Title: Commonwealth v. McDermott

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13091 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM McDERMOTT. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     May 5, 2021. - August 6, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Execution of sentence, Stay of 
proceedings. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 30, 1981. 
 
Following review by this court and the Appeals Court, a 
motion for a stay of execution of sentence, filed on October 27, 
2020, was heard by Brian A. Davis, J.; and a second motion for a 
stay of execution of sentence was heard in the Appeals Court by 
James R. Milkey, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
K. Hayne Barnwell for the defendant. 
Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, William McDermott, appeals from 
an order by a single justice of the Appeals Court denying his 
motion to stay the execution of his sentence pending his motion 
for a new trial.1  We are concerned in this case with the effect 
a defendant's COVID-19 infection or vaccination may have when 
weighing the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 
Mass. 394, 407 (2020).  In Nash, we held that COVID-19 concerns 
can buttress deficient motions to stay the execution of a 
sentence.2  Id. at 405-406. 
Background.  On November 20, 1981, the seventeen year old 
defendant shot and killed the victim, Robert Kemp.  On July 1, 
1982, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree.  
He was sentenced to the statutory term of life imprisonment.  We 
reduced the defendant's conviction to murder in the second 
degree on direct appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
 
1 If a judge denies a defendant's motion to stay, the 
defendant may renew the request with a single justice, pursuant 
to Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1608 
(2019).  Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 394, 410 (2020).  The 
single justice may review either "as if ruling on the request 
for a stay in the first instance," or "to determine if the trial 
judge made an error of law or abused his or her discretion."  
Id.  Under Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (3), "whichever side is 
aggrieved by the single justice's ruling may appeal . . . [to] 
the court on which the single justice sits."  Nash, supra at 
411-412.  This court then may transfer those appeals, reviewing 
for error of law or abuse of discretion.  Id. at 412. 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 393 Mass. 451, 459 (1984).  The 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial in 2004, arguing that 
several of the jury instructions were erroneous.  A Superior 
Court judge denied the motion, and the Appeals Court affirmed 
the denial of the motion.  See Commonwealth v. McDermott, 65 
Mass. App. Ct. 1112 (2006). 
The defendant filed a second motion for a new trial on 
October 26, 2020, as well as a motion to stay the execution of 
his sentence, seeking release due to COVID-19 concerns.  A 
Superior Court judge denied the motion to stay on January 13, 
2021, holding that the defendant did not satisfy any of the Nash 
factors because the defendant (1) had no reasonable probability 
of success on appeal, (2) was a potential flight risk, and (3) 
already had contracted COVID-19 and therefore was no longer at 
risk. 
The defendant then filed a motion to stay with a single 
justice in the Appeals Court, as allowed by Mass. R. A. P. 
6 (b) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1608 (2019).  The single 
justice disagreed with the Superior Court judge on the first 
Nash factor, concluding that the defendant had a reasonable 
probability of success on appeal.  However, the single justice 
agreed that the defendant was a flight risk and that COVID-19 
concerns did not support a different result where the defendant 
already had contracted COVID-19 and been vaccinated against it. 
4 
 
The defendant appealed from the denial of his motion to 
stay execution of his sentence pending his motion for a new 
trial, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
review.  The defendant argues that he meets all three Nash 
factors.  He further argues that even if it is determined that 
one of the first two factors is deficient, a stay must still be 
granted under the third factor because the general COVID-19 risk 
remains high for incarcerated people and because the defendant's 
age and medical conditions put him at a high specific risk. 
Discussion.  The single justice of the Appeals Court 
recognized that the defendant could not bring a motion under 
rule 6 because he had no pending appeal.  Rule 31 (a) of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, as appearing in 454 
Mass. 1501 (2009), "does not authorize a judge to stay execution 
of a penal sentence when an appeal is not pending."  
Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 74 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 518 (2000).  
Nonetheless, a judge has inherent power to stay a sentence 
pending a motion for a new trial in "exceptional circumstances."  
Charles, supra.  "The very concept of inherent power 'carries 
with it the implication that its use is for occasions not 
provided for by established methods.'"  Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 
Mass. 337, 345 n.13 (2010), quoting Brach v. Chief Justice of 
the Dist. Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528, 536 (1982). 
5 
 
The single justice of the Appeals Court, without the 
benefit of Commonwealth v. Harris, 487 Mass. 1016, 1018 (2021), 
reviewed the motion for a stay under the exception set forth in 
Charles, 466 Mass. at 77 n.16.  "Exceptional circumstances" are 
not specifically defined.  In Charles, supra at 74, we concluded 
that the magnitude of the allegations of serious and far-
reaching misconduct by Annie Dookhan at the William A. Hinton 
State Laboratory Institute constituted exceptional circumstance.  
However, in Harris, supra, we concluded that the COVID-19 
pandemic itself does not present an exceptional circumstance 
warranting exercise of a judge's inherent power to grant a stay 
where a defendant files a motion for a new trial.  Rather, a 
defendant must show that exceptional circumstances exist in his 
or her particular case.  See id. at 1018-1019.  As noted in 
Harris, supra, the pandemic, when combined with other factors, 
might present an exceptional circumstance in a particular 
defendant's case.  See Pope v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 1014, 
1016 (2021).  Assuming, without deciding, that there are 
exceptional circumstances in this particular case, we consider 
the defendant's arguments. 
 
It is unclear to us whether the single justice reviewed the 
judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a stay for abuse of 
discretion or under a de novo standard.  See Nash, 486 Mass. at 
410.  We assume for purposes of this decision that he reviewed 
6 
 
the matter under the de novo standard.  The single justice 
agreed with the reasoning of the motion judge that the motion 
should be denied because the defendant posed a serious flight 
risk in light of his life sentence, failure to obtain parole, 
and at least one previous escape attempt.3  The single justice 
also agreed with the motion judge that the risks posed by COVID-
19 did not require the defendant's sentence to be stayed because 
he had already had COVID-19 and had been vaccinated.  The single 
justice did not agree with the motion judge, however, that the 
defendant had not presented an issue worthy of appellate review.  
The single justice ventured no opinion on whether the issues 
raised were sufficiently strong to entitle the defendant to a 
new trial but did note that the defendant had made arguments of 
sufficient force to meet the first factor in Nash, whether he 
has presented an issue worthy of appellate review. 
 
Without expressing an opinion on whether the issues raised 
by the defendant would entitle him to a new trial, we agree with 
the single justice that the issues were sufficient to meet the 
first factor in Nash.4  We also agree that the defendant presents 
a serious flight risk.  See Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 1), 380 
 
3 The motion judge discounted evidence of a second attempted 
escape because, after investigating the incident, prison 
officials determined that no discipline was warranted. 
 
4 The defendant argues that anti-gay rhetoric unfairly 
infected his trial. 
7 
 
Mass. 851, 855 (1980).  Factors such as the possibility of 
flight to avoid punishment and the severity of the sentence 
imposed support this conclusion.  See Nash, 486 Mass. at 405.  
We also consider the severity of the crime itself and whether 
the defendant poses a threat to the community.  See id. at 414 
("the emphasis is primarily on the severity of the crimes").  
Compare Commonwealth v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 539, cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 132 (2016) (concluding judge did not abuse discretion 
in denying motion to stay execution of sentence based on 
security risk of defendant where defendant was convicted of 
brutally murdering victim), with Charles, 466 Mass. at 78-79 
(defendant did not pose security risk where he was convicted of 
drug offenses and had participated in various programs offered 
in prison).  Although we reduced the defendant's conviction to 
murder in the second degree, the severity of the offense goes 
without saying.  See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 58 
(2015).  Furthermore, the defendant is still facing a life 
sentence.5  We disagree, however, that the fact that the 
 
5 The defendant argues that the single justice did not 
consider positive factors, such as his release plan, his low-
risk classification, or his work and programming efforts, in 
evaluating his risk of recidivism.  These factors, although 
relevant, do not combat the security risk in this case, where no 
motion for a new trial has been allowed, the defendant has been 
denied parole repeatedly, and he has been convicted of murder in 
the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole after fifteen years. 
8 
 
defendant had already contracted COVID-19 and had been 
vaccinated rendered the third factor, the risk of COVID-19, 
irrelevant.  In Commonwealth v. Christie, 484 Mass. 397 (2020), 
we instructed that a judge considering a stay should weigh both 
the general risk of transmission to incarcerated people and 
prison staff as well as "the specific risk to the defendant, in 
view of his or her age and existing medical conditions."  Id. at 
401-402. 
In Nash, we clarified that the aim of Christie was to 
reduce prison and jail populations to safer levels amidst the 
pandemic, not to introduce a new hurdle for defendants seeking 
stays.  Nash, 486 Mass. at 406-408.  Consideration of COVID-19 
reduces incarceration rates by allowing judges to grant stays 
where "a defendant would not qualify for a stay under the 
traditional, two-factor test."  Id. at 407.  We recognize that 
"[e]veryone in a prison setting is at an increased risk [of 
COVID-19 exposure] due to the difficulty in maintaining physical 
distance from others and in spending time outdoors."  Id. at 
409.  Therefore, although vulnerability to the virus may help a 
defendant qualify for a stay, a defendant's motion should not be 
hindered by a lack of special vulnerability.  See id.  
Similarly, because COVID-19 case counts may change rapidly, the 
COVID-19 factor is not negated by a low or reduced level of 
cases at a certain facility.  Id. at 408. 
9 
 
 
We do not wish to discourage inmates or detainees from 
consenting to vaccination.  We also seek to reduce the inmate 
population where appropriate during the pandemic.  We do not yet 
know whether a previous COVID-19 infection would provide the 
defendant with complete immunity or for how long.  Although 
vaccinations have proved to be highly effective at protecting 
vaccinated people against symptomatic and severe COVID-19, 
breakthrough infections can occur and have occurred.  We 
conclude, therefore, that whether a defendant previously has 
been infected or has been vaccinated should not be counted 
against the defendant when assessing the defendant's motion for 
a stay. 
 
In any event, because we agree that the defendant presents 
a serious flight risk, we affirm the order the single justice of 
the Appeals Court denying the defendant's motion to stay his 
sentence pending appeal of his motion for a new trial.  Nothing 
in this opinion precludes the defendant from moving for a stay 
of sentence in the event that his motion for a new trial is 
allowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.