Title: Sheikh v. Buckingham Correctional Center

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
SAEED SHEIKH 
 
v.  Record No. 020677   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          November 1, 2002 
BUCKINGHAM CORRECTIONAL 
CENTER, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Michael P. McWeeny, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which a 
petitioner alleged that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel during the jury sentencing phase of his trial. 
 
The petitioner, Saeed A. Sheikh, was indicted for assault 
by mob, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-38 and –41.  Sheikh was 
accused of being a member of a gang that shot and killed a high 
school student, David Albrecht, with the intent to maim, 
disable, disfigure, or kill him.  Sheikh was convicted of the 
charged offense in a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County.  The jury fixed Sheikh's punishment at a term of 17 
years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, and the trial court 
sentenced Sheikh in accordance with the jury verdict. 
 
After exhausting his remedies on direct appeal, Sheikh 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.  
Sheikh principally asserted, in relevant part, that he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure during the sentencing 
proceeding to present mitigating evidence and to make an 
effective closing argument. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Sheikh's 
petition on various grounds, including an argument that Sheikh 
failed to sustain his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), of establishing that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient and that Sheikh suffered prejudice as 
a result of his counsel's performance.  Based upon a review of 
the trial record, the pleadings on habeas corpus, and an 
affidavit submitted by Sheikh's father stating that he and other 
family members had been available to testify at the sentencing 
proceeding, the trial court dismissed Sheikh's petition with 
prejudice.  Sheikh appeals. 
 
We first review the evidence presented at Sheikh's criminal 
trial.  That evidence established that Sheikh was a leader in a 
gang called "TRG."  On February 26, 1998, two members of the 
gang were involved in a violent altercation at a convenience 
store.  One member of TRG, Cham Choup, sustained extensive 
injuries to his face. 
 
The next morning, Sheikh, Michael Choup, who was Cham 
Choup's brother, and several other gang members planned to 
assault John C. Metcalf, one of the men who injured Cham.  The 
gang members waited in vehicles outside Pimmit Hills High School 
 
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for Metcalf to leave.  Some of the members were armed with 
baseball bats and large sticks. 
 
At 12:15 p.m., Metcalf left the school with Albrecht, who 
had not been involved in the previous day's fight.  Metcalf and 
Albrecht observed the waiting vehicles and left the school 
parking lot in Albrecht's car, followed by the gang members in 
their two vehicles.  Sheikh was seated in the back seat of one 
car behind the car's driver.  Michael Choup was seated in the 
front passenger's seat of the same vehicle. 
 
Albrecht drove his car to a nearby school so that Metcalf 
could run into the school to escape from the gang members.  
Before Metcalf could get out of the car, the vehicle carrying 
Michael Choup "pulled up" along the passenger's side of 
Albrecht's vehicle.  Michael Choup leaned across the driver's 
seat of the vehicle in which he was riding and fired three shots 
from a "sawed off" pump rifle into Albrecht's car.  Although all 
three shots missed Metcalf, a bullet struck Albrecht in the 
head, killing him. 
 
In March 1998, after learning that Michael Choup had 
implicated Sheikh in a statement made to the police, Sheikh 
discussed his involvement in the Albrecht killing with Detective 
Robert J. Murphy of the Fairfax County Police Department.  
Sheikh admitted that he was one of the gang's leaders, and that 
 
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he and other gang members intended to assault and batter Metcalf 
to avenge Cham Choup's beating. 
 
Sheikh stated that he had been sick on the morning of the 
assault.  He maintained that he was unaware that Michael Choup 
had a gun, and that he did not know that Michael planned to 
shoot Metcalf.  Sheikh asserted that if he had known Michael had 
a gun, he would not have accompanied Michael to assault Metcalf.  
However, Sheikh admitted that Michael had said some things 
before the shooting that made him think that Michael may have 
had a gun. 
 
Although Sheikh recognized that Michael Choup's actions 
were "wrong and stupid," he stated that he did not blame Michael 
for his conduct.  Sheikh further stated, in relevant part: 
If I saw my brother like that, I'd probably do the 
same [thing].  I'd go crazy.  I wouldn't [care] if it 
was daylight out.  Get a [gun] or whatever, I'd go out 
and kill 'em.  I mean I'd wear a mask . . . .  I'd go 
out in daylight.  I mean I'd try to do it at night.  
But if I caught 'em [outside] in the day, hell, yeah, 
I'd shoot that [motherf_cker].  I'd back my brother 
with my life. 
 
 
Detective Murphy read Sheikh's entire statement to the 
jury.  On cross-examination, trial counsel established that 
Sheikh had been cooperative with Detective Murphy, and that 
Murphy's investigation did not reveal any indication Sheikh had 
handled the gun used to shoot Albrecht or that Sheikh had given 
"any directives of who to shoot." 
 
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At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, Sheikh's 
counsel moved to strike the prosecution's evidence on the ground 
that any "mob" that Sheikh may have belonged to did not share 
Michael Choup's intent to shoot and kill Metcalf.  The trial 
court denied the motion. 
 
Sheikh was the only witness to testify on behalf of the 
defense.  He stated that he would not have gone with the other 
gang members if he had been aware of Michael Choup's intent.  
Sheikh also testified concerning his personal and family 
circumstances at the time of the offense.  He related that he 
was sick on the date of the offense, that his mother was ill 
with cancer, and that he worked on a construction project to 
help pay his family's expenses.  At the conclusion of all the 
evidence, Sheikh's counsel renewed his motion to strike, which 
the trial court again denied. 
 
During closing arguments in the guilt phase, Sheikh's 
counsel reiterated his argument that Michael Choup was not a 
member of any "mob" that may have included Sheikh, because 
Michael's intent to kill Metcalf was not shared by the other 
"mob" members.  Counsel also reminded the jury that after the 
shooting, Sheikh had stopped Michael from getting out of the 
vehicle to continue his attack on Metcalf. 
 
After the jury returned its verdict finding Sheikh guilty 
of the offense charged in the indictment, the trial court began 
 
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the penalty phase of the trial.  Neither party presented an 
opening statement. 
 
The Commonwealth presented evidence that Sheikh had prior 
convictions for felonious defacement and damage to private 
property, unlawful entry of a building, and assault and battery.  
The defense did not present any evidence. 
 
In his closing statement to the jury, the prosecutor made 
brief remarks emphasizing that the gang members "took the life 
of an innocent young man" who had not participated "in the 
quarrels that the gang was worried about."  The prosecutor asked 
the jury to fix Sheikh's punishment at "the high end" of the 
sentencing range because of the magnitude of the crime and 
Sheikh's "background as a criminal." 
 
In response, Sheikh's counsel made the following argument 
to the jury: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I thank you for 
the efforts that you have put in today. 
 
 
You've heard my arguments before.  I'm not going 
to repeat them again.  You know what the involvement 
was here and I respect your decisions. 
 
 
I understand the prosecution's position as far as 
his asking for the high end.  You've heard the 
evidence.  You've heard my argument previously. 
 
 
Obviously, you know I would ask for the lower 
end.  We do not minimize what has happened, but we're 
trying to somehow figure out what the future's going 
to hold.  Please search your hearts.  Thank you. 
 
 
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In a later sentencing hearing before the trial court, 
Sheikh's counsel moved the court to set aside the verdict on 
various grounds, including the argument that Sheikh had not 
shared Michael Choup's intent to kill Metcalf.  The trial court 
denied the motion. 
 
Sheikh argues on appeal that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  He contends 
that his trial counsel's performance during the sentencing phase 
of the trial should be assessed under the standard set forth in 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), because there was 
a total collapse of the adversarial process during that 
proceeding.  In support of this conclusion, Sheikh emphasizes 
trial counsel's failure to introduce any evidence concerning his 
character or the mitigating circumstances of the crime, or to 
provide any argument supporting a lesser sentence by the jury.  
We disagree with Sheikh's arguments. 
 
A defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 685-86.  Under this 
constitutional guarantee, a defendant is entitled to counsel who 
is reasonably competent and who provides advice that is within 
the range of competence required of attorneys in criminal cases.  
Id. at 687. 
 
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The issue whether a defendant received effective assistance 
of counsel at trial presents a mixed question of law and fact 
that is reviewed de novo on appeal.  Id. at 698.  To prevail on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 
ordinarily must satisfy both parts of the two-part test set 
forth in Strickland. 
 
First, the petitioner must show that "counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness."  Id. at 688.  In making this determination, the 
court considering the habeas corpus petition "must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance."  Id. at 689. 
 
Second, if counsel's performance is found to have been 
deficient, the petitioner also must show that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 694. 
 
In United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court recognized 
three very limited circumstances in which the Strickland test 
will not be applied and prejudice will be presumed from 
counsel's performance.  The first such situation arises when a 
defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of a criminal 
proceeding.  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.  The second circumstance 
 
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is when a defendant is represented by counsel at trial, but 
counsel "entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to 
meaningful adversarial testing."  Id.  Under the third 
exception, prejudice will be presumed when circumstances 
surrounding a trial prevent counsel from providing effective 
assistance to a defendant.  Id. at 659-60. 
 
Sheikh relies on the second exception recognized in Cronic, 
and argues that he thereby is relieved of establishing prejudice 
under the Strickland test.  We observe, however, that the United 
States Supreme Court recently stressed the limited scope of this 
second exception in Bell v. Cone, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1843 
(2002).  There, the Court emphasized its language in Cronic that 
a presumption of prejudice will arise under this second 
exception only when "counsel entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."  Id. at 
___, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659). 
 
In Bell, the petitioner, who had been convicted of capital 
murder, complained that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to produce mitigating evidence at the 
sentencing proceeding, and by waiving a closing argument at that 
proceeding.  Id. at ___, 122 S.Ct at 1851.  In rejecting the 
petitioner's claim, the Court observed that counsel's alleged 
errors "are plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney 
 
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errors we have held subject to Strickland's performance and 
prejudice components."  Id. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1851-52. 
 
Sheikh's claims similarly target his counsel's failure 
during the sentencing proceeding to present mitigation evidence 
and to make an effective closing argument to the jury.1  Guided 
by the Supreme Court's analysis in Bell, we find no merit in 
Sheikh's assertion that his ineffective assistance claim falls 
within the second exception stated in Cronic.  Sheikh's counsel 
rendered assistance to his client at the sentencing proceeding 
by asking the jury to sentence Sheikh at the "lower end" of the 
sentencing range, and by reminding the jury that he already had 
presented evidence and argument on behalf of his client.  In 
that earlier evidence and argument, counsel emphasized 
repeatedly that Sheikh did not share Michael Choup's intent to 
kill Metcalf.  Counsel also brought to the jury's attention 
Sheikh's illness on the date of the offense, the fact that his 
mother had cancer, and the poor state of his family's financial 
circumstances. 
 
Based on these facts, we hold that counsel did not entirely 
fail during the sentencing proceeding to subject the 
prosecutor's case to meaningful adversarial testing.  See Bell, 
                     
 
1 We do not consider Sheikh's claim on appeal that his 
counsel's performance also was deficient as a result of 
counsel's waiver of opening statement at the sentencing 
 
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___ U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1851-52; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.  
Thus, Sheikh's claim fails under Cronic and we will consider the 
claim further under the standard set forth in Strickland.  In 
accordance with that standard, we will assess "the 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of 
the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's 
conduct."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 
At the sentencing proceeding, Sheikh's counsel pursued a 
strategy that conceded the seriousness of the offense and the 
Commonwealth's interest in obtaining a significant sentence, 
while minimizing the prosecutor's ability to put evidence before 
the jury.  Under Code § 19.2-295.1, Sheikh's counsel's decision 
not to present evidence during the sentencing phase precluded 
the prosecutor from introducing any evidence other than a record 
of Sheikh's prior offenses.  See also Rule 3A:17.1(e).  Thus, by 
adopting this strategy, Sheikh's counsel was able to remind the 
jury of the evidence and argument he recently presented in the 
guilt phase of the trial, while shielding Sheikh from further 
cross-examination and preventing the prosecution from presenting 
any rebuttal evidence. 
 
We also note the temporal context in which Sheikh's counsel 
implemented these tactical decisions.  The sentencing phase of 
                                                                  
proceeding, because Sheikh did not assert this claim in his 
petition filed in the trial court. 
 
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the trial took place only one hour after the conclusion of the 
guilt phase evidence and argument, and the prosecutor had 
elected to waive an opening statement in the sentencing 
proceeding.  Therefore, the evidence and argument that had been 
presented to the jury in the guilt phase was still fresh in the 
jurors' minds.  We also observe that the substantive content of 
the evidence Sheikh claims should have been presented during the 
sentencing phase, summarized in the affidavit of Sheikh's 
father, was not materially different from the evidence of 
Sheikh's family life and work experience presented to the jury 
in the guilt phase of the trial.2  Therefore, we hold that trial 
counsel's strategy, viewed as of the time of its implementation, 
did not fall below "an objective standard of reasonableness."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90. 
 
Because Sheikh has not established that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient, we need not address the "prejudice" 
component of the Strickland test.  See id. at 697; Curo v. 
Becker, 254 Va. 486, 493, 493 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1997).  Sheikh 
has failed to meet his evidentiary burden under Strickland, and 
we conclude that he was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
                     
 
2 We do not consider the additional affidavits Sheikh 
submitted after the trial court entered its final order on 
December 18, 2001. 
 
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trial court did not err in dismissing with prejudice Sheikh's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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