Title: People v. Williams

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93573-Agenda 8-January 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								BYRON WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 3, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the Madison County circuit court, the
defendant, Byron Williams, was convicted on two counts of first
degree murder (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996)) and two
counts of contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile
(see 720 ILCS 5/33D-1 (West 1996)). The defendant received
concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for the murder
convictions and 20 years' imprisonment for the contributing
convictions. A divided appellate court panel affirmed the
defendant's convictions and sentences. No. 5-99-0452
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed
his petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now
reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND
	On January 28, 1997, two East St. Louis teenagers, Terril
Williams (Williams) and Terril Madison, telephoned an
acquaintance, Alton teenager Tineisha Haynes, to confront her
about causing problems between their friends, Albert Greenlee and
Demario Ursery. When Haynes refused to talk and hung up the
telephone, Madison and Williams called her pager to harass her.
Haynes then telephoned Williams, who initiated a three-way call
with Madison, and an argument ensued. Madison threatened to kill
Haynes and her cousin, Alton teenager Darryl Womack. Womack
eventually took the telephone from Haynes and asked Madison
and Williams to stop calling her. Madison repeated his threat;
Williams then threatened Womack. Williams said that he had a
gun, and Womack replied that he also had a gun. They then
threatened each other with an escalating variety of weapons,
including machine guns, bazookas, missiles, and tanks. The
argument continued until Womack challenged Williams to come
to his neighborhood. According to Madison, Williams said,
"[Y]ou're gonna die," and hung up the telephone.
	In the evening of January 30, 1997, Robert Brock, an
acquaintance of the defendant, approached the defendant,
Williams, and Madison outside the defendant's uncle's house. The
group was quiet, watching people. Brock overheard Williams talk
to the defendant about going to Alton and "taking care of
business." According to Brock, the defendant told Williams "to
shut his mouth up" before anyone realized what they intended to
do. Williams continued to talk and patted his side where Brock
observed a small caliber handgun with a "red bottom." According
to Brock, the defendant again told Williams, "Stop running your
mouth before everybody knows what's going on and stop telling
people stuff before I take my gun." The defendant said he planned
to find a ride to Alton. At some point, the group left.
	Later that night, Felipe Luckey drove the defendant, Williams,
Madison, and Greenlee from East St. Louis to Alton. According to
Greenlee, Williams was wearing dark clothes, brown boots, and a
red cap with a yellow "T." On the way to Alton, Luckey stopped
by the Sullivan housing projects, so that Madison and Williams
could visit a woman. Madison and Williams went to the woman's
apartment and learned that she was not home. According to
Madison, when he and Williams returned to the car, the defendant
passed a gun with red tape on it to Williams; Williams put the gun
into his coat. Luckey also stopped at a gas station. According to
gas station attendant Eldon Smith, between 8 and 8:30 p.m., the
defendant bought a snack and asked for directions to Belle Manor,
the apartment complex where Womack lived.
	Around 9 p.m., Luckey and the others arrived at Belle Manor,
where Williams saw Womack walking with James Patterson.
Luckey passed them and parked further up the road on a hill.
Williams, Madison, and Greenlee exited the car. While Greenlee
stood between two nearby apartment buildings, Williams and
Madison approached Womack and Patterson. Words were
exchanged, and Williams pulled the gun from his coat. When
Patterson stepped forward, Williams shot him. When Womack
turned to run, Williams shot him in the back. Three Belle Manor
residents who witnessed the shootings later described the shooter
as wearing a dark jacket and a red cap.
	After the shooting, Williams and Madison ran back to the car.
Greenlee, frozen in fear, urinated in his pants. Williams yelled at
Greenlee to get into the car and threatened to shoot him. Greenlee
returned to the car, and Luckey quickly drove away. According to
Madison, the defendant asked Williams if "he took care of that,"
and Williams said yes. Everyone joked about Greenlee's wet
pants, and the defendant told Greenlee that he would be hurt if he
talked about the shootings. According to Madison, the defendant
suggested that Madison and Williams go back to Alton to ensure
no one saw the shootings. Madison drove Williams to Alton.
According to Madison, Williams telephoned Haynes around 11
p.m. and said, "You know your cousin's dead. Bitch, if you call
the police or talk to the police, you're going to die." In the
background, Madison added, "Yeah, bitch you're going to die."
That night, Ursery talked to Madison and asked what Madison had
done earlier. Madison responded that he was riding around in a car
with Luckey, Williams, and the defendant.
	The police investigation eventually led to the defendant. On
March 13, 1997, he was indicted on one count of contributing to
the criminal delinquency of a juvenile in connection with
Patterson's murder and arrested. On August 11, 1997, 152 days
after he was arrested, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss under
the speedy-trial provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections
(speedy-trial act) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1998)). The trial
court denied this motion, finding that several delays were
attributable to the defendant and that only 99 days had run for
speedy-trial purposes.
	On August 27, 1997, the State filed an amended information,
recharging the defendant with contributing to the criminal
delinquency of a juvenile in connection with Patterson's murder,
and charging him with three additional offenses: one count of
contributing to the criminal delinquency of a minor in connection
with Womack's murder, one count of first degree murder
pertaining to Womack, and one count of first degree murder
pertaining to Patterson. On September 3, 1997, the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss the Patterson murder charge under the speedy-trial act, alleging that 168 days had passed since he was arrested
on the contributing charge in connection with Patterson's murder.
The trial court denied this motion.
	At trial, the State's case rested primarily on testimony from
Greenlee and Madison. The defendant's case rested on testimony
from several alibi witnesses, who stated that they saw the
defendant at an East St. Louis bar playing pool on the night of the
shootings and that he did not go to Alton. The defendant then
testified on his own behalf. He stated that he never gave Williams
a gun and that he never went to Alton to shoot someone. The
defendant testified, consistent with his alibi witnesses, that he
went to a bar and played pool on the night of the shootings.
	The jury found the defendant guilty on two counts of first
degree murder and two counts of contributing to the criminal
delinquency of a juvenile. The trial court sentenced him to
concurrent sentences of life imprisonment on the murder
convictions and 20 years' imprisonment on the contributing
convictions. A divided appellate court panel affirmed the
defendant's convictions and sentences. No. 5-99-0452
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the
defendant's petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the
State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial; (2) whether the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to impeach
the defendant with facts not in evidence; and (3) whether the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present
evidence that its key witnesses received threats before testifying at
trial.

1. Compulsory Joinder and the Speedy-Trial Act
	First, the defendant contends that the State violated the
speedy-trial act when it charged him with first degree murder in
connection with Patterson's death 168 days after it charged him
with contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile in
connection with Patterson's death. The defendant claims that,
because these charges were subject to compulsory joinder, pretrial
continuances attributable to him on the contributing charge were
not attributable to him on the murder charge.
	The speedy-trial act provides, "Every person in custody in this
State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having
jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into
custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***." 725
ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1996). Application of the speedy-trial act
is a straightforward counting exercise when the defendant is
charged with a single offense. Its application, however, becomes
more complicated when the defendant is charged with multiple,
but factually related, offenses at different times. In such cases the
speedy-trial guarantee is tempered by compulsory joinder
principles.
	The compulsory-joinder provision of the Criminal Code of
1961 states:
			"(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may
establish the commission of more than one offense, the
defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.
			(b) If the several offenses are known to the proper
prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the
prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single
court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution,
except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are based on
the same act.
			(c) When 2 or more offenses are charged as required by
Subsection (b), the court in the interest of justice may
order that one or more of such charges shall be tried
separately." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/3-3 (West
1996).
	The committee comments shed some light upon what the
phrase "based on the same act" means:
			"Section 3-3 requires in substance that several offenses
must be prosecuted in a single prosecution if they are
based on the same act. (The Joint Committee originally
used the word 'conduct' instead of 'act,' but after much
discussion it was changed to 'act' before submission to
the legislature.) This requirement is expressly subject,
however, to several qualifications. First, the several
charges must be known to the prosecuting officer
[citation] at the commencement of the prosecution. ***
Second, the several charges must be within the
jurisdiction of the same court-a necessary recognition of
the statutory venue provisions. Third, as provided in
subsection (c), after the prosecution has been initiated, the
court may permit the separate trial of one or more of the
offenses if the interests of justice so require. ***
* * *
			Section 3-3 is not intended to cover the situation in
which several offenses-either repeated violations of the
same statutory provision or violations of different
provisions-arise from a series of acts which are closely
related with respect to the offender's single purpose or
plan." (Emphasis in original.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par.
3-3, Committee Comments-1961, at 101-02 (Smith-Hurd
1989).
That is, "same act" does not include independent acts constituting
different offenses: "There is no requirement of joinder where
multiple offenses arise from a series of related acts." People v.
Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1985).
	In People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1 (1998), we discussed
section 3-3 and its relation to the speedy-trial act. In Quigley, the
defendant was charged by indictment with felony DUI and by
information with misdemeanor DUI. Both charges arose from the
same multiple-vehicle collision. The court dismissed the felony
charge, and the defendant filed a speedy-trial demand on that
charge. After he was reindicted for felony DUI, he filed a motion
to dismiss the misdemeanor charge on speedy-trial grounds. The
trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the
misdemeanor charge. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss
the felony charge on compulsory-joinder and double-jeopardy
grounds. The trial court disagreed with the defendant, and the
defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court
affirmed.
	We examined section 3-3 and noted that the parties' dispute
centered upon whether the two DUI charges were based on the
"same act." Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d  at 7. We held that they were and
that the DUI charges were subject to compulsory joinder:
			"Driving while under the influence may lead to some
other act that, in turn, leads to the accident. The
underlying cause of both misdemeanor and [felony] DUI,
however, is driving while under the influence. The
misdemeanor DUI and the [felony] DUI charges are based
on the same act. ***
			*** The 'same act' requirement applies primarily to
two situations: (1) where several persons are affected by
one act, and (2) where several different statutes are
violated by one act. ***
			*** Defendant was allegedly engaged in only one
continuous and uninterrupted act of driving while under
the influence. In this instance, the phrase 'based on the
same act' cannot be given a hypertechnical interpretation
to create multiple acts based on discrete moments in
time." (Emphasis in original.) Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d  at 10-11.
	We then addressed the interaction between compulsory-joinder principles and the speedy-trial guarantee:
			"Compulsory joinder requires the State to bring
multiple charges in a single prosecution. The charges are
tried together unless the circuit court determines that a
separate trial is required in the interest of justice.
[Citation.] Once a speedy-trial demand is filed, the
multiple charges are subject to the same speedy-trial
period. If the charges are required to be brought in a
single prosecution, the speedy-trial period begins to run
when the speedy-trial demand is filed, even if the State
brings some of the charges at a later date." Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d  at 13.
We concluded that the felony and misdemeanor charges were
required to be tried together. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d  at 13-14. Once
the speedy-trial period expired on the misdemeanor charge, it also
ran on the felony charge. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d  at 16.
	In this case, the defendant claims, and the State concedes, that
the murder and contributing charges related to Patterson were
subject to compulsory joinder. In fact, responding to the
defendant's second speedy-trial motion to dismiss, the prosecutor
stated that the new charges were based upon
		"the same fact pattern that the Grand Jury heard and in
fact the Grand Jury considered the facts.
			This is an alternative theory to the same facts. There is
no change in discovery. There is no change in witnesses.
There is no change in any evidence that would be
presented. It's preliminarily an alternative theory which
may-which a jury could find based upon the same facts
which were presented ***."
The parties disagree, however, on whether continuances
attributable to the defendant on the contributing charge were
attributable to him on the murder charge.
	In People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1981), the
appellate court addressed this issue. Though the court did not
mention compulsory joinder or section 3-3, it held:
			"Where new and additional charges arise from the same
facts as did the original charges and the State had
knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the
prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the
new and additional charges is subject to the same
statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges.
Continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the
original charges cannot be attributed to defendants with
respect to the new and additional charges because these
new and additional charges were not before the court
when those continuances were obtained." (Emphasis
added.) Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49.
	Until 1998, the appellate court uniformly followed the rule
announced in Williams. See People v. Stanley, 266 Ill. App. 3d
307, 311 (1994); People v. Hinkle, 234 Ill. App. 3d 663, 666
(1992); People v. Hawkins, 212 Ill. App. 3d 973, 981 (1991);
People v. Howard, 205 Ill. App. 3d 702, 710 (1990); see also
People v. Parker, 59 Ill. App. 3d 302, 304-05 (1978); People v.
King, 8 Ill. App. 3d 2, 5 (1972); People v. Williams, 2 Ill. App. 3d
993, 994-95 (1971); People v. Alcazar, 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354
(1988).
	People v. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1998), aff'd in part
& rev'd in part, 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000), changed that. In Gooden,
the State charged the defendant with home invasion. The State
alleged that he entered his ex-wife's house without authority and
struck her in the head with a shotgun. One hundred five days after
his arrest, the defendant requested a 3½-month continuance to
obtain a mental health expert. Two hundred eighteen days after his
arrest, the State filed an amended information against the
defendant, recharging him with home invasion and adding five
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. In the new charges,
the State alleged that the defendant sexually assaulted his ex-wife
after he struck her in the head. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the sexual assault charges under the speedy-trial act. The
trial court denied the defendant's motion. Two hundred forty-three
days after his arrest, but only 26 days after the State filed the new
charges, the defendant was tried and convicted of home invasion
and one count of sexual assault. The defendant appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed, but its holding on the speedy-trial issue is difficult to discern. The court initially announced it
had "no problem" with the proposition that, under section 3-3,
"[i]f the newly charged offenses are known to the State at the time
of the original prosecution and they arise from the same set of
facts, then they are subject to the speedy-trial limits that apply to
the original charge, regardless of when the new charges are filed."
Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. The appellate court, however, did
not explicitly apply this rule to the defendant. That is, the court did
not conclude that the home invasion and sexual assault charges
were not subject to compulsory joinder. Instead, the court
considered whether the lengthy continuance requested by the
defendant on the home invasion charge also applied to the sexual
assault charges. The appellate court stated:
		"[I]t is illogical to hold that continuances which are
attributable to the original charges are not attributable to
the later filed charges on the basis that those charges are
not before the court. The defendant cannot have it both
ways. He cannot seek continuances that benefit him and
enable him to better prepare for trial on the charges and
then seek the dismissal of a later-filed charge on the basis
that 120 days had elapsed since he was brought into
custody." Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210.
	The appellate court observed that the State waited to receive
forensic test results to support the victim's allegations before filing
the sexual assault charges: "This seems preferable to the State
filing charges initially and having the defendant defend against
charges that may be unfounded or have little supporting evidence."
Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. According to the court, nothing
in the record indicated that the State filed the new charges in an
effort to deprive the defendant of his right to a speedy trial or to
hinder his defense. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. The
defendant's trial was postponed because he sought mental health
evidence on the home invasion charge, not because the State
delayed in filing the sexual assault charges. Gooden, 296 Ill. App.
3d at 210. The court declined to follow Williams and it progeny,
in effect holding that the continuance attributable to the defendant
on the home invasion charge was also attributable to him on the
sexual assault charges. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 211.
	We affirmed. Though we noted that compulsory-joinder
principles are relevant to determining speedy-trial issues, we held
that the so-called Williams rule should not extend to cases which
do not involve compulsory joinder "because it would result in the
State having to join charges not otherwise mandated by the statute
to be joined." Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 218; accord People v.
Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2000) ("the Williams rule applies only
when the new and original charges are subject to compulsory
joinder"). We concluded that the home invasion and sexual assault
charges were based on separate acts and not subject to compulsory
joinder. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 220. We then examined whether the
State's decision to permissively join these charges thwarted the
purposes of the speedy-trial guarantee.
	The defendant contended that the continuance he requested on
the home invasion charge could not be used to extend the speedy-trial period for the sexual assault charges because those charges
did not exist when he requested the continuance. We agreed: "[I]t
is precisely because those charges were not in existence at that
time that we cannot say *** that defendant's speedy-trial rights
with respect to those charges were violated." Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 
at 221. This conclusion was merely an extension of our earlier
conclusion that the home invasion and sexual assault charges were
not subject to compulsory joinder.
	Because we disposed of this case on compulsory-joinder
grounds, we did not need to discuss the core of the appellate
court's holding-namely, its refusal to follow Williams on whether
continuances attributable to the defendant on the initial charge also
apply to subsequent charges. Nonetheless, we added that,
consistent with Quigley:
			"[T]he concerns that attend to the right to a speedy trial
come into play in those cases where the later-filed charges
are based on the "same act" as the original charges, i.e., in
cases where the charges must be brought in a single
prosecution. In other words, had the sexual assault
charges been required under section 3-3(b) to have been
joined, we would not allow the State to circumvent the
original speedy-trial term. The later date could not be used
by the State to 'restart' the speedy-trial period, and any
delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be
attributable to the defendant. The State would be required
to bring defendant to trial on all of the charges within the
original speedy-trial term or face dismissal of the new
charges. In such cases, fairness dictates that those charges
'relate back' to the date the original charges were filed."
(Emphasis added.) Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 222.
In short, we disapproved of the appellate court's departure from
Williams.
	Here, the appellate court disregarded this aspect of Gooden,
reasoning:
			"Because the supreme court reversed this court's
decision in Gooden on the basis that the charges were not
subject to compulsory joinder, any further statements by
the supreme court regarding delay attributable to the
defendant on the originally filed charges and the later-filed charges are mere dicta.
* * *
			*** [W]e choose to adhere to our court's approach in
Gooden. *** [W]e continue to believe that it is illogical
to hold that continuances which are attributable to a
defendant on an original charge are not attributable to a
defendant on a latter-filed [sic] charge where that charge
is subject to compulsory joinder. We acknowledge our
supreme court's dicta but note that it did not clearly
advise that any delay attributable to the defendant on the
original charge is not retroactively attributable to the
defendant on the later-filed charge. Our supreme court's
statement merely indicated that any delay occasioned by
such a late filing would not be attributable to the
defendant. This reasonably could refer to any future delay
on account of the late filing of the new and additional
charges, and not necessarily to delay that had already
occurred." No. 5-99-0452 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
Thus, the appellate court concluded that the charges were subject
to compulsory joinder, but found that the delays attributable to the
defendant on the contributing charge were similarly attributable to
the defendant on the murder charge.
	In dissent, Justice Kuehn wrote:
			"I cannot think of a reason why the State would have
delayed filing the murder charges until the eve of trial
other than to gain the tactical advantage of last-minute
surprise-to place the defense in a state of unreadiness and
to inflict the psychological frenzy that would accompany
shocking news of additional, and far more serious,
charges. Whatever reason the State had for filing its
murder charges just days before a trial that was scheduled
for some time, it is clear that its delay will eventually
result in the dismissal of those charges because of speedy
trial constraints.
			Our view in People v. Gooden [citation], adhered to by
the majority in affirming the denial of the motion to
dismiss, has been repudiated by the Illinois Supreme
Court. [Citation.] Rather than clinging to a view that our
betters have discredited, we might ask ourselves why the
Supreme Court bothered to publish the dicta that we have
decided to ignore. It may have been trying to inform
judges around the State that we were wrong-i.e., that
defendants can have it both ways, provided that belated
charges were subject to compulsory joinder. In any event,
how can we choose to ignore Supreme Court guidance?
			I suppose the Supreme Court could allow us to ignore
its view on this subject and adhere to our contrary view.
Then again, today's dicta should become tomorrow's
ruling. We leave the Supreme Court little choice but to
devote its precious time to send us a brief message: 'We
say what we mean and we mean what we say.' " No.
5-99-0452 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23) (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
	Dicta normally comes in two varieties: obiter dicta and
judicial dicta. Obiter dicta are comments in a judicial opinion that
are unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Black's Law
Dictionary 1100 (7th ed. 1999). Judicial dicta are comments in a
judicial opinion that are unnecessary to the disposition of the case,
but involve an issue briefed and argued by the parties. Black's
Law Dictionary 465 (7th ed. 1999). Judicial dicta have the force
of a determination by a reviewing court and should receive
dispositive weight in an inferior court. Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 80 (1993). Similarly, "obiter dict[a] of a court of last resort
can be tantamount to a decision and therefore binding in the
absence of a contrary decision of that court." Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at
80.
	Our closing statements in Gooden were judicial dicta because
they concerned an issue addressed by the parties, as well as the
core of the appellate court's holding. But whether we characterize
that portion of Gooden as judicial or obiter dicta, it still should
have guided the appellate court in this case. Now, yesterday's
dicta have become today's decision. In Gooden, when we said
"any delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be
attributable to the defendant," we meant just that. If the initial and
subsequent charges filed against the defendant are subject to
compulsory joinder, delays attributable to the defendant on the
initial charges are not attributable to the defendant on the
subsequent charges.
	The harm in a contrary result is obvious: a trial by ambush.
The State could lull the defendant into acquiescing to pretrial
delays on pending charges, while it prepared for a trial on more
serious, not-yet-pending charges. We cannot presume that a
defendant would have agreed to a continuance if he had faced both
charges. As Justice Kuehn presciently observed, "All choices
about requests that would delay proceedings would be made under
a false understanding as a result of this deception." When the State
filed the more serious charges, the defendant would face a
Hobson's Choice between a trial without adequate preparation and
further pretrial detention to prepare for trial. Today, we do not
create a loophole for criminal defendants. Instead, we close a
loophole which would allow the State to circumvent a statutorily
implemented constitutional right. See Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 217.
	Because the delays attributable to the defendant on the
contributing charge in connection with Patterson's murder were
not attributable to the defendant on the murder charge pertaining
to Patterson, the State violated the speedy-trial act on the murder
charge. That conviction is reversed. Accordingly, the defendant
cannot be convicted of two murders in this case, and a life
sentence is inappropriate. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West
1996).

2. Incomplete Impeachment-Kenneth Everage
	The defendant next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it allowed the State to impeach the defendant with
facts not in evidence-primarily, alleged conversations between the
defendant and Kenneth Everage, a cellblock acquaintance at the
Madison County jail and a potential defense witness. The
defendant charges that this incomplete impeachment led the jury
to believe that he was a drug dealer who confessed to being
involved in the shootings and who attempted to bribe a witness to
implicate another person in the shootings.
	The defendant initially challenges the State's cross-examination questions about his cellular telephone usage in the
month before the shootings. According to the defendant, these
questions were irrelevant and implied that the defendant was a
drug dealer because he made hundreds of short telephone calls
each month. The defendant did not object to these questions at
trial, and he did not argue their impropriety in his posttrial motion.
Accordingly, any review of these questions was forfeited. See
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Further, the
defendant does not argue plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel regarding these questions. We turn to the more serious
issue of the State's cross-examination questions concerning
Everage.
	In his opening statement, defense counsel previewed
Everage's expected testimony. According to defense counsel,
Everage would testify that he observed a serious fight between
Womack and a person named Jamar Plunkett sometime before the
shootings and later heard Plunkett threaten Womack's life.
Everage also would testify that when he spoke with Plunkett after
the shootings, Plunkett admitted he shot Womack. Over the State's
objection, the trial court ruled that it would allow defense counsel
to call Everage as a witness. Against the advice of his own
attorney, Everage agreed to testify.
	On the final day of defense testimony, Everage was
transported to the courthouse, where he asked to speak to an
assistant State's Attorney outside the presence of defense counsel.
A prosecutor spoke with Everage, and defense counsel requested
that the State disclose the substance of that conversation. The
prosecutor stated:
		"[T]his is his own witness. He has gotten up and given an
opening statement as to what Mr. Everage has said. He's
interviewed Mr. Everage.
			I have disclosed what I have as far as Mr. Everage's
previous statement to the police. Obviously, there are
statements of [the defendant] to Mr. Everage while they
were in the same cellblock together."
	Moments later, defense counsel called Everage to the stand,
and Everage refused to testify. In a sidebar outside the presence of
the jury, defense counsel repeated his request that the State
disclose the substance of its conversation with Everage. The
prosecutor told the court:
			"Your Honor, I have considered [defense counsel's]
request for disclosure, and at this time I would inform him
that I have nothing in writing regarding the witness
Kenneth Everage.
			However, I would state for him that Kenneth Everage
will testify that he was offered two ounces of cocaine and
$500 to make up the Jamar Plunkett story.
			He will testify that he has talked with [the defendant]
excessively. [The defendant] has talked to him about the
motive. He has talked to him about giving the gun to
Terril Williams.
			He has talked to him about why the offense went down,
and the particular details of the offense. And he has
indicated that he met on numerous occasions with this
defendant, and the defendant talked about the offense
extensively to him.
			Mr. Everage would indicate that he wanted a deal from
the State or a negotiation, and I have declined at this time
to offer him anything in regards to that.
			However, he did make those statements that are
statements upon behalf of the defendant."
	Surprised by Everage's new story, defense counsel obtained
a recess. That afternoon, the defense case resumed, culminating in
the defendant's testimony. On cross-examination of the defendant,
the State inquired about his jailhouse contact with Everage:
			"Q. Isn't it a fact that you offered Kenny Everage two
ounces of crack and $500 to testify that Jamar Plunkett
was involved [in the shootings]?
			A. I don't know Jamar Plunkett. I don't know Kenny
Everage that well. And as far as I'm concerned, this case
comes from Alton, and I don't trust no one [sic] from
Alton.
			Q. Well, you heard Kenny Everage in your attorney's
opening statement, didn't you?
			A. Did not.
			Q. You heard Kenny Everage's name in [defense
counsel's] opening statement, didn't you?
			A. I read it on the paper.
			Q. You didn't hear him mentioned when Mr. Wallis got
up here yesterday morning and said that Kenny Everage
was gonna say he was involved?
			A. I don't know if he said he was involved. I don't
know about that now.
			Q. But that he was going to be a witness about Jamar
Plunkett? Don't you remember that?
			A. Yes, I remember that part.
			Q. Now, Kenny Everage is in the same cell block that
you are, isn't he?
			A. Yes, he is.
			Q. And you've talked with him a lot about your case,
haven't you?
			A. No, I do not.
			Q. Didn't you tell Kenny Everage that the gun was in
Fred Williams' house?
			A. Hell no. I ain't never tell [sic] Kenny Everage
nothing like that. ***
			Q. Fred Williams is your uncle, isn't he?
			A. Yes, he is."
	On redirect examination, defense counsel attempted to
rehabilitate the defendant. The defendant again asserted that he
never gave or promised anything to Everage in return for
implicating Plunkett. On re-cross-examination, the State returned
to the defendant's contact with Everage:
			"Q. Mr. Everage, in fact, to your knowledge was
willing to say that you offered him crack cocaine and
money to testify to the statement that he gave you that
you're suggesting, isn't he?
			[Defense Counsel]: Objection to that, your Honor. I
object to that on the basis that the only reason that this
defendant knows that is because of it's [sic]
acknowledgement in court."
The State requested a sidebar, which was held off the record. Back
on the record, the court overruled defense counsel's objection. The
State proceeded:
			"Q. Now, you're saying now that you did not offer him
money?
			A. No, I have not."
The State never called Everage as a rebuttal witness.
	Generally, the State may not impeach a defense witness on
cross-examination with a prior inconsistent statement unless the
State can prove that statement with extrinsic evidence if the
witness denies making it. See People v. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d 324,
341 (1986) ("It is improper for the prosecutor to ask a witness
questions for purposes of impeachment unless the prosecutor is
prepared to offer proof of the impeaching information"); see also
People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 297 (1990) ("it is error for the
State to ask a defense witness questions presuming facts not in
evidence as a precursor to impeachment of that witness, unless the
State has admissible evidence to substantiate the inquiry"). The
inherent danger posed by such cross-examination questions is that
the jury will ignore the witness' denial, make a presumption that
the insinuation created by the questions is accurate, and substitute
the presumption for proof. People v. Hood, 229 Ill. App. 3d 202,
212 (1992), citing People v. O'Banner, 215 Ill. App. 3d 778, 794
(1991); see People v. Burbank, 53 Ill. 2d 261, 270 (1972) ("The
asking of the leading question and the denial carry a harmful
innuendo which is unsupported by any evidence"). The State must
have a good-faith basis to ask the cross-examination questions, as
well as the intent and the ability to complete its impeachment. See
generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois
Evidence §§607.3, 613.3 (7th ed. 1999).
	Clearly, the State's failure to call Everage in rebuttal was
error. The State argues, however, that review of this error was
forfeited because defense counsel failed to object when the State
first asked the defendant about Everage and failed to allege in a
posttrial motion that the State did not call Everage as a rebuttal
witness. The defendant responds that the State lulled defense
counsel into holding back an objection when it announced to the
court Everage "will" testify. The defendant adds that defense
counsel did not object initially to the State's questions because the
error only ripened when the State did not perfect its impeachment
by calling Everage in rebuttal.
	In order to preserve an issue for review, a defendant must
object at trial and include the issue in a posttrial motion. See
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. In order to preserve the issue of the
State's failure to perfect impeachment of a defense witness,
defense counsel must object to the State's failure to follow up its
questions with additional evidence. See People v. Williams, 165 Ill. 2d 51, 61 (1995). Here, the defendant objected at trial, but only
to the State's re-cross-examination, and only to clarify that the
defendant knew about the substance of Everage's putative
testimony because of its acknowledgment in court. The State
correctly observes that the defendant did not move for a mistrial
when the State did not call Everage as a rebuttal witness. The State
also correctly observes that the defendant did not raise the State's
failure to perfect its impeachment in his posttrial motion. Instead,
the defendant's posttrial motion alleged that the trial court erred in
allowing the State "to improperly cross-examine defendant as to
*** allegations as to the witness Kenneth Everage alleging witness
perjury and offers to solicit perjury." Accordingly, review of this
issue was forfeited.
	The defendant claims that review of this issue is warranted as
plain error. "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
trial court." 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); see People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10 (1995). The plain error rule bypasses normal forfeiture
principles and allows a reviewing court to consider a trial error
when either (1) the evidence is closely balanced or (2) the error is
"so substantial that it affected the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process." People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305,
335 (2000).
	Here, the State's error in failing to call Everage as a rebuttal
witness deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Through the State's
cross-examination and re-cross-examination questions, Everage,
in effect, testified against the defendant. The State's questions
created the insinuation that the defendant, conscious of his guilt,
tried to bribe Everage with money and drugs to finger Plunkett in
an attempt to secure an acquittal. This insinuation became
unanswerable when the State did not call Everage in rebuttal.
Particularly where, as here, the State presented strong, but not
overwhelming, evidence of the defendant's guilt, the damaging
and prejudicial effect of such a strategy is obvious. See People v.
Morris, 79 Ill. App. 3d 318, 330 (1979) ("We can think of no
evidence more damaging than the defendant's own words of
guilt").
	As we stated in People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill. 2d 375, 396 (1969):
		"Where *** the guilt of the accused is not manifest, but
is dependent upon the degree of credibility accorded by
the trier of fact to his testimony and that of the witnesses
who testify on his behalf, and there appear in the record
substantial numbers of unsupported insinuations which,
if considered, could have seriously impeached the
credibility of the defendant and his witnesses, *** it is our
opinion that justice and fundamental fairness demand that
the defendant be afforded a new trial free from such
prejudicial misconduct."
Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's remaining convictions
and remand for a new trial. We need not address the defendant's
final issue.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed, the defendant's conviction for first
degree murder in connection with Patterson's death is reversed,
the defendant's remaining convictions are reversed, and the cause
is remanded for a new trial.
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE GARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	I join in Justice Thomas' dissent to the extent that it disagrees
with the majority's conclusion that our holding in People v.
Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000), adopted both parts of the speedy-trial rule for late-filed charges as set forth in People v. Williams,
94 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1981), and the appellate court therefore was
required to follow Williams. In all other respects, I concur in the
majority opinion.
	I disagree with the majority's conclusion that People v.
Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000), adopted both parts of the speedy-trial rule for late-filed charges as set forth in People v. Williams,
94 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1981), and that the appellate court was
therefore bound to follow Williams. I believe the majority wrongly
reverses defendant's conviction for the murder of Patterson,
holding that delay attributable to defendant on the contributing
charge in connection with the murder of Patterson was not
likewise attributable to defendant on the Patterson murder charge.
I also believe that the State's failure to perfect its impeachment of
defendant by calling Everage as a witness to testify about
defendant's bribery scheme was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and therefore did not amount to plain error. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
	The speedy-trial statute provides that every person in custody
in this state for an alleged offense shall be tried within 120 days
from the date he is taken into custody, unless delay is occasioned
by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000). The right to a
speedy trial is a shield to protect an accused from unjust and
prejudicial delays occasioned by the State, not a sword to be used
to cut a defendant loose from legitimate criminal charges. People
v. Tetter, 42 Ill. 2d 569, 576 (1969); People v. Majors, 308 Ill.
App. 3d 1021, 1028-29 (1999).
	In Williams, the appellate court held the following:
			"Where new and additional charges arise from the same
facts as did the original charges and the State had
knowledge of these facts ***, the time within which trial
is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to
the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original
charges. Continuances obtained in connection with the
trial of the original charges cannot be attributed to
defendants with respect to the new and additional charges
because these new and additional charges were not before
the court when those continuances were obtained."
Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49.
	In People v. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1998), however,
the appellate court refused to follow the second sentence of the
above-quoted holding from Williams:
		"[I]t is illogical to hold that continuances which are
attributable to the original charges are not attributable to
the later-filed charges on the basis that those charges are
not before the court. The defendant cannot have it both
ways. He cannot seek continuances that benefit him and
enable him to better prepare for trial on the charges and
then seek the dismissal of a later-filed charge on the basis
that 120 days had elapsed since he was brought into
custody. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210.
	On appeal from the appellate court's ruling, this court
affirmed the result reached by the appellate court, but on different
grounds. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 222. This court found that the
later-filed charges were not subject to compulsory joinder. The
State, therefore, could bring the later-filed charges at its choosing,
and the speedy-trial clock did not begin to run on the later-filed
charges until the date they were filed. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 221-22. In dicta, this court stated that, if the new charges had been
subject to mandatory joinder, "[t]he later date could not be used by
the State to 'restart' the speedy-trial period, and any delay
occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the
defendant." (Emphasis added.) Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 222.
	Gooden did not specifically address the concern in this
case-whether delay attributed on the earlier charges would be
attributed on the later charges. Instead it merely noted two general
principles: (1) the date of the later filing cannot be used to
" 'restart' " the speedy-trial period; and (2) any delay occasioned
by the late filing would not be attributable to defendant. Gooden,
189 Ill. 2d 209. The majority accuses the appellate court here of
refusing to follow this court's dicta in Gooden, stating that when
we said " 'any delay' " would not be attributable to defendant, "we
meant just that." Slip op. at 13. The majority's criticism, however,
ignores that the key phrase from Gooden actually reads "any delay
occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the
defendant." Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 222. The appellate court
grappled with our dicta in Gooden and found that the "statement
merely indicated that any delay occasioned by such late filing
would not be attributable to the defendant." It then found that "this
reasonably could refer to any future delay on account of the late
filing of the new and additional charges, and not necessarily to
delay that had already occurred." Under these circumstances, it is
clear that the appellate court attempted to follow our dicta, not
reject it as the majority posits.
	Taking the phrase about delay in context, I would conclude
that when this court said "delay occasioned by such a late filing"
(Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d at 222), it meant any future delay caused by
the filing of the late charges. I think it obvious that the
continuances defendant sought to better prepare for trial on the
contributing charge cannot be deemed "delay occasioned by the
late filing." Moreover, common sense indicates that previous delay
attributable to defendant on the earlier charge should also be
attributable to defendant with respect to the later-filed charges.
Otherwise a defendant receives a windfall-the State is required to
join all charges in a single prosecution with the speedy-trial clock
beginning to run with the first-filed charge and continuances
granted at a defendant's request only toll the clock with respect to
the first charge, not the later charges.
	I believe that the appellate court's interpretation better
comports with logic and the limited nature of the language used by
this court in Gooden. It would also prevent the improper use of the
speedy-trial statute as a sword instead of a shield. See, e.g., State
v. DeSantiago, 108 Wash. App. 855, 874-75, 33 P.3d 394, 402-03
(2001) (speedy-trial period begins to run with the earliest-filed
charge in a compulsory-joinder setting and delays attributable to
defendant on the earliest charge are attributable to defendant on
the later charges, but continuances necessary to prepare defendant
for later-filed charges do not toll speedy trial clock).
	The majority struggles to find some kind of harm that would
be caused by the appellate court's interpretation, and states as
follows: "When the State filed the more serious charges, the
defendant would face a Hobson's Choice between a trial without
adequate preparation and further pretrial detention to prepare for
trial." Slip op. at 14. I believe the majority's concern is unfounded,
as it again ignores the clear language of Gooden that any future
delay occasioned by the late filing is attributable to the State. If
the State subsequently files additional charges, a defendant would
be entitled to a continuance to prepare for those charges provided
additional preparation was reasonably needed. The dicta in
Gooden specifically indicates that this delay would be chargeable
to the State. Under the appellate court's interpretation, then,
defendant would be assured of adequate trial preparation and
would not be subject to one second more detention time than is
allowed by the speedy-trial statute. Yet, he would not receive a
windfall in the form of having his delay on the earlier charges
transferred to the State on the later charges.
	Here, defendant sought and was granted continuances to
prepare for trial and develop a defense in connection with the
charge of contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. The same
factual elements used to convict him of the contributing charge
were used to convict him of the Patterson murder charge. By
allowing defendant to successfully assert the speedy-trial statute
as a bar to his prosecution of the murder charge under these
circumstances, the majority has opened a new procedural loophole
that can be used to obstruct the ends of justice. For the reasons
stated, I would affirm defendant's conviction for the murder of
Patterson.
	I also disagree with the majority's reversal of the remainder
of defendant's convictions. I believe that the appellate court
correctly found that the State's failure to perfect its impeachment
of defendant by presenting the testimony of Everage was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
	By failing to raise a specific objection at trial and mention it
again in a posttrial motion, defendant waived the issue of whether
the State erroneously insinuated during cross-examination that
defendant had attempted to bribe Everage. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Plain error is a limited and narrow
exception to the general waiver rule, to be invoked only where the
evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error is so substantial
that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 128 (2001). The second part of the plain error doctrine
applies only where the claimed error is so grave that its
consideration is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation
of the judicial process, thereby preventing the denial of a fair trial.
Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d  at 128. In that regard, the incomplete
impeachment of a witness only rises to the level of reversible error
where the allegedly unfounded insinuation is substantial, repeated,
and prejudicial because of the closeness of the evidence. People v.
Amos, 204 Ill. App. 3d 75, 82 (1990). In other words, such
evidence deprives the defendant of a fair trial only when it
constitutes a material factor in the defendant's conviction so that,
without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been different.
People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 285 (1998).
	Here, the majority as much as acknowledges that the evidence
of defendant's guilt was not closely balanced, noting that the State
presented "strong" evidence of defendant's guilt. Slip op. at 20.
Moreover, the number of insinuations were not substantial; the
State did not even mention, yet alone emphasize, the Everage
bribery attempt in its closing argument. Given that the evidence
against the defendant was not closely balanced, I believe that any
error was harmless, as it does not appear that, without the
evidence, the verdict would likely have been different (Cortes, 181
Ill. 2d at 285).
	For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.