Title: In re D.L.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

IN_RE_DL.94-218; 164 Vt 223; 669 A.2d 1172

[Filed 22-Sep-1995]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-218


In re D.L.                                   Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

                                             November Term, 1994


Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for State of Vermont

       David J. Mullett of Cheney, Brock, Saudek & Mullett, P.C., Montpelier,
  for appellee M.R.

       Robert A. Sheftman, Montpelier, for appellee D.H.(1)



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   The State of Vermont appeals an order of the Washington
  District Court quashing subpoenas issued in connection with an inquest
  proceeding pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 5131.  The district court ruled that the
  inquest procedure, as embodied in 13 V.S.A. §§ 5131-5137, violates Chapter
  II, Section 5 of the Vermont Constitution.  We disagree that the separation
  of powers provision is violated and reverse.

       On October 25, 1993, a state special drug prosecutor filed an
  application for an inquest regarding illegal contraband.  The application
  was granted by District Judge Dean Pineles, and the State issued subpoenas
  ordering three witnesses to appear at an inquest scheduled later that week. 
  The witnesses moved to quash the subpoenas on the ground that the statutory
  inquest procedure violates the Vermont Constitution's separation of powers
  provision.  In a lengthy opinion, District Judge Shireen Avis Fisher ruled
  that the inquest procedure violates the

 

  requirement of separation of powers.  Although, as discussed in more
  detail below, part of the court's reasoning was based on practical
  considerations related to the actual functioning of the inquest, the heart
  of the decision is in the following excerpt:

         Rather than functioning in the proper judicial role of a detached
         arbiter rendering a binding decision, the judge at an inquest is
         made a mere assistant in a process designed to render advice to a
         separate branch of government.  The ultimate decision as to
         whether to prosecute remains at all times in the hands of the
         prosecutor, an arm of the executive branch.  The judge conducting
         the inquest is placed in the role of being a delegate of, and
         assistant to, the executive branch of government, furnishing a duly
         intimidating setting, and allowing the judicial office to lend an air
         of solemnity to the process.  He or she exercises no adjudicatory
         role.


  The court granted the motions and discontinued any further proceedings
  in the inquest; this appeal followed.

                                I.

       We begin our discussion by describing Vermont's inquest procedure, its
  history, and the history of inquests in England and other American
  jurisdictions.  The general inquest (FN1) is essentially a criminal
  proceeding, State v. Alexander, 130 Vt. 54, 60,