Title: People v. Sutherland

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 85982-Agenda 2-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								CECIL SUTHERLAND, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 16, 2000.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Cecil Sutherland, appeals from the denial of his
post-conviction petition after an evidentiary hearing in the circuit
court of Jefferson County. Because defendant has been sentenced
to death, his appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
We reverse defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
	Defendant was tried by a jury in 1989 for aggravated
kidnaping, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and three counts of
murder. The following evidence was presented at his trial. On July
2, 1987, an oil field worker discovered the nude body of 10-year-old Amy Schulz near an oil lease access road in rural Jefferson
County. Amy's body was lying on its stomach covered with dirt.
There were shoeprint impressions on her back. A large, open
wound on the right side of her neck exposed her spinal cord.
Several pubic hairs were found stuck in her rectal area. On the
ground near the body were automobile tire impressions and a shoe
impression similar to that on Amy's back. Her clothes were found
strewn along the access road.
	An autopsy of Amy's body revealed a wound to the neck
extending from her throat to her right ear. Her right eye was
hemorrhaged, the base of her ear was torn away from the skin, and
her lips were lacerated from compression against her teeth. There
were linear abrasions to the outer lips of the vagina and evidence
of tearing of the rectal mucosa. Her body also had a fractured rib,
torn liver, bruised esophagus, and hemorrhages in the vocal cords
and inside the skull. The medical examiner determined that Amy's
attacker had anally penetrated her, strangled her to
unconsciousness, slit her throat, and stepped on her body to force
exsanguination. Based on her stomach's gastric contents, the time
of death was fixed between 9:30 and 11 p.m. on July 1, 1987.
Evidence at trial indicated that Amy was last seen walking alone
on a road in Kell, Illinois, at approximately 9:10 to 9:15 p.m. on
July 1.
	Police determined that the tire prints found near the body were
consistent with only two types of tires manufactured in North
America: the Cooper "Falls Persuader" and the Cooper "Dean
Polaris." Police also ascertained that the shoe prints found on and
near the body were made by a boot sold by K mart called the
"Texas Steer."
	Several months after the crime, police were contacted by law
enforcement authorities at Glacier National Park in Montana,
where defendant had been arrested for shooting at park rangers.
Park authorities reported that defendant's car had a single Cooper
Falls Persuader tire on the right front wheel, and that a pair of
Texas Steer boots was found in his possession. Police also
discovered that, at the time of Amy's murder, defendant was living
in Dix, Illinois, a few miles from where the body was found.
	Expert witnesses testified for the State at trial that the tire
prints discovered near the body corresponded with the tread from
the tire found on defendant's car in Montana. Expert testimony
also indicated that: (1) 34 dog hairs found on Amy's clothing were
consistent with hairs from defendant's black Labrador and
inconsistent with hairs from Amy's family's dogs and her
neighbors' dogs; (2) 29 fibers found on Amy's clothing could have
originated from the carpet or upholstery of defendant's vehicle;
and (3) 19 fibers found in defendant's vehicle could have
originated from Amy's clothing. A forensic scientist also testified
for the State that the two pubic hairs recovered from Amy's rectal
area could have originated from defendant, but did not originate
from 24 other suspects in the case or from any member of Amy's
family.
	Defendant's sister-in-law testified that on the night of the
crime, defendant was at her house near Kell until 8 or 8:30 p.m.
An expert for the defense testified that most of the clothing fibers
recovered from defendant's vehicle were inconsistent with fibers
from Amy's clothing.
	The jury convicted defendant on all charges, found him
eligible for the death penalty, and determined that there were no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. The
trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to death.
	On direct appeal, this court held that the prosecution at trial
improperly argued before the jury that the hair and fiber evidence
conclusively established that Amy Schultz had been in defendant's
car. People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 25 (1992). We noted that
expert testimony at trial instead indicated merely that hair and
fibers from the crime scene were "consistent with" those from
defendant's car. Nevertheless, we held this error to be immaterial
because the evidence at trial was not closely balanced. Sutherland,
155 Ill. 2d  at 25-26. We thus declined to order a new trial, and
affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence in all
respects. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d  at 31.
	Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition in the
circuit court raising a variety of claims. The court dismissed most
of the claims in the petition, but granted an evidentiary hearing on
the following allegations: (1) that defendant's trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to discover and present evidence that
defendant's purchase of "Texas Steer" boots and installation of the
Cooper "Falls Persuader" tire on his car both occurred after the
date of the crime; (2) that the conviction of Amy's step-grandfather for sexual abuse subsequent to her death constituted
evidence of defendant's actual innocence; and (3) that the verdict
form signed by the jury at sentencing was defective.
	At the evidentiary hearing, defendant's mother testified that
at the time of Amy Schulz's murder, defendant wore black lace-up
boots that were nearly knee-high. In contrast, she testified, the
Texas Steer boots recovered from defendant after his arrest in
Montana were tan in color and "above-ankle." She stated that
defendant bought the Texas Steer boots sometime in July after
Amy Schulz's murder, and that she had offered the receipt for this
purchase to defendant's counsel prior to defendant's original trial.
She also testified that defendant changed the two front tires on his
car before he left for Montana and after the date of Amy's murder.
	The defense called a retired Chicago police officer who
testified that at least 75% of homicide victims and child sexual
assault victims know their attackers. He testified that in his career
as a police investigator, he would typically look for suspects in
murder and child sexual assault cases among the victim's family
and friends and among the last persons to have seen the victim
alive. He stated that his review of the evidence and the wounds in
the instant case had led him to the conclusion that the victim
probably knew her attacker.
	William Willis, Amy Schulz's step-grandfather, testified that
at the time of Amy's death, he and his wife lived in a house
approximately 100 yards from Amy's house. Because Amy's
parents worked and attended school, he and his wife often took
care of Amy and her brothers. On the evening of July 1, 1987,
Amy went to Willis' house to eat blackberries. She was around
Willis' dog that evening. About 8:30 p.m., Amy asked Willis for
a ride into Kell, approximately three-fourths of a mile from the
house. Willis told her no because he had to go to work and had to
do some shopping first. Amy then left, walking on foot toward
Kell. A few minutes later, Willis drove over the same road toward
Kell, and he waved to Amy as he passed her walking in the same
direction he was driving. That was the last time he saw Amy alive.
	Willis acknowledged that he pled guilty in 1994 to aggravated
criminal sexual abuse of a boy in the Boy Scout troop for which he
volunteered as a leader. Willis also acknowledged that the
presentence investigation report for that crime contained
statements from several other minor victims, including Amy's two
brothers, that he had sexually abused them. Willis acknowledged
that at his sentencing hearing for the 1994 guilty plea, one of these
alleged victims testified that Willis had forced him to have oral
and anal sex and that Willis threatened to kill him. Willis testified,
however, that there were no allegations that he had ever used
weapons or engaged in kidnapping in any of these cases.
	A mental health counselor and sex offender treatment
provider then testified that, based on her research, pedophiles
attracted to prepubescent females show a 22% crossover in also
molesting males, and those attracted to males show a 62%
crossover in also molesting females. She testified that she had
reviewed William Willis' medical and psychological evaluations
and had spoken with him briefly. In her opinion, there was a high
probability that Willis would cross over from sexually abusing
young boys to abusing young girls. She also testified that Willis
was prone to outbursts of anger and that when a victim resisted, he
used more violent physical force, escalating from fondling to anal
rape.
	Ronald Lawrence, a friend of defendant, testified that he had
changed all of the tires on defendant's car two separate times after
Amy Schulz's death and before defendant left for Montana.
Lawrence explained that he and defendant had to change tires
frequently because the rock road leading to Lawrence's house
contained metal particles and railroad spikes. Lawrence testified
that he told police and the public defender after defendant's arrest
that he had changed the tires on defendant's car after the date of
Amy Schulz's murder. Lawrence stated that although he was
called and did testify as a mitigation witness at defendant's
sentencing hearing, he was not called to testify at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.
	Michael Anthis, who investigated the murder of Amy Schulz
as captain of detectives for the Jefferson County sheriff's
department, testified that he interviewed Ronald Lawrence on July
12, 1988. Anthis testified that, according to his own notes of that
interview, Lawrence told him that defendant had been at
Lawrence's house near Iuka, Illinois, from 4 p.m. until 10:30 p.m.
the night of July 1, 1987. Anthis testified that he did not provide
these notes to either the prosecution or defense attorneys prior to
defendant's trial and that he did not reduce his notes to a typed
report because he was aware that defendant had "offered up a
different alibi than what Mr. Lawrence was stating."
	James Henson testified that he was defendant's public
defender for his trial. Henson testified that although he was aware
that authorities in Montana had returned defendant's Texas Steer
boots to defendant's mother, Henson did not ask for or examine
the boots. Henson also testified that although defendant informed
him prior to trial that defendant had purchased the boots
approximately two months after Amy Schulz's murder, Henson
did not emphasize the boots at trial because he did not think they
were important to the case. Henson further testified that before
defendant's trial, he was aware of information, including a
statement by defendant's mother, that the tires on defendant's car
were changed after Amy Schulz's death, but Henson did not
investigate these reports and did not make any arguments at trial
concerning the timing of the tires' installation. Henson also
testified that he did not pursue a trial strategy of casting suspicion
on William Willis, Amy's step-grandfather, because he had
received a report from the State indicating that the hair and fiber
specimens found at the crime scene were inconsistent with
samples obtained from Willis.
	Defendant testified that between July and October 1987, he
bought approximately 14 different used tires. He stated that his
family lived on a farm and frequently bought used tires for a
variety of purposes. In August 1987, he replaced all four of his
tires at Ronald Lawrence's house, and used these tires when he
drove to Montana. Defendant also testified that in July of 1987, he
typically wore either tennis shoes or over-the-calf engineer boots.
In August 1987, before he drove to Montana, he purchased a pair
of Texas Steer boots at K mart. Defendant stated that he provided
all of this information to his public defender before his trial and
offered to provide corroboration of it, such as his receipt for the
boots, but the information was not used at trial.
	The parties agreed to forgo testimony or oral argument on the
sufficiency of the verdict form at sentencing and instead submit
only written briefs on that issue. The circuit court subsequently
denied the post-conviction petition in all respects, ruling that
defendant had failed to establish a substantial deprivation of his
constitutional rights.
ANALYSIS
	Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing
the post-conviction petition because his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to present evidence concerning the boot and
tire impressions found at the crime scene. Defendant argues that
trial counsel should have procured and presented evidence that
defendant did not come into possession of the relevant boots and
tire until after the crime was committed.
	Findings entered by a trial court after an evidentiary hearing
on a post-conviction petition will be reversed on appeal only if
manifestly erroneous. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 386
(1998). In order to establish a constitutional claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984). Second, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
	Testimony presented at the post-conviction hearing indicated
that, prior to defendant's trial, defense counsel was aware of
evidence that defendant did not own a pair of Texas Steer boots at
the time of Amy Schulz's murder. Specifically, trial counsel
testified at the evidentiary hearing that defendant informed him
prior to trial that defendant had purchased his Texas Steer boots
two months after the crime occurred. Counsel also testified that he
was aware that defendant's mother had the boots in her possession
at the time of trial, but that he did not request to examine them.
Additionally, defendant's mother testified that at the time of the
murder, defendant typically wore a different kind of boots.
	The testimony at the post-conviction hearing also indicated
that defendant's trial counsel was aware prior to trial of evidence
that defendant had changed the tires on his car after the time of
Amy Schulz's death but before defendant drove to Montana.
Specifically, there was substantial testimony presented at the
hearing that counsel learned of this information from three
different sources: defendant, defendant's mother, and Ronald
Lawrence. Counsel himself acknowledged at the hearing that he
was aware of such evidence, but failed to investigate it or present
it at trial.
	We hold that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
investigate and present evidence concerning the boots and tire.
Because the State's evidence at trial consisted primarily of a
variety of items introduced to associate defendant with the crime
scene, an attack on the suggested links between defendant and the
boots and tire could have played a prominent role in the defense.
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that his main trial
strategy was to discredit the expert testimony purportedly tying
defendant to the crime. In light of this strategy, it was incumbent
on counsel to utilize available means of casting doubt on the
physical evidence which the State relied upon. Although counsel
sought to convince the jury that the hair and fiber evidence
introduced by the State was not conclusive proof of defendant's
guilt, he failed to present the jury with evidence discrediting two
of the most salient and significant items in the State's case.
Counsel's performance thus fell below a reasonable level of
assistance.
	We also find that counsel's ineffective performance caused
substantial prejudice to defendant. Although the State presented
numerous items of evidence associating defendant with the crime,
none of them was singularly compelling. If counsel had succeeded
in raising questions as to whether the boots and tires owned by
defendant played any role in the crime committed against Amy
Schulz, there is a reasonable probability that the jury also would
have doubted at least some of the other physical evidence which
the State attempted to link to the crime, and hence quite possibly
may have acquitted defendant.
CONCLUSION
	For the above reasons, we conclude that defendant's
convictions must be reversed. In making this determination, we are
particularly mindful of our decision in the direct appeal of this
case. In that opinion, we held that the prosecution at trial
improperly overstated the strength of the fiber-comparison
evidence in its arguments to the jury. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d  at 25.
Nevertheless, we held that this error did not warrant reversal
because of the substantial evidence linking defendant to the crime.
Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d  at 25. The combination, however, of this
improper prosecutorial argument and trial counsel's ineffective
assistance now lead us to conclude that the original trial was
sufficiently compromised by error as to vitiate our confidence in
its fairness. Because we find the evidence at defendant's original
trial sufficient to support conviction, a second trial will not be
barred by constitutional principles of double jeopardy. In so
holding, however, we make no conclusion as to defendant's guilt
that will be binding on retrial. See People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 390 (1998). In light of our disposition, we need not address
defendant's remaining contentions on appeal.
	The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the circuit court for retrial.
Reversed and remanded.
	JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
	The defendant raises a number of contentions in this post-conviction appeal, but the majority considers only two matters,
which concern allegations that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to present certain evidence at trial. The post-conviction
judge rejected these claims after an evidentiary hearing, and those
determinations should be upheld on review unless they are
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). On the record before us, I
do not believe that the defendant has met this standard, and
therefore I would affirm the denial of relief under these portions
of the defendant's post-conviction petition.
	The defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to challenge the State's contention that he had a preference
for the brand of boots whose prints were discovered at the crime
scene. The trial evidence showed that the footprints were made by
a particular brand, called the "Texas Steer," sold at K-mart stores.
The defendant, at the time of his arrest in Montana, was in
possession of a pair of Texas Steer boots. Although the latter pair
of boots did not make the prints found at the crime scene, the
prosecution argued that the defendant's subsequent ownership of
a pair of Texas Steer boots evinced his preference for the brand.
The defendant argues, and the majority agrees, that trial counsel
should have presented evidence to show that the defendant was
wearing boots of a different style and brand around the time of the
commission of these offenses.
	Unlike the majority, I do not believe that counsel's failure to
present the proposed evidence was prejudicial to the defendant
under the standard expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A defendant
complaining of ineffective assistance of counsel must show both
that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency
prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Establishing prejudice requires a
defendant to show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068. Assuming, without deciding, that counsel was deficient in
this regard, I do not believe that the defendant has established that
he was prejudiced by the asserted error.
	The relative insignificance of the footprint evidence is
apparent from the brief notice it received in this court's opinion on
direct appeal. The court's opinion mentioned the footprint
evidence only once, during a summary of the testimony presented
at trial. According to the opinion, the evidence showed that
footprints were found on the victim's back and on the ground
nearby, and that the two sets of prints were "similar in design."
People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1992). Notably, in
summarizing the trial evidence the opinion did not also mention
the defendant's subsequent possession of boots of the same brand
that made the prints, or the prosecution's theory that the defendant
had a preference for boots of that brand. At no other time did the
opinion refer to the footprint evidence, and even omitted it from
later discussions of the strength of the evidence of guilt in this
case. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d  at 17-18, 25.
	At trial the State presented strong evidence, apart from that
involving the footprints, connecting the defendant to the present
offenses. As this court noted on direct review, two pubic hairs
removed from the victim's rectum were consistent in all respects
with those from the defendant, but were dissimilar to those of the
victim's family members and 24 other suspects. Gold-colored
fibers found on various articles of the victim's clothing were
consistent in all respects with the carpeting in the defendant's
vehicle, but were dissimilar to the carpet samples from the child's
environment. Also, a foreign fiber found in the victim's shirt was
consistent in every respect with fibers from the seat of the
defendant's car, but was dissimilar to sample fibers from the
child's environment. Other evidence showed that fibers found on
the front passenger side of the defendant's vehicle were consistent
with fibers from the victim's shirt and shorts. Dog hairs found on
the victim's clothing were consistent in all characteristics with a
standard from the defendant's dog, and other evidence showed that
dog hairs could be found throughout the defendant's car. Finally,
tire impressions found at the crime scene could have been made by
the defendant's car. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d  at 17-18.
	The absence from this court's prior opinion of any discussion
of the footprint evidence, beyond an abbreviated reference to the
matching prints found at the crime scene, illustrates well its
relative lack of importance to the prosecution's case at trial. Here,
the evidence showed only that footprints found at the scene could
have been made by a Texas Steer brand boot, and that the
defendant was later found to be in possession of a pair of boots of
that particular brand. Relying on this evidence, the prosecutor
argued that the defendant had a preference for the brand and could
have been wearing them when he committed the present offenses.
Although there existed evidence that defense counsel could have
presented to counter the State's theory regarding the defendant's
preference for Texas Steer boots, I do not believe that counsel's
failure to introduce this testimony was prejudicial. Because the
footprint evidence played only a minor role in the defendant's
trial, and because the remaining evidence provided strong proof of
the defendant's guilt, I would conclude that the defendant was not
prejudiced by counsel's failure to challenge more vigorously the
State's theory about his preferred footwear.
	In a separate contention, the defendant argues that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence
about the tires on his car. At trial, the State introduced testimony
showing that tire impressions found at the crime scene were made
by either a Cooper "Falls Persuader" or a Cooper "Dean Polaris"
tire, and that the tire found on the right front wheel of the
defendant's car at the time of the defendant's arrest several months
later was a Cooper Falls Persuader tire. Investigators were not able
to determine whether the defendant's particular tire had made the
impressions.
	In the present appeal, the majority agrees with the defendant
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence
that the defendant changed the tires on his automobile perhaps
once, and possibly twice, in the period between the commission of
the present offenses and the defendant's subsequent apprehension
in Montana. The evidence presented by the defendant at the post-conviction hearing was contradicted in several important respects,
however, and I do not believe that counsel was ineffective for
failing to discover and introduce the testimony the defendant now
urges.
	The evidence in question was introduced at the post-conviction hearing through the testimony of Ronald Lawrence, a
friend of the defendant. Lawrence testified that he changed a
number of tires on the defendant's car during the period after the
commission of the offenses involved here and before the defendant
left Illinois for Montana. Lawrence also stated that he had
conveyed this same information to defense counsel and to the
police some time before trial. In the original proceedings in this
case, Lawrence had testified in behalf of the defendant only at the
capital sentencing hearing.
	Officer David Leigh of the Illinois State Police testified that
he questioned Ronald Lawrence in October 1987, four months
after the present offenses were committed. At that time, Lawrence
did not mention changing any tires for the defendant. Leigh
questioned Lawrence a number of years later, in 1996, after
Lawrence had provided an affidavit stating that he had changed the
defendant's tires. On this occasion, Lawrence said that he had
mentioned the changing of the tires to defense counsel, a defense
investigator, and a captain with the Jefferson County sheriff's
department. Leigh believed that Lawrence was being prompted by
his wife during the interview.
	The defendant's trial lawyer, James Henson, testified at the
evidentiary hearing that he had one note suggesting that defendant
might have purchased tires from someone. Henson denied having
any specific evidence to support this, however. A defense
investigator, Sherry Gutzler, testified that she did not recall that
Lawrence had ever told her that he had changed tires for the
defendant. She stated that if he had, she would have attempted to
follow up on that lead, regarding it as important.
	At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction judge rejected the defendant's claims that counsel was
ineffective, including the allegation that counsel should have
introduced evidence-specifically, Lawrence's testimony-to show
that the defendant had his tires changed at some point after the
commission of the present crimes and before his departure for
Montana. Lawrence's testimony did not go unchallenged, and, on
this basis, the post-conviction judge could well have concluded
that there was reason to doubt the utility of the witness's testimony
at the guilt stage of the proceedings. In addition, there remained
strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. As noted earlier, a post-conviction judge's determinations made after an evidentiary
hearing will be reversed only if they are contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385
(1998). I do not see any reason to disturb the post-conviction
court's decision on this issue.
	Rather than grant the defendant relief on the two questions
discussed by the majority, I would uphold those portions of the
post-conviction court's judgment and would consider in this
appeal the remaining contentions raised by the defendant but not
discussed in the present opinion.