Title: Weidner v. Life Care Centers of America

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Weidner v. Life Care Centers of America1995 WY 50893 P.2d 706Case Number: 94-197Decided: 04/11/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Claim for Unemployment Insurance of Londa WEIDNER, Appellant 
(Petitioner-Claimant),

v.

LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, Appellee 
(Respondent-Employer).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, 
J.

Londa Weidner, Phoenix, AZ, 
pro se.

John C. McKinley and Anthony 
T. Wendtland of Davis & Cannon, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Upon the district 
court's certification pursuant to WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09(b), we must decide whether 
the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Commission of the Department of 
Employment of the State of Wyoming (Commission) that Londa Weidner (Weidner), an 
employee of Life Care Centers of America at its Westview Health Care Center in 
Sheridan, Wyoming, voluntarily quit her employment without good cause 
attributable directly to her employment, thereby disqualifying her from the 
receipt of unemployment insurance benefits, was in accordance with law and 
supported by substantial evidence.

[¶2]      We hold that the 
Commission's decision was in accordance with law and supported by substantial 
evidence; therefore, we affirm the Commission's decision.

FACTS

[¶3]      Life Care Centers 
of America employed Weidner at its Westview Health Care Center in Sheridan, 
Wyoming, from October 1, 1989, through October 1, 1993. During that time period, 
her employer made her the director of nursing at the Westview facility. In July, 
1993, her employer assigned a new executive director to the Westview facility; 
he became Weidner's immediate supervisor. Shortly thereafter, Weidner began 
having concerns about her immediate supervisor's management style. She disagreed 
with some of his decisions regarding the Westview facility's operations, but did 
not inform him of her concerns.

[¶4]      On Friday, 
October 1, 1993, Weidner's immediate supervisor and Weidner met in a counseling 
session to discuss her job performance. He informed her of his concerns about 
deficiencies in her job performance. He told her he would not tolerate these 
deficiencies, and he established specific actions for her to take immediately. 
He told her they would review her progress on a weekly basis during the month of 
October. He further informed her he was willing to assist her in whatever way he 
could and that she should inform him of ways in which he could assist her. From 
among her several job responsibilities, he removed her scheduling of the nursing 
staff and placed that task with the assistant director of nursing. Concluding 
the counseling session, he told her to go home, think about their discussion, 
and return to work the following Monday, October 4, 1993. On Saturday, October 
2, however, Weidner tendered her resignation which stated:

To Whom It May Concern:

I, Londa Weidner, am giving my resignation as 
Director of Nursing from Westview Health Care Center, effective 
today.

The Nursing Department has operated suc[c]essfully 
for the last 4 years and flourished in the last 2 1/2 years under Sandi LaBar's 
guidance. The Director of Nursing at this time is no longer allowed to run the 
nursing department and therefore it cannot operate at it's [sic] usual high 
standard of performance.

It is the same situation of lack of control as we 
suffered through with John Walker. As I value my integrity and refuse to be 
degraded any further, I can no longer be a part of this totally out of control 
facility. It deeply saddens me to join Sandi LaBar in giving up and leaving the 
residents, their families and the staff exposed to this 
situation.

To the Nursing Staff:

I 
apologize to you for leaving abruptly but I can no longer tolerate the verbal 
abuse from other department heads and their failure to behave 
professionally.

"God grant me the serenity to change the things I 
can, to accept the things I cannot change and the ability to know the 
difference."

I'll miss you all.

Londa Weidner, R.N.

/s/ Londa Weidner, R.N.

[¶5]      Weidner then 
filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. A Commission deputy 
determined that her claim was not disqualified and allowed her claim, holding 
her employer's account chargeable with any benefits which might be paid to 
Weidner effective October 24, 1993, for the year ending October 22, 1994. 
Weidner's employer appealed the deputy's determination to the Commission's 
appeal examiner. That examiner held an evidentiary hearing on January 3, 1994. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the examiner reversed the deputy's 
determination and found that Weidner quit her job voluntarily without good cause 
attributable directly to her employment and without a bona fide medical reason 
involving her health.

[¶6]      Weidner appealed 
the examiner's decision to the Commission. On May 17, 1994, the Commission 
affirmed the examiner's decision. Weidner filed her petition for review of the 
Commission's decision to the District Court, Fourth Judicial District. That 
court certified the petition to this Court pursuant to the provisions of 
WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09(b). Weidner did not order a transcript of the evidentiary 
hearing before the examiner; therefore, a certified transcript of that hearing 
is not a part of the record on appeal.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      On appeal, 
Weidner challenges the Commission's decision on both procedural and evidentiary 
grounds. We shall consider her procedural challenge before we address her 
evidentiary challenge.

[¶8]      Weidner contends 
she did not receive a copy of the "Employer's Amended Objection to Employee's 
Appeal and Argument and Authority"; she was not allowed to attend a Commission 
meeting; she was denied a copy of the transcript; and she was denied counsel. 
The employer maintains these contentions lack merit. We agree. Weidner appeared 
in person and called two witnesses who testified on her behalf at the examiner's 
evidentiary hearing. She had the opportunity to have counsel present, but, so 
far as can be discerned, decided to proceed without counsel. She lodged no 
objection to proceeding without counsel. Her counsel filed an appearance a week 
after the hearing and filed the appeal and petition for review the following 
week. The employer's pleadings were served upon Weidner or her counsel. We find 
no denial to Weidner of any opportunity to present evidence to either the 
examiner or the Commission.

[¶9]      In early May, 
1994, the Commission notified Weidner and her counsel by letter of, and invited 
their participation in, the May 17 appeal hearing. Her counsel appeared on that 
occasion. Despite having the opportunity to order a hearing transcript from the 
Commission, Weidner did not do so. We hold that Weidner's several procedural 
challenges are groundless.

[¶10]   With respect to Weidner's 
evidentiary challenge to the Commission's decision, she contends the evidence 
shows her employer forced her to resign and that the conclusion she voluntarily 
quit has no support in the record.

[¶11]   Preliminarily, we need to place her 
challenge in perspective in accordance with our standard of review. As noted 
earlier, Weidner did not order a transcript of the examiner's evidentiary 
hearing. In previous cases in which an appellant, who is challenging the 
decision below on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, has failed to 
provide us with a transcript or other proper record of the proceedings below, we 
have said:

[O]ur review is severely limited. . . . It is 
[appellant's] responsibility to provide a transcript. W.R.A.P. 4.05. . . . When 
there is no transcript, the findings of the [trier of fact] are accepted as the 
only basis for deciding issues pertaining to evidence. In the absence of 
anything to refute them, we will sustain the findings of the [trier of fact], 
and we assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support those 
findings.

Osborn v. Pine Mountain 
Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted); accord, Combs v. 
Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶12]   When the district court certifies 
directly to this Court an administrative agency's decision, we review that 
agency decision "under the same appellate standards applicable to the reviewing 
court of the first instance." Matter of Bessemer Mt., 856 P.2d 450, 453 (Wyo. 
1993). Our judicial review is limited to those considerations specified in WYO. 
STAT. § 16-3-114 which provides:

the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

. 
. . .

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

. . 
. .

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114 (Repl. 
1990).

[¶13]   Substantial evidence is such 
evidence as a "reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." City of Casper v. Dept. of Employment, 851 P.2d 1, 3 (Wyo. 1993). 
This substantial evidence may be less than the "weight of the evidence but 
cannot be contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Id. We review 
"only the decision of the Commission for substantial evidence." Id. at 4. 

[¶14]   Our review of findings of fact 
adheres to the following standard:

We examine the entire record to determine if there is 
substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. If the agency's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment 
for that of the agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the conclusions of the agency. It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence.

Bohren v. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 883 P.2d 355, 357 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Trout v. Oil & Gas 
Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986) (citations 
omitted)).

[¶15]   We give great deference to the 
Commission's findings of fact in light of its expertise and extensive experience 
in employment matters. Beddow v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 718 P.2d 12, 14 (Wyo. 
1986). The agency is charged with determining "the ultimate weight to be given 
that evidence." Id. In addition, the agency is charged with determining the 
credibility of the witnesses. Bohren, 883 P.2d  at 357. If the agency's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence, this Court "cannot substitute [its] 
judgment for that of the agency, but [this Court is] required to uphold its 
findings upon appeal." Beddow, 718 P.2d  at 14.

[¶16]   An employee who voluntarily resigns 
or quits employment has the burden of proving the good cause for quitting work. 
Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311, 1317 (Wyo. 1985); Beddow, 718 P.2d  at 15. This Court takes the record as a whole and reviews whether 
substantial evidence supports the agency's findings of fact. Casper Iron & 
Metal v. Unemp. Ins. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 392 (Wyo. 1993). The challenging 
party has the "burden of establishing the absence of substantial evidence." 
Id.

[¶17]   We review conclusions of law to 
determine whether they are "in accordance with law." Id. If the agency applies 
the incorrect rule of law, this Court does not defer to the agency and corrects 
the rule of law. Id. "Agency decisions are reversed only for errors of law." 
Id.; see also Union Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 821 P.2d 550, 557 (Wyo. 
1991). Therefore, we affirm correct conclusions of law and correct incorrect 
ones.

[¶18]   We begin our review of the 
Commission's decision with consideration of the applicable statute. The 
legislature has written:

An individual shall be disqualified from benefit 
entitlement beginning with the effective date of an otherwise valid claim or on 
the date the failure occurred, until he has been employed in an 
employee-employer relationship for a period of at least twelve (12) weeks 
whether or not consecutive, and has earned at least twelve (12) times the weekly 
benefit amount of his current claim for services after that date, if the 
department finds that he:

(i)         Left 
his most recent work voluntarily without good cause attributable directly to his 
employment, except for bona fide medical reasons involving his 
health[.]

WYO. STAT. § 27-3-311(a)(i) 
(Cumm.Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).

[¶19]   With this provision, the 
legislature has specifically directed that an employee shall be disqualified 
from receiving benefit entitlement if she quits or leaves work "voluntarily 
without good cause attributable directly to [her] employment."1 In this context, concerning the 
meaning of the word "voluntarily," we have said:

[V]oluntary connotes "[u]nconstrained by 
interference; unimpelled by another's influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself 
* * * [r]esulting from free choice." Similar language in other jurisdictions' 
statutes has been interpreted to require "some manifestation of intent to quit" 
to show a claimant voluntarily left employment. Merely leaving the premises of 
employment is not enough to determine intent; the totality of the circumstances 
must be considered.

Casper Iron & Metal, 845 P.2d  at 396 (citations omitted). Also in this context, concerning the meaning of 
the term "good cause," we have said:

We have held that "good cause" is such a cause that 
would justify an employee in voluntarily leaving his job to join the ranks of 
the unemployed. Consequently, a resignation must be due to such objective 
circumstances as would reasonably motivate an average able-bodied and qualified 
worker, exercising common sense and prudence, to abandon the remunerations of 
his wage for the lesser rewards of compensated 
unemployment.

Southwest Wyoming 
Rehabilitation Center v. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶20]   The parties have not referred us to 
any factually similar cases in our unemployment compensation jurisprudence. Our 
own research reveals none. We have reviewed several annotations for factually 
similar cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., ANNOTATION, Unemployment 
Compensation: Eligibility Where Claimant Leaves Employment Under Circumstances 
Interpreted as a Firing by the Claimant but as a Voluntary Quit by the Employer, 
80 A.L.R.4TH 7 (1990 & 1994 Pocket Part Supp.); ANNOTATION, Eligibility for 
Unemployment Compensation of Employee Who Left Employment Based on Belief that 
Involuntary Discharge was Imminent, 79 A.L.R.4TH 528 (1990 & 1994 Pocket 
Part Supp.); and JAMES O. PEARSON, JR., ANNOTATION, Unemployment Compensation: 
Harassment or Other Mistreatment by Employer or Supervisor as "Good Cause" 
Justifying Abandonment of Employment, 76 A.L.R.3D 1089 (1977 and 1994 Pocket 
Part Supp.). In several factually similar cases from other jurisdictions, the 
courts have affirmed agency decisions that the employee voluntarily left 
employment without good cause in the face of the employer's criticism of the 
employee's job performance. See, e.g., Claim of Merriwether, 197 A.D.2d 732, 602 N.Y.S.2d 242 3d 1993); Claim of Ortas, 187 A.D.2d 851, 589 N YS.2d 714 3d 1992); 
Claim of Krokos, 184 A.D.2d 871, 585 N YS.2d 120 3d 1992); St. Barnabas, Inc. v. 
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 106 Pa.Cmwlth. 191, 525 A.2d 885 
(1987); and Glennen v. Employment Div., 25 Or. App. 593, 549 P.2d 1288 (1976). 
We have said, in one of our decisions in which we denied benefits to an employee 
who quit after being physically assaulted by a co-worker in an isolated incident 
at work, that "good cause must meet the test of ordinary common sense and 
prudence. Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions does not constitute good 
cause for quitting one's employment." Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311, 1317 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶21]   From these cases emerges the rule 
that in a case such as this one before us, where procedures are in place in the 
employment relationship to deal with such job performance problems and are known 
to the employee, the employee must make a good faith effort to use such 
procedures in an effort to solve her problems. Common sense and prudence under 
such circumstances require that the employee use such procedures since that 
avenue is provided by the employer, rather than submit a resignation without 
giving herself and the employer the opportunity to solve the 
problems.

[¶22]   Applying that rule in the case 
before us, we can reach but one conclusion and that is the Commission's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. Although 
before Weidner submitted her resignation letter, her immediate supervisor had 
criticized her job performance, he had not fired her. He set forth a procedure 
for both of them to follow with a view toward improving Weidner's job 
performance. Instead of pursuing that procedure, she chose voluntarily and 
without good cause to resign. The Commission's decision that that was her intent 
of her own free will is well within the evidence before 
it.

[¶23]   We affirm the Commission's 
decision.

 

FOOTNOTE

1 Weidner does not claim the medical 
reasons exception is applicable to her case.