Title: Gasaway v. Reiter

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gasaway v. Reiter1987 WY 60736 P.2d 749Case Number: 86-288Decided: 05/11/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
George 
R. GASAWAY and Jeanne M. Gasaway, husband and wife, Appellants 
(Defendants)

 
 
v.

 
 
Aleck 
REITER, Appellee (Plaintiff)

 
 
James 
P. Castberg, for Appellants.

 
 
Margaret 
Sommers of McCarty & Cranfill, for Appellee.

 
 

Before 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellee, Aleck Reiter, 
sued his daughter, Jeanne Gasaway and her husband to quiet title to his life 
estate or in the alternative, for money damages for loss of the life estate. 
This appeal is from a judgment awarding appellee damages in the sum of $ 8,800 
and returning his personal property or the value thereof.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     The issues presented 
for review are whether the parties intended to create a life estate in appellee 
at the time of conveyance of real property, whether the life estate was lost by 
subsequent conveyance, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
amount of damages awarded appellee.

 
 

[¶4.]     By warranty deed 
recorded February 17, 1972, appellee conveyed 2 acres of land and his family 
home located thereon to appellants. With respect to the life estate, the deed 
contained the following:

 
 
"RESERVING, 
HOWEVER, TO THE GRANTOR HEREIN, ALECK REITER, a life estate in the within and 
foregoing property * * * *."

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellants claimed they 
did not know that the deed would contain a reservation of a life estate. The 
deed with this reservation, however, was dated February 15, 1972, recorded two 
days later, on February 17, 1972, and delivered to appellants. Appellants paid 
monthly payments over the next five years without complaint. At trial, appellant 
Jeanne Gasaway testified that appellee was supposed to continue living on the 
place, and that this had been discussed with the lawyer who prepared the deed. 
Appellant George Gasaway testified that appellee had the right to live there 
"for the rest of his life or however long he wanted to." Appellee Reiter 
testified: "I got a life estate out there" and "that was the deal, I was 
supposed to live there and he was supposed to see that I got in the 
ground."

 
 

[¶6.]     During 1975 a neighbor 
became aware of an error in the metes and bounds description in the common 
boundary dividing their property from that of appellee and appellants. 
Corrective quitclaim deeds were executed conveying this property to the neighbor 
and back to appellants. The corrective deeds made no mention of the life estate. 
During January 1985, appellee became ill and entered a hospital for care and 
treatment. After a few days he was released from the hospital but, because of 
his illness, could not live alone. He stayed at first with a son in Cody, 
Wyoming, and later with a daughter in Billings, Montana. When he returned to the 
property, he discovered that appellants had demolished his 
home.

 
 

[¶7.]     We must first determine 
whether appellee retained a life estate when he, by deed, conveyed his property 
to appellants. A deed must be considered as a whole and the intent of the 
parties gathered from the plain and unambiguous language contained therein, 
Dawson v. Meike, Wyo., 508 P.2d 15 (1973). No particular language is 
required to create a life estate. If, from the deed, the intent of the grantor 
is apparent, it is effective to reserve to himself a life estate in property in 
which the fee is granted to another. Krug v. Reissig, Wyo., 488 P.2d 150, 
52 A.L.R.3d 748 (1971). The intent of the parties here could not have been more 
clear. They agree that appellee could live on the property for his lifetime. 
They informed the lawyer employed to prepare the deed of their agreement, and he 
placed a life estate reservation in the deed that none could misunderstand and 
which was effective to reserve to appellee a life estate in the property 
conveyed.

 
 

[¶8.]     It is next contended 
that the life estate was surrendered when appellants and appellee quitclaimed 
this property to a neighbor to correct an error in the metes and bounds 
description of their common boundary lines and the neighbor quitclaimed the 
property back to appellants without mentioning or preserving the life estate. 
The parties agree that these deeds were corrective only and that they were not 
executed for the purpose of terminating the life estate. Appellee testified 
without contradiction that they did not intend to terminate the life estate. 
Clearly, failing to preserve appellee's life estate in the corrective deeds was 
a mutual mistake. A deed that does not express the intention of the parties 
because of mutual mistake may be reformed to provide what the parties intended. 
Arndt v. Sheridan Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., Wyo., 429 P.2d 326 (1967). For reformation to be granted there must 
be:

 
 
"(1) 
a meeting of the minds -- a mutual understanding between the parties -- prior to 
the time a writing is entered into,

(2) 
a written contract or agreement, (3) which does not conform to the 
understanding, by reason of mutual mistake." Crompton v. Bruce, Wyo., 669 P.2d 930, 934 (1983). See also Pfister v. Brown, Wyo., 498 P.2d 1243 
(1972).

 
 

[¶9.]     Here the parties agreed 
that the sole purpose of the deeds was correction of a misdescription, that they 
were not for the purpose of terminating the life estate, and that they did not 
intend to terminate the life estate. The mistake was mutual. The court properly 
reformed the deed to preserve appellee's life estate as agreed to by the 
parties.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellants finally contend that 
appellee's witness, who established the value of his house as $ 8,800, was not 
credible and that there was not sufficient evidence to support the award of $ 
8,800 for destruction of the house. The parties agreed that appellee's damages 
should be the value of his home at the time of its destruction. The case was 
tried upon that basis without objection. Whether that was the proper measure of 
damages we do not decide, for it was not raised and is not before us on appeal. 
The only question presented to us is the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
value at the time of destruction of $ 8,800.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellee testified that the value of his 
house was $ 10,000. An expert real estate appraiser testified to his extensive 
training and experience, to the method utilized in determining value, and that 
the value of the house at the time of destruction was $ 8,800. The trial court 
found the witness credible, accepted his opinion of value, and awarded judgment 
in the sum of $ 8,800. We have often stated:

 
 
"The 
standard of review for questions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is 
that we assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true 
leaving out of consideration the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict 
therewith and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable 
inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it." Walter v. 
Moore, Wyo., 700 P.2d 1219, 1222 (1985). See also Stockton v. 
Sowerwine, Wyo., 690 P.2d 1202 (1984); Thomasi v. Koch, Wyo., 660 P.2d 806 (1983); Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 624 P.2d 1192 (1981).

 
 

[¶12.]  True, the evidence in this case was 
conflicting. It is not, however, our function as an appellate court to resolve 
conflicting evidence or retry the case. We have said that

 
 
"the 
greatest difficulty in stating a general rule for recovery of damages has been 
in those cases involving damages to realty. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 135. So much 
is subjective and uncertain in determining fair market values before and after 
the damage, diminished values, whether the damage is permanent or temporary, the 
nature and extent of the damage and methods of repair.

* 
* *

"'If 
there is evidence from which a reasonable estimate of money damages may be made, 
that is sufficient, the primary objective being to determine the amount of loss, 
applying whatever rule is best suited for that purpose.' Douglas Reservoirs 
Water Users Association v. Cross, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1280, 1284 (1977)." 
Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316, 1323-1324 
(1984).

 
 
There 
was substantial evidence here to support the damage award.

 
 

[¶13.]  Affirmed.