Title: G.G. v. L.R.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12418 
 
G.G.  vs.  L.R. & another.1,2 
 
 
January 16, 2018. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, G.G., obtained a civil harassment 
prevention order in the Superior Court, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 258E, against L.R.  The order, and subsequent modifications 
of it, contained various directives addressed to L.R., as well 
as to L.R.'s employer, P.F.  L.R.'s appeal presently is pending 
in the Appeals Court; both the Superior Court judge and a single 
justice of the Appeals Court denied L.R.'s motion to stay 
enforcement of the order pending appeal.     
 
 
While L.R.'s appeal has been pending, a series of events 
ensued in the Superior Court and the Appeals Court.  Notably, a 
second single justice of the Appeals Court modified a provision 
of an order entered during the pendency of L.R.'s appeal, denied 
L.R.'s motion to stay contempt proceedings, and denied G.G.'s 
motion for sanctions.  In addition, after the Superior Court 
judge allowed G.G.'s "motion to add" P.F. as a party to the 
proceedings and entered other orders, P.F. appealed.  That 
appeal also is pending in the Appeals Court.  On July 27, 2017, 
a third single justice of the Appeals Court allowed P.F.'s 
motion to stay enforcement of certain orders pending appeal and 
                     
 
1 Because the Appeals Court has used the parties' initials 
in related proceedings, we do so as well.   
 
 
2 P.F.  The Appeals Court also was named as a party in 
G.G.'s petition in the county court.  We treat it as a nominal 
party.  Cf. S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996). 
   
2 
 
L.R.'s motion to stay enforcement of a portion of an order.  The 
third single justice denied G.G.'s motions for reconsideration 
of both orders, but treated them as notices of appeal, and 
indicated that "the appeal shall proceed in the normal course."  
Insofar as the record before us indicates, G.G. has not pursued 
those appeals.3 
 
 
Instead, G.G. filed a petition in the county court, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, primarily requesting that the 
court vacate the Appeals Court single justice's July, 2017, 
orders.  In addition, the petition sought an order disqualifying 
a particular attorney from representing L.R. or G.G., a 
declaration that a certain constitutional provision is 
unconstitutional as applied in the underlying proceedings, and 
other relief.4  A single justice of this court denied the 
petition without a hearing.  G.G.'s appeal from that particular 
ruling is what is now before us on a memorandum and appendix 
filed pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 
(2001).  Rule 2:21 applies where a single justice has denied 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, from a challenged 
interlocutory ruling of the trial court.  Because relief 
properly may be denied under the statute where adequate 
alternative remedies exist, the rule requires the aggrieved 
party to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court 
decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final 
adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available 
means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).  "At this juncture, our focus is 
not on the merits of any ruling . . . , but on the availability 
of other remedies."  Luke v. Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 1002, 1002 
(2011). 
                     
 
3 The Appeals Court's docket indicates the records have been 
assembled in both cases.  See Mass. R. A. P. 9, as amended, 417 
Mass. 1601 (1994).  It is unclear whether G.G. has taken the 
additional steps pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 10, as amended, 430 
Mass. 1605 (1999), to perfect the appeals. 
   
 
4 The petition also requested an order directing the 
Attorney General to initiate a criminal investigation.  Although 
G.G. has not pressed the claim here, it is plain he was not 
entitled to relief.  The Attorney General has wide discretion in 
determining whether to prosecute, see Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
428 Mass. 623, 629 (1999), and relief in the nature of mandamus 
is "not available to compel the performance of discretionary 
acts."  See Boxford v. Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 458 Mass. 
596, 605-606 (2010).  
 
3 
 
 
 
To the extent the petition sought relief from the orders of 
the third single justice of the Appeals Court, the rule does not 
apply because those orders are not interlocutory rulings of the 
trial court.  See Blonde v. Antonelli, 463 Mass. 1002, 1002 
(2012).  It is nonetheless evident on the record before us that 
the petitioner has or had an adequate alternative remedy, 
namely, an appeal from the Appeals Court single justice's orders 
to a panel of that court.  See Gifford v. Gifford, 451 Mass. 
1012, 1013 (2008).  If necessary, he could have requested that 
the Appeals Court expedite such an appeal.  Single justices of 
this court are not obligated to exercise the extraordinary power 
of general superintendence where a petitioner does not attempt 
to pursue such adequate alternative remedies.  Blonde, supra at 
1002.   
 
 
To the extent the petition seeks relief from any 
interlocutory ruling of the trial court, such as the denial of 
the petitioner's request to disqualify defense counsel, the 
petitioner failed to demonstrate why review of that ruling 
cannot adequately be obtained through the ordinary appellate 
process.  See Farahini v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 445 Mass. 
1024, 1024 (2006) (claim that counsel should be disqualified may 
be raised on appeal from final judgment).  Similarly, while the 
petition sought certain declaratory relief, the constitutional 
claims raised "could have been addressed during the ordinary 
trial and appellate process in the underlying case," Longval 
v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 437 Mass. 1018, 
1018-1019 (2002), or on appeal from the third Appeals Court 
single justice's orders.  Declaratory relief may not be used as 
a substitute for an appeal.  Id. 
 
 
We affirm that portion of the judgment that denies the 
petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3; with respect 
to the request for declaratory relief, we remand to the county 
court for entry of a judgment declaring that, because of the 
available appellate remedy, the petitioner's action does not 
state a controversy for purposes of G. L. c. 231A, and that an 
action for declaratory relief therefore cannot be maintained.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
 
G.G., pro se.