Title: State ex rel Kaino v. Commission on Judicial Fitness

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: August 14, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
State ex rel
THE HONORABLE KRISTOPHER KAINO,
Plaintiff-Relator,
	v.
OREGON COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL FITNESS AND DISABILITY,
Defendant.
(JFC 01-302; SC S49792)
	Original proceeding in mandamus.*
	Argued and submitted March 5, 2003.
	Joseph A. Di Bartolomeo, Lavis & Di Bartolomeo, PC, Astoria,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for plaintiff-relator.
	Thomas M. Christ, Cosgrave, Vergeer, Kester, LLP, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
	RIGGS, J.
	Peremptory writ to issue.
	*On petition for a writ of mandamus from a decision of the
Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability.
	RIGGS, J.
	This is an original proceeding in mandamus.  Relator, a
municipal court judge, sought to have the Oregon Commission on
Judicial Fitness and Disability dismiss misconduct proceedings
against him on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over
municipal court judges.  The commission refused to do so. 
Relator then petitioned this court for an alternative writ of
mandamus, which we issued.  For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that the commission should have dismissed the complaint
against relator.  Accordingly, we will issue a peremptory writ
directing the commission to do so.
	Relator is a municipal court judge for the City of
Astoria.  On March 14, 2002, the commission brought a formal
complaint against relator, alleging that he violated several
provisions of the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct.  The
particular allegations against relator are not relevant to this
matter.  On March 29, 2002, relator sent the commission a letter
contending that the commission should dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over municipal court judges.  The commission
denied that request by letter on April 25, 2002.  Relator then
answered the complaint on June 25, again contending that the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
	On August 28, 2002, the commission brought an amended
complaint against relator that contained additional factual
allegations.  Relator answered the amended complaint on September
12, 2002, and again argued that the complaint should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Relator then filed a petition for an
alternative writ of mandamus with this court on September 25,
2002.
	The commission argues that laches bars relator from
maintaining this mandamus proceeding because it was not filed
within 30 days of the date that the commission brought the
original complaint.  See, e.g., State v. Peekema, 328 Or 342,
346, 976 P2d 1128 (1999) ("[L]aches generally requires that a
mandamus proceeding be filed within the statutory time limitation
required for the filing of an appeal.").  We assume without
deciding that 30 days is the appropriate time period in this sort
of case.  Here, the commission amended its complaint to address
certain procedural objections made by relator. Under the
circumstances, we conclude that the time for filing a petition
for writ of mandamus began running with the filing of the amended
complaint.  Relator did file his petition within 30 days of that
date.
	Ordinarily this court considers subconstitutional
arguments before reaching constitutional ones.  E.g., Leo v.
Keisling, 327 Or 556, 562, 964 P2d 1023 (1998) ("[I]t is well
established that this court ordinarily does not decide
constitutional issues if there is an adequate subconstitutional
basis for decision.").  In this case, however, the legislature
conditioned the operation of ORS 1.420(1), the statute that
authorizes the commission to inquire into the conduct of "a
judge," on the voters adopting Article VII (amended), section 8. 
Or Laws 1967, ch 294, § 1.  In light of that fact, we deem it
appropriate to move directly to the meaning of Article VII
(amended), section 8.
	Relator contends that Article VII (amended), section 8,
does not authorize disciplinary proceedings against municipal
court judges.  As it was adopted in 1968, that section provided:
		"(1) In the manner provided by law, and
notwithstanding section 1 of this Article, a judge of
any court may be removed from his judicial office by
the Supreme Court for:
		"(a) Conviction in a court of this or any other
state, or of the United States, of a crime punishable
as a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude; or
		"(b) Wilful misconduct in a judicial office
involving moral turpitude; or
		"(c) Wilful or persistent failure to perform
judicial duties; or
		"(d) Habitual drunkenness or illegal use of
narcotic drugs.
"(2) Notwithstanding section 6 of this Article,
the methods provided in this section and in section 18,
Article II of this Constitution, are the exclusive
methods of removal of a judge from judicial office." (1)
	Article VII (amended), section 8, was a constitutional
amendment referred to the voters by the legislature.  When
interpreting an initiated or referred constitutional amendment,
this court seeks the intent of the voters by first considering
the text and context.  Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State
Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994); see Stranahan
v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 57-58 & 58 n 13, 11 P3d 228
(2000) (Ecumenical Ministries analysis applies to referred
constitutional amendments).  If the voters' intent is clear from
text and context, then this court ordinarily will not inquire
further.  Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 559.  If the voters'
intent is not clear, then this court will consider the history of
the provision.  Id.  However, "[t]his court has noted that
caution is required in ending the analysis before considering the
history of an initiated [or referred] constitutional provision." 
Id. at 559 n 7.
	The commission argues that the term "judge of any
court," as used in Article VII (amended), section 8, is extremely
broad and so includes municipal court judges. (2)  If those words
stood alone, then that might have been true.  Here, however, we
must interpret those words in context.  The voters expressly
adopted section 8 as an amendment to Article VII (amended).  Or
Laws 1967, SJR 9, at 1619 ("The Constitution of the State of
Oregon is amended by creating a new section to be added to and
made a part of Article VII (amended) * * *.").  Voters thus would
have understood the words "judge of any court" to refer only to
those courts created by and defined in Article VII (amended).
	At the time that the voters adopted section 8, this
court already had held that municipal court judges are not
Article VII (amended) judges.  In In re Application of Boalt, 123
Or 1, 260 P 1004 (1927), this court stated:
		"While it has been held that justices of the peace
should be elected for the term of six years [under
Article VII (amended), section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution], there is nothing in the language of the
Constitution indicating that it was intended to apply
to municipal judges clothed with the powers of a
justice of the peace. * * * The state is not interested
in the manner in which such judge is elected or
appointed.  That is a matter of strictly local
concern."
Id. at 18 (citation omitted; municipal court judges could hear
cases despite not being elected to six-year terms). 
	Given the foregoing decision, we conclude that the
text, in context, is unambiguous:  Section 8 does not apply to
municipal court judges.
	The foregoing notwithstanding, we also have considered
the history behind the adoption of Article VII (amended), section
8 -- specifically, its ballot title.  See Ecumenical Ministries,
318 Or at 560 n 8 (listing that item).  There is nothing in the
ballot title to suggest any understanding that section 8 extended
to municipal court judges.
	In sum, we conclude that neither Article VII (amended),
section 8, nor ORS 1.420(1), the statute adopted to enforce it,
authorizes the commission to hear complaints against municipal
court judges.  The commission lacks jurisdiction to proceed
against relator and should have dismissed the proceedings.
	Peremptory writ to issue.



1. In 1975, the voters amended the section to expand the
list of sanctionable conduct and the range of sanctions.  Those
amendments do not affect the analysis here.

2. The words "judge of any court" appear in two other
places in the Oregon Constitution that predate the adoption of
Article VII (amended), section 8.  The first place is Article V,
section 16, which permits the Governor to fill any vacancy "in
the office of judge of any court" by appointment; that provision
was part of the original constitution adopted in 1857 (and
effective in 1859).  The second place is Article VII (amended),
section 1a, adopted by the voters in 1960, which mandates
retirement at age 75 for a "judge of any court."  (There is a
third place that uses the term, adopted in 1978 after Article VII
(amended), section 8, was in place:  Article III, section 4(3),
which excepts from the Legislative Assembly's power to confirm
gubernatorial appointments the appointment of a "judge of any
court.")  We have been unable to locate any cases that interpret
those words in those provisions, and so we express no opinion
whether the term "judge of any court" has a single meaning for
all of those constitutional provisions.