Title: Idaho v. Miramontes

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 49460 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
) 
Boise, June 2022 Term 
) 
v. 
) 
Opinion filed: September 19, 2022 
) 
NATALIE J. MIRAMONTES, 
) 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
  
) 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, Bannock County. Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s order denying motion to suppress is reversed, the 
judgment of conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded. 
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, 
attorney for Appellant. Sally Cooley argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for 
Respondent. Mark Olsen argued. 
 
 
BEVAN, Chief Justice, 
This case comes to the Court on a petition for review from the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
Probation officers detained Natalie Miramontes while conducting a residence check on a female 
probationer, Christine Evans. During the detention, probation officers searched Miramontes’ purse 
and found suspected drug paraphernalia. Probation officers paused the search and contacted 
Pocatello police. Once police arrived, officers resumed the search and, inside a pantry converted 
to a spare bedroom, they uncovered more drug paraphernalia and a substance that tested 
presumptively positive for methamphetamine. Miramontes told Pocatello police she had been 
sleeping inside the spare room. Miramontes moved to suppress all evidence found during her 
detention. The district court denied her motion. Miramontes entered a conditional guilty plea and 
reserved her right to appeal. She appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction. 
Miramontes petitioned for review with this Court, which was granted. On appeal, Miramontes 
asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because officers searched her 
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purse without reasonable and articulable suspicion. She also alleges the items found during the 
later search of the spare bedroom would not have been inevitably discovered without the unlawful 
search of her purse. For the reasons below, we reverse the district court’s decision and remand. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
Probation officers with the Idaho Department of Correction entered Christine Evans’ 
residence in Pocatello, Idaho at about 9:00 p.m. The probation officers were there to conduct a 
probationary check on Evans. Evans participated in the Bannock County Mental Health Court, a 
treatment court that Evans voluntarily entered in exchange for her guilty plea to a felony charge of 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Evans’ probation agreement allowed 
probation officers Myler and LaVallee to enter Evans’ home, verify living arrangements, check 
for contraband, and confirm compliance with the terms of her probation. 
On entering the home, Myler suspected other people were inside and proceeded to the back 
of the home to verify. As she did, she saw a person exiting through the back door, hunched over 
and carrying a bag. Myler ordered the person to “stop” three times. The last time Myler shouted 
the command, the person complied. When Myler approached, the officer saw the person, later 
identified as Miramontes, drop what she was carrying in the backyard. Myler ordered Miramontes 
to reenter the residence, identify herself, and explain why she was at Evans’ home. Miramontes 
told Myler she was staying with Evans in a spare room. 
While Miramontes complied with Myler’s directive to reenter the home, LaVallee 
collected the items Miramontes dropped outside on the ground. LaVallee brought three or four 
items inside and placed them on the washing machine. Myler asked Miramontes for her 
identification card. Miramontes moved to retrieve her identification, but Myler stopped her and 
said LaVallee would retrieve the identification card for her. As a result, Miramontes told the 
officers her identification card was in her pink/salmon floral print bag, which LaVallee opened. 
When LaVallee opened the bag, he saw what appeared to be drugs or drug paraphernalia in the 
bag. Once the paraphernalia was discovered, both probation officers stopped searching and called 
the Pocatello Police Department. 
The probation officers detained Miramontes and Evans until Pocatello police arrived. 
When police arrived, Myler and LaVallee searched Evans’ bedroom and a pantry converted into a 
spare room that Miramontes also told Pocatello police officer Leach she was staying in.   Among 
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other belongings uncovered in the room, Leach found drug paraphernalia (baggies, pipes, syringes, 
and a torch) and a substance that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. Leach also 
inspected the bags LaVallee had collected outside where Miramontes dropped them and 
discovered another bag with a wallet containing Miramontes’ identification and a syringe with a 
dark substance. 
Leach spoke to Miramontes and Evans separately. Leach gave Miramontes her Miranda1 
rights and asked her which of the belongings in the spare bedroom belonged to her. After 
identifying her items, Miramontes was arrested. 
B. Procedural Background 
The State charged Miramontes with one felony count of possession of methamphetamine 
with intent to deliver under Idaho Code section 37-2732(a)(1)(A). Miramontes pleaded not guilty 
and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing Myler unreasonably seized her outside of Evans’ 
residence. In her written motion, Miramontes sought to suppress the “[e]vidence obtained through 
an illegal seizure.” The written motion was silent about any alleged illegal search. 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Officers Myler, LaVallee, and 
Leach all testified. The district court ordered the parties to submit post-hearing briefing. After 
reviewing these briefs, the district court scheduled a second hearing to clarify the parties’ positions. 
In particular, the district court asked whether the State charged Miramontes based on the evidence 
found in her purse or in the spare bedroom in which she was staying—because “there was a 
temporal difference between evidence that was discovered by officers[.]” Miramontes contended 
that if the district court found the initial search of her purse illegal, all evidence 
found in the spare 
bedroom was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The court ordered additional briefing from the parties. 
After reviewing this supplemental briefing, the district court denied Miramontes’ suppression 
motion. Following the denial of her suppression motion, Miramontes entered a conditional plea 
of guilty under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(a)(2) to possession of methamphetamine and reserved 
her right to appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. 
Miramontes then timely petitioned this Court for review, which we granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
“‘When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court gives 
due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision 
of the trial court.’” State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019) (quoting State 
v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 770, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016)). When this Court reviews a district 
court’s order granting or denying a motion to suppress, “‘the standard of review is bifurcated.’” 
Id. (quoting State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) “This Court will 
accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing State v. Watts, 
142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). Even so, “this Court may freely review the trial 
court’s application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (internal citation 
omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 
We reverse the district court’s decision denying Miramontes’ motion to suppress and 
remand for fact-finding on whether Miramontes was unlawfully searched. 
Miramontes argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because her 
purse was searched without reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, and she maintains 
Evans’ Fourth Amendment waiver did not make the search of Miramontes’ purse lawful. She also 
contends the evidence found in her purse and during the search of the spare bedroom should have 
been suppressed as fruits of the unlawful search. The State maintains that Miramontes’ argument 
was not preserved for appeal. The State argues that even if some iteration of Miramontes’ argument 
was presented below, it is still unpreserved because she did not receive an adverse ruling from the 
district court. 
1. Miramontes preserved her argument that the search of her purse was unlawful. 
We first address the State’s preservation argument. The State contends Miramontes did not 
support her argument about the legality of the search with any cogent argument or authority below, 
but even if she did, she failed to obtain an adverse ruling from the district court on the legality of 
the search. According to the State, Miramontes argued only that evidence should be suppressed 
based on “an illegal seizure,” but she did not otherwise claim her rights were violated through an 
unlawful search. 
Miramontes moved to suppress “all evidence obtained through an illegal seizure.” Her 
initial motion did not mention suppressing evidence from an illegal search. Yet her brief in support 
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of the motion to suppress included citation to a Utah Court of Appeals case in which a search was 
addressed. See State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). She alleged the intrusion on 
her Fourth Amendment rights was significant and specifically referenced the search of her 
property without her consent or a warrant. Miramontes put forth a substantive legal argument to 
suggest why the facts between her case and Valdez were similar. She maintained that what was 
“particularly interesting about the Valdez ruling and fact pattern is that the Utah Court of Appeals 
ruled the simple detention to be permissible; however, the subsequent identification and search 
was not permissible and that court suppressed the contraband found on Mr. Valdez.” Later in the 
same brief, Miramontes argued, “[t]he [c]ourt should rule similarly to the court in State v. 
Valdez[.]” Before we address the merits of the State’s preservation argument, we must first clarify 
the proper preservation standard for issues for appellate review in this and similar cases. We 
recently reiterated: 
This Court does not review an alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses 
an adverse ruling forming the basis for the assignment of error. . . . This is true 
[e]ven though an issue was argued to the court, [in order] to preserve an issue for 
appeal there must be a ruling by the court. 
Matter of Est. of Hirning, 167 Idaho 669, 678–79, 475 P.3d 1191, 1200–01 (2020) (citations 
omitted). This rule set forth a standard that required appellants to obtain an adverse ruling to 
preserve an issue for appeal. Then last year, we again “clarified” our preservation standards and 
stated the rule thus: “both the issue and a party’s position on that issue must be presented to the 
trial court before we will consider it on appeal.” State v. Wilson, 169 Idaho 342, 347, 495 P.3d 
1030, 1035 (2021) (emphasis in original). In Wilson, relying on State v. DuValt, this Court 
explained: 
An exception to the preservation requirement has been described by this Court in 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). In DuValt, this 
Court noted that “when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court,” it is 
sufficiently preserved for appeal. Id. (Italics added.) We recently reaffirmed this 
exception in State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019). 
Id. There was no reference in Wilson to a requirement that the trial court issue an adverse ruling to 
preserve an appeal. Thus, we have reached divergent holdings: one requires both an objection and 
an adverse ruling, while other, more recent pronouncements do not require such an adverse ruling. 
We take this occasion to clarify that it is not mandatory for a party-appellant to obtain an adverse 
ruling from the trial court to preserve an issue for appellate review, so long as the party’s 
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position on that issue was presented to the trial court with argument and authority and noticed for 
hearing. Thus, any prior holdings to the contrary, including, but not limited to Choice Feed,  Inc. 
v. Montierth, 168 Idaho 124, 151, 481 P.3d 78, 105 (2021); Matter of Estate of Hirning, 167 Idaho 
669, 678, 475 P.3d 1191, 1200 (2020); Oswald v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 167 Idaho 540, 563, 
473 P.3d 809, 832 (2020) are distinguished. While today’s holding appears on its face to directly 
contradict, and thus abrogate the listed cases, we do not go that far because each case is 
distinguishable on its specific facts. The parties in those cases did not present the issue in question 
to the district court or they failed to provide an adequate record on appeal to establish that they 
had sufficiently presented the issue to the district court. As a result, absent an adverse ruling from 
the district court, there was no definitive issue to review on appeal in those cases. This case is 
different because the issue was presented and argued, giving the district court the opportunity to 
rule on it, even though it failed to do so. 
As a result, we hold that a party preserves an issue for appeal by properly presenting the 
issue with argument and authority to the trial court below and noticing it for hearing or a party 
preserves an issue for appeal if the trial court issues an adverse ruling. Both are not required. But 
that said, this ruling should not be seen as carte blanche to make half-baked or cursory objections 
to preserve an issue for appeal. To be sure, obtaining an adverse ruling will always provide a better 
framework for appellate analysis. It remains the preferable course for the reasons set forth by the 
Court when the adverse ruling rule was originally recognized in 1940: 
To properly preserve and present to this [C]ourt claimed errors of this nature, 
timely and proper objection should be made, first so the trial court may have an 
opportunity to prevent or if possible eradicate such error by admonition or 
instruction, and second, that there be  adverse  ruling or  action  by  the  trial  
court for review by this court. 
Stewart v. City of Idaho Falls, 61 Idaho 471, 103 P.2d 697, 700 (1940) (emphasis added). This 
statement of law, which addressed preservation in the context of a failure to object to argument 
presented at trial, highlights the importance of an adequate objection to the trial court so that the 
trial court may resolve or “eradicate” errors in that venue. It also notes that an adverse ruling or 
action by the trial court provides the basis for review by this Court. That a party must object and 
thereby create a record of the party’s adverse contention below is axiomatic. It is foundational for 
appellate review. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (quoting   Puckett 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009)) (“This limitation on appellate-court authority   serves 
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to induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the [trial] court the opportunity 
to consider and resolve them.”). By objecting and providing a well-stated basis for such objection, 
trial courts are ordinarily 
in the best position to determine the relevant facts and adjudicate the dispute. In the 
case of an actual or invited procedural error, the district court can often correct or 
avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome. And of 
course 
the 
contemporaneous-objection 
rule 
prevents 
a 
litigant 
from 
“‘sandbagging’” the court—remaining silent about his objection and belatedly 
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor. 
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134 (quotations and citations omitted). 
We continue to uphold these principles and encourage advocates to adhere to them going 
forward. Indeed, the best practice dictates that the objecting party aim to obtain an adverse ruling 
to properly preserve the issue. That said, while an adverse ruling is best practice, and would have 
avoided the back-and-forth confusion in the record here, making the argument and stating the 
party’s position on the argument to the trial court, supported with authority is enough to preserve 
the issue for appeal. Therefore, while we are abrogating a bright line adverse ruling rule, we note 
that attorneys who properly present their issue to the district court as described above but fail to 
secure such a ruling may undermine or impair their clients’ position on appeal. 
This discussion leads us to the State’s preservation argument here. The question raised by 
the State is whether Miramontes argued, in her motion to suppress before the trial court, that she 
underwent both an unlawful search and seizure or if she only argued that she faced an unlawful 
seizure. For the reasons discussed below, we hold Miramontes preserved the argument that she 
was unlawfully searched and seized. 
During oral argument below, Miramontes’ counsel made additional argument about the 
search of Miramontes’ purse. The district court tried to clarify—from both parties—the grounds 
for the motion to suppress and what the State was charging Miramontes with: 
[THE COURT:] So here’s the first question: The drugs that are the basis of the 
charge -- there were drugs found in two places. There were drugs found in one of 
the purses, the pink flowered purse that was salmon or whatever, and back and forth 
we went. There were drugs, some drugs found in that -- in one of those, and there 
were drugs found in the bedroom where Ms. Miramontes was staying. My question 
is are the drugs you’re seeking to suppress the drugs that were in the purse or in the 
bedroom? That’s the first question. 
And related to that, . . . are the drugs that you charged this case for, were those the 
drugs in the purse or in the bedroom. . . ? 
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Miramontes’ counsel responded that “if the [c]ourt were to suppress—or I should say if the [c]ourt 
were to find that the search was an illegal search…[a]nything connecting back to Ms. Miramontes 
I think ought to be suppressed.” A few moments later, Miramontes’ counsel continued: “So they 
get to finding all the stuff and associating her and everything, because they’ve illegally searched 
the purse, at least from the defense perspective. . . ” (emphasis added). 
Near the hearing’s conclusion, the district court requested both parties supplement their 
briefing a second time. In this supplemental brief, Miramontes argued: “It is Ms. Miramontes’ 
position that the evidence obtained from Officer LaVallee’s search of the pink/salmon bag was the 
product of an illegal search, which was the conclusion of Ms. Miramontes’ first Brief in Support 
of Motion to Suppress.” (Emphasis added.) As a result, Miramontes made clear both in her 
supplementary briefing and at oral argument to the district court that she was arguing that both the 
search and seizure were unlawful. The district court simply failed to reach Miramontes’ objections 
about the constitutionality of the search. Yet we do not fully fault the district court for failing to 
discern the full extent of Miramontes’ arguments. As noted, the record is muddled in this regard. 
The written motion to suppress contained no mention of an illegal search; it was only raised later 
in Miramontes’ supporting memorandum. The district court was concerned about the temporal 
relationship between the items found in the purse and those found in the spare bedroom. Indeed, 
the court requested two rounds of briefing to clarify the issue. But to now hold that Miramontes 
loses this appeal because her counsel failed to compel the trial judge to rule on her argument about 
the search would unduly penalize Miramontes for failing to obtain an adverse ruling when our case 
law did not clearly require her to do so. 
While the emphasis of Miramontes’ briefing below focused on the alleged illegality of the 
seizure, this Court’s preservation standards are not so exacting as to foreclose an argument on 
appeal just because it was not the central focus of the appellant’s argument below. Miramontes’ 
argument that her search was also illegal was supported by argument and legal authority. She 
sufficiently raised the issue and supported it with cogent argument and authority below, to preserve 
it for appeal. Wilson, 169 Idaho at 495 P.3d at 1035 (“both the issue and a party’s position on that 
issue must be presented to the trial court before we will consider it on appeal.”). 
2. We remand Miramontes’ case to the district court for analysis under a complete Fourth 
Amendment framework. 
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While we hold that Miramontes preserved her argument on appeal, we cannot reach the 
merits of her case because a record was not sufficiently developed below pertaining to the legality 
of the search. As a result, we reverse the district court’s decision denying Miramontes’ motion to 
suppress and remand the case for determination whether the search of her purse was unlawful and, 
if so, whether the evidence uncovered in the spare bedroom was fruit of that unlawful search. 
Below, the district court based its decision on whether Miramontes’ seizure was lawful. 
The parties now agree we resolved this issue in State v. Phipps, 166 Idaho 1, 454 P.3d 1084 (2019)2 
and thus we will not address it further here. Focusing on the alleged illegal seizure, the district 
court, the State, and Miramontes misapplied the appropriate framework to analyze a Fourth 
Amendment question, which resulted in insufficient factual development below and deflected what 
should have been a more complete analysis under the Fourth Amendment. 
At the suppression hearing, the district court requested supplemental briefing from the 
parties when the arguments shifted toward fruit of the poisonous tree. In response, Miramontes’ 
second brief focused on the inevitable discovery and independent source doctrines. But before 
considering, as the district court did, whether the fruit of the poisonous tree or inevitable discovery 
doctrines applied, the starting point should have been to determine (1) whether the Fourth 
Amendment applied, (2) whether the parties were arguing about a search, a seizure, or both, (3) 
whether Miramontes had standing to challenge the conduct; (4) whether a warrant was   required, 
(5) if a warrant was required, whether exceptions to the warrant requirement were present; and (6) 
if the court concluded the Fourth Amendment was violated, what the proper remedy was. None of 
these questions was properly presented or assessed and each warrants serious consideration from 
the district court on remand. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, we reverse the district court’s decision denying Miramontes’ motion 
to suppress, vacate her conviction, and remand for analysis consistent with this opinion. 
Justices BRODY, STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 In Phipps, this Court held that “officers have the categorical authority to detain all occupants of a residence incident 
to a lawful parole or probation search and to question them as long as the detention is not prolonged by the 
questioning.” Id. at 8, 454 P.3d at 1091.