Title: STRICKLAND v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STRICKLAND v. STATE2004 WY 9194 P.3d 1034Case Number: 01-196Decided: 07/30/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

FLOYD 
STRICKLAND,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Initial 
Brief and First Supplemental Brief:  
Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel, Cheyenne, Wyoming.*

 

Second 
Supplemental Brief:  Jason M. 
Tangeman of Anthony, Nicholas, Tangeman & Yates, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.  Oral argument by Mr. Tangeman. 

 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
and Timothy William Jones, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Jones.

 

* 
Public Defender's Office allowed to withdraw on March 27, 
2003

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Appellant, 
Floyd Strickland (Strickland), was convicted of both first degree arson1 and second degree arson,2 for feloniously setting fire to his 
home with the intent to collect the insurance proceeds.  Concurrent sentences of 120 months to 
216 months, and 60 months to 108 months were imposed.  Strickland seeks review of those 
convictions, raising more than a dozen issues.  We will affirm the judgment of 
convictions, but remand with directions that the district court either delete, 
or flesh out, a provision in the sentence that essentially bans Strickland from 
Natrona County if he is placed on parole or other limited 
release.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
We 
summarize the issues raised by Strickland in his initial 
brief:

 

I.          
Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Strickland of 
first-degree arson?

 

II.          
Did Strickland's counsel fail to provide effective assistance of counsel 
by not calling an expert witness to testify at trial, or by not submitting jury 
instructions on alibi or specific intent?

 

III.         
Did omission of the words "towards another" in the jury instruction 
defining "maliciously" constitute error?

IV.        Did 
the district court sufficiently instruct the jury on the specific intent element 
of both first-degree arson and second-degree arson?

 

V.        Did 
the district court err when it did not appoint substitute counsel for 
Strickland?

 

VI.        Did 
the district court err when it denied Strickland's motion to suppress 
evidence?

 

VII.       Did the 
district court err when it admitted into evidence the written report of arson 
investigator Harry Morrow?

 

VIII.      In sentencing 
Strickland, did the district court unlawfully banish him from Natrona 
County?

 

IX.        Was 
cumulative error committed?

 

X.        Was 
Strickland's right against double jeopardy violated when he was convicted and 
sentenced for both first-degree arson and second-degree 
arson?

 

In 
a supplemental brief, Strickland expanded on the last issue listed 
above:

 

XI.        
Whether Strickland's convictions for first-degree arson and second-degree 
arson cannot stand because the two crimes are mutually exclusive and punishment 
for both crimes violates Strickland's right to be free from double 
jeopardy?

 

In 
a second supplemental brief, Strickland raised these additional 
issues:

 

XII.       Whether the 
State of Wyoming's repeated introduction of impermissible 404(b) evidence and 
other conduct constituted prosecutorial misconduct and such misconduct 
prejudiced a substantial right of [Strickland] and denied his right to a fair 
trial?

 

XIII.      Whether in light 
of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside the 
wide range of professionally competent assistance and prejudiced [Strickland] so 
that the adversarial process was compromised and the trial did not reach a just 
result?

 

The 
State essentially conforms its statement of the issues to that offered by 
Strickland.  The State does contend 
that with respect to several issues no objections were lodged below or the issue 
was not otherwise called to the attention of the trial court and, therefore, 
those issues must be addressed under the plain error 
standard.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Strickland 
returned to Casper after a family vacation on Saturday, June 17, 2000, and 
discovered that his home had been damaged by fire during his absence.  Police Officer Richard Brown was 
dispatched in response to Strickland's 911 telephone call.  Strickland told Officer Brown he had 
already looked inside the house and could hear water running and smell a burning 
odor.  Officer Brown testified that, 
in response to a question about the cause of the fire, Strickland related that 
he had filed a lawsuit and had alienated a number of people.  However, Strickland also indicated that 
the cause could have been a broken water pipe because the house was in bad 
shape.  When Strickland informed 
Officer Brown that he had found a door into the garage unlocked and partially 
open, Officer Brown examined the door knob and the door frame closely and 
carefully, using his flashlight, and did not observe any latent finger prints or 
indications that it had been pried open.  
However, a few days later a fellow police officer showed Officer Brown a 
piece of the door frame that he had taken from the scene on June 18, and it had 
what appeared to be fresh pry marks on it.  
Officer Brown was certain that had the marks been there the night he was 
there, he would have noticed them, because that is precisely what he was looking 
for.  Strickland told Officer Brown 
that all the doors to his home were secured when he left, that he was the last 
person out of the house, and that no one else had a key.  Strickland also directed Officer Brown's 
attention to a sliding glass door to the kitchen that was ajar, but Officer 
Brown did not detect any signs that the door had been forced open.  Strickland told Officer Brown that 
nothing was missing from the house, but that the contents of the basement, where 
most of the damage from fire and running water occurred, were worth over 
$30,000.  Officer Brown did not 
smell smoke in the house, though Strickland pointed out soot on the walls in the 
kitchen to him.  

 

[¶4]           
The 
electricity to the house was still on, and there was water running from a broken 
pipe in the basement, so Officer Brown called the service providers and had them 
shut off the power and water.   
Officer Brown waited at the house for the utilities to be shut off, and 
Strickland left with his family to go to a motel.  Officer Brown told Strickland that an 
evidence technician would be there the following day to continue the 
investigation.  Although Officer 
Brown made no determination of the cause of the fire that night, he related that 
Strickland knew that criminal activity was possibly involved and that an 
investigation into it would continue.

 

[¶5]           
Police 
Officer Michael Concepcion is the evidence technician who was assigned to 
further investigate Strickland's report of the fire in his home.  He arrived at the scene about 6:00 p.m. 
on June 18, and Strickland unlocked the front door and admitted him into the 
home.  Strickland directed Officer 
Concepcion's attention to a garage door that had pry marks on it as well as a 
screwdriver that Strickland said did not belong to him.  Officer Concepcion testified the pry 
marks appeared to have been made recently.  
Strickland told Officer Concepcion that he had pointed out the pry marks 
and the screwdriver to Officer Brown.3  The doorjamb itself was cut out and 
preserved as evidence.  Officer 
Concepcion opined that the pry marks on the doorjamb could have been made by the 
screwdriver Strickland identified as not belonging to him.  Officer Concepcion also noticed a 
plastic gas can near the door from the garage into the residence.  The gas can was open and the air valve 
on the back was raised.  Officer 
Concepcion then continued his portion of the investigation by taking photographs 
throughout the house.  When asked 
about suspects, Strickland identified the previous owner of the house and some 
real estate agents as possible suspects.  
Strickland also made a written list of those suspects as follows:  Roger and Fred Stratton; Victoria M. 
Lowe; Harry Willis; Michael K. Ward; Sandra Erickson; and John Logan.  Officer Concepcion found footprints in 
the soot on the kitchen floor.  
Strickland thought they were probably made by him or Officer Brown.  The final part of Officer Concepcion's 
work was done in the basement of the house, and after he observed and 
photographed that area, he called his supervisor to request that a fire 
inspector be sent to the scene.  
Strickland asked Officer Concepcion several times if he thought the fire 
was caused by arson.  Officer 
Concepcion asked Strickland if anything was missing from the house, and 
Strickland replied that nothing was missing, but that he takes his personal 
belongings with him on vacation.  
Officer Concepcion noticed the house was kind of "sparse," not much 
hanging on the walls or on top of dressers.        

 

[¶6]           
Harold 
Morrow, a trained and experienced fire/arson investigator, was dispatched to the 
Strickland residence late in the afternoon of June 18, 2000.  Officer Concepcion was already at the 
scene, as was Strickland.  Morrow 
obtained permission from Strickland to enter the home, and Officer Concepcion 
led Morrow to the basement.  Morrow 
photographed the fire scene and made a diagram of the entire basement.  Morrow was able to identify the origin 
of the fire in a small utility closet where the water heater was located.  Morrow took note that the water heater 
was an electric appliance, and although he had seen instances where gas water 
heaters had caused a fire, he had not seen that with electric ones.  Because Morrow had less experience with 
a fire situation such as this one, he called in Fire Chief Rich Carpenter to 
continue the investigation.  Morrow 
visited with Strickland while they waited for Carpenter to arrive.  During that conversation Morrow became 
aware of Strickland's dispute over the house and the lawsuit with the previous 
owner and the realtor involved in the sale of the house.  He also noticed pry marks on the garage 
door as Strickland showed him around.

 

[¶7]           
Not 
long after Carpenter arrived, he ascertained that the fire had been deliberately 
set.  Morrow then brought in 
evidence cans and obtained a consent to search from Strickland.  In the area of the water heater, beneath 
fire debris, Carpenter found partially burned newspaper, a metal food rack, 
candle drippings, a gasoline soaked magazine, and the presence of newspapers 
stuffed behind the water heater.  In 
addition, the sheet rock wall behind the water heater had been punctured in 
three areas in what could have been an attempt to spread the fire through the 
fire resistant sheet rock and into the wall structure.  It was also evident that the fire had 
become hot enough to melt a solder joint in a hot water line, causing a breach 
in that line.  The escaping water 
had extinguished the fire.  The 
water continued to build up in the basement until it reached the level of the 
toilet and bathtub, and after that it leveled off at about two feet as water 
drained out through the toilet and tub.  
A mass of candle wax that Carpenter believed was from the fire area had 
floated all the way to the bathroom and settled on the floor near the 
toilet.  The candle appeared to have 
been one of significant size.  The 
fire was actually caused by the lit candle, which burned down until it lit the 
fumes from the gasoline soaked magazine and ignited the newspaper.  Morrow informed Strickland of the 
results of the investigation and that the evidence established that the fire was 
an arson.  Strickland reacted calmly 
to that news.  Had the fire not been 
extinguished by the broken water line, the fire had the potential to have 
destroyed the house.

 

[¶8]           
Derrick 
Dietz, a detective for the Casper Police Department, became involved in this 
matter on June 18, 2000, when he was called to the scene by Officer 
Concepcion.  Immediately upon his 
arrival, and before any other words were exchanged, Strickland asked Officer 
Dietz if he was a suspect in the fire.  
Officer Dietz responded that he did not know.  While Officer Dietz attempted to survey 
the scene, Strickland followed him around, to some extent interfering with his 
ability to investigate.  In 
addition, Strickland volunteered a lot of information about the fact that he was 
away from home when the fire started, and that he had worked as a plumber and 
knew better than to start a fire near the water heater because he knew it would 
melt the water pipes and extinguish the fire.  Officer Dietz also noticed that the 
walls were sparsely decorated and things appeared to be missing from the walls 
and closets.  In order to facilitate 
the investigation process, Officer Dietz asked Strickland to come to the police 
station and talk with him.  
Strickland met Officer Dietz at the police station about forty minutes 
later.  He traveled there in his own 
car.  When Officer Dietz confronted 
Strickland with the suspicious nature of the evidence the police were finding, 
Strickland became angry and left.  
Officer Dietz also reviewed an examination under oath given by 
Strickland, which served as a comparison with what the various police officers 
had testified to, pointing out some inconsistencies and inaccuracies in that 
examination.

 

[¶9]           
Officer 
Dietz also testified that he found out that Strickland had a business office in 
Casper.  Officer Dietz obtained a 
search warrant for that office and conducted a search.  A lot of personal possessions not 
associated with the business were found boxed up in the office.  It was readily apparent that some of 
those things had been through the fire (were sooty, smelled of smoke), and some 
had not been through the fire.  The 
items that had not been through the fire were family photographs and keepsakes, 
valuables, firearms, financial records, important pieces of mail that were 
addressed to the Strickland's home address prior to the fire, etc., that could 
have been stored there to prevent them from being destroyed in a 
fire.

 

[¶10]      Strickland's 
home was insured by Allied Insurance.  
The policy covered the cost to replace/repair the home (which could 
include costs that exceeded the home's face value of about $159,500), as well as 
replacement contents coverage of $111,650.  
Strickland and his wife were the insureds and any recovery by them would 
have been barred if the damage had been intentionally caused by either one of 
them.  However, the mortgage holder 
was also a beneficiary of the insurance policy, irrespective of the cause of the 
fire.  A claim submitted to the 
insurance company by Strickland in 1999 was denied because the damage, caused by 
settlement/earth movement, was not covered by the policy or was a preexisting 
problem with the home predating his policy.  Strickland reported the fire damage that 
is the subject of this case to the insurance company on the morning of June 17, 
2000.  The insurance company 
completed a routine investigation of the claim, and it also hired an expert to 
conduct a "cause and origin" investigation of the fire.  The insurance company made an initial 
payment of $2,500 to Strickland for living expenses on June 21, 2000.  Eventually, Strickland submitted loss 
claims of about $140,000.  After 
completing its investigation, the insurance company denied the claim and voided 
the policy.  However, Wells Fargo, 
the mortgagor, was paid approximately $54,000 for the loss of its value in the 
house.

 

[¶11]      Strickland's 
insurer retained David Harvey to conduct a cause and origin investigation of the 
fire.  Harvey considered it unusual 
that Strickland's first reaction to his presence was to volunteer a detailed 
alibi of why he could not have set the fire.  Strickland told Harvey that nothing 
about the house had changed, nothing had been brought in or taken out, except 
for things taken by the police and fire investigators.  The only thing Strickland noted was that 
a can of Coleman camp fuel may have been missing from the garage.4  Harvey's investigation detected that a 
considerable amount of stuff had been brought into the house after the fire, and 
that many things also appeared to have been removed prior to the fire.  Harvey was afforded access to the 
evidence collected by the police, as well as having the results of his own 
investigation and testing.  Harvey 
also concluded the fire was an arson.

 

[¶12]      Sandra 
Erickson, the previous owner of Strickland's home, testified that she sold the 
house to Strickland for $110,000, and that he sued her because he alleged there 
were defects in the home that she had not disclosed.  She denied knowledge of any defects and 
testified that the lawsuit against her had been dismissed prior to the 
fire.  She also denied possessing a 
key to the house, giving anyone else a key to the house, or having anything to 
do with the fire.  The testimony of 
one of Strickland's neighbors suggested that, prior to the fire, he had 
compounded his problems with the value of the home by advertising it for sale 
for $475,000 and listing his grievances about the home's condition and the 
performance of the real estate agency.  
Fred Stratton testified that he sold the house at issue to Strickland, 
and Strickland had filed suit against his real estate firm, one of his agents, 
the home inspector, structural engineer, and the previous owner of the 
house.  Stratton related that he 
offered to settle the suit for $10,000, which he thought was a fair amount to 
repair and paint what he viewed as "cosmetic" flaws in the foundation and walls 
of the house.  Strickland wanted in 
excess of $100,000 to settle the suit.  
The lawsuit was eventually dismissed, and Stratton knew before the fire 
that it was going to be dismissed.  
Stratton denied having set the fire or knowing anyone that had anything 
to do with it.  Harry Willis, a home 
inspector who inspected Strickland's home prior to his purchase, testified that 
Strickland sued him and that he was always confident he would be vindicated, and 
that he had done nothing wrong in the course of performing his inspection.  He inspected the house a second time 
after Strickland complained.  He did 
find some new cracking in walls but considered them to be "cosmetic."  He also confirmed that the lawsuit 
against him was dismissed and that he had nothing to do with the 
fire.

 

[¶13]      Strickland 
testified in his own behalf, and cross-examination by the prosecutor revealed 
that he was having some financial problems prior to the fire as well as that he 
had provided false or inaccurate information on his application to become a real 
estate broker (that he had a college degree) and on a credit card application 
(that his real estate company had anticipated sales of one million dollars  in 
reality his fledgling company had no sales).  Strickland also testified on 
cross-examination that he reported a couple of backpacks and a sleeping bag as 
missing from his basement, and that in the backpacks were camp candles designed 
to be "ten-hour candles."

 

[¶14]      On 
January 11, 2001, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventh 
Judicial District charging Strickland with one count of first degree arson and 
one count of second degree arson.5 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶15]      On 
August 18, 2003, Strickland submitted supplemental authorities, conceding that 
our decision in Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶¶7-33, 64 P.3d 104, ¶¶7-33 
(Wyo. 2003), is dispositive of issues I, III, and IV, as set out by 
Strickland.  We agree with this 
concession.  We will not repeat all 
that is said in Keats, as it is a fairly comprehensive discussion of the 
subject matters covered by those issues.  
It suffices here to note that we held that first-degree arson is a 
specific intent crime and that an instruction which sets out all the elements of 
that crime, including that portion describing that the fire be set "with intent 
to destroy or damage an occupied structure," fulfills the need to instruct on 
specific intent.  In this case, just 
such an instruction was given and, as Keats concludes, it is not error, 
indeed it is the better practice, for the trial court to refuse an offered 
instruction further defining "specific intent."  In Keats, we also approved a 
"malice" instruction virtually identical to the one given here.  Further, we held that "malice" is not 
limited to ill will directed at another person, but rather may encompass any 
criminal act that is done deliberately and without justification.  Keats also makes clear that the 
evidence admitted in Strickland's trial was sufficient to sustain the jury's 
conclusion that he acted with "malice" in setting the fire in his 
home.

 

 

 

[¶16]      Strickland 
raised two separate ineffective assistance of counsel issues.  They are those numbered II and XIII of 
the issues raised by Strickland.  In 
the first of these, he contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to engage 
the services of an expert witness to counter the testimony of the State's three 
expert fire investigators (two Casper Fire Department employees and the expert 
hired by Allied insurance).  He 
enlarges on that, contending that as a whole his counsel were ineffective in 
defending him against the arson charges.

 

[¶17]      The 
standard of review to be applied here is well defined:

 

We 
recently reaffirmed our standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in Becker v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶12, 53 P.3d 94, ¶12 (Wyo. 
2002), and Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2001). Those cases approve the standard articulated in Jackson v. State, 
902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1995), and applied in Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000):

 

            
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial 
counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.  Herdt v. 
State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 
1266-67 (Wyo. 1995) [overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 1995)]; Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); Frias 
v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986).  The reviewing court should indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 
1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and 
Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 
1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., 
dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986); 
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.   
In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render 
such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" 
and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case."  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo. 1990). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064.

 

            
The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective therefore rests 
entirely on the Appellant.  
Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 660 (Wyo. 2000), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 1093, 121 S. Ct. 818, 148 L. Ed. 2d 702 
(2001).

 

Barkell 
v. State, 
2002 WY 153, ¶¶9-10, 55 P.3d 1239, ¶¶9-10 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶18]      With 
respect to counsel's failure to call an expert witness, we have 
held:

 

In 
McCoy v. State, 886 P.2d 252, 256 (Wyo.1994), we recognized that failure 
to call an expert witness may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, in Bloomquist v. State, 
914 P.2d 812 (Wyo.1996), we also stated that "the defendant must show that such 
expert testimony was available and necessary" and that "[a]ppellant must show 
that an expert was available who would have testified consistently with his 
theory."  Id. at 
820.

 

Barkell, 
¶16.

 

[¶19]      In 
his brief, Strickland concedes that "[w]hile failure to secure an expert witness 
in this case is not sufficient in itself to find ineffective assistance of 
counsel, counsel's further failure to submit proper instructions confirms that 
counsel was ineffective." The instructions Strickland claims should have been 
offered were an alibi instruction and a theory of the case instruction, as well 
as a specific intent instruction.  
We have already held above that the district court's instruction with 
respect to specific intent was proper.  
Our review of the record leaves no doubt that Strickland's "alibi" 
defense, if it can accurately be described as an "alibi" at all, was 
comprehensively presented to the jury and argued by counsel.  The record is also abundantly clear that 
Strickland's theory of his case was comprehensively presented to the jury 
through multiple witnesses and vigorously argued by counsel.  Defense counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to offer such instructions.

 

[¶20]      The 
issue of whether defense counsel should have called an expert witness on the 
subject of the fire's "cause and origin" was first broached in conjunction with 
a bevy of pro se post trial motions that included a motion for new trial, a 
motion to appoint new counsel, and a motion to reconsider previous rulings on 
similar motions filed by Strickland's attorney.  Strickland offered the affidavit of an 
"expert," Gerald L. Hurst, Ph.D.  
That affidavit disputed the testimony of the State's experts.  In addition, Hurst offered an opinion 
that an expert was necessary in Strickland's case and that his availability was 
well known to defense counsel well before trial.  Hurst also attested to the fact that he 
had made it known to defense counsel that he was willing to work pro bono and 
that he had sent a copy of his "CV" (curriculum vitae) to Strickland's 
attorney.  However, that CV is not 
attached to the affidavit nor is it otherwise included in the record.  We are unable to ascertain if Hurst 
really is an "expert," or if his testimony was "necessary," as that term is 
contemplated by the applicable case law.  
Strickland's presentation at the motion hearing indicated that defense 
counsel had consulted with experts but did not call one as a witness because 
"his testimony would not support my case."  
Strickland claimed he insisted that Dr. Hurst be called as a witness but 
defense counsel refused to do so.  
However, Strickland also related that defense counsel were told by Dr. 
Hurst that he "felt he would be a detriment to my case if he came to testify for 
me because he had testified in a trial in North Carolina for a distant cousin of 
mine . . . ."  This strongly 
suggests that the decision not to call an expert was a tactical one, and defense 
counsel opted to rely on intense cross-examination of the State's experts, as 
well as the lack of evidence placing Strickland at the scene when the fire 
occurred (the exact time of the fire was never established except that it 
occurred sometime while Strickland was gone on vacation).  We conclude that Strickland did not meet 
his burden of demonstrating that the failure to call an expert witness 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under these 
circumstances.

 

[¶21]      In 
his second supplemental brief, Strickland contends that defense counsel's acts 
or omissions were outside the range of professionally competent assistance and 
prejudiced the defendant so that the adversarial process was compromised and the 
trial did not reach a just result.  
Strickland contends defense counsel conceded in closing argument that the 
fire at Strickland's house was an arson, but then diverged from that argument to 
emphasize that the expert testimony was contradictory, incomplete or was not 
supported by the facts and, hence, could not be relied on.  Further, defense counsel did not object 
to the expert testimony of Mr. Morrow, even though he admitted he lacked 
experience in investigating a fire of this nature.  In addition, defense counsel did not 
object to the admission of Morrow's hearsay written report.  Next Strickland contends defense counsel 
did not object to the expert testimony of Mr. Carpenter when it was apparent 
that the purpose of his testimony was only to "blatantly bolster" Morrow's 
testimony.  Strickland claims that 
Morrow's testimony never came under attack and, therefore, such vouching for his 
credibility was improper.

 

[¶22]      In 
Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 894 (Wyo. 2000), we 
held:

 

Generally, 
one witness may not testify as to another witness' credibility.  See, e.g., Newport [v. 
State], 983 P.2d [1213] at 1215 [(Wyo. 1999)]; Gayler [v. 
State], 957 P.2d [855] at 860 [(Wyo. 1998)].   The purpose of this rule is to 
preserve the integrity of the jury process by protecting the jury's right to act 
as the final determiner of the credibility of the witnesses. Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860.  We have stated, 
however, that a trial court does not necessarily commit plain error when it 
allows testimony which illuminates some aspect of the case even though the 
testimony incidentally bolsters the credibility of another witness.  Id.; Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 1995).

 

In 
Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 534 (Wyo. 1993), we 
held:

 

            
Credibility of witnesses is always a question of fact for the trier of 
fact to determine.  
La Vigne v. Commw., 353 S.W.2d 376, 378-79 
(Ky. 1962).  
Witness credibility is subjective and may be affected by personal 
appearance, the perception of others, credibility of other witnesses, the theory 
of the case, the theme of the case, the order of witnesses and the character of 
the jury.  81 
Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 1027, p. 840 citing Purver, Young, Davis, and Kerper, The Trial Lawyer's Book:  Preparing and Winning Cases (1990), § 
11.3.  

 

The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, 
including the party calling him.  

 

W.R.E. 607.  A corollary to the rule allowing a party to 
attack the credibility of a witness is to permit the opposing party to bolster 
that credibility.  
Thus it has been held that:

 

Thus, the credibility of a witness does not have to have 
been the subject of attack before it can be bolstered as was traditionally 
required in past.  
Biunno, [Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, 
comment 4 to Evid.R. 20 (1990 Anno.)], at 263 (citing State v. Parsons, 83 N.J.Super. 430, 437, 200 A.2d 340 
(App.Div.1964)).  
The party calling a witness may thus attempt to support credibility 
through direct or redirect examination and through the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence.  Ibid. (citing State v. 
Johnson, 216 N.J.Super. 588, 603, 524 A.2d 826 (App. Div. 1987)).  Expert testimony may 
now be used to support a witness' credibility.  

 

State v. Frost, 242 N.J.Super. 601, 577 A.2d 1282, 1288 (1990).  We note that 
credibility may be supported or attacked by evidence of character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness and by specific instances of conduct only as 
provided in W.R.E. 608, but the restrictions therein do not apply to the effort 
to bolster credibility in this case.

 

[¶23]      Strickland contends that Morrow's testimony was not 
challenged by expert testimony and defense counsel only challenged Morrow's 
conclusions "on a common sense approach."  Continuing, Strickland asserts: "In light of 
the absence of an attack upon Mr. Morrow's credibility, an absence of a rebuttal 
expert, and the tepid cross-examination, any bolstering was improper and rose to 
the level of plain error in this matter."  Strickland further contends that if there is 
any doubt that the above evidence was improper, then certainly it was improper 
to call a third expert witness, Mr. Harvey from Allied Insurance, who had been a 
co-employee of Morrow and Carpenter at the Casper Fire Department for 
twenty-three years, and who provided essentially identical testimony to that of 
the other experts.

 

[¶24]      We note at the outset that defense counsel did not object on 
these bases during trial.  Lest Strickland assert that that too 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we hasten to add that there is no 
apparent basis for such an objection and the district court would not have 
abused its discretion in overruling any such objection.  In Mintun v. State, 966 P.2d 954, 959 (Wyo. 
1998), we held:

 

            
There is no rule limiting the number of witnesses a party may call on a 
particular fact or issue.  W.R.E. 403 permits a trial court to exclude 
relevant evidence for "considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."   This rule is to be used sparingly, 
because it excludes evidence which is concededly relevant and probative.  Towner v. State, 685 P.2d 45, 49 
(Wyo.1984).

 

            
Kwasnoski's mathematical conclusions, consistent with Sergeant Kourbelas' 
theories, served to corroborate Sergeant Kourbelas' testimony.  Corroborative 
evidence, however, is not needlessly cumulative evidence.  See Dallenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679, 682 
(Wyo.1977).  The 
testimony of Sergeant Kourbelas and Kwasnoski varies in that Sergeant Kourbelas 
was not able to perform the mathematical calculations necessary to ensure that 
his theories were consistent with the laws of physics.  Kwasnoski was able 
to perform these calculations, and did so using Sergeant Kourbelas' 
measurements.  
Sergeant Kourbelas and Kwasnoski enjoy different areas of expertise, and 
each presented testimony consistent with his area.  Kwasnoski's 
testimony was not needlessly cumulative.

 

            
Nor did Kwasnoski improperly vouch for Sergeant Kourbelas' 
credibility.  
Mintun admits it was proper for Kwasnoski to use the sergeant's facts and 
figures to reach a conclusion, but cries foul because the conclusion reached was 
the same as Sergeant Kourbelas'.  This argument is the product of Mintun's 
mistaken notion that it is improper for a party to call two expert witnesses 
whose opinions are the same.  The argument is lacking in substance and 
completely without merit.

 

Also see Winterholler v. Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621, 628-29 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶25]      We conclude that it was not improper for the State to have 
called three expert witnesses.  Our review of the record establishes that each 
expert supplemented and rounded-out the testimony of the others.  There was some 
redundancy, but only to the extent that it was necessary to make each witness's 
testimony sensical and put it in the proper perspective.  The State clearly 
established a proper foundation for the testimony of each expert and any 
objection based on foundation would have been imprudent, unnecessarily expending 
defense counsel's credibility and taxing the patience of the trial court.  It is also clear 
from the transcript that the experts were not used to vouch for the credibility 
of the others.  
Defense counsel's closing argument was certainly proper and may well have 
been wise.  He 
merely argued that though there was undoubtedly a fire set on purpose (arson), 
the evidence the State was able to collect and that the experts were able to 
examine did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Strickland was involved 
with the setting of that fire.  We hold that Strickland's counsel were not 
ineffective.

 

 

Failure of Trial Court to Appoint Different or Substitute 
Counsel

 

[¶26]      For this argument we employ the following standard of 
review:

 

We review the refusal to appoint substitute counsel for an 
abuse of discretion:

 

            
"While a trial court has the power in its discretion to appoint 
substitute counsel, its refusal to do so is not error unless an abuse of 
discretion is shown.  
A factual showing of good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel 
is essential to the demonstration of an abuse of discretion, and good cause is 
to be found in incompetence, commitment to a position or an interest which would 
conflict with the furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or other 
good reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to furnish effective 
assistance."

 

Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 951 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Wyo. 
1978)). The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful relationship with 
appointed counsel; the purpose of providing assistance of counsel is to ensure 
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.  Bell, 994 P.2d  at 
951.   A 
defendant has no right to the appointed counsel of his choice nor to counsel who 
would blindly follow his instructions.  Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 990 (Wyo. 
1998).  In 
evaluating Sixth Amendment claims,  "the appropriate inquiry focuses on the 
adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as 
such.'"  Bell, 994 P.2d  at 951-52 (quoting 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988)).  A court's own 
evaluation of counsel and the effect of any substitution upon the scheduled 
proceedings are proper considerations in addition to the reasons given for a 
defendant's dissatisfaction.  State v. Stenson, 
132 Wash. 2d 668, 940 P.2d 1239, 1272 
(1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008, 118 S. Ct. 1193, 140 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1998).

 

Allen v. State, 2002 WY 
48, ¶27, 43 P.3d 551, ¶27 (Wyo. 
2002); also see Stout v. State, 2001 WY 114, ¶7, 35 P.3d 1198, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2001).

            

[¶27]      The Public Defender's chief trial counsel, Wyatt Skaggs, one 
of the most experienced criminal defense attorneys in Wyoming, entered his 
appearance on Strickland's behalf on February 9, 2001.  Because 
irreconcilable differences developed between client and counsel, Skaggs was 
permitted to withdraw by order entered on March 1, 2001.  Eventually two other 
public defenders were appointed to represent Strickland.  In a letter filed in 
the district court on May 31, 2001, Strickland explained why the attorney/client 
relationship had failed with Mr. Skaggs, and why he felt his new attorneys were 
"incompetent, ineffective and/or negligent" in their representation of him.  A principal concern 
was the failure of his counsel to obtain the services of an expert witness.  The district court 
responded to that letter, explaining that any such request must be in the form 
of a motion and urging Strickland to confer with his counsel in that 
regard.  Defense 
counsel broached the subject with the district court on June 6, 2001, at the 
hearing on Strickland's motion to suppress (the trial commenced on June 18, 
2001).  The 
district court limited his comments to urging communication and cooperation 
between client and counsel, and again indicating that any concerns needed to be 
brought by motion.  
The matter was not further called to the trial court's attention in the 
form of a motion until July 2, 2001, after Strickland's trial was complete.  At that time he 
asked that new counsel be appointed to represent him in filing a motion for new 
trial.

 

[¶28]      Our holding in Allen, ¶32, is 
dispositive of this issue:

 

A district court has a duty to make some formal inquiry 
into, or engage the defendant in a colloquy regarding, the defendant's reasons 
for dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel when substitution of counsel is 
requested.  United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1210 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1254 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 972, 120 S. Ct. 415, 145 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1999)); United States v. 
Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1136, 117 S. Ct. 1003, 136 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1997).  Such an inquiry not 
only helps the defendant (especially when the request is pro se) "adequately to 
express the reason for his dissatisfaction with counsel, thereby promoting 
confidence in the integrity of the process and in the jury's verdict," but also 
"creates an opportunity for the court to ease the defendant's concern if it is 
ill-founded...." Graham, 91 F.3d  at 221.  However, even if 
appellant demonstrates that the district court did not properly address his 
motions to substitute counsel, he must demonstrate that the error was 
prejudicial to his case (i.e., that he was not afforded effective representation 
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment).  Graham, 91 F.3d  at 
221.   This 
Court having found that appellant's defense counsel was not ineffective, 
appellant has not met his burden on this issue.

            

Clearly it would have been the better practice for the 
district court to have reserved a few extra minutes to hear anything additional 
Strickland had to say, beyond what was in his letter, and to have treated his 
letter as a motion for substitute or new counsel.  Indeed, there will be circumstances where such 
a hearing is mandatory and identifying those circumstances at the time such an 
issue arises can be difficult.  A few minutes at a hearing could be a very 
valuable asset to affirming a case such as this on appeal.  However, we have 
exhaustively reviewed this record and can only conclude that Strickland's 
counsel were not ineffective, indeed, they performed their function quite 
well.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing substitute counsel 
under the circumstances of this case.

 

 

Error in Denying Motion to Suppress

 

[¶29]      In analyzing this issue we employ this standard of 
review:

 

Generally, we do not disturb a trial court's evidentiary 
rulings unless the court has clearly abused its discretion.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 
1994).  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).  We give 
deference to the trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress unless 
they are clearly erroneous, recognizing that court has had the opportunity to 
assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 
1995) (citing Wilson, 874 P.2d at 218).  Whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  Wilson, at 218.

 

Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 
51, ¶11, 67 P.3d 635, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2003).

            

[¶30]      Strickland maintains that we must apply a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court to the resolution of this issue.  In Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984), a plurality of the Court held that, absent consent 
or exigent circumstances, administrative searches into the cause and origin of a 
fire are subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 291-92, 104 S. Ct.  at 646; see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-05, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1947, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978).  Clifford is not 
applicable here because the record is very clear that not only did Strickland 
suspect that the fire was arson himself, he encouraged and facilitated the 
investigation of the fire, and consented to all the searches which produced 
incriminating evidence.  Applying the standard of review set out above, 
the district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress was not clearly 
erroneous, nor did the district court abuse its discretion.

 

 

Error in Admission of Fire Investigator's Report

 

[¶31]      Mr. Morrow, one of the fire investigators, prepared a 
written report of his cause and origin inquiry.  The State sought its admission in evidence, 
and the district court admitted it over Strickland's objection.

 

[¶32]      Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
showing of a clear abuse of discretion.  We will not overturn a trial court's 
discretionary decision unless the court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds 
of reason and could not rationally conclude as it did.  Decisions of the 
trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal.  Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 
2000). 

 

[¶33]      Strickland contends that admission of that report violated 
W.R.E. 803(8)(B).  
The primary premise of that rule is that the listed items are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

 

(8) Public records and reports. 
-- Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public 
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, 
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters 
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in 
criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement 
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the State in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant 
to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.  

 

W.R.E. 803(8)(B) (emphasis added). Strickland contends that 
Morrow was an "other law enforcement personnel" under the circumstances 
presented here and, therefore, the report was inadmissible.  This matter was not 
clearly enough developed below for us to conclude dispositively that the report 
at issue was admissible or inadmissible.  Professor Michael H. Graham's discussion of 
the issue suggests that the report was not admissible:

 

            
Records in any form setting forth matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, 
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel are admissible as a hearsay exception under Rule 
803(8)(B). The exclusion in Rule 803(8)(B) applies to observations made by 
police officers and other law enforcement personnel made at the scene of the 
crime, at the apprehension of the accused, or otherwise in connection with an 
investigation and not to records of routine, ministerial, objective 
nonevaluative matters made in nonadversarial settings.

 

            
The reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at 
the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable 
as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial 
nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal 
cases.  The 
limitation applies only to a public record or report offered by the prosecution 
in a criminal case; thus public records or reports containing statements of 
matters observed first-hand pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which there 
was a duty to report are admissible when offered by the criminal defendant.

 

30B Michael H. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 7049, at 480-88 (Interim ed. 2000) 
(footnotes and quotation marks omitted). 

 

[¶34]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-9-109 (LexisNexis 2001) (amended 2003) 
provides:

 

§ 35-9-109. Investigation of fires; notification to fire 
marshal; powers of fire marshal.

            
(a) The county fire warden or chief of the fire department of a city, 
town, or fire district shall investigate the cause, origin and circumstances of 
each fire occurring in the city, town, or district by which property has been 
destroyed or damaged in excess of five hundred dollars ($500.00).  The investigation 
shall be commenced within two (2) days.  The state fire marshal may direct the 
investigation.

            
(b) The officer investigating a fire shall notify the state fire marshal 
and within one (1) week of the fire shall furnish him a written statement of all 
facts relating to its cause and origin, and other information required by forms 
provided by the state fire marshal.

            
(c) The state fire marshal may investigate the origin or circumstances of 
any fire or explosion or any attempt to cause a fire or explosion.

            
(d) In performing the duties imposed by this act [§§ 35-9-101 through 
35-9-130], the state fire marshal may:

            
(i) Enter and examine any building or premises where any fires or attempt 
to cause fires occurred;

                        
(ii) Enter any building adjacent to that in which a fire or attempt to 
cause a fire occurred; and

                        
(iii) Take full control and custody of the buildings and premises until 
his examination and investigations are completed.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(vi)(E) (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides: "(vi) "Peace officer" includes the following officers assigned to duty 
in the state of Wyoming: . . . (E) Any duly authorized arson investigator 
employed by the state fire marshal."

 

[¶35]      It appears that the report should not have been admitted, 
but because of the lack of development of this issue below and rather cursory 
briefing in this appeal, we decline to definitively answer the question of 
whether Mr. Morrow was a law enforcement personnel under the circumstances of 
this case.  Of 
this we are certain, W.R.A.P. 9.04 and W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) mandate that "[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded" by the reviewing court.  Assuming for purposes of argument that the 
district court erred in admitting the report as evidence, we conclude that the 
error was harmless.  
The focal point of the testimony in this case was the evidence gathered 
by the fire investigators.  Mr. Morrow as well as Mr. Carpenter gave 
detailed testimony on direct examination, and the cross-examination was equally 
as detailed.  
The testimony was not complicated, and the report was relatively 
brief.  The 
error, if any, was harmless, and Strickland has failed in his burden to persuade 
us that it was prejudicial under the circumstances of this case.

 

 

Did the District Court Banish (Sundown) Strickland from 
Natrona County

 

[¶36]      This issue arises because of this comment from the district 
court at sentencing:  
"I would ask the order also reflect, if it would, [Prosecutor], that if 
[Strickland] is released on parole or [i]n any other manner prior to his full 
service of the sentence imposed here, that the Court requests and recommends 
that he not be allowed to return to Natrona County, Wyoming." The recommendation 
is memorialized in the Judgment and Sentence.  Strickland contends such a recommendation 
constitutes an illegal sentence and illegal sentences are, of course, 
prohibited.  An 
illegal sentence is one that exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of 
punishment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the 
law.  Bush v. State, 2003 WY 156, ¶8, 79 P.3d 1178, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2003).  The 
State focuses on the fact that the district court only articulated a 
"recommendation" that is not binding on the parole authority.

 

[¶37]      We agree with Strickland that such a strong (it is included 
in an "IT IS ORDERED" clause, and the word "strongly" is used) recommendation in 
a judgment and sentence exceeds the statutory limits of the sentence that can be 
imposed.  We are 
not convinced by the State's argument that because it is a mere recommendation 
it is not unlawful or an abuse of discretion.  We consider it significant that the record 
reflects that Strickland's wife and son live in Natrona County.  It has been held 
that a defendant may be banished from certain areas of a state, but such a 
condition must be related to the rehabilitative purposes of the sentence.  Sanchez v. State, 508 S.E.2d 185, 186-87 (Ga. App. 
1998); and see Commonwealth v. Thad T., 796 N.E.2d 869, 880 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (banishment from small geographic areas all right 
if it serves the purposes of probation).  A "banishment" may be deemed so unreasonable 
as to render the sentence void.  See Loving v. 
Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 82-83 (Va. Ct. App. 1966).  In a case more 
concerned with banishment of a defendant from a state or larger geographic 
region, rather than from a part of a state, it was held that banishment has no 
rehabilitative role in modern penology and is contrary to public policy.  State v. Charlton, 846 P.2d 341, 343-44 (N.M. 
App. 1992).

 

[¶38]      We conclude that portion of the sentence is unlawful and 
remand the sentence to the district court with directions that the offending 
paragraph be deleted from the Judgment and Sentence, or that it be justified by 
clearly articulated findings justifying the restriction on parole or other 
limited release, as they relate to the purposes of, e.g., parole, work release, or placement in community 
corrections.  In 
making such a structured examination of the relevant facts, the district court 
should also take into account where Strickland's wife and son reside.

 

 

Do Strickland's Sentences Violate Double Jeopardy 
Principles

 

[¶39]      In issues X and XI, Strickland contends that he is, in 
essence, being convicted of two crimes and being punished twice when he only set 
fire to one house, one time.  This reasoning is overly simplistic and flies 
in the face of established authority to the contrary.  The two statutes in 
question are set out in footnotes 1 and 2 at the beginning of the opinion.  It is clear upon 
cursory examination that each has an element that distinguishes it from the 
other.  
First-degree arson protects potential victims where an inhabited 
structure is set afire.  Second-degree arson vindicates victims of 
insurance fraud.  
Strickland's argument also suffers from a reliance on the belief that 
"malice" must be directed to the owner of the structure.  In the first section 
of our opinion we settled that issue.

 

[¶40]      The framework for our review of this issue is summarized in 
Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶¶14-16, 38 P.3d 1069, ¶¶14-16 
(Wyo. 2002):

 

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviews claims that a 
constitutional right has been violated by applying our de 
novo standard of review.  Burdine v. State, 
974 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo. 
1999).  The 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution guarantee that a person will not be placed twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense.  The double jeopardy provisions of the Wyoming 
and United States constitutions "have the same meaning and are coextensive in 
application."  
Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wyo. 
1977).  See also Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864 (Wyo. 
1992).  The 
double jeopardy constitutional guarantee provides three protections to persons 
accused of crimes:

 

It protects the accused who has been acquitted against a 
second prosecution for the same offense; it protects the accused who has been 
convicted against a second prosecution for the same offense; and it protects the 
accused against multiple punishments for the same offense.  

 

Amrein, 836 P.2d  at 864.   See also Frenzel 
v. State, 938 P.2d 867, 868 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied 522 U.S. 959, 118 S. Ct. 388, 139 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1997); Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977).  We are concerned with the second protection in 
this case.

 

            
The statutory elements test articulated in the famous United States 
Supreme Court case of Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), is used by this court to analyze claims 
that a person has been prosecuted twice for the same offense.  See e.g., Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 553 (Wyo. 
1995).  The Blockburger test is articulated as follows:

 

The applicable rule is that where the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the 
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is 
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does 
not.  

 

Blockburger, 284 U.S.  at 304, 52 S. Ct.  at 182.   See also Longstreth, 890 P.2d  at 553.

 

Also see Umbach v. State, 2002 WY 
42, ¶8, 42 P.3d 1006, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2002); and Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253-55 
(Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶41]      Strickland also relies on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(b)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2003), which provides that one penalty for first-degree arson 
is:  "A fine of 
not more than the greater of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) or two (2) 
times the face amount of insurance if the fire was started to cause collection 
of insurance for the loss."  We must, of course, evaluate these statutes as 
a whole, and we agree with the State that section would only affect 
punishment.

 

[¶42]      Strickland contends that he was, in essence, tried twice for 
the same crime and that he is punished twice for the same crime.  We conclude, as have 
other jurisdictions, that Strickland was properly tried, convicted, and punished 
for both first-degree and second-degree arson.  Land v. State, 802 N.E.2d 45, 51-52 (Ind.App. 2004) (no double jeopardy violation where defendant 
convicted of class B felony (arson damage to neighbor's residence) and class D 
felony (arson damage to his estranged wife's personal property)); State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386, 392 (Conn. 1993) ("The 
obvious purpose subsection (a)(3) [of the arson statute] is to prevent and 
punish fraud against the fire insurance industry, fraud for which the public 
pays in the long run.  
In contrast, the purpose of subsection (a)(4) is to protect the life and 
limb of those public servants charged with the dangerous duty of fighting 
fires."); and see Belser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 457, 
460-61 (Ind. App. 2000) (defendant properly convicted of both arson causing 
damage to person's dwelling without that person's consent, and arson endangering 
human life); People v. Walker, 593 N.W.2d 673, 678-79 
(Mich. App. 1999) (statutes punishing destruction of property of another by any 
means, and burning any personal property whether owned by himself or another, 
protect distinct societal norms); People v. Ayers, 
540 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Mich. App. 1995) (convictions for arson of dwelling and for 
burning insured property did not violate double jeopardy).

 

[¶43]      Strickland's double jeopardy rights were not violated.

 

 

Rule 404(b) Evidence and Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

[¶44]      Strickland contends he did not receive a fair trial because 
of numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct, particularly with respect to 
the admission, or attempted admission, of evidence in violation of W.R.E. 
404(b).  
Prosecutorial misconduct has always been condemned in this state.  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error affected the accused's 
substantial rights.  
The accused's right to a fair trial is a substantial right.  Wyo. Const. art 1, 
§§ 6, 9, 10.  
Before we hold that an error has affected an accused's substantial 
rights, and thus requiring the reversal of a conviction, we must be able to 
conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, 
in the absence of error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
accused.  Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶21, 54 P.3d 248, ¶21 (Wyo. 
2002); Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶9, 29 P.3d 787, ¶9 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶45]      W.R.E. 404(b) clearly prohibits evidence of prior bad acts 
to prove character disposed to criminal conduct.  "Under this subsection, evidence is 
inadmissible if the thrust of the evidence is only to demonstrate that the 
defendant had a disposition to commit crimes."  Simmons v. State, 
2003 WY 84, ¶19, 72 P.3d 803, ¶19 (Wyo. 
2003); and see Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶¶10-23, 42 P.3d 483, ¶¶10-23 (Wyo. 
2003).

 

[¶46]      Strickland correctly points out that the district court 
granted a motion in limine prohibiting any mention of Strickland's treatment at 
the Wyoming Behavioral Institute, though he did not prohibit testing 
Strickland's assertions during his civil action that, because of his mental 
condition and the fact that he was "heavily" drugged, he was not competent to 
proceed.  The 
prosecutor did broach the latter subject during his cross-examination of 
Strickland, but only for a purpose allowed under the district court's liminal 
order.  Defense 
counsel did not object to the questions and answers at the time, and from our 
review of the record that is because the questions were a valid inquiry into 
Strickland's ability to recall with accuracy the events that occurred before, 
during and after the time of the fire.  We find no prejudicial error in these 
circumstances.

 

[¶47]      Strickland claims the prosecution introduced inadmissible 
character evidence by stating (i.e., not asking a question, although it was 
during cross-examination) that Strickland had "skipped out" on his bill at a 
Casper motel.  
The State did not attempt to offer any evidence to support this 
assertion.  
Defense counsel objected, and the district court sustained the 
objection.  
Nonetheless, the prosecutor persisted in arguing his position to the 
court, and the district court had to repeat its ruling.  Given these 
circumstances, this can only be characterized as misconduct by the prosecutor 
and an apparent disregard of the applicable rules of evidence, which had been 
discussed in detail in preliminary motions hearings, as well as throughout the 
trial.  Such 
disregard of the prosecutor's responsibilities and obligations in the criminal 
justice process is unacceptable.  However, here the district court sustained the 
objection, and the jury was given both oral and written instructions to 
disregard any testimony for which an objection was sustained.  The district court 
should also have specifically told the jury that it should disregard the 
question/statement made by the prosecutor, and defense counsel should have asked 
for a limiting instruction.  In context, however, we think it is clear the 
jury was informed it could not consider that subject, and we decline to treat 
this unacceptable conduct as reversible error.

 

[¶48]      Strickland contends the State attacked his character by 
eliciting testimony from a witness that he had filed a frivolous lawsuit over 
problems he had with his home.  No objection was made to these questions, and 
in context we conclude the questions and answers were innocuous and not 
prejudicial.

 

[¶49]      Strickland contends that Rule 404(b) was violated when the 
prosecutor asked a witness if she had to file a lien on Strickland's home 
because he did not pay her bill for services.  She replied that she had.  The prosecutor then 
asked if she noticed how many liens were ahead of hers.  Defense counsel 
objected, and the district court sustained the objection.  Here again the 
district court was remiss in not specifically instructing the jury to disregard 
the subject of the offending questions.  And, once again both of these questions 
demonstrate the prosecutor's disregard of the statutory and constitutional 
protections afforded a defendant in the criminal justice system.  In context, we find 
no reversible error.

 

[¶50]      Strickland contends the prosecutor engaged in personal 
attacks on defense counsel.  Personal attacks on defense counsel are 
impermissible.  
Leiker v. State, 994 P.2d 917, 920 (Wyo. 
1999). The words used by the prosecutor in this case were:  "It is amazing a 
defense attorney who has never worked a scene, who has never investigated a fire 
can be an expert and disagree with the clear evidence of all the 
witnesses."  To 
begin with, we will identify this as a personal attack on the defense 
attorney.  
Secondly, the argument was outside the evidence, because there was no 
evidence that the defense counsel or Strickland had never "worked a scene" or 
"never investigated a fire."  This cannot be condoned as really being 
directed at the defendant rather than at defense counsel, as we have held in 
other cases, including Leiker.  See Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1066 (Wyo. 
2000).  This was 
a personal attack on defense counsel and could only serve to undermine the 
integrity of the proceedings in this case.  However, under the circumstances we are 
compelled to treat this misconduct as harmless error.  W.R.Cr.P. 52(a); 
W.R.A.P 9.04.

 

[¶51]      Strickland also contends the prosecution failed to disclose 
to Strickland exculpatory evidence.  In part, the State's theory of the case was 
that Strickland was having great financial problems and that he was motivated to 
burn his house in order to ease his financial problems.  Strickland asserts 
that the State did not disclose that it knew of a $22,000 check made out to 
Strickland that it uncovered in the course of its investigation.  The government's 
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant may deprive him of a 
fair trial.  It 
is defendant's burden to demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed evidence, 
the evidence was favorable to him, and the evidence was material.  Hensley v. State, 2002 WY 96, ¶14, 48 P.3d 1099, ¶14 (Wyo. 
2002).  We 
discern from the record that the $22,000 check was as well known to Strickland, 
as it was to the prosecution, so we are unable to conclude that evidence was 
withheld at all.

 

[¶52]      Finally, Strickland contends that the misconduct of the 
prosecutor had a cumulative effect of depriving him of a fair trial.  As previously 
explained, we find some of the conduct of this prosecutor to be unacceptable, 
but viewed in its totality we cannot conclude that it constitutes grounds to 
reverse Strickland's convictions.  

 

 

Cumulative Error

 

[¶53]      Strickland contends that the many errors asserted in this 
appeal had the cumulative effect of depriving him of a fair trial.  Because we have 
found only very limited areas of harmless and non-prejudicial error, we will not 
further consider this argument.  Robinson v. State, 
11 P.3d 361, 375 (Wyo. 
2000); Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 641 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶54]      The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  This matter is 
remanded to the district court to amend the sentence imposed, as more fully set 
out above.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1§ 6-3-101.  Arson; first degree; aggravated arson; 
penalties.

            
(a) A person is guilty of first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a 
fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage an occupied 
structure.

            
(b) First-degree arson is a felony punishable by:

                        
(i) Imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years;

            
(ii) A fine of not more than the greater of twenty thousand dollars 
($20,000.00) or two (2) times the face amount of the insurance if the fire was 
started to cause collection of insurance for the loss; or

                        
(iii) Both fine and imprisonment.

 

Strickland was sentenced to 
120 to 216 months in prison for this conviction.

 

   2§ 6-3-102.  Arson; second degree; penalties.

            
(a) A person is guilty of second-degree arson if he starts a fire or 
causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage any property to cause 
collection of insurance for the loss.

            
(b) Second-degree arson is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than two (2) times the face amount 
of the insurance, or both.

 

Strickland was sentenced to 
60 to 108 months in prison for this conviction, to be served concurrently with 
his first degree arson sentence.

 

  3In later 
testimony, Officer Concepcion related that he discussed the pry marks and the 
screwdriver with Officer Brown, and Officer Brown said Strickland had said 
nothing about them to him and that he did not observe the pry marks.

 

  4Earlier 
testimony established that the accelerant for the fire was gasoline and not 
Coleman fuel.

 

   5We will 
not set out in detail the many causes of delay in this case; however, we observe 
that the final brief was not filed until June 9, 2003.  By order entered on 
July 1, 2003, the case was set for argument, and the case was heard and taken 
under advisement on August 21, 2003.