Title: State ex rel. First New Shiloh Baptist Church v. Meagher

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. FIRST NEW SHILOH BAPTIST CHURCH, APPELLEE, v. MEAGHER, 
JUDGE; ROBINSON ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. First New Shiloh Baptist Church v. Meagher (1998), ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Civil procedure — Court properly denies postjudgment motion to intervene, 
when — Civ.R. 24, construed and applied. 
(No. 97-1543 — Submitted June 9, 1998 — Decided August 5, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-960371. 
 
Appellants, several individual members of appellee First New Shiloh 
Baptist Church, filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 
to oust the church’s pastor, Michael Cash.  Appellants claimed to represent the 
church as its board of trustees.  The common pleas court dismissed the complaint 
because it concluded that under the church’s constitution, the proper governing 
body of the church was its board of directors rather than the board of trustees. 
 
The church, as authorized by the board of directors, then filed suit in the 
common pleas court to recover from appellants the funds the church expended in 
defending against appellants’ previous suit as well as two criminal cases in which 
Cash was charged with trespassing on church property.  Appellants filed an 
answer and a third-party complaint naming the church and the members of the 
church’s board of directors as third-party defendants.  Among other things, 
appellants again requested that Cash be ousted as pastor of the church.  Appellee 
Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge John M. Meagher overruled the 
third-party defendants’ motions to dismiss appellants’ third-party complaint for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Judge Meagher ordered that the church’s 
financial records be audited and that an election be held to determine whether 
Cash should continue as pastor of the church. 
 
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Shortly thereafter, in May 1996, the church filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Hamilton County, naming Judge Meagher as the sole respondent.  The 
church requested a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Meagher from exercising 
jurisdiction over appellants’ third-party complaint.  The church and Judge 
Meagher filed evidence and memoranda, and the court of appeals granted 
appellants leave to file an amicus curiae memorandum seeking denial of the writ. 
 
In April 1997, the court of appeals granted the writ of prohibition.  The 
court of appeals held that appellants’ third-party claims related to ecclesiastical 
matters outside the jurisdiction of the common pleas court.  By letter dated May 
12, 1997, Judge Meagher’s attorney advised appellants that he would neither 
appeal nor request reconsideration of the court of appeals’ judgment.  On May 15, 
appellants filed a motion to intervene as of right under Civ.R. 24(A)(2) in the 
prohibition action in order to request reconsideration and appeal the issuance of 
the writ.  In June 1997, the court of appeals denied appellants’ motion to 
intervene. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon appellants’ appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Arthur C. Church Co., L.P.A., and Arthur C. Church, for appellee. 
 
William D. Bell, Sr., for appellants. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In their sole proposition of law, appellants assert that the court 
of appeals erred in denying their postjudgment motion to intervene.  The church, 
however, contends that the court of appeals properly denied appellants’ motion to 
intervene because it was not timely under Civ.R. 24. 
 
Civ.R. 24, which is patterned after Fed.R.Civ.P. 24, see Staff Notes to 
Civ.R. 24, provides: 
 
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“(A)  Intervention of right. 
 
“Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action:  (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
A trial court’s decision on the timeliness of a motion to intervene will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion.  See S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Kidney (1995), 
100 Ohio App.3d 661, 672, 654 N.E.2d 1017, 1024, citing Blackburn v. Hamoudi 
(1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 350, 352, 29 OBR 479, 480-481, 505 N.E.2d 1010, 1012-
1013; see, also, Grubbs v. Norris (C.A.6, 1989), 870 F.2d 343, 345-346, in which 
the federal appellate court, in analyzing the similarly worded federal rule, held that 
“a trial court’s decision with respect to the timeliness of a motion to intervene is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”1 An abuse of discretion implies 
an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.  State ex rel. Crabtree v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 673 N.E.2d 1281, 
1283. 
 
Whether a Civ.R. 24 motion to intervene is timely depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the case.  Norton v. Sanders (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 39, 42, 574 
N.E.2d 552, 554; NAACP v. New York (1973), 413 U.S. 345, 366, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 
2603, 37 L.Ed.2d 648, 663.  The following factors are considered in determining 
timeliness:  “(1) the point to which the suit had progressed; (2) the purpose for 
which intervention is sought; (3) the length of time preceding the application 
during which the proposed intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of 
 
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his interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the original parties due to the proposed 
intervenor’s failure after he knew or reasonably should have known of his interest 
in the case to apply promptly for intervention; and (5) the existence of unusual 
circumstances militating against or in favor of intervention.”  Triax Co. v. TRW, 
Inc. (C.A.6, 1984), 724 F.2d 1224, 1228. 
 
Appellants assert that the court of appeals abused its discretion by denying 
their motion to intervene, which was timely filed.  This assertion, however, is 
meritless and the court of appeals could have reasonably found that appellants’ 
motion to intervene was untimely for the following reasons. 
 
First, the prohibition action had already proceeded to final judgment when 
appellants filed their motion to intervene.  Intervention after final judgment has 
been entered is unusual and ordinarily will not be granted.  State ex rel. Gray Road 
Fill, Inc. v. Wray (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 812, 815, 673 N.E.2d 198, 200; 
Kourounis v. Raleigh (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 315, 318, 624 N.E.2d 276, 277. 
 
Second, the purpose of appellants’ attempted intervention is not compelling 
because it would probably result only in reconsideration of claims or objections 
appellants previously presented to the court of appeals in their amicus curiae 
memorandum.  See United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. (C.A.2, 1994), 25 F.3d 66, 
73; Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (C.A.7, 1987), 824 F.2d 531, 537; 
United States v. BASF-Inmont Corp. (C.A.6, 1995), No. 93-1807, unreported, 
table decision reported at 52 F.3d 326 (“Where intervention would result only in 
the reconsideration of claims or objections previously presented to and rejected by 
the district court, the purpose of intervention [for appeal] is not compelling.”). 
 
Third, appellants knew or should have known of their interest in the 
prohibition action prior to judgment.  Their contention that they acted promptly 
because they could not have intervened prior to the entry of judgment lacks merit.  
 
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Non-public officials may intervene in a prohibition case if they meet the Civ.R. 24 
requirements for intervention.  See, e.g., Dept. of Adm. Serv., Office of Collective 
Bargaining v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 48, 51, 562 N.E.2d 
125, 128; State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 304, 686 N.E.2d 238, 240; State ex rel. 
Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 490, 678 N.E.2d 1365, 1366.  The lone case cited by 
appellants in support of their contention that they could not have intervened in the 
prohibition action until final judgment, State ex rel. Cleveland Trust Co. v. 
Probate Court of Cuyahoga Cty. (1959), 113 Ohio App. 1, 17 O.O.2d 1, 162 
N.E.2d 574, predated the adoption of Civ.R. 24 in Ohio and is consequently 
inapplicable.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Northwood v. Wood Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 487, 489, 672 N.E.2d 695, 696, and cases cited 
therein, holding that Cleveland Trust does not represent the “modern approach” 
taken by Ohio courts. 
 
Fourth, appellants failed to advance any viable reason necessitating 
postjudgment intervention other than the failure of Judge Meagher to appeal.  The 
failure to appeal, by itself, is insufficient to require a finding that an intervention 
motion is timely.  Chiglo v. Preston (C.A.8, 1997), 104 F.3d 185, 188-189. 
 
Finally, it appears that even if appellants had been granted leave to 
intervene, the court of appeals’ judgment granting the writ was appropriate.  See, 
generally, Leal v. Mohr (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 685 N.E.2d 229, 231 
(Appeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order appealed from.). 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err by denying the 
appellants’ motion to intervene.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals 
is affirmed. 
 
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Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
This unanimity in application of the abuse of discretion standard of review 
of timeliness determinations under Civ.R. 24 contrasts with the differing positions 
taken by courts concerning the applicable standard of review for a trial court’s 
determination of the satisfaction of the other requirements for intervention of 
right.  See, generally, 1 Klein & Darling, Civil Practice (1997) 990-991, Section 
AT 24-4, and cases cited therein, where the authors note that while most federal 
courts of appeals hold that, in ruling on an application for intervention of right, the 
determination of timeliness is reviewed for abuse of discretion and the 
determination of the applicant’s satisfaction of other Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) 
requirements is reviewed on a de novo or plenary basis, Ohio courts have applied 
an abuse of discretion standard for all of the Civ.R. 24(A)(2) intervention of right 
requirements.