Title: State v. Hobbs

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Hobbs, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3886.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-3886 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HOBBS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Hobbs, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3886.] 
Criminal 
law—Arrest—Crim.R. 
4(A)—Warrants—Probable 
cause—Neutral 
magistrate—Person acting in dual capacity as deputy sheriff for county 
and deputy clerk for municipal court in same county is not neutral and 
detached magistrate for purposes of determining probable cause for 
issuing an arrest warrant. 
(No. 2011-1504 and 2011-1593—Submitted May 9, 2012—Decided  
August 29, 2012.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED BY the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
No. 25379, 2011-Ohio-3192. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A person acting in a dual capacity as deputy sheriff for a county and deputy clerk 
for a municipal court located in that same county is not a neutral and 
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detached magistrate for purposes of determining whether probable cause 
exists for issuing an arrest warrant. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} For purposes of Crim.R. 4(A), may a person simultaneously hold 
the positions of deputy sheriff for a county and of deputy clerk for a municipal 
court located in that same county?  Because the appellate court reached the proper 
conclusion in this matter, we affirm. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In 2009, three detectives of the Summit County Sheriff’s 
Department visited appellant, Jillian D. Hobbs, at her home.  The purpose of the 
visit was to ask appellant about a recent burglary in the neighborhood in which 
she had been implicated.  Upon the detectives’ arrival, appellant invited them 
inside.  But after hearing about the purpose of the visit, appellant and her 
boyfriend went outside to speak privately.  When appellant returned, she 
confessed to the detectives that she had committed the burglary they were 
investigating.  The detectives arrested appellant. 
{¶ 3} One of the arresting detectives drew up a complaint charging 
appellant with burglary, an arrest warrant based on the complaint, and an affidavit 
swearing to the facts in the complaint.  The detective submitted the paperwork to 
the deputy clerk of the Barberton Municipal Court.  The municipal court is 
located within the jurisdiction of the Summit County Sheriff’s Department, and 
the deputy clerk is employed as a sergeant by the Summit County Sheriff’s 
Department.  After reviewing the arresting detective’s documentation, the deputy 
clerk had the arresting officer swear an oath on the affidavit.  The deputy clerk 
then determined that probable cause existed for appellant’s arrest and signed the 
warrant.  The complaint was filed with the Barberton Municipal Court the next 
morning.  Thereafter, a grand jury indicted appellant on a burglary charge. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 4} In the trial court, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
of her arrest and any statements or identifications stemming from the incident and 
to dismiss the charges against her.  She argued that the warrant for her arrest was 
invalid because it was based on a finding of probable cause made by a magistrate 
who was not neutral and detached due to his dual role as a law-enforcement 
officer and clerk of the court.  Although the trial court agreed that the warrant was 
not properly issued, it denied the motion to suppress, concluding that no evidence 
had come to light as a result of the warrant, and therefore there was nothing to 
suppress.  Appellant pled no contest and was sentenced accordingly. 
{¶ 5} Appellant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying 
her motion to suppress and to dismiss.  The appellate court affirmed.  State v. 
Hobbs, 9th Dist. No. 25379, 2011-Ohio-3192.  Thereafter, appellant obtained a 
certification of a conflict between the decision in this case and the decisions in 
State v. Garrett, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 87112 and 87123, 2006-Ohio-6020, and 
State v. Robinson, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 49501, 49518, and 49577 (Oct. 24, 1985).  
We recognized the conflict and also accepted appellant’s discretionary appeal on 
Proposition of Law No. I.  129 Ohio St.3d 1503, 2011-Ohio-5358, 955 N.E.2d 
386, and 130 Ohio St.3d 1470, 2011-Ohio-6027, 957 N.E.2d 328. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 6} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed 
question of law and fact.”  State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.  In its review of this matter, the appellate court 
acknowledged that it must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 
supported by competent, credible evidence and then independently determine, 
without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether the facts satisfy the 
applicable legal standard.  Id.  Upon application of the aforementioned standard, 
the appellate court reached the same factual and legal conclusions as the trial 
court; i.e., that the warrant was invalid but that there was no evidence to suppress. 
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{¶ 7} On review of the case before this court, we are not required to, and 
ordinarily do not, weigh evidence.  Peer v. Indus. Comm., 134 Ohio St. 61, 67, 15 
N.E.2d 772 (1938).  When, as here, similar factual findings are made by the court 
of common pleas and the court of appeals, those factual findings must be accepted 
by this court unless there is no evidence of probative value to support them.  
Gillen-Crow Pharmacies, Inc. v. Mandzak, 5 Ohio St.2d 201, 205, 215 N.E.2d 
377 (1966), citing MacNab v. Cleveland Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Park Commrs., 
108 Ohio St. 497, 500, 141 N.E. 332 (1923).  The parties’ arguments are not 
directed to the facts.  They focus instead on challenges to the courts’ legal 
conclusions, i.e., that appellant’s arrest warrant was invalid but that the 
exclusionary rule is not implicated here.  Accordingly, this court will not disturb 
the trial court’s findings of fact. Gillen-Crow Pharmacies, Inc., at 205. 
{¶ 8} The legal issues before this court are (1) whether a person acting in 
the dual capacities of deputy sheriff for a county and deputy clerk for a municipal 
court located in the same county can determine the existence of probable cause 
for purposes of issuing a valid warrant under Crim.R. 4(A)1 and (2) if a warrant so 
issued is not valid, whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy.2     
{¶ 9} The general rule with respect to the dual-capacity question is that 
because a “warrant traditionally has represented an independent assurance that a 
                                                 
1 The certified-conflict question is “May a law enforcement officer serving a dual-role as an 
officer and deputy clerk of a local municipal court, act as a neutral and detached magistrate for 
purposes of Crim.R. 4(A)?”  
 
2 The proposition of law presented in the discretionary appeal is: 
 
When a warrantless arrest occurred with no showing why a warrant 
could not first be obtained followed by a “bare bones” complaint for an arrest 
warrant for continued detention and the warrant issued when one officer acted in 
the dual role of officer and deputy clerk where that dual-role was part of a 
recurring, systemic practice denying prompt determinations of probable cause 
by a neutral and detached magistrate, the exclusionary rule must apply to all 
evidence obtained directly or indirectly due to such policy from the time the 
policy was implemented as well as apply to bar evidence directly or indirectly 
obtained after the particular warrant issued. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
search and arrest will not proceed without probable cause to believe that a crime 
has been committed and that the person or place named in the warrant is involved 
in the crime, * * * an issuing magistrate must meet two tests.”  Shadwick v. 
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972).  The magistrate 
must be (1) neutral and detached and (2) capable of determining whether probable 
cause exists for the requested arrest.  Id. 
{¶ 10} In articulating this standard, the Supreme Court of the United 
States observed that to ensure proper separation of law enforcement from the 
judicial process of determining probable cause, “inferences [of probable cause 
must] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by 
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”  
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).  A 
magistrate is not neutral and detached if that magistrate is also the law-
enforcement officer in charge of the investigation.  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 450, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (warrant invalid because 
determination of probable cause made by agent in charge of investigation who 
was also chief prosecutor at trial). 
{¶ 11} The need for separating the executive function of law enforcement 
from the judicial function of determining probable cause has previously been 
affirmed in Ohio.  Over 25 years ago, an appellate court determined that a deputy 
clerk for a municipality was not a neutral and detached magistrate because she 
was also a dispatcher employed by the police department.  State v. Torres, 6th 
Dist. No. WD-85-64, *2 (Aug. 22, 1986). 
{¶ 12} The Ohio Attorney General has expressed similar concerns 
regarding the separation required between the executive function of law 
enforcement and the judicial function of determining probable cause.  For 
instance, the attorney general has declared that a clerk of a county or municipal 
court may not appoint deputy sheriffs of that same county as deputy clerks of the 
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court.  1984 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 84-028; 1961 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2066.  
Because the clerk of a county or municipal court may call upon deputy sheriffs to 
serve warrants, summonses, and the like, the law enforcement duties of deputy 
sheriffs risk being subordinate to and dependent upon clerks of county and 
municipal courts rather than separate and independent from them.  Id.  The deputy 
sheriff in such a dual role could also be subject to divided loyalties and conflicting 
duties if, for instance, the deputy sheriff, who is also the deputy clerk, is called 
upon to investigate irregularities in the handling of funds collected by the clerk or 
deputy clerks.  See 1984 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 84-028, at *2. 
{¶ 13} Similarly, a police officer serving a municipality may not be 
appointed to the position of deputy clerk for a municipal court located in that 
same municipality.  1988 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-093.  Nor may a dispatcher 
for the county sheriff be appointed to the position of deputy clerk of a municipal 
court located in that same county.  1995 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 95-020.  See 
also 1996 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 96-050 (a jail registrar who is employed by the 
county sheriff may not simultaneously hold the position of deputy clerk of a 
municipal court located within the county served by the county sheriff).  As 
observed by the attorney general: 
 
It is thus conceivable that a situation could arise in which a 
deputy municipal court clerk may be required to determine 
whether the county sheriff or a deputy sheriff had probable cause 
to make a warrantless arrest. See generally 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. 
No. 91-047 at 2-247 ("[t]he plain language of R.C. 2935.08 and R. 
Crim. P. 4 discloses that the General Assembly and the Ohio 
Supreme Court intended that individuals arrested without a warrant 
receive a post-arrest determination to ascertain whether the 
arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest").  If the 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
county sheriff or a deputy sheriff bring[s] a person arrested without 
a warrant before a deputy municipal court clerk who is employed 
by the county sheriff as a dispatcher, the deputy clerk's ability to 
exercise clear and independent judgment in the matter could be 
called into question because it could be difficult for the deputy 
clerk to set aside his loyalty to his employer, the county sheriff.  
Moreover, the deputy clerk may be predisposed to find probable 
cause for fear of reprisals, in his position of dispatcher, by the 
county sheriff.  Accordingly, when an individual simultaneously 
holds the positions of deputy municipal court clerk and dispatcher 
in the county sheriff's office, an impermissible conflict of 
interest exists because the individual is subject to influences that 
jeopardize the independence of the judicial function. 
 
1995 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 95-020, *2. 
{¶ 14} Appellant argues that the deputy clerk of a municipal court cannot 
be a neutral and detached magistrate when that deputy clerk is also a deputy 
sheriff in that same county.  In making this argument, appellant relies on the 
principle that various provisions of the federal and state constitutions, statutes, 
and criminal rules require warrants to issue upon probable cause upon oath before 
a neutral and detached magistrate.  In particular, appellant contends that the 
documentation that the arresting detective submitted to the deputy clerk, and the 
procedures the deputy clerk applied to that documentation, were, in reality, the 
arresting detective’s request for an arrest warrant pursuant to Crim.R. 4(A)(1).  
This rule provides:  
 
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or 
affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to 
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believe that an offense has been committed, and that the defendant 
has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, or a 
summons in lieu of a warrant, shall be issued by a judge, 
magistrate, clerk of court, or officer of the court designated by the 
judge, to any law enforcement officer authorized by law to execute 
or serve it. 
 
{¶ 15} The state, however, disputes the source of the legal authority 
supporting the warrantless arrest of appellant.  The state contends that the 
arresting detective never requested an arrest warrant from the deputy clerk.  
Instead, the arresting detective made the determination that he had probable cause 
to make a warrantless arrest for burglary and acted pursuant to that authority.  The 
state asserts that the detective had a reasonable belief that appellant had violated a 
state law, the law against burglary, which required him to arrest appellant and 
detain her until a warrant could be obtained.  R.C. 2935.03(A)(1).  After making 
the warrantless arrest of appellant, the detective took appellant before the 
appropriate court and the detective presented to the deputy clerk an affidavit for 
filing that described the offense.  R.C. 2935.05.  This is also the warrantless-arrest 
procedure set forth in Crim.R. 4(E)(2), which provides: 
 
Arrest without warrant. Where a person is arrested without 
a warrant the arresting officer shall, except as provided in division 
(F), bring the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a 
court having jurisdiction of the offense, and shall file or cause to 
be filed a complaint describing the offense for which the person 
was arrested. Thereafter the court shall proceed in accordance with 
Crim.R. 5 [initial appearance, preliminary hearing]. 
 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 16} Thereafter, a “judge, clerk, or magistrate shall forthwith issue a 
warrant to the peace officer making the arrest,” and “[a]ll further detention and 
further proceedings shall be pursuant to such affidavit or complaint and warrant.”  
R.C. 2935.08.  See also Crim.R. 4(A)(1).  Thus, the state asserts that the 
paperwork given to the deputy clerk did not require the deputy clerk to make a 
probable-cause determination and that the deputy clerk performed only the 
ministerial function of ensuring that the documents were formally filed.  Thus, the 
state suggests that the certified question is not properly before this court because 
it is based on the false premise that the deputy clerk ever made a probable-cause 
determination or acted as a neutral and detached magistrate. 
{¶ 17} In the end, however, the parties’ differences of opinion on the legal 
rationale for the warrantless arrest of appellant are academic.  Crim.R. 4(A)(1) is 
implicated under both rationales.  Appellant’s argument is a direct challenge 
under Crim.R. 4(A)(1), asserting that because the arresting officer requested a 
warrant for appellant’s arrest, the deputy clerk was required to make a probable-
cause determination, which he cannot do because the deputy clerk is also a deputy 
sheriff and unable to be a neutral and detached magistrate.  The state’s argument, 
which is less direct, is that after the institution of the warrantless arrest procedure 
by the arresting officer and the filing of the affidavit or complaint that was 
accepted by the deputy clerk, the clerk of courts issues an arrest warrant pursuant 
to Crim.R. 4(A)(1). 
{¶ 18} Moreover, based on the facts as found by the trial and appellate 
courts, the deputy clerk of the Barberton Municipal Court was also a sergeant in 
the Summit County Sheriff’s Department.  The Barberton Municipal Court is 
located in the same county as the Summit County Sheriff’s Department.  The 
arresting officer and the deputy clerk/sergeant are co-workers and members of the 
same department.  The trial court and the appellate court observed that there were 
no facts to suggest that the deputy clerk acted improperly or that he lacked 
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impartiality.  The facts also did not suggest any lack of probable cause for the 
warrantless arrest.  In fact, appellant does not dispute that the deputy clerk was 
not neutral or detached or that there was no probable cause for her warrantless 
arrest.  The deputy clerk was not directly or indirectly involved in the 
investigation of appellant’s case. 
{¶ 19} Notwithstanding these circumstances, however, the deputy clerk’s 
dual position as a sergeant in the sheriff’s department located in the same county 
served by the Barberton Municipal Court creates an inappropriate tension between 
the executive function of law enforcement and the judicial function of 
determining probable cause.  The deputy clerk’s dual-capacity position blurs the 
separation and threatens the independence of the executive and judicial functions.  
Further, the dual-capacity position places the deputy clerk at risk of divided 
loyalties and conflicting duties, as cogently described in the opinions of the Ohio 
Attorney General.  The result is that the deputy clerk lacks the requisite neutrality 
and detachment to make the probable-cause determination necessary for issuing a 
valid warrant pursuant to Crim.R. 4(A)(1). 
{¶ 20} Accordingly, we hold that a person acting in a dual capacity as 
deputy sheriff for a county and deputy clerk for a municipal court located in that 
same county is not a neutral and detached magistrate for purposes of determining 
whether probable cause exists for issuing an arrest warrant.  We answer the 
certified question in the negative, and we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals that the arrest warrant was invalid because the deputy clerk impermissibly 
acted in a dual capacity. 
{¶ 21} The remaining issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be 
invoked in this matter.  The exclusionary rule operates to exclude, or suppress, 
evidence that is derived from police conduct that violated constitutional 
protections.  See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 
1081.  The rule is a judicially created sanction intended to safeguard 
January Term, 2012 
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constitutional rights by deterring Fourth Amendment violations.  State ex rel. 
Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 82, 88, 661 N.E.2d 728 (1996). 
{¶ 22} As the trial court observed, the appropriate remedy for a defective 
warrant issued subsequent to a warrantless arrest is the suppression of wrongly 
obtained evidence and not dismissal of the charges.  United States v. Woodbury, 
551 F.3d 93, 99 (1st Cir.2007).  “An illegal arrest, without more, has never been 
viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction.”  
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 
(1980).  Moreover, as the trial court concluded, there was no evidence obtained as 
a result of the improperly issued arrest warrant.  According to the arresting 
officer, the arrest was predicated primarily upon the pre-arrest confession, and no 
other evidence was obtained subsequent to the arrest. 
{¶ 23} The appellate court reached similar conclusions.  The evidence that 
underlies the charges in the indictment and supports the state’s case-in-chief came 
from sources independent of the improperly issued arrest warrant, i.e., appellant’s 
pre-arrest confession that she committed the burglary.  Thus, the invalid warrant 
led to no evidence subject to suppression. 
{¶ 24} Accordingly, the issue of whether the exclusionary rule is an 
appropriate remedy for an invalidly issued arrest warrant is not properly before 
us.  We dismiss the discretionary appeal as having been improvidently accepted. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven 
DiMartino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Law Office of Mark H. Ludwig, L.L.C., and Mark H. Ludwig, for 
appellant. 
______________________