Title: Commonwealth v. Wiggins

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-10975 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MAXWELL WIGGINS, JR.  
(and twenty-eight companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Hampden.     February 10, 2017. - September 6, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Hines, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.2 
 
 
Homicide.  Home Invasion.  Robbery.  Evidence, Identification, 
Cross-examination by codefendant's counsel, Relevancy and 
materiality, Photograph.  Identification.  Deoxyribonucleic 
Acid.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Identification of 
defendant in courtroom, Severance, Mistrial, Argument by 
prosecutor, Sentence.  Constitutional Law, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 25, 2007. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by 
Cornelius J. Moriarty, J.; and the cases were tried before Peter 
A. Velis, J. 
 
 
 
Alan Jay Black for Maxwell Wiggins, Jr. 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for Swinkels Laporte. 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
                                                 
 
1 Thirteen against Maxwell Wiggins, Jr., and fifteen against 
Swinkels Laporte. 
 
 
2 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  On the evening of August 29, 2007, two armed and 
masked men entered a home in Springfield, assaulting and robbing 
its occupants at gunpoint.  As they left, the homeowner, Tracy 
Bennett, who was returning home, was shot and killed.  Swinkels 
Laporte and Maxwell Wiggins were identified as the assailants 
and, following a joint jury trial in the Superior Court, were 
found guilty of murder in the first degree, as well as other 
offenses related to the home invasion. 
On appeal, they primarily claim that witnesses were 
improperly allowed to identify them as the perpetrators during 
the trial.  They also raise various evidentiary issues, and 
claim error in the prosecutor's closing argument.  Wiggins 
further challenges the denial of his motions to sever and for a 
mistrial, based on co-counsel's cross-examination of a witness 
regarding a previously suppressed out-of-court identification.  
Laporte separately challenges his nonmurder sentences.  Finally, 
both defendants seek relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
We discern no reversible error and, after a thorough review 
of the record, decline to reduce or set aside the verdicts under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendants' 
convictions.  However, we remand for resentencing Laporte's 
convictions of home invasion and armed robbery while masked. 
3 
 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for discussion of the issues. 
 
Tracy Bennett lived with her adult daughter, Susan; her 
eighteen year old son, Daniel; Susan's three young children; and 
a seventeen year old family friend, Angel Colon.3  The defendants 
were friends of Daniel and visited him frequently at the Bennett 
home, where they would often see Susan, Tracy, and Colon as 
well.  The defendants and Daniel usually spent their time in 
Daniel's room, where they played video games on Daniel's new 
Xbox video game console.  In his room, Daniel kept a safe 
containing money and marijuana that he sold to friends; the 
defendants were aware of the safe and had seen its contents.  A 
couple of weeks before the killing, Colon thought he overheard 
the defendants discussing wanting to take the Xbox. 
 
On the evening of August 29, 2007, Tracy had gone out; 
Colon and Susan were watching television in Susan's room, and 
Daniel was with his girl friend in his room.  At approximately 
10 P.M., two masked African-American men carrying guns entered 
the home.  One was short and skinny; the other was tall and 
stocky.4  They wore dark hooded sweatshirts, dark pants, and dark 
                                                 
 
3 Because Tracy, Susan, and Daniel share a last name, we 
refer to them using their first names. 
 
 
4 According to the record, at the relevant time, Laporte was 
five feet, eight inches, and weighed approximately 130 pounds.  
 
4 
 
baseball caps.  One of the sweatshirts had a zipper, and the 
other was a pullover, like sweatshirts Colon had seen Wiggins 
and Laporte wear on multiple occasions.  The intruders also wore 
black bandanas over their noses and mouths.  Colon, who looked 
down the hallway to see whether Tracy had come home, saw the two 
proceed toward him and thought that Daniel's friends, Wiggins 
and Laporte, were playing a joke.  He quickly learned the 
intruders' intentions when the shorter one said, "Where's the 
fucking shit?  We ain't playing.  This ain't no joke," and 
punched him in the face.  Colon and Susan were forced to lie 
face down on the bed as the shorter assailant took items from 
the room, including Susan's cellular telephone, a piggy bank, 
and a small camcorder. 
 
Simultaneously, the taller intruder banged on Daniel's 
locked bedroom door and then forced the door open.  He pointed a 
gun at Daniel's face and said, "Give me your shit.  I know 
you've got it."  The two struggled briefly, then the intruder 
hit Daniel in the head with the gun, and Daniel opened the safe.  
The intruder instructed Daniel to put cash, marijuana, the Xbox 
console, games, and digital video disc (DVD) movies into a large 
trash bag. 
 
As soon as Colon heard the two men leave the house, he 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wiggins was six feet, one inch tall, and weighed about 200 
pounds. 
5 
 
telephoned 911.  As he was on the telephone with the dispatcher, 
he, Daniel, and Susan heard a gunshot.  They ran outside and 
found Tracy shot in the face and bleeding profusely. 
 
First responders arrived at the scene shortly after 10 P.M. 
to attend to Tracy and investigate the crime.  Colon reported to 
an officer that "Swinkels and Max" committed the crimes and told 
him where each lived.  At approximately 10:45 P.M., officers 
arrived at Laporte's home, where they found the defendants.  A 
search of that home yielded items that appeared to have been 
stolen from the Bennett home, including an Xbox console and 
components, games, DVD movies, cash and coins, jewelry boxes, 
and a digital scale.  The officers also collected other items, 
including ammunition, three black hooded sweatshirts, and other 
clothing. 
 
The State police crime laboratory performed forensic 
testing on the sweatshirts.  The cuffs of one sweatshirt tested 
positive for gunshot residue (GSR) as well as occult blood.  A 
second sweatshirt also tested positive for occult blood.  
Investigators also performed deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing 
on swabs taken from the wear areas of the sweatshirts.  DNA 
testing of samples from the sweatshirt with GSR did not produce 
any conclusive matches.  However, the investigators found that 
the second sweatshirt contained a DNA profile matching that of 
Laporte and a third sweatshirt contained a DNA profile matching 
6 
 
Wiggins. 
 
At trial, the defendants sought to convince the jury that 
any identification of the defendants as the intruders was a 
mistake.  They argued that Daniel had only mentioned their names 
to the police when he was asked whether he had any African-
American friends and that the police had inappropriately focused 
on them.  Laporte in particular argued that, although the stolen 
property had been found at his home and his DNA profile matched 
a sample from one of the black sweatshirts also found there, the 
robbery could have been committed by his brother, which would 
also explain those facts.  We discuss the defendants' arguments 
in more detail below. 
 
Discussion.  1.  In-court identification of the defendants.  
Although the defendants' theory was misidentification, this is 
not a case where the alleged perpetrators were unknown to the 
eyewitnesses.  Daniel, Susan, and Colon had known the defendants 
for some time.  The jury heard testimony that Wiggins and Daniel 
had been friends for a couple of years prior to the robbery and 
shooting, and Wiggins frequently visited Daniel.  Daniel had 
known Laporte for approximately six months, during which time 
Laporte visited Daniel with Wiggins on multiple occasions.  Both 
Susan and Colon saw the defendants when they visited Daniel.  
Colon, who had already known Laporte for several years, would 
sometimes play video games with Wiggins, Laporte, and Daniel in 
7 
 
Daniel's room.  However, despite the witnesses' familiarity with 
the defendants, compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 
Mass. 458, 459-460 (1995) (armed robbers were unknown to 
defendant), the defense argued that because the intruders wore 
masks, the witnesses mistook them for the defendants. 
 
On the night of the break-in and shooting, each of the 
witnesses viewed each defendant separately in what was later 
determined to be an unnecessarily suggestive showup procedure.5  
As a result, the motion judge suppressed the out-of-court 
identifications that Colon and Susan had made during the showup 
and that Daniel had made afterwards at the police station.  
Nevertheless, the judge allowed all three to make in-court 
identifications of the defendants at trial:  Colon identified 
both defendants as the intruders; Susan identified Laporte as 
one of the two intruders; and Daniel identified Wiggins as one 
of the intruders, although the identification was equivocal.  
The defendants assert that this was prejudicial error.  We 
                                                 
 
5 The police took each of the witnesses in turn (Daniel, 
Colon, Susan, and Daniel's girl friend) to Laporte's residence.  
The defendants were handcuffed and shown to each witness from 
twelve feet away.  After the witness was instructed to look at 
the subject's height, weight, and build, a police officer asked 
each witness what he or she had heard the intruder say, and then 
instructed the respective defendant to repeat it to each 
witness.  The motion judge determined that there was good reason 
for the one-on-one visual confrontations.  However, he found 
that the voice identification procedures were both unnecessarily 
and impermissibly suggestive, pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 516-517 (1978). 
8 
 
disagree. 
 
Colon testified that despite the masks, he recognized the 
intruders as Wiggins and Laporte as they walked toward him.  He 
recognized the defendants by voice, clothes, build, and the way 
they walked.  He told police at the scene who the assailants 
were and where they lived.  Colon further pointed out Laporte as 
the intruder who punched him in the mouth during the home 
invasion.  Although the defendants objected to Colon's in-court 
identifications, there was an independent source for that 
identification because Colon unequivocally identified the 
defendants as the perpetrators prior to the suggestive showup 
procedure. 
 
In court, Susan identified Laporte as the shorter intruder 
without objection.  She testified that although he wore a mask, 
she recognized Laporte as he walked down the hall toward her by 
his walk, voice, size, and build.  She testified that she told a 
police officer at the scene that she believed the person who 
robbed her was Laporte, but she could not recall who she spoke 
with (no officer confirmed her statement).  Because Susan's 
testimony that she identified Laporte by name before the 
suggestive procedure would be admissible regardless of the 
admissibility of her in-court identification, we conclude that 
there is no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
arising from defense counsel's failure to object to her in-court 
9 
 
identification. 
 
As for Daniel, on direct examination by the Commonwealth, 
and without objection, Daniel identified Wiggins as the intruder 
who came into his room.6  He testified further (without 
objection) that despite the hood and bandanna, he recognized 
Wiggins from Wiggins's build, skin tone, and voice, but he later 
stated that he could not be sure.7  Although Daniel did not 
directly identify either of the defendants prior to the tainted 
showup, he effectively made at least an equivocal identification 
of Wiggins by his actions at the scene of the crime:  Daniel 
testified that after the shooting he took his mother's keys, got 
into her vehicle, and planned to go to Wiggins's home to see 
whether Wiggins had been the intruder in his room.  When Colon 
took the keys away, Daniel telephoned Wiggins's home and 
Wiggins's sister in an attempt to locate him.  This evidence 
would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that, at a minimum, 
Daniel had made an equivocal identification of Wiggins as a 
                                                 
 
6 Daniel also identified both defendants as his friends, and 
stated their names for the record. 
 
 
7 It is worth noting that during his examination, Daniel 
wavered back and forth several times on his identification of 
Wiggins.  He testified that he told police initially that he did 
not think the intruder was Wiggins because it was "kind of hard 
to think that my best friend would rob me and . . . shoot my 
mom."  And despite having identified Wiggins at trial as the 
assailant, he later testified during direct examination that he 
still could not be sure that Wiggins was the person who came 
into his room. 
10 
 
perpetrator prior to the suggestive procedure.  As a result, we 
conclude that there is no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice arising from the failure by Wiggins's 
attorney to object to an in-court identification that, viewed in 
its totality, also was equivocal. 
 
2.  Daniel's out-of-court identification.  Wiggins asserts 
that there was error in admitting testimony of a police officer 
about Daniel's out-of-court identification of Wiggins because it 
had previously been suppressed.  Wiggins also argues that the 
trial judge erred in denying his motions to sever and for a 
mistrial based on co-counsel's cross-examination of Daniel that 
led to the police officer's testimony.  We conclude that there 
was no abuse of discretion in denying Wiggins' motions.  
Further, we conclude that there was no substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice in admitting evidence of Daniel's out-
of-court identification. 
 
The out-of-court identification, made during police 
questioning following a showup procedure on the night of the 
murder, was suppressed because the showup was found to be 
unnecessarily suggestive.  See note 5, supra.  During cross-
examination by Laporte's counsel, Daniel was questioned about 
his ability to see the perpetrator given the lighting and the 
mask, as well as his failure to identify Wiggins to the police 
as one of the perpetrators until much later in the night, when 
11 
 
police informed him that his mother had died.  This included 
multiple questions pertaining to the previously suppressed out-
of-court identification by Daniel of Wiggins.8  Wiggins did not 
                                                 
 
8 At trial, the following exchange occurred during cross-
examination of Daniel by Laporte's counsel: 
 
 
Q.:  "[Y]ou knew the items [shown to you] were stolen; 
correct?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
Q.:  "So when you saw they had been recovered, your 
testimony is somehow the fact that the items were recovered made 
you more certain at the time that Maxwell Wiggins robbed you?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Q.:  "Isn't it true, sir, that you never told the cops that 
you were sure or pretty sure that Maxwell Wiggins robbed you 
until after they told you your mom is dead, this is no game, we 
need to know who the robbers are, or robber is; is that 
correct?" 
 
 
A.:  "I had an idea before that, yes." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Q.:  "And when the police told you that your mother was 
dead, they just told you right there in the interview room at 
the police department; isn't that right?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
Q.:  "You obviously reacted with great emotion; isn't that 
true?"   
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
Q.:  "You were sobbing; right?" 
 
 
12 
 
object to this questioning at the time.  Wiggins also did not 
object when the prosecutor, in turn, asked Daniel about his out-
of-court identification of Wiggins during redirect examination.  
However, both defendants later objected to the prosecutor's 
questioning of the detective who had taken Daniel's statement, 
which included Daniel's identification of Wiggins.  The 
defendants also moved for a mistrial.  The judge denied the 
motion but ordered the prosecutor not to inquire "in the 
slightest fashion, regarding anything that [the motion judge] 
suppressed." 
 
The next morning, the prosecutor asked the judge to allow 
her to question the detective about the identification of 
Wiggins, arguing that Laporte had "open[ed] the door" and 
Wiggins had failed to object.  In response, Wiggins moved to 
sever and for a mistrial.  The judge denied both motions.  In 
addition, after reviewing the transcripts, the judge ruled that 
Wiggins had waived his right to enforce the suppression ruling, 
at least as to whether Daniel had identified Wiggins at the 
police station.  The judge allowed the prosecutor to elicit the 
same testimony as Laporte's counsel, i.e., that after Daniel 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
Q.:  "And then you gave the name Maxwell Wiggins as being 
the robber from your room; is that right?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
13 
 
heard that his mother had died, he identified Wiggins as the 
robber.9 
                                                 
 
9 The prosecutor asked the detective the following: 
 
 
Q.:  "And did he tell you how he knew Maxwell Wiggins?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
Q.:  "And did he describe Maxwell Wiggins for you?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
Q.:  "And did he tell you he had seen Maxwell Wiggins 
earlier the night this happened?" 
 
 
A.:  "That's correct." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Q.:  "And then at some point you told him that his mother 
had passed away, is that right?" 
 
 
A.:  "That's correct." 
 
 
Q.:  "What was his demeanor then?" 
 
 
A.:  "At that point he even became more upset and a lot of 
crying." 
 
 
Q.:  "And after he was allowed to compose himself, you 
spoke to him further?" 
 
 
A.:  "That's correct." 
 
 
Q.:  "And was it then that you began a typed statement from 
him?" 
 
 
A.:  "That's correct." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
14 
 
 
Laporte waived any objection to the admission of Daniel's 
out-of-court identification based on his counsel's cross-
examination of Daniel on this topic; thus, had the defendants 
been tried separately, Laporte would have "opened the door," 
allowing the Commonwealth to respond.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 557 n.6 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 379 Mass. 600, 604-605 (1980) (where defendant waives 
issue by using challenged statements, he "open[s] the door to 
their use by the Commonwealth").  Accord Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 
F.2d 476, 481 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979) 
("Once a defendant attempts to introduce testimony that is 
intimately interrelated with previously suppressed testimony, 
the defendant waives his objections to the introduction of that 
related evidence").  Wiggins contends, however, that Laporte's 
counsel's actions could not waive Wiggins's rights, for due 
process reasons.  We agree.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 
Mass. 675, 676 (1998) (defendant's waiver of right to jury trial 
did not affect codefendant's right).  Accord United States v. 
White, 887 F.2d 267, 269-270 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 
However, although Laporte could not waive Wiggins's rights, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Q.:  "And in the course of taking that statement, after he 
was told that his mother died, is that when he said Maxwell 
Wiggins was the robber in his room?" 
 
 
A.:  "That's correct." 
15 
 
Wiggins failed to object to his codefendant's cross-examination 
of Daniel, to the prosecutor's redirect examination, or to 
Daniel's in-court identification of Wiggins.  As a result, where 
admission of any of the related identifications would have been 
error, we consider how those errors could have combined to cause 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in the 
context of the evidence adduced at trial.10  See Commonwealth v. 
DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 623 (2017).  Based on Daniel's in-court 
identification of Wiggins as one of the perpetrators, Daniel's 
actions to check Wiggins's whereabouts following the killing, 
and the fact that Colon named Wiggins to police officers at the 
scene of the crime, the jury had a reasonable basis to conclude 
that Wiggins had participated in the robbery.  In this context, 
Laporte's line of questioning did not cause a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We reach the same 
conclusion as to the Commonwealth's examination of the police 
detective on this issue, as the prosecutor was not permitted to 
                                                 
 
10 Although Wiggins did not make a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Francis, 
411 Mass. 579, 584 (1992) ("pursuant to [G. L. c. 278,] § 33E, 
we afford such appeals plenary review"), to the extent that 
counsel's failure to object to Laporte's and the Commonwealth's 
lines of questioning could support such a claim, this would not 
change our analysis.  See Commonwealth v. Holley, 476 Mass. 114, 
121 (2016), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014) ("under § 33E review, an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed under 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice standard"). 
 
16 
 
inquire beyond the testimony that had already been elicited by 
Laporte.11  Compare note 8 with note 9, supra. 
 
Further, in the circumstances, we conclude that the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Wiggins's renewed 
motion for a mistrial and his motion to sever.  See Commonwealth 
v. Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 517 (1990) (mistrial is subject to 
judge's discretion); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 391 Mass. 749, 759 
(1984), quoting Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369, 387 
(1977) (ground for mistrial "must be called to the attention of 
the judge immediately, or when the aggrieved party first learns 
of it"); Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982) (abuse 
of discretion upon timely motion to sever).  Wiggins failed to 
object in a timely manner to both the examinations by the 
codefendant and the Commonwealth. 
 
The failure to make a timely objection to Laporte's 
examination of Daniel is particularly noteworthy given that 
there was a break shortly after the testimony in question; thus, 
any concern about drawing attention to the testimony in front of 
                                                 
 
11 Laporte elicited the details of this identification to 
show the jury that Daniel had only identified Wiggins as one of 
the intruders because he was distressed about his mother's 
death.  In fact, Wiggins later elicited testimony to emphasize 
that Daniel had not identified him prior to learning about the 
death.  Further, Daniel testified that he was still not sure 
whether Wiggins was one of the intruders.  This, combined with 
the limitation on the prosecutor's inquiry, meant that there is 
no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice from 
allowing the prosecutor to elicit the identification. 
17 
 
the jury could have been mitigated by raising the issue and 
moving to sever while the jury were not present.  In addition, 
Wiggins's counsel indicated that he had discussed his concerns 
regarding the examination with Laporte's counsel during the 
break, yet he did not raise the issue with the court until four 
days later, when the Commonwealth pointed out Wiggins's failure 
to object.  Because Wiggins did not make these motions in a 
timely manner, the judge reasonably could have inferred that 
Wiggins had made a conscious decision not to object.  Therefore, 
there was no abuse of discretion in denying Wiggins's motions. 
 
3.  DNA evidence.  Laporte argues separately that the judge 
incorrectly admitted inconclusive DNA evidence in the form of a 
chart showing DNA test results from one of the sweatshirts.  The 
judge had excluded testimony that DNA testing of the sweatshirt 
was inconclusive as to Laporte.12  However, the jury were exposed 
to a chart showing that Wiggins and the victim were excluded as 
sources of the sample from one sweatshirt, but also showed that 
the results were inconclusive as to Laporte.  After the chart 
                                                 
12 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results are inconclusive 
if they neither include nor exclude a person as a match due to 
an insufficient or degraded sample.  Commonwealth v. Almonte, 
465 Mass. 224, 238 (2013).  With limited exceptions, such 
evidence is normally too prejudicial to be admissible.  See 
Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 253-254 (2008). 
18 
 
was introduced alongside testimony from a State analyst,13 but 
before the chart was given to the jury during deliberations, the 
judge redacted Laporte's DNA profile from the chart.  Laporte's 
profile was not redacted from other exhibits, which showed that 
Laporte was excluded from a second sweatshirt sample and matched 
the major DNA profile on a third sweatshirt sample.  He argues 
that because the jury had seen his DNA profile on the chart in 
question before it was redacted, and because the jury had his 
profile available to them from other exhibits, they may have 
tried to compare his profile to the inconclusive results.  This 
argument fails. 
 
The Commonwealth was entitled to have the analyst testify 
as to those results that showed an exclusion or a match, and the 
exhibit in question showed the full comparison that was made at 
the State crime laboratory.  Moreover, the analyst did not 
testify as to Laporte's result compared to the sweatshirt, and 
the judge redacted Laporte's profile before the exhibit went to 
the jury.  Because the jury were entitled to see Laporte's 
profile with respect to the other DNA comparisons, there was no 
error in declining to redact his profile from the other 
                                                 
 
13 The analyst testified that the decedent was included in a 
sample from one area of the sweatshirt, and that the decedent 
and Wiggins were excluded from a sample of another area from the 
sweatshirt.  She did not testify as to any results for Laporte 
from that sample. 
19 
 
exhibits.14 
 
4.  Bandannas.  The defendants argue that the judge erred 
in allowing the Commonwealth, over objection, to elicit 
testimony that someone who was not a member of law enforcement 
removed two bandannas from Laporte's property bag while Laporte 
was in custody.  The bandannas had been collected along with the 
rest of Laporte's personal items during booking.  More than one 
year later, someone removed the bandannas when trading new 
clothes on behalf of Laporte.15  The Commonwealth offered the 
testimony to show why the bandannas were not available as 
evidence.  The defendants argue that, because they did not 
challenge the police investigation as inadequate (also known as 
a Bowden challenge, see Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 
[1980]), the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.  We 
disagree. 
 
Evidence is only admissible if it is relevant, that is, "if 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 
                                                 
 
14 Even if there had been error, it would have been harmless 
viewed in the context of the trial as a whole.  The State 
analyst did not testify as to the inconclusive result.  However, 
there was a match between Laporte's DNA and another sweatshirt 
that was found in the same location and showed a positive result 
in the presumptive test for blood.  Colon testified that Laporte 
had worn that sweatshirt during the robbery and on other 
occasions. 
 
 
15 A correction officer testified that the sheriff's 
department required that any new items brought to inmates must 
be traded for old items from the inmate's property bag. 
20 
 
than it would be without the evidence and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action."  Mass. G. Evid. § 401 
(2017).  See id. at § 402.  See Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 
378, 387 (2012).  The defendants argue that the evidence 
regarding the removal of the bandannas was not relevant to the 
case.  In their view, the jury only needed to hear that the 
bandannas were found on Laporte when he was arrested.  They also 
argue that there was no evidence that these bandannas were the 
ones involved in the incident.  However, the very fact that the 
defendants contested the lack of evidence surrounding the 
bandannas is what made their removal relevant to rebut the 
defendants' attempted Bowden defense.16  At trial, the defendants 
argued at sidebar that the perpetrators had been observed 
wearing bandannas, but not necessarily the bandannas that had 
been taken from Laporte's property bag.  The bandannas had been 
removed, so the Commonwealth could not introduce them in 
evidence, nor could it test the bandannas for gunshot residue, 
blood, or DNA in an attempt to show that they were the bandannas 
                                                 
 
16 See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 803 
n.25 (2009); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980).  
Even though the judge ultimately determined that the defendants 
had not made a showing sufficient to warrant a Bowden 
instruction, we are unpersuaded by the defendants' argument that 
there was no attempt to make a Bowden challenge; the defendants 
clearly claimed throughout trial that there were problems with 
the police investigation, and the principal theory of the 
defense was misidentification, yet the bandannas had not been 
tested. 
21 
 
used during the home invasion.17  Because it appeared that the 
defendants attempted to raise a Bowden defense, and because they 
attacked the integrity and adequacy of the investigation 
throughout the trial, the Commonwealth was entitled to respond.  
See Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 754-755 (2009); 
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 803 n.25 (2009). 
 
The defendants further argue that even if the removal of 
the bandannas from Laporte's property bag were relevant to the 
case, the judge erred in admitting that evidence because its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2017).  See Carey, 
463 Mass. at 387-388.  In particular, they argue that the jury 
may have interpreted the removal of the bandannas as showing 
consciousness of guilt.  Indeed, the judge recognized that 
telling the jury that it was a member of Laporte's family who 
exchanged clothing for the bandannas could be unduly prejudicial 
to the defendants.  As a result, following a lengthy sidebar 
discussion, the judge limited the prosecutor to eliciting 
                                                 
 
17 To the extent that the defendants argue that the evidence 
of removal was irrelevant because the Commonwealth knew about 
the bandannas immediately after the arrest but did not seize or 
test them, their argument is misplaced, as the bandannas were 
not lost or destroyed as a result of the Commonwealth's 
negligence.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 401 Mass. 749, 
756 (1988) ("loss and destruction of highly relevant evidence by 
the Commonwealth and its agents defeated the defendant's 
opportunity effectively to present a defense"). 
22 
 
testimony that someone who was not a member of law enforcement 
picked up the bandannas, so long as the witness also explained 
to the jury that the policy required an exchange of clothes.  
The judge reasoned that omitting the family member's name and 
including the inventory policy would "soften[] any prejudicial 
impact."  The judge also gave an instruction immediately after 
that testimony to warn the jury not to draw any negative 
inference against the defendants.  See Commonwealth v. Tennison, 
440 Mass. 553, 558 (2003), citing Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 
Mass. 319, 328 (2000) ("jury are presumed to follow the judge's 
instructions").  In this context, where the judge carefully 
considered the options to reduce any possible prejudice to the 
defendants, there was no abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 436-437 (2015). 
 
5.  Autopsy photograph.  The defendants claim that the 
judge erred in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim. 
The photograph showed how the victim's face looked after the 
medical examiner had removed the sutures and other fixes used by 
the emergency medical technicians who sought to stem the 
bleeding and save the victim's life.  With the sutures removed, 
the photograph showed a portion of the inside of the victim's 
mouth and sinus cavity.  In the defendants' view, the photograph 
was cumulative of other evidence and was so gruesome and 
inflammatory that its probative value was outweighed by the 
23 
 
potential for prejudice.  There was no error. 
 
We have warned judges to be especially careful regarding 
photographs taken after a medical examiner has modified the 
victim's body in the course of an autopsy.  See Commonwealth v. 
Carlino, 429 Mass. 692, 696 n.2 (1999), citing Commonwealth v. 
Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 106 (1980).  In Carlino, supra, for 
example, photographs of damaged internal organs were unnecessary 
where the Commonwealth had introduced other "photographs of the 
exterior of the body, . . . a chalk depicting the location of 
the wounds, and extensive expert medical testimony as to the 
nature, extent, and severity of the wounds."  However, "we do 
not exclude evidence just because it is gruesome or 
inflammatory."  Id.  Therefore, the judge may admit a photograph 
if it is relevant, not gratuitous, and probative beyond its 
"distasteful nature."  Id.  See Bastarache, supra. 
 
In this case, although the photograph did not show 
alterations of the nature made in Carlino and Bastarache, the 
judge recognized that it still held a potential for prejudice.  
Compare Carlino, 429 Mass. at 696 (photograph showed victim's 
internal organs and abdominal cavity); Bastarache, 382 Mass. at 
105-106 (photograph showed inside of skull after brain had been 
removed to show bullet holes).  In fact, the judge initially 
declined to allow the Commonwealth to introduce the photograph 
through the State medical examiner.  However, he eventually 
24 
 
changed that ruling because one of the Commonwealth's witnesses, 
a State expert in ballistics, explained that the photograph was 
an important tool for determining the type of firearm and force 
used, as well as the distance from the weapon to the victim's 
face.  During a lengthy discussion with the prosecutor and both 
defendants' counsel, the judge reasoned that these facts were 
probative of premeditation and whether the killing had been 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  He also noted that 
the ballistics expert had stated that the autopsy diagrams alone 
had been insufficient for him to make the determinations.  As a 
result, the judge admitted the autopsy photograph in evidence 
and gave a contemporaneous cautionary instruction to the jury. 
 
In light of the judge's careful analysis of the relevance 
and probative value of the photograph before admitting it in 
evidence, and the curative instruction,  there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
 
6.  Closing argument.  The defendants argue that the 
prosecutor misstated key identification evidence in her closing 
argument.  In particular, they contend that the Commonwealth 
improperly argued that the jury "kn[e]w with absolute certainty" 
that Colon identified the defendants as the intruders because, 
she argued, the police sought out the defendants based on 
Colon's identification of them in the immediate aftermath of the 
25 
 
shooting.18  In their view, this was a misstatement of the 
evidence because, they claim, Daniel's statement to the police, 
rather than Colon's, could have led the police to the 
defendants.  Because the defendants did not object to this 
portion of the argument at trial, they must show that the 
alleged misstatement or counsel's failure to object caused a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 273, 276 (1998).  This 
they cannot do. 
 
Daniel testified that when he spoke to the police at the 
crime scene he identified only Wiggins, and he did so in 
response to the police asking if he had any African-American 
friends; thus, he identified Wiggins as a friend, not a 
suspect.19  In contrast, Colon and a police officer both 
                                                 
 
18 The prosecutor said: 
 
 
"[A]s you look to decide this case, start with the 
things that you know for certain, the things that are 
given. . . .  And you know with absolute certainty that 
Angel Colon identified those two men, the defendants, as 
the intruders to police at the scene.  Angel Colon told 
you.  Officer Ed Kalish told you.  And, ladies and 
gentlemen, you know that that happened.  You know Angel 
Colon identified them because the police went looking for 
the two of them." 
 
 
19 However, officers present at the scene testified that 
Daniel named both defendants.  Whether the jury believed Daniel 
gave one or both names to the police ultimately does not matter, 
as the police still would have been searching for both 
defendants. 
26 
 
testified that when Colon spoke to police at the crime scene, he 
named the defendants as the intruders and told police the 
streets where the defendants lived.  According to police 
testimony, after speaking with Daniel and Colon they sought both 
of the defendants. 
 
"A prosecutor may argue 'forcefully for a conviction based 
on the evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence.'"  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 383 
(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 
(1987).  Here, the police were looking for both Laporte and 
Wiggins, not just Wiggins.  In addition, it was Colon who gave 
the police the names of the streets where the defendants lived.  
Thus, it was fair for the prosecutor to argue that the jury 
could infer that the police based their search for the 
defendants on Colon's statement (rather than Daniel's).  See 
Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 816 (2003) (prosecutor may 
"point to reasons why a witness's testimony, or portions of a 
witness's testimony, should logically be believed").  Further, 
the judge instructed the jury that counsel's arguments are not 
evidence.  In any event, even if the defendants were correct, 
their argument nonetheless indicates (as does the 
Commonwealth's) that someone had identified them at the scene, 
so they have failed to establish how any error would have 
influenced the jury's verdicts. 
27 
 
 
7.  Laporte's sentence.  Because Laporte was a juvenile at 
the time of the offense, his sentence was revised, and he is 
eligible for parole on his conviction of murder after fifteen 
years.  See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 688-689 (2013), S.C., 474 
Mass. 576 (2016); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 658-659 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 
(2015).  Laporte was also convicted of other crimes, including 
home invasion and robbery while masked, for which he was 
sentenced to from thirty to thirty-five years and from twenty to 
thirty years in State prison, respectively, and is eligible for 
parole after thirty years and twenty years, respectively.20  
Laporte argues that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights require reduction of the minimum terms on 
the latter sentences to no more than fifteen years, to allow for 
the same parole eligibility as does his conviction of murder. 
                                                 
 
20 Laporte's sentence for home invasion was initially to be 
served from and after the life sentence, with sentences for the 
other nonmurder convictions to be served concurrently with the 
sentence imposed for home invasion.  These sentences were all 
changed to be made concurrent with the murder sentence by the 
Appellate Division of the Superior Court.  Following our holding 
in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 
Mass. 655, 658-659 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015), the 
Department of Correction noted that Laporte would be eligible 
for parole after fifteen years on his life sentence.  Parole 
eligibility for the other convictions remains unchanged. 
28 
 
 
As in Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 143-146 (2015), 
the original sentencing judge could not have foreseen our 
decisions in Diatchenko and Brown.  At the time the defendant 
was sentenced on his nonmurder convictions, the sentencing judge 
likely believed that the defendant would never be eligible for 
parole on his murder conviction.  See Costa, supra.  Thus, the 
judge may not have given the same consideration to how the 
defendant's nonmurder convictions would affect his eligibility 
for parole.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 682-
687 (2017).  As a result, we vacate Laporte's nonmurder 
sentences and remand for resentencing in light of his revised 
murder sentence.  See Costa, supra at 143. 
 
8.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Even though Wiggins was an adult 
at the time of the crime, he argues that it is unfair for 
Laporte to receive the benefit of parole eligibility while 
Wiggins does not, as Wiggins is only months older than Laporte.  
In his view, we should exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce his conviction so their sentences will match.  
Although we recognize his point, particularly as contrasted 
against Laporte's juvenile status at the time of the homicide, 
the fact that Wiggins was only a few months past his eighteenth 
birthday does not, in itself, give us reason to reduce his 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi, 475 Mass. 597, 610 
(2016), citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (age 
29 
 
of eighteen "is the point where society draws the line for many 
purposes between childhood and adulthood"); Brown, 466 Mass. at 
684-685 (Legislature's "comprehensive sentencing scheme . . . 
remains valid as applied to adults").  Thus, we decline to 
exercise our § 33E power based on the comparative ages of the 
defendants. 
 
We have considered the defendants' other arguments and find 
them without merit.  Therefore, we decline to exercise our power 
under § 33E to reduce the defendants' verdicts or grant them a 
new trial. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 
defendants' convictions.  However, we remand Laporte's 
convictions of home invasion and armed robbery while masked for 
resentencing in accordance with Perez, supra. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.