Title: State v. Simpson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_SIMPSON.91-443; 160 Vt. 220; 627 A.2d 346


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 91-443


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

 Scott Simpson                                March Term, 1993


 David A. Jenkins, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
     Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Charles Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.   Defendant appeals from jury convictions for vehicular
 homicide and leaving the scene of an accident.  See 23 V.S.A. {{ 1091(c),
 1128(a) and (c).  He argues that (1) the court erred by refusing to allow
 defendant's expert to testify that the accident would not have happened if
 the decedent had not been speeding; (2) his right to testify was chilled by
 the court's ruling that the State could impeach him with a comment he made
 about obtaining license plates that read "KILLER"; and (3) the court errone-
 ously instructed the jury on the standard of care that defendant must have
 failed to meet for conviction of vehicular homicide.
      The State concedes the third point and agrees that the { 1091(c)
 conviction must be reversed.  The court's charge permitted the jury to base
 the conviction on a civil negligence standard, contrary to this Court's
 recent decision that a conviction under { 1091(c) requires, at minimum,
 criminal negligence.  See State v. Beayon, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 605 A.2d 527,
 528 (1992).  The parties, disagree, however, on whether reversal of the {
 1091(c) conviction requires reversal, or remand for resentencing, of the {
 1128 hit-and-run conviction.  We reverse the { 1091(c) conviction and
 remand the case for sentence reconsideration as to the { 1128 conviction.
      According to an eye witness who testified at trial, the decedent was
 killed when he lost control of his vehicle and struck a telephone pole while
 attempting to avoid a collision with defendant, who had pulled out of a side
 road onto the highway without stopping.  After the collision, defendant
 continued up the road, turned around, and drove slowly back by the scene of
 the accident.  He stopped at a nearby residence and asked the occupant to
 call the police, and then left the scene without identifying himself or
 rendering assistance.  Later, when the police interviewed defendant at his
 home, he first denied that his car had been driven that day and then denied
 having driven it himself; eventually, he admitted that he had driven the
 car.
      Defendant's principal defense at trial was that the decedent had caused
 the accident by driving at an excessive speed.  The posted speed limit on
 that stretch of the highway was 50 mph, although there was an advisory sign
 suggesting a speed of 40 mph.  The State's expert testified that the dece-
 dent had been driving at 58 mph at the time of the accident, that the
 advisory speed limit was not significant in this instance because the dece-
 dent was an experienced driver familiar with the road, and that the critical
 speed for that curve -- the speed beyond which a vehicle would leave the
 road -- was 65 mph.  He further testified that he used no specialized skills
 in negotiating the curve in a police cruiser at speeds of 50, 55, 60 and 65
 mph.  He also testified that, assuming the decedent had been traveling at 58
 mph, defendant could have seen the decedent's vehicle for approximately 26
 seconds from the stop sign where he entered the highway.  According to the
 State's expert, the accident was caused by defendant pulling out directly in
 front of the decedent.
      Defendant's expert estimated that the decedent had been traveling at 62
 mph.  He further testified that the speed of the decedent's car "absolutely
 played a part in this accident."  According to defendant's expert, there
 were two causes of the accident: "One, [defendant] did -- probably did not
 negotiate the stop sign correctly.  And two, [the decedent] was speeding."
 Defendant also sought to elicit an opinion from his expert that the accident
 would not have occurred if the decedent had not been speeding, but the court
 excluded it as speculation.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on both
 charges.
      When an accident results in death, the crimes charged in this case
 carry identical prison terms: "not less than one year nor more than 15
 years."  23 V.S.A. {{ 1091(c), 1128(c).  At sentencing, the parties informed
 the judge that they had agreed to a joint recommendation of 4-10 years, to
 run concurrently.  The court did not accept the agreement because it was
 conditioned on defendant's waiver of appeal.  At the conclusion of the
 hearing, however, the court sentenced defendant to the same sentence
 recommended by the parties.
      The primary issue on appeal is what effect reversal of the vehicular
 homicide conviction has on the hit-and-run conviction.  The court gave a
 separate instruction on the hit-and-run charge, defining its distinct
 elements.  The court instructed the jury that it must find defendant had
 actual knowledge that he caused or was involved in an accident.  The court
 then defined both "involved in" and "caused."  The court concluded by
 stating that the jury should find defendant not guilty if "the acts of the
 victim set in flow the events . . . leading to the accident" so that the
 accident would not have happened otherwise.
      Defendant argues that the hit-and-run conviction must be reversed also
 because the court's charge made guilt of the hit-and-run charge dependent on
 a finding of guilt on the vehicular homicide charge.  Apparently, defendant
 is contending that the court's instruction requiring that his actions be a
 proximate cause of the accident negated the term "involved in."  We are not
 persuaded by this argument.
      Section 1128 imposes certain duties on a person "who has caused or is
 involved in an accident."  The duties apply not only to persons with actual
 knowledge that their conduct was the proximate cause of the accident, but
 also to persons with actual knowledge that their actions were a precipi-
 tating or contributing factor to the accident.  Indeed, courts interpreting
 the term "involved in" have concluded that a person can be involved in an
 accident without being its legal cause.  See, e.g., People v. Bammes, 71 Cal. Rptr. 415, 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (assuming "real cause" of accident
 was decedent's unnecessary attempt to pass defendant after she pulled out in
 front of decedent, defendant was nevertheless "involved" in accident because
 her pulling into intersection precipitated some reaction on part of deced-
 ent); People v. Kerger, 548 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ("it is not
 necessary to determine, for purposes of deciding whether defendant was
 involved in a motor vehicle accident, whether defendant caused or was at
 fault for the accident"); State v. Carpenter,