Title: Burns v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT BURNS, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 64, 2008      
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0605017137 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  January 21, 2009 
 
 
Decided:     April 20, 2009 
 
 
Corrected:  May 4, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED IN PART and 
REMANDED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker and Santino Ceccotti (argued), Esquires, Office of the 
Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan (argued) and Danielle J. Brennan, Esquires, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
 
Robert Burns, the defendant below, appeals from a Superior Court final 
judgment of conviction of three counts of Second Degree Rape, two counts of 
Second Degree Unlawful Sexual Contact, and one count of Continuous Sexual 
Abuse of a Child.  On appeal, Burns argues that the Superior Court: (1) abused its 
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial after the victims’ father made an 
outburst before the jury; (2) erroneously denied his request to conduct an in 
camera review of the victims’ therapist records; and (3) abused its discretion by 
refusing to provide the jury access to the victims’ video-taped statements.   
 
We conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion either in 
denying Burns’ mistrial motion or in refusing to provide the jury access to the 
victims’ video-taped statements.  We are constrained to conclude, however, that 
the Superior Court erroneously denied Burns’ request for an in camera review of 
the victims’ therapist records.  Absent such an in camera review, the record, in its 
current form, does not enable us to decide whether or not the convictions should 
stand.  We therefore affirm in part, and remand to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In April 2006, the Ames family was hosting a birthday party for twelve year-
old Sara Ames.1  When Sara’s sister, Tina Ames―who was then fourteen years 
old―saw Burns, her uncle, at that party, she recalled several occasions four to six 
years earlier when Burns had inappropriately touched her.  Several days later, Tina 
asked Sara if Burns had ever touched her inappropriately.  Sara responded 
affirmatively.  Thereafter, Tina told a friend that Burns had touched her 
inappropriately.  The friend’s mother learned of Tina’s allegations, and encouraged 
Tina to tell her parents.  Tina and Sara wrote a note to their mother, Susan Ames, 
disclosing that when they were younger and had spent the night at their aunt’s 
home, Burns would come into their bedroom and “touch” them. 
 
    On the morning of April 10, 2006, Susan Ames found the note after the 
girls had left for school.  Susan then went to the girls’ school, and told school 
officials about the note.  Susan’s husband, Richard Ames, was then contacted.  
Richard left work and met his wife at the school.  The girls were removed from 
class and taken to meet their parents, who then took their children home and 
promptly called the Delaware State Police.  State Trooper Joshua Giddings, who 
responded to the Ames’ call, spoke with the girls’ parents and was told of the 
accusation contained in the girls’ note.   
                                          
 
1 The State and Burns have agreed to the use of pseudonyms for the minor victims and their 
family. 
 
3
 
Based on Giddings’ initial report, Detective Millard Greer was assigned to 
investigate the case.  Detective Greer spoke with the girls’ parents and asked them 
not to discuss the facts of the case with their children.  Greer also arranged, in 
accordance with State Police procedure, for the girls to be interviewed separately 
by forensic child interviewers at the Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”) at the 
A.I. DuPont Children’s Hospital. 
 
Susan and Richard Ames did not discuss the case with their children.  They 
did, however, ask the girls to prepare notes on all incidents where Burns allegedly 
touched them inappropriately, to aid them to recount what had occurred, at their 
CAC interviews.  Each girl separately prepared a set of notes.  Tina told her 
interviewer that while she slept in the guest bedroom at her aunt’s home, Burns had 
touched the outside of her vagina on five to ten occasions.  Sara told her 
interviewer that Burns had penetrated her vagina with his fingers between eight 
and ten times.  Sara could not recall where all those incidents occurred, but said 
that Burns inappropriately touched her at least once in the guest bedroom, and at 
least once in each of her two cousin’s bedrooms.  After the interviews, the girls 
destroyed their notes. 
 
On May 22, 2006, Burns was arrested by the State Police.  On July 24, a 
grand jury indicted Burns on five counts of Second Degree Rape as to Tina Ames, 
five counts of Second Degree Rape as to Sara Ames, and one count of Continuous 
 
4
Sexual Abuse of a Child as to each girl.  Before trial, Burns moved to compel 
production, or alternatively an in camera inspection, of Tina and Sara Ames’ 
therapist records.  The trial judge took the motion under advisement. 
 
The trial began on January 3, 2007.  The next day, the State called Richard 
Ames as a witness.  During direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Ames 
about how he had learned that Burns sexually abused his daughters.  Mr. Ames 
responded as follows: 
Q: Who was giving you information at that point? 
A: My only sources of information were [Tina, Sara] and Susan. 
Q: Were you asking questions to get that information? 
A: I sure was.  I wanted to know whether he stuck his penis in her                      
vagina. (emphasis added). 
 
While responding to the prosecutor’s second question, Richard Ames raised his 
voice, leaned forward in his chair and pointed toward Burns.  Defense counsel 
immediately objected, and the trial judge excused the jury.   
 
After the jury left the room, Burns moved for a mistrial.  The trial judge 
informed the attorneys that because it was nearly 11:30 a.m., she would excuse the 
jury for lunch and ponder how best to address the situation.  The jury was then 
brought back into the courtroom.  The judge instructed them to not discuss the case 
with anyone, and excused them for lunch.  
 
After the lunch break, and before the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial 
judge informed counsel that although she found Richard Ames’ outburst to be 
 
5
“calculated” and “intent[ional],” the outburst was not “calculated to in any way 
undermine the integrity of the court process.”  Accordingly, the trial judge denied 
Burns’ mistrial motion, and ruled that a cautionary instruction was adequate to cure 
any prejudice.  The jury was then brought back into the courtroom, and the trial 
judge gave the following instruction: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before the recess there was a 
moment where tensions ran high and voices got loud.  And that was 
not an appropriate way to express one’s self in a courtroom; the 
witness has been so advised.  Please do not allow yourself to be 
swayed by any emotion in this case.  Your responsibility is to decide 
this case based upon the facts, the evidence, the testimony, any 
documents, the items that are introduced, and apply the law to that.  
And you are not, by your oath, to be swayed by any considerations 
other than the facts of the case and the evidence and the law.  So I 
would instruct you to disregard the emotional outburst and to consider 
only the evidence in your deliberations in arriving at a verdict.            
 
After this instruction was given, the trial continued without further incident.   
 
On January 5, after hearing counsel’s arguments, the trial judge denied 
Burns’ pre-trial motion to compel production of the victims’ statements to their 
therapists, or (alternatively) to conduct an in camera review of those records.  The 
court also denied Burns’ motion to introduce the videotapes of Tina and Sara 
Ames’ CAC interviews into evidence.  Those videotapes were played for the jury 
during the trial, however.   
 
On January 10, 2007, the jury convicted Burns of three counts of Second 
Degree Rape, two counts of Second Degree Unlawful Sexual Contact (as a lesser 
 
6
included offense of Rape), and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child, 
all in relation to Sara Ames.  The jury was “hung” on one count of Continuous 
Sexual Abuse of a Child, but it acquitted Burns of two counts of Second Degree 
Rape and two counts of Second Degree Unlawful Sexual Contact, all in relation to 
Tina Ames. 
 
After trial, Burns moved for a new trial or judgment of acquittal.  He 
claimed, inter alia, that the Superior Court had erred by denying: (1) his motion for 
a mistrial after Richard Ames’ courtroom outburst, (2) his request for an in camera 
review of the girls’ therapy records, and (3) his request to introduce the girls’ CAC 
interviews into evidence.  The Superior Court denied Burns’ motion for acquittal 
or a new trial, and on January 18, 2008, sentenced Burns to forty-one years 
imprisonment, suspended after thirty-five years for two years probation.   
 
This appeal followed.  On November 12, 2008, a panel of this Court heard 
oral argument.  Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to address two 
supplemental questions: (1) the range of appropriate remedies where a witness for 
the State intentionally commits an outburst in the presence of the jury; and (2) the 
applicability of the United States Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).  The parties thereafter filed supplemental briefs. 
 
 
 
7
ANALYSIS 
 
In Part I of this Opinion, we address Burns’ claim that the Superior Court 
abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial after the girls’ father’s 
courtroom outburst.  In Part II, we address Burns’ claim that the Superior Court 
abused its discretion by denying his request to introduce the victims’ CAC 
interviews into evidence.  Lastly, in Part III, we decide whether the Superior Court 
abused its discretion by denying Burns’ request to review in camera the victims’ 
therapy records. 
I. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying  
 Burns’ Motion for a Mistrial After the Father’s Outburst. 
  
   
We begin with Burns’ challenge to the Superior Court’s denial of his motion 
for a mistrial made immediately after Richard Ames’ courtroom outburst.  The trial 
court denied that motion, and instead issued a curative instruction.  Balancing the 
Taylor v. State2 factors―the nature, persistency, and frequency of the witness’ 
outburst; the likelihood of prejudice to the jury; the closeness of the case; and the 
mitigating effect of a curative instruction―the court reasoned that a curative 
instruction would adequately cure any prejudice to Burns.3  The reasons were that: 
(i) Mr. Ames’ outburst was not accusatory, but rather was an expression of his own 
                                          
 
2 690 A.2d 933, 935 (Del. 1997). 
 
3 State v. Burns, 2007 WL 2677064, at *5-6 (Del. Super. Sept. 11, 2007). 
 
 
8
state of mind; (ii) because the jury understood that child molestation cases are very 
emotional for the victims and other witnesses, it was not likely to be misled by an 
emotional display by the victims’ father; (iii) the curative instruction was properly 
given; and (iv) the jury’s consideration of the evidence was not affected by the 
father’s outburst, as evidenced by the rendering of different verdicts as to each 
victim.4 
 
On appeal Burns claims that the trial court erroneously misweighed the 
Taylor factors in denying a mistrial.  The father’s outburst was prejudicial, Burns 
argues, because it improperly suggested that Burns may have “stuck his penis” in 
the victims’ vaginas, and also because of other events that occurred in the trial.  
Burns emphasizes that: (i) the father’s testimony directly preceded that of the 
victims, and cast the victims in a more sympathetic light; (ii) the trial judge told 
Burns’ attorney to “be quiet” after his objection to Richard Ames’ outburst; and 
(iii) several witnesses during the trial requested breaks, because they would cry 
                                          
 
4 Id. at *6. 
 
 
9
while testifying.  Burns also claims that the prosecutor’s closing argument 
accentuated the prejudice created by Richard Ames’ outburst.5   
 
The third Taylor factor is not in dispute: both sides agree that this case was 
close, because the absence of physical evidence and the age of the events in 
question made the outcome depend on a “credibility contest” between Burns and 
the victims.   
 
As to the fourth Taylor factor, Burns claims that the two hour delay between 
the father’s outburst and the court’s curative instruction to the jury rendered that 
instruction wholly ineffective.  Anything short of an immediate and explicit 
curative instruction that Richard Ames’ outburst was intentional, Burns argues, 
would be wholly inadequate.  
 
Finally, in his supplemental memorandum Burns urges that the only proper 
remedy for the outburst was to grant a mistrial.  Even if not, Burns argues that 
what occurred in this specific case was sufficiently egregious as to require a 
mistrial. 
 
The State responds that the Taylor factors were properly weighed and that 
the Superior Court’s curative instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudice, 
                                          
 
5 Specifically, Burns points to: (i) the prosecutor referencing Trooper Giddings’ testimony that 
for him this investigation was a difficult emotional experience; (ii) her statement that “there are 
adults that don’t know how to handle sexual abuse” rationalized the father’s outburst; and (iii) 
the prosecutor’s statement that “the only person responsible for the hurt and the pain and the  
emotional trauma that you witnessed in this courtroom, the only person responsible for that is the 
defendant….”  Burns argues that these factors, taken together, had the impermissible effect of 
improperly vouching for the complainants’ credibility, and thus misled and confused the jury. 
 
10
because the outburst was an isolated incident and was not accusatory or conclusive.   
The State argues that the father’s outburst expressed only his state of mind at an 
early point in the investigation, and there was no prejudice to Burns, because he 
was not being charged with having “stuck his penis” into either of the victims.   
 
The State also argues that it was unlikely that the jury would be misled or 
prejudiced.  That the jury acquitted Burns on multiple charges shows that the jury 
rationally considered the evidence presented at trial, unaffected by the outburst.  
And, although the third Taylor factor (the closeness of the case) concededly weighs 
in Burns’ favor, the State contends that the trial judge gave the jury a curative 
instruction as soon as practicable. 
 
Lastly, in its supplemental memorandum, the State resists a per se rule 
requiring a mistrial whenever a State’s witness engages in a calculated outburst, 
because a range of remedies is available to a trial court in such circumstances.  The 
alternatives include doing nothing, admonishing the witness, holding the witness in 
contempt, giving the jury a curative instruction, and (in rare cases) declaring a 
mistrial.  The State argues that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion by 
delivering an adequate and effective curative instruction that obviated any need for 
a mistrial. 
 
These contentions raise two issues.  First, did the trial judge abuse her 
discretion in applying the Taylor factors?  Second, where (as here) a witness’ 
 
11
outburst is calculated and intentional, is a mistrial the only proper remedy?  We 
address these issues in reverse order. 
A. An Intentional Outburst by a Witness for the  
 
State Does Not Per Se Require a Mistrial. 
 
 
Because “a trial judge is in the best position to assess the risk of any 
prejudice resulting from trial events,” we will reverse the denial of a motion for a 
mistrial “only if it is based upon unreasonable or capricious grounds.”6  Granting a 
mistrial is an extraordinary remedy, warranted “only when there is ‘manifest 
necessity’”7 and “no meaningful and practical alternatives.”8  In determining 
whether a witness’ outburst was so prejudicial that the refusal to grant a mistrial 
constituted an abuse of discretion, or deprived the defendant of a substantial right, 
we consider and balance four factors.9  To reiterate, they are: (1) “the nature, 
persistency, and frequency of the witness’s outburst”; (2) “whether the witness’s 
outburst created a likelihood that the jury would be misled or prejudiced”; (3) “the 
                                          
 
6 Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 27 (Del. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 
7 Chambers v. State, 930 A.2d 904, 909 (Del. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 
8 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994) (citing Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Del. 
1987)). 
 
9 Taylor v. State, 690 A.2d 933, 935 (Del. 1997). 
 
 
12
closeness of the case”; and (4) “the curative or mitigating action taken by the trial 
judge.”10 
 
In support of his claim that a purposeful outburst by a State’s witness 
required the trial judge to grant a mistrial, Burns relies on case law from other  
jurisdictions.11  Burns also argues that as a policy matter, this Court should adopt a 
per se rule mandating a mistrial where a state witness engages in a calculated 
outburst.  According to Burns, such a rule would decrease the frequency of 
calculated outbursts (and the resulting prejudice to defendants) by motivating the 
State to impress upon its witnesses the serious consequences of a calculated 
outburst. 
 
The State responds that given the many forms a witness’ intentional outburst 
might take, any per se rule would be inappropriate.  Instead, this Court should 
defer to the trial judge’s decisions on courtroom management, as it traditionally 
                                          
 
10 See id. 
 
11 Lee v. Chicago Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 507-08 (Ill. 1992) (dictum) (noting because a 
civil plaintiff’s third emotional outburst was not intentional, that the reviewing court would defer 
to the trial court’s determination that the defendant was not prejudiced); Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 681 N.E.2d 1205, 1210-11 (Mass. 1997) (holding that where the victim’s mother made 
a spontaneous emotional outburst, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the 
defendant’s motion for a mistrial, and noting, in dictum, “[b]oth sides in a criminal trial have 
substantial latitude to try the case in their own way without significant interference so long as 
they engage in no calculated impropriety.”); Glenn v. State, 52 S.E.2d 319, 321-22 (Ga. 1949) 
(granting a new trial due to the victim’s widow openly weeping while in the presence of the jury, 
and the trial court not giving any curative instruction; and noting that “[i]t is the right of every 
person accused of crime … to have a fair and impartial trial, free from any demonstration or 
disorder of a nature calculated to prejudicially affect the jurors trying his case.”). 
 
 
13
has, and permit the trial court to tailor an appropriate remedy for a witness’ 
outburst.12  The State distinguishes the cases cited by Burns, and relies upon 
decisions finding no trial court abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a 
mistrial after a witness’ spontaneous emotional outburst.13 
 
Neither party has presented case law that is directly on point.  Burns cites no 
case holding that a trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for a 
mistrial to rectify an intentional witness’ outburst.  And, the cases cited by the 
State all involved spontaneous emotional outbursts.  The outburst by Richard 
Ames was not.  There is no precedent for a per se rule that would overturn the 
well-established principle in Delaware that “the trial judge is in the best position to 
assess whether a mistrial should be granted, and may exercise his discretion in 
deciding whether to grant a mistrial.”14  For that reason, and because Burns 
advances no persuasive policy reason to change the law, we adhere to the rule that, 
                                          
 
12 See Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088, 1095 (Del. 2008) (“It is well-settled that a trial judge is 
responsible for management of the trial and is vested with broad discretion to perform that 
function.”). 
 
13 See, e.g., State v. Simmons, 662 S.E.2d 559, 561-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (no abuse of 
discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial where a victim of sexual assault, cried and screamed 
“How dare you do that to me!” at the defendant during trial); State v. Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 424, 
427-28 (Mo. 1974) (no mistrial required where the victim’s widow exclaimed “Oh God! Why 
did you kill him?  You didn’t have to kill him!”). 
 
14 Smith v. State, 913 A.2d 1197, 1220 (Del. 2007). 
 
 
14
whether a witness’ outburst should result in a mistrial is an issue to be analyzed 
within our established legal framework.   
    B. The Superior Court Properly Applied the Taylor Factors  
        To Conclude That a Curative Instruction Was Adequate. 
 
 
That brings us to the next issue, which is whether the trial judge, in the 
exercise of her discretion, properly applied the four Taylor factors in this case.  
Burns insists that all four factors should have been weighed in his favor.  The State 
disagrees, arguing that although the third factor―the closeness of the 
case―weighs in Burns’ favor, the remaining three factors support the trial judge’s 
decision to issue a curative instruction.  We agree that the Superior Court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying Burns’ motion for a mistrial.15    
 
The first Taylor factor―“the nature, persistency, and frequency of the 
witness’s outburst”16―weighs slightly in favor of the State.  Richard Ames’ 
outburst was an isolated event that lasted only a few seconds and was not persistent 
or frequent.  Although intentionally directed toward Burns (a fact that favors 
Burns), the outburst was not calculated to disrupt the trial process.  Nor did Ames’ 
                                          
 
15 We summarily dispose of Burns’ cursory arguments that he was prejudiced by (i) the judge 
telling his trial attorney to “be quiet” after Richard Ames’ outburst, (ii) the incidents where 
witnesses became extremely emotional on the witness stand, and (iii) the prosecutor’s reference 
in her closing statement to “the emotional trauma that [the jury] witnessed in this courtroom.”  
None of those events were objected to at trial, nor are they the subject of this appeal, and Burns 
did not present those issues in the context of a claim of cumulative error.  Therefore, these 
arguments are waived and we do not further address them. 
 
16 Taylor, 690 A.2d at 935. 
 
 
15
outburst go to the heart of the matter.  Although Ames exclaimed that he wanted to 
know if Burns had had intercourse with his daughters, in fact there was no charge 
or claim that Burns’ conduct involved penetrative intercourse.  Therefore, Ames’ 
outburst was not conclusive and did not accuse Burns of the exact conduct for 
which Burns was being prosecuted.17  
 
The second Taylor factor is “whether the witness’s outburst created a 
likelihood that the jury would be misled or prejudiced.”18  Ames’ outburst was 
phrased in the form of a question, and referenced conduct that Burns was never 
actually accused of committing.  The strongest evidence that the jury was not 
prejudiced was its final verdict: the jury convicted Burns on only some of the 
charges against him.  Had the jurors been prejudiced against Burns, or misled as to 
the nature of the allegations against him, they would likely not have acquitted him 
of the Second Degree Rape and Second Degree Unlawful Sexual Contact charges 
in relation to Tina Ames.  Therefore, the second Taylor factor strongly weighs in 
favor of the State. 
                                          
 
17 See Taylor, 690 A.2d at 935 (noting that in an alleged sexual abuse case, the jury would not be 
influenced by an outburst by the victims’ grandmother shouting “You, you!” at the defendant, 
because the jury would understand that that child molestation case was emotionally charged); see 
also Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022-23 (Del. 2002) (holding that a spectator’s outburst that 
the defendant had killed another person previously required a mistrial in a murder trial, because 
that outburst went to the heart of the matter the defendant was being tried for, and could not be 
remedied by a curative instruction). 
 
18 Taylor, 690 A.2d at 935. 
 
 
16
 
As noted, the State concedes that the third Taylor factor―“the closeness of 
the case”19―weighs in favor of Burns.  This case, like many child molestation 
cases, ultimately rests on the jury’s evaluation of the parties’ credibility.  The 
fourth Taylor factor―“the curative or mitigating action taken by the trial 
judge”20―weighs strongly in favor of the State.  The trial judge immediately 
excused the jury after Richard Ames’ outburst.  After a two hour lunch break, the 
jury returned to the courtroom and promptly received a curative instruction.   
 
Burns argues that no curative instruction could have undone the damage that 
Richard Ames’ outburst caused.  Alternatively, he claims that even if the court’s 
curative instruction would be adequate if given immediately, the two hour delay 
rendered it ineffective.  Neither claim has merit.  Burns’ argument that no curative 
instruction could be adequate rests on his contentions that an intentional witness 
outburst per se  requires the trial court to declare a mistrial, and that the other 
Taylor factors weigh in his favor―positions we have already rejected.  Burns 
“cannot [show how a two hour delay], without more, unfairly prejudiced him in the 
                                          
 
19 Id. 
 
20 Id. 
 
 
17
eyes of the jury when the instruction itself was properly designed to cure any 
prejudice.”21  Thus, the fourth Taylor factor also weighs in favor of the State. 
 
Because three of the Taylor factors weigh in favor of the State and only one 
weighs in favor of Burns, Burns has failed to establish that the trial judge abused 
her discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial after the victims’ father’s 
outburst. 
II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Refusing to  
  Admit Videotapes of the Victims’ CAC Interviews into Evidence. 
 
 
Burns next attacks the trial judge’s refusal to admit into evidence the 
videotapes of the victims’ CAC interviews.  The trial judge reasoned that allowing 
the jury to review those videotapes during their deliberations would improperly 
emphasize the statements in those videotapes over all in-court testimony.22  The 
court therefore adhered to the principle that admitting a witness’ prior out-of-court 
statements into evidence under 11 Del. C. § 3507 “should be the exception, rather 
than the rule.”23 
 
Burns argues that in refusing to admit the CAC videotapes into evidence, the 
trial court abused its discretion because the videotapes were admissible under 11 
                                          
 
21 See Michaels, et. al. v. State, ___ A.2d ____, 2009 WL 684142, at *5 (Del. Mar. 17, 2009) 
(citing Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 300 (Del. 2005) (holding that a “significant” delay in 
delivering a curative instruction does not render that instruction ineffective in curing prejudice to 
the defendant)). 
 
22 State v. Burns, 2007 WL 2677064, at *9-10. 
 
23 See id. (quoting Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 525 (Del. 2006)). 
 
18
Del. C. § 3507, and there were highly critical and documented inconsistencies in 
the two victims’ accounts.  Burns suggests that because the trial court did not 
engage in a balancing test, the court effectively ruled without adequately 
considering whether those videotapes should be admitted into evidence. 
 
The State responds that under Flonnery v. State24 the default rule is that 
Section 3507 statements must not be admitted into evidence and given to the jury, 
unless both parties agree to admit the statement or unless the jury, while 
deliberating, requests to see or hear the Section 3507 statements again.25  The State 
argues that because neither exception applied, the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in barring the Section 3507 statements as evidence.  
 
A single issue emerges from the parties’ contentions: was it an abuse of 
discretion for the trial judge to deny the admission of the CAC videotapes into 
evidence, where neither factor weighing in favor of admission was present?  We 
review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,26 and find no abuse of discretion 
here.     
                                          
 
24 893 A.2d 507 (Del. 2006). 
 
25 See Flonnery, 893 A.2d at 527. 
 
26 Manna v. State, 945 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Del. 2008). 
 
 
19
    
Admitting a witness’ prior out-of-court statement into evidence is disfavored 
and generally should occur only if one of two specified circumstances is present.27  
Because neither circumstance was present here, the trial judge acted well within 
her discretion by denying Burns’ request to admit the CAC interviews into 
evidence. 
III. The Superior Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing to Conduct  
    an In Camera Review of the Victims’ Therapy Records. 
 
 
 
That brings us to the final issue, which is whether the trial judge erred by 
denying Burns’ request to conduct an in camera review of the victims’ therapy 
records. 
 
Before trial, Burns moved under Superior Court Criminal Rule 1728 to 
compel production of Tina and Sara Ames’ therapy records.  The Superior Court 
                                          
 
27 See Waterman v. State, 956 A.2d 1261, 1264-65 (“… the ‘default’ rule is that written or tape 
or video-recorded § 3507 statements should not be admitted into evidence as separate trial 
exhibits that go with the jury into the jury room….  The trial judge … ha[s] discretion to depart 
from this default rule when in his judgment the situation so warrants (e.g., where the jury  asks to 
rehear a § 3507 statement during its deliberations or where the parties do not object to having the 
written or recorded statements go into the jury room as exhibits.”)). 
 
28 Superior Court Criminal Rule 17(c) provides: 
 
For production of documentary evidence and of objects. -- A subpoena may also 
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, 
documents or other objects designated therein.  The court on motion made 
promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive.  The court may direct that books, papers, documents 
or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior 
to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may 
upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions 
thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.  
 
20
deferred argument on that motion until after the beginning of trial.  Burns argued 
that the therapist’s notes (excluding any diagnosis and any medical or counseling 
records not related to this case) were necessary for impeachment purposes because 
of alleged inconsistencies between the victims’ trial testimony and their CAC 
interviews.  Burns asked the Superior Court to conduct an in camera review of the 
victims’ therapy records to determine whether disclosure of those records was 
necessary to protect his Sixth Amendment Confrontation right.  The Superior 
Court denied that request, stating: 
First, I think that based on the representations that have been made 
thus far, you're essentially asking the Court to go on a fishing 
expedition.  And as far as I can see, the possibility there might be 
some contradiction is mere speculation.  This is not a case where there 
is evidence that the victim has recanted, expressed doubt about the 
identification of the perpetrator, or there's any indication that either 
victim suffers from a mental condition that would affect their ability 
to recall and relate events of what occurred.  The [c]ourt, under case 
law, is required to balance the privilege versus the right to 
confrontation.  And I think that in this case the showing that has been 
made does not meet a threshold that would justify disregarding the 
privilege between a patient and the therapist allowed under the law.  
Secondly, this privilege under the law does not appear to be different 
in its equivalence to the other privileges.  If this were an adult sex 
case where the victim had talked with her husband and related the 
events that happened, even if he had made notes for potential civil 
litigation, I don't think that the Court would disregard that privilege.  
If the victim had consulted with her priest or clergy and had shared 
information that was relating to this event, I don't think that we would 
disregard that privilege.  And if she spoke to an attorney she had hired 
to pursue civil litigation, I don't think that we would disregard that 
privilege.  There is nothing in the law that changes the equivalence 
that this privilege between therapist and patient should be afforded, 
excepting the case law which requires the court to balance, as I said.  
 
21
Having made that balance, I find that there is an insufficient showing 
to overrule the privilege and to intrude into that relationship at this 
juncture. 
 
 
 On appeal, Burns argues that he made the showing required under State v. 
Block29 and State v. Wood30 for the issuance of a subpoena, returnable to the court, 
for any factual information in the victims’ therapy records.31  Burns claims that 
having made the requisite showing, he was entitled to an in camera review of those 
records, followed by a Superior Court determination of whether those records 
should be disclosed to him, and that the denial of an in camera review was an 
abuse of discretion.  The State responds that the trial court properly balanced the 
victims’ interest in maintaining their privilege against Burns’ Confrontation Clause 
rights, and properly determined that neither an in camera review nor disclosure of 
the victims’ therapy records was required. 
                                          
 
29 2000 WL 303351 (Del. Super. Feb. 18, 2000). 
 
30 2007 WL 441953 (Del. Super. Feb. 1, 2007). 
 
31 That line of cases requires that the defendant, when seeking to compel the disclosure of 
records from a private person or organization, must: 
 
(1) Identify precisely the records that he is seeking, and assert a compelling basis 
for the request, that satisfies the court that it is not a “fishing expedition” into 
the witness’ medical or psychological history. 
(2) Attempt to procure the witness’ consent for the release of the records. 
(3) Demonstrate to the court, with specificity, that the material sought is relevant 
and material to the defense. 
 
See, e.g., Wood, 2007 WL 441953, at *5-6. 
 
 
22
 
After this case was argued before a panel of this Court, we requested, and 
the parties submitted, supplemental briefs addressing the implications of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.32  Burns claims that 
Ritchie is on point and compels the conclusion that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by not granting in camera review.  Burns suggests that other state courts 
have applied the Ritchie framework in similar circumstances, and required the 
disclosure of privileged records to the trial court for in camera review.  The State 
responds that (1) Ritchie is distinguishable because the subpoenaed records in that 
case were in the possession of a state agency, and not (as here) in the possession of 
a private party; and (2) Burns failed to make the requisite showing of materiality. 
 
Two issues are presented.  First, is the Ritchie framework applicable where 
the privileged information is held by a private organization?  Second, what 
showing must a defendant make to establish entitlement to an in camera review of 
records, and did Burns make such a showing?  For the reasons that follow, we hold 
that Ritchie applies and that Burns was entitled to an in camera review. 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
32 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (Plurality Opinion). 
 
 
23
A. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie Controls. 
 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of Burns’ request for a Rule 17 
subpoena for abuse of discretion.33  Communications between a patient and 
therapist are privileged under D.R.E. 503(a).34  That privilege is not an absolute bar 
to the disclosure of a witness’ communication with her therapist, however.  Where, 
as here, the privilege is invoked to bar discovery of potentially relevant evidence in 
a criminal proceeding, the trial court must balance the defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause rights against the witness’ privilege.35 
 
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,36 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the 
conviction of a father who had committed various sexual offenses against his 
daughter.  After Ritchie was charged, the matter was referred to Children and 
Youth Services (“CYS”), a state agency.37  During pretrial discovery, Ritchie 
                                          
 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974) (reviewing the grant of a pretrial 
subpoena duces tecum under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 for abuse of discretion).  
The Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 is consistent with the Superior Court Criminal Rule 
17. 
 
34 D.R.E. 503(b) provides, in relevant part: 
 
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis 
or treatment of the patient’s physical, mental or emotional condition … among the 
patient, the patient’s mental health provider, physician, or psychotherapist…. 
 
35 See, e.g., State v. Wood, 2007 WL 441953, at *4. 
 
36 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
 
37 Id. at 43. 
 
24
served CYS with a subpoena seeking the disclosure of records relating to the 
charges against him.  CYS refused to comply, claiming the records were 
privileged.38  The trial judge denied Richie’s request to compel CYS to produce 
those records, and declined to review them in camera.  On appeal, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that by denying Ritchie access to the CYS 
records, the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights.39  The United 
States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.  Applying a Due 
Process Clause analysis, that Court held that Ritchie was entitled to an in camera 
review of the CYS records, but not to a direct review by his attorney.40 
 
The State contends that Ritchie is inapposite because that case involved 
records held by a state agency.  That is a distinction without a difference.  
Although Ritchie involved the disclosure of records in the possession of the State, 
nothing in the Ritchie Court’s holding or analysis limits its application to records 
held by the State.  Moreover, other jurisdictions have held that Ritchie applies to 
                                          
 
38 Id. at 45. 
 
39 Id. 
 
40 Id. at 55-61. 
 
25
privately held records.41  From the standpoint of the privilege holder it is 
immaterial whether the holder’s therapy records are in the possession of a private 
party or the State.  In either circumstance, the privilege holder has the identical 
interest in non-disclosure.  Therefore, Ritchie applies here.  Consequently, Burns, 
upon a proper showing, would have been entitled to a Superior Court in camera 
review of the victims’ therapy records. 
B. Burns Made the Necessary Showing For An In Camera Review. 
 
The final issue is what showing must Burns make to be entitled to an in 
camera review?  In State v. Wood, the Superior Court held that Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 17 requires the defendant to: (1) “identify precisely the records he or 
she is seeking, and assert a ‘compelling basis’ for the request”; (2) “attempt to 
procure the consent of the victim for release of the records, before resorting to Rule 
17”; and (3) demonstrate to the court, “with specificity, that the information he or 
                                          
 
41 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 558-61 (Ky. 2003) (analyzing Ritchie 
and concluding defendants have a Confrontation right to review of privileged therapy records); 
State v. Green, 646 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Wis. 2002) (applying Ritchie when records held by a third 
party); Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866, 874-75 (Md. 1995) (holding that privileged documents 
held by a third party subject to in camera review during trial); State v. Cressy, 628 A.2d 696, 
703-04 (N.H. 1993) (same); State v. Kelly, 545 A.2d 1048, 1056 (Conn. 1988) (holding that third 
party’s possession of privileged records immaterial to Ritchie analysis). 
 
 
26
she is seeking is relevant and material to his defense.”42  If such a showing is made, 
the court will then conduct an in camera review.43   
 
The State and Burns generally agree that the Wood framework should 
control, as do we.  Burns claims, however, that he is required only to make a 
“plausible showing” that the information he is seeking is relevant and material, 
rather than having to establish relevance and materiality with specificity.  Relying 
on a footnote in Ritchie,44 Burns points out the impracticability and unlikelihood of 
a defendant ever establishing with specificity the relevance and materiality of 
unknown records.  In response, the State argues that requiring anything less than a 
specific showing of relevance and materiality would result in the Superior Court 
                                          
 
42 See State v. Wood, 2007 WL 441953, at *5-6. 
 
43 Id. at *6. 
 
44 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n.15: 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because 
he did not make a particularized showing of what information he was seeking or 
how it would be material.  See Brief for Petitioner 18 (quoting United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976) (“The mere possibility that an item of 
undisclosed information might have helped the defense ... does not establish 
‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense”)).  Ritchie, of course, may not require the 
trial court to search through the CYS file without first establishing a basis for his 
claim that it contains material evidence.  See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 
458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (“He must at least make some plausible showing of how 
their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense”). 
Although the obligation to disclose exculpatory material does not depend on the 
presence of a specific request, we note that the degree of specificity of Ritchie's 
request may have a bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the 
materiality of the nondisclosure.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-
683 (1985) (Blackmun, J.) (emphasis added). 
 
 
27
having to conduct an in camera review in nearly all cases.  That would strain court 
resources and increase the reluctance of sexual assault victims to seek counseling, 
for fear that their therapy records will be routinely disclosed.   
 
We conclude that a defendant need only make a “plausible showing” that the 
records sought are material and relevant.  Otherwise, the defendant would find it 
impossible in most cases to establish materiality and relevance with specificity.  It  
does not follow that every defendant will automatically be entitled to an in camera 
review.  Defendants must still establish specifically what kinds or categories of 
records they are seeking, and must articulate a compelling basis for the request.  
The Superior Court must also be satisfied that the defendant is not embarking on a 
“fishing expedition”45 into the witness’ medical or psychological history.  
Moreover, the court may, where necessary, sanction defendants who abuse the 
Rule 17 process. 
 
We conclude that Burns has established his entitlement to an in camera 
review of the factual information in Tina and Sara Ames’ therapy records relating 
to the charges against him.  Because Burns sought only the factual information 
contained in those therapy records, his request was sufficiently precise and narrow.  
He also has established a compelling justification that that information was needed 
for impeachment purposes.  The crimes with which he was charged had occurred 
                                          
 
45 Wood, at *5. 
 
28
years before, there was no physical evidence, the victims had made arguably 
inconsistent factual statements, and as in most child molestation cases where there 
is no physical evidence, the case would turn largely on the jury’s determination of 
credibility.  Burns sought the victims’ consent before filing his Rule 17 motion to 
compel.  Although Burns did not specifically show any material inconsistent 
statements by the victims, he did articulate concerns that established a “plausible 
showing” that the records sought were relevant and material, namely, that: (i) the 
girls had prepared detailed notes of their alleged abuse and destroyed those notes 
after their CAC interviews, and (ii) the girls presumably had discussed their 
interviews at length with their therapist.  Those facts plausibly show that if there 
were factual inconsistencies in the girls’ accounts, those inconsistencies could be 
discerned only from an in camera review of the factual information contained in 
the girls’ therapy records. 
 
Because we find that Burns was entitled to an in camera review of the 
factual information in the victims’ therapy records, we conclude that the Superior 
Court abused its discretion by denying that request.  We therefore remand this case 
to the Superior Court. 
 
On remand that court must decide what remedy Burns is entitled to.  Burns 
claims that on remand he is entitled to a new trial.  The current record, however, 
does not enable us to decide that issue.  Ritchie does afford us guidance.  There, the 
 
29
United States Supreme Court remanded Ritchie’s case to the trial court to conduct 
an in camera review:46   
… to determine whether [the records in question] contain[] 
information that probably would have changed the outcome of his 
trial.  If it does, he must be given a new trial.  If the records 
maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if the 
nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the lower 
court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction.47 
  
 
Ritchie requires a new trial only if information in the victim’s therapy 
records would have changed the outcome of the trial.  On remand, the Superior 
Court shall conduct an in camera review, and determine whether the information in 
the victims’ therapy records would probably have changed the outcome of Burns’ 
trial.  If the Superior Court so finds, then it shall vacate the convictions and order a 
new trial.  If, however, the Superior Court finds that the information would not 
have changed the outcome, then the convictions shall stand.  In either case, the 
Superior Court shall report its findings to this Court within sixty days of the date of 
this Opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court’s denials of Burns’ motions 
for a mistrial and to admit videotapes of the victims’ CAC interviews into evidence 
are affirmed.  The case is remanded for an in camera review of the factual 
                                          
 
46 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58. 
 
47 Id. 
 
30
information in the victims’ therapy records.  Jurisdiction is retained under Supreme 
Court Rule 19(c), and the Superior Court shall report on the results of that in 
camera review within 60 days.