Title: Rogers v. Dayton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Rogers v. Dayton, 118 Ohio St.3d 299, 2008-Ohio-2336.] 
 
 
ROGERS v. CITY OF DAYTON ET AL., APPELLEES; STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Rogers v. Dayton, 118 Ohio St.3d 299, 2008-Ohio-2336.] 
Uninsured-/underinsured-motorist coverage — Financial-responsibility law — 
Political subdivisions — Relevance of certificate of self-insurance — 
Former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) — Judgment reversed. 
(Nos. 2007-0549 and 2007-0684 — Submitted January 8, 2008 — Decided 
May 21, 2008.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 
No. 21593, 2007-Ohio-673. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A political subdivision is self-insured for purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) 
if it qualifies as a self-insurer under R.C. Chapter 4509, although it is not 
required to obtain a certificate of self-insurance. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} This is a dispute between the city of Dayton, appellee, and State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), appellant.  We 
must decide which party is primarily liable for the alleged negligence of a city of 
Dayton employee who, while driving a city vehicle, apparently caused an accident 
that injured the plaintiff.  To answer this question, we must interpret former R.C. 
3937.18(K)(3), 148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11380, 11383-11384, which excluded a 
motor vehicle “self-insured within the meaning of the financial responsibility law 
of the state” from being “uninsured” or “underinsured” as those terms were used 
in R.C. 3937.18. 
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{¶ 2} We hold that a political subdivision is self-insured for purposes of 
former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) if it qualifies as a self-insurer under R.C. Chapter 
4509, although it is not required to obtain a certificate of self-insurance. 
{¶ 3} On April 22, 2002, Earl Moreo III, a city of Dayton employee, was 
operating a motor vehicle owned by the city when he struck a vehicle being 
driven by Western Rogers.  Moreo was acting within the course and scope of his 
employment when the accident occurred. 
{¶ 4} Rogers filed this action against Moreo and the city of Dayton to 
recover for his injuries.  He also named his personal insurer, State Farm, as a 
party defendant for purposes of uninsured-/underinsured-motorist (“UM/UIM”) 
coverage. 
{¶ 5} The trial court awarded summary judgment to Moreo on the basis 
of immunity from liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). The court acknowledged 
that Dayton was liable for the negligence of its employee.  However, the trial 
court concluded that Dayton was uninsured for purposes of Rogers’s entitlement 
to UM/UIM coverage under his personal insurance policy.  The city had no 
insurance policy or certificate of self-insurance under R.C. 4509.72, which covers 
the requirements for self-insurers, because as a municipality, it is exempt from 
filing.  The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that State 
Farm was responsible up to the limits of Rogers’s UM/UIM coverage. 
{¶ 6} The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County affirmed.  The 
appellate court relied on the statutory definition in former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3), 
which excluded from the definition of uninsured motor vehicles “[a] motor 
vehicle self-insured within the meaning of the financial responsibility law of the 
state in which the motor vehicle is registered.”  The court concluded that Dayton 
did not qualify as self-insured under R.C. Chapter 4509 because it did not have a 
certificate of self-insurance from the registrar of motor vehicles.  Therefore, for 
January Term, 2008 
3 
purposes of UM/UIM coverage under former R.C. 3937.18, the motor vehicle that 
caused Rogers’s injuries was uninsured. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals certified that its judgment in this case is in 
conflict with the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals in Safe Auto Ins. 
Co. v. Corson, 155 Ohio App.3d 736, 2004-Ohio-249, 803 N.E.2d 863, on the 
following issue: 
{¶ 8} “Under R.C. 3937.18(K)(3)(2000), is a political subdivision self-
insured within the meaning of the financial responsibility law of Ohio if the 
political subdivision has not qualified as a self-insurer under R.C. Chapter 4509?” 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a 
conflict exists (case No. 2007-0684) and pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal (case No. 2007-0549). 
{¶ 10} In 2000, R.C. 3937.18(K) 1 provided that the following motor 
vehicles were not considered an “uninsured motor vehicle” or “underinsured 
motor vehicle” as those terms were used in the uninsured-motorist statute: 
{¶ 11} “(1)  A motor vehicle that has applicable liability coverage in the 
policy under which the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages are 
provided; 
{¶ 12} “(2) A motor vehicle owned by a political subdivision, unless the 
operator of the motor vehicle has an immunity under Chapter 2744. of the 
Revised Code that could be raised as a defense in an action brought against the 
operator by the insured;  
{¶ 13} “(3) A motor vehicle self-insured within the meaning of the 
financial responsibility law of the state in which the motor vehicle is registered.” 
                                                 
1.  The law in effect when the parties entered into the policy controls.  Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group 
of Cos. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 281, 287, 695 N.E.2d 732. The version of Ohio’s uninsured-motorist 
statute that applies in this case was enacted by Sub.S.B. No. 267, effective September 21, 2000.  
148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11380, 11383-11384. 
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{¶ 14} If the Dayton vehicle that struck Roger’s vehicle is uninsured 
under former R.C. 3937.18(K), then State Farm is primarily liable to Rogers 
under his personal insurance policy, which provided UM coverage up to $100,000 
for each person.  The dispute centers on whether Dayton is self-insured under 
former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) and what is meant by “the financial responsibility law 
of the state.” 2 
{¶ 15} The city of Dayton did not purchase insurance policies to cover the 
vehicles it owned.  Instead, Dayton established a self-insurance program to 
directly pay damages in civil actions, consistent with R.C. 2744.08(A)(2)(a).  
Pursuant to Dayton Codified Ordinances 36.203 and 36.204, Dayton set aside 
public funds annually to be used to pay claims and judgments. 
{¶ 16} Dayton argues that “the financial responsibility law of the state” 
refers to R.C. Chapter 4509.  This chapter requires persons with vehicles 
registered in the state to file proof of financial responsibility.  R.C. 4509.44 and 
4509.45.  Any person who has more than 25 motor vehicles registered in the state 
may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance issued by 
the registrar of motor vehicles after demonstrating the financial ability to pay 
judgments against him.  R.C. 4509.72(A) and (B). 
{¶ 17} The provisions of R.C. Chapter 4509, however, do not apply to 
motor vehicles owned and operated by a political subdivision of the state (with 
the exception of R.C. 4509.06, which involves filing an accident report).  R.C. 
4509.71.  Therefore, Dayton did not have a certificate of self-insurance from the 
registrar because it was not legally required to obtain one.  Dayton contends that it 
was not self-insured under the financial-responsibility law of Ohio because it had 
                                                 
2.  The current version of R.C. 3937.18(B) contains similar language:  “An ‘uninsured motorist’ 
does not include the owner or operator of a motor vehicle that is self-insured within the meaning 
of the financial responsibility law of the state in which the motor vehicle is registered.”   
January Term, 2008 
5 
no certificate of self-insurance.  Therefore, its vehicle was uninsured for purposes 
of former R.C. 3937.18. 
{¶ 18} State Farm contends that the “financial responsibility law of the 
state” is not limited to R.C. Chapter 4509.  Other statutes address the financial 
responsibility of political subdivisions.  For example, R.C. 9.83 authorizes 
political subdivisions to either procure insurance or self-insure for motor-vehicle 
liability, and R.C. 2744.08(A) authorizes a political subdivision to procure 
insurance or self-insure to cover claims or judgments arising from “its and its 
employees’ potential liability in damages in civil actions for injury, death, or loss 
to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political 
subdivision or any of its employees in connection with a governmental or 
proprietary function.”  State Farm argues that because Dayton has a self-insurance 
program, the city is self-insured “within the meaning of the financial 
responsibility law” for purposes of R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) and is, therefore, not 
uninsured. 
{¶ 19} According to Dayton, R.C. 9.83 and 2744.08 permit a political 
subdivision to set aside funds to pay tort claims, but unlike the provisions of R.C. 
Chapter 4509, they do not require the city to prove financial responsibility.  
Former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3), however, does not require filing of proof of self-
insurance — only that the vehicle be “self-insured within the meaning of the 
financial responsibility law.”  (Emphasis added.)  Dayton meets that threshold. 
{¶ 20} There is no dispute that Dayton does not have a certificate of self-
insurance because it is exempt from the requirements of R.C. Chapter 4509.  
Nevertheless, Dayton complied with the financial-responsibility law that applies 
to political subdivisions by creating a self-insurance program for political-
subdivision tort-liability purposes as authorized under former R.C. 2744.08(A).  
141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 6083, 6085.  Because former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) does 
not specifically refer to R.C. Chapter 4509, we hold that Dayton is self-insured 
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“within the meaning of the financial responsibility law of the state,” and its 
vehicle is not uninsured for purposes of R.C. 3937.18(K)(3). 
{¶ 21} The First District Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion 
for different reasons in Safe Auto Ins. v. Corson, 155 Ohio App.3d 736, 2004-
Ohio-249, 803 N.E.2d 863.  In Corson, a motorist was injured by a Cincinnati 
police officer who was driving a city vehicle.  The officer was within the scope of 
his employment but was not on an emergency run at the time.  The city admitted 
the officer’s negligence and that he was driving a vehicle owned by the city and 
registered in Ohio.  The officer had immunity, but the city did not.  The city of 
Cincinnati had not purchased liability insurance but instead paid claims directly 
from city funds.  The issue in Corson was whether the city’s vehicle was 
considered an uninsured vehicle for purposes of R.C. 3937.18.  If so, Corson 
would be entitled to seek UM coverage under his personal-liability insurance 
policy. 
{¶ 22} Corson held that Cincinnati was self-insured in the practical sense, 
so the city’s vehicle was not uninsured for purposes of former R.C. 3937.18.  The 
city was liable, and Corson’s personal insurance policy did not apply.  Although 
Corson relied on the city’s self-insured status, we note that Cincinnati, like 
Dayton in this case, also met the statutory requirements for self-insurance that 
apply to political subdivisions. 
{¶ 23} Dayton also contends that requiring a private insurance company 
to pay is consistent with public policy to shift the financial responsibility for torts 
committed by political subdivisions from taxpayers to insurance companies, citing 
Galanos v. Cleveland (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 220, 221, 638 N.E.2d 530.  Dayton 
points to the collateral-source rule in R.C. 2744.05(B), which prohibits insurers 
from bringing a subrogation claim against a political subdivision.  This case, 
however, does not involve subrogation, and the collateral-source rule is not 
relevant to our interpretation of former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3). 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 24} Dayton argues that acquiring self-insured status under former R.C. 
3937.18(K)(3) would create an internal conflict with former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2), 
which provides that if “the operator of the motor vehicle [owned by a political 
subdivision] has an immunity under Chapter 2744. of the Revised Code that could 
be raised as a defense in an action brought against the operator by the insured,” 
the political subdivision is uninsured.  Dayton argues that the vehicle in this 
accident was owned by the city and operated by its employee, who was granted 
R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity.  Therefore, the city’s vehicle was uninsured under 
former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2), a conclusion in direct conflict with our holding that 
the city is self-insured under (K)(3). 
{¶ 25} The General Assembly amended R.C. 3937.18 in 1997 
Am.Sub.H.B. 261, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2372, 2372-2377 (“H.B. 261”) to limit 
the insured’s right to recover when the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle has immunity and to define certain vehicles that are not uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicles.  Previously, legal immunity had prevented an 
insured from collecting UM/UIM benefits because the insured was not “legally 
entitled to recover” from the tortfeasor.  State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Webb 
(1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 61, 562 N.E.2d 132, syllabus.  In Webb, the tortfeasor was 
immune under the fellow-employee doctrine, a statutory law prohibiting one 
employee from recovering damages from another in the course of the injured 
employee’s employment.  Because the injured insured was not legally entitled to 
recover from the tortfeasor, his fellow employee, the Supreme Court held that the 
injured’s insurance company was not required to pay UM benefits under the terms 
of a policy that said the company would pay for UM/UIM damages that “an 
insured is legally entitled to collect.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 61. 
{¶ 26} And in Kurent v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc. (1991), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 242, 581 N.E.2d 533, the insured, who had been injured in a no-fault 
insurance state that did not recognize a claim against the tortfeasor, likewise could 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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not collect UM benefits because he was not legally entitled to recover from the 
tortfeasor. 
{¶ 27} H.B. 261 amended R.C. 3937.18(A) to provide that when an owner 
or operator of a motor vehicle is immune under the Political Subdivision Tort 
Liability Law, R.C. Chapter 2744, the immunity will not affect the ability to 
recover UM/UIM coverage from one’s insurer.  In addition, H.B. 261 added 
Section K, which identified certain vehicles that were not uninsured or 
underinsured.  Former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) excluded any motor vehicle owned by 
a political subdivision from being uninsured — because the political subdivision 
would likely have insurance or the ability to pay damages — unless the operator 
of the political subdivision’s vehicle is immune (and the insured is not legally 
entitled to recover from the operator), whereas (K)(3) excluded from being 
uninsured any self-insured vehicle.  148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11380, 11383-11384. 
{¶ 28} A political subdivision is liable for the negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle by its employees within the scope of their employment except when 
the employee is on an emergency.  R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a).  By statute, the 
employee driver is always immune from liability for negligence unless his or her 
acts were outside the scope of employment.  R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a).  Thus, the 
General Assembly must have intended the word “operator” in R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) 
to refer to the city as well as the employee/driver.  Because the employee is 
always immune, there is no need to refer to the immunity of only the 
employee/driver in Section (K)(2).  Therefore, applying the immunity language in 
(K)(2) only to the employee/driver would be redundant because the 
employee/driver is always immune. 
{¶ 29} In addition, because the political subdivision acts only through its 
employees and Moreo was within the scope of employment at the time of the 
accident, it is reasonable that Dayton is considered the “operator” of the vehicle 
January Term, 2008 
9 
for purposes of R.C. 3937.18(K)(2).  See Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 664, 710 N.E.2d 1116. 
{¶ 30} Consequently, we interpret R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) to apply to 
emergency vehicles when both the owner and operator/driver are afforded 
statutory immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 or in other situations in which both 
the owner and operator are immune from liability.  Because the political 
subdivision acts only through its employees, the vehicle owned by the city of 
Dayton was uninsured under R.C. 3937.18(K)(2).  There is no inconsistency 
between R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) and (K)(3). 
{¶ 31} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the 
affirmative.  We hold that a political subdivision is self-insured for purposes of 
former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) if it qualifies as a self-insurer under R.C. Chapter 
4509, although it is not required to obtain a certificate of self-insurance. 
{¶ 32} Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
enter judgment in favor of appellant. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} I respectfully dissent, because the majority opinion is in conflict 
with former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2). 
{¶ 34} Former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) provides that a car is not uninsured or 
underinsured if it is “[a] motor vehicle owned by a political subdivision, unless 
the operator of the motor vehicle has an immunity under Chapter 2744. of the 
Revised Code that could be raised as a defense in an action brought against the 
operator by the insured.”  148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11380, 11383-11384.  In the 
present case, the car at issue was owned by the city of Dayton and operated by a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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city employee who was immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744.  By the 
express terms of former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2), the car is therefore uninsured or 
underinsured.  The majority holds the exact opposite—that Dayton is self-insured 
and therefore not uninsured or underinsured under former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3). 
{¶ 35} The majority reconciles this conflict by incorrectly defining 
“operator” in former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) as including “political subdivision.”  
The majority, which argues that the idea of an “immune operator” is internally 
redundant, bases this argument on an incorrect statement of law:  “Because the 
employee is always immune, there is no need to refer to the immunity of only the 
employee/driver in Section (K)(2).”  The majority is incorrect that an employee is 
always immune.  As the majority recognizes, “the employee driver is always 
immune from liability for negligence unless his or her acts were outside the scope 
of employment.”  (Emphasis added.)  ¶ 28.  The term “immune” therefore serves 
to distinguish between drivers who were employees acting within the scope of 
employment and those who were not. 
{¶ 36} In the majority’s discussion of the meaning of “operator” in former 
R.C. 3937.18(K)(2), it speculates without support about the intent of the General 
Assembly, using its theory of the intent of the General Assembly to reach a 
countertextual result.  As a preliminary matter, it is unnecessary here to look 
beyond the language to determine the intent of the General Assembly:  “The court 
must first look to the plain language of the statute itself to determine the 
legislative intent.  We apply a statute as it is written when its meaning is 
unambiguous and definite.”  (Citation omitted.)  State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 
507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9.  The plain meaning of “to operate” is 
“[t]o control the functioning of; run.”  The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language, Third Edition (1992) 1268.  The word “operator” is not a 
synonym for “owner.”  The existence of distinct meanings for these words is also 
evident in the statutory context.  Former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) refers both to the 
January Term, 2008 
11 
owner and the operator of the vehicle:  “A motor vehicle owned by a political 
subdivision, unless the operator of the motor vehicle has an immunity.”  
(Emphasis added.)  By using two different terms, the text implies two distinct 
meanings. 
{¶ 37} The majority provides no support for its theory of the General 
Assembly’s intent in enacting the provisions:  “Former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) 
excluded any motor vehicle owned by a political subdivision from being 
uninsured – because the political subdivision would likely have insurance or the 
ability to pay damages – unless the operator of the political subdivision’s vehicle 
is immune (and the insured is not legally entitled to recover from the operator), 
whereas (K)(3) excluded from being uninsured any self-insured vehicle.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Majority opinion, ¶ 27.  The majority suggests that the 
General Assembly intended to shift the burden of satisfying the judgment to 
political subdivisions, to the extent that insurance companies must satisfy the 
judgment only in cases in which it is impossible to subject the political 
subdivision to liability.  The majority provides no support for this theory. 
{¶ 38} The majority’s statement of the intent of the General Assembly 
also ignores the considerable evidence to the contrary provided by the collateral-
source rule.  As the majority recognizes, the collateral-source rule, recorded in 
R.C. 2744.05(B), prohibits insurers from bringing a subrogation claim against a 
political subdivision.  The subrogation rule thus recognizes the very result that the 
majority appears to think is impossible:  The burden of satisfying the judgment 
shifts to the insurance company when the political subdivision can still be 
subjected to liability.  The majority dismisses the collateral-source rule as 
irrelevant on the ground that this case does not involve subrogation, but I believe 
the rule provides strong and very relevant evidence that the General Assembly did 
not intend to shift the burden to satisfy the judgment to political subdivisions in 
all cases in which political subdivisions can still be subjected to liability. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 39} I also believe that the majority improperly relies on R.C. 
2744.08(A)(2)(a) to hold that Dayton is self-insured within the meaning of the 
financial-responsibility law of the state.  That provision provides only minimal 
guidance for the establishment of a self-insurance program by a political 
subdivision:  “[A] political subdivision may establish and maintain a self-
insurance program relative to its and its employees’ potential liability in damages 
in civil actions * * *.”  Section (A) of R.C. 2744.08 does not require a political 
subdivision to affirmatively demonstrate financial responsibility.  Pursuant to the 
majority’s opinion, parties not exempt from the certification requirements in R.C. 
4509.72(A) must affirmatively demonstrate financial responsibility in order to be 
considered self-insured for the purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3), whereas 
any self-insurance program by a political subdivision is by default considered 
self-insured for the purposes of former Section (K)(3). 
{¶ 40} The description of the self-insurance programs of political 
subdivisions in R.C. 2744.08(A) is not a definition of self-insurance for the 
purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3).  If the General Assembly had intended 
R.C. 2744.08(A) to be definitional for the purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3), 
it could have used language that so indicated with the clarity of R.C. 4509.72(A), 
which provides that any person with a sufficient number of cars registered in this 
state “may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance 
issued by the registrar of motor vehicles.”  Barring such language, we cannot rely 
on R.C. 2744.08(A) to hold that Dayton is self-insured within the meaning of the 
financial-responsibility law of the state. 
{¶ 41} Finally, the syllabus language is at odds with the holding in the 
text of the opinion.  The syllabus language suggests that it is proper to use R.C. 
Chapter 4509 in some manner to determine whether a party qualifies as self-
insured:  “A political subdivision is self-insured for purposes of former R.C. 
3937.18(K)(3) if it qualifies as a self-insurer under R.C. Chapter 4509, although it 
January Term, 2008 
13 
is not required to obtain a certificate of self-insurance.”  The body of the opinion 
nevertheless refers exclusively to provisions outside R.C. Chapter 4509 in its 
determination that Dayton was self-insured:  “Dayton complied with the financial-
responsibility law that applies to political subdivisions by creating a self-
insurance program for political-subdivision tort-liability purposes as authorized 
under former R.C. 2744.08(A). * * * Because former R.C. 3937.18(K)(3) does 
not specifically refer to R.C. Chapter 4509, we hold that Dayton is self-insured * 
* *.”  ¶ 20.  The majority’s syllabus language implies that some form of 
compliance with R.C. Chapter 4509 is necessary, but its opinion provides no 
indication of what form such compliance should take, referring exclusively to 
provisions outside that chapter. 
{¶ 42} For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Gallagher, Gams, Pryor, Tallan & Littrell, L.L.P., and Mark H. Gams, for 
appellant. 
 
Patrick J. Bonfield, Dayton Law Director, John J. Danish, Deputy Law 
Director, and John C. Musto, Assistant City Attorney, for appellees city of Dayton 
and Earl Moreo. 
 
Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae, the Ohio Municipal League. 
______________________