Title: Police Patrol v. Prince George's Cty

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Police Patrol Security Systems v. Prince George’s County
No. 29, September Term, 2003
MARYLAND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT (MPIA) – EXEMPTION – LOCAL
COUNTY ORDINANCE
A county ordinance alone may not be the basis for an exemption to the general public
disclosure obligations of the MPIA.  There are no discrete “public interest,” “personal
information” or “unwarranted invasion of privacy” exceptions to the MPIA.  
Circuit Court for Prince  George ’s County
Case # CAL 01-29239
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 29
September Term, 2003
POLICE PATROL
SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.
 v.
 
PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY, MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   December 18, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this
Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
and adoption of this opinion. 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references in this opinion are to the MPIA,
Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol, 2003 Cum. Supp.), §§10-611 to 10-628 of the State
Government Article.
2 During the pendency of the Circuit Court action, a potentially relevant amendment
to the MPIA took effect.  The amendment allowed a custodian of records to deny inspection
of records relating to “alarm or security systems or technologies” if the custodian believed
that disclosure was contrary to the public interest.  The County did not bring the amendment
to the attention of the Circuit Court, and there is no indication from the sparse record that
the Circuit Court considered or applied the amendment in its disposition of the case.
Police Patrol Security Systems, Inc. (“Police Patrol”), a Virginia corporation
authorized to transact business in Maryland, installs, maintains, and monitors electronic
security and alarm systems in buildings.  In 2001, Police Patrol requested of the County
Executive of Prince George’s County, Maryland that it be provided with the “name, address,
and telephone number of every resident or business” that maintained an electronic security
or alarm system in the county.  Prince George’s County (“the County”) maintained records
of such information because of its legislative requirement that such systems be registered
with the County’s police department.  Police Patrol based its request on the Maryland Public
Information Act (“the MPIA”).1  The County denied Police Patrol’s request, claiming that
a provision in its relevant registration ordinance made the information confidential.  The
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County upheld the County’s decision to deny the request.2
Before the Court of Special Appeals decided Police Patrol’s appeal, this Court, on its own
initiative, issued a writ of certiorari.  Police Patrol v. Prince George’s County, 376 Md. 49,
827 A.2d 112 (2003).
I.
2
Prince George’s County Code (“PGCC”) § 9-134 (1999 ed.) (“the Ordinance”)
requires the user of every building alarm system within the county to register with the
County’s police department.  Alarm users are required to file an application and submit a fee
as part of the registration process.  Once registered, users must display an alarm registration
sticker, bearing their permit number, at the main entrance of the building.  The Prince
George’s County Police Department maintains a record of each applicant, including name,
address, telephone number, and the type of alarm installed.  According to the Ordinance, this
information “shall be securely maintained and restricted to inspection only by police officers
or County employees specifically assigned the responsibility for handling and processing
alarm user permits in the course of official duties.”  PGCC § 9-134(d).  The Ordinance also
provides that it shall be deemed a misdemeanor for any County employee to disclose the
information.  Id.
Police Patrol’s local attorney sent the following letter, dated 10 August 2001, to the
Hon. Wayne Curry, then County Executive of Prince George’s County:
“Dear Mr. Curry:
“This firm represents Police Patrol Security Systems, Inc.  This is a
freedom of information request under Md. State Government Code Ann. § 10-
613 (2001) submitted on behalf of our client.
“We are requesting information related to Prince George’s County
residents, who subscribe to alarm services, be provided for our client’s
business use.  Specifically, we request the name, address, and telephone
number of every resident or business that subscribes to a security system
provider that utilizes the services of or is registered with the Prince George’s
County Police Department.  
“We are prepared to pay reasonable costs for compiling the requested
information and reproducing it.
3
“Please contact our office if you have any questions regarding this
request.  Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.”
The request was forwarded to the Prince George’s County Attorney’s Office (Office of
Law).  That office responded with the following letter, dated 10 September 2001:
“Dear Mr. []:
“The [Prince George’s County] Office of Law is in receipt of your
letter dated August 10, 2001 under the Maryland Public Information Act
(“MPIA”) and requesting information related to Prince George’s County
resident[s] that subscribe to alarm services.  Specifically, you have requested
the name, address, and telephone number of every resident or business that
subscribes to a security system provider that utilizes the services of or is
registered with the Prince George’s County Police Department.
“Section 9-134(d) of the Prince George’s County Code prescribes that
alarm user permit information is securely maintained and is “restricted to
inspection only by police officers or County employees specifically assigned
the responsibility for handling and processing alarm user permits in the course
of official duties.”  Further, the law provides criminal sanctions for revealing
the information contained [in] the alarm user permit applications to any other
person without the applicant’s consent.
“As you know, the MPIA requires the custodian of a public record to
deny disclosure of a public record if that document is confidential by law.
Since Section 9-134 of the Prince George’s County Code prohibits disclosure
of this confidential document, please be advised that the custodian hereby
denies your request
“Please be further advised that you may seek judicial review of this
decision pursuant to Section 10-623, State Government, Annotated Code of
Maryland.”
On 20 December 2001, Police Patrol filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince
Georges County.  Police Patrol requested that the Circuit Court order the County to produce
the records.  The County responded by asserting that the Ordinance declared the information
that Police Patrol requested to be confidential or privileged, within the meaning of those
terms as used in the MPIA, and that the County therefore was required to withhold the
3 During the course of the hearing, the Circuit Court referred to the complaint as
seeking a writ of mandamus.  This confusion appears to be due to the erroneous docketing
of the case by the Clerk’s office as a mandamus action, instead of a request for an
affirmative injunction.  Police Patrol points out that the burden of proof in a mandamus
action is on the moving party (which in this case would be Police Patrol), as opposed to the
burden of proof in a suit challenging the denial of a request under the MPIA, where the
custodian of records who denied the request (here the County), shoulders the burden.  Police
Patrol argues that, because the Circuit Court placed the burden of proof on Police Patrol
rather than the County, the judgment should be reversed.  This argument need not be
resolved in this case because no material facts were in dispute.  Because the facts in this case
are undisputed, the issue of who bore the burden of proof is irrelevant.  Accordingly, we
shall focus our attention on the question of whether Police Patrol’s request was denied
rightfully by the County as a matter of law.
4
information.  The Circuit Court held a hearing on 10 October 2002, at the conclusion of
which it denied Police Patrol’s request for an injunction, relying on the rationale supplied
by the County.  Police Patrol appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, posing the following
questions, which we have slightly rephrased.  
1.
Did the Circuit Court err by treating this action as a mandamus action instead of an
action under the Maryland Public Information Act, thereby improperly placing the
burden of proof on Police Patrol rather than Prince George’s County.[3]
2.
Did the Circuit Court err by finding that the request for information by Police Patrol
Security Systems, Inc., was rightfully denied by Prince George’s County.
II.
A.
The Circuit Court agreed with the County that § 9-134(d) of the Prince George’s
County Code makes personal information submitted by an applicant for an alarm user’s
permit confidential for the purposes of denying disclosure under the MPIA.  As we shall
5
discuss in more detail below, the General Assembly did not intend to allow counties, by
local law or ordinance, to create additional exemptions or grounds for refusing disclosure
of information required by the MPIA to be disclosed.  The argument based on the Ordinance
was the only ground advanced by the County for denying Police Patrol access to the
information requested.  Further, the Circuit Court  appears to have relied solely on this
rationale to support its decision to uphold the County’s denial.  That was erroneous as a
matter of law.  
In the period between the filing of Police Patrol’s complaint and the Circuit Court’s
hearing and ruling in this case, however, a potentially relevant amendment, titled “Public
Security Documents,” was added to the MPIA.  2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 3.  The amendment
was designated an “emergency measure” and took effect immediately upon enactment on
9 April 2002. The goal of the new amendment was to give records custodians greater
discretion to deny requests for information that might compromise the security of buildings
or facilities.  One of its provisions allows a records custodian to withhold information about
“alarm or security systems or technologies” for any building, structure, or facility if the
disclosure of that information would be contrary to the public interest.  The record of this
case indicates that neither the Circuit Court nor the parties considered the new amendment
at the Circuit Court hearing.  Because of the language of the pertinent amendment to the
MPIA and the timing of its enaction vis à vis the proceedings in this case, the County must
be given a fresh opportunity to consider Police Patrol’s request.
6
B.
The County argues that the Ordinance justifies non-disclosure of the personal
information supplied by residents who applied for alarm user registration permits.  The
source of this justification begins with § 10-615(1) of the MPIA.  Section 10-615(1)
prohibits a custodian from disclosing public records if “by law, the public record is
privileged or confidential.”  The Ordinance, at PGCC § 9-134(d), requires the County’s
Chief of Police to “securely” maintain registration information and restrict inspection to
police or County employees, in the course of official duties, having responsibility for the
pertinent registration process.  A breach of the Ordinance in this regard is punishable as a
misdemeanor.  Thus, as the County’s argument goes, the Ordinance is a “law” within the
meaning of MPIA § 10-615(1) and that “law” essentially makes the information sought by
Police Patrol “privileged or confidential” within the State statute.
We previously considered the interplay between local laws and the MPIA.  In Caffrey
v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 370 Md. 272, 805 A.2d 268 (2002), we determined that § 505
of the Montgomery County Charter was partially preempted by the MPIA.  In the Caffrey
case, Anthony Caffrey submitted a proposal to operate and manage a county-owned, retail
off-sale alcoholic beverage store.  Montgomery County denied his proposal.  Caffrey
subsequently filed a series of requests, under the MPIA, to inspect “various documents
relating to the relevant proposal and selection process.”  370 Md. at 278-79, 805 A.2d at
272.   Montgomery County “produced some of the documents, but withheld others, citing
7
various privileges and grounds for denial available under the MPIA.”  Id.  Caffrey argued
that Montgomery County, in withholding certain documents, had violated § 505 of the
Montgomery County Charter as well as the MPIA.  According to Caffrey, the County
Charter “creates ‘much narrower’ exemptions from disclosure ‘than those available under
the MPIA,’ and, ‘in effect[,] waives the broader, permissible exemptions under the MPIA.’”
370 Md. at 298, 805 A.2d at 283. 
In considering Caffrey’s argument, we divided the allowed grounds for denial of a
request for information under the MPIA into two classes: the “mandatory denials” (§§ 10-
615, 10-616, and 10-617) and the “permissible denials” (§ 10-618).  In our discussion of
mandatory denials, we noted that a county charter is subordinate to the public general laws
of Maryland.  370 Md. at 302, 805 A.2d at 286 (citing Md. Const. Art. XI-A, § 1).  A local
government ordinance or charter that conflicts with a public general law enacted by the
General Assembly is preempted and thus is invalid.  Id. (citing Montrose Christian Sch.
Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 579, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001)).  Each of the mandatory
denial provisions in the MPIA requires a custodian of records to refuse inspection of certain
records.  Thus, a county ordinance or charter that requires a custodian to act differently is
preempted.
In Caffrey, this meant that the Montgomery County Charter, even if construed as
granting greater accessibility to information than the MPIA, could not require County
officials to disclose information that the MPIA’s mandatory denial provisions required them
4 The situation in Caffrey was complicated by the fact that the custodians of some of
the requested records were attorneys representing Montgomery County.  The Caffrey Court
cited Harris v. Baltimore Sun Co. for the proposition that, “[i]f the requested public record
is ‘information relating to representation of a client,’ which, if disclosed by the attorney,
would place the attorney in violation of [Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
for Lawyers Rule] 1.6, the information is confidential under § 10-615(1) and not to be
produced under the Act.”  Harris, 330 Md. 595, 604-05, 625 A.2d 941, 945 (1993) (quoting
MRPC Rule 1.6, “Confidentiality of information”); see also § 10-615(1) (“A custodian shall
deny inspection of a public record or any part of a public record if[,] by law, the public
record is privileged or confidential...”).  In Harris, the relevant information was not
privileged because it did not fall under the attorney-client privilege, but it was found to be
confidential because it was the type of information an attorney is barred from disclosing
under MRPC Rule 1.6.  The information requested in Caffrey was of the type that is
normally subject to the attorney-client privilege.
Because § 10-615 is one of the mandatory denial provisions (“A custodian shall...”),
the Caffrey court found that an attorney representing a county could not disclose the
(continued...)
8
to withhold.  Under such circumstances, the Charter is preempted.   In other words, home
rule counties may not waive the duty to deny MPIA requests imposed on their officials by
the mandatory provisions of the MPIA.
In contrast, the “permissible denial” provisions of the MPIA authorize custodians to
exercise discretion in granting or denying requests for certain information.  Therefore, home
rule counties may direct or guide the exercise of this discretion, or even eliminate it entirely,
by local enactment.  To the extent that a county charter waives the authority vested in its
officials to deny requests under the permissible denials provisions of the MPIA, that waiver
may be effective.  Montgomery County officials in Caffrey were not entitled to withhold
information that the Montgomery County Charter required them to disclose, even though
that information might have been withheld under § 10-618 of the MPIA.4
4(...continued)
information absent a waiver of privilege from his or her client (Montgomery County).  The
Court found, however, that § 505 of the Montgomery County Charter effectuated such a
waiver.  Because Montgomery County had waived its right as a client to withhold certain
information under the attorney-client privilege, that information was deemed subject to
disclosure.
9
Though the situation in the present case is reversed from that in Caffrey, with Prince
George’s County arguing that a county ordinance requires its officials to withhold
information, the relevant legal principles to be applied are the same.  According to PGCC
§ 9-134(d): 
The information contained in an alarm user permit application required by this
Section and other information received by the Chief of Police through
correspondence or communications with an alarm user shall be securely
maintained and restricted to inspection only by police officers or County
employees specifically assigned the responsibility for handling and processing
alarm user permits in the course of official duties.  If any employee of the
County is found to have knowingly or willfully revealed the information
contained in an alarm user permit application or in correspondence or
communications with an alarm user to any other person for any purpose not
related to this Subtitle or official law enforcement matters and without the
express written consent of the alarm user supplying such information, the
County employee shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The MPIA requires that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall permit
a person or governmental unit to inspect any public record at any reasonable time.”  § 10-
613(a).  Standing alone, these two provisions appear to conflict with one another.   “A local
ordinance is pre-empted by conflict when it prohibits an activity which is intended to be
permitted by state law, or permits an activity which is intended to be prohibited by state
law.”  Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 580, 770 A.2d 111, 120
5 It should go without saying that, although not enumerated specifically, the
Constitution of Maryland, Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Constitution of the United
States of America are potential sources of law that could create exemptions to the MPIA.
(continued...)
10
(2001).  
The County argues that § 10-615(1), which requires that a custodian deny inspection
of a record if, “by law, the public record is privileged or confidential,” saves its ordinance
from preemption.  According to the County, its ordinance makes the data collected in alarm
user applications confidential “by law.”  Because the custodian is required to deny
inspection of confidential information, the County was justified in withholding the
information Police Patrol requested.
To the contrary, the General Assembly never intended to give counties the right to
create additional or new non-disclosure exceptions not contemplated within the MPIA by
declaring information “confidential” in local laws. § 10-615 reads: 
A custodian shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a public record if:
(1) by law, the public record is privileged or confidential; or
(2) the inspection would be contrary to:
(i) a State statute;
(ii) a federal statute or a regulation that is issued under the statute and
has the force of law;
(iii) the rules adopted by the Court of Appeals; or
(iv) an order of a court of record.
The sources of “law” listed in § 10-615(2) apply equally to § 10-615(1).  In other words, no
public record may be considered confidential or privileged unless a basis for that is found
in one of those enumerated sources of law.5  Local ordinances are not among those sources.
5(...continued)
See Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2000).
11
Accordingly, a local law or ordinance may not make a particular public record or piece of
public information “privileged or confidential” for the purposes of the MPIA unless one of
the sources of law listed in § 10-615(2) does so or authorizes the adoption of such.
This analysis is consistent with our previous decisions construing and applying the
MPIA, where we confirmed that constitutional, statutory, and rule-based law may make
records confidential or privileged, but where no such authority was found to exist for that
accomplishment by local laws and ordinances.  See Office of the Governor v. Washington
Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2000)  (executive privilege, which is rooted in the
concept of separation of powers inherent in the Maryland 
Constitution, may sometimes make
certain information confidential for the purposes of the MPIA); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 755 A.2d 1130 (2000) (the right to a fair trial,
found in Maryland and U.S. Constitutions, can justify the closing of a courtroom and the
sealing of a trial record from the public in limited cases); Office of the Attorney General v.
Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 753 A.2d 1036 (2000) (Md. Rule 2-402(c) makes attorney work
product privileged for MPIA purposes); Office of the State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch,
Inc., 356 Md. 118, 737 A.2d 592 (1999) (Md. Rule 4-642 makes grand jury investigation
materials confidential for MPIA purposes); Harris v. Baltimore Sun Co., 330 Md. 595, 625
A.2d 941 (1993) (the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers, adopted by the
12
Court of Appeals, see Maryland Rule 16-812, can make information confidential for MPIA
purposes).  
III.
The County presents us with two alternative grounds for affirming the Circuit Court’s
judgment: an imagined MPIA “Personal Information Exception” and the 2002 amendment
to the MPIA entitled “Public Security Documents” (see slip op. at 1, n.2, and 5).  An
appellate court may affirm the Circuit Court's decision on a ground adequately supported by
the record even though the ground was not relied upon by the trial court, and it is not
uncommon for this Court to exercise its discretion and affirm a trial court on such alternative
grounds.  See, e.g., Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E. Church, 375 Md. 59, 68-69, 825 A.2d 388, 393
(2003).  This case, however, is not amenable to such treatment in its current posture.
The only issue presented in the Circuit Court was whether the County’s justification,
under its ordinance, for denying Police Patrol’s request was authorized as a matter of law.
We hold that it was not.  It is not consistent logically to say that the County’s justification
for denying the request was sufficient on grounds other than those supplied by the County.
We cannot say what the County would have done had it known that its initial and, until
appeal, sole justification was legally insufficient.  Furthermore, at least one of the alternative
grounds presented by the County requires it to exercise discretion and consider factors that
we cannot say, on the record before us, necessarily were considered previously.  We may not
exercise the County’s discretion in its place, and so the matter must be remanded for the
6 Police Patrol argues that the second alternative grounds presented by the County,
the 2002 “Public Security Documents” amendment to the MPIA, was not preserved properly
for appellate review consideration.  For reasons we shall explain, we need not decide
whether the point was preserved.
13
County to make a new determination.6 
A.
As we previously expressed, and as we reiterate today, there are no discrete “public
interest,” “personal information,” or “unwarranted invasion of privacy” exceptions to the
MPIA.  See Washington Post, 360 Md. at 554, 759 A.2d at 268 (“the Maryland Public
Information Act does not contain a general ‘catchall’ public interest exemption. Instead, for
a record to be exempt from disclosure because of the ‘public interest,’ it must fall within one
of the specific categories set forth in § 10-618.”); Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74,
88-89, 721 A.2d 196, 203 (1998) (“the Maryland Public Information Act does not contain
an exemption for particular cases whenever the disclosure of a record might cause an
“unwarranted invasion of privacy.”).
The apparent sources of the County’s confusion on this point are §§ 10-612(b) and
10-626. Section 10-612 gives the public a broad right to access and inspect public records:
(a) General right to information. -- All persons are entitled to have access to
information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public
officials and employees.
(b) General construction. -- To carry out the right set forth in subsection (a)
of this section, unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in
interest would result, [the MPIA] shall be construed in favor of permitting
inspection of a public record, with the least cost and least delay to the person
or governmental unit that requests the inspection.  
14
§ 10-612 (emphasis added).  The County claims that the highlighted language creates a
general catchall power on the part of custodians to deny requests that would create an
“unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest.”  In fact, the highlighted
language is part of an internal statutory construction provision having no independent effect.
The language directs that the MPIA be construed more narrowly, and its exemptions more
broadly, when privacy issues are at stake.  Nonetheless, a records custodian still must find
some basis in law for the denial of a request before choosing to withhold public records.
Like § 10-612, § 10-626 addresses the privacy concerns inherent in a statute like the
MPIA, but stops short of creating any new exemptions:
(a) Liability. -- A person, including an officer or employee of a governmental
unit, is liable to an individual for actual damages that the court considers
appropriate if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) (i) the person willfully and knowingly permits inspection or use of a public
record in violation of [the MPIA]; and
(ii) the public record names or, with reasonable certainty, otherwise identifies
the individual by an identifying factor...
(2) the person willfully and knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses personal
information in violation of § 10-616 (p) of [the MPIA].
§ 10-626 (emphasis added).  While § 10-626 creates a civil penalty for the improper
disclosure of personal information, it does not create an exemption for personal information.
Instead, as the highlighted language indicates, liability under § 10-626 is contingent on a
finding of a violation of a separate provision of the MPIA.
15
B.
On 9 April 2002, the Maryland General Assembly enacted an amendment to the
MPIA  entitled “Public Security Documents.”  2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 3.  The amendment
was designated an emergency measure and took effect immediately upon enactment.  It
added a new section (j) to § 10-618, recognizing a new permissive denial basis:
(a) In general. -- Unless otherwise provided by law, if a custodian believes
that inspection of a part of a public record by the applicant would be contrary
to the public interest, the custodian may deny inspection by the applicant of
that part, as provided in this section.
* * *
(j) Denial of inspection. –
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection, a
custodian may deny inspection of:
(i) response procedures or plans prepared to prevent or respond
to emergency situations, the disclosure of which would reveal
vulnerability assessments, specific tactics, specific emergency
procedures, or specific security procedures;
(ii) 
1. building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings,
diagrams, operational manuals, or other records of
airports and other mass transit facilities, bridges, tunnels,
emergency response facilities or structures, buildings
where hazardous materials are stored, arenas, stadiums,
waste and water systems, and any other building,
structure, or facility, the disclosure of which would
reveal the building's, structure's or facility's internal
layout, specific location, life, safety, and support
systems, structural elements, surveillance techniques,
alarm or security systems or technologies, operational
and transportation plans or protocols, or personnel
deployments; or
2. records of any other building, structure, or facility, the
disclosure of which would reveal the building's,
structure's, or facility's life, safety, and support systems,
surveillance techniques, alarm or security systems or
technologies, operational and evacuation plans or
16
protocols, or personnel deployments; or
(iii) records prepared to prevent or respond to emergency
situations identifying or describing the name, location,
pharmaceutical cache, contents, capacity, equipment, physical
features, or capabilities of individual medical facilities, storage
facilities, or laboratories.
(2) The custodian may deny inspection of a part of a public record
under paragraph (1) of this subsection only to the extent that the
inspection would:
(i) jeopardize the security of any building, structure, or facility;
(ii) facilitate the planning of a terrorist attack; or
(iii) endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.
(3) 
(i) Subject to subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, a custodian
may not deny inspection of a public record under paragraph (1)
or (2) of this subsection that relates to a building, structure, or
facility that has been subjected to a catastrophic event,
including a fire, explosion, or natural disaster.
(ii) This paragraph does not apply to the records of any
building, structure, or facility owned or operated by the State or
any of its political subdivisions.
(4) 
(i) Subject to paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection and
subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, a custodian may not deny
inspection of a public record that relates to an inspection of or
issuance of a citation concerning a building, structure, or facility
by an agency of the State or any political subdivision.
(ii) This paragraph does not apply to the records of any
building, structure, or facility owned or operated by the State or
any of its political subdivisions.
Section 10-618(j)(1)(ii)(2) authorizes a records custodian to deny a request that would
disclose information about “alarm or security systems or technologies” for private buildings
if the custodian believes that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. 
The amendment was enacted after Police Patrol filed its complaint in the Circuit
Court, but before that court rendered its judgment.  As noted previously, the amendment was
not addressed by the Circuit Court or by any of the parties before the Circuit Court.  This
17
raises the question of whether the County or the Circuit Court should have considered the
amendment in rendering their respective decisions, and whether the amendment should be
considered now.
“[A] statute, though applied only in legal proceedings subsequent to its effective date
and in that sense, at least, prospective, is, when applied  so as to determine the legal
significance of acts or events that occurred prior to its effective date, applied retroactively.”
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 289-90, 829 A.2d 611, 618-19 (2003).  Police Patrol’s
initial request, however, is now stale (that is, the information it sought in August of 2001
likely has changed over the passage of time).  Police Patrol conceded at oral argument before
us that, were it to prevail on appeal on the sole issue of law decided by the Circuit Court, its
request for information must be considered as seeking that information as it is recorded
presently.  Police Patrol does not now seek the names, addresses and telephone numbers of
every registered alarm user in the County as they were recorded in August 2001.  Rather,
Police Patrol seeks the current information contained in County records.  We, and ultimately
the County, therefore must review the request according to the current provisions of the
MPIA, including the 2002 amendment.
Section 10-618(j) necessarily must be taken into account when making a
determination whether to grant Police Patrol’s request.
When an issue is raised regarding whether a statute may be given retroactive
effect, we engage in a two-part analysis. First, we must determine whether the
Legislature intended the statute to have the kind of retroactive effect that is
asserted.... If we conclude that the Legislature did intend for the statute to
7 In testimony in support of the bill, Danna Kauffman of the Governor’s Legislative
Office declared that “it has become clear that there are certain records in the possession of
State and local governments that, if released, could pose a threat to the public.”  Danna L.
Kauffman, State Government – Access to Public Records – Public Security Documents
([2002] Senate Bill 240), at 1 (28 February 2002) (located in Senate Education, Health, and
Environmental Affairs Committee bill file for 2002 Senate Bill 240).
18
have retroactive effect, we must then examine whether such effect would
contravene some Constitutional right or prohibition.... [T]hat analysis must
take into account both Federal and Maryland  provisions, as to which the
standards differ.
Kim, 376 Md. at 289-90, 829 A.2d at 618-19 (emphasis removed).  
The law was enacted as an emergency measure.  A joint task force appointed by the
Governor, Speaker of the House, and President of the Senate submitted the amendment as
part of a package of bills in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11
September 2001.  See Ryan Wilson, Department of Legislative Services Fiscal Note –
Revised, at 3 (25 March 2002) (located in Senate Education, Health, and Environmental
Affairs Committee bill file for 2002 Senate Bill 240). The amendment was intended
immediately to authorize the potential non-disclosure of records listed in § 10-618(j) to the
public before more lives or property could be put at risk.  The goal was to protect
information.7  Thus, the amendment, in order to effectuate its objective, applies to all
covered information that already has not been disclosed to the public, including requests that
were pending and denials appealed as of the time of its enactment.
This approach is consistent with the reasoning in Southwest Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. United States Dep't of Agric., 314 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).  In that case, the
8 The purpose of the Maryland Public Information Act is virtually identical to that of
the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2003): to provide the public the right to inspect the records of the
State government or of a political subdivision.  Fioretti v. Maryland State Bd. of Dental
Exam'rs, 351 Md. 66, 76, 716 A.2d 258, 263 (1998).  Moreover, the historical development
of portions of the MPIA parallel those of its federal counterpart. Under these circumstances,
the interpretation of the FOIA by federal courts is persuasive.  Id.
19
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, interpreting the Federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),8 found that the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona was
correct in applying an exemption that had been enacted after the plaintiff’s request for
information was lodged.  In March 1998, the Southwest Center for Biological Diversity
(“the Center”) filed a FOIA request with the U.S. Forest Service regarding data the Forest
Service had gathered on the Northern Goshawk, a rare western bird of prey.  314 F.3d at
1061.  When the Center did not receive a response, it brought an action in federal district
court to compel the Forest Service to release the information.  Id.  While the action was
pending in the district court, Congress enacted the 1998 Parks Act.  In relevant part, the
Parks Act provided that “information concerning the nature and specific location of a
National Park System resource which is endangered, threatened, [or] rare...within units of
the National Park System...may be withheld from the public in response to a request under
[FOIA]....” Id. (quoting 1998 Parks Act §  207, 16 U.S.C. §  5937).  The Forest Service
determined that the information requested fell within the 1998 Parks Act, precluding release
of all data that would reveal the location of goshawk nest sites. The district court held that
the Parks Act applied, and entered judgment in favor of the Forest Service.  Id.
20
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “application of the exemption furthers Congress's
intent to protect information regarding threatened or rare resources of the National Parks.”
314 F.3d at 1062.  Likewise, in the present case, application of § 10-618(j) furthers the
intent of the Maryland General Assembly to offer possible protection for information
regarding the vulnerabilities and security systems of potential terrorist targets.  
The Ninth Circuit also found that application of the FOIA exemption would have no
impermissible retroactive effect.  Id.  The U.S. Constitution,  like the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, restricts the enactment of laws with impermissible retroactive effects.  U.S.
Const., Art. 1, § 9 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed [by
Congress].”); U.S. Const. Art 1, § 10 (“No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts”); Md. Declaration of Rights Art.
17 (“That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such Laws,
and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty;
wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction
be imposed, or required.”).  
Application of the 2002 permissive exemption to the MPIA has no impermissible
retroactive effect in the present case.  We have explained that the constitutional limitations
imposed on retrospective laws collectively mean that “a statute will not be given
[retrospective] effect if it would impair vested rights, deny due process, or violate the
prohibition against ex post facto laws.”  Kim, 376 Md. at 289, 829 A.2d at 618.  Police
21
Patrol had no vested rights in the information merely as a result of submitting its request.
Nor had Police Patrol taken a prejudicial position in reliance on receiving the information.
Police Patrol was not denied its right to sue in court to gain the information.  The 2002
amendment was not an ex post facto law.  We have defined an ex post facto law as one
“which punishes that which was innocent when done; or adds to the punishment of that
which was criminal; or increases the malignity of a crime.”  Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602,
611, 471 A.2d 730, 735 (1984) (quoting Beard v. State, 74 Md. 130, 132, 21 A. 700, 701
(1891).   Police Patrol was not penalized in this case.  On remand, the County should take
§ 10-618(j) into account when considering Police Patrol’s still pending request.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE
G E O R G E ’ S  
C O U NTY  
W I T H
INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE
MATTER TO PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF POLICE PATROL’S REQUEST
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY.