Title: Com. v. Treftz

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

485 Pa. 297 (1979) 401 A.2d 1325 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Donald David TREFTZ, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 13, 1979. Decided May 1, 1979. Reargument Denied June 25, 1979. *298 *299 *300 Richard A. Peterson, Peterson & Gula, Greenville, for appellant. David B. Douds, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. LARSEN, Justice. Appellant was convicted of murder of the first degree in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas and his conviction was affirmed by this Court in Commonwealth v. Treftz, 465 Pa. 614, 351 A.2d 265 (1976). Appellant subsequently filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA)[1], and following a hearing, relief was denied. This appeal follows wherein appellant raises eight issues, all of which concern the effectiveness of his trial counsel. This Court held in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 605-06, 235 A.2d 349, 352-53 (1967) that: "As a corollary, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise baseless or frivolous issues." Commonwealth v. Wilson, 482 Pa. 350, 393 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1978). Further, "[t]he findings of the PCHA court, which hears the evidence and passes on the credibility of the witnesses, should be given great deference. . . . Consequently, this Court will not disturb its findings if they are supported in the PCHA record. . . . This is true even when the record could support a contrary holding." Commonwealth v. Lee, 478 Pa. 70, 75, 385 A.2d 1317, 1320 (1978). Appellant's first contention is that his trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he did not impeach the *302 credibility of Mary Gilkey (the Commonwealth's principal witness) by calling Barbara Gobel as a witness. At trial, Mary Gilkey testified that on the evening of October 13, 1973, a meeting of a chapter of the Breed Motorcycle Club took place in the kitchen of her home. This meeting was attended by appellant Treftz, John Gilkey (Mary Gilkey's husband), and six other individuals including the deceased, who was a prospective member of the organization. The Gilkeys' four-year old son was also present at the meeting. Mrs. Gilkey testified that although she did not attend this meeting, she was in the living room of her house while the meeting took place. Mrs. Gilkey testified that when, during the meeting, she heard a loud crash in the kitchen and the screams of her young son, she went into the kitchen and observed the deceased lying on the kitchen floor with blood on his face and arms. Mrs. Gilkey went back into the living room. Approximately five minutes later, upon hearing the screaming (again) of her young son and the back door of her house open, Mrs. Gilkey returned to the kitchen and observed the deceased lying outside the back door. Mrs. Gilkey testified that one of the Breed members said to the deceased, "You're as good as dead" and then challengingly questioned appellant, "You're the President of this club, what are you going to do about it, the Ohio Club." Mrs. Gilkey testified that she saw appellant walk out the back door with a gun in his hand. She started to walk back to the living room with her young son and she heard two shots, followed by several more shots. The record indicates that the deceased's body was discovered thirteen days later behind the Gilkeys' house. Appellant argues that trial counsel should have impeached Mary Gilkey's testimony by calling Barbara Gobel as a witness who would have testified 1) that she (Barbara Gobel) was with Mrs. Gilkey in the living room while the aforementioned meeting was taking place in the kitchen and 2) that during the meeting, Mrs. Gilkey never left the living room to go into the kitchen. *303 At the PCHA hearing, trial counsel testified that even though Barbara Gobel told him that Mrs. Gilkey never went into the kitchen while the aforementioned meeting was taking place, he (trial counsel) did not call Barbara Gobel as a witness because she (Barbara Gobel) told him that she observed appellant in the Gilkey house on the night of the crime; trial counsel feared that if a defense witness (Barbara Gobel) placed appellant at the scene of the crime, it might have been necessary for appellant to take the stand (which appellant did not want to do) to explain his conduct on the night in question (in order to avoid the drawing of "adverse inference[s]" by the jurors). Since trial counsel's decision to refrain from calling Barbara Gobel as a witness had a reasonable basis (namely, to avoid the necessity of calling appellant to the stand or alternatively to avoid a possible adverse inference by the jury because of appellant's failure to take the stand), we affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's second contention is that his trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he did not call witnesses who (allegedly) would have testified that appellant and John Gilkey took the Gilkeys' four-year old son to a bar subsequent to the shooting of the deceased. Appellant argues that evidence that the Gilkey child was with appellant and John Gilkey in a bar following the shooting is inconsistent with Mary Gilkey's testimony that just prior to the shooting, she removed the child from the kitchen and took him into the living room. A review of the record indicates that evidence that appellant and John Gilkey took the Gilkey child to a bar following the shooting would not have been inconsistent with Mrs. Gilkey's testimony. Mrs. Gilkey's testimony related to events prior to and including the shooting while the other testimony related to events after the shooting. Thus, trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not calling witnesses who (allegedly) would have testified that the Gilkey child went to a bar with appellant and John Gilkey following the shooting *304 (namely, that this evidence would not have been inconsistent with Mrs. Gilkey's testimony) and therefore, we affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's third contention is that his trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he did not investigate (or call witnesses concerning) whether Mary Gilkey was on medication (or medication combined with alcoholic beverages) on the night of the crime. Appellant argues that such evidence would have impeached Mrs. Gilkey's testimony wherein she described the events that occurred on the night in question. At the PCHA hearing, trial counsel testified that in preparing for trial, he was aware that Mrs. Gilkey was taking some form of medication in order to treat cancer. Trial counsel testified that he did not investigate whether she took medication on the night of the crime since he feared that if he brought forth evidence at trial that Mrs. Gilkey took medication on said night, it might also be elicited that Mrs. Gilkey had cancer (which this medication was treating). Trial counsel concluded that any testimony that Mrs. Gilkey had cancer "would create sympathy for. . . [Mrs. Gilkey] in the jury's mind and might adversely affect our argument concerning [her] credibility." Thus, trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not investigating (or calling witnesses concerning) whether Mrs. Gilkey was on medication (or medication combined with alcoholic beverages) on the night of the crime and therefore, we affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's fourth contention is that his trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he did not petition for a jury viewing of the Gilkey home. Appellant argues that a viewing could have impeached Commonwealth witness Mary Gilkey's testimony that on the night of the crime, she observed (from the Gilkey kitchen) 1) the deceased lying outside the back door of the house and 2) appellant walking outside the back door of said house with a gun in his hand. *305 At the PCHA hearing, trial counsel testified that prior to trial, he went to the Gilkey house and examined the Gilkey kitchen (by looking through the windows from the outside). From this examination, trial counsel concluded that Mrs. Gilkey was able to make the aforementioned observations. Thus, trial counsel's decision to not request a jury viewing had a reasonable basis and therefore, we affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's fifth contention is that his trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that an oversight by trial counsel allegedly "prohibited" appellant from testifying. At the PCHA hearing, trial counsel testified 1) that when appellant was deciding whether he would testify, trial counsel informed him that he (trial counsel) had (earlier) failed to move for the suppression of a statement which appellant made to his probation officer and 2) that trial counsel told appellant that if he testified, appellant's aforementioned statement to his probation officer could be used to impeach his testimony if his testimony was inconsistent with the statement. Appellant argues that trial counsel's failure to seek the suppression of the statement "prohibited" him from testifying since he [appellant] was afraid that his testimony would be impeached by the statement.[2] A review of the PCHA record indicates that the fact that appellant (if he testified) could possibly be impeached by his earlier statement was not appellant's overriding concern when he decided not to take the stand. Rather, the main reason that appellant did not testify was his fear of reprisals from the Breed Motorcycle Gang. At the PCHA hearing, trial counsel testified: From these facts, it is clear that the failure of trial counsel to file a motion to suppress did not "prohibit" appellant from testifying. Therefore, we affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's sixth contention is that trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he did not argue (in post-verdict motions and on appeal) that the trial court erred in refusing appellant's instruction five: A review of the record indicates that the trial court read this instruction (almost verbatim) to the jury; hence, an argument by trial counsel that the trial court erred in refusing this instruction would have been frivolous. We affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. *307 Appellant's seventh contention is that trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he did not argue in post-verdict motions and on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing appellant's instruction six: The trial court did not err in refusing appellant's instruction six. That issue was discussed in the charge and, therefore, we affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's eighth contention is that trial counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he did not argue in post-verdict motions and on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing appellant's instruction seven: The trial court charged the jury that in assessing the credibility of Mary Gilkey, it should consider whether she was "coloring her testimony . . . to protect her husband": At the conclusion of its charge, the trial court read the following instruction which was submitted by appellant's trial counsel: Thus, trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not arguing that the trial court erred in refusing appellant's instruction seven because the issue was already included in the trial court's charge on two separate occasions. Therefore, we affirm the PCHA court's finding that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.[3] *310 The order of the PCHA court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. ROBERTS, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ., concur in the result. [1] Post-Conviction Hearing Act of 1966, Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 1, et seq., 19 P.S. § 1180-1, et seq. (Supp. 1978-79). [2] This statement was not brought forth at trial. [3] Appellant also argues that prior to trial, he told trial counsel that he "suspected" that Mary Gilkey testified as a Commonwealth witness because she allegedly reached an agreement with the Commonwealth wherein the latter promised her that the Child Welfare Department of Mercer County would not remove Mrs. Gilkey's children from her custody. In this appeal, appellant requests that "an additional hearing [be held] on this matter if and when evidence of a deal is discovered" to determine whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue this matter. (Emphasis added) This request is premature and need not be addressed in this appeal.