Title: Sharon Mcknight v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95154
____________
SHARON MCKNIGHT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[October 5, 2000]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999),
in which the Third District affirmed the decision of the trial court and certified
conflict with State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 25 Fla.
L. Weekly S 463 (Fla. June 15, 2000).   We have jurisdiction. See V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.
Const.
We recently held that the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate
separation of powers, and rejected other constitutional challenges to the Act.  See
1In rejecting McKnight’s due process challenge to the Act, the Third District explained:
Next, the defendant claims that the statute violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
section 9 of the Florida Constitution because the means chosen by the Legislature to
achieve its goal of enhanced punishment excludes the court from the sentencing decision
and thereby denies the defendant a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  We reject this
argument for two reasons.  First, the decision to sentence the defendant as a PRR is
exclusively within the discretion of the sentencing judge.  The defendant is free to
challenge the state's evidence on the issue of whether he or she qualifies as a PRR and
is free to present his or her own evidence to rebut the state's allegations.  Further, the
defendant retains the right to present argument to the court in an effort to persuade the
judge that the state has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or
she qualifies as a PRR.  Second, this statute bears a rational relationship to the
legislative objectives of discouraging recidivism in criminal offenders and enhancing the
punishment of those who reoffend, thereby comporting with the requirements of due
process.  See Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993);  Tillman v. State, 609 So. 2d
1295 (Fla.1992);  Ross v. State, 601 So. 2d 1190 (Fla.1992);  Eutsey v. State, 383
So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980).
McKnight, 727 So. 2d at 319.  In context, we interpret the Third District’s statement that “the decision
to sentence the defendant as a PRR is exclusively within the discretion of the sentencing judge” to mean
that the trial court must first make a determination regarding whether the defendant qualifies for
sentencing under the Act prior to imposing a PRR sentence.  We concur with the Third District’s
reasoning that a defendant has the right to challenge the State’s showing in this regard, and to present
evidence to rebut the State’s proof that he or she qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender.  Interpreted
in this fashion, we approve the Third District’s decision in its entirety.
-2-
Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 604 (Fla. July  06, 2000); State v. Cotton, 25 Fla.
L. Weekly S463 (Fla. June 15, 2000).  Accordingly, we similarly approve the Third
District's decision in this case, to the extent that it is consistent with our Cotton1
and Ellis opinions.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
-3-
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 25 Fla. L.
Weekly S463 (Fla. June 15, 2000).
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Direct Conflict
Third District - Case No. 3D98-898
(Dade County)
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Louis Campbell, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Division Chief, and
Barbara A. Zappi, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent