Title: Nichols v. Tennessee Valley OB/GYN Clinic, P.C.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: December 20, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180156
____________________
Niloofar N. Nichols and John Matthew Nichols
v.
Tennessee Valley OB/GYN Clinic, P.C., and Sharon L.
Callison, M.D.
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-16-900572)
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.
Shaw, Bryan, Sellers, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.  
1180156
Bolin, J., concurs specially.  
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,
dissent.
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BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially). 
I concur in affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
I write specially to object to the Chief Justice's dismissive
treatment, in his dissent, of the valuable service provided to
our trial courts  and to the bar by the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions Committee (Civil).
     In addressing the matter, I initially explain the history
of pattern jury instructions in general and acknowledge with
gratitude the countless hours the committee members of the
Alabama 
Pattern 
Jury 
Instructions Committee 
(Civil), 
both 
past
and present, have put into serving the trial courts, the bar,
the litigants, and the juries in this State over the past half
century.  
One law-review article has explained the development of
pattern jury instructions as follows:
"Originally, there was a rule in England that
judges were not supposed to instruct jurors at all;
they could only answer questions.  Even then, the
answers to jury questions were not always very
helpful. In the 1314 case of Abbot of Tewkesbury v.
Calewe, a jury was asked to decide whether certain
land was 'free alms' or 'lay fee.'  They pointed out
to the judge, 'We are not men of law,' implicitly
requesting his assistance.  The judge replied, 'Say
what you feel.'   This is the problem, of course. If
a judge does not explain to the jury what it is
supposed to do, the jury will do what it feels is
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1180156
best. This is precisely the sort of arbitrary
decision making that the rule of law seeks to
prevent. 
"Eventually, judges in England did begin to
instruct jurors on the law. But even today, English
jury instructions (part of the judge's 'summation')
remain oral and relatively informal. The judge
summarizes the facts and possible inferences to be
drawn from them and then tells jurors in his own
words what the relevant law is. 
"As in England, American judges originally did
not instruct jurors on the law. Jurors were expected
to use their common sense. Common sense may have
worked well enough when the country was largely
rural. But as the country industrialized, legal
disputes became more complex and the need for
consistently applied rules of law became more
pressing. Eventually, jurors lost the right to
decide questions of law. Additionally, toward the
end of the nineteenth century, many states took away
the power of the judge to charge juries on the
facts. Thus arose the modern division of labor in
which the judge decides the law and the jury is
entrusted with the facts. Inevitably, jurisdictions
began to require the judge to instruct the jury on
the relevant law. 
"The legal profession soon came to realize that
instructing the jury could involve a lot of work and
duplication of effort. With every trial, judges and
attorneys 
would 
spend 
time 
drafting 
the
instructions. Another problem was that instructions
were often inconsistent from judge to judge. And
judges were often reversed for instructional error. 
"In 1935, Judge William J. Palmer of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles, California addressed
some of these issues in an article recommending that
a 
committee 
be 
formed 
to 
compile 
approved
instructions for civil cases.  The presiding judge
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of the court was impressed by the idea and appointed
a committee of lawyers and judges to accomplish this
goal. 
 
The 
committee 
published 
a 
book 
of
instructions a few years later. The descendant of
this book of instructions is still used in
California, where it is known as the Book of
Approved Jury Instructions ('BAJI').  A similar book
of 
criminal 
instructions, 
California 
Jury
Instructions: Criminal('CALJIC') soon followed.  The
venture was a tremendous success and has since been
imitated by many other states."
The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury
Instructions, 
66 
Brooklyn 
L. 
Rev. 
1081, 
1082–84
(2001)(footnotes omitted).
In Alabama, an effort was undertaken to simplify civil
jury instructions in 1967 by the Alabama Program of Continuing
Legal Education, with the support of the Alabama Association
of Circuit Judges, the Alabama Defense Lawyers Association,
and the Alabama Trial Lawyers Association and with the
cooperation of the Alabama State Bar.  The goal of the
resulting committee was, and still is, as this Court stated in
a 1973 order, "to formulate and compile model jury charges for
use by the Bench and Bar which would be concise, legally
accurate, unslanted, and in simple language understandable by
lay jurors."
5
1180156
By an order adopted in 1973, this Court "approved" the
use of pattern jury instructions, stating in that order that
pattern jury instructions would be an "invaluable aid to trial
judges of this State in charging juries in civil cases."  The
Court recommended publication of the pattern jury charges and
their use by the bench and bar.  The Court noted, although the
instructions 
appeared 
accurate, 
the 
instructions 
were 
patterns
only, and "should be altered or changed as circumstances
indicate."  Thus, the Court recommended the use of the pattern
charges, but without prejudice to the rights of any litigant
to make and reserve for review any objections thereto --
either to form, substance, or application.  The Alabama
Pattern Jury Instructions Committee (Civil) ("the Committee")
does not submit the pattern instructions to this Court before
their publication.  Although this Court "approved" the
publication of the pattern instructions for use in trial
courts in Alabama, it did not "preapprove" the pattern jury
charges written by the Committee as being omnipresent,
omnipotent, and all-encompassing -- applicable in their
unaltered form to every possible factual scenario conceivable
in civil litigation, then and in the future.
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I quote the following steps set out in the first edition
of the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil, outlining
the efforts to create a finished product:
"PREFACE
"In 
early 
1967 
a 
determined 
effort 
was
undertaken to simplify one of the basic facets in
the trial of civil jury cases, the matter of
instructing juries.  This objective became the
project of the Alabama Program of Continuing Legal
Education under the directorship of Honorable
Douglas Lanford with the active support of the
Alabama Association of Circuit Judges, the Alabama
Defense Lawyers Association and Alabama Trial
Lawyers Association, with the cooperation of the
Alabama State Bar.
"A committee made up of members of these
organizations was established and was composed of
the following:
"Judge 
James 
N. 
Bloodworth, 
Chairman, 
of 
Decatur
"Judge Ingram Beasley, Vice Chairman, of
Birmingham
"Judge Will G. Caffey, Jr. of Mobile
"Judge William C. Sullivan, of Talladega
"H.R. Burnham, of Anniston
"Richard L. Jones, of Birmingham
"Janie L. Shores, of Birmingham
"Regular monthly meetings of one day duration
were held during the succeeding years.  As time
passed, vacancies on the original committee occurred
through the personal success of various members and
recognition of their professional abilities.  The
original Chairman, Judge James N. Bloodworth, left
to become an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court
of Alabama.  He was replaced as Chairman in 1968 by
Judge Ingram Beasley. Judge Will G. Caffey, Jr.,
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1180156
left the Circuit bench in Mobile and the committee
to become a United States Referee in Bankruptcy.  He
was replaced by Circuit Judge Reneau P. Almon, of
Moulton, who in turn left the committee upon his
appointment to the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals.  Judge Edward N. Scruggs thereupon joined
the committee, as did Judge George Murphy, and Judge
Robert E.L. Key.  Richard L. Jones became an
Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of Alabama in
1972, but continued as a member of the committee,
which was composed of the following at the time of
publication:
"Judge Ingram Beasley, Chairman, of Birmingham
"Judge William C. Sullivan, Vice Chairman, of
Talladega
"Judge Robert E.L. Key, of Evergreen
"Judge George Murphy, of Gadsden
"Judge Edward N. Scruggs, of Guntersville
"H.R. Burnham, of Anniston
"Justice Richard L. Jones, of Birmingham
"E.C. Hornsby, of Tallassee
"Professor Janie L. Shores, of Birmingham
"Subcommittee members serving at various times
during the six years were:
"T. Rueben Bell, of Sylacauga
"Ollie L. Blan, Jr., of Birmingham
"Timothy M. Conway, Jr., of Birmingham
"Albert W. Copeland, of Montgomery
"A. Neil Hudgens, of Mobile
"Irvin J. Langford, of Mobile
"Robert B. Propst, of Anniston
"J.M. Sides, of Anniston
"J. William Thomason, of Bessemer
"George F. Wooten, of Talladega
"Judge Leigh M. Clark, of Birmingham
"Mable B. Fitch
"....
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"... No citations in this volume should be
construed as an indication that Alabama courts will
necessarily adopt rules from other jurisdictions
which may be stated in the material cited."
After considerable work and six years after the Committee
was formed, the Committee issued its report to this Court in
1973, as captioned and stating:
"REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT
"MAY IT PLEASE THIS HONORABLE COURT
"The Alabama Jury instructions Committee begs
leave to report to Your Honors as follows:
"The 
Alabama 
Pattern 
Jury 
Instructions 
Committee
was 
created 
by 
the 
Alabama 
Circuit 
Judges
Association, 
the 
Alabama 
Plaintiff's 
Lawyer's
Association 
and 
the 
Alabama 
Defense 
Lawyer's
Association in 1967 for the purpose of research and
drafting model charges for use in civil cases by the
judges and lawyers of this State.
"The committee is 
deeply indebted to 
the 
Alabama
Program of Continuing Legal Education for its
financial assistance and to the Cumberland School of
Law of Samford University for the many services
rendered by it.  The committee headquarters with all
secretarial services and incidental expenses have
been furnished by the Cumberland School of Law. 
Research services were furnished by law students of
the Cumberland School of Law under the supervision
of Professor Janie L. Shores who also acted as the
Committee Reporter.
"The goal of the committee has been to draft
charges on various subjects that would furnish busy
trial 
judges 
and 
lawyers 
with 
model 
jury
instructions 
that 
would 
be 
concise, 
legally
9
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accurate, unslanted and in simple understandable
language.
"Since members of this Committee met with
members of this Court shortly after its formation
the Committee has approved a sufficient number of
charges to justify their publication.  The Committee
does not pretend to represent that the work done by
it is in anywise complete as to the subjects
included or includes all subjects that will be
useful.  There are many other subjects to be covered
and numerous other pattern charges that would be
desirable and helpful.  We therefore recommend the
creation of a permanent Pattern Jury Instructions
Committee appointed by this Honorable Court to
review these charges as experience may indicate or
require and to draft additional pattern charges to
expand the collection to other subjects not now
covered.  Copies of the pre-publication manuscript
are herewith furnished to each member of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama for
examination and comments.  Before proceeding with
publication we are anxious to have your comments and
suggestions. 
Your 
suggestions, 
criticism 
or
recommendation will be of great value to the Bench
and Bar as well as to this Committee.
"Respectfully submitted,
"Alabama 
Pattern 
Jury 
Instructions
Committee
"Judge Ingram Beasley, Chairman
"Judge William C. Sullivan, Vice Chairman
"Honorable Janie Shores, Reporter
"Judge Edward N. Scruggs
"Judge R.E.L. Key
"Judge George Murphy
"Honorable H.R. Burnham"
(Emphasis added.)
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Based upon this formal committee report, also in 1973,
this Court issued an order of the Supreme Court of Alabama
that stated:
"ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA APPROVING USE 
      OF ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
 
"This matter comes on to be heard on the report
of the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions Committee,
accompanied by a copy of Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions 
in Civil Cases, drafted by the
Committee and which it now proposes to publish. Upon
consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion
that the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions prepared
by this Committee will be an invaluable aid to trial
judges of this State in charging juries in civil
cases, and its publication and use by bench and bar
are recommended. 
"The Court acknowledges with appreciation the
painstaking care, attention to detail and many hours
of work and study which went into the drafting of
these 
pattern 
instructions 
and 
commends 
the
Committee for the preparation of this work. The
Court is confident that the instructions prepared by
the Committee represent a scholarly effort on the
part of a group of experienced and dedicated judges
and lawyers to state the law of Alabama in simple
and understandable, yet accurate language. Use of
the instructions should relieve both trial judges
and lawyers of some of the time and tedium involved
in drafting jury instructions. A reference to the
appropriate instructions, the notes on use and the
references stated therein should enable busy trial
judges to prepare and deliver oral instructions in
less time and with greater accuracy and thus allow
them to devote more attention to other important
aspects of trials. 
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"While these instructions appear to be accurate
and appropriate to the subjects to which they
relate, they are to be considered as patterns only
and should be altered or changed as circumstances
indicate. 
"Accordingly, it is ORDERED by the Court: 
"1. The publication by the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions Committee of Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions in Civil Cases and their use by the
trial judges of this state are recommended, but
without prejudice to the rights of any litigant to
make and reserve for review any objection thereto
either as to form, substance or application. All
such objections shall be made during the trial in
accordance with the provisions of the Alabama Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any objections thus made, if
assigned and argued as error, will be reviewed by
this Court as other assignments of error are
reviewed. 
"2. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
Civil Practice and Procedure is hereby requested to
consider the desirability of an amendment to the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure so as to include an
additional rule, entitled Use of Alabama Pattern
Jury Instructions, to provide, in substance, as
follows: 
"'The publication by the Alabama
Pattern Jury Instructions Committee of
Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions in Civil
Cases and their use by the trial judges of
this State are recommended, but without
prejudice to the rights of any litigant to
make and reserve for review any objection
thereto either as to form, substance or
application. All such objections shall be
made during the trial in accordance with
the provisions of the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure. Any objections thus made,
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if assigned and argued as error, will be
reviewed by this Court as other assignments
of error are reviewed.'
".... 
"3. 
In 
accordance with 
the 
recommendation of 
the
Committee, 
a 
permanent 
Alabama 
Pattern 
Jury
Instructions Committee is hereby created by this
Court for the purpose of reviewing and improving the
charges presented as experience may require and
adding charges on subjects not covered. The
following judges and attorneys are hereby appointed
to serve at the pleasure of this Court for a term of
one (1) year: 
"Judge Ingram Beasley, Chairman 
"Judge William C. Sullivan, Vice Chairman 
"Judge Robert E.L. Key 
"Judge George Murphy 
"Judge Edward N. Scruggs 
"H.R. Burnham 
"E.C. Hornsby 
"Professor Janie L. Shores 
"Done and Ordered this the 19th day of April, 1973. 
"Chief Justice 
"Howell T. Heflin 
"Associate Justices 
"Pelham J. Merrill 
"James S. Coleman, Jr. 
"Robert B. Harwood 
"James N. Bloodworth 
"Alva Hugh Maddox 
"Daniel T. McCall, Jr. 
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"James H. Faulkner
"Richard L. Jones"
(Emphasis added.)
I recognize that, in 2018, the members of this Court,
myself included, determined that it would be best if the
Committee was completely independent from this Court.  This
move simply amplified and reaffirmed the origin of the
Committee in 1967, as a unique extrajudicial workforce of very
learned lawyers, judges, and justices -- both active and
retired -- that would be allowed to perform its ongoing work
on its own. The absence of Committee members appointed by this
Court removes any hint of bias, either consciously or
subconsciously, on behalf of this Court in deciding appeals
based upon the workproduct of a committee appointed by it.
Further, as time moves along, the independence of the
Committee will counter any future misconception by the trial
bench or bar that the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions -
Civil, although inordinately helpful, are a 
be-all and end-all
compilation.
   The effective end result of this process allows selfless
experts in the field of civil litigation serving on the
Committee to continue to study intervening statutory law and
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caselaw, as well as new topics, that will be helpful to
lawyers and trial judges, and by relation to parties, involved
in jury trials pertaining to the subject of the pattern
instructions.
I conclude by again acknowledging the timeless and
tireless hours of quality work that all the members of the
Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions Committee (Civil) have
performed to make the tasks of lawyers, trial judges, and
appellate judges smoother, easier, and more efficient. 
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PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Niloofar N. Nichols and John Matthew Nichols appeal from
a judgment entered on a jury verdict holding Sharon L.
Callison, M.D., and Tennessee Valley OB/GYN Clinic, P.C. ("the
clinic"), not liable for injuries caused by surgical objects
left in Niloofar's body after she gave birth.  The Nicholses
argue that the circuit court erred in refusing to give a jury
instruction that was necessary to accurately reflect the
burden shifting required by Alabama law in retained-objects
cases.  Because I agree with the Nicholses and would reverse
the circuit court's judgment, I dissent.  
I. Facts and Procedural History
On July 7, 2014, Niloofar gave birth to a baby boy while
attended by her obstetrician/gynecologist, Dr. Callison.  In
the days following the birth, Niloofar began to feel vaginal
and abdominal pain to an extent that she was unable to care
for her newborn child.  She made an appointment with Dr.
Callison, at whose clinic a nurse practitioner performed an
external examination and reported "redness and swelling,
warmth, tenderness to touch at the episi[o]tomy site," and a
"[v]ery foul odor with erythema and swelling."  Dr. Callison
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approved a prescription for antibiotics and sent Niloofar
home.  When Niloofar's condition did not improve within a few
weeks, she returned to Dr. Callison's office.  Dr. Callison
performed an internal examination and discovered a surgical
sponge in Niloofar's vaginal cavity, left from Niloofar's
delivery.  About three weeks later, a piece of what Niloofar
believed was gauze came out of her vagina while she was in the
bathroom.
The Nicholses sued Dr. Callison and the clinic, alleging
medical malpractice; John alleged loss of consortium.  At
trial, the parties agreed to the following pattern jury
instruction (hereinafter referred to as "the standard-of-care
instruction"): 
"The fact that Dr. Callison did not remove the
object placed in [Niloofar] is evidence that Dr.
Callison did not meet the standard of care.  Dr.
Callison put on evidence that she did meet the
standard of care when she did not remove the object. 
This creates an issue for you to decide.  You must
consider all the evidence and decide whether Dr.
Callison either met or did not meet the standard of
care when she did not remove the object."
The night before the last day of trial, however, the
Nicholses 
requested 
the 
following 
supplemental 
jury
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instruction 
(hereinafter referred 
to 
as 
"the 
Nicholses' 
burden
instruction"): 
"It is the Plaintiffs' burden to prove to you by
substantial evidence that the Defendants left a
foreign object inside Mrs. Nichols.  If you are
reasonably satisfied that the Defendants left a
foreign object inside Mrs. Nichols, the burden of
proof would shift to the Defendants to prove to you
by substantial evidence and by expert testimony that
they acted within the standard of care.  If you
conclude that the Defendants have not met their
burden, you must conclude that the Defendants
breached the standard of care by leaving a foreign
object inside Mrs. Nichols."
The judge refused to give that instruction, stating: "I'm only
going to give pattern charges."  The judge continued: "Y'all
let me know if there's a pattern y'all [want] me to look at." 
The Nicholses timely objected to the refusal to give the
instruction, and the judge noted their objection on the
record.  
After closing arguments, the judge gave the jury both the
standard-of-care instruction and the following instruction on
the burden of proof (hereinafter referred to as "the court's
burden instruction"): 
"To recover damages on this claim, Mrs. Nichols
must prove to your reasonable satisfaction by
substantial evidence all of the following elements:
Number one, the standard of care that should have
been followed by Dr. Callison during the time she
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was responsible for the medical care of Mrs.
Nichols; number two, that Dr. Callison did not
follow the standard of care in providing medical
care and treatment of Mrs. Nichols; and, number
three, that the harm to Mrs. Nichols was probably
caused by Dr. Callison’s failure to follow the
standard of care. 
"Mrs. Nichols must prove each element of her
claim by substantial evidence. ... 
".... 
 
"If Mrs. Nichols proves to your reasonable
satisfaction by substantial evidence each of these
elements, then you should find in favor of Mrs.
Nichols. However, if Mrs. Nichols fails to prove all
of these elements to your reasonable satisfaction by
substantial evidence, then you should find in favor
of Dr. Callison." 
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Dr.
Callison and the clinic.  The circuit court entered a judgment
on that verdict.  The Nicholses appealed, and a majority of
this Court affirms that judgment, without an opinion. 
II. Standard of Review
A fundamental tenet of Alabama law is that a party has a
right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury by
proper instruction.  Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Serv., Inc.
v. Jericho Plantation, Inc., 481 So. 2d 343, 344 (Ala. 1985). 
"A trial court has broad discretion when formulating its jury
instructions, provided those instructions accurately reflect
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the law and the facts of the case."  Lee v. Houser, 148 So. 3d
406, 417 (Ala. 2013). Thus, the standard of review  for jury
instructions is generally whether the trial court exceeded its
discretion. Arthur v. Bolen, 41 So. 3d 745, 749 (Ala. 2010).
Because "[a] trial judge has no discretion to misapply or
misinterpret the law," Joseph L. Lester, Alabama Evidence §
7:29 (3d ed. 2019), we will reverse a judgment where the jury
instructions misapply or misstate the law, see Hamilton v.
Scott, 278 So. 3d 1180, 1187 (Ala. 2018) (reversing judgment
where trial court's refusal to give instruction was "directly
contrary to the law as stated in our cases").  However, we
will reverse the judgment only if the error was prejudicial.
See Baldwin Cty. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Fairhope,
999 So. 2d 448, 459 (Ala. 2008).
III. Discussion
The Nicholses argue that the circuit court erred in
refusing the Nicholses' burden instruction, which resulted in
the failure of the given jury instructions to accurately
explain that a plaintiff's showing of a retained object shifts
the burden of disproving negligence to the physician. The
parties agree that the controlling law regarding retained
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objects in medical-malpractice cases was laid out by this
Court in Breaux v. Thurston, 888 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. 2003), and
Houserman v. Garrett, 902 So. 2d 670 (Ala. 2004). In Breaux,
this Court stated: 
"The presence of the retained object is prima facie
evidence of negligence by the surgeon in carrying
out that responsibility. The presence of the
retained 
object 
does 
not, 
however, 
establish
negligence per se.  Rather, it serves to shift the
burden to the defendant surgeon to show that he or
she was not negligent because he or she fully
complied with the statutorily defined standard of
care."
888 So. 2d at 1217.  This Court clarified in Houserman that
"proof of a retained object creates a prima facie case of
negligence, [and] the burden then shifts to the defendant
physician, who, upon presenting substantial evidence of the
applicable standard of care and his or her compliance with it,
may be found by the jury not to have been negligent."  902 So.
2d at 674.  The parties disagree, however, about whether the
standard-of-care 
instruction 
and 
the 
court's 
burden
instruction, read together, accurately reflected the burden-
shifting process required by Breaux and Houserman. 
In communicating which party bears the burden of proof,
it is not necessary that the trial judge use the specific term
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"shifting burden of proof," so long as the language of the
instruction meaningfully communicates the concept.  See Rule
51, Ala. R. Civ. P. ("The refusal of a requested, written
instruction ... shall not be cause for reversal on appeal if
it appears that the same rule of law was substantially and
fairly given to the jury in the court's oral charge or in
charges given at the request of the parties."); Birmingham Tr.
& Sav. Co. v. Acacia Mut. Life Ass'n, 221 Ala. 561, 563, 130
So. 327, 328 (1930) (holding that an instruction was not
incorrect for using the term "burden" rather than "weight of
the evidence" because there was no meaningful distinction
between the terms). In other words, as the Louisiana Court of
Appeals explained, the instructions must "provide the jury
with sufficient guidance to overcome the omission of the
burden-shifting language."  Odom v. Colonel Sanders Kentucky
Fried Chicken, 636 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
For an example of instruction language that effectively
communicates 
burden-shifting 
to 
the 
jury, 
Alabama 
Pattern 
Jury
Instruction –- Civil 15.32 explains how the burden of proof
shifts in spoliation cases: 
"If [plaintiff] does prove these things[,] you will
presume (he/she/it) would have won (his/her/its)
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lawsuit against [third party] if [defendant] had not
(destroyed/lost) the evidence. 
"[Defendant] must then prove to your reasonable
satisfaction that [plaintiff] would not have won the
lawsuit even if (he/she/it) had the evidence." 
That formulation accurately explains the burden shifting
required in spoliation jurisprudence, despite not containing
the word "burden" or "shifting." 
That was not the case here. The standard-of-care
instruction failed to communicate the burden-shifting process
described in Breaux and Houserman.  A reasonable jury hearing
that instruction would not have understood that, if they
believed that Dr. Callison left objects inside Niloofar
following the surgery, Dr. Callison must then prove what the
standard of care was and that her actions were consistent with
that standard. 
Compounding the confusion caused by the standard-of-care
instruction was the court's burden instruction, which stated
that the Nicholses had to prove every element of their case.
Although generally the plaintiff is responsible for proving
all elements of his case, the unique formulation of medical
malpractice 
in 
retained-objects cases 
"[shifts] the 
burden 
...
to the defendant physician" when the plaintiff makes a prima
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facie showing of a retained object.  Houserman 902 So. 2d at
674.  The failure of the court's burden instruction to
acknowledge that burden shifting, and what triggers it,
resulted in an inaccurate statement of the law.  By giving
jury instructions that inaccurately stated the law, the
circuit court exceeded its discretion. 
To be reversible, however, the error must be prejudicial.
"The rules as to the burden of proof or persuasion are
important and indispensable in the administration of justice,
and constitute a substantial right of the party on whose
adversary the burden rests."  31A C.J.S. Evidence § 191
(2008).  If the burden of persuasion is not accurately
communicated to the jury, the party who does not bear the
burden is prejudiced.  Therefore, failure to accurately
instruct the jury on the burden of proof is reversible error. 
See Gaither v. Phillips, 199 Ala. 689, 694, 75 So. 295, 297–98
(1917) (reversing trial court's judgment because "[the jury
instructions] pretermit[ted] the fact that in order to meet
the burden of proof, the party upon whom it devolves must
reasonably satisfy the jury as to the truth of the material
issue or issues which the law requires him to establish"). See
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also Texas Emp'rs' Ins. Ass'n v. Olivarez, 694 S.W.2d 92, 94
(Tex. App. 1985) (finding reversible error where "[t]he
instruction as submitted did not properly place the burden of
proof"); Grover v. Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Ass'n, 76 Ill.
App. 3d 500, 510, 394 N.E.2d 1273, 1280, 31 Ill. Dec. 896, 903
(1979) (finding reversible error where the judge failed to
instruct the jury as to which party bore the burden of proof).
 Because the circuit court here misstated the burden of proof,
the error was prejudicial.
Dr. Callison argues that the circuit court could have, in
its discretion, refused to permit changes to the jury
instructions when the Nicholses' burden instruction was
offered the night before the last day of trial.  Here,
however, the circuit judge's stated reason for refusing the
Nicholses' burden instruction was that the instruction was not
a pattern instruction, not that it was untimely.  Indeed, on
the last day of trial, the judge specifically told the parties
that changes to the jury instructions would still be
considered -- if they were pattern instructions.  Thus, the
court's refusal to give the jury instruction was clearly based
solely on the fact that the instruction was not a pattern
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instruction.   "[I]f a ruling that might have been made as a
matter of discretion is based entirely on other grounds, the
appellate court will not consider whether the ruling would
constitute a proper exercise of the discretionary power."  5
C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 923 (2019).  That is, we will not
affirm a judgment on a different discretionary ground from
that stated by a trial court, because an appellate court will
not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court, see
Beckwith v. Beckwith, 475 So. 2d 575, 576 (Ala. Civ. App.
1985).  Although the circuit court might have been within its
discretion 
to 
refuse 
the 
Nicholses' burden 
instruction request
because it was untimely, an appellate court cannot presume
that it would have done so.  Thus, we may not uphold the
circuit court's ruling on the basis of untimeliness.
 
Dr. Callison also argues that because the Nicholses
initially requested the standard-of-care instruction, any
error was invited.  However, the Nicholses do not object to
the giving of any instruction they requested.  Rather, they
contend that the circuit court erred in refusing to give
another instruction they requested and that the given
instructions did not cure that error.  Thus, the Nicholses did
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nothing to invite the error they challenged in the court below
and now raise on appeal.
IV. Conclusion
Because I believe that the instructions given to the jury
did not accurately reflect the burden-shifting process
required 
in 
retained-object 
medical-malpractice 
cases, 
I 
would
reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case
for a new trial. 
Finally, I note that the Alabama Supreme Court no longer
has any role in the crafting, approval, or publication of the
Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil.  Although a 1973
order of this Court recommended the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions - Civil as then drafted, and although this Court
first established in that order a formal Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions Committee (Civil) for a term of one year, the
relationship between this Court and the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions - Civil has changed significantly since then. 
Suffice it to say that, in 2018, this Court formally abolished
the standing committee formed to interface with the publisher
of the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil, thereby
cutting the last formal connection between this Court and the
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publisher.  Therefore, the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions -
Civil are not, and should not be perceived as, the product of
this Court or any committee thereof and are neither published
nor in any way endorsed by this Court or any committee
thereof.  See Merchants FoodService v. Rice, [Ms. 1170282,
March 1, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ n.7 (Ala. 2019) (noting
that "this Court does not preapprove" Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions - Civil, which are merely "a secondary source
concerning the law they address" (citing Ex parte Wood, 715
So. 2d 819, 824 (Ala. 1998))).  
Thus, in an appropriate case, a trial court or this Court
may hold that a jury instruction in the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions - Civil is legally deficient.  But we cannot
order that the independent Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions -
Civil be amended to correct any such deficiency.  Therefore,
to remedy the issue raised in the immediate case, I would urge
the publishers of the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions -
Civil to consider adopting an amended or new jury instruction
that accurately communicates the burden-shifting process in
retained-objects cases, as described in Breaux and Houserman,
supra.  Those opinions were issued in 2003 and 2004,
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respectively, and are long due for incorporation into the
Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil.
Mendheim and Stewart, JJ., concur.
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MENDHEIM, Justice (dissenting).
I concur fully in Chief Justice Parker's dissent. 
Although a trial court has broad discretion in formulating a
jury instruction, the trial court must nonetheless accurately
convey the law to the jury.  See Snyder v. State, 893 So. 2d
488, 551 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).  It is the court's duty alone
to explain the law to a jury. 
In this case, the trial court refused to give a requested
charge submitted by the plaintiffs, Niloofar N. Nichols and
John Matthew Nichols,  that accurately stated the law on a key
issue, and the trial court's stated reason for the refusal
was:  "I'm only going to give pattern charges." The trial
court left no doubt as to its reason for refusing to consider
the requested charge, later reiterating:  "[I]f y'all have a
pattern jury charge ..., if y'all want me to look at it. 
Anything that's a pattern charge, I'll look at it."
I write specially to stress that a trial court is
incorrect to refuse to consider any jury instruction solely on
the ground that the instruction is not included in the Alabama
Pattern Jury Instructions.  This Court has never approved such
a view of jury instructions.  To the contrary, this  Court has
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emphasized that "a trial court must diligently scrutinize the
jury charges it gives -- even pattern charges -- on a
case-by-case basis to ensure that they properly instruct the
jury in accordance with applicable statutes and caselaw." 
Ex parte Wood, 715 So. 2d 819, 824 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis
added).  As Chief Justice Parker notes, this Court has never
held that the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil are an
exhaustive and comprehensive written report of all possible
jury instructions in civil cases.  This Court has never
sanctioned, as a whole, the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions
- Civil as a correct statement of Alabama law.  See, e.g.,
Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So. 2d 319, 330 (Ala.
2000) (holding that a trial court's instruction on 
malpractice
was 
erroneous 
because 
it 
was 
"potentially 
confusing,
misleading, or incomplete" even though the trial court used
the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil in formulating
its instruction).  In fact, the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions Committee (Civil) is a private entity that has no
association with this Court.1  I have no doubt that the
1The first two editions of the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions - Civil declared on the title pages that they had
been "[a]pproved by the Supreme Court of Alabama."  Alabama
Pattern Jury Instructions - 
Civil (1974); Alabama Pattern Jury
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authors endeavor in good faith to provide proposed jury
instructions that could be helpful to lawyers in trials, and
trial judges may consider Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions -
Civil instructions when formulating their jury instructions.
However, the trial of a lawsuit is unique to the facts of
the particular case.  Accordingly, the law must be explained
to a jury with consideration of the facts of the case being
tried.2  For instance, a correct statement of law does not
Instructions - Civil (2d ed. 1993).  Notably, the "Publisher's
Preface" to the 2018-2019 Revision now correctly states that
"[t]he Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions Committee does not
submit the instructions to the Supreme Court of Alabama before
publication.  Therefore, contrary to either perception or
common belief, the Court does not preapprove them."  Alabama
Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil (3d ed. 2018).
2An excellent example of a trial court refining its jury
instructions to suit the particular facts of a case is
Merchants FoodService v. Rice, [Ms. 1170282, March 1, 2019]
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2019), in which the trial court rejected
a proposed charge taken verbatim from the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions - Civil and instead edited the instruction to
correctly state the applicable rule of law as it concerned the
facts of the case.  Quoting Wood, the Court reiterated:
"'While most pattern jury instructions may
be properly used in the majority of
criminal and civil cases, there may be some
instances when using those pattern charges
would be misleading or erroneous. In those
situations, trial courts should deviate
from the pattern instructions and give a
jury charge that correctly reflects the law
to be applied to the circumstances of the
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have to be given if it is inapplicable to the facts of the
case.  See, e.g., Vaughan v. Oliver, 822 So. 2d 1163, 1177
(Ala. 2001) (noting that "'"[t]he ground that a jury
instruction is a correct statement of the law is insufficient
to preserve an objection to the trial court's refusal to give
the instruction"'" (quoting Ex parte R.D.W., 773 So. 2d 426,
429 n.3 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Knight v. State, 710
So. 2d 511, 513 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997))).  Nor must a trial
judge give instructions that are in substance repetitive
simply because they may be correct statements of the law or
included in a pattern-charge manual.  A correct statement of
law may also be refused if it would tend to confuse the jury. 
See, e.g., Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322, 329 (1875) (observing
that "it is the duty of the court to see to it that the jury
are not misled by any charge which is given").  The trial
judge is never required to robotically recite legal principles
in a jury instruction.  Rather, the overriding responsibility
of the trial judge is to correctly articulate legal principles
to jurors, who are often laypersons, with a goal of such
case.'"
___ So. 3d at ___ n.7 (quoting Ex parte Wood, 715 So. 2d at
824).
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principles being understood by the jurors so that they may
fairly apply the law to the particular facts of the case.  See
Towner v. Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, 614 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (Ala.
1993) (explaining that "[t]he trial court has a duty 'to
instruct the jurors fully and correctly on the applicable law
of the case and to guide, direct, and assist them toward an
intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues
involved in their search for the truth'" (quoting American
Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Williams, 591 So.2d 854, 856 (Ala.
1991))).
The trial court, though, has the right to rely upon the
parties to conduct the legal research and to draft proposed
jury instructions for the court's consideration.  If a
particular legal principle is not requested or is incorrectly
stated by a party, the trial court will not be placed in error
for not giving the instruction.  In this case, the Nicholses
prepared and requested a jury instruction that reflects a well
established rule of law concerning the burden of proof in a
foreign-object medical-malpractice case.  The trial court
refused to consider the proposed instruction only because it
was not contained within the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions
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- Civil.3  I believe the Nicholses were prejudiced by having
the burden of proof placed on them when, under the particular
facts of this case, Alabama law clearly places it on the
medical provider.  The Nicholses requested a proposed jury
instruction that reflected a correct statement of law.  I
would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new
trial.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Parker, C.J., and Wise and Stewart, JJ., concur.
3I note that the trial court's logic, if taken to its
natural conclusion, would mean that the Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions Committee (Civil) could nullify any ruling of
this Court or legislative enactment simply by refusing to
publish the applicable law in its collection of instructions. 
For instance, if the Committee declined to publish any
proposed jury instruction for contributory negligence, a
defendant would lose the right to a well established defense. 
I do not believe that such a result was the intended purpose
of either the trial court's stance or the Committee in
omitting the legal principle proposed by the Nicholses.
Rather, I simply seek to stress that it is the judiciary alone
that has the constitutional duty to declare the law as applied
to specific cases.
35