Title: STATE v FRENCH JR

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12732 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 STATE O F M O N T A N A , Plaintiff and Respondent, -VS - WILLIAM E. FRENCH, JR., Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Joseph P. Hennessey, argued, Billings, Montana Kenneth R. Wilson, argued, Miles City, Montana For ~espondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana William Krutzfeldt, County Attorney, appeared, Miles City, Montana Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, Montana James J. Sinclair argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: November 13, 1974 Decided : JRN - 8 :975 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal by defendant from a second degree murder conviction entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, and from t h a t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l . This Court previously granted a w r i t of supervisory con- t r o l r e l a t i n g t o matters r a i s e d p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l of t h i s case, but involving some of t h e i s s u e s now r a i s e d on appeal. See S t a t e ex rel. Krutzfeldt v . D i s t r i c t Court, Mont . , 515 P.2d 1312, 30 St.Rep. 993. On March 5, 1973, Douglas Fleming was shot and k i l l e d i n t h e Olive Hotel Lounge i n Miles City, Montana. Fleming and de- fendant, William E. French, Jr., had been engaged i n a shouting and pushing c o n t e s t a t t h e lounge entrance some f i f t e e n t o t h i r t y minutes p r i o r t o t h e shooting. Following t h e a l t e r c a t i o n , de- fendant drove t o h i s home, found h i s p i s t o l and returned t o t h e lounge. Without saying a word, he walked t o t h e booth where Fleming, Fleming's wife, and two f r i e n d s were seated, and f i r e d a t l e a s t t h r e e s h o t s i n t o Fleming. One of those shots penetrated Fleming's h e a r t , producing near-instantaneous death. Defendant then drove t o h i s home and c a l l e d t h e author- i t i e s , reporting t h a t he had shot a man. He was a r r e s t e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r and charged with f i r s t degree murder. P r i o r t o t r i a l , defendant f i l e d a w r i t t e n n o t i c e of h i s i n t e n t i o n t o r e l y on t h e defense of mental disease o r d e f e c t excluding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e homicide. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ordered a psychiatric examination t o be conducted a t t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital. Section 95-505, R.C.M. 1947. Defense p s y c h i a t r i s t s were a l s o permitted t o examine defendant. A r e p o r t of t h e examination by t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital w a s f i l e d with t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . It contained findings t h a t defendant, a t t h e time of the homicide, had t h e a b i l i t y t o appreciate t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct and t o conform h i s conduct t o t h e requirements of law. The r e p o r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t defendant had t h e capacity t o have k i l l e d a man with a d e l i b e r a t e and premeditated design, unlawfully and maliciously. A hearing was conducted pursuant t o t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 95-507, R.C.M. 1947. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t heard both l a y and expert testimony a s t o defendant's mental condition a t t h e t i m e of t h e shooting. I n e f f e c t , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s findings concurred with t h e r e p o r t f i l e d by t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital. Defendant's motion f o r a c q u i t t a l on t h e ground of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t excluding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was denied. Certain p r e t r i a l r u l i n g s of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w e r e then brought before t h i s Court i n a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l . Our opinion i n t h a t matter recognized t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - a l i t y of section 95-503, R.C.M. 1947; recognized t h a t t h e l e g i s - l a t u r e had created a new test f o r determining criminal responsi- b i l i t y ; and, declared t h a t t h e p r e t r i a l determination of defend- a n t ' s mental s t a t u s d i d not preclude h i s r a i s i n g t h e defense of mental d e f e c t a t t r i a l . S t a t e ex rel. Krutzfeldt v . D i s t r i c t Court, supra. A jury t r i a l w a s held and defendant was found g u i l t y of second degree murder. Thereafter, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t denied de- fendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l . Defendant appeals from t h e judgment of conviction and t h e d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l . Defendant seeks r e v e r s a l f o r t h e following alleged e r r o r s of t h e d i s t r i c t court: (1) Denial of defendant's motion f o r a c q u i t t a l by reason of mental disease o r d e f e c t excluding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ( 2 ) Denial of defendant's motion f o r a c q u i t t a l on t h e charge of f i r s t degree murder. ( 3 ) Errors r e l a t i n g t o t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of c e r t a i n evidence. ( 4 ) Improper c l o s i n g arguments by t h e prosecution. (5) Errors i n t h e giving o r r e f u s a l of c e r t a i n jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . F i r s t , defendant argues t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should have acquitted him by finding t h a t he had a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which excluded h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e homicide. The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 95-507(a), R.C.M. 1947, provides: " I f t h e r e p o r t f i l e d pursuant t o s e c t i o n 95-505 f i n d s t h a t t h e defendant a t the time of the crim- i n a l conduct charged suffered from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which rendered him unable t o appreciate t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct o r t o conform h i s conduct t o t h e requirements of law, and t h e c o u r t , a f t e r a hearing i f a hearing is requested by t h e attorney prosecuting o r t h e defendant, is s a t i s f i e d t h a t such mental disease o r d e f e c t was s u f f i c i e n t t o exclude r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t h e c o u r t on motion of t h e defendant s h a l l e n t e r judgment of a c q u i t t a l on t h e ground of mental disease o r d e f e c t excluding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " Three requirements must be met before a defendant can be acquitted under t h i s s t a t u t e : (1) A r e p o r t finding mental d i s - ease o r d e f e c t a t t h e t i m e of the criminal conduct; ( 2 ) t h e c o u r t ' s determination t h a t such mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t excluded r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; and ( 3 ) defendant's motion f o r a c q u i t t a l . Here, t h e r e p o r t f i l e d by t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital found no mental d i s e a s e o r defect. Under t h e terms of t h e s t a t u t e , t h i s precludes t h e granting of a p r e t r i a l a c q u i t t a l . The matter then must go t o t h e jury f o r f i n a l determination. Second, defendant claims t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should have granted h i s motion f o r a c q u i t t a l on t h e charge of f i r s t degree murder made a t t h e c l o s e of t h e state's case-in-chief. He moved f o r a c q u i t t a l on t h e grounds t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h i n t e n t , malice, premeditation o r t h e corpus d e l i c t i . W e w i l l treat t h i s motion a s a motion f o r dismissal of t h e charge of f i r s t degree murder under s e c t i o n 95-1909(i), R.C.M. 1947. That s e c t i o n provides, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "When, a t t h e c l o s e of t h e s t a t e ' s evidence o r a t t h e c l o s e of a l l the evidence, t h e evidence is i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support a finding o r v e r d i c t of g u i l t y , t h e c o u r t may on its own motion o r on t h e motion of t h e defendant, d i s - m i s s t h e a c t i o n and discharge t h e defendant. * * *!I A review of t h e record f i n d s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence support- ing t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e motion. A pathologist t e s t i f i e d t h a t Fleming died from a gunshot wound i n t h e heart. Defendant admitted shooting Fleming a t l e a s t t h r e e t i m e s , and h i s testimony was corroborated by eyewitnesses. Defendant and Fleming were involved i n an a l t e r c a t i o n f i f t e e n t o t h i r t y minutes p r i o r t o t h e shooting. I n t h e time between t h e two events, defendant drove t o h i s home, found h i s p i s t o l , and returned t o t h e scene. Saying nothing, he walked d i r e c t l y t o where Fleming was seated and f i r e d the s h o t s , before Fleming had an opportunity t o r e a c t . This f a c t u a l r e c i t a t i o n portrays only a portion of t h e evidence before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t when it denied t h e motion f o r a c q u i t t a l on t h e f i r s t degree murder charge. The evidence c l e a r l y provided s u b s t a n t i a l proof of the corpus d e l i c t i , i n t e n t , malice and premeditation. W e f i n d no e r r o r here. Third, defendant questions t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of a photo- graph of t h e victim; b u l l e t s removed from t h e bodies of t h e victim and h i s companion; and evidence of defendant's subsequent adjud- i c a t i o n of incompetency. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t admitted a black and white photograph of t h e v i c t i m ' s body which showed t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e b u l l e t wounds. Defendant argues t h a t t h e only purpose served by the introduction of t h i s e x h i b i t was t o inflame t h e minds of t h e jury. A s w e noted i n S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k , Mont . I 516 P.2d 605, 610, 30 St.Rep. 1052, 1058: " I * * * When t h e purpose of an e x h i b i t is inflame t h e minds of t h e jury o r e x c i t e t h e f e e l i n g s r a t h e r than t o e n l i g h t e n t h e jury any f a c t , it should be excluded.' S t a t e v. 131 Mont. 152, 159, 308 P.2d 969." as t o Bischert , The challenged photograph was r e l e v a n t . I t was used t o provide a foundation f o r t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e v i c t i m as t h e s u b j e c t examined. W e have viewed t h e photo- graph and f i n d it t o be noninflarnmatory. Were it not f o r t h e markings on t h e photograph, a viewer would have d i f f i c u l t y even a s c e r t a i n i n g t h a t it showed b u l l e t wounds. The challenge t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e p i s t o l and t h e b u l l e t s w a s t h a t no proper foundation was l a i d . There can be no question b u t t h a t t h e p o l i c e e r r e d i n t h e i r i n i t i a l i d e n t i f i - c a t i o n of t h e b u l l e t s , but it i s equally apparent t h e e r r o r w a s c o r r e c t e d later i n t h e t r i a l . Our review of t h e record d i s c l o s e s no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n t h e admission of t h e s e e x h i b i t s . Defendant a l s o contends t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t improperly granted t h e s t a t e ' s motion i n limine, excluding evidence t h a t a guardian had been appointed f o r defendant and t h a t he had been declared incompetent some nine months a f t e r t h e shooting. A l - though n e i t h e r t h e t r a n s c r i p t nor t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e contains t h e motion i n limine o r evidence of t h e incompetency a d j u d i c a t i o n , t h e a p p e l l a t e b r i e f s of both p a r t i e s acknowledge t h e e x i s t e n c e of both t h e motion and such evidence of incompetency. Therefore w e w i l l consider t h e matter a s argued i n t h e b r i e f s . I n S t a t e v. Crowe, 39 Mont. 174, 179, 1 0 2 P . 579, it was held t h a t : " * * * while t h e l a w does not f i x any l i m i t of t i m e within which t h e inquiry a s t o t h e mental condition of one accused of crime is t o be d i r e c t e d , t h e r u l e most generally recognized appears t o be t o r e f e r t h e matter t o t h e sound l e g a l d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l court, subject t o review f o r abuse of such d i s c r e t i o n only." However here defendant does not a l l e g e an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , but r a t h e r urges t h a t t h e c o u r t was bound t o take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e records of t h e incompetency proceeding. That argument is not persuasive, absent a showing t h e evidence would have been relevant. Without t h e b e n e f i t of any record of t h e motion i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , we a r e not a t l i b e r t y t o speculate a s t o t h e evidence before t h e d i s t r i c t court. Knowing only t h a t t h e d i s - t r i c t court prevented t h e introduction of evidence of an adjud- i c a t i o n which occurred nine months a f t e r t h e shooting, we f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . The passage of time may have so a l t e r e d conditions t h a t t h e adjudication was i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e of defendant's mental condition a t t h e time of t h e offense. See: 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law S 620(3). Defendant's f o u r t h a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r concerns t h e use made of t h e photograph of the v i c t i m ' s body i n t h e prosecution's c l o s i n g argument. A s already noted, t h e photograph i t s e l f was not inflammatory. N o objection w a s r a i s e d e i t h e r during o r a f t e r t h e state's closing argument, concerning t h e use made of t h e pic- t u r e t h e r e i n . The challenge a r i s e s only on t h i s appeal. A n ob- jection r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t time on appeal comes too l a t e . Boehler v. Sanders, 146 Mont. 158, 4 0 4 P.2d 885; Carpenter v. Free, 138 Mont. 552, 357 P.2d 882; Hayward v. Richardson Const. Co., 136 Mont. 2 4 1 , 347 P.2d 475. Defendant's f i n a l a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r r e l a t e s t o jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . Many of these challenges a r e presented i n summary fashion, and they w i l l be d e a l t with i n l i k e manner here. The i n s t r u c t i o n defining t h e degrees of murder is phrased i n t h e language of s e c t i o n 94-2503, R.C.M. 1947. ~ e f e n d a n t k o b j e c t i o n cannot be allowed. Defendant a l s o objected t o an i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n i n g and explaining t h e element of premeditation i n t h e f i r s t degree murder. Since defendant was n o t convicted of t h i s c r i m e , t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r i s i r r e l e v a n t . This Court has previously held i n S t a t e v . Le Duc, 89 Mont. 545, 566, 300 P. 919, under s i m i l a r circumstances: " * * * Since t h e defendant was convicted of second degree murder only, it follows t h a t t h e jury must have concluded t h a t t h e r e w a s no d e l i b e r a t i o n , and hence he was n o t prejudiced by t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n even though it be assumed t h a t it was erroneous." The d i s t r i c t c o u r t refused a n i n s t r u c t i o n which would have informed t h e j u r y of s e c t i o n 95-508, R.C.M. 1947, providing t h a t a person a c q u i t t e d by reason of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t s h a l l be committed t o t h e s t a t e h o s p i t a l u n t i l cured. While t h e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n a c c u r a t e l y s t a t e s t h e law, it does n o t follow t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e it. Defendant urges t h a t we adopt t h e r a t i o n a l e employed i n Lyles v . United S t a t e s , 103 U.S.App.D.C. 2 2 , 254 F.2d 725; cert. den. 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct. 997, 2 L ed 2d 1067; cert. den. 362 U.S. 943, 80 S.Ct. 809, 4 L ed 2d 771; cert. den. 368 U.S. 992, 82 S.Ct. 610, 7 L ed 2d 529. While t h a t c a s e r e f l e c t s t h e r u l e i n t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a t such an i n s t r u c t i o n must be given, we note t h a t t h i s p o s i t i o n has been e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d i n a number of j u r i s d i c t i o n s . See, e.g. S t a t e v. G a r r e t t , (Mo. 1965), 391 S.W.2d 235; S t a t e v. Conforti, 53 N . J . 239, 250 A.2d 6; S t a t e v. Hood, 123 V t . 273, 187 A.2d 499, 1 1 ALR3d 732; Lonquest v. S t a t e , (Wyo. 1972), 495 P.2d 575; cert. den. 409 U.S. 1006, 93 S.Ct. 432, 34 L ed 2d 299; Pope v. United S t a t e s , (CA5 1962), 298 F.2d 507. The c i t e d cases, and many o t h e r s c o l l e c t e d i n t h e Anno- t a t i o n a t 1 1 ALR3d, 737-753, adopt t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e concurring opinion subscribed t o by t h r e e of t h e judges i n Lyles. The r e s u l t of an a c q u i t t a l by reason of mental disease o r d e f e c t i s a wholly extraneous consideration, not connected with t h e j u r y ' s r o l e i n determining f a c t u a l i s s u e s properly before it. Our r a t i o n a l e here i s not unlike t h a t which w e adopted i n S t a t e v. Zuidema, 157 Mont. 367, 374, 485 P.2d 952, where we said: " * * * an i n s t r u c t i o n of t h i s type allows i r r e l e v a n t matters t o be considered by t h e jury which may influence i t s decision a s i d e from t h e standard of proof by t h e evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. * * * By i n s t r u c t - ing a jury on various p o s s i b i l i t i e s of sentence, t h e court suggests t h a t it should give weight t o t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y i n reaching a verdict." Although t h e i n s t r u c t i o n involved i n Zuidema concerned p o t e n t i a l sentence, while here we d e a l with commitment following a c q u i t t a l , t h e r a t i o n a l e remains the same. The j u r y ' s function is t o d e t e r - mine t h e f a c t s relevant t o g u i l t o r innocence. It should not concern i t s e l f with a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e c o u r t following t h e v e r d i c t . Accordingly, we find no e r r o r i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o i n s t r u c t on t h i s matter. W e have noted t h e o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s proposed by defend- a n t which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t refused t o give. Each was e i t h e r covered by other i n s t r u c t i o n s given o r was n o t appropriate under t h e evidence i n t h e case. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is affirmed. J u s t i c e W e concur L -, , -* /-- c- - 4L 7