Title: Morrisette v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM WILTON MORRISETTE, III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record Nos. 020323 & 020324    JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   SEPTEMBER 13, 2002 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
William C. Andrews, III, Judge 
 
A jury convicted William Wilton Morrisette, III, of 
the 1980 rape and capital murder of Dorothy M. White.  At 
the conclusion of the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial, 
the jury fixed Morrisette’s punishment at death on the 
capital murder charge and at life imprisonment on the rape 
charge.  The jury based its sentence of death on findings 
of both “future dangerousness” and “vileness.”  See Code 
§ 19.2-264.2.  The trial court sentenced Morrisette in 
accordance with the jury verdict. 
We have consolidated the automatic review of 
Morrisette’s death sentence with his appeal of the capital 
murder conviction.  Code § 17.1-313(F).  We have also 
certified Morrisette’s appeal of his rape conviction from 
the Court of Appeals and consolidated that appeal with the 
appeal of the capital murder conviction.  Code § 17.1-409.  
After considering the issues raised in Morrisette’s 
assignments of error and conducting our mandated review 
pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C), we find no error in the 
judgments of the circuit court.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm Morrisette’s convictions for rape and capital 
murder, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-61 and 18.2-31(5), 
respectively, and his sentence of death. 
I. FACTS 
In accordance with well-established principles, we 
state the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.  Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 178, 563 S.E.2d 695,701 (2002) 
(citing Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313, 541 S.E.2d 
872, 877, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 621 (2001); 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 632, 499 S.E.2d 538, 
543 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999); Roach v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 329, 468 S.E.2d 98, 101, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996)).  We also accord the 
Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible 
from the evidence.  Id. (citing Higginbotham v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 
(1975)). 
A. GUILT PHASE 
 
When Dorothy White did not report for work on the 
morning of July 25, 1980, two of her co-workers became 
concerned and went to her house trailer, located on Pine 
Needle Road in the City of Hampton, to check on her 
 
2
welfare.  Upon entering the trailer, they found White’s 
body lying on the kitchen floor.  Her blouse and bra were 
pulled up, exposing her breasts; she was otherwise nude.  
Her throat had been cut, and she had sustained several 
other wounds.  A “milky-looking substance [that] appeared 
to be wet” was visible on her pubic hair.  The kitchen was 
splattered with blood, but there were no signs of a 
struggle in any other portion of White’s home nor any 
evidence of a forced entry into the dwelling. 
An autopsy was performed the next day, during which 
samples of White’s hair, blood, and body fluids were 
collected from her body by using a Physical Evidence 
Recovery Kit (PERK).  Testing of those samples revealed the 
presence of intact sperm on the swabs taken from White’s 
vulva, vagina, and cervix; only a sperm head was found on 
the anal swab.  The autopsy documented that White had 
suffered a slash wound across her throat, which totally 
severed her trachea, the right carotid artery, the jugular 
vein, and certain muscles in her neck; the wound partially 
severed the esophagus.  White had also sustained a stab 
wound to her neck; three stab wounds to her chest, one of 
which penetrated her heart; and stab wounds to her abdomen 
and flank, for a total of eight stab wounds.  Additional 
 
3
defensive wounds on her hands and legs indicated that White 
had attempted to ward away the knife blows. 
Several of the wounds individually could have caused 
White’s death, but the slash wound to her throat was “fatal 
within minutes.”  However, despite the lethal nature of 
that wound, it did not render White instantly unconscious.  
Dr. Faruk B. Presswalla, the forensic pathologist who 
performed the autopsy, testified that because the trachea, 
or windpipe, was cut, much of the flowing blood traveled 
down that airway.  He described the effect as “sort of like 
drowning in your own blood.”  The time of death was 
estimated at approximately 11:30 p.m. on the night before 
White’s co-workers discovered her body. 
 
In the days following the murder, police officers 
interviewed several individuals as possible suspects, 
including Morrisette.  Morrisette acknowledged that he knew 
White through his employer, Albert “Bill” Anthony, who was 
White’s “boyfriend,” and that he had previously washed 
White’s automobile when she brought it to Anthony’s “car 
lot.”  Morrisette had also accompanied Anthony to White’s 
residence on two occasions, once to perform yard work and 
the second time to pick up a stereo.  When Morrisette was 
questioned concerning his whereabouts on the night in 
question, he stated that he had gone to Fertitta’s 
 
4
Restaurant, where he had consumed hot dogs and beer.  He 
stated that after eating, he walked to the Grandview 
Fishing Pier, talked with several people who were fishing, 
and drank another beer.  According to Morrisette, he then 
went to the Circle Inn around 10:00 p.m. and stayed there 
until 2:00 a.m. the following morning.  He told the police 
that, although his sister lived in an apartment above the 
Circle Inn, he did not go to her apartment when he left the 
Circle Inn, but instead slept in an old Dodge pick-up truck 
in the parking lot of the Circle Inn.  He said that he 
awoke around 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. the next morning, returned 
to the Circle Inn, and drank with a person who lived in a 
trailer park across the street from the Circle Inn. 
 
The murder investigation became stalled, and no one 
was charged with the crime until 19 years later, when a DNA 
profile extracted from sperm retrieved from the cervix and 
vulva swabs of White’s body was entered into the Virginia 
Forensic Laboratory’s DNA databank.1  A search in the 
databank revealed that Morrisette’s DNA profile2 was a “cold 
                     
1 In a training session concerning the DNA databank, 
the Hampton Police Department had been asked to submit 
“cold cases” for retesting. 
 
2 The record does not reflect when Morrisette’s DNA 
profile was put into the Virginia Forensic Laboratory’s DNA 
databank.  However, on brief, Morrisette states that his 
 
5
hit” match with the DNA profile recovered in the PERK 
samples taken from White.  As a result, a search warrant 
was obtained for a sample of Morrisette’s blood, and 
additional testing using that sample confirmed that the DNA 
profile extracted from the sperm recovered from the victim 
was consistent with Morrisette’s DNA profile.3  According to 
David A. Pomposini, who testified at trial as an expert in 
the field of forensic biology, the probability of randomly 
selecting an unrelated individual other than Morrisette 
with a DNA profile matching the DNA profile of the sperm 
recovered from the cervix swabs of the victim is one in 900 
million in the Caucasian population, one in 1.2 billion in 
the Black population, and one in 800 million in the 
Hispanic population.4
B. PENALTY PHASE 
 
In the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
introduced photographs of the victim as evidence of the 
vileness of the murder.  The Commonwealth also argued that 
_________________________ 
DNA profile was entered in connection with his convictions 
on charges of abduction and maiming in 1986. 
 
3 Arrest warrants charging Morrisette with rape and 
first degree murder were obtained simultaneously with the 
search warrant.  A grand jury subsequently indicted 
Morrisette for rape and capital murder. 
 
4 Morrisette is a member of the Caucasian population. 
 
 
6
Morrisette was a future danger to society, introducing 
evidence of his previous convictions for abduction and 
maiming in 1986, for burglary in 1984, and for driving 
under the influence of alcohol in 1999. 
 
The victim of the prior abduction and maiming 
testified that Morrisette had attacked her as she sat in a 
car parked outside a high school, waiting for her daughter 
to emerge from band practice.  He had a knife and pushed 
her down onto the car seat, trying to gag her.  Morrisette 
cut her jawbone and neck, fleeing only when other vehicles 
approached. 
 
In mitigation, Morrisette and the Commonwealth 
stipulated that, according to a deputy at the regional jail 
where Morrisette had been incarcerated prior to trial, 
Morrisette was a model inmate with a positive attitude.  
Morrisette’s daughter and sister testified as to his 
affection for his family.5
II. ANALYSIS 
A. PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL ISSUES 
1. SPEEDY TRIAL 
 
Morrisette claims that the delay between the time of 
                     
5 We will summarize additional facts and material 
proceedings when necessary to address specific issues 
raised on appeal. 
 
7
the offense in 1980 and his arrest in August 1999 violated 
his due process rights under both the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of Virginia.  In the 
statement that Morrisette gave to the police shortly after 
the murder, he provided details concerning his whereabouts 
on the evening in question, including names, addresses, and 
telephone numbers of putative corroborating witnesses.  
Testimony at trial established that the police never made 
any attempt to confirm Morrisette’s alleged alibi after he 
provided that information.  Morrisette asserts that, as a 
result of the pre-indictment delay, he was unable to locate 
the people who could have corroborated his version of his 
activities on the evening when White was murdered. 
 
To buttress his claim of prejudice because of the pre-
indictment delay, Morrisette also relies on the fact that, 
in 1985, White’s PERK samples were resubmitted to the 
forensic laboratory for testing against Morrisette’s PERK 
samples collected in connection with the abduction and 
maiming charges.  However, Morrisette’s PERK was never 
submitted to the laboratory, and the Hampton Police 
Department eventually directed that White’s PERK be 
returned without any additional testing. 
 
In denying Morrisette’s motion to dismiss the 
indictments because of the pre-indictment delay, the trial 
 
8
court concluded that both the Commonwealth and Morrisette 
had probably experienced some actual prejudice because of 
the death of witnesses since White’s murder.  However, the 
court determined that a defendant has the burden to 
establish that the delay was intentional and used by the 
Commonwealth to gain a tactical advantage, and concluded 
that Morrisette had not carried that burden in this case.  
We agree with the trial court’s conclusions. 
 
It is important at the outset to point out that the 
type of delay about which Morrisette complains is pre-
indictment delay, not post-indictment delay.  Thus, the 
Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment is inapplicable.  
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977); Hall 
v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 526, 528-29, 383 S.E.2d 18, 20 
(1989).  Instead, the Due Process Clause is the source of 
constitutional protection against oppressive pre-indictment 
delay, but even that clause has a limited role to play in 
such situations.  Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789. 
 
“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not 
sufficient element of a due process claim, and . . . the 
due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay 
as well as the prejudice to the accused.”  Id. at 790 
(citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 
(1971)).  Thus, to gain dismissal of criminal charges 
 
9
because of pre-arrest or pre-indictment delay, a defendant 
must establish that “(1) the prosecutor intentionally 
delayed indicting [the defendant] to gain a tactical 
advantage and (2) the defendant incurred actual prejudice 
as a result of the delay.”  United States v. Amuny, 767 
F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1985); accord United States v. 
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984) (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. 
at 789-90; Marion, 404 U.S. at 324).  See also United 
States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843 (1987); United States v. 
Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 166-68 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988); United States v. Rogers, 118 
F.3d 466, 474-75 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Stierwalt, 16 F.3d 282, 285 (8th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Hayes, 40 F.3d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 812 (1995).  The defendant bears the burden of 
proving both actual prejudice and improper purpose.  
Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752; accord Ismaili 828 F.2d at 167; 
Amuny, 767 F.2d at 1119; Hayes, 40 F.3d at 365. 
 
In the present case, we hold that Morrisette failed to 
establish that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed 
arresting or indicting him in order to gain a tactical 
advantage.  Morrisette concedes that there is no direct 
 
10
evidence to prove this element of the two-part test.  
Nevertheless, he argues that an improper motive can be 
inferred from the fact that the requested comparison 
testing of White’s and Morrisette’s respective PERK samples 
was not completed in 1985 and because of the police 
department’s “willful failure” to verify the statement 
Morrisette gave a few days after White’s murder.  We do not 
agree.  The evidence demonstrates that the police 
investigated several possible suspects and that the focus 
of the investigation simply shifted to persons other than 
Morrisette.  Thus, the trial court did not err in denying 
Morrisette’s motion to dismiss the indictments because of 
the pre-indictment delay.  Morrisette’s due process rights 
under the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of Virginia were not violated by the delay.  
See Willis v. Mullett, 263 Va. 653, 657, 561 S.E.2d 705, 
708 (2002) (due process protections afforded under the 
Constitution of Virginia are co-extensive with those of the 
federal constitution). 
2. JURY SELECTION 
 
Morrisette challenges the trial court’s rulings with 
regard to two jurors.  He claims that the court erred by 
striking juror Cooper for cause and by failing to excuse 
 
11
juror Johnson for cause.  We find no merit in either of 
these assignments of error. 
 
First, as to juror Cooper, the trial court excused her 
because she indicated that she could not consider imposing 
the death penalty under any circumstances.  The following 
excerpt from the voir dire of this juror illustrates her 
position regarding the death penalty: 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Miss Cooper, I asked 
you a couple of minutes ago if you were selected 
as the foreman of the jury and the jury found the 
Defendant guilty of capital murder, um, would you 
be able to sign your name to a verdict form 
setting forth the jury sentence if that verdict 
was a death sentence, and you indicated that you 
had some difficulty with that. 
 
 
JUROR COOPER:  Yes, I did. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Do you have 
difficulty with imposing the imposition of the 
death penalty?  Is that something difficult for 
you? 
 
JUROR COOPER:  Yes. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Okay.  Is it 
something that you would have a hard time 
considering in this or – 
 
JUROR COOPER:  Yes. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: – any other case? 
 
JUROR COOPER:  Yes. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  All right.  Thank 
you. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Miss Cooper, if you were on 
the jury and the Judge advised you to consider 
 
12
all the evidence in the case that includes guilt 
or innocence and also includes as a possible 
punishment . . . the death penalty, even though 
you would have some hesitancy, could you still 
fairly consider that in arriving at your verdict 
in this case? 
 
JUROR COOPER:  No, I don’t think I would be able 
to. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Not under any circumstance as 
to the death penalty? 
 
JUROR COOPER:  I feel like I could not.  I would 
not be able to. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  Thank you, your Honor. 
 
 
Regarding juror Johnson, Morrisette moved to excuse 
this juror because, on the morning of trial, Johnson had 
read a newspaper article containing information about 
White’s murder and Morrisette’s prior conviction for 
maiming.  Juror Johnson also had some independent 
recollection of the occurrence of White’s murder.  When 
asked if his memory coupled with the newspaper article had 
“put facts in [his] mind that would stay with [him] through 
the course of this trial[,]” juror Johnson responded: 
 
That would be a little hard to answer, sir.  Of 
course, it would, you know, my memories and reading 
the paper, but I think that I would listen to the 
witnesses and just disregard what I’ve seen or heard 
up to this point . . . and just listen to the 
witnesses.  I think so. 
 
The trial court denied Morrisette’s motion to excuse 
Johnson, concluding that Johnson was simply being honest in 
 
13
his response and that he could listen to the evidence with 
an open mind. 
 
Upon appellate review, we give deference to a trial 
court’s determination regarding whether to excuse or retain 
a prospective juror “because the trial judge has observed 
and heard each member of the venire and is in a superior 
position to evaluate whether the juror’s responses during 
voir dire develop anything that would prevent or 
substantially impair the juror’s performance of duty as a 
juror in accord with the court’s instructions and the 
juror’s oath.”  Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 
522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 
(2000).  In doing so, we consider a juror’s entire voir 
dire, not just isolated parts.  Mackall v. Commonwealth, 
236 Va. 240, 252, 372 S.E.2d 759, 767 (1988), cert. denied, 
492 U.S. 925 (1989).  Absent a showing of manifest error, 
we will affirm a trial court’s decision to exclude or 
retain a juror.  Vinson, 258 Va. at 467, 522 S.E.2d at 176. 
 
We do not find manifest error in the trial court’s 
decisions regarding jurors Cooper and Johnson.  Cooper 
stated unequivocally, in response to a question by 
Morrisette’s counsel, that she would not be able to 
consider imposing the death penalty under any 
circumstances.  Johnson stated that the newspaper article 
 
14
he read on the morning of trial would not affect his 
judgment, that he could remain impartial, and that he could 
base his decision solely on the evidence presented in the 
courtroom, disregarding anything that he had seen or heard 
previously.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding juror Cooper and 
retaining juror Johnson. 
3. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF RAPE 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence in 
the guilt phase of the trial, Morrisette moved to strike 
that evidence as to the charge of rape and, thus, also as 
the underlying predicate for the capital murder charge.  
Morrisette claimed, as he does on appeal, that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove nonconsensual intercourse by 
the use of force.6  Morrisette points to Dr. Presswalla’s 
testimony at trial that there were no injuries in White’s 
genital area and seeks to disconnect the rape from the 
murder by relying on Dr. Presswalla’s testimony that intact 
sperm inside the vagina can be identified for up to 26 
hours after a sexual act.  He also relies on the fact that 
other people had access to White’s residence, including her 
                     
6 In 1980, when the offense was committed, the 
provisions of Code § 18.2-61 required proof that the sexual 
intercourse occurred against the victim’s will and through 
 
15
“boyfriend,” Albert Anthony, who had called White’s co-
workers and asked them to check on White when she did not 
come to work on the morning that her body was eventually 
discovered. 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the trial court denied the motion, 
finding that the question whether White had been raped was 
a jury issue.  We agree and conclude that the trial court 
did not err in refusing to strike the Commonwealth’s 
evidence of rape. 
 
In contrast to the testimony emphasized by Morrisette, 
Dr. Presswalla stated that the absence of genital injury is 
not unusual in a sexual assault case when a weapon is 
involved.  He further explained that, in this case, semen 
was also recovered from the vulva, and he opined that it 
was most unlikely that semen would have remained on the 
surface of the victim’s external genitals for several hours 
unless she had been incapacitated during that time.  Dr. 
Presswalla also testified that the knife wounds were 
sustained not long after the semen was deposited.  Those 
multiple knife wounds included the slashing of White’s 
throat and several defensive wounds sustained while she was 
_________________________ 
the use of force.  The use of threat or intimidation is 
included in the present version of Code § 18.2-61. 
 
16
trying to ward off her attacker.  Furthermore, her clothes 
were in disarray, with most of her body nude.  These facts 
are sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for 
rape and the use of that conviction as the predicate 
offense for the capital murder conviction.  See Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 682, 529 S.E.2d 769, 785 (15 
stab wounds and other injuries demonstrated that victim did 
not consent to sexual intercourse), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
981 (2000). 
B. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
On appeal, Morrisette raises several issues that this 
Court has already decided adversely to the position he 
espouses.  In fact, Morrisette’s counsel acknowledged 
during oral argument that all the following issues have 
been resolved by this Court, but asked, nevertheless, that 
we reconsider our prior decisions.  However, we find no 
reason to depart from our precedent.  Thus, we reaffirm our 
prior holdings and reject the following arguments: 
 
1. Imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Rejected in Johnson, 259 Va. at 667, 529 
S.E.2d at 776; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. at 635, 499 
S.E.2d at 545; Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 
S.E.2d 114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Spencer 
 
17
v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 568-69, 385 S.E.2d 850, 853 
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990). 
 
2. Virginia’s two statutory aggravating factors, 
“vileness” and “future dangerousness,” are 
unconstitutionally vague on their face and as applied, and 
thus fail to guide the jury’s exercise of discretion. 
Rejected in Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 387, 484 
S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997); 
Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 86, 472 S.E.2d 263, 
267 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997); Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 535-36, 450 S.E.2d 365, 371 
(1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995); Breard v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74-75, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994). 
 
3. Use of the defendant’s prior convictions to 
establish “future dangerousness” and to impose the death 
penalty violates the constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy.  Rejected in Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 
Va. 78, 82, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 
(1995); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 126, 410 
S.E.2d 254, 258 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992); 
Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 352, 385 S.E.2d 50, 
56 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990). 
 
18
 
4. Virginia’s jury instructions regarding mitigating 
evidence do not provide meaningful guidance to the jury 
because the instructions do not inform the jurors that they 
have a duty to consider mitigating evidence, do not provide 
any standard of proof regarding mitigating evidence, do not 
state that the death penalty can be imposed only if the 
jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating ones, do not advise 
jurors that they are free to give mitigating evidence the 
weight and effect that each juror believes is appropriate, 
do not list the statutory examples of mitigating evidence,  
and do not define the terms “fairness” and “mercy.”7  
Rejected in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-77 
(1998); Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 299, 513 
S.E.2d 642, 647, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999); Breard, 
248 Va. at 74, 445 S.E.2d at 674-75; Swann v. Commonwealth, 
247 Va. 222, 228, 441 S.E.2d 195, 200, cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 889 (1994); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 228, 
421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 
                     
7 We note that the instructions given to the jury 
during the penalty phase of the trial provided that the 
jury “shall consider any mitigation evidence,” that “a 
mitigating factor is one that would tend to favor a 
sentence of . . . imprisonment for life,” and that such 
evidence does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
19
(1993); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 490-91, 331 
S.E.2d 422, 438 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986). 
 
5. Virginia does not provide meaningful appellate 
review in death penalty cases because of the expedited 
review procedure and because this Court does not consider 
all capital murder cases, including those not appealed to 
the Court, in conducting its proportionality review.  
Rejected in Emmett v. Commonwealth, No. 020314, 264 Va. 
___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2002) (this day decided); 
Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 509, 537 S.E.2d 866, 
874 (2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 41 
(2001); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 740-42, 529 
S.E.2d 570, 580-81, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000); 
Goins, 251 Va. at 453, 470 S.E.2d at 122. 
 
6. Morrisette was entitled to expanded discovery 
beyond the scope of Rule 3A:11.  Rejected in Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 63, 515 S.E.2d 565, 570-71 
(1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000); Strickler v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490-91, 404 S.E.2d 227, 233, 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991). 
C. STATUTORY REVIEW 
 
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), 
this Court is required to consider and determine whether 
the death sentence in this case was imposed under the 
 
20
influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary 
factors.  Morrisette does not point to any such factor, and 
our review of the record does not reveal any evidence to 
suggest that Morrisette’s sentence of death was based on or 
influenced by any passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary 
factors. 
We are also required to consider and decide whether 
Morrisette’s sentence of death is “excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Code 
§ 17.1-313(C)(2).  “The purpose of our comparative review 
is to reach a reasoned judgment regarding what cases 
justify the imposition of the death penalty.”  Orbe v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000).  In conducting this 
statutorily mandated review in this case, we have focused 
on cases in which the victim was murdered during the 
commission of rape, and in which the sentence of death was 
imposed based on findings of both “future dangerousness” 
and “vileness.”  See, e.g., Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 
Va. 471, 506 S.E.2d 763 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 
(1999); Cherrix, 257 Va. 292, 513 S.E.2d 642; Pruett v. 
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. 
denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 
 
21
Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 
(1984); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 
116, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919 (1979); Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).  We have also considered cases 
in which defendants received life sentences, rather than 
the death penalty, for capital murder during the commission 
of rape.  See, e.g., Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 
339 S.E.2d 186 (1986); Keil v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 99, 
278 S.E.2d 826 (1981). 
Morrisette does not argue that his sentence of death 
is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty generally 
imposed in comparable cases.  Based on our independent 
review of this case and similar cases, we conclude that 
Morrisette’s sentence of death is not excessive or 
disproportionate to sentences generally imposed in this 
Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to the 
defendant’s murder of Dorothy White. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we find no error in the 
judgments of the circuit court or in the imposition of the 
death penalty.  We also perceive no reason to commute the 
 
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sentence of death in this case.  Thus, we will affirm the 
judgments of the circuit court.8
Affirmed. 
                     
8 Morrisette failed to brief the following assignments 
of error.  Thus, we will not consider them on appeal.  Bell 
v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 183, 563 S.E.2d 695, ___ 
(2002); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 413, 508 S.E.2d 
57, 60 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999). 
No. 9:  that portion of this assignment of error 
alleging that Code § 19.2-264.3:1(D)-(F) “is in conflict 
with the rights of the defendant under the Compulsory 
Process Clause . . . and his right against self-
incrimination;” 
No. 12:  the trial court erred in failing to strike 
prospective juror Wright; 
No. 18:  the trial court “erred in overruling an 
objection to [the introduction of] pictures from trial 
without foundation;” and 
No. 20:  the trial court erred in denying a motion to 
defer sentencing until the United States Supreme Court 
decides an issue regarding whether a mentally retarded 
defendant can be sentenced to death.  However, the record 
in this case would not support a finding of mental 
retardation.  But see Atkins v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, 122 
S.Ct. 2242 (2002).  Intelligence tests were administered to 
Morrisette on two occasions, with resulting I.Q. scores of 
77 and 82.  A psychiatrist who evaluated Morrisette with 
regard to the present charges opined that Morrisette’s 
“[i]ntelligence appeared roughly below average.”  Although 
Morrisette withdrew from school in the eighth grade with 
failing grades, he obtained a general equivalency diploma 
while serving in the military. 
 
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