Title: Billis v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Billis v. State1990 WY 102800 P.2d 401Case Number: 88-250, 88-304, 88-312, 88-310Decided: 10/05/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming


JEFFREY 
D. BILLIS,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

 v. 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

 VICKI MOON, 

Appellant 
(Defendant), 

v.

 THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 

 

WILFRED 
J. VIGIL, a/k/a TWO DOGS, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 v.

 THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

 SCOTT P. McIVER, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 v. 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

 NELLIE MAGARAHAN,

 Appellant (Defendant), 

v. 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

VICTORIA 
LOWRY,

 Defendant

Case 
No. 88-250 on appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable 
Edward L. Grant, Judge; and Case Nos. 88-310 and 88-311 on appeal from the 
District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Nicholas Kalokathis, 
Judge. Case Nos. 88-304 and 89-4, on appeal from the District Court 
of Natrona County, the Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge. Case No. 
88-312, on appeal on a Bill of Exceptions from the County court of Campbell 
County, the Honorable Jeremy D. Michaels, Judge.

  Public Defender Program: Mike Cornia, 
Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, for appellants in Case Nos. 88-250, 88-304, 
88-310, 88-311, 89-4 and for defendant in No. 88-312.Joseph B. 
Meyer, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Karen A. 
Byrne, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Cheyenne; and Campbell County Prosecutor's Office: John D. 
Young, County and Prosecuting Attorney; Russell A. Hansen, Chief Deputy, Civil 
Division; and Doug Lesley, Deputy County Attorney, Gillette, for appellee 
State of Wyoming.Urbigkit, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Macy and 
Golden, JJ. Golden, J., delivered the opinion of the court. Urbigkit, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Macy, J., joins. 
Macy, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Urbigkit, C.J., 
joins.GOLDEN[¶1.]          
In these consolidated cases we must answer several constitutional 
questions concerning W.S. 
7-13-301 (June 1987 
Repl.) (hereinafter "new 301"). "New 301" is a probation statute that applies to 
a criminal defendant who has never before been convicted of a felony and is 
presently charged with, has pleaded guilty to, or has been found guilty of an 
offense within a certain group of felonies and misdemeanors. Under the statute, 
if both the defendant and the state consent, the court may defer further 
prosecution proceedings and place the defendant on probation without entry of a 
judgment of guilt or conviction.   [¶2]  The three main issues presented by these 
cases concern whether the state's consent requirement of "new 301" violates the 
principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1; 
whether the bill that enacted "new 301" was so altered or amended on its passage 
as to change the bill's original purpose in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 
20; and whether the bill that enacted "new 301" contained more than one subject 
in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24. In several of these consolidated cases 
there are additional issues that we will address after resolving these three 
primary issues.[¶3]  We hold 
that "new 301" is constitutional. With this holding, and with our resolution of 
the additional issues presented in some of the cases, we reverse State v. 
Lowry (No. 88-312) and affirm Billis v. 
State (No. 
88-250), Moon v. State (No. 88-304), Vigil v. State (No. 88-310), 
McIver v. State (No. 88-311), and Magarahan v. State, (No. 
89-4).FACTS AND ISSUES IN THE CONSOLIDATED CASESState v. 
Lowry (No. 88-312) Facts:[¶4]  Victoria Lowry was arrested and charged 
with two misdemeanors, speeding, in violation of W.S. 
31-5-301(b)(ii)(1977), and 
driving while under the influence, in violation of W.S. 
31-5-233 (Cum.Supp. 
1987). In the evening of April 14, 1988, after meeting her brother at a lounge 
and drinking several beers, Ms. Lowry was driving home when she was stopped by 
police for speeding. The police officer noticed that her speech was slurred, her 
eyes bloodshot, and her balance unsteady. Because he smelled a strong odor of 
alcoholic beverage on her breath, he conducted a field sobriety test. Ms. Lowry 
was then placed under arrest. She consented to a breathalyzer test at the 
police station; the test showed a .185 blood alcohol level.[¶5]  Under a plea bargain with the 
prosecutor, Ms. Lowry pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while under the 
influence in exchange for the state's dismissal of the speeding charge. On being 
informed of the plea bargain, the county court judge asked whether the 
prosecutor would consent to Ms. Lowry's being placed on probation without entry 
of judgment of conviction under "new 301." The prosecutor would not consent. The 
county court judge deferred findings of a factual basis for the plea of guilty 
and ordered a presentence investigation report.[¶6]  The presentence investigation report 
revealed that Ms. Lowry had never before been charged with any criminal offense, 
had overcome much adversity in her life, was well-educated, had maintained 
steady employment, normally drank alcoholic beverages only socially, and 
customarily did not drink to excess. The probation officer making the report 
recommended probation without entry of judgment of conviction under "new 301." 
Although stating that he had considered Ms. Lowry's good character and lack of 
any criminal record, the prosecutor refused to give the state's consent to 
probation under "new 301" because Ms. Lowry's blood alcohol level of .185 was 
too high.[¶7]  After noting 
the favorable information contained in the presentence investigation report and 
the recommendation of leniency, the county court judge concluded that "the 
state's entry into sentencing prerogatives is an unconstitutional invasion of 
the judicial function by threat executive branch * * *." The county court judge 
held that the state's consent requirement contained in "new 301" was 
unconstitutional. Obtaining Ms. Lowry's consent, as required under "new 301", 
the county court judge ordered that her plea of guilty be deferred, she be 
placed on supervised probation for one year, she be evaluated by Powder River 
Council and comply with its recommendations, she not use drugs or alcohol, and 
she reimburse the government for attorney's fees in the amount of $ 200. The 
county court judge informed Ms. Lowry that if she violated her probation, he 
would immediately accept her plea of guilty.[¶8]  Following the county court's action, the 
state applied to this court for permission to file a bill of exceptions1 on the issue whether "new 301" constitutes an 
unconstitutional invasion of a judicial function. We granted the state's 
application, ordered that the state file the bill, and ordered there should also 
be a ruling whether "new 301" had been constitutionally enacted. Later, this 
court received appeals from criminal defendants in Billis, Vigil, 
McIver, Moon and Magarahan presenting 
identical issues; the six cases were consolidated on 
appeal.Issues: [¶9]  
For clarity we have rephrased Ms. Lowry's issues as 
follows: 1. Whether W.S. 
7-13-301 (June 1987 
Repl.), requiring the state's consent to the court's deferring further 
proceedings and placing a defendant on probation without entry of a judgment of 
conviction, infringes on the judicial department's sentencing power in violation 
of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const. art. 
2, § 1. 2. Whether 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting 
W.S. 
7-13-301 (June 1987 
Repl.), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, which proscribes 
altering or amending a bill during its passage through the legislature so as to 
change the bill's original purpose. 3. Whether 1987 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 
7-13-301 (June 1987 
Repl.), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, which mandates the 
passage of a bill containing only one subject which must be clearly expressed in 
the bill's title. 4. Whether W.S. 
7-6-106(d) (June 1987 
Repl.), under which the county court ordered Ms. Lowry to reimburse the state 
for attorney's fees, is constitutional.Vigil v. State (No. 
88-310) Facts:[¶10]  On January 22, 1988, in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, Mr. Vigil sold one-fourth ounce of cocaine to a confidential police 
informant. He was charged with violating W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(i) and 
35-7-1016(b)(iv) (1977). In a plea bargain Mr. Vigil agreed to plead guilty to 
the felony in exchange for the state's not opposing probation after sentencing 
provided the presentence investigation report revealed no prior felony 
convictions. The state would not consent to "new 301" probation.2 The 
presentence investigation report revealed that Mr. Vigil admitted to prior drug 
sales that he described as not amounting to much. Mr. Vigil filed a motion for 
sentencing under "new 301," in which he requested probation without entry of 
judgment of conviction in spite of the state's refusal to consent and, 
alternatively, the district court's certification of the state's consent 
requirement issue to this court. The prosecutor told the district court that the 
state refused to consent to "new 301" treatment for Mr. Vigil because his was a 
drug case and he had sold drugs before. The district court found that the 
state's position was rational, denied Mr. Vigil's motion, and sentenced him for 
a term of not less than two nor more than five years, suspended in favor of five 
years probation. The court also ordered Mr. Vigil to reimburse the state for the 
fees and costs of his public defender. W.S. 
7-6-106(d) (June 1987 
Repl.).Issues:[¶11]  
In addition to the four issues raised in Lowry, Mr. Vigil raises 
the following: 1. Whether the prosecutor's refusal to consent to 
first offender treatment for Mr. Vigil violated his rights to due process, 
and 2. Whether the prosecutor's refusal to consent to sentencing 
under § 
7-13-301 was 
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion and therefore violated Article 1, Sections 
2 and 7, of the Wyoming Constitution.State v. McIver (No. 
88-311) Facts:[¶12]  
On July 1, 1988, Mr. McIver and two companions discussed stealing money 
from soft-drink trucks and later spotted two such trucks. One of Mr. McIver's 
companions stole $ 45 from one of the trucks and $ 1,500 from the other. They 
were caught and arrested. The state charged Mr. McIver with one count of 
conspiracy to commit burglary in violation of W.S. 
6-1-303 (June 1988 
Repl.). At his arraignment of this felony charge, he pleaded guilty. Before 
sentencing, he filed a motion for sentencing under "new 301," in which he 
requested probation without entry of judgment of conviction or, alternatively, 
that the district court certify the state's consent requirement issue to this 
court. At sentencing, the prosecutor told the district court that the state 
refused to consent to "new 301" treatment for Mr. McIver and his companions had 
also planned stealing from trucks in Nebraska. The district court found the 
state's position was rational and denied Mr. McIver's motion. The district court 
sentenced Mr. McIver to a term of not less than eighteen months nor more than 
thirty-six months, suspended in favor of probation for three years. The district 
court also ordered Mr. McIver to reimburse the state for defense fees and costs. 
W.S. 
7-6-106(d)(June 1987 
Repl.). Issues:[¶13]  
Mr. McIver raises the same issues raised by Ms. Lowry.Moon v. 
State (No. 88-304) Facts:[¶14]  On September 24, 1987, Ms. Moon sold 
one-eighth ounce of cocaine to an informant working with the Casper Police 
Department. The state charged her with one count of conspiracy to deliver 
cocaine in violation of W.S. 
35-7-1016(b)(iv), 
35-7-1031(a)(i), and 35-7-1042 (Cum.Supp. 1987). At her arraignment she pleaded 
not guilty. Later, the state and Ms. Moon struck a plea bargain under which she 
agreed to plead guilty to the felony and the state agreed to recommend she be 
placed on probation after sentence was imposed and she receive neither a fine 
nor jail time. At sentencing, Ms. Moon requested treatment under "new 301"; the 
state refused to consent. Although Ms. Moon stated her belief that the state's 
consent requirement of "new 301" was unconstitutional because it interfered with 
the court's sentencing authority, she did not request the court's ruling on that 
issue. Instead, she simply asked the court to disregard the state's refusal to 
consent and place her on probation under "new 301." The district court made no 
ruling on the issue, concluding that it had no authority to grant probation 
under "new 301" without the state's consent. She was sentenced to serve a 
two-year term of probation. Issues:[¶15]  Ms. Moon raises issues concerning 
separation of powers, original purpose, one subject, and the prosecutor's 
arbitrariness in refusing to consent.   State v. Magarahan 
(No. 89-4) Facts:[¶16]  On March 31, 1988, Ms. Magarahan took, 
without permission, her roommate's federal income tax refund check for $ 290.58, 
endorsed her roommate's name on it, and cashed it. The state charged her with 
one count of forgery in violation of W.S. 
6-3-602(a)(ii) and (b) 
(June 1988 Repl.). Under the terms of the plea bargain between the state and Ms. 
Magarahan, she agreed to plead guilty to the felony and the state agreed to 
recommend that she not be imprisoned or fined, but that she be placed on 
probation for eighteen months, pay restitution, and pay $ 50 to the crime 
victims' compensation account. W.S. 
1-40-114 (June 1988 
Repl.). The state did not consent to treatment under "new 301." At sentencing, 
Ms. Magarahan asked the district court to grant her probation under "new 301" in 
spite of the state's refusal to consent. She told the district court she 
believed the state's consent requirement is an unconstitutional infringement on 
the court's sentencing power; the district court did not rule on that issue and 
declined to use "new 301" without the state's consent. The district court 
sentenced her in accordance with the state's 
recommendation.   Issues:[¶17]  Ms. Magarahan raises the same issues 
raised by Ms. Moon.State v. Billis (No. 
88-250) Facts:[¶18]  On December 1 and again on December 10, 
1987, Mr. Billis, age 33, 
sold one-eighth ounce amounts of cocaine to an undercover law enforcement agent 
in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The state charged him with two counts of delivery of 
cocaine in violation of W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 
35-7-1016(b)(iv)(Cum.Supp.1987). Under a plea bargain with the state, Mr. 
Billis pleaded 
guilty to one count of delivery in exchange for dismissal of the other count. At 
sentencing, Mr. Billis asked the 
district court to place him on probation without entry of judgment of conviction 
under "new 301." The state refused to consent to this treatment because of Mr. 
Billis' age and the 
experienced manner in which he delivered the cocaine. Because of the plea 
bargain the state had dismissed one count of delivery. Although Mr. Billis stated his 
belief that the state's consent requirement of "new 301" was unconstitutional, 
the district court judge stated that without that consent he was not authorized 
to consider "new 301" treatment. The district court sentenced Mr. Billis to a term 
of not less than three nor more than five years, suspended in favor of 
three years' probation. Issues:[¶19]  Mr. Billis raises the 
same issues raised by Ms. Moon and Ms. Magarahan.PRELIMINARY 
MATTER[¶20]  In all of 
these consolidated cases except Lowry, the state maintains that since the 
defendants did not adequately raise their appellate issues at the district court 
level, they cannot raise those issues her for the first time. Jahnke, 
692 P.2d 911, 927-28 (Wyo. 1984); 
Hopkinson 
v. State, 
664 P.2d 43, 50 (Wyo. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246. Moreover, 
the state asserts these defendants have no standing to raise these issues 
because they cannot demonstrate any adverse impact on their rights resulting 
from the allegedly unconstitutional portion of "new 301" requiring the state's 
consent. LaCombe 
v. City of Cheyenne, 
733 P.2d 601, 603 (Wyo. 1987); 
Gooden 
v. State, 
711 P.2d 405, 408-09 (Wyo. 1985).[¶21]  The state concedes, however, that the 
county court judge's ruling in Lowry, and the state's bill of exceptions 
thereto, legitimately place the issue of "new 301's" constitutionally before 
this court. We agree. Because Lowry presents these 
constitutional issues concerning "new 301," we concluded that the 
defendants in the consolidated cases should gain the benefit of a decision in 
Lowry favorable to the criminal defendant in that case. Accordingly, we 
need not discuss the questions of inadequate presentation of issues below and 
standing raised by the state.3ANALYSIS

I.PRESENT 
STATUTES [¶22]  
"New 301" provides as follows: § 
7-13-301. Placing 
person found guilty, but not convicted, on probation.(a) If a person who 
has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found 
guilty of or pleads guilty to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent 
violation of W.S. 
31-5-233, or any 
similar provision of law, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the 
first or second degree or arson in the first or second degree, the court may, 
with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment 
of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on 
probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon terms and conditions set 
by the court. The terms of probation shall include that he: (i) 
Report to the court not less than twice in each year at times and places fixed 
in the order; (ii) Conduct himself in a law-abiding 
manner; (iii) Not leave the state without the consent of the court; 
and (iv) Conform his conduct to any other terms of probation the 
court finds proper.(b) If the court finds the person has fulfilled the 
terms of probation and that his rehabilitation has been attained to the 
satisfaction of the court, the court may at the end of five (5) years, or at any 
time after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the original 
probation, discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings against 
him.(c) If the defendant violates a term or condition of probation at 
any time before final discharge, the court may: (i) Enter an 
adjudication of guilt and conviction and proceed to impose sentence upon the 
defendant if he previously pled guilty to or was found guilty of the original 
charge for which probation was granted under this section; or (ii) 
Order that the trial of the original charge proceed if the defendant has not 
previously pled or been found guilty.(d) Discharge and dismissal under 
this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for 
any purpose.(e) There shall be only one (1) discharge and dismissal 
under this section or under any similar section of the probationary statutes of 
any other jurisdiction. [¶22]  
We must also take note of W.S. 
7-13-302 (June 1987 
Repl.), which provides: § 
7-13-102. Placing 
person convicted on probation; suspension of imposition or execution of 
sentence; imposition of fine.(a) After conviction or plea of guilty for 
any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and 
following entry of the judgment of conviction, the court may: (i) 
Suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on 
probation; or (ii) Impose a fine applicable to the offense and 
place the defendant on probation.II.PREDECESSORS OF 
"NEW 301"[¶23]  Before 
we address the constitutional issues relating to "new 301," we find it helpful 
to identify and describe the origins of that statute. Before "new 301" was 
enacted by the Forty-Ninth Legislature in 1987 as part of a substantial 
revision of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes (1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3), 
two statutory provisions occupied the field. Originally enacted in 1909, 
W.S. 
7-13-203(1977) (1909 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 87, § 1) (hereinafter "old 203") provided probation to 
first-time felons who had not committed murder, sexual assault, or arson.4 The 
legislature provided for probation by having the trial court delay passing 
sentence and place the defendant on "parole." In Sorenson 
v. State, 
604 P.2d 1031, 1038 (Wyo. 1979), this court 
noted that "parole" was a misnomer and the correct status was 
"probation."[¶24]  In 1939, 
the legislature enacted W.S. 
7-13-301 (1939 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 91, § 1) (hereinafter "old 301"). King 
v. State, 
720 P.2d 465, 468 (Wyo. 1986). "Old 301" 
provided another scheme of probation.5 The 
statute applied to any criminal defendant, not just first-time felons as "old 
203" did, who had committed any crime, whether misdemeanor or felony, except a 
crime punishable by life imprisonment or death. In Peterson 
v. State, 
586 P.2d 144, 156 (Wyo. 1978), 
overruled on other grounds in Crozier 
v. State, 
723 P.2d 42, 56 (Wyo. 1986), this court 
held that the phrase "crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death" did not 
embrace offenses which had a sentence of less than life imprisonment as a 
minimum and a maximum of either life imprisonment or death.[¶24]  Under "old 301" the legislature 
established four methods by which the trial court could implement the probation 
established by the legislature. First, with the defendant's consent, the 
legislature authorized the court to suspend trial and place the defendant on 
probation. We believe the defendant's consent feature was designed to avoid the 
later assertion of a speedy trial violation by a defendant whose probation was 
terminated for misconduct and who then faced resumption of the criminal 
proceedings against him. The three other methods for probation followed a plea 
of guilty or being found guilty following a trial. Thus, the legislature 
authorized the court to suspend the imposition of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation. In King, 
720 P.2d  at 468, 469, this court 
likened "suspension of imposition of sentence" to "delay passing sentence," as 
found in "old 203." In yet another method under "old 301" the court was 
authorized to suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and place the 
defendant on probation. In Sorenson, 
604 P.2d  at 1037, this court 
held that the legislature's 1971 act creating the board of parole repealed by 
implication the court's authority to require a defendant to serve part of a 
sentence, suspend execution, and place the defendant on probation as to the 
balance. W.S. 
7-13-402 (1977) 
(1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 92, § 10). See also King, 
720 P.2d  at 467; 
Williams 
v. State, 
692 P.2d 233, 235-36 (Wyo. 1984). A final 
method under "old 301" authorized the court to impose a fine applicable to the 
offense and place the defendant on probation.[¶25]  In Sorenson, 
604 P.2d  at 1038 n.6, this court 
suggested that "old 203" probably had been superseded by "old 301," but the 
suggestion was retracted in King, 
720 P.2d  at 467, 469. In 
Peterson, 
586 P.2d  at 156, this court 
considered the differences between "old 203" and "old 301." Later, in 
King, 
720 P.2d  at 468, Justice 
Cardine, writing for the court, drew on Peterson and made further 
comparisons of the two statutes. He concluded that the legislature intended "old 
203" to be an alternative sentencing provision for a limited number of cases. He 
found that "old 203" allowed the first-time felon a considerable degree of 
liberty, his or her actions and freedom being subject to rather minimal 
limitations with the possibility of no sentence at all. Id. 
at 468. 
 Peterson, 
586 P.2d  at 156. In "old 
203" the legislature intended to preclude first-time felons who had committed 
the serious crimes of murder, sexual assault, or arson from the benefit of the 
possibility of no sentence at all. Id. In contrast, "old 301" was "much 
more restrictive [than "old 203"] since it [did] not itself specify the 
conditions of any probationary freedom." Id. In "old 301" the legislature 
intended "that those criminal defendants excluded from the benefits of ["old 
203"] could be in some cases beneficially rehabilitated under the provisions of 
["old 301"] with one exception -- those guilty of 'crimes and offenses 
punishable by death or life imprisonment.'" Id.[¶26]  On a final point of comparison, Justice 
Cardine noted that under "old 203" when the defendant successfully completed 
probation the legislature authorized the court to annul the verdict or plea of 
guilty. Id. In contrast, he observed, under "old 301" when the defendant 
successfully completed probation the legislature authorized the court, under 
then W.S. 
7-13-304 ("old 
304"), to discharge the defendant, but no mention was made of annulling the 
verdict or plea of guilty. Id.III."NEW 
301" AND "NEW 302"[¶27]  
By keeping the chief features of "old 203" and "old 301" in mind and by 
comparing them with "new 301" and "new 302" as enacted in 1987 by the 
Forty-Ninth Legislature, we can identify how "old 203" was revised to become 
"new 301" and how "old 301" was revised to become "new 302." A. 
Revision of "Old 203" into "New 301" [¶28]  "Old 203" emerged as "new 301," as 
follows: 1. From "old 203" the legislature retained the requirement 
that the defendant be a person who had never before been convicted of a felony 
and used the feature in the first line of the first sentence of "new 301" to 
describe to whom "new 301" applied. Thus, the first line of "new 301" reads in 
relevant part, "if a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony 
* * *." 2. Next, from "old 203" the legislature retained the 
requirement that a first offender be found guilty or have pleaded  guilty, 
but then added to that the feature from "old 301" relating to a defendant who 
had been only charged with a crime. Thus, the next part of "new 301's" opening 
line now read, "[i]f a person who has not previously been convicted of any 
felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty to." 
(Emphasis added.) 3. Next, the legislature retained the felony 
category of crimes, with slight modification, for which the defendant may 
receive probation. Thus, that portion of "old 203" that read "any felony except 
murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson of a dwelling 
house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being" 
emerged in "new 301" as "any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first 
or second degree or arson in the first or second degree." As can be seen, the 
slight modification related to the action offense.At this point, the 
legislature took from "old 301" the feature relating to misdemeanors, with an 
exception not important to our purposes here, adding misdemeanors to the 
previously retained felony category in "new 301." 4. Next, the 
legislature deleted from "old 203" the following phrases that appeared in the 
first two sentences of "old 203": a. The court shall ascertain 
whether the offense of which the accused is guilty is his first offense, the 
extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and other facts and 
circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know. b. 
If the court is satisfied that he was a person of good reputation before 
the commission of the offense charged and had never before been convicted of any 
felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not again violate the 
law. 5. Next, the legislature made the change in "old 203" that is 
at the heat of our controversy. That portion of "old 203" which read, "the court 
may in its discretion, by an order entered of record, delay passing sentence and 
then parole the person and permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance * 
* *," was changed to read, "the court may, with the consent of the defendant and 
the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further 
proceedings and place the person on probation * * *." In making this change the 
legislature borrowed from "old 301" the feature contained in its last sentence, 
"With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime * * * the court may 
suspend trial and place such defendant on probation." That borrowed feature 
explains where the requirement of the defendant's consent came from. It does not 
explain where that requirement of the state's consent came from. For that 
explanation, we must look elsewhere. The details of the source of the 
explanation are set out later in this opinion. Summarized here, the explanation 
is the state's consent requirement probably derives from the prosecutor's common 
law nolle prosequi power which in Wyoming was codified in old W.S. 7-198 
(1957) and later recognized in W.R.Cr.P. 45(a).As can be seen, the 
portion of "old 203" that read "delay passing sentence and then parole the 
person" was changed in "new 301" to read "without entering a judgment of guilt 
or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation * * 
*." The legislature's use of the term "judgment of guilt or conviction" shows 
its proper recognition of the bright line that divides the prosecution's power 
to prosecute from the court's power to adjudicate and to impose sentence. As 
W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) informs, "A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the 
verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. * * * The judgment shall 
be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk." In Vigil 
v. State, 
563 P.2d 1344, 1349 (Wyo. 1977), this court 
made clear that there is only one final judgment. The final 
judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.   
Berman 
v. United States, 
1937, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S. Ct. 164, 165, 82 L. Ed. 204 (1937). This is 
consistent with Rule 33(b), W.R.Cr.P. * * *. There is no judgment against the 
defendant until sentence is pronounced. 6. We need not dwell on 
other changes in "old 203" which emerged as "new 301" for purposes of this 
opinion. "Old 203's" feature of a maximum five-year probation period was 
retained. Also retained was "old 203's" requirement that the probationer report 
to the court twice yearly. "Old 203's" feature that the court shall enter an 
order discharging the defendant and annulling the verdict or plea of guilty was 
retained with slight modification in "new 301" which, instead of using 
"annulling," made it clear that such discharge and dismissal shall be without 
adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose. By clarifying 
this last feature, the legislature again showed its recognition that this 
deferral-probation scheme was taking place in the prosecutorial phase, not the 
adjudicatory-sentence phase, of a criminal prosecution. Further, the legislature 
was recognizing that portion of W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) which provides, "If the 
defendant * * * for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, judgment 
shall be entered accordingly. The judgment shall be signed by the judge and 
entered by the clerk." B. Revision of "Old 301" and "New 
302" [¶28]  "Old 301" 
emerged as "new 302," as follows: 1. The legislature inserted the 
phrase "and following entry of the judgment of conviction" between the phrase 
"except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment" and the phrase "the 
court may." 2. In two ways the legislature changed the phrase "the 
court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of 
all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may 
impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on 
probation." First, it deleted that portion relating to suspending the execution 
of "part of a sentence." This was done in recognition of this court's decisions 
in Sorenson, King, and Williams, stating that the power to suspend 
execution of a part of a sentence and place the defendant on probation was given 
by the legislature to the board of parole in the 1971 act establishing the 
board. The legislature then simply fit the phrase back together with a few 
grammatical changes.  Thus, the phrase that read "the court may suspend the 
imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation." The legislature then retained the "may impose a fine 
applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation" 
language. 3. Finally, the legislature deleted the last sentence of 
"old 301" that read "with the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, 
except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend 
trial and place such defendant on 
probation."IV.SEPARATION OF POWERS 
ANALYSIS[¶30]  With 
respect to the separation of powers issue we will decide whether the "new 301" 
requirement, that the state consent to the court's deferral of further 
proceedings and placement of defendants on probation without entry of a judgment 
of conviction, infringes on the judicial department's sentencing power in 
violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. 
Const. art. 2, § 1. A. Standard of review[¶31]  In White 
v. Fisher, 
689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 1984), we reviewed 
the separation of powers issue using these principles:We recognize the 
principle articulated in Washakie 
County School District Number One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 
(1980), cert. 
denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L.E.2d 28 (1980):  "Courts 
have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature 
has enacted if that is at all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor 
of constitutionality. Witzenburger 
v. State, 
Wyo.1978, 575 P.2d 1100, 1112; 
Lund 
v. Schrader, 
Wyo.1971, 492 P.2d 202, 206. Though the 
supreme court has the duty to give great deference to legislative pronouncements 
and to uphold constitutionality when possible, it is the court's equally 
imperative duty to declare a legislative enactment invalid if it transgresses 
the state constitution. Witzenburger, 
supra, 575 P.2d  at 1114. In our 
consideration of this case, we have consistently kept these basic principles in 
mind to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality -- but doubt is not 
present."We also are cognizant of our duty in any case in which the 
constitutionality of a statute is in issue:"It is this court's 
obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the 
legislative product. Yeik 
v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979). In 
construing statutes the intention of the law-making body must be ascertained 
from the language of the statute as nearly as possible. Wyoming 
State Treasurer v. City of Casper, 
Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 687. We must not 
give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation." McGuire 
v. McGuire, 
Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (1980). See 
also Hopkinson, 
664 P.2d  at 54, which 
involved, inter alia, a separation of powers issue. These principles will 
guide our way here. Additionally, [a]ll statutes are presumed to be 
enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of law with 
reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the 
existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, 
and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with 
the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of 
the courts. Civil 
Association of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 
1941, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245. Matter 
of Adoption of Voss, 
550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976). B. 
Discussion1. Air-Tight Compartments vs. Integrated 
Government[¶32]  Under the 
Wyoming Constitution, the legislative power is vested in a senate and house of 
representatives. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 1. The executive power is vested in a 
governor. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 1. The judicial power is vested in a supreme 
court, district courts and such subordinate courts as the legislature may 
establish. Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1. The Wyoming Constitution contains a 
definitive separation of powers provision: Powers of government 
divided into three departments. -- The powers of government of 
this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, 
executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise 
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted. Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 
1.[¶35]  The state's framers 
probably borrowed this provision from the constitutions of our neighboring 
states of Idaho and Montana. R. Prien, The Background of the Wyoming 
Constitution 56 (August 1956) (unpublished thesis); see also R. 
Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXI 
Land & Water L.Rev. 527, 534 (1986). During the floor adoption of that 
provision at the 1889 constitutional convention, the framers discussed precious 
little about that provision. Journals and Debates of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of Wyoming, 44, 210, 247, 315-16 (1893) (where Mr. 
F.H. Harvey said it was the form found in most of the western states). It is 
likely more was said in committee, but we will never know since committee 
reports are not extant.6 In 
determining the meaning of the separation of powers provision in the face of 
such meager evidence, "we must consider the probable intention of the framers of 
the constitution * * *. [T]he language is to be understood in the sense in which 
it was used at the time when it was adopted." Witzenburger 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 
575 P.2d 1100, 1111-12 (Wyo. 1978).[¶39]  In what sense, then, did our state's 
framers use the separation of powers language in 1889? Claiming that one 
department of government may not encroach upon functions belonging to another, 
these criminal defendants contend it is essential that we preserve each of the 
powers in separate, air-tight compartments. They refer us, however, to neither 
legal authority nor historical evidence that our state's framers had in mind 
principles of separation of powers any different from those recognized as 
implicit under the Federal Constitution.7 Surveying our state constitution, we 
identify convincing evidence that our state's framers intended an integration or 
dispersed powers into a balanced, workable government.[¶40]  Our state constitution, like the Federal 
Constitution, places the respective powers of the three departments of 
government into three articles. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 1, concerning the 
legislative power, is similar to the U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Wyo. Const. art. 
4, § 1, concerning the executive power, is similar to the U.S. Const. art. III, 
§ 1. Under both the Federal Constitution and our state constitution, although 
the legislative bodies propose and enact laws, the executive bodies exercise 
veto power, which by its nature injects the executive department into the 
business of the legislative department.8 n8 Under both constitutions the judicial department 
has and exercises the power to adjudicate and declare legislative enactments 
unconstitutional, which by its nature injects the judicial department into the 
business of the legislative department. Under both constitutions, although the 
judicial department adjudicates and imposes legislatively determined sentences 
upon adjudicated criminal defendants, the executive department has and exercises 
a pardon power, which by its nature injects the executive department into the 
business of both the legislative and judicial departments.9 Moreover, in Wyoming, the courts, as 
courts of general jurisdiction, "have traditionally elaborated the state's 
common law and participated in a partnership of sorts with the 
state legislature in shaping the state's law." Keiter, supra, p. 
535. If the state legislature disagrees with the court's common law decisions, 
it can legislatively reverse them. Id.[¶41]  From the foregoing discussion, we see 
that Wyoming's constitutional scheme of state government is, like the 
federal scheme of national government, replete with checks and balances. 
Considering the organizational structure, the placement of powers and the system 
of checks and balances, we are convinced that the state's framers had in mind a 
pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power. They intended 
that "practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. 
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity." Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S. Ct. 863, 870, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 1199, 26 A.L.R.2d 1378 
(1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring opinion). Separation of powers, then, merges into balanced 
government.10 We 
adopt this view and reject the "air-tight compartment" view of these criminal 
defendants.2. Powers of Each Department

 [¶42]  With this review of workable, balanced 
government, we now review this court's past decisions that identify the division 
of the government's powers in the criminal law area among the three departments. 
With these past decision this court has painted the landscape of those powers. 
On review, we keep in mind the contentions of these criminal defendants. They 
contend the judicial department has the power to decide whether to defer a 
criminal prosecution and place a defendant on probation during the time period 
those prosecution proceedings are being deferred. Next, they claim that the 
disposition of deferral and probation without the entry of a final judgment of 
conviction or guilt is a sentence, and also that this power to decide to defer 
emanates from the judicial power to impose a sentence. MJP 
v. State, 
706 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wyo. 1985). They 
maintain that, as a result, the state's consent requirement placed by the 
legislature in "new 301" is a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the 
judicial power by the executive department. We disagree with these 
contentions.[¶43]  In its 
exercise of the legislative power, the legislative department has 
the exclusive power to determine and declare what acts shall constitute 
crimes and to prescribe punishments for those crimes. Baum 
v. State, 
745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987); 
Cook 
v. State, 
710 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 1985); 
Williams, 
692 P.2d  at 235; 
Schuler 
v. State, 
668 P.2d 1333, 1342 (Wyo. 1983); 
Evans 
v. State, 
655 P.2d 1214, 1223 (Wyo. 1982).[¶44]  In its exercise of the judicial power, 
the judicial department has the exclusive power to adjudicate, to pronounce a 
judgment and carry it into effect. W.R.Cr.P. 33; S. Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 631 (1987) (Constitution of the United States-Analysis and 
Interpretation). By entering a judgment whether of acquittal or of 
conviction or of discharge, the judicial department is performing a significant 
act of government. W.R.Cr.P. 33(b); Vigil, 
563 P.2d  at 1344. On the 
other hand, the judicial department has no power to initiate a criminal 
prosecution. That department's exercise of the prosecution power would be a 
constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the executive department's 
prosecution power. Petition 
of Padget, 
678 P.2d 870, 873 (Wyo. 1984).[¶45]  The judicial department has no inherent 
power to refuse to try a criminal charge upon considerations extraneous to the 
legality of the charge, such as a belief that the particular act made criminal 
by law ought not to be treated as criminal. Ex 
Parte United States, 
242 U.S. 27, 42, 37 S. Ct. 72, 74, 61 L. Ed. 129, 140-41 (1916), cited in 
Evans 
v. State, 
655 P.2d 1214, 1224 (Wyo. 1982).[¶46]  Where the court finds no legal error on 
which to reverse a final judgment of conviction, the court has no inherent power 
to expunge that judgment for the purposes of restoring the defendant's civil 
rights or of alleviating the defendant's fear of being classified as a habitual 
criminal in the event he commits further offenses. Because expungement of a 
final judgment of conviction has the effect of a pardon and the pardoning power 
belongs exclusively to the executive department, the judicial department's 
exercise of an expungement power would be a constitutionally impermissible 
encroachment on the executive department's pardoning power. Stanton 
v. State, 
686 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo. 1984). Similarly, 
the judicial department has no power to grant an annulment of a final judgment 
of conviction. Ward 
v. State, 
735 P.2d 707, 708 (Wyo. 1987).[¶47]  The judicial department has no 
inherent power to refuse to impose a sentence fixed by statute or to refuse to 
execute such a sentence when imposed. Ex 
Parte United States, 
242 U.S.  at 41-42, 37 S. Ct.  at 74, 61 L. Ed.  at 140, cited with 
approval in Evans, 
655 P.2d  at 1224. The 
judicial department has no inherent power to suspend a sentence. That power 
belongs exclusively to the legislative department. Evans, 
655 P.2d  at 1224. In 
Evans, this court relied favorably on State 
v. Mabry, 
96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269, 272 (1981), where that 
court said: "* * * The vast majority of jurisdictions which have 
considered the question whether the courts have the inherent power to suspend 
sentences have answered in the negative. * * * A leading case is Ex 
Parte United States, 
242 U.S. 27, 37 S. Ct. 72, 61 L. Ed. 129 (1916), in which 
the Supreme Court held that federal courts did not have the power, absent 
authorization by Congress, to indefinitely suspend a sentence on good behavior. 
The Court examined common law authorities and found no support for the 
proposition that courts at common law had the inherent authority to suspend 
sentences indefinitely." Evans, 
655 P.2d  at 1224.[¶48]  The judicial department has no 
power, after imposing sentence, to reduce the sentence imposed to one the court 
was not authorized by the legislature to impose at the original sentencing. The 
judicial department has no power to either impose a sentence below the statutory 
minimum at the time of the original sentencing or impose a sentence within the 
statutory minimum and maximum and then suspend execution of a portion of that 
sentence. Williams, 
692 P.2d  at 236-37.[¶49]  The judicial department has no power to 
impose a sentence different from the sentence mandated by the legislative 
department. We have held that the legislature in "old 301" properly exercised 
its power to prohibit the court from considering probation for habitual 
offenders with life sentences. Schuler, 
668 P.2d  at 1342.[¶50]  The judicial department has no inherent 
power to grant probation. The legislative department has exclusive authority 
over sentencing. Hicklin 
v. State, 
535 P.2d 743, 752 (Wyo. 1975). And, the 
judicial department has no power to grant parole after incarceration. The 
legislative department, in the exercise of its authority over sentencing, has 
placed that parole power with the board of parole, an arm of the executive 
department. Sorenson, 
604 P.2d  at 1036-37.[¶51]  Obviously, our Wyoming decisions agree 
with that said in Geraghty 
v. United States Parole Commission, 
719 F.2d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S. Ct. 1602, 80 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1984), "Unlike 
interpreting the constitution or adjudicating disputes, sentencing is not 
inherently or exclusively a judicial function."[¶52]  The executive department, in the 
exercise of its executive power to faithfully execute the laws, has the 
exclusive power to make the charging decision and prosecute the person who has 
allegedly committed the act determined by the legislative department to be a 
crime. Padget, 
678 P.2d  at 872-73. In 
Padget this court declared unconstitutional a legislative act that 
purported to authorize the court to exercise the prosecution power belonging 
exclusively to the executive department. Although this court stated that, once 
the prosecution made the decision to prosecute, the process which leads to 
acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature, we recognized that 
within the judicial process of criminal prosecution the prosecutor's power to 
dismiss charges, to reduce charges, to defer charges, in sum to control the 
prosecution, was exclusive and not shared by the judicial department. We quoted 
from several different sources: "The prosecutor has broad 
discretion to decided whether or not prosecution of an alleged crime will serve 
the public interest. [Citations.]. He may, and should, consider a wide range of 
factors that bear on the merits of prosecution -- the nature of the offense, the 
nature and severity of the sanctions that will be imposed upon conviction, the 
personal circumstances of the accused, the expense of prosecution and congestion 
in the courts. * * *" Hoines 
v. Barney's Club, Inc., 
[28 Cal. 3d 603, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 620 P.2d 628, 635 (1980)] (Tobriner, 
J., dissenting). "A prosecutor's discretion in charging, deferring or requesting 
dismissal is limited by pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention. 
See Miller and Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A 
Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wash.U.Law Quarterly." People 
v. District Court in and for County of Larimer, 
[186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974)]. Id. 
at 873.[¶53]  In 
Jahnke, we upheld against a separation of powers challenge the 
constitutionality of W.S. 
14-6-203(c)(1977), 
which placed the decision as to the appropriate court in which to prosecute a 
juvenile within the discretion of the prosecutor as an officer of the executive 
department. After noting that there is no constitutional right to be tried as a 
juvenile, this court stated: Any decision to initiate criminal 
proceedings is vested in the prosecuting attorney, and the decision is 
discretionary. Confiscation 
Cases, 
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L. Ed. 196 (1869); 
State 
v. Faltynowicz, 
Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). Since one does not have an inherent right to be prosecuted as a 
juvenile but that is a privilege granted by the legislature, the legislature can 
restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit, so long as there is not 
involved any arbitrary or discriminatory classification. Woodard 
v. Wainwright, 
[556 F.2d 781, 785]. See, 
e.g., Lamb 
v. Brown, 
456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir.1972). Jahnke, 
692 P.2d  at 929. We 
also added that the legislature of the State of Wyoming has chosen 
to vest in the prosecuting attorney the discretion with regard to what charges 
to file and in what court they should be filed. There may be 
circumstances which would justify judicial review of the prosecutorial 
discretion, but in the absence of such suspect factors as race, religion or 
other arbitrary classification, the exercise of discretion by the prosecutor in 
deciding whether to charge as a juvenile or adult involves no violation of due 
process or equal protection of the law. Id. (citations 
omitted). These principles relating to the prosecutor's power to 
control the prosecution of a criminal charge were earlier expressed by the 
United States Supreme Court in this way: In our system, so long as 
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what 
charge to file or bring * * * generally rests entirely in his discretion. Within 
the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of 
chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement 
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection 
was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification." Oyler 
v. Boles, 
368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S. Ct. 501, 506, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 
[1962]. Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, 
434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 610-11 
(1978).[¶55]  In Gooden, 
711 P.2d  at 409-10, this court 
recognized another aspect of the prosecutor's power when it held that a criminal 
defendant has no constitutional right to any plea bargain with the prosecutor, 
nor to the reduction or dismissal of charges. The process of plea bargaining or 
whether it will be engaged in is left to the prosecutor's discretion. 
Weatherford 
v. Bursey, 
429 U.S. 545, 560-61, 97 S. Ct. 837, 846, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30, 42-43 
(1977). Accord, 
Corbitt 
v. New Jersey, 
439 U.S. 212, 223, 99 S. Ct. 492, 499, 58 L. Ed. 2d 466, 476-77 
(1978). The 
executive department, through the prosecutor as its officer, has the absolute 
right to prosecute. United 
States v. Thompson, 
251 U.S. 407, 412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 289, 291, 292, 64 L. Ed. 333, 342-43 
(1919). As 
expressed in Weatherford, 
429 U.S.  at 561, 97 S. Ct.  at 846, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 43: "It is a 
novel argument that constitutional rights are infringed by trying the defendant 
rather than accepting his plea of guilty."[¶56]  In our view of the prosecutor's power to 
control the prosecution of a criminal case, we must also consider the 
prosecutor's common law power. We have consistently said that we will read our 
statutes in harmony with the common law. Wetering 
v. Eisele, 
682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984). In this 
light, we focus attention on the prosecutor's common law power of nolle 
prosequi. At common law the power to initiate and control criminal 
proceedings is within the exclusive domain of the prosecutor. United 
States v. Brokaw, 
60 F. Supp. 100, 101-03 (S.D.Ill. 1945); 
Thompson, 
251 U.S.  at 413-14, 40 S. Ct.  at 292, 64 L. Ed.  at 342; 
Confiscation 
Cases, 
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L. Ed. 196 (1869); 
Schumann, 
2 Abb.U.S. 523, 7 Sawy. 439, 27 F. Cas. 984, 985 (C.C.D.Cal. 1866) (No. 
16,235); Padget, 
678 P.2d at 872-73; 
State 
v. Faltynowicz, 
660 P.2d 368, 377 (Wyo. 1983) (Thomas, 
J., specially concurring, with whom Raper and Rose, JJ., joined); Comment, 
The Nolle Prosequi Under Rule 
48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Det.C.L.Rev. 491 (1978). Indeed, as stated in 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice para. 48.02[1], 48-5 (2d ed. 1989): "At common law, a prosecutor 
had unfettered authority to initiate, control and discontinue a 
proceeding at any stage prior to appeal."11[¶56]  
An important feature of the prosecutor's unfettered power was his power 
to enter a nolle prosequi to discontinue a criminal proceeding he had 
earlier initiated. "Nolle prosequi means: 'I am unwilling to prosecute.'" 
Brokaw, 
60 F. Supp.  at 101. As 
described in Brokaw:The rule at the common law seems to have 
been, and in the present-day common law courts to remain, that prior 
to trial the prosecutor has the absolute uncontrolled power to enter a nolle 
prosequi; that after the empaneling of the jury until the return of a 
verdict the power is subject to the control of the court since it may not be 
used at that time to the prejudice of the defendant; and that following the 
return of the verdict the uncontrolled power of the prosecutor to enter a nolle 
revives and continues until such time as judgment is entered and sentence 
imposed. (emphasis added). Id. 
at 102. (citations 
omitted). See also 8B J. Moore, supra, 48.02[1] at 48-5; 6 L. Orfield and 
M. Rhodes, Orfield's Criminal Procedure Under the Federal 
Rules § 48.2-48.7, pp. 243-49 (2d ed.) (Lawyer's Co-op 1987); Comment, 
Criminal Law -- Nolle Prosequi -- Trial Court has Power to Dismiss for Want 
of Prosecution, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 996-1001 (1966) (placing the initial 
appearance of nolle prosequi in Stretton & Taylor's Case, 1 Leon. 
119, 74 Eng.Rep. 111 (K.B. 1588)).[¶57]  Commenting on the prosecutor's nolle 
prosequi power, the court in United 
States v. Woody, 
2 F.2d 262, 262-633 (D.C.Mont. 1924), 
observed:The power to determine whether a case shall be prosecuted to a 
conclusion must, of course, be lodged somewhere, and by common law the district 
attorney is made its repository. By no statute has Congress deprived him of it, 
in ordinary criminal cases. It is assumed he will exercise his power under a 
heavy sense of duty to enforce the law, to prosecute offenders, and to protect 
society, and with wisdom and justice.The court cannot control him, 
unless, as in some states, it is given the power by statute. He is not even 
required to give a reason for dismissal. In United 
States v. Cox, 
342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied sub nom. Cox 
v. Hauberg, 
381 U.S. 935, 85 S. Ct. 1767, 14 L. Ed. 2d 700, the court 
noted, "It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, 
that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary 
powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal 
prosecutions." In a concurring opinion, it was said:"Responsibility for 
determining whether a prosecution is to be commenced or maintained must be 
clearly fixed. The power not to initiate * * * has to reside somewhere. And the 
more clearly pinpointed it is, the more the public interest is served through 
the focus of relentless publicity upon that decision. It may not, with safety, 
be left to a body whose great virtue is the combination of anonymity, 
transitory authority, and political 
unresponsibility." Id. 
at 182. (Brown, J., 
concurring specially).[¶58]  
In another concurring opinion, Judge Wisdom reviewed the separation of 
powers doctrine, the exclusive power of the executive department to prosecute, 
the incompatibility of the functions of prosecutor and judge, and the 
prosecutor's power to enter a nolle prosequi. In light of his review, he 
observed that, within the context of law enforcement, a government's policy is 
involved. The executive department of that government is charged with carrying 
out the government's policy on law enforcement and is usually informed on more 
levels than the other two departments of government. Id. 
at 193. "In such a 
situation, a decision not to prosecute is analogous to the exercise of executive 
privilege. The executive's absolute and exclusive discretion to prosecute may be 
rationalized as an illustration of the doctrine of separation of powers." 
Id.[¶59]  Wyoming is 
a common law state, except in those areas where the common law has been changed 
by statute or court rule. W.S. 
8-30-101 (1977); 
Schlattman 
v. Stone, 
511 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1973); 
Krug 
v. Reissig, 
488 P.2d 150, 152, 52 A.L.R.3d 748 (Wyo. 1971); 
Goldsmith 
v. Cheney, 
468 P.2d 813, 816 (Wyo. 1970); 
Johnston 
v. Laird, 
48 Wyo. 532, 538, 52 P.2d 1219, 1220 (1935); 
State 
v. Foster, 
5 Wyo. 199, 208, 38 P. 926, 927-28 (1895). Wyoming's 
statutory adoption of the common law of England originated from C.L. 1876, ch. 
25 § 1. Our research had not uncovered any early Wyoming decision involving the 
prosecutor's power to enter a nolle prosequi at common law. We have 
found, however, that by virtue of Laws 1890, ch. 73 § 133, the Wyoming 
legislature enacted W.S. 7-198 (1957) which, until superseded by W.R.Cr.P. 
45(a),12 provided:   No 
indictment or information shall be nol-prossed, except by order of the court on 
the motion of the prosecuting attorney, and such motion must be in writing, and 
the reasons therefor must be stated in such motion and read in open court, 
before such order is made. Other states have modified "the common 
law [of nolle prosequi] to give courts a responsible role in the 
dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding * * *."13 United 
States v. Cowan, 
524 F.2d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1975). "The 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recommended the 
common law approach be adopted requiring additionally only that prosecutors file 
motions with the court including reasons for the nolle prosequi." J. 
Moore, supra, para. 48.02[1], at 48-3. The committee submitted the recommended 
rule to the United States Supreme Court. Reviewing the proposed rule, the Court 
"questioned the legal basis and wisdom of such a rule." Comment, 1978 
Det.C.L.Rev. supra, at 494-95. Resubmitting the proposed rule, the 
committee added "only the requirement of obtaining the defendant's consent to 
the motion if filed during the trial." Id. at 495. The Court deleted the 
proposed rule's requirement of a prosecutor's statement of reasons and added a 
requirement "by leave of court." Id. As formally adopted by the Court, 
F.R.Cr.P. 
48(a) 
states:Rule 48. Dismissal (a) By Attorney for Government. 
The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a 
dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall 
thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without 
the consent of the defendant. Nearly twenty-three years after the 
United States Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the Wyoming Supreme Court's adoption of the Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective February 11, 1969.14 Boggs 
v. State, 
484 P.2d 711, 714 n.2 (Wyo. 1971). W.R.Cr.P. 
45(a) states:   Rule 45. Dismissal(a) By the 
prosecuting attorney. -- The prosecuting attorney may, by leave of court, file a 
dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint, and the prosecution shall 
thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without 
the consent of the defendant.[¶60]  
After the effective date of this rule, W.S. 7-198 (1957), the nolle 
prosequi statute, was superseded and of no further force or effect. 
W.R.Cr.P. 56. Since W.R.Cr.P. 45(a) is the same as F.R.Cr.P. 
48(a), we give 
great weight to federal precedent under F.R.Cr.P. 
48(a) when 
considering matters arising under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a). Dobbins 
v. State, 
483 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1971).15 
[¶61]  According to Moore, 
the "by leave of court" requirement has been variously interpreted in the 
federal courts. Some federal courts believe they have broad discretion "to 
protect public interests in fair administration of criminal justice." J. Moore, 
supra, para. 48.02[1], p. 48-4. Others adhere to the standard that the 
prosecution's motion to dismiss should be denied only if "clearly contrary to 
manifest public interest." Id., para. 48.02[2], at 48-7. Despite this 
disagreement on the scope of the court's discretion, it is clear that the "by 
leave of court" requirement has modified the absolute power of the executive 
department so that the defendant is not harassed by charging, dismissing and 
recharging without placing the defendant in jeopardy. Id. para. 48.02[1], 
at 48-5; para. 48.02[2], at 48-8. "The executive branch, however, essentially 
remains the judge of the decision to initiate a prosecution and to terminate 
it." Id. para. 48.02[1], at 48-5. And, "there is a presumption that the 
prosecutor's motion is made in good faith and in the proper discharge of his 
duties." Id. para. 48.02[2], at 48-7.[¶62]  We see a direct relationship between the 
prosecutor's dismissal power under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a) and the prosecutor's power 
under "new 301" to consent to deferral of further prosecution without entry 
of judgment of conviction. In light of our foregoing analysis of the respective 
powers of the three departments of government in the criminal law area and of 
our tracing the evolution of the prosecutor's nolle prosequi power, we 
conclude that "new 301" is the product of the legislative department's correct 
recognition of the executive department's power to initiate, control, and 
terminate criminal prosecutions before the judicial department exercises its 
power to enter a final judgment. Recalling the meaning of "judgment of 
conviction" under W.R.Cr.P. 33(b), we find that it correlates well with that 
phrase found in "new 301": "The court may, with the consent of the defendant and 
the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer 
further proceedings * * *." (emphasis added). This statute demonstrates the 
legislative department's proper understanding that until the judicial department 
enters a judgment of guilt or conviction (final judgment) the prosecutor 
possesses the executive department's power to control and terminate the 
prosecution at any time before final judgment. Thus, we find W.S. 
7-13-301 compatible 
with W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) and 45(a) and solidly based on a proper understanding of 
and appreciation for the common law power of the prosecutor to control the 
criminal case even though verdict until the court enters a final 
judgment.[¶63]  In the face 
of extensive case law identifying and describing the legislative department's 
exclusive authority over sentencing, the contention of these criminal defendants 
that the judicial department has similar authority cannot stand. It is true that 
the judicial department has the power to impose sentence. W.R.Cr.P. 33(b); 
MJP, 
706 P.2d  at 1110. These 
criminal defendants are wrong, however, in concluding that probation without 
entry of a judgment under "new 301" is the functional equivalent of a sentence. 
They fail to recognize what a sentence actually is.As we pointed out 
earlier in this opinion: There is only one final judgment. The 
final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. 
Berman 
v. United States, 
1937, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S. Ct. 164, 165, 82 L. Ed. 204. That is 
consistent with Rule 33(b), W.R.Cr.P., providing that, "A judgment of conviction 
shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings,  and the adjudication 
and sentence. * * *" There is no judgment against the defendant until sentence 
is pronounced. Vigil, 
563 P.2d  at 1349. In 
Berman 
v. United States, 
302 U.S. 211, 58 S. Ct. 164, 82 L. Ed. 204 (1937), the Court 
explained that the sentence is the final determination of the merits of the 
criminal charge. To create finality it was necessary that 
petitioner's conviction should be followed by sentence * * *. In criminal cases, 
as well as civil, the judgment is final for the purpose of appeal "when it 
terminates the litigation * * * on the merits" and "leaves nothing to be done 
but to enforce by execution what has been 
determined." Id., 
302 U.S.  at 212, 58 S. Ct.  at 166, 82 L. Ed.  at 205 (citations 
omitted). The deferral of further prosecution proceedings and 
placement of a criminal defendant on probation without entering a judgment of 
guilty or conviction under "new 301" is by definition not a sentence. 
Deferral and probation without the entry of a judgment of guilty or conviction 
is not a final determination of the merits of the criminal charge. If the 
criminal defendant successfully completes probation, then the court discharges 
the defendant and dismisses the proceedings. In that event, there if finality. 
Discharge and dismissal occur without the court's adjudication of guilt and 
imposition of sentence. W.S. 
7-13-301(d) (June 1987 
Repl.).[¶65]  On the other 
hand, if the criminal defendant violates probation, the court may proceed with 
the trial of the criminal charge if the criminal defendant has been charged but 
has not pleaded guilty or been tried and found guilty. W.S. 
7-13-301(c)(ii). Or, if the 
criminal defendant violates probation, the court may, if the criminal defendant 
has previously pleaded guilty or been tried and found guilty, enter a judgment 
of guilt or conviction and proceed to impose sentence. W.S. 
7-13-301(c)(i). Thus, for 
those criminal defendants who violate probation there will ultimately be a final 
judgment of either acquittal or of guilt and conviction followed by 
sentence.[¶66]  There is 
another reason why probation without entry of a judgment is not a sentence. A 
criminal defendant upon whom a court has imposed a sentence cannot reject that 
sentence. The court has the power to force that sentence on the criminal 
defendant. Under W.S. 
7-13-301, since the 
criminal defendant's consent is required, the criminal defendant is free to 
reject the tender of probation without entry of judgment. If this disposition 
were truly a sentence, then the criminal defendant could not reject 
it.[¶67]  Viewed in this 
context, probation without entry of a judgment is analogous to a pardon. As 
Chief Justice John Marshall observed in United 
States v. Wilson, 
7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 150, 160-61, 8 L. Ed. 640 (1833), a pardon is 
like a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not 
complete without acceptance. A pardon may be rejected by the person to whom it 
is tendered. If that person rejects it, a court has no power to force it on that 
person. In Marshall's view, a pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the 
executive department's power to execute laws which exempts the person on whom it 
is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime that person has 
committed. The prosecutor's consent to probation without entry of a judgment, 
like a pardon, exempts a judgment of guilt or conviction. In the light of this 
favorable comparison, the prosecutor's consent to that type of disposition is 
also seen as an act of  grace, proceeding from the executive 
power.[¶68]  We are not 
surprised that the pardon power and the prosecutor's consent power reside within 
the same department of government. Seeing the prosecutor's consent in this 
light, the symmetry of treatment is compelling. On the pre-entry of judgment 
side of the adjudicated guilt line, the executive department possesses the power 
to divert, or not, a criminal defendant into probation and away from further 
criminal prosecution in furtherance of the social policy enacted by the 
legislative department. On the post-entry of judgment side of the line, the 
executive department also possesses the power to divert, or not, a criminal 
defendant into pardon and away from further punishment.[¶69]  Although "new 301" uses the word 
"probation," the legislature has used it only generally to describe the 
defendant's status before a final judgment of conviction or discharge has been 
entered. The legislature has not used it to mean a defendant's status after the 
court has entered a judgment of conviction. See Hicklin, 
535 P.2d  at 753. Probation 
before entry of judgment is not a punitive sanction. It is an opportunity for 
rehabilitation before sentencing. The probationer is not an adjudicated convict. 
If probation is successfully completed, the probationer may be discharged 
without adjudication of guilt.[¶70]  These criminal defendants mistakenly 
seize upon the single phrase in Padget that says when the decision to 
prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is 
fundamentally judicial in nature. Padget, 
678 P.2d  at 872 (applied in 
People 
v. Tenorio, 
3 Cal. 3d 89, 94, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 
1970)). From that 
single phrase they claim that whatever happens to the criminal charge after that 
point is an exercise of judicial power, not executive power.[¶71]  We agree that the prosecution of a 
criminal charge is part of the judicial process. In the prosecution phase of 
that judicial process, the judicial department exercises its powers and the 
executive department exercises its powers. The judicial department exercises its 
powers to control its docket, to administer court business, to adjudicate legal 
issues concerning the criminal procedures that necessarily attend the criminal 
proceeding, and to adjudicate substantive legal issues raised by the litigants. 
What these criminal defendants have failed to understand, however, is that 
during this judicial process the executive department is also at work 
exercising its powers. The prosecutor, as an officer of that department, is 
making decisions and controlling the criminal prosecution. In the exercise of 
these powers, the prosecutor may decide to add charges, to drop charges, or to 
reduce charges. The prosecutor may decide to dismiss some, but not all, charges. 
The prosecutor may decide to enter into plea negotiations. The prosecutor may 
decide to dismiss all charges and terminate the prosecution under W.R.Cr.P. 
45(a), the nolle prosequi rule.[¶72]  With respect to these decisions, and 
others like them, the prosecution is exercising its executive powers within the 
judicial process that leads to dismissal, discharge, acquittal, or conviction 
and sentencing. In their understandable zeal to seize upon the isolated phrase 
to support their position, these criminal defendants have overlooked this 
court's main teaching in Padget: during the prosecution phase of the 
criminal proceeding that is part of the judicial process, the prosecutor shall 
exercise executive powers unfettered by judicial intervention. To emphasize this 
point we quoted favorably from People 
v. District Court in and for County of Larimer, 
186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974): "A 
prosecutor's discretion in charging, deferring or requesting dismissal is 
limited by pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention." Padget, 
678 P.2d  at 873.[¶73]  These criminal defendants also 
mistakenly rely on People v. Tenorio, which this court found helpful in 
our separation of powers analysis in Padget. In Tenorio the 
defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana. He admitted an eight-year 
old prior conviction of marijuana possession. The marijuana possession statute 
provided no minimum term and a maximum term of  ten years for a first-time 
offender. For a defendant with one prior conviction, like Tenorio, the statute 
provided a minimum term of two years and a maximum term of twenty years. A 
related statute provided that unless the prosecutor so moved the court could not 
dismiss from the accusatory pleading an allegation of fact which, if admitted, 
would change the penalty from what it would be if such fact were not admitted. 
In other words, if the prosecutor refused to move to dismiss Tenorio's admission 
of the prior marijuana possession conviction, the court could not on its own 
dismiss that admission from the accusatory pleading, but must sentence Tenorio 
to at least a mandatory minimum term of two years. In violation of that statute, 
the trial court dismissed, without the prosecutor's approval, Tenorio's 
admission of his prior conviction from the complaint and granted Tenorio 
probation.[¶74]  The state 
appealed the order granting probation. In affirming the order, the California 
Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor's approval statute impermissibly 
infringed on the judicial power and violated California's separation of powers 
principle. By its decision, the California court reversed People 
v. Sidener, 
58 Cal. 2d 645, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641 (1962). The court 
reviewed the Sidener opinion, including Justice Schauer's lengthy dissent 
concurred in by two other justices that answered the majority's historical 
argument by noting that nolle prosequi never existed in California. 
Justice Schauer had argued that the common law power of nolle prosequi 
was not part of that Mexican law retained by California's 1849 constitution and 
that the nonexistence of nolle prosequi was codified by statute. 
Tenorio, 
473 P.2d  at 995. The 
Tenorio court concluded, however, that any arguments based 
upon California's legal history before 1850 were undeterminative. The court 
found that from and after 1850 neither decision nor legislation denied that the 
judiciary has the power to dismiss. Id. at 996. The court 
said: The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes 
that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to 
exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain 
with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should 
never be required to pay for its exercise. Id. at 996. The 
court made it clear that when an individual judge exercises sentencing 
discretion he exercises a judicial power, the exercise of which cannot be 
foreclosed by power given to the prosecutor by the 
legislature.[¶75]  We cannot 
follow Tenorio for several reasons. The subject statute in effect there 
operated as a mandatory sentence statute. Although the California Supreme Court 
apparently feels that such a statute cannot operate to deprive the court of 
sentencing discretion, this court does not agree. In Evans, 
655 P.2d  at 1224, this court 
upheld against a separation of powers challenge the constitutionality of 
"old 301" which mandated a life sentence for a habitual criminal. We held 
that "old 301," which precluded the court from suspending a habitual criminal's 
mandatory life sentence, was a proper exercise of the inherent legislative power 
to prohibit suspension of sentence in any given case. We further held that the 
legislative department, not the judicial department, had the inherent power to 
suspend a sentence, and that the legislature is free to retain or delegate that 
discretion in whole or in part in the exercise of its exclusive authority over 
sentencing. Id. We recognized Ex 
Parte United States, 
242 U.S.  at 42, 37 S. Ct.  at 74, 61 L. Ed.  at 140-41, which holds 
that the judicial department does not have the inherent power to refuse to 
impose a sentence fixed by statute or to refuse to execute such a sentence when 
imposed. There, the court implicitly denied the judicial department has the 
power to refuse to try a criminal charge because it believed the act made 
criminal should not be treated as criminal. Id., 
242 U.S.  at 42, 37 S. Ct.  at 74, 61 L. Ed.  at 140-41.[¶76]  Tenorio's holding that the 
judicial department has the inherent power to dismiss a criminal charge in the 
interests of justice is directly contradicted by the United States Supreme 
Court's statement in Ex Parte United States (cited favorably in this 
court's Evans) that the judicial department has no inherent power to 
refuse to try a criminal charge upon considerations extraneous to the legality 
of the charge; by the United States Supreme Court's holding that the executive 
department has the absolute right to prosecute (Bordenkircher, 
Weatherford, and Corbitt); by this court's holding that the 
prosecutor does not have to enter into plea negotiations with a defendant and 
has the right to prosecute rather than accept a plea bargain (Gooden); 
and by this court's holdings that the judicial department has no inherent power 
to suspend a sentence (Evans); to expunge a final judgment of conviction 
which was without legal error and only for the purposes of restoring a 
defendant's civil rights or of alleviating his fear of being classified as a 
habitual criminal (Stanton); to grant an annulment of a final judgment of 
conviction (Ward); to reduce the sentence imposed to one which the 
legislature has not authorized the court to impose at original sentencing 
(Williams); to  refuse to impose a sentence (Evans); to grant 
probation (Hicklin); or to grant parole after incarceration 
(Sorenson).[¶77]  
Tenorio is also out of step with United 
States v. Huerta, 
878 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1989),16  in which a federal statute requiring the 
prosecutor's motion before the sentencing court may impose sentence below the 
statutory minimum on the basis of the defendant's cooperation with the 
prosecution survived separation of powers and due process challenges. Under 
18 
U.S.C. 3553(e), upon 
the prosecutor's motion, the court has the authority to impose a sentence below 
a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a 
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense. Claiming that sentencing is a 
judicial prerogative, Huerta contended that a scheme which delegates to the 
executive branch's prosecutorial arm the authority to control when a judge may 
consider cooperation with the government as a mitigating factor interferes with 
or usurps a constitutionally assigned judicial function.[¶76]  In upholding the statute, the court 
first noted that the statute does not permit the prosecution to engage in 
"adjudication." That power remains with the court. Next, the court observed that 
the prosecutor's authority under the statute to affect sentences is more limited 
than other prosecutorial means by which it affects sentences, such as the 
exclusive authority to decide whether to prosecute and to choose among 
alternative charges. Next, the court believed that the prosecution is uniquely 
fit to resolve the question whether a defendant's cooperation has risen to the 
level of "substantial assistance."[¶77]  Recognizing that sentencing is not 
inherently a judicial function, the court concluded that the statute does not 
usurp a judicial function and, further, Congress has the power to eliminate all 
discretion in sentencing judges. Finally, the court found no precedent 
establishing a due process right of judicial review of the prosecution's 
decision to forego a motion under the statute.[¶78]  Although Tenorio found that 
California's legal history before 1850 concerning the common law power of 
nolle prosequi was undeterminative, we do not have such uncertainty in 
Wyoming. Wyoming, as a common law state, with no historical legal ties to 
Mexican law, has recognized and continues to recognize the power of nolle 
prosequi in the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department.   
[¶79]  Finally, these 
criminal defendants argue that deferral and probation under "new 301" must be 
"sentencing" because it is located in article 7, chapter 13, entitled 
Sentence and Punishment. That argument fails. As located, the statute is 
in close proximity to related statutes dealing with the treatment of criminal 
offenders. As these statutes comprise a coherent legislative scheme relating to 
criminal offenders, both before and after entry of judgment, it only makes sense 
that they occupy the location they do.[¶80]  In light of the case law identifying and 
describing these government powers, and since probation without entry of a 
judgment is not a sentence, we are compelled to conclude that the power to 
decide whether a criminal defendant who has never before been convicted of a 
felony shall be treated under "new 301" belongs to the executive department as 
an integral part of its blended prosecution power. The "defer-probation" 
decision under "new 301" is not a decision to impose sentence; rather, it is a 
decision intimately related to the decisions are committed to the sound 
discretion of the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department. We hold, 
therefore, that the executive department, not the judicial department, has the 
power to decide whether to defer prosecution under "new 301.17 The 
exercise of that prosecutorial discretion is not subject to judicial review as 
long as any unjustifiable or suspect factors such as race, religion, or other 
arbitrary or discriminatory classification are not involved. Gooden, 
711 P.2d at 408-09; 
Jahnke, 
692 P.2d  at 929.[¶81]  "New 301" and "new 302" are the produce 
of the legislature's revisions of "old 203" and "old 301." In "new 301" and "new 
302" the legislature simply adjusted its sentencing and probation discretion. 
"New 301" provides for probation before entry of final judgment; "new 302" 
provides for probation after entry of final judgment. Obviously, the legislature 
has used the act of final judgment as its point of reference or demarcation. As 
W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) informs us, final judgment means adjudication and sentence. 
See Vigil.[¶82]  The 
judiciary exercises the power of adjudication and imposition of sentence when it 
enters final judgment of conviction, but not before. The prosecution exercises 
its prosecution power before entry of final judgment, but not after. Probation 
before entry of final judgment occurs within the prosecution phase of the 
criminal judicial process. Since the prosecutor exercises the prosecution power 
during that phase, including the power to file charges, to reduce charges, and 
to dismiss charges, it is correct that the prosecutor also have the power to 
consent to deferral of prosecution proceedings before entry of final 
judgment.[¶83]  On the other 
hand, probation after entry of final judgment occurs within the adjudication 
phase of the criminal judicial process. Since the judiciary exercises the 
adjudication power during that phase, including the power to impose 
sentence, we are not surprised that the legislature did not attempt to require 
the state's consent to probation after entry of final judgment. It is correct 
that the judiciary have the power to impose probation after entry of final 
judgment.[¶84]  What the 
legislature has done in "new 301" and "new 302" is not contrary to what it had 
done in "old 203" and "old 301," which this court approved of as within the 
legislature's legitimate exercise of its sentencing and probation authority. As 
we recognized in Evans, the legislature can retain or delegate its 
sentencing and probation discretion as it sees fit. It saw fit to do it in the 
manner it did in "new 301." It is not within the power of the judicial 
department to question the wisdom of that exercise of the legislative 
department.18  We pass only on the legality and 
constitutionality of that exercise. Here, we hold that the exercise was legal 
and constitutional.[¶90]  
These criminal defendants object to the prosecution's possession of the 
power to decide from case to case whether a particular criminal defendant shall 
suffer or not from the penalties and disabilities associated with and consequent 
upon entry of a judgment of conviction or guilt. Despite the prosecutor's 
long-recognized possession of the power to charge, to reduce charges, to dismiss 
some or all of the charges, to plea bargain, and to dismiss the prosecution 
under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a), and despite the executive department's long-recognized 
possession of the power to pardon, these criminal defendants wish that the power 
to consent to a criminal defendant's probation without entry of a judgment 
resided in the judicial department rather than in the executive department. 
Under the state constitution, that cannot be. Once the prosecutor has decided to 
file the criminal charge, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to a 
preferred disposition of that charge. He has no right to a reduced charge, to a 
dismissal of some charges, or to a plea bargain. 
Gooden.[¶91]  
Possessing the nolle prosequi power, the prosecutor has played the 
role of being able to terminate a prosecution at any time before final 
judgment of guilt or conviction. Possessing the pardon power, the executive 
department has also played the role of being able to grant a pardon before or 
after final judgment.19 If 
granted before final judgment, the pardon prevented the attachment of conviction 
penalties, disabilities, and stigmas. If granted after final judgment, pardon 
removed conviction penalties, disabilities, and stigmas. Viewing in this light 
the prosecutor's possession of the power to consent, or not, to probation 
without entry of a judgment, we find no constitutionally impermissible reason 
why the consent power cannot reside where the legislative department has placed 
it. The power must reside somewhere and its residence with the executive 
department is constitutionally consistent with other similar powers at home 
there.[¶93]  In holding that 
"new 301" is constitutional, we find that the legislature enacted it with full 
knowledge of the existing state of the law with reference thereto. We have 
construed the statute in harmony with the existing law and as a part of an 
overall and uniform system of jurisprudence; the statute's meaning and effect 
have been determined in connection, not only with the common law and the 
constitution, but also with reference to court rule and court decisions. 
Adoption 
of Voss, 
550 P.2d  at 486 (citing 
Civic 
Association of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 
57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)).[¶95]  Having resolved the separation of powers 
issue, we next consider whether the legislature constitutionally enacted "new 
301."V.THE STATE'S CONSENT REQUIREMENT OF "NEW 301" WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENACTED A. Legislative History[¶96]  Earlier we identified and explained what 
the legislature apparently did in 1987 to change "old 203" into "new 301" and 
"old 301" into "new 302." Now we will review the legislative history of House 
Bill 92 (H.B. 92) which became Chapter 157 of the 1987 Session Laws of 
Wyoming.[¶97]  Sponsored by 
the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee, H.B. 92 was a revision of  Title 7 
of the Wyoming statutes. Digest of House Journal, Forty-Ninth State Legislature, 
183-84 (hereinafter H.J.). The title of the bill states in relevant 
part:Title 7 Revision. AN ACT * * * to amend, amend and 
renumber or renumber W.S. * * * 7-13-101 through 7-15-107 * * *; revising 
Chapters 1 through 5, 13 through 15 and 17 of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes; * 
* * providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation prior to 
entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication 
of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related statutes 
* * *. H.J. 183-84.[¶98]  H.B. 92 renumbered "old 203" to "new 
301" and provided changes in the category of persons qualified for probation 
before sentence and the procedures to be used before and after placing a 
qualified person on probation. H.B. 92, Forty-Ninth State Legislature, 
87LSO-0102.01, pp. 155-58 (1987). The original version of H.B. 92 contained the 
requirement of the defendant's consent to probation which was not contained in 
"old 203." Id. at 156. Before leaving the House, "new 301" was the 
subject of a few relatively minor amendments. H.J. 184-85. On January 21, 1987, 
H.B. 92 was read for the third time in the House and was passed. H.J. at 
186.[¶99]  H.B. 92 then was 
sent to the Senate. There, several more amendments were made to "new 301." The 
most significant amendment made by the Senate was the addition of the 
requirement of the state's consent to probation. H.J. 189. These amendments were 
adopted and passed in the Senate. H.J. 191-92. H.B. 92 then went back to 
the House on February 19, 1987, and the House voted not to concur in the Senate 
amendments. H.J. at 192. The matter was referred to a joint conference 
committee composed of several members from the House and Senate. H.J. at 
192.[¶100]  The joint 
conference committee reported back a recommendation to adopt, among other 
amendments, the Senate amendment (H.B. 92SS1/AE) requiring the state's consent 
to probation. H.J. at 192. The committee also recommended several other minor 
changes to "new 301." H.J. at 193. On February 28, 1987, the House and Senate 
voted to adopt the report of the joint conference committee. H.J. at 194. The 
act was signed by the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate that same 
day and by the Governor on March 5, 1987. H.J. at 194. H.B. 92 none appears as 
Chapter 157, 1987 Session Laws of Wyoming. B. "Alteration of 
Original Purpose" Issue[¶101]  
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, provides, "No law shall be passed except by 
bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either 
house as to change its original purpose." The purpose of this kind of 
constitutional provision is "to preclude last-minute, hasty legislation and to 
provide notice to the public of legislation under consideration irrespective of 
legislative merit." Anderson 
v. Oakland County Clerk, 
419 Mich. 313, 353 N.W.2d 448, 455 (1984). See also 
Annotation, Construction and Application of Constitutional Provision Against 
Changing Purpose of Bill During Passage, 158 
A.L.R. 421, 423 (1945). (Our 
research reveals no later supplementary annotation). In Scudder 
v. Smith, 
331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601, 604 (1938), the court 
said that kind of provision "put the members of the Assembly and others 
interested on notice, by the title of the measure submitted, so that they might 
vote on it with circumspection."[¶102]  These criminal defendants claim that the 
original purpose of H.B. 92, as originally introduced, namely, providing 
procedures -- including the requirement of the defendant's consent -- for 
placing a defendant on pre-guilt adjudication probation and discharging the 
defendant upon successful completion of that probation, was impermissibly change 
by the legislature's amendment that added the requirement of the state's 
consent. We disagree.[¶103]  
In our resolution of this issue, we are guided by Smith 
v. Hansen, 
386 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1963), and 
Arbuckle 
v. Pflaeging, 
20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918 (1912), 158 A.L.R. 421 (1945).  In 
these cases this court looked to the title and the body of the original bill to 
determine its purpose and make a comparison of its purpose after 
amendment.[¶104]  In 
Arbuckle, certain livestock owners sued the state veterinarian to recover 
possession of their cattle which the state veterinarian had seized and was going 
to sell in order to recoup the cost he had incurred in seizing and medically 
treating the owner's cattle for scabies or mange after the owners had failed to 
treat them as he had earlier requested. The state veterinarian counterclaimed 
for the costs incurred in seizing and treating the cattle. The trial court 
certified to this court ten constitutional questions, one of which was whether 
the legislature violated the "alteration of original purpose" provision in 
the passage of 1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 164. As originally introduced, H.B. 137 
stated in its title that it was "an act to amend and reenact section 148 and 150 
* * * of the Revised Statutes of Wyoming of 1899, relating to the duties of the 
State Veterinarian." Section 150 of the bill stated that the duty of the state 
veterinarian was to superintend the slaughter and burning of condemned animals 
and to pay the expense of that activity from any contingent fund appropriated 
for his office.[¶105]  The 
House amended the bill by the Jefferis amendment, which, in pertinent part, 
added to the bill a section 2 which provided that section 148 of the revised 
statutes of Wyoming 1899 was amended and reenacted so that the state 
veterinarian had authority to take steps to prevent the spread of contagious 
disease among animals, including ordering livestock owners to dip and treat 
their animals, seizing animals when their owners failed to treat their animals, 
treating the seized animals and selling them to recoup the cost of those 
activities.[¶106]  The 
plaintiff owners claimed that the Jefferis amendment was for a different purpose 
from that contemplated in the bill as originally introduced. This court 
disagreed. It found that the original bill's purpose concerned the state 
veterinarian's duty, as did the amendment. Both the original bill and its 
amendment related to that state official's duties concerning the prevention of 
the spread of infectious disease among cattle. This court found that the 
original bill and its amendment were not incongruous but related to that state 
official's duties to prevent disease, and that they were in furtherance of that 
purpose and within the scope of the subject of the bill. It held that the 
amendment adding further duties did not alter or amend the original bill's 
purpose. On this point, the court held the bill to have been constitutionally 
enacted.[¶107]  Using 
Arbuckle's analytical approach, we achieve the same result. As originally 
introduced, H.B. 92 stated in its title that it was an act to amend and 
renumber, among other statutory provisions, §§ 
7-13-101 through 
7-15-107, providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation 
before entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without 
adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation. As originally 
introduced, the body of the bill provided that the defendant's consent was 
required as part of these procedures. The senate amendment of the original bill 
added the state's consent requirement to the procedures for placing the 
defendant on this type of probation.[¶108]  The criminal defendants here assert that 
the senate amendment changed the purpose of the original bill. They correctly 
identify that purpose as being revision of procedures for placing certain 
defendants on probation. We agree that the purpose of the bill as originally 
introduced concerns procedures for deferring further prosecution and placing a 
defendant on probation without entry of adjudication of guilt and discharging 
the defendant if he successfully completes that probation. One of those 
procedures is obtaining the defendant's consent. The senate amendment refers to 
these procedures and simply adds one more procedure to accomplish the purpose of 
placing the defendant on probation. Both the bill and its amendment relate to 
those procedures and that purpose. They are not incongruous. They are in 
furtherance of that purpose, germane to and within the scope of the bill. 
  [¶109]  The 
Smith case helps us make our point. Several beer wholesalers sued members 
and the director of the Wyoming Liquor Commission to enjoin the collection 
of an additional four cents per gallon in excise taxes on malt liquors. The 
wholesalers contended that the provisions of 1963 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 194, § 
3(a), purporting to increase the tax from two cents per gallon to six cents per 
gallon, were unconstitutionally enacted in violation of both the "alteration of 
original purpose" provision of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, and the "one subject" 
provision, of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24.[¶110]  Focusing first on the "alteration of 
original purpose" issue, this court noted that the bill's title, as originally 
introduced, stated that the act amended and reenacted a statute relating to the 
excise tax on liquors so as to prohibit a person's importation or transportation 
of untaxed liquor into or within the state. Thus, the bill's original purpose 
was to amend and reenact the statute "so as to prohibit" importation or 
transportation of untaxed liquors. The bill was amended, and the excise tax on 
malt liquors was increased from two cents to six cents per gallon. The 
legislature also established an identification card for persons twenty-one years 
or older to be presented when purchasing liquor. With these amendments, the 
bill contained three purposes: 1) prohibition of importation or transportation 
of untaxed liquor, 2) four cent tax increase on malt liquor, and 3) liquor 
purchase identification card. Because of these amendments, the legislature then 
amended the bill's original title to include mention of the identification card 
along with the probation of importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. 
The legislature, however, failed to amend the original title to include the 
mention of the tax increase. This court held that the new purpose or objective 
of the tax increase impermissibly changed the bill's original purpose of 
prohibition of importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. Smith, 
386 P.2d  at 100.[¶105]  By contrast, in our present case, the 
senate amendment adding the requirement of state's consent to the procedures 
provided in the original bill, unlike the new purpose or objective of a tax 
increase in Smith, did not change the original purpose of the bill. That 
purpose was, and remained after the amendment, the establishment of procedures 
for the deferring and placing of a defendant on probation without the entry of 
an adjudication of guilt and the discharging of that defendant upon 
successful completion of that probation.[¶106]  In light of the objective of the 
"alteration of original purpose" provision and our decision in Smith and 
Arbuckle, we hold that Chapter 157 of the Session Laws of Wyoming 1987 
was constitutionally enacted in compliance with Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 
20. C. The "One Subject" IssueWyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, 
provides: No bill, except general appropriation bills and 
bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall 
be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in 
its title; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in 
the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so 
expressed. (emphasis added).[¶107]  
In past challenges to legislation on this constitutional ground, we have 
stated that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to 
prevent surprise or fraud in legislation. It is not intended that the title 
shall be an abstract of all provisions contained in a bill; or that the title 
must encompass all of the aspects of the statute; or that everything therein 
affected need be delineated. Brinegar 
v. 
Clark, Wyo., 371 P.2d 62, 66 [1962]; 
Morrow 
v. Diefenderfer, 
Wyo., 384 P.2d 601, 603 [1963]; 
Board 
of Com'rs of Laramie County v. Stone, 
7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 607 
[1897]. State 
v. City of Laramie, 
437 P.2d 295, 302 (Wyo. 1968).[¶108]  Sixty-five years age we said that this 
particular constitutional provisions must be liberally and reasonably 
construed: This court has long recognized the principle that this 
section of the constitution, though mandatory, must be liberally and reasonably 
construed. In the case In 
re Fourth Judicial District,c 
4 Wyo. 133, 142, 32 P. 850 [1893], the 
court quotes the language of Judge Cooley to the effect that the generality of 
the title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to 
legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be 
considered as having a necessary and fair connection. Cooley on Const. Lim. (7th 
Ed.) p. 206. In the same paragraph of that text (p. 205) it is said that, "To 
require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of a 
general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, 
would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render 
legislation impossible." And in the case of In 
re Boulter, 
5 Wyo. 329, 339, 40 P. 520 [1895], it 
is said that an act is not invalidated for that reason so long as the subjects 
of legislation are congruous, cognate or germane, and in furtherance of the 
general subject of the enactment, even though the act may authorize many things 
of a diverse nature to be done. There may be subordinate subjects if they be 
"legitimate offspring of the main subject." State 
ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 
31 Wyo. 500, 510-11, 228 P. 636, 638 (1924).[¶109]  This constitutional provision contains 
an important exception. The requirement in this "one subject" provision that a 
bill contain only one subject which shall be clearly expressed in the bill's 
title does not apply to a bill for the codification and general revision of the 
laws. We have recognized the meaning of this exception in State 
of Wyoming v. Pitet, 
69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177 (1952).20  Regarding revisions and codifications, 
Sutherland informs us: A revision is an act which restates 
the law embodied in one or more prior acts in order to clarify and harmonize the 
provisions of the prior acts and which may alter, add, or omit 
provisions. A codification  is a revision and also a 
systematic arrangement of all the statutes of the state or all those 
concerning a general field of the law. (emphasis added). 1A 
Sutherland Stat.Const. § 22.27, p. 254 (4th ed. 
1985). Defendants contend that H.B. 92 was not a revision because a 
revision, by its nature, is not intended to change anything but only to restate 
what has already been legislated, so that revisions of statutes are not presumed 
to change the law. State 
v. Baker, 
195 Conn. 598, 489 A.2d 1041, 1045 n.4 (Conn. 1985). They argue 
that the state's consent requirement contained in "new 301" changed, rather than 
restated, what had been the law under "old 203," namely, that the court in its 
discretion would decided whether to place a defendant on 
probation.[¶105]  We 
disagree that a revision is merely a restatement of, not a change in, existing 
law. As noted earlier, Sutherland's definition of revision makes room for the 
legislation's altering, adding, or omitting provisions of existing law. We adopt 
that view. The court in Baker recognized that if the legislators use 
language in the revision that admits of a construction which changes the former 
law, then there is no presumption that the revision did not change the law. 
Baker, 
489 A.2d  at 1045 n.4 (applying 
Bassett 
v. City Bank and Trust Co., 
115 Conn. 393, 161 A. 852 (1932)). Considering 
the sweep of 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, evident in both its title21 and in its body, we hold that H.B. 92 was a 
codification and general revision of Title 7 criminal procedure. We observe 
that, in addition to identifying the statutory provisions to which the revision 
act applied, the legislature used clear language to describe what the revision 
was accomplishing: amending; amending and renumbering; revising; eliminating 
duplication, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting 
and renumbering; providing definitions; repealing provisions; modifying 
provisions; eliminating certain powers; providing procedures and deleting 
requirements.[¶112]  The 
revision act was not intended to be a mere restatement of former law. Obviously, 
the legislators used language that admits of a construction which in many 
instances changed the former law. Specifically with reference to §§ 
7-13-101 through 
7-15-107, which encompass "old 203" and "old 301," the act was "to amend, amend 
and renumber or renumber" those provisions "providing procedures for placing 
certain defendants on probation prior to entry to a judgment of conviction and 
for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of 
probation and conforming related statutes * * *."  1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, 
ch. 157, p. 299. No one who read the title and was thus aware of the passage of 
the law could reasonably claim to have been surprised or misled into thinking 
that the revision act was a mere restatement of former law.[¶113]  We hold that since 1987 Wyo. Sess. Law, 
ch. 157, originally introduced as H.B. 92, was a proper codification and general 
revision of the laws to which it pertained, it was excepted from the 
requirements of one "one subject" constitutional provision. We also hold that it 
was constitutionally enacted.VI.WHETHER W.S. 
7-6-106(d) (JUNE 1987 
REPL.), UNDER WHICH LOWRY, VIGIL AND McIVER WERE ORDERED TO REIMBURSE THE 
STATE FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER ATTORNEY'S FEES, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.[¶114]  In Lowry, when the county court 
judge appointed the public defender to represent Ms. Lowry, the judge found that 
she was presently unable to provide for full payment of attorney's fees and 
other expenses of representation, but that she could afford to pay a certain 
amount to defray partial costs of representation. This finding was based upon 
the judge's consideration of Ms. Lowry's affidavit seeking court-appointed 
counsel in which she provided detailed information about her financial situation 
and present employment. Specifically, in her affidavit she stated she could 
afford to make monthly payments towards her court-appointed counsel in the sum 
of $ 50 per month. In the judge's order, and based on his finding that Ms. Lowry 
could afford to pay some amount to defray partial costs of defense counsel, he 
ordered her to pay $ 50 per month. Later, when the judge, over the prosecutor's 
objection, deferred prosecution and placed Ms. Lowry on probation under "new 
301," he ordered Ms. Lowry to reimburse the state and county $ 200 for the 
services of her court-appointed counsel.[¶115]  In Vigil, when the county court 
judge appointed the public defender to represent Mr. Vigil, his appointment was 
based upon Mr. Vigil's affidavit for court-appointed counsel in which he 
provided detailed information about his financial situation and employment 
history. Later, in the presentence investigation report Mr. Vigil provided 
further detailed information about his financial situation and his employment 
history. When the district court judge sentenced Mr. Vigil, he ordered him to 
pay the state public defender for all expenses and services according to the 
public defender's standard fee schedule. The judge ordered this to be paid 
within Mr. Vigil's five-year probationary period according to a court-approved 
payment plan.[¶116]  In 
McIver, the county court appointed a public defender based upon Mr. 
McIver's affidavit in which he gave detailed information about his financial 
situation, employment history, educational background, and family background. A 
presentence investigation report provided further detailed information about his 
financial situation, employment history, educational background, and family 
background. When the district court judge sentenced Mr. McIver, he ordered him 
to repay the state public defender for all expenses and services pursuant to 
that office's standard fee schedule. The judge ordered this to be paid within 
Mr. McIver's three year probationary period according to a court-approved 
payment plan.[¶117]  Under 
W.S. 
7-6-106(d) (June 1987 
Repl.) the courts have the authority to order a defendant to repay the state for 
the cost of defense services.22 Defendants Lowry, Vigil and McIver raise for the 
first time on appeal the question of the constitutionality of this statute. They 
do not argue plain error. Since we find no jurisdictional claim and no 
fundamental right claim, we decline to consider this issue. Hopkinson, 
664 P.2d  at 50.VII.WHETHER 
PROSECUTORS'S REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO FIRST OFFENDER TREATMENT FOR MR. VIGIL 
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS[¶120]  Since a judge's sentence must be based 
upon only accurate information found in the presentence investigation report, 
Mr. Vigil argues that the prosecutor's "sentence-like" consent decision must 
also be based upon only accurate information. See Christy 
v. State, 
731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo. 1987). Mr. Vigil 
claims that the prosecutor refused to give the state's consent to "new 301" 
probation because Mr. Vigil was a drug dealer, but that he steadfastly denied he 
dealt drugs. We view the record differently from Mr. Vigil. In the presentence 
investigation report, Mr. Vigil states that he had previously sold drugs but 
felt it did not amount to much. At the sentencing proceeding, the district court 
judge called the presentence investigation report to Mr. Vigil's attention and 
asked him if it contained any inaccuracies. Mr. Vigil said it did 
not.[¶121]  When the 
prosecutor told the district court judge why the state refused to give its 
consent to "new 301" probation, he referred to Mr. Vigil's presentence 
investigation report admission of having previously sold drugs 
and explained that the state felt the pending criminal matter was not an 
isolated incident in view of that admission and that the state felt Mr. Vigil 
should not be absolved and have a clean record under "new 301." The district 
court judge found the state's position was rational. So do we. We also note that 
Mr. Vigil did not raise this issue below, but rather presents it here for the 
first time, and he has not claimed that the prosecutor's refusal to consent was 
based on any suspect factor. Jahnke 
692 P.2d  at 927-28. Therefore, 
we find no merit to Mr. Vigil's argument on this 
point.VIII.WHETHER PROSECUTOR'S REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO SENTENCING 
UNDER § 
7-13-301 WAS 
ARBITRARY AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND, THEREFORE, VIOLATED WYO. CONST., ART. 
1, §§ 2 and 7[¶122]  In each 
of their respective cases, Vigil, Moon, Magarahan, and Billis 
claim that 
the prosecutor's refusal to consent to "new 301" treatment was arbitrary and 
abuse of discretion, thus violating Wyo. Const., art. 1, §§ 2 and 7.23[¶123]  
Both Ms. Moon and Ms. Magarahan claim that since the prosecutor in each 
of their cases gave no reason for the state's refusal to consent to "new 301" 
treatment, those refusals were arbitrary and characterized by an abuse of 
discretion. The records in these cases are silent as to why the prosecutors 
refused to consent. As explained earlier, the prosecutor, not the judge, 
controls the prosecution up to adjudication. This court will not presume that 
suspect factors or arbitrary classifications exist. Ms. Moon and Ms. Magarahan 
cannot point to any suspect factors or other arbitrary classification in the 
record. We find no merit in their argument.[¶124]  Under this assignment of error, Mr. 
Vigil claims, as he did with reference to his due process claim, that the 
prosecutor's refusal to consent based upon Mr. Vigil's admitted previous drug 
dealing was arbitrary. We find no merit to this argument for the same reasons we 
found no merit to his due process argument.[¶125]  Mr. Billis argues that 
his prosecutors's refusal to consent to "new 301" treatment was arbitrary. He 
contends that the prosecutor's refusal to consent is tantamount to sentencing, 
which we rejected earlier. This is a prosecutor's decision, and the court may 
not interfere with that, absent the presence of suspect factors. Mr. 
Billis' contention 
that the prosecutor's refusal to consent served none of the objectives of 
sentencing is without merit.[¶126]  
Last, Mr. Billis assets that 
his prosecutor based the refusal to consent upon the arbitrary factor of his 
age. The record does not bear him out. The prosecutor refused to consent not 
only because of age but also because the state had already shown leniency by 
dismissing one count of delivery of cocaine under the plea bargain and because 
of the rather professional manner in which Mr. Billis had 
committed the drug crime. We find no merit in any of Mr. Billis' assertions 
and hold that the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in refusing to consent to 
"new 301" treatment for Mr. Billis was not 
abused and was not based on any suspect factor or other arbitrary 
classification.CONCLUSION[¶127]  We hold that "new 301" does not violate 
the separation of powers doctrine and was constitutionally enacted. The due 
process rights of Mr. Vigil were not violated by the prosecutor's refusal to 
consent. As to the claim made by Ms. Moon, Ms. Magaharan and Mr. Billis, we hold 
that the prosecutor's refusal to consent was not an abuse of discretion and 
was not arbitrary.[¶128]  
Because they were not raised below, we decline to address the 
constitutional claims of Ms. Lowry, Mr. Vigil and Mr. McIver that relate to 
reimbursement of defense counsel attorney fees.URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice, dissenting.[¶129]  
We may as well provide two chairs on the bench during sentencing -- one 
for the judge and one for the prosecutor -- and be done with pretense. I dissent 
for two reasons. First, I would hold that Wyoming's separation of powers 
provisions1 prohibits the prosecutor from exercising any power 
over sentencing. Second, I would hold that the 1987 amendments to what is now 
W.S. 
7-13-301 violate 
Wyo. Const. art. 3, §§ 20 and 24.I. WHAT WE HAVE HERE AND WHY I 
WORRY![¶130]  The 
majority opinion can be breathtaking at times in the display of its scholastic 
strength. It is, however, an excellent answer to the wrong question. The 
question is not whether our state's separation of powers doctrine collides with 
a deferred prosecution scheme, but whether that doctrine prohibits prosecutorial 
participation during the sentencing process as provided by W.S. 
7-13-301. The 
majority reforms the question to ask if sentencing is an "exclusive judicial 
function" and answer that question with a "no." I would answer that question 
with a "yes." Because the majority answers that question with a "no," they make 
room on the bench for the prosecutor to participate effectively in 
sentencing.[¶131]  The 
judicial processes of Wyoming law have infrequently, if ever, been compelled by 
majority authorship to grasp so extensively in an effort to justify a societally 
unproductive and judicially untenable legal position. Paraphrasing from a 
current admonition against achieving a result without actual precedential 
justification, the majority "reaches out peripherally in [] many directions in 
an attempt to authoritatively support an [unjustified decision].  The 
reader is inundated with a multitude of citations and a bulk of material running 
the gambit of quotations from historically well-known United States Supreme 
Court Justices and legal scholars" to justify a result which is only "useful" to 
multiply numbers of Wyoming felony convictions. City 
of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., 
43 Ohio St.3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 103, 120 (1989), Justice 
Holmes dissenting.[¶132]  If 
these consolidated appeals challenge prosecutorial discretion under W.S. 
7-13-3012  to defer criminal prosecutions, then 
there is no separation of powers problem and the statute in question may be 
considered constitutionally valid. But if these consolidated appeals challenge a 
legislative scheme to allow the prosecutor control over the sentencing process, 
then a collision with our state's separation of powers doctrine appears 
unavoidable. I understand W.S. 
7-13-301 to collide 
with our separation of powers doctrine since it allows the prosecutor, against 
the wishes of the trial judge and the defendant, to control the disposition of a 
case after the accused has been "found guilty". I would hold that 
once a defendant pleads guilty or is convicted by the jury, the role of the 
prosecutor has come to an end.[¶134]  The majority disagrees and claims the 
role of the prosecutor remains active until the sentencing judgment is entered, 
but argues as if binding precedent drives their holding. Actually, existent 
legal rules have nothing to do with the achieved outcome. The cluster of federal 
cases advanced by the majority is no logical justification for re-authoring 
Wyoming law. Where the federal supremacy clause does not operate, Wyoming 
case law is the appropriate precedent and Wyoming precedent is dispositive. 
"When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to 
acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature." Petition 
of Padget, 
678 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting 
People 
v. Tenorio, 
3 Cal. 3d 89, 94, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (1970)). The 
majority now hands control over sentencing to the prosecutor when only two years 
ago we affirmed that "to require the court to accept the recommendation of the 
prosecution as a matter of law would transfer the sentencing duty from the court 
to the prosecution. * * * It is the court's duty to impose the sentence, not the 
prosecution's." Mower 
v. State, 
750 P.2d 679, 681 (Wyo. 1988).[¶135]  Today, the majority turns its back on 
its duty to guarantee the protection of individual rights and yields to 
enterprising ambition of a force within or without legislative action to take 
from the judiciary and give to the executive a power not theirs to give. Not 
only is the judiciary demeaned, but his holding overall makes no sense unless 
one examines the unprincipled impact of political theory upon appellate 
adjudication. Rather than binding precedent, this outcome appears driven by a 
political theory which tightens the grip of the prosecutor on the throat of the 
accused at every opportunity.3 As the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin 
has reminded us, several of the constitutional clauses guaranteeing rights to 
individuals are formulated in such general terms that in many cases judges 
cannot base their decisions on the text or the intent of the framers. Rather, 
they must base them, consciously or unconsciously, on a political theory of some 
king, a theory that defines in the abstract the proper scope of governmental 
authority and individual liberty. Elfenbein, The Myth of 
Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 
Iowa L. Rev. 401, 402 (1986). Whatever 
name is given to the political theory in operation here, it is one which finds 
primacy in securing legislative supremacy over the rights of citizens unless 
those rights are enumerated. Such a philosophy does no more than articulate by 
rote a political theory which selects legislative primacy when the values of 
majority adaptation in representative government and rights of citizens 
collide.[¶137]  If "'the 
general principles governing the construction of statutes apply to the 
construction of constitutions,'" County 
Court Judges Ass'n. v. Sidi, 
752 P.2d 960, 973 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting 
Zancanelli 
v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 
25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 991 (1918)), and if "we 
construe every word, every clause and every sentence so as to avoid 
rendering the [constitutional framers' and ratifiers'] actions futile or 
absurd." Britton 
v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 
786 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo. 1990) (emphasis 
added), how can we examine our separation of powers doctrine without examining 
simultaneously the potential impact of legislative enactments on the 
government's ability to protect the rights of citizens against acts of tyranny 
by state officials?4 No 
analysis is given regarding the possible rights of the accused to be free from 
prosecutorial participating at this level in the judicial process. The dialogue 
is couched only in terms of historic prosecutorial power. "The 
crucial operative aspect of rights skepticism is its attitude toward the 
resolution of [the] systemic tension [between majority rule and individual 
rights]. When a rights-supporting value of the Constitution is understood 
to be in arguable conflict with majority conduct, the rights skeptic insists 
that the case for the recognition of the right be made only under circumstances 
of textual, historical, or structural certainty; otherwise the majoritian result 
must prevail. Under this conception, rights are narrowly defined exceptions to 
an otherwise prevailing general commitment to majority 
rule." Elfenbein, supra, 71 
Iowa L. Rev. 425 n.124 (quoting 
Sager, Rights, Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
417, 441 (1981)). To maintain this skepticism, the majority leaves us with an 
unfathomable standard to guide our future judgment of when the legislature has 
violated the separation of powers doctrine. They say that as long as a 
legislative enactment does not disturb the "integration of dispersed powers into 
a balanced, workable governmental power," then there is no violation of the 
separation of powers. Although that is an unfathomable standard, it is a 
directed pathway to tyranny-ultimate autocracy of government -- absolute 
statism.[¶138]  Incredibly, 
the majority opens their analysis only after first reforming the claim made by 
the several defendants. The majority writes that "these criminal defendants 
contend it is essential that we preserve each of the powers in separate, 
air-tight compartments." (Emphasis added.) I do not find in the record or 
in the briefs where the appellants argue for "airtight compartments". The only 
reference to "airtight" I have found occurs in a case relied on by the majority 
which states "the [federal] Constitution does not require three airtight 
departments of government." Geraghty 
v. United States Parole Com'n., 
719 F.2d 1199, 1210 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S. Ct. 1602, 80 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1984) (emphasis 
added). The majority takes comfort in Geraghty standing for the 
proposition that "unlike interpreting the constitution or adjudicating disputes, 
sentencing is not inherently or exclusively a judicial function." Such comfort 
must be cold comfort because Geraghty, 
719 F.2d  at 1210 
specifically cautioned that its dicta applied to the federal system because "the 
federal Constitution, unlike some state constitutions, has no express provision 
which prohibits the officials of one branch of government from exercising 
functions of the other branches." The majority mistakenly seizes upon a 
single phrase in Geraghty. From that single phrase, they claim that 
sentencing in Wyoming is not an exclusive judicial function but, political 
theories being what they can be, everything leading up to the entry of judgment 
is, of course, an exclusive prosecutorial function.[¶140]  The fundamental character of "blending" 
the constitutional separation of powers out of reality serves only to justify 
unprincipled result-oriented adjudication to suit a contemporary concept of 
political or economic morality. State 
ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, 
377 P.2d 299 (Wyo. 1963). That course 
of governmental conduct was not acceptable to the United States Supreme Court in 
the steel industry seizure case of Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952). In that 
case, it was the executive; but the interest of the constitutional drafters of 
the United States Constitution was for "hopes for freedom" to exist in 
responsibility no less in the judiciary. Our system has not chosen to give 
separately and singularly to the trial advocate -- the prosecutor -- the keys to 
the jail nor power uncontrolled to destroy the effective existence of a human 
being.  The direct and collateral consequences of a felony conviction are, 
in today's society, beyond rational recognition. Cf. Sibron 
v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968). We deal 
here with productive lives and fruitful existence, not just deficits, money and 
budgets. Bowsher 
v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986). In exercise 
of constitutional responsibility and determination of guilt as assessed to the 
judiciary under the "stringent [] standard of disinterest as judges," the 
zealous advocacy of the prosecutors cannot be given priority if the judiciary 
chooses not to relegate itself to be in authority only a mere mockery. 
Young 
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 
481 U.S. 787, 807, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 95 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987). We walked 
that way once before in impotency. Compare Gage, 
377 P.2d 299 with 
Schaefer 
v. Thomson, 
240 F. Supp. 247 (D.Wyo. 1964).5 
[¶141]  Operating from the 
comfortable analytic position of only defending against a claim for 
"air-tight compartments," the majority employs a framer's intent analysis 
to discover the framers indeed had in mind a "pragmatic, flexible view of 
differentiated governmental power" that allows a prosecutor control over the 
outcome after the accused has pled or been found guilty.  Never 
once, however, does the majority stop to separate intent from purpose. The 
historic purpose for separating governmental powers is to prevent 
tyranny.6 Because 
the separation of powers doctrine is designed to help prevent governmental 
tyranny, displays of tyranny by state government employees makes legitimate the 
question of why our separation of powers model sometimes fails to prevent those 
displays. By answering the wrong question so well, the majority adds to the 
potential for tyrannic power which they provided prosecutors in Cooney 
v. Park County, 
792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990) by 
declaring that citizens have no civil recourse against any prosecutor, even when 
the prosecutor willfully uses the awesome power of the state to settle a 
personal vendetta. In a real sense, it is even more compelling to ask why 
prosecutorial power is being strengthened in the face of such structural 
failure.7[¶141]  
Do we examine a deferred prosecution scheme against the backdrop of our 
separation of powers doctrine? Or do we examine a legislative scheme to imbed 
the prosecutor's role into the sentencing process against the backdrop of our 
separation of powers doctrine? Initially, these consolidated cases present 
events occurring after the guilty plea or jury verdict was entered. The 
legislative scheme permits a prosecutor to require the appending of a felony 
designation to the plea and sentence. This is what these cases involve. The 
issue addresses whether the separation of powers doctrine is violated by this 
legislative scheme to strengthen the leverage of prosecutors by allowing 
prosecutors the discretion to require felony status as a constituent of any 
sentence. Punishment, confinement, or probationary responsibility is not 
altered by the prosecutorial veto under the Wyoming adjudicatory structure since 
the trial court can provide the same sentencing responsibility with or without 
the application of W.S. 
7-13-301 in 
distinction to W.S. 
7-13-302, except 
that the conviction of a felony is or is not appended.[¶142]  The majority essentially redefines 
deferred prosecution to include post-plea action of the trial court and hands 
the reins of the sentencing process to the prosecutor.[¶143]  In addition to nolle prosequi and 
acquittal, criminal charges may be disposed by three processes. Process one is 
the diversion programs,8 process two is a plea or verdict without entry of a 
felony judgment, and process three is a plea or verdict with entry of a felony 
judgment. The majority misunderstands or does not recognize the difference 
between diversion, process one, and plea or verdict without final felony 
conviction, process two. The plea or verdict which has been entered by probation 
without felony conviction is no more revocable than is probation with the 
felony conviction. Zanetti 
v. State, 
783 P.2d 134 (Wyo. 1989); 
Peper 
v. State, 
768 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1989); 
Angerhofer 
v. State, 
758 P.2d 1041 (Wyo. 1988); 
Chorniak 
v. State, 
715 P.2d 1162 (Wyo. 1986).9 
II. HISTORY OF THE STRUCTURE OF WYOMING 
LAW[¶144]  From 
before the time of statehood, Wyoming sentencing processes provided broad 
discretion to the trial court.10 S.F. 100, 10th Leg. (1909), 
enacted as Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 87 (1909), successfully introduced "an act 
relating to the parole of prisoners found guilty by a jury on their plea of 
guilty of crimes charged against them." As first offense sentencing process, the 
enacted statute was a juvenile sentencing act with comprehensive characteristics 
for purposes of clarity and to differentiate a succeeding statute. This 
enactment will be called the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act.11PAROLE.Section 
1. Whenever any person, not over twenty-one years of age, shall have been 
found guilty by the verdict of a jury empaneled to try his case, or by his plea 
of guilty, duly entered in the cause, of any felony except murder, rape of a 
woman or female child forcibly and against her will, or arson of a dwelling 
house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being, the 
court in which such verdict was found or plea of guilty entered, shall  
ascertain, if possible, whether the offense of which the accused is fund guilty 
is his first offense, as well as the extent of moral turpitude involved in the 
act committed, and such other facts and circumstances relating to the accused as 
he may desire to know; and if satisfied that such person was a person of good 
reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had never before 
been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not 
again violate the law, may in its discretion, by an order entered of records, 
delay the passing sentence upon such verdict, or plea, and parole such person 
and permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance * * * and the Court, 
if satisfied * * *, that such person has demeaned himself in a law-abiding 
manner and lived a worthy, respectable life, may by an order of record, continue 
such parole from time to time for the period of five years, at the expiration of 
which period the Court shall enter an order finally discharging such person, and 
no further proceedings shall be had upon such verdict or plea; Provided, 
however, That at any time after the expiration of one year from the date of said 
original parole  the Court 
shall have the power in its discretion to terminate said parole and finally 
discharge such person and annual such verdict or plea of 
guilty. ABSOLUTE DISCRETION.Sec. 2. The 
Court, in the exercise of its power to determine the previous good character of 
any such person, to determine the advisability of paroling such person, to 
determine the propriety of finally discharging such person at any time after the 
end of one year, and to determine the fact of violation of the terms of the 
parole and recognizance and propriety of imposing sentence upon such person, 
shall have absolute discretion, and no appeal or proceeding in error shall lie 
from the determination of the Court upon any of said 
questions. NO DELAY.  Sec. 3. No delay 
in the passing of sentence or parole of a person as provided in this act shall 
be ordered against the consent or will of such person. Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 87 (1909) (emphasis added).[¶136]  Exercise of the parole or probationary 
status provided by the act was initially subject to consent of the charged 
individual because of exposure to a probation term of five years. That statute, 
initially limited to persons under twenty-one years of age, was followed in 
initial success with a 1931 change by which the age limitation was removed. Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 73, § 9 (1931).12[¶154]  
The sentencing statute was triggered by a conviction or a plea of guilty 
followed by imposed parole obligations and gave authority to the trial court to 
annul the verdict or plea in order that a conviction of a felony did not result. 
After the age limitation had been removed from the 1909 enactment, the statute 
remained essentially unchanged until Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157 (1987). It was in 
the recodification of this Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act where the 
prosecutorial veto provision became appended by legislative passage as the 
provision from which this appeal is presented. What had started as a juvenile 
sentencing statute has now expanded to a first offender, non-conviction statute 
by W.S. 
7-13-301 with 
transposition of provisions from another statute.[¶155]  With the 1909 Modified Juvenile 
Sentencing Act in place, the legislature, by Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 91 (1939), 
enacted a separate procedure as a new sentencing code which provided for 
suspension of trial as well as suspension of sentence by probation. Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 91 (1939) in part provided: Power of Court to Suspend 
Sentence or Trial in Some Cases -- Probation.Section 1. After 
conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by 
death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend the imposition or the 
execution of sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may 
impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on 
probation. With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime 
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place 
such defendant on probation. County Attorney -- Clerk of Court 
-- Duties.Section 2. When directed by the court, the county 
attorney shall fully investigate and report to the court in writing the 
circumstances of the offense, and the criminal record, social history and 
present conditions of the defendant, including, whenever practicable, the 
findings of a physical and mental examination of the defendant. No defendant 
charged with a felony, and, unless the court shall direct otherwise in 
individual cases, no other defendant shall be placed on probation or released 
under suspension of trial or sentence until the report of such investigation 
shall have been presented to and considered by the court. If such defendant is 
committed to any institution, a copy of the report of such investigation 
shall be sent to the institution at the time of commitment. In all cases the 
clerk of court shall forward copies of such report to the Board of Charities and 
Reform, and copies of all orders entered by the court. Court May 
Modify Conditions.Section 3. The court shall determine and 
may, by order duly entered, impose in its discretion, and may at any time modify 
any condition or conditions or probation or suspension of trial or sentence. 
   Extension of Suspension or Probation -- Discharge 
-- Violation of Conditions by Defendant.Section 4. The period 
of probation or suspension of trial or sentence and the conditions thereof shall 
be determined by the court and may be continued or extended. Upon the 
satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of suspension of trial or sentence or 
probation the court shall by order duly entered discharge the defendant. At any 
time during the period of suspension of trial or sentence or probation, the 
court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested for violating 
any of the conditions of probation or suspension of trial or sentence. As soon 
as practicable after the arrest the court shall cause the defendant to be 
brought before it and may proceed to deal with the case as if no suspension of 
trial or sentence or probation had been 
ordered. Fines.Section 5. When imposing a 
fine and also placing the defendant on probation, the judge of the district 
court may permit such fine to be paid in such installments and over such periods 
of time as he deems possible and reasonable.Power of the 
Governor.13 Section 6. Nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to impair the power of the Governor to grant a 
pardon or commutation in any case.[¶155]  The difference between the 1909 Modified 
Juvenile Sentencing Act and the 1939 adult suspension of trial or sentence act 
was essentially operational. The Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act required plea 
or conviction and afforded an opportunity to avoid the felony conviction. 
Alternatively, the adult suspension of trial or sentence act, if applied 
following plea, permitted no remission of the felony status but could result, if 
applied for suspension of trial, with the same result as the Modified Juvenile 
Sentencing Act. The practical difference between the Modified Juvenile 
Sentencing Act and the adult suspended trial or sentence act is the provision in 
the latter where no plea was required for utilization if trial was suspended. 
Another obvious difference is the flexibility afforded in the Modified Juvenile 
Sentencing Act permitting a conclusion after one year, which provision might not 
necessarily be equally available under the later statute.[¶156]  The finality of the adult sentencing 
statute was established not only by the probationary terms but 
by provisions for entry of a judgment for the payment of a fine. Then, Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 68, § 1 (1984) provided a potential for prison labor when the 
statute then numbered W.S. 
7-13-301, 7-13-302, 
and 7-13-303 was amended to add: 7-13-303. Imposition or 
modification of conditions; work as a condition of probation.* * 
*(b) As a condition of any probation, the court, subject to 
W.S. 
7-13-701 through 
7-13-704, may order the defendant to perform work for a period not exceeding the 
maximum probation period. 7-13-701. Work for persons confined in 
county jail or probationers; generally.(a) The sentencing court may 
require the following persons to perform work pursuant to W.S. 
7-13-701 through 
7-13-704:   * * *(iii) Persons for whom work is 
imposed as a condition or probation pursuant to W.S. 
7-13-303(b). Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 68 (1984).These two statutes were essentially restated in 
the 1987 Title 7 recodification with the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act 
restated as W.S. 
7-13-301 and the 
adult suspended trial or sentence act restated as W.S. 
7-13-302 through 
7-13-307.14[¶166]  
The Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act was turned upside down by a Senate 
judiciary committee amendment (without change in the title of the bill) to 
provide prosecutorial veto for use of the sentencing statute by the addition of 
the words "with the consent of the defendants and the state." The adult 
suspended trial or sentence act lost its principle reason for existence by 
deletion of the provision which permitted suspension of trial and entry of a 
probationary sentence. The provision for suspension of trial disappeared in the 
same way that the prosecutorial veto provision was inserted.[¶167]  Without question, the adult suspended 
trial or sentence act was turned into a pure sentencing statute by deletion of 
the provisions. The majority now contends that the Modified Juvenile Sentencing 
Act, circa 1909, was also turned into a diversion statute. The majority uses 
this contention to justify the legislature's insertion of the prosecutorial veto 
as a limitation on sentencing authority of the judiciary.[¶168]  The majority is totally wrong in context 
and the citation of authority fails to sustain the basis arguments presented. 
The only diversion feature of either earlier statute had been found in the adult 
suspended trial or sentence act. These cases presented never considered the 
question of diversion.[¶170]  
First justification for finding the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act to 
be a diversionary process and not a sentencing statute is presented by the 
majority in discussion of prosecutorial powers of nolle prosequi. The 
presentation is well structured, but contains a pervasive fault. Nolle prosequi 
has nothing to do with these cases and this prosecutorial veto power in the 
sentencing statutes. Pure nolle prosequi cases addressing executive and judicial 
discretion can be immediately excluded as totally inapplicable for any precedent 
in this case.15[¶171]  
Of more arguable relation, we can find the cited cases involving 
prosecutorial participation in pretrial diversion programs. A clearer look is 
required to perceive why even this line of authority really does not justify 
application since W.S. 
7-13-301, as the 
successor to the 1909 juvenile sentencing statute, is still a sentencing statute 
and not a diversion program as it relates to the cases actually presented. What 
might have happened if diversion -- probation  without plea -- had been 
attempted is hypothetical and not presented by any of the cases addressed. The 
reason is that judicial action is invoked only following trial conviction or 
guilty plea and the sentencing mechanism is restricted to a confined class of 
individuals and specific offenses. The statute provides a probationary sentence 
which is wholly unremarkable in sentencing technique with the only 
individualized feature different from many laws being the opportunity to avoid 
the burden of a conviction of a felony by good behavior. Over a lifetime, that 
burden will not doubt exceed any immediate detriment and responsibility 
impressed by compliance with terms of probation.[¶172]  The structure of Wyoming criminal 
statutes for juvenile offenses vests exclusive authority in the juvenile courts 
for persons under the age of thirteen, court discretionary transfer authority 
under seventeen, and exclusive discretion in the prosecutor for youths age 
seventeen or older. W.S. 
14-2-203; 
Menapace 
v. State, 
768 P.2d 8 (Wyo. 1989). Now, the 
prosecutor has discretion to require adult proceedings for young people 
seventeen or older and the power to insist on the entry of a felony 
judgment.III. MAJORITY CASE LAW -- DIVERSION 
CASE[¶173]  The majority 
inaccurately cites a number of cases involving modern diversion procedures where 
discretion of the prosecutor has been favored for authority to justify 
prosecutorial veto of a sentencing statute. The cases do not fit!16  The 
pretrial diversion programs of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida, Tennessee, 
Colorado, Oregon and Kansas do not provide authority for application to the 
similar Wyoming sentencing statute existent here since 1909 which is triggered 
only by a guilty plea or a jury verdict. The idea of pretrial 
diversion is appealing. It represents an attempt to structure and make visible 
the informal prosecutorial practices of noncriminal disposition. It also 
makes possible the early delivery of rehabilitation services on a formal 
rather than impromptu basis. And it offers the prosecution an alternative to its 
standard options of full criminal processing or informal screening-out without 
follow-up supervision.* * *Pretrial diversion, which began six 
years ago with two pilot programs, has become today a reform movement "well on 
its way to institutionalization." It is predicted that by 1987 there will be 150 
programs diverting annually 150,000 persons before trial. But continued 
proliferation of pretrial diversion programs at this time is hard to justify. 
Existing programs must first meet the burden of showing that their promises have 
been or could be delivered. Otherwise, the practice of pretrial diversion, like 
"almost everything we do in the criminal field, is on the basis of 
faith." Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 
83 Yale L.J. 827, 852-54 (1974) (quoting Zaloom, in 4 Crim. Justice Newsletter, 
October 15, 1973, at 4 and Vorenberg & Vorenberg, Early Diversion From 
the Criminal Justice System, 1972 (unpublished paper, Harvard Law 
School).  [¶174]  
Principles of the diversion process case law originated very recently and 
principally from New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
established the diversion program and then provided the character of its 
exercise involving both prosecutorial and sentencing court responsibilities. 
After the program was in place, the state legislature adopted the structure by 
enacted statute. In State 
v. Leonardis, 
71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), 
reh'g 73 
N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) 
(Leonardis I), the pretrial intervention program (PTI) was established by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court to represent a procedural alternative to the 
traditional system of prosecuting and incarcerating criminal suspects. The court 
noted that PTI was developed within the last decade. Various studies recognize 
"the desirability of alternative means for the disposition of criminal cases." 
Id. at 325. The system was to provide "prosecutorial options." Id. 
at 325. As such, the prosecutor's participation and discretion was confirmed. 
State 
v. Leonardis, 
73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) 
(Leonardis II) addressed the exercise of that discretion in the PTI 
program. Considering that the pretrial diversion program was functionally a 
quasi judicial decision tailored to provide options to the prosecutor, the court 
in Leonardis II discerned the character of supervised discretion of the 
prosecutor by judicial oversight. The Leonardis cases were followed by 
State 
v. Dalglish, 
86 N.J. 503, 432 A.2d 74 (1981) which 
addressed the development of a legislatively enacted statewide program of 
pretrial intervention as part of the New Jersey criminal code. The court 
recognized that judicial review of a prosecutor's decision whether 
or not to suspend criminal charges infringes on both the Legislature's power to 
define crimes and the Executive's responsibility to enforce the laws and 
therefore must be performed with sensitivity. Since the Legislature has 
established a PTI program with judicial review, the trial court correctly 
concluded that the problem of judicial interference with legislative authority 
has been eliminated. Id. at 79. The New Jersey program 
did not involve a predicate of an adverse verdict or a guilty plea before 
participation was considered. The program was an alternative predating plea 
or trial. The succeeding case, State 
v. Collins, 180 
N.J.Super. 190, 434 A.2d 628 (1981), aff'd 
90 
N.J. 449, 448 A.2d 977 (1982), addressed 
various procedural and differentiating features within New Jersey law and 
determined the prosecutor's exercise of discretion to deny pretrial diversion 
was not abused and that the accused's case would be then pursued to trial. The 
difference between pretrial diversion and post-conviction sentencing is 
clear.[¶178]  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise established an accelerated rehabilitation 
disposition program (ARD) which "provides a means of suspension of 
formal criminal proceedings before conviction on the condition that the accused 
will do something in return, such as make restitution, participate in a 
rehabilitation program, undergo psychiatric treatment, hold certain employment, 
or otherwise modify his behavior. The ARD rules provide that after a defendant 
is held for court by an issuing authority or after an information or indictment, 
the district attorney sua sponte or at the request of defendant's attorney, may 
move that the case be considered for ARD. The district attorney has the 
discretion to refuse to ask for ARD and to insist on prosecuting the defendant 
for the offense. Com. 
v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99, 371 A.2d 1346, 1347 (1977) (quoting 
Shade 
v. Com. of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Transp., 
394 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (M.D.Pa. 1975)). The 
Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court addressed constitutional activity of 
the supreme court as a supervisory power in the establishment of the ARD 
program. Unquestionably, the ARD program is a diversion without conviction 
process and provides no informative authority for a separation of powers inquiry 
as is presented here. See likewise Com. 
v. Lutz, 
508 Pa. 297, 495 A.2d 928 (1985). The similar 
inquiry into the proper exercise of discretion by the prosecutor for the ARD 
program was presented as the subject of Com. 
v. Ebert, 
369 Pa.Super. 318, 535 A.2d 178 (1987). The program 
was described as "a pretrial disposition of certain cases through which the 
defendant can earn dismissal of the charges against him if he successfully 
completes a rehabilitation program." Id. at 179.[¶179]  Florida has a statutory pretrial 
intervention program and the issue presented in State 
v. Cleveland, 
390 So. 2d 364 (Fla.App. 1980) was control 
or supervision of exercised discretion of the prosecutor before trial. The court 
noted:    The system is one of balancing. If the 
prosecutor takes the case to trial and the defendant is found guilty, the trial 
judge has the discretion under the law to sentence the defendant in whatever 
fashion the trial court sees fit. Id. 
at 367. Obviously, 
the discretion of the prosecutor was to permit diversion or to proceed with 
prosecution. The Florida Supreme Court, in considering the same case, 
reiterated:The pretrial diversion is essentially a conditional decision 
not to prosecute similar to the nolle prosequi situation postulated by [State 
v.] Jogan, 
[388 So. 2d 322 (Fla.3d DCA 1980)]. It is a 
pretrial decision and does not divest the state attorney of the right to 
institute proceedings if the conditions are not met. The pretrial intervention 
program is merely an alternative to prosecutor's 
discretion. Cleveland 
v. State, 
417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982). The court 
noted that the Florida system was different than the California program, citing 
People 
v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 
11 Cal. 3d 59, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405 (1974).[¶180]  A special intervention program in the 
Cleveland municipal court was instituted to provide a form of rehabilitation in 
lieu of conviction and sentence. City 
of Cleveland v. Mosquito, 
10 Ohio App.3d 239, 461 N.E.2d 924 (1983). The program 
was based on a statutory authorization for prosecuting attorneys to establish 
the program with cooperation between the court and the executive agency. The 
program retained the prosecutorial discretion of whether to continue with 
prosecution or utilize the diversion program. The activity and status 
demonstrated in the case essentially conforms to New Jersey, Pennsylvania and 
Florida pre-conviction diversion arrangements. The specific issue in 
Mosquito, 
461 N.E.2d  at 927 was the 
prosecutor's place to deny the opportunity of Mosquito to "enter the program and 
escape trial."[¶181]  The 
constitutionality of the Tennessee pretrial diversion program was similarly 
considered in Pace 
v. State, 
566 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978). The 
Tennessee system involved a memorandum of understanding between the prosecuting 
attorney and the defendant without effect until trial court approval. The case 
confirmed the authority of the court to supervise the exercise of discretion and 
found the statute constitutional. The special concurrence is of particular 
interest in recognizing the three-stage process involving nolle prosequi or 
pretrial diversion, and, if neither, then verdict. The essential characteristic 
of the Tennessee system was premised on the agreement of the defendant and the 
prosecutor to be incorporated pretrial in the memorandum of understanding. The 
Colorado court in People, 
By and Through Vanmeveren v. District Court In and For Larimer 
County, 
186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50 (1974) applied the 
same principle to the same kind of a deferred prosecution statute as a 
recognition of the prosecutor's charging discretion.[¶182]  Oregon statutes established a 
prosecutorial based pretrial diversion authority. The Oregon courts considered 
the exercise of discretion in State 
ex rel. Anderson v. Haas, 
43 Ore. App. 169, 602 P.2d 346 (1979) and the 
character of a hearing, if any, to terminate upon decision of the prosecutor in 
State 
ex rel. Harmon v. Blanding, 
292 Or. 752, 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) and found 
that the charged defendant had no right to choose treatment as an alternative to 
prosecution in State 
v. Graves, 
58 Ore. App. 286, 648 P.2d 866 (1982). The thesis 
of the statute and the case law resulting is the well-established principle of 
prosecutorial discretion to prosecute.  The program is structured in Oregon 
on an agreement between the prosecution and the defendant and little supervision 
is provided the court to require that the prosecutor enter into the 
agreement.[¶183]  Kansas 
patterned its statute after the law enacted in Oregon. The Kansas court in 
State 
v. Greenlee, 
228 Kan. 712, 620 P.2d 1132 (1980) recognized 
the same picture of a function in exercising discretion to enter into an 
agreement by the prosecutor while perceiving that the statute itself was largely 
a recognition of a prior practice of diverted or delayed prosecution. The court 
noted: The control [of the prosecutor] is minimal and the overall 
effect is merely to make the process of diversion more formal by establishing a 
few procedural standards and establishing some degree of uniformity in 
procedure. The ultimate decision remains with the 
prosecutor. Id. at 1137-38. The court did note that the 
prosecutor, although possessing wide discretion, is not immune from judicial 
review of the exercise of that discretion for arbitrariness. Id. at 
1139.IV. NOLLE PROSEQUI -- NO RELEVANCE[¶190]  Nolle prosequi does not apply to 
judicial responsibility for sentencing after either a guilty plea or a 
guilty verdict. Since the plea of guilty has been made in each of these twelve 
cases and accepted by the court, nolle prosequi has absolutely nothing to do 
with the constitutionality of a prosecutorial veto in the sentence entered which 
determines whether or not a probationary condition will be denied which might 
permit avoidance of the felony conviction status. There is a difference between 
dismissing a pending proceeding before guilt has been ascertained and control 
over sentencing.17 Gooden 
v. State, 
711 P.2d 405 (Wyo. 1985); 
Jahnke 
v. State, 
682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984); 
State 
v. Faltynowicz, 
660 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1983), Thomas, J., 
specially concurring; United 
States v. Cox, 
342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied 381 U.S. 935, 85 S. Ct. 1767, 14 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1965); 
United 
States v. Brokaw, 
60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.Ill. 1945); 
State 
v. Bailey, 
319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990); Comment, 
The Nolle Prosequi Under Rule 
48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1978 Det. 
C.L. Rev. 491 (1978); Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? 
Morrison v. Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 
Yale L.J. 1069 (1990); Note, 
Criminal Law -- Nolle Prosequi  -- Trial Court Has Power To 
Dismiss for Want of Prosecution, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 996 
(1966).[¶192]  The majority 
opinion loses touch of the issue presented by the appellants. That issue is 
whether the legislature may delegate to prosecutors any form of control over 
sentencing. This issue concerns the core function of the judiciary over 
sentencing. See MJP 
v. State, 
706 P.2d 1108 (Wyo. 1985). The 
improper delegation of core functions to coordinate branches of government was 
reviewed in Petition 
of Padget, 
678 P.2d 870. Sentencing 
is a judicial function. MJP, 
706 P.2d 1108; 
Wright 
v. State, 
670 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1983), reh'g 
denied 707 
P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1985).V. 
SENTENCING WITH PROSECUTORIAL INVOLVEMENT[¶193]  There is a distinguished line of 
prosecutorial veto cases which address the sentencing feature implicit in the 
Wyoming Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act of 1909. The principles first 
enunciated in California case law which addressed sentencing and separation of 
powers have taken hold in other jurisdictions whose occurs addressed issues 
similar to the issue here.[¶194]  
The conflict first arose in Tenorio, 
3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 where, in 
sentencing, the court could dismiss a charged prior offense without approval of 
the prosecutor. That court indicated: Thus, even if the Legislature 
could constitutionally remove the power to strike priors from the courts, it has 
not done so, but rather has proposed to vest in the prosecutor the power to 
foreclose the exercise of an admittedly judicial power by an appropriate 
judicial officer. It is no answer to suggest that this is but a lesser included 
portion of the prosecutor's discretion to forego prosecution, as the decision to 
forego prosecution does not itself deprive persons of liberty.When the 
decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to 
sentencing is   fundamentally judicial in nature. Just as the fact of 
prosecutorial discretion prior to charging a criminal offense does not imply 
prosecutorial discretion to convict without a judicial determination of guilt, 
discretion to forego prosecution does not imply discretion to sentence without a 
judicial determination of those factors which the Legislature has never denied 
are within the judicial power to determine and which relate to punishment. The 
judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be 
dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss 
but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The 
judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay 
for its exercise. Id. at 996. The court held that the tested 
statute was "violative of the California constitutional separation of powers, as 
that concept demands that the branches of government be coequal and that a 
prosecutor not be vested with power to foreclose the exercise of a judicial 
power recognized in [statute]." Id. at 997. Tenorio was followed 
by Esteybar 
v. Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial Dist. 
of Los Angeles County, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140 
(1971) where the 
prosecutorial veto in determining that a charged defendant may not be tried as a 
misdemeanor was rejected as a violation of separate judicial responsibility and 
separation of powers. People 
v. Navarro, 
7 Cal. 3d 248, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481 (1972) held that 
the legislature can control eligibility for probation, parole and term of 
imprisonment but cannot infringe upon a core judicial function by subjecting a 
judge to the control of the prosecuting attorney. "The imposition of sentence 
and the exercise of sentencing discretion are fundamentally and inherently 
judicial functions." Id. at 143 (quoting People 
v. Burke, 
47 Cal. 2d 45, 52, 301 P.2d 241 (1956)).When 
an individual judge exercises sentencing discretion he exercises a judicial 
power which must be based upon an examination of the circumstances of the 
particular case before him, and which is subject to review for abuse. ( 
People 
v. Tenorio, supra, 
3 Cal. 3d 89, 95, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993.) Here, as in 
Tenorio and Esteybar the Legislature sought to vest the district 
attorney with unreviewable powers. * *  *We reiterate the statement 
made by Justice Schuaer in his dissent in People 
v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 645, 654, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702, 375 P.2d 641, 
646, in his 
analysis of the separation of powers doctrine, that "It bears reiteration that 
the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for 
probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot abort the 
judicial process by subjecting a judge to the control of the district 
attorney."18 Navarro, 
102 Cal. Rptr.  at 144 (emphasis 
in original).[¶200]  The 
California principles of excluding the prosecutor from control over sentencing 
was accepted in Arizona under State 
v. Jones, 
142 Ariz. 302, 689 P.2d 561, 563 (1984) (citations 
omitted): The concept of separation of powers is fundamental to 
constitutional government as we know it. * * * It is essential that sharp 
separation of powers be carefully preserved by courts so that one branch of 
government not be permitted unconstitutionally to encroach upon the functions 
properly belonging to another. * * * The legislature may not enact a statute 
which is in conflict with a provision of the state 
Constitution.[¶201]  In 
State 
v. Prentiss, 
163 Ariz. 81, 786 P.2d 932 (1989), that 
principle was reaffirmed when the court considered whether the prosecutor could 
control sentencing discretion by his charging decision. The court found that the 
statute violated constitutional concepts of separation of powers, equal 
protection, and/or substantive due process. "Once the legislature provides the 
court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then 
limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to 
review that discretion." Id. at 936. The Arizona court severed the 
prosecutorial control feature in a fashion comparable to action taken by the 
Minnesota courts. Id. at 938, appendix.19[¶202]  
In Illinois, courts have identified the difference between a sentence and 
the alternative treatment diversion: "The Act provides an 
alternative to the usual criminal justice procedures; it allows a criminal 
defendant with a drug abuse problem to avoid the criminal justice 
machinery * * *." The treatment under the Act, unlike a sentence, is not a 
consequence of defendant's guilt. It is instead an alternative to a criminal 
conviction and the regular sentencing alternatives available under [Illinois 
law]. People 
v. Teschner, 
81 Ill. 2d 187, 40 Ill.Dec. 818, 407 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1980) (emphasis 
in original and quoting People 
v. Phillips, 
66 Ill. 2d 412, 416, 6 Ill. Dec. 215, 217, 362 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 
(1977)). The 
difference was also recognized between disposition and imposition of a criminal 
sanction. Accord People 
v. Caldwell, 
118 Ill.App.3d 1027, 74 Ill.Dec. 464, 455 N.E.2d 893 (1983).20 
[¶203]  In State 
v. Olson, 
325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982), the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota considered a statute which conditioned the power of a court 
to sentence without regard to the mandatory minimum provisions upon the 
discretion of a prosecutor. The Minnesota court observed  that 
the prosecutor is not only a member of the executive branch, but an advocate as 
well. His or her attention throughout the criminal trial is focused on achieving 
conviction, and appropriately so. But we expect too much when we look to the 
prosecutor alone for an evenhanded assessment of whether mitigating factors may 
exist in cases that have been successfully prosecuted. The present appeals amply 
illustrate the inadequacy of such a limited mechanism; it is neither 
constitutional, nor practical in our adversary system of criminal 
justice.* * * * * * If the legislature gives such power to 
the prosecutors, it must also give it to the courts. It cannot constitutionally 
do otherwise. Id. 
at 19.[¶204]  In summary, not only does a rigorous 
analysis of the diversion cases cited in the majority opinion fail to 
authenticate the prosecutorial participation in judicial function, but the 
appropriately related authority uniformly denies that executive branch 
preclusion in essentially a sentencing decision which is not justified in 
Wyoming.VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS[¶205]  As the majority points out, the doctrine 
of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution is not 
mandatory on the states. Dreyer 
v. People of State of Illinois, 
187 U.S. 71, 84, 23 S. Ct. 28, 32, 47 L. Ed. 79 (1902). The 
doctrine is not mandated in the United States Constitution, but is understood to 
flow naturally from the division of government. Springer 
v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 
277 U.S. 189, 201, 48 S. Ct. 480, 482, 72 L. Ed. 845 (1928).[¶2-6]  On the other hand, Wyoming's 
Constitution includes that specific separation of powers clause:The 
powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or 
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either 
of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted. Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1. I also make note of our 
Constitution's placement of the state's judicial power:The judicial 
power of the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of 
impeachment, in a supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as 
the legislature may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to 
time. Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1.[¶205]  Given our declaration that our 
constitution "is not a grant but a limitation on legislative power," 
Witzenburger 
v. State ex. rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 
575 P.2d 1100, 1124, reh'g 
denied 577 P.2d 1386 (Wyo. 1978), this court 
should strictly construe our separation of powers clause. In the same regard 
that the legislature cannot divvy up its basic legislative power to a staff 
agency, Legislative 
Research Com'n By and Through Prather, 
664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984), it also 
cannot properly reassign a judicial function for sentencing to an advocate of 
the executive branch of government. See, likewise, the consideration of 
delegation of the executive charging function to the judiciary in 
Petition 
of Padget, 
678 P.2d 870. See, 
however, State 
ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 
136 Wis.2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987), 
overruled 150 
Wis.2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989), 
which in second opinion provided a converse result.[¶206]  The majority limits judicial power to 
the power to "adjudicate," by which it means to make the final 
determinations in a case and to administer its own affairs. I refuse to relegate 
judicial power to such a narrow sphere.[¶207]  We have visited the concept of judicial 
power before. In Bi-Rite 
Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Fremont 
County, 
735 P.2d 709, 713-14 (Wyo. 1987), we 
characterized judicial power as follows:It is unquestioned that courts 
have inherent powers beyond those specified in rules and statutes that are 
absolutely  necessary to the courts' ability to perform the functions for 
which they were created. * * ** * *First it is said that courts 
possess an inherent power described as "an extremely narrow range 
of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a 
constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this 
sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms 'court' and 
'judicial power.'" Eash 
v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 
757 F.2d 557, 562, 77 A.L.R.Fed. 751 (3rd Cir.1985). This 
power is essential to the separation of powers concept and allows a court 
to act notwithstanding contrary [constitutional] legislative direction. There is 
also an inherent power that is described as necessary to the efficient 
functioning and prompt and just disposition of litigation and business of the 
court. Thus, courts have an inherent power to summon witnesses and compel their 
attendance, to administer oaths, prevent abusive process, provide counsel for 
the indigent, correct records, relieve parties in default, discipline attorneys 
at law, and take other similar appropriate action. 20 
Am.Jur.2d Courts § 79. Finally, 
there is an inherent power to take such action as is useful to the efficient 
functioning of the court. What is necessary and what is useful may be difficult 
to ascertain and subject to considerable disagreement. It has been said that 
"the notion of inherent power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds as 
'shadowy,'" "not possible to locate with exactitude," and, therefore, should be 
exercised with great restraint and caution. Eash 
v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., supra, 
757 F.2d  at 561-562. As 
nebulous as this concept is, this quotation indicates that judicial power 
extends beyond the limit which the majority assigns.[¶208]  The majority speculates that our 
separation of powers clause was borrowed from the constitutions of Idaho and 
Montana. R. Prien, The Background of the Wyoming Constitution 56, 70 
(1956) notes that Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1, which contains the grant of judicial 
power, similarly has its roots in Montana. Thus, the meaning the Montana court 
assigns to this term could be persuasive authority and serve as an appropriate 
starting point. Cf. Matter 
of Johnson, 
568 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo. 1977).[¶209]  In State 
ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, 
123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747, 753 (1950) (emphasis 
in original and added), the Montana Supreme Court viewed judicial power this 
way: Judicial power is not only the authority to decide, but to 
make binding orders and judgments. The kind of authority that is judicial in its 
nature relates to and acts upon the rights of person and property not created by 
this authority but existing under the law. This judicial authority in 
specific controversies between parties determines these rights as they exist and 
does so at the instance of a party to such controversy. These qualities 
distinguish judicial power from that which is simply legislative or 
executive.  Judicial power as contra-distinguished from the 
power of the law has no existence. Judicial power is exercised by means of 
courts which are the mere creations and instruments of the law, and 
independent of the law the courts have no existence. The law 
precedes the courts. The law governs the courts. Thus it is the function 
of the courts to expound and administer law in those causes properly 
before them in course of legal procedure. Montana's concept of 
judicial power embraces more than the majority's "adjudication" and 
administration of court business view. Looking to other jurisdictions is also 
helpful to explain the concept. Judicial power extends beyond the 
power to adjudicate a particular controversy and encompasses the power to 
regulate matters related to adjudication. * * ** * * * 
* * Such power, properly used, is essential to the maintenance of a strong and 
independent judiciary, a necessary component of our system of 
government. State 
v. Holmes, 
106 Wis.2d 31, 315 N.W.2d 703, 709-10 (1982) (emphasis 
added). A court has all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform 
efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and 
integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective. People 
v. Little, 
89 Misc.2d 742, 392 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (1977). Judicial 
power comprehends all authority necessary to preserve and improve the 
fundamental judicial function of deciding cases. Clerk 
of Court's Comp. for Lyon County v. Lyon County Com'rs., 
308 Minn. 172, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976). Judicial 
power is the legal right, ability, and authority to hear and decide a 
justiciable issue or controversy; such power is ordinarily vested in a court of 
justice. Illinois 
Cent. R. Co. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 
135 F. Supp. 304, 308 (S.D. Miss. 1955). Judicial 
power consists of three elements: examination of the truth, determination of the 
law arising upon that fact, and ascertainment and application of the remedy. 
Cedar 
Rapids Human Rights Com'n v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., in Linn 
County, 
222 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Iowa 1974). The 
legislature is vested with the power to enact the laws, but it cannot 
constitutionally enact laws that unduly infringe upon the powers of the court. 
People 
v. Felella, 
131 Ill. 2d 525, 137 Ill.Dec. 547, 546 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1989).[¶209]  The prosecutorial veto authority 
granted by W.S. 
7-13-301 interferes 
with this core power. It denies the trial court the power to determine facts, 
for the prosecutor need not cite any facts to exercise the veto. It denies the 
trial court the power to determine an appropriate remedy in any individual 
situation. In short, the trial court's essential function of delivering justice 
becomes short circuited due to the veto. No debate is necessary over the power 
of the prosecutor to decide whether to bring charges and what charges to bring, 
or to decide to drop the charges when he feels he has no case against a 
defendant. However, the prosecutor should not have the power to sit on the bench 
or make the decisions that lead to the final disposition of a case. Adjudication 
includes the process in arriving at the final outcome as well as deciding the 
outcome itself. Waugh 
v. American Cas. Co., 
190 Kan. 725, 378 P.2d 170, 175 (1963). In 
Petition 
of Padget, 
678 P.2d  at 872 (quoting 
Esteybar, 
485 P.2d at 1143), we adopted 
the following language from the California Supreme Court: "'When 
the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or 
sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.' ([People v.] 
Tenorio, 
supra 
[3 Cal. 3d 89] at p. 94, 
89 
Cal.Rptr. [249] at p. 252, 473 P.2d [993] at p. 996.)* * 
* "This court [has] struck down under the separation of powers 
doctrine legislative attempts to subject an exercise of judicial power to 
prosecutorial concurrence." * * * Hoines 
v. Barney's Club, Inc., 
28 Cal. 3d 603, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 620 P.2d 628, 633 (1980). The 
majority would like for us to forget that we made the second part of that 
statement.[¶210]  The grant 
of power to the trial court to consider W.S. 
7-13-301 disposition 
of a criminal matter is, no doubt, a legitimate legislative exercise of power. 
Hopkinson 
v. State, 
664 P.2d 43, 50 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983). The 
legislature may authorize the trial court to use broad discretion or no 
discretion at all in making its determination of how to dispose of such matters. 
People 
v. Bainter, 
126 Ill. 2d 292, 127 Ill.Dec. 938, 533 N.E.2d 1066 (1989); 
Olson, 
325 N.W.2d  at 18. But once 
the legislature acts, it cannot constitutionally condition the trial court's 
decision upon prior approval of the prosecutor. Prentiss, 
163 Ariz. 81, 786 P.2d 932. The 
present deviation from a historical standard of Wyoming law is demonstrated 
by State 
ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 
674 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1983), where this 
court refused to accept a Petition of Padget kind of delegation from 
administrative responsibility by legislative action. See likewise 
State 
v. Saltzer, 
20 Ohio App.3d 277, 485 N.E.2d 831 (1985). "Whereas 
the judicial branch must be and is largely independent of intrusion by the 
legislative branch, the executive branch exists principally to do its bidding." 
Brown 
v. Barkley, 
628 S.W.2d 616, 623 (Ky. 1982).[¶211]  W.S. 
7-13-301 is an 
unconstitutional grant of power from the legislature to the executive branch. 
The prosecutorial veto provision of this statute violates the separation of 
powers provision of Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1 and usurps the judicial power 
granted the judicial branch of government in Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1.21[¶212]  
I would reverse all of these consolidated cases except for Lowry. In 
Lowry's case, where the trial court found the veto provision unconstitutional 
and applied W.S. 
7-13-301 without the 
prosecutor's consent, I would vote to affirm. Mower, 
750 P.2d 679 was good 
law and should not be abandoned.22VII. PENDING WYOMING 
CASES[¶214]  The dozen 
cases presently pending in this court to test the uncontrolled discretion 
granted the prosecutor to deny usage of either segment of the non-felony 
conviction statute, W.S. 
7-13-301, are a 
composite of our modern society. At issue is not the power of persuasion of the 
prosecutor; it is an undisciplined use of a veto to foreclose judicial probation 
sentencing alternatives. Not one of the cases involved a properly defined 
diversion status since in every case an actual plea was made, justified and 
accepted except the one county court case where the statute was declared 
unconstitutional by the county court judge.   [¶215]  What the trial court might have done in 
the individual case in the absence of the veto is not necessarily disclosed in 
these records. Probably at least in one case, a non-felony conviction structure 
would have been followed and, probably, in the face of the specific plea 
bargaining statute and with good reasoning and honest argument by the 
prosecutor, the felony conviction status would have been adopted by the trial 
court in at least several of the cases. This would have permitted the exercised 
discretion of the judiciary to leave further amelioration to the Governor 
under the constitutional powers of pardon and commutation.[¶216]  Here, the clearly defined issue in every 
case now pending is the authority of the prosecutor to veto a favorable 
sentencing alternative without any necessary discretional responsibility or 
justification and to do this only to insist that a felony conviction results. In 
not one of these cases was there any semblance of another issue about terms, 
conditions or probationary aspects of the actual sentence granted which, in all 
cases, was probation.23 There 
is absolutely no case cited by the State or included in the majority opinion 
that justifies the unsupervised prosecutorial discretion after considering that 
the diversion cases are not presidentially applicable to the post-guilty plea 
sentencing cases involved here.VIII(A). VETO WAS NOT PROPERLY ENACTED 
-- CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION -- CHANGE OF PURPOSE[¶217]  The history of legislative misconduct 
and mistake, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 91 (1939) (as amended), emphasizes the need for 
the constitutional protection included in the Wyoming Constitution for 
limitations on the bill passage process. Those found in the Wyoming Constitution 
are similar to many states: Laws to be passed by bill; 
alteration or amendment of bills.No law shall be passed except by 
bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either 
house as to change its original purpose. Wyo. Const. art. 3 § 
20. Bill must go to committee.No bill shall be 
considered or become a law unless referred to a committee, returned therefrom 
and printed for the use of the members. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 
23. Bill to contain only one subject, which shall be expressed 
in title.No bill, except general appropriation bills and bills for 
the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed containing 
more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any 
subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, such act 
shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so 
expressed. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24. Vote required 
to pass bill.No bill shall become a law except by a vote of a 
majority of all the members elected to each house, nor unless on its final 
passage the vote taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting be 
entered on the journal. Wyo. Const. art. 3 § 25.[¶216]  In addition, the very detailed Wyo. 
Const. art 3, § 27 itemizes prohibitions against special legislation in the 
large number of individualized perspectives.[¶217]  Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20 provides that 
"no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as 
to change its original purpose," and Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24 relates to the 
single purpose and the purpose expressed in the title that challenges the 
constitutional validity of the committee insertion of prosecutorial veto without 
changing the title in the bill.[¶218]  H.B. 92, 49th Leg. (1987), which, with 
amendments, subsequently became Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157 (1987), was a product of 
the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee's criminal code review of Wyoming's 
criminal statutes which continued over a number of years. Earlier revision of 
the criminal code in Title 6 of the statutes occurred by enactment of Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 75 (1982) and Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171 (1983) which were products 
of the same continuing program. With the exception of some specific substantive 
amendments, the revisionary purpose of H.B. 92 was stated for "eliminating 
duplications, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting 
and renumbering sections; providing definitions; repealing procedural provision 
superseded by court rules; * * *." In addition, substantive provisions were 
recognized in the title specifically to identify substantive changes by 
exclusion or inclusion. The included provision relating to this subject was 
providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation prior to the 
entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication 
of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related 
statutes.[¶219]  Following 
House passage of H.B. 92, the Senate Judiciary Committee inserted prosecutorial 
veto of the sentencing discretion of the trial court as a committee amendment. 
No change to the title was made to reflect the addition of the state's consent. 
"The purpose of the constitutional requirements relating to the enactment 
of laws was to put the members of the Assembly and others interested, 
on notice, by the title of the measure submitted, so that they might vote on 
it with circumspection." Scudder 
v. Smith, 
331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601, 604 (1938) (emphasis 
in original).[¶220]  If the 
separation of powers issue identified by the prosecutorial veto amendment was 
not significant, the extended consideration in majority opinion was wasted. The 
mother and father of Jeffrey D. Billis surely were 
not warned by information available in a process where no one outside of a few 
insiders would have been aware of the change in Wyoming law to give a power to 
the prosecutor to require felony conviction status for their son. Not only does 
the title fail to disclose creation of the prosecutorial veto of judicial 
sentencing discretion, but conversely, it clearly conveys the impression that no 
actual change in the existent law is intended.The title is therefore 
misleading and give rise to surprise. It follows then that those provisions 
which are beyond the subject as expressed in the title, must be held to be 
inoperative, since the general public would not be put upon notice of  the 
contents of the act from a reading of the title. Smith 
v. Hansen, 
386 P.2d 98, 102 (Wyo. 1963).[¶222]  The general nature of the title does not 
strengthen the choice made by the majority in this case where specific subjects 
are given a title reference, but prosecutorial veto remains 
untitled.[¶223]  
Edwards 
v. Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 
350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82, 93 (1942) recognized 
that the title "must be a fair index of the matters in the bill" when it 
stated:The purpose of the constitutional provision, supra, has been 
stated as follows: "First, to prevent hodge podge or 'log rolling' legislation; 
second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature by means of provisions 
in bills of which the titles gave no intimation and which might therefore be 
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly 
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is 
usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered in order 
that they have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if 
they shall so desire." Id. at 92 (quoting State 
ex rel. United Railways Co. v. Wiehaupt, 
231 Mo. 449, 459, 133 S.W. 329, 331).[¶224]  Furthermore, where the title is 
restrictive, the bill must be restrictive. Hunt 
v. Armour & Co., 
345 Mo. 677, 136 S.W.2d 312 (1939).[¶225]  The error made by the majority's 
argument is the disregard of the compound constitutional questions presented. 
The one subject and title recitation of purpose requirement of Wyo. Const. art. 
3, § 24 addresses a general informational function. Additionally, Wyo. Const. 
art. 3, § 20, amendment or alteration -- the log rolling proviso -- addresses 
surreptitious or unnoticed change after bill consideration starts. Here we have 
both a separate subject inserted and an amendment to achieve a different purpose 
during passage without changed title.24 The 
cogent analysis in Alabama 
Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, 
374 So. 2d 258, 262 (Ala. 1979) (emphasis 
in original) should be applied to the Wyoming Constitution: 
  There is no warning or notice to the members of the 
legislature nor to the public * * *.If this Act is not violative of [the 
Alabama Constitution], then there is little, if any, room for operation of those 
sections and extensive "log-rolling" would result to the detriment of the 
citizens of this state.If this Act does not violate 
[constitutional provisions], then any appropriation bill could carry in its body 
a hidden proviso that no judge, no legislator, nor the executive could 
receive the appropriations of his respective office until that official performs 
some act as a prerequisite.If this were permitted no legislator, no 
public official, nor the public would know of the existence of the hidden 
proviso without reading the entire bill. To require reading the 
entire bill so as to discover its pertinent provisions would clearly fly in the 
teeth of the [constitutional] requirements. * * *[¶222]  There are well-stated and very 
significant reasons for the constitutional provisions restricting bill passage. 
Spoken in terms of both legislator awareness and public information, the 
anathema to democratic processes is secret government conducted by insulated and 
isolated processes where special interests can reign supreme. For a majority 
which values the supremacy of majority rule over the potential rights of 
minorities so greatly, I am surprised they do so little to ensure that the 
legislative product is indeed the product of a majority.[¶223]  If the substantive bill change reflected 
here by introducing the prosecutorial veto does not fall within the 
constitutional criteria, then it is hard to find anything that will do so 
considering the fundamentals of separation of powers. Examination of Wyoming 
case law does not convince me that our predecessors on this court undertook to 
abandon the historical purposes of the text of constitutional limitations on 
bill passage processes. The cattle-dipping case of of Arbuckle 
v. Pflaeging, 
20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918 (1912) does not 
provide that authority for non-compliance in the prosecutorial veto statute. At 
issue in the case, as a purpose of  the legislation, were details of the 
duties of the state veterinarian. The case addressed a rather ordinary addition 
relating to epidemic control of diseased animals. The germaneness of the change 
can hardly be questioned. Arbuckle, in discussing veterinarian duties, 
provides no light on this present subject. The majority ignores fact by 
comparing the prosecutorial veto of judicial sentencing authority to a 
veterinarian's control over diseased animals.[¶224]  It is strange that the majority finds 
support from Smith, 
386 P.2d 98. In 
Smith, a bill directed to control out-of-state liquor importation 
suffered a barnacle during passage providing for an increase of the excise tax 
on malt liquors. The invalidity of the tax increase under the constitutional 
constraints of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20 is clearly comparable to the 
prosecutorial veto of judicial sentencing power found here.Generally 
speaking, if the matter contained in an amendatory or supplementary act is 
germane to the original act, a reference in the title to the section of the 
statute to be amended or supplemented accurately indicates the general subject 
of the legislation and is not in violation of the constitutional 
provision requiring a clear expression of such subject. * * *Also, 
it has been held that such a reference, although not specifying the nature of 
the amendment, is adequate, where the subject matter of the actual amendment is 
"germane" to that of the provision amended -- the theory being that the reader 
of the bill will get enough information by looking at the earlier law and the 
caption of the amendatory bill. * * *This general rule has no 
application, however, when the nature of the amendment actually is specified and 
the title of the bill indicates that a particular change in the original act is 
proposed. As for example, in both the original title and amended title of 
S.F.No.103, the title specifies that § 12-5 is to be amended "so as to prohibit" 
certain acts. It does not indicate § 12-5 is to be amended in any other respect. 
  The attorney general's office shows us no reason to believe 
and no authority for the proposition that this limited purpose of amending, "so 
as to prohibit" the forbidden acts, could be construed to include all subject 
matters germane to the original act. It does, however, place reliance upon what 
was said in the Board of Com'rs v. Stone case, supra, at 51 P. 607.  In 
that case an attempt was made in the title to state the effect, or part of the 
effect, of the amendatory act, but the court found the statement to be entirely 
meaningless and therefore pronounced it harmless and of no effect. We fail to 
find any support in the Stone case for defendants' position, and we know of no 
other reliable authority therefor.On the other hand, we consider the 
following cases authority for holding that when a title particularizes the 
changes which are to be made in an amendatory act, the legislation is limited to 
matters specified, and anything beyond this limitation would be void regardless 
of how germane it might be to the subject of the original 
act. Smith, 
386 P.2d  at 100-01.[¶224]  The relevance of Smith is 
identified by our discussion of the Nebraska cases, including Thompson 
v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 
169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1959) and 
language found in 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 310 (8th ed. 
1927):The conclusion in Nebraska has been that an act is 
unconstitutional and void if the title is not broad enough to include the 
subject matter of legislation. In other words, as stated in 1 Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, § 1908, p. 349 (3d. Ed.), while a title need not set out 
the nature of the changes made, if it does, the body of the amendatory act may 
not contain any other matter, however germane it may be to the subject of the 
original act as a whole.Sutherland, on the same page, further points out 
that if a narrow title is selected, the amendment should not go beyond its 
scope. Otherwise, the function of the title is 
defeated. Smith, 
386 P.2d  at 101.[¶225]  In Smith, 
386 P.2d  at 101, we further 
recognized prior precedent of this court:In the recent case of 
Morrow 
v. Diefenderfer, 
supra, at 
384 P.2d 603, Chief 
Justice Parker re-emphasized an earlier pronouncement to the effect that the 
object of Art. 3, § 24, is to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation, caused 
by provisions in a bill of which the title gives no intimation. Also, an opinion 
written by former Chief 
Justice Blume for In re West Highway Sanitary and Improvement District, 77 Wyo. 
384, 317 P.2d 495, 500, makes it 
clear that the title to a bill should not be misleading or give rise to surprise 
or deception, and if a title is specific, it is not entitled to the liberal 
interpretation which would prevail otherwise.[¶226]  A new subject  was introduced by 
the bill amendment within the definition of Morrow 
v. Diefenderfer, 
384 P.2d 601, 604 (Wyo. 1963) and a 
reasonable ground by which any legislator or other person could in fact claim 
surprise or fraud was provided. The Morrow circumstance cannot serve to 
provide validity to the first-time, new-subject amendment 
insertion.[¶227]  Although 
the court in Matter 
of West Highway Sanitary & Imp. Dist., 
77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d 495 (1957) declined to 
decide Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24 or the bill subject to be clearly expressed in 
the title, Chief Justice Blume provided thoughtful expression to the general 
rules by stating "the title should not be misleading or give rise to surprise or 
deception. * * * If it is specific it is not entitled to the liberal 
interpretation which would prevail otherwise." Id. at 
500.[¶228]  In Matter of 
West Highway Sanitary & Imp. Dist., Chief Justice Blume noted the title 
was both general and specific by reason of providing for the issuance of general 
obligation bonds, and he then reflected "if the title had given authority only 
to issue revenue bonds, and the body of the act had made a provision for general 
obligation bonds, then, we think we would be required to hold that the 
title would be deceiving and hence in violation of Article 3, § 24, Constitution 
of Wyoming." Id. at 500.[¶229]  In the context of these principles, we 
could also follow another rule of construction stated in the 
opinion: [With eumeration] we must apply the rule of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. Accordingly, "where a statute enumerates the 
subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or 
forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all 
those not expressly mentioned." * * * The rule is applicable in construing 
constitutional provisions. Id. at 504 (quoting 82 C.J.S. 
Statutes § 333, p. 666).[¶230]  
In an opinion anchored in practical experience, I have no disagreement 
with majority citation and quotation that the Wyoming Constitution in this 
regard, as all others, should be liberally and reasonably construed (including 
guarantees of Wyo. Const. art. 1). Morrow, 
384 P.2d  at 603; 
Brinegar 
v. Clark, 
371 P.2d 62, 66 (Wyo. 1962); 
Board 
of Com'rs of Laramie County v. Stone, 
7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605 (1898). The 
difference we have embraces justification of a separation of powers issue 
by  in-passage amendment of a legislative bill to provide for a 
prosecutorial veto of judicial sentencing authority for the first time. This 
creates a power in the prosecutor to decide that the accused must be branded a 
felon. In Morrow, the issue of difference between general obligation 
bonds and revenue bonds as a change was not decided in decision. In 
Brinegar, the controversy developed from a bill title relating to general 
powers of the fire marshal with text directed to the development of rules to 
control coin operated gasoline pump service stations. In State 
ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 
31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636 (1924), the bill 
title broadly addressed Wyoming's adventure into prohibition prohibiting the 
possession and manufacture of intoxicating beverages "and carrying into effect 
so far as the state of Wyoming is concerned the Eighteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States." Id. at 637. Bill provisions provided 
for gubernatorial removal of ineffective or inefficient law enforcement officers 
and came to be applied to the prosecuting attorney of Hot Springs County, 
Wyoming. Under the law, the amended and supplementary complaint filed with the 
governor charges that the prosecuting attorney of Hot Springs County "has 
been guilty of intoxication and drunkenness on some 14 stated dates * * * [and] 
he has at times willfully failed and refused to perform the duties imposed upon 
him by the said act, and has at frequent intervals by intoxication incapacitated 
himself from carrying on the work of county and prosecuting attorney." 
Id. at 637.[¶240]  In 
sustaining the relationship of the removal process to the title of the bill, the 
court stated:The attention of the legislature was directed to the 
subject of suppressing the unlawful manufacture, sale, etc. of intoxicating 
liquors. The effectiveness of the law would have to depend largely on the 
faithfulness and diligence of the officers charged with its enforcement, and it 
was deemed proper to provide for removal by the Governor of those officers who 
refused or neglected to perform the duties imposed upon them by the act. This 
provision, of course, would apply to only those officers who have duties to 
perform under the act, and we believe that the further provision in the same 
sentence, for the removal of officers guilty of intoxication or drunkenness must 
be restricted in its meaning to the same class of officers, and as 
permitting their removal, if by intoxication and drunkenness they render 
themselves unfit or unable to perform those duties. This we believe to be the 
real meaning of the language in question, when considered with a proper regard 
for the subject-matter and the object sought to be accomplished. As thus 
interpreted, we believe the inclusion in the act of the provision for removal of 
such officers is not contrary to the constitutional requirement that every act 
shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the 
title. Id. at 638.[¶226]  I find support in that case by the 
statement that "this court has long recognized the principle that this section 
of the Constitution, though mandatory, must be liberally and reasonably 
construed," to recognize that the prosecutorial veto amendment fails compliance 
here. Id. at 638. The only purpose of the prosecutorial veto insertion 
was to provide power to the prosecutor to make a first-time offender a felon 
with loss of citizenship and other disabilities. That power is directly related 
to the plea bargaining leverage by creating the advocate's right to destroy 
lives as a function of non-agreement in plea or, as a constituent of plea, may 
bargain for probation. This is not a matter of form, it is a question of power 
within a three-department government in a democratic society.[¶227]  I am no more enamored by the majority's 
justification based on the nature of H.B. 92 as a partial revision of Title 7 of 
the Wyoming Supreme Statutes where the bill attends to "eliminating 
duplications, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting 
and renumbering sections; providing definitions; repealing procedural provision 
superseded by court rules," and then addresses a specifically detailed subject 
described in the title. I would apply the Matter 
of West Highway Sanitary & Imp. Dist., 
317 P.2d  at 504 (quoting 82 
C.J.S. Statutes § 333, p. 666) rule on construction "'where a statute enumerates 
the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or 
forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all 
those not expressly mentioned.'" Revisers of statutes are presumed 
not to change the law if the language which they use fairly admits of a 
construction which makes it consistent with the former statute. Duffield 
v. Pike, 71 Conn. 521, 529, 42 A. 641; 
Westfield 
Cemetery Ass'n v. Danielson, 62 Conn. 319, 26 A. 345; 
State 
v. Neuner, 49 Conn. 232, 235; 36 Cyc. p. 
1067. Bassett 
v. City Bank & Trust Co., 
115 Conn. 393, 161 A. 852, 854 (1932).[¶229]  The prosecutorial veto amendatory 
addition is not an alteration or omission; it is an entirely new subject which 
should have been inserted in Title 5, Courts, since it relates to Wyo. Const. 
art. 2, § 1, separation of powers, and Wyo. Const. art. 5, judiciary to limit 
discretion and authority of the courts in criminal sentencing by a delegation of 
powers to the executive officer. Prosecutorial veto, with the prior body of 
Wyoming, was clearly so incongruous that it could not, by any fair intendment, 
be considered germane to a revision or recodification of the earlier Wyoming 
sentencing statute of probation for first-time offenders derived from a juvenile 
sentencing statute. Cf. State 
v. Pitet, 
69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177 (1952) which 
related to the criminal offense of practicing medicine without a medical 
license.[¶230]  Although I 
believe the majority ranges far too broadly in approval of a revision which 
becomes a piggy-back medium for separate statutory changes, my challenge is to 
the new legislation in this case which was neither recognized in the title 
nor germane to the issues addressed within the Title 6 designation.25[¶280]  
All of the justifications for mandatory compliance with the 
constitutional criteria for enactment process are violated by the implicit 
phraseology and far reaching consequences of the words " and the state" as an 
unnoted and probably unnoticed bill amendment. VIII(B). 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE ALSO MANDATORY FOR THE 
LEGISLATURE  [¶290]  There is one specific purpose in the 
state constitutional provisions addressing procedural requirements for 
legislative enactment. Service in the legislature is eminently persuasive of the 
wisdom of the constitutional provisions and requirements for 
compliance.26  There are few people, if any, who know 
what is going on when complex issues are presented during extended 
recodification.[¶300]  
Consequently, the theory of the procedural requirement of the Wyoming 
Constitution is to provide as much assistance and information to the individual 
member of the legislature as possible. The greatest danger develops from 
ingenious expertise when applied to recodification and revision. Without a 
legislative history foundation, such as is provided in the United States 
Congress or in many state legislatures by recorded debates and records of 
committee proceedings, the danger of accidental misadventure or surreptitious 
redirection is unfortunately enhanced without required disclosure. Sometimes 
only a few innocuous words are required.27[¶301]  
Not particularly different is the small amendatory addition to one of 
Wyoming's basic sentencing statutes, but one which effectively turned the 
eighty-year Wyoming law upside down. It is fair to assess that, excluding a few 
lobbyists who knew what they were doing, almost no member of the 1987 session 
had any perception of either the existence or the importance of the insertion of 
the prosecutorial veto into the sentencing statute. I would find the significant 
change in the sentencing statute, H.B. 92, when enacted into Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
157 (1987), to fail because: (1) the change was not described in the bill title 
as required by Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24; (2) addition of the subject in H.B. 92 
changed the original purpose in defiance of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20; (3) the 
change did not comply with the germaneness criteria of rules adopted by both the 
Wyoming House of Representatives and the Senate; and (4) the change 
substantially invaded the separation of powers of Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1 by 
denigration of the judicial sentencing power.[¶302]  Admittedly, this court has been less 
then vigilant in observation of legislative carelessness and disinclined to 
follow constitutional enactment requirements. Eternal vigilance, which is 
the essential constituent of the oath of office to support, obey and defend the 
constitution, cannot be magically eliminated by dissertations of shared burdens 
and spread responsibility. No other official in our democratic society can be 
the recipient of a shared delegation of the judiciary's responsibility for the 
maintenance of the state's Constitution and the United States Constitution. If 
the judiciary cannot, or chooses not to, then the system will inevitably 
fail.VIII(C). BILL TITLE -- SPECIFICITY AND 
ACCURACY[¶303]  The 
general principle was specifically recognized by this court in Smith, 
386 P.2d 98, discussed 
in detail hereafter, and re-recognized with the broader, non-specific title in 
State 
ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 946, I. A. F. F. v. City of 
Laramie, 
437 P.2d 295, 303 (Wyo. 1968), which 
stated:   In Smith 
v. Hansen, Wyo., 386 P.2d 98, 101, we pointed 
out, since the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as it 
pleases, it is obvious that it may sometimes so frame a title as to preclude 
matters which might with entire propriety have been embraced, but which must now 
be excluded because the title is unnecessarily restrictive and the courts 
cannot enlarge the scope of the title. We found that to have happened in the 
Smith case. If the title for the act now being dealt with had been 
restricted in the manner which the city contends for, it is entirely possible 
the act would be suffering the same fate as the act in the Smith case 
did.[¶303]  The criteria of 
the Wyoming constitutional provision that the subject be clearly 
expressed in the title was recognized in early Colorado 
cases:"Moreover, we are bound to assume that the word 'clearly' was not 
incorporated into the constitutional provision under consideration by mistake. 
It appears in but few of the corresponding provisions of other state 
Constitutions -- a fact that could hardly have been unobserved by the 
convention. That this word was advisedly used, and was intended to affect the 
manner of expressing the subject, we cannot doubt. The matter covered by 
legislation is to be 'clearly,' but dubiously or obscurely indicated by the 
title." People 
v. Friederich, 
67 Colo. 69, 185 P. 657, 658 (1919) (quoting 
In 
re Breene, 
14 Colo. 401, 24 P. 3 (1890)).[¶305]  That court followed the same thesis in 
Friederich, 
185 P. at 658:In 
determining  the first question: whether the title of the Act fails to 
clearly express the subject of the statute, we are aware that no legislative act 
should be nullified upon constitutional grounds unless such legislation is 
plainly in violation of the Constitution. It is equally true, however, that the 
authority of the fundamental law of the state must be recognized, approved and 
enforced.Section 21 of Article 5 is practically identical with 
provisions found in most of the state Constitutions, providing that the subject 
of any act shall be expressed in this title. Our Constitution, however, declares 
that no only must the subject be expressed in the title, but that such subject 
must be "clearly" so expressed. The rule, as announced in Cooley's 
Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) page 178, is as follows:"As the 
legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is 
obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being 
included in an act which might with entire propriety have been embraced in one 
enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be 
excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The 
courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; the are vested with no 
dispensing power; the Constitution has made the title the conclusive index to 
the legislative intent as to what shall be operative; it is no answer to say 
that the title might have been more comprehensive -- in fact the legislature 
have not seen fit to make it so."By all authority and precedent it is 
firmly settled that the purpose of a statute must be ascertained and determined 
by its title, and that the title is presumed to be the controlling and 
conclusive index of the legislative intent. See also 
Gronert 
v. People, 
95 Colo. 508, 37 P.2d 396 (1934).[¶306]  The clearly expressed subject is a 
mandatory requirement: The fact is this: that whatever 
constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely 
to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obligation, 
and to be therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is 
directory, seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying that it is not 
law at all. That this ought not to be so must be conceded; that it is so we have 
abundant reason and good authority for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional 
provision is to be enforced at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if 
the legislature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the 
more urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it. And it also seems to us 
that there are few evils which can be inflicted by a strict adherence to the 
law, so great as that which is done by the habitual disregard, by any department 
of the government, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which it 
derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously observed 
and obeyed. 1 T. Cooley, supra at 312-13.[¶309]  The Nebraska court, in considering a 
comparable constitutional provision in State 
ex rel. School Dist. No. 6 of Pierce County v. Board of County Com'rs of Pierce 
County, 
10 Neb. 476, 6 N.W. 763 (1880), found an 
amendment of a bill without a change in the title unconstitutional in purpose 
extension. In a succeeding lien controversy, that court restated the principled 
purpose of constitutional provisions in Miller 
v. Hurford, 
11 Neb. 377, 9 N.W. 477, 479 (1881): Our 
constitutional provision, that "no bill shall contain more than one subject, 
which shall be clearly expressed in the title," is but making inviolable 
the rule governing legislative bodies that "no proposition or subject different 
from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment." 
Experience has shown that in the absence of constitutional restrictions the rule 
at times is liable to be overthrown, and objectionable and pernicious 
legislation is the result. To guard against this evil our constitution prohibits 
more than one subject being embraced in a bill. And while this provision has 
sometimes been attended with inconvenience, as in case of a revision of the 
laws, it is a safeguard against corrupt or improvident legislation, and its 
effect has been to simplify legislation and place every bill upon its true 
merits. But if, under the pretext of amending a section, a subject entirely 
foreign to the subject-matter of the section to be amended can be introduced, 
this barrier will be entirely broken down, and the constitutional guaranty is 
effect destroyed. See likewise Trumble 
v. Trumble, 
37 Neb. 340, 55 N.W. 869, 871 (1893), which 
stated:We are fully conscious of the importance of the principle which 
forbids the courts to declare a statute unconstitutional where any substantial 
doubt exists, but we have no doubts in this case. The act is, upon its face, 
clearly violative of several constitutional provisions. To sustain it would be 
to invite their disregard in the future, if not to countenance the practice 
suggestively designated as "logrolling." In such a case the duty of the court to 
set aside an act is as clear as its duty generally to presume the validity of 
statutes, and no considerations based upon the importance of interests affected 
can discharge the courts from performing such duty.IX. 
CONCLUSION[¶306]  In 
terms of legislative enactment process, this prosecutorial veto was not 
constitutionally inserted; in terms of notice for citizen participation, nothing 
was provided. The majority fails in constitutional responsibility on this test 
also.28[¶309]  
The ability of many nonviolent persons to function as productive members 
of society will be destroyed by the ability of prosecutors to insist 
unilaterally that they be branded as felons despite the judgment to the contrary 
by the trial judge. I dissent against the grant of power to an advocate to act 
as a judge then empowered needlessly to add numbers to our members of society 
who are stigmatized as felons and more likely to be unproductive burdens on 
those of us who must work. Who is pushing and who is leading all of us to the 
cliff of economic non-competitiveness is painfully obvious. I also dissent with 
profound concern for what has been done to the precious division of governmental 
power which helps keep tyranny at bay.MACY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.[¶340]  I dissent. I commend the author for his 
struggle to compose the prestigious opinion for the majority. I simply disagree 
and dissent with the hope that somehow it will help to discourage further 
erosion of our constitution.[¶341]  
I am firmly dedicated to the proposition that the power and duty to 
adjudicate should remain exclusively in the judiciary. It is axiomatic that it 
is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the legislature to 
require a presiding judge to obtain the consent of a member of the executive 
branch of government before he can enter an order imposing a legislatively 
determined alternative for the disposition of a criminal 
charge.[¶342]  I cannot 
submit to the majority's view that the framers of our constitution had in mind 
"a pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power." To believe 
this is to ignore Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution, which 
plainly states:The powers of the government of this state are divided 
into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no 
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly 
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly 
directed or permitted.[¶343]  
I am convinced that each of the three distinct departments of government, 
or, if you prefer, the "three air-tight compartments," has exclusive power of 
its own not to be compromised in the interest of another branch of government. 
It was intended that there be a balance of power. If we continue to merge the 
powers, who is going to balance them?[¶344]  We cannot carve out exceptions to our 
constitution without threatening the existence of the rights guaranteed by it. 
Once exceptions are made, the guarantees become shallow and meaningless, and 
further erosion becomes inevitable. Former Supreme Court Justice William O. 
Douglas once commented:But that guarantee is not self-executing. As 
nightfall does not come all at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, 
there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in 
such twilight that we all must be most aware of change in the air -- however 
slight -- lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness. The 
Douglas Letters: Selections from the Private Papers of Justice William O. 
Douglas at 162 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987).[¶344]  I am informed that at least one city 
council has instructed its prosecutor not to give his consent to allowing the 
first offender status, now permitted by Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-301 (1977), for 
an accused if he is charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
It does not take a mental giant to foresee how the exception to the separation 
of powers doctrine carved out by the majority will expand and fall into 
common abuse, depending upon the whims of the prosecutor or his boss. Hopefully, 
we will not become victims of the darkness.Macy, J., 
joins.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1 W.S. 7-12-102 through 7-12-104 (June 1987 Repl.):The district 
attorney may take exceptions to any opinion or decision of the court made during 
the prosecution of a criminal case. Before being filed in the supreme court, the 
bill of exceptions shall be presented to the trial court which shall certify 
whether the contents of the bill are correct. If certified, the trial court 
shall sign the bill containing the exceptions and affix the seal of the court 
and the bill shall be made part of the record. The bill of exceptions shall be 
governed by rules as shall be promulgated by the Wyoming supreme 
court.Following certification of a bill of exceptions by the trial court 
as provided by W.S. 7-12-102, the attorney general may apply to the supreme 
court for permission to file the bill for review and decision upon the points 
presented. If the supreme court allows the bill to be filed, the judge who 
presided at the trial in which the bill was taken shall appoint a competent 
attorney to argue the case against the state and shall fix a reasonable fee for 
his service to be paid out of the treasury of the county in which the bill was 
taken.(a) If the bill of exceptions is allowed to be filed, the supreme 
court shall render a decision on each point presented.(b) The decision 
of the supreme court shall determine the law to govern in any similar case which 
may be pending at the time the decision is rendered, or which may afterwards 
arise in the state, but shall not reverse nor in any manner affect the judgment 
of the court in the case in which the bill of exceptions was 
taken. 2 W.S. 35-7-1037 (June 1988 Repl.) also provides a 
procedure for probation and discharge of first-time drug offenders. That statute 
is not, however, involved in any of these cases on 
appeal.

 

3 We note in passing that in White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 
(Wyo. 1984), in which the parties had not raised the constitutionality of W.S. 
1-1-114 (1977), relating to the legislatively imposed requirement that the 
prayer for damages in a personal injury or wrongful death action shall not state 
any dollar amount or demand a sum as judgment, this court was compelled to 
consider the statute's constitutionality because of its apparent infringement 
upon the doctrine of separation of powers.

 

4 § 7-13-203. Parole before sentence; generally; terms and conditions; 
discharge; revocation of parole and imposition of sentence.If any person 
is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any felony except murder, sexual assault 
in the first or second degree or arson of a dwelling house or other human 
habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being, the court shall ascertain 
whether the offense of which the accused is guilty is his first offense, the 
extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and other facts and 
circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know. If the court is 
satisfied that he was a person of good reputation before the commission of the 
offense charged and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if 
permitted to go at large would not again violate the law, the court may in its 
discretion, by an order entered of record, delay passing sentence and then 
parole the person and permit him to got at large upon his own recognizance, 
conditioned that he will personally appear and report to the court twice in each 
year at times and places fixed in the order and that he will demean himself 
while at large in a law-abiding manner and live a worthy, respectable life, and 
that he will not leave the state without the consent of the court. The court, if 
satisfied at the time of appearance, that the person has demeaned himself in a 
law-abiding manner and lived a worthy, respectable life, may be an order of 
record, continue parole for the period of five (5) years, at the expiration of 
which the court shall enter an order finally discharging the person, and no 
further proceedings shall be had upon such verdict or plea. At any time after 
the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the original parole the court 
shall have the power in its discretion to terminate parole and finally discharge 
the person and annul the verdict or plea of guilty. At any time before the final 
discharge of the person that the court believes that the paroled person has 
attempted to leave the state or failed to comply with the terms of his parole 
the court shall cause a warrant to issue for the apprehension and arrest of the 
person and require him to be brought before the court. The court shall inquire 
into his conduct since his parole, and if satisfied from the inquiry that the 
person has violated the terms of his parole and recognizance, the court may 
impose sentence upon the verdict or plea against him in the manner and to the 
same extent as though the passing of sentence had not been delayed and the 
person had not been paroled or permitted to go at large.

5 § 7-13-301. Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence; placing 
defendant on probation; fine and probation; suspension of trial and placing 
defendant on probation.After conviction or plea of guilty for any 
offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may 
suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a 
part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a 
fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation. With 
the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by 
death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant 
on probation.

 

6 Prien, supra, appendix A, at 38.

 

7 The doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the Federal 
Constitution is not mandatory on the states. Dreyer v. People of the State of 
Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84, 23 S. Ct. 28, 32, 47 L. Ed. 79, 85 
(1902).

 

8 Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 8. Approval of veto of 
legislation by governor; passage over veto. -- Every bill which 
has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the 
governor. If he approves, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with 
his objections to the house in which it originated, which shall enter the 
objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after 
such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected agree to pass the bill, 
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it 
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it be approved by two-thirds of the 
members elected, it shall become a law; but in all such cases the vote of both 
houses shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the names of the members 
voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the journal of each house 
respectively. If any bill is not returned by the governor within three days 
(Sundays excepted) after its presentation to him, the same shall be law, unless 
the legislature by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall 
be a law, unless he shall file the same with his objections in the office of the 
secretary of state within fifteen days after such 
adjournment. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.  
 

9 Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 5: Pardoning power of 
governor. -- The governor shall have power to remit fines and 
forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for 
all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment; but the legislature may by 
law regulate the manner in which the remission of fines, pardons, commutations 
and reprieves may be applied for. Upon conviction for treason he shall have 
power to suspend the execution of sentence until the case is reported to the 
legislature at its next regular session, when the legislature shall either 
pardon, or commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence or grant 
further reprieve. He shall communicate to the legislature at each regular 
session each case of remission of fine, reprieve, commutation or pardon granted 
by him, stating the name of the convict, the crime for which he was convicted, 
the sentence and its date and the date of the remission, commutation, pardon or 
reprieve with his reasons for granting the same. See U.S. 
Const. art. II, § 2.

10 The United States Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed founded 
James Madison's flexible approach to separation of powers, saying, "Madison 
recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of 
overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence * 
* *." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620, 101 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1988). 11 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice para. 
48.02[1] (2d ed. 1989) n.1: See United States v. Ammidown, 
162 U.S. App. D.C. 28, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Greater Blouse, Skirt and Neckwear Contractors Ass'n., 228 F. Supp. 483 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.Ill. 
1945); United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D.C.Mont. 1924); 
Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L. Ed. 196 
(1868).

 

12 W.R.Cr.P. 56: From and after the effective date of these 
rules, the sections of the Wyoming Statutes, 1957, as amended, hereinafter 
enumerated, shall be superseded, and such statutes and all other laws in 
conflict with these rules shall be of no further force or 
effect: 1-59 through 1-63The first sentence of 
7-47-77-87-867-118 through 7-1257-127 through 7-1347-136 
through 7-1467-148 through 7-1547-157 through 7-1607-162 through 
7-1647-166 through 7-1717-173 through 7-1787-181 through 
7-2007-2027-204 through 
7-2177-2197-2227-2297-2307-2327-2347-2357-2407-245 
through 7-2497-253 through 7-2607-2667-268 through 
7-2747-2767-2837-2847-2867-2877-292 through 
7-2957-299 through 7-3017-330 through 
7-3327-3447-451 (Amended January 20, 1969, effective 
February 11, 1969; amended July 12, 1971, effective November 18, 
1971.)   13 As stated in 2 W. LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal 
Procedure § 13.3, p. 569 (1985), concern over this unbridled 
discretion in the prosecution [to enter a nolle prosequi] resulted in 
legislation or rules of court in many jurisdictions intended to restrain the 
nol pros power of the prosecutor. These provisions, at a minimum, forced 
the prosecutor to explain his reasons for doing so in writing, thus assuring 
greater visibility of the manner in which the prosecutor acted; at a maximum 
they required that he receive judicial approval to make his decision 
effective. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509, 
n.11, 12 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Woodruff v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S. Ct. 2168, 48 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1976).

14 See also Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 51-52 (Wyo. 1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246, for this 
court's brief examination of the history of this court's rule making. See 
Armstrong, The Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, A View by the Judiciary, 
V Land & Water L.Rev. 581-86 (1970) -- part of a symposium on the Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 

15 See e.g., Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 902 (Wyo. 1977) 
(W.R.Cr.P. 16(b)(2) identical to F.R.Cr.P. 12(b)(2)); Richmond v. State, 
554 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Wyo. 1976); (W.R.Cr.P. 7 essentially the same as old 
F.R.Cr.P. 5(b) and (c)); Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 931 (Wyo. 1976) 
(portions of W.R.Cr.P. 32(c) identical to F.R.Cr.P. 31(c)); and Simms v. 
State, 492 P.2d 516, 523 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886, 93 S. Ct. 104, 34 L. Ed. 2d 142 (W.R.Cr.P. 18(b) practically identical to F.R.Cr.P. 
16(b)).

 

16 Accord United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1047, 110 S. Ct. 847, 107 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1990); United 
States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1145, 103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); United States v. 
Severich, 676 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.Fla. 1988), aff'd 872 F.2d 434 (11th 
Cir. 1989). See also United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175 (11th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1058, 108 S. Ct. 2829, 100 L. Ed. 2d 930; 
but see United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1989); and 
United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239 (C.D.Ill. (1989)).

17 W. LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 13.6, p. 585 
(1985): "A decision by the prosecutor not to divert a particular defendant and 
instead to proceed with prosecution on the pre-existing charge is, in essence, a 
decision to prosecute * * *."

 

18 Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1977). For the United 
States Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo put it this way: "We do not pause to 
consider whether a statute differently conceived and framed would yield results 
more consonant with fairness and reason. We take this statute as we find it." 
Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27, 53 S. Ct. 417, 420, 77 L. Ed. 1004, 
1010 (1933). 19 Constitution of the United States of America -- 
Analysis and Interpretation, pp. 491-94 (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office 1987), 
where reference is made to Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380, 
18 L. Ed. 366 (1867), for the point that a pardon may precede the indictment or 
other beginning of the criminal proceeding.

 

20 Codification is defined as: "CODIFICATION. The process of collecting and 
arranging the laws of * * * a state into a code, that is, into a complete system 
of positive law, scientifically ordered, and promulgated by legislative 
authority." 7 Words and Phrases 540, 14 C.J.S. 1306.A general revision 
of the laws, or of statutes, has been defined as follows:"Revision of 
the law" on any subject is a restatement of the law on that subject in a 
correlated or improved form, which is intended as a substitute for the law as 
previously stated, and displaces and repeals the former laws relating to the 
same subject and within the purview of the revising statute. It implies a 
reexamination of the law." People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 178 N.E. 133, 144, 
[1931]. Pitet, 69 Wyo. at 496, 243 P.2d  at 184.

21 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 157:TITLE 7 REVISIONAN ACT to 
create W.S. 7-3-611; to amend W.S. 1-40-112(c) introductory paragraph, 
6-10-106(a)(iii), 9-1-627(c), 20-3-101(a), 25-3-104(b)(iv) and 25-4-102; to 
amend, amend and renumber or number W.S. 6-3-702(c), 6-10110, 7-1-101 through 
7-5-309, 7-13-101 through 7-15-107 and 7-17-101 through 7-17-103 as 7-1-101 
through 7-6-115, 7-9-101 through 7-9-112 and 7-13-101 through 7-17-103; to 
renumber W.S. 7-1-123 as 7-1-103, 7-6-101 as 7-1-104, 7-7-107 as 7-7-103, 
7-7-108 as 7-7-104, 7-8-103 as 7-8-102, 7-8-107 as 7-8-103, 7-8-110, as 
7-10-104, 7-8-124 as 7-8-105, 7-9-101 as 7-1-104, 7-9-107 as 7-1-105, 7-10-105 
as 7-10-103, 7-10-106 as 7-10-104, 7-10-117 as 7-10-105, 7-10-120 as 7-10-106, 
7-11-207 as 7-11-203, 7-11-210 through 7-11-212 as 7-11-204 through 7-11-206, 
7-11-406 through 7-11-410 as 7-11-403 through 7-11-407, 7-11-503 as 7-11-502, 
7-11-514 through 7-11-516 as 7-11-503 through 7-11-505, 7-11-518 as 7-11-506, 
7-12-105 as 7-12-104 and 7-12-205 as 7-12-201 as enacted by Chapter 147, Wyoming 
Session Laws, 1985; and to amend or amend and renumber W.S. 7-7-102, 7-7-109 as 
7-7-105 and 7-10-101(b) as enacted by Chapter 147, Wyoming Session Laws, 1985 
relating to criminal procedure; revising Chapters 1 through 5, 13 through 15 and 
17 of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes; eliminating duplications, redundancies 
and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting and renumbering sections; 
providing definitions; repealing procedural provision superseded by court rules; 
specifying when peace officers may issue citations for misdemeanors; modifying 
the offense of desertion and reducing the penalty; eliminating power of sheriff 
granted to railroad conductors and engineers; modifying procedures relating to 
the disposition of property seized or held by peace officers and eliminating the 
provision authorizing allocation of forfeited property to law enforcement 
agencies; repealing provisions relating to the governor's reward for fugitives; 
modifying procedures relating to peace bonds; providing for limited personal 
items of a deceased to be released to his next of kin following a coroner's 
investigation; providing procedures for drawing and impaneling grand juries; 
limiting the term of county grand juries; deleting requirement of publication of 
grand jury report; providing for secrecy of grand jury indictment and 
proceedings; providing that in imposing an indeterminate sentence in a felony 
case the court shall set the minimum term at no more than 90% of the maximum 
term imposed; providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation 
prior to entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without 
adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming 
related statutes; providing that a defendant given a split sentence of 
incarceration followed by probation is not subject to parole and good time 
provisions and is under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court while 
incarcerated; specifying when probation revocation proceedings may be commenced; 
creating the department of probation and parole and providing powers and duties 
of the director and probation and parole agents; providing for the arrest by a 
peace officer of alleged probation or parole violators upon the written 
statement of a probation and parole agent; providing when restitution shall be 
made a condition of parole; specifying how earnings of certain defendants and 
prisoners shall be disbursed; specifying sex crimes for which special 
examination and sentencing provisions apply, designating who shall perform 
examinations and designating where such convicted defendants may be committed; 
placing control of the reentry furlough program under the board of charities and 
reform; modifying provisions relating to the issuance and execution of death 
warrants; providing procedures relating to the examination of female prisoners 
sentenced to death who are believed to be pregnant; providing the public 
defender shall represent certain prisoners asserting violation of constitutional 
rights; specifying in which cases the state will indemnify sheriffs or other 
officers from civil liability in connection with prisoner labor; eliminating the 
state commission on prison labor and transferring functions to the board of 
charities and reform; providing for work release programs at each of the state's 
adult penal institutions; and providing for an effective 
date. 22 W.S. 7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.): If 
the court orders probation before sentence, suspended sentence or probation, the 
court shall order the needy person as a condition of sentence or probation to 
repay the state for expenses and services provided by appointed attorneys 
pursuant to the state public defender's standard fee 
schedule.

 

23 Wyo. Const., art. 1: § 2. Equality of all. -- 
In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all 
members of the human race are equal. § 7. No absolute, 
arbitrary power. -- Absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty 
and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest 
majority.

 

Footnotes for the Dissent

1 Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1 states:The powers of the government of 
this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, 
executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise 
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted.

 

2 W.S. 7-13-301 (emphasis added) provides in pertinent 
part:Placing person found guilty, but not convicted, on 
probation.(a) If a person who has not previously been convicted of any 
felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty to 
any misdemeanor * * *, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first 
or second degree or arson in the first or second degree, the court may, with 
the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a 
judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the 
person on probation * * *.

3 See Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 
1990). 4    It is 
also harsh, but appropriate, to reflect that the prosecutorial veto would be 
more acceptableif the 
appropriateness of punishment was visited upon those responsible authorities in 
Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo.1990) by challenge to the non-prosecution of 
the principal wrongdoers or in Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287 by a perjury conviction and 
sentence for the prosecutor.  Crime 
does not first exist when the unwashed are apprehended.  It is the ignored, absolved and 
protected that set the standard for absolved and protected that set the standard 
for an offensive and criminally infected society.

            

In context of Madison and Jefferson, ideals of democracy, individual 
rights, worthiness and the individual within a civilized humane society, these 
prosecutorial veto cases personify a result-oriented adjudication at its most 
virulent manifestation.  Twenty or 
twenty-five years from now someone could easily win a Pulitzer or like award by 
following the future activities of the twelve people whose lives as potentially 
productive people were damaged or destroyed by the decision to require a 
conviction of a felony in contravention of the constitutional directive of our 
penal code of reformation and, usually, for no definable 
reason.

 

Status as a felon deals in undescribable and undiscernible present damage 
to both the individual and, through them, our society.  Each miscreant who may seek to 
rehabilitate but then becomes a hardened criminal by societal failure is the 
direct responsibility of those who author these failures of fairness.  Each future offense and each life lost 
by the criminalization of a broad group of our younger generation is a loss to 
all of us for which this court must take the primary responsibility.  Inevitably, it wil be those unable to 
protect themselves because of limited wealth or ineffective legal assistance 
upon whom prosecutorial veto will be most heavily 
inflicted.

 

It would be imbecilic or juvenile to ignore the recognition of the sweep 
of power and effect in the reorganized authority in our society of the 
prosecutorial veto.  The unanchored 
and uncontrolled power will be implicit, explicit and omnipresent within the 
totality of the first offense violator and plea bargaining in criminal 
sentences.  This is unanchored 
increased advocacy power beyond any reasoned fair trial constitutional 
concepts.

 

5 It is interesting to acknowledge the perspective of Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. that the most important case ever decided in his judicial career, 
extended as it has been, came to be the reapportionment cases required to 
correct legislative malfeasance and judicial impotence. Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962) as followed by Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, reh'g denied 
379 U.S. 870, 85 S. Ct. 12, 13 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1964). Unfortunately, federal 
judicial response was called when state political opportunism was more 
important than the legislator's constitutional oath and directed constitutional 
reapportionment obligations, and while nothing happened legislatively, the state 
courts collectively wrung their hands in disdain, despair and inaction. 
Gage, 377 P.2d 299.

 

6 Consider A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist 
(1961).

 

7 I would also consider Gale, 792 P.2d 570 important in this 
context due to the fact that prosecutors gave criminal immunity to a father 
after nearly a decade of sexually abusing his daughters.

8 See State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), 
reh'g 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).9 A thorough exploration of the probationary sentence 
without felony conviction occurs in People v. Banks, 53 Cal. 2d 370, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102 (1959), which involved criminal statutes similar in 
result to the pre-1987 Wyoming law.In distinguishing the intermediate 
probationary sentence from the felony conviction, that court 
described:By contrast, the defendant whose guilt has been established 
(by plea, finding or verdict) but who has not been sentenced to prison, i. e., 
where probation has been granted and the proceedings have been suspended without 
entry of judgment, is subject to no disabilities whatsoever except those 
specifically declared by some other provision of law or affirmatively prescribed 
by the court as terms or conditions of probation. The probationer in the latter 
case still retains his ordinary civil rights, unless the court has restricted 
them, among them being as a matter of law the right to a hearing and 
arraignment, with counsel, before judgment in the even that he is charged with a 
violation of the terms of his probation order. * * * He does, however, for some 
specific purposes -- for administration of the probation law and other laws 
expressly made applicable to persons so situated -- stand convicted of a felony. 
For example, under the statute probation may be revoked at any time * * * and 
the probationer may be arrested without warrant. * * * Such conviction, in 
itself and without pronouncement of judgment, establishes a status which is 
attended by certain disabilities. Id. at 113. See Berman 
v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 58 S. Ct. 164, 82 L. Ed. 204 
(1937). 10 
The present provisions of W.S. 7-13-301 are essentially the same as Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 84 (1909), except for the Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 
1990) amendment found in the last sentence. It is also effectively the same 
within its indeterminate sentence structure since enactment of a general 
criminal code for Wyoming. See The Compiled Laws of Wyoming, ch. 35 
(1876).  

11 The act initially 
provided an upper age limit of twenty-five years. The reduction to twenty-one 
years occurred by amendment during debate. Senate Journal, p. 299. To correlate 
the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act to the majority opinion, this statutory 
proceeding is found in W.S. 7-13-203, 7-13-204 and 7-13-205 (1977) and is the 
ancestor of W.S. 7-13-301 into which the prosecutorial veto was inserted. See 
King v. State, 720 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1986).

 

12 The revised statute cited above in introduced bill form raised the age 
limitation back to the twenty-five originally anticipated by the sponsor in 
1909. During the 1931 passage, an amendment was successfully introduced which 
eliminated any age limitation and provided the structure of the statute which 
then continued until 1987 to be available without regard for an age limitation. 
This history justifies the description of Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act, 
although the law was essentially directed toward young people and particularly 
so because of the first offense limitation. 13 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 91, § 6 (1939), W.S. 7-13-306, 
entitled "Governor's Power of Pardon Unaffected," also achieved an interesting 
metamorphosis in the recodification process which was originally found in the 
session laws as W.S. 7-13-307, captioned "Governor's Power of Pardon 
Unaffected." The new text with the same caption stated that "nothing in W.S. 
7-13-301 through 7-13-306 shall be construed to authorize the court to expunge 
the record of a person charged with or convicted of a criminal offense." 
Somehow, the caption got re-edited in the current supplements to the statutes 
and now states as a title, "Expungement of criminal record." The new language 
added by recodification and the disappearance of the prior statute is not 
explained. A title change for this text substitution was not included in the 
enacted legislation.

14 Because of the importance to understand what occurred in recodification, 
the terminology provided in recodification was 
restated: 7-13-301. Probation before 
sentence; generally; terms and conditions; discharge; revocation of probation 
and imposition of sentence.(a) If a person who has not 
previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or 
pleads guilty to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent violation of 
W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provisions of law, or any felony except murder, 
sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second 
degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and 
without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings 
and place the person on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon 
terms and conditions set by the court. The terms of probation shall include that 
he:(i) Report to the court not less than twice in each year at times and 
places fixed in the order;(ii) Conduct himself in a law-abiding 
manner;(iii) Not leave the state without the consent of the court; 
and(iv) Conform his conduct to any other terms of probation the court 
finds proper.(b) If the court finds the person has fulfilled the terms 
of probation and that his rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction 
of the court, the court may at the end of five (5) years, or at any time after 
the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the original probation, 
discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings against him.(c) If the 
defendant violates a term or condition of probation at any time before final 
discharge, the court may:(i) Enter an adjudication of guilt and 
conviction and proceed to impose sentence upon the defendant if he previously 
pled guilty to or was found guilty of the original charge for which probation 
was granted under this section; or(ii) Order that the trial of the 
original charge proceed if the defendant has not previously pled or been found 
guilty.(d) Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without 
adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose.(e) There 
shall be only one (1) discharge and dismissal under this section or under any 
similar section of the probationary statutes of any other 
jurisdiction. 7-13-302. Suspension of 
imposition or execution of sentence; placing defendant on probation; fine and 
probation.(a) After conviction or plea of guilty for any 
offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and following 
entry of the judgment of conviction, the court may:(i) Suspend the 
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation; 
or(ii) Impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant 
on probation. 7-13-303. Investigation of 
defendant by district attorney or state probation officer; report of 
investigation prerequisite to probation or suspension of sentence; copies of 
report to institution and board of charities and reform.(a) When 
directed by the court, the district attorney or the state probation and parole 
officer shall fully investigate and report to the court in writing:(i) 
The circumstances of the offense;(ii) The criminal record, social 
history and present conditions of the defendant; and(iii) If 
practicable, the findings of a physical and mental examination of the 
defendant.(b) No defendant charged with a felony, and, unless the court 
directs otherwise, no defendant charged with a misdemeanor, shall be placed on 
probation or released under suspension of sentence until the report of the 
investigation under this section is presented to and considered by the court. If 
the defendant is committed to a state penal institution, a copy of the report of 
the investigation shall be sent to the institution at the time of commitment. In 
all felony cases the clerk of court shall forward copies of the report to the 
board of charities and reform together with copies of all orders entered by the 
court. 7-13-304. Imposition or 
modification of conditions; work as a condition of probation.(a) 
The court may impose, and at any time modify, any condition of probation or 
suspension of sentence.(b) As a condition of any probation, the court, 
subject to W.S. 7-13-701 through 7-13-704 [7-16-101 through 7-16-104], may order 
the defendant to perform work for a period not exceeding the maximum probation 
period. 7-13-305. Determination, 
continuance or extension of suspension or probation; discharge; violation of 
conditions.(a) The period of probation or suspension of sentence 
under W.S. 7-13-302 shall be determined by the court and may be continued or 
extended.(b) Upon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of 
suspension of sentence or probation under W.S. 7-13-302 the court shall enter an 
order discharging the defendant.(c) For a violation of a condition of 
probation occurring during the probationary period, revocation proceedings may 
be commenced at any time during the period of suspension of sentence or 
probation under W.S. 7-13-302, or within thirty (30) days thereafter, in which 
case the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested. If 
after hearing the court determines that the defendant violated any of the terms 
of probation or suspension of sentence, the court may proceed to deal with the 
case as if no suspension of sentence or probation had been ordered.(d) 
The time for commencing revocation proceedings shall be automatically extended 
for any period of time in which the probationer is incarcerated outside this 
state during the probationary period for the conviction of an offense which is a 
violation of the conditions of probation, unless the probationer has made a 
valid request for final disposition under the interstate agreement on detainers, 
W.S. 7-15-101 through 7-15-106. 7-13-306. Payment of fine in 
installments. When imposing a fine and also placing the defendant 
on probation, the district judge may permit the fine to be paid in installments 
over a reasonable period of time. 7-13-307. Governor's power 
of pardon unaffected. Nothing in W.S. 7-13-301 through 7-13-306 shall be 
construed to authorize the court to expunge the record of a person charged with 
or convicted of a criminal offense. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157 
(1987). 15Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870; State v. 
Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 40 S. Ct. 289, 64 L. Ed. 333 (1920); In re Confiscation Cases, 
74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454, 19 L. Ed. 196 (1868); United States v. Schumann, 2 
Abb. 523, 7 Sawy. 439, 27 F. Cas. 984 (C.C.Cal. 1866); United States v. 
Ammidown, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 28, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D.C.Mont. 1924); United States v. Greater 
Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n., 228 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.Ill. 1945); Comment, 
The Nolle Porsequi Under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 1978 Det. C.L. Rev. 491 (1978). This subject is more generously 
pursued in Section IV of this dissent.

16 Not one of those cases stands as authority for an unqualified right of 
the prosecutor to make the decision that the offense, without necessarily 
affording a difference in probationary term, will result in a felony status. 
That is all this appeal and these cases are about -- the uncontrolled power of 
the prosecutor to require in sentencing that a felony conviction will result.

17 Responsible authority exists to implement judicial authority over 
the prosecutorial discretion to nolle prosequi even before the plea is entered 
and without regard for a plea bargain status in special situations. See Hook 
v. State, 315 Md. 25, 553 A.2d 233 (1989). Cf. Jackson v. State, 82 
Md.App. 438, 572 A.2d 567 (1990), in stating a plausible exception.

18 The California court in Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 extended Tenorio, Esteybar 
and Navarro further than is required for application to the Wyoming 
statutes where pretrial diversion veto was also rejected. Superior Court of 
San Mateo County is like the cases cited by the majority, not really 
relevant to the Wyoming statute. See, however, Sledge v. Superior Court of 
San Diego County, 11 Cal. 3d 70, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28, 520 P.2d 412 (1974) where 
the preliminary determination of the eligibility for division exercised by the 
district attorney did not constitute an invasion of the separation of powers 
prohibition.In a most recent consideration in People v. Ames, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 261 Cal. Rptr. 911 (1989), the sentencing separation of power 
concept was revisited to determine whether judicial authority to change a plea 
bargain existed or the options were either acceptance or rejection. The court 
noted that "the imposition of sentence and exercise of discretion are 
fundamentally and inherently judicial functions. * * * While no bargain or 
agreement can divest the court of the sentencing discretion it inherently 
possesses * * *, a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a 
sentence within the limits of that bargain." Id. at 913.

19 Unbending to the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court in People ex 
rel. Carroll v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 106 Colo. 89, 101 P.2d 26 (1940) that a prosecutor had the right to prevent the judge from 
suspending sentence by withholding his approval as decidedly unpersuasive, the 
Arizona court severed the unconstitutional veto provision and upheld the balance 
of the statute. The court noted the differentiating status of Greenlee, 
228 Kan. 712, 620 P.2d 1132 as a diversion agreement process and not involving a 
sentencing statute. 20 In generic terms, State ex rel. Light v. 
Sheffield, 768 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Mo.App. 1989) stated:At the time 
Light entered her pleas of guilty to the drug charges, several sentencing 
alternatives were available to the trial court. It could have sentenced Light to 
a term of imprisonment as authorized by Chapter 558, RSMo, or pronounced 
sentence and suspended its execution, placing Light on probation, or, as the 
trial court did, suspend imposition of the sentence, with or without placing 
Light on probation. * * * The trial court, evidently in hopes that Light would 
mend her ways, suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on supervised 
probation for a term of three years, in which case, if Light successfully 
completed her probation, she would not have a criminal conviction on her record. 
* * * Suspension of imposition of sentence is an entirely different matter from 
imposing sentence and then suspending execution of it. In the first instance, 
the person has no criminal conviction, in the second, he does.State 
v. Anderson, 645 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1982) considered an apparent 
requirement of the prosecutor for guilty pleas before a pre-indictment approval 
of a memorandum of understanding for pretrial diversion. The court said that if 
the requirement existed, it was a nullity and "is in irreconcilable conflict 
with the provisions of the statute. A plea of guilty is a confession. It is an 
admission, or proof of guilt." Id. at 253.The court noted that 
the statute provided that no confession or admission against interest during the 
pendency and relevant to the charges contained in the memorandum of 
understanding was admissible and stated "there is no rule in this State which 
requires a defendant to admit his guilt in order to seek probation. To deny 
probation on that basis is an abuse of discretion." Id. at 253. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court achieved a similar result denying prosecutorial veto to 
accord constitutionality to the statute in State v. LeCompte, 406 So. 2d 1300 (La. 1981). 21 The ideological battle that is reflected in the 
philosophic differences between the majority and this dissent in application of 
separation of powers identifies the broad jurisprudential dispute. Minimizing 
separation of powers maximizes statism and dilutes and diminishes individual 
liberties and personal rights. Cf. Alfange, The Supreme Court and the 
Separation of Powers; A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
668 (1990). "The doctrine is not an end in itself, but a means of avoiding 
threats to individual liberty and of insuring that no branch of the government 
is disabled from effectively carrying out its constitutional responsibilities." 
Id. at 669-70.Comparable contemporary literature when closely 
read details the testiness between institutional power and individual rights 
implicit in blending separation of powers out of the constitution either 
nationally or within the state's adjudicatory responsibility when inquiry is 
made about the intrinsic operation of functional government. Anderson, The 
Separation Doctrine -- Prescription for Conflict or Cause for Creative 
Constitutionalism?, 14 Nova L. Rev. 227 (1989); Gibbons, The 
Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning of Separation of 
Powers, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 435 (1974); Gressman, Separation of Powers: 
The Third Circuit Dimension, 19 Seton Hall L. Rev. 491 (1989); Gusman, 
Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: 
Judicial Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 39 Am. U.L. 
Rev. 391 (1990); Marshall, "No Political Truth:" The Federalist and Justice 
Scalia on the Separation of Powers, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 245 
(1989-90); Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of 
Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 De Paul L. 
Rev. 299 (1990); Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History 
in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme 
Court, 39 Am. U.L. Rev. 277 (1990); Comment, Separation of Powers and the 
Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United States, 50 La. L. 
Rev. 117 (1989); Note, Separation of Powers: A New Look at the Functionalist 
Approach, 40 Case W. Res. 331 (1989-90). For result without recognition, 
consider Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Transformation of Judicial 
Precedent, XXXI B.C.L. Rev. 641 (1990).The issue within a democratic 
society is how is power created, defined and applied. For a discussion of the 
results without a delineation of the reasons, compare the three statutory 
interpretation discussions in Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 
76 Geo. L.J. 319 (1989); Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative 
Supremacy, 76 Geo. L.J. 281 (1989); and Zeppos, Judicial Candor and 
Statutory Interpretation, 76 Geo. L.J. 353 (1989).

22 Doubling the number of persons incarcerated in the states' 
penitentiaries, see Wyoming State Tribune, June 5, 1990, in one decade 
while the adult population declines by perhaps twenty-five percent should 
suffice. We do not need a prosecutorial veto of judicial decisions and 
sentencing to add to the despair of societal illness involved in and resulting 
from the prevalence of crime in our society. Included in that category is that 
which may be committed by the prosecutors themselves. See Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287, Urbigkit, J., dissenting. See also current newspaper reports that the 
planned new Wyoming prison must be now doubled in size since a year or so ago 
when the selection committee stated its site studies. The planned facility is 
over crowded before a site is selected or funding for architectural planning 
provided. Casper Star-Tribune, Sept. 22, 1990, at B1.

23 Victoria Lowry, Supreme Court No. 88-312, bill of exceptions from 
Campbell County Court, DUI case, April 14, 1988, disposition by plea bargain, 
guilty plea entered July 13, 1988 and sentenced August 16, 1988 pursuant to the 
plea bargain and upon objection by the State to application of the provisions of 
W.S. 7-13-301. The sentence entered was one year supervised probation and 
reimbursement in $ 200 in attorney's fees. The original arrest came for speeding 
forty-four miles per hour in a thirty miles per hour zone in Gillette, Wyoming. 
Lowry was twenty, single, regularly employed, and had no prior record of any 
kind. The stated reason for the State's objection to the use of W.S. 7-13-301 
was the alcohol test result of .185.Elmer Cambio, Supreme Court No. 
89-169, Natrona County, April 30, 1988, child abuse. On February 21, 1989, 
Cambio entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor of battery. On May 31, 1989, he 
was sentenced to six month's supervised probation. At age fifty-seven, Cambio 
had minor traffic offenses and was regularly employed. The stated basis for the 
prosecutorial veto was the fact that the plea bargain arrangement had reduced 
the charges to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor stated: Your Honor, I 
guess one of the first things [defense counsel] brought up, the State would 
oppose any 7-13-301 treatment. That was discussed time and time again in the 
negotiations involving this case. If [defense counsel] wants to apply for 
7-13-301 treatment, and the Court deems that would be appropriate in this case, 
I would ask the court to dissolve the plea and proceed on the two felonies. 
[This is an absolute misstatement of fact. There was only one felony originally 
charged.] If a negotiated disposition, stay with it and don't come back into 
court later and ask for more lenient treatment than negotiated with the district 
attorney. (There is nothing in the record reflecting a negotiated 
agreement that Cambio would not try to achieve disposition under the purview of 
W.S. 7-13-301, although the functionality of the difference is de minimis 
considering that the conviction itself was a misdemeanor only.)Jeffrey 
D. Billis, 
Supreme Court No. 88-250, Laramie County, December 1 & 10, 1987, two counts, 
delivery of controlled substance. Undercover agent solicitation at place of 
employment. On May 24, 1987, a plea bargain negotiated to one count and the 
second count was dismissed. Billis was sentenced on July 22, 1988 
to three to five years, which was suspended. He was placed on supervised 
probation for three years. Billis, age thirty-three, had a wife 
and three children. His occupation was a mechanic. He had an epileptic honorable 
discharge from the Navy and had no prior record of any kind. The justification 
for the prosecutorial veto given was his age and the method of operation for the 
offense charged looked professional. Drug offense factor.Vicki Moon, 
Supreme Court No. 88-304, Natrona County. On September 24, 1987, Moon was 
charged with delivery and conspiracy of a controlled substance. Undercover agent 
purchase, actual delivery by third party. Charges were amended to conspiracy 
only. A plea bargain was obtained on December 23, 1987 and Moon pled guilty to 
conspiracy on May 12, 1988. She was sentenced on October 11, 1988 for a two year 
supervised probation period. At age twenty-nine, Moon was a single parent with 
three children, no prior felonies, two minor traffic offenses, was 
self-supporting, and had regular employment. Sentencing under W.S. 7-13-301 was 
rejected by the prosecutor without a reason stated. The basis argued by Moon was 
a somewhat innocent victim status and her desire to pursue a higher education at 
a Montana university.Scott P. McIver, Supreme Court No. 88-311, Laramie 
County, conspiracy to commit a burglary of a bottling truck in Cheyenne, two 
offenses. The crime was committed by another party. The plea was entered July 
22, 1988 on the conspiracy charge. McIver was sentenced on October 21, 1988 for 
eighteen to thirty-six months in the penitentiary, which was suspended, three 
years probation was given. At age twenty-two, McIver was unmarried, a hard 
worker, and had a steady record of employment. The prosecutor objected to W.S. 
7-3-301 treatment on the basis of the prior planning involved in the trip to 
Cheyenne by the three participants.Willard Vigil, Supreme Court No. 
88-310, Laramie County, January 22, 1988, delivery of a controlled substance to 
an undercover agent. The plea bargain was entered August 19, 1988 and he was 
sentenced on October 21, 1988 to two to five years in the penitentiary, which 
was suspended, and five years probation was given. At age twenty-six, Vigil had 
no prior record of criminal activity. The activity was the basis of 
prosecutorial rejection of W.S. 7-13-301 consideration by the trial 
court.Nellie Magarahan, Supreme Court No. 89-4, Natrona County, March 
31, 1988, improper endorsement of a federal income tax return check. The plea 
bargain was entered on August 11, 1988 and she was sentenced on November 15, 
1988. Magarahan was sentenced to eighteen months of supervised probation. At age 
twenty, she had no prior felony convictions. 1982 Girls' School custody, 1985 
dismissed burglary charge. She was self-supporting and had prior restaurant 
employment. No justification for the prosecutorial veto was given.Kirk 
Hudson, Supreme Court No. 89-83, Natrona County, July 5, 1988, delivery of a 
controlled substance. Hudson pled guilty and the plea bargain was entered on 
November 15, 1988. He was sentenced on February 14, 1989 to supervised probation 
for two years. At age twenty-nine, he was a petroleum engineer, married, had no 
children, regularly employed and had no prior record except traffic offenses. 
This is a case of a user who became available as a source. The prosecutor 
opposed W.S. 7-13-301 usage without reason stated by veto.Thomas Heggen, 
Supreme Court No. 89-84, Natrona County, March 29, 1987, false unemployment 
compensation claims, intent to defraud, nine counts totalling $ 1,584. On 
October 6, 1988, a plea bargain was arranged bring the charge down to only one 
count. Heggen was sentenced on February 14, 1989 to two years supervised 
probation. At age thirty-one, he was married with a family. These events 
occurred from a period of unemployment; child adoption problem with attendant 
difficulties and expenses. No prior criminal record. No reason was stated for 
the exercise of the prosecutorial veto.Matthew Mollman, Supreme Court 
No. 89-21, Natrona County, May 4, 1988, larceny in taking a television set from 
an adjacent apartment. A plea bargain was arranged on August 26, 1988 and was 
sentenced to one year supervised probation. Guilty plea entered to a burglary 
offense. This case is unusual as one of the two among the dozen where the 
subject of sentencing under W.S. 7-13-301 was specifically included in the plea 
bargain decision. The prosecutor agreed that he would not object to a sentence 
W.S. 7-3-301 application if the presentence investigation report showed nothing 
more serious than "minor traffic offenses." On November 18, 1988, Mollman was 
sentenced pursuant to the guilt plea and plea bargain when the prosecutor then 
objected to a W.S. 7-13-301 sentence. In addition to very minor traffic offense 
charges, the presentence investigation report included reference to one 
conviction of driving while under the influence and "12/29/85, Vandalism, 
Glenrock, Wyoming, Fine suspended, damages repaired." Testimony reflected that 
conviction had not occurred since restitution was arranged for the damage caused 
in a juvenile "horsing around" occurrence. At age twenty-two, Mollman had no 
prior felony convictions, no significant misdemeanor charges except one, driving 
while under the influence, and the dismissed vandalism complaint. Justification 
for the prosecutorial veto was that the dismissed vandalism did not fit into the 
plea bargain.Sandra Gezzi, Supreme Court No. 89-275, Laramie County. 
Gezzi's husband, a Cheyenne, Wyoming businessman, was sentenced to the Wyoming 
penitentiary for delivery offenses and she was charged with writing eleven bad 
checks in an amount of $ 510.41 on a discontinued bank account. On June 23, 
1989, a plea bargain was obtained and she pled guilty to two charges, nine were 
dismissed. This is the second case where it is indicated that the W.S. 7-13-301 
status was specifically the subject of the plea bargain and, in this case, no 
W.S. 7-13-301 consideration would be given by the trial court as a condition for 
the dismissed charges and the prospective probationary sentence. On September 
15, 1989, Gezzi was sentenced to two to three years incarceration, which was 
suspended, and three years supervised probation was given. The file does not 
include the presentence investigation report so her age is indeterminate, 
although there are three minor children at home. The offenses were committed by 
economic necessity by virtue of her husband's incarceration in order to have 
food for her children. The basis of the W.S. 7-13-301 rejection was continued 
sequence of crimes over a period of time and that the subject of W.S. 7-13-301 
consideration was a specific decision in the plea bargain.Carl Kruzich, 
Supreme Court No. 90-15, Natrona County, October 12, 1988, two counts of 
delivery and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. A change of plea from 
an earlier guilty plea was entered on June 29, 1989. The plea bargain 
encompassed two years of supervised probation. On November 17, 1989, Kruzich was 
sentenced to two years supervised probation. At age thirty-five, he was a 
homeowner, had no prior record except misdemeanor driving charges, and was 
regularly employed. The reason given for the prosecutorial veto was that drug 
cases were not appropriate for W.S. 7-13-301 type treatment in the opinion of 
the prosecutor.These are only the presently appealed cases and do not 
include cases where the prosecutorial veto is used for bargaining "leverage" or, 
as in one city, the city council directed the city prosecutor to veto all 
requests as a city council determination for client direction to attorney. The 
W.S. 7-13-301 prosecutorial veto has apparently become involved in many 
sentencing decisions since enactment.

24 A poll of each of the ninety-four members of the 1987 Wyoming 
Legislature would be interesting to determine whether they were aware of any 
change and whether they knowingly voted to re-delegate prior judicial sentencing 
discretion after entry of the jury verdict or guilty plea to a prosecutorial 
right of veto over the historical structure of Wyoming law for avoidance of 
felony conviction status if the probationary term was successfully served. 
Unquestionably, there is nothing in the title to give notice to the legislator 
or to the public generally. Cf. Ex parte Hilsabeck, 477 So. 2d 472 (Ala. 
1985), Adams, J., dissenting, and Knight v. West Alabama Environmental Imp. 
Authority, 287 Ala. 15, 246 So. 2d 903 (1971), Coleman, J., dissenting.

25 The Connecticut court addressed statutory amendment compared to revision 
in recognition that an amendment contemplated change while "a revision is by its 
nature not intended to change anything, but only to restate what has already 
been legislated. * * * It is for that reason that "revisors of statutes are 
presumed not to change the law if the language which they use fairly admits of a 
construction which makes it consistent with the former statute." State v. 
Baker, 195 Conn. 598, 489 A.2d 1041, 1045 n.4 (1985) (quoting 
Bassett, 115 Conn. at 400-01), 161 A. 852.

26 Even speed readers could not be informed as to the content in the mass 
of proposed legislation unless the title adequately describes and the specific 
language provides clues. At best, eternal vigilance against both accident and 
undisclosed intent is required.

27 Any experienced legislator can cite samples and examples, but the most 
significant example occurred in the Wyoming legislature in the 1965 session when 
an Albany County legislator achieved a minor change in the state's eminent 
domain statute which effectively gave the Union Pacific Railroad a stranglehold 
and veto on future underground trona development in southern Wyoming. In the 
following session, perhaps the most heavily lobbied and most changes in the 
state's history occurred in reversal of the minor 1965 provision of Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 35 (1965). H.B. 208, 39th Leg. (1967), co-sponsored by the late 
Governor of the State of Wyoming, Ed Herschler, present United States Senator 
Alan K. Simpson, and Republican leader Harold Hellbaum, produced monumental 
expenditures in support and opposition, but when passed as Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
244 (1967), became the inducement for a billion dollar trona mining industry in 
Sweetwater County. In 1965, the statutory change was "housekeeping." In 1967, it 
was a million dollar investment in legislative effort correction.

28 It is interesting to speculate if the amending Senate committee had 
known what they were being asked to do and had consequently inserted that 
subject, "providing a veto of the judicial discretion for sentencing to grant 
status to the prosecution to demand commission of a felony status first 
offender," in the title of the bill to provide a properly completed amendment 
whether consideration and approval of the ultimate legislation would have 
differed, either in the Senate committee or later during the enactment process 
with floor debate.