Title: Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12431 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MELISSA PFEIFFER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 6, 2018. - May 1, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,  
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Burning a Dwelling House.  Fire 
Fighter.  Intent.  Evidence, Intent, Grand jury 
proceedings.  Grand Jury.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions 
to jury, New trial, Bill of particulars, Sentence, Grand 
jury proceedings, Dismissal.  Constitutional Law, Sentence.  
Due Process of Law, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 8, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Colby M. Tilley, Assistant District Attorney (Julie S. 
Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for 
district attorney for the Norfolk district & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Following an argument with her boyfriend, the 
defendant set a bag of his clothes on fire inside their 
apartment, then fled the building without calling for help or 
warning the occupants of other units.  One person died in the 
resulting two-alarm fire.  Three others, including two 
firefighters, were injured.  A Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant of arson of a dwelling house, G. L. c. 266, § 1; 
felony-murder in the second degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; and two 
counts of injuring a firefighter, G. L. c. 265, § 13D1/2.  The 
defendant appealed, and we granted her application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
The defendant raises several challenges to the arson 
conviction, which served as the predicate for the other charges:  
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she 
specifically intended to set the apartment building on fire;  
that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in instructing 
the jury on an "alternative theory" of arson, namely, that she 
also could be found guilty if she accidentally or negligently 
set the fire and then wilfully and maliciously failed to 
extinguish or report it; and that the Commonwealth expressly 
waived the right to pursue that alternative theory by its 
response to her pretrial motion for a bill of particulars.  
Moreover, she challenges the conviction of felony-murder in the 
3 
 
second degree on the ground that the judge declared, as a matter 
of law, that arson is an inherently dangerous felony, rather 
than letting the jury determine whether her conduct evidenced a 
conscious disregard for the risk to human life.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that the verdicts should be vacated and the 
indictments dismissed because the Commonwealth declined her 
request to instruct the grand jury regarding the elements of the 
offenses. 
 
The parties, both in the trial court and on appeal, have 
treated the charge of arson under G. L. c. 266, § 1, as a 
specific intent crime.  As discussed herein, however, arson 
under § 1, which is derived from the common law, is a crime 
requiring general intent with malice.  We accordingly provide an 
appendix containing a model jury instruction for arson of a 
dwelling house under G. L. c. 266, § 1, which has been 
unanimously approved and recommended by this court.1 
 
Concerning the defendant's claims on appeal, we conclude 
that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish that she specifically 
intended to burn the apartment building.  The court unanimously 
                                                          
 
 
1 The statute also makes it unlawful for anyone to "aid[], 
counsel[] or procure[] the burning of . . . a dwelling house."  
G. L. c. 266, § 1.  As the defendant was not charged under that 
portion of the statute, we do not address it here or in the 
model jury instruction appended hereto. 
4 
 
agrees that the instruction on the alternative theory of arson 
was erroneous, and a majority concludes that the error, whether 
it is viewed for prejudice or for a substantial miscarriage of 
justice, does not warrant overturning the verdicts.  As there 
also is no merit to the defendant's other arguments, the 
verdicts are affirmed. 
 
Background.  The facts developed at trial are as follows.  
On December 24, 2010, the defendant was living in a ground-floor 
unit of a two-story apartment building in Chelsea with her 
boyfriend, William Brewer, and their two year old son.  Early 
that evening, the defendant dropped their son off to spend the 
night at a relative's home, arriving back at the apartment at 
approximately 9 P.M.  Immediately upon the defendant's return, 
she and Brewer engaged in a heated argument that resulted in 
Brewer leaving for a nearby bar.  Approximately one hour later, 
he returned and found that the defendant, still angry, had 
locked him out of the apartment.  From the sidewalk outside, 
Brewer spoke to the defendant through a window and attempted to 
calm her down and persuade her to let him in.  Being 
unsuccessful in both regards, Brewer departed again, this time 
looking to buy marijuana. 
 
Approximately fifteen minutes later, Brewer returned again.  
This time, as he approached the building, he observed the 
defendant running out of the building.  When he asked her what 
5 
 
she was doing, she responded that his clothes were on fire.  The 
defendant had lit a piece of paper on fire and tossed it on a 
duffel bag full of Brewer's clothes, which was sitting on the 
floor in a corner of the apartment.  She had then changed out of 
her night clothes and left, locking the exterior door of the 
building behind her,2 and without calling for help or alerting 
other occupants.  As she then stood outside arguing with Brewer 
about what she had done, flames were already visible inside 
through one of the apartment windows. 
 
As the two argued, a passing car came to a halt, and a 
woman and three men jumped out.  The woman immediately used her 
cellular telephone to call 911.  She then asked what had 
                                                          
 
 
2 The defendant, who did not testify at trial but provided a 
recorded interview to the police that was played for the jury, 
denied purposely locking the exterior door and suggested it must 
have locked automatically as she exited.  It is undisputed, 
however, that neither the defendant nor Brewer ever possessed a 
key to that door.  Yet, as the defendant admitted, that is the 
door they regularly used to enter and exit the building.  
Typically, therefore, the exterior door must have been unlocked.  
Otherwise, they would have been locked out of the building on a 
regular basis.  It is also undisputed that the exterior door was 
unlocked when Brewer first returned (from the bar) and found the 
defendant had locked him out by locking their apartment door, 
which was located just inside the exterior door.  Only minutes 
later, when he returned for a second time and observed the 
defendant running out of the building, the exterior door was now 
locked.  As Brewer testified, "it doesn't . . . lock[] unless 
you lock it.  You have to lock it from the inside and she knew I 
didn't have no key . . . to that door."  Unless the exterior 
door somehow locked on its own on that one occasion, the most 
reasonable inference from the evidence is, as Brewer testified, 
that the defendant locked it. 
6 
 
happened, and the defendant replied that she had set Brewer's 
clothes on fire.  Meanwhile, one of the men, believing that 
Brewer had said there were children inside, attempted to enter 
the building.  He broke down the locked exterior door, only to 
find that the fire had already become so intense that it was not 
safe to go inside. 
 
While this was occurring, a man and a woman who occupied 
the unit directly above that of the defendant attempted to leave 
the building using the interior staircase, but the fire had 
already rendered it impassable.  Trapped on the landing at the 
top of the stairs, they began shouting for help and taking turns 
trying to breathe through a small window.  The man, his upper 
body already covered in burns, squeezed through the window and 
jumped to the street below, suffering a broken ankle and spinal 
fracture in the process.  The woman, meanwhile, remained trapped 
on the second floor until firefighters located her, unconscious; 
she died of smoke inhalation and thermal injuries.  Two 
firefighters also were injured. 
 
The woman who had called 911 confronted the defendant.  The 
defendant again stated that she had set Brewer's clothes on 
fire, and added that she was angry that he had left without her 
7 
 
to purchase drugs.3  She also stated that it was not the first 
time she had done something like this.  She destroyed personal 
items belonging to Brewer on several prior occasions after the 
two had argued.  She had even set a bag of his clothes on fire 
once before, but Brewer quickly managed to extinguish the fire. 
 
Through the cross-examination of witnesses at trial, the 
defendant challenged whether the Commonwealth could prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt either that she set the fire or, if she did, 
that she did so with the specific intent to burn the dwelling.  
She also called one witness, a forensic psychologist, who opined 
that the defendant suffered from low cognitive functioning and 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)4 that "quite likely" 
impaired her ability to fully appreciate and understand the 
consequences of her acts as compared to the average person.  He 
further opined, however, that she had the capacity to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of her conduct and to conform her conduct to 
the requirements of the law at the time she set the fire (i.e., 
                                                          
 
 
3 In the days that followed, the defendant would change her 
story several times, first suggesting that she did not know how 
the fire started, and then that it was started by a defective 
baseboard heater, and finally that Brewer had started it. 
 
 
4 The psychologist opined that the defendant's posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) resulted from her having experienced 
sexual and other physical abuse since she was an infant, a 
childhood spent being passed from one foster home to another, 
and periods of homelessness as an adult. 
8 
 
she was, in his opinion, criminally responsible for her 
conduct).5 
 
At the close of evidence, the jury considered charges of 
arson of a dwelling house; felony-murder in the second degree; 
murder in the second degree based on malice; involuntary 
manslaughter; and two counts of injuring a firefighter.6  As to 
all charges, the jury were instructed on the options of finding 
the defendant not guilty or not guilty by reason of lack of 
criminal responsibility.  The jury found the defendant guilty of 
arson, felony-murder in the second degree, and injuring the two 
firefighters.7 
                                                          
 
 
5 The psychologist also testified that the defendant's low 
cognitive functioning and PTSD impaired her ability to form the 
specific intent to burn the building, but his only basis for 
that was her self-report that the idea "she formulated was to 
burn [Brewer's] clothing because she was angry at him and wanted 
to get revenge . . . .  [S]he lit a piece of paper on fire . . . 
and then dropped that on his clothing and . . . left." 
 
 
6 The trial judge entered a required finding of not guilty 
on a charge of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A, in connection with the man forced 
to jump from the second floor. 
 
 
7 The jury did not return a verdict on the alternate theory 
of second-degree murder, i.e., murder with malice.  The 
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder 
conviction, with eligibility for parole after fifteen years, and 
to two terms of from three to five years in prison for causing 
injury to the firefighters, both to be served concurrently with 
the sentence on the murder charge.  At the request of the 
Commonwealth, the arson conviction was dismissed as duplicative 
of the felony-murder conviction. 
9 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Intent necessary to prove arson.  "Few 
areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper 
definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime."  
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980).  As the 
present case makes clear, this is true for the crime of arson of 
a dwelling house under G. L. c. 266, § 1, concerning at least 
whether a conviction requires proof of specific or general 
intent and whether a conviction can be secured against someone 
who accidentally or negligently sets a fire and then wilfully 
and maliciously fails to extinguish or report it.  We use this 
opportunity to clarify those issues. 
 
The "venerable distinction at common law between general 
and specific intent has been the source of a good deal of 
confusion" (citations and quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 268 (1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010) 
and 459 Mass. 480, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).  As noted, 
the parties here have treated arson under G. L. c. 266, § 1, as 
a specific intent crime, requiring proof that the defendant not 
only "consciously intended to take certain actions, but that 
[s]he also consciously intended certain consequences."  Id. at 
268.  See id. at 268-269 & n.12 (discussing distinction between 
common-law concepts of "general" and "specific" intent).  To 
date, we have not had occasion to address squarely whether G. L. 
c. 266, § 1, requires proof of specific intent. 
10 
 
 
"As with all matters of statutory interpretation, we look 
first to the plain meaning of the statutory language. . . . 
Where the language is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given 
its 'ordinary meaning.' . . .  Of course, this meaning must be 
reasonable and supported by the purpose and history of the 
statute" (citations and quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013).  To secure a conviction 
for arson in this case, the statute required proof that the 
defendant "wilfully and maliciously set[] fire to, burn[ed], or 
cause[d] to be burned . . . a dwelling house."  G. L. c. 266, 
§ 1.  To establish that the defendant acted with a culpable 
state of mind, therefore, required proof that she acted 
"wilfully and maliciously."8 
 
Although our jurisprudence has not addressed whether arson 
requires specific intent, we have had occasion, in arson and 
nonarson cases alike, to consider the meaning of the terms 
"wilfully" and "maliciously."  Recently this court, interpreting 
another statute, noted that the term "wilfully" has not been 
defined consistently in either dictionaries or across our 
jurisprudence.  See Millis Pub. Schools v. M.P., 478 Mass. 767, 
775-776 (2018) (in context of analyzing statute that forbids 
                                                          
 
 
8 The Commonwealth also had to prove that the apartment 
building was a "dwelling house" and that the defendant set fire 
to, burned, or caused it to be burned, but the defendant has not 
disputed those elements on appeal. 
11 
 
wilfully failing to attend school, noting that some dictionaries 
and appellate decisions focus on actor's purpose, others on 
whether actor's conduct was voluntary or intentional).  At its 
core, however, it "means intentional and by design in contrast 
to that which is thoughtless or accidental."  Commonwealth v. 
McGovern, 397 Mass. 863, 868 (1986) (wilful and malicious 
destruction of property).  For purposes of arson, malice 
"comprises only three components . . . .  'The wilful doing of 
an unlawful act without excuse is ordinarily sufficient to 
support the allegation that it was done maliciously and with 
criminal intent.'"  Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 
26 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 
513 n.6 (2000).9  Although both "malicious" and "wilful" require 
                                                          
 
 
9 In Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 Mass. 513 (1980), where a 
defendant appealed from his conviction of arson, we stated that 
"malice 'characterizes all acts done with an evil disposition, a 
wrong and unlawful motive or purpose; the wilful doing of an 
injurious act without lawful excuse."  Id. at 527, quoting 
Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. 93, 104 (1845).  As we subsequently 
explained in McLaughlin, 431 Mass. at 513 n.6, however, "[t]he 
first half of the Niziolek formulation (the part that precedes 
the semicolon) is, strictly speaking, surplusage that serves 
only to round out the meaning of the second half. . . .  Put 
otherwise, 'an act done with an evil disposition, a wrong and 
unlawful motive or purpose' is essentially synonymous, at least 
in arson cases, with 'the wilful doing of an injurious act 
without lawful excuse'" (citations omitted).  Accordingly, we 
conclude that it is best to dispense with the first half of the 
Niziolek formulation and its somewhat antiquated reference to an 
"evil disposition."  See Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. at 26 (modern 
definition of "wilfulness" dispenses with "reference to any evil 
intent" [citation omitted]). 
12 
 
that a person act intentionally, the definitions shed no light 
on whether the statute requires specific or general intent.10 
 
It is true that in certain nonarson cases we have suggested 
that "[c]onduct is wilful when the actor intends both the 
conduct and its harmful consequences."  Commonwealth v. 
Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 352 (1990) (wilful and malicious 
destruction or injury of personal property, dwelling house, or 
building of another under G. L. c. 266, § 127).  See 
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 Mass. 236, 242 (2012) (considering 
term "wilfully" in criminal harassment statute, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 43A).  Here, a specific intent instruction was requested by 
both parties and utilized by the trial judge.11    Yet, such an 
interpretation has never been squarely adopted for § 1. 
                                                          
 
 
10 At least two commentators have suggested that the term 
"wilfully" is redundant when coupled with the term 
"maliciously."  See R.M. Perkins and R.N. Boyce, Criminal Law 
275 (3d ed. 1982) ("intentional act creating an obvious fire 
hazard to the dwelling of another, done without justification 
. . . might well be characterized as 'wilful' . . . and would 
certainly be malicious, but as the law has developed it is a 
mistake to assume that the phrase 'wilful and malicious,' when 
found in the definition of common-law arson, adds some distinct 
requirement not included in the word 'malicious' alone" 
[footnote omitted]); Poulos, The Metamorphosis of the Law of 
Arson, 51 Mo. L. Rev. 295, 323 (1986) (although "the mens rea of 
arson is generally described as 'maliciously,' accompanied by 
either 'willfully' or 'voluntarily,' the latter words add 
nothing to the concept of 'malice'" [footnote omitted]). 
 
 
11 The judge instructed, "The word 'willfully' means that 
the act was intentional and by design, rather than an act that 
is thoughtless or accidental.  A person acts willfully if she 
13 
 
 
In Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. at 12, 27, the defendant was 
charged with arson after he poured gasoline in such a manner 
that it landed on himself and two others, as well as on the 
floor of the apartment, and then ignited it.  He argued that the 
evidence established, at most, that he intended to burn himself 
and that the resulting burning of the apartment was accidental.  
Id. at 26.  This court disagreed and concluded that the evidence 
was sufficient for the jury to "have found, consistent with the 
[trial] judge's supplemental instruction on [wilfulness], that 
the defendant intended not only his conduct, i.e., lighting the 
fire, but also the resulting harm, which . . . was the burning 
of the apartment" (quotations omitted).  Id. at 27.  Although 
the supplemental instruction clearly required a finding of 
specific intent, Dung Van Tran was a sufficiency of the evidence 
case.  It did not involve a challenge to the propriety of the 
supplemental instruction or consider whether proof of specific 
intent is required for a conviction of arson. 
                                                          
 
intends both her conduct, for example, the lighting of a paper, 
and the resulting harm, the burning of the building or some part 
of it."  See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury 
Instructions § 4.3.1 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2013).  
Instructions published in the various editions of the 
Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury Instructions 
can be a useful resource, but not all of them have been reviewed 
or approved by our courts.  Contrast Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide (2018) (approved and recommended by Supreme Judicial 
Court). 
14 
 
 
Ultimately, although "'willful' may have several meanings 
when read in isolation, its meaning in any particular statute 
may be determined from examining the act itself as well as the 
larger statutory scheme."  Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. 
Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 466 Mass. 454, 
463 (2013).  Accordingly, we view the term "wilfully" in the 
context of the broader phrase "wilfully and maliciously," as 
used historically in the crime of arson. 
 
"At common law the offence of arson consisted of the wilful 
and malicious burning of the house of another" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lamothe, 343 Mass. 417, 419 (1961).  
See A. F. Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Arson § 57, at 71 
(1936) (Curtis); W. R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 21.3, at 1365 (6th 
ed. 2017).  The same common-law language -- wilfully and 
maliciously -- appears in the current version of § 1, enacted in 
1932.  See St. 1932, c. 192, § 1.12  The same language also 
appeared in every predecessor version of § 1, dating back more 
than two hundred years.  See, e.g., St. 1784, c. 58, § 1; R.S. 
(1836) c. 126, §§ 1-2; Pub. St. 1882 c. 203, § 1; Rev. L. 
                                                          
 
 
12 The only amendments to G. L. c. 266, § 1, since 1932 have 
been for purposes of providing alternatives to the punishment of 
not more than twenty years in State prison.  See St. 1948, 
c. 43, § 1 ("by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction 
for not more than two and one half years"); St. 1974, c. 281 
("or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by such 
fine and imprisonment"). 
15 
 
c. 208, § 1 (1902); G. L. c. 266, § 1 (1921); G. L. (Ter. Ed.) 
c. 266, § 1.  Quite simply, the crime of arson in Massachusetts, 
including the requirement that a defendant have acted "wilfully 
and maliciously," has deep roots, and, as this court has 
previously acknowledged, to ascertain the meaning of the words 
in § 1, "we must turn to the common law, for the statute was 
undoubtedly drawn against that background."  Lamothe, 343 Mass. 
at 419).  See Commonwealth v. DeCicco, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 
127 (1998) (common-law understanding of arson was "engrafted in 
§ 1").13 
 
Common-law arson has been widely acknowledged as a crime of 
general intent.  See, e.g., People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 406 
(2000) ("Common-law arson is a general intent crime"); Linehan 
v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 1985) (same); Veverka v. 
Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1982) (same); United States v. 
Doe, 136 F.3d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 
1041 (1999) (same); United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1, 
2-3 (C.M.A. 1983) (same).  See also D.A. Dripps, R.M. Boyce & 
R.M. Perkins, Criminal Law and Procedure, at 383 (13th ed. 2017) 
                                                          
 
 
13 The current statute "differs from common law arson in two 
respects.  Firstly, the statute includes within its terms the 
burning of one's own dwelling.  Secondly, one building 
containing many dwelling units falls within the definition of a 
'dwelling house' in § 1, whereas at common law, each unit is a 
separate dwelling" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
DeCicco, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 127 (1998). 
16 
 
("if without justification, excuse or mitigation, one sets a 
fire which obviously creates an unreasonable fire hazard for 
another's dwelling, which is actually burned thereby, the result 
is common-law arson even if this was not an intended 
consequence"); W.R. LaFave, Criminal Law, supra at § 21.3(e), at 
1375-1376 (common-law arson involved either "intentional[ly] 
burning" dwelling house of another or "intentionally doing an 
act [e.g., starting a fire or burning his own premises] under 
circumstances in which the act created a very high risk of 
burning the dwelling house of another, where the actor knew of 
that risk but nonetheless engaged in the risk-taking act"); R.M. 
Perkins, Criminal Law, at 175 (1957) (state of mind required for 
common-law arson, "assuming . . . there are no circumstances of 
justification, excuse or mitigation, is either an intent to burn 
the dwelling of another, or an act done under such circumstances 
that there is obviously a plain and strong likelihood of such a 
burning"). 
 
In other jurisdictions where the "wilful and malicious" 
language was adopted by statute or code, courts have uniformly 
followed the common law and interpreted the language as seting 
forth a general intent crime.  This is true at the State level, 
see, e.g., State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1978); 
People v. Atkins, 25 Cal. 4th 76, 84-85 (2001); Linehan, 476 So. 
2d at 1264-1265, State v. O'Farrell, 355 A.2d 396, 398 (Me. 
17 
 
1976); State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130, 135 (R.I. 1980); at the 
federal level, see Doe, 136 F.3d at 634-635 (interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 81); United States v. M.W., 890 F.2d 239, 240-241 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (same); and even under the code of military justice, 
see Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. at 7 (interpreting art. 126 of 
Uniform Code of Military Justice). 
By contrast, in jurisdictions where arson has been declared 
a specific intent crime, the statutes have been drafted or 
amended to achieve that end.  For example, in Wyoming, the 
statute was drafted to provide that a "person is guilty of 
first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire or causes an 
explosion with intent to destroy or damage an occupied 
structure" (emphasis added).  Keats v. State, 64 P.3d 104, 107 
(Wyo. 2003), quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a).  There, the 
court held that the statute "can be categorized as a 'specific 
intent' crime."  Id.  In Maryland, the statute is still drafted 
in a form akin to that of the common law, see Md. Code Ann., 
Criminal Law, § 6-102 (LexisNexis 2012), but the Legislature has 
expressly defined "maliciously" as "acting with intent to harm a 
person or property," id. at § 6-101(c), and "willfully" as 
"acting intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully," id. at § 6-
101(e).  See Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 371 (2001) (given 
"the plain language used to define 'maliciously' and 'wilfully,' 
we conclude that the Legislature intended for arson to be a 
18 
 
specific intent crime").  Contrast DeBettencourt v. State, 48 
Md. App. 522, 523-524, 532 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), cert. 
denied, 290 Md. 713 (1981) (prior version of Maryland arson 
statute containing no definitions of "wilfully" and 
"maliciously," followed common law intent). 
 
Here, the Legislature has given no indication in more than 
two hundred years that it intended to deviate from the common-
law general intent requirement for the crime of arson.  
Moreover, if the Legislature had intended to require specific 
intent, it would have used more explicit language as it has in 
other criminal statutes, including a provision involving burning 
of insured property.  See G. L. c. 266, § 10 ("Whoever, wilfully 
and with intent to defraud or injure the insurer, sets fire to . 
. ." [emphasis added]); G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b) ("Whoever, being 
armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another with intent to 
rob or murder . . ." [emphasis added]).  We conclude, therefore, 
that proof of general intent with malice is all that is 
required. 
 
To be sure, § 1 is still far from being some form of strict 
liability offense.  Requiring malice "ensures that the act is 
done with a design to do an intentional wrongful act without any 
legal justification, excuse or claim of right. . . . [The] 
willful and malice requirement ensures that the setting of the 
fire must be a deliberate and intentional act, as distinguished 
19 
 
from an accidental or unintentional ignition or act of setting a 
fire" (quotations and citations omitted).  Atkins, 25 Cal. 4th 
at 88.  See Commonwealth v. Ely, 388 Mass. 69, 74 (1983) 
("requirement that the act be wilful eliminate[s] accidental or 
negligent fires" from reach of statute).  See also Curtis, supra 
at § 2, at 3 (throughout arson's long history "distinction 
between intentional and accidental fires has always been 
maintained, the latter never forming a basis for a criminal 
prosecution"). 
 
Moreover, we conclude that, even in the absence of proof 
that a defendant acted purposefully to set fire to or burn some 
portion of a dwelling house, the intent element of § 1 still may 
be satisfied by proof that a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would have known that there was a plain and 
strong likelihood that some portion of a dwelling house would be 
set on fire or burned.  See, e.g., Atkins, 25 Cal. 4th at 89 
(incendiary act must be committed "under such circumstances that 
the direct, natural, and highly probable consequences would be 
the burning of the relevant structure"); Nowack, 462 Mich. at 
408-409 (act done in "circumstances where a plain and strong 
likelihood of [the burning of a dwelling house] exists"). 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In this case, we conclude 
that the evidence was overwhelming that the defendant acted with 
general intent and malice for purposes of arson under G. L. 
20 
 
c. 266, § 1, when she set fire to a bag of clothes located on 
the floor inside an apartment for the purpose of exacting 
revenge against her boyfriend.  Because the defendant described 
her conduct and motivation to more than one person immediately 
after she left the apartment building, we can say for certain 
that the fire was not the product of an accident or negligence.  
It was set intentionally, without justification or excuse, and 
for an unlawful or injurious purpose or motive.  Moreover, a 
reasonable person, under those circumstances, would have known 
that there was a plain and strong likelihood that some portion 
of the apartment building would be set on fire or burned. 
 
To the defendant's benefit, the jury were not instructed 
that arson was a general intent crime.  Instead, the trial judge 
instructed that there were two alternative theories by which the 
Commonwealth could prove that the defendant acted with specific 
intent for purposes of satisfying the mens rea requirement for 
arson under G. L. c. 266, § 1, which we shall refer to as the 
specific intent theory and the failure to extinguish or report 
theory. 
 
The defendant argues that, even viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that she had the specific intent to burn the apartment 
building, not just Brewer's clothing.  We disagree. 
21 
 
 
The arson statute, by its plain terms, does not require 
extensive damage to the dwelling house -- e.g., that it be 
"consumed" or "destroyed" by fire.  See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 
110 Mass. 403, 404 (1872).  It requires proof only that some 
portion of the dwelling house actually was on fire or burned.  
Id.  The mere charring of some portion of the dwelling house is 
sufficient.  See Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 
924, 925 (1980).  Although specific intent requires proof that 
the defendant intended her conduct and its consequences, it does 
not require proof that the consequences she intended were as 
extensive as those realized (i.e., that the apartment building 
be consumed or destroyed by the fire).  Rather, specific intent 
requires only that the consequences she intended are among those 
covered by the statute (i.e., that some portion of the apartment 
building actually be set on fire or burned).14  See Gunter, 427 
Mass. at 269 n.12 ("in a specific intent crime, the defendant 
must intend that the particular consequences constituting the 
crime follow from his act or conduct").  See also Curtis, supra 
at § 62, at 78-79 ("not necessary that the burning effected 
correspond precisely with the intent or design of the accused"). 
                                                          
 
 
14 The trial judge instructed the jury:  "A person acts 
willfully if she intends both her conduct, for example, lighting 
a paper, and the resulting harm, the burning of the building or 
some part of it." 
22 
 
 
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, established that the defendant, in a fit of anger, 
intentionally lit a piece of paper on fire and threw it on a 
pile of Brewer's clothes that were located on the floor inside 
the apartment.  A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence 
alone that the defendant was aware that her actions would result 
in the burning of not only Brewer's clothing, but also some 
portion of the apartment building.  See Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 
at 27 (where defendant poured gasoline in such manner that it 
got not only on himself but also on other people and on living 
room floor of apartment, jury could reasonably infer he was 
aware when he ignited it that he would do more than simply light 
himself on fire); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 393 Mass. 612, 613-
615 (1985) (defendant who lit newspaper on fire inside tenement 
building and threw it at another occupant, thereby igniting 
fire, guilty of arson); Commonwealth v. Roy, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 
14, 16 (1974) (defendant who lit apartment curtains on fire 
after fighting with roommate, resulting in fire, guilty of 
arson). 
 
After setting the fire, the defendant left without 
attempting to extinguish the fire or call for help.  The 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, further established that she locked the exterior 
door of the building as she left, thereby making it more 
23 
 
difficult for anyone to escape or to enter and attempt to 
extinguish the fire.  Therefore, the jury reasonably could have 
inferred that the defendant acted with the requisite specific 
intent at the time she set the fire.  See, e.g., Dung Van Tran, 
463 Mass. at 27-28 (defendant's failure to attempt to put out 
fire or to sound alarm was further proof of his intent to burn 
apartment); Commonwealth v. Cavedon, 301 Mass. 307, 314-315 
(1938) (jury could reasonably infer defendants intended to 
commit arson from their failure to make any effort to extinguish 
fire or sound alarm). 
 
"We are mindful that in arson cases the Commonwealth often 
can prove guilt only by a web of circumstantial evidence that 
entwines the suspect in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"  
(citation and quotation omitted).  Choy v. Commonwealth, 456 
Mass. 146, 150, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986 (2010).  Here, that 
web was sufficiently woven. 
 
3.  Instruction on failure to extinguish or report fire.  
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion for bill of 
particulars to determine whether the Commonwealth's theory of 
liability was based on her having set the fire, having failed to 
extinguish or warn of the fire after she started it, or both.  
At the subsequent hearing, the Commonwealth represented that its 
theory was based on the setting of the fire, not the failure to 
act after the fire was set.  Based on that representation, the 
24 
 
motion judge, who was not the trial judge, endorsed the motion 
as follows:  "Upon hearing, the Commonwealth representing that 
it will proceed on a theory of 2nd degree felony murder, the 
underlying felony being the crime of arson by intentionally 
setting fire to or within an occupied dwelling, further 
particulars are not required." 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth largely abided by its prior 
representation.  During the trial, the Commonwealth filed a 
proposed jury instruction on arson that focused on the 
defendant's intent at the time the fire was set and made no 
mention of failing to extinguish or report a fire.  Later, it 
filed a final set of requests proposing essentially the same 
instruction.  While arguing in opposition to the defendant's 
motion for a required finding of not guilty, the Commonwealth 
restated that the theory of liability was that the defendant 
intentionally set the apartment building on fire, and that any 
evidence that she failed to extinguish or report the fire was 
relevant insofar as it reflected on her intent at the time she 
set the fire.15 
                                                          
 
 
15 The Commonwealth took the same position at a pretrial 
motion hearing, when it agreed with the judge that it was only 
the defendant's intent "at the time of ignition" (i.e., "when 
lighting that match") that was relevant, although her subsequent 
acts or omissions could be considered in assessing her intent at 
the time of ignition. 
25 
 
 
However, during the charge conference, the trial judge, 
without prompting from the Commonwealth, suggested she was 
inclined based on the evidence to provide the jury with a 
supplemental instruction that, in its final form, stated as 
follows: 
"If an act is accidental, it is not a crime; that is, the 
requirement of willfulness means that accidentally or 
negligently caused burnings are not arson.  However a 
person may have the required intent for arson if he or she 
negligently or accidentally causes a fire and then 
willfully and maliciously makes no attempt to extinguish it 
or to report it.  In that circumstance, the necessary 
criminal state of mind for arson, willfulness and 
maliciousness, may be formed after the fire starts."16 
 
The Commonwealth agreed and requested that the supplemental 
instruction be given.  The defendant objected, arguing that the 
Commonwealth had waived the right to seek such an instruction, 
and that, in any event, there was insufficient evidence to 
justify providing it.  Although the Commonwealth did not 
specifically argue in closing that the defendant's failure to 
report or extinguish the fire constituted arson, the judge 
provided the supplemental instruction.  For the first time, the 
defendant argues that the supplemental instruction was improper 
because G. L. c. 266, § 1, does not criminalize the wilful and 
                                                          
 
 
16 The supplemental instruction was adapted from § 4.3.3 of 
the Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury 
Instructions, supra. 
26 
 
malicious failure to extinguish or report an accidentally or 
negligently set fire.  We agree. 
 
The statute, in pertinent part, makes it unlawful for a 
person to "wilfully and maliciously set[] fire to, burn[], or 
cause[] to be burned . . . a dwelling house."  G. L. c. 266, 
§ 1.  There is nothing in this plain language that suggests that 
a person is culpable for accidental or negligent conduct.  See 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. at 633 (court looks to plain language of 
statute to ascertain legislative intent).  Indeed, accidentally 
or negligently set fires cannot form the basis for arson under 
G. L. c. 266, § 1.  Moreover, there is nothing on the face of 
the arson statute to suggest that a person is liable for failing 
to act after accidentally or negligently setting fire to, 
burning, or causing to be burned a dwelling house.  Therefore, 
the supplemental instruction was erroneous.17 
 
The Commonwealth suggests that the statute criminalizes the 
wilful and malicious failure to extinguish or report an 
accidentally or negligently set fire through the inclusion of 
the words "burns" and "causes to be burned."  However, the 
                                                          
 
 
17 In certain circumstances, the defendant's actions may 
constitute wanton or reckless conduct rising to the level of 
involuntary manslaughter.  See infra.  Having returned a verdict 
of murder in the second degree on a theory of felony-murder 
based on the underlying crime of arson, however, the jury here 
never reached this potential lesser included offense. 
27 
 
Commonwealth does not direct us to any authority that has 
interpreted those words in that fashion. 
 
Moreover, had the Legislature intended for the statute to 
cover acts or omissions committed after a fire is accidentally 
or negligently set, it is evident from the language used in 
other arson-related statutes that it knew how to do so.  See G. 
L. c. 266, § 7 ("Whoever by wantonly or recklessly setting fire 
to any material, or by increasing a fire already set, causes 
injury to, or the destruction of, any growing or standing wood 
of another shall be punished"); G. L. c. 266, § 8 ("Whoever, not 
being a tenant thereof, sets or increases a fire upon land of 
another whereby the property of another is injured, or whoever 
negligently or wilfully suffers any fire upon his own land to 
extend beyond the limits thereof whereby the woods or property 
of another are injured, shall be punished"); G. L. c. 266, § 9 
("Whoever . . . sets a fire on land which is not owned or 
controlled by him and before leaving the same neglects to 
entirely extinguish such fire, or whoever wilfully or 
negligently sets a fire on land which is not owned or controlled 
by him whereby property is endangered or injured, or whoever 
wilfully or negligently suffers a fire upon his own land to 
escape beyond the limits thereof to the injury of another, shall 
be punished");.  Notably, the relevant language in each of these 
statutes was in effect when § 1 was amended in 1932 to provide 
28 
 
as it does today.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 266, §§ 7, 8, as amended 
through St. 1912, c. 419, §§ 1, 2; G. L. c. 266, § 9, inserted 
by St. 1897, c. 254, §§ 1, 2. 
 
Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the words 
"burns" and "causes to be burned" are ambiguous, the rule of 
lenity applies to a criminal statute and "requires that the 
defendant receive the benefit of the ambiguity."  Commonwealth 
v. Dayton, 477 Mass. 224, 226 (2017). 
 
The Commonwealth cites a trio of cases, two of which appear 
to have served as the impetus for the supplemental instruction 
at issue.  Given the plain language of G. L. c. 266, § 1, the 
cases do not advance the Commonwealth's cause. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20 (1923), the defendant 
was not charged with arson but with burning insured property 
with intent to defraud.  At that time, G. L. c. 266, § 10, 
provided, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever, with intent to 
injure the insurer, burns a building . . . belonging to himself 
or another, and which [is] at the time insured against loss or 
damage by fire, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for not more than twenty years."18  See G. L. c. 266, § 10 
                                                          
 
 
18 General Laws c. 266, § 10, was subsequently amended, see 
St. 1932, c. 192, § 7, and now provides, in pertinent part:  
"Whoever, wilfully and with intent to defraud or injure the 
insurer, sets fire to, or attempts to set fire to, or whoever 
causes to be burned . . . a building . . . belonging to himself 
29 
 
(1923).  Cali appealed and claimed that, at most, the evidence 
established that the fire was accidental.  Cali, supra at 247 
Mass. at 25.  The court disagreed, stating, "[I]f he merely 
neglected in the emergency of the moment to act, his negligence 
was not proof of a purpose to commit the crime charged.  The 
intention, however, to injure could be formed after as well as 
before the fire started. . . .  [H]is immediate departure from 
the premises . . . , without giving any alarm, warranted the 
inference of a criminal intent or state of mind, that the 
building should be consumed."  Id.  The court also stated that 
there was no error in the jury instruction: 
"If a man does start an accidental fire what is his conduct 
in regard to it?  A question might arise -- as if after the 
fire has started accidentally, and he then has it within 
his power and ability to extinguish the fire and he 
realizes and knows that he can, and then he forms and 
entertains an intent to injure an insurance company, he can 
be guilty of this offense.  It is not necessary that the 
intent be formed before the fire is started."  (Emphasis 
added) 
 
Id. at 24-25.  This holding does not aid the Commonwealth's 
argument because G. L. c. 266, § 10, unlike G. L. c. 266, § 1, 
did not require that the defendant act "wilfully and 
maliciously."  Moreover, the intent element required under § 10, 
unlike under § 1, was the intent to injure an insurance company, 
                                                          
 
or another, and which [is] at the time insured against loss or 
damage by fire, shall be punished . . . ." 
30 
 
i.e., an intent that theoretically could be formed after the 
fire was accidentally set. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Glenn, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 440, 443-445 
(1987), the defendant appealed from his conviction under G. L. 
c. 266, § 1, arguing that the jury were erroneously provided 
with a modified version of the jury instruction from the Cali 
case recited supra.  The Appeals Court agreed, concluding that 
the modified instruction "did not follow the language in the 
Cali case [and] failed to make clear that either the setting of 
the fire or the failure to extinguish or report it had to be 
intentional and not merely negligent."  Id. at 444.  In Glenn, 
however, the defendant did not argue, nor did the court discuss, 
whether the Cali instruction was appropriate in a case charging 
arson under G. L. c. 266, § 1. 
 
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 444-
447 (2002), this court considered whether the defendants, who 
had started a fire in an abandoned warehouse by accidentally 
knocking over a lit candle, could face involuntary manslaughter 
charges in connection with the death of several firefighters 
based on the defendants' failure to take adequate steps either 
to control or report the fire.  After noting that "[i]t is true 
that, in general, one does not have a duty to take affirmative 
action," id. at 449, we concluded that "where one's actions 
create a life-threatening risk to another, there is a duty to 
31 
 
take reasonable steps to alleviate the risk.  The reckless 
failure to fulfil this duty can result in a charge of 
manslaughter."  Id. at 450.  See id. at 453 (to prove 
recklessness there need only be proof "that the defendant's 
choice not to report the fire was intentional, not that the fire 
was intentionally set"). 
In Levesque, however, we were interpreting the crime of 
involuntary manslaughter, the elements of which are derived from 
the common law.  Id. at 447-448.  The defendants were not 
charged with arson, which is defined by statute.  And although 
G. L. c. 266, § 1, has its roots in the common law and we look 
to that law when necessary to ascertain the meaning of its 
language, the plain language of the statute still prevails. 
Thus, it was error to provide the supplemental instruction 
on arson. 
 
We next consider whether, as the defendant argues and 
dissent believes, the error in the jury instruction requires a 
new trial.  Although the defendant objected at trial to the 
supplemental instruction, she did not do so on the grounds 
raised here.  "It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a 
party alleges error in a charge he must bring the alleged error 
to the attention of the judge in specific terms in order to give 
the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 Mass. 479, 482-483 
32 
 
(1995).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 24 (b), 378 Mass. 895 (1979) ("No 
party may assign as error the giving [of] . . . an instruction 
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider 
its verdict, specifying the matter to which he objects and the 
grounds of his objection").  The objection, therefore, was not 
preserved -- the judge was not alerted to the erroneousness of 
the jury instruction -- and we review the error for a 
substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 353 (2018). 
 
"An error creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice unless we are persuaded that it did not materially 
influence the guilty verdict. . . . In applying this standard, 
we analyze the potential impact of the error on the verdict, and 
review the record to determine the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case, absent the improper evidence" (quotations, 
alteration, and citation omitted).  Id. at 354-355.  Here, the 
Commonwealth, despite agreeing with the trial judge's suggestion 
that the supplemental instruction was warranted and should be 
given, never argued before the jury that the defendant 
accidentally or negligently set the fire or that she formed the 
requisite intent after having set the fire.  The Commonwealth 
consistently argued that the defendant intended to burn the 
apartment building at the time she set the fire, and, as we have 
concluded, that argument had compelling support in the evidence.  
33 
 
In addition, the evidence regarding the defendant's acts or 
omissions after she set the fire was relevant and admissible as 
to both the specific intent theory of arson and the offense of 
involuntary manslaughter.  We are persuaded, therefore, that the 
error did not materially influence the guilty verdict. 
 
The defendant also argues that it was improper to provide 
the supplemental instruction because the Commonwealth waived the 
right to pursue the alternative failure to extinguish or report 
theory by its representation at the hearing on the motion for 
bill of particulars.  Specifically, the defendant suggests that 
the Commonwealth's sudden reversal, in response to the trial 
judge's sua sponte suggestion that the supplemental instruction 
was warranted, prejudiced the preparation of her defense because 
had she known the alternative theory would be pursued she could 
have presented additional evidence to put her acts or omissions 
following the setting of the fire in a different (i.e., less 
inculpatory) light.  The defendant further argues that she was 
prejudiced by the last-minute revival of the alternative theory 
because it opened the door for the jury to consider her acts or 
omissions after she set the fire that were otherwise irrelevant. 
 
Because evidence of the defendant's acts or omissions 
following the setting of the fire was relevant and admissible 
with respect to both the specific intent theory of arson and the 
offense of involuntary manslaughter, the defendant had notice of 
34 
 
and reason to offer additional evidence on those issues before 
the Commonwealth reversed its position regarding the alternative 
theory.  Therefore, the jury did not have before them any facts 
that were otherwise inadmissible.  The defendant's claims of 
prejudice, therefore, miss the mark. 
 
Further, even if we were to agree with the dissent and deem 
the defendant's objection to the supplemental instruction to 
have been preserved by her objection on the basis of waiver, we 
still conclude that the error in providing the instruction was 
harmless.  See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 
(1994) (error harmless if reviewing court "sure that [it] did 
not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect" [citation 
omitted]).  Although there was a variance between the 
Commonwealth's representation at the bill of particulars hearing 
and its response to the trial judge's sua sponte suggestion that 
the supplemental instruction was warranted, there was no 
variance between the Commonwealth's representations to the 
motion judge and the evidence it offered or the arguments it 
made to the jury at trial.  As detailed supra, the 
Commonwealth's argument to the jury, as it had previewed at the 
motion hearing, was that the defendant fully intended to burn a 
portion of the apartment building when she ignited a bag of 
Brewer's clothes.  The Commonwealth never argued that the fire 
was accidentally or negligently set.  Nor could the jury have 
35 
 
reached such a conclusion based on any reasonable view of the 
evidence.  But for the reference in the instructions to the 
failure to report theory, therefore, the focus of the trial was 
where it should have been and, given that the arson charge was 
tried strictly on a specific intent basis, was skewed in favor 
of the defendant. 
 
4.  Other issues.  Because of our decision, we address the 
other issues raised by the defendant only briefly.19 
 
a.  Inherently dangerous felony.  In her instructions to 
the jury on the felony-murder in the second degree charge, the 
trial judge indicated that the third element that the 
Commonwealth had to prove was that the underlying felony was 
inherently dangerous or that the defendant acted with a 
conscious disregard for the risk to human life.  Over the 
defendant's objection, the judge further instructed that, as a 
matter of law, arson is inherently dangerous to human life.  The 
defendant argues that this was error and that the jury should 
have decided whether, in this case, she acted with a conscious 
disregard for the risk to human life. 
                                                          
 
 
19 We need not address the defendant's arguments that (1) 
the evidence was insufficient to establish that she wilfully and 
maliciously failed to extinguish or report the fire; (2) a new 
trial is required even if the evidence was sufficient to 
establish one of the two "theories" of arson; and (3) the jury 
should have been instructed that they had to reach a unanimous 
decision on the underlying "theory" to convict her under § 1. 
36 
 
 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the right to due process 
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
the right to notice and a jury trial guaranteed by the due 
process clause and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 476 & 490.  Here, the 
defendant argues that the use of arson as the predicate felony 
for the conviction of murder in the second degree had the effect 
for her of increasing the penalty for arson from its maximum of 
twenty years in State prison, see G. L. c. 266, § 1, to one of 
imprisonment in State prison for life, with eligibility for 
parole after fifteen years, see G. L. c. 265, § 2, and G. L. c. 
127, § 133A,20 based on the determination whether she acted with 
a conscious disregard for the risk to human life. Therefore, she 
argues that, under Apprendi, the jury must determine if she 
acted with a conscious disregard for the risk to human life. 
                                                          
 
 
20 The applicable statutes were amended after the date the 
offense was committed here and now provide for life 
imprisonment, with eligibility for parole in not less than 
fifteen years nor more than twenty-five years, for a murder in 
the second degree conviction.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2 (c), as 
inserted by St. 2014, c. 189, § 5; G. L. c. 127, §133A, as 
amended through St. 2012, c. 192, § 37; and G. L. c. 279, § 24, 
as amended through St. 2012, c. 192, § 46. 
37 
 
 
The argument fails because it is well settled that the 
question whether a felony is inherently dangerous to human life 
is one of law.  See Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 
208 (2014).  Moreover, arson has been identified by this court 
on numerous occasions as inherently dangerous as a matter of 
law.  See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 528 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 308 (2011); Commonwealth v. 
Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 391 (1995), citing Commonwealth v. 
Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 505 n.15 (1982).21  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Tevenal, 401 Mass. 225, 230 (1987) (only where 
judge determines that felony is not inherently dangerous does it 
become factual question whether defendant acted in conscious 
disregard for risk to human life). 
 
b.  Disproportionality in sentencing.  The defendant 
further argues that her sentence on the conviction of murder in 
the second degree on a theory of felony-murder violates the 
requirement of proportionality in sentencing under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 26 of 
                                                          
 
 
21 Although this court has previously stated that "[w]e have 
never delineated exactly which felonies give rise to application 
of the [inherently dangerous] rule," Commonwealth v. Matchett, 
386 Mass. 492, 505 (1982), we meant that we have never compiled 
an exhaustive list, not that we have never identified any 
felonies as inherently dangerous.  Indeed, in Matchett, supra at 
505 n.15, we listed inherently dangerous common-law felonies, 
including arson. 
38 
 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  She argues that, to be 
constitutionally firm, the intent element for felony-murder in 
the second degree should not have been constructively implied 
from the arson conviction.22  Rather, the jury should have 
determined whether she acted with a conscious disregard for the 
risk to human life. 
 
"[A] heavy burden is on the sentenced defendant to 
establish that the punishment is disproportionate to the offense 
for which [s]he was convicted. . . . It must be so 
disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 233 
(1992).  In making this assessment, "we examine three objective 
considerations:  (1) the nature of the offender and offense in 
light of the degree of harm to society; (2) sentencing 
provisions in other jurisdictions for similar offenses; and (3) 
sentences for more severe offenses within the Commonwealth."  
Id. at 233-234. 
                                                          
 
 
22 The present case went to trial before this court, in 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 (2017), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), prospectively abolished the concept of 
constructive malice, which in turn eliminated our common-law 
felony-murder rule as an independent theory of murder.  Id. at 
832 (Gants, C.J., concurring) ("sole remaining function of 
felony-murder [is] to elevate what would otherwise be murder in 
the second degree to murder in the first degree where the 
killing occurs during the commission of a life felony"). 
39 
 
 
Arson of a dwelling place, especially when committed by an 
adult, is, as this case confirms, "a heinous, life-threatening 
crime."  DeCicco, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 127.  In some other 
jurisdictions, causing another person's death in the course of 
committing arson is punished more harshly than in 
Massachusetts.23  The sentence for the more serious offense of 
murder in the first degree in Massachusetts, meanwhile, is life 
imprisonment with no eligibility for parole.  G. L. c. 265, 
§ 2 (a).  Thus, a life sentence, with parole eligibility after 
fifteen years, for causing death in the course of the commission 
of arson, does not shock the conscience or offend fundamental 
notions of human dignity.24 
 
c.  Instructions to the grand jury.  "Generally speaking, 
the Commonwealth is not required to provide legal instructions 
on the elements of an offense for which it seeks an indictment."  
                                                          
 
 
23 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-54d (West, Supp. 
2018) (life with no eligibility for parole); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 750.316(1)(b) (Supp. 2018) (same);  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) 
(2017) (death or life with no eligibility for parole); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 163.115(1)(b)(A) and (5)(a), (b) (2017) (life with no 
eligibility for parole until after twenty-five years). 
 
 
24 The defendant also argues that the trial judge's ruling 
that, as a matter of law, arson is inherently dangerous deprived 
the defendant of her only defense to the felony-murder charge, 
i.e., that her low cognitive functioning and PTSD affected her 
capacity to consciously disregard the risk to human life.  In so 
doing, she asks us to ignore the defenses she asserted to the 
predicate charge of arson, which also served as defenses to the 
felony-murder charge.  This, we cannot do. 
40 
 
Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 41 n.10 (2014).  We have, 
however, recognized two limited exceptions to this rule.  First, 
such an instruction should be provided where the grand jury 
requests it.  See Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 
(1999).  Second, where a juvenile is accused of murder and there 
is substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances, the grand 
jury must be instructed on the elements of murder and mitigating 
circumstances and defenses.  See Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 
Mass. 808, 810 (2012).25  The defendant invites us to create 
another exception for cases like this one involving murder and 
arson because of the severity of the potential punishment 
involved and concern over whether a lay grand juror could 
possibly understand the nature of the evidence required to 
establish probable cause for such "complex" offenses.  We 
decline to create such an exception.26 
                                                          
 
 
25 Our committee on grand jury proceedings recently 
submitted a report recommending various "best practices," 
including on issues such as when grand jurors should be 
instructed on defenses to the crime or on less serious offenses 
than the most serious potential charge and when and how grand 
jurors should be instructed on the law.  See Supreme Judicial 
Court Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings, Final Report to the 
Justices (June 2018).  See also Supreme Judicial Court Press 
Release, Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings Proposes Best 
Practices in Grand Jury Proceedings (June 27, 2018). 
 
 
26 The Commonwealth suggests that it is generally the 
practice in Suffolk County to instruct the grand jury on the 
elements of offenses, although it is not recorded.  A transcript 
from a recording in this case reflects that the Commonwealth 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
                                                          
 
provided the grand jury with the relevant language for arson 
from G. L. c. 266, § 1. 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting in part, with whom Lenk and Budd, 
JJ., join).  I concur in parts 1, 2, and 4 of the court's 
opinion.  Further, I agree with the court that the judge erred 
by instructing the jury that "a person may have the required 
intent for arson if he or she negligently or accidentally causes 
a fire and then wilfully and maliciously makes no attempt to 
extinguish it or to report it."  I conclude that the judge's 
instruction was erroneous for two reasons:  first, because the 
instruction mischaracterizes the intent required to prove the 
crime of arson of a dwelling house, in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 1; and second, because at the hearing on the 
defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, the Commonwealth 
told the judge that it was proceeding solely on the theory that 
the defendant was guilty of arson because she intentionally set 
the fire, not that she failed to act after the fire was set. 
 
I dissent from the portion of the court's opinion in which 
the court concludes that the erroneous jury instruction was 
harmless error, where it allowed the jury to convict the 
defendant of arson of a dwelling and felony-murder even if they 
had a reasonable doubt whether she intended to burn any part of 
the building at the moment when she threw a lit piece of paper 
on a duffel bag containing her boyfriend's clothes.  I agree 
with the court that there was sufficient evidence to permit the 
jury to find that she had that intent, but I conclude that the 
2 
 
weight of that evidence was far from overwhelming.  The risk 
that one or more jurors found the defendant guilty of arson and 
felony-murder on a theory that is wrong as a matter of law (and 
that the Commonwealth had promised not to pursue) is too 
significant to permit the verdicts to stand.  Justice requires 
that the convictions be vacated, and that the defendant be 
retried with correct jury instructions. 
 
The consequence of the judge's erroneous instruction can 
only be understood in the context of the other jury instructions 
that she gave.  She instructed the jury that the Commonwealth 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the defendant 
wilfully and maliciously set fire to or caused the building to 
be burned," and that "[a] person acts wilfully if she intends 
both her conduct, for example, lighting a paper, and the 
resulting harm, the burning of the building or some part of it."  
The judge further instructed:  "Although an act may be 
intentional, its consequences may be accidental.  An accident is 
defined as an unexpected happening in that it occurs without 
intention or design on the defendant's part.  If an act is 
accidental, it is not a crime; that is, the requirement of 
3 
 
wilfulness means that accidentally or negligently causing 
burnings are not arson."1 
                                                          
 
 
1 The entirety of the judge's instruction regarding this 
element of the offense is set forth below: 
 
 
"The third element the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt is the defendant wilfully and maliciously 
set fire to or caused the building to be burned. 
 
"Both wilfulness and malice are required to constitute the 
state of mind necessary to commit arson.  The word 
'wilfully' means the act was intentional and by design 
rather than an act that was thoughtless or accidental.  A 
person acts wilfully if she intends both her conduct, for 
example, lighting a paper, and the resulting harm, the 
burning of the building or some part of it. 
 
"Although an act may be intentional, its consequences may 
be accidental.  An accident is defined as an unexpected 
happening in that it occurs without intention or design on 
the defendant's part.  If an act is accidental, it is not a 
crime; that is, the requirement of wilfulness means that 
accidentally or negligently caused burnings are not arson.  
However a person may have the required intent for arson if 
he or she negligently or accidentally causes a fire and 
then wilfully and maliciously makes no attempt to 
extinguish it or to report it.  In that circumstance, the 
necessary criminal state of mind for arson, wilfulness and 
maliciousness, may be formed after the fire starts. 
 
"Now, what is the criminal state of mind necessary for 
arson?  The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt not only the defendant acted intentionally but that 
she did so maliciously or with malice.  The term 'malice' 
and 'maliciously' have special definitions under the law.  
Malice characterizes all acts done with an evil disposition 
or with a wrongful and unlawful motive or purpose.  It also 
includes the wilful doing of an injurious act without any 
lawful excuse.  Similarly, the failure to report or 
extinguish the fire must be as a result of an evil or 
wrongful motive or purpose.  It is something more than 
thoughtlessness or a failure to understand the consequences 
4 
 
 
The evidence at trial was overwhelming that the defendant 
intended her conduct -- because she was angry with her 
boyfriend, she intentionally lit a piece of paper and threw it 
on a pile of the boyfriend's clothes in the apartment they 
shared.  However, the evidence was less than overwhelming that 
                                                          
 
that could follow if there is no report or effort to 
extinguish it. 
 
"The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted wilfully and 
maliciously as I have defined it for you.  Because this 
element rests upon proof regarding what the defendant knew 
and intended at the time of the acts in question, you 
should consider any credible evidence of mental impairment 
in determining whether the Commonwealth has met [its] 
burden of showing the defendant here possessed the 
requisite knowledge and intent.  This is true even if you 
determine the defendant is criminally responsible for her 
conduct.  The concept we are going to discuss later in the 
instructions. 
 
"Keep in mind it is not up to the defendant to prove any 
mental impairment.  It is incumbent on the Commonwealth to 
rule it out; that is, in the case of arson, the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant wilfully and maliciously set 
fire to a dwelling or alternatively, having caused the 
fire, then wilfully and maliciously failed to extinguish it 
or notify others. 
 
"If you conclude after you've considered all the evidence, 
including any evidence as to mental impairment that the 
Commonwealth has failed to prove she possessed the 
requisite intent, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty of arson. 
 
"If, on the other hand, the Commonwealth has sustained its 
burden of proof as to all the elements I've just described, 
then you shall find the defendant guilty of arson." 
5 
 
she intended "the resulting harm, the burning of the building or 
some part of it." 
 
Nothing the defendant said suggested that she intended to 
burn any part of the building.  In an interview at the Chelsea 
police department on January 6, 2011, the video recording of 
which was played for the jury at trial, the defendant engaged in 
the following exchange with an officer: 
Q.:  "So did that piece of paper have -- maybe still had a 
flame maybe?" 
 
A.:  "It probably did that I didn't see, because all I seen 
was smoke on it." 
 
. . . 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  So you drop --" 
 
A.:  "I just threw it." 
 
Her subsequent cellmate testified at trial that the defendant 
told her that she lit a notebook, "threw it on his clothes, and 
then the fire started." 
 
The court concludes that the fact that the outside door to 
the building was locked when persons tried to enter the burning 
building shows that she affirmatively locked the door in order 
to prevent others from putting out the fire, ante at note 2, 
which reflects her intent to burn the building, ante at    .  
But, although the evidence was compelling that the outside door 
was locked, the evidence was less compelling that she intended 
to lock it.  The only evidence suggesting that she intended to 
6 
 
lock the door came from the defendant's boyfriend, who 
testified: 
"She just ran out and she just closed the door. 
 
". . . 
 
"[W]hen she closed it she locked it." 
 
When asked, "How do you know she locked it?" the boyfriend 
answered: 
"Because it doesn't be [sic] locked unless you lock it.  
You have to lock it from the inside and she knew I didn't 
have no key or nothing to that door.  I don't think she did 
either." 
 
The testimony at trial indicated that the defendant did not have 
a key to the building when she left, so it is unlikely that she 
locked the outside door with a key.  From the boyfriend's 
testimony, one can infer that the door could be locked from the 
inside without a key, but there was no evidence at trial 
regarding what someone must do to lock the door from the inside 
without a key.  There was no photograph of the locking mechanism 
of the outside door admitted at trial; nor was there any 
evidence describing the locking mechanism.  Even if we were to 
accept the inference from the boyfriend's testimony that the 
door typically was unlocked, there was no evidence as to how 
frequently (if ever) someone locked the outer door, thus locking 
the defendant and her boyfriend out of the building.  Moreover, 
even if the defendant did intentionally lock the outside door 
7 
 
after she set fire to the clothes, the relevant intent for the 
crime of arson is her intent at the time she threw the lit piece 
of paper, not her intent at the time she left the building.  See 
Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 273-274 (1901) ("If the 
accused intended to rely upon his own hands to [set a fire], he 
must be shown to have had a present intent to accomplish the 
crime without much delay, and to have had this intent at a time 
and place where he was able to carry it out").  But as discussed 
infra, the judge's erroneous instruction permitted the jury to 
convict the defendant regardless of when they believed she 
formed the requisite intent to burn the dwelling. 
 
Nor was there overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the 
defendant intended to burn anything more than the defendant's 
clothes.  The defendant's boyfriend testified at trial that he 
kept his clothes in "a big duffel bag right there in [the] 
corner."  Based on photographs and a videotape of the fire scene 
taken after the fire and offered in evidence, it appears that 
the pile of clothes on which the burning paper was thrown was a 
substantial pile near a dresser, and that the height of the pile 
was approximately the height of three drawers of the dresser, in 
short, approximately the height of a standing duffel bag.  There 
was no evidence that the defendant knew anything about the 
flammability of her boyfriend's clothes; the only relevant 
8 
 
testimony was that she had previously tried to burn his clothes 
and they failed to ignite. 
 
Moreover, even if a person of ordinary intelligence might 
recognize that throwing a lit piece of paper on a duffel bag 
full of clothes might result in the burning or charring of some 
part of the building, the defendant offered compelling evidence 
from a forensic psychologist that the defendant was not a person 
of ordinary intelligence.  Based on the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale, fourth edition, which the psychologist 
described as "the gold standard in psychology to measure 
cognitive functioning . . . in adults," the defendant had an 
intelligence quota (IQ) of 71, which is approximately two 
standard deviations below average.  The psychologist testified 
that "her score is at the third percentile, which means that 
. . . ninety-seven percent of similar aged adults scored higher 
than her."  He noted that "[a] score of [71] is sometimes 
categorized as borderline intellectually disabled."2  And he 
explained that, because she has borderline intellectual 
function, she is not able to "foresee consequences, think 
through a plan of action, to draw logical conclusions about it."  
                                                          
 
2 The forensic psychologist noted that an IQ score below 
seventy is considered "intellectually disabled," which "used to 
be referred to as mildly mentally retarded."  He explained that 
the defendant's "score is . . . right on the cusp there at 
[71]." 
9 
 
He further opined that, "when she engaged in the intentional 
act, as she reports, to ignite her boyfriend's clothing, she did 
not fully appreciate the circumstances that she was in, what 
could reasonably follow from that."  The issue before the jury 
under the judge's instructions (in contrast with what the court 
concludes should now be under common-law general intent 
principles) was not whether a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position must have known that there was a plain and 
strong likelihood that the apartment would be set on fire or 
burned; the issue was whether this borderline intellectually 
disabled defendant must have known that.  With an IQ at the 
third percentile, consequences that might have been apparent to 
a reasonable person of average intelligence might not have been 
apparent to the defendant. 
 
From this evidence, a reasonable juror may have had a 
reasonable doubt whether it was inevitable that throwing a lit 
piece of paper on the duffel bag full of clothes would cause the 
burning or charring of some part of the building.  And even if a 
reasonable juror believed that result to be inevitable, that 
juror may have had a reasonable doubt that this defendant 
recognized its inevitability and intended that result.  And if 
the judge's instructions had been legally correct, the 
consequence of that reasonable doubt may have been a not guilty 
10 
 
verdict or a hung jury, or a guilty verdict of involuntary 
manslaughter.3 
 
The judge's erroneous instruction, however, allowed any 
juror who may have had a reasonable doubt whether the 
defendant's act was accidental (because she intended to burn the 
clothes but not the building) to find the defendant guilty of 
arson and felony-murder on a separate theory -- that she set 
fire to the clothes, without intending to burn any part of the 
building, but having accidently set fire to the building, 
"willfully and maliciously [made] no attempt to extinguish or to 
report it."  This erroneous arson instruction allowed the jury 
to convict the defendant on an incorrect theory of law regarding 
the most fundamental issue in the case:  whether the defendant 
intended to burn the dwelling when she threw the lit piece of 
paper onto the duffel bag of clothes. 
 
The court concludes that the standard of review for this 
error should be whether it creates a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice because the defendant objected to this 
jury instruction only on the ground that the Commonwealth, in 
response to the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, 
had represented that it would not proceed on the theory of 
failure to act; the defendant did not additionally object on the 
                                                          
 
 
3 The jury was not instructed regarding the lesser included 
offense of malicious destruction of property. 
11 
 
ground that the instruction constituted an error of law.  Where 
the Commonwealth proceeds on a theory that is at variance with 
its commitment to the court in response to a bill of 
particulars, the defendant is entitled to relief upon a showing 
that she was denied "notice to prepare [her] defense."  
Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 188 (2005), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 234 (1989).  If the 
defendant was not afforded such notice, the appropriate standard 
should be to review for prejudicial error. 
 
Here, the denial of the notice needed to prepare her 
defense caused the defendant to suffer two types of prejudice.  
First, in view of the Commonwealth's representation, defense 
counsel reasonably would not have believed that he needed to 
focus the defendant's factual defense on challenging whether the 
defendant wilfully and maliciously made no attempt to extinguish 
or report the fire.  I agree with the court that evidence of the 
defendant's actions after the fire was admissible because it was 
relevant to her intent at the time that she set the fire.  Ante 
at    .  But that does not diminish the fundamental unfairness 
arising from the variance:  the defendant here was stripped of a 
fair opportunity to prepare her defense to a separate and 
distinct theory of criminal liability that, in effect, relieved 
12 
 
the Commonwealth of its burden to prove that she intended to set 
fire to a dwelling.4 
 
Second, because of the Commonwealth's representation, there 
was no reason for defense counsel to examine the case law 
regarding this theory before the charge conference because the 
Commonwealth had declared that it did not intend to proceed on 
this theory.  Because counsel reasonably relied on the 
Commonwealth's assurance that it would not pursue a failure to 
act theory, the defendant was effectively deprived of a 
meaningful opportunity to object to the judge's decision to 
instruct the jury that it may convict the defendant on the 
failure to act theory.  Cf. Mass. R. Crim. P. 22, 378 Mass. 892 
(1979) ("if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or 
order, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice 
him").  Either source of prejudice is sufficient alone to 
justify the application of the prejudicial error standard rather 
than the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard. 
                                                          
 
 
4 I recognize, as the court notes, ante at    , that "there 
was no variance between the Commonwealth's representations to 
the motion judge and the evidence it offered or arguments it 
made to the jury at trial."  But the fact remains that, when the 
judge at the charge conference suggested that she instruct the 
jury regarding the failure to act theory, the Commonwealth urged 
her to do so.  And regardless of whether the Commonwealth was in 
any way at fault, it remains true that the defendant was 
deprived of adequate notice to prepare her defense to that 
theory of criminal liability. 
13 
 
 
Because I conclude that this case should be reviewed under 
the prejudicial error standard, I now turn to the question 
whether the defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous jury 
instruction.  An error is nonprejudicial only if we are "sure 
that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 
417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  "[I]f one cannot say, with fair 
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping 
the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude 
that substantial rights were not affected" (citation omitted).  
Id.  In light of the paucity of evidence regarding the 
defendant's intent, the underwhelming evidence that it was 
certain that throwing a smoking piece of paper on top of a 
duffel bag filled with clothes would inevitably burn or char 
some part of the building, and the expert evidence that a person 
with the defendant's borderline intellectual disability might 
not recognize that inevitability even if a person of average 
intelligence would, I cannot be sure that this error did not 
materially influence the jury's decision. 
 
But even if the appropriate standard of review were not 
prejudicial error, but a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice, I believe that the defendant would still be entitled to 
a new trial.  We must order a new trial under the substantial 
14 
 
risk standard "if we have a serious doubt whether the result of 
the trial might have been different had the error not been 
made."  Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 
444 Mass. 72 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 
169, 174 (1999).  "We consider the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case, the nature of the error, the significance 
of the error in the context of the trial, and the possibility 
that the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable 
tactical decision."  Id.  "We have said that this standard is 
particularly well suited to a situation, such as here, where the 
elements of a crime are erroneously stated in the jury charge."  
Id.  See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 647 n.21 
(1997) ("It is striking that this power [to order a new trial] 
is frequently used in respect to jury charges that include 
erroneous instructions as to the elements of a crime"). 
 
The erroneous instruction here cannot fairly be 
characterized as a mere "reference . . . to the failure to 
report theory," as the court posits.  Ante at    .  The judge 
twice instructed the jury on the failure to act theory, 
succinctly stating a second time that "in the case of arson, the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt the defendant wilfully and maliciously set fire to a 
dwelling or alternatively, having caused the fire, then wilfully 
and maliciously failed to extinguish it or notify others."  That 
15 
 
error permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty even if 
they merely believed that she intended to burn the clothing, 
regardless of whether she understood when she threw the lit 
paper on the clothing that the consequences of that action would 
be to burn the dwelling.5 
                                                          
 
5 The court, in concluding that the error was harmless, 
declares that the jury could not have reached the conclusion 
that the fire "was accidentally or negligently set . . . on any 
reasonable view of the evidence."  Ante at    .  This, 
respectfully, totally misses the point.  The judge's instruction 
declared: 
 
"If an act is accidental, it is not a crime; that is, the 
requirement of wilfulness means that accidentally or 
negligently caused burnings are not arson.  However a 
person may have the required intent for arson if he or she 
negligently or accidentally causes a fire and then wilfully 
and maliciously makes no attempt to extinguish it or to 
report it.  In that circumstance, the necessary criminal 
state of mind for arson, wilfulness and maliciousness, may 
be formed after the fire starts." 
 
Shortly thereafter, she instructed: 
 
"[I]n the case of arson, the Commonwealth bears the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant wilfully 
and maliciously set fire to a dwelling or alternatively, 
having caused the fire, then wilfully and maliciously 
failed to extinguish it or notify others." 
 
A reasonable jury would not understand from these instructions 
that this alternative theory -- the failure to act theory -- 
applied only if the defendant negligently or accidentally set 
the fire.  The defendant admitted that she intentionally set the 
fire; there would be no good reason for the judge to offer the 
jury this alternative where it found no support in the evidence.  
Rather, any reasonable jury would have understood that this 
alternative applied if they found that the defendant 
accidentally or negligently set fire to the building, and a 
reasonable juror "based on any reasonable view of the evidence" 
2 
 
 
Here, where the judge misstated the element of wilfulness 
as it applies to the crime of arson of a dwelling house and, by 
extension, felony-murder, and allowed the jury to convict the 
defendant of these crimes even if they had a reasonable doubt 
whether the defendant intended to burn any part of the building, 
I conclude that we would tolerate a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice if we allow these verdicts to stand.  
Because I cannot in good conscience affirm these convictions, I 
respectfully dissent. 
                                                          
 
certainly could have concluded this to be true or, at least, had 
a reasonable doubt whether it was true. 
Appendix. 
 
 
Model Jury Instruction -- Arson of a Dwelling House --  
G. L. c. 266, § 1 
 
In this case, the defendant is charged with arson of a dwelling 
house. 
 
In order to prove the defendant guilty of this offense, the 
Commonwealth must prove three elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
 
First:  That the defendant set fire to, burned, or caused to be 
burned a building; 
 
Second:  That the building was a dwelling house; and 
 
Third:  That the defendant acted wilfully and maliciously. 
 
As to the first element, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant set fire to, burned, or 
caused to be burned a building.  This requires proof that some 
portion of the building must have actually been on fire or 
burned.  There is, however, no requirement that the building be 
consumed by fire or destroyed.  Proof that some portion of the 
building was burned or charred is sufficient. 
 
As to the second element, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the building was a dwelling house, a 
building adjoining or adjacent to a dwelling house, or a 
building whose burning resulted in a dwelling house being 
burned.  A "dwelling house" means a building used as a dwelling, 
such as a single-family or multifamily house, an apartment 
house, tenement house, hotel, boarding house, dormitory, 
hospital, institution, sanatorium, or other building where 
people live or reside.  It does not matter whether the dwelling 
house or other building was occupied or unoccupied at the time, 
although the Commonwealth must prove that the dwelling house was 
capable of being occupied. 
 
As to the third element, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted wilfully and 
maliciously.  Let me discuss those in reverse order, since the 
word "wilfully" is incorporated in the word "maliciously." 
 
2 
 
"Malicious" refers to the wilful doing of an unlawful or 
injurious act without excuse. 
 
"Wilful" means intentional and by design in contrast to that 
which is thoughtless or accidental. 
 
To prove the third element, the Commonwealth does not 
necessarily have to prove that the defendant acted for the 
purpose of setting fire to or burning some portion of the 
dwelling house or other building.  Rather, the  Commonwealth may 
meet its burden of proof as to this third element by proving one 
of two things beyond a reasonable doubt:  either that, without 
justification or excuse, the defendant did, in fact, act for the 
purpose of setting fire to, burning, or causing to be burned 
some portion of the dwelling house or other building, or that, 
without justification or excuse, the defendant intentionally 
engaged in an unlawful or injurious act that a reasonable person 
in the defendant's position would have known created a plain and 
strong likelihood that some portion of the dwelling house or 
other building would be set on fire or burned. 
 
Keep in mind that the act that results in some portion of the 
dwelling house or other building being set on fire or burned 
must be deliberate and intentional.  If you have a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the fire or burning was accidental, because 
it was caused by a negligent, thoughtless, or mistaken act of 
the defendant, you may not find that the defendant acted 
wilfully and maliciously.  Accidental fires or burnings are not 
arson.