Title: ROBERT CARL FOLEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2014-SC-000743-MR

ROBERT CARL FOLEY APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS P. JONES, JUDGE
NO. 93-CR-00070

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE,

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
L FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

Following a jury trial in 1994, Robert Carl Foley received four death
sentences for the 1989 murder of four individuals; and in 1997, this Court
affirmed the resulting judgment on direct appeal.! Foley later filed a collateral
motion for new trial alleging newly-discovered evidence, and this Court
‘affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the new-trial motion.

Shortly after the trial court denied his motion for new trial, but before we
rendered our opinion in Foley II, he filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or

* See Foley v. Commonwealth, 953 8.W.2d 924, 928 (Ky. 1997) (*Foley P.
2 See Foley v. Commonwealth, 55 8.W.34 809 (Ky. 2000) (“Foley IP.
correct his judgment under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42,
alleging twenty-two grounds for relief. Over a decade passed before Foley's
counsel moved for an evidentiary hearing on this RCr 11.42 motion. He also
moved the court to amend his original motion, and sought funds for expert
assistance.

In 2011, the trial court concluded that an evidentiary hearing would be
necessary for claims that Foley's trial counsel failed to investigate and discover
lay witnesses and failed to present mitigating evidence. The trial court also
granted Foley leave to amend his claim but denied him funds for expert
witnesses. Foley filed his amended RCr 11.42 claim a year later, asserting an
‘additional twenty-one claims to his original motion. The trial court ultimately
determined that five issues warranted an evidentiary hearing—four claims from
Foley's original motion and one from his supplement. The trial court found the
remaining claims to be refuted by the record. The trial court also found that
thirteen of Foley's supplemental allegations did not relate back to his original
motion and, accordingly, were untimely.

Following the evidentiary hearing on the five issues before the trial court,
the trial court entered an order denying all of Foley’s post-conviction claims.

Foley now appeals to this Court as a matter of right.

3 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b)
Il, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
A. Standard of Review.

‘The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal is detailed in a two-part test first articulated in Strickland v.
Washington.* This standard essentially requires a reviewing court to ask two

questions: (1) was trial counsel's representation so deficient that it “fell below

 

an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) was the defendant actually
“prejudiced by his attorney's substandard performance.”5 Unless a defendant
can prove the affirmative to both questions, “it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.”*

‘The first question requires a defendant to prove that “counsel made
errors 0 serious that counsel was not functioning as ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” This is a highly deferential standard to
an attorney's actual performance at trial. In performing this analysis, the
Supreme Court held that “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's perspective at the time."® And that

requires the court to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls.

+ 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
2 Id. at 687-88.

© 1d. at 687.

Id,

9 1d. at 689,
 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."® This evaluation
includes the defendant's own words or conduct in assisting his attorney. For
example, if the defendant gives counsel reason to believe certain defenses or
strategies are meritless or even potentially destructive, the defendant cannot
later challenge the attorney's failure to pursue those leads as unreasonable
‘actions by counsel in the scope of representation.!°

But even if'a defendant can establish that counsel's conduct was
unreasonable, the second Strickland factor still requires him to prove he
suffered actual prejudice as a result of the deficient representation. The
‘Supreme Court declared that, to prevail, the defendant “must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”"! We impose
such a high burden to blunt the “all too tempting” urge to second-guess trial
counsel's performance after an adverse sentence. !?

With the Strickland standard firmly in place, we must also recognize the
context in which this rule is to be applied. This case comes to us on appeal
from a collateral motion originally presented in the trial court under RCr 11.42.

‘On appeal, we review counsel's performance under the de novo standard of

oid.
°8 See id. at 691.

1d. at 694.

12 See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011),

4
review.19 But in appealing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion based on
ineffective assistance, the appealing party bears the burden of proving the trial
court erred in its ruling." Furthermore, an RCr 11.42 motion “must set forth
all facts necessary to establish existence of a constitutional violation and that
the court will not presume that facts omitted from the motion establish
existence of such a violation.”'5 And finally, an RCr 11.42 motion must state
specific grounds for relief and include relevant supporting facts. ¢

Keeping these standards in mind, we now review the entirety of Foley's
motion—both the trial court's express rulings and its decision that some of
Foley's claims did not merit a hearing.

B. Foley's Various Claims of Ineffective Assistance on Appeal.

1, Failure to question witnesses about agreements with the
‘Commonwealth.

Foley's first instance of ineffective assistance on appeal was trial
counsel's failure to impeach the Commonwealth's witnesses Phoebe Watts and
Gordon Canter about agreements they made with police in exchange for their
testimony. Both Canter and Watts could have faced a multitude of charges
associated with the homicides Foley was charged with committing. They both
took part in disposing of the victims’ bodies and valuables, and Watts is

believed to have cleaned the cabin where the murders took place.

 

‘See Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 $.W.34 490, 500 (Ky. 2008)
Md

15 Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 $.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006),
18 See Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993}.

5
At trial, Foley’s counsel asked both Watts and Canter if any charges had
been brought against them. Each witness responded in the negative. Foley
suspects that Watts and Canter each had agreements with the Commonwealth
that they would not be charged with any crimes in exchange for their testimony
against Foley. And correspondingly, trial counsel was deficient because he
‘should have asked them whether any agreements in fact existed. The trial
court determined that trial counsel's questioning of these witnesses was simply
trial strategy and was not adequate grounds for finding ineffective assistance.
‘And we agree.

First, the Commonwealth reminds us that it has a duty to disclose any
such agreements that may affect a witness's motivation to testify. Because of
that duty, defense counsel could fairly assume that if any agreement such as
the one Foley alleges existed, such agreements would have been disclosed. We
cannot say counsel’s performance was deficient when the Commonwealth
possesses an affirmative duty to disclose agreements of this kind. It is a
reasonable inference for trial counsel to conclude that the absence of a
disclosure means that no agreements existed.

But even so, Foley also contends that the purpose of this line of
impeachment is not to reveal the existence of an agreement between the
prosecution and two witnesses but instead to expose the crimes Watts and
Canter could have been charged with as associates to the murders. But the
witnesses openly testified to the roles they played, and trial counsel made it

clear to the jury that they had not been charged with any crimes. Given the

6
lack of actual evidence of any agreement with the Commonwealth, we agree
with the trial court that it was plausible trial strategy to allow the jury to draw
its own inferences about Watts's and Canter’s motivations for testifying against
Foley. And we are certain Foley was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to
explore this particular line of questioning.

2. Fatlure to impeach Watts’s inconsistent statements.

Foley next argues that trial counsel was deficient by failing to impeach
Watts with prior inconsistent statements made to Ed Gross and Louise
Bridges. As a key witness in the case, Watts gave a number of different
statements about the murders and her role in the events that unfolded. And
this naturally lead to some inconsistencies in her story. Most notably, Foley
points to her statement to Gross that suggests Gross and Canter were the true
murderers and her statement to Bridges that Watts would supply Bridges with
testimony if she would testify against Foley.

Trial counsel attempted to impeach Watts on this ground. But the trial
court refused introduction of this evidence because trial counsel failed to lay a
proper foundation as required by Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 613, the

evidentiary rule governing the use of prior statements of witnesses. The trial

 

court denied a hearing on this claim, determining that counsel’s performance

 

on cross-examination amounted to reasonable trial strategy. Though we agree
that counsel may have erred, we agree with the trial court that there is no

evidence of ineffective assistance in this instance.
Foley is correct in concluding that admission of this impeachment
evidence almost certainly would have been allowed if trial counsel had properly
laid the foundation to impeach Watts. This failure prevented defense counsel
from exploring that line of questioning. But despite this error, we are confident
that this mistake did not prejudice Foley's case. Under Strickland, not only
‘must trial counsel perform deficiently, but the mistake must cast doubt on the
integrity of the verdict. In this case, there was ample evidence connecting Foley
to the crime, We are unable to say there would have been a different outcome
had counsel laid the proper foundation and pursued a line of questioning in an
attempt to impeach Watts.

9. Failure to subpoena an Indiana State Police investigator.
Foley next contends he received ineffective assistance by counsels failure

to subpoena Indiana State Police Investigator Robert Abbitt to testify about a
fax transmission requesting Canter's location. At trial, Foley hoped to introduce
this evidence to highlight Canter’s flight from Kentucky to Indiana shortly after

the bodies were discovered to suggest Canter’s culpability for the murders. But

 

similar to the issues impeaching Watts, Foley’s trial counsel failed to lay the

 

proper foundation for this evidence because he did not subpoena Investigator
Abbitt to authenticate the document. And this Court in Foley Iheld that the
trial court rightly excluded the fax from evidence. So Foley now argues
counsel's ineffective assistance caused this evidence to be excluded.

Like the issue with Watts, we are inclined to agree that had counsel

made the necessary preparations to subpoena Investigator Abbitt to testify, the

8
fax transmission would likely have been admitted into evidence, But also like
the prior issue, we cannot say this mistake prejudiced his case under the
second Strickland factor. The fax itself sought to locate Canter only as a
potential witness to the homicides and indicated that Kentucky police only
planned to treat Canter as a co-conspirator if “uncooperative.” In Foley J, we
held that this evidence was “of marginal relevance” and cumulative in nature—
similar testimony could be elicited from other detectives without the need of the
document.!” With this in mind, we are confident Foley was not prejudiced on
this issue.

4. Failure to call Timothy Rose as a witness.

The next instance of alleged ineffective assistance stems from counsel’s
failure to call Timothy Rose as a witness at trial. Foley specifically claims that
Rose could have testified that David Gross possessed a number of firearms and
was known as a “big-time dope dealer.” Foley further speculates that Rose
could have established a relationship between Gross, Canter, and Dave Neal.
Rose spoke with detectives in December 1991 and much of his testimony was
considered double-hearsay. No one has been able to locate him since, including
a two-month window in 2014 when the trial court ordered an evidentiary
hearing on this matter. Post-conviction counsel was unable to locate and

subpoena Rose for testimony. And we agree with the Commonwealth that we

 

1 See Foley I, 953 8.W.34 at 938.
cannot hold trial counsel as ineffective for failing to call a witness who has

 

never been found.

5. Failure to call Jamie Batley and Leonard Jones as witnesses.
Foley contends that counse!’s failure to call Jamie Bailey and Leonard

Jones as witnesses also amounts to ineffective assistance. He claims they both

could have connected David Gross with the murder weapon. The trial court,

 

ordered an evidentiary hearing on this

 

Despite subpoena, Jones could not be located to appear, and the trial
court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. He was held for a considerable
amount of time, but Foley never asserted a desire to present his testimony at
the 11.42 hearing,

As for Bailey, he offered video testimony from an Oklahoma prison
consistent with his original statements. The problem trial counsel immediately
identified, however, was that Bailey did not meet Foley until they were both
inmates in the Kentucky State Penitentiary in the mid-1990s. Trial counsel

could not discern a basis for Bailey and Foley to have known each other when

 

the crime occurred and he could not find an independent basis for knowing
Bailey could be a credible witness at the time. As such, we agree that counsel
was not deficient in this context

6. Failure to call Imogene Barnes as a witness.
According to Foley, Imogene Barnes could have corroborated testimony

from another witness, Brian Engle, which contradicts the timeline articulated

by Watts and Canter. The trial court denied relief on this claim. There is no

10
indication in the record that Barnes would have been willing to testify on
Foley's behalf and there is no basis for concluding her testimony would be
fundamentally different from Engle's testimony. As such, we can confidently
declare he did not suffer prejudice to his case in counsel's failure to call Barnes
as a witness.

7. Failure to prevent the Commonwealth from disparaging a witness.

Foley next argues that he received ineffective assistance when counsel
failed to prevent the Commonwealth from disparaging a defense witness's
testimony. Through deposition testimony, Crocket Stevens claimed to have had
‘a conversation with Canter after the murders in which Canter admitted that he
and Gross had to “off” some people in Kentucky because of a drug-related
controversy. For unknown reasons, Stevens did not offer live testimony at trial.
‘The Commonwealth in closing argument used Stevens's failure to testify in
person to discredit his testimony.

On direct appeal in Foley /, Foley argued that these characterizations of
Stevens's deposition testimony amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. The
basis behind his claim is the evidentiary principle that deposition testimony is
afforded the same weight as live testimony and that the Commonwealth’s
remarks left the jury with the impression that Stevens's testimony was not
credible because he did not appear in person. We determined that this did not
‘amount to prosecutorial misconduct, finding that “the remarks referred to here

are] well within the proper bounds ofa closing argument and certainly did not

ul
 

affect the outcome of the trial."!* Now in this ineffective-assistance case, Foley
‘argues that counsel should have objected to this closing argument and also
critiques counsel's failure to subpoena Stevens for live testimony.

Whether counsel objected to this characterization or not, Stevens's
testimony was presented to the jury for consideration. The jury heard his
unabridged account of his knowledge of the case and the conversation between
him and Canter. As Foley himself argues, it is a principle of black-letter law
that deposition testimony is to be given the same weight as that offered by a
live witness at trial. So counsel successfully presented this side of Foley's case
to the jury. And our position in Foley Ifinding no misconduct in the
‘Commonwealth's closing argument assures us that even had counsel objected
in this instance, this issue was meritless.

8. Failure to obtain a ballistics expert.
One of Foley’s primary defenses at trial was that Canter and Gross

executed the victims in a car owned by victim Jerry McMillan. Specifically, he
claims his theory of multiple shooters with multiple weapons was confirmed by
autopsy. In this post-conviction motion, he contends that counsel should have
retained Arthur Alphin and Frank Camper as expert witnesses. Alphin is a
retired army colonel and Camper is an alleged ballistics expert. Foley argues
‘that two weapons were used: a 9mm Uzi and a P85 Ruger. The autopsy

revealed a projectile in McMillan’s body, while none of the other victims’ bodies

1 Foley I, 953 S.W.34 at 939 (quoting Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.24
407, 412 (Ky. 1987).

12
contained a projectile. Foley therefore contends that these witnesses would
testify that a 9mm Uzi has a higher muzzle velocity than a P85 Ruger and
would be more likely to pass through a body. Thus, this would imply two
different weapons were used, implying two gunmen.

Thi

 

‘an intriguing argument, But the problem for Foley is that we have
no way of differentiating this argument from conclusory, self-serving
speculation, There are no affidavits from these experts in the record, and
indeed, there is no evidence these men are in fact “ballistics experts.” The only
information provided on Alphin is his background as @ retired army colonel,
the record does not inform us of his experience testifying in court as a weapons
expert, So there is no evidence qualifying Alphin as an expert.

‘As for Camper, itis easy to see why counsel did not retain him for
testimony at trial. Camper was supposedly an owner and operator of a
mercenary training school in Birmingham, Alabama. In 1987, he was
sentenced to fifteen years in federal prison for a laundry list of federal crimes
including conspiracy to destroy property, to possess and use “incendiary
destructive devices,” and two counts of using an “incendiary destructive device”
during the course of violence and racketeering We have no difficulty seeing

why the trial court rejected Foley's claims on this issue.

© See United States, Hedgcorth 879.24 1207, 1909 (9th Ci. 1989),
(affoming Camper’ and co-defendants convizions on direct appeal) Campero. United
Stice, 947 tad Sar (otn C1090) atirming denial af Campers petion fr habeas
corpus relief)

13,
9. Failure to establish the absence of bullet strikes on October 9,
1991.

Under the Commonwealth's theory ofthe case, Foley shot his victims
inside Gross’s home, with some bullet strikes left in the walls. He contends
these strikes were not discovered for over two years. At trial, the
Commonwealth produced concrete blocks from the walls of Gross’s home to
demonstrate where the bullets allegedly struck and used the KSP Crime Lab to
verify that a number of markings contained lead residue consistent with being
caused by a bullet.

According to Foley, there is no evidence those strikes were present at the
time the murders occurred. He cites an October 1991 report in which Detective
Lonnie Owens, after inspecting the walls shortly after the Gross home burned,

remarked there was no sign of any projectile ever hit

 

ing the walls. In his
ineffective-assistance claim, Foley alleges that counsel failed to use the October
1991 report to rebut what he perceives as misrepresentation from the
Commonwealth regarding the bullet strikes. The trial court determined Foley
‘was not entitled to any relief on this issue. And we agree.

‘The record reflects that Foley's counsel directly asked Detective Owens

 

whether there were any bullet strikes on the walls when he inspected the
home. And Owens clearly responded that there were none. So it seems obvious
that counsel clicted testimony consistent with the October 1991 report and
accordingly, counsel was not deficient through failure to introduce the

document when questioning Owens.

14
10. Charles Lanham’s testimony.

Foley's next claim of ineffective at

 

stance is his allegation that counsel
deficiently failed to request a Daubert hearing to challenge Charles Lanham’s
opinion that indentations in concrete blocks removed from Gross's home were

the result of bullet strikes.

 

In the Supreme Court’s seminal case Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court outlined a standard for trial judges to apply in
qualifying witnesses purporting to testify as experts. This is done to
determine whether “the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
‘scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology can properly be
applied to the facts in issue."?! And the record appears clear that counsel did
not request to qualify Lanham’s testimony through a Daubert hearing.

‘The problem for Foley here is that he first raised this issue in his
amended RCr 11.42 motion filed in 2012; this claim did not appear in his
original 1999 motion. Under our holding in Roach v. Commonwealth, we ruled
that amended RCr 11.42 motions are untimely if filed outside the three-year

period set forth in RCr 11.42(10) unless the amended claims “arose from the

 

29 509 USS. 579 (1993). Relevant Daubert factors include the ability to test
particular testimony, methodologies subject to peer review or publication, that stated
practices are generally accepted in the field, and the existence of standards controlling
the bases for opinions. See id. at 593-94.

21 Jd, at $92-93. See also Kumbo Tire Co., Lid. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152
(1999) (noting that the overall concern in Daubert was “to ensure the reliability and
relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes that practice of an expert in the
relevant field."

15,
same ‘conduct, transacti

 

|, OF occurrence” as claims in the original motion.22
“New claims based on facts of a different time or type will not meet [this]
standard and so, generally, should not be allowed."25 The trial court
determined that counsel's alleged failure to request a Daubert hearing was
unrelated to any of the other timely issues in the original motion. And we
agree

To be sure, Foley is well-aware of the rule in Roach and attempts to
structure his argument accordingly. He specifically cites to three arguments in
his original motion that he considers adequately similar to this particular
amended complaint: failure to retain a ballistics expert, failing adequately to
prove there were no bullet strikes on the walls, and stipulating to autopsy
reports. We agree with the lower court's determination that this particular
issue does not properly relate back to his original RCr 11.42 motion. There is
simply not enough in the three cited examples to prove to us that this amended
issue truly enhances the nature of those preceding claims. So we affirm the
trial court's ruling that the amended motion does not relate back, and we
accordingly hold that this issue is not properly before the court for review on

the merits.

22 384 $.W.3d 131, 136 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 15.03(1))
29d, at 137 (quoting Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005),

16
411, Failure to consult with an independent expert about autopsy
results.

Foley next claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because
of trial counsel's decision to stipulate to the medical examiner's findings. Most
particularly, Foley takes issue with counsel's decision not to hire an

independent expert to review the autopsy results, especially in light of Watts’

 

and Canter’s testimony. According to Foley, he could not rebut those
statements without expert testimony. And he points to a United States
‘Supreme Court decision holding that failure to retain an expert is deficient
representation.2*

‘The trial court disagreed and viewed the decision not to retain an
independent expert as reasonable trial strategy. Counsel appeared to have
opted to attack Watts’s and Canter’s credibility through cross-examination
based on their own accounts of the events that transpired. But perhaps more
importantly, by not using an expert, counsel spared the jury from the
unsettling and graphic details of the murders, and the horrific conditions of the
victims’ bodies as they were discovered by authorities. We take no issue with
this characterization of trial strategy, and we concur that the decision to spare
the jury from more gory testimony than necessary was more likely to be in

Foley's best interest.

™ See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79-80 (1985).
17
12, Stipulating to autopsy results and fatture to call Luther Arnold.
Related to the previous issue, Foley contends he was denied effective

assistance of counsel through trial counsel’s actions stipulating to autopsy
results and failing to call Luther Arnold as a witness. The trial court found this
issue meritless. And so do we.

Foley alleges that the autopsy results supported his theory that the

 

victims were shot while sitting in a car, rather than in Gros:

 

home. He argues
that trial counsel should have called the pathologists who performed the
autopsies to testify and highlight the results Foley believes were consistent with
this defense theory. Instead, counsel decided to stipulate to the contents of the

 

reports. He did not question the pathologists, but rather, a simple statement

regarding each victim and injury sustained w:

 

read to the jury.
In ruling against Foley, the trial court determined that this approach was
a reasonable strategic decision. The decision to stipulate to the findings was
made intentionally, seeking to avoid testimony of the gruesome details
surrounding the deaths and the condition of the corpses at the time of the
examination. The simple descriptions of the deaths given as stipulation spared
the jury from the graphic realities. The Commonwealth speculates that had
counsel not stipulated to the findings, the autopsy photographs that would
have inevitably been introduced contained images so graphic in nature that
Foley may have argued he was denied a fair trial. We are inclined to agree that

counsel acted strategically in limiting Foley's exposure in this instance.

18
But Foley also argues that counsel erred in failing to call Luther Arnold

witness. According to Foley, Arnold possessed knowledge of how the

 

victims were killed. Arnold was supposedly prepared to testify that sometime in
the first week of October 1989 he heard automatic weapons firing and that he
heard screams, suggesting that the victims were not in Gross’s home but
outside. The Commonwealth dismisses Amold’s value as a witness because he
‘was also on record saying that the firing of automatic weapons was a routine

occurrence, and that “Foley and Canter were at the Gross property all the

 

jon to his,

 

time.” This information in ad

 

ability to recall precisely when he
heard the gunfire and screams renders Amold an unreliable witness that
appears incapable of altering the result at trial. So we find no prejudice in
counsel's failure to call him to testify at trial.

13. Foley's statement to the police.

Foley next asserts that counsel's recommendation to provide a statement
to Detective Phelps amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. This was an
added issue as part of Foley's amended RCr 11.42 motion, but the trial court
determined the issue related back to the original motion. Nevertheless, the trial
court determined that counsel's action was trial strategy and Foley was not
entitled to relief.

During the course of his statement to Detective Phelps, Foley revealed
that a Ruger PAS was the murder weapon. According to Foley, the
Commonwealth had no information about the murder weapon at that time

And eventually, this revelation helped the Commonwealth connect him with the

19
‘weapon. The Commonwealth used this statement in its closing argument,
suggesting that the reason Foley knew this particular weapon was the one used
was because he was the “trigger man.” His primary argument for ineffective
assistance of counsel is that trial counsel inadequately investigated the case
and should never have advised Foley to give that statement to the police.
Because of the usefulness of this information regarding the murder weapon,
Foley argues this mistake set off a chain of events that inalterably prejudiced
his defense in this case.

Trial counsel's thought process behind recommending the statement
ultimately boiled down to the realities of Foley’s legal situation at the time.
When this occurred, Foley was already charged with two murders outside this
case and was not yet considered a prime suspect in these killings. Counsel
believed it was in Foley's best interest in the outside case to provide a
statement to police in this matter; counsel believed that useful information
could help take the death penalty off the table for the charges he already faced.
‘The trial court considered this reasonable trial strategy, and we agree. Of
course that strategy ultimately failed, and Foley was indeed given a death
sentence, perhaps partly because of the inculpatory statement he gave
Detective Phelps. But that alone is not worth undermining the tactics employed
designed to obtain a more lenient sentence for Foley.

14, Fatlure to advise Foley of the marital privilege.
Foley next claims he was prejudiced by a several statements made at

trial by his wife, Marjorie. He asserts that these statements were privileged

20
‘communications between spouses and that his attorney's failure to raise the
privilege at trial amounted to a prejudicially deficient performance. In total,
Foley raises this issue for six statements made at trial. The trial court
determined that three were not privileged and three were privileged, but non-
Prejudicial, We find no reason to overturn the trial court's ruling.

Under KRE 504(b), “An individual has a privilege to refuse to testify and
to prevent another from testifying to any confidential communication made by
the individual to his or her spouse during their marriage.” This privilege may
only be asserted by the individual holding the privilege.25 The rule qualifies a

 

communication as confidential if ‘made privately by an individual to his or her
spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person.”

We will begin with the statements the trial court considered privileged
but non-prejudicial. This classification applies to three instances in Marjorie’s
testimony: (1) Foley calling Bowerstock derogatory names; (2) Foley saying he
‘would retaliate against Bowerstock for ruining his life; and (8) Foley saying he

would run into Bowerstock when she returns to Kentucky. The essential basi

 

in the trial court's determination that these admittedly privileged
communications were not prejudicial was because this testimony was
cumulative of other evidence properly admitted. In other words, the trial court
determined that there was nothing in this testimony independent of other

evidence and hence, Foley was relatively unharmed by the error. This

2% KRE 504),
oid.

a
testimony at its core reflects Foley's overall motive for committing the crimes—
and there is ample evidence elsewhere in the record detailing a similar motive.
So we are confident that while error, trial counsel's failure to invoke the marital
privilege with regard to these statements did not corrupt the integrity of Foley’s
conviction.

Now for the alleged-non- privileged communications. The following
portions of Marjorie’s testimony were determined to be outside the scope of the
marital privilege: (1) Foley's statements to Marjorie that she better not have
anything to do with telling his parole officer of any parole violations; (2) that
before leaving to commit the murders, Foley hit Marjorie with a gun and
warned her she better have not had anything to do with calling his parole
officer; and (3) Foley's statement to Marjorie, shortly before he left to commit
the murders, to call his parents if he was not home by sunrise because he
would either be in jail or in the morgue

‘The trial court found the first two statements were not privileged because
they were deemed threats against Marjorie and that those threats could be the
subject of a domestic violence petition, and, accordingly, could be part of
public record in a circuit clerk's office. Under the exceptions to the spousal
privilege detailed in KRE 504(c), there is no privilege where the spouse engages
in wrongful conduct against the person or property of the other spouse, in any

proceeding.2” At the time of trial, Marjorie had not filed a domestic violence

 

27 KRE 504(¢}(2)(A)
22
  

petition against Foley—and to our knowledge one has never been filed. These
‘two statements were never part of a public record, and we must agree with
Foley that they are subject to the spousal privilege.

‘Though we agree that the trial court erred in classifying the two

statements as privileged, for Foley to prevail on this RCr 11.42 motion, we

 

must also determine he was prejudiced under the Strickland standard. And
this requires us to ask: had these two bits of testimony been excluded from
tial, do we seriously question whether Foley would have been convicted?

Because of the overwhelming evidence against him, we simply cannot conclude

 

this

 

error failing to object to this testimony altered the outcom«

As for the final statement, the trial court ruled that Foley’s instruction to
call his parents if he did not return by sunrise was not privileged because it
was not a confidential communication. The trial court characterized this
statement as an instruction to a third party. Foley disputes that he told
Marjorie to instruct his parents he would “either be in the jail or the morgue,”
but rather just to inform them he was missing if he did not return by daybreak.
Nevertheless, the communication, when viewed as a whole, is clearly not meant
to be limited between husband and wife; the nature of the statement invariably
extends to those beyond the marital home. So we concur with the trial court

that this statement was not within the scope of the spousal privilege.

23
15. Failure to establish Foley's standing to challenge the search of a
‘septic tank.

Foley next argues he received ineffective assistance from counsel's failure
to prove Foley's ownership of property in effort to establish his standing to
suppress evidence recovered from a police search. The search ultimately led to
the discovery of the victims’ bodies buried in a septic tank. The trial court
originally denied Foley's motion to suppress because he was supposedly not
the record owner of the property at the time of the search, despite Foley's

ssistence that he owned the property. And this was an issue we affirmed on

 

direct appeal.2*
Foley now presents an unrecorded deed from his father transferring the
property to him, and he also highlights a number of affidavits in support of his
ownership of the property in question. The basis behind this RCr 11.42 claim
then is that trial counsel should have discovered this unrecorded deed and
acted more diligently to establish Foley's standing to challenge the
‘suppression. This error, he argues, led to the introduction of critical evidence
against him and irreparably prejudiced his defense. Though hindsight is

20/20, we find no such prejudice in this instance.

 

First, even Foley thought no such deed existed at the time of tri
‘Though adamant about his ownership of the property, Foley believed the
unrecorded deed had been destroyed in a house fire—he even told trial counsel

the deed had been destroyed and could not be produced at the suppression

2 See Foley I, 953 8.W.2d at 932.
24
 

hearing, We agree trial counsel cannot be deficient for failing to obtain evidence
he reasonably believed did not exist.

But moreover, even if counsel had found the deed, we are unconvinced
the outcome of the suppression hearing would have changed. Reviewing courts
at the time determined that even had Foley been able to establish standing to
challenge the search, there would have been no basis for granting the
suppression.»

There is no indication that Foley's trial counsel acted deficiently in
attempting to suppress evidence of the discovered bodies, nor do we believe he
was prejudiced in any way in this matter.

16. Reference to the Vaughn murders.

Foley next accuses trial counsel of making an egregious mistake while
ccross-examining Phoebe Watts. At trial, counsel opened the door to evidence
that Foley had been charged with the Vaughn murders—two murders outside

of those involved in the present cas

 

Foley stresses the necessity of mitigating
evidence in death-penalty cases.®° He believes that this blunder all but assured
that he would receive the death penalty for his convictions. The trial court
disagreed and found sound trial strategy in counsel's decision to bring up the
Vaughn murders. And we affirm that ruling.

On direct examination, Watts testified that she did not seek help

following the charged murders because she feared Foley, According to her

2 Id. at 934.
29 See Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 2006);

25
testimony, she only spoke with police in October 1991 after she was assured
Foley was in jail and could not get out. Counsel attempted to rebut that
testimony, and in turn impugn her credibility through use of the Vaughn

murders. In August 1991, before Foley was in jail, Watts willingly spoke with

 

.w enforcement regarding Foley's involvement in the Vaughn murders. It was
also quite noteworthy that this August 1991 statement omitted any references
to the murders involved in this case. By bringing up the Vaughn murders and
Watts's ready cooperation with law enforcement in that case, counsel cast
doubt on both her sincerity in fearing Foley and the truthfulness of her
‘motivations for not seeking help following these murders. We agree with the
trial court that this was reasonable trial strategy to discredit Watts’s testimony
before the jury.
17. Failure to object to use of the Vaughn murders as an aggravator.
During the penalty phase of trial, the Commonwealth used Foley's

participation in the Vaughn murders as a serious-assaultive-conviction
aggravator. The Vaughns were actually murdered after Foley's victims in this
case but Foley had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for
those killings at the time this trial took place. The Commonwealth used this
conviction to support an aggravating circumstance that Foley had a
“substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.” Because those
crimes occurred after those involved in this case, Foley contends that use of
those convictions as aggravating circumstances violates both his right to Due

Process of Law and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States

26
Constitution. And Foley deems counsel's failure to raise this objection during

the penalty phase of trial to be inexcusably deficient.

 

‘This claim was not part of Foley's original RCr 11.42 motion—it was
added as part of his amended motion. So again, before analyzing any of the

merits of this issue, we must first conclude that this issue relates back to one

 

present in the original motion.*? The trial court denied review, holding this
issue did not relate back and was thus untimely filed. Foley contends this
relates back to his previous accusation involving counsels introduction of the
Vaughn murders when cross-examining Watts. We agree with the trial court,
that this issue is not properly before us for review.

Under Roach, an amended claim only relates back when it ‘amplifyjies]
or clarifyfies] the original claims” or, ifa new claim is “related to the original
cones by shared facts such that the claims can be genuinely be said to have
arisen from the same ‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence."22 But new claims
“based on facts ofa different time or type will not meet that standard and so,
generally, should not be allowed."*

Here, we find a number of key factual and temporal distinctions that

unavoidably preclude this claim from relating back to the original motion. Most

91 See U.S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 3 (No..x post facto Law shall be passed”)
‘The prohibition against ex post facto laws is violated by any law that “aggravates or
increases the punishment or a crime as compared to the punishment when the crime
‘was committed.” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).

32 See, eg., Roach, supra.
3) Roach, 384 S.W.3d at 137.
od.

a7
notably, this claim occurred in a critically different time at trial than the
original reference to the Vaughn murders; this instance occurred during the
penalty phase, which by its nature is a fundamentally different aspect of trial
than the guilt phase. Also, the alleged deficiencies involved completely separate
facts and uses of fact. In the original claim, counsel invoked Watts's testimony
to law enforcement while the present action involves Foley's conviction. The
only connection is the Vaughn murders themselves, but each instance involved
different subcategories and facts within that proceeding. Literally the only thing
connecting the two motions is the two outside murders and Foley's
involvement, and to us, that is too far attenuated to find that this supplemental
claim relates back to the original

So we affirm the trial court's ruling that the claim does not relate back
and is, thus, untimely filed.

18. Failure to reference Foley’s head injuries as mitigating evidence.

Foley's next alleges he received ineffective assistance due to counsel's

failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into his medical history to present

evidence of a history of head injuries

 

mitigating evidence to the jury during

the penalty phase of trial. To be sure, failure to conduct @ thorough mitigation

 

investigation and failure to consult with experts may constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.35 And this is

%8 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000).
28
certainly true if a defendant possesses cognitive impairment as a result of head
trauma,

According to Foley, he has two documented instances of head injury, and
he also points to undocumented claims from family members that he
frequently injured his head, Unfortunately for him, there is no history of any
injury of the type that could be remotely considered mitigating evidence. One of
the recorded instances he cites occurred after he murdered Bowerstock,
Reynolds, Contino, and McMillian, so that injury most certainly does not
qualify. The medical records associated with the only other instance he can
rove cites merely to scratches and contusions on his face. In short, he offers
no evidence of any serious head trauma that may have impaired his cognitive
functions. So the trial court rightly summarily refuted this claim.

19. Failure to cite Foley's exposure to violence as a child as
mitigating evidence.

Foley next argues that counsel was deficient in the sentencing phase of
‘trial by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence relating to his
exposure to violence as a child. The trial court agreed with Foley that this
issue, which originally appeared in his amended RCr 11.42 motion, related
ack to his original motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. But on.
review of the merits, the trial court determined that Foley failed to meet his
burden of prejudice as detailed in Strickland.

‘This argument is not a new one. Foley presented this same issue in his
RCr 11.42 motion for the Vaughn murders, and he has also pursued this
collateral attack in federal court. Both this Court and the Sixth Circuit

29
confidently ruled that counsel was not ineffective by failing to present this
specific evidence.% These reviewing courts essentially determined that the
volume of aggravating evidence substantially outweighed whatever mitigating
impact this particular evidence may contain, And we agree with that
assessment.

The particular evidence Foley touches on relates to his relationship with
his maternal grandfather, Sam Pennington. Pennington was supposedly a
seven-time murderer whom Foley apparently “idolized” as a child. According to
Foley's family members, Pennington instilled a culture of violence as a solution
to life's problems. He taught Foley at a young age to fire @ weapon and even
allegedly asked the twelve-year-old Foley to assassinate a prosecutor. Foley
believes Pennington’s influence over him as a young man impacted the course
of the rest of his life, and he avers that had counsel investigated and presented
this evidence during the penalty phase of trial, he would have received a more
lenient sentence than death.

In our review of the RCr 11.42 motion relating to the Vaughn murders,
‘we recognized other testimony relating to Foley's general propensity for
violence. And we concluded that whatever questionable mitigating effect Foley's
relationship with Pennington may possess, this would have been offset through
testimony regarding his violent tendencies. Trial counsel was never informed of

‘any critical mitigating witnesses, so counsel used his own discretion in piecing

 

% See Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 $.W.3d 878, 883-85 (Ky. 2000); Foley v.
Parker, 488 F.3d 377, 382-84 (6th Cir. 2007).

30
together strategy for the sentencing phase of trial. Given the information and
evidence available, we cannot say counsel was ineffective in making these
strategic decisions.

20. Foley’s exposure to toxins.
Next, Foley contends that counsel inadequately investigated his

employment history and failed to identify

 

is exposure to toxic chemicals that
could have impacted his brain functions. Specifically, he contends that while
working at his father’s service station in his youth, he was exposed to
industrial degreasers that may have contained Trichloroethylene (TCE). TCE
supposedly may cause symptoms such as dizziness and vomiting, and long-
term exposure may lead to damage to the central nervous system. Foley argues
that his potential exposure to TCE may have impacted his mental state at the
time of the murders.

This claim first appeared in Foley’s amended RCr 11.42 motion. The trial
court ruled this claim did not relate back under Roach and refused to review its
merits. Foley offers no argument that the lower court erred in this analysis and
fails to even address this initial burden to presenting the merits in this Court.
Because Foley does not dispute the ruling below, neither will we. We affirm the
trial court’s holding that this amended claim does not related back to Foley's
original RCr 11.42 motion.

21. Cumulative error.
‘As a final argument, Foley contends that even if each of the alleged

errors do not amount to reversible error, the cumulative effect of errors below

31
render his trial fundamentally unfair as a deprivation of due process of law.
‘Though we have recognized and speculated on some minor errors below, we
must remind ourselves that an accused is not guaranteed the right to a perfect
trial; rather, our constitutions enshrine the right of each criminal defendant to
« fair trial. There is nothing in the record or proceedings below for us to
determine that counsel's performance was so deficient that Foley was denied a
fair trial.

11. _ PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

A. Standard of Review.
Part of Foley's RCr 11.42 motion essentially argues that the

Commonwealth routinely committed prosecutorial misconduct during the
course of his trial and counsel failed to prevent the prosecution from abusing
the criminal-trial process. So naturally, before we can determine that trial
counsel failed to defend Foley from prosecutorial misconduct, we must first
determine whether the Commonwealth acted accordingly. Only upon a finding
that the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial misconduct will we then
review counsel’s performance under Strickland.

B. Foley’s Alleged Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct.

1. Withholding information about a deal with Watts and Canter.
‘The first instance Foley brings on appeal is the Commonwealth's

supposed deliberate withholding of evidence of a deal the prosecution made

with Watts and Canter in exchange for their testimony against him. This claim

32
is corollary to Foley's position that counsel failed to extract testimony about
this deal from the witnesses during cross-examination.

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that the
prosecution has a complete duty to disclose any potentially exculpatory
evidence to the defense.%” But for purposes of determining whether evidence is
material to an accused’s defense, there is no distinction between exculpatory
and impeaching evidence,*# which seemingly includes promises of leniency in
‘exchange for testimony.‘ And a failure to disclose is material, regardless of
whether the prosecution acted in good or bad faith.‘

Foley contends that a post-conviction investigation reveals the existence
of a deal between the Commonwealth and Watts and Canter. He offers

circumstantial inferences surrounding Watts's arrest for marijuana possessii

 

and an alleged fax from Kentucky authorities recognizing an agreement with
Canter. The trial court rejected this claim without hearing because Foley failed

to offer anything actually proving the existence of a relationship between the

 

Commonwealth and these two witnesses.
‘The trial court particularly noted the apparent duplicitous nature of this
claim in relation to his ineffective-assistance contention that trial counsel failed

to impeach Watts and Canter through the existence of an agreement to testify.

» See 373 US. 83 (1963)
°8 See United States v. Bagly, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
2 See United States v. Gigili, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
© Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

33
Foley simultaneously argues that the Commonwealth withheld material
evidence but trial counse! failed to use that evidence at trial; this unavoidably
presumes either trial counsel possessed this information at trial (and there can
be no Brady violation) or his ineffective-assistance argument was totally
meritless. The trial court aptly found that “Foley is basically arguing with
himself on this issue because the information could not have been withheld
from trial counsel while at the same time been known to him.” We agree with
that assessment and we see no merit to his claim.

2. Withholding exculpatory evidence and introducing misstatements
of fact to the jury.

‘The second instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct against relates
to Watts's and Canter's testimony. Foley believes the Commonwealth withheld
information about Canter’s whereabouts before speaking with law enforcement
and that the prosecution went even further to misstate related facts to the jury.
Specifically, Foley discovered that Canter was supposedly in Phoenix, Arizona,
directly before making his statement to the police in the Lexington airport.
Coincidentally, other witnesses were supposedly in Arizona around the same
time, and Foley suspects they coordinated stories to frame him for the
murders. And he argues that the Commonwealth purposefully withheld this
knowledge and intentionally offered misstatements of fact to the jury.
Unfortunately for Foley, there is no evidence the Commonwealth knew
Canter came from anywhere other than Indiana—where he lived at the time—to
offer his statement. It is difficult for us to condemn the Commonwealth for
withholding potentially exculpatory evidence when the record is devoid of any
34
factual bas

 

supporting the claim that the Commonwealth actually identified
this information at the time of the investigation. So we agree with the trial
court that Foley failed to establish any factual support for this allegation.

3. Allegedly hiding Watts and Canter before trial.
Foley next alleges the Commonwealth inappropriately hid Watts and

Canter from the defense before trial to “mask its misconduct.” Before trial, trial
counsel had the opportunity to depose both Watts and Canter. The witnesses
refused to disclose their addresses and phone numbers. Foley argues this
refusal to reveal their location amounts to misconduct. The trial court rejected

Foley's argument as meritless and frivolous because “a defendant does not

 

have a constitutional right to gain access to every witness he desires."*! And we
agree.

Foley was given the opportunity to depose these two witnesses and
accordingly possessed an arsenal of responses available for use at trial if Watts
or Canter testified inconsistently. We know of no rule of law requiring the
prosecution to disclose addresses and phone numbers for key fact witnesses.
We see no violation of due process of law by failure to reveal the addresses and

phone numbers.

4. Improper argument about bullets matching Foley's weapon.
For his next alleged incident of prosecutorial misconduct, Foley contends

that the Commonwealth’ statements relating to the veracity of an expert

witness's testimony mischaracterized the true nature of the evidence and

“Epperson v. Commonwealth, 197 8.W.34 46, 54-55 (Ky. 2006),
35
misled the jury. The trial court determined that this claim did not relate back
to his original RCr 11.42 motion and considered this claim untimely filed under
RCr 11.42(10} and Roach. Because Foley has failed to persuade us his claim is

in fact timely filed, we affirm the trial court and reject this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's rejection of Foley's

RCr 11.42 motion.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Euva Denean Blandford
Margaret Anne Ivie

Robert C. Garrison

Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

‘Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jason Bradley Moore
Assistant Attorney General

36