Title: State v. Engle

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Engle, Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Engle (1996), ___ Ohio St. 3d ___.] 
Criminal law -- Pleas -- Enforcement of plea unconstitutional, when -- 
Plea not knowingly or intelligently made, when -- Crim.R. 11(C), 
applied. 
 
(No. 94-2042--Submitted December 6, 1995--Decided February 14, 
1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, No. 38-CA-
OCT-92. 
 
Appellant, Edna Mae Engle, and her husband, John Engle, Jr., were the 
parents of ten children.  On July 9, 1991, John Engle’s sister reported to the 
Fairfield County Sheriff’s Office that she believed the Engles’ son Christopher 
was dead.  She stated that appellant had told her some weeks earlier that John 
Engle had killed Christopher.  Subsequently, Mrs. Engle gave a statement to 
investigators that her husband had poured scalding water on Christopher and 
that Christopher had died two days later.  Mrs. Engle was indicted on August 2, 
1991, by the Fairfield County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated murder 
 
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with a death-penalty specification, two counts of abuse of a corpse, three 
counts of forgery, two counts of perjury, sixteen counts of child endangering, 
one count of obstruction of justice, and one count of theft.  The theft and 
forgery counts related to welfare fraud.   
 
Trial began on August 25 before a jury.  The state rested on September 4, 
and the court overruled a defense motion for acquittal.  After the defense gave 
its opening statement on September 8, but before any evidence was presented, 
the state filed a motion in limine to prevent appellant’s expert and others from 
testifying about duress and the battered woman syndrome.  The court granted 
the motion.  Defense counsel then asked for a recess to confer with the 
prosecution.   
 
Following the recess, the state announced that the defendant would be 
changing her plea to several counts in the indictment.  “We further anticipate 
the Defendant filing an appeal to appeal the Court’s rulings that have been 
rendered previously in this case,” the prosecutor informed the court.  
“Certainly, she is permitted to file an appeal pursuant to this negotiated plea.”  
 
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The prosecutor further informed the court that the state would be dismissing 
the remainder of the counts “without prejudice only if she wins her appeal and 
is entitled to a completely new trial.” 
 
Defendant then pleaded no contest to one count each of murder, 
obstruction of justice, and theft, three counts of forgery, two counts of perjury 
and six counts of child endangering.  The court then found her guilty on those 
counts and sentenced her to fifteen years to life on the murder charge, to be 
served consecutively and to a term of nineteen and one-half years on the other 
charges.   
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County in a split decision 
held that under Crim. R. 12(H), appellant had waived the assignments of error 
that were based on the trial court’s refusal to allow testimony on the battered 
woman syndrome or duress and the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the 
aggravated murder and child endangering counts for insufficient evidence.  The 
court of appeals also rejected appellant’s claim that her plea had not been 
voluntary because it was based on a belief that she could appeal certain issues. 
 
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The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
Gregg Marx, Assistant Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney, for 
appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Kort Gatterdam and David 
Hanson, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
 
WRIGHT, J.    When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea 
must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Failure on any of those 
points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United 
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.  Kercheval v. United States 
(1927), 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 1012; Mabry v. 
Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504, 508-509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-2547, 81 
L.Ed.2d 437, 443; Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct 1709, 23 
L.Ed.2d 274; State v. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658; Crim. 
R. 11(C). 
 
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In State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 342, 2 O.O.3d 467, 358 N.E.2d 
601, this court reversed a conviction for aggravated murder where the 
defendant’s lawyers had prepared a written statement which withdrew pleas of 
not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity and which entered a no contest 
plea.  The statement also recited that the defendant understood his rights under 
Crim. R. 11(C)(2).  In Caudill, the trial court asked whether the defendant had 
read everything in the statement, but neither personally informed him of his 
rights nor personally informed him of what he was giving up. Paragraph two of 
the syllabus states:  “Adherence to the provisions of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) requires 
an oral dialogue between the trial court and the defendant which enables the 
court to determine fully the defendant’s understanding of the consequences of 
his plea of guilty or no contest.” 
 
In the instant case, the prosecutor, in explaining the plea bargain to the 
court, made no fewer than six references to an appeal by the defendant in a 
colloquy that covers only seven sentences in the trial transcript.  Defense 
counsel, noting that the defendant had earlier been deemed incompetent to 
 
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stand trial, asked the court to determine whether Engle’s pleas were voluntary.  
Based on the prosecutor’s statements to the court, it is beyond doubt that 
defense counsel had explained to his client the strategy of pleading to reduced 
charges and appealing the trial court’s adverse rulings, rather than proceeding 
with a defense that had been stripped of its key elements.   
 
The trial court listened without uttering a word of correction.  The judge 
did inquire about the defendant’s understanding of her pleas as required by 
Crim. R. 11(C)(2).  The record reflects that all the parties, including the judge 
and the prosecutor, shared the impression that appellant could appeal rulings 
other than a pretrial motion.  Crim.R. 12(H).  In fact, at the sentencing hearing, 
the judge advised the defendant:  “I want to be sure that you understand that 
you have the right to appeal the decision of this Court.”   
 
Judge Hoffman noted in his dissent below, “[a]ppellant’s agreement to 
the plea bargain implies her understanding that she could appeal those issues.  
Likewise, though the trial court did not expressly confirm the prosecutor’s 
representation of the availability of appeal on those issues, its failure to advise 
 
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the prosecutor, defense attorney and/or the defendant to the contrary would be 
considered by most defendants to be a tacit affirmation/recognition of her 
ability to appeal those very issues.”   
 
Although the trial court may have followed the letter of Caudill, it did 
not follow its intent.  There can be no doubt that the defendant’s plea was 
predicated on a belief that she could appeal the trial court’s rulings that her 
counsel believed had stripped her of any meaningful defense.  Therefore, her 
plea was not made knowingly or intelligently.  Consequently, we remand this 
cause to the trial court with instructions that Mrs. Engle be given the 
opportunity to withdraw her plea and proceed to trial.  The state, of course, is 
also free to reinstate the original charges.  In light of this decision, appellant’s 
second and third propositions of law are rendered moot. 
 
Judgment reversed 
 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER AND COOK, JJ., CONCUR. 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and COOK, JJ., concur separately. 
 
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ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring.  I reluctantly concur in the 
majority’s judgment and opinion.  Because of the serious nature of the offenses 
committed in this case, I find it difficult to reverse the convictions.  However, I 
believe we are compelled to reach such a result because of what appears to be a 
grave misunderstanding of the law on the part of the trial court, the prosecutor, 
and the defense attorney.  This case presents the issue of whether a defendant’s 
plea of no contest precludes appellate review of the merits of pretrial motions 
in limine and for judgment of acquittal.  The confusion in this area is somewhat 
understandable, since this issue has never been clearly addressed by this court.  
I therefore write separately because I do not believe the majority adequately 
sets forth the law applicable to this situation. 
 
In Ohio, a defendant’s plea of no contest does not preclude appellate 
review of the merits of a pretrial motion to suppress.  Crim.R. 12(H); State v. 
Ulis (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 83, 600 N.E.2d 1040; Defiance v. Kretz (1991), 60 
Ohio St.3d 1, 573 N.E.2d 32, syllabus; State v. Renalist, Inc. (1978), 56 Ohio 
St.2d 276, 281, 10 O.O.3d 408, 411, 383 N.E.2d 892, 896, fn. 4.  Where the 
 
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denial of a pretrial motion to suppress is dispositive of the action, judicial 
economy is served by allowing the defendant to plead no contest and then to 
appeal the evidentiary ruling rather than completing the trial.  Kretz, 60 Ohio 
St.3d at 4, 573 N.E.2d at 35; State v. Malinovsky (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 20, 23, 
573 N.E.2d 22, 25.  In such a case, the denial of the motion to suppress is 
dispositive because it eliminates all possible defenses to the charge.  Likewise, 
judicial economy is served by allowing an appeal, after a plea of no contest, of 
a trial court’s denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss based on a violation of the 
defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial.  Montpelier v. Greeno (1986), 25 
Ohio St.3d 170, 171-172, 25 OBR 212, 213, 495 N.E.2d 581, 582, fn. 2; State 
v. Luna (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 57, 58, 2 OBR 615-616, 442 N.E.2d 1284, 1285. 
 
The Kretz court distinguished motions in limine from motions to 
suppress:   
 
“A motion in limine is tentative and precautionary in nature, reflecting 
the court’s anticipatory treatment of an evidentiary issue at trial.  In deciding 
such motions, the trial court is at liberty to change its ruling on the disputed 
 
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evidence in its actual context at trial.  Finality does not attach when the motion 
is granted.  State v. Grubb (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 201-202, 28 OBR 285, 
288, 503 N.E.2d 142, 145.”  Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d at 4, 573 N.E.2d at 35. 
 
Judicial economy could not be served by an appeal of such a ruling after 
a plea of no contest.  Rather, it is more efficient for the case to proceed to trial 
and for the evidentiary issue to be finally determined at trial.  A plea of no 
contest and an immediate appeal would be premature and would not afford the 
appellate court the benefit of a complete record upon which to review the issue.  
See Malinovsky, 60 Ohio St.3d at 24-25, 573 N.E.2d at 26-27 (Resnick, J., 
dissenting).  By entering a plea of no contest in such a case, the defendant 
voluntarily waives the right to appeal the ruling on the motion. 
 
In the case sub judice, the rulings appellant states that she would appeal 
include the trial court’s order granting the state’s motion in limine, finding 
inadmissible any evidence regarding duress and battered woman’s syndrome, 
and the court’s denial of appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  The ruling granting the motion in limine was a tentative ruling based 
 
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on the relevance of the evidence.  The ruling could be changed anytime prior to 
or during trial.  The Crim.R. 29 motion was also preliminary.  Appellant could 
have renewed her motion following the presentation of her evidence and the 
jury could have acquitted her notwithstanding the court’s rulings on the 
motions.  Thus, both rulings were not appealable until after the completion of 
the trial.  By entering a pretrial plea of no contest, appellant waived her right to 
appeal the rulings. 
 
However, as the majority points out, in the case at bar, the trial court, the 
prosecutor, and the defense attorney all misled the defendant as to her right to 
appeal the court’s ruling on the motion in limine.1  At best this demonstrates 
confusion on the part of these officers of the court and of the court itself as to 
the state of the law; at worst it shows an appalling lack of concern for the 
preservation of a fair system which accurately determines the guilt or 
innocence of accused parties.  As the majority correctly holds, with inaccurate 
legal advice, appellant’s plea could not have been made knowingly or 
intelligently.  It was the duty of all officers of the court, that is, the prosecution, 
 
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the defense attorney, and the trial court itself, to ensure that appellant 
understood the implications of her plea of no contest. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully concur with the majority’s decision and 
opinion. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS and COOK, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
concurring opinion. 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
1When explaining the plea agreement to the court, the prosecutor stated: 
 
“We further anticipate the Defendant filing an appeal to appeal the 
Court’s rulings that have been rendered previously in this case.  Certainly she 
is permitted to file an appeal pursuant to this negotiated plea.  However, if she 
wins her appeal so that she’s entitled to a new trial on the entire indictment, 
that would be out--well, it is our motion that we’re dismissing Counts 2 and 3, 
11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25 and 26 without prejudice only if she wins her 
appeal and is entitled to a completely new trial. 
 
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“Further, I anticipate that again we would at least potentially be able to 
reinstitute the indictment as to Count 1 if she completely gets a new trial based 
on the appeal. 
 
“Another possibility of the appeal would be that the Court feels that 
there was insufficient evidence on some counts, sufficient on another.  If that’s 
the case, we’re not going to retry her.  This would only be if the Court of 
Appeals holds that this entire conviction is null and void, then we can retry 
her.” 
 
Neither the court nor appellant’s defense attorney corrected the 
prosecutor.  When determining the validity of the plea, the court stated: 
 
“Okay.  And do you understand also that the Prosecution has 
recommended to the Court, and they will in fact, based on the fact of your 
finding of guilty and after the appeal, that all the other counts in this indictment 
will be nolled or what we would commonly refer to as being dismissed?  Do 
you understand that?” 
 
14 
 
Again, neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney corrected this 
statement.