Title: P. v. Gaines

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 4/30/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S157008 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B192177 
RODNEY LOUIS GAINES, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MA032254 
____________________________________) 
 
A criminal defendant, on a showing of good cause, is entitled to discovery 
of information in the confidential personnel records of a peace officer when that 
information is relevant to defend against a criminal charge.  (Pen. Code, § 832.7; 
Evid. Code, § 1043 et seq.; see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 
(Pitchess).)  In this case, the Court of Appeal determined that the trial court abused 
its discretion by summarily denying defendant’s Pitchess motion without first 
examining the requested records in camera to determine whether they contained 
relevant information.  The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment of 
conviction and remanded the matter to permit the trial court to conduct an in 
camera review of the requested personnel records.  If the trial court’s inspection 
uncovered no relevant information, the trial court was to reinstate the judgment.  
If, on the other hand, relevant information was discovered during the in camera 
review, the trial court was to order disclosure, allow defendant an opportunity to 
demonstrate prejudice from the failure to disclose the relevant information, and 
1 
order a new trial if there was a reasonable probability the outcome would have 
been different had the information been disclosed. 
The parties agree that the trial court erred in failing to review the requested 
records in camera and that a remand is the appropriate remedy to permit the trial 
court to conduct that review.  The parties further agree that if the in camera review 
uncovers no relevant information, the judgment should be reinstated.  The dispute 
centers on the remainder of the disposition ordered by the Court of Appeal.  
Defendant argues that if the in camera review uncovers any information that ought 
to have been disclosed, the trial court’s error in failing to order that disclosure 
prior to trial should be deemed reversible per se or, alternatively, that the judgment 
should be reversed unless the People can show that the failure to disclose the 
information was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The People, as did the 
Court of Appeal, believe that the burden of establishing prejudice from any error 
in failing to disclose relevant information lies with defendant, and that the proper 
standard of prejudice is whether there is a reasonable probability of a different 
result had the information been disclosed. 
We conclude that the trial court’s erroneous denial of a Pitchess motion is 
not reversible per se.  Rather, the failure to disclose relevant information in 
confidential personnel files, like other discovery errors, is reversible only if there 
is a reasonable probability of a different result had the information been disclosed.  
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, with one minor 
modification to the disposition. 
 
      
2 
BACKGROUND1 
On June 11, 2005, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Roger Izzo was 
conducting undercover surveillance of a home in Lancaster where he believed 
narcotics were being sold.  Some people left the house in a maroon minivan, and 
Deputy Izzo followed the minivan as it proceeded to a liquor store about half a 
mile away.  He directed Deputies Steven Lehrman and Christopher McMaster to 
stop the minivan when it exited the area.  As Izzo waited for the minivan’s 
occupants to come out of the store, defendant Rodney Louis Gaines approached 
Izzo’s unmarked vehicle and asked him whether he “smoked the white.”  
Defendant offered to sell whatever Izzo might want and claimed he “had it all.”  
Although Izzo declined the offer, defendant spit a small black plastic bindle into 
his hand and presented it to Izzo.  After Izzo reiterated that he was not interested 
in buying drugs, defendant walked away. 
Izzo then contacted the other two deputies and asked them to detain 
defendant for offering to sell drugs.  While Izzo continued to wait, defendant again 
approached and handed Izzo a small piece of cocaine base, later determined to 
weigh .03 grams, and a glass pipe used for smoking the drug.  Defendant said, 
“This one [is] on me.  Hit this.  You’ll like it.”     
Moments later, when Deputies Lehrman and McMaster drove into the 
parking lot, defendant turned and walked quickly away.  As he did so, he put his 
right hand to his mouth.  McMaster ordered defendant several times to stop and, 
when he did not comply, grabbed him by the shirt and ordered him to get down on 
the ground.  Lehrman noticed that defendant’s mouth was clenched closed; he 
                                              
1  
These background facts are taken largely from the recital contained in the 
Court of Appeal opinion.   
3 
appeared to be chewing for a moment and then swallowed.  When defendant 
finally opened his mouth, Lehrman saw white residue on his tongue and inside his 
mouth.       
Izzo gave the other deputies the glass pipe and the .03 gram piece of 
cocaine in a base form.   
Defendant, a convicted felon and admitted cocaine addict, denied offering 
to sell Izzo any drugs, denied spitting a bindle of drugs into his hand, and denied 
handing Izzo a pipe or cocaine.  He testified at trial that he had gone to the liquor 
store to panhandle for money to buy cocaine.  While there, he saw a fellow 
panhandler, an older man, go over to a car.  When the panhandler returned, he 
offered to give defendant a piece of cocaine in exchange for use of his pipe.  
Defendant handed the panhandler his pipe.  About 10 minutes later, the panhandler 
left the parking lot and indicated he had left defendant’s pipe on the side of a large 
trash receptacle.  Defendant went back to the alley to retrieve his pipe and stuck 
the pipe in his sock.  When he returned to the parking lot, Deputy Izzo called him 
over and asked whether he had any “rock” for sale.  Defendant replied, “I don’t 
sell rock, I just use it.”     
Suddenly, and without warning, Deputy McMaster grabbed him by the shirt 
and forced him to the ground.  McMaster spotted the glass pipe in defendant’s 
sock and ordered defendant to remove his socks and shoes.  As defendant removed 
his left sock, a “little white speck hit the ground.”  Defendant thought the 
panhandler must have left the cocaine base in the pipe for him.  
A jury convicted defendant of possessing cocaine base (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11350) and possessing a smoking device (id., § 11364, subd. (a)).  
Defendant then admitted a prior strike conviction and seven prior prison term 
allegations and was sentenced to 11 years in prison.   
4 
The Court of Appeal determined that the trial court had erred in summarily 
denying defendant’s Pitchess motion without first conducting an in camera review 
of the requested records.  In the trial court, defendant had sought records relating 
to whether the deputies had previously falsified police records, planted evidence, 
or committed acts demonstrating dishonesty, and the Court of Appeal found that 
defendant’s showing satisfied “the ‘ “relatively low threshold for discovery” ’ ” 
under our precedents.  The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment 
and remanded the case to permit the trial court to conduct an in camera review of 
the requested peace officer personnel records.  The Court of Appeal’s disposition 
provided that “[i]f the trial court’s inspection on remand reveals no relevant 
information, the trial court must reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence, 
which shall stand affirmed.  If the inspection reveals relevant information, the trial 
court must order disclosure, allow appellant an opportunity to demonstrate 
prejudice, and order a new trial if there is a reasonable probability the outcome 
would have been different had the information been disclosed.”  
We granted review on a single issue:  “Is outright reversal or a remand for a 
showing of prejudice the appropriate remedy for a trial court’s erroneous denial of 
a Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531)?” 
DISCUSSION 
This court has reviewed at length in several recent cases the background 
and mechanics of the procedures by which a party may discover relevant evidence 
in confidential peace officer personnel records.  (See, e.g., Garcia v. Superior 
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63; Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011; 
Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033; City of Los Angeles v. Superior 
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1.)  It is sufficient here to reiterate that, on a showing of 
good cause, a criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of relevant documents or 
information in the confidential personnel records of a peace officer accused of 
5 
misconduct against the defendant.  (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).)  Good cause 
for discovery exists when the defendant shows both “ ‘materiality’ to the subject 
matter of the pending litigation and a ‘reasonable belief’ that the agency has the 
type of information sought.”  (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 
Cal.3d 74, 84.)  A showing of good cause is measured by “relatively relaxed 
standards” that serve to “insure the production” for trial court review of “all 
potentially relevant documents.”  (Ibid.)  If the defendant establishes good cause, 
the court must review the requested records in camera to determine what 
information, if any, should be disclosed.  (Chambers v. Superior Court (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 673, 679.)  Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations (see 
Evid. Code, § 1045, subds. (b)-(e)), “the trial court should then disclose to the 
defendant ‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
litigation.’ ”  (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226, quoting Evid. Code, 
§ 1045, subd. (a); see also Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 
1019.)   
Applying this framework, the Court of Appeal determined that the trial 
court had erred in rejecting defendant’s showing of good cause to justify an in 
camera review of the requested records.  Defendant, representing himself in 
propria persona, had alleged in his pretrial motion that Deputies McMaster and 
Lehrman did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain him, that 
Deputy Izzo never called McMaster and Lehrman to tell them defendant had tried 
to sell drugs, that defendant never placed drugs in or removed them from his 
mouth, and that all three deputies wrote arrest reports that contained false and 
misleading information.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that any evidence that the 
deputies had previously falsified police reports or planted evidence would be 
relevant to support defendant’s assertion that they had done so in this case.  In the 
view of the Court of Appeal, the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in-
6 
chambers review of the deputies’ personnel records to ascertain whether they 
contained discoverable information relevant to these potential defenses.   
The People did not dispute the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial 
court had erred in failing to review the deputies’ personnel records in camera, nor 
did they challenge the Court of Appeal’s disposition conditionally reversing the 
judgment and remanding the matter to permit the trial court to review these 
records.  Under the remand order, the trial court was to reinstate the judgment if it 
determined that the records contained no relevant information; if the records 
contained relevant information, the trial court was to disclose the information, 
allow defendant an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice from the trial court’s 
earlier failure to make this disclosure, and order a new trial if defendant 
demonstrated a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had 
the relevant information been disclosed.   
Instead, it was defendant who objected.  In defendant’s view, he was 
entitled to a new trial merely upon a showing that relevant information had been 
erroneously withheld, without any need to demonstrate prejudice from the 
nondisclosure.  Defendant argued, alternatively, that if prejudice was a 
prerequisite to relief, the burden should be on the People to demonstrate that the 
erroneous failure to disclose the information was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We disagree with both of defendant’s contentions. 
As the parties concede, the proper remedy when a trial court has 
erroneously rejected a showing of good cause for Pitchess discovery and has not 
reviewed the requested records in camera is not outright reversal, but a conditional 
reversal with directions to review the requested documents in chambers on 
remand.  (See Pen. Code, § 1260 [reviewing court “may, if proper, remand the 
cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the 
circumstances”].)  “Section 1260 evinces a ‘legislative concern with unnecessary 
7 
retrials where something less drastic will do.’  (People v. Vanbuskirk (1976) 61 
Cal.App.3d 395, 405 (Vanbuskirk) [remand to take evidence of fairness in pretrial 
identification procedures ‘may avert the need for a retrial’].)  ‘[W]hen the validity 
of a conviction depends solely on an unresolved or improperly resolved factual 
issue which is distinct from issues submitted to the jury, such an issue can 
be determined at a separate post-judgment hearing and if at such hearing the issue 
is resolved in favor of the People, the conviction may stand.’  (Ibid.)  In other 
words, ‘when the trial is free of prejudicial error and the appeal prevails on a 
challenge which establishes only the existence of an unresolved question which 
may or may not vitiate the judgment, appellate courts have, in several instances, 
directed the trial court to take evidence, resolve the pending question, and take 
further proceedings giving effect to the determination thus made.’  ([People v. 
Minor (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 194,] 199.)”  (People v. Moore (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
168, 176-177.)  Thus, as we have previously held, when a trial court has failed to 
make a record of the Pitchess documents it reviewed in camera, it is appropriate to 
remand the case “with directions to hold a hearing to augment the record with the 
evidence the trial court had considered in chambers when it ruled on the Pitchess 
motion.”  (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1231.)  Similarly, when a trial 
court has failed to review the Pitchess documents at all, it is appropriate to remand 
the case to permit the trial court to review the requested documents in chambers 
and to issue a discovery order, if warranted.2    
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
2  
There is language in People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658 to suggest that 
an outright reversal, not a remand, is the appropriate remedy when the trial court 
erroneously denies a Pitchess motion without conducting an in camera review of 
the requested documents.  (Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 685.)  However, no 
published decision has ever cited Memro as authority for an outright reversal in 
such circumstances, defendant does not contend here that Memro announced a rule 
requiring an outright reversal, and it would make no sense to reverse a judgment 
8 
After reviewing the confidential materials in chambers, the trial court may 
determine that the requested personnel records contain no relevant information.  
The Court of Appeal directed the trial court, in that circumstance, to reinstate the 
judgment, and no party objects to that portion of the disposition.3  It is also 
possible for the trial court to determine on remand that relevant information exists 
and should be disclosed.  The Court of Appeal provided, in that event, that the trial 
court “must order disclosure, allow [defendant] an opportunity to demonstrate 
prejudice, and order a new trial if there is a reasonable probability the outcome 
would have been different had the information been disclosed.”  This was not 
error.   
“It is settled that an accused must demonstrate that prejudice resulted from 
a trial court’s error in denying discovery.”  (People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 
p. 684; see also People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 670-671; cf. People v. Snow 
(1985) 44 Cal.3d 216, 226 [infringement on right to fair and impartial jury is 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
for a new trial “if it turns out after discovery is granted [at the retrial] that the 
personnel files contain no evidence to support the defendant’s claim.”  (Memro, 
supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 708 (conc. & dis. opn. of Grodin, J.).)  We therefore 
overrule Memro to the extent it is inconsistent with the views expressed here.     
3  
The Court of Appeal’s disposition on this point provided that “[i]f the trial 
court’s inspection on remand reveals no relevant information, the trial court must 
reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence, which shall stand affirmed.”  
We are concerned, however, that the italicized language “could be construed to 
preclude the defendant from seeking appellate review of the trial court’s rulings on 
the Pitchess motion following remand,” even though “the defendant retains the 
right to appeal from the judgment for the limited purpose of challenging the 
Pitchess findings.”  (People v. Wycoff (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 410, 415.)  
Accordingly, we will modify the Court of Appeal’s disposition to delete the 
italicized language.    
9 
reversible per se].)  Defendant contends nonetheless that no separate prejudice 
analysis should be required here, in that a trial court’s determination that relevant 
information exists and should be disclosed is the result of “a process, akin to 
weighing prejudice, in which it has deemed the records integral to the defendant’s 
case.”  Defendant misapprehends the Pitchess procedure.   
“This court has held that the good cause requirement embodies a ‘relatively 
low threshold’ for discovery” (People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109), 
under which a defendant need demonstrate only “a logical link between the 
defense proposed and the pending charge” and describe with some specificity 
“how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would 
impeach the officer’s version of events.”  (Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at p. 1021.)  The trial court may then disclose information from the 
confidential records that “is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
litigation” (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (a)), provided that the information does not 
concern peace officer conduct occurring more than five years earlier, the 
conclusions of an officer investigating a citizen complaint about a peace officer, or 
facts that are so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit (id., 
§ 1045, subd. (b)).  Evidence Code section 1045 thus balances the officer’s 
privacy interests against the defendant’s need for disclosure.  (Alford v. Superior 
Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039.)  As we have previously explained, however, 
this weighing process for screening out unwarranted discovery requests is not akin 
to the inquiry into whether a particular error in denying discovery was prejudicial, 
an inquiry that involves an assessment or weighing of the persuasive value of the 
evidence that was presented and that which should have been presented.  (Warrick 
v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026; cf. People v. Vanbuskirk, supra, 
61 Cal.App.3d at p. 407, fn. 10 [once the Court of Appeal determined that 
prejudice existed “if either identification was unfair,” the matter was remanded to 
10 
the trial court to consider defendant’s claim that both eyewitness identifications 
were unfairly tainted by an improper photographic identification, and to order a 
new trial if it determined that either identification was unfair].)  Indeed, a 
defendant is entitled to discover relevant information under Pitchess even in the 
absence of any judicial determination that the potential defense is credible or 
persuasive.  (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026.)   
Accordingly, a trial court’s determination that information in the requested 
records ought to have been disclosed is not equivalent to a finding that such 
information would have had any effect on the outcome of the underlying court 
proceeding—or, indeed, even a finding that such information would have been 
admissible, inasmuch as the trial court’s duty to disclose encompasses information 
that is not itself admissible but which “may lead to admissible evidence.”  
(Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1048-1049.)  To obtain 
relief, then, a defendant who has established that the trial court erred in denying 
Pitchess discovery must also demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome had the evidence been disclosed.  (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
932, 960; People v. Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 110; People v. Memro, supra, 
38 Cal.3d at p. 685; People v. Johnson (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 292, 305; People 
v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 421-422; see also People v. Gill (1997) 60 
Cal.App.4th 743, 751 [new trial required if the Pitchess evidence would have been 
“helpful” to the defense and of a nature “to affect the outcome of his trial”]; see 
generally Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)   
The reasonable-probability standard of prejudice we have applied in 
Pitchess cases is the same standard we have applied generally to claims that the 
prosecution improperly withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of a 
defendant’s right to due process.  Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) 
held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
11 
. . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment.”  (Id. at p. 87.)  Evidence is material “ ‘if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.’ ”  (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 
433-434.)  It is true, as defendant points out, that a trial court need make a 
determination only of “the materiality [of the requested documents] to the subject 
matter involved in the pending litigation” before ordering disclosure of the 
confidential materials under Pitchess.  (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)  But a 
trial court’s finding that information is material within the meaning of the Pitchess 
scheme does not mean that it is material within the meaning of Brady, for these 
two legal schemes “employ different standards of materiality.”  (City of Los 
Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 7.)  “Our state statutory scheme 
allowing defense discovery of certain officer personnel records creates both a 
broader and lower threshold for disclosure than does the high court’s decision in 
Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83.  Unlike Brady, California’s Pitchess discovery scheme 
entitles a defendant to information that will ‘facilitate the ascertainment of the 
facts’ at trial [citation], that is, ‘all information pertinent to the defense.’ ”  (City of 
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 14.)  Consequently, a 
finding that material evidence was wrongfully withheld under Pitchess does not 
invariably mean that a defendant’s right to due process was denied, “since ‘the 
Constitution is not violated every time the government fails or chooses not to 
disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense.’ ”  (People v. Salazar 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1050, quoting Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 
436-437.)  To establish a due process violation, a defendant must do more than 
show that “helpful” evidence was withheld (People v. Gill, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 751); a defendant must go on to show that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability 
that, had [the evidence] been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have 
12 
been different.’ ”  (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544; see generally 
Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 559 [“There is no general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”]; Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 
412 U.S. 470, 474 [except for Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, “the Due Process Clause 
has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be 
afforded”].)   
Defendant contends also that the withholding of discoverable materials 
should result in a reversal without any further showing of prejudice because the 
nature of a Pitchess violation precludes a court from undertaking a meaningful 
inquiry into whether prejudice occurred.  In defendant’s view, courts are “poorly 
equipped to appraise the ways in which the failure to turn over critical police 
personnel records prejudiced the defendant,” including “how their deprivation 
adversely affected the defendant’s overall strategy.”  We disagree.  The 
determination of materiality for Brady claims “ ‘is necessarily fact specific’ ” 
(People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1052, fn. 8), yet courts are called upon 
in each case to assess the probable effect of withholding such evidence on the 
outcome.  Moreover, the Brady duty of disclosure, like the duty announced in 
Pitchess, extends to impeachment evidence (People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th 
at p. 1050), including impeachment of peace officers.  (People v. Gutierrez (2003) 
112 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474, fn. 6; accord, U.S. v. Alvarez (9th Cir. 1996) 86 F.3d 
901, 903-905.)  In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that 
disclosure of such evidence would have yielded a different outcome under Brady, 
“ ‘the court must consider the nondisclosure dynamically, taking into account the 
range of predictable impacts on trial strategy.’ ”  (U.S. v. Johnson (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
519 F.3d 478, 489.)  Defendant does not explain how it can be that courts are 
deemed well equipped to ascertain the prejudicial effect of failing to disclose 
evidence tending to impeach an officer but must be deemed poorly equipped to 
13 
ascertain the effect of failing to disclose the same information when it derives 
from confidential personnel files.      
Finally, defendant contends that a heightened standard of prejudice—i.e., 
the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18—must be applied because a failure to disclose 
evidence helpful to the defense would impinge on his federal constitutional right 
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.  He is mistaken.  Even if relevant 
evidence that could have been used to impeach the deputies was wrongfully 
withheld, defendant suffered no restriction on the scope of their cross-examination 
and was free to cross-examine these witnesses on any relevant subject.  “The 
constitutional error, if any, in this case was the Government’s failure to assist the 
defense by disclosing information that might have been helpful in conducting the 
cross-examination.  As discussed above, such suppression of evidence amounts to 
a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.  Consistent 
with ‘our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt,’ [citation], a 
constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the 
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.”  (United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 678, italics 
added; see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 53 (plur. opn. of Powell, 
J.) [“The ability to question adverse witnesses . . . does not include the power to 
require pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in 
contradicting unfavorable testimony”]; accord, In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 
884.)  Because that is precisely the standard employed by the Court of Appeal 
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [“A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”]), no error 
appears. 
 
14 
15 
DISPOSITION 
We modify the judgment of the Court of Appeal to delete the direction that 
the judgment “shall stand affirmed” if the trial court’s inspection of the requested 
personnel records on remand reveals no relevant information.  As so modified, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gaines 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 8/29/07 – 2d Dist., Div. 4 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S157008 
Date Filed: April 30, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Lisa Mangay Chung 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Peter Gold, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the 
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith Borjon, Kathy S. Pomerantz, Scott A. Taryle, Kristofer 
Jorstad and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Peter Gold 
2269 Chestnut Street, #124 
San Francisco, CA  94123 
(510) 872-6305 
 
Stacy S. Schwartz 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2252