Title: BRANDY FAY PENDLETON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRANDY FAY PENDLETON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 36180 P.3d 212Case Number: 06-129Decided: 04/02/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
BRANDY 
FAY PENDLETON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. 
Terry Rogers, InterimState Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; Geoffrey L. Gunnerson, Student Director; and 
Brian J. Hunter, Student Intern.  
Argument by Mr. Hunter.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Brandy Pendleton 
(the appellant) was convicted of being an accessory before the fact to 
first-degree murder and of conspiring to commit first-degree murder.  Part of the evidence submitted to the 
jury during her trial was a tape-recorded interview wherein the appellant 
discussed her involvement in the attempted murder.  In this appeal, the appellant alleges a 
number of errors resulting from the admission of this recorded interview.  She also contends that the prosecutor 
improperly elicited testimony from a co-conspirator concerning a guilty 
plea.  We will affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The appellant 
presents the following issues for our review:

 
 
1.  Whether plain error occurred when the 
jury was permitted to hear the appellant's entire recorded police 
interview?

 
 
2.  Whether trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by not objecting to admission of the recorded interview 
or by the tactical decision to allow the interview to be 
admitted?

 
 
3.  Whether the district court erred when it 
allowed the jury to take a recording of the interview into the deliberation 
room?

 
 
4.  Whether plain error occurred when the 
State elicited in its case-in-chief that the principal pled guilty to attempted 
second-degree murder?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On June 25, 
2004, the appellant was released from jail after serving a ten-day sentence for 
delivery of methamphetamine.  As her 
husband was driving her home from jail, the appellant spotted Armando Canales 
(Cali).  The appellant asked her husband to stop 
the vehicle and she confronted Cali because she suspected that he had 
"snitched her out."  At that time, 
the appellant told Cali, "I'll see you 
dead."

 
 
[¶4]      Later that same 
day the appellant met with Dayle Wooden and Josh Dubois (J.D.) and discussed 
Cali.   The appellant told J.D. that Cali was a "rat" and that 
he was looking for J.D.  The 
appellant offered J.D. $7,000 and a fake I.D. if he would kill Cali.  Later that night, J.D. found Cali, drove him out of 
town, and shot him twice with a sawed-off shotgun.  After shooting Cali, J.D. fled to Cortez, Colorado, where he was eventually arrested. 
 Cali did not die from his 
wounds.

 
 
[¶5]      Almost a year 
after the shooting, Wooden, who was then incarcerated in Utah on unrelated 
charges, told authorities that he had information about his and the appellant's 
involvement in the Cali shooting.  
Wyoming law enforcement officers 
interviewed both Wooden and J.D. (who had already pled guilty to the attempted 
murder of Cali).  
Both confirmed the appellant's involvement in the attempted murder.  On June 8, 2005, Detectives Vranish and 
Matthews interviewed the appellant regarding her involvement in the 
crime.

 
 
[¶6]      Based on the 
information gathered by interviewing Wooden, J.D., and the appellant, the State 
of Wyoming 
filed a felony Information against the appellant on June 20, 2005.  The appellant was charged with being an 
accessory before the fact to first-degree murder and with conspiring to commit 
first-degree murder.  The appellant 
pled not guilty, but was convicted on both counts after a four-day jury 
trial.

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant 
filed a timely notice of appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      The appellant 
did not object at trial to any of the alleged errors and thus our review is for 
plain error.

 
 
When no 
objection is made at trial to the evidence challenged on appeal, we apply our 
plain error standard of review.  Plain error will not be found 
unless:  (1) the record clearly 
reflects the alleged error; (2) the party claiming the error demonstrates a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the party proves that 
the violation adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material 
prejudice.

 
 

Cazier 
v. State, 2006 
WY 153, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 23, 28 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶9]      Additionally, the 
appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the 
first time in this appeal.  Because 
the district court did not hear the claim or make any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, this Court must conduct a de novo review of the facts pertinent to 
the claim of ineffective assistance.  
Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, 
¶ 16, 141 P.3d 106, 113 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
plain error occurred when the jury was permitted to hear the appellant's entire 
recorded police interview?

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant first argues that it 
was plain error for the district court to allow the jury to hear the recorded 
interview.  Specifically, she 
contends that certain statements made by the officers during the interview were 
misstatements of the law, that the officers expressed opinions of guilt, and 
that the officers implicitly vouched for the credibility of the State's 
witnesses when, while questioning her, they accused her of lying.  The appellant points to the following 
highlighted portions of the recording as the basis for her claims:    

 
 
[Appellant]:    They are trying to find out 
what I knew about Cali and J.D.

 
 
M. 
Vranish:  And did you say, "yeah, I 
saw J.D. tonight with a sawed off shot gun.  He was at my house there cutting the 
barrel off.

 
 
[Appellant]:  No, sir I didn't because I didn't want 
to go right back to jail.

 
 
M. 
Vranish:  Because you're 
involved.  That's right.  Because you had prior knowledge of 
it.  Is that not 
correct?

 
 
[Appellant]:  I had prior knowledge of what he said 
was going to happen, but J.D. has told some really far fetched stories 
before.

 
 
M. 
Vranish:  Yeah.  
So, right there, you admit that you had knowledge.  Right there you admit that you are an 
accessory before the fact.

 
 
[Appellant]:  I am not an accessory . . 
.

 

D. 
Matthews:  You are, you just admitted to me, you said 
you had prior knowledge, see Brandy, this is the thing that is going to get you 
into trouble, you're admitting the crime, but you are not being honest about the 
crime.

 
 
[Appellant]:    What does it matter?  You guys have already pre-determined 
what's going to happen to me, haven't ya?

 
 
D. 
Matthews:  Well, there, there is no doubt you're going 
to go to jail Brandy, we are going to be honest with you.  But, at this point you can't hurt 
yourself anymore, you've, you've, you've filled the elements of the crime.  You have told us what 
happened.

            

M. 
Vranish:  I'm not the Judge and I'm 
not the jury, so no, I haven't pre-determined what's going to happen to 
you.

 
 
D. 
Furlong:  Oh, yeah, that's what you 
meant.  You're going to jail 
today.

 
 
M. 
Vranish:  Uh, 
huh.

 
 
D. 
Furlong:  But, how long you spend in jail is not up to 
the three people in this room, okay.  
What charges are eventually, the disposition on the final charges, are 
not in the hands of the three in this room, that's in the hands of your defense 
attorney, the County Prosecutor, and the Judge.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
D. 
Furlong:  You'll, you'll be entitled 
to [an attorney].  But, what makes the difference here is the 
cooperation level that goes into it from this interview, might, have some 
determination. . . .

 
 
[Appellant]:  Oh, I cooperated enough to put myself in 
jail didn't I?

 
 
M. 
Vranish:  You 
did.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 

 
 
[¶11]   Because the third prong of the 
plain error test is dispositive, we will begin our analysis by examining whether 
prejudice resulted when the jury heard the above-quoted portion of the recorded 
interview.  See supra ¶ 10.  Under plain error analysis, the appellant has the burden of showing material prejudice.  Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 49, 123 P.3d 543, 558 (Wyo. 2005).  To 
establish prejudice, the appellant must show a reasonable probability that she 
would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the error.  Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2006).  
When analyzing whether the inclusion of certain evidence resulted in 
prejudice to the appellant, we must view that evidence in light of the entire record.  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 14, 153 P.3d 256, 261 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶12]   This trial lasted approximately 
four days.  The prosecution called 
eight witnesses and the defense presented six.  The portion of the tape-recorded 
interview to which the appellant objects on appeal is a short excerpt from a 
three-hour recorded interview.  
When the state presented the recorded 
interview to be played for the jury, the district court judge questioned whether 
a proper foundation had been laid.  
Defense counsel did not object to the admission of the evidence, or 
portions thereof, but instead advocated for its admissibility, arguing that the 
foundation for the recording was evident in the recording 
itself.

 
 
[¶13]   It is not surprising that the appellant 
advocated for the admission of the evidence as this evidence appears to have 
been an integral part of the appellant's trial strategy. Defense counsel 
repeatedly referred to the recorded interview, and the specific portion to which 
the appellant now objects.  For example, during opening statements, 
defense counsel said the following:

 
 
The 
police, you're going to hear a three hour  a three hour plus statement from 
[the appellant] that she gave when the police arrested her on June 8, 2005, and 
they interrogated her. They said, "We want to question you about this.  We're going to advise you about your 
constitutional rights."  She agreed 
to talk to them.  She went to the 
police department.  She was held 
there and grilled and grilled and grilled for three hours.  She told one story after another, dug 
herself a ditch she couldn't get out of, and finally admitted, "Yes, Josh Dubois 
came to my place at midnight or about that time."

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
. . . 
The police say to her when they're trying to just browbeat her into a 
confession, "We've got statements from two people who told us the truth and we 
know that because their statements are the same.  You lied to us"  and she did lie to 
them  "so we know you're guilty."

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
. . . 
The police didn't keep an open mind in this thing.  They decided who they wanted to arrest 
for this and they went about trying to prove it.  That's not the way people who are trying 
to investigate the facts do things.  
You listen to what goes on and then you let the facts take you to the 
conclusion.  You don't go to the 
conclusion and then try to make the facts fit your conclusion.  That's what's happened in this 
case.

 
 
 
 
Defense 
counsel's opening statement reflects an intent to use the recording to 
demonstrate the officer's brow-beating, false accusations, and 
closed-mindedness.  

 
 
[¶14]   Additionally, the following 
colloquy, which occurred toward the end of the trial, indicates that the 
appellant intended to use the recorded interview as a means of presenting her 
version of the events without testifying in open court:

            

[Defense 
Counsel]:  Your Honor, [the 
appellant] and I have spoken; and she will not be taking the stand.  I wanted to advise you in open court 
that she has made that decision and ask her if that is, in fact, her 
decision.

 
 
The 
Court:  All 
Right.

 
 
[The 
appellant]:  Yes, your 
Honor.

 

The 
Court:  All right.  You're making that decision in light of 
the advice I gave you earlier today; is that correct?

 
 
[The 
appellant]:  No, sir.  It's in view of my statements earlier 
which they played in court that I have nothing further to 
say.

 
 
[¶15]   During closing arguments, defense 
counsel reiterated that the appellant had held fast to her version of the events 
even in the face of aggressive and confrontational questions, and emphasized to 
the jury that they needed to listen to the entire tape, as a 
whole:

 
 
Ladies 
and Gentlemen, you can take a little excerpt here and a little excerpt there and 
make all of us guilty whenever we say anything.  There's the tape.  Listen to the damn tape.  Because what [the appellant] finally 
said, when she got beaten down, beaten down, finally browbeatened [sic] and 
she'd tried to divert all the attention from herself, but when it finally came 
down to "We want the truth.  If you 
want a deal, you better tell us the truth."  She said, "I have told you the truth. . 
. ."

 
 
[¶16]   As 
can be seen, the appellant relied heavily on the recorded interview, and this 
evidence was an important, if not vital, part of the appellant's defense 
strategy.  She cannot have it both 
ways, and now claim that she was prejudiced by the inclusion of this 
evidence.  In arguing prejudice, the 
appellant does not attempt to explain the contradiction between her trial and 
appellate positions, but instead she points to certain inconsistencies in the 
testimony of J.D. and Wooden and argues:

 
 
In a 
case where the testimony is contradicted, not by the defense, but by the state's 
own witnesses, the chances of the conviction being a result of the improper 
comments heard through the recorded interview are even more likely.  Prejudice has been shown when there is a 
likelihood that the verdict may have been more favorable had the error not 
occurred.  In this case, there is a 
strong likelihood the verdict could have been more favorable had the jury not 
heard the misstatement of the law, expressed opinions on guilt, vouching for 
witnesses and using the accomplice's guilty pleas as substantive evidence of 
guilt.[1]  

 
 
[¶17]   The 
appellant's argument is simply inadequate to satisfy her burden of demonstrating 
prejudice.  While she insists that 
the verdict would have been more favorable had the jury not heard the selected 
portion of the recorded interview, she fails specifically to articulate how the 
exclusion of the challenged evidence might have lead to a more favorable result, 
especially in light of the fact that, at the time of trial, her own counsel felt 
that admission of the tape was the appellant's best strategy.  Given the substantial amount of 
evidence inculpating the appellant, and the limited strategical choices 
available to defense counsel, we are not willing to second-guess counsel and 
suggest that a different strategy might have been more productive.  Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 
17, 55 P.3d 1239, 1243 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶18]   Finally, the potential for prejudice arising from the 
officers' alleged misstatements of the law or comments about the appellant's 
untruthfulness must also be considered in light of the jury instructions.  The district court properly instructed 
the jury on the law of the case, and further instructed that "[t]he instructions 
given by the Court to you constitute the only law for your guidance on the 
case."  Also, with regard to the 
question of truthfulness, the district court instructed that "it is the 
exclusive province of the jury to . . . determine the credibility of all 
witnesses and evidence."  We presume 
that juries follow such instructions.  Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47, ¶ 56, 70 P.3d 179, 199 (Wyo. 2003).  Thus, any 
adverse effect that the alleged improper statements might have had on the jury 
was mitigated by the jury instructions.  See Christian v. State, 883 P.2d 376, 
381 (Wyo. 1994); James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 208 
(Wyo. 
1994).

 
 
[¶19]   When 
viewing the evidence in the context of the entire trial, we cannot see how its 
inclusion prejudiced the appellant.  
Thus, we find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that 
the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceeding were adversely affected 
when the jury heard the entire recorded interview.

 
 
Whether 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to admission of 
the recorded interview or by the tactical decision to allow the interview to be 
admitted?

 
 
[¶20]   In her next argument, the appellant 
contends that her trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the 
recorded interview or tactical decision to have the interview admitted were 
outside the range of professionally competent assistance.  When analyzing ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, this Court has adopted the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 623 
(Wyo. 1985); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 
1986).   

 
 
Under 
this standard, appellant must demonstrate

 
 
" * * * 
first * * * that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel' 
guaranteed [appellant] by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, [appellant] must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [appellant] of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable. * * * " 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 
 

Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  The appellant must 
make both showings in order to demonstrate that a breakdown in the adversary 
process made the result unreliable.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2059.  The burden of 
proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on the appellant.  Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 663 
(Wyo. 2006).   In order to meet 
this burden, the appellant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was competent.  Rion v. State, 2007 WY 197, ¶ 2, 172 P.3d 734, 736 (Wyo. 
2007).  

 
 
[¶21]   "An 
ineffectiveness claim may be disposed of solely on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice."  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 19, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007).  "Indeed, if it is easier to dispose 
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which 
we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.'"  Martinez, 
2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d  at 663 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 104 
S.Ct. at 2069). Thus, we will limit our analysis of appellant's ineffective 
assistance claim to the prejudice prong of the above-articulated test.  See supra ¶ 19.  To show prejudice, the appellant must 
"demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the 
deficiency in counsel's performance, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different."  Dettloff, 2007 
WY 29, ¶ 19, 152 P.3d  at 382.  

 
 
[¶22]   Appellant's ineffective assistance 
claim is based on trial counsel's failure to prevent admission of the recorded 
interview evidence or the decision to use the interview as part of the defense 
strategy.  Because we have already 
concluded above that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving 
prejudice resulting from the admission of that evidence, we must necessarily 
reach the same result with regard to her ineffective assistance claim.  See supra ¶ 19.  Without a showing of prejudice, we 
cannot conclude that appellant's trial counsel was 
ineffective.

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred when it allowed the jury to take a recording of the 
interview into the deliberation room?

 
 
[¶23]   During deliberations, the jury 
requested either a transcript of the appellant's recorded police interview or 
the actual audio disks so they could replay them.  When the interview was first played for 
the jury in open court, the disks were marked as Exhibits 3A and 3B; however, 
the record is unclear whether these two disks were ever formally offered or 
accepted into evidence.  The 
appellant now contends that it was plain error to allow the jury to take into 
the jury room items that had not been formally admitted into evidence.  

 
 
[¶24]   The appellant did not object to 
allowing the jury to listen to the recorded interview in the deliberation room, 
so we again review the alleged error under the plain error standard.  And once again, the prejudice prong of 
that test is the quickest route to a determination of the issue.  Because we have already found no 
prejudice resulting from the jury hearing the recorded interview, it would be 
difficult to conclude that prejudice occurred when the jury was allowed to take 
the disks into the deliberation room.  
This is especially true where, as here, the linchpin of the appellant's 
defense was the allegedly overbearing demeanor of the officers during the 
interview and the resultant involuntary confession.

 
 
Whether 
plain error occurred when the State elicited in its case-in-chief that the 
principal pled guilty to attempted  second-degree 
murder?

 
 
[¶25]   In her final argument, the 
appellant contends that error occurred when the prosecutor questioned J.D. 
regarding the fact that he pled guilty to attempted second-degree murder for the 
attempt to kill Cali.  
The appellant points to the rule set forth in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375-76 
(Wyo. 1979), 
where we said

 
 
when two 
persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstance, 
the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other. See, 
Wharton, Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., § 439. This is so because competent 
evidence against one person charged with an offense is not necessarily 
admissible against another charged with the same offense. Furthermore, each 
person charged with an offense must be tried upon evidence tending to show his 
guilt or innocence.  48 A.L.R.2d p. 
1017.  For a prosecutor to argue or 
elicit testimony disclosing that another has pleaded guilty is to argue from 
facts either not in evidence or facts which are inadmissible in evidence. In State v. McCarthy, Mo.App., 567 S.W.2d 722 (1978), the rationale of the rule holding the admission of such evidence to 
be prejudicial error is said to be that it is irrelevant and incompetent because 
it suggests that since the confederate is guilty, the defendant must also be 
guilty, and this inference violates the 
defendant's right to have his trial on its own merits.

 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 
[¶26]   The appellant contends that this 
rule was violated when the following exchange occurred:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Now, you were initially charged with 
attempted first degree murder, is that right?

            

[J.D.]:  Yes.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Ultimately, there was a plea agreement 
in your case; is that right?

 
 
[J.D.]:  It was, so I didn't have to go to 
trial.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Okay.  Ultimately, you pled guilty to attempted 
second degree murder; is that correct?

 
 
[J.D.]:  Yes.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:    There were some discussions 
about you receiving a benefit for your testimony against anybody else that might 
have been involved in that shooting; is that right?

 
 
[J.D.]:  Yes.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Can you tell the jury about those 
discussions, who you talked to and what was discussed?

            

[J.D.]:  I talked to a detective and he said if I 
was to help them with [the appellant], that I would get three years off my 
thirty year sentence.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:    The decision you made to 
plead guilty to attempted second degree murder, was that decision made by you 
before you agreed to testify against anybody else?

 
 
[J.D.]:  Yes, I agreed to that so I didn't have 
to go to trial.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:    And then after that, you were 
offered three years off your maximum sentence - -

 

[J.D.]:  Yes.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  -- for any testimony you 
had?

 
 
[J.D.]:  Yes. (Pause.)

 
 
[Prosecutor]:    Okay.  Now, you have a minimum sentence that 
was imposed; is that correct?

 
 
[J.D.]:  Twenty-five.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Actually, I think it reflects it was 
twenty years.

 
 
[J.D.]:  I think - - yeah, twenty or 
twenty-five.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:    Okay.  Did your cooperation in this case do 
anything to affect the minimum sentence that you have to 
serve?

 
 
[J.D.]:  No.

 
 
[¶27]   The State counters that the 
prosecutors did not violate the Kwallek 
rule because the appellant's attorney had already referred to J.D.'s plea 
agreement in his opening statement.  
The State specifically points to the following statement made by defense 
counsel: 

 
 
[J.D.] 
was originally charged with accessory  or with attempted first degree murder, 
which is life in prison.  A deal was 
made.  "You tell us about everything 
you know, we'll take it down to second degree murder," which is twenty years to 
life.  "Furthermore, if you testify 
about everything you tell us, we'll give you another three years off that."  That's what he's doing 
here.

 
 
The 
State contends that in light of defense counsel's comments during his opening 
statement, the prosecutor's questions of J.D. during direct examination 
regarding his guilty plea were proper.  
In support of this argument, the State cites the following language from 
KP v. State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d 217, 223 (Wyo. 2004): 

 
 
The 
Kwallek rule precludes the State from presenting evidence of guilty pleas 
of accomplices in its case-in-chief under circumstances that might tend to 
implicate the defendant's guilt by association.  In the case sub judice, the prosecutor 
never introduced evidence of guilty pleas of [the accomplices] for any reason 
other than to counter KP's claim of bias and his attacks on the credibility of 
[the accomplices]. The prosecutor never mentioned [the accomplices'] guilty 
pleas in her opening or closing statements and never argued that their guilty 
pleas in any manner reflected upon KP's guilt or innocence.  The 
Kwallek rule was not violated.

 
 

Id., 2004 
WY 165, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d  at 223.  The 
State argues that defense counsel made it apparent that he would use J.D.'s plea 
agreement to impeach J.D.'s credibility by the manner in which he addressed it 
during his opening statement.  The 
State asserts that the prosecutor did not present any argument concerning J.D.'s 
guilty plea in a manner that would imply the appellant's guilt, but rather 
addressed the plea agreement on direct examination solely to bolster J.D.'s 
credibility in response to the attack made by defense counsel's opening 
statement.  

 
 
[¶28]   We find the State's argument 
compelling. The nature and scope of the prosecutor's questions strongly indicate 
that his purpose in asking J.D. about his guilty plea was to respond to defense 
counsel's comments in his opening statement.  The prosecutor stated:  "There were some discussions about you 
receiving a benefit from your testimony against anybody else that might have 
been involved in that shooting; is that right?" and "Okay.  Did your cooperation in this case do 
anything to affect the minimum sentence you have to serve?"  These comments, and the fact that the 
prosecutor made no other statements regarding J.D.'s guilty plea in his opening 
statement or closing argument, convince us that the purpose of the questions was 
proper and not in violation of the Kwallek rule.  This is a classic case of defense 
counsel having "opened the door" to this line of questioning.  See Lawrence v. State, 2007 WY 183, ¶ 14, 171 P.3d 517, 521 (Wyo. 2007); and White v. 
State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 642, 648 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
[¶29]   Furthermore, even if we were to 
conclude that the prosecutor's questions were improper under our prior 
application of the Kwallek rule, we 
would have difficulty concluding that prejudice arose from the admission of 
J.D.'s statements regarding his guilty plea.  In Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965 (Wyo. 
1996), the appellant asserted that the trial court had erred by allowing his 
co-conspirators to testify that they had pled guilty to the charges similar to 
those for which the appellant was on trial, and by allowing the prosecutor to 
use that evidence in closing argument.  
Id. at 969.  Although we found that an unequivocal 
rule of law had been violated by the admission of the testimony regarding the 
co-conspirators' guilty plea, we concluded that the appellant failed to show 
that material prejudice had resulted.  Id. at 970.  
We began our analysis of the prejudice prong of the plain error test 
by noting that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions without 
the co-conspirators' statements about their guilty pleas.  Id.  We then compared the circumstances under 
which the testimony was elicited to those presented in Kwallek.  Id.  In Kwallek, we concluded that prejudice 
resulted when the jury's attention was inordinately directed to the improper 
evidence when the district court twice overruled defendant's objection to the 
admission of the evidence about the co-conspirator's guilty plea.  We said:

 
 
[T]he 
jury was left with the impression that, since the total evidence connected the 
defendant with [his co-conspirator] in the altercation with [the victim], the 
court must have wanted the jury to understand that, since [the co-conspirator] 
had pleaded guilty, it must be that the defendant is also 
guilty.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting 
Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1376).  We concluded in Urrutia that the jury was not left with 
such an impression because no objection to the evidence of the co-conspirators' 
guilty pleas were made.  As such, 
the appellant could not show material prejudice.  Urrutia, 924 P.2d  at 
970.

 
 
[¶30]   The facts of this case relative to 
this issue are similar to those in Urrutia.  In neither case was there an objection to 
the admission of the co-conspirators' testimony, and thus, little emphasis was 
placed upon that testimony.  
Moreover, in both cases, even without the evidence of the 
co-conspirators' pleas, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support 
conviction. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶31]   We conclude that the appellant 
failed in her burden of demonstrating that material prejudice resulted when the 
jury was allowed to hear the recorded police interview or when the jury was 
permitted to take the recording into deliberations.  Additionally, we find that no error of 
law occurred when the prosecutor questioned one of the appellant's 
co-conspirators concerning his guilty plea.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
appellant's mention of the accomplice's guilty plea does not factor into the 
propriety of the admission of the recorded interview, but rather is a separate 
issue that will be addressed later.