Title: Flores v. Flores

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

Flores v. Flores1999 WY 56979 P.2d 944Case Number: 98-58Decided: 05/13/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

DEBRA 
JANET FLORES, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

ABEL FLORES, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs County 
Honorable

Gary P. Hartman, Judge.

 

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; 
Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. Wilde, Assistant Attorney 
General; Harry D. Ivey, Special Assistant Attorney General, representing 
State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, on behalf of 
Appellant.

 William R. Shelledy, Jr., of Scott, Shelledy and 
Luhm, P. C., Worland, Wyoming, representing 
appellee.

 

 Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

   * 
retired November 2, 1998.

 

    GOLDEN, 
Justice.

   
[¶1]      In this appeal, we address the conflict 
created by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-105(a)(i) (Michie 1997) of the Wyoming Child 
Enforcement Support Act limiting services provided by the State of Wyoming 
(State) through its child support enforcement agency to Wyoming residents and 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-157(a) (Michie 1997) of Wyoming's Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act (UIFSA) requiring the State to provide services to any 
individual upon request. The district court ruled that the State could not 
petition for a modification of a child support order entered in Wyoming because 
Appellant Debra Janet Flores (Mrs. Flores) was a Colorado 
resident.

 

  [¶2]      We hold that the legislature intended 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-105(a)(i) to apply to intrastate agency services and did 
not intend to limit the interstate services that the State is mandated to 
provide under UIFSA. We reverse the district court's order denying the State's 
petition and remand for hearing.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

  [¶3]      The State of Wyoming, Department of 
Family Services, on behalf of Mrs. Flores, presents these issues for our 
review:

  

I. Did the District Court err when it determined the 
State of Wyoming was not authorized to petition for a modification of child 
support under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act?

 

II. Did the District Court err when it determined the 
State of Wyoming was not authorized to petition for modification of a Wyoming 
child support order when the obligee does not reside within the State of 
Wyoming?

 

  Appellee Abel Flores (Mr. Flores) 
rephrases the issue as:

 

Whether the Child Support Enforcement Act (W. S. § 
20-6-101 et seq.) allows for child support enforcement services for support 
obligees who are neither recipients of aid under the POWER program nor residents 
of Wyoming?

 

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶4]      At the time that the Flores divorced in 
1994 in Wyoming, they had three minor children. Mr. Flores was awarded custody 
of the two older children, and Mrs. Flores was awarded custody of the youngest 
child. The two older children became emancipated, but, because the original 
divorce decree had not awarded child support to either party, Mrs. Flores did not receive any 
child support from Mr. Flores for their youngest, unemancipated 
child.

 

  [¶5]      Mrs. Flores, now a resident of Colorado, 
applied for child support from Wyoming's child support enforcement authorities 
through a uniform support petition prepared by Colorado child support 
enforcement authorities. In response to the interstate petition, the State filed 
a petition for modification of support and judgment of arrears and served it on Mr. Flores. 
Following a hearing, the district court denied the State's petition for 
modification based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-105 (a)(i) and (ii). The district 
court approved a stipulated record stating:

 

1. At the modification hearing on December 15, 1997, 
Appellee Abel Flores (hereinafter "Appellee") argued that Appellant State of 
Wyoming (hereinafter "Appellant") did not have authority to provide child 
support services to [Mrs.] Flores since she was not a resident of Wyoming. 
Appellee cited § 20-6-105(a)(i)(ii) in support of his argument. Said statute 
states that child support enforcement services shall be provided to (i) POWER 
recipients and (ii) any obligee residing in Wyoming.

 

2. Appellant argued that the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act not only gives authority to provide services, but actually 
mandates that Appellant provides services to any applicant.  Specifically, Appellant relied on W.S. § 
20-4-147(b), W.S. § 20-4-151, and W.S. § 20-4-155(b)(i) and W.S. § 20-4-157. 
Additionally, Appellant relied on 45 C.F.R. § 302.33(a)(i) which states that 
services shall be available to any individual who files an 
application.

 

3. The District Court contended that the statutes 
cited by Appellant gave the Court authority to hear a modification but did not 
confer authority on the child support agency to provide services to a 
non-resident of Wyoming. Further, the Court found that the Code of Federal 
Regulations conflicts with W.S. § 
20-6-105(a)(i)(ii). The Court therefore relied on the specific Wyoming statute 
and ordered that child support services could not be provided to a non-resident 
of Wyoming pursuant to W.S. § 20-6-105(a)(i)(ii).

 

  [¶6]      This appeal 
followed.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  [¶7]      The State contends that the district 
court erred when it determined that it was not authorized to petition for a 
modification of child support under UIFSA and when it determined that the 
Department of Family Services was not authorized to petition for modification of 
a Wyoming child support order when the obligee does not reside within the state 
of Wyoming. Mr. Flores contends that the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-6-105(a) does not allow the State to provide what he believes is essentially 
free legal services to a support obligee seeking a support increase who is 
neither a recipient of public assistance nor a resident of the state. The 
relevant part of the statute provides:

 

    § 20-6-105. Eligibility 
for services; fees for services.

  

            (a) 
Child support enforcement services shall be provided to:

 

(i) 
Those recipients of aid under the personal opportunities with employment 
responsibilities (POWER) program who, as a condition of eligibility under 
federal law, are required to assign their 
rights to support to, and 
cooperate with, the department in the establishment of parentage and the 
enforcement of support obligations; and

 

                        
(ii) Any obligee residing in Wyoming. . . .

 

  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-105(a)(i) and 
(ii) (Michie 1997).

 

                        
 Standard of 
Review

 

  [¶8]      "Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law, so our standard of review is de novo . . . . If the conclusion of law is 
in accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct it." May v. 
May, 945 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 
1993)).

 

"We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with 
the Legislature's intent. We begin by making an ` inquiry respecting the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection. § Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and 
Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 
Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). 
We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia."

 

Cargill v. State, Dept. of 
Health, Div. of Health Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 
1997)).

 

                      
Availability of Services

 

  [¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-105(a)(i) and 
(ii) (Michie 1997) mandate that child support enforcement services shall be 
provided to certain recipients of public assistance and "any obligee residing in 
Wyoming." We have recognized, however, that the statutory language "[provision 
of] the same services to applicant obligees who are not recipients of public assistance" 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-106(m)(ii) (Michie 1997) authorized the Department of 
Family Services to bring an action in its own name, without regard to the 
obligee's status as a recipient or non-recipient of public assistance. Dept. of 
Family Services v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Wyo. 1998). Here, the district court relied on the statute's 
specification that services shall be provided to a resident obligee and 
determined this language excluded a nonresident obligee from receiving agency 
services under UIFSA, codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-139 through 20-4-189 
(Michie 1997).

 

  [¶10] 
  Effective July 1, 1998, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-105(a)(ii) was modified to state that services shall be 
provided "to any obligee or obligor residing in Wyoming;" however, Mrs. Flores' 
petition for modification of support and judgment of arrears was filed on July 
31, 1997, and we will apply the statute in effect at that time. The district 
court's ruling presents the precise issue of whether this statute may limit the 
agency's duties provided for in 
UIFSA.

 

  [¶11] 
  In 1974, Congress amended 
the Social Security Act to require states to establish the Child Support 
Enforcement Program in order to receive federal funding. Dept. of Family 
Services v. Peterson, 955 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo. 1998), modified, 960 P.2d 1022 
(1998). In response, the Wyoming Legislature enacted the Wyoming Child Support 
Enforcement Act in 1984. 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 51 § 1. To address interstate 
child support enforcement issues, the Wyoming Legislature enacted UIFSA in 1995 
to replace the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act (URESA), and Congress 
has since mandated that all states adopt UIFSA. 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 148 § 
1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (West Supp. 1991-1998); Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (1992) § 501, 9 U. L. A. 454 (Supp. 1998). UIFSA was also modified 
effective July 1, 1998, but we will apply the version in effect at the time Mrs. 
Flores' petition was filed in 1997. 1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 97 § 2. A state 
that participates in a federally funded program must comply with the federal 
laws governing the program. Davidson v. 
Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Wyo. 1993). In this case, the district court recognized that UIFSA as codified in 
the federal law required the agency to provide services to any applicant, but 
ruled that it conflicted with the state law expressed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-6-105(a)(ii) and held the latter must be applied.  The Wyoming version of UIFSA requires 
the State to provide services to any petitioner upon request. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-4-157(a) (Michie 1997).

 

  [¶12] 
  Generally, a statute that 
specifically names the persons affected is to be construed as excluding from its 
effect all those not expressly mentioned. City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1993). When two sections of legislation contradict each other, 
however, a court should give them a reading that gives them both effect. Wyoming 
State Treasurer v. City of Casper, 551 P.2d 687, 697 (Wyo. 1976). Where, as 
here, the legislature modified § 
20-6-105(a) in 1997 well after its adoption of UIFSA, which does not limit 
availability of services, we presume it did so with full knowledge of existing 
law and as part of a uniform system of jurisprudence. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1044 
(quoting Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)). Our examination of the underlying statutory scheme 
convinces us that by holding that § 20-6-105(a)(ii) was not intended to limit 
services available under UIFSA, this Court preserves and enforces the 
legislative intent of both provisions.

 

                     
Underlying Statutory Scheme

 

  [¶13] 
  Congress' well-established 
conviction that the number of recipients needing and collecting public 
assistance could be reduced by state guidelines establishing support and state 
enforcement of spousal and child support orders propelled enactment of child 
support enforcement acts in every state. Mark S. Coven, Welfare Reform, Contempt 
and Child Support Enforcement, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1067, 1069-72 (1997). It 
was soon apparent, however, that by traveling across state lines, obligors 
created difficulty for obligees and courts to collect support. Tina M. Fielding, 
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act: The New URESA, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. 
425, 426 (1994). Intent upon decreasing these difficulties, uniform laws like 
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act (URESA) and the Revised Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act (RURESA) were designed to seek out obligors 
and enforce support orders issued by other states. Id. at 427. These laws proved 
to have procedural defects and loopholes that allowed some states to avoid or 
inadequately enforce interstate support 
orders. Id. at 444-46. Both laws were adjudged as failures in resolving 
obligees' difficulties in collecting adequate support. Id. To address 
shortcomings, the UIFSA was proposed to replace URESA and all states were 
required to adopt it by July 1, 1998. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (West Supp. 
1991-1998); 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(20) (West 1991); Child Support Enforcement Div. v. 
Brenckle, 675 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Mass. 1997).

 

  [¶14] 
  UIFSA permits either an 
"individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency" to commence proceedings 
authorized under it and specifically requires this state's support enforcement 
agency to provide services "upon request 
. . . to a petitioner" in a proceeding under it. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-151(c) 
(Michie Supp. 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-157(a) (Michie 1997). The Act 
explicitly authorizes parties to retain private legal counsel as well as to use 
the services of a state support enforcement agency, and the official comments to 
the Act tell us this provision was included because RURESA's failure to clearly 
recognize the power caused confusion. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-159 (Michie 1997); Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(1996) § 309 cmt, 9 U. L. A 368 (Part 1, Supp. 1998). Plainly, the only 
condition precedent for agency services under UIFSA is a petition and, as the 
district court recognized, that conflicts with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-105(a)'s 
limitation of agency services to residents.

 

  [¶15] 
  Wyoming's Child Support 
Enforcement Act primarily concerns itself with intrastate child support issues. 
It does, however, address interstate child support concerns in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-6-109 (Michie Supp. 1998) which directs that "[t]he department shall assist 
other states in locating absent parents, establishing parentage and securing 
child support as required in order for the state to qualify for federal funds 
under Title IV-D." This provision was part of the original act passed in 1984 
and was intended to address the interstate efforts then in place; however, Wyoming's statutory scheme 
manifests a strong interest in ensuring that child support payments are made by 
the responsible parent. As just discussed, Congress has honed and refined its 
mandatory uniform laws in an effort to achieve maximum support collections and 
reduce public assistance, leading to the conflict between UIFSA and § 
20-6-105(a). Although it has not been updated of late, the plain language of § 
20-6-109 is easily understood to authorize the department to follow any 
federally required interstate laws, and we hold that the legislature intended 
that UIFSA would not be limited by § 20-6-105(a).

 

  [¶16] 
  Accordingly, we extend 
Peterson's holding that the Department of Family Services is authorized to bring 
an action in its own name, without regard to the obligee's status as a recipient 
or non-recipient of public assistance, to also provide that the State is 
authorized to bring an action in its own name, without regard to the residency 
of the obligee.

 

  [¶17] 
  We reverse the district 
court's denial of this petition and remand with directions to hear the petition 
for modification and judgment of arrears in accordance with 
UIFSA.