Title: State v. Kennedy

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 132 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP523-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alvernest Floyd Kennedy, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 348 Wis. 2d 263, 831 N.W.2d 824) 
(Ct. App. – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 26, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Marcus J. Berghahn and Hurley, Burish & Stanton, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Marcus J. Berghahn. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 132
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP523-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2006CF4053) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alvernest Floyd Kennedy, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 26, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
circuit court's entry of a judgment of conviction following the 
jury trial of Alvernest Floyd Kennedy ("Kennedy").2  The 
Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office charged Kennedy with 
homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle in violation of 
                                                 
1 State v. Kennedy, No. 2012AP523-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2013). 
2 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner, presiding. 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
2 
 
Wisconsin Statutes § 940.09(1)(a),3 and homicide by operation of 
a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration in 
violation of § 940.09(1)(b).4  At trial, the jury found Kennedy 
guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.5 
¶2 
The following issues are presented for our review: 1) 
whether the police had probable cause to arrest Kennedy for 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated ("OWI"); 2) whether 
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), renders unconstitutional 
the warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Kennedy; 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(a) provides: 
Any person who does any of the following may be 
penalized as provided in sub. (1c): 
(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or 
handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.09(1)(b) provides: 
Any person who does any of the following may be 
penalized as provided in sub. (1c): 
 . . .  
(b) Causes the death of another by the operation or 
handling 
of 
a 
vehicle 
while 
the 
person 
has 
a 
prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in s. 
340.01 (46m). 
5 While the jury also found Kennedy guilty of the companion 
violation of homicide by operation of a motor vehicle with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration, in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(c) that charge was dismissed on the State's motion. 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
3 
 
and 3) if McNeely renders the warrantless investigatory blood 
draw unconstitutional, whether the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies. 
¶3 
We conclude that the police had probable cause to 
believe that Kennedy had committed a drunk-driving related crime 
or offense.  Therefore, Kennedy's arrest was lawful. 
¶4 
Following our interpretation of the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966), we held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in 
the bloodstream of a suspect created a sufficient exigency so as 
to justify a warrantless investigatory blood draw.  State v. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 547, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993).  The 
police in this case acted in accordance with our holding in 
Bohling when they ordered the warrantless investigatory blood 
draw performed on Kennedy.   
¶5 
During the pendency of this case, however, the United 
States Supreme Court abrogated our holding in Bohling.  McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. 1552.  In light of that abrogation, we accept, as we 
must, McNeely's totality of the circumstances test for the 
purpose of determining whether exigent circumstances are present 
so as to justify warrantless investigatory blood draws in cases 
involving "drunk-driving related violation[s] or crime[s]."   
¶6 
The State has not argued that exigent circumstances 
exist so as to justify the warrantless investigatory blood draw 
performed on Kennedy.  Because the State does not argue that 
exigent circumstances existed, we assume, without deciding, that 
the warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Kennedy 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
4 
 
was not supported by exigent circumstances.  However, we 
conclude that the police acted in objectively reasonable accord 
with the clear and settled Wisconsin precedent existing at the 
time the warrantless investigatory blood draw was performed on 
Kennedy.  Therefore, the good-faith exception applies and we 
affirm the court of appeals and uphold Kennedy's conviction. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
On August 3, 2006, shortly after midnight, Kennedy, 
the driver of a 1966 Chevy Impala, struck the victim as she 
crossed the street on West Fond du Lac Avenue in Milwaukee.  
Milwaukee police officers Marcey Asselin and Jeffrey Hoffman 
were the first on the scene at 12:15 a.m., less than a minute 
after the collision.  Upon arrival, Officer Asselin observed the 
1966 Chevy Impala facing westbound in the eastbound lane with 
the severely injured victim pinned underneath the passenger side 
of the vehicle and skid marks approximately one block long 
leading to the vehicle.  
¶8 
Officer Asselin asked bystanders at the scene if 
anyone knew the identity of the driver of the Impala.  In 
response, Kennedy admitted to Officer Asselin that he was the 
driver.  Officer Asselin then told him to wait on the sidewalk 
while she tended to the victim.  Paramedics placed the victim in 
an ambulance at approximately 12:30 a.m., at which point Officer 
Asselin returned to talk with Kennedy and his passenger, Anthony 
Jones.   
¶9 
When Officer Asselin approached Kennedy in order to 
obtain his statement, she observed that Kennedy's eyes were 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
5 
 
glassy and bloodshot, he was swaying back and forth, his speech 
was slow and slurred, and a strong odor of alcohol was on his 
breath.  These observations, combined with the severity of the 
accident, led Officer Asselin to conclude that Kennedy was 
intoxicated.  Officer Asselin did not ask Kennedy to perform any 
field sobriety tests. 
¶10 During Officer Asselin's conversation with Kennedy, a 
crowd of approximately 30 to 40 people had gathered at the scene 
and began "yelling and screaming," and some attempted to 
improperly cross the police tape.  Because of this unrest and 
the possible jeopardy to Kennedy's safety, Officer Asselin and 
Sergeant Roberto Hill asked Kennedy to sit in one of the squad 
cars.  Kennedy initially refused, but at 12:45 a.m. relented and 
voluntarily walked to one of the squad cars.  At this time, the 
officers did not inform Kennedy that he was under arrest nor was 
he physically restrained.  Shortly thereafter, at 12:50 a.m., 
Officer Asselin learned the victim had died as a result of the 
injuries she sustained from the impact of Kennedy's vehicle.   
¶11 At 1:00 a.m., Officer Asselin received information 
that a witness saw two cars, one of which was Kennedy's Impala, 
traveling at a high rate of speed6 just before the accident.  The 
witness stated that the victim was crossing the street when she 
was hit by Kennedy's Impala.   
                                                 
6 The record varies on the speed of the 2 cars, but the 
range was between 50 and 80 miles per hour. 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 Milwaukee police detective Paul Formolo arrived at the 
scene at 1:51 a.m., at which time officers on the scene informed 
him they suspected Kennedy of OWI.  Detective Formolo entered 
the squad car in which Kennedy was seated and immediately 
noticed a strong odor of alcohol.  After a brief conversation 
with Kennedy, Detective Formolo placed him under arrest at 2:05 
a.m. and instructed one of the officers on the scene to 
transport Kennedy to a nearby hospital for an investigatory 
blood draw.  Hospital personnel conducted the investigatory 
blood draw at 3:18 a.m.  No warrant had been sought for the 
blood draw and none had been issued.  The results of the blood 
draw showed Kennedy's blood-alcohol level was .216 (nearly three 
times the legal limit) at the time of the draw.  
¶13 The 
Milwaukee 
County 
District 
Attorney's 
Office 
charged Kennedy with homicide by intoxicated use of a motor 
vehicle and homicide by operation of a motor vehicle with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration.  Kennedy moved the circuit 
court to suppress the results of the warrantless investigatory 
blood draw, arguing that the police lacked probable cause for 
his arrest.  The circuit court denied Kennedy's motion.  A trial 
was held and the jury found Kennedy guilty of both counts.  The 
circuit court entered a judgment of conviction for homicide by 
intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and dismissed the second 
count on the State's motion. 
¶14 Kennedy appealed, and in an unpublished opinion the 
court of appeals affirmed Kennedy's conviction.  Eight days 
after the court of appeals issued its decision the United States 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
7 
 
Supreme Court released its decision in Missouri v. McNeely.  The 
Supreme Court held in McNeely that the dissipation of alcohol in 
the bloodstream by itself does not create a per se exigency so 
as to justify a warrantless investigatory blood draw of an OWI 
suspect.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563.  Thus, McNeely abrogated 
this court's holding in State v. Bohling.   
¶15 Kennedy petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on February 19, 2014.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 This case presents questions of constitutional fact.  
On review, "we accept the circuit court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous."  State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 
84, ¶13, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97.  The application of 
those facts to constitutional principles is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
The Police Had Probable Cause to Arrest Kennedy at the Time 
He Went to the Squad Car. 
¶17 Kennedy argues that the police lacked probable cause 
to arrest him for OWI, so that the subsequent warrantless 
investigatory blood draw was unlawful.  Thus, the initial 
question in this case is whether Kennedy's arrest was lawful.  A 
warrantless investigatory blood draw is lawful so long as 
exigent circumstances exist and: 
(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is 
a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
8 
 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in 
a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 534 (footnote omitted).  This four-
factor test is rooted in Schmerber and was not overruled by 
McNeely.  See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-71; McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1560.  In a footnote to this test, we explained that probable 
cause to arrest for a drunk-driving related violation or crime 
"substitutes for the predicate act of lawful arrest" under the 
first factor.  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 534 n.1 (citing State v. 
Bentley, 92 Wis. 2d 860, 863-64, 286 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 
1979)).  The second factor, whether there is a "clear indication 
that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication," in 
this case is also satisfied by the same facts that support a 
finding of probable cause to arrest.  See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
770 (noting that "the facts which established probable cause to 
arrest in this case also suggested the required relevance and 
likely success of a test of petitioner's blood for alcohol"); 
State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, ¶12, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 
N.W.2d 407 (noting that "in the absence of an arrest, probable 
cause to believe blood currently contains evidence of a drunk-
driving related violation or crime" necessarily satisfies the 
first and second prongs of Bohling).   
¶18 We note that probable cause to arrest for a drunk-
driving related violation or crime is not the only avenue to a 
lawful warrantless investigatory blood draw.  Rather where law 
enforcement officers have probable cause to search a suspect's 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
9 
 
blood for evidence of a drunk-driving related violation or 
crime, they will necessarily satisfy the first two Bohling 
factors.7  Erickson, 260 Wis. 2d 279, ¶12.8  Because Kennedy 
challenges whether his arrest was supported by probable cause, 
we proceed under that analytical framework.  However, in the 
absence of an arrest, probable cause to search the suspect's 
blood, along with exigent circumstances, is sufficient to 
satisfy Schmerber and McNeely.  See Erickson, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 
¶¶12-16. 
¶19 Kennedy argues he was under arrest at the time he was 
placed in the squad car.  Further, he argues the police did not 
have probable cause to arrest him for OWI at that time.  Kennedy 
claims that under the circumstances, he was not free to leave 
and, even though not formally under arrest, he was under de 
facto arrest.  In contrast, the State argues, and the court of 
                                                 
7 While probable cause to search for evidence of a drunk-
driving related violation or crime is sufficient to satisfy the 
first two factors of Bohling, the converse is not necessarily 
true.  The fact of an arrest, or probable cause to arrest, for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime alone will not permit 
an investigatory blood draw.  Rather, there must also be a clear 
indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of 
intoxication.  State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, ¶8, 260 
Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407 (noting that "police sometimes come 
into possession of information supporting an arrest long after 
the intoxicated operation and at a time when there is no longer 
reason to think the driver's blood contains alcohol."). 
8 Kennedy does not argue that the warrantless investigatory 
blood draw was performed in an unreasonable manner or that he 
had a reasonable objection to it and we do not address these 
issues. 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
10 
 
appeals determined, Kennedy was not under arrest until Detective 
Formolo arrived at the scene and placed Kennedy under formal 
arrest.  The State and court of appeals concluded that at this 
time the police officers on the scene had sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of probable cause to arrest Kennedy for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime. 
¶20 While the parties spend a great deal of time in their 
briefs on the issue of when Kennedy was placed under arrest, we 
need not decide that issue because the police had probable cause 
to arrest Kennedy for a drunk-driving related violation or crime 
when he was placed in the rear of the squad car.  We therefore 
assume, without deciding, that Kennedy was under arrest when 
placed in the squad car, and hold that at that time the police 
had probable cause to arrest him for a drunk-driving related 
violation or crime. 
¶21 Kennedy argues that the physical indications of 
intoxication observed by the officers (i.e., his bloodshot and 
glassy eyes, slurred speech, swaying, and the strong odor of 
alcohol on his breath) were insufficient to establish probable 
cause to believe Kennedy probably committed a drunk-driving 
related violation or crime.  He makes this argument based on his 
understanding that field sobriety tests are a prerequisite to a 
finding of probable cause.  Kennedy's understanding is mistaken.  
Wisconsin has no requirement that police must perform field 
sobriety tests in order to determine whether probable cause 
exists that a person is operating a vehicle under the influence 
of alcohol.  See State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶43, 317 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551 (Ziegler, J. concurring).  "Probable 
cause exists where the totality of the circumstances within the 
arresting officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest would 
lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant 
probably committed a crime."  State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 
701, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).  Further, "[i]t is not necessary 
that the evidence giving rise to such probable cause be 
sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor must it 
be sufficient to prove that guilt is more probable than not."  
Id. (quoting State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 624-25, 184 
N.W.2d 836 (1971)). 
¶22 In the context of an arrest for a drunk-driving 
related violation or crime, a law enforcement officer may 
consider numerous factors in order to determine probable cause 
to arrest.  Probable cause may be established through a showing 
of erratic driving and the subsequent "stumbling" of the driver 
after getting out of the motor vehicle.  See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 333-35, 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982) overruled on other 
grounds, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).  In other 
cases, factors sufficient to support a finding of probable cause 
have included bloodshot eyes, an odor of intoxicants, and 
slurred speech, together with a motor vehicle accident or 
erratic driving.  See State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 683, 518 
N.W.2d 325 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994) 
(holding 
that 
the 
officers' 
observation of an odor of intoxicants, the nature of the 
accident, and the defendant's statement that he had "to quit 
doing this," supported probable cause); State v. Babbitt, 188 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 349, 357, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
the officer's observation of erratic driving and physical 
indications of intoxication supported probable cause); State v. 
Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 622, 558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that the nature of the single-vehicle accident, odor of 
intoxicants, and slurred speech supported probable cause).  
These cases illustrate that "[p]robable cause is a 'flexible, 
common-sense 
measure 
of 
the 
plausibility 
of 
particular 
conclusions about human behavior.'"  Lange, 317 Wis. 2d 383, ¶20 
(quoting State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 
N.W.2d 24 (1991)). 
¶23 Here, 
the 
facts 
known 
to 
Officer 
Asselin 
are 
undeniably sufficient to support a finding of probable cause 
that Kennedy committed a drunk-driving related violation or 
crime.  Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Asselin observed 
block-long skid marks leading to Kennedy's Impala which faced 
the opposite direction of traffic.  Officer Asselin further 
observed the results of the high speed impact between Kennedy's 
vehicle and the victim.  After identifying Kennedy as the 
driver, Officer Asselin observed that Kennedy's eyes were 
bloodshot and glassy, he was slurring his speech, he was 
swaying, and he smelled of alcohol.  Combined, these facts would 
lead a reasonable police officer to believe that Kennedy 
probably committed a drunk-driving related violation or crime. 
¶24 In light of the foregoing, we hold that "the totality 
of the circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge at 
the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
13 
 
believe 
that 
the 
defendant 
probably 
committed 
a 
crime;" 
specifically, a drunk-driving related violation or crime.  Koch, 
175 Wis. 2d at 701.  Consistent with our discussion of Schmerber 
and Bohling we also hold that these same facts and circumstances 
provided probable cause to search Kennedy's blood.  See 
Erickson, 260 Wis. 2d 279, ¶12. 
B. 
Wisconsin Law and McNeely 
¶25 Having addressed the threshold issue of whether 
Kennedy's arrest was lawful, we turn now to the next issue 
before us: whether Kennedy's Fourth Amendment9 right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated.  At the 
time of Kennedy's arrest, Wisconsin law regarding "drunk-driving 
related violation[s] or crime[s]" stated "the dissipation of 
alcohol from a person's bloodstream constitutes a sufficient 
exigency to justify a warrantless [investigatory] blood draw."  
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 547.  In Bohling, we considered 
warrantless investigatory blood draws in light of the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in Schmerber v. California.  In 
                                                 
9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
14 
 
Schmerber, the Court held that seizing a suspect's blood for 
evidentiary purposes was different than other searches and 
seizures subsequent to a lawful arrest because "[t]he interests 
in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects 
forbid any such [bodily] intrusions on the mere chance that 
desired evidence might be obtained."  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
769-70.  Thus, the Court required "a clear indication" that 
evidence of intoxication will be found through a blood draw.  
Id.  Schmerber concluded that, under the circumstances of that 
case, the blood draw performed was reasonable and did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 772. 
¶26 The Court used three important factors to reach its 
conclusion that Schmerber's blood draw was reasonable.  First, 
the same facts that showed probable cause to indicate the 
defendant operated a motor vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol also showed "likely success" in finding further evidence 
by testing the defendant's blood.  Id. at 770.  Second, due to 
the rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the defendant's 
bloodstream, the officer "might reasonably have believed that he 
was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary 
to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the 
destruction of evidence."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
Third, the Court concluded that the method chosen to draw and 
test the defendant's blood, and the means by which the test was 
performed, were reasonable.  Id. at 771. 
¶27 In Bohling, we stated that Schmerber could  
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
15 
 
be read in either of two ways: (a) that the rapid 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream 
alone 
constitutes a sufficient exigency for a warrantless 
blood 
draw 
to 
obtain 
evidence 
of 
intoxication 
following a lawful arrest for a drunk driving related 
violation or crime——as opposed to taking a blood 
sample for other reasons, such as to determine blood 
type; or (b) that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in 
the 
bloodstream, 
coupled 
with 
an 
accident, 
hospitalization, and the lapse of two hours until 
arrest, constitute exigent circumstances for such a 
blood draw. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539 (emphasis added).  We concluded that 
following a lawful arrest for a drunk-driving related violation 
or crime the "more reasonable" reading of Schmerber was the 
former: 
that 
the 
"rapid 
dissipation 
of 
alcohol" 
alone 
constitutes 
the 
kind 
of 
exigency 
necessary 
to 
permit 
a 
warrantless investigatory blood draw from the suspect.  Id.  We 
reached this conclusion based on "a logical analysis" of 
Schmerber, that the exigency presented was the fact that, as 
time passed, the critical evidence of alcohol in the bloodstream 
was rapidly being destroyed.  Id. at 539-40.  In other words, we 
construed Schmerber to hold that the sole exigency in that case 
was the destruction of critical evidence: the alcohol in the 
defendant's blood. 
¶28 As a result of this construction, we held that a 
warrantless investigatory blood draw, conducted at the direction 
of a law enforcement officer, was lawful so long as:  
(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is 
a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
16 
 
a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw.   
Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).10  Each of these factors is rooted 
in Schmerber.  See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-771.  Bohling 
interpreted Schmerber to mean that the natural dissipation of 
alcohol in a defendant's bloodstream was per se an "exigent 
circumstance." 
 
That 
interpretation 
remained 
the 
law 
in 
Wisconsin for 20 years.11 
¶29 However, in 2013, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its decision in McNeely, effectively abrogating our 
holding in Bohling that the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone 
constitutes 
an 
exigent 
circumstance 
sufficient 
for 
law 
enforcement officers to order a warrantless investigatory blood 
draw.  In McNeely, the Court considered an appeal in which the 
State of Missouri argued for the creation of a per se rule 
nearly identical to our holding in Bohling.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1556.  The Missouri Supreme Court held "Schmerber directs 
lower courts to engage in a totality of the circumstances 
analysis 
when 
determining 
whether 
exigency 
permits 
a 
nonconsensual, warrantless blood draw."  Id. at 1557.  The 
United States Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve a 
split 
of 
authority 
on 
the 
question 
whether 
the 
natural 
                                                 
10 As explained above, probable cause to arrest "substitutes 
for the predicate act of lawful arrest."  State v. Bohling, 173 
Wis. 2d 529, 534 n.1, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993) (citation omitted).  
This portion of our holding is not affected by McNeely. 
11 We decided Bohling on January 26, 1993, and the Supreme 
Court decided McNeely on April 17, 2013. 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
17 
 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per 
se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an exception to 
the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in 
drunk-driving investigations."  Id. at 1558.  The Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment does not allow such per se rules in 
the context of warrantless investigatory blood draws.  Id. at 
1561 (stating that a per se rule would be a "considerable 
overgeneralization" of Schmerber).  The Court in McNeely 
clarified its decision in Schmerber and explained that, while 
the 
natural 
dissipation 
of 
alcohol 
in 
the 
defendant's 
bloodstream was a significant factor in its analysis, it was not 
dispositive.  Id.  Thus, because an investigatory blood draw 
"implicates an individual's most personal and deep-rooted 
expectations 
of 
privacy," 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
exigent 
circumstances, a warrant is required in order to perform an 
investigatory blood draw.  Id. at 1558 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
¶30 The Court noted that advancements in technology since 
Schmerber have greatly reduced the time and effort needed to 
secure 
a 
warrant 
before 
an 
investigatory 
blood 
draw 
is 
performed, resulting in more time for law enforcement officials 
to obtain a warrant.  Id. at 1562.  McNeely did, however, 
acknowledge that such improvements do not guarantee that a judge 
or magistrate will be available to approve a warrant in all 
situations. 
 
Id. 
 
McNeely 
further 
suggested 
that 
such 
improvements do not eliminate the possibility that circumstances 
may make it impractical for law enforcement to even attempt to 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
18 
 
obtain a warrant.  Id. at 1568.  While a "variety of 
circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify 
a warrantless search," in each circumstance the exigency will be 
"a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a 
warrant."  Id. at 1558-59 (citations omitted).  Nevertheless, 
where law enforcement officers can "reasonably obtain a warrant 
before a blood sample can be drawn . . . the Fourth Amendment 
mandates that they do so."  Id. at 1561 (emphasis added). 
¶31 McNeely recognized the difficulty such a requirement 
creates for law enforcement, and explained that "exigent 
circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in 
the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the 
warrant application process."  Id. at 1563.  As a result, while 
the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream alone does 
not create an exigent circumstance, it may serve to support a 
finding of exigency.  Id.  Thus, the Court was clear that law 
enforcement must procure a warrant when it is reasonable to do 
so under the facts and circumstances of the situation.  However, 
law enforcement is not required to obtain a warrant when there 
is "a compelling need for official action and no time to secure 
a warrant."  Id. at 1559, 1561. 
¶32 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in McNeely, 
we recognize our holding in Bohling, that the rapid dissipation 
of alcohol alone constitutes an exigent circumstance sufficient 
for 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
to 
order 
a 
warrantless 
investigatory 
blood 
draw, 
is 
no 
longer 
an 
accurate 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
19 
 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone no longer constitutes a 
per se exigent circumstance.  Exigent circumstances, sufficient 
to justify a warrantless investigatory blood draw of a drunk-
driving suspect, are to be determined on a case-by-case totality 
of the circumstances analysis. 
1. 
McNeely Applies to Kennedy's Case.  
¶33 Following the Supreme Court's decision in McNeely, it 
is also necessary to determine whether its holding applies 
retroactively to Kennedy's case.  We recently discussed the 
principle of retroactivity in State v. Dearborn.  In Dearborn, 
we explained that "newly declared constitutional rules must 
apply to all similar cases pending on direct review."  Dearborn, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶31 (citations omitted).  As Kennedy's direct 
appeal was not yet final12 when the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in McNeely, its holding applies and the State may not 
rely solely on the natural dissipation of alcohol to justify the 
warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Kennedy.  
Thus, even if the police officers acted in accordance with clear 
and settled Wisconsin precedent at the time they ordered the 
warrantless investigatory blood draw, we must nevertheless 
analyze their conduct in light of McNeely.  If the warrantless 
                                                 
12 In the context of retroactivity, "final" means "a case in 
which 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
has 
been 
rendered, 
the 
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition 
for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally 
denied."  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987). 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
20 
 
investigatory blood draw was unconstitutional under McNeely, we 
must then consider whether the exclusionary rule applies. 
2. 
The State Does Not Argue that the Warrantless Investigatory 
Blood Draw Performed on Kennedy was Constitutional. 
¶34 In 
order 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
warrantless 
investigatory blood draw performed on Kennedy was constitutional 
we look to whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
police officers could reasonably have obtained a warrant before 
ordering an investigatory blood draw be performed on Kennedy.  
See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.  We note that it is the State 
that bears the burden of proving the existence of exigent 
circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless investigatory 
blood draw.  See State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463.  Under McNeely, the Supreme Court 
left open the possibility that exigent circumstances could exist 
even in "an ordinary traffic stop" due to the "procedures in 
place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a 
magistrate judge," among other factors.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 
1568.  However, the State has not attempted to meet its burden 
in this case.  In light of the State's concession, we find it 
difficult to address whether exigent circumstances did or did 
not exist, because we are deprived of arguments by either the 
State or Kennedy.  As a result, we will assume, without 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
21 
 
deciding, that exigent circumstances did not support the blood 
draw performed on Kennedy.13   
3. 
The Police Officers Acted in Accordance with Clear and 
Settled Precedent and Thus, the Good-Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule Applies. 
¶35 In ordering the warrantless investigatory blood draw 
on Kennedy the police followed our clear and settled precedent 
in Bohling.  Accordingly, we analyze whether the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies. 
¶36 "[S]ince its inception, the exclusionary rule has been 
a remedy, not a right."  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶48, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 
629 
N.W.2d 625. 
 
The 
main 
purpose 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and "necessarily 
assumes that the police have engaged in willful or, at the very 
least, negligent conduct which has deprived a defendant of a 
constitutional right."  Id., ¶45 (quoting State v. Gums, 69 
Wis. 2d 513, 517, 230 N.W.2d 813 (1975)).  Moreover, application 
of the exclusionary rule "is not absolute, but requires a 
                                                 
13 The State, which would bear the burden, does not argue 
that exigent circumstances existed in this case.  Neither the 
State nor Kennedy focus on this issue.  Whether an exigency 
exists in a given case will vary depending on any number of 
facts or circumstances, as law enforcement investigations are 
often extraordinarily fluid situations.  Our holding in this 
case must not be read to affirmatively conclude that exigent 
circumstances did not support the warrantless investigatory 
blood draw performed on Kennedy.  Nonetheless, our analysis 
remains focused on the arguments addressed by counsel and 
ultimately 
rests 
upon 
an 
application 
of 
the 
good-faith 
exception. 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
22 
 
weighing of the pertinent interests."  Id., ¶43.  Thus, the 
exclusionary rule applies "most appropriately when the deterrent 
benefits outweigh the substantial costs to the truth-seeking and 
law enforcement objectives of the criminal justice system."  
Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶38.  As such, "the exclusionary rule 
should not apply when the police act in good faith, or in 
'objectively reasonable reliance' on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant."  Id., ¶36 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 142 (2009)); see also Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶74.  
Further, police conduct must be "sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion 
can 
meaningfully 
deter 
it." 
 
Dearborn, 
327 
Wis. 2d 252, ¶36 (citing Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).   
¶37 Here, 
the 
police 
committed 
no 
misconduct 
and 
application of the exclusionary rule would be both inappropriate 
and unnecessary as the police acted in accordance with clear and 
settled 
Wisconsin 
precedent 
in 
ordering 
the 
warrantless 
investigatory blood draw.  "[T]he good-faith exception precludes 
application of the exclusionary rule where officers conduct a 
search [or seizure] in objectively reasonable reliance upon 
clear and settled Wisconsin precedent that is later deemed 
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court."  Id., ¶51.  
As we explained above, our decision in Bohling was the settled 
law in Wisconsin for the two decades preceding the decision in 
McNeely.  Our holding in Bohling was clear and straightforward: 
"the 
dissipation 
of 
alcohol 
from 
a 
person's 
bloodstream 
constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood 
draw."  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 547.  Officer Asselin and the 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
23 
 
other police officers involved in this case followed that rule.  
To apply the exclusionary rule here would be counter to the 
purposes for which it was created.  Where police officers have 
acted in accordance with clear and settled Wisconsin precedent, 
there is no misconduct to deter.  Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 
¶44.  We see no reason to depart from Dearborn and our 
application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  As a result, the officers' reliance on Bohling was 
reasonable and the results of Kennedy's warrantless blood draw 
will not be suppressed. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶38 We conclude that the police had probable cause to 
believe that Kennedy had committed a drunk-driving related crime 
or offense.  Therefore, Kennedy's arrest was lawful. 
¶39 Following our interpretation of the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California, we held 
that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream of a 
suspect created a sufficient exigency so as to justify a 
warrantless investigatory blood draw.  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 
547.  The police in this case acted in accordance with our 
holding 
in 
Bohling 
when 
they 
ordered 
the 
warrantless 
investigatory blood draw performed on Kennedy.   
¶40 During the pendency of this case, however, the United 
States Supreme Court abrogated our holding in Bohling.  McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. 1552.  In light of that abrogation, we accept, as we 
must, McNeely's totality of the circumstances test for the 
purpose of determining whether exigent circumstances are present 
No. 
2012AP523-CR   
 
24 
 
so as to justify warrantless investigatory blood draws in cases 
involving "drunk-driving related violation[s] or crime[s]."   
¶41 The State has not argued that exigent circumstances 
exist so as to justify the warrantless investigatory blood draw 
performed on Kennedy.  Because the State does not argue that 
exigent circumstances existed, we assume, without deciding, that 
the warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Kennedy 
was not supported by exigent circumstances.  However, we 
conclude that the police acted in objectively reasonable accord 
with the clear and settled Wisconsin precedent existing at the 
time the warrantless investigatory blood draw was performed on 
Kennedy.  Therefore, the good-faith exception applies and we 
affirm the court of appeals and uphold Kennedy's conviction.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2012AP523-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
instant case is part of a trilogy of cases examining the 
constitutionality of warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws 
performed on persons suspected of driving under the influence of 
an intoxicant in light of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013).  The other two cases in this trilogy are State v. 
Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, and 
State v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
For a discussion of these three opinions, including the instant 
case, and the issues arising therein, see my dissenting opinion 
in State v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___. 
 
No.  2012AP523-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1