Title: State v. Emerson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Emerson, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5047.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5047 
STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. EMERSON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Emerson, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5047.] 
Criminal law—DNA testing—A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his or her DNA profile extracted from a lawfully obtained DNA sample, 
and a defendant lacks standing to object to its use by the state in a 
subsequent criminal investigation. 
(No. 2011-0486—Submitted January 18, 2012—Decided November 1, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 94413, 192 Ohio App.3d 446, 2011-Ohio-593. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile 
extracted from a lawfully obtained DNA sample, and a defendant lacks 
standing to object to its use by the state in a subsequent criminal 
investigation. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} There are two issues presented in this case.  First, when a sample 
of a person’s DNA is lawfully obtained by the state during the course of a 
criminal investigation but the person is acquitted of that crime, does that person 
have standing to object under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to 
the retention by the state of the DNA profile obtained from that sample or its use 
in a subsequent criminal investigation?  Second, is the state authorized to retain 
and subsequently use a DNA profile when the DNA sample was lawfully taken 
from a person during a criminal investigation, but the person was acquitted?   
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a person does not 
have standing to object to the retention of his or her DNA profile or the profile’s 
use in a subsequent criminal investigation, and the state is authorized to retain the 
DNA profile and to use it in a subsequent investigation even though the profile 
was obtained from a sample taken during the investigation of a crime of which the 
person was acquitted.  We accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
A.  Combined DNA Index System 
{¶ 3} The Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) “is a computerized 
program designed to house DNA profiles from convicted offenders, forensic 
samples, suspects, missing persons, unidentified remains and relatives of missing 
persons in various searchable databases.”  Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification 
and Investigation, CODIS Methods Manual, Section 1 (2009).  There are three 
levels in CODIS—local, state, and national.  Id. at Section 1.1.  In this case, the 
local databases were the Cuyahoga County Coroner’s Office and the Ohio Bureau 
of Criminal Identification and Investigation’s (“BCI”) Richfield laboratory.  The 
state database is maintained at BCI’s London laboratory, and the Federal Bureau 
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of Investigation maintains the national database.  The Criminal Justice 
Information System Wide Area Network links the three CODIS levels. 
B.  DNA Profile Created from a DNA Sample 
{¶ 4} A DNA sample is processed to yield a DNA profile.  A DNA 
profile consists of a series of numbers that represent different alleles1 that are 
present at different locations on the DNA.  Thus, those numbers constitute the 
DNA profile used by the laboratories in making comparisons. 
C.  DNA Sample from 2005 Rape Investigation 
{¶ 5} In 2005, appellant, Dajuan Emerson, was accused of rape.  In the 
course of the investigation, a search warrant was executed to obtain a DNA 
sample from appellant. 
{¶ 6} The sample was processed and a DNA profile was obtained.  The 
profile was placed into CODIS at the local level and, eventually, was entered in a 
“suspect” database at the state level. 
{¶ 7} Appellant was acquitted of the rape charge.  After his acquittal, the 
DNA profile remained in CODIS.  Appellant did not seek to have the profile 
expunged. 
D.  2007 Homicide 
{¶ 8} In July 2007, Marnie Macon was murdered in Cleveland, Ohio.  
Blood was found on a door handle at the crime scene, and the Cleveland Police 
Department submitted a sample of the blood to the Cuyahoga County Coroner’s 
Office.  A DNA analyst with the coroner’s office processed the blood sample, and 
the resulting DNA profile was entered into CODIS at the local level as a forensic 
unknown. 
                                                          
 
1 An allele is defined as “either of a pair of genes located at the same position on both members of 
a pair of chromosomes and conveying characters that are inherited in accordance with Mendelain 
law.”  Webster’s New World Dictionary,Third College Edition 36 (1988). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 9} The profile was sent electronically to the state.  In August 2008, a 
report generated at the state level was sent to the coroner’s office and the forensic 
scientist at BCI’s Richfield laboratory, notifying each that a forensic match had 
been found between the profile submitted by the coroner’s office and a known 
profile in BCI’s system.  Specifically, appellant’s DNA profile, which was 
obtained during the 2005 rape case, matched the DNA profile obtained from the 
blood found at the homicide scene. 
{¶ 10} A search warrant was issued to obtain a DNA sample from 
appellant.  The sample was processed by the coroner’s office and the resulting 
DNA profile was compared with the unknown DNA profile in the homicide case. 
E.  Aggravated Murder 
{¶ 11} In March 2009, appellant was indicted on one count each of 
aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and tampering with evidence.  Appellant 
filed a motion to suppress any DNA evidence.  After holding a hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion. 
{¶ 12} The matter proceeded to trial.  The jury found appellant guilty of 
aggravated murder and tampering with evidence.  The trial court, however, 
granted appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
aggravated-burglary count.  On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed.  192 Ohio App.3d 446, 2011-Ohio-593, 949 N.E.2d 538. 
{¶ 13} We accepted 
appellant’s appeal under our discretionary 
jurisdiction to review two questions of law:  (1) does a person have standing to 
object under the Fourth Amendment to the retention of a DNA profile by the state 
and its use in a subsequent criminal investigation, when the profile was lawfully 
created during a previous criminal investigation, but the person was acquitted of 
the crime, and (2) does the state have the authority to retain a DNA profile that 
was created during a criminal investigation and use that profile in a subsequent 
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investigation, when the person was acquitted of any crime following the first 
investigation.  128 Ohio St. 3d 1556, 2011-Ohio-2905, 949 N.E.2d 43. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standing to Object 
{¶ 14} Appellant argues that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the DNA profile obtained from his sample.  He contends that the state was able to 
use the DNA profile only for its lawfully obtained purpose—the rape 
investigation.  Accordingly, appellant asserts that the continued retention of the 
DNA profile, and its subsequent use in the murder trial, was an impermissible 
search and seizure to which he has standing to object.  In other words, the 
retention and subsequent use implicated the Fourth Amendment independently of 
the taking of the sample. 
{¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  We have interpreted Article I, Section 14 “to protect the same interests 
and in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”  State v. Andrews, 57 
Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991), fn. 1.  The guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment is protected by use of the exclusionary rule.  United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). 
{¶ 16} “ ‘Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which * * * may 
not be vicariously asserted.’ ”  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134, 99 S.Ct. 
421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 
174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).  “In order to have standing to challenge 
a search or seizure, the defendant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the evidence seized.”  State v. Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio-3206, 
811 N.E.2d 68, citing Alderman at 171-172.  To determine whether a defendant 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, it first must be determined whether “the 
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
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challenged search?”  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 
L.Ed.2d 210 (1986), citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 
61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979).  Then, a court must decide whether society is willing to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable.  Id. 
{¶ 17} The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he possessed 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the object of the search.  State v. Dennis, 79 
Ohio St.3d 421, 426, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). 
{¶ 18} A person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her 
bodily fluids.  See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).  The expectation of privacy extends to the DNA in the 
sample obtained from appellant during the 2005 rape investigation.  See Smith v. 
State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind.2001).  However, that sample was obtained 
pursuant to a search warrant.  Appellant is not now challenging the warrant and 
does not present any evidence that he challenged the warrant when it was issued.  
Thus, there was no Fourth Amendment violation with respect to that sample, see 
id., and the resulting DNA profile. 
{¶ 19} However, appellant argues that the DNA profile obtained from the 
sample taken during the 2005 rape investigation was used improperly.  
Specifically, appellant contends that the state was permitted to use the DNA 
profile only for the 2005 rape investigation and its retention and subsequent use 
subjected him to a new Fourth Amendment search and seizure.  First, we must 
examine whether appellant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in that 
DNA profile. 
{¶ 20} A DNA sample and a DNA profile are not one and the same.  
Instead, a DNA sample is processed by a specialist to obtain the DNA profile.  
See R.C. 109.573(B)(5) and (H)(2).  Once the sample is processed, a record is 
made of the profile.  Accordingly, this scientific process results in a record 
January Term, 2012 
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separate and distinct from the DNA sample.  Because a scientific process must be 
performed on a DNA sample by an agent of the government to obtain the  DNA 
profile, and the DNA profile is separate and distinct from the DNA sample, we 
conclude that the DNA profile obtained from appellant’s DNA sample was the 
work product of the government.  See Smith, 744 N.E.2d at 439.  Therefore, 
appellant had no possessory or ownership interest in the DNA profile.  Id.  
Although, as discussed below, appellant may have been able to request 
expungement of that DNA profile from CODIS, BCI regulates access to and the 
use of the information until it is expunged.  See R.C. 109.573. 
{¶ 21} Additionally, appellant presented no evidence at the suppression 
hearing that he sought expungement of the profile from CODIS upon his acquittal 
or that he took any other action in the intervening years to seek removal of the 
profile from CODIS.  Therefore, appellant did not manifest a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the profile, at least to the extent that it remained in the 
possession of the state for criminal investigatory purposes. 
{¶ 22} Moreover, even if appellant had shown that he had manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the DNA profile, society does not recognize 
that expectation as reasonable.  “ ‘[A] defendant [can] not plausibly assert any 
expectation of privacy with respect to the scientific analysis of a lawfully seized 
item of tangible property, such as a gun or a controlled substance.  Although, 
human blood, with its unique genetic properties, may initially be quantitatively 
different from such evidence, once constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a 
blood sample is not unlike other tangible property which can be subject to a 
battery of scientific tests.’ ”  (Emphasis omitted.)  Wilson v. State, 132 Md.App. 
510, 545, 752 A.2d 1250 (2000), quoting People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614, 
232 A.D.2d 111 (1997). 
{¶ 23} Further, retention by the state of a DNA profile for possible future 
comparison with profiles obtained from unknown samples taken from a victim or 
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a crime scene does not differ from the retention by the state of fingerprints for use 
in subsequent investigations.  As stated in Bickley v. State, 227 Ga.App. 413, 415, 
489 S.E.2d 167 (1997), “[N]o matter how many times defendant’s blood is tested, 
the DNA results would be identical.  What defendant is really objecting to is the 
comparison of his DNA with DNA derived from samples taken from the victims 
of crimes other than the one specified in the search warrant.  * * * ‘In this respect, 
DNA results are like fingerprints which are maintained on file by law 
enforcement authorities for use in further investigations.’ ” (Footnote omitted). 
{¶ 24} We note that numerous courts around the country have examined 
this issue and have reached the same conclusion that we do here—a person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile extracted from a 
lawfully obtained DNA sample.  A defendant lacks standing to object to its use by 
the state in a subsequent criminal investigation.  See Herman v. State, 122 Nev. 
199, 207, 128 P.3d 469 (2006) (A DNA sample legally obtained in a criminal 
investigation that had no limitation on its use may be used in a subsequent 
investigation without implicating Fourth Amendment concerns because “[a] 
reasonable person would have understood that the resulting DNA profile, like 
fingerprints, could be available for general investigative purposes); State v. 
Hauge, 103 Haw. 38, 52, 79 P.3d 131 (2003) (once the authorities lawfully 
obtained a blood sample to test for DNA, using the test results in subsequent 
investigations is irrelevant to the question of whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy existed); Smith, 744 N.E.2d at 439 (“once DNA is used to create a profile, 
the profile becomes the property of the Crime Lab.  Thus, the defendant had no 
possessory or ownership interest in it”); Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 364 
(Fla.1994), (“once [blood] samples were validly obtained, albeit in an unrelated 
case, the police were not restrained from using the samples as evidence in the 
murder case”); State v. Barkley, 144 N.C.App. 514, 521, 551 S.E.2d 131 (2001) 
(“a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange [between the 
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defendant and the arresting officer] that his blood analysis could be used generally 
for investigative purposes, and not exclusively for the murder investigation”); 
Wilson v. State, 132 Md.App. 510, 546, 752 A.2d 1250 (2000), quoting Bickley v. 
State, 227 Ga.App. 413, 415, 489 S.E.2d 167 (1997) (defendant’s objection to the 
comparison of his DNA, lawfully obtained in one investigation, with sample in 
another investigation was not well taken, because “ ‘DNA results are like 
fingerprints which are maintained on file by law enforcement authorities for use 
in further investigations’ ”); King, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 614, 232 A.D.2d 111 (“once a 
person’s blood sample has been obtained lawfully, he can no longer assert either 
privacy claims or unreasonable search and seizure arguments with respect to the 
use of that sample”). 
{¶ 25} Although appellant concedes that the DNA sample was legally 
obtained, he argues that it is not a record made for public purposes.  Appellant 
opines that it if were, any person would be able to access individual DNA samples 
obtained in a criminal investigation.  Appellant contends that the privacy 
implications are demonstrated by the need to obtain a search warrant before 
obtaining a person’s DNA. 
{¶ 26} Appellant’s argument misses the mark.  First, he focuses on the 
privacy implications associated with the 2005 DNA sample.  As discussed above, 
there are privacy implications with respect to appellant’s DNA.  However, 
because a search warrant was executed to obtain the DNA sample, the Fourth 
Amendment was satisfied.  Thus, the true focus of appellant’s argument is on the 
DNA profile that the sample yielded.  But, as discussed above, it is the profile for 
which there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Second, the General 
Assembly has provided a level of confidentiality for the DNA profiles and 
samples.  R.C. 109.573(E) states, “DNA records, DNA specimens, fingerprints, 
and photographs that the bureau of criminal identification and investigation 
receives pursuant to this section and sections 313.08, 2152.74, and 2901.07 of the 
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Revised Code and personal identification information attached to a DNA record 
are not public records under section 149.43 of the Revised Code.”  See also R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(j) (DNA records stored in the DNA database pursuant to R.C. 
109.573 are not public records). 
{¶ 27} Appellant was not subjected to a new Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure when the DNA profile was used during the second criminal 
investigation.  The state did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy held 
by appellant by using the DNA profile, which was the state’s own record and 
which appellant took no action to have removed from CODIS after his acquittal.  
Because appellant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA 
profile, we conclude that the appellant lacks standing to challenge its use by the 
state in a subsequent criminal investigation. 
B.  Retention of DNA Profile 
{¶ 28} Appellant also argues that the DNA profile should not have been 
retained by the state after he was acquitted of the rape charge.  He contends that 
the state lacked the authority to retain the DNA profile and subsequently use it in 
the homicide investigation because he was acquitted of the 2005 rape charge.  
Appellant relies upon R.C. 109.573 and 2901.07 and section 17.6 of BCI’s 2009 
CODIS Methods Manual in support of his argument. 
{¶ 29} Appellant is correct that R.C. 2901.07 does not support the 
inclusion of his profile in CODIS.  However, the same cannot be said for R.C. 
109.573.  The superintendent of BCI is empowered to “establish and maintain a 
DNA database.”  R.C. 109.573(B)(1)(b).  “DNA database” is defined in part as “a 
collection of DNA records from forensic casework.”  R.C. 109.573(A)(3).  
“Forensic” is defined as “[u]sed in or suitable to courts of law or public debate.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 721 (9th Ed.2009).  In this case, the police lawfully 
obtained the DNA sample in the course of the 2005 rape investigation.  Therefore, 
the profile obtained from the sample is a record from forensic casework and is 
January Term, 2012 
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properly maintained in CODIS.  Moreover, we note that neither R.C. 109.573 nor 
2901.07 require that the state, on its own initiative, remove the DNA profile of a 
person who was acquitted at trial. 
{¶ 30} There is no support in the CODIS Methods Manual for appellant’s 
position.  The manual has no provision for the removal of a DNA profile of an 
individual acquitted at trial.  Section 17.6 sets forth the basis for expunging a 
DNA profile—a conviction being overturned on appeal or a sample taken in 
error—and the procedures that need to be followed.  However, section 17.6 is not 
self-executing.  There is no mechanism set forth in the manual by which the state 
is automatically notified that a person’s conviction has been overturned, requiring 
the profile of the acquitted person to be removed.  Instead, the requirement of 
going forward is on the exonerated individual to notify CODIS that the conviction 
has been overturned and to seek expungement of the DNA profile.  Appellant 
failed to do this. 
{¶ 31} There is no legislative requirement that DNA profiles obtained 
from lawfully obtained DNA samples be removed from CODIS on the state’s 
initiative when the subject of the profile is acquitted at trial, and we will not create 
such a requirement.  “Exclusion of extremely valuable evidence in crimes that 
often leave little other trace is a major social cost” and “the potential for abuse in 
the future is not sufficiently clear to warrant adopting a rule excluding evidence 
from the database on the ground that it was obtained or retained beyond the 
authorized classifications.”  Smith, 744 N.E.2d at 442. 
{¶ 32} Even if Ohio’s statutory scheme required the removal of 
appellant’s DNA profile upon his acquittal, suppression of that evidence is not 
appropriate.  “[A] violation of a state statute, * * * in and of itself, [does not] give 
rise to a Fourth Amendment violation and result in the suppression of evidence.” 
State v. Jones, 121 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009-Ohio-316, 902 N.E.2d 464, ¶ 15, citing 
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008).  
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“[B]ecause of the need for consistency and bright-line standards when applying 
the Fourth Amendment, * * * ‘it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to 
enforce state law.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 18, quoting Moore at 178.  Since the General 
Assembly opted not to provide a remedy to a party wronged by a violation of 
either R.C. 109.573 or 2901.07, “we are not in the position to rectify this possible 
legislative oversight by elevating a violation of [these statutes] to a Fourth 
Amendment violation and imposing the exclusionary rule.”  Id. at ¶ 21, citing 
Moore at 178. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, we conclude that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile extracted from a lawfully 
obtained DNA sample, and a defendant lacks standing to object to its use in a 
subsequent criminal investigation.  Under these circumstances, the state is not 
prohibited from retaining in CODIS the DNA profile of a person acquitted of a 
crime and using the DNA profile in a subsequent criminal investigation.  We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Katherine Mullin and Brian McDonough, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellee. 
 
Brian Moriarty, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Attorney General. 
______________________