Title: State v. Lagasse

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 158 
Docket: 
Aro-15-638 
Argued:  
September 8, 2016 
Decided: 
October 20, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
CHAD D. LAGASSE 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  Chad D. Lagasse appeals from the judgment and conviction entered 
in the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Hunter, J.) following a jury verdict 
finding him guilty of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs pursuant to 
17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B)(1) (2015).1  Lagasse contends that the Superior 
Court erred by denying his motion to suppress.  We find no error and affirm 
the judgment. 
                                         
*  Although not available at oral argument, Justice Gorman participated in the development of 
this opinion.  See M.R. App. P. 12(a) (“A qualified justice may participate in a decision even though 
not present at oral argument.”). 
1  The court also issued a forfeiture order pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 5826 (2015).  Lagasse was 
sentenced to fifteen years in prison with all but four years of the sentence suspended, four years of 
probation, and a $5,000 fine. 
 
2 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
 
[¶2] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a finding, we review the evidence—here the evidence at the 
suppression hearing—and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 
that evidence, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, to 
determine whether the court rationally could have found the contested facts 
at issue.  See State v. Murphy, 2016 ME 5, ¶ 5, 130 A.3d 401; State v. Jones, 
2012 ME 88, ¶ 7, 46 A.3d 1125.  
[¶3]  The Superior Court made the following findings, which are 
supported by the record.  On or about January 3, 2013, two masked men burst 
into the victim’s home in Caribou and demanded money from her.  At least one 
of the men brandished a firearm.  The victim gave them money, and the men 
left the victim physically unharmed but shaken.  The victim called the Caribou 
Police Department to report the robbery.  She reported that she recognized 
one of the men as Eric Mowatt but could not identify the other robber.  Police 
located Mowatt within a few hours and interviewed him.  At that time, he 
denied any involvement in the robbery.  Based on the victim’s report, police 
arrested Mowatt and transported him to the Aroostook County Jail. 
 
3 
 
[¶4]  Several days later, Mowatt contacted the police from the jail.  He 
admitted his involvement in the robbery and identified Lagasse as his 
accomplice.  He stated that the purpose of the robbery was to obtain money to 
satisfy Lagasse’s drug debt.  The police continued their investigation but were 
unable to locate Lagasse. 
[¶5]  On January 19, 2013, Mowatt, who had been released on bail, 
contacted the police to tell them that Lagasse was at a store in Fort Fairfield in 
a silver Mazda Protégé with a special license plate called a “transport plate.”  
Mowatt provided the license plate number.  The lead investigator emailed the 
officers of the Caribou Police Department to alert them to Lagasse’s presence 
in the area.  He provided a description of the car and instructed officers to 
arrest Lagasse if they found him.  The lead investigator also instructed officers 
to find a reasonable basis to stop the car and to use caution when interacting 
with Lagasse.  No warrant for Lagasse’s arrest was sought. 
 
[¶6]  The following day, a Caribou police officer located a car matching 
the description provided by Mowatt but could not determine anything about 
its occupants.  The officer was following the car closely enough to read the 
transport plate when the car suddenly “veered sharply to the right” and 
changed lanes without signaling.  The officer executed a “high risk felony stop” 
 
4 
by radioing for assistance, drawing his weapon, and verbally commanding the 
driver to get out of the car and place his hands on the vehicle’s roof.  When the 
driver complied, the officer immediately recognized Lagasse and arrested him. 
 
[¶7]  Lagasse was indicted on charges of robbery (Class A), 
17-A M.R.S. § 651(1)(E) (2015), theft by unauthorized taking or transfer 
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(4) (2015), illegal possession of a firearm 
(Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1) (2015), and aggravated trafficking of 
scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B)(1) (2015).  The 
indictment also included a claim for criminal forfeiture of property, 15 M.R.S. 
§ 5826 (2015).  The aggravated trafficking charge was based on pills that 
Lagasse possessed or apparently dropped on the ground at the time of his 
arrest. 
[¶8]  Lagasse moved to suppress evidence of drugs that the arresting 
officer found on and near Lagasse when he was arrested, arguing that police 
lacked probable cause for Lagasse’s warrantless arrest because Mowatt’s 
identification was unreliable, the stop for failure to use a turn signal was 
 
5 
pretextual, and the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the 
vehicle.2 
 
[¶9]  The court held a testimonial hearing on the motion on May 20, 
2014, at which the lead investigator and arresting officer testified.  By written 
order, the court denied the motion, finding that Mowatt’s identification was 
sufficiently reliable because Mowatt had admitted personal involvement in 
the robbery.  The court further found that the car stop was lawful based on 
Lagasse’s sudden change in direction without using a turn signal.  The court 
denied Lagasse’s motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
See M.R. Crim. P. 41A(d). 
 
[¶10]  A jury trial was held on November 12-13, 2015.  The jury found 
Lagasse guilty of aggravated trafficking but not guilty of the three charges 
related to the home invasion.  Lagasse filed a timely notice of appeal.  
15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2015); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A). 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
[¶11]  “We review the trial court's factual findings on a motion to 
suppress for clear error, and its ultimate determination regarding 
                                         
2  Lagasse’s written motion to suppress asserted only that the stop of his vehicle was illegal 
because it was based on pretext, rather than reasonable and articulable suspicion.  At the hearing 
on that motion, however, Lagasse also argued that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.  
 
6 
suppression de novo.”  State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 8, 97 A.3d 595.  Because 
Lagasse does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, we review only 
the legal determination.  See id.  We will uphold the trial court’s “denial of a 
motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial 
court's decision.”  State v. Kierstead, 2015 ME 45, ¶ 14, 114 A.3d 984. 
[¶12]  On appeal, Lagasse contends that (A) the officer did not have 
probable cause to arrest him for robbery, and (B) the officer did not have 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop his car.  We address each contention 
in turn. 
A. 
Probable Cause to Arrest 
 
[¶13]  Law enforcement officers are authorized to make warrantless 
arrests under certain circumstances, including when an officer has probable 
cause to believe that a person has committed any Class A, Class B, or Class C 
crime.  17-A M.R.S. § 15(1)(A)(2) (2015); cf. State v. Martin, 2015 ME 91, ¶ 8, 
120 A.3d 113.  “Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within 
the knowledge of the officers and of which they have reasonably trustworthy 
information would warrant a prudent and cautious person to believe that the 
arrestee 
did 
commit 
or 
is 
committing 
the 
felonious 
offense.”  
 
7 
State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 8 (Me. 1978); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 
540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003).   
[¶14]  Probable cause includes the collective information known to the 
police and is not limited to the personal knowledge of the arresting officer.  
State v. Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 353.  The test is an objective 
standard.  State v. Enggass, 571 A.2d 823, 825 (Me. 1990).  “The probable 
cause standard . . . has a very low threshold.”  State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115,  
¶ 7, 754 A.2d 976. 
[¶15]  Here, the trial court found that the magnitude of Mowatt’s 
admission of personal involvement in the armed robbery carried sufficient 
reliability to overcome any flaws in Mowatt’s statements to the police and 
supported 
the 
objective 
standard 
required 
for 
a 
probable 
cause 
determination.  Lagasse contends that the court erred in its probable cause 
determination by relying on an unreliable and uncorroborated statement of 
an informant. 
[¶16] Lagasse’s characterization of Mowatt as an “informant” is 
misplaced.3  Mowatt was an accomplice-witness to the crime and had 
                                         
3  Lagasse supports his argument with a long list of cases involving police informants in drug 
investigations.  We have described police informants as persons who “are often criminally disposed 
or implicated, and supply their ‘tips’ to the authorities on a recurring basis, in secret, and for 
 
8 
provided accurate information identifying the vehicle in which Lagasse was 
located.   
[¶17]  A conviction, which requires a burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice.  See State v. Johnson, 434 A.2d 532, 534-535, 537 (Me. 1981) 
(affirming conviction for murder principally based on testimony of accomplice 
whose credibility was challenged); State v. Jewell, 285 A.2d 847, 851-852 
(Me. 1972) (affirming conviction for breaking, entering, and larceny when the 
uncorroborated accomplice testimony formed the basis for the jury’s verdict); 
State v. Morey, 126 Me. 323, 327, 138 A. 474, 475 (1927); State v. Cunningham, 
31 Me. 355 (1850). 
[¶18]  Because uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may sustain 
a conviction, which requires the highest burden of proof, such statements of 
an accomplice may satisfy the lower standard of proof required to 
demonstrate probable cause.  Here, in the totality of circumstances of this 
case, Mowatt’s statement to police identifying Lagasse as his accomplice 
during the robbery was sufficient evidence, by itself, to provide the police with 
probable cause for Lagasse’s arrest. 
                                                                                                                                   
pecuniary or other personal gain.”  State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 9 (Me. 1978) (quoting People v. 
Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Cal. 1976)).  That is not the case at hand. 
 
9 
[¶19]  Lagasse further contends that police were required to 
corroborate Mowatt’s identification because of inconsistencies in Mowatt’s 
statement. However, the uncorroborated statement of an accomplice may, 
under certain circumstances, be credible despite inconsistencies.  See State v. 
Sawyer, 314 A.2d 830, 832 (Me. 1974).  In Sawyer, we upheld a conviction for 
breaking, entering, and larceny in the nighttime when the State's evidence as 
to the defendant's participation in the crime came entirely from the testimony 
of the accomplice, and the accomplice had renounced his accusation against 
the defendant on one occasion prior to trial.  Id.  Under a different set of 
circumstances, we found that a jury could have construed seemingly 
inconsistent answers made by an accomplice during his testimony in a 
manner that would be consistent with his prior description of events.  
State v. James, 161 Me. 17, 22, 206 A.2d 410, 412 (1965).  We noted “the 
evidence in the case was not marked by that degree of inconsistency and lack 
of credibility which would preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id.   
[¶20]  Here, Mowatt’s statement to police progressed from denying any 
involvement in the robbery to, eventually, admitting his participation and 
naming Lagasse as his accomplice.  Throughout the course of a police 
 
10 
interview or interrogation, it is not unusual for a suspect’s statement to 
develop in stages.  “Accomplices confessing their criminal activity with a 
defendant oftentimes are influenced . . . by such motives as malice toward the 
accused, fear, threats, promises or hopes of leniency or benefits from the 
prosecution.”  Jewell, 285 A.2d at 851.  We cannot conclude that the 
inconsistencies in Mowatt’s several statements were so significant that the 
statements could not satisfy the low burden of proof required to demonstrate 
probable cause. 
B. 
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for the Traffic Stop 
[¶21]  “The Constitution requires only the presence of a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle . . . .”  
State v. Rideout, 2000 ME 194, ¶ 6, 761 A.2d 288.  A “finding of probable cause 
subsumes a finding of a reasonable and articulable suspicion.”  Id.; see State v. 
Menard, 2003 ME 69, ¶ 9, 822 A.2d 1143; State v. Babcock, 361 A.2d 911, 
914 (Me. 1976).  Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Lagasse, 
based on information previously communicated, the officer necessarily had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Lagasse’s car.  The vehicle stop was 
constitutionally permissible and the court properly denied Lagasse’s motion 
to suppress. 
 
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[¶22]  Because we find that Lagasse’s stop and arrest were lawful, we 
need not reach the other contentions advanced by Lagasse on this appeal. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Christopher J. Coleman, Esq., Law Office of Christine M. 
Smith, Presque Isle, for appellant Chad Lagasse 
 
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, Prosecutorial District 8, 
Caribou, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Aroostook Superior Court docket number CR-2013-38 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY