Title: Hoff v. Goyer

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 08/17/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
____________________
1111078
____________________
Eliot Hoff
v.
Anita Kidd Goyer
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-11-1936)
STUART, Justice.
Eliot Hoff ("Hoff") appeals the order of the Jefferson
Circuit 
Court 
("the 
circuit 
court") 
remanding 
the
administration of the conservatorship of his grandmother,
1111078
Susan Bibb Kidd, to the Jefferson Probate Court ("the probate
court").  We affirm.
I.
On August 30, 2006, the probate court adjudged Kidd to be
an incapacitated person and appointed Mark Goolsby as
conservator of her estate.   The estate of Susan Bibb Kidd, a
1
protected person, was thereby assigned probate-court case no.
192761.  Sometime in August 2008, Goolsby sold some personal
property in Kidd's estate to Anita Kidd Goyer, one of Kidd's
three daughters.  When another of Kidd's daughters, Susan
Louis Hoff, and her son Hoff (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the Hoffs") found out about the sale, they
Documents in the record indicate that Mary Bibb Miller,
1
one of Kidd's three daughters, was at some point appointed her
guardian and that attorney Robert W. Gwin served for some time
as guardian ad litem; however, the dates and details of those
appointments are not found in the record.  See Comments on §
26-2A-1, Ala. Code 1975 ("[T]his chapter recognizes two
fiduciary capacities -- i.e., a 'guardian' who is 'of the
person' and analogous to the role of the parent, and a
'conservator' who is 'of the property' and more closely
analogous to the role of a trustee.  Historically, in many
states, including Alabama, the term 'guardian' covered 
both of
these capacities and for that reason has been a source of
confusion not only as to the capacity of the fiduciary, but
also as to his or her duties and responsibilities.  Because
this chapter distinguishes between the two capacities, the
duties and responsibilities may be separated by two
appointments or one person may serve in both capacities (and
with both titles) as the circumstances seem to dictate.").
2
1111078
filed an objection in the probate court.  Meanwhile, on
September 29, 2009, Kidd died.
On February 21, 2011, the probate court issued an order
that, among other things, approved the August 2008 sale of
Kidd's personal property to Goyer.  The Hoffs promptly moved
the probate court to reconsider.  An initial hearing on their
motion was held on June 8, 2011; however, the matter was
subsequently continued and another hearing scheduled for
September 15, 2011.  
On June 24, 2011, Goolsby petitioned the probate court to
be appointed administrator of Kidd's estate because he could
not conduct business as conservator after her death.  The
Hoffs thereafter also filed a motion to continue the hearing
scheduled for September 15, 2011.  On August 22, 2011, the
probate court ruled on those motions, setting the hearing on
the Hoffs' motion to reconsider for October 27, 2011, and
denying Goolsby's motion to be appointed administrator of
Kidd's estate.  Instead, the probate court, on its own motion,
appointed 
attorney 
Elizabeth 
W. 
McElroy, the 
general
administrator 
for 
Jefferson 
County, 
as 
administrator 
of 
Kidd's
3
1111078
estate.  The estate of Susan Bibb Kidd, deceased, was thereby
opened and assigned case no. 212938 in the probate court.
On October 20, 2011 –– one week before the probate court
was scheduled to conduct a hearing on the Hoffs' motion to
reconsider its February 21 ruling approving Goolsby's sale to
Goyer of certain personal property belonging to Kidd  –– the
Hoffs petitioned the circuit court to remove case no. 192761,
the conservatorship proceeding, from the probate court.   That
2
petition stated in pertinent part:
"Comes now, Eliot Hoff and Susan Hoff, pursuant
to Ala. Code [1975,] § 12-11-41, and petition[] the
Court for an Order removing the administration of
the Estate of Susan Bibb Kidd, a protected person,
now deceased, from the Probate Court of Jefferson
County, Alabama to the Circuit Court of Jefferson
County, Alabama, with the attached will.
"....
"As grounds for said petition, Eliot Hoff and
Susan Hoff, state the following:
The Hoffs had been represented by attorney William F.
2
Prosch, Jr., in connection with their motion asking the
probate court to reconsider its February 21, 2011, order;
however, they filed their petition for removal and have
engaged in all subsequent proceedings including this appeal 
pro se.  Prosch, in fact, filed a response in the circuit
court stating that he has never advised the Hoffs in
connection with the petition for removal and did not even
become aware of it until after it had already been ruled upon.
4
1111078
"(1) In case no. 192761, in the matter of
the Estate of Susan Bibb Kidd, a protected
person, now deceased:
"(a) No final settlement of the
estate has been made and no steps
have been taken for a settlement
in the probate court.
"(b) In the opinion of your
petitioners the estate can be
better administrated in circuit
court than in probate court.
"(c) This case is removable from
the Probate Court of Jefferson
County, Alabama pursuant to ... §
12-11-41[, Ala. Code 1975,] upon
this petition because ... Eliot
Hoff and Susan Hoff, are the
respective daughter and grandson,
heirs and legatees of said Susan
Bibb Kidd, and as such have an
interest in the administration of
said estate.
"....
"For the foregoing reasons, petitioners pray
that case no. 192761, in the Probate Court of
Jefferson County, Alabama be removed to this court
pursuant to ... § 12-11-41."
On October 25, 2011, the circuit court entered an order
removing the conservatorship proceeding from the probate
court.
5
1111078
The judge initially assigned to preside over this case in
the circuit court subsequently recused himself, and the judge
thereafter assigned to the case scheduled an initial status
conference for February 3, 2012.  On February 2, 2012, Goyer
moved the circuit court to remand the conservatorship
proceeding to the probate court, arguing that removal of a
conservatorship proceeding from a probate court to a circuit
court in Jefferson County was governed by § 26-2-3, Ala. Code
1975, not by § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, as the Hoffs had
alleged in their petition seeking removal and that the Hoffs
had not established that they were entitled to removal under
§ 26-2-3.  At the status conference held the next day, the
circuit court set a hearing on Goyer's motion to remand for
February 23, 2012.
On February 16, 2012, the Hoffs filed their response
opposing Goyer's motion and seeking sanctions against her and
her 
attorney 
pursuant 
to 
the 
Alabama 
Litigation 
Accountability
Act, § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the ALAA"),
because, the Hoffs alleged, the motion to remand lacked any
legal or factual basis.  The circuit court considered all
pending motions at the hearing held February 23, 2012, and, on
6
1111078
March 2, 2012, entered an order remanding the conservatorship
proceeding to the probate court and denying the Hoffs' motion
for sanctions.  On March 20, 2012, Hoff filed his notice of
appeal.3
II.
Hoff argues that the circuit court erred both in
remanding the conservatorship proceeding to the probate court
and in denying his motion for sanctions.  Hoff's argument that
the circuit court erred in remanding the conservatorship
proceeding presents, essentially, a question of statutory
interpretation; no relevant facts are in dispute, and we must
determine which of the cited statutes –– § 12-11-41 or § 26-2-
3 –– governs the removal of this conservatorship proceeding
from the probate court to the circuit court.  Accordingly, we
review the circuit court's decision pursuant to the de novo
standard of review.  See Pitts v. Gangi, 896 So. 2d 433, 434
(Ala. 2004) ("We review questions of statutory construction
and interpretation de novo, giving no deference to the trial
court's conclusions.  Greene v. Thompson, 554 So. 2d 376 (Ala.
1989).").  
This appeal was originally filed in the Court of Civil
3
Appeals; it was transferred to this Court on May 4, 2012.
7
1111078
We set forth the standard of review applicable to Hoff's
argument that the circuit court erred in denying his motion
for sanctions pursuant to the ALAA as follows in Ex parte Loma
Alta Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 52 So. 3d 518, 523-24 (Ala.
2010):
"If a court denies a claim for attorney fees under
the ALAA after holding a hearing on that claim, and
the party seeking attorney fees appeals that denial
arguing that the subject action, claim, defense, or
appeal was frivolous, groundless in fact, vexatious,
or interposed for an improper purpose, the appellate
standard of review is equivalent to the ore tenus
standard of review. ...  If a court denies a claim
for attorney fees under the ALAA after holding a
hearing on that claim, and the party seeking
attorney fees appeals that denial arguing that the
subject action, claim, defense, or appeal was
groundless in law, the appellate standard of review
is de novo ...."
(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
III.
We first consider Hoff's argument that the circuit court
erred in remanding this conservatorship proceeding to the
probate court.  Citing Rules 12 and 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., Hoff
first makes the procedural argument that Goyer's motion to
remand was untimely.  However, Goyer's motion to remand was
not made pursuant to Rule 12 or Rule 59, and the time limits
set forth in those rules do not apply to a motion to remand
8
1111078
such as Goyer's.  Moreover, we note that in her motion to
remand Goyer argued that the Hoffs lacked standing to seek the
removal of the conservatorship proceeding in the first place,
and this Court has stated that issues of standing may not be
waived and may be raised at any time in a proceeding.  State
v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Ala.
1999).  Hoff's argument that Goyer's motion to remand was
untimely is without merit.
We therefore turn to the gravamen of Hoff's argument on
appeal –– that it is undisputed both that Kidd was deceased at
the time Hoff and his mother filed their petition to remove
the conservatorship proceeding to the circuit court and that
an administrator had been appointed over Kidd's estate;
accordingly, he argues, § 12-11-41 was the only mechanism by
which to remove the conservatorship proceeding to the circuit
court because § 12-11-41 contemplates the removal of a
deceased person's estate, while § 26-2-3 contemplates the
removal of a living person's estate.  On a literal level,
Hoff's argument is partially correct –– § 12-11-41 does
concern the removal of the administration of an estate opened
by a probate court after a person dies, and § 26-2-3 does
9
1111078
concern the removal of the administration of an estate opened
for a living, though incapacitated, person.  However, because
these statutes contemplate different kinds of estates –– a
decedent's estate as opposed to a conservatorship or
guardianship –– Hoff's argument ultimately fails.
The Hoffs' petition for removal explicitly stated that it
was being made pursuant to § 12-11-41, which provides as
follows:
"The administration of 
any 
estate 
may 
be 
removed
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, without assigning any special
equity; and an order of removal must be made by the
court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such
estate can be better administered in the circuit
court than in the probate court."
Hoff and his mother further attempted to fulfill the terms of
the statute by attaching Kidd's will to their petition,
declaring themselves to be Kidd's heirs and legatees, and
stating their opinion that Kidd's estate could better be
administered in the circuit court than in the probate court. 
10
1111078
This petition would accordingly have been sufficient to
require the removal to the circuit court of proceedings
related to the administration of a decedent's estate, that is,
the case opened by a probate court after an individual dies. 
The probate court had, in fact, opened such an estate on
August 22, 2011, when it appointed McElroy as administrator of
Kidd's estate and assigned the administration of her estate
case no. 212938.  However, Hoff and his mother did not
petition for the removal of case no. 212938 to the circuit
court; rather, they filed their petition in case no. 192761
and explicitly stated therein that they sought the removal of
case no. 192761 –– the case opened when Kidd was initially
found to be an incapacitated person and a conservator was
appointed for her estate.  
4
Because case no. 192761 involves a conservatorship in
Jefferson County, a "county where the judge of probate is
A transcript of the February 23, 2012, hearing is not in
4
the record; however, Hoff appears to argue for the first time
in his reply brief that there is no evidence indicating that
case no. 212938 actually exists.  Regardless of whether this
issue was raised in the circuit court, however, "we will not
consider an issue not raised in an appellant's initial brief,
but raised only in its reply brief."  Brown v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 899 So. 2d 227, 234 (Ala. 2004).
11
1111078
required to be learned in the law," its removal is governed by
§ 26-2-3, which provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) In any county where the judge of probate is
required 
to 
be 
learned 
in 
the 
law, 
the
administration or conduct of any guardianship or
conservatorship of a minor or incapacitated person
may be removed from the probate court to the circuit
court pursuant to Section 26-2-2 at any time before
a proceeding for final settlement thereof is
commenced in probate court by the guardian or
conservator of the guardianship or conservatorship
or guardian ad litem or next friend of a ward or
anyone entitled to support out of the estate of the
ward without assigning any special equity.  The
circuit court shall remand the administration of a
guardianship 
or 
conservatorship 
transferred 
pursuant
to this section to the probate court if the circuit
court finds that the removal was sought for the
purpose of improper delay or did not comply with
applicable law."5
Despite the clear terms of § 26-2-3 indicating that it applies
to "the administration or conduct of any guardianship or
conservatorship," Hoff nevertheless argues that § 12-11-41
applies in this case because Kidd was deceased when he and his
Section 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides that an order
5
of removal will be issued
"upon the filing of a sworn petition by any such
guardian or conservator or guardian ad litem or next
friend for the ward or such person entitled to
support out of the estate of such ward, reciting in
what capacity the petitioner acts and that in the
opinion of the petitioner such guardianship or
conservatorship can be better administered in the
circuit court than in the probate court."
12
1111078
mother filed the petition for removal of the conservatorship
proceeding.  Although Hoff refutes this characterization of
his argument, it appears to be his position that the
proceeding 
governing 
the 
administration 
of 
the 
conservatorship
(case no. 192761) automatically expanded to include the
administration of Kidd's post-death estate either upon her
death or upon the appointment of McElroy as administrator of
her post-death estate.  The circuit court responded to this
argument in its order remanding the case to the probate court
as follows:
"Eliot Hoff and Susan Louis Hoff assert that
because the protected person, Susan Bibb Kidd, is
now deceased, Title 26 of the Alabama Code [1975],
including Alabama Code [1975,] § 26-2-3, does not
apply to this matter, and instead the only
applicable statute is Alabama Code [1975,] §
12-11-41, which pertains to decedents' estate. 
Although it is undisputed that Susan Bibb Kidd died
on or about September 29, 2009, this proceeding
relates to her conservatorship estate –– the Estate
of Susan Bibb Kidd, a protected person, which was
administered in the Probate Court of Jefferson
County as case number 192761 and not to a decedent's
estate administration.  The court notes that there
is a separate decedent's estate administration which
is 
being 
administered 
concurrently 
with 
the
conservatorship estate:  on August 22, 2011, the
Probate 
Court 
of 
Jefferson 
County 
appointed
Elizabeth 
W. 
McElroy, 
Esq., 
to 
serve 
as
administrator with the will annexed of the Estate of
Susan Bibb Kidd, deceased.  The decedent's estate
administration is a separate proceeding, case number
13
1111078
212938 in the Probate Court of Jefferson County. 
The Hoffs contend that under Alabama law, a
conservatorship 
or 
guardianship 
cannot 
exist
concurrently with a decedent's estate for the same
person.  This is simply a misunderstanding of
Alabama law.  While the authority of a conservator
may indeed cease upon the death of the protected
person or ward, a conservatorship estate remains
open until final settlement thereof.  See Alabama
Code [1975,] § 26–5-7.  The administration of the
decedent's estate of the formerly protected person
may be commenced separately, and, indeed, Alabama
Code [1975,] § 26-5-12, contemplates that the
personal 
representative 
of 
a 
deceased 
ward's
decedent's estate may be involved as a consenting
party in the settlement of a deceased ward's
conservatorship estate.  There is no provision in
the Alabama Code requiring final settlement of a
conservatorship 
prior 
to 
commencement 
of 
a
decedent's estate administration."
We agree with the rationale of the circuit court.  The
administration of a protected person's estate is not closed
until there is a final settlement as described in § 26-5-1 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975; it does not automatically terminate upon
the protected person's death or even when an administrator is
appointed for that person's post-death estate.  See, e.g.,
Smith v. Smith, 248 Ala. 49, 51, 26 So. 2d 571, 571 (1946)
("The ward is dead and it only remains for the guardian to
undertake his statutory duty of making a final settlement of
his 
guardianship."). 
 
Moreover, 
§ 
26-5-12 
expressly
contemplates the simultaneous existence of a conservator ––
14
1111078
who would administer a protected person's estate while the
person was living –– and an administrator or personal
representative –– who would administer that same protected
person's post-death estate following the representative's
appointment by the probate court after the protected person's
death.  
We further reject Hoff's argument that the administration
of a post-death estate must be conducted within the confines
of a preexisting case involving a conservatorship if, in fact,
such a conservatorship exists, because, he argues, the
administration of an estate is "a single and continuous
proceeding" and there cannot be two cases involving the estate
of the same person.  Hoff cites Allen v. Estate of Juddine, 60
So. 3d 852, 855 (Ala. 2011), for this proposition.  Hoff's
reliance upon Allen, however, is misplaced.  In Allen, this
Court reversed a circuit court's judgment holding that it
could preside over certain aspects of the administration of a
post-death estate while a probate court was presiding over
other matters related to the same post-death 
estate, 
including
the probate of the decedent's will, stating:
"In its March 11, 2010, order, the circuit court
stated that its administration of the estate and the
15
1111078
probate of the will were 'two totally different
matters,' noting the exclusive authority of the
probate court to initiate the administration of an
estate, citing Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d 1374, 1376
(Ala. 1993) ('The circuit court cannot initiate the
administration of an estate, because the initiation
of administration is a matter exclusively in the
jurisdiction of the probate court.').  However, this
Court has explained:
"'[T]he administration and settlement of a
decedent's estate in equity is a single and
continuous 
proceeding; 
and 
when 
the
administration of an estate is once removed
from the probate court into a court of
equity, its jurisdiction becomes exclusive
and efficient, and the court must operate
to a final settlement governed by its own
procedure.'
"Hinson v. Naugher, 207 Ala. 592, 593, 93 So. 560,
561 (1922) (emphasis added).  See also Ex parte
Farley, 981 So. 2d 392, 396 (Ala. 2007) ('"[T]he
administration and settlement of a decedent's estate
is a single and continuous proceeding throughout,
and 
there 
can 
be 
no 
splitting 
up 
of 
such
administration, any more than any other cause of
action ...."'  (quoting McKeithen v. Rich, 204 Ala.
588, 589, 86 So. 377, 378 (1920)(emphasis added))).
...
"The administration of the estate was initiated
by 
the 
probate 
court 
when 
it 
granted 
[the
administrator] letters of administration.  See
Smith, 619 So. 2d at 1376 ('[T]he mere filing of a
petition for the administration of an estate does
not in itself begin the administration; rather, the
probate court must act upon the petition and thereby
activate the proceedings, which may thereafter be
subject to removal to the circuit court.').  The
administration of the estate was properly removed to
the circuit court on December 28, 2009.  The
16
1111078
administration of the estate was a single and
continuous proceeding over which the circuit court
had exclusive jurisdiction, and the probate of [the
decedent's] will could not be split from the action. 
See Hinson and Farley, supra.  The circuit court,
therefore, erred in refusing to probate [the
decedent's] will."
60 So. 3d at 855-56.  Hoff's reliance upon Allen and the cases
cited therein is misplaced because those cases 
clearly 
concern
only post-death estates; they do not involve living estates
like conservatorships.  There is no dispute but that the
administration of a post-death estate is a single and
continuous proceeding that cannot be split between separate
courts; however, the present appeal involves not just a post-
death estate, but a post-death estate and a conservatorship. 
The administration of these two estates involves different
proceedings governed by different sections of the Alabama
Code, and the probate court organized those proceedings into
two separate cases.  Accordingly, the remand of the
conservatorship proceeding created no conflict with Allen.
Hoff next argues that, even if he should have sought
removal under § 26-2-3 instead of § 12-11-41, his petition for
removal should nevertheless have been granted because, he
argues, his petition met the requirements of that statute as
17
1111078
well.  We disagree.  Section 26-2-3 permits a "guardian or
conservator ... or guardian ad litem or next friend ... or
anyone entitled to support out of the estate of [the protected
person]" to file a petition to remove the conservatorship
proceeding for that protected person from the probate court to
the circuit court.  It is undisputed that Hoff was not Kidd's
guardian, conservator, or guardian ad litem; nor is there any
allegation that he was entitled to support out of her estate
while she was alive.  
However, even though Hoff did not allege himself to be
Kidd's next friend in his petition for removal, he argues that
his blood relationship to her qualifies him as a next friend
with standing to seek removal under §§ 26-2-2 and 26-2-3.  Our
caselaw, however, refutes that argument.  See McNairy v.
McNairy, 416 So. 2d 735, 736 (Ala. 1982) (holding that
petition for removal filed by a protected person's sister did
not meet the requirements of § 26-2-2 in part because the
petition "did not recite in what capacity the [sister] was
acting"), and Smith, 248 Ala. at 51, 26 So. 2d at 571-72
(holding that the next of kin of a deceased protected person
did not have the absolute right to remove the administration
18
1111078
of the guardianship proceeding from the probate court to the
circuit court because the predecessor statute to § 26-2-2 did
not include next of kin in the list of persons granted that
absolute right).  Hoff's petition for removal did not meet the
requirements of §§ 26-2-2 and 26-2-3 and was therefore
insufficient to merit the removal sought therein.
Hoff's attempt to remove the conservatorship proceeding
pursuant to § 12-11-41 –– which applies to post-death estates
–– was improper because, § 26-2-3, not § 12-11-41, was the
governing statute.  
Accordingly, even though the 
circuit 
court
initially granted the removal petition, it subsequently
remedied 
its 
error 
by 
remanding 
the 
conservatorship 
proceeding
to the probate court because the initial removal "did not
comply with applicable law."  § 26-2-3.  Our conclusion that
the circuit court properly granted Goyer's motion to remand
the conservatorship proceeding to the probate court requires
us also to conclude that the circuit court did not err in
denying Hoff's motion for sanctions against Goyer and her
attorney based on the filing of the motion for remand; as
explained supra, that motion was supported by both the law and
19
1111078
the facts.  Further discussion of Hoff's ALAA argument is
accordingly unnecessary.6
IV.
Hoff appealed the order entered by the circuit court
remanding the administration of the conservatorship of his
grandmother to the probate court, arguing that he had properly
petitioned for removal of the case pursuant to § 12-11-41. 
However, 
because 
the 
removal 
of 
the 
conservatorship 
proceeding
in this case is governed by § 26-2-3, not § 12-11-41, and
because Hoff did not have standing to seek removal under § 26-
2-3, the circuit court's order of remand was properly entered
and is, accordingly, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Malone, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
We also decline to address in any detail Hoff's argument
6
that the circuit court ruled against him on the basis of his
status as a pro se litigant.  The circuit court entered a six-
page order explaining the law supporting its decision; there
is nothing in that order or elsewhere in the record that would
support this argument.
20