Title: Behrmann v. Public Employees Relations Board

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

225 Kan. 435 (1979)
591 P.2d 173
MICKEY BEHRMANN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 50,090

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 24, 1979.
Janet Chubb, assistant attorney general, argued the cause and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, and Douglas B. Muxlow, assistant attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellant.
Russell Cranmer, of Michaud, Cranmer, Syrios and Post, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This is an interlocutory appeal by the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB or Board) from an order of the district court holding K.S.A. 75-4334(b) unconstitutional as violating article 3, section 1 of the Kansas constitution. Appellee, Mickey Behrmann, was employed by the sewer maintenance department of the City of Wichita. After being dismissed by the City she filed a complaint with appellant alleging the City had engaged in a prohibited practice under K.S.A. 75-4333(b)(4). A hearing was held before the Board and an order was issued by the Board finding the City had engaged in a prohibited practice under the statute. The Board ordered appellee reinstated in her job but without back pay. Behrmann filed a petition for review in the district court alleging the order of the Board was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and asked for a modification of the order to include back wages and other benefits. During the course of the appeal, Behrmann sought a trial de novo which was granted by the district court.
The PERB brought this interlocutory appeal pursuant to an order granted by the district court which also stayed further proceedings pending a determination of this appeal. While the parties list three points on appeal, the basic issue is whether a de novo review of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative bodies is required by article 3, section 1 of the Kansas constitution and, if so, is 75-4334(b), which provides a more limited scope of review, unconstitutional?
*437 Prior to 1972, the Kansas constitution provided as follows:
Subsequent to 1972, after its amendment, the judicial article has read as follows:
K.S.A. 75-4334 governs the procedure for an action before the Board under the Public Employer-Employee Relations Act (K.S.A. 75-4321, et seq.) when controversies concerning alleged prohibited practices are involved. Subsection (a) sets forth the time span for filing a prohibited practices complaint, provides for notice, filing of an answer by the accused party and for a hearing before the Board.
K.S.A. 75-4334(b) provides:
Subsections (c) and (d) are not material to the issues herein.
While much space and argument is devoted by each party in the briefs to a discussion of whether the PERB was making a quasijudicial decision, both parties appear to conclude that it was. We agree. See Coggins v. Public Employee Relations Board, 2 Kan. App.2d 416, 581 P.2d 817, rev. denied 224 Kan. clxxxvii (1978). In Gawith v. Gage's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 206 *438 Kan. 169, 476 P.2d 966 (1970), Justice Schroeder (now Chief Justice) cites with approval what he calls the "classic statement setting out the abstract test" to be used in determining between an administrative entity performing a judicial or legislative function and quotes Justice Holmes from the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908), as follows:
K.S.A. 75-4334(b) limits the scope of review in an appeal from a decision of the PERB to the traditional three-pronged test. In Kansas Ass'n of Public Employees v. Public Service Employees Union, 218 Kan. 509, 544 P.2d 1389 (1976), this court in considering the scope of review referred to the portion of the statute emphasized above and stated:
This now brings us to the real question before the court. Appellee contended, and the district court so held, that the amendment of the judicial article of the Kansas constitution in 1972 to provide that "The judicial power of this state shall be vested exclusively in one court of justice ...." severed all judicial power from the executive and legislative branches of the government and precludes administrative agencies from making quasi-judicial decisions unless the same are to be reviewed de novo in the district court. The trial court held that K.S.A. 75-4334(b) grants quasi-judicial or judicial powers to the PERB in violation of article 3, section 1. The court in its memorandum opinion stated:
....
Appellant contends that the use of the word "exclusively" in the amended section expresses the intent to achieve court unification and not an attempt to preclude administrative agencies of the executive and legislative branches of government from exercising quasi-judicial functions under proper circumstances. In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the primary duty of the courts is to look to the intention of the makers and adopters of that provision. State, ex rel., v. Highwood Service, Inc., 205 Kan. 821, 473 P.2d 97 (1970); Wall v. Harrison, 201 Kan. 600, 443 P.2d 266 (1968). In interpreting and construing a constitutional amendment the court must examine the language used and consider it in connection with the general surrounding facts and circumstances that caused the amendment to be submitted. State, ex rel., v. Anderson, 180 Kan. 120, 299 P.2d 1078 (1956).
As early as 1928, the Judicial Council of Kansas made recommendations to the governor that article 3 of the constitution, pertaining to the judiciary, should be amended, a primary consideration being as follows:
By 1935, the judicial council drafted a proposal for the legislature, the continuing expressed intent being to "provide a system of courts as distinct from separate judicial units." 9th Annual Report  Part 2, Kansas Judicial Council Bulletin, April, 1935, at p. 28.
In 1941, the judicial council reported that twelve constitutional amendments had been introduced that year. Since only three could be submitted to the voters, the legislature approved none of them. 15th Annual Report  Part 1, Kansas Judicial Council Bulletin, April, 1941, at p. 21.
In 1968, the legislature established a citizen's committee to study and propose amendments to the constitution. L. 1968, ch. 265. The committee reported to the legislature as authorized in February of 1969 in a report numbering some 124 pages.
In its report the committee summarized the significant recommended changes in article 3 and the objectives they were designed to accomplish:
The committee's commentary on the proposed changes revealed the purposes behind amending article 3, section 1:
The committee does not discuss the specific effect of the word "exclusively" other than under the above quoted general comment.
Chief Justice Fatzer, in his 1972 message to the joint session of the legislature in his state of the judiciary address, stated:
See also Fatzer, The State of the Kansas Judiciary, 11 Washburn L.J. 343, 347 (1972).
The two branches of the legislature thereafter deliberated in committee and the minutes indicate the general purpose of the amendment was to unify and modernize the judicial system. Nowhere in the history of the amendment of the judicial article is there any indication that the intent was to completely prohibit the other two branches of government from exercising certain quasi-judicial functions.
*442 Thus it seems clear from the history of the judicial amendment that its primary purpose was one of court unification and that the use of the word "exclusively" in the article was to establish one court system and was never intended to prevent the legislature from conferring quasi-judicial powers on administrative agencies when necessary to enable them to carry out their functions.
While it is vital to the preservation of our form of government that this Court remain vigilant in guarding the separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches, such separation must be maintained on a practical basis or government as we know it would cease to function.
....
The doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of our state government has been recognized throughout our decisions as being one designed to avoid and prohibit a dangerous concentration of power in one branch of the government to the detriment of the others. In Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973), former Chief Justice Fatzer presents an excellent review of the history and application of the doctrine which need not be repeated here.
In State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976), we said:
Appellee argues for the strict application of the separation of powers doctrine based upon the rule that words used in the constitution are to be given their natural and popular meaning as usually understood by the people who adopt them. State, ex rel., v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 659, 308 P.2d 537 (1957); Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 1, 90 P.2d 747 (1939). Appellee contends that the use of the word "exclusively" precludes the other branches of government from exercising any judicial power and then makes an ingenious argument that administrative bodies may make quasi-judicial decisions so long as they are reviewable by trial de novo. The basis of the argument appears to be that administrative bodies making quasi-judicial decisions subject to review de novo are not asserting any judicial power and such power is thereby retained by the courts. It is difficult to see how a body may perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function if it has no judicial power in the first instance. It would seem that without any such power any decision of a quasi-judicial nature would be void ab initio and there would be nothing to review in district court, de novo or otherwise.
Article 3, section 1, as amended, does not prevent administrative agencies from performing quasi-judicial functions reasonably necessary to the proper performance of their administrative duties and when authorized by the legislature, and the scope of review of such functions may be determined by the legislature.
A comprehensive discussion of the law relevant to court review of administrative decisions is contained in the recent case of Brinson v. School District, 223 Kan. 465, 576 P.2d 602 (1978):
K.S.A. 75-4334 does not specifically provide for review by trial de novo but to the contrary, provides the customary three-pronged scope of review as stated in Kansas Ass'n of Public Employees, 218 Kan. 509.
We hold K.S.A. 75-4334(b) is not unconstitutional as being violative of amended article 3, section 1 of the Kansas constitution and such section does not require a trial de novo in the district court on appellee's petition to review the orders of the Public Employees Relations Board.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views herein set forth.