Title: Teel v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ERIC TEEL, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 363, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 2004004125 (N) 
§  
§  
 
Submitted: July 21, 2023 
Decided: 
September 5, 2023 
 
Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.  
 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Eric Teel, filed this appeal from a Superior Court order 
denying his motion for correction of an illegal sentence under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 35 and his motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61.  After consideration of the parties’ arguments, we affirm the 
Superior Court’s denial of the motions.   
(2) 
In August 2021, a grand jury indicted Teel for possession of a firearm 
by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”) and two counts of terroristic threatening.  The 
charges arose from Teel threatening his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend by sending 
 
2 
her a photograph of himself with a gun.  On December 6, 2021, Teel pleaded guilty 
to one count of PFBPP and one count of terroristic threatening in exchange for the 
State (i) entering a nolle prosequi on the other terroristic threatening charge, and (ii) 
agreeing not to pursue other acts of intimidation occurring before December 6, 2021.  
The parties also stipulated that Teel had two previous violent felony convictions and 
jointly agreed to recommend the following sentence: (i) for PFBPP, fifteen years of 
Level V incarceration suspended after the ten-year minimum mandatory for 
decreasing levels of supervision; and (ii) for terroristic threatening, one year of Level 
V incarceration suspended for one year of Level III probation.  That same day, the 
Superior Court accepted Teel’s guilty plea and imposed the recommended sentence.    
(3) 
On May 2, 2022, Teel filed a pro se motion for correction of illegal 
sentence, and on May 12, 2022, he filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.  
In both motions, Teel argued that his PFBPP sentence was illegal because one of the 
two felony convictions identified in the Immediate Sentencing Form—a 2008 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a school 
zone—was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c) and he therefore did not 
qualify for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(2).  
He also contended that his 2008 conviction for possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana (“PWITD”), which was not listed on the Immediate Sentencing Form, 
should not qualify as a violent felony under Section 4201(c). 
 
3 
(4) 
The Superior Court asked the State and Teel’s trial counsel to address 
whether Teel qualified for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under Section 
1448.  In response, Teel’s counsel advised the court that he had contacted the State 
a few days after sentencing to request resentencing because the school zone 
possession conviction was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c).  If Teel only 
had one prior violent felony conviction, he faced a five-year minimum mandatory 
sentence under Section 1448(e)(1)(b) rather than a ten-year minimum mandatory 
sentence under Section 1448(e)(2)(b).  Teel’s counsel also told Teel that if the State 
relied upon the school zone possession conviction, he would seek resentencing to 
reduce the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence to a five year minimum 
mandatory sentence.  
(5) 
Teel’s counsel further advised the court that he and the State had 
discovered the Immediate Sentencing Form contained a scrivener’s error and should 
have listed Teel’s 2008 PWITD conviction as the second violent felony conviction, 
rather than the school zone possession conviction.  Teel’s counsel also discussed this 
with Teel, who reminded counsel that he had filed a motion regarding his belief that 
the PWITD conviction should not qualify as a violent felony.  Teel’s counsel then 
reminded Teel that the Superior Court had denied that motion before accepting his 
plea.1  The State agreed with Teel’s counsel’s summary of the parties’ 
 
1 See App. to Answering Br. at B35. 
 
4 
communications, took responsibility for the scrivener’s error in the Immediate 
Sentencing Form, and noted that the plea form correctly listed the minimum 
mandatory sentence for PFBPP as ten years.     
(6) 
The Superior Court held an office conference with counsel on August 
3, 2022.  After the parties reviewed what had occurred since sentencing, the Superior 
Court judge stated that he believed the error in the Immediate Sentencing Form was 
minor and he would resolve the error in his order deciding the motion for correction 
of illegal sentence.  On September 1, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order 
denying the motions for correction of illegal sentence and postconviction relief.  This 
appeal followed. 
(7) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a Rule 35 motion for 
correction of illegal sentence and a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion.2  We review questions of law de novo.3  A sentence is illegal if 
it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to 
the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a 
term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a 
sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.4  To prevail on an 
 
2 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014); Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 
810 (Del. 2013). 
3 Fountain, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1; Ploof, 75 A.3d at 820. 
4 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
 
5 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Rule 61 after entering into a plea 
agreement, the defendant must demonstrate that: (i) trial counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) counsel’s actions were 
so prejudicial “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the 
defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”5 
(8) 
On appeal, Teel argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his 
motions because his PWITD conviction is not a violent felony under Section 4201(c) 
and therefore he only qualified for a five-year minimum mandatory sentence for 
PFBPP under Section 1448(e)(1).  At the time of the crimes Teel committed in 2020, 
Section 1448(e)(1)(c) provided that a prohibited person who knowingly possessed a 
firearm “shall receive a minimum sentence of . . . ten years at Level V, if the person 
has been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of any violent felony.”  Teel 
does not dispute that he was convicted of stalking, a violent felony under Section 
4201(c), in 2014.  He also admits that he has a 2008 conviction for PWITD but 
contends that PWITD is no longer a violent felony under the Ned Carpenter Act, 78 
Del. Laws. Ch. 13 (2011).   Teel is mistaken.   
(9) 
The Ned Carpenter Act eliminated or reclassified certain drug offenses, 
but the act did not apply retroactively to any violation that occurred before 
 
5 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
 
6 
September 1, 2011.6  At the time Teel committed the crime of PFBPP in 2020, 
Section 
4201(c) 
designated 
(and 
still 
designates) 
Former 
Manufacture/Delivery/Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled or Counterfeit 
Controlled Substance under 16 Del. C. § 4752, the crime Teel was convicted of in 
2008, a violent felony.7  Because Teel had two convictions designated violent 
felonies under Section 4201(c) at the time he committed PFBPP in 2020,8 he was 
subject to a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.9  The Superior Court 
therefore did not err in denying Teel’s motion for correction of illegal sentence. 
(10) As to the Rule 61 motion, the record does not support Teel’s claim that 
he pleaded guilty because he believed he would not have to serve a ten-year 
minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.  Although the Immediate Sentencing 
Form incorrectly listed possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a 
school zone, instead of PWITD, as one of Teel’s prior violent felony convictions, 
the plea colloquy reflects that Teel was aware he had a previous conviction for 
PWITD.  The signed plea agreement correctly disclosed that Teel faced a ten-to-
fifteen year Level V sentence for PFBPP.  The parties agreed in the plea agreement 
 
6 Ayala v. State, 204 A.3d 829, 838-39 (Del. 2019). 
7 Section 4201(c) also designates the current version of 16 Del. C. § 4752, drug dealing, a violent 
felony. 
8 Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 543 (Del. 2017) (holding “that the definition of ‘violent felony’ 
as the term is used in Section 1448(e) is controlled by the version of Section 4201(c) in effect” at 
the time the defendant committed the Section 1448 offense). 
9 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1).   
 
7 
to recommend a PFBPP sentence of fifteen years of Level V incarceration suspended 
after the ten-year minimum mandatory.  During the plea colloquy, Teel expressed 
his understanding that he faced a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.  
The Superior Court imposed the sentence recommended by the parties.   
(11) If Teel had not pleaded guilty and had insisted on going to trial, he 
would have faced the same minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP— ten years of 
Level V incarceration—plus the possibility of an additional five years of 
unsuspended Level V time for PFBPP and two years of unsuspended Level V time 
for the terroristic threatening charges, along with additional Level V time for the act 
of intimidation charges that the State agreed not to pursue in exchange for Teel’s 
plea.  Teel has not shown that there is a reasonable probability he would have 
rejected the plea offer and insisted on proceeding to trial had he known he would 
have to serve the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.  Accordingly, 
the Superior Court did not err in denying Teel’s motion for postconviction relief 
under Rule 61.         
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice