Title: Darren Witt v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

APPELLANT PRO SE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Darren Witt   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Michigan City, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael Gene Worden  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 45S00-0608-CR-283 
 
DARREN WITT, 
 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
(Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
(Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, No. 45G02-9510-CF-206 
The Honorable Clarence D. Murray, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Direct Appeal 
_________________________________ 
 
June 12, 2007 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
An individual who pleads guilty where the issue of sentencing is left to the trial court’s 
discretion must challenge that sentence, if at all, in a direct appeal.  When the time for appeal has 
expired, Post-Conviction Rule 2 permits such an individual to request permission to file a belated 
notice of appeal.  But the grant of such permission is not automatic.  In this case, Darren Witt did 
 
not meet the Rule’s requirement that he demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
had been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal.   
 
Background 
 
In October 1995, Darren Witt was charged with Murder,1 Felony Murder,2 and Criminal 
Deviate Conduct.3  The State sought the death penalty.4   
 
In November 1996, Witt and the State entered into an “open plea” agreement.5  The State 
amended the charging information by adding a charge of Robbery6 and substituted a request for 
a sentence of Life Imprisonment Without Parole7 for its earlier death penalty request.  Witt 
agreed to plead guilty to Murder and Robbery.  In return for a plea of guilty, the State said it 
would recommend that Witt receive a sentence of life without parole; Witt said he would agree 
that a sentence of life without parole was appropriate.   
 
The trial court accepted Witt’s guilty plea.  After taking sentencing under advisement, the 
trial court sentenced Witt to life without parole on December 6, 1996. 
 
During the next nine and one-half years, Witt did not seek direct or collateral review of 
his convictions or sentence.  On May 5, 2006, Witt filed a petition for permission to file a belated 
notice of appeal pursuant to Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 2.  Without a hearing, but after receiving 
a response from the State, the court granted Witt’s motion.  
                                                 
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1993). 
 
2 Id. 
 
3 I.C. § 35-42-4-2 (1993). 
 
4 I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(D), (G), (b)(9)(D) (Supp. 1994).   
 
5 A plea agreement where the issue of sentencing is left to the trial court’s discretion is often referred to as 
an “open plea.”  Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004). 
 
6 As a Class A felony, I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (1993). 
 
7 I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G), b(9)(D). 
 
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Witt contends that his sentence was improperly imposed in light of Blakely v. Washing-
ton, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which recognized certain constitutional limitations on a trial court’s 
sentencing authority.8  The State cross appeals, arguing that Witt’s request to file a belated notice 
of appeal was improvidently granted.  Because Witt appeals from a sentence of life without pa-
role, this Court (rather than the Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction. Ind. Appellate Rule 
4(A)(1)(a).   
 
Because we agree with the State that Witt’s request to file a belated notice of appeal was 
improvidently granted, we do not reach the question of whether Witt has a colorable claim under 
Blakely.  That issue is pending before this Court in another case.  See Gutermuth v. State, 848 
N.E.2d 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. granted, 860 N.E.2d 588 (Ind. 2006) (table). 
 
Discussion 
 
Several years ago, this Court’s decision in Collins v. State resolved a conflict in the Court 
of Appeals over whether challenges to a sentence imposed following an open plea must be 
brought in a direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1.  
Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 2004).  We held that the proper procedure was to file a 
direct appeal.     
 
Collins noted that many trial courts had advised defendants, in reliance on Court of Ap-
peals authority (disapproved in Collins), that no direct appeal was available with respect to their 
sentences when they pled guilty.  As such, the deadlines imposed by the appellate rules for filing 
a direct appeal had expired for many defendants.  Collins held that an individual in this situation 
could still look to Post-Conviction Rule 2, which permits an individual convicted after a trial or 
guilty plea who fails to file a timely notice of appeal to petition for permission to file a belated 
notice of appeal.  Id. at 233.     
 
                                                 
8 Witt also contends that his due process rights were violated when the trial court deviated from the terms 
of the plea agreement and reduced his Robbery conviction from a Class A felony to a Class C felony.  
Having pled guilty, such a claim is available to Witt, if at all, in post-conviction proceedings pursuant to 
Post-Conviction Rule 1.  See Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395-96 (Ind. 1996).  
 
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Witt was advised at the time of his sentencing hearing that he could not appeal the sen-
tence and understandably invokes Collins in seeking to use the belated appeal procedure con-
templated by Post-Conviction Rule 2.  But, while Post-Conviction Rule 2 permits an individual 
convicted after a trial or guilty plea who fails to file a timely notice of appeal to petition for per-
mission to file a belated notice of appeal, receiving that permission requires the petitioner to 
make two showings by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the failure to file a timely notice 
of appeal is not the fault of the petitioner; and (2) that the petitioner has been diligent in request-
ing permission to file a belated notice of appeal.  P-C.R. 2(1); Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 233. 
 
Here, the State contends that Witt did not satisfy these conditions and so the trial court 
should not have granted Witt’s motion for permission to file a belated notice of appeal.  It argues 
that Witt has not proven that he was not at fault for failing to file a timely notice of appeal and 
that he did not present evidence demonstrating his diligence in requesting permission to file the 
belated notice of appeal.    
 
Witt, in his petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal and response to the 
State’s cross appeal, argues to the contrary.  In his petition for permission to file a belated notice 
of appeal, he maintained that: 
 
• He is not trained in matters of the law.  
• He relied on the improper instructions of the sentencing court that instructed him 
that he was not permitted to appeal his sentence directly. 
 
Witt, in his Reply Brief to this Court, reiterated the above arguments and added the following: 
 
• He did not graduate from high school. 
• His IQ is in the lower eighth percentile of the population.  
• His education and abilities were under those of the average person at the time of 
the sentencing hearing. 
•  His appeal of a conviction following a jury trial was his only prior experience 
with the appellate process and the fact that the instant sentence was the result of a 
 
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plea agreement militated in favor of his reliance upon the trial judge’s incorrect 
statement of the law.  
• Other than the colloquy between the trial judge and his trial counsel, his trial 
counsel did not otherwise inform him of his appellate options.  
• The State failed to remedy the trial court’s misstatement of the proper appellate 
procedure for review of his sentence.   
 
 
The trial court, without the benefit of Witt’s argument to this Court, found dispositive the 
following colloquy between the sentencing court and the trial counsel and ruled in favor of Witt: 
 
By [defense counsel] Mr. Thiros: Does he have a right to appeal? 
By the Court: I don’t think so.  Appeal P.C.R., this is not the result of a trial. 
By Mr. Thiros: I think even as a result of a plea, your Honor, this is not an agreed 
sentence. 
By the Court: It doesn’t make any difference.  It’s P.C.R. if he wishes to raise any 
claim about the deficiency of the sentence, it’s a P.C.R. It’s not a direct 
appeal.  He’s not entitled to a direct appeal on a guilty plea.  
 
Pursuant to Collins, the fact that the trial court had advised Witt that he could not file a 
direct appeal for review of his sentence satisfies the first requirement of Post-Conviction Rule 2; 
Witt is not at fault for failing to pursue what he was told would be improper appellate procedure.   
 
Witt, however, has not demonstrated that he has complied with the second prong of Post-
Conviction Rule 2.  The trial court did not make any findings of fact regarding the second prong 
of Post-Conviction Rule 2 but compliance with the second prong is also a prerequisite for per-
mission to pursue a belated appeal.  Nothing in the record suggests that Witt attempted to chal-
lenge his sentence until nine and one-half years after it was entered when he filed the petition at 
issue here.9  Notably, Witt did not petition the trial court for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
Post-Conviction Rule 1 even though the trial judge, at the sentencing hearing, told him that he 
had that vehicle available to challenge his sentence.  Accordingly, Witt has failed to demonstrate 
                                                 
9 Indeed, Witt’s petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal was not filed until 19 months 
after Collins was decided. 
 
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that he was diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal as required by 
Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(b). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Because Witt has failed to satisfy the requirements of Post-Conviction Rule 2, the trial 
court should not have granted his motion to file the belated notice of appeal.  We dismiss the ap-
peal. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
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