Title: Alakai Na Keiki, Inc. v. Hamamoto

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

 

{++ NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

No, 27559

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

ALAKA'I NA KEIKI, INC., AppellantAppellant

PATRICIA HAMAMOTO, in her official capacity as
Superintendent of Education, Appellee-Appellee

 

and

DOES 1-10, Appellees

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CI¥. No. 05-1-1658)

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy JJ.)
Appellant~Appellant Alaka‘i Na Keiki, Inc.

(hereinafter, ANK} appeals from the October 10, 2005 final
judgment of the circuit court of the first circuit! which
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction ANK's appeal of the decision
of Appellee-Appellee the State of Hawai'i Department of
Education's Superintendent of Education, Patricia Hanamoto
[hereinafter, DOE}. ANK raises one point of error on appeal, to
wit, that the circuit court erred in concluding that Hawai'i
Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 103F (Supp. 2005), “Purchases of
Health and Hunan Services,” precludes HRS chapter 91 (1993)
judicial review of the decision. The DOE counters that the

circuit court correctly ruled that HRS chapter 91 jurisdiction

 

+ the Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presided over
 

+ NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

does not exist to review the actions of a purchasing agency under
HRS chapter 103F.

Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the argunents advocated and the issues raised, we hold that the
circuit court did not err in ruling that it lacked HRS chapter 92
jurisdiction in the instant case. See ARS § 91-14(a) (1993)
("Any person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a
contested case . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof under
this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)); HRS § 91-1(5) (1993)
(defining “contested case” as “a proceeding in which the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by
law to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing”):
HRS § 91-1(6) (1993) (stating that an “agency hearing” “refers
only to such hearing held by an agency innediately prior to a
judicial review of 2 contested case as provided in section

gi-14yys

 

Haw 'n, 76 Hawai'i 128, 134, 870
P.2d 1272, 1278 (1994) (“[I}£ an agency hearing is ‘required by
law,’ it is a contested case for the purposes of judicial
review."); i count
Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425, 431, 903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995)

("In order for a hearing to be ‘required by law,’ [the hearing]
{++ NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

may be required by statute, agency rule, or constitutional due

 

process.” (Citation omitted.)).

The submission of ANK's written protest, the DOE's
written response, and ANK’s written reply did not constitute a
“nearing” within the meaning of HRS chapter 91. Although a
“hearing” necessarily requires an aggrieved person to present
evidence and/or arguments to a decision-maker, the converse is
not true that every time an aggrieved person submits evidence
and/or arguments to a decision-maker a “hearing” has occurred.
See HRS § 1-14 (1993) ("The words of a law are generally to be
understood in their most known and usual signification, without
attending so mich to the literal and strictly grammatical
construction of the words as to their general or popular use or
meaning.”).

None of the cases cited by ANK support its definition
of “hearing.” In Diamond a
Appeals, 52 Haw, 518, 523-24, 479 P.2d 796, 799 (2971), and Town
vw. Land Use Commission, 55 Haw. 538, 539, 548, 524 P.2d 84, 86,
91 (1974), this court observed that public hearings could
constitute contested case hearings. Those cases, however, do not

hold that written submissions constitute a “hearing” within the

 

) hs the O0E points cut, ANK does not argue that a hea
by constitutional due process. As such, this argunent is dei
Rawas't RUlee of Appellate Procedure (HEAP) Rule 26(b) (7) ("Points not argued
ay be deened waived.").

    

 
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meaning of HRS chapter 91. Additionally, ANK’s citation to
v, Allecheny=) , 406 v.s. 742
(1972), and United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410
U.S. 224 (1973), for the proposition that “the procedure of
notice and written comments satisfies a statutory requirement of
‘hearing’” are equally unavailing. Neither case, both of which
deal with rule-making proceedings under the Esch Car Service Act
of 1917, 49 U.S.C. § 1/24) (a), support ANK’s position because the
instant case does not concern the Esch Car Service Act, nor, more
importantly, does it present this court with the question of
whether a hearing requirenent is satisfied. Although written
submissions may satisfy the Esch Car Service Act's hearing
requirement, Elorida E. Coast By., 410 U.S, at 241, it does not
follow that written submissions always constitute a “hearing.”
Furthermore, the circuit court correctly ruled that it
did not have jurisdiction under HRS chapter 91 to review the
decision because neither the plain language of HRS chapter 103F
nor that of Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR) chapter 3-148
mandate a hearing prior to deciding @ protest. See Bush, 76
Hawai's at 134, 870 P.2d at 1278 (“IE the statute or rule
governing the activity in question does not mandate a hearing
Prior to the administrative agency’s decision-making, the actions
of the administrative agency axe not ‘required by law’ and do not

amount to ‘a final decision or order in a contested case’ from
 

{IREPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

   

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAW,

which a direct appeal to circuit court is possible.” (Citations
omitted.)

to the extent that there is any doubt or uncertainty as
to whether the legislature intended to require a hearing prior to
decision-making under HRS chapter 103F, we construe HRS chapter
103F, the human services procurement code, with reference to HRS
chapter 1030, the public procurement code. while HRS chapter
1030 provides for a hearing to review any request from a party
aggrieved by a determination of the chief procurenent officer or
head of a purchasing agency,’ a similar provision is

> WRS § 1030-709 (Supp. 2005), entitied “Adninistrative proceedings for
review," states in relevant part

(2) The severe] nearings officers shal have
juriediotion to review and determine de novo’ any request
ftom any bidder, offeror, contractor or governmental body
aggrieved by # determination of the chief procurement
Officer, head of a purchasing agency, or a designee of
Gither officer under sections 1030-310, 1030-108, or
fosp=102-

{bi Hearings to review and deternine any request nade
pursvant to subsection (aj shell counence within twenty-one
Eslencar days of receipt of the request. The hearings
officers snail have power to issue suspoenas, aaminister
oaths, near testinony, find facts, make conclusions of law,
Gnd iSeue a written decision wiieh shall be final and
Conclusive unless s person or governmental body adversely
Gffected by the decision commences on appeal 1A the circuit
fourt of the circuit where che case or controversy arises
Under section 1030-720

(ci Only parties to the protest made and decides
pursvant to sections 1030-701, 1030~708(a), 1030-310 (b), and
fiese-702(g)] may initiate # proceeding under this section.
The party initiating the proceeding shall have the burden of
frock, including the burden of producing evidence as well as
The burden of persussion. The degree or quantum of proof
Shall bes preponderance of the evidence. All parties to
the procseding shall be afforded an opportunity to present
oral! or documentary evidence, conduct crossvexamination 38
ay be required, and argunent on sll issues involved. The
Fules of evidence shall apply

 

 

 

 

   
 

 

 

(continued...)
   

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conspicuously absent from HRS chapter 103F, thus demonstrating
that the legislature did not intend to allow, and certainly did
not intend to require, a hearing prior to decision-making under
HRS chapter 103F. See State v. Rodgers, 68 Haw. 438, 442, 718
P.2d 275, 277 (1986) (*[W]here a statute, with reference to one
subject contains a given provision, the omission of such
provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is
significant to show that a different legislative intention
existed.” (Ellipsis and citations omitted.)), superseded by
statute on other grounds.

Additionally, preclusion of judicial review pursuant to
HRS chapter 91 does not preclude judicial review through
alternative means.‘ See HRS § $1-14(a) (*(NJothing in this
section (91-14) shall be deemed to prevent resort to other means

of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo, including the right

oc seontinves)
(£) The hearings officer shail decide whether the
doterninations of the chief procurenent office: or the chief
procurenent officer’s designee were in accordance with the
Constitution, statutes, rules, and the terns and conditions
of the solicitation or contract, and shall order such relief
a5 may be appropriate in accordance with this chapter:

«ie take judicial notice of Alake’ :
civ. No. O5-1-1688-03, currently pending tn the circuit court, Which 15 ANK S|
civ action to contett shether the agency hes conducted ite decisioo-mahing
activities in accordance with applicable Laws, “Soe

Hinshaw, 103 wowai'i 26, 29 n.7, 19 P-34 119, 122 n-7 (2005) noting Chat this
Court tay take judicial notice ‘of a related case)? Bouse v, Mascos, 69 Hava!'t
81, 1102.9, 969 P.2d 1209, 1228 n.9 (1998) (nichourts have generally
recognized that they may, in appropriate circumstances, take notice of
proceedings in other courts, both within and without thelr Judicial

those proceedings have # ditect relaticn to the matter at igsve.”” (Brackets
snd citations omitted.)

 

   

 

 
   

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of trial by jury, provided by law.” (Emphasis added.)); Bush, 76
Hawai'i at 137, 870 P.2d at 1281 (stating that the appellants
were “not barred from contesting the [agency"s actions through
alternative means, but they {were} prohibited from accessing
review of these actions through inappropriate means”)
therefore,
17 TS HERESY ORDERED that the circuit court's
october 10, 2005 final judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 22, 2007.
on the briefs:
Perry Confaione Gp
and Avis K. Poa
(of Carlsmith Ball ute)

for appellant-appellant MivcP hn nae

Deirdre Marie-Tha
and Dorothy D. Sellers, Pasctes C eaeaejre
Deputy Attorneys General,

for appellee-appellee 3 on

Yrrre. Ouily ith