Title: Bosler v. Shuck

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bosler v. Shuck1986 WY 54714 P.2d 1231Case Number: 84-174Decided: 03/03/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
FRANK BOSLER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
ASHTON SHUCK, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

C.M. Aron, Aron & 
Hennig, Laramie.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Cary R. Alburn III, Laramie.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* ROSE, J., retired from 
the court November 1, 1985.

 
 
** ROONEY, J., retired 
from the court November 30, 1985.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The primary problem 
presented by this case is the identification of the elements of the tort of 
abuse of process. Ancillary to this question in the disposition of the appeal 
are questions about the legal accuracy of the instruction which was given by the 
trial court setting forth the elements of the tort and the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Our study persuades us that the instruction given by the district 
court did not correctly set forth the elements of the tort of abuse of process. 
We cannot discern evidence in the record which would sustain a recovery for 
abuse of process under a correct instruction. Consequently, we reverse the 
judgment of the district court entered upon the jury 
verdict.

 
 

[¶2.]     While the parties have 
structured a more elaborate statement of the issues, we are satisfied that a 
resolution of the following questions disposes of all of the issues suggested in 
the briefs and arguments:

 
 
1. What are the elements 
of the tort of abuse of process?

 
 
2. Did the district court 
properly instruct the jury with respect to these elements?

 
 
3. Does this record 
contain evidence which would sustain a verdict finding abuse of process under a 
proper instruction?

 
 

[¶3.]     Frank C. Bosler orally 
agreed to lease certain grazing lands to Shuck Brothers, Inc. Ashton Shuck is 
the father of the principals in Shuck Brothers, Inc., and he was present at all 
of the material negotiations and meetings in connection with this case. It is 
Shuck's position, however, that he was only an employee of Shuck Brothers, Inc., 
and was not a principal in its affairs. During the approximately 18 months that 
its cattle remained on the premises, Shuck Brothers, Inc. made regular payments 
on the pasturage fee. There were some collateral agreements covering haying 
operations, housing, and the like, for some of which Shuck Brothers, Inc. was 
entitled to be compensated.

 
 

[¶4.]     In September of 1982, 
Bosler discovered that the Shucks were preparing to move their cattle from the 
leased premises. He inquired about that move, and was assured that the pasturage 
bill would be settled up before the cattle were moved. Ashton Shuck and two of 
his sons agreed to meet with Bosler that same evening to settle the bill. Bosler 
was concerned, however, and contacted an officer in the sheriff's department. 
The officer explained that he could not prevent the removal of the cattle, but 
he did offer to take to the Shucks a copy of the statute relating to the 
pasturage of animals, which he later did.

 
 

[¶5.]     The meeting to settle 
the pasturage bill did occur on that evening. There developed a disagreement 
about the amount due, attributable in part to a dispute over the number of 
cattle which had been grazing in the pasture and in part to the proper amount of 
a set-off due to the Shucks. This meeting continued until after 
midnight.

 
 

[¶6.]     Later that morning 
Bosler discovered that the Shucks were loading the cattle for shipment, and he 
insisted that they not be moved until the pasturage bill was paid. They went to 
town together for the purpose of permitting the Shucks to obtain a surety bond 
to secure the pasturage bill. The Shucks were unable to obtain such a bond, 
however, and they all went to the county attorney's office with the view of 
settling the matter there. None of the attorneys on the county attorney's staff 
were available, so the Shucks agreed to meet Bosler back at the county 
attorney's office after lunch. They did not appear at that time, and on his 
return to his home Bosler discovered that the cattle had all been 
removed.

 
 

[¶7.]     Thereafter, Bosler 
subscribed under oath to a criminal complaint filed pursuant to § 29-7-102(b), 
W.S. 1977, which provides:

 
 
"If any person causes to 
be removed from the possession of a lien claimant any property or part thereof 
which is subject to the lien created by W.S. 29-7-101 through 29-7-106 from the 
place where the property was located when the lien is perfected, without the 
written consent of the owner and the holder of the lien or his agent, either 
originally or by transfer, the person so removing the property affected by the 
lien is guilty of a misdemeanor. On conviction he may be punished by a fine of 
not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00)."

 
 
The complaint named 
Ashton Shuck as well as three of his sons, and an arrest warrant was issued for 
each of them.

 
 

[¶8.]     Several months later 
Bosler encountered Ashton Shuck outside of a bank in Laramie. Soon after that 
encounter Shuck was arrested, processed by the sheriff's department and released 
on his own recognizance. After several more months had passed the charge against 
him was dismissed by the county attorney.

 
 

[¶9.]     Shuck then brought this 
action against Bosler for abuse of process, false imprisonment, malicious use of 
process, and malicious prosecution. The district court granted a summary 
judgment in favor of Bosler on the claims for false imprisonment, malicious use 
of process, and malicious prosecution. The court, however, permitted the claim 
for abuse of process to go to trial.

 
 

[¶10.]  The trial court denied a motion by Bosler 
to dismiss the case when Shuck rested. The Court then, over the objection of 
both parties, gave the following instruction relative to abuse of 
process:

 
 
"Instruction No. 
3

 
 
"In order to prevail in 
this case, the plaintiff, Ashton Shuck, must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence each of the following elements of abuse of 
process:

 
 
"1. That the defendant, 
Frank Bosler, made use of the criminal process;

 
 
2. That the defendant, 
Frank Bosler, initiated a criminal process by signing a criminal 
complaint;

 
 
"(a) with a wrongful or 
ulterior purpose or motive; and

 
 
"(b) with malice; 
and

 
 
"(c) with knowledge of 
the process which would ensue following the signing of the criminal 
complaint.

 
 
"3. That defendant, Frank 
Bosler, directly participated in the criminal process after he signed the 
criminal complaint, after the arrest warrant was issued, and prior to defendant, 
Ashton Shuck's arrest under the warrant which was issued.

 
 
4. That the plaintiff, 
Ashton Shuck, suffered damages which were proximately caused by defendant, Frank 
Bosler's abuse of process."

 
 
The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Shuck finding his damages to be $9,000. The district court 
denied motions by Bosler for a new trial and a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, and judgment was entered upon the jury's verdict. This appeal is taken 
from that judgment. 

 
 

[¶11.]  Previously this court has recognized the 
tort of abuse of process both indirectly and directly. Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 (1985), citing Comments, Wyoming's Governmental 
Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions - A Statutory Analysis, XV Land 
and Water L.Rev. 619, 629 (1980); Blake 
v. Rupe, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1096 (1982), citing Sampson v. Rumsey, 1 Kan. App. 2d 191, 563 P.2d 506 (1977); and Foothill Industrial Bank v. Mikkelson, 
Wyo., 623 P.2d 748 (1981). In the context of the issues posed here, we have not had occasion to 
consider this tort directly.

 
 

[¶12.]  In Foothill Industrial Bank v. Mikkelson, 
supra, at 757, we quoted in part from Meadows v. Bakersfield Savings & Loan 
Association, 250 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753, 59 Cal. Rptr. 34, 37 
(1967):

 
 
"`* * * [T]he essence of 
the tort "lies in the misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the 
name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of perpetrating 
injustice * * *"'"

 
 
That quotation does 
capture the gravamen or gist of the tort of abuse of process. Pound explained 
that "[t]he gist of the action for abuse of process lies in the improper use of 
process after it is issued. To show that regularly issued process was perverted 
to the accomplishment of an improper purpose is enough." Dean v. Kochendorfer, 237 N.Y. 384, 143 N.E. 229 (1924). Other jurisdictions have adopted this analysis. E.g., Duncan v. Kent, Ala., 370 So. 2d 288 
(1979); Rondelli v. County of Pima, 
120 Ariz. 483, 586 P.2d 1295 (1978); 
Meadows v. Bakersfield Savings & Loan Association, supra; Cline v. Flagler Sales Corp., Fla.App., 
207 So. 2d 709 (1968); Mills County State 
Bank v. Roure, Iowa, 291 N.W.2d 1 (1980); Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 
Ky.App., 598 S.W.2d 765 (1980); Packard v. Central Maine Power Co., 
Maine, 477 A.2d 264 (1984); Farmers Gin 
Co. v. Ward, 73 N.M. 405, 389 P.2d 9 (1964); Kelly v. McBarron, 258 Or. 149, 482 P.2d 187 (1971); Casa Di Sardi, Inc. v. Alpha 
Motors, Inc., 277 Pa. Super. 415, 323 A.2d 288 (1974); Manufacturers Supply Co. v. Parker, 103 
R.I. 426, 238 A.2d 616 (1968); Huggins v. 
Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693, 27 A.L.R.3d 1195 
(1967); Layton v. Chase, 82 S.D. 270, 144 N.W.2d 561 
(1966); Evans v. Perkey, Tenn. App. 647 S.W.2d 636 (1982); Blackstock v. 
Tatum, Tex.Civ. App., 396 S.W.2d 463 (1965); Crease v. Pleasant Grove 
City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 519 P.2d 888 (1974); Tower Special Facilities, Inc. v. Investment 
Club, Inc., 104 Wis.2d 221, 311 N.W.2d 225 (1981). Many of these authorities 
speak in terms of a perversion of the legal process. Scholars including text 
writers have agreed with this analysis of the tort of abuse of process. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682, p. 474 (1977); Prosser & Keeton, Torts, 
§ 121, p. 898 (5th Ed. 1985); Goldoftas, Abuse of Process, 13 Clev.-Mar.L.Rev. 
163-164 (1964).

 
 

[¶13.]  It follows from the description of the 
gravamen of this tort that one of its essential elements is generally recognized 
as being some wilful act in the use of process which is not proper in the 
regular conduct of the proceeding. The usual description of the essential 
elements of the tort of abuse of process, which we now adopt, is that it 
encompasses (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) the wilful act in the use of the 
process which is not proper in the regular conduct of the legal proceeding. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 121, p. 
898. E.g., Rondelli v. County of Pima, supra; Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n of 
Oakland, Inc., 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Scott, 4 
Ill. App.3d 
962, 282 N.E.2d 452 (1972); Blackstock v. 
Tatum, supra. In distinguishing the tort of abuse of process from the tort 
of malicious prosecution or malicious use of process, the courts have noted that 
it is the second element, that is the act in the use of the legal process which 
is not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings, which sets apart 
the tort of abuse of process. Duncan v. 
Kent, supra; Triester v. 191 Tenants 
Association, 272 Pa. Super. 271, 415 A.2d 698 (1979); Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 
supra.

 
 

[¶14.]  One example of a wilful act in the use of 
the process which is not proper in the regular conduct of the legal proceedings 
is described in Kelly v. McBarron, 
supra. In that case the defendant had filed a lien for some laminated wooden 
arches. In order to obtain the removal of the filed lien the plaintiff had paid 
the defendant an agreed upon sum plus an additional amount to satisfy another 
lien which the defendant had filed pursuant to a different merchandise order. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon noted that with respect to the amount paid on the 
second lien the plaintiff might well have had a cause of action for abuse of 
process had it been properly pleaded. The court identified the requirement of 
the payment of the additional amount as a perversion of a legal procedure to 
accomplish an ulterior purpose. Still another example may be found in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n of 
Oakland, supra, in which the defendant was charged with wilfully and 
knowingly filing actions in an improper county pursuant to statutorily 
inadequate pleadings with the intent to impair the rights of the individuals to 
defend such suits. The Supreme Court of California concluded that such conduct 
did amount to an abuse of process because it was wilful conduct in the use of 
process not proper in the regular conduct of proceedings. In that case the court 
relied upon Czap v. Credit Bureau of 
Santa Clara Valley, 7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1970) in which the 
credit bureau was charged with abuse of process because it threatened to bring 
levies on the plaintiff debtor's salary even though it knew that the plaintiff's 
wages were exempt from garnishment. Such conduct was held in the Czap case to be 
within the ambit of abuse of process because it would jeopardize the plaintiff 
debtor's employment and thus induce her to apply her exempt earnings or other 
assets which were exempt under the statute to the payment of the debt. In the 
instant case had Bosler demanded payment in order to induce him to desist from 
pursuing the criminal case against Shuck those circumstances would have resulted 
in an obvious abuse of process.

 
 

[¶15.]  An examination of Instruction No. 3, 
given by the court in this case and quoted above, discloses that it does not 
inform the jury of the second standard element of the tort of abuse of process. 
Indeed, the instruction perhaps more nearly describes the tort of malicious use 
of process than that of the tort of abuse of process. See, e.g., Casa Di Sardi, Inc. v. Alpha Motors, Inc., 
supra; Manufacturers Supply 
Co. v. Parker, supra. It is to be 
remembered, however, that based upon its conclusion that there was no material 
issue of fact the trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of Bosler with 
respect to the tort of malicious use of process. The affirmative act involved in 
the use of the process which is not proper to the regular prosecution of the 
proceedings is necessary for this tort to exist. Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Scott, 
supra.

 
 

[¶16.]  We then consider the record in this case 
to determine whether a verdict finding the tort of abuse of process could be 
supported by this evidence. If such a verdict could be supported, the case would 
have to be remanded for a new trial based upon the instructional error. If the 
evidence would not sustain such a verdict, the judgment would properly be 
reversed. A scrutiny of this record discloses that there may be ample evidence 
from which the jury could infer the first element of the tort of abuse of 
process, i.e., an ulterior purpose or motive. There is no evidence of any 
affirmative act manifesting a perversion of the process. It would appear to be 
Shuck's position that the jury properly could infer the act from an improper 
motive. The contrary proposition is well established, and in treating with abuse 
of process the fact finder cannot infer any improper act simply from the 
presence of the improper motive. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 121 at 
898.

 
 

[¶17.]  The trial court erred in giving an 
improper instruction with respect to the elements of the tort of abuse of 
process. Because the record would not sustain a verdict based upon a proper 
instruction, the judgment of the district court must be reversed.