Title: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5934.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5934 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE  
COMPANY ET AL. v. GRACE ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5934.] 
Uninsured/underinsured-motorist insurance — R.C. 3937.18, as amended by 
2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97, permits insurers to include provision precluding 
payment of medical expenses when such expenses have been paid or are 
payable under the medical payments coverage purchased in the same 
policy. 
(No. 2009-0122 — Submitted September 1, 2009 — Decided  
November 17, 2009.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, Nos. 1:08-CV-254,  
5:08-CV-1917, and 1:08-CV-2083. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division, has certified the following question of state law for our 
resolution:  “Does Ohio Revised Code Section 3937.18, as amended in 2001 by 
S.B. 97 (effective October 31, 2001), permit insurers to include an express 
limitation of coverage in an automobile insurance policy that precludes payments 
made under Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist coverage for medical expenses that 
are paid or payable under the Medical Payments coverage purchased in the same 
policy?”  Stated differently, the question is whether an insurance carrier may 
decline to pay medical expenses pursuant to UM/UIM coverage when those same 
medical expenses have previously been paid or will be paid pursuant to the 
medical payments coverage in the same policy. 
{¶ 2} We answer in the affirmative and hold that R.C. 3937.18(I), as 
amended by S.B. 97, permits an insurer to limit coverage so as to preclude 
payment pursuant to UM/UIM coverage for medical expenses that have 
previously been paid or are payable under the medical payment coverage in the 
same policy. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} We adopt the following factual and procedural history from the 
certification order submitted by the United States district court. 
{¶ 4} Laura Grace, Elizabeth Garcia, Ladon Ruffin, Dorian Jones, 
Angela Webb, and Patricia Schwab (collectively, “the insureds”), allege 
involvement in separate motor vehicle accidents with uninsured motorists.  At the 
time of their respective accidents, each claimant had purchased an automobile 
insurance policy issued by either State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company or State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (collectively, “State Farm”) 
that included both uninsured- and underinsured-motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage 
January Term, 2009 
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and medical payments (“Med Pay”) coverage in the same policy.  Each claimant 
submitted a request for payment of medical expenses under both the UM/UIM 
and Med Pay coverages pursuant to the terms of their respective policies. 1   
{¶ 5} State Farm declined to pay medical expenses under the UM/UIM 
coverage, asserting that such expenses were already paid or payable under the 
Med Pay coverage of the same policy.  Grace, Garcia, Ruffin, and Jones together 
filed a putative class action against State Farm, and Webb and Schwab each filed 
individual putative class actions against State Farm.  Each insured sought to 
represent a class of persons composed of all residents of the state of Ohio who  (1) 
were insured persons under a policy of insurance issued by State Farm that 
included UM/UIM coverage and Med Pay coverage, for which State Farm 
charged separate premiums, (2) were insured persons under a policy of insurance 
comprised of State Farm’s standard policy form or forms that included a 
purported “non-duplication” clause, and (3) suffered a bodily injury for which 
State Farm refused to provide Med Pay payment benefits under both the UM/UIM 
and Med Pay portions of the policy. 
{¶ 6} These underlying actions challenge the enforceability of the 
nonduplication clauses set forth in State Farm automobile insurance policies 
which purportedly preclude payment pursuant to the UM/UIM coverage for 
medical expenses that are paid or payable under the Med Pay coverage purchased 
in the same policy. 
{¶ 7} The parties do not dispute that the declarations page of each policy 
identified separate limits of coverage for UM/UIM and Med Pay coverage, or that 
                                                 
1. In its brief, State Farm asserts that Patricia Schwab’s complaint does not allege that she was 
injured in an automobile accident involving an uninsured or underinsured motorist, that she 
incurred medical expenses as a result of any accident, or that State Farm did not pay for any 
damages she incurred in an accident.  However, State Farm acknowledges that she claims to 
represent a putative class of insureds who (1) paid separate premiums for UM/UIM coverage and 
Med Pay coverage and/or (2) suffered bodily injury and incurred medical expenses for which State 
Farm refused to pay under both coverages. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State Farm charged separate premiums for each of these coverages.  Each of the 
challenged policies contained an endorsement form 6083VV, or a substantially 
identical form, containing the following “non-duplication” clause limiting the 
UM/UIM coverage: 
{¶ 8} “Non-Duplication 
{¶ 9} “We will not pay under Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage any 
medical expenses paid or payable under: 
{¶ 10} “(1)  Medical Payments Coverage of this policy, or 
{¶ 11} “(2)  The medical payments coverage, no fault coverage, personal 
injury protection, or other similar coverage of any other motor vehicle policy.”  
(Boldface sic.) 
{¶ 12} Each policy also contained a separate “non-duplication” clause 
within the Med Pay portion of the policy, stating: 
{¶ 13} “Non-Duplication 
{¶ 14} “No person for whom medical expenses are payable under this 
coverage shall recover more than once for the same medical expense under this or 
similar vehicle insurance.”  (Boldface and italics sic.) 
{¶ 15} Confronted with State Farm’s motions for judgment on the 
pleadings alleging that the nonduplication clauses contained in the subject 
insurance policies are valid and enforceable as a matter of law, the United States 
district court certified the instant question of state law to this court pursuant to 
Sup.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII.  We accepted the certified question and agreed to answer it.  
Grace v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2009-Ohio-1296, 
903 N.E.2d 322. 
Argument of the Parties 
{¶ 16} State Farm contends that R.C. 3937.18, as amended by 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97 (“S.B. 97”), 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 779, effective October 
31, 2001, expressly permits insurers to insert exclusionary or limiting provisions 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
into the UM/UIM portion of their policies.  State Farm recognizes that this court’s 
decisions interpreting earlier versions of R.C. 3937.18 have held that such 
exclusions violate public policy.  But State Farm argues that S.B. 97 signals a 
dramatic shift in public policy because it eliminates the statutorily mandated 
offering of UM/UIM coverage, as well as the attendant public policy against 
reducing such mandatory coverage, and expressly permits insurers to 
contractually limit UM/UIM coverage.  Accordingly, State Farm urges that the 
certified question be answered in the affirmative. 
{¶ 17} The insureds, on the other hand, maintain that this court’s 
decisions in Shearer v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 1, 7 O.O.3d 
1, 371 N.E.2d 210, Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lindsey (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 153, 
22 OBR 228, 489 N.E.2d 281, and Berrios v. State Farm Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 
109, 2002-Ohio-7115, 781 N.E.2d 149, reflect a common law prohibition against 
UM/UIM coverage setoff that survives the enactment of S.B. 97.  Specifically, 
they contend that these decisions stand for the proposition that insureds who pay 
two separate premiums, one for medical payments coverage, and another for 
uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage are entitled to collect benefits under 
both coverages.  Accordingly, they urge us to answer the certified question in the 
negative. 
{¶ 18} We focus then on the narrow issue of whether R.C. 3937.18(I), as 
amended by S.B. 97, permits an insurer to contractually preclude payment 
pursuant to UM/UIM coverage for medical expenses that have previously been 
paid or are payable under the medical payment coverage in the same policy. 
Interpretation of R.C. 3937.18 Prior to the Enactment of S.B. 97 
{¶ 19} Prior to the General Assembly’s 2001 enactment of S.B. 97, R.C. 
3937.18 required insurers to offer UM/UIM coverage to all persons who obtained 
motor vehicle liability insurance policies in Ohio.  See, e.g., former R.C. 3937.18, 
148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11380.  In construing this statutorily mandated offer of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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coverage, we held that in the absence of an express rejection of that coverage by 
the insured, the coverage arose by operation of law.  See, e.g., Linko v. Indemn. 
Ins. Co. of N. Am. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 445, 449, 739 N.E.2d 338, citing Abate 
v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 161, 51 O.O.2d 229, 258 N.E.2d 
429, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Relying upon the mandatory nature of 
UM/UIM coverage under earlier versions of R.C. 3937.18, this court has 
previously rejected the efforts of insurers to contractually limit their liability 
under the UM/UIM portions of their policies. 
{¶ 20} In Shearer v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 1, 7 O.O. 3d 
1, 371 N.E.2d 210, we confronted a condition in an insurance policy that 
permitted a setoff from UM coverage of medical payments paid under another 
portion of the policy.  Noting that the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 was to provide the 
injured policy holder the same recovery he would have received if the tortfeasor 
had insurance, we disagreed.  Quoting Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exchange 
(1970), 106 Ariz. 280, 283, 475 P.2d 264,2 we stated,  “ ‘The fact that the motorist 
sees fit to clothe himself with other insurance protection and pays a premium 
therefor such as medical payments cannot alter the mandatory safeguards that the 
Legislature considers necessary for the well-being of the citizen drivers of our 
state.  More particularly, a policy provision which the insured considers to be 
additional protection and for which he pays a premium with such extra protection 
in mind cannot be transposed by the insurer into a reduction of the mandatory 
minimum coverage.’ ”  Shearer, 53 Ohio St.2d at 7-8, 7 O.O.3d 1, 371 N.E.2d 
210.  Thus, we held that “[t]he uninsured motorist coverage required to be offered 
by R.C. 3937.18 in all automobile or vehicle liability policies issued in the state of 
                                                 
2.  The Supreme Court of Arizona later overruled Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exchange 
(1970), 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264, in Schultz v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. (1991), 167 Ariz. 
148, 805 P.2d 381, holding that such endorsements may be enforced so long as they do not 
deprive the insured of  full recovery for his or her loss. 
 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
Ohio cannot be diluted or diminished by payments made to the insured pursuant 
to the medical payment provision of the same contract of insurance.”  Id. at 
syllabus. 
{¶ 21} Next, we considered a policy term that provided an insurer a 
contractual right of subrogation for payments made under the Med Pay portion of 
an insurance policy.  In Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lindsey, 22 Ohio St.3d 153, 22 
OBR 228, 489 N.E.2d 281, we recognized that if enforced, a subrogation clause, 
like the setoff provision at issue in Shearer, would permit an insurer to 
contractually alter its insurance policy to escape all or part of its statutory 
obligation to provide uninsured-motorist coverage.  Thus, while recognizing that a 
subrogation clause permits an insurer to pursue the tortfeasor for amounts paid to 
the insured, we held that to the extent that such clauses purported to permit an 
insurer to set off payments it made to its insured for Med Pay coverage against 
amounts due for UM coverage, they were “void as in derogation of the public 
policy and purpose underlying R.C. 3937.18.”  Id. at 155, 22 OBR 228, 489 
N.E.2d 281. 
{¶ 22} Most recently, in Berrios v. State Farm Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 
109, 2002-Ohio-7115, 781 N.E.2d 149,  we rejected an insurer’s efforts to enforce 
a Med Pay subrogation clause against proceeds its insured received from the 
tortfeasor.  Recognizing the mandatory nature of both UM and UIM coverage 
under former R.C. 3937.18 and the public policy favoring equal treatment of 
automobile liability policyholders regardless of the tortfeasor’s status as an 
insured, underinsured, or uninsured motorist, we concluded that our holdings in 
Shearer and Lindsey applied equally to both UM and UIM coverage.  Id. at ¶ 35-
38.  Accordingly, we held that an insurer could not dilute the statutorily mandated 
UIM coverage by setting off or subrogating payments made under the Med Pay 
portion of its policy.  Id. at ¶ 39, 43. 
Interpretation of R.C. 3937.18 Subsequent to the Enactment of S.B. 97 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 23} Subsequent to our decisions in Shearer and Lindsey, in 2001, the 
General Assembly enacted S.B. 97, effecting comprehensive changes to Ohio’s 
UM/UIM law.  Notably, the enactment eliminated the mandatory offer 
requirement for UM/UIM coverage, and, consequently, the possibility that 
UM/UIM coverage could arise by operation of law.  See R.C. 3937.18(A) (the 
insurer “may, but is not required to,” include UM/UIM coverage); S.B. 97, 
Sections 3(B)(1), (2), and (4), 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 779, 788. 
{¶ 24} Additionally, the bill amended former division (J) of R.C. 3937.18, 
redesignating it as division (I), to provide:  “Any policy of insurance that includes 
uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured 
and underinsured motorist coverages may include terms and conditions that 
preclude coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an insured under 
specified circumstances, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to [certain listed 
circumstances].”  (Emphasis added.)  We recognize that none of the specified 
circumstances include the circumstance in this case of an insurance carrier 
precluding payment of medical expenses pursuant to UM/UIM coverage if they 
were paid or are payable under Med Pay coverage.  However, it is the 
nonexclusive language “including but not limited to” that is the focus of our 
attention. 
{¶ 25} Our paramount concern in construing statutes is legislative intent.  
Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20; 
State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 852 
N.E.2d 145, ¶ 37; State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005-
Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 23.  We consider the statutory language in 
context, construing words and phrases in accordance with rules of grammar and 
common usage.  State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 
76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 34.  “When the language of a statute is 
plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need 
January Term, 2009 
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for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.”  Symmes Twp. Bd. of 
Trustees v. Smyth (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057. 
{¶ 26} While S.B. 97 does not expressly state the General Assembly’s 
intent to supersede our holdings in Shearer or Lindsey, it did eliminate the 
statutory obligation of a carrier to offer of UM/UIM coverage that was the basis 
of those holdings.  Moreover, the legislature broadened the circumstances under 
which a carrier may preclude coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an 
insured, and it expressed its intent to do so by incorporating the phrase “including 
but not limited to” when referring to the circumstances under which coverage may 
be precluded. 
{¶ 27} We have previously recognized that the phrase “including but not 
limited to” “denotes a nonexclusive list” of examples.  Moore v. Lorain Metro. 
Hous. Auth., 121 Ohio St.3d 455, 2009-Ohio-1250, 905 N.E.2d 606, ¶ 24;  
Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-3319, 790 N.E.2d 781, ¶14, 
citing State v. Thompson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 588, 752 N.E.2d 276, and 
State v. Lozano (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 560, 562, 740 N.E.2d 273.  Thus, the list of 
circumstances set forth in R.C. 3937.18(I)(1) through (5), in which an insurer may 
preclude UM/UIM coverage for bodily injury is nonexhaustive. 
{¶ 28} This provision is different from the prior version of R.C. 
3937.18(J), which restricted insurers to precluding UM/UIM coverage for bodily 
injury in only three circumstances and did not contain the “including but not 
limited to” language.  2000 Sub.S.B. No. 267, 148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11380, 
effective September 21, 2000.  As we recognized in Snyder v. Am. Family Ins. 
Co., 114 Ohio St.3d 239, 2007-Ohio-4004, 871 N.E.2d 574, ¶15, “the 2001 statute 
for the first time permits policies with uninsured-motorist coverage to limit or 
exclude coverage under circumstances that are specified in the policy even if 
those circumstances are not also specified in the statute” and “provide[s] insurers 
considerable flexibility in devising specific restrictions on any offered uninsured- 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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or underinsured-motorist coverage.”  Therefore, our precedent construing earlier 
versions of R.C. 3937.18 based upon the statutory duty imposed on insurance 
carriers to provide UM/UIM coverage has been superseded by the plain language 
of the amended statute, which now permits insurance providers include terms and 
conditions in their policies that preclude UM/UIM coverage for bodily injury or 
death suffered by an insured. 
{¶ 29} The uncodified language of S.B. 97 supports this conclusion.  In 
Section 3(B)(3) of S.B. 97, the General Assembly expressed the public policy of 
this state to not only eliminate the mandatory offer of UM/UIM coverage, but also 
to permit insurers to incorporate exclusionary or limiting provisions in their 
UM/UIM coverages.  149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 788.  Thus, based on express 
legislative intent, insurers may now include terms and conditions in their policies 
to limit or exclude UM/UIM coverage. 
{¶ 30} Seven appellate districts that have considered the S.B. 97 version 
of R.C. 3937.18(I) have held that it permits insurers to include limitations and 
exclusionary clauses in the UM portion of their policies.  See Shenyey v. Glasgow, 
Cuyahoga App. No.  91713, 2009-Ohio-1366; Bousquet v. State Auto Ins. Co., 
Cuyahoga App. No. 89601, 2008-Ohio-922; O’Connor-Junke v. Estate of Junke, 
Cuyahoga App. No. 91225, 2008-Ohio-5874; Calhoun v. Harner, Allen App. No. 
1-06-97, 2008-Ohio-1141; Lawrence v. Lawrence, Coshocton App. No. 06-CA-
14, 2007-Ohio-4634; Wertz v. Wertz, Huron App. No. H-06-036, 2007-Ohio-
4605; Howard v. Howard, Pike App. No. 06CA755, 2007-Ohio-3940; Green v. 
Westfield Natl. Ins. Co., Medina App. No. 06CA25-M, 2006-Ohio-5057; Kelly v. 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., Hamilton App. No. C-050450, 2006-Ohio-3599. 
{¶ 31} One decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, however, has 
reached the opposite conclusion.  In Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bradley, Stark App. 
No.  2005CA00200, 2006-Ohio-1517, the court held that an insurer cannot set off 
payments made under the Med Pay coverage from UM coverage if it treats the 
January Term, 2009 
11 
 
coverages as separate and charges separate premiums for them.  Id. at ¶ 35-36.  
The dispute in Bradley arose from a 2004 automobile accident and involved an 
insurance policy governed by the S.B. 97 version of R.C. 3937.18.  Nonetheless, 
the court in Bradley relied upon our holdings in Shearer, Lindsey, and Berrios, all 
of which construe the pre-S.B. 97 version of the statute, and never addressed the 
impact of the changes effectuated by S.B. 97. 
{¶ 32} We reject the further contention of the insureds that language in 
the current version of R.C. 3937.18(F) – permitting insurers to include terms and 
conditions in their policies that preclude stacking of any and all UM/UIM 
coverages “without regard to any premiums involved” – requires a different 
result. 
{¶ 33} The General Assembly originally enacted R.C. 3937.18(F) in 
response to our decision in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 
500, 620 N.E.2d 809.  In Savoie, we held that insurers could contractually 
preclude the intrafamily stacking of UM/UIM coverage limits of policies 
purchased by family members living in the same household, but could not 
contractually preclude the interfamily stacking of UM/UIM  coverage limits of 
policies purchased by two or more people who were not members of the same 
household.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  We concluded in Savoie that it 
would be unconscionable to permit insurers to avoid payment of the full policy 
limits on two unrelated policies for which the insureds paid the full premiums.  Id. 
at 507, 620 N.E.2d 809. 
{¶ 34} Expressing its intention to supersede our decision in Savoie, the 
General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204, 
effective October 20, 1994.  See Section 9 of the bill, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 238.  
S.B. 20 amended former R.C. 3937.18(G)3 to permit the inclusion of terms and 
                                                 
3.  Now R.C. 3937.18(F). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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conditions precluding “any and all stacking” of UM/UIM coverages, “without 
regard to any premiums involved,” including but not limited to intrafamily and 
interfamily stacking.  Id. at 211-212.  The language of that amendment supported 
the General Assembly’s intention to permit insurers to limit both forms of 
stacking. 
{¶ 35} Unlike the situation that obtained when the General Assembly 
enacted S.B. 20, the facts and circumstances surrounding the enactment of S.B. 97 
and the language used by the General Assembly in R.C. 3937.18(I) broadly 
permit insurance carriers to limit or exclude UM/UIM coverage in their policies 
and make no distinction on the basis of premiums paid. 
{¶ 36} Based upon the foregoing, we hold that R.C. 3937.18(I), as 
amended by S.B. 97, permits an insurer to limit coverage so as to preclude 
payment pursuant to UM/UIM coverage for medical expenses that have 
previously been paid or are payable under the medical payment coverage in the 
same policy. 
{¶ 37} Accordingly, we answer the certified question of state law in the 
affirmative. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring. 
 
{¶ 38} The certified question in this case is:  “Does Ohio Revised Code 
Section 3937.18, as amended in 2001 by S.B. 97 (effective October 31, 2001), 
permit insurers to include an express limitation of coverage in an automobile 
insurance policy that precludes payments made under Uninsured/Underinsured 
Motorist coverage for medical expenses that are paid or payable under the 
January Term, 2009 
13 
 
Medical Payments coverage purchased in the same policy?”  Based on my reading 
of R.C. 3937.18, in particular subsection (I), and the analysis contained in the 
majority opinion, the answer to the certified question must be yes. 
{¶ 39} I write separately to emphasize that Shearer v. Motorists Mut. Ins. 
Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 1, 7 O.O.3d 1, 371 N.E.2d 210; Grange Mut. Cas. Co. 
v. Lindsey (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 153, 22 OBR 228, 489 N.E.2d 281; and Berrios 
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 109, 2002-Ohio-7115, 781 N.E.2d 149, 
remain good law, having been neither overturned by this case nor superseded by 
S.B. 97.  Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the General Assembly has abandoned 
the public policy upon which those three cases were based. 
{¶ 40} I cannot say with confidence that the State Farm policy in this case 
is contrary to public policy or goes beyond what the General Assembly intended 
to allow.  Furthermore, based on the policy language in this case, the exclusion 
does not present a gap in coverage.  See Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
271, 276, 744 N.E.2d 719 (the purpose of uninsured-motorist coverage is to 
eliminate gaps in coverage that could occur because the tortfeasor is uninsured or 
underinsured).  An exclusion that creates a gap in coverage would be contrary to 
public policy, and nothing in the statutory scheme indicates that by enacting R.C. 
3937.18(I), the General Assembly intended to abandon its policy against such 
gaps. 
__________________ 
 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Rodger L. Eckelberry, Michael K. Farrell, 
Mark A. Johnson, and Robert J. Tucker, for petitioners. 
 
Kisling, Nestico & Redick, L.L.C., Gary W. Kisling, Alberto R. Nestico, 
Robert W. Redick, and Thomas Vasvari; and Feazell & Tighe, L.L.P., and Austin 
Tighe, for respondent Angela Webb. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Seaman Garson, L.L.C., James DeRoche, and David H. Krause; and Law 
Offices of Glenn D. Feagan and Glenn D. Feagan, for respondents Laura Grace, 
Elizabeth Garcia, Ladon Ruffin, and Dorian Jones. 
 
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., Patrick J. Perotti, and Nicole T. 
Fiorelli; and Schottenstein Law Offices and Edwin E. Schottenstein, for 
respondent Patricia Schwab. 
______________________