Title: JON ALAN BANKS v. ARTHUR J. CROWNER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JON ALAN BANKS v. ARTHUR J. CROWNER1985 WY 10694 P.2d 101Case Number: 83-259Decided: 01/24/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JON 
ALAN BANKS, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v. 

ARTHUR J. CROWNER, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Julie Nye 
Tiedeken of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellant.

John E. 
Stanfield and John B. Scott of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee Arthur J. 
Crowner sued appellant Jon Alan Banks to recover for personal injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident. The jury found that both parties were negligent but 
that appellant's negligence was greater, and awarded damages to 
appellee.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The accident resulting 
in appellee's injuries occurred around dusk, December 11, 1980, on a primary 
paved highway in Albany County, Wyoming. 
Appellee's pickup truck had stalled on the highway due to a sudden failure of 
the electrical system, and he was unable to pull off the road all the way 
because of a deep snowfilled barrow pit. About thirty minutes later appellant 
was traveling in the same direction, and failed to see the stalled vehicle or 
appellee, who was standing behind his pickup. Appellant struck the pickup truck 
and Crowner as Crowner was attempting to move to the side of the road to safety. 
Crowner suffered internal and other injuries which caused him to be 
hospitalized. The jury found that appellee was 35 percent negligent in causing 
the accident, and appellant was 65 percent negligent. The total damages awarded 
were $102,000, which resulted in a judgment for appellee in the amount of 
$66,300.

[¶4.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"A. Whether the trial 
court improperly prohibited the Defendant from mentioning the word 
`alcoholism.'

"B. Whether the trial 
court erred in prohibiting the Defendant from cross-examining the Plaintiff on 
his drinking habits and alcoholism.

"C. Whether the trial 
court erred in prohibiting Defendant from questioning Dr. Haight, Plaintiff's 
treating physician, on Plaintiff's withdrawal symptoms and 
alcoholism.

"D. Whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the standard of care required of 
an intoxicated person.

"E. Whether the trial 
court erred in allowing Plaintiff to submit as evidence the hospital bills from 
the Veteran's Administration when the claim of the United 
States was not pled in the case and the 
United 
States is not a party to this 
case.

"F. Whether the trial 
court erred in refusing Defendant's proposed jury verdict form which would 
require the jury to find that Defendant's negligence was a `proximate cause' 
(direct cause) of the accident.

"G. Whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to cross-examine Plaintiff's witness, 
Zeimans, as to the difference between his testimony and the facts contained in 
the Highway Patrolman's accident report."

Issues A through 
D will be considered together.

[¶5.]     Evidentiary rulings are 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and it is the burden of 
appellant to demonstrate that the trial court abused that discretion. Absent a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion, the trial court's ruling will not be 
disturbed. Caterpillar Tractor Company v. 
Donahue, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 
(1983).

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
the trial court's exclusion of evidence dealing with the alleged alcoholism of 
appellee constitutes an abuse of discretion by the court, thereby severely 
prejudicing the presentation of his case. This was first argued before the trial 
court pursuant to a motion in limine filed by appellee. Appellee asserted, and 
the trial court agreed, that the evidence of appellee's history of alcoholism 
was irrelevant to the issues of the case and should be excluded under Rule 402, 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence, since the probative worth of the evidence would be 
far outweighed by its prejudicial effect and confusion of the 
issues.

[¶7.]     The trial court 
restricted the testimony with regard to appellee's "drinking problem" or alcohol 
consumption to the day of the accident; and the court prohibited use of the 
terms alcoholism and alcoholic. Appellant asserts that evidence of appellee's 
alleged alcoholism was highly relevant and should have been admitted as "habit" 
and/or as impeachment evidence on the issue of appellee's 
credibility.

[¶8.]     Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible. Rule 402, W.R.E. Rule 401, W.R.E., defines relevant 
evidence as

"* * * evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."

We are not 
convinced that evidence of appellee's alleged alcoholism even rises to the level 
of relevancy pronounced in Rule 401. Whether or not appellee was an alcoholic 
does not help the trier of fact determine appellee's negligence at the time of 
the accident. The trial court did, however, allow evidence which indicated the 
amount of alcohol appellee consumed and its effect on him before the 
accident.

[¶9.]     Assuming that the 
evidence of appellee's alcoholism was relevant, it would still have to satisfy 
Rule 403, W.R.E., which states:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."

The trial 
court's authority to exclude relevant evidence is discretionary in nature, as it 
is in a better position "both to detect and to assess the dangers and 
considerations enumerated in the rule, and to balance these against the 
probative value of proffered evidence." 2 Louisell and Mueller, Federal 
Evidence, § 125, p. 10 (1978).

[¶10.]  The information which appellant sought to 
have introduced into evidence concerning alcoholism was disclosed to the trial 
court in an offer of proof and at the hearing on the motion in limine. The 
record discloses that at the time of the motion in limine, appellant's evidence 
concerning alcoholism was that appellee admitted in his deposition that he was 
having a drinking problem; that appellee was confused about the events of the 
accident; that appellee's admission to a drinking problem "probably" led to the 
conclusion that he is an alcoholic; and that the deposition of Dr. Haight 
indicated that appellee suffered from a seizure, which could have been caused by 
either hypoxia or alcoholism.

[¶11.]  The trial court ruled that appellee's 
admission of a drinking problem could be explored at trial, but it could not be 
concluded that he was an alcoholic. The fact that appellee may have been 
confused about the accident and the amount of alcohol consumption on the day of 
the accident could have been thoroughly explored by the appellant. The answers 
in the physician's deposition regarding the factual observations of withdrawal 
and the recent use of alcohol were admissible. The seizure was allowed to be 
discussed insofar as it related to aggravation of appellee's condition, but the 
conclusory statement that alcoholism as an explanation for the seizure was not 
permitted because it was not supported by a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty and was prejudicial.

[¶12.]  The court's ruling on the motion in 
limine was not overly prohibitive. Our review of the record makes it clear that 
appellant had very little affirmative evidence which would convince a jury that 
appellee was an alcoholic. The evidence is speculative and 
conjectural.

[¶13.]  Appellant's offer of proof suffers from 
the same infirmity that we find with his argument on his motion in limine. After 
discussion by appellant that the physician should be allowed to testify as to 
appellee's alcoholism and that alcohol caused the grand mal seizure, the trial 
court ruled that counsel was permitted to explore the tremens which the 
physician observed appellee experiencing, but the explanation of the seizure as 
being alcohol induced was only a possible diagnosis, highly prejudicial and 
inadmissible. We agree with the reasoning of the trial 
court.

[¶14.]  In addressing issue "G," appellant 
contends that he should have been allowed to use the diagram made by the highway 
patrolman, who was at the scene of the accident, to impeach the testimony of 
Matt Zeimans concerning the vehicle location at the time of the accident. 
Appellee had sent for Zeimans to assist with the stalled vehicle, and he arrived 
at the scene of the accident later. Appellant contends the highway patrolman 
presented a different version of the position of appellee's vehicle on the 
highway than Zeimans. The offer of the highway patrolman's diagram by appellant 
was without proper foundation. Zeimans could not properly identify the diagram; 
it confused him, and it did not help refresh his memory. Even though the diagram 
may have been admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, it was properly 
excluded by the trial court because of lack of foundation. Combined Insurance Company of 
America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034 (1978). Appellant should have 
established a proper foundation for the admission of the 
exhibit.

[¶15.]  We will now consider whether the hospital 
bills from the Veteran's Administration (V.A.) were properly submitted to the 
jury for consideration. It is generally held that one who is injured by the 
tortious conduct of another is entitled to recover the reasonable value of the 
medical services necessary to treat the injury. This is true even if the medical 
services are rendered gratuitously:

"Payments made to or 
benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited 
against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a part of the 
harm for which the tortfeasor is liable. Restatement (Second), Torts 2d, § 
920(A)(2) (1982).

Comment (c) of 
the above section reads, in relevant part:

"c. The rule that 
collateral benefits are not subtracted from the plaintiff's recovery applies to 
the following types of benefits:

* * * * * 
*

"(3) Gratuities. This 
applies to cash gratuities and to the rendering of services. Thus the fact that 
the doctor did not charge for his services or the plaintiff was treated in a 
veterans hospital does not prevent his recovery for the reasonable value of the 
services."

See also, Hudson v. Lazarus, 95 App.D.C. 16, 217 F.2d 344 (1954), where a veteran was treated in a veteran's hospital after he 
sustained injuries in a car accident, the court allowing the recovery of such 
medical and hospital expenses rendered, even though they were received 
gratuitously. It is noted in the present case that appellee agreed to reimburse 
the V.A. for all medical services rendered; however, that matter is between 
appellee and the V.A. and is immaterial to our decision in this 
case.

[¶16.]  The parties stipulated to foundation on 
the V.A. bills, with appellant reserving the right to object to some of the 
bills because they were not incurred as a result of the injuries caused by this 
accident. Appellant made no objection to the V.A. bills being admitted on the 
grounds that they were not pled or because the United States 
was not a party to the action. They were introduced into evidence without 
objection other than relevancy. It was appellant's duty to inform the trial 
court of the possible problems with the admission of these bills; appellant did 
not do so until after the evidence was closed. At the close of the evidence, 
after appellee raised the need for an instruction on the V.A. bills, appellant 
only asserted that the V.A. bills were not pled and did not discuss the fact 
that the United States was not a party. We will not allow 
appellant to assert claims on appeal which were not properly raised below. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981).

[¶17.]  Lastly we reach the issue of whether the 
trial court erred in refusing appellant's proposed jury verdict form. The 
verdict form requested by appellant would have required the jury to find that 
appellant's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of appellee's injuries. 
The verdict form given by the trial court was taken from the Wyoming Civil 
Pattern Jury Instructions, No. 10.02, and requires the jury to apportion 
fault.

[¶18.]  It is a well-established rule that this 
court examines instructions in their entirety when asked to determine whether 
instructions are erroneous. Instructions must be considered as a whole and not 
according to isolated phrases and paragraphs. Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981). The test we will apply is whether the instructions, taken as a whole, 
adequately informed the jury of the applicable law. See Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420 (Wyo. 1984); and Scheikofsky v. State, 
supra.

[¶19.]  Appellant claims the jury was not 
adequately informed on the issue of proximate cause; however, the instructions 
given by the trial court adequately informed the jury of the applicable law of 
proximate cause. In the court's Instruction 7, fault, negligence, and cause were 
fully discussed. The instruction gave a clear, understandable definition of 
proximate cause. Instructions 3, 5, and 13 also discussed cause. Therefore, the 
jury was completely apprised of the fact that they were required to find that 
appellant's acts were the proximate cause of the injury to 
appellee.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.