Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John A. Ward

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 9 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0349-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John A. Ward, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John A. Ward,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WARD 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 8, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 3, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Craig W. 
Nelson and Nelson, Connell & Conrad, S.C., Brookfield, and oral 
argument by Craig W. Nelson. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe, Krohn, Pope, McCarthy, Haas & Robinson, 
LLP, Edgerton, and oral argument by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
 
2005 WI 9 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0349-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John A. Ward, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John A. Ward,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 8, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.     
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   We 
review 
the 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendations of referee Rose Marie 
Baron for sanctions, pursuant to SCR 22.17(1).1  Attorney John A. 
Ward was found to have engaged in unprofessional conduct in the 
course of his practice of law in violation of the Rules of 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(1) provides:  “(1) Within 20 days after the 
filing of the referee’s report, the director or the respondent 
may file with the supreme court an appeal from the referee’s 
report.” 
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
2 
 
Professional 
Conduct. 
 
The 
referee 
recommended 
a 
public 
reprimand. 
¶2 
We 
approve 
the 
findings, 
conclusions 
and 
recommendations, and determine that Attorney Ward’s misconduct 
warrants a public reprimand.   
¶3 
Attorney 
Ward 
was 
licensed 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin in 1985.  He received a private reprimand for a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in 1999.   
¶4 
This case involves three counts:  (1) failing to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client in violation of SCR 20:1.3;2 (2) charging an unreasonable 
fee in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a);3 and (3) failing upon 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client."   
3 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides:   
“(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors 
to be considered in determining the reasonableness of 
a fee include the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that 
the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by 
the circumstances;  
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
3 
 
termination of representation to refund any unearned portion of 
an advanced fee in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).4   
¶5 
These counts involve Attorney Ward’s representation, 
commencing in April 2001, of a woman from Kenosha in two 
matters.  First, the client retained Attorney Ward to represent 
her in opposing a February 2001 motion filed in Milwaukee County 
by her former husband to establish visitation rights with their 
daughter.  Second, the client retained Attorney Ward to commence 
a separate proceeding in Kenosha County to terminate her former 
husband’s parental rights to the child.  The client agreed to a 
"non-refundable minimum fee" of $10,000 to cover the first 50 
hours of Attorney Ward’s time with work beyond that to be billed 
at $200 per hour. 
¶6 
The client wanted Attorney Ward to immediately change 
the venue of the Milwaukee matter to Kenosha in order to cut 
                                                                                                                                                             
(6) 
the 
nature 
and 
length 
of 
the 
professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” 
 
4 SCR 
20:1.16(d) 
provides: 
 
“Upon 
termination 
of 
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as 
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to 
which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment 
of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.” 
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
4 
 
down on his travel time and thereby reduce the hours he would 
have to spend on the case.  She also believed that since she and 
the child lived in Kenosha, that was the appropriate county to 
litigate visitation.  Finally, since the termination proceeding 
was going to be in Kenosha, she believed it was efficient to 
have all proceedings in that county.   
¶7 
There is a dispute whether Attorney Ward agreed with 
this strategy and consented to expeditiously attempt the venue 
change.  In any event, Attorney Ward did not seek the venue 
change.  At the initial May 2001 motion hearing before a 
Milwaukee County family court commissioner, he objected to venue 
but the commissioner advised him to raise it by written motion 
with the judge assigned to the case even assuming that could 
still be done in a timely fashion.  Attorney Ward claims he had 
prepared a "rough draft" of a venue change motion before this 
hearing, but decided not to file it.  The matter was adjourned 
to August 2001.   
¶8 
Attorney 
Ward filed 
the 
termination 
petition in 
Kenosha County later in May.  A guardian ad litem was appointed 
for the child who soon advised Attorney Ward that she wanted to 
interview the child.  However, the termination proceeding was 
adjourned in July by the Kenosha court to await the outcome of 
the visitation dispute that was still pending in Milwaukee. 
¶9 
When the visitation matter returned to court in 
August, the commissioner held it open for another month, sent it 
to the circuit court for resolution, and in the interim gave the 
former husband temporary visitation, at least in part because 
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
5 
 
the client may have misrepresented the husband’s alleged lack of 
contact with the child over the years and had impeded his past 
visitation.  Throughout this period, Attorney Ward never sought 
the change of venue.   
¶10 Within a few days after the August hearing, the client 
terminated Attorney Ward’s services.  She apparently was unhappy 
that temporary visitation had been awarded and that venue had 
not 
changed 
which 
she 
believed 
might 
have 
avoided 
the 
unfavorable temporary result.  Attorney Ward admits that by this 
time he too realized the matter had to be moved to Kenosha.   
¶11 Attorney Ward cooperated in forwarding his file to the 
client’s new attorney.  However, he refused her demand to return 
the unearned portion of the $10,000.  His services, for what 
amounted to a four-month period from April to August, allegedly 
totaled 36.4 hours.  Thus he was refusing to return at least 
$2720 (13.6 hours x $200 per hour) in unearned fees.   
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
6 
 
¶12 This court adopts the referee’s findings of fact 
unless clearly erroneous.5  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  No 
deference is granted to the referee’s conclusions of law and 
they are reviewed de novo.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 310 N.W.2d 789 (1981).  The 
court 
may 
impose 
whatever 
sanction 
it 
deems 
appropriate 
regardless of the referee’s recommendation.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686.   
COUNT 1 
¶13 The referee concluded there had been a violation of 
SCR 20:1.13 due to Attorney Ward’s failure to file a written 
motion seeking a change of venue as directed by his client.   
¶14 Attorney Ward disputed that he had ever agreed to seek 
the venue change.  He claims it was "not true" that it was in 
                                                 
5 Attorney Ward requests a change to this standard, claiming 
that it is too deferential where a referee knows nothing about 
the area of law in question.  He argues that a referee who is 
not a family court commissioner does not have the expertise to 
judge the actions of an attorney in a family matter.  We reject 
this argument and decline to alter the existing standard.  
Referees in attorney disciplinary matters do not typically 
require specialized knowledge to judge the conduct of the 
attorney.  In the event a particular case allegedly requires 
more, referees are directed to Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel 
Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971) (whether expert 
testimony is required under a given situation must be decided on 
a case-by-case basis); and Cramer v. Theda Clark Memorial 
Hospital, 45 Wis. 2d 147, 172 N.W.2d 427 (1969) (expert 
testimony is required to assist the adjudicator to understand 
complex issues).   
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
7 
 
his client’s interest to have the matter moved to Kenosha; that 
it was "absolutely simply a ploy" to even preliminarily raise a 
change of venue because he was only "testing the waters" and 
trying to feel out the opposition; that he initially did not 
"care one way or the other" whether there was a change of venue; 
that he eventually decided to "table" the idea because he 
thought things were going well in Milwaukee; and that this was 
"absolutely the type of tactical decision" that he——and not his 
client——should make.   
¶15 Attorney Ward argued that there were several reasons 
why not seeking a venue change was a sound tactical decision.  
First, he claimed that the former husband’s attorney——who would 
not have represented the husband had the case been transferred 
to Kenosha——was not particularly "aggressive" and Kenosha was a 
more litigious venue.  Second, he claimed that his client had 
been uncooperative with the Kenosha guardian ad litem by not 
letting the guardian interview the child.  Thus Attorney Ward 
supposedly believed it was better to keep the visitation dispute 
in Milwaukee.  Third, Attorney Ward claimed that the Milwaukee 
action was going well, at least until August when the former 
husband got temporary visitation, and thus there was no reason 
to move it. 
¶16 On the other hand, the client testified that Attorney 
Ward "assured me that that [change of venue] would be done" and 
that she was "of the impression" that the Milwaukee visitation 
matter would ultimately be moved to Kenosha which was her "main 
concern." 
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
8 
 
¶17 The referee acknowledged that an attorney is not 
liable under the Rules of Professional Conduct for errors in 
professional judgment that are made in good faith and/or are in 
the best interest of the client.  Thus she acknowledged that the 
failure to seek the venue change was not misconduct per se. 
¶18 However, the referee rejected Attorney Ward’s defense 
stating: 
Mr. Ward failed to file the requisite written motion 
seeking a change of venue from Milwaukee County to 
Kenosha County for approximately three months contrary 
to the direction and expectation of his client, his 
assurances that he would do so, and the direction of 
the Milwaukee Court Commissioner . . .   It is argued 
that there were good reasons for not pressing for a 
change in venue and there was no harm done to the 
[client] . . .   I find that Mr. Ward’s explanation of 
his strategy to keep the case out of Kenosha County 
and delay filing a change of venue motion until he was 
able to have a new Milwaukee guardian ad litem 
appointed (who presumably would provide a positive 
recommendation to the Kenosha guardian ad litem) is 
not credible.6 
¶19 Mindful of the applicable standard for our review of 
findings of fact and that the referee was best situated to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that these 
findings are not clearly erroneous.  Further, we agree that 
                                                 
6 Attorney Ward introduced the testimony of two Racine 
County attorneys and former guardians to support his handling of 
the venue matter.  Both testified that the alleged hostility of 
the Kenosha termination guardian would have justified keeping 
the visitation dispute in Milwaukee.  But the referee noted that 
neither had talked with the Kenosha guardian to determine if 
indeed he had been hostile to Attorney Ward’s client.  Thus the 
referee concluded that neither witness had any direct knowledge 
of the facts.   
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
9 
 
these facts support the subsequent conclusion of law that this 
rule of professional conduct was violated.   
¶20 There was a direct factual dispute between the 
client’s understanding of what would occur by way of a venue 
change and Attorney Ward’s insistence that he never agreed to 
take such action and that it would have been a bad tactical 
decision under the circumstances.  The referee was obviously 
best 
situated 
to 
listen 
to 
the 
witnesses, 
assess 
their 
credibility, and resolve this factual dispute.7   
COUNTS 2 & 3 
¶21 The referee concluded that Attorney Ward had charged 
an unreasonable fee in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a) and that a 
refund was in order under SCR 20:1.16(d).  The Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) had not argued that the amount of the fee was 
unreasonable per se.  
Rather, it 
objected 
to 
it 
being 
nonrefundable under circumstances where the amount was not 
reasonable and here $10,000 was unreasonable in relation to the 
                                                 
7 Attorney Ward was not charged with a violation of SCR 
20:1.2(a) and (c) which require a lawyer to abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation unless the 
client consents after consultation to a change.  Neither was he 
charged under SCR 20:1.4(a) and (b) which require the lawyer to 
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter 
and to explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.  But it is apparent that if Attorney Ward had 
thoroughly discussed his alleged tactical designs with regard to 
venue and obtained her consent to delay the matter, the problems 
in this case might not have resulted.   
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
10 
 
amount of time Attorney Ward put in on the case and the result 
he achieved.8 
¶22 The referee stated that Attorney Ward turned a 
"simple" visitation/termination dispute into a "complex legal 
endeavor" by allegedly spending over 36 hours to make a few 
appearances before a commissioner and never filing any written 
motions.  Further, the referee found that much of the research 
Attorney Ward claimed he performed in this case——such as a 
memoranda after the second commissioner hearing——was at a time 
when he should have anticipated his imminent discharge as 
counsel.  The referee also termed the research "of questionable 
necessity, not on point, and of no value."  The referee observed 
that Attorney Ward had no documents in the file that reflected 
the 26.3 hours of research he claimed he performed in this case.  
For example, there were no bills for electronic legal services, 
no computer files, no copies of a daily time record for the days 
for which he billed, or any contemporaneous notes.  The referee 
acknowledged that it was evident Attorney Ward did some 
research, but found that the alleged total of over 36 hours was 
"unreliable."   
¶23 The referee further found that Attorney Ward had not 
performed in an acceptable professional fashion in this case:   
                                                 
8 Attorney Ward’s two witnesses had testified that a $10,000 
nonrefundable fee was high but not unreasonable under the 
circumstances.  But the referee considered this testimony to be 
"far too general to be of significant import" because, in part, 
both of the experts were based in Racine County.     
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
11 
 
I do not believe that Mr. Ward exhibited the level of 
professionalism in his performance representing [the 
client] before the Family Court Commissioner that 
would be expected from someone with his many years of 
legal experience.  Further, I find his apparent need 
to expend excessive hours on researching a relatively 
straightforward topic surprising given his professed 
ability as a family law practitioner.  The record 
reflects 
that 
successor 
counsel, 
with 
far 
less 
experience than Mr. Ward, was able to bring the change 
of venue matter as well as the TPR to a speedy and 
successful conclusion without reliance on the subject 
matter jurisdiction issue that consumed so much of Mr. 
Ward’s time.  Thus, while acknowledging Mr. Ward’s 
reputation among fellow lawyers, I must nonetheless 
find that his ability in this case falls below 
reasonable expectations.   
¶24 As for the nonrefundability 
factor, 
the referee 
acknowledged that nonrefundable fees are not a per se violation 
but are typically permissible, in part, only where the nature of 
the reputation precludes the lawyer from accepting other 
representation, or the lawyer’s experience, reputation, and 
skill may result in immediate benefit to the client without 
regard to whether extensive labor is performed.  See Wisconsin 
Ethics Opinion E-93-4.  Based on this, the referee concluded the 
nonrefundable aspect of this fee was unreasonable because 
Attorney 
Ward 
was 
not 
precluded 
from 
taking 
on 
other 
representation due to his representation of this client, and his 
experience, reputation, and skill were not at such a level as to 
give this client an immediate benefit.   
¶25 The 
referee ultimately found that 
Attorney 
Ward 
performed 13.8 hours of legitimate research for a total time 
expenditure of 23.9 hours which at a rate of $200 per hour, 
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
12 
 
amounted to $4780.  The referee concluded that reasonable 
restitution to this client would thus be $5220.   
¶26  The 
referee’s 
findings 
with 
respect 
to 
this 
nonrefundable fee agreement are not clearly erroneous.  The 
record does not support Attorney Ward’s contention that the 
nature of the representation of this client precluded him from 
accepting 
other 
representation 
or 
that 
his 
experience, 
reputation and skill could result in immediate benefit to the 
client without regard to whether extensive labor was performed.  
Indeed, there certainly was no immediate benefit to this client.   
¶27 Further, the referee’s findings with respect to the 
amount to be refunded this client are not clearly erroneous.  It 
obviously was difficult to create exactly what Attorney Ward 
legitimately did in this case, due in significant part to his 
lack of proper documentation.  Again, the referee had the 
benefit of listening to the witnesses, examining any relevant 
documentation that did exist, and assessing Attorney Ward’s 
assertions in his defense.9   
                                                 
9 Attorney Ward contends he should not have to refund 
anything to his client because she was unsuccessful in a prior 
small claims action that sought a refund.  However, claim or 
issue preclusion does not apply in this situation because the 
OLR was not a party to this client’s action.  Further the court 
specifically declined to render any opinion as to whether 
Attorney Ward breached the fee agreement or otherwise performed 
below the required threshold (it resolved the case against the 
client solely because she had not presented expert testimony).  
Finally, claims of attorney misconduct in this regard come 
before a referee with eventual review by this court, and this 
process cannot be short-circuited by an unsuccessful pro se 
action.   
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
13 
 
SANCTION 
¶28 The referee recommended the public reprimand which the 
OLR sought.  She agreed with its characterization of Attorney 
Ward as selfish and having intentionally misstated the amount of 
time he spent on this case.  The referee reviewed several cases 
where public and private reprimands were issued but concluded 
they 
were 
not 
entirely 
comparable 
because 
of 
factual 
differences.  However, the referee indicated that since there 
were three counts of misconduct, and particularly since Attorney 
Ward already has a private reprimand on his disciplinary record, 
a public reprimand was appropriate.   
¶29 As previously noted, the referee also recommended 
restitution of $5220 to be awarded the client, plus interest at 
the statutory rate from the date Attorney Ward’s services were 
terminated.   
¶30 We adopt the referee's recommendation and therefore 
decide that a public reprimand is appropriate.  Although there 
are indeed factual differences with similar prior cases, several 
are instructive.  In Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tjader, 
2002 WI 37, 252 Wis. 2d 94, 643 N.W.2d 87, resulted in a public 
reprimand for failure to act with reasonable diligence and 
return an unearned fee.  Further, In Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Koehn, 208 Wis. 2d 128, 559 N.W.2d 908 (1997), resulted 
in 
a 
public 
reprimand 
for 
failure 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation, failing to promptly file necessary documents, 
and failing to respond to a request for information from the 
client, under circumstances where the attorney had a prior 
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
14 
 
disciplinary record.  These, coupled with Attorney Ward’s 
disciplinary record, indicate that a public reprimand is 
appropriate.10 
¶31 IT IS ORDERED that Attorney John A. Ward is publicly 
reprimanded.   
¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Ward’s motion to 
dismiss the OLR complaint, objection to costs, motion to 
disallow or reduce costs, motion to hold in abeyance, and motion 
to supplement are denied.   
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Ward shall pay: (1) the costs of this 
proceeding to the OLR in the amount of $18,097.26; and (2) his 
former client $5220 plus interest at the statutory rate from the 
date his representation was terminated.  If these costs are not 
paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to this 
court of an inability to pay those costs within that time, the 
license of Attorney Ward to practice law shall be suspended 
indefinitely.   
                                                 
10 We note that in the course of Attorney Ward’s vigorous 
defense he advanced several contentions that are overzealous.  
To claim that "the referee’s findings are result oriented, 
stemming from her obvious desire to rule for the OLR on every 
issue," that she "did not understand the evidence on a fairly 
basic level," and that she "made up" evidence, is unwarranted.  
Although they did not affect the outcome of this case, Attorney 
Ward’s personal attacks on the integrity of the referee were 
unnecessarily contentious and inappropriate.   
No. 
03-0349-D   
 
 
 
1