Title: Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1858 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Three, LLC, Voters with Facts, Leah 
Anderson, David Wood, Jo Ann Hoeppner Cruz, 
Maryjo Cohen, Janice Wnukowski, Rachel Mantik, 
Pure Savage Enterprises, LLC, Paul Zank, Judy 
Olson, Janeway Riley, J. Peter Bartl and Dorothy 
Westermann, Dewloc, LLC, Cynthia Burton, Corinne  
Charlson, Christine Webster, 215 Farwell LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Eau Claire and City of Eau Claire Joint 
Review Board, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 376 Wis. 2d 479, 899 N.W.2d 706 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 35 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul J. Lenz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., and KELLY, J., dissent 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Thomas C. Kamenick, Richard M. Esenberg, Brian 
McGrath, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee.  
There was an oral argument by Richard M. Esenberg. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Douglas Hoffer, assistant city attorney, and Stephen C. Nick, 
city attorney, with whom on the brief was Remzy D. Bitar and 
 
 
2 
Arenz, Molter, Macy, Riffle & Larson S.C., Waukesha. There was 
an oral argument by Douglas Hoffer. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Eau Claire 
Area Chamber of Commerce, Inc. by Ryan J. Steffes and Weld 
Riley, S.C., Eau Claire. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
REALTORS Association, NAIOP-WI, and the Wisconsin Economic 
Development Association by Thomas D. Larson and The Wisconsin 
REALTORS Association, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities, City of Milwaukee, City of Madison, 
and Wisconsin Towns Association by Claire Silverman and League 
of Wisconsin Municipalities, Madison, with whom on the brief 
were Mary L. Schanning, deputy city attorney of Milwaukee; Gregg 
C. Hagopian, assistant city attorney of Milwaukee; Grant F. 
Langley, city attorney of Milwaukee; Michael May, city attorney 
of Madison; and Rick Manthe and Wisconsin Towns Association, 
Shawano. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the State of 
Wisconsin by Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general, and Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general.  
There was an oral argument by Misha Tseytlin.   
 
 
2018 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP1858 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV175) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Voters with Facts, Pure Savage Enterprises, 
LLC, Wisconsin Three, LLC, 215 Farwell LLC, 
Dewloc, LLC, Leah Anderson, J. Peter Bartl, 
Cynthia Burton, Corinne Charlson, Maryjo Cohen, 
Jo Ann Hoeppner Cruz, Rachel Mantik, Judy 
Olson, Janeway Riley, Christine Webster, 
Dorothy Westermann, Janice Wnukowski, David 
Wood and Paul Zank, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Eau Claire and City of Eau Claire Joint 
Review Board, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This case arises out 
of the approval of a redevelopment project in the City of Eau 
Claire (the "City"), which relied in part on funds derived from 
two tax incremental districts ("TIDs"): TID 8 and TID 10.  
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
2 
 
Voters with Facts, et al.1 ("Plaintiffs") challenged the legality 
of the City's actions with regard to these TIDs.  We review here 
a published decision of the court of appeals, Voters with Facts 
v. City of Eau Claire, 2017 WI App 35, 376 Wis. 2d 479, 899 
N.W.2d 706 [hereinafter Voters], affirming the Eau Claire County 
circuit court's2 dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint as to 
declaratory 
judgment, 
but 
reversing 
and 
remanding 
as 
to 
certiorari review.   
¶2 
The expansion or creation of TIDs is limited to one of 
four purposes: addressing blighted areas, urban rehabilitation 
or conservation, industrial development, or the promotion of 
mixed-use development.  Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a. (2013–
14).3  Where a municipality seeks to expand or create a TID, it 
must resolve to do so for one of these purposes.  Id.  Here, the 
City's declared purpose was to address blight, and, to support 
that purpose, the City's local legislative body had to find, 
among other things, that "[n]ot less than 50%, by area, of the 
real property within the district is . . . a blighted area."  
Id.  A TID must also be approved by a joint review board 
("JRB"), which must find, among other things, that "in its 
                                                 
1 There are 19 plaintiffs total: 4 LLCs, 14 individuals, and 
Voters with Facts——"an unincorporated association of grassroots 
citizen volunteers and Eau Claire taxpayers who question the 
propriety of the proposed developments."   
2 The Honorable Paul J. Lenz presided. 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-
14 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
3 
 
judgment, the development . . . would not occur without the 
creation of a [TID]."  § 66.1105(4m)(b)2.  In their complaint, 
Plaintiffs did not dispute that the appropriate bodies stated 
the appropriate findings, but rather alleged that the findings 
were "neither supported by record evidence nor factually 
correct."  Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged that the City's 
disbursement of cash grants to the developer for "project costs" 
was unlawful because it amounted to an unconstitutional tax 
rebate and/or because the developer could apply the cash grants 
to reimburse itself for already-incurred costs of demolishing 
historic buildings, contrary to § 66.1105(2)(f)1.a.  Plaintiffs 
sought declaratory relief on these claims, but argued in the 
alternative that, under certiorari review, the City had acted 
outside the scope of its lawful authority.   
¶3 
The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint 
because it found that they lacked standing.  The court of 
appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding with 
instruction.  Voters, 376 Wis. 2d 479, ¶¶2, 4.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
complaint as to declaratory judgment because it agreed that 
Plaintiffs lacked standing.  See id., ¶26 (findings); id., ¶39 
(project costs); id., ¶48 (uniformity clause).  It reversed and 
remanded for certiorari review, however, because the circuit 
court had not directly addressed that claim.  Id., ¶¶35, 60. 
¶4 
On review, we consider two issues.  First, we consider 
whether dismissal of Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claims was 
proper.  We conclude that it was, because Plaintiffs have failed 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
4 
 
to state claims upon which relief can be granted: the first and 
second counts fail because the City Common Council's findings of 
blight and the JRB's "but for" assertions are legislative 
determinations that do not present justiciable issues of fact or 
law; the third count fails because it does not allege facts 
which plausibly establish that the City's cash grant for TID 10 
was used to reimburse the developer's costs associated with 
demolishing historic buildings; and the fourth count fails 
because it does not allege facts which plausibly establish that 
cash grants are intended or used to pay owner-developers' 
property taxes.   
¶5 
Second, we consider whether certiorari review is 
appropriate.  We conclude that it is, because certiorari review 
is the appropriate mechanism for a court to test the validity of 
a legislative determination.  The record before us, however, 
does not contain a municipal record sufficient to enable our 
review.  Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court for 
certiorari review of Plaintiffs' first and second claims. 
¶6 
Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
on other grounds. 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
As noted above, this case arises out of the approval 
of a redevelopment project (the "Confluence Project") in 
downtown Eau Claire.  The Confluence Project relied in part on 
tax incremental financing ("TIF") derived from the City's 
expansion of the already-existing TID 8 and its creation of 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
5 
 
TID 10,4 both of which were endorsed by the City Planning 
Commission on August 18, 2014.   
¶8 
On September 9, 2014, the City Common Council adopted 
a resolution approving the expansion of TID 8.  In its 
resolution, the City Common Council stated that "not less than 
50%, by area, of the real property within the amended boundary 
area of the District is a 'blighted area' and is in need of 
'rehabilitation or conservation' within the meaning of Section 
66.1105(2)(a)1 of the Wisconsin Statutes."  On September 26, 
2014, the JRB approved the resolution.  In its approval, the JRB 
stated that "the development described in the Amendment [to TID 
#8] would not occur without the amendment."5  (Alteration in 
original.) 
¶9 
On October 14, 2014, the City Common Council adopted a 
resolution approving the creation of TID 10.  In its resolution, 
                                                 
4 When a city approves tax incremental financing, the 
property owners within the boundaries of the tax incremental 
district continue to pay the same rate of property tax, and the 
city allocates a portion of that tax revenue to finance the 
approved development project.  As property values rise——
presumably due to the public improvements financed by the TIDs——
property owners will pay a higher amount of property tax 
commensurate with the incremental increase in value of their 
property.  This value increment——the difference between taxes 
paid before and taxes paid as property values rise——is what the 
City ultimately uses to pay for the public improvements.  See 
City of Hartford v. Kirley, 172 Wis. 2d 191, 198-200, 493 
N.W.2d 45 (1992). 
5 Neither the City Common Council's resolution approving the 
expansion of TID 8, nor the JRB's approval of that resolution, 
are in the record, but the Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that 
these statements were contained in those documents.   
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
6 
 
the City Common Council stated that "not less than 50%, by area, 
of the real property within the amended boundary area of the 
District is a 'blighted area' and is in need of 'rehabilitation 
or conservation' within the meaning of Section 66.1105(2)(a)1 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes."  On October 22, 2014, the JRB approved 
the resolution.  In its approval, the JRB stated that "the 
development described in the Project Plan would not occur 
without the creation [presumably of TID #10]."6  (Alteration in 
original.) 
¶10 Open public hearings were held prior to the decisions 
of the Planning Commission and the City Common Council,7 at which 
"numerous city residents, including many of the Plaintiffs, 
spoke out against the TIDs."  On March 12, 2015, Plaintiffs 
filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief on four claims.   
¶11 The first and second claims (regarding TID 8 and TID 
10, respectively) challenged the validity of the City's findings 
of blight under Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a. and the JRB's 
"but for" findings under Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4m)(b)2.  With 
regard to the City's findings, Plaintiffs alleged that the City 
was "required to articulate the basis for its finding and the 
evidence of record that supports its action," and that, although 
                                                 
6 Neither the City Common Council's resolution approving the 
creation of TID 10, nor the JRB's approval of that resolution, 
are in the record, but the Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that 
these statements were contained in those documents.   
7 The minutes from these public hearings are not in the 
record before the court. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
7 
 
the City's resolution "contains a conclusory assertion that 'not 
less than 50%, by area, of the real property within the amended 
boundary area of the [TID] is a "blighted area,"'" the City "did 
not articulate the factual basis for this conclusory statement 
and the record before the [City] contains no evidence to support 
its assertion."  With regard to the JRB's findings, Plaintiffs 
alleged that the JRB could not have "reasonably concluded on the 
record evidence that the development would not occur in the 
[TID] without tax incremental financing."  Plaintiffs thus 
argued that the TIDs lacked a public purpose in violation of the 
public purpose doctrine and sought a declaration that the 
authorization and implementation of the TIDs was "invalid, void, 
and of no force and effect."   
¶12 The third claim challenged the validity of the City's 
disbursement of cash grants pursuant to the project plan for 
TID 10.  Plaintiffs alleged that "the development agreement does 
not clearly provide that the [] developer may not use the lump 
sum payments to reimburse itself for the costs of demolishing 
[historic] 
properties," 
and 
that, 
"[g]iven 
the 
lump 
sum 
character of the developer payments, there is in fact no way to 
assure [how] the payments have been used."  Plaintiffs thus 
argued 
that 
the 
cash 
grants 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1105(2)(f)1.a.——which excludes "destruction of [historic] 
properties" from the definition of "project costs"——because the 
project 
plan 
"unlawfully 
reimburses 
the 
developer 
for 
[demolishing historic properties]," and sought a declaration 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
8 
 
that the implementation of TID 10 was "invalid, void, and of no 
force and effect."   
¶13 The fourth claim also challenged the validity of the 
City's disbursements of cash grants pursuant to the project plan 
for TID 10.8  Plaintiffs alleged that the cash grants function 
"as [a] tax rebate or tax credit" because the developer, who is 
also the "owner of taxable property[,] is given substantial cash 
payments, effectively reimbursing the owner[-developer] (in 
advance) for all or a part of the taxes paid on its property."  
Plaintiffs thus argued that the cash grants violate the 
Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution because the 
owner-developer "is being taxed at a more favorable rate than an 
owner of identically-assessed property elsewhere in Eau Claire," 
and sought a declaration that the creation of TID 10 was 
"unlawful, void, and of no force and effect."   
¶14 Plaintiffs 
asserted 
certiorari 
review 
as 
an 
alternative basis for relief, "[i]f for any reason [they] are 
not entitled to declaratory relief."  On this fifth claim, 
Plaintiffs argue that, "[f]or the reasons set forth above, the 
                                                 
8 The complaint is not clear as to whether this challenge is 
raised against both TIDs or just TID 10.  The heading for the 
fourth claim states that it seeks "Declaratory Judgment relating 
to both TIDs," but the final paragraph requests only that "the 
Resolution creating TID #10 [be declared] . . . unlawful, void, 
and of no force and effect."  Because we conclude that the claim 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this 
discrepancy in the record does not affect our analysis.  
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
9 
 
[actions] 
of 
the 
[City 
and 
the 
JRB] 
[were] 
arbitrary, 
capricious, and outside the scope of their lawful authority."   
¶15 On April 9, 2015, the City filed its answer, denying 
in relevant part Plaintiffs' allegations.  The City also 
asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including that 
"Plaintiffs' complaint contains claims which may fail to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted," and that "[o]ne or more 
plaintiffs may lack capacity to sue or standing and one or more 
of the claims may be unripe or moot."  On May 22, 2015, the City 
filed a motion to dismiss, which more fully articulated its 
challenges to the viability of Plaintiffs' complaint.   
¶16 In general, the City argued that Plaintiffs lacked 
standing because the claims were highly speculative, did not 
allege any direct pecuniary loss, and were not ripe.  More 
specifically, the City argued that Plaintiffs' first and second 
claims fail because they do not allege "that there can be no 
benefit 
to 
the 
public . . . which 
the 
Plaintiffs 
must 
demonstrate to prove a lack of public purpose"; Plaintiffs' 
third claim fails because the "'anything's possible' allegations 
are not sufficient" and are moot in any event "because the 
buildings in question have already been demolished"; and 
Plaintiffs' 
fourth 
claim 
fails 
because 
it 
is 
a 
facial 
constitutional challenge to a law that has already been held to 
be constitutional.  Additionally, even assuming Plaintiffs have 
standing, the City argued that declaratory judgment was not the 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
10 
 
proper method for reviewing the creation or expansion of TIDs, 
which is limited to certiorari.9   
¶17 The circuit court agreed.  On August 17, 2015, the 
circuit court ruled from the bench and dismissed Plaintiffs' 
complaint for lack of standing under the declaratory judgment 
standard.10 
 
It 
concluded 
that 
"none 
of 
the 
plaintiffs . . . allege 
a 
legally 
protect[a]ble 
interest" 
because they "allege no particular pecuniary loss attributable 
to them except a speculative possibilit[y] that general tax 
revenues could be affected."  The circuit court further 
concluded that the issue was not ripe because the alleged harms 
were highly speculative, and because it concluded that "the 
determination of blight is legislative and is, in essence, a 
political question."  In this regard, it determined that 
"[t]here is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards," it is impossible to decide the matter "without an 
initial policy determination of a kind that is clearly not for 
judicial 
discretion," 
and 
"the 
court's 
undertaking 
an 
independent resolution of this matter would express a lack of 
                                                 
9 On June 22, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their response.  On 
July 2, 2015, the City filed its reply.  On July 16, 2015, the 
circuit court held a hearing on the motion.   
10 There are four prerequisites a party must satisfy to seek 
declaratory relief: (1) a justiciable controversy must exist; 
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are 
adverse; (3) the plaintiff must have a legally protectable 
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue must be ripe for 
determination.  See Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 410, 320 
N.W.2d 175 (1982).   
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
11 
 
respect 
due 
to 
coordinate 
branches 
of 
government." 
 
On 
August 28, 
2015, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
dismissing 
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed.  Plaintiffs appealed.   
¶18 On May 31, 2017, the court of appeals affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings on 
Plaintiffs' certiorari claim.  Voters, 376 Wis. 2d 479, ¶¶2, 4.  
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' first four claims because it agreed that Plaintiffs 
lacked taxpayer standing.  In this regard, it stated that "the 
alleged unlawful expenditure of public funds, if otherwise 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, is sufficient to 
support taxpayer standing."  Id., ¶17 (citing S.D. Realty Co. v. 
Sewerage Comm'n of City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 15, 22, 112 
N.W.2d 177 (1961)).  It thus concluded that, "[a]scertaining 
whether [Plaintiffs have] standing . . . turns on whether those 
claims adequately allege the unlawful expenditure of public 
funds."  Id., ¶18. 
¶19 As to the first and second claims, the court of 
appeals concluded that Plaintiffs did not adequately plead the 
unlawful expenditure of public funds because the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a. and 66.1105(4m)(b)2. is 
procedural, not substantive, and therefore requires only that 
the City and the JRB "assert the requisite findings."  Id., ¶25.  
Thus, "even assuming a neutral factfinder would conclude there 
was an inadequate factual basis . . . [that] alone do[es] not 
support [Plaintiffs'] allegation that those bodies failed to 
follow the statutory procedure for creating a TID."  Id., ¶26.  
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
12 
 
The court of appeals concluded, however, that these findings11 
may be challenged through certiorari review, id., ¶¶28 n.9, 35, 
and that, if the findings were "without a substantial basis in 
the evidence, or [were] arbitrary and unreasonable (or otherwise 
contrary to law), then the creation/amendment of the TIDs [was] 
not only an unlawful act, but also unconstitutional as lacking a 
valid public purpose," id., ¶59.  It thus remanded to the 
circuit court for certiorari review of the City's and the JRB's 
findings.12  Id., ¶60.  
¶20 As to the third claim, the court of appeals concluded 
that 
Plaintiffs 
did 
not 
adequately 
plead 
the 
unlawful 
expenditure of public funds because the "sum total" of their 
allegations "fail[ed] to allege that anything unlawful has 
occurred, or is even likely to occur."  Id., ¶38.  Thus, 
Plaintiffs' "alleged injury is far too speculative to create a 
plausible claim for relief."  Id., ¶39.   
¶21 As 
to 
the 
fourth 
claim, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded, as a preliminary matter, that Plaintiffs' allegations 
"constitute[] a facial challenge to the constitutional validity 
of payments authorized by Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)2.d." 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that 
these findings are acts of legislative discretion.  Voters, 2017 
WI App 35, ¶30, 376 Wis. 2d 479, 899 N.W.2d 706.   
12 The court of appeals noted that "[t]ypically, this court 
determines for itself whether a plaintiff has adequately stated 
a claim for certiorari relief and whether the plaintiff should 
prevail on the merits of his or her claim," but remanded because 
the parties agreed that remand was more appropriate.  Id., ¶60. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
13 
 
because Plaintiffs assert that "in all instances, payments from 
a city to an authorized entity 'effectively reimburs[e] the 
owner (in advance) for all or a part of the taxes paid on its 
property.'"  Id., ¶47.  The court of appeals then concluded that 
Plaintiffs did not adequately plead the unlawful expenditure of 
public funds because limiting the cash grants to reimbursement 
for "project costs" is a "significant and material restriction 
[that] compels us to conclude this case presents no issue 
regarding uniformity that has not already been settled by our 
supreme court."  Id., ¶54 (citing Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity 
House Corp. v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 412, 288 
N.W.2d 85 (1980), and State ex rel. La Follette v. Torphy, 85 
Wis. 2d 94, 108, 270 N.W.2d 187 (1978)).  In this regard, the 
court of appeals noted that Plaintiffs' "characterization of the 
payments as unlawful tax rebates or credits . . . are mere legal 
conclusions, which we need not accept."  Id. (citing Data Key 
Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶18, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, 
849 
N.W.2d 693). 
 
Thus, 
it 
concluded 
that 
Plaintiffs have "failed to state a cognizable claim."  Id., ¶48.  
Plaintiffs petitioned for review. 
¶22 On October 2, 2017, we granted Plaintiffs' petition 
for review.13 
 
                                                 
13 At the same time that the petition for review was 
granted, motions for discovery and for disqualification of 
Justice Kelly were denied.  
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
14 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶23 "Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief 
can be granted is a question of law for our independent review."  
Data Key Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶17. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶24 On review, we consider two issues.  First, we consider 
whether dismissal of Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claims was 
proper.  We conclude that it was, because Plaintiffs have failed 
to state claims upon which relief can be granted: the first and 
second counts fail because the City Common Council's findings of 
blight and the JRB's "but for" assertions are legislative 
determinations that do not present justiciable issues of fact or 
law; the third count fails because it does not allege facts 
which plausibly establish that the City's cash grant for TID 10 
was used to reimburse the developer's costs associated with 
demolishing historic buildings; and the fourth count fails 
because it does not allege facts which plausibly establish that 
cash grants are intended or used to pay owner-developers' 
property taxes.   
¶25 Second, we consider whether certiorari review is 
appropriate.  We conclude that it is, because certiorari review 
is the appropriate mechanism for a court to test the validity of 
a legislative determination.  The record before us, however, 
does not contain a municipal record sufficient to enable our 
review.  Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court for 
certiorari review of Plaintiffs' first and second claims.  
 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
15 
 
A.  Standing 
¶26 The circuit court's and court of appeals' decisions 
relied on standing as grounds for dismissal.  Here, we analyze 
Plaintiffs' complaint to determine whether it states a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.  See State v. Castillo, 213 
Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) ("An appellate court 
should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.").  In 
doing so, we assume without deciding that Plaintiffs had 
standing to bring their claims.   
 
B.  Failure To State A Claim 
 
¶27 "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint."  Data Key 
Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶19.  "[T]he sufficiency of a 
complaint depends on [the] substantive law that underlies the 
claim made because it is the substantive law that drives what 
facts must be pled."  Id., ¶31.  In determining whether a 
complaint sufficiently alleges a claim upon which relief may be 
granted,14 we accept as true all facts pled and the reasonable 
                                                 
14 This standard is derived from Wis. Stat. § 802.02(1), 
which states, in relevant part, as follows: 
Contents 
of 
pleadings. 
 
A 
pleading 
or 
supplemental pleading that sets forth a claim for 
relief, 
whether 
an 
original 
or 
amended 
claim, 
counterclaim, cross claim or 3rd-party claim, shall 
contain all of the following: 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
16 
 
inferences therefrom; we do not, however, accept as true any 
legal 
conclusions 
stated 
in 
the 
complaint. 
 
Id., 
¶19.  
"Therefore, it is important for a court considering a motion to 
dismiss to accurately distinguish pleaded facts from pleaded 
legal conclusions."  Id.  
 
1.  Findings under Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a. 
a.  The substantive law 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.1105(4) states, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
Creation 
of 
tax 
incremental 
districts 
and 
approval of project plans.  In order to implement the 
provisions of this section, the following steps and 
plans are required: . . .  
 
(gm)  Adoption by the local legislative body of a 
resolution which: . . .  
 
4.  Contains findings that: 
 
a.  Not less than 50%, by area, of the real 
property within the district is at least one of the 
following: a blighted area . . . . 
§ 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a.  The term "blighted area" is defined, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
An area, including a slum area, in which the 
structures, buildings or improvements, which by reason 
of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a)  A short and plain statement of the claim, 
identifying the transaction or occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences out of which the claim 
arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief. 
§ 802.02(1)(a). 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
17 
 
inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, 
sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population 
and overcrowding, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or 
any combination of these factors is conducive to ill 
health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, 
juvenile delinquency, or crime, and is detrimental to 
the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 
§ 66.1105(2)(ae)1.a. 
 
b.  The allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint 
¶29 With regard to this claim, Plaintiffs' complaint 
alleged the following facts: 
29.  The City and the JRB created TID #10 and 
amended and expanded TID #8 exclusively for the 
alleged purpose of addressing blighted areas.  None of 
the three remaining statutory purposes for creating a 
TID were invoked in connection with or stated by the 
city or the JRB to be the basis for the creation of 
TID #10 or the amendment to TID #8. 
51.  On September 9, 2014, the City Common 
Council voted 8-3 to adopt a resolution approving 
Amendment No. 3 to TID #8. 
58.  [O]n October 14, 2014, the City Council 
voted 7-3 to adopt a Resolution approving the creation 
of TID #10. 
72.  The Resolution adopted by the City Council 
approving Amendment No. 3 to TID #8 contains a 
conclusory assertion that "not less than 50%, by area, 
of the real property within the amended boundary area 
of the District is a 'blighted area.'"  The City 
Council did not articulate the factual basis for this 
conclusory statement and the record before the City 
Council contains no evidence to support its assertion. 
83.  The resolution adopted by the City Council 
approving TID #10 contains a conclusory assertion that 
"not less than 50%, by area, of the real property 
within the boundary area of the District is a 
'blighted area' and is in need of 'rehabilitation or 
conservation' . . . ."  The City Council did not 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
18 
 
articulate the factual basis for this conclusory 
statement and the record before the City Council 
contains no evidence to support its assertion.[15]  
 
c.  These allegations are insufficient to state a  
claim upon which relief may be granted. 
¶30 To determine whether the allegations are sufficient to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we must 
interpret the statute; specifically, we must determine what the 
statute means when it requires that the local legislative body 
adopt a "resolution which . . . [c]ontains findings."  Wis. 
Stat. § 66.1105(4)(gm)4.  The interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  See, e.g., Estate of 
Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶25, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 
N.W.2d 759. 
¶31 Plaintiffs argue that the areas in question were not 
actually blighted and that, "when the legislature established 
                                                 
15 These allegations span the first and second claims of 
Plaintiffs' 
complaint, 
which 
address 
TID 
8 
and 
TID 
10, 
respectively.  With regard to both claims, Plaintiffs' complaint 
also alleged several legal conclusions: (1) that, under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a., 
the 
City 
Common 
Council 
"was 
required to make a finding that '[n]ot less than 50%, by area, 
of the real property within the district is . . . a blighted 
area'"; (2) that "to properly make such a 'finding' the City 
Council is required to articulate the basis for its finding and 
the evidence of record that supports its action"; (3) that "the 
City Council could not reasonably have concluded that the area 
was blighted"; and (4) that, if a TID "does not actually serve 
to eliminate blight, it lacks a public purpose and therefore 
represents an unconstitutional expenditure of public funds."  We 
disregard 
Plaintiffs' 
legal 
conclusions 
because 
"legal 
conclusions stated in the complaint are not accepted as true, 
and [] are insufficient to enable a complaint to withstand a 
motion to dismiss."  Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 
2014 WI 86, ¶19, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
19 
 
conditions for diverting tax money for the benefit of private 
parties, it intended to permit such diversion only where those 
conditions actually exist."  In this regard, Plaintiffs argue 
that "[c]ourts are more than capable of evaluating a factual 
determination made by a municipal body," and "no Wisconsin court 
has ever held that declaratory judgment actions may not be used 
to challenge" TIDs.  Moreover, they argue that where "the TIDs 
do not in fact work to eliminate blight, they lack a public 
purpose and are unconstitutional."16  The City argues that the 
determination of blight is a legislative act and that Plaintiffs 
"failed to plead sufficient facts to satisfy the bedrock 
separation-of-powers principle that challenges to state and 
local legislative acts should not be resolved by the judicial 
process if they are 'fairly debatable.'"  In this regard, 
"[l]egislative acts enjoy a high level of judicial deference" 
and the complaint "does not demonstrate the duly authorized City 
Council . . . [determinations] 
were 
clearly 
in 
error."  
Moreover, the complaint "does not demonstrate it is 'clear and 
palpable that there can be no benefit to the public'"; thus, 
Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violation of the public 
                                                 
16 The public purpose doctrine is the rule that "there can 
be no expenditure of public funds for a private purpose."  State 
ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 48, 
205 N.W.2d 784 (1973) (quoting State ex rel. Singer v. Boos, 44 
Wis. 2d 374, 381, 171 N.W.2d 307 (1969)).  "No specific clause 
in the constitution establishes the public purpose doctrine.  
However, it is a well-established constitutional tenet."  Id. at 
47-48. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
20 
 
purpose doctrine.  We conclude that Plaintiffs' complaint was 
properly dismissed as to declaratory judgment on this issue 
because the City Common Council's findings of blight are 
legislative determinations that do not present justiciable 
issues of fact or law. 
¶32 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Here, 
the statute states, in relevant part, as follows: 
In order to implement the provisions of this section, 
the 
following 
steps 
and 
plans 
are 
required: . . . Adoption by the local legislative body 
of 
a 
resolution 
which . . . [c]ontains 
findings 
that . . . [n]ot less than 50%, by area, of the real 
property within the district is at least one of the 
following: a blighted area . . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a.  "All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to common and approved usage; but technical 
words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the 
law shall be construed according to such meaning."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(1); see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45; Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 69-77 (2012) ("Ordinary-Meaning Canon").   
¶33 "Findings" is not a defined term in the statute.  The 
word "findings" is also not defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 
which instead refers the reader to the following entry for 
"finding of fact": "A determination by a judge, jury, or 
administrative agency of a fact supported by the evidence in the 
record . . . ."  Finding of fact Black's Law Dictionary 749 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
21 
 
(10th ed. 2014).  Given this ordinary meaning of "findings", the 
plain language of the statute does not require that the local 
legislative body——here, the City Common Council——itemize the 
evidence in the record that supports its finding of blight. 
¶34 This plain language interpretation is supported by the 
context of surrounding and closely-related statutes.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; . . . in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.").  In a 
closely-related statute, the legislature has demonstrated that 
it is fully capable of specifying when findings of blight must 
be 
explained 
by 
itemized 
evidence. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.03(6)(c)4.  Chapter 32 governs the acquisition of condemned 
property 
vis-à-vis 
eminent 
domain, 
including 
municipal 
acquisition of blighted properties under chapter 66.  See, e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1331(4)(a)3., 
(4)(b); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1333(5)(a)3., (5)(b)1.  Section 32.03(6) limits this method 
of 
acquiring 
blighted 
properties 
by 
requiring 
that 
"the 
condemnor shall make written findings and provide a copy of the 
findings to the owner of the property.  The findings shall 
include . . . [a] finding that the owner's property is blighted 
and the reasons for that finding."  § 32.03(6)(c)4. (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the legislature is fully capable of specifying 
when the reasons underlying a finding of blight must be given, 
and we should not read into Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a. such 
a requirement where it is not specified.  See Scalia & Garner, 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
22 
 
supra ¶32 at 93 ("Nothing is to be added to what the text states 
or reasonably implies."). 
¶35 This interpretation is reinforced by the surrounding 
blight-elimination statutes in chapter 66.  For example, Wis. 
Stat. § 66.1331, commonly known as the "Blighted Area Law," 
requires only "the adoption of a resolution by the local 
legislative body declaring the area to be a blighted area in 
need of redevelopment."  § 66.1331(5)(b)1.  Similarly, Wis. 
Stat. § 66.1333, commonly known as the "Blight Elimination and 
Slum Clearance Act," requires only "the adoption by the local 
legislative body of a resolution declaring in substance that 
there exists within the city a need for blight elimination, slum 
clearance 
and 
urban 
renewal 
programs 
and 
projects."  
§ 66.1333(3)(a)2.17  Here, Wis. Stat. § 66.1105, commonly known 
as the "Tax Increment Law," requires only the "[a]doption by the 
local legislative body of a resolution which . . . [c]ontains 
findings that . . . [n]ot less than 50%, by area, of the real 
property 
within 
the 
district 
is . . . a 
blighted 
area."  
                                                 
17 In addition to chapters 32 and 66, "blight" is discussed 
in chapter 30, relating to the construction, repair, or 
maintenance 
of 
harbor 
improvements, 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 30.121(3w)(b), 30.30(3)(b); in chapter 60, relating to the 
miscellaneous powers of town housing authorities, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 60.23(27); in chapter 67, relating to the procedure for 
issuing bonds to finance the elimination of blight, see Wis. 
Stat. § 67.05(5)(b); and in chapter 292, relating to exemptions 
for local government units from hazardous waste contamination 
penalties and requirements for properties acquired for the 
purpose 
of 
blight 
elimination, 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 292.11(9)(e)1m.(d), 292.23(2)(d), 292.26(2)(d).   
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
23 
 
§ 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a.  Thus, the blight-elimination provisions in 
chapter 66 are all similar in that none of them require a 
specified rationale or itemization of supporting evidence. 
¶36 Moreover, 
and 
perhaps 
more 
importantly, 
this 
interpretation is reasonable because findings of blight are 
legislative determinations that "do[] not raise justiciable 
issues of fact or law."  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State Appeal 
Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 790, 794, 203 N.W.2d 1 (1973).  In Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.1105, "blighted area" means: 
An area, including a slum area, in which the 
structures, buildings or improvements, which by reason 
of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, 
inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, 
sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population 
and overcrowding, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or 
any combination of these factors is conducive to ill 
health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, 
juvenile delinquency, or crime, and is detrimental to 
the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 
§ 66.1105(2)(ae)1.a.  And this is substantially similar to the 
definition of "blighted area" in all of the blight-elimination 
statutes:  
 
"Blighted area" means any area, including a slum 
area, in which a majority of the structures are 
residential or in which there is a predominance of 
buildings or improvements, whether residential or 
nonresidential, and which, by reason of dilapidation, 
deterioration, 
age 
or 
obsolescence, 
inadequate 
provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or 
open 
spaces, 
high 
density 
of 
population 
and 
overcrowding, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or 
any combination of these factors, is conducive to ill 
health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
24 
 
juvenile delinquency and crime, and is detrimental to 
the public health, safely, morals or welfare. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1331(3)(a). 
"Blighted area" means . . . [a]n area, including 
a slum area, in which there is a predominance of 
buildings or improvements, whether residential or 
nonresidential, 
which 
by 
reason 
of 
dilapidation, 
deterioration, 
age 
or 
obsolescence, 
inadequate 
provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or 
open 
spaces, 
high 
density 
of 
population 
and 
overcrowding, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or 
any combination of such factors id conducive to ill 
health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, 
juvenile delinquency, or crime, and is detrimental to 
the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1333(2m)(b)1.  
¶37 The key language in each of these statutes is that the 
"area," in its current state, "is detrimental to the public 
health, safety, morals, or welfare."  "Public safety, public 
health, [and] morality . . . are some of the more conspicuous 
examples of the traditional application of the police power to 
municipal affairs,"  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954),  
and 
a 
"municipality's 
exercise 
of 
its 
police 
power 
has 
traditionally been accorded deference by reviewing courts."  
Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶46, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 838 
N.W.2d 852.  "It is to be remembered that we are dealing with 
one of the most essential powers of government, one that is the 
least limitable."  Id.18 
                                                 
18 Legislative exercise of the police power is delegable, 
and its delegation to cities regarding matters of redevelopment 
has been upheld against constitutional attack on numerous 
occasions.  See, e.g., David Jeffrey Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 
267 Wis. 559, 590, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954).  
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
25 
 
¶38 When exercised, the police power "may, indeed, seem 
harsh in its exercise, [and] usually is on some individual."  
Id.  The act of condemnation for the purpose of eliminating 
blight 
is 
no 
exception: 
"to 
condemn 
unoffending 
property . . . is repugnant to the concept of the fundamental 
right of private property."  David Jeffrey Co. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 585, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954).  "[B]ut the 
imperative necessity for [the police power] precludes any 
limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily."  Nowell, 351 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶46.  In this regard, it must also be remembered that 
"the law is directed against slum and blighted areas, not 
individual structures," David Jeffrey Co., 276 Wis. at 585, and 
that "the amount and character of land to be taken for the 
project and the need for a particular tract to complete the 
integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative 
branch."19  Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36; see also David Jeffrey 
                                                                                                                                                             
Here, by its enactment, the legislature has 
declared the policy and fixed the standards for the 
administration of the law. . . . It defines blighted 
area.  It gives to cities the responsibility of 
determining the size of an area to be redeveloped, the 
costs involved and the details of the redevelopment 
plan, the method and mechanics of clearance, and the 
determination 
of 
future 
uses. 
 
Obviously, 
the 
legislature could not make specific provisions for all 
of these items, for the very reason that the size, 
extent, and character of the blighted areas, and the 
plans for redevelopment, differ in each city where the 
slum and blight condition exists. 
Id.  See also Hammermill, 58 Wis. 2d at 57-59. 
19 In fact, Wis. Stat. § 66.1331 explicitly states: 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
26 
 
Co., 267 Wis. at 578 ("The use of all property is subject to the 
police power of the state, to be exercised for the protection of 
the health, safety, and general welfare of the public, either 
                                                                                                                                                             
Findings and declaration of necessity.  It is 
found and declared that there have existed and 
continue 
to 
exist 
in 
citied 
within 
the 
state, 
substandard, 
insanitary, 
deteriorated, 
slum 
and 
blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing 
menace, injurious and inimical to the public health, 
safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the 
state.  The existence of these areas contributes 
substantially and increasingly to the spread of 
disease and crime . . . constitutes an economic and 
social liability, substantially impairs or arrests the 
sound growth of cities, and retards the provision of 
housing accommodations.  This menace is beyond remedy 
and control solely by regulatory process in the 
exercise of the police power and cannot be dealt with 
effectively by the ordinary operations of private 
enterprise without the aids provided in this section.  
The acquisition of property for the purpose of 
eliminating 
substandard, 
insanitary, 
deteriorated, 
slum or blighted conditions or preventing recurrence 
of these conditions in the area, the removal of 
structures and improvement of sites, the disposition 
of the property for redevelopment incidental to these 
activities, and any assistance which may be given by 
cities or any other public bodies, are public uses and 
purposes for which public money may be expended and 
the power of eminent domain exercised.  The necessity 
in the public interest for the provision of this 
section is declared as a matter of legislative 
determination. 
§ 66.1331(2); see also Wis. Stat. § 66.1333(2).  The fact that 
these specific legislative findings are absent from Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.1105 does not surprise us, or cause us concern, however, 
because the Tax Increment Statute simply enables municipalities 
to work with private parties on public improvements it would 
otherwise be authorized to undertake itself under §§ 66.1331 and 
66.1333. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
27 
 
directly or through subordinate agencies to whom the exercise of 
such prerogative may be entrusted."). 
¶39 "Legislative 
determination[s] 
of 
public 
policy 
questions [do] not raise justiciable issues of fact or law."  
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 56 Wis. 2d at 794; see also Buhler v. 
Racine 
Cty., 
33 
Wis. 2d 137, 
146, 
146 
N.W.2d 403 
(1966) 
("However, since zoning is a legislative function, judicial 
review is limited and judicial interference restricted to cases 
of abuse of discretion, excess of power, or error of law.").  
This is because de novo review of a legislative determination 
violates the doctrine of separation of powers.  See Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 56 Wis. 2d at 795; Buhler, 33 Wis. 2d at 147 
("[T]he court, because of the fundamental nature of its power, 
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authority 
in the absence of statutory authorization."); see also Bisenius 
v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 53-54, 165 N.W.2d 377 (1969) ("[O]nce 
within the area of proper exercise of police power, it is for 
the legislature to determine what regulations, restraints or 
prohibitions are reasonably required to protect the public 
safety.").  Therefore, a finding of blight under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a. is not susceptible to an action for 
declaratory judgment because, as a legislative determination, it 
does not give rise to justiciable issues of fact or law.20   
                                                 
20 We note the dissent's focus on our discussion of Joint 
School Dist. No. 1 v. State Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 790, 203 
N.W.2d 1, and Buhler v. Racine Cty., 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 
N.W.2d 403 (1966)——which we cite for the broad proposition that 
legislative findings, in general, do not raise justiciable 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
28 
 
¶40 Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon 
which relief may be granted because a court cannot issue a 
declaration regarding the wisdom of a legislative determination.  
See, e.g., Aicher v. Wis. Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 
98, ¶57, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 ("It is not our role to 
determine the wisdom or rationale underpinning a particular 
legislative pronouncement."); Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 
Wis. 2d 408, 415, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967) ("We are not concerned 
with the wisdom of what the legislature has done."); Buhler, 33 
Wis. 2d at 146-47.21 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
issues 
of 
fact 
or 
law——and 
its 
misapprehension 
of 
our  
discussion of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), David 
Jeffrey Co., 267 Wis. 599, and Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 
88, ¶46, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852——which we rely on for the 
proposition 
that 
a 
finding 
of 
blight 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1105(4)(gm)4.a. is a legislative one.  From this, we are 
compelled to conclude that the dissent does not seem to 
understand 
the 
significance 
of 
the 
difference 
between 
legislative facts/findings and judicial facts/findings.  See, 
e.g., Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of 
Legislative Facts, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 111, 113-16 (1988).  
21 Because we conclude that the findings of blight are 
legislative determinations, we need not address Plaintiffs' 
coordinate claims regarding the public purpose doctrine, which 
assume that these determinations are reducible to judicial fact 
finding ("If a [TID] ostensibly created to address issues of 
blight does not actually serve to eliminate blight, it lacks a 
public purpose and therefore represents an unconstitutional 
expenditure of public funds.").   
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
29 
 
2.  Assertions under Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4m)(b)2. 
a.  The substantive law 
 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.1105(4m) states, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
Joint review board.  (a)  Any city that seeks to 
create a tax incremental district, amend a project 
plan, [or] have a district's tax incremental base 
redetermined under sub (5)(h) . . . shall convene a 
temporary joint review board under this paragraph, or 
a standing joint review board under sub (3)(g), to 
review the proposal. . . . 
  
(b)  1.  The 
board 
shall 
review 
the 
public 
record, planning documents and the resolution passed 
by the local legislative body or planning commission 
under sub (4)(gm) . . . . 
 
2.  Except as provided in subd. 2m., no tax 
incremental district may be created and no project 
plan may be amended unless the board approves the 
resolution 
adopted 
under 
sub 
(4)(gm) . . . by 
a 
majority vote within 30 days after receiving the 
resolution. . . . The 
board 
may 
not 
approve 
the 
resolution under this subdivision unless the board's 
approval contains a positive assertion that, in its 
judgment, the development described in the documents 
the board has reviewed under subd. 1. would not occur 
without the creation of a tax incremental district. 
§ 66.1105(4m)(a), (b)1.-2. 
 
b.  The allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint 
¶42 With regard to this claim, Plaintiffs' complaint 
alleges the following facts: 
44.  [D]evelopment 
plans 
unrelated 
to 
the 
Confluence Project were already underway with respect 
to certain of the historic properties within TID #10.  
For example, the Kline Department Store building was 
in the hands of a new owner who had publicly announced 
a redevelopment plan for that property.  And the owner 
of the historic property at 2 South Barstow Street had 
already entered into an agreement with the City for 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
30 
 
the renovation and redevelopment of that building with 
City-negotiated 
requirements 
that 
its 
historic 
character be preserved. 
45.  . . . The City's decision . . . to fund the 
Confluence Project . . . forced the alternative plans 
to be abandoned . . . .  
 
53.  On September 26, 2014, the JRB adopted a 
resolution approving Amendment No. 3 to TID #8. 
 
54.  The statement in the resolution that in the 
judgment of the JRB "the development described in the 
Amendment [to TID #8] would not occur without the 
amendment" is neither supported by record evidence nor 
factually correct.  
 
60.  On October 22, 2014, the JRB adopted a 
Resolution approving the creation of TID #10. 
 
61.  The statement in the Resolution that in the 
judgment of the JRB "the development described in the 
Project Plan would not occur without the creation 
[presumably of TID #10]" is neither supported by 
record evidence nor is factually correct.  
76.  . . . The JRB did not "review the public 
record, planning documents, and the resolution passed 
by" the City Council for Amendment No 3. to TID 
#8 . . . ; it considered only a conclusory three-page 
"Joint Review Board Report." 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
31 
 
87.  . . . The JRB did not "review the public 
record, planning documents and the resolution passed 
by" the City Council [for creation of TID #10].[22] 
 
(Alterations in ¶¶54 and 61 in original.) 
 
c.  These allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
¶43 To determine whether these allegations state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, we must interpret the statute; 
specifically, we must determine what the statute means when it 
requires that that the JRB's "approval contain[] a positive 
assertion."  The interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  See Estate of Miller, 378 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶25. 
¶44 Plaintiffs argue that redevelopment in the areas in 
question would have occurred without the TIDs and that, "when 
the legislature established conditions for diverting tax money 
for the benefit of private parties, it intended to permit such 
diversion only where those conditions actually exist."  In this 
regard, "[c]ourts are more than capable of evaluating a factual 
determination made by a municipal body," and "no Wisconsin court 
has ever held that declaratory judgment actions may not be used 
                                                 
22 These allegations span the first and second claims of 
Plaintiffs' 
complaint, 
which 
address 
TID 
8 
and 
TID 
10, 
respectively.  With regard to both claims, Plaintiffs' complaint 
also alleged that the JRB could not have "reasonably concluded" 
"that development would not occur . . . without tax incremental 
financing."  This is a legal conclusion which we disregard 
because "legal conclusions stated in the complaint are not 
accepted as true, and [] are insufficient to enable a complaint 
to withstand a motion to dismiss."  Data Key Partners, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, ¶19. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
32 
 
to challenge" TIDs.  Moreover, where the "development would 
occur in the area without a TID, the TIDs do not serve [a] 
public purpose[]."  The City argues that the JRB's "but for" 
assertions are legislative acts and that Plaintiffs "failed to 
plead sufficient facts to satisfy the bedrock separation-of-
powers principle that challenges to state and local legislative 
acts should not be resolved by the judicial process if they are 
'fairly debatable.'"  In this regard, "[l]egislative acts enjoy 
a high level of judicial deference" and the complaint "does not 
demonstrate 
the 
duly 
authorized . . . Joint 
Review 
Board 
[determinations] 
were 
clearly 
in 
error." 
 
Moreover, 
the 
complaint "does not demonstrate it is 'clear and palpable that 
there can be no benefit to the public'"; thus, Plaintiffs have 
not stated a claim for violation of the public purpose doctrine.  
We conclude that Plaintiffs' complaint was properly dismissed as 
to declaratory judgment on this issue because the JRB's "but 
for" assertions are legislative determinations that do not 
present justiciable issues of fact or law. 
¶45 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Here, the 
statute states, in relevant part, as follows: 
[N]o tax incremental district may be created and no 
project plan may be amended unless the board approves 
the resolution adopted under sub. (4)(gm) . . . . The 
board may not approve the resolution under this 
subdivision unless the board's approval contains a 
positive 
assertion 
that, 
in 
its 
judgment, 
the 
development described in the documents the board has 
reviewed under subd. 1. would not occur without the 
creation of a tax incremental district. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
33 
 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4m)(b)2.  "All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to common and approved usage; but technical 
words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the 
law shall be construed according to such meaning."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(1); see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45; Scalia & 
Garner, supra ¶32 at 69-77 ("Ordinary-Meaning Canon").   
¶46 "Positive assertions" is not a defined term in the 
statute.  The word "assertion" is, however, defined in Black's 
Law Dictionary: "1.  A declaration[23] or allegation.[24]  2.  A 
person's speaking, writing, acting, or failing to act with the 
intent of expressing a fact or opinion; the act or an instance 
of engaging in communicative behavior."  Assertion Black's Law 
Dictionary, supra ¶33 at 139.  Given this ordinary meaning of 
"assertion," the plain language of the statute does not require 
that the JRB itemize the evidence in the record that supports 
its "but for" assertion. 
¶47 This plain language interpretation is supported by our 
analysis above because, as with the City Common Council's 
finding of blight, "[t]he Joint Review Board's task was to look 
at the TIF District as a whole and determine whether development 
would occur without the use of tax incremental financing."  
State ex rel. Olson v. City of Baraboo Joint Review Bd., 
                                                 
23 "Declaration" 
is 
defined: 
"A 
formal 
statement, 
proclamation, or announcement . . . ."  Declaration Black's Law 
Dictionary 493 (10th ed. 2014). 
24 "Allegation" is defined: "A declaration that something is 
true . . . ."  Allegation id. at 90. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
34 
 
2002 WI App 64, ¶29, 252 Wis. 2d 628, 643 N.W.2d 796.  The issue 
is not whether one owner of one structure plans to redevelop one 
property, because "the piecemeal approach, the [remediation] of 
individual 
structures . . . would 
be 
only 
[] 
palliative."  
Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.  Rather, the redevelopment projects 
permitted under the statute are of an integrated nature so as to 
prevent the recurrence of blight.  This determination is 
holistic and wholly within the discretion of the legislature.  
Therefore, 
a 
"but 
for" 
assertion 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1105(4m)(b)2. 
is 
not 
susceptible 
to 
an 
action 
for 
declaratory judgment because, as a legislative determination, it 
does not give rise to justiciable issues of fact or law. 
¶48 Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon 
which relief may be granted because a court cannot issue a 
declaration regarding the wisdom of a legislative determination.  
See, e.g., Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶57 ("It is not our role to 
determine the wisdom or rationale [of] a particular legislative 
pronouncement."); Gottlieb, 33 Wis. 2d at 415 ("We are not 
concerned with the wisdom of what the legislature has done."); 
Buhler, 33 Wis. 2d at 146-47. 
 
3.  Cash grants under Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)1.a. 
a.  The substantive law 
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)1. states, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
"Project costs" mean any expenditures made or 
estimated to be made or monetary obligations incurred 
or estimated to be incurred by the city which are 
listed in a project plan as costs of public works or 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
35 
 
improvements within a tax incremental district . . . . 
"Project costs" include: 
a.  Capital costs including, but not limited to, 
the actual costs of the construction of public works 
or 
improvements, 
new 
buildings, 
structures, 
and 
fixtures; 
the 
demolition, 
alteration, 
remodeling, 
repair 
or 
reconstruction 
of 
existing 
buildings, 
structures and fixtures other than the demolition of 
listed properties as defined in s. 44.31(4) . . . . 
§ 66.1105(2)(f)1.a.  Section 44.31(4) defines "listed property" 
to mean "property which is listed on the national register of 
historic places in Wisconsin or the state register of historic 
places, or both."  Wis. Stat. § 44.31(4). 
 
b.  The allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint 
¶50 With regard to this claim, Plaintiffs' complaint 
alleges the following facts: 
42.  . . . The buildings that have been purchased 
and subsequently demolished by the developer include 
the Kline Department Store, which was listed on the 
National Register of Historic Places.  Also demolished 
were several other buildings within the Confluence 
Commercial District, also on the National Register.  
43.  A substantial part of the development costs 
actually incurred by the developer thus includes the 
costs of demolition as well as the purchase price of 
the 
Kline 
Department 
Store 
building 
and 
other 
buildings that are listed properties pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § [44.31(4)].   
46.  The Project Plan for TID #10 indicates that 
$10,400,000 of the project costs will come in the form 
of "contributions"——i.e. cash payments from the City——
to the Confluence developer.  These contributions are 
to be paid in the form of cash grants to the 
partnership to compensate it for development costs.  
The funds . . . depend upon its achieving specified 
milestones in the project, but they are paid to the 
developer in a lump sum once those milestones have 
been reached.  Neither the Project Plan for TID #10 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
36 
 
nor the agreements with the developer clearly provide 
that the lump sum grants may not be used by the 
Confluence developer to reimburse itself for some or 
all of the costs of purchasing then demolishing listed 
properties that it had already incurred.  
94. . . . Given the lump sum character of the 
developer payments, there is in fact no way to assure 
that the payments have been used as reimbursement for 
certain already incurred costs, and not used as 
reimbursement for others.[25] 
 
c.  These allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
¶51 To determine whether these allegations state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted we must interpret the statute.  
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  See Estate of Miller, 378 Wis. 2d 358, ¶25. 
¶52 Plaintiffs argue that they "alleged that TIF funds for 
TID #10 were in fact being used to reimburse the developer for 
the 
acquisition 
and 
destruction 
of 
historic 
properties," 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)1.a., and that to conclude 
otherwise would mean that "reimbursement for the destruction of 
historic buildings can be challenged only when TID funds are 
expressly earmarked for demolition."  The City argues that 
                                                 
25 With regard to this claim, Plaintiffs' complaint also 
alleged the following legal conclusions: (1) that, under Wis. 
Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)1.a., "tax incremental funds cannot be used 
to compensate a developer for the costs associated with the 
destruction of listed properties"; and (2) that "the TID #10 
project plan . . . unlawfully reimburses the developer for such 
costs."  We disregard Plaintiffs' legal conclusions because 
"legal conclusions stated in the complaint are not accepted as 
true, and [] are insufficient to enable a complaint to withstand 
a motion to dismiss."  Data Key Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶19. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
37 
 
Plaintiffs' claim here fails because it is moot, as the 
buildings in question have already been demolished, and because 
the complaint "fails to plead facts demonstrating any connection 
between 
TIF 
funds 
and 
historic 
building 
acquisition 
or 
demolition."  We conclude that Plaintiffs' third claim was 
properly dismissed because it does not allege facts which 
plausibly establish that the City's cash grant for TID 10 was 
used 
to 
reimburse 
the 
developer's 
costs 
associated 
with 
demolishing historic buildings. 
¶53 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 66.1105(2)(f) states, in relevant part, as follows:  
"Project 
costs" 
include . . . [c]apital 
costs 
including . . . the 
demolition, 
alteration, 
remodeling, 
repair 
or 
reconstruction 
of 
existing 
buildings, structures and fixtures other than the 
demolition of [property which is listed on the 
national register of historic places in Wisconsin or 
the state register of historic places, or both]. 
§ 66.1105(2)(f)1.a.  The plain language of this provision 
establishes that it would be a violation of the statute for a 
developer to use money allocated for "project costs" to pay for 
the demolition of historic buildings.   
¶54 This 
is 
not, 
however, 
what 
Plaintiffs 
alleged.  
Although Plaintiffs alleged that the $10.4 million cash grant 
was for "project costs," they did not allege facts which 
establish that the developer in fact used the money from the 
cash grant to pay for the demolition of Kline Department Store 
or other historic buildings.  Nor did they allege facts which 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
38 
 
demonstrate that the developer was likely to do so.  Plaintiffs 
alleged only that "there is . . . no way to assure" that the 
developer did not use the cash grant to pay for the demolition 
of historic buildings.   
¶55 Thus, Plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted because, even if taken as true, 
they establish only the possibility that funds could be used to 
pay for the demolition of historic buildings.  This is not 
"enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.'"  Data Key Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶26 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 
557 (2007)).  "'[I]t gets the complaint close to stating a 
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
entitle[ment] to relief.'"  Id. (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557). 
 
4.  Cash grants under Article VIII, Section 1 
a.  The substantive law 
¶56 Article VIII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states, in relevant part, as follows: 
The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the 
legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to 
collect and return taxes on real estate located 
therein by optional methods. 
 
Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
39 
 
b.  The allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint 
¶57 With regard to this claim, Plaintiffs' complaint 
alleges the following facts: 
42.  The developer purchased the properties on 
the 
Confluence 
Project 
site 
in 
three 
separate 
transactions in May, 2012, April, 2014, and June, 
2014 . . . . 
106.  [T]he project plans provide for millions of 
dollars of incremental TID taxes to be paid directly 
to the owner of the property within the TID, with no 
meaningful restrictions except that the developer use 
them to reimburse itself for "project costs."[26]  
 
c.  These allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
¶58 To determine whether these allegations state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted we must interpret the statute 
and Article VIII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
(hereinafter the "Uniformity Clause").  The interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law that we review de novo.  See Estate 
of Miller, 378 Wis. 2d 358, ¶25.  The interpretation of a 
constitutional provision is also a question of law that we 
                                                 
26 With regard to this claim, Plaintiffs' complaint also 
alleged that "[t]his arrangement functions as a tax rebate or 
tax credit, and . . . constitutes a violation of the Uniformity 
Clause . . . [b]ecause the developer here is being taxed at a 
more favorable rate than an owner of identically-assessed 
property elsewhere."  This is a legal conclusion, which we 
disregard because "legal conclusions stated in the complaint are 
not accepted as true, and [] are insufficient to enable a 
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss."  Data Key Partners, 
356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶19. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
40 
 
review de novo.  Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, 
¶13, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337.  
¶59 Plaintiffs argue that the TIDs violate the Uniformity 
Clause because "the owner is paying the same formal rate as 
everyone else, but is getting paid a reimbursement that lowers 
its effective rate"; thus, the cash grants constitute "an 
unconstitutional tax rebate."  Plaintiffs argue that this is an 
as-applied challenge because they "seek[] only to invalidate 
these particular TIDs" and "[a] ruling for [Plaintiffs] on this 
claim would not bar all cash grants under [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 66.1105(2)(f)2.d."  The City argues that the complaint "does 
not plead sufficient facts to satisfy the burden necessary to 
challenge the constitutional validity of a state statute" 
because "[i]t is not sufficient to say reasonable minds may 
disagree"; rather "[a]ny doubt as to constitutionality must be 
resolved in favor of constitutionality."  It also argues that 
Plaintiff's claim is a facial challenge, and that Plaintiffs 
have not successfully distinguished Sigma Tau, where this court 
upheld the Tax Increment Law against such a challenge.  We 
conclude that Plaintiffs' fourth claim was properly dismissed 
because it does not allege facts which plausibly establish that 
the cash grants are intended or used to pay the property taxes 
of owner-developers. 
¶60 As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Plaintiffs 
are 
attempting 
to 
raise 
an 
as-applied 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of cash grant disbursements pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)2.d.  Our prior cases distinguish between 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
41 
 
facial and as-applied challenges as follows: a facial challenge 
is 
"[a] 
claim 
that 
a 
statute . . . always 
operates 
unconstitutionally"; an as-applied challenge is "a claim that a 
statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or 
to a particular party."  Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 
2008 WI 51, ¶44 n.9, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211 (citing 
Black's Law Dictionary); see also Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 
WI 30, ¶¶46-48, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854; State v. Wood, 
2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  This 
distinction is significant because, although the presumption 
that a statute is constitutional applies in both facial and as-
applied challenges, in an as-applied challenge "there is no 
presumption the statute has been applied in a constitutional 
manner."  Milewski v. Town of Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶15, 377 
Wis. 2d 38, 899 N.W.2d 303.   
¶61 Here, Plaintiffs' claim is that cash grants to the 
owner-developer violate the Uniformity Clause because they 
effectively reimburse the owner-developer for property taxes 
paid on the project property.  These allegations have some 
characteristics of both a facial challenge and an as-applied 
challenge, as defined in our prior cases.  In other words, one 
could argue that the challenge is either.  On the one hand, it 
has the character of a facial challenge because, if Plaintiffs 
are successful, the statute would be invalidated beyond these 
particular TIDs; that is, all cash grants to all owner-
developers would be unconstitutional.  On the other hand, it is 
more of an as-applied challenge because, if Plaintiffs are 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
42 
 
successful, this provision of the statute would not always 
operate unconstitutionally; that is, Plaintiffs' allegations do 
not challenge cash grants to developers who do not own the land 
being developed.  Thus, Plaintiffs' claim does not fit clearly 
within one or the other of the traditional, categorical 
definitions for constitutional challenges.   
¶62 Some have reasoned that challenges like this exist 
because there is no "sharp, categorical distinction between 
facial and as-applied . . . challenges to the validity of 
statutes."  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial 
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harvard L. Rev. 1321, 
1336 (2000).  Fallon opines that this is because "a litigant 
must always assert that the statute's application to her case 
violates 
the 
[c]onstitution"; 
thus, 
"determinations 
that 
statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as logical 
outgrowths of rulings on whether statutes may be applied to 
particular litigants on particular facts."  Id. at 1327-28.  
Here, we conclude that Plaintiffs' claim is an as-applied 
challenge because, even if Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)2.d. is 
invalid as Plaintiffs claim, the constitutional infirmity would 
not invalidate all applications of this provision, nor would it 
render the remainder of the statute invalid.  
¶63 We have once before upheld Wis. Stat. § 66.1105 
against 
a 
constitutional 
challenge. 
 
See 
Sigma 
Tau, 
93 
Wis. 2d 392.  In Sigma Tau we concluded that "the Tax Increment 
Law is constitutional" on its face because "[a]ll tax payers 
within the territorial limits of each . . . district [] continue 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
43 
 
to be taxed at a uniform rate based upon valuations uniformly 
arrived at."  Id. at 412.27  At that time, however, the Tax 
Increment Law did not incorporate the particular provision at 
issue here,28 and a statute once held to be constitutional, is 
not "forever and always" constitutional, "regardless of any 
legislative alterations."29  Voters, 376 Wis. 2d 479, ¶46.  Thus, 
                                                 
27 In doing so, we distinguished two of our prior cases.  
See State ex rel. La Follette v. Torphy, 85 Wis. 2d 94, 108, 270 
N.W.2d 187 (1978) (concluding that the Improvements Tax Relief 
Law violated the Uniformity Clause because its rebate credits 
for 
certain 
property 
owners 
"lead[] 
to 
the 
indisputable 
conclusion that taxpayers owning equally valuable property will 
ultimately be paying disproportionate amounts of real estate 
taxes."); Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 428-29, 
147 N.W.2d 633 (1967) (concluding that the Urban Redevelopment 
Law violated the Uniformity Clause because its suspension of 
property taxes for redevelopment corporations constituted a 
partial exemption).  We do not perceive these cases to be 
directly applicable to the issue here presented and therefore do 
not analyze them further.   
We note, however, that, as we pointed out in Torphy, "[t]he 
initial question is whether the [law] is a tax statute subject 
to the uniformity clause."  85 Wis. 2d at 104; see also State ex 
rel. Harvey v. Morgan, 30 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966) 
("The [question of whether chapter 580 violated the uniformity 
clause] is relevant only if Ch. 580 is in fact a tax law.").  
Neither party has presented arguments regarding whether the Tax 
Increment Law is a tax law and, for the purposes of our 
analysis, we assume without deciding that it is. 
28 See 2003 Wis. Act 126, § 3. 
29 In this regard, we note that the legislature made 
numerous amendments to Wis. Stat. § 66.1105 since the 2013-14 
version considered herein.  See 2015 Wis. Act 60, §§ 32-36; 2015 
Wis. Act 75; 2015 Wis. Act 96; 2015 Wis. Act 254, §§ 1-7; 2015 
Wis. Act 255; 2015 Wis. Act 256, §§ 3-18; 2015 Wis. Act 257, 
§§ 7-12; 2017 Wis. Act 58, §§ 19-21. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
44 
 
Sigma Tau is not dispositive on the issue here presented and we 
undertake a de novo analysis.30 
¶64 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 66.1105(2)(f)2. states, in relevant part, as follows: 
Notwithstanding subd. 1., none of the following 
may 
be 
included 
as 
project 
costs 
for 
any 
tax 
incremental district for which a project plan is 
approved . . .  
d.  Cash grants made by the city to owners, 
lessees, or developers of land that is located within 
the 
tax 
incremental 
district 
unless 
the 
grant 
recipient has signed a development agreement with the 
city, a copy of which shall be sent to the appropriate 
joint review board or, if that joint review board has 
been dissolved, retained by the city in the official 
records for that tax incremental district. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)2.d.  Subdivision 1. lists the costs 
that are "include[d]" within the definition of "[p]roject 
costs": capital costs, financing costs, real property assembly 
costs, professional service costs, imputed administrative costs, 
relocation 
costs, 
organizational 
costs, 
project 
plan 
implementation costs, infrastructure construction or alteration 
costs, 
and 
lead 
contamination 
costs. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1105(2)(f)1.a.—n.  This list does not include property 
taxes; thus, the plain language of the statute does not 
affirmatively permit the use of cash grants to pay property 
                                                 
30 Our analysis here, however, does not in any way abrogate 
or overrule Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House Corp. v. City of 
Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288 N.W.2d 85 (1980). 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
45 
 
taxes.  We presume, however——absent some textual evidence that 
the legislature intended the word "include" to be interpreted as 
a term of limitation——that the legislature's use of "include" 
denominates a nonexclusive list.  See State v. Popenhagen, 
2008 WI 55, ¶¶43-47, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611.  Thus, the 
plain language of the statute also does not affirmatively 
prohibit use of cash grants allocated for projects costs to pay 
property taxes. 
¶65 The fact that a statute does not affirmatively 
prohibit a possibility is not, however, the standard.  Rather, 
[a]ll legislative acts are presumed constitutional and 
we must indulge every presumption to sustain the law.  
Any doubt that exists regarding the constitutionality 
of the statute must be resolved in favor of its 
constitutionality.  Consequently, it is insufficient 
for 
a 
party 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
statute's 
constitutionality is doubtful or that the statute is 
probably unconstitutional.  Instead, the presumption 
can be overcome only if the party establishes the 
statute's 
unconstitutionality 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt. 
Madison Teachers, Inc., 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13 (citations omitted).  
Thus, to establish that a statute violates the Uniformity 
Clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the statute contravenes the rule that "taxation shall be 
uniform."  Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1.  This is not what 
Plaintiffs alleged.  Plaintiffs did not allege facts which 
establish that cash grants are intended to reimburse owner-
developers for property taxes.  Nor did they allege facts which 
establish that owner-developers in fact use cash grants to pay 
property taxes, or that owner-developers are likely to do so.  
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
46 
 
Plaintiffs alleged only that a requirement that owner-developers 
use cash grants for "project costs" imposes "no meaningful 
restrictions." 
¶66 Similarly, although Plaintiffs alleged that "millions 
of dollars of incremental TID taxes [will] be paid directly to 
the owner of property within the TID," they did not allege facts 
which establish that the developer here in fact used that money 
to pay its property taxes.  Nor did they allege facts which 
demonstrate that the developer here was likely to do so.  
Plaintiffs alleged only that the project plan imposes "no 
meaningful restrictions except that the developer use [the 
money] to reimburse itself for 'project costs.'"   
¶67 Thus, Plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted because, even if taken as true, 
they establish only that the statute does not explicitly exclude 
property taxes from the definition of "project costs"; in other 
words, that the statute does not preclude the possibility that 
developers could use cash grants to pay property taxes.  This is 
not sufficient to state a constitutional challenge under the 
Uniformity Clause because such a possibility does not even 
amount 
to 
an 
allegation 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
"probably 
unconstitutional," 
let 
alone 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt.  Madison Teachers, Inc., 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13.  
Moreover, Plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted because, even if taken as true, they 
establish only the possibility that the developer here could use 
the funds to pay property taxes.  This is not "enough heft to 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
47 
 
'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'"  Data Key 
Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶26 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557).  "'[I]t gets the complaint 
close to stating a claim, but without some further factual 
enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility 
of 
entitle[ment] 
to 
relief.'" 
 
Id. 
(second 
alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 
557).     
¶68 In sum, Plaintiffs' complaint was properly dismissed 
as to declaratory judgment because it fails to state claims upon 
which relief may be granted.  The first and second counts fail 
because the City Common Council's findings of blight and the 
JRB's "but for" assertions are legislative determinations that 
do not present justiciable issues of fact or law; the third 
count fails because it does not allege facts which plausibly 
establish that the City's cash grant for TID 10 was used to 
reimburse the developer's costs associated with demolishing 
historic buildings; and the fourth count fails because it does 
not allege facts which plausibly establish that cash grants are 
intended or used to pay developers' property taxes. 
 
C.  Certiorari Review 
¶69 We conclude, however, that Plaintiffs' first and 
second claims are reviewable under certiorari.  Plaintiffs argue 
that a "preference for certiorari review is an abdication of 
judicial responsibility," and that it is insufficient because it 
"would entail no discovery or other opportunity to assess 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
48 
 
whether . . . [the] incantations of 'blight' and 'but for' 
development are accurate."31  The City argues that common law 
                                                 
31 Plaintiffs cite three cases in support of their argument 
that these are determinations susceptible to judicial fact 
finding, none of which actually support their argument.  In 
Fenton v. Ryan, we concluded that whether a proposed village 
possesses the requisite attributes is a question of judicial 
character because, if the attributes are not present, "the 
uniformity of town and county government guaranteed by the 
Constitution is invaded," 140 Wis. 353, 359, 122 N.W.2d 756 
(1909); 
such 
questions 
of 
constitutionality 
are 
judicial 
questions.  See, e.g., Gottlieb, 33 Wis. 2d at 415-16 ("We are 
not concerned with the wisdom of what the legislature has done.  
We are judicially concerned only when the statute clearly 
contravenes some constitutional provision.").  In Town of Mt. 
Pleasant v. City of Racine, we held that a city's determination 
of its own boundaries was a legislative determination, and the 
judicial question was limited to whether the boundary lines were 
"reasonable in the sense that they were not fixed arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or in the abuse of discretion."  24 Wis. 2d 41, 
46, 127 N.W.2d 757 (1964) (citing Town of Fond du Lac v. City of 
Fond du Lac, 22 Wis. 2d 533, 126 N.W.2d 201 (1964)).  And, in 
Bechthold v. City of Wauwatosa, the petitioners challenged the 
city's adherence to the procedure for advertising bids for 
street repair, and the judicial questions were whether strict or 
substantial compliance was required, and whether the undisputed 
facts demonstrated that the city had complied, 228 Wis. 544, 
551-58, 277 N.W. 657 (1938); Plaintiffs here do not dispute that 
the City adhered to the correct procedure. 
Plaintiffs also claim that "in at least three published 
cases, TIF actions were brought as declaratory actions."  Two of 
these cases are distinguishable on the basis that they sought a 
declaration of constitutionality, which, as noted above, is a 
proper question for the court.  See Kirley, 172 Wis. 2d 191; 
Gottlieb, 33 Wis. 2d 408.  The third case never reached the 
declaratory 
question, 
and 
thus 
provides 
no 
support 
for 
Plaintiffs' argument.  See Town of Baraboo v. Vill. of West 
Baraboo, 
2005 
WI 
App 
96, 
¶¶31-37, 
283 
Wis. 2d 479, 
699 
N.W.2d 610.  Plaintiffs' reliance on Kaiser v. City of Mauston 
is similarly misplaced because that case addressed the validity 
of an ordinance under a statute, which is not the issue here.  
99 Wis. 2d 345, 354-55, 299 N.W.2d 259 (1980). 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
49 
 
certiorari is the applicable standard of review because it is a 
mechanism by which a court may test the validity of a decision 
rendered by a municipality; is appropriate where, as here, no 
statutory appeal process has been created; is the proper 
standard 
to 
review 
local 
legislative 
functions; 
and 
is 
consistent with the longstanding policy that "declaratory relief 
is disfavored if there is a 'speedy, effective and adequate' 
alternative remedy."  We conclude that certiorari review is 
appropriate and adequate to address Plaintiffs' claims regarding 
the municipality's findings of blight and "but for" assertions 
because certiorari review is the mechanism by which a court 
should test the validity of a municipality's legislative 
determinations. 
¶70 "It is well established in this state that where there 
are no statutory provisions for judicial review, the action of a 
board or commission may be reviewed by way of certiorari."  
State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-50, 185 
N.W.2d 306 (1971).  No statutory appeal process has been created 
to review the formation of a TID; therefore, certiorari review 
of the decisions of both the City Common Council and the JRB is 
appropriate.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.1105; Olson, 252 Wis. 2d 628, 
¶32 (Roggensack J., dissenting); see also Ottman v. Town of 
Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶34, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411 
("Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test the 
validity of a decision rendered by a municipality."). 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
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¶71 Where, as here, there is no express statutory method 
of 
review, 
common 
law 
certiorari 
applies. 
 
Ottman, 
332 
Wis. 2d 3, ¶35. 
When conducting common law certiorari review, a court 
reviews the record compiled by the municipality and 
does not take any additional evidence on the merits of 
the decision.  The courts review is limited to: (1) 
whether the municipality kept within its jurisdiction; 
(2) whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law; 
(3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that 
it might reasonably make the order or determination in 
question. . . 
Id. (citation omitted).  Additionally, "on certiorari review, 
there is a presumption of correctness and validity to a 
municipality's 
decision." 
 
Id., 
¶48. 
 
This 
standard 
is 
commensurate with our established deference to legislative 
determinations.32  Therefore, certiorari review of the decisions 
of both the City Common Council and the JRB is also an adequate 
remedy.   
¶72 The record before us, however, does not contain a 
"record compiled by the municipality" because the litigation 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Town of Baraboo, 283 Wis. 2d 479, ¶18 (quoting 
Town of Campbell v. City of La Crosse, 2003 WI App 247, ¶19, 268 
Wis. 2d 253, 673 N.W.2d 696) ("The doctrine known as the 'rule 
of reason' is applied by the courts to ascertain whether the 
power delegated to the cities and villages has been abused in a 
given case."); see also Fond du Lac, 22 Wis. 2d 533 (applying 
the rule of reason to annexation); Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 56 
Wis. 2d at 797 ("The trial court properly confined its review to 
whether the State Appeal Board had jurisdiction and whether the 
order evinced arbitrary or capricious action."). 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
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below did not proceed to that point.  See supra notes 5-7.  We 
therefore remand the cause to the circuit court for certiorari 
review of the decisions of the City Common Council and the JRB. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶73 On review, we consider two issues.  First, we consider 
whether dismissal of Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claims was 
proper.  We conclude that it was, because Plaintiffs have failed 
to state claims upon which relief can be granted: the first and 
second counts fail because the City Common Council's findings of 
blight and the JRB's "but for" assertions are legislative 
determinations that do not present justiciable issues of fact or 
law; the third count fails because it does not allege facts 
which plausibly establish that the City's cash grant for TID 10 
was used to reimburse the developer's costs associated with 
demolishing historic buildings; and the fourth count fails 
because it does not allege facts which plausibly establish that 
cash grants are intended or used to pay owner-developers' 
property taxes.   
¶74 Second, we consider whether certiorari review is 
appropriate.  We conclude that it is, because certiorari review 
is the appropriate mechanism for a court to test the validity of 
a legislative determination.  The record before us, however, 
does not contain a municipal record sufficient to enable our 
review.  Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court for 
certiorari review of Plaintiffs first and second claims. 
No. 
2015AP1858 
 
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¶75 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
on the other grounds. 
 
¶76 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
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1 
 
 
¶77 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J. and 
DANIEL 
KELLY, 
J.   (dissenting).  The court held that Plaintiffs' richly-
detailed 
and 
amply 
supported 
25-page 
Complaint 
does 
not 
sufficiently state a claim.  It also said Plaintiffs may not 
request declaratory relief on their claims that the City of Eau 
Claire (the "City") lacked authority to expand TID #8 or create 
TID #10.  And ignoring the obvious fungibility of money, it said 
Plaintiffs' assertion that developers who were reimbursed out of 
TID funds for demolishing historic buildings did not plausibly 
allege that TID funds were used to pay for demolishing historic 
buildings. 
¶78 The court's decision forecloses taxpayers from ever 
seeking declaratory judgment when municipalities violate the TIF 
statutes.  Our court (and the court of appeals) sidestepped the 
complex substantive issues, incorrectly applied the law, and 
deprived Plaintiffs of their rights.  We write separately to 
explain why:  (1) Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their 
Complaint; (2) declaratory judgment is an appropriate avenue for 
seeking relief; and (3) the Complaint sufficiently alleges facts 
to support each claim, although not every claim is legally 
supportable.  We specifically address why the factual existence 
of "blight" is justiciable, why Plaintiffs' cash grant claim 
should have survived a motion to dismiss, and why TIDs in 
general, and these cash grants specifically, do not implicate 
the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We 
respectfully dissent. 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND1 
¶79 The City expanded TID #8 and created TID #10 in 
conjunction with a development known as the Confluence Project.  
Our statutes authorize municipalities to create TIDs as a 
mechanism to fund any of four types of projects:  blight 
elimination (Wis. Stat. § 66.1105); urban rehabilitation or 
conservation (Wis. Stat. § 66.1337(2m)); industrial development 
(Wis. Stat. § 66.1101); or promotion of mixed use development 
(Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(cm)).  The City claimed it amended 
TID #8 and created TID #10 to combat blight.  The controlling 
statute defines "blighted area" as either:  (1) a slum area or 
an area that endangers life or property and is detrimental to 
health, safety, morals, or welfare; or (2) a predominantly open 
area that consists primarily of an abandoned highway corridor or 
demolished 
structures 
that 
substantially 
impair 
community 
growth.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(ae)1. 
¶80 The Confluence Project engendered considerable debate, 
which focused primarily on whether, as a factual matter, the 
TIDs actually comprised blighted areas.  At public hearings 
addressing the TIDs, those opposed to the project presented 
evidence that the areas were not blighted, that the areas 
contained historic buildings, and that redevelopment of some of 
                                                 
1 This section primarily recounts facts and reasonable 
inferences from Plaintiffs' Complaint.  In reviewing a motion to 
dismiss, we accept as true the alleged facts and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom.  See Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers 
LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶19, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693.  We draw 
all legal conclusions independently.  See Walberg v. St. Francis 
Home, Inc., 2005 WI 64, ¶6, 281 Wis. 2d 99, 697 N.W.2d 36. 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
3 
 
the buildings was already underway and would occur without the 
TIDs and without the Confluence Project. 
¶81 On September 9, 2014, the Eau Claire City Council (the 
"City Council") approved the amendment to TID #8 and adopted a 
resolution to that effect.  Nothing in the minutes from that 
meeting indicates the City Council had any evidence that the 
area was actually blighted.  The City Council's resolution did 
not contain any specific facts documenting or explaining why the 
Council found "not less than 50%, by area, of the real property 
within the district is . . . a blighted area."  On September 26, 
2014, the Joint Review Board (the "Board")2 approved the City 
Council's resolution expanding TID #8. 
¶82 At the public hearing on TID #10, residents opposed to 
its creation presented evidence that the City's own records 
prove the area was not blighted.  Nonetheless, the City Council 
adopted a resolution approving TID #10 on October 14, 2014. 
Although the resolution said that "not less than 50%, by area," 
was a blighted area in "need of rehabilitation or conservation," 
Plaintiffs say there is no evidence to support this finding.  On 
October 
22, 
2014, 
the 
Board 
adopted 
the 
City 
Council's 
resolution, claiming the development would not occur without the 
creation of TID #10. 
¶83 Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim and Injury with the 
City claiming the actions related to the TIDs were unlawful, 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.1105(4m) describes the role and 
responsibility of the Joint Review Board.  The majority opinion 
sets forth the full text of § 66.1105(4m) in ¶41. 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
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violated the TIF statutes, and injured the taxpayers by 
obligating them to pay higher taxes.  The Notice advised that 
disallowance of the claim would cause the taxpayers to file a 
declaratory judgment action.  The City did not respond.  
Instead, the City Council adopted a resolution appropriating 
$9,976,100 to the project plans for TID #8 and $5,945,800 for 
TID #10.  It also adopted a resolution authorizing issuance of 
bonds to be funded by the incremental revenue from TID #8 and 
TID #10. 
¶84 Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking 
declaratory judgment on four claims:  (1) the City did not 
comply with the TIF statutes in expanding TID #8; (2) the City 
did not comply with the TIF statutes in creating TID #10; (3) 
the City unlawfully used TID funds to pay for demolition of 
historic buildings; and (4) the cash grants violated the 
Uniformity Clause.  The Complaint alleged an alternative fifth 
claim "for certiorari review of the actions taken by the City 
Council and the Joint Review Board." 
¶85 The City denied Plaintiffs' allegations and moved to 
dismiss the Complaint.  As material here, the City claimed:  (1) 
Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment 
or a certiorari action; (2) the TID resolutions are non-
justiciable legislative enactments; (3) the Complaint fails to 
state a claim and any claim based on demolition of the historic 
buildings is moot; and (4) this court already declared the TIF 
statutes constitutional in Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House 
Corp. v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288 N.W.2d 85 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
5 
 
(1980).  The circuit court granted the City's motion, holding 
Plaintiffs did not have standing, declaratory judgment was 
inappropriate because the case presented a political question, 
and the TIF statutes are constitutional. 
¶86 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.  It agreed with the circuit court that Plaintiffs did not 
have 
standing 
to 
seek 
a 
declaratory 
judgment 
and 
that 
declaratory judgment is an inappropriate avenue to challenge a 
City's factual findings.  See Voters with Facts v. City of Eau 
Claire, 2017 WI App 35, ¶¶2-3, 376 Wis. 2d 479, 899 N.W.2d 706.  
It held Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a violation of 
the TIF statutes, their claim regarding illegal payment for 
demolition of historic buildings was speculative, and they did 
not sufficiently allege a constitutional violation.  Id.  It 
decided, however, that Plaintiffs had the right to certiorari 
review of Plaintiffs' first and second claims, and remanded to 
the circuit court.  Id., ¶60.  We granted Plaintiffs' petition 
for review. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standing  
¶87 The court "assumes" standing, but does not address it.  
In this case, the circuit court decided Plaintiffs did not have 
standing at all, and the court of appeals decided that 
Plaintiffs did not have standing to seek declaratory judgment.  
Plainly, 
the 
question 
of 
"standing" 
in 
the 
context 
of 
declaratory judgment claims needs some attention.  We should 
provide guidance on this issue so it does not readily recur.  We 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
6 
 
write to explain why Plaintiffs had standing to assert their 
claims. 
1.  Standard of Review and Applicable Law 
¶88 Whether a plaintiff has standing to bring suit is a 
question of law we review de novo.  See Krier v. Vilione, 2009 
WI 45, ¶14, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517.  Taxpayers have 
standing when the complaint alleges the taxpayer has or will 
sustain some pecuniary loss as a result of an illegal 
expenditure of public funds.  S.D. Realty Co. v. Sewerage 
Comm'n., 15 Wis. 2d 15, 21-22, 112 N.W.2d 177 (1961).  "A 
taxpayer [has] a financial interest in public funds. . . . "  
Id. at 22.  Standing exists even when the pecuniary loss alleged 
is "infinitesimal."  Id.  The merits of the claim have no 
bearing on whether standing exists.  Kaiser v. City of Mauston, 
99 
Wis. 2d 345, 
360-61, 
299 
N.W.2d 259 
(Ct. 
App. 
1980), 
overruled on other grounds by DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994) (notice of claim 
statute) (subsequent case limiting DNR's notice of claim holding 
omitted); Hart v. Ament, 176 Wis. 2d 694, 699, 500 N.W.2d 312 
(1993). 
2.  Application 
¶89 We conclude Plaintiffs have standing to pursue a claim 
that the City of Eau Claire did not follow the requisite 
procedures outlined in the TIF statutes when the City decided to 
create TID #10 and expand TID #8.  Plaintiffs' claim, if true, 
necessarily means the taxpayers will suffer pecuniary harm 
because the City will expend funds without any legal basis.  
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
7 
 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that:  (1) they are taxpayers (two 
of Plaintiffs actually own property within a TID district and 
assert it is not blighted); (2) the City "failed to satisfy the 
statutory requirements" and did not make required statutory 
findings before proceeding with the TIDs; (3) the areas within 
the TIDs are in fact not blighted areas; and (4) Plaintiffs were 
harmed as a result of the City's "unlawful actions as their tax 
dollars will be spent in an unlawful manner, tax revenues from 
the incremental growth in TID #8 will be unavailable for general 
purposes such as schools, roads, and public safety, and the 
incremental tax revenues from TID #8 will be unavailable for 
other taxing jurisdictions."  The Complaint makes the same 
assertions about TID #10. 
¶90 These allegations easily confer taxpayer standing.  
"An allegation that the city has spent, or proposes to spend, 
public funds illegally is . . . sufficient to confer standing on 
a taxpayer."  Kaiser, 99 Wis. 2d at 360.  When we inquire into 
standing, we do not evaluate a plaintiff's likelihood of success 
on the merits.  That comes later.  When the court of appeals 
decided that the City's expenditure of tax funds was legal, it 
improperly explored the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.  See 
Voters with Facts, 376 Wis. 2d 479, ¶¶18-59.  The circuit court 
also erred in its standing analysis by passing on the question, 
believing it to be political rather than legal.  This is error 
both procedurally and conceptually because it requires a defense 
of the merits before an opportunity to develop factual support. 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
8 
 
¶91 A 
taxpayer's 
complaint 
alleging 
past 
or 
future 
pecuniary loss based upon an unlawful expenditure of tax 
revenues has long been deemed sufficient to establish standing.  
Over one hundred years ago, this court recognized that "[e]very 
taxpayer, great or small, has an interest in the disposition of 
county funds.  Courts will not stop to balance differences or 
enter into computations to ascertain just how much the taxpayer 
will be likely to suffer . . . ."  Mueller v. Eau Claire Cty., 
108 Wis. 304, 311, 84 N.W. 430 (1900).  Rather, when a taxpayer 
shows "'an active or threatened invasion or destruction of a 
distinct right belonging to himself or to the body of citizens 
for 
whom 
he 
sues . . . the 
taxpayer's 
right 
to 
sue 
is 
recognized.'"  Id. at 312 (citation omitted).  See also Hart, 
176 Wis. 2d at 698-99 (taxpayer challenge to transfer of a 
county museum to a private organization); State ex rel. Wis. 
Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) 
(taxpayer challenge to "Frankenstein" veto); City of Appleton v. 
Town of Menasha, 142 Wis. 2d 870, 419 N.W.2d 249 (1988) 
(taxpayer challenge to statutory scheme for apportionment after 
annexation of a town); Tooley v. O'Connell, 77 Wis. 2d 422, 439, 
253 N.W.2d 335 (1977) (taxpayer challenge to statutory plan for 
financing city schools from property taxes); Buse v. Smith, 74 
Wis. 2d 550, 563, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) (taxpayer challenge to 
negative-aid school financing); State ex rel Sundby v. Adamany, 
71 Wis. 2d 118, 124, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976) (taxpayer challenge 
to constitutionality of veto); Thompson v. Kenosha Cty., 64 
Wis. 2d 673, 679-81, 221 N.W.2d 845 (1974) (taxpayer challenge 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
9 
 
to statutory creation of countywide assessor system); Vill. of 
W. Milwaukee v. Area Bd. of Vocational, Tech. and Adult Ed., 51 
Wis. 2d 356, 365-66, 187 N.W.2d 387 (1971) (taxpayer challenge 
to statute allowing for area vocational education districts); 
Columbia Cty. v. Bd. of Trs. of Wis. Ret. Fund, 17 Wis. 2d 310, 
116 N.W.2d 142 (1962) (taxpayer challenge to statute mandating 
all counties join the welfare fund); Fed. Paving Corp. v. 
Prudisch, 235 Wis. 527, 293 N.W. 156 (1940) (taxpayer challenge 
to statute allowing certain cities to pay funds under contracts 
later found void). 
¶92 Despite 
longstanding 
and 
clear-cut 
law 
to 
the 
contrary, the circuit court and the court of appeals ruled 
Plaintiffs lack standing.  Instead of correcting the error, this 
court dodged it, which means it will just come back to us again.  
The law of standing requires nothing more than Plaintiffs' claim 
that they are harmed by the unlawful expenditure of their tax 
dollars. 
B.  Dismissal of Counts One and Two 
¶93 The first two counts of the Complaint challenge the 
City's authority to amend TID #8 and create TID #10.  They seek 
a declaration that the City may not exercise TID authority 
unless (as relevant here) the proposed districts encompass the 
statutorily-prescribed 
minimum 
concentration 
of 
blighted 
properties.  This court dismissed these counts for failure to 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
10 
 
state a claim because, it said, blight is a non-justiciable 
legislative determination.3 
¶94  This conclusion is not possible without indulging two 
foundational errors.  First, the court never faced, and so did 
not answer, the central question Plaintiffs raised:  Whether the 
statutorily-mandated preconditions to the City's exercise of TID 
authority were satisfied.  And second, the court made a category 
error when, for purposes of justiciability, it assumed the 
existence of blight is the same thing as a municipality's 
response to it. 
1.  Controlling Legal Principles 
¶95 Declaratory judgments, such as the one Plaintiffs 
requested, are broadly available under our Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act, which says:  "Courts of record within their 
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, 
status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief 
is or could be claimed.  No action or proceeding shall be open 
to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree 
is prayed for."  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).  Such declarations are 
available so long as there is a justiciable controversy.  
Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cty., 2001 WI 65, ¶37, 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶4 ("First, we consider whether dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claims was proper. We conclude 
that it was, because Plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon 
which relief can be granted:  the first and second counts fail 
because the City Common Council's findings of blight . . . are 
legislative determinations that do not present justiciable 
issues of fact or law . . . ."). 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
11 
 
244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866 ("A declaratory judgment is 
fitting when a controversy is justiciable."). 
¶96  We have previously said that an issue is justiciable, 
for purposes of declaratory judgment actions, when there is: 
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it. 
(2) The controversy must be between persons whose 
interests are adverse. 
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a 
legal interest in the controversy——that is to say, a 
legally protectible interest. 
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe 
for judicial determination. 
Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 409, 320 N.W.2d 175 
(1982) 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
and 
citation 
omitted).  
Justiciability, however, does not depend on the ultimate merits 
of the claim.   Tooley v. O'Connell, 77 Wis. 2d 422, 434–35, 253 
N.W.2d 335 (1977) ("The merits of plaintiffs' cause of action do 
not determine its justiciability."). 
¶97 As the court recognized, the substantive law informing 
Plaintiffs' claims controls what they must plead.  See majority 
op., ¶27 ("[T]he sufficiency of a complaint depends on [the] 
substantive law that underlies the claim made because it is the 
substantive law that drives what facts must be pled." (quoting 
Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶31, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693)).  It also supplies the raw 
material for the justiciability analysis. 
¶98  The contest with respect to Counts One and Two is 
over the City's authority to expand TID #8 and create TID #10.  
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
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The Tax Increment Law (Wis. Stat. § 66.1105) is the source of 
that authority:  "In addition to any other powers conferred by 
law, a city may exercise any powers necessary and convenient to 
carry out the purposes of this section, including the power to:  
(a) Create tax incremental districts and define the boundaries 
of the districts . . . ."  § 66.1105(3).  But this is not an 
absolute grant of power.  That is to say, the legislature did 
not authorize municipalities to create TIDs whenever and 
wherever they wish.  To the contrary, a municipality may not 
create a TID unless all of the statutorily-defined prerequisites 
are satisfied.  The legislature introduced the operative portion 
of the Tax Increment Law with this command:  "In order to 
implement the provisions of this section, the following steps 
and plans are required . . . ."  § 66.1105(4). 
¶99 One of the requirements a municipality must satisfy 
before it may create a TID is adoption of a resolution finding 
that: 
[n]ot less than 50 percent, by area, of the real 
property within the district is at least one of the 
following:  a blighted area; in need of rehabilitation 
or conservation work, as defined in s. 66.1337 (2m) 
(a); suitable for industrial sites within the meaning 
of s. 66.1101 and has been zoned for industrial use; 
or suitable for mixed-use development . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(4).  An area is blighted if it meets any of 
the following descriptions: 
a. An area, including a slum area, in which the 
structures, buildings or improvements, which by reason 
of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, 
inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, 
sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population 
and overcrowding, or the existence of conditions which 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
13 
 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or 
any combination of these factors is conducive to ill 
health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, 
juvenile delinquency, or crime, and is detrimental to 
the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 
b. An area which is predominantly open and which 
consists primarily of an abandoned highway corridor, 
as defined in s. 66.1333 (2m) (a), or that consists of 
land upon which buildings or structures have been 
demolished and which because of obsolete platting, 
diversity of ownership, deterioration of structures or 
of site improvements, or otherwise, substantially 
impairs or arrests the sound growth of the community. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(ae)1. 
¶100 That is the substantive law against which we compare 
Counts One and Two.  Plaintiffs make three relevant allegations.  
In the first, they say the City acted solely on the basis that 
the property within the TIDs was blighted.  In the second and 
third, they say that although the City claimed the property 
within TID #8 and TID #10 (respectively) was blighted, the 
record before the City contained no evidence this was true.  
When we consider the sufficiency of a complaint, "we accept as 
true all facts well-pleaded in the complaint and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom."  Data Key Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶19. 
¶101 Therefore, the proper analysis accepts the truth of 
the following two propositions as the starting point:  (1) The 
City exercised TID authority based on its assertion that 
property within the districts is blighted; and (2) there is no 
evidence the City's assertion is true.  Counts One and Two 
unmistakably challenge whether the preconditions to the City's 
exercise of TID authority have been satisfied.  Although the 
court did not say so explicitly, it appears to have concluded 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
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these claims are not justiciable because they do not satisfy the 
third prong of the Loy formula:  "The party seeking declaratory 
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy——that is to 
say, a legally protectible interest."  Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 409-
10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In other 
words, the court concluded that the people of Wisconsin have no 
legally protectible interest in ensuring municipalities exercise 
TID authority only when the legislature says they may.  And that 
brings us to the first of the court's two foundational errors. 
2.  The Court Assumed Away the Question 
¶102 The court completely missed that Plaintiffs' challenge 
goes to whether the preconditions to the City's exercise of TID 
authority have been satisfied with respect to the areas defined 
by TIDs #8 and #10.  Steve Martin, the comic genius, once 
described how to be a millionaire and never pay taxes.  First, 
he said, get a million dollars.  The court has done something 
similar in assessing the City's authority with respect to TIDS 
#8 and #10.  First, it said, assume the authority to create 
them.  The court spent most of its analysis describing the 
procedure by which a municipality documents that assumption.  
But Plaintiffs' actionable concern is not that the City failed 
to do its paperwork properly.  Their Complaint alleges that the 
City lacked the authority to create (or expand) the TIDs because 
the statutorily-mandated factual predicate to the exercise of 
that authority does not exist. 
¶103 The 
court's 
analysis 
started 
with 
the 
unvoiced 
assumption that the City had the authority to do what it did, 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
15 
 
and in so doing, it assumed away Plaintiffs' actual challenge.  
Here is how the court began:  "To determine whether the 
allegations are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, we must interpret the statute; specifically, we 
must determine what the statute means when it requires that the 
local 
legislative 
body 
adopt 
a 
'resolution 
which . . . [c]ontains findings.'"  Majority op., ¶30.  Why on 
earth would we do that?  No one doubts the City's resolution 
contains findings.  What they doubt is whether they reflect 
reality.  Nonetheless, the court lamented that "finding" is a 
statutorily-undefined term (as if we do not know what a 
"finding" is) before settling on a dictionary definition.4  Then, 
without explanation, we leapt from Black's definition to the 
conclusion that the City need not provide evidence for its 
findings.5  Let's stipulate that this non sequitur could be saved 
by some hitherto unknown logic——why would it matter?  The manner 
in which a municipality must document its findings says nothing 
at all about whether the findings must be, not to put too fine 
of a point on it, true. 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶33 ("A determination by a judge, jury, or 
administrative agency of a fact supported by the evidence in the 
record." (quoting Finding of fact, Black's Law Dictionary 749 
(10th ed. 29 2014)).  That's a fine definition of a finding of 
fact, although the court's long history with findings of fact 
probably makes a dictionary definition unnecessary. 
5 Majority op., ¶33 ("Given this ordinary meaning of 
'findings', the plain language of the statute does not require 
that the local legislative body——here, the City Common Council——
itemize the evidence in the record that supports its finding of 
blight."). 
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¶104 The legislature granted municipalities the authority 
to create TIDs.  But it placed a gate with a combination lock in 
front of that grant of authority.  The gate will not swing open 
unless the statutorily-prescribed combination of conditions is 
fulfilled.  In this case, the City is trying to access TID-
creating authority using the blight combination.  Plaintiffs say 
the City did not get it right, and so the gate did not open.  
The court's response to Plaintiffs' claim was to consider the 
nature of the record the City must make as it jumps the gate.  
That is not what the court was supposed to do.  It was supposed 
to consider whether the people of Wisconsin may seek a 
declaration that the City may not jump the gate.  That, however, 
was only the first of the court's foundational errors. 
3.  The Court's Category Error 
¶105 The balance of the court's opinion on Counts One and 
Two comprised its mistaken conclusion that the existence of 
blight is a non-justiciable question of legislative policy.  
This is a profoundly disturbing category error, inasmuch as it 
caused the court to conclude that facts are contingent on 
municipal policies——a conclusion that obtains nowhere but in 
Orwellian dystopias.  So the court did not recognize that (1) a 
municipality's policy, and (2) the facts on the ground to which 
the policy responds, do not fall into the same category.  The 
first is generally not justiciable; the second is. 
¶106 The court created this error when it observed that our 
statutes define "blight," in part, with reference to some of the 
maladies that municipalities have the authority to address:   
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The key language in each of these [blight-
related] statutes is that the "area," in its current 
state, "is detrimental to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare."  "Public safety, public health, 
[and] morality . . . are some of the more conspicuous 
examples of the traditional application of the police 
power to municipal affairs," Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32 (1954), and a "municipality's exercise of 
its police power has traditionally been accorded 
deference by reviewing courts."  Nowell v. City of 
Wausau, 
2013 
WI 88, 
¶46, 
351 
Wis. 2d 1, 
838 
N.W.2d 852. 
Majority op., ¶37.  Because it saw similar phrases in the 
description of a municipality's authority and the situations a 
municipality may address, the court apparently thought they must 
be in the same category for purposes of the justiciability 
analysis.  They are not. 
¶107 The court's category error is the consequence of not 
recognizing the difference between subjects and objects.  The 
subject is the municipality's authority; the object is the 
situation to which the municipality may apply that authority.  
Yes, municipalities have authority to address matters of public 
health, 
safety, 
morals, 
and 
welfare. 
 
And 
yes, 
certain 
properties and areas are blighted (something that affects public 
health, safety, morals, and welfare).  This inexorably leads to 
the unremarkable conclusion that municipalities have certain 
authority (the subject) to remedy properties or areas that are 
blighted (the object).  A logically-ordered universe, however, 
does not allow the conclusion that this means subjects and 
objects are the same thing.  Just because municipalities have 
authority to address blight does not mean they have the 
authority to define what blight is.  The legislature has already 
taken care of that task.  It told municipalities, in great 
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detail, what "blighted area" means in the context of the Tax 
Increment Law.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(ae)1.6  This 
conflation of subjects and objects guaranteed the court's 
justiciability analysis would produce the wrong answer. 
¶108 Because of that conflation, the court mistakenly 
concluded that a challenge to the City's description of reality 
is as non-justiciable as its policy decisions responding to that 
reality.  Specifically, the court said that "findings of blight 
are legislative determinations that 'do[ ] not raise justiciable 
issues of fact or law.'"  Majority op., ¶36 (quoting Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. State Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 790, 794, 203 
N.W.2d 1 (1973)).  No, findings of blight are most assuredly not 
legislative determinations.  And the court cited not a single 
                                                 
6 It really could not be otherwise.  If the authority to 
address blight encompassed the authority to define blight, there 
would be no end to a municipality's authority.  An enterprising 
municipality could create authority ex nihilo through the simple 
expedient of calling any condition it wished to address 
"blighted." 
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authority to explain how this could possibly be so.7  What to do 
about blight (if anything) is a legislative determination.  But 
the existence of blight (as defined by the legislature) cannot 
be a legislative determination unless, alone amongst all 
governmental entities and sentient beings, municipalities have 
the power to conform the world to their dictates.  The first 
category involves the exercise of legislative judgment and 
discretion.  The second category involves the legislators' 
accurate apprehension of the world around them.  The court's 
consistent failure to distinguish between these two categories 
resulted in its implied holding that municipalities are entitled 
to their own facts. 
¶109 Without that category error, none of the authorities 
the court cited would support its position.  Not one.  Each of 
the cases on which it relied addresses matters in the first 
category——that is, the exercise of a legislative body's judgment 
                                                 
7 The immediately preceding quote from the court's opinion 
looks like it might contradict our statement, but it does not.  
Majority op., ¶36 (quoting Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State 
Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d  790, 794, 203 N.W.2d 1 (1973)).  The 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 case had nothing to do with blight 
findings.  In fact, the Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 court concluded 
that the dispute had nothing to do with findings at all.  It 
instead concerned "the wisdom and advisability of the proposed 
reorganization" of a school district.  Id. at 795.  The sentence 
fragment the court cherrypicked says, in full, this:  "As a 
consequence of these holdings, we have concluded that the merits 
of 
a 
school 
district 
reorganization 
is 
a 
legislative 
determination of public policy questions which does not raise 
justiciable issues of fact or law."  Id. at 794.  "Public policy 
questions" are quintessential non-justiciable issues.  The 
existence of a fact, at least outside Orwell's 1984, is never 
contingent on a public policy. 
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and discretion.  For example, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 did not say 
that all legislative determinations are non-justiciable.  It 
said "legislative determinations[s] of public policy questions" 
are not justiciable.  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 56 Wis. 2d 790 at 
794 (emphasis added).  That, of course, is indubitably true.  
The issue in Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 was the "wisdom and 
advisability of the proposed reorganization" of a school 
district.  Id. at 795.  The contest was not over objective 
reality, such as whether the school district did or did not 
exist.  It was over the form the district ought to take, the 
resolution of which necessarily rests on the legislative body's 
prudential exercise of discretion.  That is what made the 
legislative determination non-justiciable. 
¶110 Similarly, Buhler v. Racine Cty., 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 
N.W.2d 403 
(1966), 
addressed 
questions 
of 
discretion 
and 
judgment, not the reality of the world to which that discretion 
and judgment would be applied.  The question there was the 
propriety 
of 
certain 
zoning 
classifications. 
 
The 
court 
concluded that zoning decisions are largely non-justiciable 
because they are based on the "wisdom" and "desirability" of the 
varying classifications when applied to the properties in 
question.  Id.at 146-47.  If the court's decision today is 
correct, then not only the wisdom of the zoning would be non-
justiciable, but also the very nature of the property to which 
the zoning applied.  Do we really need to say that the nature of 
the property does not care about what the municipality thinks of 
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it?  It is what it is, notwithstanding any number of municipal 
"findings" to the contrary. 
¶111 The court says, in a footnote, that Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26 (1954), supports its proposition that the existence 
of blight is a non-justiciable legislative determination.  See 
majority op., ¶39, n.20.  But it does not explain how.  Nor 
could it, because Berman recognizes the distinction between 
subjects and objects we have laid out in this dissent:  "Once 
the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to 
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.  For 
the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end."  
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.  As here, the "object" in Berman was 
blighted property.  But as Berman recognized, before the 
government could act, the object had to have been "within the 
authority of Congress [the subject]."  The authority at issue 
there was eminent domain, a power granted to the District of 
Columbia without preconditions.  Here, the authority in question 
is the creation of a TID, an authority that does not exist 
unless and until certain legislatively-prescribed preconditions 
have been fulfilled.  Berman's lesson is that, once the 
legislative body has authority (the subject) to operate on the 
object (blight), the manner in which it exercises that authority 
is a legislative determination committed to the legislative 
body's sound discretion and prudence.  Consequently, Berman can 
have nothing to say here unless we confound subjects and 
objects. 
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¶112 For essentially the same reasons, David Jeffrey Co. v. 
City of Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 578, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954), does 
not support the court's assertion that the existence of blight 
is a legislative determination.  The issue in David Jeffrey Co. 
was not whether a municipality has unreviewable power to declare 
something blighted that is not; it was whether the expressed 
purpose for eliminating blight in the City of Milwaukee could be 
considered a "public use" of private property (as required by 
Article I, sec. 13 of our State Constitution).  After converting 
"public use" into "public purpose," the David Jeffrey Co. court 
said "[t]he determination of what constitutes a public municipal 
purpose is primarily a function of the legislative body, subject 
to a review by the courts, and such determination by the 
legislative body will not be overruled by the courts except in 
instances where that determination is manifestly arbitrary or 
unreasonable."  Id. at 579.  This is so because the purpose for 
applying the municipality's authority (the subject) to the 
blighted areas (the object) is a matter of judgment, discretion, 
and prudence.  The David Jeffrey Co. court said nothing to 
suggest that the existence of blight (the object) is a 
legislative determination. 
¶113 The last case on which the court relies for its 
proposition, Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶46, 351 
Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852, provides no more support than any of 
the others.  There, a bar owner asked the court to review the 
City of Wausau's decision to not renew its liquor license.  The 
Nowell court observed that the decision to grant or deny a 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
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liquor license is committed to the municipality's unconstrained 
discretion.  Unsurprisingly, that court correctly concluded the 
municipality's authority was legislative in nature, and subject 
to only certiorari review.  But 
Nowell can provide no 
instruction here because Plaintiffs are not asking whether the 
City exercised its TID authority in a prudent manner; they are 
asking whether the preconditions to unlimbering that authority 
have been satisfied.  Nowell does not——and cannot——tell us that 
the existence of blight is a non-justiciable legislative 
determination.  And the court has identified no case capable of 
suggesting it is. 
* 
¶114 The proper justiciability analysis would recognize 
that facts are not contingent on a municipality's prudential 
exercise of its discretion.  Instead, if the world is to make 
any sense at all, the exact opposite must be true:  The 
municipality's policies must be contingent on the facts.  And 
that means that facts are justiciable, while policies are 
generally not.  There is no mystery to this.  Justiciability, as 
the court noted, implicates the separation of powers.  Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("It is apparent that several 
formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in 
which the questions arise may describe a political question, 
although each has one or more elements which identify it as 
essentially a function of the separation of powers."); Majority 
op., ¶39 ("This is because de novo review of a legislative 
determination violates the doctrine of separation of powers.").  
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
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We respect the separation of powers, in part, by not second-
guessing a legislative body's policy choices.  Those choices are 
generally not justiciable because they comprise the prudential 
exercise of judgment and discretion, variables that by their 
nature 
are 
not 
susceptible 
to 
judicial 
inquiry. 
 
But 
legislatures have no monopoly on reality, and so there is no 
conceivable violation of the separation of powers when we look 
at facts for ourselves.  That is to say, while municipalities 
are entitled to their choice of policies, they are not entitled 
to their own facts.8 
                                                 
8 Contrast this with, for example, Plaintiffs' assertion 
that they may have a declaration that the City did not fulfill 
the condition that the Confluence Project would not occur but 
for the creation and expansion of the TIDs.  The statute says 
"[t]he 
board 
may 
not 
approve 
the 
resolution 
under 
this 
subdivision unless the board's approval contains a positive 
assertion that, in its judgment, the development described in 
the documents the board has reviewed under subd. 1. would not 
occur without the creation of a tax incremental district."  Wis. 
Stat. § 66.1105(4m)(b)2. (emphasis added).  Access to TID 
authority does not depend on whether the project, in fact, would 
not occur but for the TID.  With respect to this precondition, 
authority depends on the municipality's judgment that it would 
not occur but for the TID.  We traditionally review a 
municipality's exercise of judgment under common-law certiorari 
standards.  See, e.g., Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, 
¶¶34-35, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411 ("Certiorari is a 
mechanism by which a court may test the validity of a decision 
rendered by a municipality . . . .").  We apply the common law 
certiorari standard where there is no express statutory method 
of review, and our review is limited to the record compiled by 
the municipality.  Moreover, we may only consider:   
(1) 
whether 
the 
municipality 
kept 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct 
theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will 
and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was 
(continued) 
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¶115 The United States Supreme Court's Baker opinion 
provides significant guidance in describing the category of non-
justiciable questions: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question is found a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political 
department; 
or 
a 
lack 
of 
judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality 
of 
embarrassment 
from 
multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
¶116 Nothing in this formulation is capable of making 
Plaintiffs' challenge non-justiciable.  The entire formula rests 
on an a priori understanding that facts——the stuff of reality——
precede 
and 
are 
therefore 
outside 
the 
category 
of 
non-
justiciable questions.  Thus, for example, reality (here, 
whether certain property satisfies the statutory definition of 
blight) has not been (nor could it be) committed to a coordinate 
branch of government (unless it is entitled to its own facts).  
And the statute's definition of blight is so specific there is 
no lack of discoverable and manageable standards for recognizing 
where it might exist.  Nor must the judiciary make any policy 
                                                                                                                                                             
such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question. 
 
Id. 
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determinations 
as 
a 
predicate 
to 
identifying 
blighted 
properties.  And allowing Plaintiffs to assert that there is no 
blight where the City says there is expresses no disrespect for 
the City, just disagreement.  And so on through all of the Baker 
factors.  Because the existence of a set of facts cannot be 
contingent on a legislative body's exercise of its discretion or 
judgment, the court committed an outcome-determinative error in 
concluding that both subjects and objects fall in the same 
category for purposes of the justiciability analysis. 
¶117 In a terse footnote, the court suggests the key to its 
opinion is the distinction between legislative and adjudicative 
facts.  Majority op., ¶39 n.20.  It also says that we do not 
understand the distinction, and that this failure accounts for 
our dissent.  Id.  Although we get the difference, we do not 
understand——and the court does not explain——why that means it 
must conflate subjects and objects.  There is no magic to 
legislative facts——they simply describe the world as perceived 
by legislative bodies.  Municipalities cannot speak (or write) a 
single fact into existence (or make one disappear).  The facts 
either are, or they are not.  And that matters because the 
legislature conditioned the City's TID authority on whether the 
TIDs——as a factual matter——encompass the required amount of 
blight.  If it did not matter——that is, if the City can create 
legislative facts ex nihilo, the truth of which are beyond 
questioning——then 
the 
legislature 
can 
never 
condition 
a 
municipality's exercise of authority on a factual predicate.  If 
the court is right, then the predicate can never be anything but 
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a functional nullity because the municipality will always be 
able to create compliance by speaking the "legislative" facts 
into existence.  That, of course, is not a condition.  It is 
surplusage.  We are supposed to avoid that.  See, e.g., 
Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 (1980) 
("A statute should be construed so that no word or clause shall 
be rendered surplusage and every word if possible should be 
given effect."). 
* 
¶118 The 
factual 
predicates 
to 
the 
exercise 
of 
a 
municipality's TID authority are not legislative determinations.  
They are simply facts, the existence of which is as susceptible 
to determination in the context of the Tax Increment Law as in 
any other setting.  The court erred, profoundly, when it 
concluded that Counts One and Two are non-justiciable. Our 
jurisprudential world will be on tilt until we abandon this 
reality-warping category error. 
C.  Dismissal of Counts Three and Four 
¶119 The court concludes that Count Three insufficiently 
states a claim because it does not allege facts plausible enough 
to show TID funds were used to demolish historic buildings.  And 
it concludes that Count Four suffers the same infirmity because 
Plaintiffs do not allege facts that plausibly show the grants 
were really paying the developer's property taxes.  We disagree. 
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 
¶120 Our review of the sufficiency of a complaint is a 
question of law reviewed de novo.  See Kaloti Enterprises, Inc. 
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v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 
N.W.2d 205.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.02(1)(a) provides the 
necessary requirements for a valid complaint: 
(1) Contents of pleadings.  A pleading or supplemental 
pleading that sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original or amended claim, counterclaim, cross 
claim or 3rd-party claim, shall contain all of the 
following:  
(a) A short and plain statement of the claim, 
identifying the transaction or occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences out of which the claim 
arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.  
(b) A demand for judgment for the relief the 
pleader seeks.  
¶121 Wisconsin adopted "notice pleading" "so that legal 
disputes are resolved on the merits of the case" rather than 
dismissed based on a technicality.  See Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis 
& Loewi, Inc., 174 Wis. 2d 381, 403, 497 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting Korkow v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 
193, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984)).  "The 'notice' pleading rules of 
the current civil procedure code are intended to facilitate the 
orderly adjudication of disputes; pleading is not to become a 
'game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive 
of the outcome.'"  Korkow, 117 Wis. 2d at 193 (quoted source 
omitted). 
¶122 When a court is asked to determine whether a complaint 
states a claim, we accept the facts pled in the complaint as 
true, as well as "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from those facts."  Hlavinka, 174 Wis. 2d at 403.  To be valid, 
the complaint must give notice sufficient enough "that the 
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defendant, and the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the 
plaintiff is complaining, and can see that there is some basis 
for recovery."  Id. (quoted sources and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The complaint should be liberally construed in favor 
of stating a claim and only dismissed when it is clear that 
there are no conditions under which Plaintiffs could prevail.  
See Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 378, 572 
N.W.2d 855 (1998). 
2.  Application 
¶123 Plaintiffs' third claim seeks a declaration voiding 
the City Council's TID resolution because TID funds were 
unlawfully used to pay for demolition costs of historic 
buildings in violation of Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)1.a.9  The 
court 
agrees 
that 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.1105(2)(f)1.a prohibits using TID money to pay for the 
demolition of a historic building.  See majority op., ¶53.  
Nonetheless, the court concludes that Count Three failed to 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)1.a provides:  
"Project costs" include: 
a. Capital costs including, but not limited to, the 
actual costs of the construction of public works or 
improvements, new buildings, structures, and fixtures; 
the demolition, alteration, remodeling, repair or 
reconstruction of existing buildings, structures and 
fixtures 
other 
than 
the 
demolition 
of 
listed 
properties as defined in s. 44.31 (4); the acquisition 
of equipment to service the district; the removal or 
containment 
of, 
or 
the 
restoration 
of 
soil 
or 
groundwater affected by, environmental pollution; and 
the clearing and grading of land. 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
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state a claim for declaratory relief because it did not use the 
right words.  According to the court, (1) the Complaint "did not 
allege facts which establish that the developer in fact used the 
money from the cash grant to pay for the demolition of" the 
historic buildings; and (2) the Complaint did not "allege facts 
which demonstrate that the developer was likely to do so"; and 
(3) the Plaintiffs allege only that "'there is . . . no way to 
assure' that the developer did not use the cash grants to pay 
for the demolition of historic buildings."  Id., ¶55. 
¶124 The court is mistaken because it did not account for 
what everyone knows:  Money is fungible.  The Complaint alleges 
that historic buildings on the National Register of Historic 
Places within the TID district were purchased and demolished by 
the developer——specifically identifying at least one of those 
buildings by name, the Kline Department Store, and another by 
address, "the historic property at 2 South Barstow Street."  It 
alleges the demolition occurred "after the project plans were 
developed 
and, 
upon 
information 
and 
belief, 
with 
the 
understanding that [the developer] would be reimbursed for the 
costs of development."  It further alleges:  "A substantial part 
of the development costs actually incurred by the developer thus 
includes the costs of demolition as well as the purchase price 
of the Kline Department Store building and other buildings" 
protected by statute as historic places.  Paragraph 46 of the 
Complaint alleges the City will pay the developer $10,400,000 in 
the form of cash grants for project costs, without prohibiting 
the developer from using that money to purchase or demolish the 
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historic properties.  Paragraph 94 alleges "two lump-sum 
'contributions' of $2.95 million to the developer" which "may be 
used by the developer for any project related purpose, including 
reimbursing the developer for its already-incurred costs.  These 
costs include acquisition and demolition" without prohibiting 
the developer from using this money "for the costs of 
demolishing" historic properties.  Finally, the Complaint 
states:  "Lump sum reimbursement for already incurred costs can 
properly be viewed as including any of those costs, including 
the 
costs 
of 
demolishing 
historic 
structures 
within 
the 
Confluence Commercial Historic District." 
¶125 Taking these alleged facts as true, as we must, 
together with any reasonable inference derived therefrom, see 
Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶19, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693, Plaintiffs' claim survives a motion 
to dismiss.  The statute prohibits using TID funds to demolish 
historic places.  The Complaint alleges the developer bought and 
demolished historic places pursuant to a development agreement 
under which the City pays millions of dollars in cash grants to 
the developer for any project-related purpose.  In essence, the 
Complaint asserts the City is unlawfully transferring taxpayer 
money to the developer in part to cover the developer's costs 
for demolishing historic buildings; if proven, this would 
constitute an illegal expenditure of public funds.  The 
Complaint need not track the currency's serial numbers from the 
TID funds to the wrecking company's bank account. 
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¶126 The court heightens pleading requirements beyond what 
the law supports.  It dismisses this claim even though the 
Complaint conveys fair notice of Plaintiffs' grievance and even 
though the Complaint's factual allegations and reasonably drawn 
inferences, if true, provide a basis for recovery.  If 
Plaintiffs' claim proceeded, discovery would either prove or 
disprove Plaintiffs' allegation that the developer used TIF 
funds to cover demolition costs.  If discovery shows Plaintiffs' 
allegations were correct, Plaintiffs would be entitled to a 
declaration that the City violated the statute.  The court's 
perplexing dismissal of this claim achieves what notice pleading 
is supposed to prevent——dismissal on a technicality.  The court 
selectively ignores pivotal words in the Complaint and spurns 
what is left as insufficient.  It suggests that had Plaintiffs 
simply chosen a few different words, this claim would have 
survived dismissal.  The court's analysis is unsound.  The 
Complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and 
this claim should have been allowed to proceed to a decision on 
the merits rather than dismissed at the pleading stage on a 
specious technicality. 
¶127 Plaintiffs' Fourth Count alleges that the cash grants, 
through which the City pays the developer millions of dollars, 
violate the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution 
because the cash grants effectively lower the developer-owners' 
property taxes.  The court's opinion again concludes Plaintiffs' 
Complaint is factually insufficient.  We disagree. 
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¶128 Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges:  (1) the cash grants 
reimburse the developer-owner "for all or a part of the taxes 
paid on its property"; (2) "the project plans provide for 
millions of dollars of incremental TID taxes to be paid directly 
to the owner of the property"; (3) these payments "function[] as 
a tax rebate or tax credit"; (4) as a result, the developer-
owner is "being taxed at a more favorable rate than an owner of 
identically-assessed property elsewhere in Eau Claire"; and (5) 
this arrangement violates the Uniformity Clause. 
¶129 As noted, in reviewing a sufficiency of the complaint 
challenge, we accept all of its asserted facts and reasonably 
drawn inferences as true.  We analyze any legal assertions 
independently.  Plaintiffs' Complaint gives fair notice that 
Plaintiffs seek a declaration regarding the constitutionality of 
the cash grant part of the TIF statute.  The Complaint alleges 
that the cash grants operate as a tax rebate that in effect 
lowers the developer's taxes, making the tax rate paid by the 
developer more favorable than the rate paid by other taxpayers.  
The facts alleged are sufficient to withstand a motion to 
dismiss.  The court errs by concluding otherwise, which 
prevented the court from taking the next step of reviewing the 
legal basis for the claim.  If the facts alleged are true, and 
if the legal premises are correct, Plaintiffs could receive the 
relief they seek:  a declaration that the cash grants violate 
the 
Uniformity 
Clause. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
court 
errs 
in 
prematurely disposing of this claim on the narrow basis that the 
Complaint insufficiently pleads adequate facts to support a 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
34 
 
Uniformity Clause claim.  Although the claim suffers no fact-
related pleading inadequacy, it nonetheless fails to state a 
claim for the reasons we explain below. 
D.  Constitutionality of TIF Cash Grants 
¶130 The court's rejection of Plaintiffs' constitutional 
challenge to the cash grants based on purportedly insufficient 
factual allegations in the Complaint is particularly puzzling 
because resolving the issue of whether the cash grants violate 
the Uniformity Clause does not depend on factual findings or 
require discovery.10  Rather, whether tax policy implicates the 
Uniformity Clause presents a legal question, which is ripe for 
resolution by this court.  A statute's constitutionality 
presents an issue of law, which we review de novo.  State v. 
Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 276, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993). 
¶131 Plaintiffs make an "as-applied" challenge.11  Although 
statutes 
are 
generally 
presumed 
constitutional, 
when 
the 
challenge is not to the statute itself, but to its application, 
no presumption exists.  Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶27, 326 
Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385 ("While we presume a statute is 
constitutional, we do not presume that the State applies 
                                                 
10 We address only Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge 
under 
the 
Uniformity 
Clause. 
 
We 
cannot 
decide 
its 
constitutional challenge based on the public purpose doctrine 
because that analysis depends upon the blight findings. 
11 We acknowledge the parties' dispute as to whether the 
challenge is a facial or an as-applied challenge.  Like the 
majority, we analyze it as an as-applied challenge. 
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statutes in a constitutional manner.")12  Plaintiffs argue that 
cash grants to a non-tax exempt developer who also owns the 
property violate the Uniformity Clause.  They contend such 
grants operate as a tax rebate, which effectively lowers the 
property taxes the developer pays to the City.  Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs do not challenge all cash grants under the TIF law, 
but only those made to property owners who are subject to 
taxation. 
¶132 The Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees "[t]he rule of taxation shall be uniform."  Wis. 
Const. art. VIII, § 1.  Generally speaking, the uniformity 
clause applies to property taxes, which are "direct taxes on 
real estate."  Columbia Cty. v. Wis. Retirement Fund, 17 Wis. 2d 
310, 325, 116 N.W.2d 142 (1962).  A Uniformity Clause analysis 
primarily focuses on "inequality in the assessing or collecting 
of a tax."  State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Cary, 181 Wis. 564, 572, 
191 N.W. 546 (1923).  When taxes are collected or assessed 
unequally, the Uniformity Clause is implicated.  In Gottlieb v. 
Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 425-32, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967), this 
court held a tax law that "partially exempt[s] particular tax 
property" violated the Uniformity Clause.  The tax law in 
Gottlieb gave decades-long tax exemptions to developers who 
                                                 
12 A facial challenge to a statute alleges that the statute 
is unconstitutional on its face——that it is unconstitutional in 
every circumstance.  State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶10 n.9, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90.  In contrast, an as-applied 
challenge asserts that a statute is unconstitutional as it 
relates to the facts of a particular case or a particular party. 
Id. 
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agreed to construct or improve substandard properties in 
exchange for partial freezing of tax assessments.  Id.  Such an 
arrangement lowered the tax rate for the developers and resulted 
in other taxpayers paying a higher and disproportionate share of 
property taxes, in clear violation of uniformity.  Id. at 429. 
¶133 The statute Plaintiffs challenge here does not involve 
a tax freeze or a tax exemption.  The developer-owner in the 
matter before us is assessed uniformly with other taxpayers and 
fully pays property taxes on that assessment.  Plaintiffs' 
constitutional challenge targets municipal disbursement of tax 
revenues after collection rather than the collection itself.  
Disbursement of funds generally survives challenges under the 
Uniformity Clause.  In an early dispute over a surtax imposed to 
fund a teachers' retirement fund, this court identified "a 
substantial distinction between an inequality in the assessing 
or collecting of a tax and inequality in the disbursing of its 
proceeds among those who contributed," concluding that "while 
the former may invalidate the tax, the latter does not . . . ."  
State ex rel. Van Dyke, 181 Wis. at 572.  "TIF departs from 
uniformity only with respect to spending," which is significant 
because state courts hold that "state constitutional uniformity 
requirements appl[y] only to tax assessment and tax rates, not 
spending."  Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool:  Tax 
Incremental Financing and the Political Economy of Local 
Government, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 65, 75 & n.54 (2003) (citing 
state 
court 
opinions 
from 
Indiana, 
Illinois, 
Colorado, 
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37 
 
Tennessee, Utah, and Iowa upholding TIF under their respective 
uniformity clauses). 
¶134 The constitutional requirement of uniform taxation 
does extend, in some circumstances, to the manner of fund 
disbursement.  See State ex rel. La Follette v. Torphy, 85 
Wis. 2d 94, 107, 108, 270 N.W.2d 187 (1978).  While uniformity 
does not extend to disbursement of tax revenues when paid to 
counties and municipalities for use on government and public 
improvements,  id. at 107, when a tax statute authorizes payment 
to an individual taxpayer, the Uniformity Clause applies if the 
effect of the statute imposes an unequal tax burden.  Id. at 
108-110.  "The uniformity clause is intended to protect the 
citizen against unequal and unjust taxation."  Id. at 198.  In 
Torphy, this court held the tax law giving tax credits to 
residential property owners who elected to make "building and 
garage improvements which result in increased property tax 
assessments" had the effect of imposing an unequal tax burden on 
homeowners with the same assessed valuations and therefore 
violated the Uniformity Clause.   Id. at 98, 111. 
¶135 Plaintiffs here allege that the TIF cash grants 
violate the Uniformity Clause because, like the tax credits in 
Torphy, they have the effect of lowering the developer's tax 
rate, 
rendering 
the 
rate 
unequal 
among 
taxpayers. 
 
The 
dispositive question then is whether the cash grants act as a 
tax rebate, credit, or exemption that has the effect of imposing 
an unequal tax burden upon other Eau Claire taxpayers.  We 
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38 
 
conclude that the TIF cash grants do not have that effect and 
therefore do not violate the Uniformity Clause. 
¶136 This court has already rejected a facial and as-
applied constitutional challenge to the TIF statute in Sigma 
Tau, 93 Wis. 2d at 412.  Sigma Tau determined: 
With respect to the question of uniformity of taxation 
among individual taxpayers, the Tax Increment Law is 
clearly distinguishable, both in form and effect, from 
the tax provisions struck down by the court in 
Gottlieb and in Torphy.   In both of those cases the 
court based its conclusion that the provisions were 
unconstitutional 
upon 
its 
finding 
that 
taxpayers 
owning equally valuable property were required to pay 
disproportionate amounts of taxes. 
Under tax increment financing, however, there is no 
such disproportionate impact upon taxpayers within the 
same territorial boundaries of the unit imposing the 
tax.  All taxpayers . . . continue to be taxed at a 
uniform rate based upon valuations uniformly arrived 
at.  No taxpayer or group of taxpayers is being 
singled out for preferential treatment either in the 
form of an exemption from taxation or a tax credit.  
Thus, we conclude, taxation under tax incremental 
financing is uniform. 
Id. at 412. 
¶137 Plaintiffs contend the cash grant provision of the TIF 
statute did not exist at the time Sigma Tau declared the TIF law 
constitutional.  The City disputes this, arguing cash grants 
have always been a part of the TIF framework.  The State, in an 
amicus brief, agrees:  "'Cash grants' to private developers have 
always been part of the definition of 'eligible project costs' 
under Wisconsin's TIF law."  It is not necessary to resolve this 
dispute in reaching our conclusion that the TIF cash grants do 
not violate the Uniformity Clause. 
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¶138 The purpose of the TIF law is "to provide a mechanism 
for cities to finance projects commenced" under redevelopment 
statutes or to combat blighted areas.  Id. at 403.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 66.1105(2)(f)2.d allows the City to give cash grants to 
developers if they "signed a development agreement with the 
city."13  The cash grants are not a tax rebate, credit, or 
exemption.  They are payments pursuant to an agreement to engage 
in redevelopment projects.  The cash grants are not linked to 
future property tax payments, do not give the developer a 
property tax break, and do not operate as a tax refund.  The 
grants do not have the effect of creating an unequal tax burden 
on similarly situated taxpayers.  They do not lower the 
developer's tax burden or require other taxpayers to pay more 
than their fair share.  Both the developer and other taxpayers 
are taxed at the same rate based on the equalized value of their 
property.  Thus, the cash grants do not apportion the tax burden 
unevenly.  The City effectively pays developers to undertake a 
project it would otherwise plan, manage, and pay for itself, if 
it had the ability to do so.  The City pays for development 
services using revenues the project itself will generate.  See 
Monroe WaterWorks Co. v. City of Monroe, 110 Wis. 11, 12-13, 85 
N.W. 685 (1901) (concluding City's contract agreeing to pay for 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 
1105(2)(f)2.d 
provides 
as 
material: " . . . none of the following may be included as 
project costs for any tax incremental district . . . [c]ash 
grants made by the city to owners, lessees, or developers of 
land that is located within the tax incremental district unless 
the grant recipient has signed a development agreement with the 
city . . . ." 
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40 
 
water services is not unlawful grant of immunity from taxes when 
"the sum so stipulated to be paid is a fair and just allowance 
to compensate for the actual value of the services to be 
rendered, and that the stipulation is bona fide, and not in the 
nature of an evasion of the law against exemption from taxes.").  
The developer uses the grants to defray the costs of economic 
development, not to lower or offset property tax payments. 
¶139 The TIF cash grants do not alter the uniformity of tax 
payments among taxpayers or impose an unequal tax burden.  They 
do not impose on other taxpayers a disproportionate amount of 
taxes like the tax laws found unconstitutional in Gottlieb and 
Torphy.  Accordingly, we conclude the TIF cash grants do not 
violate the Uniformity Clause. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶140 Plaintiffs have standing in this matter and the law 
permits them to seek both declaratory judgment and certiorari 
review.  Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges sufficient facts to 
withstand a motion to dismiss on each of its claims. The TIF 
cash grants do not have the effect of imposing an unequal tax 
burden; therefore, the TIF statute, as applied to developer-
owners receiving TIF grants, comports with the Uniformity Clause 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, requiring dismissal of Count 4. 
¶141 The court says Plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed 
because "a court cannot issue a declaration regarding the wisdom 
of a legislative determination."  Majority op., ¶40.  But it 
says so only because it believes facts are contingent on 
municipal 
policy 
choices, 
a 
paradigm 
that 
is 
untenable, 
No.  2015AP1858.rgb&dk 
 
41 
 
unworkable, 
and 
unintelligible. 
 
Consequently, 
the 
court 
abdicated the judicial duty to decide whether a municipal body 
properly 
applied 
the 
law. 
 
Because 
the 
court 
jettisons 
Plaintiffs' cause of action without basis, we respectfully 
dissent. 
 
 
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