Title: Clark v. Smith

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

299 So. 2d 226 (1974)
Jervis Howard CLARK, a minor, et al.
v.
Jefferson E. SMITH and W. R. Mitchell, Contractor, Inc., a corporation.
Howard G. CLARK
v.
Jefferson E. SMITH and W. R. Mitchell, Contractor, Inc., a corporation.
SC 375, 775.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 15, 1974.
Cunningham, Bounds & Byrd, Mobile, for appellants.
Cooper C. Thurber and G. Sage Lyons, Mobile, for appellees.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Turner Road, a four lane street in Pritchard, Alabama, runs roughly east and west. Shortly before daybreak on the morning of 13 October 1970, Jervis Howard *227 Clark, a paper carrier was traveling on his motorcycle eastwardly on Turner Road. Jefferson Smith, an employee of W. R. Mitchell, Inc., acting in the course of his employment, was driving a truck owned by Mitchell in a westwardly direction. A collision occurred between the motorcycle and the truck. Young Clark received serious injuries in the collision.
Jervis Howard Clark, by and through his father Howard Clark, filed a suit seeking damages of $150,000.00 from Jefferson Smith and Mitchell Contracting Co., Inc., because of the alleged negligence of Smith in the operation of the truck. Originally Claude W. Nordan was also named as a defendant, but Nordan was later eliminated as a defendant.
Howard G. Clark, father of Jervis Howard Clark, also filed a derivative suit against Jefferson Smith and W. R. Mitchell Contractor, Inc., seeking damages in the amount of $10,000.00 for medical expenses incurred in behalf of his son, and for loss of his son's services.
The defendants filed pleas of the general issue, and also pleas of contributory negligence in each suit. The cases were consolidated for trial.
A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants in each case. The plaintiffs' respective motions for new trials being overruled, appeals were thereafter perfected in each case, the minor's case to this court, and the father's case to the Court of Civil Appeals. By proper orders, the derivative suit of the father was transferred from the Court of Civil Appeals to this court, a decision in the minor's suit being dispositive of the father's derivative suit, and the appeals were consolidated.
The plea of contributory negligence filed in the minor's suit was as follows:
The plea of contributory negligence filed in the father's suit was to the same effect, but with phraseology making the plea appropriate in the father's suit.
None of the witnesses presented by the plaintiffs, other than Jervis Howard Clark, were eye witnesses to the collision. They arrived at the scene a few minutes after the accident. Their testimony was to the effect that at the time of their arrival they saw young Clark, his motorcycle, gasoline, and the papers he was carrying, on the side of the street for east bound traffic, i. e., in Clark's lane.
Jervis Howard Clark testified he was 15 years of age at the time of the accident. He was traveling in the east bound lane, having just turned into Turner Road. He did not observe any approaching traffic at this time, but after having ridden a short distance in the inside east lane, he suddenly saw headlights approaching him about 20 feet away. He swerved in an attempt to avoid a collision but his efforts were unsuccessful.
On cross-examination, Clark denied he had collided with more than one vehicle at the time of the accident.
The evidence presented by the defendants in the trial below was to the effect that on the morning of the accident Jefferson Smith and Claude Nordan had left Nordan's home at the same time. Nordan was driving his own automobile and Smith followed in the Mitchell truck. As they drove westwardly on Turner Road, they were in the inside west lane, Nordan being *228 about four car lengths in front of the truck. Nordan testified that Jervis Howard Clark crossed over the center line on his motorcycle and "clipped" the rear of his automobile. While he heard the impact the damage to his automobile was slight. He looked in his rear view mirror and saw Jervis Howard Clark collide with the truck. The truck was in the westbound lane at the time of the impact.
The defendant Smith testified he first saw the motorcycle when Nordan cut to the right and the motorcycle struck the rear of Nordan's automobile. Smith stated he also cut to his right but that the motorcycle continued coming and struck his truck when it was in the center of the westbound lane.
Officer Daniel L. Goldman who investigated the accident testified that three vehicles were involved. He found Nordan's automobile, the truck, and the motorcycle at the scene. The left rear fender of Nordan's automobile had been damaged, the truck's left front fender was damaged, and Jervis Howard Clark's motorcycle was wrecked. From the location of glass, debris, and the way Smith "had cut off the road" it was Goldman's opinion that the point of impact was in the north [outside] lane of the westbound lane of Turner Road.
As the only points argued in brief pertain to certain written charges given at the request of the defendants, we think the above a sufficient statement of the facts for the purpose of this review.
Since the plaintiffs and the defendants occupy the same position in these appeals as they did below, we will hereinafter refer to the parties as plaintiffs and defendants.
Under assignments of error 2 and 6 the plaintiffs argue that the court erred in giving at the request of the defendants two charges pertaining to contributory negligence, that is, defendants' requested charges 11 and 16.
We will set out only charge 16, since charge 11 was in our opinion to the same effect as charge 16.
Defendants' requested charge 16 reads:
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that these charges were erroneously given for the reason that:
Counsel then cites a number of cases holding that the giving of an instruction as to contributory negligence which was not phrased in the particular terms of the contributory negligence as set forth in the plea, constituted error.
However, each and every case cited by counsel for the plaintiff in this connection was decided prior to the first Monday in October 1942, the date on which Rule 37, as set out below became effective.
Rule 37 of the Rules of Practice in the Circuit and Inferior Courts of Common Law Jurisdiction, to be found in Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940, reads:
In Birmingham Electric Co. v. Carver, 255 Ala. 471, 52 So. 2d 200, decided in 1951, the court gave at the request of the defendant the following charge as to contributory negligence:
Count A was a simple negligence count, as is the count in the present case.
Verdict and judgment in the above mentioned case was for the defendant. However, the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted, and the defendant appealed. This court held that the trial court's action in granting the motion for a new trial was not justified, and its judgment was reversed and the original judgment was reinstated, and the cause was rendered. In discussing the effect of Rule 37, this court wrote:
The pleas of contributory negligence filed in the present case meet these requirements. The plea alleges in general terms only that "the plaintiff himself so negligently operated a motor bike so as to cause or allow said motor bike to then and there collide with a motor vehicle being operated by Jefferson E. Smith, and a proximate result of the defendant's negligence * * *" This is only a general government of the alleged contributory negligence and does not allege any specific acts of negligence. In fact, in the complaint it is alleged in general terms that the defendant "* * * negligently operated a motor vehicle on Turner Road * * * so as to cause said motor vehicle to collide with a motor bike which plaintiff was operating * * *"
In Parker v. Williams, 289 Ala. 466, 268 So. 2d 746, the court seems to have relied on Preston v. LaSalle Apartments, 241 Ala. 540, 3 So. 2d 411, which was decided prior to Rule 37. However, the ratio decidendi in this instance resulted from the fact that some five specific actions by the plaintiffs intestate constituting his alleged contributory negligence were set forth in the contributory negligence plea. The court also noted in Footnote 1, at page 470, 268 So.2d at page 749 of Parker that: "The effect, if any, of Rule 37 is not made an issue here." Under these conditions the court held that the plea of contributory negligence having been alleged in several specific and particular terms, the giving of a charge on contributory negligence in *230 general terms constituted error. These factors being absent in the present case, we do not consider Parker of influence to our determination of the question presented in the present case.
In the present case the effect of Rule 37 is vigorously argued in brief of the defendants, and is presented clearly for consideration.
We find no merit in assignments of error 2 and 6.
Plaintiff's assignment of error No. 9 charges error in the action of the court in giving written charge No. 35 at the request of the defendants which reads:
In Whaley v. Sloss-Sheffield S. and I. Co., 164 Ala. 216, 51 So. 419, the trial court gave the following written charge at the request of the defendant:
The tenor of this charge is the same as that now being considered.
In discussing the action of the trial court in giving this charge, the court stated:
The court can give or refuse such charges without committing error.
On the other hand, in Helton v. Easter, 41 Ala.App. 648, 148 So. 2d 486, where a charge similar to the one now being considered was refused, the Court of Appeals observed:
Counsel for the defendants in his argument under this assignment (No. 9) has cited and relied on Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666, and Parker v. Williams et al., 289 Ala. 466, 268 So. 2d 746.
In Britton, supra, the trial court refused a charge requested by the defendant based on leaving the minds of the jurors in a state of "speculation or conjecture at most." The court held that there was no error in refusing the charge. It is to be noted that the charge did not require that the minds of the jurors be left wholly in the realm of "conjecture and doubt" as did the charge we are now considering. The court simply held that it was not reversible error to refuse the charge considered in Britton.
In Parker v. Williams, supra, the pertinent part of the charge insofar as this review is concerned, was:
Such instruction placed the elements of "speculation, conjecture or doubt" in the disjunctive.
*231 In Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Robinson, 183 Ala. 265, 62 So. 813, the refused charge requested by the defendant instructed the jury to the effect the verdict should be for the defendant if after hearing the evidence their minds should be in a state of doubt or confusion, their verdict should be for the defendant.
In holding that such charge was bad and its refusal proper, the court wrote:
This vice was of course present in the given charge considered and condemned in Parker v. Williams, supra, in that "speculation, conjecture, or doubt" being in the disjunctive, the word "doubt" placed too great a burden of proof on the plaintiff.
In the charge now being considered the word "doubt" is used in the conjunctive with the word "conjecture," i. e., "conjecture and doubt."
A verdict cannot be based on conjecture. Aircraft Sales & Service, Inc. v. Bramlett, 254 Ala. 588, 49 So. 2d 144.
In James v. Laidlaw Contracting Co., 277 Ala. 143, 167 So. 2d 711, the court approved two charges to the effect that the jury "could not base a verdict for the plaintiff on conjecture, speculation or surmise." The court wrote:
Since in the present charge the words "conjecture and doubt" are used in the conjunctive, the jury would under the instruction have to find not only that the cause of the accident was wholly in "doubt," but wholly in "conjecture" as well. We therefore consider the charge well within the influence of Whaley v. Sloss-Sheffield S. and I. Co., supra, and that no error to reversal should be cast upon the lower court in giving said charge.
Plaintiff's assignment of error No. 1 asserts error because of the giving of defendants' requested written charge No. 9. This charge reads:
In support of their argument that the giving of this charge was error, counsel for plaintiffs cite and rely only on Harris v. Schmaeling, 270 Ala. 547, 120 So. 2d 731.
However, in Jones v. Berney, 288 Ala. 423, 261 So. 2d 745, it was held that the giving of a charge identical with charge No. 9 above, was not reversible error. Further, in Jones v. Berney, supra, the court distinguished the charge No. 9, now being considered, from the charge condemned in Harris v. Schmaeling, supra, by pointing out that the charge in Harris v. Schmaeling, was defective in, (1) not hypothesizing that the accident proximately contributed to the injury, and (2) in failing to hypothesize a finding by the jury "from the evidence."
Assignment of error No. 1 is therefore without merit.
We have written to all assignments argued by the plaintiffs, and find them *232 without merit. Both judgments are due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
MERRILL, MADDOX, McCALL and FAULKNER, JJ., concur.