Title: GDK v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GDK v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, STATE OF WYOMING2004 WY 7892 P.3d 834Case Number: C-03-10Decided: 06/30/2004
APRIL TERM, 
A.D. 2004

                                                            
                    

 

GDK,

 

Appellant(Respondent) 
,

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF

FAMILY 
SERVICES; STATE OF WYOMING

ex rel., DDK 
and MK, a/k/a MW, minor children,

 

Appellees(Petitioners) 
.

 

Appeal from 
the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Matthew F.G. 
Castano of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Cynthia 
L. Harnett of Harnett Law Office, LLC, Casper, Wyoming

 

 

 

 

Before HILL, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and PARK, 
D.J.

 

            
PARK, District Judge.

 

[¶1]      TAK, mother of 
the children in question, was married to GDK, appellant herein, at the time her 
children, DDK and MK, were born; however, she had a relationship with JMW and 
was living with him at the time of both births.  Genetic testing established that JMW was 
the biological father of the children.  
Both GDK and JMW asserted paternity as to both children.  The district court determined that JMW 
was the legal father of the minor children.  GDK appeals from the decision on several 
grounds.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

1.                  
Whether the 
district court correctly chose between two conflicting statutory presumptions 
and properly applied this presumption to determine that JMW was the father of 
DDK.

2.         
Whether the district court correctly applied the genetic testing 
presumption to determine that JMW was the father of MK.

 

FACTS

[¶3]      TAK and GDK were 
married on December 31, 1998, and two children were born during this marriage: 
DDK born July 17, 2001, and MK (also known as MW) born May 3, 2002.  During a period from prior to DDK's 
birth until shortly after MK's birth, TAK and JMW had a relationship and lived 
together in an on-again, off-again manner.  
TAK and JMW had a disagreement, and TAK moved out shortly after MK was 
born.  Shortly thereafter, on June 
4, 2002, TAK and GDK were divorced, but then remarried on November 2, 
2002.

 

[¶4]      The State of 
Wyoming filed a Petition to Establish Support on March 21, 2002, and then filed 
an Amended Petition to Establish Paternity and Support after the birth of 
MK.  Both GDK and JMW responded to 
the amended pleadings and each sought a declaration that he was the father of 
both children. TAK, the mother, also responded, seeking a declaration of 
paternity and asking for custody of the children.  The district court ordered genetic 
testing, and these tests resulted in a finding that there was a 99.9% 
probability that JMW was the father of both children.

 

[¶5]      JMW's request to 
establish paternity was made within six months of the birth of MK but not within 
six months of DDK's birth.  The 
statute in effect at the time had a time limit of six months within which a man 
could bring an action to establish paternity.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  JMW was 
time-barred as to DDK; however, he did bring his action to establish paternity 
in a timely manner for MK.  Because 
of the statutory time limitations, the district court was required to do a 
separate analysis for each child. The determination of paternity for DDK 
involved determination of conflicting statutory presumptions, and the 
determination of paternity for MK involved a statutory presumption on one hand 
and the impact of a positive genetic test on the other.

 

[¶6]      Regarding DDK, 
the district court had to make a determination as between two different 
conflicting presumptions in the applicable statute.  GDK claimed paternity under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-102(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2001), which provided that a man was presumed to be the natural father of a 
child if the child was born during the marriage.  The claim of JMW rested on Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-102(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001), providing that a man was presumed to 
be the father of a child if he "receives the child into his home and openly 
holds out the child as his natural child."  
The district court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that JMW 
had received the child into his home and openly acknowledged DDK as his.  The parties agreed that TAK and GDK were 
married at the time of DDK's birth.  
Therefore, as to DDK, each man could assert a statutory presumption.  The controlling statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-102(b) (LexisNexis 2001), provided that when there were two or more 
conflicting presumptions, the presumption based on the weightier considerations 
of policy and logic would control.

 

[¶7]      As to DDK, the 
district court found that the "holding out" presumption took priority; and as to 
MK, the district court found that, in addition, there was no evidence to rebut 
the results of the genetic testing.  
Thus, for different reasons, the district court determined that JMW was 
the legal father of both children.

 

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      GDK argues that 
the district court improperly weighed the conflicting presumptions asserted by 
each of the men who claimed paternity.  
Resolution of this issue requires interpretation of the paternity 
statutes in effect at the time of the action.  Therefore, the standard of review for 
statutory construction applies.  The 
first consideration, when interpreting statutes, is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  In re 
State, Div. of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. NDB, 35 P.3d 1224, 1229 
(Wyo. 2001).  When a court seeks to 
ascertain the meaning of a given law, all statutes must be construed in pari 
materia and all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same 
general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Id.  Since statutory construction is a 
question of law, our standard of review is de novo.   Id.  We begin by making an inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.  
Id.  We construe the 
statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we 
construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.  Fontaine v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 895 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶9]      At the time of 
this action, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 (LexisNexis 2001) set forth certain 
presumptions to be used by a court to determine paternity.  This statute provided, in pertinent 
part:

(a)       A man is 
presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

(i)         
He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other 
and the child is born during the marriage, or within three hundred (300) days 
after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment or divorce or after a 
decree of separation is entered by the court.

* * 
*

(iv)       While the 
child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and 
openly holds out the child as his natural child.

(b)       A 
presumption under subsection (a) of this section may be rebutted in an 
appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.  If two (2) or more presumptions under 
subsection (a) of this section arise which conflict with each other, the 
presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of 
policy and logic controls.  A 
presumption under subsection (a) of this section is rebutted by a court decree 
establishing paternity of the child by another man or, after the court finds by 
clear and convincing evidence that the child was not born of the marriage, by a 
divorce decree expressly declaring the child was not born of the 
marriage.

 

[¶10]   The first issue mandates a 
discussion of the evolution of a presentation necessary to overcome the enduring 
and strongly supported marital presumption.  The marital presumption was derived from 
Roman civil law and adopted as part of English common law.  Edward R. Armstrong, Putative Fathers 
and the Presumption of Legitimacy  Adams and the Forbidden Fruit: Clashes 
Between the Presumption of Legitimacy and the Rights of Putative Fathers in 
Arkansas, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 369, 373 
(2003).  This common law rule was in 
place to prevent the "bastardization" of children with the attendant lack of 
legal rights. Armstrong, supra.  
Furthermore, the courts wanted to provide families for children because 
such families "were desirable for such children and for the kingdom as a 
whole."  Judge Chris W. Altenbernd, 
Quasi-marital Children:  The 
Common Law's Failure in Privette and Daniel Calls for Statutory 
Reform, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 219, 234 
(1999).

 

[¶11]   Challenges to the marital 
presumption arose from many quarters, including the push to obtain child support 
from fathers in lieu of public support.  
Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child:  Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital 
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 547, 557-58 
(2000).  Part of this challenge also 
derived from the advances in science, including DNA testing.  This testing provided substantially 
improved reliability in paternity determinations.  Glennon, supra.  Thus, courts have increasingly been 
required to make decisions as to whether the mother's husband or the biological 
father should be declared to be the legal father of the child in question.  This has generated discussions as to the 
proper role of the "best interests of the child" as a factor in resolving 
paternity issues.

 

[¶12]   The district court recognized this 
conflict and applied the statute to resolve which presumption should 
control.  GDK argues that the 
court's finding is not proper because it improperly considered the children's 
best interest and the dissolution of the first marriage between TAK and 
GDK.  The propriety of consideration 
of "best interest of the child" is the subject of many legal articles, a few of 
which have been previously cited, and of many court decisions.

[¶13]   Minnesota has a similar statute, 
which provides that conflicts between statutory presumptions were to be resolved 
by applying the facts and making a determination as to which conflict was 
founded on weightier considerations of policy and logic.  In re Paternity of B.J.H., 573 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 1998).  
The Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation to that 
present in this case and, after applying the best-interest factors, determined 
the biological father, not the husband, to be the legal father.  Id. at 104.  The court noted that:  Among other things, the respondent 
wanted a relationship with the child; he was willing and financially able to 
support the child; the child was accepted by the respondent's family; the 
respondent no longer wanted a relationship with wife; the child will want to 
know the identity of his biological father; and even though the child spent the 
majority of his life with husband, because of his young age he was still able to 
develop a relationship with the respondent.  The court held that adjudicating the 
respondent to be the father of the child was consistent with the policy of not 
unnecessarily impairing blood relationships and was logically based on the 
facts.  Id. at 103.  The court held that a child's best 
interests are part of the analysis for resolving conflicting paternity 
presumptions and were consistent with a broad-based method of resolving 
conflicting paternity presumptions.  
Id. at 102.

 

[¶14]   The 
Colorado Supreme Court, faced with a similar problem, also came to the 
conclusion that the best interests of the child must be of paramount concern 
throughout a paternity proceeding and, therefore, must be explicitly considered 
as a part of the policy and logic analysis that is used to resolve competing 
presumptions of fatherhood.  
N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo.  2000).

 

[¶15]   Wyoming has traditionally followed 
the rule that the best interests of the children are generally not relevant in 
paternity cases. See Matter of Paternity of TS, 917 P.2d 183, 186 
(Wyo. 1996) (A best-interest analysis is not relevant in an inquiry which 
relates solely to establishing paternity); TL ex rel. TL v. CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Wyo. 1999) (best interest of the child not relevant in an action 
purely to establish paternity).  
However, we have recognized that there are some paternity proceedings 
where the best interests of the child are an issue.  See NDB, 35 P.3d  at 
1228.  The distinction 
between these cases has not been previously discussed, and perhaps the conflict 
has not been clearly explained.  We 
now hold that in cases involving conflicting statutory presumptions, courts must 
consider the best interests of the child as one factor in determining 
paternity.  To clarify, if the 
action involves solely a determination of paternity where there are no competing 
fathers, best interests of the child do not come into play; however, when the 
determination of paternity involves broader policy consideration, such as 
conflicting statutory presumptions, a best interest analysis is not only 
relevant but unavoidable.  

 

[¶16]   Although the district court did not 
specifically use the term "best interest of the child," it is clear that the 
analysis was focused on this issue.  
The district court first noted that the six-month limitation under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(c) (LexisNexis 2001) did not apply to those men alleging 
paternity under the "holding out" presumption; since JMW also alleged this cause 
of action, he had the right to assert paternity at any time pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  The court then held that there was 
substantial evidence to support a finding that JMW had taken both DDK and MK 
into his home and held them out as his natural children. GDK does not seriously 
contest this finding.  We will 
follow the well-established rule that the finding of the trier of fact is to be 
accorded great deference, and we find that there is substantial evidence to 
support this finding.  
Schlesinger v. Woodcock, 35 P.3d 1232, 1238 (Wyo. 2001).  The court went to great lengths to point 
out that JMW was the biological father; that he had established a relationship 
with both children; and that he was willing to "undertake all responsibilities, 
financial included, associated with fatherhood."  Specifically, the district court found 
that:

However, the 
tenuous proposition of legitimacy recognized in this family cannot, under the 
facts and circumstances of this case, overcome the presumptions of paternity 
built on biological, physical and emotional evidence of a willingness to father 
this young [child]. 

 

[¶17]   The district court's analysis also 
discussed the fact that GDK and TAK were married at the time of the birth of the 
two children.  The court did not 
elaborate on this except to point out that GDK and TAK divorced after she left 
JMW and then remarried.  It is clear 
that the district court determined that the best interest of the children 
favored the declaration of JMW as the father, and that this would have little 
impact on the family unit.

 

[¶18]   The court found that JMW would be 
the best father, and we will not second-guess this decision.  GDK argues, however, that this decision 
has the effect of making the children illegitimate, and this is contrary to best 
policy and not in the best interest of the children.  This Court does not believe that GDK's 
concerns about the impact on the children of an implied illegitimacy are 
well-founded.  Scholars have noted 
that the rate of divorce, although dropping slightly since the 1980's, is still 
high; and it has been predicted that 65 percent of all new marriages will end in 
divorce.  Glennon, supra ¶ 
11, at 559.  As a result of the 
divorce rate and the increasing propensity of divorced persons to have 
subsequent relationships without the benefit of marriage, nearly 40 percent of 
all minor children will experience the divorce of their parents, and by the time 
they reach majority, one-half will have spent some time in a single-parent 
household.  Stephen J. Bahr, 
Social Science Research on Family Dissolution, presented at the 
conference "ALI Family Dissolution Principles:  Blueprint to Strengthen or Deconstruct 
American Families?", J. Reuben Clark School of Law, Brigham Young University 
(February 1, 2001).  Another 
study suggests that "[c]lose to a majority of children growing up today are 
likely to spend some time living in a single-parent family before reaching 
adulthood."  Frank Furstenberg, 
History and Current Status of Divorce in the United States, Children and 
Divorce, Vol. 4, No. 1, at 30, 34 (1994).  Our society is changing, and some 
believe that this cultural change is progressing rapidly.  Among these changes are an increasing 
divorce rate, a decreasing rate of remarriage after divorce, and an increasing 
number of children born out of wedlock.  
Given all of these factors, there is substantially less adverse impact on 
children in single-parent homes and substantially less stigma for a child whose 
parents are not married.  The 
district court's lack of concern about elevating the "marital" presumption 
reflects the impact of these cultural changes, and this Court can find no reason 
to disagree.  The strong policy of 
legitimacy that attends the marital presumption as set out in LC v. TL, 
870 P.2d 374, 380 (Wyo. 1994), has diminished with the changes in societal 
values discussed herein.

 

[¶19]   The Court agrees with the decision 
of the district court.  There are 
two men, each seeking an adjudication of paternity, and the statutory 
presumptions asserted by each man must be resolved by considering the "weightier 
considerations of policy and logic."  
The use of the term "policy" by the legislature clearly implies that a 
court should consider the broader sociological and psychological ramifications 
of its decision as to which man should be adjudicated the legal father.  It is inescapable that the best 
interests of the child must be considered in making a determination as to which 
of the competing presumptions controls. JMW is not a stranger to the 
children.  He has developed a 
relationship with them; he has indicated his willingness to support them, both 
financially and emotionally; and he has demonstrated a commitment to the 
children.  The district court did 
not err when it considered these factors and when it considered the best 
interests of the children in making its decision.

 

[¶20]   Finally, the Court will also affirm 
the ruling as to the other child, MK, for the reasons set forth below.  It is clearly in the interests of both 
children that since they have the same biological father, both the district 
court and this Court should recognize that reality and not adjudicate a 
different legal father for each child.  
The district court's ruling as to DDK is affirmed.

[¶21]   The discussion of the paternity of 
MK is not as complex.  All of the 
reasoning of the district court that resulted in the court's determination that 
JMW was DDK's legal father also applies to MK.  In addition, JMW made a timely request 
to establish paternity as to MK.  A 
paternity test ordered by the district court also showed a 99.9% probability 
that JMW was MK's biological father.  
At the time of this action, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109(e)(iv) (LexisNexis 
2001) set out that the results of the paternity test created a presumption that 
could be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.  The district court noted that the 
genetic test was undisputed.  The 
record supports this finding.  GDK 
argues that the marriage presumption trumps and that these tests should not be 
used to overcome a "presumption of legitimacy."  This argument runs counter to the 
express mandate of the legislature that such test results can only be overcome 
by clear and convincing evidence.  
The advances in technology with the attendant increase in the reliability 
and accuracy of genetic testing and the cultural and societal changes discussed 
previously indicate that biological ties are increasingly being recognized as 
having priority, in appropriate cases, even over the marital 
presumption.

 

[¶22]   Acceptance of the argument advanced 
by GDK would have the law determine that one man is the legal father of the 
child even though blood tests -- the reliability of which is not challenged -- 
determine conclusively that another is the biological father.  In his dissent in Commonwealth ex 
rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 136 A.2d 451, 455 (Pa. 1957), Justice Chidsey aptly 
noted:  "To hold that a 
presumption' establishes a fact in the eyes of the law' is not only to 
look upon justice as blindfolded, but to blind her by the law's own 
hand."

 

[¶23]   If we were to hold that we should 
substitute a legal fiction (that GDK, as the husband, is presumed to be the 
legal father) over an established scientific fact, it would present problems for 
the child as well as for the biological father.  The child has important rights, 
including the right to know and spend time with the father.  Other rights include the child's 
interest in the father's lineal descent and the ramifications for medical 
treatment purposes; inheritance issues; and allaying the psychological stress of 
the uncertainty of parentage.  
Again, the Court must consider the best interests of the 
child.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   The district court was faced with a 
complex and deeply unsettling problem.  
There is no authority in Wyoming for dual paternity; therefore, the legal 
declaration of one man as the father could come only at the expense of the 
other.  The court gave careful 
consideration to the evidence that was presented and to recognized societal 
norms.  The district court's 
decision is supported by the record and by a thoughtful legal analysis.  This Court agrees with the result 
reached.  Rather than severing an 
existing parental relationship, the order finding JMW to be the children's 
biological father simply confirms and gives legal effect to a relationship known 
to all the parties. Accordingly, the district court's order declaring JMW to be 
the biological father simply provides legal substance to a relationship that has 
existed throughout the children's lives. Under these facts, determining that 
JMW's parentage claims are weightier than GDK's does not impermissibly interfere 
with any rights GDK may have stemming from his marriage to TAK.  We affirm the decision of the district 
court.