Title: State v. John V. Dundon, Jr.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1423-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
John V. Dundon, Jr.,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 11, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 9, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Miech and Bonnie L. Gordon 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by William S. Coleman, Jr., assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Lara M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James D. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1423-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John V. Dundon, Jr.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, Robert J. Miech and Bonnie L. Gordon, 
Circuit Court Judges.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The issue presented in this 
case is whether a person may assert a defense of privilege to 
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.  The issue arises in 
John V. Dundon, Jr.'s appeal from his conviction under Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23 (1995-96)1 and from the denial of his post-
conviction motion requesting relief. 
FACTS 
¶2 
John Dundon (Dundon) managed a Clark Oil gas station 
at 60th Street and Fond du Lac Avenue in northwest Milwaukee.  
By late June 1995, Dundon had been working at the gas station 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
2 
for 14 or 15 months.  His duties included collecting and 
depositing bank receipts. 
¶3 
The gas station had a safe.  On June 21, 1995, the 
safe was filled to capacity because the station's armored car 
company (Federal Armored) had not picked up any receipts for 
four days.  The company had failed to come on Saturday the 17th 
as well as the following Monday and Tuesday.  On Wednesday the 
21st, Dundon called the company and was told it would send an 
armored vehicle that day.  When the vehicle did not come at the 
normal pick up time, Dundon called back and the company said it 
would send a vehicle for an evening pick up.  The vehicle never 
came.  Sometime around 10:30 p.m. or 11:00 p.m., an employee 
called Dundon and advised him that he was unable to drop any 
more envelopes into the safe.   
¶4 
Dundon later told a jury he could not call another 
armored car company, and he could not have someone accompany him 
to the bank.  He said his only alternatives were to take the 
cash to the bank himself or to hide the money in the back room 
and risk getting fired because it was against company policy, 
risk other employees knowing he had put a large amount of money 
in the back room, and risk someone coming in the back room to 
rob him.  
¶5 
On June 22, knowing that he would have to take about 
$22,000 ($17,000 of which was cash) to the bank himself, Dundon 
brought a loaded Raven hand gun to the station. 
¶6 
Dundon kept the gun in his car when he arrived at 
work.  He proceeded to bundle the money, put the bundles into 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
3 
two bags (one made of clear plastic), and wrapped the bags 
inside a coat.  He then drove to Milwaukee Western Bank at 6001 
West Capitol Drive, several minutes from the station.  Dundon 
testified that, after arriving at the bank, he got out of his 
vehicle, then reached back and took the gun off the passenger 
seat of the vehicle.  He placed the gun on his right hip in the 
waistband of his blue jeans.  Dundon claimed the gun was exposed 
but that the barrel of the gun was tucked in his waistband and 
covered by his belt.  He then picked up the two large bags of 
money and went into the bank. 
¶7 
Otis Lee Roberson (Roberson), a security guard at the 
bank, observed Dundon pull up, get out of his vehicle, reach 
back into his vehicle and pull a gun out from under the seat.  
Roberson then observed Dundon tuck the hand gun in his waistband 
and pull his shirt down.  Before Dundon got inside the bank, 
Roberson told the secretary to call 911 because he saw someone 
put a gun in his pants.  Richard Burdick (Burdick), the bank's 
vice president, called 911. 
¶8 
After Dundon entered the bank, Roberson observed 
Dundon approach the teller. He testified he could not see the 
weapon because it was covered by Dundon's shirt.  No disturbance 
occurred once Dundon was in the bank; in fact, Dundon spoke 
pleasantly with the bank teller.  Seeing this and realizing that 
Dundon was a frequent customer, Burdick called 911 again and 
reported that the situation was not threatening and he would 
wait for the police.  The police arrived within two to three 
minutes.  Burdick approached Dundon while Dundon was speaking 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
4 
with the teller and told Dundon that the Milwaukee police wanted 
to talk to him.  According to Burdick, after the officers asked 
Dundon some questions, Dundon lifted his shirt to reveal the 
butt end of the weapon.  Roberson testified that a police 
officer patted Dundon down and took the gun out of his 
waistband. 
¶9 
On June 23, 1995, Dundon was charged with carrying a 
concealed weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶10 A jury heard the case on March 28, 1996, before 
Circuit Judge Robert J. Miech.  At trial, Judge Miech excluded 
evidence about the defendant's concern of being a crime target 
while transporting the funds to the bank.  He excluded all 
proffered evidence of the prevalence of crime in the area, 
including a recent robbery at the bank, and excluded proffered 
evidence of Dundon's previous experience as a victim of 
robberies and robbery attempts, including a claim that he had 
once been set up and shot at by a gunman.  Additionally, Judge 
Miech denied Dundon's theory of defense instruction on the 
privilege of necessity. 
¶11 The next day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.  
On April 18, 1996, Judge Miech sentenced Dundon to 45 days in 
the Milwaukee County House of Correction with Huber privileges. 
¶12 On April 22, 1996, Dundon filed a Notice of Intent to 
Pursue Post-conviction Relief.  The court stayed his sentence 
pending post-conviction relief.   
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
5 
¶13 On March 10, 1997, Dundon filed a post-conviction 
motion for a new trial or sentence modification, requesting an 
evidentiary hearing to support his motion.  On April 14, 1997, 
Circuit Judge Bonnie L. Gordon entered an order denying the 
post-conviction motion without the requested hearing.  Judge 
Gordon stated that "this Court finds nothing in the record to 
indicate there has been any abuse of discretion on the part of 
the sentencing court or any other reason to modify the sentence 
imposed.  The Court finds that the sentence is not unduly harsh 
under the particular circumstances in this case."   Judge Gordon 
distinguished Dundon's case from State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 
199, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996),  where this court found a narrow 
defense of privilege to the charge of felon in possession of a 
firearm.  Judge Gordon stated:  "Under the five-step analysis 
set forth in Coleman, the defendant fails to satisfy the first 
test because no reasonable jury could conclude that Dundon was 
'under an unlawful, present, imminent, and impending threat of 
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death 
or serious bodily injury, or the defendant reasonably believes 
he or she is under such a threat.'" 
¶14 On May 5, 1997, Dundon filed a timely notice of appeal 
of both his judgment of conviction and sentence and the order 
denying his post-conviction motion.  On December 23, 1997, the 
court of appeals certified the appeal to this court under Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) § 809.61, to decide whether the law of privilege 
may be asserted as a defense to the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon in violation of § 941.23. We accepted the 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
6 
certification "for consideration of all issues raised before the 
court of appeals." 
ANALYSIS 
I. 
¶15 To convict a person of carrying a concealed weapon in 
violation of § 941.23,2 the State must establish three elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt.3  First, the State must show that a 
person who is not a peace officer went armed with a dangerous 
weapon.4  Second, the State must show that the person was aware 
of the presence of the weapon.5  Third, the State must show that 
the weapon was concealed.6  When Dundon testified that he removed 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 provides: 
Carrying a concealed weapon.  Any person except a 
peace officer who goes armed with a concealed and 
dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
3 State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 182, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); Wis JICriminal 1335. 
4  In State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 433-34, 249 N.W.2d 
529 (1977), we explained that "going armed" means "that the 
weapon was on the defendant's person or that the weapon must 
have been within the defendant's reach and that the defendant 
was aware of the presence of the weapon." 
5  See Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 433 ("Concealing or hiding a 
weapon precludes inadvertence.").  
6  In Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 432, 230 N.W. 76 
(1930), this court stated:  "If the weapon is hidden from 
ordinary observation it is concealed.  Absolute invisibility to 
other persons is not indispensable to concealment.  The test is, 
was it carried so as not to be discernible by ordinary 
observation."  In Asfoor we cited Mularkey with approval when we 
approved an instruction which stated:  "If a weapon is hidden 
from ordinary observation then it is concealed."  Asfoor, 75 
Wis. 2d at 433. 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
7 
a hand gun from a locked cabinet in his bedroom and carried it 
loaded 
either 
on 
or 
under 
the 
passenger 
seat 
of 
his 
vehiclefirst to the gas station, then to the bankand then 
carried the hand gun into the bank, he admitted all three 
elements of the offense.7  The testimony of Roberson and Burdick 
clearly buttressed the third element of concealment, for the 
word "concealed" means hidden from ordinary observation; and the 
weapon does not have to be completely hidden. 
¶16 What remains is the pivotal issue whether Dundon had a 
privilege to carry and conceal a loaded hand gun under these 
circumstances, or, more generically, whether, and to what 
extent, the defense of privilege is available to a person 
charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.  Whether 
a crime is subject to a privilege defense and the scope of such 
a defense if it exists, present questions of law.  We review 
                     
7  In State v. Walls, 190 Wis. 2d 65, 71-72, 526 N.W.2d 765 
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 182), the court of 
appeals held: 
a person is guilty of carrying a concealed weapon in 
an automobile where:  (1) the weapon is located inside 
a vehicle and is within the defendant's reach; (2) the 
defendant is aware of the presence of the weapon; and 
(3) the weapon is concealed, or hidden from ordinary 
viewmeaning it is indiscernible from the ordinary 
observation of a person located outside and within the 
immediate vicinity of the vehicle. 
 
Thus, a person who carries a weapon in a car with the weapon in 
plain view on the front seat may have nonetheless unlawfully 
concealed the weapon. 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
8 
questions of law de novo.  Kara B. v. Dane County, 205 Wis.2d 
140, 145-46, 555 N.W.2d 630 (1996). 
A. 
¶17 The first issue is whether the defense of privilege 
applies to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.  The 
preamble clause of the privilege statute, § 939.45, reads, in 
part, as follows: 
 
Privilege.  The fact that the actor's conduct is 
privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense 
to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. 
. . .   (Emphasis supplied) 
¶18 Use of the phrase "any crime" implies a legislative 
intent to permit the defense of privilege for "any crime."  Yet 
common sense suggests that the defense of privilege does not fit 
easily with certain crimes.  Recognition of the privilege for 
some crimes would undermine the objective in criminalizing 
conduct.  In other instances, the limitations of a privilege may 
be incompatible with the elements of a crime.  In still other 
situations, the nature of the crime is such that the defense of 
privilege cannot reasonably apply. 
¶19 In short, the defense of privilege applies by statute 
to "any crime" but the defense may be limited for some crimes to 
extraordinary facts. 
¶20 The second sentence in the preamble clause of the 
privilege statute provides that "The defense of privilege can be 
claimed under any of the following circumstances: . . ."  
(Emphasis supplied).  The statute then lists a number of 
circumstances.  But in Coleman, we decided that while a crime 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
9 
may be subject to a defense of privilege, the crime may not be 
subject to all the types of privilege outlined in § 939.45. 
¶21 In Coleman, this court recognized a very narrow 
defense of privilege under § 939.45(6) to the crime of felon in 
possession of a firearm.  The case involved a convicted felon 
who had possessed a rifle in violation of law.  Coleman was 
visiting his girlfriend's apartment.  A month earlier, four men 
had entered and robbed the apartment, putting a gun to the head 
of one of the occupants.  Coleman had been there and had jumped 
out a bedroom window to secure assistance from the police.  A 
month later, when police suddenly battered in the door while 
executing a "no knock" search warrant, Coleman grabbed a rifle 
in the apartment in the mistaken belief that history was 
repeating itself.  In reviewing the case, this court implied 
that most provisions of the privilege statutei.e., subsections 
(1) through (5) of § 939.45did not apply to the crime of felon 
in possession of a firearm.  Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).  Rather, 
the court looked to subsection (6) to justify a very limited 
common law privilege.  Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 207-12.  The court 
reviewed both state and federal cases from other jurisdictions 
and concluded that the courts which had considered the issue 
"overwhelmingly determined that a defense of privilege exists." 
 Id. at 208. 
¶22 The court described § 941.29(2) as a strict liability 
offense.  Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 207 (citing State v. Phillips, 
172 Wis. 2d 391, 395, 493 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1992)).  It went 
on to say that a strict liability offense does not preclude the 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
10
application of the defense of privilege.  It quoted State v. 
Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 318 N.W.2d 370 (1982), that: 
 
We conclude that recognizing a defense of legal 
justification does not necessarily conflict with the 
concept that violation of a traffic law is a strict 
liability offense.  The basic concept of strict 
liability is that culpability is not an element of the 
offense and that the state is relieved of the 
burdensome task of proving the offender's culpable 
state of mind.  When the defendant in the case at bar 
claims legal justification, he is not seeking to 
disprove 
a 
statutorily 
required 
state 
of 
mind.  
Instead he is claiming that even though he knowingly 
violated the law, his violation was privileged under 
the circumstances. 
Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 207 n.8. 
¶23 The crime of carrying a concealed weapon has many of 
the earmarks of a strict liability offense.  Although the 
offender must have awareness that the weapon is present, the 
offender need not have culpability or bad purpose.  As the court 
explained in Brown, 
 
One of the objectives of the legislature in adopting 
the concept of strict liability in statutes designed 
to control conduct of many people . . . is to assure 
the quick and efficient prosecution of large numbers 
of violators. . . .  [T]he legislature will often 
define the offense[s] in such a way as to avoid the 
need for lengthy trials. 
Brown, 107 Wis. 2d at 54. 
 
¶24 Opening up § 941.23 to broad "justification" defenses 
would create mischief, destroy uniformity, and impose a heavy 
burden on prosecutors.  Hence, to the extent that any privilege 
in § 939.45 does apply, it must be applied restrictively so as 
not to undermine the objective of the statute. 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
11
B. 
¶25 We are convinced that Dundon was not able to identify 
any privilege under § 939.45 that would benefit him on the facts 
of this case.  Wisconsin's privilege statute8 has six parts, and 
we examine each part in turn. 
                     
8  Wisconsin's privilege statute, § 939.45, provides: 
 
Privilege.  The fact that the actor's conduct is 
privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense 
to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct.  
The defense of privilege can be claimed under any of 
the following circumstances: 
 
(1) 
When 
the 
actor's 
conduct 
occurs 
under 
circumstances of coercion or necessity so as to be 
privileged under s. 939.46 or 939.47; or 
 
(2) When the actor's conduct is in defense of 
persons or property under any of the circumstances 
described in s. 939.48 or 939.49; or 
 
(3) When the actor's conduct is in good faith and 
is an apparently authorized and reasonable fulfillment 
of any duties of a public office; or 
 
(4) When the actor's conduct is a reasonable 
accomplishment of a lawful arrest; or 
 
(5) (a) In this subsection: 
 
1. "Child" has the meaning specified in 
s. 948.01(1). 
 
3. "Person responsible for the child's 
welfare" 
includes 
the 
child's 
parent, 
stepparent or guardian; an employe of a 
public 
or 
private 
residential 
home, 
institution or agency in which the child 
resides or is confined or that provides 
services to the child; or any other person 
legally responsible for the child's welfare 
in a residential setting. 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
12
¶26 First, a privilege exists "When the actor's conduct 
occurs under circumstances of coercion or necessity so as to be 
privileged under s. 939.46 or 939.47 . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45(1). 
¶27 The defense of coercion exists when "A threat by a 
person other than the actor's coconspirator . . . causes the 
actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only 
means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the 
actor or another and which causes him or her so to act . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1).  Dundon cannot claim the defense of 
coercion in this case because he did not establish any "threat 
by a person."  Dundon was not coerced by another to act as he 
did.  He was not subjected to severe pressure. 
¶28 The defense of necessity exists when "Pressure of 
natural physical forces . . . causes the actor reasonably to 
believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing 
imminent public disaster, or imminent death or great bodily harm 
to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act 
. . " Wis. Stat. § 939.47.  In State v. Olsen, 99 Wis. 2d 572, 
                                                                  
 
(b) When the actor's conduct is reasonable 
discipline of a child by a person responsible for 
the child's welfare.  Reasonable discipline may 
involve only such force as a reasonable person 
believes is necessary.  It is never reasonable 
discipline to use force which is intended to 
cause great bodily harm or death or creates an 
unreasonable risk of great bodily harm or death. 
 
(6) When for any other reason the actor's conduct is 
privileged by the statutory or common law of this 
state. 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
13
576, 299 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1980), the court recognized that 
the defense of necessity is available "only if the person 
asserting the defense acted under 'pressure of natural physical 
forces.'"  Plainly, the facts in this case do not establish that 
the 
"pressure 
of 
natural 
physical 
forces" 
caused 
Dundon 
reasonably to believe that his act of carrying a concealed 
weapon was the only means of preventing imminent public disaster 
or imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or others. 
¶29 Second, a privilege exists "When the actor's conduct 
is in defense of persons or property under any of the 
circumstances described in s. 939.48 or 939.49 . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.45(2). 
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.48 provides a privilege for 
self-defense or defense of others,9 while Wis. Stat. § 939.49 
                     
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.48 provides, in relevant part: 
Self defense and defense of others.  (1) A person is 
privileged to threaten or intentionally use force 
against another for the purpose of preventing or 
terminating what the person reasonably believes to be 
an unlawful interference with his or her person by 
such other person. . . .  
 
. . .  
 
(4)  A person is privileged to defend a third person 
from real or apparent unlawful interference by another 
under the same conditions and by the same means as 
those under and by which the person is privileged to 
defend himself or herself from real or apparent 
unlawful 
interference, 
provided 
that 
the 
person 
reasonably believes that the facts are such that the 
third person would be privileged to act in self-
defense 
and 
that 
the 
person's 
intervention 
is 
necessary for the protection of the third person. 
 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
14
provides a privilege for the defense of property and protection 
against retail theft. 10 These privileges do not apply because 
Dundon's concerns were not specific and imminent; they were only 
general and potential. 
¶31 Third, a privilege exists "When the actor's conduct is 
in good faith and is an apparently authorized and reasonable 
fulfillment of any duties of a public office . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45(3).  This privilege does not apply because the facts of 
this case show no duty of a public office. 
¶32 Fourth, a privilege exists "When the actor's conduct 
is a reasonable accomplishment of a lawful arrest . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.45(4).  Dundon was not attempting to accomplish a 
lawful arrest when he concealed his hand gun. 
                                                                  
. . .  
 
(6)  In this section "unlawful" means either tortious 
or expressly prohibited by criminal law or both. 
 
10  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.49 provides, in relevant part: 
Defense of property and protection against retail 
theft.  (1) A person is privileged to threaten or 
intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for the 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person 
reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with the person's property. . . . 
 
. . . 
  
(2)  A person is privileged to defend a 3rd person's 
property from real or apparent unlawful interference 
by another under the same conditions and by the same 
means as those under and by which the person is 
privileged to defend his or her own property. . . .  
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
15
¶33 Fifth, a privilege exists "When the actor's conduct is 
reasonable discipline of a child by a person responsible for the 
child's welfare . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5)(b).  This 
privilege does not apply.  It is difficult to conceive of facts 
that would permit the carrying of a concealed weapon to 
administer reasonable discipline of a child. 
¶34 Sixth, a privilege exists "When for any other reason 
the actor's conduct is privileged by the statutory or common law 
of this state."  Wis. Stat. § 939.45(6).11  Dundon claims this 
specific enumerated privilege permits the common law privilege 
recognized in Coleman for felon in possession to apply in this 
case. 
                     
11  As an explanation to the defense of privilege statute 
and its "catch all" subsection, the 1953 Legislative Council 
Report on the Criminal Code comment to Wis. Stat. § 339.45 
(subsequently Wis. Stat. § 939.45) noted: 
This 
section 
deals 
with 
the 
defense 
of 
privilegesometimes 
called 
"justification" 
or 
"excuse".  The law long has recognized the fact that 
certain 
conduct 
has, 
under 
some 
circumstances, 
sufficient value to society so that it ought not to 
subject the actor to criminal liability even though 
the conduct falls within the language of a section 
defining a crime. . . .  Some of these privileges are 
of great practical importance in the criminal law, 
arise frequently, and have been fairly well defined by 
the courts.  Others arise only rarely, and their 
precise limits never have been clearly determined.  No 
attempt has been made to codify the whole law of 
privilege.  Some of the more important privileges have 
been codified; as to the others, the common law will 
prevail.  (Emphasis supplied). 
 
Subsection 6 permits other statutory privileges and common 
law privileges to be recognized and used. 
 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
16
¶35 According to Dundon, the rationale for finding a 
privilege for carrying a concealed weapon is more compelling 
than the rationale applied in Coleman for felon in possession.  
Dundon states that §§ 941.23 and 939.45 were enacted together in 
1955 as part of a comprehensive criminal code.  See § 1, ch. 
696, Laws of 1955.  Dundon also contends that it would be 
logically inconsistent to allow a privilege defense to felon in 
possession but not to carrying a concealed weapon because felon 
in possession, being a felony, is a more serious crime than the 
misdemeanor in this case.  Dundon thus asserts that the 
privilege created in Coleman should apply to the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
¶36 In Coleman, we recognized that "a narrow defense of 
privilege under Wis. Stat. § 939.45(6) exists to a charge of 
felon in possession of a firearm."  Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 210. 
 The privilege contained a five-part test which was derived from 
numerous cases cited in the opinion.12  Dundon points to Coleman, 
                     
12 The court in Coleman established the following test to 
describe the common law privilege for felons in possession: 
In order to be entitled to the defense, the defendant 
must prove:  (1) the defendant was under an unlawful, 
present, imminent, and impending threat of such a 
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of 
death or serious bodily injury, or the defendant 
reasonably believes he or she is under such a threat; 
(2) the defendant did not recklessly or negligently 
place himself or herself in a situation in which it 
was probable that he or she would be forced to possess 
a firearm; (3) the defendant had no reasonable, legal 
alternative to possessing a firearm, or reasonably 
believed that he or she had no such alternative; in 
other words, the defendant did not have a chance to 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
17
but he fails to point to case law recognizing a common law 
defense of privilege for the crime of carrying a concealed 
weapon.  We decline to extend the privilege recognized in 
Coleman to the unrelated crime of carrying a concealed weapon. 
C. 
¶37 Wisconsin has not recognized any unique statutory or 
common law privilege to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon 
for more than 120 years.  Tracing the history of § 941.23 is 
illuminating.   
¶38 The Wisconsin legislature passed the first concealed 
weapons law in 1872.  The chapter provided: 
 
If any person shall go armed with a concealed dirk, 
dagger, sword, pistol, or pistols, revolver, slung-
shot, brass knuckles, or other offensive and dangerous 
weapon, he shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by 
                                                                  
refuse to possess the firearm and also to avoid the 
threatened harm, or reasonably believed that he or she 
did not have such a chance; (4) a direct causal 
relationship may be reasonably anticipated between 
possessing 
a 
firearm 
and 
the 
avoidance 
of 
the 
threatened harm; (5) the defendant did not possess the 
firearm for any longer than reasonably necessary. 
 
State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 210-11, 556 N.W.2d 701 
(1996). 
 
We also noted "that a defendant will be able to establish 
these elements 'only on the rarest of occasions,' because of the 
difficulty in proving that he or she did not have a reasonable 
legal alternative to violating the law, and that he or she 
possessed the firearm for a period of time no longer than 
reasonably necessary."  Id. at 212 (citing United States v. 
Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 
1126 (1995)). 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
18
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not 
more than two years, or by imprisonment in the county 
jail of the proper county not more than twelve months, 
or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, 
together with the costs of prosecution, or by both 
said fine and costs and either of said imprisonments; 
and he may also be required to find sureties for 
keeping the peace and against the further violation of 
this 
act 
for 
a 
term 
not 
exceeding 
two 
years:  
provided, that so going armed shall not be deemed a 
violation of this act whenever it shall be made to 
appear that such person had reasonable cause to fear 
an assault or other injury or violence to his person, 
or to his family or property, or to any person under 
his immediate care or custody, or entitled to his 
protection or assistance, or if it be made to appear 
that his possession of such weapon was for a temporary 
purpose, and with harmless intent.   
§ 1, ch. 7, Laws of 1872 (emphasis supplied).  As originally 
enacted, the stated exceptions in the statute might well have 
provided Dundon a defense.  He might have been able to argue 
that he had "reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury 
or violence to his person" or that his possession of the hand 
gun was for "a temporary purpose, and with harmless intent."   
 
¶39 But these exceptions were repealed.  In 1878, only six 
years after first passing the original concealed weapons 
statute, the legislature significantly revised it, eliminating 
the broad exceptions and producing a short, direct prohibition: 
 
Any person who shall go armed with any concealed and 
dangerous weapon, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the county jail not more than six months, or by fine 
not exceeding one hundred dollars:  provided, this 
section shall not apply to any policeman or officer 
authorized to serve process. 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
19
Wis. Stat. § 4397 (1878).  After that legislative action the 
only remaining exception was for police officers.  The statute 
has remained substantively the same since 1878.13 
 
¶40 Hence, the history of the concealed weapons statute in 
Wisconsin is unambiguous:  More than 120 years ago, our 
legislature revoked the very privilege Dundon now asks this 
court to create.  We cannot comply with his request without 
exceeding the role the constitution assigns to the judicial 
branch in our system of government. 
 
¶41 Forty-three 
states 
have 
legislative 
enactments 
permitting citizens to carry concealed weapons under a variety 
of conditions and circumstances.14  The existence of these many 
statutes underscores the impropriety of the judiciary attempting 
to act in this controversial policy area which is so clearly the 
province of other branches. 
II. 
 
¶42 We accepted certification "for consideration of all 
issues raised before the court of appeals," and therefore we 
                     
13 Section 4397 was renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 340.69 in 
1925.  § 1, ch. 4, Laws of 1925. In 1953, the legislature 
repealed § 340.69 and adopted Wis. Stat. § 341.23, a statute 
very similar to the current statute.  § 2, ch. 623, Laws of 
1953.  In 1955, this statute was repealed and renumbered, with 
minimal changes, as the current Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  § 1, ch. 
969, Laws of 1955.  
14 See Todd Barnet, Gun "Control" Laws Violate the Second 
Amendment and May Lead To Higher Crime Rates, 63 MO. L. REV. 155, 
180-81 (1998); Donnie E. Martin, "Concealed Carry" Legislation 
and Workplace Violence:  A Nightmare in Employers' Liability?, 
65 DEF. COUNS. J. 100, 101 (1998). 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
20
must also address other issues raised in Dundon's case.  In 
addition to claiming that a defense of privilege exists to the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon, Dundon claims that the 
circuit court denied him his right to present this "privilege" 
theory of defense by (1) excluding evidence relevant to the 
defense, (2) refusing to permit him to argue the defense to the 
jury, and (3) refusing to instruct the jury on the defense.  
Inasmuch as no defense of privilege to the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon was or could have been established by Dundon in 
this case, these "sub-issues" are easily dealt with.  In short, 
Judge Miech did not commit error by excluding evidence to 
support an invalid defense, refusing to permit Dundon to argue 
that defense to the jury, and refusing to instruct the jury on 
the defense. 
¶43 First, we address whether it was error to exclude 
evidence in support of a privilege defense.  The court of 
appeals in Olsen, 99 Wis. 2d at 577-78, stated: 
 
In virtually all circumstances a trial court must hear 
an offer of proof to determine whether the evidence 
would support a defense before ruling whether evidence 
relating to that defense is relevant.  Here, however, 
the court determined that the defense of necessity was 
not available because defendant's actions were not 
caused by the pressure of a natural physical force.  
It was not necessary for the trial court to take 
evidence to make this determination, for it was clear 
from the arguments of counsel that this was strictly a 
question of law; no offer of proof could have shown 
that the defendant responded to a natural physical 
force.  For this reason, the trial court did not err 
in ruling on the state's motion in limine without 
first hearing defendant's offer of proof. 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
21
Thus, while the general rule in this state is that a circuit 
court must hear an offer of proof to determine whether evidence 
would support a proffered defense before ruling on the relevancy 
of the evidence, it is not error for a circuit court to exclude 
evidence where it is clear that an offer of proof could not have 
shown that the defense was applicable. 
 
¶44 In this case, Judge Miech correctly determined that 
with these facts, privilege is an invalid defense to the crime 
of carrying a concealed weapon.  Therefore, Judge Miech was not 
in error for excluding evidence offered in support of an invalid 
defense. 
¶45 Second, we determine whether the judge erred by not 
allowing Dundon to argue the defense of privilege to the jury.  
A defendant is not entitled to have the jury consider his or her 
theory of defense when there is no evidence to support it.  See 
Olsen, 99 Wis. 2d at 578-79 (citing Johnson v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 
22, 270 N.W.2d 153 (1978)); see also State v. Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 
2d 949, 954, 472 N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991).  Having just 
concluded that Judge Miech did not err by not allowing evidence 
in support of an invalid defense, it is clear that Dundon was 
not entitled to argue a defense of privilege to the jury because 
there was no evidence to support such a defense. 
¶46 Third, we consider whether Judge Miech erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of privilege.  "A 
defendant is entitled to an instruction on a valid applicable 
theory of defense if it is timely requested and is supported by 
credible evidence."  State v. Bernal, 111 Wis. 2d 280, 282, 330 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
22
N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1983).  However, a circuit court has broad 
discretion in deciding whether to give a requested jury 
instruction.  State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 690, 312 N.W.2d 
489 (1981).  We will not reverse such a determination absent an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Morgan, 195 Wis. 2d 
388, 448, 536 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1995).  Here we have already 
determined 
that 
there 
was 
no 
valid 
theory 
of 
defense.  
Therefore, it was not an erroneous exercise of discretion to 
refuse to instruct the jury on an invalid defense. 
III. 
¶47 Finally, we must address whether the post-conviction 
court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on 
Dundon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶48 Dundon claims his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request jury instructions on the privilege defenses 
of "Self-defense," Wis JI-Criminal 800, or "Defense of Another's 
Property," Wis JI-Crim 860.  Dundon claims that the court of 
appeals' decision in State v. Coleman, 199 Wis. 2d 174, 544 
N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1996), established that the privilege 
defenses of self-defense and defense of others were available in 
a prosecution for felon in possession of a firearm.  Dundon also 
cites State v. Anderson, 137 Wis. 2d 267, 277-78, 404 N.W.2d 100 
(Ct. App. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 141 Wis. 2d 653, 416 
N.W.2d 276 (1987), for the proposition that long standing case 
law in Wisconsin impliedly recognized the privilege defenses of 
self-defense and defense of others property to a charge of felon 
in possession of a firearm.  Finally, Dundon asserts that other 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
23
jurisdictions identified a similar privilege defense to felon in 
possession of a firearm.  Therefore, he argues, his counsel 
performed ineffectively by not citing Coleman and requesting 
instructions on self-defense and defense of another's property 
for Dundon's alleged crime.  
¶49 As established earlier, Dundon was not entitled to an 
instruction on any privilege defense.  Therefore, the post-
conviction 
court did not 
err when 
it denied 
Dundon an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  We would be hard pressed to conclude that Dundon's 
counsel performed deficiently in failing to request a jury 
instruction to an invalid defense.  See State v. Ambuehl, 145 
Wis. 2d 343, 352, 425 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1988).  Nothing that 
Dundon's counsel did or failed to do on the instructions 
deprived Dundon of a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
¶50 To sum up, we reject the defendant's request to extend 
the narrow defense of privilege we recognized for the crime of 
felon in possession of a firearm to the separate and distinct 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon.  We find no basis for 
either a statutory or common law defense of privilege for the 
crime 
of 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
weapon 
under 
§ 939.45(6).  
Although other privilege defenses outlined in § 939.45 may apply 
to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, we find no possible 
basis for their application to the facts in this case.  
Therefore, the circuit court did not err by excluding evidence 
to support an invalid defense, by refusing to permit the 
No. 
97-1423-CR 
 
24
defendant to argue an invalid defense to the jury, or by 
refusing to instruct the jury on an invalid defense.  Finally, 
the post-conviction court did not err in failing to grant an 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's claim that his attorney 
acted deficiently by not requesting an instruction on self-
defense or defense of others.  Dundon was not entitled to any 
instruction on a privilege defense on these facts. 
¶51 There is no evidence that the defendant is a bad 
person.  There is ample evidence that he violated the law.  
Consequently, we affirm the judgment and order of the circuit 
court. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed. 
 
 
 
1