Title: Sadid v. Idaho State University

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 37563-2010 
 
HABIB SADID, an individual, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ROBERT 
WHARTON, JACK KUNZE, MICHAEL 
JAY LINEBERRY, MANOOCHEHR 
AOGHI, RICHARD JACOBSEN, GARY 
OLSON, AUTHUR VAILAS, and JOHN 
AND JANE DOES I through X., whose true 
identities are presently unknown, 
 
       Defendants-Respondents-Cross  
       Appellants. 
 
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Twin Falls, November 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No.  125 
 
Filed: November 30, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Bannock County.  The Hon. David C. Nye, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
 
Ronaldo A. Coulter; Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC; Eagle; 
argued for appellant. 
 
John A. Bailey, Jr.; Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey Chtd.; Pocatello; argued 
for respondents. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a complaint by an engineering 
professor who alleged that Idaho State University had retaliated against him because of his 
comments criticizing the administration that had been published in a local newspaper over 
several years and that the University had breached his employment contract.  We affirm the 
summary judgment, but remand for determination of reasonable attorney fees on the breach of 
contract claim. 
 
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I. 
Factual Background 
 
Habib Sadid (“Plaintiff”) was a tenured professor in the Department of Civil Engineering 
at Idaho State University.  He began working for the University in 1991, was given full tenure in 
1993, and became a full professor in 1999.  During the period from 2001 through 2008, Plaintiff 
publically criticized successive University administrations in guest columns, printed comments, a 
letter to the editor, and a paid advertisement, all of which were published in a local newspaper. 
On September 29, 2008, Plaintiff filed this action against the University and a University 
administrator alleging that they retaliated against him for exercising his free speech rights, that 
the University breached his employment contract, and that the administrator defamed him.  He 
later amended his complaint to add as defendants the former and current Provosts, the former and 
current Deans of the College of Engineering, the current Chair of the Department of Civil and 
Environmental Engineering, and the current University President. 
The Defendants moved for summary judgment on various grounds, and the district court 
granted their motion.  Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.  The 
court awarded the Defendants court costs as a matter of right, but denied their request for an 
award of attorney fees.  Plaintiff appealed the granting of summary judgment, and the 
Defendants cross-appealed the denial of their request for attorney fees. 
 
II. 
Applicable Standards 
 
When reviewing on appeal the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we apply the 
same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.  Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 
Idaho 45, 46–47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101–02 (2002).  We construe all disputed facts, and draw all 
reasonable inferences from the record, in favor of the non-moving party.  Id. at 47, 44 P.3d at 
1102.  Summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence in the record and any admissions 
show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact regarding the issues raised in the 
pleadings and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground that Defendants violated 
his freedom of speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
 
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the United States.  Determining whether a public employer infringed upon its employee’s 
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression requires the following analysis: 
(a) Did the plaintiff make the statements at issue pursuant to his or her official 
duties as a public employee?  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  If so, the 
speech is not protected from employer discipline.  Id. 
(b) If not, does the court conclude, as a matter of law, that any of the plaintiff’s 
speech addressed a matter of public concern, considering the content, form, and context 
of the statement(s) as revealed by the whole record?  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
147-48 & n.7 (1983).  If none of the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern, 
the speech was not protected from employer discipline.  Id. 
(c) If any of the speech did address a matter of public concern, has the plaintiff 
produced evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably find that such speech 
was a substantial or motivating factor in adverse employment action?  Id. at 149; Brown 
v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 806, 229 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010).  If not, the plaintiff 
has no First Amendment cause of action based upon his or her employer’s reaction to the 
speech.  Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
(d) If so, does the court conclude that the employer has shown adequate 
justification for the action taken because its interest in the effective and efficient 
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public, including promoting efficiency and 
integrity in the discharge of official duties and in maintaining proper discipline in public 
service, outweighed the employee’s First Amendment right, considering factors such as 
how substantially the speech involved matters of public concern; the manner, time, and 
place where the speech occurred; and the context in which it arose, giving a wide degree 
of deference to the employer’s judgment?  Id. at  150-54.  If the court so concludes, then 
the employer’s action did not offend the First Amendment.  Id. at 154. 
(e) If the court cannot so conclude, has the employer shown by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action even in the 
absence of the protected speech?  Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977). 
 
III. 
 
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Did the District Court Err in Holding that Plaintiff’s Statements  
Were Not Protected Because He Spoke as a Public Employee? 
Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated his rights of freedom of speech.  When he 
made the statements at issue, Plaintiff was a public employee.  The district court characterized 
the issue as whether he “spoke as Public Employee or Private Citizen,” and concluded that his 
speech was not protected because he spoke as a public employee. 
“When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain 
limitations on his or her freedom.”  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).  “[T]he State 
has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly 
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”  
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County, Illinois,  391 U.S. 563, 
568 (1968).  “A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its 
role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some 
potential to affect the entity’s operations.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
When a public employee alleges retaliation for exercising his or her freedom of speech, 
the first issue is determining whether the employee was speaking as a citizen or pursuant to his 
or her official duties.  “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”  Id. at 421.  
Conversely, “[e]mployees who make public statements outside the course of performing their 
official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of 
activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.”  Id. at 423.  Thus, the issue 
is whether Plaintiff’s statements at issue were made in the course of performing his official 
duties. 
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s speech was in performance of his duties, as shown by 
the allegation in his amended complaint stating that he made the public comments at issue “[i]n 
his capacity as a Faculty Member and Full Professor of ISU.”  Plaintiff made that same 
allegation in his original complaint, and the two Defendants named in the original complaint 
admitted the allegation in their answer.  Plaintiff was later granted permission to file an amended 
complaint naming additional defendants.  Plaintiff’s amended complaint superseded the original 
complaint, and all subsequent proceedings had to be based upon the amended complaint.  
 
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Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 330, 233 P.3d 1221, 1252 
(2010).  Although “[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact as to issues admitted by the parties 
in their pleadings,” Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 
188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008), the Defendants did not file an answer to Plaintiff’s amended 
complaint, which was unverified.  Because the allegation was unsworn and was not admitted by 
the Defendants, we need not decide whether it should be construed as alleging that Plaintiff’s 
statements at issue were made in the course of performing his official duties.  The party moving 
for summary judgment has the burden of presenting admissible evidence showing that there is an 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issues raised by the summary 
judgment motion.  Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 893, 120 P.3d 278, 281 (2005).  The unsworn 
allegation in the amended complaint does not satisfy that burden. 
The district court held that Plaintiff’s statements were not protected by the First 
Amendment because he was speaking as a public employee rather than as a private citizen.  The 
court reasoned: 
He argues that because his job description does not mention anything to the fact 
of a duty to write newspaper articles that critique the ISU administration is 
evidence that he was speaking as a citizen.  The Court disagrees with Sadid’s 
argument.  Whether his job description requires him to write articles is not the 
determining factor of him being in the role of a citizen or a public employee.  
After reviewing Sadid’s letters that were published, the Court finds that the tone 
of the letters is that of an employee of ISU.  . . . .  Furthermore, Sadid 
continuously argues in his brief and even in the published article itself that he was 
speaking as a private citizen, yet in both of the published articles he identifies 
himself as an ISU employee. 
 
In so holding, the district court erred.  Characterizing the issue as whether Plaintiff was 
speaking as a public employee or a private citizen is misleading.  The issue is not whether 
Plaintiff identified himself as a University professor at the time he made the statements.  It is also 
not whether his criticisms concerned administration actions that would impact his official duties 
or that the statements he made were based upon information he acquired while performing those 
duties.  The fact that the speech at issue concerned the subject matter of the public employee’s 
employment is not dispositive because “[t]he First Amendment protects some expressions related 
to the speaker’s job.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  The controlling issue is whether Plaintiff’s 
statements were made pursuant to his duties as a professor at the University.  Id. 
 
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“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”  Id.  In Garcetti, the statement at 
issue was a memo written by a deputy prosecutor in which he outlined his concerns that a deputy 
sheriff had made serious misrepresentations in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant.  In 
holding that the deputy prosecutor’s speech was unprotected, the Supreme Court stated that he 
“spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to 
proceed with a pending case,” that he “wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what 
he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do,” and that “[t]he significant point is that the memo 
was written pursuant to [the deputy prosecutor’s] official duties.”  Id.  The Court then added:  
“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities 
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.  It simply 
reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or 
created.”  Id. at 421-22. 
The Supreme Court distinguished between making statements pursuant to one’s official 
duties and making statements pursuant to one’s right as a citizen.  The Court contrasted “speech 
that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities” with “the 
expressions made by the speaker in Pickering, whose letter to the newspaper had no official 
significance and bore similarities to letters submitted by numerous citizens every day.”  Id. at 
421-22.  In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), a teacher was dismissed for 
writing a letter to the editor which consisted “essentially of criticism of the Board’s allocation of 
school funds between educational and athletic programs, and of both the Board’s and the 
superintendent’s methods of informing, or preventing the informing of, the district’s taxpayers of 
the real reasons why additional tax revenues were being sought for the schools.”  Id. at 569.  The 
Pickering Court held that the teacher’s letter to the editor was protected speech. 
The Garcetti Court explained the theoretical underpinnings of its opinion as follows: 
Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing their 
official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that 
is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.  
The same goes for writing a letter to a local newspaper, see Pickering . . . .  When 
a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities, however, there 
is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees. 
 
 
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Garcetti, at 547 U.S. at 423-24. 
 
Again, the Court referred to writing a letter to a local newspaper as in Pickering as a 
public statement made by a government employee outside the scope of performing his official 
duties.  In his letter to the editor, the teacher in Pickering, identified himself as a high school 
teacher.  He challenged the accuracy of a statement contained in a letter to the editor from the 
school board and school administration by saying, “I teach at the high school and I know this just 
isn’t the case.”  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 576.  His letter also included information that he 
obviously obtained while performing his duties as a school teacher.  As the Court noted, 
“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite 
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent.”  Id. at 572.  
Even though the letter writer identified himself as a teacher and was criticizing the 
administration’s allocation of funding based upon information obtained while performing duties 
as a teacher, the Supreme Court stated that where “the fact of employment is only tangentially 
and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a 
teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general 
public he seeks to be.”  Id. at 574. 
 
The issue is not whether Plaintiff spoke as a public employee, in the sense that he 
identified himself as a public employee and spoke about issues related to his employment based 
upon information obtained in his employment.  It is whether his speech was pursuant to his 
official duties.  In the instant case, there is no evidence showing that Plaintiff’s official duties 
included making public statements on behalf of the University regarding the subject matter of his 
letters, nor is there evidence that his employment responsibilities included creating the 
statements that were published in the newspaper.  Therefore, his speech was as a private citizen. 
 
IV. 
Did the District Court Err in Holding that Plaintiff’s Speech 
Did Not Involve a Matter of Public Concern? 
 
Having concluded that Plaintiff’s speech was not made pursuant to his official duties, the 
next issue is whether it involved a matter of public concern.  The district court held that it did 
not, stating as follows: 
 
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After reviewing the argument of Sadid, the case law, and the entire 
content, form and context of his letters, the Court disagrees with Sadid’s claim 
that this was a matter of public concern.  The Court finds that the letters contain 
nothing more than personal grievances against ISU regarding matters that relate 
directly to Sadid’s interest in his employment.  The content and opinions may in 
fact be interesting to the public; however, the value of interest alone does not 
make the matter a public concern.  Furthermore, simply because it involves a 
matter that may have occurred behind close governmental doors does not make it 
a public concern.  Sadid’s statements go more to matters of an internal 
administrative dispute than a matter of public concern. 
 
 
In determining whether any of Plaintiff’s speech at issue concerns a matter of public 
concern, the inquiry is not his motivation for the comments or the general tone of his comments 
(e.g. venting personal grievances).  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1983).  Although 
much of the communications certainly express Plaintiff’s dislike for the former University 
President, disappointment in the current President, and dislike for members of the administration, 
the appropriate analysis is whether any of his comments involve matters of public concern.  Id. at 
149.  In his paid advertisement published on March 9, 2003, Plaintiff speculated that Idaho State 
University and the University of Idaho were conspiring to shift engineering to the University of 
Idaho so that Idaho State University could create a medical school.  The issue of a creating a 
medical school at Idaho State University was a matter of public concern.  Having concluded that 
there was at least one matter of public concern in his comments, we need not address whether 
there were others because the district court correctly granted summary judgment on an 
alternative ground. 
 
V. 
Did the District Court Err in Holding that There Was a Lack of Evidence 
Supporting the Allegation that Plaintiff Suffered Adverse Employment Action? 
 
Having concluded that Plaintiff’s speech involved at least one matter of public concern, 
the next issue is whether he has produced evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably 
find that such speech was a substantial or motivating factor in adverse employment action.  To 
do so, he must show that there was some action by the University that constituted adverse 
employment action.  In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged four actions by the Defendants 
that constituted retaliation for exercising his freedom of speech.  They were: 
 
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(a) Failing to have the then-Dean of Engineering conduct annual evaluations of Plaintiff 
beginning in 2001 and for the next five years; 
(b) Hiring another person as Chair of the Engineering Department rather than Plaintiff; 
(c) Increasing Plaintiff’s salary at the lowest percentages; and 
(d) The defendant Lineberry sending an e-mail to a third party in which he referred to 
“Sadid’s tirade with the Dean” and characterized Plaintiff as “a nut-case who cannot help 
himself.” 
 
a.  Failing to conduct annual evaluations.  In response to the allegation of not 
conducting annual evaluations, Defendants contend that annual evaluations were not required  
once Plaintiff received tenure.  They rely upon the provisions of Section IV.B. of Part 4 of the 
University’s Faculty/Staff Handbook entitled “Evaluation of Faculty/Tenure.”  Subsection 1 is 
entitled, “Annual Evaluation,” and its first paragraph states: 
Each year the chair of a department (or unit head) must submit to the Dean 
of the chair’s college (or appropriate superior) an evaluation of each faculty 
member in that department (or unit).  Any evaluation must include at least 
administrative access to all primary or raw evaluation data.  This evaluation, 
together with the opinion of higher administrators, will be used as one (1) basis 
for the final recommendation relative to reappointment, nonreappointment, 
acquisition of tenure, or other personnel action, whichever is appropriate. 
 
Subsection 1 is followed by Subsection 2 entitled, “Tenure”; Subsection 3 entitled, 
“Evaluation for Tenure”; Subsection 4 entitled, “Standards of Eligibility for Tenure Status”; 
Subsection 5 entitled, “Award of Tenure”; Subsection 6 entitled, “Interpretations Relating to 
Tenure”; and then Subsection 7 entitled, “Periodic Performance Review.”  The first paragraph of 
Subsection 7 states: 
It is the policy of the Board that at intervals not to exceed five (5) years 
following the award of tenure to faculty members, the performance of tenured 
faculty must be reviewed by members of the department or unit and the 
department chairperson or unit head.  The review must be conducted in terms of 
the tenured faculty member’s continuing performance in the following general 
categories: (a) teaching effectiveness, (b) research or creative activities, (c) 
professional related services, (d) other assigned responsibilities, and (e) overall 
contributions to the department. 
 
Defendants argued to the district court that pursuant to Subsection 7, once a professor is 
tenured, he or she only needs to be evaluated at intervals not to exceed five years.  In response, 
 
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Plaintiff merely cited to Subsection 1 and stated that he was entitled to annual evaluations after 
he was tenured. 
Considering the wording of the two provisions and their relative placement in the 
Handbook, we agree with the district court that the Handbook by its terms does not require 
annual evaluations once a faculty member receives tenure.  As the district court noted in denying 
reconsideration, the record shows evaluations of Plaintiff were done in 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 
and 2007.  Since the University was not required by the Handbook to review Plaintiff annually, 
the failure to do so cannot constitute adverse employment action. 
b.  Not hiring Plaintiff as Chair of the Department of Engineering.  The faculty 
unanimously recommended Plaintiff as the new Chair of the Department of Engineering, but the 
University hired someone else for that position, after inviting nationwide applications.  The 
district court held that failing to hire Plaintiff as the Chair did not constitute retaliation because 
he never applied for that position.  Plaintiff does not dispute that he never applied.  He simply 
contends on appeal that it would have been an exercise in futility for him to have done so. 
We need not decide whether there is any evidence in the record, aside from Plaintiff’s 
assertion, from which the trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that it would have been 
futile for Plaintiff to have applied.  He did not raise the futility issue in the district court.  “The 
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time 
on appeal.”  Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001).  The district court did 
not err in holding that there was no evidence supporting the allegation that the failure to hire 
Plaintiff as Chair of the Department of Engineering was retaliatory conduct. 
c.  Increasing Plaintiff’s salary at the lowest percentages.  Plaintiff did not argue in the 
district court that there was any evidence supporting this allegation. 
d.  The Lineberry e-mail.  On August 1, 2008, defendant Lineberry sent an e-mail to a 
third party in which he stated, “I was disappointed to learn of Sadid’s tirade yesterday with the 
Dean, regarding the employ of [named] to help in teaching 402/502.  My disappointment is not 
with Sadid, who is a nut-case and cannot help himself.  . . . .”  Plaintiff does not explain how this 
e-mail could possibly constitute adverse employment action, and we are likewise unable to 
image how it could. 
In response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff was required to 
offer proof that he sustained some sort of adverse employment action.  Absent anything that 
 
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could be considered adverse employment action, there could not be retaliation for his exercise of 
his First Amendment rights.  He failed to present any such evidence, and therefore the district 
court did not err in holding that there was no evidence supporting this requirement.  As a result, 
the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the 
Defendants had violated his rights under the First Amendment. 
 
VI. 
Did the District Court Err in Dismissing Plaintiff’s Claim 
for Breach of Contract? 
Plaintiff filed a claim alleging that the University breached the express terms of his 
employment contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in that contract by 
failing to evaluate him annually.  As explained above, the district court correctly held that 
Plaintiff’s contract did not require annual evaluations.  Therefore, there was also no violation of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  “The implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing obligates parties to cooperate with one another and to perform the obligations imposed 
by their agreements.  Express terms of a contract may not be overridden by those implied from 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”  Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 910, 
104 P.3d 946, 952 (2004) (citation omitted).  The district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s 
claim for breach of his employment contract. 
 
VI. 
Did the District Court Err in Failing to Award the Defendants 
Attorney Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3)? 
 
The Defendants timely requested an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
sections 12-117, 12-120(3), 12-121, and 6-918A and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988.  The 
district court denied an award of attorney fees under all statutes.  On appeal, the Defendants 
contend that the district court failed to award them attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-
120(3). 
 
In arguing to the district court that they were entitled to an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), the Defendants relied upon Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 
138 Idaho 131, 59 P.3d 302 (2002), wherein we held, “Actions brought for breach of an 
 
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employment contract are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the attorney fee 
provision of I.C. § 12-120(3).”  Id. at 136, 59 P.3d at 307.  The district court denied the request 
for attorney fees under this statute on the ground that “the Complaint does not allege that a 
commercial transaction has taken place between the parties.” 
 
Plaintiff entitled the second cause of action in his amended complaint as, “COUNT TWO 
– BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING IMPLIED THEREIN.”  In the body of the count, he alleged, “Defendant 
ISU materially breached the contract of employment and the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing implied therein.”  As we held in Willie, where Plaintiff alleged a cause of action for 
breach of his employment contract, he alleged a commercial transaction with the University.  
Therefore, the University is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-
120(3) for defending against the breach of employment contract claim.  See Beco Constr. Co., 
Inc. v. J-U-B Engrs. Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 233 P.3d 1216 (2010).  However, the other Defendants 
cannot recover attorney fees under this statute unless Plaintiff alleged a claim seeking to recover 
on a commercial transaction with them.  Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242, 
___, 254 P.3d 1238, 1245-46 (2011).  He did not do so. 
 
VII. 
Are Defendants Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
 
Defendants seek an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-
120(3) and 12-121, 42 U.S.C. section 1988, and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).  With the exception of Idaho 
Code section 12-120(3), Defendants do not present any argument as to how the other statutes and 
the rule of civil procedure apply.  Therefore, we will not address their request under them.  
Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho 945, 947, 88 P.3d 764, 766 (2004). 
 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), the University is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees on appeal incurred in defending against Plaintiff’s claim that the University 
breached his employment contract.  Because the Plaintiff did not allege a commercial transaction 
with the other Defendants, they are not entitled to an award under this statute. 
 
 
 
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VII. 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the amended complaint.  We 
vacate the denial of attorney fees to the University and remand this case for consideration of its 
request for attorney fees in defending against the breach of employment contract claim.  We 
award the University attorney fees on appeal with respect to the breach of contract claim.  We 
affirm the denial of attorney fees to the remaining respondents, and we deny them attorney fees 
on appeal.  We award costs on appeal to all respondents. 
 
Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, HORTON, and J. Pro Tem BEVAN CONCUR.