Title: Hill, et al. v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Steven Hill, Terri Alston, & Charles Yates v. State of Maryland, No. 93, September Term,
2010
CRIMINAL LAW—ESCAPE—INVALIDITY OF UNDERLYING SENTENCE—Criminal
defendants were sentenced to a term of imprisonment with a deferred start date.  The
defendants failed to report on their respective start dates, and were later convicted of second
degree escape.  After the escape convictions, the validity of the underlying, “springing”
sentences was questioned by a decision from this Court.  Nonetheless, the escape convictions
are valid.  Invalidity of a sentence is not a defense to the crime of escape.  A criminal
defendant must not engage in self-help, but must instead challenge the validity of his
sentence through the appropriate legal channels.
Circuit Court for Charles County
Case Nos. 08-K-07-00799, 08-K-06-000017, 08-K-03-0000413, 08-K-07-000288
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 93
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
STEVEN HILL, TERRI ALSTON
& CHARLES YATES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
Filed:    May 23, 2011
1Jason Hernandez, one of the original Petitioners, withdrew from this appeal. 
The Petitioners in this case—Steven Hill, Terri Alston, and Charles Yates1—were
sentenced to terms of imprisonment with a deferred, or “springing,” start date.  Under these
sentences, their jail terms were scheduled to begin three to five years after the sentencing
date.  The sentencing judge informed Petitioners that if they stayed out of further legal
trouble during that time, they could return to court before the start date and have their
sentences vacated.  Petitioners, however, did not return to court, and later failed to report on
the respective start dates, and each was charged and pled guilty to second degree escape.
After the escape convictions, this Court decided Montgomery v. State, 405 Md. 67,
950 A.2d 77 (2008), and invalidated a “springing sentence” similar to the underlying
sentences here.  After that decision, Petitioners attempted to vacate their escape convictions,
arguing that they could not be criminally responsible for failure to report for the now-invalid
sentences.  The Circuit Court denied the motions to vacate the convictions, and the Court of
Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion.  We granted certiorari to determine the
following question:
Whether a conviction and/or sentence for second degree
escape is legally []valid if it is predicated on the failure “to obey
a court order to report to a place of confinement,” where that
court order was legally invalid.  
We shall answer this question affirmatively and uphold the trial court’s denial of motions to
vacate the convictions. 
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
The facts in this case are not disputed by either party, and were summarized by the
2
Court of Special Appeals as follows:
Hill v. State
On March 12, 2002, Mr. Hill pled guilty to possession of
cocaine, and the court sentenced him to two years of
incarceration, to begin five years later, on March 12, 2007.  On
March 12, 2007, Mr. Hill failed to report to the Charles County
Detention Center to begin his sentence.  Mr. Hill was indicted
on one count of second degree escape, alleging that he “did
unlawfully and knowingly fail to obey a court order to report to
the Charles County Detention Center.”  On February 1, 2008,
Mr. Hill pled guilty to second degree escape, and the circuit
court sentenced Mr. Hill to a period of incarceration for one year
and one day. 
On July 2, 2008, and October 16, 2008, Mr. Hill filed,
respectively, a “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence” and a
“Motion to Vacation Conviction.”  In both motions, he argued
that the Court of Appeals decision in Montgomery rendered his
conviction for second degree escape “void ab initio and a legal
nullity.”  
On October 16, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing.
With respect to the conviction and sentence for second degree
escape, the court denied Mr. Hill’s “motion to vacate the
sentence and set aside the conviction.”  The court stayed
execution of the sentence pending appeal.  Mr. Hill noted a
timely appeal.
Alston v. State
On October 2, 2002, Ms. Alston pled guilty to a
probation violation for failing to pay restitution.  The court
sentenced Ms. Alston to three years of incarceration, to begin
approximately three years later, on October 31, 2005.  The court
advised Ms. Alston that “[i]f I am advised that the restitution has
been paid in full between now and that date I will grant a
Motion to Reconsider, vacate the sentence; you won’t have to
serve any of it.”  The court added, however, that if “it hasn’t
been paid as of that date or the date hasn’t been extended at your
request beyond that – if you don’t show up at the sheriff’s front
desk at 9:00 that morning, there’ll be a warrant out for you.”  
3
Ms. Alston subsequently was indicted on one count of
second degree escape, alleging that she “did unlawfully and
knowingly fail to obey a court order to report to the Charles
County Detention Center.”  On May 12, 2006, Ms. Alston pled
guilty to the escape charge, and the circuit court sentenced Ms.
Alston to a period of incarceration for one year and one day.
On July 24 and October 16, 2008, Ms. Alston filed,
respectively, a “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence” and a
“Motion to Vacate Conviction.”  She argued that the Court of
Appeals decision in Montgomery rendered her conviction and
sentence for second degree escape void. 
On October 16, 2008, the court held a hearing on Ms.
Alston’s motions.  The court denied the motion to vacate the
escape conviction and sentence.  The court stayed execution of
the sentence pending appeal, releasing Ms. Alston on her own
recognizance.  Ms. Alston noted a timely appeal.  
Yates v. State
On February 10, 2004, Mr. Yates pled guilty to second
degree burglary, and the court imposed a five-year sentence, to
begin three years later, on February 14, 2007.  On February 14,
2007, Mr. Yates failed to report to the Charles County Detention
Center to begin his sentence.  On April 30, 2007, Mr. Yates was
indicted on one count of second degree escape.  On May 21,
2008, Mr. Yates pled guilty to the charge, and the court imposed
a sentence of one year and one day.  
On July 2 and October 15, 2008, Mr. Yates filed motions
similar to those of the other appellants, asking the court to
vacate the conviction and sentence for second degree escape.
On November 13, 2008, the court denied “the motion.”  Mr.
Yates noted a timely appeal.
(Footnotes omitted). 
As the intermediate appellate court’s summary reveals, the relevant facts of each case
are the same: Petitioners were convicted of second degree escape for failing to report to
prison on a so-called “springing sentence,” and later challenged the escape conviction based
2Acceptable reasons for a deferred start date included “when a female defendant was
pregnant or when a defendant desired an opportunity to apply for executive clemency.”  See
Montgomery v. State, 405 Md. 67, 79, 950 A.2d 77, 84 (2008), and sources cited therein.  
4
on the decision by this Court in Montgomery v. Maryland, 405 Md. 67, 950 A.2d 77 (2008).
The Montgomery decision, issued by this court on June 11, 2008, invalidated certain
“springing sentences.”  See 405 Md. at 81, 950 A.2d at 85–86.  There, a criminal defendant
admitted to violating his probation, and was ordered to serve the remaining ten years of his
sentence with a deferred start date of three years after the sentencing hearing.  Id. at 69-70,
950 A.2d at 79.  In ordering the deferred start date, the trial court reasoned “if you are of
good behavior between now and three years from now I will reconsider it and vacate it and
not make you serve another day.”  Id.  The defendant challenged this “springing sentence”
as being unauthorized by statute and being illegal, and the issue eventually reached this
Court.  
We first concluded that, although a deferred sentence was allowed at common law,
it would not be allowed for the reasons stated by the trial judge; i.e. to monitor good behavior
and give the defendant an opportunity to avoid imprisonment.  See Montgomery, 405 Md.
at 79, 950 A.2d at 84.2  We next analyzed Maryland Rule 4-348(d), which states that a
sentence “may be stayed upon terms the court deems proper.”  After reviewing the
development of that rule, we concluded that a stay was intended to allow the defendant “take
care of his or her personal, financial or other commitments[,] [including] such things as
winding up business affairs [and] making arrangements for the care of children or other
5
dependents[.]” Id. at 81, 950 A.2d at 85.  We thus held that “[t]he purpose of the provision
was not to allow a trial judge to monitor the defendant’s behavior for several years[,]” and
that the sentence was illegal.  Id. at 81, 950 A.2d at 86.   
The State has conceded that the underlying, springing, sentences are illegal under
Montgomery.  The single issue in this Court, then, is whether Petitioners’ failure to report for
their sentences, which were later invalidated, supports a conviction for second degree escape.
DISCUSSION
The Petitioners each pled guilty to second degree escape under Maryland Code (2002,
2005 Supp.), § 9-405 of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited — (1) A person who has been lawfully
arrested may not knowingly depart from custody without the
authorization of a law enforcement or judicial officer.
(2) A person may not knowingly fail to obey a court order
to report to a place of confinement.
* * *
(c) Penalty. — A person who violates this section is
guilty of the misdemeanor of escape in the second degree and on
conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or
a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.
(Emphasis added).  
The current form of the escape statute is the result of amendments in 1999, in which
the Legislature included, among other things, a “fail[ure] to obey a court order” as an
3At that time, the escape statute was contained in Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol., 1997 Supp.), Article 27, Section 137(a).  This article was recodified as the Criminal
Law article in HB 11 of the 2002 session, enrolled as Chapter 26 of the Maryland Laws
2002.  The new second degree escape statute, located in Criminal Law Section 9-405,
contained “new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, Section
137A.”  Revisor’s Note to Chapter 26.  (emphasis added).
4The catalyst for these amendments was this Court’s decision in Farris v. State, 351
Md. 24, 716 A.2d 237 (1998).  There, a defendant was convicted of first degree escape, under
(continued...)
6
“escape.”3  The Legislature described the purpose of these revisions, contained in Senate Bill
355, and its companion House Bill 463, as follows: 
This bill [makes] one uniform provision applicable to temporary
leave and home detention in all counties[, and] mak[es] the
failure to report to a correctional facility as required by a court
order an escape.
* * *
[House Bill 463] further codifies existing law concerning escape
while on leave or otherwise not in a correctional facility.
Although the current statute only refers to escape from a
correctional facility, case law has adopted the concept of
constructive custody to apply this statute to persons  who escape
while on leave or are otherwise outside of the correctional
facility (e.g., in a hospital).
* * *
This bill explicitly covers persons on leave. By defining escape
to retain its judicially determined meaning, it also includes those
taken out of a correctional facility for other reasons, such as to
a hospital or court.
Floor Report to Senate Bill 355, quoted in Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724, 742–43, 816 A.2d
88, 98–99 (2003).4  As this history demonstrates, the Legislature intended to treat a failure
4(...continued)
the old version of the escape statute, for failing to report for a weekend imprisonment.  On
appeal, we held that the escape statute did not apply for failure to report, because at that time
the defendant was not in “constructive custody” of law enforcement while free during the
week.  Thus, “he did not leave or physically depart from any place of confinement” when he
failed to report.  Id. at 35, 716 A.2d at 243.  Although Farris may have involved first degree
escape, the Legislative response included the current form of the second degree escape
statute.
7
to report for imprisonment identically to an active escape from confinement.  
Thus, we turn to case law regarding escape from physical confinement.   The Court
of Special Appeals has previously upheld an escape conviction despite the defendant’s claims
that the underlying conviction was illegal.  See, e.g., Vucci v. State, 18 Md. App. 157, 160,
305 A.2d 483 (1973).  In Vucci, the defendant attempted to escape from prison by cutting a
hole through a perimeter fence, and was charged with escape.  On appeal, the defendant
argued he was being illegally detained because of a procedural defect; “he had not been
examined for the purpose of determining his status as a defective delinquent within six
months from the date he was received by the [prison], as required by” statute.  Id. at 159, 305
A.2d at 483.  This illegality, he argued, gave him “the absolute right to depart from the
confines of [imprisonment.]” Id. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed:
[I]t is clear in Maryland that even if a person is illegally
confined because of defects in the procedure by which he was
arrested and imprisoned, he is not entitled to resort to self-help
but must apply for his release through regular legal channels.
We think it is equally clear that even if a person, confined under
color of law, is illegally confined because of violations of
statutory procedures required with respect to his continued
confinement, he is similarly not entitled to resort to self-help but
must apply for his release through regular legal channels.  
8
Id. at 159, 305 A.2d at 484.  The Vucci decision is representative of Maryland’s strong
prohibition against self-help.  See also Jennings v. State, 8 Md. App.  321, 325, 259 A.2d
547, 550 (1969) (escape convictions are valid “even though [the defendant] might be able
to show such defects in the procedure by which he was arrested and imprisoned as would
justify his release.”).
Maryland’s approach to the crime of escape is consistent with a vast majority of courts
that have rejected the alleged illegality of the underlying conviction as a defense to escape.
See United States v. Pereira, 574 F.2d 103, 106 n.6 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
847, 58 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1979) (illegality of arrest or detention is not a defense to charge of
escape); United States v. Haley, 417 F.2d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 1969) (“A prisoner’s complaints
concerning the legality of his conviction or of his imprisonment should be addressed to
proper administrative body or to the courts.  Self help in the form of escape or assault on a
prison guard is indefensible.”); United States v. Smith, 534 F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1976)
(“[V]alidity of conviction under which an escapee is confined is not an element of the offense
of unlawful[] escap[e.]”); Petition of Lynch, 400 N.E.2d 854, 857 n.2 (Mass. 1980) (When
“imprisonment is under color of law, the prisoner is not entitled to resort to self-help, but
must apply for his release through regular legal channels[.]”); Brown v. State, 552 So. 2d
109, 110 (Miss. 1989) (“[W]here one is imprisoned under some color of law, he is not
entitled to resort to self-help but must apply for release through regular legal channels.”)
(citation omitted); but see State ex rel. Robison v. Boles, 142 S.E.2d 55, 57 (W. Va. 1965)
(accused was not guilty of escape from imprisonment because he was denied assistance of
5In addition, we allow self-help when a defendant escapes in response to threats to his
life, and immediately reports to the proper authorities upon reaching a position of safety.  See
Robinson v. State, 42 Md. App. 617, 620, 402 A.2d 115, 116–17 (1979) (citing People v.
Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823 (Ca. App. 1975) (describing a narrow duress defense to
escape)); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 411, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1980)
(“[T]he escapee is not entitled to claim a defense of duress or necessity unless and until he
demonstrates that, given the imminence of the threat, [escape] was his only reasonable
alternative.”).  This potential defense is clearly not applicable to the facts here.  
9
counsel at his previous trial, and the prior conviction was therefore void). 
  
Under existing Maryland law, there is a narrow exception to its general prohibition
against self-help for criminal defendants.  Maryland has recognized that “one illegally
arrested may use any reasonable means to effect his escape, even to the extent of using such
force as is reasonably necessary." Polk v. State, 378 Md. 1, 41, 835 A.2d 575, 599 (2003)
(quoting Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103
S. Ct. 1798, 76 L. Ed. 2d 363(1983)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).5  Maryland thus
allows a defendant to argue, as a defense to certain criminal charges arising from his
resistance to an arrest, that the arrest was illegal.  
This limited allowance for self-help, however, does not extend to facially valid court
orders.  For example, a person may not resist an arrest carried out pursuant to a court-issued
warrant.  See Rodgers v. State, 280 Md. 406, 421, 373 A.2d 944, 952 (1977) cert. denied, 434
U.S. 928, 98 S. Ct. 412, 54 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1977) (A person may not resist “an arrest [] made
by a peace officer on a warrant duly issued by a judicial officer.”).  This distinction makes
clear that Maryland law requires compliance with court orders, even if there are serious
questions about the validity of the order. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
10
258, 91 L. Ed. 884, 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947) (even where the court’s jurisdiction is subject to
serious doubt, violation of the court order is subject to sanction); United States v. Petrella,
707 F.2d 64 (2nd Cir. 1983) (alleged invalidity of deportation order no defense to charge of
illegal re-entry).
Under these standards, Petitioners were properly convicted of escape.  They were
under a court order to report for a term of imprisonment, and failed to comply with these
court orders, a clear violation of CL Section 9-405.  A prisoner with an invalid sentence may
not engage in self-help, and defy a court order of imprisonment, any more than a prisoner
with a potentially invalid conviction.  See Jennings, 8 Md. App. at 325, 259 A.2d at 550
(escape convictions are valid “even though [the defendant] might be able to show such
defects in the procedure by which he was arrested and imprisoned as would justify his
release.”).  Although Petitioners may have grounds to challenge their underlying, springing
sentence, that challenge must be made through the appropriate channels. 
Petitioners’ argument to the contrary falls short.  They argue that illegality of the
underlying court order is a defense to escape because the escape statute, CL Section 9-
405(b), requires the underlying court order to be lawful.  In support of this point, Petitioners
cite language from Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724, 816 A.2d 88 (2003).  The Boffen Court
reversed a first degree escape conviction, explaining that for a valid escape conviction “the
escapee must have been legally detained[,]” and that “escape is the unauthorized departure
from lawful custody.”  Id. at 733, 816 A.2d at 93 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
  
Petitioners, however, take the Boffen language out of context.  Boffen had been
11
convicted of certain credit card offenses, and appeared in court for a sentencing hearing.  Id.
at 727, 816 A.2d at 89.  When the judge stated that “the sentence under count number one
is fifteen years to the Division of Correction. . . [,]”  Boffen “interrupted him, bolted from
the courtroom, and ran out onto the street where he was eventually arrested.”  Id.  He was
later tried and convicted for escape.  His appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, on grounds
that he was not yet in police custody when he fled, proved unsuccessful.  
We granted certiorari to define the boundaries of “custody.”  We reviewed Johnson
v. Warden, 196 Md. 672, 674, 75 A.2d 843, 844 (1950), where we held: 
[A] prisoner was legally confined in the State Reformatory. . .
even though he was allowed to work outside, unguarded, on a
private farm, and that, when he escaped from the farm, he was
subject to punishment for escape from the Reformatory.
 
(Emphasis added).  We also considered Ford v. State, 237 Md. 266, 205 A.2d 809 (1965),
where we held that a prisoner was in constructive custody of the State while being
transported from a prison, and stated:
Maryland draws no distinction between an escape from within
the prison walls and one effected when the prisoner, while still
in legal custody, was physically outside the prison area.
Id. at 270, 205 A.2d at 812.  (emphasis added).  We then distinguished Johnson and Ford,
because, unlike those cases, Boffen had not yet entered custody of law enforcement,
constructive or otherwise, at the time he fled.  See Boffen, 372 Md. at 747, 816 A.2d at
101–02.  We therefore reversed his conviction.  
In this line of cases, we referred to “lawful custody” to signify that the defendant was
6Cf. Vucci, 18 Md. App. at 160, 305 A.2d at 484  (rejecting defense that detention was
“illegal,” to charges under escape statute which applied to “persons legally detained and
confined”) (emphasis added).  
7We need not reach the State’s alternative argument that the Montgomery decision was
not retroactive. 
12
“within the actual or constructive custody of a place of confinement within the meaning of
the statute.”  See Boffen, 372 Md. at 733, 816 A.2d at 93 (emphasis added).   Contrary to
Petitioners’ allegation, these cases do not distinguish between lawful and unlawful official
custody.6  Indeed, those defendants did not allege that their underlying conviction or sentence
was invalid.  Clearly, the Boffen decision did not transform Maryland law so as to allow
criminal defendants, seeking relief from their sentences, to engage in self-help instead of
filing an appropriate motion or pleading in court.7
CONCLUSION
Petitioners’ failure to report for imprisonment was sufficient to support their escape
convictions.  The subsequent ruling in Montgomery v. State allowed Petitioners to challenge,
in the appropriate venue, the validity of their “springing” sentences. It did not, however,
allow them to engage in self-help.  Maryland law has clearly foreclosed, as a defense to
escape, a challenge to the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONERS.