Title: State v. Kierstead

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 45 
Docket: 
Kno-14-118, SRP-14-117 
Argued: 
February 10, 2015 
Decided: 
April 30, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
ANDREW J. KIERSTEAD 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Andrew J. Kierstead appeals from a judgment of conviction of murder, 
17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2014), entered in the trial court (Hjelm, J.) after a jury 
trial.  Kierstead argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
statements he made to law enforcement officers in the hours following the murder.1  
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
[¶2]  On October 10, 2012, a Knox County Grand Jury returned an 
indictment charging Kierstead with knowing or intentional murder.  17-A M.R.S. 
§ 201(1)(A).  Kierstead pleaded not guilty, and moved to suppress the statements 
he had made on September 27, claiming that they were involuntary due to his 
                                         
1  The sentence review panel has granted Kierstead’s application to allow an appeal of his sentence, 
and Kierstead argues that the court erred or abused its discretion in setting his forty-five-year prison 
sentence.  We find no error in the court’s sentencing decision pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1)-(2) 
(2014), and therefore affirm the sentence. 
 
2 
intoxication and emotional state at the time.2  We view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the court’s order.  State v. Collier, 2013 ME 44, ¶ 2, 
66 A.3d 563.   
[¶3]  On September 27, 2012, Kierstead went to Richard Mills’s house to 
buy methadone, which he regularly purchased illegally from Mills.  Kierstead had 
been drinking alcohol since early that morning, and he continued to drink at 
Mills’s house.  After Mills refused to provide Kierstead with methadone because 
Kierstead owed him money from prior drug purchases, Kierstead lured Mills 
outside on the pretext that he needed help with his truck.  Kierstead shot Mills with 
a twelve-gauge pump-action shotgun several times at close range, including four 
times in the back.  After the shooting, Kierstead swallowed Mills’s Vicodin pills in 
an attempt to commit suicide.   
[¶4]  After ingesting the pills and passing out for a period of time, Kierstead 
awoke and called 9-1-1.  He reported to the dispatcher that he had shot and killed 
his friend, whose body was in the driveway.  Kierstead provided an address for his 
location as well as a description of the property, and reported that he had tried to 
commit suicide by overdosing on pills.  The dispatcher instructed Kierstead to go 
out on the porch and wait for police to arrive.  Throughout the twelve-minute call, 
                                         
2  Kierstead did not contend that his statements were involuntary as a result of police coercion or 
improper state action.  
 
3 
Kierstead was “calm but upset,” repeatedly saying things to the effect of, “I can’t 
believe this happened,” and, “I ruined my life.”  He did not slur his speech or 
demonstrate any other signs of intoxication.   
[¶5]  Officer Kirk Guerrette of the Knox County Sheriff’s Department 
responded to the address Kierstead had provided, and found Kierstead sitting on 
the porch and talking on the phone.  Following Guerrette’s instructions, Kierstead 
put his hands behind his back and, without stumbling or falling, began walking 
backward toward Guerrette.  Guerrette asked where Mills was and how long he 
had been there, and Kierstead responded coherently and without slurring.  
Kierstead stood upright without difficulty during a pat-down search, was able to 
walk normally and unassisted, and was calm and compliant.  
 
[¶6]  The emergency medical technicians who evaluated Kierstead while he 
sat in the back of a police cruiser asked him several questions to determine his 
alertness, and Kierstead responded appropriately to each question.  An emergency 
medical technician also took Kierstead’s vitals, which, except for an elevated 
pulse, were all normal.  At one point, Kierstead stood up so that his blood pressure 
could be tested, and he did not stagger or fall in doing so.  Kierstead was alert and 
responsive throughout the evaluations, and did not nod off or slur his speech.  
Though one emergency medical technician described him as “in shock” or 
 
4 
“stunned,” no one who evaluated Kierstead believed him to be in need of medical 
care. 
 
[¶7]  Detective Reginald Walker of the Knox County Sheriff’s Department 
conducted an audio-recorded interview of Kierstead at the scene.  Walker, who at 
no point told Kierstead that he had to speak with him, read Kierstead his Miranda 
rights, each of which Kierstead indicated he understood before agreeing to speak 
with Walker.  Kierstead provided details about the shooting and also expressed his 
regret for shooting Mills.  Throughout the nonconfrontational interview, Kierstead 
was soft-spoken, but calm, coherent, and mostly responsive.  Although at times he 
did not immediately respond to certain questions, Walker was able to quickly 
regain his attention and resume his questioning.  At no point during the interview 
did Kierstead appear to lose consciousness.  Kierstead became emotional at times, 
particularly when he talked about the shooting.  He requested and was given water, 
and stated that he had not eaten in days but was not hungry.  At one point, 
Kierstead reported feeling nauseated and Walker let him step out of the car, which 
Kierstead had no apparent difficulty doing.  As Kierstead stood outside, Walker 
began talking with another officer about hunting, and Kierstead asked that they 
stop talking about guns and shooting things.  
[¶8]  Maine State Police detective Jason Andrews also met Kierstead at the 
scene.  Kierstead, who recalled having spoken with Walker and being read his 
 
5 
Miranda rights, said he was willing to speak with Andrews but asked that they 
leave the scene.  Andrews transferred Kierstead into his cruiser in order to bring 
him to the Rockland Police Department, and Kierstead had no difficulty standing 
or walking to Andrews’s car.  After Kierstead smoked a cigarette that Andrews had 
offered, he became nauseated and vomited.   
[¶9]  On the way to the police department, Kierstead spoke with Andrews 
about his job and where he lived.  He spoke clearly, and did not nod off or fall 
asleep during the drive.  Upon arriving at the police department, Kierstead drank 
more water and smoked another cigarette before again becoming ill and vomiting.  
[¶10]  Inside the police station, Detectives Andrews and Jackson conducted 
an audio-recorded interview of Kierstead.  Kierstead was again informed of his 
Miranda rights, and he indicated that he understood them and was willing to speak 
with the detectives.  The detectives were nonconfrontational and Kierstead agreed 
that they treated him fairly and did not compel him to make any statements.  After 
coherently providing details about the shooting, Kierstead stated that he had tried 
to kill himself and that he still wished to die.  As a result, and pursuant to standard 
booking procedure for an arrestee who indicates suicidal intentions, Kierstead was 
taken to Pen Bay Medical Center for a mental health evaluation.   
[¶11]  At the hospital, Dr. John Whitney Randolph examined Kierstead.  
Randolph concluded that Kierstead exhibited symptoms of toxic levels of 
 
6 
acetaminophen, which is found in Vicodin.  He believed that Kierstead was at the 
lowest stage of acetaminophen overdose, which is characterized by an upset 
stomach.  Randolph found that Kierstead’s blood-alcohol level was .054%—a rate 
he believed sufficient to impair one’s judgment.  Extrapolating backward based on 
standard metabolic rates, he calculated that around the time Kierstead spoke with 
law enforcement officers the previous evening his blood-alcohol level might have 
been as high as .20%.  At that level, Randolph opined, an individual may “slump 
over,” lose consciousness and perhaps become comatose, and have difficulty 
talking.   
 [¶12]  The court denied Kierstead’s suppression motion based on its 
conclusion that his statements had been proved voluntary beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The court reasoned that, though there was evidence that Kierstead had 
consumed Vicodin, methadone, and alcohol on the day of the shooting, he did not 
display signs of heightened drug impairment or of actual significant impairment 
due to alcohol.   
[¶13]  After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Kierstead 
guilty of murder.  The court sentenced Kierstead to forty-five years in prison.  
Kierstead appealed to us.  
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶14]  Kierstead contends that the court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because after the shooting he was in a state of intoxication and emotional 
distress that rendered his statements involuntary.  “We review the trial court’s 
factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error, and its ultimate 
determination regarding suppression de novo.”  State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 8, 
97 A.3d 595.  Because Kierstead does not challenge the court’s factual findings, 
we review only the legal determination that his statements were made voluntarily 
and should not be suppressed.  See id.  We will uphold the “denial of a motion to 
suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court’s decision.”  
State v. Ormsby, 2013 ME 88, ¶ 9, 81 A.3d 336 (quotation marks omitted).  
[¶15]  In order for a statement to be voluntary, the State must establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it is “the free choice of a rational mind, 
fundamentally fair, and not a product of coercive police conduct.”  
Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶¶ 15-16, 97 A.3d 595.  In determining voluntariness, we 
consider the totality of the circumstances.  Id ¶ 16.  That a person is under the 
influence of drugs or in emotional distress does not, by itself, render a statement 
involuntary.  See State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶ 22, 81 A.3d 360.  Rather, the 
particular circumstances of each case must be evaluated to determine whether a 
defendant’s drug-related or emotional condition made him incapable of acting 
 
8 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.  See State v. Ashe, 425 A.2d 191, 194 
(Me. 1981); State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶¶ 6, 12, 704 A.2d 387; State v. 
Philbrick, 481 A.2d 488, 494 (Me. 1984). 
[¶16]  Here, the court did not err in finding that the totality of the 
circumstances establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Kierstead’s statements to 
law enforcement3 were made voluntarily.  Though Kierstead exhibited some signs 
of a low-level acetaminophen overdose (specifically, nausea), and though there 
was objective evidence of Kierstead’s alcohol consumption, there is abundant 
evidence that Kierstead’s mental faculties were not significantly impaired at the 
time he made the statements in question.  This conclusion is supported not only by 
the detectives’ testimony and the interrogation recordings, but also by the 
testimony of the 9-1-1 dispatcher and medical personnel who evaluated Kierstead 
that night.   
[¶17]  Kierstead complied with the 9-1-1 dispatcher’s instruction to go out 
on the porch and wait for police to arrive.  Each individual who evaluated 
Kierstead after the shooting described him as calm, cooperative, and lucid.  He 
never nodded off or otherwise appeared drowsy.  He at no point exhibited slurred 
                                         
3  Though in its order on Kierstead’s motion to suppress the trial court expressly considered 
Kierstead’s statements to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, we decline to decide whether these statements were made 
to a law enforcement entity, and consider them only insofar as they are indicative of Kierstead’s ability to 
act voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 
 
9 
speech or difficulty with balance or ambulation.  He spoke clearly and coherently, 
and at all times exhibited an awareness of his circumstances.  
[¶18]  Moreover, Kierstead coherently and appropriately responded to the 
detectives’ questions, and was able to provide specific details about the shooting 
and the events that led to it.  He repeatedly affirmed that he understood his 
Miranda rights, and that he was willing to speak with police.  Kierstead asked for 
water when he became thirsty, accepted a cigarette when he was offered one, asked 
two officers to refrain from a conversation about shooting guns, and said that he 
was hungry but did not want to eat.  After a break in Walker’s interrogation, 
Kierstead recalled Walker’s name, and during the Rockland Police Department 
interview he recalled without hesitation Mills’s cellular and home telephone 
numbers.   
[¶19]  Although Kierstead appeared withdrawn or not immediately 
responsive at times, the court found that this was due to Kierstead’s reflecting on 
the gravity of the situation.  Likewise, although Kierstead’s suicide attempt and his 
repeated statements that he wished to die may indicate irrationality or impaired 
decision-making, these actions and statements are properly viewed in the context 
of Kierstead’s recognition of his circumstances.  His stated suicidal intentions and 
occasional emotional breakdowns do not override the fact that he was consistently 
 
10 
alert, coherent, and responsive.  See Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶¶ 22-25, 81 A.3d 360; 
Philbrick, 481 A.2d at 494. 
[¶20]  The record fully supports the court’s determination that the totality of 
the circumstances demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Kierstead’s 
statements to law enforcement were the free choice of a rational mind, were 
fundamentally fair, and were not a product of coercive police conduct.  See Bryant, 
2014 ME 94, ¶ 19, 97 A.3d 595.  The court did not err in determining that the 
statements were voluntary. 
The entry is: 
Judgment of conviction affirmed.  Sentence 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Steven C. Peterson, Esq., West Rockport, for appellant Andrew J. 
Kierstead 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellee State of Maine 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Steven C. Peterson, Esq., for appellant Andrew J. Kierstead 
 
Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of 
Maine 
 
Knox Superior Court docket number CR-2012-265 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY