Title: McColley v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McColley v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.1985 WY 183708 P.2d 441Case Number: 85-138Decided: 11/06/1985JAMES A. McCOLLEY, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE, 

EXETER DRILLING COMPANY, (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES A. McCOLLEY, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE, 

EXETER DRILLING COMPANY, 
(EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NiobraraCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Dennis C. Meier, 
Lusk, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order, after trial to the court, denying a worker's compensation claim. 
Appellant's issue on appeal is best summarized by appellee as 
follows:

"I. Did the trial court 
err in finding that Appellant failed to establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he suffered a compensable injury while working with Exeter 
Drilling Company[?]"

[¶2.]     Thus, we must review 
the record to determine the presence or absence of substantial evidence to 
support the district court. Lindbloom v. 
Teton International, Wyo., 684 P.2d 1388, 
1389 (1984); Olson v. Federal American 
Partners, Wyo., 567 P.2d 710, 712 (1977). Where a 
finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence, the judgment of the trier 
of fact will not be disturbed. Lindbloom 
v. Teton International, supra; Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522, 529 (1983). In determining 
sufficiency of the evidence, we assume the evidence in favor of the successful 
party to be true, leave out of consideration the evidence of the unsuccessful 
party in conflict therewith, and give the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. Anderson v. Bauer, 
Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1984); Yost v. Harpel Oil Company, Wyo., 674 P.2d 712, 716 
(1983). Furthermore, the burden of proof in a worker's compensation case is on 
the injured worker to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of DeForrest, Wyo., 603 P.2d 865 (1979); Matter of Haynie, Wyo., 
592 P.2d 693 (1979).

[¶3.]     In this case appellant 
testified that approximately a week after he began work with Exeter Drilling he 
was at the top of a derrick stacking pipe joints as they were being pulled out 
of the hole. In stacking the pipe, appellant had to stand on the portion of the 
rig into which the pipe is racked, which is called the "fingers," and which is 
located about eighty feet above the ground. Appellant testified that his right 
foot slipped between the fingers and that as he fell his weight was placed on 
his left leg and his left knee twisted, causing the injury upon which this case 
is predicated. Appellant further testified that after the fall he rode the 
elevator down to the floor, and then slipped and fell again as he walked across 
the wet floor. Appellant did not see a doctor at that time. Appellant continued 
to work for Exeter for one to two weeks, quitting to accept 
employment by the Natrona County Sheriff's Office.

[¶4.]     Appellant's supervisor 
at Exeter 
testified that after the slip in April of 1983 appellant told him that he was 
all right and could finish that tour; that he did not request to see a doctor; 
and that he was able thereafter to perform his duties and did not miss any 
work.

[¶5.]     In July of 1983, 
appellant's knee again suffered a disengagement and he went to the hospital. The 
records kept by the doctor at that time said that:

"Thirty-two year old 
deputy sheriff, twisted his left knee originally playing basketball. He heard 
something `pop', the knee swelled-up a lot. Since that time he's had recurrent 
episodes of disengagement, going out of the knee associated with swelling. 
Presents today with a recent episode of giving-way of the 
knee."

[¶6.]     Appellant's doctor 
testified that appellant was suffering from an anterior cruciate ligament tear 
that was chronic and at the very least six weeks old, and from a medial meniscus 
tear that was acute, and "occurred probably at the time of his most recent 
episode which was that episode of playing basketball."

[¶7.]     On July 9, 1983, when 
appellant visited the hospital, he advised both the hospital and the doctor to 
bill his personal health insurance and the health insurance provided him by his 
employer, the Sheriff's Office. At the time he was well aware of the reporting 
requirements for and benefits provisions of the worker's compensation 
system.

[¶8.]     At trial, appellant's 
doctor testified, by deposition, as follows:

"On the question is, 
`Based on those facts, is it possible for you to form a medical opinion as to 
when the anterior cruciate ligament tear occurred?'

"Answer, `Okay, all I am 
going to do is just repeat what I said before. Based on what I visualized, the 
objective evidence that I have when I am looking at the ligament through the 
orthoscope and also when I actually opened the knee up on the day I operated on 
him, he had a chronic anterior cruciate ligament tear, and I previously 
indicated in my testimony that it had to be at least six weeks old, if not 
older, and that's all I can say. I cannot really pin it down beyond that. You 
can come up with almost any scenario of the sequence of events of how things 
happen, and it doesn't necessarily mean that the anterior cruciate ligament had 
to be the first injury of the knee. An ultimate scenario would be that he could 
have, for example, sustained a small tear of the cartilage and then a subsequent 
injury, wipe out the anterior cruciate ligament, and then out of the increased 
instability in the knee, then - at a subsequent injury after that - then finish 
off the medial meniscus, for example, on the July 9th when he presented himself 
to the emergency room. So there is almost any number of 
scenarios.'

* * * * * 
*

"All right, on where Mr. 
Burley is asking the questions and Dr. Behrens is answering, the question is, 
`This is Tom Burley again, Doctor. I just have one question. Isn't it true, 
then, that what you are saying is that it is only within the realm of medical 
possibility that the anterior cruciate ligament tear occurred when he fell 
through the fingers, and you can't say that it is within the realm of medical 
probability that it occurred then?'

"Answer, `That's 
absolutely correct.'"

[¶9.]     The trial court, in its 
Order Denying Claims for Awards, found that appellant had not established, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered a compensable injury 
and

"2. That the evidence 
showed that the Employee-Claimant had injured his knee prior to commencing his 
employment, with the Employer-Defendant, in April 1983, and that the tear of the 
anterior cruciate ligament of his left knee was chronic and could have occurred 
as much as two years prior to the tear of the median meniscus, which occurred on 
or about July 9, 1983, after his employment with the Employer-Defendant was 
terminated."

[¶10.]  After the careful and thorough review 
that this court gives to every record on appeal, we find there was ample 
evidence to support factual findings of the district court in all 
respects.

[¶11.]  Affirmed.