Title: Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio 
St.3d 55, 1999-Ohio-248.] 
 
 
 
 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY 
CHAPTER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY, 
APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State 
Univ. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 55.] 
Education — State universities — Faculty workload policies — Classification 
contained in R.C. 3345.45 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Ohio Constitution — R.C. 3345.45 is a valid exercise of legislative 
authority under Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
1. 
The classification contained in R.C. 3345.45 does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution because it is rationally related to 
a legitimate government interest. 
2. 
R.C. 3345.45 is a valid exercise of legislative authority under Section 34, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 97-568 — Submitted August 25, 1999 — Decided October 20, 1999.) 
UPON REMAND from the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Effective July 1, 1993, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3345.45 to 
address its concern over the decline in faculty teaching hours at Ohio’s public 
universities.  That section provides: 
 
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“On or before January 1, 1994, the Ohio board of regents jointly with all 
state universities, as defined in section 3345.011 of the Revised Code, shall 
develop standards for instructional workloads for full-time and part-time faculty in 
keeping with the universities’ missions and with special emphasis on the 
undergraduate learning experience.  These standards shall contain clear guidelines 
for institutions to determine a range of acceptable undergraduate teaching by 
faculty. 
 
“On or before June 30, 1994, the board of trustees of each state university 
shall take formal action to adopt a faculty workload policy consistent with the 
standards developed under this section.  Notwithstanding section 4117.08 of the 
Revised Code, the policies adopted under this section are not appropriate subjects 
for collective bargaining.  Notwithstanding division (A) of section 4117.10 of the 
Revised Code, any policy adopted under this section by a board of trustees prevails 
over any conflicting provisions of any collective bargaining agreement between an 
employees organization and that board of trustees.” 
 
Also enacted as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152 was Section 84.14, 
uncodified, which provides: 
 
“Pursuant to section 3345.45 of the Revised Code, the Ohio Board of 
Regents shall work with state universities to ensure that no later than fall term 
1994, a minimum ten per cent increase in statewide undergraduate teaching 
 
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activity be achieved to restore the reductions experienced over the past decade.  
Notwithstanding section 3345.45 of the Revised Code, any collective bargaining 
agreement in effect on the effective date of this act shall continue in effect until its 
expiration date.”  145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4539. 
 
Pursuant to the standards in R.C. 3345.45, appellant and cross-appellee, 
Central State University (“CSU”), adopted and later amended a new faculty 
workload policy.  That policy provided: 
 
“The normal full-time teaching load will be a range of 36 to 40 contact hours 
per academic year.  The normal teaching load in any quarter will not exceed 15 
contact hours.  Faculty members shall have at least ten office hours distributed 
over the five day work week.” 
 
CSU then notified the certified collective bargaining agent for full-time 
faculty members at CSU, the American Association of the University Professors, 
Central State University Chapter (“AAUP”), that, in accordance with R.C. 
3345.45, it would no longer bargain over the issue of faculty workload. In 
response, AAUP filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
and a motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Civ.R. 65(B), alleging that 
R.C. 3345.45 violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions, and Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
The trial court held R.C. 3345.45 constitutional in its entirety.  AAUP 
 
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appealed that decision to the Second District Court of Appeals, which reversed the 
trial court’s judgment and concluded that the statute was unconstitutional. 
 
Upon appeal and cross-appeal to this court, we were asked to determine the 
constitutionality of R.C. 3345.45 under the Equal Protection Clauses of both the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions, as well as under Section 34, Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution.  A majority of this court held that R.C. 3345.45 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause under either Constitution, as it did not rationally relate to a 
legitimate government interest. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. 
Chapter v. Cent. State Univ. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 229, 699 N.E.2d 463 (“AAUP 
I”).  The AAUP I majority based this conclusion upon the state’s failure to provide 
any evidence of a link between collective bargaining and a decline in teaching.  
Because the AAUP I majority determined that the statute was unconstitutional 
under those clauses, it did not reach the issue of constitutionality under Section 34, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed AAUP I to the extent that it held 
the statute unconstitutional under the United States Equal Protection Clause. Cent.  
State Univ. v. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter (1999), 526 
U.S. 124, 119 S.Ct. 1162, 143 L.Ed.2d 227 (“Central State”).  The United States 
Supreme Court emphasized in Central State that AAUP I misapplied federal 
rational-basis review by requiring the state to provide evidence of a rational 
 
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relationship between the statute and its goal. The Supreme Court held that R.C. 
3345.45 rationally relates to the statute’s legitimate goal and therefore survived the 
federal equal protection challenge.  The Supreme Court then remanded this case 
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., Donald J. Mooney, Jr.,  
and Mark D. Tucker,  for appellee and cross-appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor,  
pro hac vice, Lawrence J. Miltner and Jan A. Neiger, Assistant Attorneys General, 
for appellant and cross-appellee. 
 
Snyder, Rakay & Spicer and Peter J. Rakay, for amicus curiae Ohio 
Education Association. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  This case returns to us for consideration of R.C. 3345.45’s 
constitutionality under Section 2, Article I and Section 34, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
Equal Protection 
 
To avoid duplication, we begin our equal protection analysis of R.C. 
3345.45 by restating several of the conclusions reached by a majority of this court 
in AAUP I.  These conclusions remain applicable to our Ohio analysis, and the 
 
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parties have acknowledged their validity by omitting them from the scope of their 
arguments: 
 
(1) the classification created by R.C. 3345.45 is subject to rational-basis 
scrutiny; 
 
(2) the inquiry under the rational-basis test is whether the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest; 
 
(3) the goal of R.C. 3345.45 — to effect a change in the ratio between 
faculty activities in order to correct the imbalance between research and teaching at 
four-year undergraduate state institutions — serves a legitimate state interest. 
 
Accordingly, the sole issue remaining for our determination is whether R.C. 
3345.45 rationally relates to a legitimate interest under our interpretation of Ohio’s 
Equal Protection Clause.  CSU asks us to apply federal rational-basis analysis to 
this issue, while AAUP contends that rational-basis review requires a stricter 
analysis under our state’s Constitution. 
 
Under federal rational-basis analysis, a classification “must be upheld 
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of 
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”  Fed. 
Communications Comm.  v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993), 508 U.S. 307, 
313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 221.  A rational relationship will exist 
under rational-basis review if “the relationship of the classification to its goal is not 
 
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so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. [1985], 473 U.S. [432], 446 [105 S.Ct. 3249, 3257, 87 
L.Ed.2d 313, 324].” Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992), 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 
2332, 120 L.Ed.2d 1, 13. 
 
Importantly, a state has no obligation whatsoever “to produce evidence to 
sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.” Heller v. Doe (1993), 509 U.S. 
312, 320,  113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, 271. “[A] legislative choice is 
not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”  Beach Communications, supra, 508 
U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102, 124 L.Ed.2d at 222.  “ ‘[T]he burden is on the one 
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which 
might support it.’ “  Heller, supra, quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts 
Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351, 358.  
Furthermore, “courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a 
legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and 
ends.  A classification does not fail rational-basis review because   ‘ “it is not made 
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” ‘    
Dandridge v. Williams [1970], 397 U.S. [471] 485 [90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 
L.Ed.2d  491, 501-502], quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 
61, 78 [31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377] (1911).  * * *” Heller, 509 U.S. at 
 
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321, 113 S.Ct. at 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d at 271. 
 
Applying the federal standard to its analysis of R.C. 3345.45, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded in Central State that R.C. 3345.45 bears a rational 
relationship to the state’s intended goal and therefore upheld the statute against 
equal protection attack.  The Supreme Court emphasized that this court’s decision 
in AAUP I misapplied the accepted standard of federal rational-basis review by 
requiring the state to produce evidence of the rational relationship between the 
statute and its goal.  Using the appropriate federal analysis, the United States 
Supreme Court reasoned that R.C. 3345.45’s purpose was to correct the imbalance 
between teaching and research in Ohio’s public universities and that the General 
Assembly rationally could have concluded that “the policy animating the law 
would have been undercut and likely varied if it were subject to collective 
bargaining.” Cent. State, 526 U.S. at 128, 119 S.Ct. at 1163, 143 L.Ed.2d at 231.  
The Supreme Court further determined that the state must have considered “the 
attainment of this goal [to be] more important than the system of collective 
bargaining that had previously included university professors.”  Id.  Such a 
rationale, the Supreme Court concluded, passed rational-basis review and survived 
the constitutional challenge.  CSU asks us to apply this reasoning to our Ohio 
constitutional analysis and to uphold the statute as rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest. 
 
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AAUP, however, maintains that Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause is to be 
construed differently from its federal counterpart.  Specifically, AAUP would have 
us modify the application of the federal test to require factual evidence of a rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.  As a result, AAUP contends 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Central State has no bearing upon the Ohio 
analysis because Ohio’s standard is more stringent.  In support of that argument, 
AAUP argues that we have recently adopted just that standard.  AAUP  focuses 
first upon our use of the following “shred of evidence” language in AAUP I:  “We 
have reviewed each of these reports, and all the other evidence contained in the 
record, and can conclude with confidence that there is not a shred of evidence in 
the entire record which links collective bargaining with the decline in teaching 
over the last decade * * *.” 83 Ohio St.3d at 236, 699 N.E.2d at 469.  AAUP 
further calls our attention to a similar statement made in State ex rel. Dayton 
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 44 v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 22 
Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 22 OBR 1, 5, 488 N.E.2d 181, 186:  “If there is a reason for 
exempting Dayton employees from the rights enjoyed by all others, then that 
reason is not contained in the record of this case.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
Despite the use of that language, this court has never held Ohio’s equal 
protection standard to be different from that employed under the federal analysis.  
See, e.g.,  Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 544, 706 N.E.2d 323, 
 
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332; Keaton v. Ribbeck (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 443, 445, 12 O.O.3d 375, 376, 391 
N.E.2d 307, 308, citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 
U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563; Beatty v. Akron City Hosp. (1981), 67 Ohio 
St.2d 483, 491, 21 O.O.3d 302, 307, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-592.  Notably, even the 
courts in Dayton and AAUP I espoused adherence to the federal standard before 
straying from it in the manner set forth above.  For example, the AAUP I majority 
specifically stated that the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses “are 
functionally equivalent, and the standards for determining violations of equal 
protection are essentially the same under state and federal law.” 83 Ohio St.3d at 
233, 699 N.E.2d at 467.  In fact, it was under that reasoning that the AAUP I court 
announced its intention to determine the equal protection issues “under both  * * * 
[the Ohio and United States] constitutional provisions as a single question.”  Id.  
Thus, the AAUP I court had no intention of renouncing the federal standard when it 
suggested that the legislature must provide evidence of a rational relationship — it 
simply misapplied that standard. 
 
This recent confusion concerning the federal standard of rational-basis 
review should not serve as support for its abandonment in Ohio.  The United States 
Supreme Court’s analysis and construction of this standard has evolved over many 
years of review.  It is only one part of a carefully conceived structure of equal 
protection review, with each section occupying its own place in a larger scheme. 
 
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Were we to modify this portion of the review in the manner suggested by AAUP I 
and Dayton and impose greater judicial scrutiny on classifications under rational-
basis review, every other step of the analysis would likewise be disturbed.  We see 
no reason to create such a disturbance when the existing federal standard is 
workable and exceedingly well reasoned.  We affirm, therefore, that the federal 
and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses are to be construed and analyzed identically.  
We also specifically set forth that the state has no obligation to produce evidence 
to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification under Ohio’s standard of 
rational-basis review. 
 
Having confirmed that Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause tracks its federal  
counterpart, we follow the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Central 
State and hold that the classification contained in R.C. 3345.45 does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution because it is rationally related to 
a legitimate government interest. 
Section 34, Article II 
 
AAUP next challenges the constitutionality of R.C. 3345.45 under Section 
34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  That section provides: “Laws may be 
passed fixing and regulating the hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and 
providing for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all employe[e]s; 
and no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power.” 
 
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AAUP urges us to construe Section 34 as a restriction upon the General 
Assembly’s authority to pass employee-related legislation.  Specifically,  AAUP 
argues that only those laws benefiting employees may be enacted, while laws 
burdening employees are unconstitutional as violative of Section 34.  Based upon 
that reasoning, AAUP argues that R.C. 3345.45 is unconstitutional because it 
burdens rather than benefits employees.  We disagree with AAUP’s reasoning, as it 
compels unsound results both in this specific instance as well as in the broader 
context. 
 
This court has repeatedly interpreted Section 34, Article II as a broad grant 
of authority to the General Assembly,  not as a limitation on its power to enact 
legislation. See, e.g., Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 43 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 14, 539 N.E.2d 103, 114.  AAUP’s position would require Section 34 to be 
read as a limitation, in effect stating: “No law shall be passed on the subject of 
employee working conditions unless it furthers the comfort, health, safety and 
general welfare of all employees.”  Under that approach, however, Section 34 
would prohibit all legislation imposing any burden whatsoever on employees, 
regardless of how beneficial to the public that legislation might be. The invalidity 
of this position becomes strikingly apparent when viewed in the context of existing 
employment-related laws. 
 
The General Assembly routinely enacts legislation that serves precisely the 
 
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purpose AAUP would have us declare impermissible.  R.C. 3319.22, for instance, 
allows rules imposing continuing education requirements upon teachers; R.C. 
109.801 requires police officers to undergo annual firearm training; public 
employees are limited by R.C. 102.03 in gifts they may receive; and classified 
employees are limited in their solicitations of political contributions under R.C. 
124.57.  Furthermore, employees of Head Start agencies and out-of-home child 
care employees must submit to criminal record checks (R.C. 3301.32 and 
2151.86); teachers and other school employees may be required to undergo  
physical examinations in certain instances at the discretion of school physicians 
(R.C. 3313.71); an employee who contracts AIDS from a fellow employee has no 
cause of action in negligence against his employer (R.C. 3701.249); and board of 
health employees dealing with solid and infectious waste are required to complete 
certain training and certification programs (R.C. 3734.02). 
 
These statutes provide only a few examples of laws burdening employees 
based upon legislative decisions to regulate the employment sector in the public 
interest.  None of these statutes was enacted to benefit employees, but there can be 
no question that they constitute important legislation that the General Assembly 
has the constitutional authority to enact. 
 
R.C. 3345.45 is no different.  Here, the state identified a disturbing trend in 
faculty workload at public universities.  As with each of the above statutes, the 
 
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General Assembly considered this to be a situation where the public interest 
necessitated legislative intervention.  It enacted a law, therefore, to address and 
modify the existing concern.  Jurists may not agree that such a remedy is the best 
or most effective means of resolving the problem.  Nevertheless, the remedy must 
be upheld unless it constitutes a plain affront to a specific provision of the 
Constitution. 
 
We conclude that R.C. 3345.45 does not constitute such an affront to Section 
34, Article II.  As set forth above, the public’s interest in the regulation of the 
employment sector often requires legislation that burdens rather than benefits 
employees.  Section 34 should continue to be interpreted as a broad grant of 
authority to the General Assembly to pass such legislation. 
 
We hold, therefore, that R.C. 3345.45 is a valid exercise of legislative 
authority under Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  The judgment of 
the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., dissent.