Title: Dunn v. Langevin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13364 
 
MATTHEW DUNN  vs.  MARIE LANGEVIN & others.1 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 8, 2023. - July 11, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.  Supreme 
Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 29, 2020. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Janet Kenton-Walker, J. 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Joseph M. Ditkoff, J., in the Appeals 
Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Benjamin C. Rudolf for the plaintiff. 
Thomas J. Conte (Alexandra N. Mansfield also present) for 
the defendants. 
Patricia A. Washienko & Allison L. Williard, for 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & another, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
Deirdre Ann Hosler, for Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
1 Mark W. Langevin and Phoenix Communications, Inc. 
2 
 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In this case, we revisit the reach of certain 
emergency orders issued by this court during the early months of 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  In those orders, this court, pursuant to 
its superintendence and rule-making authority, sought to reduce 
the number of people coming into Massachusetts court houses 
during the pandemic.  The orders, among other measures, tolled 
"[a]ll civil statutes of limitations" between March 17, 2020, 
and June 30, 2020.  The question before us is whether that 
tolling applies to the time limits established in G. L. c. 151B, 
§ 5, including those that require that claims be pursued by 
first filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination (MCAD) "within 300 days after the alleged 
act of discrimination." 
We answer this question in the negative.  Our emergency 
orders were expressly issued pursuant to our superintendence 
authority under G. L. c. 211, § 3, to oversee "the 
administration of all courts of inferior jurisdiction."  The 
MCAD is an executive branch agency, not a court of inferior 
jurisdiction.  We also conclude that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to benefit from equitable tolling.  Not only was our 
order issued pursuant to our superintendence powers over courts, 
and not independent executive branch agencies, but the MCAD also 
had its own express tolling process, which the plaintiff did not 
3 
 
employ.  We therefore affirm the dismissal of his G. L. c. 151B 
claims.2 
 
Background.  While attending a "leadership conference" run 
by his employer, Phoenix Communications, Inc., in January of 
2019, Dunn alleges that he and his girlfriend suffered sexual 
harassment at the hands of the company's president.  After Dunn 
discussed the events of the conference with several other 
employees, he suffered what he claims were several acts of 
retaliation, the last of which was his termination on November 
21, 2019. 
Dunn first sought relief in the Superior Court in July 2020 
via a suit that included only claims regarding unpaid wages, and 
no claims based on discrimination or retaliation.  On November 
16, 2020, during the pandemic and just shy of one year after his 
termination, he filed a complaint with the MCAD alleging sexual 
harassment in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16A), and 
retaliation in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4).  He did so 
even though such a claim must, according to G. L. c. 151B, § 5, 
be filed with the MCAD within 300 days.  He had also not sought 
to toll the MCAD filing deadlines even though the MCAD had its 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association and Fair Employment 
Project, Inc.; and the amicus letter submitted by the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. 
4 
 
own COVID-related tolling process.3  Shortly thereafter he sought 
to withdraw his MCAD complaint and file in the Superior Court.  
The dismissal notice from the MCAD provided:  "Please note that 
further administrative or judicial review of the dismissal of 
your complaint is unavailable." 
After Dunn amended his existing Superior Court complaint to 
add his G. L. c. 151B claims, the defendants moved to dismiss in 
part.  Those claims were barred, they argued, because Dunn's 
MCAD complaint was filed too late -- 361 days after his 
termination, the latest "alleged act of discrimination" for the 
purposes of the 300-day filing window in G. L. c. 151B, § 5.  
 
3 The MCAD's website included guidance under the heading 
"How to Submit a Request for Tolling and Extensions."  It 
provided: 
 
"The MCAD Commissioners are keenly aware that not everyone 
may have the ability to file a Complaint during this 
crisis, and employers and businesses may not be fully 
functioning and may need additional time to respond to 
complaints. 
 
"Please note that extending a filing deadline (tolling) and 
granting a motion requesting an extension will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis through each individual 
Investigating Commissioner. 
 
"To submit a motion, please email a PDF of your motion to 
the investigator or staff member assigned to your case.  If 
you do not know the person assigned to your investigation, 
please email mcad@mass.gov." 
 
MCAD COVID-19 Information & Resource Center, https://web.archive 
.org/web/20201103110905/https://www.mass.gov/guides/mcad-covid-
19-information-resource-center [https://perma.cc/KQ72-ECDU]. 
5 
 
Dunn did not contest the timing calculation, but argued that the 
300-day time limit was tolled by this court's emergency orders, 
or in the alternative by equitable tolling.  The motion judge 
dismissed the claims, reasoning that our emergency orders 
applied only to courts, not the MCAD, and that equitable tolling 
did not apply because Dunn had failed to show that he was 
excusably ignorant of the deadline.  Dunn received leave to 
pursue an interlocutory appeal from a single justice of the 
Appeals Court, and we transferred the case to this court sua 
sponte. 
Discussion.  "We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de 
novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the 
complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
plaintiff's favor, and determining whether the allegations 
plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief."  
Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 
43 (2022). 
1.  MCAD requirements.  "The MCAD has been charged by the 
Legislature with addressing certain types of discrimination in 
the Commonwealth . . . ."  Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 
599 (2009).  Those alleging claims under G. L. c. 151B cannot 
bring a civil suit to court directly; they must first file a 
verified complaint with the MCAD.  See G. L. c. 151B, §§ 5-6, 9; 
Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., 402 Mass. 815, 817 
6 
 
(1988) ("It is true that, before initiating a § 9 action, the 
plaintiff must have filed a timely complaint" with MCAD); Flint 
v. Boston, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 298, 303 (2018) ("Absent a timely 
MCAD complaint, a plaintiff is barred from filing a Superior 
Court action under G. L. c. 151, § 9").  Cf. Charland v. Muzi 
Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 585 (1994) ("the election to pursue 
a claim of discrimination in court applies only after the first 
step of filing with the MCAD"). 
Such a complaint must be filed within 300 days.  G. L. 
c. 151B, § 5.  However, "at the expiration of ninety days after 
the filing of a complaint with the [MCAD], or sooner if a 
commissioner assents in writing," a plaintiff may file suit in 
the Superior Court if he or she so chooses, triggering dismissal 
of the MCAD case.  G. L. c. 151B, § 9.  "The purpose of the 
administrative filing is '(1) to provide the MCAD with an 
opportunity to investigate and conciliate the claim of 
discrimination; and (2) to provide notice to the defendant of 
potential liability.'"  Everett, 453 Mass. at 600, quoting 
Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermkt. Co., 434 Mass. 521, 531 (2001). 
In the instant case, the 300-day filing deadline was 
missed.  There was also no attempt to toll the filing deadline 
at the MCAD, even though the MCAD had provided instructions for 
doing so on its website.  The plaintiff relies instead on our 
7 
 
emergency orders, or on equitable tolling exceptions, to excuse 
his failure to meet the MCAD filing deadline. 
2.  Scope of the emergency orders.  In the spring of 2020, 
we issued a series of emergency orders in response to the COVID-
19 pandemic.4  See Graycor Constr. Co. v. Pacific Theatres 
Exhibition Corp., 490 Mass. 636, 642-643 (2022) (Graycor); 
Shaw's Supermkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338, 340-341 
(2021).  Whether the orders operated to toll the G. L. c. 151B, 
§ 5, deadline for filing a complaint with the MCAD is a question 
of interpretation.  "In interpreting rules and orders adopted by 
this court, we rely upon basic principles of statutory 
construction.  Thus, we begin with the plain language of the 
 
4 See Order Regarding Court Operations Under the Exigent 
Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic, 
No. OE-144 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/repealed-
sjc-order-regarding-court-operations-under-the-exigent-
circumstances-created-by-the/download [https://perma.cc/F5V5-
TPPB]; Updated Order Regarding Court Operations Under the 
Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) 
Pandemic, No. OE-144 (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc 
/repealed-sjc-updated-order-regarding-court-operations-under-
the-exigent-circumstances-created/download [https://perma.cc 
/JPU4-KUG3]; Second Updated Order Regarding Court Operations 
Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 
(Coronavirus) Pandemic, No. OE-144 (May 26, 2020), https://www 
.mass.gov/doc/repealed-sjc-second-updated-order-regarding-court-
operations-under-the-exigent-circumstances/download 
[https://perma.cc/UYT3-U4KP]; Third Updated Order Regarding 
Court Operations Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the 
COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic, No. OE-144 (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.mass.gov/doc/repealed-sjc-third-updated-order-
regarding-court-operations-under-the-exigent-circumstances 
/download [https://perma.cc/5K7R-27AT]. 
8 
 
order.  We do not read any particular provision in isolation 
but, rather examine its meaning in the context of the order as a 
whole" (quotation and citations omitted).  Graycor, supra at 
643-644. 
This interpretive exercise echoes the one we undertook in 
Graycor.  There, we considered whether the same orders tolled 
the statutory deadline for recording a notice of contract in the 
registry of deeds pursuant to G. L. c. 254, § 2.  Graycor, 490 
Mass. at 638-639, 643.  As we explained, "[t]he opening 
paragraphs of the orders clearly stated that they were issued 
pursuant to our supervisory authority under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
to oversee 'the administration of all courts of inferior 
jurisdiction.'"  Id. at 644.  Also, the purpose of the orders 
was to "safeguard the health and safety of the public and court 
personnel" (citation omitted).  Id.  Additionally, the topics 
they discussed were limited to court operations under the 
exigent circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
including electronic filing, remote proceedings, and controlling 
physical access to court houses.  Id. at 644-645.  Considering 
these factors altogether, we concluded that the orders had a 
"limited reach" that did not extend to the statutory deadline at 
issue: 
"In issuing the orders, we did not purport to supervise 
executive agencies such as the registry of deeds.  Rather, 
we provided guidance to lower courts as to how to conduct 
9 
 
court operations safely amid the ongoing public health 
crisis, so that the courts remained accessible to the 
public, while abiding by public health restrictions to 
protect litigants, attorneys, and court employees.  The 
orders correspondingly tolled only those statutory 
deadlines that pertained to court proceedings." 
 
Id. at 646. 
 
This analysis is directly applicable to the filing 
deadlines related to the MCAD, another executive agency.  "Given 
the narrow focus of the orders on court operations, it is clear 
that the provision in each order that tolled statutory deadlines 
was designed to encompass only those statutory deadlines that 
affect court operations, i.e., deadlines in cases pending in 
court or to be filed in a court."  Id. at 645. 
That G. L. c. 151B, § 9, provides a path for a claimant to 
resolve his or her claims in court is not enough to bring the 
MCAD filing deadline within the limited scope of our orders.  
Cf. Graycor, 490 Mass. at 646-647 (statutory deadline for filing 
notice of contract not tolled notwithstanding that "an entity 
seeking to perfect a mechanic's lien might eventually turn to 
the courts to enforce that lien").  The requirement that a 
claimant file at the MCAD before pursuing judicial remedies is 
absolute.  "Without the predicate filing in MCAD, the Superior 
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of 
discrimination."  Everett, 453 Mass. at 600.  Thus, regardless 
of which path a claimant ultimately chooses -- continuing with 
10 
 
the MCAD or commencing a civil action -- his or her claim must 
begin at the MCAD.  And the MCAD, as an independent agency of 
the executive branch, see G. L. c. 6, § 56, is not subject to 
our superintendence powers.  Just as our emergency orders did 
not extend deadlines at the registry of deeds, so too do they 
not affect the 300-day deadline for filing at the MCAD.5,6  See 
Graycor, supra at 646 ("In issuing the orders, we did not 
purport to supervise executive agencies . . ."). 
3.  Equitable tolling.  Dunn also contends that even if 
this court's COVID-19 orders did not expressly toll his filing 
deadline with the MCAD, equitable tolling principles did.  We 
have said that "[e]quitable tolling is to be 'used sparingly,' 
and the circumstances where tolling is available are extremely 
 
5 Dunn's reliance on Christo, 402 Mass. 815, is misplaced.  
In Christo, we concluded that a Superior Court judge could 
"perhaps" apply equitable tolling to the MCAD filing deadline if 
the plaintiff "was misled by agency employees who discouraged 
her from filing a timely complaint with the MCAD."  See id. at 
817.  That such case-specific equitable relief may be available 
in certain situations has little bearing on the tolling enacted 
by our emergency orders, for all the reasons discussed supra. 
 
6 Because our interpretation of the text of the orders is 
that they do not extend the MCAD filing deadline, we need not 
address the question whether they could do so without violating 
art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 301 (2014) ("Article 30 
specifically prohibits the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches from 'exercis[ing] the . . . powers' of the other 
branches").  See also Beeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 613 n.4 
(1982) (recognizing "duty to avoid unnecessary decisions of 
serious constitutional issues"). 
11 
 
limited."  Halstrom v. Dube, 481 Mass. 480, 485 (2019), quoting 
Shafnacker v. Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 425 Mass. 724, 728 
(1997).  In the context of G. L. c. 151B claims, we have 
recognized that equitable tolling could potentially apply if the 
MCAD misled a plaintiff, causing the plaintiff to miss the 
deadline, see Christo, 402 Mass. at 817, or if a "plaintiff is 
excusably ignorant about the [300-day] statutory filing period," 
Andrews v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 1021, 1022 (1996). 
In the instant case, there is no suggestion of misconduct 
by the MCAD or even excusable neglect by the plaintiff.  To 
address the problems created by COVID-19, the MCAD's website 
contained instructions for requesting tolling of its filing 
deadlines.  The plaintiff never sought to toll the filing 
deadline.  See Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 
615, 631 (1997) ("[a] party attempting to invoke [equitable 
tolling] will be held to a duty of reasonable inquiry").  
Instead, he chose to rely on our orders, which, as explained 
supra, applied to court filings, not agency filings.  In these 
circumstances, we discern no inequity and therefore no basis for 
equitable tolling of the 300-day filing requirement with the 
MCAD.  See Halstrom, 481 Mass. at 485; Andrews, 423 Mass. at 
1022; Christo, 402 Mass. at 817. 
Conclusion.  The order dismissing the plaintiff's G. L. 
c. 151B claims is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the 
12 
 
Superior Court for further proceedings regarding the remaining 
claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.