Title: State v. Andre Johnson

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Verniero, J., writing for a Unanimous Court. This case involves the validity of a no-knock search warrant. Detective Anthony Falcone of the North Brunswick Township police department received information from a confidential informant that Sandra Figaroa, AKA Sandra Alfonso, and her boyfriend Andre Johnson, known as Earthquake, were selling drugs out of an apartment. Detective Falcone proceeded to conduct a controlled buy through the confidential informant. Following the purchase of two bags of heroin, Detective Falcone obtained a no-knock search warrant to search Figaroa's apartment. Detective Falcone testified before the issuing judge that a no-knock search warrant was needed for the officers' safety and to ensure that the evidence was not destroyed. Based on that testimony alone, the court issued the search warrant, never commenting on the no-knock provision. The warrant had to be executed within ten days and could be executed day or night. On July 31, 1997, various officers of the North Brunswick and New Brunswick police departments and the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office forced themselves into Figaroa's apartment at about 8:30 p.m.. The officers recovered two glassine packets of heroin that Figaroa tried to flush down the toilet and arrested Figaroa and defendant Andre Johnson. Upon a further search of the apartment, the officers found heroin, cocaine, cash suspected to be drug proceeds, and various drug paraphernalia. Defendants were charged with numerous drug offenses, including possession of heroin with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property. At trial, defense counsel argued that the court did not possess probable cause to issue the search warrant, but failed to raise the no-knock provision issue. Defendant subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to a five- year term of imprisonment with a three-year period of parole ineligibility. On appeal, however, defendant argued that there was no justification for a no-knock provision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a no-knock warrant. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification and granted the motion of the Attorney General to appear as amicus curiae. HELD: The record did not adequately justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant in this case. 1. The knock-and-announce rule is a long-standing component of the common law, with its origins dating as far back as the Magna Carta, and is an underlying principle of both the Federal and State Constitutions. There are three main exceptions, however, where knock-and-announce is not required: (1) immediate action is required to preserve evidence; (2) the officer's peril would be increased; or (3) the arrest would be frustrated. A per se rule dispensing with the no-knock rule in felony drug cases is contrary to the Fourth Amendment. An officer requesting a no-knock warrant must be able to specify the applicable exception, articulate a reasonable particularized suspicion justifying the no-knock provision, and cannot rely on a mere hunch of criminal activity. (Pp.7-14) 2. The State's arguments in support of the no-knock provision are flawed. First, Detective Falcone never articulated reasons specific to the case that would have led the issuing judge to believe that these particular defendants would have destroyed the evidence. Second, Detective Falcone never articulated any specific reasons as to why either the officers' safety or that of other residents was at risk. Third, Detective Falcone never explained to the issuing judge how waiting the required reasonable amount of time between the police announcement and any forced entry would have impeded the police in the execution of the warrant. Fourth, the State's argument that defendant Johnson's nickname Earthquake signaled a propensity for violence is baseless; the right to be free of unreasonable searches cannot hinge on a person's nickname. Fifth, the State's argument that the conviction should be affirmed because they relied in good faith on the warrant runs contrary to the need for clear and uniform rules. (Pp. 14-20) 3. Although detailed findings by the issuing judge are not necessary, a no-knock provision in a search warrant must be based on more than conclusory statements. Probable cause alone is not sufficient. A trial court must make a fact-specific and fact-sensitive inquiry to determine whether a no-knock provision is justified. There are a number of facts that Detective Falcone could have specified that may have proven sufficient to justify the no-knock provision in this case, including defendant's criminal history and the layout of Figaroa's apartment. Finally, the Court recognizes that a residential dwelling enjoys a greater degree of privacy than an automobile. (Pp. 20-24) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division to vacate the judgment of conviction. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO'S opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANDRE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 17, 2001 -- Decided July 10, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. J. Michael Blake, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). John N. Shaughnessy, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Glenn Berman, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Simon Louis Rosenbach, on the letter in lieu of brief). Catherine A. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. While executing a no-knock search warrant at a residential apartment, the police seized evidence of illegal drug activity that led to defendant's arrest and conviction. As the name implies, a no-knock warrant authorizes police officers to enter a home or business without first knocking and announcing their presence. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized at the apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed. We hold that the record did not adequately justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant in this case. We are thus compelled to set aside defendant's conviction. Those exceptions would seem to swallow the rule, particularly in drug investigations in which there are often grounds to suspect that immediate action is required to preserve evidence, protect the safety of police officers, or effectuate a successful arrest. However, the Supreme Court has warned that there can be no blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule in felony drug cases consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 285, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997). In Richards, a lower state court had created a per se rule permitting law enforcement officers to dispense with the knock-and-announce rule in cases involving suspected felony drug offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, stating: [T]he fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and- announce requirement. In order to justify a no-knock entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standard -- as opposed to a probable-cause requirement -- strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no- knock entries. Under Richards, then, the task of courts evaluating the propriety of a no-knock provision is to determine whether the applying officer has articulated a reasonable suspicion to believe that one or more exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule are justified. Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, satisfying the doctrine of reasonable suspicion requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for [taking the police action]. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, ___ (2000). The officer must be able to articulate more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch ' of criminal activity. Ibid. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909 (1968)). The Court in Richards also stated that the showing of reasonable suspicion justifying an exception to the knock-and- announce rule is not high, but the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged. Richards, supra, 520 U.S. at 394-95, 117 S. Ct. at 1422, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 627. Within a similar context of determining the reasonableness of investigative stops, this Court has stated that it is incumbent upon a reviewing court to evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions. An investigatory stop is valid only if the officer has a particularized suspicion based upon an objective observation that the person stopped has been or is about to engage in criminal wrongdoing. The articulable reasons or particularized suspicion of criminal activity must be based upon the law enforcement officer's assessment of the totality of circumstances with which he is faced. Such observations are those that, in view of [the] officer's experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonabl[y] warrant the limited intrusion upon the individual's freedom. See also State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 487 (2001) (emphasizing that officer's hunch, without more, cannot rise to level of reasonable and articulable suspicion in context of investigatory stop). In applying that jurisprudence within the framework of the knock-and-announce rule, we discern the following tenets. First, to justify a no-knock warrant provision, a police officer must have a reasonable, particularized suspicion that a no-knock entry is required to prevent the destruction of evidence, to protect the officer's safety, or to effectuate the arrest or seizure of evidence. Second, the police officer must articulate the reasons for that suspicion and may base those reasons on the totality of the circumstances with which he or she is faced. Third, although the officer's assessment of the circumstances may be based on his or her experience and knowledge, the officer must articulate a minimal level of objective justification to support the no-knock entry, meaning it may not be based on a mere hunch. NO. A-132 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANDRE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 10, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz