Title: DaPrato v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12651 
 
RICHARD A. DaPRATO  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS WATER RESOURCES 
AUTHORITY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 4, 2019. - June 5, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.  Family & Medical Leave 
Act.  Public Employment, Termination.  Employment, 
Termination, Retaliation.  Damages, Emotional distress, 
Liquidated damages, Punitive.  Practice, Civil, 
Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 7, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Douglas H. Wilkins, J., and a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new 
trial or remittitur was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Meghan L. McNamara (Carolyn Francisco Murphy also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Robert S. Mantell (David E. Belfort also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
Patricia A. Washienko & Rebecca G. Pontikes, for 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority 
(MWRA) terminated the employment of an information technology 
manager, Richard DaPrato, after he went on vacation to Mexico 
during the final two weeks of a paid medical leave to recover 
from foot surgery.  A jury found the MWRA liable for a 
retaliatory termination in violation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2012), the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012), 
and G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16).  The jury awarded $19,777 in "back 
pay" damages for DaPrato's lost wages and made an "advisory" 
award of $300,000 in "front pay" for the future loss of his 
pension benefits.  The jury also awarded $200,000 in damages for 
emotional distress and $715,385 in punitive damages, and the 
trial judge awarded $208,443 in liquidated damages and $605,690 
in attorney's fees and costs.  The MWRA moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new 
trial or remittitur.  The judge entered remittitur as to the 
jury's front pay award, reducing it to $188,666, but otherwise 
denied the MWRA's motion, resulting in total damages of 
$1,332,271, not including attorney's fees, costs, and interest. 
3 
 
 
The MWRA now appeals from the judgment below.  It argues 
that a new trial is warranted because the trial judge, over its 
objections, gave erroneous jury instructions about the causation 
standard for an FMLA retaliation claim and failed to give a 
requested jury instruction concerning the so-called "honest 
belief" defense to this claim.  The MWRA also contends that the 
judge erred when, over its objection, he instructed the jury 
that they could not consider that DaPrato "took or requested 
[FMLA] leave or spent time recuperating in a particular location 
or in a particular manner" when determining whether the MWRA had 
an "independent reason" for terminating DaPrato.  Finally, it 
contends that the damages award should be vacated or modified 
with respect to the liquidated, punitive, and emotional distress 
damages, and recalculated with respect to the front pay award.  
We affirm the judgment and damages awards.1 
                                                 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted in support of 
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) by the New 
England Legal Foundation and the Associated Industries of 
Massachusetts, as well as the amicus brief submitted in support 
of Richard DaPrato by the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association. 
4 
 
1.  Facts and procedural history.  We recite the following 
facts that could have been found by the jury, reserving certain 
facts for later discussion.2 
The MWRA is a public authority created by statute to 
provide water and sewer services to municipalities in 
Massachusetts.  DaPrato began working for the MWRA in 2004 as a 
manager in the information technology department.  He received 
positive performance evaluations, had no disciplinary history, 
and "loved [his] job."  DaPrato planned to retire from the MWRA 
in 2019, at age sixty-six. 
In January 2015, DaPrato informed the MWRA's human 
resources department (HR) by e-mail that he was postponing a 
                                                 
 
2 When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 50 (b), 
as amended, 428 Mass. 1402 (1998), we consider "whether anywhere 
in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination 
of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable 
inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party" and 
view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise 
considering the weight of the evidence" (quotation and citations 
omitted).  Gyulakian v. Lexus of Watertown, Inc., 475 Mass. 290, 
295 n.11 (2016). 
 
 
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an 
abuse of discretion, bearing in mind that a judge should 
exercise his or her discretion "only when the verdict is so 
greatly against the weight of the evidence as to induce in his 
[or her] mind the strong belief that it was not due to a careful 
consideration of the evidence, but that it was the product of 
bias, misapprehension or prejudice" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Group, Inc., 413 
Mass. 119, 127 (1992). 
5 
 
previously scheduled knee surgery and instead planning to take 
FMLA leave to have an operation to remove a nerve tumor from his 
right foot.3  Based on information received from his surgeon, 
DaPrato "estimate[d]" that he would need to take FMLA leave 
during his recovery period from February 6, 2015, the date of 
the surgery, through March 26, 2015.  DaPrato explained that his 
surgeon had told him that the "recovery is [three to four] weeks 
but [he] will not be able to drive as [he] will have a boot on 
[his] foot for an additional [three to four] weeks." 
DaPrato subsequently provided HR with an FMLA application 
form completed by his surgeon.  In the form, the surgeon twice 
explained that DaPrato would be able to "transition" to putting 
weight on his right foot after four weeks.4  Additionally, the 
                                                 
 
3 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(a)(1)(D) (2012), requires a covered employer to provide 
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve-month period for 
an eligible employee whose "serious health condition . . . makes 
the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of 
such employee."  See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2), (4) (definitions of 
"eligible employee" and covered "employer").  The MWRA's "Family 
and Medical Leave Policy and Procedures" (FMLA leave policy) 
permitted an eligible employee to apply for "up to [twelve] 
weeks of unpaid FMLA Leave during any [twelve]-month period for 
. . . a serious health condition that prevents the employee from 
performing job requirements." 
 
 
4 In a section of the form describing "job functions the 
employee is unable to perform," the surgeon wrote that DaPrato 
"must be nonweightbearing to right foot for [four] weeks then 
transition to WB [weightbearing]."  In a section of the form 
describing "other relevant medical facts . . . related to the 
condition for which the employee seeks leave," the surgeon wrote 
6 
 
surgeon estimated that DaPrato would be "[four to six] weeks out 
of work from date of surgery."  The director of HR relied on 
this form when approving DaPrato's FMLA leave. 
DaPrato had his foot surgery as scheduled on February 6, 
2015.  A few weeks later, DaPrato informed the MWRA that he 
hoped to return to work early because he could "walk around a 
little without crutches" and was planning to drive his car using 
his left foot.  DaPrato had returned to work early from previous 
FMLA leaves, and his hope was to do so in this case as well in 
order to avoid exhausting his allotted vacation leave time.  HR 
told DaPrato, however, that he could not return to work without 
written permission from his doctor.  On February 24, 2015, 
DaPrato informed the MWRA that he would not be able to obtain 
his doctor's permission to return to work until his next 
doctor's appointment on March 26.  In another FMLA leave 
application dated March 11 and signed by his surgeon, DaPrato 
requested an additional week of FMLA leave from March 20 until 
March 26.5 
                                                 
that DaPrato "must keep his foot elevated + be NWB 
[nonweightbearing] for [four] weeks --> then transition to WB." 
 
 
5 Similar to the earlier FMLA application, this application 
stated that "patient must be nonweightbearing right foot for 
[four] weeks then transition to weight bearing."  It also stated 
"patient . . . must . . . be non weight bearing for [four] weeks 
transitioning to weight bearing full over next [three] weeks."  
7 
 
When DaPrato determined that he would exhaust his sick time 
and vacation time before returning to work due to his inability 
to return until March 26, he spoke to a manager in HR about the 
MWRA's "salary continuation" policy for providing pay to 
managers who took FMLA leave due to a "serious health condition 
that prevents the employee from performing job requirements."6  
DaPrato had first learned about this program in December 2014 
from the same manager, when he had informed her about his 
multiple upcoming surgeries.  The MWRA did not have a written 
application for salary continuation separate from the FMLA leave 
request forms, and HR applied the same "criteria" as it applied 
to an FMLA leave request when deciding whether to grant salary 
                                                 
This form anticipated DaPrato's return to work as March 27, 
2015. 
 
 
6 Tracking the language of the relevant provision of the 
FMLA statute, see note 3, supra, the MWRA's FMLA leave policy 
stated that an "employee may apply for salary continuation 
during FMLA Leave only when the employee has a serious health 
condition that prevents the employee from performing job 
requirements."  In turn, the salary continuation policy 
provided:  "[a]n employee who is seriously ill or disabled, and 
who has no remaining sick leave balance may apply for salary 
continuation benefits for a maximum of [twenty-six] weeks.  
Documentation from a licenced [sic] physician stating that the 
employee is unable to perform his/her normal duties is 
required."  The policy provided that an employee on salary 
continuation would receive one hundred percent of his or her pay 
for the first eight weeks of salary continuation and a 
descending percentage of his or her salary thereafter.  While 
not reflected in the written policy, the MWRA typically required 
employees to exhaust vacation time before receiving salary 
continuation benefits. 
8 
 
continuation.  Based on the FMLA forms completed by DaPrato's 
physician, the HR manager concluded that DaPrato should be 
approved to receive "salary continuation" benefits while on his 
FMLA leave. 
On March 12, 2015, DaPrato went on a vacation to a beach in 
Mexico with his family.  DaPrato took this trip every year, had 
booked the travel arrangements well in advance, and had informed 
his supervisor of the dates of his vacation on multiple 
occasions.7  Due to his medical condition, DaPrato stated that he 
limited the typical activities in which he engaged while on 
vacation.  As discussed infra, at trial the MWRA introduced 
photographs of DaPrato standing on a boat fishing, including one 
photograph where he was proudly holding a large fish he had 
caught, to impeach DaPrato's testimony about his lack of 
mobility.  The MWRA did not, however, possess these photographs 
when it reached its termination decision.  DaPrato returned from 
his vacation on March 24, 2015. 
Several days later, DaPrato contacted HR because his 
paycheck did not reflect the salary continuation benefits that 
HR had told him he would receive should he exhaust his allocated 
sick days and vacation days while on unpaid FMLA leave.  HR 
                                                 
 
7 There was also evidence that DaPrato had told the MWRA's 
director of administration, one of the managers who interviewed 
him prior to his termination, that he was going on vacation to 
Mexico. 
9 
 
subsequently provided DaPrato with $4,614.22 in salary 
continuation payments for March 16 through March 27, 2015.  
DaPrato went back to work on March 30, 2015.  On April 6, he 
sent an e-mail message to HR asking for a copy of the salary 
continuation policy so that he would not encounter any 
"surprises" about using the policy when he took FMLA leave for 
his previously postponed knee surgery.  The director of HR 
forwarded DaPrato's e-mail message to an HR manager with the 
message "is he serious," to which the manager responded "OMG."  
Despite this and other requests, HR did not provide DaPrato with 
a copy of the salary continuation policy prior to his 
termination. 
The same day as this e-mail exchange, HR learned that 
DaPrato had gone on vacation to Mexico while on FMLA leave and 
receiving salary continuation.  The director of HR immediately 
launched an investigation into the propriety of DaPrato's leave 
because she did not think an employee "who's seriously ill or 
disabled would be able to be on a vacation."8  In the course of 
                                                 
 
8 The HR director testified as follows when examined by 
DaPrato's counsel: 
 
Q.:  "And is it your testimony that that fact made you 
suspicious?" 
 
A.:  "Which -- which fact?" 
 
Q.:  "That he had been on vacation?" 
10 
 
her investigation, the HR director obtained video recordings 
that depicted DaPrato walking, driving, and lifting luggage out 
of his car at an MWRA facility on his FMLA leave.9  The director 
of HR believed that these actions were inconsistent with the 
medical conditions for which DaPrato had been granted FMLA leave 
and received salary continuation benefits. 
                                                 
 
A.:  "Made me suspicious of what?" 
 
Q.:  "That [DaPrato] was doing something he shouldn't have 
done?" 
 
A.:  "I didn't think he should be away on vacation, yes, 
when he received salary continuation benefits." 
 
Q.:  "Right.  But didn't you testify earlier that there is 
no inconsistency in the salary continuation policy between 
taking salary continuation and recovering in a vacation 
location?" 
 
A.:  "Well, I didn't mean that I thought someone should be 
on vacation.  What I meant was if they needed -- you know, 
if someone has a sister in Florida and they were unable to 
work and they needed to be taken care of, there was nothing 
in the policy preventing them to go to Florida to recover, 
but I wasn't talking about being on vacation.  I wouldn't 
think somebody who's seriously ill or disabled would be able 
to be on a vacation" (emphasis added). 
 
 
9 The director of HR reviewed three video recordings 
obtained from an MWRA facility near Boston's Logan Airport where 
employees were permitted to park their cars before taking 
flights.  On March 9, 2015, DaPrato entered the building on 
crutches when at the facility to attend a meeting.  On March 12, 
he parked his car and transferred luggage to a taxicab.  On 
March 24, he put the luggage back in his car and drove away.  In 
the latter two recordings DaPrato was not using crutches, but he 
testified that he had a medical boot on his right foot. 
11 
 
On April 8, the HR director presented the video recordings 
to the MWRA's senior management.  The MWRA management instructed 
the HR director and the MWRA director of administration to 
interview DaPrato immediately.  The interviewers claimed that 
DaPrato initially denied parking at the MWRA facility or going 
on vacation.  DaPrato contested this account of the meeting:  he 
stated that he attempted to explain that he had tried to come 
back to work before his vacation and that his conduct on the 
video recordings was consistent with the limitations described 
in his FMLA leave forms.  The interviewers concluded that 
DaPrato had "misrepresent[ed] . . . his disability" for which he 
had obtained FMLA leave and salary continuation.  At the end of 
the interview, the HR director gave DaPrato a letter she had 
brought to the interview that stated that DaPrato was now 
"prohibited from entering MWRA property" because he had "been 
placed on administrative leave with pay effective immediately 
pending further review of a matter that has come to our 
attention." 
Immediately following the interview, the interviewers 
reported to MWRA senior management that DaPrato had lied to them 
about the medical conditions for which he had received FMLA 
leave and salary continuation benefits and recommended his 
termination.  The interviewers did not, however, present the 
FMLA leave forms to senior management.  Based on the report of 
12 
 
the interview, the MWRA's executive director, with the agreement 
of the other senior managers, decided to terminate DaPrato's 
employment.  The director of HR sent DaPrato a termination 
letter, dated April 9, 2015, informing him that his employment 
was terminated as of April 10, 2015, due to "[his] 
misrepresentation that [he was] unable to work from March 12 to 
March 27, 2015, [his] receipt of extended salary continuation 
pay to which [he was] not entitled, and [his] failure to be 
truthful during [his] interview concerning these matters on 
April 8, 2015."  DaPrato elected to begin receiving his pension, 
shortly after his termination from the MWRA. 
In December 2015, DaPrato brought suit against the MWRA 
under the FMLA, ADA, and G. L. c. 151B, § 4.  Following trial, 
the jury returned a verdict in DaPrato's favor on his claims 
that the MWRA had terminated him in retaliation for his taking 
FMLA leave for his foot surgery and expressing his intention to 
take FMLA leave in the future.  The judge and jury awarded 
damages as described supra.  The judge denied the MWRA's motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial or remittitur, with the exception 
of remittitur of the front pay damages.  The MWRA appealed from 
the final judgment, and we transferred the case here on our own 
motion. 
13 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  FMLA statute and regulations.  The 
central claim in this case is that the MWRA terminated DaPrato 
in retaliation for his exercise of his right to take medical 
leave under the FMLA.  In relevant part, the FMLA provides that 
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, 
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, 
any right provided under this subchapter."  29 U.S.C. 
§ 2615(a)(1).  It also states that an employer may not 
"discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any 
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this 
subchapter."  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).  A regulation issued by 
the Department of Labor further states that the FMLA's 
"prohibition against interference prohibits an employer from 
discriminating or retaliating against an employee . . . for 
having exercised or attempted to exercise FMLA rights," and in 
particular explains that "employers cannot use the taking of 
FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as 
hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions."  29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.220(c).10 
To succeed on a claim of retaliation under the FMLA, an 
employee "must show that (1) he availed himself of a protected 
                                                 
 
10 The text of 29 U.S.C. § 2615 only refers to 
"discrimination" and "interference," not retaliation.  The 
Federal Courts of Appeals differ as to whether a cause of action 
14 
 
right under the FMLA; (2) he was adversely affected by an 
employment decision; [and] (3) there is a causal connection 
between the employee's protected activity and the employer's 
adverse employment action."  Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 
144 F.3d 151, 161 (1st Cir. 1998). 
b.  Errors in jury instructions.  The MWRA claims that it 
is entitled to a new trial based on several erroneous jury 
instructions regarding DaPrato's FMLA retaliation claim.11  We 
consider the MWRA's claimed errors in turn. 
                                                 
for retaliatory termination under the FMLA is created by 29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), the antidiscrimination provision; or 29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), the anti-interference provision, and 29 
C.F.R. § 825.220(c), a regulation interpreting the interference 
provision; or both provisions and the accompanying regulation.  
See Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 
325, 331 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing different approaches 
and ambiguity of statutory source of this prohibition, while 
recognizing that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220[c] "unambiguously 
interprets § 2615 as prohibiting retaliation"); W. Bush & J.M. 
Paul, The Family and Medical Leave Act, at 10-4 to 10-5 (2d ed. 
2017) (discussing different approaches).  Regardless of its 
origin, a retaliatory FMLA discharge claim is "universally 
recognized" by the Federal courts.  Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of 
San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012), citing 
Colburn, supra at 331 n.2. 
 
 
11 In a civil trial, a "judge should instruct the jury 
fairly, clearly, adequately, and correctly concerning principles 
that ought to guide and control their action" (citation 
omitted).  Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 547 
(2014).  The judge is "not bound to instruct in the exact 
language of the [parties'] requests," however, and "has wide 
latitude in framing the language to be used in jury instructions 
as long as the instructions adequately explain the applicable 
law" (quotation and citations omitted).  Kelly v. Foxboro Realty 
Assocs., LLC, 454 Mass. 306, 316 (2009).  Moreover, an 
15 
 
i.  Jury instruction on standard of causation.  The MWRA 
argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the judge gave 
an erroneous instruction to the jury concerning the causation 
standard required for DaPrato to prove that his termination was 
unlawful retaliation for his taking of FMLA leave.12  In relevant 
part, the judge instructed the jury: 
"Mr. DaPrato must prove that more likely than not he 
was fired because of retaliation.  He must show that 
                                                 
"appellate court considers the adequacy of the instructions as a 
whole, not by fragments."  Selmark Assocs. Inc., supra. 
 
 
12 The MWRA also argues that the judge's erroneous 
instructions regarding DaPrato's FMLA retaliation claim  
"tainted" his claims of disability and handicap retaliation 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and 
G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16).  After reciting the elements of a 
retaliation claim under the ADA and G. L. c. 151B § 4 (16), the 
judge instructed the jury that the "same principles apply to 
[these] claim[s] as to the FMLA retaliation claim" and 
"refer[red] [the jury] back to [his] discussion of those 
principles."  The MWRA does not otherwise claim error with 
respect to the ADA or G. L. c. 151B instructions or claims. 
 
 
As we discern no reversible error in the FMLA instructions, 
we do not address the ADA or G. L. c. 151B claims separately.  
We note that the standards for succeeding on a claim of 
disability or handicap retaliation under the ADA or G. L. 
c. 151B, § 4 (16), are similar to that used for finding 
retaliation under the FMLA.  See Mole v. University of Mass., 
442 Mass. 582, 591–592 (2004) (retaliation claim under G. L. 
c. 151B requires employee to "show that he engaged in protected 
conduct, that he suffered some adverse action, and that a causal 
connection existed" [quotation, citation, and footnote 
omitted]); Kelley v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 
108, 115 (1st Cir. 2013) (retaliation claim under ADA requires 
plaintiff to show that "[1] she engaged in protected conduct; 
[2] she experienced an adverse employment action; and [3] there 
was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the 
adverse employment action" [citation omitted]). 
16 
 
his taking leave or requesting leave in the future was 
a negative factor in the MWRA's decision to terminate 
his employment in the sense that, but for the 
retaliation, MWRA would not have terminated him.  If 
so, then he has met his burden of proof on the fourth 
element. . . .  If Mr. DaPrato proves that more likely 
than not MWRA fired him because of retaliation for 
taking or requesting FMLA leave, then you'll answer 
yes to question 1 [on the jury verdict form], which 
asks . . . Did MWRA retaliate against Mr. DaPrato by 
terminating his employment because he took or 
requested FMLA leave?"  (Emphasis added.) 
 
According to the MWRA, this instruction was erroneous because it 
led to "impermissible confusion" whether DaPrato's taking of 
FMLA leave need only be a "negative factor" considered by the 
MWRA in its termination decision or rather whether retaliation 
against DaPrato for taking leave was the "but for" cause of his 
termination.13  Because the MWRA objected to this instruction at 
                                                 
 
13 The judge explained that he included the phrase "negative 
factor" based on our statement in Esler v. Sylvia-Reardon, 473 
Mass. 775 (2016), that an "employer may not . . . 'use the 
taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, 
such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.'"  Id. at 
779, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).  The trial judge's cautious 
approach to the negative factor regulation in his causation 
instruction was appropriate.  Our statement in Esler simply made 
reference to the Department of Labor regulation; it did not 
provide guidance on how the regulation should be considered in a 
causation instruction in a retaliation case.  The language of 
the regulation itself is also more general and may simply be 
designed to provide guidance for how employers, particularly 
human resources professionals, should treat requests for FMLA 
leave in the employment context.  We could also find nothing in 
the regulatory history that is informative in this regard. 
 
 
The case law reflects significant uncertainty in the 
Federal courts, and no definitive guidance from the United 
States Supreme Court, about how to consider the Department of 
17 
 
trial, we review for prejudicial error.  See Blackstone v. 
Cashman, 448 Mass. 255, 270 (2007) ("An error in jury 
instructions is not grounds for setting aside a verdict unless 
the error was prejudicial -- that is, unless the result might 
have differed absent the error").  We conclude that the judge's 
instruction did not result in error, let alone prejudicial 
error. 
                                                 
Labor regulation in the context of a causation instruction in an 
FMLA retaliation case.  See, e.g., Gourdeau v. Newton, 238 F. 
Supp. 3d 179, 194 (D. Mass. 2017) (discussing conflicting 
interpretations, even within United States Court of Appeals for 
First Circuit).  The Federal courts appear divided between those 
adopting a "but for" causation test, regardless of the 
regulation, and those considering the regulation indicative of a 
less demanding, motivating factor test.  Compare, e.g., id. 
(regulation not entitled to judicial deference) with Woods v. 
START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 169 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (regulation entitled to judicial deference), and Egan 
v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 273-274 (3d Cir. 
2017) (same).  See Colburn, 429 F.3d at 335 n.8 ("Whether a 
mixed-motive analysis is available at all in an FMLA case for 
retaliation is an open question, and we do not resolve it here.  
The issue has been adverted to but avoided by three circuits"). 
 
 
In its brief, the amicus New England Legal Foundation 
presents extensive analysis contending that the "but for" 
standard is appropriate absent express language to the contrary 
in the statute itself and that the Supreme Court will adopt the 
"but for" test when the issue is presented to it.  We are, 
however, neither prepared nor required to predict how the 
Supreme Court will decide this issue in order to decide the 
instant case because we conclude that the MWRA received the 
benefit of the higher standard and any uncertainty in this 
regard.  See ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 437 Mass. 241, 248 n.8 (2002) ("we are not bound by the 
decisions of Federal courts [other than the United States 
Supreme Court] on matters of Federal law"). 
18 
 
 
The emphasized portion of this instruction contains the 
MWRA's requested "but for" standard.  The judge carefully 
explained the sense in which he was using negative factor in the 
instruction.  It was not just a motivating factor but instead a 
"but for" factor, in the sense that "but for the retaliation 
[for the exercise of a protected FMLA right], MWRA would not 
have terminated [DaPrato]."14  Further clarifying this sense, the 
judge then reviewed the verdict form with the jury, explaining 
that the jurors must consider whether "MWRA fired [DaPrato] 
because of retaliation" and whether it was "more likely than not 
MWRA fired [DaPrato] because of retaliation for taking or 
requesting FMLA leave" (emphasis added).  This language applies 
a "but for" standard of causation.  See University of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013), citing Safeco 
                                                 
 
14 The "but for" portion of the instruction as given is 
similar to the MWRA's requested instruction that "Mr. DaPrato 
must show that a desire to retaliate against him was a 
determinative, or but for, factor in the decision by MWRA to 
terminate him.  In other words, the plaintiff must prove that, 
had he not taken the FMLA leave, MWRA would not have terminated 
his employment."  By contrast, the judge omitted the plaintiff's 
proposed instruction that the jury need only find that the 
MWRA's retaliatory motive for DaPrato's taking leave may have 
been a "motivating factor" among "other, legitimate 
considerations." 
 
19 
 
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 & n.14 (2007) 
("because of" calls for "but for" causation standard).15 
 
In short, in considering the "adequacy of the instructions 
as a whole," Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 
547 (2014), and respecting the "wide latitude" the judge has in 
framing the instructions (citation omitted), Kelly v. Foxboro 
Realty Assocs., LLC, 454 Mass. 306, 316 (2009), we discern no 
error in the judge's causation instruction. 
 
ii.  Jury instruction on location or manner of FMLA leave.  
The MWRA also claims that the judge erred when, over its 
objection, he instructed the jury:  "[DaPrato] has not met this 
element [i.e., causation] if the MWRA discharged him for 
independent reasons, even if that discharge occurred during or 
after his taking of FMLA leave.  A reason counts as an 
independent reason only if it does not include as a negative 
factor the fact that Mr. DaPrato took or requested leave or 
spent time recuperating in a particular location or in a 
particular manner" (emphasis added).  The MWRA argues that it 
suffered prejudice because the instruction prohibited the jury 
from considering DaPrato's conduct while on vacation during his 
                                                 
 
15 Moreover, the jury were instructed to award compensatory 
damages that DaPrato lost "as a result of MWRA's retaliation" or 
"as a result of the MWRA's unlawful conduct."  The award of 
damages thus required the jury to find retaliation to be the 
"but for" cause of DaPrato's termination. 
20 
 
FMLA leave, even though the jury may have thought this conduct 
was inconsistent with DaPrato's claimed medical condition and 
thus supplied an independent reason for the MWRA to terminate 
DaPrato. 
 
Although the wording of this instruction was problematic, 
we conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, it was not 
an abuse of discretion and, in any event, was not prejudicial.  
The purpose of the instruction was curative:  the judge 
determined that it was necessary to minimize the "substantial 
risk that the jury would be swayed by the MWRA's attempts, 
through photographs and evidence, to play to the jury's possible 
resentment . . . against DaPrato for taking a vacation while on 
FMLA leave."  Specifically, the judge had admitted photographs 
of DaPrato on a fishing trip while on vacation in Mexico during 
his FMLA leave.  The photographs, which depicted DaPrato 
standing on a boat and holding up a large fish, were admitted, 
over DaPrato's objection to their potential prejudice, so that 
during cross-examination the MWRA could impeach DaPrato's 
account of his mobility while on vacation.  The judge concluded, 
however, that the "jury saw the picture a bit excessively at a 
time when counsel could have taken it down. . . .  I think that 
was inappropriate."  The judge thus decided that he needed to 
give an instruction explaining to the jury that "you can't 
penalize someone for going on vacation during FMLA leave." 
21 
 
 
The judge's instruction was intended to comply with Esler 
v. Sylvia-Reardon, 473 Mass. 775, 781 (2016).  Indeed, in Esler 
we emphasized that an employer may not treat the mere fact that 
an employee went on vacation while on FMLA leave, standing on 
its own, as grounds for an adverse employment action.  In that 
case, however, there was no inconsistency between the employee's 
medical reasons for taking the leave (an anxiety diagnosis) and 
her conduct on leave (ice skating in New York City).  Id. at 
777.  We clarify today that an employer may validly consider an 
employee's conduct on vacation -- or, for that matter, anywhere 
-- that is inconsistent with his or her claimed reasons for 
medical leave, when the employer has such information at the 
time the employer is evaluating whether leave has been properly 
or improperly used. 
 
Here, DaPrato took FMLA leave to allow his foot to recover 
fully from surgery.  Such recovery could take place in a warm 
climate as well as in a New England winter.  That being said, 
vacationing while on FMLA leave may take either permissible or 
impermissible forms.  An employee recovering from a leg injury 
may sit with his or her leg raised by the sea shore while fully 
complying with FMLA leave requirements but may not climb Machu 
22 
 
Picchu without abusing the FMLA process.16  Careful consideration 
of the reasons for the medical leave and the activities 
undertaken, including the timeline for rehabilitation and 
recovery, are required to determine whether FMLA leave has been 
abused.  DaPrato's fishing trip raises legitimate questions:  he 
is seen in photographs standing on a boat and holding a large 
fish that apparently he had reeled in himself at a time when he 
was supposedly still recovering from foot surgery.  In this 
context, the instruction given by the judge is problematic, as 
the photograph is some evidence that DaPrato may not have been 
entirely truthful about the state of his injury and his need for 
FMLA leave. 
                                                 
 
16 For informative fact patterns, compare, e.g., Esler, 473 
Mass. at 777, 781 (no inconsistency between FMLA leave and ice 
skating where employee out on FMLA leave for anxiety disorder 
was encouraged by her doctor to engage in pleasurable activities 
and light exercise to relieve stress), with Sharrow vs. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-CV-11138 (E.D. Mich. 
Apr. 12, 2018) (employer had nonretaliatory reason to terminate 
employee who played nine holes of golf and went "tubing" in 
river while on FMLA leave for foot injury), and Lineberry vs. 
Richards, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 11-13752 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2013) 
(granting summary judgment to employer where investigation 
revealed that employee on FMLA leave for leg and back pain lied 
about need for wheelchair while taking preplanned vacation to 
Mexico and employer reasonably relied on other particularized 
facts, such as Facebook posts of employee riding in motorboat).  
See Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 
1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2017) (overturning grant of summary 
judgment for employer where evidence was "murky at best" that 
employee who took FMLA leave for shoulder surgery abused leave 
by going to amusement park and Caribbean island). 
23 
 
Nevertheless, as discussed supra, the MWRA did not have the 
photographs when reaching its termination decision.  It did not 
know what he did on vacation in Mexico, just that he had gone on 
vacation to Mexico.  The HR director's statement that she 
considered all vacations while on FMLA leave impermissible was 
incorrect as a matter of law.  Importantly, DaPrato's FMLA leave 
certification forms described his foot as steadily recovering, 
with weight bearing allowed, indicating he could engage in some 
activity on vacation.  Finally, the judge was concerned that the 
MWRA was appealing to the jury's emotions by highlighting the 
fishing pictures and not removing them from the jury's sight.  
We cannot say, in these circumstances, that it was an abuse of 
discretion to give this instruction to address unfairness that 
he concluded may have arisen during trial.  See Renzi v. 
Paredes, 452 Mass. 38, 53 (2008) ("well within [judge's] 
discretion to provide [a] curative instruction" to ensure jury 
correctly base their decision on evidence); Carrel v. National 
Cord & Braid Corp., 447 Mass. 431, 447 (2006) (proper for judge 
to issue instruction that jury consider certain evidence without 
being influenced by "sympathy, emotion, [or] sentiment"). 
Finally, even if such an instruction were an error, we 
conclude that it was not prejudicial.  The jury awarded punitive 
damages because it found the MWRA's conduct outrageous.  This 
award demonstrates that the jury credited DaPrato's account of 
24 
 
his medical condition, and what he said to the MWRA officials 
when they confronted him, and not the MWRA's.  Given the jury's 
unequivocal decision in favor of DaPrato, we conclude that any 
error in this instruction would not have prejudiced the MWRA. 
 
iii.  Absence of jury instruction on MWRA's "honest belief" 
for its termination decision.  The MWRA further argues that it 
was error for the judge, over its objection, to decline to 
provide a jury instruction that "an employer is not liable under 
the FMLA if it discharges an employee based upon an honest 
belief that the employee had misused FMLA leave, even if that 
belief is mistaken."17  The judge declined to give an "honest 
belief" instruction on the ground that "an honest but 
                                                 
 
17 The judge did instruct the jury that they might find the 
MWRA's termination decision to have been "poor or erroneous" but 
not an FMLA violation so long as it was not a "pretext for 
illegal retaliation."  He further instructed the jury that the 
"employer's stated legitimate reason must be reasonably 
articulated and non-retaliatory but does not have to be a reason 
that you, the jury, would personally agree with.  An employer is 
entitled to make his own policy and business judgments."  As 
discussed, the jury determined that DaPrato's termination was 
"because of retaliation for taking or requesting FMLA leave."  
They thus rejected the possibility that the termination decision 
was made for valid business reasons rather than serving as a 
"pretext for illegal retaliation."  As the judge explained in 
denying the MWRA's motion for a new trial, the "MWRA argued this 
case as an 'either-or' question.  Either MWRA fired DaPrato for 
the reasons it stated, or the reasons were a pretext for 
discrimination and retaliation.  Neither party suggests a third 
possibility." 
25 
 
unconsciously biased decision would [not] absolve the employer 
from liability." 
 
Based on the text of the FMLA, we conclude that the judge 
properly declined to give an honest belief instruction.18  The 
statute provides a specific, narrowly defined role for good 
faith, honest but mistaken beliefs that have a reasonable basis.  
The FMLA provides that a judge "shall" award 
"an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to 
the sum of the amount described in clause (i) [("any 
wages, salary, employment benefits, or other 
compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason 
of the violation")]; and the interest described in 
clause (ii), except that if an employer who has 
                                                 
 
18 Whether or not an employer's "honest belief" is a viable 
defense to an FMLA claim is another issue that has divided the 
Federal courts.  Some reject it as a defense, at least in the 
context of an FMLA inference claim; others accept it, at least 
in the retaliation context.  Compare, e.g., Tillman v. Ohio Bell 
Tel. Co., 545 Fed. Appx. 340, 352 (6th Cir. 2013) ("An employer 
who honestly, but mistakenly believes that the employee abused 
his FMLA leave can still be said to have interfered with, 
restrained, and/or denied the exercise of those rights"), and 
Colburn, 429 F.3d at 332 ("employer motive plays no role in a 
claim for substantive denial of benefits"), with Capps v. 
Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (where 
employer alleged to have retaliated against employee "provides 
evidence that the reason for the adverse employment action taken 
by the employer was an honest belief that the employee was 
misusing FMLA leave, that is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
justification for the discharge").  Some of those recognizing 
the defense appear to still require employers to show that their 
employment decisions were reasonable under the circumstances.  
See, e.g., Marshall v. The Rawlings Co., 854 F.3d 368, 380 (6th 
Cir. 2017) ("The honest-belief rule applies where the employer 
reasonably relied on the particularized facts that were before 
it at the time the decision was made" [quotation and citation 
omitted]).  Regardless, the United States Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue, and, as we have explained, we are not bound 
by decisions of other Federal courts.  See note 13, supra. 
26 
 
violated [§] 2615 of this title proves to the 
satisfaction of the court that the act or omission 
which violated [§] 2615 of this title was in good 
faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for 
believing that the act or omission was not a violation 
of [§] 2615 of this title, such court may, in the 
discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the 
liability to the amount and interest determined under 
clauses (i) and (ii), respectively" (emphasis added). 
 
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).  See Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of 
San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012) ("To 
establish good faith under the FMLA, a defendant must show that 
it honestly intended to ascertain the dictates of the FMLA and 
to act in conformance with it" [quotation and citation 
omitted]).  The award of multiple damages, unless the employer 
demonstrates good faith or lack of knowledge that its conduct 
violated the FMLA, demonstrates that good faith or honest belief 
is "pertinent only to the question of [the amount of] damages 
under the FMLA, not to liability."  Bachelder v. America W. 
Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001).19  It would 
not make sense to require an employer to prove that its 
challenged employment decision was done in "good faith" to avoid 
mandatory payment of liquidated damages if in fact such a 
showing would defeat liability entirely.  See Bellalta v. Zoning 
                                                 
 
19 The parties agreed that, in the event of the jury finding 
the MWRA liable for an FMLA violation, they would obtain a "good 
faith ruling" with respect to liquidated damages by filing 
postverdict motions.  As discussed infra, the judge concluded 
that the MWRA had made its termination decision in good faith, 
but that it lacked reasonable grounds for that decision. 
27 
 
Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 378 (2019) 
(statutory interpretation must be reasonable and avoid absurd 
results).  We thus conclude that the MWRA's requested "honest 
belief" instruction was not a correct statement of law. 
 
c.  Damages awards.  The MWRA challenges the awards of 
liquidated and punitive damages and damages for emotional 
distress.  We find no error in these damages awards and affirm. 
 
i.  Liquidated damages.  The MWRA argues that the judge's 
award of liquidated damages should be vacated because the MWRA 
honestly believed that DaPrato misused his FMLA leave and had 
reasonable grounds for this belief.  As the statute expressly 
provides, the FMLA requires a judge to award liquidated damages 
in an amount equivalent to front pay and back pay damages, 
unless an employer proves that its violation was done both in 
"good faith" and on "reasonable grounds," in which case the 
award is within the judge's discretion.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).  See Pagán-Colón, 697 F.3d at 12 ("an 
employer must prove both 'good faith' and 'reasonable grounds' 
to escape liquidated damages, and the decision of whether to 
award liquidated damages is left to the court"). 
 
Here, the judge concluded that he was obligated to award 
liquidated damages based on his findings that, although the MWRA 
"honestly believed it was complying with the FMLA" when it 
terminated DaPrato, it lacked objectively reasonable grounds for 
28 
 
that belief.  The judge found that the MWRA's investigation was 
objectively unreasonable because it ignored DaPrato's FMLA 
application and medical records and was grounded in "shock, 
outrage and offense" at the possibility of further FMLA leave 
rather than "reasonable discovery and evaluation of the facts."  
The judge observed that his finding that the MWRA had acted in 
good faith differed from the jury's finding that it had not done 
so. 
 
Based on his findings, the judge awarded liquidated damages 
in the statutorily specified amount.  We will affirm a judge's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Klairmont 
v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 183 (2013), 
quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 
(1996) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous . . .").  Because the findings on which the judge 
based his award were not clear error, we affirm the award of 
liquidated damages in its entirety. 
 
ii.  Punitive damages.  The MWRA argues that the jury's 
award of punitive damages should be vacated or remitted because 
its conduct was neither outrageous nor egregious.  Punitive 
damages may be awarded "for conduct that is outrageous, because 
of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to 
the rights of others" (citation omitted).  Haddad v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. (No. 1), 455 Mass. 91, 107 (2009).  A jury award of 
29 
 
punitive damages will be sustained if it could "reasonably have 
[been] arrived at . . . from any . . . evidence . . . presented" 
(citation omitted), id. at 107, and is not so "grossly 
excessive" as to violate constitutional standards of due 
process, Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc., 466 Mass. 398, 412-413 
(2013), quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 
(1996). 
 
We affirm the award of punitive damages.  The jury 
reasonably could have found the manner in which the MWRA treated 
a long-time employee with no prior history of misconduct to be 
egregious or recklessly indifferent.  The jury could have found 
that the MWRA was recklessly indifferent because DaPrato's 
conduct was not inconsistent with the recovery time frame 
described in the FMLA application.  Also, the MWRA's HR director 
never presented this information to senior management when 
recommending termination.  She also seemed unaware that an 
employee could be on vacation and still be eligible for FMLA 
leave, so long as the activity on vacation was consistent with 
the reasons for the FMLA leave.  Furthermore, the MWRA never 
checked with DaPrato's doctor to confirm his representations 
about his medical condition, despite admitting that this was an 
option.  The MWRA also denied DaPrato's request for a copy of 
the salary continuation policy he was subsequently found to have 
violated.  Additionally, the jury could have found that the MWRA 
30 
 
demonstrated hostility in the internal e-mail messages 
responding to DaPrato's request for FMLA leave and the manner in 
which it conducted its investigatory interview of DaPrato.20 
The ratio of punitive damages ($715,385) to compensatory 
damages ($616,886) is also reasonable.  See Aleo, 466 Mass. at 
417 (upholding punitive damages award with greater ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages).  See also Rhodes v. AIG 
Domestic Claims, Inc., 461 Mass. 486, 503-504 (2012) ("ratio 
. . . not excessive" where amount of punitive damages award was 
double that of underlying judgment); Williamson-Green v. 
Equipment 4 Rent, Inc., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 154 (2016) 
(upholding award of $3,692,657.40 in compensatory damages and 
$5,900,000 in punitive damages).  And the deterrence purpose of 
punitive damages justifies the sum awarded here, particularly 
because the MWRA is a sophisticated and solvent public employer 
expected to know and comply with the spirit and letter of the 
FMLA law.  See Aleo, supra at 412 (deterrence); Labonte v. 
                                                 
 
20 The jury could also have reached the opposite conclusion 
on punitive damages.  In the past the MWRA had signed off on 
DaPrato's requests for FMLA leave without objection, and the 
jury could have found that the HR manager's "OMG" statement was 
simply understandable frustration on the part of the MWRA with 
an employee who made one request immediately after another 
without appreciating or acknowledging the assistance he had 
already received.  The jury also had the benefit of the parking 
lot video recordings, and could have drawn different inferences 
regarding the state of DaPrato's recovery.  It clearly chose to 
credit DaPrato's explanation, not the MWRA's. 
31 
 
Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 827 (1997) (financial 
position of defendant may be considered when reviewing punitive 
damages).  See also Ciccarelli v. School Dep't of Lowell, 70 
Mass. App. Ct. 787, 798 (2007) (jury could have found violation 
of G. L. c. 151B by public employer to be particularly 
outrageous). 
 
iii.  Damages for emotional distress.  The MWRA argues that 
the award of $200,000 damages for emotional distress, as found 
by the jury and affirmed by the court, should be remitted 
because it was excessive and not supported by the evidence.  We 
will affirm such an award unless the court below committed an 
"abuse of discretion . . . amounting to an error of law" 
(citation omitted).  Labonte, 424 Mass. at 824.  See Reckis v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 471 Mass. 272, 299 (2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 896 (2016) ("award of damages must stand unless . . . to 
permit it to stand was an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court below, amounting to an error of law" [citation omitted]). 
 
It is an error of law for a court to allow an award of 
damages for emotional distress that is "greatly disproportionate 
to the injury proven or represented a miscarriage of justice."  
Labonte, 424 Mass. at 824.  See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer 
Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 404, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 927 (2005) 
("general rule" is "that a reviewing court should not disturb a 
jury's award of damages unless it is clearly excessive in 
32 
 
relation to what the plaintiff's evidence has demonstrated 
damages to be"). 
 
Here, we affirm the award of damages for emotional distress 
because it was supported by the evidence and not greatly 
disproportionate to the injury suffered.  DaPrato testified 
that, due to the termination, "mentally, physically, 
emotionally, I was a train wreck."  He consulted a doctor for 
anxiety and experienced migraine headaches and other negative 
health effects.  Furthermore, he spent three months finding new 
employment, and due to economic necessity he was forced to alter 
his retirement plans by making the difficult decision to elect 
"early" pension benefits.  His subsequent series of new jobs, 
while higher paying, lacked the job security, paid vacations, 
and other benefits he enjoyed at the MWRA. 
In these circumstances, the jury reasonably could have 
found that DaPrato experienced emotional distress due to 
negative health and emotional effects following his termination.  
See Labonte, 424 Mass. at 824 ("jury reasonably could have 
concluded that the depression caused by the termination was 
sufficient to warrant damages for emotional distress"); 
Dalrymple v. Winthrop, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 620-621 & n.14 
(2000) (upholding $200,000 damages award for emotional distress 
under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, where jury had evidence that 
wrongfully terminated plaintiff "felt humiliated and went into a 
33 
 
depression").  It was also reasonable for the jury to infer that 
a long-term employee, nearing retirement age, who "loved his 
job" and was committed to the water quality mission of the MWRA, 
would suffer emotional distress from wrongful termination of his 
employment and the need to change his pension and retirement 
planning.  See Massasoit Indus. Corp. v. Massachusetts Comm'n 
Against Discrimination, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 215 (2017) 
(upholding emotional distress damages award under G. L. c. 151B, 
§ 4, where long-time employee "suffered from anxiety and 
diminished self-esteem" following wrongful termination); 
Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 50, 56 
(D. Mass. 2004) (inferring that "necessity of resorting to 
retirement funds . . . was a source of considerable emotional 
distress" for wrongfully terminated employee).  In short, the 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the emotional 
injury suffered by the plaintiff was serious.  We thus affirm 
the award in its entirety. 
 
d.  Calculation of FMLA front pay award.  The MWRA contends 
that the judge erred in calculating the front pay damages that 
DaPrato received on account of the diminishment of his pension 
by his earlier than anticipated retirement.  The judge informed 
the parties that he would receive "an advisory decision from the 
jury on FMLA, front pay."  This was proper:  as we held in 
Esler, 473 Mass. at 782, relying on Traxler v. Multnomah County, 
34 
 
596 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010), and other Federal cases, 
"front pay under the FMLA is appropriate for a judge's 
consideration."  The court in Traxler, in turn, explained that, 
although "front pay is an equitable remedy," a "trial court, 
sitting in equity, may nevertheless employ an advisory jury.  
The ultimate decision, however, rests with the court."  Traxler, 
supra at 1013.  The award of front pay under the FMLA is an 
equitable decision that we review for an abuse of discretion.  
Esler, supra.  We conclude that there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
DaPrato was the beneficiary of a "traditional pension plan" 
or "defined benefit plan" to which he and the MWRA both 
contributed.21  The amount of the pension was contingent on 
factors including his retirement age and number of years of 
employment.  DaPrato planned to begin receiving his pension at 
age sixty-six, the date of his anticipated retirement; due to 
his termination, however, he retired at age sixty-two.  DaPrato 
introduced testimony from an expert in economics and finance to 
calculate the impact of his earlier than expected retirement on 
                                                 
 
21 DaPrato's expert defined a "traditional pension plan" 
(i.e., a defined benefit plan) as one in which the pension 
beneficiary receives a pension on retirement calculated 
according to a certain formula.  He contrasted this kind of plan 
with a "defined contribution plan," such as a so-called "401(k)" 
plan, in which contributions go into an individual account 
belonging to the employee. 
35 
 
the amount of his pension.  The expert assumed that DaPrato 
would receive his pension from the date of his planned 
retirement through the date of his statistically likely death.  
He then used the MWRA's "pension calculator" and properly 
discounted the amount of the pension to present value to arrive 
at a value of $351,869 for DaPrato's pension losses.  In 
determining front pay damages, the jury were instructed to 
consider these same factors.22 
From the $351,869 that DaPrato claimed in front pay 
damages, the jury and judge deducted the following amounts.  
First, as instructed by the judge, the jury deducted pension 
contributions that DaPrato would have otherwise made but did not 
make due to his earlier than anticipated retirement.  The jury 
deducted $51,869 to arrive at its advisory front pay award of 
$300,000.  The judge observed that the jury's deduction to 
reflect DaPrato's contributions was "approximate," and 
                                                 
 
22 The judge instructed the jury to consider, "[f]irst, the 
date that Mr. DaPrato would've taken retirement if MWRA had not 
terminated his employment unlawfully; second, Mr. DaPrato's life 
expectancy expressed in terms of the number of years and months 
he can reasonably expect to live beyond that retirement date; 
third, the amount that Mr. DaPrato would've received in pension 
if MWRA had considered his -- continued his employment through 
his expected retirement date . . . fourth, the amount of pension 
that Mr. DaPrato will receive as a result of his . . . firing 
and early retirement.  If this rate is lower than the amount of 
pension he otherwise would receive -- received, then you may 
find that Mr. DaPrato suffered front pay . . . damages." 
36 
 
subsequently "reduce[d] the total pension loss by $60,000, 
resulting in an award of $291,869 before considering the MWRA's 
additional arguments."23  Second, the judge deducted the $103,203 
in pension payments that DaPrato received and would receive from 
the date of his termination until the date of his anticipated 
retirement.  The judge rejected the MWRA's argument that he 
should deduct a further $97,867 in so-called "excess" salary 
between the greater amount that DaPrato earned from short-term 
contract work he obtained following his termination and the 
lesser amount that he would have earned by remaining at the 
MWRA.  The judge ordered a front pay award of $188,666. 
We conclude that the judge made the aforementioned 
deductions properly and did not abuse his discretion when he 
declined to deduct DaPrato's "excess" salary.  An employee who 
is wrongfully terminated on account of discrimination is 
entitled to be made whole.  See Arban v. West Publ. Corp., 345 
F.3d 390, 406 (6th Cir. 2003) (in FMLA retaliation case, where 
plaintiff cannot be reinstated, "the question to be answered is 
whether front pay damages are needed in a particular case to 
                                                 
 
23 DaPrato's expert approximated that he did not have to 
make between $50,000 and $60,000 in pension contributions due to 
his earlier than anticipated retirement.  The judge's deduction 
of $60,000, rather than the $51,869 deducted by the jury, 
reflects the amount that DaPrato's counsel stated in closing 
argument that the jury should deduct to account for these unmade 
contributions. 
37 
 
make the plaintiff whole").  See also Avitia v. Metropolitan 
Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(Posner, C.J.) ("when reinstatement is infeasible, the plaintiff 
is free to seek in lieu of that remedy an award of 'front pay,' 
designed to put him in the identical financial position that he 
would have occupied had he been reinstated"); Blum v. Witco 
Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373 (1987) (front pay available under 
"make-whole philosophy").  Lost pension benefits are part of the 
"make whole" calculation.24 
 
The award of front pay "restor[ed] [DaPrato] to the 
position [he] would have been in had the discrimination never 
occurred" (citation omitted).  Blum, 829 F.2d at 373.  Had he 
not been discharged in retaliation for the exercise of his FMLA 
rights he would have retired at age sixty-six at a greater 
pension.  The retaliation thus caused a "tangible loss" 
calculated reasonably and precisely by a financial expert 
                                                 
 
24 For cases in which courts held as much, see School Comm. 
of Norton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. 839, 849-850 (2005) (awarding lost pension 
benefits in employment discrimination case); Ventresco v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 209 (2002) ("Lost 
pension benefits are recoverable in an action under G. L. 
c. 151B"); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 374 (1987) 
("Because of the paramount importance of pension benefits to an 
employee's future financial security, it would be unfair to 
exclude them from a calculation of front pay" in employment 
discrimination case).  See also Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(No. 1), 455 Mass. 91, 102 (2009) (front pay intended to 
compensate plaintiff for loss of future earnings caused by 
discriminatory conduct, including salary and benefits). 
38 
 
(citation omitted).  School Comm. of Norton v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 839, 849 
(2005).  Because the judge deducted amounts included in the 
claimed damages that DaPrato no longer had to pay or had already 
received, there was no double recovery. 
 
The MWRA claims that the judge nonetheless erred when he 
declined to offset the "excess" salary from DaPrato's 
posttermination, short-term contract work against the damages 
attributable to DaPrato's pension losses.  An employee has a 
"duty to mitigate her damages by reasonable efforts to secure 
other employment."  Haddad, 455 Mass. at 102.  In this case, 
DaPrato properly and successfully mitigated his damages when he 
sought and achieved other employment and actually earned more 
than he previously had at the MWRA.  As a result, his backpay 
award was minimal, just the three months he spent looking for 
work.  The question then becomes whether the additional amounts 
he earned above and beyond his former salary should be used to 
offset his pension amounts.  We conclude that the trial judge 
was well within his discretion in declining to do so. 
In the instant case DaPrato obtained various short-term 
contract jobs.  This work may have provided him more 
compensation, but it was less predictable and reliable and thus 
more precarious.  Unlike at the MWRA, he also received no 
pension; nor did those employers make contributions to a 
39 
 
"401(k)" or other retirement plan.  See Blum, 829 F.2d at 374 
("employee illegally discharged near the end of his working 
career is particularly vulnerable to suffering economic injury 
in the form of lost pension benefits").  In these circumstances, 
it was within the judge's discretion not to offset earnings that 
exceeded DaPrato's prior salary from the calculation of his lost 
pension benefits.  See id. at 374-375 (employees earning more 
money at current employers entitled to front pay for pension 
losses without offsets for these additional earnings where 
current employers had either no pension plans or inferior 
pension plans); Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 
48, 50 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("There is no question that if a 
plaintiff cannot, in a new job, acquire rights to pension 
benefits equivalent to what he would have had in the job from 
which he was wrongfully dismissed, he cannot be made whole for 
the discrimination unless he is given prospective benefits").  
To hold otherwise would run counter to the "make whole" 
principle of front pay awards, at least when an employee, as 
here, does not receive any pension benefits from posttermination 
employment.  It was also within the judge's discretion to 
conclude that in the employment discrimination context, "if 
there is to be a 'windfall,' such benefit should accrue to the 
injured party rather than to the wrongdoer."  School Comm. of 
Norton, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 849, quoting Jones v. Wayland, 374 
40 
 
Mass. 249, 262 (1978).  See Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 
870 F.2d 1198, 1210 (7th Cir. 1989) (employer should not receive 
"discrimination bonus" [citation omitted]).  We thus conclude 
that there was no abuse of discretion and affirm the front pay 
award in its entirety. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.