Title: Waltman v. Rowell

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

913 So. 2d 1083 (2005)
Michael WALTMAN
v.
William Robert ROWELL.
1031960.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 20, 2005.
*1084 James B. Rossler of Rossler & Redditt, LLC, Mobile, for appellant.
Donald E. Brutkiewicz of Brutkiewicz Attorneys, Mobile, for appellee.
STUART, Justice.
William Robert Rowell filed an election contest, challenging the results of an August 24, 2004, municipal election for the District 3 seat on the Citronelle City Council. Michael Waltman appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Rowell. We reverse and remand.
On August 24, 2004, the City of Citronelle held a municipal election. Michael Waltman, the incumbent holding the District 3 seat on the Citronelle City Council, was running for reelection. William Robert Rowell was the challenger for the District 3 seat. After the election, Waltman was declared the winner.
Rowell then filed this election challenge in the Mobile Circuit Court, arguing that illegal or ineligible votes had been included in tallying the votes for Waltman and that, upon a proper recount, Rowell should be declared the winner. Pursuant to § 17-4-127, Ala.Code 1975, and § 11-46-109, Ala. Code 1975, Rowell contested both absentee ballots and "challenged" ballots filed on the day of the election.[1] Waltman responded by contesting certain votes that Waltman says were illegal or ineligible and that had been included in the tally for Rowell.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the election contest on September 8-10, 2004. By the time of the hearing, the votes had been recounted and the official vote tally had changed; Waltman and Rowell had 177 votes each. Pursuant to the trial court's order, the City of Citronelle produced election documents relevant to the contested race for the District 3 seat.[2] Those documents included the "affidavits of challenged voters" filed by some of the challenged electors.[3]
Ore tenus evidence was presented at the hearing. However, none of the *1085 challenged electors testified at the hearing.[4] Rowell called as a witness, among others, Gayther Rowell, the chief inspector of the polls for the August 24, 2004, election.[5] Gayther testified as to where she knew various of the challenged electors lived, whether she believed the residences of those challenged electors were located in the city limits of Citronelle, and, if so, whether the residences were located in District 3 or in another district. Rowell also called as a witness Wesley Raymond Rowell, who also testified as to where, based on his knowledge and belief, certain of the challenged electors lived.[6]
Rowell also called Diane D. Barnett, who at that time was employed by the City of Citronelle as the city clerk and treasurer. Barnett, in her capacity as the city clerk, responded to the trial court's order to produce the election records. Included in those records were the "absentee manager's voter list" and a list of voters whose ballots were challenged. Barnett testified as to where various of those challenged voters lived; Barnett also testified as to each challenged voter whether, to her knowledge and understanding, the address provided by the voter on the challenged ballots as his or her then current residence was located in District 3.
Finally, Rowell called Virginia Delchamps, the chairperson of the Mobile County Board of Registrars. Delchamps testified that she had confirmed that the nine names of voters whose ballots were being challenged submitted to her by Rowell's attorney represented voters who were registered to vote on the day of the August 24, 2004, election.[7] She testified, however, that many of those electors lived outside the city limits of Citronelle and were therefore ineligible to vote in a municipal election for the City of Citronelle. She also testified that a few of the nine voters lived in Citronelle but that they lived in a municipal district other than District 3.
At the close of the hearing, the trial judge orally declared Rowell to be the winner of the election. In its written order dated September 22, 2004, the trial court stated:
Waltman appealed, asserting (1) that the trial court erred by not declaring invalid those votes cast in favor of Rowell by persons who resided outside the city limits of Citronelle and (2) that the trial court erred by not declaring invalid those votes that were cast in favor of Rowell by persons who resided in council districts other than District 3. Waltman asserts that the trial court's decision is plainly and palpably wrong and that it is unsupported by the evidence of record. Rowell did not cross-appeal.
As noted in Williams v. Lide, 628 So. 2d 531, 534 (Ala.1993):
This Court has also recognized:
Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala.1985) (citations omitted). Additionally, the ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a presumption of correctness a trial judge's conclusions of law or the incorrect application of law to the facts. "[W]hen the trial court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment." Griggs v. Driftwood Landing, Inc., 620 So. 2d 582, 586 (Ala.1993).
We first recite the statutes and legal principles applicable to this dispute.[8] Section 11-46-38, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
Section 11-46-39, Ala.Code 1975, addresses the identification of challenged voters and the process of challenging voters. This section provides, in pertinent part:
Section 11-46-41, Ala.Code 1975, sets forth the form of oaths to be taken by challenged voters and the penalty to be assessed against a voter for providing a false oath. That section provides:
Section 17-4-127, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
Section 17-7-13, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
We also note that it is the responsibility of a party seeking to have a vote excluded to make a prima facie showing that the vote was illegally cast. See Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113, 1145 (Ala.1999), citing Shepherd v. Sartain, 185 Ala. 439, 64 So. 57 (1913), and Black v. Pate, 130 Ala. 514, 30 So. 434 (1901). "Where there is no prima facie showing that a vote was illegally cast, that vote cannot be excluded." Eubanks, 752 So. 2d  at 1145. As the Eubanks Court quoted:
Eubanks, 752 So. 2d  at 1150 n. 18 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964)). Addressing the requirements of the absentee-voting statutes, the Eubanks Court stated:
Eubanks, 752 So. 2d  at 1150 (footnote omitted). Although Eubanks addressed an elector's right to vote by absentee ballot, the general principles applied in Eubanks are also relevant in this case.
For the convenience of the reader, we will keep a running tally of the votes as we discuss each category of challenged voters. Our starting points are the totals presented to the trial court at the beginning of the election-contest hearing  177 votes for each candidate. Because Waltman stipulated before the trial court that the vote cast in his favor by W.B. should not be counted, we immediately reduce Waltman's vote tally by one. Thus, we begin our analysis with a vote tally of 177 for Rowell and 176 for Waltman. There were no additional votes to be added. Therefore, with regard to each of the challenged ballots discussed below, the only question is whether it is to be excluded and therefore subtracted from our totals.
Waltman first argues that the trial court erred by not declaring invalid the challenged ballots cast in favor of Rowell by persons who lived outside the city limits of Citronelle. Waltman asserts that unless electors lived within the municipal limits of Citronelle, they were ineligible to vote in the August 24, 2004, election for the Citronelle City Council. With certain limited exceptions provided in the statute, we agree with Waltman.
As provided in § 11-46-38, Ala.Code 1975:
(Emphasis added.) See also Hawkins v. Persons, 484 So. 2d 1072, 1073 n. 3 (Ala.1986) (recognizing that votes cast in a municipal city council election by electors who *1091 lived outside the city limits should not have been counted).
Under § 11-46-38, Ala.Code 1975, the elector must be registered to vote in the county of his or her residence and, with certain limited exceptions relating to an elector's move to a different ward or district within a city, must vote only in the ward or precinct of the elector's residence.
Hawkins, 484 So. 2d  at 1074. Accordingly, if the evidence before the trial court established that a challenged elector did not live within the city limits of Citronelle, that challenged elector was ineligible to vote in the municipal election held on August 24, 2004, for the City of Citronelle.
Waltman also argues that the trial court erred by not declaring invalid those challenged ballots cast in favor of Rowell by electors who, although registered to vote and residing in Citronelle, did not reside in District 3. Waltman argues that unless the electors lived in District 3, they were ineligible to vote in the election for the District 3 seat.
Again, we agree with Waltman. As stated in § 11-46-38, Ala.Code 1975:
(Emphasis added.) Thus, with the certain limited exception set out in § 11-46-38(b), even if a challenged elector was registered to vote in Mobile County and lived in the City of Citronelle on the day of the municipal election, if the evidence at the hearing established that the elector's residence was not within District 3, that challenged elector was ineligible to vote for the District 3 seat on the Citronelle City Council.
We now examine the challenged ballots submitted in favor of Rowell. The record accompanying this appeal includes the affidavit of C.H., one of the challenged voters. In his affidavit, C.H. indicated that he lived at an address located in the City of Mobile. Therefore, on its face, C.H.'s affidavit established that he was ineligible to vote in the Citronelle municipal election. However, the trial court failed to disqualify C.H.'s vote; failing to do so was plain and palpable error. Because C.H.'s ballot was submitted in favor of Rowell, Rowell's total vote tally is reduced from 177 to 176; Waltman's vote remains at 176.
The record also contains the affidavit of F.W., a challenged voter; F.W. cast a challenged ballot in favor of Rowell. On her affidavit, F.W. specified a street address. *1092 However, at the hearing, Diane Barnett, who was then the city clerk and treasurer for Citronelle, testified that a portion of F.W.'s property was located inside the city limits of Citronelle and another portion was located outside the city limits of Citronelle. Barnett testified that F.W.'s house was located within the Citronelle city limits.
However, the chairperson of the Mobile County Board of Registrars testified that F.W.'s house was located within District 4 of Citronelle. Because F.W. did not reside within District 3 on the date of the election and because she did not qualify as a voter recently removed from District 3, she was ineligible to vote in the August 24, 2004, election for the District 3 seat on the Citronelle City Council. Because F.W. voted for Rowell, Rowell's vote tally is further reduced from 176 to 175; Waltman's vote tally remains at 176.
We note that Rowell did not cross-appeal and that, therefore, Waltman's vote tally would not be affected by further analysis of the remaining votes. Therefore, even if we concluded that the trial court had properly counted all of the remaining votes in favor of Rowell, Waltman would remain the winner of this election by at least one vote. For this reason and based on the state of the record before us, we need not and do not address the remaining challenged ballots.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Waltman won the District 3 seat on the Citronelle City Council by at least one vote. We conclude that the findings on which the trial court's order declaring Rowell to be the winner of the election contest was based were plainly and palpably erroneous. We, therefore, reverse the order of the trial court and remand this cause for entry of an order declaring Waltman the winner of the election for the District 3 seat on the Citronelle City Council.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
NABERS, C.J., and SEE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, SMITH, and BOLIN, JJ., concur.
LYONS and PARKER, JJ., concur specially.
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the votes cast by F.W. and C.H. in favor of Rowell in the election for the District 3 seat on the Citronelle City Council cannot be counted.
Section 11-46-41, Ala.Code 1975, sets forth the form of oaths to be taken by challenged voters and the penalty to be assessed against a voter for providing a false oath. That section provides for an affidavit that includes a statement as to the affiant's address. See § 11-46-41(c)(12). While F.W.'s and C.H.'s affidavits are not a part of the record, the evidence is undisputed, as the majority points out, that the address given in each of their affidavits is outside District 3.
The trial court found "that there is not sufficient evidence as to any of these voters to establish the falsity of their declaration of the fact of their alleged non-residency." The trial court thus appears to have allowed the affidavits to trump the registration list. But the trial court could not rely upon C.H.'s and F.W.'s affidavits, which set forth addresses established without contradiction at the trial to be outside District 3. While these affidavits, we must assume, also contained the requisite averment, "I have actually resided 30 days in this ward next preceding this day," § 11-46-41(c)(4), neither F.W. nor C.H. was called as a witness at trial to explain the obvious inconsistency in these statements *1093 as to their respective addresses that was developed by Waltman's evidence. I must conclude that the proof at trial of an internally inconsistent affidavit is prima facie evidence of an illegal vote. On this state of the record, the trial court's conclusion as to lack of evidence to establish the falsity of these affidavits, in the face of Waltman's unrebutted prima facie showing that these two votes were illegally cast, cannot stand. When these votes are thrown out, even if we affirm the trial court as to its allowing the affidavits to have primacy in all other instances, Waltman wins by one vote.
PARKER, J., concurs.
[1]  Rowell challenged a vote for Waltman cast by C.R. by absentee ballot. The trial court heard testimony regarding this vote at the hearing on the election contest; however, the trial court's final order did not disqualify C.R.'s absentee ballot. Therefore, we assume C.R.'s vote is included in the final vote total of 176 determined by the trial court to have been properly cast in favor of Waltman. Rowell did not appeal from this determination.
[2]  Included in these documents were the election results for Districts 2, 4, and 5. According to the record, the City of Citronelle has two polling places: a separate polling place for voters in District 1 and another polling place for voters in Districts 2, 3, 4, and 5. Only residents of District 3 were eligible to vote for the District 3 seat on the city council.
[3]  At the hearing before the trial court, the parties addressed and argued the alleged illegality or ineligibility of the ballots cast on August 24, 2004, by several of the challenged electors; however, the exhibits submitted to this Court contain no corresponding "affidavits of challenged voters" for those electors. We find no objection from either party to the absence of these affidavits from the record on appeal; therefore, we assume that the legality or ineligibility of these "votes" was tried by the consent of the parties.
[4]  None of the electors whose ballots were challenged testified at the hearing to support the declarations made in their affidavits. It is unusual for such electors not to testify in an election contest in which it is alleged that electors casting challenged ballots were ineligible to vote because they lived outside the city limits or outside the district. However, neither Rowell nor Waltman objected or argued that the affidavits were inadmissible as evidence; we therefore have no basis on which to reject the affidavits as evidence. We simply note that generally a witness must appear at a trial to testify in support of the contents of an affidavit. To allow otherwise would defeat a party's right to cross-examine witnesses and might impede other applicable rules of evidence and civil procedure.
[5]  Gayther Rowell is related by marriage to William Robert Rowell.
[6]  Wesley Raymond Rowell is the brother of William Robert Rowell.
[7]  Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, the letter signed by Delchamps, contained the names of nine electors. According to Delchamps, Rowell's lawyer asked her to verify whether the persons listed on the letter were registered to vote on the day the municipal election for the District 3 seat was held.
[8]  Because the City of Citronelle has a mayor and city council form of government, we refer to the appropriate sections found in Art. 2, Title 11, Ala.Code 1975.