Title: State v. Phillips

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

#28181-a-SLZ 
2018 S.D. 2 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
TRAVIS ROBERT PHILLIPS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
 TURNER COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE CHERYLE W. GERING 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
QUINCY R. KJERSTAD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff  
 
and appellee.  
 
 
WILLIAM D. SIMS of 
Zimmer, Duncan & Cole, LLP 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Attorneys for defendant 
 
and appellant. 
 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON 
 
NOVEMBER 6, 2017 
 
OPINION FILED 01/03/18 
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ZINTER, Justice 
 
[¶1.] 
Travis Phillips was convicted of aggravated assault (domestic) and 
simple assault (domestic).  He appeals the circuit court’s admission of evidence of 
alleged instances of prior domestic abuse.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.] 
Travis Phillips and Amanda Johnson were married in 2014.  Their 
marriage was often contentious.  Phillips suspected Johnson of having affairs, 
which led to many accusations and arguments. 
[¶3.] 
On June 24, 2016, Johnson called Phillips at work to inform him that a 
law enforcement officer came to their apartment to serve legal papers.  The 
paperwork related to stalking charges filed against Phillips by Tim DeWitt, a man 
with whom Johnson had previously had a sexual relationship.  Upset, Phillips left 
work and went to the apartment. 
[¶4.] 
Johnson testified that upon his arrival, Phillips consumed alcoholic 
beverages.  At about 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., when Johnson was making their son’s bed, 
Phillips entered the doorway to the room and began yelling at her about DeWitt and 
her relationship with him.  Johnson tried to leave the room, but Phillips blocked the 
doorway.  He told her to sit on the bed, and he continued yelling at her for yet 
another hour, alleging the stalking charges were her fault because she had a 
relationship with DeWitt.  Johnson testified that when Phillips then approached 
and backed her into a wall, she kicked him in the groin.  Phillips became even 
angrier and knocked a box fan off a dresser. 
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[¶5.] 
Johnson repeatedly asked Phillips to use the bathroom, and Phillips 
eventually relented.  Phillips followed Johnson into the bathroom and continued 
yelling at her.  She alleged that while in the bathroom, Phillips threatened her, 
indicating that he was going to report her for marijuana use1 and that she would 
never see her children again. 
[¶6.] 
When Johnson attempted to leave the bathroom, Phillips put his arm 
around her waist and threw her back into the bathroom, causing her arm to hit and 
bend a doorknob.  When Johnson began screaming for someone to call the police, 
Phillips covered her mouth and nose with his hand, making it difficult for Johnson 
to breathe.  Johnson then started sobbing uncontrollably, and Phillips sat down on 
the toilet seat and told her to be quiet.  Johnson testified that Phillips then put his 
hands around her neck, preventing her from breathing: he told her he knew a 
wrestling move that would not leave any marks.  Phillips released her once he 
realized she could not breathe. 
[¶7.] 
Johnson exited the bathroom, and Phillips followed her into the 
kitchen.  He told her that she had until 11:00 p.m. to figure out “where [their] 
relationship was going” or he was going to leave with their son.  At 11:00, Phillips 
took their son out of Johnson’s arms and left.  According to Johnson, when she tried 
to follow, Phillips threatened to kick her back into the house “so hard that [she] 
would be sh***ing in a bag for the rest of [her] life.”  Johnson then waited and 
followed from a distance.  She noticed a neighbor was outside and asked if she could 
                                                     
 
1. 
Johnson, who was sixteen weeks pregnant at the time, testified that she 
occasionally used marijuana to help with morning sickness. 
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use the neighbor’s phone to call the police because Phillips was kidnapping her son.  
Phillips, who had taken Johnson’s phone from her earlier that night, then threw her 
phone into the neighbor’s yard.  Johnson retrieved the phone and called law 
enforcement. 
[¶8.] 
The police arrived and interviewed both Johnson and Phillips.  
Johnson told the officers that Phillips had thrown her into the bathroom and choked 
her.  The officers noted Johnson had a bruise on her arm and marks on her chest 
and neck.  When the officers asked Phillips what happened and what caused the 
marks, Phillips claimed that Johnson had an asthma attack and was 
hyperventilating.  He denied that he would ever hit or harm his pregnant wife. 
[¶9.] 
Phillips was arrested and charged with one count of aggravated 
assault (domestic) and three counts of simple assault (domestic).  Prior to trial, the 
State gave notice of intent to introduce four prior incidents.  The State alleged that 
on prior occasions: (1) Phillips “smacked” Johnson with an open hand after Phillips 
had accused Johnson of cheating and demanded to know who it was; (2) Phillips 
yelled or screamed at Johnson while driving, causing Johnson to “shut down”; (3) 
Phillips started arguments when Johnson was talking to a person either “too much” 
or about “inappropriate things”; and (4) while living in Idaho, an intoxicated 
Phillips threatened Johnson (who was pregnant with their son) that if she ever did 
anything to take their son away from him, Phillips would cause her to go missing.  
The State argued the prior acts were relevant to show the nature of their domestic 
relationship and Phillips’s motive and intent to control Johnson through threats 
and physical violence. 
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[¶10.] 
The circuit court ruled that the prior acts were relevant and admissible 
to show: Phillips’s “motive or plan to control his wife through threats and/or acts of 
physical violence”; Phillips’s “motive and intention to physically assault his wife 
when he believed she was cheating on him”; and Phillips’s “plan or knowledge of the 
manner in which he could hide any violent actions taken toward his wife.”  The 
court also ruled that the probative value of the acts was not substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
[¶11.] 
At trial, Johnson testified to the alleged assaults and the prior acts.  
The State also presented expert testimony from Krista Heeren-Graber, a social 
worker.  Heeren-Graber testified about the dynamics of abusive relationships, 
including victim minimization of what is going on in a relationship and an abuser’s 
use of threats and violence to maintain power and control.  Phillips did not testify. 
[¶12.] 
A jury found Phillips guilty of aggravated assault and one count of 
simple assault.  On appeal, Phillips challenges the circuit court’s admission of the 
other acts evidence.  He also claims his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
Decision 
[¶13.] 
Phillips first argues that the prior acts were inadmissible because they 
were introduced only to show that he had a propensity to be violent.  See SDCL 19-
19-404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.”).  However, other acts evidence “may be admissible 
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”  SDCL 19-19-404(b)(2).  
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A circuit court’s determination to admit other acts evidence will be overturned only 
upon a showing that it was an abuse of discretion.  State v. Medicine Eagle, 
2013 S.D. 60, ¶ 16, 835 N.W.2d 886, 892. 
[¶14.] 
“To determine the admissibility of other acts evidence, the court must 
determine: (1) whether the intended purpose is relevant to some material issue in 
the case, and (2) whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”  State v. Huber, 2010 S.D. 63, ¶ 56, 789 N.W.2d 
283, 301.  SDCL 19-19-404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion.  Id.  “[I]f the other 
act evidence is admissible for any purpose other than simply character, then its use 
is sustainable.  All that is prohibited under § 404(b) is that similar act evidence not 
be admitted ‘solely to prove character.’”  State v. Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 17, 
593 N.W.2d 792, 800 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 687, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1500, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988)).  “It is the 
proponent of the prior acts evidence who must persuade the trial court that the 
evidence has some permissible purpose.”  State v. Armstrong, 2010 S.D. 94, ¶ 11, 
793 N.W.2d 6, 11. 
[¶15.] 
Phillips contends that none of the circuit court’s stated purposes were 
at issue in this case; and therefore, none of the prior acts were relevant.  We 
disagree.  The prior acts showed a controlling and hostile relationship that was 
fueled by Phillips’s suspicion of Johnson’s relationship with other men.  That 
evidence was relevant because it revealed a motive for Phillips’s assault of Johnson.  
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In essence, the evidence was used to provide context and show the nature of the 
parties’ relationship.2 
[¶16.] 
Prior instances of domestic abuse against the same victim are often 
relevant in the familial context because they show the nature of the relationship, 
which explains the interactions between the parties. 
Domestic abuse often has a history highly relevant to the truth-
finding process.  When an accused had a close relationship with 
the victim, prior aggression, threats or abusive treatment of the 
same victim by the same perpetrator are admissible when 
offered on relevant issues under Rule 404(b).  The rationale for 
admissibility is that an accused’s past conduct in a familial 
context tends to explain later interactions between the same 
persons. 
 
State v. Laible, 1999 S.D. 58, ¶ 21, 594 N.W.2d 328, 335 (citations omitted).  In 
Laible, we upheld the admission of prior instances of domestic abuse in a murder 
prosecution because the defendant’s “persistent verbal abuse, though not always 
accompanied by violence or threats, was an expression of his attitude, inseparable 
from his intermittent aggression.”  Id.  Therefore, “[h]is previous attacks and 
threats . . . were . . . admissible to show the nature of [the] relationship, his motive, 
and his state of mind.”  Id.; accord Huber, 2010 S.D. 63, ¶ 57, 789 N.W.2d at 301-02. 
[¶17.]  
Courts in other jurisdictions also admit prior instances of domestic 
abuse against the same victim in assault prosecutions.  They do so for reasons 
similar to those we expressed in Laible and Huber.  See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 
                                                     
 
2. 
We also note that immediately after the assault, Phillips claimed that 
Johnson’s injuries were caused by hyperventilation in an asthma attack.  
Phillips’s contemporaneous claim was an assertion of “accident” within the 
meaning of SDCL 19-19-404(b)(2).  Phillips’s prior acts were also relevant to 
prove “lack of accident.”  See id.   
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689 N.W.2d 116, 128 (Iowa 2004) (“The defendant’s prior acts of violence toward his 
wife, while certainly illustrative of a propensity to use violence, also reflect his 
emotional relationship with his wife, which as our discussion shows, is a 
circumstance relevant to his motive and intent on the day in question.”); People v. 
Dorm, 903 N.E.2d 263, 265 (N.Y. 2009) (“Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the 
evidence in this case was not propensity evidence, but was probative of his motive 
and intent to assault his victim; it provided necessary background information on 
the nature of the relationship and placed the charged conduct in context.”); State v. 
Sanders, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (Vt. 1998) (stating that prior instances of domestic abuse 
are relevant “to portray the history surrounding the abusive relationship, providing 
the needed context for the behavior in issue” and that “[a]llegations of a single act of 
domestic violence, taken out of its situational context, are likely to seem 
‘incongruous and incredible’ to a jury”); Thomas v. State, 131 P.3d 348, 358 (Wyo. 
2006) (upholding admission of prior instances of domestic abuse demonstrating an 
“ongoing pattern” of behavior because it refuted the claim that the victim caused 
her own injuries); see also 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct 
Evidence § 4:19, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2017) (stating uncharged acts of 
domestic violence may be admitted “on a noncharacter motive theory; the 
uncharged acts evidence hostility toward the victim, and in turn that hostility may 
be the motive for the charged act of domestic violence”). 
[¶18.] 
Phillips, however, contends that the evidence was inadmissible under 
State v. Lassiter, 2005 S.D. 8, 692 N.W.2d 171.  In Lassiter, the defendant was 
accused of assaulting the boyfriend of Lassiter’s former girlfriend.  The circuit court 
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admitted evidence of a prior assault against a different former girlfriend.  A 
majority of this Court reversed, holding that the prior assault constituted 
inadmissible character evidence.  Id. ¶ 27, 692 N.W.2d at 179-80.  In Lassiter, 
however, “there was no relationship between the two offenses or the two victims.”  
Id. ¶ 21, 692 N.W.2d at 178.  The majority held that without some sort of 
relationship between the offenses and the victims, the evidence only showed that 
the defendant had the propensity to commit assaults.  Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 692 N.W.2d at 
178-79.  But the majority did note that when there is a relationship that connects 
the victims and offenses, the uncharged acts may show the existence of a motive 
that “is in the nature of hostility, antipathy, hatred, or jealousy.”  Id. ¶ 22, 
692 N.W.2d at 178.  Here, the victim is the same person and the offenses are 
similar.  Therefore, Lassiter supports rather than precludes the admission of the 
other acts evidence. 
[¶19.] 
Phillips also contends that even if the prior acts were relevant, the 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.  We 
disagree.  As previously noted, the prior acts were highly probative of Phillips and 
Johnson’s relationship.  Relationships are complex, and without an understanding 
of the nature of the abusive relationship, a jury may be unable or unwilling to 
accept that a single instance of abuse occurred without context to explain an 
isolated incident.  See Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13 (“Without knowing the history of the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim, jurors may not believe the 
victim was actually abused, since domestic violence is ‘learned, controlling behavior 
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aimed at gaining another’s compliance’ through multiple incidents.” (quoting 
Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410, 414 (N.D. 1996))). 
[¶20.] 
Phillips finally contends the circuit court erred in failing to make a 
preliminary determination that the prior acts occurred and that Phillips was the 
actor.  We have said that other acts evidence is “admissible only if the evidence is 
sufficient for the trial court to conclude that a jury could find by a preponderance 
that the other ‘act[s] occurred and that the defendant was the actor.’”  Kostel v. 
Schwartz, 2008 S.D. 85, ¶ 28, 756 N.W.2d 363, 375 (quoting Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, 
¶ 14, 593 N.W.2d at 798).  Therefore, as a prerequisite to admissibility, the State 
was required to identify sufficient evidence for the trial court to make a 
determination whether the prior acts occurred. 
[¶21.] 
Here, the court did not make a preliminary determination but it 
appears that the prior acts were uncontested.  Phillips neither challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence of the prior acts nor requested a preliminary 
determination.  Additionally, the court correctly instructed the jury that it could 
only consider the prior acts if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Phillips committed them.  Finally, Phillips has not explained how the failure to 
make a preliminary finding prejudiced him.  That failure is dispositive here because 
“the protection against . . . unfair prejudice emanates not from a requirement of a 
preliminary finding by the trial court, but rather from” the requirements of Rule 
404(b) itself.  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92, 108 S. Ct. at 1502.  Accordingly, we 
find no reversible error in the lack of a preliminary finding. 
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[¶22.] 
In his second issue, Phillips argues his trial counsel was ineffective.  
We only address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal if it 
appears that counsel was “so ineffective and counsel’s representation so casual as to 
represent a manifest usurpation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.”  State v. 
Kiir, 2017 S.D. 47, ¶ 19, 900 N.W.2d 290, 297.  In other words, it must be “obvious 
on the record that the defendant has been deprived of his constitutional rights to 
counsel and a fair trial.”  State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 17, 874 N.W.2d 475, 482.  
That is because on direct appeal, trial counsel is not afforded the opportunity to 
explain and defend his or her actions.  Id.  Considering the nature of Phillips’s 
ineffective-assistance claims, this is not a case in which a constitutional deprivation 
is obvious. 
[¶23.] 
Phillips’s first claim is that his attorney was ineffective in failing to 
seek recusal of the trial judge.  Phillips points out that the same judge had 
previously granted Johnson a protection order against him.  However, we have 
repeatedly held that a judge’s acquisition of knowledge from unrelated cases is not a 
ground for disqualification.  See State v. Hauge, 2013 S.D. 26, ¶ 33, 829 N.W.2d 145, 
153-54.  Moreover, counsel may have believed it was better to continue with a judge 
who was already familiar with the case.  In any event, Phillips cannot show 
prejudice.  It was the jury—not the judge—that determined Phillips’s guilt. 
[¶24.] 
Phillips also claims that counsel should have challenged the 
qualifications of the State’s expert and retained an independent rebuttal expert.  
But there are often strategic reasons for not challenging such testimony.  Counsel 
may have believed that the State’s expert was properly qualified or that challenging 
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her credentials would pointlessly detract from the material issues and the 
credibility of the defense.  Counsel may have also believed that cross-examination 
would have made retention of another expert unnecessary. 
[¶25.] 
We cannot say on this record that counsel was so ineffective that it 
deprived Phillips of his constitutional rights to counsel and a fair trial.  Phillips’s 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not appropriate for review on direct 
appeal. 
[¶26.] 
Affirmed. 
[¶27.] 
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SEVERSON and KERN, Justices, 
and WILBUR, Retired Justice, concur. 
[¶28.] 
JENSEN, Justice, did not participate.