Title: Fancher v. Fagella

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
RICHARD A. FANCHER 
              OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 062339  
          September 14, 2007 
 
JOSEPH B. FAGELLA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 
 
 
This is an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-670(B)(1) from an order denying injunctive relief.  The 
dispositive question is whether an injunction may issue to 
compel an adjoining landowner to remove a tree, the roots of 
which intrude into, and cause significant, continuous and 
increasing structural damage to the plaintiff’s property.  The 
appeal requires us to revisit our holding in Smith v. Holt, 
174 Va. 213, 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939). 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The essential facts are not in dispute.  Richard A. 
Fancher and Joseph B. Fagella are the owners of adjoining 
townhouses in the Cambridge Court subdivision in Fairfax 
County.  Fagella’s property is higher in elevation than 
Fancher’s and a masonry retaining wall running along the 
property line behind the townhouses supports the grade 
separation.  There is a sunken patio behind Fancher’s 
townhouse, covered by masonry pavers. 
 
2
 
Fancher brought this suit against Fagella, alleging that 
Fagella has on his property a large sweet gum tree that 
constitutes a noxious nuisance; the tree’s invasive root 
system has damaged and displaced the retaining wall between 
the parties’ properties, displaced the pavers on Fancher’s 
patio, caused blockage of his sewer and water pipes and has 
impaired the foundation of his house.  Fancher also complained 
that the tree’s overhanging branches grow onto his roof, 
depositing leaves and other debris onto his roof and rain 
gutters.  He contended that he had attempted self-help, by 
trying to repair the damage to the retaining wall and the rear 
foundation of the house, as well as trying to cut back the 
overhanging branches, but that these steps were ineffectual 
because of the continuing expansion of the root system and 
branches.  Fancher prayed for an injunction compelling Fagella 
to remove the tree and its invading root system entirely, and 
an award of damages to cover the cost of restoring the 
property to its former condition. 
 
The circuit court heard the evidence ore tenus.  At the 
hearing, Fancher testified that the tree’s trunk was on 
Fagella’s property, about “two to three feet from the 
party/common wall.”  Fancher estimated the tree was about 60 
feet high at the present time and two feet in trunk diameter 
at its base. 
 
3
 
Fancher presented the testimony of an arborist who 
qualified as an expert witness and testified that the sweet 
gum is native to the area, that it grows to “incredible 
heights of 120 to 140 feet” at maturity and would eventually 
reach a trunk diameter of 4 to 6 feet.  The arborist testified 
that the tree was deciduous, dropped “spiky gumballs,” had a 
“heavy pollen load,” an “extremely invasive root system” and a 
“high demand for water.”  His opinion was that the tree was 
presently “only at mid-maturity,” that it would continue to 
grow, and that “[n]o amount of concrete would hold the root 
system back.”  The root system was, in his opinion, the cause 
of the damage to the retaining wall and the pavers and “in the 
same line as those cracks to the wall and the foundation.”  
The arborist stated that the tree was “noxious” because of its 
location and that the only way to stop the continuing damage 
being done by the root system was to remove the tree entirely, 
because the roots, if cut, would grow back. 
 
Fancher also presented the expert testimony of two 
engineers, who opined that the pressure of the tree’s 
expanding root system was the cause of the structural damage 
to the retaining wall.  At the conclusion of Fancher’s case, 
Fagella moved to strike the prayer for injunctive relief.  The 
court, relying on our decision in Smith v. Holt, granted the 
motion to strike and entered an order denying injunctive 
 
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relief, retaining for further adjudication Fancher’s claim for 
damages.  We awarded Fancher an interlocutory appeal. 
Analysis 
A. Right of action 
 
 
The issues raised by vegetation encroaching across 
property lines have frequently confronted courts throughout 
the country, leading to results that are less than harmonious. 
The earlier decisions, including our own, were decided in  
times when the population was far less densely concentrated 
than at present, and more often engaged in agriculture.  More 
recent cases have been concerned with problems arising in more 
urban settings.  A thorough review and analysis of those cases 
was recently made by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Lane v. 
W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355, 360-63 (Tenn. 2002), and it 
would serve no purpose to repeat that discussion here. 
 
Suffice it to say that, as the Tennessee court explained 
in Lane, several rules have evolved.  (1) The “Massachusetts 
Rule,” holds that a landowner’s right to protect his property 
from the encroaching boughs and roots of a neighbor’s tree is 
limited to self-help, i.e., cutting off the branches and roots 
at the point they invade his property.  That rule was based on 
Michalson v. Nutting, 175 N.E. 490 (Mass. 1931), where the 
court observed that “the common law has recognized that it is 
wiser to leave the individual to protect himself, if harm 
 
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results to him from this exercise of another’s right to use 
his property in a reasonable way, than to subject that other 
to the annoyance, and the public to the burden, of actions at 
law, which would be likely to be innumerable and, in many 
instances, purely vexatious.”  Id. at 491.  (2) The “Virginia 
Rule,” holds that the intrusion of roots and branches from a 
neighbor’s plantings which were “not noxious in [their] 
nature” and had caused no “sensible injury” were not 
actionable at law, the plaintiff being limited to his right of 
self-help.  That rule was based on our holding in Smith v. 
Holt, 174 Va. 213, 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939), where we also said, 
“when it appears that a sensible injury has been inflicted by 
the protrusion of roots from a noxious tree or plant onto the 
land of another, he has, after notice, a right of action at 
law for the trespass committed.”  Id. at 219, 5 S.E.2d at 495.  
We affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer in 
that case, holding that neither equitable relief nor damages 
were warranted because the invading roots came from a privet 
hedge that was not “noxious” in nature and had caused no 
“sensible injury.”  Id. at 220, 5 S.E.2d at 495.  (3) The 
“Restatement Rule,” based on Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§ 839, 840 (1979), imposes an obligation on a landowner to 
control vegetation that encroaches upon adjoining land if the 
vegetation is “artificial,” i.e., planted or maintained by a 
 
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person, but not if the encroaching vegetation is “natural.”  
(4) The “Hawaii Rule,” holds that living trees and plants are 
ordinarily not nuisances, but can become so when they cause 
actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to 
adjoining property.  That rule is based upon Whitesell v. 
Houlton, 632 P.2d 1077 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981), where the court 
said:  “[W]hen overhanging branches or protruding roots 
actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, 
[substantial] harm to property other than plant life, in ways 
other than by casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or 
fruit, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may 
require the owner of the tree to pay for the damages and to 
cut back the endangering branches or roots and, if such is not 
done within a reasonable time, the . . . neighbor may cause 
the cut-back to be done at the tree owner’s expense.”  Id. at 
1079.  The Tennessee court, in Lane, after considering the 
merits and weaknesses of the foregoing rules, decided to adopt 
the Hawaii approach, partially overruling an earlier Tennessee 
decision that had generally adhered to the “Massachusetts 
Rule.”  Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 363-64. 
 
The “Massachusetts Rule” has been criticized on the 
ground that it is unsuited to modern urban and suburban life, 
although it may still be suited to many rural conditions.  The 
“Restatement Rule” has been criticized on the grounds that it 
 
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is often impossible to determine whether a plant has 
originated naturally or has been introduced or nurtured by 
human activity; further, that rule illogically imposes 
liability on a landowner who carefully maintains his property 
and spares one who neglects his land and permits his 
vegetation to “run wild.” 
 
Our “Virginia Rule” is subject to the just criticism that 
the classification of a plant as “noxious” depends upon the 
viewpoint of the beholder.  “Noxious" has been defined as 
“Hurtful; offensive; offensive to the smell.  The word 
'noxious' includes the complex idea both of insalubrity and 
offensiveness.  That which causes or tends to cause injury, 
especially to health or morals.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1065 
(6th ed. 1990).  Many would agree that poison ivy meets that 
definition because of its proclivity to cause personal injury.  
Some would include kudzu because of its tendency toward 
rampant growth, smothering other vegetation.  Few would 
include healthy shade trees, although they may cause more 
damage, and be more expensive to remove, than the others.  We 
conclude that continued reliance on the distinction between 
plants that are “noxious,” and those that are not, imposes an 
unworkable standard for determining the rights of neighboring 
landowners. 
 
8
 
Accordingly, we now overrule Smith v. Holt, insofar as it 
conditions a right of action upon the “noxious” nature of a 
plant that sends forth invading roots or branches into a 
neighbor’s property.  We find the reasoning of the Tennessee 
court in Lane persuasive, and adopt the Hawaii approach as 
expressed in that case: 
Accordingly, we hold that encroaching trees and 
plants are not nuisances merely because they cast 
shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just 
because they happen to encroach upon adjoining 
property either above or below the ground.  However, 
encroaching trees and plants may be regarded as a 
nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an 
imminent danger of actual harm to adjoining 
property.  If so, the owner of the tree or plant may 
be held responsible for harm caused to [adjoining 
property], and may also be required to cut back the 
encroaching branches or roots, assuming the 
encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance.  We 
do not, however, alter existing . . . law that the 
adjoining landowner may, at his own expense, cut 
away the encroaching vegetation to the property line 
whether or not the encroaching vegetation 
constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm 
or possible harm to the adjoining property.  Thus, 
the law of self-help remains intact . . . . 
 
Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 364.  We also overrule Smith v. Holt 
insofar as its language may be read to imply that equitable 
relief is precluded even when a nuisance is found to exist. 
B. 
Remedy 
In a proper application of stare decisis, the circuit 
court followed Smith v. Holt in denying injunctive relief in 
the present case.  Because of the rule we now adopt, it 
 
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becomes necessary to consider the appropriate remedy.  The 
facts pleaded, if proved by Fancher, would constitute a 
continuing trespass, resulting in actual harm to his property.  
Under traditional equitable principles, a chancellor may 
enjoin a continuing trespass, even when each increment of 
trespass is trivial or the damage is trifling, in order to 
avoid a multiplicity of actions at law.  Seventeen, Inc. v. 
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 Va. 74, 78, 205 S.E.2d 648, 653 
(1974).  Thus, on remand, the circuit court may properly 
consider injunctive relief in the present case. 
Not every case of nuisance or continuing trespass, 
however, may be enjoined.  The decision whether to grant an 
injunction always rests in the sound discretion of the 
chancellor, and depends on the relative benefit an injunction 
would confer upon the plaintiff in contrast to the injury it 
would impose on the defendant.  Any burden imposed on the 
public should also be weighed.  Akers v. Mathieson Alkali 
Works, 151 Va. 1, 8-9, 144 S.E. 492, 494 (1928). 
In weighing the equities in a case of this kind, the 
chancellor must necessarily first consider whether the 
conditions existing on the adjoining lands are such that it is 
reasonable to impose a duty on the owner of a tree to protect 
a neighbor’s land from damage caused by its intruding branches 
and roots.  In the absence of such a duty, the traditional 
 
10
right of self-help is an adequate remedy.  It would be clearly 
unreasonable to impose such a duty upon the owner of 
historically forested or agricultural land, but entirely 
appropriate to do so in the case of parties, like those in the 
present case, who dwell on adjoining residential lots.1  
Further, if such a duty is found to exist on the part of 
the tree owner, the chancellor must determine the extent of 
the remedy.  Under the circumstances of the case, will self-
help by cutting off the invading roots and branches, followed 
by an award of damages to compensate the plaintiff for his 
expenses, afford an adequate and permanent remedy, obviating 
the need for an injunction?2  If not, will complete removal of 
the defendant’s tree be the appropriate remedy when the 
equities are balanced?  An affirmative answer to the latter 
question will necessitate a mandatory injunction.  As in all 
cases in which equitable relief is sought, the chancellor's 
decision must necessarily depend on the particular facts shown 
by the evidence, guided by traditional equitable principles. 
                     
1 The duty of the owner of a large tract of rural land, 
whose neighbor creates an adjoining subdivision of small 
residential lots, presents a question not now before us.  We 
leave that decision to another day. 
2 In such a case, the chancellor may consider any evidence 
bearing on the question whether cutting invading roots back to 
the property line will cause the tree to become so unstable or 
diseased as to constitute an imminent danger to the properties 
of either of the parties, or others. 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
Because the circuit court, following our decision in 
Smith v. Holt, did not consider equitable relief to be 
available, we will reverse the order appealed from and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.