Title: STATE v RADI

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 14937 I N T H E SUPREPIIE C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1979 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- GARY EUGENE RADI, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: McKinley Anderson, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Honorable Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : October 1 4 , 1979 Decided: D E C 2 8 1 m M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal r e s u l t i n g from a resentencing of a p p e l l a n t t o a sentence of 50 years. Appellant w a s convicted i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of Sweet Grass, of t h e c r i m e of burglary. The jury returned a ver- d i c t a t t h e same time which a c q u i t t e d a p p e l l a n t of t h e charge of t h e f t . Appellant w a s sentenced a s a p e r s i s t e n t offender t o a t e r m of 50 years. Appeal w a s taken t o t h i s Court. This Court, i n S t a t e v. Radi (1978), Mont. , 578 P. 2d 1169, 35 St.Rep. 489, affirmed t h e i s s u e r a i s e d on appeal i n favor of t h e S t a t e , b u t held t h a t s i n c e t h e sentence pro- nounced w a s done without a presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n , r e - turned t h e case t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e purpose of resentencing a p p e l l a n t a f t e r a presentence r e p o r t had been f i l e d . Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on t h e p r e s e n t appeal: 1. W a s t h e presentence r e p o r t prepared by t h e Board of Pardons and Paroles p r e j u d i c i a l t o a p p e l l a n t i n t h i s case? 2. Is t h e r e an inconsistency between t h e v e r d i c t returned by t h e jury of g u i l t y of Count I, t h e count of burglary, and of n o t g u i l t y of Count 11, thef t ? The f i r s t i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d t o whether t h e presentence r e p o r t prepared by t h e Board of Pardons and Paroles w a s p r e j u d i c i a l t o a p p e l l a n t . Section 46-18-112, MCA, provides f o r a sentencing r e p o r t a s follows: "Whenever an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s required, t h e pro- b a t i o n o f f i c e r s h a l l promptly i n q u i r e i n t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , circumstances, needs, and po- t e n t i a l i t i e s of t h e defendant; h i s criminal record and s o c i a l h i s t o r y ; t h e circumstances of t h e offense; t h e time t h e defendant has been i n detention; and t h e harm t o t h e victim, h i s i m - mediate family, and t h e community. A l l l o c a l and state mental and c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , c o u r t s , and p o l i c e agencies s h a l l f u r n i s h the probation o f f i c e r , on request, t h e defendant's criminal record and o t h e r r e l e v a n t information. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s h a l l include a physical and mental examination of t h e defendant when it i s d e s i r a b l e i n t h e opinion of t h e court." Before proceeding t o analyze each of t h e provisions i n t h e r e p o r t of t h e presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t i s a l l e g e d t o be i n e r r o r , w e w i l l address some general comments re- garding such r e p o r t s i n t h e sentencing process. This Court has held t h a t a presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t " i s a v i t a l t o o l of t h e d i s t r i c t judge i n a r r i v i n g a t what it considers a proper sentence." S t a t e v. Radi, supra, 578 P.2d a t 1182, 35 St.Rep. a t 504. The primary function of t h e presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s t o assist t h e judge i n making h i s determination a s t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a f t e r con- v i c t i o n . People v. Edwards (1976)r 18 Cal.3d 796, 135 Cal.Rptr. 4 1 1 , 557 P.2d 995. The probation r e p o r t i s gener- a l l y a proper source of information upon which j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n can be exercised when a defendant i s brought before t h e c o u r t f o r sentencing. People v. Chi KO Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976. The sentencing judge cannot be denied an opportunity t o o b t a i n information by imposing strict requirements o r r e s t r i c t i n g t h e proceedings t o t h e r u l e s of evidence a p p l i c a b l e a t a t r i a l . Thus, hearsay and o t h e r matters a r e acceptable i n a presentence r e p o r t . Williams v. New York (1949), 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S . C t . 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337. Montana has long allowed t h e use of r e p o r t s of pre- sentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n s f o r sentencing purposes. See S t a t e v. Karathanos (1972), 158 Mont. 461, 493 P.2d 326; S t a t e v. Harris (1972), 159 Mont. 425, 498 P.2d 1222. It i s a general r u l e throughout t h i s country t h a t when matters contained i n a r e p o r t a r e contested by t h e defen- d a n t , t h e defendant has, i n e f f e c t , an a f f i r m a t i v e duty t o p r e s e n t evidence showing t h e inaccuracies contained i n t h e r e p o r t . Crowder v. S t a t e (Okla. 1974), 518 P.2d 890; People v. Carter (1974), 186 Colo. 391, 527 P.2d 875. A r e c e n t Supreme Court c a s e from t h e S t a t e of Alaska, Nukapigak v. S t a t e (Alaska 1978), 576 P.2d 982, 983, held t h a t f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e defendant t o challenge t h e accuracies of statements o r t o o f f e r contrary evidence a t t h e t i m e of sentencing i s f a t a l . "That f a c t alone i s s u f f i c i e n t t o support our d e c i s i o n t o a f f i r m h i s sentences." Nukapigak, 576 P.2d a t 983. Nukapigak r e l i e d upon a C a l i f o r n i a decision, People v. Chi KO Wong, supra, and found t h a t it i s a defendant's o b l i g a t i o n t o comply with "procedures t o e s t a b l i s h t h e claimed u n r e l i a b i l i t y of m a t e r i a l s properly submitted f o r t h e sentencing purposes; a mere claim of i n v a l i d i t y i s i n s u f f i c i e n t . " Nukapigak, 576 P.2d a t 984. A number of c o u r t s have held t h a t , i f a defendant does n o t p r e s e n t evidence o r witnesses t o c o n t r a d i c t o r otherwise r e b u t materials i n a probation r e p o r t , he is foreclosed from r a i s i n g such i s s u e s on appeal. See Crowder, supra; Carter, supra. This s t a t e t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t adopted t h e general r u l e i n I n re P e t i t i o n of J e r a l d M. Amor (1964), 143 Mont. 479, 389 P.2d 180, where t h e defendant, on a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t , a l l e g e d t h a t he w a s n o t given t h e opportunity t o r e f u t e evidence contained i n t h e presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t . This Court declined t o hear t h a t argument reasoning t h a t s i n c e t h e defendant was represented by competent counsel a t sentencing, t h e defendant had an opportunity t o r e f u t e o r c o n t r a d i c t t h e information i n t h e r e p o r t b u t chose n o t t o do SO. This case i s much l i k e Amor. Here, a p p e l l a n t had t h e opportunity t o r e f u t e o r c o n t r a d i c t t h e information t h a t w a s contained i n t h e r e p o r t . Both a p p e l l a n t and h i s counsel w e r e presented with a copy of t h e r e p o r t p r i o r t o t h e hear- ing. Appellant chose t o o f f e r no witnesses t o r e b u t o r c o n t r a d i c t any information i n t h e r e p o r t . I n f a c t , appel- l a n t n e i t h e r t e s t i f i e d nor o f f e r e d witnesses on h i s behalf. While counsel f o r a p p e l l a n t d i d make mention t o t h e c o u r t of c e r t a i n p o i n t s i n t h e r e p o r t t h a t he thought were inaccurate o r i n c o n s i s t e n t , t h e c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t those m a t t e r s would be taken i n t o consideration i n reaching its decision. Appellant d i d n o t m e e t h i s a f f i r m a t i v e duty of presenting evidence o r testimony t o c o n t r a d i c t o r r e f u t e t h e m a t t e r s a l l e g e d i n t h e r e p o r t a s objectionable. Appellant asserts t h a t t h e r e p o r t lacked any informa- t i o n as t o " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , circumstances, needs and poten- t i a l i t i e s " of a p p e l l a n t . W e do n o t agree. Taken a s a whole, t h e r e p o r t i s f u l l of information regarding appel- l a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and p o t e n t i a l . Information of t h a t n a t u r e i s n o t only contained i n a p p e l l a n t ' s criminal h i s - t o r y , b u t a l s o contained i n information regarding h i s phy- sical condition and d e s c r i p t i o n ; h i s family and s o c i a l background; h i s educational, vocational, and m a r i t a l h i s - t o r i e s ; and summarized i n t h e conclusion of t h e r e p o r t . Appellant next a l l e g e s t h a t t h e r e p o r t t o a l a r g e e x t e n t shows b i a s and prejudice on behalf of the o f f i c e r presenting t h e r e p o r t . W e f i n d no m e r i t t o t h i s contention. The r e p o r t i s a f a c t u a l summary of a p p e l l a n t ' s criminal, physical, family, s o c i a l and educational background. There i s nothing on its f a c e t h a t would s u b s t a n t i a t e an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e o f f i c e r who presented it was biased o r prejudiced. Appellant n e x t contends t h a t it was improper f o r t h e probation o f f i c e r t o include information about a p p e l l a n t ' s juvenile record, c i t i n g s e c t i o n 41-3-205, MCA, t o support t h a t contention. However, s e c t i o n 41-3-205, MCA, does n o t apply t o t h e juvenile record of those youths under t h e delinquency provisions of t h e juvenile l a w , commonly known as t h e Youth Court Act. That s e c t i o n i s contained i n t h e chapter of juvenile law concerned only with dependent and n e g l e c t s i t u a t i o n s . The provisions of Chapter 3, T i t l e 4 1 , do n o t p e r t a i n t o proceedings f o r delinquents under t h e Youth Court Act. The Youth Court A c t does, however, contain a provision regarding t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of t h e r e p o r t s . Section 41-5- 604, MCA. I t i s t h e general r u l e t o allow juvenile records a s a p a r t of presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t a t a sentencing hearing. See 47 Am.Jur.2d Juvenile Courts S56 a t 1029. The leading case i n t h i s f i e l d i s Hendrickson v. Myers (1958), 393 Pa. 224, 1 4 4 A.2d 367, which held t h a t depriving t h e c o u r t s of t h e i r r i g h t t o be informed of and t o consider t h e e n t i r e h i s t o r y and background of a person s u b j e c t t o sen- tence may r e s u l t i n sentences t h a t are u n j u s t and u n f a i r t o both s o c i e t y and t h e defendant. While w e a r e unable t o f i n d any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a s t a t u t e s i m i l a r t o Montana's, t h e r e a r e c a s e s t h a t have i n t e r p r e t e d s t a t u t e s regarding t h e use of juvenile records t h a t have a s i m i l a r purpose t o t h e Montana s t a t u t e . Wash- ington has a s t a t u t e t h a t provides t h a t an order of t h e c o u r t adjudicating a c h i l d delinquent s h a l l i n no case be deemed a conviction of a crime. Section 13.04-240, R.C.W. See S t a t e v. Dainard (1975), 85 Wash.2d 624, 537 P.2d 760, a c a s e holding t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e w a s broad enough i n i t s i n t e n t t o permit consideration of juvenile records i n sen- tencing hearings. For c o u r t s t h a t have allowed t h e use of juvenile records i n presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t s see Young v. S t a t e (Okla. 1976), 553 P.2d 192; People v. McFarlin (1973), 389 Mich. 557, 208 N.W.2d 504; S t a t e v. F i e r r o (1966), 101 Ariz. 118, 416 P. 2d 551. The gravamen of t h e d e c i s i o n s allowing t h e sentencing judge t o use t h e f u l l and complete r e p o r t s of an i n d i v i - d u a l ' s background i n making t h e determination of sentence was set f o r t h by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court: ". . . highly relevant--if n o t e s s e n t i a l - - t o h i s s e l e c t i o n of an appropriate sentence i s t h e possession of t h e f u l l e s t information pos- s i b l e concerning t h e defendant's l i f e and char- a c t e r i s t i c s . And modern concepts i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g punishment have made it a l l t h e more necessary t h a t t h e sentencing judge n o t be denied t h e op- p o r t u n i t y t o o b t a i n p e r t i n e n t information by a requirement of r i g i d adherence of r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e s of evidence properly a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e t r i a l . . . [probation] r e p o r t s have been given a high value by conscientious judges who want t o sentence persons on t h e b e s t a v a i l a b l e informa- t i o n r a t h e r than on guesswork and inadequate information . . ." Williams v. New York, supra, 337 U.S. a t 247. The same r a t i o n a l e can be applied t o t h i s case. W e n o t e t h a t t h e purpose of t h e Montana s t a t u t e regard- i n g juvenile records i s t o prevent p u b l i c dissemination of a juvenile record once t h a t i n d i v i d u a l a t t a i n s an age of majority. A s presentence r e p o r t s a r e required by l a w t o be s e a l e d as well, s e c t i o n 46-18-113(3), MCA, t h e p u b l i c d i s - semination of m a t e r i a l i s avoided. A t t h e same t i m e t h e sentencing judge is afforded the opportunity to have a complete picture of the individual who is before him for sentencing. There would seem to be no other purpose in maintaining the sealed records of the youth court over a period of at least ten years if they were not to be used in considering the sentencing of an individual later as an adult. See Young v. State, supra, where the Oklahoma court used that rationale in allowing the admission of the juve- nile records. In this case, appellant was 34 years of age at the time of sentencing. The report indicates an extensive criminal record, subsequent to appellant's juvenile record. The juvenile record was compiled long before the Youth Court Act was passed in 1974. Considering the report as a whole, it is doubtful that the information in the juvenile records contained in the report played any significant role in the court's sentence. Appellant makes several other contentions concerning factual inconsistencies. One, that the report had an al- leged escape from Pine Hills at the time when appellant was incarcerated in the state prison; two, that the report concerned appellant's military record when he contended that he had no such record; and three, that the report laid some significance to information regarding the fact that he was acquitted of Count I1 of the information with which he was charged at trial, These matters were brought to the atten- tion of the trial judge, and we can presume that the trial judge was capable of giving appropriate weight to uncon- firmed and inconsistent matters contained in the presentence report. See State v . McManus (19731, 12 Ore-APP- 84, 504 P.2d 1046. Appellant next alleges that the report is void of information regarding harm to the victims and immediate family or the community. However, the charge itself in this case, which is set forth in the official version of the crime section of the report, does contain that information. Also, the sentencing and trial judge in this case was well aware of that information. See State v. James (1977), 223 Kan. 107, 574 P.2d 181. We note in summary that the entire report is consistent with the purposes and rationale for requiring a presentence investigation. The report did not make any recommendation one way or the other regarding the sentencing, although appellant, for some reason, contends it did. The summary of the report provides no reason to return this matter to the District Court for resentencing. The report was properly used by the sentencing judge and provided him with a fair objective review of appellant's history and meets all of the rationale applied by courts for the use of such reports. Appellant made no attempt to present witnesses to contradict any of the provisions contained in the report or to provide the court with additional information as to his character or history. The report was, we find, properly applied in this case. Its use provides no basis to remand for a further resentencing hearing. The second issue raised by appellant concerns the inconsistency of the verdicts on the two counts of the information charging appellant with burglary and theft. He urges that, since he was acquitted on the charge of theft, the conviction of burglary is inconsistent and therefore must be reversed. This argument i s a l l b u t i d e n t i c a l t o t h e argument t h a t was r a i s e d i n t h e f i r s t appeal. See S t a t e v. Radi, supra, 578 P.2d a t 1176, 35 St.Rep. a t 496, where t h i s Court r u l e d on t h e contention a s follows: "Defendant next contends t h a t t h e t h e f t charge should have been dismissed because it arose from t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n as t h e burglary and t h e de- fendant could n o t be charged with two offenses. However, d i f f e r e n t elements must be proven f o r t h e charge of t h e f t than f o r a charge of burglary and we cannot see e r r o r t o charge defendant with both offenses. W e note a l s o t h a t t h e jury was i n s t r u c t e d t o f i n d defendant n o t g u i l t y of t h e t h e f t i f they found him g u i l t y of burglary. Since it d i d so, w e see no prejudice t o t h e defendant." While t h e argument here i s n o t i d e n t i c a l t o t h e argu- ment r a i s e d on t h e p r i o r appeal, t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e was determined i n t h a t opinion, and we f i n d no m e r i t t o t h i s i s s u e . A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n r e c e n t l y w a s addressed by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Holliday (19791, Mont. - , 598 P. 2d 1132, 1135, 36 St.Rep. 1535, 1539, where t h i s Court s t a t e d : ". . . defendant i s presenting i n essence t h e same i s s u e w e have previously decided. The d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two arguments i s s u p e r f i c i a l , n o t substantive. It i s well e s t a b l i s h e d , t h a t where a d e c i s i o n has been reached by t h i s Court on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e between t h e same p a r t i e s i n t h e s a m e case such d e c i s i o n i s bind- i n g on t h e p a r t i e s and c o u r t s , and cannot be r e l i t i g a t e d i n a subsequent appeal, s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n exceptions n o t p e r t i n e n t here. [Cita- t i o n s omitted.] The defendant i s bound by our previous determination t h a t defendant i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o a d i s m i s s a l of a l l charges." Here, as i n Holliday, a p p e l l a n t is bound by t h e previ- ous r u l i n g and i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o reassert h i s p o s i t i o n on t h i s appeal. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: C i e f J u s t i c e P , , , < /? --- -. ' . - I J u s t i c e s , - 8 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t of t h e case. O n t h e f i r s t i s s u e I concur on t h e grounds t h a t t h e defendant cannot a t t a c k t h e contents of t h e presentence r e p o r t because he d i d not introduce any r e b u t t i n g evidence a t t h e t i m e of sentencing. I do not agree with a l l t h e discussion of t h a t i s s u e however. I agree with t h e second i s s u e on t h e grounds s t a t e d i n t h e majority opinion. ................................. Chief J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea w i l l f i l e an opinion l a t e r .