Title: Winston v. Warden (Unpublished Order)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Wednesday, the 7th day of 
March, 2007. 
 
Leon Jermain Winston, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
  against  
Record No. 052501 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed January 27, 2006, the respondent's motion to dismiss, and 
petitioner’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, the Court is of 
the opinion that the motion should be granted and the writ should 
not issue. 
Leon Jermain Winston was convicted in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Lynchburg of capital murder of Anthony Robinson in the 
commission of robbery or attempted robbery, capital murder of 
Rhonda Whitehead Robinson in the commission of robbery or attempted 
robbery, capital murder of Rhonda Whitehead Robinson during the 
same act or transaction in which another person was willfully, 
deliberately and with premeditation killed, two counts of attempted 
robbery, statutory burglary, maliciously discharging a firearm, and 
five counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  The 
jury fixed Winston’s punishment at death for each of the three 
capital murder convictions and at seventy-three years imprisonment 
 
2
for the remaining convictions.  The trial court sentenced Winston 
in accordance with the jury verdict.  This Court affirmed Winston’s 
convictions and upheld the sentences of death in Winston v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 604 S.E.2d 21 (2004), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 107 (2005). 
In claim (I), petitioner alleges that he is actually innocent 
of capital murder.  While conceding that this Court’s decision in 
Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259, 585 S.E.2d 801, 827 (2003), 
bars consideration of assertions of actual innocence in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contends that Lovitt was 
wrongly decided.  We disagree.  The Court holds that claim (I) is 
barred because assertions of actual innocence are outside the scope 
of habeas corpus review, which concerns only the legality of the 
petitioner’s detention.  Lovitt, 266 Va. at 259, 585 S.E.2d at 827. 
In claim (II), petitioner relies on an affidavit of Dr. J. 
Thomas McClintock, a purported expert in DNA analysis, who has 
analyzed the certificates of analysis, the Department of Forensic 
Science (“DFS”) laboratory notes, the trial testimony, and a 
September 12, 2005 report of an audit conducted of DFS practices, 
and alleges generally that the DNA evidence that the Commonwealth 
introduced against petitioner at trial was scientifically invalid.  
In claim (II)(A), petitioner relies on both Dr. McClintock’s 
affidavit and on an audit of DFS, which was performed after 
 
3
petitioner’s trial and direct appeal, and alleges that the 
statistical analysis of the DNA evidence introduced at petitioner’s 
trial was “inappropriate” because the analyst “selected only those 
loci that ‘fit’ her formulated hypothesis” and inappropriately 
“disregarded the loci that did not necessarily ‘fit’ that 
hypothesis.”  In claim (II)(B), petitioner relies on Dr. 
McClintock’s affidavit and alleges that the random controls used in 
analyzing the DNA evidence were flawed.  In claim (II)(C), 
petitioner relies on Dr. McClintock’s affidavit and alleges that 
DFS analysts erroneously interpreted the data, to wit, concluding 
that certain allelic bands were “stutter” rather than actual 
alleles of another contributing individual. 
The Court holds that to the extent petitioner should have 
known the basis supporting his claims (II)(A), (II)(B), and 
(II)(C), before or during trial, claims (II)(A), (II)(B) and 
(II)(C) are procedurally defaulted because these non-jurisdictional 
issues could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, 
thus, are not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
To the extent that petitioner’s claims are based upon the 
audit conducted after trial and direct appeal, the Court holds that 
claims (II), (II)(A), (II)(B), and (II)(C), are not cognizable in a 
 
4
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  “The writ is available only 
where the release of the prisoner from his immediate detention will 
follow as a result of an order in his favor.  It is not available 
to secure a judicial determination of any question which, even if 
determined in the prisoner’s favor, could not affect the lawfulness 
of his immediate custody and detention.”  Virginia Parole Bd. v. 
Wilkins, 255 Va. 419, 420–21, 498 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1998). 
In claim (II)(D)(1), petitioner alleges that flaws in the DNA 
analysis linking petitioner to the murder weapon support 
petitioner’s claim that he is actually innocent of capital murder.  
The Court holds that claim (II)(D)(1) is barred because assertions 
of actual innocence are outside the scope of habeas corpus review, 
which concerns only the legality of the petitioner’s detention.  
Lovitt, 266 Va. at 259, 585 S.E.2d at 827. 
In a portion of claim (II)(D)(2), petitioner relies on the 
affidavit provided by Dr. McClintock and alleges that the 
Commonwealth knew the DNA profile developed on the murder weapon 
strongly suggested multiple contributors of DNA, and that the 
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose this fact constituted a 
violation of the requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence 
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The record, 
including motions, orders, exhibits, and the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that petitioner was provided with the necessary 
 
5
assistance, including access to the DFS case file and the 
appointment of an expert to conduct an independent review of the 
DNA examination performed by the DFS.  Petitioner does not allege 
that the Commonwealth withheld information from the file provided 
to the defense expert, but instead contends that the Commonwealth 
had reached and reported erroneous conclusions. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(D)(2) is 
procedurally defaulted because this non-jurisdictional issue could 
have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 
Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In another portion of claim (II)(D)(2), petitioner alleges 
that the Commonwealth, in violation of Brady, failed to disclose 
certain electronic data that would have allowed petitioner to 
conduct an independent examination of the data, and that had this 
information been made available to the jury, there is a reasonable 
probability that Winston “could have been convicted of a lesser 
offense.”  The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(D)(2) is 
without merit.  Petitioner does not identify specifically the 
electronic data that he claims the Commonwealth should have 
disclosed and, thus, he cannot demonstrate that the electronic data 
contained either exculpatory or material information. 
 
In claim (II)(D)(3), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
 
6
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to identify 
and challenge the errors relating to the DNA evidence enumerated in 
claims (II)(A), (II)(B), (II)(C), and (II)(D).  The Court holds 
that claim (II)(D)(3) satisfies neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The record, including the 
trial transcripts, demonstrates that counsel sought and obtained an 
independent, expert review of the DFS analysis.   Petitioner’s 
court-appointed DNA expert reviewed the Commonwealth’s analysis and 
expressed her disagreement with some of the Commonwealth’s expert’s 
conclusions.  The Commonwealth’s expert testified that the DNA 
evidence recovered from gloves found discarded in the neighborhood 
near the scene of the murders was a mixture, which matched DNA 
samples taken from the petitioner, Kevin Brown and David Hardy.  
Whereas the Commonwealth’s expert testified that the probability 
was greater than one-in-one billion of matching the DNA evidence 
from the gloves to a different group of three people, the defense 
expert testified that “the probability of randomly selecting an 
individual out of the African-American population that would be 
included . . . for [] evaluation was one in 195.”  Furthermore, 
petitioner’s own expert testified that the only area of the DFS 
conclusion with which she disagreed concerned the gloves.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to show that counsel’s performance was 
 
7
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In a portion of claim (III), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct in knowingly 
presenting the false testimony of Marty Campbell to the grand jury.  
Campbell testified to the grand jury that petitioner said he shot 
“the woman, three times in the face,” and that “after Kevin shot 
the guy,” petitioner said he “had to cap [the woman].”  Petitioner 
claims that petitioner did not speak to Campbell and Campbell never 
spoke to Kevin Brown about these crimes.  According to petitioner, 
Campbell had previously told investigators that none of Campbell’s 
information about the crimes came from either petitioner or Brown. 
The Court holds that Code §§ 8.01-654.1 and 8.01-654(B)(2) bar 
consideration of this portion of claim (III).  Code § 8.01-654.1 
requires a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person 
sentenced to death to be filed within 60 days of the “denial by the 
United States Supreme Court of a petition for a writ of certiorari 
to the judgment of Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal.”  
The Supreme Court of the United States denied petitioner’s petition 
for a writ of certiorari on October 3, 2005; thus, he had until 
December 2, 2005 to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
this Court.  Petitioner filed an oversized petition for writ of 
 
8
habeas corpus (which he categorized as “prophylactic”) and this 
Court twice directed him to file a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus that complied with this Court’s rules.  On January 27, 2006, 
petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
In an order dated February 28, 2006, this Court accepted the 
January 27th petition only with respect to those claims that were 
also raised in the oversized petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed on December 2, 2005.  This portion of claim (III) was 
untimely filed because it was not included in the oversized 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in this Court on 
December 2, 2005.  In addition, as the facts which support this 
allegation were known to petitioner at the time he filed his 
oversized petition on December 2, 2005, Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) also 
bars our consideration of this portion of claim (III). 
In another portion of claim (III), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct in knowingly 
presenting false testimony from Nate Rorls that petitioner called 
Rorls and confessed to killing the victims.  Petitioner contends 
that Rorls’ testimony actually indicated that petitioner called 
Rorls and confessed to the murders before they took place and that 
Rorls testified falsely that he first notified the Commonwealth 
about this telephone call only “a couple days” before trial.  
Petitioner contends further that the Commonwealth knew this 
 
9
testimony was untruthful because investigators asked Rorls about 
the call during an interview five months earlier.  The record, 
including the trial transcript, demonstrates that defense counsel 
was aware of Rorls’ earlier statement to the police and used it in 
cross-examination of Rorls. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) is 
procedurally defaulted because this non-jurisdictional issue could 
have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 
Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In another portion of claim (III), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct in knowingly 
creating false impressions regarding Rorls’ negotiations for a plea 
agreement in connection with federal drug charges in exchange for 
his testimony against petitioner at petitioner’s capital murder 
trial.  Petitioner claims that the Commonwealth concealed its 
awareness of federal prosecutors’ decision to delay the 
finalization of Rorls’ plea agreement until after petitioner’s 
trial.  Petitioner maintains that the delay prevented the jury from 
learning about Rorls’ plea agreement, wherein he would serve less 
than three years of incarceration, as opposed to the fourteen years 
he told the jury on direct examination that he faced. The record 
demonstrates that petitioner was aware of the ongoing negotiations 
 
10
and that counsel elicited testimony from Rorls that he actually 
faced “twenty-five [years] to life.” 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) is factually 
without merit.  The petitioner has failed to allege facts that 
establish how the Commonwealth violated its obligation to disclose 
impeachment evidence.  The record established that petitioner was 
aware of ongoing plea negotiations with federal prosecutors and 
that the negotiations were not completed at the time Rorls 
testified.  Petitioner used this information in his cross-
examination of Rorls to establish that Rorls expected to receive 
favorable treatment as a result of his testimony. 
In another portion of claim (III), petitioner asserts that 
Rorls subsequently received treatment better than Rorls predicted 
while testifying. In support of this claim, petitioner notes that, 
following his testimony against Winston, Rorls pled guilty to 
conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine and instead of 
serving “twenty-five [years] to life,” Rorls was released in less 
than three years.  Petitioner contends that such treatment proves 
the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. The Court 
holds that this portion of claim (III) is factually without merit.  
The record, including the trial transcript and the exhibits 
submitted in support of the petition, demonstrates that the 
Commonwealth properly disclosed that Rorls was in negotiations with 
 
11
federal prosecutors and that Rorls’ sentence reduction was the 
result of his cooperation in 2003 and in 2004 with federal 
authorities and his testimony in petitioner’s case. 
In another portion of claim (III), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct in creating the 
false impression that petitioner’s knowledge of victim Rhonda 
Robinson’s pregnancy was solely attributable to the fact that he 
was the one that killed her.  Petitioner claims the Commonwealth 
failed to elicit during re-direct examination of Rorls that he 
stated six months before trial that petitioner knew about the 
pregnancy from Tywan Turner, the father of Rhonda Robinson’s unborn 
baby.  Furthermore, petitioner contends the Commonwealth also knew, 
from Campbell’s grand jury testimony, that Rhonda Robinson’s 
pregnancy was public knowledge before trial. 
The Court holds that, to the extent petitioner is challenging 
the admission of evidence of Rhonda Robinson’s pregnancy, this 
portion of claim (III) is barred because this issue was raised and 
decided in the trial court and on direct appeal from the criminal 
conviction and, therefore, petitioner cannot raise it in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  Henry v. Warden, 265 Va. 246, 249, 
576 S.E.2d 495, 496 (2003).  To the extent petitioner is 
challenging the Commonwealth’s failure to elicit from Rorls his 
prior speculation that Winston learned of the pregnancy from Tywan 
 
12
Turner, this portion of claim (III) is procedurally defaulted 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
In another portion of claim (III), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct when, in spite of 
its knowledge that Tywan Turner was in the City of Lynchburg on the 
night of the murders, it argued to the jury that Turner could not 
have committed the murders because the evidence at trial showed 
that Turner was in Washington, D.C. and not in Lynchburg on the 
night of the murders.  Petitioner submits that Turner told police 
on the day after the murders that he was in Lynchburg, at home with 
his girlfriend, on the night of the murders.  Second, petitioner 
contends that the Commonwealth knew that Patty Whitehead, the 
sister of Rhonda Robinson and mother to Turner’s two children, told 
police that Turner’s son had been visiting Turner, and that Turner 
returned the child to Patty Whitehead in Lynchburg on the day of 
the murders.  Third, petitioner further contends that Rorls told 
police and prosecutors that Turner was “down there in Lynchburg” 
and that Turner brought Winston to Lynchburg from Washington, D.C. 
so Winston could “retaliate” against individuals who had stolen a 
safe from his home. 
 
13
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) is 
procedurally defaulted because these non-jurisdictional issues 
could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, are 
not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 
215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In a footnote, petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel with respect to each of the claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct raised in claim (III) because counsel 
had failed “to investigate and present the claims.”  The Court 
holds that petitioner’s allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel with respect to petitioner’s claim (III) does not satisfy 
the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  Petitioner has failed to allege with particularity any 
prejudice he sustained as a result of counsel’s alleged failures or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (IV)(A), petitioner alleges violations of his Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury 
because several jurors “were exposed to extraneous influences 
during the course of the trial.”  Juror Archer Caldwell reported 
that four jurors were approached during recesses by members of the 
victims’ families, who made statements to these jurors that they 
 
14
should convict petitioner and sentence him to death.  The trial 
court questioned each contacted juror and determined that none of 
those jurors felt threatened or intimidated and that the contact 
would not affect their deliberations.  The record demonstrates that 
petitioner raised this argument on direct appeal but that Rule 5:25 
prevented this Court from considering the argument because it had 
not been presented to the trial court. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(A) is procedurally defaulted 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim (IV)(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to make a 
timely motion for a mistrial as a result of the victims’ families 
contact with the jurors.  Petitioner argues that counsel failed to 
request that the trial court examine the entire jury panel about 
the extraneous contact, that counsel should have ensured 
petitioner’s presence during the in-chambers voir dire of the four 
jurors, and that counsel should have known about and argued during 
trial the Court of Appeals decision in Scott v. Commonwealth, 11 
Va. App. 516, 521-23, 399 S.E.2d 648, 651-52 (1990), that jurors 
cannot be expected to admit that they violated their oaths of 
 
15
office, that a defendant is entitled to be tried by no fewer than 
twelve impartial jurors, and that a new trial must be granted if 
there is the possibility that the jury’s verdict was improperly 
influenced.  Instead, the affidavit of counsel reveals that trial 
counsel did not know about the decision in Scott until after trial, 
when he cited it to the trial court in a post-trial motion, which 
petitioner claims the trial court denied as having been untimely 
filed. 
The record, including the post-verdict sentencing transcript, 
demonstrates that the trial court denied petitioner’s motion on the 
grounds that the court had examined each of the jurors who stated 
they had been approached, the trial court was satisfied with their 
answers, and the trial court remained satisfied that petitioner was 
not prejudiced or harmed. The Court holds that claim (IV)(B) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
the affidavit of counsel and the trial transcript, establishes that 
each juror testified that the contact with third parties did not 
intimidate or frighten them and would not influence their 
deliberations.  The record further demonstrates that counsel made a 
tactical decision not to move for a mistrial after discussing the 
issue with petitioner.  Counsel believed that at least one specific 
juror would not vote for a death sentence and that they would 
 
16
likely not get another juror like her at a new trial, and that 
counsel thought, “the trial was leaning our way.”  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to show that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that a motion for mistrial would 
have been granted and that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (V)(A), petitioner alleges that he was denied his 
right to be present during critical stages of trial, to wit, when 
the trial judge and the Commonwealth’s Attorney examined four 
jurors in the court’s chambers.  The Court holds that claim (V)(A) 
is procedurally defaulted because this non-jurisdictional issue 
could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is 
not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 
215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
 
In claim (V)(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to 
ensure petitioner’s presence during the examination of the four 
jurors.  Petitioner argues that had he witnessed the reactions of 
the jurors, he would not have agreed to forego a motion for a 
mistrial and that the motion likely would have been granted. 
The Court holds that claim (V)(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to establish that even 
 
17
if he had asked counsel to seek a mistrial, one would have been 
granted. The testimony of the jurors regarding the outside contact 
proved there was no basis for a mistrial and the trial judge noted 
his satisfaction with the jurors’ responses.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
In a portion of claim (VI)(A), petitioner alleges that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to cross-examine Nate Rorls concerning continuances of Rorls’ 
criminal trial in federal court.  Petitioner claims that counsel 
should have cross-examined Rorls about the fact that any leniency 
he would receive from federal prosecutors depended on his testimony 
at petitioner’s trial and should have cross-examined Rorls 
concerning the fact that Rorls’ federal trial was continued and 
would not be held until after Rorls testified at petitioner’s 
trial.  Petitioner contends that this fact “contradicted Rorls’ 
testimony that the capital murder case was a small factor in his 
anticipated federal deal.” 
The Court holds that this claim satisfies neither the 
“performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
 
18
transcript, establishes that counsel cross-examined Rorls about his 
discussions with the United States Attorney and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency regarding his knowledge about petitioner’s case 
and how that knowledge could benefit Rorls.  Petitioner has not 
articulated how additional information concerning the details of 
Rorls’ potential agreement with federal prosecutors would have 
affected his credibility.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (VI)(A), petitioner alleges that 
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to effectively cross-examine Rorls about the existence and 
timing of alleged telephone calls between Rorls and petitioner.  
Petitioner alleges that Rorls gave conflicting statements and 
testimony as to when petitioner called him and confessed to the 
crimes and, under both versions of his account, Rorls claimed to 
have received the telephone call before the victims died. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the 
two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The Commonwealth’s 
evidence proved that petitioner saw Rorls the day after petitioner 
called Rorls; however, neither in his statement to police nor in 
 
19
his trial testimony did Rorls state what day he received the phone 
call or what day he met with petitioner.  Rorls noted only that he 
received the phone call after the killings and that on the day 
after he received the phone call he spoke with petitioner in person 
in Woodbridge, Virginia, and in Maryland.  Furthermore, the 
information provided by Rorls corroborated the account given by 
Niesha Whitehead.  Additionally, on direct appeal, petitioner 
conceded that he was present when the murders took place.  
Therefore, any discussion of the exact time of day petitioner made 
the phone call has little bearing on the truthfulness of Rorls’ 
testimony that petitioner told Rorls he had “slumped” some people.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (VI)(A), petitioner alleges that 
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to cross-examine Rorls about the conflict between his 
statement that petitioner told him that petitioner left the murder 
weapon at the victims’ home and the Commonwealth’s evidence, which 
showed that police recovered the weapon from a different home.  
Petitioner also alleges that he was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel because counsel failed to question Rorls about his 
 
20
failure to alert law enforcement about petitioner’s confession for 
six months and then only after Rorls was arrested and charged with 
federal drug crimes. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the 
two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
Rorls’ statement to police and the trial transcripts, demonstrates 
that there was no “glaring contradiction” because there were two 
guns involved in the killings.  In both his statement to police and 
in his trial testimony, Rorls claimed that petitioner showed one of 
the guns, a 9-millimeter handgun, to Rorls.   The trial transcript 
demonstrates that petitioner then took the gun to Robin Wilson to 
keep in his apartment where police later recovered it.  When read 
in context, it is clear that, in his statement to police, Rorls was 
referring to the second gun, which Rorls believed, based upon his 
conversation with petitioner, had been left in the victims’ house, 
but which actually had been found at a location near the house.  
The record demonstrates that the other gun used in the murders, a 
.38 caliber handgun, was found in Lynchburg near the victims’ 
residence and near the area where articles of clothing worn by 
petitioner’s co-defendant were found.  Counsel’s failure to cross-
examine a witness concerning a contradiction that does not exist is 
not deficient performance.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
 
21
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (VI)(A), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to investigate Rorls’ statements.  Petitioner bases this claim on 
Rorls’ trial testimony that ”Pego,” petitioner’s cousin, was 
present during petitioner’s confession to Rorls in Woodbridge, 
Virginia.  Petitioner contends counsel erred because “counsel never 
asked [petitioner] who was present at the house, and never 
identified [Peyton] Carter before trial.”  Petitioner alleges that 
Peyton Carter is the cousin “Pego” who was present in Woodbridge.  
Carter submitted an affidavit wherein he stated that he would have 
testified that he was with petitioner the entire time petitioner 
was at the house in Woodbridge, Virginia, that petitioner and Rorls 
never had a private conversation in that house, and that Carter 
never heard petitioner mention the murders and never saw petitioner 
show anyone a gun.  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the 
two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
Carter’s affidavit, establishes only that Carter did not hear or 
see petitioner confess to the crimes.  Essentially, petitioner 
 
22
claims that counsel’s assistance was ineffective because counsel 
failed to present the testimony of this witness who did not see the 
gun or hear the confession.  As such, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (VI)(A), petitioner alleges that 
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to present the testimony of Joe Lewis, who would have 
testified that he was present at the time and location of 
petitioner’s alleged in-person confession to Rorls and that he did 
not hear petitioner confess, nor did Rorls ever tell him that 
petitioner had confessed to the murders. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the 
two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
Lewis’ affidavit, establishes only that Lewis did not hear or see 
petitioner confess to the crimes and that Rorls did not relay 
petitioner’s confession to him.  Essentially, petitioner claims 
that counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony of a 
witness who did not see or hear anything.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
 
23
alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
In another portion of claim (VI)(A), petitioner alleges that 
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to properly address testimony regarding Rhonda Robinson’s 
pregnancy at the time of her death.  The record establishes that 
the trial court ruled that it would allow testimony regarding 
Rhonda Robinson’s pregnancy “if the witness can testify as to what 
the defendant told him about the appearance.”  Rorls testified on 
re-direct examination “that [Robinson] was pregnant.”  Petitioner 
claims that Rorls never testified about comments made by petitioner 
about Rhonda Robinson’s appearance and that counsel should have 
objected or moved for a mistrial at that point of the proceedings 
because the testimony was irrelevant, inflammatory, and 
prejudicial. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI)(A) satisfies 
neither the “performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the 
two-part test enunciated in Strickland.   The record, including the 
trial transcript and this Court’s opinion on direct appeal, 
demonstrates that although Rhonda Robinson’s pregnancy may not have 
been relevant before cross-examination, upon cross-examination it 
became relevant and admissible and was properly elicited on re-
direct examination.  Petitioner, therefore, cannot establish that 
 
24
an objection would have been successful.  Furthermore, any chance 
that the information would have been improperly prejudicial was 
negated when counsel, on cross-examination, elicited testimony from 
Rorls that at least one other person knew about Rhonda Robinson’s 
pregnancy.  This testimony undermined the Commonwealth’s contention 
that only Rhonda Robinson’s killer knew about the pregnancy, that 
petitioner knew about the pregnancy, and that, therefore, the 
petitioner was Rhonda Robinson’s killer.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
In a portion of claim (VI)(B), petitioner alleges that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to offer “affirmative evidence of their theory” that there was “a 
viable alternate suspect,” Tywan Turner. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI)(B) satisfies 
neither the “performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the 
two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
trial transcript, demonstrates that counsel attempted to present 
evidence that Rhonda Robinson’s sister, Angela Whitehead, had told 
Investigator Carson that Turner kept a 9-millimeter handgun in his 
car.  Angela Whitehead surprised counsel by vehemently denying 
 
25
having made that statement to Carson.  Counsel attempted to refresh 
Angela Whitehead’s recollection and she maintained that she never 
saw a gun and never told anyone about a gun.  Moreover, counsel 
presented evidence that Turner was the primary drug supplier to 
Anthony Robinson, a suspected drug dealer, that Anthony Robinson 
was under indictment for drug trafficking, and that Anthony 
Robinson had been released from custody shortly before his murder.  
Petitioner does not identify any additional evidence which counsel 
could have presented to demonstrate that Turner was “a viable 
alternate suspect.”  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In claim (VI)(C), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call 
Patty Whitehead, Angela Whitehead’s sister and mother of two of 
Turner’s children, to testify in furtherance of this “alternate 
suspect theory.”  Petitioner claims that Patty Whitehead would have 
testified that Turner dropped off the children at her home in 
Lynchburg around midnight on the night of the murders, placing him 
in the city and without the company of his children.  She also 
would have testified, according to petitioner, that Turner supplied 
Anthony Robinson with drugs. 
 
26
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C) fails to satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the transcript of Patty Whitehead’s statement 
to law enforcement, establishes that she had “no idea” if Turner 
killed the victims.  Moreover, her statement that Turner was in 
Lynchburg to drop off the children at her house is not evidence of 
his involvement in the crimes.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  
 
In claim (VI)(D), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call Ann 
Marie Lewis as a defense witness.  Petitioner contends that Lewis 
was concerned that Patty Whitehead influenced Niesha Whitehead’s 
statement to police.  Petitioner bases this claim on the notes from 
a police interview with Lewis.  According to the notes, it appears 
that Lewis was present when Niesha Whitehead told the police that 
the men were masked.  Later, however, Patty Whitehead told police 
that Niesha had told her that one of the assailants was light-
skinned, with braided hair and a tattoo of a dog on his arm. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(D) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner does not proffer an affidavit 
 
27
from Lewis to establish that she would have testified as he 
contends.  Furthermore, petitioner does not articulate how the two 
statements are inconsistent. Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In claim (VI)(E), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to confront 
Angela Whitehead with “important information contained in her 
recorded interview with Investigator Carson.”  The record, 
including the trial transcript, establishes that counsel subpoenaed 
Angela Whitehead to testify about statements she made immediately 
after the murders that tended to implicate Turner in the crimes.  
On direct examination, however, Angela Whitehead surprised defense 
counsel by denying having made any of the statements attributed to 
her. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(E) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, establishes that counsel did confront Angela Whitehead 
with her statement to Investigator Carlson after she denied making 
the statement.  After giving Angela Whitehead the opportunity to 
refresh her recollection by reviewing her prior statement to 
 
28
Carlson, the witness continued to insist that she had never seen 
the inside of Turner’s car and that she had never seen Turner hold 
a weapon.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In claim (VI)(F), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call 
Thomas Whitehead, Rhonda Robinson’s brother, as a defense witness.  
Petitioner alleges that Thomas Whitehead made a statement to police 
and would have testified that Rhonda Robinson’s daughter, Niesha, 
told him that she did not witness the actual shootings.  Petitioner 
claims that Thomas Whitehead also would have testified that his 
sister, Patty Whitehead, had discussed the events with Niesha, 
which, petitioner contends, would have supported his theory that 
Patty Whitehead was attempting to deflect suspicion from Turner, 
the father of two of her children. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(F) satisfies neither the 
“performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including transcripts and 
notes of Thomas Whitehead’s statements to police, establishes that 
he told police that Niesha, Rhonda Robinson’s daughter, had told 
him and Patty Whitehead that she had seen her mother get shot.  
 
29
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
 
In claim (VI)(G), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call 
Investigator Gearhardt in order to demonstrate to jurors that 
police ignored Turner as a possible suspect in the murders despite 
their knowledge that Turner was in Lynchburg on the night of the 
murders, that he had a motive to murder Anthony Robinson, that 
Turner owned guns, and that Turner matched the general physical 
description given by Niesha Whitehead, the sole eyewitness to the 
murders.  Petitioner claims that Turner, by his own admission to 
police, knew that Anthony Robinson had been incarcerated the 
weekend before his death and that Turner had seen Anthony Robinson 
within days of his murder. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(G) satisfies neither the 
“performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record establishes that counsel 
presented evidence that Turner was concerned that Anthony Robinson 
would implicate him in drug trafficking and that Turner had guns.  
The jury could have inferred that Turner was involved in the 
killings.  Further, the record establishes that petitioner admitted 
 
30
he was present at the scene at the time of the murders and he was 
identified as the shooter by the tattoo on his arm.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (VII)(A), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth 
made several misstatements of fact during its closing argument at 
the conclusion of the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial.  First, 
petitioner claims that the Commonwealth improperly referred to 
petitioner as “Mr. No Name,” whom Niesha Whitehead identified as 
the person who shot her mother.  Second, petitioner claims that the 
Commonwealth improperly argued in closing that Niesha’s testimony 
proved “that the two men had guns.”  Third, petitioner claims that 
the Commonwealth improperly argued in closing that the results at 
each locus in petitioner’s DNA profile matched the results at the 
corresponding locus on the sample taken from the murder weapon. 
The Court holds that claim (VII)(A) is procedurally defaulted 
because these non-jurisdictional issues could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, are not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
 
In a portion of claim (VII)(B), petitioner claims that he was 
 
31
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to object to the Commonwealth’s misstatement that petitioner was 
“Mr. No Name.”  Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s reference 
to petitioner as “Mr. No Name” is a misstatement because Niesha had 
identified “Mr. No Name,” as a black-clad black male and the 
Commonwealth had introduced into evidence petitioner’s black 
sweatshirt with white stripes on the arms and Niesha had described 
“Mr. No Name’s Friend” as wearing black with white stripes. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VII)(B) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prongs of the two-
part test in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, establishes that Niesha also testified that “Mr. No-
Name” bore a tattoo of a dog on his arm, and that petitioner bore a 
tattoo of a dog on his arm.  On direct appeal, petitioner did not 
deny that he was present at the shootings and the record 
demonstrates that he was the only criminal actor bearing a tattoo 
on his arm.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In a portion of claim (VII)(B), petitioner claims that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to object to the Commonwealth’s misstatement that Niesha 
 
32
Whitehead’s testimony proved that both assailants had guns.  The 
Court holds that this portion of claim (VII)(B) satisfies neither 
the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test in 
Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript, 
establishes that counsel elicited from Niesha Whitehead on cross-
examination that only one of the men had a gun.  Niesha positively 
identified the man who shot her mother as the man with a tattoo on 
his arm.  In addition, Niesha’s mother was shot three times with a 
9-millimeter handgun, the gun which petitioner is identified as 
having possessed.  Anthony Robinson, however, was shot eight times: 
seven times with the 9-millimeter handgun and once with a .38 
caliber handgun.  No evidence was presented that petitioner ever 
possessed the .38 caliber weapon.  Consequently, objecting to the 
Commonwealth’s argument that the second assailant also had a gun 
would have been without effect.  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In a portion of claim (VII)(B), petitioner claims that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to object to the Commonwealth’s misstatement that petitioner’s DNA 
matched the DNA recovered from the murder weapon at the TPOX, Penta 
D, and the CSF1PO loci because the results of the DNA testing were 
 
33
inconclusive for both the petitioner and the gun.  Petitioner 
contends that the prosecutor misstated the record because, in fact, 
no result was obtained at the TPOX locus for either the gun or the 
petitioner and because an inconclusive result does not constitute a 
“match.”   
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VII)(B) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prongs of the two-
part test in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that there was overwhelming evidence of 
petitioner’s DNA on the weapon, and that the evidence introduced at 
trial established that the likelihood of another person being the 
contributor of the DNA on the weapon was greater than one in six 
billion.  Any error in the prosecutor’s argument concerning whether 
there were inconclusive results, as opposed to no results at the 
TPOX locus, would not have been prejudicial in light of the 
conclusions to which the experts testified concerning the DNA match 
and the trial court’s instruction that closing argument is not 
evidence.  As to the prosecutor’s argument that the other loci 
contained inconclusive results for both the gun and the petitioner, 
the evidence adduced at trial supports the prosecutor’s statements.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
 
34
would have been different. 
 
With respect to petitioner’s claim that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to 
the Commonwealth’s argument that an “inconclusive” finding on the 
TPOX locus from both petitioner’s DNA sample and the sample from 
the murder weapon constituted a positive DNA match, the Court holds 
that this portion of claim (VII)(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test in 
Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript and the 
testimony of the Commonwealth’s DNA expert, establishes that there 
was overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s DNA on the weapon, even 
if petitioner’s DNA was not on the specific locus that was 
mentioned during closing.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claims (VIII)(A) and (VIII)(B), petitioner alleges that his 
execution is barred by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), 
because he was diagnosed with mental retardation at age sixteen and 
allegedly meets the statutory definition for mental retardation as 
prescribed in Code  § 19.2-264.3:1.1.  In support of this claim, 
petitioner relies on a cover page from a Fairfax County Public 
Schools Special Education Eligibility Form that indicates that 
 
35
petitioner was eligible to receive special education services after 
school officials determined that he was disabled due to mild mental 
retardation.  Petitioner additionally submits an affidavit 
indicating that the test scores and data relied upon to reach this 
determination are unavailable.  
The Court holds that claims (VIII)(A) and (VIII)(B) are not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as these non-
jurisdictional issues could have been raised at trial and on direct 
appeal.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim (VIII)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel unreasonably failed 
to present evidence of petitioner’s mental retardation, including 
petitioner’s school record diagnosing his mental defects and 
evidence of the “Flynn Effect,” a multiplier that petitioner 
asserts must be accounted for in calculating a person’s true 
intelligence quotient (IQ) score. 
The Court holds that claim (VIII)(C) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the evidence 
presented at trial and the documents upon which petitioner now 
relies, demonstrates that petitioner was administered three 
standardized tests for measuring intellectual functioning.  
Petitioner achieved full-scale scores of 77, 76, and 73 on three 
 
36
administrations of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-
Revised.  While petitioner offered evidence that he was once 
described as “mildly mentally retarded” for the purposes of special 
education eligibility, the definitions of mental retardation 
provided by petitioner demonstrate that for special-education 
eligibility, a candidate may, nonetheless, have an IQ score above 
70.  Furthermore, petitioner offers no objective data in support of 
his claim of mental retardation.  The legislature has defined 
mental retardation as: 
[A] disability, originating before the age of 18 years, 
characterized concurrently by (i) significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning as demonstrated by 
performance on a standardized measure of intellectual 
functioning administered in conformity with accepted 
professional practice, that is at least two standard 
deviations below the mean and (ii) significant 
limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in 
conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A). 
This Court has previously held that the maximum score for a 
classification of mental retardation is an I.Q. score of 70.  See 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 53, 75, 591 S.E.2d 47, 59 (2004), 
vacated on other grounds, 544 U.S. 901 (2005).  Petitioner provides 
no documentation that he was diagnosed as being mentally retarded 
before the age of 18 in accordance with the legal definition of 
mental retardation established by the legislature.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
 
37
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (VIII)(D), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present 
evidence about petitioner’s subaverage intellectual functioning.  
Petitioner contends that there was abundant evidence of his low 
functioning and its impact on his life.  
The Court holds that claim (VIII)(D) satisfies neither the 
“performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the exhibits admitted at trial, demonstrates that 
counsel moved into evidence copies of four different psychological 
evaluations made of petitioner in 1987, 1990, 1994 and 1995.  These 
reports included the following findings: petitioner “is a youngster 
of mentally deficient to average intelligence” with “functional 
deficits . . . evidenced in short and long term auditory memory, 
visual memory, visual motor integration, visual sequencing, and 
perception and integration of part-whole relationships;” petitioner 
had “extreme problems maintaining attention and effort;” 
“declining” verbal scores over the years; and “many emotional 
concerns resulting from his abandonment and rejection from various 
family members.”  Petitioner does not identify the substance of any 
 
38
additional evidence he contends counsel should have presented and 
does not explain how such evidence would not have been cumulative.  
Furthermore, petitioner does not allege how the presentation of 
this evidence would have affected the proceedings.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to investigate and 
present available mitigation evidence.  Petitioner alleges that 
counsel failed to investigate his immediate family’s criminal 
activity during his formative years and that counsel failed to 
interview or present for the jury’s consideration petitioner’s 
schoolteachers, psychologist, counselors and social workers, who 
observed the impact petitioner’s exposure to his family environment 
had on him.  Petitioner alleges that counsel failed to interview 
other children in petitioner’s family, who also were exposed to the 
adults’ criminal activity, and failed to review the court files 
from the prosecutions of petitioner’s mother and grandmother.  
Petitioner contends it was unreasonable for counsel to present 
psychological reports and “hope” the jury would read them.  
The Court holds that claim (IX) satisfies neither the 
 
39
“performance” prong nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel presented the testimony of 
petitioner’s mother, Connie Winston, that she drank alcohol and 
used PCP, marijuana and cocaine nearly every day while she was 
pregnant with petitioner.  Petitioner’s grandmother, Mary Berrios, 
testified that petitioner, while he was a child in Berrios’ care, 
accompanied Berrios on various shoplifting capers and observed his 
grandmother stealing merchandise.  Counsel moved into evidence 
copies of four different psychological evaluations made of 
petitioner in 1987, 1990, 1994 and 1995.  These reports included 
the following findings: petitioner “is a youngster of mentally 
deficient to average intelligence” with “functional deficits . . . 
evidenced in short and long term auditory memory, visual memory, 
visual motor integration, visual sequencing, and perception and 
integration of part-whole relationships;” petitioner had “extreme 
problems maintaining attention and effort;” “declining” verbal 
scores over the years; and “many emotional concerns resulting from 
his abandonment and rejection from various family members.” 
Petitioner does not articulate how the evidence he claims 
counsel failed to present would not have been cumulative, given the 
evidence that counsel did present in mitigation.  Furthermore, 
petitioner does not allege that the jury disregarded the trial 
 
40
court’s instruction to consider the evidence in aggravation and in 
mitigation and to review the additional exhibits.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient 
or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In a portion of claim (X), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth made improper statements during its closing argument 
in the sentencing phase of petitioner’s trial.  First, petitioner 
claims that the Commonwealth violated his right to due process by 
referring to petitioner as a “pitbull.”  Second, petitioner claims 
that the Commonwealth’s request of the jury for “justice for our 
community” was improper in that it called for the jury to sentence 
petitioner on behalf of the community rather than on the law and 
the facts presented. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (X) is procedurally 
defaulted because these non-jurisdictional issues could have been 
raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, are not cognizable 
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29, 
205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In another portion of claim (X), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to object to the Commonwealth’s improper statements during the 
 
41
closing argument of the sentencing phase of petitioner’s trial, as 
set forth in the first portion of claim (X). 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (X) fails to 
satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that the prosecutor’s statement during closing 
regarding “justice for the community,” was not improper.  This 
Court has previously held that “[w]hile considerations of 
deterrence should not be the basis for a finding of guilt of the 
offense, such considerations may be argued in connection with the 
punishment to be assessed for the crime.” Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 
253 Va. 156, 157, 482 S.E.2d 837, 838 (1997) (citing Payne v. 
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 468, 357 S.E.2d 500, 505, cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 933 (1987)).  Furthermore, not every improper argument 
amounts to a denial of due process.  
The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' 
comments "so infected the trial with unfairness as to 
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). Moreover, 
the appropriate standard of review for such a claim on 
writ of habeas corpus is "the narrow one of due process, 
and not the broad exercise of supervisory power." Id. at 
642. 
 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).  See also Bennett 
v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346-47 (4th Cir. 1996) (religiously 
loaded closing argument, while “highly improper and deserve[d] 
 
42
condemnation” did not render death sentence constitutionally 
infirm).  Petitioner has not demonstrated that in the context of 
the trial, considering all of the evidence and the totality of the 
arguments, the prosecutor’s reference to petitioner as a “pitbull” 
rendered the death penalty constitutionally infirm.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XI), petitioner alleges that the claims concerning 
petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel, when considered cumulatively, demonstrate that “trial 
counsels’ performance and the resulting prejudice deprived Winston 
of constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance of counsel, and 
requires that his convictions and/or sentences be vacated.” 
The Court holds that petitioner’s claim (XI) is without merit.  
As addressed previously, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged errors.  “Having 
rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, there is no 
support for the proposition that such actions when considered 
collectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel.”  Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex 
I State Prison, 267 Va. 318, 340, 593 S.E.2d 292, 305, cert. 
denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
 
43
Upon consideration thereof, petitioner’s “motion for leave to 
depose the department of forensic science,” “motion for funds to 
hire a psychologist or psychiatrist,” “motions for appointment of a 
DNA expert and discovery of electronic data,” and “motion for 
discovery” are denied. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the petition is 
dismissed. 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk