Title: State v. Perry

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: September 30, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON
Respondent
on Review,
v.
JUSTIN CLARK PERRY,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
03-06-33108: CA A125135: SC S055142)
En Banc
On review from
the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and
submitted March 5, 2008.
Daniel J. Casey,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
David B.
Thompson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed
the brief for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of
the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from
Multnomah County Circuit Court. Marilyn
Litzenberger, Judge. 213 Or App 391,
161 P3d 955 (2007).
GILLETTE,
J.
Defendant
was charged with various crimes based on a child's report that defendant had sexually
abused her.  The report was made several months after the crimes allegedly had occurred. 
At defendant's trial, the court permitted an expert witness for the state to
testify about a phenomenon known as "delayed reporting."(1)
 The expert testified that children who have been sexually abused often delay
in reporting that abuse.  The testimony was intended to rebut an inference that
defendant sought to have the jury draw that the child's failure to report
defendant's alleged acts of abuse immediately indicated that the abuse never had
happened.  After a jury convicted him of all charges, defendant appealed to the
Court of Appeals, claiming that admission of the expert's testimony about
delayed reporting was reversible error.  The Court of Appeals affirmed without
opinion.  State v. Perry, 213 Or App 391, 161 P3d 955 (2007).  We
allowed defendant's petition for review and now affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.
The
facts essential to the legal issue on review are not in dispute.  Early in
2002, defendant and his wife agreed to serve as foster parents for the wife's
10-year-old niece (victim) and her eight-year-old brother.  In February 2002,
the two children moved into the couple's Northeast Portland home.
Nothing
occurred to raise questions about the placement of the children until December
2002, when the victim and her brother attended a Christmas party that was held
by the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) for foster children and their
families.  The victim's biological father was there, and victim was able to
converse with him without supervision.  In the course of their conversation, the
victim reported to her father that defendant had touched her sexually on
numerous occasions some months previously and that she did not want to return
to defendant's home.  The victim repeated her story to a DHS caseworker who, in
turn, arranged to have her evaluated by an organization known as Child Abuse
Response and Evaluation Services (CARES).
CARES
personnel who examined the victim found no physical evidence of sexual abuse
but concluded, nonetheless, that her report of sexual abuse was credible.  Based
on the victim's report, defendant thereafter was charged with one count of
unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree, one count of sodomy in the
first degree, and nine counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.
Before
his trial on the foregoing charges, defendant filed two motions in limine
challenging the admissibility of certain expert testimony that the state
intended to introduce.  Although the actual motions are not in the trial court
file, we can determine from the transcript that one motion sought to limit
expert testimony respecting the phenomenon known as "delayed
reporting" by sexually abused children -- the subject at the heart of this
case.  The other motion is not pertinent to our inquiry.
In
an OEC 104(2)
hearing held in response to defendant's motions in limine, the state's expert,
Dr. Keltner, answered questions about her intended testimony at trial.  She
testified that she was the medical director of CARES Northwest and held various
advanced degrees, including an M.D. and a Ph.D. in biometry; that the medical
profession recognizes a medical diagnosis of child sexual abuse; that CARES
uses a widely accepted medical model for child sexual abuse assessment; that
CARES examiners and interviewers receive extensive specialized training; and
that there are specialized journals and other peer reviewed literature devoted
to the subject of child sexual abuse.  Keltner acknowledged that "we do
not do scientifically case-controlled research" in the area of child sexual
abuse, but noted that the same was true for a "majority of medical
processes."(3)
The
prosecutor questioned Keltner about a phenomenon known as "delayed reporting"
by child victims of sexual abuse.  Keltner testified that such a phenomenon was
"common" and "well understood," and that there was a body
of literature dealing with the issue.  Keltner also testified that a separate CARES
study of delayed reporting, although not peer reviewed, was consistent with the
"national experience" as reported in the literature(4) -- i.e., that, in
cases of children with "abnormal [physical] exams," there was a delay
in reporting in a majority of those cases.  
On
cross-examination, Keltner acknowledged that there was no way to determine
whether any particular child who delays a report of sexual abuse is telling the
truth.  She testified, however, that people in the field "do understand
that disclosure is a process and that [the] first part of the process is
denial."  She also stated that, according to "studies looking at
false allegations in children[,] * * * the thing they're most likely to lie
about is that abuse did not occur rather than lying falsely about abuse
occurring."  
Thereafter,
the prosecutor argued that the state had established a foundation for admitting
Keltner's testimony "to explain the delay in reporting."  In
response, defendant argued that Keltner's testimony regarding delayed reporting
was inadmissible on three grounds -- (1) it was not scientifically valid under
the multifactor analysis described in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 687
P2d 751 (1984) and State v. O'Key, 321 Or 285, 899 P2d 663 (1995); (2)
it was irrelevant; and (3) it was unfairly prejudicial.  Defendant noted that
Keltner had admitted that there was no scientifically controlled research on
the issue of delayed reporting and, thus, "no way to test the rate of
error."  Defendant also noted that Keltner 
"didn't give any evidence that this * * * really what
is syndrome evidence about delayed reporting, she cited no specific literature
to support that.  She said something about when children have abnormal exams
showing abuse that 90 percent of the time they delay in reporting.  But I don't
think that's enough."
Finally,
defendant argued that the delayed reporting testimony was irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial because "the state ha[d] failed to establish any link
between this child and a delay in reporting, only that children tend to delay
in reporting."
Ultimately,
the trial court rejected defendant's objections and ruled that Keltner could
testify "with respect to the scientific validity of delayed reporting as a
characteristic of sexual abuse."  The court's ruling took place in this
brief colloquy:
"[THE COURT:]  Defense Motion in Limine No.
2, whether the expert is qualified, we already said that the expert is
qualified.  Whether the expert can give testimony with respect to the
scientific validity of delayed reporting as a characteristic of sexual abuse, I
will allow that testimony based on the references to the literature, the peer
review of cases that are done both nationally -- or nationally and here
locally.
"I think it's the type of evidence that --
I think the testimony has established that it's the type of evidence that is
found to be scientifically valid within the group of people who specialize in
this area.
"Having said that, I would have expected to
have a little more detail in the -- in the presentation with respect to [the]
delayed reporting phenomen[on] itself.
"[THE
PROSECUTOR:]  I'm sorry?
"[THE COURT:]  I would have expected to
have a little more detail with respect to delayed reporting as a characteristic
of this phenomenon.  And specifically we didn't hear any testimony about what
constitutes delayed reporting.  Is it an hour, is it a day, is it a month, is
it a year, is it ten years, what is it?
"[THE PROSECUTOR:]  I will certainly flesh
that out.
"[THE COURT:]  All right.  So I would expect
that.  So I'm -- as I said, I'm going to allow that testimony."
As
that colloquy reveals, the trial court's ruling was conditional in nature: 
Keltner could testify, but the trial judge expected her to explain more fully
what "delayed reporting" was.  Moreover, her testimony remained
subject to any specific objections that defendant might make at trial.  Also
implicit in the court's ruling was the idea that defendant could move for a
limiting instruction on the uses that the jury could make of the testimony.
The
case proceeded to trial before a jury.  In its case-in-chief, the state
presented the victim's testimony, together with a videotape of an interview of the
victim by CARES personnel.  It also presented testimony from several other
witnesses, including Keltner.  Defendant took the stand and denied any
wrongdoing.  The jury convicted him of all charges, and these appellate
proceedings ensued.
We
emphasize the limited nature of the issue before us in this case.  Defendant
does not assign error to any ruling made by the trial court after the jury was
empanelled and sworn.  (Defendant made only a single objection during Keltner's
testimony at trial, and he does not assign error to the ruling on that
objection.)  Instead, defendant rests his arguments entirely on the trial court's
rulings at the conclusion of the OEC 104 hearing.  Defendant's strategy is a
permissible one, of course, but it highlights both the utility and the limits to
the utility of motions in limine:  A general ruling that a certain
type of evidence (even scientific evidence) is minimally relevant under OEC 401(5)
and OEC 702(6)
does not relieve a party of the obligation to make specific objections to discrete
pieces of that evidence at trial, if the dynamics of the trial process reveal other
grounds for objection.
We
turn, then, to the three arguments that defendant made at the close of the OEC
104 hearing.  As noted, they were that (1) Keltner's testimony did not meet the
legal test for "scientific" evidence; (2) the evidence was not
relevant; and (3) the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.  We address the latter
two arguments first.  In doing so, we add the following contextual
observation:  Much of defendant's argument, both at the OEC 104 hearing and to
this court, consists of asserting that Keltner's delayed reporting testimony
was being offered to show that the victim's delayed reporting affirmatively
established that the victim had been sexually abused.  
In
considering that argument, however, two things must be kept in mind:  (1) Because
defendant's case was built, in part, on the proposition that the victim's delay
in reporting gave rise to an inference that she had not been abused,
Keltner's testimony served a legitimate purpose -- to show that there was a
scientific basis for rejecting that proposition -- i.e., a treating
health care professional would not necessarily view the delay as a reason to
discount the victim's story.  (2) Even if, at the OEC 104 hearing, Keltner
characterized delayed reporting as a normal "part of the disclosure
process" and in other ways suggested through her testimony that delayed
reporting might have some affirmative diagnostic value, she never stated that
delayed reporting was affirmatively probative of whether sexual abuse actually
had occurred.  In fact, she specifically conceded that delayed reporting itself
was not a diagnostic tool in that regard.(7) 
In light of those facts, we think that it was defendant's responsibility to
point out to the trial court -- either by means of some generalized
discussion of the matter at the OEC 104 hearing or by means of specific
objections at trial -- the line between testimony that tended to rebut defendant's
theory that the victim's delayed reporting was affirmative evidence of
fabrication and testimony that instead presented delayed reporting as
affirmative evidence of abuse.  Defendant did not do that, and did not make
distinct arguments about the relevance, unfair prejudice, and scientific
validity of the two kinds of evidence.  
With
those points in mind, we turn first to the OEC 401 issue, i.e., the
issue of relevance.  As noted, defendant's theory of the case was that the
victim was fabricating.  One part of that theory was that a trier of fact could
infer that the victim's delay in reporting tended to show that the events about
which the victim testified had never happened.  But Keltner's testimony that
similar delayed reporting often is seen in verified cases of child sexual abuse
tended to counter that inference.  The testimony was relevant in that respect
at least, i.e., it had some "tendency to make the existence of [a]
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable."  OEC 401.  
It
could be argued from this record that the state had a further purpose in mind: 
In the OEC 104 hearing, the prosecutor stated that the evidence should be
admitted because it was "an important piece of the diagnostic process." 
But the existence of that second purpose -- if, in fact, it did exist -- adds
nothing to the inquiry whether Keltner's testimony could be admitted for the
reason already discussed:  If defendant was attempting to make something of the
victim's delay in reporting (and he was), then the state was entitled to meet
that argument.  If the state sought to elicit the testimony for a different
purpose as well, then defendant was free to object to Keltner's testimony on
that more limited basis.  See, e.g., State v. Camarena,
344 Or 28, 33 n 3, 176 P3d 380 (2008) (objection to evidence as a whole not
basis for reversal, if some of evidence was admissible).  He did not do so. 
Defendant also was free to seek an appropriate limiting instruction.  But,
again, he did not.(8) 
If defendant thought that Keltner was adding a different (and irrelevant)
"spin" to the relevant facts that she was reporting, then it was for
the defendant to point that out and to seek to limit her testimony.  The trial
court did not err in ruling that, in this context, Keltner's testimony was
relevant.
Neither,
in our view, did the trial court demonstrably err in ruling that Keltner's
testimony did not violate OEC 403.(9)
 That is, the court was entitled, on this record, to rule that the probative
value of Keltner's testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice or confusion.  We already have established that the testimony
was relevant in that it challenged defendant's theory that the victim's delayed
reporting affirmatively indicated that her report was a fabrication.   But
defendant contends that the testimony posed a substantial danger of unfair
prejudice -- the likelihood that jurors would find that the complainant
in fact was abused simply because she waited to make her allegations.   
In
our view, that danger of unfair prejudice is not inherent in the central thesis
of Keltner's testimony that delayed reporting is common in verified cases of
child sexual abuse.  And, if defendant was of the view that Keltner was embellishing
that central thesis in a way that was unfairly prejudicial -- by
suggesting that delayed reporting actually might be an indicator of sexual
abuse -- then defendant should have made it clear to the court that he was
objecting to that embellishment.  Defendant did not do that.  Again, we reject
defendant's claim of error.
Finally,
we turn to defendant's contention that Keltner's opinion testimony given at the
OEC 104 hearing was not admissible as scientific evidence.  Defendant argues
that the state failed to establish that Keltner's delayed disclosure testimony
met the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence described in State
v. Brown, 297 Or at 417, and State v. O'Key, 321 Or at 303-05.
There
is no real dispute with regard to the underlying premise of defendant's
argument -- that the testimony was offered as "scientific evidence" and
therefore requires a Brown foundation to be admissible.  Instead, the
state acknowledges that State v. Marrington, 335 Or 555, 73 P3d 911 (2003),
establishes defendant's premise.  In Marrington, this court held that an
expert's testimony that delay in reporting "is a prevalent characteristic
of sexually abused children" would be perceived as scientific evidence by a
trier of fact and, as such, must be shown to be scientifically valid before it
is admissible.  Id. at 506.  In deciding that point, this court focused
on the fact that the expert in that case had presented herself as having a
scientific background and had claimed that her knowledge was based on science:
"An expert * * * who has a background in
behavioral sciences and who claims that her knowledge is based on studies,
research, and the literature in the field, announces to the factfinder that the
basis of her testimony is 'scientific,' i.e., is grounded on conclusions
that have been reached through application of a scientific method to collected
data.  Because that is how the factfinder would understand it, a court has a
duty to ensure that such information possesses the necessary indices of
scientific validity."
Id. at
563-64.  As our summary of Keltner's testimony in the OEC 104 hearing makes
clear, she similarly was presenting herself as an expert in her field whose
knowledge was based, at least in part, on studies, research, and scientific
literature.  Consequently, her testimony regarding delayed disclosure is
scientific evidence and must comply with the standard described in Brown
and O'Key for admission of such evidence.
Under
Brown and O'Key, scientific evidence is admissible if it is
relevant under OEC 401,(10)
helpful to the trier of fact under OEC 702,(11)
and not subject to exclusion under OEC 403.(12) 
Brown, 297 Or at 409; O'Key, 321 Or at 297-99.  Underpinning the
entire admissibility analysis, however, is the requirement that the evidence be
shown to be scientifically valid.  See Marcum v. Adventist Health
System/West, 345 Or 237, 245, 193 P3d 1 (2008) (so holding); O'Key,
321 Or at 301 n 19 ("scientific validity [is] the linchpin of
admissibility").  To determine that issue, and depending on the nature of
the evidence in question, a court may be required to consider a number of
factors, including:
"(1) The technique's general acceptance in the field;
"(2) The expert's qualifications and stature; 
"(3) The use which has been made of the technique;
"(4) The potential rate of error;
"(5) The existence of specialized literature;
"(6) The novelty of the invention; and
"(7) The extent to which the technique relies on the
subjective interpretation of the expert."
Brown,
297 Or at 417.(13)
In
considering the question of scientific validity (which generally is resolved as
a preliminary fact question in an OEC 104 hearing, as it was in this case),
courts must bear in mind that the foregoing factors are not exclusive and are
not to be used as a mechanical checklist requiring an affirmative finding with
respect to each factor.  O'Key, 321 Or at 300.  Whatever factors may be
relevant in a particular case, the party offering the scientific evidence at
issue (in the present case, the state) has the burden of establishing that it
is scientifically valid.
Before
applying the multifactor test to the evidence in question, it is important to restate
the purpose for which the scientific evidence was offered.  As we already have
noted, the core of Keltner's testimony was her assertion that delayed reporting
often occurs in children who verifiably have been sexually abused.  Defendant
had signaled his intention to defend on the theory that the victim was
fabricating and that her delay in reporting was evidence of that fabrication.  As
we have explained, the most obvious (and permissible) function of Keltner's
testimony was to contradict defendant's claim that delay in reporting demonstrated
fabrication.  
Turning
to defendant's arguments under the multifactor test, the state argues that
defendant did not preserve his present "scientific foundation"
argument in its entirety because, in the OEC 104 hearing, he addressed only two
of the five Brown factors -- the "potential rate of error" and
the existence of a "specialized literature" -- on which he now relies. 
The state asserts that, because defendant did not alert the trial court that he
had concerns about the sufficiency of the state's scientific foundational
evidence with regard to other factors, we should not consider those factors in
our Brown analysis.
In
general, we agree with the premise of the state's argument:  In multifactor
foundation cases like the present one, for example, the trial court reasonably
might assume that some factors are not in dispute if no one mentioned them.  However,
we think that defendant's arguments in this case were not as the state
perceives.  When considered in the context of defense counsel's
cross-examination of Keltner at the OEC 104 hearing, we think that defendant's
arguments at least should have alerted the trial court that two other Brown
factors -- the "general acceptance of [the technique] in the field"
and "use which has been made of the theory" -- were implicated.  That
is as far, however, as the arguments that defendant made fairly may be said to
reach.(14) 
We turn, then, to the relevant Brown factors.  In assessing those
factors, we rely on the evidence presented at the OEC 104 hearing.(15)
General Acceptance in the Field. 
We note at the outset that Keltner's credentials as an expert are unchallenged,
and her qualification to give scientific evidence in her field is unassailable. 
Instead, we focus on the narrower issue whether her testimony concerning
delayed reporting was itself scientific.  The first factor that we consider is
"the theory's general acceptance in the field."  Keltner testified
that the phenomenon of delayed reporting in sexually abused children was a
"fairly well understood topic" and that "the idea that when
children report abuse * * * that [it] * * * is a process and not a single event
* * * is well understood."  From that testimony by that witness, the trial
judge could conclude that there was general agreement in the field that delayed
reporting by a child was not inconsistent with the child's having been sexually
abused.  That criterion -- to the extent it was applicable -- was met.
The Use Which Has Been Made of
the Technique.  As we have discussed, we assess Keltner's testimony on the
assumption that it was relevant to show that experts in the field would not necessarily
regard the evidence of delayed reporting as proving that the victim had not
been abused.  So understood, Keltner's testimony was not really about a
"technique" or its "use."  This criterion thus is
inapposite in the context of this case.
The Potential Rate of Error.  This
criterion has limited utility in the context of this case for two reasons: 
First, as already noted, controlled studies are not possible.  See ___
Or at ___ n 3 (slip op at 3 n 3).  Lack of controlled studies is not, in any
event, an absolute bar to the admission of expert testimony by qualified
clinicians, which was the kind of testimony Keltner gave.  See Marcum,
345 Or at 252 (so stating); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 331 Or
285, 305-06, 14 P3d 596 (2000) (so holding respecting differential diagnosis by
treating physician).  That means that other factors must play a more
significant role.  Second, given the permissible use of the evidence to counter
defendant's factual theory about delayed reporting, a "rate of error"
in that respect is difficult to postulate.  
Even
assuming, however, that numbers are relevant, Keltner gave evidence respecting
numbers.  She repeatedly stated that sexually abused children commonly delay in
reporting, but further acknowledged that "a small percentage * * * report
immediately."(16) 
She also acknowledged that there were studies that show that children sometimes
lie, but she then stated that "the thing they're most likely to lie about
is that abuse did not occur rather than lying falsely about abuse
occurring."  Keltner did not identify the "studies" to which she
referred and did not offer any statistical analysis of the prevalence of
delayed false accusations.  Defendant, for his part, did not ask for
verification or challenge her assertion, as an expert, that such studies
existed.  As noted, however, Keltner did agree with defense counsel, on
cross-examination, that there was no way to distinguish a false delayed report
from a true delayed report, in the absence of physical evidence or other corroboration.
The
state contends that Keltner's acknowledgment in no way detracts from the thrust
of Keltner's testimony that delayed disclosure is not a factor that would lead
a professional to rule out the possibility that a child had been
molested sexually.  The state notes that Keltner's narrow assertion is entirely
verifiable and, in fact, has been verified by the "Sorenson and
Snow" study that Keltner mentioned (and which, according to Keltner, found
that, out of a group of "confirmed" victims of sexual abuse, 72
percent delayed in disclosing).  We agree with the state.  Keltner's assertions
were admissible for the purpose that the state describes, and the trial court
did not err in so ruling.  
The Existence of a Specialized
Literature.   At the OEC 104 hearing, Keltner responded affirmatively when
the prosecutor asked if there has been specialized, peer reviewed literature
devoted to the issue of delayed disclosure.  She testified that
"what the literature looks like if you're looking at
national studies, for example, there was one by -- done by Sorenson and Snow in
the early '90s, but really well done, and I continue to use it as a reference. 
They found that 72 percent of the children that they evaluated initially denied
abuse.   
"And since that time, others have spent
more studies actually looking at adults who are known to have been abused as
children or raped as children, and again, what you find is even adults looking
back at their abuse as children, that very large percentages never reported,
never disclosed it, and that those that do disclose tend to delay in their
disclosure."
Keltner later
clarified that the Sorenson and Snow study looked at cases that were confirmed
by means of an abnormal physical examination, perpetrator confession, or
perpetrator conviction, and that it looked at both delayed disclosures and
initial denials.  The factors of abnormal physical examination, perpetrator
confession, and perpetrator conviction were used as objective verifiers in the
study.  Keltner obviously assumed that the study paralleled the situation in
cases that lacked those objective verifiers, and defendant does not argue even
now that the study was irrelevant because, for example, the present case
involves neither an abnormal physical examination nor a confession.(17)  Keltner also
referred to "studies" and "the literature" in various other
contexts, but was not asked to provide more detail.  Keltner's testimony on the
point thus was scanty, but it was sufficient to permit the trial judge to be
satisfied that this criterion had been met.
Other Factors.  Brown
refers to two additional factors -- the novelty of the technique and the
"extent to which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of
the expert."  Brown, 297 Or at 417.  Keltner was not cross-examined
about those factors, and defendant does not attempt to make a separate issue respecting
either or both of them here.  Even were he to do so, however, the trial court
was entitled to find from Keltner's testimony that the state's particular use
of the phenomenon of delayed reporting was not unduly novel and did not rely
improperly on the subjective interpretation of the expert.
Having
completed our consideration of the Brown factors as they apply to the
state's proffered evidence of the delayed reporting phenomenon presented in the
OEC 104 hearing, we conclude that, on the record before it, the trial court was
entitled to determine that Keltner's testimony about the delayed reporting
phenomenon survived the objections to it that were made at that hearing,
subject to qualifications that defendant did not later choose to raise at trial. 
There was no reversible error.
The
decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. We
understand from the testimony that "delayed reporting" is the label
used by professionals in the field to describe a situation in which a sexually
abused child does not report an abusive event immediately but, instead, reports
it some time later.
2. Oregon
Evidence Code (OEC) Rule 104 provides, in part:
"(1)  Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subsection (2) of this section.  In making its determination the
court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges.
"(2)  When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
3. Keltner
explained that no true controlled studies would be possible within the bounds
of medical ethics:  Dividing children into two groups and then intentionally
abusing one of the groups would be a perversion of science of Orwellian
proportions.  
4. Keltner
referred in particular to a study "done by Sorenson and Snow in the early
90s," which "found that 72 percent of the children that they
evaluated [who had been sexually abused] initially denied abuse." 
5. OEC
401 provides:
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."
6. OEC
702 provides:
"If
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
7. Defendant's
counsel asked Keltner the following questions, among others, and received the
following answers:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  In a situation where
you don't have a confession --
"[THE WITNESS:]  Yes.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  -- and you don't have
an abnormal [physical] exam and you don't have a -- a verdict at trial, there
is no way to distinguish between someone who has delayed in reporting who is
telling the truth and someone who's delayed in reporting [who] is not telling
the truth?
"[THE WITNESS:]  There is no single test
that can give you a hundred percent validity and reliability. * * *
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  But there's no test at
all, right, Doctor?
"[THE WITNESS:]  * * * [Y]ou are correct,
there's no --
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  You said there's no
100 percent test, but there's no way to tell at all, is there, under the
hypothesis I've given you?
"[THE WITNESS:]  No. * * *"
Thereafter, defense counsel asked one other important
question:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  * * * [W]hat [another
recognized expert] says is that this syndrome [of delayed reporting] is not a
diagnosis but a -- but a counseling tool; is that right?
"[THE WITNESS:]  Correct. * * *"
8. The
trial court's ruling was not a model of clarity, mentioning, as it did,
"delayed reporting as a characteristic of sexual abuse."  But the
ruling also was correct at least in part -- as we have explained -- and defense
counsel was left with the awkward necessity of accepting the outcome or
pursuing clarification.  We are not called on in this case to decide whether
the "delayed reporting" phenomenon ever would be admissible as a
characteristic of a diagnosis of "sexual abuse."  Respecting the
testimonial use of that diagnosis, see State v. Southard, 347 Or
___, ___ P3d ___ (2009) (decided this date).
9. OEC
403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
10. OEC
401 is set out above at note 5, ___ Or at ___ n 5 (slip op at 7 n 5). 
11. OEC
702 is set out above at note 6, ___ Or at ___ n 6 (slip op at 7 n 6). 
Generally, scientific evidence will assist the trier of fact if it is
scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue.
12. OEC
403 is set out above at note 9, ___ Or at ___ n 9 (slip op at 11 n 9).
13. As
noted, those factors for analyzing scientific validity initially were set out
in Brown.  This court expanded on them in O'Key, adopting, as
"an appropriate further development," the logic and a slightly
different formulation of the factors articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579, 113 S Ct
2786, 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993).  O'Key, 321 Or at 306.  For the purposes
of our analysis in this case, the distinction between the two sets of standards
is not significant.
14. Of
course, the trial court was free to address all the Brown factors if it
wished to do so.  We merely observe here that, where a trial court has ruled
that certain evidence is admissible as "scientific evidence," a party
ordinarily may not predicate a claim of reversible error on the court's failure
to address one or more criteria that the party did not argue.
15. In
O'Key, this court indicated that its assessment of the factors would be
based on the "scientific testimony and evidence given at the * * * hearing
in the trial court, pertinent legal and medical literature on the subject
received in evidence at that hearing, and numerous other sources in the
area."  321 Or at 308-09.  In the present case, the prosecution
(which, as the proponent of Keltner's delayed disclosure testimony, bore the
burden of demonstrating its scientific validity) did not submit any literature
or other documentation, but relied entirely on Keltner's presentation. 
16. Keltner
explained that such immediate disclosures occurred "particularly with
younger kids where it's an accidental disclosure, where they really don't have
the capability to keep it a secret."   
17. Keltner
also described a small, informal CARES study of children with abnormal physical
examinations, which found that 90 percent of those children had delayed in
disclosing sexual abuse.  She acknowledged that the study was not peer reviewed
and was not rigorous.  We do not consider it as part of the state's portrayal
of specialized literature at the OEC 104 hearing.