Title: State v Michelle Jones

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

FILED

December 29 2008

 

DA 07-0490
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2008 MT 440

 

 

FILED

 

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee, DEC 29 zone
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‘Sar oF ean
MICHELLE LARAE JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Custer, Cause No. DC-06-23,
Honorable Gary L. Day, Presiding Judge

 

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant

Jim Wheeis, Chet Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:

Hon, Mike MeGrath, Montana Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli,
Assistant Attomey General; Helena, Montana

‘Wyatt Glade, Custer County Attorney, Miles City, Montana

‘Submitted on Briefs: August 19, 2008

Decided: December 29, 2008

Filed:
Terk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court,

 

{1 Michelle Larae Jones (Jones) appeals from the judgment entered by the Sixteenth
Judicial District Court, Custer County, on her convietion and sentence for the offense of
felony criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. We affirm in par, reverse in part and
remand with instructions.

42 Jones raises the following issues on appeal:

$31. Did the District Court err in failing to suppress the recording of a telephone

 

conversation between Jones and a confidential informant?

$4 2 Did the District Court err in imposing various conditions on Jones's sentence?
BACKGROUND

{5 On the morning of December 22, 2005, Marjorie Marie Brown (Brown), who

previously had agreed to act as a confidential informant for the Eastern Montana Drug Task

 

Force (Task Force), contacted Agent Ben Brewer (Brewer) to inform him that she had
arranged to buy one-half ounce of marijuana from Cody Butler (Butler). Atthe time, Butler
‘was Jones's boyfriend and the two resided together. Later that morning, Brown telephoned
Butler's home to confirm arrangements for the drug purchase. Jones answered the telephone
and told Brown that Butler was hiding from some people and had asked her to complete the

drug transaction with Brown, Jones and Brown made arrangements to meet later that day.

‘This telephone conversation was tape-recorded by Brewer with Brown’s consent and without
‘a search warrant. Jones and Brown later met ina restroom at the Miles Community College
‘where Jones provided Brown one-half ounce of marijuana in exchange for $100.
{6 The State of Montana (State) subsequently charged Jones by information with one
count of felony criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. Jones moved the District Court to
dismiss the charge on the grounds of entrapment and to suppress the tape recording of the
telephone conversation, The District Court held an evidentiary hearing, following which it
denied both of Jones's motions. Jones and the State then entered into a plea agreement in
which Jones agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense in exchange for the State's
‘agreement to recommend the District Court defer imposition of sentence for three years. The
plea agreement also provided that Jones would pay $125 restitution to the Task Force and
that she reserved her right to appeal the District Court’s ruling on her pretrial motions. The
District Court accepted Jones's guilty plea, seta sentencing hearing and ordered preparation
ofa presentence investigation report (PSI).
{7 The PSI concurred in the 3-year deferred imposition of sentence and set forth 25
recommended probation conditions. Following the sentencing hearing, the District Court
fordered that imposition of Jones's sentence be deferred for two years subject to 24
conditions. The court also ordered Jones to pay $125 restitution tothe Task Force. The court
entered judgment on the conviction and sentence. Jones appeals,

DISCUSSION

{8 1. Did the District Court err in failing to suppress the recording of the telephone
conversation between Jones and Brown?
{9 Jones moved the District Court to suppress the tape recording of the telephone
conversation between she and Brown, relying on two cases—State v. Goetz, No. 05-676
(Mont filed Oct. 12, 2005) and State v. Hamper, No. 05-539 (Mont. filed Aug. 4, 2005)—
Which were then pending on appeal in this Court, but not yet decided. She essentially
asserted that the warrantless recording violated her rights under Article Il, Sections 10 and 11
‘ofthe Montana Constitution. The District Court denied her motion to suppress, concluding
that the warrantless recording of a conversation with the consent of one party to the
conversation is lawful. Jones asserts error. We review a district court's ruling on a motion to
suppress to determine whether the courts findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its
interpretation and application of the law correct, State v. Copelton, 2006 MT 182, § 8, 333,
Mont. 91, $8, 140 P.3d 1074, $8.

{10 On appeal, Jones again asserts that the facts and issue in this case are substantially

 

 

similar to those in Goetz and Hamper, and argues this case should be resolved in conformity
with the outcome in those cases. Although those cases were still pending at the time of
briefing inthis appeal, we recently issued our decision in those cases in State v. Goetz, 2008

MT 296, 345 Mont, 421, 191 P.3d 489. In Goets, the defendants appealed from the denials

   

of their respective motions to. suppress tape recordings of one-on-one, in-person

conversations between the defendants and confidential informants which occurred in the

 

defendants’ homes and, in one instance, in a vehicle. Goetz, 5:
 

{IL Wepreviously have addressed the specific issue of whether the warrantless consensual
‘monitoring and recording of a telephone conversation constitutes an unreasonable search in
Violation ofthe Montana Constitution. We did so in State v. Coleman, 189 Mont. 492, $02-
03, 616 P.2d 1090 1096 (1980); State v. Canon, 212 Mont. 157, 162-63, 687 P.2d 705, 708
(1984); and State v. Brown, 232 Mont, 1, 6-7, 75S P.2d 1364, 1368 (1988) (overruled on
‘other grounds in Goetz, § 24). Jones does not cite to, discuss or analyze Coleman, Canon, or
Brown. Nor does Jones present any analysis of the factors applicable in determining whether
‘an unreasonable—or unlawful—search occurred as contemplated by Article II, Sections 10
and 11 of the Montana Constitution, those factors being whether Jones had an actual
expectation of privacy which society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable and the
nature of the state’s intrusion upon that expectation of privacy. See Goets, §)27.

{12 The appellant bears the burden of establishing error by the district court, State v
Hicks, 2006 MT 71, § 22, 331 Mont. 471, 4 22, 133 P.3d 206, 4122. Furthermore, itis not
this Court's obligation to conduct legal research on an appellant's behalf or develop legal
‘analysis supporting an appellant’s position. Hicks, 22. We conclude Jones has failed to

establish that the District Court erred in refusing to suppress the recording of a telephone

 

conversation between Jones and a confidential informant,
$13. 2. Did the District Court err in imposing various conditions on Jones’s sentence?
{14 The District Court deferred imposition of Jones’s sentence for 2 years, subject to 24

‘enumerated conditions and the payment of restitution. On appeal, Jones asserts that 4 of the
‘enumerated conditions —specifically, Conditions 7, 12, 13 and 22—areilegal and should be
siricken From her sentence because they have no nexus to either Jones of the offense of
criminal distribution of dangerous drugs to which she pled guilty. Jones also contends that,
the condition that she pay $125 restitution tothe Task Force is illegal because itis outside the
scope of the District Court’s statutory sentencing authority.

{1S We generally review probation conditions included in a criminal sentence for legality

 

first, determining whether they fall within statutory parameters. State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83,
‘19, 342 Mont, 187, $9, 179 P.3d 1164, 9. We recognize that, even if the conditions are
otherwise legal, additional sentencing statutes authorize reasonable conditions on deferred or
suspended sentences considered necessary for rehabilitation or the protection of the victim or
society. We review the reasonableness of such conditions under an abuse of discretion
standard. Ashby, 9. To be reasonable, such conditions must have “a nexus to either the

offense for which the offender is being sentenced, ot to the offender himself or herself.”

Ashby, $15.

 

$16 As stated above, Jones challenges Conditions 7, 12, 13 and 22 ofher sentence on the
basis that they have no nexus to either her or her offense, She did not object to Conditions 7,
13 and 22 during the sentencing hearing, however, and we generally refuse to address issues
(on appeal absent an objection in the trial court. State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, 48, 335,
Mont. 344, $8, 151 P.3d 892, #8. An exception to this general rule exists, however. We

will review a criminal sentence alleged to be illegal, or in excess of statutory parameters,
‘even where the defendant failed to object to the sentence in the trial court. See State v.
Lenihan, 184 Mont, 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979). We have held, however, that “a
sentencing cour’s failure to abide by a statutory requirement rises to an objectionable
sentence, not necessarily an illegal one that would invoke the Lenihan exception.” Kotwicki,
13,

{17 We recently have held that a defendant's challenge to a sentencing condition on the
basis that no evidence of record establishes a nexus between the condition and the defendant
ot the defendant's offense “is merely a contention that his sentence is objectionable, not that
itis illegal.” State v. Hameline, 2008 MT 241, § 14, 344 Mont, 461, § 14, 188 P.3d 1052,
14, Therefore, Jones’s arguments thatthe District Court erred in imposing Conditions 7, 13
‘and 22 because they have no nexus to her or her offense are assertions that the conditions are
objectionable, rather than illegal. As a result, the Lenihan exception is inapplicable and
Jones is barred from raising these arguments on appeal.

{IS Jones did object to Condition 12, which prohibits her from consuming
alcohol/intoxicants or entering establishments where intoxicants are the chief item of sale, in

the trial court. This condition—while not among the statutorily-enumerated sentencing

 

conditions set forth in § 46-18-201(4Xa)-(n), MCA—may nevertheless be reasonably related
to the objectives of rehabilitating the offender and protecting the victim and society under §§
46-18-201 (40) and -202(1)(, MCA, if it has a nexus to either the offense for which the

offender is being sentenced or to the offender herself. See Ashby, ©15. Ifa sentencing
condition does not have such a nexus, the sentencing court has abused its discretion in
imposing it,
19 Here, itis undisputed that alcohol was not a factor in—or related in any way to—
Jones's offense of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. The question remains whether a
nexus exists between the alcohol prohibition condition and Jones herself.
{20 We previously have cautioned that
courts may impose offender-related conditions only in those cases in which the
history or pattern of conduct to be restricted is recent, and significant or
chronic. A passing, isolated, or stale instance of behavior or conduct will be
insufficient to support a restrictive probation condition imposed inthe name of
offender rehabilitation.
Ashby, 15. Where a defendant has a recent and significant or chronic history of drug abuse
‘and dependency, we have upheld alcohol-restriction conditions as having a nexus to the
coffender—regardless of whether the defendant has a specific history of alcohol abuse—based
‘on the possibility of the defendant's addictive tendencies causing him or her to substitute
alcohol for drugs. See e.g. State v. Winkel, 2008 MT 89, §§ 15-16, 342 Mont. 267, 44 15-16,
182 P.3d 54, $9 15-16; State v. Brotherton, 2008 MT 119, § 23, 342 Mont. 511, 4 23, 182
P.3d 88, 4 23; State v. Greensweight, 2008 MT 185, § 28, 343 Mont. 474, $28, 187 P.3d 613,
1.28 In contrast, where there is no evidence that a defendant has a drug or alcohol

dependency problem, an alcohol-restriction probation condition has no nexus to the offender

and its imposition is an abuse of discretion. See Ashby, $ 19.
{21 Here, the PSI indicated that Jones’s criminal history consisted of two prior traffic-
related misdemeanor offenses. She has no prior felonies and no drug: o alcohol-related
convictions. The PSI further indicated that Jones self-reported that she does not use alcohol

and had not used marijuana for three years prior to being arrested for the instant offense. The

 

probation and parole officer who prepared the PSI made no suggestion, cither in the PSI orat
the sentencing hearing, that Jones appeared untruthful or evasive when discussing her alcohol
and drug use. There is no evidence that Jones has used drugs other than marijuana at any
time, The PSI noted, however, that Jones's deceased father was an alcoholic. Upon

questioning by the District Court at the sentencing hearing, the probation officer stated the

 

alcohol-estriction condition was appropriate because the underlying offense was a drug
offense and the court agreed. No other reason for the condition was given, either at the
sentencing hearing or in the court’s written judgment.

{22 The State points out that, at the evidentiary hearing on Jones's motions to dismiss and
suppress, informant Brown testified that she had “done drugs maybe twice” with Jones prior

to the date on which the drug transaction occurred. However, Brown also testified that she

 

hhad known Jones for three or more years, and she did not t

 

‘as to when during those
‘years she had “done drugs” with Jones. Thus, Brown’s testimony does not contradict Jones's

assertion that she had not used marijuana for three years prior to her arrest. Furthermore, “[a}

 

passing, isolated, or stale instance of behavior or conduct” is an insufficient basis upon which

to ground an offender-related restrictive probation condition. Ashby, $15.
$23. We conclude that the evidence and circumstances of this case do not establish that

Jones has a recent,

 

ignificant or chronic drug dependency and abuse problem establishing a
‘nexus between an alcohol-related restrictive probation condition and her rehabilitative needs
We conclude, therefore, that the District Court abused its discretion in imposing Condition
2.

‘24 Finally, Jones argues that the requirement in her sentence that she pay $125 restitution
to the Task Force is beyond the District Court's statutory sentencing authority and, therefore,
illegal because the Task Force isnot victim of her criminal distribution of dangerous drugs
offense, She cites State v. Krum, 2007 MT 229, 420, 339 Mont. 154, § 20, 168 P.34 658, 4
20, for the proposition that a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution to third-party
‘organizations such as state and local community entities which are not actual vietims of the
underlying offense, Jones further asserts that, although the Task Force could be considered a
victim pursuant to § 46-18-243(2)(aXvi), MCA, her agreement to pay the $125 restitution in
the plea agreement was given under duress. Under the facts and circumstances of this case,
‘we conclude she is incorrect.

$25 Iris undisputed that full restitution to any victim suffering a pecuniary loss is a

 

statutorily permissible part of a sentence under § 46-18-241(1), MCA. Section 46-18-
243(2Ma)(vi), MCA, defines the term “victim,” in part, as “any person or entity whom the

offender has voluntarily agreed to reimburse as part of a voluntary plea bargain.”
{26 Inthe present case, the plea agreement—signed by both Jones and her counsel, as well
as the State's counse!—expressly provided that Jones “will pay restitution in the amount of
$125.00 to the Eastern Montana Drug Task Force.” Documentation appended to the PSI
indicated that the restitution included repayment of the $100 provided by the Task Force to
Brown to purchase the marijuana from Jones and $25 paid to Brown for her services as a
confidential informant. Jones has not established that, atthe time she and her counsel signed
the plea agreement agreeing to pay the $125 restitution to the Task Force, she was under any
duress to do so; nor did she attempt to withdraw her guilty plea on that, or any, basis.
Finally, Krum did not involve a situation where restitution was agreed to ina plea agreement

and, therefore, that case is i

 

applicable here. See Krum, 19 5-8
{27 Weconclude that, because Jones agreed in her plea agreement to pay restitution tothe
Task Force, the Task Force is a “victim” as defined by § 46-18-243(2){aX\vi), MCA, to whom
the District Court could require Jones to pay restitution. Asa result, the District Court did
not err in imposing the $125 restitution obligation on Jones's sentence.

{28 _ Insummary, we hold that Jones is barred from challenging Conditions 7, 13 and 22 of
her sentence on the basis they have no nexus to her or the underlying offense because she
failed to object to those conditions in the District Court. We further hold that the District

Court abused its discretion in imposing Condition 12, prohibiting Jones from consuming

 

alcohol/intoxicants or entering establishments where intoxicants are the chief item of sale,

because there is no nexus between the condition and either Jones herself or the offense of

n
criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. Finally, we hold that the District Court did not err

 

in ordering Jones to pay $125 in restitution to the Task Force because she agreed to do so in
her plea agreement,
{29 Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions to the District Court,

to strike Condition 12 from Jones’s sentence.

atest

We concur:

 
Justice Jim Rice, concurring in part and dissenting in par.

$30 I concur with the result under Issue 1 under a different rationale and with most of
Issue 2. 1 dissent from the Court's reversal of the alcohol condition, Condition 12, under
Issue 2.

BI Jones’ challenge to the tape recordit

 

12 of her telephone conversation with

 

informant Brown is an issue this Court has previously decided contrary to her position,
In the cases the Court cites in | 11, we held that telephone conversations of the kind
challenged here are not subject to a warrant requirement. These holdings were consistent

with the deliberations of the delegates to the 1972 Constit

 

ional Convention regarding
the right to privacy, as explained by Delegate Dahood:

First of all, this does not in any way relate to the obscene phone call
situation, nor does it relate to the ability of the telephone company to make
the traces. The logic and the reason is this: all personal rights,
constitutional or otherwise, may be waived. Lady A is receiving the
‘obscene phone call. She waives her right and grants the telephone
‘company the right to intercept that communication. The individual that's
making the call does not have the right to privacy with respect to violating.
the law and making the obscene phone calls, so as a consequence, we are
not interfering with anyone's rights by having the telephone company
attempt to intercept and discover and determine who the caller is; we are
protecting the right to privacy. So as a consequence, may I say that that
objection would not be one that we would have to Worry about under the
law

 

Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1686.

 

Based upon the specific statements of the constitutional convention delegates and the

holdings of our cases, I would affirm Issue 1
732 Under Issue 2, 1 would affirm all of the challenged Conditions, including.
Condition 12, the alcoho! condition. Jones was convicted in this proceeding of a crime
‘elated to substance abuse—the criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. She is an
illegal drug user herself, and the evidence demonstrates that she has maintained
relationships with drug users and dealers, including Brown and Butler. In my view, a
sufficient nexus is presented by the record to justify imposition of the aleohol condition

under our cases.

  
 

Justice John Warmer joins the concurring