Title: Haddenham v. Board of County Com'rs of Carbon County

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Haddenham v. Board of County Com'rs of Carbon County1984 WY 38679 P.2d 429Case Number: 83-174Decided: 04/11/1984D.N. HADDENHAM, D/B/A B & D DISTRIBUTORS, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF CARBON, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
D.N. HADDENHAM, D/B/A B 
& D DISTRIBUTORS, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

THE BOARD OF 
COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF CARBON, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Edwin V. 
Newcomer of Schaefer & Newcomer, Laramie, for appellant.

K. Craig 
Williams, DeputyCounty and Pros. Atty., CarbonCounty, Rawlins, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals from 
a denial of his request for a judgment declaring unenforceable a resolution1 by appellee containing a more 
comprehensive restriction on the sale of fireworks than is contained in the 
state statutes.2 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant is in the 
business of selling fireworks at retail. He was able to carry on such business 
in CarbonCounty under the state 
statutes inasmuch as sale of only the larger fireworks is prohibited by such 
statutes. He could not do so under the resolution adopted by appellee. He words 
the issues on appeal as follows:

A. "HAS THE STATE OF 
WYOMING PREMPTED [sic] THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CARBON COUNTY FROM 
PASSING LEGISLATION CONCERNING FIREWORKS?"

B. "IS THERE A CONFLICT 
BETWEEN `FIREWORKS' AS DEFINED BY THE UNIFORM FIRE CODE AND ADOPTED BY THE BOARD 
OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF CARBONCOUNTY 
AND `FIREWORKS' AS DEFINED BY THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN WYOMING STATUTE SECTION 
35-10-201(a) AMENDED 1983?"

PREEMPTION

[¶4.]     In his Decision Letter 
in this case, the district court judge (the Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum) 
properly stated the law on this issue as follows:

"* * * It is generally 
recognized that a local government may pass laws which go beyond a state statute 
governing the same subject as long as the local law is not in direct conflict 
with the statute and the legislature has not preempted the regulation of the 
field. The mere fact that the local law goes beyond the state statute, in 
requiring more than the statute, is permissible as long as the two can co-exist 
together and the local law does not contravene the intent and purpose of the 
statute.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * [T]he general rule 
is that where a local law merely enlarges upon the provisions of a state statute 
by having stricter requirements than the statute, there is no conflict between 
the two where the legislature has not preempted regulation of the field. That is 
the case here. The Board of County Commissioners of CarbonCounty has passed a resolution banning the 
sale or possession of fireworks in the county. The resolution merely goes beyond 
the requirements of state law on the subject and there is clearly no state 
preemption in the field. Absent such a showing, the resolution must be allowed 
to stand."

[¶5.]     In support thereof the 
trial judge quoted from or summarized the following cases: Broward County v. Fort Lauderdale Christian 
School, Fla.App., 366 So. 2d 1264 (1979); Klimek v. Town of Ghent, Columbia County, 
71 A.D.2d 359, 423 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1979); Belle v. Town Board of Town of Onondaga, 
61 A.D.2d 352, 402 N YS.2d 677 (1978); Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 532 P.2d 1292 (1975); Leavenworth Club Owners 
Association v. Atchison, 208 Kan. 318, 492 P.2d 183, 51 A.L.R.3d 1054 
(1971); City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 81 
N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917 (App. 1970). He quoted the following from 56 Am.Jur.2d, 
Municipal Corporations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions, § 374, in 
summary of the issue:

"`The mere fact that the 
state, in the exercise of the police power, has made certain regulations does 
not prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So long as 
there is no conflict between the two, and the requirements of the municipal 
ordinance are not in themselves pernicious, as being unreasonable or 
discriminatory, both will stand. The fact 
that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requiring more 
than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith unless the statute 
limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescription. Thus, where both 
an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory, and the only difference between them 
is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the 
prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to 
authorize by the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid when the 
legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the 
provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist 
and be effective. Unless legislative provisions are not contradictory in the 
sense that they cannot coexist, they are not deemed inconsistent because of mere 
lack of uniformity in detail.' * * * (Emphasis supplied.)"

[¶6.]     In Haddenham v. City of Laramie, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 (1982), we confirmed the authority of 
a city to pass an ordinance more restrictive, with reference to sale, etc., of 
fireworks, than the state statute. We said at :

"* * * The Ordinance is 
not subject to, subordinate to or subservient to §§ 35-10-201 through 35-10-207. 
It concerns that deliberately excluded from such sections. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶7.]     Although appellant's 
argument is directed at preemption and, thus, accepts the premise that appellee 
had the power to adopt the resolution, we note that a county is a political or 
civil division of the state created to aid in the administration of government 
and is not a sovereign entity, State v. 
Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 456 (1982), 
and that they have only the powers expressly granted by statute or reasonably 
implied from powers granted. Hyde v. 
Board of Commissioners of ConverseCounty, 47 Wyo. 101, 31 P.2d 75 
(1934).

[¶8.]     The statutes have 
either expressly granted the power to counties to control fires and fireworks 
for public health and safety, or such may reasonably be implied from that which 
is granted. Section 18-2-101(a)(v), W.S. 1977, authorizes counties to "exercise 
other powers as provided by law." Section 18-3-509, W.S. 1977, authorizes the 
board of county commissioners to provide fire protection for persons and 
property within the boundaries of the county. In 1973, the legislature 
established the Department of Fire Prevention and Electrical Safety and gave it 
the power to, among other things, adopt rules and regulations to provide 
standards for fire prevention. Sections 35-9-101 through 35-9-140, W.S. 1977. 
Section 35-9-110(a) specifically directs adoption of rules and regulations 
to:

"(vi) Allow any 
municipality or county to adopt and enforce local minimum fire prevention and 
building energy conservation standards which are not less stringent than state 
standards or enforce state standards."

Recognition of 
power in the board of county commissioners to control fireworks is also implied 
from the authorization given it to:

"* * * grant permits, 
within the area under its jurisdiction, for supervised public displays of 
fireworks by individuals, municipalities, amusement parks and other 
organizations and groups, and to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for the 
granting of such permits. * * *" Section 35-10-203(a), W.S. 
1977.

[¶9.]     The state statutes did 
not prevent appellee from adopting the fireworks 
resolution.

STATUTORY 
CONFLICT

[¶10.]  Appellant argues that inasmuch as the 
Department of Fire Prevention and Electrical Safety (a state agency) adopted the 
Uniform Fire Code which defines fireworks more stringently than does § 
35-10-201, there exists a conflict in state law.

[¶11.]  We have already noted that appellee's 
resolution adopted the definition of fireworks as set out in the Uniform Fire 
Code. If there is indeed a conflict in state law, between the Uniform Fire Code 
and § 35-10-201, it would not be relevant to the disposition of this case. 
Appellee's resolution is valid under either the Uniform Fire Code or § 
35-10-201, the former because they are identical, the latter because of the 
reasons stated above.

[¶12.]  Appellant cites no law, other than the 
statutes themselves, in connection with this argument. We do not consider or 
respond to issues alleging error which are not supported by cogent argument and 
proper citation of authority or which are not clearly defined. Knadler v. Adams, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1052 (1983); Young v. Hawks, 
Wyo., 624 P.2d 235 (1981).

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Resolution No. 1981-8 
adopted provisions of the Uniform Fire Code, which in effect barred possession, 
sale, etc., of fireworks and which defined fireworks as 
follows:

"Fireworks is any 
combustible or explosive composition, or any substance or combination of 
substances, or device prepared for the purpose of producing a visible or an 
audible effect by combustion, explosion, deflagration or detonation, and shall 
include blank cartridges, toy pistols, toy cannons, toy canes or toy guns in 
which explosives are used, firecrackers, torpedoes, sky-rockets, Roman candles, 
Daygo bombs, sparklers or other devices of like construction and any devices 
containing any explosive or flammable compound, or any tablet or other device 
containing an explosive substance, except that the term `fireworks' shall not 
include any auto flares, paper caps containing not in excess of an average of 
twenty-five hundredths of a grain of explosive content per cap and toy pistols, 
toy canes, toy guns or other devices for use of such caps, the sale and use of 
which shall be permitted at all times."

2 By statute, Wyoming prohibits 
possession, sale, etc., of fireworks, which are defined as follows in § 
35-10-201, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1983:

"`Fireworks' means any 
article, device or substance prepared for the primary purpose of producing a 
visual or auditory sensation by combustion, explosion, deflagration or 
detonation including without limitation, the following articles and devices 
commonly known and used as fireworks, toy cannons or toy canes in which 
explosives are used, blank cartridges, firecrackers, torpedoes, skyrockets and 
Roman candles. Fireworks shall not include any item which may be sold or offered 
for sale under 15 U.S.C. § 1261, 21 U.S.C. § 371 and 16 C.F.R., Commercial 
Practices, part 1507."