Title: Moore Ex Rel. Benton County v. Renick

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

626 So. 2d 148 (1993) Attorney General Mike MOORE, ex rel., BENTON COUNTY, Mississippi and the Mississippi Ethics Commission v. William Jackson RENICK, Former Supervisor, District 3, Benton County, Mississippi. No. 90-CC-1263. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 4, 1993. Michael C. Moore and Larry E. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellant. Roger F. Wicker, Sparks Wicker & Colburn, Tupelo, Terry L. Jordan, Philadelphia, and Wendell H. Bryan, II, Amory, for appellee. Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, JR., JJ. DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice, for the court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Benton County, wherein on March 31, 1989, the Attorney General and the Mississippi Ethics Commission ("the appellants") filed suit against William Jackson Renick ("Renick"). *149 The suit alleged that Renick had violated Section 109 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 and various conflict of interest laws. These allegations arose out of certain actions taken by Renick while serving on the Benton County Board of Supervisors in relation to Benton, Inc., a furniture manufacturer located in Benton County. The appellants alleged a conflict of interest on the part of Renick because Renick's trucking company, A & R Trucking, conducted substantial business with Benton, Inc. Following extensive discovery, the appellants moved for summary judgment as did Renick. Following argument on the motions, the lower court denied the appellants' motion for summary judgment and granted Renick's motion for summary judgment on November 5, 1990. Judgment was entered on January 10, 1991. From this adverse judgment, the appellants appeal, assigning as error the following: We hold that the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Renick. Because this case was improperly decided on summary judgment, it would be premature for this Court to address the aforementioned assignments of error as they relate to the merits. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause for a trial or other disposition on the merits. Renick was a member of the Benton County Board of Supervisors during the years 1984-1988. In 1984, the Appalachian Regional Commission Office in Tupelo, Mississippi, advised the Chancery Clerk in Ashland, Mississippi, of a possible industrial prospect for the Benton County Industrial Park. This effort was initiated by Mr. Ken Hurt, then Executive Director of the Appalachian Regional Commission in Tupelo, and culminated with a series of negotiations that led to the location of the corporation in the Industrial Park. During the years 1984 through 1987, the Board, including Renick, passed many orders and resolutions to provide financial, as well as other, support for the industry in question Benton, Inc., a private furniture manufacturer. These orders, resolutions, and other actions involving Renick are the basis of the alleged ethical violations under Section 109 of the Mississippi Constitution. In an effort to aid Benton, Inc. in beginning its manufacturing operations, the first action taken by the Benton County Board of Supervisors was the passage of a resolution to begin the application process for a $150,000.00 Community Development Block Grant from the Governor's Office of Federal/State Programs. The initial resolution to set a public hearing on the application was passed on December 14, 1984. Subsequent to the public hearing, the Board passed a resolution to make an application for the grant on December 28, 1984. Renick seconded and voted for the adoption of these resolutions. On April 1, 1985, Renick introduced and voted for a resolution of the Board conveying five acres of land in the Industrial Park to Benton, Inc. on which to construct its operating facility. On April 2, April 19, May 6, and *150 June 3, all in 1985, Renick introduced, moved the adoption of and voted for resolutions of the Board to issue an industrial revenue note in the amount of $187,000.00. The proceeds of this note were used to build a facility for Benton, Inc. to house its manufacturing operations. According to Renick, on September 16, 1985, he called the Mississippi Ethics Commission and talked with Assistant Director Charles Brown about the legality of his doing business with Benton, Inc. This inquiry was made as the result of suggestions by Andy Morris, a vice-president of Benton, Inc., to Renick that Renick and David Akin form a trucking company and haul furniture for Benton, Inc. Although this date does not appear to be definitely established by the record, the record does indicate that this conversation took place sometime between April 1, 1985, and January 31, 1986, and that the date was alleged to be September 16, 1985. The exact substance of this conversation is disputed by the parties. Renick claims that he presented the facts to the Ethics Commission official and that he received permission to conduct business with Benton Inc. The appellants claim the assistant director responded to another totally different factual situation and question posed to him by Renick and advised Renick that no opinion of his would be official and further instructed Renick on how to obtain an official opinion. On November 4, 1985, Renick offered, moved the adoption of and voted for a resolution of the Board agreeing to assist Benton, Inc. in obtaining a $90,000.00 revolving loan from the Community Development Block Grant Program for the purpose of equipping Benton, Inc.'s facility. On February 26, 1986, Renick seconded and voted for a Board order amending this November 4, 1985, resolution to assist in obtaining the $90,000.00 revolving loan for Benton, Inc. On January 31, 1986, Renick and Akin formed a partnership called A & R Trucking. This business was formed by the two men with the expectation of contracting to haul furniture manufactured by Benton, Inc. On that same date, A & R Trucking contracted with Benton, Inc. to perform hauling services. The contract was signed for A & R Trucking by Renick. Subsequent to the signing of the contract, A & R Trucking began transporting furniture for Benton, Inc. As a result of this work, A & R Trucking was paid the sum of $88,776.13 by Benton, Inc. between February 7, 1986, the date of the first payment received by A & R Trucking, and April 27, 1987. On February 26, 1986, the same day that the Board amended the resolution concerning the $90,000.00 revolving loan, Renick introduced, recommended adoption of, and voted for a Board resolution authorizing the Board president to execute an agreement between the Board and Benton, Inc., which secured a loan of $25,000.00 for Benton, Inc. from the Tennessee Valley Authority. Renick also personally assisted Benton, Inc. in obtaining through the Board, an $18,000.00 award from the Appalachian Regional Community in Tupelo. Renick introduced, moved the adoption of and voted for a March 17, 1987, Board resolution requesting additional funding through the Governor's Office of Federal/State Programs for Benton, Inc., in the amount of $100,000.00. On March 27, 1987, Renick seconded a motion to pass and voted for a Board resolution agreeing to execute a promissory note and loan agreement in favor of the First National Bank of Ashland in the amount of $50,000.00 to secure additional funds for Benton, Inc. The present action was initiated by the appellants on March 31, 1989. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Renick on January 10, 1991, and this appeal followed. We begin by setting forth our scope of review. In Mississippi Ethics Com'n v. Aseme, 583 So. 2d 955 (Miss. 1991), the Ethics Commission brought suit against a physician for an alleged violation of Section 109 of the Mississippi Constitution and Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(2). Summary judgment was granted in favor of the physician. In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we stated: Aseme, 583 So. 2d at 957. Our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether there existed material issues of fact at the trial level. In reviewing the record, we are left with the inescapable conclusion that this action was improperly decided via summary judgment. The lower court found that Renick had previously talked to the assistant director of the Ethics Commission by telephone and obtained his verbal approval of Renick's business dealings with Benton, Inc., stating: We have consistently held that we will not disturb a trial judge's findings of fact unless the trial judge was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Omnibank of Mantee v. United Southern Bank, 607 So. 2d 76 (Miss. 1992); Melchiors v. Melchiors, 607 So. 2d 1237 (Miss. 1992); Walters v. Patterson, 531 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1988). Where the trial judge's findings of fact are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record, this Court will not reverse. Allied Steel Corp. v. Cooper, 607 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1992); Crowe v. Smith, 603 So. 2d 301 (Miss. 1992). However, if the record is devoid of such credible evidence and the trial judge's ruling is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we will not hesitate to reverse. In the case at bar, the evidence reveals that there is no dispute as to the fact that a conversation did take place between Renick and a high-ranking official with the Mississippi Ethics Commission. The appellants even admit that this conversation led Renick to believe his actions were proper. However, the appellants contend that any permission given by the Ethics Commission official was in response to an entirely different factual scenario and further contend that the official informed Renick that this oral opinion was not binding and that Renick *152 needed to get a written opinion, a fact Renick denies. Based on the admissions of the appellants in response to discovery propounded by Renick and on the affirmative defenses set forth in Renick's answer, the lower court found that everything done by Renick had been cleared through the Ethics Commission. However, a review of the record reveals that the only evidence supporting such a conclusion is the affirmative defense set forth in Renick's answer and the following request for admission by Renick and the appellants' response: The record is devoid of any other evidence supporting the lower court's conclusion that Renick cleared his actions with the Ethics Commission. The lower court did say that based on oral argument the contention was strong that the official in question was a high-ranking official with the Ethics Commission and approved all of Renick's actions. However, a transcript of this oral argument is not part of the record and the fact that Renick talked to a high-ranking official with the Ethics Commission is not disputed by any party. However, there is no other evidence before this Court supporting the lower court's finding of fact. Therefore, we find that the lower court erred in concluding as a matter of fact that Renick cleared his conduct with the Ethics Commission before taking any action. As noted above, the lower court found that Renick's actions were cleared by the Ethics Commission. As such, the lower court found that this clearance by the Ethics Commission operated as a waiver of the appellants' right to sue Renick for his alleged violation of the law, stating: Renick claims that the lower court did not err in holding the appellants estopped to pursue the suit due to the fact that had he not obtained permission from the Ethics Commission, then this suit would never have occurred. While it is not entirely clear, it appears that Renick argues that as he relied to his detriment on the Ethics Commission's opinion, then the appellants are equitably estopped from suing him for an alleged ethical violation. We encountered a similar situation in Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1985). In Suggs, two store-owners, Suggs and Killebrew, sued the Town of Caledonia, seeking to enjoin the town from enforcing a municipal ordinance regarding the sale of beer. The chancellor held the town equitably estopped from enforcing the ordinance against Suggs but held that the ordinance could be enforced as to Killebrew. While both parties appealed, we are concerned only with our opinion in that case insofar as it pertained to Killebrew. Killebrew argued on appeal to this Court that he had relied on the representations of the Mayor of Caledonia in locating his store where he did. Therefore, Killebrew argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was applicable, the factors being: Suggs, 470 So. 2d at 1057. We rejected Killebrew's argument and affirmed the decision of the lower court, stating: Suggs, 470 So. 2d at 1057. Our decision in Suggs is one in a line of cases wherein this Court has held that the state is not estopped from filing suit due to the unauthorized acts of one of its officials. See also Board of Educ. of Lamar County v. Hudson, 585 So. 2d 683 (Miss. 1991); Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1989); Oktibbeha County Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Sturgis, Miss., 531 So. 2d 585 (Miss. 1988); Robert E. Ratliff Co., Inc. v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 400 So. 2d 1211 (Miss. 1981) (verbal statement by employee of public body cannot work estoppel as against state or any other political subdivision). This principle is relevant due to the fact that the appellants claim that any oral permission given by the Ethics Commission official was unauthorized and as such cannot estop the State in this action. In support of its argument that the official's actions were unauthorized, the appellants cite the laws governing the Ethics Commission during the time Renick was in office, 1984-1988. Under these laws, the Ethics Commission could not give oral advisory opinions and could only issue advisory opinions on matters involving economic interests. This power was set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-17(j), which states in relevant part: According to the appellants, it was not until 1989 that the Ethics Commission was statutorily empowered to issue advisory opinions on a host of conflict of interest situations. The Ethics Commission was empowered to render such opinions with the addition of Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-17(i) which reads in relevant part: The appellants claim that "in 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987, the Ethics Commission had absolutely no authority to issue advisory opinions on the conflict of interest laws which afforded any legal protection to the requestor whatsoever." Renick has cited no statutory authority for his position and we have found none. Accordingly, we cannot sustain the grant of summary judgment based on the theory of waiver. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment for appellee was improper and must be reversed and the cause remanded. Upon remand, we call the trial court's attention to Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-107(2). Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-107 provides: Under Section 109 of the Mississippi Constitution, the attorney general has the right to have a court declare contracts made in violation thereof void and to recover all sums paid under said void contracts. As noted above, Renick was charged with violating this section. However, the appellants also charged Renick with a violation of several of the various ethics laws, codified in Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-101 et seq. These laws govern the conduct of public officials, detailing actions which are proscribed by law and which constitute a conflict of interest. Additionally, these statutes detail the powers and remedies available to the State when a public official is accused of an ethics violation as well as the protections afforded said public official by the ethics statutes. Many of these protections, as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-107, are beyond those ordinarily afforded a defendant in an ordinary civil action. One final point concerns our decisions in Waller v. Moore ex rel. Quitman County, 604 So. 2d 265 (Miss. 1992) and Towner v. Moore ex rel. Sch. Dist., 604 So. 2d 1093 (Miss. 1992). In both Waller and Towner, summary judgment was entered against the defendants in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-107(2). *155 In Waller, the issue was not raised on appeal. However, in Towner, the appellants raised the issue on appeal. We held in that case that Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-107(2) did not alter our summary judgment procedure. We do not overrule Waller or Towner as they are distinguishable upon their facts. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a trial or other disposition on the merits of this cause. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, JR., and SMITH, JJ., concur.