Title: McQuay v. Guntharp

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Cathy McQUAY, Sam McQuay, Sue Beebe, Sharion
Cantrell, Rachel Keech, Charman Rowe, 
Dennis Rowe, and Randy Thatch v. 
Randall GUNTHARP, M.D., and Northeast
Arkansas Internal Medicine Clinic, d/b/a
Pocahontas Family Clinic

96-1523                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 19, 1998


1.   Civil procedure -- when motion to dismiss treated as one for summary
     judgment. -- Ordinarily, when matters outside the pleadings are
     presented and not excluded by the trial court in connection
     with a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the
     appellate court treats the motion as one for summary judgment
     under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56.

2.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- matters considered. -- The matters to
     be considered in summary-judgment proceedings are limited to
     affidavits, depositions, admissions, and answers to
     interrogatories.

3.   Pleading -- court must look to complaint to determine whether particular
     cause of action stated. -- In determining whether the trial court
     erred in characterizing appellants' claim as a battery as
     opposed to outrage and thus ruling that the action was barred
     by the one-year statute of limitations pertaining to battery,
     the supreme court was obliged to look to the complaint itself. 
     

4.   Limitation of actions -- statute with longest limitations applies. --
     Where two or more statutes of limitations apply to a cause of
     action, the supreme court generally applies the statute with
     the longest limitations. 

5.   Pleading -- Arkansas recognizes only "facts pleadings." -- Although
     appellants' complaint stated that their action was one for
     outrage, the supreme court was required to look to the facts
     alleged because Arkansas does not recognize "notice
     pleadings," but only "facts pleadings"; the court looks to the
     gist of the action in making such a determination.

6.   Torts -- outrage -- necessary elements. -- To establish an outrage
     claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements:
     (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew
     or should have known that emotional distress was the likely
     result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was "extreme and
     outrageous," was "beyond all possible bounds of decency," and
     was "utterly intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) the
     actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff's
     distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the
     plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be
     expected to endure it. 

7.   Torts -- outrage -- determined on case-by-case basis. -- The type of
     conduct that meets the standard for outrage must be determined
     on a case-by-case basis.

8.   Torts -- outrage -- clear-cut proof required. -- The supreme court
     gives a narrow view to the tort of outrage and requires
     clear-cut proof to establish the elements in outrage cases;
     merely describing the conduct as outrageous does not make it
     so; clear-cut proof, however, does not mean proof greater than
     a preponderance of the evidence.

9.   Appeal & error -- issue not ruled upon by trial court not addressed on
     appeal. -- Although appellees raised the issue of the
     applicability of the statute of limitations pertaining to
     medical injury in their motion to dismiss, the record did not
     reflect that the trial court ever ruled on the issue, and,
     accordingly, the supreme court did not address the argument on
     appeal.   

10.  Torts -- outrage -- complaint demonstrated sufficient facts to support
     claim for -- trial court erred in characterizing action as battery. --
     Appellants' complaint demonstrated sufficient facts to support
     a claim for outrage separate and apart from a claim for
     battery where, among other things, appellants were patients of
     appellee-physician, who, during their physical examinations,
     improperly touched, examined, and fondled their breasts; where
     appellants specifically pleaded that the trauma of having a
     doctor, whom each had trusted, fondle their breasts in a
     sexually suggestive manner had caused them to be less trusting
     of physicians in general; and where two appellant-husbands
     asserted that they had suffered a loss of consortium of their
     wives as a result of appellee-physician's actions; the trial
     court erred in characterizing the cause of action as
     constituting the tort of battery.

11.  Torts -- outrage -- nature of physician-patient relationship made outrage
     suit appropriate. -- The nature of the physician-patient
     relationship and the nature of the allegations presented by
     appellants made appropriate a suit for the tort of outrage; a
     patient entrusts his or her body and sense of dignity to a
     physician; looking to the facts alleged in the complaint, it
     was apparent that appellants were most vulnerable in
     presenting their bodies to a physician whom they trusted to
     exercise professionalism in his treatment, only to be taken
     advantage of by a doctor seeking his own personal
     gratification.  

12.  Limitation of actions -- trial court erred in dismissing complaint --
     three-year outrage limitations applied -- reversed and remanded. -- The
     supreme court, concluding that the trial court erred in
     dismissing the complaint because sufficient facts were alleged
     to state a cause of action for the tort of outrage, which is
     governed by the three-year statute of limitations found in
     Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-105 (1987), reversed the dismissal of
     the complaint and remanded the matter to the trial court.


     Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court; Harold S. Erwin, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Boswell, Tucker, Brewster & Hicks, by: George R. Wise, Jr.,
for appellants.
     Womack, Landis, Phelps, McNeill & McDaniel, by:  Lucinda
McDaniel, for appellees.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellants Cathy and Sam McQuay, Sue Beebe, Sharion Cantrell,
Rachel Keech, Charman and Dennis Rowe, and Randy Thatch, appeal the
judgment of the Randolph County Circuit Court dismissing with
prejudice their claim against Appellees Dr. Randall Guntharp and
Northeast Arkansas Internal Medicine Clinic.  Our jurisdiction of
this appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(15), as it
presents a question concerning the law of torts.  Appellants raise
one point for reversal.  We reverse.
     Dr. Guntharp is a licensed physician with a medical practice
in Pocahontas, employed by the Northeast Arkansas Internal Medicine
Clinic, d/b/a Pocahontas Family Clinic.  It is undisputed that he
last saw Appellants in his office on the following dates:  Rachel
Keech on November 30, 1993; Charman Rowe on February 4, 1994;
Sharion Cantrell on March 11, 1994; Randy Thatch on April 4, 1994;
Sue Beebe on October 25, 1994; and Cathy McQuay on January 30,
1995.  On February 28, 1996, Appellants filed a complaint for the
tort of outrage, alleging that Dr. Guntharp had "improperly
touched, examined, and otherwise fondled" their breasts during
their physical examinations.  In an amended complaint filed on
April 25, 1996, Appellants Sam McQuay and Dennis Rowe alleged a
loss of consortium of their wives based upon Dr. Guntharp's
outrageous conduct.    
     Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on April 3,
1996, stating that the allegations of wrongful touching constituted
a battery, and were thus barred by the one-year statute of
limitations, as provided in Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-104 (Supp.
1995).  Attached to the motion as Exhibit 2 was Dr. Guntharp's
affidavit, which merely set out the last dates on which he had seen
each of the Appellants in his office.  Appellees alternatively
moved to dismiss the complaint on their theory that the allegations
of distress arising from Dr. Guntharp's professional services
constituted a medical injury, which therefore barred the claims of
Rachel Keech and Charman Rowe through the two-year statute of
limitations.  See Ark. Code Ann.  16-114-203 (Supp. 1997).
     The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice,
holding that Appellants' claims constituted a battery and was
therefore barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable
to such action.  At the dismissal hearing, the trial court stated
that the facts pleaded in the case did not rise to the level of
outrage and added, "it's got to be terrible in order for outrage to
occur."  On appeal, Appellants do not dispute that the initial
complaint was filed more than one year after Dr. Guntharp had any
contact with each of them.  Instead, they argue that the trial
court erred by finding that the complaint described claims for
battery instead of outrage.
     Ordinarily, when matters outside the pleadings are presented
and not excluded by the trial court in connection with a motion to
dismiss under ARCP Rule 12(b)(6), we treat the motion as one for
summary judgment under ARCP Rule 56.  Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark.
378, 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996).  The matters to be considered in
summary judgment proceedings are limited to affidavits,
depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories.  Id. 
Here, the trial court considered Dr. Guntharp's affidavit in
support of Appellees' assertion that the claim was barred by the
one-year statute of limitations for battery or, alternatively, the
two-year statute of limitations for medical injuries.
     The circumstances of this case are somewhat unusual in that
the trial court's dismissal of the case was based solely upon its
characterization of the nature of the claim, which resulted in a
ruling that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Accordingly, we must decide whether the trial court erred in
characterizing the claim as a battery, as opposed to outrage, and
thus ruling that the action was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations pertaining to battery.  In making this determination,
we must look to the complaint itself.  O'Bryant v. Horn, 297 Ark.
617,