Title: Metzger v. DaRosa

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 95913-Agenda 34-September 2003.
LINETTE METZGER, Appellee, v. TIMOTHY DaROSA et al., 							Appellants.
Opinion filed February 20, 2004.
 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case is before us on questions of Illinois Law certified by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 145 Ill. 2d R. 20.
The certified questions are:
			"1. Does Section 19c.1 of the Illinois Personnel Code, 20
ILCS 415/19c.1, create an implied private right of action?
			2. If there is an implied private right of action under Section
19c.1, is that action limited to one against the employer (i.e., the
State of Illinois), or may it also be brought against individual
employees (i.e., supervisors, managers, or others who retaliate
against the whistleblower)?"
	For the reasons that follow, we hold that under Illinois Law,
section19c.1 of the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/19c.1 (West 2002))
does not create an implied private right of action.
I. BACKGROUND
	In the underlying case, Linette Metzger (Metzger), an employee of
the Illinois State Police, filed a multiple-count action in federal court
against the State Police and several individuals, alleging sexual harassment,
gender discrimination, and retaliation in violation of federal statutes and
constitutional provisions, and one count of a violation of section19c.1 of
the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/19c.1 (West 2002)).
	The parties have differing interpretations of the events that led to this
action. According to Metzger, she reported multiple attendance abuses
involving employees who were paid for days when they were not at work,
giving the Department of Internal Investigation (DII) over 40 pages of
documentation. The DII returned the documents to Metzger and told her
to inform her supervisor. Metzger informed her supervisor, Betsy
Wasmer-Ryherd (Wasmer), by e-mail. Wasmer immediately charged
Metzger herself with attendance abuse to DII, but the allegations were
never substantiated. Wasmer then transferred Metzger to another division
and revoked her 24-hour building access privileges. At her new division,
Metzger had no work assignments for some time. Metzger also claimed
that Wasmer and others attempted to retaliate further by changing
Metzger's work schedule at her new job without discussing it with her
new supervisor. According to Metzger, the transfer adversely affected her
chances for promotion and job advancement.
	According to defendants, Metzger first told Wasmer in 1996 that
another employee was not properly accounting for time off. Wasmer
discussed the matter with the employee and corrected the records to
charge two days off against the employee. Two years later, without asking
Wasmer if the problem had been corrected, Metzger reiterated the
complaint to the DII. The DII told Metzger to discuss it with Wasmer.
When Wasmer received Metzger's e-mail, she checked all the employee
time records and discovered that Metzger was frequently late for work.
Wasmer also suspected that Metzger was going through other employees'
desks after hours. Wasmer requested that Metzger be transferred to
another unit and revoked Metzger's 24-hour building access.
	The jury found in Metzger's favor on the count alleging violation of
section19c.1of the Personnel Code and awarded damages. All other
counts were decided in favor of the defendants by court ruling or verdict.
Both parties appealed.
	On appeal, the state defendants argued that there is no implied right
of action under section19c.1 and that the verdict on that count should be
reversed. Alternatively, defendants argued any cause of action implied by
that statute would only lie against the State of Illinois and a federal action
against the state is barred by the eleventh amendment.
	Perceiving a need for this court to decide authoritatively the issue of
whether section19c.1 of the Personnel Code creates an implied private
right of action and, if there is such a right, whether that action is limited to
one against the employer (i.e., the State of Illinois), or whether it may also
be brought against individual employees (i.e., supervisors, managers, or
others who retaliate against the whistleblower), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified these questions to this court
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 20 (145 Ill. 2d R. 20).(1) We agreed to
answer the certified questions.
II. ANALYSIS
	We are first asked to answer the following certified question:
		"1. Does Section 19c.1 of the Illinois Personnel Code, 20 ILCS
415/19c.1, create an implied private right of action?"
	Since the resolution of the certified question involves an interpretation
of the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/1 et seq. (West 2002)), it presents
a question of law that we review de novo. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle
County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07 (2003). In construing the meaning of a
statute, the primary objective of this court is to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the legislature, and all other rules of statutory construction
are subordinated to this cardinal principle. Carver, 203 Ill. 2d  at 507. The
plain language of the statute is the best indicator of the legislature's intent.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc., 202 Ill. 2d 586, 591 (2002).
When the statute's language is clear, it will be given effect without resort
to other aids of statutory construction. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 445 (2002).
	Section 19c.1 of the Personnel Code provides:
			"(1) In any case involving any disclosure of information by an
employee which the employee reasonably believes evidences-
			(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
			(ii) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety if the disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law, the
identity of the employee may not be disclosed without the
consent of the employee during any investigation of the
information and any related matters.
			(2) No disciplinary action shall be taken against any
employee for the disclosure of any alleged prohibited activity
under investigation or for any related activity. For the
purposes of this Section, disciplinary action means any
retaliatory action taken against an employee, including but
not limited to reprimand, suspension, discharge, demotion or
denial of promotion or transfer." (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS
415/19c.1 (West 2002).
Section 19c.1 does not articulate any precise relief for a state employee
who suffers retaliatory action in violation of this provision. Nor does any
other provision of the Personnel Code expressly provide state employees
with the right to pursue an action for damages under section 19c.1. The
lack of specific statutory language granting such a right, however, is not
necessarily dispositive because a court may determine that a private right
of action is implied in a statute. See Fisher v. Lexington Health Care,
Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 460 (1999); Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of
Decatur, 149 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (1992); Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v.
Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 386-87 (1982). Metzger urges this court to
find that section 19c.1 implies a private right of action for state employees
who are subjected to retaliatory action for reporting wrongdoing by other
state employees.
	This court recently reiterated that there are four factors to be
considered in determining if a private right of action may be implied from
a statute:
		"Implication of a private right of action is appropriate if: (1) the
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted; (2) the plaintiff's injury is one the statute was
designed to prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private
right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for
violations of the statute." Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 460 (citing
Rogers, 149 Ill. 2d  at 308, and Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 312-13 (1991)).
	In Fisher, plaintiffs sought to pursue an action for damages under
section 3-608 of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-608
(West 1996)). Section 3-608 provides:
			"A [nursing home facility] licensee or its agents or employees
shall not transfer, discharge, evict, harass, dismiss, or retaliate
against a resident, a resident's representative, or an employee or
agent who makes a report *** or brings or testifies in an action
*** or files a complaint *** because of the report, testimony, or
complaint." 210 ILCS 45/3-608 (West 1996).
	In applying the four factors, this court determined that section 3-608
does not imply a private right of action for nursing home employees who
are retaliated against by their employer. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 460. First,
we determined that plaintiffs were not members of the class that the
Nursing Home Care Act was enacted to protect, and that their injuries
were not the type the statute was designed to prevent. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d 
at 460. Moreover, we concluded that implying a private cause of action
under the Nursing Home Care Act was not necessary to provide an
adequate remedy for violations of the Act. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 460. We
reasoned that the Nursing Home Care Act was enacted for the purpose
of protecting and benefitting nursing home residents and that the Act was
designed to prevent abuse and neglect of nursing home residents as well
as other violations of residents' rights. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 462. We also
reasoned that the legislature had provided an adequate statutory
framework to encourage reporting of violations and to punish retaliation.
Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 467. Accordingly, we held that section 3-608 of the
Nursing Home Care Act does not imply a private right of action for
nursing home employees who are retaliated against by their employer.
Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 468.
	The case before us now is similar to Fisher. In applying the factors
delineated in Fisher, we first consider whether Metzger is a member of
the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. The General
Assembly enacted the Personnel Code in 1955 "to revise the law in
relation to personnel administration and to make appropriations in
connection therewith." 1955 Ill. Laws 2208 (eff. July 18, 1955). The
stated purpose of the Personnel Code is "to establish for the government
of the State of Illinois a system of personnel administration under the
Governor, based on merit principles and scientific methods." 20 ILCS
415/2 (West 2002). Metzger argues that the plain language of section 2
of the Personnel Code indicates that it was designed to protect civil
service employees. Defendants argue that the general public is the class for
whose benefit the Personnel Code was enacted.
	When interpreting legislative enactments, we must read the statute as
a whole and not as isolated provisions. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 463. Illinois
courts have determined that the purpose of the Personnel Code is to
ensure competent employees for government bodies and, in carrying out
that purpose, to protect state employees from discharge for political or
capricious reasons. See Brown v. Department of Corrections, 199 Ill.
App. 3d 648, 650 (1990); Hacker v. Myers, 33 Ill. App. 2d 322, 333
(1961); People v. Niewinski, 13 Ill. App. 2d 307, 314 (1957).
Moreover, this court has held that the purpose of civil service laws is to
increase the efficiency of the public service to obtain better practical
results in state service by improving methods, using the services of the
employees in the best manner in order that the state may obtain its
money's worth in the services rendered. See People ex rel. Baird v.
Stevenson, 270 Ill. 569, 573-74 (1915).
	When viewed as a whole, it is clear that the Personnel Code was
primarily designed to benefit the state and the people of Illinois by ensuring
competent employees for government bodies. The protections afforded
state employees under the Personnel Code are incidental to the overall
purpose. Although section 19c.1 protects state employees from retaliatory
action, it does so to advance the Personnel Code's central purpose of
advancing the interest of the state and the public by encouraging state
employees who become aware of wrongdoing by other state employees
to report the wrongdoing. See, e.g., Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 463 (primary
purpose of Nursing Home Care Act is to protect nursing home residents,
despite specific provision protecting nursing home employees from
retaliation for reporting violation of Act). Accordingly, we conclude that
the Personnel Code was enacted primarily to benefit the state and the
people of Illinois by providing efficient government administration.
Therefore, Metzger is not a member of the primary class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted.
	Next, we consider whether Metzger's injury is one the statute was
designed to prevent. Again, in interpreting the Personnel Code, we must
read the statute as a whole and not as isolated provisions. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 463. While section 19c.1 specifically prohibits retaliating against an
employee who reports wrongdoing, the statute's broad purpose is to
protect the public by "establish[ing] for the government of the State of
Illinois a system of personnel administration *** based on merit principles
and scientific methods." 20 ILCS 415/2 (West 2002).
	Just as state employees are not the class for whom the statute was
primarily enacted to benefit, it is clear that the Personnel Code was not
primarily designed to prevent retaliation against state employees.
	We next consider whether a private right of action is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the Personnel Code. The Personnel Code
prescribes procedures for appointment, promotion, and removal of state
employees, and prohibits certain discriminatory and politically based
misconduct. Although the Personnel Code incidentally protects state
employees such as Metzger, no civil remedy is provided for those
employees injured by its violation. See, e.g., Davis v. Dunne, 189 Ill.
App. 3d 739, 741-42 (1989).
	State employees who report misconduct serve the public interest, and
protecting them from retaliatory action is, therefore, in the public interest.
However, providing an implied right of action for state employees against
the state would deprive the state of its independent ability to manage its
employees and to decide whether an action is retaliation or appropriate
management, and would instead vest that power in a court. Accordingly,
we hold that a private right of action would be inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of the Personnel Code.
	Finally, we examine whether implying a private right of action is
necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the Personnel
Code. This court has implied a private right of action under a statute "only
in cases where the statute would be ineffective, as a practical matter,
unless such an action were implied." Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 464. While
encouraging honesty and candor among state employees is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the Personnel Code, implying a private right of
action for state employees is not necessary to achieve that purpose.
	Metzger argues that under Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of
Decatur, 149 Ill. 2d 302 (1992), this court should imply a private right of
action. In Rodgers, after determining that the plaintiff was a member of the
class for whose benefit the X-Ray Retention Act (210 ILCS 90/0.01 et
seq. (West 2000)) was enacted and that plaintiff's injury was one the Act
was designed to prevent, this court noted that the Act provides no specific
administrative remedy for a violation of the Act. Rodgers, 149 Ill. 2d  at
308-09. We further noted that administrative remedies would not provide
an adequate remedy to those injured by violations of the Act and that the
threat of liability is an efficient method of enforcing the regulation.
Rodgers, 149 Ill. 2d  at 309. Accordingly, we concluded that a private
cause of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy for
violations of the Act and that it was consistent with the underlying purpose
of the Act.
	Unlike the X-Ray Retention Act at issue in Rodgers, the Personnel
Code expressly provides sanctions and remedies for violations of its
provisions: (1) an administrative process through the Civil Service
Commission for both discipline and protection of state employees (20
ILCS 415/10(6), 11 (West 2002)); (2) judicial review of the Civil Service
Commission's administrative decisions (20 ILCS 415/11a (West 2002));
(3) authority for the Director of Central Management Services to institute
and maintain any action or proceeding to secure compliance with the
Personnel Code and its implementing rules and orders (20 ILCS 415/16
(West 2002)); and (4) criminal penalties for violation of any provision of
the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/18 (West 2002)). These mechanisms
are sufficient to encourage the reporting of violations of the Personnel
Code and to prevent and punish retaliatory action against state employees
who make such reports.
	Metzger could have filed a grievance under the Personnel Code, but
she did not. She complains that the grievance procedure does not provide
for compensation for the damages she suffered. However, Metzger's
argument inappropriately focuses on the claimed right to compensation for
her injuries rather than on whether adequate remedies are provided to
make compliance with the Personnel Code likely. See Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d 
at 464 (private right of action under statute will be implied only where the
statute would be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless such an action
were implied).
	Metzger further contends that the criminal penalties imposed for
violation of the Personnel Code are inadequate to ensure compliance with
the statute and that this court should, therefore, imply a private right of
action. Violation of the Personnel Code is a Class B misdemeanor and is
punishable by a $1,500 fine and imprisonment for no more than six
months. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(3) (West 2002); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-3(2)
(West 2002). Metzger argues that these penalties are minimal and serve
as only a minor deterrent. The purpose of the criminal penalties is not to
compensate employees, but to assure compliance with the Personnel
Code. Here, criminal penalties are but one of the enforcement mechanisms
provided by the legislature. One who violates the Personnel Code may
also be subject to demotion, suspension, or discharge. See 20 ILCS
415/8b.15, 8b.16, 11 (West 2002). Accordingly, we disagree with
Metzger that a private right of action must be implied to ensure compliance
with the statute.
	The legislature has provided a statutory framework to encourage
reporting of Personnel Code violations and to punish retaliatory action
against state employees. The legislature could have granted state
employees a private action for damages, but it did not do so. We cannot
say that the statutory framework of the Personnel Code is so deficient that
it is necessary to imply a private right of action for employees to effectuate
its purpose. See Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 467.
	The Personnel Code provides a comprehensive statutory scheme for
redress of Metzger's type of injury. The Personnel Code's statutory
scheme demonstrates that no implied private right of action was intended
by the legislature. The Personnel Code provides that a state employee
alleging retaliatory action in the form of discharge, demotion, or suspension
may appeal to the Commission. See 20 ILCS 415/11 (West 2002). The
Personnel Code further provides for judicial review of the Commission's
decision pursuant to the Administrative Review Law. 20 ILCS 415/10(6),
11a (West 2002). Where the statute creating or conferring power on an
administrative agency expressly adopts the Administrative Review Law,
a circuit court has no authority to entertain an independent action. Dubin
v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 497-98 (1989). Given that the
Personnel Code provides for administrative remedies, we conclude that
the legislature intended the Administrative Review Law to be the exclusive
remedy under the Code in cases of retaliatory action involving discharge,
demotion, or suspension. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147, 87 L. Ed. 2d 96, 107, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3093 (1985) (" 'The presumption that a [private] remedy
was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system
of procedures for enforcement' "), quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 97, 67 L. Ed. 2d 750, 767, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1583-84 (1981). The legislature intended the
Administrative Review Law to be the exclusive remedy under the
Personnel Code in cases of retaliatory action by discharge, demotion, or
suspension. Thus, in providing that the Administrative Review Law is
applicable, the legislature has demonstrated its intent that no private right
of action be employed for discharge, demotion, or suspension.
	Where, as in Metzger's case, the alleged retaliatory conduct does not
involve discharge, demotion, or suspension, section 16 of the Personnel
Code authorizes the Director to institute and maintain any action or
proceedings to secure compliance with the Personnel Code, and, pursuant
to that authorization, the Department of Central Management Services
regulations provide that an employee may file a grievance with the
Director. 20 ILCS 415/16 (West 2002); 80 Ill. Adm. Code §303.20
(2002). Just as the legislature intended the Administrative Review Law to
be the exclusive remedy under the Personnel Code in cases of retaliatory
conduct involving discharge, demotion, or suspension, when a statute
grants a state official broad authority to enforce the statute, we believe it
indicates the legislature's intent not to imply a private right of action for
others to enforce the statute.
	In his dissent, Justice Rarick contends that the recent passage of the
State Officials and Employee Ethics Act (Pub. Act 93-615) expresses the
legislature's clear intent that state employees who blow the whistle on
government misconduct must have specific redress in the courts. Slip op.
at 16 (Rarick, J., dissenting). The State Employee Ethics Act applies,
however, only to causes of action that accrue on or after November 19,
2003 (Pub. Act 93-615, §1-10), and is not applicable to Metzger's pre-November 19, 2003, claim. The passage of the new legislation merely
reinforces our conclusion that where the legislature intends to create a
private right of action for damages, it will expressly provide for the right.
	We further note that the Personnel Code expressly provides a private
right of action in the payroll certification provision. 20 ILCS 415/12a
(West 2002). The familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
is an aid of statutory interpretation meaning "the expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another." Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990).
"Where a statute lists the things to which it refers, there is an inference that
all omissions should be understood as exclusions ***." Burke v. 12
Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 442 (1992). This rule
of statutory construction is based on logic and common sense. It
expresses the learning of common experience that when people say one
thing they do not mean something else. The maxim is closely related to the
plain language rule in that it emphasizes the statutory language as it is
written. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.24, at
228, §47.25 at 234 (5th ed. 1992). Where, as here, the legislature has
expressly provided a private right of action in a specific section of the
statute, we believe the legislature did not intend to imply private rights of
action to enforce other sections of the same statute.
	Moreover, this court has consistently sought to restrict the common
law tort of retaliatory discharge. See Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 467. This court
has, on occasion, recognized an implied civil common law remedy for
retaliatory discharge. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172
(1978) (discharge for asserting worker's compensation claim); Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124 (1981) (discharge for
whistleblowing). We have, however, never recognized a common law tort
for any injury short of actual discharge. See Zimmerman v. Buchheit of
Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29 (1994) (no implied cause of action for
retaliatory demotion in a workers' compensation case); see also Fisher,
188 Ill. 2d 455 (no implied cause of action for retaliatory conduct under
Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-608). As this court noted in
Fisher: "[g]iven this court's reluctance to expand the common law in this
area, we must also hesitate to imply such actions under a statute without
explicit legislative authority." Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 468.
	Because we conclude that section 19c.1 of the Personnel Code does
not imply a private right of action for state employees who are retaliated
against by other state employees, we need not address the second
certified question.
III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we answer the first question certified to
us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as
follows: we hold that section19c.1 of the Personnel Code (20 ILCS
415/19c.1 (West 2002)) does not create an implied private right of action.
We answer only the certified question and our holding does not implicate
what other remedies may be available to Metzger.
Certified question answered.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	I strongly disagree with Justice Rarick's contention that the analysis
employed in Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455
(1999), was an "analytical error" (slip op. at 13) (Rarick, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, I do agree with Justice Rarick that relevant distinctions exist
between the Personnel Code and the Nursing Home Care Act, which was
at issue in Fisher. Accordingly, I believe that Fisher does not dictate the
result in this case, and I agree with Justice Rarick that the appropriate
result in this case would be to imply a private right of action for the
violation of the Personnel Code's whistleblower statute (20 ILCS
415/19c.1 (West 2002)).
	JUSTICE RARICK, also dissenting:
	In stating the facts underlying this litigation, the majority notes that the
parties "have differing interpretations of the events that led to this action."
It then proceeds to recount each side's version of what occurred as if the
matter remains in dispute. The flaw in this approach is that the matter has
proceeded to final judgment following a jury trial in the federal courts.
Plaintiff prevailed on her claim under section 19c.1 of the Personnel Code
(20 ILCS 415/19c.1 (West 2002)) and was awarded $138,379.
	 Although defendants have filed an appeal from the judgment with the
federal court of appeals, that appeal does not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the jury's finding in favor of plaintiff on the
question of liability. If the facts supporting liability are not questioned in the
federal action, they cannot be questioned here. We do not sit as a court
of review for the federal district court. The matter is before us on
certification of questions of law from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. Our function is limited to answering those
questions. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 102 (2001).
	 Given the procedural posture of this case, we must assume that
plaintiff, a state employee, suffered adverse disciplinary action in retaliation
for having disclosed that some of her coworkers were improperly taking
time off work without using benefit time. We must further assume that the
retaliatory action taken against plaintiff contravened section 19c.1(2) of
the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/19c.1(2) (West 2002)). Contrary to
the majority, I would hold that plaintiff was entitled to assert a private right
of action to recover damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of
that statutory violation. In my view, plaintiff was a member of the class for
whose benefit section 19c.1 of the Personnel Code was enacted, the
injury she suffered was one the statute was designed to prevent, a private
right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute, and
implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate
remedy for violation of the statute. See Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital
of Decatur, 149 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (1992).
	The majority reaches the opposite result by perpetuating an analytical
error made in Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455
(1999). As the court did in that case, the majority here directs attention
away from the particular legislative provision that was violated and focuses
instead on broad and generic purposes behind the statutory scheme to
which that provision belongs. It justifies this approach by invoking the
doctrine that when interpreting legislative enactments, we must read the
statute as a whole. That doctrine, however, is inapplicable to this case. It
pertains to situations where there is a dispute over how particular terms of
a statute should be construed. See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). When ascribing meaning to the words used in a statue,
we look to the statute as a whole because we assume that the legislature
intended to act consistently and to give meaning to every word and phrase
it employed. How it used terms in one part of a statute is a useful guide to
understanding how it intended to use terms elsewhere.
	The problem facing us in this case is different. There is no debate as
to what the terms of section 19c.1 mean. Its provisions are clear and
unambiguous. What confronts us here is the much larger question of
whether Illinois law allows aggrieved employees to sued for damages
when the statute is violated. Ultimately, that is a question of public policy
(see Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 314-15 (1991)), not textual
analysis.
	Even if the majority's approach were sound, its result is not. The
Nursing Home Care Act at issue in Fisher v. Lexington Health Care,
Inc. may have been intended primarily to benefit nursing home residents,
rather than nursing home employees. The Personnel Code, however, is
concerned exclusively with state employees and the terms and conditions
of their employment. From beginning to end, it focuses entirely on
personnel matters. That is why it is called the Personnel Code. Under
these circumstances, the majority's assertion that personnel employed by
the state are merely "incidental" beneficiaries of the state's Personnel
Code is untenable.
	It is true that enforcement of the Personnel Code will also benefit of
the state and the people of Illinois. But improving the common good is
supposed to be the ultimate objective of every law the General Assembly
enacts. If we use that as the standard, there will be no set of circumstances
in which the requirements for implying a private right of action will ever be
satisfied. Justice Harrison's charge in Fisher v. Lexington Health Care,
Inc. that implied private rights of action have been abolished in Illinois
(Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d  at 469 (Harrison, J., dissenting)) will be borne out.
That is not a result I am willing to endorse.
	I likewise reject the majority's assertion that recognizing a private
right of action would be inconsistent with the Personnel Code's purposes.
The Code's overarching objective is to create a system of personnel
administration based on merit and scientific principles. 20 ILCS 415/2
(West 2002). Eliminating mismanagement, waste, abuse of authority, and
the violation of laws and regulations by government employees are integral
to that goal. The problem is that those types of inefficiencies and
wrongdoing are among the most difficult to police. The nature of
governmental bureaucracies is such that graft, corruption, mismanagement,
and illegal conduct are often undetectable by outsiders. Keeping
government efficient and honest depends on the vigilance of those most
involved in its day-to-day operations, its employees. Those employees,
however, are unlikely to step forward and speak out unless they are
assured that they will not be the target of retribution by their coworkers
and superiors.
	The pivotal role of "whistle blowing" employees in ensuring the
operation of a modern and efficient state workforce and the importance
of protecting such employees from retribution were recognized by the
General Assembly when it enacted section 19c.1 of the Personnel Code.
Relegating whistle blowers to internal grievance procedures is not
sufficient to achieve the General Assembly's purposes. All bureaucracies
tend to protect themselves. Knowing this, experienced employees will
realize that they are not likely to find a hospitable forum in a grievance
system maintained by the very entity whose agents are involved in the
wrongdoing. Furthermore, even if a whistle blowing employee does
prevail, the protections available are limited. Under the administrative
remedies touted by the majority, the most an aggrieved employee can
hope for is the prospect that eventually, after battling his employer
administratively and obtaining judicial review of the administrative
agency's decision, he may be able to keep his job and have adverse
references to the disciplinary action he suffered removed from his
personnel file. That is small consolation for acts that require such courage
and are so beneficial to the people of our state. The result, in my view, is
that employees will simply stop coming forward to report wrongdoing. For
all practical purposes, the safeguards promised by section 19c.1 of the
Personnel Code will be rendered meaningless.
	There is no merit to the majority's suggestion that the availability of
criminal penalties under the Personnel Code obviates the need for implying
a private right of action. The criminal penalties imposed by the statute are
modest, as they were in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 185
(1978), which recognized a private right of action for retaliatory discharge
based on the Workmen's Compensation Act. We wrote in Kelsay:
			"The imposition of a small fine, enuring to the benefit of the
State, does nothing to alleviate the plight of those employees who
are threatened with retaliation and forgo their rights, or those
who lose their jobs when they proceed to file claims under the
Act. It is conceivable, moreover, that some employers would
risk the threat of criminal sanction in order to escape their
responsibility under the Act. Further, the fact that an act is penal
in nature does not bar a civil remedy, and where a statute is
enacted for the benefit of a particular class of individuals[,] a
violation of its terms may result in civil as well as criminal liability,
even though the former remedy is not specifically mentioned."
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d  at 185.
These considerations apply with equal force here.
	Protecting state employees from retaliation for disclosing violations
of laws, rules and regulations is a matter of ongoing concern for the
General Assembly. Last May it adopted a new State Officials and
Employee Ethics Act. The Act, which originated as House Bill 3412,
contained whistle blowing provisions similar to those set forth in section
19c.1 of the Personnel Code and provided criminal penalties for its
violation just as the Personnel Code does. In addition, it made clear that
an aggrieved employee could seek redress in the courts and be awarded
"all remedies necessary to make [him] whole and to prevent future
violations of [the Act]." 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 3412, 2003
Sess. Although the Governor made an amendatory veto of the legislation,
his veto was overridden by both houses in the General Assembly. The
vote was unanimous. The legislature could not have expressed its views
more decisively. If we ever had grounds for believing that the General
Assembly opposed the idea of allowing whistle blowers employed by the
State to seek redress in the courts, those grounds are lost. See also Pub.
Act 93-544, eff. January 1, 2004 (Whistleblower Act) (authorizing
private sector whistle blowers to bring civil actions for damages and obtain
additional relief, including reinstatement and attorney fees).
	The majority is wrong to reject an implied private right of action
under section 19c.1 of the Personnel Code based on comparison with
section 12a of the statute (20 ILCS 415/12a (West 2002)). The majority
claims that section 12a provides for a private right of action and that if the
General Assembly had intended to allow employees to seek a private right
of action under section 19c.1, it would have included comparable
language there as well. What the majority overlooks is that the remedy
authorized by section 12a is qualitatively different from the one at issue
here. Section 12a does not authorize a state employee to bring a private
right of action to collect damages for violation of the Personnel Code. It
merely authorizes private citizens to sue to enjoin certain state employees
from making payments in contravention of the statute. Any monies
improperly disbursed in contravention of the statute are recoverable, but
they must be paid into the state treasury. There is no provision for
damages at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the matter at issue here.(2)
	For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the plaintiff in this case
was entitled to seek and obtain an award of damages for the injuries she
sustained as a result of defendants' violation of the whistle blower
provisions of the Personnel Code. I therefore respectfully dissent.
1.                 
             
  Our Rule 20 permits the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to certify a question of Illinois law to this 
court where the question "may be determinative of the said cause, and there are 
no controlling precedents in the decisions of this court." 145 Ill. 2d R. 20(a).
 
2.       
 The majority's discussion of section 12a is also 
perplexing for its invocation of the maxim that where a statute list the things 
to which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions should be 
understood as exclusions. The majority's discussion addresses separate and 
distinct sections of a statute, not lists of things within a statutory 
provision. There is no list of things in section 12a or anywhere else in the 
Personnel Code pertaining to implication of private rights of action for 
damages.