Title: Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d 27, 2000-Ohio-264.] 
 
 
 
 
 
MOORE, APPELLANT, v. STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 27.] 
Automobile liability insurance — Uninsured motorist coverage — R.C. 
3937.18(A)(1), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, construed. 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, does not permit an 
insurer to limit uninsured motorist coverage in such a way that an insured 
must suffer bodily injury, sickness, or disease in order to recover damages 
from the insurer. 
(No. 98-2495 — Submitted October 19, 1999 — Decided February 16, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Huron County, No. H-98-012. 
 
Our recitation of the facts of this case is based on stipulations entered into by 
the parties.  On May 28, 1996, Randy Moore (“the decedent”) died as a result of 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of an 
uninsured motorist. 
 
Appellant, Alice Moore, is the decedent’s mother.  She was not involved in 
the accident, nor did she sustain bodily injury from the accident.  At the time of the 
accident, appellant was a named insured on a policy of automobile liability 
insurance issued by appellee, State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company.  The 
 
 
2
policy also provided uninsured motorist coverage.  The decedent was not a named 
insured in appellant’s policy, was not a resident of appellant’s household, and, at 
the time of the accident, was not occupying a vehicle that was covered by 
appellant’s policy. 
 
It appears that appellant filed an uninsured motorist claim with appellee for 
damages arising out of the death of her son.1  Appellee denied the claim and 
thereafter, on December 31, 1996, appellant filed a complaint against appellee in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Huron County.  In her complaint, appellant asserted 
that pursuant to R.C. 2125.02, she was presumed to have suffered damages as a 
result of the wrongful death of her son.  Appellant further contended that she was 
entitled to receive compensation for those damages from appellee, up to the policy 
limit, pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision of her policy of insurance. 
 
On February 9, 1998, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, 
asserting that the terms of the policy precluded appellant from receiving uninsured 
motorist benefits.  The relevant policy language provided that appellee would pay 
“compensatory damages which an ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover from the 
owner or operator of an ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ because of ‘bodily injury’: 1. 
Sustained by an ‘insured’; and 2. Caused by an accident.”  Appellee contended that 
appellant’s claim did not satisfy this policy provision because, as stipulated by 
 
 
3
appellant, the decedent was not an insured under the policy and the insured, 
appellant, did not sustain bodily injury as a result of the accident. 
 
In her brief in opposition to appellee’s motion for summary judgment, 
appellant contended that the policy limitation sought to be enforced by appellee 
was contrary to Ohio law and was therefore invalid.  Appellant also asserted that 
she was entitled to recover under the terms of the policy.  In this regard, appellant 
contended that the “nervous shock and psychological trauma” she suffered as a 
result of her son’s death constituted “bodily injury.”2 
 
The trial court found that the policy provision limiting uninsured motorist 
benefits to accidents in which an insured sustains bodily injury was permitted by 
Ohio law and held that the policy did “not provide uninsured motorist coverage to 
[appellant] for the death of her son.”  Hence, the court granted appellee’s motion 
for summary judgment.  Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court on essentially the same grounds. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
R. Jack Clapp & Associates Co., L.P.A., R. Jack Clapp and Timothy A. Ita, 
for appellant. 
 
Flynn, Py & Kruse, L.P.A., John D. Py and James W. Hart, for appellee. 
 
 
4
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The central issue for our determination in this case is whether 
the insurance policy limitation enforced by the courts below is valid under Ohio 
law.  In order for a limitation on uninsured motorist coverage to be valid it must 
not be contrary to the coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18(A).  Sexton v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 431, 433, 23 O.O.3d 385, 386, 433 
N.E.2d 555, 558; Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 
639 N.E.2d 438, paragraph two of the syllabus.  R.C. 3937.18 sets forth the 
minimum uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that an insurer must offer 
its insureds at the time of contracting for automobile liability insurance. 
 
As previously stated, the policy provision at issue herein provides that 
appellee “will pay compensatory damages which an ‘insured’ is legally entitled to 
recover from the owner or operator of an ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ because of 
‘bodily injury’: 1. Sustained by an ‘insured’; and 2. Caused by an accident.”  This 
language, in effect, limits uninsured motorist coverage to accidents in which an 
insured sustains bodily injury. 
 
Appellant, relying on our decision in Sexton,3 contends that this limitation is 
not valid because it results in less than the minimum amount of uninsured motorist 
coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18(A).  The facts of Sexton are essentially 
identical to those in the case at bar.  In Sexton, Gareld Sexton’s daughter was killed 
 
 
5
in an automobile accident caused by an uninsured motorist.  Sexton sought to 
recover his damages arising out of the death of his daughter under the uninsured 
motorist provision of his insurance policy.  However, because Sexton’s daughter 
was not an insured as defined by the policy, the insurer denied the claim, relying 
on a policy provision requiring that an insured sustain bodily injury.  The court 
looked to R.C. 3937.18 to determine whether this limitation on uninsured motorist 
coverage was valid. 
 
The version of R.C. 3937.18(A) that applied in Sexton provided that “[n]o 
automobile liability * * * policy of insurance * * * shall be delivered or issued for 
delivery in this state * * * unless an equivalent amount of coverage for bodily 
injury or death is provided therein * * * for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators 
of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, 
including death, resulting therefrom.”  138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1458. 
 
The Sexton court noted that R.C. 3937.18 did not specify that an insured 
must sustain bodily injury in order to recover damages.  Accordingly, the court 
held that the policy’s restrictions allowing recovery only when an insured suffered 
bodily injury were “void because they attempt[ed] to limit recovery contrary to 
R.C. 3937.18.”  Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d at 437, 23 
 
 
6
O.O.3d at 389, 433 N.E.2d at 560.  Clearly, if Sexton is still the law in this state, 
then appellee’s policy limitation in this case is invalid. 
 
However, subsequent to the Sexton decision, the General Assembly, in 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, amended R.C. 3937.18.4  We must therefore determine 
whether those amendments altered the meaning of R.C. 3937.18 in such a way as 
to permit insurers to limit uninsured motorist coverage to accidents in which an 
insured sustains bodily injury. 
 
The version of R.C. 3937.18 at issue provides: 
 
“(A) No automobile liability * * * policy of insurance * * * shall be 
delivered or issued for delivery in this state * * * unless both of the following 
coverages are provided to persons insured under the policy for loss due to bodily 
injury or death suffered by such persons: 
 
“(1) Uninsured motorist coverage, which * * * shall provide protection for 
bodily injury or death * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who 
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, 
suffered by any person insured under the policy.”  145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204, 210. 
 
Appellee contends that the plain language of the statute invalidates our 
decision in Sexton.  In this regard, appellee asserts that R.C. 3937.18(A), enacted 
as part of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, permits insurers to limit uninsured motorist 
 
 
7
coverage, in their policies of insurance, to automobile accidents in which an 
insured sustains bodily injury.  Appellee’s contention is based on the statutory 
phrases “suffered by such persons” and “suffered by any person insured under the 
policy” as they relate to the phrase “bodily injury [sickness or disease] or death.”  
Appellee assumes that these phrases allow insurers to require that an insured under 
a policy of insurance suffer bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death in order for 
there to be coverage. 
 
Appellant, on the other hand, contends that the statute does not permit 
insurers to limit uninsured motorist coverage to automobile accidents in which an 
insured suffers bodily injury.  Appellant’s conclusion is based on her belief that the 
phrase “suffered by such persons” found in section (A) of R.C. 3937.18 refers to 
“loss” and the phrase “suffered by any person insured under the policy” found in 
subsection (A)(1) refers to “damages.”  Neither phrase, appellant claims, refers to 
“bodily injury.”  Hence, appellant contends that the court’s interpretation of R.C. 
3937.18 in Sexton was not altered by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 and is still good law.  
Accordingly, appellant urges us to find that appellee’s policy limitation requiring 
that an insured suffer bodily injury in order to recover damages provides less 
coverage than is mandated by R.C. 3937.18(A) and is therefore invalid. 
 
We find that R.C. 3937.18(A) is ambiguous regarding whether an insurer 
may limit uninsured motorist coverage to accidents in which an insured sustains 
 
 
8
bodily injury.  Thus, we must determine the intent of the legislature in enacting 
R.C. 3937.18(A) and construe the statute in a manner that reflects that intent.  
Cochrel v. Robinson (1925), 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871, paragraph four of the 
syllabus.  R.C. 1.49 mandates that we consider both the objective of the statute and 
the consequences of any particular construction in determining the intention of the 
legislature.  For the following reasons, we find that the General Assembly did not 
intend the amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A) contained within Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 
to supersede the court’s ruling in Sexton. 
 
Initially we note that R.C. 3937.18 is remedial legislation.  Stanton v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 623 N.E.2d 1197, 1199.  
Therefore, it must be liberally construed to give effect to the legislative purpose.  
R.C. 1.11; Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 33, 38, 54 
O.O.2d 166, 169, 266 N.E.2d 566, 569;  Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co., 70 
Ohio St.3d at 480, 639 N.E.2d at 440. 
 
The purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to protect persons from losses 
which, because of the tortfeasor’s lack of liability coverage, would otherwise go 
uncompensated.  Id.  See, also, Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
553, 555, 668 N.E.2d 913, 915.  It is clear that claims such as appellant’s fit within 
this purpose.  R.C. 2125.01 recognizes a cause of action for wrongful death and 
 
 
9
R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) acknowledges that parents of wrongful death victims are 
presumed to have suffered damages.  Therefore, the parents of a wrongful death 
victim are legally entitled to recover damages from the tortfeasor responsible for 
their child’s death.  However, under appellee’s suggested interpretation of R.C. 
3937.18(A), the parent of the wrongful death victim would go uncompensated due 
to the tortfeasor’s uninsured status, notwithstanding the fact that the parent had 
uninsured motorist coverage. 
 
Thus, applying appellee’s proposed interpretation of R.C. 3937.18 would 
thwart the underlying purpose of uninsured motorist insurance, i.e., to protect 
persons who are entitled to recover damages from uninsured motorists, and would 
conflict with R.C. Chapter 2125, the wrongful death statute.  This result would in 
turn violate R.C. 1.47(C), which provides a presumption against statutory 
construction that would produce unreasonable or unjust consequences.  Therefore, 
we decline to adopt appellee’s proposed interpretation. 
 
Furthermore, if the words “for loss” and “damages” were removed from 
R.C. 3937.18(A) and (A)(1), then the statute would have precisely the meaning 
that appellee suggests.  Thus, appellee’s interpretation of the statute renders the 
words “for loss” and “damages” superfluous.  Such a result contravenes the general 
rule of statutory construction codified under R.C. 1.47(B), which provides that the 
General Assembly, in enacting a statute, intends that the entire statute be effective.  
 
 
10
Moreover, such a result undermines our holding that “[i]n determining the 
legislative intent of a statute ‘it is the duty of this court to give effect to the words 
used [in a statute], not to delete words used or to insert words not used.’ ”  
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Porterfield (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 24, 28, 53 O.O.2d 13, 
15, 263 N.E.2d 249, 251, quoting Columbus-Suburban Coach Lines v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 49 O.O.2d 445, 446, 254 N.E.2d 8, 9. 
 
Finally, we note that, in addition to the above-mentioned amendments to 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 also contains amendments to R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2).  R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) addresses underinsured motorist coverage.  
This is relevant to our discussion in this case because in the uncodified portion of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, the General Assembly explicitly set forth that its intent in 
amending R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) was to supersede the effect of this court’s holding in 
Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809.  
Section 7, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 238.  We believe that if the 
General Assembly had intended the changes in subsection (A)(1) to supersede the 
court’s holding in Sexton, it would have made its intentions equally clear by 
declaring such in the uncodified portions of the law.5 
 
However, we find nothing in the uncodified section of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 
that indicates that the amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) were intended to 
 
 
11
supersede our decision in Sexton.  We therefore reject appellee’s assertion that the 
amendments were clearly meant to supersede Sexton. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 20, does not permit an insurer to limit uninsured motorist coverage in such a 
way that an insured must suffer bodily injury, sickness, or disease in order to 
recover damages from the insurer.  Therefore, we find that the limitation in 
appellee’s policy requiring that the insured suffer bodily injury in order to recover 
uninsured motorist benefits is an attempt to provide lesser coverage than that 
which is mandated by law.  As such, we find that the limitation is invalid and 
unenforceable.  Having held in appellant’s favor on this issue, we need not address 
appellant’s assertion that she suffered bodily injury because of the death of her son. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
BROGAN, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
JAMES A. BROGAN, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
 
12
 
1. 
The record does not contain documentation regarding appellant’s 
claim or appellee’s denial of appellant’s claim.  However, paragraph eleven of 
appellant’s complaint filed in the trial court alleges: “Although Plaintiff, Alice 
Moore, has requested payment of said Uninsured benefits pursuant to her policy, 
Defendant, State Auto, has refused to honor her request.” 
 
2. 
Appellant made this argument despite the fact that she had previously 
stipulated that she had no bodily injury as a result of the accident. 
 
3. 
Sexton was decided by this court in 1982, long before any present 
member of this court was serving on the court. 
 
4. 
In Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. (1998), 82 Ohio St. 3d 281, 695 
N.E.2d 732, we held that for the purpose of determining the scope of insurance 
coverage the statutory law in effect at the time of entering into a contract for 
automobile liability insurance controls the rights and duties of the contracting 
parties.  The record in this case does not indicate when the policy was issued to 
appellant; however, both parties agree that R.C. 3937.18, as amended by 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, is the applicable law in this case. 
 
One of appellant’s propositions of law is that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 is 
unconstitutional and as such the amendments to R.C. 3937.18 are invalid.  
However, the record does not reflect that appellant served the Attorney General of 
Ohio with notice of this contention as required by R.C. 2721.12.  Therefore, 
 
 
13
pursuant to the statute we lack jurisdiction to make this determination.  
Accordingly, we make no ruling on the constitutionality of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20. 
 
5. 
It should be noted that the General Assembly’s “supersede” language 
relates to case law involving statutory interpretation as opposed to constitutionally 
based case law. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  In Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 431, 23 O.O.3d 385, 433 N.E.2d 555, this court 
greatly extended the reach of uninsured motorist coverage required by R.C. 
3937.18.  In Sexton, Gareld Sexton’s daughter was killed in an automobile 
accident.  The driver of the automobile was not insured.  Sexton sought recovery 
for his damages under the uninsured provision of his automobile insurance policy 
with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.  State Farm argued that 
limitations within Sexton’s insurance policy precluded such recovery.  In effect, 
the policy provisions limited coverage to recovery for bodily injury or death 
sustained by an insured as defined in the policy.  The court in Sexton examined 
whether these limitations were valid in light of R.C. 3937.18.  At that time R.C. 
3937.18(A) read: 
 
“No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance 
insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or 
 
 
14
death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a 
motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to 
any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless an 
equivalent amount of coverage for bodily injury or death is provided therein or 
supplemental thereto under provisions approved by the superintendent of 
insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled 
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because 
of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.”  138 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 1458. 
 
In examining R.C. 3937.18(A), the court in Sexton stated, “The critical 
language for this case is that the coverage is ‘for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators 
of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom.”  Id. at 434, 23 O.O.3d at 387, 433 N.E.2d at 
558.  Construing this language, the court in Sexton stated, “Although the statute 
does not indicate who must have sustained the bodily injury, it does not specify that 
it be the insured.  Because the statute should be construed liberally, * * * we will 
not add that limitation.” (Emphasis added; citation omitted.) Id. at 434, 23 O.O.3d 
at 387, 433 N.E.2d at 558-559. 
 
In 1994, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3937.18 to read: 
 
 
15
 
“(A) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance 
insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or 
death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a 
motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to 
any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless both of the 
following coverages are provided to persons insured under the policy for loss due 
to bodily injury or death suffered by such persons: 
 
“(1) Uninsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of coverage 
equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage and shall 
provide protection for bodily injury or death under provisions approved by the 
superintendent of insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who 
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, 
suffered by any person insured under the policy.” (Emphasis added.) 145 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 204, 210. 
 
The majority relies on Sexton to find that Alice Moore should be able to 
recover the damages she incurred because of the death of her emancipated son, 
Randy, despite the fact that her policy limits coverage to insured individuals who 
suffer a bodily injury or death.  The majority acknowledges that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
20 amended R.C. 3937.18, but declines to acknowledge the effect of the added 
 
 
16
language.  Instead, the majority finds that the phrase “suffered by such persons” is 
ambiguous with regard to whether it modifies the word “loss” or the words “bodily 
injury or death.”  The majority also finds that the phrase “suffered by any person 
insured under the policy” is ambiguous with regard to whether it modifies the word 
“damages” or the words “bodily injury, sickness, or disease.”  I disagree.  I believe 
that the amendments made to R.C. 3937.18, pursuant to Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 
unambiguously indicate that the General Assembly intended that insurers may 
limit uninsured motorist coverage to an insured who suffers bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death. 
 
Courts must look to the language of the statute itself to determine legislative 
intent.  Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 65 O.O.2d 296, 
298, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381.  It is well settled that “[w]ords and phrases shall be read 
in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 1.42.  Pursuant to the rules of grammar, absent an intent 
to the contrary, a qualifying phrase refers “solely to the last antecedent.“  Carter v. 
Youngstown (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 209, 32 O.O. 184, 186, 65 N.E.2d 63, 66. 
See, also, Indep. Ins. Agents of Ohio v. Fabe (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 310, 314, 587 
N.E.2d 814, 817; Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm.  (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 
242, 699 N.E.2d 473. 
 
 
17
 
The phrase “suffered by such persons,” as set out in amended R.C. 
3937.18(A), is immediately preceded by the words “bodily injury or death.” The 
phrase “suffered by any person insured under the policy,” as set out in amended 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), is immediately preceded by the words “bodily injury * * * 
including death.”  There is no language in amended R.C. 3937.18 indicating that 
these phrases modify anything other then the terms “bodily injury” or “death.”  
Absent an ambiguity in the language, a statute should be applied, not interpreted.  
State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 512 
N.E.2d 332. 
 
Further, the majority’s holding effectively renders the phrases “suffered by 
such persons” and “suffered by any person insured under the policy” meaningless.  
These phrases have no other logical purpose than to modify the terms “bodily 
injury” and “death” within the respective provisions of R.C. 3937.18, so as to 
allow insurers to limit coverage to instances where the insured sustains bodily 
injury or death.  The majority’s holding fails to give any meaning to these phrases, 
thereby effectively nullifying this language added to R.C. 3937.18 by the General 
Assembly pursuant to Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20.  Thus, the majority’s holding conflicts 
with the well-settled rule that none of the language employed in a statute should be 
disregarded.  Carter, supra, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
 
18
 
The majority also finds support for its position by noting that there is 
nothing in the uncodified section of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 that indicates that the 
amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) were intended to supersede Sexton.  However, 
there is no requirement that the General Assembly  indicate that legislation is 
superseding a specific court decision.  Further, I believe that we should not 
encourage such a practice because it appears to pit the General Assembly against 
the courts. 
 
Finally, I believe that the result reached by the majority is unreasonable.  
Neither uninsured motorist insurance nor underinsured motorist insurance was 
intended to provide coverage for parties outside the insurance contract.  Moore did 
not own the car involved in the accident.  Further, Moore’s son was not living at 
home at the time of the accident.  Therefore, Moore’s son was not an insured under 
Moore’s insurance policy.  The majority’s interpretation allows recovery for risks 
that are impossible to assess.  The majority’s holding begs the following questions:  
Does one applying for coverage now need to disclose every emancipated child’s 
place of residence, as well as their lifestyle, so that the insurer can write the 
coverage to anticipate this possible exposure?  How much additional premium 
should be assessed?  Will one’s own child serving in the Peace Corps in another 
country, where uninsured motorists possibly abound, need to be factored into 
premiums because that child represents a risk, since the stateside parents can now 
 
 
19
recover for their child’s death under the parents’ uninsured motorist coverage even 
though the child does not live at home?  If one has ten children living away from 
home, must the parents now pay a much higher premium to cover all those 
exposures created by Sexton and now by Moore? 
 
I believe that the phrases “suffered by such persons” and “suffered by any 
person insured under the policy” were added to R.C. 3937.18 by the General 
Assembly for the purpose of countering the unwarranted extension of uninsured 
coverage allowed in Sexton.  Liability coverage requires that an insured live in the 
same house and drive a covered automobile.  Uninsured and underinsured 
coverage are meant to provide coverage or provide additional coverage where the 
tortfeasor has no liability coverage or has insufficient liability coverage.  No one, 
as yet, has argued that one’s liability policy would cover one’s emancipated child 
living in another country driving his own car.  Yet that is exactly what the majority 
has done with uninsured and underinsured coverage through this decision. 
 
I agree that the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 is “to protect persons injured in 
automobile accidents from losses which, because of the tort-feasor’s lack of 
liability coverage, would otherwise go uncompensated.”  Abate v. Pioneer Mut. 
Cas. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 161, 165, 51 O.O.2d 229, 231, 258 N.E.2d 429, 
432.  However, I believe that the majority has distorted this purpose by finding that 
this protection goes beyond those insured under the policy who sustain bodily 
 
 
20
injury, disease, sickness, or death.  The majority’s holding unjustifiably subjects 
insurance companies to provide coverage beyond what is required by R.C. 
3937.18. 
 
Thus, I would find that R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 
unambiguously allows an insurer to limit uninsured motorist coverage to an 
insured who suffers bodily injury, sickness, or death.  Therefore, I would find that 
to the extent that Sexton held that a provision in an insurance policy limiting 
uninsured motorist coverage to an insured who sustains bodily injury or death is 
invalid because it conflicts with R.C. 3937.18, it is overruled.  As a result, I believe 
that the majority opinion is without support.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.