Title: Commonwealth v. Kalila

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13428 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KHALID KALILA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2023. – March 13, 2024. 
 
Present:  Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.1 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Execution of sentence, Stay of proceedings, 
Affidavit.  Appeals Court, Appeal from order of single 
justice. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 28, 2018. 
 
 
A motion for a stay of execution of sentence, filed on May 
24, 2021, was heard by Michael D. Ricciuti, J., and a second 
motion for a stay of execution of sentence was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Kenneth V. Desmond, Jr., J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
J.W. Carney, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Darcy Jordan, Assistant District Attorney (Lynn Feigenbaum, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
 
1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case, we review the decision of a 
single justice of the Appeals Court denying the defendant's 
motion to stay execution of his sentence pending the appeal from 
his convictions.  The single justice upheld the decision of the 
trial judge (trial judge or judge), and concluded that although 
the defendant demonstrated a likelihood of success on his 
appeal, he was nonetheless a flight risk and a danger to others.  
In support of this conclusion, the single justice cited the 
defendant's connections and frequent travel to a foreign country 
as evidence that he was a flight risk.  The single justice also 
cited the impulsive, racially motivated, and violent acts for 
which the defendant was convicted as evidence that he was a 
danger to others. 
There is no dispute that the defendant established a 
reasonable likelihood of success on appeal.  In fact, the 
defendant's direct appeal was successful, and his convictions 
have now been vacated.  See Commonwealth v. Kalila, 103 Mass. 
App. Ct. 582, 583 (2023).  Notwithstanding this determination, 
we discern no abuse of discretion in the single justice's denial 
of the defendant's motion to stay execution of his sentence.  
Applying the relevant factors, see Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 
1), 380 Mass. 851, 855-857 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 
Mass. 394, 403 (2020), the single justice had an adequate basis 
to determine that the defendant posed an unacceptable security 
3 
 
risk.  Accordingly, we affirm the single justice's order denying 
the defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. 
Background.  We set forth the facts as presented to the 
trial judge and single justice in connection with the motion to 
stay the defendant's sentence pending appeal. 
The defendant was born in Morocco and lived there with his 
family until the age of fourteen.  He and his family then 
emigrated to the United States in 2003, where he since has 
resided.  The defendant routinely visits Morocco with his family 
and maintains dual citizenship with the United States and 
Morocco.  Indeed, the defendant's father resides in Morocco. 
On January 30, 2018, the defendant and his brother were 
drinking to celebrate their spouses' just-announced pregnancies.  
The celebration ended at a restaurant and lounge in Boston, 
where the defendant had an altercation with another patron.  
Security personnel attempted to remove the defendant from the 
premises.  The defendant responded by striking one of the 
security personnel, who was Black, with a glass at least twice 
and yelling racial epithets.  The victim was taken to a 
hospital, where he required plastic surgery and more than 
seventy stiches.  As a result of his injuries, the victim 
continues to suffer from loss of vision, nerve damage, and 
permanent scarring.  The defendant subsequently was arrested by 
Boston police. 
4 
 
 
After his arrest, the defendant was released on $10,000 
cash bail from the South Boston Division of the Boston Municipal 
Court Department.  As a condition of his release, the defendant 
was ordered to have no contact with the victim and to refrain 
from visiting the restaurant where the altercation occurred.  
The defendant followed these conditions for the next three 
years.  During this time, the defendant also remained gainfully 
employed and attended every court date. 
 
In June 2018, a grand jury indicted the defendant for 
mayhem, G. L. c. 265, § 14; assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i); and violation of constitutional 
rights with bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 37. 
On May 10, 2021, empanelment for the defendant's trial 
commenced in the Superior Court.  After four jurors had been 
seated, including a Black woman, two white women, and one white 
man, juror no. 32, a Black man, was called.  During voir dire 
examination, juror no. 32 stated he would not weigh the 
testimony of a police officer differently from that of a 
civilian.  The juror also stated that his mother worked as a 
civilian in internal affairs at Boston police department 
headquarters.   
5 
 
On completion of individual voir dire, the defendant 
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove juror no. 32 due to 
the juror's familial connection with the Boston police 
department.  The defendant did not challenge another juror who 
had a familial connection to the police.2  Nonetheless, the 
defendant argued that juror no. 32 should be dismissed because 
the defendant planned to challenge the testimony of two Boston 
police officers during trial.  The judge overruled the 
challenge, stating that while the defendant's reason was 
genuine, the defendant's proffered race-neutral explanation was 
inadequate.3 
 
At trial, the defendant denied using racial epithets and 
claimed he acted in self-defense against the victim.  The jury 
rejected the defendant's testimony and returned verdicts of 
guilty on all four charged offenses.  The conviction of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious 
bodily injury ultimately was dismissed and vacated at the 
defendant's sentencing hearing.  The defendant was sentenced to 
 
2 In particular, juror no. 17, a white woman, had a father 
who was a former police officer. 
 
3 The judge further explained that he was overruling the 
defendant's objection because there was no reason why a Black 
juror should be challenged on the proffered grounds, where the 
juror credibly testified that he would not value a police 
officer's testimony differently from the testimony of another 
witness. 
 
6 
 
from three to four years in State prison for the mayhem 
conviction; one year in a house of correction for his conviction 
of violating constitutional rights with bodily injury, to be 
served from and after his State prison sentence; and two years 
of probation for his conviction of assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon. 
 
On May 24, 2021, the defendant filed a motion for a stay of 
execution of his sentence pending appeal pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 31 (a), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1501 (2009).  In his 
motion, the defendant argued that the judge's erroneous denial 
of his peremptory challenge against juror no. 32 created a 
strong likelihood that the defendant's conviction would be 
overturned and further argued that the defendant did not pose a 
security risk. 
On June 14, 2021, the judge denied the defendant's motion 
in a written opinion.  The judge found that even if an appellate 
court considered the denial of the defendant's peremptory strike 
"as based on genuineness rather than adequacy grounds, the 
defendant nonetheless has shown a likelihood of success of 
appeal."  However, the judge also found that the defendant 
"present[ed] a profound risk of flight."  The judge first noted 
the serious crimes for which the defendant had been convicted, 
which arose "from an extraordinarily violent and sudden attack 
in which [the defendant] seriously slashed the face of a [B]lack 
7 
 
bar employee with a shard of heavy glass while repeatedly 
threatening and hurling ugly racial epithets at the employee."  
The judge then found that the defendant's significant sentence 
created a compelling motive for the defendant to escape.  
Further, given that the jury rejected the defendant's 
exculpatory testimony as "incredible," the judge concluded that 
it was "impossible to rely on [the defendant's] representations 
that he will not seek to flee."  Last, the judge found that the 
defendant was an "extreme risk of flight" due to his status as a 
dual citizen of the United States and Morocco, the time he had 
spent in Morocco, the presence of his father in Morocco, and the 
defendant's ability to access a foreign passport.4   
The judge also inferred that the defendant was stockpiling 
funds that would provide him the financial ability to flee.  In 
making this inference, the judge cited the defendant's payment 
of bail on the night of his arrest, regular employment, history 
of expensive foreign trips, and representation by private 
counsel. 
 
Following the judge's denial, on July 30, 2021, the 
defendant filed a motion to stay with a single justice of the 
Appeals Court pursuant to Mass R. A. P. 6 (b), as appearing in 
 
4 Although the judge noted that the defendant's Moroccan 
passport currently was expired, he asserted that the defendant 
could replace the expired passport. 
 
8 
 
481 Mass. 1608 (2019).  The single justice examined the judge's 
denial utilizing the test articulated in Nash, 486 Mass. at 403.  
Finding no abuse of discretion or error of law, the single 
justice denied the defendant's motion. 
Specifically, the single justice concluded that, under the 
first Nash factor, the defendant presented "an issue which is 
worthy of presentation to an appellate court, one which offers 
some reasonable possibility of a successful decision in the 
appeal."  Under the second Nash factor, the single justice held 
that the judge's finding that the defendant was a security risk 
was reasonable due to his extreme risk of flight and the danger 
he posed to others.  The single justice reasoned that the 
defendant's flight risk was demonstrated by his dual citizenship 
and associated recurring travel to Morocco, the sentence that 
the defendant faced, the jury's rejection of the defendant's 
testimony at trial, and the seriousness of the crimes of which 
he was convicted.  The single justice further reasoned that the 
defendant was a danger to others, as shown through his 
"convictions for impulsive, racially motivated, and violent 
acts."  Last, after exercising his independent review and 
discretion, the single justice reached the same conclusions as 
the judge.5 
 
5 The single justice also addressed the third Nash factor 
sua sponte.  He "conclude[d] that the health risks to the 
9 
 
 
The defendant appealed from the single justice's order to a 
full panel of the Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court affirmed the 
single justice's order denying the defendant's motion for a 
stay.  See Commonwealth v. Kalila, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 108, 120 
(2023).  After concluding that the first Nash factor was not at 
issue, the Appeals Court focused on the second Nash factor -- 
whether the defendant posed a security risk.  See id. at 112-
113.  While acknowledging that the judge may have "placed undue 
reliance on the fact that the defendant retained private 
counsel" to infer that the defendant had the financial ability 
to flee the country, the Appeals Court held that the single 
justice did not abuse his discretion.  Id. at 116.  The Appeals 
Court, in upholding the single justice's decision, cited the 
defendant's frequent travel to Morocco, his visits abroad to see 
his brother in Germany, his stable employment, and the judge's 
opportunity to assess the defendant's credibility firsthand.  
Id. at 115-116.  The Appeals Court also held that, insofar as 
the single justice made an independent determination that the 
defendant posed a security risk, there likewise was no abuse of 
discretion.  See id. at 120. 
Meanwhile, the defendant had filed a direct appeal from his 
convictions to the Appeals Court.  In his direct appeal, the 
 
defendant do not outweigh the significant security risk the 
defendant would pose if released." 
10 
 
defendant argued that the judge's refusal to strike juror no. 32 
constituted structural error.  See Kalila, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 
583.  As the defendant's direct appeal was pending, in May 2023, 
this court granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review of the single justice's denial of the 
defendant's motion to stay.  See 492 Mass. 1101 (2023).  After 
oral arguments in the case before us, the Appeals Court, on 
November 30, 2023, issued a decision on the defendant's direct 
appeal, holding that the judge had erred in denying the 
defendant's peremptory challenge and vacating the defendant's 
convictions.  See Kalila, supra. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the single 
justice's denial of the defendant's motion to stay for error of 
law or abuse of discretion.  See Nash, 486 Mass. at 412, citing 
Hodge, 380 Mass. at 853.  An abuse of discretion occurs when a 
judge makes a clear error in weighing the relevant factors such 
that the decision "falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives."  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014).  The role of an appellate court in this context is not 
to exercise our independent discretion but merely to review the 
correctness of the single justice's ruling.  See Nash, supra at 
412.  We do not substitute our judgment for that of the single 
justice simply because we would have reached a different result.  
See Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 485 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2020).  See 
11 
 
also L.L., supra, citing Bucchiere v. New England Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 396 Mass. 639, 641 (1986) ("it is plainly not an abuse of 
discretion simply because a reviewing court would have reached a 
different result").6  
 
2.  The single justice's review of the trial judge's denial 
of the stay.  A judge evaluates two factors in deciding a 
defendant's request for a stay:  (1) the defendant's likelihood 
of success on appeal and (2) certain security concerns.  See 
Nash, 486 Mass. at 406.7  The defendant has the burden to prove 
both factors by a preponderance of the evidence.  See id.  See 
 
6 In addition to challenging the single justice's decision 
on his motion to stay, the defendant asserts in passing that the 
single justice's decision amounts to impermissible 
discrimination based on the defendant's national origin.  A 
conclusory two sentences in the defendant's brief, not 
accompanied by either legal argument or factual detail, is 
insufficient to rise to the level of appellate argument, and 
thus is deemed waived.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as 
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (appellate issue must include 
rationale and legal authority).  See also Atwater v. 
Commissioner of Educ., 460 Mass. 844, 853 n.8 (2011) (mere 
citation to article of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
without further development did not rise to level of acceptable 
appellate argument). 
 
7 Due to the "extraordinary" nature of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the "fundamental change in circumstances" that it brought, 
including "the particular danger of transmission of the [COVID-
19] virus to persons in custody who cannot realistically engage 
in social distancing," we adjusted the test to incorporate a 
third factor.  Christie v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 401-402 
(2020).  See Nash, 486 Mass. at 405.  Under this third factor, 
judges consider pandemic-related health and safety risks to a 
defendant.  See id. at 406.  Here, the third Christie factor is 
not at issue. 
 
12 
 
also Care & Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 791 (1993), 
citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-176 (1987) 
(preliminary questions of fact established by preponderance of 
evidence). 
To meet the first factor, a defendant needs to show that he 
has presented an appealable issue "which is worthy of 
presentation to an appellate court [and] offers some reasonable 
possibility of a successful decision in the appeal."  Nash, 486 
Mass. at 403, quoting Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 
501, 503-504 (1979).  As the first factor involves a "pure 
question of law or legal judgment," the single justice's 
decision on this factor receives no deference from a reviewing 
court.  See Commonwealth v. Allen, 378 Mass. 489, 498 (1979), 
citing Levin, supra at 505.  To establish a reasonable 
possibility of success, a defendant need not prove that his 
success on appeal is certain or "even more likely than not."  
Nash, supra at 404.  The appeal, however, may not be frivolous.  
See Hodge, 380 Mass. at 587.  Instead, the question to be 
answered on this first factor is whether the defendant has 
proved the existence of at least one appellate issue with 
"sufficient heft" that would provide an appellate court "pause."  
Nash, supra.  The issue presented by the defendant must require 
legitimate evaluation, where both parties can find meaningful 
support for their position, and where the defendant would 
13 
 
receive a favorable outcome if he were successful.  See id.  In 
this case, as stated, there is no dispute that the defendant has 
presented an appellate issue of "sufficient heft."  See id. 
Under the second factor, to determine whether a defendant 
poses a security risk, a judge must weigh considerations such as 
"the possibility of flight to avoid punishment; potential danger 
to any other person or to the community; and the likelihood of 
further criminal acts during the pendency of the appeal."  Nash, 
486 Mass. at 405, quoting Hodge, 380 Mass. at 855.  See Christie 
v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 401 (2020) (judges should 
consider "the danger to other persons and the community arising 
from the defendant's risk of reoffense"); Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct 
at 505 (weighing considerations such as possibility of flight 
and further criminal acts, familial status, roots in community, 
employment, prior criminal record, and demeanor).  While the 
first factor is a question of law, the second factor presents a 
question of fact.  Nash, supra, citing Levin, supra.  Judges 
have "considerable leeway" in determining this second factor.  
Nash, supra.  
 
Here, the single justice detailed various considerations 
that supported the judge's conclusion that the defendant was a 
flight risk, including the defendant's dual citizenship and 
frequent travel to his country of origin, the serious crimes of 
which the defendant was convicted, the significant sentence that 
14 
 
the defendant had begun to serve, and the jury's rejection of 
the defendant's testimony at trial and its effect on his 
credibility.  The single justice also emphasized that the 
defendant's convictions were based on "impulsive, racially 
motivated, and violent acts," demonstrating a potential danger 
to others.  At the same time, the single justice also noted 
considerations that weighed in the defendant's favor, such as 
the defendant's minimal criminal history, community support, and 
compliance with conditions of pretrial release.  Ultimately, the 
single justice held that, even accounting for mitigating 
factors, it was not "outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" for the judge to find that the defendant 
constituted a security risk.  See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the single justice 
abused his discretion when he endorsed the judge's "speculation" 
that the defendant has the means, both financially and through 
his support network, to flee the country.  Specifically, the 
defendant claims that the considerations on which the judge 
relied in reaching these inferences, including the defendant's 
steady employment, his strong family support, his posting of 
$10,000 bail on the night of his arrest, and his hiring of 
private counsel, were improper.8 
 
8 The defendant also asserts that the judge and the single 
justice appear to have presumed, in error, that the defendant 
15 
 
A judge properly may consider a defendant's financial 
resources in evaluating whether he is a flight risk.  See 
Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 693 (2017) (judge "must 
consider a defendant's financial resources" in setting amount of 
bail under G. L. c. 276, § 58); Allen, 378 Mass. at 498 (factors 
used to govern bail before trial "may properly be considered" in 
deciding motion to stay).  Here, the judge referenced financial 
resources in rejecting the defendant's motion for a stay.  
Specifically, the judge wrote: 
"At argument, the court expressed to Kalila's counsel that 
the release terms the defense proposed -- [global 
positioning system monitoring], a curfew[,] and $10,000 
bail (the amount Kalila originally posted) -- were 
inadequate, but counsel offered nothing to supplement them.  
That was troubling; Kalila posted $10,000 bail on the night 
of his arrest, has been regularly employed in a management 
job . . . , has a history of regularly taking expensive 
foreign trips, and is represented by private counsel, all 
of which suggests that Kalila has access to significant 
financial resources to make good on flight, but offered 
none to further secure his release.  That he may be 
conserving funds to flee is thus a serious risk." 
 
In doing so, the judge did not consider merely the 
defendant's actual financial resources as permitted by law.  
Instead, he found "troubling" that the defendant posted bail on 
 
could not be extradited from Morocco to the United States.  
However, this rationale does not feature in either the judge's 
or the single justice's written decisions.  In any event, 
whether the defendant could be extradited after he already fled 
bears little, if any, weight in the determination whether the 
defendant may flee in the first place. 
 
16 
 
the night of his arrest, maintained regular employment, had a 
history of foreign trips, and retained private counsel yet 
offered no additional funds in seeking his motion for a stay.  
It was error for the judge to use all of this information to 
speculate that the defendant was stockpiling funds to flee. 
However, the single justice did not endorse these 
considerations.  In fact, these considerations do not appear in 
the single justice's written opinion.  The single justice's 
stated reasons -- including the defendant's dual citizenship, 
recurring trips abroad, "impulsive, racially motivated, and 
violent acts," and lack of credibility at trial -- were all 
proper and, when taken together, sufficient to find that the 
defendant constituted a security risk.  We thus conclude that 
the single justice did not abuse his discretion.  See L.L., 470 
Mass. at 158 n.27. 
The defendant also argues that his strong likelihood of 
success on appeal should be considered in assessing whether he 
constitutes a security risk.  Specifically, the defendant 
asserts that "[t]he single justice abused his discretion here by 
failing to weigh the strength of the defendant's appeal under 
factor 1 and its bearing on the defendant's flight risk under 
factor 2."  This is not the proper analysis for these two 
factors. 
17 
 
As recognized by the Appeals Court, Nash did not "signal[] 
a new approach to the traditional two-factor test."  Kalila, 102 
Mass. App. Ct. at 113.  In Nash, 486 Mass. at 407 n.17, we noted 
that judges may consider the totality of the circumstances in 
weighing a third factor against the other two factors if it 
serves the ultimate objective underlying that third factor -- to 
"safely and responsibly manag[e] confinements pending appeal for 
the duration of the pandemic."  The creation of a third factor, 
however, was not intended to modify the way judges should assess 
the first two factors in all cases going forward.  The third 
factor is unique from the other factors in both its purpose and 
application.  It was created in response to the "extraordinary 
times" of the COVID-19 pandemic.  See note 7, supra; Christie, 
484 Mass. at 401.  See also Nash, supra at 396 ("we held that 
the pandemic is a factor for judges to consider when ruling on 
requests for stay").  Our approval of a totality of the 
circumstances test was likewise an extraordinary measure for 
extraordinary times. 
A judge evaluating a motion to stay thus has two distinct 
factors to consider, as stated supra:  (1) the likelihood of 
success on appeal, and (2) certain security concerns, such as 
possibility of flight and potential danger to the community.  
See Nash, 486 Mass. at 406 ("Under the traditional, pre-pandemic 
standard for determining motions to stay, . . . a defendant 
18 
 
bears the burden of proving two factors -- likelihood of success 
on appeal and security -- in order to prevail").  If, after 
examining the first factor, the answer to that threshold 
question is yes, then the judge should proceed to an examination 
of the second factor; if the answer is no, the motion to stay is 
denied. 
Nonetheless, the defendant here asserts that the type of 
error involved in his underlying appeal -- structural error -- 
makes the defendant less of a security concern because it 
requires reversal without a need to demonstrate prejudice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 545 (2017).  We are not 
convinced for two reasons.  To begin with, the defendant's best 
outcome from his appeal is a new trial.  The possibility of a 
conviction after the defendant's new trial certainly is not 
remote.  A prior jury, in convicting the defendant of all 
charges, rejected the defendant's claims that he did not use 
racial epithets and acted in self-defense.  We therefore agree 
with the Appeals Court that "the nature of the error gives [the 
defendant] no reasonable expectation of an acquittal -- or any 
less incentive to flee."  Kalila, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 118.9  
 
9 This reasoning, of course, is not applicable to appeals 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence or other issues 
resulting in acquittal.  See Kalila, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 117.  
That issue is not raised in this case, and we need not reach it. 
 
19 
 
Next, the second Nash factor requires judges to consider the 
danger a defendant poses to the community.  See Nash, 486 Mass. 
at 405.  The nature of the error underlying the appeal here does 
not make the defendant any less dangerous. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the single justice did not abuse 
his discretion in concluding that the judge likewise did not 
abuse his discretion. 
 
3.  The single justice's independent determination.  A 
single justice has the option to review a judge's denial of a 
motion to stay in two ways.  Nash, 486 Mass. at 410.  Either the 
single justice may review the matter for an error of law or 
abuse of discretion, or the single justice may review it anew.  
See id. (reviewing motion anew provides defendant with "a second 
bite at the apple").  It is not uncommon for a single justice to 
review a judge's decision under both methods.  See id. at 410-
411.  Here, the single justice stated, at the end of his 
decision, that, "after exercising [his] independent review and 
discretion, [he] reach[ed] the same conclusion [as the judge]."  
Having analyzed the single justice's appellate review of the 
judge's decision, we now analyze the single justice's decision 
as if he made it anew. 
For purposes of our analysis, there is only one noteworthy 
difference between the single justice's review of the judge's 
decision and the single justice's independent determination.  
20 
 
The single justice had two additional pieces of evidence before 
him that the judge did not:  an affidavit of the defendant's 
wife in which she asserts that the financial resources of the 
defendant's family are limited and an affidavit of the 
defendant's brother in which he states that their father did not 
live in Morocco full time.  Neither affidavit is sufficient to 
render the single justice's decision denying the motion to stay 
unreasonable, given the single justice's stated reasons for 
finding that the defendant constituted a security risk -- the 
defendant's dual citizenship status and associated travel, the 
jury's determination that the defendant was not credible, and 
the serious and impulsive nature of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted.  See Nash, 486 Mass. at 405 (judge has 
"considerable leeway" in determining second factor).  We thus 
conclude that the single justice did not abuse his discretion 
insofar as he engaged in any independent review of the 
defendant's motion. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we conclude that 
the single justice did not commit an abuse of discretion by 
denying the defendant's motion to stay the execution of his 
sentence pending appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the single 
justice's order denying that motion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.