Title: DULCIE C. WRIGHT v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DULCIE C. WRIGHT v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION 2007 WY 101160 P.3d 1129Case Number: 06-223Decided: 06/21/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
 
 
DULCIE 
C. WRIGHT, Appellant(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Barbara 
A. Baker, Sheridan, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi J. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Dulcie Wright 
(Wright) appeals a district court order affirming the Office of Administrative 
Hearings' (OAH) denial of her claim for worker's compensation benefits on the 
grounds that she failed to carry her burden of establishing a compensable 
injury.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Wright states a 
single issue for our review:

 
 
Whether 
the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings denying workers' [sic] 
compensation benefits was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion 
given that the Claimant met her evidentiary burden of proof establishing that 
her attendance at the December 18, 2004, fundraising event was within the course 
and scope of her employment.

 
 
 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In December 2004, 
Wright was employed as a cook and healthcare provider at the Buffalo, Wyoming, branch of Absaroka Head Start 
(Absaroka).  Head Start is a 
federally funded program that provides daycare services to families with limited 
income.  Parents of children 
attending Absaroka are strongly encouraged to organize events to raise money for 
the program. 

 
 
[¶4]      On December 18, 
2004, parents held a fund-raiser at Scotty's SkateCastle 
in Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Wright attended the event at the direction of the Buffalo site teacher, 
Sally Wright (no relation), and took part in the skating activities.  While skating, Wright fell and broke her 
leg. Wright submitted an injury report to the Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (Division) claiming she had suffered a work-related 
injury, which Absaroka disputed.  In 
a letter to the Division, Absaroka explained why it did not believe that 
Wright's injury was work related:

 
 
When 
injured, Dulcie [Wright] was attending a Head Start parent activity (roller 
skating party) on her own time (Saturday, Dec. 18, 2004).  She was not getting paid for 
participating, nor required to attend.  
Our last actual work day for the year was Friday 12/17/04 and all 
employees were off until January 3, 2005 on paid Holiday Leave.  

 
 
 
 
[¶5]      On January 5, 
2005, the Division issued a Final Determination denying benefits, citing the 
statutory definition of a compensable injury found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(H) (LexisNexis 2005), which excludes from 
coverage

 
 
[a]ny 
injury sustained while engaged in recreational or social events under 
circumstances where an employee was under no duty to attend and where the injury 
did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee's normal 
job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed by the employer. 

 
 
Wright 
objected, and a contested case hearing was held before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings.  Both 
Wright and the Division presented witnesses and exhibits at the hearing.  The hearing examiner determined that 
Wright had not met her burden of proving that the injury occurred while in the 
course and scope of her employment, and denied her claim for benefits.  Specifically, the hearing examiner found 
that Wright had "not shown that her attendance at [the] fund raising activity 
was a condition of employment imposed by her Employer." Wright sought review in 
the district court, which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      When reviewing an 
administrative agency order, we review the case as if it came directly from the 
administrative agency, affording no deference to the district court's 
decision.  Hicks v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 11, ¶ 16, 105 P.3d 462, 469 (Wyo. 2005); Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 2002).  Judicial review of an agency decision is 
limited in scope to those matters specified in Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), 
which provides in relevant part:

 
 
(c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
[¶7]      Although Wright 
phrases her issue in terms of an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, 
the appropriate standard of review in appeals where both parties to a contested 
case submitted evidence, as in this case, is the substantial evidence test. 

 
 
In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.

 
 

Cramer 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2005 
WY 124, ¶ 10, 120 P.3d 668, 671 (Wyo. 2005); see also Newman, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d  at 
168.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      To qualify for 
worker's compensation benefits, a claimant must have sustained an injury 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2005).  "Injury" is defined as "any harmful 
change in the human organism other than normal aging . . . arising out of and in 
the course of employment while at work . . . in places where the employer's 
business requires an employee's presence . . . ."  Id. An injury arises out of and in the 
course of employment when a causal connection exists between the injury and some 
condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment.  Hanks v. City of Casper, 2001 WY 4, ¶ 6, 
16 P.3d 710, 711 (Wyo. 2001); Hepp v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 977 P.2d 682, 685 
(Wyo. 1999).  For purposes of 
compensability, the term "injury" does not include

 
 
[a]ny 
injury sustained while engaged in recreational or social events under 
circumstances where an employee was under no duty to attend and where the injury 
did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee's normal 
job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed by the 
employer[.]

 
 
§ 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(H). 

 
 
[¶9]      In Cronk v. City of Cody, 897 P.2d 476 
(Wyo. 1995), this Court considered a situation in which an off-duty police 
officer was injured while lifting weights in a gym located in the Law 
Enforcement Center.  Cronk claimed 
that maintaining his physical fitness made him a better police officer and that 
he was, therefore, injured in the course of his employment.  Id. 
at 477.  We affirmed the denial of 
benefits because no nexus existed between the injury and Cronk's 
employment.  Cronk was not required 
to use the gym or partake in any kind of physical fitness program as a condition 
of his employment.  Id. at 
478.

 
 
[¶10]   Three years later, we affirmed the 
denial of worker's compensation benefits to a ski instructor who was injured 
while he was skiing between lessons.  
DeWall v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 960 P.2d 502 
(Wyo. 
1998).  DeWall claimed that the 
extra skiing made him better at his job and, therefore, benefited his employer 
because it enabled him to maintain his skills, stay physically fit and become 
familiar with the snow conditions in the event he needed to take a student up 
the mountain for a lesson.  
Id. at 503.  We held that, because the employer did 
not require, as a condition of employment, its instructors to ski unless they 
were giving a lesson, DeWall was not acting within the course of his employment 
at the time of the injury even though the extra skiing might have enhanced his 
job performance.  Id. at 
504.

 
 
[¶11]   We reached a similar result in Hepp, 977 P.2d 682.  In that case, Hepp sustained a severe 
head injury while horseback riding outside normal working hours with a client of 
the employer.  Id. at 
683-84.  Hepp claimed that the 
injury occurred in the course of her employment because she was furthering the 
employer's business at the time she was injured.  We upheld the denial of benefits, 
concluding that no causal connection existed between the injury and Hepp's 
employment because the employer did not require Hepp, as a condition of her 
employment, to go horseback riding, or otherwise engage in after hour social 
activities with clients.  Id. at 686-87. 

 
 
[¶12]   Our primary focus in all these 
cases was whether the employee was in a place her employer required her to be 
and whether the employee was engaging in an activity which her employer required 
as a condition of her employment.  
Wright contends that these conditions were met because she was ordered to 
attend the fund-raiser by an alleged supervisor, specifically Sally Wright.  The hearing examiner found 
otherwise.  Specifically, the 
hearing examiner found:

 
 
The 
Claimant was employed as a cook/healthcare provider who worked 35 hours per 
week.  Pursuant to her job 
description, the Claimant was not required to attend fund raisers during her off 
time.  The Employer's policies 
required pre-approval for any time worked in excess of 35 hours per week.  The requirement for the Claimant to 
attend the fund raiser was by her co-employee, Sally Wright.  The Claimant admits her direct 
supervisor was Barb Harrich.  The 
Claimant never inquired of her supervisor or for that matter, anyone in a 
supervisory capacity for the Employer as to whether she was required to attend 
said fund raising events.  The 
Claimant was not paid for such attendance and knew she would not be paid for 
such attendance.  

 
 
[¶13]   Upon review of the record, we find 
substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings.  The hearing examiner's determination 
that Sally Wright was a co-employee is supported by virtually uncontradicted 
testimony.  Wright testified that 
she knew that Sally Wright was not her immediate supervisor.  She testified that, because Sally Wright 
performed certain day-to-day administrative functions, she assumed that Sally 
Wright possessed supervisory authority at least on a practical level.  Wright acknowledged, however, that she 
never verified Sally Wright's actual authority.  Sally Wright testified that she had no 
supervisory authority over Wright, and specifically had no official authority 
from Absaroka to require Wright to attend the fund-raiser as a condition of her 
employment.  Finally, Elaine Laird, 
the director of Absaroka, testified that Sally Wright was only a teacher at the 
Buffalo branch 
and had no supervisory authority over Wright.  Elaine Laird also testified that she was 
the only person who could have required Wright to attend the fund-raiser as a 
condition of her employment.  

 
 
[¶14]   The evidence also shows that Wright 
was an hourly employee who worked Monday through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 
p.m., for a total of 35 hours per week.  
Wright needed approval from Elaine Laird for any overtime.  At the time of the injury, the Buffalo branch was closed 
and Wright was on holiday pay.  
Elaine Laird expressly testified that she had not given Wright 
permission, let alone required her to attend the fund-raiser.  She also testified that she did not 
approve any overtime, nor did she pay Wright for attending the fund-raiser.  All objective evidence establishes that 
Wright was not in a place or involved in an activity required by Absaroka as a 
condition of her employment.  

 
 
 
 
 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The decision of the hearing 
examiner is supported by substantial evidence.  Wright was not required to attend the 
fund-raiser as a condition of her employment.  The district court's order upholding the 
hearing examiner's denial of benefits is affirmed.