Title: Town of Rocky Mount v. Southside Investors

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., Poff, Senior Justice 
 
TOWN OF ROCKY MOUNT 
 
v.  Record No. 962021 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                      June 6, 1997 
SOUTHSIDE INVESTORS, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
 
B.A. Davis, III, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a landowner 
acquired a vested right to build townhouses on its property 
before a zoning ordinance was amended to require a special use 
permit for such development. 
 
Southside Investors, Inc. (Southside), initiated an action 
against the Town of Rocky Mount, challenging a 1995 amendment to 
the Town's zoning ordinance.  The trial court heard the following 
evidence in a bench trial. 
 
In July 1985, Southside purchased a 5.5 acre tract of 
property located on Herbert Street in the Town of Rocky Mount.  
About one month later, Southside obtained a rezoning of the 
property from R-1 to R-2, a residential use classification in 
which townhouses were a use permitted by right. 
 
After the rezoning, Southside constructed two four-unit 
townhouse buildings on the north side of Herbert Street.  
Southside extended Herbert Street and installed water and sewer 
lines to accommodate these townhouse units, but did not file a 
site plan to develop the remaining portion of its parcel located 
on the south side of Herbert Street.  However, the street 
extension and the water and sewer lines were adequate to serve 
future development on the south side of the street. 
 
 
 
 
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In 1995, the Town amended the zoning ordinance to remove 
townhouses as a use permitted by right in an R-2 district and to 
allow such development only by special use permit.  Christopher 
Lee Whitlow, the Town's planning and zoning administrator, 
testified that in an R-2 district, multiple-family developments, 
such as townhouse complexes, were not consistent with "the 
overall scheme of the [T]own plan."   
 
Southside asserted that it had a vested property right to 
construct townhouses on the undeveloped portion of its property. 
 The trial court agreed, stating that "a conveyance has been 
made, substantial expense has been incurred and a hardship will 
be worked if further permit applications and delays are mandated 
prior to the building of additional townhouse units."  The trial 
court also observed that Southside already had constructed 
townhouses on part of the original 5.5 acre parcel, and that 
there had been no evidence Southside had failed to comply with 
the Town's "building and structural requirements."  Therefore, 
the court ruled that, based on Southside's vested property right, 
the 1995 amendment was null and void as to the subject parcel. 
 
On appeal, the Town contends that the trial court erred in 
holding that Southside had a vested right to construct townhouses 
when it did not file a site plan or take any other significant 
action to develop the remainder of the tract prior to the 1995 
zoning amendment.  The Town asserts that Southside cannot rely on 
its earlier expenditures for extending the street, water lines, 
 
 
 
 
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and sewer capabilities, because these improvements were made to 
service the existing townhouses.  
 
In response, Southside argues that the 1985 rezoning of its 
original parcel was a significant governmental act which gave 
Southside a vested right to construct additional townhouses.  
Southside asserts that, in reliance on this governmental act, it 
incurred substantial expense by extending Herbert Street and by 
installing water and sewer lines.  Southside also contends that 
it diligently pursued development of its property by obtaining 
zoning and building permits for the existing townhouses.  We 
disagree with Southside's arguments. 
 
A landowner who asserts a vested property right to a 
particular zoning classification must identify a significant 
governmental act permitting the landowner the particular use of 
its property that otherwise would not be allowed.  Holland v. 
Board of Supervisors, 247 Va. 286, 289, 441 S.E.2d 20, 21-22 
(1994); Town of Stephens City v. Russell, 241 Va. 160, 164, 399 
S.E.2d 814, 816 (1991); Fairfax County v. Cities Service, 213 Va. 
359, 362, 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1972); see Board of Supervisors v. 
Trollingwood Partnership, 248 Va. 112, 115-16, 445 S.E.2d 151, 
153 (1994).  The requirement of a significant governmental act 
creates a bright line test that enables the landowner to 
determine the point at which it has acquired the vested right.  
Holland, 247 Va. at 292, 441 S.E.2d at 23.  
 
The facts in the present case are similar to those in 
 
 
 
 
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Trollingwood Partnership.  There, the landowner asserted that its 
site plans for earlier phases of a development were sufficient to 
create a vested property right permitting the landowner to expand 
its development to an additional portion of the original parcel 
for which no site plan had been approved.  We held that the 
landowner’s failure to obtain site plan approval for the new 
construction before the property was rezoned defeated its vested 
rights claim.  248 Va. at 115-16, 445 S.E.2d at 152-53. 
 
Similarly, in Russell, a landowner contended that he had 
acquired a vested right in a prior zoning classification after an 
amendment effectively reduced the number of apartment units that 
he could build on his land.  241 Va. at 162, 399 S.E.2d at 815.  
He claimed a vested right to build the number of units permitted 
under the former zoning ordinance, despite the fact that he had 
failed to obtain the required approval of his subdivision plat 
and site plan before the ordinance was amended.  We held that the 
landowner's failure to obtain any type of governmental permit or 
approval before the ordinance was amended was fatal to his claim. 
 Id. at 164-65, 399 S.E.2d at 816.  
 
Applying this principle to the present case, we conclude 
that Southside does not have a vested right to construct 
additional townhouses on its property because it has failed to 
identify any significant governmental act approving its proposed 
development before the 1995 zoning amendment.  We find no merit 
in Southside’s contention that the 1985 amendment, rezoning the 
 
 
 
 
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property from the R-1 to R-2 classification, is such a 
governmental act.  That amendment merely changed zoning 
classifications and did not authorize any specific plan for 
development of the property.  A significant governmental act, as 
contemplated by our decisions set forth above, authorizes the 
specific use to be made of the property, rather than the general 
categories of development allowed in a given zoning 
classification.   
 
Southside's earlier expenditures for street, water, and 
sewer improvements are not relevant to this inquiry, because they 
were made in conjunction with the previous townhouse 
construction.  The fact that some of these improvements may be 
utilized in future development of the property does not alter our 
conclusion, since they were not approved as part of a site plan 
or permit for the undeveloped portion of the property.  Thus, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Southside 
acquired a vested right under the Town’s 1985 zoning ordinance. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and enter final judgment in favor of the Town. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.