Title: Coleman v. Coleman

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LEROY COLEMAN 
 
v.  Record No. 971833     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 5, 1998 
VERDONDA COLEMAN, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Katie Coleman executed a will in which she gave her 
daughter Shirleeta a life estate in certain real property.  
The will further provided that "[u]pon termination of said 
life estate all the rest residue . . . of my estate I give as 
follows:  A.  One half in fee simple absolute to my daughter, 
Ms. Verdonda Coleman.  B.  One half divided equally between 
[my] daughter, Shirleeta Coleman, and my son Melvin Coleman."  
Katie Coleman died in 1992.  Shirleeta died intestate in 1994, 
unmarried and without any children.  Leroy Coleman, 
Shirleeta's father, was her sole heir at law.  Verdonda and 
Melvin Coleman filed a petition seeking a determination of the 
ownership of the remainder interest devised to Shirleeta. 
 
The trial court determined that Shirleeta's interest in 
the residuary estate was a contingent remainder which lapsed 
at her death and passed to Melvin and Verdonda under Code 
§ 64.1-65.1.  Shirleeta did not have a vested remainder in her 
mother's estate, according to the trial court, because 
Shirleeta did not possess a "present capacity" to take her 
residuary interest upon termination of the prior life estate.  
"[T]he prior life estate could only terminate upon Shirleeta's 
death; therefore, she could never take her remainder interest 
because in order for it to come into existence, she had to 
die." 
 
On appeal, Leroy Coleman asserts that the trial court's 
determination was in error because it ignores the early 
vesting rule and is inconsistent with Allison v. Allison, 101 
Va. 537, 44 S.E. 904 (1903).  We agree and will reverse the 
decision of the trial court. 
 
The early vesting rule is a firmly established principle 
of will construction in Virginia.  It provides that unless the 
intention to postpone vesting is clearly indicated in the 
will, all devises and bequests are to be construed as vesting 
at the testator's death.  Chapman v. Chapman, 90 Va. 409, 411, 
18 S.E. 913, 913 (1894).  Nothing in Katie Coleman's will 
indicates any intent to postpone vesting of the remainder 
interest in the residuary estate.  See Crews v. Hatcher, 91 
Va. 378, 379, 382, 21 S.E. 811, 812 (1895)("At the death of my 
[wife], I direct that the remaining portion of my estate shall 
be equally divided" does not show intent to postpone vesting.)  
Accordingly, applying the early vesting rule, Shirleeta's 
interest in the residue of her mother's estate vested at the 
time of her mother's death. 
 
2
This conclusion is also consistent with Allison, which 
allowed a life tenant to also own a remainder in the 
testator's residuary estate.  101 Va. at 540-56, 44 S.E. at 
904-10.  In that case, the testator left his daughter a life 
estate and, on her death, the remainder was to be divided 
among her surviving children.  If there were no surviving 
children, the remainder was to be divided among the testator's 
"heirs at law."  Id. at 540, 44 S.E. at 904-05.  Citing a 
number of English and American cases, Allison held that the 
testator's "heirs at law" were to be determined at the time of 
the testator's death, not at the death of the life tenant.  
Id. at 543-55, 44 S.E. at 906-10.  Thus, the life tenant, an 
heir of the testator at the time of his death, also had a 
remainder interest in the residual estate which vested in her 
at the time of the testator's death, subject only to being 
divested in the event her children survived her.  Id. at 542, 
556, 44 S.E. at 905, 910.  As in Allison, the life tenant here 
acquired a remainder interest in the testator's residual 
estate which vested in her at the time of the testator's 
death. 
 
The trial court's conclusion that a life tenant cannot 
also own a vested remainder because the life tenant cannot 
have a "present capacity" to take possession upon termination 
of the life estate misapplied the distinction between vested 
 
3
and contingent interests.  A vested remainder is an estate in 
land that presently exists in a definite person, but the 
actual enjoyment of it is deferred until the termination of a 
previous estate.  The certainty or uncertainty of the right of 
enjoyment, not the certainty of actual enjoyment distinguishes 
vested and contingent interests.  1 Frederick Deane Goodwin 
Ribble, Minor on Real Property § 709 (2d ed. 1928).  In this 
case, the right of enjoyment of the residuary estate vested at 
the testator's death -- only the actual enjoyment of the right 
was deferred until the termination of the life estate. 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is 
reversed and final judgment will be entered declaring that 
Shirleeta's one-fourth interest in the residual estate of 
Katie Coleman vested in her at her mother's death and at 
Shirleeta's death passed to her sole heir, Leroy Coleman. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
4