Title: Behrens v. Behrens

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM C. BEHRENS, 
 
) 
No. 12, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Court Below:        Family Court 
 
          Appellant, and 
 
) 
of the State of  Delaware  in and 
 
       Petitioner Below 
 
) 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
) 
File No:             CN99-08345 and 
) 
Petition Nos. 02-16863, 02-29706 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
and 02-02958 
BARBARA R. BEHRENS, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
          Appellee, and 
 
) 
              Respondent Below 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July   8, 2003 
Decided:     July 24, 2003 
 
Before  VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ORDER 
 
 
This 24th day of July, 2003, it appears to the Court that: 
(1)     The  Petitioner Below, Appellant, William C. Behrens ("Father") has 
appealed  from an order of the Family Court of the State of Delaware, denying his 
Petition for Specific Performance of a May 2, 2000 Stipulation and Order into 
which Father and the Respondent Below-Appellee, Barbara R. Behrens ("Mother") 
entered in connection with their divorce.  
 
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(2)     The portion of the Stipulation that Father sought to have specifically 
performed states that: 
7. Mother  agrees that father would be dependent upon 
mother should he be obligated to pay anything additional 
above his obligation to pay one-half of the tuition at St. 
Thomas  the Apostle for the children's attendance at any 
Parochial school as hereinbefore set forth.  Mother agrees 
that  she waives further support for the children above such 
tuition payment, however, should she file and obtain a 
support Order against father, then she agrees that she 
would be obligated to pay father non-deductible alimony in 
the same amount as any increase above father's tuition 
obligation.  The parties agree that this is an integrated 
agreement.  Except  as otherwise expressly provided 
herein, each party waives and releases with prejudice all 
claims against each other which were or could have been 
asserted in these proceedings for all alimony or support 
pursuant to 13 Del. C. §§ 1509 or 1512. 
(3) 
The Stipulation also contained a provision on child support, which 
states as follows: 
6. 
Father agrees that in lieu of child support, he shall pay 
one half of the tuition cost for the children to attend St. 
Thomas the Apostle through the eighth grade.. Thereafter, if   
the children attend Parochial school, father agrees that he shall 
continue to pay an amount equivalent to one half of the tuition 
at St. Thomas the Apostle paid during the children's [sic] 
attendance during the eighth grade in lieu of child support. 
(4) 
In February, 2002, Mother filed a petition for child support, alleging 
that Father had failed, without just cause, to comply with his duty to support 
his children.  Father  filed an Answer, which claimed that  (i) he had been 
 
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paying his obligations as provided by the May 2, 2000 Stipulation, and that 
(ii) the Stipulation provided that should Mother seek an increase in support, 
she would then be obligated to pay non-deductible alimony to Father in the 
same amount as the increased support.  Thereafter, in May, 2002, Father 
filed a Petition for alimony, which was amended so as to be designated as a 
Petition for Specific  Performance of Paragraph 7 of the May 2, 2000 
Stipulation. 
(5)    The Family Court denied the Petition for Specific Performance  
on the legal basis that: 
[T]his Court cannot enforce an agreement which 
contracts away the right of children to receive adequate 
and fair child support,  Solis v. Tea,  468 A.2d 1286 
(1983). 
 
Realistically, 
the 
Stipulation…required 
[Father] to pay one-half of the children's tuition at a 
parochial school in lieu of child support.  [Mother} 
agreed not to seek child support above the tuition 
payment, but if she did so in the future, then she would 
have to pay the difference between the child support 
and [Father's] share of the tuition payment  back to 
[Father] as non-deductible.  This creative wording does 
nothing more than state that the child support can never 
exceed one-half of the parochial school tuition.  To 
honor such a provision would restrict [Mother's] right 
to receive child support and the parties would have 
contracted away the rights of two children to be 
adequately supported.  They cannot do so.  When 
balancing contract law principles against the best 
interests of children, the children's best interests must 
always prevail. 
 
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(6)     On this appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in holding that the Stipulation was unenforceable, and that instead, the 
Court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on the fairness and 
validity of that Agreement.  The standard of review of a grant or denial of 
specific performance of a contract is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion.1 Where, as here, specific performance is denied because the 
contract is found to be unenforceable on its face, the standard of review is 
whether the trial court committed legal error requiring reversal.2  In this 
case, the Family Court, in denying specific performance of the Stipulation, 
did not commit legal error, nor did that Court abuse its discretion. 
(7)     The Family Court committed no abuse of discretion by not conducting 
an evidentiary hearing, because the issue was whether the Stipulation was 
unenforceable on its face.  That was an issue of law, which the trial court 
decided correctly, because the clear and unambiguous effect of the contested 
provisions was to limit the amount of Father's child support obligation to a 
fixed amount.  Because as a matter of public policy the Family Court cannot 
be precluded by private contract from determining the level of support that is 
                                                 
1 Brown v.  Giles-Brown, 1997  WL 878705 at *3  (Del. Fam. Ct. 1997); see U.S. 
Dimension Products, Inc.  v. Tassette, 290 A.2d 634, 635 (Del. 1972) (holding that 
"whether the [trial judge] should have awarded…specific performance…was a matter 
within the discretion of the Court below.") 
 
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in the best interests of minor children,3  the Stipulation was correctly found  
to be unenforceable as a matter of law, requiring, as a consequence, that 
Father's Motion for Specific Performance be denied. 
(8)     Although the trial court's ruling properly vindicated the rights of the 
children (and of Mother, as their representative), the relief that it granted 
was improperly one-sided. That ruling invalidated the Stipulation insofar as 
it  restricted Mother's right to seek additional child support, but  
(inadvertently, it appears) did not invalidate the provision that restricted 
Father's right to seek alimony, even though those two rights were integrated 
and mutually dependent upon each another.  To the extent the trial court's 
ruling denied enforcement of one party's (Mother's) promise while holding 
the other party (Father) to terms made in reliance on that promise, that ruling  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1282 (Del. 1983). 
3 G.W.F. v. G.P.F., 271 A.2d 38, 39 (Del. 1970) ("[P]arents may not, by agreement 
between themselves, bargain away or adversely affect the right of a minor child to look to 
his father for support and maintenance.  Parents  are not precluded from contracting with 
respect to the support of their children, but they may not, by agreement, prevent in futuro 
the re-examination by a court of the adequacy of the support for minor children agreed 
upon by the parents.  It  is only when the parents' contract is consistent with the welfare 
and best interests of the child that the agreement for support may be given controlling 
effect."); accord, Coneys v. Coneys, 269 A.2d 634, 635 (Del. 1972) ("[A] prior support 
agreement between the parents does not preclude the Court from allowing a greater 
amount.") 
 
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was not a sound exercise of discretion.4  The case will, therefore, be 
remanded to the Family Court to modify its Order to the extent necessary to 
enable Father to file a new Petition for Alimony. 
           NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED  that the Order and 
Judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED, and that the matter is 
REMANDED  to the Family Court for proceedings consistent herewith.  
Jurisdiction is not retained.          
                                                       BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
    /s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §184 (1981) ("Under the rule stated in [§ 184], an 
agreement may be unenforceable as to corresponding equivalents on each side but 
unenforceable as to the rest.  If it is not possible to apportion the parties' performances in 
this way so that corresponding concessions are made on both sides, a refusal to enforce 
only part of the agreement will necessarily result in some inequality.")  In this case, it is 
possible to avoid that "inequality" by treating as unenforceable the "corresponding 
equivalent," in this case , Father's agreement not to petition for alimony as the quid pro 
quo for Mother's promise to cap the  amount of child support. Cf. also, Willcher v. 
Willcher, 294 A.2d 486 (D.C. App. 1972); Gelmi v. Gelmi, 172 A.2d 888 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 
App. 1961).