Title: Hughes Equipment Co. v. Fife

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

482 So. 2d 1144 (1986) HUGHES EQUIPMENT COMPANY a/k/a Stribling Equipment CO. v. Grover FIFE, Linnie Schuchs d/b/a Fife's Specialties & Fife Oil Field, Inc. No. 55243. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 29, 1986. T. Frank Collins, Jackson, for appellant. John R. Kingsafer, Hudson & Kingsafer, Natchez, for appellees. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Hughes Equipment Company, a/k/a Stribling Equipment Company [Hughes] appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Adams County awarding attorney's fees in the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000) to Grover Fife [Fife] after a voluntary dismissal by Hughes of a complaint filed by it against Fife, Linnie Schuchs, and Fife Oil Field, Inc. Hughes cross-appeals, contending that in the event attorney's fees were properly allowed, the fees were excessive. The appellant assigns four (4) errors in the trial below. We address only the first assignment, which is dispositive of the case. On June 25, 1982, prior to the institution of suit on September 20, 1982, the attorney for Hughes wrote Fife a letter advising that Fife's outstanding account in the sum of eighteen thousand two hundred fifty-five dollars seventy-six cents ($18,255.76) had been placed with him for collection, the letter following provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-53-81 (1972), as amended, and that attorney's fees would be claimed in the event the account was not paid. The record does not indicate that any response was made to that letter. After the suit was filed, Fife filed an answer, affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment as to his non-liability. Subsequently, an amended answer and affirmative defenses were filed enlarging upon the affirmative defenses. On April 4, 1983, Hughes filed a motion to dismiss its suit and the counterclaim with prejudice, stating that Hughes' claim had been successfully settled with one of the defendants; that there was no necessity of Hughes pursuing its claim against the individual defendant (Fife); and that the counterclaim for declaratory judgment on behalf of Fife should also be dismissed as moot. On April 14, 1983, Fife filed a motion to dismiss his counterclaim, and on April 15, 1983, the Court found that Fife's motion was well taken and ordered the counterclaim against Hughes dismissed, without further explanation. *1145 On April 20, 1983, the court sustained the motion of Hughes for dismissal of its complaint and entered the following order: Previously, on April 4, 1983, Fife filed a motion for attorney's fees and expenses, which motion was heard by the lower court April 25, 1983, and, on the same date, an order was entered granting Fife's motion for attorney's fees and allowing three thousand dollars ($3,000). The order provided in part the following: The statute on which Fife relies for attorney's fees is Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-53-81 (1972), as amended, following: The first sentence of the above section, which relates to the recovery of attorney's fees by the plaintiff, was interpreted and decided in Magnolia Farm Services v. Tunica Oil Co., 438 So. 2d 285 (Miss. 1983), wherein the Court said: 438 So. 2d at 288. The question involved in the case sub judice is that part of the statute relating to *1146 the defendant, viz, "If that person sued on the open account shall prevail in the suit, he shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees to be set by the judge." Rules 41 and 54, Miss.Rules Civ.Proc., do not offer Fife any help on this question. Rule 54 provides in part: The sworn account attached to the complaint, together with the invoices, reflect that the statements and invoices, except for two invoices, were mailed to G. Fife and L. Schuchs, d/b/a Fife Oil Field Specialists, P.O. Box 1432, Natchez, MS 39120. The two invoices mentioned were mailed to Fife Oil Field, Inc., Box 1432, Natchez, MS 39120. The affirmative defenses stated that Fife disposed of his interest in the business to the corporation upon dissolution of the Fife-Schuchs partnership on or about February 8, 1979, and that he has had nothing to do with the business since such time. Appellee Fife contends he was a prevailing party, since the complaint was dismissed without collecting from him. He introduced proof over objection of the appellant, to indicate that he was not liable for the claim. We do not address that assignment of error by Hughes. However, cases are not tried on the merits to determine which party shall be liable for costs or attorney's fees, after the substance of a case has been adjudicated or disposed of. Appellant argues that, upon settlement of the case, all discovery, investigation and trial preparation ceased, the issues became moot, and the question of whether or not Fife was liable on the account was of no consequence. Appellant contends that it is not the practice of courts to decide cases after the time when a judgment may be made effective, or to decide questions after the decision has become useless, merely to ascertain who is liable for costs or attorney's fees, citing 1 Am.Jur.2d Actions § 57 (1965). Chisolm v. Crook, 272 Ala. 192, 130 So. 2d 191 (1961). We think the reasoning of the California Court in International Industries, Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218, 145 Cal. Rptr. 691, 577 P.2d 1031 (Calif. 1978) is sound: 145 Cal. Rptr. 693-694, 577 P.2d at 1034-1035. We can conceive of close questions on liability in an open account against multiple defendants in which it is necessary to sue those defendants in order to have all parties before the court. After a trial on the merits, judgment might be entered against one defendant and judgment entered for the other defendants that the plaintiff take nothing from them. Without speculating on such a situation, we are of the opinion that the second part of § 11-53-81 relating to the defendant(s) must be interpreted consistently with the first part relating to plaintiff(s) in that judgment must be rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff to constitute a defendant as the prevailing party. The lower court erred in allowing attorney's fees for Fife under the facts and circumstances here involved, and the judgment of the lower court is reversed and judgment is rendered here for the appellant Hughes.[1] REVERSED AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. [1] This decision on the direct appeal disposes of the cross-appeal.