Title: CORY AND KATHRYN DAVISON; RONALD AND STACY RICHNER; AND MARTON RANCH, INC. V. WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION and the WYOMING GAME AND FISH DEPARTMENT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CORY AND KATHRYN DAVISON; RONALD AND STACY RICHNER; AND MARTON RANCH, INC. V. WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION and the WYOMING GAME AND FISH DEPARTMENT2010 WY 121238 P.3d 556Case Number: S-10-0007Decided: 08/25/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
COREY AND KATHRYN 
DAVISON; RONALD AND STACEY RICHNER; AND MARTON RANCH, 
INC.,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
WYOMING GAME AND FISH 
COMMISSION and the WYOMING GAME AND FISH DEPARTMENT,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Natrona County

The Honorable David 
B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Harriet M. Hageman 
and Kara Brighton, Hageman & Brighton, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Hageman. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Jay A. Jerde, Deputy Attorney General; James Kaste, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Kaste.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
  
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellants 
(Landowners) seek reversal of the district court's decision granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission and the Wyoming Game 
and Fish Department (collectively the Commission) in their dispute over the 
interpretation of an easement the Commission has over a portion of the 
Landowners' properties.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
The Landowners state 
their issues this way:

 
 

1.    
Whether the District 
Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion for Ruling as a Matter of 
Law.

 
 

2.    
Whether the District 
Court erred in denying the Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 
Counterclaims.

 
 

3.    
Whether the District 
Court erred in finding that the November 20, 1964 "Permanent Easement for Public 
Fishing, Migratory Waterfowl Hunting, and Boat Launching," (Lusby Easement) is 
ambiguous; thus accepting extrinsic evidence in order to "interpret" it in a 
manner that is contrary to its terms.

 
 

4.    
Whether the Appellees 
can claim an easement by prescription under Wyoming law.

 
 

5.    
Whether the District 
Court erred in finding that the parties had an oral agreement to modify the 
Lusby Easement with regard to the location of the boat 
ramp.

 
 
The issues stated by 
the Commission can be summarized this way:

 
 

A.   Does the plain 
language of the easement and the available extrinsic evidence show that the 
parties intended to grant access to the middle of the river so the public can 
fish, hunt, and launch boats along the easement?

 
 

B.   Should this Court 
render an advisory opinion on the Commission's authority to acquire rights by 
prescription?

 
 

C.   Can the landowners 
complain about the location of the boat launch after they asked that it be 
moved?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
This recitation is 
based largely on the statement of undisputed facts contained in the district 
court's decision letter.  On June 
17, 1964, the Commission entered into a sales contract with Clarence and Frances 
Lusby for an easement along the North Platte River in Natrona County, 
Wyoming.  The contract stated that 
its purpose was to grant to the Commission "for the use of the public, a 
permanent walking easement . . . for public hunting and fishing in and to the 
North Platte River."  The contract 
specified that: 

 
 
Said easement shall 
extend from midstream of the said North Platte River outward to a point 100 feet 
above and beyond the high water line to the left of said river looking 
downstream.

 
 
The purchase price 
was listed as $10,000.00.  The 
Commission received federal funding for a portion of this purchase price.  In the process of obtaining the funding, 
the Commission certified to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior that 
the Commission had entered into an obligation to purchase the Easement.  The certification specified that the 
Easement extended from the "centerline of the North Platte 
River."

 
 

[¶4]        
On November 20, 1964, 
the Lusbys executed a "Permanent Easement for Public Fishing, Migratory 
Waterfowl Hunting, and Boat Launching."  
Included in this Lusby Easement were a "walking easement," two access 
roadways, two parking lots, and a boat launching ramp.  With specific regard to the walking 
easement, the Lusbys granted to the Commission:

 
 
A permanent public 
walking easement, one hundred (100) feet in width, for public fishing and 
migratory waterfowl hunting on the North Platte River, as particularly described 
in the Plat and Survey by Worthington, Lenhart and Assoc., Inc., . . . which 
Plat and Survey is expressly made a part of this instrument and by reference 
incorporated herein.

 
 
In the Plat and 
Survey, the walking easement is described as:

 
 
A strip 100 feet in 
width, as measured 100 feet to the right from the right and northerly high water 
line of the North Platte River (as one looks upstream) and being parallel to 
said high water line as said river traverses the W½, Section 1 and the E½ NE¼, 
Section 2, T.30 N., R. 82 W. and the S½ SE¼, Section 35, T.31 N., R. 82 W. of 
the Sixth Principal Meridian, Natrona County, Wyoming.  

 
 
The Plat and Survey 
then recite a detailed description, by angles and distances, of an "easement 
line having a total length of 10,977.1 feet or 2.08 miles, more or less."  They also include detailed descriptions 
of the separate easements for the two access roads, two parking lots, and boat 
launching ramp.

 
 

[¶5]        
After purchasing the 
Lusby Easement, the Commission completed its application for federal funding by 
certifying to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior that it had 
obtained "a permanent public fishing, migratory waterfowl hunting and boat 
launching easement."  Once again, 
the Commission certified that the Easement extended to "the centerline of the 
North Platte River."

 
 

[¶6]        
The Landowners are 
the successors in interest to the Lusbys, and their properties remain encumbered 
by the Lusby Easement.  In October 
2007, representatives of the Commission met with some of the Landowners and 
other interested parties to discuss concerns, including dogs being allowed to 
run freely on the Easement, dust from the access roads, and slow responses by 
Commission representatives to the Landowners' concerns.  In addition, the Landowners suggested 
that the wording of the Lusby Easement allowed access only to the high water 
line of the river, not to the middle of the river.  After reviewing its documentation, the 
Commission sent letters to the Landowners stating its position "that the 
easement extends from midstream of the river outward one-hundred feet from the 
high water line."  This disagreement 
over the extent of the Lusby Easement led the Landowners to file this suit on 
September 8, 2008.

 
 

[¶7]        
After various 
pretrial proceedings, the district court held a hearing on September 21, 
2009, to consider cross motions for summary judgment.  The district court took the matter under 
advisement, and issued its decision letter on October 12, 2009.  It ruled against the Landowners and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission.  A final judgment incorporating the 
decision letter was filed on November 3, 2009.  The Landowners 
appealed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]        
This 
Court evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by using the same materials as employed and used by the lower 
court.  Thunder Hawk v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 
Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 
39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 
2002).  "A genuine issue of material 
fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute 
an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have 
asserted."  Id.  Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial court's 
summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 

Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. 
v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 

[¶9]        
In this case, the 
parties do not dispute the material facts.  
Their disagreement centers on interpretation of the Easement.  The district court's decision letter 
includes this accurate explanation of how easements are to be 
interpreted.

 
 
Easements are 
reviewed under the same principles that have been established for interpretation 
of contracts.  Lozier v. Blattland Investments, LLC, 100 P.3d 380, 383-384 (Wyo. 2004); 
Klutznick v. Thulin, 814 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 
1991).  The primary goal is to 
determine the intention of the parties from a close reading of the document 
language and by interpreting the terms of the document according to their plain 
and ordinary meaning.  Comet Energy Services, LLC v. Powder River 
Oil & Gas Ventures, LLC, 185 P.3d 1259, 1261-1262 (Wyo. 2008).  
Determination of the parties' intentions requires common sense and good 
faith; it also requires consideration of the context within which the contract 
was made.  Double Eagle Petroleum & Min. Corp. v. 
Questar Exploration & Production Co., 78 P.3d 679, 681-682 (Wyo. 
2003).  If necessary, the reviewing 
court may also look to the circumstances surrounding the contract, as well as 
its subject matter and the purpose of the contract to glean the intent of the 
agreement.  Id.  Any examination of the context within 
which the contract was drawn is limited to ascertaining the intent of the 
parties in making the agreement.  Id.  The context "cannot be invoked to 
contradict the clear meaning of the language used, and those extraneous 
circumstances do not justify a court in proceeding to insert therein a provision 
other than or different from that which the language used clearly indicates, and 
thereby, in effect, make a contract for the parties."  Lozier v. Blattland Investments, LLC, 100 P.3d 380, 383-384 (Wyo. 2004). 
(Internal citations omitted.)

 
 
If the language is 
ambiguous, then the court may use extrinsic evidence in an effort to determine 
the intentions of the parties.  Id.  A contract is ambiguous if it can be 
read in more than one way.  Dwan v. Indian Springs Ranch Homeowners 
Ass'n Inc., 186 P.3d 1199, 
1202 (Wyo. 2008).  Whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide.  State, ex rel., Arnold v. Ommen, 201 P.3d 1127, 1137 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Is the Lusby Easement 
ambiguous?

 
 

[¶10]     
Applying the standard 
of review set forth above, we begin our analysis by examining the Lusby Easement 
closely to determine if it provides an unambiguous expression of the intentions 
of the parties, or if it is ambiguous because it can be read more than one 
way.  The Landowners and the 
Commission agree that the Easement unambiguously provides that the landward 
boundary of the walking easement is a line located one hundred feet from the 
high water line of the river.  It is 
only the streamside boundary that is in dispute.  The Landowners contend that the Easement 
clearly and unambiguously states that the streamside boundary of the Easement is 
the high water line of the river.  
The Commission also asserts that the Easement is clear and unambiguous, 
but claims that it establishes the middle of the river as the streamside 
boundary of the walking easement.

 
 

[¶11]     
The Landowners argue 
that the Plat and Survey document, incorporated by reference as part of the 
Lusby Easement, provides "a metes and bounds legal description of the Easement, 
including the land encumbered and the boundaries."  This description, they contend, 
designates the high water line of the river as the streamside boundary of the 
Lusby Easement.  However, the 
description contained in the Plat and Survey is not a metes and bounds 
description.  A metes and bounds 
description

 
 
operates, in its most 
common format, by delineating the external boundaries of a parcel of land.  The external metes and bounds of the 
property are recited, in serial fashion, until there is a closure with the 
beginning point.  More specifically, 
the description is made up of a series of "calls," each of which is composed of 
(1) a course or direction and (2) a distance.  When the calls finally close with the 
beginning point, the description is complete.

 
 

14 Powell on Real Property 
§ 81A.05[2], at 81A-83 (2000).  A key characteristic of a metes and 
bounds description is that it describes a complete boundary  the "bounds"  
starting at a point of beginning and returning to that same point of 
beginning.  "Accordingly, a 
description by metes and bounds, whether along natural or artificial boundaries 
or by courses and distances, must be by continuous lines, one commencing where 
the other leaves off and the final line returning to the point of beginning." 
III American Law of Property 
§ 12.105, at 413 (1952).  A deed in which "the metes and bounds 
description did not close on the north boundary line" is faulty.  Arndt v. Sheridan Congregation of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, 429 P.2d 326, 327 
(Wyo. 1967).

 
 

[¶12]     
We quoted this 
example of a metes and bounds description in Barrett 
v. Guernsey, 
652 P.2d 395, 396 n.1 (Wyo. 
1982):

 
 
Beginning 
at the Southwest corner of Lot 32, West Subdivision to the Town of Guernsey, 
Platte County, State of Wyoming, and considering the South line of said Lot 32 
to bear South 89º 40' West with all bearings herein being relative thereto; 
thence South 89º 40' West, 138 feet to a line of old fence posts; thence North 
12º 35' East, along said line of old fence posts, 40.0 feet; thence North 77º 
25' West, 25 feet to a post; thence North 12º 35' East 21.5 feet; thence South 
77º 25' East, 25 feet; thence North 12º 35' East, 287.33 feet; thence North 89º 
40' East, 60.32 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 32; thence South 00º 
17' East, along the West line of said Lot 32, 340.0 feet to the Point of 
Beginning, containing 0.8 acres more or less.

 
 
Another example can 
be found in the Lusby Easement, where metes and bounds descriptions are given 
for the two parking lots.  The 
description of Parking Lot No. 2: 

 
 
Begin[s] at the 
northwesterly corner of the Parcel being described, which corner and point is 
located in the north line of said NE¼ NW¼, Section 1 at S. 89º16' E., 274.7 feet 
from the northwesterly corner thereof; thence from said point of beginning, S. 
89º16' E., 200.0 feet along said north line of the NE¼ NW¼, to a point and 
northeasterly corner of said Parcel; thence S. 5º20' E., 405.7 feet to the 
southeast corner of said Parcel; thence N. 89º16' W., 200.00 feet to the 
southwest corner of the Parcel being described; thence N. 5º20' W., 405.7 feet 
to the point of beginning and containing 1.85 acres, more or less.  

 
 
Both examples 
describe a complete outer boundary surrounding a parcel of land, beginning and 
ending at the same point, and specifying the acreage of the parcel, more or 
less.   

 
 

[¶13]     
In contrast, the Plat 
and Survey's description of the walking easement does not set forth the 
boundaries of a parcel of real property.  
It describes only a single "easement line" 100 feet from the high water 
line.  The description does not 
begin and end at the same point.  It 
begins "at point 1," located between Sections 1 and 36, and ends at "point 55," 
a different location on the boundary of Section 35.  It does not describe the boundary of a 
parcel of land containing a specified number of acres, but rather an easement 
line with "a total length of 10,977.1 feet or 2.08 miles, more or 
less."

 
 

[¶14]     
All parties agree 
that this single "easement line" described in the Plat and Survey is intended to 
be the landward boundary of the walking easement.1  What is missing from the language of the 
Easement documents, however, is any explicit designation of the streamside 
boundary of the walking easement.  
Nowhere in the Lusby Easement is there any explicit designation of the 
streamside boundary.

 
 

[¶15]     
The Landowners urge 
us to interpret the Easement documents as specifying the high water mark as the 
streamside boundary.  They 
repeatedly point out that the high water line is specifically marked on the map, 
and can be relocated even now based on the description provided in the Lusby 
Easement.  While that may be true, 
it does not tell us whether the high water line was meant to be a boundary line, 
or only a reference for locating the landward side of the walking easement.  Nothing in the language of the Lusby 
Easement answers that question.  On 
the map included within the Plat and Survey, the high water line is marked with 
a light line of long dashes and three dots.2  The boundaries of the parking lots and 
boat launching ramp are marked with dark lines of one long dash and two short 
dashes, and this same dark line is used to mark the landward boundary of the 
walking easement.3  The difference between the lines is not 
explained on the map or elsewhere in the Lusby Easement.  However, the fact that the high water 
line is marked differently from the other boundary lines suggests that the high 
water line was meant to be something other than a boundary line.  What that is remains 
ambiguous.

 
 

[¶16]     
Both parties rely on 
Glover v. Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552 (Wyo. 1992).  The Commission cites the case for the 
rule that "Where a deed describes land bounded by a non-navigable stream and 
names the stream as a monument, a presumption exists that the grant extends to 
the center and the thread of the stream is the true boundary."  Id. at 554.  The Landowners cite it because "The 
presumption is rebuttable by any words which clearly indicate an intention of 
the grantor to restrict the grant to the edge, shore, or some point other than 
the thread of the stream."  Id. at 555.  The presumption stated in Glover does not help the Commission, 
however, because the Lusby Easement does not expressly name the North Platte 
River as a monument or boundary.  It 
refers only to a "permanent public walking easement, one hundred (100) feet in 
width, for public fishing and migratory waterfowl hunting on the North Platte 
River."  Glover does not help the Landowners, 
either, because there are no words in the Lusby Easement indicating a clear 
intent to place the boundary at the edge of the river or anywhere else.  The Plat and Survey refer to "A Strip 
100 feet in width, as measured 100 feet to the right from the right and 
northerly High Water Line of the North Platte River," but never expressly states 
that the high water line is meant to be the boundary of the walking 
easement.  The inherent ambiguity in 
the Lusby Easement is that it simply does not say what the streamside boundary 
of the walking easement was intended to be.

 
 

[¶17]     
The Landowners rely 
most heavily on the fact that the walking easement is described as "one hundred 
(100) feet in width" in the granting document, and as a "Strip 100 feet in 
width" in the Plat and Survey.  
Because the landward boundary of the Easement is located 100 feet from 
the high water line, and the walking easement is a strip 100 feet in width, the 
Landowners maintain that the high water line must necessarily be the streamside 
boundary of the walking easement.

 
 

[¶18]     
This interpretation 
is entirely plausible.  However, as 
the district court recognized, the language highlighted by the Landowners must 
be considered in context.  We 
interpret the Easement documents "as a whole, and meaning should be afforded to 
all of the language used by the parties if that can be done and a reasonable 
construction achieved."  Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien 
Const. Co., 597 P.2d 945, 
951 (Wyo. 1979).  We must, 
therefore, also consider the language of the Lusby Easement stating that the 
purpose of the walking easement is to allow "public fishing and migratory 
waterfowl hunting on the North Platte River."4  This purpose is confirmed by the title 
of the document: "Permanent Easement for Public Fishing, Migratory Waterfowl 
Hunting, and Boat Launching."

 
 

[¶19]     
The Commission argues 
that these stated purposes would be utterly frustrated if the Landowners are 
correct that the streamside boundary of the walking easement is the high water 
line.  As the district court took 
note, the water of the North Platte River runs as high as the high water mark 
only during a short time in the spring.  
At all other times, there will be a strip of dry land between the high 
water line and the water in the river.  
If the Landowners are correct, and the Easement is bounded by the high 
water line, the public has no right to cross the strip of dry land to get from 
the Easement to the river.  

 
 

[¶20]     
As the district court 
wrote, "any fisherman knows5 that it is nearly impossible to 
cast a fishing line, either bait, lure, or fly, across any distance of open 
ground to a river," or to "reel in a fish" across a strip of dry land.  

 
 
In addition, if 
hunters were unable to have their dogs go in the river to retrieve downed birds, 
they would be faced with the choice of either shooting only those birds certain 
to fall onto the walkway, again a near impossibility, or abandoning those birds 
that fall into a river which, apart from the obvious ethical problems, has 
criminal ramifications (Wyo. Game and 
Fish Commission Regulations, Ch. 14, Sec. 4(a):  No person shall wound or kill any 
migratory bird without making a reasonable effort to retrieve it and reduce it 
to possession).

 
 

[¶21]     
There is a clear 
conflict in the Lusby Easement between the stated width of the walking easement 
(100 feet) and the stated purposes of the walking easement (public fishing, 
migratory waterfowl hunting, and boat launching).  Our decision in Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74, 76 (Wyo. 1983), 
provides useful precedent for dealing with such a conflict.  In that case, Mr. Munroe had granted Mr. 
Rouse an easement that was described as covering "approximately 10 acres, more 
or less."  The stated purpose of the 
easement was to allow Mr. Rouse to construct a dam "for the purpose of a stock 
water reservoir and in accordance with [the] application dated September 26, 
1955 which is on file in the State Engineer's Office."  Id.  The referenced application proposed a 
dam with the high-water line 17 feet above the creek bottom and a capacity of 
162.9 acre feet of water.  When the 
dam was constructed, the resulting reservoir was not 10 acres, as described in 
the easement, but more than 15 acres.  
Mr. Munroe sought to enjoin Mr. Rouse from flooding any more 
than 10 acres of his land.  

 
 

[¶22]     
We noted that our 
basic purpose was to "determine the intent of the parties as embodied in the 
instrument, just as we are asked to do in any other case involving the 
construction of a contract."  Id. at 77.  We then said:

 
 
The parties to this 
appeal both contend that the easement agreement is clear on its face and that 
the intent of the parties can be determined from within the four corners.  With this contention we cannot 
agree.  From our viewpoint, the 
language contained in the easement agreement can be read in two ways.  First of all, the contract can be read 
to provide an easement for the construction and maintenance of a stock-watering 
reservoir with a capacity water level of 17 feet above the creek bottom at the 
dam site.  From another point of 
view, the contract can be read to provide for an easement of ten acres of land 
for the purpose of inundating that area for maintenance of a stock-watering 
reservoir.  Given this double 
meaning, we believe it is necessary to resort to extrinsic evidence in order to 
determine the actual intent of the contracting parties.

 
 

Id. at 78.  Based on the extrinsic evidence in that 
case, we concluded that the intent was to establish a reservoir with a capacity 
of 162.9 acre feet, and that the use of "the 10 acres, more or less' language 
by the parties was merely an estimation on their part of the amount of acreage 
that would be inundated."  Id.

 
 

[¶23]     
Applying similar 
reasoning here, we conclude that the Lusby Easement is ambiguous.  First, the language can be read to 
establish an easement for the purpose of fishing and migratory waterfowl 
hunting, with its streamside boundary at the middle of the river.  From another point of view, the language 
can be read to establish a walking easement 100 feet in width with the 
streamside boundary at the high water line.  Giving effect to both readings is 
impossible.  We therefore agree with 
the district court that the "inconsistency between the seemingly restricted walk 
way for fishermen and hunters on one hand, and, on the other hand, the expressed 
intent within the easement to allow fishing and migratory bird hunting . . . 
creates an ambiguity within the easement."  

 
 
Interpreting 
the Lusby Easement using extrinsic evidence

 
 

[¶24]     
The Commission points 
out that all of the documents contemporaneous with the Lusby Easement indicate 
that the walking easement was intended to extend to the middle of the 
river.  The most telling of these 
documents is the sales contract.  It 
unambiguously states that the Easement "shall extend from midstream of the said 
North Platte River outward to a point 100 feet above and beyond the high water 
line."  

 
 

[¶25]     
The 
Landowners contend that "[t]he fact that the parties chose not to use the 
language of the sales contract [in the Easement documents] speaks volumes  they 
changed their minds."  This 
contention is undermined by the Commission's certifications to the Secretary of 
the Department of the Interior.  Two 
certifications were submitted as part of an application for federal funding of 
part of the purchase price, the first soon after the sales contract was 
executed, and the second soon after the Easement documents were executed.  Both certifications clearly reflect the 
Commission's understanding that the middle of the river was intended to be the 
boundary of the walking easement.

 
 

[¶26]     
The 
Landowners claim that the sales contract cannot be used to help interpret the 
Easement documents because, under the doctrine of merger, the Easement documents 
are controlling over the sales contract.  
In support of this claim, they cite Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C., 2004 
WY 29, ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 843, 848 
(Wyo. 2004), in which we stated that "the deed is the final agreement and all 
prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and 
unenforceable."  (Quoting Hansen v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational 
Fonds, 898 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (C.D. Utah 1995).)  They also rely on Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo. 2000), in 
which we stated that "All conversations, contemporaneous negotiations, and parol 
agreements between the parties that occurred prior to the written agreement are 
merged into the written agreement."  

 
 

[¶27]     
The 
flaw in the Landowners' claim is exposed when the language from Sowerwine is placed in 
context:

 
 
When 
contract provisions are not ambiguous or uncertain, the document speaks for 
itself.  With an unambiguous 
agreement, we secure the parties' intent from the words of the agreement as they 
are expressed within the four corners of the document.  All conversations, contemporaneous 
negotiations, and parol agreements between the parties that occurred prior to 
the written agreement are merged into the written agreement.  We 
turn to extrinsic evidence and rules of contract construction only when the 
contract language is ambiguous and its meaning is doubtful or 
uncertain.

 
 

Id. 
(Emphasis added and internal citations omitted.)  Because the Lusby Easement deed is 
ambiguous, the merger doctrine does not preclude us from considering the 
extrinsic sales contract as an aid in interpreting the deed 
language.

 
 

[¶28]     
The Commission 
submitted affidavits from several witnesses attesting that they have observed 
fishermen and hunters wading into the river at the Lusby Easement for many 
years.  The district court found 
that these affidavits constituted "ample evidence that it has been the 
long-standing custom for fishermen to wade into the river from the bank and to 
fish offshore," and concluded that, "If the parties wanted the public restricted 
in the manner proposed by [the Landowners], one would think the Lusbys would 
have objected to the fishermen wading."  
We note, however, that the Lusbys sold their property in 1971.  The affidavits refer to wading in the 
river only as far back as the early-1970's, which provides little insight into 
the parties' intentions in 1964 when the Lusby Easement was 
granted.

 
 

[¶29]     
Even 
disregarding the affidavits, however, we find that the sales contract and the 
Commission's certifications firmly establish that the Lusby Easement was meant 
to extend to the middle of the river.6  As pointed out by the district court, 
the Landowners "presented no evidence on this point," but instead rely solely on 
their position that the language of the Easement is plain and unambiguous.  Given the absence of any genuine issue 
of material fact and our agreement with the district court's conclusion that the 
Commission was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Commission.

 
 
Prescriptive 
Easement

 
 

[¶30]     
Because 
we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Commission, there is no reason for the Commission to pursue a claim of 
prescriptive easement, and no need for us to consider the Landowners' contention 
that the Commission cannot claim a prescriptive 
easement under Wyoming law.

 
 
Location of the Boat 
Launching Ramp

 
 

[¶31]     
All parties agree 
that the Lusby Easement's description of the boat launching ramp is clear and 
unambiguous.  It is also undisputed 
that the ramp was initially constructed in the specified location, but was later 
moved to a different spot.  The 
Landowners sought an injunction requiring the Commission to remove the current 
boat ramp, reclaim the area, and reconstruct the ramp in the location specified 
in the Lusby Easement.  In response, 
the Commission explained that it had moved the boat ramp at the request of Mr. 
Davison.  The Davisons own the 
property on which the old boat ramp was built, and on which the present ramp is 
located.

 
 

[¶32]     
The Commission 
supported its explanation with the affidavits of several employees.  Mr. Kofron stated in his affidavit 
that:

 
 
In approximately 
2005, a lawyer representing Mr. Davison, contacted the [Commission] requesting 
that the boat launch be moved to a different, but nearby location because, in 
part, the platted boat launch area was too close to Mr. Davison's house.  Myself and Al Conder met with Mr. 
Davison and his attorney.  In 
addition to the request to move the boat launch area, Mr. Davison's lawyer also 
requested that boulders be positioned to prevent driving on his property, and 
that signs defining the landward side of the easement be created and 
affixed.  The [Commission] 
accommodated Mr. Davison's request, at the [Commission's] 
expense.

 
 
Mr. Conder's 
affidavit was consistent with Mr. Kofron's, and provided this additional 
information:

 
 
After that meeting, 
neither the Davisons, nor the attorney we met with, ever communicated any 
concern or complaint regarding the work that was done to move the boat launch 
(and signs), and close the old boat launch.  Until this litigation began it appeared 
as if the [Commission] had done exactly as Mr. Davison and his attorney had 
wanted for the boat ramp.

 
 
The affidavit from 
Mr. DeBerard indicated that he was involved in the physical work of moving the 
boat launch ramp:

 
 
On September 27, 
2005, we were out on the job site, we were talking about how we wanted the 
jobsite to look and Mr. Davison [waved] us over.  Mr. Davison asked us several questions 
about signs on the easement and the easement boundary.  Mr. Davison did not ask any questions, 
nor did he express any concern, about the work we were doing on the new and old 
boat launch areas.  He seemed 
excited about the new boat launch area as he stated that the previous area 
seemed to invite unwanted trespass onto his lot.  We closed off the old launch with 
boulders so no one could park there in the future. . . .  The [Commission] spent $2,116.72 on the 
Lusby job, including the cost of the materials (including boulders), and 
employee time.

 
 

[¶33]     
Based on these facts, 
the Commission contended that Mr. Davison's claim was barred by the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel.  It listed the 
elements of promissory estoppel as:  
"a clear and definite agreement; proof that the party urging the doctrine 
acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and the equities 
support the enforcement of the agreement."  Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1996).  Applying this theory to the facts 
established in the employees' affidavits, the Commission maintained that it was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

 
 

[¶34]     
After oral argument 
on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the district court first 
noted the undisputed facts that Mr. Davison had "requested that the ramp be 
moved," and that the Commission had "accommodated this request at a cost of 
$2,116.72."  The district court then 
wrote:

 
 
Now [the Landowners], 
particularly Davisons, have asserted a claim for trespass because the public is 
using the new boat ramp.  At oral 
argument, the [Landowners] argued that the written easement agreement could not 
be changed by an oral agreement.  It 
is not clear, but I assume this is a reference to the statute of frauds, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105(a)(v).

 
 
If the [Landowners] 
are contending that they are not bound by their agreement to move the boat ramp, 
they cannot rely on the statute of frauds because of the complete performance of 
the agreed modification.  Wyoming 
has recognized that either full or part performance of a contract involving land 
will avoid the statute of frauds defense.  
Parkhurst v. Boykin, 94 P.3d 450, 458 (Wyo. 2004).  The modification may also be enforceable 
on the basis of promissory estoppel.  
Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, 
Inc., 113 P.3d 26, 32 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
In this case, 
application of either exception defeats the [Landowners' claim].  There is no question that the new boat 
ramp has been constructed and is in use.  
Therefore, there is complete performance of this agreement.  In addition, the required elements of 
promissory estoppel have been met:  
(1) the existence of a clear and definite agreement; (2) proof that 
the party urging the doctrine acted in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and 
(3) equities supporting the enforcement of the agreement.  Baker v. Ayres and Baker Pole and Post, 
Inc., 170 P.3d 1247, 1250 
(Wyo. 2007).  Again, the evidence is 
not in dispute.  The parties had an 
agreement to move the ramp.  The 
[Commission] moved the ramp reasonably relying on Davison's request and the 
agreement of the parties to move the location of the ramp.  Finally, the [Commission] expended 
money, manpower, and time to move the ramp solely to accommodate the 
Davisons.  The equities strongly 
favor enforcement of the agreement to move the ramp.

 
 

[¶35]     
When 
the Commission moved for summary judgment, it had the "initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for 
summary judgment by showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists."  Alloway v. RT Capital, Inc., 2008 WY 123, ¶ 7, 193 P.3d 713, 715 (Wyo. 2008); Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 
(Wyo. 1987).  With the facts 
established in the Commission's affidavits, discussed above, the Commission 
carried that burden.  The burden 
then shifted to the Landowners to "present specific facts to demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact exists."  
Alloway, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d  at 
715; Hatton v. Energy Electric Co., 
2006 WY 151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 8, 12 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon 
allegations and pleadings . . . , and conclusory statements or mere 
opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's 
burden.

 
 

Alloway, 
¶ 8, 193 P.3d  at 715, quoting Cook 
v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 
13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 
890 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

[¶36]     
In their brief to 
this Court, the Landowners assert that "Mr. and Mrs. Davison disagree with the 
[Commission's] rendition of what occurred in relation to the . . . decision to 
move the boat launch ramp."  
However, the Landowners never provide their version of what 
occurred.  More importantly, they do 
not provide a single citation to the record providing any factual support for 
their disagreement with the Commission's rendition of what occurred.  The district court was correct in ruling 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to the relocation 
of the boat ramp.

 
 

[¶37]     
As to whether the 
Commission was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we note initially that 
the Landowners have not raised the statute of frauds in their brief to this 
Court.  Either the district court 
wrongly interpreted their argument, or the Landowners have abandoned it on 
appeal.  Either way, it is now the 
law of this case that the statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-23-105(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2009), provides no basis for denying the 
Commission's motion for summary judgment.

 
 

[¶38]     
The crux of the 
Landowners' legal argument on appeal is that, "Because the Commission . . . had 
no legal authority to move the ramp, [the] facts' are largely 
unimportant."  They then assert 
that, because the Lusby Easement was "purchased in part with federal-aid monies 
there are certain requirements and steps that must be met before any disposal or 
exchange of property rights can take place."  They do not provide a single citation to 
any legal authority for this proposition.  
They claim that a Commission employee, Alan Bott, "identified all of the 
issues that would first need to be addressed in order for such a change to be 
carried out."  They list a number of 
such issues.  However, their 
citation to the record "See 
R 1354." leads to a fee schedule that is an attachment to the Landowners' 
expert witness designation for Steve M. Castle and Don A. Davis.  It contains no mention of Mr. Bott, 
of any issues involved in a land exchange, or of any requirements relating to 
federal funds.

 
 

[¶39]     
When a party fails to 
provide pertinent legal authority, cogent argument, or factual support for an 
issue, we cannot provide meaningful review.  See Kruckenberg v. Ding Masters, Inc., 
2008 WY 40, ¶ 25, 180 P.3d 895, 903 (Wyo. 2008).  We are unable to discern the factual or 
legal basis of the Landowners' argument on this issue and will not consider it 
further.

 
 

[¶40]     
Finally, in light of 
our conclusion that the district court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Commission, we need not address the first two issues presented by 
the Landowners.

 
 

[¶41]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1A 
metes and bounds description may also be in a center line format, e.g., "A right-of-way having a width of 
100 feet and being 50 feet on either side of a center line described as follows: 
. . . ."  Powell at 81A-85.  In the Lusby Easement, the boat 
launching ramp easement is described in this format.  It is clear, however, that the walking 
easement is not described in this format, and none of the parties contend that 
the line described in the Plat and Survey is intended to be the center of the 
walking easement.

 
 

2 
It looks something like this:  ________ . . . 
_________

   

3It 
looks something like this:  
______  ___ ___  _______

  

 

4The 
Landowners correctly assert that the question of whether the Lusby Easement is 
ambiguous must be answered based solely on the language of the easement 
documents, and not on extrinsic evidence.  
They then argue that the purpose of the easement "only comes into play if 
the Commission [is] first successful in establishing that the Lusby Easement is 
ambiguous."  However, because the 
purpose is expressly set forth in the language of the easement, it is not 
extrinsic, and the district court properly considered the stated purpose in an 
effort to interpret the Lusby Easement.

 
 

5The 
Landowners object strenuously to the district court's taking judicial notice of 
what "any fisherman knows."  The 
district court cited Fort Defiance 
Housing Corp. v. Lowe, 5 Am. Tribal Law 394 (2004), for the proposition that 
"Judicial notice is appropriate in matters of custom and tradition."  More directly applicable legal authority 
can be found in Wyoming cases.  E.g., TR v. LVM, 2009 WY 76, ¶ 6, 209 P.3d 879, 
882 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting W.R.E. 201(b):  
"A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute 
in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.").  Judicial notice is often taken of 
matters of common knowledge.  E.g., Lawson v. Schuchardt, 363 P.2d 90, 92 (Wyo. 1961) 
("Moreover, it is well recognized that a court is entitled to take judicial 
notice of climatic conditions."); Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1983) ("It 
is common knowledge, especially in the west where heavy snows can accumulate in 
the mountains, that unusual spring runoffs may substantially change the location 
of streams and rivers."); Roussalis v. 
Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 248 (Wyo. 2000) ("It is common 
knowledge that in major projects construction costs are difficult to manage."); 
Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 733 (Wyo. 1980) ("It 
is common knowledge that dirt roads become dusty when traveled upon."); Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Wyo. 1978) 
("It is common knowledge that the mere presence of a dog or other animal upon a 
highway or street can be a serious distraction to, and even interference with, 
traffic.").  The district court did 
not err in taking judicial notice of the fact that the North Platte River often 
runs below the high water line, or the fact that it would be difficult to fish 
or hunt without access to the stream bed.

 
 

6The 
Landowners also object to the interpretation that the boundary for the easement 
is the middle of the river because "there is no way to determine where that 
middle of the river' is located."  
We note, however, that it is not uncommon to designate the middle of a 
stream as the boundary of a parcel of land.  See, e.g., Glover, 824 P.2d  at 554-55. In fact, 
when the Wyoming Territorial Legislature established Sheridan County in 1888, it 
specified "the 
center of the channel of the Big Horn River" as one of its boundaries.  See Board of County Comm'rs of Crook County 
v. Board of County Comm'rs of Sheridan County, 17 Wyo. 424, 435, 100 P. 659, 662 (Wyo. 
1909).