Title: Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc.1992 WY 120839 P.2d 903Case Number: 89-15, 89-16Decided: 09/18/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Andrea DWORKIN, a citizen of New York; Priscilla Moree, a 
Wyoming citizen, individually and in her representative capacity of the Jackson, 
Wyoming Chapter of the National Organization for Women; and Judith Fouts, a 
Wyoming citizen individually and in her representative capacity of the Wyoming 
Chapter of the National Organization for Women,

Appellants (Plaintiffs) 
Cross-Appellees,

v.

L.F.P., INC., a 
California corporation, also sometimes designated as LFP, Inc., L.F.P., Inc., a 
California corporation d/b/a Larry Flynt Publications; Hustler Magazine, Inc., a 
California corporation; Larry Flynt, a citizen of California; the 
Conservatorship of Larry Flynt, L.A. Superior Court # P688238, Jimmy Flynt, 
Conservator; Althea Flynt; Flynt Subscription Company, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation; Island Distributing Company, Ltd., a B.W.I. company; LFZ, Ltd., a 
B.W.I. company; Flynt Distributing Company, Inc., a California corporation; 
Inland Empire Periodicals, an Oregon corporation; Park Place Market Inc., a 
Wyoming corporation, 

Appellees (Defendants) 
Cross-Appellants.

L.F.P., INC., a 
California corporation, also sometimes designated as LFP, Inc., L.F.P., Inc., a 
California corporation d/b/a Larry Flynt Publications; Hustler Magazine, Inc., a 
California corporation; Larry Flynt, a citizen of California; the 
Conservatorship of Larry Flynt, L.A. Superior Court # P688238, Jimmy Flynt, 
Conservator; Althea Flynt; Flynt Subscription Company, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation; Island Distributing Company, Ltd., a B.W.I. company; LFZ, Ltd., a 
B.W.I. company; Flynt Distributing Company, Inc., a California corporation; 
Inland Empire Periodicals, an Oregon corporation; Park Place Market Inc., a 
Wyoming corporation, 

Appellants (Defendants) 
Cross-Appellees,

v.

Andrea DWORKIN, a citizen 
of New York; Priscilla Moree, a Wyoming citizen, individually and in her 
representative capacity of the Jackson, Wyoming Chapter of the National 
Organization for Women; and Judith Fouts, a Wyoming citizen individually and in 
her representative capacity of the Wyoming Chapter of the National Organization 
for Women, 

Appellees (Plaintiffs) 
Cross-Appellants.

Appeal from District Court,    
Teton    
County, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Gerry L. Spence 
and Gary L. Shockey of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, for 
appellants/cross-appellees in case No. 89-15 and appellees/cross-appellants in 
case No. 89-16.

Paul B. Godfrey, 
George E. Powers, Jr. of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, and Alan L. Isaacman, 
David O. Carson, and Kirk N. Sullivan of Cooper, Epstein & Hurewitz, P.C., 
Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellees/cross-appellants in case No. 89-15 and 
appellants/cross-appellees in case No. 89-16.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, 
CARDINE,* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal a 
public-figure plaintiff who is an outspoken opponent of pornography seeks 
reversal of the summary judgment entered against her in her defamation action 
against certain media defendants.1 She filed her defamation action 
because statements concerning her appeared in an article published in the July, 
1985 issue of Hustler magazine. That article was recently before us in Spence v. 
Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (       
 Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 
___        
 U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1668, 118 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1992).

[¶2]      With the issues 
raised here we must explore the meaning of the free speech/libel provision of 
the Wyoming Constitution,2 and the relationship of that 
provision to prevailing First Amendment jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court.3

[¶3]      In particular, 
the public-figure plaintiff maintains that     
             
            
         
          
          
             
          
           
          Wyoming 
's free speech/libel constitutional 
provision precludes a state trial court's use of summary judgment procedure in a 
public-figure libel action against a media defendant. A jury must decide all 
issues, the public-figure plaintiff asserts. The public-figure plaintiff also 
contends that the challenged statements were defamatory falsehoods and not 
protected speech. In the alternative, the public-figure plaintiff argues that 
even if the challenged statements are found to be "true" or protected speech 
under prevailing First Amendment law, under this state's free speech/libel 
constitutional provision the media defendant bears the burden of proving that 
the statements were published with good intent and for justifiable ends. 

[¶4]      For the reasons 
given below, we reject the public-figure plaintiff's claims and affirm the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment against all of the plaintiffs below on 
all of the counts contained in the complaint.

ISSUES

[¶5]      The public-figure 
plaintiff presented these issues for review:

1. Whether this Court 
will give full force and meaning to     
              
         Wyoming's Constitutional provision which 
provides that "the jury [has] the right to determine the facts and the law, 
under the direction of the court" in a libel case.

2. Whether the 
publication was protected "opinion" and whether or not the determination of what 
is opinion is left to the jury under  Wyoming's Constitution.

3. Whether the 
publication was made with "actual malice."

4. Whether the trial 
court invaded the province of the jury and resolved a disputed factual issue 
against Andrea Dworkin.

[¶6]      The media 
defendants rephrased the issues in this way:

1. Whether the statements 
made about plaintiff Andrea Dworkin were constitutionally protected statements 
of opinion.

2. Whether summary 
judgment was improper under Article I, Section 20 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

a. Whether Article I, 
Section 20 forbids summary judgment in a libel action.

b. Whether the court's 
responsibility under the First Amendment to grant summary judgment on 
constitutional issues can be superseded by a provision of the state 
constitution.

3. Whether plaintiff 
Andrea Dworkin, a public figure, met her burden of coming forward with clear and 
convincing evidence that defendants published falsehoods about her with 
knowledge that they were false or with a subjective awareness of probable 
falsity.

4. Whether the 
publication about Dworkin was false and defamatory.

5. Whether there was a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to Dworkin's advocacy of incest, 
bestiality and sex with children.

BACKGROUND

[¶7]      The public-figure 
plaintiff, Andrea Dworkin (hereinafter Dworkin), is an outspoken opponent of 
pornography who has engaged in vigorous and robust national debate on the 
subject. She has worked to accomplish the passage of an anti-pornography 
ordinance in major cities in the      
            
             
 United States and has written books 
and articles on a variety of subjects, including her opposition to pornography 
and her support of feminism and the women's liberation movement. She is an 
admitted public figure.

[¶8]      In earlier 
litigation filed by Dworkin against some of the same media defendants in this 
case, she was represented by lawyer Gerry Spence. See Dworkin v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812, 110 S. Ct. 59, 107 L. Ed. 2d 26. As a result of Spence's representation of 
Dworkin, the media defendants in this case published an article in the July, 
1985 issue of Hustler magazine featuring Spence as "Asshole of the Month." 
Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d  at 793. In addition to speaking of and concerning 
Spence, the article refers to Dworkin. After stating that Spence on behalf of 
"the little guy" has won substantial monetary judgments against big corporations 
and would like to add Hustler to his list, the article speaks of 
Dworkin:

His client is "little 
guy" militant lesbian feminist Andrea Dworkin, a shit-squeezing sphincter in her 
own right. In her latest publicity-grab Dworkin has decided to sue Hustler for 
invasion of privacy among other things.

     Dworkin seems to be an 
odd bedfellow for "just folks," "family values" Spence. After all, Dworkin is 
one of the most foul-mouthed, abrasive manhaters on Earth. In fact, when 
Indianapolis 
contemplated an antizorn ordinance co-authored by Dworkin, she was asked 
by its supporters to stay away for fear her repulsive presence would kill the 
statute * * *. Considering that Dworkin advocates bestiality, incest and sex 
with children, it appears Gerry "this Tongue for Hire" Spence is more interested 
in promoting his bank account than the traditional values he'd like us to 
believe he cherishes.

     
This case is a nuisance suit initiated by Dworkin, a crybaby who can dish 
out criticism but clearly can't take it. The real issue is freedom of speech, 
something we believe even Dworkin is entitled to, but which she would deny to 
anyone who doesn't share her views. Any attack on First Amendment freedoms is 
harmful to all [,] Spence's foaming-at-the-mouth client especially. You'd think 
someone of Spence's stature would know better than to team with a censor like 
Dworkin.

[¶9]      As a result of the 
publication of this article, Dworkin filed this lawsuit. She was one of three 
plaintiffs named in the action. The other two plaintiffs were Priscilla Moree, 
individually and as a representative of the Jackson, 
Wyoming Chapter 
of the National Organization for Women; and Judith Fouts, individually and as a 
representative of the Wyoming Chapter of the National Organization for Women. 
The complaint contained four claims. All of the plaintiffs alleged three claims: 
the media defendants, in publishing the article attacking the plaintiffs' 
attorney, sought to deprive the plaintiffs of obtaining justice, as guaranteed 
by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8; the media defendants' publication and distribution 
of the article constituted the tort of outrage (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); and the media defendants' publication and distribution of 
the article constituted an overt act of conspiracy to discredit the plaintiffs 
and their attorney and to interfere with their exercise of rights under the 
Wyoming Constitution. For the fourth claim, Dworkin alone alleged that the media 
defendants' publication and distribution of the article constituted a libel of 
her. Under each claim, the plaintiffs sought fifty million dollars actual 
damages and one hundred million dollars punitive damages.

[¶10]   The parties conducted discovery, 
following which the plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the 
libel and outrage claims, and the media defendants moved for judgment on the 
pleadings or, in the alternative, summary judgment on all claims. The trial 
court held a hearing on the motions, then issued a decision letter, and finally 
entered an order denying the plaintiffs' motion and granting the media 
defendants' motion. This appeal followed.

[¶11]   In Dworkin's initial appellate brief, 
she addressed only issues relating to her libel claim. In the media defendants' 
appellate brief, they asserted that the plaintiffs had abandoned the other three 
claims (outrage, deprivation of justice, and conspiracy) by not raising issues 
relating to them in their appeal. In Dworkin's reply appellate brief, she 
contended that plaintiffs had not abandoned the other three claims. She 
contended that the trial court's decision letter was silent as to those claims 
and covered only dismissal of Dworkin's libel claim. We disagree. The media 
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, summary 
judgment was directed to "all counts of the complaint." In its decision letter, 
the trial court explained that the article was constitutionally protected and 
that, as a matter of law, the media defendants were entitled to judgment. The 
trial court's order granted their motion for summary judgment which was directed 
to all claims. It is clear to this court that the trial court's order disposed 
of all claims. Plaintiffs' failure to raise on appeal issues relating to the 
non-libel claims constitutes an abandonment of those issues. See 
State Highway Comm'n v. Triangle Dev. Co., 371 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1962), and Wyuta Cattle Co. v. 
Connell, 43 Wyo. 135, 299 P. 279 (1931). Even if 
the plaintiffs had not abandoned those claims, our decision today is dispositive 
of those issues.

[¶12]   We now turn to the issues remaining for 
our review.

DISCUSSION

1. Whether Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20, 
precludes summary judgment in libel actions.

[¶13]   Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20, says that 

[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and in all trials for 
libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good intent and 
[for] justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense, the jury having the right 
to determine the facts and the law, under the direction of the 
court.

[¶14]   Focusing on the provision's language 
"the jury having the right to determine the facts and the law, under the 
direction of the court," Dworkin asserts that "our framers granted preferential 
protection" to libel victims, namely, that no court can enter summary judgment 
in a libel action. Dworkin contends that all issues in a libel action must be 
presented to and decided by a jury. To develop and prove her position with 
respect to this state constitutional provision, Dworkin, and any other similarly 
situated litigant, must use "a precise, analytically sound approach. Counsel 
must provide [this court] with proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future 
growth of this important area of law." Robert F. Utter, Advancing State 
Constitutions in Court, Trial, Oct. 1991, at 45. Regrettably, Dworkin has failed 
to support her assertion and contention with appropriate constitutional 
analysis, legal authority, or cogent argument. In the face of such failure, our 
rule has been swift and sure: we refuse to consider the alleged error. Burg v. 
Ruby Drilling Co., Inc., 783 P.2d 144, 153 (Wyo. 1989). In this instance, 
however, in order to foster and promote the interpretation of our state 
constitution through an appropriate analytical technique,4 we choose to 
consider the issue presented more fully than we did in Spence v. Flynt, in which 
we summarily rejected the same contention by Dworkin's counsel.

[¶15]   Historically, our state trial courts 
have granted summary judgments in libel actions and this court has affirmed many 
of them;5 this court has not had occasion until now to 
answer fully the precise issue Dworkin raises here. This court has, however, had 
occasion in the past to consider the constitutional language in question, and we 
find that consideration illuminating. In Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 
416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947), this 
court affirmed a verdict in favor of a media defendant after a review of the 
record convinced the court that the allegedly defamatory articles were true and 
published with good intent and for justifiable ends. Among the various points 
raised on appeal, the plaintiff insisted that in closing argument "he was 
entitled to argue either his own view or the view of others concerning the law 
under which the case should be decided entirely apart from what the court stated 
the law of this state in fact was." Spriggs, 63 Wyo. at 427, 182 P.2d  at 804. After 
reviewing the decisions of sister states6 having 
constitutional provisions textually similar to this state's free speech/libel 
provision, this court concluded that the trial court had correctly ruled the 
plaintiff could not discuss the law of the case independently of the 
instructions given by the court to the jury for their guidance. Spriggs, 63 
Wyo. at 428, 182 P.2d  at 809. In its 
review of sister states' decisions, this court explored the "judicial history of 
this and other like provisions in other state constitutions as an outgrowth of 
English and early American law concerning the subject of criminal libel * * *." 
Spriggs, 63 Wyo. at 428, 182 P.2d  at 804. In 
light of that review, the court doubted the correctness of a jury instruction, 
earlier examined in Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157 P. 1013 (1916), to the 
effect that the jury could disregard the court's instructions and apply the 
jury's own notion of what the law was. Spriggs, 63 Wyo. at 427, 182 P.2d  at 804. 
Drawing on decisions from Colorado, Missouri, Ohio, and, in particular, Mississippi, this court demonstrated 
that our constitutional provision

grew 
out of the practice in England as modified by what 
is known as the Fox Libel Act. Prior to that act in prosecutions for libel the 
verdict of the jury was special; the only question submitted to the jury being 
whether the alleged libel had been published and whether the language supported 
the innuendo. The question of libel or no libel was determined by the court. By 
the Fox Act the jury was authorized to return a general verdict of guilty, or 
not guilty, as in other criminal cases, and thus decide the question of libel or 
no libel, formerly decided by the court.

Spriggs, 63 Wyo. at 427-28, 182 P.2d  at 804 (quoting 
Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157 P. 1013, 1015 
(1916)).

[¶16]   In Spriggs this court quoted with 
approval from Oakes v. State, 98 Miss. 80, 54 So. 79, 83, 33 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 207:

If 
juries have the right to determine the law of libel for themselves, free from 
the control of the court, the result would be not only that the law would be 
uncertain, because of the different views which different juries might take of 
it, but their judgment of the law, however erroneous, would be final; for in 
that event neither the trial court nor this court would have any right to review 
same, and could grant no relief to a defendant, however erroneously he may have 
been convicted. The court would have no right to decide any question of law 
which might arise on the trial, by demurrer or otherwise. Should a citizen, 
under this construction of the Constitution, be indicted for libel, and the 
matter charged to be such be never so harmless or lawful, the court would be 
powerless to prevent his conviction and punishment, should the jury decide that, 
in its judgment, the matter charged was libelous. The jury would be the judge of 
the meaning of the Constitution and statutes, whether statutes were valid, what 
the common law is, what the law of privilege is - in short, of all questions of 
law which could arise on the trial.

Spriggs, 63 Wyo. at 431, 182 P.2d  at 
806.

[¶17]   This court continues to accept that 
reasoning as valid. For further historical perspective on the purpose of the Fox 
Act to protect freedom of speech by restoring to juries the same, but no 
greater, power in libel prosecutions than they had in other criminal 
prosecutions, see Construction of Constitutional or Statutory Provision Giving 
Jury Power to Determine Law and Facts in Action for Libel or Slander, 38 (1915 
D) Ann. Cases 1261 (1915); Annotation, Effect of provision that jury shall 
determine the law and the facts in libel cases, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 369 (1914); 
Annotation, Effect of provision that jury shall determine the law and the facts 
in libel cases, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 207-12 (1911).

[¶18]   Although in Spriggs this court reviewed 
the history of the substance of Wyoming's free speech/libel 
constitutional provision, this court did not review the history of how that 
provision became a part of the state constitution. That history can be a 
valuable aid in interpreting the scope of a provision of the state constitution. 
Robert F. Utter and SanfordE. Pitler, Presenting a 
State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind. L.Rev. 
635, 657 (1987). In our effort to understand the constitutional language in 
question here we begin with a review of the proceedings of our state 
constitutional convention.

[¶19]   Convening in September, 1889, the 
constitution's framers had copies of the proposed and soon-to-be ratified 
constitutions of Idaho, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington.7 Richard K. 
Prien, The Background of the Wyoming Constitution, iii (Aug. 1956) (unpublished 
M.A. Thesis, University of Wyoming); T.A. Larson, History 
of Wyoming, 246-47 (1965). As our own examination reveals, and as Prien points 
out, a side-by-side comparison of article 6, § 5 of the South Dakota 
Constitution, with Wyoming's art. 1, § 20, the free 
speech/libel provision in question, reveals nearly identical text.8 See, Prien, supra at 49-50. A comparison with 
Mont. Const. art. II, § 7, reveals closely similar text as well.9 According to our research of the Journals and 
Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming (1889), the framers 
established Committee No. 1 to consider the preamble and the declaration of 
rights article of the state charter, of which the free speech/libel provision is 
a part. Id. at 18. George W. Baxter of 
LaramieCounty was on that committee. 
Id. at 22; see also Henry J. Peterson, The Constitutional Convention of Wyoming, 
University of Wyoming Publications in Science, Vol. VII, No. 6 (1940). According 
to Melville C. Brown, the president of the convention, Mr. Baxter was "the 
author of much of our declaration of rights." Melville C. Brown, "Constitution 
Making," Address Given at a Meeting of Pioneers at Cheyenne, Wyoming, Winter 1898 reprinted in Wyoming 
Historical Collections, First Biennial Report of the State Historian of the 
State of Wyoming (1920). Unfortunately, as we 
have previously noted,10 reports of the several standing committees do 
not exist. Equally unfortunate, our review of the proceedings, and in particular 
Mr. Baxter's recorded discussions as reported in the floor debates, has not 
revealed any comment specifically concerning the free speech/libel 
constitutional provision in question. In the absence of helpful information from 
these sources, we look to other recognized sources.

[¶20]   We agree with Prien's conclusion that it 
is likely the framers borrowed our free speech/libel constitutional provision 
from South Dakota, with 
some consideration given the Montana provision. Prien, 
supra, at 49-50. Working with that likelihood, we have turned to those sister 
states for judicial opinions which might give us guidance. In Brodsky v. Journal 
Publishing Co., 73 S.D. 343, 42 N.W.2d 855 (1950), the South Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed a directed verdict for the media defendant in the face of the 
plaintiff's contention that it was for the jury to determine whether or not the 
published article referred to the plaintiff. After reciting S.D. Const. art. 6, 
§ 5, upon which the plaintiff relied and which as noted is nearly textually 
identical to our free speech/libel provision, the court stated:

Constitutional provisions and statutes having similar import 
have been adopted in other jurisdictions. Springer v. Swift, 59 S.D. 208, 239 N.W. 171, 78 A.L.R. 1171. A review of the cases which have construed such 
provisions justifies the conclusion that they have not taken from the court or 
imposed upon the jury the duty of determining whether a communication is capable 
of a defamatory meaning. Egan v. Eastwood, 36 S.D. 42, 153 N.W. 917; 53 C.J.S., 
Libel and Slander, § 223(b); see also annotation in 33 L.R.A.N.S. 207. * * * 
Whether the published article in the instant case was libelous per se was a 
question for the court.

Brodsky, 42 N.W.2d  at 857.

[¶21]   Even more helpful than Brodsky for our 
immediate purpose on the question of the court's power to decide questions of 
law in a libel case is Williams v. Pasma, 202 Mont. 66, 656 P.2d 212, (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S. Ct. 2122, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1302 (1983). There, the Montana Supreme 
Court squarely held that that state's free speech/libel constitutional 
provision, textually similar to ours, does not preclude summary judgment in 
libel cases. In affirming a summary judgment in favor of a member of the state 
Democratic committee, the court quoted from its earlier decision in Griffin v. Opinion Pub. Co., 114 
Mont. 502, 512, 138 P.2d 580, 586 (1943):

     
While our Constitution like that of Missouri, Colorado, South Dakota and 
Wyoming provides that in libel suits "the jury, under the direction of the 
court, shall determine the law and the facts," yet the decisions clearly show 
that the function of the court and jury is not greatly different in the trial of 
libel from what it is in other cases.

      
In other words, it is for the court and not the jury to pass upon 
demurrers to the complaint; upon the admissibility of the evidence; upon motions 
for nonsuit; upon motions for a directed verdict; upon motions for a new trial 
and upon motions to set aside verdicts or vacate judgments.

Pasma, 656 P.2d  at 215.

[¶22]   In view of our case law, the history of 
our constitutional provision, and the helpful opinions from sister jurisdictions 
having textually similar constitutional provisions, we hold that Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 20, does not preclude the trial court's use of summary judgment 
procedure in a defamation action.

2. Summary judgment procedure in libel cases.

[¶23]   In Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 
555 P.2d 556, 562 (Wyo. 
1976), this court recognized that a libel plaintiff's status as a public figure 
invokes the United States Supreme Court's actual malice standard for liability. 
We had recognized and adopted that standard in Phifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 41 A.L.R.3d 
1078 (Wyo. 1968). We often have applied 
that standard in affirming summary judgments. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical & 
Atomic Workers Int'l v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d 283, 287-89 (Wyo. 
1987); McMurry v. Howard Publications, Inc., 612 P.2d 14, 17 (Wyo. 
1980); MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 831-33 (Wyo. 
1980); cf. Williams v. Blount, 741 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶24]   The actual malice standard prevents a 
public figure, such as Dworkin, from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to a matter of public concern unless she proves with 
convincing clarity that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false 
or not. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1, 18 (1990); Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. 
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2681, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562, 571 
(1989); Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 108 S. Ct. 876, 878-79, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48 (1988) (same standard applies in action alleging 
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1960, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502, 517 (1984); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1996, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 1116-17 (1967); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 706-07, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). That actual 
malice standard derives from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the First Amendment's free speech clause.11

[¶25]   This state's free speech/libel 
constitutional provision is textually different from the free speech clause of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In comparison with the 
text of its federal counterpart, Wyoming's free speech/libel 
provision is more elaborate and clearly worded. Expansive protection for freedom 
of expression seems to be invited by the state text that "Every person may 
freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right * * *." This provision, like similar provisions in thirty-eight 
other state constitutions, is phrased as an affirmative right, in contrast to 
the First Amendment's negative phrasing that restrains government action. The 
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harvard L.Rev. 1324, 1399 
(1982). Yet, the additional language of the state provision, that truth when 
published with good intent and for justifiable ends is a sufficient defense to 
libel, suggests a contraction of the protection for expression. See Garrison v. 
State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 n. 7, 85 S. Ct. 209, 214 n. 7, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125, 130-31 n. 7 (1964) for 
a list of jurisdictions having similar, seemingly restrictive constitutional or 
statutory provisions. See also Frederic Jesup Stimson, The Law of the Federal 
and State Constitutions of the United 
States, §§ 60-61, pp. 144-46 
(1908).

[¶26]   Additional evidence suggests a 
contraction of the protection for expression under our state constitution; Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 8, states in pertinent part: "[E]very person for an injury done 
to reputation shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay."12 Of course, under the New York Times doctrine, 
as Garrison recognized, "where the criticism is of public officials and their 
conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by 
the larger interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of 
truth." Garrison, 379 U.S.  at 72-73, 85 S. Ct.  at 
215, 13 L. Ed. 2d  at 132.

[¶27]   "[T]here is no reason why we should not 
apply Wyoming constitutional provisions 
in the administration of our jurisprudence, as long as they do not infringe upon 
the constitutional standards of the United States Constitution." Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1223 
(Wyo. 1976). Does this state's free 
speech/libel constitutional provision infringe upon the First Amendment? If it 
does, if it is more restrictive (less protective) of the fundamental right to 
freedom of speech than the interpretation of that right by the United States 
Supreme Court, which, of course, is deemed the minimum permissible, then this 
court is constitutionally obligated to apply the less restrictive (more 
protective) federal interpretation. U.S. Const. art. VI; and 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 37 and art. 
21, § 24; State ex rel. Mansfield v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601 P.2d 174, 75 
(Wyo. 1979); Doe v. Burk, 513 P.2d 643, 644 (1973). 
On the other hand, if this state's free speech/libel constitutional provision is 
less restrictive (more protective) than the First Amendment as interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court, then, of course, we are free to apply our state 
provision which enlarges the right. Richmond, 554 P.2d  at 
1223.

[¶28]   In this case, however, it is 
unnecessary for us to engage in the rigorous examination required to determine 
whether our state free speech/libel constitutional provision provides more 
protection for freedom of speech than afforded under prevailing federal First 
Amendment law. That is simply because the federal floor in the 
public-figure/media defendant libel field, to be applied in this case, 
adequately protects the media defendants here from liability to Dworkin, as we 
shall show. And, as our prior libel case law richly illustrates, this court has 
readily embraced the federal doctrine in this specific area of free speech 
jurisprudence. That is not to say, however, that in a future case in a different 
area of free speech jurisprudence, this court would not undertake the necessary 
effort to determine the full scope of our free speech/libel constitutional 
provision.

[¶29]   In cases in which the fundamental right 
of freedom of speech is involved, as here, this court has declared:

The 
best procedural protection for freedom of speech, which [the United States 
Supreme Court] standard is designed to protect, is found in the remedy of 
summary judgment which the courts have utilized freely in such cases. The 
chilling effect of litigation and the associated expense and inconvenience 
frequently have led courts to conclude that summary judgment is the most 
appropriate remedy in an instance such as this in order to minimize that 
chilling effect as much as possible.

Adams, 
555 P.2d  at 566 (citations omitted).

[¶30]   In applying the actual 
malice/convincing clarity standard in the summary judgment context, this court 
follows the same approach it uses in any other summary judgment setting: we have 
the same task as the trial court, we have the same material as that court, and 
we follow the same standards. Sinclair Oil, 748 P.2d  at 288-89.

3. 
Whether the Hustler statements are actionable as a 
matter of law.

A. 
Milkovich Analysis.

[¶31]   In Milkovich, the United States Supreme 
Court's recent opinion in First Amendment libel jurisprudence, the Court refused 
to recognize, in addition to the established constitutional safeguards in the 
freedom of speech area, "still another first amendment-based protection for 
defamatory statements that are categorized as `opinion' as opposed to `fact.'" 
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct.  at 2705, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 17. Thus, existing constitutional doctrine 
adequately secures the "breathing space" which "freedoms of expression require 
in order to survive." Id., 
497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct.  at 
2706, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 18.13 One rule of that existing protective 
constitutional doctrine is that "a statement of opinion relating to matters of 
public concern which does not contain a provably false connotation will receive 
full constitutional protection." Id. See, e.g., Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 
89 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1986). The doctrine also provides full protection for 
"statements that cannot `reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' 
about an individual." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct.  at 
2706, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 19. See, e.g., Falwell, 485 U.S.  at 50, 108 S. Ct.  at 
879, 99 L. Ed. 2d  at 48. As the Court stated in Milkovich, "This provides 
assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of `imaginative 
expression' or the `rhetorical hyperbole' which has traditionally added much to 
the discourse of our nation." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct.  at 
2706, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 19.

[¶32]   As revealed by the Court's analysis of 
the statements reviewed in Milkovich, in determining whether an alleged 
defamatory falsehood purports to state or imply "actual facts about an 
individual," a court must scrutinize the type of language used, the meaning of 
the statement in context, whether the statement is verifiable, and the broader 
social circumstances in which the statement was made. Id., 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct.  at 2706-07, 111 L.Ed.2d at 18-19; and see dissenting opinion of Brennan, 
J., 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct.  at 2709, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 21.

B. 
Application of the Milkovich Analysis.

[¶33]   We shall now scrutinize the Hustler 
statements about Dworkin using the analytical technique applied in Milkovich. 

·        
 The type of language 
used.

[¶34]   The kind of language used may signal 
readers that a writer is not purporting to state or imply actual, known facts. 
In Milkovich, the Court referred to Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S. Ct. 1537, 
26 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1970), where the Court held that the word "blackmail," when used 
by a newspaper to characterize a land developer's negotiation position with the 
city, was not slander when spoken and not libel when written. The Court 
explained that "even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word 
was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who 
considered [the developer's] negotiating position extremely unreasonable." 
Greenbelt, 398 U.S.  at 14, 90 S. Ct.  at 
1542, 26 L. Ed. 2d  at 15. In Falwell, the Court held an ad parody "could not 
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure 
involved." Id., 485 U.S.  at 50, 108 S. Ct.  at 
879, 99 L. Ed. 2d  at 48. In Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter 
Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86, 94 S. Ct. 2770, 2781-82, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745, 762-63 (1974), the 
Court found the word "traitor" in a literary definition of a union "scab" was 
not actionable since it was used "in a loose, figurative sense" and was "merely 
rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by 
union members." Abusive epithets, vulgarities and profanities are nonactionable. 
Rodney Smolla, Law of Defamation § 4.03, at 4-09 to -10 and § 6.12[10], at 6-52 
(1991); see cases cited therein. The ad hominem 
nature of such language easily identifies it as rhetorical hyperbole which, as a 
matter of law, cannot reasonably be understood as statement of fact. Clearly 
falling into this category are Hustler's statements characterizing Dworkin as: 
"`little guy' militant lesbian feminist," a "shit-squeezing sphincter in her own 
right," "one of the most foul-mouthed, abrasive manhaters on Earth," a 
"repulsive presence," "a cry-baby who can dish out criticism but clearly can't 
take it," "Spence's foaming-at-the-mouth client," and "a censor." Under 
prevailing constitutional First Amendment safeguards, that language cannot, as a 
matter of law, form the basis for a defamation claim.

·        
The 
meaning of the statement in context.

[¶35]   Certain formats - editorials, reviews, 
political cartoons, monthly features - signal the average reader to expect a 
departure from what is actually known by the writer as fact. As explained in 
another case, "[t]he reasonable reader who peruses [a] column on the editorial 
or Op-Ed page is fully aware that the statements found there are not `hard' news 
like those printed on the front page or elsewhere in the news sections of the 
newspaper." Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S. Ct. 2662, 
86 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1985). See also Smolla, supra, § 6.12[4], n. 252 (collecting 
cases).

[¶36]   The Hustler article appears under the 
heading "Bits and Pieces" and is a regular monthly feature. The tone of the 
article is pointed, exaggerated and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric 
invoking first amendment principles. We are convinced that the average reader is 
fully aware that the statements found there are not "hard news." Readers of that 
column expect that Hustler's writers will make strong opinionated statements in 
that column, a recognized home of opinion and comment. That proposition is 
inherent in the very notion of a regularly appearing "Bits and Pieces" page 
which is akin to an editorial page.

·        
Verifiability of the statements.

[¶37]   There are four statements in the 
article which appear more likely to be objectively capable of proof or disproof 
and about which we will say more below. They are that Dworkin is a lesbian; 
supporters of the antipornography ordinance asked her to stay away; she 
advocates bestiality, incest and sex with children; and she initiated a nuisance 
suit. The remainder of the statements in the article, however, are not capable 
of being proved by objective means as either false or true. The terms "militant 
feminist," "shit-squeezing sphincter," "publicity-grab," "foul-mouthed abrasive 
manhater," "cry-baby," "foaming-at-the-mouth," and "censor" are hopelessly 
vague, imprecise, indefinite and amorphous. These terms are loosely definable 
and subjectively interpreted in such a variety of contexts that they cannot 
support an action for defamation. "Lacking a clear method of verification with 
which to evaluate a statement * * * the trier of fact may improperly tend to 
render a decision based upon approval or disapproval of the contents of the 
statement, its author, or its subject." Ollman, 750 F.2d  at 981. See also 
Smolla, supra, § 6.12[5].

·        
The 
broader social circumstances in which the statement was made.

[¶38]   The importance of social context has 
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. The Court has observed, 
concerning the nonactionable words "scab" and "traitor" as applied to an 
employee who crossed a picket line, that "such exaggerated rhetoric was common 
place in labor disputes." Old Dominion, 418 U.S.  at 286, 94 S. Ct.  at 
2782, 41 L. Ed. 2d  at 763. Just as labor's historical confrontation with 
management presents a widely recognized arena in which bruising and brawling, 
rough and tumble debate is the daily fare, so does the social, moral, and 
political clash between pornographers and antipornographers. Dworkin is an 
antipornography activist whose activities are in the form of public advocacy and 
direct political involvement. She participated in the drafting of the Indianapolis antipornography 
ordinance that was enacted and then held unconstitutional. See Am. Booksellers 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). Hustler's Bits and Pieces article is an ad hominem 
attack against an advocate of a social, moral and political viewpoint contrary 
to Hustler's. The statements in question were uttered in the context of an 
ongoing debate in which Dworkin seeks to destroy the industry of which Hustler 
is a part. In response, Hustler seeks to destroy Dworkin's viewpoint by 
vilifying its advocate. In such a heated and spirited confrontation, of which 
the statements are a part, abusive epithets, exaggerated rhetoric and hysterical 
hyperbole are expected. "The offending phrases in this article are, 
unfortunately, representative of the type of language generated in a dispute 
over such a subject." Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080, 109 S. Ct. 1532, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1989).

[¶39]   We agree with that said by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals: "Ludicrous statements are much less insidious and 
debilitating than falsities that bear the ring of truth. We have little doubt 
that the outrageous and the outlandish will be recognized for what they are." 
Dworkin v. Hustler, 867 F.2d  at 1194. Vulgar speech reflects more on the 
character of the user of such language than on the object of such language. 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1966).

[¶40]   Having applied the Milkovich analysis 
to most of the statements in the Hustler article, we must examine more closely 
those four statements which appear more likely to be objectively capable of 
proof or disproof. As we examine these four statements, we are mindful of the 
warning that we must "not engage, without bearing clearly in mind the context 
before us, in a Talmudic parsing of a single sentence or two, as if we were 
occupied with a philosophic enterprise or linguistic analysis." Ollman, 750 F.2d  
at 991.

[¶41]   The four statements are: Dworkin is a 
"lesbian"; when Indianapolis contemplated an 
antipornography ordinance co-authored by her, supporters asked her to "stay away 
for fear her repulsive presence would kill it"; Dworkin "advocates bestiality, 
incest and sex with children"; and Dworkin initiated a "nuisance suit" against 
Hustler. We consider these statements in the light of Dworkin's legal burden of 
having to prove with convincing clarity not only the falsity of the statements, 
but also that Hustler uttered them with knowledge of the falsity or in reckless 
disregard for the truth. As shall be seen, Dworkin has not satisfied her burden 
in this summary judgment setting. 

[¶42]   Hustler has provided Dworkin's own 
writing to support its statement that she is a lesbian.14 Neither in 
her argument before the trial court nor in her argument before this court has 
Dworkin challenged this particular statement. Thus, she has failed to carry her 
burden of proof in this instance.

[¶43]   To bolster the statement that 
supporters of the Indianapolis ordinance asked Dworkin 
to stay away for fear her repulsive presence would kill it, Hustler provided two 
pieces of evidence. The first was an article from the Village Voice entitled, 
Censorship in the Name of Feminism. This article describes the attempt to pass 
the antipornography ordinance. It reads:

     Indianapolis, though, is not Minneapolis. When Mayor Hudnut heard 
of the Dworkin/MacKinnon bill at a Republican conference, he didn't think of it 
as a measure to promote feminism, but a weapon in the war on smut. He recruited 
City-County Councilmember Beulah Coughenour - an activist in the Stop ERA 
movement-to-introduce the law locally.

     Coughenor's first smart 
move was to hire MacKinnon but not Dworkin as a consultant to the city in 
developing the legislation. * * * MacKinnon is * * * "respectable." * * * Of the 
law's coauthors, she was most likely to be accepted by Indianapolis's conservative city 
officials. Dworkin's style would not have gone over in Indianapolis - there are no crowds 
of anti-porn feminists to galvanize into action, while there are innumerable 
tight-laced conservatives to be alarmed by the feverish pitch of Dworkin's 
revival-style speeches, not to mention her overalls and unruly 
appearance.

[¶44]   Hustler also provided a New York Times 
article about the Indianapolis ordinance entitled, A 
Feminist Offensive Against Exploitation. Included in the article was the 
following statement: "In Indianapolis, where many of the ordinance's proponents 
deemed Miss Dworkin too radical for the conservative community, Professor 
MacKinnon was brought in as a consultant * * *."

[¶45]   It is true that neither of these two 
articles on which Hustler relies directly states that supporters of the 
ordinance actually asked her to "stay away." It is clear to us, however, that 
the gist, the sting, the hurt of the articles and Hustler's statement based on 
them was that she was not hired as a consultant because it was felt her style 
would alarm the conservative supporters of the ordinance. The statement was 
substantially true. As this court recognized in Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State 
Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1120-21 
(Wyo. 1985), it is sufficient to 
show that the imputation is substantially true. See also Smolla, supra, § 
5.08-.11.

[¶46]   It may also be said Hustler drew an 
inference from the article that Dworkin was asked to "stay away." Assuming that 
the inference drawn is false, Dworkin still must establish that it was drawn 
with actual malice. Dworkin fails to point to evidence of malice other than her 
statement that malice may be inferred from the character and content of the 
publication alone. Particularly in a case such as this, where Hustler reached an 
inference or interpretation from reputable source material, a mere inference of 
malice is insufficient. Plaintiff must show that the interpretation made was 
reached maliciously. Malice must be proved, because "punishment of error runs 
the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally 
guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. * * * The First Amendment requires that 
we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters." Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 805-06 (1974).

[¶47]   We turn next to Hustler's accusation 
that Dworkin advocates bestiality, incest and sex with children. Here again, 
Hustler provided source material for its statement from Dworkin's own writings. 
Hustler provided the trial court with a chapter entitled, Androgyny: Androgyny, 
Fucking and Community, from Dworkin's book, Woman Hating. In this chapter, 
Dworkin describes a model society in which "redefine[d] human sexuality" 
transforms "human relationships and the institutions which seek to control that 
relationship." She states that in androgynous community, "human and other-animal 
relationships would become more explicitly erotic." She advocates "destruction 
of the incest taboo" in order to develop "cooperative human community based on 
the free-flow of natural androgynous eroticism." Finally, she states that 
children have "every right to live out their own erotic impulses" and that the 
distinctions between children and adults would disappear as androgynous 
community develops.

[¶48]   Dworkin argues that her book merely 
discusses these practices rather than advocates them. This does not resolve the 
issue. Assuming that her claim is correct, since the book itself is not 
mentioned in the Hustler article, the question of fact to be resolved is not 
whether her book truly advocates these practices, but whether Hustler's 
interpretation of Dworkin's work as advocacy rather than description is "false" 
and was made with malice. Again, Dworkin has failed to show that the 
interpretation was reached maliciously.

[¶49]   On the subject of a critic's 
interpretation of another's writings, it has been said:

[C]ommentary on another's writing was considered a 
privileged occasion at common law and therefore received the benefit of the fair 
comment doctrine. When a critic is commenting about a book, the reader is on 
notice that the critic is engaging in interpretation, an inherently subjective 
enterprise, and therefore realizes that others, including the author, may 
utterly disagree with the critic's interpretation. The average reader further 
understands that because of limitations of space, not to mention those 
limitations imposed by the patience of the prospective audience, the critic as a 
practical matter will be able to support his opinion only by rather truncated 
quotations from the book or work under scrutiny. The reader is thus predisposed 
to view what the critic writes as opinion. In this context, courts have rightly 
been wary of finding statements to be defamatory, unless the statements misquote 
the author, put words into the author's mouth or otherwise clearly go beyond the 
realm of interpretation.

Ollman, 750 F.2d  at 988. See also, Smolla, supra, § 
6.12[7].

[¶50]   We believe that when dealing with 
interpretation of a literary work, we must be especially careful to guard the 
critic's right to express his opinion about the meaning of the work. Any author 
who places a book in the marketplace of ideas makes his work subject to 
criticism. Dworkin's book itself reinterprets fairy tales from a feminist 
perspective. Who is to say which interpretation is "true" and which 
"false"?

[¶51]   Furthermore, the United States Supreme 
Court has allowed latitude for the interpretation of ambiguous documents where a 
claim of libel is made. In Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 91 S. Ct. 633, 28 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1971), the Court rejected the concept that a faulty interpretation 
of an ambiguous document could give rise to a claim for libel. In Pape, Time 
Magazine had erroneously reported that the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights had accused the plaintiff, a public official, of police brutality. Time 
misinterpreted a Commission report to say that the Commission had made the 
accusation; in fact, the Commission was only reporting allegations made by 
others. The Supreme Court stated that Time's omission of the word "alleged" when 
describing the incident of police brutality "amounted to the adoption of one of 
a number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled with 
ambiguities. The deliberate choice of such an interpretation, although arguably 
reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of `malice' 
under New York Times." Pape, 401 U.S.  at 290, 91 S. Ct.  at 
639, 28 L. Ed. 2d  at 53.

[¶52]   The United States Supreme Court 
recently stated concerning Pape that "[a] fair reading of our opinion is that 
the defendant did not publish a falsification sufficient to sustain a finding of 
actual malice." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 447, ___ (1991). The same is true in this case. 
Hustler's interpretation of Dworkin's work simply does not create an issue of 
malice for the jury.

[¶53]   Finally, we arrive at a statement which 
is difficult to classify. It has elements of either fact or hyperbole, depending 
on how it was used. Hustler accused Dworkin of filing a "nuisance suit" against 
Hustler. We have not located any authoritative definition of a "nuisance suit," 
but in the most narrow sense it appears to refer to a suit which the plaintiff 
knows is not well-founded in the law, but which is brought to browbeat the 
defendant into paying nominal damages rather than incurring legal fees and 
costs. A "nuisance suit" may also have a rhetorical meaning, however. In a 
rhetorical sense, a "nuisance suit" may be one which the defendant finds 
inconvenient or annoying to fight and which he feels confident the plaintiff 
will lose. When a litigant without legal training refers to a suit brought 
against him as a "nuisance suit," it is difficult to know whether he means that 
the suit is a nuisance in the narrow, technical sense or in a broader, 
rhetorical sense. In the rhetorical sense, calling a suit a "nuisance" should be 
viewed as expressing an opinion which cannot be proved by objective means. Even 
if a court rules for the plaintiff, that may not change the defendant's opinion 
that the suit was frivolous. The First Amendment protects expression of this 
sort of opinion. Dworkin had the burden of establishing that "nuisance suit" was 
meant in the narrow, technical sense. She has pointed to nothing which could 
satisfy that requirement. See Camer v. Seattle Post Intelligencer, 45 Wn. App. 29, 723 P.2d 1195, 1200-02 
(1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S. Ct. 3189, 96 L. Ed. 2d 677 (court held 
that a media defendant's attributing nuisance suits to a plaintiff did not 
constitute actionable libel). See also Waldo v. Journal Co., 45 Wis.2d 203, 172 N.W.2d 680 (1969). There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' libel complaint which alleged the defendant's use of 
the term "nuisance suit" to describe the plaintiffs' taxpayers' suit against the 
city was defamatory. Agreeing with the trial court that the term is an 
expression of opinion of the writer about the suit, namely, that he did not 
think it had great merit, the Supreme Court said,

[t]o 
import any defamatory meaning to these words would result in a strained and 
unnatural construction and give effect to innuendoes that are neither apparent 
directly from the language nor arise by clear implication. Nothing in this 
language could reasonably be construed as harming the reputation of the 
plaintiffs, lowering them in the estimation of the community, or deterring third 
persons from associating or dealing with them.

Waldo, 172 N.W.2d  at 684.

[¶54]   In the broader sense, there was some 
justification for Hustler to believe that it would prevail in Dworkin v. 
Hustler, and that the suit was a "nuisance." The Ninth Circuit Federal Court of 
Appeals said the following in its opinion:

Attorneys [for Hustler] have requested double costs and 
attorneys' fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1912. We have "discretion to award attorney's fees and costs as a sanction 
against a frivolous appeal. An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious, or 
the arguments of error are wholly without merit." DeWitt v. Western Pac. R.R. 
Co., 719 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1983).

     We denied a similar request 
made by Hustler in Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 895-96. Consequently, sanctions would be inappropriate in this appeal, 
which was filed under circumstances substantially similar to those of Leidholdt. 
However, the arguments made in this case have now been rejected by this court in 
Leidholdt, Ault, and in this case. Should litigants 
raise similar contentions in subsequent cases, the courts hearing those cases 
may consider in the first instance whether sanctions are 
appropriate.

Dworkin v. Hustler, 867 F.2d  at 1200-01 (emphasis 
added).

[¶55]   In summary, we have applied the 
appropriate Milkovich analysis to the statements of and pertaining to Dworkin. 
We hold that neither the statements considered individually nor the article 
considered as a whole constitute actionable defamation under controlling First 
Amendment law.

4. 
Good motives and for justifiable ends.

[¶56]   There remains one further point 
asserted by Dworkin which we choose to address. She claims that under the 
language "the truth, when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends, 
shall be sufficient defense," as found in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20, these media 
defendants bear the burden of proving that the statements, even if "true" or 
constitutionally protected, were published with good motives and for justifiable 
ends. Again regrettably, she pursues this assertion in the same manner as she 
pursued her other contention that the subject constitutional provision precluded 
summary judgment in a libel action. Her assertion lacks constitutional analysis, 
legal authority, and cogent argument.

[¶57]   We have carefully studied New York 
Times, Butts, and the subsequent United States Supreme Court cases that have 
consistently adhered to that doctrine since first announced in 1964. In 
particular, we find Garrison most informative on the point Dworkin raises. In 
that case, the Court applied its New York Times rule and struck down a 
Louisiana criminal libel statute 
which, like the language of this state's free speech/libel constitutional 
provision, conditioned the defense of truth on the presence of good motives and 
justifiable ends. Where the challenged statements criticize public officials or 
public figures in matters of public concern, "the interest in private reputation 
is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the 
dissemination of the truth." Garrison, 379 at 73, 85 S. Ct.  at 215, 13 L. Ed. 2d  at 
132. Consequently, "[t]ruth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal 
sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned." Garrison, 379 U.S.  at 74, 85 S. Ct.  at 
216, 13 L. Ed. 2d  at 133.

[¶58]   The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the 
Garrison approach in a civil libel action in Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408, 410 (1969). There, the court held that the "good 
motives and for justifiable ends" language of its free speech/libel 
constitutional provision was "incompatible with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the scope of the first amendment guarantees of the 
Federal Constitution." See also, People v. Heinrich, 104 Ill. 2d 137, 83 Ill.Dec. 
546, 550-555, 470 N.E.2d 966, 970-71, 68 A.L.R.4th 1003 (1984).

[¶59]   A few years later the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, in a criminal libel action, relied on New York Times and Garrison 
to hold a similar provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution repugnant to the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Armao, 446 
Pa. 325, 286 A.2d 626, 632 
(1972).

[¶60]   As recognized in our state 
constitution,15 the United 
States Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land. We hold, therefore, that the phrase "when published with good intent and 
[for] justifiable ends" of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20, is repugnant to the 
guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution in libel 
actions in which the New York Times/Butts standard applies to public figures who 
have been criticized by a media defendant regarding matters of public concern. 
Consequently, the media defendants in this case do not bear the burden Dworkin 
would have them assume.

[¶61]   We affirm the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment against all of the plaintiffs on all of the counts in 
the complaint.

APPENDIX A

Interpretation of State Constitutions

Judith Hession, Comment, Rediscovering State Constitutions 
for Individual Rights Protection - Civil, 37 Baylor L.Rev. 463 
(1985)

Dorothy T. Beasley, The Georgia Bill of Rights: 
Dead or Alive? 34 Emory L.J. 341 (1985)

The 
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324-1502 
(1982)

Earl 
M. Maltz, False Prophet - Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional 
Law, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 429 
(1988)

J. 
Skelly Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 165 
(1984)

Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions - Away 
From a Reactionary Approach, 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1 
(1981)

George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail 
and No Anchor - Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 Hastings Const. L.Q. 975 
(1979).

Lawrence M. 
Newman, Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 
26 Hastings L.J. 481 (1974)

Robert F. Utter & SanfordE. Pitler, Speech, Presenting a State 
Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind.L.Rev. 635 
(1987)

Steve McAllister, Comment, Interpreting the State 
Constitution: A Survey and Assessment of Current Methodology, 35 Kan.L.Rev. 593 
(1987)

Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional 
Interpretation, 21 Land & Water L.Rev. 526 (1986)

Glen 
S. Goodnough, Comment, The Primacy Method of State Constitutional 
Decision-making: Interpreting the Maine Constitution, 38 Me.L.Rev. 
491 (1986)

John 
Sunquist, Construction of the Wisconsin Constitution - Recurrence to 
Fundamental Principles, 62 Marq.L.Rev. 531 (1979)

William F. Swindler, State Constitutions for the 20th 
Century, 50 Neb.L.Rev. 577 (1970)

William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: 
The Revival of State Constitutions As Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 535 (1986)

Robert Vogel, Sources of the 1889 North Dakota Constitution, 65 N.D.L.Rev. 331 
(1989)

James E. Leahy, The Constitution is What the Judges Say It 
is, 65 N.D.L.Rev. 491 (1989)

Don 
S. Willner, A Second Look at Constitutional Interpretation in a Pioneer and 
PopulistState, 67 Or.L.Rev. 93 
(1988)

Ken 
Gormley, State Constitutions and Criminal Procedure: A Primer for the 21st 
Century, 67 Or.L.Rev. 689 (1988)

Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources 
of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. 707 (1983)

Peter P. Miller, Note, Freedom of Expression Under State 
Constitutions, 20 Stan. L.Rev. 318 (1968)

Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States 
Constitution, 14 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 887 (1980)

The 
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex.L.Rev. 959 (1985)

Justice Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering 
the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 379 (1980)

Justice Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and 
Publish Freely: State Constitutional Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 
U.Puget Sound L.Rev. 157 (1985)

Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal 
System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. 
Puget Sound L.Rev. 491 
(1984)

Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and 
First Amendment Freedoms, 4 Vand.L.Rev. 620 (1951)

Robert Force, State "Bill of Rights": A Case of Neglect and 
the Need for a Renaissance, 3 Val.U.L.Rev. 125 (1969) 

Maurice Kelman, Foreword: Rediscovering the State 
Constitutional Bill of Rights, 27 Wayne L.Rev. 413 (1981)

Don 
S. Willner, Constitutional Interpretation in a Pioneer and PopulistState, 17 Williamette L.Rev. 
757 (1981)

Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 
Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 169 (1983)

Junaid H. Chida, Comment, Rediscovering the Wisconsin 
Constitution: Presentation of Constitutional Questions in State Courts, 1983 
Wis L.Rev. 483 (1983)

Linda B. Matarese, Other voices: The Role of Justices 
Durham, Kaye, and Abrahamson in Shaping the "New Judicial Federalism," 2 
Emerging Issues St. Const. Law 239 (1989)

David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: 
A Report from the Provinces, 2 Emerging Issues St. Const. Law 275 (1989)

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶62]   I concur in the opinion of the court 
because of clear United States Supreme Court precedent. Nevertheless, I am less 
than enthusiastic over a state of law which allows a publisher to create a 
money-making business out of cruel, obscene, random attacks upon public figures. 
Nor am I able to justify these publications by equating them to the writing of 
Shakespeare or Chaucer. They are hardly in that class.

[¶63]   I could agree to reversal of summary 
judgment in Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), because Spence was 
subjected to a most bizarre, cruel, obscene libel only because he, as attorney, 
undertook representation of a client. Sadly, Dworkin is not in the same posture. 
My sympathies are with the dissenting justices, but established law requires my 
concurrence. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 876, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).

[¶64]   In Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695, the Supreme Court declined to create a separate, sweeping category of 
defamation exception for statements of "opinion" as opposed to statements of 
"fact." The Court noted that an "opinion" exception could unjustifiably shield 
defamatory statements if the speaker or writer couched his or her statement in 
terms of opinion. Instead, the Court found adequate the protections secured by 
existing constitutional doctrine. These protections include exclusion from 
liability for statements on matters of public concern which cannot be proven 
false, protection for statements which cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
stating actual facts, and plaintiff's burden of proving malice where a statement 
on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defamatory facts 
regarding public officials or public figures. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct.  at 
2706-07. It is in the light of these three protected areas that I suggest that 
there should be some rethinking of the apparent absolute immunity from suit for 
defamation granted to publishers who, for profit, regularly and randomly attack 
public figures. The law of defamation in our sister common-law jurisdiction, 
Canada, provides guidance 
in striking a better balance between the right to reputation and freedom of 
speech and of the press. I firmly believe that freedom of speech and of the 
press can survive nicely without the protection now afforded the likes of Hustler Magazine. Nevertheless, I must for the reasons 
stated specially concur.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶65]   In this world of sloganistic 
wordsmanship and phrase making, it becomes easier than agonizing about the hard 
effort of thinking to relegate decision making to spontaneous reactivity and 
opinion-determining words. Spender, do-gooder, ultra-conservative, soft on 
crime, gun control, abortion, and censorship serve as examples. In this case, 
the umbrella of the First Amendment casts a shadow which tends to exclude deeply 
important issues. These include summary judgment decision making. It is followed 
by an application of a derived or directed federal concept to diminish efficacy 
of our state constitutional right to the integrity of the whole individual to be 
protected by a jury trial review through a damage claim.

[¶66]   There is much with which I do agree in 
the scholarly and complete majority opinion. There was much about which I 
likewise agreed in the effort of Justice Thomas to write a majority opinion 
before this case was reassigned and with which I also joined in concept to favor 
disposition within the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶67]   I will leave the subject to be 
critically considered by Justice Thomas in his dissent regarding the broad base 
anticipations and concepts of the Wyoming Constitutional Convention when its 
members wrote Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20. I will generally limit this dissent to 
the immediately pressing question regarding inappropriateness of deciding by 
summary judgment that the Wyoming Constitution is invalid. I also do not accept 
the view that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution determines 
that the provisions of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20 should be abrogated or ignored. 
I reject decision making for the libel case through summary judgment rather than 
jury trial exposure guaranteed by the explicit terms of our 
constitution.

[¶68]   The real issue we determine here is 
that Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20 is involved and cannot be ignored whether or not, 
as the majority essentially determines, it is in essence invalidated by 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. We do that when considering a scurrilous publication which, by any 
definition, panders a prurient course of character assassination. This is not an 
injunctive action to stop exposure of the world to the product - good, bad or 
indifferent. This is a damage case to assess defamation tort responsibility by 
exposure of the purveyor to a jury review and verdict decision. In Spence v. 
Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1668, 118 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1992), the cause was 
to attack the attorney to defeat litigation, and now it comes directly in this 
case as an effort to defeat the muckraker by multiplying the quantity of 
muck.

[¶69]   First, let's look at the text of the 
two constitutional provisions. This is done to assess why the majority feels 
required to superimpose a federal veto on the Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1991) clear intent application 
of the Wyoming Constitution in this case. We would 
then deny the litigant access to a jury trial for review of unabused truth and 
good intent for justifiable ends as defenses.

[¶70]   Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20 
states:

Freedom of speech and press; libel; truth a 
defense.

     Every person may freely 
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, 
when published with good Intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be a 
sufficient defense, the jury having the right to determine the facts and the 
law, under direction of the court.

[¶71]   U.S. Const. amend. I 
states:

     Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.

[¶72]   It would be wise, before we wade deeply 
into the morass provided in the litigative pursuits of the Hustler publications, 
to recall clearly and with specificity what summary judgment is all about. It 
should be apparent that if the product with which we are concerned is so 
acceptable or important, then the purveyor should have no objection to a jury 
review and discernment. This court made a serious effort in Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986), as followed by Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987), to properly understand 
the diverse applications of summary judgment as a procedural deterrent to the 
litigant's right to a jury trial.1 In Cordova and Davenport, summary judgment was 
recognized in a six stage review: (1) legal sufficiency of the complaint; (2) 
procedural sufficiency of the motion for summary judgment and attached 
affidavits and deposition material; (3) substantive sufficiency of the 
affidavits to initially support the motion; (4) procedural sufficiency of 
responsive affidavits; (5) substantive legal issue disposition (factual issues 
not relevant); and (6) disposition if there are no material issues of fact 
(material factual issues do not exist). Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 635-36.

[¶73]   Consequently, when an adequately 
developed summary judgment litigative attack is unleashed, the decisional 
process addresses a contended basis for granting the relief by either of two 
decisions: (a) a dispositive rule of law which controls without regard for 
conflicting schemes of fact; or (b) absence of material issues of fact to be 
determined from the affidavits and depositions as admissible evidence if a trial 
were to be held.

[¶74]   Summary judgment then, if properly 
developed, either presents a law case, Dean W. Knight & Sons, Inc. v. State 
ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 155 Cal. App. 3d 300, 202 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1984), or a no 
factual conflict case, Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110. It is now 
apparent that the federal court system, through the Triad cases, Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1029, 107 S. Ct. 1955, 95 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1987), has moved beyond the 
conventional standard for state court and prior federal law. This effort has not 
met with acceptance among the state judiciary and particularly not in Wyoming. This court has not been 
willing to accept the supposition of federal cases to base "trial" upon 
affidavits and bits and pieces of deposition material rather than the integrity 
of an actual trial with live witnesses and, perforce, even a jury 
decision.

[¶75]   In simplest text, if we are looking at 
the component of summary judgment involving existence of a material issue of 
fact, the principle is stated:

     The motion for summary 
judgment should be sustained in the absence of a real and material fact issue 
considering movant's burden, respondent's right to the benefit of all favorable 
inferences and any reasonable doubt, with credibility questions to be resolved 
by trial.

Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 640.

[¶76]   In broader text, we have alternatively 
stated:

"* * 
* `Summary judgment should not be granted where contradictory inferences may be 
drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts.' * * * `Even where the facts bearing 
upon the issue of negligence are undisputed, * * *, if reasonable minds could 
reach different conclusions and inferences from such facts, the issue must be 
submitted to the trier of fact.' * * * `"Evaluative judgment between two 
rationally possible conclusions from facts cannot be engaged in on summary 
judgment."' * * * `Summary judgment is not appropriate where the record, 
including documents and pleadings, establishes facts which give rise to 
contradictory inferences, one of which supports the party opposing the motion.' 
* * *" * * * 

"* * 
* The motion for summary judgment is a drastic remedy and one which is designed 
to pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of the controversy - but 
only when no material issue of fact is present. * * * Although both parties are 
obligated to come forward with their evidence, the burden is on the moving party 
to demonstrate clearly that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and if that is not done, the motion for summary judgment 
should be denied. This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable 
inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the affidavits, exhibits, and 
depositions. * * *

"* * 
* If the evidence is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable minds 
might differ as to its significance, summary judgment is improper[.]" Weaver v. 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984, 986-987 
(1980).

     Precedentially significant 
are the credibility and the reasonable-inference principles. * * *

* * 
* * * *

[¶77]   We would synthesize the general 
principles advanced by some Wyoming cases and general 
standards of many well-reasoned cases from the federal courts and other 
states:

(a) 
The motion for summary judgment is a drastic remedy and one which is designed to 
pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of the controversy - but only 
when no material issue of fact is present. Although both parties are obligated 
to come forward with their evidence, the burden is on the moving party to 
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

(b) 
The court should scrutinize with care movant's affidavits and indulge leniency 
to respondent's affidavits but not to permit overtrading on the indulgence of 
the court since there must be a genuine issue of a material fact to be tried 
after looking at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to respondent and 
giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in 
the affidavits, exhibits, and depositions.

(c) 
When credibility is to be tested, the witnesses should testify at 
trial.

(d) 
Cross-motions do not concede the absence of factual issues.

(e) 
Finally, then, to determine whether the evidence is in factual dispute or 
subject to conflicting interpretation or of differing significance with 
respondent afforded the benefit of reasonable doubt.

Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 639-40 (emphasis in 
original).

[¶78]   The challenge then presented is to 
determine, as a result of the majority's decision, whether supersession of the 
Wyoming constitutional provision 
regarding the right to a jury trial explicitly stated in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
20 is a determination as a matter of law without regard for conflicts of fact or 
whether we have the character of summary judgment determined by the conclusion 
that there is no material issue of fact presented.

[¶79]   Although I do not enthusiastically 
accept invalidation of the solemn provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, 
whether by summary judgment or otherwise, it becomes even less acceptable if a 
fact finding exercise is utilized as an adjunct of the summary judgment 
disposition. In recognizing that in essence what we label here as summary 
judgment is in actuality a fact finding exercise by appellate review, I 
respectfully and urgently dissent from this decision. Alternatively, I would 
think that if we start down this pathway, it is highly preferable for this court 
to declare Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20 void and ineffective. This court can then 
start over with the sole protection to be provided in this jurisdiction for 
freedom of speech or liability for libel and defamation to come from the 
periodic incursion into constitutional law by the United States Supreme 
Court.

[¶80]   The overwhelming issue for this libel 
action appeal is whether, as a matter of law, Hustler Magazine's "comments" 
cannot be found to be actionable under the Wyoming Constitution as limited to 
the extent it would be by the First Amendment decisions of the 
United States Supreme 
Court. The use in this case of a summary judgment proceeding to invalidate 
Wyoming Constitution requirements and guarantees is, in my opinion, unnecessary 
and inappropriate.

[¶81]   The first decisional examination made 
by the majority was whether an alleged defamatory statement "purports to state 
or imply `actual facts about an individual.'" Maj. op. at 914 (quoting Milkovich 
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 
2706-07, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990)). I find that inquiry and the coordinate concerns 
of the majority opinion to be, in totality, factual determinations and, 
consequently, not subject to resolution under the established rules of this 
court for summary judgment. Cordova, 719 P.2d 625. It should be clearly understood that the issue of this case is not 
whether the statements are determinatively actionable as a matter of law, but 
whether the statements cannot be actionable in any circumstance consequently 
justifying summary judgment disposition. Unfortunately, this court's opinion 
applies the matter of law summary judgment resolution by a comprehensive factual 
issue evaluation. Combining the two alternatives for a grant of summary judgment 
only logically results in a totally invalid conclusion. The majority first 
outlines the scope of expected factual issues:

[A] 
court must scrutinize the type of language used, the meaning of the statement in 
context, whether the statement is verifiable, and the broader social 
circumstances in which the statement was made.

Maj. 
op. at 914. The majority then follows with a detailed factual 
analysis:

The 
type of language used.

     The kind of language used 
may signal readers that a writer is not purporting to state or imply actual, 
known facts. * * * Clearly falling into this category are Hustler's statements 
characterizing Dworkin as: "`little guy' militant lesbian feminist," a 
"shit-squeezing sphincter in her own right," "one of the most foul-mouthed, 
abrasive manhaters on Earth," a "repulsive presence," "a cry-baby who can dish 
out criticism but clearly can't take it," "Spence's foaming-at-the-mouth 
client," and "a censor."

Id. at 
914-915. Having exercised this factual review conceptual interpretation, the 
majority then answers: "Under prevailing constitutional First Amendment 
safeguards, that language cannot, as a matter of law, form the basis for a 
defamation claim." Id. at 915.

[¶82]   Next examined is: "The meaning of the statement in context." This legal 
application of a factual review is considered when the majority factually 
applies:

     Certain formats - 
editorials, reviews, political cartoons, monthly features - signal the average 
reader to expect a departure from what is actually known by the writer as fact. 
As explained in another case, "[t]he reasonable reader who peruses [a] column on 
the editorial or Op-Ed page is fully aware that the statements found there are 
not `hard' news like those printed on the front page or elsewhere in the news 
sections of the newspaper." Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S. Ct. 2662, 
86 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1985). * * *

     The Hustler article appears 
under the heading "Bits and Pieces" and is a regular monthly feature. The tone 
of the article is pointed, exaggerated and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric 
invoking first amendment principles. We are convinced that the average reader is 
fully aware that the statements found there are not "hard news." Readers of that 
magazine expect that Hustler's writers will make strong opinionated statements 
in that column, a recognized home of opinion and comment. That proposition is 
inherent in the very notion of a regularly appearing "Bits and Pieces" page 
which is akin to an editorial page.

Maj. 
op. at 915.

[¶83]   From this totally directed factual 
analysis in appellate review, the next topic, "Verifiability of the statements," reaches further for 
appellate adjudicatory fact finding. Id. at 915.

[¶84]   Continuing to apply the broad concepts 
of summary judgment adjudication, my objection to what is done does not end here 
since the search factually expands beyond the printed record within the topic of 
"The broader social circumstances in which the statement 
was made." Id. at 916. The context is stated: 
"The importance of social context has been recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court," and then the factual conclusion to determine that dismissal is 
proper is sequentially stated:

Dworkin is an antipornography activist whose activities are 
in the form of public advocacy and direct political involvement. She 
participated in the drafting of the Indianapolis antipornography 
ordinance that was enacted and then held unconstitutional. * * * Hustler's Bits and Pieces article is an ad hominem attack against an advocate of a social, 
moral and political viewpoint contrary to Hustler's. The statements in question 
were uttered in the context of an ongoing debate in which Dworkin seeks to 
destroy the industry of which Hustler is a part. In response, Hustler seeks to 
destroy Dworkin's viewpoint by vilifying its advocate. In such a heated and 
spirited confrontation, of which the statements are a part, abusive epithets, 
exaggerated rhetoric and hysterical hyperbole are expected.

Id.

[¶85]   Four statements are then examined 
"which appear more likely to be objectively capable of proof or disproof." 
Id.

[¶86]   The majority then tells us:

     The four statements are: 
Dworkin is a "lesbian"; when Indianapolis contemplated 
an antiporn ordinance co-authored by her, supporters asked her to "stay away for 
fear her repulsive presence would kill it"; Dworkin "advocates bestiality, 
incest and sex with children"; and Dworkin initiated a "nuisance suit" against 
Hustler. We consider these statements in the light of Dworkin's legal burden of 
having to prove with convincing clarity not only the falsity of the statements, 
but also that Hustler uttered them with knowledge of the falsity or in reckless 
disregard for the truth.

Id. at 
916-917.

[¶87]   The majority then states, which defines 
the keynote for my attack on this summary judgment decision: "As shall be seen, 
Dworkin has not satisfied her burden in this summary 
judgment setting." Id. at 917 (emphasis 
added). Overtly missing is the initially emplaced burden of the movant to either 
show that disposition is proper as a matter of law or that no material factual 
issues exist. The first burden in application of Wyoming summary judgment concepts 
does not properly fall on a respondent.

[¶88]   The misapplication of the burden makes 
a point which could be continued through the balance of the majority opinion. 
The summary judgment had not been initially granted by the trial court or now 
approved by this tribunal as a matter of law except after judicial reference and 
analysis to the compelling and comprehensive factual conflicts. This is a stage 
six, Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 636, summary judgment where conflicting facts are 
actually analyzed to then be determined by a favorable inference based upon the 
implication that no genuine issue is present. I cannot find that conclusion to 
properly follow from this recitation by even the wildest adaptation of the 
English language. The criteria for granting summary judgment is comprehensively 
and clearly defined by this court and cannot by any means be satisfied within 
this profusely demonstrated, factually conflicting appellate record.

[¶89]   This leads to my conclusion that the 
jury-directed fact finding function detailed in the Wyoming Constitution has 
been turned upside down. Summary judgment in this case becomes a trial mechanism 
for the fact finder trial judge and appellate court to become lawmaker, judge 
and jury regarding the solemn subjects of both freedom of speech and damage for 
libel addressed in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20. If the evidentiary status was that 
well-determined and self-evident, it would seem certain that the jury can 
properly decide. The constitutionally constituted jury, with proper instruction, 
should reliably be expected to answer the demands of justice without preemption 
by a summary judgment decision. The only escape from this inevitable certainty 
is for the judiciary to avoid incursion into fact finding and to leave decision 
making to legal concepts. The majority here decides that under no circumstances 
or character of events can actionable libel be established by writings at issue 
in this litigation. If this is not true, we just turn the judiciary into the 
fact finder for it to slide into a conclusionary and reference comparison making 
instrumentality for all final fact finding for Wyoming defamation cases. I do not 
accept this to be procedurally correct or constitutionally valid.

[¶90]   Stripped of its complexities and the 
significant academic direction of analysis, this majority opinion simply tests 
the validity and consequent constitutionality under the United States 
Constitution of a firm and certain provision adopted by the founders of this 
state at the constitutional convention in 1889. I do not so lightly abandon the 
Wyoming Constitution to summary judgment adjudicative disposition. I find value 
in retaining the civil liability defenses which are constitutionally stated for 
this jurisdiction that "the truth, when published with good intent [for] 
justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense * * *." Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
20.

[¶91]   To first review the Wyoming cases, I would not find 
Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1117 
(Wyo. 1985) to be faintly comparable 
where the issue there presented was essentially whether appellant was "wrestled 
to the ground." Since the appellant was essentially "wrestled to the ground," no 
factual issue was presented. Id. at 1117. That status cannot be 
compared to this case. Nor do I find the call-in radio broadcast portrayed in 
Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976) to be relevant authority. Recognizing that the case itself 
was a political decision relating to an alleged political figure, the validity 
of the statement of the anonymous caller was first, unexpected and, second, not 
knowingly untrue by the radio station when broadcast. Obviously, the appellate 
court in the case opted to favor call-in programs over possible derogatory 
comments by anonymous participants. That situation cannot be accurately related 
to the events of this deliberate publication thoughtfully prepared in 
considerable detail for which the fact finding exercise of present adjudication 
is employed.

[¶92]   Similarly, Spriggs v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947) 
provides no summary judgment justification or persuasion since the case was 
determined by a jury verdict. John J. Spriggs, a participant in significant 
litigation, was an anathema to the members of the Wyoming Supreme Court, but at 
least the decision making, fact finding process was retained for jury 
examination. Williams v. Blount, 741 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1987) and Oil, Chemical and 
Atomic Workers Intern. Union v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d 283 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 488 U.S. 821, 109 S. Ct. 65, 102 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1988) did not raise the constitutional 
question and likewise cannot provide authority for summary judgment inversion of 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20.

[¶93]   This leaves MacGuire v. Harriscope 
Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1980) for discussion. In 
MacGuire, the issue was the existence of sufficient indicia of malice to defeat 
summary judgment. Conversely, for this present case, the actual existence of 
malice could hardly be questioned. We do not have here a contested malice case, 
we have a case where, despite malice, we are asked to determine whether First 
Amendment rights as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court supplement 
the dual interests of free speech and responsibility for misuse constructed into 
the Wyoming constitutional provision, 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20. Furthermore, I would join with Justice Rooney in his 
special concurrence in MacGuire to follow his justified understanding of the 
basic nature of summary judgment and the disingenuous result if certain cases 
are casually excluded from its specifically established criteria and 
limitations. Justice Rooney said: "If there is a `genuine issue as to any 
material fact,' a trial should be had to resolve it. The plaintiff ought not be 
required to prove his case at the summary judgment stage. He need only establish 
that there is an issue of material fact." MacGuire, 612 P.2d  at 841. 
Furthermore, he accurately added for determination of malice:

"In 
reviewing an appeal from the granting of a summary judgment and in determining 
the existence of a genuine issue of material facts, the court must inquire from 
the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Timmons v. Reed, 
Wyo., 569 P.2d 112 (1977). Facts 
asserted by such party and supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material 
must be taken as true, Trautwein v. Leavey, Wyo., 472 P.2d 776 (1970), and 
be given every favorable inference, which may be reasonably and fairly drawn 
from them, Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 
(1976)."

MacGuire, 612 P.2d  at 841, Rooney, J., specially 
concurring. To be complete for Wyoming case law analysis, the political handbill 
case of Phifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1968), involving campaign disputes between public officials, can 
hardly be found to be applicable here where the differentiated malice issue 
predominated in the decision made.

[¶94]   I share with Justice Rooney a 
disinclination to create a general exception in defamation cases for the 
utilization of summary judgment. MacGuire, 612 P.2d  at 840. However, I take that 
concern further in my analysis to look directly at the clear language of the 
Wyoming Constitution. I conclude that for defamation cases, we not only rewrite 
summary judgment concepts but also determine that the applicable Wyoming constitutional provision 
regarding freedom of the press, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20, is constitutionally 
invalid under the constraints of the Constitution of the United 
States. I find that opinion neither necessary 
nor appropriate. I take this position without legal embarrassment while 
recognizing that the requirements established by interpretation of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution are controlling upon the state court 
by virtue of the application of the incorporation doctrine through enforcement 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931).

[¶95]   We are presented an interpretative 
responsibility which clearly embraces the differentiated concepts addressed by 
this court in Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d 214. If clear and specific language means anything, the Wyoming constitutional provision 
cannot be reconciled with the decision this court now makes. Conversely, if I 
follow the pathway now taken by this present majority in utilizing a historical 
perspective, I likewise find the applied principles to be fallacious.2

[¶96]   I follow a perception gained through a 
close examination of both the initiating history and the specific language of 
the Wyoming constitutional provision. 
Its adaptation and utilization need take us no further than to determine that 
defamation provides an application for summary judgment identical to and not 
more easily provided than exists for any other civil litigation. The same 
standard should be followed. Contrarily, this majority now takes a 
constitutional provision and upends it by application of a differentiated 
concept of summary judgment which leads the trial judge and the appellate 
tribunal to make the fact finding decisions required for adjudicatory 
resolution. 

[¶97]   Legal historians trace the ancestry of 
the Wyoming constitutional provision in 
adopted style to Chapter 60 of 32 George III, enacted in 1792 and known by the 
title of "Fox's Libel Act". Entitled "An Act to Remove Doubts Respecting the 
Function of Juries in Cases of Libel," the purpose answered was to require a 
finite jury decision in criminal libel proceedings. The Act assured an actual 
jury decision and limited the prior process wherein the scope of decision by the 
jury was constrained and the real decision was made by the court as a matter of 
law. See Oakes v. State, 98 Miss. 80, 54 So. 79 
(1910). See also Annotation, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 207 (1911) and Annotation, 51 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 369 (1914).

[¶98]   Although Fox's Libel Act originally 
addressed only criminal libel proceedings, in due time through early 
constitutional conventions and then clear identification in the Western states, 
the provision applied equally to either civil or criminal proceedings. That law 
and the American constitutional provisions which followed were intended to 
clarify the preeminence in fact finding left for the jury's consideration and 
verdict. This history cannot be properly applied to demean and diminish or 
extinguish the use of the jury for fact finding decision. Not so surprisingly, 
until recent time, that understanding of the purview of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20 
did not create a question of a differentiated status regarding summary judgment 
from the usual civil case.

[¶99]   The majority similarly misunderstands 
the context of case law in adjoining states regarding these constitutional 
provisions. The burden of those cases, which will be considered in later review, 
was not to establish a differentiated class for defamation cases where summary 
judgment becomes more appropriate. It was rather to define the integration of 
the constitutional provisions to guarantee the similar right to trial by jury in 
for defamation.

[¶100] 
The historical underpinnings of American law relating to nonsuit/summary 
judgment criteria are well established and firmly defined in relating to the 
disparate function of the jury to make the fact finding and the judge to 
determine issues of law. That rule is: if there is some evidence to sustain the 
plaintiff's case, the weight and sufficiency is to be passed upon by the jury. 
Hornsby v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 26 S.C. 187, 1 S.E. 594 (1887); Lingenfelter 
v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 9 Ky.L.Rptr. 116, 4 S.W. 185 (1887). See also 
Eaton v. Lancaster, 79 Me. 477, 10 A. 449, 449 
(1887) ("If there was any evidence which, if believed by the jury, would 
authorize a verdict for the plaintiff, a nonsuit should not have been 
ordered.").

[¶101] 
These firmly established principles of general law were also equally 
applied to the defamation case. State constitutional provisions or statutory 
enactments which adopted the thesis of Fox's Libel Act are considered not to 
eliminate, but rather to assure the responsibility of the court to provide 
instructions on the law and to assure that fact finding was retained by the 
jury. Perhaps the most exhaustive case, Oakes, 54 So. 79, pursued this concept 
with a detailed examination of prior English cases. Clearly recognized in detail 
of numerous cases is the difference between libel per se and libel per quod. If 
the statement was determined to be libelous as a matter of law, the fact finding 
exercise by the jury was appropriately diminished. If the subject was libel per 
quod, the determinative obligation of the court was equally constrained. The 
difference in defamation cases is the additional requirement for libel per quod 
to require special damages to be actionable. Boucher v. Clark Pub. Co., 14 S.D. 72, 84 N.W. 237 (1900). In quoting 
a much earlier English case, the Mississippi court in Oakes 
recognized with approval in regard to libel per se:

"Libel is a question of law, and the judge is the judge of 
the law in libel as in all other cases; the jury having the power of acting 
agreeably to his statement of the law or not. All that the statute does is to 
prevent the question from being left to the jury in the narrow way in which it 
was left before that time [passage of the statute of George III]. The jury was 
then only to find the fact of the publication, and the truth of the innuendoes; 
for the judges used to tell them that the intent was an inference of law, to be 
drawn from the paper, with which the jury had nothing to do. The Legislature has 
said that it is not so, but that the whole case is to be left for the 
jury."

Oakes, 54 So.  at 81 (quoting Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. & A. 
131, 1 How.St.Trials (N.S.) 1).

[¶102] 
Oakes provides a detailed discussion of this understanding which clearly 
recognized defamation to be identical in adaptation with other civil 
actions:

     The enactment of this 
statute was largely influenced by the argument of Alexander Hamilton in the case 
of People v. Croswell, [3 Johns.Cas. 365 (N.Y.)], supra, and by the opinion of 
Chancellor Kent rendered in 
the case. Hamilton only 
contended for the right of juries in libel cases to render a verdict as broad as 
the issue involved, and this contention was upheld by Chancellor 
Kent in the opinion 
rendered by him in the case. This provision was incorporated into our first 
Constitution, adopted in 1817, while this controversy over the rights of juries 
in libel cases was fresh in the minds of all men conversant with the then recent 
history of this country and of England. Had this 
controversy never arisen, there would have been no necessity for the adoption of 
this provision. Since the controversy centered around the rights of juries to 
render a general verdict in libel cases, as broad and comprehensive as such a 
verdict is in all other criminal cases, the conclusion is irresistible that its 
adoption was for the purpose of settling the right of juries so to do, and not 
to confer upon them the right to determine the law for themselves without the 
assistance, or against the direction, of the court. Indeed, any doubt on this 
point ought to be removed by the language of the Constitution itself, for it 
does not simply provide that the jury shall determine the law and the facts, but 
provides that it shall do this "under the direction of the court." State v. 
Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 25 A. 964, 19 L.R.A. 145, 36 
Am.St.Rep. 775, 790; Com. v. Anthes, 5 Gray (Mass.) 185; Drake v. State, 53 
N.J.Law 23, 20 A. 747; 2 McClain's Cr.Law, § 1070; 3 Greenleaf, Evidence, § 179; 
Com. v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, 21 A. 1018, 22 A. 761, 14 L.R.A. 89; State v. 
Syphrett, 27 S.C. 29, 2 S.E. 624, 13 Am.St.Rep. 617; Brown v. State, 40 
Ga. 689; Edwards v. State, 
53 Ga. 428; Sparf v. 
U.S., 
156 U.S. 51, 15 Sup.Ct. 273, 
39 L. Ed. 343; Cooley's Const.Lim. (7th Ed.) 665; Franklin v. State, 12 
Md. 236; Harris v. State, 
75 Tenn. 538.

     If juries have the right to 
determine the law of libel for themselves, free from the control of the court, 
the result would be not only that the law would be uncertain, because of the 
different views which different juries might take of it, but their judgment of 
the law, however erroneous, would be final; for in that event neither the trial 
court nor this court would have any right to review same, and could grant no 
relief to a defendant, however erroneously he may have been convicted. The court 
would have no right to decide any question of law which might arise on the 
trial, by demurrer or otherwise. Should a citizen, under this construction of 
the Constitution, be indicted for libel, and the matter charged to be such be 
never so harmless or lawful, the court would be powerless to prevent his 
conviction and punishment, should the jury decide that, in its judgment, the 
matter charged was libelous. The jury would be the judge of the meaning of the 
Constitution and the statutes, whether statutes were valid, what the common law 
is, what the law of privilege is - in short, of all questions of law which could 
arise on the trial.

Oakes, 54 So.  at 82-83.

[¶103] 
It is said in Harrington v. Butte Miner Co., 48 Mont. 550, 139 P. 451, 452 (1914) (quoting Odgers, Libel and Slander 604 (2d ed.)): "`The 
judge, of course, may still direct the jury on any point of law, stating his own 
opinion thereon, if he thinks fit; but the question of libel or no libel must 
ultimately be decided by the jury.'" See also Annotation, supra, 51 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) at 371.

[¶104] 
To be repetitive, the substance of these cases was not whether summary 
judgment or nonsuit could ever be granted when issues of fact did not exist, but 
rather if issues of fact did exist appropriate to the law, then the jury 
decision was required. An early text states that principle in the following 
fashion:

The 
court will generally direct judgment of nonsuit to be entered for the 
defendant:

     (1) If there is no evidence 
that the defendant published the words at all, or (if the statute of limitations 
be pleaded) that he did so within the period prescribed.

     (2) If there is no evidence 
that the words refer to the plaintiff.

     (3) If the words proved are 
not actionable per se, and there is no evidence of any special 
damage.

     (4) If the words are 
actionable by reason only of their being spoken of the plaintiff in the way of 
his office, profession or trade, and there is no evidence that the words were so 
spoken, or that the plaintiff held such office or exercised such profession or 
trade at the time of publication.

     (5) If the words are not 
actionable in their natural and primary signification, and there is no innuendo; 
or if the only innuendo puts upon the words a meaning that they cannot possibly 
bear. If, however, it is reasonably conceivable that those addressed might by 
reason of any facts known to them have put upon the words the secondary meaning 
ascribed to them by the innuendo, then it will be a question for the jury in 
which meaning the words were in fact understood. Whenever the words, though 
primarily not actionable, are yet reasonably susceptible of a defamatory 
meaning, the court will not as a rule grant the motion for a nonsuit. "It is 
only when the judge is satisfied that the publication cannot be a libel, and 
that, if it is found by the jury to be such, their verdict will be set aside, 
that he is justified in withdrawing the question from their cognizance." Where 
the words of the libel are ambiguous, allegorical, or in any way equivocal, and 
the jury have found that they were meant and used in a defamatory sense, the 
court will not set aside their verdict, unless it can be clearly shown that, on 
reading the whole passage, there is no possible ground for the construction put 
upon it by the jury. But where the words are not reasonably capable of any 
defamatory meaning, there the judge will be right in directing a 
nonsuit.

Mason H. Newell, The Law of Slander and Libel § 718, at 
802-03 (4th ed. 1924) (quoting Kelly, C.G. in Cox v. Lee, L.R., 4 Ex. 288) 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶105] 
The even more recent cases found from decisions in adjoining 
jurisdictions have not ignored these general principles. Griffin v. Opinion Pub. Co., 114 
Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580 (1943) was determined on the basis that the statement was not libelous 
per se and, lacking allegations of special damage, the complaint failed to state 
an actionable claim. Springer v. Swift, 59 S.D. 208, 239 N.W. 171 (1931) 
recognized that at least for South Dakota, the Fox's Libel Act and the 
constitutional provisions that followed applied only to libel in that 
jurisdiction and did not include slander. Brodsky v. Journal Publishing Co., 73 
S.D. 343, 42 N.W.2d 855 (1950) recognized that if an article was not libelous 
per se, special damages must be alleged. That court further found that for libel 
per se, the plaintiff must be clearly identified in the challenged publication. 
That case did recognize where, however, an article alleged to be libelous is 
susceptible of different interpretations, one of which is defamatory and the 
other not, a question for the jury is presented. The only question resolved was 
whether the published article was libelous per se. The same understanding is 
provided in Spriggs, 63 Wyo. at 437, 182 P.2d  at 
808 (quoting 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 955 (8th ed)):

     "Nevertheless, we conceive 
it to be proper, and indeed the duty of the judge, to instruct the jury upon the 
law in these cases, and it is to be expected that they will generally adopt and 
follow his opinion.

     "Where, however, the 
constitution provides that they shall be judges of the law `as in other cases,' 
or may determine the law and the fact `under the direction of the court,' we 
must perhaps conclude that the intention has been simply to put libel cases on 
the same footing with any other criminal prosecutions, and that the jury will be 
expected to receive the law from the court."

[¶106] 
The basic determinate and foundational issue in this appeal considers 
whether the characterized constitutional revolution for defamation stated to 
result from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) essentially eliminates jury involvement. See Clarence 
Morris, Modern Defamation Law ch. 2 and ch. 3 (1978). See also Ella Cooper 
Thomas, The Law of Libel and Slander and Related Action, ch. IX, at 55 (1973). 
The Sullivan clear and convincing evidentiary test came in more recent times to 
be joined, in the federal court system, with an evolutionary change for summary 
judgment. Within the current purview of the United States Supreme Court in 
denigrating rights to trial and jury in the Triad cases, Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505 was broadly phrased as a summary judgment decision and directly involved a 
Sullivan perspective of defamation.

[¶107] 
Liberty Lobby, Inc. has not been accepted as a procedural reconstruction 
of Wyoming summary judgment law. 
However, the context and concepts advanced in this majority opinion cause 
concern that by indirection, something new has been created without stated 
intention, either by defining a separate category of defamation summary judgment 
or embracing a change in basic Wyoming summary judgment law. See 
Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 12.07[3][b], at 12-35 (1992) in discussion 
of the convincing clarity requirement for proof of actual malice and the summary 
judgment requirement of disproof by the respondent derived from Liberty Lobby, 
Inc.3

[¶108] 
When we pass through the sweep of current American defamation and First 
Amendment media cases involving the United States Constitution, starting with 
the incorporation doctrine application of the United States Constitution to 
state decisions by the Fourteenth Amendment in Stromberg, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, and continuing to Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., ___ 
U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 
115 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1991), we pass by a course of guide posts or obstructive cases 
along that case law pathway. Overtly, we recognize the case of the new 
revolution, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710; observe the application of Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S. Ct. 209, 
13 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1964); acknowledge the application to civil litigation of Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1226, 103 S. Ct. 1233, 75 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1983); understand the confusion 
emanating from Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n. 9, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 n. 9, 61 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1979); pass by Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 91 S. Ct. 633, 28 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1971); and then come to Masson, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2419. Within this process, I do not ignore Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695 to 
ask: what answer does it provide? The majority in Milkovich determined that all 
but one of the incidents reflected in the misquotations involved issues of fact. 
The dissent authored by Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, 
found a further issue of fact in the last misquotation. That direction can 
hardly justify the adjudicatory fact finding summary judgment decision required 
to favor Hustler Magazine here.

[¶109] 
Careful, comprehensive and detailed analysis of malice, malice in fact, 
malice implied, malice that is something else, willful misconduct, gross 
negligence, ordinary negligence, Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292, 
299 (1975), intentional misstatement, and so forth, can provide, as it has, a 
world of topics for law journal analysis. In recent review, see Paul D. Driscoll 
& Kyu Ho Youm, Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton: The U.S. Supreme 
Court's Application of the Actual Malice Rule, 14 Comm. and the Law 57 (1992). 
See also Kate Silbaugh, Sticks and Stones Can Break My Name: Nondefamatory 
Negligent Injury to Reputation, 59 U.Chi.L.Rev. 865 (1992). The point resulting 
from this review, however, despite the Triad cases and their non-jury trial 
concepts, is that in Masson, the United States Supreme Court required the 
factual review to be resolved in a reordered jury trial decision.

[¶110] 
Appropriate limitations on the exercise of "free speech" are recognized 
in current cases. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 
119 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1992) and Zarsky v. State, 827 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App. 1992). 
Likewise, the courts have recognized that fact finding in assessing any First 
Amendment limitation - for this case compensatory defamation liability - should 
be left (as the Wyoming Constitution actually requires) with the jury. That 
recognition in Masson, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2419 
has support from other cases. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 
Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975) 
provides a similar result by an ordered retrial for the jury decision. Goldwater 
v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1049, 90 S. Ct. 701, 
24 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1970) approved denial of initial summary judgment and affirmed 
the resulting jury verdict in that libel litigation. Cf. Southard v. Forbes, 
Inc., 588 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 832, 100 S. Ct. 62, 62 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1979), where Judge Thornberry, in dissent, 
recognized the jury question presented in similar thought with the statement of 
Justice Rooney in his special concurrence in MacGuire, 612 P.2d  at 
840.

[¶111] 
Furthermore, when summary judgment is emplaced for disposition through 
its affidavit and deposition review, we do not have the full record from which 
an adequate appellate examination to assess evidentiary sufficiency can be made. 
See, conversely, Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984); and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 966, 88 S. Ct. 2036, 20 L. Ed. 2d 880 (1968).

[¶112] 
We should be reminded that the comfort provided by the Wyoming 
Constitution has, for this past century, sufficed admirably. We should then ask 
ourselves: what is there in this continuum of United States Supreme Court 
decisions to now justify a Fourteenth Amendment due process determinate 
requiring invalidation of one of our constitution's very significant provisions? 
Again stated, that provision is:

     Every person may freely 
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, 
when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be a 
sufficient defense, the jury having the right to determine the facts and the 
law, under direction of the court.

Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 20.

[¶113] 
Directly stated, segment four of the majority opinion determined that good motives and for justifiable ends should be 
disregarded and discarded in the defamation case as criteria for liability or 
the absence thereof. Maj. op. at 920. I cannot find that resolution in 
Wyoming constitutional 
reconstruction to be ordered by persuasive case law in the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. That precedent, in my opinion, does not justify or 
require invalidation of the constitutional provisions of Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 20 
regarding both free speech and responsibility for defamation. I will not invite 
bad faith and unjustifiable ends to be stuck on the 
Wyoming Constitution like barnacles to provide a wrongdoer immunity from 
defamation and misconduct.

[¶114] 
Overtly, obviously and without any question, if I engage in a similar 
degree of fact finding, Hustler and its principals acted with the highest degree 
of intended malice, bad faith and viciousness. No semblance of good faith and 
honest motive is to be portrayed. I envision the Wyoming Constitution as 
retaining a factor of validity that truth, good faith 
and honest intent do have a significance for determination of immunity 
applied judicially to the perverted Hustler material embodied here. 
Consequently, the singularly defined, constitutionally clear and unquestioned 
responsibility of the jury in defamation and libel cases surely should not be 
ignominiously discarded by any appellate rewriting of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

[¶115] 
I agree with the balanced relationship between freedom to write and 
responsibility for willful and significantly negligent harm:

     The constitutionally 
recognized interest of the individual in his reputation is not and can not be 
measured solely in terms of monetary compensation. At the least, the individual 
has an interest in preserving and restoring his reputation through an 
authoritative and publicly known determination that an injurious statement about 
him is in fact false. To foreclose or restrict the availability of the judicial 
process as a means of securing such a determination prevents the individual from 
obtaining the effective vindication to which he is entitled.

Troman, 340 N.E.2d  at 297.

[¶116] 
I dissent because of an unwillingness to accept this trial by affidavit 
for adjudicatory fact finding processes in a defamation case. In the even more 
basic concept, I would firmly contend that the mandatory text of the Wyoming Constitution should not 
be denied, discarded or rejected by any decision made on the subject by summary 
judgment. If a libel suit resulting from obscene personal attacks printed on the 
pages of Hustler Magazine cannot, in the Wyoming state court system, be 
accommodated within the text of the Wyoming Constitution requiring a dual 
respect of free press and responsibility for misconduct, I would leave 
supersession of our constitution for action by the federal courts. I do not find 
it necessary for us to do it. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57, 91 S. Ct. 1811, 1826, 29 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971), White, J. concurring in the judgment. 
Absolute immunity should not be required to cultivate activated health in our 
media and guarantee their full First Amendment exercise of the right of 
communication. "`Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the 
First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further 
proliferation.'" Time, Inc., 401 U.S.  at 292, 91 S. Ct.  at 640 (quoting 
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1326, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1968)). I am even more emphatically convinced that 
the mechanism of decision should not be summary judgment as a substitute for the 
thoughtful analysis of citizens as our peers through the jury trial. Goodness, 
badness, good faith and demonstrated malice are not such esoteric concepts that 
only the judiciary, and not even the media, is afforded the opportunity and 
responsibility to differentiate.

[¶117] 
Consequently, I would like to invite a trial where Hustler has the 
opportunity to prove either good faith or validity or to pay the price if unable 
to convince the examining jury. If that cannot suffice as guide-posts of Wyoming 
behavior within our state's constitutional concepts, I would require the United 
States Supreme Court to be the first to then have the duty of rewriting our 
state constitution.

[¶118] 
Consequently, I dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 
These defendants will frequently be referred to in the singular as "Hustler": 
L.F.P., INC., a California corporation, also sometimes designated as LFP, Inc., 
L.F.P., Inc., a California corporation d/b/a Larry Flynt Publications; Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., a California corporation; Larry Flynt, a citizen of California; 
The Conservatorship of Larry Flynt, L.A. Superior Court # P688238, Jimmy Flynt, 
Conservator; Althea Flynt; Flynt Subscription Company, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation; Island Distributing Company, Ltd., a B.W.I. company; LFZ, Ltd., a 
B.W.I. company; Flynt Distributing Company, Inc., a California corporation; 
Inland Empire Periodicals, an Oregon corporation; Park Place Market Inc., a 
Wyoming corporation.

2  Freedom of speech and press; libel; truth a 
defense. - Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and in all trials for 
libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good intent and 
[for] justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense, the jury having the right 
to determine the facts and the law, under the direction of the 
court.

Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 20.

3 
"[F]reedom of speech and of the press - which are protected by the first 
amendment from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal 
rights and `liberties' protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment from impairment by the states." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 630, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 1145 (1925).

4 
Justice Robert F. Utter of the Washington Supreme Court has co-authored a 
particularly helpful article for the practicing lawyer on formulating and 
presenting a state constitutional argument. See Robert F. Utter and SanfordE. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional 
Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind.L.Rev. 635-77 (1987). See 
Appendix A to this opinion for a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, list of law 
review articles on the subject of interpretation of state 
constitutions.

5 
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l, 748 P.2d 283 (Wyo. 1987); Williams v. Blount, 741 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1987); MacGuire v. Harriscope 
Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1980); 
McMurry v. Howard Publications, Inc., 612 P.2d 14 (Wyo. 1980); Adams v. Frontier 
Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976); 
Phifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 41 A.L.R.3d 
1078 (Wyo. 1968).

6 
Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio. See Spriggs, 63 Wyo. at 429-37, 182 P.2d  at 
805-08.

7 
Idaho:

Constitution ratified November 5, 1889. Idaho admitted to the Union, July 3, 1890; the constitution 
became effective the same day.

Montana:

Constitution ratified October 1, 1889. Montana admitted to the Union, November 8, 1889; the constitution 
became effective the same day.

North Dakota:

Constitution ratified October 1, 1889. North Dakota admitted to the Union, November 2, 1889; the 
constitution became effective the same day.

South Dakota:

Constitution ratified October 1, 1889. South Dakota admitted to the Union, November 2, 1889; the 
constitution became effective the same day.

Washington:

Constitution ratified October 1889. Washington admitted to the Union, November 11, 1889; the constitution 
became effective the same day.

Charles Kettleborough, Ph.D., The State Constitutions 
(1918).

8 
S.D.Const. art. 6, § 5:

Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. In all trials for 
libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published, with good motives and 
for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense. The jury shall have the 
right to determine the facts and the law under the direction of the 
court.

9 
Mont.Const. art. II, § 7:

No 
law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free 
to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible 
for all abuse of that liberty; and that in all suits and prosecutions for libel, 
the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and the jury, under the direction of 
the court, shall determine the law and the facts.

10 
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413-14 (Wyo. 1990).

11 The 
First Amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law * * * 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *."

12 See 
Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 68-70 (Wyo. 1992) (Golden, J., dissenting, 
for a discussion of the origins and meaning of Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 
8).

13 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1561, 
89 L. Ed. 2d 783, 790 (1986) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.  at 272, 84 S. Ct.  at 
721, 11 L. Ed. 2d  at 701, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964)).

14 The 
writing appeared in Volume 4, number 2, the Second Wave, and is entitled, "What 
is Lesbian Pride." At the end of the writing, the reader is informed that it was 
delivered "at the rally for Lesbian Pride Week, Central Park, June 28, 1975 * * * sponsored by 
Lesbian Feminist Liberation."

15 Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 37 
and art. 21, § 24. See also Doe v. Burk, 513 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1973).

  

 
 

FOOTNOTES for the Dissent

1 A 
rank amateur would recognize that a major war, which will be determinative of 
the American civil justice delivery system, is being waged around summary 
judgment. The idiom of this time is anything to avoid trial and, even more so, a 
jury trial. See, for example, the President's Council for Competitiveness, 
Agenda for Civil Justice Reform, which would require the trial court to make an 
exclusive finding of fact (based on affidavits and whatnot) before summary judgment could be denied. The 
presumptiveness of the recommendation is that summary judgment should be granted 
and that reason is required to reject. Avoiding jury consideration at all costs 
is clearly apparent from this source and other major movers who seek to 
reconstruct the American judicial system. See Finding 8, p. 20, Table of 
Recommendations, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform. See also Clermont & 
Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L.Rev. 
1178 (1992).

2 It 
is recognized that utilization of history for interpretation of a constitutional 
provision or a statutory enactment is under review and attack to a greater 
extent at the present time than has ever previously occurred. Sable 
Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 130, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2839, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1989), Scalia, J., concurring; Green v. Bock 
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527, 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989), Scalia, J., 
concurring; Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and 
Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 Duke L.J. 160 
(1990); Richard Nagareda, Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice 
Antonin Scalia, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 705 (1987). Cf. John Paul Stevens, Essay, The 
Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1373, 1381 (1992). 
See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: 
An Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex.L.Rev. 1073 (1992).

3 The 
argument favoring availability of summary judgment in the defamation case has a 
striking resemblance to the broad scope attack on the American tort system, 
particularly resulting from medical malpractice cases. A text which yields to a 
clearly pro-media basis, Smolla, supra, § 12.07[1][b], at 12-32.3 (quoting 
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 954 
(D.D.C. 1976)), recognizes:

     Suits against the media 
often chill first amendment freedoms because of the huge costs attendant to 
carrying a defense through trial. * * * Summary judgment was thought of as a 
screening device particularly useful in first amendment cases as a tool for 
"shielding the press from harassment."

Persuasive argument by variant special interest groups that 
they should be shielded from exposure to costs of defense from claims of 
misconduct or fault is clearly not an unexplored phenomenon in current American 
adjudicatory developments. Efforts to federalize products liability is clearly 
the most pertinent present example. See President's Council on Competitiveness, 
The Agenda for Civil Justice Reform. Extremely short statutes of limitation for 
professional liability and specialty actions like defamation are apparently not 
found to be acceptable alternatives. That continued anxiety has now brought many 
specialized economic interests of this nation to seek success by a legislative 
agenda where the litigative results were dissatisfying.

A 
fair evaluation was provided by Morris, supra, ch. 6, at 62-63:

     The satisfying gains 
achieved in the freedoms of speech and press have been accompanied by a less 
welcome loss. Many innocent victims of vilification who could formerly go to law 
for vindication and compensation no longer have legal remedies. Furthermore, the 
majority of defamers who are advised that they will probably not be held liable 
for publishing a particular slur are not likely to go overboard in making 
detailed, prominent, and completely exculpatory apologies, if indeed they 
retract at all. Certainly, the immune detractor will seldom be generous to the 
point of compensating his victim for any financial losses caused by the 
canard.

     It is not necessary for me 
to engage in ptolemaics about these major economic, philosophic and political 
trends now swirling like a maelstrom in contemporary American society to support 
my thesis that this court should not effectively disembowel the Wyoming constitutional provision by 
a summary judgment anticipation that it is required in order to meet federal 
First Amendment standards. I do not think that the cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court since Sullivan rewrite Wyoming law to require judiciary 
fact finding, because the topic of contended wrong is defamation and libel. 
Certainly the United States Supreme Court cannot make that imposition upon the 
Wyoming Constitution by direction of the procedural adaptations of Liberty 
Lobby, Inc. and the other two of the Triad cases. Cf. John H. Langbein, On the 
Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 
Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 119 (1992).