Title: Starr v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Starr v. State, No. 76, September Term, 2007
                                                                                                                                             
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; STATEMENT OF REASONS WHY MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL SHOULD BE GRANTED: Maryland Rule 4-324(a)
requires that a defendant who moves for judgment of acquittal “state with particularity all
reasons why the motion should be granted.”  The petitioner was convicted of openly wearing
and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure, and argued to the appellate courts
that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground that -- although the State’s
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for a violation of § 4-203(a)(1)(i) of the
Criminal Law Article -- he had been erroneously charged with a violation of § 4-101(c)(2)
of the Criminal Law Article.  Because petitioner’s trial counsel did not include this argument
in the statement of reasons presented in support of petitioner’s motion for judgment of
acquittal, this argument was not preserved for appellate review.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 76
September Term, 2007
                                                                    
CURTIS C. STARR
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                    
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned),
JJ.
                                                                   
Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                    
Filed:   June 26, 2008
In the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, a jury convicted Curtis C. Starr,
petitioner, of first degree assault and related offenses, including openly wearing and
carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure.  After the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed those convictions in an unreported opinion, petitioner requested that this Court
issue a writ of certiorari to review the sufficiency of the evidence that he violated Section
4-101(c) of the Criminal Law Article.  His petition presented us with a single question:
Is the evidence insufficient to sustain [petitioner’s]
conviction for wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon
openly with intent to injure under Criminal Law Article, § 4-
101 because a sawed-off shotgun does not meet the definition
of a dangerous weapon for purpose of that statute?
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that (1) this argument was not preserved
for appellate review, and (2) in the alternative, the evidence was sufficient to support
petitioner’s conviction.  For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment on the
ground that the sufficiency of the evidence issue was not preserved for appellate review.  
Background
Petitioner was tried on a four count indictment that included the following charge:
Count 4
THAT CURTIS C. STARR, on or about the 24th day of
September, 2005, in Wicomico County, State of Maryland, did
openly wear and carry a shotgun, a dangerous weapon, with
the intent and purpose of causing injury to Kevin Lucas in an
unlawful manner, contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly
in such cases made and provided, against the peace,
government and dignity of the State.
2
Art. CR Sec. 4.101. (c)(2)
The jurors were entitled to find beyond a reasonable doubt that about 11:30 p.m.
on September 24, 2005, in the Salisbury Motor Home Park, petitioner fired a “sawed-off
shotgun” over the head of one Kevin Lucas.  Prior to jury selection, petitioner’s trial
counsel requested that the Circuit Court “consider asking the question about crimes
involving firearms as there is an allegation that a firearm was involved in the
commission of this crime.”  When asked whether the firearm in question was a handgun,
petitioner’s trial counsel responded, “No, sawed off shotgun is the allegation.”  
Mr. Lucas testified as follows on direct examination:
A.
He passed by and he started, you know, giving us a real
mean look, it was like three of us. I asked him what
was going on. And he reached inside his pants and he
pulled out, it looked like a sawed off shotgun. And at
that time he put it back in his pants and kept going.
*    *    *
A.
...And I had been in the house for a few minutes and I
came outside and I heard someone call my name. And I
looked and he was standing there with a shotgun
pointing at me.
Q.
When you say he, who are you referring to?
A.
[] the Defendant. He was standing with a shotgun
pointed at me...
*    *    *
Q.
What kind of gun was it?
A.
It was a sawed off shotgun, it was wrapped in white
tape and it had a pistol grip.
Q.
What part of it was wrapped in white tape?
A.
The barrel.
3
Q.
How long was the gun?
A.
About that long, whatever that is, about 12, 14 inches.
Q.
Where was he pointing the shotgun when he fired it?
A.
In the air. He fired in the air.
Q.
Is it possible for you to demonstrate the angle with
your hands for the jury, the angle when he fired the
gun?
A.
Like that (indicating).
Q.
Was he holding it with two hands?
A.
Yes, one here and one there (indicating).
Q.
How many times did he fire it?
A.
One time. I think it was one shot because he loaded it
up again.
Q.
Did you see how he loaded it?
A.
Yes, he flicked it down and pulled the one shell out
and stuck the other shell in.
Q.
Where did he take the additional shell from?
A.
I guess in his pocket.
Q.
Did you see what he did -- was there an expended shell
from inside the shotgun?
A.
I think he put that inside his pocket, too, because it
wasn’t found.
The following transpired during Mr. Lucas’ cross-examination:
Q.
Do you have prior contact with shotguns what enables
you to identify something as a shotgun?
A.
No, I don’t. But when he shot it two feet of fire came
out of the end of it, that usually happens with a
shotgun.
Q.
So what you’re indicating is when you saw the gun fire
you saw something come out of the barrel?
A.
Fire came out of the barrel.
Q.
Fire came out of the barrel?
A.
Right.
Q.
Did you observe anything except for fire come out of
the barrel?
A.
Well, the trees and leaves and stuff moved, yes.
The State’s witnesses included Daniel Wiltbank, who testified as follows on
4
cross-examination: 
Q.
Do you have prior experience with firearms or
shotguns that enables you to identify the object held by
[the defendant] as a shotgun?
A.
Do I have professional training or do I own firearms?
Q.
Do you own firearms?
A.
Yes, I do.
Q.
Do you own shotguns?
A.
Yes, I do.
Q.
Can you describe the size of the firearm that you
described as a shotgun that was held by [the
defendant]?
A.
Pretty much, yes, sir.
Q.
Okay, what was its size?
A.
It was probably anywhere from I’d say 28 to maybe 32
inches total length. I do believe it was a double barrel.
Stock was cut off, the barrel was modified and cut off
as well.
*    *    *
Q.
And could you describe the angle at which the gun was
pointed when it was shot, when it was fired?
A.
Pretty much up in the air.
Q.
Okay. Did you see anything become expelled from the
barrel when it was fired?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
What did you see that was expelled from the barrel?
A.
I stated I saw a muzzle blast which looks like, in my
experience before, looks like fire.
Q.
Did you see the person who you’ve described as [the
defendant] reload the gun?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
Why do you believe it was a double barreled shotgun?
A.
Because I saw it and it looked to me like it was. But
that I’m not 100 percent sure.
Q.
But it looked to you like it had two barrels?
A.
Yes, sir.
5
Petitioner testified that he was not at the scene of the crime.  The firearm described
by the State’s witnesses was never recovered.  At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-
chief, petitioner’s trial counsel moved “for judgment of acquittal with respect to all
counts,” and presented the following argument in support of those motions:  
Specifically with respect to the fourth count, the justification
is that under the current State of Maryland case law it’s not
against the law to possess a shotgun or sawed off shotgun or
at the very least Criminal Law Article Section 4-101(c)(2)
doesn’t prohibit it. The Court will notice in the annotations
following the section of the case U.S. versus One 1967 Ford
Thunderbird, 316 F. Supp., 391, it’s a Federal District of
Maryland case that was affirmed. Simply put shotguns, even
sawed off shotguns aren’t dangerous weapons as
contemplated by this particular statute.  There are
prohibitions against, obviously, using a weapon against
someone in a particular manner but that case as well as
Anderson versus State, 328 Maryland 426, a ‘92 case, the
Anderson case stands for the proposition if it’s not listed in
the statute the State has to show that it was intended to be
included and the federal U.S. versus One 1967 Ford
Thunderbird case, taken in conjunction with the Anderson
case points out the reason why count four at this point, the
charge is openly wearing and carrying a shotgun is not an
appropriate charge under the circumstances.
I would also note, for the record, that in order to be
charged with and successfully convicted for wearing and
carrying a shotgun the State has to show more than just plain
use of it, but that it was worn around in some sort of general
way. Specifically there’s a court case where a person was
accused of wearing and carrying a beer bottle for purposes of
assaulting someone and what the Court of Special Appeals
said is just because you carry around a beer bottle doesn’t
mean that you violate the requirement of Criminal Law
Article Section 4-101(c)(2).
6
That’s the extent of argument with respect to count
four.
(Emphasis supplied).  The record shows that the following transpired at this point:
THE COURT: The way I read the Thunderbird case,
according to the annotations it says mere possession is not a
crime, it didn’t say it wasn’t a dangerous weapon.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s why it’s not a crime,
Your Honor, because it’s not a dangerous weapon under the
Statute, that’s the proposition to which the case stands.
THE COURT: Well, that’s not what the annotation
says. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s the proposition for
which the case stands.
*    *    *
[PROSECUTOR]: I thought the important factor there
was whether it was being worn and carried as opposed to
possessed. Just possessing isn’t a crime, it has to be carried. In
this case, you have the victim saying he saw him carrying it
down the street in his waistband, lifted it up and put it back
down, then came back and fired the shot and then walked
away with it again. That’s carrying, not just possessing.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If the State wants to rely
upon that theory, it’s a concealed weapon theory and so under
my theory -- what the victim says is that he sees him earlier
with it tucked in his pants, which is not openly wearing and
carrying anything but is in fact carrying it concealed which is
an entirely different crime.
* * *
THE COURT: Well I’m not convinced a sawed off
shotgun is not a dangerous weapon.  I don’t think the case you
7
cited stands for that proposition.  There is evidence from
which the jury could infer that the Defendant was carrying a
sawed off shotgun, certainly he pulled it out of his pants and
held it.  And they can infer that he was carrying it openly with
the intent or purpose of injuring someone else based upon the
comments that he made.  So I deny the motion as to count
four.
At the close of all the evidence, although he renewed the motion for judgments of
acquittal, petitioner’s trial counsel did not (1) state any additional reasons why the motion
should be granted, or (2) request a jury instruction that petitioner could not be convicted
of the offense charged in Count 4 unless the jurors were persuaded beyond a reasonable
doubt that the “sawed-off shotgun” fired by petitioner was not a handgun.  
As stated above, petitioner was convicted of all counts.  He noted an appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals, and filed an Appellant’s Brief that included the following
argument:
Defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal
arguing that a sawed-off shotgun did not meet the definition
of a dangerous weapon under Md. Ann. Code (2002, 2006
Supp.), Crim. Law Art. § 4-101.  
* * *
[Petitioner] was improperly convicted of openly
wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to
injure, because Criminal Law Article, § 4-101(a)(5)(ii) 1.
provides that a “weapon,” for purposes of this statute, does
not include a handgun.  
In support of its conclusion “that the reason advanced by [petitioner] in this appeal
for the alleged insufficiency of the evidence for a conviction was never argued with
1 According to petitioner, he should have been charged with CL § 4-203(a)(1)(i),
which prohibits a person from wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun, whether
concealed or open, on or about the person.   
8
particularity in the motion for judgment of acquittal in the trial court[,]” the Court of
Special Appeals stated:
Although not entirely clear, defense counsel apparently
argued that mere possession of a “sawed-off shotgun” did not
violate CR § 4-101(c)(2) and that the shotgun was not a
dangerous weapon because “if it’s not listed in the statute the
State has to show that it was intended to be included....”  At
no time did defense counsel assert that the shotgun qualified
as a handgun and thus was not covered by CR § 4-101(c)(2). 
Indeed, as previously stated, defense counsel expressly
conceded during voir dire that the shotgun at issue was not a
handgun.
Petitioner now argues to this Court that his “sufficiency” argument has been
preserved for our review.  
Discussion
Petitioner argues that his “wearing and carrying” conviction must be reversed on
the ground that there was a fatal variance between (1) the allegata, possession of a
shotgun under circumstances that violated CL § 4-101(c)(2), which prohibits a person
from carrying certain dangerous weapons -- including a shotgun -- openly with the intent
or purpose of injuring an individual in an unlawful manner, and (2) the probata,
possession of a “handgun,” which is not proscribed by CL § 4-101 because the definition
of a weapon in this section expressly excludes “a handgun.”  CL § 4-101(a)(5)(ii).1   
2 § 4-201 of the Criminal Law Article, in pertinent part, provides:
(c)(1) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm
capable of being concealed on the person.
(2) "Handgun" includes a short-barreled shotgun and a
short-barreled rifle.
(3) "Handgun" does not include a shotgun, rifle, or antique
firearm.
*    *    *
(g) "Short-barreled shotgun" means:
(1) a shotgun that has one or more barrels less than 18 inches
long; or
(2) a weapon that has an overall length of less than 26 inches
long and was made from a shotgun, whether by alteration,
modification, or otherwise.
(h) "Shotgun" means a weapon that is:
(1) designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to
be fired from the shoulder; and
(2) designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the
energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through
a smooth bore one or more projectiles for each pull of the
trigger.
9
Because petitioner’s trial counsel never argued to the circuit court that the “sawed-off
shotgun” described by the State’s witnesses was actually a “handgun” as that term is
defined in CL § 4- 201,2 this argument has not been preserved for our review.  
It is well settled that “appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a
criminal case tried by a jury is predicated on the refusal of the trial court to grant a motion
for judgment of acquittal.”  Lotharp v. State, 231 Md. 239, 240, 189 A.2d 652, 653
(1963).  A criminal defendant who moves for judgment of acquittal is required by Md.
Rule 4-324(a) to “state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted[,]”
10
and is not entitled to appellate review of reasons stated for the first time on appeal.  State
v. Lyles, 308 Md. 129, 135-36, 517 A.2d 761, 764-65 (1986); Muir v. State, 308 Md. 208,
218-19, 517 A.2d 1105, 1110 (1986); Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 416-17, 601 A.2d
131, 140 (1992).  In Graham, the petitioner, who had been convicted of theft of property
worth $300 or more, argued that this conviction should be reversed on the ground “that
the State failed to establish that [the stolen] items were worth $300 or more.”  Id. at 416,
601 A.2d at 140.  This Court, however, refused to consider that argument because the
record showed that the petitioner’s trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal solely
on the ground that the State had failed to prove that the owner of the stolen items was “a
corporation, licensed to practice in the State of Maryland.”  Id. at 417, 601 A.2d at 140.  
“Sufficiency” arguments that were not presented to the trial judge are often
presented to the Court of Special Appeals, and are rejected by that court under the
authority of Lyles, Muir and Graham.  For example, in McIntyre v. State, 168 Md. App.
504, 897 A.2d 296 (2006), while affirming possession and distribution of child
pornography convictions, the Court of Special Appeals refused to decide whether “ the
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to establish that the images depicted actual
children, as opposed to virtual images of children[,]” because that argument was not made
in the Circuit Court when the appellant’s trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. 
Id. at 526-27, 897 A.2d at 308-09.  The McIntyre Court stated: 
In Fraidin v. State, 85 Md.App. 231, 244-45, 583 A.2d
1065 (1991), Judge Moylan, speaking for [the Court of
11
Special Appeals], said:
In a jury trial, the only way to raise and
to preserve for appellate review the issue of the
legal sufficiency of the evidence is to move for
a judgment of acquittal on that ground. Under
Md. Rule 4-324(a), a defendant is further
required to argue precisely the ways in which
the evidence should be found wanting and the
particular elements of the crime as to which the
evidence is deficient. In State v. Lyles, 308 Md.
129, 135 [517 A.2d 761] ... (1986), the Court of
Appeals held clearly that a defendant is
“required to state with particularity all reasons
why his motion for judgment of acquittal should
be granted.”...
More recently in Bates v. State, 127 Md.App. 678, 691,
736 A.2d 407 (1999), we said: “A defendant may not argue in
the trial court that the evidence was insufficient for one
reason, then urge a different reason for the insufficiency on
appeal....”
Id. at 527-28, 897 A.2d at 309.
According to petitioner, his present argument was preserved for appellate review
when his trial counsel stated, “shotguns, even sawed off shotguns aren’t dangerous
weapons as contemplated by this particular statute,” and “if it’s not listed in the statute the
State has to show that it was intended to be included.”  While an appellant/petitioner is
entitled to present the appellate court with “a more detailed version of the [argument]
advanced at trial[, this Court has refused] to require trial courts to imagine all reasonable
offshoots of the argument actually presented to them before making a ruling on
admissibility.”  Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 116, 136, 857 A.2d 88, 99-100 (2004).  In Sifrit,
12
we declined “to place such a substantial burden on the trial court[,]” when the trial court
was ruling on the admissibility of an item of evidence.  Id. at 136, 857 A.2d at 100.  What
we said in that case is fully applicable to appellate review of the denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal.  When ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court
is not required to imagine all reasonable offshoots of the argument actually presented.  
Moreover, even if there were such a requirement, the argument petitioner presents
to this Court is not a reasonable offshoot of the argument presented to the Circuit Court,
during which petitioner’s trial counsel called the Circuit Court’s attention to two cases:
United States v. One 1967 Ford Thunderbird, 316 F.Supp. 391 (D.Md. 1970), and
Anderson v. State, 328 Md. 426, 614 A.2d 963 (1992).  Ford Thunderbird was cited in
support of the argument that “mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun is not a crime.” 
316 F.Supp. at 393.  Anderson was cited in support of the argument that § 4-101 of the
Criminal Law Article did not apply to any weapon that was not “listed” in that statute. 
Both of these arguments are based on the proposition that petitioner was in possession of
a “sawed-off shotgun” rather than a “handgun” on the occasion at issue.  No “reasonable
offshoot” of either of those propositions includes the argument that the petitioner was
entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground that, although the State’s evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction for a violation of § 4-203(a)(1)(i) of the Criminal Law
Article, petitioner had been erroneously charged with a violation of § 4-101(c)(2) of the
Criminal Law Article.  
13
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; 
PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.