Title: Bishop v. Burgard

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90742-Agenda 27-September 2001.
CATHERINE R. BISHOP, Appellant, v. KELLY BURGARD et
al. (Administrative 	Committee, 
 as Adm'r of the Associates
Health 								and Welfare Plan, Appellee).
Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The issues presented in this appeal are, simply put, whether
the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a petition
for adjudication of lien because the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq.
(1994)) preempted state court action, and whether the circuit court
properly applied the common fund doctrine to reduce the amount
the administrator of plaintiff's benefit plan received from
plaintiff's settlement fund as reimbursement for medical benefits
paid on plaintiff's behalf.
	In this case, the circuit court of Tazewell County ruled that
ERISA did not preempt state court action on plaintiff's motion to
adjudicate lien, and that the common fund doctrine applied to
reduce the amount the administrator of plaintiff's benefit plan
would receive from settlement proceeds. In the ensuing appeal, the
appellate court agreed with the circuit court's ruling on the
preemption issue, but held that the circuit court had erred in
applying the common fund doctrine rather than the terms of the
plan, as the appellate court interpreted them. Accordingly, the
appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court. 317 Ill.
App. 3d 923. We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and granted leave to the Illinois Trial
Lawyers Association to submit a brief as amicus curiae in support
of the plaintiff. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. For the reasons expressed
below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
	The plaintiff, Catherine Bishop, incurred medical expenses in
the amount of $8,576.30 as a result of injuries she sustained in an
automobile accident on September 3, 1997, when her automobile
was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant, Kelly Burgard.
Bishop was an employee of Wal-Mart and a participant in the
company's ERISA plan. Pursuant to plan provisions, Bishop, or
her health-care providers, received payments totaling $8,576.30
from the plan for medical expenses Bishop had incurred.
	Bishop retained counsel on February 17, 1998, signing an
agreement under which she would pay her attorney a percentage
of her recovery as attorney fees and costs. On June 9, 1998, Bishop
filed a personal injury action against Burgard, seeking damages in
excess of $50,000. Bishop's attorney ultimately procured a
settlement offer of $21,500, which Bishop accepted. On February
19, 1999, Bishop's attorney filed a petition for adjudication of lien
in the circuit court of Tazewell County, alleging (1) Blue
Cross/Blue Shield (Blue Cross) had claimed a lien in the amount
of $8,576.30 on any proceeds Bishop received as settlement, (2)
Blue Cross had refused a request to reduce the lien by one-third to
reflect attorney fees, asserting that Illinois' common fund doctrine
did not apply, (3) pursuant to precedent established in Scholtens v.
Schneider, 173 Ill. 2d 375 (1996), ERISA's conflict preemption
doctrine does not preempt Illinois' common fund doctrine, and (4)
under Illinois law, the common fund doctrine requires that the
creator of the fund be reimbursed by Blue Cross for the reasonable
value of the legal service rendered in protecting Blue Cross's
subrogation lien. The amount of Blue Cross's lien was not
disputed, nor was its validity. On March 10, 1999, an amended
petition was filed, substituting the Associates Health and Welfare
Plan as the lienholder claiming a right against the proceeds of
settlement. Neither the original petition, nor the amended petition,
refers to plan provisions which might require interpretation in this
matter or control the outcome.
	On April 13, 1999, the Administrative Committee, as
administrator of the Associates Health and Welfare Plan, filed an
emergency petition to intervene as of right. The Committee then
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for adjudication pursuant to
section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619
(West 1996)) on the ground that ERISA preempted the state court
action. The circuit court denied the Committee's motion to
dismiss. On May 28, 1999, Bishop filed a motion for summary
judgment, asking that the circuit court apply Illinois' common
fund doctrine to reduce the amount claimed by the plan, reflecting
a proportionate reduction of one-third for attorney fees and an
additional reduction for costs attributable to the plan's share of the
recovery. On July 12, 1999, the Administrative Committee filed
a response to Bishop's motion and a cross-motion for summary
judgment against Bishop, seeking full reimbursement, pursuant to
plan provisions, for the medical benefits it had paid as a result of
the automobile accident. The Committee attached to its pleading
the 1996 and 1998 versions of the benefit plan.
	The plan's pertinent provisions for 1996 and 1998 differ
slightly, but are consistent in most respects. Both versions contain
a section entitled, "Right to Reduction and Reimbursement
(Subrogation)," which gives the plan the right-under the terms of
the 1996 provision:
		"[to] recover (subrogate) [under the 1998 provision,
"recover or subrogate" (emphasis added)] 100% of the
benefits previously paid by the plan to the extent of any
and all of the following:
				* Any judgment, settlement, or any payment, made
or to be made by a person considered responsible for
the condition giving rise to the expense or by their
insurers.
				* Any auto or recreational vehicle insurance
coverages or benefits including, but not limited to,
uninsured motorist coverage.
				* Business and homeowners medical liability
insurance coverage or payments.
				* Attorney's fees."
	Under a subsection entitled "Cooperation Required," plan
participants are obliged to "cooperate to guarantee reimbursement
to the Plan from third party benefits." Participants are prohibited
from taking any action that would "hinder reimbursement of
overpayment to the Plan after [the participant has] accepted
benefits." Immediately following those indiscriminate
admonishments, a "Note," without specific contextual reference,
states, "All attorney's fees and court costs are the responsibility of
the participant, not the Plan." Plan provisions do not expressly
repudiate the common fund doctrine, nor do they specifically state
that the participant will be obligated to pay the plan's attorney
fees. Participants are advised:
		"These rights apply regardless of whether such payments
are designated as payment for, but not limited to:
				* Pain and suffering
				* Medical benefits
				* Other specified damages
				* Whether the participant has been made whole (i.e.,
fully compensated for his/her injuries):
		Additionally, the Plan has the right to file suit on your
behalf against any person or entity considered responsible
for the condition giving rise to the medical expenses to
recover benefits paid or to be paid by the Plan."
	Another subsection, entitled "Participant's Responsibility
Regarding Right of Recovery," provides,
		"To aid the Plan in its enforcement of its right of
recovery, reimbursement, and subrogation, the participant
must, at the Plan's request and at its discretion:
				* Take any action
				* Give information
				* Execute documents so required by the Plan."
This subsection concludes with an explanation of the term
"subrogation": "Subrogation is when Wal-Mart pays your medical
charges relating to your accident while waiting for the responsible
party to settle. Repayment to the Plan of 100% will be made at the
time the settlement is received by the associate, dependent, or their
attorney."
	The 1998 version of the plan contains several paragraphs
under the subsection "Cooperation Required" that do not appear
in the 1996 version, among them, two stating as follows:
			"* The Plan does not pay for nor is responsible for the
participant's attorney's fees. Attorney's fees are to be paid
solely by the participant.
			* Modification to this section regarding the right to
reduction and reimbursement (subrogation) are [sic] made
to clarify previous Plan wording."
	On September 9, 1999, the circuit court, in an order that
mentioned neither plan provisions nor the common fund doctrine,
denied the Committee's motion and granted Bishop's motion,
reducing by $3,025.09 the amount the plan was entitled to receive
from the settlement proceeds.
	As we have previously noted, the appellate court held that
ERISA did not preempt state court action on plaintiff's motion to
adjudicate lien; however, the appellate court concluded that the
circuit court had erred in applying the common fund doctrine
rather than the terms of the plan, as the appellate court interpreted
them. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether ERISA
preempts application of the common fund doctrine in this context,
and if not, whether, on these facts, the provisions of the benefit
plan preclude application of the doctrine, and if so, whether those
provisions are unenforceable because they violate public policy.
The standard of review in cases involving review of summary
judgment is de novo. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co.,
183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998).
	We find the disposition of this case controlled by analytical
principles espoused in Scholtens. In Scholtens, this court held that
ERISA does not preempt application of Illinois' common fund
doctrine (Scholtens, 173 Ill. 2d at 396), stating in the course of
analysis that a claim for attorney fees based upon the doctrine is,
"in substance if not in form," a "separate and distinct action,"
resting "upon equitable considerations of quantum meruit and the
prevention of unjust enrichment"; an action "wholly independent
of and unrelated to the underlying benefit plan"; a cause of action
premised upon the rights of the attorney who rendered services.
Scholtens, 173 Ill. 2d  at 390.
	In Scholtens, we held that section 514(a) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.
§1144(a) (1982)) does not preempt application of the common
fund doctrine. That issue was fully addressed in Scholtens, and the
Administrative Committee presents nothing to convince us that
our Scholtens analysis was in error or that the facts of this case
require a different result.
	Preemption is disfavored. As we observed in Scholtens, a
presumption exists in every preemption case that Congress did not
intend to supplant state law. Scholtens, 173 Ill. 2d  at 379.
Preemption under section 514(a) is at best a nebulous concept
which the United States Supreme Court is still struggling to
clarify. While it appears that all members of the Court have now
effectively abandoned statutory language as the sole tool to be
used in discerning the scope of ERISA preemption, in favor of an
inquiry focusing primarily on the objectives of the ERISA statute
and the nature and effect of state laws on ERISA plans (Egelhoff
v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, __, 149 L. Ed. 2d 264, 271, 121 S. Ct. 1322, 1327 (2001); New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695, 705, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995)), many
members of the Court recognize that neither the shift in focus, nor
years of effort, have succeeded in providing guidance to lower
courts or in clarifying the scope of ERISA preemption. See
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at __, 149 L. Ed. 2d  at 275-80, 121 S. Ct.  at
1330-35 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.; Breyer, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.); California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 335-36, 136 L. Ed. 2d 791, 806, 117 S. Ct. 832, 843
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.). In
Scholtens, our discussion of section 514(a) preemption took into
account the analytical revision of Travelers (Scholtens, 173 Ill. 2d
at 383) and relevant factors currently utilized by the Court. We
noted in Scholtens that the United States Supreme Court, in
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., "recognized
that such actions [common fund claims] are not preempted by
ERISA":
			" 'These cases-lawsuits against ERISA plans for
run-of-the-mill state-law claims such as unpaid rent,
failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an
ERISA plan-are relatively commonplace. Petitioners and
the United States (appearing here as amicus curiae)
concede that these suits, although obviously affecting and
involving ERISA plans and their trustees, are not pre-empted by ERISA §514(a).' " Scholtens, 173 Ill. 2d  at
391-92, quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836,
846,108 S. Ct. 2182, 2187 (1988).
See generally The Meadows v. Employers Health Insurance, 47 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995) (ERISA does not preempt claims
by a third party who sues the plan as an independent entity
claiming damages). While the plan provisions in this case, unlike
Scholtens, do address attorney fees, those provisions cannot
govern the relationship between the plan and an independent
entity, the attorney whose efforts created the common fund.
Scholtens so held. Consequently, there is no need to revisit section
514(a) preemption here.
	The Committee, however, points out that Scholtens only
discussed conflict preemption under section 514 (a) of ERISA.
The Committee argues that complete preemption under section
502(a) of ERISA (29 U.S.C §1132(a) (1994)) applies and deprived
the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
	The complete preemption doctrine is a doctrine of federal
jurisdiction which, under appropriate circumstances, permits
recharacterization of a plaintiff's state law claim as a federal claim
so that removal is proper. Speciale v. Seybold, 147 F.3d 612, 615
(7th Cir. 1998). Complete preemption under section 502(a)
encompasses all claims by a participant or beneficiary to enforce
his rights under an ERISA plan, whereas conflict preemption
under section 514(a) preempts any state law that may "relate to"
an ERISA plan. Speciale, 147 F.3d  at 615.
	The Committee claims that the motion to adjudicate lien in
this case qualifies for complete preemption under section
502(a)(3) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. §1132 (a)(3) (1994)), which
provides for a civil action to be brought "by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary" of a plan. Three factors must be present
before a state law claim comes within the scope of section 502(a):
(1) the plaintiff must be eligible to bring a claim under that
section; (2) the plaintiff's cause of action must fall within the
scope of an ERISA provision that the plaintiff can enforce by
utilizing section 502(a); and (3) the plaintiff's state law claim
cannot be resolved without an interpretation of the contract
governed by federal law. Speciale, 147 F.3d  at 615.
	The Committee argues that the motion to adjudicate liens in
this case was a civil action brought by a plan participant to obtain
equitable relief, "to enforce or interpret the Plan's reimbursement
provisions to require a one-third reduction under Illinois' common
fund doctrine."
	We refer again to our decision in Scholtens. This court made
clear in Scholtens that the quasi-contractual right to payment of
fees for services rendered belongs to the attorney who rendered the
services and does not affect the contractual relationship between
the plan participant and the plan. Because this point is central to
our disposition, we quote at length from Scholtens:
			"An employee benefit plan is in the nature of a
contractual agreement between the employer, the plan and
its fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries. The
claim for attorney fees at issue here did not arise out of
that contractual agreement or any separate subrogation
agreement executed between the Trustees and Scholtens.
Rather, the claim for attorney fees arises independently of
both the benefit plan and the subrogation agreement.
Here, the attorney who represented Scholtens in his tort
action, and who negotiated the settlement and obtained
the proceeds from which the plan's subrogation lien will
be paid, simply invoked his quasi-contractual right to
payment of fees for services rendered in recovering the
plan's subrogation lien. The quasi-contractual obligation
he seeks to impose upon the Trustees arises independently
of the benefit plan, resting instead upon equitable
considerations of quantum meruit and the prevention of
unjust enrichment. Accordingly, applying the common
fund doctrine under the circumstances of this case does
not alter the relationship or agreements formulated among
the principal ERISA entities (e.g., the employer, the plan
fiduciaries, and the participants). It affects the relations
between one of those entities (i.e., the Trustees) and an
outside party. In effect, the attorney who performed legal
services that ultimately led to the recovery of the plan's
subrogation lien instituted a separate and distinct action
against the Trustees for unpaid fees. The action, in
substance if not in form, is wholly independent of and
unrelated to the underlying benefit plan." Scholtens, 173 Ill. 2d  at 389-90.
Following Scholtens, the appellate court has repeatedly concluded
that an action to recover fees under the common fund doctrine is
an independent action invoking the attorney's right to the payment
of fees for services rendered, an action that is not preempted by
ERISA. See Hillenbrand v. Meyer Medical Group, S.C., 308 Ill.
App. 3d 381, 389 (1999) (a common fund claim, which is wholly
independent of a benefit plan, is brought by a third party, the
attorney who represents the participant, to enforce the attorney's
quasi-contractual right to payment for services rendered in
recovering for the plan's benefit); Health Cost Controls v. Sevilla,
307 Ill. App. 3d 582, 590 (1999) (state court "indisputably" has
subject matter jurisdiction over common fund claims, which are
not preempted by ERISA); LeFevre, Zeman, Oldfield & Schwarm
Law Group, Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 1059,
1068 (1999) (like a claim under the common fund doctrine, a
claim brought pursuant to the Illinois Attorneys Lien Act (770
ILCS 5/1 (West 1994)) is an independent action wholly unrelated
to an underlying benefit plan, a claim does not arise out of the
contractual agreement between the parties, and one which is not
preempted by ERISA).
	To better illustrate the independent nature of an attorney's
claim under the common fund doctrine, and to demonstrate that its
assertion does not involve the provisions of this plan, we need
only look to this court's decision in Baier v. State Farm Insurance
Co., 66 Ill. 2d 119 (1977), which served as a foundation for our
analysis in Scholtens. In Baier, the plaintiff, an attorney, had
represented a motorist in a claim for damages arising out of an
automobile accident. The attorney ultimately negotiated a
settlement between the injured motorist and the tortfeasor. The
injured motorist used a portion of the settlement proceeds to
reimburse State Farm, pursuant to a subrogation agreement, for
medical benefits State Farm had paid the motorist following the
accident. Following dismissal of the negligence action, the
attorney brought a separate action against State Farm to recover a
fee for the services he had performed in recovering State Farm's
subrogation lien. There was no allegation of a contract of
employment, express or implied, between the attorney and State
Farm. Rather, the claim for fees was based on the equitable
concept that an attorney who performs services in creating a fund
should, in equity and good conscience, be allowed compensation
from all those who seek to benefit from the fund recovered. Baier,
66 Ill. 2d  at 124. In applying the common fund doctrine, this court
specifically rejected State Farm's claim that application of the
doctrine would violate the subrogation agreement between the
insured motorist and State Farm. Baier, 66 Ill. 2d  at 126.
	The implications of Baier in this case are twofold. First, as
noted previously, it supports our conclusion in Scholtens that the
common fund claim is, in effect, an independent action by the
attorney who rendered services. Second, it shows that the common
fund claim can be maintained by the attorney before or after
reimbursement to the party who paid for medical expenses. See
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 83 L. Ed. 1184, 1189, 59 S. Ct. 777, 782 (1939) (claim is an independent
action that can be maintained after the original action has been
concluded). Thus, the attorney making the claim in this case could
have waited until Bishop had received her settlement and had
reimbursed the plan in full before asserting his common fund
claim, avoiding entirely the controversy over whether the common
fund doctrine or the plan provisions controlled. We see no reason
for a different result here because the attorney asserted his claim
before reimbursement.
	Because a claim under the common fund doctrine is an
independent action, based upon the attorney's rights, and wholly
unrelated to the plan itself, such a claim simply does not fit the
criteria for complete preemption under section 502(a)(3) of
ERISA. The attorney who seeks compensation for services
rendered to the plan is obviously not "a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary" of the plan, and the attorney's action is unrelated to the
plan. The Committee's attempt to create federal jurisdiction by
interjecting plan interpretation into the case via its response and
cross-motion for summary judgment fails because interpretation
of the plan provisions is not necessary to determine the attorney's
rights against the plan and because the Committee's defense is not
part of the properly pleaded statement in the petition to adjudicate.
The "well-pleaded complaint rule" provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the
face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. A defense is not
part of plaintiff's properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.
See Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475, 139 L. Ed. 2d 912, 918, 118 S. Ct. 921, 925 (1998). The well-pleaded
complaint rule would apply to defeat federal jurisdiction. Section
502(a)(3) does not preempt application of the common fund
doctrine on these facts.
	While we recognize that some federal circuits may have
reached a different conclusion as to sections 514 and 502(a)
preemption on similar facts, federal circuit courts of appeals
exercise no appellate jurisdiction over this court. See People v.
Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 457 (1989). This court need not follow
precedent of a particular federal circuit court where, as here, the
Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise question presented,
there is uncertainty among the federal circuit courts of appeals,
and we believe a case is wrongly decided. Weiland v. Telectronics
Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1999). Our analysis is
based upon long-standing state precedent, our resolution of this
matter is founded upon that precedent, and we need not engage in
apologies for want of equity and fairness as some federal courts
have felt obliged to do. See IBP, Inc. v. Foust, 987 F. Supp. 714,
719-20 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
	The Committee next contends that the common fund doctrine
should not apply because the plan participated in the creation of
the fund and the plan will not benefit from the fund. To sustain a
claim under the common fund doctrine, the attorney must show
that (1) the fund was created as the result of legal services
performed by the attorney, (2) the subrogee or claimant did not
participate in the creation of the fund, and (3) the subrogee or
claimant benefited or will benefit from the fund that was created.
See Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 323
Ill. App. 3d 376, 382 (2001); Morris B. Chapman & Associates,
Ltd. v. Kitzman, 307 Ill. App. 3d 92, 105 (1999).
	The Committee suggests that the plan participated in the
creation of the fund by merely paying benefits. Not surprisingly,
the Committee cites no authority in support of this novel
proposition. We are aware of none, and we see no need to devote
more space to this specious argument than the three sentences the
Committee thought it deserved in briefing.
	The Committee's contention that it would not benefit from the
fund warrants brief comment. The Committee argues that the plan
will not benefit from the fund because 100% reimbursement will
merely return it to the position it enjoyed prior to Bishop's
accident, before the plan paid out benefits. According to the
Committee, "the Plan will not be unjustly enriched by the
requested 100% reimbursement. It merely seeks to enforce the
plan language to which Bishop voluntarily agreed to be bound
when she enrolled for participation in the Plan." (Emphasis in
original.)
	The Committee is either being disingenuous or it has entirely
missed the point of our decision in Scholtens and the purpose of
the common fund doctrine. The common fund doctrine rests upon
the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit
without contributing to its costs are unjustly enriched. Boeing Co.
v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478, 62 L. Ed. 2d 676, 682, 100 S. Ct. 745, 749 (1980). In this state, as in many others (see Phillips
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 73 F.3d 1535,
1538-39 (10th Cir. 1996)), the doctrine, in some form, has found
expression in statutes (820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2000); 215 ILCS
105/8(h)(6) (West 2000)), and has been accorded public policy
status by judicial decision (Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd.
v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d 560, 568-70 (2000), citing Scholtens, 173
Ill. 2d at 385). The doctrine has been applied against the State
Employees' Retirement System of Illinois (SERS), despite
administrative regulations (80 Ill. Adm. Code §1540.90(a)(5)
(1997)) intended to override its application, where SERS had
"clearly benefit[ed] from the services of [participant's] attorney"
by achieving a set-off. Young v. Mory, 294 Ill. App. 3d 839, 849
(1998).
	Even more to the point is Taylor v. State Universities
Retirement System, 203 Ill. App. 3d 513 (1990). In Taylor, the
appellate court upheld a judgment for attorney fees rendered
pursuant to the common fund doctrine under circumstances very
similar to the facts in this case. In that case, an attorney, Taylor,
represented Burwell, obtaining for him an award of benefits under
the Occupational Diseases Act from which the State Universities
Retirement System (SURS) recouped disability benefits it had
previously paid Burwell. SURS did not in any way participate in
the creation of the fund. The appellate court held that SURS
"definitely benefited from the creation of that fund by obtaining a
recoupment of $6,954.66, which it would not have received absent
the fund's creation." Taylor, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 520. Clearly, the
plan in this case benefited from Bishop's lawsuit and the efforts of
her attorney, just as SURS did in Taylor.
	But for Bishop's action, and the efforts of her attorney, there
would have been no fund from which the plan could have obtained
reimbursement. For purposes of applying the common fund
doctrine, it is irrelevant that the party who benefits from a lawyer's
services has a right to compensation, be it an undifferentiated right
of reimbursement or subrogation as is asserted here, or a right to
compensation under some other theory. Obviously, everyone who
brings a legal action is asserting some claim of right. However, a
mere right may amount to nothing more than a possibility unless
it is properly asserted. That is the point. The real question is
whether the plan obtained the benefit of a lawsuit without
contributing to its costs. See Boeing, 444 U.S.  at 478, 62 L. Ed. 2d 
at 682, 100 S. Ct.  at 749. If so, it was unjustly enriched for
purposes of applying the common fund doctrine. The policy
behind the fund doctrine is to prevent subrogees from
"freeloading." Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Baron, 964 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1997). "If the costs of litigation are
not spread to the beneficiaries of the fund, they will be unjustly
enriched by the attorney's efforts." Chapman, 193 Ill. 2d  at 573,
citing Scholtens, 173 Ill. 2d  at 385. These principles undoubtedly
apply to the facts of this case.
	Because we view the motion for adjudication in this case as
an independent action by the attorney, which is unrelated to the
benefit plan and does not alter the contractual relationship of the
parties thereto, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court as to the
disposition of the settlement fund. For the foregoing reasons, we
find that summary judgment was proper in this case. The judgment
of the appellate court is reversed, and that of the circuit court is
affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.