Title: STEVEN CHRISTOPHER MATTERN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEVEN CHRISTOPHER MATTERN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 24151 P.3d 1116Case Number: 05-218Decided: 02/13/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
STEVEN 
CHRISTOPHER MATTERN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion 
Yoder, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Yoder.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Morgan.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found the 
appellant guilty of attempted first-degree murder, and the district court 
sentenced him to life in prison.  
This appeal raises questions concerning jury selection, uncharged 
misconduct evidence, the adequacy of the jury instructions, and the sufficiency 
of the evidence.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES1

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the State engage in purposeful 
discrimination when it exercised peremptory challenges to exclude two Hispanics 
from the jury?

 
 
2.   Was character evidence improperly 
admitted at trial?

 
 
3.   Did the district court properly 
instruct the jury as to the elements of the crime of attempted first-degree 
murder?

 
 
4.   Was there sufficient evidence for 
the jury to find the appellant guilty of attempted first-degree 
murder?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant and 
Jenny Abeyta lived together in Rawlins, Wyoming, for about two months before he moved 
out at her request after a dispute.  
On the night of September 10, 2004, the appellant went to Abeyta's house 
and asked her to join him at a bar later that night.  She did not do so.  Several hours later, the appellant and 
his brother, James Mattern, returned to Abeyta's house.  Before getting out of his car, the 
appellant retrieved his single-action Colt .45 automatic pistol and hid it in 
his waistband.  Inside the house 
were Abeyta, her two children, and her mother's boyfriend, Tim 
Snow.

 
 
[¶4]      As he entered the 
house, the appellant was already angry that Abeyta had not come down to the 
bar.2  He became more angry when he saw that 
Snow was there, because he thought Snow and Abeyta "did drugs" together and that 
Snow had "tried to hit on her" in the past.  Almost immediately, an argument erupted 
among the appellant, Abeyta, and Snow.  
It began with the Appellant and Abeyta shouting at one another, and 
escalated to include Snow when the appellant accused Snow of "saying something." 
 The confrontation began in the 
bedroom, proceeded outside, where the appellant and Snow intended to fight at 
the appellant's suggestion, and then went back up the front steps to the front 
door.  Snow retreated into the 
bedroom, at which time the appellant reached past Abeyta and shot Snow.  The appellant and his brother fled the 
scene.  Snow was taken by air 
ambulance to Casper for treatment.  The appellant was arrested several weeks 
later in Tucson, Arizona.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
State engage in purposeful discrimination when it exercised peremptory 
challenges to exclude two Hispanics from the 
jury?

 
 
[¶5]      We will begin 
this discussion with an analysis of the context in which peremptory challenges 
occur.  All jury trials begin, of 
course, with the voir dire process, 
where jurors are examined by counsel for the following 
purposes:

 
 
            
Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(1), the purpose of voir dire is to choose jurors who will be fair 
and impartial:

 
 
In 
Wyoming, the 
purpose of voir dire is to seek to establish grounds for challenge for cause; 
assess any individual bias as to each member of the panel; and to arrive at a 
determination of the potential jurors' ability to decide a case fairly. . . 
.

 
 
            
In accordance with the rule, voir dire is subject to the supervision and 
control of the trial judge.  The 
rulings of the trial judge are given deference within the permissible 
bounds.  The authority of the trial 
court is discretionary and "[t]he only inhibition regarding the discretion of 
the trial court is that it must be exercised subject to the essential demands of 
fairness."  Jahnke [v. State, 682 P.2d 991,] 999 
[(Wyo. 
1984)].

 
 

Law v. 
State, 2004 
WY 111, ¶ 32, 98 P.3d 181, 192-93 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 960 
(Wyo. 
1996)).

 
 
[¶6]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-105 (LexisNexis 2005) sets forth the limited bases upon which a venire 
member may be challenged for cause.  
In addition, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-103(a) (LexisNexis 2005) and 
W.R.Cr.P. 24(d)(1) allow the State and each defendant in a non-capital felony 
criminal jury trial eight peremptory challenges.  Traditionally, peremptory challenges 
could be exercised for any reason or for no reason:

 
 
            
Appellant acknowledges the holding in Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965), to the effect that a defendant could not 
question a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a particular case even 
if the peremptory challenge was allegedly used to discriminate against a 
particular group of persons.  The 
court there said:

 
 
The 
essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without 
a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's 
control.  State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 206 P.2d 1037 (1949); Lewis v. United 
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 
13 S. Ct. 136, 139, 36 L. Ed. 1011 [(1892)].  
While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly 
specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory 
permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily 
designated or demonstrable.  Hayes v. State of Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70, 7 S. Ct. 350, 351, 30 L. Ed. 578 [(1887)].  It is often 
exercised upon the sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt 
to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another,' Lewis, supra 146 U.S., at 376, 13 S.Ct., 
at 138, upon a juror's habits and associations,' Hayes v. State of Missouri, supra, 120 
U.S., at 70, 7 S.Ct., at 351, or upon the feeling that the bare questioning [a 
juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment,' Lewis, supra, 146 U.S., at 376, 13 
S.Ct., at 138.  It is no less 
frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings 
or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or 
affiliations of people summoned for jury duty.

 
 

Evans v. 
State, 653 P.2d 308, 309-10 (Wyo. 1982).

 
 
[¶7]      The "any reason 
or no reason" rule came to an end, however, with the publication of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), overruled in part by 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991).  
Batson, a black man, was convicted by an all-white jury, of certain theft 
offenses, after the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to strike all 
four blacks from the venire.  
Relying upon Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 10 Otto 303, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880), where 
the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution prohibits states from excluding blacks from service as jurors, the 
Court in Batson declared that the 
Equal Protection Clause likewise prohibits state prosecutors from peremptorily 
challenging members of the venire "solely on account of their race or on the 
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider 
the State's case against a black defendant."  Batson, 476 U.S.  at 89, 106 S. Ct.  at 1719.

 
 
[¶8]      A "Batson challenge," as it has come to be 
called, follows a three-step process:  
First, the defendant must establish a prima facie showing of purposeful 
discrimination in the State's exercise of peremptory challenges.  This prima facie showing may be met by 
combining a showing that the defendant is a member of a racial group capable of 
being singled out for differential treatment, with proof of systematic exclusion 
of that racial group from juries over time, or with proof that the facts of the 
particular case show purposeful racial discrimination.  Id., 476 U.S.  at 93-97, 
106 S. Ct.  at 1721-23.  If the 
defendant makes such a prima facie 
showing, the State must then come forward with a "neutral explanation" for 
the exercise of its peremptory challenges.  
While such neutral explanation need not rise to the level of justifying a 
challenge for cause, it must go beyond the assumption that a juror of the same 
race as the defendant would not be impartial, and it must be related to the 
particular facts of the case.  
Id., 476 U.S.  at 97-98, 
106 S. Ct.  at 1723-24.  As the third 
step in the process, the trial judge then determines whether the defendant has 
established purposeful discrimination.  
Id., 476 U.S.  at 98, 106 S. Ct.  at 1724.

 
 
[¶9]      The Batson principles have been refined over 
time.  In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 
364-69, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868-71, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991), for instance, the 
Supreme Court made clear that in reviewing a state trial court's findings on the 
issue of discriminatory intent, the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard 
would apply.  Further, the Court 
re-emphasized that what Batson 
forbids is discriminatory intent, rather than discriminatory 
effect.  Id., 500 U.S.  at 362, 111 S. Ct.  at 1867.  In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995), the Court held that, at the second 
step in the Batson process, the 
State's explanation of its intent need not be persuasive, or even 
plausible.  In other words, all that 
is required is an explanation that is facially valid.  Id.  It is not until the third stepwhere the 
judge is called upon to determine whether the defendant has carried his burden 
of proving purposeful discriminationthat the judge must choose whether to 
believe or disbelieve the State's explanation.  That is because the ultimate burden of 
proof regarding motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the 
defendant.  Id., 514 U.S.  at 768, 115 S. Ct.  at 1771.  Quite recently, in 
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325, 
162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005), the Supreme Court gave further guidance by declaring 
that:

 
 
[i]f a 
prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well 
to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence 
tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third 
step.

 
 
[¶10]   The Wyoming Supreme Court has, from 
time-to-time, been required to review Batson challenges.  In Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132 
(Wyo. 1986), 
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907, 107 S. Ct. 1353, 94 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987), a Mexican national defendant moved for a mistrial 
on the ground that three panelists with Spanish-sounding surnames were 
peremptorily challenged by the State.  
This Court rejected the Batson 
challenge for two reasons:  one, 
the record did not establish that the individuals were, indeed, 
"Mexican-Americans," and two, the prosecutor had offered race-neutral 
explanations for challenging the three venire members.  Id. 
at 1133-35 (two of the panelists had been involved in litigation where 
prosecuting attorneys were on the other side, and the third was known to be 
"anti-law enforcement").  Similarly, 
in Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 
547 (Wyo. 1998), we concluded that the State's assertion that the two venire 
members with Hispanic surnames were peremptorily challenged because they knew 
Espinoza and because their children were friends with him, was a sufficiently 
race-neutral explanation to defeat a Batson challenge.  Finally, in Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 142-43 
(Wyo. 2000), we followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994), in extending the Batson principles to gender-based 
discrimination.  We also recognized 
that Court's standard of review:

 
 
[T]hese 
are questions best left to the discretion of the trial judge, who can . . . more 
reliably determine . . . whether a lawyer is manufacturing pretextual excuses to 
conceal discrimination. . . .  On 
appeal, a trial court's findings of fact after a Batson hearing on whether the State's 
strikes were taken for discriminatory reasons will be reversed only if clearly 
erroneous.  Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1871, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991); U.S. v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108-09 
(10th Cir.1991).  When the trial 
judge accepted the explanations offered by the prosecution, he ratified the 
reasonability of those proffered explanations.  We will not second guess the trial 
court's findings of fact in a Batson 
ruling absent clear error.

 
 

Beartusk, 6 P.3d  at 143.

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant in the case sub judice is Hispanic.  The State exercised two of its 
peremptory challenges to remove the only two Hispanics from the venire.  After the final panel was selected in 
chambers, the following colloquy occurred:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Any objection to the jury 
panel, the alternate or the method of selection?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your Honor.  I am going to make an objection to, I 
believe the State has purposely eliminated all of the Hispanic folks from the 
jury panel.  We would object to the 
way the panel was comprised at this time.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Mr. 
[Prosecutor]?

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, the reasons for excluding 
the only two Hispanics that I'm aware of on the panel, Pamela Sandoval and 
Beatrice Vasquez, is that both expressed that they knew witnesses.  Ms. Sandoval also expressed that she has 
a doctor's appointment, that this may interfere with it as it goes on.  Beatrice Vasquez indicated she knew at 
least one of our witnesses and I believe knew the Defendant, 
also.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Any further argument, 
[Defense Counsel]?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your Honor.  There are lots of witnesses (sic) that 
indicated that they knew witnesses in this trial, and the State didn't eliminate 
very much of those.  In fact, I 
don't believe the State eliminated any of them.  So we'll continue with our 
objection.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The court finds that the 
State has expressed legitimate reasons for the peremptory challenges issued 
against Beatrice Vasquez and Pamela Sandoval and will overrule the objection 
from the Defense.

 
 
Anything 
else?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  No, Your 
Honor.

 
 
[¶12]   Application of the Batson three-step analysis to these 
facts convinces us that the district court's findings were not clearly 
erroneous.  By considering the 
State's stated justification for the way it exercised its peremptory challenges, 
the district court apparently treated defense counsel's objection as a prima facie showing of purposeful 
discrimination.  We, however, are 
not so sure that such was the case.  
The mere challenge of jurors with Spanish-sounding surnames would not be 
sufficient to establish purposeful discrimination, and the record reflectswhich 
means the district judge was awarethat the State also challenged a non-Hispanic 
juror who knew a witness. 

 
 
[¶13]   Even if we assume that the 
appellant met his initial burden of showing a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination and get to the second Batson step, we agree with the district 
court that the State expressed a facially legitimate reason for exercising its 
peremptory challenges as it did.  
Furthermore, the district court's brief response to the appellant's 
objection includes, without directly stating it, the analysis that makes up Batson's third step.  The district court concluded that the 
State did not purposefully discriminate against the Hispanic jurors as a 
group.  The record supports that 
conclusion.  The State challenged 
only five jurors:  two non-Hispanics 
who had not indicated that they knew any witnesses, one non-Hispanic who 
indicated he knew Abeyta, and two Hispanics.  One of the Hispanic jurorsMs. 
Sandovalknew one of the law enforcement witnesses, knew Abeyta's mother, and 
preferred not to miss an upcoming doctor's appointment for her first pregnancy 
checkup.  The other Hispanic 
jurorMs. Vasquezknew Abeyta.  
Interestingly enough, by the time the State exercised its fifth 
peremptory challenge and began to pass, defense counsel had peremptorily 
challenged one juror who was related to one of the law enforcement witnesses, 
and one juror who knew Abeyta.  At 
that point, five of the jurors who knew witnesses had been removed from the 
panel, and we cannot simply assume that the State was acting with improper 
motivation in not removing more such jurors.3

 
 
Was 
character evidence improperly admitted at trial?

 
 
[¶14]   Evidentiary rulings are reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion, which goes to the question of the reasonableness of 
the trial court's decision.  Barker v. State, 2005 WY 20, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 297, 299-300 (Wyo. 2005).  
Where there was no objection to the evidence at trial, we review its 
admission under the plain error standard, which requires the appellant to show 
that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious 
way, resulting in the denial of a substantial right and material prejudice.  Gomez v. 
State, 2003 WY 58, ¶ 4, 68 P.3d 1177, 1179 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant raises two claims under 
this issue.  
First, he argues that W.R.E. 404(a)4 was violated 
when the following exchange occurred during defense counsel's cross-examination 
of the victim, Snow:

 
 
Q.   Okay.  Now, did you and [Abeyta] consume any 
methamphetamine together?

 
 
A.   Not that night.

 
 
Q.   Not that  Have you before?

 
 
A.   Probably, yeah.

 
 
Q.   Okay.

 
 
A.   And [the appellant], actually [the 
appellant] had gave me some cocaine.

 
 
[¶16]   Defense counsel did not object to this 
answer, so we must review it for plain error.  We note first that, while the question and 
answer are clearly shown in the record, the portion of the transcript quoted 
above does not accurately reflect the context of the allegedly "non-responsive" 
answer.  Rather 
than being an aberrant declaration, the statement actually appears in the midst 
of five pages of questioning of Snow by defense counsel about his drug use, 
including several questions about cocaine, and its comparison to 
methamphetamine.  
In that context, we cannot say that Snow's response was entirely 
non-responsive.  
In fact, the situation may be characterized as invited error.  See Fortner v. 
State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1148 
(Wyo. 1992).  Perhaps realizing 
that to be the case, defense counsel chose to pursue the matter in an attempt to 
discredit Snow.  
In light of this tactical choice, we certainly cannot fault the district 
court for failing sua sponte to interject its own objection to the 
testimony.  
Beyond that, the appellant has failed to show how the statement violated 
the admonition of W.R.E. 404(a) that evidence of a character trait not be 
admitted to prove that the appellant acted in conformity therewith on the 
occasion in question.  
Lastly, the appellant has not shown how he was prejudiced by this 
isolated comment.

 
 
[¶17]   The appellant was arrested in 
Arizona a little more than two 
months after the incident underlying this case.  After being advised by Arizona law 
enforcement officers of his constitutional rights as per the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the appellant described the 
incident in detail.  During that interview, the appellant made 
several statements revealing the fact that he had a prior criminal record.  A tape of the 
interview was played for the jury, and the appellant now claims that 
introduction of the evidence of his prior record violated W.R.E. 404(b)5 and W.R.E. 6096. 

 
 
[¶18]   The parties disagree what standard the 
court should apply in reviewing this issue because they disagree as to whether 
the appellant appropriately objected below to admission of the evidence.  Consequently, we 
must reconstruct the status of this issue as it was presented to the district 
court.  The 
court file reveals that the appellant filed a motion on May 10, 2005, demanding 
notice of any uncharged misconduct evidence the State intended to introduce. 
 The State's 
response contained the following paragraph:

 
 
The plaintiff has provided all the statements made by each 
of the defendants in this matter to both of the defendants through 
discovery.  It 
is the intention of the plaintiff to use any or all of those statements, unless 
precluded by Court order to do so.[7]

 
 
[¶19]   The same document contains the 
following paragraph, headed as shown:

 
 
5.    Motion In Limine to WRE 
609 Evidence:

 
 
a.   The defendants will be provided with 
evidence intended to be introduced under the provisions of WRE Rule 404(b) under 
separate cover.  
A hearing must be conducted on that matter and this can be used in 
conjunction therewith.  The nature of the Menacing felony conviction 
of James Mattern tends to show absence of mistake and identity, which permit 
introduction of the felony under Rule 404(b).

 
 
This paragraph is curious, for several reasons.  First, only the 
appellant's brother, and not the appellant, filed a motion under W.R.E. 
609.  Second, 
this response to that motion deals only with W.R.E. 404(b).  Third, the State 
indicates in the response that 
it intends to use the brother's menacing conviction to show absence 
of mistake and identity, but at the hearing on the motion, the State's position was as 
follows:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  We were trying to get those separate 
convictions.  
That's what we just received Thursday from those.  Those do show  As 
I say, they have not been provided yet.  We have to make copies of all that and 
provide it to them.  
It does not have a report as to the similarities, but we do have a 
menacing charge with a deadly weapon against Steven Mattern and against James 
Mattern.  They 
arise out of the same event, apparently, from the dates that were there.

 
 
            
We intend to use them to show that there is a lack of mistake, knowledge 
on their part as to what occurs when you're threatening somebody with a deadly 
weapon.  That's 
the intent of this.  
If they are saying, gee, this is an accident, which is one of the 
defenses that has been put out by Steven Mattern, at least in his statement that 
we have and we'll attempt to introduce at the time of trial.

 
 
[¶20]   So, in response to James Mattern's 
W.R.E. 609 motion, the State described how it intended to use the appellant's 
prior convictions against him, using a W.R.E 404(b) analysis.  The district court 
withheld ruling on the motion, indicating that it would take the matter under 
advisement and rule later on the application of W.R.E. 404(b) to the 
convictions.  Later in the same hearing, however, the 
prosecutor once again addressed the statements made by the two brothers to the 
police, indicating that he intended to introduce them at trial as statements 
against their own interests.8 The appellant's counsel responded as 
follows:  "I 
wouldn't have any objection to that, if I could see the statements prior to 
trial so that I can object specifically to any statement which I think may be 
inappropriately being  or at least attempted to be admitted in the trial."

 
 
[¶21]   At trial, video and audio tapes of the 
appellant's statement to the Tucson police were played 
for the jury, without objection by defense counsel.  In fact, defense 
counsel stipulated to the tapes' authenticity and admissibility.  Defense counsel's 
objection that transcripts of the tapes be provided to the jurors to "follow 
along" was overruled.  
Now, however, the appellant objects to the admission of certain specific 
statements he made during the recorded interview.  Those specific comments, in context, were as 
follows:

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  That's what I don't understand.  They should have 
the gun.  They 
should know everything.

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Well, I'm not saying they don't.  I'm just 
asking.

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Yeah.  I dropped it right there.

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Okay.

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Because I freaked, you know.  I'm, like, shit, I'm just getting off 
parole.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
DETECTIVE LOPEZ:  Why did you run?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  What else am I going to do?

 
 
DETECTIVE LOPEZ:  Well, honestly.  I  I just want to 
know your reasoning, your reasons.

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Because I  you know, I was, like, shit, 
man.  I didn't 
know what to do.  
I just got out of going 
 just got out  off parole, so I was, like, shit.

 
 
DETECTIVE LOPEZ:  What were you on parole for?

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Got scared, basically, right?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Yeah.  I mean, shit.  I know I'm going down regardless.

 
 
DETECTIVE LOPEZ:  What were you on parole for?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  For theft and escape.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
DETECTIVE LOPEZ:  You weren't scared of him?

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Has he been in the joint before?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Huh-uh.

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  But you have; huh?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  I've been to the joint.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  How long were you in prison for?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Four years.

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Four years.  In Wyoming?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  No.  In Colorado.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
DETECTIVE LOPEZ:  And that's why you ran, got rid of the 
clothes and stuff?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Yeah.  Knew I was going back to the joint.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Couldn't be traced to you, though, right, 
because you didn't buy it at a gun store; huh?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Right.

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Have you had experience with that before or 
something?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Uh-huh.

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  Were you picked up for a gun violation?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  I've  I've been picked up on a menacing case 
before.

 
 
DETECTIVE HOGAN:  What's  what's that?

 
 
MR. MATTERN:  Brandishing a weapon.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶22]   The appellant's appellate argument 
concerning these statements is somewhat convoluted and, in the end, 
unpersuasive.  
First, he contends that this evidence constituted impeachment by evidence 
of conviction of a crime, and should have been reviewed by the district court 
under W.R.E. 609, which review would have included a balancing of probative 
value and prejudicial effect under W.R.E. 403.9  Following that 
assertion, the appellant skips immediately to the proposition that the 
statements should  
have been analyzed under W.R.E. 404(b).  In that regard, the appellant contends that 
he clearly objected to the State's use of uncharged misconduct evidence, and 
that he had no notice or opportunity to be heard as to these statements.  Finally, he 
declares himself to have been prejudiced by admission of the evidence in the 
following fashion:

 
 
            
Certainly, this evidence was prejudicial to Mr. Mattern.  The jury was 
improperly allowed to hear about Mr. Mattern's prior convictions.  Such character 
evidence is implicitly damaging to a criminal defendant; indeed, there would not 
be rules of evidence concerning character evidence if that were not so.  Therefore, Mr. 
Mattern's conviction should be reversed, and his case remanded for new 
trial.

 
 
[¶23]   The State counters these arguments from 
several directions.  
First, the State cites Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, ¶ 31, 120 P.3d 980, 988 (Wyo. 
2005), for the well-established principle that, so long as his constitutional 
rights appropriately have been explained to him, the custodial statements of a 
defendant may be used as evidence against him.  Second, the State notes that admissions by a 
party-opponent are not hearsay, and are not, therefore, excludable on that 
basis.  See W.R.E. 
801(d)(2).10  Third, the State finds W.R.E. 609 
inapplicable because it is a rule designed to control the impeachment of 
witnesses through introduction of prior criminal convictions, and here, the 
appellant did not testify and was not, therefore, subject to such 
impeachment.  
Finally, the State cites Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 125-126 
(Wyo. 1981), for the proposition 
that a defendant's statements to an officer are an "admission" and do not, 
therefore, implicate W.R.E. 404.

 
 
[¶24]   Our own assessment of this issue leads 
us to agree with the State's final conclusion, if not necessarily with the path 
it took to get there.11  Our first observation is that the appellant 
did not preserve these issues with adequate objections below.  There were 
pre-trial motions and pre-trial hearings involving W.R.E. 404 and 609, but, at 
trial, the appellant stipulated to the admission of the statement he made to the 
Tucson police.  This has to have 
been a tactical decision.  Given the fact that he did not testify, 
admission of his statement was the best way to present his version of the events 
to the jury without subjecting himself to cross-examination.  As to the 
particular brief comments about parole and his prior conviction, those were made 
in an effort to explain to the police why he fled from Rawlins.  Perhaps no 
objection was made at trial for the same purpose.  Under all these circumstances, the record 
does not show that the district court committed a clear error of law, or that 
the appellant was prejudiced by his decision to stipulate to admission of the 
entire statement.

 
 
Did the district court properly instruct the jury as to the 
elements of the crime of attempted first-degree murder?

 
 
[¶25]   The jury instructions in this case 
consisted mainly of pattern instructions that have been given to juries 
innumerable times in this State's history.  Furthermore, not only did the appellant not 
object to the instructions as given, he actually proffered the instruction 
defining "premeditated" that he now attacks as being "misleading, incomplete, 
inadequate and confusing."  And inexplicably, despite his failure to 
object below, the appellant fails to present to us a plain error analysis of 
this issue.

 
 
[¶26]   We could decline even to consider the 
appellant's instruction arguments because of these procedural deficiencies.  Given the 
seriousness of the offense and the fact that the appellant was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, however, and to avoid later charges of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in this regard, we will make one quick observation about the 
instructions that is dispositive of the appellant's primary complaint, which 
complaint is as follows:

 
 
The "premeditation" instruction given to the jury was 
misleading, incomplete, inadequate and confusing, as it emphasized that 
premeditation implies an interval, however brief, between the formation of the 
intent or design to kill and the commission of the act which results in death, 
but did not inform the jury that Mr. Mattern also had to have deliberated 
upon the intent or design to kill, which cannot happen in "an interval, 
however brief."  
Neither did any other given jury instruction provide this 
information.  
Without jury instructions explaining deliberation to the jury, 
the typical premeditation instruction given in this case results in blurring the 
lines and distinctions between the different degrees and kinds of murder."

 
 
(Emphasis in original.)

 
 
[¶27]   As we read this passage, it appears 
that the appellant's complaint is that, even though the jury was instructed that 
first-degree murder requires premeditation in the form of an interval of time 
sufficient to form the intent to kill before doing the act of killing, the jury 
was not instructed that the appellant must actually have deliberated; that is, 
he thought about the idea of killing before doing the act.  We reject this 
argument because the instruction that was given, Instruction No. 7, clearly made 
just that point:

 
 
"Premeditated malice" means that the defendant thought 
about and considered the idea of killing before the act which caused death was 
committed, and that the act which caused death was done with intent to 
kill and without legal justification or excuse.

 
 
            
Premeditated requires an interval sufficient to form the intent to kill 
before the commission of the act intended to result in death.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  We cannot comprehend how the idea of 
deliberation could be stated any more plainly for the jury.

 
 
Was there sufficient evidence for the jury to find the 
appellant guilty of attempted first-degree murder?

 
 
[¶28]   Defense counsel moved for a judgment of 
acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case, which motion was denied.12  We review the denial of a motion for judgment 
of acquittal by examining and accepting as true the State's evidence, together 
with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, leaving out entirely any 
conflicting evidence.  
Wise v. 
State, 654 P.2d 116, 117 
(Wyo. 1982).  The question is 
whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have 
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hightower v. State, 901 P.2d 397, 401 
(Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶29]   The appellant argued at trial that the 
State proved neither premeditation nor malice, the former being an element of 
the charged crime of attempted first-degree murder, and the latter being an 
element of both attempted first-degree murder and the lesser-included offense of 
attempted second-degree murder.  On appeal, he abandons any effort to argue 
that he did not act maliciously, adopting, instead, an argument that he did not 
act purposely or with premeditation.  In his brief, the appellant begins his 
discussion of this issue by stating boldly that "there was a complete lack of 
any proof of premeditation or deliberation."  Having reviewed the entire record, we find 
this conclusion to be nothing more than a bald assertion based upon the 
appellant's view of the evidencea view obviously not shared by the jury or the 
trial court.

 
 
[¶30]   The essence of the appellant's first 
argument is that the event occurred too quickly for him to have "thought about 
and considered the idea of killing," and that the circumstantial evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he engaged in such deliberation.  We have already 
quoted in full the district court's instruction to the jury as to the definition 
of "premeditated malice."  On appeal, we evaluate the evidence of 
premeditation as follows:

 
 
            
We have taken this opportunity to carefully review our premeditation 
jurisprudence.  
We find that heretofore we have not identified and articulated a method 
for evaluating evidence of premeditation.  To clarify what is required on appeal to 
sustain a conviction of first degree murder and to analyze the evidence 
presented in this instance, we adopt the three-part framework articulated by the 
California Supreme Court, applied in California and other 
jurisdictions.  
We offer the framework verbatim:

 
 
            
Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and 
deliberation "falls into three basic categories:  (1) facts about * * * what defendant did prior to the actual 
killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, 
and explicable as intended to result in, the killingwhat may be characterized 
as planning' activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship 
and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a 
motive' to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts 
of type (1) or (3) would * * * support an inference that the killing was the 
result of a pre-existing reflection' and careful thought and weighing of 
considerations' rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily 
executed'; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could 
infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that 
the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived 
design' to take [the] victim's life in a particular way for a reason' which the 
jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2)."

 
 

People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 441, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 
(1988) (quoting People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 949, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (1968)).

 
 
[V]erdicts of first degree murder typically [are sustained] 
when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise require at least 
extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either 
(1) or (3).

People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d  at 949, 73 Cal. Rptr.  at 557.

 
 
(Some citations omitted; emphasis in original.)  Bouwkamp v. State, 
833 P.2d 486, 494-95 
(Wyo. 1992).  In Hightower, 901 P.2d  
at 403, we added the following:

 
 
Persons convicted of premeditated murder often have 
questioned what amount of time is required in "thinking over" or "deliberating 
upon" for juries to find that sufficient premeditation existed.  Our rule is:

 
 
Premeditation need not have existed for any given length of 
time before the act, it being sufficient that it existed at the time of the act; 
and the intent and the act may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts.  Sandoval v. People, 
117 Colo. 588, 192 P.2d 423 (1948).

 
 
[¶31]   Our analysis of the evidence in the 
instant case differs from the analysis just recited solely in that the appellant 
was convicted only of attempted first-degree murder, rather than first-degree 
murder.  Under 
the circumstances of this case, the act that constituted the attempt was 
shooting Snow through the mouth, jaw, and neck.  The evidence of the appellant's actions prior 
to that act was as follows:  he became angry because Abeyta did not come 
to the bar and because Snow was at Abeyta's house; he returned to Abeyta's 
house, took his loaded handgun from his vehicle and hid it in his clothing; he 
accosted Abeyta and then Snow, engaging them in a violent argument; he 
brandished the gun inside the house while challenging Snow to go outside and 
fight; once outside, he again brandished the gun and, while so armed, chased 
Snow back into the house, reaching past Abeyta with the gun in hand; and because 
Snow had hit the appellant's brother in the head with something, the appellant 
intended to "make Snow bleed."

 
 
[¶32]   As to the second type of evidence to be 
consideredthat of the prior relationship between Snow and the appellantthe 
appellant did not argue self-defense, or any other legal justification or 
excuse, at trial.  
Beyond that, in his statement to the officers, in his opening statement, 
and in his closing argument, he indirectly admitted motive for the attempted 
murder by stressing his ill will and hostility toward Snow.  Although defense 
counsel's purpose in making these admissions was to try to direct the jury 
toward a verdict of attempted voluntary manslaughter, the evidence actually 
showed that the appellant's intense dislike for Snow predated the incident.

 
 
[¶33]   The final question is whether the State 
presented evidence about the nature of the act, itself, to sustain a jury 
conclusion that the appellant deliberately intended to kill Snow.  While the use of a 
deadly weapon, alone, would not support such a conclusion, it was not 
unreasonable for the jury to conclude in this case that the manner in which the 
gun was used, when combined with all the other evidence, was sufficient.  The appellant, with 
gun in hand, chased Snow up the stairs and back into the house.  He then reached 
around Abeyta, who was attempting to block his entrance, pointed the gun in the 
direction Snow was fleeing, and pulled the trigger.

 
 
[¶34]   The evidence of premeditation in this 
case was not just evidence of the passage of an interval of time.  There was an 
interval of time that passedsufficient time during which the appellant could 
deliberateand the evidence of his conduct during that interval was sufficient 
for the jury to conclude that he did, indeed, deliberate.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury when there is sufficient evidence 
to support its factual determinations.

 
 
[¶35]   The appellant's second sufficiency of 
the evidence argument is contained in this single paragraph of his Brief:

 
 
            
In order to meet the elements of the crime of attempted first degree 
murder, the state had to prove a number of things.  One of those things 
would be that Mr. Mattern acted "purposely" in shooting Mr. Snow.  "Purposely" was 
defined for the jury as "that the act that caused the death was intentionally 
done."  There 
is no evidence in this record that Mr. Mattern purposely pointed the gun at Mr. 
Snow, nor that Mr. Mattern purposely pulled the trigger and shot Mr. Snow.  It cannot be 
inferred, from the mere possession and display of a weapon, that one has acted 
"purposely" in shooting another. 

 
 
(Citation omitted.)

 
 
[¶36]   We will make two observations about 
this argument.  
First, it is basically inconsistent with the appellant's position at 
trial, where defense counsel repeatedly argued that the appellant should be 
convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, rather than attempted 
first-degree murder.  
Defense counsel admitted that the appellant had acted voluntarily, but 
contended that he did not have the specific intent to kill.  The problem with 
now arguing that the appellant did not act "purposely" is that we have 
previously equated the words "voluntarily" and "purposely" in the murder 
statutes as both connoting an intentional act, rather than an accidental 
one.  State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138 
(Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶37]   Our second observation is that what is 
really happening here is that the appellant is re-arguing the facts.  His contention is, 
in effect, that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that he 
intentionally swung the gun at Snow, but not sufficient to find that he 
intentionally pulled the trigger.  Once again, our job is not to re-weigh the 
evidence.  Our 
job is only to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented for 
reasonable jurors to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant 
intentionally shot Snow.  The jury was given a choice between two 
versions of the facts:  the appellant intentionally swung the gun at 
Snow and it accidentally went off, or the appellant intentionally shot 
Snow.  The jury 
chose the latter version.

 
 
[¶38]   We need not repeat in detail the 
evidence already outlined hereinabove.  Suffice it to say that, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State, the evidence showed that the appellant chased Snow 
into the house and reached around Abeyta with the gun.  Given the fact that 
Snow was, in fact, shot, the gun must have been pointed in Snow's direction, and 
must have been held so that it could be fired, rather than being held as a 
club.  In the 
context of all the other facts, that was sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could draw the conclusion that the appellant intentionally shot Snow.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶39]   The district court did not err in 
denying the appellant's Batson challenge or in denying the appellant's motion 
for judgment of acquittal.  The jury was properly instructed as to the 
elements of the crime of attempted first-degree murder, and the State produced 
sufficient evidence for reasonable jurors to determine beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the appellant was guilty of that crime.   Finally, no character evidence was 
improperly admitted.

 
 
[¶40]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The appellant attempts to raise a fifth issue in his reply 
brief: whether the trial court committed plain error in not answering a jury 
question about the difference between first-degree and second-degree 
murder.  The 
purpose of a reply brief is to allow the appellant to reply to new issues raised 
in the appellee's brief; not to raise new issues himself.  Budd-Falen Law Offices, 
P.C. v. Rocky Mountain Recovery, Inc., 2005 WY 77, ¶ 14, 114 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Wyo. 
2005); and Siler v. 
State, 2005 WY 73, ¶ 48, 115 P.3d 14, 38 (Wyo. 
2005).  Here, 
the issue concerning the district court's reply to the jury question was not a 
new issue raised by the State, but was part of its response to the appellant's 
jury instruction and evidence sufficiency issues.  Consequently, we will not address that issue 
separately.

  

2Abeyta, Snow, and the appellant's brother all testified at 
trial.  The 
appellant did not testify at trial, but a statement he made to the police when 
he was arrested was entered into evidence.  The facts described herein are gleaned from 
the witnesses' separate accounts, which were similar in most respects, although 
not identical.  
A major disagreement was the point at which the appellant had drawn his 
pistol.  Snow 
said that the appellant first took the gun out in the bedroom, while the 
appellant claimed not to have done so until they were outside and Snow hit the 
appellant's brother with something.  Neither Abeyta nor the appellant's brother 
saw the gun inside the house.  The jury, of course, was free to decide which 
version was the truth.

 
 

3We will also note in passing that defense counsel's three 
final peremptory challenges were all exercised against jurors who had stated 
that they knew various witnesses, meaning, of course, that the State had no 
reason or need to challenge those jurors.  In total, three of the State's five exercised 
peremptory challenges and five of the appellant's seven exercised peremptory 
challenges were used against jurors who knew witnesses.  Apparently, this 
issue was of particular concern to both sides.

 
 

4W.R.E. 404(a) reads as follows:

 
 
(a)    Character evidence 
generally.  Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith 
on a particular occasion, except:

(1)    Character of Accused.  Evidence 
of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same;

(2)    Character of Victim.  Evidence 
of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character 
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide 
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;

(3)    Character of Witness.  Evidence 
of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.

 
 

5W.R.E. 404(b) reads as follows:

 
 
(b)    Other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts.  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.

 
 

6W.R.E. 609 reads in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
(a)    General rule.  For 
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,

(1)    evidence that a witness other 
than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 
403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one (1) 
year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the accused; and

(2)    evidence that any witness has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment.

 
 

7The response refers to two defendants because the 
appellant's brother was scheduled to be tried at the same time as the 
appellant.  He 
pled guilty, however, and testified for the State at the appellant's trial.

 
 

8W.R.E. 804(b)(3) excludes from the hearsay rule certain 
statements made against the declarant's own interests.

 
 

9W.R.E. 403 reads as follows:

 
 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

 
 

10W.R.E. 801(d) reads in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
(d)    Statements which are 
not hearsay.  A statement is not hearsay if:

. . . .

(2)    Admission by Party-Opponent.  
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either 
his individual or a representative capacity . . . .

 
 

11The fact that a statement is not hearsay, for instance, 
does not insulate it from analysis under W.R.E. 404.  Also, we do not 
find the officer's testimony in Hopkinson to be at all similar to the taped statement 
presented to the jury in the instant case.

 
 

12W.R.Cr.P. 29(a) reads as follows:

 
 
(a)    At close of 
evidence.  Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions for 
judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place.  The court on motion 
of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of 
acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or 
citation after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.  If a defendant's 
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the 
state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved 
the right.