Title: James E. Smith v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 05-294 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION JAMES E. SMITH Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered February 23, 2005 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, CR 99-724-3-5, HON. JOHN B. PLEGGE, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM A jury found James E. Smith guilty of two counts of rape for engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with two victims, who were both under the age of fourteen. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed. Smith v. State, CACR 02-228 (Ark. App. January 8, 2003). Subsequently, Smith filed in the trial court a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, and Smith has lodged an appeal in this court. Appellant's single point on appeal alleges that the trial court erred in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court's order. The record reflects that witnesses for the state included the two victims and their mother, Francis M. Love. Ms. Love and Smith lived together for approximately twelve years. Although not married, Ms. Love considered Smith to be her husband and her children referred to Smith as their father. Both victims testified at the trial. They stated that beginning when they were about ages seven and nine, Smith began sexually abusing them, and that the abuse eventually escalated to intercourse. They alleged that Smith continued this conduct until each girl left the home upon reaching adulthood. The police charged Smith with rape after the brother of one of the victims disclosed the abuse to police following an altercation between Smith and Ms. Love's two older sons. Although Smith denied the charges, he admitted to police that he had consensual sex with the victims when they were adults. After filing his petition for Rule 37.1 relief, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order finding that Smith failed to show that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel in accordance with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The trial court also found that no prejudice resulted from the attorney's actions or that the trial outcome would have been different but for the alleged misconduct of Smith's attorney. On appeal to this court, appellant alleges his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because the trial counsel: (1) failed to investigate appellant's claims regarding Ms. Love's stealing juvenile court documents; (2) failed to object to Ms. Love's referring to herself as appellant's slave, (3) failed to consult with appellant regarding whether appellant wanted his trial counsel to continue to represent appellant in light of the trial counsel's friendship with Ms. Love. Additionally, appellant claims that his trial counsel's friendship with Ms. Love resulted in trial counsel's failure to mount a proper defense. In an appeal from a court's denial of a petition pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland. Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). Under the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of counsel as set out in Strickland, when a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show first that counsel's performance was deficient through a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam). For appellant's first point on appeal, appellant maintains that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate appellant's accusations that Ms. Love, a records clerk at the juvenile court in Pine Bluff, stole juvenile records. Appellant claimed that he obtained these stolen documents and gave a copy of the documents to Ms. Love's supervisor, and that a state agency investigated Ms. Love on this matter. At the hearing on the Rule 37.1 petition, appellant alleged that the rape charges filed against him were in retaliation for his actions. Appellant now argues that because his trial counsel failed to properly investigate appellant's accusations regarding Ms. Love's theft, his trial counsel was not able to cross-examine Ms. Love about the theft or bring out the potential underlying motive for the victims filing rape charges against appellant. Appellant relies on Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002), in support of his contention that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to make a proper investigation. In Flores, Flores was on trial for second-degree murder of his wife after he found her having sexual relations with another man. Flores's trial counsel committed a litany of errors both beforeand during trial which this court determined constituted ineffective assistance counsel.1 The trial attorney in Flores acted in such an ineffective manner that no points of error were preserved for a direct appeal. With regard to Flores's trial counsel's lack of investigation before the trial, the record indicated that trial counsel failed to obtain Flores's personal history, other than the name of Flores's employer at the time of his arrest. Trial counsel did not discuss or pursue the possible defense of Flores's extreme emotional distress when he discovered his wife with another man. Trial counsel failed to read the entire case file supplied by the prosecutor, admitting that he merely skimmed certain documents in the file. Although he reviewed the murder statutes, he failed to review the manslaughter statute and failed to offer a manslaughter instruction to the trial court. Flores's trial counsel failed to file a discovery motion or a motion pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), seeking exculpatory evidence in the State's possession, and failed to file a motion to suppress the statements of Flores or certain evidence seized at the residence. Trial counsel also failed to file a motion to suppress hearsay testimony of two witnesses. In finding that Flores's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, we held: [T]rial counsel had a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. Strickland, supra. However, "when the appellant shows that defense counsel failed to exercise the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exhibit under similar circumstances, that presumption must fail." Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280 (8th Cir.1994). Here, trial counsel neither investigated the law nor the facts pertaining to Flores's case. Trial counsel did not use reasonable professional judgment. Flores, 350 Ark. at 212-213, 85 S.W.3d at 905. We do not find Flores to be factually dispositive in this matter. Flores's trial counsel indicated that his focus was to negotiate a plea for Flores. As a result, he made literally no effort to provide Flores with competent representation at the trial, including conducting any investigation into a possible defense to the charges against Flores. In contrast, in the instant matter, appellant's trial attorney testified at the hearing on appellant's petition for postconviction relief that he did investigate appellant's claims regarding Ms. Love. On cross-examination at the trial, appellant's counsel questioned Ms. Love about whether she offered to have the victims drop their claims of rape against appellant in exchange for appellant dropping criminal charges against Ms. Love's sons stemming from the altercation. Appellant's counsel testified that he did not, however, investigate certain potential witnesses named by appellant or obtain the juvenile court documents.2 The trial attorney stated that he did not believe that the various allegations recounted to him by appellant "would provide a basis for a meritorious defense against the charge of rape against the two ladies." Unless appellant makes both Strickland showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Actual ineffectiveness claims alleging deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice. Chenowith v.State, 341 Ark. 722, 19 S.W.3d 612 (2000) (per curiam). Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make an argument that is meritless, either at trial or on appeal. Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 128, 55 S.W.3d 255, 262-263 (2001). There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). To rebut this presumption, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Because of this standard, the burden is on the petitioner to provide facts to support his claims of prejudice. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam). Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Id. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis of postconviction relief. Jackson, supra. Here, we cannot say it is clearly error that the trial court concluded that appellant's counsel made a reasonable decision not to investigate those claims. Appellant's trial counsel did question Ms. Love in order to expose the potential ulterior motive that appellant claims instigated the case against him. Appellant has not delineated the actual prejudice that arose as a result of counsel's decision. Having already questioned the motives of Ms. Love, we cannot say that any additional cross-examination by counsel would have changed the trial outcome. Furthermore, the decision not to pursue and present every aspect of the allegations made by appellant regarding Ms. Love, including obtaining a copy of the allegedly stolen documents and questioning all witnesses named by appellant, is largely a matter of trial strategy. See Camargo, supra. Trial counsel's decision, as a matter of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, falls within the realm of trial counsel's professional judgment and is not grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Noel, supra. Here, we find that appellant failed to show that his trial counsel did not make a reasonable decision that extensive investigation was unnecessary. The testimony of any additional witnesses and the presence of the allegedly stolen documents focused completely on questioning the credibility of Ms. Love, the mother of the victim, which trial counsel already accomplished. However, appellant's allegations regarding Ms. Love had no direct bearing on the credibility of the victims and failed to show a meritorious defense to the charges based on the information he provided trial counsel. An attorney's decision not to call a particular witness is largely a matter of professional judgment, and even the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not, itself, proof of counsel's ineffectiveness. Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38 S.W.3d 334 (2001). Here, appellant provided evidence of what the omitted testimony for some witnesses might have been, but did not show how that testimony was beneficial, could have been admitted into evidence or how it might have changed the outcome of his trial. Appellant thus failed to show that he suffered actual prejudice or received ineffective assistance of counsel on this point. Based on the totality of the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland. Next, appellant claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object when Ms. Love used the word "slave" during her direct examination. In response to the prosecutor's question of whether she took on the role of appellant's wife, she responded, "Yes[,] or his slave." Appellant contends that use of that word amounted to a prejudicial and inflammatory statement and that it was irrelevant as to the crimes against the victims. Other testimony presented at the trial portrayed appellant in a negative light. The witnesses asserted that after appellant began abusing the older victim, one of the brothers of the victim informed Ms. Love about the abuse. Ms. Love confronted appellant about the allegations. The victim, who was nine years old at the time, testified that as a result, appellant beat her until she told "the truth" about the situation to her mother and denied the abuse. Witnesses also testified that after appellant began living with their family, appellant prohibited family members from attending church or engaging in outside activities, such as choir. Ms. Love testified that appellant held approximately twenty different jobs during the time he lived with Ms. Love and lost one job due to punching his foreman. She also claimed that appellant spent a large amount of time watching adult and pornographic movies. The altercation that brought the abuse to the attention of the police began when appellant accused Ms. Love of seeing another man. During the altercation, appellant hit Ms. Love and also hit one of her sons on the head with a skillet. Appellant failed to demonstrate he suffered prejudice by the use of this single word. Based on the extensive testimony presented at trial, appellant's claim of prejudice amounted to a mere conclusory statement without factual substantiation. Appellant has not shown that the use of the word "slave" rises to the level sufficient to adversely affect the outcome of the trial, such as the prejudice Flores suffered by wearing prison clothes and shackles, triggering a constitutional issue. Flores, supra. Based on the totality of the evidence, appellant failed to show that counsel's performance was ineffective under Strickland or adversely affected the outcome of the trial. As a final basis for ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant urges that the trial attorney failed to "consult" with appellant as to whether the trial attorney should have withdrawn his representation based on his relationship with Ms. Love. Appellant's counsel testified about this matter at the hearing on appellant's petition for postconviction relief. Prior to trial, the trial attorney disclosed to appellant that in the attorney's capacity as city attorney, he knew Ms. Love, but did not characterize their passing professional relationship with each other as a friendship. The attorney later discussed this matter with the trial judge and the prosecutor to determine whether he would be able to continue representing appellant. The trial attorney reported to appellant that the judge did not see any problems with the attorney's continued representation of appellant. In support of his claim of the consultation requirement, and resulting ineffective assistance, appellant relies upon Strom v. State, 348 Ark. 610, 74 S.W.3d 233 (2002), seeking to extend the consultation requirement of Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), to the present set of facts.3 We do not find Strom to be applicable to the present case. Strom considered whether an attorney would continue representing the defendant on appeal after trial, relying upon Rule 16 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure - Criminal. Here, appellant expects the same constitutional protections regarding whether an attorney should discontinue representing the defendant at the trial court level. The constitutional conditions regarding legal representation in Strom are not analogous to the those in the instant case and Ark. R. App. P. - Crim. 16 does not concern legal representation at the trial level. Thus, the present situation does not warrant application of the consultation requirement of Strom. It appears that instead of a constitutional claim, appellant's argument on this point asserts a conflict of interest arising from his trial counsel's relationship with Ms. Love. In Wilburn v. State, 346 Ark. 137, 56 S.W.3d 365 (2001), we noted that "[t]he cornerstone principle in all conflict cases is whether prejudice will result to the client as a result of the conflict of interest. . . . That prejudice must be real and have some demonstrable detrimental effect on the client and not merely be abstract or theoretical." Wilburn, 346 Ark. at 143, 56 S.W.3d at 369, citing Sheridan v. State, 331 Ark. 1, 959 S.W.2d 29 (1998); Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.1990). At the Rule 37.1 hearing, the trial attorney explained that he felt obligated to notify appellant about his minimal working relationship with Ms. Love, and noted that but for his disclosure, appellant would have no knowledge that Ms. Love and trial counsel knew each other in any manner. Counsel admitted that he did not make a record of his conversations with the judge or his client about his relationship with Ms. Love, but should have in retrospect. While it is better practice to have the trial attorney's conversations with the judge, prosecutor and appellant on the record, appellant did not establish that he was muzzled to the extent that he was prevented from being given an opportunity to convey his concerns to his attorney in the course of the trial. Nor did appellant demonstrate that counsel failed to devote a sufficient amount of time in preparing for the trial, thereby allowing appellant numerous opportunities to express his desires. Apparently, the trial court found the testimony of appellant's trial counsel more compelling than appellant's testimony. The trial court is in the best position to resolve any conflicts in testimony. Snelgrove v. State, 292 Ark. 116, 728 S.W.2d 497 (1987). The judge at a postconviction relief hearing is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, particularly that of the accused. Skeels v. State, 300 Ark. 285, 779 S.W.2d 146 (1989). Moreover, in the case before us, appellant failed to show a demonstrable detrimental effect as a result of appellant's counsel knowing Ms. Love. Trial counsel cross-examined Ms. Love at length, and as discussed above, he questioned her about an improper underlying motive for the rape charges. As will be discussed below, we do not find that trial counsel's work relationship with Ms. Love impaired trial counsel's ability to properly defend appellant. As a result, we are left with merely a theoretical argument that appellant's counsel was hampered or impaired in any respect by knowing Ms. Love. Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the alleged conflict of interest. We cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that appellant did not suffer any prejudice as a result of trial counsel's actions. Finally, relative to his consent/conflict argument, appellant maintains that his trial attorney's friendship with Ms. Love prevented him from mounting a proper defense. Specifically, appellant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate appellant's accusations about the prior criminal acts of Ms. Love and one of the victims4 and that the trial attorney did not seek a continuance to properly prepare for cross-examination of the State's expert witness, Dr. Karen Worley. Finally, appellant claims that during closing arguments, his trial attorney improperly apologized for appellant's admission during cross-examination that he had sex with both of the victims when they were adults. At the trial, Dr. Karen Worley, a psychologist specializing in child victims of sexual abuse, testified as an expert witness on behalf of the State. She related her interviews with the victims at the request of the police after the rapes had been brought to light. In her expert opinion, she determined that both victims suffered symptoms consistent with the type of sexual abuse they disclosed to her. Appellant's trial attorney conducted a voir dire of Dr. Worley to authenticate her status as an expert witness. The trial attorney also cross-examined Dr. Worley about the scope of her investigation and the conclusions she reached. At the hearing on appellant's postconviction relief petition, appellant's counsel explained that he initially indicated that he would seek a continuance of the trial in order to prepare for cross-examination of Dr. Worley. However, counsel was able to adequately prepare to question her and did not require a continuance. Appellant testified at the trial in his own defense. While being cross-examined by the prosecutor, appellant admitted having sex with both victims. He claimed that during a two-week period, each of them seduced appellant and had consensual sex with him when they were aged eighteen and twenty, approximately two years before appellant's arrest for rape. Appellant expressed his remorse that these events occurred. During his closing argument, trial counsel again apologized for appellant's admission of having consensual sex with both victims, raising the issue a second time. As to his apology for appellant's admission of sex with the victims, trial counsel defended his action at the Rule 37.1 hearing. He stated that since appellant had already made the admission, counsel attempted to lessen the impact of this confession, reiterate appellant's remorse and highlight appellant's owning up to his actions. We find that appellant failed to show that trial counsel did not conduct a proper defense of appellant. The evidence against the appellant was substantial. On his direct appeal, the court of appeals rejected appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument and upheld certain testimony presented at the trial. Appellant failed to show that trial counsel appeared unprepared, failed to make appropriate objections or failed to sufficiently cross-examine witnesses including Dr. Worley. Counsel was able to bring out inconsistent statements and other weaknesses in the state's case. Counsel also preserved six points of error for appellant's direct appeal. At the hearing on appellant's petition for Rule 37.1 relief, trial counsel set out his strategy supporting his decisions at trial, including his decision to re-visit appellant's admission of having sex with the victims after they reached adulthood during closing arguments. As noted above, appellant's trial counsel made a strategic decision to not pursue certain allegations made by appellant that would not support a meritorious defense to the charges filed against appellant. Additionally, appellant's counsel explained at the hearing for postconviction relief that a continuance was not necessary in order to properly prepare for cross-examination of the state's expert witness. Based on evidence presented at the hearing and the totality of the evidence, we cannot say that trial counsel failed to provide appellant with reasonable professional assistance. The trial court found that appellant failed to show that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. The trial court also found that no prejudice resulted from the attorney's actions or that the trial outcome would have been different but for the acts of appellant's attorney. Our review of the record supports those findings. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. Affirmed. 1 These errors included allowing Flores to attend the entire jury trial dressed in his jail uniform and shackles. Trial counsel failed to object, to seek to correct the situation, to take any steps to protect Flores's constitutional rights in that regard or to preserve the record for appeal. Additionally, Flores's trial counsel failed to undertake even basic trial preparation or minimal activities on behalf of Flores during the trial. For example, Flores's attorney failed to make any pretrial or trial motions, failed to make an opening statement, failed to make a single objection to any trial error, and failed to object to any evidence presented at trial. 2 Appellant testified that he possessed a copy of these documents, but inexplicably did not provide the documents to his trial attorney. 3 In Roe, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that a criminal defendant had a constitutional right to an attorney, but questioned whether the failure of an attorney to perfect an appeal created a per se ineffective assistance of counsel ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the ineffective assistance standards of Strickland would be applied to the requirement that an attorney consult with a criminal defendant regarding filing an appeal. In Strom, the issue we faced was whether a criminal defendant's trial attorney, after trial sufficiently consulted with the defendant regarding whether the defendant should file an appeal. We considered whether Strom's trial attorney properly complied with Rule 16 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure - Criminal, which encapsulates the constitutional requirement of consultation and defines the foundation for compliance therewith. We decline to impose the underlying constitutional consultation requirement of Strom to the present case. As a result, the Strickland standards for ineffective assistance of counsel must be applied to the present case without any constitutional overtones. 4 Appellant argued that his attorney failed to investigate claims that Ms. Love and one of the victims committed arson for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining insurance proceeds.