Title: Vandiver v. Banks

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Sandra VANDIVER v. Ronald W. BANKS

97-272                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1998


1.   Appeal & error -- law-of-case doctrine discussed. --  In the
     doctrine of law of the case, the decision of a first appeal
     becomes the law of the case and is conclusive of every
     question of law or fact decided in the former appeal and also
     of those that might have been, but were not, presented; the
     doctrine of the law of the case prevents an issue raised in a
     prior appeal from being raised in a subsequent appeal unless
     the evidence materially varies between the two appeals.     

2.   Appeal & error -- law-of-case doctrine applicable -- appellee
     barred from having issues reconsidered on review. -- Where the
     parties' case before the supreme court was essentially the
     same as the ones previously heard by the chancellor and
     decided by the court of appeals, appellee was barred it having
     them reconsidered on review.

3.   Appeal & error -- argument without legal authority -- nonsuit
     argument without merit. -- Appellee's argument that the law of
     the case was inapplicable because appellant nonsuited on
     remand at one stage of litigation was meritless and made
     without citation to legal authority; this nonsuit argument, if
     accepted, would have the result that any plaintiff losing an
     appeal could avoid an appellate court's mandate in a case
     merely by voluntarily dismissing suit upon remand.

4.   Appeal & error -- unpublished opinion by court of appeals -- 
     Appellee's argument that the law of the case was inapplicable
     because the court of appeals' mandates were set out in
     unpublished opinions was without merit; Rule 5-2(d) of the
     Rules of the Supreme Court clearly provides such opinions may
     be cited or referred to where an issue such as res judicata,
     collateral estoppel, or law of the case is involved. 

5.   Appeal & error -- law of case applicable -- review on remand
     not same as petition for review. -- Appellee's argument that,
     because the supreme court is superior to the court of appeals,
     it need not be bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine was
     without merit; although the supreme court, on a petition for
     review, would not be bound by a court of appeals' decision,
     that was not the situation in thiis case; here, review of the
     correctness of the trial court's rulings was on remand after
     the decisions rendered by the court of appeals; appellee's
     argument concerning appellate superiority was inapposite to
     the matter at hand.


6.   Evidence -- chancellor's admission of parol evidence was error
     -- whether jurisdiction expressly reserved was irrelevant. --
     It was error for the chancellor to admit parol evidence to
     determine whether the California court reserved jurisdiction
     to determine the right to the pension; whether jurisdiction
     was expressly reserved was irrelevant because the court of
     appeals had held in its second opinion that the chancellor had
     erred in determining he lacked jurisdiction to entertain a
     common-law partition action, and so the court of appeals
     decision as to jurisdiction was law of the case and the
     chancellor was obliged to follow its mandate; secondly,
     appellant was not seeking to modify the California divorce
     decree; rather, she was simply asserting her partition action,
     which was clearly permissible under California law; hence,
     appellant's partition action had nothing to do with the law of
     contracts, to which the parol evidence rule is related, and
     the admittance of such evidence was error.     

7.   Divorce -- payments made above and beyond those mandated by 
     divorce decree -- common-law voluntary-payment rule
     applicable. -- Appellee pled alternatively the affirmative
     defense of setoff, and filed a counterclaim, seeking to
     recover the amount for payments he made above and beyond those
     mandated by the divorce decree, including moving expenses,
     increases in spousal support, and life insurance premiums; the
     common-law voluntary-payment rule states that when one pays
     money on demand that is not legally enforceable, the payment
     is deemed voluntary, and absent fraud, duress, mistake of
     fact, coercion, or extortion, voluntary payments cannot be
     recovered; where appellee made no such showing, the payments
     in question as to both the defense of setoff and the
     counterclaim were voluntary, and, as such, were not
     recoverable.  

8.   Appeal & error -- matters could have been raised in two
     earlier appeals -- matters barred by law of case. --   
     Although the court of appeals' opinions made no specific
     references to appellee's defenses involving laches and
     equitable estoppel, these are matters that appellee could have
     raised in the earlier two appeals but did not; consequently,
     these claims were barred by the law of the case.
     
9.   Divorce -- trial court reversed and case remanded -- appellant
     entitled to share of appellee's retirement benefits under
     California law. -- The trial court was reversed, and the
     supreme court remanded the case, directing the chancellor to
     partition appellee's pension and to award appellant her
     community property share; the supreme court determined that
     appellant's award should be computed using applicable
     California law; under California law, appellant was entitled
     to a percentage of the gross pension payments appellee had
     received since the filing of her partition action in 1990.

     Appeal from Lonoke Chancery Court; Charles A. Walls,
Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     Clearly Law Firm, P.A., by:  Robert M. Clearly, Jr., for
appellant.
     Gruber Law Firm, by:  Wayne A. Gruber, for appellee.   

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     This case arises from appellant Sandra S. Vandiver's and
appellee Ronald W. Banks's divorce granted in California on May 27,
1982.  Banks was a member of the U. S. Air Force and possessed a
fully vested, non-disability military retirement pension.  The
California court approved the parties' marital settlement
agreement, which permitted that court to reserve jurisdiction over
Banks's Air Force retirement benefits; it subsequently incorporated
the parties' agreement into their divorce decree.  Vandiver later
moved to Missouri, and Banks to Lonoke County, Arkansas. 
     In 1990, Vandiver filed suit against Banks in Lonoke County
Chancery Court, seeking to enforce her community property rights to
pension benefits under the 1982 California divorce, but the
chancellor, applying Arkansas law, dismissed Vandiver's lawsuit. 
On appeal, the court of appeals, on April 8, 1992, issued an
unpublished opinion, holding that the chancellor erred in failing
to apply California law.  The court of appeals held California law
applied because the parties' agreement was made in California and
all significant events concerning the agreement had occurred in
that state.
     On remand, Vandiver amended her complaint to seek partition of
the military pension.  Banks filed another dismissal motion which
the chancery court, again, granted.  In dismissing, the chancery
court found the following:
     (1)  A final adjudication on the issue of military benefits
had been made and decided in the 1982 California divorce
proceeding;
     (2)  the California court took judicial action regarding the
benefits by striking through the language in its order which would
have reserved jurisdiction on the subject;
     (3)  res judicata and collateral estoppel barred any further
claim for pension benefits; and
     (4)  California law, Civil Code  5124, a statute of
limitations, barred any adjudicated claim for such benefits, if
sought after January 1, 1986.
     Vandiver appealed a second time, and on October 13, 1992, the
court of appeals, in another unpublished opinion, reversed,
disagreeing with all the chancellor's findings.  The court of
appeals reached and decided the following issues:
     (1)  California law applies to the case, and the trial court
erred in holding it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a common-law
partition action.  It held that California law permitted Vandiver
to file a partition action to enforce her right to military
retirement pension benefits.
     (2)  In applying California law, citing Berry v. Berry,