Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Mishler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008-Ohio-1810.] 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. MISHLER. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008-Ohio-1810.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules — 
Violation of rule prohibiting fee-splitting not found — Two-year license 
suspension with one year stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2007-0344 — Submitted July 10, 2007 — Decided April 23, 2008.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-040. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Howard V. Mishler of Westlake, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0007281, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1973.  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
now suspend respondent’s license to practice for one year, staying the last six 
months on conditions, based on findings that he committed multiple violations of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
{¶ 2} On review, we agree with the board that respondent committed 
professional misconduct to the extent that he accepted a settlement offer without 
his client’s knowledge, obtained settlement proceeds with forged client 
endorsements, charged excessive fees, and failed to account for client funds.  
Such serious breaches of our profession’s ethical duties, however, require a more 
exacting sanction than the board recommended.  We therefore order a two-year 
suspension of respondent’s license to practice, the second year of which will be 
stayed provided that respondent complies with conditions for his rehabilitation 
and reimburses his clients and we order a one-year probation period upon 
reinstatement. 
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{¶ 3} Relator, Cleveland Bar Association, initiated these proceedings by 
charging respondent in three counts with numerous violations of the Disciplinary 
Rules.  In August and October 2006, a panel of the board heard the case, 
including the parties’ stipulations, and then made findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.  The panel recommended the one-year suspension with six months stayed 
and one year of probation.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct 
and recommendation. 
{¶ 4} Both parties have objected to the board’s report.  Respondent 
objects to the board’s finding that he violated rules governing lawyers’ fee-
sharing, arguing that he did nothing wrong by paying a lawyer who was not a 
member of his law firm to appear for him at proceedings.  Relator objects to the 
recommended sanction, arguing that the board was too lenient. 
Misconduct 
Count I – Dellipoala Settlement Improprieties 
{¶ 5} Franco J. Dellipoala Jr. retained respondent in fall 2000 to sue his 
former employer, a company then doing business as the Geon Company, for 
employment discrimination.  According to Dellipoala, respondent promised to 
pursue the discrimination case in state and federal trial courts for $10,000 or “40 
percent of the award” plus $2,000 “if an appeal occurred.”  By May 2001, 
Dellipoala had paid respondent installments totaling $17,600. 
{¶ 6} Respondent filed a complaint in December 2000 in Cuyahoga 
County Common Pleas Court on Dellipoala’s behalf.  In June 2001, over 
respondent’s opposition, that court granted Geon’s motion for summary 
judgment.  In July, after Dellipoala apparently agreed to a new $3,000 fee, 
respondent appealed.  Respondent claims that the parties discussed settlement at 
about this time and that Geon offered $7,500 to resolve the dispute.  Respondent 
would later accept this offer. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 7} Also in June 2001, respondent filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.  In October 2001, the 
district court designated a neutral to evaluate the case.  According to the court’s 
docket, the parties had reached a settlement by December 14, 2001.  The district 
court dismissed the case on February 12, 2002, noting, “Counsel has notified the 
Court that the above-captioned case is settled and dismissed, with prejudice.” 
{¶ 8} In early March 2002, respondent and Geon’s counsel filed a joint 
stipulation in the state court of appeals, advising that they had settled the case and 
canceling an impending oral argument.  Later that month, the court of appeals 
dismissed the Dellipoala appeal “pursuant to parties [sic] joint stipulation to 
cancel oral argument due to settlement.” 
{¶ 9} Dellipoala did not authorize respondent to settle his state and 
federal discrimination claims.  In fact, when respondent had presented the $7,500 
offer during the federal mediation proceedings, Dellipoala flatly rejected it, asking 
respondent, “[W]hy would I settle for $7,500 when I spent over $17,000 with 
you?” 
{¶ 10} Dellipoala did not learn that respondent had settled his claims for 
more than six months after the state and federal cases were dismissed.  His first 
indication came in a November 14, 2002 letter with which respondent enclosed a 
settlement agreement.  Respondent’s letter advised that oral argument in the state 
appeal “did not ensue because of the illness which had gripped myself and other 
members of my family causing me to develop an exacerbated and prolonged 
illness.”  The letter continued with this curious passage: 
{¶ 11} “I do recall that contemporaneously, but prior to, my exacerbated 
illness and the unforeseen and shocking malady that I underwent, that there was 
an offer for $7,500 from [Geon].  This recollection was brought to fruition by the 
receipt of a communication on or about 10/28/02 from [Geon’s] counsel 
indicating that as a courtesy to me, that the offer, hence the case, remained 
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unresolved as of October 2002.  I am forwarding a copy of the letter and the 
settlement agreement I received on or about October 2002.  I am still developing a 
method to approach the burden of bringing everything current or active that was 
allowed to slip into the proverbial doldrums out of professional courtesy and 
professionalism directed towards myself and my family.” 
{¶ 12} Dellipoala 
did 
not 
return 
the 
settlement 
agreement.  
Notwithstanding, respondent sent Geon’s counsel a settlement agreement in 
December 2002 that bore an endorsement purporting to be Dellipoala’s signature 
and dated November 5, 2002.  Later that month, Geon’s counsel sent respondent a 
$7,500 check dated March 4, 2002, and made payable to “Franco Dellipoala and 
attorney Howard Mishler.”  Respondent negotiated the check, which also 
purported to be endorsed by Dellipoala.  Dellipoala denied having signed or 
having approved either the settlement agreement or the check. 
{¶ 13} In February 2003, Dellipoala, lodged a grievance with relator, still 
unaware of the dismissals and settlement.  In reply, respondent reported that Geon 
had made the $7,500 settlement offer in July 2001, during an attorneys’ 
conference in the state court of appeals and that he had entertained the offer 
because recent case law had diminished his client’s chances of proving unlawful 
discrimination.  Respondent then characterized his November 16, 2002 letter as 
notice to Dellipoala that the $7,500 settlement “was still available.”  Respondent 
also reported that a six-year statute of limitations applied to Dellipoala’s state 
claim and that respondent could therefore “reactivate” the claim if Dellipoala 
wanted to risk losing his entire $17,600 “investment,” including the $7,500 
settlement amount that respondent saw as an offset to that loss. 
{¶ 14} In mid-August 2004, Dellipoala asked respondent in writing for a 
progress report or the return of his $17,600.  Respondent sent Dellipoala a check 
for $8,000 in April 2005, but the check was returned as undeliverable. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 15} Respondent settled and dismissed Dellipoala’s state and federal 
claims without his client’s authority.  In executing the unauthorized settlement 
agreement, respondent oversaw the process through which Dellipoala’s signature 
was affixed without his permission.  Respondent compounded these improprieties 
by allowing the unauthorized endorsement of Dellipoala’s signature on the 
settlement check and paying none of those proceeds to his client.  He also failed 
to refund any unexpended funds. 
{¶ 16} We adopt the board’s findings that respondent thereby violated DR 
1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects 
on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 7-101(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
intentionally failing to seek a client’s lawful objectives), 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from damaging or prejudicing a client during representation), 9-
102(B)(1) (requiring a lawyer to promptly notify a client of received funds 
belonging to the client), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver 
requested funds that the client is entitled to receive). 
Count II –Dellipoala Fee and Accounting Improprieties 
{¶ 17} Despite his client’s requests, respondent did not account for the 
fees and expenses charged in pursuing Dellipoala’s federal and state 
discrimination suits until he was asked for this information during relator’s 
investigation.  Respondent did not keep track of the time he spent on clients’ 
cases and tried to reconstruct these charges in a “Breakdown of Expenses and 
Fees” for Dellipoala.  In anticipation of the panel hearing, respondent also listed 
his receipts and disbursements in a “Final Account [for] Franco J. Dellipoala” and 
presented that prepared document as evidence that he had fully reimbursed his 
client: 
 
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RECEIPTS 
 
Monies Advanced for Cost 
 
 
 
 
$17,600.00 
 
Settlement Proceeds  
 
 
 
 
  $7,500.00 
 
Total  
 
 
 
 
 
 
$25,100.00 
DISBURSEMENTS 
 
Investigative Fee 
 
 
 
 
 
  $1,000.00 
 
Filing Fee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     $100.00 
 
Monroe Arlen, MD Report 
 
 
 
 
     $500.00 
 
State Appeal — Agreed Fee  
 
 
 
  $3,000.00 
 
Rhonda’s Secretarial Service-Deposition of Mike Guyer 
     $471.00 
 
Rhonda’s Secretarial Service-Deposition of Jeffrey Ames       $590.00 
 
Filing Fee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     $100.00 
 
Copy of Franco Dellipoala’s Deposition 
 
 
     $731.75 
 
Mitchell Wax, Ph.D Report  
 
 
 
     $440.00 
 
Xeroxing and Postage  
 
 
 
 
       $40.00 
 
Attorney Fees for Settlement (1/3 of $7,500)  
 
  $2,500.00 
 
Distribution to Franco Dellipoala of Settlement Proceeds 
$13,127.25 
 
 
And costs ($8,627.25 and $4,500) 
 
 
(Check # 6142 for $8,627.25 [which respondent claimed was in  
 
 
reimbursement for costs not incurred], Account 0166168) 
 
 
(Check # 1492 for $4,500 [which respondent paid as his client’s  
 
 
share of settlement proceeds], Account 0689090) 
 
 
Total Disbursements  
 
 
 
 
$25,100.00 
 
Balance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    0  
{¶ 18} Inaccuracies in this after-the-fact summary cast grave doubt on the 
account.  First, the listed disbursements actually add up to $22,600.  Second, 
respondent testified at the panel hearing that under the terms of his engagement 
contracts with Dellipoala, respondent should have calculated his fee by taking 40 
percent of the $7,500 settlement amount, making that disbursement $3,000.  With 
this new figure, the total disbursements equal $23,100.  And whether 
disbursements total $22,600 or $23,100, receipts minus disbursements do not 
produce a zero balance – the balance equals either $2,500 or $2,000. 
{¶ 19} Inconsistencies also exist between the final account and other 
documents.  Respondent reported in his breakdown of expenses and fees that the 
January Term, 2008 
7 
Mike Guyer deposition had cost $810, not $471, and that the Jeff Ames 
deposition had cost $630, not $590.  And in a February 2005 letter to an officer 
investigating Dellipoala’s criminal allegations, respondent reported that 
Dellipoala’s deposition had cost $800, not $731.75. 
{¶ 20} Moreover, we share the board’s skepticism toward the amount of 
respondent’s fees and expenses generally.  We suspect the legitimacy of these 
charges first because respondent kept no contemporaneous financial records to 
substantiate them.  Second, by his own account, respondent spent only $6,972.75 
of the $17,600 he ostensibly collected to pay expenses.  Yet not until the week 
before the panel hearing did respondent attempt to refund any of the costs he 
owed his client.  He also gave up on paying Dellipoala’s share of the settlement 
proceeds. 
{¶ 21} Furthermore, respondent’s statements as to the cost of his services 
and expenses have differed dramatically.  An engagement contract, executed 
without a witness on an unspecified date in October 2000, provided for 
respondent to represent Dellipoala at the trial level “in any and all matters 
concerning or in any way concerned with the case, controversy, or dispute known 
as Dellipoala v. The Geon Company, et al.,” excluding state and federal appeals.  
The contract required Dellipoala to pay respondent (1) a $1,000 retainer for 
investigating and filing the complaint, (2) “out-of-pocket costs” estimated at 
$10,000, and (3) one-third of any settlement proceeds received before filing suit 
and 40 percent of any settlement received afterward.  A second contract, executed 
on an unspecified date in June 2001 and signed by respondent, witnesses, and 
apparently Dellipoala, contains essentially the same terms. 1 
                                                 
1.  Asked why he had both of these contracts, respondent explained that the first contract covered 
state-court claims and the second covered federal-court claims.  Given that respondent promised to 
provide the same representation in each contract, however, this explanation raises serious 
questions about respondent’s professional competence beyond the allegations charged against him 
in this case.  Moreover, expert testimony established that lawyers do not customarily charge 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 22} But in reply to the Dellipoala grievance, respondent reported 
having had “a fee of Ten Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($10,000.00), plus one-
third (1/3) of any settlement proceeds.”  Similarly, in a February 2001 invoice, 
respondent listed $10,000 as his “estimated fee.”  And in the February 2005 letter 
to the investigating officer, respondent first wrote: “The case was estimated at 
$10,000.00.  Howard V. Mishler received a $1,000.00 retainer, non-refundable, 
and was to receive a third of any settlement proceeds plus out-of-pocket 
reimbursement.”  Later, respondent claimed the value of his services to be 
“$21,000.00 or one-third of the settlement proceeds.” 
{¶ 23} A longtime practitioner in employment law provided expert 
testimony that lawyers in that field (1) rarely charge more than $3,000 in fees in 
advance and (2) rarely, if ever, ask for an all-purpose, lump sum to pay expenses 
in advance.  And as we have seen, respondent is unable to reliably account for the 
fees and expenses he charged Dellipoala.  We therefore adopt the board’s findings 
that respondent violated DR 2-106(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee) and 9-102(B)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep 
complete records of all client funds in his possession and to render appropriate 
accounts to his client). 
Count III – Improprieties in the Walton Case 
{¶ 24} Respondent practices law by himself, doing business as Howard V. 
Mishler Co., L.P.A.  In the summer of 2002, Bruce Walton retained respondent to 
contest his discharge from Rolls-Royce as part of a reduction in force.  
Respondent promised to sue Rolls-Royce for employment discrimination, among 
other claims, based in part on theories of “antiquated education” and 
“physiognomy.”  Respondent told Walton that he had a 70 to 90 percent chance of 
                                                                                                                                     
separately for state and federal employment-discrimination suits because the same facts typically 
underlie both. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
winning his case, and this assurance persuaded Walton to hire respondent and 
forgo a severance package worth approximately $10,000. 
{¶ 25} Walton testified that he paid respondent $5,000 for some 
depositions, with the understanding that respondent would refund this money 
upon obtaining one-third of any recovery.  Respondent testified that after Walton 
agreed to be a witness for another client’s suit against Rolls-Royce, he lowered 
his fee to $1,000, retaining the additional $4,000 to pay expenses for filing in 
federal court. 
{¶ 26} Respondent filed Walton’s complaint against Rolls-Royce in 
September 2002 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio.  In December 2003, respondent had an attorney who was not a member of 
his law firm appear for him during Walton’s deposition.  Respondent did not 
disclose this arrangement to Walton in writing or obtain his consent beforehand.  
The other lawyer also appeared for respondent at a mediation conference without 
Walton’s prior written consent.  Respondent paid the lawyer $20 per hour, never 
gaining Walton’s permission to do so.  Walters felt “uncomfortable” without 
respondent at his deposition and felt “cheated” and “strong armed” without him at 
the mediation conference. 
{¶ 27} The district court granted summary judgment for Rolls-Royce on 
Walton’s federal-law claims and dismissed the remaining state-law claims 
without prejudice.  Respondent appealed, but in November 2004, he stipulated to 
a voluntary dismissal of the appeal in exchange for Rolls-Royce’s agreement not 
to pursue costs.  Walton resignedly consented to the dismissal. 
{¶ 28} Respondent did not commit any fee agreement to writing and had 
no records of the time he spent on Walton’s case.  He has not been able to reliably 
account for how he earned or appropriately spent Walton’s $5,000.  The week 
before the panel hearing, respondent wrote Walton a $638.75 check as a refund. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} Respondent does not contest the board’s findings that he violated 
DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 2-106(A), and 9-102(B)(3) in the course of 
representing Walton.  He does, however, challenge the finding that he violated 
DR 2-107(A), which addresses when lawyers unaffiliated in practice may 
legitimately divide or share fees.  We adopt the board’s uncontested findings of 
misconduct; however, because we have no specific evidence that respondent 
shared his fee by charging Walton for the services of a lawyer with whom 
respondent was not in practice, we sustain respondent’s objection and find no 
violation of DR 2-107(A). 
{¶ 30} DR 2-107(A) permits a “division of fees” between lawyers who are 
not in the same law firm only with the prior consent of the client and when all of 
the following apply: (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by 
each lawyer or, if by written agreement with the client, all lawyers assume 
responsibility for the representation, (2) the terms of the division and the identity 
of all lawyers sharing in the fee are disclosed in writing to the client, (3) the total 
fee is reasonable.  Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Ohio 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Prof.Cond.R.”), effective February 1, 2007, 
define “division of fees.”  We are guided, however, by paragraph seven of the 
comment to Prof.Cond.R. 1.5, which describes a “division of fee” as “a single 
billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same 
firm.” 
{¶ 31} Respondent insists that his payment of an hourly rate to a second, 
unaffiliated attorney whom he described as a “per diem attorney” and an 
“independent contractor” was not “a division of fees” under the rule.  He argues 
that because he did not separately bill Walton for the second attorney’s services, 
the fee represented “normal” office overhead in the nature of secretarial services.  
Respondent further emphasizes that the rule against fee-sharing exists to 
discourage lawyers from “brokering” clients – the practice of accepting a fee for 
January Term, 2008 
11 
referring a client without assuming any concomitant responsibility for the client’s 
legal interests.  See Spayd v. Turner, Granzow & Hollenkamp (1985), 19 Ohio 
St.3d 55, 62, 19 OBR 54, 482 N.E.2d 1232.  Respondent did not engage in this 
evil and thus concludes that he did not violate DR 2-107. 
{¶ 32} Relator and respondent concede that the fee-splitting charge 
against respondent is the least of his alleged improprieties and that a failure of 
proof on this issue would ultimately have little effect on our disposition.  Relator 
nevertheless cites King v. Housel (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 228, 556 N.E.2d 501, to 
establish the charged misconduct.  In King, we acknowledged that the first lawyer 
retained by a client was responsible for complying with DR 2-107(A)(1) insofar 
as charging a contingent or hourly fee for a second unaffiliated lawyer’s services: 
{¶ 33} “An attorney who employs another attorney to assist him in the 
representation of a client has a duty to fully disclose to his client the fee 
agreement with the employed attorney.  DR 2-107(A)(1).  The duty of full 
disclosure requires that the amount to be paid and manner of payment, as well as 
other relevant fee agreements, be disclosed to the client by his attorney.” Id., 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 34} The lawyer retained first in King engaged a second lawyer to help 
him try his clients’ personal-injury case and told the clients that the second lawyer 
would be paid on an hourly basis.  The lawyers, who were not members of the 
same firm, did not reduce their fee agreement to writing.  The first lawyer paid the 
second for his hourly work, but afterward, the second lawyer sued to recover an 
additional ten percent contingent fee, arguing that the lawyers had also agreed to 
this compensation. 
{¶ 35} We were not called upon in King to decide whether the contingent-
fee agreement existed, because of the procedural posture of the case.  But we said 
that if such an agreement existed, the lawyer retained first had the duty under DR 
2-107(A)(1) to provide the clients with written notice of terms for paying a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
second lawyer.  Because the first lawyer had not provided the requisite notice 
relative to the claimed contingent fee, we concluded that he could not use this 
deficiency to defeat the fee agreement in dispute. 
{¶ 36} Following King, we found another attorney in violation of DR 2-
107 in Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 220, 729 
N.E.2d 1167.  That lawyer asked several unaffiliated lawyers to assist him with 
his client’s representation and also later prepared fee statements that charged the 
client the other attorney’s fees in addition to his own.  The violation occurred 
because the retained lawyer did not disclose for the client’s consent either the 
other lawyers’ identities or the basis on which the lawyers would be paid. 
{¶ 37} But this case differs fundamentally from King and Zingarelli.  In 
neither of those cases did the lawyers deny that they had charged the client in a 
single billing for another unaffiliated lawyer’s work.  In contrast, respondent 
insists that he did not charge Walton for the work of the “per diem” attorney or 
share with that lawyer part of his contingent fee, and this record contains no proof 
to contradict his claim.  We therefore have no clear and convincing evidence upon 
which we can rely to find a “single billing” to Walton covering the “fee of two or 
more lawyers who are not in the same firm” in accordance with the definition in 
paragraph seven of the Comment to Prof.Cond.R. 1.5.  Accordingly, we do not 
find a violation of DR 2-107. 
{¶ 38} In sustaining respondent’s objection, however, we also admonish 
that his enlistment of, reliance on, and payment to a second lawyer to represent 
his client are not without ethical difficulty.  Notwithstanding issues of improper 
fee-splitting, lawyers are cautioned against engaging unaffiliated counsel without 
the client’s consent.  Such improprieties at least implicate a violation of an 
attorney’s duty to preserve client secrets and confidences and may also impinge 
on standards demanding an attorney’s undivided loyalty to the client. 
Sanction 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 39} In determining the appropriate sanction to impose for attorney 
misconduct, “we consider the duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, 
the attorney’s mental state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, and sanctions imposed in similar cases.”  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006-Ohio-5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 44.  We weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors to decide whether extenuating circumstances 
justify lenience in our disposition.  See Section 10(B) of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  We are 
not limited to the factors specified in the rule and may take into account “all 
relevant factors” in determining which sanction to impose.  Id. 
{¶ 40} Respondent flagrantly breached duties to his clients.  He did not 
conscientiously represent his clients’ interests, promptly account for and return 
funds to which the clients were entitled, or charge them reasonable fees.  In 
general, he failed to represent his clients with honesty and integrity. 
{¶ 41} As mitigating factors, respondent has no prior disciplinary record, 
and he submitted letters from colleagues recommending his honesty and 
character.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(a) and (e).  Respondent has also refunded 
money to both clients, the mitigating effect of which is diminished by 
respondent’s delay in waiting until just before the panel hearing to do so.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c).  These mitigating circumstances are outweighed by 
the aggravating factors that respondent acted out of self-interest, committed 
multiple offenses, and engaged in a pattern of misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b), (c), and (d).  Also weighing against respondent is that despite a 
zealous defense, he either could not or would not explain his misdeeds.  Indeed, 
we are confounded, as was the board, by respondent’s inability or refusal to 
account for his actions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 42} The board recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for one year with a stay of the last six months on the conditions 
that he (1) not commit any other ethical violations and (2) fully account to Walton 
and Dellipoala for his fees and expenses and refunds any funds still owed to them.  
The board further recommended that respondent be placed on probation for one 
year upon reinstatement and that he be required to establish an office accounting 
system that accurately tracks receipts and disbursements of his clients’ funds. 
{¶ 43} Relator objects to this recommendation, arguing that an indefinite 
suspension is warranted for misconduct of this magnitude.  Though 
acknowledging that disbarment is the presumptive sanction when a lawyer 
misappropriates client funds, relator is satisfied that an indefinite suspension of 
respondent’s license, with the attendant requirement of a petition for 
reinstatement, will provide sufficient protection for the public.  We imposed this 
sanction in Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Maybaum, 112 Ohio St.3d 93, 2006-Ohio-
6507, 858 N.E.2d 359, ¶ 27, when another lawyer failed to distribute proceeds to 
his client for years after a settlement. 
{¶ 44} “Misappropriation of a client’s money cannot be tolerated, and * * 
* [t]he presumptive disciplinary measure for acts of misappropriation is 
disbarment.”  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Gerren, 103 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-4110, 
812 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 14.  And we have stated as well that an attorney who has 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) “will be actually suspended from the practice of law for 
an appropriate period of time.”  Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kramer (2000), 89 Ohio 
St.3d 321, 323, 731 N.E.2d 643.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Claflin, 107 Ohio St.3d 
31, 2005-Ohio-5827, 836 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 45} Claflin confirmed that a lawyer’s “months-long misuse of his 
client’s funds, coupled with his misrepresentations * * *, represents serious 
misconduct that cannot be tolerated in a learned profession grounded on integrity, 
respectability, and candor.”  Id.  We did not, however, disbar or indefinitely 
January Term, 2008 
15 
suspend the offending lawyer in that case.  That lawyer had no prior disciplinary 
record and had repaid the misappropriated funds, thereby overcoming concerns 
about his contrition and lack of any character evidence.  We said that the board 
recommendation for a two-year suspension with one year stayed on conditions 
“struck the right balance.”  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 46} A similar sanction is appropriate here.  Until these grievances, 
respondent had practiced without incident for over 30 years, and letters from 
attorneys and a former colleague attesting to his good character were submitted.  
That record deserves consideration in the imposition of any sanction.  Although 
respondent has no prior disciplinary record, the lapses in this case are egregious 
and unexplained, suggesting that an extended suspension with provisions for an 
extended stay and probation will be in the best interest of respondent as well as 
the public. 
{¶ 47} We therefore suspend respondent from the practice of law for two 
years and stay the last year of the suspension on the conditions that respondent (1) 
not commit any other ethical violations and (2) fully account to Walton and 
Dellipoala for his fees and expenses and then refund any unverified fees and 
expenses still owed to them, with interest at the statutory rate for judgments.  
Upon reinstatement, respondent shall complete a probation period of one year 
and, in addition to fulfilling the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(9), establish an 
office accounting system to accurately track receipts and disbursements of his 
clients’ funds.  If respondent fails to comply with the conditions of the stay or 
probation, the stay will be lifted, and respondent shall serve the entire two-year 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Robert J. Hanna, and Benjamin C. Sassé, for 
relator. 
Lester S. Potash, for respondent. 
______________________