyoming 
Controlled Substances Act] within the state of Wyoming or who conspires to 
commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be 
an offense punishable under this article, shall be punished by imprisonment or 
fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the 
offense the commission of which was the object of the attempt or 
conspiracy.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1042 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added). We find that § 35-7-1042 is ambiguous 
with respect to whether it adopts a bilateral or unilateral theory of 
conspiracy. The ambiguity in the statute arises from the use of the singular 
"[a]ny person" language, which since the adoption of the Model Penal Code has 
been said to be indicative of the unilateral approach to conspiracy, and the 
traditional, common law view that it takes at least two guilty parties to 
"conspire." See, e.g., Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1332 (Wyo. 1977) (quoting 
Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1971)) ("A conspiracy is an 
agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful 
act.").

[¶7]      The history of 
Wyoming's drug conspiracy statute provides some insight into the legislature's 
intent at the time of its enactment. Section 35-7-1042 was derived, not from the 
general conspiracy statute or the Model Penal Code, but from the Federal 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 846.1 When the Wyoming legislature adopts 
a statute from another jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's case law construing the 
statute is considered persuasive authority and an aid to determine legislative 
intent. Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1981); Woodward v. Haney, 
564 P.2d 844, 845-46 (Wyo. 1977). As such, we have looked to the case law 
interpreting the federal conspiracy provision as persuasive authority when 
interpreting § 35-7-1042. Apodaca, 627 P.2d  at 1027; Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1053-54 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶8]      The federal 
courts have consistently adhered to the Sears rule, a Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals holding that there can be no conspiratorial liability imposed when the 
only other person involved is a government agent. Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1965); see also United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 
1198-99 (9th Cir. 1984). The federal rule, which takes a bilateral approach, is 
grounded in the traditional definition of conspiracy as "an agreement between 
two or more people to commit an unlawful act." Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d  at 
1199. The reasoning behind the federal approach is that the act of agreeing is a 
group act requiring at least two people, and when one of two persons merely 
pretends to agree, there is neither a true agreement nor a meeting of the minds. 
Id. This was the conventional view of conspiracy law, and the view espoused by a 
majority of states, including Wyoming when § 35-7-1042 was enacted in 1971.2 In Miller, we determined the 
modification of the language in Wyoming's general conspiracy statute from the 
traditional "[i]f two (2) or more persons conspire" to the Model Penal Code 
formulation of "[a] person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if" 
evidenced the legislature's intent to move to the unilateral approach. In 
contrast, § 35-7-1042 has not been amended since its enactment, and we find no 
similar evidence of legislative intent to depart from the federal bilateral 
position.

[¶9]      We acknowledge 
that this construction results in divergent treatment of conspiracies in 
Wyoming, depending on whether controlled substances are involved. However, the 
adoption of the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act, § 35-7-1001 et seq., suggests 
the legislature intended to treat drug crimes differently. The preamble of the 
Act describes it as "providing a comprehensive codification and revision of the 
laws of the State of Wyoming relating to controlled substances and the use and 
abuse of drugs," providing for, among other things, "crimes and offenses." 1971 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 246. At the time it was enacted, the legislature removed 
from the criminal code those provisions governing crimes and enforcement 
relating to controlled substances and placed them in the Act. 
Id.

[¶10]   In addition, we note that § 
35-7-1042 has already been determined to alter the general law of conspiracy in 
an important respect. Apodaca, 627 P.2d  at 1026-27. Specifically, the drug 
conspiracy statute includes no overt act requirement. When a defendant is 
charged under § 35-7-1042, the government is not required to allege and prove an 
overt act to sustain a conviction. Apodaca, 627 P.2d  at 1027. An overt act 
requirement affords at least a minimal added assurance, beyond the bare 
agreement, that a socially dangerous combination exists and that a person is not 
punished for a mere evil state of mind. Dierdre A. Burgman, Unilateral 
Conspiracy: Three Critical Perspectives, 29 DePaul L.Rev. 75, 102 (1979). With 
respect to unilateral conspiracies, the overt act requirement is conceivably a 
protection to insure that police activity is not abused. See id. at 101. The 
Model Penal Code does not require an overt act for conspiracies to commit first 
and second degree crimes. Model Penal Code, supra, § 5.03(5). Although the 
legislature generally followed the Model Penal Code approach when it modified 
the general conspiracy statute in 1982, the legislature saw fit to retain the 
overt act requirement for all conspiratorial objectives. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-303(b). That being the case, and given the omission of an overt act 
protection in the drug conspiracy statute, we cannot ascribe to the legislature 
the intent to adopt the unilateral conspiracy theory absent a clear expression 
of that intent.

[¶11]   For the reasons stated above, we 
hold that the controlled substances conspiracy statute embraces the bilateral 
theory of conspiracy, in accordance with federal case law. The certified 
question, whether a defendant can be found guilty, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1042, of conspiring to deliver a controlled substance when the only other 
member of the alleged conspiracy is a government agent, is answered 
"no."

Footnotes

1 The federal 
provision provided:

Any 
person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this 
subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed 
the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was 
the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

21 
U.S.C. § 846 (amended in 1988 substituting "shall be subject to the same 
penalties as those prescribed for the offense" for "is punishable by 
imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment 
prescribed for the offense").

2 The 
American Law Institute approved § 5.03 of the Model Penal Code in May 1962. 
Model Penal Code, supra, § 5.03 n.*. However, it was not until the early and 
mid-1970s that state legislatures began to incorporate the Model Penal Code 
recommendations into their criminal codes. Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform 
Since the Model Penal Code, 75 Colum. L.Rev. 1122, 1125 n.8 (1975). Wyoming did 
not modify its general conspiracy provision until 1982. 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws, 
ch. 75.

Although no decision of this court expressly decided the question, prior 
to 1982, Wyoming's statute employed the traditional "[i]f two (2) or more 
persons conspire" language, indicating the bilateral approach. See Miller, 955 P.2d  at 897.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶12]   I would answer "Yes" to the 
certified question posed in this case. The majority resolution structures an 
inconsistency in the substantive law of Wyoming for the sake of being consistent 
with a federal substantive rule that manifests consistency within the federal 
law. To maintain a unilateral theory of conspiracy for all other crimes, but 
continue with a bilateral theory of conspiracy for controlled substances crimes 
injects an unwarranted complexity into the criminal law of Wyoming. I am 
satisfied that the legislature intended to adopt the unilateral theory of 
conspiracy as we held in Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶13]   I attach no significance to the 
proposition that the legislature did not change the set of statutes creating 
offenses with respect to controlled substances at the same time. Probably the 
legislature did not believe it necessary to do so. Our reliance on federal 
authority as persuasive is misplaced here because our statutory scheme relating 
to the conspiracy offense has been adjusted while the federal statutory scheme 
is the same as it has been for years. The majority opinion adopts the stance 
that we are bound by the interpretation given to the federal statute at the time 
our controlled substances statute was adopted. Indeed we do have authority 
supporting that position.

[¶14]   The two statutes are remarkably 
similar:

Any person who 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within the state 
of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which 
if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, shall 
be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum 
punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of 
the attempt or conspiracy.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1042 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).

Any person who 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is 
punishable by * * *.

21 U.S.C. § 846 
(emphasis added). Neither statute, however, offers a definition of the word 
"conspires."

[¶15]   Perhaps my position is too 
simplistic, but I conclude that there is only one definition of a conspiracy in 
the Wyoming statutes. It is:

(a) A person is 
guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons 
that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of 
them does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-303 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added). Similarly, there is only one definition 
of a conspiracy in the federal statutes. It reads:

If two or more 
persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to 
defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any 
purpose and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy * * *.

18 U.S.C. § 371 
(emphasis added).

[¶16]   The language of the federal statute 
tracks the language of the Wyoming statute prior to the amendment of the Wyoming 
statute in 1988. That statute read:

If two (2) or 
more persons conspire to (a) commit a felony in the state of Wyoming or to 
commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be a 
felony, and (b) one (1) or more of such persons do any act, within or without 
the state of Wyoming, to effect the object of the conspiracy, each, upon 
conviction, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years or both. A 
conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the conspiratorial agreement or 
combination was entered into, or in any county where any act or acts evidencing 
the conspiracy or in any county wherein the furtherance of its purpose took 
place.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-117 (1977).

In Miller, 955 P.2d  at 897, we said:

When we compare 
the first sentences of the earlier and current statutes in Wyoming, we find that 
the old statute began "[i]f two (2) or more persons conspire to (a) commit a 
felony in the state of Wyoming * * *," while the new statute reads, "[a] person 
is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more 
persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime * * *." 
(Emphasis added.) Our research discloses that most states that have adopted this 
second definition of the crime of conspiracy have embraced a unilateral approach 
to conspiracy, and we hold that is appropriate in Wyoming.

(Emphasis in 
original.) Given the fact that the revision of the Wyoming conspiracy statute 
post dates any of our earlier precedent relating to a conspiracy to violate the 
controlled substances statutes, we must acknowledge a change in Wyoming 
statutory law that has not occurred in the federal legislation. I would 
recognize that change as extending to any conspiracy to commit a crime in 
Wyoming, including a conspiracy to violate the controlled substances 
statute.

[¶17]   The federal cases simply follow a 
theory of conspiracy found in the federal statute that has remained unchanged 
since the adoption of the statutes regulating controlled substances. Under the 
federal conspiracy rule, all conspiracies must be bilateral. Sears v. United 
States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1965). This is the view that has been 
applied to all federal conspiracy statutes, including the general conspiracy 
statute, the Sherman Anti-trust Act, and RICO. The policy justifications for 
this rule, as summarized in United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 
1198-2000 (9th Cir. 1984), are antithetical to those adopted by this court in 
Miller, 955 P.2d  at 897-98. This federal approach maintains consistency within 
the federal law.

[¶18]   In United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 115 S. Ct. 382, 395, 130 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1994), the Supreme Court of the 
United States maintained the bilateral theory of conspiracy, but explained the 
absence of a requirement for an overt act. It relied upon the common law 
definition of conspiracy, as recognized in constructions of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1, and the Selective Service Act, and ruled that the language of 21 
U.S.C. § 846 was modeled intentionally after those statutes rather than the 
general conspiracy statute. That rationale has to be suspect in Wyoming because 
our legislature specifically abolished common law crimes and provided, "[n]o 
conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this act or in 
another statute of the state." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102(a) (Lexis 1999). In 
light of that language, it seems a far reach to rely upon federal precedent that 
invokes a common law definition of conspiracy.

[¶19]   I am satisfied that Wyoming no 
longer should follow federal precedent that invokes a bilateral theory of 
conspiracy in controlled substances cases. Our legislature has spoken on the 
issue, while Congress has not. We should serve cohesiveness in Wyoming law by 
having only the unilateral theory of conspiracy coupled with an over act for all 
criminal cases. The overt act specifically is required by our conspiracy statute 
and serves, in an instance such as this, to protect the individual from any 
overly zealous law enforcement officer.

[¶20]   The certified question in this case 
should be answered "Yes" so that the sovereign State of Wyoming can maintain the 
same consistency in its law of conspiracy that the federal courts have 
maintained in the federal law of conspiracy.