Title: Woodman v. Grace Bomac Drilling

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Woodman v. Grace Bomac Drilling1987 WY 56736 P.2d 313Case Number: 86-318Decided: 05/05/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the Injury to: Terry WOODMAN, Appellant (Claimant)

 
 
v.

 
 
GRACE 
BOMAC DRILLING, Appellee (Employer-Objector)

 
 
Paul 
G. Jarvis, for Appellant.

 
 
Steven 
R. Helling of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for Appellee.

 

Before 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order denying the application of appellant Terry Woodman to reopen his 
worker's compensation case and for modification of the original award seeking 
additional benefits received for an injury he sustained while employed by 
appellee Grace Bomac Drilling.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues on appeal:

 
 
"I. 
ONCE THE INJURED CLAIMANT IN A WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION CASE ESTABLISHES AN 
ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, DOES THE BURDEN OF 
GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE THEN SHIFT TO THE EMPLOYER TO SHOW THAT THE 
EMPLOYEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS?

 
 
"II. 
DID THE APPELLANT SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS ENTITLED 
TO BENEFITS?

 
 
"III. 
DID THE APPELLEE FAIL TO CARRY ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AND PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
BENEFITS?

 
 
"IV. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ALLOWING THE USE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S UNSWORN TAPE RECORDED DEPOSITION?"

 
 

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶4.]     On December 26, 1983, 
while working for Grace Bomac Drilling in the "cellar" of an oil rig in Johnson 
County, appellant fell approximately eight feet onto frozen ground and pipes, 
landing on his back. He was awarded temporary total disability benefits for the 
periods of December 27, 1983, through February 25, 1984, and March 8, 1984, 
through May 31, 1984, for an injury diagnosed, using common X-rays, as a 
muscular back pain secondary to trauma.

 
 

[¶5.]     On September 30, 1986, 
appellant filed an application for an additional award for temporary total 
disability for the period January 8, 1986, to the present date, or until such 
time as he was released to work, or until such time as he received an award for 
permanent partial disability. In his application, appellant claimed that he had 
reoccurring back problems resulting from the original 
injury.

 
 

[¶6.]     At trial, the court 
heard testimony and received evidence from several witnesses, including the 
deposition of a neurosurgeon, Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr., in lieu of direct 
testimony. The deposition of Dr. Johnson showed he had examined appellant and 
formed the impression that appellant was suffering from low back and leg pain 
which was bilateral and symmetrical. At the time of the examination, Dr. Johnson 
used magnetic resonance imaging (commonly known as an MRI) to diagnose 
appellant's problem. Dr. Johnson found that appellant had an early disk 
desiccation at L-5 and S-1 with low grade central bulge. He explained that the 
disk between appellant's fifth lumbar and first sacral vertebrae was drying out 
and bulging centrally, rather than laterally, where the nerve roots are located. 
On the basis of appellant's age and history, it was Dr. Johnson's opinion that 
damage to the disk was a result of the trauma received by appellant at the time 
of his original injury in 1983.

 
 

[¶7.]     Other evidence 
presented at trial revealed that, between the years of 1983 and 1986, a number 
of other accidents befell appellant. While driving a motorcycle to work, 
appellant hit a deer and received serious head injuries and a broken collar 
bone. He suffered a loss of memory and a basic dullness as a consequence of 
those injuries but did not receive any spinal fractures or complain of any pain 
or problems with his spine.

 
 

[¶8.]     After recovering from 
his motorcycle accident, appellant was again working as a derrick hand and was 
"tagged" in the back with some tongs used at a drilling site. In addition, 
during a confrontation with his girl friend, appellant was hit by a car and 
rolled across the hood. He received no medical treatment after these 
incidents.

 
 

[¶9.]     At trial, the court 
found that appellant did not bear his burden of proof, and thus the application 
to reopen the case and modify benefits was denied.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant applied for modification of his 
worker's compensation benefits pursuant to § 27-12-606, W.S.1977. We have 
interpreted the language of this statute to mean that

 
 
"a 
timely application for benefits may be made by an injured workman subject only 
to the requirement of showing an increase or decrease in incapacity due solely 
to the injury, or mistake, or fraud." Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction 
Company, Wyo., 668 P.2d 649, 652 (1983).

 
 
The 
claimant's burden of proof, when applying to reopen the case and modify benefits 
received under that section, is the same burden as exists in the original claim. 
Loveday v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division, Wyo., 711 P.2d 396 (1985); Hunteman v. Ward Transport, 
Inc., Wyo., 706 P.2d 1126 (1985). The workman must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that there has occurred an increase in incapacity due solely to 
the injury, or mistake or fraud in connection with the initial 
award.

 
 

[¶11.]  In Abas v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1985), we held 
that

 
 
"worker's 
compensation statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate their 
beneficent purpose. The purpose of such construction is to require the industry 
to bear the burden of industrial accidents, not the injured worker. But we 
cannot ignore clear statutory language and apply worker's compensation statutes 
to situations that do not reasonably fall within the intended ambit of such 
laws." (Citations omitted.)

 
 
Thus, 
the rule of liberal construction does not relieve a claimant of the burden of 
proving the essential elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Ott v. Rissler & McMurry Co., Wyo., 726 P.2d 1079 
(1986).

 
 

[¶12.]  On appeal, this Court 
must

 
 
"'assume 
on review that the evidence favoring the employer is true and leave out of 
consideration entirely the evidence presented by the claimant which conflicts 
with the employer's evidence. * * * * We can reverse the trial court only if its 
findings are "clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong and totally against the 
evidence."'" Id. at 1080, quoting Potter v. RMT Properties, Inc., Wyo., 
715 P.2d 214, 216-17 (1986).

 
 

[¶13.]  In Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Schwilke, Wyo., 649 P.2d 218, 222 
(1982), we acknowledged the rule which permits

 
 
"the 
medical expert to establish causation with a somewhat lesser degree of certainty 
than may be required in other cases. This rule is consistent with the 
oft-repeated statement that we will liberally construe the worker's compensation 
statutes in favor of the injured worker."

 
 
However, 
this Court has also found that, as long as there is sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's holding, we will not reverse even though the only 
medical evidence on causation favors the claimant. Ott v. Rissler & 
McMurry Co., 726 P.2d  at 1080.

 
 

[¶14.]  Although, in the case at bar, the doctor 
indicated that the injury was more probably than not caused by the original 
injury, appellant testified to various other accidents which were of equal 
or less magnitude and could have caused his ultimate problems. The doctor 
testified that it was "possible" that these intervening causes could have caused 
the ultimate injury, but, because of the history related to him by appellant, it 
was his opinion that the original injury more probably than not resulted 
in this final medical problem.

 
 

[¶15.]  In Hunteman v. Ward Transport, 
Inc., 706 P.2d 1126, we were faced with facts similar to those now before 
us. Because the evidence in that case indicated that the claimant's increased 
incapacity could have resulted from activities unrelated to his employment, we 
upheld the district court's finding that the claimant failed to meet his burden 
of showing an increase of incapacity due solely to the injury. Further, we held 
that the district court properly found that the claimant failed to establish 
that, by relying upon the diagnosis of the first doctor, the district court made 
a mistake in the original award of temporary total disability benefits. The same 
is true in this case. Appellant has not supported his claims by a preponderance 
of the evidence.

 
 
"Where 
evidence justifies either of two reasonable inferences, the trier of fact is 
allowed to determine which, if either, of the two inferences is more reasonable 
or probable. 'The trial court is in a far better position to judge the demeanor, 
truth and veracity of a witness; therefore, we give considerable deference to 
the court's findings regarding such witness.'

 
 
"The 
district court heard the testimony of the witnesses, considered the evidence, 
and found that appellant failed to meet his burden of proving a causal 
connection between the accident and his back injury. We cannot say that finding 
was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong. On the basis of the evidence set 
forth above, the district court could reasonably have found against appellant." 
Ott v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 762 P.2d  at 1080 (citations 
omitted).

 
 
See 
also Big Horn Coal Company v. Taylor, Wyo., 718 P.2d 63 
(1986).

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant's contention that it was 
prejudicial error to use his unsworn deposition for impeachment purposes is 
without merit. On cross-examination, appellant answered "no" to the question as 
to whether he had slipped and fallen on ice on one or two occasions in 1984 or 
1985. The tape recorded testimony of appellant then was played over the 
objection of appellant's attorney. Appellant stated during his recorded 
testimony that he had fallen on the ice "a time or two." After the recorded tape 
was played, appellant was asked whether he would agree that he had fallen on the 
ice after working with Grace Bomac Drilling, and appellant answered: "No, 
because I didn't even say I did, did I?"

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant asserts that it was error to 
use the tape because he did not testify under oath and because he did not have 
an opportunity to review the tape before it was introduced into evidence. 
Appellant also asserts that it was error not to have the tape transcribed and 
the transcript signed by him, certified by a court reporter or notary public, 
and introduced into evidence in lieu of the audio recording of the 
tape.

 
 

[¶18.]  We agree with appellant that the 
deposition did not conform to the general requirements of Rule 30, W.R.C.P., and 
that the statements made by appellant were prejudicial. However, it was not 
error for the court to admit the audio recording of the tape into evidence. This 
is clearly permissible under Rule 613, W.R.E., which 
provides:

 
 
"(a) 
Examining witness concerning prior statement. -- In examining a witness 
concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement 
need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request 
the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.

 
 
"(b) 
Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness -- 
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not 
admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the 
same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him 
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not 
apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801 (d) 
(2)."

 
 

[¶19.]  Appellant certainly had the opportunity 
to explain or deny his prior inconsistent statement. His attorney conducted a 
redirect examination in which he could have questioned appellant about the 
inconsistent statement, but he failed to do so.

 
 

[¶20.]  There was substantial evidence to support 
the denial of appellant's claim, and the court did not err by admitting the 
audio recording of the taped statements of appellant which were excerpted from 
his unsworn deposition. We, therefore, affirm the order of the district court 
denying appellant's application to reopen his worker's compensation case and for 
modification of the original award seeking additional benefits under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act.

 
 

[¶21.]  Affirmed.