Title: Commonwealth v. Linton

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12528 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAMION LINTON. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 3, 2018. - September 26, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction 
relief.  Evidence, Scientific test. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 22, 2005. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 456 Mass. 534 (2010), a 
motion for postconviction access to evidence and forensic 
analysis, filed on December 24, 2014, was heard by Peter M. 
Lauriat, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gaziano, J., 
in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Ira L. Gant, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the 
defendant. 
 
Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  We are called upon to consider issues raised 
by the defendant's motion for access to evidence and scientific 
and forensic testing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A. 
In 2006, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty in the death of his wife, Andrea Harvey, by 
strangulation.  We affirmed his conviction.  See Commonwealth v. 
Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 561 (2010).  In 2014, following the 
enactment of G. L. c. 278A, the defendant sought 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of nine items of evidence.  
A few of those items, including a cellular telephone, a drinking 
glass, and a hair collected at autopsy, have not been tested for 
DNA.  Other items -- swabs taken from various areas of the 
victim's body, including two swabs from the right side of the 
victim's neck that corresponded to fingernail marks left by the 
killer -- had been tested for Y-chromosome short tandem repeat 
(Y-STR) DNA prior to trial and had produced exculpatory results 
showing no male DNA was present.  In his motion for forensic 
testing, the defendant sought permission to test the evidence 
using newer and more discriminating Y-STR test kits that had not 
existed at the time of his conviction.  He also sought 
3 
 
 
permission to conduct mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)1 testing on the 
hair. 
After an evidentiary hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b), the trial judge denied the defendant's motion.  He 
determined that the neck swabs no longer existed; three of the 
items had not been stored in a manner that was likely to yield 
probative DNA evidence; a reasonably effective attorney would 
not have sought DNA testing of the hair; the requested DNA 
testing did not have the potential to produce evidence material 
to the defendant's identification as the perpetrator; and newer 
Y-STR tests did not offer a material improvement over previously 
conducted Y-STR testing.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1)-(4).  
The defendant sought leave to appeal to the full court pursuant 
to the gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and a single 
justice of this court allowed his petition. 
                     
 
1 "A DNA profile for an individual is that combination of 
alleles, or versions of genes, possessed by the individual at 
the loci tested."  Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 721 
n.2 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 248 
n.1 (2005).  Except for identical twins, no two individuals 
share precisely the same DNA profile.  Commonwealth v. Kostka, 
471 Mass. 656, 658 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 
Mass. 446, 448 n.6 (2010).  Y-STR DNA can identify only all 
individuals within a patrilineal lineage.  Commonwealth v. 
Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 699 (2016).  Nuclear DNA, by contrast, 
contains both male and female components and allows a full 
profile that may be capable of identifying an individual.  
Commonwealth v. Carnes, 457 Mass. 812, 841-842 & n.17 (2010). 
4 
 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion based on the evidence that was 
presented at the motion hearing. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts presented at the 
hearing on the motion for forensic testing, which included 
relevant trial transcripts and exhibits. 
a.  Crime scene and collection of evidence.  The victim's 
parents discovered the body of their daughter in her apartment, 
lying on the bedroom floor.  Near her head were a drinking glass 
containing a clear liquid and her cellular telephone.  In his 
closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that the defendant 
placed the drinking glass and the telephone near the victim in 
an attempt to make it appear that she had committed suicide.  
While arguing that the crime scene had been staged, the 
prosecutor asked the jury, "How in the world was that cup of 
water not spilled if there was a struggle?" 
The cause of death was manual strangulation.  There were 
multiple abrasions consistent with fingernail marks on the right 
side of the victim's neck, hemorrhaging in both of her eyes, a 
detached hyoid bone inside her neck, and evidence that the 
perpetrator had kneeled on her chest, causing a large bruise.  
The medical examiner used a sexual assault evidence kit to 
collect evidence from the victim's body.  This evidence included 
the following:  head and pubic hair standards; a blood standard; 
5 
 
 
fingernail scrapings from both hands; vaginal swabs; external 
genital swabs; anorectal swabs; and oral swabs.  At the autopsy, 
the State police collected the victim's clothing and a 
"questioned hair."  It is unknown whether the police collected 
the hair from the victim's clothing or somewhere on her body. 
In addition, the police swabbed the right side of the 
victim's neck in an attempt to identify the perpetrator's DNA.  
A State police crime laboratory (crime lab) chemist examined the 
two swabs from the victim's neck and found no visible stains.  
Because the police were searching for so-called "touch" or 
"handler" DNA, and this type of DNA is "considered limited," the 
chemist conducted no further testing. 
 
The police also dusted the victim's neck with black 
fingerprint powder, and applied adhesive lift tape, in an 
attempt to recover latent fingerprints.  The impressions from 
the lift tape were preserved by transferring them to latent lift 
paper.  The police did not find any fingerprints, and the latent 
lift paper was not stored as evidence. 
 
b.  DNA testing.  In May 2005, a Superior Court judge 
allowed, without objection, the Commonwealth's motion for 
authorization to conduct exhaustive testing of the fingernail 
scrapings and "item 3-2, swabs from the right side of [the 
victim's] neck." 
6 
 
 
 
In August 2005, the crime lab sent the following evidence 
to Orchid Cellmark (Cellmark), a private laboratory, for male Y-
STR DNA testing:  the swabs from the right side of the victim's 
neck; the fingernail scrapings; "cuttings" from the vaginal, 
external genital, and oral swabs; and the defendant's known 
saliva standard.2  Cellmark "amplified" and "typed" DNA from the 
submitted samples utilizing the "Yfiler" Y-STR test kit, a kit 
manufactured by Applied Biosystems, Inc., that was released in 
2004.  The Yfiler test examines seventeen locations on the 
Y-chromosome; each location is known as a locus. 
Although the two swabs from the right side of the victim's 
neck were consumed during testing, Cellmark had separated DNA 
from other cellular material, and tested a portion of the 
resulting "extract."  The untested portion of this pure DNA 
extract remains, in evaporated form, in a test tube. 
After testing, Cellmark returned the DNA evidence, 
including the test tube, to the crime lab, where it was secured 
in long-term storage. 
 
c.  Trial testimony.  Cassie Johnson, a Cellmark forensic 
DNA analyst, testified to the results of the Y-STR DNA testing.  
She detected male DNA on the victim's left-hand fingernail 
                     
 
2 The crime lab did not send the anorectal swab to Cellmark.  
The chemists believed that the anorectal swab would be unlikely 
to yield probative evidence because initial testing revealed no 
foreign biological evidence such as sperm cells or saliva. 
7 
 
 
scrapings with results appearing on thirteen of the seventeen 
loci that were tested.  The defendant could not be excluded as a 
possible contributor to this partial DNA profile. 
Johnson did not detect male DNA on the other samples.  In 
particular, with respect to the swabs taken from the right side 
of the victim's neck, she testified, "We might not be able to 
detect male DNA because it simply isn't present, or else it 
could be that male DNA is present but it's below our level of 
detection.  There's simply not enough there."  She explained 
that Cellmark set its level of detection, based on internal 
validation studies, at "peaks . . . above [their] minimum 
threshold of one hundred."  If a peak does not reach that 
height, Cellmark analysts "can't call that result." 
Johnson testified in accordance with Cellmark's then-
existing Y-STR testing guidelines.  The guidelines provided, "A 
true allele is one that falls at or above the threshold value, 
is clearly above any background noise, and . . . has a 
distinctly shaped peak, as compared to artifacts which commonly 
appear as a spike or hump."  The guidelines further provided, 
"Based on internal validation studies, the minimum threshold of 
detection for Y-STR loci is [one hundred] RFUs (relative 
fluorescence units).  In extreme circumstances, this may be 
lowered to [fifty] RFUs with approval of the technical leader or 
the laboratory director." 
8 
 
 
d.  Postconviction proceedings.  In December 2014, the 
defendant filed a motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A for 
postconviction access to evidence and forensic testing.  He 
requested that the court authorize "PCR-based Y-STR type DNA 
analysis, using Quantifiler Duo or Quantifiler Trio during the 
quantitation stage of the STR process," of the following 
evidence:  (1) swabs from the right side of the victim's neck; 
(2) vaginal swabs; (3) external genital swabs; (4) anorectal 
swabs; (5) oral swabs; (6) the victim's known blood standard; 
(7) swabs from latent print paper from the victim's neck; 
(8) the drinking glass found near the victim's head; and (9) the 
cellular telephone found near the victim's head.  The defendant 
also requested mtDNA testing of the "questioned hair sample" 
recovered from the victim's body, and mtDNA testing of the 
victim's known blood standard.  In support of his motion, the 
defendant submitted an affidavit from a DNA expert, Dr. Carll 
Ladd, a senior supervisor and analyst at the Connecticut State 
forensic laboratory and a forensic DNA consultant.  The 
Commonwealth opposed the motion. 
 
In January 2015, a Superior Court judge, who had not been 
the trial judge, found that the defendant had made the minimal 
preliminary showing necessary under G. L. c. 278A, § 3, in order 
to proceed to an evidentiary hearing.  She then referred all 
further proceedings to the trial judge. 
9 
 
 
 
In May 2015, the defendant filed a supplemental affidavit 
from Ladd, which focused on advances at later stages of analysis 
after the quantification stage.  Ladd opined that the samples 
should be analyzed with two newly available Y-STR testing kits, 
either the "PowerPlex Y23" or the "Yfiler Plus," that had become 
available in 2014 but that, under national accreditation 
standards, required a process of internal validation by a given 
laboratory before it could adopt the test for its own use.  He 
explained, "In the time since my 2014 affidavit, some 
laboratories, including Cellmark . . . , have finished 
validating and began using a new test kit for [Y-STR] DNA 
analysis . . . called PowerPlex Y23."  Other laboratories were 
at that point validating the Yfiler Plus test, and Ladd 
"expect[ed] many [would] begin using it for forensic casework in 
the coming months or as late as early 2016."  Ladd asserted that 
both PowerPlex Y23 and Yfiler Plus were more discriminating than 
the Yfiler test kit, because they analyze, respectively, six and 
ten additional markers on the Y-chromosome.  He opined that 
these tests could offer other improvements as well over the 
Y-STR testing that previously had been performed on the samples 
the defendant sought to test. 
 
The trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing over three 
days from November 2015 through March 2016.  Ladd and Sharon 
Convery Walsh, the technical lead at the crime lab's DNA and 
10 
 
 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) units, testified, and the 
parties stipulated to the introduction of forty-five exhibits.  
The judge then issued a written decision denying the defendant's 
motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory framework.  Upon a finding 
that a moving party's motion for forensic testing has satisfied 
the preliminary requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 3, a judge 
"shall order a hearing on the motion."  G. L. c. 278A, § 6 (a).  
At that hearing, the moving party is required to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence each of the six factors set forth 
in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1)-(6).  Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 
Mass. 54, 56 (2016) (Wade III).  "If the moving party has done 
so, then the judge shall allow the requested forensic or 
scientific analysis" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 125 (2015).  The judge 
must "state findings of fact and conclusions of law on the 
record," or issue written findings and conclusions, "that 
support the decision to allow or deny [the] motion."  See G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (a). 
 
The judge is required to consider the following criteria 
under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (a): 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; 
 
"(2) that the evidence or biological material has been 
subject to a chain of custody that is sufficient to 
establish that it has not deteriorated, been substituted, 
11 
 
 
tampered with, replaced, handled or altered such that the 
results of the requested analysis would lack any probative 
value; 
 
"(3) that the evidence or biological material has not been 
subjected to the requested analysis for any of the reasons 
in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of paragraph (5) of 
subsection (b) of [§] 3; 
 
"(4) that the requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case; 
 
"(5) that the purpose of the motion is not the obstruction 
of justice or delay; and 
 
"(6) that the results of the particular type of analysis 
being requested have been found to be admissible in courts 
of the commonwealth." 
 
With respect to the third factor, as relevant here, the reasons 
enumerated in G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5), that the evidence or 
biological material has not been subjected to the requested 
analysis, include 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at 
the time of the conviction; [and] 
 
". . . 
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying case 
was aware at the time of the conviction of the existence of 
the evidence or biological material, the results of the 
requested analysis were admissible as evidence in courts of 
the commonwealth, a reasonably effective attorney would 
have sought the analysis and either the moving party's 
attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge denied 
the request." 
 
 
With this framework in mind, we turn to the issues raised 
by the denial of the defendant's motion for forensic testing. 
12 
 
 
 
b.  Standard of review.  In Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 
Mass. 292, 298 (2017), we discussed "the appropriate standard of 
review when considering the denial of a motion pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7."  Where the motion judge was not the trial judge, 
and the record before the court is purely documentary, we review 
claims of error under a de novo standard.  Id.  In such 
circumstances, the motion judge is "not required 'to make 
credibility determinations, or to consider the relative weight 
of the evidence or the strength of the case presented against 
the moving party."  Id., quoting Clark, 472 Mass. at 130.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 505-506 (2014) (Wade II).  
Therefore, we are in the same position as the motion judge, and 
in as good a position to assess the record.  See Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 654-655 (2018). 
 
Where, instead, the trial judge presides over the hearing, 
"we review the trial judge's findings under an abuse of 
discretion standard."  Moffat, 478 Mass. at 299.  See Wade III, 
475 Mass. at 55-56.  "This deference is warranted because a 
motion judge who was the trial judge conducts a fact-specific 
analysis [predicated on] a thorough knowledge of trial 
proceedings" (quotation and citation omitted).  Moffat, supra.  
The language of G. L. c. 278A, § 6 (b), expresses the 
Legislature's preference ("if possible") that the trial judge be 
the one to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
13 
 
 
the moving party has met the enumerated requirements of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1)-(6). 
 
In reviewing the denial of a motion for forensic testing, 
we are mindful that the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 278A as a 
means to permit prompt access to scientific and forensic testing 
in order to remedy wrongful convictions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 46 (2014) (purpose of G. L. c. 278A "is to 
remedy the injustice of wrongful convictions of factually 
innocent persons by allowing access to analyses of biological 
material with newer forensic and scientific techniques"); Wade 
II, 467 Mass. at 511 (G. L. c. 278A was enacted to provide 
greater access to forensic testing than had been allowed 
following motions for new trials pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 [2001]).  The remedial 
purpose of the statute makes it "entirely appropriate that we 
construe the language of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), in a manner 
that is generous to the moving party."  Clark, 472 Mass. at 136. 
 
The defendant contends that the judge abused his discretion 
in finding that the defendant did not meet his burden to 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his request 
for testing met the criteria set forth in G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (1)-(6).  There was no dispute, as the judge found, that 
the defendant had met his burden with respect to factors (5) 
and (6).  Accordingly, we consider only the first four factors 
14 
 
 
mandated by G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1)-(6).  We discuss, in 
turn, the issues raised by each of the items for which the 
defendant sought testing. 
 
c.  Cellular telephone, drinking glass, and fingerprint 
lift paper.  The defendant sought testing of the glass and 
cellular telephone that had been found on the floor near the 
victim's head, as well as the lift paper that the defendant 
argued might have contained skin fragments from the victim that 
had been picked up along with the fingerprint powder that was 
applied to her neck.  The judge denied the motion for testing of 
these items because he determined that the chain of custody with 
respect to these items had not been shown to be "sufficient to 
establish that [the biological material] has not deteriorated, 
been substituted, tampered with, replaced, handled or altered 
such that the results of the requested analysis would lack any 
probative value."  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (2). 
 
The cellular telephone had been introduced in evidence at 
the defendant's trial and possibly handled by jurors, counsel, 
or court staff; it also had been sent to this court in 
conjunction with the defendant's direct appeal.  More recently, 
it had been stored, not packaged, in an open box with other 
trial exhibits.  The liquid in the glass had been tested, but 
the glass itself had a label attached directly to it, was at 
that point stored in a plastic bag rather than the more 
15 
 
 
desirable paper bag, and could have been handled by an unknown 
number of people.  The lift paper had been kept in an envelope 
with the case file and not with the stored exhibits; the 
envelope had not been properly sealed with evidence tape; and 
the evidence could have been contaminated during the 
fingerprinting process. 
 
At the hearing on the defendant's motion for forensic 
testing, the experts offered somewhat differing opinions 
regarding whether the cellular telephone, drinking glass, and 
latent lift paper had been subject to a chain of custody or 
stored in a manner sufficient to produce probative DNA results.  
Ladd testified that the evidence storage had not been "ideal" or 
"optimal," but that there was no impediment to testing the items 
and possibly obtaining scientifically valid DNA results.  The 
judge asked Ladd whether the possibility that the cellular 
telephone might have been touched by an unknown number of male 
jurors and court or prosecution staff gave Ladd any concerns 
regarding DNA testing.  Ladd responded that the profiles might 
be mixed, but the later handling would not wipe out any earlier 
placed DNA.  He opined that it would be possible to obtain DNA 
standards from any male who had handled the telephone, for 
elimination purposes. 
 
Walsh testified that, under those circumstances, she would 
begin extracting DNA from the object, but that, if her testing 
16 
 
 
produced any suggestion that at least three different people had 
handled the object, the crime lab's policy would deem the sample 
not suitable and would preclude further examination or providing 
a result on any profile.  While Walsh agreed that it might be 
possible to obtain a very mixed sample of "handler" DNA if 
multiple people had touched an object, that would not produce a 
viable result because of the virtual impossibility of 
determining when any handler DNA had been placed on the object 
or by whom. 
 
The judge determined that "the cellphone . . . , the blue 
drinking glass . . . , and the swabs of the latent print paper 
from the victim's neck . . . have not been subject to a chain of 
custody or securely stored in a manner likely to yield usable 
and material DNA results."  He concluded that "[t]he chain of 
custody of these items is not sufficient to prevent evidence 
degradation or to avoid the presence of 'handler' DNA.  They are 
not suitable for DNA testing, and any analysis or results would 
lack any probative value." 
 
The judge did not, as the defendant maintains, turn the 
requirement of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (2), "on its head" by 
requiring the defendant to establish the absence of degradation 
or contamination.  Rather, the judge weighed the testimony and 
made findings adverse to the defendant.  See generally 
17 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 573 (2002) (judge's 
obligation to assess weight and credibility of witnesses). 
 
We conclude that the judge's findings were supported by the 
evidence, and see no reason to disturb them. 
 
d.  "Questioned hair."  The defendant challenges the denial 
of his motion for postconviction testing of the "questioned" 
hair possibly found on the victim's body or clothing, which was 
not introduced at trial and was never tested for DNA. 
 
Neither party disputes that mtDNA analysis was admissible 
at the time of the defendant's trial, and that trial counsel was 
aware that the police had recovered a hair when the victim's 
body was first examined.  See Commonwealth v. Carnes, 457 Mass. 
812, 841 & n.17 (2010); Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 
528-529 (2003).  Accordingly, pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, 
§§ 3 (b) (5) (iv) and 7 (b) (3), to obtain postconviction 
testing of the hair, the defendant was required to establish 
that "a reasonably effective attorney would have sought the 
analysis."  Wade III, 475 Mass. at 57, quoting G. L. c. 278A, 
§§ 3 (b) (5) (iv).  We conclude that, on this record, he has not 
done so. 
 
Unlike in a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30, the reasonably effective attorney prong of G. L. c. 278A, 
§§ 3 (b) (5) (iv) and 7 (b) (3), does not require a defendant to 
establish that trial counsel's strategic decision to forgo 
18 
 
 
forensic testing was manifestly unreasonable.  In Wade II, 467 
Mass. at 511, this court concluded that an interpretation of the 
phrase "reasonably effective" that imported the Saferian 
standard of ineffective assistance "does not accord with the 
Legislature's intent of promoting access to DNA testing 
regardless of the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt in 
the underlying trial."  See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 
89, 96-97 (1974).  Rather, the statute requires that a moving 
party must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
"a reasonably effective attorney would have sought the requested 
analysis, not that every reasonably effective attorney would 
have done so."  Wade II, supra. 
 
The judge found that the defendant failed to demonstrate 
that a reasonably effective attorney would have sought DNA 
testing of any of the items of evidence.  We agree.3 
                     
 
3 Our agreement with this outcome, however, does not 
indicate that we agree with all of the judge's reasons for 
denying the motion to test the hair.  The judge concluded that 
the hair had not been tested at the time of trial "presumably 
because it did not include hair roots."  No evidence, however, 
was produced to show whether the hair in fact retained its 
roots, as the defendant's expert had not examined the hair 
itself.  In any event, both experts agreed that, if it had no 
roots, the hair could have been tested using mtDNA.  The judge 
also stated that mtDNA testing only allows comparisons of DNA 
from one hair to DNA from another hair.  As both experts 
explained, however, mtDNA testing can be used to compare any two 
biological samples from any source.  See Commonwealth v. Carnes, 
457 Mass. 812, 841-842 (2010) (mtDNA from hair and from saliva 
were compared). 
19 
 
 
 
The precise source of the hair, and whether it came from 
the victim's body, from her clothing, or possibly from an 
extraneous source, is unknown.  On the evidence submission form 
to the crime lab, the hair was listed with items of clothing 
removed from the victim, and not as having been found on her 
body.  The submission form described it as "brown paper with 
possible hairs."  At the crime lab, the item was numbered "8-10" 
and labeled "questioned hair sample." 
 
Neither the Commonwealth nor the defendant's trial counsel 
appears to have treated the "questioned" hair as relevant 
evidence, and neither party sought to have it tested before 
trial.  Based on its choice to forgo any type of forensic 
testing of the hair, the Commonwealth clearly viewed it as of no 
evidentiary value. 
 
The record is entirely devoid of even basic evidence 
concerning the appearance of the hair, its length and color, or 
whether it was in any way similar to the victim's hair.  Yet, 
the defendant apparently did not seek to have his expert examine 
it or to make any visual comparisons.4  In essence, the 
defendant's motion for testing does not provide any further 
information about the hair than that which was included on the 
                     
 
4 The expert had examined the materials he had been given 
with respect to the hair, e.g., photographs of the envelope 
containing the hair, in which the hair itself is not visible. 
20 
 
 
evidence submission form.  See Wade II, 467 Mass. at 510 
(defendant's request for postconviction testing included 
information that pretrial serological tests "revealed the 
presence of a third party's seminal fluid"). 
 
At trial, the defendant made effective use of the absence 
of information concerning the hair in support of his Bowden 
defense.  In his closing, trial counsel relied on the 
uncertainties concerning the hair to argue that police were 
deliberately not testing evidence in an effort to locate other 
suspects because they had focused improperly upon the defendant 
as the only suspect.  Pointing to the lack of testing, trial 
counsel argued, based on the Y-STR DNA results from the other 
testing of areas of the victim's body (which, except for the 
fingernails of one hand, returned results of "no [male] data"), 
that "the most . . . important [DNA] evidence," "where the 
person's hands actually strangled her," did not "com[e] back" to 
the defendant as a possible contributor.  We cannot say that a 
reasonable attorney would have chosen to undertake testing in 
these circumstances. 
 
As the judge noted, given that the defendant and the victim 
were married, the result showing that the defendant was a 
possible contributor to the DNA found under the victim's 
fingernails on one hand was of little importance.  Nonetheless, 
as a result of that finding, a reasonable attorney well might 
21 
 
 
have chosen to forgo testing of an item of questionable 
exculpatory value that possibly could have yielded inculpatory 
results. 
 
Accordingly, the defendant has not met his burden to show 
that a reasonable attorney would have sought the testing at the 
time of his trial. 
 
e.  Swabs collected from the victim's body.  The judge 
concluded that the defendant did not meet his burden to 
establish that testing of the vaginal swabs, external genital 
swabs, and oral swabs, using newer versions of Y-STR tests than 
had been available at the time of his trial, "has the potential 
to result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime."5  See G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4). 
 
The judge made this finding after hearing conflicting 
expert testimony concerning the likelihood of obtaining material 
DNA results from the untested portions of the swabs.  Ladd 
                     
 
5 We agree with the defendant that the judge at one point 
misstated the law by requiring the defendant to show that the 
information sought would "identify or exclude [the defendant] as 
the murderer."  A defendant is not required to demonstrate that 
the requested forensic testing would identify the real 
perpetrator.  It is the defendant's burden to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that testing may result in 
evidence that, on its own, or with other evidence, might be 
material to the identity of the perpetrator.  See G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (4); Moffat, 478 Mass. at 301.  As noted, however, in 
other parts of his decision, the judge properly stated the 
materiality standard. 
22 
 
 
testified that there was a possibility that DNA remained on the 
untested portions of the swabs that had not been present on the 
tested portions.  He did not believe that it was appropriate to 
assume there had been a roughly "homogeneous distribution" of 
the cellular material on the swabs.  He opined that it is 
"fairly standard" laboratory procedure to continue testing swabs 
that yield negative results until the entire swab is consumed. 
 
Walsh testified that the general policy of the crime lab 
was to test a portion of a swab (described as a "cutting" or 
"snippet"), and to retain an equal amount for independent 
testing by defense experts, as well as possible future analysis 
if new forms of forensic testing were developed.  If an analyst 
obtains negative DNA results, the crime lab does not test the 
retained portion of a swab because the swabs are "required to be 
collected homogeneously" and the analysts assume that that 
protocol has been followed. 
 
With respect to Ladd's testimony concerning the untested 
portions of the swabs, the judge found that "there is no 
scientific support for the proposition that DNA not found on one 
portion of a homogeneous swab will produce enough evidence on 
another portion of the swab sufficient enough for DNA testing."  
The judge determined further that, "[u]pon consideration of the 
credible testimony presented at the hearing, it is not evident 
that the swabs from the victim items would, if tested using the 
23 
 
 
newer version of Y-STR DNA analysis, have the potential to 
produce any new, different or material DNA-based evidence." 
 
It was for the judge to weigh and resolve the conflicting 
expert testimony.  We discern no abuse of discretion in his 
decision to deny the defendant's request for testing of the 
remaining swabs. 
 
f.  DNA extract from neck swab.  The defendant sought 
permission to test, among other evidence, "Swabs from the right 
side of the victim's neck (MSP lab item 3-2)."  The judge found 
that the defendant did not establish that the neck swabs 
existed, see G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1); testing of the neck 
swab did not have the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to the defendant's identification as the perpetrator, 
see G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4); and the requested PowerPlex Y23 
or Yfiler Plus testing was not a material improvement over 
previous Y-STR testing, see G. L. c. 278A, §§ 3 (b) (5) (i), 
7 (b) (1). 
 
i.  Whether the neck swabs still exist.  The judge 
concluded that the defendant had not established that "the 
evidence or biological material exists," G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (1), because he determined that the swabs had been 
consumed during "court-approved" exhaustive testing.  This 
finding is contrary to the undisputed evidence at the hearing 
24 
 
 
that a DNA extract from the neck swabs does still exist and is 
capable of being tested. 
 
The defendant's written motion for postconviction testing, 
filed before the hearing, indeed did request testing of the 
biological material contained in the two swabs from the right 
side of the victim's neck.  Postconviction counsel's affidavit, 
however, filed in support of the motion, asserted that "whatever 
is left of item 3-2, the swabs of the victim's neck" is 
available for testing. 
 
At the hearing, both experts explained clearly that the 
swabs themselves had been consumed, but that the untested 
portion of pure DNA extract, which had been derived from the 
swabs, was still extant and contained in a test tube.  The 
extract likely had evaporated due to the passage of time.  The 
experts agreed, however, that evaporation is not an impediment 
to testing; the extract could be reconstituted with liquid and 
then analyzed. 
 
Because DNA extract remains notwithstanding the exhaustive 
testing, the defendant established that biological material from 
the victim's neck exists within the meaning of G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (1), and the judge's conclusion to the contrary was 
error. 
 
ii.  Evidence material to the defendant's identification as 
the perpetrator.  The defendant's motion for forensic testing 
25 
 
 
relied in large part on findings by his expert, using newer 
computer software, that, if the threshold for analysis of DNA 
"peaks" were lowered, and the samples were examined using newer, 
more precise tools, three "peaks" that had not been identified 
in the Yfiler kit used in 2006 could be identified in the DNA 
taken from the victim's neck. 
A brief explanation of certain aspects of DNA testing is 
necessary to understand the significance of this evidence of 
"peaks" and "thresholds."  Y-STR testing focuses on different 
markers on the male Y-chromosome where known sequences of DNA 
base pairs repeat themselves.  During Y-STR testing, analysts 
run DNA samples through an instrument that produces a graphical 
representation of the results in an electropherogram.  The 
electropherogram displays peaks corresponding to specific loci, 
measured in RFUs.  The higher the peak, the more amplified DNA 
is present at the location.  Peaks that are at or above a 
minimum threshold RFU are "called" or "reported" as DNA results.  
In 2006, Cellmark employed a threshold calling level of one 
hundred RFUs.  Pursuant to a 2015 Y-STR guideline, the crime lab 
set its calling threshold at 165 RFUs.  In 2015, the calling 
threshold at the Connecticut State forensics laboratory was 
seventy-five RFUs. 
A lower threshold, the "analytical" threshold, set at a 
point above background machine noise but below the calling 
26 
 
 
level, "may be used for interpretational purposes along with 
other data when examining an individual's DNA profile."  
Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 731 (2015).  Ladd 
testified that it is common practice in forensic DNA analysis to 
interpret peaks at or above fifty RFUs for exclusionary 
purposes.  Cellmark allows the use of a threshold at or above 
fifty RFUs in "extreme" circumstances.  The crime lab also 
allows an analyst to assess "below threshold" level peaks "to 
support the inclusion and/or exclusion of an individual(s)."  
The 2002 short tandem repeat analysis protocols of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation require all "labeled peaks of [fifty] 
RFU and greater" to be interpreted. 
 
In this case, Ladd examined the data derived from the 
samples that had been taken from the victim's neck, using a 
newer computer testing program, and a threshold setting of fifty 
RFUs.  He found peaks at levels exceeding fifty RFUs at three 
loci:  DYS390, DYS391, and DYS393.  At DYS390, he observed a 
potential allele of 21 at fifty RFUs, and, at DYS393, he 
observed a potential allele of 13 at eighty-three RFUs.  These 
two potential alleles matched the defendant's DNA profile.  At 
DYS391, however, he observed a potential allele of 11, measured 
at sixty-four RFUs.  The defendant has an allele of 10 at locus 
DYS391. 
27 
 
 
 
The judge weighed this evidence and determined that Ladd's 
detection of a potential exculpatory DNA result at a single 
locus was insufficient to support a determination of materiality 
under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  The judge commented that "it 
far from clear" that a lower threshold would "yield any 
analytical or reportable DNA results." 
 
Reviewing the defendant's proffer under the preponderance 
of the evidence standard, and with due regard for the purpose of 
the statute, we conclude that the defendant has established that 
testing of the DNA from the right side of the victim's neck has 
the potential to result in material evidence within the meaning 
of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4). 
 
The Commonwealth argues, pointing to DiCicco, 470 Mass. 
at 731, that a single below-threshold peak is not indicative of 
a potentially exculpatory DNA result.  In DiCicco, supra, we 
held that a judge did not abuse her discretion in determining 
that a DNA expert's opinion concerning a single below-calling 
threshold peak was not sufficiently reliable to be put before a 
jury.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 
(1994).  The defendant in that case proffered no evidence to 
establish that the expert's opinion "was generally accepted by 
the relevant scientific community or otherwise sufficiently 
reliable."  DiCicco, supra. 
28 
 
 
 
Here, by contrast, the defendant introduced sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that analytical level peaks provide 
relevant data, and can be used to support an exclusion.  
Significantly, as well, the procedural posture of this case is 
quite different.  We are not deciding whether the evidence of a 
single potential allele supports the allowance of a motion for a 
new trial.  The requirements of G. L. c. 278A are, by design, 
less stringent than a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 30.  "In enacting G. L. c. 278A, the Legislature 
separated the procedure for seeking forensic testing from the 
procedure for seeking scientific testing in conjunction with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), and 
intended that G. L. c. 278A provide increased and expeditious 
access to scientific or forensic testing."  Wade II, 467 Mass. 
at 509. 
 
Under the preponderance of the evidence standard set forth 
in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4), we conclude that the defendant 
has demonstrated that additional Y-STR testing of the DNA 
extract from the victim's neck has the potential to result in 
evidence material to the identity of the perpetrator.  The 
Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant strangled 
his wife and grabbed her throat so forcefully that he left 
fingernail marks on the right side of her neck.  Crime scene 
investigators swabbed the victim's neck at the location of those 
29 
 
 
marks in an effort to obtain the killer's DNA.  See Moffat, 478 
Mass. at 301; Commonwealth v. Coutu, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 702 
(2015). 
 
Based on the importance of this evidence at trial, and the 
identification of potentially exculpatory male DNA at locus 
DYS391, the defendant has satisfied the materiality requirement 
of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  Thus, the judge erred in denying 
the defendant's motion for postconviction forensic testing on 
this basis. 
 
iii.  Whether the requested analysis had not yet been 
developed at the time of trial.  The defendant also was required 
to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 
motion for postconviction testing with the PowerPlex Y23 or 
Yfiler Plus Y-STR test was a request for analysis that had not 
been developed at the time of his conviction.  See G. L. 
c. 278A, §§ 3 (b) (5) (i), 7 (b). 
As stated, in 2006, Cellmark employed the Yfiler Y-STR test 
kit, which had been released in 2004.  Its manufacturer, Applied 
Biosystems, Inc., released an upgraded version, Yfiler Plus, in 
2014.  In 2012, a different manufacturer, Promega Corporation, 
also released an enhanced DNA test kit, PowerPlex Y23.  At the 
time of the hearing on the defendant's motion for postconviction 
forensic testing, at least one private laboratory, Bode 
Cellmark, had finished validation studies and was using the 
30 
 
 
PowerPlex Y23 test kit.  At the same time, Bode Cellmark and 
other laboratories were in the (up-to-one-year-long) process of 
validating the Yfiler Plus test kit. 
These newer tests are capable of analyzing additional loci 
on the Y-chromosome beyond the seventeen loci examined by the 
Yfiler test.  As its name implies, PowerPlex Y23 examines 
twenty-three locations on the Y-chromosome, and Yfiler Plus 
examines twenty-seven.  Ladd testified that the forensic 
community considered the newer test kits to be substantial 
improvements over the older Yfiler.  He explained, "It's not, 
strictly speaking the number of tests [(i.e., loci)], although 
that's part of it, but collectively the product is much more 
discriminating, which means that it's more accurate in that it 
is better suited to distinguish people and minimize the chance 
of a coincidental match or a false inclusion.  And the 
methodologies are more sensitive as well. . . .  They require 
less starting material, less DNA, in order to get a result."  He 
also testified that the newer tests are better suited to 
examining degraded samples because they examine more stable loci 
with smaller base pairs and can detect DNA in a smaller number 
of cells, approximately one-half the minimum number needed by 
Yfiler.  Ladd opined that "[b]oth [PowerPlex 23 and Yfiler Plus] 
are more discriminating, significantly more discriminating, and 
significantly more sensitive" than Yfiler, which might in some 
31 
 
 
circumstances (on a "case-by-case basis") be able to produce a 
positive result from a small sample where an earlier test had 
shown no DNA was present.  He did not opine whether this was 
such a case. 
Walsh agreed that an advantage of new tests such as 
PowerPlex Y23 and Yfiler Plus was the ability to test smaller 
areas on the Y-chromosome.  She had searched the scientific 
literature, however, and had been unable to find any studies 
comparing the results of Y-STR testing using Yfiler and the 
newer tests.  Although Ladd discussed the existence of 
validation studies, he did not offer any specific studies or 
provide statistical data involving the PowerPlex Y23 and Yfiler 
Plus test kits. 
 
Neither of the experts had any experience using the new 
Y-STR test kits in their own laboratories.  Indeed, in 2015, the 
Connecticut State forensics laboratory and the crime lab 
continued to use the Yfiler test kit.  The Connecticut State 
forensics laboratory intended to undertake the validation 
process to move to one of the enhanced tests during the 
following year (2016), and the crime lab was expected to move to 
the newer tests at some point. 
The judge recognized that the new tests increased the 
ability to find identifiable DNA in degraded samples.  
Notwithstanding this improvement, however, the judge concluded 
32 
 
 
that the defendant had "failed to show that this new DNA 
technology is a marked improvement over the old testing 
procedure. . . .  While [the tests] appear to work with smaller, 
older, and/or somewhat degraded test samples, they do not 
represent a 'material' or 'marked['] advancement in DNA 
technology or analysis, such that they would identify or exclude 
[the defendant] as the murderer."  The judge noted, but did not 
discuss, the differences in the numbers of alleles tested; this 
is consistent with the testimony, as neither expert had 
explained the extent to which these additional alleles would 
produce meaningfully different results. 
In Donald, 468 Mass. at 38-39, we also confronted the issue 
whether the degree of improvement in DNA testing at issue met 
the criteria of being a new analysis that had not been developed 
at the time of the convictions.  In that case, a cutting from a 
rape victim's underwear had been submitted to a crime laboratory 
for polymerase chain reaction (PCR) DNA testing.  Id. at 39.  
Before the defendant's trial in 1999, a DNA expert examined six 
loci from the sample and determined that the defendant in that 
case was "among 1 in 7,800 African Americans whose DNA profile 
would match that of sperm obtained from the underwear."  Id. at 
46.  The defendant was convicted.  Beginning in 2012, he sought 
postconviction testing in the Superior Court.  Id. at 38-40.  
His renewed motion requested DNA analysis using "Profiler Plus 
33 
 
 
and Cofiler" test kits.  Id. at 41.  The motion was supported by 
a letter from a DNA expert stating that testing using Profiler 
Plus and Cofiler was "more powerful statistically than [the PCR 
testing] used previously in [the defendant's] case."  Id. at 45.  
The defendant also presented evidence that the newer testing 
methods combined PCR and STR analysis to "generate information 
for all [thirteen] core [short tandem repeat] loci required by 
the [CODIS] database" (footnote and citation omitted).  Id. 
General Laws c. 278A is designed to "allow access to more 
sophisticated forensic and scientific tests than were available 
at the time of a moving party's trial."  Donald, 468 Mass. 
at 46.  "[A] § 3 motion should not be denied on the ground that 
the evidence sought to be tested has been subjected previously 
to a method of testing, if the accuracy of that testing has 
materially improved the test's ability to identify the 
perpetrator of a crime."  Id. at 47.  Such a determination 
necessarily is a case-specific inquiry.  Id. at 44-45.  Factors 
to consider in pursuing the inquiry include whether the 
requested analysis "uses a different technology that is designed 
to reduce error, or applies a more comprehensive technique, or 
offers a significant increase is statistical accuracy."  Id. 
at 45. 
 
Here, the motion judge applied the Donald factors and 
concluded, on the basis of the evidence then before him, that 
34 
 
 
the newer Y-STR tests were a modest advancement over the Yfiler 
testing that had been conducted in 2006.  Given the evidence 
presented at the hearing in 2015, we are unable to say that the 
judge abused his discretion.  That is not to say that enhanced 
Y-STR testing might not, given what we know today, or hereafter, 
represent a material difference that could be described, 
demonstrated, or quantified.  The circumstances of each case 
differ, and a determination whether the new testing sought meets 
the requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), is a fact-specific 
inquiry at a given point in time.6  See Donald, 468 Mass. 
at 44-45. 
 
We are required, however, to consider the evidence that was 
before the judge at the hearing in 2015, and at the level of 
specificity that was presented to him.  In that light, we cannot 
say that the judge abused his discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  for postconviction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  testing affirmed. 
                     
 
6 The defendant is not precluded from refiling his motion 
with appropriate evidence of improvements in the DNA testing 
sought from the test used before trial.  See G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (4).