Title: Adams v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 85 

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP608 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
John Adams, Linda Adams, Mike Johnson, Ann Johnson, 
Verne Wilkie, Rosemary Wilkie, Richard Massen and 
Darlene Massen, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Livestock Facilities Siting 
Review Board, 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
Larson Acres, Inc., 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Town of Magnolia, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Livestock Facilities Siting 
Review Board, 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
Larson Acres, Inc., 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 

 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 327 Wis. 2d 676, 787 N.W.2d 941 
(Ct. App. 2010 - Published) 
PDC No: 2010 WI App 88 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:         
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 COURT: 
Circuit   
 COUNTY: 
Rock 
 JUDGE: 
James E. Welker 
  
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
        
 DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (Opinion filed).  
BRADLEY, J., joins part III of dissent.    
 NOT PARTICIPATING:        
  
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 



For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Glenn C. Reynolds, Rebecca A. Paulson, and Reynolds & 
Associates, Madison, and oral argument by Glenn C. Reynolds. 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioners there were briefs 
filed by Christa Westerberg and McGillivray, Westerberg & Bender 
LLC, Madison, and Peter M. McKeever and Garvey McNeil & 
Associates, 
S.C., 
Madison, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Christa 
Westerberg. 
For the intervener-appellant there was a brief by Eric M. 
McLeod, Michael P. Screnock, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Eric M. McLeod. 
For the respondent-co-appellant the cause was argued by 
Robert M. Hunter, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of Wisconsin Farm 
Bureau Federation, Cooperative, The Dairy Business Association, 
Inc., 
The 
Wisconsin 
Cheese-Makers’ 
Association, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin Pork Association, Cooperative, by H. Dale Peterson, 
Krista R. Pleviak, and Stroud, Willink, & Howards, LLC, Madison, 
Wisconsin Lakes Association, River Alliance of Wisconsin, and 
Wisconsin 
Trout 
Unlimited 
by 
Jodi 
Habush 
of 
Midwest 
Environmental Advocates, Madison, Family Farm Defenders, Inc. 
and Wisconsin Farmers Union by Lester A. Pines, Jeffrey L. 
Vercauteren, and Cullen Weston Pines & Bach, LLP, Madison and 
Kara 
Slaughter 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Farmers 
Union, 
Madison, 
Wisconsin Counties Association and Wisconsin Towns Association 
by Patrick Henneger, Andrew T. Phillips, Daniel J. Borowski, and 
Phillips Borowski, S.C., Mequon, and Richard J. Stadelman and 
the Wisconsin Towns Association, Shawano. 


2012 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP608 
 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV1478, 2007CV1479, 2007CV2104 & 2008CV79) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Adams, Linda Adams, Mike Johnson, Ann 
Johnson, Verne Wilkie, Rosemary Wilkie, Richard 
Massen and Darlene Massen, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Livestock Facilities Siting 
Review Board, 
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
 
Larson Acres, Inc., 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Town of Magnolia, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Livestock Facilities Siting 
Review Board, 
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
 
Larson Acres, Inc., 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 



 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of the Rock 
County Circuit Court, James E. Welker, Judge.  The circuit court 
order reversed and remanded the cause to the State Livestock 
Facilities Siting Review Board ("Siting Board"), which had  
affirmed with modifications a permit issued by the Town of 
Magnolia ("Town").  The Town had granted an application for a 
livestock facility siting permit submitted by Larson Acres, Inc. 
("Larson"), but imposed several conditions on the permit. 
¶2 
In Wisconsin, as in states all over the country,2 the 
legislature has taken steps to balance the important interest in 
protecting 
precious 
natural 
resources 
with 
the 
important 
interest in encouraging a robust and efficient agricultural 
economy.  As a central component of balancing these interests, 
the legislature has strictly limited the ability of political 
subdivisions to regulate the livestock facility siting process.  
The Town stepped over those limitations when it impermissibly 
conditioned the terms of a siting permit without following the 
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1 Adams v. State Livestock Facilities Siting Review Bd., 
2010 WI App 88, 327 Wis. 2d 676, 787 N.W.2d 941. 
2 See generally Jody M. Endres & Margaret R. Grossman, Air 
Emissions from Animal Feeding Operations: Can State Rules Help?, 
13 Penn St. Envtl L. Rev. 1, 7-43 (2004) (surveying regulatory 
approaches to livestock farming in various states). 
No. 
2009AP608 
   

3 
 
guidelines set forth by the legislature.  Because the Town’s 
actions were violative of the Siting Law, the court of appeals 
was correct to find the challenged conditions in the permit 
invalid, and we therefore affirm. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶3 
As reflected by the voluminous record, the history 
between the parties is a long and rancorous one.  The facts 
presented are only those relevant to the disposition of the 
appeal. 
¶4 
The narrative begins in 1977.  That year, the Town 
passed its first zoning ordinance.  The ordinance included a 
section entitled, "Water Quality Protection," which provided a 
general prohibition on pollutants, followed by this more 
specific clause: 
[N]o activity shall discharge any liquid, gaseous, or 
solid materials so as to exceed or contribute toward 
the exceeding of the minimum standards and those other 
standards and the application of those standards set 
forth in [Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 102] for all 
navigable waters. 
Magnolia, Wis., Ordinance (July 26, 1977). 
¶5 
Twenty-seven years elapsed.  In 2004, the Wisconsin 
legislature passed, and the governor signed into law, Wisconsin 
Statutes 
section 93.90 
(2003–04) 
("Siting 
Law"),3 
an 
act 
regulating "livestock facility siting and expansion."  As 
suggested by its title, the Siting Law established various 
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3 When referring to the statute as a whole, we use the term, 
"Siting Law."  When referring to specific sections of the 
statute, we cite to the particular provision. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   

4 
 
procedures for livestock farm operators to apply for, and 
receive, permits from political subdivisions4 allowing them to 
locate their facilities in particular areas. 
¶6 
The following year, the Town adopted the Siting Law as 
part of its zoning ordinance. 
¶7 
One 
provision 
of 
the 
Siting 
Law 
directed 
the 
Department 
of 
Agriculture, 
Trade 
and 
Consumer 
Protection 
("Department") to draw up rules providing more specific, precise 
guidelines 
for 
the 
new 
permitting 
process. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 93.90(2)(a) (2005-06).5  After an extensive rulemaking process, 
the 
Department 
fulfilled 
its 
legal 
duty 
and 
promulgated 
Wisconsin Administrative Code ch. ATCP 51 ("ATCP 51") on May 1, 
2006. 
¶8 
The next day, Larson filed an application with the 
Town for a conditional use permit6 ("CUP") for a facility to 
house 1,500 "animal units."7 8 
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4 For purposes of the statute, and of this opinion, 
"'Political subdivision' means a city, village, town, or 
county."  Wisconsin Statutes section 93.90(1m)(f) (2005-06). 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
6  Conditional use permits are "flexibility devices, which 
are designed to cope with situations where a particular use, 
although not inherently inconsistent with the use classification 
of a particular zone, may well create special problems and 
hazards if allowed to develop and locate as a matter of right in 
[a] particular zone."  Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, 
¶23, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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5 
 
¶9 
Approximately three weeks later, on May 24, 2006, the 
Town adopted a revised zoning ordinance.  The new ordinance 
recited the same language from the water quality protection 
provision quoted above, but appended several words at the end: 
In addition, no activity shall discharge any liquid, 
gaseous, or solid materials so as to exceed or 
contribute 
toward 
the 
exceeding 
of 
the 
minimum 
standards and the application of those standards set 
forth in [Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 102] for all 
navigable waters and [chs. NR 140, 141 and 809] for 
groundwater and drinking water and applicable federal 
drinking water regulations. 
Magnolia, Wis., Ordinance (May 24, 2006) (emphasis added). 
¶10 After a lengthy dispute regarding the sufficiency of 
Larson's application, the Town deemed it complete and scheduled 
a public hearing.  The hearing's organization followed formal, 
quasi-judicial lines: witnesses were sworn and examined by 
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7  An animal unit is "a unit of measure used to determine 
the total number of single animal types or combination of animal 
types." Wis. Stat. § 93.90(1m)(a)  (incorporating Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 243.03(3) (later renumbered § 243.03(5)).  Under this 
system of measurement, a steer is 1 animal unit and a milking 
cow is 1.4 animal units.  § 243.03(5) tbl. 2A. 
8 As a result of previous litigation and settlement, Larson 
was apparently operating in the absence of a permit when it 
applied.  There was some ambiguity below as to whether the 
application was for a new facility or an expanded one.  The 
parties do not suggest that the ambiguity, whatever it was, has 
any bearing on the outcome of the case, so we do not address the 
question. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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6 
 
attorneys from both sides,9 and arguments were presented to the 
Board.  Most of the day was devoted to testimony from several 
expert witnesses retained by the Town.  Two of the experts were 
scientists who spoke at length about the environmental damage 
they believed the farm was inflicting, and the risks its 
operations posed, to the water quality of Norwegian Creek 
(running through the Town) and to the Town's drinking water.  
Larson submitted the results of various studies and reports to 
the Town, stressed that the alleged environmental problems had 
not been definitively linked to the farm, and reiterated that it 
read the Siting Law as forbidding the imposition of any 
conditions taken from outside ATCP 51's parameters. 
¶11 On March 27, 2007, the Town Board issued its decision.  
It granted the CUP with seven conditions, "imposed for the 
purpose of protecting the Town's ground and surface water."  The 
conditions, quoted in their entirety, were: 
1. 
Larson shall provide the Town, within 60 days of 
this decision, a plan to utilize land use, 
farming, and nutrient management practices to 
substantially 
reduce 
and 
thereafter 
minimize 
nitrogen loading to surface and ground water 
using the following strategies: 
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9 By this point, a third lawyer, representing John and Linda 
Adams, as well as other individual citizens in the area, was 
participating in the proceedings and opposing the CUP (or, in 
the alternative, supporting it with the imposition of numerous 
conditions).  This group later filed a separate petition for 
review in circuit court after the Siting Board's ruling.  Their 
claim was subsequently consolidated with the Town's, and the two 
claims appear here as one. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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7 
 
a. 
No fall spreading of manure on tile drained 
or upland field on the Cook [F]arm until 
nitrate pollution is substantially reduced. 
b. 
Crop rotation to include alfalfa on the 
entire Cook [F]arm in 3-4 year rotations 
beginning in 2008 and continuing over a 4-
year period until the entire Cook Farm has 
been rotated and is consistent with the 
current 
farm 
conservation 
plan. 
 
The 
rotation plan shall include no less than 3 
years of alfalfa for every year of corn 
planted on each acre. 
c. 
Increased frequency of soil testing from 
once every four years to once a year, 
focusing 
on 
phosphorous 
and 
nitrogen 
contents of the soil to account for residual 
nitrogen in calculating spreading plans for 
the upcoming growing season. 
2. 
Larson will exchange information with the Town 
concerning management practices of the Facility, 
including notification to the Town Chair of all 
changes in circumstances. 
3. 
Larson will allow access for testing well water 
at the Facility and access for the Town to test 
tile lines for water quality monitoring purposes 
monthly, upon proper notice to the owners of the 
Facility unless such testing is required under 
the terms of a Wisconsin Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System Permit ["WPDES Permit"] as 
issued by the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources ["DNR"].10 
4. 
Larson will submit nutrient plans and update 
annually as required under WPDES to the Town of 
Magnolia as well as to the DNR. 
5. 
Larson will comply with all provisions of the 
Town of Magnolia Zoning Ordinance and any other 
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10 A WPDES permit is a certification provided by the DNR 
under 
authority 
delegated 
by 
the 
federal 
Environmental 
Protection Agency.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 283. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   

8 
 
applicable federal, state, and local regulations 
and law. 
6. 
If 
water 
quality 
monitoring 
or 
testing 
is 
required under the terms of a WPDES permit as 
issued by the Wisconsin [DNR], the Town shall be 
provided 
with 
all 
records 
and 
information 
provided by Larson Acres to the DNR. 
7. 
The Town Board shall review the CUP annually to 
assure itself that Larson is in compliance with 
the permit. 
¶12 The conditions were preceded by sections labeled 
"findings of fact" and "conclusions of law," which emphasized 
the ecological dangers posed by the farm to fish and other 
aquatic life, as well as the health risks posed to residents' 
drinking water.  The Town Board determined that it would have 
been within its rights to deny the application outright, but 
concluded that the better course was to grant it with the 
conditions. 
¶13 Larson appealed the Town's decision to the Siting 
Board, challenging conditions one, two, three, five, and seven. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶14 After extensive briefing from the litigants, and after 
two lengthy meetings, the Siting Board issued its decision and 
affirmed the granting of the permit, while imposing its own 
substantial modifications. 
¶15 In its conclusions of law, the Siting Board determined 
as an initial matter that the Board was correct to grant the 
application because Larson had satisfied all of the requirements 
laid out by the Siting Law and ATCP 51.  The Siting Board also 
affirmed the Town's authority to impose conditions in a CUP, but 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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9 
 
it restricted such conditions to those based on the standards 
incorporated into ATCP 51. 
¶16 The Siting Board reviewed the challenged conditions 
and determined that each exceeded the Town's legal authority.  
In particular, the Siting Board reversed four of the five 
challenged conditions: one, three, five, and seven.  Those 
conditions, respectively, required Larson to provide a nutrient 
management plan according to specified strategies; allowed the 
Town access to Larson's farm for testing purposes; mandated 
compliance with the zoning ordinance "and any other applicable 
federal, state, and local regulations and law"; and provided 
that the Town would review the CUP annually to confirm 
compliance with its terms.  The Siting Board affirmed conditions 
four and six, both of which essentially required Larson to 
provide to the Town any materials that it submitted to the DNR 
as part of the WPDES permit process.11  Finally, it modified 
condition two, which required Larson to exchange information 
with the Town concerning its "management practices," by limiting 
such information to that needed by the Town in order for it to 
monitor compliance with the standards in the Siting Law and ATCP 
51. 
¶17 The Town appealed to circuit court.  Applying a de 
novo standard of review, the circuit court vacated and remanded 
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11 Larson declined to challenge conditions four and six at 
the Siting Board, and does not challenge them here.  They are 
consequently not before the court, and will not be addressed in 
the analysis.  
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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10 
 
the cause to the Siting Board.  It interpreted the Siting Law as 
having no preemptory effect on political subdivisions' powers 
that existed prior to the enactment of the Siting Law.  Instead, 
the 
court 
concluded, 
the 
law 
simply 
forced 
political 
subdivisions to follow specific procedures when they wanted to 
impose standards more stringent than the state's.  In the 
circuit court's view, the Town imposed no such standards because 
the requirements in condition five of the CUP12 were drawn from 
the state's own administrative code. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the Town acted within its lawful authority when 
it imposed the conditions. 
¶18 In contrast, the circuit court regarded the Siting 
Board as acting outside of its lawful authority when it modified 
the permit, interpreting the Siting Law and ATCP 51 as limiting 
the Board's options to outright reversals or affirmances of 
challenged permits.  Consequently, the court vacated the Siting 
Board's ruling and remanded the cause to the Siting Board for a 
determination of whether the permit should be affirmed or 
reversed in its entirety.  Acknowledging that the issues raised 
were difficult and novel ones, and predicting that they would 
ultimately be resolved by appellate courts, the circuit court 
ordered that Larson be permitted to continue operating its 
facility as before until all appeals were disposed of. 
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12 The circuit court focused its legal analysis of whether 
the 
conditions 
were 
improper 
almost 
entirely 
on 
the 
administrative chapters referenced in condition five. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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11 
 
¶19 Larson appealed.  In a published decision, the court 
of appeals reversed the circuit court.  Adams v. State Livestock 
Facilities Siting Review Bd., 2010 WI App 88, 327 Wis. 2d 676, 
787 N.W.2d 941.  It began by demurring on the question of the 
appropriate standard of review, concluding that it would reverse 
under any standard.  Id., ¶10 n.6.  The court went on to 
consider three issues: 1) whether the Town was required to act 
within the constrictions of the Siting Law in conditioning the 
permit; 2) whether the Town's conditions were proper under the 
Siting Law; and 3) whether the Siting Board was authorized to 
modify the CUP. 
¶20 On the first issue, the court of appeals determined 
that the Siting Law preempted the Town's actions.  The court 
grounded its decision on the distinction between uniformity in 
the regulation of farming operations and uniformity in the 
regulation of siting.  Id., ¶¶11-35.  It also rejected the 
Town's invocation of the public trust doctrine,13 emphasizing 
that several other mechanisms exist by which the challenged 
standards could be enforced.  Id., ¶¶36-37. 
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13 Under the public trust doctrine, the legislature and 
local governments are "bound by [their] duty to protect the 
navigable waters of the state for the citizens' benefit" and "to 
evaluate," before acting to affect the water, "all potential 
benefits that can be derived from water, including its use for 
drinking."  Gabe Johnson-Karp, That the Waters Shall Be Forever 
Free: Navigating Wisconsin's Obligations under the Public Trust 
Doctrine and the Great Lakes Compact, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 415, 422 
& n.37 (2010). 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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12 
 
¶21 On the issue of whether the Town acted within the 
Siting Law's parameters, the court tied its reversal to a 
question the trial judge elided: whether the Town adopted 
factual findings to justify the standards incorporated into the 
zoning ordinance, as required by Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar).  
Id., ¶39.  In the court's opinion, the Town had not.  "[U]nder 
no reasonable view," the court of appeals concluded, "did the 
[T]own adopt any findings of fact" to support the regulations at 
issue, and they were therefore barred by the Siting Law from 
applying them in a CUP in the siting process.  Id., ¶40. 
¶22 Finally, the court of appeals rejected the circuit 
court's 
limiting 
of 
the 
Siting 
Board 
to 
reversals 
and 
affirmances.  Id., ¶¶44-51.  Under the trial court's ruling, the 
court of appeals reasoned, an "absurd result" obtains: the 
Siting Board is forced to instruct applicants dissatisfied with 
the terms of their CUPs that their only relief, if they "win," 
is to return to the beginning of an application process they 
have already completed.  Id., ¶49. 
¶23 The Town petitioned this court for review.  After more 
than four years of litigation in four judicial and quasi-
judicial forums, the time has now come to resolve the important 
and novel issues raised by this case. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 When considering the decision of an administrative 
agency, this court reviews the agency's ruling, not the circuit 
court's.  Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶31, 320 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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13 
 
Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868 (citing Liberty Trucking Co. v. 
DILHR, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973)).  The 
question of whether the state preempted the Town's actions is a 
matter of law that we "review independently, benefitting from 
the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals."  
DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 652, 
547 N.W.2d 770 (1996). 
¶25 Although the parties dispute the appropriate level of 
deference to give the Siting Board's legal determinations,14 the 
question is not a difficult one.  Both Larson and the Siting 
Board accurately cite well-established precedent requiring de 
novo review of legal conclusions by administrative agencies when 
the issues presented are of first impression.  Clean Wisconsin, 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2005 WI 93, ¶43, 282 
Wis. 2d 250, 
700 
N.W.2d 768 
(affirming 
that 
"an 
agency's 
interpretation of a statute is given no weight at all . . . when 
the 
issue 
is 
clearly 
one 
of 
first 
impression 
for 
the 
agency . . . ."); Coutts v. Wis. Ret. Bd., 209 Wis. 2d 655, ¶14, 
562 N.W.2d 917 (1997) (same).  There has never been any 
contention that the Board had any experience interpreting the 
laws and rules at issue here prior to this case, nor that any 
other 
adjudicatory 
body 
did. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
Siting 
Board 
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14 Adams contends that the Town's legal conclusions deserve 
deference because they interpret its own zoning ordinance.  
However, since we review the Siting Board's determinations of 
law, not the Town's, we need not decide the standard of review 
that would apply to the Town's conclusions.   
No. 
2009AP608 
   

14 
 
acknowledged in its opinion that Larson's appeal was the first 
claim it ever handled. 
¶26 Even if we were to accept Larson and the Siting 
Board's argument that there are circumstances in which an 
agency's legal answers to questions of first impression deserve 
judicial deference, those circumstances are not present here.  
The Siting Board was deliberating for the first time in its 
history, interpreting a brand-new, complex regulatory scheme, in 
the absence of any controlling authority from appellate courts, 
and considering several questions that implicated the scope of 
the Board's own power.  Aside from the first-impression issue, 
there are thus several additional reasons for us not to defer to 
its legal conclusions.  See, e.g., Andersen v. DNR, 2011 WI 19, 
¶25, 332 Wis. 2d 41, 796 N.W.2d 1 ("The extent of [an] agency's 
statutory authority is a question of law which we review 
independently 
and 
without 
deference 
to 
the 
agency's 
determination.").  For the reasons set forth above, our review 
is de novo. 
IV. 
DISCUSSION 
¶27 This case presents a set of narrow but complex 
questions.  All of the issues before the court require us to 
determine whether the Town's actions were preempted by the 
Siting Law.  Therefore, we first undertake a detailed look at 
Wisconsin's 
preemption 
doctrine 
in 
order 
to 
establish 
a 
foundation upon which to analyze the plain language of the 
statute and the Town's actions.  Second, we analyze the plain 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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15 
 
language of the Siting Law and determine that it preempts 
political subdivisions from regulating livestock facility siting 
in any manner inconsistent with the Siting Law.  Third, we 
evaluate whether the Town's actions were consistent with the 
Siting Law, and determine that they were not.  Finally, we 
evaluate whether the Siting Board was entitled to modify the 
conditions of the siting permit, and conclude that it was. 
A. 
Preemption 
¶28 Preemption is a threshold question because it is clear 
(and undisputed) that prior to the enactment of the Siting Law, 
the Town would have had the authority to condition the permit as 
it did.  Therefore, if the Siting Law does not preempt the 
Town's authority to impose the challenged conditions, the Town 
acted within its legal powers and our analysis need proceed no 
further.
1. 
The Home Rule Amendment and Issues of Statewide Concern 
¶29 Longstanding Wisconsin law supports the proposition 
that political subdivisions retain their ability to govern in 
the absence of state legislation.  See State ex rel. Ekern v. 
Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 637, 639, 209 N.W. 860 (1926).  A 
constitutional amendment reinforced the importance of this 
No. 
2009AP608 
   

16 
 
bedrock principle in 1924.  Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3.15  However, 
the legislature may, on issues of statewide concern, prohibit 
political subdivisions from enacting ordinances, or invalidate 
ordinances already promulgated.  See, e.g., DeRosso, 200 
Wis. 2d at 651. 
¶30 Legislative 
enactments 
fall 
into 
one 
of 
three 
categories: 
exclusive 
statewide 
concern, 
exclusive 
local 
concern, or a "mixed bag" of both state and local concern.  
State ex rel. Michalek v. LeGrand, 77 Wis. 2d 520, 527, 253 
N.W.2d 505 (1977) (citing Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 
Wis. 58, 82, 267 N.W. 25 (1936)). 
¶31 We conclude that livestock facility siting is an issue 
of statewide concern.  We base this conclusion on the purpose of 
the Siting Law as articulated by its plain language.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 93.90(1) (stating that the Siting Law is an "enactment of 
statewide 
concern 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
providing 
uniform 
regulation 
of 
livestock facilities").  However, livestock 


15 Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3 states: "Cities and villages 
organized pursuant to state law may determine their local 
affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with 
uniformity shall affect every city or every village."  For a 
more detailed treatment of the history of the home rule 
amendment, see generally Robert W. Hansen, Municipal Home Rule 
in Wisconsin, 21 Marq. L. Rev. 74 (1937). 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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17 
 
facility siting is not a matter of exclusive statewide concern.16  
Livestock facility siting clearly affects local concerns, and 
has 
been 
traditionally 
regulated 
at 
the 
local 
level.  
Accordingly, we conclude that livestock facility siting is a 
"mixed bag" of statewide and local concern.  Michalek, 77 
Wis. 2d at 527 & n.8. 
2. 
The Anchor Test17 
¶32 When an issue falls into the "mixed bag" category, 
political 
subdivisions may adopt "ordinances which, while 
addressed to local issues, concomitantly regulate matters of 
statewide concern."  DeRosso, 200 Wis. 2d at 650 (citing Anchor 
Sav. 
& 
Loan 
Ass'n 
v. 
Equal 
Opportunities 
Comm'n, 
120 
Wis. 2d 391, 395-96, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984)).  However, "this 
authority is limited to ordinances that complement rather than 
conflict with the state legislation."  State ex rel. Ziervogel 
v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶37, 269 
Wis. 2d 549, 
676 
N.W.2d 401. 
 
Four 
factors 
guide 
our 
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
16 Livestock facility siting does not fall into any of the 
"traditional" 
categories 
of 
exclusive 
statewide 
concern 
enumerated in Van Gilder.  Van Gilder provides, as examples of 
areas of statewide concern, "the law of domestic relations, of 
wills, of inheritance, of contracts, of crimes not essentially 
local (for example, larceny or forgery), [and] the organization 
of courts."  222 Wis. at 82 (quoting Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 
705, 713 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, J.)). 
17 We refer to the four-factor preemption test as the 
"Anchor test" because it first appeared, in its modern form, in 
Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 120 
Wis. 2d 391, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984). 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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18 
 
determination of whether the political subdivision's actions are 
preempted by the state legislation:18 
(1) whether the legislature has expressly withdrawn the 
power of political subdivisions to act; or 
(2) whether the political subdivision's actions logically 
conflict with the state legislation; or 
(3) whether the political subdivision's actions defeat the 
purpose of the state legislation; or 
(4) 
whether 
the 
political 
subdivision's 
actions 
are 
contrary to the spirit of the state legislation.   
Jackson County v. DNR, 2006 WI 96, ¶¶19-20, 293 Wis. 2d 497, 717 
N.W.2d 713 (citing Mommsen v. Schueller, 228 Wis. 2d 627, 636-
37, 599 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1999)); Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Vill. of E. Troy, 2011 WI 55, ¶15, 335 Wis. 2d 92, 799 
N.W.2d 787; see also DeRosso, 200 Wis. 2d at 651-52.  Because 
the test is formulated in the disjunctive, if any one of the 
factors is met, the political subdivision's conflicting action 
is void.  DeRosso, 200 Wis. 2d at 652. 
¶33 Applying this test, we look to the plain language of 
the Siting Law to determine whether the Town's actions violate 
any of the four factors.  We conclude that the conditions 
imposed by the Town violate the first factor because they were 
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18 Prior cases have applied this test when there have been  
challenges to political subdivisions' ordinances.  The test is 
also properly applied where, as here, the action of the 
political subdivision has the force and effect of law. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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19 
 
an attempt to exercise power expressly withdrawn by the plain 
language of the Siting Law.19 
B. 
The Legislature Has Expressly Withdrawn the Power of 
Political Subdivisions to Act in the Field of Livestock 
Facility Siting 
¶34 To apply the Anchor test, we must evaluate the plain 
language of the statute to determine whether the Town's actions 
are preempted by the Siting Law.  This is a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  Therefore, we resort to our standard means of 
statutory interpretation: an evaluation of the plain meaning. 
¶35 When interpreting a statute, language is given "its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  Both the context and structure of the statute are 
relevant to a plain meaning analysis, and the statute is 
interpreted to "avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., 
¶46. 
¶36 We begin with the plain language of the statute, and 
determine that the power of political subdivisions to regulate 
livestock facility siting has been expressly withdrawn by the 
legislature.  We conclude that the legislature has expressly 


19 Because we conclude that the Siting Law has expressly 
withdrawn political subdivisions' power to regulate livestock 
facility siting, we need not evaluate the other three factors.  
Jackson County v. DNR, 2006 WI 96, ¶20, 293 Wis. 2d 497, 717 
N.W.2d 713. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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20 
 
withdrawn political subdivisions' power to regulate livestock 
facility siting by: 1) creating uniform state standards that all 
political subdivisions must follow; 2) mandating that political 
subdivisions may not disapprove CUPs for livestock facilities, 
with limited exceptions; and 3) requiring political subdivisions 
to grant CUPs for livestock facilities. 
1. 
The Siting Law Provides for Uniform State Standards 
¶37 The purpose of the Siting Law, set forth in the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 93.90(1), is to provide "uniform 
regulation of livestock facilities."  To effectuate its goal of 
uniformity 
in 
livestock 
facility 
siting, 
the 
legislature 
required the promulgation of a comprehensive statewide livestock 
siting standard.  Wis. Stat. § 93.90(2)(a) (ordering the 
Department 
to 
"promulgate 
rules 
specifying 
standards 
for 
siting . . . livestock 
facilities"). 
 
The 
legislature 
was 
careful to provide boundaries to the new regulations.  For 
example, it prohibited the Department from promulgating rules 
relating to livestock facility siting that conflict with Wis. 
Stat. § 93.90(2)(a).  Id.  Further, the legislature allowed——but 
did not require——the Department to incorporate those same 
sections into its newly-minted state standards.20  Id. 
¶38 The Town argues that the Department may not, acting on 
its own, preempt local authority through its regulation.  In 
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
20 In promulgating ATCP 51, the Department elected to 
incorporate multiple state and federal regulations, as well as 
sections of the Wisconsin statutes.  We refer to these 
regulations as the "state standards."  The specific contents of 
these regulations are not relevant to our analysis. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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21 
 
general, we agree with this principle.  However, the Town's 
argument is not persuasive here because the Department did not 
act on its own, but instead acted pursuant to the express 
instruction of the legislature.  Put simply, the Department 
acted precisely how an agency is supposed to act where the 
legislature has delegated rulemaking authority.  Wis. Stat. § 
227.11(2)(a) (permitting "[e]ach agency [to] promulgate rules 
interpreting 
the 
provisions 
of 
any 
statute 
enforced 
or 
administered by the agency"); see Oneida Cnty. v. Converse, 180 
Wis. 2d 120, 125, 508 N.W.2d 416 (1993) ("An administrative 
agency may not issue a rule that is not expressly or impliedly 
authorized by the legislature."). 
¶39 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
by 
requiring 
the 
promulgation of state standards for livestock facility siting, 
the legislature expressly withdrew the power of political 
subdivisions to enforce varied and inconsistent livestock 
facility siting standards. 
2. 
The Legislature Has Preempted the Authority of Political 
Subdivisions to Disapprove Livestock Facility Siting Permits 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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22 
 
¶40 The 
Siting 
Law 
expressly 
withdraws 
political 
subdivisions' authority to disapprove livestock facility siting 
permits unless one of eight narrow exceptions applies.  Wis. 
Stat. § 93.90(3)(a) provides, in part: "Notwithstanding ss. 
33.455, 59.03(2)(a), 59.69, 60.10(2)(i), 60.61, 60.62, 61.34(1), 
61.35, 
62.11(5), 
62.23, 
66.0415, 
92.07(2), 
92.11, 
and 
92.15(3)(a), a political subdivision may not disapprove . . . a 
livestock facility siting [permit]."  (emphasis added). 
¶41 The 
Town 
argues 
that 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
word 
"notwithstanding" is ambiguous, and that the proper definition 
is "in addition to."  In other words, the Town asserts that the 
legislature intended to allow political subdivisions to continue 
disapproving applications for reasons outside the Siting Law. 
¶42 The Town cites two cases in which the court did in 
fact conclude that the term "notwithstanding" was ambiguous.  
Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶36, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866 
(defining "notwithstanding" to mean "in lieu of"); Bartholomew 
v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶84, 293 
Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (defining "notwithstanding" to mean 
"in spite of").  Nevertheless, that a term is ambiguous in one 
context does not render it ambiguous in all.  Indeed, in Maurin 
we acknowledged that the meaning of "notwithstanding" can be 
made clear by the surrounding language.  274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶37 
(acknowledging that "the meaning of 'notwithstanding' by itself 
is not clear") (emphasis added). 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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23 
 
¶43 The ordinary meaning of the term is clear.  Black's 
defines "notwithstanding" as "[d]espite; in spite of," Black's 
Law Dictionary 1168 (9th ed. 2009), and lay dictionaries agree, 
see, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1238 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "notwithstanding" as "in 
spite of").  This definition is the only sensible one in light 
of the Siting Law's purpose: statewide uniformity in the 
regulation 
of 
livestock 
facility 
siting. 
 
For 
if 
"notwithstanding" meant what the Town believes it to mean, there 
would be no restraints on the ability of political subdivisions 
to impose a host of diverse standards on the siting process, 
thus subjecting farm operators to inconsistent conditions.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(a) should be 
read to provide that "[i]n spite of [previous statutory 
authority afforded to political subdivisions], a political 
subdivision may not disapprove . . . a livestock facility siting 
[permit]."  (emphasis added).  
¶44 In 
light 
of 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 93.90(3)(a), it is clear that the term "notwithstanding" means 
"in spite of."  Therefore, the Siting Law's prohibition on 
disapproving livestock facility siting permits pertains to all 
such 
permits, 
and 
leaves 
no 
authority 
to 
the 
political 
subdivisions to disapprove permits. 
¶45 The legislature did create narrow exceptions that 
allow a political subdivision to disapprove a livestock facility 
siting permit.  Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(a)1.-9. (providing the 
No. 
2009AP608 
   

24 
 
exceptions to the rule that that "a political subdivision may 
not disapprove or prohibit a livestock facility siting or 
expansion").  The exception which is pertinent to our analysis 
is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(a)6.21  According to that 
section, if a political subdivision wishes to disapprove a 
livestock facility siting permit for failure to satisfy some 
requirement imposed by a political subdivision but not contained 
in the Siting Law, the political subdivision must "[a]dopt[] the 
requirement 
by 
ordinance 
before 
the 
applicant 
files 
the 
application for approval," and 2) "[b]ase[] the requirement on 
reasonable and scientifically defensible findings of fact, 
adopted by the political subdivision."  § 93.90(3)(a)6.a.-b.  
This requirement ensures that farm operators receive notice of 
local standards that differ from the state's, and that they are 
not subjected to arbitrary or unreasonable conditions.  
¶46 Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature has 
expressly withdrawn, with limited exceptions, the power formerly 
reserved to political subdivisions to disapprove livestock 
facility siting permits. 
3. 
The Legislature Has Limited the Conditions a Political 
Subdivisions May Impose When Granting Livestock Facility Siting 
Permits 
¶47 The Siting Law not only expressly withdraws political 
subdivisions' power to disapprove livestock facility siting 
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
21 In the interest of brevity, we do not list all of the 
exceptions in Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(a)1.-9. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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25 
 
permits absent some narrow exception, but also expressly 
withdraws 
political 
subdivisions' power to impose certain 
conditions when they grant such permits.22  When political 
subdivisions grant a livestock facility siting permit, they must 
condition the permit on compliance "with the applicable state 
standards." Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ae).  This requirement imposed 
by the legislature upon political subdivisions that grant 
livestock facility siting permits pertains to all such permits, 
and leaves no authority to the political subdivisions to grant 
permits in a manner inconsistent with the Siting Law. 
¶48 Mirroring 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 93.90(3)(a)6 (pertaining to the disapproval of permits), 
§ 93.90(3)(ar) provides that if a political subdivision wishes 
to grant a livestock facility siting permit and condition it on 
a requirement not contained in the state standards, it must: 1) 
"[a]dopt[] the requirement by ordinance before the applicant 
files the application for approval;" and 2) "[b]ase[] the 
requirement on reasonable and scientifically defensible findings 
of fact, adopted by the political subdivision." 
¶49 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
legislature 
has 
expressly 
withdrawn the power of a political subdivision to condition the 
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
22 The two exceptions addressed in paragraphs 61 and 65 are 
nearly identical.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(a)6.a.-b. with 
§ 93.90(3)(ar) (requiring identical procedure to either deny a 
siting permit or approve the permit with additional, "more 
stringent" 
conditions). 
 
This 
supports 
our 
plain-meaning 
interpretation that the Siting Law expressly withdraws the power 
of political subdivisions to regulate, in any manner, livestock 
facility siting permits, unless they comply with the Siting Law. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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26 
 
grant of a livestock facility siting permit on any requirement 
other than the state standards unless the political subdivision 
has complied with the single, narrow exception contained in 
§ 93.90(3)(ar). 
¶50 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the 
legislature has expressly withdrawn from political subdivisions 
the power to regulate livestock facility siting in any manner 
not prescribed by the Siting Law.  It has done so by 1) 
promulgating uniform state standards designed to supersede local 
standards, 2) requiring that political subdivisions may not 
disapprove livestock facility siting permits, and 3) requiring 
that political subdivisions must condition permits on only the 
state standards.23  Therefore, any attempt by the Town to 
regulate the livestock facility siting process outside the 
parameters set by the Siting Law is preempted.  Jackson, 293 
Wis. 2d 497, ¶¶19-20 (holding that where the legislature has 
expressly withdrawn the power of political subdivisions to act, 
any attempt by the subdivision to exercise the withdrawn power 
is preempted).   
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
23 The legislature has, through the exceptions contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(a)1.-9. and § 93.90(3)(ar), granted back 
to political subdivisions a small amount of their former power 
to regulate livestock facility siting permits.  The presence of 
these exceptions does not mean that the Siting Law failed to 
expressly withdraw political subdivisions' power in the field of 
livestock facilities siting.  On the contrary, exceptions are 
the result of a general rule.  Here, the general rule is the 
express withdrawal of political subdivisions' authority to 
disapprove livestock facility siting permits. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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27 
 
¶51 The Town's concern that the legislature's preemption 
of the Town's former power over livestock facility siting will 
allow water polluters to operate without the threat of sanction 
is unwarranted.  Several actors retain the tools and the 
authority to regulate water quality.  For instance, the WPDES 
permit, under which Larson operates, makes available enforcement 
actions for water pollution brought by the federal and state 
governments, as well as by private individuals.  See generally 
Domino v. Didion Ethanol, LLC, 670 F. Supp. 2d 901, 912-13 (W.D. 
Wis. 2009).  Additionally, the state has several enforcement 
mechanisms available to it for the enforcement of proper 
environmental standards, including water quality standards. For 
example, the State, through the DNR and the Department, remains 
free to promulgate and enforce regulations related to the 
operation of livestock facilities.  Indeed, there are lengthy 
sections of the administrative code designed to ensure the 
protection of Wisconsin's waters.  See, e.g., Wis. Admin. Code 
chs. NR 200, 300, 800; Wis. Admin. Code chs. ATCP 31, 50.  
Nothing in the Siting Law preempts the enforcement of such 
regulations, so long as the enforcement takes place outside the 
siting permit application process.24   
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
24  The dissent believes that it is "absurd" for conditions 
in a siting permit to be void under the Siting Law when at the 
same time "the Town has the power to regulate the operations of 
the livestock facility" in other ways.  Dissent, ¶69.  "It 
doesn't make any sense" to the dissent "to interpret the Siting 
Law as prohibiting a political subdivision from granting a 
permit with otherwise valid conditions regulating the livestock 
facility" while at the same time "interpret[ing] the Siting Law 
as invalidating the permit conditions yet allowing the political 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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28 
 
¶52 Accordingly, the Town was preempted from regulating 
livestock facility siting in a manner inconsistent with the 
Siting Law.  Therefore, we conclude that in order for its 
decision to be upheld, the Town must have demonstrated that it 
met one of the narrow exceptions in the Siting Law in order to 
regulate livestock facility siting. 
C. 
The Challenged Conditions Failed to Satisfy the Narrow 
Exception Set Forth in § 93.90(3)(Ar) Because the Town 
Failed to Adopt Fact-Finding to Support Any of the 
Requirements Imposed in the CUP 
¶53 The Town was preempted from acting outside the 
parameters of the Siting Law in the permitting process.  
Therefore, the question is whether the Town passed its zoning 
ordinance——and imposed its conditions——in accordance with the 
procedures laid out by the Siting Law.  We hold that it did not. 
¶54 There is only one mechanism in the Siting Law that 
allows a political subdivision to condition a permit on 
standards outside of those contained in ATCP 51, and that 
mechanism is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar) (allowing 
political subdivisions to impose conditions based on more 

subdivision to impose the same conditions on the operation of 
the livestock facility and to pursue remedies against a 
polluting facility."  Dissent, ¶99.  The distinction between 
livestock facility siting and livestock facility operations may 
not "make any sense" to the dissent, but it surely made sense to 
the legislature, given that the entire Siting Law is premised on 
that distinction.  To ignore the distinction in this case, as 
the dissent does, is to ignore the entire framework and content 
of the statute, beginning with its title.        
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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29 
 
stringent standards if they were adopted by the subdivision 
before the application was filed and were based on findings 
adopted by the subdivision).  The legislature's decision to 
afford but a single avenue for the imposition of such conditions 
underscores 
that 
it 
is 
the 
only 
vehicle 
for 
political 
subdivisions to use if they want to reach outside the standards 
incorporated by the regulations themselves.  See Groh v. Groh, 
110 Wis. 2d 117, 125, 327 N.W.2d 655 (1982) (applying the 
statutory canon of expressio unius est exclusion alterius,25 "the 
legislature's failure to specifically confer [a] power is 
evidence of legislative intent not to permit the exercise of the 
power."); DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶29, 299 
Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 (holding that statutory canons are 
applied 
to 
the 
interpretation 
of 
rules 
promulgated 
by 
administrative agencies). 
¶55 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar)2., a political 
subdivision may impose a condition more stringent than the state 
standards only if it grounds its conditions "on reasonable and 
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
25 Expressio 
unius 
est 
exclusion 
alterius 
is 
roughly 
translated as "to express or include one thing implies the 
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 661 (9th ed. 2009). 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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30 
 
scientifically defensible findings of fact, adopted by the 
political subdivision."26   
¶56 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that none of 
the conditions the Town imposed were based on fact-finding the 
Town adopted.  As a result, we hold that the Town improperly 
imposed all of the challenged conditions. 
¶57 The Town insists that Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar)2. 
"does not specify who must create reasonable and scientifically 
defensible findings of fact."  It is true that the provision is 
silent on who "creates" the findings, but that is not the 
question here.  The issue is who must adopt the findings, and 
the provision is clear on this point: the Town must.  We reject 
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
26 We note that several additional questions are implicated 
by the parties' arguments, including: whether the Town timely 
incorporated 
the 
four 
administrative 
chapters 
imposed 
in 
condition 
five 
of 
the 
CUP, 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 93.90(3)(ar)1.; whether a political subdivision may condition 
a permit on a requirement that does not appear to be a 
"standard" at all, let alone a "more stringent" one (e.g., 
rights of access, exchange of information, annual review of a 
CUP, etc.); whether a subdivision may condition a permit on 
requirements that fall under categories other than those 
regulated by the state in the sections incorporated by ATCP 51 
(e.g., if ATCP 51 incorporated restrictions on phosphorous but 
not nitrogen, and the Town sought to regulate the latter); and 
whether a "more stringent" analysis may be conducted with 
reference to "narrative" standards that offer general, verbal 
prescriptions, as opposed to "performance" standards, which 
include precise, numerical limitations.  Cf. Pennaco Energy, 
Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. Review, 199 P.3d 191, 200 (Mont. 
2008) (affirming a trial court's conclusion that "because there 
were no corresponding federal numeric standards . . . [the] 
adoption of numeric standards was not 'more stringent' than a 
federal standard").  Because resolution of these questions is 
not required by the instant case, we save these questions for 
another day.   
No. 
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31 
 
the 
Town's 
attempt 
to 
inject 
ambiguity 
into 
unambiguous 
statutory language.  Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶25, 
260 
Wis. 2d 633, 
660 
N.W.2d 656 
(2003) 
("Statutory 
interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a 
search for ambiguity."); accord Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47. 
¶58 Aside from this and similar word-play,27 the only 
rationale advanced by the Town in support of its position that 
it properly adopted fact-finding to warrant the imposition of 
the conditions in the CUP is that it implicitly adopted the 
facts found by the state to justify the state standards.  There 
is no authority for a political subdivision to implicitly adopt 
any fact-finding by any entity for the purpose of satisfying the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar)2., nor, indeed, for 
any other purpose.  Although there are circumstances in which 
implicit fact-finding is permissible, see, e.g., State v. 
Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 672, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993) (discussing 
judicial fact-finding), it may not be done in the face of an 
express legislative demand for actual adoption.  This is so 
because we must give effect to every requirement in the statute, 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46, and the law requires the adoption 
of fact-finding by the Town.   
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
27 For instance, Adams writes that the Town's water quality 
ordinance 
was 
"based 
upon 
reasonable 
and 
scientifically 
defensible factual findings because it adopts state water 
quality standards." This argument blurs the crucial distinction 
between basing a standard on fact-finding and actually adopting 
the fact-finding.  Furthermore, even if the argument were valid 
it would have no bearing on this case, because there is no 
indication that the Town did in fact base the standards imposed 
in the CUP on the state's fact-finding. 
No. 
2009AP608 
   

32 
 
¶59 Accordingly, we conclude that because the Town failed 
to adopt fact-finding to support the standards it sought to 
impose in the CUP, all of the challenged conditions were infirm 
under Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar)2.28  
D. 
The Siting Board Was Entitled to Modify the CUP 
¶60 Having concluded that the conditions in the permit 
were improper, there remains the question of what the Siting 
Board was supposed to do with them.  It could have reversed the 
Town's decision in its entirety, restoring the parties to the 
position they were in before Larson filed the application.  
Instead, it modified the CUP, striking conditions one, three, 
five, 
and 
seven 
as 
invalid, 
narrowing 
condition 
two 
as 
overbroad, and affirming the unchallenged conditions (four and 
six).  We agree with the court of appeals that the Board acted 
properly. 
¶61 The Siting Law instructs the Siting Board that it 
"shall," if it determines that a challenge is justified, 
"reverse the decision of the political subdivision."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 93.90(5)(d).  In the Town's view, this provision compels the 
Board to outright reverse improper permits rather than modify 
them.  We disagree. 
¶62 It 
is 
true, 
as 
the 
Town 
observes, 
that 
an 
administrative agency has "only those powers which are expressly 
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28 Like the court of appeals, we express no view on whether 
a political subdivision may, under certain circumstances, adopt 
fact-finding conducted by the state or other political entities 
when the subdivision incorporates standards set forth elsewhere 
into its local siting process.   
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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33 
 
conferred or which are necessarily implied by the statutes under 
which it operates."  Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes and 
Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶14, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 
(quoting Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. PSC, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 
329 N.W.2d 143 (1983)).  Understandably, the Town zeroes in on 
the first clause: expressly conferred.  We consider both, and 
hold that the Siting Board properly exercised an implied power 
under the statute.  
¶63 Our holding is compelled by the unusual circumstances 
of the case.  First, the Town committed the initial error that 
the Siting Board was required by law to rectify.  The Town 
imposed the impermissible, extra-legal conditions.  It would 
make little sense, therefore, to read the Siting Law as 
prohibiting the Siting Board from correcting the problem in as 
efficient a manner as possible.  
¶64 In the same vein, the Siting Law and ATCP 51 were 
plainly designed to facilitate the speedy approval of proper 
siting applications.  See, e.g., DATCP Analysis, Business Impact 
(noting 
that, 
under 
old 
regime, 
some 
"operators, 
though 
ultimately 
successful, 
incurred 
extraordinary 
(and 
often 
unnecessary) costs and delays").  It would significantly 
frustrate that purpose to invalidate the Siting Board's action 
precisely because it was the most efficient option available.  
In other words, long and unnecessary delays in the process were 
the problem, and it would only compound that problem to "reward" 
farm operators challenging invalid CUPs by returning them to the 
No. 
2009AP608 
   
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34 
 
beginning of the application process.  See, e.g., DATCP 
Analysis, Business Impact (stating that under old regime, some 
"operators, though ultimately successful, incurred extraordinary 
(and often unnecessary) costs and delays").  Such an outcome 
would render many of the other carefully designed components of 
the statute meaningless.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (holding 
that context and structure of the statute are relevant to 
interpretation). 
¶65 Moreover, the unique procedural posture the appeal was 
in when it reached the Siting Board put the Board in an 
extremely difficult, almost untenable, position.  It would be 
absurd for the Siting Board to tell Larson, which filed an 
application more than four years ago and was entitled to a 
permit shortly thereafter, that it was required to return to the 
beginning of the application process because of the Town's 
mistake.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Siting Board acted 
properly pursuant to an implied power.29 30 
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
29 Our holding today regarding the Siting Board's authority 
is a narrow one.  We hold that when, as here, a political 
subdivision imposes conditions not authorized by the Siting Law 
or ATCP 51, the Siting Board may modify the conditions so as to 
render them in conformity with the Siting Law.  In such a 
circumstance, the Siting Board need not return the farm operator 
to the beginning of the application process, which it has 
already properly completed.  We do not address situations that 
may arise with respect to other agencies, and we craft no 
exceptions to the well-settled rules of administrative law.   
30 Our decision does not leave political subdivisions without 
recourse 
against 
polluters. 
 
Most 
importantly, 
political 
subdivisions retain the authority to bring nuisance abatement 
actions against polluting farms.  See Wis. Stat. § 823.01.  More 
generally, 
this 
decision 
does 
not 
speak 
to 
political 
No. 
2009AP608 
   

35 
 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶66 In Wisconsin, as in states all over the country, the 
legislature has taken steps to balance the important interest in 
protecting 
precious 
natural 
resources 
with 
the 
important 
interest in encouraging a robust and efficient agricultural 
economy.  As a central component of balancing these interests, 
the legislature has strictly limited the ability of political 
subdivisions to regulate the livestock facility siting process.  
The Town stepped over those limitations when it impermissibly 
conditioned the terms of a siting permit without following the 
guidelines set forth by the legislature.  Because the Town’s 
actions were violative of the Siting Law, the court of appeals 
was correct to find the challenged conditions in the permit 
invalid, and we therefore affirm.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
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subdivisions' ability to regulate livestock facility operations.  
It simply says that the legislature has forbidden them from 
regulating livestock facility siting except as permitted by the 
Siting Law. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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
¶67 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  This is 
the first case that the Wisconsin Livestock Facility Siting 
Review Board has had involving Wis. Stat. § 93.90, the Siting 
Law.  It is also the first Siting Law case to come to this 
court.  
¶68 The Siting Law is a complex statute.  It is difficult 
to fit its various provisions together with the related 
provisions of the Wisconsin Administrative Code and apply them 
in a coherent, cohesive manner.  As counsel for Larson Acres 
wryly observed in response to a question about the complexity of 
the Siting Law, the Law "require[s] a fair amount of close 
attention." 
¶69 I write separately for three reasons: 
I.  The majority opinion's analysis of the text of the 
Siting Law as expressly withdrawing the powers at 
issue from the Town is not a reasonable interpretation 
and application of preemption law to the Siting Law.  
II. The majority opinion's interpretation of the Siting Law 
reaches an absurd result.  The majority opinion voids 
conditions the Town imposed, although it acknowledges 
that regardless of the permit, the Town has the power 
to regulate the operations of the livestock facility. 
III. The majority opinion violates the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 93.90(5)(d) in concluding that the Siting 
Board may modify conditions the Town imposed in 
granting a siting permit. 
I 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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2 

¶70 The majority opinion's analysis of the text of the 
Siting Law as expressly withdrawing the powers at issue from the 
Town is not a reasonable interpretation and application of 
preemption law to the Siting Law.  No such express language can 
be found.  According to the Siting Law, the Siting Board, the 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, and 
local governments exercise power over siting of livestock 
facilities.  
¶71 As 
the 
majority 
correctly 
recognizes, 
livestock 
facility siting is a matter of statewide concern, but it is not 
a matter of exclusively statewide concern.  Majority op., ¶31.  
Rather, 
livestock 
facility 
siting 
has 
traditionally 
been 
regulated at the local level.  Although Wis. Stat. § 93.90(1) 
provides that the Siting Law "is an enactment of statewide 
concern," this court has explained that "[l]abelling a matter 
one of statewide concern does not . . . automatically void local 
regulation."1 
¶72 The 
Siting 
Law 
does 
not 
establish 
a 
statewide 
permitting system.  Rather, the Siting Law empowers political 
subdivisions 
to 
disapprove 
siting 
permits 
under 
certain 
circumstances and to issue special exceptions or conditional use 
permits under certain circumstances.  The Siting Law limits the 
power of political subdivisions in siting permits, but does not 
withdraw all authority of political subdivisions over livestock 
facilities.     
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
1 DeRosso 
Landfill 
Co. 
v. 
City 
of 
Oak 
Creek, 
200 
Wis. 2d 642, 650, 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996). 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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3 

¶73 It is true that the Siting Law is geared toward 
providing more uniformity in decision making related to siting 
livestock facilities.  Wis. Stat. § 93.90(1).  To achieve this 
goal, the legislature empowered the Department of Agriculture, 
Trade and Consumer Protection (the Department) to promulgate 
certain standards for siting permits that will apply statewide.2  
The Department has developed standards on several subjects, 
including livestock structures, odor, nutrient management, waste 
storage facilities, and runoff management.  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ ATCP 51.12-.20 (Apr. 2009). 
¶74 Nevertheless, 
the 
Siting 
Law 
explicitly 
allows 
differences in political subdivisions granting and denying 
permits across the state.  Even in relation to topics that the 
Department has addressed, such as odor, towns may impose "more 
stringent" conditions if they satisfy the prerequisites of Wis. 
Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar).  Additionally, nothing in the text of the 
Siting Law or Chapter 51 of the Administrative Code explicitly 
prohibits towns from imposing conditions relating to subjects 
that the Department has not addressed.   
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
2 See Wis. Stat. § 93.90(2)(a): 
For the purposes of this section, the department shall 
promulgate rules specifying standards for siting and 
expanding livestock facilities.  In promulgating the 
rules, the department may incorporate by cross-
reference provisions contained in rules promulgated 
under ss. 92.05(3)(c) and (k), 92.14(8), 92.16, and 
281.16(3) and ch. 283.  The department may not 
promulgate rules under this paragraph that conflict 
with rules promulgated under s. 92.05(3)(c) or (k), 
92.14(8), 92.16, or 281.16(3) or ch. 283.  
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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4 

¶75 Finally, the Siting Law does not govern all the 
operations of the livestock facility.  Nothing in the Siting Law 
withdraws the authority of a political subdivision to regulate 
the ongoing operations of a livestock facility. 
¶76 Even with a "fair amount of close attention," it is 
difficult to conclude, as the majority opinion does, that the 
Town's power to impose its conditions was "expressly withdrawn 
by the plain language of the Siting Law."3  Majority op., ¶33.   
¶77 The majority begins its analysis by stating that "the 
legislature 
expressly 
withdrew 
the 
power 
of 
political 
subdivisions to enforce varied and inconsistent livestock 
facility siting standards" by "requiring the promulgation of 
state standards for livestock facility siting."  Majority op., 
¶39.  The majority opinion does not explain how delegating rule-
making power to the Department constitutes express withdrawal of 
power from political subdivisions.  After painting with a broad 
brush, the majority opinion quickly concludes that the specific 
content of the Department rules is not relevant to its analysis.  
Majority op., ¶37 n.20.       
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
3 The test for whether local action is preempted by a state 
statute was first fully articulated by this court in Anchor 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Commission, 120 
Wis. 2d 391, 395-96, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984).  Although the 
majority refers to the Anchor test as having four "factors," 
majority op., ¶32, the Anchor test actually sets forth four 
independent ways in which preemption may be found: (1) The 
legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities 
to act; (2) the ordinance logically conflicts with the state 
legislation; (3) the ordinance defeats the purpose of the state 
legislation; or (4) the ordinance goes against the spirit of the 
state legislation.  Anchor, 120 Wis. 2d at 397.  The second, 
third, and fourth forms of preemption seem very similar. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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5 

¶78 The majority then turns to Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3), the 
provision detailing the power of political subdivisions to 
disapprove and conditionally approve a siting application.  The 
majority reads Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(a) as providing nine 
grounds on which a political subdivision may reject a siting 
application and concludes that other grounds for rejecting a 
siting application are "expressly withdrawn."  Majority op., 
¶¶44-46.  The majority further concludes that because the 
legislature has required political subdivisions to require 
compliance with the Department's statewide standards and the 
legislature has also authorized political subdivisions to impose 
certain conditions on the granting of a conditional use siting 
permit, it has "expressly withdrawn the power of a political 
subdivision to condition the grant" on any other grounds.  
Majority op., ¶49.   
¶79 In other words, according to the majority opinion, the 
Siting Law has expressly withdrawn local control because:  (1) 
the Town can deny a permit only if one of the nine grounds is 
met; (2) the Town must require compliance with Department rules 
in granting a permit; and (3) the Town can impose conditions 
more stringent than the Department rules only if the Town meets 
certain statutory prerequisites.  
¶80 Because the majority must concede that that political 
subdivisions retain some authority over siting permits, the 
majority opinion intermittently backs away from its "express 
withdrawal" rationale.  Thus the majority opinion occasionally 
switches its reasoning to analyze whether the Town's actions are 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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6 

"inconsistent" with the Siting Law.  Majority op. ¶¶47, 51.  
Furthermore, the majority opinion explains in a footnote that 
although the legislation does not expressly withdraw all powers 
from the political subdivisions, the majority opinion interprets 
the statute as creating a general rule that all powers are 
withdrawn from the political subdivisions except those expressly 
permitted by the siting statute.  Majority op., ¶50 n.23.  So 
much for the statute expressly withdrawing powers from political 
subdivisions!   
¶81 Because 
the 
Siting 
Law 
expressly 
empowers 
both 
political subdivisions and the State to govern the siting of 
livestock facilities, I would analyze the instant case and 
determine the preemption issue by asking whether the Town's 
exercise of power conflicts with the Siting Law, defeats the 
purpose of the Siting Law, or goes against the spirit of the 
Siting Law.    
II 
¶82 The majority opinion's interpretation of the Siting 
Law reaches an absurd result.  The majority opinion voids 
conditions the Town imposed, although it acknowledges that 
regardless of the permit, the Town has the power to regulate the 
operations of the livestock facility. 
¶83 The majority opinion, ¶65 n.30, and Larson Acres 
recognize that the Siting Law does not deprive a political 
subdivision of authority to enforce existing laws not contained 
in the Siting Law against a livestock facility.  The Siting Law 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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7 

does not preclude a political subdivision from regulating a 
livestock facility.  
¶84 Indeed, applicants for a local siting permit must 
acknowledge that laws other than the Siting Law apply to 
livestock operations and that violation of these other laws may 
have consequences.  The siting application form provides that 
many substantive laws beyond the rules promulgated by the 
Department "may apply to the operation of a livestock facility."  
The application form explains that "[l]ocal approval of a 
livestock facility siting application is NOT based on these 
laws, 
except 
as 
specifically 
provided 
in 
[Wis. 
Admin. 
Code §] ATCP 51," but that "violations may have other legal 
consequences . . . ."  
¶85 In the present case, the Town granted Larson Acres the 
permit.  The Town imposed seven conditions it concluded were 
needed to enforce state water quality standards.  The Siting Law 
has provisions that govern a Town's granting a permit.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 93.90(3)(ae), (am), (ar).  
¶86 In other provisions, the Siting Law limits a political 
subdivision in disapproving or prohibiting a livestock facility 
siting.  A political subdivision "may not disapprove or prohibit 
a livestock facility siting or expansion unless at least one of 
the" circumstances set forth in Wis. Stat. § 90.93(3)(a)1.-9. 
applies.   
¶87 The Siting Board and the majority opinion read Wis. 
Stat. § 93.90(3)(a), which governs disapproving a permit, to 
mean that a political subdivision is required to approve 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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8 

unconditionally a siting application except under the limited 
circumstances for disapproval set forth in § 90.93(3)(a)1.-9. 
and the limited circumstances for conditional approval set forth 
in § 93.90(3)(ae), (am), and (ar).  This reading is not 
compelled by the plain text of the Siting Law.  The provisions 
governing the disapproval of a siting application and the 
provisions governing the granting of a conditional use permit 
are separate provisions in the statute and should be read 
separately.   
¶88 I now turn to the conditions the Town imposed in 
granting the permit.  The Town asserts in effect that all seven 
conditions are necessary to ensure Larson Acres' compliance with 
state water quality standards and that the Town has the power 
(outside the Siting Law) to impose these conditions.  For 
purposes of this dissent, I accept these assertions.  The 
majority opinion, the Siting Board, and Larson Acres do not 
appear to challenge the Town's power to regulate the facility's 
ongoing operations in terms of state water quality standards.  
Rather, they maintain that the Town cannot regulate water 
quality standards by including these conditions in the siting 
permit.   
¶89 Should the Town's conditions in the siting permit be 
upheld, the question may arise regarding the remedies the Town 
has if Larson Acres does not comply with one of the conditions.  
Larson Acres assumes the Town would revoke or withdraw the 
siting permit should Larson Acres not comply with a condition, 
which it contends would be akin to rejecting the siting permit 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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9 

in the first instance.  The Town does not discuss its powers to 
enforce the conditions in the event of a violation if they were 
held to be valid conditions in the present case.  I do not 
address this issue because the Town is not attempting to revoke 
or withdraw the permit in the present case.4  I recognize, as the 
parties and the majority opinion do, that the Town may have 
means other than permit revocation or withdrawal, such as 
mandamus or injunctive relief, to enforce the conditions.  
¶90 Although it is within the power of the Department to 
promulgate rules under the Siting Law regarding water quality, 
Wis. Stat. § 93.90(2)(a), the Department has not done so.  The 
Siting Law expressly limits the Department's rule-making power 
were the Department to promulgate rules regarding water quality:  
the rules may not conflict with several existing water quality 
statutes.  Wis. Stat. § 93.90(2)(a).  Under these circumstances, 
in my opinion, any permit conditions based on state water 
quality standards are consistent with and are not preempted by 
the Siting Law. 
¶91 Moreover, because the Department has not promulgated 
rules regulating water quality under Wis. Stat. § 93.90(2)(a), a 
plain reading of the text of the Siting Law is that the Town's 
imposition of a condition relating to water quality in granting 
a permit is not the imposition of a "more stringent [condition] 
than the state standards under sub. (2)(a) [of the Siting Law]."  
See Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ar).   
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4 Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ ATCP 
51.34(4)(b) 
identifies 
circumstances under which a siting permit may be withdrawn. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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10 

¶92 The Siting Board narrowed Town condition number 2.  It 
affirmed, without explanation, conditions 4 and 6, which were 
not challenged.  The Siting Board struck conditions 1, 3, 5, and 
7 as "an incorrect application of the Law and the regulations" 
or as "in excess of the Town's authority." 
¶93 Some of the Town's conditions (like conditions 2, 3, 
4, and 6) are notice-type or access-type requirements relating 
to water quality that would allow the Town to be in a position 
to enforce existing water quality laws.   
¶94 Do 
such 
conditions 
requiring 
notice 
or 
access 
contravene the express language of the Siting Law?  The Town's 
access to information is not expressly withdrawn, revoked, or 
restricted by the Siting Law.  Do these conditions conflict with 
the Siting Law?  Defeat the purpose of the Siting Law?  Or go 
against the spirit of the Siting Law?  I think not.     
¶95 Wisconsin Admin. Code § ATCP 51.34(4) provides that 
"[chapter 51] does not limit a political subdivision's authority 
to . . . (a) [m]onitor compliance . . . ."  It is certainly 
arguable that these "notice-type" conditions are for the purpose 
of monitoring compliance with applicable laws.5  The Board has 
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5 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 93.90(5)(c) provides that the 
Siting Board, in deciding a challenge involving the application 
of requirements relating to water quality, must consult with 
either the Department or the Department of Natural Resources:   
In 
a 
case 
that 
involves 
the 
application 
of 
requirements related to water quality, the board shall 
consult with the department of agriculture, trade and 
consumer protection or with the department of natural 
resources 
concerning 
the 
application 
of 
the 
requirement related to water quality. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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11 

interpreted "monitoring compliance" as limited to monitoring 
compliance with standards pursuant to ch. ATCP 51, subchapter 
II, of the Administrative Code.  This is not the only reasonable 
reading of Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 51.34(4)(a).  One could argue 
that 
the 
provision 
gives 
the 
Town 
authority 
to 
monitor 
compliance with all state water quality statutes, not just the 
rules promulgated by the Department.  In any event, even if the 
"monitor compliance" regulation expressly allows the Town to 
monitor compliance only with state standards adopted by the 
Department, why does the Town need express authority in the 
Siting Law or Department rules to monitor compliance with other 
laws not addressed by the Siting Law or the Department?         
¶96 I think it more in keeping with the language, purpose, 
and spirit of the Siting Law to allow a political subdivision to 
grant a siting permit and impose conditions relating to 
regulation of the facility, conditions that complement the 
Siting Law and that enable the political subdivision to act 
within its granted powers.     
¶97 In sum, assuming that the Town's conditions relating 
to operating the facility are consistent with state water 
quality standards and the Town's powers (aside from the Siting 
Law), I conclude the conditions are not preempted by the Siting 
Law or Department rules.  The Town granted the permit and Larson 
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The court of appeals viewed this provision as inapplicable.  
The parties do not refer to this provision and its application 
to the water quality conditions the Town imposed is not clear.  
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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12 

Acres can comply with both the Siting Law and the conditions the 
Town required.6  
¶98 According to the majority opinion, after a siting 
permit is granted, a political subdivision may seek redress 
against the facility if it violates a law.7  The majority's 
position that siting and regulation of the operations of the 
livestock facility are separate spheres results in regulatory 
inefficiency and is inconsistent with the goal of the Siting Law 
to provide consistency and predictability to large livestock 
operations.8 
¶99 It doesn't make any sense to me on the one hand to 
interpret the Siting Law as prohibiting a political subdivision 
from 
granting 
a 
permit 
with 
otherwise 
valid 
conditions 
regulating the livestock facility, and on the other hand to 
interpret the Siting Law as invalidating the permit conditions 
yet allowing the political subdivision to impose the same 
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6 Again, the instant case does not raise the question of the 
power of the Town over the siting permit should the facility 
violate any of the conditions. 
7 See majority op., ¶65 n.30. 
8 The 
Town 
illustrates 
the 
difference 
between 
siting 
"licensing" [technical standards] and "regulation" [performance 
standards] as follows:  
State "technical standards" for a [driver's] license 
require a driver be of age, have good eyesight, and 
show knowledge of the rules of the road and the 
ability to competently operate a motor vehicle.  But a 
licensed driver must still conform to "performance 
standards" of traffic laws which protect the safety of 
other citizens.  Just as a driver's license does not 
give the right to speed, compliance with "siting 
standards" does not give a CAFO the right to pollute.    
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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13 

conditions on the operation of the livestock facility and to 
pursue remedies against a polluting facility. 
¶100 Lastly, even if the Board and majority opinion are 
correct in their interpretation of the Siting Law, the Board's 
decision 
and 
the 
majority 
opinion 
are 
each 
internally 
inconsistent.  Why do they allow any conditions to be imposed by 
the Town except the one condition set forth in the Siting Law, 
namely that the facility must comply with applicable state 
standards under Wis. Stat. § 93.90(2)(a)?  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 93.90(3)(ae).   
¶101 The Siting Law, Wis. Stat. § 93.90(3)(ae), requires a 
political subdivision granting a conditional use permit to 
impose one condition——compliance with applicable state standards 
under Wis. Stat. § 93.90(2)(a).  The Town did not include this 
condition in granting the permit, and the Siting Board required 
the Town to include the condition.  As I understand the 
reasoning of the Siting Board and the majority opinion, this 
condition should be the only condition the Town may impose.  Yet 
the Board explicitly affirmed other conditions.        
¶102 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the Siting 
Law does not prohibit a Town from granting a siting permit with 
conditions relating to state water quality standards if the Town 
otherwise has the power to adopt such conditions to protect 
local water quality, because neither the Siting Law nor the 
Department rules regulate water quality and the Department is 
prohibited from promulgating rules that violate state water 
standards. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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14 
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III 
¶103 The majority opinion violates the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 93.90(5)(d) in concluding that the Siting Board may 
modify conditions the Town imposed in granting a siting permit. 
¶104 I agree with the circuit court that the Siting Board 
acted outside its lawful statutory authority when it modified 
the conditions of the permit.  The Siting Law limits the Siting 
Board's options to outright reversal or affirmance of challenged 
permits.  The Siting Law provides, inter alia, in Wis. Stat. 
§ 93.90(5)(d): 
If the board determines that a challenge is valid, the 
board shall reverse the decision of the political 
subdivision (emphasis added).  
¶105 Thus, upon finding a valid challenge to the Town's 
permit, the Siting Board must reverse the decision of the Town 
to grant the permit.  The Siting Law does not authorize the 
Siting Board to modify conditions imposed by a political 
subdivision that grants a permit.   
¶106 As 
this 
court 
is 
fond 
of 
saying 
in 
statutory 
interpretation cases:  Had the legislature intended a particular 
interpretation, it knows how to express itself.9  When the 
legislature empowers an agency to modify or otherwise alter a 
decision, it says so explicitly.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.18(4)(c)1.; 108.09(3)(b); 111.39(5)(b).  It did not do so 
in the Siting Law. 
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9 See, e.g., State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶37, 325 
Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513; State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶21, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90; Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett 
Services, Inc., 2007 WI 39, ¶51, 300 Wis. 2d 92, 729 N.W.2d 712.  
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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15 
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¶107 The Siting Board's bylaws explicitly confirm the 
limitations on its actions.  The bylaws state that the Siting 
Board "has quasi-adjudicatory authority to perform the following 
functions: . . . Affirm 
the 
decision 
of 
the 
political 
subdivision or reverse that decision based on whether or not the 
challenge is valid. . . ."10 
¶108 The Siting Board's deliberations in the present case 
demonstrate its concern that it lacked authority to modify 
permit conditions independently of the decision whether to grant 
the permit at all.  
¶109 The 
majority opinion apparently agrees that the 
statute does not expressly empower the Siting Board to modify 
the permit and holds that the Siting Board has "implied power" 
to modify a permit.11  It is not clear from whence cometh this 
implied power.  The majority thus contravenes the plain language 
of the statute and tries to make its extension of the plain text 
palatable by characterizing its holding expanding the Siting 
Board's authority as "a narrow one."12 
¶110 I 
acknowledge 
the 
dilemma 
in 
interpreting 
this 
provision of the Siting Law.  Applying the plain language to 
limit the Siting Board's power only to affirm or reverse the 
Town's 
decision 
might 
enable 
political 
subdivisions 
to 
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10 Wis. Livestock Facility Review Siting Board Bylaws 
§ IV.A., 
available 
at 
http://datcp.wi.gov/uploads/Environment/pdf/LFSRBBylawsAppendixA
.pdf (last visited July 3, 2012).  
11 Majority op., ¶65.   
12 Majority op., ¶65 n.29. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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16 
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manipulate the statute to avoid ever granting a permit and 
might, as the majority opinion and court of appeals point out, 
lead to absurd results.13     
¶111 As 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
acknowledges, 
however, 
situations may exist in which, had the political subdivision 
known that a condition would be stricken, it might have imposed 
an alternative proper condition or denied the permit.14  The Town 
makes this argument in this court.   
¶112 As the majority opinion notes, ¶11, the Town asserts 
that during its hearing it explicitly stated that Larson Acres' 
nitrate pollution gave it a basis to reject the permit if it did 
not impose permit conditions.  Yet the Siting Board ignored the 
Town's statement in the record and stripped away the permit 
conditions the Town found necessary to grant the permit.  
¶113 After considering the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 93.90(5)(d) and the policy arguments in favor of and in 
opposition to the expansion of the powers of the Siting Board 
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13 As the court of appeals noted, however, we should not 
presume that the Town would act in bad faith in order to delay 
the siting process were it given another opportunity to consider 
the application.  If it did become clear that a town was 
attempting to game the system, the courts would be capable of 
addressing the problem in individual cases.  
14 Indeed the court of appeals acknowledged that "had the 
municipality known that a critical condition was defective, it 
could have imposed an alternative proper condition.  We leave 
this issue for another day.  Here, the Town has not made the 
alternative argument that, if its statutory interpretation 
argument is wrong, the matter should be remanded so that the 
Town may attach alternative proper conditions."  Adams v. State 
Livestock Facilities Siting Review Bd., 2010 WI App 88, ¶51, 327 
Wis. 2d 676, 787 N.W.2d 941. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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17 
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beyond affirming or reversing the siting permit, I agree with 
the circuit court that the Siting Board exceeded its authority 
in striking some of the conditions.  I conclude that it is the 
legislature's task, not that of this court, to amend the text of 
the Siting Law.   
¶114 Thus, even if I were to agree (and I do not) with the 
Siting Board and majority opinion that some of the Town's 
conditions violated the Siting Law, I would conclude that the 
cause should be remanded to the Siting Board with directions 
either to reverse or affirm the Town's permit in its entirety.   
¶115 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶116 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins part III of this dissent. 
No.  2009AP608.ssa 
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