Title: State v. Williams

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5695.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5695 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5695.] 
(No. 2011-2094—Submitted September 25, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 94965, 195 Ohio 
App.3d 807, 2011-Ohio-5650. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Evid.R. 404(B) is in accord with R.C. 2945.59 in that it precludes the admission 
of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove the character 
of an accused in order to show that the accused acted in conformity 
therewith, but it does not preclude admission of that evidence for other 
purposes. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The state appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals that reversed the convictions of Van Williams, for rape, gross sexual 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
imposition, kidnapping, and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and held, 
pursuant to State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975), that other 
acts evidence offered to show a scheme, plan, or system is inadmissible unless it 
shows the background of the alleged crime or proves the identity of the accused.  
State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 807, 2011-Ohioi-5650, 961 N.E.2d 1200 (8th 
Dist.; en banc), ¶ 50-51.  The appellate court determined that our holding in Curry 
precluded the admission of evidence of a prior sexual relationship Williams had 
had with a different minor boy because the sexual acts of that relationship had 
been “chronologically and factually separate occurrences” and the identity of the 
accused was not an issue at trial.  Id. at 58. 
{¶ 2} Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), however, evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts of an accused may be admissible to prove intent or plan, even if 
the identity of an accused or the immediate background of a crime is not at issue.  
Consequently, evidence that Williams had engaged in sexual relations with a 
teenage boy on previous occasions may be admissible to prove that Williams had 
a plan to target vulnerable teenage boys, to mentor them, and to groom them for 
sexual activity with the intent of sexual gratification.  The rule precludes 
admission of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove the character of 
an accused to demonstrate conforming conduct, but it affords the trial court 
discretion to admit other acts evidence for any other purpose, and therefore, we 
reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} Van Williams met J.H. at the Good Shepherd Baptist Church in East 
Cleveland, Ohio, became a mentor to him, as J.H. had no contact with his natural 
father and lived with his grandmother, and would often buy him gifts and pay him 
to do odd jobs at his home.  In 2008, when J.H. was 14, Williams began to 
sexually abuse him.  During a counseling session at his school, J.H. revealed to 
January Term, 2012 
3 
Michael Tesler that Williams had abused him, and as a result, Tesler notified the 
Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. 
{¶ 4} A grand jury subsequently indicted Williams on 12 counts of rape, 
12 counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, 12 counts of kidnapping, 24 
counts of gross sexual imposition, and one count of intimidation of a crime victim 
or witness. 
{¶ 5} Prior to empaneling a jury, the state moved to admit evidence that 
Williams had had a similar relationship with a different teenage boy, A.B., a 16-
year-old member of the high school swim team that Williams coached in 1997.  In 
support of its motion, the state asserted that the fact that Williams’s relationship 
with A.B. paralleled that with J.H., indicated a course of conduct constituting a 
common plan, demonstrated a distinct pattern of sexual conduct constituting a 
modus operandi, and, by reasonable inference, tended to prove Williams’s intent 
to achieve sexual gratification with teenage males.  Williams objected to the 
admission of testimony of A.B. and requested a hearing, but the court deferred the 
hearing until after trial began. 
{¶ 6} During opening statements, defense counsel told jurors that 
Williams had treated J.H. like a son but that J.H. had “betrayed” him and that the 
boy had “issues”—had made suicide attempts and liked pornography.  Defense 
counsel suggested that J.H. had made up the accusation to get out of trouble: 
“[J.H.] is in the [school] office perhaps under a disciplinary situation for 
something related to inappropriate conduct regarding female students and so 
forth.”  Defense counsel further stated, “So he may be confused about his sexual 
preference.  Mr. Williams is not.  [J.H. is] in the office in this context being 
confronted with his own bad behavior, and this is the first time the evidence will 
show that this whole thing about Mr. Williams comes up.” 
{¶ 7} At a hearing, out of the presence of the jury, on the state’s motion to 
admit the testimony of A.B., A.B. stated that at the time of his relationship with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
Williams, his father did not have an active involvement in his life and he trusted 
Williams.  He explained that they had a sexual relationship that lasted until the 
end of the school year that included kissing, masturbation, and oral sex in the high 
school locker room, as well as a sexual encounter at a swim meet.  According to 
A.B., Williams received “some type of sexual gratification” when he touched 
A.B.’s genitals.  After transferring to another high school, A.B. disclosed the 
relationship to a tutor. 
{¶ 8} Over objection, the court permitted A.B. to testify at trial, but at that 
time it also gave the following cautionary instruction: “The evidence [from this 
witness] is going to be received for a limited purpose.  It’s not going to be 
received, and you may not consider it, to prove the character of the Defendant in 
order to show that he acted in conformity or accordance with that character.”  The 
court also permitted Shawana Cornell, a social worker, to testify that Williams 
had admitted to her that he had been accused of sexual abuse about 12 earlier but 
that the charge in that matter had been reduced to misdemeanor assault.  Cornell 
further testified that, in response to her question whether he was attracted to men 
or women or both, he responded that he was attracted to women. 
{¶ 9} When the state rested, the court dismissed seven counts of rape, 18 
counts of gross sexual imposition, five counts of kidnapping, seven counts of 
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and the intimidation count.  In its charge to 
the jury at the close of the case, the court repeated its limiting instruction 
regarding other acts evidence.  Following deliberation, the jury found Williams 
guilty of five counts of rape, six counts of gross sexual imposition, seven counts 
of kidnapping, and five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.  The 
court sentenced him to an aggregate 20-year prison term. 
{¶ 10} Williams appealed, challenging the admission of the testimony of 
A.B. and Cornell.  Relying on Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720, the 
appellate court stated that there “are only two situations in which other-acts 
January Term, 2012 
5 
evidence is admissible to show a defendant’s ‘scheme, plan, or system’: (1) to 
show the background of the alleged crime or (2) to show identity.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 807, 2011-Ohio-5650, 961 N.E.2d 1200, 
¶ 51.  Concluding that identity was not at issue, that the other acts with A.B. were 
remote and distinct occurrences, and that the testimony of A.B. and Cornell was 
unduly prejudicial, the court reversed the trial court and remanded the matter for 
further proceedings. 
{¶ 11} We accepted the state’s appeal on two propositions of law.  The 
state claims that other acts evidence is “admissible to show his intent, where 
intent is an element of the statute and both acts are committed against teenage 
boys of similar ages,” and it also contends that, notwithstanding Curry, “[o]ther 
acts evidence demonstrating that a defendant exhibited a pattern of isolating 
certain types of victims and then abused a position of authority to engage in 
grooming behaviors for the purpose of sexual gratification is admissible to show 
his unique, identifiable plan, independent of whether it shows identity.” 
{¶ 12} What the state really argues is that two independent bases exist to 
admit the other acts evidence in this case: the intent and the plan of the accused, 
i.e., intent of sexual gratification eminating from sexual conduct with teenage 
males and a specific plan to target vulnerable teenage boys and groom them for 
eventual sexual activity. 
{¶ 13} Williams argues that evidence of his prior sexual relationship with 
A.B. is admissible only if it is introduced to prove identity or to establish the 
immediate background of the charged offense, claiming that Curry should apply 
to Evid.R. 404(B) to limit “plan” evidence to proof of identity or establishment of 
the immediate background of an offense. 
{¶ 14} Accordingly, we are asked to consider whether our decision in 
Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720, which addressed R.C. 2945.59 and 
stated that scheme, plan, or system evidence is relevant in two general factual 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
situations—when the other acts form part of the immediate background of the 
alleged act that forms part of the foundation of the crime charged and when 
identity of the perpetrator is at issue—also precludes admission of plan evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the accused pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 15} Evidence that an accused committed a crime other than the one for 
which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the 
accused’s propensity or inclination to commit crime or that he acted in conformity 
with bad character.  Curry at 68; State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 184, 552 
N.E.2d 180 (1990).  The General Assembly, however, has codified certain 
exceptions to the common law regarding the admission of evidence of other acts 
of wrongdoing.  Those exceptions are contained in R.C. 2945.59: 
 
In any criminal case in which the defendant’s motive or 
intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the 
defendant’s scheme, plan, or system in doing an act is material, 
any acts of the defendant which tend to show his motive or intent, 
the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s 
scheme, plan, or system in doing the act in question may be 
proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or 
subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may show or 
tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant. 
This court likewise has promulgated Evid.R. 404(B), which states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 16} We have recognized that Evid.R. 404(B) is in accord with R.C. 
2945.59, State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 281, 532 N.E.2d 628 (1988), and that 
the rule and statute each “codify the common law with respect to evidence of 
other acts of wrongdoing,” State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 530, 634 N.E.2d 616 
(1994), and preclude admission of other acts evidence to prove a character trait in 
order to demonstrate conduct in conformity with that trait, id.; State v. Hector, 19 
Ohio St.2d 167, 174, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969). 
{¶ 17} While both the statute and the rule adopted the common law rule, 
they also carve out exceptions to that common law, and some differences exist 
between the statute and the rule.  The statute affords the trial court discretion to 
admit evidence of any other acts of a defendant in cases where motive or intent, 
absence of mistake or accident, or scheme, plan, or system in doing an act is 
material.  See generally Black’s Law Dictionary 1066 (9th Ed.2009) (“material” 
means “[h]aving some logical connection with the consequential facts”).  Evid.R. 
404(B) contains no reference to materiality.  Rather, it precludes the admission of 
evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove the character of an accused in 
order to demonstrate conforming conduct, and it affords the trial court discretion 
to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for “other purposes,” including, 
but not limited to, those set forth in the rule.  Hence, the rule affords broad 
discretion to the trial judge regarding the admission of other acts evidence. 
{¶ 18} In Curry, we interpreted R.C. 2945.59 and stated that “scheme, 
plan, or system” evidence is relevant in two general factual situations: those in 
which the other acts form part of the immediate background of the alleged act that 
forms the foundation of the crime charged in the indictment and those involving 
the identity of the perpetrator.  Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d at 72, 330 N.E.2d 720.  But 
we did not limit admissibility to those two situations.  Moreover, Curry predated 
Evid.R. 404(B), so it did not consider or apply that rule. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 19} Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused tending to 
show the plan with which an act is done may be admissible for other purposes, 
such as those listed in Evid.R. 404(B)—to show proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident—
and in considering other acts evidence, trial courts should conduct a three-step 
analysis. 
{¶ 20} The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence is 
relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.  Evid.R. 401.  
The next step is to consider whether evidence of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is presented to prove the character of the accused in order to show activity in 
conformity therewith or whether the other acts evidence is presented for a 
legitimate purpose, such as those stated in Evid.R. 404(B).  The third step is to 
consider whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  See Evid.R 403. 
{¶ 21} The state offered the testimony of A.B. to demonstrate the motive, 
preparation, and plan of the accused to target teenage males who had no father 
figure and to gain their trust and confidence for the purpose of grooming them for 
sexual activity with the intent to be sexually gratified.  See United States v. 
Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir.2011) (“Grooming refers to deliberate 
actions taken by a defendant to expose a child to sexual material; the ultimate goal 
of grooming is the formation of an emotional connection with the child and a 
reduction of the child’s inhibitions in order to prepare the child for sexual 
activity”); United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.1997), fn. 2 (“ 
‘Shaping and grooming’ describes the process of cultivating trust with a victim 
and gradually introducing sexual behaviors until reaching the point of 
intercourse”). 
January Term, 2012 
9 
{¶ 22} As to the first step of our three-part test for the admission of other 
acts evidence, A.B.’s testimony was relevant because it tended to show the motive 
Williams had and the preparation and plan he exhibited of targeting, mentoring, 
grooming, and abusing teenage boys; if believed by the jury, such testimony could 
corroborate the testimony of J.H.  Notably, A.B.’s testimony also rebutted the 
suggestion offered by the defense during opening statements that J.H. had falsely 
accused Williams of abuse with the hope of getting out of trouble at school and 
the suggestion that Williams was sexually attracted to women.  A.B.’s testimony 
that Williams received “some type of sexual gratification” also is relevant to show 
Williams’s intent was sexual gratification.  See R.C. 2907.01; 2907.05(A)(1). 
{¶ 23} The next step relates to whether the evidence is presented to prove 
the accused’s character in order to show that the conduct was in conformity with 
that character.  In this case, contrary to the view expressed by the court of appeals, 
the state did not offer the evidence of the Williams-A.B. relationship to show that 
abusing J.H. was in conformity with Williams’s character.  In fact, the trial court 
gave two limiting instructions that this evidence was not being offered to prove 
Williams’s character—one just prior to the testimony of A.B., and one prior to 
deliberation.  We presume the jury followed those instructions.  See State v. 
Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995); Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio 
St.3d 186, 195, 559 N.E.2d 1313 (1990). 
{¶ 24} Third, we consider whether the probative value of the other acts 
evidence of the prior relationship with A.B. is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  This evidence is not unduly prejudicial, because the 
trial court instructed the jury that this evidence could not be considered to show 
that Williams had acted in conformity with a character trait.  This instruction 
lessened the prejudicial effect of A.B.’s testimony, and A.B. corroborated J.H.’s 
testimony about the sexual abuse, which had been denied by Williams.  Thus, 
Evid.R. 404(B) permitted admission of evidence of Williams’s prior crime 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
because it helped to prove motive, preparation, and plan on the part of Williams.  
The prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh the probative value of that 
evidence. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} Evid.R. 404(B) is in accord with R.C. 2945.59 in that it precludes 
the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove the 
character of an accused in order to show that the accused acted in conformity 
therewith, but it does not preclude admission of that evidence for other purposes, 
e.g., to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  Evidence that Williams had targeted 
teenage males who had no father figure to gain their trust and confidence and 
groom them for sexual activity with the intent of sexual gratification may be 
admitted to show the plan of the accused and the intent for sexual gratification.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of 
the trial court is reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} After reviewing the record in this case, I find that the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, got it right.  It concluded that other-acts 
testimony against VanWilliams had been offered for the express purpose of 
proving the bad character of the defendant in order to demonstrate that his 
conduct with regard to J.H. was in conformity with his prior bad acts. 
{¶ 27} The court of appeals also stated: 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
 
There is no doubt that A.B.’s [other-acts] testimony 
coupled with the social worker’s statements unfairly 
prejudiced Williams.  * * * [Because] no physical evidence of 
sexual abuse was found[,] [t]he case essentially hinged on the 
credibility of the witnesses.  In cases such as these, there is a 
real risk that a jury will believe that if Williams did it once, he 
must have done it again.  That is the danger cautioned of and 
protected against by Evid.R. 403 and 404.  Therefore, the trial 
court erred in finding that the probative value of A.B.’s 
testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect. 
 
State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 807, 2011-Ohio-5650, 961 N.E.2d 1200 (8th 
Dist.; en banc), ¶ 64. 
{¶ 28} The majority opinion only cursorily addresses whether the other-
acts testimony unfairly prejudiced Williams even though that is an essential part 
of an other-acts analysis.  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 
1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988).  I find a clear violation of Evid.R. 404(B) and 
would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Matthew E. Meyer, and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen A. Goldmeier, 
Assistant State Public Defender, for appellee. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Peter K. Glenn-Applegate, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General.