Title: Hoffman Family L.L.C. v. Mill Two Associates

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
HOFFMAN FAMILY, L.L.C. 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 981302 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
April 21, 2000 
MILL TWO ASSOCIATES PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
John E. Kloch, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we first consider whether a proposed land 
development had advanced to a point sufficient to permit the 
chancellor to issue a declaratory judgment construing a 
restrictive covenant burdening a portion of the land to be 
developed, and if so, whether the chancellor correctly 
determined that the proposed development did not violate that 
restrictive covenant. 
BACKGROUND 
The central focus of this appeal is a restrictive covenant 
in a December 11, 1989 deed between Hubert N. Hoffman and Peggy 
L. Hoffman, husband and wife and predecessors in interest in 
Hoffman Family, L.L.C.,1 and Mill Two Associates Partnership 
                     
1Although not evidenced in the record, it is undisputed that 
the Hoffmans transferred their interest in this covenant to this 
limited liability corporation prior to the initiation of the 
suit for declaratory judgment from which this appeal arises.  
Because the interests of the Hoffmans and the successor 
corporation are identical, we will hereinafter refer to 
(Mill Two) recorded in the land records of the City of 
Alexandria on December 12, 1989.  By that deed, Hoffman conveyed 
to Mill Two a 3.88-acre tract of land, referenced in the 
subsequent declaratory judgment suit from which this appeal 
arises as “Parcel 11,” situated at the northwest corner of the 
intersection of Eisenhower Avenue and Mill Road in the City of 
Alexandria.  The restrictive covenant provides that: 
the property set forth above shall be developed for 
residential purposes only, not to include motels and 
hotels, but, which may include up to fifteen percent 
(15%) of commercial space for residential support.  
This covenant shall run with the land, but, nothing 
above withstanding, shall lapse and be no further in 
force and effect on January 1, 2020. 
 
The conveyance of Parcel 11 to Mill Two by the December 11, 
1989 deed was made in conjunction with an “Agreement for the 
Like-Kind Exchange of Property” executed by Hoffman and Mill Two 
on November 6, 1989.  Pursuant to that agreement, Hoffman 
subsequently received five separate parcels of land in the City 
of Alexandria totaling 3.3 acres.  Like Parcel 11, these parcels 
were part of the “Eisenhower Avenue Metro valley,” an area of 
the City of Alexandria undergoing intense redevelopment 
following the opening of a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority Metrorail line.  In addition to parcels already owned, 
                                                                  
“Hoffman” whenever referencing the party seeking to enforce this 
covenant. 
 
 
2
these parcels facilitated Hoffman’s current and future plans to 
develop property adjoining the Metrorail line in the City of 
Alexandria. 
Mill Two ultimately sought to develop Parcel 11 in 
conjunction with Old Town Development Company, L.L.C. (Old Town 
Development), the owner of two parcels on Mill Road adjoining 
Parcel 11 along their south and west boundaries.  These parcels, 
referenced in the subsequent declaratory judgment suit from 
which this appeal arises as Parcel 9 and Parcel 10, total 
approximately 1.24 acres.2
The purpose of combining the land area of the three parcels 
into a single development was to obtain the benefits of the 
designation of property in the Eisenhower Avenue Metro valley 
area as a “Coordinated Development District” under the City of 
Alexandria’s zoning ordinances.  See Alexandria Zoning Ordinance 
§ 5-601, et seq.  In testimony during a hearing on the merits of 
the suit, Kimberly Johnson, chief of the development division of 
                     
2Also named as respondents in this litigation were Old Town 
Development’s predecessor in interest, another development firm, 
and a construction firm involved at various points in the joint 
venture to develop Parcels 9, 10, and 11.  These parties were 
subsequently dismissed from the suit and are not parties to this 
appeal.  Subsequent to the filing of the original declaratory 
judgment suit, Old Town Development acquired a contract purchase 
interest in Parcel 11 from Mill Two.  Accordingly, Old Town 
Development is the principal party in interest that seeks to 
develop these three parcels. 
 
 
3
the City of Alexandria Department of Planning and Zoning, 
explained that Coordinated Development Districts are employed by 
the City to “encourage higher density development around Metro 
stations.”  Essentially, within a Coordinated Development 
District, the floor area ratio for determining the maximum 
square footage of permissible development, or “density,” for a 
given parcel of land may be increased by combining its 
development with that of adjoining parcels.  According to 
Johnson, the parcels of land included in a combined development 
proposal need not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of 
lots as reflected in the land or tax records. 
By combining the development of Parcels 9 and 10 with that 
of Parcel 11, the floor area ratio for the combined parcels 
would be raised from 1.25 to 3.75.  Alexandria Zoning Ordinance 
§ 5-602.  Moreover, the total density permitted in the 
development would be based upon the application of the floor 
area ratio to the combined area of the three parcels, rather 
than to each parcel individually.  In other words, the density 
of development of one parcel would not be limited based upon its 
area so long as the total density of development of the three 
parcels combined did not exceed that allowed under the zoning 
ordinance. 
“Mill Race - Old Town Commons,” the development proposed 
for Parcels 9, 10, and 11, consists of four high rise 
 
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residential towers, principally located on Parcel 11, and a 
fifteen story office building located solely on Parcels 9 and 
10.  A ground level plaza with retail commercial space and 
parking garages, both below and above ground, connect the five 
main buildings of the development. 
The record shows that efforts were made to coordinate the 
development of Parcels 9, 10, and 11 with the development of 
Hoffman’s parcels in the Eisenhower Avenue Metro valley.  
However, because of competing interests, the parties were unable 
to reach an accord on joint development. 
On August 13, 1997, Hoffman filed a bill of complaint 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposed development of 
Parcels 9, 10, and 11 would violate the restrictive covenant in 
the December 11, 1989 deed conveying Parcel 11 to Mill Two.  
Because of changes in ownership of the parcels, see note 2 
supra, and the continuing process of obtaining approval from the 
City of Alexandria for the proposed development, Hoffman filed 
an amended bill of complaint on October 22, 1997.  The gravamen 
of Hoffman’s suit, however, continued to be that the use of the 
land area of Parcel 11 to increase the density of commercial 
construction permitted on Parcels 9 and 10 was violative of the 
restrictive covenant in that this constituted a use of Parcel 11 
for other than residential and supporting commercial purposes. 
 
5
On November 7, 1997, Mill Two filed a demurrer to the 
amended bill of complaint, asserting that the case was not yet 
ripe for decision.  Mill Two asserted that the plan for 
development of Parcels 9, 10, and 11 as alleged in the bill of 
complaint was not sufficiently certain to warrant a declaratory 
judgment. 
On November 14, 1997, Old Town Development filed an answer 
and cross-bill to the bill of complaint.3  Old Town Development 
contended that Hoffman had no standing to challenge the proposed 
development of Parcels 9 and 10.  Old Town Development further 
contended that Hoffman’s suit was an improper attempt to bring 
“a cloud on the title” of Parcel 11 and sought damages on that 
account. 
Hoffman filed a motion for summary judgment on the cross-
bill, contending that a lawsuit could not constitute an improper 
attempt to cloud a title.  On December 23, 1997, the chancellor 
heard argument on the motion for summary judgment, but declined 
to rule on the matter and, rather, permitted Old Town 
Development to file an amended cross-bill.  Hoffman then moved 
the court to dismiss the case, asserting that its bill of 
                     
3The cross-bill was initially styled as a “counterclaim.”  
In this opinion, we will use “cross-bill,” the proper term for 
this type of pleading in a chancery suit.  See Rule 2:13 
(“Cross-Bill Against Plaintiff”).  
 
 
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complaint was premature, and that, but for the filing of the 
cross-bill, it would have taken a voluntary nonsuit.  Old Town 
Development and Mill Two took the position that the case was 
ripe for decision in order to resolve the “cloud hanging over 
us.”  The chancellor ruled that there was a justiciable 
controversy and denied Hoffman’s motion to dismiss. 
On December 30, 1997, Old Town Development filed its 
amended cross-bill.  Included in the relief sought in that 
pleading was a determination of whether the proposed development 
of Parcels 9, 10, and 11 would violate the restrictive covenant 
on Parcel 11. 
During the pendency of the proceeding before the chancellor 
and despite concerns over the failure to coordinate development 
with Hoffman, on January 24, 1998, the Alexandria City Council 
approved, subject to certain restrictions, the Coordinated 
Development District Concept Plan submitted by Old Town 
Development for Parcels 9, 10, and 11.  The approval of the 
concept plan does not permit the beginning of construction, 
which requires the further approval of final site plans and the 
grant of building permits.  In addition to approving the concept 
plan, the City also approved a necessary zoning change and 
granted a special use permit for traffic management related to 
the development of phase one of Old Town Commons. 
 
7
Having previously filed a demurrer to the amended cross-
bill, on February 18, 1998, Hoffman filed a motion to dismiss 
its amended bill of complaint or, in the alternative, to be 
allowed to take a voluntary nonsuit.  Hoffman also filed a 
motion to dismiss the amended cross-bill.  In each of these 
pleadings Hoffman again asserted that there was not yet a 
justiciable controversy between it and Old Town Development, 
either because Old Town Development had not yet acquired an 
interest in Parcel 11 or because the plan for development of 
Parcels 9, 10, and 11 was not yet sufficiently certain to permit 
a declaratory judgment on the effect of the restrictive 
covenant.  Old Town Development filed responsive pleadings, with 
supporting materials, opposing Hoffman’s efforts to prevent the 
chancellor from rendering a judgment on the merits.4
A three-day hearing on these issues commenced on February 
27, 1998.  The voluminous record of testimony and exhibits that 
resulted from that hearing need not be summarized here except to 
the extent that the facts have already been recounted above.  It 
shall be sufficient to state that Hoffman argued forcefully for 
                     
4As we have previously noted, this change in the essential 
positions of the parties, whereby Hoffman sought dismissal and 
Old Town Development sought an adjudication on the merits, 
resulted from the changes in ownership of Parcel 11 and the 
continuing process of obtaining approval from the City of 
Alexandria during the pendency of the suit.  
 
 
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the dismissal of its amended bill of complaint and Old Town 
Development’s amended cross-bill, while maintaining that if the 
case were ripe for decision, the coordinated development of 
Parcels 9, 10, and 11 violated the restrictive covenant on 
Parcel 11 by permitting its land area to be used in augmenting 
the permissible density of commercial development of the other 
two parcels.  Hoffman also asserted that the proposed commercial 
retail space on Parcel 11 violated the restrictive covenant 
because it was not intended for “residential support.”  Old Town 
Development presented evidence that it was close to receiving 
approval to begin construction of the first phase of the 
development, necessitating a judicial determination of the 
effect of the restrictive covenant.  Old Town Development 
maintained that its proposed development of the three parcels 
did not violate that covenant. 
On March 31, 1998, the chancellor entered a final decree, 
which dismissed Hoffman’s amended bill of complaint with 
prejudice and granted judgment for Old Town Development on its 
amended cross-bill.  Specifically, the chancellor ruled “that 
the development plans of Old Town [Development], as presented in 
evidence in this proceeding and to the City of Alexandria, do 
not violate the covenant . . . given by defendant Mill Two . . . 
to Hoffman.”  We awarded Hoffman this appeal. 
 
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DISCUSSION 
Hoffman first contends that the trial court erred in 
dismissing its amended bill of complaint with prejudice and in 
addressing the merits of the amended cross-bill because no 
justiciable controversy existed between Hoffman and Old Town 
Development concerning the proposed use of Parcels 9, 10, and 
11.  We disagree. 
The circumstances under which a circuit court may render a 
declaratory judgment are provided for by statute and have been 
frequently addressed in our prior decisions.  Under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act (the Act), Code §§ 8.01-184 through -
191, circuit courts have the authority to make “binding 
adjudications of right” in cases of “actual controversy” when 
there is “antagonistic assertion and denial of right.”  Code 
§ 8.01-184; Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 245 
Va. 24, 35, 426 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1993); Erie Insurance Group v. 
Hughes, 240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990); Reisen v. 
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 225 Va. 327, 331, 302 S.E.2d 529, 531 
(1983).  The Act does not give trial courts the authority to 
render advisory opinions, to decide moot questions, or to answer 
inquiries that are merely speculative.  Blue Cross, 245 Va. at 
35, 426 S.E.2d at 123; Erie, 240 Va. at 170, 393 S.E.2d at 212; 
Reisen, 225 Va. at 331, 302 S.E.2d at 531.  The Act also is not 
to be used as an instrument of procedural fencing, either to 
 
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secure delay or to choose a forum.  Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 419, 177 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1970); 
Williams v. Southern Bank, 203 Va. 657, 662, 125 S.E.2d 803, 807 
(1962). 
The authority to enter a declaratory judgment is 
discretionary and must be exercised with great care and caution.  
Liberty Mutual, 211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524.  Furthermore, 
when the resolution of a disputed fact would be determinative of 
a case, rather than a construction of definite stated rights, 
status, or other relations, commonly expressed in written 
instruments, the case is not appropriate for declaratory 
judgment.  Id. at 420, 177 S.E.2d at 523; Williams, 203 Va. at 
663, 125 S.E.2d at 807.  Ultimately, however, the Act is 
remedial, having the express purpose “to afford relief from the 
uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over 
legal rights, without requiring one of the parties interested so 
to invade the rights asserted by the other as to entitle him to 
maintain an ordinary action therefor.”  Code § 8.01-191.  The 
Act is to be “liberally interpreted and administered with a view 
to making the courts more serviceable to the people.”  Id.
Hoffman contends that the limitation of the restrictive 
covenant in the December 11, 1989 deed was not ripe for 
determination in a declaratory judgment action because Old Town 
Development had no vested right to develop Parcels 9, 10, and 11 
 
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at the time the original action commenced.  Even conceding that 
the approval of the Coordinated Development District Concept 
Plan for those parcels occurred prior to the chancellor’s 
rendering judgment, Hoffman contends that it was still purely 
speculative whether Old Town Development would receive the 
necessary final zoning and building permit approvals before the 
right to begin construction would be assured. 
With respect to land use issues, it is true that we have at 
times defined the nature of a declaratory judgment suit in terms 
of whether the party seeking the judgment has acquired some 
vested right by virtue of zoning approval and, thus, is entitled 
to the relief sought.  See, e.g., Town of Stephens City v. 
Russell, 241 Va. 160, 164, 399 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1991).  However, 
we have never held that a party must establish a vested right, 
in the form of governmental approval to proceed with 
development, before obtaining a declaratory judgment on the 
issue whether some private right would bar that development. 
While we can envision cases where the proposed development 
of property would be so speculative and indefinite as to not 
rise to the level of a justiciable controversy, such is not the 
case here.  The record shows that Mill Two and Old Town 
Development have taken substantial steps, with significant 
financial expense, in developing specific plans for the 
development of residential and commercial buildings on Parcels 
 
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9, 10, and 11.  From the detail and scale of those plans, it is 
certain that governmental approval of the density of the 
commercial portion of that development will require the 
increased floor area ratio provided by treating the three 
parcels as part of a coordinated development.  Thus, while those 
plans may undergo revision prior to Old Town Development 
receiving final approval to begin construction, nothing in the 
record suggests that those plans would be altered so radically 
as to render speculative the central issue raised in this 
declaratory judgment suit.  Moreover, without a judicial 
resolution of the effect of the restrictive covenant in question 
the parties would be left without relief from the uncertainty 
and insecurity attendant upon the continuing controversy of 
their legal rights with regard to this covenant.  Accordingly, 
we hold that, on the specific facts of this case, a justiciable 
controversy existed at the time Hoffman filed the initial bill 
of complaint, and that the chancellor properly exercised his 
jurisdiction thereafter in rendering judgment to resolve that 
controversy. 
We now consider Hoffman’s contention that the chancellor 
erred in finding that the development proposed for Parcels 9, 
10, and 11 did not violate the restrictive covenant in the 
December 11, 1989 deed.  The essence of Hoffman’s contention in 
this regard is that the covenant restricts not merely the uses 
 
13
that may be made upon Parcel 11, but also the uses that may be 
made of Parcel 11.  Hoffman first asserts that the language of 
the deed is unambiguous and, thus, the chancellor should have 
applied its plain meaning “in light of the circumstances at the 
time of its creation.”  Hoffman then asserts that under those 
circumstances in this case, the terms “property” and “developed” 
in the phrase “the property set forth above shall be developed 
for residential purposes only” in the restrictive covenant are 
terms of art which should be given the meaning intended by the 
parties as evidenced by their dealings.  That meaning, Hoffman 
further asserts, is that “property” refers to the boundaries of 
a parcel of land and to all “[t]he bundle of rights attaching to 
[land] . . . which includes the right of development,” and 
“developed” refers to “planned unit developments” of the type 
contemplated in a Coordinated Development District or under a 
similar zoning scheme.  Thus, Hoffman concludes that the 
covenant restricts the use of the development rights attached to 
Parcel 11 in the proposed development of Parcels 9, 10, and 11 
as one tract of land.  We disagree with Hoffman. 
It is the well settled rule of this Commonwealth that if 
the language in a deed is clear, unambiguous, and explicit, a 
court called upon to construe such language should look no 
further than the four corners of the deed itself.  Irby v. 
Roberts, 256 Va. 324, 329, 504 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1998).  Thus, 
 
14
contrary to Hoffman’s contention, parol evidence of “the 
circumstances at the time of [the deed’s] creation” is not to be 
considered in giving effect to the clear, unambiguous, and 
explicit language of the deed.  Daugherty v. Diment, 238 Va. 
520, 525, 385 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1989). 
The plain meaning of the language emphasized by Hoffman 
does not support the broad construction of the terms “property” 
and “developed” that Hoffman asserts.  Here the term “property” 
is modified by the phrase “set forth above.”  This is clearly a 
reference to the physical description of the property earlier in 
the deed.  Similarly, the term “developed” must be read in the 
context of the language that both precedes and follows it.  When 
so read, the clear, unambiguous, and explicit language of the 
covenant restricts the development that may occur on Parcel 11 
to residential uses, excluding hotels and motels, but permitting 
a limited amount of supporting commercial uses.  Nothing in this 
language imposes a limitation on Parcel 11 being developed in 
conjunction with other parcels in the Coordinated Development 
District.  While we agree that Hoffman could have drafted the 
covenant to apply to “development rights” related to “planned 
unit developments,” it simply failed to do so with the language 
of this covenant. 
Finally, Hoffman contends that the chancellor erred in 
failing to find that the retail commercial space included in the 
 
15
proposed residential development of Parcel 11 violates the 
restrictive covenant.  Hoffman does not contend that the amount 
of retail commercial space exceeds the fifteen percent 
limitation of the restrictive covenant.  Rather, it contends 
that under the development proposal the retail commercial space 
“is intended to serve the entire local region.”  Thus, Hoffman 
contends that the scope of the proposed retail commercial 
development exceeds that contemplated by the phrase “for 
residential support” in the restrictive covenant. 
The phrase “commercial space for residential support” 
clearly imports that the retail commercial space should benefit 
the residential development of Parcel 11.  Nothing in that 
language suggests, however, that the customer-base of the retail 
commercial space must be restricted to the residents of that 
development.  It is, therefore, not inconsistent with the 
language of the covenant that the retail commercial space 
permitted as part of the development of Parcel 11 may also serve 
the occupants of the adjoining parcels or those of the 
surrounding environs so long as its purpose does not exclude 
providing retail commercial support to the residential 
development of Parcel 11. 
The chancellor found that there was a lack of “persuasive 
evidence that the [retail commercial space] is particularly 
oriented to support the commercial buildings as opposed to the 
 
16
residential buildings.”  When the chancellor hears evidence ore 
tenus, his decree is entitled to the same weight as a jury 
verdict, and we are bound by the chancellor’s findings of fact 
unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
them.  Rash v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 251 Va. 281, 283, 467 
S.E.2d 791, 793 (1996).  Additionally, we review the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing parties below.  Id.  
Applying that standard, we cannot say that the chancellor’s 
determination that the proposed retail commercial space did not 
violate the restrictive covenant was in error. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we find no error in the chancellor’s 
declaratory judgment that the proposed development of Parcel 11 
in conjunction with Parcels 9 and 10 will not violate the 
restrictive covenant in the December 11, 1989 deed.  
Accordingly, that judgment will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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