Title: State v. Lende

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

190 N.W.2d 52 (1971) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donald LENDE, Sr., Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 415. Supreme Court of North Dakota. September 1, 1971. Rehearing Denied October 1, 1971. *53 Eugene A. Kruger, State's Atty., and William D. Yuill, Asst. State's Atty., Fargo, for State of North Dakota. P. W. Lanier, Jr., of Lanier & Knox, Fargo, for defendant and appellant. *54 CLIFFORD JANSONIUS, District Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction. The defendant was charged with the crime of assault and battery upon a peace officer, a charge established by the 1969 Legislature. Section 12-26-04, N.D.C.C., as amended, reads: The information charges: The defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and was tried by a jury and convicted. The Court sentenced him to one year at the State Farm. The evidence indicates that the defendant was in an alley in back of a restaurant which he operated, behaving in a disorderly manner and using vulgar and obscene language. A police officer by the name of Donald R. Lawyer was patrolling in the neighborhood of the back door of the restaurant, and a discussion developed between the police officer and the defendant which resulted in the charge made. The police officer's testimony is as follows: The record indicates that the judgment of conviction was entered on August 3, 1970, and an amended notice of appeal was filed which, in addition to the appeal from the judgment, attempted to enlarge the appeal as follows: Notwithstanding the paragraph added in the amended notice of appeal, as above set forth, the defendant did not make a motion for a directed or advised verdict, nor did the Court see fit to take any action in that regard and attempt to advise the jury. Further, the defendant made no motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, and at no time moved to quash the information. Therefore the appeal in this case is from the judgment only, and brings before this Court for review any errors of law committed by the trial Court which appear in the record of the action and which have been preserved and *55 presented in the manner prescribed by statute. State v. Dietz, 115 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1962); State v. Timm, 146 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1966); State v. McClelland, 72 N.D. 665, 10 N.W.2d 798 (1943). Counsel for the defense at the time of argument interjected a statement to the effect that he felt that he had not competently represented the defendant in the trial. He bases this claim on the fact that the Court did not permit him to introduce certain evidence on cross-examination of the complaining witness, Lawyer, to the effect that the witness had a reputation for violence and abuse of power. The offer of proof in connection therewith is as follows: The Court sustained the objection of the prosecution, and the exclusion of such testimony was proper. See 1 Jones on Evidence, Section 172, page 303, where we read: An adverse ruling on a question of law cannot be used by counsel as a claim of incompetence and denial of a client's rights, and as justification for a new trial. If this theory were sustained, the Court would find itself in a position which would make the granting of a new trial almost automatic. This contention of defendant's counsel must be disregarded. People v. Kaczor, 14 Mich.App. 724, 165 N.W.2d 899 (1968). The other issues raised by the defendant are not properly before this Court for the reasons heretofore stated. The Court nevertheless is placed in a difficult *56 position because counsel insists that the conviction must be the result of his failure or omission to have done everything possible for the defendant. We have carefully reviewed the evidence, which leaves us with no conclusion other than that the jury was justified in returning the verdict of guilty. State v. Wilson, 142 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1966); State v. McClelland, supra, 72 N.D. 665, 10 N.W.2d 798 (1943). Also in connection with the position taken by counsel, the procedures followed by the officer in making the arrest have been examined. An arrest is authorized by statute when a public offense is committed or attempted in the presence of a peace officer. Sec. 29-06-15, N.D.C.C. The evidence justifies a determination that this situation existed at the time the arrest was made. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. STRUTZ, C. J., and KNUDSON, TEIGEN and ERICKSTAD, JJ., concur. PAULSON, J., deeming himself disqualified did not participate; CLIFFORD JANSONIUS, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District, sitting in his stead.