Title: HEILIG v. WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HEILIG v. WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION2003 WY 2764 P.3d 734Case Number: 02-41Decided: 02/28/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
    

 

DANIEL 
HEILIG,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
GAME AND FISH

COMMISSION, 
WYOMING GAME

AND 
FISH DEPARTMENT, and

JOHN 
BAUGHMAN, Director,

Wyoming 
Game and Fish Department,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Daniel F. Heilig, Lander, Wyoming, pro se 

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Thomas J. Davidson, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Lynda G. Cook, Senior Assistant Attorney General  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Daniel Heilig, an 
attorney and avid hunter, filed a pro se declaratory judgment action in 
the Ninth Judicial District Court asserting Chapter 2, Section 12 of the Wyoming 
Game and Fish Department's (Game and Fish) general hunting regulations was null 
and void, unenforceable, and invalid ab initio because Game and Fish had 
not complied with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
16-3-101 to -115 (LexisNexis 2001)) (WAPA) in incorporating its 2000 Walk-In 
Areas Hunting publication (Atlas) by reference into its rules and 
regulations.  Prior to the 
declaratory judgment action being filed, a criminal action was filed against Mr. 
Heilig in the Big Horn County Circuit Court alleging he failed to obtain 
landowner consent to hunt in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-3-305(b) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The criminal 
matter was pending on appeal to the Fifth Judicial District Court and presented 
the same legal issues as the declaratory judgment complaint.  The Ninth Judicial District Court 
granted Game and Fish's motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action 
finding the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
and Mr. Heilig was not adversely affected in fact.  We affirm the dismissal on different 
grounds because the declaratory judgment was not consistent with the 
circumstances in which we have allowed multiple similar actions to proceed.  

 

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      We rephrase the 
issue as follows:  Did the Ninth 
Judicial District Court abuse its discretion by dismissing the declaratory 
judgment action?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Game and Fish 
began to develop a program in 1998 intended to make hunting on private lands 
available to the public through agreements with private landowners.  The landowners stipulate the species for 
which they will permit access and the time frame within established hunting 
seasons in which the public will be allowed access on their private lands.  We will refer to this as the Walk-In 
Area Program.

 

[¶4]      On November 5, 
2000, Mr. Heilig was hunting pheasants in Walk-In Area No. 28 located in Big 
Horn County.  The area was not 
designated for pheasant hunting by the Atlas, and Mr. Heilig had not asked for 
nor received the landowner's permission to hunt pheasants.  He was cited by a Game and Fish warden 
and prosecuted in the circuit court of the Fifth Judicial District for allegedly 
violating § 23-3-305(b)1 by entering private property in Big 
Horn County to hunt without the landowner's permissiona seventh degree 
misdemeanor.  These facts are not in 
dispute.  

 

[¶5]      In February of 
2001, Mr. Heilig filed a motion to dismiss the criminal action contending in 
part that Game and Fish's rules and regulations for the Walk-In Area Program 
were void because they were improperly promulgated and were 
unconstitutional.  On April 24, 
2001, the circuit court denied the motion, and Mr. Heilig entered a conditional 
guilty plea under W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2)2 and appealed the denial of his 
motion to dismiss to the Fifth Judicial District Court.  On the same day, the parties filed a 
joint motion requesting the circuit court to certify specific questions to the 
Fifth Judicial District Court and identified these legal 
issues:

 

a.  Does 
a person hunting on private lands that are enrolled in [Game and Fish's] Walk-In 
Access Program who has received permission of the owner or person in charge of 
the property commit a trespass in violation of W.S. § 23-3-305(b) when that 
person hunts a species not contemplated in the contract which created the rights 
of the general public to hunt the private lands?

 

b.  Did 
[Game and Fish] violate W.S. § 23-1-302(a)(i) when it established the Walk-In 
Access Program in a manner which allowed private landowners to determine which 
species may be hunted on their private lands, and at what dates, irrespective of 
the legally promulgated seasons which were established according to the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure[] Act?

 

c.  Has 
[Game and Fish] violated the requirements of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure[] Act when it allowed private landowners, in conjunction with the 
Walk-In Access Program, to set dates and species which could be taken on their 
private lands when said dates and species limitations conflicted with hunting 
areas not enrolled in said program?

 

d.  Is 
the Walk-In Access Program in violation of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure[] Act in that the program was not subject to the procedural 
requirements of the Act, yet criminal sanctions may result from violations of 
the provisions of the program?

 

e.  Can 
a [Game and Fish] publication (Walk-In Area Atlas), which has not been subject 
to public notice or public comment, provide a legal basis to sustain a criminal 
charge of trespassing, a violation of W.S. § 23-3-305(b)?

 

f.  Is 
W.S. § 23-3-305(b), as applied to [Mr. Heilig] in this case, unconstitutionally 
vague, and therefore void, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I of 
the Wyoming Constitution?

 

The 
status of the appeal to the Fifth Judicial District Court is unclear, but it 
appears from the designated record to be pending.

 

[¶6]      On April 6, 2001, 
Mr. Heilig filed a pro se declaratory judgment action in the Ninth 
Judicial District Court setting out claims we paraphrase as 
follows:

 

Count 
I"Violations of Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act."  Game 
and Fish violated § 16-3-103(h) of the WAPA by incorporating "Department 
publications," the Atlas, by reference into its rules at Chapter 2, Section 12 
which are not codes, standards, rules, or regulations and were not in existence 
at the time the rules (Chapter 2, Section 12) were promulgated in April of 
2000.  Game and Fish violated the 
WAPA because it failed to identify what "Department publications" it was 
incorporating by reference, provide a statement of the terms and substance of 
the proposed rule, or indicate where the publications material could be 
accessed.

 

Count 
II"Violations of Wyoming Game and Fish Statutes and Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act."  Game 
and Fish exceeded its authority and acted contrary to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
23-1-302(a) and 23-1-303 (LexisNexis 2001) by establishing the Atlas hunting 
seasons and dates without conforming to the WAPA 
requirements.

 

Count 
III"Violation of Due Process Requirements of the 14th Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States."  
Game 
and Fish violated Mr. Heilig's right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment3 to the United States Constitution 
by prosecuting a criminal charge on the basis of Game and Fish's rules (Chapter 
2, Section 12) and the Atlas which were not properly promulgated under the WAPA 
and did not provide adequate notice of the prohibited behavior or the potential 
penal sanction.

 

Count 
IV"Violation of Due Process Requirements of Article 1, Section 6 of the 
Constitution of [t]he State of Wyoming."  Game and Fish violated Mr. Heilig's 
right to due process under Article 1, Section 64 of the Wyoming Constitution by 
prosecuting a charge on the basis of a rule and publication which failed to 
provide fair and adequate warning of the prohibited conduct or penalty and were 
not promulgated pursuant to the WAPA procedural 
requirements.

 

[¶7]      Through this 
action, Mr. Heilig requested the Ninth Judicial District Court: (1) declare Game 
and Fish's rules (Chapter 2, Section 12) and Atlas null and void, unenforceable, 
invalid ab initio, and unconstitutional; (2) issue an injunction 
precluding enforcement under the rules; and (3) award him attorney fees.  Game and Fish filed a motion to dismiss 
alleging Mr. Heilig did not have standing and was endeavoring to forum shop 
because these issues were before the circuit court of the Fifth Judicial 
District.  The Ninth Judicial 
District Court granted Game and Fish's motion holding that Mr. Heilig did not 
have standing to file the complaint because he was not affected in fact by the 
rule.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      The declaratory 
judgment action was dismissed because the district court found Mr. Heilig lacked 
standing.  We agree dismissal was 
proper but on different grounds.  
This court must affirm the district court's action on appeal if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground appearing in the record even if the legal ground 
or theory articulated by the district court is incorrect.  Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, ¶8, 45 P.3d 237, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2002); Deisch v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273, 1278 (Wyo. 1990); 
Transamerica Commercial Finance Corporation v. Naef, 842 P.2d 539, 541 
(Wyo. 1992).

 

                        
In a de novo review of the threshold question of jurisdiction, "we 
examine the policies underlying both the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and 
the doctrine of justiciability to determine if this is a proper case for 
judicial action."  Reiman Corp. 
v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Wyo. 1992).  The district court's decision to stay or 
dismiss an action due to a pending proceeding, however, is 
discretionary.

 

Southwestern 
Public Service Company v. Thunder Basin Coal Company, 
978 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 1999).  In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we must decide the 
ultimate issue of whether the court could have reasonably concluded as it did in 
the situation before it.  Capshaw 
v. Schieck, 2002 WY 54, ¶13, 44 P.3d 47, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002); Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  
However,

 

"[t]he 
trial court's exercise of this discretion is subject to searching appellate 
review and is not given the same deference as is the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in other contexts.  
Independent review is justified because the exercise of the trial court's 
discretion in granting or denying declaratory relief is not dependent upon 
factors which are difficult for an appellate tribunal to review, such as, for 
example, factual determinations of credibility.'"  Gaiser v. Village of Skokie, 271 
Ill.App.3d 85, 207 Ill.Dec. 749, 648 N.E.2d 205, 210 (1995) (quoting Chicago 
& Eastern Illinois Railroad Company v. Reserve Insurance Co., 99 
Ill.App.3d 433, 54 Ill.Dec. 564, 425 N.E.2d 429, 432 
(1981)).

 

Southwestern 
Public Service Company, 
978 P.2d  at 1142.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      "Standing is a 
legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to 
insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy."  Jolley v. State Loan and Investment 
Board, 2002 WY 7, ¶6, 38 P.3d 1073, ¶6 (Wyo. 2002).  We hold Mr. Heilig was affected in fact 
by Game and Fish's rules (Chapter 2, Section 12) because he held a hunting 
license, contributed to the Access Yes Program that helped fund the Walk-In Area 
Program, and was criminally cited on a designated Walk-In Area for hunting an 
unauthorized species under the program rules.  Game and Fish argues the provisions of 
Chapter 2, Section 12 were procedural and not substantive and, therefore, Mr. 
Heilig could not be affected in fact by their application.  We cannot abide this argument when the 
rules set out the allowed species, time, and location of hunting through the 
Walk-In Area Program. These directives are clearly substantive in nature, and 
Mr. Heilig had standing to file the declaratory judgment action.  However, this determination does not 
resolve the question of whether the Ninth Judicial District Court properly 
dismissed the declaratory judgment action.  

 

[¶10]   "Wyoming has long held that a 
declaratory judgment action should only be maintained where it would serve a 
useful purpose." Morris v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 771 P.2d 1206, 
1212 (Wyo. 1989); Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 408 (1935); Holly Sugar Corporation v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 
296 P. 206, 210 (1931); John C. Karjanis, Note, Basic Misconceptions of the 
Declaratory Judgment Law, 12 Wyo. L.J. 66, 71 (1957).  In the context of insurance and coverage 
claims, we clarified the circumstances under which  a declaratory judgment action should be 
dismissed when another similar proceeding is pending:

 

"1.  The declaratory judgment action was 
. . . intended to be used to force the [other party] to have a dress 
rehearsal' of an issue to be tried in the main case

 

"2.  The holding in the declaratory judgment 
action might inappropriately collaterally estop the parties to the main action 
as to certain factual issues

 

"3.  Such a proceeding would unduly burden 
the [opposing party] and improperly allow . . . control of 
the litigation [to be wrested] from the [initiator of the original 
action]

 

"4.  Such a declaratory judgment would 
violate the principle of judicial economy

 

"5.  Such an action would constitute an 
unwarranted interference with another court's 
proceedings[.]"

 

Morris, 
771 P.2d  at 1211 (quoting Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 8.04 
at 326 (1982) (footnotes omitted));5 see also National Chiropractic 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Doe, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1122 (D. Alaska 
1998).  Although tandem proceedings 
are more often seen in the insurance arena, in Southwestern Public Service 
Company, 978 P.2d  at 1145, this court specifically declined to limit the 
application of the Morris test "to intrastate actions between an insured 
and its insurer." 

 

[¶11]   When the certified questions from 
the criminal case and the counts of the declaratory judgment action are 
compared, it is obvious both actions raise the same issues.  Applying the Morris factors, we 
can find no other purpose for the declaratory judgment action than as a  "dress rehearsal" for the criminal case 
or to obtain a final judgment from a different forum which would bind the first 
court.  A final judgment in the 
declaratory judgment action would at least arguably collaterally estop the 
parties in the main action from litigating the same issues.  Further, the declaratory judgment action 
would take control of the proceedings from the prosecution in the Big Horn 
County criminal case because neither the prosecutor nor Big Horn County was a 
party to the Ninth Judicial District declaratory judgment action.  Further, asking two district courts to 
address the same issues violates the principles of judicial economy and results 
in an unwarranted interference by the Ninth Judicial District Court in the 
proceedings before both the circuit court and the district court of the Fifth 
Judicial District.

 

[¶12]   Mr. Heilig denies the issues 
presented before the Fifth and Ninth Judicial Districts are the same.  While the language used to frame the 
issues is not identical, we conclude the same meaning is conveyed and the same 
relief is requesteda finding that Game and Fish's rules and Atlas were 
improperly promulgated, unconstitutional, and, therefore, of no force and effect 
in Mr. Heilig's circumstances.  We 
reject Mr. Heilig's argument as inconsistent with the application of the 
Morris factors and conclude the Ninth Judicial District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in dismissing the declaratory judgment action.  Southwestern Public Service 
Company, 978 P.2d  at 1145.  

 

[¶13]   We anticipate these same issues may 
be presented to us in an appeal of the criminal action.  Regardless, dismissal of this action is 
necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, discourage redundant 
actions, and minimize their attendant problems.

 

[¶14]   Affirmed. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1"(b) No person shall enter upon the private property of any person to 
hunt, fish, or trap without the permission of the owner or person in charge of 
the property.  Violation of this 
subsection constitutes a 7th degree 
misdemeanor."

 

2"(2) Conditional Pleas.  With 
the approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal shall 
be allowed to withdraw the plea."

 

 

4"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law."

 

5The sixth consideration of the original Morris test is not set out 
because it is tailored solely to the circumstances of an insurance 
forum.