Title: Reynolds v. Sterling College, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Reynolds v. Sterling College, Inc. (98-396); 170 Vt. 620; 750 A.2d 1020

[Opinion Filed 28-Jan-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 14-Mar-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-396

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 1999

Betty and Jay Reynolds	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Orleans Superior Court
                                       }	
Sterling College, Inc.	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 162-7-97Oscv
  	

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiffs Betty and Jay Reynolds appeal from a summary judgment in
  favor of defendant Sterling  College, Inc. in their action to obtain a
  partial refund of tuition paid to defendant.  In response to  plaintiffs'
  claim that defendant owed a refund under the policy in effect at the time
  they commenced  paying tuition, the court held that defendant had validly
  reserved the right to modify its tuition  reimbursement policy and had done
  so.  Accordingly, it dismissed plaintiffs' claims for breach of  contract
  and consumer fraud.  We reverse and remand.

       The complaint, answer, affidavits and depositions filed by the parties
  disclose the following facts.  In the Spring of 1995, Jay Reynolds was
  accepted to Sterling College.  Before making any  payments, Betty Reynolds,
  Jay's mother, read the catalog, which covered the years 1994 through  1996,
  particularly its policy on tuition refunds for students who withdraw before
  the end of the  academic year.  The catalog policy provided for a pro rata
  refund of prepaid tuition based on the ratio  of the number of weeks
  remaining in the academic year after withdrawal to the total number of 
  weeks in the academic year.  A footnote to this policy, however, added the
  following:

     At press time, the Tuition Refund policy is under revision to comply 
     with requirements of the federal Higher Education Amendments of 
     1992.  Please consult the refund policy accompanying all tuition bills 
     or request a copy of the policy in effect during your attendance.

  Prior to sending the $500 dollar enrollment fee on May 1, 1995, Betty
  Reynolds called defendant's  business office to inquire about the refund
  policy.  She was told that the catalog policy was still in  effect and no
  revisions had yet been made.  She stated at her deposition that she relied
  upon the  refund policy, and would not have paid the enrollment fee if she
  knew it had been modified to favor 

 

  defendant.  Along with the enrollment fee, both plaintiffs filled out and
  signed a registration form  which stated: "I have read and agreed to the
  terms of the Tuition and Refund policy."

       Betty Reynolds commenced making tuition payments in July.  No new
  refund policy accompanied  the tuition bills.  When Jay arrived on campus
  on September 25, 1995, a copy of a new refund  policy, effective July 1,
  1995, was waiting in his mail box.  Jay attended defendant college until 
  January 5, 1996, when he voluntarily withdrew.  By that time, Betty had
  paid defendant $14,104 out  of a total comprehensive fee of $18,167 for the
  year.  Under the new policy, defendant determined  that plaintiffs were
  entitled to a refund of $379 and sent them a check for that amount.  It is 
  undisputed that the refund would have been much larger under the catalog
  policy.

       Plaintiffs argued below that the tuition refund policy contained in
  the catalog was part of the contract  entered into between plaintiffs and
  defendant when Jay Reynolds enrolled, and defendant did not  have the
  unilateral power to modify it.  They also argued that the statements of
  defendant's  employees and those in its catalog "were material
  misrepresentations of the Sterling College refund  policy" that induced
  plaintiffs to enter into an enrollment agreement in violation of the
  Consumer  Fraud Act.  See 9 V.S.A. § 2453.  The superior court ruled that,
  in view of the footnote, the catalog  policy was not a contract term; the
  refund policy was not an essential term of the contract between  plaintiffs
  and defendant; and the agreement contemplated that defendant could
  unilaterally supply  this term at a later date.  Consistent with its ruling
  on the breach of contract claim, the court  dismissed the consumer fraud
  claim because there was no "unfair and deceptive act or practice." 

       In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we use the same standard
  as the trial court.  A party  is entitled to summary judgment if there are
  no genuine issues of material fact and the party is  entitled to judgment
  as a matter of law.  See Lake v. Town of Grafton, 166 Vt. 148, 150,