Title: State v. Rohrbaugh

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Rohrbaugh, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3286.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3286 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. ROHRBAUGH, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Rohrbaugh, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3286.] 
Criminal procedure — Crim.R. 7 — Amendments to indictments. 
(Nos. 2008-2127 and 2008-2249 — Submitted November 3, 2009 — Decided  
July 20, 2010.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Logan County, 
No. 8-07-28, 2008-Ohio-4781. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A defendant may plead guilty to an indictment that was amended to change the 
name or identity of the charged crime when the defendant is represented 
by counsel, has bargained for the amendment, and is not prejudiced by the 
change. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether plain error exists when a 
defendant pleads guilty to a charge in an indictment that has been amended as a 
result of a plea bargain to charge a crime not originally charged in the indictment.  
We hold that a defendant may plead guilty to an indictment that was amended to 
change the name or identity of the charged crime when the defendant is 
represented by counsel, has bargained for the amendment, and is not prejudiced 
by the change. 
Factual and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Appellee, John Rohrbaugh, was indicted on eight counts by a 
grand jury.  Count one of the indictment charged Rohrbaugh with breaking and 
entering under R.C. 2911.13(A).  After plea negotiations, the state sought to 
amend the indictment, changing the charge of breaking and entering to a charge of 
receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51.  The trial court allowed the 
amendment.  Rohrbaugh, who was represented by an attorney, pleaded guilty to 
count one and to count eight (possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 
2925.11(A)).  In return, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining six counts from 
the indictment.  The court imposed a sentence of 11 months on both counts to be 
served concurrently and ordered Rohrbaugh to pay restitution. 
{¶ 3} Rohrbaugh appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in ordering 
restitution.  The court of appeals did not reach the alleged error.  Instead, the court 
held that the trial court committed plain error when it amended the indictment.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals ordered that the defendant’s guilty plea be 
vacated. 
{¶ 4} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal.  We also determined 
that a conflict exists between the judgment rendered by the court of appeals and 
the judgment rendered in State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. No. 90411, 2008-Ohio-
January Term, 2010 
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3972.  We ordered briefing on the following certified question: “May a defendant 
consent to a negotiated plea to an offense that was neither indicted, nor a lesser 
included offense of the indicted offense, without a waiver of indictment pursuant 
to Criminal Rule 7(A) and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution?” 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} The Ohio Constitution provides that “no person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury.”  Section 10, Article I.  Crim.R. 7(A) mirrors the 
constitutional provision by requiring that all felonies, absent proper waiver, be 
prosecuted by indictment.  Indictments may be amended “before, during, or after 
a trial * * *, provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime 
charged.”  Crim.R. 7(D). 
{¶ 6} Rohrbaugh did not object to the indictment before trial, so he has 
waived all but plain error.  See Crim.R. 12(C)(2).  To reverse a decision based on 
plain error, a reviewing court must determine that a plain (or obvious) error 
occurred that affected the outcome of the trial.  State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio 
St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240.  See Crim.R. 52(B).  Additionally, we have 
admonished courts that plain-error review must be undertaken “ ‘with the utmost 
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest 
miscarriage of justice.’ ”  Id., quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 
O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 7} We conclude that although there was error in this case, it was not 
reversible plain error, because there was no miscarriage of justice.  Furthermore, 
Rohrbaugh cannot take advantage of an error that he invited through the plea 
negotiations. 
{¶ 8} The trial court erred because the amendment to the indictment 
changed the name or identity of the crime charged in count one.  See Crim.R. 
7(D).  The error was plain because Crim.R. 7(D) clearly bans such amendments.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The error also “affected the outcome of the trial” because if not for the 
amendment, Rohrbaugh could not have pleaded guilty to the crime of receiving 
stolen property.  See Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶ 9} In State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-4537, 903 
N.E.2d 609, ¶12, we found plain error when a trial court amended an indictment 
to allow a defendant to be prosecuted for a higher degree of a crime.  In that case, 
there was a miscarriage of justice because the prosecution was attempting to 
“increase the penalty or degree of the offense” charged.  Id.  Unlike the defendant 
in Davis, Rohrbaugh was not prejudiced by the amendment to the indictment; to 
the contrary, he gained a benefit when the prosecution dismissed six charges 
against him.  In Davis, the crime was amended from a felony of the fourth degree 
to a felony of the second degree.  Id. at ¶ 2–3.  In this case, the amended charge of 
receiving stolen property and the original charge of breaking and entering are both 
felonies of the fifth degree.  Moreover, Rohrbaugh was represented by counsel 
and signed a statement that he had reviewed and understood the amended 
indictment.  We conclude that there was no miscarriage of justice in this case. 
{¶ 10} This case also differs from Davis in that Rohrbaugh invited the 
alleged error.  We have repeatedly held that a defendant may not “take advantage 
of an error that he himself invited or induced.”  State ex rel. Kline v. Carroll, 96 
Ohio St.3d 404, 2002-Ohio-4849, 775 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 27.  In Davis, there was no 
invited-error issue because the prosecution acted unilaterally during trial.  Id. at ¶ 
3–4.  In this case, Rohrbaugh negotiated for the amended indictment and agreed 
to plead guilty to the amended charge.  He cannot now argue that the amendment 
is plain error. 
{¶ 11} Rohrbaugh argues that he was not indicted and did not properly 
waive the right to indictment under the rule, even though Crim.R. 7(A) requires 
that a crime be prosecuted by indictment unless the indictment is properly waived.  
We conclude that Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by an indictment and that he was 
January Term, 2010 
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sufficiently informed of the charges in the indictment.  See State v. Childs (2000), 
88 Ohio St.3d 558, 565–566, 728 N.E.2d 379 (an offense is adequately charged 
when an indictment contains all elements of the offense and informs defendant of 
the charge).  Because Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by indictment, Crim.R. 7(A) and 
its waiver requirements are not applicable to this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 12} Based on the foregoing analysis, we answer the certified question 
in the affirmative.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the court of appeals so that it may reach the error concerning 
restitution that Rohrbaugh alleged in his appeal. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Gerald L. Heaton, Logan County Prosecuting Attorney, and Eric C. 
Steward, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, for appellant. 
Marc S. Triplett, for appellee. 
______________________