Title: P. v. Seneca Ins. Co.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 2/3/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S104487 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B148121 
SENECA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. KA045412 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case, we decide whether Penal Code1 section 1166 (section 1166), 
which governs release of a convicted defendant on bail pending sentencing, applies 
in the case of a conviction by guilty plea.  We conclude that section 1166 does not 
apply in this context.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A criminal complaint filed on July 30, 1999, charged Seung Hyun Noh 
(Noh) with seven counts of receiving stolen property.  (§ 496, subd. (a).)  On 
September 11, 1999, Seneca Insurance Company (Seneca) posted a bail bond to 
secure Noh’s release from custody.  The bond provided that Noh would 
“appear . . . to answer any [charge] in any accusatory pleading based upon the acts 
supporting the complaint filed against him . . . and if convicted, [would] appear for 
                                             
 
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
 
 
2
pronouncement of judgment or grant of probation,” or if Noh failed to appear, 
Seneca would pay $70,000 to the State of California.  On May 23, 2000, Noh 
entered a guilty plea on five of the seven charged counts.  The court ordered Noh 
to appear on June 21, 2000, for sentencing and permitted him to remain free on 
bail.  Noh failed to appear for sentencing, and the court issued a bench warrant and 
ordered Seneca’s bail bond forfeited. 
On November 15, 2000, Seneca moved to vacate forfeiture and exonerate 
bail.  Seneca argued that, after Noh entered his guilty plea, the trial court should 
have proceeded in accordance with section 1166 before permitting Noh to remain 
free on bail.  Seneca further asserted that section 1166 required the court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact with respect to five 
considerations, including public safety and the probability of Noh failing to appear 
for judgment.  Seneca argued the court’s failure to comply with section 1166 was 
a jurisdictional error that exonerated bail by operation of law.  In other words, 
because the court failed to follow the procedures set forth in section 1166—
procedures that might have led the court to commit Noh to custody following his 
plea—Seneca contended it should not be held responsible for Noh’s failure to 
appear.  In opposition, the People claimed Seneca’s reliance on section 1166 was 
misplaced because the statute governs only bail following a “verdict” in a 
contested trial and has no application to bail following a plea of guilty. 
On December 13, 2000, after hearing argument and considering the 
legislative history of section 1166, the trial court denied Seneca’s motion to vacate 
forfeiture and exonerate bail.  Seneca appealed from that order (see People v. 
Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, 655), and the Court of Appeal reversed.  We granted 
the People’s petition for review.  We conclude that section 1166 does not apply 
where conviction is by guilty plea, and therefore Seneca’s argument based on 
section 1166 fails.  We do not decide whether a trial court’s failure to comply with 
 
3
section 1166 in a case where that provision does apply would have the effect of 
exonerating bail by operation of law, nor do we decide whether compliance with 
section 1166 requires an evidentiary hearing with formal findings of fact. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 1166, as amended in 1999, provides:  “If a general verdict is 
rendered against the defendant, or a special verdict is given, he or she must be 
remanded, if in custody, or if on bail he or she shall be committed to the proper 
officer of the county to await the judgment of the court upon the verdict, unless, 
upon considering [1] the protection of the public, [2] the seriousness of the offense 
charged and proven, [3] the previous criminal record of the defendant, [4] the 
probability of the defendant failing to appear for the judgment of the court upon 
the verdict, and [5] public safety, the court concludes the evidence supports its 
decision to allow the defendant to remain out on bail.  When committed, his or her 
bail is exonerated, or if money is deposited instead of bail it must be refunded to 
the defendant or to the person or persons found by the court to have deposited said 
money on behalf of said defendant.”  (Italics added.)  Prior to the 1999 
amendment, section 1166 stated only that, after conviction by verdict, an on-bail 
defendant “may be committed to the proper officer of the county.”  (Stats. 1935, 
ch. 657, p. 1814, § 5, p. 1814, italics added.)  Thus, the former version of section 
1166 gave the trial court unguided discretion as to whether to commit an on-bail 
defendant to custody or permit him or her to remain free.  The 1999 amendment, 
however, requires the court to commit the defendant to custody unless, after 
considering five factors, the court concludes the evidence supports a decision to 
release the defendant on bail. 
In general, a person is convicted either by verdict or by guilty plea, and the 
term “verdict” refers to a jury verdict.  A finding of guilt in a criminal case is 
made only “by verdict of a jury, . . . by a finding of the court in a case where a jury 
 
4
has been waived, or by a plea of guilty” (§ 689, italics added), and a court’s 
finding “shall be in substantially the form prescribed for the general verdict of a 
jury” (§ 1167).  Section 1166 states that the section applies only to proceedings 
after a trial and verdict, not proceedings involving a guilty plea.  The section 
makes no express reference to guilty pleas; nor does it use a broad term, such as 
“conviction,” that would more clearly encompass both guilty pleas and verdicts.  
Rather, the statute refers only to “general verdict[s]” and “special verdict[s].”  
(§ 1166.)  In the same chapter of the Penal Code, the Legislature explains these 
terms:  “The jury must render a general verdict, except that in a felony case, when 
they are in doubt as to the legal effect of the facts proved, they may, except upon a 
trial for libel, find a special verdict.”  (§ 1150, italics added.)  “A general verdict 
upon a plea of not guilty is either ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty,’ which imports a 
conviction or acquittal of the offense charged in the accusatory pleading.”  
(§ 1151, italics added.)  “A special verdict is that by which the jury find[s] the 
facts only, leaving the judgment to the Court.”  (§ 1152, italics added.)  These 
specific descriptions of general and special verdicts simply do not encompass 
guilty pleas; rather, they refer to the findings of fact after a contested trial.  
Moreover, the organization of the Penal Code and the placement of section 1166 
within that code strongly suggest that section 1166 does not apply in the case of a 
guilty plea. 
Part 2 of the Penal Code, which begins at section 681, relates to criminal 
procedure.  The statutes proceed in a logical, consecutive fashion through the 
stages of a typical criminal case, starting with the indictment (§ 940 et seq.) and 
then addressing pleadings (§ 948 et seq.), arraignment (§ 976 et seq.), pretrial 
matters (§ 995 et seq.), plea (§ 1016 et seq.), trial (§ 1055 et seq.), verdict (§ 1147 
et seq.), sentencing (§ 1170 et seq.), judgment (§ 1191 et seq.), and appeals 
(§ 1235 et seq.).  The provisions governing Noh’s guilty plea appear in part 2, title 
 
5
6, which relates to pretrial matters.  In contrast, section 1166 appears in part 2, 
title 7, which relates to matters that arise after the start of trial and before 
judgment.  Within title 7, chapter 1 governs challenges to the jury, chapter 2 
governs the trial itself, chapter 3 governs the conduct of the jury after the cause is 
submitted to them, and chapter 4—which includes section 1166—governs the 
jury’s verdict or findings.  Chapter 4 first addresses the two types of verdict, 
general and special (§ 1150 et seq.), and explains what the trial court should do in 
the case of an ambiguous verdict (§§ 1161, 1162) or an acquittal (§ 1165).  Then, 
in section 1166, chapter 4 describes what the court should do when the jury returns 
a “verdict . . . against the defendant.” 
This context clearly indicates that section 1166 refers to proceedings 
following a contested trial and verdict.  When the drafters of the Penal Code 
reached the chapter in which section 1166 appears, they simply were not talking 
about pleas—they were talking about post-trial verdicts—and we would need to 
distort the logical structure of the Penal Code to relate section 1166 to pleas.  
Moreover, section 1166 works in tandem with section 1129, which appears in 
chapter 2 of the same title.  Under section 1129, a trial court “may, in its 
discretion,” commit an on-bail defendant to custody “at any time after his 
appearance for trial.”  (Italics added.)  Under section 1166, that discretion 
becomes a presumption once the jury renders a verdict against the defendant; the 
court, then, must commit the defendant to custody, unless it finds the statute’s 
five-part test satisfied.  Viewed together, sections 1129 and 1166 have little to do 
with guilty pleas; they have to do with an on-bail defendant’s custody status after 
the defendant appears for trial and before judgment. 
From its context, section 1166 clearly relates to convictions by verdict, not 
guilty pleas.  Seneca, however, argues that section 1166 is ambiguous because of 
the frequency with which criminal cases are now resolved by guilty plea.  Seneca 
 
6
reasons that, with so many cases resulting in guilty pleas and comparatively few 
cases reaching the verdict stage, the Legislature could not reasonably have enacted 
a provision governing custody following a verdict and not have enacted a 
comparable provision governing custody following a guilty plea. 
The gap that Seneca identifies in the statutory scheme may be because the 
Penal Code was first enacted at a time when guilty pleas were less common than 
they are today.  Nevertheless, as early as 1930, the Court of Appeal held that, 
despite the absence of a specific statute on point, trial courts may in their 
discretion allow an on-bail defendant who pleads guilty to remain free on bail 
pending sentencing and judgment.  In People v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1930) 107 
Cal.App. 160 (Fidelity), the court found this discretion implicit in section 1278, 
which sets forth the statutory form for bail bonds.  This form requires the surety to 
undertake, among other things, that the defendant “if convicted, will appear for 
pronouncement of judgment or grant of probation.”  (§ 1278.)  The Fidelity court 
concluded, from the text of this form, that the Legislature must have contemplated 
the possibility of defendants sometimes remaining free on bail following 
conviction, and that conviction in this context might include conviction by way of 
guilty plea.  (Fidelity, at p. 163.)  In support of its conclusion, the court also noted 
other Penal Code provisions, including section 1166, that contemplate a convicted 
defendant remaining free on bail pending judgment.  (Fidelity, at p. 164.)  Seneca 
is therefore correct that the Penal Code does not expressly address release on bail 
following a guilty plea, but in light of the holding in Fidelity, the Legislature may 
have concluded that no specific statute was needed. 
Both Seneca and the dissent interpret Fidelity as expressly holding that 
guilty pleas fall within the scope of section 1166.  They also cite People v. Scott 
(1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 792, in which the court found section 1166 applicable to a 
case involving conviction by a judge at a bench trial.  They reason from these 
 
7
cases that courts have historically understood section 1166 to encompass all 
convictions, and that only now after the 1999 amendment limited trial court 
discretion under section 1166 are the People attempting to give it a narrower 
scope.  (See dis. opn., post, at pp. 8-11.) 
We agree that the 1999 amendment to section 1166 gave new significance 
to the issue presented here, but we do not think section 1166 has historically 
applied to guilty pleas.  The Fidelity court did not hold that guilty pleas fall within 
the scope of section 1166, and that holding would have made little sense in light of 
the plain language of section 1166 and its placement in the chapter of the Penal 
Code governing verdicts.  Instead, the Fidelity court cited section 1166 as an 
example of an analogous situation in which a convicted defendant remains free on 
bail pending sentencing and judgment.  We think Seneca and the dissent err in 
reading the Fidelity decision more broadly.  As for People v. Scott, supra, 184 
Cal.App.2d 792, we find no suggestion in that opinion that section 1166 applies to 
a case involving a guilty plea, and we have no reason to decide here whether the 
court was correct to apply section 1166 to a case involving a bench trial instead of 
a jury trial. 
The Court of Appeal found section 1166 to be ambiguous, warranting 
consideration of legislative history, because a guilty plea is generally equivalent to 
a guilty verdict.  The court reasoned, in light of this general equivalence, that “the 
absence of any reference to guilty pleas in section 1166 creates an ambiguity.”  
We find no ambiguity when the context of the statute is considered.  The absence 
of any reference to guilty pleas in section 1166 merely reflects that section’s 
placement in the Penal Code chapter governing verdicts, not pleas.  Of course, a 
defendant can plead guilty after a trial has begun, but the logical place in the Penal 
Code for the Legislature to have addressed release on bail following a guilty plea 
is in the section governing pleas, not in the section governing the jury’s verdict at 
 
8
the close of trial.  Hence, we see no ambiguity inherent in the Legislature’s failing 
to discuss guilty pleas in section 1166. 
Moreover, the equivalence of guilty pleas and guilty verdicts relates to their 
legal effect, and our statements finding them to be equivalent are therefore 
contextual.  (See, e.g., People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601 (Valladoli).)  
Here, we are more concerned with procedure than substantive legal effect, and 
procedurally, a guilty plea is quite different from a guilty verdict.  In the case of a 
guilty plea, for example, the defendant accepts responsibility for his crime, often 
in hopes of minimizing his or her punishment.  The Legislature may have 
concluded that, in that circumstance, where the defendant may be cooperating at 
least to some extent with prosecutorial authorities, he or she is less likely to pose a 
flight risk or a danger to public safety.  Though, as this case attests, some 
defendants plead guilty and then fail to appear for sentencing and judgment—and 
therefore the Legislature might reasonably have opted to extend the procedures set 
forth in section 1166 to defendants who plead guilty—many defendants who plead 
guilty manifest a desire to resolve the matter on relatively favorable terms, and the 
Legislature may have reasoned that these defendants would not want to jeopardize 
that favorable resolution by committing new crimes or failing to appear.  In short, 
the distinction the Legislature drew between guilty pleas and convictions by 
verdict is not completely baseless, and we reject Seneca’s argument that section 
1166 must apply to guilty pleas in order to avoid absurd results. 
In addition, as a practical matter, the disparate treatment of persons who 
plead guilty as compared to persons convicted by verdict is not as pronounced as 
Seneca suggests.  The factors listed in section 1166 replicate, almost verbatim, the 
factors that apply, under section 1275, subdivision (a), when a judge or magistrate 
initially sets bail, and in fact, the Legislature appears to have modeled the 1999 
amendment to section 1166 on section 1275, subdivision (a).  Specifically, section 
 
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1275, subdivision (a), provides:  “In setting, reducing, or denying bail, the judge or 
magistrate shall take into consideration [1] the protection of the public, [2] the 
seriousness of the offense charged, [3] the previous criminal record of the 
defendant, and [4] the probability of his or her appearing at trial or hearing of the 
case.  [5]  The public safety shall be the primary consideration.”  Therefore, in the 
case of all on-bail defendants, including an on-bail defendant who pleads guilty, 
the factors listed in section 1166 were already considered at the time bail was 
initially set, and they were found to weigh in favor of release.  The only new factor 
after the defendant pleads guilty is the fact of the conviction itself, and it is that 
factor, considered in light of the others, that the court must evaluate when deciding 
whether the defendant should remain free on bail, but section 1166 does not have 
to apply in order for a court to take the defendant’s conviction into account when 
exercising its discretion. 
The dissent asserts, based in large part on our holding in People v. Statum 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 682 (Statum), that the term “verdict” in statutes governing 
criminal procedure encompasses convictions by guilty plea.  (See dis. opn., post, 
at pp. 2-4.)  In Statum, we recently concluded that a trial court’s order reducing a 
felony conviction to a misdemeanor is an “order modifying the verdict” for 
purposes of appeal under section 1238, subdivision (a)(6), even if the conviction is 
by way of a guilty plea, not a trial, and therefore no jury verdict is at issue.  
(Statum, at p. 688, italics added.)  We reaffirmed in this regard that a guilty plea is 
the legal equivalent of a verdict, citing Valladoli, supra, 13 Cal.4th 590.  (Statum, 
at p. 688, fn. 2.) 
We concede that, in many contexts, a guilty plea is not different from a guilty 
verdict, and where the procedural distinctions between guilty pleas and guilty verdicts 
are not legally significant, the Legislature might use the term “verdict” broadly to 
include guilty pleas.  But, as discussed, we can think of several plausible reasons why 
 
10
the Legislature might treat a guilty plea differently from a guilty verdict for purposes 
of custody status pending judgment.  Therefore, we must assume in that context that 
the Legislature chose its words carefully and intended a special rule to apply in the 
case of a guilty verdict after a contested trial, because otherwise we would nullify the 
presumptively intentional distinction the Legislature drew. 
Moreover, unlike section 1166, the statute that was at issue in Statum (§ 1238, 
subd. (a)(6)) does not fall in a chapter of the Penal Code that (1) specifically focuses 
on the verdict or finding after a contested trial and addresses no other subjects; (2) 
carefully delineates the various types of verdict a jury might render after completing 
its deliberations (§§ 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1158, 1158a, 1160); and then (3) 
describes what should follow in the case of each type of jury verdict (§§ 1155, 1156, 
1157, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1168), expressly distinguishing jury 
verdicts from other ways a defendant might be convicted such as findings by the 
court.  (§§ 1165, 1167.)  While the use of the term “verdict” in other places in the 
Penal Code might suggest a broad interpretation that would reasonably include guilty 
pleas, its use in the context of part 2, title 7, chapter 4 of that code can only 
reasonably mean one thing:  a verdict given at the conclusion of a contested trial. 
The Court of Appeal also relied on the oft-repeated rule that, because the law 
disfavors forfeitures, courts interpret bail forfeiture laws in favor of the surety.  (See, 
e.g., People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 906; People v. Ranger 
Ins. Co. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1305; County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. 
(1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 62; People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 556, 
561.)  Here, however, we are not construing a bail forfeiture law; we are construing a 
rule of criminal procedure governing release on bail after a verdict.  Seneca contends 
that failure to comply with this rule of criminal procedure has the effect of 
exonerating bail, but we do not decide that issue.  The rule of interpretation on which 
the Court of Appeal relied simply does not apply here. 
 
11
In conclusion, we find no ambiguity in section 1166 in light of the context in 
which the provision appears.  To concede that meaning must be determined from 
context does not indicate that a provision is ambiguous.  Many words have a wide 
range of possible meanings, but context eliminates that ambiguity, leaving the 
intended meaning clear.  That is the case here.  Section 1166 governs proceedings 
following a trial verdict; it does not govern guilty pleas.  Accordingly, we need not 
consider legislative history.  (See, e.g., Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1055.) 
But even were resort to legislative history justified, we must be careful not to 
misuse it.  It is notoriously easy to support any number of conflicting propositions by 
selectively quoting legislative history.  To be persuasive, such an exercise must offer 
something more compelling than, as one critical jurist describes it, “ ‘looking over a 
crowd and picking out your friends.’ ”  (Wald, Some Observations on the Use of 
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term (1983) 68 Iowa L.Rev. 195, 
quoting a conversation with Judge Harold Leventhal.)  But this pick-out-your-friends 
strategy is the best the dissent offers.  The two obscure references to guilty pleas on 
which the dissent relies (see dis. opn., post, at pp. 5-6) occur on page 4 of two nearly 
identical committee reports, in a section of the reports quoting background provided 
by the bill’s author.  Moreover, these two reports are among a collection of nearly a 
dozen that otherwise make no mention of guilty pleas, and several of the reports, 
including the two the dissent relies on, describe the scope of section 1166 as applying 
to defendants “convicted after a trial” or “found guilty after trial.”  (See, e.g., Assem. 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) Mar. 
23, 1999, p. 1; Assem. Republican Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) as amended Aug. 17, 1999, p. 1; Sen. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) as amended July 13, 
1999, p. 2; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 
 
12
476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) as amended Aug. 17, 1999, p. 2.)  Therefore, the only 
significance of the legislative history is that it is inconclusive. 
The dissent complains that interpreting the statute as we do is bad public policy 
because the bail requests of those defendants who plead guilty will not be subject to 
the requirements of section 1166.  We are not prepared to say, as the dissent does (dis. 
opn., post, at pp. 13-17), that judicial discretion in this context is bad policy. 
Accordingly, we conclude section 1166 does not apply where the defendant’s 
conviction is by guilty plea.  Because section 1166 does not apply, Seneca’s 
arguments—that the trial court should have proceeded in accordance with that section 
and that its failure to do so exonerated bail as a matter of law—are without merit.  
Seneca’s bail bond constitutes a contract with the State of California.  (See Fidelity, 
supra, 107 Cal.App. at p. 164.)  Pursuant to that contract, Seneca expressly 
guaranteed Noh’s appearance at judgment following conviction, and in the event Noh 
failed to appear, Seneca promised to pay $70,000.  Nothing in section 1166 abrogates 
Seneca’s contractual obligation.  The trial court had discretion to allow Noh to remain 
free on bail pending sentencing, and it acted in accordance with that discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal erred in finding section 1166 applicable where a 
defendant’s conviction is based on a guilty plea rather than a verdict.   
 
13
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with 
instructions to affirm the trial court’s order denying Seneca’s motion to vacate 
forfeiture and exonerate bail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
 
In 1999, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 11661 to increase 
public protection by requiring a court to commit a defendant to custody upon 
conviction and before judgment unless, after considering specified factors, the 
court finds that the evidence supports a decision to release the defendant on bail.  
(Stats. 1999, ch. 570, § 1.)  The majority holds that the increased public protection 
the Legislature sought to provide through this amendment does not apply to the 
great majority of defendants who are convicted—those who plead guilty.  
Moreover, the majority’s rationale—that section 1166’s use of the term “verdict” 
refers only to jury verdicts—necessarily renders this increased protection also 
inapplicable to defendants convicted by court findings after nonjury trials.   
 
The majority’s analysis is flawed and its conclusion is contrary to the 
Legislature’s intent.  In reaching its conclusion, the majority does not maintain 
that the statute’s plain meaning requires us to construe section 1166 so as to render 
its increased protection inapplicable to the great majority of convicted defendants.  
On the contrary, the majority concedes that the statutory language is ambiguous 
and that the term “verdict” sometimes encompasses guilty pleas.  Instead, focusing 
on a single extrinsic aid—statutory context—the majority asserts that the only 
reasonable construction of section 1166 excludes defendants who are not 
convicted by jury verdict.  In my view, other extrinsic aids that the majority 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
virtually ignores are far more illuminating and compel the conclusion that the 
Legislature both understood and intended that section 1166’s increased protection 
would apply in all cases where the defendant is convicted, whether by jury verdict, 
court finding, or guilty plea.  This construction best serves the public policy the 
Legislature has declared in section 1166, whereas the majority’s construction 
defeats that public policy in the great majority of cases.  I therefore dissent. 
I.  THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 1166 CAN BE REASONABLY CONSTRUED TO 
APPLY TO CONVICTIONS BY GUILTY PLEA. 
 
“[I]n any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is 
to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.  
[Citation.]  We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and 
commonsense meaning.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 
142.)  Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous—i.e., it has only one 
reasonable construction —judicial construction is generally unnecessary.  (Hughes 
v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 775 (Hughes); People 
v. Moroney (1944) 24 Cal.2d 638, 642.)  However, where a statute is ambiguous—
i.e., it has more than one possible construction that is reasonable—we consider 
extrinsic evidence of the Legislature’s intent beyond the statute’s words.  (Hughes, 
supra, at p. 776.) 
 
Section 1166 has more than one reasonable construction, and is therefore 
ambiguous.  Given the statute’s use of the term “verdict,” the majority’s 
construction of section 1166—that it applies only to jury verdicts—is arguably 
reasonable.  However, under a long line of California cases, the term “verdict” can 
also be reasonably construed as encompassing guilty pleas.  In People v. Statum 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685-686, we recently held that section 1238, subdivision 
(a)(6), authorizes the People to appeal where a defendant pleads guilty to a felony 
charge and the trial court later reduces the conviction to a misdemeanor and 
imposes a jail sentence.  Section 1238, subdivision (a)(6), provides that the People 
may appeal from “[a]n order modifying the verdict or finding by reducing the 
3  
degree of the offense or the punishment imposed or modifying the offense to a 
lesser offense.”  (Italics added.)  In finding this section applicable, we concluded 
in Statum that the reduction of a defendant’s conviction by guilty plea is an 
“ ‘order modifying the verdict . . . by . . . modifying the offense to a lesser 
offense.’ ”  (Statum, supra, at p. 688, italics added.)  We based this conclusion on 
the principle that “[a] guilty plea is the ‘legal equivalent’ of a ‘verdict’ [citation] 
. . . .”  (Id. at p. 688, fn. 2.)  Thus, we held in Statum that a Penal Code statute’s 
use of the term “verdict” rendered the statute applicable to convictions by guilty 
plea, not, as the majority here concludes, inapplicable.  Our Courts of Appeal have 
similarly construed the term “verdict” in section 1238 since 1962, 45 years before 
we decided Statum.  (People v. Eberhardt (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1119-
1124; People v. Hames (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1238; People v. Gaines (1980) 112 
Cal.App.3d 508, 514 [statute applies because guilty plea is “tantamount to a 
verdict”]; People v. Thatcher (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 830, 831-832; People v. 
Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553, 557, fn. 1 [statute applies because “[a] plea 
of guilty is the equivalent of a verdict of a jury”].)  Thus, the language of section 
1166 is ambiguous because it has more than one reasonable construction. 
 
Notably, the majority expressly concedes that the language of section 1166 
is ambiguous.  After discussing Statum, the majority states:  “We concede that, in 
many contexts, a guilty plea is not different from a guilty verdict . . . .”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 9.)  The majority also states that the term “verdict” in other Penal 
Code provisions may be “reasonably” construed to “include guilty pleas.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 10.)  The majority also implicitly concedes the statute’s ambiguity 
by concluding that section 1166 has only one reasonable construction when 
viewed in its statutory “context” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5, 7, 10, 11), i.e., its 
“placement” within the Penal Code.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4.)  A statute’s 
placement within “the statutory scheme” is one of the “extrinsic aids” we look to 
only after concluding that the statute “is ambiguous . . . .”  (Hughes, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 776; see also Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 582 
4  
[“[w]hen the words are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we 
consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the statutory context”]; People v. 
Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 [“[w]hen the statutory language is ambiguous,” 
courts consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including “the context in which the 
language appears”].)  Thus, by basing its construction on section 1166’s placement 
within the Penal Code, the majority implicitly concedes that the statute’s language 
is ambiguous. 
II.  EXTRINSIC AIDS ESTABLISH THAT THE LEGISLATURE BOTH UNDERSTOOD 
AND INTENDED THAT SECTION 1166 WOULD APPLY TO CONVICTIONS BY 
GUILTY PLEA. 
 
Because the statutory language is ambiguous, we may properly look to “a 
variety of extrinsic aids” to determine the Legislature’s intent.  (People v. 
Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008.)  As noted, the statute’s placement within 
“the statutory scheme” is one of those aids.  (Ibid.)  We also consider a number of 
other factors, “including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be 
remedied, the legislative history, [and] public policy.”  (Ibid.)  “Using these 
extrinsic aids, we ‘select the construction that comports most closely with the 
apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating 
the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to 
absurd consequences.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 
212.)  Here, the relevant extrinsic aids demonstrate that the Legislature both 
understood and intended that section 1166 would apply to convictions by guilty 
plea. 
A.  The Legislative History Indicates A Legislative Intent That Section 
1166 Be Applied to Defendants Who Plead Guilty. 
 
As the majority explains, before 1999, section 1166 gave a trial court 
unguided discretion to permit a defendant to remain out on bail after conviction.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)  The 1999 amendment requires a court to commit a 
defendant after conviction “unless, upon considering” specified factors, it 
5  
“concludes the evidence supports its decision to allow the defendant to remain out 
on bail.”  (§ 1166.)  Several legislative analyses explained that the amendment was 
necessary because “individuals who are convicted pose a much greater risk of 
flight if released [on bail] prior to sentencing.  The intent of this [amendment] is to 
assure that a judge has an opportunity to examine the record of a convicted 
individual prior to release and pending sentencing if that individual is out on bail.”  
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. 
Sess.) Mar. 23, 1999, p. 2, italics added; see also Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. 
on Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1999, p. 5.)  Another 
legislative analysis explained that the amendment is “intended to secure convicted 
parties immediately rather than let them free on bail possibly to escape authorities 
. . . .”  (Cal. Dept. of Finance, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. 
Sess.) Apr. 17, 1999, p. 2.)   
 
Nothing in the legislative history supports the majority’s speculation that 
the Legislature “may have concluded that” a defendant convicted by guilty plea “is 
less likely to pose a flight risk or a danger to public safety” than a defendant 
convicted by jury verdict.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  On the contrary, two 
legislative analyses that expressly focused on the amendment’s purpose 
specifically cited the flight risk of defendants who plead guilty.  Those analyses 
explained:  “[T]he intent of this bill is to assure that a judge has an opportunity to 
examine the record of a convicted individual who is pending sentencing after 
conviction or guilty plea.  It should be obvious that individuals who are free on 
bail after conviction, but who have not been sentenced, pose a greater flight risk 
than other persons on bail.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d 
reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 24, 1999, p. 
4, italics added; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 
(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1999,  p. 5, italics added.)  Thus, the legislative 
history indicates that the Legislature did not, as the majority asserts, intend to 
“dr[a]w” a “distinction . . . between guilty pleas and convictions by verdict . . . .”  
6  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  Instead, the legislative history supports the conclusion 
that the Legislature viewed all defendants as posing a greater flight risk after 
conviction—whether by jury verdict or guilty plea—and intended the increased 
public protection under the amended statute to apply to all such defendants.2 
 
The majority’s explanation for virtually ignoring this legislative history is 
both baseless and unpersuasive.  The majority first asserts that it “need not 
consider legislative history” because section 1166 is not ambiguous “in light of 
[its] context.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  However, as I have already explained, a 
statute’s context is but one of several extrinsic aids we look to where a statute is 
ambiguous.  As we have expressly held, where a statute is ambiguous, “[t]o 
discern legislative intent, we must examine the legislative history and statutory 
context of the act under scrutiny.  [Citations.]”  (Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 
Cal.3d 567, 570.)  Thus, the majority’s questionable view of section 1166’s 
context neither requires nor justifies a refusal to consider legislative history.3 
 
                                             
 
2  
It is therefore not surprising that the most the majority can say to defend its 
conclusion is that a distinction between defendants who plead guilty and those 
convicted by jury verdict “is not completely baseless.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)    
3  
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 
1036 (Diamond), on which the majority relies (maj. opn., ante, at p. 11), actually 
supports my analysis.  There, this court “declined[d]” the defendants’ request for 
consideration of “the context in which the Corporate Securities Law was enacted” 
and “available legislative history,” explaining that “[o]nly when the language of a 
statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction is it appropriate to 
turn to extrinsic aids . . . .”  (Diamond, supra, at p. 1055.)  Notably, in support of 
this position, the court cited Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 
744, which, also consistent with my analysis, stated that “ ‘we look to a variety of 
extrinsic aids, including . . . the legislative history . . . and the statutory scheme of 
which the statute is a part,’ ” only “ ‘[w]hen the [statutory] language is susceptible 
of more than one reasonable interpretation.’ ”  (See Diamond, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 1055.)  Moreover, despite its statement, the Diamond court went on to consider 
the extrinsic materials the defendants cited.  (Id. at pp. 1055-1056.) 
7  
 
The majority’s fallback position—that the legislative history’s express 
references to defendants convicted by guilty plea are “obscure” (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 11)—is equally baseless and unpersuasive.  The majority observes that these 
express references do not appear on the first page of the relevant legislative 
reports.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  Of course, I must concede that the majority is 
correct.  However, unlike the majority, I find this fact to be utterly insignificant.  
Instead, what I find significant is the fact that, as previously noted, these explicit 
references appear in sections of the reports that expressly focus on and explain the 
amendment’s purpose, intent, and justification.  The majority also observes that 
these express references appear “in a section of the reports quoting background 
provided by the bill’s author.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  However, we have 
often relied on similar statements of intent in construing other statutes.4  (E.g. 
People v. Kramer (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720, 724; Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 1046, 1055; Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 36.)  Discounting 
these express statements, the majority instead focuses on selected other phrases 
that, at best, only arguably and inferentially suggest that the Legislature intended 
to exclude defendants convicted by guilty plea.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11 [citing 
phrases “convicted after a trial” and “found guilty after trial”].)  The majority 
offers no convincing justification for relying on these ambiguous phrases and 
ignoring express references to defendants convicted by guilty plea.  It cites 
nothing in the legislative history that explicitly contradicts the express references I 
have cited or states an intent to exclude defendants convicted by guilty plea.  Nor 
does it explain how its construction fits within the predominant theme expressed 
throughout the legislative history:  that the risk of flight substantially increases 
                                             
 
4  
Ironically, in construing a statute for a unanimous court in Cornette v. 
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 72, the author of today’s 
majority opinion recently relied on “a letter to the Governor” from the statute’s 
“author,” finding that it “best explained” the statute’s “purpose.” 
8  
after conviction, and that courts should therefore be required to consider certain 
factors before releasing a defendant on bail after conviction.  The legislative 
history discloses not the slightest hint of a belief that defendants convicted by 
guilty plea pose less of a flight risk than other convicted defendants.  Thus, the 
“pick-out-your-friends strategy” the majority cautions against (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 11), precisely describes the majority’s approach to the legislative history, not 
mine.  Indeed, that characterization accurately describes the majority’s overall 
analysis in this case, which, unlike mine, focuses exclusively on a single extrinsic 
aid—section 1166’s context—and ignores all other extrinsic sources.  As I have 
shown, the legislative history, which is one of those other extrinsic sources, 
strongly supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended section 1166 to be 
applied to defendants convicted by guilty plea.5 
B.  Prior Judicial Construction Indicates a Legislative Intent That 
Section 1166 Be Applied to Defendants Who Plead Guilty. 
 
Judicial construction of section 1166 strongly reinforces the conclusion that 
the legislative history supports:  when the Legislature amended section 1166 in 
1999, it understood and intended that the amended statute’s increased public 
protection would apply to defendants convicted by guilty plea.  In People v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1930) 107 Cal.App. 160, the court applied section 1166 
on facts very similar to those now before us.  There, the trial court ordered a bail 
bond forfeited when the defendant, who was continued on bail after pleading 
guilty, failed to appear for a hearing on his probation request.  (Fidelity, supra, 
                                             
 
5  
Nor does anything in the legislative history suggest that the Legislature 
viewed defendants convicted after nonjury trials as posing less of a flight risk than 
defendants convicted by jury verdict.  However, the majority’s analysis 
necessarily renders section 1166’s protection inapplicable to defendants convicted 
after nonjury trials, because such convictions occur by court “finding,” not by jury 
“verdict.”  (§ 689.)  Thus, the majority errs in stating that “a person is convicted 
either by verdict or by guilty plea.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.) 
9  
107 Cal.App. at p. 162.)  Contesting the forfeiture order, the surety argued that it 
was “released from liability on the bond when the court failed” to fulfill its “duty 
. . . to order [the defendant] into custody upon his plea of guilty.”  (Id. at pp. 162-
163.)  In rejecting this claim, the Court of Appeal responded that several Penal 
Code statutes established “that a defendant may be admitted to bail not merely 
until the time he is convicted, but until he appears for judgment, and that such a 
bond as that now under consideration continues until the defendant, for whose 
release it is given, makes this appearance.”  (Id. at p. 163.)  Among the statutes the 
court relied on was section 1166, which then provided:  “If a general verdict is 
rendered against the defendant, or a special verdict is given, he must be remanded, 
if in custody, or if on bail he may be committed . . . to await the judgment of the 
Court upon the verdict.  When committed his bail is exonerated . . . .”  (1872 Pen. 
Code, § 432, p. 261.)  “The plain implication from this,” the Fidelity court 
explained, “is that if a defendant is out on bail, the court has a discretion either to 
commit him or not to do so, and that if he is not committed, his bail is not 
exonerated.”  (Fidelity, supra, 107 Cal.App. at p. 164.)  Thus, the court concluded, 
“the statutes,” including section 1166, “seem to particularly authorize” a bond “so 
conditioned as to make the surety responsible for the appearance of the defendant 
up to the time for pronouncing judgment.”  (Fidelity, supra, 107 Cal.App. at p. 
164.)  The surety in Fidelity alternatively “argued that there must be some hearing 
or showing before the trial court can exercise” its “discretion” to continue a 
defendant on bail “after conviction,” and that a surety is “entitled to notice 
thereof.”  (Id. at pp. 164-165.)  Again turning to section 1166 to reject the surety’s 
argument, the court replied that a surety has no “right to assume that the court will 
commit a defendant to custody, as it may do under sections 1129 and 1166 . . . .”  
(Fidelity, supra, 107 Cal.App. at p. 165.)  Thus, the Fidelity court directly relied 
on section 1166 in determining a court’s power and a surety’s rights with respect 
to the bail status of a defendant convicted by guilty plea.   
10 
 
 
Thirty years later, in People v. Scott (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 792, a similar 
issue arose in a case involving a conviction by court findings in a nonjury trial.  
After “announc[ing] its findings,” the trial court in Scott permitted the defendant 
to remain at large after her conviction and ordered her to return in three days.  (Id. 
at p. 793.)  She did not return as ordered and “[h]er bail was forfeited.”  (Ibid.)  In 
affirming the forfeiture, the appellate court held that “[s]ince defendant was free 
on bail at time of conviction, it was optional with the court to permit her to remain 
at liberty on bail pending judgment [citations].”  (Ibid.)  The only authority the 
court cited for this holding was section 1166 and Fidelity.  Thus, in a case 
involving conviction by court findings after a nonjury trial, the court applied 
section 1166, which specifies a court’s powers after “a general verdict is rendered 
. . . or a special verdict is given,” and Fidelity, which relied on section 1166 in a 
case involving conviction by guilty plea. 
 
Like the legislative history, these decisions—and the Legislature’s reaction 
to them—strongly support the conclusion that the Legislature understood and 
intended that the increased public protection it was providing by amending section 
1166 in 1999 would apply to defendants convicted by both guilty pleas and court 
findings after nonjury trials.  During the almost 70 years between Fidelity and the 
1999 amendment, no case expressed a different view or even suggested that 
section 1166 does not apply under these circumstances.  Moreover, the Legislature 
amended section 1166 in 1935, only five years after Fidelity, but did nothing at 
that time to undermine or reverse Fidelity’s application of the statute to a 
conviction by guilty plea.  (Stats. 1935, ch. 657, § 5, p. 1814.)  Nor did the 
Legislature do anything to undermine or reverse Fidelity—or Scott’s application of 
section 1166 to convictions by court findings after nonjury trials—when the 
Legislature again amended the statute in 1999.  The Legislature’s lack of action in 
this regard raises a presumption that it endorsed Fidelity and Scott, because 
“ ‘[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute without changing those portions . . . 
that have previously been construed by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to 
11 
 
have known of and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial construction.’  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 89-90; see also Malcolm v. 
Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 518, 528 [because the Legislature “presumably 
was aware of” statute’s prior “judicial interpretation” when it amended the statute, 
its retention of “parallel language in the revised statute” requires that we “construe 
the present provision . . . in conformity with the established judicial 
interpretation”].)   
 
The majority incorrectly discounts the significance of these decisions.  
According to the majority, Fidelity “did not hold that guilty pleas fall within the 
scope of section 1166,” but merely “cited section 1166 as an example of an 
analogous situation in which a convicted defendant remains free on bail pending 
sentencing and judgment.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  As I have already 
demonstrated, the majority is substantively incorrect; the Fidelity court directly 
relied on section 1166 in determining a court’s power and a surety’s rights with 
respect to the bail status of a defendant convicted by guilty plea.  In any event, the 
majority’s response focuses on the wrong question.  Our task here is not, as the 
majority appears to assume, to think up some new way now to distinguish Fidelity 
and render it inapposite, but is to determine what the Legislature understood and 
intended when it amended section 1166 in 1999.  Notwithstanding the arcane and 
arguable distinction the majority now attempts to draw, when the Legislature 
amended section 1166 in 1999, it no doubt understood Fidelity as applying section 
1166 to a defendant who pleads guilty.  The majority similarly focuses on the 
wrong question in its treatment of Scott.  The question is not, as the majority 
suggests, whether Scott “was correct” to apply section 1166 to a defendant 
convicted by court finding after a nonjury trial (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7), but 
whether, in light of Scott, the Legislature understood and intended section 1166 to 
apply only to defendants convicted by jury verdict.  Both decisions support the 
conclusion that the Legislature intended the statute to have a broader reach. 
12 
 
 
Also supporting this conclusion are the appellate decisions I have already 
discussed that applied section 1238 to guilty pleas based on their legal equivalence 
with jury verdicts.  (People v. Eberhardt, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1119-1124; 
People v. Hames, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d 1238; People v. Gaines, supra, 112 
Cal.App.3d at p. 514; People v. Thatcher, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at pp. 831-832; 
People v. Orrante, supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 557, fn. 1.)  Each of these 
decisions applied section 1238 to convictions by guilty plea because of its use of 
the term “verdict,” and notwithstanding its lack of “express reference to guilty 
pleas” or its failure to “use a broad term, such as ‘conviction.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 4.)  Accordingly, they further support the conclusion that in 1999, when the 
Legislature enacted section 1166 in its current form, the Legislature understood 
and intended that its use of the term “verdict” would not limit the statute to jury 
verdicts, but would render it applicable to guilty pleas and court findings after 
nonjury trials.  This conclusion follows from our long-standing presumption that 
the Legislature is “aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, 
and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof.  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329.)  Thus, “[w]here a statute is framed in 
language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analogous subject, and that 
enactment has been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have 
adopted that construction.  [Citation.]”6  (Harrison, supra, at p. 329; see also 
People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [“[w]e presume that the Legislature, in 
drafting [certain] provisions” of the Penal Code, “was aware of our long-standing 
judicial construction of” the same language “as used in other Penal Code statutes 
and intended to incorporate it”].) 
 
                                             
 
6  
Because we decided People v. Statum, supra, 28 Cal.4th 682, after the 1999 
amendment of section 1166, I do not rely on it in applying this principle here. 
13 
 
 
Again, in discounting the significance of these decisions, the majority errs 
both substantively and in its analytical approach.  Substantively, the majority is 
incorrect in asserting that “the equivalence of guilty pleas and guilt verdicts” that 
both this court and the Courts of Appeal have identified “relates” only to their 
“substantive legal effect,” not to “procedure.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  Here, we 
are certainly no more “concerned with procedure” (ibid.) than were the courts that 
determined that section 1238 authorizes the People to appeal after a defendant 
pleads guilty.7  Analytically, the majority errs in searching for a way to distinguish 
Statum and the other section 1238 cases, rather than determining what the 
Legislature reasonably understood when it amended section 1166 in 1999.  
Certainly, nothing in the legislative history or the case law suggests that the 
Legislature had the majority’s novel distinction in mind when the Legislature 
amended section 1166. 
C.  Public Policy As Declared By The Legislature Supports Applying 
Section 1166 To Defendants Who Plead Guilty. 
 
As previously explained, the Legislature passed the 1999 amendment to 
section 1166—which requires a court to commit a defendant after conviction 
unless it concludes the evidence supports its decision to allow the defendant to 
remain out on bail—because, in the Legislature’s view, the risk that a defendant 
                                             
 
7  
In People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, which the majority cites to 
support its assertion (maj. opn., ante, at p. 8), we did not even suggest that the 
equivalence of guilty pleas and jury verdicts relates only to substantive legal effect 
and not to procedure.  Rather, we broadly stated that “[a] guilty plea is, for most 
purposes, the legal equivalent of a verdict of guilty reached by a jury.”  (Valladoli, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 601.)  Similarly broad statements appear in numerous other 
cases.  (E.g., People v. Williams (1945) 27 Cal.2d 220, 228 [“[a] plea of guilty is 
equivalent to the verdict of a jury”]; Smith v. Municipal Court (1977) 71 
Cal.App.3d 151, 154 [“a guilty plea, once accepted by the court, is the equivalent 
of a verdict of a jury”]; People v. McDaniels (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 283, 285 
[guilty plea “is the equivalent of a verdict of the jury”]; People v. Kepford (1921) 
52 Cal.App. 508, 513 [guilty plea is “equivalent to the verdict of a jury”].) 
14 
 
will flee substantially increases after conviction.  The Legislature wanted “to 
assure that a judge has an opportunity to examine the record of a convicted 
individual prior to release and pending sentencing if that individual is out on bail.”  
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. 
Sess.) Mar. 23, 1999, p. 2.)  As we long ago recognized, the “ ‘great majority’ ” of 
convictions are obtained by guilty plea.  (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 
604.)  Thus, we best serve the Legislature’s purpose by construing the statute, if 
reasonably possible, to apply to all defendants who are convicted, including those 
who plead guilty.  As I have already demonstrated, such a construction is both 
reasonable and most likely reflective of the Legislature’s intent. 
 
By contrast, the majority substantially defeats the Legislature’s purpose by 
adopting a construction that renders section 1166 inapplicable to the great majority 
of defendants who are convicted—those who plead guilty.  Moreover, although 
the majority purports not to decide any question regarding convictions after 
nonjury trials (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7), its analysis necessarily further defeats the 
Legislature’s purpose by rendering section 1166 inapplicable under these 
circumstances, because such convictions occur by court “finding,” not by jury 
“verdict.”  (§ 689.)  
 
The majority offers no public policy justification for its construction.  It 
speculates, without basis, that the Legislature “may have concluded that” a 
defendant convicted by guilty plea “is less likely to pose a flight risk or a danger to 
public safety” than a defendant convicted by jury verdict.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
8.)  As I have already explained, nothing in the legislative history supports this 
speculation.  Moreover, even were the majority correct, the majority fails to 
explain why the Legislature would want to allow courts to release defendants 
convicted by guilty plea without first going through the process section 1166 
mandates to protect public safety.  Thus, although the majority can “think of” a 
distinction (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9) that, in its view, is not “completely baseless” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 8), the majority offers no reason why the Legislature would 
15 
 
want to draw this distinction.  In short, from the perspective of the public policy 
the Legislature has declared, the majority’s construction is both unjustified and 
unjustifiable. 
 
Instead, the majority insists that section 1166 is not necessary to protect the 
public from the great majority of convicted defendants, i.e., those convicted by 
guilty plea.  According to the majority, as to all defendants admitted to bail, the 
factors section 1166 specifies were, under section 1275, “already considered at the 
time bail was initially set,” and the “only new factor” after a defendant pleads 
guilty is “the fact of the conviction itself.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  Although 
acknowledging that courts “must evaluate” this “new factor” to determine whether 
a defendant should remain out on bail, the majority states that section 1166 “does 
not have to apply in order for a court to take the defendant’s conviction into 
account . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.) 
 
For several reasons, the majority’s reasoning is unpersuasive.  First and 
foremost, it is inconsistent with both the Legislature’s view and purpose in 
amending section 1166.  As explained above, the Legislature viewed “individuals 
who are free on bail after conviction” by verdict “or guilty plea” as “pos[ing] a 
greater flight risk than other persons on bail,” and it therefore amended section 
1166 to require courts to consider the fact of conviction before allowing convicted 
defendants to remain on bail.  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d 
reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, italics added; 
Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. 
Sess.) July 13, 1999, p. 5, italics added.)  Contrary to this intent, the majority’s 
holding leaves it to the trial court’s discretion to consider the fact of conviction in 
determining whether to permit defendants convicted by guilty plea to remain out 
on bail.  Moreover, the majority’s observation that section 1166 “does not have to 
apply” for a court to take this factor into account (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9) is of no 
consequence, because the same is true of every factor section 1166 specifies.  The 
16 
 
Legislature’s purpose in amending section 1166 was to make consideration of all 
of the specified factors mandatory, not discretionary.   
 
The second flaw in the majority’s reasoning is that the differences between 
section 1166 and section 1275 in terms of the factors a court must consider are 
both greater and more significant than the majority indicates.  Whereas section 
1275, subdivision (a), requires courts to consider “the seriousness of the offense 
charged” and “the probability of [the defendant’s] appearing at trial or hearing of 
the case,” section 1166 requires courts to consider “the seriousness of the offense 
charged and proven” and “the probability of the defendant failing to appear for the 
judgment of the court . . . .”8  (Italics added.)  Obviously, a defendant at the 
beginning of a prosecution who does not yet know the strength of the state’s case 
and who faces only the possibility of trial, of conviction on some charge, and of 
uncertain punishment, generally poses a different—and, in the Legislature’s view, 
a lesser—flight risk than a defendant who has been convicted of a specific offense, 
even if by guilty plea, who faces certain punishment, who knows the statutory 
punishment for the offense, and who awaits only judgment.  Accordingly, as 
several legislative analyses explained, the Legislature amended section 1166 in 
1999 to “grant[] an additional safeguard against convicted felons fleeing 
jurisdiction by requiring a judge to again look at the defendant’s flight risk” in 
deciding whether to permit the now convicted defendant to remain out on bail.  
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 
(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 22, 1999, italics added; Assem. Com. on Public 
Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 
                                             
 
8  
Several legislative reports emphasized that the 1999 amendment to section 
1166 “direct[s] a court to consider,” among other factors, the defendant’s “crime 
of conviction.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-
2000 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1999, p. 2; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess) Aug. 
24, 1999, p. 1.)   
17 
 
23, 1999, italics added; see also Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 2, 1999 
[amendment “grants an additional safeguard against convicted felons fleeing the 
jurisdiction or menacing the community by requiring trial judge’s [sic] to look 
again at the defendant’s overall fitness for remaining out on bail”].)  Under the 
majority’s analysis and holding, a court may, in its discretion—but is not required 
to—consider the fact and seriousness of the conviction in making this 
determination as to defendants convicted by guilty plea.  Because the great 
majority of convictions now occur by guilty plea, the majority’s construction of 
section 1166 renders the increased public protection the Legislature sought to 
provide inapplicable to the great majority of defendants who are convicted. 
 
Finally, and unfortunately, rather than respond to my argument, the 
majority completely miscasts and misrepresents my position in an apparent 
attempt to arouse emotions against it.  The majority states my view to be that 
“judicial discretion in this context is bad policy.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  
However, I make no judgment on this policy question, because it is not my job to 
do so here.  My position is that the Legislature has declared public policy in this 
context and, as I have explained, the majority’s construction defeats the public 
policy the Legislature has declared.  The fact remains that the majority offers no 
reason why the Legislature would have wanted to exempt the great majority of 
convicted defendants from a mandatory process that the Legislature thought was 
necessary to protect public safety.  Thus, the majority offers no valid response to 
my actual position—that the majority’s construction defeats public policy as 
declared by the Legislature. 
D.  The Statutory Context Does Not Justify The Majority’s 
Construction. 
 
Finally, I consider the extrinsic aid on which the majority places sole 
reliance:  section 1166’s placement within the statutory scheme.  According to the 
majority, given that context, the term “verdict” in section 1166 “can only 
18 
 
reasonably mean one thing:  a verdict given at the conclusion of a contested trial.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) 
 
For several reasons, the majority is incorrect.  First, as I have already 
explained, statutory context is only one of many extrinsic aids to which we look in 
construing an ambiguous statute.  Nothing supports the majority’s decision to 
focus on this extrinsic aid to the exclusion of all others.  Second, the majority 
vastly overstates the significance of the statute’s context.  The majority 
emphasizes section 1166’s inclusion in a title of the Penal Code addressing 
“matters that arise after the start of trial and before judgment.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 5.)  However, a defendant may plead guilty at any time, including, as the 
majority notes, “after a trial has begun.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  Moreover, the 
same chapter that contains section 1166 also addresses disposition by court 
findings in a nonjury trial.  (§§ 1158, 1165, 1167.)  Thus, section 1166’s 
placement within the Penal Code does little, if anything, to indicate that the 
statute’s language renders the statute applicable only to defendants convicted by 
jury verdict.  It certainly does not, as the majority asserts, “clearly indicate[]” that 
this is the statute’s only reasonable interpretation.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)   
 
Finally, and most importantly, the majority’s exclusive focus on context 
defeats our very goal in considering extrinsic aids:  to “ ‘select the construction 
that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view 
to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and [to] 
avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ ”  (People v. 
Sinohui, supra, 28 Cal.4th 205, 212.)  As I have demonstrated, other, far more 
illuminating and definitive extrinsic aids—the legislative history, prior judicial 
construction, and public policy—support the conclusion that the Legislature 
understood and, to enhance public safety, intended that section 1166 would be 
applied to all convicted defendants.  The majority’s construction defeats this 
purpose and produces an absurd consequence by rendering section 1166’s 
increased protection inapplicable to the great majority of defendants who are 
19 
 
convicted.  As I have demonstrated, nothing—including the statute’s context—
requires that we adopt this curious construction. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Although I disagree with the majority’s holding that section 1166 does not 
apply in this case, ultimately, I do not necessarily disagree with the majority’s 
result.  I have serious doubt that a trial court’s failure to follow section 1166 in 
permitting a convicted defendant to remain out on bail requires exoneration of a 
surety’s bond when the defendant fails to appear.  As demonstrated, the 
Legislature passed the statute to protect the public, not sureties.  However, the 
parties have not raised or briefed this potentially dispositive issue; therefore, it is 
not before us and the majority correctly declines to discuss it.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 3, 10-11.)  But the fact that this issue is not now before us—and that Seneca 
Insurance Company is therefore entitled to return of its money if section 1166 
applies—should not drive our construction of a statute the Legislature passed to 
enhance public safety, because the effect of the majority’s holding will reach well 
beyond the strictly financial context of this case.  Indeed, Seneca Insurance 
Company is probably correct in stating that, “[w]ere bail money not involved” in 
this case, “the People would likely be on [the other] side of the argument, given 
that protection of the public is the highest objective.”  We should not restrictively 
construe a statute the Legislature passed to increase public safety in order to enrich 
state coffers, absent evidence of legislative intent requiring us to do so.  Because 
such evidence is absent here, I dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
1  
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Seneca Insurance Company 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 94 Cal.App.4th 1358 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S104487 
Date Filed: February 3, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert M. Martinez 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Brent Riggs and Fred Klink, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel (Tulare) and Lawrence A. Perkes, Deputy County Counsel, for 
California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
2  
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
E. Alan Nunez 
Nunez & Bernstein 
4836 N. First Street, Suite 106 
Fresno, CA  93726-0527 
(559) 227-2373 
 
Fred Klink 
Deputy District Attorney 
329 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-5911