Title: Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene County Bd. of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5448.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5448 
MARALGATE, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF  
REVISION ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5448.] 
Real property taxation—Valuation for current agricultural use—Transfer of part 
of property to related entity—Common ownership and contiguity of 
parcels—R.C. 5713.30(A)—Noncommercial timber. 
(No. 2010-1769—Submitted October 18, 2011—Decided October 26, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2008-M-644. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal by the Greene County auditor and the Greene 
County Board of Revision (“BOR”) from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”) that reversed the BOR and granted current-agricultural-use-valuation 
(“CAUV”) status to a 70.959-acre parcel owned by Maralgate, L.L.C.  The parcel 
was purchased by the Turner Family Partnership as part of a 749-acre farm in 
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March 2005.  Apparently, the entire farm enjoyed CAUV status until the parcel 
was transferred from the family partnership to the Maralgate entity on July 28, 
2006.  Thereafter, the Greene County auditor denied the CAUV application for 
tax year 2007, and Maralgate filed a complaint with the BOR, which held a 
hearing and denied the application.  Maralgate then filed an appeal to the BTA, 
which held a hearing of its own and issued a decision reversing the BOR and 
granting the CAUV status.  The county has appealed. 
{¶ 2} Central to all the county’s arguments is its contention that because 
of the transfer of the one parcel from Turner Family Partnership to Maralgate, the 
tax status of that parcel had to be determined in isolation, without regard to the 
use of adjacent parcels still directly owned by the partnership.  Because almost 60 
percent of the parcel has trees that are not grown for commercial purposes, the 
most important consideration is whether the parcel is, for purposes of R.C. 
5713.30(A)(1), under “common ownership” with the rest of the farm. 
{¶ 3} We hold that the parcel was under common ownership with the 
rest of the farm.  Guided by that central holding, we reject two additional 
arguments advanced by the county.  First, contrary to the county’s assertion, the 
phrase “growth of timber for a noncommercial purpose” in R.C. 5713.30(A)(1) 
does not require that the trees in question be grown as a crop.  Second, the county 
is mistaken when it contends that Maralgate could receive the tax preference only 
for that portion of the parcel that was being actively cultivated; as a result,  
Maralgate did not have the burden to present a land survey showing how much of 
the parcel was devoted to different uses.  Contrary to the county’s argument, the 
case law requires such a survey only if there is a commercial use of part of a 
parcel that is not an agricultural use.  In the present case, those portions of the 
parcel not actively cultivated were not used for any commercial purpose. 
{¶ 4} Because we reject the arguments advanced by the appellants, we 
affirm the decision of the BTA. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 5} In March 2005, the Turner Family Partnership acquired a 749-acre 
farm consisting of more than one parcel in a single transaction.  One component 
of that farm was the 70.959-acre parcel that is at issue.  In July 2006, the 
partnership assigned that parcel to Maralgate L.L.C., in order to limit liability in 
case of a drowning in one of the quarry ponds on the property. 
{¶ 6} Because of the change of ownership, the auditor declined to treat 
the parcel as part of the larger farm.  Instead, she reviewed the application solely 
in light of the uses of the parcel itself.  Pursuant to that review, the auditor and 
subsequently the BOR determined that the parcel did not qualify for CAUV 
treatment for 2007. 
{¶ 7} Maralgate appealed to the BTA, which held a hearing on October 
15, 2009.  At that hearing, Maralgate offered the testimony of Albert J. Turner III, 
a principal and the general partner of the Turner Family Partnership. 
{¶ 8} Turner testified that the partnership acquired the “Noble Farm,” a 
749-acre tract that included the property at issue, through auction in February 
2005.  In July 2006, the partnership transferred the parcel to Maralgate for 
liability reasons relating to the ponds.  Maralgate is a single-member limited-
liability company wholly owned by the Turner Family Partnership. 
{¶ 9} Turner himself farmed the larger farm, including the parcel at 
issue, and testified that the cultivation involved the field crops soy beans and 
corn.  Turner stated that there were about 20 acres of “agricultural land” on the 
parcel.  But he amended that testimony to 19.7310 based on reviewing the 
property record card, which sets forth “tillable,” “woodland,” and “right of way” 
acreage.  As for the portion of the parcel actually under cultivation, approximately 
2.2 acres were farmed in the northwest corner of the parcel, and Turner’s 
testimony indicated (with very little precision) that additional land in the eastern 
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and southeastern part of the parcel had been cleared and farmed.  Turner 
additionally testified that the parcel generated at least $2,500 per year. 
{¶ 10} The record does not contain Maralgate’s 2007 CAUV application, 
but at the BOR hearing the auditor explained her grounds for denying the 
preferred tax status:  “[Y]ou have to [actually farm] at least 25 percent [of the 
parcel] * * * and you are not meeting the 25 percent for farming purposes” as to 
the parcel.  As for the integration of the parcel into the whole 749-acre farm, the 
auditor stated her position that “[e]ven though it’s owned by the same family it’s 
not the same name” and that as a result of the partnership having “transferred it 
into an LLC,” the parcel’s tax status must be determined in isolation from the 
remainder of the farm.  The BOR denied Maralgate’s complaint on the grounds of 
“no documentation provided and no proof of income.” 
{¶ 11} After Maralgate appealed to the BTA, the board held a hearing at 
which it reviewed an aerial photograph of the parcel and heard testimony of 
Turner.  The BTA issued its decision on September 21, 2010. 1  The BTA first 
found that “the property, as a part of the larger farm, had been continuously 
farmed during the relevant time period.”  BTA No. 2008-M-644, at 6.  Second, 
the BTA cited an earlier decision for the proposition that in R.C. 5713.30(A)’s 
reference to exclusive agricultural use, “exclusively” means “primarily.”2  In this 
                                                 
1 At page 8 of its decision, the BTA notes that “the tillable land * * * comprises 19 acres,” and on 
page 9 the BTA states that “[t]he 19-20 acres that have been and continue to be planted each year 
are also entitled to CAUV status.”  The county points out that land determined to be suited for 
agricultural use is not necessarily under actual cultivation.  To the extent that there is any factual 
mistake on the BTA’s part, however, it is inconsequential:  the BTA predicated its decision on 
considering the parcel as part of the 749-acre farm, and the county does not claim that the 
agricultural use is insubstantial in relation to the entire farm. 
 
2 The county contends that the BTA erred by stating that exclusive use under R.C. 5713.30(A) 
means primary use.  The county is correct to the extent that any commercial use of a portion of a 
parcel that is not agricultural will defeat the claimant’s right to obtain CAUV status, at least as to 
that nonagricultural portion.  But as discussed below, the BTA’s decision does not fall into error, 
because the BTA correctly distinguished the incidental uses in this case as noncommercial, and 
found that they did not defeat the CAUV claim. 
January Term, 2011 
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context, the BTA acknowledged the BOR’s view that because “a single parcel of 
land may be divided into separate economic units, all or some of which may 
qualify for CAUV and others of which may not,” the property owner should 
“specify the boundaries of the economic units.”  Id. at 7.  But the BTA rejected 
the application of that doctrine in the present case on the grounds that the parcel 
“has not been divided into separate economic units,” inasmuch as “[n]o income, 
other than farm income, devolves from any portion of the property.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id.  The BTA determined that the wooded portion of the parcel enjoyed the 
preferred tax status because it was under common ownership with the surrounding 
Turner Family Partnership parcels pursuant to R.C. 5713.30(A)(1).  Id. at 7-8.  
The BTA also found that the portion of the parcel that was being tilled should 
enjoy CAUV status and declined to require detachment of the other portions of 
the parcel.  Id. at 8.  Accordingly, the BTA reversed the BOR’s denial of CAUV 
status and ordered that it be granted. 
{¶ 12} The BOR and the auditor have appealed, and we now affirm. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 13} By a 1973 amendment to the state constitution, Ohio voters 
authorized the General Assembly to depart from uniformity in valuing real 
property by permitting farms to be valued in accordance with their current 
agricultural use rather than their market value.  Section 36, Article II, Ohio 
Constitution; 1973 House Joint Resolution 13, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2043; see 
Fife v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 120 Ohio St.3d 442, 2008-Ohio-6786, 900 
N.E.2d 177, ¶ 3.  “Under the authorizing amendment and the implementing 
statutes, ‘the auditor disregards the highest and best use of the property and values 
the property according to its current agricultural use,’ a procedure that ‘usually 
results in a lower valuation and a lower real property tax.’ ”  Id., ¶ 4, quoting 
Renner v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 142, 572 N.E.2d 
56. 
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{¶ 14} The implementing legislation is set forth at R.C. 5713.30 et seq.  
Central to the resolution of the case before us is the definition of “land devoted 
exclusively to agricultural use” at R.C. 5713.30(A).  Division (A)(1) offers a 
definition applicable to “[t]racts, lots, or parcels totaling not less than ten acres,” 
while division (A)(2) states a definition applicable to tracts of less than ten acres.  
Because we affirm the BTA’s grant of CAUV status under division (A)(1), we do 
not reach and do not address the applicability of division (A)(2). 
A.  The parcel is under “common ownership” with the 749-acre Turner 
family farm because the family partnership owns Maralgate 
{¶ 15} Under R.C. 5713.30(A)(1), “[t]racts, lots, or parcels of land” 
qualify for CAUV treatment to the extent that during the requisite period of time, 
they are “devoted exclusively to commercial animal or poultry husbandry, 
aquaculture, apiculture, the production for a commercial purpose of timber, field 
crops, tobacco, fruits, vegetables, nursery stock, ornamental trees, sod, or 
flowers.”  Additionally, the statute provides that tracts, lots, or parcels devoted 
exclusively to the “growth of timber for a noncommercial purpose” may qualify 
“if the land on which the timber is grown is contiguous to or part of a parcel of 
land under common ownership that is otherwise devoted exclusively to 
agricultural use.”3  We hold that to the extent that it is wooded, the parcel 
qualifies for CAUV status under R.C. 5713.30(A)(1). 
{¶ 16} Three uses of property described in division (A)(1) occurred on the 
parcel.  First, field crops were cultivated on approximately three acres in the 
northwest corner of the parcel and an indeterminate portion in the south and east 
of the parcel.  Second, a portion of the parcel is covered with ponds that are 
                                                 
3 A stand of noncommercial timber may also qualify as part of a federal land retirement or 
conservation program, but that provision is not at issue here. 
 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
vestiges of earlier quarrying conducted on the parcel, while another portion is 
devoted to a landfill that the owner permits the county to use without charge. 
{¶ 17} Third and most significantly, more than 40 of the 70 acres of the 
parcel were wooded, but the trees were not cultivated as a crop.  Thus, the stand 
of trees covered some 57 percent of the parcel, and its presence raises the question 
whether the parcel constitutes land “contiguous to or part of a parcel of land under 
common ownership that is otherwise devoted exclusively to agricultural use” for 
purposes of R.C. 5713.30(A)(1). 
{¶ 18} The county contends that the parcel cannot be treated as part of the 
larger farm under R.C. 5713.30(A)(1) because Maralgate is not identical to the 
Turner Family Partnership, i.e., it is a different entity that owns the property.  The 
county cites an administrative rule of the tax commissioner that defines “[t]racts, 
lots or parcels” as “all distinct portions or pieces of land (not necessarily 
contiguous) where the title is held by one owner, as listed on the tax list and 
duplicate of the county, which are actively farmed as a unit if together the total 
acreage meets the requirements of section 5713.30(A)(1) or (A)(2), of the Revised 
Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-30(B)(25).  That rule 
plainly contemplates an identity of owners.  Contrary to the county’s contention, 
however, the rule does not apply to the situation before us. 
{¶ 19} As noted, the relevant statutory language is in R.C. 5713.30(A)(1):  
land devoted to “the growth of timber for a noncommercial purpose” may qualify 
for CAUV status if it is contiguous to and under common ownership with land 
that is otherwise devoted to agricultural use.  The applicable statutory language is 
“common ownership,” which connotes a wider scope than that contemplated by 
the administrative rule.  Different corporate entities—such as Turner Family 
Partnership and Maralgate—are said to be under common ownership when they 
are parent and subsidiary, or when they each have the same members or 
shareholders.  See, e.g., Union Bldg. & Constr. Corp. v. Bowers (1958), 110 Ohio 
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App. 81, 86-87, 12 O.O.2d 254, 158 N.E.2d 386 (fact of “common ownership” of 
the two parties to a transaction did not avoid sales-tax obligation where the sales-
tax vendor was a wholly owned subsidiary of the sales-tax purchaser). 
{¶ 20} The county argues that the tax commissioner’s rule, which requires 
the same entity to be listed as owner of the different parcels, controls the scope of 
“common ownership” under R.C. 5713.30(A)(1).  We disagree. 4   
{¶ 21} It is elemental that an administrative rule such as Ohio Adm.Code 
5703-25-30 is “ ‘designed to accomplish the ends sought by the legislation 
enacted by the General Assembly,’ ” and an administrative rule “ ‘does not 
conflict with a statute to the extent that it provides a reasonable, supportable 
interpretation of it.’ ”  Rich’s Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Levin, 125 Ohio St.3d 15, 2010-
Ohio-957, 925 N.E.2d 951, ¶ 17, quoting Hoffman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 113 
Ohio St.3d 376, 2007-Ohio-2201, 865 N.E.2d 1259, ¶ 17, and Chicago Pacific 
Corp. v. Limbach (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 432, 435, 605 N.E.2d 8.  Moreover, “ ‘an 
administrative rule that is issued pursuant to statutory authority has the force of 
law unless it is unreasonable or conflicts with a statute covering the same subject 
matter.”  Nestle R&D Ctr., Inc. v. Levin, 122 Ohio St.3d 22, 2009-Ohio-1929, 907 
N.E.2d 714, ¶ 40, quoting State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 377, 382, 627 N.E.2d 538. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 5715.29 authorizes the tax commissioner to prescribe rules 
concerning “the exercise of the powers and the discharge of the duties” of the 
auditor in relation to “the assessment of property and the levy * * * of taxes.”  As 
R.C. 5713.31 acknowledges, this authority extends to prescribing rules for valuing 
land that has been determined to be “devoted exclusively to agricultural use.”   
                                                 
4 We recognize that requiring parcels to be titled to the very same owner has the substantial 
advantage of making the common ownership immediately evident to the auditor.  That 
consideration is not decisive, however, given that the board-of-revision proceedings pursuant to 
R.C. 5715.19 permit the introduction of evidence of common ownership where the owners are not 
identical. 
January Term, 2011 
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Moreover, the authority by its terms encompasses the eligibility of land for 
CAUV.  Thus, the administrative rules at issue fall generally within a grant of 
rulemaking authority to the commissioner. 
{¶ 23} Nonetheless, we do not read Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-30(B)(25) 
as imposing the same-owner limitation on the language of R.C. 5713.30(A)(1).  
The main reason is that the reference to “common ownership” was enacted into 
R.C. 5713.30(A)(1) many years after the administrative rule was promulgated.  
See Castillo v. Jackson (1992), 149 Ill.2d 165, 178, 594 N.E.2d 323 (attaching 
little interpretative significance to a Labor Department program letter because the 
letter was promulgated “well before” the passage of the relevant statute). 
{¶ 24} Specifically, the text that is currently the tax commissioner’s rule 
at Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-30 was originally a BTA rule promulgated in 1973 
that was codified in the Ohio Administrative Code on November 11, 1977, as a 
rule of the former commissioner of tax equalization at Ohio Adm.Code 5705-5-
01.  1977 Ohio Monthly Record 3-652.  Subsequently, the rules codified at Ohio 
Adm.Code Title 5705 were recodified as Chapter 5703-25, at which time the 
language became part of current Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-30.  2003-2004 Ohio 
Monthly Record 784, 795. 
{¶ 25} Meanwhile, the General Assembly amended R.C. 5713.30(A) 
twice in a manner pertinent to the issue before us.  See Dircksen v. Greene Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 109 Ohio St.3d 470, 2006-Ohio-2990, 849 N.E.2d 20, ¶ 16-21 
(discussing history of R.C. 5713.30(A)).  Originally, the statute listed timber 
among the agricultural products that, when cultivated for commercial purposes, 
could qualify land for the preferred tax treatment.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 423, 135 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 341, 344.  Effective March 1993, the legislature removed 
division (A)(1)’s reference to timber produced for commercial purposes and 
substituted a provision that qualified timber “whether or not it is produced for a 
commercial purpose.”  1992 Sub.H.B. No. 95, 144 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2994, 
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3001.  Later in 1993, the statute was amended again so as to read as it currently 
does—namely, land devoted to commercial timber production qualifies as well as 
land devoted to “growth of timber for a noncommercial purpose, if the land on 
which the timber is grown is contiguous to or part of a parcel of land under 
common ownership that is otherwise devoted exclusively to agricultural use.”  
1993 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 281, 145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5281.  Thus, the reference 
to “common ownership” did not become part of the statute until almost 20 years 
after the original promulgation of the rule. 
{¶ 26} Because the rule was promulgated long before the statutory 
language at issue was enacted, we do not view the rule as an administrative 
construction of that language.  Moreover, a rule that would require the same entity 
to be the owner of two parcels is arguably inconsistent with the statutory 
requirement that land be under “common ownership,” as already indicated.  
Simply put, the latter term indicates that once the information is in their 
possession, the taxing authorities should look behind the person or entity named 
on a deed to determine the ultimate ownership of two properties. 
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we reject the county’s contention that 
Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-30(B)(25) forecloses consideration of the parcel in 
conjunction with the contiguous Turner family parcels. 
B.  R.C. 5713.30(A)(1) explicitly allows the tax preference for 
noncommercial timber based on contiguity and common ownership 
{¶ 28} The county argues that noncommercial timber under R.C. 
5713.30(A)(1) must still constitute a “crop” in order to qualify the wooded area of 
the parcel for the tax preference.  We disagree.  As already discussed, the history 
of R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)’s reference to timber demonstrates that the county is 
mistaken.  See Dircksen, 109 Ohio St.3d 470, 2006-Ohio-2990, 849 N.E.2d 20, ¶ 
20-21.  Originally, the statute referred to timber produced “for commercial 
purposes.”  Next, the statute was amended to include timber whether or not grown 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
for a commercial purpose.  Finally, the current language limited the tax break for 
noncommercial timber by requiring contiguity and common ownership. 
{¶ 29} This sequence of amendments shows that the General Assembly 
intended to permit the tax break to apply to the wooded portions of a farm even if 
the timber in those areas was not harvested as a crop.  The county’s citation of 
Rocky Fork Hunt & Country Club v. Testa (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 570, 654 
N.E.2d 429, is unavailing.  In that case the parties disputed whether the wooded 
portion of a parcel was devoted exclusively to agricultural use in 1992, before the 
1993 amendments that permitted noncommercial timber to qualify for the tax 
preference.  Thus the Tenth District’s decision simply did not address the 
provision of law at issue here, because it was not in effect at the time at issue in 
that case. 
C.  Granting CAUV status is not unreasonable when a parcel is part of 
and under common ownership with a larger farm and has a sizeable 
wooded area but no commercial use other than agriculture 
{¶ 30} Section 36, Article II of the Ohio Constitution authorizes the 
legislature to provide preferential tax treatment where land is “devoted 
exclusively to agricultural use.”  R.C. 5713.30(A) implements the constitutional 
authorization, setting forth when land is “devoted exclusively to agricultural use,” 
and it does so by stating those agricultural uses that qualify for the tax preference. 
{¶ 31} The county argues that the tax preference must be granted on an 
acre-by-acre basis and that the owner has the burden to demonstrate by land 
survey precisely which portions of any particular parcel are subject to agricultural 
use as defined.  In support, the county cites Renner, 59 Ohio St.3d 142, 572 
N.E.2d 56. 
{¶ 32} In both Renner and the later case Furbay v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 64, 572 N.E.2d 660, land that had previously 
qualified for CAUV treatment was subject to a conversion, i.e., a loss of CAUV 
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status, pursuant to R.C. 5713.34.  In each case, the owner had leased a portion of 
the parcel to another entity for mining.  When called upon to render a recoupment 
of tax savings from earlier years, the owner in each case sought to reduce the 
amount of recoupment by arguing that only some, not all, of the land had been 
leased for a nonagricultural, commercial use. 
{¶ 33} The court held that an owner may reduce the amount of 
recoupment by proving that a portion of the land continued to enjoy CAUV status.  
But the court placed the burden firmly on the owner to demonstrate, by land 
survey if necessary, the precise area devoted to agricultural and nonagricultural 
use.  Absent such proof, the recoupment must equal the tax savings that relate to 
the entire parcel. 
{¶ 34} In this case, the BTA correctly concluded that Renner and Furbay 
are not apposite.  What was different in Renner and Furbay was the existence of a 
new commercial use of the property that was not agricultural.  Simply put, Renner 
and Furbay underscore the proposition that when a portion of a parcel of real 
estate is used for a commercial purpose that is not agricultural, the parcel itself 
cannot be said to be “devoted exclusively to agricultural use.”  It follows that if an 
owner nonetheless desires to qualify some portion of the parcel that is still subject 
to the agricultural use, the owner must show precisely what acreage is agricultural 
and what acreage is subject to the other commercial use.  But as the BTA stated, 
the doctrine of Renner and Furbay does not apply here, because there is no 
commercial use other than the agricultural.  BTA No. 2008-M-644, at 7 (the 
noncommercial uses of the parcel did not involve “economic units” that had to be 
excluded from CAUV status). 
{¶ 35} The county also points to an administrative rule of the tax 
commissioner to support its position.  In particular, the rule requires that “[o]ne 
acre for each residence on a parcel shall be valued as a homesite in the same 
manner as similar homesites in the area on a market value basis.”  (Emphasis 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
added.)  Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-34(I).  On the basis of this pronouncement the 
county infers that “[w]hat applies to a homesite would, of course, equally apply to 
a landfill or an abandoned quarry, none of which are used for an agricultural 
purpose.”  In other words, the county postulates that any acreage not directly 
farmed must be separated and subjected to market valuation, even if it has no 
separate commercial use. 
{¶ 36} We disagree.  The administrative rule expressly creates a one-acre 
carve-out for the farm home but remains silent on other uses incidental to 
agricultural use.  Contrary to the county’s reasoning, we construe the rule’s 
silence on other uses—such as the vestigial quarry ponds and the county’s 
permissive and noncommercial use of a corner of the parcel as a landfill—as not 
requiring a carve-out.  The conditions are merely that such uses be purely 
incidental to the overall agricultural use and that they not be commercial in 
nature. 
{¶ 37} In sum, the present case involves a 749-acre farm consisting of 
contiguous parcels and, with respect to the parcel at issue, only one commercial 
use—the growing of field crops, which is agricultural under R.C. 5713.30(A).  As 
discussed, there are about 40 acres of noncommercial timber on the parcel, and 
they qualify for tax preference by virtue of their contiguity and common 
ownership with the farm.  With regard to the entire 749-acre tract (that being the 
relevant unit), the county does not contend that agricultural use is insubstantial.  
All that remains is at most 27 acres of the quarry ponds along with the area that 
Maralgate allows the county to use, free of charge, as a landfill.  This area 
constitutes a mere 3.6 percent of the area of the entire Turner farm, and nothing in 
the record suggests that its use is anything other than incidental to the farm as a 
whole. 
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{¶ 38} Under all these circumstances, we conclude that the BTA acted 
reasonably and lawfully when it granted CAUV status to the entire parcel.  We 
therefore affirm the BTA’s decision. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} For the reasons set forth, the decision of the BTA is reasonable and 
lawful.  We therefore affirm it. 
Decision affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Rogers & Greenberg, L.L.P., James G. Kordik, and David M. Pixley, for 
appellee. 
 
James R. Gorry, for appellants. 
______________________