Title: Saldana v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Saldana v. State1993 WY 13846 P.2d 604Case Number: 90-24Decided: 01/28/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming

Maro 
SALDANA,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Goshen 
County, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public 
Defender, Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired 1/1/93.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The foremost 
question presented in this case arises out of the claim of Maro Saldana 
(Saldana) that the State unlawfully invaded his reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to telephone company records for an unlisted telephone 
number. His specific contention is that certain records concerning telephone 
calls made to, and from, his unlisted telephone number at his residence were 
seized, or otherwise intercepted, in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 and 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 to -610 (Supp. 1990) and, because of the violation of the 
Constitution and statutes, those telephone company records should not have been 
admitted as evidence at his trial. Saldana also asserts the admission of certain 
papers seized from his bedroom dresser drawer, together with testimony of an 
investigative agent that interpreted those documents to the jury, deprived him 
of his constitutional right to confrontation. In addition, Saldana contends 
testimony by the investigative agent was presented as an opinion regarding his 
guilt and as an opinion concerning credibility of various witnesses so that the 
testimony usurped the role of the jury. All of these assertions of error by 
Saldana culminate in his contention that, if the improper evidence had not been 
admitted, there would not be sufficient evidence in the record to sustain his 
conviction for the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Our 
review of the record in light of our statutes and controlling precedent leads us 
to conclude that no reversible error occurred in connection with Saldana's 
trial, and the judgment and sentence is affirmed.

[¶2]      As set forth in 
his Brief of the Appellant, Saldana presents the issues in the case as follows: 

1. Was the evidence 
presented insufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction?

2. Was Agent Arter's 
testimony concerning his opinion of appellant's guilt and the credibility of 
various witnesses inadmissible and denied Appellant his right to a jury 
trial?

3. Did the admission of 
the papers found in the dresser drawer violate Appellant's right to 
confrontation?

4. Whether Appellant's 
phone records and the derivative evidence were seized in violation of Article 1, 
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and therefore inadmissible as 
evidence.

5. Whether the 
Appellant's telephone toll records were intercepted in violation of § 7-3-601 et 
seq. W.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.) and therefore were inadmissible.

In its brief, 
the State of Wyoming states the issues in 
this way:

I. Whether sufficient 
evidence was presented to convict appellant of possession of cocaine with the 
intent to deliver, in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i).

II. Whether DCI Agent 
Mike Arter gave his opinion on the guilt of the appellant and the credibility of 
witnesses.

III. Whether it was 
proper to admit evidence concerning papers which were found on appellant's 
bureau during the search of his house.

IV. Whether the records 
of appellant's telephone calls should have been admitted.

V. Whether the use of 
appellant's telephone records violated W.S. 7-3-601 through 7-3-610, which 
proscribes the unauthorized interception of telephone conversations.

[¶3]      Late in February 
of 1989, a package containing four and one-half ounces of uncut cocaine was 
shipped from Green 
Bay, Wisconsin to 
Torrington, Wyoming via United Parcel 
Service (UPS). The shipper was identified as "Bob Haeger," and the package was 
addressed to one Hilario Torres (Torres). Torres was an unemployed laborer from 
Texas who was temporarily 
residing in the basement of the Saldana home. Saldana lived upstairs with his 
wife and children.

[¶4]      The package 
arrived in Torrington, but it could not be 
delivered at the time because it was addressed incorrectly and, as a result, had 
to be returned to Green 
Bay. "Bob Haeger" could not 
be contacted in Green 
Bay and, in accordance with 
standard UPS policy, UPS officials opened the unclaimed parcel in an effort to 
determine the identity of the shipper or an alternate address. The cocaine that 
was discovered when the package was opened by UPS was turned over to appropriate 
law enforcement personnel.

[¶5]      No one who could 
be identified as "Bob Haeger" ever did inquire about this package. Nevertheless, 
numerous telephone calls were received by the UPS office in 
Green 
Bay regarding the package. 
As a product of those calls, together with some information from the UPS driver 
in Wyoming, sufficient information was developed to reveal that Saldana's 
brother, Umero, actually sent the package, and the Saldana residence in 
Torrington was the intended destination. Umero Saldana previously had been 
convicted at least once for trafficking in cocaine.

[¶6]      The Division of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI) of the Attorney General's office in 
Wyoming entered the case when 
the Green Bay/Brown County, Wisconsin, multijurisdictional drug task force 
informed the DCI Wisconsin authorities had intercepted a parcel that was shipped 
to Torrington, Wyoming and contained a large 
quantity of cocaine. The addressee was identified as a person in the 
Torrington area named "Hilario 
Torres." An arrangement was made pursuant to which the resealed package was hand 
delivered to Mike Arter, a Wyoming DCI agent, on March 2, 
1989. The same day, Arter 
obtained a search warrant and reopened the package. In addition to a jar 
containing four and one-half ounces of rock cocaine mixed in with coffee 
grounds, the box contained some empty paper sacks and a pair of worn boots. 
After it was searched, the package was, again, resealed, and Arter, attired as a 
UPS driver and operating one of its vans, took it to the Saldana address. 
Saldana's wife advised Arter the package was expected, but Torres was not at 
home. She then signed a receipt acknowledging delivery.

[¶7]      Agent Arter 
returned to the UPS truck but, approximately ten minutes later, he went back to 
the Saldana residence on the pretext that UPS needed some additional information 
contained on a "next day" shipping label he had forgotten to remove before 
delivering the package. On this occasion, Saldana answered the door. After 
hearing Arter's explanation, Saldana went down to the basement and returned with 
the package which had not been opened. Torres came upstairs later, after he was 
informed his signature was needed. The testimony in the record discloses Torres 
seemed confused but, nevertheless, he did as he was asked. The receipt obtained 
at that time, containing Torres' signature and his handwriting sample, 
subsequently was lost and was not offered into evidence at trial. After Torres' 
signature had been obtained, Arter then signaled to two other agents who were 
waiting outside, and both Torres and Saldana were arrested. Torres seemed unable 
to speak English, and it appeared to the agents he did not comprehend what was 
happening.

[¶8]      Agent Arter then 
obtained a search warrant for the Saldana residence and the package that had 
been delivered, and the package was opened once more. The rock cocaine and the 
other contents of the package were identical to those Arter had observed before 
he resealed the package after opening it when it was hand delivered to him. 
Other items that were seized, pursuant to the search warrant, included some 
scraps of paper taken from a dresser drawer located in the Saldana's master 
bedroom. One of these pieces of paper had written on it "1 oz. front 
2-10-89 paid $1,000.00" and 
"front 2-12-89 paid 825 owes 575." 
There was another, purportedly signed by Federico Saldana, that listed Federico 
Saldana's address and contained the words "to pay 1/yr." Federico also is a 
brother of Saldana and, like Umero, previously had been convicted of trafficking 
in cocaine. With respect to this latter document, Christine Saldana, the 
Saldanas' daughter, testified she, not Saldana, had written the second note and 
it related only to a sale of a used Pontiac Tempest by her father to his 
brother. Additional pieces of paper were seized from the kitchen during the 
course of the search of the Saldanas' house, and these contained handwriting 
referring to the return address of the package, the UPS tracking number, the UPS 
telephone number, and various other "things of that nature."

[¶9]      Within a short 
time, the authorities in Wyoming decided Torres was not a 
part of any drug trafficking scheme, and he had been manipulated to the end that 
he permitted his name to be used for the address on the package containing the 
cocaine. He was released from custody and permitted to return to 
Texas. Saldana was charged 
with possessing cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
35-7-1031(a)(i) (1988). He was found guilty after a trial to a jury, and the 
trial court sentenced him to a term of not less than two and one-half years nor 
more than seven years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary with credit allowed for 
333 days previously served prior to his sentence. It is from that judgment and 
sentence Saldana appeals. We will state the facts in more detail as they relate 
to the several issues Saldana poses.

[¶10]   Saldana asserts in his brief 
"[p]erhaps the linchpin of the state's case against Appellant was the 
introduction and interpretation of Appellant's phone records and derivative 
evidence," and he then argues this evidence was obtained in violation of the 
provisions of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, and Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 to -610 
(Supp. 1990). Saldana's conclusion is that evidence obtained in violation of the 
constitution and the statute is not admissible at his trial. The significance of 
the contested evidence must be conceded, although its total impact may not be as 
significant as Saldana claims because there are additional facts pointing to his 
guilt. We must reject Saldana's contention and argument, however, and hold that 
the telephone records were lawfully obtained and were admissible into 
evidence.

[¶11]   With regard to the telephone 
records, Agent Arter testified he had obtained, through use of the federal 
subpoena power, since "the State of Wyoming doesn't have an 
investigative subpoena power," information that connected Saldana to an unlisted 
telephone number given to the UPS office in Green 
Bay by an unidentified 
caller. Through the use of the federal subpoena power, records of telephone 
calls, made from Saldana's residence and the homes of his two brothers, Federico 
and Umero, for a period of time extending both before and after delivery of the 
package containing cocaine, also were obtained. A request for this information 
previously had been denied by the telephone company, and no state warrant for 
obtaining the evidence ever was sought. Specifically, Arter testified as 
follows:

Q: You obtained phone 
records?

A: That's correct, 
sir.

Q: And when did you start 
that process, and what was that process?

A: I started the process 
almost - actually, to backtrack a little bit, I started the process prior to 
even delivery of the package.

During our investigation 
with help from that of our counterparts in Green 
Bay, one of the times that 
the UPS was called about the package was by a man giving his identity as Homer, 
who later identified himself as Umero Saldana. He gave a delivery address, the 
corrected delivery address of what Mr. Saldana's real address is, and he also 
gave a delivery phone number. The delivery phone number was a local phone number 
here in Torrington, of course, and I 
checked that phone number through - who handles yours? It is not U.S. 
West.

Q: United.

A: United Telephone, yes. 
I checked that through United telephone. It was a nonpublished number. In order 
for any law enforcement agencies to get information on a nonlisted number, we 
have to get a search warrant. In this case - because the State of 
Wyoming doesn't have an 
investigative subpoena power. In this case the DEA was also working on the case 
on this due to the fact that it came from Wisconsin and the amount of drugs 
involved.

Q: Let's back up. DEA, 
what agency or what part of our government does that refer to?

A: The Department of 
Justice.

Q: So that is 
federal?

A: Yes, sir, we are 
talking federal.

Q: Federal Department of 
Drug Enforcement Administration?

A: That's correct, sir. 
They also had a case start on this, but since I was the case agent, I just 
merely kept them informed as to what was going on, and they gave me any support 
they can or any input.

Through one of the agents 
with DEA, Special Agent Larry Gregory, we submitted a federal subpoena for the 
records of United Telephone to determine, number one, who owned the return 
telephone number, the number that was given. That number was cement [sic] out to 
me that the person who owned that number was in fact Maro Saldana at the address 
indicated.

From there it sort of 
stayed for awhile until the package was delivered and everything else from there 
was my determination that since we did have someone from another state involved 
that there was a need to see if they communicated, so I subpoenaed, again, 
through the federal subpoena power - or had Special Agent Gregory subpoena - the 
phone tolls for a several month period, two months prior to the delivery and the 
month after.

When I received these 
tolls, I did basically analysis of where the calls were going to. The numbers 
that I could check that was not nonpublished, I checked to determine who they 
belonged to the toll calls he had made; and the ones that were nonpublished, if 
I felt they were germane to the investigation, I got a subpoena and tried to 
obtain the records also.

Q: All right. Whose phone 
records from Wisconsin did you obtain in terms 
of the toll calls?

A: Through the 
investigation of Mr. Saldana, Maro Saldana's phone records, there was frequent 
calls to the Green Bay area to several numbers, one being the 465-0171, which 
was the number of Michele Senechal, who is now the wife of Umero Saldana. Umero 
Saldana gave the address of 846 Edgewood, which was, of course, 
her address.

I obtained a subpoena for 
those toll records. Through also the analysis of Maro Saldana's, I noticed that 
he called his other brother an unusual amount of times, Federico, and I obtained 
a federal subpoena to get those phone records.

Arter continued 
to testify about the number and the length of the calls made between Saldana's 
residence and the residences of Umero and Federico. His interpretation of this 
telephone activity was that it indicated certain members of Saldana's family 
were calling other members to keep them informed as to what was 
happening.

[¶12]   When cross-examined about this 
testimony, Arter conceded there was no way of knowing who was talking to whom 
from the information developed by a search of the telephone records. On redirect 
examination, Arter then testified:

Q: You were asked by Mr. 
Newlon whether you know who made the calls, and you indicated that you did. What 
I would like to ask you, not what your opinion is as to who made the calls, but 
why do you think you know who made the calls?

A: Through the 
investigation that I have conducted and just the experience and the details of 
the case, it is obvious to me that the calls were made by Maro Saldana. When I 
was in the house and interviewed both his wife and his daughters, it was fairly 
obvious to me that the wife and daughters did nothing in that house without the 
permission of Maro Saldana.

The wife was, as we 
interviewed her, she was terrified of the results of his implication here and 
more from him than what had [sic] considered. There was indication from all the 
daughters, and the mother, that they were not allowed to use the phone. He told 
them that they weren't even allowed to answer the phone unless he had told them 
to. He made those type of phone calls. The phone calls from the month in 
question was over $266. It is hard for me to understand, how he would allow them 
to make that type of commitment for phone bills like that on their own sake and 
not his. I am convinced that he made those calls.

[¶13]   We have acknowledged many times the 
constitutional guarantee against government intrusion into an individual's 
legitimate expectation of privacy through an unreasonable search and seizure. 
The guarantee is found in both Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, and U.S. Const. amend. 
IV. Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1992); King v. State, 
780 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1989); Pellatz v. State, 
711 P.2d 1138 (Wyo. 1986). See 
United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977). See also Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926, 85 S. Ct. 879, 13 L. Ed. 2d 813 
(1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, reh'g denied, 
368 U.S. 871, 82 S. Ct. 23, 7 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1961); Wolf v. People of State of 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949). This protection is broad, but it is not absolute. Katz v. 
United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). See Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681 
(Wyo. 1982); Neilson v. State, 
599 P.2d 1326 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980). The courts have drawn a balance between the interest of the 
state in protecting its citizens from the criminal conduct of others and its 
interest in preserving the freedom of the individual from overly intrusive 
governmental invasion. Consequently, the rule has developed that any search, 
assuming first that it does invade a subjective and legitimate expectation of 
privacy sufficient to invoke the constitutional protections, must be 
unreasonable in order to be impermissible. 
United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); Chadwick; United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976); Katz; King; Jessee; Neilson; State v. George, 32 
Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683 
(1924).

[¶14]   Whether a search is reasonable is 
to be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case in light of the 
"fundamental criteria" that are found in the Fourth Amendment, as those criteria 
have been interpreted and defined in the opinions of the Supreme Court. Berger 
v. State of New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963); George. The question of reasonableness does not arise, 
unless there has been an intrusion upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Pellatz. The primary, and often ultimate, test for determining whether evidence 
must be suppressed, at least in the federal arena, has evolved into the 
determination of whether "the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is 
`justifiable' under the circumstances." Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 
2580, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S. Ct. 1035, 59 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1979); United 
States v. Waupekenay, 973 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).

[¶15]   The protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures found in the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming is virtually identical 
to that found in the federal constitution. U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4; 
State v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 P. 2 (1930). 
Even though the federal law establishes minimum requirements for individual 
protection and does not mandate any maximum criteria as to the degree of 
protection afforded an individual under state law, federal interpretations of 
the Fourth Amendment are regarded as persuasive and this court adheres to them 
closely absent some contrary direction from the legislature of the State of 
Wyoming. See U.S. Const. amend. 
X; Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 
(Wyo. 1985), appeal dismissed, 
476 U.S. 1110, 106 S. Ct. 1961, 90 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1986).

[¶16]   The facts in Smith are similar to 
those in the case before us, but they can be distinguished since Saldana 
maintained an unlisted telephone number while the petitioner in Smith did not. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in that case held that the warrantless 
use of a pen register, installed at police request on telephone company property 
at the telephone company central office, did not constitute a "`search'" 
invading a "`legitimate expectation of privacy.'" Smith, 442 U.S.  at 742, 99 S. Ct.  at 
2581. The rationale in Smith was that people generally do not "entertain any 
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial" since they realize they 
"must `convey' phone numbers to the telephone company." Smith, 442 U.S.  at 742, 99 S. Ct.  at 
2581. Furthermore, pen registers acquire only the numbers dialed and do not 
report any part of the actual communication so there is no interception of the 
contents of the conversation. The Supreme Court noted:

Indeed, a law enforcement 
official could not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a 
communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the 
telephone numbers that have been dialed - a means of establishing communication. 
Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of 
the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed 
by pen registers.

Smith, 442 U.S.  at 741, 99 S. Ct.  at 2581 
(citing United 
States v. New York Tel. Co., 
434 U.S. 159, 167, 98 S. Ct. 364, 
369, 54 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1977)).

[¶17]   Saldana's situation is different 
from the facts in Smith, but the two cases match sufficiently that the same 
reasoning can apply in both. Smith is controlling to the extent that we hold the 
DCI's procurement of Saldana's telephone records, including those linking his 
name to his unlisted telephone number, does not constitute a "search" invading a 
"legitimate expectation of privacy" sufficient to demonstrate an invasion of 
Saldana's constitutional rights. Any person using a telephone, whether on 
legitimate business or otherwise, assumes a risk that the telephone can, and 
will, reveal the numbers that he dials. Smith. It may be that an unlisted number 
such as that used by Saldana affords to a party some greater subjective 
expectation of privacy than one would find in connection with a listed number 
like Smith's. That expectation is not more "legitimate" with respect to criminal 
investigations, however, because the purpose and the privacy protections of an 
unlisted number go only to veiling it from the general public by not including 
it in telephone books and directory assistance services. An unlisted number and 
the name of its owner are not affected any more with respect to its procurement 
through use of a subpoena or warrant than is the information acquired by a 
telephone company pen register, which is similarly veiled from public scrutiny. 
The fact that Saldana's telephone number was not listed, even though permitting 
increased expectation of privacy with respect to who might call him, is a 
distinction without a difference for the purposes of this case. Here there was 
no "search" that invaded a legitimate expectation of privacy and, for that 
reason, no warrant was required. The DCI did not infringe on Saldana's Fourth 
Amendment rights by acquiring information through the use of the federal DEA 
investigative subpoena.

[¶18]   Under the Tenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, the freedom of the state to provide greater 
expectations of privacy for its citizens than those provided under the federal 
constitution is guaranteed if, in either its legislative or judicial discretion, 
it deems it necessary or appropriate to do so. U.S. Const. amend. X; 
Cheyenne 
Airport, 707 P.2d 717. See 
United 
States v. Millstone 
Enterprises, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 867 (W.D.Pa. 1988), reversed on other grounds, 
864 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1988); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 
Increased protection could be afforded to Wyoming citizens. It is our 
conclusion, however, that the substantial identity of the constitutional 
provisions involved does not suggest, nor do we perceive it appropriate in this 
instance to recognize, any increased protection as being afforded by our state 
constitution. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4; 
Hinshaw.

[¶19]   We next turn to the statutes relied 
upon by Saldana, Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 to -611 
(1987), to determine whether legislative discretion may have been invoked to 
expand the constitutional protection. Saldana claims that, under this 
Wyoming "wire-tapping" statute, 
the admission into evidence of his telephone records is prohibited. We rely upon 
the statute in the form that it had been adopted at the time of Saldana's 
conduct instead of at the later, and somewhat more expansive, version relied 
upon by Saldana. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 to -610 
(Supp. 1990). Cf. Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 
(Wyo. 1992) (holding statutes 
are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent); Wyoming Refining 
Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 (Wyo. 1985); Johnson v. 
Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977). However, it is 
likely our resolution would be essentially the same under either version. Also, 
we reiterate our general rule that statutes will be strictly construed to cause 
them to comport with legislative intent and the first, and foremost, indicator 
of that intent is found within the language of the statute. Allied-Signal, Inc. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1991); Johnson v. 
Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1989); Halliburton Co. 
v. Adams, Roux & Assoc., Inc., 773 P.2d 153 
(Wyo. 1989). Furthermore, no 
statute should be interpreted so that any portion of it would be rendered 
meaningless. Halliburton; Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 713 P.2d 766 
(Wyo. 1986).

[¶20]   Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-602 (1987) 
provided, in pertinent part:

(a) Except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section, no person shall willfully:

(i) Intercept any wire or 
oral communication;

(ii) Disclose to another 
person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason 
to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or 
oral communication in violation of this section; 

(iii) Use the contents of 
any wire or oral communication knowing or having reason to know that the 
information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral 
communication in violation of this section.

(b) Nothing in subsection 
(a) of this section prohibits:

(i) An officer, employee 
or agent of a communications common carrier from intercepting, disclosing or 
using a wire communication intercepted in the normal course of that person's 
employment if the interception is made only for mechanical or service quality 
checks or to protect the property of the communications common 
carrier;

(ii) An officer, employee 
or agent of any communication common carrier providing information, facilities 
or technical assistance to a peace officer who is authorized pursuant to this 
act to intercept a wire or oral communication;

* * 
* * * *

(v) 
A peace officer from intercepting, using or disclosing to another peace officer 
in the course of his official duties any wire or oral communication pursuant to 
an order permitting the interception under this act;

* * 
* * * *

(c) 
Any person who violates this section is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine 
of not more than one thousand dollars ($1000.00), imprisonment for not more than 
five (5) years, or both.

[¶21]   Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(iii) (1987) 
defines the contents of an oral or wire communication to be:

(iii) "Contents of an oral or wire communication" includes 
information concerning the identity of the parties participating in the 
communication and the existence, meaning, substance or purport of the 
communication; * * *.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(v) (1987) defines the word "intercept" to mean:

(v) 
"Intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents of any oral or wire 
communication by use of an electronic, mechanical or other device; * * 
*.

There are a few exceptions that are not pertinent in this 
instance, but the theme of the statute is to prohibit a person, with criminal 
sanctions attached to infractions, from willfully intercepting, disclosing, or 
using the contents of any wire or oral communication that is obtained in 
violation of the statute.

[¶22]   Saldana's argument is that acquiring 
the identities of the parties participating in a communication amounts to 
acquiring the contents of that communication within the purpose of this statute. 
Numerous different individuals can, however, have access to any given telephone 
number and, consequently, obtaining information regarding the name of the person 
owning the telephone number does not constitute acquiring information even as to 
the identity of the parties who were involved in any given communication. In 
this regard, it is also noteworthy that Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(iv) (1987) 
defines an "electronic, mechanical or other device" as:

(iv) 
"Electronic, mechanical or other device" means any device or apparatus which can 
be used to intercept a wire or oral communication, other than:

(A) 
Any telephone, telex or telegraph equipment, or component thereof, used in the 
ordinary course of business; * * *.

The 
equipment used to track the calls to, and from, Saldana's residence was 
equipment used by the telephone company to record connections in the interests 
of assessing charges in the ordinary course of its business. There is nothing in 
the record to indicate it was installed to intercept the contents of any wire or 
oral communication in contravention of the statute, and the information it 
furnished was specifically obtained for telephone company purposes. It was 
released to the authorities only under orders promulgated by virtue of a 
lawfully issued subpoena. It follows that, in light of Wyo. Stat. § 
7-3-601(a)(iv) (1987), the devise was not an "electronic, mechanical or other 
device," and the information obtained by virtue of this equipment was not 
"intercepted." 

[¶23]   We hold that the telephone toll records 
Saldana complains of were not "intercepted," and they were not, in fact, 
acquired, disclosed, or used contrary to the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 
7-3-602(a) (1987). The increased expectation of privacy the statute affords was 
not breached in this instance, and Saldana's claims to the contrary are not 
efficacious. In addition, in reaching this result, we recognize that the 
acquisition of telephone number information is not "aural acquisition of the 
contents of any oral or wire communication by use of an electronic, mechanical 
or other device," as is required for a violation of the statute. Wyo. Stat. § 
7-3-601(a)(v) (1987) (emphasis added).

[¶24]   We next consider Saldana's contention 
that the testimony at trial encompassed testimony of an opinion concerning his 
guilt and an opinion relating to the credibility of certain witnesses, the 
result of which denied him his right to trial by jury. See U.S. Const. amend. 
VI; Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 9. These contentions relate to testimony by DCI Agent Arter in 
two separate areas. The first of those related to the interpretation of certain 
papers found during the search of the residence. The second related to comment 
upon the identification of an individual by a Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac as well as 
the explanation for the dismissal of the charge against Torres.

[¶25]   Turning to the matter of the papers 
first, the record discloses that Agent Arter testified before the jury that the 
two papers taken from the bedroom of the home indicated a long-term trafficking 
in controlled substances; that the individuals involved in the trafficking 
trusted each other greatly; and that "there was a knowledge of what was in the 
package." Specifically, Arter testified:

In 
the residence we picked up some papers that were recovered from the master 
bedroom of the Saldana residence which indicated to us through our experience, 
indicated trafficking in controlled substances, cocaine or something of that 
nature, or papers that indicated that there was a knowledge of what was in the 
package and that this type of thing had occurred before.

Defense counsel had objected to the admission of these 
papers on the ground they were not relevant because no showing was made with 
respect to who actually wrote the allegedly incriminating memoranda and because 
the handwriting appeared to be that of two different people. Nonetheless, they 
ultimately were received into evidence.

[¶26]   With respect to identification of the 
individual by the other witnesses, the State attempted, during the trial, to tie 
one Greg Chisholm, referred to as a known narcotics dealer, into its case. In 
making this effort, the State relied in part on testimony provided by Mr. and 
Mrs. Cardeilhac, the owners of a resort area known as the Oregon Trail Lodge. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac claimed they had observed a blond male in and 
around their property during the month of February. This fact was relevant in 
light of earlier testimony indicating that an individual identified as "Hilario 
Torres" had registered at the motel at approximately the same time. When shown a 
photograph of Chisholm, both of the Cardeilhacs testified the individual in the 
picture resembled the blond male they had observed, but they could not be 
certain it was the same man.

[¶27]   The State recalled Agent Arter, and he 
was permitted to testify as follows:

What 
I did was I got a stack of photographs. I took a stack of individuals that are 
known to be involved in this case, the defendant, Maro Saldana, I took a 
photograph of Federico Saldana, Umero Saldana, Amato Saldana, Greg Chisholm, 
Hilario Torres, and I believe there was it. There were 7 or 8 
pictures.

Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the 
photograph and the surrounding testimony on the ground that the witnesses who 
had testified were unable to make a positive identification of the parties 
allegedly involved. The defense argued that introduction of the evidence would 
be unduly and unfairly prejudicial under such circumstances. That objection was 
overruled by the court, and Arter was permitted to continue with this 
subject.

[¶28]   Arter's testimony then was: 

There was one other - I just remembered there was Henry 
Castro's photo, also. He was also someone I felt was tied into this case. I 
showed the photographs to the individuals, in a stack, and I explained to them 
just to - look at the face and page through them. There was no order that the 
photographs were in. They were just random.

They 
went through and immediately discarded several of them, stated that they had 
never seen the individual. They stopped at one and said he looked vaguely 
familiar; and when they got to the photograph of Greg Chisholm they both 
stopped, independently, and said this individual had been there, had been 
contacted for making numerous phone calls. There were problems with the phone 
calls. They told me the entire story about the phone calls, but both Mr. and 
Mrs. Cardeilhac both independently identified Greg Chisholm as the individual in 
that room that day.

[¶29]   In addressing Arter's testimony, 
Saldana specifically objected to the testimony concerning how the papers taken 
from his bedroom tended to establish prior drug trafficking and his knowledge 
that the package contained cocaine. Saldana also contends there was error on the 
part of the trial court in permitting Arter to testify that the quantity and 
purity of the substance demonstrated it was meant for distribution and the 
telephone calls between his residence and the residences of his brothers, and 
between his residence and the Oregon Trail Lodge, established that Saldana and 
his brothers were trying to let each other know what was going on regarding the 
missing package. Saldana's argument is that all of these subjects reflected 
directly on his guilt, and Agent Arter was offering an opinion as to his guilt. 
Finally, Saldana objects to the testimony concerning the identifications or the 
lack of identifications by Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac as well as Arter's testimony 
regarding the dismissal of Torres as both amounting to comments on the 
credibility of witnesses.

[¶30]   In Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66 
(Wyo. 
1989), the court quoted from 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 
566 at 324-25 (14th ed. 1987), saying:

Ordinarily, the opinion of a lay or expert witness is not 
admissible if it amounts to a conclusion of law or a mixed conclusion of law and 
fact. Thus, a witness may not state his opinion as to * * * whether the 
defendant was guilty or innocent of the crime charged; * * *.

The 
court then held that "permitting a witness, lay or expert, to articulate an 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused constitutes plain error and demands 
reversal." Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 67. See also Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 
(Wyo. 
1992); Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 
1992); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶31]   In addition to the testimony of Agent 
Arter, quoted above with respect to the papers seized during the search of the 
Saldana residence, Saldana points to the following testimony by Agent Arter as 
also encompassing a comment on his guilt:

In 
the residence we picked up some papers that were recovered from the master 
bedroom of the Saldana residence which indicated to us through our experience, 
indicated trafficking in controlled substances, cocaine or something of that 
nature, or papers that indicated that there was a knowledge of what was in the 
package and that this type of thing had occurred before.

and 
additionally:

Q. 
Now agent Arter, let's talk a little bit about 4 1/2 or 4 ounces plus of 
cocaine?

A: 
Yes sir.

Q: 
First of all, have you ever seen it in rock form like that before?

A: 
Yes, I have, on many occasions.

Q: 
And does that in itself signify something based on your experience?

A: 
Based on my experience, it signifies it is for further distribution. Cocaine in 
that rock form means it was probably cut off a kilo size chunk of it. Cocaine 
when it is made and formed and shipped, it is shipped in kilo size packets in 
the rock, compressed form like that. When it is - when we intercept it in that 
way, it is either by a big dealer who is selling it, or through other people who 
are going to refine it to break it down into usable amounts, add adulterants to 
it, and then further put it out to the street to people that are actually going 
to use it.

It 
is very seldom we find someone for their personal use or someone who is not a 
distributor that has rock form of hydrochloric cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride 
in its form like that. It is usually in a powder already broke down and already 
cut, basically.

* * 
* * * *

Q: 
What is the basic, bottom-of-the-line amount in a street transaction, 
usually?

A: 
Usually - and it varies from area to area - the area we work in the southeast 
here, we see deals that go for grams and as little as quarter grams, a quarter 
gram going for $25. The quarter gram is the basic user amount. What usually 
happens is a person who is buying will buy a gram itself, being about a hundred 
dollars worth. He will buy that gram. He will take half of it for his own 
personal use and not cut it. He will cut something else into the other half to 
equal his whole gram again, and then he will resell that gram either as a full 
gram or half gram or quarter gram to someone else. It is cut, cut down again. It 
is pretty weak as far as he is concerned, but he got half a gram of cocaine for 
his own use for that day, but he didn't spend a cent because he is getting his 
money back. That is the basic level we will see in this area.

Q: A 
quarter gram, when you get down to a quarter gram, that's what you 
use?

A: 
Basically, yes sir.

Q: 
And what usually - what has been the purity found in those quarter gram 
transactions?

A: 
Again, that varies from who you are getting it from, what the dealer is, who he 
is selling it to. Because if he is going to establish a clientele, he will keep 
it at a little higher level of purity. We have bought as low as 6 percent 
purity.

The 
normal, I would say, is somewhere between 20 and 25 percent, 20 to 25 percent 
being the cocaine, the other 75, 80 percent being some sort ever [sic] additive, 
adulterate.

* * 
* * * *

Q: 
So you are confident in the proposition that these 4 ounces plus of cocaine that 
you seized was not a consumer amount or quantity?

A: 
No sir, I can't testify that one person was going to cut it down to the amounts 
we are talking about and sell it [out], but it was for distribution somewhere to 
be cut and put out in the streets in about 20 to 25 percent purity.

The 
specific testimony, furnished on redirect examination, regarding the 
significance of the long distance telephone calls was as follows:

Q: 
So there is a suggestion here, perhaps, that members of the defendants family 
were calling other family members to let them know what was going 
on?

A: 
Yes.

[¶32]   The selection of the particular 
testimony to which Saldana now objects suggests he would have us extend the 
holding in Stephens to reach, and exclude, all opinion testimony, expert or not, 
on any issue that could go to proving an element of the crime charged. Saldana's 
view is that any analysis offered by a witness on the evidence presented at 
trial is equivalent to a direct, and thus impermissible, comment on the 
defendant's guilt. We are not inclined to accept this premise, especially in 
light of the provisions of Wyo.R.Evid. 702 that permit opinion evidence even on 
an ultimate issue. Stephens; McCabe v. R.A. Manning Constr. Co., 674 P.2d 699 
(Wyo. 
1983). An interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that 
interpretation may be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus 
leading to the inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual 
conclusional statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party. We are 
particularly firm in this determination if the record demonstrates the proffered 
opinion was helpful to the jury in determining the facts of the case and was 
elicited for that reason. Wyo.R.Evid. 702.

[¶33]   The inquiry by the court when claims 
like this are raised, assuming that proper objections are presented, must be 
whether the testimony sought to be elicited will constitute a direct, and 
therefore impermissible, opinion with respect to the innocence or guilt of the 
accused or whether it is nothing more than related information offered to assist 
the jury in resolving the factual issues placed before it. See Wyo. 
R.Evid. 702; Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 
1992); Stephens; Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 
1986). Testimony that is given only as an aid to the jury in its pursuit of the 
facts and does not address directly the guilt of the accused in a conclusional 
way does not deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a trial by 
jury.

[¶34]   In our view, contrary to the 
contentions of Saldana, the comments of Agent Arter were not offered as opinions 
concerning Saldana's guilt; taken by themselves, they could be construed as not 
even directly implicating Saldana. The average person, a concept that probably 
includes at least some jurors in this case, is not knowledgeable with respect to 
matters involving commerce in cocaine. We perceive these comments, instead of 
being comments on Saldana's guilt, to be statements offered chiefly to the jury 
to aid it in understanding and resolving the factual issues of the case. We 
understand the devastating impact a witness perceived to be an expert in a 
particular field may have when he offers testimony interpreting other evidence 
and that testimony is contrary to the interests of the defendant. That does not 
require, however, that the jury be isolated in some constructive vacuum under 
the pretext all comment on evidence, no matter how unbiased or neutral it might 
be, is unfair to the accused. In our jurisprudence, the trial is a search for 
the truth, the identification of the truth being within the province of the 
jury, and that effort demands the jury be given the benefit of whatever 
assistance may lawfully be provided. There was no error in the admission of 
Agent Arter's testimony in this case.

[¶35]   Much the same thing is true about 
Saldana's contentions that Arter commented impermissibly on the credibility of 
the witnesses. When cross-examined with respect to the testimony provided by Mr. 
and Mrs. Cardeilhac as to their inability to positively identify Greg Chisholm, 
Agent Arter testified:

Q: 
Now, when they identified this picture, I take it by your testimony it was a 
picture of Greg Chisholm; is that correct?

A: 
That's correct.

Q: 
How positive were they about that identification at that time?

A: 
That they had seen this individual, or who he was?

Q: 
Well, let's start with that they had seen him?

A: 
Mr. Cardeilhac was immediately certain that that was the individual that was 
involved in a room and was making all the phone calls. Mrs. Cardeilhac said the 
same thing from the get-go. She said when she saw the picture, "I know this guy. 
He was the one who made all the phone calls, and I had seen him outside." They 
were independently certain of it from the first time they saw the 
pictures.

Q: 
Now, you used the word "certain." You were sure in your mind that they were 
absolutely certain?

A: 
In my mind, it was the first time they had ever seen the photo. It was an 
initial response that immediately struck to them. You could see their eyes lit 
up that they recognized him from somewhere, and their first words were the words 
that came out.

I 
have a tendency to agree with that rather than when they get to the stand and 
are trying to swear to something. They were convinced. They have since talked 
themselves out of it.

Q: 
So you think what they told you makes more difference than what they say 
here?

A: I 
don't know that I said that. I hope you didn't understand that.

[¶36]   This court has held, on reasoning 
similar to the rationale in Stephens, that it is error for an expert witness to 
comment on the credibility of another witness. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 
(Wyo. 
1988). See Rivera; Lessard. The determination of credibility is exclusively 
within the province of the jury because the members of the jury are themselves 
the only "experts" in that area. Zabel. Nevertheless, testimony assisting the 
jury in understanding some aspect of the testimony of another witness that does 
not comment directly on that witness' credibility or veracity is not invasive of 
the role of the jury. Even though that testimony may have the collateral or 
incidental effect of either supporting or denigrating the other witnesses' 
statements, its admission does not constitute error. Zabel. See Griego v. State, 
761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 
1988). In connection with this issue, reality demonstrates all testimony may 
affect the credibility of other testimony in one way or another.

[¶37]   Viewed superficially, this testimony 
may appear to be contrary to Zabel because it does contravene statements made by 
the Cardeilhacs without providing any additional information helpful to the 
jury. We recognize, however, that this testimony was elicited by defense counsel 
in cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. It was not developed by the 
State. For that reason, there is no need to analyze its impact. If the error was 
made, it was the error of the defendant, not that of the State of 
Wyoming, 
and we will not charge it to the prosecution. This sort of product is one of the 
hazards of cross-examination. Even though we find nothing improper in this 
particular instance, we do recognize that, if reversible error is found under 
this situation, precedent is established that would be regarded in the future as 
permitting a defense attorney to create error if it looked like the trial was 
leading to an unfortunate result for his client. We do not think the 
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial requires that such an opportunity be 
made available. In this instance, we also note, even though the testimony was 
elicited by the defendant, no motion was made to strike it. Under these 
circumstances, we cannot conclude there was error committed in its 
introduction.

[¶38]   With respect to Arter's testimony about 
the investigative disposition of the case against Torres, any tie between that 
testimony and Torres' testimony is tenuous at best. We see no merit to the 
contention by Saldana that Arter's testimony that Torres was not charged because 
he was "convinced beyond any doubt that he had no part in this plan to receive 
or deliver cocaine" constitutes any comment on the credibility of the witness. 
Arter was merely reporting what had happened in connection with the case. As we 
noted earlier, there is no requirement that the jury work in a vacuum in order 
to insure the guarantees of a fair trial. In concluding the analysis of this 
issue, we reiterate the rule that evidentiary matters are generally within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and that discretion will not be overturned 
on appeal absent clear indications it has been abused. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of 
County 
Comm'rs of 
Hot 
Springs 
County, 
790 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 
1990); Arnold v. 
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 
1985). There was no abuse in this instance.

[¶39]   The next claim to be addressed is 
Saldana's contention that the introduction of the papers found in his dresser 
drawer violated his right to confrontation. See Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 10. Essentially, Saldana is claiming these papers were hearsay, 
and he then elaborates by asserting the "documents" were out-of-court statements 
admitted without a showing of the unavailability of the witness and without 
fitting them into any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. We conclude 
these papers do not fit within the definition of hearsay found in Wyo.R.Evid. 
801(c):

Hearsay. - "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by 
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.

One 
of the papers carried language reading "1 oz. front 2-10-89 
paid $1,000.00" and "front 2-12-89 
paid 825 owes 575." The other simply listed Federico Saldana's address and 
contained the words "to pay 1/yr." We understand these notations are the 
out-of-court statements complained of by Saldana. As he acknowledges in his 
brief, these "documents" were offered as circumstantial evidence of his past 
trafficking in controlled substances and of his knowledge regarding the illicit 
contents of the package. They were not offered to establish the quantity and 
price of drugs, Federico's address, or any other matter contained therein. 
Consequently, since these papers were not offered "to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted," they simply do not constitute hearsay. Saldana's creative 
claim in this regard fails for that obvious reason. Wyo.R.Evid. 801(c). The 
papers were evidence properly admitted at trial, and no error was committed by 
the court in receiving them.

[¶40]   Saldana's last claim of error obviously 
depends upon his success with respect to some of the other claims. We have 
resolved those other issues contrary to Saldana's argument. We still consider 
the question whether the admissible evidence presented at trial, viewed 
collectively, was sufficient to sustain Saldana's conviction. The standard with 
respect to sufficiency of evidence is this court's assessment as to whether all 
of the evidence presented is "adequate to support a reasonable inference of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the finder of fact, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the state." Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Wyo. 
1990); Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133 (Wyo. 
1989); Washington v. 
State, 751 P.2d 384 (Wyo. 
1988). See Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104 (Wyo. 
1992) (citing Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758 (Wyo. 
1992)); Jennings v. 
State, 806 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 
1991); Kavanaugh v. State, 769 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 
1989); Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145 (Wyo. 
1986). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury in applying this 
rule, and our only duty is to determine if a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result the jury actually 
did. See Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 
1989); Corson v. State, 766 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 
1988); Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201 (Wyo. 
1980). We do not serve as a second jury involved in assessing factual matters 
that apply to the case at hand according to our own perspective. Neither can we 
weigh the evidence nor re-examine the credibility of witnesses. Kavanaugh; 
Johnston v. 
State, 747 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 
1987). The judgment and sentence of the trial court must be affirmed if the test 
just stated is met.

[¶41]   The offense of which Saldana was 
convicted is encompassed in Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(a) (1988). That statute 
provides, in pertinent part, that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance." At trial, the jury was instructed:

Instruction No. 6

The 
necessary elements of the crime of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance, * * *, are:

1. 
The crime occurred within the County of 
Goshen, 
State of Wyoming, on 
or about the date of March 2, 1989; 
and

2. 
That the defendant possessed cocaine, a Schedule II narcotic drug controlled 
substance;

3. 
That the defendant did so possess with a specific intent to deliver cocaine, a 
Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substance; and

4. 
That the defendant did so knowingly and intentionally.

If 
you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these 
elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty.

If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that 
each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the defendant guilty.

[¶42]   There is no dispute by Saldana that the 
package addressed to Torres was delivered on March 2, 1989, 
nor that it contained cocaine. The only factual issue here before the jury is 
whether Saldana possessed the substance knowingly with an intent to deliver. The 
State's position is that, acknowledging the lack of actual possession on the 
part of Saldana, Saldana had constructive possession of the controlled 
substance, as that has generally been defined. The State contends this 
circumstance is sufficient to establish that element. The instruction given to 
the jury on this issue was:

Instruction No. 7

The 
law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive 
possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at 
a given time, is then in actual possession of it.

A 
person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and 
the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, 
either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive 
possession of it.

The 
law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone 
has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or 
more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is 
joint. You may find that the element of possession as that term is used in these 
instructions is present if you find beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
had actual or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with 
others.

An 
act or a failure to act is "knowingly" done, if done voluntarily and 
intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent 
reason.

[¶43]   The State's position is correct that 
constructive possession is sufficient to meet the possession requirement in 
Wyoming 
controlled substance cases. The element of possession, in this instance 
constructive possession, may be established by circumstantial evidence. Wise v. 
State, 654 P.2d 116 (Wyo. 
1982). See Deluna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 
1972). Constructive possession is deemed present if the person charged as 
possessor has sufficient control over the party with actual possession that the 
illicit goods would be forthcoming at his command. As that concept was stated in 
Wise, 654 P.2d at 119:

If a 
defendant is sufficiently associated with the persons having physical custody so 
that he is able, without difficulty to cause the drug to be produced for a 
customer, he can also be found by a jury to have dominion and control over the 
drug and, therefore, possession.

[¶44]   In the trial in this case, the evidence 
presented to the jury was that Torres was an unemployed laborer temporarily 
residing in Saldana's basement. It appears from the record that, even though the 
package was addressed to him, he had no knowledge of the contents of the package 
in its unopened condition. Perhaps more importantly, the record demonstrates 
that Saldana went downstairs and brought the package back upstairs when he was 
requested to do so by Arter, posing as the delivery man. Under these 
circumstances, the reasonable jury certainly is entitled to infer constructive 
possession of the controlled substance. Since such a finding is both rational 
and plausible, it should not be disturbed.

[¶45]   Turning to the element of the intent to 
deliver, the jury was provided evidence, again circumstantial, with respect to 
Saldana's connection with previously convicted drug dealers. Those individuals 
happened to be his brothers. There also was submitted admissible evidence that 
the quantity and purity of the cocaine in question was such that it would not be 
likely a possessor would have acquired it for personal use. Circumstantial 
evidence, which is "proof of facts and circumstances from which the main fact to 
be proved reasonably follows according to common experience of mankind," is 
sufficient to establish the elements of a crime. Murray v. 
State, 671 P.2d 320, 328 (Wyo. 
1983); Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 
1978). Cf. Jozen v. State, 746 P.2d 1279 (Wyo. 
1987) (holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct 
evidence in criminal prosecution). As was true with respect to the element of 
possession, the jury in this instance would be entitled to infer the intent to 
deliver based upon this evidence. We should not, nor will we, overrule its 
findings. 

[¶46]   In summation, after analyzing all of 
the issues presented in this appeal, we conclude: Saldana was not denied the 
right to a jury trial because of statements that were admitted allegedly 
constituting comments on his guilt or because of testimony allegedly 
constituting comment on the credibility of witnesses; the admission of papers 
found in his personal dresser drawer did not violate his constitutional right to 
confrontation; his telephone records and other evidence derived therefrom were 
not seized in contravention of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4; and the same telephone 
records were not intercepted in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601 to -611 
(1987). We further determine that the admissible evidence presented at trial 
indeed is sufficient to sustain his conviction. The judgment and sentence of the 
trial court is affirmed.

MACY, 
C.J., files a specially concurring opinion.

GOLDEN, 
J., files a concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, 
J., Retired, files a dissenting opinion.

MACY, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

[¶47]   I write only to comment on the dicta in 
the majority opinion which states:

The 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming is 
virtually identical to that found in the federal constitution. Even though the 
federal law establishes minimum requirements for individual protection and does 
not mandate any maximum criteria as to the degree of protection afforded an 
individual under state law, federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are 
regarded as persuasive and this court adheres to them closely absent some 
contrary direction from the legislature of the State of Wyoming.

(Citations omitted.) I do not concur with the idea that in 
the future we will blindly follow the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when we 
interpret the Wyoming Constitution.

GOLDEN, 
Justice, concurring.

[¶48]   I concur in the majority opinion ably 
written by Justice Thomas. I write separately to recite my observations about 
independent state constitutional analysis, since that topic appears as the 
centerpiece of the dissenting opinion.

[¶49]   Appellant promised in his appellate 
brief to show that his telephone records and the derivative evidence were seized 
in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4.1 He described 
this seized evidence as being the "linchpin of the state's case" against him. 
Unfortunately, his brief and argument did not fulfill the promise. He cited King 
v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 959 (Wyo. 
1989), for the proposition that Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 affords protection of 
persons from unreasonable governmental intrusion into legitimate privacy 
expectations. He also cited Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring), a Fourth 
Amendment case, for the same proposition. King was also a Fourth Amendment 
decision, not a decision based on Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4. King, 780 P.2d  at 
959-61. The state constitutional law argument goes downhill from there; to be 
accurate, there is no discernible state constitutional law argument in 
appellant's brief.

[¶50]   Appellant urges us to adopt the 
reasoning in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), a leading case 
holding that the Washington Constitution's analogue to the Federal 
Constitution's Fourth Amendment provides greater protection than the Fourth 
Amendment for the privacy of telephone records. He asks us, therefore, to hold 
that the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal 
Constitution for his privacy interests. The problem is that appellant must do 
much more than ask; he must show. That also is the problem of the dissenting 
opinion. In its zealous rush to take the majority to task for following federal 
law on the search and seizure issue, it has overlooked cardinal principles of 
appellate judicial process and state constitutional law.

[¶51]   In countless decisions this court has 
warned litigants "[i]n the presentation of an appeal to our court, it is 
inadequate simply to allude to an issue or identify only a potential issue." 
Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wyo. 
1988). Further, we have reminded litigants:

[I]t 
is not the function of this court to frame appellant's argument or draw his 
issues for him.

This 
court consistently has refused to consider positions which are not supported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority. We are not required to consider on 
appeal grounds which were neither presented to * * * nor passed upon [by the 
trial court].

Hance v. Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Wyo. 
1986) (citations omitted).

[¶52]   Appellant identifies the potential 
state constitutional issue but fails to support his claim by cogent argument or 
pertinent authority. This court may not frame and make his argument for him. 
Having found Gunwall, appellant needed to recognize that the Washington Supreme 
Court analyzed the issue on state constitutional law grounds only because 
appellant had squarely raised, briefed, and argued the issue on those grounds. 
The court set out a list of useful "non-exclusive neutral criteria" 
which

are 
relevant in determining whether, in a given situation, the Washington State 
Constitution should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens 
than the United States Constitution: (1) the textual language; (2) the 
differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; 
(5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local 
concern.

Gunwall, 720 P.2d  at 811. I recommend this analytical 
technique to our practicing bar.2

[¶53]   In the case at hand, appellant used 
neither the Gunwall analytical technique nor any other analytical technique 
appropriate to brief and present a state constitutional law argument. The 
Washington Supreme Court handles such failures swiftly and surely, as we should 
also. In refusing to consider the issue, that court colorfully expressed its 
position when it said:

As 
expressed by the Eighth Circuit, "Naked castings into the constitutional sea are 
not sufficient to command judicial consideration and discussion." 
United States v. 
Phillips, 433 F.2d 1364, 1366 (8th Cir. 1970).

In 
re Request of Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 717 P.2d 1353, 1359 (1986).

Litigants would do well to remember:

Recourse to our state constitution as an independent source 
for recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens must spring 
not from pure intuition, but from a process that is at once articulable, 
reasonable and reasoned.

Gunwall, 720 P.2d  at 813.

[¶54]   Justice Robert F. Utter of the 
Washington Supreme Court is one of the leaders in the effort to foster and 
promote the development of state constitutional law.3 Speaking for 
his court in a case in which the appellant had perfunctorily raised but not 
briefed the issue whether the self-incrimination provision of the Washington 
Constitution conferred a right to Miranda like warnings, Justice Utter 
said:

By 
failing to discuss at a minimum the six criteria mentioned in Gunwall, he 
requests us to develop without benefit of argument or citation of authority the 
"adequate and independent state grounds" to support his assertions. See 
Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). We decline to do so consistent 
with our policy not to consider matters neither timely nor sufficiently argued 
by the parties. In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353 
(1986).

State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 755 P.2d 797, 800-01 
(1988).

[¶55]   Most state appellate courts exercise 
similar judicial restraint in this important area. Justice Utter observes that 
"[a]lmost 80% of the state supreme court justices responding to a recent survey 
indicated that their court would decline to hear a state constitutional claim if 
the litigant failed to raise the claim below."4 Illustrative 
of this restraint are decisions from Vermont, 
Wisconsin, 
and Utah. In 
Vermont the 
court refused to consider an illegal stop and arrest claim under the Vermont 
Constitution, stating:

The 
state constitutional issue has been squarely raised, but neither party has 
presented any substantive analysis or argument on this issue. This constitutes 
inadequate briefing, and we decline to address the state constitutional question 
on the basis of the record now before this court.

State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 
221, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (1985) (citation omitted).

[¶56]   Justice Judith S. Kaye of the New York 
Court of Appeals, also a leader in this movement, agrees with that said in 
Jewett:

A 
grudging parallel citation to a state constitution, or an argument that the 
state particularly values the rights of its citizens, in a brief devoted to 
federal law does nothing to aid in the development of state jurisprudence, so 
that everyone can know from reading a particular state court's decisions what 
factors would impel that court to decide one way or the other. Only by the 
customary process of research and reasoning can there be principled development 
of a body of state constitutional law that does not seek merely to sidestep 
review by the United states 
Supreme Court in isolated cases but one that truly supports the state 
constitution, as state court judges and lawyers are charged to do.

Judith S. Kaye, A Mid-Point Perspective on Directions in 
State Constitutional Law, 1 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 17, 24 
(1988).

[¶57]   In Wisconsin, Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson, also a well-recognized leader in state constitutional law issues,5 wrote for the court in State v. Pitsch, 124 
Wis.2d 628, 369 N.W.2d 711, 721 (1985), in deciding an issue of claimed 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. She correctly observed that when the 
litigants present and argue a claim only under the Federal Constitution, the 
court must apply federal law in analyzing the claim. Pitsch, 369 N.W.2d  at 718. 
Because the litigants failed to develop the claim under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, the court properly declined to consider it on state constitutional 
grounds. Pitsch, 369 N.W.2d  at 721.

[¶58]   In Utah, 
another leader in this area, Justice Christine Durham, wrote for the court on a 
search and seizure question.6 As had Justice Abrahamson in Pitsch, Justice 
Durham correctly noted that since the litigants had argued the claim on only 
Fourth Amendment grounds, not relying on the Utah Constitution's analogue, the 
court had no choice but to consider the claim only under federal law. State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 
1986). She pointedly wrote:

We 
have not considered separate state constitutional standards, even though we are 
aware that other states are relying with increasing frequency on an analysis of 
the provisions of their own constitutions to expand constitutional protection 
beyond that mandated by the United States Supreme Court. * * * Since it was not 
raised here, we do not treat that question. We note, however, that despite our 
willingness to independently interpret Utah's 
Constitution in other areas of the law, the analysis of state constitutional 
issues in criminal appeals continues to be ignored. It is imperative that 
Utah 
lawyers brief this court on relevant state constitutional questions. 
See 
State v. 
Hygh, 
Utah, 
711 P.2d 264 (1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). We cite with approval the 
summary of scholarly commentary and analytical technique set forth by the 
Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Jewett, Vt. [146 Vt. 221], 500 A.2d 233 
(1985).

Earl, 716 P.2d  at 805-06 (citations omitted). Accord, State 
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 and accompanying text (Utah 
1988).

[¶59]   The Wyoming Supreme Court continues to 
be willing to independently interpret the provisions of the Wyoming 
Constitution. But it is imperative that Wyoming 
lawyers properly brief this court on relevant state constitutional questions. 
See, e.g., Dworkin v. LFP. Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992), in which we (1) 
provided the practicing bar with a comprehensive bibliography on the subject of 
interpretation of state constitutions, and (2) informed the Bar that it must use 
a precise and analytically sound approach and provide us with the proper 
arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth of this important area of the 
law. That was not done here; therefore, the majority quite properly exercised 
restraint, as counseled by Justices Abrahamson, Durham, 
Kaye, and Utter, and declined to consider the claim on state constitutional 
grounds. Recourse to the Wyoming Constitution as an independent source for 
recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens must spring 
from a process that is articulable, reasonable, and reasoned. Gunwall, 720 P.2d  
at 813. We look forward to developing and applying such a process.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice, Retired, dissenting.

[¶60]   What this decision determines is that 
Wyoming 
citizens have no judicially enforced protection from the surreptitious 
acquisition of, and disclosure of: to whom and from whom telephone calls are 
made. The warrantless use of pen registers and dialed number recorders is 
legitimatized despite the desired privacy interests of the telephone 
user.

[¶61]   This decision also determines that the 
provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, which secure a right of privacy and 
place limitations on search and seizures, provide no significant additional 
protection to our citizens. Instead, the court accepts a "lockstep" application 
which limits the protection of the state constitution to that which is decreed, 
from case-to-case, by the United States Supreme Court in analysis of our federal 
constitution.

I. 
INTRODUCTION

[¶62]   What is the significance of the Wyoming 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights with thirty-six individual provisions stated 
in Wyo. Const. art. 1? I contemplate, without pleasure, that this decision to 
adopt federal constitution "lockstep" mandates an answer of essentially nothing. 
I strongly reject the outdated and uninformed conclusion enveloped by the 
concept that gives the Wyoming 
constitutional guarantees only the equivalent rights established by the 
transigent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in applying the Bill of 
Rights found in the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution. The 
subject I particularly address in this dissent is frequently called either 
independent application of the state constitution or, conversely, 
"lockstep."

[¶63]   This appeal presents 
constitutionally-involved search and seizure questions. The decisive answer is 
which constitution? In this case, this court, by almost slight of hand, abandons 
our heritage of an independent analysis and application of our own constitution. 
We have removed our former protections from the meandering and the week-by-week 
changes of the United States Supreme Court which has embarked upon an 
accelerated direction to reduce, remove or differentiate the protection of 
people's rights from government. These were the rights created in solemn concern 
by the founders of this nation and written into the United States Constitution 
as the Bill of Rights by the first ten amendments. More importantly, these are 
the rights explicitly designed into this state's Constitution upon adoption a 
century ago. We do not here honor our responsibility to support, obey and 
defend, Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 20, by joining in the present major judicial trend 
for state courts to independently apply guarantees of rights enunciated in the 
individual state constitutions, some of which predate the United States 
Constitution. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977); Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Matthew 
O. Tobriner Memorial Lecture. Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More 
Perfect Union, 18 
Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 723 (1991); Ann Althouse, Tapping The State Court Resource, 44 
Vand.L.Rev. 953 (1991); Ken Gormley, Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Review, 1990. Foreword: A New Constitutional Vigor for the 
Nation's Oldest Court, 64 Temp.L.Rev. 215 (1991).

[¶64]   It is stated in one comprehensive legal 
article: "From 1970 to 1984, state courts handed down over 250 opinions holding 
that state constitutional protection of individual liberties was greater than 
that afforded by their federal counterparts." Foster A. Stewart, Jr., Comment, 
The Role of New Federalism in Pennsylvania: 
Does United States 
Supreme Court Precedent Have Any Weight?, 30 Duq.L.Rev. 707, 709-10 (1992) 
(citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival 
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N YU.L.Rev. 535, 
548 (1986)). That number of state constitution-directed decisions has clearly 
arithmetically accelerated since the 1984 observation. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, 
Foreword, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 Rutgers 
L.J. 881 (1989); Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1989, 21 Rutgers L.J. 
903 (1990); Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1990, 22 Rutgers L.J. 887 
(1991); and Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1991, 23 Rutgers L.J. 789 
(1992), each of which detail developments in state constitutional law during the 
prior year and recognize the increased utilization of state constitutional 
provisions for decisions. Included in the authoritative comments of Professor 
Robert F. Williams are the words of J. Bryce, The American Commonwealth 434 
(Rev. 2nd ed. 1891): "[S]tate constitutions are a `mine of instruction for the 
natural history of democratic communities.'" Robert F. Williams, Introduction, 
22 Rutgers 
L.J. 815, 816 (1991).

[¶65]   We should have taken heed in this 
decision of "a tale of two states." Compare Oregon's 
law with what Wyoming is 
now directed to be by this majority opinion. Compare also James A. Gardner, The 
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich.L.Rev. 761 (1992) with 
David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 Mich.L.Rev. 274 
(1992). Professor Schuman indicates that Professor Gardner, considering where 
Wyoming is 
directed, finds "`[u]seful tidbits' of constitutional history and philosophy 
from the state jurists - is either thin, incoherent, derivative, or 
non-existent." Schuman, supra, 91 Mich.L.Rev. at 274 (quoting Gardner, supra, 90 
Mich.L.Rev. at 764-66). As Professor Schuman responds, "[t]he moral of Professor 
Gardner's story is that state constitutional discourse is impoverished." 
Schuman, supra, 91 Mich.L.Rev. at 274. Professor Schuman recognizes as an 
alternative:

Professor Gardner accurately depicts the depressed 
condition of state constitutional discourse in many jurisdictions. From that 
perfectly reasonable premise, he moves to an argument that state courts should 
abandon their attempts to improve it because that endeavor is inherently 
impossible and, in any event, undesirably schismatic. This argument ultimately 
fails, because he provides no convincing evidence that the development of 
sophisticated and vigorous state constitutional law is either impossible or 
unwise. By contrast, Oregon, as 
just one example, has shown that a state can develop a sophisticated independent 
constitutional culture without any noticeable threat to national 
values.

Id. at 
280.

[¶66]   I refuse to accept that condition of 
permanent judicial failure for Wyoming. I 
also refuse to accept any present judicial amendment of the text of the Wyoming 
constitutional provisions in Article I establishing our state Bill of Rights by 
the action of five, six or seven members of the United States Supreme Court 
whose allegiance to state decisions is only as embracing as their capacity to 
gain a majority to limit explicitly, or subvert implicitly, constitutional 
guarantees under the United States Constitution. What they do is beyond control 
of any Wyoming 
citizen, but what we do with the Wyoming Constitution remains our solemn oath, 
which, for a jurist, nothing can be more sacred.

[¶67]   The developed literature is near 
unending since Justice William A. Brennan, Jr. enunciated his classical 
federalist concept asking for independent state constitutional application in 
Brennan, supra, 90 Harv. L.Rev. 489 about sixteen years ago. Much will be 
explored in this dissent about this court's present analysis and decision which 
will undoubtedly come to be one of its major actions during this century. At 
least that will be true as long as "lockstep" lasts into the future which is 
directly contrary to our independent history of the past century. To be 
addressed first will be the substantive appellate issues and then the 
preclusively important concern about what, in bitter analysis, is frequently 
characterized to be "lockstep" constitutional adjudication.

[¶68]   May it suffice in introduction to 
repeat the analysis of "lockstep" enunciated within a most difficult case 
involving the rape of a fifteen year old girl who requested an abortion, which 
was discriminatorily denied because of indigency. The Michigan 
court spoke thoughtfully in review:

The 
Bill of Rights, major portions of which are made applicable to the states by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, is derived from state constitutional 
provisions which predate the adoption of the federal constitution. As the court 
said in People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975):

"It 
is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually 
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal 
counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based 
upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than 
the reverse. `By the end of the Revolutionary period, the concept of a Bill of 
Rights had been fully developed in the American system. Eleven of the 13 states 
(and Vermont as 
well) had enacted Constitutions to fill in the political gap caused by the 
overthrow of British authority. * * * Eight of the Revolutionary Constitutions 
were prefaced by Bills of Rights, while four contained guarantees of many of the 
most important individual rights in the body of their texts. Included in these 
Revolutionary constitutional provisions were all of the rights that were to be 
protected in the federal Bill of Rights. By the time of the Treaty of Paris 
(1783) then, the American inventory of individual rights had been virtually 
completed and included in the different state Constitutions whether in separate 
Bills of Rights or the organic texts themselves.' (Italics added.) (1 Schwartz, 
The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History (1971) p 383; see generally 2 id., p 
1204.) . . .

"We 
need not further extend this opinion to trace to their remote origins the 
historical roots of state constitutional provisions. Yet we have no doubt that 
such inquiry would confirm our view of the matter. The federal Constitution was 
designed to guard the states as sovereignties against potential abuses of 
centralized government; state charters, however, were conceived as the first and 
at one time the only line of protection of the individual against the excesses 
of local officials."

Doe 
v. Director of Dept. of Social Services, 187 Mich. 
App. 493, 468 N.W.2d 862, 870-71 (1991). Doe was reversed on further review by 
the Michigan Supreme Court on a state constitutional examination. Doe v. 
Department of Social Services, 439 Mich. 
650, 487 N.W.2d 166 (1992).

[¶69]   I emphatically, specifically, and 
totally reject the majority dicta which is overtly intended to bring 
Wyoming 
into "lockstep" with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. I would 
follow California, 
Oregon, 
Michigan, 
the persuasive historical Wyoming 
precedent, and many, if not most, of the states. I do not now, nor will I ever, 
accept any part of the following statements in the majority opinion:

The 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming is 
virtually identical to that found in the federal constitution. * * * Even though 
the federal law establishes minimum requirements for individual protection and 
does not mandate any maximum criteria as to the degree of protection afforded an 
individual under state law, federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are 
regarded as persuasive and this court adheres to them closely absent some 
contrary direction from the legislature of the State of Wyoming.

* * 
* * * *

Under the Tenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the freedom of the state to provide greater expectations of 
privacy for its citizens than those provided under the federal constitution is 
guaranteed if, in either its legislative or judicial discretion, it deems it 
necessary or appropriate to do so. * * * Increased protection could be afforded 
to Wyoming 
citizens. It is our conclusion, however, that the substantial identity of the 
constitutional provisions involved does not suggest, nor do we perceive it 
appropriate in this instance to recognize, any increased protection as being 
afforded by our state constitution.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶70]   What this will mean is that the 
Wyoming 
decisions are displaced and the Wyoming Constitution is amended by cases 
politically postured by the United States Supreme Court because 
Wyoming 
jurists do not give substance to the Wyoming Constitution. Unfortunately, this 
case serves to demonstrate how vigorous attacks on crime mutated to a war on 
drugs and corrupted into a war against our constitutional Bill of Rights. This 
result is epitomized by the inevitably valid ancient axiom: "The road to hell is 
paved with good intentions." Likewise, I do not accept a recently expressed 
restatement that intentions are immaterial if the results are socially 
acceptable. This concept sounds strikingly similar to result-oriented 
adjudication where it is first determined how the case can suit perceptions of 
contemporary desires and then analysis is used to fit fact and precedential 
logic into some after-the-fact justification for a predetermined 
answer.

II. 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL

A. 
Right to Privacy - Wire Tapping - Warrantless Search

[¶71]   Appellant designated six issues in his 
extended appellate brief. In reality, guilt was proved by three questionable 
evidentiary developments. First was the use of federal resources to obtain 
telephone records contrary to the protection provided by state law. This was 
followed by the drug investigator's testimony, stated as expert witness opinion, 
which was directed to authenticate appellant's guilt. Third is the questionable 
use of hearsay documents.

[¶72]   The conviction can only be affirmed by 
justification of each of these elements as conjunctively used to prove guilt. I 
agree with the majority's conceptualization of none of them. Unfortunately, at 
this juncture, neither time nor space justifies exhaustive research in this case 
to state why I disagree in all three parts of the affirming decision, except for 
the one that created the carrier for the dictum statement of limited state 
constitutional right application (lockstep). That issue is the acquisition by 
federal administrative subpoena of telephone call records and the subsequent use 
of the recording in the state court prosecution as evidence of 
guilt.

[¶73]   It is important to recognize that 
Wyoming 
provides no prosecutorial or investigative agency right to supersede rights to 
privacy with administrative subpoenas. We should judicially notice that this has 
been a principal legislative effort of the Attorney General's office and the 
state prosecutors for a number of sessions. The effort has, to this date, 
uniformly been rejected by the Wyoming State Legislature. In this case, lacking 
any legislatively approved right to gain access to these records from telephone 
companies in this state, the state drug agent used the federal authorities to 
acquire the documentary information by processes authorized in federal law, but 
not available in state statutes. There is nothing subversive about interagency 
co-operation. The issue is admissibility of evidence not legally obtained under 
state law.1 

[¶74]   What we have here are documents 
acquired in contravention of explicit decisions of the Wyoming State Legislature 
and then used as evidence in the state courts by a "gift" from federal 
authorities. Stated otherwise, what we have here are documents acquired in a 
fashion not permitted by either Wyoming 
statutes or our state constitution when a state agency used a federal 
subpoena.2

[¶75]   In regard to the telephone calls, we 
are not faced so much with right to privacy concerns. Today's unfortunate 
reality is that anyone in business or government who does not assume his or her 
telephone calls may be intercepted or checked is naive. The vice in this case is 
admission into evidence of what is clearly obtained without right under state 
law. This generally presents the "which is the biggest problem" syllogism or 
whether "the end always justifies the means." In this case, in open court, the 
state drug agent admitted that no authority in state law existed for the 
acquisition he undertook; so, he used federal sources. Categorically stated, for 
the state court prosecution, this constituted illegally obtained 
evidence.

[¶76]   What I particularly dislike is this 
court's blase acceptance that telephone call interception, without following our 
state laws, is socially acceptable and legally proper where it is decided the 
end will justify the means. My reasoned anticipation of what is occurring does 
not lead to acceptance that constitutional or statutory prohibitions and 
preclusions are administratively repealed and rescinded by a course of conduct 
of agents of the federal government. With that predicate, I address the 
majority's differentiation of telephone user identification as acceptable while 
what may be said (probably also intercepted with regularity) limits the sweep of 
the anti-wire tap - get a search warrant on probable cause - Wyoming 
statute.

B. 
Wire Tapping - Pen Register - Wyoming 
Statute

[¶77]   We need to look at this entire statute, 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-610; 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 121; 1987 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 157, for proper construction. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
Wyoming 
State Bd. 
of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 
1991). I would suggest nothing, within the plain meaning and clear purpose of 
the comprehensive statute, provides support for this majority's interpretive 
application that where the statute says it is the only way, another way is 
through the use of federal resources and their administrative subpoena. 
Additionally, the majority contemplates facts clearly not in evidence within 
this record, although perhaps adaptable from judicial notice resources. Cf. Monn 
v. State, 811 P.2d 1004 (Wyo. 
1991). What on one occasion is stridently and divisively criticized is, on the 
next case, utilized in adjudicatorial response. This is the case with judicial 
notice. See Eisenbarth v. Hartford First Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 945 
(Wyo. 
1992).

[¶78]   There is really no dispute about the 
absence of any right under state law for law enforcement personnel to obtain 
administrative subpoena information in the fashion portrayed here. This is the 
reason for the state drug agent using the federal authorities. The fact of 
acquisition, contrary to state law, hardly makes the information admissible. It 
is unquestioned in this record that no effort was made by the state 
investigative authorities to comply with the authorizing processes provided in 
the state wiretap statutes, Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-602, 7-3-605, and 7-3-606. Those 
statutes stated:

(a) 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person shall 
willfully:

(i) 
Intercept any wire or oral communication;

(ii) 
Disclose to another person the contents of any wire or oral communication, 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this 
section;

(iii) Use the contents of any wire or oral communication 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this 
section.

(b) 
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section prohibits:

* * 
* * * *

(v) 
A peace officer from intercepting, using or disclosing to another peace officer 
in the course of his official duties any wire or oral communication pursuant to 
an order permitting the interception under this act[.]

Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-3-602.

(a) 
The governor, the attorney general or the district attorney within whose 
jurisdiction the order is sought in conjunction with the attorney general may 
authorize an application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for an order 
authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications by the Wyoming 
division of criminal investigation or any law enforcement agency of the state 
having responsibility for investigation of the offense for which the application 
is made, if the interception may provide evidence of an attempt to commit, 
conspiracy to commit, solicitation to commit or the commission of any of the 
following felony offenses or comparable crimes in any other 
jurisdiction:

(i) 
Violations of the Wyoming 
Controlled Substances Act of 1971[.]

Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-3-605.

(a) 
Each authorized application for an order permitting the interception of wire and 
oral communications shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge 
and shall state the applicant's authority under W.S. 7-3-605(a) to make the 
application. Each application shall include the following 
information:

(i) 
The identity of the peace officer;

(ii) 
A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the 
applicant to justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including:

(A) 
Specific facts concerning the particular offense that is being 
investigated;

(B) 
A particular description of the nature and location of the equipment from which, 
or the place where, the communication is to be intercepted;

(C) 
A particular description of the type of communication sought to be 
intercepted;

(D) 
The identity of the person or persons, if known, who are suspected of committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted.

(iii) A complete statement as to whether or not other 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed or too dangerous;

(iv) 
A statement of the required duration of the interception. If the nature of the 
investigation will require that the interception not automatically terminate 
when the described type of communication has been first obtained, the 
application shall state facts sufficient to establish probable cause to believe 
that additional communications of the same type will occur after the initial 
interception;

(v) 
A full and complete statement by the applicant concerning all previous 
applications known to have been made to any judge:

(A) 
For permission to intercept wire or oral communications involving any of the 
same persons, equipment or places specified in the application; and

(B) 
Action by the judges on each previous application.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-3-606.

C. 
Smith v. Maryland 
Where "Lockstep" in Privacy Begins

[¶79]   The majority builds its expostulation 
as to why unlisted numbers, which admittedly were not available to investigating 
officers in Wyoming, should be admissible evidence when acquired through federal 
resources by reliance on Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). Smith was a pen register case which set a federal standard 
seldom followed in state courts and never in the context of conspiratorial or 
conjunctive efforts as is the evidence here. Additionally, it must be recognized 
that the pen register discussion of Smith did not account for explicit statutory 
provisions relating to "information concerning the identity of the parties 
participating in the communication * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(iii). 
Explicitly, the Wyoming legislature intended to reject the pen register concept 
by enactment of 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 121 and also carefully continued that 
thesis into the last amendment provided by 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
118.

[¶80]   It belies reason to utilize a pen 
register case where the equipment itself is illegal, except in certain context: 
when the manufacture, assembly, possession or offer for sale is a felony, Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-3-603; where intercept means the "aural acquisition of the contents", 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(v); and where contents include "information concerning 
the identity of the parties participating * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 
7-3-601(a)(iii).3 If the thesis with which we are presented in 
the "lockstep" approach is to attribute to the Wyoming Constitution a confined 
attribute, unless the legislature adopts an expansive view, then the application 
of a case such as Smith in the face of the explicit Wyoming 
statute is a total non sequitur.

Just 
as one who enters a public telephone booth is "entitled to assume that the words 
he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world," Katz v. 
United States, [389 U.S. 347, 352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)], so 
too, he should be entitled to assume that the numbers he dials in the privacy of 
his home will be recorded, if at all, solely for the phone company's business 
purposes.

Smith, 442 U.S.  at 
752, 99 S. Ct.  at 2586, Marshall, J., dissenting.

[¶81]   We start this examination with the 
contention of the State, true or false as it may actually have been, that there 
was no way under state law that law enforcement could acquire the information 
desired by some probable cause, judicially issued, warrant; and consequently, 
that resort to federal administrative subpoena was justified. This contemplates 
an examination of a reverse "silver platter doctrine" concept.

[¶82]   Following that examination, we are then 
faced with the inquiry of whether identification, e.g., pen register or 
something else as in this case, does not constitute a search since it only 
breaches privacy by providing identification of the caller's telephone number or 
the recipient's telephone number. Consequently, the identification provides 
information locating the calling or called party's name and address.

[¶83]   Finally, the weighty question, under 
the structure of the majority's accommodative dictum, is whether the privacy 
rights of Wyoming citizens, as guaranteed through our constitution with its 
preclusion against unreasonable searches and seizures, should be limited by 
federal case law, albeit United States Supreme Court or otherwise. Essentially, 
what all of this means is an advance determination that either congressional 
action or United States Supreme Court decisions will always limit the protection 
guaranteed in the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶84]   The majority opinion has included an 
impressive lineage of United States Supreme Court decisions, apparently, to 
authenticate that there is no right of privacy in your telephone number or the 
usage that you make from it under the prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4. We can classify those cases with some 
degree of realism by finding they have no persuasive relevance. We should then 
look, in fresh perspective, at the 1992 controlling philosophy involved in 
independent constitutional application of a state supreme court and the state's 
independently applied guarantees of rights within the state 
constitution.

[¶85]   I need not, in the sense of accuracy 
and completeness, pursue the issue of what constitutes probable cause under the 
pen register, court order requirement statutes or, for that matter, the federal 
law since the legislature of this state has not seen fit to authenticate that 
addition to the Wyoming broadly confining and carefully detailed right to 
privacy act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-610; 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
121. See Richardson v. 
State, 821 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.), judgment vacated in part, 824 S.W.2d 585 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1992). It should not be ignored that very specific reporting 
requirements exist, not only to the state attorney general, Wyo. Stat. § 
7-3-608, but also by the attorney general and state courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2519; Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-611.

[¶86]   The federal statute provides a 
requirement of thirty days after the expiration of an order or denial that the 
issuing judge report to the administrative office of the United States Court in 
significant detail. In these cases, we face the constitutional interest of the 
sanctity and privacy of home. Consequently, close judicial scrutiny should be 
exercised. United States v. 
Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf. People v. Yanez, 178 A.D.2d 357, 
577 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1991). Inevitably, the federal statutory requirements 
represent the minimum constitutional criteria for electronic surveillance and 
does not preclude Wyoming 
from enacting more stringent standards. See People v. Otto, 2 Cal. 4th 1088, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 831 P.2d 1178, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 414, 121 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1992) (holding in a murder case, improper wire tapping of telephone 
calls between the victim's wife and her lover, recorded by the victim before his 
death, required reversal for suppression).

D. 
No Issue of Retroactivity

[¶87]   As it happens, the Communications 
Privacy Act, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 121, had an automatic expiration date of 
July 
1, 1989. 
That automatic repealer was revoked by 1989 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 118, which provided a termination date effective July 
1, 1995. 
The difference in terminology is not really significant to the issues presented 
here and the actual issue is diminutive since the 1989 re-enactment provided an 
effective date of June 8, 1989, 
which was subsequent to the investigation in which the federally obtained 
evidence was acquired to provide the subject of this appeal. I do not seek to 
apply the 1989 statute retroactively. Without characterizations to be 
adjudicatorily expansive or not, a difference in justification for the invasion 
of privacy, cannot be found, in my opinion, from the general difference in the 
two enactments or the change from "aural or wire communication" to "aural, wire 
or electronic communication." We do not have a fiber optics or microwave issue, 
which might explain the changes addressed by the 1989 enactment. Obviously, 
something was occurring which denigrated the philosophy of the 1985 act and 
required supplementation in the terminology of the 1989 provisions. The pen 
register cases, e.g. Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct.  at 2577, which became the 
modus vivendi of the pen register legitimizing cases, could not find a 
differentiation, in either Wyoming enactment, which equally addresses 
"information concerning the identity of the parties participating in the 
communication * * *." The 1989 enactment neither legitimized pen registers nor 
additionally addressed their illegitimacy under the law.

E. 
"Silver Platter" is Back in Reverse

[¶88]   In addition to the affixation on 
Wyoming law 
of the discredited and discarded non-sequitur that pen register and telephone 
usage recording equipment does not invade a protected interest of privacy, this 
court now resurrects the discarded and degenerative "silver platter" idiom to 
justify usage of evidence illegally obtained. For state courts, the name case 
resolution came in People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d 232, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947 (1967), now twenty-six years in discard, and in a series of United States 
Supreme Court examinations of the interjection of evidence illegally obtained by 
state authorities for use in federal court prosecutions. We have this 
longdiscarded, philosophically disindigenous, "silver-platter" doctrine 
resurrected, in a reverse fashion, for Wyoming 
criminal procedures. Evidence illegally obtained under the confines of 
Wyoming 
rules, statutes and constitution, surreptitiously secured by the conspiratorial 
activities of federal officialdom is sanitized for introduction in our courts. 
In Kelley, 57 Cal. Rptr.  at 378, 424 P.2d  at 962, a confession which was perhaps lawful under 
military law was deemed inadmissible where not in compliance with 
California 
judicial requirements. That court said: "In other words the `silver platter' 
doctrine is not here applicable." Id. The 
California Supreme Court restated the subject in 1992 where wire taping was 
conducted contrary to law and protection of privacy required suppression, even 
though the government was the innocent recipient of the evidence rather than the 
procurer. Otto, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 831 P.2d 1178. Telephone conversations 
between the murder victim's wife and her lover, recorded by the victim in 
violation of state law, were not admissible in the wife's murder 
trial.

[¶89]   It would have seemed that the whole 
ignoble thesis of "silver platter" had been exculpated from the law decades ago. 
Lustig v. United States, 
338 U.S. 74, 
79, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 1374, 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949); Gambino v. 
United States, 
275 U.S. 310, 48 S. Ct. 137, 72 L. Ed. 293 (1927). Within the operational facts of this 
present decision, "silver platter" evidentiary usage reappears for a 
jurisdictional forum shopping justifying the use of evidence unconstitutionally 
secured. It has perhaps been so long that "silver platter" is not even 
accurately defined by a new crop of politicized jurists in the federal venue. 
United States v. 
Queen, 732 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (W.D.N.C. 1990). Cf. United States v. 
Freeman, 897 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990) and United States v. 
Comstock, 805 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022, 107 S. Ct. 1908, 95 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1987) with Navarro v. 
United States, 
400 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1968), all of which would use evidence in federal courts 
arguably valid under federal evidentiary concepts. See, however, 
United States v. 
McKeever, 905 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 790, 112 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1991). Here, however, we have evidence 
which is not legal in state courts, but validated by retrieval from the federal 
system by processes not permitted under explicit Wyoming 
statutes. We subjugate Wyoming law 
and pollute the system by the subterfuge of alternative jurisdictional agency 
justified acquisition.

[¶90]   "Silver platter," as accurately 
identified for the state court systems by Kelley, 57 Cal. Rptr.  at 378, 424 P.2d  
at 962 in rejection, had a relatively short, but very abrupt, constitutional 
interment. The total lack of understanding, of the dysfunctional substance 
coming from the rejected alternative source to avoid illegality, is demonstrable 
from a footnote in a recent federal case, where the subject actually was not 
even governmental agency participation. In United States v. 
Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 850-51 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1988), the opinion writer footnoted 
his discussion by stating:

The 
so-called "silver platter doctrine" is not to the contrary. In some situations, 
evidence illegally obtained by state police cannot be used by federal officials. 
Gambino v. United States, 
275 U.S. 310, 48 S. Ct. 137, 72 L. Ed. 293 (1927). The evidence must be presented to 
federal officials on a silver platter by state authorities i.e., without any 
federal participation in the underlying illegal search or seizure, to be 
admissible in federal prosecutions. Lustig v. United States, 
338 U.S. 74, 
79, 69 S. Ct. 1372 [1374], 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949). We note that the rule vindicates 
core Fourth Amendment policy because state police are state actors and so their 
actions may independently violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments even if 
they are not viewed as instruments of the federal authorities.

[¶91]   The statement both totally 
misunderstands the concept of "silver platter" and abjectly misstates the 
substantive law. "Silver platter" does not refer to sanitation, it refers to bad 
evidence delivered as a "valued gift" on a "silver platter." "The `silver 
platter doctrine' operates on assumption that the illegality of the state 
seizure has been established. How it has been established is immaterial." Rios 
v. United States, 
256 F.2d 173, 177 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965, 79 S. Ct. 881, 3 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1959), vacated, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688 (1960). What Koenig, 856 F.2d 843 ignores in 
1988 is that Rios, written in 1958, and its brethren in protege, were totally 
rejected and dismembered by the United States Supreme Court. Rios v. 
United States, 
364 U.S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688 (1960); Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). See also, the predecessor, Weeks v. 
United States, 
232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).

[¶92]   The "silver platter" cases were founded 
as questions of federal law admittedly premised on more restrictive rules of 
admission in those courts than applied within the state court system. The 
subject and the substance remain appropriate for validating today's state court 
constitutional guarantees where both due process and Fourth Amendment 
protections have lost their protective facility in federal law and state courts 
have consequently been called to re-examine the concepts enunciated in state 
constitutions.

[¶93]   The initiating case, which stands as a 
bulwark against which broad based attacks of diminished protection are now being 
mounted by current decisional processes developing in federal law, was Weeks, 
232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341. The philosophic magnificence of Weeks reaches back 
to the earlier case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 
532, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886):

"The 
principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional 
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then 
before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all 
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and 
the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it 
is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his 
conviction of some public offense * * *."

Weeks, 232 U.S.  at 
391, 34 S. Ct.  at 343-44.

[¶94]   Weeks was then continued in the 
dispositive "silver-platter" case of Elkins, 364 U.S.  at 
209-10, 80 S.Ct. at 1439-40:

"The 
effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and 
Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under 
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and 
to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection 
reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it 
force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with 
the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws 
of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced 
confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to 
unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, 
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all 
times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions 
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental 
rights.

* * 
* * * *

"* * 
* The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to 
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of 
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have 
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." [Weeks], 232 U.S. 383, 391-393 [34 S. Ct. 341, 344].

[¶95]   Weeks further reminds us:

"Accordingly," says Lieber in his work on Civil Liberty and 
Self-Government, 62, in speaking of the English law in this respect, "no man's 
house can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away after it has 
thus been forced, except in cases of felony; and then the sheriff must be 
furnished with a warrant, and take great care lest he commit a trespass. This 
principle is jealously insisted upon."

Weeks, 232 U.S.  at 
343, 34 S. Ct.  at 343.

[¶96]   Case law, as it then developed in the 
United States Supreme Court through the intermediate stage of Gambino, 275 U.S. 310, 48 S. Ct. 137, would still not have countenanced what happened here since 
Gambino made the test one of police officer cooperation in a joint enterprise. 
The agency preclusion of Gambino certainly exists here: "that the rights 
guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments may be invaded as effectively by 
such cooperation as by the state officers acting under direction of the federal 
officials." Id. at 
316, 48 S. Ct.  at 138. This is the co-conspirator acquisition process which, of 
course, is identical in application to the usage in the present case of a 
federal process which avoids the more stringent requirements for evidentiary 
acquisition delineated for utilization by state law enforcement 
authorities.

[¶97]   Although Justice Frankfurter came to 
dissent in Elkins, 364 U.S.  at 233, 80 S. Ct.  at 1453, the predicate principal of 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949) also requires 
recognition and application. Wolf determined that evidence which was 
unconstitutionally obtained, under purview of the United States Constitution, 
was, by application of the due process clause, inadmissible in the state court 
proceedings. Enunciated in Wolf, 338 U.S.  at 
27-28, 69 S. Ct.  at 1361, to be fundamental interests by application of due 
process, Justice Frankfurter observed:

The 
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is 
at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society. It is 
therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable 
against the States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, 
whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law 
but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent 
history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights 
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of 
English-speaking peoples.

[¶98]   In Elkins, 364 U.S.  at 
215 n. 7, 80 S. Ct.  at 1443 n. 7, the author of the majority opinion, Justice 
Stewart, brought the subject into clear focus:

Long 
before the Court established that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the security 
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by state officers, Mr. Justice 
(then Judge) Cardozo perceived a basic incongruity in a rule which excludes 
evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officers, but admits in the same court 
evidence unlawfully obtained by state agents. "The Federal rule as it stands is 
either too strict or too lax. A Federal prosecutor may take no benefit from 
evidence collected through the trespass of a Federal officer. . . . He does not 
have to be so scrupulous about evidence brought to him by others. How finely the 
line is drawn is seen when we recall that marshals in the service of the nation 
are on one side of it, and police in the service of the States on the other. The 
nation may keep what the servants of the States supply. . . . We must go farther 
or not so far. The professed object of the trespass rather than the official 
character of the trespasser should test the rights of government. . . . A 
government would be disingenuous, if, in determining the use that should be made 
of evidence drawn from such a source, it drew a line between them. This would be 
true whether they had acted in concert or apart." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 
22-23, 150 N.E. 585, 588.

[¶99]   He wrote further in 
analysis:

For 
surely no distinction can logically be drawn between evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and that obtained in violation of the 
Fourteenth. The Constitution is flouted equally in either case. To the victim it 
matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent 
or by a state office. It would be a curiously ambivalent rule that would require 
the courts of the United States to 
differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence upon so arbitrary a 
basis. Such a distinction indeed would appear to reflect an indefensibly 
selective evaluation of the provisions of the Constitution. Moreover, it would 
seem logically impossible to justify a policy that would bar from a federal 
trial what state officers had obtained in violation of a federal statute, yet 
would admit that which they had seized in violation of the Constitution 
itself.

Elkins, 364 U.S.  at 
215, 80 S. Ct.  at 1442-43 (footnote omitted).

[¶100] 
The writer then, of course, went from his concept of logic and symmetry 
to consider the presently divisive point of departure - accuracy versus due 
process. In the end result, "silver platter" admissibility of evidence in the 
federal court system was terminated. See also, Rios, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431.

F. 
Wyoming 
State 
Court Decisions - Privacy is Constitutionally "Real"

[¶101] 
We should follow New 
York in 
recognizing that protection against unreasonable interception of telephone 
conversations, and all processes equivalently involved, is a protection 
guaranteed by the Wyoming Constitution. See People v. Fata, 159 A.D.2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1990). New 
York 
extends that constitutional protection, in responsiveness of rights of the 
individual, even to cordless telephone communications. Id., 
559 N YS.2d at 351. See Fred Jay Meyer, Note, Don't Touch that Dial: Radio 
Listening Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 63 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 416 (1988).

[¶102] 
Although the right to privacy and its protection against governmental 
intrusion does not appear to have special constitutional significance for the 
United States Supreme Court, the courts of the states have not, so ungenerously, 
rewritten their own state constitutions. See Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 
(Alaska), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086, 94 S. Ct. 603, 38 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1973); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 1039, 92 S. Ct. 1307, 31 L. Ed. 2d 579, judgment vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 33, 
93 S. Ct. 32, 34 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1972); People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483 
(Colo. 
1990); People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811 (Colo. 
1985); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 
1983); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985); Matter of Triplett, 
119 Idaho 
193, 804 P.2d 922 (1990); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 
746, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988); State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990); 
and State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). For recognition where a 
separate federal court order was used, see Van Buren v. State, 823 P.2d 1258 
(Alaska App. 1992); Com. v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (rejecting 
application of the United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984) good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).

[¶103] 
The corrosion, from the legitimatizing of the pen register, is observed 
when information obtained from the pen register is utilized to obtain a search 
warrant upon which a further incursion into eavesdropping privacy may then be 
legitimatized justifying an otherwise unsupported warrant. In result, the 
ultimate warrant is inverted and corroded by the original pen register tool 
which can pervasively be used to invade residential privacy. Yanez, 577 N.Y.S.2d 621; People v. Baker, 174 A.D.2d 815, 570 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1991); People v. Spano, 
170 A.D.2d 996, 566 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1991); Fata, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348; People v. 
Bachiller, 159 A.D.2d 955, 552 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1990).

[¶104] 
It is noteworthy that the New 
York 
legislature did recognize the problem in state law, and the preclusive direction 
of federal law, in providing privacy protection against pen registers by the 
enactment of a warrant requirement for pen register usage by law enforcement 
agencies. 11A McKinney's 
Consolidated Laws of New 
York 
Annotated, § 705.00 (Cum.Supp. 1993); 1988 N.Y. Laws, ch. 744, § 21; Baker, 570 N.Y.S.2d 857. The New 
York 
statute became the primary, and almost sole, state to totally follow Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577. The statutory change came at the same time as a 
comprehensive change in federal law which reversed the bland no warrant usage of 
the pen register, search and seizure, eavesdropping technique justified in 
Smith. See P.L. 99-508 (1986), 18 U.S.C. § 3121 through 3127.4 

[¶105] 
What this means is the principal authority used in the majority opinion, 
Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, is not accepted by the great majority of state courts. Its 
principal use in New 
York was 
rejected by that state's legislature and the United States Congress rejected its 
use for the federal system. See Van Buren, 823 P.2d 1258 and State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) which recognize the ongoing requirement of the pen 
register search by authority of a court order. Recognition of a suppression 
requirement under state law, where the pen register is installed with a warrant, 
was also comprehensively considered in the Pennsylvania case of Com. v. Melilli, 
521 Pa. 405, 555 A.2d 1254 (1989). In Melilli, without a probable cause 
determination for the usage of the pen register, the court ruled the illegality 
of the information required the subsequent legal wire tap evidence to be 
suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. Pennsylvania 
explicitly rejected Smith and followed its more protective application of the 
state constitution. Incursions into telephone communications "within the 
confines of an expectation of privacy under the State Constitution" required 
suppression. Melilli, 555 A.2d  at 1258. Telephone numbers were equated with 
other telephone communication information. Melilli, 555 A.2d  at 1258-59. See 
also People v. Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d 98, 201 Cal. Rptr. 628, 679 P.2d 62 (1984) and 
State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982). The foundational case for 
Melilli, and decisions of other cases which rejected the United States Supreme 
Court non-warrant legalization of pen registers, was Com. v. Beauford, 327 Pa. 
Super. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984). That court recognized:

The 
fallacy in the Commonwealth's reliance on Smith is the implicit assumption that 
our state constitution provides no greater protection against the installation 
and use of pen registers than the federal constitution provides. Although Smith 
conclusively decides the extent of the fourth amendment guarantee in this area, 
appellants have also asserted their rights under article 1, § 8 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution. We turn now to the state constitutional 
claim.

Preliminarily, it cannot be doubted that this state has the 
constitutional power to guard individual rights, including the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, more zealously than the federal 
government does under the United States Constitution. Pruneyard Shopping Center 
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980); Cooper v. 
California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S. Ct. 788, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1967); Commonwealth v. 
Sell, [504] Pa. [46], 470 A.2d 457 (1983); Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 481 
Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 239 A.2d 290 
(1968); Commonwealth v. Walsh, [314] Pa.Super. [65], 460 A.2d 767 (1983). "The 
present function of state constitutions is as a second line of defense for those 
rights protected by the federal constitution and as an independent source of 
supplemental rights unrecognized by federal law." Note, The Interpretation of 
State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L.Rev. 1324, 1367 (1982) (emphasis added). 
Commentators urge state governments to reflect deeply before deciding whether 
state constitutional provisions affecting individual liberties conform to 
similar provisions in the federal constitution. W. Brennan, State Constitutions 
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489, 501 (1977); Note, 
The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State 
Constitution, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 297 (1977).

Beauford, 475 A.2d  at 788 (emphasis in 
original).

[¶106] 
The Idaho Supreme Court likewise joined in the independent state 
constitutional analysis in reversing the decision in State v. Thompson, 113 
Idaho 466, 745 P.2d 1087 (1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 114 Idaho 746, 
760 P.2d 1162 (1988). The differentiation, between a pen register surveillance 
device and the dialed number recorder (DNR), was noted with analysis that the 
impact on privacy was the same. Idaho 
found justification in the Smith dissents of Justices Stewart and Marshall and 
then concluded:

We 
adopt these dissenting comments in Smith as stating the interpretation that 
should be given to art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution as it applies to the 
use of pen registers in Idaho. 
Perhaps the day will come when a majority of the United States Supreme Court 
will decide to overrule Smith and establish for the nation the protection to 
which we believe those who use telephones in Idaho are 
entitled. Until then, art. 1, § 17 will stand as a bulwark against the 
intrusions of pen registers into our daily life in Idaho.

Thompson, 760 P.2d  at 1167.

[¶107] 
The Colorado 
court, similarly, provided constitutional protection for privacy from pen 
registers under the state constitution in Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135. That court 
rejected both Smith and United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) in another case, Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 
200 Colo. 94, 
612 P.2d 1117 (1980), by application of the superior protective rights of the 
state constitution. See also People v. Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216 (Colo. 
1987). See also State v. Rothman, 70 Haw. 546, 779 P.2d 1 (1989), which was 
considered in detail by Karen L. Stanitz, State v. Rothman: Expanding the 
Individual's Right to Privacy Under the Hawaii Constitution, 13 U.Haw.L.Rev. 619 
(1991).

[¶108] 
Since Wyoming has 
not enacted any pen register legislation for state law enforcement usage, 
installation by those personnel, under any circumstances, would be a crime as 
would be the case for any federal officials providing the same activity without 
court order. The Wyoming legislature, see 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 121; 1987 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157; and Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-610, has not 
chosen to enact pen register legislation and the delay time of two years from 
October 21, 1986 has long since expired.

[¶109] 
To justify what occurred to Saldana as a "silver platter" authentication 
of illegal evidence under Wyoming law, through Smith or pen register usage 
statutes, is absolutely unjustified, if not entirely absurd. We effectuate 
criminal misconduct to justify the acquisition of evidence for the proffered 
purpose of the criminal prosecution of someone else who has been alleged to have 
committed criminal conduct.

[¶110] 
The present application of "silver platter" in state courts, earlier 
addressed by People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d 232, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947 
(1967) in California, follows, in general, a trend stated by 1 LaFave, Search 
& Seizure, § 1.5(b) (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted):

When 
(as is occurring with greater frequency) a state court finds that a certain 
arrest or search passes muster under the Fourth Amendment but that it violates 
the comparable provision of the state constitution, there does not appear to be 
any dissent from the conclusion that the fruits thereof must be suppressed from 
evidence. The rationale for such a result is seldom stated in the cases, but 
exclusion in these circumstances may be explained on the ground that a violation 
of the fundamental law of the state constitutes such a substantial intrusion 
upon the defendant's rights that the exclusionary remedy is just as appropriate 
as when the Fourth Amendment is violated.

The 
issue of this case, and an increasing number of other cases, develops from the 
conduct of federal law enforcement agencies within the same jurisdiction5 seeking to acquire desired evidence, with 
expedited processes unavailable under state law, for the use of state law 
enforcement agencies. What we have here, and what is occurring with frequency, 
is that upon request by state authorities of the federal agencies, the evidence 
is obtained under federal process and delivered to the state enforcement 
agencies to supply a probable cause basis to then utilize state search and 
seizure statutory processes to obtain a warrant to invade the home or business 
privacy of the target individual. State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 536 A.2d 1252 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008, 108 S. Ct. 1474, 99 L. Ed. 2d 703 (1988).

[¶111] 
Arguably excluded from a requirement for a warrant to use the pen 
register is one case provided by the intermediate appellate court in 
Texas. 
State v. Toone, 823 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 
App. 1992). Toone did not involve questions of "joint collaboration" and defined 
its adaptation in the opinion as a "reverse silver platter doctrine." Cf. 
Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991). Toone did not consider 
Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, or recognize the limitations for use 
mandated in both State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 554 A.2d 1315 (1989) and State 
v. Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. 119, 796 P.2d 728 (1990). Toone appears to stand alone 
in state jurisprudence, except for the differentiated federally used process 
found in Valenzuela, 536 A.2d 1252. Cf. Thompson, 745 P.2d 1087, where the 
intermediate appellate court rejected the persuasion and validity of Smith, but 
found "lockstep" adaptation by the state Supreme Court to control. See also 
State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 
480, 745 P.2d 1101 (1987). The Idaho Supreme Court answered the call made in 
Thompson and reversed, determining that the state would not follow Smith or 
authenticate the warrantless use of the pen register.

[¶112] 
It should also be recognized that the philosophical basis for Toone and 
the following case, Richardson, 821 S.W.2d 304, of "lockstep," the Texas 
constitutional provisions of article 1, section 9 would not be given a more 
restrictive standard, was completely obliterated by the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals in Heitman, 815 S.W.2d 681. Heitman rejected "lockstep" and adopted an 
independent application of the state constitution for Texas 
constitutional law.

[¶113] 
Lustig, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S. Ct. 1372 was cited in Toone and completely 
misstated in decision in the opinion, as were the non-law enforcement activity 
concepts addressed in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). See 1 LaFave, supra, at § 1.8. Lustig, 338 U.S.  at 
80, 69 S. Ct.  at 1375, Murphy, J., concurring, and Wolf, 338 U.S.  at 
41, 69 S. Ct.  at 1371, Murphy, J., dissenting. In Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, the United States Supreme Court held that it was unlawful for a state to 
seize evidence in violation of a defendant's constitutional right and hand that 
evidence on a "silver platter" to the federal courts for prosecution. People v. 
Martinez, 
151 Misc.2d 641, 574 N.Y.S.2d 467, 473 n. 10 (1991).

[¶114] 
We need not go beyond the cooperation and joint enterprise cases here, 
since admittedly Wyoming law 
enforcement officials asked the federal authorities, in their efforts to target 
Saldana, to get the evidence for them regarding the telephone records by a 
process which was unavailable to the state authorities without the use of at 
least a formal search warrant. This joint endeavor preclusion is recognized 
dispositively in State v. Abdouch, 230 Neb. 
929, 434 N.W.2d 317, 325 (1989):

Referring to a joint endeavor between a private person and 
a government official, LaFave notes:

"It 
is not essential that the government official be involved in the endeavor at the 
very outset; cases in this area often apply the rule from Lustig v. 
United States, 
[338 U.S. 74, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949)] that it is `immaterial' 
whether the government official `originated the idea or joined in it while the 
search was in progress' and that it is sufficient that the official `was in it 
before the object of the search was completely accomplished.' Nor is it 
necessary that the government official directly participate in the illegal 
entry. The courts have found sufficient government involvement where the officer 
was standing by giving tacit approval to the entry made by a private person. 

1. 
W. LaFave, Search & Seizure, a Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.8(b) at 
179-80 (2d ed. 1987).

Lustig, 338 U.S. 74, 
69 S. Ct. 1372; Gambino, 275 U.S. 310, 48 S. Ct. 137, and Byars v. United States, 
273 U.S. 28, 
47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520 (1927) pervasively define the joint conduct to 
invalidate admissibility if the evidence is obtained by a search violating state 
constitutional standards. See Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437.

[¶115] 
In addition to Abdouch, 434 N.W.2d 317, this identical subject was 
comprehensively addressed in New Jersey by State v. Minter, 116 N.J. 269, 561 A.2d 570 (1989); Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315; and Gwinner, 796 P.2d 728. See also 
State v. Christensen, 244 Mont. 
312, 797 P.2d 893 (1990) (consideration if state action might be involved). 
Compare the privacy issues addressed in State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 
700 P.2d 153 (1985), superseded in part by Christensen. See also People v. 
Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1973), where federally obtained 
information was suppressed when obtained in violation of a state 
nonadmissibility statute. California's 
expanded right of privacy by the state constitution and statute was recognized 
to be controlling.

[¶116] 
The case of State v. Harms, 233 Neb. 882, 449 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1989) reached 
the Fourth Amendment conduct of the federal law enforcement personnel, but 
recognized participative conduct as a concept in rejecting admissibility of the 
evidence obtained by the federal authorities in violation of the federal 
constitution:

In 
light of Mapp [v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961)] and Elkins [v. 
United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960)], we see no logical reason why 
evidence which is unlawfully seized by federal law enforcement personnel should 
be admissible in state court criminal prosecutions. We therefore hold that 
evidence illegally obtained by federal law enforcement personnel cannot be used 
in Nebraska 
state courts, provided the lawfulness of the seizure is properly raised and 
adjudicated.

[¶117] 
I apply the same concept, where participative conduct is involved, if the 
evidence is obtained in contravention of the state constitution as an improper 
search and seizure under the preclusion of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4:

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

[¶118] 
If this court does not enforce that provision, despite our oath of office 
requiring justices to "support, obey and defend," Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 20, no 
one else in this state is available to accept the responsibility. If one 
deserves to view the law involving individual rights with anguish today and 
concern tomorrow, a thoughtful reading of Monroe Freedman, Essay, Law in the 
21st Century, 60 Fordham L.Rev. 503 (1991), will add further uneasiness. After 
dire and terrifying prediction about the status of the law and the justice 
delivery system in the year 2050, none of which he finds favorable, Monroe 
Freedman then concluded: "In short, nothing is going to change in the next 59 
years." Id. at 
505. See also Robert Crook, Sorry, Wrong Number: The Effect of Telephone 
Technology on Privacy Rights, 26 Wake Forest 
L.Rev. 669 (1991); Glenn Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is it 
Constitutional to Give it Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right 
to Informational Privacy, 37 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 145 (1989); and Riley K. Temple 
& Michael Regan, Recent Developments Relating to Caller ID, 18 W.St.U.L.Rev. 
549 (1991). In further specificity, consider Michael D. Strugatz, Comment, 
Criminal Procedure - Cordless Telephone Communications and the Federal Wire Tap 
Act - Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990), XXIV Suffolk U.L.Rev. 1152 (1990); 
and Tyler v. 
Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990). 

G. 
Where the Law of Wire Tap (Pen Register Included) Goes From Here

[¶119] 
The issue presented here was not comparable with a Terry stop, Terry v. 
Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 
88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and those authorities, 
United States v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985), have no relevance here. We have 
already recognized that the pen register cases as identified with Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, are distinguishable because of the preclusive terms of 
the Wyoming anti-wiretap statute, Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601. Likewise, this is not a 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978) case since 
the property interest addressed here was specifically one of the charged 
defendant - his privately listed telephone and record of billings for the calls 
made therefrom. This was a personal right within the Rakas characterization of 
the reach of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977), in recognizing that the Fourth Amendment 
extends beyond a dwelling, is not favorable authority for justification of the 
absence thereof for a telephone which is a conjunctive part of a residence in 
modern America. No warrantless search can be justified from that 
case.

[¶120] 
We then move to the case of Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, which is differentiated, at the very least, by the 
third-party subpoena process used by the United States for 
its own prosecution. Bank records were held not to constitute the depositor's 
private papers. See, however, Burrows v. Superior 
Court 
of 
San 
Bernardino 
County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590 n. 7 (1974); and Miller, 425 U.S.  at 
455, 96 S. Ct.  at 1629, where the Supreme Court found that the subpoena process 
clearly differentiated Miller from a case where voluntary response to an oral 
request was the medium of acquisition. Valley Bank of Nevada v. 
Superior 
Court 
of 
San 
Joaquin 
County, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977 (1975); J. Clark Kelso, 
California's 
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 Pepp.L.Rev. 327 (1992). The case of Miller 
was also rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 
(Utah 1991) where that court also applied the Utah Constitution independently to 
find a similar right of privacy in bank records. See Arthur B. Berger, Recent 
Developments, Right to Privacy in Bank Records Under the Search and Seizure 
Provision of the Utah 
Constitution, 1992 Utah 
L.Rev. 201 (1992) as also assessing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 
1990), which applied the independent Utah 
constitutional standard to the search of an automobile.

[¶121] 
In reality, we have here a telephone search and seizure not really 
different from the classical wiretap situation first considered under a 
reasonableness test in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Following Katz, the clearly enunciated public policy in 
Wyoming has 
been contained within the enactment of Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-610. 
The Wyoming 
statute, with its felony crime punishment, like Katz, rejects any warrantless 
wiretap. Katz did, of course, effectively overrule Olmstead v. 
United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) in recognizing that modern communications 
in today's world is an adjunct to which privacy should extend protecting usage 
of the telephone so that warrantless intrusion should never be permitted by 
police authority. See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961); and John Applegate & Amy Grossman, Pen Registers After 
Smith v. Maryland, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 753 (1980).

[¶122] 
It should be noteworthy that the Wyoming 
statute applies its prohibition to all wiretap processes and for the controlled 
substance investigation only provides rights to secure the judicially approved 
warrant. The case with which search warrants can be obtained surely neither 
justifies failure to follow the Wyoming law 
nor alternative resort to the subterfuge of acquisition of information from some 
federal source. I agree with the State that compliance with Wyoming law 
did not exist here. Differing from the majority, for me, that omission should 
deny admission of any illegally obtained information into evidence anywhere in 
the state court system.

[¶123] 
Here, we demean and diminish rights or privacy in order to unjusticiably 
affirm one criminal conviction.6 I reject that result-oriented 
adventure.

III. 
NO ENFORCEABLE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ACQUIRED WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW

A. 
What "Lockstep" Means in Lost State Constitutional Rights for 
Wyoming 
Citizens

[¶124] 
The majority buttresses admissibility of the warrantless pen register 
data by denial of any constitutionally guaranteed Wyoming 
right to privacy in the pen register acquired telephone number identifications. 
In the first place, the concept clearly ignores the specific language of the 
Wyoming 
statute which includes information concerning the identity of the parties 
participating in a telephone call. Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(iii).

[¶125] 
Secondly, the authentication of the diminished right in pen register 
acquired information stated in Smith, 442 U.S.  at 772, 99 S. Ct.  at 2597 does not 
fit either the Wyoming statute or, more preclusively, the state of the law 
provided in federal statutes responding to Smith. It does not fit, furthermore, 
with the many state statutes with carefully prescribed processes for judicial 
supervision of general acquisition of telephone communication data, which 
specifically pertains to pen register interception equipment usage. It is my 
perception that this decision, consequently, ignores or misapplies both federal 
law and the Wyoming state statute, Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-610; but, 
furthermore, fails to recognize the emergence of authenticating statutes which 
has never been chosen by the state legislature to be used in 
Wyoming.

[¶126] 
It is, however, in a third concept where this decision is most dangerous. 
The majority states that, in result, Wyoming is 
without the protection later provided by congressional action where a pen 
register statute was enacted. This is to adopt "lockstep" with Smith, but to 
then ignore the congressional change in federal law which effectively superseded 
Smith.

[¶127] 
This is the raw, uncontrolled "lockstep" in which the court confines 
protection in this state for search and seizure, and privacy, under the state 
constitution to constitutional rights apportioned out by decisions of the 
nation's highest court under the Bill of Rights which are emplaced in the United 
States Constitution. Specifically, with regard to the right to privacy, this 
court essentially invalidates one of the Wyoming 
legislature's efforts to protect citizens from communication incursions. This is 
done by denial of a constitutional right of privacy or proper recognition of the 
significance of the Wyoming 
statute that does exist. I strongly reject this federal legislation limiting 
rights for our citizens by the non-sequitur of applied "lockstep." It is to that 
subject, and the growing majority of cases decided by state supreme courts that 
require first attention to state constitutional rights, which we now need to 
comprehensively consider. After all, we have built the structure of 
Wyoming law 
for too long to now regress to what is said about unprotected rights to privacy 
and limited rights as controlled by another court.

B. 
Wyoming Precedent

[¶128] 
Nothing stated by the Wyoming Constitutional Convention membership, when 
they convened in July 1889, provides authority or persuasive logic that those 
intellectual and influential citizens assumed that the guarantees of Article I 
of the constitution that they wrote would only be coextensive with the effect of 
the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. Unfortunately, a verbatim 
record of the session was not maintained and nothing is directly preserved from 
committee sessions where most of the drafting was accomplished. Since 
Idaho 
started first, their draftsmanship, as well as other surrounding states, 
clearly, was copied in text. None of those states, through constitutional 
convention literature, provide support for this present majority's supposition 
that constitutional guarantees written into each state constitution were to be 
confined to the interpretive activity of the United States Supreme Court.7 In a most comprehensive and scholarly review, 
see Robert B. Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution: A 
Reference Guide (1993).

[¶129] 
Obviously, precedent from the United States Supreme Court can be used for 
comparison, but Saldana now stands alone in Wyoming 
adjudicative history in adopting "bright line" the "lockstep" confinement for 
interpretation of Wyo. Const. art. 1 in all of its thirty-six provisions. This 
is the first Wyoming 
decision which, in either dictum or resolution, specifically determines 
Wyoming 
constitutional rights are limited by application of the direct authority of 
other courts, driven through the analysis of the United States Constitution's 
Bill of Rights. Four significant cases which defined the course of 
Wyoming 
constitutional law are clearly contrary to this majority's position. This court 
unanimously applied the Wyoming 
constitutional protections and defended its independence under that document in 
the rights of students to equal protection. Washakie County School Dist. No. One 
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), contra San 
Antonio 
Independent 
School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 980, 93 S. Ct. 2266, 36 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1973). It is noteworthy that the United 
States Supreme Court has since retreated from its no constitutional interest in 
equality of education posture of Rodriguez, and almost directly follows the 
thesis of the Wyoming Supreme Court in defining the Wyoming Constitution adopted 
in Herschler.

[¶130] 
In more recent times, an independent right to expanded jury trial 
protection for anyone charged with an offense for which a sentence to jail was 
possible, was realized by the Wyoming Supreme Court and enforced in Brenner v. 
City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1986). This same thesis which was highlighted 
and advanced in Brennan, supra, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489, was cited and recognized in 
the case of Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985), 
regarding the exercise of police powers. See also Johnson v. State Hearing 
Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 
1992) and State v. Langley, 53 
Wyo. 
332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938); cf. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903 
(Wyo. 
1992), Urbigkit, J., dissenting, and now pending on rehearing by this court. The 
most recent constitutional examination was provided by Simms v. Oedekoven, 839 P.2d 381 (Wyo. 
1992). In March 1992, this court had adopted rewritten rules of criminal 
procedure which included, generally, provisions for release on bail. W.R.Cr.P. 
46.1. That rule had been adapted, almost verbatim, from the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by recommendation of the statutory Wyoming 
rules committee and consequent approval and adoption by this court. 
Constitutionality of the rule in usage in the federal system had been clearly 
established. United States v. 
Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987). In Simms, this court was called to a 
closer examination of the Wyoming Constitution regarding right to bail found in 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14. That examination with closer review revealed that the 
Wyoming Constitution clearly provided a greater protection for the arrested 
individual than did its counterpart in the United States Constitution and this 
court consequently held the adopted rule to be invalid in application of any 
complete denial of bail for any case except those constitutionally excluded 
(capital offenses, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14).8

[¶131] 
What is so curious about the approach now adopted by this court in this 
case is that it is completely contrary to the attitude provided in decisional 
resolution in both Washakie County School Dist. No. One and Brenner on the 
equally significant issues of right for education and right to a jury trial upon 
criminal prosecution.

[¶132] 
We follow Wyoming law 
from statehood through the grand days of Justices Blume, Riner and Kimball to 
current time to demonstrate not only how inappropriate, but how shortsighted, 
this dictum development in this case really is. Then we will, with the hundreds 
of state cases, look at the coverage of the Justice Brennan philosophy as now 
developing and followed in most state jurisdictions at the present time. The 
sweep and scope of the federalism movement will be left in total analysis for 
others with more academic time than this writer, but representative analysis and 
determination will be pervasively provided to demonstrate, again, how this court 
pushes the state backwards from modern courts in what this case establishes to 
be the meaning and purpose of the Wyoming 
constitution.

[¶133] 
Before exhaustively pursuing these cases, there is another vice in what 
is occurring in this decision. We extrapolate a principle in the circumstances 
of the Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989), cf. 
Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv.L.Rev. 1733 (1991) and Paul E. McGreal, A Tale 
of Two Courts: The Alaska 
Supreme Court, the United States 
Supreme Court, and Retroactivity, IX Alaska L.Rev. 305 (1992), direction of 
adjudication by the United States Supreme Court involving determination of a 
case on some basis which had been neither considered nor argued by the litigants 
in the case.9 Obviously, the appellate court is not limited 
to the logic or conceptualization of the litigants, but surely an issue such as 
this most important development in Wyoming law 
would deserve the associative value of litigant briefing. This contribution 
should have at least been given the opportunity to predate adoption of the 
broadsweeping and totally unnecessary conclusions found in this decision. This 
is not an issue of liberal courts versus conservative courts. This is a question 
of the validity of federalism and the basic reality and meaning of the state 
constitution. The choice the majority makes is not only abysmally unacceptable 
to me, but specifically contrary to thought, analysis and generic development 
within most state courts in this nation's federalistic two-tier judicial 
system.

IV. 
THE DIRECTION OF AMERICAN LAW TODAY - AN INDEPENDENT ALLOCUTION OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPTS

[¶134] 
There is an almost unlimited supply of texts, legal articles and court 
cases which agreeably consider utilization of the state constitution for 
decisions regarding rights of citizens of the jurisdiction. None stated with 
more simplicity, yet with convincing logic, than the student author in Timothy 
Stallcup, Comment, The Arizona Constitutional "Right to Privacy" and the 
Invasion of Privacy Tort, 24 Ariz.St.L.J. 687, 693-95 (1992) (footnotes 
omitted), where he wrote:

State courts have many reasons to look to their state 
constitutions for guarantees of individual rights. The most compelling is the 
traditional role of state constitutions as primary protectors of individual 
liberties: state constitutions protected individual rights before the enactment 
of the Federal Constitution; debate at the Continental Congress resolved that 
the states maintain separate, individual constitutions; the powers of the 
Federal Government are specifically enumerated, whereas those of the states are 
plenary; and prior to incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the first ten amendments explicitly were held inapplicable 
to the states.

The 
framers of state constitutions, and the voters who adopted them, intended those 
constitutions to protect individual rights. Because they are frequently more 
recent than their federal counterpart, and more easily changed, a state 
constitution may better reflect the history, needs, and desires of the state's 
people. Also, Arizona 
judges are sworn to uphold both the Arizona and 
Federal Constitutions. Most important, individual liberties deserve the dual 
protections of federal and state law. If the United States Supreme Court has 
recently sought to shift the burdens of government to the states, defining and 
enforcing individual rights should be one of those burdens most welcomely 
accepted.[10]

[¶135] 
It is witnessed by a requirement for this dissent that in any individual 
state, the long term result today is not determinable with certainty. Clearly, 
Wyoming 
moves backward in lacking the present willingness to provide reality to our 
state constitutional rights for the major concerns of life and criminal process 
involved in privacy and search and seizure.

[¶136] 
Retired Justice Hans A. Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court concluded in 
his contribution for Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law:

So 
the future of the "new federalism" remains doubtful. There is no reason for 
confidence that most state courts will systematically decide what their state 
constitutions require, either adapting someone's federal analysis or making 
their own, before deciding whether their state has violated the nation's 
Constitution. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that those judges who do not 
abdicate their responsibility outright will put first things first when the case 
is properly put to them. How often and how well they do it depends on the 
professionalism of the younger generation of advocates in constitutional cases 
as well as on the professionalism of the younger generation of 
judges.

Hans 
A. Linde, Does the "New Federalism" Have a Future?, 4 Emerging Issues in State 
Constitutional Law 251, 261 (1991).

[¶137] 
Professor Barry Latzer would apparently agree. See Barry Latzer, Into the 
'90s: More Evidence That The Revolution Has a Conservative Underbelly, 4 
Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 17 (1991); see, however, Yvonne 
Kauger, Reflections On Federalism: State Constitutions' Role As Nurturers of 
Individual Rights, 4 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 105 (1991). 
Justice Kauger set the concepts in order by her conclusion:

Travel by train is a wonderful experience. The travel 
itself becomes a part of the adventure as you rumble through the countryside. 
However, there is always an appropriate place to stop - an appropriate place to 
end a journey. This is the point for this article to end. If a purely federal 
right is at issue the journey concludes somewhere in the federal system with the 
absolute terminal being the United States Supreme Court. However, if a right 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution is also recognized by a state 
constitution, the train station to seek may well be within the state of origin - 
that state's highest court. The prudent train conductor (attorney) will consult 
the correct schedule (the state constitution) to guarantee that the passenger 
will receive all that is due. A first-class trip does not conclude when only 
basic rights are given but when civil liberties and personal rights have enjoyed 
their fullest protection.

Id. at 
131 (footnote omitted). Compare also Gardner, 
supra, 90 Mich.L.Rev. 761.11

[¶138] 
The flood of case law in state courts demonstrate momentum, if not 
absolute unanimity, that the people's protection from the encroachment and 
violation by government requires independent review and application of rights 
written as guarantees in the separate state constitutions. The cases and 
subjects can be mined on rational recitation or even reconciliation, but 
adjusted within the topics of privacy, search and seizure, arrest and due 
process, a composite of fairly recent cases is particularly illustrative. 
Wyoming 
marches in lonely retreat with the federal constitution "lockstep" when it does 
what was done in this case as an unthinking and casual surrender of its 
philosophic independence.

[¶139] 
Justice Mosk said it best in his concurrence in the case of Sands v. 
Morongo Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 61, 809 P.2d 809, 836 (1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 3026, 120 L. Ed. 2d 897 
(1992), where he directed us:

Indeed, as the highest court of this state, we are 
independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of our citizens. State 
courts are, and should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties in 
the federal system. It is unnecessary to rest our decision on federal authority 
when the California Constitution alone provides an independent and adequate 
state constitutional basis on which to decide.

Symptomatic for this court's minority position in falling 
prey to "lockstep," we would recognize the following state resolutions among the 
multitude of cases.

A. 
Privacy

[¶140] 
A pen register invasion of privacy, Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, is 
unconstitutional as an unreasonable search and seizure under the Colorado 
Constitution by invasion of a legitimate expectancy of privacy in telephone 
numbers dialed by the user. Warrantless search is presumed to be invalid under 
the Colorado Constitution. Cf. People v. Guerra, 65 N.Y.2d 60, 489 N.Y.S.2d 718, 
478 N.E.2d 1319 (1985); People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 448 N YS.2d 448, 
433 N.E.2d 513 (1982) (declined to extend rights of privacy in New York on this 
subject beyond decision of the United States Supreme Court) and Winfield v. 
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dept. of Business Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544 
(Fla. 1985) (right of privacy in Florida Constitution is much broader in scope 
than the federal constitution including privacy in financial institution 
records). See also Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 
1989) (judicial order was required for pen register invasion of individual's 
right of privacy). Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 determined that the state legislature and 
the state constitution should move beyond protection provided by the federal 
doctrine as a second line of defense for rights of individuals, with telephone 
toll record acquisition without warrant invalidated. Contra 
State ex 
rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Williams, 63 Ohio 
St.2d 51, 407 N.E.2d 2 (1980) (a warrant to install a pen register was not 
mandatory but "it is a good procedure"). As another example, the right to 
privacy in the use of "controlled" substances providing an issue determinable 
under the state constitution was involved in State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 
(Alaska 1978) and Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).

[¶141] 
In Washington, 
there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the state 
constitution. State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 808 P.2d 773 (1991). When the United States Supreme Court departed 
from the Aguilar-Spinelli standard in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), Washington, in State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984), declined to follow Gates and retained the "`well established 
protections against unreasonable searches' provided by Aguilar-Spinelli. * * * 
Under the Washington Constitution, the exclusionary rule serves not merely as a 
remedial measure for unconstitutional government actions, but rather to assure 
judicial integrity and preserve the individual's right to privacy." 
Crawley, 
808 P.2d  at 776 (quoting Jackson, 
688 P.2d at 143) (emphasis added). See 
State v. 
White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). Washington 
recognized in the early case of State v. Gunkel, 188 Wn. 528, 63 P.2d 376, 380 
(1936) "that the State may not use, for its own profit, evidence that has been 
obtained in violation of law." The general subject is well stated in White, 640 P.2d  at 1070-71 (footnote omitted):

As 
we have stated in previous decisions, this court may interpret the Washington 
Constitution as more protective of individual rights than parallel provisions of 
the United States Constitution. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 177-82, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 392-93, 617 P.2d 720 (1980); 
Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980); 
Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 709, 714, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978); State 
v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 49, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn.2d 859, 
868, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 646-47, 374 P.2d 989 
(1962). See generally W. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977).

We 
have had two recent occasions to interpret Const. art. 1, § 7 more expansively 
than the Fourth Amendment so as to provide additional protection to citizens of 
this state. In State v. Simpson, supra, a plurality of this court found that 
Const. art. 1, § 7 conferred the right of "automatic standing" to contest 
illegal searches and seizures. This interpretation gave greater protections than 
those found by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980). In State v. Hehman, supra, this 
court found the Washington Constitution to grant greater protections than the 
Fourth Amendment in the area of custodial arrests for minor traffic violations. 
* * *

* * 
* * * *

The 
result reached by the United States Supreme Court in [Michigan v.] 
DeFillippo, [443 U.S. 31, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979)] is justifiable 
only if one accepts the basic premise that the exclusionary rule is merely a 
remedial measure for Fourth Amendment violations. As a remedial measure, 
evidence is excluded only when the purposes of the exclusionary rule can be 
served. This approach permits the exclusionary remedy to be completely severed 
from the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions. Const. art. 
1, § 7 differs from this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in that it 
clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express 
limitations.

[¶142] 
In a case involving entry into a hotel room, the Washington court in 
State v. Ramirez, 49 Wn. App. 814, 746 P.2d 344 (1987), recognized that the 
Washington Constitution afforded greater protection to privacy interests than 
the Fourth Amendment, citing State v. Bell, 108 Wn.2d 193, 737 P.2d 254 (1987). 
In a search incident to an arrest, the Hawaiian Constitution provides 
significantly more confining rights of privacy to the individual in declining to 
follow United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 
(1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 
(1973). The Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 362 (Hawaii 
1992) declined to adopt the definition of seizure the United States Supreme 
Court utilized in California v. Hodari D., ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). The court stated, "`[a]s long as we afford defendants the 
minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we are unrestricted in interpreting the 
constitution of this state to afford greater protection.'" Quino, 840 P.2d  at 
362 (quoting State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 
(1967)). A federal court, in analyzing pre-employment polygraph testing, 
considered a trend of federal cases, Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129, 99 S. Ct. 1047, 59 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1979), and 
used a balancing test rather than the strict scrutiny analysis for privacy 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas. Woodland v. 
City of Houston, 
940 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991); Texas 
State 
Employees Union v. 
Texas 
Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 
1987). These cases delineate the invalidity and short-sightedness of any lavish 
adaptation of decisions of the United States Supreme Court for application to 
protect the citizens of the jurisdiction under the purview of the state 
constitution.

[¶143] 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Guiney v. Police Com'r of Boston, 411 
Mass. 
328, 582 N.E.2d 523 (1991) repelled privacy invading random drug testing of 
police department personnel. The court rejected the concept approved by National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989). Of particular note was the 
concurrence of Chief Judge Liacos, where he stated:

While I concur with the result reached in this case, I must 
reiterate my concern with this court's willingness to consider the "balance" of 
public interests against privacy interests in determining the constitutionality 
of searches and seizures. * * * Notwithstanding its allusion to the laws of 
physics, and their concomitant certainty and precision, a "balancing" test 
subjects the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures to 
a standard only slightly more enduring than the latest public opinion poll. It 
is my firm belief that the use of these tests, no matter how well-intended, will 
result in the eventual dissolution of this precious constitutional right. The 
focus of the constitutional analysis must remain on the issue whether reasonable 
cause exists to justify the particular search and seizure at issue.

Guiney, 582 N.E.2d  at 527. That court likewise in Com. v. 
Henderson, 411 Mass. 
309, 582 N.E.2d 496 (1991) declined to follow Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 
109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988) requiring bad faith in failure to preserve 
potentially useful evidence. Instead of bad faith, due process was 
applied.

[¶144] 
On the subject of warrantless home arrest, the Washington Constitution 
provides greater protection to privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment. 
See 
State v. 
Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 808 P.2d 1171 (1991) and Bell, 
737 P.2d 254. In regard to the right to privacy, the Massachusetts Constitution 
does, or may, afford more substantive protection to individual's than that which 
prevails under the United States Constitution. Com. v. Blood, 400 
Mass. 61, 
507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987); Com. v. Upton, 394 Mass. 
363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985).

[¶145] 
Considering an affidavit for arrest warrant - illegally obtained 
evidence, we find State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 849-50 (1987), 
which states:

It 
is an established principle of our federalist system that state constitutions 
may be a source of "individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by 
the Federal Constitution." Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 
100 S. Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741, 752 (1980); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 718, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1218-19, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 575 (1975); State v. Gilmore, 
103 N.J. 508, 522, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986); "Symposium: The Emergence of State 
Constitutional Law," 63 Tex.L.Rev. 959 (1985); Pollock, "State Constitutions as 
Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights," 35 Rutgers 
L.Rev. 707 (1983); "Developments in the Law - The Interpretation of State 
Constitutional Rights," 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324 (1982); Brennan, "State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights," 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 
(1977); Note, "The New 
Jersey 
Supreme Court's Interpretation and Application of the State Constitution," 15 
Rutgers 
L.J. 491 (1984).

This 
Court has frequently resorted to our own State Constitution in order to afford 
our citizens broader protection of certain personal rights than that afforded by 
analogous or identical provisions of the federal Constitution. State v. 
Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 
287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982); State v. Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952; State 
v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom., Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 867, 70 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1982); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). Although the language of article I, paragraph 7 of the New 
Jersey Constitution is virtually identical with that of the fourth amendment, we 
have held in other contexts that it affords our citizens greater protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the fourth amendment. See 
State v. Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (individual has protectible 
interest in telephone toll billing records under article I, paragraph 7 of the 
New Jersey Constitution); State v. Alston, supra, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 
(possessory interest in property sufficient to confer standing to challenge 
validity of automobile search); State v. Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (validity of consent to search depends on knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent).

[¶146] 
Warrantless entry of a home in the absence of exigent circumstances or 
other necessity raises a right to privacy under the Arizona 
Constitution:

While we are cognizant of the need for uniformity in 
interpretation, we are also aware of our people's fundamental belief in the 
sanctity and privacy of the home and the consequent prohibition against 
warrantless entry. We believe that it was these considerations that caused the 
framers of our constitution to settle upon the specific wording in Article 2, § 
8. While Arizona's constitutional provisions generally were intended to 
incorporate the federal protections, Malmin v. State, 30 Ariz. 258, 261, 246 P. 548, 549 (1926), they are specific in preserving the sanctity of homes and 
creating a right of privacy. Id. at 
262-63, 246 P.2d  at 549. After noting our previous cases and the wording of both 
the state and federal constitutional provisions, we held in [State v.] Martin, 
139 Ariz. 
[466] at 474, 679 P.2d [489] at 498, and affirm here, that as a matter of state 
law officers may not make a warrantless entry of a home in the absence of 
exigent circumstances or other necessity. Such entries are "per se unlawful" 
under our state constitution. * * * Such entries are violations of our 
constitution's guarantee of the right to privacy.

State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 
260, 689 P.2d 519, 523-24 (1984) (footnotes omitted). See also People v. 
Hammons, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1710, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317 (1991), involving right to 
promised privacy at police station. Cf. Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912 
(Wyo. 
1992). For a comprehensive review involving state constitutional rights of 
privacy from personal autonomy to sobriety check points, see Ken Gormley & 
Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 Temple L.Rev. 1279 
(1992).

[¶147] 
This general subject of privacy, as a constitutional issue under state 
constitutions, has a broad and pervasive scope as the small sample of cases 
earlier outlined illustrate. In this anxiety, a thoughtful consideration of the 
dangers to the intrinsic structure of the American society is illustrated in a 
long course of consideration by legal commentators. The point of departure in 
considering privacy, of course, came from Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890). See also William L. 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383 (1960). That broad subject has now narrowed 
for this decision by the dual concepts of no right to privacy regarding numbers 
to whom or from whom calls are placed by telephone and the "lockstep" 
attribution of United States Supreme Court decisions. An illustrative sampling 
of writing from commentators' analyses discloses the depth of concern. See, 
e.g., Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for 
the 1970's, 66 Colum.L.Rev. 1003 (1966) and Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Note, Toward a 
Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 Fla.St. U.L.Rev. 631 
(1977). Gerald B. Cope, Jr. said, as he anticipated the future with concern and 
with considerable foresight:

Events of the past ten years have brought to the fore 
privacy issues on a larger scale. At the same time, retrenchment by the United 
States Supreme Court and the report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission 
have made it abundantly clear that the right of privacy will be fully protected 
only if there is action by the states. It is time to take that step. It is vital 
to a free society to establish a zone of privacy in which each individual is 
free from physical and psychological intrusion and has the autonomy to make 
vital personal decisions. "[T]he right to be let alone," Brandeis said, is "the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." It is 
time to protect that right - by establishing the right of privacy as a matter of 
state constitutional law.

Id. at 
742-43 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S.  at 
478, 48 S. Ct.  at 572, Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also, Robert F. Utter, 
Ensuring Principled Development of State Constitutional Law: Responsibilities 
for Attorneys and Courts, 1 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 217 
(1988). A broadened perspective regarding rights of privacy under state 
constitutions and an issue important to state jurists is provided by numerous 
commentators, which include John C. Barker, Constitutional Privacy Rights in the 
Private Workplace, Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 19 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 1107 (1992); Timothy O. Lenz, Florida's Constitutional Right of 
Privacy and Criminal Justice Policies, 28 Crim.L.Bull. 137 (1992); Sheldon W. 
Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law's 
Limitations, 43 Rutgers 
L.Rev. 539 (1991); John Wesley Hall, Jr., Privacy: Drug War Casualty, Nat'l 
L.J., Feb. 
17, 1992; 
and Kelso, supra, 19 Pepp.L.Rev. 327.

[¶148] 
State constitutional guarantees for a right to privacy are alive and 
enduring (except in Wyoming). 
This right for us should not be easily or ignorantly abandoned.

B. 
Equal Protection

[¶149] 
For similar consideration within this broad subject, we should also look 
at the state equal protection clause. See Alaska 
Pacific Assur. Co. v. 
Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 
1984); Erickson, 574 P.2d 1; Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 
1976). See also Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 
1990). In Zsupnik v. State, 789 P.2d 357 (Alaska 
1990), as an incident of arrest, the defendant was entitled to call a relative 
or a lawyer before determining whether to take a breathalyzer test. In 
Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court 
addressed the reversal of a conviction where the arresting agency failed to 
retain the components of the breathalyzer test for scientific determination 
relative to the validity of the test when given. The issue of a fair trial was 
at stake. The consistency of the Alaska court in recognizing the state due 
process right, as different from the limited protection provided by the United 
States Supreme Court, see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 
81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984), in following Lauderdale, 548 P.2d 376, includes Gundersen 
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673 (Alaska 1990) and Oveson v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978). The Alaska 
court, in application of equal protection, applies a flexible sliding scale more 
protective of state citizens than is afforded by United States Supreme Court 
decisions. See Sonneman, 790 P.2d 702; Alaska 
Pacific Assur. Co., 
687 P.2d 264.

[¶150] 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah 1991) (citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984)), 
in considering public safety regulation of pitbull breeding, recognized 
different equal protection guarantees derived from application of the Utah 
Constitution and the results provided under federal law:

Because no fundamental right or suspect class is involved 
in this case, the Fourteenth Amendment requires only that the classification be 
rationally related to a valid public purpose. * * * [The Utah Constitution] 
requires that a law must apply equally to all persons within a class and that 
statutory classifications must have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute.

[¶151] 
State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 
1991) involved a differentiated penalty for crack cocaine compared to cocaine 
powder involving a determined racial function in usage. The Minnesota 
court recognized that "[s]ince the early eighties, this court has, in equal 
protection cases, articulated a rational basis test that differs from the 
federal standard[.]" Id. at 
888. A more stringent standard of review as a matter of state law was applied 
under the state constitution equivalent to the equal protection clause of the 
federal constitution. An interesting comment was included:

To 
harness interpretation of our state constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection to federal standards and shift the meaning of Minnesota's 
constitution every time federal case law changes would undermine the integrity 
and independence of our state constitution and degrade the special role of this 
court, as the highest court of a sovereign state, to respond to the needs of 
Minnesota citizens.

Id. at 
889.

[¶152] 
The issue on a certified question to be considered by the Ohio Supreme 
Court from the federal district court of that jurisdiction resulted in a 
persuasive recognition by the state tribunal:

We 
begin with a truism: the Ohio Constitution permits the state to exercise its own 
sovereignty as far as the United States Constitution and laws permit. Since 
federal law recognizes Ohio's 
sovereignty by making Ohio law 
applicable in federal courts, the state has the power to exercise and the 
responsibility to protect that sovereignty.

Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 62 Ohio 
St.3d 39, 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (1991). The Ohio 
court further included a comment from a federal judge with which strong 
disagreement was stated:

Another federal judge has argued that it matters little if 
a federal court errs in applying state law, because if "state law is so unclear 
that a federal court, honestly trying to discover and apply it, falls into error 
* * * the relevant state policies are so lacking in development and firmness 
that their nonapplication in a diversity case is not of very great 
moment."

Id., 
577 N.E.2d  at 1080 (quoting Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and 
Quality of State Law, 14 Wayne 
L.Rev. 317, 320 (1967)).

C. 
Search and Seizure - Confessions

[¶153] 
The subject of expanded protection, in the multiplicity of search and 
seizure circumstances, has not been ignored in state constitutional law 
development. Recent cases, declining to follow a "lockstep" attribution of the 
United States Supreme Court decision making, would include the Massachusetts 
Constitution which provides greater protection against unlawful search and 
seizure than does the Fourth Amendment. Com. v. Cast, 407 Mass. 
891, 556 N.E.2d 69 (1990). See also Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (wiretaps). The court 
recognized that not only probable cause was required, but, for warrantless 
search, exigent circumstances had to be demonstrated. See also Com. v. Wunder, 
407 Mass. 
909, 556 N.E.2d 65 (1990).

[¶154] 
A search preclusion was authenticated in Com. v. Rostad, 410 
Mass. 
618, 574 N.E.2d 381 (1991), considering a custodial inventory search of 
defendant's purse following traffic conduct observation stop and license 
suspension arrest. Defendant's handbag was opened and its contents inventoried. 
Lacking specificity in written police procedures, which otherwise permitted 
exercise of discretion, the search was unfair within the Massachusetts 
Constitution.

[¶155] 
Another pat-down case was provided in People v. Mathis, 211 
Ill. 
App.3d 678, 156 Ill.Dec. 158, 570 N.E.2d 634 (1991) when a hard object, about 
the size of a golf ball, was felt on a defendant's person, seized, opened, and 
determined to contain cocaine. Under the totality of the circumstances, the 
court held that the statement that the officer reasonably might have believed 
the object was a weapon was manifestly erroneous. An order denying a motion to 
suppress was reversed and the conviction was overturned. A pharmacy search, 
State v. Penn, 61 Ohio St.3d 720, 576 N.E.2d 790 (1991), based on entry 
permitted by a discharged employee, was likewise subjected to review under the 
Ohio Constitution and was found to protect the commercial building as well as 
private homes and offices.

[¶156] 
A violation of a knock-and-announce rule on entry into a private dwelling 
was a violation of a state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the Pennsylvania Constitution. For the violation, 
exclusion of the evidence was the appropriate remedy under the Pennsylvania 
constitutional protective umbrella. "Exclusion of evidence is the appropriate 
remedy for this violation. `A search is not to be made legal by what it turns 
up. In law, it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from 
what is dug up subsequently.' Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 449, 240 A.2d 795, 799 (1968), citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 S. Ct. 222, 
229, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948)." Com. v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 
403, 598 A.2d 539, 542 (1991). The Di Re case is probably not good law today 
under present applications of the United States Constitution in current 
cases.

[¶157] 
Two of the most persuasive cases coming from jurisdictions which protect 
the validity and sanctity of the state constitutions are State v. Geisler, 25 
Conn. App. 282, 594 A.2d 985 (1991) and People v. Harris, 77 N Y2d 434, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 570 N.E.2d 1051 (1991). In State v. Geisler, 22 Conn. App. 142, 
576 A.2d 1283, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 819, 576 A.2d 547 (1990), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 663, 112 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1991) 
(Geisler I), the Connecticut court held that warrantless entry into the 
defendant's home violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, lacking exigent circumstances to justify the entry. The court held 
that evidence derived from the illegal arrest was a tainted product of that 
arrest and subject to suppression. The United States Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded based on New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1990).

[¶158] 
The original New 
York 
decision had likewise required suppression under a similar circumstance. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded on a federal constitutional 
basis. In Harris, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 570 N.E.2d 1051, upon remand, the New York 
Court of Appeals declined to follow the federally determined Harris decision and 
applied a protective body of law for New York resting on concerns of due process 
which is substantially greater than that recognized in the United States Supreme 
Court decision.

[¶159] 
In Geisler, the Connecticut 
court similarly, upon remand, reconsidered based upon the Connecticut 
Constitution an issue previously unresolved in the earlier opinion and again 
held the evidence inadmissible. The court stated:

We, 
therefore, reject a per se inclusion of evidence obtained outside a home 
following a Payton [v. New 
York, 
445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639] violation, regardless of temporality and 
intervening circumstances. The facts of this case are such that the unlawful 
entry into the home was not diluted or lessened in effect by the passage of time 
or intervening circumstances when the evidence in question was 
obtained.

We 
conclude that the federal exclusionary rule, as narrowed by New 
York v. 
Harris, supra, does not ensure that Connecticut 
citizens' rights, as guaranteed by our state constitution, will be adequately 
protected. We hold, therefore, that our state exclusionary rule, as derived from 
article first, § 7, bars the state from using evidence acquired outside a 
defendant's home following a Payton violation, unless the taint resulting from 
the violation is sufficiently attenuated from the initial entry into the 
home.

Geisler, 594 A.2d  at 990.

[¶160] 
The coerced confession cases and attribution of applied harmless error 
appropriately come within this category of decision making by state courts which 
refuse to follow a federal harmless error absolution. Arizona v. 
Fulminante, ___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991); Tamara Lynne Jones, Comment, 
Coerced Confessions and Harmless Error, 18 Ohio 
N.U.L.Rev. 877 (1992); Lynne Trulock Ravellette, Note, Criminal Procedure - 
Harmless Error - Coerced Confession Is No Longer Grounds for Automatic Reversal 
of a Trial. Arizona v. 
Fulminante, ___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991), 14 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 537 
(1992); David F. Wells, Comment, Due Process Bows to Judicial Expediency: Should 
Michigan 
Follow Arizona v. 
Fulminante?, 69 U.Det. Mercy L.R. 227 (1992); Amy B. Bloom, Comment, 
Constitutional Law - Harmless Error Analysis Applies to Erroneously Admitted 
Coerced Confessions - Arizona v. Fulminante, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991), 26 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 269 (1992). See, however, Robert J. 
Fratianne, Note, California and 
the Coerced Confession: The Effect of Arizona v. Fulminante - Did the Supreme 
Court Go For Enough?, 22 Sw.U.L.Rev. 285 (1992).

[¶161] 
It is the Fourth Amendment cases, involving categories of search and 
seizure, where this court further makes an incursion into "lockstep," by dicta, 
to which I take the strongest exception. Search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment or arrest under the Fifth Amendment cases provide the arena where the 
more apparent deviation or distinction between state constitutional rights and 
the application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by the federal court system 
can more clearly be discerned. Attacks on the exclusionary rule and utilization 
of the Leon 
good faith validation of an invalid search and seizure, as well as consideration 
of when has seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment, provide the substance 
for both case decisions in reversing denial of suppression or seizure and 
extended commentaries by legal authorities.

[¶162] 
A review, which examines this whole galaxy of issues, is provided by 
Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 Vill.L.R. 1267 (1991), where the author 
considers checkpoint stops, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990), under some character of a Terry, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 concept. Next considered was anonymous tip information 
sufficient to create reasonable suspicion. Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). See Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549 
(Wyo. 1992), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; plain view seizure eliminating the 
required inadvertence, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); third party consent, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 
110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990);12 
reasonableness of protective sweep for self protection, Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990); discretional inventory 
searches, Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); 
exigent circumstances for arrest, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990); and Miranda limitation, Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1990), where an undercover agent was 
placed in the prisoner's cell. It would seem that this whole array of cases, 
each without protective morality, has now been rewritten into Wyoming 
law.

D. 
Leon For 
Example

[¶163] 
Illustrative, for only one of the segments of this array of issues, is 
State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d 119 (1991), where that court declined an 
invitation to apply good faith as a justification to fulfill the lack of initial 
probable cause. The Leon 
concept has been given broad rejection. State v. Gutierrez, 112 N.M. 774, 819 P.2d 1332 (1991), cert. granted, 841 P.2d 549 (N.M. 1992). The "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule defined in Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 was not followed in Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887. See also State v. 
Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58 (1990); Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242 
(Del.Super. 1987); Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548; Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837 
(Miss. 1986); Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820; People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 (1985); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988); Jean-Paul Layrisson, Comment, The Exclusion of Unconstitutionally 
Obtained Evidence and Why the Louisiana Supreme Court Should Reject United 
States v. Leon on Independent State Grounds, 51 La.L.Rev. 861 (1991); and Andrea 
Lynn Bistline, Note, The State Constitution as a Source of Individual Liberties: 
Declining to Apply the "Good-Faith" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule in 
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 96 Dick.L.Rev. 573 (1992). Andrea Bistline's conclusion 
provides a thoughtful perspective:

The 
decision in Edmunds reflects a deep-rooted tradition of respect for individual 
privacy rights in Pennsylvania. 
While the failure to apply the "good-faith" exception may in some cases allow 
guilty defendants to go free, it also, and more importantly, preserves the 
integrity of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. At a time when more and more individual liberties are being curtailed 
on a federal level, state courts are returning to their own constitutions to 
deal with issues that have been left to the United States Supreme Court for 
forty years. State courts must continue to interpret their own laws on a 
separate basis from federal law in order to guarantee the full realization of 
personal liberties throughout this country.

Id. at 
579 (footnotes omitted).

[¶164] 
For further review and authority, see William J. Mertens and Silas 
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the 
Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo.L.J. 365 (1981). Likewise disdaining to 
follow Leon, there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the 
New Mexico Constitution, following with approval in State v. Greene, 162 Ariz. 
383, 783 P.2d 829 (1989); Marsala, 579 A.2d 58; People v. David, 119 Mich. App. 
289, 326 N.W.2d 485 (1982); Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820; and Bigelow, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451. Good reason for a better rule is persuasively 
provided.

E. 
The Roadblock Cases for Another Example

[¶165] 
The roadblock cases centered upon Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 have comparable aspects regarding state law constitutional 
adaptation. But see Sitz v. Department of State Police, 193 Mich. 
App. 690, 485 N.W.2d 135 (1992). See also Jonathan A. Block, Please Stop: The 
Law Court's Recent Roadblock Decisions, 44 Me.L.Rev. 461 (1992). Considerable 
persuasion is provided on this topic by the result achieved in Michigan 
following remand from Sitz for a consideration of the constitutional principles 
involved in the automatic stop under the purview of the Michigan Constitution. 
Sitz, 485 N.W.2d 135. The state court categorically declined to follow the prior 
United States Supreme Court distillation of constitutional interest involved in 
that police activity. "We find the indiscriminate suspicionless stopping of 
motor vehicles violative of art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan 
Constitution." Sitz, 485 N.W.2d  at 139. See also Mitchell Lampson, On the Silver 
Anniversary of Terry v. Ohio: 
The Reasonableness of an Automatic Frisk, 28 Crim. L.Bull. 336 (1992) and Judith 
E. Baylinson, Criminal Procedure - Pennsylvania 
Circumvents the Plain View Doctrine in a Warrantless Search - Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 524 Pa. 72, 
569 A.2d 337 (1990), 64 Temp.L.Rev. 251, 260 (1991).

F. 
To Be Followed by Hodari D. and Bostick

[¶166] 
Similarly emplaced in search and seizure are the Hodari D. and Bostick 
derived cases. Hodari D., ___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 1547; Florida v. 
Bostick, ___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991). See also Thomas K. Clancy, The 
Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 
Am.Crim. L.Rev. 799 (1991); Christian J. Rowley, Florida v. 
Bostick: The Fourth Amendment - Another Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 
Utah 
L.Rev. 601 (1992); Susan M. Kuzma, Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment: Let's 
Cut to the Chase, 18 Am.J.Crim.L. 289 (1991); and Wayne R. LaFave, 
Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 
1991 U.Ill.L.Rev. 729 (1991). Exigent or explained circumstances cases fare no 
better. George E. Dix, Entry to Execute Search Warrants In Texas 
Criminal Procedure, 19 Am.J.Crim. L. 159 (1992); Jacqueline Bryks, The Second 
Circuit Review - 1989-1990 Term. Exigent Circumstances and Warrantless Home 
Entries: United States v. 
MacDonald, 57 Brook L.Rev. 307 (1991); Baylinson, supra, 64 Temp.L.Rev. 
251.

[¶167] 
In a motor vehicle search case, it was recognized to be "settled law that 
the Washington 
constitution * * * provides greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment." 
State v. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 820 P.2d 53, 55 (1991). See also Gunwall, 
720 P.2d 808; Boland, 800 P.2d 1112; Gutierrez, 819 P.2d 1332; State v. Beyer, 
822 P.2d 519 (Hawaii 
1991).

[¶168] 
The bottoming fact for this entire snow-covered prairie of issues 
involving the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is the directed federal attack on 
philosophical justification for the exclusionary rule. The attack embraces the 
principle of useability based on usefulness without regard for method of 
acquisition. Christopher Slobogin addressed the topic in, The World Without a 
Fourth Amendment, 39 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 1 (1991). This well-plowed field before the 
snow came does include, as illustrative only, William C. Heffernan & Richard 
W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of 
Police Compliance With the Law, 24 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 311 (1991); John Apol, The 
Fourth Amendment: Historical Perspective, Warrantless Searches and a Solution to 
the Exclusionary Rule Debate, 4 Det.C.L.Rev. 1205 (1991); Craig D. Uchida & 
Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and "Lost Cases:" The 
Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J.Crim.L. & 
Criminology 1034 (1991); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule 
Rest On A "Principled Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 
Creighton L.Rev. 565 (1983); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the 
Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 Am.B.Found.Res.J. 585 (1983); 
and Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule On The 
Scaffold: But Was It A Fair Trial?, 22 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 85 (1984).

G. 
Other Constitutional Protections Enforced and Protected by State Constitutions - 
Confrontation, Proportionality, Counsel, Bail and Double Jeopardy, for a Few 
Examples

[¶169] 
Similar concerns involving state constitutional rights to confrontation 
have followed the United States Supreme Court decision of Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988). See also Beyer, 822 P.2d 519. For 
example, regarding the right of confrontation, U.S. Const. amend. VI, see Com. 
v. Ludwig, 527 Pa. 
472, 594 A.2d 281 (1991) and Com. v. Lohman, 527 Pa. 
492, 594 A.2d 291 (1991) (closed circuit television disproved in contravention 
to right of confrontation). In a somewhat similar constitutional examination, 
the Indiana court in Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991) determined that 
a statute authorizing video taped testimony of a child witness in child abuse 
cases unconstitutionally infringed upon the defendant's right of confrontation 
guaranteed under the Indiana Constitution. The court recognized its historical 
precedent. The confrontation right contained both the right to cross-examine and 
the right to meet the witnesses face to face. It further said:

This 
Court has recently examined the origins and traced the development of the right 
of criminal defendants to meet the witnesses face to face as this right is 
guaranteed by Article I, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Miller [v. State], 
517 N.E.2d 64. Article I, § 13 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face. . . ." 
This Court has long recognized that this basic trial right is an ancient one 
with roots in the common law and that its design has more than a single part. 
Because this right is secured by the Constitution, it cannot be abridged by 
judicial or legislative action. Graves v. 
State (1931), 203 Ind. 1, 178 N.E. 233.

Brady, 575 N.E.2d  at 986-87.

[¶170] 
Other topics similarly demonstrating extension beyond the criteria now 
enforced by the United States Constitution include right to assistance of 
counsel, People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 385 N.E.2d 612 
(1978) (right to assistance of counsel to safeguard substantive and procedural 
rights is inviolable and fundamental). Protection is superior to that afforded 
by federal constitutional application, including the requirement that a criminal 
defendant under indictment and in custody may not waive his right to counsel 
unless he does so in the presence of an attorney. The right to bail, including 
the protection from unreasonable or arbitrary denial, extends the protection 
beyond the federal Bill of Rights. Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527, 644 P.2d 968 
(1982). See, in identical circumstance, a fourth Wyoming 
case which has recently revisited the Wyoming Constitution in determining right 
to bail for those persons arrested by state authorities. Simms, 839 P.2d 381.

[¶171] 
Likewise, see the principle applied in State v. Soriano, 68 Or. App. 642, 
684 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1984), where refusal to testify before the grand jury was 
considered after the defendant had been granted use and derivative use 
immunity:

In 
recent years, the Oregon Supreme Court has made it clear that the Oregon 
Constitution has a content independent of that of the federal constitution and 
that Oregon 
courts should consider state constitutional claims before examining issues of 
federal law. See, e.g., In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 673 P.2d 855 (1983); State 
v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983); State v. Davis, 
295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802 (1983); Hewitt v. SAIF, 294 Or. 33, 653 P.2d 970 
(1982); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982). The state 
nonetheless argues that, with respect to the issue now before us, we should 
generally construe the Oregon Constitution to the same effect as the United 
States Supreme Court construes similar provisions of the federal constitution. 
It points out that many of the guarantees in both constitutions come from the 
same sources and urges that the United States Supreme Court's construction of 
them should control the Oregon 
construction. The state's arguments miss the point of the Oregon Supreme Court's 
holdings.

While many guarantees of the state and federal 
constitutions have their roots in the same sources, they are embodied in 
different constitutions, with different ultimate interpreters, and may reflect 
variations in their values and purposes. They generally appeared first in state 
constitutions and were later added to the federal. No court is the primary 
interpreter of those guarantees. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the United 
States Supreme Court's construction of the federal version of those guarantees 
is both authoritative for the federal system and a constitutional minimum which 
states must obey. Its decisions do not, however, decide the meaning of the 
Oregon Constitution. In that respect, a United States Supreme Court majority is 
no more binding in Oregon 
than is a United States 
Supreme Court minority, a decision of the Supreme Courts of Hawaii, 
California, or 
Georgia, or 
a well-reasoned law review article. Judicial opinions from other jurisdictions 
are helpful in interpreting the Oregon Constitution to the extent that their 
reasoning is persuasive and their background is applicable to Oregon. 
Cf. State v. Kennedy, supra (establishing a double jeopardy rule under the 
Oregon Constitution different from that proposed by the majority or the minority 
of the United States Supreme Court). This independent construction of 
Oregon law 
holds even the Oregon law 
is directly derived from the federal law, which the Oregon Bill of Rights is 
not. See 
State v. 
Pottle, 296 Or. 274, 677 P.2d 1 (1984).

[¶172] 
In People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo. 
1991), the death penalty was discussed by the Colorado Supreme 
Court:

We 
have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and 
on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more 
protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions 
of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811 
(Colo. 1985) (rejecting the reasoning of United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984), which construed the United States 
Constitution, and holding that warrantless installation of an electronic 
tracking device in a drum of chemicals prior to sale violated the purchaser's 
right to protection against unreasonable searches under the Colorado 
Constitution); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (holding, in 
contrast to Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 
(1979), construing the federal constitution, that warrantless installation of a 
pen register to record numbers dialed from defendant's home telephone 
constituted an unreasonable search under the Colorado Constitution); Charnes v. 
DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980) (rejecting the rationale of United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976), which 
construed the federal constitution, and holding that a bank customer has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records of the customer's financial 
transactions for purposes of state constitutional protections against 
unreasonable searches); People v. Paulsen, 198 Colo. 458, 601 P.2d 634 (1979) 
(rejecting the double jeopardy analysis in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 
98 S. Ct. 2187, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1978), in interpreting the state constitution to 
preclude a retrial of the defendant where the trial court erroneously entered 
post-jeopardy judgment of acquittal on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or 
innocence); Juhan [v. District Court for Jefferson County], 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (rejecting due process analysis in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1302 (1952), which held an Oregon statute requiring an 
accused to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt to be constitutional under 
federal standards, and concluding that a Colorado statute requiring an accused 
to prove sanity by a preponderance of evidence violated the due process clause 
of the Colorado Constitution). Cf. [People v.] Davis, 794 P.2d [159] at 170-72 
(evaluating challenges to the death penalty statute under the Colorado 
Constitution by applying Colorado law and using United States Supreme Court 
cases only for guidance); * * *. This history reflects our repeated recognition 
that the Colorado Constitution, written to address the concerns of our own 
citizens and tailored to our unique regional location, is a source of protection 
for individual rights that is independent of and supplemental to the protections 
provided by the United States Constitution.

Double jeopardy - exigent circumstances - is not found by 
smelling burning marijuana cigarettes. State v. Santiago, 
813 P.2d 335 (Hawaii 
App. 1991). The Hawaiian double jeopardy constitutional standard was more 
"rigorous" than the Blockburger rule adapted by the United States Supreme Court. 
Sentencing as a subject for a contrary view to determinations by the United 
States Supreme Court is also a subject not without notice. Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 
___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) as compared to Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983) has received both law journal and 
case disaffirmance. State v. Bartlett, 171 Ariz. 
302, 830 P.2d 823, cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 113 S. Ct. 511, 121 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1992); People v. Boyce, 228 
Ill. 
App.3d 87, 170 Ill.Dec. 65, 592 N.E.2d 501 (1992); Aisha Ginwalla, 
Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment: And Their Object Not "Sublime, to Make 
the Punishment Fit the Crime", 57 Mo.L.Rev. 607 (1992); G. David Hackney, A 
Trunk Full of Trouble: Harmelin v. Michigan, 
111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), 27 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 362 (1992).13 Also compare 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1986) with the Kentucky 
resolution in State v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 
1992) and the Illinois 
court differentiation of People v. Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d 1, 178 Ill.Dec. 1, 604 N.E.2d 257 (1992) and People v. McCauley, 228 Ill. 
App.3d 893, 172 Ill. 
Dec. 222, 595 N.E.2d 583 (1992) with Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986). Another example of additional state 
constitutional protection is provided in Utah for 
due process in eyewitness identification in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 
1991). See also Developments in State Constitutional Law, supra, 23 Rutgers L.J. 
at 846 (procedural due process discussion).

[¶173] 
The foregoing cases and analysis are not intended to be either exhaustive 
or even illustrative of the character of cases where many of the state's highest 
courts have determined that the state constitution should be given first 
consideration in protecting individual rights. Estimates vary, but the total 
number of cases available today to demonstrate this adaptive principle are 
considered to certainly total more than five hundred, generally coming since 
1977 after the ground breaking call to action was broadcast by Justice William 
J. Brennan, Jr. Illustrative, as taken from a differentiated non-criminal case 
involving equal protection, is the defining comment in Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 599 A.2d 1371, 1373 (Vt. 1991). The court held "that the Vermont Constitution is 
freestanding and may require [it] to examine more closely distinctions drawn by 
state government than would the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Directed to the same 
perception, Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard provided a foreword in Indiana Law, 
the Supreme Court, and a New Decade, 24 Ind.L.Rev. 499 (1991). He recognized 
that the turning point in the Indiana Supreme Court's jurisdiction during the 
period

was 
the court's use of the Indiana Constitution to resolve issues that previously 
would have been resolved only by reference to the United States Constitution. 
State courts across the country increasingly have relied on their own 
constitutions for almost two decades, but most commentators did not notice the 
movement until 1975 when Justice William Brennan, dissenting from a 
Burger Court 
decision on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, urged state courts 
to use their own constitutions to afford protections not available under the 
federal charter.

Id. at 
504 (citing Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 
120, 96 S. Ct. 321, 334, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1975), Brennan, J., 
dissenting).

[¶174] 
A footnote in the law review further considered:

For 
a more thorough discussion of the view that Brennan hardly started this movement 
but only gave it visibility, see Shepard, State Constitutions: State 
Sovereignty, Intergovernmental Perspective, Summer 1989, at 10. See also Falk, 
The Supreme Court of California, 1971-1972: Foreword - The State Constitution: A 
More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 
3 Val.U.L.Rev. 125 (1969); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' 
Bills of Rights, 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 379, 396 n. 70 (1980) (providing extensive 
bibliography).

Shepard, supra, 24 Ind.L.Rev. at 504 n. 25.

[¶175] 
Whenever it started, it certainly is here to be a major progression in 
American law. Illustrative reviews by a wide range of analysts, legal scholars 
and commentators would find general substance in the attribution of state 
constitutional application. I note in review, only in part, however: Brennan, 
supra, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489; The Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern 
State 
Constitution, 45 Wn.L.Rev. 453 (1970). See generally, 17 Intergovernmental 
Perspective (Fall 1991), including articles involving the following subjects: 
Daniel J. Elazar, Rights: The States and the Federal Government, at 5; Donald S. 
Lutz, The State Foundations of the U.S. Bill of Rights, at 6; Kermit L. Hall, 
The Legacy of 19th-Century State Bills of Rights, at 15; Daniel E. Lungren, 
Federal-State Relations in the Habeas Corpus Process, at 18; Ellen A. Peters, 
State Supreme Courts in Our Evolving Federal System, at 21; Stanley H. 
Friedelbaum, Supreme Courts in Conflict: The Drama of Disagreement, at 27; John 
Kincaid, The State and Federal Bills of Rights: Partners and Rivals in Liberty, 
at 31; Mark L. Glasser & John Kincaid, Selected Rights Enumerated in State 
Constitutions, at 35; and Janice C. May, Amending State Bills of Rights: Do 
Voters Reduce Rights?, at 45.

[¶176] 
1 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law (1988), including: Warren 
E. Burger, Foreword, at ix; Robert Abrams, Introduction, at xi; A.E. Dick 
Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, at 1; Judith S. Kaye, A 
Mid-Point Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, at 17; Ken 
Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, at 29; Richard M. Frank, 
The Scorpions' Dance: Judicially Mandated Attorney's Fees - The Legislative 
Response and Separation-of-Powers Implications, at 73; William P. French & 
John G. Loughrey, Impeachment Power: The Legislature as Moral and Ethical 
Watchdog Over the Executive, at 101; Julie F. Pottorff, Political Stew: Item 
Veto Issues Bubbling to the Top in State Court Jurisdictions, at 121; Eric B. 
Schnurer, It Is a Constitution We Are Expanding: An Essay on Constitutional 
Past, Present and Future, at 135; Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, 
Victims' Rights in State Constitutions, at 163; Ralph L. Finlayson, State 
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Use of Public Financial Resources in Aid of 
Private Enterprises, at 177; Ronald K.L. Collins, Litigating State 
Constitutional Issues: The Government's Case, at 201; Robert F. Utter, Ensuring 
Principled Development of State Constitutional Law: Responsibilities for 
Attorneys and Courts, at 217; and Jeffrey Amestoy & Julie Brill, State 
Constitutions from the Attorney General's Perspective: An Institutional 
Schizophrenia, at 229.

[¶177] 
2 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law (1989), including: Harry 
Carrico, Foreword, at ix; Tom Miller, Introduction, at xi; Ken Gormley, 
Significant Developments in State Constitutional Law, 1988, at 1; Vincent 
Bonventre, State Constitutionalism in New York: A Non-Reactive Tradition, at 31; 
Janice May, State Constitutional Revision in 1988, at 61; Richard Briffault, The 
Item Veto: A Problem in State Separation of Powers, at 85; James C. Harrington, 
Reemergence of Texas Constitutional Protection, at 101; Harry F. Tepker, Jr., 
Abortion, Privacy and State Constitutional Law: A Speculation If (Or When) Roe 
v. Wade Is Overturned, at 173; Louis F. Hubener, Rights of Privacy in Open 
Courts - Do They Exist?, at 189; Michael W. Catalano & Christine Modisher, 
State Constitutional Issues in Public Funding Challenges, at 207; Christine M. 
Durham, The New Judicial Federalism and the Policy Making Role of State Supreme 
Courts, at 219; Earl Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial 
Federalism", at 233; Linda Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of Justices Durham, 
Kaye and Abrahamson in Shaping the Methodology of the "New Judicial Federalism", 
at 239; and David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report 
from the Provinces, at 275.

[¶178] 
3 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law (1990), including: Vincent 
L. McKusick, Foreword, at ix; Mary Sue Terry, Introduction, at xiii; Neil C. 
McCabe, Criminal Law Developments Under State Constitutions, 1989-90, at 1; 
Gerald F. Uelmen, The California Constitution After Proposition 115, at 33; 
Jeffrey A. Parness, Respecting State Judicial Articles, at 65; Michael W. 
Catalano, The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling, at 
77; Daniel D. McDevitt, State Action in Pennsylvania: Suggestions for a Unified 
Approach, at 87; John A. Saurenman, Keystone, First English, and Nollan Three 
Years Later: How Fare the States?, at 115; Harry F. Tepker, Jr., The Trouble 
With Pool Halls: Rationality and Equal Protection in Oklahoma Law, at 151; 
Steven J. Twist & Mark Edward Hessinger, New Judicial Federalism: Where Law 
Ends and Tyranny Begins, at 173; and John M. Devlin, State Constitutional 
Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the 
Interpretation of State Rights Derived from Federal Sources, at 195.

[¶179] 
4 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law (1991), including: Robert 
N.C. Nix, Jr., Foreword, at vii; Ken Eikenberry, Introduction, at xi; Vincent M. 
Bonventre, State Constitutional Recession: The New York Court of Appeals 
Retrenches, at 1; Barry Latzer, Into the '90s: More Evidence that the Revolution 
Has Conservation Underbelly, at 17; Bruce Ledewitz, Judicial Construction of 
State Constitutional Provisions Protecting the Environment, at 33; Eric B. 
Schnurer, The Sorry Phenomenon of "Legal Constitutional Evasion": The Lesson of 
State Constitutional Debt Limits, at 81; Yvonne Kauger, Reflections on 
Federalism: State Constitutions' Role as Nurturers of Individual Rights, at 105; 
Neil C. McCabe & Cynthia Ann Bell, Ex Post Facto Provisions of State 
Constitutions, at 133; Gerald E. Weis, Stepping Into the Breach: State 
Constitutional Protection of Expressive Rights in Privately Owned Commercial 
Establishments, at 159; Ann C. Michailenko, Pennsylvania's Constitutional 
Mandate and the General Assembly's Duty to Provide Public School Students with a 
"Thorough and Efficient" Education, at 177; Peter Galie, Modes of Constitutional 
Interpretation: The New York Court of Appeals' Search for a Role, at 225; and 
Hans A. Linde, Does the "New Federalism" Have a Future?, at 251. See also 
Symposium, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 65 Temp.L.Rev. 1119 
(1992).

[¶180] 
Many additional literate and philosophical commentaries are available, 
which include: Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 91 Colum.L.Rev. 1369 (1991); Yvonne Kauger, William O. Douglas 
Lecture. Reflections on Federalism: Protections Afforded by State Constitutions, 
27 Gonz. L.Rev. 1 (1991/92); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, 
Miranda, Minnick, and the Morality of Confessions, 19 Am.J.Crim.L. 1 (1991); 
Marcia Coyle, Back to the Future - The Justices Re-Examine the Habeas Corpus 
Writ, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 1; and Brian J. O'Connell, Note, Search and 
Seizure: The Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Under the Terry-Standard, Creating 
Suspicion in High Crime Areas - State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2833 (interim ed. 1991), 16 U.Dayton L.Rev. 
717 (1991).

[¶181] 
Symposium: Federalism and Parity, 71 B.U.L.Rev. (1991), including: Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, at 593; Michael Wells, Behind the Parity 
Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 
at 609; Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Parity as a Constitutional Question, at 645; 
and Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, at 651.

[¶182] 
Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities, 19 Human Rights (ABA 
1992), including: Robin Sher, Choosing the Right Court, at 12; Vicki Quade, 
State Courts: The Next Frontier, at 14; Barbara Kritchevsky, What State Courts 
Can Do to Protect Privacy, at 16; MaryAnn Dadisman, Gay Activists Seek Rights 
State by State, at 18; Sheila Murphy, Diverting Abuse Cases Before They Clog 
Courts, at 20; Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Dark Side of Constitutional Law, at 
22; and Shirley Abrahamson, Reawakening to State Courts, at 26.

[¶183] 
496 Annals Am.Acad.Pol. & Soc.Sci. (1988), including: John Kincaid, 
Preface, at 10; John Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, at 12; 
Donald S. Lutz, The United States Constitution as an Incomplete Text, at 23; 
Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, at 33; 
Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive Power in the 
Founding Decade, at 43; Stanley Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in State 
Constitutional Rights Law, at 54; G. Alan Tarr, Religion Under State 
Constitutions, at 65; Peter J. Galie, State Courts and Economic Rights, at 76; 
Jennifer Friesen, The Public Employee's Stake in State Constitutional Rights, at 
88; Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, at 98; 
Michael E. Libonati, Intergovernmental Relations in State Constitutional Law: A 
Historical Overview, at 107; Richard Briffault, Localism in State Constitutional 
Law, at 117; and Ivo D. Duchacek, State Constitutional Law in Comparative 
Perspective, at 128.

[¶184] 
See also Daniel R. Gordon, Progressives Retreat: Falling Back From the 
Federal Constitution to State Constitutions, 23 Ariz.St.L.J. 801 (1991); Craig 
L. Crawford, Comment, Dowling v. United States: A 
Failure of the Criminal Justice System, 52 Ohio 
St.L.J. 991 (1991); Rita Coyle DeMeules, 
Minnesota's 
Variable Approach to State Constitutional Claims, 17 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 163 
(1991); Louis A. Smith, II, Recent Decision, Criminal Law - Search and Seizure - 
Warrant - Affidavit - Rules of Criminal Procedure - "Four Corners" Determination 
of Probable Cause - Exclusionary Rule - Rejection of "Good Faith" Exception - 
Right of Privacy - Magisterial Neutrality, 30 Duq. L.Rev. 115 (1991); Symposium, 
The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later, 41 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 643 (1991); 
Craig F. Emmert, Note, Litigants in State Supreme Court Judicial Review Cases: 
Participation and Success, 14 Just.Sys.J. 486 (1991); Althouse, supra, 44 
Vand.L.Rev. 953; Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the 
Rehnquist Court, 18 
Hastings 
Const.L.Q. 587 (1991); Lee Anne Fritzler, Optimality in Fourth Amendment Law, 27 
Am.Crim.L.Rev. 473 (1990); Marguerite A. Kirk, Note, State v. Andrews: The 
Fourth Amendment in Jeopardy, XVIII Ohio 
N.U.L.Rev. 309 (1991); and Daniel R. Gordon, The Demise of American 
Constitutionalism: Death by Legal Education, 16 S.Ill.U.L.J. 39 
(1991).

[¶185] 
20 Rutgers L.J. (1989), including: Robert F. Williams & Earl M. 
Maltz, at 877; Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of 
Positive Rights, at 881; Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1988, at 903; 
James A. Thomson, Review Essay: State Constitutional Law: Some Comparative 
Perspectives, at 1059; and Earl M Maltz, Robert F. Williams & Michael 
Araten, Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 1980-1989, at 
1093.

[¶186] 
21 Rutgers 
L.J. (1990), including: Robert F. Williams, Introduction, at 793; Gary L. 
McDowell, Foreword: Rediscovering Federalism? State Constitutional Law and the 
Restoration of State Sovereignty, at 797; John Devlin, Constructing an 
Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights 
Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, at 819; Developments in State 
Constitutional Law: 1989, at 903; and Paul Bender & Earl M. Maltz, Judicial 
Activism Under State Constitutions: Boon or Bane?, at 1113.

[¶187] 
See Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 22 Rutgers 
L.J. 815 (1991); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: 
The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. 
L.Rev. 1141 (1985); William Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights: State Constitution 
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 59 N YSt.B.J. 10 (1987); Developments in the 
Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324 
(1982); Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Abney, The Double Security of 
Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberty 
Under the Arizona 
Constitution, 20 Ariz.St. L.J. 115 (1988); Arthur J. Goldberg, Stanley 
Mosk: A Federalist for the 1980's, 12 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 395 (1985); Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming 
Constitutional Interpretation, 21 Land & Water L.Rev. 527 (1986); Steven 
Knitzer, Double Jeopardy: State Courts Advance as the Supreme Court Retreats, 
1984 Ann. Surv.Am.L. 201 (1985); Stanley 
Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in State Constitutional Rights Law, 496 Annals 
Am.Acad.Pol. & Soc.Sci. 54 (1988); Stanley 
Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in Protecting Individuals Rights, 8 
N.Ill.U.L.Rev. 651 (1988); Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: 
Exploring the Limits of Florida's 
"Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U.Fla.L.Rev. 653 (1987); and Sol Wachtler, Our 
Constitutions - Alive and Well, 61 St. 
John's 
L.Rev. 381 (1987).

[¶188] 
See also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and 
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1365 (1983); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard 
Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the 
Exclusionary Rule: THE NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 
Am.B.Found.Res.J. 611 (1983); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 
Neb.L.Rev. 195 (1976); Arval A. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and 
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57 Wn.L.Rev. 647 (1982); Walter Urbigkit, 
Address at the Bill of Rights Seminar, Casper Star-Tribune (July 1991); Robert 
B. Keiter, Address at the Wyoming State Bar Convention (Sept. 13, 1991); Robert 
S. Peck, The Bill of Rights & the Politics of Interpretation 
(1992).

[¶189] 
In addition, see Charles H. Sheldon, "We Feel Constrained to Hold. . . ." 
An Inquiry Into the Basis for Decision in the Exercise of State Judicial Review, 
27 Gonz. L.Rev. 73 (1991-92); Robert F. Utter, Advancing State Constitutions in 
Court. Protecting Individual Rights, 27 Trial 41 (October 1991); Elder Witt, 
State Supreme Courts: Tilting the Balance Toward Change, I Governing 30 (August 
1988); Vicki Quade, State Courts: The Next Frontier for Civil Liberties, 19 
Human Rights 14 (Winter 1992); John Kincaid & Robert F. Williams, The New 
Judicial Federalism: The States' Lead in Rights Protection, 65 J. State 
Government 50 (April-June 1992); Symposium, "The Law of the Land." The 
North Carolina 
Constitution and State Constitutional Law, 70 N.C.L.Rev. 1701 (1992); Barry 
Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice (1992); Calvin R. Massey, 
Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 Hastings 
L.J. 305 (1987); Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth Amendment, 59 Fordham L.Rev. 
597 (1991); Hans A. Linde, Are 
State 
Constitutions Common Law?, 34 Ariz.L.Rev. 215 (1992); National Conference on 
State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 Va.L.Rev. 1655 (1992); and Barry 
Latzer, State Constitutional Developments, 28 Crim.L.Bull. 141 (March-April 
1992).

[¶1.]     This extensive, but still 
incomplete, listing of legal review and source material, is not abstractly 
presented for this dissent. It serves to demonstrate that a mere one sentence 
adaptation of "lockstep" in the majority opinion ignores an actual universe of 
contrary decisions and academic analyses. In reality, the state of 
Wyoming and 
its judiciary looks backward and inward to another century. That character of 
bowing to special interest groups with unitary purpose can hardly serve our duty 
to the Wyoming Constitution and to build a greater society within a forward 
faced progressive state - our Wyoming.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶191] 
Harm is done in affirming Saldana's conviction within the present 
structure of Wyoming 
criminal law under the trial deficiencies presented. Far greater damage is done 
to the rights of every citizen under the state constitution, without persuasive 
logic, by the adaptation of a "lockstep" adjudicatory process to demean and 
de-effectuate this state's constitution. I emphatically and unreservedly 
dissent. Constitutional rights and their preservation remain, to each of us, a 
primary and unlimited obligation, whether as an office holder or as a citizen, 
jurist or lawyer. This decision, whether by dicta or with resolution, fails that 
responsibility.

[¶192] 
I dissent.

Footnotes

1The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by an affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 4.

2 
Other analytical techniques exist. See, e.g., Wallace Carson, Last Things Last: 
A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 19 Williamette 
L.Rev. 641 (1983); Robert F. Utter and Sanford 
E. 
Pitler, 
Presenting a State Constitutional Argument, 20 Ind.L.Rev. 635 
(1987).

3 
See, e.g., Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: 
Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 
U. Puget Sound 
L.Rev. 157 (1984); Robert F. Utter and Sanford 
E. 
Pitler, 
Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 
Ind.L.Rev. 635 (1987); Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington 
Search and Seizure Law, 9 U. Puget Sound 
L.Rev. 1 (1985); Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: 
State Constitutional Protection Against Private Abridgement, 8 U. 
Puget Sound 
L.Rev. 157 (1985).

4 
Utter and Pitler, supra note 2, p. 639 n. 31.

5 
Linda Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of Justices Durham, 
Kaye and Abrahamson in Shaping the Methodology of the "New Judicial Federalism," 
2 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 239 (1989).

6 
Id.

Footnotes for the 
Dissent

1 The 
court's opinion fails to recognize the status of congressional legislation 
involving wire taps and pen registers and the correlative fact that 
Wyoming has 
failed to enact pen register authenticating legislation. Following Smith v. 
Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979), the United States Congress commenced 
an active re-examination of communication privacy.

As a 
result, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was enacted to amend 
the original wire tap legislation of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq. (1979). The 
stated purpose of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was 
to

protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic 
communications. The bill amends the 1968 law to update and clarify Federal 
privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer 
and telecommunications technologies.

When 
the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against the arbitrary use of 
Government power to maintain surveillance over citizens, there were limited 
methods of intrusion into the "houses, papers, and effects" protected by the 
fourth amendment. During the intervening 200 years, development of new methods 
of communication and devices for surveillance has expanded dramatically the 
opportunity for such intrusions.

The 
telephone is the most obvious example. Its widespread use made it 
technologically possible to intercept the communications of citizens without 
entering homes or other private places. When the issue of Government wiretapping 
first came before the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 
[48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944] (1928), the Court held that wiretapping did not 
violate the fourth amendment, since there was no searching, no seizure of 
anything tangible, and no physical trespass.

Today, the Olmstead case is often remembered more for 
Justice Brandeis' prescient dissent than for its holding. Justice Brandeis 
predicted:

"Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, 
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by 
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of 
the home . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against 
such invasions of individual security?"

Forty years later, the Supreme Court accepted Justice 
Brandeis' logic in Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 
[88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576] (1967), holding that the fourth amendment applies 
to Government interception of a telephone conversation. At the same time, the 
Court extended fourth amendment protection to electronic eavesdropping on oral 
conversations in Berger v. New 
York, 
388 U.S. 41 
[87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040] (1967).

5 
U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News 3555-56 (1986).

Wyoming 
first responded comprehensively to those wire tap and privacy concerns by 
enactment of 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 121, Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-610 
(1985), the Communications Privacy Act of Wyoming.

The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, P.L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 
provided significant changes in federal law, including explicit removal of pen 
register legislation from 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq. (1979), and the creation of 
a new regulatory code for pen registers, 18 U.S.C. § 3121 through 3127 (1992), 
entitled Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices. John Applegate & Amy 
Grossman, Pen Registers After Smith v. Maryland, 15 
Harv.C.R.C.L.L.Rev. 753 (1980).

In 
result, Smith was explicitly superseded by the regulatory authority of the new 
enactment. The terminology of the pre-1986 federal law included in the 
definition of "contents": "information concerning the identity of the parties 
[participating in the] communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1979). This 
identical language was contained in Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(ii) and (iii) 
(1985). The federal Electronics Communications Privacy Act of 1986 deleted this 
law to make it clear that pen register information was not regulated by the wire 
tap statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1992), and clearly identified transfer to 
the new register statute responsibilities and control of this medium of 
intervention in personal privacy by governmental authorities. See Senate Report 
99-541, 5 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, at 3567:

Subsection 101(a)(5) of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act amends current section 2510(8) of title 18 to exclude from the 
definition of the term "contents," the identity of the parties or the existence 
of the communication. It thus distinguishes between the substance, purport or 
meaning of the communication and the existence of the communication or 
transactional records about it.

The 
importance of the legislative history is that the Wyoming legislature, even 
though the communication privacy legislation was addressed twice in amendment: 
1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, criminal code recodification; and 1989 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 118, specific amendments; did not remove identification information 
from the statute as had the United States Congress or pass pen register 
legislation as invited by the federal code. That law, the Electronics 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, effective ninety days after October 21, 1986, 
contained a two year gateway for state legislation. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 
(1992).

Consequently, on or about January 19, 1988, 
the preclusion provision of the federal pen register law went into effect. 
Clearly, and without question, the Wyoming 
statute contained identification preclusion and federal law then also precluded 
pen register usage since the Wyoming 
legislature had not provided the statutory changes required. Actually, in the 
text of 1989 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 118 neither the "contents" amendment to federal law nor the pen 
register legitimatizing legislation was considered.

It 
must be concluded: (a) Smith was superseded by subsequent federal legislation; 
(b) "contents" under Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601, in the clear meaning of the term 
itself, includes pen register identification information; (c) Wyoming has not 
accepted the invitation to enact pen register authenticating legislation; (d) 
warrantless acquisition and subsequent disclosure of the information from pen 
registers is illegal in this state and constitutes a felony offense under Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-3-602(c), except to the extent that federal authorities use federal 
processes for federal purposes; and (e) admission in evidence for criminal 
prosecution cannot be justified.

2 I 
do not suggest that it was impossible for the state drug agent to have legally, 
and perhaps even simplistically, obtained the desired information in compliance 
with the state constitution. The fact is he chose the shortcut in disregard of 
the Wyoming Constitution and statutes. Now this court is called upon to justify 
the violation by affirming the case in result and to also limit the Wyoming 
Constitution. Consequently, rights of Wyoming citizens under the Wyoming 
Constitution are not only limited by the constitutional interpretations of the 
United States Constitution by the United States Supreme Court, but also federal 
statutes and federal criminal investigative activities define the authority of 
the Wyoming legislature to respond to the Wyoming constitutional Bill of Rights. 
Not only the constitution of this state, but also the legislative responsibility 
for exercise of the police power are superseded and subverted by that conduct 
and this decision.

It 
is fair to suggest that the Wyoming 
legislature could pass one law and then close up and go home. That law would 
adopt the enactments, by reference, of the entire United States Code and all its 
peculiarities and technicalities regularly added. Fortunately, they have not 
and, hopefully, will not.

3 The 
Wyoming 
statute was changed at a date effective shortly after those events occurred. 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(v) redefined intercept to include "aural or other 
acquisition" by 1989 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 118. The majority did not find the change to be dispositive when 
the new provision became effective on June 
8, 1989, 
after approval on February 24, 1989, 
and was before any pen register had occurred for this case.

4 In 
part, that enactment presently provides:

§ 
3121. General prohibition on pen register and trap and trace device use; 
exception (a) In general. 
Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a pen register 
or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 
3123 of this title or under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.).

(b) 
Exception. The 
prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to the use of a pen 
register or a trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or wire 
communication service -

(1) 
relating to the operation, maintenance, and testing of a wire or electronic 
communication service or to the protection of the rights or property of such 
provider, or to the protection of users of that service from abuse of service or 
unlawful use of service; or

(2) 
to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or 
completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing service 
toward the completion of the wire communication, or a user of that service, from 
fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service; or

(3) 
where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.

(c) 
Penalty. Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a) shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

18 
U.S.C. § 3121 (1992).

The 
law provided a state two-year window for similar enactments. See Act 
Oct. 
21, 1986, 
P.L. 99-508, Title III, § 302, 100 Stat. 1872:

(b) 
Special rule for State authorizations of interceptions. Any pen register or trap 
and trace device order or installation which would be valid and lawful without 
regard to the amendments made by this title [adding 18 U.S.C. § 1367 and 3121 et 
seq.] shall be valid and lawful notwithstanding such amendments if such order or 
installation occurs during the period beginning on the date such amendments take 
effect and ending on the earlier of -

(1) 
the day before the date of the taking effect of changes in State law required in 
order to make orders or installations under Federal law as amended by this title 
[adding 18 U.S.C. § 1367 and 3121 et seq.]; or (2) the date two years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.

The 
federal legislation provided a procedure to obtain an order for installation in 
18 U.S.C. § 3122, comprehensive provisions relating to issuance in § 3123, a 
methodology in § 3124, and, finally, an exception provision in § 
3125.

5 The 
question presented does not address mere jurisdictional state court questions 
where acquisition results in the non-forum state and was legally obtained in 
accord with the laws of the place where acquired. See People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738 (1979) and Com. v. Bennett, 245 
Pa. 
Super. 457, 369 A.2d 493 (1976).

6 
With presentence confinement credit of 333 days and a sentence of two and 
one-half years to seven years, Saldana was released from penitentiary 
confinement months ago. I write in this case for the future of individual rights 
for citizens of this state from governmental dominance and destruction of 
individualism.

7 
This basis of thinking is self-evident since the United States Supreme Court 
decisions using the Fourteenth Amendment for state law incorporation came a 
number of decades later. Selective incorporation of the protection of the 
federal constitution's Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's 
restrictions on state action began with the famous footnote four in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783 n. 4, 
82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938). See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 11-2 
(2d ed. 1988). The court suggested that "[t]here may be narrower scope for 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on 
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those 
of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth." Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.  at 
152 n. 4, 58 S. Ct.  at 783 n. 4. From this thesis, the United States Supreme 
Court has selectively incorporated, into the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provisions of the Bill of Rights stated in the first eight amendments to the 
federal constitution.

Incorporation was quickly applied to the First Amendment 
freedoms of: speech, Fiske v. Kansas, 
274 U.S. 380, 47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108 (1927); press, Near v. Minnesota ex 
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931); assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937); petition, Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939); and religion, Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). The incorporation of rights now 
commonly associated with criminal prosecutions was more deliberate. The Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, Wolf, 338 U.S. 25, and to exclude illegally seized evidence, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), required the passage of more than a decade 
between decisions. Indeed, the decade of the 1960's brought incorporation to 
most of the rights involving prosecutions. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964) (incorporating Fifth Amendment right to be free of 
compelled self-incrimination); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 
23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969) (incorporating double jeopardy protection); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) (incorporating 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to speedy 
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965) 
(incorporating opportunity to confront witnesses).

8 
W.R.Cr.P. 46.1 was then rewritten by the rules committee following the 
publication of Simms. The proposed change was adopted by this court on 
October 30, 1992, 
with the amendment to be effective sixty days after publication - 
January 20, 1993.

9 I 
acknowledge what is said in special concurrence, but suggest that the litigants 
did not fail to address the state constitutional issue. This court provides an 
answer in the majority decision to a question that was never asked nor analyzed 
by the litigants. Rejection or acceptance of the independent state 
constitutional basis for decision is first considered in this present 
opinion.

10 
Timothy Stallcup followed in thesis and text the statement of Justice William 
Brennan in recognizing:

"[T]here exists in modern America the 
necessity for protecting all of us from arbitrary action by governments more 
powerful and more pervasive than any in our ancestors' time."

Stallcup, supra, 24 Ariz.St.L.J. at 695 n. 57 (quoting 
Brennan, supra 90 Harv.L.Rev. at 495). See also Charles G. Douglas, III, The 
Clash Over Constitutions; The Reassertion of State Authority, Judges J., Summer 
1987, at 39.

The 
significance of this issue to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. is shown by a 1990 
interview where he analyzed: "[T]he emphasis on the individual rights and their 
protection * * * has been the principal contribution to jurisprudence that the 
Court has made in my time, including things like supporting the extension of 
protections to state decisions that rely on state constitutions rather than on 
the federal Constitution." David O. Stewart, A Life on the Court, 77 
ABA J. 
62 (February 1991).

11 It 
is noteworthy in advancing legal thought that four of the most vocal supporters 
of state constitutional rights decision making are female justices of state 
supreme courts: Judith S. Kaye, Judge, New York Court of Appeals; Christine 
Durham, Justice Utah Supreme Court; Shirley Abrahamson, Justice, Wisconsin 
Supreme Court; and Yvonne Kauger, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court. See 
Abrahamson, supra, 18 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 723; Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective On Directions In State 
Constitutional Law, 1 Emerging Issues In State Constitutional Law 17 (1988); and 
Christine M. Durham, Obligation or Power? The New Judicial Federalism and the 
Policy-Making Rule of State Supreme Courts, 2 Emerging Issues In State 
Constitutional Law 219 (1989); see also Linda B. Matarese, Other Voices: The 
Role of Justices Durham, Kaye, and Abrahamson in Shaping the "New Judicial 
Federalism", 2 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 239 
(1989).

12 See 
Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How 
Illinois v. 
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and 
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 Tenn.L.Rev. 1 
(1991).

13 It 
is most interesting to observe that the Michigan Supreme Court refused to follow 
the United States Supreme Court's reconceptualization of Michigan's 
sentencing laws. See why the Michigan Constitution required a different 
understanding of its cruel and unusual punishment standard in People v. Bullock, 
440 Mich. 15, 
485 N.W.2d 866 (1992).