Title: Flint Engineering & Const. Co. v. Richardson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Flint Engineering & Const. Co. v. Richardson1986 WY 188726 P.2d 511Case Number: 86-138Decided: 10/15/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
FLINT ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., Appellant 
(Employer/Contestant),

v.

Ed L. RICHARDSON, 
Appellee (Employee/Claimant).

Appeal from District Court,UintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Timothy G. 
Williams, and George J. Argeris, of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Charles D. 
Phillips, of Phillips and Phillips, Evanston, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT, 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The Worker's 
Compensation question in this case of a construction worker's status being 
either that of a noncovered independent contractor or that of a covered employee 
affords cause for the court to revisit Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 
467, 84 P.2d 736, 120 A.L.R. 1020 (1938), in determining whether substantial 
evidence supported the trial court in granting benefits to a rig welder after 
injury during oil-patch construction activities. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     That issue, although 
otherwise stated by the litigants, is whether an alleged independent contractor 
is a covered employee under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation laws, § 
27-12-101 et seq., W.S. 1977. An ancillary subject raised by appellant and 
discussed by appellee considers the "employment" agreement involved as being 
contendably invalid under Wyoming law by adversely determining rights to 
employee compensation benefits. We review the trial court's determination of 
coverage and grant of benefits:

"The Court now finds and 
concludes generally in favor of the Claimant and against the Contestant on all 
issues. The Court further finds and concludes that Contestant exercised control 
over Claimant of such type and to such degree that Claimant was actually an 
employee of Contestant and not an independent contractor; that the so-called 
Agreement With Independent Contractor was not properly executed by the parties, 
was not supported by valid consideration, was not binding on the parties, and 
lacked the specificity necessary to exclude Claimant from worker's compensation 
coverage; that in any event said Agreement, even if otherwise valid and 
sufficient to exclude Claimant from coverage, is void as a `contract' or 
`device' prohibited by 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977; and that Claimant's injury is 
covered by the worker's compensation laws of the State of 
Wyoming."

[¶3.]     Ed Richardson 
(claimant) was a rig welder, meaning that he had a truck unit welder and hired 
out within the oil patch industry on an hourly basis for himself and his truck 
which supplied all equipment required to perform general welding services. Flint 
Engineering & Construction Co. (general contractor) was engaged in the oil 
field construction business, including both roustabout and pipeline 
work.

[¶4.]     At the time of the 
injury, the general contractor had contracted to construct a natural gas 
pipeline in southwest Wyoming for Northwest Pipelines 
(owner).

[¶5.]     Included in the 
construction of the usual pipeline job was some prefabrication and assembly 
completed in the general contractor's yard prior to field installation. Claimant 
was engaged in this activity (after welding-skill testing by the owner) when 
injured. Richardson, who had worked for the general contractor before, had on 
those occasions been furnished an engagement contract which 
provided:

"AGREEMENT WITH 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

"It is the intent of the 
parties involved to establish an `independent relationship' rather than an 
employer-employee relationship. All Federal, State and Local laws, regulations, 
and guidelines should be adhered to accordingly. The Independent Contractor is 
responsible for maintaining adequate amounts of 
insurance."

[¶6.]     This document was 
unsigned in the appropriate space by claimant who only inserted the word 
"Welder," signed the bottom portion of the form entitled "Payer's Request for 
Identifying Number," and inserted his social security number. This form, as 
introduced in evidence, apparently related to a prior job, and no form is found 
for the Northwest job where he was injured.

[¶7.]     At the jobsite, 
claimant worked as an expert welder fabricating units for the pipeline field 
installation at an hourly rate, under the supervision of Flint's employees. 
Following employment in late August or early September of 1985, he was injured 
on September 21, 1985, when a buffing machine particle spun off the machine and 
pierced his right eye, causing permanent damage. Although he was supposed to 
have a helper furnished by the employer, only one was available on an erratic 
basis, and no one was available at the time of the injury. Claimant contended 
that since the helper would have been doing the buffing, the availability of 
such assistance would have avoided the accident.

[¶8.]     Wyoming's Worker's 
Compensation law came to exist by constitutional amendment which afforded the 
benefits and constrained certain common-law rights of the 
employee:

"No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death 
of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to 
recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void. 
As to all extra hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for 
the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid 
compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each 
person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as 
the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee. Such fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each employee to compensation from such fund 
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action 
against any employer contributing as required by law to such fund in favor of 
any person or persons by reason of any such injuries or death." Article 10, § 4, 
Wyoming 
Constitution.

[¶9.]     As a result of societal 
factors motivating the electorate to adopt the amendment and the legislature to 
provide comprehensive legislation, there has been invoked a basic tenet that the 
law must be construed with reasonable liberality to protect persons suffering 
casualties in industry and to avoid incongruous results. Fox Park Timber Co. v. 
Baker, supra.

[¶10.]  The three generally applied principles, 
recently restated by this court in Hampton v. All Field Service, Inc., Wyo., 726 P.2d 98 (1986), are (a) liberal construction in favor of the employee; (b) 
however the employee must prove all of the essential facts required for claim 
allowance; and (c) the decision of the trial court will be sustained if 
supported by substantial evidence. Tate v. Colling Production Service, Inc., 
Wyo., 726 P.2d 100 (1986).

Agreement to Exclude 
Coverage

[¶11.]  The general contractor justifies reversal 
premised on the "Independent Contractor" agreement. In examining the document, 
we need not premise our conclusion as to whether it applied to this job on the 
absence of its actual execution.

[¶12.]  Appellant misunderstands the legal 
significance of the document. In no way does it confirm or establish the 
work-place relationship between the parties. We would consider the document to 
have been equally effective as an enumeration of the actual working status if 
the description afforded was "for service in the French Foreign Legion." Without 
defining the relationship, the form gave the employment status a title without 
definitional character.

[¶13.]  That document obviously was intended to 
obviate Worker's Compensation coverage, unemployment compensation and federal 
withholding regulations, including social security. That attempt does not 
succeed unless it is established that the actual relationship between the 
parties, not the designation of the employee, meets the test of a bonafide 
independent-contractor status.

[¶14.]  Inevitably such effort to bypass 
Wyoming 
statutes and Constitution has limited success. See § 27-1-105, W.S. 1977, § 
27-12-103(b), W.S. 1977, and Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶15.]  Section 27-1-105, W.S. 1977 
reads:

"It shall be unlawful for 
any person, company or corporation to require of its servants or employes, as a 
condition of their employment or otherwise, any contract or agreement where by 
such person, company or corporation shall be released or discharged from 
liability or responsibility on account of personal injuries received by such 
servants or employes while in service of such person, company or corporation, by 
reason of the negligence of such person, company or corporation, or the agents 
or employes thereof, and such contracts shall be absolutely null and 
void."

[¶16.]  Section 27-12-103(b), W.S. 1977 
reads:

"(b) No contract, rule, 
regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability 
created by this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] except as otherwise 
provided by this act."

[¶17.]  Escape from the required Worker's 
Compensation coverage will be justified only if the essential factors of the 
relationship in work-place detail exempt employee status, no matter what 
characterization might be implanted in the agreement by the prospective employer 
as a condition or term of employment. Obviously, the clinical desire to "run 
with the foxes and hunt with the hounds" is the attribute of the construction 
company's method of labor employment. The public policy to the contrary has been 
stated by the citizens of this state through constitutional amendment and by the 
legislature through specific statutes.

[¶18.]  In this case we find that the document, 
whether signed or unsigned, has no effect on the status of the parties for a 
determination of Worker's Compensation coverage.

Coverage Status Under 
Worker's Compensation

[¶19.]  We are then asked to decide that the 
trial court misapplied Fox Park Timber, or that Fox Park Timber should be 
superseded and rescinded as a foundational premise of Wyoming law. We decline 
that invitation in both regards.

[¶20.]  We are appreciative of the cogent comment 
of the trial court:

"* * * In Common Law we 
didn't have Federal Withholding. We didn't have Federal Employment Security 
Withholding. We didn't have social security. These are all creatures of the 20th 
Century and the law of independent contractor was developed much sooner in legal 
history than the advent of unemployment compensation, Worker's Compensation, 
social security, or income taxation. And so when we start talking about these - 
or, you know, retirement programs or insurance programs, none of those things 
were known at Common Law. They weren't even known in the United States 
prior to, probably, 1940. * * *

"I think it's a tough 
question. I still think it's a policy question because I think the evidence in 
this case indicates that Mr. Richardson was under the control of Flint. He was in the same 
- He was under control to the same degree, no greater or no lesser, than any 
other Flint 
employee. But Flint attempted to treat Mr. Richardson 
differently with respect to these 20th Century requirements than they did other 
employees. * * * They treated him differently with respect to Federal Income Tax 
Withholding. They treated him differently with respect to Federal Social 
Security. They treated him differently with respect to unemployment. They 
treated him differently with respect to Worker's Compensation. They treated him 
differently with respect to health insurance. And they treated him differently 
with respect to retirement plans. But in all other aspects, he was subject to 
the same kind of control as any other employee. So the question becomes whether 
or not under Wyoming law it's permissible for Flint, on the one side, and Mr. 
Richardson, on the other, to agree that he shall be treated like all other 
employees for purposes of the work but he will be treated differently than the 
other employees - the other people providing services for - I don't want to use 
the word employee, but treated differently than the other people providing 
services for Flint when it came to these 20th Century 
items."

[¶21.]  In revisiting Fox Park Timber Co. v. 
Baker as the existent Wyoming law since 1938, we repeat what Justice Riner 
enumerated as "earmarks" to consider:

(1) right of control of 
worker;

(2) relationship 
terminable at will by either party;

(3) piece work or time 
compensation basis;

(4) scheduling option 
with worker;

(5) choice of place of 
work; and

(6) who furnishes 
equipment for the work requirements.

[¶22.]  In Fox Park Timber, Baker furnished his 
truck and hauled ties on a piece-work basis for the lumber company which 
retained work-place control, scheduling decisions, the right to terminate 
employment at will, and general operational control.

[¶23.]  In this case, the claimant furnished his 
truck and was not paid on a piece-work basis; the employer determined the 
method, place and hours of work, with right to terminate at will, and had the 
ability to demand greater hourly production and arrange scheduling and general 
operational control.

[¶24.]  We agree with the factual decision of the 
trial court, and consequently now affirm. The two cases are nearly identical 
with this case, being stronger only by virtue of the hourly rate factor as 
differentiated from the Fox Park Timber piece-work compensation arrangement. 
This court has consistently retained Justice Riner's reasoning and the ratio 
decidendi of the Fox Park Timber case. See Tauer v. Williams, 69 Wyo. 388, 242 P.2d 518 (1952); Tharp v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 57 Wyo. 486, 121 P.2d 172 (1942); Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 111 P.2d 132 (1941). 
See also Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, Wyo., 656 P.2d 1154 (1983); Walton v. 
Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 (1981); Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge 
International Order of Odd Fellows, Wyo., 526 P.2d 52 (1974); Bowser v. State 
Industrial Accident Commission, 182 Or. 42, 185 P.2d 891 (1947); Annot., 120 
A.L.R. 1031.

[¶25.]  The business relationship in Burnett v. 
Roberts, 57 Wyo. 511, 121 P.2d 896 (1942), involving the independently 
controlled manufacture of grain doors, involves a dissimilar business 
relationship, and is not authority for the employee status inquiry involved in 
this case. The established Wyoming rules of law consistently continued and the 
substantial evidence sufficient to support the decision of the trial court 
postulate affirmation.

[¶26.]  Affirmed.