Title: Brown v. Dermer

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF  MARYLAND
NO. 49
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1998
CLAYTON BROWN, A MINOR, ET AL.
v.
FRANK DERMER, ET AL. 
 
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
   
Rodowsky
  
Chasanow*
Raker
   
Wilner
Cathell
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
FILED: January 14, 2000
*Chasanow, J. now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an  active
member of this Court, but did not participate in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
 Janet and Christopher Brown, the petitioners’ parents, separated in 1983.  The
1
petitioners lived with their mother at another location; however, they spent weekends at
the subject premises with their father.
This is a negligence action, instituted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on behalf
of two children, alleging lead-based paint poisoning.  The issue presented to this Court is the
propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents, Frank
and Harold Dermer, trading as HF & S Partnership (hereinafter “the Dermers” or “the
respondents”).  More particularly, we must determine whether allegations concerning a
landlord’s knowledge  that leased premises contain flaking, loose or peeling paint, a violation
of the Baltimore City Housing Code (“housing code”), are sufficient to survive summary
judgment, where the landlord denies all general knowledge of the hazards of lead-based paint
and  poisoning or of its presence in the leased premises.  The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.  Brown v. Dermer, 120 Md. App. 339,
345, 707 A.2d 407, 411 (1998).  We disagree and, therefore, shall reverse. 
I.
The minor petitioners, Clayton and Crystal Brown, twins, born in January 1984,
periodically  resided in a house, located at 4112 Hayward Avenue in Baltimore City and
1
owned by the respondents.  The house is a two story structure built in the early 1920’s and
purchased by the respondents in 1981.  The petitioners’ father, Christopher Brown, an
existing tenant at the time of the purchase, then leased the house from the respondents.
The respondent, Frank Dermer is in business with his father, the respondent Harold
Dermer.  The respondents, under the name HF & S Partnership, purchased their first rental
 The petitioners’s initial complaint was challenged by  a motion to dismiss, which
2
the respondents filed.   That motion was granted; however, following a hearing on the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the petitioners were granted leave to amend their
complaint.   The amended complaint, which the petitioners subsequently filed, contained
four counts, all sounding in negligence.   Following the filing of the respondents’ answer, 
the parties engaged in discovery.
2
property in Baltimore City in 1968.  Periodically thereafter, they invested in houses that
needed restoration.  The respondents also did electrical, plumbing, heating, carpentry and
home improvement work for various landlords in Baltimore City.
In 1985, the petitioners were diagnosed with elevated blood-lead levels and lead
poisoning.  After receiving notice of the children’s condition and conducting an investigation
to ascertain the source of the lead poisoning, the Baltimore City Health Department (BCHD)
issued a violation notice to the respondents, listing thirty (30) violations, including twelve
emergency violations, regarding the presence of deteriorated lead paint at 4112 Hayward
Avenue.  The notice required the respondents to make certain corrections and repairs, within
one week, or by January 23, 1986.  The respondents did not complete the necessary repairs
and corrections until April 10, 1986, more than two months later than ordered.
The Petitioners, by their mother and next friend, Janet Brown, thereafter filed suit
against the respondents in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking damages for lead
paint poisoning, alleging their negligence.   Janet Brown’s answers to interrogatories
2
indicated that she informed the respondents of chipping, peeling and flaking paint in the
house during 1983, one month before she became pregnant with the twins, but that
respondents failed to correct the condition.
 The respondents first filed a motion for summary judgment on October 9, 1996.  
3
That motion was answered by the petitioners, who, after deposing Frank Dermer, filed a
supplemental response.  The respondents subsequently withdrew that motion for
summary judgment.  They filed the motion that is the subject of this appeal on February
21, 1997.
3
The respondents denied that they were notified of chipping, flaking and peeling paint.
At his deposition, the respondent Frank Dermer admitted that, at the time of the alleged lead
poisoning, he was aware that Baltimore City laws and ordinances required rental properties
be kept in habitable condition, that both Baltimore City ordinances and Maryland statutes
banned the use of lead-based paint, and that the Baltimore City Code required the interior
surfaces of rental buildings to be kept free of loose, flaking or peeling paint.  In addition, he
admitted that, at around the same time, he was receiving the Evening Sun newspaper, in
addition to watching television and listening to radio news reports.  Frank Dermer also
testified at deposition that he periodically visited 4112 Hayward Avenue to do maintenance
and conduct inspections.  He recalled being inside 4112 Hayward Avenue approximately
four to five months before the violation notice of January of 1986 was issued, but stated that
he was unaware of any loose, flaking, or peeling paint anywhere in the premises. 
The respondents moved for summary judgment,  arguing that, prior to the BCHD
3
notice, they (1) had no knowledge of the hazard of lead-based paint, (2) were unaware that
flaking and chipping paint in older houses could pose a danger to children, (3) had never
before received a lead paint violation notice or had a lead paint suit filed against them, and
(4) were unaware that the premises at 4112 Hayward Avenue contained lead paint in a
4
deteriorated condition.  The petitioners filed an opposition to the motion, contending that
there was sufficient evidence from which the respondents’ knowledge of the hazardous lead-
based paint condition existing on the premises could be inferred.  They also asserted that the
Dermers could not, and should not be permitted to “close their eyes” to the issue of lead
paint.
 
The trial court granted the respondents’ summary judgment motion.  It determined that
there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that the respondents had knowledge of
the presence of lead-based paint on the premises before they were served with notice of the
BCHD notice.  The petitioners noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Relying on
Richwind Joint Venture4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994) and Section 358
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.  The intermediate appellate court held that “a plaintiff must present
admissible evidence to permit a jury to infer that a landlord knew or had reason to know (1)
that there was deteriorated paint on the premises, and (2) that the deteriorated paint contained
lead.” Brown v. Dermer, 120 Md. App. at 345, 707 A.2d at 411.   The Court of Special
Appeals was satisfied that the record contained “sufficient evidence from which a jury could
infer that lead paint existed on the premises in 1984-85--when [the petitioner’s] exposure to
lead occurred,” id. at 346, 707 A.2d at 410, and, “sufficient evidence from which a jury
could infer that deteriorated paint existed on the premises in 1984-85 and that [the
respondents] had knowledge or reason to know of that condition prior to January, 1986.” Id.
The court concluded, however, that “there is no ... evidence to show that [the respondents]
 That evidence was a note made at the Kennedy-Krieger Institute.  While the note 
4
indicated that the minor appellants were placed in a cab to go to  4112 Hayward Avenue,
it also  indicated that the petitioners remained with their mother in a one room apartment
at 2005 McCullogh Street, thus tending to negate an inference that they were further
exposed to lead paint in the premises.
Because we have determined that the petitioners’ principal argument has merit, we
need not, and therefore will not, address this alternative argument any further.
5
knew or had reason to know that the deteriorated paint contained lead.” Id.
The court also rejected the petitioners’ alternative claim, that the failure of the
respondents to abate the hazardous condition within a reasonable time after they received the
BCHD notice exposed the petitioners to lead-based paint for an additional period and,
thereby, caused the petitioners to suffer injuries. The court reasoned that there was
insufficient evidence in the record to support this allegation. Id. at 349, 707 A.2d at 412.
Specifically, the court concluded that the evidence on which the petitioners relied, did not
support the claim factually. Id.4
We granted certiorari in this case, Brown v. Dermer, 350 Md. 279, 711 A.2d
871(1998), to determine whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment, and to
clarify the knowledge requirement in lead paint poisoning negligence actions based upon a
violation of the housing code.  Because we conclude that summary judgment should not have
been granted, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand this case
to the circuit court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.
II.
6
The petitioners contend that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was legally
incorrect.  Citing Richwind, supra, and § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, they
argue that, where an injury is proximately related to a violation of the housing code -- which,
they point out, defines any flaking, loose or peeling paint as an unsafe condition, see
Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl. Vol.), Art. 13 §§ 702 and 703 -- the plaintiff, in order to
survive summary judgment, need only present evidence that the defendant had notice of the
noncomplying condition and a reasonable opportunity to correct it. See Richwind, 335 Md.
at 674, 645 A.2d at 1153.  As they see it, because sufficient evidence was present to allow
a jury to conclude that the respondent had notice of flaking, loose or peeling paint on the
premises, and that the condition was the proximate cause of their injury, the trial court
should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents.  Alternatively, the
petitioners argue that, even if knowledge of chipping, peeling and flaking paint is not enough,
if the law requires the landlord to know or have a reason to know of the presence of lead-
based paint before liability can attach, every landlord is presumed to know of the dangers of
lead-based paint in older houses.  In this case, they contend, the issue of the landlord’s
“reason to know” of the dangers of lead-based paint in older houses and of the
reasonableness of a landlord’s purported lack of knowledge is for a jury to decide after
considering of all of the evidence. To hold otherwise, they argue, would invite landlord
perjury.
As expected, the respondents maintain that the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment in its favor.  They, too, rely on Richwind, supra, and § 358 of the Restatement
7
(Second) of Torts.  Before liability can attach, the respondents argue, a landlord must have
notice of a defective condition and a reasonable  opportunity to correct it. See Richwind, 335
Md. at 674, 645 A.2d at 1153.  As they see it, in order to overcome a motion for summary
judgment in a lead paint poisoning action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
knew or had “reason to know” of the presence of lead-based paint in the premises and the
risks that it presented.  They assert that knowledge of flaking or chipping paint is not
necessarily knowledge of an unsafe condition because nothing in the housing code informs
owners that deteriorated lead-based paint could pose a health threat to young children.  They
argue further that, because the petitioners failed to rebut the Dermer’s testimony that the
Dermers did not know and, indeed, had no reason to know, of the presence and hazards of
lead-based paint in the subject premises and in general, the trial court properly granted
summary judgment, and the Court of Special Appeals properly affirmed that judgment.
III
 Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”  Maryland Rule 2-501(e).  This Court discussed the summary judgment
procedure in Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 642 A.2d 219 (1994),  explaining:
“The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to decide whether
there is an issue of fact sufficiently material to be tried, not to try the case or
to resolve factual disputes.  Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d
1156, 1160 (1993).  See  Foy v. Prudential Insurance Company of America et
al., 316 Md. 418, 422, 559 A.2d 371, 373 (1989); Coffey v. Derby Steel
Company, 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564, 568 (1981).  Thus, the review of
the grant of summary judgment involves the determination whether a dispute
8
of material fact exists, Gross, 332 Md. at 255, 630 A.2d at 1160; Beatty v.
Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1992), and "whether the
trial court was legally correct." Heat & Power Corporation v. Air Products &
Chemicals, Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990) (citations
omitted).  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501(e), therefore, when the motion
and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court
shall enter summary judgment for the moving party forthwith. Gross, 332 Md.
at 255, 630 A.2d at 1160. The determination whether a genuine dispute of
material fact exists and, if not, what the ruling of law should be, requires the
reviewing court to resolve all inferences to be drawn from the pleadings,
admissions, and affidavits, etc. against the moving party. Id. at 256, 630 A.2d
at 1160.  ‘In other words, all inferences must be drawn against the moving
party when determining whether a factual dispute exists, even when the
underlying facts are undisputed.’” Id.
Id. at 145, 642 A.2d 224.
Summary judgment generally is inappropriate when matters -- such as knowledge,
intent or motive --  that ordinarily are reserved for resolution by the fact-finder are essential
elements of the plaintiff’s case or of the defense. See Di Grazia v. County Executive for
Mont. Co., 288 Md. 437, 445 , 418 A.2d 1191, 1196 (1980); Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312
Md. 662, 677, 541 A.2d 1303,1310 (1988).  As was explained in Federal Sav. & Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md.1984), summary judgment is generally not
appropriate for issues concerning knowledge, motive, or intent because “the facts concerning
the defendant's knowledge and conduct, and the circumstances in which they existed, as well
as any determinations of how they  relate to the legal standard ... are best left for resolution
by the trier of fact at trial.” Id. at 1213. See e.g. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc. 547 F.2d
1329, 1345 (7th Cir. 1977)(“Summary judgment motions are  particularly inappropriate
vehicles by which to judge subjective considerations such as motive, intent, or knowledge.”).
9
See also, Staren v. American National Bank  and Trust Company of Chicago, 529 F.2d 1257,
1261-62 (7th Cir. 1976); Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1974);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218  (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, Manley v.
Shoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906, 89 S.Ct.  1747, 23 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969).
Negligence is “any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of
others, which falls below the standard established by law for protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm.” Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149, 157, 200 A. 353, 357 (1938),
quoting Restatement of Torts A.L.I. §. 282. See William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law
of Torts § 43, at 250 (4th ed. 1971).  It does not exist apart from the facts and circumstances
upon which it is predicated, Baltimore, C. & A. R. Co. v. Turner, 152 Md. 216, 228, 136 A.
609,614 (1927); Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 157 Md. 448, 450, 146 A. 282, 283,
(1929); Schell v. United Rys. & El. Co., 144 Md. 527, 531, 125 A. 158, 159 (1924),
necessarily involves the breach of some duty owed by a defendant to the plaintiff,
Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Kerr, 25 Md. 521, 530 (1866), and is inconsistent with the
exercise of ordinary care. Paramount Development Corp. v. Hunter, 249 Md. 188, 193, 238
A.2d 869, 871 (1968); Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 497, 204 A.2d 526, 530-31, (1964).  In
order to establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiffs must prove the following
elements: (1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that
the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4)
that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty.
Richwind, 335 Md. at 670, 645 A.2d at 1151 (citations omitted).  See Manor Inn, 335 Md.
10
at 147-48, 642 A.2d at 225; Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 712-13, 633 A.2d 84,
88 (1993).
Judge Cole, writing for the Court in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617,
627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986), analyzed the first element: 
“‘Duty’ in negligence has been defined as ‘an obligation, to which the law will
give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct
toward another.’ ... .   There is no set formula for this determination.   As Dean
Prosser noted, ‘duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ ...   In broad terms, these policies
include: ‘convenience of administration, capacity of the parties to bear the
loss, a policy of preventing future injuries, [and] the moral blame attached to
the wrongdoer....’”
(quoting W. Page Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on The Law of Torts, § 53, at 164 (5th ed.
1984).  See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 76-77, 642 A.2d 180, 189-90
(1994); Erie Ins. Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 84, 585 A.2d 232 (1991); Jacques v. First Nat.
Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 532, 515 A.2d 756, 758-59 (1986).
We also have observed:
“[T]here can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due;  for
negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes to another.  It is
consequently relative and can have no existence apart from some duty
expressly or impliedly imposed.  In every instance before negligence can be
predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to
the  individual complaining, the observance of which duty would have averted
or avoided the injury....  As the duty owed varies with circumstances and with
the relation to each other of the individuals concerned, so the alleged
negligence varies, and the act complained of never amounts to negligence in
law or in fact;  if there has been no breach of duty.”  
West Va. Central R. Co. v. Fuller, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A. 669, 671 (1903).  We have
11
recognized, however, that the concept of duty as owing to all persons the exercise of
reasonable care to protect them from harm has to be limited if liability for unreasonably
remote consequences are to be avoided. Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320,
333, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986).  One of the mechanisms utilized for that purpose is, and
has been, application of the variable, foreseeability, which “involves a prospective
consideration of the facts existing at the time of the negligent conduct,” Henley, 305 Md. at
336, 503 A.2d at 1341, to the determination of whether a duty  exists. Ashburn, 306 Md. at
627, 510 A.2d at 1083; Henley, 305 Md. at 333-34, 503 A.2d at 1340. 
A duty may be, and often, is prescribed by statute.  See e.g Schweitzer v Brewer, 280
Md. 430, 440-41, 374 A.2d 347, 353 (1977).  Where that is the case, the courts will defer
to the  legislative determination:
“The general rule regarding the standard of conduct applied under our
decisions to measure ... negligence does not supersede a prescription of
conduct by the legislature.  As we have indicated, what governs is the
legislature's intention... not necessarily what a ‘reasonably prudent’ person
would do under such circumstances. We said in Md. Medical Service v.
Carver,  238 Md. 466, 588, 209 A.2d 582, 588 (1965):
“If the legislative intent is expressed in clear and unambiguous
language, this will be carried into effect by this Court even if
this Court might be of the opinion that the policy of the
legislation is unwise, or even harsh or unjust, if no constitutional
guarantees are impaired by the legislation.”
  
Id. at 439-40, 374 A.2d at 353.
It is well-settled that the violation of a statute may furnish evidence of negligence.
Richwind, 335 Md. at 670-71, 645 A.2d at 1151-52; Manor Inn, 335 Md. at 155, 642 A.2d
12
at 229; Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 124, 591 A.2d 507, 510 (1991);  Aravanis
v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259-60, 206 A.2d 148, 158 (1965).  But the mere violation of a
statute will not sustain an action for damages unless the violation is the proximate cause of
the injury.  Proximate cause is established by determining whether the plaintiff is within the
class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the drafters
intended the statute to prevent. Manor Inn, 335 Md. at 156, 642 A.2d at 229; Peterson v.
Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 15, 264 A.2d. 851, 854 (1970); Owens v. Simon, 245 Md. 404, 409,
226 A.2d 548, 551 (1967).  It is the existence of this cause and effect relationship that makes
the violation of a statute prima facie evidence of negligence. Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md.
62, 65, 155 A.2d 698, 700 (1959).
The parties in the case sub judice direct our attention to the Baltimore City Housing
Code which prescribes duties with regard to the lease of housing for human habitation. See,
Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl. Vol.), Art. 13 §§ 701 to 708.  The purpose of the housing
code is to:
“establish and maintain basic requirements, standards and conditions essential
for the protection of the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the
public ... in the City of Baltimore; to establish minimum standards governing
the condition, use, operation, occupancy and maintenance of dwellings...in
order to make the dwelling safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation”  
See Art. 13 § 103.  In accordance with this purpose, the City Council, in clear and express
terms, see Art. 13 § 702, § 703, § 706, has required landlords to ensure that leased dwellings
are fit for human habitation, that is, are safe and sanitary to occupy.  Section § 702 provides:
13
“Every building and all parts thereof used or occupied as a dwelling shall,
while in use ...  be kept in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for human
habitation....”
Pursuant to §703, defining the standards for good repair and safe condition, interior “walls,
ceilings, woodwork, doors and windows shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose
or peeling paint and paper.”§ 703 (2)(c) (emphasis added).  Section 706 addresses interior
wall covering and paint.  It provides:
“All interior loose or peeling wall covering or paint shall be removed and the
exposed surface shall be placed in a smooth and sanitary condition.  No paint
shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling, dwelling unit, or rooming
unit unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.”
Moreover, the housing code prohibits an owner from “leas[ing] or permitt[ing] the subletting
to another for occupancy any vacant or vacated dwelling or dwelling unit which does not
comply with [its] provisions....” § 1001.  Further, § 9-14.1 provides:
“In any written or oral lease or agreement for rental of a dwelling intended for
human habitation, the landlord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that
a dwelling is fit for human habitation.” 
The housing code also provides for notice to those who violate its provisions and for
the correction of any defective conditions caused thereby.  Article 13 § 301 provides:
“Whenever the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development
determines that there has been a violation of any provision of this Code or of
any rule or regulation adopted pursuant hereto, he shall give notice of such
alleged violation to the person or persons responsible therefor as hereinafter
provided.”
Section 303 requires the Commissioner to “order the necessary corrections by notice and
service” as therein provided. 
 Section 17.6 provides as follows:
5
"A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the
tenant and others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or
his subtenant by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the
tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to
repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of:
(1) an implied warranty of habitability;  or
(2) a duty created by statute or administrative
regulation."  
14
In Richwind, this Court reviewed the requirements of §§ 702, 703 and 706.  We
concluded that:
“[t]he implied warranty of habitability established by §§702 and 703
necessarily includes flaking, loose or peeling lead-based paint within the scope
of hazardous conditions that render the premises unfit for human habitation.
Thus, a landlord leasing property in Baltimore City is under a statutory
obligation to correct such a hazardous condition even in the absence of a
contractual duty to do so.”
 335 Md. at 671, 645 A.2d at 1151. (emphasis added).  The Court then recognized, quoting,
with approval Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 17.6,  that violation
5
of the city code provisions just referenced may be the basis for a negligence action.   We
opined:
“a private cause of action in a landlord/tenant context can arise from a
violation of any statutory duty or implied warranty created by the Baltimore
City Code.  If [the defendant] violated one of the city code provisions, that
violation could provide the basis for a negligence action against it and its
agent....”
 Id. at 672, 335 A.2d at 1152.
15
From the foregoing, it is clear that it is unlawful to lease a dwelling with flaking, loose
or peeling paint and that no premises are to be leased for human habitation, except those that
are fit for human habitation, i.e. those that are kept in good repair and safe condition as
defined in the Baltimore City Code.  To be sure, § 706 prohibits the use of lead-based paint
for interior painting in a dwelling unit; however, neither it nor §§ 702 or 703 limits the
prohibition of flaking, loose or peeling paint to lead-based paint.  To be a violation, all that
must be shown is that there was flaking, loose or peeling paint, without any further showing
as to the content of the paint.  Moreover, none of the provisions of the Housing Code
premises violation on the landlord’s knowledge of the hazards of lead-based paint.
The plaintiff, however, still bears the burden of pleading and proving that the landlord
had notice of a defective condition on the premises.  Thus, to survive summary judgment,
a plaintiff alleging lead paint poisoning caused by a landlord’s negligence in failing to correct
a defective condition in a leased dwelling must first meet the “reason to know” test.  Under
this test, a plaintiff must present evidence that establishes that the landlord knew or had
reason to know of a condition on the premises posing an unreasonable risk of physical harm
to persons in the premises. See Restatement § 358(1)(b) (“knows or has reason to know of
the condition”) (emphasis added).  The fact that a defendant is a landlord or engages in a
certain trade is not enough to meet the reason to know standard.  Some evidence that, by
virtue of those facts, the defendant has knowledge sufficient to support an inference of
knowledge of the condition is required. Id. at 677, 645 A.2d at 1154-55.  It follows that, in
order to present the question of the respondents’ negligence to the jury in a lead poisoning
16
negligence action based upon a violation of the statutory duties in §§ 702 and 703, as is the
case sub judice, all that a plaintiff must show in order to satisfy the reason to know element
is that there was flaking, loose or peeling paint and that the defendant had notice of that
condition.  It need not be shown that the flaking, loose or peeling paint was lead-based.
Once it is established that the landlord has reason to know of the defective condition,
i.e., the existence of flaking, loose or peeling paint, a plaintiff must present facts that
establish that he or she or a landlord of ordinary intelligence with the same knowledge,
should realize the risk of lead poisoning.  The test at this stage is one of foreseeability; it
encompasses what a person of ordinary prudence should realize, not what he or she  actually
did know or realize.  Thus, the only question for the court to decide at the summary judgment
stage is whether the lead-based paint injury is without, or within, the range of reasonable
anticipation and probability.
In Richwind we applied the aforementioned test.  Among the issues presented in that
case were “whether the city code's notice provisions expand common law liability, and
whether Richwind or its agent had adequate notice and/or knowledge of this hazardous lead
paint condition.”  335 Md at 672, 645 A.2d at 1152.  As to the former, commenting that both
Article 13, §§ 301 and 303 of the Housing Code and the common law of this State require
notice and a reasonable opportunity to correct a defective condition, see Scott v. Watson, 278
Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976); Ramsey v. D.P.A. Associates, 265 Md. 319, 3222,
289 A.2d 321, 323 (1972); Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307, 311, 312, 286 A.2d 115, 118
(1972); Elmar Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 454, 458, 177 A.2d 263, 265-66 (1962); State v.
That section, headed “Undisclosed Dangerous Conditions Known to Lessor,” 
6
provides: 
“(1) A lessor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk of
physical harm to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the lessee and
others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee for
physical harm caused by the condition after the lessee has taken possession,
if
17
Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 29-34, 113 A.2d 100, 104-06 (1955), the Court held that the notice
provisions in the City Code neither expanded nor superceded the common law requirements
and, indeed, “appear consistent with each other as they apply to the prerequisite of
knowledge and/or notice.” Id. at 674, 645 A.2d at 1153.  We explained that:
“[b]oth require that a landlord have notice of the dangerous condition on the
property and a reasonable opportunity to correct it. Neither impose upon [the
defendant] a duty to periodically inspect the premises during the leased period
for dangerous conditions to determine if repairs are necessary. To hold
otherwise would circumvent years of unbroken precedent concerning such a
duty, and might force landlords to become the ‘insurers’ of their tenants, a
policy which has been repeatedly rejected by the courts of this State,”
Id. (citations omitted). We therefore concluded that the notice and knowledge requirements
remain the same regardless of the source. Id. at 675, 645 A.2d at 1154. 
The Richwind Court then turned to the sufficiency of the evidence question,
concluding that sufficient evidence had been presented to permit a jury to find that the
landlord had notice of a dangerous condition on the premises and breached the duty to
correct it. Id. at 679, 645 A.2d at 1157.  To reach that conclusion, the Court applied Section
358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.   The evidence to which Section 358 was
6
“(a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the
condition or the risk involved, and
“(b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition,
and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has
reason to expect that the lessee will not discover the condition
or realize the risk." 
The Court also relied on Comment b to § 358:
“In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not enough
that the dangerous condition of the land is one which might be discovered
by a reasonable inspection of the premises.  The lessor is under no duty to
his lessee, or to any other person entering the land, to make such an
inspection, except where premises are leased for a purpose involving the
admission of the public, as stated in § 359.  
“It is not, however, necessary that the vendor have actual knowledge
of the condition, or that he be in fact aware that it involves an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to persons on the land.  It is enough that he has reason
to know that the condition exists, as that phrase is defined in § 12(1)...,”  
as well as the distinction that this Court has drawn between “reason to know,”required by
§ 358, and “should know,” utilized in other sections :
“‘Both the expression ‘reason to know’ and ‘should know’ are used with
respect to existent facts.  These two phrases, however, differ in that ‘reason
to know’ implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas
‘should know’ implies that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining
the fact in question.  ‘Reason to know’" means that the actor has knowledge
of facts from which a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence or one of the
superior intelligence of the actor would either infer the existence of the fact
in question or would regard its existence as so highly probable that his
conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact did exist. 
‘Should know’ indicates that the actor is under a duty to another to use
reasonable diligence to ascertain the existence or non-existence of the fact
in question and that he would ascertain the existence thereof in the proper
performance of that duty.’”
18
Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 676-77, 645 A.2d 1147, 1154
(1994), quoting  State v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 33, 113 A.2d 100, 106 (1955) (quoting
Restatement of Torts § 12 cmt. a (1934)) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12.   
19
applied was that the tenant, who resided in the premises prior to their acquisition by the
landlord, forwarded, at the invitation of the owner’s management company, a series of
complaints about the disrepair of her apartment, including “[chipping and flaking] paint and
plaster from the walls.”  Richwind at 668, 645 A.2d 1147.  Although workers were
dispatched to correct the problems, neither the landlord nor the president of the management
company inspected the work to determine whether the repairs had been made adequately. Id.
at 668, 645 A.2d at 1150.  Evidence had also been presented that the president of the
management company, who had approximately sixteen years of experience as a property
manager and worked for two years as a Baltimore City Housing Inspector, was aware that
houses built before 1957 often contained lead-based paint, that the subject property was built
before 1957, and that peeling lead-based paint was dangerous to children. Id. at 678-79, 645
A.2d at 1156.
While the Richwind Court found that the landlord could be held liable for failing to
correct the defective lead paint condition, Richwind does not establish a factual threshold
for all lead poisoning cases.  The plaintiffs in Richwind satisfied a higher burden than a
strict application of the two prong test discussed above.  Rather than rely on the fact that the
defective condition was  specifically addressed by the housing code and, in fact, involved
provisions setting minimum standards and thereby giving meaning to the warranty of
20
habitatability, the plaintiffs in that case presented extrinsic evidence of the landlord’s
knowledge of housing stock and of the lead paint hazard.  Presenting such evidence
certainly is appropriate and, as Richwind attests, is effective, perhaps the most effective and
safest way to proceed, but it is only one option.  The jury in Richwind also could have
found that the defendant’s breach of statutory duty prescribed by the housing code was
proximately related to the injury alleged, without specifically finding that the defendant had
actual knowledge or reason to know of the presence or hazards of lead-based paint. 
This Court applied the Richwind holding in a companion case, Scroggins v. Dahne,
335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160 (1994).  In that case, the Court reviewed two cases, Scroggins
and Davis v. Stollof, involving lead poisoning injuries sustained by children.  Both
presented the same legal issue as Richwind — whether a landlord can be held liable for lead
poisoning when the landlord had no knowledge of flaking lead-based paint in rented
premises. Id. at 690, 645 A.2d at 1161.  In both cases, we held that summary judgment was
properly granted because the landlord did not receive notice of the dangerous condition. Id.
at 691, 645 A.2d at 1161.
In Scroggins, violation of the statute could not serve as notice of the dangerous
condition because the plaintiff did not establish the cause and effect relationship between
the violation and injury.  In that case, there was no dispute that the landlord did not receive
timely notice of flaking paint in the apartment. Id. at 692, 645 A.2d 1161.  The plaintiff
argued, instead, that the law should impute notice to the landlord because the landlord had
notice of a hole in the wall, and if he had come to the apartment to repair the hole he would
21
have seen flaking paint.  This Court rejected this argument, reasoning that, 
“[i]t appears from the evidence that the plaintiff notified the landlord of the
hole in the wall sometime between when she noticed the child eating the
plaster and when she took the child to the hospital two days later.   Evidence
from the plaintiffs’ own expert ... indicates that the plaster around the hole
was not the source of the child's lead poisoning, and there is no evidence to
indicate that any other notice of flaking or peeling paint was given to the
landlord prior to that time.”
 Id.  The Court also observed that, even if there were a hazardous condition on the premises,
“[t]he short period between when [the plaintiff] saw her son eating the plaster and when the
child was diagnosed with lead poisoning was insufficient to provide the landlord with notice
and a reasonable opportunity to correct the condition.”Id. at 693, 645 A.2d 1162.
Consequently, this Court concluded “the trial judge did not err in concluding that notice of
a hole in a wall on the premises did not establish a basis for concluding that the landlord had
reason to know there was chipping, flaking, or peeling, lead-based paint on the premises.”
Id. 
Similarly, in Stollof, this Court stated that “the record clearly shows that no notice
concerning any paint problems was ever given to the landlords prior to [the defendant’s]
injury.” Id. at 695, 645 A.2d 1163.  The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
fact that the defendants did not paint the premises for seven years is evidence of negligence.
As to that, we said:
“although paint in one location may flake in less than seven years, paint in
another location may last well beyond seven years with no signs of flaking.
Therefore, we believe that the mere fact that the premises in question were
not painted for seven years is not, by itself, evidence of negligence.  The
tenant, seeing the premises on a daily basis, is in the best position to observe
 See Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 207, 680 A.2d
7
1067, 1078 (1996); Manor Inn, 335 Md. at 145, 642 A.2d at 224; Gross v. Sussex, 332
Md. 247, 256, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993)
 See Chronology of Lead Poisoning Control in Baltimore 1931-1971, Balt. Health
8
News, Volume XLVIII, No. 12, April 3, 1971 (providing chronology of lead poisoning in
Baltimore City from 1931 up to and beyond the passing of the housing code in 1966 and
noting that the greatest source of lead poisoning is flaking, peeling paint.)  See also, Lead
Poisoning Kills 22 Here in Three Years, Balt. Sun, April 4, 1937; One Dead, 5 in
Hospital From Rare Lead Poisoning, Balt. News Amer., Aug. 2, 1940; 7 Children
22
flaking paint.  Thus, notice of such a condition is a prerequisite to recovery
by the plaintiff in a negligence action.  See Richwind, 335 Md. at 676, 645
A.2d at 1154.” 
Id. at 695-96, n.4, 645 A.2d at 1164, n.4.
In the case sub judice, the first prong of the test is clearly satisfied.  The petitioners’
mother testified that she complained to the respondents about the deteriorating condition of
the paint well before the petitioners were born.  The respondents of course deny receiving
notice of the condition.  Accepting the petitioner’s explanation as true, as the law requires
the trial court to do,  we conclude that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding
7
the landlords’ knowledge of the dangerous condition.
The second prong is also satisfied.  The lead poisoning injury alleged here is within
the range of reasonable anticipation and probability.  Patently, by enacting §§ 702 and 703
of the Housing Code, the City Council sought to protect children from lead paint poisoning
by putting landlords on notice of conditions which could enhance the risk of such injuries.
As far back as the early 1930s childhood lead paint poisoning was a problem in the City of
Baltimore  and, in 1966, the city Council addressed this problem by enacting the provisions
8
Poisoned in July From Nibbling Led Paint, Balt. Sun, Aug. 12, 1946; Dr. Huntington
Williams and Joseph Gordon, Death at the Window Sill, Balt. Afro-Amer., May 13,
1958; Drive on Lead Paint Opened By City, Balt. Evening Sun, Feb 9, 1960; Donald
Bremner, New Method Used to Fight Poisoning by Lead Paint, Balt. Evening Sun, July
17, 1962; Four Children Poisoned by Lead Paint in ‘66, Balt. Evening Sun, June 15,
1966.
 The legislative history of the housing code shows that §§ 703 and 706 were
9
written to prevent childhood lead poisoning.  The proposed § 703, defining good repair
and safe condition, contained a sentence prohibiting the use of lead-based paint. See
Letter from R.L. Steiner, Director, Baltimore City Urban Renewal and Housing Agency
to Guy T. O. Hollyday, Chairman, Housing Code Committee (Letter is undated; however,
a memorandum that is attached and refers to the letter is dated April 10, 1963). An
amendment was made to add Section 706 which addressed the lead-based paint concerns
in greater detail by requiring that, loose flaking paint be removed, that the surface be
properly prepared for repainting and that repainting be done with non lead-based paint.
Id. The reference to lead paint was then removed from Section 703 as  redundant, but the
City Council left intact the provision that defined the presence of any flaking, loose or
peeling paint as an unsafe condition. See Balt. City Code (1983 Repl. Vol.), Art. 13 §
703.  It is evident from the exclusion of language referring to the type of paint and the
historical context in which the housing code was written that these provisions were aimed
at preventing childhood lead poisoning.
23
discussed herein.   Moreover, the respondents acknowledged that they were aware of the
9
Baltimore City and Maryland State laws banning lead-based paint, and of the City
ordinances that required rental properties to be kept in a habitable condition, including
requiring the interior surfaces to be kept free of loose, flaking or peeling paint.  Under these
circumstances, we hold that a jury could find that a reasonably prudent landlord would
realize, after receiving notice, that flaking, loose or peeling paint presents an unsafe or
dangerous condition and thus would investigate and correct the condition. The effectiveness
of the housing code in promoting health and safety would be severely undermined if
landlords were permitted to use lack of knowledge that the flaking paint was lead-based
 The court in Winston applied Section 00053-15 of the Cincinnati Board of
10
Health Regulation (Amended, Jan. 28, 1973; a. Nov. 23, 1976) entitled, “Regulating the
Sale and Use of Paint Containing More Than 1 Percent of Metallic Lead.”  That section
provides, in pertinent part: 
“(C) 
1. 
Loose and flaking paint containing lead in excess of
five-tenths percent on interior or exterior surfaces of
any property accessible to small children shall be
removed or made inaccessible and/or the surfaces
recovered with paint or other covering.  If paint is
used, it shall not contain lead in excess of five-tenths
percent.
24
paint as a defense against civil liability for injuries proximately caused by their failure to
comply with the law.
The respondents argue that, “[t]o hold a property owner liable in the absence of such
particular notice [of the hazards of lead] paint is to impose strict liability, a standard which
neither Maryland nor any other jurisdiction imposes on landlords.”  They and Amici cite
Winston Properties v. Sanders, 565 N.E.2d 1280 (Ohio App. 1989) and Garcia v. Jiminez,
539 N.E.2d 1356 (Illinois 1989) for this proposition.  We do not agree.
Both Winston and Garcia are distinguishable.  In Winston, an  intermediate appellate
court decision, the court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a landlord where
the landlord filed an affidavit that he did not know of the existence of lead-based paint on
the property until the municipal authority issued a violation notice. 565 N.E.2d at 1282.
There, to be sure, the court held that notice of peeling paint was insufficient to establish
liability; however, unlike the present case, the statute being interpreted by the court
specifically prohibited flaking lead-based paint. Id. at 1281.   Understandably, where the
10
2. 
Interior and exterior surfaces of property found to have
coatings which contain lead in excess of five-tenths
percent limit, when said coatings are identified as the
probable source of undue lead absorption or lead
poisoning in human beings, shall have the coatings
removed, covered or made inaccessible to small
children.  When paneling or other covering is used, it
shall cover the wall at least four feet above floor level.
25
statute is specific as to what must be proven, a defendant may plead lack of notice of a
“condition” that does not fall within the statute, because knowledge of the noncomplying
condition necessarily includes knowledge of the presence of lead-based paint.  On the other
hand, where flaking, loose or peeling paint defines the condition without reference to the
content of the paint, the landlord can be held to have notice of a condition from which the
trier of fact could conclude that the threat of injury is reasonably foreseeable.
Likewise, in Garcia, another intermediate appellate court decision, the court held that
the landlord was not under a duty to foresee that paint chips in an apartment created a
dangerous condition making injury to the child foreseeable and creating a duty upon the
landlord to remedy the situation. 539 N.E.2d at 1357-58.  It opined:
“In our opinion, paint chips, like dirt, coins, stones, or other objects that
children may place in their mouths, are not in and of themselves sufficient as
a matter of law to establish the dangerousness that makes an injury
foreseeable and creates a duty to remedy.  However, the actual or constructive
knowledge that the paint chips contain a toxic substance, such as lead,
combined with the actual or constructive knowledge that a child may ingest
those paint chips, will create such a duty.”
Id. at 1359.
 We decline the respondents’ invitation to follow Hayes v. Hambruch, 841
11
F.Supp 706 (1994, D. Md), on which Richwind relied. See 335 Md. at 688, 645 A.2d at
1155.  In Hayes a federal district court, reviewing the same provisions of the housing
code discussed herein, found that, although a landlord knew about flaking paint on the
leased premises, he had no “ reason to know” that the flaking paint contained lead. 841 F.
Supp. at 711. Thus, that court concluded that, “[a]bsent notice to a landlord of the
existence of lead paint in leased premises, the landlord cannot be expected to reasonably
foresee the lead poisoning of a child living in those premises.” Id.  It is significant that the
Hayes court  relied primarily on Garcia v. Jiminez, 539 N. E. 2d 1356 (Ill. 1989) and
Winston Properties v. Sanders, 565 N. E. 2d 1280 (Ohio 1989), which we have  discussed
and distinguished, to reach that result.   As Richwind’s reliance on  Hayes was not
necessary to its  holding, we decline to follow it here. 
26
However, the Garcia court did not base its decision on the violation of a statutory duty;
instead, it relied upon common law principles of proximate cause and foreseeability to
determine whether the landlord had a duty to act, and the issue of whether the landlord had
knowledge of a dangerous condition was presented to the jury. Id. at 1358-59.  Concerning
the landlord’s notice of the dangerous condition, the court commented:
“[p]laintiff was allowed to allege and prove that the premises contained
lead-based paint, thus establishing the element of the existence of a dangerous
condition.  As defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition is required to establish liability, defendant was entitled to deny
knowledge of that condition at trial.  Thus, the trial court's orders denying
plaintiff's motion in limine and his motion for directed verdict were not
error.... The jury may have concluded that defendant did not know or have
reason to know that the premises contained lead-based paint, or even that
defendant did not know or have reason to know that the paint was peeling.”
Contrary to the respondents’ argument, it seems apparent, that what the Baltimore City
Council sought to do by enacting the ordinances at issue in this case was prevent such “lack
of knowledge” defenses by putting landlord on notice that any flaking paint is considered
a dangerous condition.11
 The Dermers argue that they are plumbers by trade.   Interestingly, and perhaps
12
ironically, the word plumber is derived from the Latin word “plumbum,” meaning “lead”
and “plumbarius,” meaning “lead worker.” See The American Heritage College
Dictionary, 1052 (3rd. ed.1997).
27
Furthermore, the holding in this case does not impose strict liability.  The finder-of-
fact is free to reject the evidence offered to prove that the respondent violated the housing
code and/or that the respondents had notice of the noncomplying condition.  The finder-of-
fact may also reject evidence offered to prove the injury, if any, was of the kind that was
reasonably foreseeable as a result of the respondent’s negligence.
Finally, the respondents argue that they are “electricians and plumbers by trade” and
are not “professional property owners.” They argue that “[a] distinction must be made
between non-professional, unsophisticated property owners ... and professional property
owners who own hundreds of rental properties ....”  We reject this argument.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a Landlord as “ [o]ne who leases real property to
another.” Black's Law Dictionary 883 (7th ed. 1999).  The housing code defines an
“operator,” as “any person who has charge, care or control of a building ... in which
dwelling units ... are let....” See, Balt. City Code (1983 Repl. Vol.) Art.13, §105.  In
Baltimore City, therefore, the obligation to comply with the law begins with the first
dwelling let for money.  One who leases a dwelling thereby becomes a landlord and is
required to know the law and live up to the standards of the profession, regardless of the
profession title they assign themselves.   There is no principled basis on which to draw a
12
distinction, as a matter of law, between a landlord who leases one property and another who
28
leases one hundred properties. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND
THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION.   COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
THE RESPONDENTS.