Title: Tampa Electric Co. v. Joe Garcia

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1§ 403.501-.518, Fla. Stat. (1997).
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
_____________________________
Nos. SC95444; SC95445; SC95446
_____________________________
TAMPA ELECTRIC CO.; FLORIDA POWER CORP.;
and FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.,
Appellants,
vs.
JOE GARCIA, et al., as the FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION;
UTILITIES COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH; and
DUKE ENERGY NEW SMYRNA BEACH POWER CO., LTD., LLP.,
Appellees.
[April 20, 2000]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM. 
These consolidated cases are before the Court on appeal from an order of
the Public Service Commission (PSC or Commission).  We have jurisdiction.  Art.
V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.  The issue presented concerns the statutory authority of
the PSC to grant a determination of need under the Florida Electrical Power Plant
Siting Act (Siting Act)1 and the Florida Energy Efficiency & Conservation Act
2§§ 366.80-.85, 403.519, Fla. Stat. (1997).
3The PSC defines “merchant plant” as a power plant with no rate base and no captive retail
customers.
4Section 403.506, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in relevant part:
(1) The provisions of this act shall apply to any electrical power plant as defined
herein, except that provisions of this act shall not apply to any electrical power plant or
steam generating plant of less than 75 megawatts in capacity or to any substation to be
constructed as part of an associated transmission line unless the applicant has elected to
apply for certification of such plant or substation under this act.
5Section 403.519, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in relevant part:
On request by an applicant or on its own motion, the commission shall begin a
proceeding to determine the need for an electrical power plant subject to the Florida
Electrical Power Plant Siting Act. . . .  The commission shall be the sole forum for the
determination of this matter, which accordingly shall not be raised in any other forum or
in the review of proceedings in such other forum.  In making its determination, the
commission shall take into account the need for electric system reliability and integrity,
-2-
(FEECA)2 for an electric power company’s proposal to build and operate a
merchant plant in Volusia County.3  We reverse the order of the PSC for the
reasons stated herein.
The construction of any new electrical power generating plant as defined by
section 403.503(12), Florida Statutes, that is not otherwise exempted by Florida
law, is required to be certified in accord with the various requirements of the Siting
Act in chapter 403, Florida Statutes.4  As part of the process, an applicant seeks a
determination of need from the PSC for a proposed power plant.  See § 403.519,
Fla. Stat. (1997).5  The PSC’s granting of a determination of need for a proposed
the need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, and whether the proposed plant
is the most cost-effective alternative available.  The commission shall also expressly
consider the conservation measures taken by or reasonably available to the applicant or
its members which might mitigate the need for the proposed plant and other matters
within its jurisdiction which it deems relevant.
6See 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (1994).
-3-
power plant creates a presumption of public need.  See § 403.519, Fla. Stat.
(1997).  This determination serves as the PSC’s report required by section
403.507(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1997), as part of the permitting procedure.
On August 19, 1998, the Utilities Commission of the City of New Smyrna
Beach (New Smyrna), and Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Co., Ltd.
(Duke) filed in the PSC a joint petition for determination of need for the New
Smyrna Beach Power Project, a proposed natural gas fired combined cycle
generating plant with 514 megawatts of net capacity to be built and operated by
Duke in New Smyrna Beach.  Duke is not presently subject to PSC regulation as a
public utility authorized to generate and sell electric power at retail rates to Florida
customers.  Duke is a subsidiary of an investor-owned utility based in North
Carolina.  As a company offering electrical power for sale at wholesale rates, Duke
is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and is classified as an exempt wholesale generator (EWG).6 
New Smyrna is a Florida municipal electric utility that directly serves retail
7New Smyrna is regulated by the PSC pursuant to section 366.04(2), Florida Statutes (1997).
-4-
customers.7  In the present petition for determination of need, Duke proposed to
build a 514-megawatt plant, with thirty megawatts of that capacity and associated
energy committed to be sold to New Smyrna and the remaining megawatts
uncommitted and intended to be made available for sale at competitive wholesale
rates to utilities that directly serve retail customers.
Prior to filing the present joint petition, Duke and New Smyrna entered into
an agreement requiring Duke to finance, design, build, own, and operate the plant
and to sell to New Smyrna thirty megawatts of Duke's proposed plant's capacity at
a discount wholesale rate.  New Smyrna agreed to provide the site for the plant, a
wastewater treatment facility, water, and tax reductions.  New Smyrna intends to
sell to its retail customers the energy it has committed to purchase from Duke.  The
agreement also provides that Duke will make available for sale the remaining 484
megawatts of power in the competitive wholesale electrical power market primarily,
but not exclusively, for ultimate use in Florida.
The seven intervenors as to the petition included present appellants Tampa
Electric Co. (Tampa Electric), Florida Power Corp. (FPC), and Florida Power &
Light Co. (FP&L).  After a hearing in December 1998, three members of the
Commission voted to deny motions to dismiss by FPC and FP&L and voted to
8Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645
(1994)).  See also Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992–A Watershed
for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 447 (1993).
-5-
grant the joint petition.  In re Joint Petition for Determination of Need, No. PSC-99-
0535-FOF-EM (March 22, 1999) (Order).  Commissioner Clark dissented,
concluding that Duke was not a proper applicant.  Commissioner Jacobs concurred
and dissented, stating that he believed Duke was a proper applicant but that Duke
had not proven its proposed plant to be the most cost-effective option.
In this appeal, appellants are public utilities that are regulated and authorized
by the PSC to generate and sell electrical power to users of the power in Florida. 
Appellants designate themselves as Florida retail utilities.  Appellants contend that
section 403.519, Florida Statutes, from its initial adoption in 1980 through
subsequent legislative changes and up to the present date, does not authorize the
PSC to grant a determination of need to an entity other than a Florida retail utility
regulated by the PSC whose petition is based upon a specified demonstrated need
of Florida retail utilities for serving Florida power customers.
Appellants point out that the recent national movement toward the
construction of power plants intended to generate power to be sold in competitive
wholesale markets stems from recent federal legislative initiatives.  This movement
began with the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).8 
9Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (amending the Federal Power Act, codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 791a-825u (1994)).
10Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order
No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996), [Regs. Preambles Jan. 1991-June 1996] F.E.R.C. Stats. and Regs.
31,036, clarified, 76 F.E.R.C. 61,009 & 76 F.E.R.C. 61,347 (1996) (known as Order 888).
11New Smyrna’s committed power purchase could be satisfied by a power plant that is exempt
from obtaining a determination of need because a plant with a capacity of less than seventy-five megawatts
-6-
Subsequent relevant federal legislation includes the Energy Policy Act of 1992,9
which exempts certain wholesale generators from some regulatory requirements. 
Another milestone is a FERC order issued in 1996 which affects power
distribution.10  Appellants note that these federal initiatives occurred subsequent to
the Legislature’s enactment of the Siting Act of 1973.  Appellants also emphasize
that the Legislature has not amended section 403.519 to authorize the PSC to grant
a determination of need for a power plant in Florida that would generate power
intended to be sold in the competitive wholesale market which is developing as a
result of these federal legislative and regulatory changes.
Appellants contend that Duke is not an authorized applicant under section
403.519 because Duke is not a Florida retail utility.  Appellants contend that joining
with New Smyrna, which is a proper applicant, does not cure the fact that Duke is
not a proper applicant in view of the commitment to New Smyrna of just thirty
megawatts of the 514-megawatt capacity of the plant.11  Appellants contend that the
is exempt from the need determination requirement.  § 403.506, Fla. Stat. (1997).
-7-
proposed plant is not authorized by section 403.519 because all but the thirty
megawatts that New Smyrna has agreed to buy is uncommitted.  Therefore, there is
no demonstrated specific need committed to Florida customers who are intended
to be served by this proposed plant.
In support of their position, appellants cite PSC orders in proceedings that
led to this Court’s decisions in Nassau Power Corp. v. Beard, 601 So. 2d 1175
(Fla. 1992) (Nassau I), and Nassau Power Corp. v. Deason, 641 So. 2d 396 (Fla.
1994) (Nassau II) (collectively, the Nassau cases).
In the proceedings below, the five members of the PSC were divided in their
conclusions as to the decision to grant the determination of need.  The three-
member majority’s rationale is presented by the PSC as an appellee in this Court. 
In the PSC order at issue here, the PSC majority finds that Duke and New Smyrna
are proper applicants pursuant to the Siting Act, FEECA, and the Florida
Administrative Code.  Order at 18-29.  The majority construes section 403.519 as
requiring, pursuant to section 403.503(4), Florida Statutes (1997), that an applicant
may be any “electric utility.”  Id. at 19.  Utilities are defined in section 403.503(13),
Florida Statutes (1997), as “regulated electric companies.”  Id.  The majority finds
that Duke is a regulated electric company pursuant to federal regulatory statutes
-8-
because the statutes do not expressly provide that “regulated electric companies”
are to be state-regulated.  Id. at 20.  The majority finds that even though Duke is not
a Florida retail utility, it is a regulated electric company subject to federal regulation
and certain other Florida regulation.  Id. at 19, 22-24.  The majority also finds that a
determination of need properly could be based upon the projected needs of utilities
throughout peninsular Florida rather than committed megawatt needs of specific
retail utilities.  Id. at 53-54.  The majority finds the Nassau cases not to be on point
here because those cases concerned a wholly different issue.  Id. at 29-32.  In the
Nassau cases, the PSC was asked to determine the need and standing of qualified
facilities under PURPA, the federal law regulating cogenerators.  The PSC points
out that it specifically limited its decision to the facts of those qualified-facilities
cases.  Id. at 32.
In her dissenting opinion, Commissioner Clark construes the Siting Act and
FEECA to mean that a proper applicant under section 403.519 is defined for
purposes of FEECA, of which section 403.519 is a part, as “any person or entity
of whatever form which provides electricity or natural gas at retail to the public.” 
Order at 58 (quoting Ch. 80-65, § 5 at 214, Laws of Fla.) (alteration in original). 
She concludes that a utility’s sale of electrical power must be a retail sale in order
for that utility to be subject to PSC regulatory authority.  Id. at 66.  She notes that
-9-
“wholesale sales are a matter within the sphere of federal regulation.”  Id. 
Commissioner Clark cites this Court’s Nassau cases in support of her
interpretation of the term “applicant” in section 403.519.  Id. at 68.  She finds those
cases to be relevant in that this Court’s rationale focused on the types of entities
enumerated in section 403.503, Florida Statutes, and “concluded that the common
denominator present in each was an obligation to serve customers.”  Id. at 68. 
Thus, “the need to be examined under section 403.519, Florida Statutes, was a
need resulting from the duty to serve those customers.”  Id.  Commissioner Clark
concludes her dissenting opinion by stating:
Our task in this case was to decide what the law is, not what it
ought to be.  In my view, the law is clear that Duke New Smyrna is not
a proper applicant under section 403.519, Florida Statutes, and the
petition must be dismissed.  We should, however, move forward with
our workshop so that we can make recommendations to the
Legislature as to what the law ought to be.
Order at 71.  In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Jacobs agrees with the
majority that Duke is a proper applicant but finds that Duke and New Smyrna
“failed to provide the weight of evidence required to depart from the Commission’s
long-standing policy of relying on its own cost effectiveness analysis of a proposed
plant.”  Order at 74.
In this Court, Duke and New Smyrna, who are joint appellees with the PSC,
-10-
argue that a need determination as part of the permitting process for the proposed
Duke plant does fall within the parameters of section 403.519.  They argue that the
primary determinant as to Duke’s applicant status is whether Duke is a regulated
utility.  The appellees maintain that Duke qualifies as a regulated utility because it is
regulated under federal regulatory procedures, and if Duke receives permits to
operate its proposed plant in Florida, the plant’s operation will be regulated in part
by the PSC.  Duke and New Smyrna maintain that the Nassau cases were decided
in the context of need for power demonstrated by cogenerators and that those
cases do not apply here.  The appellees also rely upon the fact that Duke has filed a
joint application with New Smyrna.
New Smyrna additionally presents two constitutional arguments and argues
that prohibiting Duke from applying directly for a need determination would violate
the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because such
action would unconstitutionally discriminate against out-of-state commerce and
burden interstate commerce.  New Smyrna also argues that any state requirement
that Duke first obtain a contract with a retail utility to build the project is preempted
by the federal Energy Policy Act of 1992, which mandates a robust competitive
wholesale market.
We conclude that this case is resolved on the threshold legal issue of whether
-11-
the PSC exceeded its statutory authority in granting the present determination of
need.  As we stated in United Telephone Co. of Florida v. Public Service
Commission, 496 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1986):
We note preliminarily that ‘orders of the Commission come
before this Court clothed with the statutory presumption that they have
been made within the Commission's jurisdiction and powers, and that
they are reasonable and just and such as ought to have been made.’ 
General Telephone Co. v. Carter, 115 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla.1959)
(footnote omitted).  See also Citizens v. Public Service Commission,
448 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 1984).
Such deference, however, cannot be accorded when the
commission exceeds its authority.  At the threshold, we must establish
the grant of legislative authority to act since the commission derives its
power solely from the legislature.  See Florida Bridge Co. v. Bevis,
363 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 1978).  As we said in Radio Telephone
Communications, Inc. v. Southeastern Telephone Co., 170 So.2d 577,
582 (Fla.1965):
[O]f course, the orders of the Florida Commission
come to this court with a presumption of regularity, Sec.
364.20, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.  But we cannot apply such
presumption to support the exercise of jurisdiction where
none has been granted by the Legislature.  If there is a
reasonable doubt as to the lawful existence of a particular
power that is being exercised, the further exercise of the
power should be arrested.
496 So.2d at 118.
The precise question we consider here is:
Does section 403.519, Florida Statutes, authorize the granting of a
determination of need upon an application for a proposed power plant
for which the owner and operator is not a Florida retail utility regulated
-12-
by the PSC and for which only thirty megawatts of the plant’s 514-
megawatt capacity have been committed by contract to be sold to a
Florida retail utility regulated by the PSC?
While we recognize that the PSC is correct in pointing out that the Nassau
cases were decided upon different facts and were intended to resolve different
issues, we conclude that our analysis of the Siting Act, articulated in those
decisions, is applicable to the present case.  In Nassau II, we stated:
In Nassau Power Corp. v. Beard, 601 So. 2d 1175, 1176-77
(Fla.1992), we recently explained:
The Siting Act was passed by the legislature in 1973 for
the purpose of minimizing the adverse impact of power
plants on the environment.  See § 403.502, Fla. Stat. 
(1989).  That Act establishes a site certification process
that requires the PSC to determine the need for any
proposed power plants, including cogenerators, based on
the criteria set forth in section 403.519, Florida Statutes
(1989).  Section 403.519 requires the PSC to make
specific findings for each electric generating facility
proposed in Florida, as to (1) electric system reliability
and integrity, (2) the need to provide adequate electricity
at a reasonable cost; (3) whether the proposed facility is
the most cost-effective alternative available for supplying
electricity; and (4) conservation measures reasonably
available to mitigate the need for the plant.
(Footnote omitted). . . .
. . . .
Only an “applicant” can request a determination of need under
section 403.519.  Section 403.503(4), Florida Statutes (1991), defines
the term “applicant” as “any electric utility which applies for
certification pursuant to the provisions of this act.”  An “electric
-13-
utility,” as used in the Act,
means cities and towns, counties, public utility districts,
regulated electric companies, electric cooperatives, and
joint operating agencies, or combinations thereof,
engaged in, or authorized to engage in, the business of
generating, transmitting, or distributing electric energy.
Sec. 403.503(13), Fla. Stat. (1991).  The Commission determined that
because non-utility generators are not included in this definition,
Nassau is not a proper applicant under section 403.519.  The
Commission reasoned that a need determination proceeding is
designed to examine the need resulting from an electric utility's duty to
serve customers.  Non-utility generators, such as Nassau, have no
similar need because they are not required to serve customers.
The Commission's interpretation of section 403.519 also
comports with this Court's decision in Nassau Power Corp. v. Beard. 
In that decision, we rejected Nassau's argument that “the Siting Act
does not require the PSC to determine need on a utility-specific
basis.”  601 So. 2d at 1178 n.9.  Rather, we agreed with the
Commission that the need to be determined under section 403.519 is
“the need of the entity ultimately consuming the power,” in this case
FPL.  Id.
641 So. 2d at 397, 398-99 (footnote omitted).  Based upon our Nassau analysis of
the Siting Act, we conclude that the granting of the determination of need on the
basis of the present application does exceed the PSC’s present authority.  A
determination of need is presently available only to an applicant that has
demonstrated that a utility or utilities serving retail customers has specific
committed need for all of the electrical power to be generated at a proposed plant.
Our decision is founded upon our continuing recognition that the regulation
12We find the historical context offered by Commissioner Clark in her dissenting opinion to be
helpful.  Order at 64-71.  The record also contains a relevant discussion by FPC counsel Gary L. Sasso
before the PSC in proceedings below.  Record on Appeal, Vol. I of Hearing Transcript at 21-50.
13§ 350.001, Fla. Stat. (1997).
14Ch. 73-33, § 1 at 73, Laws of Fla.
15Ch.73-33, § 1 at 76 (codified at § 403.505, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1974)).
-14-
of the generation and sale of power in Florida resides in the legislative branch of
government.12  The PSC, successor to the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission, is an arm of the legislative branch in that the Commission obtains all
of its authority from legislation.13  Originally, the Legislature did not include among
the PSC’s responsibilities the authority to approve the siting of new power plants
but left such authority to local government entities.  In 1973, the Legislature enacted
the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act,14 to preempt local government action
and to consolidate approval of most state agencies into a single license.  Within that
law was a requirement that each utility submit a ten-year site plan estimating the
utility’s power generating needs and the general location of its power plants.15  In
enacting the Siting Act, the Legislature recognized a need for statewide perspective
in selecting sites for power plants because of the “significant impact upon the
welfare of the population, the location and growth of industry and the use of the
natural resources of the state.”  See Ch. 73-33, § 1 at 73, Laws of Fla.  At that time,
-15-
the role of the PSC was to prepare a “report and recommendation as to the present
and future needs for electrical generating capacity in the area to be served by the
proposed site.”  Id. at 77.
In 1980, as part of the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act
(FEECA), the Legislature changed the PSC’s requirement of a “report and
recommendation” to “a proceeding to determine the need for an electrical power
plant subject to the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act.”  Ch. 80-65, § 5, at
214, Laws of Fla. (codified at section 366.86, Fla. Stat. (1981)).  By this statutory
revision, the PSC was directed to review the regulated utilities’ proposed new
plants, taking into account the need for system reliability and integrity, the need for
adequate reasonable-cost electricity and whether a proposed plant was the most
cost-effective alternative available.  See Ch. 80-65, § 5 at 217, Laws of Fla.  The
need determination provision at issue in this case was originally codified at section
366.86, Florida Statutes (1981), which was part of FEECA.  The same provision is
now at section 403.519 but continues to be listed within FEECA, even though it is
codified immediately following the Siting Act.
The term “utility” was expressly defined for purposes of FEECA, including
section 403.519, as “any person or entity of whatever form which provides
electricity or natural gas at retail to the public.”  Ch. 80-65, § 5 at 214, Laws of Fla. 
16Ch. 90-331, § 24, at 2698, Laws of Fla.
-16-
Section 366.82(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: “For the purposes of ss.
366.80- 366.85 [FEECA], and 403.519, ‘utility’ means any person or entity of
whatever form which provides electricity or natural gas at retail to the public.”  In
1990, statutory revisions included an amendment that changed the term “utility” to
“applicant” in the first sentence of section 403.519.16
Our reading of this statutory history leads us to continue to conclude that the
present statutory scheme was intended to place the PSC’s determination of need
within the regulatory framework allowing Florida regulated utilities to propose new
power plants to provide electrical service to their Florida customers at retail rates. 
This need determination, pursuant to section 403.519, contemplates the PSC’s
express consideration of the statutory factors based upon demonstrated specified
needs of these Florida customers.  The need determination is part of the process
that the Legislature intended by its plain language to balance “the pressing need for
increased power generation facilities” with the necessity that the state
ensure through available and reasonable methods that the location and
operation of electrical power plants will produce minimal adverse
effects on human health, the environment, the ecology of the land and
its wildlife, and the ecology of state waters and their aquatic life.
§ 403.502, Fla. Stat. (1997).
17Our conclusion is consistent with the conclusion of the North Carolina Utilities Commission,
which dismissed a similar petition by an independent power producer that proposed a merchant plant in
North Carolina  that was opposed by Duke Power Company.  The Commission’s order was affirmed.
Empire Power Co. v. Duke Power Co., 437 S.E. 2d 540 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
-17-
Accordingly, we find that the statutory scheme embodied in the Siting Act
and FEECA was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a
proposed power plant output that is not fully committed to use by Florida
customers who purchase electrical power at retail rates.  Rather, we find that the
Legislature must enact express statutory criteria if it intends such authority for the
PSC.  Pursuant only to such legislative action will the PSC be authorized to
consider the advent of the competitive market in wholesale power promoted by
recent federal initiatives.  Such statutory criteria are necessary if the Florida
regulatory procedures are intended to cover this evolution in the electric power
industry.17  The projected need of unspecified utilities throughout peninsular Florida
is not among the authorized statutory criteria for determining whether to grant a
determination of need pursuant to section 403.519, Florida Statutes.  Moreover, we
agree with appellants that the fact of Duke’s joining with New Smyrna in this
arrangement for a thirty-megawatt commitment does not transform the application
into one that complies with the Siting Act and FEECA.
We find no merit in the constitutional arguments advanced by New Smyrna. 
18The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, Title VIII, Subtitle C, State and Local
Authorities, section 731, provides:
Nothing in this title or in any amendment made by this title shall be construed as
affecting or intending to affect, or in any way to interfere with, the authority of any State
or local government relating to environmental protection or the siting of facilities.
-18-
As to any alleged preemption or interference with interstate commerce, we find that
power-plant siting and need determination are areas that Congress has expressly left
to the states.18
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the PSC on the basis that the granting
of the determination of need exceeds the PSC’s authority pursuant to section
403.519, Florida Statutes (1997).
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting.
I cannot concur in the majority’s conclusion that the Florida Legislature has
clearly prohibited the proposed action of the Commission.  Indeed, it appears to
me that the prohibition is based upon a strained and artificial construction of
various provisions of the legislative scheme that have little bearing on the issue
-19-
before us today.  In fact, even under the strained construction of the majority the
issue would be not whether the petitioning utilities were proper applicants, but
whether the capacity required should be permitted.  
I am especially concerned with the majority’s conclusion that it will not find
Commission authority to act absent “express statutory criteria” for the specific
circumstances presented here.  Clearly, the Commission was created to regulate
utilities seeking to operate in Florida.  In my view that is precisely what the
Commission is doing here.
Three Consolidated  Appeals from the Public Service Commission
Harry W. Long, Jr., pro hac vice, Tampa, Florida, and Lee L. Willis and James D.
Beasley of Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee, Florida, for Tampa Electric Company;
Gary L. Sasso, Sylvia H. Walbolt, Robert Pass and Joseph H. Lang, Jr. of Carlton,
Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida, and James A.
McGee and Jeff Froeschle, Senior Counsels, St. Petersburg, Florida, for Florida
Power Corporation; Matthew M. Childs and Charles A. Guyton of Steel, Hector &
Davis, Tallahassee, Florida, and Alvin B. Davis, Thomas R. Julin, Edward M. Mullins
and Sandra K. Wolkov of Steel, Hector & Davis, Miami, Florida, for Florida Power
and Light Company, 
Appellants
Robert D. Vandiver, General Counsel and Richard C. Bellak, Associate General
Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, for the Florida Public Service Commission; Robert
Scheffel Wright and John T. LaVia, III of Landers & Parsons, P.A.,  and Alan C.
-20-
Sundberg, c/o Landers & Parsons, P.A., Tallahassee, and Steven G. Gey and Mark
Seidenfeld, pro hac vice, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee,
Florida, for Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida; Stephen H.
Grimes, D. Bruce May, Karen D. Walker and Susan L. Kelsey of Holland & Knight,
Tallahassee, Florida, Daniel S. Pearson of Holland & Knight, Miami, Florida, and
Brent C. Bailey, pro se, Vice President and General Counsel, Houston, Texas, for
Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Co., Ltd., LLP;  and Jon C. Moyle, Jr. and
Robert J. Sniffen of Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Kolins, Raymond & Sheehan, P.A.,
Tallahassee, Florida, for PG&E Generating (f/k/a/ U.S. Generating Company),
 
 Appellees
Bill L. Bryant and Katherine E. Giddings of Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant
& Yon, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,
for Enron North America (“Enron”), Amicus Curiae