Title: Perkins v. Superior Court

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

100 Ariz. 186 (1966) 412 P.2d 476 William PERKINS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, R.C. Stanford, Jr., Judge, and All Judges of Said Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, Respondents. No. 8723. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. March 23, 1966. *187 Skousen, McLaws & Skousen, Mesa, for petitioner. Rhodes, Killian & Legg, Mesa, for Evelyn Perkins, real party in interest. BERNSTEIN, Vice Chief Justice. Petitioner, William Perkins, has filed in this court his petition for a Writ of Prohibition against the Superior Court of Maricopa County prohibiting the court from enforcing the following order: On March 2, 1966 we granted an Alternative Writ of Prohibition, it appearing that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction. See Van Ness v. Superior Court, 69 Ariz. 362, 213 P.2d 899. William Perkins was divorced from Evelyn Perkins on August 20, 1965. The decree ordered petitioner to pay alimony and child support in the sum total of $125 per month, and further provided: After the divorce petitioner kept current his payment of alimony and support but was subsequently declared bankrupt and was discharged from and therefore did not pay the community obligations to third persons as provided for in the divorce decree. At issue here is whether the payment of the then existing community obligations was the payment by petitioner of a debt, for neither party challenges the principle that imprisonment for a debt is contrary to the Arizona Constitution, Article 2, section 18, A.R.S., while imprisonment for failure to make support payments to a former wife as ordered in a divorce decree is proper, Stone v. Stidham, 96 Ariz. 235, 393 P.2d 923. The court in ordering petitioner to pay the obligations or face incarceration for contempt of court, no doubt reasoned that since the decree specifically conditioned the amount of support on the fact that petitioner would pay off the community obligations, the payment of the obligations was considered in lieu of a higher alimony figure. A similar issue was presented in Collins v. Superior Court, 48 Ariz. 381, 62 P.2d 131. There we interpreted Section 2187, Revised Code of 1928, the forerunner of A.R.S. § 25-319, and held that "to the wife" meant just what it said: Further, in Stone v. Stidham, supra, we held as follows after an analysis of the cases: It is ordered that the Alternative Writ of Prohibition shall be made permanent. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and UDALL, LOCKWOOD and McFARLAND, JJ., concur.