Title: Romero v. Shih

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
TATANA SPICAKOVA ROMERO et al., 
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants, 
v. 
LI-CHUAN SHIH et al., 
Defendants, Cross-complainants and Respondents; 
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
Cross-defendant and Respondent. 
 
S275023 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Eight 
B310069 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
EC064933 
 
 
February 1, 2024 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
 
1 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
S275023 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
This dispute over a residential driveway in Sierra Madre 
raises a significant question about the law of easements.  Under 
California law, the parties to a sale of real property may grant 
or reserve easements as part of the transaction.  This may be 
done expressly, in a written instrument, or impliedly, based on 
clear evidence of the parties’ intent.  In this case, the trial court 
concluded that the parties to a 1986 division and sale of two 
adjacent residential properties intended to create an implied 
easement over an eight-foot-wide strip of land that belonged to 
one parcel, but that had been used as the driveway to the home 
on the neighboring parcel.  As a consequence, the current 
owners of the neighboring parcel may continue to use that strip 
of land as a driveway. 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  The court concluded that 
regardless of what the parties to the 1986 sale might have 
intended, the law prohibits a court from recognizing an implied 
easement that precludes the property owners from making all 
or most practical uses of the easement area.  Because 
recognizing the neighbors’ nonpossessory right to use the land 
as a driveway would effectively prevent the property owners 
from using the land for their own purposes, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the easement could have been created only in a 
written instrument and not by implication. 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
We took this case to decide whether the law imposes such 
a limitation on the recognition of implied easements.  We now 
conclude that it does not.  The evidentiary standard for 
recognizing an implied easement is a high one, and that 
standard will naturally be more difficult to meet where, as here, 
the nature of the easement effectively precludes the property 
owners from making most practical uses of the easement area.  
But if there is clear evidence that the parties to the 1986 sale 
intended for the neighboring parcel’s preexisting use of the area 
to continue after separation of title, the law obligates courts to 
give effect to that intent. 
We reverse and remand for the Court of Appeal to consider 
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding 
that an implied easement existed under the circumstances of 
this case.  
I. 
In the early 1940’s, Edwin and Ann Cutler (the Cutlers) 
purchased adjacent parcels of property on West Alegria Avenue 
in Sierra Madre.  Soon after, the Cutlers built a home on the 
parcel lying to the east, at 643 West Alegria Avenue (the 643 
Property).  In the years that followed, the Cutlers built a brick 
garden planter in the front left corner of the yard and next to it, 
a driveway running along the western edge of the property for 
its entire length.  The planter and driveway encroached by about 
eight feet onto the Cutler’s other parcel, which lay directly to the 
west at 651 West Alegria Avenue (the 651 Property).  A chain-
link fence marked the western edge of the driveway and planter, 
separating the 643 Property and the encroachments from the 
remainder of the 651 Property.  The encroaching area consisted 
of a strip of land measuring about 8 feet wide by about 157 feet 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
long, for a total area of almost 1,300 square feet, or about 13 
percent of the 651 Property’s 10,000-square-foot lot.   
Aside from the encroachments, the 651 Property remained 
undeveloped for several decades.  In 1985, the Cutlers allowed 
their son Bevon and a family friend, David Shewmake, to build 
a house on the 651 Property so that it could be sold for profit.  
According to their arrangement, once the house was built and 
sold, Bevon and Shewmake would use the proceeds from the sale 
to pay the Cutlers for the land and would retain the profits on 
the house for themselves.   
In furtherance of this project, Edwin Cutler applied to the 
city to adjust the boundary between the 643 Property and the 
651 Property to the line marked by the chain-link fence.  The 
Sierra Madre Planning Commission approved his request, 
subject to a city engineer’s review of the parcel map and 
boundary line adjustment.  But for reasons that are not clear 
from the record, the process was never completed and the legal 
boundary line remained as before.   
Although the lot line adjustment had not been completed, 
the Cutlers, Bevon, and Shewmake proceeded much as if it had 
been.  They obtained building permits from the city and 
completed construction on the house, and the chain-link fence 
separating the 651 Property from the 643 Property was replaced 
with a concrete block wall.   
In 1986, the Cutlers conveyed the 651 Property to Bevon 
and Shewmake, and on the same day, Bevon and Shewmake 
sold the property to another family.  Both grant deeds described 
the 651 Property according to the original boundary lines, 
without mentioning or accounting for the encroachments on the 
strip of land along the property’s eastern edge.  In the years that 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
followed, the Cutlers executed several grant deeds for the 643 
Property that included a legal description of the eight-foot-wide 
strip.  Because the lot line adjustment had not been completed, 
the Cutlers did not actually own that strip of land; those grant 
deeds were therefore “wild deeds,” outside the chain of title and 
ineffective to convey title to the area.  (See 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. 
Real Estate (4th ed. 2023) § 8:58, p. 8-175 [“If a deed purports to 
convey property that is not owned by the grantor, it is ineffective 
to convey the property, and it is a ‘wild deed’ that can have no 
effect on title of the person who holds real title to the property”] 
fn. omitted.) 
The properties remained in this configuration, with the 
643 Property making use of the encroaching area as a garden 
planter and driveway, during the next three decades.  The 651 
Property was sold once during this period, in 2005.  Plaintiffs 
Cesar and Tatana Spicakova Romero (the Romeros) then 
purchased the 651 Property in 2014.  That same year, 
defendants Li-Chuan Shih and Tun-Jen Ko (the Shih-Kos) 
purchased the 643 Property from Ann Cutler’s estate. 
At the time they purchased their respective properties, 
neither the Romeros nor the Shih-Kos were aware of any 
easements, encroachments, or boundary disputes.  None had 
been disclosed by the sellers in the respective purchase 
agreements or advertising materials, and neither party had 
taken steps to verify that the concrete block wall separating the 
properties conformed to the true boundary line.  The Romeros 
did not discover that anything was amiss until about a year after 
purchasing the 651 Property, when Cesar Romero was taking 
measurements in his front yard for a landscaping project and 
realized that the yard was not as wide as he expected.  The 
Romeros commissioned a survey, which confirmed that the 643 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
Property’s garden planter and driveway were encroaching on 
the 651 Property. 
The Romeros filed a lawsuit against the Shih-Kos, 
requesting that the Shih-Kos be ordered to remove all 
encroachments and pay damages.  The Shih-Kos filed a cross-
complaint alleging that when the Cutlers separated the 643 and 
651 Properties in 1986, they created an implied easement over 
the disputed area in favor of the 643 Property.  In the 
alternative, the Shih-Kos asked the court to create an equitable 
easement in favor of the 643 Property over the disputed area, 
which would entitle the Romeros to compensation for the burden 
imposed on their property. 
The matter proceeded to a bench trial focusing on the 
easement issue.  The parties presented evidence regarding the 
history of the two properties and the circumstances surrounding 
their separation in 1986, discussed above, as well as evidence of 
the effect that the alleged easement would have on each 
property.  As relevant here, the Shih-Kos’ appraisal expert, 
Daniel Poyourow, testified about the uses of the disputed area 
that would remain to the Romeros’ 651 Property if the trial court 
were to award an easement in favor of the 643 Property.  
Poyourow explained that the Romeros could continue to use the 
easement area for “setback purposes” — i.e., to calculate how far 
any structure must be set back from the true property line — 
and for “FAR uses” — apparently referring to the “floor area 
ratio,” or the permissible floor area of a building in relation to 
the size of the lot where the building is located.  He also testified 
that certain subsurface uses remained to the 651 Property — 
e.g., for the running of underground pipes or cables.  On cross-
examination, however, Poyourow acknowledged that his 
appraisal report had characterized the easement as “effectively 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
exclusive” and that the potential for the 651 Property to take 
advantage of any remaining uses was “remote.”  Overall, 
Poyourow estimated that the “residual value” of the uses of the 
property to the 651 property represented approximately 2 
percent of the value of the disputed area. 
After the bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for 
the Shih-Kos, concluding that they possessed an implied 
easement over the disputed strip of land.  The court found that 
it was “clear under the circumstances” that when the Cutlers 
separated and sold the two properties in 1986, “the parties to 
the transaction intended the 643 Property’s encroachment on 
the 651 Property would continue after the division.”  
Specifically, the court noted that “all the Cutlers, the 
Shewmakes, and every successive owner of either property 
(until now) [have] allowed for and/or behaved as if the 643 
Property has the right to encroach upon the disputed strip of 
land with the driveway, planter, and block wall — all of which 
have remained unchanged in their use and function since at 
least the initial property separation.”  The court also determined 
that the encroachment was reasonably necessary to the 
beneficial enjoyment of the 643 Property because without the 
easement, the 643 Property’s driveway would be too narrow for 
normal use.   
In finding an implied easement, the trial court rejected the 
Romeros’ argument that California law prohibits the recognition 
of an implied easement that would effectively exclude the 
property owner from any practical use of the disputed area.  The 
trial court reasoned that “the focus of the [implied easement] 
analysis is what the parties intended at the time of the division 
or conveyance; whether their intended use was exclusive or not 
is beside the point.”  The trial court ordered that the implied 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
easement would run with the land and, “consistent with the 
original grantor and grantee’s intent in 1986, shall terminate if 
the 643 Property ceases its continued use of the easement for a 
driveway, planter and wall/fence.”   
In the alternative, the trial court created an equitable 
easement over the disputed area in the event the implied 
easement was overturned on appeal.  The court relied on a series 
of appellate decisions permitting courts in certain situations to 
exercise their powers in equity to fashion an interest in the 
owner’s land that will protect an innocent encroacher’s use of 
the property, on the condition that the encroacher pay damages 
to the property owner.  (See generally Hirshfield v. Schwartz 
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 764–765 (Hirshfield).)  The court 
determined that even if the Shih-Kos were ultimately found to 
have no preexisting right of use, they could continue to use the 
disputed property but would be obligated to pay damages to the 
Romeros in the amount of $69,000. 
The Court of Appeal reversed on the implied easement 
issue.  (Romero v. Shih (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 326, 362 
(Romero).)  The critical question, the appellate court concluded, 
was whether the easement was “exclusive.”  (Id. at pp. 349, 350.)  
Here, according to the Court of Appeal, the implied easement 
was “exclusive” in the sense that the easement “essentially 
divests [the Romeros] of nearly all rights that owners 
customarily have in residential property, including access and 
practical usage.”  (Id. at p. 354.)   
The appellate court acknowledged that California law has 
recognized similarly “exclusive” easements in cases where the 
easement was created by express grant and the written 
instrument either explicitly provided or clearly implied a right 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
to exclusive use of the easement area (for instance, by indicating 
that the easement is “ ‘ “for parking and garage purposes” ’ ”).  
(Romero, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 350, citing Blackmore v. 
Powell (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1593, 1599–1600 (Blackmore).)  
But the court held that the same rule should not obtain for 
easements implied by law.   
The appellate court relied for its conclusion on a line of 
cases concerning prescriptive easements, which are easements 
acquired through the open, continuous, and hostile use of 
another’s land.  (Romero, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 350–352.)  
In those cases, several appellate courts have held that a court 
cannot recognize a prescriptive easement that has the effect of 
leaving the fee title holder with no practical use of the land 
subject to the easement.  (Ibid.)  To recognize such a prescriptive 
easement, the courts have reasoned, would undermine the 
integrity of the statute governing the acquisition of a real 
property estate by adverse possession by permitting claimants 
“ ‘to obtain the fruits of adverse possession’ ” without satisfying 
the statutory requirements, including the payment of taxes.  (Id. 
at p. 350, quoting Hansen v. Sandridge Partners, L.P. (2018) 22 
Cal.App.5th 1020, 1033 (Hansen).)  The Court of Appeal in this 
case found this rationale “based on the distinction between 
estates and easements — equally applicable to exclusive implied 
easements.”  (Romero, at p. 352.)1   
 
1  
The court noted that some courts have recognized implied 
“exclusive” easements for encroachments that are either “ ‘de 
minimis’ ” or “necessary to protect the health or safety of the 
public or for essential utility purposes,” but neither description 
applies to the disputed easement at issue here.  (Romero, supra, 
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 352.) 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
Having concluded there could be no implied easement over 
the disputed strip of land in favor of the 643 Property (Romero, 
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 353), the court did not address the 
Romeros’ alternative argument that the implied easement 
finding was not supported by substantial evidence (id. at p. 355).  
The court did, however, affirm the trial court’s imposition of an 
equitable easement and upheld the award of $69,000 in 
damages to the Romeros (id. at p. 362).   
Both sides petitioned for review.  We granted the Shih-
Kos’ petition to decide whether, as the Court of Appeal held, the 
law forbids recognition of an implied easement that would 
effectively exclude the property owners from most practical uses 
of the easement area. 
II. 
“Interests in land can take several forms, including 
‘estates’ and ‘easements.’ ”  (Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1032.)  “An estate is an ownership interest in land that is, or 
may become, possessory.”  (Ibid.)  “An easement,” by contrast, 
“gives a nonpossessory and restricted right to a specific use or 
activity upon another’s property, which right must be less than 
the right of ownership.”  (Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 
Cal.App.4th 1296, 1306 (Mehdizadeh).)   
The law recognizes several methods of creating an 
easement.  Among other methods, the parties to a real property 
transaction may grant or reserve an easement as part of the 
conveyance of land; an individual may acquire an easement by 
prescription, through the continuous, hostile, and adverse use of 
the property; or a court acting in equity may order that an 
easement be created under specified circumstances.  (6 Miller & 
Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 15:13, pp. 15-70–15-72.)  The 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
scope of the easement, like the scope of any servitude on land, 
“is determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the 
enjoyment by which it was acquired.”  (Civ. Code, § 806.) 
When an easement is granted or reserved as part of a real 
property transaction, the grant or reservation may appear 
expressly in the terms of a written instrument.  (See, e.g., Gray 
v. McCormick (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1019.)  But even without 
a writing, California law recognizes the grant or reservation of 
the easement by implication in appropriate cases.  (See, e.g., 
Fristoe v. Drapeau (1950) 35 Cal.2d 5 (Fristoe); see generally 6 
Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 15:19, pp. 15-94–15-
95.)  “ ‘The doctrine of implied easements is applied by the courts 
to carry into effect the intention of the parties as manifested by 
the facts and circumstances of the transaction.’ ”  (Horowitz v. 
Noble (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 120, 132 (Horowitz).) 
California has codified the doctrine of implied easements 
in Civil Code section 1104 (section 1104).  Section 1104, which 
has remained unchanged since its 1872 enactment, provides:  “A 
transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, 
and creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real 
property of the person whose estate is transferred in the same 
manner and to the same extent as such property was obviously 
and permanently used by the person whose estate is 
transferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time when the 
transfer was agreed upon or completed.”  In other words, when 
a grantor conveys a portion of an estate to another party but 
fails to expressly grant an easement in the written instrument, 
the law infers that the grantor and grantee intended the 
conveyed portion of the property to enjoy any preexisting uses of 
the grantor’s remaining estate that were “obvious[] and 
permanent[],” and the law accordingly implies an easement.  
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
(§ 1104; see, e.g., Kytasty v. Godwin (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 762, 
768 [§ 1104 “creates an implied easement as an exception to the 
general rule that interests in real property can only be created 
by an express writing or by prescription”].)  “In such cases, for 
purposes of identification, the portion or parcel that is being 
used is called the ‘quasi-servient tenement,’ and the portion or 
parcel benefited by the use is called the ‘quasi-dominant 
tenement.’ ”  (6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 15:20, 
p. 15-98, fn. omitted.)  Where the statutory conditions are 
otherwise satisfied, “if the owner conveys the quasi-dominant 
tenement, the grantee receives an implied easement for the use 
and benefit of his or her property over the quasi-servient 
tenement retained by the owner-grantor.”  (Id. at p. 15-99.) 
Though recognized in statutory law, the doctrine of 
implied easements is at least equally a product of the common 
law as elaborated in judicial decisions.  The cases make clear 
that the law of implied easements is broader than section 1104, 
read in isolation, might suggest.  For instance, “[a]lthough the 
Civil Code speaks only in terms of implying an easement in favor 
of a grantee, ‘California also recognizes easements by implied 
reservation.  The result is that a purchaser may take not only 
the obvious benefits but the obvious burdens as well.’ ”   
(Horowitz, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at p. 133.)  In a similar vein, 
this court has explained that “[t]he factors enumerated in 
section 1104 of the Civil Code are not exclusive of other possible 
factors which may have a bearing in ascertaining the extent of 
an easement created by implication.  Section 1104, which relates 
to the creation of easements by implied grant, must be read with 
section 806 of the Civil Code, which defines the extent of all 
servitudes, and also in the light of the common law rules 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
governing easements by implication.”  (Fristoe, supra, 35 Cal.2d 
at p. 9.)   
Synthesizing the statutory text and common law 
elaboration of the doctrine, California appellate courts have 
summarized the elements of an implied easement as follows:  
“[A]n ‘easement will be implied when, at the time of conveyance 
of property, the following conditions exist:  (1) the owner of 
property conveys or transfers a portion of that property to 
another; (2) the owner’s prior existing use of the property was of 
a nature that the parties must have intended or believed that 
the use would continue; meaning that the existing use must 
either have been known to the grantor and the grantee, or have 
been so obviously and apparently permanent that the parties 
should have known of the use; and (3) the easement is 
reasonably necessary to the use and benefit of the quasi-
dominant tenement.’ ”  (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196 
Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420 (Thorstrom).)   
Implied easements are not favored in the law.  Because an 
implied easement deprives the property owner of the exclusive 
use of that property, courts do not lightly infer that the parties 
intended to create one.  (Orr v. Kirk (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 678, 
681.)  Moreover, given the ordinary rule that courts should 
construe a reservation in any grant against the grantor, a court 
“will imply an easement in favor of the grantee more easily than 
it will imply an easement in favor of a grantor.”  (Ibid.; see Civ. 
Code, § 1069 [“A grant is to be interpreted in favor of the 
grantee, except that a reservation in any grant . . . is to be 
interpreted in favor of the grantor.”].)  In either case, courts 
exercise substantial caution in recognizing implied easements, 
requiring “ ‘clear evidence’ ” of the parties’ intent, taking into 
account “ ‘ “the circumstances attending the transaction, the 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
particular situation of the parties, and the state of the thing 
granted.” ’ ”  (Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420; 
accord, Walters v. Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 21, 
disapproved on other grounds in Gray v. Don Miller & 
Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 507; Orr, at p. 681.)   
The question before us concerns the recognition of what 
the Court of Appeal had described as “exclusive” implied 
easements, by which the court meant an implied easement that 
“only permits the dominant owner to use the easement area.”  
(Romero, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 349.)  Some clarification of 
this usage is helpful.  In general, the term “ ‘exclusive’ ” in the 
context of easements and other servitudes simply refers to “the 
right to exclude others.”  (Rest.3d Property, Servitudes (2000) 
§ 1.2, com. c, p. 14.)  The exclusivity of an easement is not so 
much a binary attribute — either an easement is exclusive or it 
is not — as a matter of degree.  (Ibid. [“The degree of exclusivity 
of the rights conferred by an easement . . . is highly variable.”].)  
Exclusivity in this context “includes two aspects: who may be 
excluded and the uses or area from which they may be 
excluded.”  (Ibid.)  At one end of the spectrum, easement holders 
may be limited to narrow, specific uses of the property, and may 
have “no right to exclude anyone from making any use that does 
not unreasonably interfere” with those narrow uses.  (Ibid.)  At 
the other end of the spectrum, easement holders may possess 
“the right to exclude everyone, including the servient owner, 
from making any use of the land within the easement 
boundaries.”  (Ibid.)  When the Court of Appeal in this case used 
the term “exclusive” easement, it was referring to easements 
that sit closer to the latter end of this spectrum — to what we 
might consider “highly exclusive” or “broadly exclusive” 
easements.   
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
Though an easement may be broadly exclusive, it is 
nonetheless necessarily limited in scope.  An easement is 
“considered a nonpossessory interest in land because it 
generally authorizes limited uses of the burdened property for a 
particular purpose,” leaving the property owner “the right to 
make all uses of the land that do not unreasonably interfere 
with exercise of the rights granted by the [easement].”  (Rest.3d 
Property, Servitudes, supra, § 1.2, com. d, pp. 14–15.)  Broadly 
exclusive easements “may involve uses that make any actual use 
of the premises by the transferor unlikely, but they are still 
considered nonpossessory interests if the transferor is not 
excluded from the entire parcel and retains the right to make 
uses that would not interfere with the easement.”  (Id. at p. 15.)  
When an exclusive easement has been established, a dominant 
tenement owner may use the easement area only for a limited 
set of purposes, and the easement may be terminated if the 
dominant tenement owner ceases to use the area for those 
purposes.  (6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 15.77, 
pp. 15-282–15-284; McCarty v. Walton (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 
39, 45.)   
The easement the trial court recognized here fits this 
model:  It was broadly exclusive, in that it gave the Shih-Kos a 
right to use the easement in a manner that effectively excluded 
the Romeros from most practical uses of the surface area, if not 
the areas below and above the surface, but it was nonetheless 
limited in that it preserved the Romeros’ property rights not 
inconsistent with the Shih-Kos’ usage, including the right to 
terminate the easement if the Shih-Kos ceased to use it for the 
specified limited purposes.  
The question now before us is whether, as the Court of 
Appeal held, an implied easement that excludes the servient 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
tenement owner from making most practical uses of the 
easement’s surface area is impermissible as a matter of law.  As 
the Court of Appeal acknowledged, effectively exclusive 
easements are not impermissible as a general matter.  Courts 
have upheld granted or reserved easements of comparable scope 
where the parties have expressly granted or reserved a 
restricted right of use as part of the transaction.  (Romero, 
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 350; see, e.g., Gray v. McCormick, 
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029; Blackmore, supra, 150 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1599–1601.)  The Court of Appeal held, 
however, that California law prohibits courts from recognizing 
effectively exclusive implied easements, as distinct from express 
easements.   
The Court of Appeal relied for this conclusion on a line of 
cases pertaining to easements acquired by prescription.  The 
cases begin with Raab v. Casper (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 866, in 
which the defendants had built a house near the boundary line 
dividing their property from the plaintiffs’ property and 
inadvertently built “part of their driveway, utility lines, yard 
and landscaping on plaintiffs’ land.”  (Id. at p. 876.)  The trial 
court awarded the defendants a prescriptive easement over the 
land containing the encroachments, but the Court of Appeal 
reversed.  (Id. at p. 878.)  The appellate court understood the 
trial court’s judgment as “designed to exclude plaintiffs from 
defendants’ 
domestic 
establishment, 
employing 
the 
nomenclature of easement but designed to create the practical 
equivalent of an estate.”  (Id. at p. 877.)  “Achievement of that 
objective,” the court held, “required proof and findings of the 
elements of adverse possession, not prescriptive use.”  (Ibid.)  
Because the defendants had not established the necessary 
elements of adverse possession — in particular, the requirement 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
that the defendants paid taxes on the disputed land (see Code 
Civ. Proc., § 325) — the court reversed the judgment.  (Raab, at 
pp. 877–878.)   
Several courts have since followed Raab in prohibiting the 
acquisition of an easement by prescription where the easement 
would deprive the property owner of all or most practical uses of 
the easement area.  (See Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1034 [rejecting prescriptive easement for farming that would 
not allow the owner “to use the [d]isputed [l]and for any 
‘practical purpose’ ”]; Mehdizadeh, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1305, 1308 [rejecting prescriptive easement that was limited 
to “landscaping and recreation” because the easement would 
leave the owner with “only a minimal right to use it”]; Silacci v. 
Abramson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 558, 564 (Silacci) [rejecting 
prescriptive easement for an enclosed yard that would 
“amount[] to giving [the true owner’s] land completely, without 
reservation, to [the encroacher]”]; Harrison v. Welch (2004) 116 
Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093 [rejecting prescriptive easement for use 
as a woodshed because “ ‘as a practical matter [such use] . . . 
prohibits the true owner from using his land’ ”].)   
The concern underlying this line of cases — that claimants 
could “obtain the fruits of adverse possession under the guise of 
a prescriptive easement” — arises because of the high degree of 
similarity between the elements of a prescriptive easement and 
the elements of adverse possession.  (Hansen, supra, 22 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1033.)  Both the law of prescriptive easements 
and the law of adverse possession permit a party to acquire 
rights to property through their own unilateral conduct — that 
is, by using or occupying the property — and, generally 
speaking, the elements of the doctrines closely resemble each 
other.  (Id. at pp. 1032–1033.)  Crucially, however, adverse 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
possession requires claimants to prove that they have paid taxes 
assessed against the property in order to claim title.  (Ibid.; Code 
Civ. Proc., § 325, subd. (b).)  The creation of easements by 
prescription does not.  To ensure adherence to this statutory tax 
requirement, the courts in the Raab line have considered it 
“especially important to maintain the distinction between 
easements and estates in the context of prescription.  (See Code 
Civ. Proc., § 325, subd. (b).)  That is, if courts allowed claimants 
to obtain by prescription a functional estate without satisfying 
the statutory requirements of adverse possession, then Code of 
Civil Procedure section 325, subdivision (b)’s tax requirement 
would be nullified.”  (Hansen, at p. 1036.)2   
The Court of Appeal in this case believed the logic of the 
exclusive prescriptive easement cases equally applicable to 
implied easement cases.  We are not convinced.  Prescriptive 
easement cases like Raab and Hansen are grounded in a concern 
for maintaining the integrity of the adverse possession statute 
and its demanding standard for the acquisition of another’s 
 
2  
The appellate case law is not uniform in forbidding 
broadly exclusive prescriptive easements.  (See Otay Water Dist. 
v. Beckwith (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1048 [granting 
prescriptive easement that excluded servient tenement owner 
where uses of the property were limited to “reservoir purposes 
only”]; cf. Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 769, fn. 11 
[questioning breadth of rule stated in the Raab line of cases:  
“Since the scope of a prescriptive easement is determined by its 
historical use [citations], and since exclusive easements, while 
rare, are possible [citation], we believe the holdings [of the cases] 
may be overbroad.”].)  We do not decide here whether Otay, 
Raab, or any of the other so-called exclusive prescriptive 
easements were decided correctly.  The only question now before 
us concerns the law of implied easements, which are materially 
different from easements acquired by prescription. 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
property through occupation.  (Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1036.)  But as Hansen itself recognized, not all easement 
claims raise the same concerns.  (Ibid.)  Hansen acknowledged 
that courts have permitted exclusive express easements, for 
instance.  (Id. at p. 1035.)  But it explained that, unlike in 
prescriptive easement cases, express easement cases involve no 
danger that the claimant could shoehorn what is in reality a 
claim for adverse possession, which has nothing to do with the 
terms of a land transaction, into a cause of action for an express 
easement, which has everything to do with the terms of a land 
transaction and nothing to do with the claimant’s hostile use of 
the property.  (Id. at p. 1036.)  In other words, “permitting 
express exclusive easements does not create the same statutory 
nullification issue that prescriptive exclusive easements do.”  
(Ibid.) 
In this regard, implied easements are similar to express 
easements; to recognize an implied easement creates none of the 
statutory nullification concerns underlying the Raab line of 
cases.  To establish the existence of an implied easement, a 
plaintiff must allege and prove a specific set of circumstances 
surrounding a particular land transaction:  that a common 
owner of property conveyed a portion of that property to another, 
that the parties to the transaction must have intended to 
maintain the benefits and burdens between the newly divided 
estates after the separation of title, and that the resulting 
easement was reasonably necessary to the dominant estate.  
(See 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 15:20, pp. 15-
97–15-102; accord, Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1420.)  Those circumstances bear little resemblance to the 
elements of adverse possession, which, again, does not concern 
the terms (either express or implied) of a land transaction.  For 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
that reason, there is little reason to fear that claimants might 
seek an implied easement merely as a means of circumventing 
the statutory tax requirement or some other adverse possession 
element.  Thus, while it may be necessary to prohibit courts from 
recognizing prescriptive easements that effectively exclude the 
property owner from the easement area, the same is not true in 
express or implied easement cases.  (Cf. Hirshfield, supra, 91 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 768–769 [distinguishing equitable easements 
on the same ground].) 
Unlike in prescriptive easement cases, the court’s primary 
duty in cases involving easements created by grant or 
reservation — whether express or implied — is to give effect to 
the intent of the parties to the relevant land transaction. In 
cases involving express easements, at least, courts have long 
recognized this duty, even when following the parties’ intent 
produces unusually expansive rights of use.  As the Court of 
Appeal in this case acknowledged, courts have generally held 
that even when a written instrument does not explicitly state 
that a granted easement is to be exclusive, courts may 
nevertheless recognize an exclusive easement where there is a 
clear indication of such an intention.  (See, e.g., Romero, supra, 
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 350; cf. Pasadena v. California-Michigan 
etc. Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 578–579 [case involving an express 
easement noted that “[n]o intention to convey such a complete 
interest [that would permit the dominant tenement owner to 
exclude others from the easement area] can be imputed to the 
owner of the servient tenement in the absence of a clear 
indication of such an intention”].)    
In Gray v. McCormick, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 
page 1022, for example, the court enforced the express terms of 
a residential development’s Master Declaration of Covenants, 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
Conditions, Restrictions and Reservation of Easements (Master 
CC&Rs), which granted an “exclusive easement” to Lot 6, the 
dominant tenement, over a 16-foot-wide by 90-foot-long strip of 
land on Lot 3, the servient tenement.  The dominant tenement 
owners sought to improve the strip of land with a driveway, 
perimeter walls, and landscaping, and to prohibit the servient 
tenement owners from making any use of the easement area.  
(Id. at p. 1023.)  The servient tenement owners conceded that 
the Master CC&Rs expressly created an easement, but they 
objected to the dominant tenement owners’ characterization of 
its scope.  Specifically, they argued that the label “exclusive” did 
not evince an intent to exclude them from their own property.  
(Id. at p. 1025.)  A contrary interpretation, they asserted, would 
violate the law by effectively “grant[ing] the owners of the 
dominant tenement fee ownership over the easement area.”  (Id. 
at p. 1029.)  The appellate court rejected the argument.  The 
court reasoned that the easement provision “repeatedly uses 
language of exclusivity,” and that any uncertainty about the 
meaning of that language was dispelled by the surrounding 
context, which imposed on the dominant tenement owners the 
costs of improving and maintaining the easement area and 
required them to indemnify the servient tenement owners for 
any liability resulting from the exclusive use of the easement.  
(Id. at p. 1026.)   
Similarly, in Blackmore, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at 
page 1597, the court construed an express easement “for 
‘parking and garage purposes’ over a defined area” on the 
servient tenement, holding that the dominant tenement owner 
could construct a garage on the easement area for the owner’s 
exclusive use.  The court concluded that “exclusive use of the 
garage” was “ ‘a necessary incident’ of the easement,” because “a 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
shared garage would generate disputes about allocation of 
parking spaces, security, and maintenance costs.”  (Id. at 
p. 1599.)   
In such cases, California appellate courts have recognized 
that exclusive easements, while rare, can exist where the 
parties’ intent is sufficiently clear in the written instrument 
creating the easement.  (See also Heath v. Kettenhofen (1965) 
236 Cal.App.2d 197, 206 [dominant tenement owner entitled to 
exclusive use of 10-foot-wide strip within easement area for 
parking].)  Implied easement cases are not fundamentally 
dissimilar.  Just as in cases where a court must interpret the 
terms of a written conveyance, the court’s duty in an implied 
easement case is to give effect to the intent of the parties.  
(Fristoe, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 8.)  As we explained in Fristoe, 
this principle accords with the overarching instruction in Civil 
Code section 806, that “ ‘the extent of a servitude is determined 
by the terms of the grant.’ ”  (Fristoe, at p. 9.)  We observed:  
“Under this section . . . , the controlling factor is the terms of the 
grant.  When the grant is implied, its terms must be inferred 
from all of the circumstances of the case.  The effect of section 
806 is to establish intent as the criterion, and this is in accord 
with the rationale of the rules governing easements by 
implication.”  (Ibid.)  Nothing in the language of the statutes 
suggests a limitation to this principle whereby the parties must 
preserve a certain quantum of practical uses for the owner.  (See 
Civ. Code, §§ 806, 1104.)  The scope of the burden imposed on 
the servient tenement is determined by the parties’ intent 
(ibid.), even if that intent was to create a privilege to use the 
property in a way that effectively precludes the property owners 
from making their own use of the easement area. 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
Although the parties have not cited, and we have not 
found, any cases directly addressing the question presented here 
concerning implied easements, California appellate courts have 
generally measured the scope of an implied easement by 
following the intent of the parties, regardless of whether giving 
effect to that intended scope would mean precluding the servient 
tenement owner from making most practical uses of the land.  
In Dixon v. Eastown Realty Co. (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 260, for 
example, the court recognized an implied easement over a small 
area of the plaintiffs’ land that contained an encroaching portion 
of the defendant’s garage, which effectively excluded the 
plaintiffs entirely from the disputed area.  (Id. at pp. 263–264.)  
Likewise, in Zeller v. Browne (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 191, the 
court recognized an implied easement over a strip of land on the 
defendants’ property that contained a concrete walkway, 
stairway, and retaining wall, providing the plaintiff an 
apparently exclusive pathway to access a higher elevation at the 
rear of their house.  (Id. at pp. 194–195.)  In Thorstrom, by 
contrast, the court reversed a trial court judgment “that granted 
defendants an implied easement for exclusive use of water from 
a well on” the plaintiff’s property.  (Thorstrom, supra, 196 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1411.)  The court concluded that “the scope of 
the easement granted to defendants is excessive” (ibid.) — but 
not because implied easements that prevent the servient 
tenement owner from using the easement are impermissible as 
a matter of law.  Rather, the court held that the scope of the 
easement was impermissibly broad only because there was no 
evidence in the record suggesting that the well “was drilled, 
constructed and used to benefit defendants’ parcel alone.”  (Id. 
at p. 1423.)  Accordingly, the plaintiffs retained the right, as the 
owners of the servient tenement, to use the well on their 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
property in any manner that did not interfere with the 
defendants’ own reasonable residential uses.  (Id. at pp. 1423–
1424; see Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 
Cal.App.4th 697, 702 [“Every incident of ownership not 
inconsistent with the easement and the enjoyment of the same 
is reserved to the owner of the servient estate.”].)  The reasoning 
of these cases suggests that an implied easement, like an 
express one, may effectively exclude the servient tenement 
owner from the easement area in rare cases where the 
circumstances show that the relevant parties clearly intended 
that result. 
Taking a different view, the Court of Appeal posited that 
implied easements are essentially different from easements 
where “the language of the creating instrument clearly 
expresses an intention that the use of the easement area shall 
be exclusive to the dominant owner.”  (Romero, supra, 78 
Cal.App.5th at p. 350.)  But the court did not explain why it 
thought that such an intention must be memorialized in the 
creating instrument and may not be found elsewhere.  Perhaps 
the court believed that in order to convey an interest as 
comprehensive as an exclusive easement, a party should have to 
do so in writing, much as if the party were conveying ownership 
of the land.  (Cf. Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3) [the Statute of 
Frauds, which requires a contract “for the sale of real property, 
or of an interest therein,” to be made in writing].)  But the 
doctrine of implied easements is a settled exception to the 
Statute of Frauds.  (1 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, 
§ 1:74, pp. 1-277–1-278.)  Courts have recognized this exception 
as necessary to avoid injustice when the circumstances of the 
transaction have mitigated the evidentiary concerns underlying 
the general rule that interests in land must be transferred in 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
writing.  (See Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, supra, § 2.11, com. 
c, p. 155.)  
Or perhaps the appellate court’s concern was simply a 
practical one:  If a court is to recognize an easement so 
comprehensive as to effectively preclude the property owner’s 
practical use of the land, it should be very certain that this is 
what the parties intended.  If this was indeed the court’s 
concern, we share it.  But an express statement requirement 
goes farther than necessary to respond to the concern.  Given 
the consequences of recognizing an easement where the parties’ 
intent to create one appears only by implication rather than 
expressly in a written instrument, the common law already 
requires claimants seeking to establish such implied intent to 
clear a high bar:  The preexisting use of the quasi-servient 
tenement must have been “ ‘so obviously and apparently 
permanent’ ” that the law may conclude “ ‘the parties must have 
intended or believed that the use would continue’ ” after the 
division of the property.  (Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1420, italics added.)   
Again, easements by implication are not favored in the 
law.  But where the circumstances of a land transaction clearly 
evince an intent to continue the quasi-dominant tenement’s 
preexisting uses of the quasi-servient tenement, and where the 
circumstances also clearly evince an intent that the easement 
be comprehensive in scope, the bar is cleared and the relevant 
legal requirements have been satisfied.  (Cf. Rest.3d Property, 
Servitudes, supra, § 2.11, com. c, p. 155 [“servitude burdens are 
established by implication only . . . where the evidentiary 
concerns underlying the Statute of Frauds have been met”].)  In 
discerning the intended scope of an easement, we see little 
reason to distinguish between an intent clearly expressed in 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
writing and an intent clearly inferable from “all the facts and 
circumstances.”  (Fristoe, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 8.)   
To give effect to implied easements, even when those 
easements may be comprehensive in scope, protects the 
reasonable expectations of the parties to land transactions in a 
manner consistent with the usual presumption that the parties 
“ ‘contract[ed] in reference to the condition of the property at the 
time of the sale.’ ”  (Rosebrook v. Utz (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 726, 
729 (Rosebrook).)  Here, for example, the trial court concluded 
that any reasonable person observing the two properties in 
1986, when the Cutlers divided them, would have assumed the 
643 Property retained at least some continuing interest in the 
disputed strip of land.  The trial court further found that the 
Cutlers’ successors made just that assumption:  For almost 30 
years, between the original separation of the properties in 1986 
and the Romeros’ discovery of the encroachments in 2015, “every 
successive owner of either property (until now) has allowed for 
and/or behaved as if the 643 Property has the right to encroach 
upon the disputed strip of land with the driveway, planter, and 
block wall — all of which have remained unchanged in their use 
and function since at least the initial property separation.”  The 
question of whether the trial court’s findings are supported by 
substantial evidence remains to be considered.  But if these are 
indeed the facts of the case, they offer a concrete illustration of 
why a blanket prohibition on exclusive implied easements would 
encourage litigation to upset long-standing and until-now 
settled uses of the property. 
The Romeros suggest, on the flip side, that our conclusion 
will create uncertainty in land titles.  The argument is that by 
permitting the recognition of exclusive implied easements, we 
will undermine the ability of buyers to rely on readily available 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
and accurate legal descriptions of property contained in 
recorded deeds.  (See Mehdizadeh, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1308.)  The same concern inheres to some extent in every case 
involving an implied easement, because an implied easement by 
definition is not expressly set out in any written conveyance.  
The law, however, treats that concern as outweighed by the 
interest in protecting the reasonable expectations of landowners 
and purchasers by giving effect to what the parties “ ‘must have 
intended’ ” given the “ ‘obvious[] and apparently permanent’ ” 
nature of the preexisting use.  (Thorstrom, supra, 196 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1420; see also Rosebrook, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d 
at p. 729.)3   
Contrary to the Romeros’ argument, our conclusion does 
not “pervert[] the classical distinction in real property law 
between ownership and use.”  (Silacci, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 564.)  As we have already explained, there remain important 
differences between an easement with even this degree of 
exclusivity and an estate or ownership interest.  The trial court’s 
judgment granted the Shih-Kos the right to maintain the 
preexisting use of the disputed strip of land as a driveway, 
garden planter, and concrete block wall; it did not give the Shih-
Kos the right to make any other use of the disputed area.  And 
although the trial court determined the easement would run 
with the land, it ordered that the easement would terminate if 
the 643 Property ceased to use the disputed area for those 
 
3  
Here, the “obviously and apparently permanent” nature of 
the use in question means that the Romeros could have 
discovered the existence of the easement with reasonable 
diligence at the time they purchased the 651 Property.   
 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
preexisting, limited uses.  The Romeros benefit from this 
limitation because they are provided certainty that the 
easement area will never be used for any activity that might 
have a more intrusive impact on their property.  Moreover, as 
the Shih-Kos’ appraisal expert testified at trial, the Romeros 
retained any rights to use the strip of land that would not 
interfere with the 643 Property’s easement — namely, the right 
to any subsurface uses, however often there might be a need for 
them, and the right to use the easement area to calculate the 
minimum setback from the property line and the maximum floor 
area ratio of their home under applicable zoning laws. 
The easement therefore is not so comprehensive in scope 
as to extinguish the servient tenement owner’s property rights 
in the disputed area.  Though the Shih-Kos possess a right to 
exclude the Romeros from the driveway, they are not permitted 
to exclude the Romeros from all potential uses of the easement.  
And because the Shih-Kos may only use the land for a driveway, 
a garden planter, and a concrete block wall, the Romeros retain 
the right to terminate the easement if the property is used for 
another purpose.  These differences are sufficient to distinguish 
the rights accorded to the Shih-Kos by the trial court from a fee 
interest.  (See Gray v. McCormick, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1031 [“Here, the owners of Lot 6 have not acquired fee title to 
the easement area; rather, their use of the [exclusive] easement 
area is limited to access, ingress and egress purposes, not all 
conceivable uses of the property.”]; Blackmore, supra, 150 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1600 [noting that the exclusive use of a garage 
on the easement area “does not rise to fee ownership” because 
the rights given to the easement holder were “circumscribed” 
and the exclusivity was “intended solely to protect these 
restricted rights”]; see also Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, supra, 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
§ 1.2, com. d, p. 15 [“Easements and profits may authorize the 
exclusive use of portions of the servient estate, and may involve 
uses that make any actual use of the premises by the transferor 
unlikely, but they are still considered nonpossessory interests if 
the transferor is not excluded from the entire parcel and retains 
the right to make uses that would not interfere with the 
easement or profit.”].)  
The Romeros also argue that our conclusion “contravenes 
the fundamental maxim of jurisprudence that equity must 
follow the law.”  They argue that the Legislature has created an 
exclusive path to obtaining title to property through adverse 
possession, in Code of Civil Procedure section 325, and we may 
not circumvent those requirements by recognizing an 
alternative means of accomplishing the same end.  (See Marsh 
v. Edelstein (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 132, 140–141.)  But the Shih-
Kos are not seeking to obtain title to property through adverse 
possession.  As we have explained, section 1104, which codifies 
the doctrine of implied easements, addresses a wholly different 
set of circumstances than the adverse possession statute.  In 
holding that exclusive implied easements are not impermissible 
as a matter of law, we do not “lend [our] aid to accomplish by 
indirection what the law or its clearly defined policy forbids to 
be done directly.”  (Marsh, at p. 141.)  Instead, we interpret and 
apply section 1104 “in the light of the common law rules 
governing easements by implication.”  (Fristoe, supra, 35 Cal.2d 
at p. 9.) 
Finally, in their answering brief, the Romeros argue that 
the trial court’s judgment recognizing an exclusive implied 
easement violates the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment.  The Romeros did not raise this issue below 
and therefore have forfeited the objection.  (Cal. Rules of Court, 
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
rule 8.500(c)(1); see, e.g., Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 
Cal.5th 561, 578.)  But the argument is without merit in any 
event.  The trial court’s implied easement finding did not result 
in the creation of any new property rights; it instead clarified 
the respective rights of the neighbors as determined by the 
intentions of the parties at the time the two adjacent parcels 
were severed and sold to third parties.  (See § 1104 [providing 
that the implied easement passes at the time of the transfer that 
divides the grantor’s estate].)  In other words, the trial court’s 
finding means the Romeros purchased the 651 Property subject 
to the implied easement; their bundle of property rights never 
included the right to make practical use of the easement’s 
surface area.  This is not a taking.  (Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental 
Protection (2010) 560 U.S. 702, 715 (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.); id. 
at p. 727 [“And insofar as courts merely clarify and elaborate 
property entitlements that were previously unclear, they cannot 
be said to have taken an established property right.”].) 
Our conclusion does not end the proceedings in this case.  
As noted, the Romeros contend that even if the law permits 
exclusive easements by implication, substantial evidence does 
not support the trial court’s conclusion that an implied easement 
exists in this case.  Based on its conclusions on the exclusivity 
issue, the Court of Appeal declined to evaluate the evidentiary 
support for the trial court’s finding.  We now remand for the 
Court of Appeal to consider the question.   
To the extent the Romeros challenge the evidentiary 
showing of intent to create an easement across their property, 
the issue for the court to consider is whether the evidence shows 
that the parties clearly intended for the preexisting use of the 
quasi-servient tenement to continue after the separation of title.  
ROMERO v. SHIH 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
Remarking on this issue, the Court of Appeal suggested, without 
formally deciding, that this question may be answered by 
evidence indicating that “the original grantor Edwin Cutler’s 
intent was . . . to effectuate a variance/lot line adjustment 
between the 643 and 651 properties.”  (Romero, supra, 78 
Cal.App.5th at p. 354.)  We note, however, that considered in the 
abstract, evidence that a party intended to effectuate a variance 
does not eliminate the possibility that the parties also intended 
for the preexisting use of the quasi-servient tenement to 
continue after the separation of title.  We express no view on the 
issue as it arises in this case, nor do we express any view on the 
weight or significance to be given to the evidence of the 
uncompleted lot line adjustment among the other relevant facts 
presented here.  The matter is for the Court of Appeal to resolve 
in the first instance. 
III. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal as to the 
cause of action for the implied easement and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Romero v. Shih 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 78 Cal.App.5th 326 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S275023 
Date Filed:  February 1, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Curtis A. Kin 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth and Scott M. Reddie 
for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants. 
 
Songstad Randall Coffee & Humphrey, Janet E. Humphrey and Elyn 
C. Holt for Defendants, Cross-complainants and Respondents. 
 
No appearance for Cross-defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Scott M. Reddie 
McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP 
7647 North Fresno Street 
Fresno, CA 93720 
(559) 433-2156 
 
Janet E. Humphrey 
Songstad Randall Coffee & Humphrey LLP 
3200 Park Center Drive, Suite 950 
Costa Mesa, CA 92626 
(949) 757-1600