Title: State ex rel. Inskeep v. Staten

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Inskeep et al. v. Staten, Mayor, et al. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Inskeep v. Staten (1996),     Ohio St.3d      .] 
Mandamus to compel members of Mason City Council to comply with city 
charter by conducting open meetings -- Writ granted, when. 
 
(No. 95-1811 -- Submitted January 23, 1996 -- Decided March 1, 1996.) 
 
In Mandamus. 
 
Realtors, residents of the city of Mason, frequently attend meetings of the 
Mason City Council.  Despite the repeated objections of relators, council has 
routinely adjourned its meetings in  order to conduct executive sessions from 
which the public and media are excluded.   
 
Relators filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling 
respondents, members of the Mason City Council, to comply with the Mason City 
Charter by conducting open meetings.  We issued an alternative writ, and the 
parties have filed evidence and briefs. 
____________________ 
 
Richard J. Inskeep, Thomas E. Anderson and Charles W. Beatty, pro se. 
 
Kenneth J. Schneider, Mason Law Director; Wood & Lamping and Amy E. 
Gasser, for respondents. 
 
2
 
William M. Saks, urging issuance of the writ for amicus curiae, American 
Civil Liberties Union of Ohio. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, 
relators must establish a clear legal right to open council meetings, a clear legal 
duty on the part of respondents to provide open council meetings, and the lack of 
an adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Fenley v. Kyger (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
164, 165, 648 N.E.2d 493, 494. 
 
The pertinent sections of the Mason City Charter provide: 
 
“SECTION 3.08  COUNCIL MEETINGS 
 
“No less than one regular meeting of the Council shall be held each month.  
Four members of the Council shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of 
business at any meeting of the Council ***.  *** All meetings of the Council shall 
be open to the public and each journal and other records of the Council shall be 
open to the public at all reasonable times.  Regular meetings shall be held at such 
times and places as shall be determined by Council.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
“SECTION 3.09  SPECIAL COUNCIL MEETINGS 
 
3
 
“Special Meetings of the Council may be called as provided by ordinance.  
In the absence of any such provision, special meetings may be called by a vote of 
Council taken at any regular or special meeting thereof or may be called by the 
Mayor, or any three members of the Council.  The Clerk of Council *** shall 
cause notice in writing of each special meeting to be served personally or to be left 
at the usual place of residence of each member of the Council not less than twelve 
hours preceding the time for such special meeting.  ***” 
 
The term “meetings” in Section 3.08 refers to “any assemblage of the city 
council or its committees where a majority of members constituting the body are in 
attendance and the gathering is arranged for the purpose of discussing public 
business.”  (Emphasis sic.)  See State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. 
Barnes (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 165, 527 N.E.2d 807, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  We have construed charter provisions similar to Section 3.08 of the 
Mason City Charter’s requirement that all council meetings be open to the public 
to preclude private, executive sessions held pursuant to either a municipal 
ordinance or R.C. 121.22, Ohio’s sunshine law.  Fenley, supra; State ex rel. Craft 
v. Schisler (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 149, 532 N.E.2d 719; Fox v. Lakewood (1988), 
39 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 528 N.E.2d 1254, 1257. 
 
4
 
Respondents contend that the foregoing cases are distinguishable, since 
Section 3.09 of the Mason City Charter and Section 121.01(b) of the Mason Code 
of Ordinances permit “special meetings” to be conducted in private.  Respondents’ 
interpretation contravenes the plain language of the charter.  Section 3.08 
unambiguously provides that all council meetings shall be open to the public.  
Like the quorum requirement set forth in the same section, the open-meetings 
provision is not limited to “regular” council meetings. 
 
In addition, Section 3.09 only permits the enactment of ordinances to “call” 
special meetings.  Section 3.09 does not authorize the enactment of ordinances 
regarding whether council may hold executive sessions on certain matters.   
 
Further, the ordinance relied on by respondents purports to vest authority in 
respondents to hold executive sessions at regular or special meetings.  Contrary to 
respondents’ claims that they have conducted only executive sessions at special 
meetings, ninety-five of the one hundred and eight meetings in which council 
adjourned to hold executive sessions from 1989 through mid-1994 were regular 
meetings.  (Rels’ Aff. of Evidence, Ex. 14) 
 
In sum, we find no irreconcilable conflict on the issue of open council 
meetings between Sections 3.08 and 3.09 of the Mason City Charter.  See, e.g., 
 
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State ex rel. Dublin Securities, Inc. v. Ohio Div. of Securities (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 426, 429-430, 627 N.E.2d 993, 996.  The charter manifestly requires open 
meetings and prohibits executive sessions.  To the extent that Section 121.01(b) of 
the Mason Code of Ordinances conflicts with the foregoing charter provisions, it 
is ineffective.  Fenley, supra, 72 Ohio St.3d at 166, 648 N.E.2d at 494; Fox, supra, 
39 Ohio St.3d at 22, 528 N.E.2d at 1257.  Respondents’ remedy is to propose a 
charter amendment providing for executive sessions.  Fenley, supra, 72 Ohio St.3d 
at 166, 648 N.E.2d at 495.  Respondents attempted to do just that in 1989, but the 
electorate rejected the proposed amendment. 
 
Accordingly, relators are granted a writ of mandamus ordering respondents 
to open all council meetings to the public, as required by Section 3.08 of the 
Mason City Charter.  Relators’ request for attorney fees and litigation expenses 
pursuant to R.C. 733.59 and 733.61 is denied.  Cf., e.g., State ex rel. Thomas v. 
Ohio State Univ. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 251, 643 N.E.2d 126, 131 ( pro se 
litigants not entitled to attorney fees under R.C. 149.43); In re Election of 
November 6, 1990 for the  Atty. Gen. of Ohio (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 577 
N.E.2d 343, 346 (“costs” not synonymous with litigation expenses unless 
specified by statute). 
 
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Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK, JJ., concur.