Title: Thompson v. State

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

197 Kan. 630 (1966)
419 P.2d 891
DONALD GENE THOMPSON, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 44,698

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 5, 1966.
Lloyd Burke Bronston, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
James P. Davis, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, attorney general, and Leo J. Moroney, county attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is an appeal from an order denying post conviction relief.
On May 8, 1961, appellant pleaded guilty in the district court of Wyandotte County, Kansas, to the offense of murder in the first degree and, following the hearing of evidence by the trial court pursuant to K.S.A. (then G.S. 1949) 21-403 on the question of the punishment to be assessed, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1964 appellant filed his petition to vacate the sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. Counsel was appointed to represent him. On May 27, 1965, an evidentiary hearing was held at which appellant was present and testified. The petition was denied, hence this appeal for which further counsel has been appointed.
Appellant's first contention of error is based on his claim that he waived extradition proceedings to come from the state of Oklahoma into the state of Kansas upon a charge of burglary and larceny and that while he was in jail in Kansas as a suspect for the first two offenses he was charged with the murder offense. This claim does not entitle appellant to any relief. The jurisdiction of a Kansas district *631 court to try a person on a charge of having committed a public offense does not depend upon how he came to be in this state. (Stebens v. Hand, 182 Kan. 304, 320 P.2d 790; Converse v. Hand, 185 Kan. 112, 340 P.2d 874; Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438, 411 P.2d 663.)
Appellant next claims that at the time he entered his plea of guilty he was unfamiliar with his rights and not properly advised by counsel. At his preliminary hearing and upon his appearance in district court at the time of his plea and sentencing appellant was represented by three competent attorneys of his own choice, one of whom was widely experienced in the field of criminal law. The transcript of the district court proceeding reveals the following:
"...
"THE COURT: You are Donald Gene Thompson?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: How old are you, Donald?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Twenty-one.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Of where are you a resident?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Oklahoma City.
"THE COURT: What education have you had, Donald?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: In California.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Uh, huh.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Uh, huh.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor please.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes, sir.
*632 "DEFENDANT THOMPSON: What does this `mute' mean?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: What my attitude will be?
"THE COURT: If you don't mind 
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Do you now wish to enter a plea?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"THE COURT: How do you plead, sir?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Guilty.
..............
The transcript then recites the evidence offered by the state, being the testimony of three police officers together with exhibits consisting of photographs and appellant's written confession, and continues:
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: I didn't understand.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes, sir.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes.
"THE COURT: What?
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: I knew it could be death.
"THE COURT: I see.
"DEFENDANT THOMPSON: No sir.
..."
In his testimony at his 1507 hearing appellant does not indicate in what respect he was not familiar with his rights nor does he specify of what rights he was unaware at the time he pleaded *634 guilty. He simply maintains the transcript on its face indicates a lack of understanding of trial procedure at the time the plea of guilty was entered and that it should not have been accepted by the trial judge. We do not agree. We think the transcript evidences that the trial judge fairly discharged his responsibility in accepting the plea of guilty. It reflects his careful ascertainment that the plea was voluntarily made and that appellant understood the nature and consequence of the same. The transcript contains nothing to indicate the contrary and furnishes no grounds for vacating the sentence. Appellant was represented by his retained counsel throughout all proceedings commencing with his preliminary hearing. Although the record on appeal does not reveal the circumstances, it further indicates that appellant appeared with his counsel before the judge of another division of the Wyandotte County District Court on two occasions prior to the plea and sentencing. And as previously indicated, appellant's testimony at his evidentiary hearing supplies no factual basis for this complaint.
Although not specifically delineated in his statement of points setting forth error in the 1507 proceeding, appellant does assert he was not advised of his constitutional right to counsel or his right against incrimination at the time he made his confession and that he was beaten and mistreated.
The matter of appellant's confession was inquired into at some length at the time of his hearing upon the sentence. It appears that appellant first made an oral confession to police officers admitting participating in the offense of felony murder. The police officers testified appellant was previously advised of his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. Then appellant gave a signed written confession to the county attorney of Wyandotte County. The written confession acknowledged that appellant was advised of his right against self-incrimination and that it was being made freely and voluntarily, that no threats or promises were made in obtaining it, and that appellant was not misused in any way. As previously set forth, the sentencing judge made further inquiry in open court of appellant as to the voluntary nature of the confession. No complaint that anything was amiss appears to have been made by appellant until the 1507 proceeding was started. The trial judge at the 1507 hearing (who was also the sentencing judge) had all this before him. At the 1507 hearing appellant did deny he was advised of his rights to counsel and he *635 did make the bald assertion he was beaten and mistreated. Appellant's allegations of wrongdoing are not only affirmatively contradicted by the record of his conviction, such statements are wholly uncorroborated and unsupported. In Goodwin v. State, 195 Kan. 414, 407 P.2d 528, the rule is stated thus:
The trial court committed no error in finding appellant failed to meet the requisite burden of proof and its order denying relief is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.