Title: State v. Brady

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BRADY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493.] 
Trial court erred in dismissing charges of pandering obscenity and sexually 
oriented material involving a minor — Defendant was not deprived of 
right to fair trial by federal statutes that do not provide an exception that 
would allow his digital-photography expert to possess the alleged child 
pornography for inspection in preparation for trial — Under federal 
statutes, alleged child pornography must remain in prosecutor’s or court’s 
custody, but must be made available for inspection by defendant’s expert. 
(No. 2007-0742 – Submitted February 6, 2008 – Decided September 11, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashtabula County,  
No. 2005-A-0085, 2007-Ohio-1779. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
I.  Introduction 
{¶ 1} The state appeals from a decision of the Ashtabula County Court 
of Appeals affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the state’s case against Daniel 
Brady, which consisted of 50 counts of pandering obscenity and sexually oriented 
material involving a minor. 
{¶ 2} Two issues are presented on this appeal:  whether a trial court may 
consider evidence beyond the face of the indictment in ruling upon a motion to 
dismiss an indictment and whether the federal child pornography statutes deprive 
a defendant of the right to expert assistance in a trial involving charges for 
pandering obscenity and sexually oriented material involving a minor. 
{¶ 3} Crim.R. 12 permits a court to consider evidence beyond the face of 
an indictment when ruling on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment if the 
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matter is capable of determination without trial of the general issue.  Moreover, 
the federal child pornography laws do not deprive a defendant charged with 
pandering obscenity and sexually oriented material involving a minor of the right 
to expert assistance or to a fair trial.  Thus, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it dismissed the indictment on that basis.  Therefore, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} On September 17, 2004, the state indicted Daniel Brady on 34 
counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor, 16 counts of pandering sexually 
oriented material involving a minor, and five counts of gross sexual imposition.  
The trial court bifurcated the case and dismissed three counts of gross sexual 
imposition, and the remaining counts of gross sexual imposition were tried to a 
jury, which returned a verdict finding Brady not guilty on both counts. 
{¶ 5} Regarding the remaining 50 counts, the trial court appointed Dean 
Boland, an attorney, to serve as an expert to assist in the preparation of Brady’s 
defense.  Thereafter, on June 24, 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
executed a search warrant at Boland’s home in connection with two unrelated 
child pornography cases — State v. Sparks, Summit Cty. Common Pleas No. CR 
02-12-3669, and United States v. Shreck, N.D.Okla. No. 03-CR-43-H.  In those 
cases, Boland had testified as an expert and allegedly prepared and displayed 
exhibits that depicted identifiable minors who appeared to be engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.  Among the items seized by the FBI were CDs containing copies 
of the state’s evidence against Brady, Boland’s laptop computer, and 
approximately 50 digital-image exhibits that Boland was preparing as exhibits for 
Brady’s trial. 
{¶ 6} At a subsequent hearing, Boland testified that he could no longer 
possess copies of the state’s evidence, due to the threat of federal prosecution.  He 
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also claimed that he could not perform his duties as a defense expert by viewing 
the state’s evidence at the prosecutor’s office because, inter alia, he would have 
limited opportunity to view the images and would have to testify about them from 
memory, and he would not have the necessary software to perform his analysis.  
He further testified that he would be unable to investigate the origins of the state’s 
evidence or to create trial exhibits for the defense.  Boland also proffered that 
Brady would be unable to find any expert willing to analyze the state’s evidence 
due to the risk of federal prosecution associated with the completion of these 
tasks. 
{¶ 7} At the conclusion of that hearing, Brady moved to dismiss the 
indictment, claiming that he could not receive a fair trial without the benefit of 
expert testimony.  In his subsequent written motion, Brady reiterated Boland’s 
explanation for why an expert would be unable to adequately prepare for trial. 
{¶ 8} Finding that the risk of federal prosecution of his expert deprived 
Brady of effective assistance of an expert witness and effective assistance of 
counsel, the trial court determined that Brady could not receive a fair trial, and it 
therefore granted Brady’s motion to dismiss all the pandering charges pending 
against him. 
{¶ 9} The state appealed that dismissal.  The Court of Appeals for 
Ashtabula County concluded that because Brady’s motion to dismiss challenged 
the constitutionality of proceeding to trial in light of the FBI’s actions against 
Boland, the trial court properly ruled on the Crim.R. 12 motion.  State v. Brady, 
Ashtabula App. No. 2005-A-0085, 2007-Ohio-1779, ¶ 26. 
{¶ 10} Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial court 
properly ruled that Brady had a right to the assistance of an expert.  Because the 
federal child pornography statutes do not contain an exemption permitting a 
“proper person” to use the material for a bona fide purpose, as the Ohio statutes 
do, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s determination that no expert 
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could assist Brady without becoming subject to federal child pornography 
charges.  Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in 
dismissing the charges against Brady. 
{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court upon the allowance of the 
state’s discretionary appeal. 
III. Crim.R. 12(C) Motion to Dismiss 
{¶ 12} In its first proposition of law, the state contends that Brady’s 
motion to dismiss addressed the quality of the evidence that he would be able to 
present at trial in light of alleged federal statutory limitations placed upon his 
expert witness.  Because Brady’s motion dealt with facts that went beyond the 
face of the indictment and events that had not yet occurred, the state claims that 
the motion constituted a motion for summary judgment – a motion for which 
there is no provision in the Criminal Rules. 
{¶ 13} In response, Brady indicates that Crim.R. 12(C) permits pretrial 
motions regarding “any defense, objection, evidentiary issue, or request that is 
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue.”  He further 
indicates that the plain language of Crim.R. 12(F) permits the court to consider 
evidence beyond the four corners of the indictment, including “briefs, affidavits, 
the proffer of testimony and exhibits, a hearing, or other appropriate means.” 
{¶ 14} The state cites State v. O’Neal (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 335, 336, 
683 N.E.2d 105, quoting State v. Patterson (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 91, 95, 577 
N.E.2d 1165, for the proposition that “ ‘ “[a] motion to dismiss charges in an 
indictment tests the sufficiency of the indictment, without regard to the quantity 
or quality of the evidence that may be produced by either the state or the 
defendant.” ’ ” 
{¶ 15} We have examined O’Neal and State v. Varner (1991), 81 Ohio 
App.3d 85, 610 N.E.2d 476, which dealt with similar claims. 
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5 
{¶ 16} In O’Neal, the trial court granted the defendant’s pretrial motion to 
dismiss an indictment for possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) 
on the ground that the small amount of cocaine found on his person was 
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the “knowingly” element of the 
possession charge.  O’Neal, 114 Ohio App.3d  at 336, 683 N.E.2d 105.  In 
reviewing the judgment, the appellate court stated:  “ ‘The proper determination 
[for the trial court to make in reviewing the motion to dismiss the indictment] was 
whether the allegations contained in the indictment made out offenses under Ohio 
criminal law.  If they did, it was premature to determine, in advance of trial, 
whether the state could satisfy its burden of proof with respect to those charges.’ ”  
Id., quoting Patterson, 63 Ohio App.3d at 95, 577 N.E.2d 1165.  Because 
O’Neal’s motion required consideration of the general issue at trial – whether 
O’Neal knowingly possessed the small amount of cocaine found on his person – 
the Montgomery County Court of Appeals determined that the pretrial dismissal 
of the indictment was improper. 
{¶ 17} Similarly, in Varner, the Summit County Court of Appeals 
considered the dismissal of an indictment for failure to appear in violation of a 
recognizance bond.  The motion to dismiss required the trial court to examine 
Varner’s bond to determine whether it was a recognizance bond.  The appellate 
court reversed the order granting dismissal, holding that “[t]he Ohio Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, * * * do not allow for ‘summary judgment’ on an indictment 
prior to trial.”  Varner, 81 Ohio App.3d at 86-87, 610 N.E.2d 476. 
{¶ 18} O’Neal and Varner are distinguishable from the instant case, 
however, because they involved pretrial motions to dismiss that required 
consideration of the general issue for trial.  Here, Brady’s motion did not embrace 
what would be the general issue at trial.  Instead, it alleged that the FBI’s 
enforcement of federal child pornography laws against his expert compromised 
his constitutional right to a fair trial by restricting the expert’s ability to perform 
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tasks deemed necessary to Brady’s defense.  Because Brady’s pretrial motion to 
dismiss did not require a determination of the general issue for trial, Crim.R. 
12(C) allowed the trial court to consider it.  Moreover, because Crim.R. 12(F) 
expressly permits a court to consider briefs, affidavits, the proffer of testimony, 
and other exhibits, the trial court could properly consider evidence beyond the 
face of the indictment in ruling on Brady’s motion to dismiss.  We now turn to the 
appellate court’s decision affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Brady’s 
indictment. 
IV.  Dismissal of the Indictment Against Brady 
{¶ 19} The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
charges against Brady on the grounds that Brady had a constitutional right to an 
expert, that the application of federal child pornography laws denied him the 
assistance of an expert, and that without the services of an expert, Brady could not 
receive a fair trial.  Brady at ¶ 39. 
{¶ 20} In its second proposition of law, the state contends that an expert is 
not necessary to defend the charges against Brady, because the expert’s 
anticipated testimony and exhibits would not prove that the images of children at 
issue in this case are not images of real children.  Brady, however, contends that 
the central issues of the case are the content and authenticity of the state’s 
evidence – digital images – rendering expert assistance on that issue 
constitutionally necessary.  In order to address these arguments, we must first 
examine the right to expert assistance and the charges against Brady. 
A. Right to Expert Assistance 
{¶ 21} In Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 
L.Ed.2d 53, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that due process and 
fundamental fairness require the state to provide an indigent criminal defendant 
with “access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.”  
Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.  As we stated in State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 
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149, 694 N.E.2d 932, “[w]hile Ake involved the provision of expert psychiatric 
assistance only, the case now is generally recognized to support the proposition 
that due process may require that a criminal defendant be provided other types of 
expert assistance when necessary to present an adequate defense.” 
{¶ 22} Pursuant to Ake and Mason, it is appropriate for a court to consider 
the following factors in determining whether the provision of an expert witness is 
necessary:  “(1) the effect on the defendant’s private interest in the accuracy of the 
trial if the requested service is not provided, (2) the burden on the government’s 
interest if the service is provided, and (3) the probable value of the additional 
service and the risk of error in the proceeding if the assistance is not provided.”  
Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 149, 694 N.E.2d 932, citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79, 105 
S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53.  In the absence of a particularized showing of need, 
due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution does not 
require the provision of an expert witness.  Mason at 150. 
{¶ 23} The decision to grant or deny a defendant’s request for an expert 
witness lies in the trial court’s sound discretion.  Mason at 150.  We have defined 
“abuse of discretion” as an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of 
discretion, or as a view or action that no conscientious judge could honestly have 
taken.  State v. Cunningham, 113 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-1245, 863 N.E.2d 
120, ¶ 25. 
B. The Charges Against Brady 
{¶ 24} In the present case, the grand jury indicted Brady on multiple 
counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.321, 
and pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor in violation of R.C. 
2907.322. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 2907.321(A), prohibiting pandering obscenity involving a 
minor, provides: 
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{¶ 26} “No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or 
performance involved, shall do any of the following:  
{¶ 27} “* * *  
{¶ 28} “(5) Buy, procure, possess, or control any obscene material that 
has a minor as one of its participants.” 
{¶ 29} R.C. 2907.322(A), prohibiting pandering sexually oriented 
material involving a minor, provides:   
{¶ 30} “No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or 
performance involved, shall do any of the following:   
{¶ 31} “(1) Create, record, photograph, film, develop, reproduce, or 
publish any material that shows a minor participating or engaging in sexual 
activity, masturbation, or bestiality.” 
{¶ 32} In New York v. Ferber (1982), 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 
L.Ed.2d 1113, the United States Supreme Court held that pornography depicting 
real children may be proscribed regardless of whether the images satisfy the test 
for obscenity set forth in Miller v. California (1973), 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 
37 L.Ed.2d 419, based upon the state’s compelling interest in protecting the 
children exploited in its production and in prosecuting persons who promote such 
sexual exploitation.  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758, 761.  But pursuant to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), 535 
U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403, virtual child pornography that does 
not use any real children in its creation or production is a form of protected 
speech under the First Amendment.  The constitutional status of innocent images 
of real children morphed to make it appear as though the children are engaged in 
sexual activity is uncertain under Free Speech Coalition.  State v. Tooley, 114 
Ohio St.3d 366, 2007-Ohio-3698, 872 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 24.  But the court has 
acknowledged that “ ‘[a]lthough morphed images may fall within the definition of 
virtual child pornography, they implicate the interests of real children and are in 
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that sense closer to the images in Ferber.’ ”  (Emphasis omitted.)  Id. at ¶ 20, 
quoting Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 242, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 
403. 
{¶ 33} Thus, in light of Ferber and Free Speech Coalition, an essential 
element of each of the charges against Brady that the state must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that the children depicted in the subject images are real 
children.1   
{¶ 34} In State v. Tooley, we stated that despite advances in technology, “ 
‘[j]uries are still capable of distinguishing between real and virtual images.’ ”  
Tooley, 114 Ohio St.3d 366, 2007-Ohio-3698, 872 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 50, quoting 
United States v. Kimler (C.A.10, 2003), 335 F.3d 1132, 1142.  We held that R.C. 
2907.322(B)(3), which states, “In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact 
may infer that a person in the material or performance involved is a minor if the 
material or performance, through its title, text, visual representation, or otherwise, 
represents or depicts the person as a minor,” is not overbroad but merely allows 
the state to prove its case with circumstantial evidence.  Tooley at ¶ 2, 33.  The 
inference permits, but does not require, a fact-finder to infer the age of the person 
depicted in an image.  Tooley at ¶ 35.  Thus, it is still the state’s burden to prove 
                                                          
 
1.  
{¶ a} In response to the court’s decision in Free Speech Coalition, Congress enacted 
Section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of Title 18, United States Code, which prohibits offers to provide and 
requests to obtain child pornography, but does not require the actual existence of child 
pornography.   
{¶ b} The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 
2252A(a)(3)(B) in  United States v. Williams (2008), __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 
650, holding that it was neither overbroad under the First Amendment nor void for vagueness 
under the Due Process Clause.   Id., __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. at 1842, 1846, 170 L.Ed.2d 650.  In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, stated that the practical effect of the 
court’s decision is to overrule its decisions in Ferber and Free Speech Coalition by permitting the 
government to prosecute defendants for merely proposing a child pornography transaction without 
requiring the government to prove that the subject images depict real children.  However, because 
the majority expressly rejects the notion that its decision overrules Ferber and Free Speech 
Coalition, id., __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. at 1844-1845, 170 L.Ed.2d 650. and because the charges 
against Brady involve the creation, reproduction, or publishing of the images themselves, Williams 
does not affect our analysis. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the images depict real children.  Tooley at ¶ 35.  In 
Tooley, we also acknowledged the possibility that expert testimony might 
establish that “images of real children may be altered or ‘morphed’ without 
detection.”  Tooley at ¶ 27.  Therefore, a defendant in this type of case may seek 
expert assistance in his defense. 
C. Perceived Limitations on Brady’s Expert 
{¶ 35} Brady maintains that the appellate court properly affirmed the 
dismissal of the charges against him on the ground that the threat of federal 
prosecution for the performance of tasks necessary to his defense, including 
viewing and analyzing the state’s evidence, made it impossible for him to obtain a 
fair trial. 
{¶ 36} Brady contends that the exceptions contained in R.C. 2907.321 and 
2907.322, permitting certain persons to possess material that would otherwise 
constitute illegal child pornography, would apply to an expert in a criminal trial.  
But he claims that the federal statutes, namely Sections 2252(a)(2)(A) and 
2252A(a)(2), Title 18, U.S.Code, contain no such exception and, therefore, 
expose an expert witness to federal prosecution for performing the very tasks 
necessary to aid the defense. 
{¶ 37} Brady also asserts that the possibility of federal prosecution 
prevents any expert witness from even viewing the evidence against him, and he 
therefore claims that the threat of federal prosecution inhibits his ability to prepare 
exhibits to demonstrate that real child pornography and virtual child pornography 
are indistinguishable. 
{¶ 38} The state did not challenge the request for the court to appoint an 
expert to aid in Brady’s defense.  But in response to Brady’s motion to dismiss, it 
did challenge the probable value of the evidence that would result from the expert 
services that Brady claimed were necessary for his defense.  These arguments 
emanate from the third prong of the test established in Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 
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1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, and cited in Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932 – 
“the probable value of the additional service and the risk of error in the 
proceeding if the assistance is not provided.” Mason at 149. 
{¶ 39} The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s findings that Brady 
had a particularized need for an expert and that he could not receive effective 
assistance due to the expert’s risk of federal prosecution.  This risk allegedly 
arises from the fact that the federal statutes regarding child pornography do not 
provide an exception for expert witnesses.  This position, however, is not well 
taken. 
{¶ 40} Both R.C. 2907.321 and R.C. 2907.322, which prohibit the 
pandering of obscenity involving minors and sexually oriented material involving 
minors, contain the following exception:  “This section does not apply to any 
material or performance that is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, 
controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona 
fide medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other 
proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, 
person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, 
judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance.”   
R.C. 2907.321(B)(1) and 2907.322(B)(1). 
{¶ 41} The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”), Section 
2251 et seq., Title 18, U.S.Code, contains no comparable exception.  However, 
despite Brady’s repeated assertions that his expert cannot even view the evidence 
against him without the risk of federal prosecution, Section 3509(m), Title 18, 
U.S.Code, contains a provision that permits an expert to view and analyze the 
government’s evidence.  It provides:   
{¶ 42} “(1) In any criminal proceeding, any property or material that 
constitutes child pornography (as defined by section 2256 of this title) shall 
remain in the care, custody, and control of either the Government or the court. 
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{¶ 43} “(2)(A) Notwithstanding Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a court shall deny, in any criminal proceeding, any request by the 
defendant to copy, photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce any property or 
material that constitutes child pornography (as defined by section 2256 of this 
title), so long as the Government makes the property or material reasonably 
available to the defendant. 
{¶ 44} “(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), property or material 
shall be deemed to be reasonably available to the defendant if the Government 
provides ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination at a 
Government facility of the property or material by the defendant, his or her 
attorney, and any individual the defendant may seek to qualify to furnish expert 
testimony at trial.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 45} Section 3509(m) requires the material to remain in the care, 
custody, and control of the government.  Furthermore, it mandates that the court 
deny any request to copy, photograph, or duplicate the material, provided the 
government gives a defendant and/or his representatives ample opportunity to 
inspect, view, and examine the material at a government facility. 
{¶ 46} These restrictions are consistent with Crim.R. 16(E), which 
provides that upon a sufficient showing, a “court may at any time order that 
discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate” and further requires a court restricting such access to “specify 
the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection permitted.”  
Crim.R. 16(E)(1) and (2).  Courts routinely place restrictions upon access to 
evidence, particularly when that evidence consists of alleged contraband, e.g., 
controlled substances or counterfeit money. 
{¶ 47} Boland objected to viewing the evidence in the prosecutor’s office, 
asserting that he could not analyze all of the images in one sitting, did not believe 
that the state had the software he needed for his analysis, and would have to 
January Term, 2008 
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testify about the images from memory.  However, at oral argument before this 
court, Boland, who also served as Brady’s counsel on appeal, conceded that he 
could analyze the state’s evidence at the prosecutor’s office. 
{¶ 48} Brady’s argument that he would like his expert to create exhibits 
for use at trial is also not well taken.  It is axiomatic that an expert’s conduct must 
conform to the law.  If in preparing for trial, Boland were to create images of real 
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, or modify images of identifiable 
children to appear that they are engaging in sexually explicit conduct, his conduct 
would violate federal law.  Section 2256(8)(A) & (C), Title 18, U.S.Code; Free 
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 242, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403.  This is no 
different from the practice of prohibiting experts in drug cases from 
manufacturing controlled substances or prohibiting experts in counterfeiting cases 
from printing counterfeit money.  While an expert may view and analyze the 
state’s evidence and offer an opinion as to its content (i.e. whether it is what the 
state purports it to be), see Evid.R. 703, an expert may not violate the law when 
providing expert assistance to aid in defense of a case. 
V. Conclusion 
{¶ 49} Because it is possible for Brady’s expert to examine and analyze 
the state’s evidence at the prosecutor’s office or another government facility, the 
trial court abused its discretion in determining, prior to trial, that the lack of an 
exception for expert witnesses in the federal child pornography laws deprived 
Brady of the assistance of an expert and further deprived him of the ability to 
receive a fair trial.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed, 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
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__________________ 
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley 
M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Dean Boland, for appellee. 
______________________