Title: State v. John Tomlinson, Jr.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 91 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3134-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
John Tomlinson, Jr.  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 212 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 682, 635 N.W.2d 201 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 2, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
John J. Grau and Grau Law Office, Waukesha, and oral argument by 
John J. Grau. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 91 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3134-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 1079) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John Tomlinson, Jr.  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Tomlinson, 
2001 WI App 212, 247 Wis. 2d 682, 635 N.W.2d 201, which upheld 
the conviction of John Tomlinson, Jr., for being a party to the 
crime of first-degree reckless homicide while using a dangerous 
weapon, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1), 939.05, and 
939.63 (1999-2000)1. 
¶2 
Tomlinson challenges his conviction on three disparate 
grounds.  First, Tomlinson argues that the baseball bat and mop 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
2 
 
 
handles, which were allegedly used in the homicide and which 
were found in Tomlinson's house following his arrest, should 
have been suppressed because the police did not obtain proper 
consent to enter Tomlinson's house.  Second, Tomlinson claims 
that the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to 
introduce a witness's preliminary hearing testimony after that 
witness asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege during trial.  
Third, Tomlinson claims that the circuit court erred in 
instructing the jury that a baseball bat constitutes a dangerous 
weapon. 
¶3 
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Jeffrey A. Wagner, 
Judge, denied Tomlinson's post-conviction motions on each of the 
three claims.  On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the ruling 
of the circuit court.  See State v. Tomlinson, 2001 WI App 212, 
¶1.  Tomlinson petitioned this court for review, and we 
accepted.  We now affirm the decision of the court of appeals on 
all three issues. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On February 27, 1999, Milwaukee Police Detective 
Dennis Kuchenreuther and several other members of the Milwaukee 
Police 
Department 
were 
investigating 
the 
death 
of 
Lewis 
Phillips.  Phillips had suffered blunt force trauma to the head 
late on the night of February 5 or early on the morning of 
February 6, 1999, on the 1100 block of West Chambers Street in 
Milwaukee.  Phillips died from his injuries several days later. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
3 
 
 
¶5 
During the investigation, police received information 
from Angela Green, a witness to several events which immediately 
followed the homicide.  Green informed police that she had been 
walking on the 1100 block of West Chambers late in the evening 
of February 5 or early in the morning of February 6, 1999, when 
she heard a woman yell, "Kick the bitch in the head." 
¶6 
Green then observed a man walking toward her, carrying 
a baseball bat.  She knew the man as "John" or "Red."  Green 
also saw two teenaged girls, whom Green recognized as the man's 
daughters, carrying what appeared to be broom or mop handles.  
After Green passed them on the street, she came upon Phillips, 
who was on the ground, bleeding from the head.  Green identified 
a photograph of Tomlinson as the man she knew as "John" or 
"Red."  Green also identified the woman's voice she had heard as 
Tomlinson's wife.  Green informed the police of Tomlinson's 
address, and pointed out the house to the officers. 
¶7 
At 
about 
8:50 
p.m. 
that 
same 
day, 
Detective 
Kuchenreuther and the other officers went to Tomlinson's house 
and knocked on the back door.  According to Kuchenreuther's 
testimony, the officers were met at the door by an African-
American female who appeared to be 15 or 16 years old.  
Tomlinson himself was standing nearby, in the house.  According 
to Kuchenreuther, the girl identified herself, but the record 
does 
not 
reflect 
what 
that 
identification 
actually 
was.  
Kuchenreuther then informed the girl that they were looking for 
Tomlinson, and they asked for permission to enter the house.  
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
4 
 
 
The girl said nothing, opened the door, and walked into the 
house.  The officers followed her into the entryway and the 
kitchen area.  The officers did not have a search warrant for 
the house or an arrest warrant for Tomlinson. 
¶8 
After the officers entered the house, they placed 
Tomlinson, Tomlinson's wife (Michelle), and Tomlinson's two 
daughters (Monteria and Kamisha), under arrest.  Later trial 
testimony confirmed that Monteria and Kamisha were 14 and 15 
years old at the time.  After being placed under arrest, 
Michelle, Monteria, and Kamisha asked if they could put shoes 
and socks on before they left.  The officers allowed them to do 
so, and escorted the three into an adjoining bedroom.  In the 
bedroom, in plain view, the officers observed a baseball bat and 
some broom or mop handles lying between the bed and the wall.  
The officers seized the items as evidence. 
¶9 
Tomlinson was charged with being a party to the crime 
of first-degree reckless homicide under Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1) 
and 939.05, and was charged with the penalty enhancer for the 
use of a dangerous weapon, under Wis. Stat. § 939.63.2  Tomlinson 
pleaded not guilty. 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 939.63 states, in pertinent part: 
(1)(a) 
If 
a 
person 
commits 
a 
crime 
while 
possessing, using or threatening to use a dangerous 
weapon, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by 
law for that crime may be increased as follows: 
. . . . 
2. If the maximum term of imprisonment for a 
felony is more than 5 years or is a life term, the 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
5 
 
 
¶10 At the preliminary hearing, testimony was taken from 
Otis Coleman, another witness to the events surrounding the 
homicide.  Coleman testified that he had seen Phillips on the 
night in question with two other people, whom Coleman described 
as one African-American male and one African-American female.  
Coleman identified the male as Tomlinson. 
¶11 Coleman testified that Phillips had asked the female 
if he could buy a cigarette from her for a quarter.  Coleman 
then heard the female respond, "I have to have 50 cents, 
nigger."  Coleman testified that he then heard Phillips say 
"A quarter, bitch."  Coleman then saw Tomlinson approach 
Phillips and ask, "What did you call my wife?"  Coleman 
testified that the verbal altercation between Tomlinson and 
Phillips escalated, and that Tomlinson left the area, telling 
Phillips to be there when he got back. 
¶12 Coleman testified that he and Phillips began walking 
away, when Tomlinson returned about two minutes later, carrying 
a baseball bat.  Coleman testified that Tomlinson confronted 
Phillips, and struck him three times with the baseball bat: once 
in the leg, once in the head, and a third time after Phillips 
was on the ground. 
¶13 At trial, the State called Coleman to testify.  When 
the prosecutor asked Coleman if he was willing to answer 
questions regarding the case, Coleman responded: 
                                                                                                                                                             
maximum term of imprisonment for the felony may be 
increased by not more than 5 years. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
6 
 
 
I would——any questions asked here today, I would have 
to invoke my Fifth Amendment rights.  It might tend to 
incriminate me.  I don't care to do any talking about 
anything.  I don't think I'm mentally stable enough at 
the present time to answer any questions about 
anything. 
Coleman proceeded to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in 
response to all of the questions asked by the prosecutor.  When 
the prosecutor asked what Coleman meant by his Fifth Amendment 
rights, Coleman responded: 
I do not wish to say anything that might tend to 
incriminate me or to get me harmed in any way, shape 
or fashion. 
Coleman continued to invoke the Fifth Amendment the entire time 
he was on the stand, even after being ordered by the court to 
answer the State's questions, and during an attempted cross-
examination by defense counsel. 
¶14 After Coleman was excused, the State moved to have 
Coleman declared unavailable under Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1)(a) and 
(b), and to have Coleman's preliminary hearing testimony 
admitted under the hearsay exception in Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1).  
The circuit court granted the State's motion, and allowed 
Coleman's preliminary hearing testimony to be introduced. 
¶15 At the close of the trial, the court instructed the 
jury with regard to the dangerous weapon sentence enhancer.  
That instruction was: 
If you find the defendant guilty, you must answer the 
following question.  Did the defendant commit the 
crime of first-degree reckless homicide while using, 
threatening to use, or possessing a dangerous weapon? 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
7 
 
 
Before you may answer the question yes, you must be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime while using, threatening to use, 
or possessing a dangerous weapon and possessed the 
dangerous weapon to facilitate the crime. 
Dangerous weapon means a baseball bat. 
When the court finished issuing the jury instructions, the 
prosecutor asked for a sidebar and the jury was excused.  The 
prosecutor pointed out that there was a footnote in Wis JI——
Criminal 990, the standard jury instruction for the dangerous 
weapon sentence enhancer, which suggested that it should be up 
to the jury to decide whether a baseball bat is a dangerous 
weapon.3 
                                                 
3 The footnote cited by the prosecutor states: 
The Committee suggests using the part of the statutory 
definition that applies to the facts of the case. 
"Dangerous 
weapon" 
is 
defined 
as 
follows 
in 
§ 939.22(10): 
(10) "Dangerous weapon" means any firearm, 
whether loaded or unloaded; any device designed 
as a weapon and capable of producing death or 
great 
bodily harm; 
any 
electric 
weapon, as 
defined in § 941.295(4); or any other device or 
instrumentality which, in the manner it is used 
or intended to be used, is calculated or likely 
to produce death or great bodily harm. 
For example, if the evidence shows a firearm was used, 
the sentence at note 2 would read: "'Dangerous weapon' 
means 
any 
firearm, 
whether loaded 
or 
unloaded." 
Similar statements should be used for the other 
alternatives provided by the statutory definition. See 
Wis JI——Criminal 910 for suggested instructions for 
the other alternatives and a discussion of some of the 
substantive issues relating to "dangerous weapons." 
Wis JI——Criminal 990, n.4. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
8 
 
 
¶16 Tomlinson's defense attorney, when asked, stated that 
they wanted the jury instruction to remain as the court had read 
it.  The prosecutor noted that leaving the jury instruction as 
it had been read would essentially relieve the State of its 
burden on that element, and asked the defendant if he understood 
that consequence.  Tomlinson replied, "Yeah." 
¶17 The court then asked the defendant the same question.  
Defense counsel again replied that they wanted the instruction 
the way it had been read.  The court asked the defendant if he 
understood what was happening, to which the defense attorney 
replied, "[The defendant] told me yes and I'm repeating it.  He 
told me yes."  The jury found Tomlinson guilty of being party to 
the crime of first-degree reckless homicide while using a 
dangerous weapon, and he was sentenced to 38 years in prison. 
¶18 Tomlinson filed a post-conviction motion challenging 
the propriety of the police search, the admissibility of 
Coleman's preliminary hearing testimony at trial, and the 
court's jury instruction on the dangerous weapon element.  The 
circuit court denied Tomlinson's motion on all three issues.  In 
a published opinion, State v. Tomlinson, 2001 WI App 212, the 
court of appeals upheld the decision of the circuit court.  
Tomlinson petitioned this court for review, which we accepted.  
We now affirm the court of appeals' decision, and uphold 
Tomlinson's conviction.  We address each of Tomlinson's three 
issues in turn. 
II.  CONSENT TO SEARCH 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
9 
 
 
¶19 We first review the propriety of the police seizure of 
the baseball bat and the mop/broom handles at Tomlinson's house.  
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution each states that "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . ."  Whether police conduct has 
violated the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is a question of constitutional fact.  
State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 
N.W.2d 72.  Thus, we give deference to the circuit court's 
findings 
of 
evidentiary 
and 
historical 
fact, 
but 
we 
independently apply those historical facts to the constitutional 
standard.  Id. 
¶20 Here, the police entered Tomlinson's home to arrest 
him without a warrant.  Searches conducted without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.  State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶17, 
241 
Wis. 2d 52, 
621 
N.W.2d 891; 
State 
v. 
Phillips, 
218 
Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  However, the police 
may enter a home without a warrant to make an arrest if two 
circumstances are present.  First, the police must have probable 
cause to make the arrest, and second, there must be an exception 
to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances or 
consent to enter.  Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 593-94, 267 
N.W.2d 278 (1978).  Tomlinson does not dispute the existence of 
probable cause to arrest, and the State does not contend that 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
10 
 
 
there were exigent circumstances in this case.  Our inquiry is 
thus confined to the question of whether the police received 
consent to enter Tomlinson's home. 
¶21 The State has the burden of proving consent by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 
548 (1968); State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 107, 349 
N.W.2d 453 (1984).  Here, Tomlinson does not challenge the 
voluntariness of the consent, nor does he claim that the consent 
was given under duress or coercion.4  Tomlinson's challenge is 
limited to the authority of the girl who opened the door to give 
consent to the police officers to enter the house, and the 
girl's actions in allegedly giving the consent.  We focus our 
discussion on those issues. 
¶22 Under certain circumstances, consent to search may be 
given by a third person——that is, by a person other than the 
subject of the search.  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
171 (1974); State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 542, 577 
N.W.2d 352 (1998).  The U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, is most often cited for the doctrine of 
third-party consent.  In that case, the Court upheld the search 
of a bedroom, which the defendant occupied jointly with a 
cohabitating girlfriend.  Id. at 177-78.  The defendant's 
                                                 
4 We also note that Tomlinson does not challenge the 
propriety of the officers' subsequent entry into the bedroom, or 
the actual seizure of the bat and the mop/broom handles once the 
officers were in the bedroom. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
11 
 
 
girlfriend gave the police permission to search the bedroom, 
where the police found money that had been taken during a bank 
robbery in which the defendant was a suspect.  Id. at 166-67. 
¶23 In upholding the search, the Court discussed the 
theoretical bases for third-party consent.  The Court stated 
that consent to search may be "obtained from a third party who 
possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship 
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."  Id. at 171.  
The Court went on to explain that: 
[t]he 
authority 
which 
justifies 
the 
third-party 
consent does not rest upon the law of property . . . 
but rests rather on the mutual use of the property by 
persons generally having joint access or control for 
most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize 
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit 
the inspection in his own right and that the others 
have assumed the risk that one of their number might 
permit the common area to be searched. 
Id. at 171 n.7 (citations omitted). 
¶24 This court has also addressed the concept of third-
party consent in several cases, most notably in State v. 
Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531.  Applying the concepts of Matlock in 
that case, we held that the defendant's father-in-law lacked the 
actual authority to consent to a police search of a garage 
attic, which the father-in-law rented to his daughter and the 
defendant, and in which the couple had essentially established a 
"separate household."  Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 545-46. 
¶25 More importantly, in Kieffer we also discussed the 
relationship between actual authority and apparent authority to 
grant third-party consent.  Citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
12 
 
 
U.S. 177 (1990), we held that even if a third party lacks the 
actual authority to consent to a search, police may rely upon 
the third party's apparent common authority, if such reliance is 
reasonable.  Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 548.  In that case, we 
noted, "officers may not always take third-party consent to a 
search at face value, but must consider the surrounding 
circumstances."  Id. at 549. 
¶26 In the present case, the State argues that the girl 
who answered the door had both actual and apparent authority to 
give the officers consent to enter.  Tomlinson challenges the 
State's assertions on both of these counts.  In considering the 
facts surrounding the officers' request for consent, we agree 
with the State's argument that the girl had apparent authority 
to give the police limited consent to enter, and therefore, we 
are not required to address the question of whether or not the 
girl had actual authority to consent. 
¶27 Tomlinson first claims that the girl could not have 
had authority to give consent because there is nothing in the 
record to show that the girl was one of Tomlinson's daughters.  
We agree with the court of appeals that this issue was not fully 
addressed at trial.  However, any question of whether or not the 
girl was Tomlinson's daughter would be more consequential in a 
determination of actual authority to allow entry.  Under the 
apparent authority rule, however, we think that there was 
sufficient evidence for the officers to reasonably conclude that 
the girl who answered the door was one of Tomlinson's daughters. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
13 
 
 
¶28 Before coming to the house, the police officers knew 
that Tomlinson had two teenage daughters, later shown to be 14 
and 15 years old, who themselves were suspects in the crime.  
The police had obtained descriptions of the two daughters by 
interviewing witnesses to the crime.  Although the specific 
identification is not in the record, the girl who answered the 
door——described by Detective Kuchenreuther as a 15- or 16-year-
old 
African-American 
girl——had 
identified 
herself 
to 
the 
detective.  Tomlinson was apparently standing nearby when the 
door was opened,5 and he did not object to the girl's letting the 
officers into the house.  After the police entered the house, 
they arrested Tomlinson, his wife, and both of his daughters.  
There was no evidence of anyone else in the house, and no one 
else was arrested or questioned at that time.  Under these 
circumstances, it was more than reasonable for the officers to 
conclude that the girl who answered the door was one of 
Tomlinson's daughters. 
¶29 Given the conclusion that the officers could have 
reasonably believed that the girl was Tomlinson's daughter, we 
must next consider the question of when a minor child has the 
authority to consent to police entry of his or her parents' 
home, and whether the officers reasonably believed that the girl 
in this case had the authority to do so.  We begin with the 
basic principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
                                                 
5 Detective Kuchenreuther testified that Tomlinson was 
standing behind the girl who answered the door, at the top of a 
short flight of stairs that led up to the kitchen. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
14 
 
 
Matlock.  That is, third-party consent can be obtained from a 
person who possesses "common authority over or other sufficient 
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."  
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.  This common authority rests on the 
"mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint 
access or control for most purposes" and that "any of the co-
inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own 
right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of 
their number might permit the common area to be searched."  Id. 
at 171 n.7. 
¶30 A minor child who lives in the same home with his or 
her parents or guardians obviously shares use of the property 
with the parents or guardians to some extent.  However, it 
should also be obvious that a child generally does not share 
mutual use of the property with a parent to the same extent that 
such use might be shared between spouses or between cohabitating 
adults.  In general, a parent's interest in the property will be 
superior to that of the child, and the child will generally not 
have the equivalent authority of a parent or guardian to consent 
to a search of the premises. 
¶31 Still, there are some situations where a child could 
reasonably possess the authority to consent to a search, or to 
consent to police entry of a parent's home.  Whether the child 
possesses such authority will depend on a number of factors, and 
courts must look at the totality of the circumstances to make 
such a determination.  The primary factors to be considered are 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
15 
 
 
the child's age, intelligence, and maturity, and the scope of 
the search or seizure to which the child consents.  3 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(c), at 773-74 (3d ed. 1996).  
To a lesser extent, the court should also consider the extent to 
which the child has been left in charge, and the extent to which 
the parent has disclosed his or her criminality to the child.  
Id. § 8.4(c), at 774; United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 
778-79 (6th Cir. 1990). 
¶32 The age, intelligence, and maturity of the child are 
important because, as a child gets older and more mature, the 
child will generally be entrusted with greater responsibility.  
See, e.g., Laasch, 84 Wis. 2d at 592-93 (holding that the State 
did not prove that the defendant's five-year-old son possessed 
the capacity, intelligence, or authority to give consent for 
police to enter the apartment at midnight).  The scope of the 
consent is also particularly important because there are parts 
of a family's home where the parents have an increased privacy 
interest, and where the child could not reasonably give consent 
to a search, even though a parent could.  In some situations, 
however, a child might reasonably be able to give consent for 
police to enter or search a common area of the home where the 
parents and the child share a greater mutual use and a similar 
expectation of privacy. 
¶33 In the present case, given the age of the girl who 
answered the door, the limited scope of the entry, and the 
surrounding circumstances, the officers could have reasonably 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
16 
 
 
concluded that the consent to enter the house was valid.  A high 
school-aged child will likely have at least some authority to 
allow limited entry into the home.  Courts that have addressed 
this issue are generally in agreement on this point.  See, e.g., 
Doyle v. State, 633 P.2d 306, 309 (Alaska 1981); Mears v. State, 
533 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 1989); State v. Folkens, 281 N.W.2d 1, 
4 (Iowa 1979); State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 484-85 (Mo. 
1988).  There is no evidence here that the girl who answered the 
door lacked the intelligence or maturity such that the officers' 
reliance on the consent would have been called into question. 
¶34 The 
scope 
of 
the 
entry 
and 
the 
surrounding 
circumstances in this case bolster our conclusion that the 
officers reasonably relied on the third-party consent.  The 
officers were only allowed into the entryway and the kitchen.  
They did not search or enter into the rest of the house on the 
basis of the initial consent.  Additionally, the officers came 
to the house on a Saturday evening, rather than extremely late 
at night or early in the morning.  We also give weight to the 
fact that Tomlinson was nearby when the door was opened.  
Tomlinson did not object to the police coming in, and the 
daughter did not hesitate or turn to ask Tomlinson's permission 
to let the officers in.  Under these circumstances, the officers 
reasonably could have believed that Tomlinson entrusted the girl 
with at least some authority to give consent to enter, and 
certainly with enough authority to allow the limited entry that 
occurred in this case. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
17 
 
 
¶35 Tomlinson next suggests that, even if the girl had the 
authority to allow entry, her actions were insufficient to give 
the officers consent to enter.  Tomlinson argues that the 
actions of the girl who answered the door were consistent with a 
person turning away from the door to inform someone else that 
the police were there to speak with him.  Tomlinson suggests 
that, particularly because a minor answered the door, more 
should be required to show consent. 
¶36 Whether an individual in fact gives consent is a 
question of historical fact.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196-97.  
Thus, we will uphold the trial court's finding on this issue 
unless it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of 
the evidence.  Id. at 197.  Here, although Tomlinson's 
formulation of the events is one possible characterization of 
events, the finding of the circuit court on this issue was not 
against the great weight of the evidence, and we uphold the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
girl's 
actions 
were 
sufficient to give consent to enter. 
¶37 Consent to search does not have to be given verbally.  
Consent may be given in non-verbal form through gestures or 
conduct.  Id. (citing United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 
741-42 (7th Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Walls, 225 
F.3d 858, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2000).  The girl who answered the 
door turned to enter the house upon the officer's request to 
enter——this could reasonably have been interpreted as an 
invitation to follow her inside.  Additionally, Tomlinson was 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
18 
 
 
present and apparently said nothing when this occurred.  Under 
the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court did not err 
when it held that the girl gave consent for the officers to 
enter the house. 
¶38 Because the officers reasonably believed that the girl 
who let them in had the authority to consent to the limited 
entry, and because the girl actually did give consent for the 
officers to enter the house, we hold that the consent to enter 
the house was valid.  As a result, the warrantless arrest of 
Tomlinson and the seizure of the bat and the mop/broom handles 
were both valid, and the circuit court properly allowed the 
State to introduce these items as evidence at trial. 
III.  ADMISSION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY 
¶39 We next turn to Tomlinson's contention that the 
circuit court improperly declared Coleman to be an unavailable 
witness, and that the circuit court violated Tomlinson's right 
to confrontation when it allowed the State to introduce 
Coleman's preliminary hearing testimony into evidence under the 
hearsay exception in Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1).  The admissibility 
of former testimony is a discretionary decision of the circuit 
court, and we will not overturn the circuit court's decision 
unless it is clearly erroneous.  La Barge v. State, 74 
Wis. 2d 327, 338, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).  Whether a defendant's 
right to confrontation has been violated, however, is a question 
of constitutional fact.  State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 655, 
575 
N.W.2d 475 
(1998). 
 
When 
we 
review 
a 
question 
of 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
19 
 
 
constitutional fact, we adopt the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but we 
independently apply those facts to the constitutional standard.  
Id. 
¶40 Tomlinson's challenge in this case requires us to 
examine, once more, the relationship between the hearsay rule 
and the constitutional right to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  The right to confrontation and the 
hearsay rule with its many exceptions, serve a similar purpose: 
to ensure that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for 
evaluating the truthfulness of the evidence admitted in a 
criminal case.  State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 210, 325 
N.W.2d 857 (1982).  However, compliance with the hearsay rule 
does not absolutely insure compliance with the constitutional 
right to confrontation.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) 
(holding that the Confrontation Clause "was intended to exclude 
some hearsay"); Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 210.  Conversely, the 
confrontation right is not absolute, as a literal reading of 
that right would essentially require the exclusion of any 
statement made by a declarant who was not available at trial, 
and would necessarily exclude all hearsay evidence.  Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 63; Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 209.  Thus, over the 
course of many years and many cases, courts have been repeatedly 
faced with situations where they have had to accommodate these 
two competing principles of law. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
20 
 
 
¶41 The basic test governing the relationship was set down 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, and 
further explained by this court in State v. Bauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 204.  The threshold question in such a case is whether 
the 
evidence 
in 
question 
is 
admissible 
under 
a 
hearsay 
exception.  Id. at 215.  Obviously, if the out-of-court 
statement is not admissible under the statutory rules, the 
evidence should be excluded and there is no reason to proceed to 
the constitutional question.  However, if the evidence is 
admissible under a hearsay exception, the court must go on to 
address the constitutional question of whether the defendant's 
right to confrontation has been violated.  Id. at 210.  This is 
done by applying a two-part test: (1) the State must have 
demonstrated the declarant's unavailability; and (2) the State 
must have shown that the hearsay evidence bears some indicia of 
reliability.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 
210-11. 
¶42 In the present case, we hold that the State has met 
its burden on the threshold question.  The State moved for 
admission of Coleman's preliminary hearing testimony under the 
hearsay exception in Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1).  If the declarant 
is unavailable, that statute allows the admission of 
[t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition 
taken in compliance with law in the course of another 
proceeding, at the instance of or against a party with 
an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross-, or redirect examination, with motive and 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
21 
 
 
interest similar to those of the party against whom 
now offered. 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1). 
 
According 
to 
the 
statute, 
"unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the 
declarant: 
(a) Is exempted by ruling of the judge on the 
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning 
the 
subject matter 
of 
the declarant's 
statement 
despite an order of the judge to do so . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1). 
¶43 Because the witness must be statutorily "unavailable" 
for Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1) to apply at all, we address that 
statutory section first.  Tomlinson argues that the circuit 
court erred because it did not explore the validity of Coleman's 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege.  That is, Tomlinson 
contends that Coleman's reason for invoking the Fifth Amendment, 
fear of physical harm, is not a legitimate reason for asserting 
the privilege.  Although we agree (and the State concedes) that 
Coleman may not have properly invoked his Fifth Amendment 
privilege in this case, we do not have to answer the question, 
because the trial court could properly find Coleman unavailable 
under Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1)(b). 
¶44 According to that section, a witness is unavailable if 
he "[p]ersists in refusing to testify concerning the subject 
matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the 
judge to do so."  This was precisely what happened in this case.  
Coleman repeatedly pleaded the Fifth Amendment when questioned 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
22 
 
 
by the prosecutor.  The judge then ordered Coleman to answer the 
State's questions several times, which Coleman again refused to 
do by invoking the Fifth Amendment.  Coleman also invoked the 
Fifth Amendment when the defense attorney tried to cross-examine 
him.  Because Coleman persistently refused to testify, in light 
of a court order to do so, the circuit court properly declared 
him unavailable under Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1)(b). 
¶45 Given that Coleman was properly declared unavailable 
under the statute, the next question is whether Coleman's 
preliminary 
hearing 
testimony 
meets 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045.  Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 215-16.  We think 
it is clear that it does.  First, the testimony was "given as a 
witness at another hearing of the same . . . proceeding"——the 
preliminary hearing for the same case.  The defendant was also 
given "an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross-, or redirect examination" at the preliminary hearing.6  
Because 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 908.04(1) 
and 
908.045(1) have been met, we hold that the threshold question, 
whether the evidence is admissible under a statutory hearsay 
exception, has been satisfied. 
                                                 
6 Coleman 
answered 
a 
number 
of 
questions 
on 
cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing.  The defendant was able 
to elicit, among other things, that Coleman had not called 
police after the incident, that he did not see the third blow 
with the bat because he was retreating from the scene, and that 
Coleman had never seen Tomlinson prior to the date of the 
incident. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
23 
 
 
¶46 Because we hold that the evidence is admissible under 
the statutory rules of evidence, we next address whether 
Tomlinson's 
constitutional 
right 
to 
confrontation 
has 
nevertheless been violated.  To do this, we apply the two-part 
test we have previously stated: (1) whether the State has shown 
that the declarant is unavailable;7 and (2) whether the hearsay 
evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability.  Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 65-66; Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 210-11.  Here, we hold that 
both parts of the test have been met. 
¶47 For the purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the 
State has not shown a witness is unavailable until it has made a 
good-faith effort to obtain the witness's presence at trial.  
                                                 
7 We apply the unavailability prong from Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56 (1980), in this case because the hearsay exception 
at issue is one that requires that the witness be unavailable.  
However, we note that our holding in State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 
204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982), may have been overbroad in 
suggesting that the unavailability determination must be made in 
all Confrontation Clause cases.  In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346, 357 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the 
unavailability rule in a Confrontation Clause challenge to 
evidence that was admitted under the hearsay exceptions for 
spontaneous 
declarations 
and 
statements 
made 
for 
medical 
treatment.  In that case, the Court noted that "there is little 
benefit, 
if 
any, 
to 
be 
accomplished 
by 
imposing 
an 
'unavailability rule,'" in which the court would "require as a 
predicate for introducing hearsay testimony either a showing of 
the declarant's unavailability or production at trial of the 
declarant."  Id. at 354-55 & n.6.  The Court noted that such a 
broad unavailability rule would not likely "add[] meaningfully 
to the trial's truth-determining process," and would impose 
substantial burdens on fact-finding.  Id. at 354.  Instead, the 
Court held that because the evidence had "sufficient guarantees 
of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the 
hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause [was] satisfied."  Id. at 
356. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
24 
 
 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 
724-25 (1968)).  "The lengths to which the prosecution must go 
to produce a witness . . . is a question of reasonableness."  
Id. at 74 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 
(1970)).  The question is whether the witness continues to be 
unavailable despite a good faith effort by the prosecution to 
locate and present that witness.  Id.  In Roberts, for instance, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that the prosecution had made a 
good faith effort to locate a witness when it sent the witness 
five separate subpoenas over the course of several months, and 
had interviewed the witness's parents, who did not know of her 
location.  Id. at 75. 
¶48 In this case, we easily conclude that the prosecution 
made a good faith effort to locate and present Coleman as a 
witness at Tomlinson's trial.  The State was able to produce 
Coleman at the preliminary hearing, where he gave testimony, and 
the State personally produced Coleman again as a witness at the 
trial.  It was only when Coleman took the stand at trial that he 
persistently refused to testify.  When Coleman got on the stand 
to testify, the State tried repeatedly to get Coleman to answer 
questions, and, when Coleman continued to refuse to answer, the 
State asked the court to order Coleman to answer.  Despite these 
attempts, Coleman continued to refuse to testify.  Given these 
facts, we conclude that the State made a good faith effort to 
produce the witness, and that the first part of the test is met. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
25 
 
 
¶49 We now move to the second part of the test.  Under the 
second prong, we must determine whether the admitted evidence 
bears sufficient indicia of reliability such that it does not 
violate Tomlinson's right to confrontation.  This prong is in 
place to ensure that the trier of fact has a "'satisfactory 
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.'"  Id. at 
65-66 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161).  Generally, if the 
evidence fits within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the 
reliability of the evidence can be inferred.  Id. at 66; Bauer, 
109 Wis. 2d at 215. 
¶50 Here, Coleman's preliminary hearing testimony clearly 
contains sufficient indicia of reliability.  As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has noted in similar cases where preliminary hearing 
testimony was introduced, the testimony at the preliminary 
hearing 
here 
was 
given 
under 
circumstances 
that 
closely 
approximated those at trial.  See Green, 399 U.S. at 165.  
Therefore, the evidence is sufficiently reliable to protect 
Tomlinson's confrontation rights. 
¶51 Coleman's testimony was given under oath, before a 
judicial tribunal, and in a setting equipped to make a judicial 
record.  Id. at 165.  Tomlinson was also represented by counsel 
at 
the 
preliminary 
hearing——the 
same 
attorney 
who 
later 
represented Tomlinson at trial.  Additionally, Tomlinson's 
defense counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine Coleman at 
the preliminary hearing.  During the cross-examination, the 
defense attorney was able to elicit information helpful to 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
26 
 
 
Tomlinson's defense, including the fact that Coleman did not 
call the police after the incident, that Coleman did not see 
whether Tomlinson struck Phillips a third time because he had 
been leaving the scene at the time, and that Coleman had been 
drinking on the day of the incident.  Thus, we find Tomlinson's 
ability to cross-examine Coleman was meaningful. 
¶52 Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that 
Tomlinson's confrontation rights were not violated.  The hearsay 
evidence 
was 
admissible 
under 
a 
statutorily 
recognized 
exception, the State made a showing that the witness was 
unavailable, and the hearsay evidence bore sufficient indicia of 
reliability.  Thus, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court properly allowed the State to admit Coleman's 
preliminary hearing testimony, and we affirm the court of 
appeals' holding on that issue. 
IV.  JURY INSTRUCTION 
¶53 Finally, 
we 
review 
the 
propriety 
of 
the 
jury 
instruction offered by the trial court with regard to the 
dangerous 
weapon 
penalty 
enhancer——specifically, 
that 
the 
circuit court gave the instruction, "Dangerous weapon means a 
baseball bat."  Tomlinson argues that this jury instruction 
deprived him of his right to due process because the jury did 
not have to decide whether the State proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a baseball bat was a dangerous weapon.  Whether a 
jury instruction from the circuit court deprives a defendant of 
his right to due process is a question of law, which we review 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
27 
 
 
de novo.  State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 467 N.W.2d 531 
(1991). 
¶54 Tomlinson and the State both appear to concede that 
the jury instruction on the dangerous weapon element was 
erroneous, and focus their arguments primarily on whether or not 
Tomlinson adequately waived his right to a jury trial.  While we 
agree with the presumption that the jury instruction was 
erroneous, we hold that the error was harmless as it was 
committed in this case.  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' 
ultimate decision on this issue, albeit on different grounds, 
and we do not reach the question of waiver.8 
¶55 It is well-established that to convict a criminal 
defendant, the State must prove all elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.9  Id. at 736 (citing Muller v. State, 94 
Wis. 2d 450, 473, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980)).  Thus, an evidentiary 
presumption in a jury instruction may have the effect of 
relieving the State of this obligation.  Id. (citing Muller, 94 
Wis. 2d at 473-74).  As we have previously held, when the 
circuit court instructs the jury that it must find the elemental 
                                                 
8 The 
parties' 
waiver 
arguments 
primarily 
involve 
reconciling the present case with State v. Villarreal, 153 
Wis. 2d 323 
(Ct. 
App. 
1989), 
and 
State 
v. 
Benoit, 
229 
Wis. 2d 630 (Ct. App. 1999).  We mention these cases only to 
emphasize that we do not interpret either of the two cases as 
limiting the harmless error rule's application to erroneous jury 
instructions. 
9 The parties do not dispute the fact that the dangerous 
weapon penalty enhancer constitutes an element of the charged 
crime.  See State v. Carrington, 134 Wis. 2d 260, 268-70, 397 
N.W.2d 484 (1986). 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
28 
 
 
fact if the State proves certain other predicate facts, the 
State might be relieved of its burden of persuasion because the 
element will be removed from the jury entirely if the State 
proves the predicate facts.  Id. at 736-37.  Thus, we have 
generally 
held 
that 
a 
mandatory 
presumption 
in 
a 
jury 
instruction is impermissible.  Id. at 737. 
¶56 In State v. Kuntz, we were presented with a jury 
instruction error similar to the one here.  In that case, the 
defendant was on trial for arson, which requires, as an element, 
that a "building" be damaged by fire.  Id. at 734; see also 
Wis. Stat. § 943.02; Wis JI——Criminal 1404 (1992).  The alleged 
arson had occurred in a mobile home, and in instructing the 
jury, the circuit court stated, "'[a] mobile home is a 
building.'"  Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 734.  Kuntz challenged this 
instruction on the grounds that it deprived him of due process 
by not requiring the State to prove that element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 733-34. 
¶57 We held that the jury instructions, as given, created 
a mandatory conclusive presumption regarding an element of the 
arson offense, and were therefore erroneous.  Id. at 735.  
However, we went on to hold that the mandatory conclusive 
presumption was harmless error because it did not play a role in 
the jury's verdict.  Id.  In that case, we applied the reasoning 
of Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carella v. California, 491 
U.S. 263, 267-73 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), to hold that 
the jury instructions, as given, still left it up to the jury to 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
29 
 
 
determine whether or not the structure in question was a mobile 
home.  Id. at 740.  We concluded that no rational jury could 
possibly have found that the structure in question was a mobile 
home without also finding that it was a building, and thus the 
error was harmless.  Id. 
¶58 Cases subsequent to Kuntz have called into question 
the viability of Justice Scalia's Carella concurrence, and thus 
have also called into question our analytical framework in 
Kuntz.  See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1999); 
State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶43-45, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.  However, they have affirmed the bottom line in both 
cases: the use of harmless error analysis is appropriate in the 
case of an erroneous jury instruction. 
¶59 In the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Neder, 527 
U.S. 1, the Court stated that unlike constitutional violations 
which "affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds," 
errors in jury instructions——which in Neder, was the omission of 
an entire element——do not necessarily render a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair or unreliable, and are therefore subject to 
harmless error analysis.  Id. at 8-9.  The Court declined to 
apply the more restrictive framework in the Carella concurrence, 
instead articulating the test for harmless error as "whether it 
appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'"  Id. at 15 
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).  However, 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
30 
 
 
the bottom line of Carella——the applicability of harmless error 
to an erroneous jury instruction——remained unchanged. 
¶60 This term, in Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶35, we adopted the 
Neder rule for harmless error.  In that case, we assessed a jury 
instruction in which the court took judicial notice that 
Madison's Penn Park was a "city park" for the purposes of a 
penalty enhancer, and instructed the jury that they must accept 
that fact as true.  Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶10-12.  We held that, 
under Neder, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
properly 
instructed, 
rational 
jury 
would 
have 
found 
the 
defendant in that case guilty of the enhancer even if it had 
been properly instructed that it may, but need not accept the 
judicially noticed fact as true.  Id. at ¶47. 
¶61 The Neder rule is equally appropriate in this case.  
Under the harmless error rule, we must ask if it appears 
"'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained . . . .'"  Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶44 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15-16).  We hold that the 
test is met here. 
¶62 In 
this 
case, 
the 
court 
instructed 
the 
jury, 
"A dangerous weapon is a baseball bat."  This is clearly a 
mandatory conclusive presumption because it requires the jury to 
find that Tomlinson used a "dangerous weapon" for the purpose of 
the sentence enhancer if it first finds the predicate fact that 
he used a baseball bat to commit the homicide.  As a mandatory 
conclusive presumption, the jury instruction is presumed to be 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
31 
 
 
erroneous.  However, we think it is clear, beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, absent the error, any rational jury would have come 
to the same conclusion. 
¶63 To be a "dangerous weapon" an object must be 
any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; any device 
designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or 
great bodily harm; any electric weapon, as defined in 
s. 941.295 (4); or any other device or instrumentality 
which, in the manner it is used or intended to be 
used, is calculated or likely to produce death or 
great bodily harm. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(10).  A baseball bat, when used to strike 
another person, and particularly when used to strike another 
person in the head, would without question qualify as a 
"device . . . which, 
in 
the 
manner 
it 
is 
used . . . is 
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm."  If 
the court had given a proper instruction——that the jury must 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a baseball bat is a 
"dangerous weapon" under this statutory definition——any rational 
jury would have come to the conclusion that it was, and thus 
would have reached an identical verdict to the one it reached in 
this case. 
¶64 We agree that the mandatory conclusive presumption 
given in the jury instructions by the circuit court in this case 
did constitute error.  However, because we are convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error did not play any role in the 
jury's verdict, we hold that the erroneous instruction was 
harmless.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
No. 
00-3134-CR   
 
32 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶65 In conclusion, we agree with the conclusion of the 
circuit court and court of appeals on all three issues.  First, 
the police properly received consent to enter Tomlinson's house, 
and the circuit court properly refused to suppress the evidence 
of the baseball bat and the broom/mop handles.  Second, the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
admitted 
the 
preliminary 
hearing 
testimony of Otis Coleman, and did not violate Tomlinson's right 
to confrontation.  Finally, although we hold that the circuit 
court erred in issuing a mandatory conclusive presumption in its 
jury instructions for the dangerous weapon sentence enhancer, we 
also hold that the error was harmless.  Therefore, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals and uphold Tomlinson's 
conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  00-3134-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶66 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, also 
released today.   
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  00-3134-CR.ssa 
 
1