Title: ABEYTA v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ABEYTA v. STATE2002 WY 4442 P.3d 1009Case Number: 01-46Decided: 03/21/2002
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

STORM 
REALL ABEYTA, 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge 

Representing 
Appellant:

David B. 
Hooper and Tom A. Glassberg of Hooper Law Offices, P.C., Riverton and Teton 
Village, Wyoming.       

 Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Nancy E. Vehr, Assistant 
Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
In this 
appeal, we are asked to interpret the restitution statutes to determine whether 
settlement of civil liability claims will extinguish a restitution order imposed 
against a criminal defendant during sentencing.  The district court ruled that a civil 
liability settlement entered into by Appellant Storm Reall Abeyta and two 
victims of his criminal conduct did not extinguish the restitution order earlier 
imposed against him during sentencing for his criminal convictions and denied 
the petition.

[¶2]           
We 
affirm the district court's order denying Abeyta's petition to omit the 
restitution requirement.

ISSUES

[¶3]           
Abeyta 
presents the following issue for our review:

If a 
criminal defendant settles, makes payments to his victims and obtains complete 
releases from them after the court orders him to pay restituion, can the court 
order him to continue to pay restitution even though the victims would not 
otherwise be entitled to collect a civil judgment because they executed complete 
releases?

The 
State restates the issue as:

Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion when it did not eliminate but, rather, 
reduced the restitution by the amount of insurance settlement monies which the 
victims or their estates received.

FACTS

[¶4]           
In its 
January 31, 2000, order after arraignment and sentence, the district court found 
Abeyta guilty of reckless endangering in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-504(a) and (c) and sentenced him to one year in the Fremont County Detention 
Center.  Abeyta's guilty plea to the 
charge of aggravated homicide by a vehicle was deferred pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-301.  After he served 
his one-year sentence on the reckless endangering conviction, Abeyta was 
sentenced to five years supervised probation subject to specified terms and 
conditions.  He was ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of $200,624 in accordance with a restitution 
plan.

[¶5]           
On 
February 24 and October 13, 2000, in exchange for $25,000 each, the personal 
representative of the estate of the deceased victim and the injured victim 
signed releases discharging all civil claims against Abeyta.  The parties to those agreements were the 
insurer, Abeyta's parents, Abeyta, and the injured victims.  The State was not a party to the 
agreement.

[¶6]           
On July 
1, 2000, several of the restitution statutes were redesignated and supplemented 
with additional provisions.  2000 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 90, §§ 1, 2. ("W.S. 7-9-103, 7-9-104, 7-9-109, 7-9-111 and 
7-9-113 are amended . . . .").   
Among other changes to § 7-9-103, the following section was 
added:

(f) The 
defendant shall be given credit against his restitution obligation for payments 
made to the victim by the defendant's insurer for injuries arising out of the 
same facts or event.

2000 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, supra.

[¶7]           
On 
October 26, 2000, Abeyta filed a petition to modify the court's order after 
arraignment and sentence.  That 
petition stated that pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 39(b), Abeyta sought to modify the 
restitution condition of probation to omit the restitution requirement because 
one victim and the other victim's estate had signed releases discharging Abeyta 
from any further liability.  
Abeyta's petition asserted that § 7-9-110 entitled him to a discharge of 
the restitution order based on the releases.

[¶8]           
After a 
hearing, the district court denied the petition, but did order that pursuant to 
its discretionary authority under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-9-105 and -106, the order 
of restitution should be reduced by the sum of $50,000.   This appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶9]           
The 
parties' contentions present an issue of first impression in Wyoming and require 
that we interpret the statutory scheme governing restitution, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-101 through 115.  As of July 1, 
2000, a number of amendments to some of these statutes became effective.  

Applicable 
general principles of statutory construction include:  if the language is clear and 
unambiguous, we must abide by the plain meaning of the statute; if a statute is 
ambiguous, we may resort to general principles of construction; an ambiguous 
statute is one whose meaning is uncertain and susceptible of more than one 
meaning; and in a criminal statute, an ambiguity should be resolved in favor of 
lenity.

Amrein 
v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Wyo. 1992).  This 
Court construes statutes in pari materia, giving effect to each word, clause, 
and sentence so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. Mazurek v. 
State, 10 P.3d 531, 541 (Wyo. 2000).  
We will not construe a statute in a manner which renders any portion 
meaningless or produces an absurd result.  
Id.

Legislative 
Intent

[¶10]       
Abeyta 
contends that because several sections of the restitution statutes reference 
civil proceedings, the plain language indicates a legislative intent that these 
statutes are to be governed by the same civil action rules applicable to tort 
damages. He argues that the legislature's intent that the restitution statutes 
are to be governed by civil action rules means that a crime victimlike a tort 
victimcannot pursue a judgment after accepting insurance payments and signing a 
release.  From this logic, he then 
concludes that the legislature did not intend that a criminal defendant should 
pay restitution to a victim after the victim accepts an insurance settlement and 
executes a release.  The State 
contends that the statutes plainly do not allow the settlement of civil 
liability to operate as satisfaction of a restitution 
order.

[¶11]       
Section 
7-9-102 requires that the trial court order a defendant to pay restitution to 
each victim unless the court specifically finds that the defendant has no 
ability to pay and no reasonable probability that he will have an ability to 
pay.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Restitution is 
defined as full or partial payment of pecuniary damage to a victim.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(iv) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The statute 
defines pecuniary damage to mean:

all 
damages which a victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the same facts or event, including damages for wrongful 
death.  It does not include punitive 
damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and loss of 
consortium[.]

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(iii) (LexisNexis 2001).

[¶12]       
In 2000, 
§ 7-9-103 was amended by adding the following provisions:  

(d) Any 
order for restitution under this chapter constitutes a judgment by operation of 
law on the date it is entered.  To 
satisfy the judgment, the clerk, upon request of the victim or the district 
attorney, may issue execution in the same manner as in a civil 
action.

(e) The 
court's determination of the amount of restitution owed under this section is 
not admissible as evidence in any civil action.

(f) The 
defendant shall be given credit against his restitution obligation for payments 
made to the victim by the defendant's insurer for injuries arising out of the 
same facts or event.

2000 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, supra. 

[¶13]       
A defendant's 
failure to comply with the plan of restitution is a violation of the conditions 
of probation or subject to civil or criminal contempt proceedings.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-109 (LexisNexis 
1999) (amended 2000). Any restitution payment by the defendant to a victim shall 
be set off against any judgment in favor of the victim in a civil action arising 
out of the same facts or event.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-110(a) (LexisNexis 2001).  That restitution was required or made 
shall not be admissible as evidence in a civil action unless offered by the 
defendant.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-110(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  A 
civil action is the sole and exclusive remedy of any victim who is not satisfied 
with the restitution plan approved or modified by the court.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-111 (LexisNexis 
1999) (amended 2000).  Finally, a 
restitution order for long-term physical health care is a civil judgment against 
the defendant and may be enforced by any means provided for enforcing other 
restitution orders and civil judgments.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-114(b) (LexisNexis 2001).

[¶14]       
As the 
State contends, nowhere in the plain language of the 1999 statutes or the 2000 
amendments is there any support for Abeyta's position.  Plainly, however, the statutes do 
provide that, as a condition of probation, Abeyta was permitted to pay 
restitution to avoid a prison sentence for aggravated vehicular homicide.  Generally, a state criminal justice 
system that imposes restitution during sentencing as a condition of probation 
and as part of the judgment of conviction is considered a penal sanction rather 
than civil in nature.  See Kelly 
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 48-50 & n.10, 107 S. Ct. 353, 360-61 & 
n.10, 93 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1986); State v. Applegate, 976 P.2d 936, 938 (Kan. 
1999); People v. Maxich, 971 P.2d 268, 269-70 (Colo. App. 1998); State 
v. Iniguez, 821 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Ariz. App. 1991).  As Kelly  stated:

The 
criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, 
but for the benefit of society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with 
punishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Although restitution 
does resemble a judgment "for the benefit of" the victim, the context in which 
it is imposed undermines that conclusion. The victim has no control over the 
amount of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitution.  Moreover, the decision to impose 
restitution generally does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal 
goals of the State and the situation of the defendant. As the Bankruptcy Judge 
who decided this case noted in Pellegrino: "Unlike an obligation which 
arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law duty, here the obligation 
is rooted in the traditional responsibility of a state to protect its citizens 
by enforcing its criminal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a 
criminal sanction intended for that purpose."  

Kelly, 479 U.S.  at 52, 107 S. Ct.  at 362 (citations omitted).

[¶15]       
We have 
identified the four purposes which the imposition of a criminal sentence 
serves.  Those are:  (1) rehabilitation;  (2) punishment (specific deterrence and 
retribution);  (3) example to others 
(general deterrence); and (4) removal from society (protection of the 
public).  Kavanaugh v. State, 
769 P.2d 908, 915-16 (Wyo. 1989); Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1093 
(Wyo. 1983), reh. denied, 707 P.2d 153 (1985).  We hold that restitution imposed by 
trial courts under these statutes is a criminal penalty meant to have deterrent 
and rehabilitative effects.  Where 
restitution is imposed as part of a criminal sentence, it is not a debt between 
the defendant and the victim, and agreements between those parties have no 
effect on a sentencing court's order of restitution except to the extent that 
the statute requires offset.  
Iniguez, 821 P.2d  at 196-97.  

[¶16]       
Abeyta's 
position would require that a private settlement with a victim would extinguish 
a restitution order without endorsement by the court and State.  Uniformly, courts hold that a civil 
settlement or release does not absolve the defendant of criminal restitution. 
 State v. DeAngelis, 747 A.2d 289, 294 (N.J. Super. 2000).  We 
hold that private parties cannot simply agree to waive the application of a 
criminal statute.  We do not see any 
legislative intent to tolerate privately negotiated end runs around the criminal 
justice system, and we, therefore, reject Abeyta's claim that the district court 
was required to allow the civil liability settlement to satisfy its restitution 
order.  
Affirmed.