Title: Matter of Adoption of R.S.C.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Adoption of R.S.C.1992 WY 117837 P.2d 1089Case Number: C-91-5Decided: 09/11/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF R.S.C., a Minor. R.C.L. and K.L., Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

K.S.C., 
Appellee (Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty. The Honorable John D. Troughton, 
Judge

 
 
Robert 
O. Anderson, Andrews & Anderson, Riverton, for Appellants.

 

George 
L. Arnold, Evanston, for Appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT, 
* and GOLDEN, JJ.

  

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 
 
THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The primary issue to be 
resolved in this case is whether a biological mother can be foreclosed from an 
action to declare the nonexistence of a presumptive father and child 
relationship upon a finding by the district court that the action was not 
brought within a reasonable time or whether, on the other hand, the 
determination by the trial court constitutes an abuse of discretion. Collateral 
issues abound relating to abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in 
decreeing adoption in favor of the presumptive father; error in connection with 
that proceeding because of insufficient notice to the biological father; whether 
the consent of the biological mother to adoption by the presumptive father was 
required; and, if so, whether it was given. The district court concluded the 
biological mother was foreclosed from an action to declare the nonexistence of 
the presumptive father and child relationship; ruled it was in the best 
interests of the child to maintain the parental rights and custody of the 
presumptive father; and granted the petition of the presumptive father to adopt 
the child. We hold there was no abuse of discretion in the action of the trial 
court in foreclosing the effort of the biological mother to declare the 
nonexistence of the presumed father and child relationship and in denying the 
petition of the biological mother's second husband for adoption. However, 
because the presumptive father enjoys the rights of a natural parent, the award 
of a decree of adoption to him was superfluous. We affirm the judgment of the 
trial court in all respects except that the decree of adoption in favor of the 
presumptive father is vacated as an unnecessary judicial 
determination.

 
 

[¶2.]     In their Appellant's 
Brief, the biological mother and her second husband frame the issues in this 
language:

 

I. Did 
the trial court err in granting the adoption of [the minor child] unto [the 
presumptive father] when the petition for adoption served upon the natural 
father did not specifically inform him that his failure to appear or respond 
could end in the termination of his parental rights and where the mother of the 
child has not given a written consent to the adoption and instead has filed her 
written objection thereto?

 

II. Did 
the trial court err in denying adoption by Stepfather where his petition had the 
consent by mother and natural father, evidence demonstrated his good parental 
qualifications and no other person could legally adopt the 
child?

 

In his 
Brief of Appellee, the presumptive father offers this statement of the 
issues:

 

1. Was 
the relinquishment and consent of the Appellant [the biological mother] required 
under the Wyoming adoption code, before the court could 
enter its decree of adoption in favor of Appellee?

 

2. If 
the consent of the Appellant [the biological mother] was required, was the court 
correct in finding that such consent had been given?

 

3. Do 
the Appellants have standing to raise issues concerning the alleged defects in 
the notice of the trial proceedings given by Appellee to the putative 
father?

 

4. If 
the Appellants do have standing, were there any defects in the notice of the 
trial proceeding given by Appellee to the putative father?

 

5. 
Should the court have entered a default judgment against the 
Appellee?

 

6. Was 
the court correct in granting to Appellee a decree of adoption as to the minor 
child RSC and in denying Appellant's petition for 
adoption?

 
 

[¶3.]     The biological mother 
and the presumptive father had two daughters born during their marriage, both of 
whom were the biological children of the mother and the presumptive father. 
During their marriage, the biological mother then became pregnant by another 
man. The child was born during wedlock, but there appears to be no issue 
concerning the fact the presumptive father was not the biological father of the 
child. The record discloses the presumptive father had undergone a vasectomy 
prior to the time of conception, and the biological mother admitted an affair 
with the biological father. That individual never asserted any parental rights, 
other than his effort to relinquish the child for adoption by the biological 
mother's second husband. The presumptive father knew prior to the birth he was 
not the biological father of this child, but he accepted the child into the 
marital household and, with his consent, his name was entered upon the child's 
birth certificate. There is no question that he is the presumptive father. 

 
 

[¶4.]     Sometime after the 
birth of the child, the biological mother left the family and began living with 
another man whom she later married. She permitted all three of the children to 
remain with her first husband, the presumptive father. The presumptive father 
and the biological mother were later divorced and, in the divorce decree which 
was entered, custody of this minor child was awarded to the presumptive father 
along with custody of the two older siblings who admittedly were the biological 
children of the presumptive father. The biological mother was granted parental 
visitation rights. An appeal was taken from the divorce decree, but that appeal 
was dismissed.

 
 

[¶5.]     Some three years later, 
but within a period of five years of the birth of the child, the second husband 
of the biological mother endeavored to adopt the child. This case was initiated 
by the petition for adoption filed on behalf of the biological mother's second 
husband, in which she joined, thereby manifesting her consent to the adoption by 
the second husband. A consent to the adoption by the second husband was obtained 
from the biological father and filed in connection with that petition. In a 
separate action, which later was consolidated with the adoption proceeding 
instituted by the second husband, the presumptive father also petitioned for 
adoption of the child.

 
 

[¶6.]     The trial court 
determined that the best interests of this minor child would be served by 
permitting him to remain in the custody of the only father he had ever 
known--the presumptive father. This determination was made after extensive 
psychological testing of the parties and testimony revealing the presumptive 
father and his second wife would provide, at the very least, an atmosphere equal 
to that which might be provided by the biological mother and her second husband. 
The court weighed the stability of the daughters and concluded the boy would 
stand an equally good chance for a successful upbringing if he were to be raised 
in that same household. The trial court also considered the fact that removal of 
the boy from the presumptive father's care would split the children into 
separate households. On the basis of these findings, the district court refused 
to grant the petition for adoption by the second husband, in which the 
biological mother joined, and it granted the petition for adoption by the 
presumptive father.

 
 

[¶7.]     This case is 
essentially one that will resolve the custody of the minor child and, in such 
instances, our primary concern is directed to the welfare of the child. 
Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093, 43 A.L.R.2d 351 
(1953). The same standard is legislatively embraced for granting or denying a 
decree of adoption. Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-111 (Supp. 1992). In an 
instance such as this, the applicable standard on appeal is, "in reviewing 
factual determinations in a contested adoption case, our rule is that the court 
can be reversed only if it committed a clear abuse of its discretion; that is, 
if it could not reasonably have concluded as it did." Matter of Adoption of 
CJH, 778 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1989). In light of the facts of this 
case, and considering the welfare of the child, we can discern no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's determination to deny the petition to adopt 
presented by the second husband and the biological mother.

 
 

[¶8.]     In contemplating the 
best interests of the child and the child's welfare, we note there is a strong 
policy against bastardy. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91, reh'g denied 492 U.S. 937, 110 S. Ct. 22, 106 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1989). In support of that policy, the Wyoming Legislature has 
enacted stringent provisions that tend to insure children born during wedlock 
will not be considered illegitimate. That presumption of paternity is 
sufficiently strong in certain instances to override even the fact of biological 
parenthood. For example, in A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1982), we 
held that the biological father did not have standing under the provisions of 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104 (1978)1 to challenge the paternity of one 
who was presumed to be a father under the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a) 
(1986).2 The thrust of the opinion of this 
court in X, Y, and Z logically would vitiate the consent to adoption that 
was obtained from the biological father in this instance. He would be without 
standing to establish his paternity against the presumptive 
father.

 
 

[¶9.]     The critical question 
then becomes whether the trial court correctly disposed of what it considered an 
effort on the part of the biological mother to declare the nonexistence of the 
father and child relationship between the presumptive father and the child. The 
statutory provision is:

 

(a) A 
child, his natural mother * * * may bring action:

 

* * 
*

 
 
(ii) For 
the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship 
presumed under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) only if the action is brought 
within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no 
event later than five (5) years after the child's birth.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-2-104(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992).

 

The term 
"reasonable" has to be defined by the circumstances. While we have found no 
precedent that matches this case, that proposition has been addressed in a case 
in which a presumed father sought to determine the nonexistence of the father 
and child relationship pursuant to the statute. Matter of Paternity of 
JRW, 814 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1991). We said 
there:

 
 
Determination 
of what constitutes "reasonable time" is a question of fact for the trial court. 
This court recently stated the principle by the following quotation in Matney 
v. Webster, 808 P.2d 212, 214 (Wyo. 1991):

 

What 
constitutes a reasonable time in any particular case is a question of fact. 
Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 907 (N.D. 
1975).

 

In the 
application of this rule and the further principle regarding appellate review, 
the court, in Miller v. Sybouts, 97 Wash. 2d 445, 645 P.2d 1082, 1085 
(1982), said that "normally we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
trial court when there is support for its decision." We will follow those 
principles for this decision to concur with the decision of the trial court. 
Klawitter v. Crawford, 185 Ill.App.3d 778, 133 Ill.Dec. 721, 727, 541 N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (1989). 

 
 
JRW, 814 P.2d  at 1263.

 

We agree 
that, "what constitutes a 'reasonable time' is not defined by the law, but 
rather is a question to be decided by the judge according to the facts and 
circumstances of the case or as ascertained by the findings of the jury." 
Cleghorn v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 611 S.W.2d 893, 897 Tex. Civ. 
App. 1981) (quoting Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 383, 15 S.W. 396 (1891) 
(reversed on grounds not affecting cited material, Dallas Power & Light 
Co. v. Cleghorn, 623 S.W.2d 310 Tex. 1981)).

 
 

[¶10.]  Under the standard of review articulated 
in CJH, in order to conclude that a reasonable time had not expired, we must 
find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Our evaluation of 
the facts in this case leads us to the conclusion that one cannot say that the 
district court "could not have reasonably concluded as it did" by finding that 
the petition of the biological mother was time barred under § 
14-2-104(a)(ii).

 
 

[¶11.]  All of the parties who had an interest 
knew in early 1986 about the biological ancestry of this minor child. The 
petition for adoption in which the biological mother joined was filed December 
15, 1989. Even at the time of the divorce, the parties were aware that the 
presumptive father was not the biological father and, yet, the presumptive 
father was awarded custody pursuant to the divorce decree. That circumstance 
leads to a conclusion that, in 1986, the parties were content to allow the 
presumption pursuant to § 14-2-102(a)(i) and (iv) to control. The issue was not 
contested until almost four years after all of the relevant facts were known, 
and we agree with the determination of fact by the district court that it was 
time barred under the statute that requires the action to be brought within a 
reasonable time. This forecloses the biological mother, the only party who has a 
statutory right to challenge the parent-child relationship, from contesting the 
paternity in this instance.

 
 

[¶12.]  In this regard, we take guidance and 
comfort from Wolf v. Goin, 26 Ore.App. 23, 552 P.2d 258 (Or. App. 1976), 
in which paternity proceedings were initiated some four years after the 
enactment of a statute limiting the time for bringing the action to six years. 
The Oregon 
appellate court held that the limitation included the time of inaction before 
the statute was passed, saying:

 

Litigant 
[must be] afforded a "reasonable" opportunity to initiate a proceeding 
subsequent to the enactment of the new statute. * * * There remained an interval 
of nearly four years, a patently "reasonable" period, within which petitioner 
might have sought to prosecute an action to establish paternity. Failing to have 
taken that necessary step in a timely fashion, petitioner is now barred from 
proceeding on this cause of action.

 
 

Wolf 552 P.2d  at 261 (citations omitted).

 
 

[¶13.]  The effect of foreclosing the effort of 
the biological mother to seek an adjudication of the nonexistence of the father 
and child relationship is that the biological mother and the presumptive father 
are acknowledged in the law as the parents of the child. Consequently, the 
petition for adoption filed by the second husband, in which the biological 
mother joined, was deficient because the requisite consent of both parents as 
specified in Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-109 (1988) was not filed with it as required in 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-104 (1988). That failure, without more, justifies the decision 
of the trial court to deny the second husband's petition for 
adoption.

 
 

[¶14.]  This leaves only the propriety of 
granting the adoption petition of the presumed father. Since his presumed 
paternity cannot be attacked by the parties in this matter, he is left in the 
situation of being not only a procedural presumptive father but a substantive 
presumptive father. He is the parent of the child and has the same status as a 
biological father. We are aware of no procedure or rule that would justify an 
adoption proceeding by a biological parent who had not in some way had parental 
rights terminated. Furthermore, the petition for adoption filed by the 
presumptive father is deficient in the same way that the petition for adoption 
filed by the second husband is deficient. The awarding of an adoption decree to 
the presumptive father was superfluous and, in our judgment, it makes the 
situation less amorphous if it is stricken.

 
 

[¶15.]  Consequently, we think the only issue 
between the biological mother and the presumptive father is the right of custody 
pursuant to the adjudication in their divorce decree. The custodial rights were 
not adjusted in any way by the trial court, and custody remains with the 
presumptive father. If any effort is to be made to provide exclusive parental 
rights to the presumptive father, the effort should be made under the statutes 
relating to the termination of parental rights.

 
 

[¶16.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed in every respect except for the granting of a decree of adoption to the 
presumptive father. His rights are established by the fact that he is the 
substantively presumed father, and the only issue left is that of custody which 
has been awarded to him. For that reason, the decree of adoption in favor of the 
presumptive father is vacated.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104 (1978) provide, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(a) A child, his natural mother or a man 
presumed to be his father under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) may bring 
action:

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(b) Any interested party may bring an 
action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence 
of the father and child relationship presumed under W.S. 
14-2-102(a)(iv).

 
 
(c) An action to determine the existence 
of the father and child relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed 
father under W.S. 14-2-102 may be brought * * *.

2Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a)(i) (1986) 
provided:

 
 
(a) A man presumed to be the natural 
father of a child if:

 
 
(i) He and the child's natural mother 
are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the 
marriage, or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated by 
death, annulment or divorce or after a decree of separation is entered by a 
court; * * *.