Title: Davis v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

297 So. 2d 289 (1974)
William Charles DAVIS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 44520.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 3, 1974.
*290 O'Gwen L. King of Hahn, Reeves, Barfield & King, Pensacola, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A.S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
James G. Mahorner, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Tallahassee, Curtis A. Golden, State's Atty., and C.S. Williams, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., for amicus curiae.
McCAIN, Justice.
This appeal is taken from an order entered in the Circuit Court of Santa Rosa County, directly passing upon the constitutionality of Florida Statutes, Section 39.09(2), F.S.A., Laws of Florida, Chapter 73-231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
Appellant, a sixteen year old child, was charged with the commission of felonies, to-wit: Grand Larceny on August 7, 10 and 11, 1973. On September 11, 1973, the State Attorney's Office filed a petition for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction alleging that there was probable cause to believe that the felonies had been committed by the appellant and that it was in the best interest of the public that juvenile jurisdiction over this child be waived in order that he might be tried as an adult.
After proper notice to all persons entitled to be notified, a hearing was held. On September 28, 1973, the Judge of the Circuit Court, Juvenile Division, entered an order of transferral to the Criminal Division, specifically finding that there was probable cause to believe that the child had committed the felonies and the public interest would best be served by the transfer.
Appellant filed a petition for rehearing alleging that pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 39.09(2)(c), F.S.A., the Juvenile Court must determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of rehabilitating the child prior to his majority. This, it was alleged, was not done.
Appellant further alleged that pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 39.09(2)(d), F.S.A., certain factors are to be considered by the Court in making this determination. Appellant asserted that both at the hearing and by its order the Court failed to consider the statutory factors.
Finally, appellant contended that the Court failed to set forth in writing its reasons for finding that there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitating this child prior to his majority, as required by Florida Statutes, Section 39.09(2)(f), F.S.A.
By order dated October 11, 1973, the Judge ruled that Section 39.09(2) is unconstitutional and void, stating:
The primary issue for our determination is whether a conflict exists between Rule 8.110(b)(6)(c), Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure [Temporary] and Section 39.09(2)(c) and (d).
Rule 8.110(b)(6)(c) provides that:
However as to this point the Statute provides that:
As to the first criterion presented in both the Rule and the Statute, that there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the child has committed it, there clearly is no conflict. As to the second criterion, the answer is by no means obvious.
The United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States[1] set forth eight factors which the Juvenile Court must consider in deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived.
In Kent, a sixteen year old child, while on probation, entered the house of a woman, took her wallet and raped her. Kent admitted his involvement after an interrogation which lasted seven hours on the day of his arrest. He volunteered information of similar offenses concerning housebreaking, robbery and rape. The Juvenile Court waived juvenile jurisdiction without a hearing and without conferring with the defendant, his parents or his counsel.
Attached to the opinion of the Court in Kent is an appendix entitled "Policy Memorandum No. 7, November 30, 1959" in which the Court states:
Further in this memorandum, the Court went on to enumerate the specific criteria which must be considered by the Judge in deciding whether juvenile jurisdiction should be waived, to-wit:
As to the application of these factors, the Court stated that the Juvenile Court Judge must fully develop all available information which may bear upon these factors. Although not all of these factors are applicable to the facts in a given case, the Judge is charged with considering the relevant factors in a special case before reaching a conclusion as to whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer the child to the appropriate court for prosecution as an adult.
In viewing the alleged conflict between the Rule and the Statute involved in this case in light of the pronouncement in Kent, we resolve the seeming conflict without a finding that the Statute has trespassed upon the rule making power of this Court.
The Rule merely states that a transfer should be affected when it is in "the best interest of the public", whereas the Statute expands upon this generalized language and lists criteria for what constitutes "the best interest of the public."
In reviewing the three factors found in Section 39.09(2)(d), it is clear that they are inclusive of at least five of the factors set forth in Kent. (See Kent factors 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8). The fourth factor in Kent is analogous with the requirement found both in the Rule and the Statute to the effect that there must be probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and the child has committed it. The fifth factor in Kent although not reiterated in either the Rule or Statute, was considered by the Juvenile Court Judge in this case as evidenced by his pronouncement in the order denying the petition for rehearing, wherein he states:
Consideration of the sixth factor is clearly evident in the record by the filing with the Court of the Pre-Dispositional Report which contains relevant information as to the child's home and environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
*293 Therefore the interest of the public should be measured by more than a pronouncement that the public is being protected by a transfer of the action to the Criminal Division. [See Fla. Stat. § 39.09(2) (f), F.S.A.]. The interest of the child must be considered at least equally with that of the public. The factors enumerated in Kent are intended to be guidelines for the determination of whether waivers of juvenile jurisdiction will be granted, to the same extent that the factors presented in Section 39.09(2) (d) are intended as guidelines for the determination of the public interest. The Statute must then be considered in pari materia with the Rule of this Court. Thus the provisions of the Statute are not mandatory but rather directory, to the same extent as those factors stated in Kent are not all applicable in every case but should be considered by the facts of each case individually.
Therefore that portion of the order holding that Section 39.09(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is unconstitutional and void is reversed.
As to appellant's second contention that the lower court abused its discretion in certifying the appellant to the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court, it cannot be sustained by the record before this Court.
We have carefully reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the appellant and find that there was not an abuse of discretion in the lower Court's transferring the action to the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court for further proceedings as an adult. Therefore that portion of the Order waiving juvenile jurisdiction is affirmed.
The decision of the Circuit Court is therefore reversed in part and affirmed in part.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, Acting C.J., and ERVIN, BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
[1]  383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966).