Title: CNH America v. Smith

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Mims, JJ., and Russell 
and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
CNH AMERICA LLC 
 
v.  Record No. 091991 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 13, 2011 
FRED N. SMITH 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SMYTH COUNTY 
Birg E. Sergent, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in admitting into evidence the opinion testimony of the 
plaintiff’s two expert witnesses.  For the reasons stated 
below, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
On October 12, 2002, Fred N. Smith (“Smith”), a then 72-
year-old farmer, was severely injured when a hose on his 
newly-purchased New Holland 616 disc mower (“the mower”) 
exploded and injected burning hydraulic fluid into his hand.  
Smith had purchased the mower from Lebanon Equipment Co., Inc. 
(“Lebanon”), an agricultural equipment dealer, approximately 
two months before the accident. 
On the day of the accident, one of Smith’s sons had 
difficulty operating the mower and called for Smith’s 
assistance.  As Smith approached the tractor, he “heard a 
bang, like a .22 had went off.”  Smith could not remember what 
happened, but he found himself lying on the ground with his 
hand burning.  Smith was taken to the hospital, where doctors 
determined that his injuries were caused by the injection of 
hydraulic fluid into his right hand.  The injuries required 
five surgical operations, including the partial amputation of 
the middle finger on his right hand.  Smith’s medical bills 
totaled approximately $79,000. 
Smith filed a civil action against New Holland North 
America, Inc. (“New Holland”) and Lebanon containing five 
counts: (I) negligence against New Holland; (II) strict 
liability against New Holland; (III) failure to warn against 
New Holland; (IV) negligence against Lebanon; and (V) breach 
of express and/or implied warranty against both New Holland 
and Lebanon.  CNH America, LLC (“CNH”) responded in place of 
New Holland to Smith’s motion for judgment with a demurrer and 
grounds of defense, claiming that CNH had been “improperly 
named as New Holland.”∗  Subsequently, Lebanon was dismissed 
from the action and Counts II and III were struck, leaving 
only Counts I and V for negligence and breach of warranty 
against CNH. 
                     
∗ The final judgment order in this case is styled as “Fred 
N. Smith, Plaintiff v. New Holland North America, Inc., (now 
known as CNH America LLC) Defendant.”  The defendant initiated 
its appeal with a filing in the trial court captioned: “CNH 
America LLC’s Notice of Appeal.”  CNH filed its petition for 
appeal as “CNH America LLC, Petitioner v. Fred N. Smith, 
Respondent.” 
 
2
Before trial, CNH moved to exclude Smith’s two liability 
experts.  CNH sought to exclude Smith’s hose expert, Steven D. 
Haubert (“Haubert”), asserting that his opinions were 
inadmissible because they lacked adequate foundation or basis 
in fact.  CNH also sought to exclude Dennis L. Heninger 
(“Heninger”), Smith’s hydraulics systems expert, arguing that 
Heninger was not qualified to offer opinion testimony and his 
opinions lacked adequate foundation or basis in fact.  The 
trial court denied CNH’s motions and permitted Haubert and 
Heninger to testify. 
At trial, Smith asserted that the mower’s hose had a 
manufacturing defect in its internal wire braiding, which 
caused the hose to curl under pressure.  Smith argued that 
this curled, pressurized hose became pinched in a gap caused 
by a design defect in the mower.  In combination, Smith 
asserted that the manufacturing defect in the hose and the 
design defect in the mower caused the hose to rupture.  Smith 
conceded that he needed the expert testimony of both Haubert 
and Heninger to prove his case, stating: 
Heninger gives us the gap and the pinching.  
Haubert gives us the initial weakness in the 
hose which causes the torquing.  Taken 
together, it explains how this accident 
occurred. 
Smith also specifically admitted that “if [the court] were to 
exclude Heninger in particular . . . we don’t have a case.” 
 
3
Haubert, an engineering manager for a window company, 
testified that the hose had a manufacturing defect called 
“tight carrier” that caused the hose to curl under pressure.  
Haubert had previous experience working for hose 
manufacturers, but he had never before been qualified as a 
hose expert.  Haubert explained that there were three methods 
he could have used to determine the cause of the defect: he 
could pressurize the hose in order to see how it responds; he 
could peel back the outer layer of the hose to examine the 
internal wire braiding; and he could x-ray the hose to see the 
internal braiding.  However, Haubert admitted that he did not 
perform any of these tests that may reveal the presence or 
absence of a “tight carrier” defect. 
Additionally, Haubert testified that he used a borescope, 
a tubular viewing device used to inspect the inside of 
cylindrical objects, Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 256 (1993), to inspect the inside of the hose, but 
he saw no evidence of a “tight carrier” defect.  Even though 
he admitted that he saw no evidence of a defect in the hose, 
Haubert testified that it was still his opinion that the hose 
was defective because it “failed young.” 
Smith offered Heninger to testify about the hydraulic 
system of the mower.  During voir dire examination on 
qualifications, Heninger admitted that his experience with 
 
4
hydraulic systems was limited to the mining industry and that 
he was not an expert in the hydraulic system of this 
particular type of hay mower or agricultural equipment 
generally.  Based on his lack of expertise for hydraulic 
systems in hay mowers, CNH moved to exclude his testimony as 
an expert witness.  The trial court denied CNH’s motion but 
restricted Heninger’s testimony to general “hydraulic hose 
matters.”  The trial court stated that Heninger was to be 
limited to testifying about hydraulic systems generally and 
could not give his opinion regarding this particular mower, 
but rather only “generally, with respect to a machine of any 
sort that has a hydraulic system.”  The trial court further 
stated that Heninger could “testify in general now, not 
specifically.” 
Nonetheless, Heninger testified about the specific cause 
of this hose’s rupture, opining that the hose became trapped 
in a “pinch point” in a gap caused by a design defect in the 
mower.  Heninger stated, 
My purpose for – in being here . . . is to be a 
witness and to offer my opinion on what caused 
the hose to fail. 
 
And in my opinion, the lack of those restraints 
and that design caused that hose to be pinched. 
(Emphasis added.)  Heninger offered alternative designs for 
this particular mower and concluded that the design defect 
 
5
could be remedied by adding a bracket over the gap that would 
prevent the hose from becoming pinched.  He opined that the 
“gap and [the] lack of restraint on that hose is a safety 
hazard.” 
On cross-examination, Heninger admitted that he would 
never make such recommendations without determining whether 
the design changes would affect the function or safety of the 
machine, and he could not state whether these changes would be 
feasible, effective, or create other safety issues.  He 
conceded that the design change “wouldn’t be [his] 
recommendation, because [he had not] done the analysis that 
would be necessary to make that recommendation.”  Finally, 
Heninger admitted that he was “not a hose expert” and never 
examined or tested the hose, stating, “I don’t know anything 
about the hose . . . I’ve done no examination of the hose.” 
 
CNH moved to strike the testimony of Haubert and 
Heninger, arguing that “the opinions they offered are 
inadmissible and insufficient as a matter of law to allow the 
jury to make a finding that [the mower] was unreasonably 
dangerous.”  The trial court denied the motions and admitted 
their testimony, stating that “they’re just barely experts, 
maybe but . . . that’s all they have to be.” 
After presentation of the evidence and instructions to 
the jury, it returned a verdict for Smith in the amount of 
 
6
$1,750,000.  The trial court denied CNH’s post trial motions 
for a new trial, to set aside the verdict as excessive, and to 
set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence. 
CNH timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court.  We 
awarded an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. 
The Trial Court committed reversible error in 
allowing unqualified and speculative expert opinion 
testimony from Steven Haubert that the subject hose 
was defectively manufactured, despite his admission 
that (a) he failed to conduct the tests that he 
testified were necessary to reveal the presence or 
absence of the alleged defect, and (b) his own 
unscientific examination of the hose revealed no 
defect. 
 
2. 
The Trial Court committed reversible error in 
permitting Dennis Heninger’s opinion testimony that 
CNH’s mower was defectively designed because 
Heninger was unqualified to render design opinions 
on the mower and because he did not conduct the 
analysis required to render his design opinions. 
 
3. 
The Trial Court committed reversible error in 
denying CNH’s motion to set aside or remit the jury 
verdict because the jury’s verdict was excessive, 
against the weight of the evidence and based upon 
passion, prejudice and/or mistake of law or fact. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
“The admission of expert testimony is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will reverse a 
trial court’s decision only where that court has abused its 
discretion.”  Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 
250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995) (quoting Brown v. 
 
7
Corbin, 244 Va. 528, 531, 423 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1992)).  
Therefore, we apply an abuse of discretion standard when 
reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit expert opinion 
testimony.  Keesee v. Donigan, 259 Va. 157, 161, 524 S.E.2d 
645, 647 (2000). 
We have held that “[e]xpert testimony is allowed where it 
‘will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue.’ ”  Norfolk Southern Railway Co. 
v. Rogers, 270 Va. 468, 479, 621 S.E.2d 59, 64 (2005) (quoting 
Code § 8.01-401.3.).  “An expert’s testimony is admissible not 
only when scientific knowledge is required, but when 
experience and observation in a special calling give the 
expert knowledge of a subject beyond that of persons of common 
knowledge and ordinary experience.”  Neblett v. Hunter, 207 
Va. 335, 339, 150 S.E.2d 115, 118 (1966).  Additionally, under 
Code § 8.01-401.1, an expert’s opinion may be based upon 
“facts, circumstances or data made known to or perceived by 
such witness.” 
However, we also have recognized that the admission of 
expert testimony is limited and “subject to certain 
fundamental requirements, including the requirement that the 
evidence be based on an adequate foundation.”  Keesee, 259 Va. 
at 161, 524 S.E.2d at 647.  Therefore, expert testimony is 
inadmissible if it rests on assumptions that have an 
 
8
insufficient factual basis or it fails to take into account 
all of the relevant variables.  Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 
Va. 151, 154, 475 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1996); Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, 
250 Va. at 166, 458 S.E.2d at 465-66.  We have explained: 
Expert testimony founded upon assumptions that 
have no basis in fact is not merely subject to 
refutation by cross-examination or by counter-
experts; it is inadmissible. Failure of the 
trial court to strike such testimony upon a 
motion timely made is error subject to reversal 
on appeal. Furthermore, expert testimony is 
inadmissible if the expert fails to consider 
all the variables that bear upon the inferences 
to be deduced from the facts observed.  
Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 160, 606 S.E.2d 809, 811 
(2005) (citations omitted). 
B. The Expert Testimony of Haubert and Heninger 
Regarding Haubert, the only basis for his opinion 
testimony that the hose had a manufacturing defect was the 
failure of the hose itself.  That opinion is not based upon an 
adequate foundation.  It is insufficient for Haubert to base 
his opinion upon the premise that because the hose failed, it 
was the result of a manufacturing defect.  Additionally, 
Haubert admitted that he failed to perform tests that could 
have determined whether the hose suffered from the “tight 
carrier” defect he alleged.  When Haubert made his own 
examination of the hose with a borescope, he conceded that he 
saw no evidence of a “tight carrier” defect in the hose.  
 
9
Haubert’s opinion testimony concerning the hose’s alleged 
manufacturing defect was not supported by facts, and the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting his opinion into 
evidence. 
The trial court also abused its discretion in admitting 
the expert opinion of Heninger.  Heninger admitted that he was 
not an expert in the hydraulic systems of mowers and had no 
experience in the design or manufacture of mowers or any other 
agricultural equipment.  An expert’s qualifications must 
correlate to the opinions for which the expert is being 
offered.  King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71, 78, 471 S.E.2d 481, 485 
(1996).  The fact that a person is a qualified expert in one 
field does not make him an expert in another field, even if 
they are closely related.  Combs v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 256 Va. 
490, 496, 507 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1998); Tazewell Oil Co. v. 
United Virginia Bank, 243 Va. 94, 110, 413 S.E.2d 611, 620 
(1992).  Here, Heninger admitted that he lacked specific 
expertise in the hydraulics of disc mowers and was unfamiliar 
with the hydraulic system of this mower.   
In Keesee, we clarified the standard for “the 
admissibility of expert testimony offered to assist a trier of 
fact in understanding general scientific or technical 
principles.”  259 Va. at 161, 524 S.E.2d at 648 (emphasis 
added).  While a trial court may permit an expert witness to 
 
10
explain the general nature of the principle, testimony that 
goes further and attempts to relate those general principles 
to a particular person or event generally is inadmissible 
because “the probative value of that evidence rest[s] on 
assumptions . . . that [have] no factual basis in the record.”  
Id. at 162, 524 S.E.2d at 648.   
Furthermore, because of Heninger’s limited expertise, the 
trial court ruled that his testimony was to be restricted to 
hydraulic systems generally and held that he could not testify 
specifically about the particular mower at issue.  However, 
Heninger’s actual testimony went far beyond the court’s 
limitations.  He opined that the defect in this particular 
hose could have caused the hose to get caught in a “pinch 
point” in the mower, which caused the hose to burst.  Heninger 
also offered alternative designs for the mower, but he 
conceded that he did not know whether these alternatives would 
make the mower unsafe or would even be feasible or effective.  
His opinions about the design of the mower were based upon 
assumptions not supported by facts and outside his area of 
expertise.  Additionally, he admitted that he was not 
qualified to testify about the hose.  As such, Heninger’s 
opinion testimony lacked adequate foundation, and the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting his opinions into 
evidence. 
 
11
III.  Post-Trial Motions and Conclusion 
This case was submitted to the jury on two theories of 
liability: negligence and breach of implied warranty.  After 
the verdict, CNH filed two post-trial motions, each requesting 
a new trial.  CNH argued that the admission of opinion 
testimony of Haubert and Heninger constituted error and that 
the trial court should award CNH a new trial.  Additionally, 
CNH argues that the verdict was excessive, should be set 
aside, and that CNH should be granted “a new trial as to all 
issues.”  Finally, one of CNH’s alternate requests for relief 
on appeal states as follows: “CNH requests that this Court set 
aside the verdict and remand the case for a full trial on the 
merits.”   
For the reasons previously stated, the admission of the 
expert testimony of Haubert and Heninger constitutes 
reversible error.  Vasquez, 269 Va. at 160, 606 S.E.2d at 811.  
Therefore, consistent with CNH’s requests for relief, we will 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand “for a full 
trial on the merits.” 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
12