Title: State v. White

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 1999-Ohio-281.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WHITE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433.] 
Criminal law — Penalties and sentencing — Imposing sentence for aggravated 
murder — Victim-impact evidence admissible in capital sentencing hearings, 
when — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 96-2853 — Submitted September 28, 1998 — Decided May 12, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, No. CR-96-01-0059. 
 
Appellant, Clifton “Sonny” White III, was convicted of the aggravated 
murder of Deborah Thorpe with death specifications.  Defendant was sentenced to 
death for this crime and now appeals to this court as a matter of right. 
 
Defendant lived with his girlfriend, Heather Kawczk, at 615 Day Street, 
Akron.  Once Kawczk moved in with him, defendant became extremely jealous 
and possessive and sometimes beat Kawczk.  Kawczk decided to break up with 
defendant, but she had no place to live and was afraid of him. 
 
Kawczk worked at a Kentucky Fried Chicken (“KFC”) restaurant on South 
Arlington Street, where one of her co-workers was Michael Thorpe, Jr.  Kawczk 
and Thorpe began dating, and Kawczk told Thorpe that she wanted to leave 
defendant.  Thorpe’s mother, Deborah Thorpe, was a former co-worker of 
Kawczk’s, as well as her close friend.  Hearing of Kawczk’s problem, Deborah 
Thorpe offered her a place to stay. 
 
On December 10, 1995, Deborah Thorpe and Kawczk drove to 615 Day 
Street while defendant was away and took Kawczk’s clothes from the apartment.  
Distraught, two days later defendant repeatedly telephoned Kawczk, apologizing 
and begging her to come back.  Defendant continued to call Kawczk for several 
days. 
 
 
2
 
On the morning of Christmas Eve, around 11:00, defendant pulled up to the 
drive-through window at the KFC while Kawczk was working there.  Defendant 
asked Kawczk whether she could come to his apartment and pick up the rest of her 
belongings.  Kawczk said she could not, and defendant drove off. 
 
Later that day, defendant called Kawczk’s mother, Julie Schrey.  He asked 
Schrey to come to his apartment with Kawczk, since Kawczk did not want to come 
alone.  Schrey then called Kawczk, who told Schrey that she “didn’t want to go 
over there.”  Around 12:30 p.m., Schrey called again.  She told Kawczk that she 
was about to go to the apartment with Deborah Thorpe to pick up Kawczk’s 
belongings. 
 
That afternoon, after Schrey and Deborah Thorpe arrived at 615 Day Street, 
defendant killed them both with deer slugs fired from a 12-gauge pump shotgun. 
 
About forty-five minutes after Kawczk’s last conversation with Deborah 
Thorpe, defendant walked into the KFC and told Kawczk he had some of her 
things in the car.  Kawczk refused to accompany defendant to his car. 
 
A few minutes later, defendant came back into the restaurant, shotgun in 
hand.  He vaulted over the counter, ran toward Kawczk, pointed the gun at her, and 
pumped it.  At this point, Michael Thorpe confronted defendant, telling him several 
times to leave.  Defendant responded by shooting Thorpe in the head, and then he 
fled.  Thorpe survived the shooting but lost most of his right ear, part of his skull, 
and the right upper lobe of his brain. 
 
Later that day, defendant told a friend of his that “I messed up really bad * * 
* [.]  I shot three people.”  Defendant called 911 to report the shootings.  He then 
got another friend to drive him to the Akron police station.  Defendant told the 
desk officer at the station, “I done something bad.  I just killed a guy at KFC.”  
Defendant also asked for an ambulance at 615 Day Street because “I shot two 
people over there.” 
 
 
3
 
Defendant then spoke to Detective Lawrence McCain.  He told Detective 
McCain that the two women at the apartment were trying to talk him out of 
committing suicide when his gun “went off,” killing Schrey.  He said that he then 
shot Deborah Thorpe because “he didn’t want her to have to live with the thought 
of seeing her friend killed.”  As for Michael Thorpe, defendant said Thorpe “got in 
the way” and his gun “went off again.”  Defendant later told the same story, in 
more detail, to Akron Police Captain Paul Callahan and Lieutenant Robert Offret. 
 
The Summit County Grand Jury indicted defendant on two counts of 
aggravated murder, R.C. 2903.01(A) (prior calculation and design), and one count 
of attempted aggravated murder.  (Two other counts were dismissed before trial.)  
Count One (aggravated murder of Julie Schrey) and Count Two (aggravated 
murder of Deborah Thorpe) each carried a course-of-conduct specification under 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5); Count Two also carried a specification under R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3) (murder for purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or 
punishment for another crime).  Each count had a firearm specification under R.C. 
2941.141. 
 
On Count One, the jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included offense 
of murder.  On Count Two, the jury convicted defendant of aggravated murder and 
of both death specifications.  The jury also convicted defendant of the lesser-
included offense of attempted aggravated murder on Count Three, and all firearm 
specifications. 
 
Following a mitigation hearing, the court sentenced defendant to terms of 
imprisonment on the murder and attempted murder convictions, and imposed the 
sentence of death on the aggravated murder conviction. 
 
Defendant attempted to appeal the judgment to the Court of Appeals for 
Summit County, which dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.1  
 
 
4
Simultaneously, defendant appealed the conviction and sentence directly to this 
court as a matter of right, pursuant to Section 2, Article IV, Ohio Constitution. 
__________________ 
 
Michael T. Callahan, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip D. 
Bogdanoff, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Annette L. Powers and Renee W. Green, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  We have reviewed defendant’s  propositions of 
law, independently weighed the evidence relating to the death sentence, weighed 
the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors, and compared the 
sentence with sentences in similar capital cases.  As a result, we affirm defendant’s 
convictions and death sentence. 
I.  BATSON ISSUE 
 
At trial, defendant objected to the state’s peremptory challenge of 
prospective juror Jesse Dent, arguing that the state challenged Dent because Dent 
was black, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Batson v. Kentucky 
(1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.  After the state explained its 
reasons for striking Dent, the trial court overruled defendant’s objection.  In his 
fifth proposition of law, defendant contends that the trial court erred. 
 
Batson establishes a three-step procedure for evaluating claims of racial 
discrimination in peremptory strikes.  First, the opponent of the strike must make a 
prima facie showing of discrimination.  Second, the proponent must give a race-
neutral explanation for the challenge.  Third, the trial court must determine 
whether, under all the circumstances, the opponent has proven purposeful racial 
discrimination.  Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-89; Purkett 
v. Elem (1995), 514 U.S. 765, 767-768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 
 
 
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839; State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 582, 589 N.E.2d 1310, 1313-
1314. 
 
At oral argument, the state contended that in order to prevail on a Batson 
claim, a defendant must show the existence of a pattern of peremptory challenges 
by the state against members of the group in question.  Inasmuch as Dent was the 
only black prospective juror on whom the state used a peremptory challenge, the 
state argues that there was no pattern, and hence no Batson violation. 
 
We reject this view, for “the exercise of even one peremptory challenge in a 
purposefully discriminatory manner would violate equal protection.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  State v. Ellison (Tenn.1992), 841 S.W.2d 824, 827.  “ ‘A single 
invidiously discriminatory act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such 
discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.’ “  Batson, 476 U.S. at 
95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87, quoting Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp. (1977), 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450, 465, fn. 
14. 
 
The existence of a pattern of discriminatory strikes is not a prerequisite 
either to finding a prima facie case in step one of the Batson analysis or to finding 
actual discrimination in step three.  Such a rule would ignore Batson’s requirement 
that the trial court consider all the circumstances in determining whether racial 
discrimination occurred.  It would also mean that no Batson challenge could 
succeed unless the prosecutor challenged more than one member of the group in 
question.  Such a rule would license prosecutors to exercise one illegal peremptory 
strike per trial.  The law of equal protection does not allow “one free bite.” 
 
Thus, the mere fact that the state challenged only one black prospective juror 
does not preclude a Batson challenge.  See United States v. Battle (C.A.8, 1987), 
836 F.2d 1084, 1086. 
 
 
6
 
The state also contends that defendant failed to make a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination.  We need not consider this question.  At trial, the state 
gave its reason for challenging Dent, even though the trial court neither ordered the 
state to do so nor found that a prima facie case existed.  Once the proponent 
explains the challenge and the trial court rules on the ultimate issue of 
discrimination, whether or not a prima facie case was established becomes moot.  
Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 
L.Ed.2d 395, 405; State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583, 589 N.E.2d at 1314. 
 
Thus, the Batson analysis moves to the second step: whether the state 
supplied a race-neutral explanation.  The prosecutor told the trial court that he 
removed Dent because Dent opposed capital punishment.  This is a race-neutral 
explanation.  Defendant argues that it is nevertheless an invalid explanation 
because Dent said that he would put his feelings aside and follow the law.  But 
defendant’s argument misconceives the nature of a Batson claim.  The only issue 
in step two of the Batson analysis is whether the proponent gave a race-neutral 
explanation for his peremptory challenge.  The “explanation need not rise to the 
level of justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”  Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 
S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.  See, also, Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 
1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839.  While a prospective juror’s answers may be sufficient 
to survive a challenge for cause, both prosecutors and defense attorneys must 
remain free to challenge on a peremptory basis jurors whose answers create overall 
concerns on the subject at issue. 
 
Finally, step three asks whether, in light of all the circumstances, the state 
did, in fact, have a discriminatory motive for striking the juror.  The burden of 
persuasion always stays with the opponent of the strike.  Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 
115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839.  The trial court’s finding is entitled to 
 
 
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deference, since it turns largely “on evaluation of credibility.”  Batson, 476 U.S. at 
98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 89, fn. 21. 
 
The facts in this case support the state’s explanation.  Dent did say that he 
opposed the death penalty, had been against it for over five years, and just did not 
believe in the death penalty.  In fact, he initially said that his beliefs would prevent 
or substantially impair his ability to find the defendant guilty (although he later 
appeared to change his mind). 
 
Other facts also point away from a racial motivation.  The state “did not 
attempt to exclude all blacks, or as many blacks as it could, from the jury.”  United 
States v. Montgomery (C.A.8, 1987), 819 F.2d 847, 851.  When the defense 
challenged a black prospective juror because she was a deputy sheriff, the state 
argued vigorously in favor of keeping that juror. 
 
Moreover, the state did not use a peremptory challenge on prospective juror 
John A. Rucker, who was black.  The state, in fact,  waived its last two 
peremptories and proclaimed itself satisfied with the jury, including Rucker.  Since 
the defense had just waived a peremptory, the prosecutors knew that Rucker would 
be on the jury as a result.  The presence of one or more black persons on a jury 
certainly does not preclude a finding of discrimination, but “the fact may be taken 
into account * * * as one that suggests that the government did not seek to rid the 
jury of persons [of a particular] race.”  United States v. Young-Bey (C.A.8, 1990), 
893 F.2d 178, 180.  See, also, United States v. Canoy (C.A.7, 1994), 38 F.3d 893, 
900-901 (citing cases). 
 
Defendant cites the state’s challenges for cause of two black prospective 
jurors, Carolyn A. Howard and James M. Stafford, as showing the prosecutors’ 
discriminatory intent.  However, both challenges were well supported by the 
record, and both were upheld by the trial court.  One of those prospective jurors 
strongly opposed capital punishment.  The other asked to be excused because she 
 
 
8
needed to baby-sit her grandchildren during her son’s honeymoon; the state did not 
actually challenge her, but merely supported her request.  The state’s actions with 
respect to these jurors do not remotely suggest any racial motivation. 
 
On this record, the trial court reasonably found that defendant did not carry 
his burden of persuasion.  Indeed, defendant points to no prosecutorial act or 
statement during voir dire that supports an inference of racial motivation.  Hence, 
he shows no basis to disturb the trial court’s ruling.  His fifth proposition is 
overruled. 
II.  CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, defendant contends that the excusal for cause 
of prospective juror Stafford violated Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 
S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.  Under Witt, a prospective juror may not be excused for 
cause due to his opinions on capital punishment unless his views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties in accordance with his 
instructions and oath.  Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-852. 
 
Stafford began by stating that he had opposed capital punishment since the 
end of the Vietnam War.  The trial judge asked: “Would your view * * * prevent or 
substantially impair your finding the defendant guilty if the evidence and the law 
so warrant it because the death penalty could be imposed?”  Stafford said: “I don’t 
know * * * [.] I have never been tested.”  Asked whether he could follow the law if 
that entailed recommending death, Stafford said it would be “difficult.” 
 
After defense counsel examined Stafford, Stafford said, “I think I can follow 
the Court’s instructions.”  However, the judge then asked: “Would your present 
views * * * prevent or substantially impair your finding the defendant guilty if the 
evidence and the law so warranted because the death penalty could be imposed?”  
Stafford replied: “[I]t seems like the answer should be yes.  It seems to me that my 
answer should be yes.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
9
 
Later, Stafford appeared to contradict his earlier statements: “I am really 
struggling with that * * *.  I am going to say that — yes, yes, I can do that.”  The 
trial judge noted Stafford’s indecisiveness and found that Stafford’s views would 
“substantially impair his ability to render a fair and impartial judgment.” 
 
The record supports this finding.  Stafford’s voir dire reflects a sincere, 
conscientious citizen, but one who agonized over whether he could follow the law 
if it conflicted with his strong ethical beliefs opposing the death penalty.  Most 
important, when asked whether his views would prevent or substantially impair his 
ability to find White guilty if the evidence and law so warranted, Stafford appeared 
to say “yes.” 
 
White argues that Stafford’s “clear conclusion” was that he could follow the 
law.  But when a prospective juror makes what appear to be contradictory 
statements on voir dire, as Stafford did, it is for the trial court to decide which 
statements to believe.  The issue is not conclusively determined by whatever the 
prospective juror happens to say last.  See, e.g., State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 
92, 97-98, 26 OBR 79, 83-84, 497 N.E.2d 55, 60-61. 
 
Stafford apparently admitted that his views could prevent or impair his 
finding defendant guilty, even if the evidence and the law so warranted.  Basing its 
ruling on Stafford’s demeanor, as well as his words, the trial court found that 
Stafford’s views would substantially impair his ability to render a fair, impartial 
verdict. 
 
A reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s findings regarding bias if 
the record fairly supports those findings.  State v. Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 
203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 414, 280 N.E.2d 915, 920.  On this record, we can see no 
basis to second-guess the trial court’s finding as to Stafford.  We therefore overrule 
defendant’s sixth proposition of law. 
III.  PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
 
10
 
Michael Thorpe testified for the state in the guilt phase, with Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney Michael E. Carroll conducting his direct examination. As 
Thorpe testified, Carroll’s co-counsel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Alison E. 
McCarty, wept.  According to defense counsel, McCarty “[cried] for 30 seconds to 
a minute” and had “tears running down her face.”  Defense counsel believed that 
“at least a couple of the jurors [were] watching her cry.”  After Michael Thorpe left 
the stand, the defense moved for a mistrial because of McCarty’s behavior.  The 
trial court overruled the motion. 
 
In his eighth proposition of law, defendant contends that McCarty’s weeping 
in front of the jury required a mistrial.  Defendant cites State v. Morales (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 252, 513 N.E.2d 267, a case involving a spectator’s emotional outburst.  
However, Morales lends no support to defendant’s position.  Morales holds that 
whether an emotional outburst improperly influences the jury against the accused 
is a factual question to be resolved by the trial court, whose determination will not 
be overturned absent clear, affirmative evidence of error.  Id., 32 Ohio St.3d at 
255, 513 N.E.2d at 271, quoting State v. Bradley (1965), 3 Ohio St.2d 38, 32 
O.O.2d 21, 209 N.E.2d 215, syllabus.  See, also, State v. Bailey (1982), 132 Ariz. 
472, 477, 647 P.2d 170, 175 (reviewing court deferred to trial court’s finding that 
prosecutor’s weeping did not affect jury). 
 
But defendant argues that no deference is owed here because the trial judge 
could not see the jury.  During discussion of the mistrial motion, the judge did 
indeed state that the courtroom was set up in such a way that she could not “see the 
expressions of the jury.”  (We note, however, that the record does not support 
defendant’s more extravagant claim that the jurors were sitting “in front of the 
judge with their backs to the Court.”)  But even though the judge could not see the 
jurors’ expressions, she was still better positioned to perceive their reactions than 
any reviewing court could ever be.  Consequently, deference remains appropriate. 
 
 
11
 
Other courts have not automatically reversed convictions solely because a 
prosecutor wept in the jury’s presence.  Where the weeping was not shown to have 
affected the jury, convictions have been allowed to stand.  See Bailey; Gibbins v. 
State (1997), 229 Ga.App. 896, 901, 495 S.E.2d 46, 51.  Cf. People v. Dukes 
(1957), 12 Ill.2d 334, 341-343, 146 N.E.2d 14, 17-18 (reversing conviction where 
prosecutor wept and engaged in other misconduct that deliberately exploited jury’s 
emotions). 
 
We certainly cannot condone a prosecutor’s weeping in open court.  The 
prosecutor, as the representative of the state, ought to exercise self-control and has 
a professional obligation to refrain from creating prejudice against the defendant.  
However, as suggested by defense counsel’s allegation that at least four of the 
spectators in the court room were crying, as well, “any capital trial generates strong 
emotions. * * * Realism compels us to recognize that criminal trials cannot be 
squeezed dry of all feeling.”  State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 408-409, 
613 N.E.2d 203, 208-209. 
 
In this case, we see no indication of a deliberate, sustained attempt to 
manipulate and inflame the jury’s emotions, such as what occurred in Keenan and 
Dukes.  Thus, the question here is simply what effect the prosecutor’s tears had on 
the jury.  Nothing in the record shows clearly and affirmatively that McCarty’s 
tears had any effect.  We therefore lack a basis to find that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied defendant’s mistrial motion.  Accordingly, defendant’s 
eighth proposition is overruled. 
IV.  “OTHER ACTS” EVIDENCE 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, defendant contends that the state violated 
Evid.R. 404(B) (governing “other acts” evidence) by introducing Heather 
Kawczk’s testimony that defendant sometimes struck her during their relationship. 
 
 
12
 
Kawczk testified that defendant sometimes “smacked” her when he was 
angry.  This happened “a couple times” before she moved in with him and became 
“a little bit more frequent” after that.  The prosecutor stated that he offered this 
testimony to show motive and to explain “the defendant’s relationship with 
Heather, which we feel is the primary triggering factor in the [murders].”  The state 
never argued that defendant’s behavior showed his bad character or propensity for 
violence. 
 
Defendant nevertheless claims that the testimony was relevant only to show 
his bad character.  We disagree.  Defendant’s beating Kawczk  tends to show his 
jealousy and resulting rage toward her, emotions that gave defendant a strong 
motive to kill her mother and boyfriend.  Moreover, the beatings explain why 
Kawczk left defendant and refused to go to his apartment, which in turn explains 
why Julie Schrey and Deborah Thorpe were there instead.  Thus, the evidence was 
relevant for purposes other than showing bad character.  Accordingly, defendant’s 
ninth proposition is overruled. 
V.  VICTIM IMPACT 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, defendant contends that the state 
introduced impermissible victim-impact evidence.  Defendant was convicted of a 
capital crime with respect to Deborah Thorpe’s murder only.  However, in the 
penalty phase, in addition to calling witnesses to testify about the impact of 
Deborah Thorpe’s murder, the state called Julie Schrey’s widower, Dennis Schrey, 
to tell how Julie Schrey’s murder had affected him.  Also, Michael Thorpe’s 
brother, Robert Thorpe, told how Michael Thorpe’s injuries had affected the 
Thorpe family. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the victim-impact testimony by 
Dennis Schrey, and the victim-impact testimony by Robert Thorpe concerning 
 
 
13
Michael’s injuries, were improperly admitted.  Nevertheless, admission of this 
evidence was harmless error. 
Historical Perspective 
 
Historically, victims’ participation in the American criminal justice system 
has been narrowly limited.  Although the victim is the party who is harmed, the 
crime is considered as having been committed against the state, and the state is 
responsible for prosecuting the defendant on behalf of the people and ensuring that 
the sentence against the defendant is carried out.  Some victims contend that the 
criminal process excludes them, even treats them as merely another piece of 
evidence, thereby victimizing them a second time.2 
 
Victims’ dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system’s focus on the 
defendant contributed to the growth of victims’ rights organizations.  In 1984, 
there were approximately 2,000 government and private victim assistance 
organizations.  By 1991, there were over 7,000.3  After restitution programs and 
victim-witness assistance programs were established, the victims’ rights movement 
sought to allow victims to participate in the sentencing phase of capital trials via 
victim-impact evidence.4 
United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 
In Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 
720, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered its previous rejection of victim-
impact evidence.  A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of first-degree 
murder and one count of assault with intent to commit first-degree murder.  The 
defendant was sentenced to death for each of the murders and to thirty years in 
prison for the assault.  Payne’s victims were twenty-eight-year-old Charisse 
Christopher, her two-year-old daughter, Lacie, and her three-year-old son, 
Nicholas, who survived the attack. 
 
 
14
 
During the sentencing phase, the defendant presented the testimony of four 
witnesses: his mother and father, a friend, and a clinical psychologist.  The state 
presented the testimony of Charisse Christopher’s mother.  When asked how 
Nicholas had been affected by the murders of his mother and sister, she responded:  
“ ‘He cries for his mom.  He doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t come 
home.  And he cries for his sister Lacie.  He comes to me many times during the 
week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie.  And I tell him yes.  He 
says, I’m worried about my Lacie.’ “  Id. at 814-815, 111 S.Ct. at 2603, 115 
L.Ed.2d at 728.  In addition, the prosecutor, in closing argument at the penalty 
stage, recited again the injuries to Nicholas, the noncapital victim.  “But we do 
know that Nicholas was alive.  And Nicholas was in the same room.  Nicholas was 
still conscious.  His eyes were open.  He responded to the paramedics.  He was 
able to follow their directions.  He was able to hold his intestines in as he was 
carried to the ambulance.”  Payne, 501 U.S. at 815, 111 S.Ct. at 2603, 115 L.Ed.2d 
at 728-729.  The prosecutor concluded, “There is obviously nothing you can do for 
Charisse and Lacie Jo.  But there is something that you can do for Nicholas.”  Id. at 
815, 111 S.Ct. at 2603, 115 L.Ed.2d at 729.  The jury imposed the death penalty. 
 
The court stated that a misreading of its previous holdings had “unfairly 
weighted the scales in a capital trial; while virtually no limits are placed on the 
relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own 
circumstances, the State is barred from either offering ‘a quick glimpse of the life’ 
which a defendant ‘chose to extinguish’ * * *, or demonstrating the loss to the 
victim’s family and to society which has resulted from the defendant’s homicide.”  
(Citation omitted.)  Id., 501 U.S. at 822, 111 S.Ct. at 2607, 115 L.Ed.2d at 733. 
 
The court held that “for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s 
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing 
phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.”  (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
15
Id., 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735. “ ‘It is an affront to the 
civilized members of the human race to say that at sentencing in a capital case, a 
parade of witnesses may praise the background, character and good deeds of 
Defendant * * * without limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that 
bears upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.’ “  Id., 501 
U.S. at 826, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 736, quoting the state Supreme 
Court decision, State v. Payne (Tenn.1990), 791 S.W.2d 10, 19. 
 
Accordingly, the court held that “if the State chooses to permit the admission 
of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth 
Amendment erects no per se bar.  A State may legitimately conclude that evidence 
about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is 
relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be 
imposed.  There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant 
evidence is treated.”  Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 
736. 
 
Justice Souter’s concurrence mirrored Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
comments: “Murder has foreseeable consequences.  When it happens, it is always 
to distinct individuals, and, after it happens, other victims are left behind.  Every 
defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal 
responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a 
unique person, like himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close 
associates, ‘survivors,’ who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim’s 
death.  Just as defendants know that they are not faceless human ciphers, they 
know that their victims are not valueless fungibles; and just as defendants 
appreciate the web of relationships and dependencies in which they live, they know 
that their victims are not human islands, but individuals with parents or children, 
spouses or friends or dependents.  Thus, when a defendant chooses to kill, or to 
 
 
16
raise the risk of a victim’s death, this choice necessarily relates to a whole human 
being and threatens an association of others, who may be distinctly hurt.”  Id. at 
838, 111 S.Ct. at 2615-2616, 115 L.Ed.2d at 744. 
Ohio’s Victims’ Rights Act 
 
Since Payne, at least thirty-two of the thirty-eight states that impose the 
death penalty have incorporated victim-impact statements into their capital 
sentencing proceedings.5  On November 8, 1994, Section 10a, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution was adopted to grant crime victims the right to a meaningful role in 
the criminal justice process.6  Proponents of this section “pointed out that while 
[Section] 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution was adopted to protect the rights of 
persons accused of crime, there was no corresponding section in the Constitution to 
protect the rights of victims of crime, and adoption of this section was thus ‘a 
question of balance.’ ”  1994 Editor’s Comment, Section 10a, Article I, Ohio 
Constitution, Baldwin’s Ohio Revised Code. 
 
To that end, prior to the effective date of the constitutional amendment, the 
General Assembly enacted the Victims’ Rights Act on May 26, 1994, which 
became effective on October 12, 1994.  145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2085.  The Act 
amended victims’ rights law, repealed other sections of the Revised Code, and 
enacted R.C. Chapter 2930.  R.C. Chapter 2930 includes provisions entitling 
victims to make a written or oral statement to the court regarding the impact of the 
crime on their lives, requiring the court to consider the victim-impact statement in 
determining the sentence to be imposed, and providing the victim the opportunity 
to make a statement to the court before sentencing.  See former R.C. 2930.13, 
2930.14, 2947.051, and 2929.19. 
 
In addition to enacting R.C. Chapter 2930, the General Assembly repealed 
former R.C. 2943.041 and 2945.07, which expressly excluded victim-impact 
evidence from capital cases.  The newly enacted provisions in R.C. Chapter 2930, 
 
 
17
as well as related sections of the code, no longer contain this express exclusion.  
However, the new statutory scheme is silent as to how victim-impact evidence may 
be presented to juries in capital cases.  Although the court has recognized 
situations where such evidence may be properly presented to a jury, the statutes 
only address the presentation of such evidence to the courts.  Thus, the General 
Assembly has yet to expand victim-impact evidence in capital cases to the extent 
allowed in Payne. 
Ohio Jurisprudence 
 
However, since the constitutional amendment and the Victims’ Rights Act, 
this court has had an opportunity to address the issue of victim-impact evidence in 
capital cases a number of times.  This court permitted a jury to review victim-
impact evidence in State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 440, 650 
N.E.2d 878, 883, where the court found that “evidence which depicts both the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the murder and also the impact of 
the murder on the victim’s family may be admissible during both the guilt and 
sentencing phases.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 440, 650 N.E.2d at 882-883. 
 
Later, in State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311, 
this court noted that R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) provides that “in making a determination 
whether a death sentence should be imposed, ‘[t]he court, and the trial jury if the 
offender was tried by a jury, shall consider * * * any evidence raised at trial that is 
relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of 
committing or to any factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of 
death, shall hear testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the nature and 
circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of 
committing, the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the 
Revised Code, and any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence 
of death, and shall hear the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, if 
 
 
18
any, of counsel for the defense and prosecution, that are relevant to the penalty 
that should be imposed on the offender.’ (Emphasis added.)”  Id. at 352-353, 662 
N.E.2d at 319. 
 
As recently as last year, this court held that “in attempting to refute or rebut 
the mitigating evidence offered, relevant victim-impact evidence is permissible 
other evidence pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(2).”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. McNeill 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 446, 700 N.E.2d 596, 606.  In addition, victim-impact 
evidence may be admitted through a presentence investigation report should the 
defendant request one.  See R.C. 2929.03(D)(1). 
 
Thus, this court has held that capital sentencing juries are permitted to 
review victim-impact evidence if the evidence is relevant to the circumstances of 
the murder, the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances that permit the 
death penalty, and the nature and circumstances of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, if the evidence is introduced to attempt to refute or rebut the 
mitigating evidence offered, or if the defendant requests a presentence 
investigation report. 
 
In capital cases, since the victim is deceased, the “victim” would be the 
victim’s representative who would be permitted to speak on behalf of the victim 
pursuant to R.C. 2930.02.  It is important to note that the defendant does not 
challenge the portion of Robert Thorpe’s testimony that relates to the impact from 
the death of his mother, Deborah Thorpe, the capital victim. 
 
However, the defendant challenges the testimony that related to the impact 
on the noncapital victims, Julie Schrey and Michael Thorpe.  That testimony 
should not have been permitted under Ohio’s statutory framework.  A review of 
Ohio’s statutory framework on victim-impact evidence indicates that testimony 
relating to noncapital victims is currently to be presented only to judges, who are 
charged with the responsibility of sentencing in noncapital cases. 
 
 
19
 
For example, former R.C. 2930.13 provides for the victim to make a written 
or oral statement to the judge.  Further, former R.C. 2930.14 allows the victim to 
make a statement prior to sentencing.  It provides:  “(A) Before imposing sentence 
upon the defendant for the commission of a crime, the court shall permit the victim 
of the crime to make a statement concerning the effects of the crime upon the 
victim, the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the manner in which the 
crime was perpetrated.  At the judge’s option, the victim may present the statement 
in writing prior to the sentencing hearing, orally at the hearing, or both.  (B) The 
court shall consider the victim’s statement along with other factors that the court is 
required to consider in imposing sentence.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2930.14(A) 
and (B). 
 
In this case, the victim-impact evidence at issue related to noncapital crimes 
for which the judge alone bore the responsibility for sentencing.  Dennis Schrey 
(widower of Julie Schrey, the noncapital crime victim) testified about the impact of 
his wife’s death.  Further, Robert Thorpe (son of Deborah Thorpe, the capital-
crime victim, and brother of Michael Thorpe, the attempted-murder victim), in 
addition to testifying about his mother’s death, testified about the effects of 
Michael Thorpe’s injuries on the family. 
 
While Dennis Schrey (a representative of victim Julie Schrey) and Robert 
Thorpe (a relative of Michael Thorpe) were clearly representatives of victims, they 
were not testifying about the impact of the capital crime, i.e., on behalf of the 
capital victim, Deborah Thorpe, pursuant to R.C. 2930.14.  Because this evidence 
was unrelated to the capital murder for which the defendant was to be sentenced, it 
was improperly admitted.  Such testimony was admissible only for the judge alone 
to hear, as it related to sentencing on the two noncapital crimes. 
 
However, while admission of this evidence violated Ohio’s statutory 
scheme, it was not a constitutional violation.  Payne clearly allows the presentation 
 
 
20
of victim-impact testimony to a capital jury if a “State chooses to permit” such 
testimony.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 736.  Payne 
clearly allows such testimony when the crimes are so interrelated that victims are 
affected by more than just the capital death.  Payne does not limit the “evidence of 
the specific harm” caused by the defendant to the capital victim’s family only, but 
allows the jury to assess the “defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness” 
by victim-impact “evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing 
authorities.”  Id., 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735.  
However, Ohio’s statutory provisions as yet make no such specific provision for 
such noncapital victim-impact testimony to be presented to a jury in a capital case.  
Therefore, the admission of the evidence in question was, at most, a statutory 
violation. 
 
Further, there was more than ample evidence to support the jury’s 
determination that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  As such, we find the error to be harmless.  See 
McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d at 447, 700 N.E.2d at 606, quoting State v. Webb (1994), 
70 Ohio St.3d 325, 335, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 1032. 
 
Accordingly, defendant’s twelfth proposition of law is overruled. 
VI.  EXCLUSION OF MITIGATION 
 
In the penalty phase, the defense called as an expert witness Lawrence J. 
Whitney, an attorney experienced in capital cases.  Whitney was called to testify 
about the total minimum time that defendant, if sentenced to life imprisonment, 
would have to serve before parole eligibility, including the time that he would 
serve on the firearm specifications attached to each of the three counts of the 
indictment. 
 
According to the defense proffer, Whitney would have testified that the law 
would require defendant to serve at least twenty-nine or thirty-nine full years’ 
 
 
21
incarceration before becoming eligible for parole.  This would consist of twenty or 
thirty full years on the aggravated murder, pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A), plus three 
years’ actual incarceration for each of the three firearm specifications, all of which 
would run consecutive to the life sentence and to each other (see former R.C. 
2929.71[B]). 
 
Subsequently, the defense amended its proffer to reflect that the trial court 
might (as it ultimately did) merge the firearm specifications attached to the Day 
Street apartment shootings, requiring defendant to serve only twenty-six or thirty-
six full years before parole eligibility. 
 
However, the prosecution objected to any testimony about how the firearm 
specifications would affect defendant’s parole eligibility, arguing that the 
specifications were not a mitigating factor.  The trial court sustained this objection.  
Accordingly, Whitney was permitted to explain the meaning of “full” years of 
incarceration but not to testify on the firearm specifications. 
 
In his fourteenth proposition of law, defendant contends that the exclusion of 
testimony regarding the firearm specifications’ effect on the total sentence denied 
him the right to present relevant mitigating evidence, thereby contravening the 
Eighth Amendment.  See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 102 
S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1.  Defendant also contends that the exclusion was 
fundamentally unfair, thus raising a due process question.  See Simmons v. South 
Carolina (1994), 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133.  We deal first 
with the Eighth Amendment claim. 
 
In Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, mitigating factors are facts about the 
defendant’s character, background, or record, or the circumstances of the offense, 
that may call for a penalty less than death.  See Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988), 487 
U.S. 164, 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2327, 101 L.Ed.2d 155, 166 (plurality opinion), and 
id. at 188, 108 S.Ct. at 2335, 101 L.Ed.2d at 175 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
 
22
 
The length of incarceration to be served by the defendant before parole 
eligibility is not a fact about the defendant’s character or background, or about the 
circumstances of the offense.  See O’Dell v. Netherland (1997), 521 U.S. 151, 162-
168, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 1976-1977, 138 L.Ed.2d 351, 362-364 (distinguishing 
between information about the defendant and information about parole); Smith v. 
State (Tex.Crim.App.1995), 898 S.W.2d 838, 853.  Thus, it is not a mitigating 
factor for Eighth Amendment purposes. 
 
We turn, then, to the due process issue.  Simmons v. South Carolina holds 
that in a capital case, “where the defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and 
state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the 
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible.”  Id., 512 U.S. 
at 156, 114 S.Ct. at 2190, 129 L.Ed.2d at 138 (plurality opinion); see, also, id., 512 
U.S. at 178, 114 S.Ct. at 2201, 129 L.Ed.2d at 150-151 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
Some courts have extended Simmons to require that the jury be given 
complete information on parole eligibility.  See Clark v. Tansy (1994), 118 N.M. 
486, 492, 882 P.2d 527, 533; State v. Martini (1993), 131 N.J. 176, 312-313, 619 
A.2d 1208, 1280.  Defendant asks us to do likewise. 
 
We cannot read Simmons so broadly.  In Simmons, life without parole was 
the sole alternative to death  — a point stressed by the concurring justices who cast 
the deciding votes in that case.  See 512 U.S. at 176, 114 S.Ct. at 2200-2201, 129 
L.Ed.2d at 150-151 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In the case at bar, life without 
parole was not an alternative at all.  Thus, the jury was not given a “false choice 
between sentencing [defendant] to death and sentencing him to a limited period of 
incarceration.”  (Emphasis added.)  Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161, 114 S.Ct. at 2193, 
129 L.Ed.2d at 141.  The choice before the jury was, in fact, between sentencing 
White to death and sentencing him to life with the possibility of parole.  In these 
circumstances, Simmons does not apply.  See Muniz v. Johnson (C.A.5, 1998), 132 
 
 
23
F.3d 214, 224; State v. Bush (Tenn.1997), 942 S.W.2d 489, 503; Smith v. State, 
898 S.W.2d at 850. 
 
Moreover, the prosecutor in Simmons “relie[d] on a prediction of future 
dangerousness in requesting the death penalty.”  512 U.S. at 164, 114 S.Ct. at 
2194, 129 L.Ed.2d at 143.  In the case at bar, the state did not argue future 
dangerousness — a crucial distinction, since Simmons rests on the principle that a 
capital defendant may not be sentenced to death “ ‘on the basis of information 
which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.’ ”  Id. at 164, 114 S.Ct. at 2194, 
129 L.Ed.2d at 143, quoting Gardner v. Florida (1977), 430 U.S. 349, 362, 97 
S.Ct. 1197, 1207, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 404.  What Simmons affords is a “narrow right 
of rebuttal * * * in a limited class of capital cases.”  (Emphasis added.)  O’Dell, 
521 U.S. at 167, 117 S.Ct. at 1978, 138 L.Ed.2d at 365.  Here, defendant was not 
seeking to rebut an argument on future dangerousness.  Again, Simmons does not 
apply. 
 
We conclude that the trial court neither violated the Eighth Amendment nor 
deprived defendant of due process by excluding information about the effect of the 
firearm specification on his parole eligibility.  Accordingly, defendant’s fourteenth 
proposition is overruled. 
VII.  SENTENCING OPINION 
 
R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the trial court’s sentencing opinion to be filed with 
the clerk of this court within fifteen days after imposition of sentence.  Because 
defendant was sentenced on October 31, 1996, the opinion should have been filed 
here by November 15.  This was not done, however, until January 22, 1997, when 
the entire record (including the sentencing opinion) was filed with the clerk.  In his 
seventh proposition of law, defendant contends that this invalidates his death 
sentence.  But we do not see, and defendant  does not explain, how the late filing 
 
 
24
could have prejudiced him.  Hence, we find the error harmless and overrule 
defendant’s seventh proposition. 
 
In his seventeenth proposition, defendant attacks the trial court’s sentencing 
opinion.  Defendant claims the trial court discounted his low intelligence as a 
mitigating factor because it did not meet the legal test for insanity.  Cf. Eddings v. 
Oklahoma.  However, nothing in either the sentencing opinion or the trial judge’s 
remarks from the bench suggests that the trial court applied an insanity standard to 
the proffered mitigation. 
 
The sentencing opinion also noted that defendant’s sister, raised in the same 
environment as defendant, was “a responsible adult” pursuing a college education, 
and the trial judge stated at the sentencing hearing that “[m]any members of our 
society have low intelligence and have been raised in circumstances similar to your 
own [and] they do not * * * deliberately kill.”  Defendant argues that these 
comparisons “denied [him] an individualized sentencing determination.”  
However, “[t]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is 
satisfied by allowing the [sentencer] to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.”  
Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990), 494 U.S. 299, 307, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083, 108 
L.Ed.2d 255, 264.  Both the jury and judge considered defendant’s mitigating 
evidence. 
 
Accordingly, defendant’s seventeenth proposition is overruled. 
VIII.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
 
In his tenth proposition of law, defendant claims ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  To prevail, he must show (1) that counsel performed so deficiently 
that they were not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment and (2) that counsel’s errors were prejudicial.  Strickland v. 
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 
693.  Performance is “deficient” when it falls below an objective standard of 
 
 
25
reasonable representation.  Id. at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695-
696.  “Prejudice” means a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different; “[a] reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine [the court’s] confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 
694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.  See, generally, State v. Bradley (1989), 
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142-143, 538 N.E.2d 373, 379-381, and paragraphs two and 
three of the syllabus.  (Contrary to the state’s claim, the defendant need not show 
that, but for the error, the trial would have come out differently.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 693-694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697.) 
 
Defendant argues that counsel should have objected when the trial court 
excluded prospective juror Donald C. Burgess for cause due to his beliefs about 
capital punishment.  However, the trial court had a strong basis to excuse Burgess, 
who repeatedly said that he did not know whether he could vote to impose the 
death penalty if the law so required.  On these facts, and given the strong deference 
owed to the trial court’s resolution of challenges for cause, see State v. Wilson, it 
was reasonable for counsel not to object. 
 
Defendant also complains that his counsel did not attempt to “educate or 
rehabilitate” Burgess on the death penalty in order to keep him on the panel.  But 
defendant’s argument assumes that Burgess was a desirable juror for the defense.  
The record does not show that, and we decline to speculate on the matter.  For all 
we know, counsel may have welcomed Burgess’s excusal for some reason 
unrelated to his death-penalty views.  Cf. Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 
437-438, 105 S.Ct. at 859, 83 L.Ed.2d at 860 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Trial 
counsel is in a better position than we are to decide whether a juror can or should 
be rehabilitated.  Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 143, 538 N.E.2d at 381. 
 
At defendant’s arraignment on January 23, 1996, defendant’s counsel 
entered on his behalf a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and also requested 
 
 
26
an evaluation of defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Defendant was examined 
by psychologist Dr. Yossef Ben-Porath.  After receiving the results of this 
evaluation, the defense withdrew the insanity plea.  After defendant was convicted, 
the defense called Dr. James Eisenberg to testify in the penalty phase regarding 
defendant’s mental condition.  The state called Dr. Ben-Porath to rebut Dr. 
Eisenberg’s testimony. 
 
Defendant contends that his counsel should have requested expert assistance 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.024 rather than a mental evaluation under R.C. 2945.37.  
Had counsel done so, defendant argues, “they could have retained control over the 
content and presentation of their penalty case.”  See Glenn v. Tate (C.A.6, 1995), 
71 F.3d 1204. 
 
However, pursuant to former R.C. 2945.371(A) and 2945.39(A), defendant’s 
counsel had no choice regarding a mental evaluation.  Former R.C. 2945.371(A) 
provided:  “If the issue of a defendant’s competence to stand trial is raised under 
section 2945.37 of the Revised Code, the court may order one or more, but not 
more than three evaluations of the defendant’s mental condition.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  138 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4209.  Similarly, former R.C. 2945.39(A) 
provided:  “If a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court 
may order one or more, but not more than three, evaluations of the defendant’s 
mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense.”  143 Ohio Laws, 
Part III, 5352.  Thus, once counsel had raised the issue of sanity and competence, 
they could not have blocked the evaluations. (White makes no claim that counsel’s 
decision to raise the sanity and competence issues itself constituted ineffective 
assistance.) 
 
Defendant also contends that defense counsel should have invoked former 
R.C. 2945.38(J) and former R.C. 2945.39(D), presumably to prevent Dr. Ben-
Porath from testifying against him in the penalty case.  Former R.C. 2945.38(J) 
 
 
27
provided: “No statement made by a defendant in an examination * * * relating to 
[his] competence to stand trial shall be used in evidence against [him] on the issue 
of guilt * * * .”  142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 760.  Former R.C. 2945.39(D) provided: 
“No statement made by a defendant in an examination * * * relating to his mental 
condition at the time of the commission of an offense shall be used in evidence 
against him on the issue of guilt * * * .”  143 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5353.  Defendant 
appears to contend that his counsel should have invoked these statutes to prevent 
Dr. Ben-Porath from testifying against him in the penalty phase. 
 
In fact, however, defendant’s counsel did attempt to block Dr. Ben-Porath’s 
testimony.  Before the penalty phase, counsel filed a motion in limine asking that 
the state be precluded from using Dr. Ben-Porath’s testimony or report “on rebuttal 
or for any other purpose” in the penalty phase, on the ground that the evaluations 
“were for the purposes of competency and sanity evaluation only” and “not * * * 
for the purpose of rebutting defense psychological testimony at the penalty phase.”  
The trial court denied the motion on authority of State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio 
St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895.  Since defendant’s counsel tried to have Dr. Ben-
Porath’s testimony excluded, there is no factual foundation for defendant’s claim 
of attorney neglect. 
 
Defendant argues that his counsel were ineffective because certain 
discussions between the court and counsel, concerning “the order of proceedings” 
with regard to victim-impact testimony, are not in the record.  However, defendant 
does not explain how this omission was prejudicial. 
 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel “failed to request the lesser 
instruction [sic] at both the trial and the penalty phases.”  This assertion is too 
vague to permit analysis. 
 
Defendant complains that trial counsel did not object to the instructions’ 
“defective” definition of “reasonable doubt.”  But that definition is sanctioned by 
 
 
28
our precedents, on which counsel could reasonably rely.  See State v. Nabozny 
(1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 8 O.O.3d 181, 375 N.E.2d 784; State v. Van Gundy 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 594 N.E.2d 604.  Finally, defendant complains that his 
counsel “failed to request an instruction on victim impact.”  However, defendant 
does not say what instruction he thinks counsel should have requested.  Thus, we 
are unable to find either defective performance or prejudice. 
 
None of defendant’s claims establishes ineffective assistance.  Accordingly, 
defendant’s tenth proposition is overruled. 
IX.  SETTLED ISSUES 
 
Defendant’s thirteenth and fifteenth propositions of law raise issues 
pertaining to the jury instructions.  Defendant neither objected to the instructions at 
issue nor submitted his own proposed instructions under Crim.R. 30(A).  These 
issues are waived.  Defendant’s thirteenth and fifteenth propositions are therefore 
overruled. 
 
In his second, third, fourth, eleventh, and sixteenth propositions of law, 
defendant reargues settled issues.  Defendant’s second, fourth, and sixteenth 
propositions are foreclosed by, e.g., State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 
167-174, 210-211, 15 OBR 311, 314-319, 350-352, 473 N.E.2d 264, 272-277, 304-
305, and paragraphs one and eight of the syllabus; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio 
St.3d 124, 137-138, 22 OBR 203, 214-215, 489 N.E.2d 795, 807-808; State v. 
Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of 
the syllabus; State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 9-10, 529 N.E.2d 192, 194-
195; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643, 671.  
Defendant’s third proposition is foreclosed by State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 413, 417-418, 653 N.E.2d 253, 259-260; his eleventh by Phillips, 74 Ohio 
St.3d at 101, 653 N.E.2d at 669; and his thirteenth by Nabozny and Van Gundy.  
 
 
29
These propositions are summarily overruled.  See, generally, State v. Poindexter 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
X.  INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
 
Having overruled defendant’s propositions of law, we must now 
independently determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of 
aggravating circumstances, whether those aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the death sentence in 
this case is proportionate to sentences in similar cases.  R.C. 2929.05(A). 
Aggravating Circumstances 
 
Defendant was convicted of two aggravating circumstances in connection 
with Deborah Thorpe’s murder: a course of conduct involving two or more 
purposeful killings or attempts to kill (R.C. 2929.04[A][5]), and murder to escape 
detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another crime (R.C. 
2929.04[A][3]).  The evidence supports these aggravating circumstances. 
 
With respect to the course-of-conduct specification, defendant admitted the 
three shootings, and the evidence shows that all three were committed with the 
purpose to kill.  The physical evidence did not support defendant’s claim that Julie 
Schrey struggled with him over the gun.  The chief deputy coroner who examined 
the bodies concluded that Schrey was shot from two to four feet away.  The slug 
that killed Schrey entered through the back of her right wrist, and police found a 
broken lighter and a singed cigarette near her body, all of which suggests that she 
was lighting a cigarette when defendant shot her.  Finally, the gun’s 7.5-pound 
trigger pull makes it unlikely that it just “went off,” as defendant claimed. 
 
Defendant admitted to Detective McCain that he killed Deborah Thorpe for 
a reason, and hence purposefully: he said he did it because “he didn’t want 
[Deborah Thorpe] to have to live with * * * seeing her friend killed.”  (This may 
not have been defendant’s real reason for killing Deborah Thorpe; after all, the jury 
 
 
30
found that defendant killed her to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or 
conviction for another offense.  The point here, however, is simply that defendant 
admitted that his purpose was to kill Deborah Thorpe.) 
 
Other evidence confirms defendant’s purpose to kill Deborah Thorpe.  
Defendant had to pump the shotgun to eject the spent cartridge and reload the 
chamber.  Moreover, the physical evidence indicates that he fired at Deborah 
Thorpe twice.  A slug went through the front window; from this one may infer that 
defendant fired that shot at Deborah Thorpe, who was running for the door, and 
had just reached it when defendant shot her.  (Schrey was shot at the rear of the 
apartment.) 
 
Defendant’s attempt to kill Michael Thorpe was also purposeful.  Defendant 
was angry and had a strong motive to kill Thorpe, his rival for Kawczk.  He shot 
Thorpe in the head, a vital area.  Eyewitnesses contradicted defendant’s claim that 
Thorpe tried to grab him as defendant was leaving the restaurant. 
 
With respect to the second specification, defendant admitted that he shot 
Julie Schrey first, in Deborah Thorpe’s presence.  Thus, one may infer that he 
killed Deborah Thorpe to eliminate the sole witness to Schrey’s murder.  See State 
v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 148-149, 512 N.E.2d 962, 965. 
Mitigating Factors 
 
Defendant was twenty-two years old at the time of the offense.  His youth is 
entitled to some weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4).  State v. Grant (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 465, 486, 620 N.E.2d 50, 71; but, cf., State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
244, 257, 667 N.E.2d 369, 382 (age of twenty-two entitled to little weight).  Also, 
defendant plainly lacks a “significant history of prior criminal convictions and 
delinquency adjudications.”  R.C. 2929.04(B)(5).  His record consists solely of a 
few minor violations.  We assign this factor significant weight. 
 
 
31
 
Defendant was the youngest of his mother’s six children by three different 
fathers.  Defendant’s father, Clifton White, Jr., lived with the family “on and off.”  
When defendant was six or seven years old, Clifton White, Jr. was imprisoned for 
raping his daughter. 
 
Defendant’s mother, Shirley White, was an alcoholic.  Defendant’s sister 
testified that Shirley White was a “mean” drunk who would hit her children 
“maybe about once or twice [a] week” with a switch, belt, or electrical cord.  
However, defendant’s sister was unclear as to how often Shirley White hit 
defendant.  “About three times. * * * I don’t know.  He probably got more 
whoppings than I did.” 
 
On the other hand, Shirley White testified that her temper was not “that bad” 
when she drank, and that she “whopped” her children “[n]ot that much, but 
whenever they did something bad.”  She also denied striking them with a cord, 
although she admitted using other objects to administer corporal punishment. 
 
The family moved frequently, living in five to ten different homes during 
defendant’s childhood.  Defendant attended eight different schools during the first 
six years of his education.  Shirley White’s children were taken from her custody at 
least once due to neglect and placed in a foster home. 
 
Defense psychologist, Dr. James Eisenberg, testified that defendant is 
“mildly mentally retarded,” with an IQ of 63, in the lowest one percent of the 
population.  Dr. Eisenberg administered part of the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory II (“MMPI II”) to defendant, but could not get a valid result.  
Dr. Eisenberg believed that defendant did not understand the questions, which 
supported Dr. Eisenberg’s diagnosis of retardation.  Dr. Eisenberg also gave 
defendant the verbal portion of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised 
(“WAIS-R”) and felt the result was valid; that result also indicated retardation. 
 
 
32
 
Dr. Eisenberg also concluded that defendant suffers from mild depression, a 
mental disorder characterized by loss of self-esteem, feelings of hopelessness, 
worthlessness, helplessness, which he blamed on defendant’s dysfunctional family.  
Dr. Eisenberg cited two alleged suicide attempts by defendant.  In 1992, defendant 
took an overdose of seventy vitamin pills, and about four days before the murders, 
he overdosed on Nytol.  Finally, defendant had purchased a shotgun and talked to 
Heather Kawczk about killing himself with it. 
 
Rebuttal witness Dr. Yossef Ben-Porath, a consultant psychologist with the 
Psycho-Diagnostic Clinic (“PDC”), had evaluated defendant before trial for 
competency and sanity.  Dr. Ben-Porath concluded that defendant had an antisocial 
personality disorder. 
 
Dr. Ben-Porath disagreed with Dr. Eisenberg’s diagnosis of retardation.  
Defendant took intelligence tests at the PDC, but the results were invalid because 
defendant was uncooperative.  According to Dr. Ben-Porath, defendant’s test 
results and other information elicited from him indicated that he was malingering. 
 
Dr. Ben-Porath believed that defendant also malingered on the MMPI II 
administered by Dr. Eisenberg, because defendant’s responses on the MMPI’s 
validity scales were inconsistent with the random responses that would be expected 
of a person who could not understand the questions.  (Dr. Ben-Porath was an 
expert on the MMPI II, having participated in its development and having trained 
psychologists in its use.)  Furthermore, Dr. Ben-Porath testified, the verbal portion 
of the WAIS-R (the sole portion of that test given by Dr. Eisenberg) would tend to 
understate defendant’s intelligence. 
 
Under the circumstances, we cannot find that defendant proved mental 
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.  In contrast, defendant’s mild 
depression was undisputed, but it is unclear what role (if any) it played in these 
crimes.  This is, at best, a weak mitigating factor. 
 
 
33
 
Defendant’s family background is entitled to some mitigating weight.  With 
a father in prison, an alcoholic and neglectful mother, and frequent changes of 
school and residence, defendant surely lacked the stability and moral instruction 
that most people have.  Yet even backgrounds far worse than defendant’s are 
seldom accorded major weight.  Cf. State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 
54-55, 630 N.E.2d 339, 353-354; State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 585, 
605 N.E.2d 884, 908; State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d at 41, 544 N.E.2d at 919; State 
v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 245-246, 527 N.E.2d 831, 838-839. 
 
In his unsworn statement, defendant expressed remorse for his crimes: “I’m 
sorry for everything that happened * * * [.]  I know everybody [is] hurt over it.  I 
can’t really explain it * * * .”  More important, he showed his remorse on the very 
day he committed the crimes, by summoning help for his victims and by turning 
himself in and confessing.  This factor is entitled to significant weight.  See State v. 
Hicks (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 72, 80, 538 N.E.2d 1030, 1039.  However, its weight 
is limited here by defendant’s lack of complete honesty.  Cf. State v. Wiles (1991), 
59 Ohio St.3d 71, 93-94, 571 N.E.2d 97, 123.  In his unsworn statement and his 
confessions, defendant insisted that he meant to harm no one but himself, a claim 
we cannot accept.  Moreover, his version of the crime was inconsistent with the 
evidence. 
 
Defendant’s sister and cousin testified that defendant had a close 
relationship with his daughter, Raven, one of the three children he fathered by 
three different mothers.  Defendant took care of Raven on weekends and when he 
did not have to work, “and she was happy with him. * * * [S]he never wanted to 
leave; and when he dropped her off, she cried * * * to be with her dad * * * .”  
Defendant’s relationship with his daughter is entitled to some weight.  See, e.g., 
State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 342-343, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 1037-1038. 
 
 
34
 
There was some evidence that defendant took several Nytol tablets on the 
morning of the murders.  However, there was no testimony as to how the Nytol 
affected defendant.  Even if there had been some effect, voluntary intoxication is 
not a strong mitigating factor.  See, e.g., State v. Otte (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 
568, 660 N.E.2d 711, 723. 
 
Although a number of mitigating factors exist here, the aggravating 
circumstances of multiple murder and murder to escape accountability for another 
crime outweigh these mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proportionality 
 
We have frequently affirmed death sentences in cases where multiple 
murder was the only aggravating circumstance, including cases where “the 
defendant was * * * under significant emotional stress.”  State v. Williams (1997), 
79 Ohio St.3d 1, 20, 679 N.E.2d 646, 662-663.  See, e.g., State v. Sowell (1988), 39 
Ohio St.3d 322, 336-337, 530 N.E.2d 1294, 1309-1310; State v. Combs (1991), 62 
Ohio St.3d 278, 294, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1084; State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
324, 338-339, 667 N.E.2d 960, 972-973. 
 
On the other hand, we reversed a death sentence on independent review in 
State v. Lawrence (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 24, 541 N.E.2d 451, where the mitigating 
factors included depression, lack of significant criminal history, and the 
defendant’s care for his family.  However, Lawrence’s mental problems, unlike 
defendant’s, established a mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) (diminished 
capacity).  Id., 44 Ohio St.3d at 32, 541 N.E.2d at 460.  Lawrence could also point 
to military service and provocation as strong mitigating factors.  Moreover, 
Lawrence’s depression was severe; defendant’s, according to defense witness Dr. 
Eisenberg, was mild.  Thus, we find that the death sentence for defendant is not 
disproportionate. 
 
The judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed. 
 
 
35
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Defendant also appealed that dismissal to this court.  We consolidated that 
appeal, case No. 97-1001, with the instant case.  79 Ohio St.3d 1401, 679 N.E.2d 
718.  Subsequently, we dismissed case No. 97-1001 for want of prosecution.  See 
80 Ohio St.3d 1452, 686 N.E.2d 524. 
2. 
See Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital 
Sentencing Hearings (1992), 45 Vand.L.Rev. 1621, 1624. 
3. 
Bartolo, Payne v. Tennessee:  The Future Role of Victim Statements of 
Opinion in Capital Sentencing Proceedings (1992), 77 Iowa L.Rev. 1217, 1217-
1218. 
4. 
See Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital 
Sentencing Hearings (1992), 45 Vand.L.Rev. 1621, 1624-1629. 
5. 
See Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim 
Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing (1997), 35 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 93, 99–101. 
6. 
Section 10a, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:  “Victims of 
criminal offenses shall be accorded fairness, dignity, and respect in the criminal 
justice process, and, as the general assembly shall define and provide by law, shall 
be accorded rights to reasonable and appropriate notice, information, access, and 
protection and to a meaningful role in the criminal justice process.  This section 
does not confer upon any person a right to appeal or modify any decision in a 
criminal proceeding, does not abridge any other right guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the United States or this constitution, and does not create any cause 
of action for compensation or damages against the state, any political subdivision 
 
 
36
of the state, any officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any political 
subdivision, or any officer of the court.”