Title: State v. Blankenship

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Blankenship, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4624.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-4624 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BLANKENSHIP, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Blankenship, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4624.] 
Criminal law―Sex offenders―R.C. Chapter 2950―Registration and address-
verification requirements for Tier II sex offenders do not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of either Eighth Amendment to U.S. 
Constitution or Article I, Section 9 of Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 2014-0363—Submitted March 10, 2015—Decided November 12, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark County, No. 2012-CA-74,  
2014-Ohio-232. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Travis Blankenship, challenges as cruel and unusual 
punishment the sex-offender-registration and address-verification requirements 
imposed upon him as part of his sentence for violating R.C. 2907.04 by engaging 
in unlawful sexual conduct with M.H., a 15-year-old, when he was 21.  Because 
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we hold that the Tier II registration requirements imposed upon him are not so 
extreme as to be grossly disproportionate to the crime or shocking to a reasonable 
person and to the community’s sense of justice, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} In 2011, Blankenship began communicating with M.H. through a 
social media site called PhoneZoo.com.  During an online conversation he told 
M.H. that he was 21, and she informed him that she was 15.  After meeting in 
person, they began a sexual relationship and had intercourse on two different 
dates.  M.H. reported that it was consensual each time. 
{¶ 3} A bill of information charged Blankenship with one count of 
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor who was over 13 but less than 16 years of 
age, a violation of R.C. 2907.04, a fourth-degree felony.  Blankenship pled guilty 
and was evaluated by a psychologist as part of the presentence investigation 
ordered by the court.  The psychologist characterized Blankenship as showing 
none of the characteristics of what he considers a sex offender despite his 
commission of a sex offense and concluded that Blankenship’s risk of reoffending 
was low. Yet while the presentence investigation was pending, Blankenship 
contacted the victim and lied to the psychologist about it.  As a result, the court 
postponed sentencing and ordered a reevaluation. After the new evaluation, the 
psychologist’s opinion and recommendations remained the same. 
{¶ 4} The trial court then sentenced Blankenship to five years of 
community control with conditions, including a six-month jail sentence, which 
was suspended after Blankenship served 12 days.  Blankenship was also 
designated a Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, R.C. 2950.01(F)(1)(b), 
and pursuant to R.C. 2950.04(A)(2) was required to register in person with the 
sheriff of the county where he establishes residency within three days of 
coming into that county, as well as with the sheriff of the county in which he 
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attends school or in which he is employed immediately upon coming into 
that county.  He is also required to verify his residence address, place of 
employment, and place of education in person every 180 days for 25 years.  
R.C. 2950.06(B)(2) and 2950.07(B)(2). 
{¶ 5} On appeal, Blankenship argued that these Tier II sex–offender 
requirements imposed upon him violated the prohibition of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Blankenship stressed the psychologist’s opinion to support the 
contention that he was not a sex offender.  He argued that his relationship with 
M.H. was “caring” and that the circumstances showed no aggravating facts.  He 
contended that a 25-year registration period would serve no legitimate 
penological purpose in his case. 
{¶ 6} The Second District, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court and concluded that Blankenship’s sentence did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment. 
{¶ 7} Blankenship appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on 
his sole proposition of law: “Mandatory sex offender classifications under Senate 
Bill 10 constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the classification is grossly 
disproportionate to the nature of the offense and character of the offender.”  139 
Ohio St.3d 1404, 2014-Ohio-2245, 9 N.E.3d 1062. 
{¶ 8} Although the proposition of law refers only to the mandatory sex-
offender classification, Blankenship’s brief also contains numerous references to 
the registration requirements.  Indeed, it would be difficult to discuss the impact 
of being classified as a sex offender without referring to those mandatory 
requirements.  We therefore will address both classification and registration in our 
discussion. 
II. Analysis 
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{¶ 9} We have already set forth the history of Ohio’s sex-registration 
legislation in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424. 933 N.E.2d 
753, ¶ 3-28. While classification and registration schemes vary across states, most 
states addressing Eighth Amendment challenges to mandatory sex-offender 
classification for adults have dismissed those challenges based on their findings 
that the registration schemes are remedial rather than punitive.1 We, however, 
have held that the enhanced sex-offender reporting and notification requirements 
contained in R.C. Chapter 2950 enacted by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 10”) are 
punitive in nature: “Following the enactment of S.B. 10, all doubt has been 
removed: R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive.”  State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 
2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16.  In addition, we also have held as 
unconstitutional the prospective, automatic application of those reporting and 
notification requirements to certain juvenile offenders.  In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 
513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. 
{¶ 10} Blankenship, although not a juvenile, claims that his classification 
and requirement to register as a sex offender violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  He relies heavily on his 
psychologist’s opinion that he is not a sex offender.  But this reliance is 
misplaced because the state statutory scheme provides for automatic 
consequences. 
                                                          
 
1 For cases holding that  registration schemes are remedial rather than punitive, see, e.g., Doe v. 
Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 662 A.2d 367 (1995);  State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 175 P.3d 764 (2007); 
Meinders v. Weber, 2000 SD 2, 604 N.W.2d 248. 
For cases resting on findings that registration requirements do not constitute 
punishment, see, e.g., Wiggins v. State, 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (2010); People v. Adams, 144 
Ill.2d 381, 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991); State v. Lammie, 164 Ariz. 377, 793 P.2d 134 (App.1990); 
Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007 (Alaska App.1999).; In re Alva, 33 Cal.4th 254, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 
811, 92 P.3d 311 (2004).   
For a case finding that the registration requirements are punishment but do not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment, see State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 281 P.3d 153 (2012). 
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{¶ 11} Ohio’s current sex-registration statutes create a three-tier 
classification system.  Unlike the earlier “labeling” classification system under 
Megan’s Law, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, in which a judge could consider the 
characteristics of an offender before sentencing, “tier” classification is based 
solely upon the offense for which a person is convicted and the judge has no 
discretion to modify the classification.  Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-
3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 20.   
{¶ 12} Blankenship pled guilty to a violation of R.C. 2907.04, unlawful 
sexual conduct with a minor.  Generally, a violation of R.C. 2907.04 is a fourth-
degree felony and prohibits sexual conduct between a person 18 or older and 
someone 13, 14, or 15 years old.  R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(1).  The offense is a 
third-degree felony if the age span is ten or more years, R.C. 2907.04(B)(3), and 
becomes a second-degree felony if the offender has certain prior offenses, R.C. 
2907.04(B)(4).  The offense is reduced to a misdemeanor of the first degree if the 
age span is less than four years.  R.C. 2907.04(B)(2). 
{¶ 13} For purposes of R.C. Chapter 2950, certain violations of R.C. 
2907.04 qualify as “sexually oriented offenses.” R.C. 2950.01(A)(2) and (3).  A 
“sex offender” is a person who is convicted of “any sexually oriented offense.” 
R.C. 2950.01(B)(1). 
{¶ 14} A person convicted of violating R.C. 2907.04 is a Tier I sex 
offender if the offender was less than four years older than the victim, there was 
no consent, and the offender has not been convicted of or pled guilty to certain 
sex offenses.  R.C. 2950.01(E)(1)(b).  But if the offender is at least four years 
older than the victim, or if the offender is less than four years older but has been 
convicted of or pled guilty to certain sex offenses, the classification is raised to 
that of Tier II sex offender.  R.C. 2950.01(F)(1)(b). 
{¶ 15} Blankenship was convicted of the fourth-degree felony version of 
R.C. 2907.04 in this case because he was six years older than M.H., the person 
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with whom he engaged in sexual conduct, and he did not have prior offenses.  His 
Tier II classification requires him to register and verify his address semiannually 
for 25 years as specified by R.C. 2950.06(B)(2) and 2950.07(B)(2). 
{¶ 16} Blankenship bases his claim of cruel and unusual punishment on 
both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.  We will therefore examine his claim under 
both federal and state law. 
A. Federal Law 
{¶ 17} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”  “The Amendment proscribes ‘all excessive 
punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not 
be excessive.’ ”  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 
171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008), quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311, 122 
S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), fn. 7.  It is elementary that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits torture.  Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136, 25 L.Ed. 345 
(1878).  But the bulk of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerns not whether a 
particular punishment constitutes torture, but whether it is disproportionate to the 
crime.  The central precept is that “punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 
S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). 
{¶ 18} The United States Supreme Court has observed that its cases 
addressing proportionality fall into two categories.  The first involves “challenges 
to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular 
case.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 
(2010).  The second involves categorical restrictions that, until Graham, applied 
only in capital cases.  The second approach traditionally involves “cases in which 
the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical 
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restrictions on the death penalty.”  Id.  These restrictions include a prohibition on 
the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes, for defendants who committed the 
crime before the age of 18, and for defendants with low mental functioning.  See 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) 
(prohibiting death as a punishment for nonhomicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (prohibiting the death 
penalty for defendants who committed crimes before turning 18); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (prohibiting 
death for persons with low intellectual functioning). 
{¶ 19} In Graham v. Florida, the court applied the categorical approach, 
as in Roper, Kennedy, and Atkins, and concluded that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of life without parole on a juvenile who did not commit 
homicide.  But Blankenship does not fit into this categorical restriction—he was 
not a juvenile when he committed his sex offense.  He does not identify, either in 
briefing or at oral argument, any other group into which he fits where a 
categorical rule has been established making requirements such as Tier II 
registration cruel and unusual.  At best, Blankenship suggests that we adopt a 
categorical prohibition of Tier II registration for young adult offenders who are 
shown to present a low risk of recidivism, who have a consensual relationship 
with the victim, and whose psychological profile shows none of the features 
typical of sex offenders. For an Eighth Amendment analysis, we must determine 
whether a new categorical rule is constitutionally mandated. 
{¶ 20} When considering Eighth Amendment challenges and whether to 
adopt a categorical rule, the U.S. Supreme Court engages in a two-step process: 
 
The Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, 
as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to 
determine whether there is a national consensus against the 
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sentencing practice at issue.  Roper, supra, at 572 * * *.  Next, 
guided by “the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and 
by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose,” Kennedy, 554 
U.S., at 421 * * *, the Court must determine in the exercise of its 
own independent judgment whether the punishment in question 
violates the Constitution.  Roper, supra, at 572 * * *. 
 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. 
{¶ 21} In analyzing Blankenship’s challenge to 
the registration 
requirements imposed on him, we must bear in mind the overriding principle that 
“[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. at 59.  
Thus, the goal of the two-step process described above is to determine whether 
Blankenship’s punishment is proportionate to his crimes. 
{¶ 22} Because Blankenship concedes the lack of a national consensus 
against lengthy sex-offender registration for individuals like himself, we need not 
discuss the first step.  With regard to the second step, a review undertaken in our 
own independent judgment, there are three considerations:  (1) the culpability of 
the offender in light of his crime and characteristics, (2) the severity of the 
punishment in question, (3) and the penological justification.  Graham at 67.  We 
now consider these three areas. 
Culpability of the Offender 
{¶ 23} The first consideration in the independent review is assessing the 
culpability of the offender.  As a matter of law, Blankenship’s conviction for a 
sexually oriented offense makes him a sex offender.  R.C. 2950.01(B)(1).  
Blankenship urges us to consider the analysis in In re C.P. regarding juveniles as 
equally applicable to young adult offenders like himself who do not have a 
criminal history and who pose no real threat to the community.  But in C.P., we 
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9
emphasized that Ohio’s system for juveniles assumes that “children are not as 
culpable for their acts as adults.” 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 
N.E.2d 729, ¶ 39.  We are not persuaded that this longstanding distinction 
between the culpability of juveniles and adults, even young adults, should be set 
aside in this case.  Blankenship is an adult and thus In re C.P. does not apply to 
him. 
{¶ 24} Blankenship was himself 21 when the relationship began, and he 
knew that M.H. was only 15; she told him so over the Internet.  Despite his 
awareness of her minority, he had intercourse with her twice.  He also contacted 
her while his case was pending in direct violation of the court’s presentence order.  
These facts show Blankenship’s culpability in engaging in sexual conduct when 
the offender “knows the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than 
sixteen years of age.” R.C. 2907.04(A).  It is true that if M.H. had been only one 
year older, she would have been at the age of consent and there would have been 
no crime.  But the legislature has chosen to draw the line at a difference of four 
years between the offender and the victim. Blankenship was six years older than 
M.H. and is therefore deemed more culpable and more deserving of punishment. 
 
 
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Severity of the Punishment 
{¶ 25} The second consideration is the severity of the punishment.  
Blankenship, an adult, had a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old, fully aware of 
her age.  He could have received 18 months in prison as a maximum sentence. 
R.C. 2929.14(A)(4) (fourth-degree felony).  Instead, he was placed on community 
control and served 12 days of a six-month sentence.  If M.H. had been three years 
younger, Blankenship would have faced an indefinite prison term of a minimum 
of ten years to a maximum term of life.  R.C. 2907.02(B); 2971.03(B)(1)(a).  
These legislative gradations according to the victim’s age reflect society’s 
judgment that the culpability of the offender increases as the age of the victim 
decreases.  There is no support in the law for Blankenship’s contention that the 
maturity level of a “young adult” of 21 is similar to that of a juvenile and that his 
culpability should be reduced accordingly. 
{¶ 26} In addition, we cannot say that the state has no interest in 
protecting minors who may otherwise “consent” to sexual activity.  Consent plays 
no role and is not a viable defense in determining whether a person has violated 
R.C. 2907.04.  A child under 16 is simply not legally capable of consent to sexual 
conduct with an adult. 
{¶ 27} Tier II registration requirements associated with a conviction for 
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor are not so severe as to amount to cruel and 
unusual punishment under the federal Constitution.  Blankenship’s obligation to 
register in person in any county where he establishes residency, goes to school, or 
takes a job and to verify his residence address, place of employment, and place of 
education in person every 180 days for 25 years is burdensome but does not reach 
that constitutional level.  Our research reveals no case in which similar 
registration and verification requirements have been held to be cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Blankenship has not persuaded us to extend the law in the manner 
he suggests. 
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Penological justifications 
{¶ 28} The final consideration in an Eighth Amendment analysis is to 
assess the penological justifications for the sentencing practice.  Graham, 560 
U.S. at 67, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.  The stated purpose of S.B. 10 and 
its registration and community-notification requirements is “to protect the safety 
and general welfare of the people of this state.”  R.C. 2950.02(B). 
{¶ 29} We acknowledge that sex-offender registration schemes have been 
criticized on the ground that they do not actually serve the intended purpose of 
community protection.  See, e.g., McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, 
Intimates, and Social Institutional Reform, 102 Calif.L.Rev. 1553, 1573-1580 
(2014); Rodriguez, The Sex Offender Under the Bridge: Has Megan’s Law Run 
Amok?, 62 Rutgers L.Rev. 1023, 1052-1056 (2010); Yung, The Emerging 
Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 435, 453-459 (2010). 
{¶ 30} Yet we also note that while registration provisions such as the one 
at issue have been criticized by some as unjustified, the penological grounds for 
imposing such requirements are still accepted in many quarters and are justified in 
part based upon the perceived high rate of recidivism and resistance to treatment 
among sex offenders.  Proponents consider registration to be a more economical 
method of monitoring and preventing recidivism than the costly alternative of 
imprisonment.  Wilkes, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification 
Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U.Rich.L.Rev. 1245, 1251-1252 (2003).  We 
cannot say that the requirements of semiannual address registration and 
verification are so unjustified as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 
B. Ohio Law 
{¶ 31} The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, contains its own 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. While it contains the same 
language as the United States Constitution (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, 
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nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”), it 
provides unique protection for Ohioans: 
 
The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. 
In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the 
United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, 
provides a floor below which state court decisions may not 
fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much 
protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided 
in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts 
are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and 
protections to individuals and groups. 
 
Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  Thus, Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution provides 
protection independent of the protection provided by the Eighth Amendment. 
{¶ 32} We have recognized that cases involving cruel and unusual 
punishments are rare, “limited to those involving sanctions which under the 
circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person.”  
McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964).  As with the 
Eighth Amendment, lack of proportionality is a key factor: “A punishment does 
not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, if 
it be not so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice 
of the community.” State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 33} Our review is focused on the portion of Blankenship’s sentence 
that imposes an obligation on him to comply with the registration and address-
verification requirements for Tier II sex offenders.  We have established that the 
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enhanced sex-offender reporting and notification requirements enacted by S.B. 10 
are punitive in nature, Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 
N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16,  and violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to certain 
juveniles, In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729.  But 
we have not considered whether the punishment is cruel and unusual when 
applied to adults. 
{¶ 34} Blankenship cites In re C.P., in which we were asked to address 
whether lifetime registration for a new class of juvenile sex-offender registrants 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state 
Constitutions.  We examined each separately, and in holding that R.C. 2152.86 
violated the Ohio Constitution, we stated, 
 
 
S.B. 10 forces registration and notification 
requirements into a juvenile system where rehabilitation is 
paramount, confidentiality is elemental, and individualized 
treatment from judges is essential.  The public punishments 
required by R.C. 2152.86 are automatic, lifelong, and 
contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system.  
We conclude that they “shock the sense of justice of the 
community” and thus violate Ohio’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments. 
 
While In re C.P. was pending, the First District Court of Appeals determined that 
the Tier II registration requirements associated with a conviction for unlawful 
sexual conduct with a minor did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.  
State v. Bradley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100833, 2011-Ohio-6266.  As a point 
of comparison, the First District relied upon State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 
289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, a case in which we upheld a prison 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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sentence of 134 years against a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.  After 
examining the facts in its own case, the First District concluded, 
 
 
We cannot say that the requirement that Bradley 
register as a sexual offender for 25 years and verify his 
information every 180 days constitutes one of those rare 
cases where the punishment is so extreme as to be grossly 
disproportionate to the crime or that it is shocking to a 
reasonable person and to the community’s sense of justice. 
 
Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 35} In similar fashion, Blankenship has not overcome the hurdle of 
showing that his punishment is cruel or unusual. The concerns that led us to 
conclude that the requirement of lifetime registration for certain juvenile 
offenders violated Ohio’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in In 
re C.P. are largely absent when dealing with an adult who engaged in unlawful 
sexual conduct with a minor. 
{¶ 36} We are also mindful that “reviewing courts should grant substantial 
deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types 
and limits of punishments for crimes.”  Weitbrecht at 373.  The General Assembly 
has seen fit to impose registration sanctions in cases involving sex offenses to 
protect the public.  Indeed, such sanctions now are the norm.  People v. 
Temelkoski, 307 Mich.App. 241, 262, 859 N.W.2d 742 (2014) (“all 50 states and 
the federal government have enacted some form of sex offender registration and 
notification provisions”). They cannot be said to be shocking to the sense of 
justice of the community. 
{¶ 37} The stated legislative intent of the General Assembly in enacting 
S.B.10 is to protect the public. While some may question whether the registration 
January Term, 2015 
 
15 
requirements are the best way to further public safety,2 questions concerning the 
wisdom of legislation are for the legislature.  “ ‘[W]hether the court agrees with it 
in that particular or not is of no consequence.  * * *   If the legislature has the 
constitutional power to enact a law, no matter whether the law be wise or 
otherwise it is no concern of the court.’ ”  (Ellipsis sic.)  Butler v. Jordan, 92 Ohio 
St.3d 354, 376, 750 N.E.2d 554 (2001), quoting State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 
86 Ohio St. 1, 20, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912).  It is undisputed that the General 
Assembly is “ ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy’  ” and the only branch of 
government charged with fulfilling that role.  Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 
Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. 
Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Dupuis, 98 
Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 21. Blankenship has not met 
his burden to show that Tier II sex-offender registration requirements are cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 38} We hold that the registration and address-verification requirements 
for Tier II offenders under R.C. Chapter 2950 do not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of either the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.  The Tier II 
registration requirements do not meet the high burden of being so extreme as to be 
grossly disproportionate to the crime or shocking to a reasonable person.  We 
therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
                                                          
 
2 See, e.g., Miller, Let the Burden Fit the Crime: Extending Proportionality Review to Sex 
Offenders, 123 Yale L.J. 1607 (2014). 
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_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 39} I concur with the majority’s judgment to affirm the court of 
appeals, because there is no merit to Travis Blankenship’s claim that his 
classification as a Tier II sex offender subjects him to cruel and unusual 
punishment.  It clearly does not. 
{¶ 40} In my view, the Eighth Amendment does not apply to this case, 
because I believe that sex offender registration in Ohio is a civil, nonpunitive 
requirement. Ohio’s current sex offender registration statute, 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 10 (“S.B. 10”), does not substantially differ from prior versions of the statute 
upheld in State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998), State v. 
Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 528, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), State v. Hayden, 96 
Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, and State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, cases recognizing that sex offender 
registration is not a form of punishment. 
{¶ 41} The General Assembly enacted S.B. 10 in compliance with the 
federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901 et seq.  To 
avoid losing federal funds allocated to Ohio, the legislature followed a federal 
mandate to designate offenders and classify them as Tier I, II, or III sex offenders 
based on the offense of conviction and to require them to register for the durations 
and frequencies specified by federal law. 
{¶ 42} In direct conflict with this court’s recent decisions in State v. 
Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, and In re C.P., 
131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, every federal circuit court 
to consider the issue has recognized that the federal sex offender registration 
scheme which Ohio adopted does not impose additional criminal punishment on 
sex offenders.  In fact, in its most recent pronouncement, the United States 
January Term, 2015 
 
17 
Supreme Court described the federal sex offender registration law as establishing 
“[a] civil registration requirement” that “is eminently reasonable.”  United States 
v. Kebodeaux, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2496, 2503, 186 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013). 
{¶ 43} Until the decisions in Williams and C.P., Ohio recognized 
registration as a civil requirement, not punitive or criminal in nature.  Instead of 
diametrically changing Ohio law, we should follow our precedent and established 
federal law and hold that classifying Blankenship as a Tier II sex offender does 
not punish him for an offense and therefore cannot violate the United States 
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
Ohio History of Sex Offender Registration 
{¶ 44} A review of the prior sex offender registration statutes, 1996 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180 (“H.B. 180”), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, subsequently 
amended by 2003 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (“S.B. 5”), 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6558, 
and our decisions interpreting them sheds light on whether S.B. 10 imposes 
punishment on sex offenders. 
Megan’s Law 
{¶ 45} In 1996, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 180, better known as 
“Megan’s Law.”  That act revised R.C. Chapter 2950 and established a 
comprehensive system of sex-offender classification and registration, which 
applied regardless of when the underlying sex offense had been committed.  
Former R.C. 2950.04(A), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2609-2610.  The act also 
provided criminal penalties for failing to comply with its registration 
requirements.  Former R.C. 2950.99, id. at 2634-2635. 
{¶ 46} Megan’s Law divided sex offenders into three categories: sexually 
oriented offenders, habitual sex offenders, and sexual predators.  Former R.C. 
R.C. 2950.09, id. at 2618.  It provided in former R.C. 2950.06(B)(2) and 
2950.07(B)(3), id. at 2613 and 2617, that anyone convicted of a sexually oriented 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
offense would be subject to annual reporting requirements for a period of ten 
years. 
{¶ 47} Having convicted an offender of a sexually oriented offense, if a 
judge determined that the offender had a previous conviction for a sexually 
oriented offense, then former R.C. 2950.09(E), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2623-
2624, required the court to adjudicate the offender a habitual sex offender, thereby 
subjecting the offender to annual reporting for 20 years pursuant to former R.C. 
2950.06(B)(2) and 2950.07(B)(2), id. at 2613, 2617. 
{¶ 48} The General Assembly reserved the most stringent reporting 
requirements for offenders who had been adjudicated by a court to be a sexual 
predator.  Megan’s Law required sexual predators to report every 90 days for life, 
former R.C. 2950.06(B)(1) and 2950.07(B)(2), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2613, 
2616-2617, unless the court removed that classification pursuant to former R.C. 
2950.09(D), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2621-2623. 
{¶ 49} Megan’s Law required all sex offenders to register with the sheriff 
in the county in which they resided or were temporarily domiciled for more than 
seven days.  Former R.C. 2950.04(A), id. at 2609.  It required sex offenders to 
provide a current residence address, the name and address of any employer, any 
other information required by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation, and a photograph.  Former R.C. 2950.04(C), id. at 2610.  
Additionally, the law required sexual predators to provide the license plate 
number of each motor vehicle owned by the offender or registered in the 
offender’s name.  Id. 
Challenges to Megan’s Law 
{¶ 50} We considered several challenges to the constitutionality of 
Megan’s Law, and each time our analysis focused on whether the requirements 
the law enacted were punitive or civil in nature. 
January Term, 2015 
 
19 
{¶ 51} In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, we 
considered the constitutionality of Megan’s Law as applied to offenders who 
committed sexually oriented offenses before the effective date of the statute.  We 
held that the law did not violate Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution, 
the Retroactivity Clause, because the registration requirements provided in the act 
were necessary to achieve the legislature’s remedial purpose of protecting the 
public from sexual offenders.  Id. at 412-413.  Although we recognized that 
Megan’s Law increased the frequency and duration of reporting beyond that 
required by prior law, id. at 411, we determined that these provisions only “us[ed] 
past events to establish current status” and constituted “de minimis procedural 
requirements” necessary to achieve the purpose of the act, id. at 412. 
{¶ 52} Additionally, in Cook, we rejected an ex post facto challenge to 
Megan’s Law, explaining that the statute did not contain any language expressing 
an intent to punish sex offenders for prior conduct, id. at 417, nor could it be 
considered to be punitive in practical effect, id. at 423.  Rather, the statutory 
scheme furthered the stated legislative purpose of protecting the public from 
sexual offenders.  Id.  While weighing the seven nonexhaustive guideposts set 
forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 
644 (1963),3 for deciding whether a statute is punitive for purposes of federal law, 
we determined that the act did not impose a new affirmative disability or further 
                                                          
 
3 These guideposts include  
 
“[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into 
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the 
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior 
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it 
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned * * * .” 
 
(Footnotes omitted, brackets and ellipsis sic.)  Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 418, 700 N.E.2d 570, 
quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
the traditional aims of punishment, but imposed an inconvenience comparable to 
the renewal of a driver’s license. Cook at 418, 420. Because we concluded that the 
registration requirements were not punitive, but remedial, in nature, we held that 
the retrospective application of Megan’s Law did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  Id. at 423. 
{¶ 53} Again, in State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d at 528, 728 N.E.2d 342, 
relying on Cook, we held that because Megan’s Law did not impose punishment, 
it necessarily did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitutions of 
the United States and the state of Ohio. 
{¶ 54} And in State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 
N.E.2d 502, we considered whether Megan’s Law violated an offender’s right to 
procedural due process by imposing a sex offender classification and registration 
requirement without a judicial hearing.  Adhering to our holdings in Cook and 
Williams, we determined that an offender suffers neither bodily restraint nor other 
punishment as a result of the de minimis registration requirements imposed by 
Megan’s Law, and therefore due process did not require a court to conduct a 
hearing before finding a defendant to be a sexually oriented offender.  Id. at  
¶ 14-15, 18. 
S.B. 5 
{¶ 55} In 2003, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 5, amending Megan’s 
Law to provide, inter alia, that regardless of when a sexually oriented offense 
occurred, sex offenders had to personally register with the sheriff of the county in 
which they (a) resided or were temporarily domiciled for more than five days, (b) 
attended school, and/or (c) worked for more than 14 days or for an aggregate of 
30 days or more in a calendar year.  Former R.C. 2950.04(A)(1), 150 Ohio Laws, 
Part IV, at 6657-6658.  The act imposed a duty upon sex offenders to report not 
only their home address but also the address of their school and place of 
employment.  Former R.C. 2950.06(A), id. at 6673.  Adult offenders classified as 
January Term, 2015 
 
21 
sexual predators could no longer petition to remove the designation.  Former R.C. 
2950.07(B)(3) and 2950.09(D)(1), id. at 6683, 6696.  Additionally, the act 
provided that any information provided by sex offenders to the county sheriff was 
available for public inspection, and it directed the attorney general to establish an 
Internet database providing this information to the public.  Former R.C. 2950.081, 
2950.13(A)(11), id. at 6686, 6728-6729. 
Challenges to S.B. 5 
{¶ 56} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 
N.E.2d 1264, we considered whether Megan’s Law remained a civil, regulatory 
scheme following its amendment by S.B. 5.  The issue in Wilson concerned 
whether an appellate court should apply a civil or criminal standard of review to a 
trial court decision not to classify an offender as a sexual predator.  Following 
Cook and Williams, we held that sex-offender-classification proceedings were 
civil in nature, not criminal.  Id. at ¶ 32.  We concluded that courts reviewing the 
outcome of sexual-predator-classification hearings should apply the civil 
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard and affirm a trial court judgment if it 
was supported by some competent, credible evidence.  Wilson at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 57} In State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 
N.E.2d 110, we addressed retroactivity and ex post facto challenges to R.C. 
Chapter 2950, as amended by S.B. 5.  Although we recognized that the law “may 
pose significant and often harsh consequences for offenders,” we explained that 
the amendments enacted by S.B. 5 had not “transmogrified the remedial statute 
into a punitive one.”  Id. at ¶ 32.  Further, we acknowledged the General 
Assembly’s “clear reaffirmation of an intent to protect the public from sex 
offenders” and concluded that “the more burdensome registration requirements  
* * * were not born of a desire to punish.”  Id. at ¶ 35-36.  Recognizing that “ 
‘consequences as drastic as deportation, deprivation of one’s livelihood, and 
termination of financial support have not been considered sufficient to transform 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
an avowedly regulatory measure into a punitive one,’ ” we determined that the 
additional burdens imposed by S.B. 5 did not amount to punishment.  Id. at ¶ 39, 
quoting Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279 (2d Cir.1997).  Accordingly, we held 
that the amendments enacted by S.B. 5 did not violate the Retroactivity Clause of 
the Ohio Constitution.  Id. at ¶ 40.  Furthermore, based on our conclusion that 
R.C. Chapter 2950 established a civil, remedial regulatory scheme, we rejected 
Ferguson’s related ex post facto challenge.  Id. at ¶ 43. 
The Adam Walsh Act and SORNA 
{¶ 58} On July 27, 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act”) with the expressed intent “[t]o 
protect children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse 
and child pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of 
Adam Walsh and other child crime victims.”  Title of the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act, Pub.L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587.  This legislation 
established the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) with 
the purpose of creating uniform national classification and reporting standards to 
protect the public from sex offenders and child-victim-oriented offenders.  42 
U.S.C. 16901 et seq. 
{¶ 59} Congress designed SORNA “to make more uniform what had 
remained ‘a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration systems,’ ” 
United States v. Kebodeaux, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. at 2505, 186 L.Ed.2d 540, 
quoting Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 975, 978, 181 L.Ed.2d 
935 (2012), in order to eliminate “ ‘loopholes and deficiencies’ that had resulted 
in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders becoming ‘missing’ or ‘lost,’ ” id., quoting 
H.Rep. No. 109-218(I), at 20, 26 (2005).  See S.Rep. No. 109–369, at 16–17 
(2006).  Congress encouraged the states to adopt uniform sex offender registration 
laws, 42 U.S.C. 16912, or risk losing federal funds otherwise allocated to them, 
42 U.S.C. 16925. 
January Term, 2015 
 
23 
{¶ 60} SORNA requires sex offenders to be classified within three tiers 
based solely on the offense of conviction.  42 U.S.C. 16911.  Tier I sex offenders 
must register annually for 15 years, Tier II sex offenders must register every six 
months for 25 years, and Tier III sex offenders must register every three months 
for life.  42 U.S.C. 16915(a); 42 U.S.C. 16916.  SORNA also requires sex 
offenders to update their registration within three business days of changing a 
residence, employment, or student status, and to provide personal information 
such as home, work, and school addresses, descriptions of vehicles, a current 
photograph, and a set of finger and palm prints and a DNA sample.  42 U.S.C. 
16913; 42 U.S.C. 16914.  These requirements apply to federal sex offenses and 
include offenders who had already completed their sentences.  42 U.S.C. 16913, 
42 U.S.C. 16913(d); 28 C.F.R. 72.3.  And Congress made it a federal offense 
punishable by up to ten years in prison to knowingly fail to register as required by 
SORNA.  18 U.S.C. 2250. 
{¶ 61} The United States Supreme Court has explained that these 
provisions “reflect Congress’ determination that the statute, changed in respect to 
frequency, penalties, and other details, will keep track of more offenders and will 
encourage States themselves to adopt its uniform standards.”  Kebodeaux, ___ 
U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. at 2505, 186 L.Ed.2d 540.  Characterizing SORNA as 
providing a “civil registration requirement,” the court stated that “Congress could 
reasonably conclude that registration requirements applied to federal sex 
offenders after their release can help protect the public from those federal sex 
offenders and alleviate public safety concerns.”  Id. at 2503.  It further indicated 
that “sex offender registration has ‘a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of “public 
safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in 
their community.” ’ ”  Id., quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103, 123 S.Ct. 
1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), quoting Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 991 (9th 
Cir.2001). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
Challenges to SORNA 
{¶ 62} Challenges to the constitutionality of SORNA have been 
consistently rejected, and every federal circuit court to consider the issue has held 
that SORNA’s sex offender registration requirements are not punishment.  See 
United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.2012); United States v. Guzman, 
591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir.2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 159 
(3d Cir.2010), abrogated on other grounds, Reynolds, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 
975, 181 L.Ed.2d 935; United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 266 (4th 
Cir.2013); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 204-205 (5th Cir.2009); United 
States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir.2012); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 
769, 773 (7th Cir.2011); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919-920 (8th 
Cir.2008), abrogated on other grounds, Reynolds; United States v. Shoulder, 738 
F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir.2013); United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329, 1333-
1334 (10th Cir.2008); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 859-860 (11th 
Cir.2011); see also Anderson v. Holder, 647 F.3d 1165, 1169 (D.C.Cir.2011) 
(concluding that the District of Columbia’s Sex Offender Registration Act is civil 
and nonpunitive). 
S.B. 10 
{¶ 63} This understanding that SORNA imposes only a civil registration 
requirement is an essential part of the analysis here, because the Ohio General 
Assembly enacted S.B. 10 in support of Congress’s effort to adopt a national, 
uniform system of sex offender registration and notification and in response to the 
federal mandate to comply with SORNA or risk losing federal funds allocated to 
Ohio. 
{¶ 64} The General Assembly established a civil, remedial system 
designed to “protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state” and 
to “assur[e] public protection,” R.C. 2950.02(B), in light of its determination that 
“[s]ex offenders and child-victim offenders pose a risk of engaging in further 
January Term, 2015 
 
25 
sexually abusive behavior even after being released from * * * confinement,” 
R.C. 2950.02(A)(2).  From the General Assembly’s decision to adopt the 
Congressional SORNA, which by definition is civil in nature, and its legislative 
finding that sex-offender-registration laws are necessary to protect the public 
because sex offenders pose a present danger—not because additional punishment 
should be inflicted on them—we can infer its intent to establish sex offender 
registration as a civil, remedial system. 
{¶ 65} In accordance with SORNA, S.B. 10 replaced Ohio’s prior sex 
offender classification scheme with a three-tiered system classifying offenders 
based on the offense of conviction: an adult Tier I offender is required to register 
every year for 15 years; an adult Tier II offender is required to register every 180 
days for 25 years; and a Tier III offender is required to register every 90 days for 
life.  R.C. 2950.01(E) through (G), 2950.06(B), and 2950.07(B).  S.B. 10 also 
requires offenders to personally register with the sheriff of the county or counties 
in which they reside, attend school, and work,  R.C. 2950.04(A)(2) and 
2950.041(A)(2), and the offender must give at least 20 days’ advance notice of a 
change of residence or school address and provide notice of a change of 
employment address, vehicle information, e-mail address, Internet identifier, or 
telephone number within three days of the change, R.C. 2950.05(A) and (D). 
{¶ 66} The S.B. 10 provisions do not significantly depart from the civil, 
remedial registration requirements we have previously upheld, and they are 
equivalent to the regulations adopted by Congress and held by federal circuit 
courts to be nonpunitive in nature. 
{¶ 67} In contrast to a plethora of established case authority, this court 
concluded in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 
1108, that the amendments enacted by S.B. 10 rendered R.C. Chapter 2950 
punitive.  Id. at ¶ 16. The court noted that sex offender registration is based solely 
on the offense of conviction, without regard to an offender’s future 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
dangerousness; that the offender is required to register in person in the county of 
residence, the county of employments, and the county of school or college 
attendance; and that the duration of the registration requirements had been 
extended.  Id. at ¶ 20.  And the court stated, “No one change compels our 
conclusion that S.B. 10 is punitive. It is a matter of degree * * *.” Id. at ¶ 21.  And 
relying on the assumption that sex offender registration is now punishment, the 
court in In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 58, 
held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the automatic imposition of lifetime sex 
offender registration and notification requirements on juveniles. 
{¶ 68} But none of the changes identified by Williams rendered sex 
offender registration in Ohio punitive in intent or effect.  The purpose of 
classifying offenders into tiers based on the nature of the conviction is not to 
impose punishment for that conviction; rather, it is intended to facilitate a national 
system of sex offender registration that simplifies the process of classification 
based solely on the offense committed either in this state or another jurisdiction 
for the purpose of protecting the public from the risk of recidivism. 
{¶ 69} Further, linking the duty to register to a conviction for a sex offense 
without first requiring an individual assessment of dangerousness or risk of 
recidivism does not make registration punitive. The United States Supreme Court, 
in analyzing whether Alaska’s sex offender registration statute imposed 
punishment on sex offenders, indicated that “[t]he State's determination to 
legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require 
individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a 
punishment * * *.”  Smith, 538 U.S. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164.  
The court further noted,  
Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides 
evidence of substantial risk of recidivism. The legislature's 
findings are consistent with grave concerns over the high rate of 
January Term, 2015 
 
27 
recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness 
as a class. The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is 
“frightening and high.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 S.Ct. 
2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) * * *. 
 
 
Smith at 103.  Thus, the court concluded, a state is permitted to make “reasonable 
categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular 
regulatory consequences.”  Id. 
{¶ 70} Nor does the duration of the registration requirements render them 
punishment.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Smith, explaining that 
“[t]he duration of the [Alaska] reporting requirements is not excessive. Empirical 
research on child molesters, for instance, has shown that, ‘[c]ontrary to 
conventional wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur within the first several years 
after release,’ but may occur ‘as late as 20 years following release.’ ” Id. at 104, 
quoting R. Prentky, R. Knight & A. Lee, Child Sexual Molestation: Research 
Issues, National Institute of Justice Research Report, 14 (1997).  Thus, the 
duration of registration duties in Ohio corresponds to a continuing risk sex 
offenders pose to the public. 
{¶ 71} Lastly, in-person registration is not a form of punishment.  In Cook, 
83 Ohio St.3d at 418, 700 N.E.2d 570, we explained that “[r]egistering may cause 
some inconvenience for offenders. However, the inconvenience is comparable to 
renewing a driver's license. Thus, we find that the inconvenience of registration is 
a de minimis administrative requirement.”  And the Supreme Court in Smith 
rejected the notion that registration is akin to probation or supervised release.  
Smith, 538 U.S. at 101, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164. 
{¶ 72} The reasons advanced in Williams for deciding that S.B. 10 is 
punishment do not withstand scrutiny. Sex offender registration is not 
punishment, and therefore we need not decide whether classifying Blankenship as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
a Tier II sex offender with a duty to report every 180 days for 25 years is 
proportionate to his offense of having consensual sex with a minor.  Questions 
regarding whether this registration duty is necessary and appropriate in these 
circumstances do not involve the Eighth Amendment, but rather, these are matters 
of policy that are the province of the General Assembly, the arbiter of public 
policy in Ohio. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 73} There are no significant differences between Megan’s Law, which 
this court characterized as a civil, remedial enactment designed to protect the 
welfare and safety of the public, and S.B. 10, which the legislature enacted to 
conform with the registration and notification requirements established by federal 
law.  In accordance with our prior precedent and in agreement with the federal 
circuit courts, I would overrule our decisions in Williams and C.P. and hold that 
sex offender registration is not punishment for an offense.  Accordingly, I concur 
in the judgment to affirm the court of appeals based on this analysis. 
 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 74} The framework within which an issue is presented can unduly 
influence the outcome.  For example, if you ask a stadium full of people whether 
requiring a Tier II sex offender to comply with certain reporting requirements 
shocks their sense of justice, you are unlikely to receive a single affirmative 
response.  But, as more information is provided, the likely response can be 
expected to change. 
{¶ 75} Assume the same question but add that the offender was an adult 
male who had sex with a 15-year-old girl.  Requiring registration and address 
verification will still seem reasonable, unlikely to shock a community’s sense of 
January Term, 2015 
 
29 
justice.  Even so, some might ask about the age of the offender and the specifics 
of the reporting requirements. 
{¶ 76} Assume the same question as above but add that the offender was a 
21-year-old male, that the 15-year-old girl consented, and that the registration and 
address-verification requirements must be complied with every six months for 25 
years, and now we are at the threshold.  Many will see the consent as a mitigating 
factor, many will see the relatively modest age difference as a mitigating factor, 
and many will see the 25-year time period as unnecessarily long.  As the majority 
notes, and I acknowledge, these potentially mitigating factors are not statutorily 
relevant, but they are nevertheless constitutionally relevant. 
{¶ 77} Assume further that the offender has been determined by a 
psychologist to have none of the characteristics of a sex offender and to have a 
low risk of reoffending.  There would be many who would be shocked at the 
severity and length of the punishment, i.e., the reporting requirements. 
{¶ 78} Assume all of the above and add that the offender could have 
received a sentence of up to 18 months, see R.C. 2929.14(A)(4), that he was 
sentenced to six months in prison (the shortest term possible), and that a judge 
released him after he had served a mere 12 days.  Now the community’s sense of 
justice has been violated.  Few would deem it appropriate to require a person who 
committed a crime that warranted a 12-day sentence to comply with reporting 
requirements every six months for the next 25 years. 
{¶ 79} The touchstone of federal cruel-and-unusual-punishment analysis is 
that the punishment must be proportional to the crime.  Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910).  The case before us fails 
this standard.  The current statutory scheme does not allow discretion on the part 
of the sentencing judge.  Instead, all similarly situated offenders (meaning those 
with a similar age differential and no prior record as a sex offender) are punished 
according to a one-size-fits-all standard.  There is no proportionality.  The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
sentencing judge has discretion as to imposing a prison term, but not as to the 
registration and address-verification requirements.  Offenders warranting a 12-day 
sentence have the same reporting requirements as those warranting an 18-month 
sentence.  Offenders considered at low risk of reoffending have the same 
reporting requirements as those considered at high risk of reoffending.  This lack 
of proportionality is constitutionally flawed. 
{¶ 80} Ohio’s constitutional standard is somewhat different:  a punishment 
is cruel and unusual when it “would be considered shocking to any reasonable 
person.”  McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964).  It 
is clear to me that reasonable people would consider it shocking to require a 
person whose crime warranted a 12-day sentence to submit to twice-a-year 
reporting requirements for a 25-year period. 
{¶ 81} This court has determined that the registration and address-
verification requirements for Tier II sex offenders are punitive.  State v. Williams, 
129 Ohio St.3d 3474, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16.  Today we should 
declare that in certain circumstances, the 25-year reporting requirements are 
onerous enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  I do not believe that 
the registration and address-verification requirements at issue in this case are 
cruel and unusual with respect to all Tier II sex offenders.  But as applied to 
Blankenship, who was deemed to warrant a prison sentence of only 12 days, who 
has a low risk of reoffending, and who possesses none of the characteristics of a 
sex offender, the requirement to register and verify his address every six months 
for the next 25 years “would be considered shocking to any reasonable person.”  
McDougle at 70. 
{¶ 82} I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  I dissent. 
 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
31 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 83} Respectfully, I dissent.  This case presents yet another example of 
the one-size-fits-all mentality that increasingly dictates criminal sentencing in 
Ohio.  Judicial discretion has again been pushed aside. 
{¶ 84} A well-qualified psychologist provided the only evidence in this 
case that remotely touches on the question of this defendant’s threat to society.  
He stated unequivocally that the risk of reoffending was low.  Yet, this 21-year-
old offender will pay for his youthful indiscretion for a quarter of a century.  Until 
he is 46 years old, Blankenship will be required to contact the sheriff in his home 
town every six months.  If he moves, he must alert the authorities in his new town 
that a convicted sex criminal has moved into Pleasantville.  R.C. 2950.05(A).  
That information will be available to the public on the Internet.  R.C. 
2950.081(A).  In this age of instant Internet chat rooms, imagine the future for his 
children when the mother’s network alerts all the grade-school children to avoid 
anyone who lives at 123 Elm Street.  These requirements fall directly within the 
definition of the phrase “cruel and unusual.” 
{¶ 85} I believe that imposing the Tier II sex-offender/child-victim-
offender classification and its attendant registration requirements upon this 
defendant is a punishment grossly disproportionate to his crime.  The trial court 
followed the law as it is written, and that is the problem.  When sex offenders 
present a real threat to the public, the law indeed deters further crime, punishes 
the offender, and provides information the public can use to protect itself from 
offenders of the worst sort.  In those cases, when there is a classic sex offender, 
the registration process that started with Megan’s Law and continued in the Adam 
Walsh Act is not grossly disproportionate to the crime.  However, this is not one 
of those cases. And yet this trial court was required to impose the penalty as 
prescribed.  No discretion needed or permitted here. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
{¶ 86} Blankenship has never been convicted of a prior felony or a crime 
of violence. A psychologist considered the facts of the crime, met with 
Blankenship multiple times, determined that Blankenship’s diagnostic tests 
indicated a low potential for reoffending, and he exhibited no psychopathology or 
sociopathy. The doctor further opined that Blankenship’s conduct was not 
evidence of pedophilia or hebephilia.  Rather, Blankenship exhibited genuine 
emotions toward the juvenile. The psychologist reported to the trial court that 
treatment specific to sex offenders is unethical for a man like Blankenship with no 
disorder to treat. The doctor did recommend psychotherapy to help Blankenship 
to cope with and move on from the loss of the relationship with the minor female, 
to educate him about appropriate healthy relationships, and to address cognitive 
distortions he used to rationalize his conduct. Blankenship consistently expressed 
remorse. 
{¶ 87} For offenders like Blankenship, these registration requirements 
guarantee an unnecessarily long term of public humiliation only.  And they 
effectively destroy any hope of leading a successful and productive life from that 
point forward.  This mandatory registration requirement will limit Blankenship’s 
employability for most jobs, will prevent him from engaging in any meaningful, 
productive relationship with the community around him, and will essentially label 
him as a pariah.  He will have to lay his shame at the feet of everyone he 
encounters: employers, neighbors, love interests, friends, co-workers, and others.  
And for what?  The public gains little of value to offset the unusual punishment 
because it is perfectly clear from this record that Blankenship was psychologically 
capable of learning his lesson the first time.  And the record in this matter reflects 
that he has learned right from wrong.  In that sense, the harsh punishment of 
sharing his personal information with the world for 25 years is grossly 
disproportionate to the crime.  The mandatory registration requirement applied 
January Term, 2015 
 
33 
here, even though consistent with mandatory Ohio law, is constitutionally 
prohibited as it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment. 
PFEIFER, J. concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
D. Andrew Wilson, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ryan A. 
Saunders, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Katherine R. Ross-Kinzie, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 
Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
_________________