Title: TOMIKA JOHARI JONES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TOMIKA JOHARI JONES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 40132 P.3d 162Case Number: 04-35Decided: 04/06/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
TOMIKA 
JOHARI JONES,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Morgan.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a dissenting opinion, in 
which BURKE, J., joins.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Tomika 
Jones appeals her criminal conviction for escape in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-18-112 (LexisNexis 2001).1  Jones requests this Court review whether 
§ 7-18-112 is constitutional, whether sufficient evidence supports her 
conviction, and whether she was denied her right to counsel as guaranteed by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Finding no reversible error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Jones 
presents the following four issues for our review:

 
 
I.  Whether 
W.S. § 7-18-112 is unconstitutional because it is facially 
vague.

 
 
II.  Whether 
W.S. § 7-18-112 is unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's 
case.

 
 
III.  Whether 
the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of escape, when the State did 
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt Appellant failed to remain within the 
extended limits of her confinement.

 
 
IV.  Whether 
Appellant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments' right to counsel was violated when 
she was not appointed counsel at a critical stage of the criminal proceedings, 
the preliminary hearing.

 
 
FACTS2

 
 

[¶3]           
Jones 
was ordered to complete a six month residency program at Community Alternatives 
of Casper (CAC) as a result of an unrelated felony conviction.  Jones entered residency at CAC on 
October 23, 2002.  CAC is an adult 
community corrections facility.  

 
 

[¶4]           
As a 
condition of her admission to CAC, Jones was required to maintain 
employment.  Jones was thus 
authorized to leave the CAC facility to go to her place of employment for the 
purpose of working.  Jones completed 
the sign-out and sign-in forms for each trip to work.  On October 28, 2002, Jones informed her 
case manager she had been evicted from her apartment and she needed to move her 
belongings out of the apartment by November 11.  Jones' case manager informed Jones she 
would either have to get someone else to move her belongings or she would have 
to set up a time with CAC when a CAC staff member could monitor her.  Jones availed herself of neither of 
these two options.  Instead, on 
November 4, 2002, Jones signed out to go to work and to a counseling 
session.  She returned approximately 
three and a half hours later.  She 
stated on her sign-in form that she had not worked because she was off that 
day.  CAC verified Jones had not 
worked that day nor had she been to counseling.  When questioned, Jones admitted she had 
gone to her apartment to remove her belongings without authorization.  CAC sanctioned Jones for being at an 
unauthorized location.  Jones was 
warned by her case manager that any further unauthorized movements by Jones 
could result in more serious consequences, including a charge of escape.  

 
 

[¶5]           
After 
that incident, CAC continued to authorize Jones to leave CAC to go to work and 
various other authorized locations as necessary.  On November 22, Jones signed out at 8:15 
in the morning to go to work.  She 
also signed out to go to the self-help center and the courthouse for the purpose 
of filing a stalking order against a person allegedly harassing her.  Later that morning a staff member of CAC 
reported seeing Jones in the community at a location he did not believe Jones 
was authorized to be.  CAC phoned 
Jones' employer and discovered that, not only was Jones not at work, Jones had 
not reported to work since November 10.  
CAC phoned the other places Jones had signed out to go and was told that 
she was not currently3 present at any of these other 
locations.  CAC reported Jones as an 
escape to the Department of Corrections.  
Jones returned to CAC at approximately 6:15 that evening, where she was 
informed she had been listed as an escape. 

 
 

[¶6]           
Knowing 
Jones had not reported to work since November 10, CAC reviewed Jones' sign-out 
sheets.  CAC found that Jones had 
signed out to go to work on at least four different occasions between November 
11 and November 22.  Upon receiving 
this information, the State charged Jones with one count of escape in violation 
of § 7-18-112(a)(i).  During trial, 
the State introduced evidence of four different occasions between November 11 
and November 22 when Jones signed out to go to work but her time cards proved 
she was not at work.  After trial, a 
jury convicted Jones of escape as charged.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Constitutionality 
of § 7-18-112

 
 

[¶7]           
On 
appeal, Jones challenges the constitutionality of § 7-18-112.  Jones waived this issue by not filing a 
motion to dismiss or in any other manner challenging the constitutionality of 
the statute before the district court.  
The general rule of this Court is that it will not review issues that 
were waived below and raised for the first time on appeal unless the issue 
involves jurisdiction or a right so fundamental in nature that the court must 
take cognizance of it.  Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d 1016, 1022 (Wyo. 2004), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 1175 (2005).  In her brief Jones presents no argument 
to this Court as to why we should invoke either of these exceptions and accept 
review of her constitutional challenges.    

 
 

[¶8]           
The 
issue does not raise jurisdictional concerns.  There is a strong presumption in favor 
of the constitutionality of a statute.  
Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 
10, 96 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 2004).  
A trial court unquestionably has subject-matter jurisdiction over a 
controversy stemming from a violation of a state law that is presumptively 
valid.  Neither do we find the 
alleged infirmity so fundamental as to compel this Court to undertake review for 
plain error under W.R.Cr.P. 52(b).  
The main constitutional arguments propounded by Jones all revolve around 
one complaint: no person of ordinary intelligence, and specifically Jones, could 
know that § 7-18-112 could, and would, be applied to the instant fact 
pattern.  Jones, however, was 
specifically warned by her case manager that any unauthorized movements by 
Jones, such as the November 4 incident for which she was sanctioned, could lead 
to an escape charge.  Thus, Jones 
had fair warning that her conduct could be considered escape without reference 
to the statute.  See In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 775 
(Wyo. 
1987).  Under these circumstances, 
this Court sees no reason not to hold Jones to her waiver of the 
issue.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶9]           
When 
reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court accepts as true the 
State's evidence, affording to the State those inferences which may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from that evidence.  This Court does not consider the 
evidence in conflict with the State's evidence and the inferences 
therefrom.  Our duty is to determine 
whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, 
have come to the same result as the jury actually did.  Leyo v. State, 2005 WY 92, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 1113, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005); Brown v. 
State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 18, 109 P.3d 52, 57 (Wyo. 2005). 

 

[¶10]       
Jones 
argues that this Court should alter its established standard of review for 
sufficiency of the evidence claims.  
She presents an argument almost identical to that made in the recent case 
of Leyo, ¶¶ 12-16, 116 P.3d  at 
1117-18.  Because we have already 
dispensed with this argument in Leyo, 
we will not address it further.

 
 
Evidentiary 
Sufficiency

 
 

[¶11]       
Jones 
argues the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not have 
authorization to leave the extended limits of her confinement.  In support of this argument, Jones 
relies on testimony to the effect that occasionally, when a resident was already 
in the community pursuant to prior authorization, the resident could call in and 
CAC would authorize a further movement over the phone.  Thus a movement could be authorized 
although it did not appear on the sign-out sheet.  While a telephonic authorization should 
have been recorded in a call log, testimony at trial suggested not all phone 
calls were properly logged.  Jones 
thus argues it is impossible for the State to prove she did not call in and 
receive authorization to be somewhere other than the location she put on her 
sign-out sheet.  

 
 

[¶12]       
While we 
do not necessarily agree with Jones' theory, we find no need to address it.  Jones' contention is premised on the 
assumption that the only material issue under the statute is her location.  We disagree that the scope of the 
statute is to be so narrowly construed.  
Her sufficiency argument, therefore, is subsumed in the greater 
discussion of the construction of the statute.  

 
 
            
Instead of a sufficiency of the evidence issue, this Court is actually 
presented with a question of statutory interpretation and application of the 
facts to the statute.  This Court 
reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  The rules of statutory construction are 
well-established:

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we 
must abide by the plain meaning of the statute.  Adobe Oil & Gas Corporation v. Getter 
Trucking, Inc., Wyo., 676 P.2d 560 (1984).  If a statute is ambiguous, however, we 
will resort to general principles of statutory construction in the effort to 
ascertain legislative intent. State v. 
Sodergren, Wyo., 
686 P.2d 521 (1984).  A statute 
which is uncertain and susceptible of more than one meaning is ambiguous.  McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 
(1985).  In addition, we have said 
that "[s]tatutes should be given a reasonable, practical construction."  State Bd. of Equalization v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805, 809 (1980).  Further, "all portions of an act must be 
read in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it must be 
considered so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous," Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 (1985), and a statute should not be construed to render any portion 
of it meaningless, Reliance Ins. Co. v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 766 (1986), or in a manner producing 
absurd results, State v. Sodergren, 
supra.  Also, ambiguity in a 
criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity.  Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148 
(1984).

 
 

KP v. 
State, 2004 
WY 164, ¶ 22, 102 P.3d 217, 224 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 
(Wyo. 
1988)).   

 
 

[¶13]       
Jones 
was charged with violating § 7-18-112(a)(i):

 
 
(a) An 
offender, parolee or an inmate is deemed guilty of escape from official 
detention and shall be punished as provided by W.S. 6-5-206(a)(i) if, without 
proper authorization, he:

(i) 
Fails to remain within the extended limits of his confinement . . . .  

 
 
There is 
no question that Jones was in official detention.  What remains to be determined is the 
exact nature of the extended limits of confinement beyond which Jones could not 
go without authorization.

 
 

[¶14]       
The 
statute at issue is found in Chapter 18 of Title 7.  Chapter 18 is titled "Community 
Corrections."  The stated 
legislative purpose of the chapter is to establish community correctional 
facilities and programs to help reintegrate low-risk felons into society.  1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 219.  Towards that end, the act establishes 
community correctional facilities and programs, defined 
as:

a 
community based or community-oriented facility or program which is operated 
either by a unit of local government or by a nongovernmental agency 
which:

(A) May 
provide residential and nonresidential accommodations and services for 
offenders, parolees and inmates;

(B) 
Provides programs and services to aid offenders, parolees and inmates in 
obtaining and holding regular employment, in enrolling in and maintaining 
academic courses, in participating in vocational training programs, in utilizing 
the resources of the community in meeting their personal and family needs and in 
participating in whatever specialized treatment programs exist within the 
community;  
and

(C) 
Provides supervision for offenders, parolees and inmates as 
required.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-18-102(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001) (amended 2003).  Based on the purpose and definition, 
supervised release of residents into the community is anticipated (and indeed 
virtually required) by the statute in order for the program participants to 
engage in certain activities such as work, education and 
counseling.

 
 

[¶15]       
An adult 
community corrections facility, however, is still first and foremost a detention 
facility.  The facility must meet 
certain requirements, such as maintaining "strict accountability procedures and 
practices for the conduct and supervision of offenders, parolees and inmates 
including requirements for twenty-four (24) hour supervision of offenders, 
parolees and inmates in residential programs."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-107(LexisNexis 
2001)(amended 2003).  Thus, an adult 
community correctional facility must manage conduct and provide twenty-four hour 
supervision of residents while at the same time allowing the residents to enter 
the community for specific purposes intended to facilitate their reintroduction 
into society.  

 
 

[¶16]       
It is in 
this context that we find § 7-18-112.  
Any escape provision relating to an adult community correctional facility 
must necessarily be tailored to the scope and purpose of such a facility.  The general intent of the escape statute 
does not change.  The statute 
logically is intended to define escape in a manner that penalizes residents who 
do not abide by the terms of their confinement.  The language of the statute therefore 
must encompass the unique nature of the terms of confinement in an adult 
community corrections facility.

 
 

[¶17]       
Looking 
again at the language of § 7-18-112, the meaning of the statute becomes 
clear.  In an adult community 
corrections facility, residents may not leave the facility without 
authorization.  Authorization for 
leave may be given for purposes consistent with the statute.  Pursuant to Chapter 18, residents may be 
authorized to enter the community in order to pursue certain activities such as 
employment or counseling.  If a 
resident receives authorization from the facility to attend counseling for 
instance, then the terms of that resident's confinement are extended to include 
the trips into the community for that specific purpose.  Thus, the "extended limits of his 
confinement" would include the facility and authorized trips into the community 
for purposes of attending counseling.  
Should the resident, without authorization, leave the facility and enter 
the community for any purpose other than attending counseling, the resident has 
failed to remain within the extended limits of his confinement and is guilty of 
escape under § 7-18-112.

 
 

[¶18]       
The 
general principles upon which CAC operates are fairly simple to explain and 
understand.  CAC residents are 
restricted to the CAC facility unless they have specific authorization to enter 
the community.  This authorization 
is based upon not where the resident wants to go, but why.  When Jones entered CAC, she was employed 
at ParkwayPlaza.  As a condition of her CAC residency 
program, she was required to maintain that employment (unless directed 
otherwise).  In order to maintain 
her employment, Jones was authorized to leave CAC for the purpose of 
working.  The location of her work 
happened to be ParkwayPlaza.  When she left CAC to go to ParkwayPlaza, but then did not work, she went 
outside the extended limits of her confinement.  Jones's argument that she could do 
anything she wanted that day and not be guilty of escape as long as she stayed 
at Parkway Plaza finds no support in the language of § 7-18-112, or indeed in 
logic.

 
 

[¶19]       
Thus, 
Jones is guilty of escape if she left CAC for the purpose of going to work but 
then never worked during the time she was away from CAC.  The evidence is uncontradicted that 
Jones did just that.  In order to 
monitor residents' activities, CAC requires residents to complete a sign-out 
form before departing from the CAC facility.  Among other things, a resident is to 
indicate where she is going, for what purpose, and when she anticipates 
returning to CAC.  Evidence was 
introduced at trial that on November 11, 15, 17 and 22, Jones signed out of CAC 
to go to work at ParkwayPlaza.  Her time cards from her employer, 
however, show that she did not work on any of those days.  Jones' leaving CAC for an unauthorized 
purpose clearly meets the definition of escape under § 
7-18-112.

 
 

[¶20]       
Despite 
these four instances of criminal conduct, the State charged Jones with only one 
count of escape.  The jury was 
instructed that the elements of escape were:

 
 
1.  On 
or about the 11th day of November, 2002, through on or about the 25th day of November, 2002

2.  In 
Natrona County, Wyoming

3.  The 
Defendant, Tomika Johari Jones

4.  Escaped 
by failing to remain within the extended limits of her confinement, without 
proper authorization

5.  Said 
confinement being the result of a felony conviction.

 
 
The jury 
convicted Jones of one count of escape on a general verdict form.  

 
 

[¶21]       
Citing 
to Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 
1995), and May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 
62 P.3d 574 (Wyo. 2003), Jones contends that, since the State failed to specify 
which date it was basing the charge on, and evidence was presented regarding 
specific activities on four different dates, the guilty verdict must be set 
aside unless the evidence is sufficient to prove escape beyond a reasonable 
doubt on all four dates.  The 
problem in Bush and May was that the State instructed the 
jury on alternative means by which the charged crime could be committed.  The jury rendered its verdict on a 
general verdict form.  It was thus 
impossible to determine which alternative the jury had relied upon in reaching 
its verdict.  This Court thus held 
that, in order for the guilty verdict to be sustained, sufficient evidence must 
exist to support a finding of guilt as to each alternative.  

 
 

[¶22]       
In the 
instant case, the elements instruction given to the jury did not contain 
alternative theories upon which a conviction for escape could be based.  The instruction follows the statutory 
language and such language contains all that is essential to constitute the 
crime.  Pursuant to the statute, a 
specific date is not a requirement of the crime of escape.  Because the specific date is not a 
material element of the crime, and the State did not allege that the crime 
occurred on one specific date, the jury was not required to determine Jones 
escaped on any particular date.  Her 
escape conviction will stand if the record contains sufficient evidence that 
Jones escaped by failing to remain within the extended limits of her 
confinement, without proper authorization at any time between November 11 and 
November 22, 2002.  See Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, ¶¶ 
19-22, 79 P.3d 526, 533 (Wyo. 2003); Huff 
v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 1999) ("This Court has consistently 
ruled that the exact date of the offense is not required so long as the action 
or occurrence relied upon for conviction is sufficiently identified."). 

 
 

[¶23]       
The jury 
was instructed to find Jones guilty if the evidence offered by the State proved 
Jones met the defined elements of escape at any time between November 11 and 
November 22.  The State chose to 
present evidence of Jones's activities on four distinct dates between November 
11 and November 22.  Jones places 
great reliance on the fact that on two of those dates she signed out of CAC to 
engage in other activities besides work, such as going to the courthouse for 
legal proceedings.  Jones argues 
that for these two dates, the evidence is insufficient to prove she was 
unauthorized even though she didn't work.  
She cannot make that argument, however, for the other two dates.  On those dates the only reason she left 
CAC was to go to work.  Thus, 
regardless of any potential merit in Jones' argument, the evidence was 
sufficient, in fact uncontroverted, that Jones failed to remain within the 
extended limits of her confinement, without proper authorization, on at least 
one occasion between November 11 and November 22, 2002.4

 
 
Preliminary 
Hearing

 
 

[¶24]       
Jones' 
allegation that she was denied her right to counsel at her preliminary hearing 
is easily disposed of.  Jones 
appeared at her preliminary hearing without counsel.  There is no official record of what 
occurred during the hearing except both parties agree the judge did not inquire 
of Jones at the beginning of the hearing whether she was affirmatively electing 
to proceed pro se and that at the end of the hearing the judge appointed the 
public defender's office to represent Jones, although not at Jones' 
request.  Even if Jones is correct 
in her contention that she was denied the right to counsel at the preliminary 
hearing, such alleged error is still subject to harmless error analysis.  The alleged denial of counsel was 
limited to the preliminary hearing and did not affect the entire criminal 
proceeding. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1798, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988).  

 
 

[¶25]       
Approximately 
two and a half months after her arraignment, almost five months after the 
preliminary hearing, Jones filed a motion for a remand for a new preliminary 
hearing.  After a hearing on the 
motion, the trial judge denied the motion on the grounds that, at the 
preliminary hearing, Jones waived her right to counsel.  While we have grave concerns regarding 
the analysis and decision of the trial court, any potential error on the part of 
the district court was harmless.  
Importantly, Jones presents no argument that any substantial right was 
affected by the alleged denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing.  Generally, it is simply nonsensical to 
allege, after conviction, that prejudicial error affecting defendant's 
substantial rights occurred in the preliminary hearing:

 
 
[A] main 
purpose of a preliminary hearing, as we have noted, is to afford the accused a 
chance to secure his immediate release by persuading the Commissioner that there 
is no probable cause to hold him on the charges in question.  Where, as here, the accused has been 
found guilty of those charges in a full-scale trial that we have otherwise found 
to be free of error, the chances that he could persuade a magistrate that no 
probable cause exists for his continued detention are perhaps not ungenerously 
to be characterized as speculative.

 
 

Trujillo 
v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 582-83 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 901 
(D.C. Cir. 1965)).  The probability 
of proving prejudicial error under these circumstances is remote and in fact has 
not been met in this case.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   We find no prejudicial error in the 
proceedings below.  Jones waived her 
challenge to the constitutionality of § 7-18-112 by not raising it below.  The evidence was sufficient to support 
her conviction of one count of escape.  
Any alleged error on the part of the district court in refusing to remand 
Jones' case for a new preliminary hearing was harmless.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice, dissenting, in which BURKE, Justice, joins.

 
 

[¶27]   I respectfully dissent.  The alleged crimes in this case were 
improperly charged and the jury was improperly instructed.  As a result, we do not know what alleged 
conduct, on what date, formed the basis for the conviction.  This case is not like Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 
1999), relied 
upon by the majority, wherein we reiterated the rule that the State need not 
prove the exact date of an offense "so long as the action or occurrence relied 
upon for conviction is sufficiently identified."  Here, the exact dates of the four 
separate events were well-known to the State and became part of the 
proof.

 
 

[¶28]   Neither is this case like Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966-68 
(Wyo. 1995), relied 
upon by the appellant, wherein we reversed Bush's burglary conviction because 
the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that Bush entered the 
particular building with both the intent to commit larceny and the intent to 
commit a felony.  The elements 
instruction given to the jury in Bush 
alleged both statutory bases for burglary, and there was no special verdict 
form "particulariz[ing] the underlying crime that supports the burglary 
conviction."  Id. at 967.  Bush involved a criminal statute that 
could be violated in multiple ways.  
This case involves allegations of multiple violations of a single 
statute.

 
 

[¶29]   The mischarged Information and the 
general verdict form in this case violated the doctrine of charging duplicity 
described in McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190, 193 (Wyo. 1991):

 
 
            
Secondly, the amended information impermissibly combines several separate 
and independent offenses into one count.  
Even if there was no issue of improper amendment the information as 
amended would be void for duplicity on this basis.  Edelhoff v. State, 5 Wyo. 19, 36 P. 627 
(1894).  This court has said that 
"[n]o man should be tried or convicted for several offenses when he is charged 
with but one."  Edelhoff, 5 Wyo. at 33, 36 P.  at 
632.  That is precisely what 
happened to McInturff as the result of the amended information and its 
supplemental bill of particulars.

 
 
            
McInturff, charged with a single count in violation of W.S. 
6-3-403(a)(i), was actually convicted for the aggregate of several separate and 
distinct violations of that statute, as is evident from the state's bill of 
particulars and proof at trial.

 
 
[¶30]   McInturff follows the general rule 
against duplicitous charging, which rule has been outlined as 
follows:

 
 
            
Duplicity is the charging of separate offenses in a single count.  This practice is unacceptable because it 
prevents the jury from deciding guilt or innocence on each offense separately 
and may make it difficult to determine whether the conviction rested on only one 
of the offenses or both.  Duplicity 
can result in prejudice to the defendant in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, 
in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate 
offense, in determining the sentence, and in limiting review on appeal.  Also, where the jury is not able to 
reach a verdict or renders a guilty verdict that is later overturned, the 
defendant may be subjected to a second trial that exposes him to double jeopardy 
insofar as it includes an offense on which the original jury would have 
acquitted if required to render separate verdicts.

 
 

4 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure §19.3(c), at 775 (2d 
ed. 1999).  See also 1 Nancy Hollander, Barbara E. 
Bergman, Melissa Stephenson, & Theresa M. Duncan, Wharton's Criminal Procedure §5.12, at 
5-62 (14th ed. 2005) ("To determine if an indictment is 
duplicitous, the court must determine whether only one violation can be found in 
each count.").

 
 
[¶31]   The reason that duplicitous 
charging is forbidden is brought home by what happened in this case.  Instruction No. 6 quoted the 
Information, including the allegation that the alleged escape from official 
detention took place "on or about the 11th day of November, 2002, through on or 
about the 25th day of November, 2002[.]"  
These dates were repeated as an element of the charged crime in 
Instruction No. 7.  As noted by the 
majority, however, the State produced evidence of at least four separate 
incidents of escape.5  Apparently recognizing the problems 
caused by the charging duplicity, the jury sent the judge the following 
note:

 
 
Do we 
have to focus on the 11/22/03 [sic.]?

 
 
                                    
or

 
 
Do we 
have to consider 10, 11, 15, 17, 21, & 22?

 
 

The 
district court's one-line response"With regard to your question concerning the 
dates, you are directed to Instruction Nos. 6 and 7."did nothing to correct the 
problem.  The result, as stated at 
the beginning of this dissent, is that we simply do not know what conduct formed 
the basis for the conviction.  See Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 
36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001) ("the test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed.").

 
 
[¶32]   I would reverse the 
conviction.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Jones was 
charged with escape under the 2001 statute, which 
read:

 
 
(a) An 
offender, parolee or an inmate is deemed guilty of escape from official 
detention and shall be punished as provided by W.S. 6-5-206(a)(i) if, without 
proper authorization, he:

            
(i) Fails to remain within the extended limits of his confinement or to 
return within the time prescribed to an community correctional facility to which 
he was assigned or transferred;  
or

            
(ii) Being a participant in a program established under the provisions of 
this act he leaves his place of employment or fails or neglects to return to the 
community correctional facility within the time prescribed or when specifically 
ordered to do so. 

 
 
In 2003, 
Chapter 18, including this section, was amended by adding the word "adult" 
before "community correctional facility." 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 42, § 1.  The amendment is not material to the 
outcome of this opinion.

 
 

2The facts 
are set forth in accord with our standard of review that we accept the facts 
most favorable to the verdict.

 
 

3Information 
received by CAC later indicated that Jones had been to the courthouse but had 
not been to either of the other two locations.

 
 

4Following 
oral arguments and a review of the appellate briefs, this Court requested 
additional briefing on the issue

 
 
whether 
[Jones'] conviction of one count of escape is legally sustainable in light of 
the presentation by the State of evidence indicating multiple acts of escape, 
growing out of distinct and separate transactions, without specifying to the 
jury the specific act upon which it was relying for conviction, or instructing 
the jury that it must unanimously agree on the specific act of [Jones] 
constituting escape.

 
 
After 
due consideration of the parties' supplemental briefs, we conclude that the 
legal arguments presented do not compel us to consider the issue 
further.

 
 

5The dates of incidents for which proof 
was presented were November 10, 11, 15, 17, 21 and 22.  November 10 was the last day the 
appellant actually worked at ParkwayPlaza.