Title: JEFFREY SOTELO V TWP OF GRANT

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 489009  
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 3, 2004 
JEFFREY SOTELO, SUSAN SOTELO,
WALTER J. VANDER WALL,
Individually and as Trustee,
and PHYLLIS A. VANDER WALL,
Individually and as Trustee, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
 
No. 123430 
TOWNSHIP OF GRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM 
Plaintiffs sought to divide their property in Grant 
Township, but the defendant township denied approval of the 
request pursuant to the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 
560.101 et seq. 
The circuit court upheld the township’s 
decision and awarded summary disposition for defendant. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. 
255 Mich App 466; 660 NW2d 
380 (2003). 
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision and 
reinstate the Newaygo Circuit Court judgment. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
I  
The LDA regulates the division of land by imposing 
platting (that is, mapping or charting) requirements and 
other building and assessment requirements.1
 This case 
concerns “division” rights, a statutory concept found in 
the LDA, which limits the ability of a landowner to split 
or partition real property without complying with the 
platting process. “Divisions”2 of parcels that meet certain 
criteria are exempt from statutory platting requirements 
and must be approved by a municipality. 
MCL 560.109(1). 
The present case involves two adjacent “parent” parcels 
that were reconfigured when a portion of one was sold to 
the owner of the other. 
The question is whether the 
reconfiguration resulted in an increase in the total number 
of possible divisions that could be made in the area 
1 See, e.g., MCL 560.102(a); 560.132 to 560.198.
2 “Division” is defined by the LDA as 
the partitioning or splitting of a parcel or tract of land
by the proprietor thereof or by his or her heirs,
executors, 
administrators, 
legal 
representatives,
successors, or assigns for the purpose of sale, or lease of
more than 1 year, or of building development that results
in 1 or more parcels of less than 40 acres or the 
equivalent, and that satisfies the requirements of [MCL
560.108, 560.109]. 
Division does not include a property
transfer between 2 or more adjacent parcels, if the 
property taken from 1 parcel is added to an adjacent
parcel; and any resulting parcel shall not be considered a
building 
site 
unless 
the 
parcel 
conforms 
to 
the 
requirements of this act or the requirements of an 
applicable local ordinance. [MCL 560.102(d).] 
2  
 
 
                                                 
encompassed by the two original parent parcels without 
complying with statutory platting requirements. 
The facts are not in dispute. They are taken from the 
trial court opinion, on which the Court of Appeals also 
relied. 
Before July 15, 1999, plaintiffs Jeffrey and Susan 
Sotelo owned a 2.35-acre parcel of land that was adjacent 
to, and immediately north of, a 7.63-acre parcel owned by 
Robert Filut. 
On July 15, 1999, Filut conveyed 3.25 acres 
of his property to the Sotelos, making the Sotelo parcel 
5.6 acres and the Filut parcel 4.38 acres. 
No division 
rights were transferred with this conveyance. 
By deeds 
dated July 15, 1999, the remaining 4.38-acre parcel of the 
Filut property was divided into four parcels, each larger 
than one acre.3
 Filut conveyed these four parcels to two 
trusts, which are owned by plaintiffs Walter and Phyllis 
Vander Wall. 
By deeds dated August 10, 1999, the 5.6-acre 
Sotelo property was then divided, also into four parcels, 
each larger than one acre. 
All the divisions were made 
without the township approval required by MCL 560.109. 
3 Section 109(1)(d) of the LDA requires parcels that result
from a division to conform to local ordinance lot-size 
minimums. 
The size of the divided parcels was an apparent
attempt to comply with the Grant Township ordinance, which
required that parcels be no smaller than one acre. 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
When they were informed that they were in violation of 
the LDA, the plaintiff owners requested the defendant 
township to approve the divisions. After extensive review, 
however, the request was denied by a resolution passed on 
July 27, 2000. 
The township concluded that the number of 
divisions exceeded the number allowed under the LDA. 
Plaintiffs initiated suit to compel approval of all 
the land divisions. 
While the action was pending, the 
parties agreed that the transfer of the 3.25 acres from 
Filut to the Sotelos and the four divisions of the 
reconfigured Filut parcel were consistent with the LDA and 
township ordinances. Thus, the only remaining issue became 
the legality of the divisions of the reconfigured Sotelo 
parcel. 
The Newaygo Circuit Court granted summary disposition 
to the township, finding that the number of plaintiffs’ 
divisions exceeded the number available under the LDA. The 
circuit court held in part: 
The Filut parcel and the Sotelo parcel, as
they existed on March 31, 1997, are parent
parcels. 
The transfer of land from the Filut 
parcel to the Sotelo parcel on July 15, 1999, did
not 
count 
against 
the 
potential 
divisions 
available to the Filut parcel under Section 108
of the LDA;[4] but, this transfer did not change 
4 The trial court mistakenly reported that the transfer from
Filut to the Sotelos was an “exempt split” under the LDA.
Pursuant to MCL 560.102(e), an “exempt split” is “the
partitioning or splitting of a parcel or tract of land
. . . that does not result in 1 or more parcels of less 
4  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
the boundary lines of the parent parcels for
purposes of determining the number of divisions
available under the LDA. 
The division of the 
Filut parcel into four separate parcels equaled,
but did not exceed, all divisions available to 
the Filut parent parcel. 
The divisions from the 
reconfigured Sotelo parcel on August 10, 1999,
violated the LDA, because some of the divisions
were made within the Filut parent parcel and the
divisions available to this parcel had been 
exhausted. 
Therefore, the court agreed with the township and found 
that plaintiffs were required to comply with the platting 
provisions of the LDA in making the four-parcel split of 
the reconfigured Sotelo parcel. 
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for the 
township. 
It held first that “the LDA is in derogation of 
the common-law right to freely alienate real property” and 
that, therefore, the act should be "strictly and narrowly 
construed." 
255 Mich App 471. 
It concluded that the 
division of the Sotelo parcel into four separate parcels 
satisfied the requirements of § 108 and that the township 
than 40 acres or the equivalent.” (Emphasis added.) 
Because the transfer did result in parcels of less than 40
acres, it was not an “exempt split.” 
The trial court 
nevertheless reached the correct conclusion that the 
transfer was also not a “division” and therefore did not 
count against the number of divisions available to the
parent parcel. 
See MCL 560.102(d) (“Division does not
include a property transfer between 2 or more adjacent
parcels, if the property taken from 1 parcel is added to an
adjacent parcel.”). 
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
was required to approve the divisions under § 109(1). 
255 
Mich App 474. 
Defendant Grant Township now seeks leave to appeal in 
this Court.5 
II 
This case concerns the proper interpretation of the 
LDA and the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for 
the defendant township. Issues of statutory interpretation 
are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo. 
Wood v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 401, 403; 668 NW2d 353 
(2003). Our obligation in construing the provisions of the 
LDA 
is 
to 
discern 
the 
legislative 
intent 
that 
may 
reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the 
statute by according those words their plain and ordinary 
meaning. 
MCL 8.3a; Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 
Mich 155, 159-160; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). 
Decisions regarding summary disposition motions are 
also reviewed de novo. 
First Pub Corp v Parfet, 468 Mich 
101, 104; 658 NW2d 477 (2003). 
III 
We conclude that under the plain language of the LDA, 
the division of the reconfigured Sotelo parcel resulted in 
5 We grant the motion of the Michigan Department of Consumer
and Industry Services to file a brief amicus curiae in
support of defendant’s application. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
a number of divisions to the parent parcel that exceeded 
the number of divisions permitted, and that plaintiffs were 
therefore required to comply with the LDA’s platting 
provisions. 
Under § 103(1), if a partitioning or splitting of a 
parcel qualifies as a “division,” it “is not subject to the 
platting requirements of this act but subject to the 
requirements of sections 108 and 109.” 
Section 108(2) 
exempts a certain number of divisions from the platting 
requirements of the act. Section 108 provides in part: 
A division is not subject to the platting 
requirements of this act. . . . [T]he division,
together with any previous divisions of the same
parent parcel or parent tract, shall result in a
number of parcels not more than the sum of the
following, as applicable: 
(a) For the first 10 acres or fraction 
thereof in the parent parcel or parent tract, 4
parcels. [Emphasis added.] 
A “parent parcel” or “parent tract” is defined as "a 
parcel or tract . . . lawfully in existence on the 
effective date of the amendatory act that added this 
subdivision.” 
MCL 560.102(i). 
The effective date of the 
1996 amendment that added that subsection, 1996 PA 591, was 
March 31, 1997. 
Thus, under the LDA, a parent parcel that 
was in existence on March 31, 1997, and is less than ten 
acres in size, cannot be divided into more than four total 
parcels. MCL 560.108(2)(a). 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
On March 31, 1997, the Sotelo parent parcel was 2.35 
acres 
and 
the 
Filut 
parent 
parcel 
was 
7.63 
acres. 
Accordingly, under § 108(2)(a), the two parent parcels 
could not be divided into more than six resulting parcels. 
Part of the Filut parent parcel (3.25 acres) became part of 
the “reconfigured” Sotelo parcel.6
 The parties correctly 
assume that the first transfer of property—the conveyance 
of the 3.25 acres from Filut to the Sotelos—was not a 
“division,” “exempt split,” or “subdivision,” as those 
terms are defined in the LDA, because it was a transfer to 
an adjacent piece of property, MCL 560.102(d),(e), and (f). 
Therefore, it does not count as a division when evaluating 
Filut’s subsequent four-parcel partitioning. Because Filut 
did not transfer to the Sotelos the right to make any of 
his four divisions, his subsequent four-parcel splitting 
was within his limit under the LDA. MCL 560.108(2)(a). 
The reconfigured Sotelo parcel could not be divided 
into four parcels, however, because it included a portion 
of the original Filut parent parcel, which had already 
reached its maximum potential divisions. The Sotelo parent 
parcel, because it had not previously been divided, was not 
in violation of the LDA. 
But the Filut parent parcel, a 
portion of which was now part of the reconstituted Sotelo 
6 Under § 109(2), Filut could have transferred one or more 
of his division rights to the Sotelos, but he did not. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
parcel, had already been divided four times. 
Therefore, 
its further division (as part of the Sotelo reconstituted 
parcel) violated § 108(2)(a). 
No portion of the Filut 
parent parcel (including the portion that was conveyed to 
the Sotelos) could be divided again until at least ten 
years expired, MCL 560.108(5)(a), without complying with 
the platting requirements of the LDA. Therefore, the trial 
court did not err when it granted summary disposition to 
defendant on this basis. 
In contrast, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of 
the LDA does not comport with the language of the act. 
First, the Court ignored the requirements of § 108(2). 
Although the panel correctly observed that a “division” is, 
in part, “the partitioning or splitting of a parcel or 
tract of land by the proprietor . . . that results in 1 or 
more parcels of less than 40 acres . . . ,” 255 Mich App 
166 quoting MCL 560.102(d), it erred in interpreting the 
phrase “same parent parcel or parent tract” in § 108(2)(a) 
as referring to the reconfigured Sotelo property rather 
than to the parent parcels that existed on March 31, 1997. 
Section 
108(2) 
specifically 
includes 
“any 
previous 
divisions of the same parent parcel” in the calculation of 
the number of allowable divisions. 
With respect to the 
portion of the resulting Sotelo property that came from 
9  
 
 
 
Filut, the “same parent parcel” was the Filut parent 
parcel. 
Second, the Court of Appeals misconstrued § 102(d), 
which states in part that, in order to “be considered a 
building site,” a parcel that results from a transfer 
between 
two 
adjacent 
parcels 
must 
conform 
to 
the 
requirements of the LDA or an applicable local ordinance. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that this rule implies that 
the LDA allows for the development of a parcel created by 
transferring adjoining property if the LDA and local 
ordinances are satisfied. 
On the basis of this provision, 
the panel broadly concluded that the enlarged Sotelo parcel 
that resulted from the transfer from the adjacent Filut 
parcel was a proper building site and that the “parcels 
into which it was divided conformed to the LDA and 
applicable local ordinances.” 
255 Mich App 472. 
In 
contrast to the panel’s conclusion, this portion of the 
statute merely states that the parcel that results from an 
adjacent-parcel 
transfer 
must 
meet 
minimum 
local 
regulations (i.e, for lot size), or, if there is no local 
government 
regulation, 
then 
whatever 
requirements 
are 
imposed under the LDA. 
See MCL 560.109(1)(b) and (5). 
It 
does not state that any transfer of property to an adjacent 
parcel is permissible as long as it results in buildable 
lots. 
Because the division of the reconfigured Sotelo 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
parcel resulted in a number of divisions to the parent 
parcel that exceeded the number of divisions permitted 
under § 108(a) of the LDA, plaintiffs were required to 
comply with the LDA’s platting provisions. 
IV 
We hold that the circuit court properly considered the 
Filut 
and 
Sotelo 
parent 
parcels—as 
they 
existed 
on 
March 31, 1997—when it concluded that the four-parcel 
splitting of the reconfigured Sotelo parcel was required to 
comply with the platting provisions of the LDA. 
The Court 
of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s grant of 
summary disposition for the township. 
Therefore, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 
the 
judgment 
of 
the 
Newaygo 
Circuit 
Court. 
MCL 
7.302(G)(1). 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ. 
We would not dispose of this case by opinion per 
curiam, but would grant leave to appeal. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
11