Title: Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp.1996 WY 157928 P.2d 473Case Number: 95-277Decided: 12/05/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Jose M. ANAYA,

Appellant 
(Petitioner/Claimant),

v.

HOLLY SUGAR CORPORATION, 

Appellee 
(Respondent/Employer), 

and

 State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 

Appellee 
(Respondent/Objector).

Appeal from Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division.

Lowell H. Fitch, 
Torrington, for Appellant.

Donald I. 
Schultz of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, for Appellee Holly Sugar 
Corp.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Evans, Cheyenne, for 
Appellee State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J.*, THOMAS, MACY and LEHMAN, JJ., and KAIL, District Judge 
(Retired).

* Chief Justice effective 
July 1, 1996.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The only real 
issue in this case is whether the record discloses sufficient evidence to 
sustain the findings of a hearing examiner acting for the Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division (Division) that Jose M. Anaya (Anaya) should be 
awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 7% for physical impairment and 
20% for vocational loss. Anaya complains of a failure to award permanent total 
disability based upon the odd-lot doctrine. He has parsed the case into a number 
of sub-issues, but all of them fit within the substantial evidence mold. We hold 
that the decision of the hearing examiner was supported by substantial evidence 
in the record and must be affirmed.

[¶2]      In his 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Anaya sets forth seven issues stated as:

1.         Is a 
permanent total disability claimant required to search for suitable work in his 
community when the search would be objectively futile?

2.         If 
not, was the Hearing Examiner's denial of Claimant's permanent total disability 
benefits not in accordance with law?

3.         Was 
the finding and conclusion of the Hearing Examiner that there was suitable work 
available to Claimant in his community not supported by substantial evidence, 
arbitrary, and not in accordance with law?

4.         Was 
the finding and conclusion that claimant's vocational incapacity is unrelated to 
his work injury to the extent caused by claimant's severe deconditioning not 
supported by substantial evidence and not in accordance with law?

5.         Were 
various findings and conclusions disparaging to the Claimant's integrity not 
supported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, and not in accordance with law, 
all to great prejudice?

6.         Even 
if this case were fairly one for permanent partial disability, was the hearing 
examiners determination of 20% for loss of earning capacity rational and in 
accordance with law?

7.         Will 
a statement by a claimant that he's "retired" and is drawing social security 
retirement, or that he personally believes the local economy is tough, alter his 
eligibility for regular permanent disability?

In the 
Appellee's Brief, Holly Sugar Corporation, the Anaya issues are answered under 
the following statement of the issues:

A.        Did 
Petitioner fail to meet his burden of proof to show permanent total 
disability?

B.        Is the 7% 
physical impairment award supported by substantial evidence?

C.        Is the 20% 
vocational loss award supported by substantial evidence?

The Brief of 
Appellee, filed on behalf of the Division, sets forth only one 
issue:

Whether the Office of 
Administrative Hearings' order awarding permanent partial disability benefits 
was supported by substantial evidence, reasonable and in accordance with 
law.

[¶3]      Anaya was moving 
a wheelbarrow loaded with sugar beets, and he slipped and fell backward, landing 
on his right wrist and hip. At that time, Anaya was sixty-one years old. The 
orthopedic surgeon who treated Anaya diagnosed a herniated disc at the L4/5 
level and also stated that Anaya suffered from spondylolisthesis and severe 
degenerative joint disease. On June 29, 1990, the treating orthopedist advised 
the Division that Anaya had obtained maximum medical improvement and should be 
referred to another orthopedist for a permanent impairment rating. A month 
later, Anaya's orthopedist advised the Division that Anaya should not return to 
his former employment with Holly, nor should he engage in any activity that 
involved heavy lifting, bending, or twisting. Anaya was awarded medical and 
temporary total disability benefits up until September 18, 1990.

[¶4]      Anaya was 
referred to a second physician to obtain a physical impairment rating, and, 
after examining Anaya, the second physician completed a functional capacity 
evaluation. That physician rated Anaya at a total impairment rating of 7% using 
the American Medical Association's Guidelines to Impairment (AMA Guidelines). 
The physician agreed with the treating physician that Anaya would be unable to 
return to his previous job at Holly, but he could return to light 
duty.

[¶5]      Anaya objected to 
the 7% disability rating, and the Division referred him to another orthopedic 
specialist for a second impairment rating. The third physician utilized the 
exact range-of-motion findings the second physician had used to calculate the 7% 
rating, but this physician rated Anaya's physical impairment at 25% of the whole 
body. This rating later was determined to be invalid under the AMA Guidelines, 
and Anaya does not dispute the invalidity. 

[¶6]      Following the 
series of examinations, the Division offered Anaya a 25% permanent impairment 
award less the 7% Anaya previously had received. Anaya rejected the offer and 
the impairment rating, and the Division referred the case to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings to resolve the question of Anaya's total or partial 
disability. Prior to the hearing, Anaya had another functional capacity 
evaluation which was performed by two vocational rehabilitation 
specialists.

[¶7]      The hearing was 
rescheduled several times and ultimately was held on March 21 and 22, 1994, with 
a concluding session on April 11, 1994. Anaya sought an award of permanent total 
disability. Evidence presented at the hearing consisted of Anaya's testimony; 
the testimony of the first specialist to whom Anaya was sent for a physical 
impairment rating, together with the functional capacity evaluation report of 
that specialist; the functional capacity evaluation of the two rehabilitation 
specialists; and two vocational evaluations outlining employment opportunities 
in Anaya's community.

[¶8]      The hearing 
examiner denied Anaya's application for total disability benefits. The order 
that was entered by the hearing examiner awarded Anaya benefits for a 7% 
physical impairment and a 20% vocational loss of earnings as the result of his 
injury. Anaya sought judicial review in the district court, and the district 
court certified the case to this court.

[¶9]      Our standard for 
judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence relating to administrative 
agency decisions is well settled. If there is substantial evidence in the record 
to support the hearing examiner's findings of fact, we uphold those findings. On 
review, it is Anaya's burden to demonstrate that the findings of fact by the 
hearing examiner are not supported by substantial evidence. See Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873 (Wyo. 1994); State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1991). Our task is to 
examine the evidence that favors the Division and Holly, the prevailing parties, 
affording to them all favorable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. We do 
not consider any conflicting evidence. Robles.

[¶10]   The odd-lot doctrine1 has been a part of our substantive 
law of workers' compensation since 1941. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 
(1941). We consistently have held that the initial burden of producing evidence 
falls upon the injured workman. Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation 
Div., 875 P.2d 1272 (Wyo. 1994); Leonard v. McDonalds of Jackson Hole, 746 P.2d 1261 (Wyo. 1987); Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corp., 718 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1986); City of Casper v. Bowdish, 713 P.2d 763 (Wyo. 1986); Rose v. 
Westates Construction Co., 703 P.2d 1084 (Wyo. 1985); Lebsack v. Town of 
Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1985); Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corp., 669 P.2d 522 (Wyo. 1983); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862 (Wyo. 
1979). In Bowdish, 713 P.2d  at 765, we articulated the proposition 
thusly:

In order to come within 
the odd-lot doctrine, however, it is the burden of the employee to establish not 
only that he is no longer capable of working at the job in which he was employed 
at the time of his injury, but that the degree of obvious physical impairment, 
coupled with other facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age, 
must prima facie place him in that category.

This rule has 
been affirmed and reaffirmed by quotation in Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Cannon, 718 P.2d  at 884-85 and Gilstrap 875 P.2d  at 1274. It is clear from our 
cases that, in order to meet his burden of producing evidence, Anaya was 
required to demonstrate he had made reasonable efforts to find work in his 
community after reaching maximum medical improvement or, alternatively, that he 
was so completely disabled by his work-related injury that any effort to find 
employment would have been futile. Gilstrap; Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Cannon; Schepanovich.

[¶11]   In this regard, Anaya testified 
that he considered himself "retired when his benefits stopped from Workmen's 
Comp", and if he had looked for work, he would not have been hired because "even 
the young people don't have employment right now." Testifying through a 
Spanish-speaking interpreter at the hearing, Anaya was asked:

Q.        Isn't it 
true, you just have not looked for work since your injury, have you?

A.        That is the 
truth.

The record 
stands that Anaya made no efforts, never mind "reasonable efforts" to find 
employment after his injury in 1989. Anaya agreed on cross-examination at the 
hearing, "if someone doesn't look, you can't find [work]." Because Anaya did not 
look for suitable employment, he failed to shift the burden of proof to Holly 
that suitable employment was available in the community.

[¶12]   The alternative premise available 
to Anaya was to establish that he was so totally disabled from the injury that 
any efforts to find employment would have been futile. In this regard, the 
evidence demonstrates that Anaya could not return to his former occupation at 
Holly, but a specialist and a rehabilitation counselor both classified Anaya as 
having the ability to return to light-duty jobs. The rehabilitation specialist 
testified that jobs were available, which Anaya could have performed, even given 
his limitations. That witness stated the available jobs "all met either a light- 
or sedentary-job classification * * *." They were "unskilled" positions, which 
"did not require English-speaking abilities to a major degree." During the 
hearing, the witness engaged in this dialogue with counsel for 
Holly:

Q         Based 
upon your investigation, do you have an opinion whether suitable employment was 
regularly and continuously available for Mr. Anaya in the Torrington 
area?

ANAYA'S COUNSEL:          
Objection. No foundation.

HEARING EXAMINER:        
Overruled.

A         I 
have an opinion.

Q         (By 
Holly's Counsel) And what is that opinion?

A         I 
believe there is employment that is compatible that has been regularly and 
continuously available to him in the Torrington area.

(Emphasis 
added.) The rehabilitation specialist specifically stated that jobs continuously 
were available in the Torrington area for parts assemblers, sorters, and 
stocking clerks, which did not involve any heavy lifting and met the light-duty 
classification. The witness further testified employers were willing to make 
reasonable accommodations for employees with back pain, allowing periodic breaks 
and a change in positions from sitting to standing and vice versa, all within 
the context of the Americans With Disabilities Act [Americans With Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1990 & Supp. III 1991)].

[¶13]   The vocational assessment 
accomplished for Anaya listed occupations he was qualified to perform that 
encompassed only sedentary to light physical duties. Anaya's subjective 
determination that he was too disabled to work or that a job search would have 
been futile on his part is not adequate to sustain his burden of producing 
evidence under the odd-lot doctrine. Gilstrap; Schepanovich. Instead, this 
evidence demonstrated that a job search in Torrington likely would have been 
successful. The conclusion is that Anaya was not entitled to an award of 
permanent total disability benefits under the odd-lot doctrine because of his 
failure to go forward with the evidence. The record supports the decision of the 
hearing examiner on this aspect of the case.

[¶14]   Anaya also seeks review of the 
permanent partial impairment rating adjudicated by the hearing examiner of 7% 
plus 20% of loss of earning capacity. Two orthopedic specialists arrived at 
identical conclusions regarding Anaya's ranges of motion upon examination. While 
the second specialist found Anaya to be 25% physically impaired based upon those 
limitations, his conclusion was not compatible with the AMA Guidelines.2 Had the second specialist followed 
the guidelines, his impairment rating would have been the same 7% rating 
reported by the first specialist.

[¶15]   The record also demonstrates that 
Anaya suffered from physical deconditioning between 1990 and 1993, the period 
between the initial and the last physical evaluation. The physician who arrived 
at the 7% impairment figure testified:

The issue is that the man 
[Anaya] is deconditioned since he has pain. And if he were to get into 
condition, he - and get into shape, he wouldn't have the pain.

*           
*           
*           
*           *           
*

And if he continues to 
remain out of shape, he will continue to have pain. But in that case, it's 
not an occupational disorder.

(Emphasis 
added.) Even if one were to conclude that Anaya's deconditioning was a product 
of the original injury in 1989, restoring his physical condition would leave his 
permanent physical impairment at 7%. The deconditioning exacerbates Anaya's 
disability, but the injury itself produced impairment of only 7%. Anaya offered 
nothing to refute this conclusion at the hearing. Anaya did not meet his burden 
by establishing on the record that he suffered more than the 7% disability 
rating, and the determination of the physical impairment rating by the hearing 
examiner is supported by substantial evidence.

[¶16]   The personnel manager for Holly 
testified that Anaya was earning $7.22 an hour prior to the 1989 injury. The 
available jobs, identified by the vocational assessment as ones Anaya could 
perform given his disability, would have paid an average salary of $5.03 an 
hour. The comparison of these two figures results in a conclusion that there was 
a 20% reduction in Anaya's earning capacity. The record sustains the conclusion 
that, if Anaya had made the effort to maintain his physical condition, the $5.03 
figure is the hourly rate that Anaya could earn should he decide to seek 
employment. The hearing examiner's decision on the 20% loss of earnings factor 
is supported by substantial evidence on the record and must be 
affirmed.

[¶17]   We do not read the record as 
Anaya's counsel does with respect to any disparagement of Anaya's integrity. The 
findings of the hearing examiner were based on the physical evaluations made by 
the specialists and are supported by the record. Further, we do not discern any 
evidence of prejudice resulting from Anaya's statement that he was retired and 
drawing social security benefits.

[¶18]   The hearing examiner's Findings and 
Conclusions are affirmed in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 In Cardin v. 
Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862 (Wyo. 1979), we adopted the description of the 
"odd-lot doctrine" set forth in 2 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.51 
at p. 10-109 (1976),

as providing that 
permanent total disability

"may be found in the case 
of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped 
that they will not be employed regularly in any well known branch of the labor 
market."

2 The AMA Guidelines 
essentially state, that if there is more than a 10% difference between a 
patient's tighest straight-leg raising in his standing versus his prone 
position, then those figures are discounted in the impairment rating for the low 
back. Anaya's percentages were more than 10% as evidenced in the record by the 
first specialist:

And in Anaya's case, he 
has a difference of range of motion. I'll give you the numbers here. He had had 
straight-leg raising of 80 and 90 degrees. Yet, in the standing position, he had 
range of motion of flexion of 30 degrees and extension of 10 degrees. So he got 
40 degrees, versus 80 or 90 degrees. That's greater than 10 percent.