Title: McLean v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-632 
____________ 
 
DERRICK MCLEAN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1788 
____________ 
 
DERRICK MCLEAN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL D. CREWS, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 19, 2014] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Derrick McLean appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for 
postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and 
 
 
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petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.1  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm the denial of his postconviction motion and deny his habeas petition. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Derrick McLean was convicted of the 2004 first-degree murder of Jahvon 
Thompson and was sentenced to death.  On direct appeal, we described the facts as 
follows: 
The evidence at trial revealed that on November 24, 2004, 
McLean, along with his cousin, Maurice Lewin, and acquaintance, 
James Jaggon, drove to the apartment where the victim, fifteen-year-
old Jahvon Thompson, lived with his father in Orlando.  McLean, 
Lewin, and Jaggon planned that morning to rob the apartment of 
marijuana or money or both.  On the way to the apartment, the three 
men agreed that McLean and Jaggon would commit the robbery and 
Lewin would wait in the car.  Although all three men had guns, there 
was no discussion of shooting or killing anyone during the 
commission of the robbery.  McLean and Jaggon, each armed with a 
gun, knocked on the victim’s door and, when the victim opened the 
door, rushed into the apartment.  McLean was wearing a black 
baseball cap and batting gloves, and Jaggon was wearing a ski mask.  
Lewin remained nearby in the car, his gold Buick, and maintained an 
open line between his Samsung cell phone and McLean’s Nokia cell 
phone.  
Meanwhile, the victim’s next-door neighbor, Theothlus Lewis, 
heard loud noises he thought might be music coming from 
Thompson’s apartment.  Lewis told his girlfriend that he was going 
over to Thompson’s apartment to ask him to turn down the music.  
When Lewis knocked on the door, McLean opened the door, 
brandished a gun, and motioned for Lewis to enter the apartment. 
When Lewis entered the living room area, McLean asked him “where 
was the money at,” and Lewis turned his pockets inside-out, revealing 
he had nothing.   
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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Then, Lewis saw Jahvon Thompson and Jaggon come from the 
hallway.  Both Thompson and Lewis were ordered to sit on the couch.  
While McLean searched the apartment, Jaggon held Lewis and 
Thompson at gunpoint.  At some point, McLean grabbed a blue pillow 
sham from a shelf and ordered Jaggon to leave the apartment, telling 
him to shoot the female next door if he saw her.  Lewis testified that 
he sensed danger from the look in McLean’s eyes, so he dove to the 
floor, crawling toward the back of the apartment.  McLean shot at 
Lewis, hitting him once in the back, and then fired several more shots 
at Thompson.  The medical examiner found that each of the three 
gunshots to Thompson’s chest would have been fatal.  After waiting 
for McLean to leave, Lewis returned to his apartment, where his 
girlfriend and her daughter had already called 911.  
Meanwhile, Lewin and Jaggon drove off, McLean left the scene 
on foot, and the three men met up at a nearby restaurant.  McLean, 
still carrying the blue pillow sham from the apartment, got into the car 
with Lewin and Jaggon, and Lewin pulled the car out onto the road.   
A police officer, who was driving an unmarked car in the vicinity and 
had been notified of the shooting, saw the gold Buick pass by, and he 
activated his lights and initiated pursuit.  Lewin sped up and attempted 
to elude the officer but soon crashed into the marked patrol car of a 
sheriff’s deputy who was investigating an unrelated incident nearby.  
The deputy, who was in his marked car, saw the Buick coming at him 
and ran from his vehicle in order to get out of the way.  Lewin’s car 
struck the marked car, sending it into the deputy, who was struck in 
the hip and thrown fifteen to twenty feet.  The deputy saw Jaggon 
sitting in the front passenger seat of the Buick.  He also saw McLean 
running from the Buick.   
Additional law enforcement arrived on the scene of the crash. 
Officers who searched the area discovered a batting glove, black 
baseball cap, Nokia cell phone, shirt, and handgun discarded in the 
woods adjacent to the crash.  A blue pillow sham containing 
marijuana was found in the backseat of Lewin’s Buick.  McLean’s 
DNA was later detected on the shirt, pillow sham, and batting glove.  
The Nokia cell phone discovered in the woods near the crash was 
determined to be registered to McLean’s girlfriend.  Cell phone 
records revealed calls between this Nokia phone and Lewin’s phone 
on the day of the crime.  The Nokia phone also contained images of a 
semiautomatic firearm.  
 
 
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At trial, Lewin and Jaggon testified that the weapon McLean 
carried during the crimes was a .380.  Eight shell casings found in the 
victim’s apartment were consistent with having been fired from a .380 
Hi-Point semiautomatic.  About six months after the crime, law 
enforcement found a .380 Hi-Point semiautomatic in the woods about 
fifteen feet from the road where the crash had occurred.  This handgun 
appeared to be the weapon in the images found on McLean’s cell 
phone.   
The day after the crimes, Lewis worked with a police sketch 
artist to develop a composite of his shooter.  Over the next few days, 
the Orlando Police Department showed Lewis three photo lineups—
none including McLean, whose identity they had not yet learned—but 
Lewis did not recognize any of the individuals as the shooter.  On 
December 1, Jaggon’s father told the police that a third man, who was 
Lewin’s cousin and named Derrick, was involved in the crime.  A 
crime line tip also implicated a person named Derrick and provided 
information about where he lived, and this information led police to 
identify McLean as a suspect in the crime.   
On December 9, police showed Lewis another photo lineup—
this one containing McLean—and Lewis identified McLean as the 
shooter.  Lewis said he was 90% certain about his identification but 
would be absolutely sure if he saw the suspect in person.  Police then 
took McLean into custody for violation of probation, questioned him 
briefly about the murder, and arranged a live lineup of six individuals 
from which Lewis identified McLean as the shooter.  Lewis also made 
an in-court identification of McLean as the man who shot him.  
At trial, Jaggon and Lewin testified against McLean as part of 
their plea agreements for charges related to the events of November 
24, 2004.  Jaggon and Lewin gave consistent accounts of McLean’s 
participation in the crime.  Lewin also testified that when he asked 
McLean why he fired shots during the robbery, McLean replied that 
he “wanted to feel like what it feels like to shoot and kill somebody.” 
During the penalty phase, the defense offered expert testimony 
regarding McLean’s psychological, mental, and emotional health as 
well as testimony from McLean’s older brother.  One defense 
psychologist diagnosed McLean with an organic brain impairment, 
although the psychologist had no medical records or diagnostic 
studies to confirm any brain injury.  Another defense psychologist 
testified that McLean had some history of substance abuse and 
functioned at the emotional level of an adolescent.  Both 
 
 
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psychologists diagnosed McLean with borderline personality disorder 
but found that he was of average intelligence.  McLean’s brother 
testified to a history of some family dysfunction. 
 
McLean v. State, 29 So. 3d 1045, 1047-49 (Fla.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 153 
(2010) (footnotes omitted). 
Following the penalty phase, the jury voted nine to three in favor of the 
death penalty, and the trial court sentenced McLean to death.2  Id. at 1049.  We 
affirmed McLean’s conviction and death sentence on direct appeal.3  Id. at 1047.  
                                          
 
 
2.  The trial court found three aggravating factors:  (1) McLean was on 
felony probation when he committed the murder (moderate weight); (2) “McLean 
was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence” (great 
weight); and (3) the murder occurred during commission of a robbery (great 
weight).  McLean, 29 So. 3d at 1049.  The trial court also found two statutory 
mitigators:  (1) that McLean was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at 
the time of the crime (little weight); and (2) that “McLean’s capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law” was substantially impaired (little weight).  Id.  In addition, the trial court 
considered the following non-statutory mitigating circumstances:  “(1) mental 
health issues (no weight); (2) substance abuse issues (little weight); (3) disparate 
treatment of codefendants (no weight); (4) family problems (little weight); (5) 
brain injury (little weight); and (6) miscellaneous factors, such as poor grades in 
high school, good behavior in court, and lack of positive role models in his youth 
(little weight).”  Id. at 1049-50. 
 
3.  We denied the following claims on direct appeal:  (1) that the trial court 
erred when it admitted the photographic and live lineup identifications because law 
enforcement failed to offer McLean assistance of counsel; (2) that the trial court 
erred in conducting a portion of the hearing pursuant to Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 
256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), on McLean’s pro se motion to replace or discharge 
counsel, outside of McLean’s presence; (3) “that the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury on the avoid arrest aggravator;” (4) that McLean’s death sentence was 
disproportionate; and (5) “that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
 
 
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In 2011, McLean filed a motion for postconviction relief asserting eleven 
claims.  The circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on some of the claims, 
while summarily denying others.  Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit 
court entered an order denying relief on all claims.  McLean now appeals the 
denial of his postconviction motion and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
II.  POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Guilt Phase 
 
McLean argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during 
the guilt phase of his trial by failing to call an expert in eyewitness identification to 
challenge Lewis’s identification of McLean.4  Because McLean has failed to 
establish the requirements necessary for relief, we affirm the circuit court’s denial. 
                                          
 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).”  McLean, 29 So. 3d 
at 1050-53 & n.5. 
 
4.  McLean also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
ensure that he was present during a bench conference at the Nelson hearing.  We 
affirm the summary denial of this claim because this issue is procedurally barred as 
it was already raised and denied on direct appeal.  McLean, 29 So. 3d at 1050-51; 
see also Sireci v. State, 469 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1985) (“Claims previously raised 
on direct appeal will not be heard on a motion for post-conviction relief simply 
because those claims are raised under the guise of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”). 
 
 
 
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Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court explained that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two factors must be established:   
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.   
 
 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).   
The deficiency prong of Strickland “requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  There is a 
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was not ineffective, and it is up to 
the defendant to present evidence to overcome this presumption.  Id. at 689.  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id.     
In order to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant must 
show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
 
 
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probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694).   
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  
In this case, McLean has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  At the evidentiary hearing, McLean’s trial counsel 
testified that she discussed issues regarding Lewis’s identification of McLean with 
co-counsel and attempted to have the lineup identifications suppressed, but that 
given the other independent evidence identifying McLean, including, his likeness 
to the police sketch, the DNA evidence, and the testimony of his co-defendants as 
to his role in the crime, it would not have made sense to bring in an expert on 
eyewitness identification.  McLean has failed to demonstrate how counsel’s actions 
were not reasonable given the facts of the case and counsel’s perspective at the 
time.  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]trategic 
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses 
 
 
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have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the 
norms of professional conduct.”).   
Additionally, McLean has also failed to establish prejudice.  At trial, the 
defense focused on issues surrounding Lewis’s identification of McLean as the 
shooter, cross-examining Lewis about the identification and arguing during closing 
arguments that Lewis’s identification was questionable.  Since the jury was 
presented with the argument that Lewis’s identification of McLean was unreliable, 
there was no prejudice by trial counsel’s failure to call an expert in eyewitness 
identification.  See Rimmer v. State, 59 So. 3d 763, 777 (Fla. 2010) (“Because 
counsel conducted an effective cross-examination of the eyewitnesses and 
consistently attacked the eyewitness identifications and the process of making 
those identifications, [the defendant] has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced 
by counsel’s failure to obtain an eyewitness identification expert.”). 
Moreover, even without Lewis’s identification of McLean, there was 
substantial evidence linking McLean to the crime, including, his codefendants’ 
testimony as to his role in the crime and his blood and DNA found on an item 
taken from the victim’s home.  See McLean, 29 So. 3d at 1048-49.  Therefore, 
there is not a reasonable probability of a different outcome.  Our confidence in the 
outcome is not undermined. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief.  
 
 
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B.  The Crimeline Tape 
Next, McLean claims that his due process rights were violated by the State’s 
institutional policy of reprocessing tape recordings of tips received by Crimeline, a 
crime reporting hotline, including a tape recording of a tip made implicating him in 
the crime of which he was convicted.  Additionally, McLean argues that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to take action to prevent the destruction of this 
evidence.  We disagree and affirm the circuit court’s denial of these claims.   
McLean’s substantive claim that his due process rights were violated by the 
State’s institutional policy of reprocessing the Crimeline tapes is without merit 
because McLean has failed to establish that the State destroyed the evidence in bad 
faith.  See Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 509 (Fla. 2003) (explaining that “[t]he 
loss or destruction of evidence that is potentially useful to the defense violates due 
process only if the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police or 
prosecution,” and that “bad faith exists only when police intentionally destroy 
evidence they believe would exonerate a defendant” (citing Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988))).  McLean has made no allegation, much 
less established, that the State intentionally destroyed the tape recording in bad 
faith.  Nor has McLean shown that the tape recording was of any exculpatory 
value, or that the State knew of its potential exculpatory value at the time the tape 
was reprocessed.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this issue. 
 
 
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We also affirm the denial of the related claim that McLean’s trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to take action to preserve or compel disclosure of the 
tape recording.  Trial counsel explained at the evidentiary hearing that the defense 
did not take any action to compel discovery of or preserve the tape recording 
because it was their understanding that the tape recording had already been 
reprocessed.  Nonetheless, the record establishes that counsel took action to 
discover as much information as possible concerning the tip.  Counsel obtained 
copies of the reports generated from the calls made into Crimeline concerning this 
crime, deposed the lead detective as to how this information was used in the case, 
and made every effort to learn the identity of the caller.  McLean has failed to 
explain how trial counsel’s actions were not reasonable under the circumstances or 
how these actions “fell beyond an ‘objective standard of reasonableness,’ such that 
counsel could not be said to be functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment.”  Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 616 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).  Therefore, McLean has failed to establish that 
trial counsel’s performance was deficient.      
McLean has also failed to establish prejudice.  McLean’s allegations that the 
tape recording was of potential exculpatory or impeaching value to his case is 
completely speculative, and postconviction relief cannot be based on mere 
speculation.  See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 951 (Fla. 2000) 
 
 
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(“Postconviction relief cannot be based on speculation or possibility.”).  
Furthermore, McLean’s arrest was not based solely on the tip.  Rather, the record 
reflects that James Jaggon, Sr., the father of one of McLean’s codefendants, had 
contacted police seven days after the crime and told them of McLean’s 
involvement before the Crimeline tip came in.  In addition, as discussed on direct 
appeal, there was independent evidence linking McLean to this crime.  See 
McLean, 29 So. 3d at 1048-49.  Therefore, there is not a reasonable probability of 
a different outcome.  Our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase 
 
Next, McLean claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present evidence that he suffered from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD)5 during the penalty phase.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
McLean has not established prejudice because he has failed to demonstrate 
that the additional information that he suffered from ADHD would have resulted in 
mitigation that would undermine “this Court’s confidence in the sentence of death 
                                          
 
 
5.  At the evidentiary hearing, the expert witness, Dr. Eisenstein, who had 
also been a defense witness at trial, used both the terms ADD and ADHD  
interchangeably, and explained that ADD “is subdivided into whether or not it’s 
primarily an attention problem or it’s a problem of hyperactivity.”  ADHD is more 
focused on hyperactivity and conduct, while ADD is more focused on the inability 
to pay attention for a certain period of time.   
 
 
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when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and the mitigators and 
aggravators found by the trial court.”  Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1013 (Fla. 
2009); see also Bolin, 41 So. 3d at 155 (“A court considering a claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance 
component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not 
satisfied.” (quoting Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932)). 
As explained on direct appeal, the trial court found three aggravating 
circumstances which were given more weight than the mitigating factors.  See 
McLean, 29 So. 3d at 1049-50.  And, although the trial court stated in the 
sentencing order that ADHD had not been established as a non-statutory mitigating 
factor, the trial court gave “little weight” to McLean’s organic brain injury as a 
non-statutory mitigating factor, and Dr. Eisenstein had explained on cross-
examination at trial that McLean’s ADD was part of the organic brain injury.   
Moreover, Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing concerning 
McLean’s ADHD and its impact on McLean’s behavior was largely cumulative to 
other testimony presented at trial—that McLean had an impulse control problem, 
had an inability to think through the consequences of his actions, and that his 
ability to self-monitor and conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was 
substantially impaired.  See Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 586 (Fla. 2008) (“We 
 
 
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have repeatedly held that counsel is not ineffective for failing to present 
cumulative evidence.”). 
Therefore, McLean has not established prejudice because “[t]he mitigating 
evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing combined with the mitigating 
evidence presented at the penalty phase would not outweigh the evidence in 
aggravation[.]”  Tanzi v. State, 94 So. 3d 482, 491 (Fla. 2012).  Therefore, there is 
not a reasonable probability that additional evidence of McLean’s ADHD would 
have led to a different result.  Our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
D.  Remaining Claims 
 
Finally, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of McLean’s claims 
that:  (1) Florida’s lethal injection procedure is unconstitutional because it involves 
a risk that it will cause extreme pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment, (2) 
section 945.10(1)(g), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, and (3) that his 
constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated since he 
may be incompetent at the time of execution.  These claims have been repeatedly 
rejected by this Court.  See, e.g., Chavez v. State, 132 So. 3d 826, 831 (Fla.), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1156 (2014) (“Summary denial of a lethal injection challenge is 
proper where the asserted reasons . . . are based upon conjecture or speculation.”); 
Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 2008) (“We [have] previously found 
 
 
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section 945.10 facially constitutional and decline to recede from our decision 
now.”); Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001) (explaining that it is 
premature for a death-sentenced individual to present a claim of incompetency 
with regard to his execution if a death warrant has not been signed).6 
III.  HABEAS PETITION 
 
McLean raises two claims in his habeas petition:  (1) that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an allegation of error concerning the 
State’s destruction of the Crimeline tape; and (2) that Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme, which permits the imposition of a death sentence based on a simple 
majority jury recommendation violates the Eighth Amendment’s evolving 
standards of decency.  We reject both claims and find that no habeas relief is 
warranted.  
While claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, McLean’s claim concerning the 
Crimeline tip is procedurally barred because he raised this exact argument in his 
postconviction motion.  Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 747 (Fla. 2011) (holding 
                                          
 
 
6.  Because we find all of McLean’s claims of error to be procedurally 
barred or otherwise without merit, we deny McLean’s claim that the cumulative 
impact of the alleged errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial.  Bell v. State, 
965 So. 2d 48, 75 (Fla. 2007) (“[W]here individual claims of error alleged are 
either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error must 
fail.” (quoting Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003))). 
 
 
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that the defendant’s habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have 
been or was raised in his postconviction motion); Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387, 
395 (Fla. 2005) (holding that claims raised in a postconviction motion “cannot be 
relitigated in a habeas petition”).  Moreover, as discussed above, this issue is 
meritless. 
Similarly, McLean’s claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional because it allows a death sentence recommendation based on a 
simple majority jury vote has been repeatedly rejected by this Court and is without 
merit.  See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 125 So. 3d 752, 754 (Fla.), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 632 (2013) (“[The defendant’s] claim ‘is subject to our general jurisprudence 
that non-unanimous jury recommendations to impose the sentence of death are not 
unconstitutional.’ ” (quoting Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013))); 
Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 383 (Fla. 2005) (“This Court has repeatedly held 
that it is not unconstitutional for a jury to recommend death on a simple majority 
vote.”).  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of McLean’s motion for 
postconviction relief and deny his habeas petition.   
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Julie Hions O’Kane, Judge - Case No. 2004-CF-015923-A-O 
and  
An Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Mark S. Gruber, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, 
Florida,    
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Scott Andrew 
Browne,  Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent