Title: Bauer v. Wisconsin Energy Corp.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2090 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Claudia B. Bauer , individually and Claudia B. 
Bauer , as Trustee of the Claudia B. Bauer 
Revocable Trust 2010 Restatement, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Energy Corporation d/b/a WE Energies, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Dean Gatziolis , individually, Susan W. 
Gatziolis , individually, Engerman Contracting, 
Inc., Dean Gatziolis , as Trustee of the 
Gatziolis Family Trust and Susan W. Gatziolis , 
as Trustee of the Gatziolis Family Trust, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
From an unpublished summary disposition issued 
January 20, 2021   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 24, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 16, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel Steven Johnson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Stephen E. Kravit, Leila N. Sahar, Gerald S. 
Kerska and Kravit, Hovel & Krawczyk, S.C., Milwaukee. There was 
an oral argument by Stephen E. Kravit. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Miles W. Hartley and Guttormsen & Hartley, LLP, Kenosha.  There 
was an oral argument by Miles W. Hartley. 
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 11 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP2090 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV215) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Claudia B. Bauer, individually and Claudia B. 
Bauer, as Trustee of the Claudia B. Bauer 
Revocable Trust 2010 Restatement, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Energy Corporation d/b/a WE Energies, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Dean Gatziolis, individually, Susan W. 
Gatziolis, individually, Engerman Contracting, 
Inc., Dean Gatziolis, as Trustee of the 
Gatziolis Family Trust and Susan W. Gatziolis, 
as Trustee of the Gatziolis Family Trust, 
 
          Defendants. 
FILED 
 
FEB 24, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   Claudia Bauer seeks the removal 
of a natural-gas line first installed beneath her property over 
41 years ago by a public utility with the permission of the 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
2 
 
property's then-owner, Virginia Garside.  We are asked whether 
Garside's grant of permission ripened into a prescriptive right 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.28(2) (2019-20),1 allowing the public 
utility to continue using the line over Bauer's protests.  We 
conclude that it did. 
¶2 
Under § 893.28(2), a public utility's continuous use 
of another's real property for at least 10 years establishes a 
prescriptive right to continue that use.  This represents a 
marked change from the common-law requirements under which a 
party's use of another's real property became a prescriptive 
right upon:  (1) an adverse use; (2) which is visible, open, and 
notorious; (3) under an open claim of right; and (4) continuous 
for twenty years.  The parties agree that § 893.28(2) displaced 
the common-law adversity requirement and reduced the vesting 
period from 20 to ten years.  They dispute whether that statute 
also abrogated the "visible, open, and notorious" and "under an 
open claim of right" requirements. 
¶3 
We conclude that the public utility here met the 
required continuous use for ten years prior to Bauer's purchase 
of the property, notwithstanding periodic repairs during that 
period.  We further conclude that § 893.28(2) necessarily 
abrogated the claim-of-right requirement when it removed the 
adversity requirement.  We do not reach, however, whether that 
                                                 
1 This statute has remained unchanged in all relevant 
respects during the applicable time period and up through the 
current version of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Therefore, all 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
current 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
3 
 
statute still requires a visible, open, and notorious use 
because, regardless of the answer, Garside's actual knowledge of 
the gas line in this case would satisfy that requirement.  
Accordingly, under § 893.28(2) the public utility's prescriptive 
right to continue using the gas line vested prior to Bauer's 
purchase of the property, and her claims against the public 
utility were properly dismissed. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In July 1980, beneath a property along Geneva Lake 
then owned by Virginia Garside, the Wisconsin Energy Corporation 
(WEC) installed a single half-inch diameter, plastic natural-gas 
pipe line.2  WEC installed the line with Garside's written 
permission "to cross [her] property . . . to put a gas line into 
the [neighboring home]," now owned by the Gatziolis family.  Of 
the roughly 285-foot line, 135.49 feet crosses underneath the 
Garside property. 
¶5 
WEC periodically serviced the gas line.  Service 
records show that in 1984 WEC "relocated" the gas line "due to 
customer requests."  "Relocation," WEC's representative averred, 
does not necessarily mean the line was moved but could also mean 
that a broken portion was replaced by splicing in a new piece of 
pipe.  In 1988, WEC replaced 84 feet of the line by splicing new 
pipe of the same diameter and material into the existing line.  
In 1989, WEC again "relocated" the gas line "due to customer 
                                                 
2 The gas line was installed by the Wisconsin Southern Gas 
Company, which later merged with the Wisconsin Natural Gas 
Company, which in turn merged with WEC.  This opinion will 
simply refer to these companies collectively as WEC. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
4 
 
requests."  Throughout each of these maintenance efforts, the 
line continued its existing gas service to the neighboring home. 
¶6 
In 1996, Claudia Bauer purchased the Garside property 
with 
no 
actual 
knowledge 
of 
the 
underground 
gas 
line's 
existence.  She first learned of the line in 2014 when WEC 
contacted her about acquiring an easement to upgrade the gas 
line's diameter by a half-inch to better service the neighboring 
Gatziolises' planned home reconstruction.  Bauer declined to 
grant the larger easement, which ultimately proved unnecessary 
after WEC determined that the existing line could adequately 
serve the Gatziolises' larger home. 
¶7 
Nevertheless, 
Bauer 
sued 
WEC 
as 
well 
as 
the 
Gatziolises and their contractor.3  Relevant to this appeal, 
Bauer sought a declaration that WEC lacked an easement to 
continue operating the gas line under her property and brought 
trespass and ejectment claims against WEC.4  WEC counterclaimed 
for its own declaration that it had obtained a prescriptive 
right to continue using the gas line pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.28(2).  The circuit court agreed with WEC and granted it 
summary judgment, declaring that WEC had acquired a prescriptive 
                                                 
3 Bauer also sued her title insurance company, who was later 
dismissed from the suit by stipulation of the parties. 
4 Bauer's 
claims 
against 
the 
Gatziolises 
and 
their 
contractor are not before this court. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
5 
 
easement5 
across 
Bauer's 
property 
under 
§ 893.28(2) 
and 
dismissing the trespass and ejectment claims.6 
¶8 
Nearly eight months later, Bauer asked the circuit 
court to reconsider its summary-judgment decision.  Her brief in 
support of reconsideration argued only that the circuit court's 
order 
failed 
to 
account 
for 
her 
previously 
unalleged 
constitutional rights to either just compensation for the taking 
of property or a court-made remedy to cure all alleged injuries 
or wrongs against her.  Then, in her reply brief, Bauer raised 
for the first time an argument that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because, based on a "re-review" of WEC's summary-
judgment submissions, there existed a genuine dispute regarding 
the effect of the 1984 and 1989 "relocations" and the 1988 pipe 
replacement on the continuousness of WEC's use of the gas line. 
¶9 
Ten days after filing her reply brief, on the eve of 
the reconsideration hearing, Bauer filed a declaration with two 
exhibits, both of which were photos that she maintained showed 
two separate gas lines at "two different," but unspecified, 
locations exposed when she excavated her property.  She argued 
these images created an additional genuine dispute over the 
existence of two separate gas lines beneath her property.  The 
circuit court denied Bauer's reconsideration motion, concluding 
                                                 
5 This 
opinion 
uses 
"prescriptive 
easement" 
and 
"prescriptive right" interchangeably.  See, e.g., Garza v. Am. 
Transm. Co. LLC, 2017 WI 35, ¶23, 374 Wis. 2d 555, 893 N.W.2d 1 
("An easement grants a right to use another's land."). 
6 The Honorable Daniel Steven Johnson of the Walworth County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
6 
 
that Bauer neither presented newly discovered evidence nor 
established any manifest error. 
¶10 On appeal, the court of appeals summarily affirmed 
both the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
WEC and its order denying Bauer's reconsideration motion.  Bauer 
v. Wis. Energy Corp., 2019AP2090, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jan. 20, 2021).  We granted Bauer's petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 This case requires that we review the appropriateness 
of 
summary 
judgment 
and 
reconsideration, 
which 
includes 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.28(2).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); see Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2021 
WI 43, ¶9, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305.  We review a summary-
judgment decision de novo, using this same methodology.  See 
Stroede, 397 Wis. 2d 17, ¶9.  As for reconsideration, we review 
a circuit court's denial of reconsideration for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion, meaning that we affirm the circuit 
court's decision unless it "fails to examine the relevant facts, 
applies the wrong legal standard, or does not employ a 
demonstrated rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion."  
See Borreson v. Yunto, 2006 WI App 63, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d 231, 713 
N.W.2d 656.  Finally, statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law that we review de novo.  See Stroede, 397 
Wis. 2d 17, ¶9. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
7 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶12 When reviewing summary judgment, we generally first 
define the applicable law and then decide if a genuine dispute 
exists as to any fact material to the law's application.  But 
here, Bauer asked to expand the summary-judgment record via her 
motion to reconsider, so we must start there to define the 
appropriate scope of the record on review. 
A.  Reconsideration 
¶13 In our first review of the merits of a circuit court's 
reconsideration decision, we agree with the approach developed 
by the court of appeals.  As that court has explained, a circuit 
court possesses inherent discretion to entertain motions to 
reconsider "nonfinal" pre-trial rulings.7  See, e.g., Fritsche v. 
Ford Motor Credit Co., 171 Wis. 2d 280, 294-95, 491 N.W.2d 119 
(Ct. App. 1992).  To succeed, a reconsideration movant must 
either present "newly discovered evidence or establish a 
manifest error of law or fact."  Koepsell's Olde Popcorn Wagons, 
Inc. 
v. 
Koepsell's 
Festival 
Popcorn 
Wagons, 
Ltd., 
2004 
WI App 129, ¶44, 275 Wis. 2d 397, 685 N.W.2d 853 (citing Oto v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
¶14 Newly discovered evidence is not "new evidence that 
could have been introduced at the original summary judgment 
phase."  Id., ¶46.  Similarly, a "manifest error" must be more 
                                                 
7 When Bauer moved for reconsideration, the summary-judgment 
ruling was not final as it lacked the required "THIS JUDGMENT IS 
FINAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF APPEAL" statement.  See Wambolt v. W. 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 35, ¶44, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 
N.W.2d 670. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
8 
 
than disappointment or umbrage with the ruling; it requires a 
heightened showing of "wholesale disregard, misapplication, or 
failure to recognize controlling precedent."  Id., ¶44 (quoting 
Oto, 224 F.3d at 606).  Simply stated, "a motion for 
reconsideration is not a vehicle for making new arguments or 
submitting new evidentiary materials [that could have been 
submitted earlier] after the court has decided a motion for 
summary judgment."  Lynch v. Crossroads Counseling Ctr., 
Inc., 2004 WI App 114, ¶23, 275 Wis. 2d 171, 684 N.W.2d 141. 
¶15 Yet Bauer's reconsideration motion did just that, 
according to the circuit court.  Her motion raised three 
previously 
unalleged 
grounds. 
 
Two 
grounds 
were 
new 
constitutional claims.  The third ground was a claimed factual 
dispute over WEC's continuous use of the gas line based on her 
"re-review" of the service records and the alleged newly 
discovered evidence——two photos of uncovered utility lines at 
"two different locations" on her property.  The circuit court 
denied reconsideration, reasoning that: 
 No manifest error existed as to the constitutional claims 
because Bauer had an imperfect-title remedy and lacked 
standing to raise a taking claim as the prescriptive 
right vested before she owned the property; 
 Photos of additional pipe beneath the Bauer property were 
not newly discovered because the service records in the 
original summary-judgment record had always indicated 
that new piping was spliced into the original line to 
repair it, leaving the inactive pipe in the ground; and 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
9 
 
 Even if they were newly discovered, the dispute they 
raised was immaterial as no evidence suggested that the 
additional piping was anything more than reasonable 
maintenance of a single gas line permitted under the 
original 1980 grant of permission. 
¶16 We see no error in the circuit court's rationale that 
would justify reversal.  Applying the law set forth above to the 
relevant facts before it, the circuit court reasonably concluded 
that 
Bauer 
lacked 
necessary 
factual 
predicates 
on 
both 
constitutional claims and offered no newly discovered evidence 
warranting reconsideration.  See Borreson, 292 Wis. 2d 231, ¶6.  
Because the circuit court permissibly declined to accept 
additional 
evidence 
and 
legal 
arguments 
via 
Bauer's 
reconsideration motion, we disregard that material in reviewing 
the underlying summary-judgment decision.8  See Clark v. League 
of Wis. Muns. Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 WI App 21, ¶19 n.8, 397 
Wis. 2d 220, 959 N.W.2d 648. 
B.  Summary Judgment 
¶17 We begin our review of summary judgment with the legal 
requirements to obtain a prescriptive easement, both at common 
law and as legislatively codified.  We then assess whether any 
                                                 
8 For this reason, Bauer's third issue presented regarding 
her constitutional right to a judge-made remedy under Article I, 
Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution is not properly before 
us.  Even if it were, our conclusion that WEC acquired the 
prescriptive right prior to Bauer purchasing the property means 
that she never possessed the right she claimed was injured and 
that the "wrong" for which she seeks a remedy was committed not 
by WEC but by Garside, who conveyed imperfect title. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
10 
 
genuine disputes exist as to the facts material to WEC's claimed 
prescriptive right that would render summary judgment improper. 
1.  Prescriptive rights 
¶18 At common law, a party acquired a prescriptive right 
in another's real property upon:  (1) an adverse use hostile and 
inconsistent with the exercise of the titleholder's rights; 
(2) which was visible, open, and notorious; (3) under an open 
claim of right; and (4) was continuous and uninterrupted for 
twenty years.  See, e.g., Ludke v. Egan, 87 Wis. 2d 221, 230, 
274 N.W.2d 641 (1979).  With respect to public utilities such as 
WEC,9 the legislature supplanted the common law with Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.28(2).  See § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  Under 
§ 893.28(2), a public utility "establishes the prescriptive 
right to continue [its] use" of rights in another's real 
property upon "[c]ontinuous use of [those] rights . . . for at 
least 10 years." 
¶19 Both the common law and § 893.28(2) require that the 
use be "continuous" for a set period.  But the statutory text 
diverges from the common-law elements in three significant ways.  
First, the statute omits any mention of the use being "adverse" 
or 
"hostile 
and 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
exercise 
of 
the 
titleholder's rights."  The parties agree the statute omits that 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.28(2) applies to, in addition to 
certain 
utility 
cooperatives, 
all 
"domestic 
corporation[s] 
organized to furnish telegraph or telecommunications service or 
transmit heat, power or electric current to the public or for 
public purposes."  There is no dispute that WEC is such a 
corporation, which also falls under the statutory definition of 
"public utility."  See Wis. Stat. § 196.01(5). 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
11 
 
language so as to allow permissive uses, such as licenses, to 
ripen 
into 
prescriptive 
rights. 
 
See 
Williams 
v. 
Am. 
Transmission Co., LLC, 2007 WI App 246, ¶¶9-15, 306 Wis. 2d 181, 
742 N.W.2d 882.  Second and also undisputed, the statutory 
vesting period is reduced from 20 to ten years.  Finally, 
§ 893.28(2) contains no mention of the use being either 
"visible, open, and notorious" or "under an open claim of 
right." 
¶20 The parties dispute the meaning of the legislature's 
omission.  WEC urges that the omission demonstrates legislative 
elimination of these two requirements.  Bauer counters that the 
legislature would need to be more "clear, unambiguous, and 
peremptory" than mere silence to abrogate those common-law 
requirements.  See, e.g., United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2021 
WI 44, ¶15, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317.  Alternatively, WEC 
suggests that those two requirements are mere subparts of the 
"adversity" element, such that when the legislature eliminated 
the 
adversity 
element 
it 
simultaneously 
eliminated 
both 
"visible, open and notorious" and "under an open claim of 
right."  Bauer responds that these requirements are all 
conceptually distinct. 
¶21 With 
respect 
to 
the 
claim-of-right 
requirement, 
context makes clear that § 893.28(2) necessarily abrogated it 
along with the adversity element.  As Bauer concedes, the 
legislature drafted § 893.28(2) to allow a permissive use to 
ripen 
into 
a 
prescriptive 
right. 
 
See 
Williams, 
306 
Wis. 2d 181, ¶¶9-15.  But "an open claim of right" is the exact 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
12 
 
opposite of a permissive use.  See Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 231 
(evidence of express permission rebuts the claim-of-right 
presumption).  The legislature, then, necessarily had to remove 
both the adversity and claim-of-right requirements to allow a 
permissive use to ripen into a prescriptive right.  This 
conclusion makes sense in light of the common view that a claim 
of right is a subpart of the larger adversity requirement.  See, 
e.g., Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 797 S.E.2d 387, 392 
(S.C. 2016); 28A C.J.S. Easements § 43; John W. Bruce & James W. 
Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land § 5:8. 
¶22 The same cannot be said about the visible, open, and 
notorious 
requirement. 
 
Such 
a 
use 
is 
not 
inherently 
inconsistent with a permissive license.  That said, we need not 
and do not address whether § 893.28(2) still requires a visible, 
open, and notorious use because, as explained below, regardless 
of how we might answer that question our ultimate conclusion in 
this case remains the same.  See, e.g., Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. 
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15. 
2.  WEC's claimed prescriptive right 
¶23 We assume without deciding that Wis. Stat. § 893.28(2) 
still requires a public utility's use be visible, open, and 
notorious.  Therefore, at issue here is whether WEC's use after 
the 1980 grant of permission was:  (1) continuous for a period 
of ten years; and (2) visible, open and notorious.  We conclude 
that WEC's use met both conditions prior to Bauer's purchase of 
the property. 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
13 
 
¶24 A continuous use is one that is neither voluntarily 
abandoned by the party claiming a prescriptive right nor 
interrupted by an act of the landowner or a third party.  See 
Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Merch. Corp., 4 Wis. 2d 327, 335, 
90 N.W.2d 777 (1958); see also 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and 
Licenses § 51.  Whether a use is abandoned or interrupted will 
"depend[] on the nature and the character of the right claimed."  
Shellow v. Hagen, 9 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 101 N.W.2d 694 (1960).  A 
use remains continuous even when the user takes measures 
reasonably necessary to maintain or improve the use, so long as 
those measures are not inconsistent with the use's original 
nature and character nor more burdensome on the landowner.  See 
Garza v. Am. Transm. Co. LLC, 2017 WI 35, ¶29, 374 Wis. 2d 555, 
893 N.W.2d 1; Bino v. City of Hurley, 14 Wis. 2d 101, 106, 109 
N.W.2d 544 (1961). 
¶25 Here, the nature and character of WEC's claimed right 
is to provide gas service to a neighboring home via an 
underground plastic pipe.  That use began in July 1980 and WEC 
contends it continued uninterrupted through July 1990, at which 
point it ripened into a prescriptive right.  Bauer counters that 
a genuine dispute exists as to whether WEC's periodic repairs to 
the line disrupted its continuous use.  According to Bauer, 
those repairs restarted the ten-year vesting period, so WEC's 
prescriptive right could not vest until after she purchased the 
property in 1996. 
¶26 Bauer's argument misses the mark.  The evidence 
reveals that WEC's replacement and "relocat[ion]" of the line 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
14 
 
meant it repaired the line by splicing in a new piece of pipe to 
the original one.  No evidence suggests that the character of 
the use——supplying gas along a single conduit——ever changed.  
Nor did these repairs increase the burden on the landowner; any 
land rendered unbuildable by the original line merely remained 
so.  Accordingly, nothing in the record creates a genuine 
dispute that WEC's actions constituted anything other than 
reasonable maintenance on the line to continue its initial 
purpose.  To the contrary, these activities manifest an ongoing 
desire to continue the use rather than interruption or voluntary 
abandonment.10 
 
As 
such, 
this 
record 
supports 
only 
one 
conclusion:  WEC's 
use 
was 
continuous 
for 
ten 
years 
by 
July 1990. 
¶27 That 
leaves 
the 
"visible, 
open, 
and 
notorious" 
requirement.  A visible, open, and notorious use is one that 
would put a reasonably diligent landowner on notice of the use.  
See Kurz v. Miller, 89 Wis. 426, 433-34, 62 N.W. 182 (1895).  
The requirement's role is to give the landowner "knowledge and 
[an] opportunity to assert his or her rights."  25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and Licenses § 42.  Consistent with that objective, 
actual knowledge of the use satisfies this requirement.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.17 (2000); 28A 
                                                 
10 Moreover, if repairs disrupted a continuous use, then 
public utilities would face an unreasonable dilemma whereby 
honoring their legal obligations to repair and maintain a line 
could mean they risk altogether losing the right to continue 
servicing 
customers 
via 
that 
line. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 182.0175(2m)(c) 
& 
196.745(1)(a); 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ PSC 135.012 (December 2018). 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
15 
 
C.J.S. Easements § 33; Bruce & Ely, Jr., supra § 5:13.  Bauer 
does not dispute her predecessor's actual knowledge of WEC's 
use, evidenced by the written permission Garside granted WEC.  
So, here too, the record permits one conclusion:  WEC's use was 
visible, open, and notorious to Garside. 
¶28 Absent a genuine dispute over WEC's continuous use 
from July 1980 through July 1990 or Garside's actual knowledge 
of that use, we conclude that summary judgment is appropriate.  
We therefore affirm the circuit court's declaration that WEC 
acquired a prescriptive right across the Garside property to 
deliver natural gas to the neighboring home before Bauer owned 
the property.  And because Bauer purchased the property subject 
to WEC's vested right, we further affirm the dismissal of her 
trespass and ejectment claims against WEC. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We affirm both the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment in WEC's favor and its denial of reconsideration. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2019AP2090 
 
 
 
1