Title: Safety Medical Services, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Safety Medical Services, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming1986 WY 171724 P.2d 468Case Number: 86-52Decided: 09/05/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
SAFETY MEDICAL SERVICES, 
INC., Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING, Appellee (Respondent), Margo Green, 
(Respondent).

Appeal from The District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

C. Robert Klus, 
Jr., Gillette, for 
appellant.

Karen A. Byrne, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ. 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Employer appealed to 
the district court from the decision of the Wyoming Employment Security 
Commission (Commission) to award unemployment compensation to discharged 
employee Margo Green, and the appeal was certified directly to this court under 
Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. The employer, Safety Medical Services, Inc. (SMS), 
challenges the Commission's decision that Green was not discharged from 
employment for work-related misconduct pursuant to § 27-3-311(c), W.S. 1977, and 
also challenges district court utilization of our administrative agency 
direct-certification appeal process. Finding that the administrative agency's 
decision was based on substantial evidence in accord with a generally 
established agency rule and that certification was proper, we 
affirm.

[¶2.]     The issues on appeal 
are:

I. Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in certifying this case to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court?

II. Is the Commission's 
decision to award benefits unsupported by substantial evidence, and/or is the 
decision arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law?

[¶3.]     The substantive issue 
is validity of the agency's definition of work-related misconduct and whether it 
was properly applied to the facts of this case, raising both rule and use 
legitimacy. Conversely, the principle presented is whether unintended or accidental work rule 
violation with consequent discharge constitutes statutory misconduct for 
denial of unemployment-benefit payment.

FACTS

[¶4.]     Green was employed by 
SMS as an emergency medical technician and security guard from July 23, 1984 to 
April 8, 1985. The company's basis for terminating her employment was an 
incident involving alleged company rule violation. That incident occurred in 
1985, when Green and Nulle, a senior co-worker, reported for work at a coal mine 
facility where SMS provided security and medical services. They arrived at 3:30 
p.m. for a shift beginning at 4:00 p.m., relieving employees on the prior shift 
who left early. Nulle conducted the check-out of departing mine employees, while 
Green left the guard shack to perform a routine ambulance 
inspection.

[¶5.]     A mine employee, 
Ingram, entered the guard shack and told Nulle that he was going to take his 
(Ingram's) wife on a tour of the mine. Nulle started to assist Ingram, but Nulle 
became occupied with other duties. Green, who had returned to the guard shack, 
took over assisting Ingram. Green asked Ingram if his wife had received required 
safety gear, and when informed that she had not, furnished that equipment. 
Ingram then left the guard shack and drove with his wife up to the change house 
which sits on the mine site just past the guard shack. Because the vehicle they 
intended to use was unavailable, the Ingrams never toured the mine site but, 
instead, within 10 or 15 minutes left the jobsite.

[¶6.]     After Ingram left the 
guard shack, Green asked Nulle if they should have logged in Mrs. Ingram. Nulle 
answered that he believed employee's wives were handled differently from other 
persons touring the mine. Because of past practices of the company, Nulle 
thought that employees' wives were not required to follow the same log-in 
procedures as others, but he was uncertain as to the correct procedures to apply 
in this situation. Nulle and Green then searched SMS' Policy and Procedure 
Manual, and the pass-along book,1 to ascertain the log-in 
requirement. They did not, however, find a definitive policy regarding tours by 
employees' spouses.

[¶7.]     Later, Nulle found two 
pass-alongs in the outdated file2 which, without specifically 
addressing employees' spouses, seemed to indicate that Mrs. Ingram should have 
been logged in. The first pass-along, dated July 3, 1984, informed employees of 
the new "Assumption of Risk and Waiver of Liability" clause on the back of the 
safety certification check list. This pass-along stated: "It is now necessary to 
have all visitors to the mine site flip the sheet over and read and sign the 
reverse of the form." (Emphasis added.) The second pass-along, dated July 11, 
1984, stated: "Everyone on a tour must sign a safety certification check list 
and [issue] the necessary safety equipment." Nulle and Green had initialed both 
memoranda to show that each had read them. SMS asserts that Green's failure to 
log in Mrs. Ingram and obtain her signature on the liability waiver form was 
misconduct even though no tour of the facility ever occurred or risk of 
liability to the mine company was created.

[¶8.]     The president of SMS, 
while reviewing the day's records, discovered the Ingrams' tour approval form, 
and noticed that the logs were not appropriately signed. He spoke with Nulle and 
put him on 90-days probation for failing to inform management of the incident. 
When the project site manager mentioned the incident to Green she could not 
recall the incident, but said that if she had done anything wrong she was sorry 
and would not do it again. However, two days later, Green was informed that her 
employment was terminated.

ISSUE 
I

[¶9.]     After the Commission 
affirmed a hearing examiner's contested trial finding that Green was eligible 
for unemployment benefits, SMS petitioned for judicial review by the district 
court, and the Commission asked the district court for certification to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court. Following receipt of memoranda and a hearing on that 
issue, the district court directly certified the case to this court, and the 
appeal comes to us on the factual record developed by the hearing 
examiner.

[¶10.]  SMS contends that the district court 
should not have certified this case to the Supreme Court because it does not 
present a novel legal or constitutional issue and because it requires no 
construction of a statute. Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. provides in 
part:

"If after such review [of 
the record], the district court concludes the matter to be appropriate for 
determination by the Supreme Court, the district court may certify the case to 
the Supreme Court."

This rule does 
not require that any particular criteria be considered before certification is 
proper: a case need not present a novel or complex legal issue, a question of 
constitutionality, nor invoke construction of a statute. The rule leaves the 
question of certification to the trial court's discretion without reference to 
the criteria appellant seeks to impose. Beddow v. Employment Security Commission 
of Wyoming, Wyo., 718 P.2d 12, 13 n. 1 
(1986).

[¶11.]  This case does, however, involve 
construction of a statute. Section 27-3-311(c), W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"An individual shall be 
disqualified from benefit entitlement and shall forfeit all accrued benefits if 
he was discharged from his most recent work because of misconduct connected with 
his work * * *."

[¶12.]  The appeal centers around the 
Commission's interpretation of the word "misconduct." There are no Wyoming decisions 
defining misconduct for purposes of the Employment Security law. Because the 
Commission is in a position where it has to defend its actions in every district 
court in Wyoming it is desirable that this court 
construe the statute to provide the district courts with uniform guidance as to 
what constitutes misconduct. Therefore, although a question of statutory 
construction is not required for proper certification, the existence of such a 
question supports the trial court's decision to certify.

[¶13.]  Appellant further asserts that Rule 
12.09, W.R.A.P. requires the district court to review not only the record, but 
also the parties' briefs in determining the appropriateness of the case for 
certification. Appellant's position is clearly contrary to the direct language 
of the rule:

"The review shall be * * 
* confined to the record * * * and to the issues raised before the 
agency."

Rule 12.09 
neither requires the trial court to review the briefs nor imposes any other 
specific requirement for certification. The present rule and procedural system 
encompasses a screening process by the district court rather than the certiorari 
process observed by the supreme courts of many states. Any evaluative criteria 
would involve appellate expediency and judicial efficiency. Obviously what can 
be settled in the district court should be.

[¶14.]  SMS argues that the Commission would not 
have standing to appeal an adverse decision from the district court and that 
therefore the Commission's request for certification to the Supreme Court is 
also inappropriate. SMS relies on § 16-3-115, W.S. 1977 of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides:

"An aggrieved party may 
obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court under this act * * * 
by appeal to the supreme court."

See also Rule 
12.11(a), W.R.A.P. SMS reasons that the Commission would not be an aggrieved 
party because it does not have a substantial, immediate and pecuniary interest 
in the case. In the matter of Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet v. Texaco, 
Inc., Wyo., 623 P.2d 764 (1981).

[¶15.]  To the contrary, the Commission would 
have standing to appeal to the Supreme Court even if the district court 
originally had decided to hear the appeal and then reversed the Commission's 
decision on the merits. An agency adversely affected by the decision of a 
district court is aggrieved and is entitled to appeal to this court. An agency 
is also a party as that term is defined in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act, § 16-3-101(b)(vi), W.S. 1977. SMS would have this court adopt an approach 
to administrative review which would make the district courts the final arbiters 
of decisions adverse to state agencies but would allow individuals to obtain 
Supreme Court review of district court decisions favorable to the agencies. This 
court has never ruled that an agency is not an appropriate appellant from the 
district court,3 and we refuse to do so here. See 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Van Buskirk, Wyo., 721 P.2d 570 
(1986); State v. Moncrief, Wyo., 720 P.2d 470 (1986); State Board of 
Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Co., Wyo., 694 P.2d 97 (1985); Department of Revenue 
and Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979).

ISSUE 
II

[¶16.]  The scope of review of agency action is 
established in § 16-3-114(c), W.S. 1977:

"To the extent necessary 
to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

"(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be: 

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

[¶17.]  The Supreme Court reviews agency action 
as though directly referred from the agency and follows the same rules of review 
as do the district courts. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Laramie Cabs, 
Inc., 700 P.2d 399, 403 (1985). See also Majority of the Working Interest Owners 
in the Buck Draw Field Area v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 
Wyo., 721 P.2d 1070 (1986); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 662 P.2d 878, 882 (1983); and Wyoming State 
Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681, 689 
(1982).

[¶18.]  The appeal standard invokes determination 
of whether the agency findings are supported by substantial evidence. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, supra, 662 P.2d  at 882. 
The burden of proving a lack of substantial evidence is upon the party appealing 
from the agency's decision. Id. at 883. See also Holding's Little America 
v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County, Wyo., 670 P.2d 699 (1983); 
and Laramie River Conservation Council v. Industrial Siting Council, Wyo., 588 P.2d 1241 (1978).

[¶19.]  The Commission is required to apply § 
27-3-311(c), W.S. 1977, which states:

"An individual shall be 
disqualified from benefit entitlement and shall forfeit all accrued benefits if 
he was discharged from his most recent work for misconduct connected with his work, 
fraud or receipt of disqualifying income." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶20.]  In applying its generally utilized 
definition of the statutorily proscribed misconduct, the Commission found that 
Green was not discharged for misconduct connected with her 
work:

"`Misconduct under the 
Wyoming Employment Security Law means generally an act of an employee which 
indicates a disregard of (1) the employer's interests or (2) the commonly 
accepted duties, obligations and responsibilities of an employee. This would 
include carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to reveal 
willful intent or an intentional disregard of the employer's interests or of the 
employee's duties and obligations to his employer. Inefficiency or failure in 
good performance as the result of inability or incapacity; ordinary negligence 
in isolated instances or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not 
deemed to be misconduct within the meaning of the Law.'"

[¶21.]  SMS contends that the plain language of 
the statute is sufficient4 and that this definition is an 
improper standard for determining misconduct. We disagree. The Commission's 
definition is in accord with definitions in other jurisdictions and expresses 
the plain, commonly understood meaning of the word 
misconduct.

[¶22.]  This court defined misconduct of a public 
employee in Matter of State Bank Charter Application of Security Bank, Buffalo, 
Wyo., 606 P.2d 296, 302 (1980), stating that:

"* * * Webster defines 
`misconduct' as * * * intentional wrongdoing; deliberate violation of a rule of 
law or standard of behavior * * *; malfeasance; bad conduct." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶23.]  Other courts have defined misconduct to 
require wrongful intent or deliberate disregard of expected standards of 
employee behavior. See Williams v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, 
D.C. App., 383 A.2d 345 (1978); Molina v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment 
Security Division, Inc., 418 N.E.2d 1198 (1981); Demech v. Board of Review, 
Dept. of Labor and Industry, 167 N.J. Super. 35, 400 A.2d 502, 503 (1979); and 
Wheeler v. Dept. of Employment Security, 139 Vt. 69, 421 A.2d 1315 (1980). In Eastex 
Packaging Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 89 Wis.2d 
739, 279 N.W.2d 248, 253-254 (1979), the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
1941 definition of misconduct in Boynton Cab Company v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 
296 N.W. 636, 639 (1941), as follows:

"`. . . the intended 
meaning of the word "misconduct," as used in [the unemployment compensation 
statutes] is limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an 
employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of 
standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his 
employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to 
manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an 
intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the 
employee's duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere 
inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as a result of 
inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated 
instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed 
"misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.'"

That definition 
is very similar to the Commission's definition in this case. The Eastex court 
further stated:

"* * * [w]hen determining 
whether a worker's conduct is `misconduct' which will disqualify such worker 
from unemployment compensation benefits, the employee's behavior must be 
considered as an intentional and unreasonable interference with the employer's 
interests." 279 N.W.2d  at 254.

[¶24.]  Wyoming's Commission defines the statutory 
standard, "misconduct," in a manner consistent with its accepted use and meaning 
in other jurisdictions, while appellant cites no contrary authority applying a 
different standard of misconduct. We hold that the Commission's definition of 
misconduct is proper under Wyoming Employment Security law, in accord with the 
intent of the legislature.

[¶25.]  Applying these facts to that rule, there 
is no doubt that Green inadvertently violated company policy. By permitting Mrs. 
Ingram to even leave the check-out station preparatory to entering the mine 
site, Green failed to comply with a policy memorandum. However, the question to 
be decided is not whether Green violated a company policy or rule, but rather 
whether she intentionally acted contrary to her responsibility to perform her 
duties or willfully and intentionally 
disregarded known employer interests.

[¶26.]  The Supreme Court of Idaho has 
stated:

"* * * Violation of an 
employer's rule is not, per se, misconduct; rather, a deliberate and intentional 
violation of the spirit of the rule is required." Simmons v. Department of 
Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 581 P.2d 336, 338 
(1978).

[¶27.]  The Commission's definition of misconduct 
is consistent with the Idaho interpretation which guards against 
employer abuse of the misconduct provision. If any violation of an employer's 
rule was misconduct which would result in the denial of unemployment benefits, 
then an employer would need only to establish rules so complex or so strict that 
any employee would ultimately fail to live up to every provision, and would 
thereby escape the burden of paying unemployment 
compensation.

[¶28.]  The record contains substantial evidence 
to support the Commission's finding that Green did not commit the willful and 
intentional acts necessary to constitute misconduct. The hearing examiner 
determined:

"* Additional testimony 
demonstrated that certain spouses and family members of mine supervisory 
personnel might be admitted to the mine site without entrance documentation 
completed,"

and properly 
found that

"* * * specific rules and 
procedures maintained by the employer in a `pass along book' and policy manual 
did not specifically address procedures to be followed in admitting spouses of 
[employees] onto the site * * *.

* * * * * 
*

"The claimant was 
discharged following an incident wherein exact operational procedures were vague 
or not available."

[¶29.]  We agree with the hearing examiner that 
Margo Green's action was a good-faith error in judgment, and affirm the 
Commission's finding that she was not discharged for the statutorily vitiating 
misconduct.

[¶30.]  Finding reason and justification for the 
Commission's definition of misconduct, and substantial evidence to support its 
decision, we affirm the Commission's award of unemployment compensation 
benefits.

[¶31.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The pass-along book was 
a loose-leaf binder containing a chronological compilation of company policy 
memoranda. The pass-along book, which is required reading for SMS employees, has 
since been revised to include a table of contents and a subject 
index.

2 The outdated file is a 
drawer where memoranda formerly in the pass-along book are kept. The memoranda 
are moved to the outdated file, not because they no longer apply, but in order 
to make room for newly issued memoranda in the pass-along 
book.

3 This is not a case where 
an agency seeks to appeal its own decision to the district court. See Pritchard 
v. State, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Dept. of Health and Social 
Services, Wyo., 540 P.2d 523 (1975). Rather, appellant's argument involves an 
agency's standing to appeal from the district court to the Supreme 
Court.

4 Burton's Legal Thesaurus 
at 332 provides some 43 synonyms for misconduct, ranging from "bad conduct" to 
"wrongdoing." Most anything one may do can contendably fit within one of those 
terms.

"One who must search a 
haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is 
not worth the search. Robert Jackson, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 
[73 S. Ct. 397, 425, 97 L. Ed. 469] 1953." Shager & Frost, The Quotable Lawyer 
at 221 (1986).