Title: Attorney Grievance v. Robbins

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Jonathan David Robbins, Miscellaneous 
Docket AG No. 12, September Term, 2017 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT: Respondent Jonathan 
David Robbins violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MLRPC”) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) in 
his capacity as attorney for Shelba Bossom, Annette Torchinsky, and Helen Nutt.  Robbins 
made misleading representations to clients that he had performed work that he, in fact, had 
not performed; failed to take action to advance client matters despite requests to do so; 
failed to timely file a Petition to Caveat; failed to provide clients with timely invoices for 
work he performed for several years of representation; executed a new retainer agreement 
without client’s authorization; and used a recently obtained Power of Attorney to 
retroactively increase his hourly rate from $350 per hour to $500 per hour.  
 
Respondent violated (1) MLRPC 1.1 (Competence); (2) MLRPC 1.2 (Scope of 
Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer); (3) MLRPC 1.3 
(Diligence); (4) MLRPC 1.4 (Communication); (5) MLRPC 1.5 (Fees); (6) MLRPC 1.7 
(Conflict of Interest: General Rule); (7) MLRPC 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary 
Matters); and (8) MLRPC 8.4 (Misconduct).  Taken together, Robbins’ violations warrant 
disbarment.  
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No.: 433323-V 
Argued: November 5, 2018 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 12  
 
September Term, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
JONATHAN DAVID ROBBINS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
Adkins, Sally D.,  
     (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:   April 3, 2019
 
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”), acting through Bar 
Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against 
Respondent Jonathan David Robbins.  Bar Counsel charged Robbins with violating the 
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) in his capacity as attorney 
for Shelba Bossom, Annette Torchinsky, and Helen Nutt.1  Specifically, Bar Counsel 
alleged that Robbins violated the following rules:  (1) MLRPC 1.1 (Competence); (2) 
MLRPC 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and 
Lawyer); (3) MLRPC 1.3 (Diligence); (4) MLRPC 1.4 (Communication); (5) MLRPC 1.5 
(Fees); (6) MLRPC 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); (7) MLRPC 1.7 (Conflict of 
Interest – General Rule); (8) MLRPC 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific 
Rules); (9) MLRPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); (10) MLRPC 1.16 (Declining or 
Terminating Representation); (11) MLRPC 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); 
and (12) MLRPC 8.4 (Misconduct).  Pursuant to Maryland Rules 19-722 and 19-727, this 
Court designated the Honorable Harry C. Storm of the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County (“hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and 
recommend conclusions of law.  The hearing was held over five days in March and May 
of 2018.   
Following the hearing, the hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, in which he found by clear and convincing evidence that Robbins violated 
                                              
1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct 
(“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MARPC”) and renumbered.  Rules Order (June 6, 2016).  The revised rules are listed in 
the Conclusions of Law section in parentheses next to the appropriate MLRPC rule.  
2 
MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, 8.1(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).  The hearing judge 
found that Robbins did not violate MLRPC 1.6(a), 1.8, 1.16, or 8.4(b).   
THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
Robbins was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1988.  Upon admission, he began 
work with Ernst & Whinney2 and practiced law part-time.  He is also licensed as a Certified 
Public Accountant and a Certified Financial Planner, holding professional financial 
specialist and global management accountant designations from the Association of 
International Certified Public Accountants.  Robbins is a solo practitioner.  He operates the 
Law & Accounting Offices of Jonathan D. Robbins, Chartered, a law/accounting/estate and 
financial planning business.  Approximately 50% of his time is spent preparing income tax 
returns and providing representation to clients with matters brought by tax agencies.  The 
remaining half of his time is focused on legal work involving trusts and estates, formation 
of business entities, and litigation over trusts and estates.  At all times relevant to the 
matters before us, Robbins handled all secretarial, administrative, paralegal, and IT support 
functions himself.  Robbins logged incoming and outgoing phone calls and all time billed 
for calls and other work was entered into the Timeslips computer program when the work 
was performed.  By Robbins’ own testimony, it is his practice to only send client invoices 
“when jobs are completed.” He also performs discrete tasks for flat fees “whenever 
possible.”  
                                              
2 Later Ernst & Young LLP, now doing business as EY.   
3 
 
The AGC’s investigation of Robbins was set in motion by the complaints of Shelba 
Bossom, Annette Torchinsky, and Helen Nutt.  As to each complaint, Judge Storm made 
the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence: 
Complaint of Shelba Bossom 
In 1992, Robbins prepared estate planning documents for Shelba Bossom’s 
mother, Louise Sutherland, which named Bossom as successor trustee and sole 
beneficiary of Sutherland’s estate.  Soon after Sutherland’s death in May 2012, it came 
to light that in July of 2007, Sutherland executed revised estate planning documents, 
which named Bossom’s daughter, DeLee Yaukey, and son-in-law, Kirk Yaukey, as 
successor trustees and personal representatives.  The new documents set forth that 
Sutherland’s estate was to be equally divided between Bossom and her daughter.   
 
Bossom executed two retainer agreements with Robbins on May 22, 2012.  The 
first was for Bossom as personal representative of her mother’s estate and the second as 
trustee of her mother’s trust (“2012 Bossom Retainer Agreements”).3  Given the 
amendments that Sutherland made in 2007 to her estate planning documents, Bossom 
was no longer named personal representative or trustee.  Robbins stated that he was hired 
“to find out what was happening in terms of the financial situation that Louise Sutherland 
left once she died.”4  
                                              
3 Shelba Bossom provided Jonathan David Robbins, Esq. with an initial retainer in 
the amount of $1,500.   
 
4 Louise Southerland’s 2007 Will was filed for probate on June 12, 2012.  DeLee 
Yaukey was appointed as the personal representative of the Southerland estate.  
4 
The 2012 Bossom Retainer Agreements include the following provisions:  
°  The hourly rates of the attorneys, paralegals and 
administrative personnel who will work on these matters will 
range from $50.00 - $75.00 per hour for administrative 
personnel, $75.00 - $100.00 per hour for paralegals and legal 
assistants and $350.00 per hour for attorneys. 
 
°  The Firm will send you a monthly (or less frequent) 
statement for services rendered and costs incurred. 
 
The Retainer Agreements also included provisions giving Robbins “the right to request 
replenishment of the retainer ‘so that representation may continue’” and the “unilateral 
right to withdraw from further representation” if invoices or statements were not paid 
within 30 days.   
On June 26, 2012, Robbins informed Bossom that he had “hired Eugene Kane, Jr., 
Esq. to assist with the imminent litigation.”  Robbins represented that he was drafting 
documents to be filed with the court, affidavits, and a letter to DeLee.  He also requested 
that Bossom replenish her retainer with $5,000.  The hearing judge found that there was 
“no credible evidence showing that at the time of this communication Mr. Robbins was in 
fact drafting any court documents.”   
On July 10, 2012, Robbins communicated to Bossom that “the situation is urgent at 
this time” and “we must and will file the necessary challenges [to the 2007 Will] as soon 
as possible.”  Yet, another three months passed before Robbins told Bossom that his part 
of the Caveat document was complete and that he had “almost finished with the Complaint 
document.”  Finally, on December 15, 2012 Robbins again indicated that he “expect[ed] 
to be able to file the lawsuit against [Mr. Yaukey] very shortly.”  The hearing judge found 
5 
“no credible evidence, either from [Robbins’] time and billing entries or otherwise, to 
support” this representation by Robbins.   
On December 15, 2012, Robbins advised Bossom that “the Petition to Caveat would 
be filed ‘on Monday’ and that he had waited ‘until this point’ to file the Petition ‘to give 
[the Yaukeys] the maximum amount of time to respond to our original letter to disclose 
information and provide requested documents.’”  Robbins also represented that he had not 
received a response from the Yaukeys to his July 13 request for information and documents 
related to Sutherland’s estate when, in fact, in late July, their attorney, Scott A. Morrison, 
had declined to provide any documents.5  This notification occurred three days after the 
statutory deadline had passed mandating that a Petition for Caveat be filed “prior to the 
expiration of six months following the appointment of a personal representative,” 
Maryland Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), § 5-207(a) of the Estates and Trust Article (“ET”).  
Consequently, the hearing judge found this statement to be misleading.   
Robbins ultimately filed the Petition to Caveat on December 19, 2012—seven days 
late.  An order was issued on December 20, 2012 dismissing the Petition as untimely 
pursuant to ET § 5-207(a).  Bossom received notice of the dismissal on December 22, 2012 
and emailed Robbins.6  The hearing judge found that “no material work appears to have 
been performed in furtherance of Shelba Bossom’s case between July [24,] 2012 when Mr. 
                                              
5 There is no evidence that Robbins followed up.  According to Robbins’ 
timekeeping and billing records, he received documents from Scott A. Morrison on 
October 27 and November 5.   
 
6 Robbins’ billing entries indicated he spoke with Bossom by phone that day.  
6 
Morrison responded to [Robbins’] letter and December [19,] 2012, when Mr. Robbins filed 
the untimely Petition to Caveat the 2007 Will . . . .”  
From June 2012 through September 2013, Robbins made a number of misleading 
statements to Bossom wherein he represented that he was working on the Complaint.  On 
January 22, 2013, he emailed Bossom and indicated that “I am hopeful that I can complete 
the complaint against [the Yaukeys] this week and have it sent to Eugene Kane for his 
review over the weekend.  This is an extensive complaint and am looking forward to it 
being filed very shortly.”  The judge found this to be misleading, as there was “no credible 
evidence, either from [Robbins’] time and billing entries or otherwise that as of January 
2013, [Robbins] had drafted a complaint.”  The hearing judge also found that there were 
no billing entries from January 22, 2013 through April 13, 2013.   
On April 13, 2013, Bossom emailed Robbins requesting another update.  Robbins 
responded on April 19 stating:  
I had to get through tax season and I have gotten rid of the 
lawyer that I hired to assist in the litigation.  I am interviewing 
several others and I like one better than the rest.  I am preparing 
to file suit and will be in touch with you next week to discuss 
the relevant issues. 
 
The hearing judge found “no credible evidence showing that on April 19, 2013, [Robbins] 
was ‘preparing to file suit.’”  Nor is there evidence in Robbins’ “time and billing entries or 
otherwise, showing that as of April 19th he had interviewed any other attorney to assist 
with the litigation.”  Thus, these statements were also misleading.  
On May 1, 2013, Bossom and Robbins received the First and Final Account of the 
Sutherland Trust.  On May 16, 2013, Robbins again assured Bossom that he “expected to 
7 
provide her with a draft complaint for review and comment within the next week and stated, 
‘I want to file suit against [the Yaukeys] by the end of next week in the Montgomery 
County Circuit Court.’”  The hearing judge found that there was “no credible evidence, 
either from [Robbins’] time and billing entries or otherwise, to suggest [Robbins] had either 
begun the draft of a complaint, or that he would otherwise be prepared to file suit within 
the next week.”   
Between early July and September of 2013, Bossom tried on numerous occasions 
to get updates from Robbins.  His responses to the various requests included that: he was 
“in the middle of a deadline” and would try to call to “discuss the case”7; he had been in a 
“very bad accident several weeks ago, surgery” but he was “ready to sue”8; and he had 
been “extremely busy.”  
Morrison wrote Robbins on September 6, 2013 to advise that the Yaukeys would be 
moving forward with the distribution of the trust assets as set forth in the First and Final 
Account dated May 1, 2013.9  Robbins responded indicating that Bossom “continued to 
assert that the July 2007 Will and trust amendment were invalid and that no distributions 
should be made.”   
                                              
7 There was no evidence that Robbins followed-up with a call.  
 
8 Robbins misled Bossom when he indicated he was “ready to sue” as the hearing 
judge found that there was no credible evidence, in Robbins’ time and billing entries or 
otherwise, that on July 29 he had drafted a complaint or that one was ready to be filed.  
 
9 In mid-July, Morrison wrote Robbins to inquire whether he was still representing 
Bossom.   
8 
In September 2013, Robbins met with Robert Scanlon and retained Scanlon’s 
services as litigation counsel for Bossom against the Yaukeys.  The court found that this 
was the first “meaningful action” Robbins took in 14 months.   
Scanlon drafted a complaint within weeks of being retained and sent it to Robbins 
for review.  He also advised Robbins on September 19 that he had spoken with the Bossoms 
and they were ready to proceed.  On September 28, Robbins provided a copy of the 
Complaint to Bossom and requested that she send $5,000 “to cover fees and expenses” as 
well as Scanlon’s fees.  Suit was filed on October 7, 2013 in Montgomery County Circuit 
Court and identified both Robbins and Scanlon as counsel.  The Complaint alleged, inter 
alia, that the 2007 trust agreement was procured by undue influence.  The hearing judge 
found that there was “no credible and reasonable explanation offered by [Robbins] for the 
delay in preparing and filing suit against the Yaukeys.”  Even after Scanlon was retained 
to assist with the litigation, Robbins remained the primary point of contact for Bossom, 
despite having knowledge that he would be a witness in the litigation.10   
In May 2014, Robbins told Bossom that, “[A]ll aspects of your litigation are 
proceeding well and in your favor.  I am very happy with the way things are moving.”  
Then on June 24, Scanlon received an offer from the Yaukeys’ attorney to settle the 
litigation, which “made clear that the Yaukeys viewed the litigation as having triggered a 
‘no contest’ clause of the trust, thereby revoking any interest Shelba Bossom had therein 
(meaning that if the no contest clause was upheld, Shelba Bossom would receive nothing).”   
                                              
10 Robbins was even present during Bossom’s deposition preparation, although he 
did not participate.   
9 
Later that year, Robbins and Scanlon began to disagree on strategy.  Robbins 
communicated to Bossom that he suspected “Scanlon might be conspiring with the 
Yaukeys or their counsel, perhaps having a side agreement whereby, if the case settled, Mr. 
Scanlon would receive a secret kickback.”  This put a strain on Scanlon’s ability to 
communicate effectively with Bossom and planted seeds of doubt in her mind about his 
integrity.  Eventually, Bossom told Scanlon that “communications should go through Mr. 
Robbins,” but Scanlon admittedly was able to speak with Bossom when necessary.  
By the end of November 2014, Robbins had begun to try to retain additional counsel.  
In December, Robbins brought in James E. Edwards, an attorney with whom he had shared 
his theory regarding Scanlon having a deal to receive a kickback when the case settled.  
Edwards agreed to investigate the case and sent a retainer agreement to Bossom.  Edwards 
met with Scanlon and determined that Scanlon “appeared competent and prepared to 
handle the case[.]”  Edwards agreed to take a limited role in the Bossom matter and help 
manage the relationship between Robbins and Scanlon.   
Despite having retained Scanlon and Edwards in the Bossom matter for their 
litigation prowess and knowing that he would be called as a witness, Robbins was 
determined to “remain in control of the client, and as the lead conductor on the direction 
of the case and any settlement strategy” and filed a “Line” in January 2015 to document 
that Bossom was being represented by him and the Law & Accounting Offices of Jonathan 
D. Robbins, Chartered.  Many of Robbins’ actions were erratic and conflicted with trial 
counsel’s advice, including failing to withdraw his appearance until April 22, 2015—the 
10 
day before the trial.11  Robbins also withdrew a settlement offer made to the Yaukeys 
without consulting Scanlon or Edwards.  
Robbins drafted a term sheet for the March 16, 2015 mediation estimating damages 
at approximately $2.8 million.12  Scanlon and Edwards had reservations about components 
of the term sheet.  Scanlon testified that, at the mediation, Robbins told Bossom “that the 
case was as close to a ‘slam dunk’ as he had ever seen, and that he wanted $2.4 million.”  
Bossom, following Robbins’ advice, wanted to proceed to trial.  In Scanlon’s estimation, 
if Bossom won, the “best case” would have been that she received $1.2 to $1.3 million.   
The trial started on April 23, 2015.  On the fourth day of trial, the Yaukeys “made 
a ‘substantial settlement offer.’”  Scanlon discussed this with the Bossoms and Edwards.  
While Scanlon and Edwards agreed to reduce their fees to “make the numbers work,” they 
needed to speak with Robbins about his fees because he had never sent Bossom a billing 
invoice, and the only amount they had for reference was that which Robbins included on 
the term sheet he had prepared.  Edwards testified, and Scanlon corroborated, that when 
Robbins was informed of the settlement offer, he “became very agitated,” was verbally 
abusive to Edwards, and Robbins’ response upset the Bossoms.  A confidential settlement 
was eventually reached.  
                                              
11 Litigation counsel also believed that Robbins had not sufficiently relayed the 
litigation risks to Bossom and that he had overestimated the value of the case.  
 
12 Included in the damages calculations were “attorneys’ fees already paid to Mr. 
Robbins in the amount of $37,732.87, and an estimate of outstanding legal fees owed to 
[Robbins] of $150,000.00.”  
11 
 
Between November 11, 2013 and May 22, 2014, although Robbins had still never 
provided Bossom with an invoice or billing statement, he requested that she provide 
additional funds to replenish her retainer.  In November 2013, Robbins told Bossom that 
he would provide her with a copy of Scanlon’s invoice, but Robbins was not able to send 
his invoice because he was “slowly preparing” them.  In January of 2014, Robbins still had 
not sent Bossom a copy of his or Scanlon’s invoice.  He used the excuse that his scanner 
was not working and said he would email Scanlon’s invoices once it was functioning.  
Robbins further told Bossom that his “invoices will be sent out in about two to three 
weeks.”  At the end of February, Robbins requested payment and indicated that it “should 
cover both January and February legal fees and expenses.”  At this point, he still had not 
provided Bossom with a copy of the invoice, so she responded by asking him to “send her 
an accounting of [her] expenses to this date.”  Robbins replied, stating in part: 
I received your e-mail message and I will forward Robert’s 
invoices as soon as I receive his latest one.  My invoices are a 
bit more complicated and will take a little more time to forward 
to you.  The complication is a result of my giving you sizable 
“courtesy discounts” over time.  I have a higher billable rate 
than does Robert and I want to keep my portion of the bills at 
a reasonable amount for you. 
 
Again, in late May 2014, Robbins told Bossom that he had “reviewed Robert Scanlon’s 
billing statements and I will be writing down my statements to you.  However, you are in 
the most expensive part of the lawsuit.”13  The hearing judge found that there was “no 
                                              
13 Robbins requested $5,000 on November 11, 2013; $11,000 on January 16, 2014 
($6,800 for Robert Scanlon’s invoice and $4,200 for his charges); $11,000 on February 27, 
2014; and $16,000 on May 22, 2014.  Bossom paid Robbins an additional $13,000 in 
September 2014.   
12 
credible evidence” to show: that “sizeable courtesy discounts were ever given,” that 
Robbins wrote down his statements to Bossom, or that he had been preparing his statement.   
 
On June 8, 2014, Robbins sent Bossom a Durable Power of Attorney for the 
Property of Shelba Ann Sutherland Bossom, which granted Robbins “broad power to act 
on Bossom’s behalf.”  Bossom executed it and returned it to Robbins.  Three weeks later, 
Robbins used the Power of Attorney to execute a new engagement agreement between 
Bossom, in her individual capacity, and Robbins’ firm.  This retainer agreement increased 
Robbins’ hourly rate to $500 per hour from $350 per hour, and made the new hourly rate 
“retroactive to May 22, 2012.”  Robbins testified that that he had signed the July 1, 2014 
Retainer Agreement for “administrative purposes” and that he had discussed it with 
Bossom, she had agreed to it, and he had mailed a copy of the Retainer Agreement to her.  
There was no documentation of any of this in his time and billing entries.  The hearing 
judge found that: 
[T]here was no credible reason advanced by [Robbins] for why 
he used his authority under the recently granted Power of 
Attorney to execute the July 1, 2014 Bossom Retainer 
Agreement, rather than have Ms. Bossom execute it herself.  
After all, just three weeks earlier, he provided the Power of 
Attorney to Shelba Bossom for personal signature.  
  
Simply put, there is no credible evidence that Ms. Bossom 
authorized [Robbins] to use the Power of Attorney to execute 
the July 1, 2014 Bossom Retainer Agreement, that [Robbins] 
told her he used the Power of Attorney for that purpose, or that 
Ms. Bossom was even aware of the existence of that document 
until after the representation ended in April 2015.  
 
The court rejects [Robbins’] claim that Shelba Bossom agreed 
to his nearly forty-three (43%) increased rate change in their 
December 22, 2012 telephone call [as asserted by Robbins].  It 
13 
strains credibility to believe that Ms. Bossom willingly agreed 
to a $150 per hour increase on the same day that [Robbins] 
would have discussed with her the fact that the Caveat 
proceeding had been dismissed because he filed it too late.  
Respondent’s version is simply not credible.   
 
 
In early May of 2015, Bossom received a 56-page billing invoice from Robbins, 
which spanned May 21, 2012 to April 30, 2015—nearly three years—the entirety of his 
representation of Bossom.  The hearing judge wrote that:  
The Court does not find credible and rejects Respondent’s 
testimony to Bar Counsel that he provided Ms. Bossom with 
information about his billing statements “every single time 
[she] asked for retainer replenishment and then thereafter on 
several occasions.”  Moreover, despite statements that he 
intended to provide a statement “shortly” or “Within a few 
weeks,” that never occurred. There is likewise no evidence that 
Mr. Robbins provided the “sizeable courtesy” adjustment that 
he indicated would be forthcoming. 
 
From May 2012 to May 2015, the attorneys’ fees and costs that Robbins charged Bossom 
were $219,330.  During the course of his representation, Bossom paid Robbins $31,992.96.  
From April 22, 2015 to April 31, 2015—after Robbins had withdrawn his representation—
he included further charges in a second invoice to Bossom totaling $21,200.  
 
Bossom filed a complaint against Robbins with Bar Counsel in August 2015.  Bar 
Counsel also obtained information from Scanlon and Edwards regarding “observations and 
concerns” they had about Robbins.  A copy of the complaint was sent to Robbins on 
September 10, 2015 with a request that he provide a written response.   
 
In his response to Bar Counsel dated October 7, 2015, Robbins stated that “Bossom 
(i) never requested a billing invoice during the pendency of the representation; (ii) that she 
had agreed verbally to an increase in his hourly rate[;] and (iii) that she authorized him to 
14 
execute the July 2014 Agreement using the Power of Attorney.”  The hearing judge found 
that Robbins’ first statement was “misleading” and his “second statements were knowingly 
false and misleading.”  
 
Bar Counsel took Robbins’ statement under oath in July 2016 in which he testified 
that Bossom “did not want to see Mr. Scanlon’s bills, and that she authorized [Robbins] to 
sign the July 2014 Bossom Retainer Agreement.”  The hearing judge found that these 
statements were “knowingly false and misleading.”   
Complaint of Annette Torchinsky 
 
In late November 2012, Annette Torchinsky contacted Robbins regarding 
representation on estate planning and tax matters.  Torchinsky signed a retainer 
agreement14 (the “First Torchinsky Retainer Agreement”) on December 28, 2012 and gave 
Robbins an initial retainer of $3,500.  The representation was “in connection with her estate 
planning, Income Tax Return preparation and other matters as [she] may refer to [Robbins] 
from time to time.”  The First Torchinsky Retainer Agreement provided the following:   
The hourly rates of the attorneys, paralegals and administrative 
personnel who will work on these matters will range from 
$50.00–$75.00 per hour for administrative personnel, $75.00–
$100.00 per hour for paralegals and legal assistants and 
$350.00 per hour for attorneys. 
 
* * * 
Client acknowledges that, if Client has received an estimate of 
the fees and costs that may be incurred in connection with the 
legal and accounting services that we will provide, that 
estimate is not a fixed fee and does not constitute a 
                                              
14 This was the standard retainer agreement that Robbins used with all clients, 
regardless of whether the matter was to be billed at an hourly rate or a flat fee.  
15 
commitment by the Firm to perform the described services for 
that amount or an obligation by you to pay that amount. 
 
* * * 
The Firm will send you a monthly (or less frequent) statement 
for services rendered and costs incurred. 
 
* * * 
It is the Firm’s practice to obtain a retainer before we 
commence work for new clients. This retainer is used to pay 
the Firm for services rendered and costs incurred on your 
behalf in accordance with this Engagement Letter. From time 
to time, the Firm may ask you to replenish all, a part of, or more 
than your retainer so that representation may continue. Upon 
completion of all work to be performed by the Firm for you, 
we will return to you any unused portion of your retainer which 
may exist. We believe that a retainer of $3,500.00 is 
appropriate under your circumstances. 
 
Robbins testified that, from the beginning of his representation, Torchinsky was 
insistent that she did not want to see any invoices.  Robbins presented no evidence to 
support this assertion.  While conceding that she had not asked Robbins to provide an 
invoice, Torchinsky denied having told Robbins that she did not want to see billing 
statements.   
Torchinsky and Robbins gave conflicting testimony regarding whether some of the 
work performed by Robbins was to be on a flat fee basis.15  Despite evidence that he had 
                                              
15 Examples of flat fee work that Robbins initially did for Torchinsky included: (i) 
preparation of an employment agreement between Torchinsky and her parents; (ii) 
revisions to Torchinsky’s father’s estate plan; (iii) revision and redrafting of Torchinsky’s 
personal estate planning documents; (iv) preparation of Torchinsky’s 2012 tax returns; (v) 
“business organization” of Torchinsky’s company, Kindle Korp, LLC; and preparation of 
a personal property tax return for Kindle Korp.  
16 
done some flat fee work for Torchinsky, Robbins testified that he had not.  Specifically, 
under oath, Robbins asserted that “[d]uring my entire representation of [Torchinsky], I 
never produced or worked on any ‘flat fee’ item.  No ‘flat fee’ item ever existed during the 
entire time I had represented her[.]”  Yet, Robbins indicated to Bar Counsel in 
correspondence and a sworn statement that there were 22 flat fee documents.  The hearing 
judge noted that, “The court does not find credible [Robbins’] later attempts to pedal back 
from his use of the term ‘flat fee’ in describing some of the work performed for Ms. 
Torchinsky.”  
Robbins met Torchinsky’s father, Irving Torchinsky (“Irving”), on January 9, 2013.  
Notwithstanding that Robbins had never met Irving prior to this date, Robbins had prepared 
a retainer agreement and estate planning documents and presented them to Irving for 
execution.  The documents included a “parent and adult child conflicts waiver letter,” an 
Employment Agreement, a Durable Power of Attorney for the Property, and a Living Will 
and Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Decisions.16  Irving signed the 
Employment Agreement, Power of Attorney, and Living Will, but did not sign the retainer 
agreement or the conflicts waiver letter.  Despite Irving’s failure to sign these documents, 
Robbins went forward with his representation of Irving.  Robbins testified that he explained 
the potential conflict to Irving in detail, and that Irving “waived it verbally.”  The court 
found this testimony to lack credibility.  
                                              
16 Annette Torchinsky had asked Robbins to prepare the documents due to 
disagreement among her family about her parents’ care.  
17 
By this point, Robbins and Torchinsky’s relationship had become more personal 
than just that of attorney and client, and by June of 2014, the were involved in a sexual 
relationship.  On May 27, 2013, Torchinsky executed a second retainer agreement for work 
to be done relating to Kindle Korp, LLC (the “Kindle Korp Retainer Agreement”).  This 
retainer agreement only differed from the 2012 Torchinsky Retainer Agreement in that 
non-income tax matters were billed at $500 per hour and a $1,300 retainer was required.  
Robbins also handled a leasing matter for a rental property owned by Torchinsky.  On June 
8, 2013, in an email, she inquired how much this would cost and Robbins’ response was, 
“Let me work on the amount.”   
In July 2013, as Torchinsky’s relationship with her siblings grew more contentious, 
Robbins told her that litigation was probable.  Robbins began to discuss Torchinsky’s 
litigation needs with Robert Scanlon and continued to communicate with him regarding 
her issues.  The pending litigation with Torchinsky’s siblings never materialized, but 
Robbins continued to engage in discussions with Torchinsky’s siblings and their counsel 
into 2014.  
On alleged advice from Robbins, Torchinsky had taken out a home equity line of 
credit (“HELOC”).  In July, he instructed her to pay him $50,000 out of her HELOC as a 
retainer.  Torchinsky provided Robbins with two checks equaling $50,000 to replenish her 
retainer.  Robbins used these funds to make regular payments to himself and three 
18 
payments to Scanlon’s firm.  The court was not persuaded by Torchinsky’s testimony that 
Robbins had requested and maintained the $50,000 for future litigation.17  
 
In October of 2013, Torchinsky executed estate planning documents that Robbins 
had prepared for her.  Approximately five months later, Robbins, allegedly at the request 
of Torchinsky, again prepared and attempted to have Irving execute a new retainer 
agreement, conflict waiver related to a durable power of attorney, and living will/health 
care power of attorney.  Irving did not sign them.  
The hearing judge found that from July 2013 through the summer of 2014, Robbins’ 
representation included much more than only preparing flat fee documents for Torchinsky.  
Torchinsky never asked Robbins for an invoice related to the disbursements from the 
$50,000 retainer.  Robbins was able to pay himself without any accountability for two years 
because he failed to provide Torchinsky with billing statements.  Regular invoices would 
have clarified what work was being performed on an hourly basis and what was being 
completed on a flat fee basis.   
 
Torchinsky terminated Robbins’ representation by letter dated July 7, 2015.  In the 
letter, she itemized the work she believed to have been done on a flat fee basis.  Robbins 
responded on July 9, 2015 acknowledging that some tasks had been done on a flat fee basis.  
He also advised: 
(i) 
That he had “constantly” advised Ms. Torchinsky of the 
status of her retainer balance.  
                                              
17 Robbins disputes Torchinsky’s version of events, stating that the money was to 
replenish her retainer and to be made available for the litigation with her siblings.  
19 
(ii) That he had “made known” to Ms. Torchinsky that the 
$50,000 had been earned and removed from his trust 
account.   
(iii) That Ms. Torchinsky “specifically directed” that 
Respondent was not to provide her with any billing 
invoices “under any circumstances.”   
(iv) That Ms. Torchinsky repeatedly stated that she did not 
want to see her invoices. 
 
The hearing judge had “doubts” regarding statements (i) and (ii), but found 
statements (iii) and (iv) to “have no credibility.”   
The only invoices that Robbins ever sent Torchinsky were provided to her at the 
end of July 2015.  The first was a 71-page invoice covering work performed for Torchinsky 
in her individual capacity between November 26, 2012 and July 7, 2015.  The second was 
for work he did for Kindle Korp, LLC.  These invoices reflected work billed on an hourly 
basis with attorney’s fees being $149,005 and total expenses of $1,714.37.  
On August 13, 2015, Torchinsky filed a complaint against Robbins with Bar 
Counsel.  In Robbins’ response, he acknowledged that several tasks were billed on a flat 
fee basis.  He also told Bar Counsel that Torchinsky required “that she was to receive no 
billing statements” as a condition of Robbins’ employment—a claim that Torchinsky 
denied had ever occurred.  The court found that Robbins’ statement to Bar Counsel was 
knowingly false and misleading.  Again, on June 3, while under oath Robbins told Bar 
Counsel that Torchinsky was “quite clear by stating that under no circumstances was she 
ever to see an invoice from [him].”18   
                                              
18 A recess was taken so Robbins could review his documents and billing entries 
and specifically identify entries billed on a flat fee basis and those billed on an hourly basis.   
20 
Yet, when Bar Counsel’s interview resumed on July 1, 2016, Robbins revised his 
earlier testimony stating:  
[D]uring the entire time I represented Ms. Torchinsky, all work 
that I ever did for her, without exception, was charged at my 
hourly rate of $350 in accord With the Client Engagement 
Agreement 
which 
she 
signed 
on 
December 
28, 
2012[. . . . ]During my entire representation of her, I never 
produced or worked on any “flat fee” item.  No “flat fee” item 
ever existed during the entire time I had represented her.   
 
Again, while under oath, Robbins stated that Torchinsky expressly indicated that she never 
wanted to see an invoice or billing statement.   
Complaint of Helen Nutt 
Helen Nutt was nearly 88-years old when she and her son, Randy Nutt, met Robbins 
to discuss estate planning matters.19  At the time, Nutt’s assets were valued at 
approximately $2 million to $2.5 million.  Nutt fell in her home soon after retaining 
Robbins.  She spent a week in Holy Cross Hospital, then was transferred to a rehabilitation 
facility, and finally settled in an assisted living facility.  
Nutt retained Robbins to represent her “for estate planning and other matters” on 
October 6, 2013 (“Nutt Retainer Agreement”).  The retainer agreement set Robbins’ billing 
rate at “$350 per hour for most tax return preparation engagements and $500 per hour for 
all other matters.”  The Nutt Retainer Agreement set forth hourly billing rates ranging 
“from $50.00-$75.00 per hour for administrative personnel, $75.00-$100.00 per hour for 
                                              
19 Shortly after this meeting, Randy Nutt died leaving Helen Nutt’s daughter, Nancy 
Nutt; Nutt’s sister, Ruth Ann Taylor; and Ruth Ann Taylor’s children as Nutt’s only living 
relatives.  
21 
paralegals and legal assistants and from $350.00 to $500.00 per hour for attorneys.”  Nutt 
paid an initial retainer of $3,500.  In boldface type and underlined in the Nutt Retainer 
Agreement it was set forth that “[w]here possible, work will be done on an [sic] flat fee 
amount basis.”  
The initial estate planning documents prepared for Nutt included a Durable Power 
of Attorney for the Property of Helen E. Nutt, a Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney 
for Heath Care Decisions of Helen E. Nutt, a Revocable Trust, Last Will and Testament, 
and amendments to the Helen Nutt Living Trust and the James Nutt Family Trust.  Robbins 
identified himself as Helen Nutt’s “attorney and personal friend” and named himself as her 
agent or health care surrogate.  He also was named as Trustee, personal representative, and 
co-trustee on the respective documents.  
According to the testimony that Robbins provided, Nutt suffered from several 
deficits including aphasia causing her speech to be impaired; mild dementia; short term 
memory loss; and inability to recall amounts, dates, and, eventually, to write checks.  He 
also testified that Nutt could not remember information about her income and expenses 
that he verbally provided to her because of a long-term deficit.  As a result, Robbins stated 
that he “was actively involved in the management of her legal, financial and personal 
affairs.”  He wrote checks and paid bills for Nutt, including paying himself, all the while 
charging her $500 per hour.  
Robbins stayed in touch with Nutt’s sister, Ruth Ann Taylor, regarding his 
representation of Nutt, but never provided an invoice or billing statement because “[t]hey 
weren’t insistent on any invoices.”  On several occasions, Taylor relayed to Robbins that 
22 
Nutt wanted a report on her finances and Robbins’ fees.20  Robbins avoided providing the 
information requested by making excuses and stating that he had “discussed [Nutt’s] 
expenses with her every time that I visit her.  I visit her at least once every two weeks.  
Helen knows what her expenses are and probably forgets the information very quickly.  
She also has the same problem when I explain what her asks are.”   
Finally, on November 11, 2015, Robbins presented a 109-page invoice with charges 
totaling $322,050.00 in fees and $20,920.04 in expenses—the only invoice he had ever 
provided, which covered from September 10, 2013 through November 11, 2015.  The 
hearing judge did not find Robbins’ testimony to Bar Counsel credible when he said that 
“he told Helen Nutt ‘almost every single time he [saw] her’ what his fees were, and that he 
provided Ruth Ann Taylor with estimates.”  Moreover, the judge credited expert testimony 
concluding that Robbins’ fees in this matter were far above average.  
Robbins’ representation of Nutt was to include preparation of a financial plan and 
also preparation of income tax returns for her and her trusts.  While Robbins told Taylor in 
February of 2015 that he had been working on “a detailed financial plan” for Nutt “for a 
number of months,” when he was interviewed by Bar Counsel in July 2016, there was no 
such financial plan.  Robbins explained that when he made that representation to Taylor, 
he had begun to compile information to go into the plan.  Robbins’ excuses about why he 
had not completed the plan were not convincing to the hearing judge.  Robbins also failed 
                                              
20 These communications occurred throughout the course of Robbins’ representation 
of Nutt, specifically on May 25, 2014; June 8, 2014; July 10, 2014; October 22, 2014; 
January 20, 2015; and February 8, 2015.   
23 
to prepare or file income tax returns for Nutt or her trusts for 2013, 2014, or 2015.  He 
claimed he was unable to do so because there was missing financial information and despite 
his “several” requests to the IRS, he had not obtained the needed information to file the tax 
returns.  The hearing judge found these excuses to be unconvincing.  
THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From these facts, the hearing judge concluded that Robbins, through his 
representation of Bossom, Torchinsky, and Nutt, violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 
1.7, 8.1 and 8.4.21  The hearing judge also concluded that Robbins did not violate MLRPC 
1.6, 1.8, or 1.16.  We address these rulings and any pertinent exception as follows.  
DISCUSSION  
 
Standard of Review 
 
“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction 
and conducts an independent review of the record.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
McClain, 406 Md. 1, 17 (2008).  Still, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact, unless 
they are found clearly erroneous.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 
351, 368 (2008) (citation omitted).  The hearing judge’s findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous if they are supported by “any competent material evidence,” Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 (2014) (citation omitted), and “we have said that the 
                                              
21 Jonathan David Robbins’s violation of MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3 were specific to his 
representation of Shelba Bossom and Helen Nutt.  His violation of 1.2 was specific to his 
handling of the Bossom matter only.  The MLRPC 8.1 violation was specific to both the 
Bossom and Torchinsky matters.  Robbins’s violation of 1.4, 1.5, 1.7 and 8.4 related to all 
three clients, Bossom, Torchinsky, and Nutt. 
24 
hearing judge ‘may pick and choose what evidence to believe,’” Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Woolery, 462 Md. 209, 230 (2018) (citation omitted).  We review proposed 
conclusions of law de novo.  Id.  
Findings of Fact 
Respondent’s Factual Exceptions 
Both parties are permitted to file “(1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of 
the hearing judge, [and] (2) recommendations concerning the appropriate disposition . . . .”  
Maryland Rule 19-728(b).  Robbins takes exception to many of the hearing judge’s 
findings of fact.  There is significant overlap between Robbins’ factual and legal 
exceptions, though most are more appropriately reviewed in the findings of fact section.  
Bar Counsel does not except to any findings of fact, so we only review Robbins’ 
exceptions.22   
(i) Exceptions Regarding the Bossom Matter 
Robbins argues that, without hearing from Bossom or her husband, the Court 
rendered credibility determinations “without citation to any evidence contrary to 
                                              
22 Robbins also argues that Bar Counsel engaged in misconduct and that, 
consequently, his due process rights were irreparably harmed and the Attorney Grievance 
Commission’s case should be dismissed or docketed anew.  Twice before the courts have 
rejected Robbins’ arguments on these points.  First, Robbins made substantially the same 
argument regarding discovery before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in a 
Motion to Compel Discovery and Request for Sanctions Regarding Discovery.  This 
motion was denied.  Again, in March 2018, Robbins filed a Motion for Sanctions and 
Appropriate Relief making precisely the same arguments.  The Circuit Court denied the 
motion, and, on March 22, 2018, this Court, too, rejected it.  Robbins presents no new 
information or further factual support that would require us to depart from our previous 
rejection.  Thus, we feel no compulsion to address these claims, again, here.  
25 
Respondent.”  We note that, beyond Bossom’s initial complaint letter, the Bossoms did not 
testify in this proceeding.  Yet, the hearing judge relied on various other forms of evidence, 
such as email communications between Robbins and Bossom, the existence and 
nonexistence of time log entries, and the testimony of the other attorneys involved in the 
case, plus the logical inferences that could be drawn from such evidence.  These are all 
valid forms of “contrary” evidence appropriately used to render credibility determinations, 
which we review below.   
Bar Counsel responds to this exception, and nearly all of Robbins’ additional 
exceptions, with a similar refrain: “Respondent’s factual exceptions are based on the 
hearing judge’s failure to adopt the Respondent’s versions of events.”  Bar Counsel also 
notes that Robbins takes similar exception to “incorrect or unreasonable inferences” drawn 
from these facts.  We will consider Bar Counsel’s objection throughout this section.  
A party challenging a hearing judge’s factual findings must demonstrate that the 
finding was clearly erroneous.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 74 
(2003) (citations omitted).  Many of Robbins’ exceptions, as Bar Counsel rightly points 
out, are simply based on his own competing testimony.  Because we must “give due regard 
to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses,” Md. Rule 
19-741(b)(2)(B), we will not disturb determinations based on a good faith credibility 
determination.   
There is no question that the hearing judge cited considerable evidence regarding 
the Bossom matter.  Robbins does not specify which credibility determinations he takes 
issue with, but we will review many such determinations below.  As a global matter, if 
26 
“Respondent [does] not present further evidence in the record to reveal that the hearing 
judge’s findings were clearly erroneous,” we will not credit these exceptions.  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 462 Md. 112, 134 (2018).   
Robbins’ first, more specific exception relates to the hearing judge’s findings 
regarding Robbins’ failure to provide invoices.  Specifically, he takes exception to the 
hearing judge’s conclusion that the retainer agreement, providing that any bill must be paid 
within 30 days of an invoice to avoid “withdrawal from further representation” implied 
that invoices would be provided during the representation.  Robbins claims this is 
“speculation” and does not rise to the clear and convincing evidence level.   
We disagree, as the hearing judge had ample grounds to find that Robbins 
wrongfully failed to provide Bossom with invoices.  First, the judge cites the many years 
of assurances Robbins provided to Bossom that invoices and billing statements were 
forthcoming.  He also points to Bossom’s specific request that Robbins produce an 
“accounting of [her] expenses to date.”  Robbins repeatedly stated that he was in the process 
of creating such an invoice but failed to do so within a reasonable time.  In January 2014, 
Robbins stated that his invoices would be sent out in “two to three weeks,” but they were 
not sent until well more than a year after that.   
Additionally, the hearing judge relied on the statement in the retainer providing that 
representation would be “discontinued” on nonpayment of an invoice.  From this statement, 
he inferred that the representation agreement anticipated that invoices would be provided 
during the course of representation.  This inference—alone a weak reed—lends support to 
the hearing judge’s overall conclusion that Robbins unreasonably failed to provide Bossom 
27 
with invoices.  The above facts, in total, provide clear and convincing evidence to support 
the hearing judge’s factual conclusion.  Consequently, we overrule this exception.  
Robbins further objects that the hearing judge “failed to acknowledge” that he had 
testified to drafting the Petition to Caveat, but that he made a “mistake in the filing” of the 
document.  Robbins makes substantially the same objection to the judge’s conclusion that 
“no credible evidence” existed, as of Robbins’ October 8, 2012 email, that he had 
completed any portion of either the caveat or complaint, as he claimed.  Again, Robbins 
claims that he was drafting both documents and that no contrary evidence was admitted.  
The hearing judge is the arbiter of credibility, and he did not find Robbins’ 
testimony credible.  The hearing judge relies on evidence demonstrating that the Petition 
to Caveat was filed a week late and that no work was entered into Robbins’ time log as 
proof that none of these tasks occurred as stated, despite Robbins telling Bossom several 
times that he was working on the petition.  Moreover, the opposing attorney responded to 
Robbins’ request for information on July 24, 2012, and while Robbins asserts that he 
followed up with the attorney and his client after receiving Morrison’s letter, there is no 
evidence of any such follow up occurring.  The hearing judge also relies on the obvious 
implications that can be drawn from the long periods of delay in responding to 
communications from Bossom and ultimate late filing—Robbins had not completed these 
documents, or likely even started them.  Even if the hearing judge did not mention some 
testimony, “[t]he mere failure to mention a particular fact in its findings, normally is not 
the equivalent of failing to consider it,” and exceptions should be directed as specific 
28 
finding or express rejection.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 
385 (2001). 
Regarding the Complaint, as the hearing judge states, “it was in September 2013 
when a complaint was finally drafted by Robert Scanlon, Esq., not Respondent.”  In fact, 
it took 14 months from the time when Robbins said filing the Complaint was an “urgent” 
matter for the Complaint to be filed.  As with the Petition for Caveat, Robbins “failed to 
take any meaningful action to advance Ms. Bossom’s matter” between January and 
September 2013, despite Bossom’s repeated requests.  
The hearing judge is “not required to mention every evidentiary matter” in the 
findings of fact.  Id. at 384.  “[I]f there is any competent material evidence to support” the 
hearing judge’s finding, it should not be disturbed.  McDonald, 437 Md. at 16 (citation 
omitted).  We believe that the above represents competent material evidence supporting 
the judge’s findings and, thus, we overrule Robbins’ exceptions.   
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he was not “ready to sue” 
when he claimed to have been ready.  He insists that the judge should better define what is 
meant by “ready to sue.”  The hearing judge seems to rely on the fact that, in April 2013, 
Robbins stated that he was “ready to sue,” but did not file any documents until July 2013.  
The fact that Robbins did not sue when he was “ready,” combined with his previous late 
filing and unreliable assertions that he was in the process of drafting documents, strongly 
indicates that Robbins was not, in fact, “ready to sue.”  We reject this exception, as well.  
Robbins also takes exception to the judge’s characterization of the 2014 invoices he 
provided to Bossom.  He argues that the dollar figures given to Bossom via email on 
29 
January 16, 2014 were “just estimates,” disputes the hearing judge’s interpretation of his 
claim that he was “writing down” the invoices, and offers his own testimony as support.  
If the costs listed in the January 16, 2014 email were “just estimates,” as Robbins 
claims, it is hard to understand why he would have then requested that Bossom send him a 
check in the amount of those estimates.  The $11,000 charge was only an estimate in the 
sense that Robbins provides absolutely no evidence to support how the charges were 
calculated, despite having promised to do so on numerous occasions.  As the hearing judge 
noted, Robbins stated that the invoices would be “easy to produce” but never produced 
them and was still “writing them down” and requesting more money.  There is clear and 
convincing evidence to support the hearing judge’s findings, and Robbins merely relies on 
his own testimony to rebut them.  As stated above, this is insufficient, and, we overrule this 
exception.   
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s characterization of his substitute retainer 
agreement with Bossom.  He states that the retainer agreement was not used for any work 
or for billing purposes, but, rather, was created for legal malpractice requirements only and 
was effective for all clients “across the board.”  Further, he argues that phone logs show 
calls between him and Bossom wherein they discussed the retainer agreement.   
In June 2014, Robbins was granted Power of Attorney over Bossom’s affairs for the 
ostensible purpose of “acting quickly” on certain pressing matters.  He used the Power of 
Attorney to execute another Engagement Agreement, increasing his pay rate to $500 per 
hour “retroactive to May 22, 2012.”  To conclude that Robbins’ assertions regarding the 
retainer agreement were not credible, the hearing judge first relied on the fact that there is 
30 
no indication in Robbins’ time logs that he spoke with Bossom about the increased fee or 
mailed her a copy of the second engagement agreement, despite claiming to have done so.  
This is especially significant because Robbins had recorded and charged for similar 
services in the past.  Moreover, the hearing judge points to the fact that this fairly significant 
act was not mentioned in any email and that there is no compelling reason stated as to why 
Bossom could not have signed the new agreement herself.  The above consists of 
“competent material evidence,” McDonald, 437 Md. at 16, to support the hearing judge’s 
findings.  We therefore overrule this exception.   
Robbins also argues that the hearing judge was incorrect when he found that it was 
improper for Robbins to remain on the case, notwithstanding the likelihood that he would 
be called as a witness.  Instead, Robbins insisted that he intended to withdraw as attorney 
when necessary.  We address this exception in the Conclusions of Law section, under Rule 
1.1, Competence.  
Finally, Robbins states, generally, that his behavior during his representation of 
Bossom and interactions with Scanlon have been mischaracterized by the hearing judge.  
Ultimately, the hearing judge credited the testimony of the other attorneys involved in the 
case over Robbins’ testimony regarding these matters.  Because we give “due regard to the 
opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses,” Md. Rule 19-
741(b)(2)(B), we overrule Robbins’ exception.   
(ii) Exceptions Regarding the Torchinsky Matter 
First, Robbins generally objects to what he refers to as the “inconsistent weight” 
placed on his phone records.  As noted by Bar Counsel, the “factfinder determines the 
31 
weight of the evidence” presented.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 
399 (2001) (citations omitted).  The weight of phone records is wholly dependent on the 
reason they are admitted and other evidence presented.  We will not disturb the hearing 
judge’s good faith weighing of evidence and, thus, we overrule Robbins’ exception.  
Additionally, Robbins proffers an exception to the hearing judge’s determination 
that his use of the phrase “flat fee” was a false statement, as opposed to an inadvertent use 
of language.  He argues that he intended to say “estimate.”  Yet, Robbins does not dispute 
that he stated, under oath, that he “never produced or worked on any ‘flat fee’ item” for 
Ms. Torchinsky, only to reverse himself, again under oath, to reflect that he did perform 
flat fee work for her.  The hearing judge was well within his rights to credit this as a false 
statement and we overrule Robbins’ exception.  
Robbins also excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Irving Torchinsky 
“declined” to sign a conflict waiver, as opposed to simply omitting his signature.  Again, 
Robbins disputes the hearing judge’s reliance on Robbins’ own trial testimony that Irving 
“signed the [forms] he wanted to sign and declined to sign the ones that he didn’t want to 
sign.”  This statement, in conjunction with the fact that Irving left the conflict waiver forms 
unsigned, provides clear and convincing evidence to conclude that Irving “declined” to 
sign the waiver.  Therefore, we overrule this exception.  
Finally, Robbins takes exception to the hearing judge’s comparison of his statement 
that Torchinsky specifically instructed him not to send invoices, to supposedly similar 
statements he made to Bossom and Nutt.  According to Robbins, he “never said [Bossom 
32 
and Nutt] directed that no statements were to be generated . . . .”  We believe that Robbins’ 
propounds an incorrect and overly-literal reading of the judge’s statement.   
The judge’s central point was that one of the many reasons he doubted Robbins’ 
truthfulness regarding his claim that Torchinsky requested not to see her billing statement 
was that he had attributed “similar” statements to “clients in both the Bossom and Nutt 
matters.”  Regarding the Bossom matter, Robbins did claim that “[Bossom] said in a 
telephone conversation she didn’t want to see [Mr. Scanlon’s invoices],” which is clearly 
a “similar” statement.  Moreover, the hearing judge was quite likely referring to the 
multiple instances of similarly false statements regarding other clients’ billing statements, 
as opposed to instances when Robbins made precisely the same statement.  We therefore 
overrule Robbins’ exception.   
(iii) Exceptions Regarding the Nutt Matter 
First, Robbins objects to the hearing judge’s determination that he did not keep Nutt 
or Ruth Ann Taylor informed of Nutt’s bill.  Moreover, he states that the financial analysis 
for Nancy Nutt was always intended to be oral.  The hearing judge specifically stated that 
he did not find Robbins’ testimony on this matter credible.  The hearing judge may “pick 
and choose what evidence to believe and what evidence to disbelieve . . . .”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Usiak, 418 Md. 667, 687 (2011).  Not relying on Robbins’ testimony 
was within the judge’s discretion, and we overrule Robbins’ exception.  
Robbins also takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions regarding his failure 
to file any income tax returns for Nutt or her trusts in 2013, 2014, and 2015.  Robbins states 
that the returns were never prepared due to the “improper removal of necessary paperwork” 
33 
from Nutt’s home by her daughter-in-law.  He made the same claim to the hearing judge 
who found it “unconvincing.”  We therefore overrule Robbins’ exception.  
Conclusions of Law 
MLRPC 1.1: Competence (MARPC 19-301.1) 
MLRPC 1.1 requires that lawyers provide competent representation to their clients.  
The hearing judge found that Robbins violated MLRPC 1.1 in his handling of the Bossom 
and Nutt matters.  Regarding the Bossom matter, the hearing judge stated that Robbins 
violated Rule 1.1 when he:  
(i) failed to file a timely Petition to Caveat Ms. Sutherland’s 
Will and failed to take meaningful action to advance Ms. 
Bossom’s case from May 2012 through August 2013; (ii) 
falsely communicated to her on multiple occasions the status 
of his efforts on her behalf . . . ; (iii) increased her hourly 
billing rate effective January 1, 2013, without her knowledge 
or informed consent; (iv) used the Power of attorney to execute 
a new retainer agreement (which was also at the higher hourly 
rate) without authorization and disclosure; (v) acted in a 
manner that negatively impacted Ms. Bossom’s trust in her 
relationship with Mr. Scanlon through unfounded comments 
about Mr. Scanlon’s integrity; and (vi) failed to withdraw 
timely as attorney of record, when he knew he would be a 
necessary trial witness, and failed to advise Ms. Bossom of the 
problems inherent in his conflicting positions.  
 
As to Robbins’ representation in the Nutt matter, the hearing judge concluded 
Robbins violated Rule 1.1 by: (i) “fail[ing] to file tax returns for her for tax years 2013, 
2014, and 2015”; and (ii) “fail[ing] to complete the detailed financial plan from February 
2015 until July 2016.”  
Robbins takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 1.1.  
Yet, his exceptions are largely a repetition of the arguments made in his exceptions to the 
34 
findings of fact.  For example, he argues that his actions regarding the retainer agreement 
were authorized, Nutt’s tax returns were not prepared due to the removal of documents 
from her home, and that he never made false statements.  We have already overruled 
Robbins’ exceptions to the findings of fact and need not revisit them.   
Robbins also claims that the untimely filing of the Petition to Caveat did not deprive 
Bossom of any right, lead to “inconsistent positions,” or have a negative impact.  Even if 
this were true, “we do not measure an attorney’s violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct based on success, or failure to succeed . . . .”  Woolery, 462 Md. at 233.  We 
generally overrule Robbins’ exceptions to these matters and conclude that he violated Rule 
1.1 in the Bossom and Nutt matters.  
Nonetheless, Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he “failed to 
withdraw timely as attorney of record, when he knew he would be a necessary trial witness” 
as a basis for a Rule 1.1 violation in this circumstance.  Typically, when attorneys are 
accused of failing to withdraw from representation due to their necessity as a witness, such 
behavior is not evaluated under Rule 1.1, but under Rule 3.7.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Dyer, 453 Md. 585, 665, 670 (2017) (evaluating the lawyers’ withdrawal 
decision under Rule 1.16 and 3.7); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zhang, 440 Md. 128, 
165 (2014) (evaluating the lawyer’s withdrawal decision under Rule 3.7).  In this case, Bar 
Counsel does not charge Robbins with violating Rule 3.7—the proper vehicle for such 
claims—and cites no cases establishing a “timeliness” of withdrawal requirement for 
competence.  It is not apparent that Robbins’ withdrawal to serve as a witness prejudiced 
Bossom’s case in any manner, as other attorneys remained on her case.  We sustain 
35 
Robbins’ objection to the hearing judge’s reliance on Robbins’ “failure to withdraw timely 
as attorney of record” as a basis for a Rule 1.1 violation in this circumstance.   
MLRPC 1.2: Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority  
Between Client and Lawyer (MARPC 19-301.2) 
 
MLRPC 1.2 requires that a “lawyer abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued.”  It also provides that a “lawyer may take such 
action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation,” 
and that a “lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”  The 
hearing judge found that Robbins’ violation of MLRPC 1.2 was specific to his handling of 
the Bossom matter.  
The hearing judge determined that Robbins violated Rule 1.2 by attempting to 
“control all relevant decision-making.”  Specifically, Robbins “viewed the case as ‘his 
case,’ not the client’s”; “exerted control over communications between Ms. Bossom and 
Mr. Scanlon”; “attempted to control the settlement of the case”; and “acted inappropriately 
and unprofessionally in trying to convince Shelba Bossom not to settle on the fourth day 
of trial.”  
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s determination that he violated Rule 1.2.  
Again, he argues that the judge “failed to make any findings that were inconsistent with 
Respondent’s testimony that he was acting with full knowledge of Ms. Bossom.”  
Moreover, he disputes that Scanlon and Bossom did not have “the ability to communicate 
at all necessary times.”  As stated above, we accept the hearing judge’s findings on these 
36 
matters as not clearly erroneous.  The client must be appropriately informed to have the 
“ability to make informed decisions.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 
163, 182 (2015).  Robbins’ actions prevented this and we overrule his exceptions.  
Robbins also states that any conduct occurring in the conference room during the 
trial happened after he withdrew from the case and, therefore, is “not subject to disciplinary 
review.”  Even if he had technically withdrawn as counsel, he should have realized that his 
statements—made soon after his withdrawal, in the context of formal settlement 
negotiations, and pursuant to a long-term relationship with the client—were almost certain 
to appear to her to be made as part of his role as her attorney.  In any event, we have 
disciplined attorneys in the past for violating Rule 1.2 for acts occurring after termination 
of the attorney-client relationship.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sacks, 458 Md. 461, 
494 (2018) (attorney disciplined for actions taken after he was terminated).  We therefore 
overrule this exception, as well, and hold that Robbins violated Rule 1.2.   
MLRPC 1.3: Diligence (MARPC 19-301.3) 
 
MLRPC 1.3 mandates that a “lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  The hearing judge explained that Robbins violated 
MLRPC 1.3 for the same reasons that he articulated in his finding for the violation of 
MLRPC 1.1 above.  The violation of MLRPC 1.3 relates to Robbins’ handling of the 
Bossom and Nutt matters.  
Robbins objects to the conclusion that he violated Rule 1.3 because “no violation, 
prejudicial in nature to a client, has been demonstrated according to the appropriate 
37 
standard . . . .”  For the reasons stated in our Rule 1.1 analysis, we overrule Robbins’ 
exception, and conclude that Robbins violated Rule 1.3 in the Bossom and Nutt matters.  
MLRPC 1.4: Communication (MARPC 19-301.4) 
 
MLRPC 1.4 requires lawyers to communicate with their clients.  The hearing judge 
concluded that Robbins violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(2), failing to keep the client informed, and 
1.4(b), failing to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions, in the Bossom, Torchinsky, and Nutt matters.   
The hearing judge explained that Robbins “failed in each case to provide timely 
information to the clients about their fees and expenses, thereby depriving the clients of 
the ability to make informed decisions about their matters.”  Robbins took 35 months to 
provide Bossom with an invoice, 31 months to provide Torchinsky with an invoice, and 26 
to provide one to Nutt.  
Respondent, who is after all a certified public accountant and 
certified financial planner, kept his time contemporaneously 
pursuant to the Timeslips billing program.  He is computer 
proficient, and testified that he could easily have produced 
invoices at any time.  Indeed, he promised invoices to all three 
clients that were never forthcoming.  The invoices, when they 
were provided, covered such extended periods, and were so full 
of minutiae-laden entries, that the clients’ ability to understand 
and confirm or refute charges was necessarily hindered.  
 
The hearing judge also found by clear and convincing evidence that Robbins 
violated Rule 1.4 (a)(1), (3), and (4), as to his handling of the Bossom matter.  He found 
that Robbins “misrepresented” the work he performed for her and made “affirmative 
misrepresentations or misleading statements” regarding the status of her case.  Further, he 
explained that Robbins: 
38 
failed to advise [Ms.] Bossom of his unilateral hourly rate 
increase; failed to advise her that he had used the Power of 
Attorney to execute the new retainer agreement; failed to 
adequately explain the litigation risks (while portraying the 
case as a “slam dunk”) to enable Ms. Bossom to make an 
informed decision; and, failed to advise her of the problems 
inherent in serving as her attorney when he was required as a 
necessary witness at trial.  
 
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 1.4.  Once 
again, most of Robbins’ exceptions are a repetition of the exceptions made to the findings 
of fact.  For example, he repeats his contentions that he provided all requested information 
to clients, as required by the retainer agreements, and that the new retainer agreement was 
merely a “back up.”  We previously determined that the hearing judge’s findings on these 
matters were not clearly erroneous.  We therefore overrule Robbins’ exceptions and 
conclude that he violated Rule 1.4.  
MLRPC 1.5: Fees (MARPC 19-301.5) 
MLRPC 1.5(a) provides in part that: “An attorney shall not make an agreement for, 
charge, or collect an unreasonable amount for expenses.”  For a fee to be “reasonable,” it 
must be “commensurate with the legal services provided.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Bellamy, 453 Md. 377, 397 (2017).  Factors to be considered in determining reasonableness 
appear in Rule 1.5(a), subsections (1) through (8).  
The hearing judge concluded that Robbins violated MLRPC 1.5(a) in the Bossom, 
Torchinsky, and Nutt matters.  First, he noted that each of Robbins’ retainer agreements 
provided that “the hourly rates of the attorneys, paralegals and administrative personnel 
who will work on these matters will range from $50.00–$75.00 for administrative 
39 
personnel, $75.00–$100.00 per hour for paralegals and legal assistants and $350.00 [or 
$350.00 to $500.00] per hour for attorneys.”  He concluded that:  
Notwithstanding the language in the retainer agreements, Mr. 
Robbins, who did not have paralegals, legal assistants or 
administrative personnel, billed all time at his hourly attorney 
rate ($350 or $500 per hour) regardless of the task.  And while 
Mr. Robbins testified during his statement under oath that he 
did not bill his clients for administrative matters, the evidence 
belies that assertion.  Respondent’s billing entries routinely 
include (while frequently blended together with normal 
attorney tasks) time spent and billed at his attorney rate for 
routine administrative matters, including for such things as 
opening mail, filing documents, sending mail, and printing.  By 
charging his attorney rate for these services, Respondent 
charged unreasonable fees and violated Rule 1.5(a) in each of 
the three cases.   
 
The hearing judge also concluded that Robbins violated Rule 1.5 “when he failed to 
provide regular billing invoices for his hourly billings to Ms. Bossom, Ms. Torchinsky, and 
Ms. Nutt.”  We have before determined that failing to provide invoices at reasonable 
intervals upon request or as agreed can violate Rule 1.5, under certain circumstances.  See, 
e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 629 (2015) (failing to provide 
invoices upon request, upon request for replenishment of the retainer, and as provided in 
the retainer agreement violated Rule 1.5); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Green, 441 Md. 
80, 91–92 (2014) (failing to provide invoices, as agreed upon in the attorney’s fee 
agreement violated Rule 1.5).  
Next, the hearing judge determined that Robbins’ fees were unreasonable as related 
to the Bossom matter for two additional reasons.  First, even were Robbins’ time 
appropriately billed at the attorney rate, “the hourly rate charged to Ms. Bossom 
40 
commencing January 1, 2013 was $150 more per hour than she had agreed to pay.”  The 
judge specifically noted that:  
Between January 1, 2013 and April 30, 2015, Mr. Robbins 
billed Ms. Bossom for 415.70 hours of his time, and charged 
$500 per hour (for a total of $207,850).  Had the same number 
of hours been billed at the agreed rate of $350 per hour, the 
total would have been $145,495, a material and unreasonable 
difference of $62,355.  
 
Second, the hearing judge observed that the “bill to Ms. Bossom includes time entries 
totaling 42.4 hours ($21,200) for the period from April 22, 2015 (the day his notice of 
withdrawal was filed) through April 30, 2015.”  These billings relate to a “time when 
[Robbins] was no longer an attorney in the case and was simply a fact witness.”  
Regarding the Nutt matter, the hearing judge concluded that Robbins also violated 
Rule 1.5 by charging “grossly disproportionate” fees.  The judge accepted expert testimony 
to determine that “the fees were substantially greater than the industry norm.”  The expert 
criticized Robbins’ management fees for Nutt’s trust—where the normal trustee 
management fee would be 2% of the trust corpus, Robbins was charging upwards of 6%.   
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s determination that he violated Rule 1.5.  In 
essence, he again asserts that he provided information as asked and that Maryland Rules 
do not require regular billing invoices.  We rely on the hearing judge’s findings, and our 
previous statements in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 629 (2015), to 
overrule this exception.   
Moreover, Robbins states that the hearing judge “fails to explain how the entries 
outlined in Footnote 59 are anything but necessary and professional in nature.”  Robbins 
41 
mischaracterizes this footnote, as, even if the listed tasks were “professional,” they were 
certainly administrative and should not have been billed at the attorney rate, which was the 
judge’s point.  Moreover, exceptions such as these go to the hearing judge’s credibility 
findings, which we have already determined were not clearly erroneous.  For these reasons, 
we overrule Robbins’ exceptions and conclude that he violated Rule 1.5.   
MLRPC 1.7: Conflicts of Interest – General Rule (MARPC 19-301.7) 
MLRPC 1.7 mandates that a lawyer “shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves a conflict of interest.”  Under Comment 1 to Rule 1.7, “Loyalty and independent 
judgment are essential elements in the attorney’s relationship to a client.  Conflicts of 
interest can arise from the attorney’s responsibilities to another client or from the attorney’s 
own interests.”   
Consequently, the hearing judge found that Robbins violated Rule 1.7 in all three 
matters.  Regarding the Bossom matter, the hearing judge determined:  
[O]n July 1, 2014, Respondent executed the July 1, 2014 
Bossom Retainer Agreement using the Power of Attorney.  
That agreement provided for an hourly rate of $500, retroactive 
to May 22, 2012.  While Respondent claimed that he discussed 
the rate increase with Ms. Bossom in a telephone call on 
December 22, 2012 and received her approval, this court found 
otherwise.  Moreover, even if Respondent had discussed the 
increase with Ms. Bossom and even if Ms. Bossom had orally 
agreed to the increase, Rule 1.7 required that her informed 
consent be in writing, or at a minimum, confirmed in writing.  
 
Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Robbins violated Rule 
1.7 due to his conduct in the Bossom matter, as opposed to Rule 1.8.  According to Bar 
Counsel, Robbins was not charged with violating Rule 1.7 in the Bossom matter.  
42 
Consequently, he had no notice, nor opportunity to defend, against these allegations.  We 
sustain Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Robbins violated 
Rule 1.7 in the Bossom matter and do not adopt this conclusion.   
As to the Torchinsky matter, the hearing judge determined that “there was, at a 
minimum, the risk that Respondent’s representation of Irving Torchinsky would be limited 
materially by his responsibilities to Annette Torchinsky.”   
[W]ith knowledge of the family conflicts and dynamics, 
[Robbins] undertook to represent [Annette Torchinsky’s] 
father, Irving Torchinsky in connection with [her] employment 
agreement, and in connection with the financial and health care 
powers of attorney. . . . Indeed, the documents were prepared 
at Ms. Torchinsky’s request in advance of Respondent’s 
meeting with Irving Torchinsky.  Respondent recognized the 
conflict and prepared the parent-child conflict waiver.  Yet, 
upon Mr. Torchin[sk]y’s failure or refusal to sign the waiver, 
Respondent nevertheless proceeded with the representation.   
 
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he violated Rule 1.7 in the 
Torchinsky matter.  He states that any conflict was only “potential,” and thus did not 
require a waiver.  In any event, he insists the waiver should be implied.  Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
specifically contemplates that a “significant risk” of materially limited representation is 
sufficient to cause a conflict.  We agree with the hearing judge that such a risk existed here 
and that Robbins’ actions indicate that he understood this, too.  Robbins’ argument for 
waiver is also unavailing.  Given the facts as found by the hearing judge, not signing the 
form is the only evidence we have of waiver.  This is not enough and we overrule Robbins’ 
exception.  
43 
Finally, concerning the Nutt matter, the hearing judge decided that Robbins violated 
Rule 1.7 by “pa[ying] himself in his role as trustee, without providing any accounting or 
oversight, despite repeated requests from Ms. Taylor that he provide information about his 
charges.”  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 193 (2014) (attorney, 
acting as trustee, violated Rule 1.7 by engaging in self-dealing that had “an adverse impact 
on his duty of loyalty” to the client and the trust).  Accepting the testimony of an expert 
witness, the judge found that Robbins’ “fees to Ms. Nutt included unreasonable charges 
for routine administrative tasks that were billed at Respondent’s attorney rate.”  Moreover, 
she might have known about these charges had he provided appropriate billing statements.  
Robbins also excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions regarding the Nutt matter.  
He argues that he met with Nutt frequently and that she believed his fees were reasonable.  
We overrule this exception, as we accepted the hearing judge’s findings of fact on this issue 
as not clearly erroneous, as described above.   
In conclusion, we do not adopt the hearing judge’s determination that Robbins 
violated Rule 1.7 in the Bossom matter because Bar Counsel did not charge Robbins with 
such a violation.  Nonetheless, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that Robbins 
violated Rule 1.7 in the Torchinsky and Nutt matters.  
MLRPC 1.8: Conflict of Interest; Current Clients;  
Specific Rule (MARPC 19-301.8) 
 
Bar Counsel takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Robbins did not 
violate Rule 1.8 in the Bossom matter.  Conceding that Rule 1.8 “does not apply to ordinary 
fee arrangements between client and attorney,” per Comment 1, Bar Counsel argues that 
44 
the Bossom retainer agreement was not an ordinary fee arrangement.  Rather, Petitioner 
states that the fee agreement at issue here was not negotiated at arm’s length.  
Comment 1 to Rule 1.8 notes that the rule does not apply to “ordinary fee 
agreements” because such agreements are regulated under Rule 1.5.  Moreover, the 
comment specifies that Rule 1.8 “requirements must be met when the attorney accepts an 
interest in the client’s business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of 
a fee.”  Distinguishing “ordinary” agreements from those involving “nonmonetary 
property” and business interests suggests that the use of the word “ordinary” refers to the 
type of remuneration provided for in the agreement, rather than the circumstances of its 
formation.  This view is supported by our previous cases.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Lawson, 428 Md. 102, 115 (2012) (violation for lien on the client’s marital property).  
We agree with the hearing judge that the Bossom retainer agreement was an “ordinary fee 
agreement” and appropriately addressed under Rule 1.5.  We therefore overrule Bar 
Counsel’s exception and conclude that Robbins did not violate Rule 1.8 in the Bossom 
matter.  
MLRPC 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters (MARPC 19-308.1) 
MLRPC 8.1 mandates in part that “[A lawyer] in connection with a disciplinary 
matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact[.]”  The hearing 
judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Robbins violated MLRPC 8.1(a) in his 
representation of Bossom and Torchinsky.   
45 
Regarding the Bossom matter, the hearing judge found that Robbins violated Rule 
8.1(a) when he “knowingly” made false statements that were “related to material facts.”  
These false statements included:  
[H]is letter to Bar Counsel dated October 7, 2015, [in which] 
Respondent falsely stated that Ms. Bossom had agreed verbally 
to an increase in his hourly rate, and that Ms. Bossom 
authorized him to execute the July 2014 Bossom Retainer 
Agreement.  Thereafter, Mr. Robbins falsely stated under oath 
to Bar Counsel that Ms. Bossom did not want to see Mr. 
Scanlon’s invoices, and that she authorized him to sign the July 
2014 Retainer Agreement using the Power of Attorney.   
 
In the Torchinsky matter, Robbins was also found to have made false statements 
“knowingly[ and] related to material facts” in violation of Rule 8.1(a).   
First, Mr. Robbins falsely stated both in his October 10, 2015 
letter to Bar Counsel, and in his statement under oath to Bar 
Counsel, that Ms. Torchinsky told him that she did not want to 
see her invoices.  Second, in both written correspondence to 
Bar Counsel and in his statement under oath, Respondent 
stated that he charged Ms. Torchinsky flat fees for a number of 
services.  He thereafter changed his testimony during the 
continuation of the statement under the oath and testified 
falsely to Bar Counsel (and repeated at trial) that throughout 
the entirety of his representation, he only charged Ms. 
Torchinksy at his hourly rate of $350 and never performed any 
work for her on a flat fee basis.   
 
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s determination that he violated Rule 8.1 on 
the basis of his exceptions to “each of the factual statements incorporated by the Circuit 
Court . . . .”  We have already affirmed that the judge’s factual findings were made by clear 
and convincing evidence and review some of these findings below.  
The hearing judge had clear and convincing evidence to find a violation of Rule 
8.1(a).  In the Bossom matter, Robbins made false statements regarding invoices.  In a letter 
46 
to Bar Counsel, Robbins stated that “Mrs. Bossom never asked for a single invoice, either 
verbally or in writing.”  Yet, in February 2014, Bossom sent an email specifically 
requesting an accounting from Robbins.  Throughout his representation, Robbins 
continually assured Bossom that invoices were forthcoming, and he stated under oath such 
invoices would have been “easy to produce.”  In January 2014, Robbins again stated that 
he would send invoices in “two to three weeks,” though they would not be sent until more 
than a year later.  We agree with the hearing judge that, given all this, it is clear that Robbins 
knew that Bossom sought invoices and his statement that she did not was false.  
In the Torchinsky matter, Robbins stated, under oath, that he “never produced or 
worked on any ‘flat fee’ item” for Torchinsky.  He later, and again under oath, changed his 
testimony to reflect that he performed flat fee work for Torchinsky.  This again, 
demonstrated that Robbins knowingly made a “false statement of material fact.”  Both of 
these incidents are sufficient to conclude that Robbins violated Rule 8.1(a) in the Bossom 
and Torchinsky matter.  Thus, we overrule Robbins’ exception and conclude that he 
violated Rule 8.1(a).   
MLRPC 8.4: Misconduct (MARPC 19-308.4) 
An attorney has engaged in professional misconduct and violated Rule 8.4(a) 
whenever he or she is found to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.  See 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Framm, 449 Md. 620, 664 (2016) (“We have held that, 
when an attorney violates a rule of professional conduct, the attorney also violates MLRPC 
8.4(a).”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, an attorney can violate Rule 8.4 
by committing a “criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, 
47 
trustworthiness or fitness,” Rule 8.4(b); engaging in “conduct involving dishonestly, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation,” Rule 8.4(c); or “conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice,” Rule 8.4(d).   
The hearing judge concluded that Robbins violated MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d).  As 
the hearing judge concluded that Robbins violated numerous Rules of Professional 
Conduct, he concluded Robbins violated Rule 8.4(a).  Additionally, Robbins “[made] 
misrepresentations in connection with this disciplinary proceeding, and . . . violated Rule 
1.4 in connection with other misrepresentations,” violating Rule 8.4(c).  “Finally, the court 
conclude[d] that Respondent’s conduct, taken as a whole, and involving multiple 
misrepresentations, brings the legal profession into disrepute.  Such conduct is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice, and in violation of Rule 8.4(d).”   
Bar Counsel takes exception to the hearing judge’s determination that Robbins did 
not violate MLRPC 8.4(b).  Petitioner argues that Robbins falsely stated under oath that: 
(i) “Ms. Bossom did not want to see Mr. Scanlon’s bills”; (ii) “Ms. Bossom authorized him 
to sign the July 2014 Bossom Retainer Agreement”; (iii) Ms. Torchinsky stated that “she 
did not want to see any invoice”; and (iv) “work done for Ms. Torchinsky was at an hourly 
rate” and denied the existence of any flat fee agreement or work.  These “willfully false” 
statements, according to Bar Counsel, amount to perjury, under Md. Code (2002, 2012 
Repl. Vol.), § 9-101 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”), and thus a violation of Rule 
8.4(b).  
We are hesitant to accept such an argument when the attorney has not been charged 
with a crime, especially when the alleged crime is related to the process of defending 
48 
oneself from charges by Bar Counsel—like perjury.  It is true that we have stated that “a 
criminal conviction is not required in order to find a violation of Rule 8.4,” Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 363 (1999) (citation omitted), but, in White, we 
stated this in the context of the hearing judge concluding that Rule 8.4(b) was violated.  
Here, the hearing judge determined that Rule 8.4(b) was not violated for the reasons stated 
above.  Giving due weight to the conclusions of the hearing judge, we overrule Bar 
Counsel’s objection and conclude that the hearing judge did not err in concluding that clear 
and convincing evidence did not establish that Robbins violated Rule 8.4(b).   
Robbins excepts to the hearing judge’s determination that he violated MLRPC 
8.4(a) and (c).  Similar to his exception to the Rule 8.1 violation, he excepts to each of the 
findings of fact in this section that lead to the conclusion that he violated this rule.  Again, 
we overrule Robbins’ objection based on the reasoning provided above.   
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors 
When assessing the appropriate result in an attorney disciplinary matter, we often 
refer to the American Bar Association’s Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions xvii (2015), which advises the consideration of four questions: (1) “What ethical 
duty did the lawyer violate?”; (2) “What was the lawyer’s mental state?”; (3) “What was 
the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct?”; and (4) 
“Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?”  
The respondent in an attorney disciplinary proceeding has the burden of 
demonstrating the presence of any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Joseph, 422 Md. 670, 695 (2011) (citation omitted).  We 
49 
listed common mitigating factors in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 
277–78 (2018) (citation omitted).  They include:  
(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of 
a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional 
problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to 
rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free 
disclosure to the Commission or a cooperative attitude toward 
the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the 
practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical 
disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, 
including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical 
evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency 
or mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or mental 
disability caused the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery 
from the chemical dependency or mental disability is 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the 
misconduct, and the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) 
delay in the attorney discipline proceeding; (11) the imposition 
of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; (13) remoteness 
of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of 
repetition of the misconduct. 
 
The hearing judge determined that Robbins demonstrated that he had never before 
been disciplined, but this was the only mitigating factor he was able to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
Bar Counsel has the burden to prove the existence of any aggravating factors by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Joseph, 422 Md. at 695 (citation omitted).  The aggravating 
factors upon which we rely to determine the appropriate sanction were, again, enumerated 
in Sperling, 459 Md. at 275 (citation omitted), and include:  
(1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the 
MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline 
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the 
50 
Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge; 
(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; 
(7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; 
(8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the 
practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or 
rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, 
including that involving the use of controlled substances; and 
(12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
The hearing judge found multiple aggravating factors.  First, he found that Robbins 
had a “dishonest or selfish motive” when he profited by withholding information from his 
clients.  Additionally, the three similar instances of misconduct that are the subject of the 
case constitute a “pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses.”  Robbins was found to 
have made “knowingly false statements to Bar Counsel . . . .”  Moreover, he “refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct,” instead shifting blame to others.  
Importantly, the judge also found that Nutt was a “vulnerable” client due to her old age and 
dementia diagnosis.  Finally, the hearing judge concluded that Robbins had “substantial 
experience,” as he had been practicing law since 1988.  
THE SANCTION  
We must now determine the appropriate sanction in such a case.  This Court imposes 
sanctions on wayward attorneys “to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the 
legal profession rather than to punish the attorney . . . [and] to deter other lawyers from 
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Taylor, 405 
Md. 697, 720 (2008) (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the sanction should be 
“commensurate with the nature and the gravity of the misconduct and the intent with which 
it was committed.”  Id.  Thus, the style and severity of the sanction “depends upon the facts 
51 
and circumstances of the cases, taking account of any particular aggravating or mitigating 
factors.”  Id.   
Bar Counsel contends that Robbins’ professional misconduct combined with the 
aggravating factors justify disbarment.  Indeed, “[w]hen a pattern of intentional 
misrepresentations is involved, particularly those misrepresentations that attempt to 
conceal other misconduct by the attorney, disbarment will ordinarily be the appropriate 
sanction.”  Framm, 449 Md. at 667.  As previously stated, Robbins’ misrepresentations 
were made in an attempt to conceal his misconduct.  
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 511 (2002), we stated 
that the attorney’s behavior was “especially troubling” given that his “chosen prey . . . were 
the elderly and their families, vulnerable people who sought [the attorney’s] assistance in 
alleviating their difficult circumstances.”  We reaffirm the McLaughlin Court’s sentiment 
and note that Robbins’ inclination to prey on the elderly is particularly heinous.  
In the present case, we have sustained the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions 
that Robbins violated many rules of professional conduct, including: MLRPC 1.1 
(Competence); 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority); 1.3 (Diligence); 
1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 1.7 (Conflict of Interest – General Rule); 8.1 (Bar 
Admissions and Disciplinary Matters); and 8.4 (Misconduct).  We disagree with the 
hearing judge’s conclusions of law regarding Rule 1.7 only in that Robbins was not charged 
with a violation of Rule 1.7 in the Bossom matter.  Thus, we do not adopt the hearing 
judge’s conclusion that Rule 1.7 was violated with regard to Bossom.   
52 
Robbins has demonstrated no compelling extenuating circumstances that would 
justify a lesser sanction.  Consequently, for the reasons provided in detail herein, we hold 
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in the present case.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d) FOR 
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
JONATHAN DAVID ROBBINS.