Title: LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12016 
 
EDMUND LaCHANCE  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 10, 2016. - October 21, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.2 
 
 
Civil Rights, Attorney's fees.  Practice, Civil, Attorney's 
fees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 20, 2006. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 463 Mass. 767 (2012), a 
motion for attorney's fees was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J., 
and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
William D. Saltzman for the defendants. 
 
James R. Pingeon for the plaintiff. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Additional defendants, sued in their individual or 
official capacities, or both, include the superintendent, the 
deputy superintendent for classification, and the former 
assistant director of classification at Souza-Baranowski 
Correctional Center (SBCC). 
 
 
2 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  This appeal concerns an award of attorney's 
fees under the Federal Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), in a civil rights action brought by a 
Massachusetts prison inmate, Edmund LaChance.  LaChance claimed 
that the defendants violated his constitutional due process 
rights by holding him in essentially solitary confinement in a 
special management unit (SMU) for ten months, without a hearing, 
while waiting to transfer or reclassify him.  That litigation 
eventually resulted in our decision in LaChance v. Commissioner 
of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012) (LaChance I), where we 
announced "for the first time that segregated confinement on 
awaiting action status for longer than ninety days gives rise to 
a liberty interest entitling an inmate to notice and a hearing," 
and a written posthearing decision.  Id. at 778.  See id. at 
776-777.  On remand, a Superior Court judge entered declaratory 
judgment in favor of LaChance and awarded him $28,578.69 in 
attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).  The 
defendants are challenging that award in this appeal. 
 
The principal issue before us is whether LaChance qualified 
for an award of fees as a "prevailing party" under § 1988(b), 
even though he had already been discharged in 2006 from the SMU 
detention that was the subject of his suit, long before he won 
any relief in his favor.  The defendants argue that, in these 
3 
 
circumstances, LaChance was not a prevailing party because the 
declaratory judgment he ultimately won was moot, and did not 
directly benefit him or materially alter his relationship with 
the defendants, at the time it was entered.  We conclude, 
however, that LaChance does qualify as a prevailing party in the 
circumstances of this case, where the record demonstrates that 
(1) the declaratory judgment he obtained was not moot when 
entered, because it concerned a deprivation of civil rights of 
short duration that was capable of repetition against LaChance; 
and (2) LaChance directly benefited from that judgment at the 
time it was entered.  We also reject the defendants' contention 
that the judge's award of fees to LaChance was unreasonable.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judge's award of attorney's fees and 
costs to LaChance. 
 
Background.  We briefly summarize the facts that gave rise 
to this litigation, which are detailed in LaChance I, 463 Mass. 
at 769-773.  LaChance has been in the custody of the Department 
of Correction (DOC) from the inception of this litigation 
through at least the submission of his brief on appeal.  During 
most of this time, he was an inmate at Souza-Baranowski 
Correctional Center (SBCC), a maximum security prison in 
Shirley.  In December, 2005, he was assigned to SBCC's SMU for 
fourteen days as a sanction for throwing a cup of pudding at 
another inmate and later threatening to harm him.  After 
4 
 
completing this disciplinary detention, however, he continued to 
be held in the SMU for another ten months, from January to 
November, 2006, on "awaiting action" status pending his 
reclassification or transfer to another facility.3  LaChance did 
not leave the SMU and return to his previous placement until the 
other inmate involved in the altercation had been moved out of 
it.  During his ten-month detention in the SMU, LaChance was in 
solitary confinement for all but a few hours per week.  He was 
shackled whenever he left his cell; allowed only one hour of 
recreation per day, five days per week, in an unsheltered, 
outdoor cage; barred from educational, religious, vocational, 
and rehabilitative programming available to other inmates; and 
permitted only very limited visitation and library privileges.  
Although a prison official informally reviewed LaChance's status 
on a weekly basis and gave him written reports of the reviews, 
he was not given a hearing. 
 
In an amended complaint filed in Superior Court in May, 
2008, LaChance asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and G. L. 
c. 12, § 11I, alleging that the conditions of his SMU detention 
                                                          
 
 
3 In LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767, 
769 n.5 (2012) (LaChance I), we noted that, although "awaiting 
action" was not defined in Department of Correction (DOC) 
regulations pertaining to detention in a special management unit 
(SMU), the phrase was used in other contexts, generally 
referring to confinement pending investigation or a final 
placement or transfer decision.  See 103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 421.06 (1994); 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.21(1) (2006). 
5 
 
were at least as harsh as those in a departmental segregation 
unit (DSU), but he was denied the right to a hearing guaranteed 
in DOC regulations governing DSU confinement.  See 103 Code 
Mass. Regs. §§ 421.00 (1994).  He requested compensatory and 
punitive damages, a declaration that the defendants' actions 
were unlawful, and an award of costs including reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
 
On April 6, 2010, a judge granted LaChance's motion for 
partial summary judgment on his claims for declaratory relief.  
Citing our decision in Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, 
437 Mass. 737 (2002), the judge concluded that LaChance's 
confinement in the SMU was substantially similar to confinement 
in a DSU, and that the defendants violated his constitutional 
due process rights by failing to provide him with the same 
procedural protections afforded by the DSU regulations. 
 
In the same order, the judge allowed in part and denied in 
part the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment.  The 
judge granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on 
LaChance's claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. 
c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I, on the ground that LaChance had offered 
no evidence that the defendants had employed threats, 
intimidation, or coercion, a necessary element of that claim. 
See Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar 
Junction, 406 Mass. 156, 158 (1989).  The judge also granted 
6 
 
summary judgment in favor of two defendants on LaChance's claims 
for money damages against them in their official capacities 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because money damages against State 
officials are available only if they are sued in their 
individual capacities.  See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester 
County, 415 Mass. 132, 140-141 (1993).  The judge denied the 
defendants' summary judgment motion, however, insofar as they 
argued that they could not be sued in their individual 
capacities because they enjoyed qualified immunity as government 
officials.  He reasoned that after this court's decision in 
Haverty, supra, it should have been clear to the defendants that 
the conditions of LaChance's SMU confinement were substantially 
similar to those in a DSU and that LaChance was therefore 
entitled to the same procedural protections.  The judge 
concluded that the defense of qualified immunity would therefore 
be unavailable to the defendants if they directly participated 
in this violation of LaChance's clearly established rights.  See 
O'Malley, 415 Mass. at 142 (plaintiffs can overcome government 
officials' qualified immunity defense by showing that defendants 
directly participated in violating plaintiffs' clearly 
established rights). 
 
The defendants sought interlocutory appeal under the 
doctrine of present execution from the judge's ruling on 
7 
 
qualified immunity,4 and we transferred the case on our own 
motion.  We held that the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity and directed the Superior Court to enter summary 
judgment in their favor as to the damages claims against the 
individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We noted, 
"[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions . . . 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  LaChance I, 463 Mass. at 777, quoting Rodriques v. 
Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 882 (1991).  We concluded that it would 
not have been clear to reasonable officers that their behavior 
violated LaChance's due process rights, because "neither State 
nor Federal law ha[d] clearly articulated the outer limit of 
what constitutes 'reasonable' segregated confinement on awaiting 
action status without the safeguards of procedural due process."  
LaChance I, supra at 778. 
                                                          
 
 
4 "The doctrine of present execution is a limited exception 
to the finality rule.  It permits the immediate appeal from an 
interlocutory order if the order will interfere with rights in a 
way that cannot be remedied on appeal from a final judgment."  
Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 315 n.6 (2002).  Where a 
public official asserts immunity from suit as a defense, a 
ruling allowing the suit to proceed may be appropriate for 
appeal under the doctrine of present execution because otherwise 
the benefits of immunity would be irrevocably lost.  See Breault 
v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 
26, 31 (1987), cert. denied, 485 Mass. 906 (1988). 
8 
 
 
We then clearly articulated the outer limit of what Federal 
due process requires for reasonable segregated confinement on 
awaiting action status.5  We declared that, given the 
restrictions imposed on LaChance in the SMU, his ten-month 
detention on awaiting action status was not reasonable and gave 
rise to a liberty interest that was entitled to the protection 
of due process.  LaChance I, 463 Mass. at 775-776.  We further 
held that the procedures followed by the DOC were insufficient 
to safeguard that interest.  We concluded that "an inmate 
confined to administrative segregation on awaiting action 
status, whether such confinement occurs in an area designated as 
an SMU, a DSU, or otherwise, is entitled, as a matter of due 
process, to notice of the basis on which he is so detained; a 
hearing at which he may contest the asserted rationale for his 
confinement; and a posthearing written notice explaining the 
reviewing authority's classification decision."  Id. at 776-777.  
We left it to the DOC to promulgate appropriate regulations, 
balancing the inmate's interest in challenging potentially 
arbitrary detention with prison officials' interest in securing 
reclassification or transfer of inmates.  But we concluded that 
                                                          
 
 
5 In considering the defendants' appeal in LaChance I, "it 
was necessary to focus on LaChance's Federal due process claims 
because LaChance would be entitled to damages under his § 1983 
claims only if the defendants knowingly violated LaChance's 
rights under the United States Constitution."  Cantell v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass.    ,     (2016). 
9 
 
"in no circumstances may an inmate be held in segregated 
confinement on awaiting action status for longer than ninety 
days without a hearing."  Id. at 777. 
 
Upon remand, a different judge6 issued an order for entry of 
a final judgment in favor of LaChance, declaring that the 
defendants had violated LaChance's constitutional due process 
rights by failing to provide him with the procedural protections 
that we announced in LaChance I.  The judge allowed the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all of LaChance's 
remaining claims.  Final judgment was entered in accord with 
this order on August 21, 2013. 
 
LaChance subsequently requested an award of $56,504.59 in 
attorney's fees and $392.69 in costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 54, as amended, 382 Mass. 829 (1981).  The 
judge who had entered judgment in favor of LaChance concluded 
that LaChance was a "prevailing party" and therefore entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees under § 1988, even though he had not 
prevailed on his claims for money damages and no injunction had 
entered.  The judge held that LaChance "clearly prevailed in 
proving his constitutional claim" and "won a significant victory 
for himself as well as any other inmate that could possibly be 
held in segregated confinement" because, as a result of his 
                                                          
 
 
6 The judge who had decided the summary judgment motions had 
retired. 
10 
 
litigation, "the DOC is not permitted to hold an inmate in 
segregated confinement for longer than ninety days without 
providing procedural protections."  The judge also concluded 
that the significance of this victory was not affected by the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment rather than an injunction 
because "the courts rely on public officials to comply with the 
law as judicially defined and thus, injunctive orders are 
redundant."  In determining the amount of the award, the judge 
first calculated the total amount of attorney's fees under the 
traditional "lodestar" formula,7 and then reduced this amount 
($56,372) by fifty per cent to $28,186 "due to the discrepancy 
between the claims brought and the claims won."  With the 
addition of $392.69 in costs, the judge ordered a total award of 
$28,578.69. 
 
The defendants asked the judge to reconsider this award in 
light of a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014), 
that issued five days after the award was entered.  In Ford, the 
court held that, where a pretrial detainee in a civil rights 
action obtained declaratory relief regarding his pretrial 
disciplinary segregated confinement that was moot when judgment 
entered because the plaintiff was no longer a pretrial detainee, 
                                                          
 
 
7 The "lodestar" figure is derived by multiplying hours 
reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate.  See Stratos v. 
Department of Pub. Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 322 (1982). 
11 
 
the plaintiff was not a prevailing party, and therefore not 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs under § 1988.  Id. at 31.  
The defendants argued that LaChance was similarly not a 
prevailing party because he had been discharged from the SMU 
before the declaratory relief was entered, so his declaratory 
judgment was moot. 
 
The judge denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration 
on the ground that mootness was not a new issue and could have 
been raised earlier by the defendants.  The judge further held 
that, even assuming that the Ford decision changed the governing 
law, that change was not a sufficiently extraordinary 
circumstance to justify reopening a final judgment under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974).8  The defendants 
appealed the award of attorney's fees, and we transferred the 
case on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that in an 
action to enforce certain Federal civil rights statutes, 
including 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as 
part of the costs."  Section 1988 thus creates an exception to 
the "American Rule" that litigants must ordinarily bear their 
                                                          
 
 
8 The court reviewed the defendants' motion for 
reconsideration under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), rather than Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 59 (e), 365 Mass. 827 (1974), because it was filed 
more than ten days after entry of the award of fees. 
12 
 
own attorney's fees and expenses.  By authorizing awards of fees 
to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions, the statute 
serves "to encourage suits that are not likely to pay for 
themselves, but are nevertheless desirable because they 
vindicate important rights."  Stratos v. Department of Pub. 
Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 323 (1982).  It "promote[s] civil rights 
enforcement and . . . deter[s] civil rights violators, by 
encouraging private lawsuits aimed against civil rights abuses."  
Kadlick v. Department of Mental Health, 431 Mass. 850, 852 
(2000). 
 
"Congress enacted § 1988 specifically because it found that 
the private market for legal services failed to provide many 
victims of civil rights violations with effective access to the 
judicial process. . . .  These victims ordinarily cannot afford 
to purchase legal services at the rates set by the private 
market."  Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986) 
(plurality opinion), citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1, 3; S. 
Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2.  "[Fee] awards have proved an essential 
remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity 
to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these 
laws contain. . . .  If private citizens are to be able to 
assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's 
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens 
must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to 
13 
 
vindicate these rights in court."  Riverside, supra at 577-578, 
quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2. 
 
Congress also recognized that a successful civil rights 
plaintiff acts "not for himself alone but also as a 'private 
attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered 
of the highest importance."  Riverside, supra at 575, quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 2.  Thus, in enacting § 1988, Congress 
also "meant to promote" a "'private attorney general' role" for 
plaintiffs in enforcing the civil rights laws.  Texas State 
Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 
(1989). 
 
In this appeal, the defendants have challenged the judge's 
award of fees on two grounds.  First, they assert that the judge 
erred in concluding that LaChance is a prevailing party.  
Second, they contend that the award of fees is excessive.  We 
address each issue in turn. 
 
1.  Prevailing party.  Whether LaChance is a "prevailing 
party" is an issue of law that we consider de novo.  See Newell 
v. Department of Mental Retardation, 446 Mass. 286, 298, cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 823 (2006).  In general, under § 1988, 
"plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for 
attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant 
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the 
parties sought in bringing suit."  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 
14 
 
103, 109 (1992), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 
(1983).  Following Farrar, we have held that to qualify for an 
award of fees as a "prevailing party" under § 1988, first, a 
civil rights plaintiff "must obtain at least some relief on the 
merits of his claim"; second, the "plaintiff must obtain an 
enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are 
sought"; and third, "[w]hatever relief the plaintiff secures 
must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or 
settlement."  Mendoza v. Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 
188, 210 (2005), quoting Farrar, supra at 111.  We have further 
said that "for a party to be considered a 'prevailing party' 
under Federal fee-shifting statutes there must be a 'material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,' . . . and 
there must be a 'judicial imprimatur on the change.'"  Newell, 
supra at 297-298, quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. 
West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 
604, 605 (2001).  See T & D Video, Inc. v. Revere, 450 Mass. 
107, 108 (2007), quoting Buckhannon, supra at 605 (defining 
"prevailing party" as "one who obtains a 'judicially sanctioned 
change in the legal relationship of the parties'"). 
 
Here, the defendants acknowledge that a declaratory 
judgment in favor of a plaintiff, like that won by LaChance, 
will usually suffice to establish that the plaintiff is a 
"prevailing party" under § 1988. See Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. 
15 
 
Ct. 9, 11 (2012).  They also acknowledge that, where the 
declaratory judgment is directed to public officials, an 
injunctive order is not necessary to create an enforceable 
judgment and confer prevailing party status on a plaintiff, 
because Massachusetts courts "assume that public officials will 
comply with the law declared by a court and that consequently 
injunctive orders are generally unnecessary."  Massachusetts 
Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Servs., 400 
Mass. 806, 825 (1987). 
 
The defendants contend, however, that LaChance did not 
qualify as a "prevailing party" because he was discharged from 
the SMU in November, 2006, so the declaratory judgment he won 
(1) was moot when entered,9 and (2) did not directly benefit 
LaChance or materially alter his legal relationship with the 
defendants.  We conclude that the declaratory judgment was not 
moot when entered, and that it both directly benefited  LaChance 
and materially altered his legal relationship with the 
                                                          
 
 
9 As noted above, the Superior Court judge declined to 
address the defendants' mootness argument on the merits when he 
denied their motion for reconsideration because, in his view, 
the defendants should have raised the issue previously but 
failed to do so.  In fact, however, the defendants presented the 
mootness argument in their opposition to LaChance's motion for 
attorney's fees.  Moreover, as LaChance concedes, the defendants 
raised mootness in moving to dismiss his complaint and in 
opposing his motion for partial summary judgment.  We address 
the issue in light of those facts and because the question of 
mootness implicates the justiciability of the underlying case. 
16 
 
defendants, and therefore LaChance was correctly determined to 
be a "prevailing party" under § 1988. 
 
The concept of mootness, as applied in the Federal courts, 
derives from the case or controversy requirement of art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1, of the United States Constitution.  Under art. III, 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts is limited 
to "cases" and "controversies."  See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. 
Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016).  To meet this jurisdictional 
requirement, there must be an "actual controversy" between the 
parties at all stages of the case.  See id.; Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) ("Article III demands that 
an 'actual controversy' persist throughout all stages of 
litigation").  An actual controversy exists only when the 
parties have a "personal stake" in the outcome.  See Genesis 
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2013); 
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 702 (2011) ("So long as the 
litigants possess [a] personal stake . . . , an appeal presents 
a case or controversy . . .").  This personal stake "requirement 
ensures that the Federal Judiciary confines itself to its 
constitutionally limited role of adjudicating actual and 
concrete disputes, the resolutions of which have direct 
consequences on the parties involved."  Genesis Healthcare 
Corp., supra at 1528.  If a plaintiff's circumstances change 
such that he or she no longer has a personal stake in the 
17 
 
outcome of the case, the case becomes moot; there is no longer 
an actual controversy as required for Federal court 
jurisdiction, and the case must be dismissed.  See id. ("If an 
intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a 'personal 
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,' at any point during 
litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be 
dismissed as moot" [citation omitted]); Already, LLC v. Nike, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726-727 (2013), quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 
455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) ("A case becomes moot -- and therefore 
no longer a 'Case' or 'Controversy' for purposes of Article III 
-- 'when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the 
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome'"). 
 
Plaintiffs cannot ordinarily "prevail" under § 1988 where 
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter relief in 
their favor because the case has become moot.  In Rhodes v. 
Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988), one of the principal cases cited by 
the defendants, the United States Supreme Court held that two 
plaintiff inmates were not entitled to attorney's fees as 
prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even though they had 
won a favorable judgment, because their claims had become moot 
long before the judgment entered.  The plaintiffs claimed that 
their constitutional rights had been violated by correctional 
officials who had refused them permission to subscribe to a 
magazine.  A Federal District Court ruled that the officials had 
18 
 
not applied the proper standards in denying the inmates' 
request, ordered compliance with those standards, and 
subsequently awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.  See id. 
at 2.  It later came to light, however, that one of the 
plaintiffs had died, and the other had been paroled and given a 
final release, long before the District Court entered its order.  
See id. at 3.  Based on those facts, the Supreme Court 
overturned the judgment and award of attorney's fees, reasoning 
that "[a] modification of prison policies on magazine 
subscriptions could not in any way have benefited either 
plaintiff," and consequently "[t]he case was moot before 
judgment issued, and the judgment therefore afforded the 
plaintiffs no relief whatsoever."  Id. at 4. 
 
Similarly, in Ford, 768 F.3d at 31, as earlier noted, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that 
the plaintiff inmate was not entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees as a prevailing party under § 1988 for declaratory relief 
he won in a Federal District Court arising from his pretrial 
detainment because the defendant was no longer a pretrial 
detainee when judgment entered.  The court reasoned that the 
case was moot as to that issue when the relief was granted, so 
there was no case or controversy and therefore no Federal court 
jurisdiction to grant that relief.  See id.  See also id. at 29-
30. 
19 
 
 
A case is not moot under Federal law, however, where "it 
falls within a special category of disputes that are 'capable of 
repetition' while 'evading review.'"  Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 
431, 439 (2011), quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).  "A 
dispute falls into that category, and a case based on that 
dispute remains live, if '(1) the challenged action [is] in its 
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation 
or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that 
the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same 
action again.'"  Turner, supra at 439-440, quoting Weinstein v. 
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).  The Federal requirement 
that a case must be capable of repetition as to the same 
plaintiff ensures that the plaintiff still has an ongoing 
personal stake in the matter sufficient to meet the case or 
controversy requirement of art. III.10  See United States Parole 
                                                          
 
 
10 The Federal courts have not always applied this 
requirement with strict consistency.  See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 
484 U.S. 305, 335-336 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Roe, at 
least one other abortion case, . . . and some of our election 
law decisions, . . . differ from the body of our mootness 
jurisprudence . . . in dispensing with the same-party 
requirement entirely, focusing instead upon the great likelihood 
that the issue will recur between the defendant and the other 
members of the public at large" [citations omitted]); 13C C.A. 
Wright, A.R. Miller, & E.H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3533.9, at 488 (3d ed. 2008) ("Although it has not 
been abandoned, the requirement that the individual plaintiff is 
likely to be affected by a future recurrence of a mooted dispute 
has been diluted in some cases"; citing cases). 
20 
 
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980) ("Since the 
litigant faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the same 
controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can be expected to 
continue").  The plaintiff need only show that "the controversy 
was capable of repetition"; the plaintiff need not show "that a 
recurrence of the dispute was more probable than not" (emphasis 
in original).  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 n.6 (1988). 
 
In Turner, 564 U.S. at 440, the Supreme Court held that a 
father's due process challenge to his incarceration for civil 
contempt based on his failure to make child support payments was 
not moot even though he had completed his twelve-month sentence, 
because his imprisonment was too short to be litigated fully 
before its expiration and there was a reasonable likelihood that 
he would again be subjected to the same action.  In so holding, 
the Court cited evidence that the father had been the subject of 
several civil contempt proceedings for which he had been 
imprisoned on several occasions, including another six-month 
term imposed shortly after his release from the imprisonment at 
issue in his action.  See id. at 436-437, 440.  Other Federal 
decisions involving plaintiff inmates have also held that their 
cases were not moot because the alleged wrongs were likely to 
21 
 
recur in the future, based on evidence that the plaintiffs had 
been repeatedly subjected to similar conditions.11 
 
LaChance's circumstances in this case are similar to those 
in Turner and the other cases just cited.  LaChance has remained 
in DOC custody throughout the course of this litigation, and he 
has demonstrated through an unrebutted affidavit that there was 
a reasonable expectation when judgment entered that he would 
again be subjected to segregated detention, because he has been 
repeatedly confined in segregation units during his 
                                                          
 
 
11 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 218-219 (1990) 
(Court could properly decide case concerning administration of 
antipsychotic drugs to prisoner against his will, even though 
State had stopped doing so, because situation was likely to 
recur; prisoner was still in custody, was still mentally ill, 
had been twice transferred to center for treatment of felons 
with serious mental illness, and remained subject to transfer); 
Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1026-1027 (9th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005) (detainees' suit challenging 
sheriff's policy of placing photographs of detainees on Internet 
while they were held in jail awaiting trial was not moot, even 
though they had been released from jail, because there was 
evidence that they would likely again be detained there; one 
plaintiff had been detained there twenty times, and eleven 
others had been detained there on more than one occasion); 
LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1462 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(prisoner's constitutional challenge to conditions in 
disciplinary segregation unit was not moot, even though he was 
no longer being held there, because he remained under control of 
prison system, and practices and sanctions of which he 
complained were capable of repetition); Ferreira v. Duval, 887 
F. Supp. 374, 382 (D. Mass. 1995) (prisoner's suit alleging 
constitutional violations during his departmental disciplinary 
unit confinement was not rendered moot by his discharge from 
unit because alleged violations were capable of repetition, yet 
evading review, where plaintiff had poor disciplinary record and 
five years left on his prison sentence and therefore had 
reasonable expectation of again being confined in unit). 
22 
 
incarceration.12  LaChance's affidavit also supports the 
conclusion that SMU detentions are too short for prisoners to 
obtain judicial relief before they are discharged, so that the 
practice would evade review if LaChance's case and others like 
it were dismissed on mootness grounds. 
 
These facts distinguish LaChance's case from the cases 
cited by the defendants where prisoners' civil rights claims 
were held to be moot, such as Rhodes v. Stewart, supra, and Ford 
v. Bender, supra.  The plaintiffs in those cases were either 
dead or released from the custody at issue when declaratory 
judgment entered, and therefore there was no reasonable 
possibility that they would again be subjected to the same 
                                                          
 
 
12 LaChance submitted the affidavit in response to the 
defendants' motion for reconsideration of the award of 
attorney's fees.  He stated that he had been placed in 
segregation units many times during his incarceration, including 
placement in the SMU at SBCC as a pretrial detainee for 
approximately fourteen months in 2000-2001; placement in a 
segregation unit at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution 
at Concord as a sentenced prisoner for about three months from 
late 2001 to early 2002; subsequent placements in the SMU at 
SBCC from September 29, 2002, to February 10, 2003, and from 
December 21, 2005, to November 15, 2006 (the placement 
challenged in this action), plus "at least a few other occasions 
in 2007-2009" for which he did not recall the dates; placements 
in the segregation unit at the North Central Correctional 
Institution at Gardner "on at least three occasions," for which 
he did not recall the dates; and a placement in the segregation 
unit at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar 
Junction from June 5 to July 22, 2014.  Although the motion 
judge did not make any findings based on LaChance's affidavit, 
the defendants did not dispute the assertions therein, and we 
are in as good a position to assess it as the judge below.  See 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 492, 493 
(1974). 
23 
 
wrongs.  Here, by contrast, LaChance was still in custody when 
judgment entered and, based on his prior history of segregated 
confinement, there was a reasonable expectation that he would 
again be returned to such confinement.13  Therefore, applying 
Federal principles of justiciability, the denial of due process 
at the SMU that was the basis of LaChance's civil rights claim 
was capable of repetition as to him, so his claim was not moot 
when judgment entered. 
 
The declaratory judgment won by LaChance also benefited him 
and materially altered his legal relationship with the 
defendants because that judgment required the defendants to 
provide him with additional procedural protections that he had 
not previously received if he were again placed in segregated 
detention on awaiting action status.  See Lefemine, 133 S. Ct. 
at 11 (where Federal District Court ruled that defendants had 
violated plaintiff abortion protester's rights and enjoined them 
                                                          
 
 
13 We are mindful of the United States Supreme Court's 
observation that, "for purposes of assessing the likelihood that 
state authorities will reinflict a given injury," it has 
"generally . . . been unwilling to assume that the party seeking 
relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again 
place him or her at risk of that injury."  Honig, 484 U.S. at 
320.  But we note that the DOC's SMU regulations provide that an 
inmate may be placed in administrative segregation for 
nondisciplinary reasons such as pending transfer or 
classification, pending an investigation or hearing, or for the 
inmate's own safety.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 423.08(1) (1995).  
Thus, we need not presume repeated misconduct by LaChance to 
conclude that there was a reasonable expectation when judgment 
entered that he would again be subjected to segregated 
confinement. 
24 
 
from engaging in similar conduct in future, that ruling 
materially altered parties' relationship and therefore justified 
award of fees because police had intended to stop plaintiff from 
protesting with his signs but, as result of ruling, could not 
prevent him from demonstrating in that manner).  Although 
LaChance could only take advantage of this benefit in the 
future, it was nevertheless a tangible present benefit to him.  
See Mendoza, 444 Mass. at 210-211 (judgments that invalidated 
adult entertainment ordinances challenged by plaintiff bar owner 
materially altered his relationship with defendants, even though 
he was still barred from presenting nude dancing by limitations 
in zoning variance, because plaintiff was "eligible to apply for 
a zoning variance that would permit nude dancing"). 
 
In short, because LaChance has adequately shown that there 
was a reasonable expectation when judgment entered that he would 
again be held in segregated detention on awaiting action status, 
he had a sufficient ongoing interest in his suit for it not to 
be moot, even if he was no longer held in the SMU when 
declaratory relief was entered in his favor.  And because he had 
an ongoing interest in the outcome of his suit, the favorable 
rulings he obtained benefited him.  We therefore conclude that, 
even if this case had been brought in Federal court under the 
25 
 
constraints of Federal subject matter jurisdiction, LaChance 
would qualify for an award of fees as a "prevailing party."14 
                                                          
 
 
14 We note that, because Federal limitations on 
justiciability are grounded in the case or controversy 
limitation in art. III of the United States Constitution, and 
because art. III does not apply to State courts, State courts 
remain free to define their own jurisdictional limits even when 
adjudicating Federal claims.  See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 
U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ("We have recognized often that the 
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and 
accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of 
a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability 
even when they address issues of federal law, as when they are 
called upon to interpret the Constitution or . . . a federal 
statute").  In Massachusetts, "we have on occasion answered 
questions in moot cases where the issue was one of public 
importance, where it was fully argued on both sides, where the 
question was certain, or at least very likely, to arise again in 
similar factual circumstances, and especially where appellate 
review could not be obtained before the recurring question would 
again be moot."  Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 574 
(2013), quoting Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 783 
(1984).  Notably, under our principles of justiciability -- in 
contrast with Federal jurisprudence -- it is not "indispensable 
that the case be capable of repetition in respect only to the 
particular claimant," because the "doctrine is designed to 
assist in the clarification of the law generally, and not simply 
to assist the situation of a particular party."  Mendonza v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 777 (1996). 
 
 
We recognize that there is an unanswered question whether a 
plaintiff may be a "prevailing party" under § 1988 in a 
Massachusetts court where the plaintiff obtains a declaratory 
judgment or injunctive relief after the case became moot, even 
though the plaintiff could not be a "prevailing party" had the 
case been brought in Federal court, where mootness would have 
resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff's claims.  It arguably 
would thwart the congressional purpose in enacting § 1988 if a 
Massachusetts court were to exercise its broader subject matter 
jurisdiction to allow a moot civil rights case brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to proceed to judgment where the challenged 
conduct is likely to recur against others, and then, when the 
plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a declaratory judgment or 
injunctive relief, conclude that the plaintiff's attorneys are 
26 
 
 
2.  Reasonableness of the award of fees.  Having concluded 
that LaChance was a prevailing party, we now address whether the 
judge abused his discretion in his award of attorney's fees.  
The defendants contend that the judge abused his discretion in 
concluding that $28,186 was a reasonable award of attorney's 
fees, because LaChance's success in relation to his goals was 
minimal and his attorneys devoted considerably more effort to 
claims on which they failed than to those on which they 
succeeded.15  We do not agree. 
 
Section 1988(b) permits a prevailing party to recover "a 
reasonable attorney's fee" (emphasis added).  The determination 
of the amount of reasonable attorney's fees rests in the sound 
discretion of the judge, to be exercised in accord with certain 
governing principles.  See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-437; 
Stratos, 387 Mass. at 321.  This determination should ordinarily 
begin with the lodestar calculation, based on the number of 
hours that are reasonably expended and adequately documented, 
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.  The judge may then 
adjust the lodestar calculation upward or downward in light of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not entitled to an award of attorney's fees because the 
plaintiff himself or herself did not "prevail."  Because the 
plaintiff here would be a "prevailing party" even if his case 
had been brought in Federal court, we need not reach that 
unanswered question in this case. 
 
 
15 The defendants do not challenge the $392.69 in costs 
awarded by the Superior Court. 
27 
 
the results obtained.  See Hensley, supra at 433-434.  Where the 
plaintiff has obtained only partial success, it may be feasible 
to exclude time devoted to claims on which the plaintiff did not 
succeed.  In many civil rights cases, however, it may be 
difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim 
basis, because "the plaintiff's claims for relief will involve a 
common core of facts or will be based on related legal 
theories," and "[m]uch of counsel's time will be devoted 
generally to the litigation as a whole."  Id. at 435.  In those 
cases, the "court should focus on the significance of the 
overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the 
hours reasonably expended on the litigation," and "it may simply 
reduce the award to account for the limited success."  Id. at 
435, 436-437.  "There is no precise rule or formula for making 
these determinations."  Id. at 436. 
 
Bearing in mind the deference due the judge's "superior 
ability to calibrate such awards to the nuances of the case," 
Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587 F.3d 445, 452 (1st Cir. 2009), 
we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion.  In our 
view, the judge carefully and thoughtfully applied these 
governing principles in determining an appropriate award of 
fees.  He scrutinized the number of hours worked by the 
plaintiff's counsel, noting that hours devoted to certain 
claims, motions, and issues were properly excluded where they 
28 
 
were unsuccessful, not related to the principal case, or not a 
proper basis for an award of fees.  He also reduced the rates 
proposed by the plaintiff's counsel based on the limitations in 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3).  He 
multiplied these rates by the number of hours reasonably 
expended to obtain a lodestar calculation of $56,372, which he 
then assessed in light of "the degree of success obtained," 
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 
including "the extent of relief, the significance of the legal 
issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose 
served" by the litigation, Farrar, supra at 122 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring).  The judge noted that LaChance did not succeed on 
all of his claims.  Nevertheless, the judge concluded that our 
ruling in LaChance I constituted a significant victory that 
served a public purpose by establishing the due process rights 
of inmates held in administrative segregation.  Taking into 
account these factors and the common core of facts and related 
legal issues involved, the judge reduced the lodestar 
calculation by fifty percent "due to the discrepancy between the 
claims brought and the claims won." 
 
In challenging this award, the defendants emphasize the 
point that LaChance did not succeed on all his claims.  But our 
holding in LaChance I was nevertheless a substantial victory for 
LaChance on his most fundamental claim:  that his confinement in 
29 
 
administrative segregation without a hearing violated his 
Federal constitutional right to due process.  It also led to a 
significant new statement of law, since we announced "for the 
first time that segregated confinement on awaiting action status 
for longer than ninety days gives rise to a liberty interest 
entitling an inmate to notice and a hearing" and a written 
posthearing decision.  LaChance I, 463 Mass. at 778.  See id. at 
776-777.  This was much more than a de minimis success, even 
when considered in the context of the other goals of LaChance's 
suit. 
 
The defendants also argue that LaChance's award should have 
been reduced further because his counsel devoted substantially 
more effort to his unsuccessful claims than to his successful 
claims.  In making this argument, the defendants primarily rely 
on counting the relative number of claims in the pleadings and 
the relative number of pages in briefs concerning LaChance's 
successful and unsuccessful theories.  But such a mathematical 
"ratio provides little aid in determining what is a reasonable 
fee in light of all the relevant factors."  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 
435 n.11. 
 
In sum, given that the Superior Court judge already reduced 
the award of fees to half of the amount requested in light of 
the discrepancy between the claims brought and the claims won by 
LaChance, and considering that "[t]here is no precise rule or 
30 
 
formula" for determining an appropriate fee reduction where, as 
here, a civil rights plaintiff has achieved only partial 
success, id. at 436, we conclude that the judge did not abuse 
his discretion in calculating the award of attorney's fees. 
 
3.  Fees awarded on appeal.  Both LaChance and the 
defendants have requested their attorney's fees and costs for 
this appeal.  In light of our rulings above, we conclude that 
LaChance is also entitled under § 1988 to recover his reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this 
appeal.  See Mendoza, 444 Mass. at 212 n.28, citing Ustrak v. 
Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 1988) (prevailing party 
entitled to reimbursement of fees incurred in defending trial 
court's award of fees).  We therefore invite LaChance to file 
with the clerk of this court the appropriate documents detailing 
and supporting his request for such fees and costs within 
fourteen days of the issuance of the rescript in this case, in 
accord with the procedure established in Fabre v. Walton, 441 
Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004).  The defendants' fee request is denied. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 
award of attorney's fees and costs entered by the judge in favor 
of LaChance and conclude that LaChance is also entitled under 
§ 1988 to recover his reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in connection with this appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.