Title: CRAIG E. ADELIZZI and BETSY ADELIZZI v. ROGER FRED STRATTON, d/b/a STRATTON REAL ESTATE; MARY MCGILL, individually and as an agent for STRATTON REAL ESTATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CRAIG E. ADELIZZI and BETSY ADELIZZI v. ROGER FRED STRATTON, d/b/a STRATTON REAL ESTATE; MARY MCGILL, individually and as an agent for STRATTON REAL ESTATE2010 WY 148Case Number: No. S-09-0257Decided: 11/17/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
CRAIG 
E. ADELIZZI and BETSY ADELIZZI, husband and wife,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROGER 
FRED STRATTON, d/b/a STRATTON REAL ESTATE; MARY MCGILL, individually and as an 
agent for STRATTON REAL ESTATE,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

James 
R. Bell of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
*This 
case was reassigned to Justice Voigt on September 22, 
2010.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of a real estate 
agent and broker who were sued by former clients for professional 
negligence.  We affirm because there 
are no genuine issues of material fact, and the appellees are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.    When did the limitation 
period for professional negligence begin to run under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 
(LexisNexis 2009)?

 
 
            
2.    Did the 
district court correctly conclude that neither exception to the commencement of 
the limitation period found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(i) is applicable 
given the undisputed facts of this case?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On April 8, 2006, 
the appellants (the Adelizzis) hired the appellees (McGill and Stratton) to act 
as their agent and broker in the purchase of a house from Victoria Lockard 
(Lockard).  McGill had shown the 
house to the Adelizzis several times in the preceding months.  Lockard and the Adelizzis closed the 
purchase-and-sale on June 1, 2006, and the Adelizzis moved into the 
house.

 
 
[¶4]      Prior to this 
transaction, the house had suffered at least three basement flooding 
incidents:  a sprinkler line break 
on October 15, 2001, a snow melt on March 22, 2003, and a rain storm on August 
4-5, 2005.  In mid-June 2006, the 
Adelizzis called McGill to tell her water was coming up in a basement floor 
drain.  After contacting Lockard, 
McGill returned the Adelizzis' call and told them to contact Huber Plumbing and 
Heating, which they did, and the problem was fixed.

 
 
[¶5]      On April 1-2, 
2007, the Adelizzis experienced a "big flood" in their basement.  A company named SERVPRO cleaned up the 
basement and during the clean-up, one of the company's servicemen told the 
Adelizzis that the house was frequently flooded.  After obtaining engineering and 
contracting estimates for remediation purposes, the Adelizzis contacted an 
attorney.  On May 8, 2007, the 
attorney sent a letter to Lockard and to Raylene Rowe (Rowe), Lockard's real 
estate agent in the sale of the house, alleging failure to disclose the water 
problems and asking Lockard and Rowe to take the necessary steps to fix the 
problem rather than face a lawsuit.

 
 
[¶6]      On August 1, 
2007, water seeped through the house's foundation into the basement.  On August 18, 2007, water came through 
the window wells into the basement.  
Contractors then spent about two months performing engineer-designed 
remediation on the house, for which the Adelizzis paid $25,260.52.1

 
 
[¶7]      On September 24, 
2007, the Adelizzis filed a complaint against Lockard, Rowe, and Rowe's agency, 
Home Access Realty, LLC (Home Access).  Discovery and other pre-trial matters 
took place over the next 14 months, with no party deposing or contacting McGill. 
 Finally, on November 7, 2008, Home 
Access's attorney listed McGill as a witness and supplied her affidavit setting 
forth her anticipated testimony.  The Adelizzis were then allowed to amend 
their complaint, adding McGill and Stratton as defendants, with the gravamen of 
the amendment being the accusation that McGill negligently and intentionally 
failed to disclose to the Adelizzis the flooding that had occurred in August 
2005.  The Amended Complaint was 
filed on January 12, 2009.

 
 
[¶8]      McGill and 
Stratton moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Adelizzis' lawsuit 
was barred by the applicable statute of limitations for professional negligence, 
that being Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a).  
Specifically, McGill and Stratton stated the controlling issue as being 
whether the two-year period of limitations began to run on June 1, 2006, which 
was the last date of any possible act, error or omission by McGill, or on April 
2, 2007, when the Adelizzis suffered flooding and learned of the 2003 and 2005 
flood incidents.  The district court 
granted the motion for summary judgment on the ground that the period of 
limitations began to run on June 1, 2006, and had expired on June 1, 2008, 
meaning that the Adelizzis' assertion of a cause of action against McGill and 
Stratton was untimely.

 
 
PROFESSIONAL 
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107(a) provides as follows:

 
 
            
(a)    A cause of 
action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or 
certified professional or health care services shall be brought within the 
greater of the following times:

 
 
(i)      Within two (2) 
years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of 
action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the 
alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged 
act, error or omission was:

                        

(A)    Not reasonably discoverable 
within a two (2) year period; or

 
 
(B)    The claimant failed to 
discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶10]   We 
have often described and applied the following standard for reviewing summary 
judgment decisions:

 
 
            
Our standard of review for summary judgment states:

 
 
            
On appeal, this Court evaluates the propriety of a district court's 
summary judgment ruling by examining the same materials and following the same 
standards as the district court.  We 
examine the record de novo in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  If 
upon review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of genuine issues of 
material fact, we resolve that doubt against the party seeking summary 
judgment.  We review questions of 
law de novo without giving any deference to the district court's 
determinations.  If we can uphold 
summary judgment on any proper legal basis appearing in the record, we 
will.

 
 

Wagner 
v. Reuter, 
2009 WY 75, ¶ 11, 208 P.3d 1317, 1321-22 (Wyo. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted).  See also Cheek v. Jackson Wax Museum, 
Inc., 2009 WY 151, ¶ 12, 220 P.3d 1288, 1290 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 

Heimer 
v. Antelope Valley Improvement & Serv. Dist., 
2010 WY 29, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 860, 863 (Wyo. 2010).  The question of when a statute of 
limitations began to run is a question of law if the material facts are not in 
dispute.  Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, 
¶ 24, 118 P.3d 429, 437 (Wyo. 2005); Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880, 883 (Wyo. 1998); Hiltz v. Robert W. 
Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 1996); Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach 
& Assocs., 824 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 1992); see also Lucky

  
 
 

Gate 
Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assocs., Inc., 
2009 WY 69, 208 P.3d 57 (Wyo. 2009) (affirmance of summary judgment based 
upon date of act, error or omission under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-3-107).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
When 
did the limitation period for professionalnegligence begin to run under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 (LexisNexis 2009)?

 
 
[¶11]   We have stated and re-stated our 
rules of statutory construction many times, and there is no reason to do so in 
detail once again.  For the purposes 
of this discussion, we will mention briefly a few central principles:  first, statutory construction is a 
matter of law; second, we are seeking legislative intent; third, we construe a 
statute only if it is ambiguous, with the question of ambiguity being a question 
of law; and fourth, a "statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that 
reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and 
predictability."  Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2003 WY 83, ¶ 10, 72 P.3d 799, 802 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyo. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991)); see also In re Interest of MN, 2007 WY 
189, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 2007).   In addition, "[a] basic tenet of 
statutory construction is that omission of words from a statute is considered to 
be an intentional act by the legislature, and this court will not read words 
into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them."  Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 29, 86 P.3d 270, 285 (Wyo. 2004); see also 
Kennedy Oil v. Dep't of Revenue, 2008 WY 154, ¶ 14, 205 P.3d 999, 1004 (Wyo. 
2008); and Mathewson v. City of 
Cheyenne, 2003 WY 10, ¶ 9, 61 P.3d 1229, 1232-33 (Wyo. 2003).  Finally, a closely related principle is 
that "[w]hen the legislature specifically uses a word in one place, we will not 
interpret that word into other places where it was not used."  Qwest Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of 
Wyo., 2007 WY 97, ¶ 25, 161 P.3d 495, 501 (Wyo. 2007) (citing In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 
485 (Wyo. 1976)).  Stated otherwise, 
"[w]e presume that the legislature acts intentionally when it uses particular 
language in one statute, but not in another."  Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 10, 
50 P.3d 323, 327 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶12]   Applying these principles in Lucky Gate Ranch, 2009 WY 69, ¶ 19, 208 P.3d  at 65, we stated that "[i]t appears from a plain reading of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-3-107 that the time for filing suit is governed by the date when the act, 
error or omission' occurs, rather than the date when the cause of action 
accrues."2  In the instant case, the district court 
relied upon this statement in granting summary judgment to McGill and Stratton. 
 The district court was correct and 
will be affirmed in that regard.

 
 
[¶13]   It is true that in Lucky Gate Ranch we made the above 
statement, but then went on to leave the specific issue now before the Court 
open because the resolution of that case was the same whether the period of 
limitations began to run on the date of the act, error or omission, or on the 
date that the cause of action accrued.  2009 WY 69, ¶ 19, 208 P.3d  at 65.  Application of the above-recited 
rules of statutory construction lead us now, however, to the ineluctable 
conclusion that the analysis in Lucky 
Gate Ranch was correct.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 is unambiguous.  
Further, the concept of "when the cause of action accrues," which defines 
every other period of limitation found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-102 through 
1-3-116 (LexisNexis 2009), is not present in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107.  Under no theory of statutory 
construction are we free to interpret the words "within two years of the date of 
the alleged act, error or omission" to mean "within two years of the date when 
the cause of action accrues."  There 
could be no clearer example of the legislature using one set of words in some 
statutes and another set of words in the statute at issue.  The statute of limitations began to run 
in this case on June 1, 2006, the last day that McGill performed professional 
services for the Adelizzis under their agreement.

 
 
Did 
the district court correctly conclude that neither exception to the commencement 
of the limitation period found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(i) is applicable 
given the undisputed facts of this case?

 
 
[¶14]   The period of limitations found in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 does not begin to run on the date of the alleged act, 
error or omission if the plaintiff can establish either that the alleged act, 
error or omission was not reasonably discoverable within the statutory two-year 
period or that the plaintiff failed to discover the alleged act, error or 
omission within the statutory two-year period, despite the exercise of due 
diligence.  In the instant case, the 
district court made the dual finding that the alleged act, error or omission of 
McGill was reasonably discoverable during the two-year period, and that the 
Adelizzis did not discover the alleged act, error or omission because they did 
not exercise due diligence.  That 
dual finding is supported by the undisputed facts.

 
 
[¶15]   The sale closed on June 1, 
2006.  Less than a month later, the 
Adelizzis suffered the first of four flooding incidents that occurred during the 
two-year statutory period.  The 
other incidents happened on April 1-2, 2007, August 1, 2007, and August 18, 
2007.  By May 8, 2007, the 
Adelizzis' attorney was demanding compensation for remediation from Lockard and 
Rowe.  Suit was filed on September 
24, 2007.  Perhaps most 
significantly, the Adelizzis learned during the April 1-2, 2007 incident that 
the house was considered by the service company to be a "frequently flooded 
house."  Despite all this, the 
Adelizzis made no effort even to contact McGill until they moved to amend their 
complaint to add her as a defendant on November 24, 2008, more than five months 
after expiration of the statutory period of limitations.

 
 

[¶16]   We have said that "Wyoming is a 
discovery' state, which means that the statute of limitations is not triggered 
until the plaintiff knows or 
has reason to know 
the existence of the cause of action."  
Boller v. Western Law Assocs., 
P.C., 828 P.2d 1184, 1185 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 
1989) (emphasis added)).  Indeed, 
the concept of discovery is written into Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 in the two 
exceptions.  In the instant case, 
the Adelizzis knew of the water problem within weeks of moving into the house, 
and knew at least by April 1-2, 2007, that undisclosed flooding incidents had 
occurred prior to their purchase of the house.  The Adelizzis knew at that time that 
they potentially had a cause of action, and the due diligence mandate of the 
statute required them to make some effort to determine McGill's role, if 
any.  See Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, ¶ 
22, 64 P.3d 120, 125 (Wyo. 2003) (statute barred lawsuit where house purchaser 
became aware of water problem in June 1995 but did not sue realtor until 
December 1998); and Boller, 828 P.2d  
at 1185-86 (alleged negligence of attorneys, causing bank's failure, was 
reasonably discoverable at time of closure or soon 
thereafter).

 
 
[¶17]   The Adelizzis knew by April 1-2, 
2007, that the house had a history of flooding.  They also knew, if the facts are viewed 
in the light most favorable to them, that McGill had not disclosed the flooding 
problem to them.  They were 
certainly on "inquiry notice" by that time of the cause of action that they 
brought against her nineteen months later.  
"[I]f uncontroverted facts exist which specify when a reasonable person 
should have been placed on inquiry notice, we can resolve the question as a 
matter of law."  Hiltz, 910 P.2d  at 
569.

 
 
[¶18]   To apply either of the statutory 
exceptions to the facts of this case would be to emasculate them.  It cannot reasonably be disputed that 
the Adelizzis had sufficient knowledge about the water problems and the 
non-disclosure of those water problems to make any professional negligence by 
McGill reasonably discoverable well within the statutory two-year period.  We affirm the district court's 
conclusion that such was the case.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶19]   The 
two-year statutory period of limitations for professional negligence found in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) began to run in this case on June 1, 2006, the last 
day that appellee McGill performed professional services for the Adelizzis.  Furthermore, the act, error or omission 
that would have constituted such professional negligence, if any, was reasonably 
discoverable by the Adelizzis within that two-year period, and the Adelizzis did 
not exercise due diligence in failing to discover the act, error or omission 
that constituted the alleged professional negligence.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

1The 
Adelizzis approximated their total damages at $50,331.93.

 
 

2"A 
cause of action accrues for statute of limitation purposes when all elements of 
the cause of action are present, including damages."  Lucky Gate Ranch, 2009 WY 69, ¶ 20, 208 P.3d  at 65.