Title: Wolinski v. Wolinski

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAURIE G. WOLINSKI, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 432, 2002 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  State of Delaware in and  
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MICHAEL L. WOLINSKI, 
 
)  File No. CN01-06477 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  February 19, 2003 
Decided:  April 8, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 8th day of April 2003, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
1. 
This is an appeal from a decision and order of the Family Court of 
Delaware concerning a property division following the divorce of Laurie and 
Michael Wolinski.  Following a hearing on January 29, 2002, the trial judge issued 
a Decision and Order on March 25, 2002.  On June 28, 2002, the trial judge issued 
a Letter Decision and Order granting in part and denying in part Wife’s Motion for 
Reargument.  Wife raises two issues in this appeal: (i) the trial judge erred by 
finding that the home constituted a marital asset and (ii) the trial judge abused his 
discretion when he valued the marital home at $57, 314. 
 
2
 
2. 
Husband and Wife married on May 26, 1990 and divorced on March 
29, 2001.  They lived in a Cochran Street home for most of the marriage.  Wife’s 
mother owned the Cochran Street property.  Husband and Wife paid rent to Wife’s 
mother. 
 
3. 
During the parties’ marriage, Wife’s name was added to the title of 
the Cochran Street property.  In her testimony, Wife explained that the parties 
needed more room at the Cochran Street property, and wanted to construct an 
addition to the home.  Wife claimed that her mother could not obtain financing to 
construct the addition.  Consequently, they decided to add Wife’s name to the title 
of the property so that her income could be considered in obtaining the $50,000 
needed for the addition.  Despite the change in title, the parties continued to act as 
tenants.  They paid no portion of the loan and did not claim deductions for interest 
or taxes on their income tax forms.   
 
4. 
The $50,000 Wife’s mother borrowed did pay not the full costs of the 
addition.  Husband and Wife secured an additional $20,000 loan and repaid it 
during the marriage.  During trial, Husband never asserted that the property 
constituted a marital asset.  On the contrary, Husband limited his claim to a share 
of the $20,000 loan.   
 
5. 
The trial judge found that Wife’s interest in the property constituted a 
marital asset subject to distribution because Wife acquired an interest during the 
 
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marriage.  The trial judge noted that Wife purchased the property outright from her 
mother after the divorce and concluded that the “timing of the purchase implies 
that this transaction was not at ‘arm’s length.’”1  In determining a value for the 
property, the trial judge noted the absence of evidence for valuation purposes, and 
used the value of the improvements to value that asset. 
 
6. 
Wife now appeals the Family Court’s findings and judgment.  She 
argues: (i) that the trial judge erred by determining that the Cochran Street property 
was a marital asset subject to division; and (ii) that the trial judge abused his 
discretion when he determined the home’s value to be $57, 314.  
 
7. 
This Court’s review of appeals from the Family Court extends to 
review of the facts and law as well as to a review of the inferences and deductions 
made by the trial judge.2  This Court will not disturb findings of fact unless they 
are clearly wrong and justice requires that they be overturned.3  This Court will not 
substitute its own opinion for the inferences and deductions made by the trial judge 
if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical 
deductive process.4 
 
8. 
Wife claims that the trial judge erred when he determined the Cochran 
Street property to be a marital asset subject to division.  Wife claims  (and 
                                                 
1 Wolinski v. Wolinski, Del. Fam. Ct., No. CN01-06477, Buckworth, J. (March 25, 2002) 
2 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
3 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983) (citing Wife (J.F.V.), 402 A.2d at 1204). 
4 Solis, 468 A.2d at 1279. 
 
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Husband does not dispute) that her name was added to the title for the purpose of 
obtaining financing and that she acquired no equitable interest in the property.  
Wife also complains that the trial judge’s conclusion that the after-divorce 
purchase of the mother’s home was not at arm’s length surprised her at trial.  Wife 
claims that with notice that the matter would be raised either by husband or sua 
sponte by the Court that she would have presented evidence to the contrary.   
 
9. 
When Wife acquired a legal interest in 1995, the property became a 
marital asset pursuant to 13 Del. C. § 1513.  13 Del. C. § 1513 states in part:  “All 
property acquired by either party subsequent to the marriage is presumed to be 
marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the parties in 
some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common or tenancy 
by the entirety.”5  The Cochran Street property was presumed to be a marital asset 
when Wife, during the marriage, acquired a legal interest by having her name put 
on the title to secure the loan.  
 
10. 
However, the presumption that the property was marital property 
pursuant to 13 Del. C. §1513(c) is a rebuttable presumption that may “[be] 
overcome by showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in 
paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (b) of this section.”6  Wife could have 
rebutted the presumption that the Cochran Street property was a marital asset 
                                                 
5 13 Del. C. §1513 (c). 
6 13 Del. C. §1513 (c). 
 
5
subject to a property division by establishing that she acquired her interest by one 
of the methods contemplated by §1513(b).  Wife presented no evidence to show 
that the Cochran Street property met any of the criteria set out in 13 Del. C.  
§1513(b) that would have rebutted the presumption that property acquired during a 
marriage by either party was marital property subject to a marital property division 
order upon divorce.  The trial judge’s conclusory remarks that the wife’s post-
divorce purchase of her mother’s interest was not at arms length has no bearing on 
the statute’s declaration that acquisition of an interest during the marriage makes 
that interest fair game for a property division hearing.  The statute itself put wife 
on notice to be prepared to rebut any inference that her acquisition of any interest 
in the Cochran Street property constituted marital property subject to division in 
the wake of a divorce.   
 
11. 
The trial judge carefully discussed the different methods of valuation 
traditionally applied by the Family Court.  The trial judge determined that the best 
method was to determine “deposit and down payment toward the purchase price, 
the cost of improvements, and the actual payments on any loan borrowed for 
improvements and mortgage payments.”7  However, the trial judge concluded that 
he could not accurately employ that method because he lacked any documentation 
of the value of the Cochran Street property.  In his attempt to assign a fair and 
                                                 
7 See Albanese v. Albanese, Del. Fam. Ct., No. CN93-09486 (June 28, 1996).  
 
6
reasonable value to the Cochran Street property, the trial judge used the method 
discussed in In re D.K.H.8  Without an appraisal or any direct evidence of the value 
of the property, other than the cost of the improvements made to the property, the 
In re D.K.H. court valued the property at the cost of the specific improvements to 
the residence.9   
 
12. 
Here, the trial judge determined that improvements to the Cochran 
Street property totaled $63,022.00.  However, after re-argument, the judge 
deducted $6,022.00 which represented the value of the non-fixtures and personality 
that would be divided as personal furnishings. 
 
13. 
Valuations of real and personal property in marital property divisions 
ancillary to a divorce are highly discretionary exercises of equitable power.  Where 
parties offer no evidence of value, we conclude that they must accept the trial 
judge’s best efforts at determining a value.  We will not disturb the findings and 
conclusions of a trial judge, where as here the trial judge used an orderly and 
logical deductive process to determine value.  At the very least, given the evidence 
the trial judge had available, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. 
                                                 
8  2001 WL 1773595 (Del. Fam. Ct.) 
9 In re D.K.H., 2001 WL 1773595 *4 (Del. Fam. Ct.) 
 
7
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice