Title: Stein v. Me. Criminal Justice Academy

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2014 ME 82 
Docket: 
Cum-13-466 
Argued: 
May 14, 2014 
 
Decided: 
June 24, 2014 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
NICHOLAS STEIN 
 
v. 
 
MAINE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACADEMY 
 
 
SILVER, J. 
 
[¶1]  Nicholas Stein appeals from an order of the Superior Court 
(Cumberland County, Warren, J.) affirming the decision by the Maine Criminal 
Justice Academy Board of Trustees to suspend for one year Stein’s certificate of 
eligibility to act as a corrections officer.  Stein challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the Board’s finding that he committed an assault against an 
inmate at the Cumberland County Jail.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Nicholas Stein worked as a corrections officer at the Cumberland 
County Jail for about twelve years before this incident.  On June 17, 2011, while 
Stein was working an overtime shift, an inmate housed in the 72-hour pod1 
                                         
1  The 72-hour pod serves primarily as temporary housing for inmates awaiting classification. 
 
2 
threatened to commit suicide.  Stein offered to assist the pod supervisor with 
removing the suicidal inmate from the pod. 
 
[¶3]  While Stein and the pod supervisor were attempting to speak with the 
suicidal inmate and remove him from his cell, another inmate entered the pod and 
went up a set of stairs to the second-floor tier, where his cell was located.  Stein 
and the pod supervisor were the only officers on duty in the pod, so the pod 
supervisor instructed the inmate to wait outside his cell until it could be unlocked.  
The inmate became agitated, climbed onto the second-floor railing, and threatened 
to commit suicide by jumping to the concrete below.  Stein attempted to engage 
with the inmate telling him that if he jumped he would only succeed in breaking 
his ankles. 
 
[¶4]  The inmate jumped feet first landing directly in front of Stein.  Stein 
heard the sound of bones breaking as the inmate fell to the ground.  Stein 
immediately handcuffed the inmate’s hands toward the front.  Although both Stein 
and the pod supervisor were carrying radios, neither called for medical assistance 
as required by jail policy.  Instead, Stein, who had successfully completed 124 
hours of training as a Basic Emergency Medical Technician, grabbed the inmate’s 
shirt by the back of the collar and dragged the inmate, who was lying on his back, 
toward the medical department.  The pod supervisor used his radio to call 
sub-control and requested that the door to the pod be unlocked.  As Stein dragged 
 
3 
the inmate toward the medical unit, he had to stop at the locked door to the 72-hour 
pod; however, sub-control opened it almost immediately when he reached it.  The 
distance from the spot where the inmate landed to the pod door was about twenty 
or twenty-five feet.  As Stein continued to drag the inmate toward an observation 
cell in the medical department, the inmate’s pants were dragged down so that the 
inmate’s bare skin was in contact with the ground.  Another corrections officer 
described the sound of the inmate being dragged as similar to the sound of 
sneakers on a gym floor. 
 
[¶5]  The total distance Stein dragged the inmate was 127 feet, which took 
forty-six seconds.  During that time, the inmate was screaming and crying in pain, 
complaining that his ankles hurt.  Neither the pod supervisor nor any one of the 
several other corrections officers who saw Stein dragging the inmate down the 
hallway attempted to stop him.  Once they arrived in the medical unit, Stein placed 
the inmate on an observation mattress on the floor and loosened the inmate’s 
handcuffs because they appeared to be too tight. 
 
[¶6]  The inmate suffered two broken ankles as a result of the jump.  He also 
had abrasions on his hip, which he claimed resulted from being dragged across the 
floor.  However, the direction of the marks appeared to be inconsistent with the 
direction in which Stein dragged him, and another officer overheard the inmate say 
 
4 
that the injury was a result of being dragged on the ground behind an automobile 
several days prior to his incarceration. 
 
[¶7]  Stein’s employment was terminated as a result of this incident.  He was 
charged with assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2013), in August 2011.  
The Board of Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy, which is 
responsible 
for 
certifying 
and 
disciplining 
corrections 
officers, 
see 25 M.R.S. § 2801(2) (2013), notified Stein in October 2011 that it was 
investigating the incident.  In December 2011 the Board informed Stein that it had 
voted to revoke his corrections-officer certificate.  Stein appealed that decision by 
requesting a hearing pursuant to 25 M.R.S. § 2806(2)(A)(1) (2012).2  Meanwhile, 
in March 2012, Stein was acquitted of the criminal assault charge following a jury 
trial.  Stein was reinstated to his position at the jail by an arbitrator in June 2012. 
 
[¶8]  In May and June of 2012, a two-day hearing concerning the status of 
Stein’s corrections-officer certification was held before a hearing officer.  In 
August 2012, the hearing officer issued his Recommended Decision, in which he 
determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Stein had committed assault 
against the inmate.  Specifically, the hearing officer found that Stein recklessly 
caused bodily injury or offensive physical contact, and that this conduct constituted 
                                         
2  This section was repealed and replaced by  P.L. 2013, ch. 147, §§ 38, 39 (effective October 9, 2013) 
(codified at 25 M.R.S. § 2806-A (2013)). 
 
5 
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent 
person would observe under the circumstances.  However, the hearing officer 
concluded that a full revocation was not warranted and instead recommended that 
Stein’s certificate be suspended for one year.  The Board issued a final decision 
adopting the hearing officer’s recommendation and findings in September 2012. 
 
[¶9]  Stein appealed the suspension to the Superior Court pursuant to 
M.R. Civ. P. 80C.  The suspension of Stein’s certificate was stayed automatically 
pursuant to 25 M.R.S. § 2806(3-A) (2012).3  The Superior Court affirmed the 
Board’s decision in September 2013.  Stein filed a notice of appeal on 
October 7, 2013, and we granted his motion to stay the suspension of his certificate 
pending the outcome of this appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶10]  The Board of Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy serves 
to “protect the public health and welfare” by “ensuring that the public is served by 
competent and honest criminal justice practitioners and by establishing minimum 
standards of proficiency in the [criminal justice] professions by examining, 
licensing, 
regulating 
and 
disciplining 
practitioners 
of 
those 
regulated 
professions[,]” including corrections officers, criminal justice executives, harbor 
                                         
3  This section was repealed and replaced by P.L. 2013, ch. 147, §§ 38, 39 (effective October 9, 2013) 
(codified at 25 M.R.S. § 2806-A (2013)). 
 
6 
masters, judicial marshals, law enforcement officers, and transport officers.  
25 M.R.S. §§ 2801(2), 2803-A.  A corrections officer must possess a current and 
valid certificate of eligibility issued by the Board.  25 M.R.S. §§ 2801-A(2), 
2804-D(1) 
(2013). 
 
At 
the 
time 
of 
Stein’s 
administrative 
appeal, 
25 M.R.S.§ 2806(1) (2012) provided, in relevant part: 
 
The board of trustees: 
 
. . . .  
 
 
B.  May suspend or revoke the certificate . . . of any 
person who: 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
 
(2)  Has engaged in conduct that is prohibited or 
penalized by state law as murder or a Class A, Class B, 
Class C or Class D crime or a violation of any provision 
of the Maine Criminal Code, chapter 15, 19, 25 or 45. 
 
A. 
The Board’s Findings 
 
[¶11]  When the “Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court 
reviewing agency acts pursuant to Rule 80C, we review the agency’s decision 
directly.”  Me. Health Care Ass’n Workers’ Comp. Fund v. Superintendent of Ins., 
2009 ME 5, ¶ 8, 962 A.2d 968.  When reviewing an agency’s factual findings, we 
will not substitute our own judgment for that of the Board.  Duffy v. Town of 
Berwick, 2013 ME 105, ¶ 22, 82 A.3d 148.  “[T]hat the record before the Board is 
inconsistent or could support a different decision does not render the decision 
 
7 
wrong.”  Id.  (quotation marks omitted).  “An administrative decision will be 
sustained if, on the basis of the entire record before it, the agency could have fairly 
and reasonably found the facts as it did.”  Seider v. Bd. of Exam’rs of 
Psychologists, 2000 ME 206, ¶ 9, 762 A.2d 551.  As the party seeking to overturn 
the agency’s decision, Stein bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that no 
competent evidence supports the Board’s decision.  Id. 
 
1. 
State of Mind Required to Prove Assault 
 
[¶12]  Pursuant to the Maine Criminal Code, a person is guilty of assault if 
“[t]he person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury or 
offensive physical contact to another person.”  17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A).  “A 
person acts recklessly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the 
person consciously disregards a risk that the person’s conduct will cause such a 
result.”  17-A M.R.S. § 35(3)(A) (2013).  Further, “the disregard of the risk, when 
viewed in light of the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the 
circumstances known to the person, must involve a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the 
same situation.”  17-A M.R.S. § 35(3)(C) (2013).  “By definition, conscious 
disregard is a subjective state of mind.”  State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268, 280 
(Me. 1979) (quotation marks omitted).  “The [fact-finder] may infer the 
 
8 
defendant’s state of mind from his objective conduct.”  State v. Taylor, 661 A.2d 
665, 668 (Me. 1995). 
 
[¶13]  Stein argues that he was in a state of shock when he dragged the 
inmate to the medical unit, thus he was not consciously disregarding the risk of 
causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact to the inmate.  Stein also 
contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding 
that his conduct amounted to a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a 
reasonable corrections officer would observe in the same situation.  He argues that 
the hearing officer found simply that Stein violated jail policies and procedures, 
and that the hearing officer placed too much weight on that finding in reaching the 
conclusion that Stein’s behavior constituted a gross deviation. 
 
[¶14]  Stein further contends that we should review this issue de novo 
because it involves the application of law to the facts.  However, whether Stein’s 
conduct was a gross deviation is a factual finding that is properly left to the 
fact-finder’s determination.  See Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs., 2001 ME 37, ¶ 
10, 767 A.2d 310 (“[W]hether a defendant’s conduct was reasonable under the 
circumstances [is a] question[] of fact.”); State v. Ledger, 599 A.2d 813, 815 
(Me. 1991) (concluding that evidence supported “the jury’s conclusion that [the 
defendant’s] conduct was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation”); State v. 
 
9 
Gammon, 529 A.2d 813, 815 (Me. 1987) (“We cannot say that the District Court 
erred in finding that [the defendant’s conduct] involved reckless conduct, a 
conscious disregard of a known risk, and a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same 
situation.”); State v. Perfetto, 424 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Me. 1981) (“A rational jury 
could conclude that [the defendant’s conduct] was a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the 
same situation.”).  As such, it must be upheld if there is any competent evidence in 
the record to support it.  See Seider, 2000 ME 206, ¶¶ 8-9, 762 A.2d 551. 
 
[¶15]  The hearing officer found that “[i]t was reckless for [Stein] to move 
the inmate without attempting to secure medical care.”  Although this statement, 
standing alone, does not identify which risks, if any, Stein may have consciously 
disregarded, the decision went on to explain in detail why the hearing officer 
concluded that Stein consciously disregarded the risk of causing bodily injury or 
offensive physical contact.  Specifically, the decision noted that Stein was aware 
that the inmate’s injuries likely involved broken bones, that Stein had been trained 
to immobilize an inmate who had sustained such serious injuries, that the inmate 
was screaming in pain, that the inmate’s buttocks were partially exposed while he 
was being dragged, and that Stein repeatedly asked the inmate, “Was it worth it?”  
Similarly, in his response to the parties’ exceptions to the Recommended Decision, 
 
10 
the hearing officer unequivocally found “that Mr. Stein consciously disregarded 
the risk” and that “[a] reasonable person, including a corrections officer, aged 18 
or older in Mr. Stein’s mental state, would have recognized the risk and would not 
disregard it.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
[¶16]  In short, the record contains sufficient evidence to permit a fact-finder 
to infer that Stein acted recklessly by consciously disregarding the risk that his 
actions would cause bodily injury or offensive physical contact to the inmate.  
Similarly, the evidence supports the finding that Stein’s conduct constituted a gross 
deviation “from the standard of conduct of an ordinary and prudent corrections 
officer as well as that of a reasonably prudent person.”  Stein’s objective 
conduct⎯including dragging the inmate for forty-six seconds⎯provides a 
sufficient basis for the hearing officer to infer that Stein acted with a reckless state 
of mind.  See Taylor, 661 A.2d at 668. 
 
2. 
Bodily Injury or Offensive Physical Contact 
 
[¶17]  “Bodily injury means physical pain, physical illness or any 
impairment of physical condition.”  17-A M.R.S. § 2(5) (2013) (quotation marks 
omitted).  There is no statutory definition of offensive physical contact, but we 
have previously explained that “the question is whether a reasonable person would 
find the contact to be offensive.”  State v. Pozzuoli, 1997 ME 91, ¶ 7, 693 A.2d 
 
11 
745.  “Although the victim’s reaction to the contact is relevant, it is not 
determinative of whether contact is offensive.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶18]  Stein contends that the only evidence relating to this element was the 
inmate’s subjective response.  He asserts that the hearing officer did not adequately 
consider that the conduct occurred during an emergency situation, lasted only 
forty-six seconds, and resulted in the inmate obtaining necessary medical care.  
However, the hearing officer’s decision explained that 
[u]nder these circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of 
[the inmate] would most likely have felt humiliated and degraded by 
being dragged across the floor by the shirt collar with his buttocks at 
times half or more exposed, while seriously injured and in pain and 
unable to stand, resist or protect himself. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  This finding reflects that the hearing officer appropriately 
considered whether Stein’s actions caused physical contact that was objectively 
offensive.  The finding that the contact was offensive was supported by evidence in 
the record, including the inmate’s statement that he should have been treated like a 
human.  See Pozzuoli, 1997 ME 91, ¶ 7, 693 A.2d 745. 
 
[¶19]  Stein further argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the 
finding that Stein caused bodily injury to the inmate.  Because the hearing officer 
found that Stein’s conduct resulted in offensive physical contact, there is no 
requirement that the State prove bodily injury as well.  See 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 207(1)(A).  Nevertheless, Stein argues that, because there was inconsistent 
 
12 
testimony about whether the abrasions on the inmate’s hips were caused by Stein 
or by an incident that occurred prior to the inmate’s incarceration, there is 
insufficient evidence to support a finding that Stein caused bodily injury. 
 
[¶20]  Stein’s argument fails for two reasons.  First, the hearing officer did 
not find that Stein caused the abrasions; on the contrary, he explicitly found that 
Stein caused bodily injury “[r]egardless of whether [the inmate’s] abrasions were 
caused by his being dragged by an automobile prior to his jail injuries or whether 
they were caused in full or in part from being dragged across the jail floor.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
[¶21]  Second, contrary to Stein’s assertion, the hearing officer was not 
required to find that Stein caused the abrasions in order to find that Stein caused 
bodily injury.  The hearing officer’s findings make clear that he relied on the 
statutory definition of bodily injury, which includes “physical pain” as a category 
of bodily injury.  17-A M.R.S. § 2(5).  The hearing officer found, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, “it is more likely true than not that Mr. Stein 
caused [the inmate] additional pain to his ankles by dragging him 127 feet across a 
concrete floor without in any way supporting [the inmate’s] shattered ankles.”  
Because this finding is supported by competent evidence in the record⎯including 
evidence that the inmate complained that his ankles hurt while he was being 
dragged⎯we must uphold it.  See Seider, 2000 ME 206, ¶¶ 8-9, 762 A.2d 551. 
 
13 
B. 
The Board’s Ultimate Decision 
 
[¶22]  Stein argues that the Board’s decision to suspend his certificate was 
arbitrary and capricious because the Board took no similar action against the pod 
supervisor.  He asserts that he and the pod supervisor are similarly situated and that 
the disparity between the Board’s initial decision to revoke Stein’s certificate 
entirely and its failure to take any disciplinary action against the pod supervisor 
demonstrates an abuse of discretion. 
 
[¶23]  In an appeal from a Rule 80C judgment, we review the administrative 
agency’s decision directly for an abuse of discretion.  Forest Ecology Network v. 
Land Use Regulation Comm’n, 2012 ME 36, ¶ 28, 39 A.3d 74.  Because the 
decisions concerning whether to revoke or suspend a correction officer’s certificate 
are discretionary, Stein has the burden of demonstrating that the Board abused its 
discretion in reaching its final decision.  See id.  “An abuse of discretion may be 
found where an appellant demonstrates that the decisionmaker exceeded the 
bounds of the reasonable choices available to it, considering the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case and the governing law.”  Lippitt v. Bd. of 
Certification for Geologists and Soil Scientists, 2014 ME 42, ¶ 16, 88 A.3d 154 
(quotation marks omitted).  “It is not sufficient to demonstrate that, on the facts of 
the case, the decisionmaker could have made choices more acceptable to the 
 
14 
appellant or even to a reviewing court.”  Sager v. Town of Bowdoinham, 
2004 ME 40, ¶ 11, 845 A.2d 567. 
 
[¶24]  Stein has not demonstrated that the one-year suspension exceeded the 
bounds of reasonable choices available to the Board.  Whether the pod supervisor 
or other officers were disciplined for their different roles in the incident is not 
persuasive in our consideration of whether the Board exceeded the bounds of its 
discretion with respect to Stein.  The Board was authorized by statute to revoke or 
suspend 
Stein’s 
certificate 
upon 
making 
the 
appropriate 
findings.  
See 25 M.R.S. § 2806(1)(B)(2) (2012).  The hearing officer’s recommendation was 
issued after a two-day evidentiary hearing, and the Board accepted the hearing 
officer’s more lenient recommendation.  On this record, we discern no basis for 
concluding that the Board’s decision to issue a one-year suspension constituted an 
abuse of discretion. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Kristine C. Hanly, Esq., Portland, for appellant Nicholas Stein 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Dennis E. Smith, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellee Maine Criminal Justice Academy 
 
15 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Kristine C. Hanly, Esq., Portland, for appellant Nicholas Stein 
 
Dennis E. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Maine Criminal 
Justice Academy 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-12-53 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY