Title: Dunlap v. State Farm

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE,

IN RE APPEAL OF DUNLAP V. —)

STATE FARM FIRE AND ) No. 504, 2007
CASUALTY COMPANY )

DISQUALIFICATION OF ) Court Below: Superior Court
COUNSEL. ) of the State of Delaware in

) and for New Castle County
) C.A. No, 03C-12-168

Submitted: April 16, 2008
Decided: May 6, 2008

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 6" day May 2008, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Appellant Daniel V. Folt appeals a Superior Court judge's sua sponte

 

ruling disqualifying him as defense trial counsel in a case arising from a motor

vehicle accident in 1998 that left Anne Dunlap seriously injured. Folt acted as lead

 

trial counsel for State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the Dunlaps” automobile
insurer. At the end of an August 3, 2007 opinion ruling on several pending
‘motions, the trial judge sua sponte disqualified Folt. State Farm and Folt requested
reargument of the disqualification order. ‘The trial judge denied the request in a
September 7, 2007 opinion, Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42 and the

independent standing conferred upon counsel in In re Infotechnology, Folt timely

582 A.2d 215, 217-218 (Del. 1990).
applied for an interlocutory appeal. The case settled, in the interim, however,
mooting this appeal. Given the seriousness of the issue to Delaware lawyers and
the lack of any other means of review, however, we will look to the public interest
‘exception to mootness and act on Folt’s appeal.”

(2) We review “matters affecting governance of the Bar” de novo?
Although a court has “the inherent power to supervise the professional conduct of
attorneys appearing before it... disqualification motions are generally
disfavored.” A motion to disqualify must contain clear and convincing evidence
establishing a violation of the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct so extreme
that it calls into question the faimess or the efficiency of the administration of
justice.’ “Vague and unsupported allegations are not sufficient to meet this
[disqualification] standard.”

(3) This case, however, perplexes us as: (I) no motion was made to

disqual

 

Folt; (2) Folt had no notice that the trial judge had disqualification under

consideration; and, (3) itis impossible to review the decision under any standard

® MeDermou Inc. v. Lewis, $31 A.2d 206, 211-12 (1987).

* Infotechnology, $82 A.2d at 218,

* Unanue v. Unanue, 2004 WL 602096, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 2004).

* Inve Waters, 647 A.24 1091, 1095-96 (Del. 1994); Infotechnology, S82 A.2d at 221.

© Unamwe, 2004 WL 602096, at *2 (citing Elonex LP. Holdings, Lid. v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
142 F. Supp. 24 579, $81 (D. Del. 2001).
of review because the trial judge specified no factual basis for his decision to
disqualify Folt. In his August3, 2007 opinion and his decision denying
reargument on September 7, 2007, the trial judge provided no specific instances of
misconduct upon which he disqualified Folt. The trial judge based his decision
more generally on strong language, loss of professional detachment in vigorous
advocacy, hostility, and the expression of intense personal feelings. He declined to
specify, writing that “{tJo repeat that language here is to compound the wrong.”
On reconsideration, he did not elaborate on the particulars.

(4) We fully understand the trial judge's reluctance to elaborate and
provide more details in the public record that may serve to exacerbate an
unfortunate situation, The trial judge no doubt viewed his reticence to be
beneficial to Folt and the profession generally. Nevertheless, disqualifying Folt
without preserving the reasons for review led to an inadequate record that allows
unfair speculation about the egregiousness of any conduct, Trial judges must
expound on the reasons for their decision to disqualify counsel and provide a basis,
for review either in a written opinion or on the record in a bench ruling, no matter
how distasteful the circumstances. In this case, we are compelled to conclude the
trial judge’s reluctance to specify the factual basis for misconduct that led to Folt’s

disqualification constituted legal error.
NOW, THEREFORE, we remand and instruct the Superior Court to enter an.
order vacating Folt’s disqualification.
BY THE COURT:

(si Myron T,
Chief Justice

le