Title: Muto v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

1The second assault count was amended to the lesser-included charge of third-degree assault on the morning
of the trial.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ALBERT MUTO
§
No. 472, 2003
§
    
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr. ID No. 0210012203
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: 
January 21, 2004
Decided: 
February 12, 2004
  Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 12th day of February 2004, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties
it appears to the Court that:
(1)  A grand jury indicted the defendant, Albert Muto, on two counts of second-
degree assault and two counts of terroristic threatening.1  David Lukoff, Assistant
Public Defender, represented Muto at a jury trial.
(2)  The evidence at trial indicated that sometime between October 10 and
October 17, 2002, Muto struck his mother in the face with his hand.  Muto also stated
that if his mother called the police he would “kill somebody.”  Then, on October 19,
2
2002, Muto struck his sister, Virginia, with sufficient force to knock her to the ground.
As Virginia was falling, she struck a piece of furniture, leaving her with a broken
wrist.  Virginia called for her husband, who was upstairs, and asked him to call the
police and take her to the hospital.  Muto then said, “Nobody’s calling the police or
I’m going to kill people, starting with the grandchildren.”
(3)  On January 30, 2003, Muto moved pro se to dismiss counsel and for
appointment of new counsel.  On February 4, 2003, Lukoff asked the court to schedule
a hearing on Muto’s motion to dismiss current counsel so that the issue could be
decided well in advance of trial.  On March 3, 2003, Lukoff again wrote to the court,
inquiring whether any additional information were needed in order to decide Muto’s
motion for new counsel.  On April 7, 2003, the Superior Court denied the motion.  In
her letter denying the motion, the trial judge stated, “You may make application to
represent yourself, and if found qualified you may do so; or you may of course pay
for private counsel of your choosing.”  The court advised Muto that if he hired private
counsel the trial date of April 22, 2003, would not be continued.
(4)  On the morning of trial, Muto orally moved to dismiss Lukoff as his
counsel, which motion the trial judge denied.  Muto then sought to proceed pro se.
After making some inquiry into Muto’s ability to represent himself, the court denied
2See Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996) (“As an issue of constitutional dimension, we review de
novo the trial court’s denial of Stigars’ request to proceed pro se.”).
3Id.
4Id.
3
that request.  The trial proceeded with Lukoff representing Muto.  The jury found
Muto guilty of all charges.  This is his direct appeal.
(5) Muto’s first claim of error is that the Superior Court erred by denying
Muto’s request to proceed pro se.  We review this issue de novo.2  
(6)  The Superior Court did not err by denying Muto’s request for self-
representation.  The trial court struck the appropriate balance between Muto’s right
to represent himself and the State’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of
the trial process.  Muto’s request to proceed pro se was ambiguous, and the record
demonstrates that Muto was motivated more by a desire to obtain substitute counsel
or to delay the proceedings than to represent himself.
(7)  A defendant’s right to represent himself in a criminal proceeding is
protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article
1, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution.3
Although the right to self-representation is fundamental, the
exercise of this right is not unqualified.  Before a trial court may permit
a defendant to represent himself, the court must:  1) determine that the
defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional
right to counsel; and 2) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in
going forward in a criminal trial without the assistance of legal counsel.4
5Id.
6Id.
7Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547-48 (Del. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
4
A defendant’s right to represent himself must be balanced against his right to be
represented by counsel.5  “When faced with an ambiguous request for self-
representation, a trial court should lean in favor of the right to counsel.”6  This
approach balances the defendant’s rights to counsel and to self-representation against
one another as well as balancing those rights against certain governmental interests:
[T]he right to represent one’s self is not absolute.  For instance, the right
to self-representation is not a license to disrupt the criminal calendar, or
a trial in progress.  After a trial has begun, the right of self-representation
may be curtailed, and the trial judge considering the motion must weigh
the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may
result from the potential disruption of proceedings already in progress.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that even at the trial level,
the government’s interest in ensuring integrity and efficiency of the trial
at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.7
(8)  The Superior Court did not err by denying Muto’s request to proceed pro
se.  His motion was tardy.  Even considering the Superior Court’s delay in deciding
his motion for substitute counsel, Muto had approximately two weeks between his
receipt of the Court’s decision, which notified Muto of his right to seek self-
representation, and the first day of trial in which he could have sought to represent
8The trial court suggested that Muto might be able to represent himself, if he wanted to do so.  Muto replied,
“Well, I’m going to have to, but I am going to need this postponed.  I prefer not to.  I need legal representation. . . .”
9The trial court was not required to grant Muto’s motion for substitute counsel simply because Muto had some
dissatisfaction with his appointed public defender.  A defendant’s “mere dissatisfaction with his counsel does not, by
itself, justify the appointment of different counsel.  Although an indigent person, [sic] has a right to appointed counsel
on direct appeal, he does not have a right to the counsel of his choice.”  In re Deputy, No. 120, 1998, 1998 Del. LEXIS
118, at *2 (Del. Mar. 20, 1998) (ORDER).  Muto’s complaints about Lukoff related to their disagreements over how
to handle the case.  “While [a defendant has] a right to counsel without a conflict of interest, he [does] not have a right
to counsel who [will] not disagree with him about how to proceed with his case. . . .”  Austin v. State, No. 429, 2000,
2001 WL 898621, at *2 (Del. Aug. 6, 2001) (ORDER).  In addition, “a defendant does not have a constitutional right
to a ‘meaningful relationship’ with his public defender.”  Id.
10The Court also struck the appropriate balance between Muto’s right to self-representation and the State’s
interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial.  In Zuppo, this Court upheld the Superior Court’s denial of
a defendant’s request to proceed pro se because the defendant’s interest in representing himself did not outweigh the
State’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial.  Zuppo, 807 A.2d at 549.
5
himself.  Instead, Muto waited until the morning of trial to revisit the issue of
substitution of counsel and to ask to proceed pro se.  
(9) In addition, the record shows that Muto did not truly desire to represent
himself.8  Rather, the record reflects that his request was motivated by either a desire
to postpone the trial or a desire for substitute counsel, which the court had already
denied.9  Despite those apparent motivations, the trial judge inquired about the
defendant’s capacity to represent himself.  The judge determined that Muto had an
eighth grade education and that he had limited familiarity with the legal system.  In
light of Muto’s ambivalence toward proceeding pro se and the court’s findings with
respect to Muto’s limited ability to satisfactorily represent himself, the Superior Court
struck the appropriate balance between Muto’s right to self-representation and his
right to counsel.10
6
(10)  Muto next claims that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence of
Muto’s prior bad acts.  He contends that the court erroneously allowed Muto’s mother,
sister, and brother-in-law to testify regarding Muto’s prior verbal threats to and
physical assaults on family members.  Muto’s mother testified that Muto threatened
his sister, but that she had not heard the words that he used.  She then stated, “but he
threatened her before.”  Muto’s sister, Virginia, testified that Muto had threatened to
kill someone if anyone called the police after his assault on his mother.  Virginia
added, “That was the normal threat.”  She also stated that there had been “more than
one incident” and that “this happened more than once.”  Virginia also testified that
after Muto began living with his parents, her visits with her parents “were very
curtailed, because he made it very clear, you know, with his threats and with his
actions, he didn’t want [Virginia and her husband] there.”  Virginia’s husband,
Douglas, testified that after Virginia fell and broke her wrist and asked Douglas to
take her to the hospital, Muto told Douglas that Douglas had better not call the police,
“threatening with the same type of threats that I had had before.”  Douglas also stated
that he remembered the threats that Muto used because “it’s not the first time that he
had said that to us.”
(11)  Because Muto did not object at trial to the admissibility of the evidence
he now challenges, this Court reviews the issue to determine whether the trial court
11Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
12Id.
13DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.”).
14Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 586 (Del. 2001); see also id. at 664 (“In the context of plain error review,
the defendant must show that the error affected substantial rights.  Under the federal plain error rule, the phrase
‘affecting substantial rights’ means ‘in most cases . . . that the error must have been prejudicial:  It must have affected
the outcome of the [trial] court proceedings.’ [C]onsistent with this Court’s plain error jurisprudence, we must decide
whether the error that occurred in this case prejudiced Capano when viewed in the total context of the record relating
to the . . . issue [that the defendant contends constituted plain error].”).
7
committed plain error.11  “Under the plain error standard of review, the error
complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the
fairness and integrity of the trial process.  Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is
limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are
basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an
accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”12
(12)  The evidence of Muto’s prior bad acts was not sufficiently prejudicial that
its admission constituted plain error in the absence of an objection by the defendant.
Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is not admissible to show that the defendant
likely committed the crime with which he is charged.13  When no objection is made
to evidence at trial and plain error review applies, “the prejudicial effect of the
proffered evidence is often the determinative consideration” when deciding whether
the evidence should have been admitted.14
15At least some of the statements may also have been admissible as offered for a permissible Rule 404(b)
purpose.  Douglas referred to Muto’s earlier threats to explain how he remembered Muto’s threats during the incident
with which Muto was charged, rather than to prove that Muto likely acted in conformity with his prior threats.  At least
one of Virginia’s references to Muto’s prior bad acts explained the contentious relationship between Muto and the other
family members, which might demonstrate motive or lack of accident.  See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . . may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent
. . . or absence of mistake or accident.”).  We need not decide this issue, however.
8
(13)  The references to Muto’s prior threats were not so prejudicial to Muto’s
case as to constitute plain error.  The remarks were unsolicited statements about
Muto’s prior actions, and all were vague and brief.  Muto’s mother, Virginia, and
Douglas each commented that Muto had made threats before, but they did not detail
Muto’s prior bad acts, nor did the prosecutor elicit further testimony concerning those
acts.  The Superior Court did not err by failing sua sponte to strike the testimony or
issue a curative instruction.15
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
       Chief Justice