Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-1471.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. TOMLAN. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-1471.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Accepting employment when professional judgment 
reasonably may be affected by financial or personal interest — Conduct 
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Suppressing evidence 
that lawyer has legal obligation to reveal — Engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation — Indefinite 
suspension. 
(No. 2007-1595 — Submitted November 27, 2007 — Decided April 3, 2008.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 06-079. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Richard Tomlan of St. Clairsville, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0007449, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1983. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
recommends that we now indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to practice 
based on findings that he (1) without her informed consent, transferred an elderly 
client’s financial assets to joint and survivorship accounts in both of their names, 
(2) concealed estate proceeds in his possession after his client died, (3) unduly 
delayed performing his duties as executor of the client’s estate, and (4) engaged in 
prohibited ex parte communication with a probate court judge.  We adopt the 
board’s findings that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and, over respondent’s objections, accept the recommendation for an indefinite 
suspension. 
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{¶ 3} Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with multiple 
violations of the Disciplinary Rules, including DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting 
conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) 
(prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), l-
102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects upon a lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law), 5-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer, except with consent of a client 
after full disclosure, from accepting employment if the exercise of professional 
judgment on behalf of the client may be reasonably affected by the lawyer’s 
financial and personal interests), 7-109(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from suppressing 
evidence that the lawyer has a legal obligation to reveal or produce), and 7-110(B) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from communicating ex parte on the merits of a case with 
the judge).  Respondent answered relator’s complaint, denying all wrongdoing 
and asserting various legal defenses.  A panel of the board heard the case, found 
the cited misconduct, and recommended a two-year suspension of respondent’s 
license to practice.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct but 
modified the sanction, recommending an indefinite suspension. 
Misconduct 
Respondent Violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1) by 
Transferring His Client’s Assets to Joint and Survivorship 
Accounts without the Client’s Informed Consent 
{¶ 4} Respondent befriended Katherine Rice, a 90-year-old nursing 
home resident, shortly after her admission in 1993.  Rice suffered from 
Parkinson’s disease and, as early as July 1997, also showed signs of dementia or 
organic brain syndrome.  Unmarried and childless, Rice possessed considerable 
wealth. 
{¶ 5} Respondent began doing some legal work for Rice in 1997, when 
he handled a real estate closing for her and drafted a deed for the sale of a cabin.  
He then started helping Rice pay her bills, eventually having some mail directed 
January Term, 2008 
3 
to his home or office.  In time, respondent also advocated on Rice’s behalf, 
intermittently identifying himself as her legal counsel. 
{¶ 6} Respondent prepared a will that Rice executed in May 1998.  The 
will named respondent as executor and his wife as the alternate executor.  Rice 
made these bequests in the will: $20,000 to Rice’s nephew, $2,000 to her niece, 
$2,500 to be divided between two acquaintances, $25,000 to be divided among 
three churches, $2,000 to be divided between two fraternal organizations, $1,000 
to be used for the perpetual care of Rice’s cemetery plot, $1,000 to an alumni 
association, and the remainder of the estate to be divided among specified 
hospitals and philanthropic organizations. 
{¶ 7} In spring 1999, Rice apparently told respondent that she wanted to 
revise her will to leave him a monetary bequest.  Respondent properly advised his 
client that he could not ethically prepare a will that named him as a beneficiary 
and that she would have to hire another attorney.  Rice apparently did not want 
another lawyer and never revised her will.  Respondent never discussed the 
subject of independent counsel with Rice again. 
{¶ 8} Respondent then began transferring Rice’s assets, purportedly at 
her direction, into joint and survivorship accounts that they shared.  In the first of 
three conveyances, respondent arranged in June 1999 for Rice to endorse four 
$100,000 checks with which he obtained four certificates of deposit in both of 
their names.  He bought one certificate at the Belmont Savings Bank, a second at 
Wheeling National Bank, a third at Belmont National Bank, and a fourth at 
WesBanco Bank.  These transactions ensured that title to the certificates of 
deposit would pass to respondent on Rice’s death. 
{¶ 9} In July 1999, Rice signed a healthcare power of attorney and a 
durable power of attorney.  The first instrument named Rice’s nephew as 
attorney-in-fact for healthcare decisions and respondent as first alternate attorney-
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in-fact.  The durable power of attorney designated respondent as Rice’s attorney-
in-fact, conferring on him broad authority to buy and sell property, contract with 
financial institutions, buy and sell stocks and bonds, and transact business related 
to social security, pensions, IRAs, government benefits, insurance, credit cards, 
tax returns, and civil claims.  Respondent used the durable power of attorney 
during Rice’s lifetime to correspond with banks, creditors, and other entities about 
her legal affairs, and to open bank accounts, manage funds, and create and renew 
numerous certificates of deposit. 
{¶ 10} Respondent facilitated a second conveyance of Rice’s assets in 
June 2000.  He arranged at that time for Rice to sign papers transferring 28,800 
shares in stock she owned individually to him and herself jointly.  This transfer, 
valued at approximately $1,000,000, also ensured that title of the stock would 
pass to respondent on Rice’s death. 
{¶ 11} In January 2002, Rice’s treating physician recommended that Rice 
enter hospice care due to deteriorating health, and Rice’s impaired 
decisionmaking capabilities prompted hospice staff to consult her healthcare 
fiduciary about admitting her.  Respondent consented to Rice’s admission to 
hospice care.  To treat Rice’s end-stage Parkinson’s disease and other serious 
infirmities in the hospice facility, her doctor prescribed a variety of medications, 
including drugs for Parkinson’s disease, dementia, and depression.  A month after 
her admission to the hospice facility, respondent facilitated a third conveyance of 
Rice’s property.  He obtained a fifth certificate of deposit for $250,000 from 
Citizen’s Bank with the proceeds from two of the previous certificates of deposit.  
After arranging for Rice to sign papers for the purchase, respondent placed the 
certificate of deposit jointly in his and Rice’s name, again ensuring that title to the 
certificate would pass to him at Rice’s death. 
{¶ 12} In advising lawyers to eschew gifts from clients, and thereby avoid 
suggestions of undue influence and overreaching, EC 5-5 recommends that 
January Term, 2008 
5 
lawyers insist that munificent clients obtain independent counsel before accepting 
a gift.  Respondent did not prevail upon Rice to seek another lawyer.  He instead 
single-handedly facilitated the purchase of four $100,000 certificates of deposit 
and the transfer of over $1,000,000 in stock with assets previously held 
individually by his elderly and debilitated client and placed the assets in joint 
accounts that would pass to him upon her death. 
{¶ 13} Respondent does not deny now that he failed to obtain his client’s 
valid consent to these gifts, which required him to disclose attendant risks such as 
the tax consequences of the gifts and how the gifts might deplete her testamentary 
bequests.  Respondent thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1). 
Respondent Violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 7-109(A) by Concealing the Estate 
Proceeds in His Possession after His Client’s Death 
{¶ 14} Rice died on December 25, 2002, at age 99.  Respondent notified 
Rice’s out-of-town niece of her death and arranged for the funeral.  Though 
respondent had been appointed executor of Rice’s estate and controlled all of 
Rice’s primary assets by operation of the joint survivorship accounts, he took no 
action on behalf of her estate for over 16 months.  During this time, respondent 
failed to (1) file Rice’s will with the probate court, (2) file estate tax returns, (3) 
pay creditors, including the nursing and funeral homes, (4) terminate deductions 
for Rice’s health-insurance premium from her checking account, and (5) deposit 
numerous interest and dividend checks as they became available. 
{¶ 15} In December 2003, the nursing home hired attorney Thomas 
Semple to collect Rice’s outstanding bill of approximately $11,500.  At the end of 
that month, Semple applied to the Belmont County Probate Court for authority to 
administer Rice’s estate.  In February 2004, Semple discussed Rice’s estate and 
the pending administration application with respondent.  Respondent advised that 
he had Rice’s will.  Respondent also reported to Semple that Rice had no living 
relatives, which was not true. 
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{¶ 16} In March 2004, the probate court appointed Semple as 
administrator of Rice’s estate.  The day after his appointment, Semple sent 
respondent a letter requesting a list of Rice’s assets, her will, and keys to her 
house.  Respondent did not reply to this letter but did do something else.  At the 
end of the month, respondent used $112,154.86 in proceeds from redeeming 
Rice’s Belmont Savings Bank certificate of deposit to obtain a new certificate of 
deposit at WesBanco Bank in the name of his wife and himself. 
{¶ 17} In April 2004, Semple moved the probate court for an order 
requiring respondent to produce Rice’s will.  Semple also filed a concealment 
action in that court, alleging that respondent had assets belonging to Rice’s estate 
in his possession.  Respondent, in turn, moved the probate court to appoint him as 
executor and discharge Semple as administrator.  In his application to administer 
the estate, respondent estimated the value of assets in Rice’s estate at $190,000, 
an amount that he would eventually concede was at least $200,000 too low. 
{¶ 18} In June 2004, the probate court denied respondent’s motion to 
discharge Semple as administrator of Rice’s estate.  The court also found that 
respondent was “not a suitable person to serve as executor” because of his delay 
in administrating the estate and the resulting detriment to the beneficiaries.  The 
court cited respondent’s failure to properly manage assets, settle estate bills, and 
respond to Semple’s numerous communications requesting information and 
documentation.  The order denying Semple’s discharge and respondent’s 
appointment was affirmed on appeal. 
{¶ 19} After the probate court’s order, respondent continued to refuse to 
give Semple information concerning the Rice estate assets, ignoring Semple’s 
further inquiries in July and August 2004.  That August, respondent’s wife 
applied for authority to administer the Rice estate and, notably, estimated the 
estate’s value at $1,000,000.  The probate court denied this application and, on its 
January Term, 2008 
7 
own motion, issued an order compelling respondent to produce all information 
and documentation pertaining to the estate. 
{¶ 20} In November 2004, Semple sent respondent a set of 
interrogatories, specifically asking him to identify all assets that he had acquired 
from Rice.  In his response, an unsworn statement, respondent identified three of 
four nonprobate assets that he held with Rice at her death, the three for which he 
had not exercised survivorship rights: the $100,000 WesBanco certificate of 
deposit, the stock, and the $250,000 Citizens Bank certificate of deposit.  He did 
not identify a $100,000 check made payable to Rice or him from the Belmont 
Savings Bank, which he received from cashing in the joint certificate of deposit 
that he had obtained in June 1999, and which he used in March 2004 to obtain a 
new certificate of deposit for his wife and himself. 
{¶ 21} In December 2004, Semple moved the probate court to enjoin 
respondent from accessing the nonprobate assets of the Rice estate.  At a hearing 
on the motion in January 2005, respondent again disclosed just the three 
nonprobate assets previously identified.  Though asked directly, respondent did 
not divulge in his testimony the check for the proceeds from the Belmont Savings 
Bank joint certificate of deposit.  The probate court issued a preliminary 
injunction, restraining respondent as of February 1, 2005, from exercising any 
control over the three disclosed nonprobate assets. 
{¶ 22} Also in December 2004, Semple filed an action in the Belmont 
County Common Pleas Court, alleging respondent’s undue influence, breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and negligence in overseeing 
Rice’s affairs.  Respondent retained attorney Stuart G. Parsell for his defense.  At 
a May 20, 2005 pretrial, Parsell disclosed for the first time the former $100,000 
Belmont Savings Bank joint certificate of deposit.  In May 2005, the probate court 
signed an agreed entry restraining respondent from exercising any control over 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the proceeds from the previously undisclosed Belmont Savings Bank joint 
certificate of deposit. 
{¶ 23} In August 2006, Semple dismissed the common pleas suit pursuant 
to the parties’ agreement to settle the case.1  Respondent agreed in the settlement 
to return the stock, then valued at over $1.4 million, and the $250,000 Citizens 
Bank certificate of deposit, then valued at $276,951.41, to the Rice estate.  The 
settlement terms allowed respondent to retain ownership of the Belmont Savings 
and WesBanco certificates of deposit and all interest accrued on those certificates, 
valued together at $222,944.75.  The probate court found that the settlement 
agreement was in the best interest of the estate. 
{¶ 24} On August 20, 2006, Semple filed an amended inventory in the 
Rice estate that, including the over $1,600,000 in assets returned by respondent, 
valued the estate at $2,158,931.93. 
{¶ 25} Though asked in interrogatories to identify “any and all assets” that 
had once belonged to Rice and that presently belonged to him, respondent 
identified only three of the four under his control.  He did not reveal the $100,000 
Belmont Bank certificate of deposit that he conveyed, at a value of $112,154.86, 
to himself and his wife just eight months before Semple propounded the 
interrogatories.  Several months later in probate court, respondent concealed the 
same evidence while testifying under oath. 
{¶ 26} Respondent does not deny now that he failed to disclose evidence 
that he knew he had a duty to reveal.  He thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 7-
109(A). 
Respondent Violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6) by Unduly Delaying the 
Performance of His Duties as Executor of His Client’s Will 
                                                 
1.  Provisions for confidentiality in the settlement agreement did not preclude disclosure of the 
terms to disciplinary authorities.   
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 27} Respondent delayed admitting the Rice estate to probate for 16 
months.  He did not deposit numerous dividend and interest checks accruing from 
the stock and certificates of deposit during that time, depriving the estate and 
beneficiaries of the use of and interest on these funds.  He then impeded the 
probate process by ignoring the court-appointed administrator’s efforts to open 
the estate, necessitating a legal action to obtain Rice’s will and identify concealed 
assets. 
{¶ 28} Respondent’s failure to turn over estate assets and pay creditors 
also led to the common pleas action, which in turn led to the recovery of assets 
held by respondent.  By forcing Semple to sue, respondent substantially damaged 
his former client’s estate by depleting the assets intended for residual 
beneficiaries.  As a significant example, the contingent legal fee charged to obtain 
the disclosed and concealed assets cost the estate approximately $560,000 and 
reduced the residual estate by that amount.  Respondent’s delay also harmed 
beneficiaries and creditors of the estate simply by generating frustration and 
inconvenience. 
{¶ 29} Respondent does not now deny that he unduly delayed in 
performing his duties as executor of the Rice estate.  He thereby violated DR 1-
102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6). 
Respondent Violated DR 7-110(B) by Engaging in Prohibited  
Ex Parte Communications with the Probate Judge 
{¶ 30} In mid-May 2004, Belmont County Probate Judge J. Mark Costine 
conducted a hearing on Semple’s allegations of concealment.  Shortly afterward, 
respondent spoke with Judge Costine as the judge was leaving the courthouse and 
asked the judge for his thoughts on the case.  Respondent advised Judge Costine 
that he had been Rice’s attorney and knew her personal affairs.  Respondent also 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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said that he hoped the judge would exercise his discretion to decide in 
respondent’s favor. 
{¶ 31} Respondent does not deny now that he spoke to Judge Costine 
about the merits of a pending adversarial proceeding without notice to opposing 
counsel and without legal justification.  He thereby violated DR 7-110(B). 
Sanction 
{¶ 32} The board recommended that we indefinitely suspend respondent’s 
license to practice, citing the scope of respondent’s calculated misconduct and the 
actual harm suffered.  Respondent objects and urges us to accept the panel’s 
recommendation for a two-year suspension, arguing that neither self-dealing nor 
egregious injury exists in this case.  We disagree and overrule the objections. 
{¶ 33} In determining the appropriate sanction to impose for attorney 
misconduct, we consider the duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, 
the attorney’s mental state, the sanctions imposed in similar cases, and the 
existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ake, 
111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006-Ohio-5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 44.  We weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether circumstances warrant a 
more lenient or a more exacting disposition.  See Section 10(B) of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Because 
each disciplinary case involves unique facts and circumstances, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(A), we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule and may take into 
account “all relevant factors” in determining which sanction to impose.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
A.  Duties Violated, Mental State, and Injury Caused 
{¶ 34} Respondent violated his duty to his client by (1) failing to insist 
that she obtain independent counsel, (2) facilitating transfers of her assets to 
January Term, 2008 
11 
himself by himself, and (3) saying virtually nothing of the ramifications to her 
estate.  Respondent violated duties to the public and the judicial system by his 
undue delay in administering the Rice estate, concealment of estate assets in his 
possession, and ex parte communication with Judge Costine.  Respondent accepts 
the findings that he breached these duties. 
{¶ 35} In his defense, however, respondent underscores that he was “like 
family” to Rice and genuinely believed that, given their long, close friendship and 
discussions about her affairs, the transfers to joint and survivorship accounts 
fulfilled her ambitions for her fortune.  Though Rice experienced some 
intermittent diminished mental capacity, respondent also insists that she continued 
to function with purpose and decisiveness during her last years and, as a result, 
conveyed unblemished title when she signed all the papers necessary to complete 
the transfers.  Respondent thus claims that he did not exercise undue influence or 
engage in overreaching, the evils that DR 5-101(A)(1) exists to prevent. 
{¶ 36} “Elements of undue influence include ‘a susceptible testator, 
another's opportunity to exert it, the fact of improper influence exerted or 
attempted, and the result showing the effect of such influence.’ ”  Krischbaum v. 
Dillon (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 58, 65-66, 567 N.E.2d 1291, quoting West v. Henry 
(1962), 173 Ohio St. 498, 501, 20 O.O.2d 119, 184 N.E.2d 200.  Because all these 
elements are present when a lawyer receives a testamentary gift from a client 
unrelated by blood or marriage through a will that the lawyer prepared, a 
presumption of undue influence arises.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  The 
presumption, as well as the prohibition against a lawyer’s receiving such gifts 
through a will or trust in DR 5-101(A)(2), serves to protect the high level of trust 
and confidence that the attorney-client relationship demands in fulfilling a client’s 
testamentary wishes: 
{¶ 37} “A client’s dependence upon, and trust in, his attorney’s skill, 
disinterested advice, and ethical conduct exceeds the trust and confidence found 
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in most fiduciary relationships.  Seldom is the client’s dependence upon, and trust 
in, his attorney greater than when, contemplating his own mortality, he seeks the 
attorney’s advice, guidance, and drafting skill in the preparation of a will to 
dispose of his estate after death.  These consultations are often among the most 
private to take place between an attorney and his client.  The client is dealing with 
his innermost thoughts and feelings, which he may not wish to share with his 
spouse, children and other next of kin. 
{¶ 38} “Because the decisions that go into the preparation of a will are so 
inherently private, and because, by definition, the testator will not be available 
after his death, when the will is offered for probate, to correct any errors that the 
attorney may have made, whether they are negligent errors or of a more sinister 
kind, a client is unusually dependent upon his attorney's professional advice and 
skill when he consults the attorney to have a will drawn.  The client will have no 
opportunity to protect himself from the attorney's negligent or infamous 
misconduct.”  Krischbaum, 58 Ohio St.3d at 62-63, 567 N.E.2d 1291. 
{¶ 39} As the board observed, considerations underlying a presumption of 
undue influence equally apply to situations in which lawyers obtain an interest in 
client assets by preparing other instruments that transfer the interest in 
anticipation of the client’s death.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 87, 666 N.E.2d 1083, we suspended a lawyer from practice because he 
had prepared a will for an unrelated client that named the lawyer as a beneficiary 
and had also transferred client assets to himself through joint and survivorship 
accounts.  Though we focused in that case mainly on the impropriety of giving 
such gifts through testamentary devise rather than through inter vivos transfers, 
we referred to the presumption of undue influence because the clients in both 
situations are contemplating their own mortality and thus are peculiarly 
susceptible to the influence of their counsel, citing Krischbaum, 58 Ohio St.3d at 
62-63, 567 N.E.2d 1291.  Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelleher, 102 Ohio 
January Term, 2008 
13 
St.3d 105, 2004-Ohio-1802, 807 N.E.2d 310 (lawyer violated DR 5-101(A)(2) by 
drafting an inter vivos trust for an unrelated client that provided for distributions 
to the lawyer’s family when the client died). 
{¶ 40} Nursing staff corroborated that Rice and respondent had a 
longstanding relationship and that, for the most part, Rice remained strong-willed 
and lucid throughout.  Strength of will and lucidity, however, are not 
characteristics on which we can rely to conclude that this 96-year-old nursing 
home patient with multiple debilitating infirmities, including signs of dementia or 
organic brain syndrome, was impervious to respondent’s influence.  To the 
contrary, with these obvious indicators of vulnerability, we doubt that Rice 
directed respondent’s efforts, without any encouragement, to circumvent the 
numerous bequests to friends, family, and philanthropic groups that she had made 
in a will executed just one year before the transfer of assets to joint and 
survivorship accounts. 
{¶ 41} We share the board’s skepticism and suspect that respondent used 
the joint and survivorship accounts to accomplish what he knew he could not 
ethically do through a will.  He then did not insist upon independent counsel 
because the interference could derail the transfer of Rice’s considerable assets to 
him.  Moreover, we infer from respondent’s delay in administering the Rice estate 
that he fully realized the threat that admitting the estate to probate might expose 
undue influence and overreaching.  We thus do not accept respondent’s assertion 
that his misconduct was a mere technical violation of DR 5-101(A)(1). 
{¶ 42} Respondent also urges us to weigh in his favor that he regrets 
having failed to disclose the proceeds from the $100,000 Belmont Savings Bank 
certificate of deposit, that he did so unintentionally, and that he afterward rectified 
the mistake by accounting for and preserving the assets in which Rice had an 
interest when she died.  The harm respondent avoided with his disclosure, 
however, does little to offset the rest of the damage done in this case.  The cost of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
respondent’s misconduct to the Rice estate, its beneficiaries, and creditors is 
indefensible. 
B.  Sanctions Imposed in Similar Cases 
{¶ 43} Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Theofilos (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 43, 
521 N.E.2d 797, signaled this court’s growing impatience with lawyers profiting 
from client gifts given in anticipation of a client’s demise.  For preparing the 
offending will and joint and survivorship accounts from which he and his son 
received over $200,000, we suspended the lawyer in Theofilos from practice for 
one year.  The lawyer in Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
87, 666 N.E.2d 1083, took nearly $955,000 under the offending will and joint and 
survivorship accounts.  Because he also attempted to collect $150,000 in 
excessive attorney fees for administering his client’s uncomplicated estate, we 
suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law.  Id. at 92, 666 N.E.2d 1083.  
We imposed this sanction, which requires the suspended lawyer to petition for 
reinstatement in and fulfill the standards in Gov.Bar R.V(10)(B), to ensure the 
public’s protection. 
{¶ 44} As relator argues, the scope of respondent’s misconduct is much 
like that in Disciplinary Counsel v. Slavens (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 162, 586 
N.E.2d 92, in which a lawyer wrote a will for a client suffering from senility and 
organic brain syndrome, devising 35 percent of the client’s $1,500,000 estate to 
himself and  naming his children as beneficiaries.  With a power of attorney, the 
lawyer further gave himself “gifts” of over $160,000 without disclosing the 
transfers to the client’s accountant or filing any gift tax returns.  After the client’s 
death, the lawyer lied about the existence of predecessor wills and, when asked 
about the assets of the estate, did not disclose the inter vivos transfers.  63 Ohio 
St.3d at 163, 586 N.E.2d 92.  For his violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(1) 
and (6) and 5-101(A), we ordered an indefinite suspension. 
January Term, 2008 
15 
{¶ 45} Respondent cites cases similar to Slavens in which we have 
imposed sanctions less stringent than indefinite suspension.  In Kelleher, 102 
Ohio St.3d 105, 2004-Ohio-1802, 807 N.E.2d 310, for example, we suspended a 
lawyer from practice for one year, staying the last six months on conditions, 
because he drafted an inter vivos trust for an unrelated client and named the 
lawyer’s spouse, children, and grandchildren as beneficiaries.  In Toledo Bar 
Assn. v. Cook, 97 Ohio St.3d 225, 2002-Ohio-5787, 778 N.E.2d 40, another 
lawyer received a one-year suspension with a conditional stay of the last six 
months because she prepared a will for an unrelated testator that named her 
siblings’ corporation as a beneficiary.  In Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 
Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, a lawyer failed to fully 
disclose to his clients his financial interest in the investment recommendations he 
made while acting as their lawyer and as their financial planner and received a 
six-month suspension from practice, all stayed on conditions.  And in  Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Clark (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 145, 642 N.E.2d 611, we found a 
violation of DR 5-101(A) and suspended the lawyer for two years, staying the last 
year on conditions, because he both gave and loaned his client’s money to himself 
and his family. 
{¶ 46} None of these cases, however, involved a lawyer who realized the 
impropriety of giving himself gifts of a client’s property through one form of 
conveyance and then turned to another form to accomplish the same result.  This 
self-dealing recalls the “cost/benefit analysis” conducted by the lawyer in 
Galinas,  who, when he chose to prepare the will in question, weighed the risks of 
violating DR 1-102(A)(6) and “the possibilities of being caught for the 
disciplinary infraction (and the range of possible sanctions) against the economic 
benefits to be derived” from the misconduct.  76 Ohio St.3d at 91, 666 N.E.2d 
1083.  We imposed the indefinite suspension in that case, in part to send a strong 
message that we will not tolerate such machinations from the legal profession. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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C.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 47} Having found that an indefinite suspension of respondent’s license 
is justified under the preceding tests, we examine the mitigating and aggravating 
factors to further tailor our disposition.  Respondent has no prior disciplinary 
record and cooperated professionally in the disciplinary proceedings, which are 
mitigating factors under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (d).  He has also 
presented persuasive testimonials as to his character and reputation apart from the 
events at bar.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e). 
{¶ 48} These factors are outweighed, however, by the aggravating 
circumstances that respondent compromised his vulnerable client and her named 
beneficiaries to benefit his own financial interests and that he did so in a series of 
wrongful acts.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (d), and (h).  Moreover, though 
the board found mitigating that respondent had resolved the underlying dispute to 
the satisfaction of the estate administrator and the probate court, we cannot ignore 
that respondent profited from his wrongdoing.  Therefore, although we do not 
order restitution, we find the fact of respondent’s windfall to be an aggravating 
factor. 
{¶ 49} For violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 5-
101(A)(1), 7-109(A), and 7-110(B), we hereby indefinitely suspend respondent 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would permanently 
disbar the respondent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
January Term, 2008 
17 
{¶ 50} I concur with the decision to indefinitely suspend the respondent 
from the practice of law.  However, I would additionally require him to disgorge 
the proceeds that he was permitted to retain in the settlement with Thomas 
Semple in the Belmont County Common Pleas Court and return those funds to the 
estate. 
{¶ 51} The majority acknowledges that respondent profited from his 
wrongdoing, yet it does not order restitution.  As I stated in my dissenting opinion 
in Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 87, 92, 666 N.E.2d 
1083, I do not believe that a respondent should be permitted to “keep the fruits of 
his unethical conduct, particularly when he knowingly engaged in such unethical 
conduct.”  The settlement in this case was a windfall to the respondent.  However, 
the settlement is not binding upon this court in a disciplinary action. 
{¶ 52} Because I do not believe that the respondent should be permitted to 
profit from his unethical behavior, I would require him to return to the estate all 
the funds he unethically obtained. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger Jr., 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., and Stuart G. Parsell; and Terry K. 
Sherman, for respondent. 
______________________