Title: State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an Elected Law Director v. Bay Village

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an Elected Law Director v. Bay 
Village, 115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-5380.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. COMMITTEE FOR THE CHARTER AMENDMENT FOR AN 
ELECTED LAW DIRECTOR ET AL. v. CITY OF BAY VILLAGE ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an Elected Law 
Director v. Bay Village, 115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-5380.] 
Election law — Mandamus — Relators failed to comply with the personal-
knowledge requirement of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) — Cause dismissed. 
(No. 2007-1687 ─ Submitted October 2, 2007 ─ Decided October 8, 2007.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel a city, its city council, and the clerk of council to submit a proposed 
charter amendment to the electorate at the November 6, 2007 election.  Because 
relators failed to comply with the personal-knowledge requirement of 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B), we dismiss the cause. 
{¶ 2} Relators Lucian A. Dade, Karen Dade, and Eric Hansen are 
electors, residents, and taxpayers of respondent city of Bay Village, Ohio.  The 
individual relators formed a committee and decided to circulate and file a petition 
proposing a charter amendment.  Relator Committee for the Charter Amendment 
for an Elected Law Director is the committee formed by the individual relators. 
{¶ 3} On August 29, 2007, the committee filed with respondent Joan T. 
Kemper, the clerk of council for the city of Bay Village, a petition containing 46 
part-petitions and 907 signatures.  The petition requested that respondent Bay 
Village City Council enact an ordinance to submit a proposed charter amendment 
to the electorate.  The amendment is entitled “A Proposed Charter Amendment to 
provide for the election of the Director of Law by the electorate, and to provide 
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for the office of the Director of Law by amending Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 11.2 of 
the Bay Village City Charter.” 
{¶ 4} On September 6, 2007, the city council held a special meeting to 
consider the petition and vote on an ordinance to submit the proposed charter 
amendment to the electorate at the November 6, 2007 election.  The council 
defeated the ordinance and refused to submit the proposed charter amendment to 
the electorate at the November 6, 2007 election. 
{¶ 5} On September 10, relators, the committee and its three members, 
filed this expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, 
Bay Village, the clerk of council, and the city council, to submit the proposed 
charter amendment to the electorate at the November 6, 2007 general election.  
Relators filed an affidavit of their counsel with the complaint.  Respondents filed 
an answer, and the parties filed evidence and briefs. 
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court for its consideration of relators’ 
mandamus claim 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) 
{¶ 7} Respondents contend that this case should be dismissed because 
relators failed to comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B), which provides that affidavits 
supporting an original action other than habeas corpus filed in this court must 
specify the details of the claim, set forth facts admissible in evidence, and be 
made on personal knowledge: 
{¶ 8} “All complaints shall contain a specific statement of facts upon 
which the claim for relief is based, shall be supported by an affidavit of the relator 
or counsel specifying the details of the claim, and may be accompanied by a 
memorandum in support of the writ.  The affidavit required by this division shall 
be made on personal knowledge, setting forth facts admissible in evidence, and 
showing affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to all matters stated 
in the affidavit.” 
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3 
{¶ 9} Relators supported their complaint in mandamus with their 
counsel’s affidavit, in which he stated that he had read and reviewed the 
complaint and that based upon his “personal knowledge and information the fact[ 
] statements and claims” contained in the complaint “are true and correct.”  
Relators’ counsel also stated that based on his “personal knowledge and 
information,” the exhibits attached to the complaint “are true and accurate copies 
of the originals.”  The entire affidavit was prefaced by the statement that counsel 
upon his “own personal information and knowledge, depose and state as follows.”   
{¶ 10} Concerning the personal-knowledge requirement of S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(4)(B), we have long held that affidavits required in original actions filed in this 
court must be based on personal knowledge.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Sekermestrovich v. Akron (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 536, 538, 740 N.E.2d 252.  Even 
before S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) expressly required that affidavits supporting the 
claim be based on the affiant’s personal knowledge, we dismissed original actions 
that did not include affidavits that included a statement to that effect.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 324, 750 N.E.2d 167.  
Although we dismissed most of these preamendment cases without prejudice, 
Justice Pfeifer cautioned that future violations of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) may be 
subject to dismissal with prejudice: 
{¶ 11} “However, I would further caution relators, as well as other 
prospective relators, that future violations of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) may be subject 
to dismissal with prejudice.  * * * This case should provide prospective relators 
with sufficient warning regarding the potential consequences of not fully 
complying with the affidavit requirement of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B).  Much like an 
umpire giving a pitcher a warning that the next pitch aimed at a batter’s head may 
lead to his ejection, attorneys are similarly warned here.”  (Emphasis sic)  Id. at 
325, 750 N.E.2d 167 (Pfeifer, J., concurring). 
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{¶ 12} Effective August 1, 2002, S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) was amended to 
incorporate the court’s construction of the previous version of the rule to specify 
that the affidavit required must be made on personal knowledge.  95 Ohio St.3d 
CXXXVI.  Following this amendment, we reiterated that “ ‘[w]e have routinely 
dismissed original actions, other than habeas corpus, that were not supported by 
an affidavit expressly stating that the facts in the complaint were based on the 
affiant’s personal knowledge.’ ”  State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 
437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 31, quoting State ex rel. Hackworth v. 
Hughes, 97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334, 776 N.E.2d 1050, ¶ 24.  In Evans, 
we held that an affidavit of relator’s counsel did not comply with the S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(4)(B) personal-knowledge requirement because it stated that the facts in the 
complaint were “ ‘true and correct to the best of his knowledge.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 32.  In 
Hackworth, the affidavit of relator’s attorney stated that the facts in the complaint 
were “ ‘true and accurate to the best of her knowledge and belief.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 24.  
Both Evans and Hackworth were expedited election cases. 
{¶ 13} As respondents contend, relator’s counsel’s affidavit stating that 
the statements and claims contained in the complaint are “true and correct” based 
on the attorney’s “personal knowledge and information” or “personal information 
and knowledge” does not fully comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) because it is not 
clear which allegations are based on personal knowledge and which allegations 
are based simply on information.  That is, under this affidavit language, one 
paragraph of relators’ 66-paragraph complaint could be based on personal 
knowledge and the remaining 65 paragraphs could be based on information.  
Although relators claim that the intent of the phrases “personal information and 
knowledge” and “personal knowledge and information” in their counsel’s 
affidavit was to make the adjective “personal” apply to both knowledge and 
information, and that in applying the common usage of the terms, they are 
synonymous, relators’ counsel could have avoided any problem with the affidavit 
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by simply amending the affidavit to state that it was based solely on his “personal 
knowledge.”  The fact that he did not seek leave to do so implies that he could not 
swear that every pertinent allegation necessary to support the mandamus claim 
was, in fact, based on his personal knowledge. 
{¶ 14} Consistent with Evans, Hackworth, and S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B), we 
dismiss this cause because although respondents notified relators of this defect in 
both their answer to relators’ complaint and in their merit brief, relators failed to 
seek leave to amend their mandamus complaint to correct the affidavit.  See, e.g., 
Evans, 111 Ohio St.3d 437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 34.  We recognize 
that “the fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio is that courts should decide 
cases on their merits.”  See State ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 
502, 505, 756 N.E.2d 1228.  But because our longstanding legal construction of 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) demands dismissal, we will not create an exception to that 
precedent. 
Cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 15} It is well established that “the fundamental tenet of judicial review 
in Ohio is that courts should decide cases on their merits.”  State ex rel. Becker v. 
Eastlake (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 505, 756 N.E.2d 1228.  I believe that the 
affidavit in this case meets the personal-knowledge requirement in S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(4)(B) and that the majority’s interpretation is too technical.  Consequently, I 
respectfully dissent from the decision to dismiss, and I would consider the case on 
the merits. 
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{¶ 16} This case is not like State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, or State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes, 
97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334, 776 N.E.2d 1050, in which the affiants 
attested, respectively, that the documents were “true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge” and “true and accurate to the best of her knowledge and belief.”  
These phrases do not reflect personal knowledge gained through firsthand 
observation or experience.  Rather, the phrases attested to by the affiants in Evans 
and Hackworth merely express a belief based on what someone else said or based 
on secondhand information that the affiants believed to be true.  For those 
reasons, the affidavits did not comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B), and dismissal 
was appropriate. 
{¶ 17} Here, relators’ counsel used the requisite phrase “personal 
knowledge.”  I do not believe that the reference to “information” or “personal 
information” removes the affidavit from compliance with the personal-knowledge 
requirement of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B).  As written, the adjective “personal” applied 
to both the affiant’s knowledge and his information.  In the common usage of the 
terms, they are synonymous.  One accepted definition of “information” is 
“knowledge of a particular event or situation.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1986) 1160. 
{¶ 18} The majority places significance on the fact that relators’ counsel 
did not seek leave to amend his affidavit.  However, it is likely that counsel 
believed that the affidavit complied with the rule and that it was unnecessary to 
move to amend merely to delete the word “information” when the affidavit 
included the requisite phrase “personal knowledge.”  The fact that the affiant 
included the additional, but unnecessary, word “information” should not defeat 
the affidavit’s validity. 
{¶ 19} The majority’s interpretation is a new construction of the rule.  
Because relators’ counsel did use the phrase “personal knowledge” in his 
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affidavit, applying this new interpretation to dismiss the relators’ complaint in this 
case is unfair.  To avoid unfairness, I believe that the court should prospectively 
apply this interpretation and caution attorneys that in future cases, this language 
will not be held to fully comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B), and the case will be 
subject to dismissal with prejudice. 
{¶ 20} Consequently, I respectfully dissent and would consider the case 
on the merits. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Phillips & Co., L.P.A., and Gerald W. Phillips, for relators. 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Stephen M. O’Bryan, Patrick J. Krebs, 
and Majeed G. Makhlouf; and The McTigue Law Group, Donald J. McTigue, and 
Mark A. McGinnis, for respondents. 
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