Title: Rosenberger v. City of Casper Bd. of Adjustment

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Rosenberger v. City of Casper Bd. of Adjustment1988 WY 150765 P.2d 367Case Number: 88-138Decided: 12/12/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN ROSENBERGER, JULIA 
ROSENBERGER, IRVIN DUANE TIMBERMAN, PATRICIA TIMBERMAN AND LUCILLE READ, 
APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS),

v.

CITY OF CASPER BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Ronald A. 
Kastanek, Casper, for appellants.

David B. Park, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants John 
Rosenberger, Julia Rosenberger, Irvin Timberman, Patricia Timberman, and Lucille 
Read (Rosenbergers) challenge the district court's dismissal of their appeal 
from appelleeCity of Casper Zoning Board 
of Adjustment's (Board) denial of their petition for 
rehearing.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     In their petition for 
rehearing, Rosenbergers challenged the Board's August 6, 1987, final decision 
granting a Conditional Use Permit to a nonprofit shelter for homeless persons. 
The Board is said to have mailed written notice of its decision to grant the 
permit on October 8, 1987. On August 13, 1987, Lucille Read and Duane Timberman 
filed a notice of appeal in the district court from the Board's decision to 
grant the permit. That notice of appeal was dismissed on November 9, 1987, for 
failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

[¶4.]     Rosenbergers filed 
their petition for rehearing with the Board on November 13, 1987. The Board held 
a rehearing on December 3, 1987, during which it denied the petition for 
rehearing. Rosenbergers appealed from the denial of their petition for rehearing 
in a notice of appeal filed on January 11, 1988. The district court dismissed 
that notice of appeal on April 25, 1988, after determining that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the Board's denial of the petition for rehearing because 
the Board lacked authority to rehear its original decision to grant the 
Conditional Use Permit. From this determination the district court reasoned that 
Rosenbergers' notice of appeal was not taken from an appealable final order and 
the notice of appeal was not timely filed as to the original Board decision 
granting the permit. Rosenbergers challenge those conclusions, arguing that: (1) 
the Board's order denying rehearing was an appealable final order over which the 
district court had jurisdiction; and (2) their appeal was timely as to the 
original Board decision granting the permit, because under W.R.A.P. 12.04,1 the petition for rehearing tolled 
the time during which the notice of appeal from the Board's decision to grant 
the permit had to be filed.

[¶5.]     The district court 
dismissed Rosenbergers' notice of appeal from the Board's decision denying 
rehearing, basing its dismissal on this court's opinion in Hupp v. Employment 
Security Commission of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1986). In Hupp, this court 
unanimously reversed a Wyoming Employment Security Commission (WESC) decision on 
rehearing that overturned a final WESC ruling. Although the members of the court 
at that time unanimously agreed on that result, i.e., WESC had not adopted a 
rule to rehear its own final decisions, they held divergent views about the 
source of power from which such a rehearing rule might be 
created.

[¶6.]     In what is labeled as 
the majority opinion, Justice Cardine, joined by Justice Rooney, held that WESC 
did not have a rule allowing it to rehear its own final decision because the 
power to adopt such a rule was not expressly granted to the agency by the 
legislature. Id. at 225 (citing Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. City of 
Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Wyo. 1974)). A specially concurring opinion, authored 
by Justice Urbigkit, joined by Chief Justice Thomas, and adopted by Justice 
Brown in his own specially concurring opinion, advocated a different approach. 
It argued that an agency, with the general powers to adopt rules of procedure 
when granted by the legislature, may reconsider a decision if the agency has 
adopted rehearing rules pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
(WAPA). Hupp, 715 P.2d  at 228-232. The special concurrence cited W.S. 
16-3-102(a)(i) (October 1982 Repl.) as authority for this position. 715 P.2d  at 
228. (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas, C.J. See also 
Id. at 227 
(Brown, J., specially concurring).

[¶7.]     This case is not one in 
which an agency has adopted a rehearing rule without express legislative 
authority to do so, thereby requiring us to choose one of the two positions 
advocated in Hupp to render a binding opinion. In fact, embracing either of 
those positions in this case would risk issuing an advisory opinion. The 
statutes allowing the City of Casper to appoint the Board do not give the 
Board the express power to rehear its final decisions. See W.S. 15-1-605 through 
15-1-609 (July 1980 Repl.). Further, the Board's own rules and regulations, 
which appear to have been adopted pursuant to the WAPA, do not set forth a 
specific procedure for rehearing final Board decisions concerning Conditional 
Use Permits. No statutory or regulatory authority, under any rationale, exists 
for the Board to rehear its final decision on a Conditional Use 
Permit.

[¶8.]     The Board's order 
denying Rosenbergers' petition for rehearing is not an appealable final order 
since the Board lacked authority to rehear its original decision granting the 
permit. Rosenbergers' filing of their petition for rehearing did not toll the 
running of the time period for filing a notice of appeal of final agency action 
under W.R.A.P. 12.04.

[¶9.]     
AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.R.A.P. 12.04 provides 
in pertinent part:

In a contested case, or 
in a noncontested case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the 
petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, 
certified notice to all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of 
the petition for a rehearing, or if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) days 
after written, certified notice to all parties of the decision thereon 9*9 9*9 
9*9. (Emphasis added.)

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶10.]  I dissent because neither this record nor 
the law supports the premise of the majority decision that the City of Casper 
Board of Adjustment (Board) could not grant a rehearing which would toll the 
time for the Rosenbergers to appeal. Additionally, the time limitation for 
administrative agency appeal properly commences upon denial of rehearing or a 
decision on rehearing as expressly stated by W.R.A.P. 12.04 as constituting the 
second error in majority decision.

[¶11.]  Specifically, I would hold as documented 
in the record that the Board had the authority and had adopted rehearing rules. 
Further, the case of Hupp v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1986) is neither advisory nor nearly as 
narrow as the majority concludes.

[¶12.]  The gravamen of the majority is based on 
the supposition that the statutes do not grant express authority to rehear nor 
did the Board adopt any rules or regulations concerning a rehearing of 
conditional use permits. While the statutes do not explicitly provide for 
rehearing, the majority's view of the Board's rules is too restrictive and 
incorrect. In Chapter III entitled "Variances and Appeals," the post hearing 
requirements are set out in Sections 3 and 4 and provide:

b. Unless otherwise 
stated in the Board's minutes, all variance permits shall be valid for a period 
of six months. The case can then be reconsidered in its entirety, on petition or 
on the Board's own motion, and the previous decision left unchanged or modified 
as the Board sees fit.

c. All appeals from the 
decisions of the Board shall be in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, Section 9-276.19 - 9-276.33, Wyoming Statutes of 1957, Compiled 
1969.

Section 4. Non-conforming Uses. Variances 
considered under the non-conforming provisions of the Zoning Code shall follow 
the procedure outlined above. [Emphasis in original.]

The majority 
juggles semantics to find that a conditional use is not a variance because 
referenced in another rule to further the thesis that the Board has not adopted 
rehearing rules in this specific respect. However, Section 4 is explicit that 
the Section 3 procedure is applicable for non-conforming uses. While Section 
40-28 of the Board's rules entitled "Procedure for Variances, Exceptions, 
Conditional Uses, and Home Occupation Complaints" is applicable, it does not 
answer the rehearing question; that section speaks only to the form of such 
petitions and does not vary nor contradict the general appeals provisions of 
Sections 3 and 4 of the rules. Moreover, the Board recognized the need for 
rehearing flexibility as evidenced in Section 2 of its rules which expressly 
allows reconsideration of decisions which are only taken under advisement.1

[¶13.]  Clearly, the majority does not accept the 
inherent-authority rule, but melds the other two approaches together - the 
statutory requirement standard and the general power provisions - to derive a 
new compilation. While certainly unique, such a compromising perspective ignores 
the very issue before the court. I will not redebate the merit, desirability, or 
wisdom of the general power provisions approach as explained in my special 
concurrence in Hupp which did carry three judges' approval, except to point out 
that neither the Board nor the majority have referenced a single case even 
suggesting that law has changed in the two years since Hupp was published nor 
that the general law is different. See I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 107 S. Ct. 2360, 96 L. Ed. 2d 222, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 3209, 96 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1987) and West Penn Power v. EPA, 860 F.2d 581 (3rd 
Cir. 1988).

[¶14.]  The Supreme Court of Mississippi in Delta 
Drilling Co. v. Cannette, 489 So. 2d 1378 (Miss. 1986), when faced with this 
issue in relation to whether a worker's compensation case should be reopened, 
stated many of the reasons for the general power approach.

We emphasize that the 
Commission is an administrative agency, not a court. It has broad discretionary 
authority to establish procedures for the administration of compensation claims. 
It has like authority to relax and import flexibility to those procedures where 
in its judgment such is necessary to implement and effect its charge under the 
Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act. It is a rare day when we will reverse the 
Commission for an action taken in the implementation and enforcement of its own 
procedural rules. Today is not such a day.

Id. at 1380-81. See also 
Moschetti v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of Boulder, 40 Colo. App. 156, 
574 P.2d 874 (1977) (where rehearing was proper even without specific statutory 
authorization for rehearing because the subject of the variance showed that the 
board's actions may have been taken in violation of the law); Ranney v. Board of 
Appeals of Nantucket, 11 Mass. App. 112, 414 N.E.2d 373 (1981) (where the 
board's view, of its own error concerning application for a special use permit, 
constituted a change of circumstances so board could hear second zoning 
application); Henry v. Minnesota Public Utilities Com'n, 392 N.W.2d 209, 214 
(Minn. 1986) (the rehearing decision was "lawful, practical, and served the 
public interest"); Monaci v. W.C.A.B. (Ward Trucking), 541 A.2d 60, 63 
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1988) (rehearing could be granted "when justice requires"); Evanick 
v. W.C.A.B. (Fisher Scientific Co.), 111 Pa.Cmwlth. 439, 533 A.2d 1137 (1987) 
(grant of rehearing was discretionary with board); and Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n 
Ins. Co. v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 111 Pa. Cmwlth. 15, 
533 A.2d 186 (1987) (decision to reopen is within board's discretion). Cf. 3 E. 
Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 18-10 at 186 (1979), which constrains 
rehearing authority to correction of errors "caused by fraud, surprise, mistake 
or inadvertence."

[¶15.]  The timeliness of the Rosenbergers' 
notice of appeal can be unquestioned since it was well within the thirty days 
after the rehearing was denied. Further, the Rosenbergers' delay in filing the 
notice of appeal is well grounded in Wyoming precedent.

Rule 12.04, Wyoming Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, provides that if a rehearing is held in an 
administrative case, then the 30-day appeal period does not commence until the 
decision on rehearing is given to the parties through a written, certified 
notice. In other words, when an agency renders a second decision the full appeal 
period runs from the second decision, and an appealing party need not go back 
and calculate the days expended between the first decision and the date on which 
rehearing was granted to determine how many days he has left to appeal after the 
second decision. The same general rule is applicable to post-trial motion 
decisions in civil and criminal cases. Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P. It has also been held 
that where an administrative agency vacates a decision and enters the same 
decision subsequently, the time for taking an appeal begins to run from the date 
of the later decision. 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 
193, at 541 (1951). We find all of these situations analogous to the 
circumstances herein. It makes little difference whether the Board voluntarily 
vacated its own decision, or whether a court ordered it to do so - the 
subsequent entry of the same decision begins the appeal period anew. We hold 
that Hinckley's petition for review was timely 
filed.

Big 
HornCounty Com'rs v. Hinckley, 593 P.2d 573, 582 
(Wyo. 1979). 
See also Sky Lake Gardens Recreation, Inc. v. District Court of Appeal, Third 
Dist., 511 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1987) (date of rendition for calculating time to 
appeal was date of disposition of motion to amend); Gordon v. Richter, 528 So. 2d 374 (Fla.App. 1987); and Wakulla Wood Products v. Richey, 465 So. 2d 660 
(Fla.App. 1985). Cf. Janelli v. Pagano, 492 So. 2d 796 (Fla.App. 1986) (where 
notice of appeal from rehearing decision was truly untimely when filed more than 
thirty days from rehearing decision).

[¶16.]  There is a further very practical reason 
why this decision is simply wrong in adjudicatory procedure. The Board granted a 
rehearing, held the rehearing, and then denied the rehearing. The sole issue here is when does the notice 
of appeal time start. W.R.A.P. 12.04 provides in pertinent 
part:

In a contested case, or 
in a noncontested case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the 
petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, 
certified notice to all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of 
the petition for a rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) 
days after written, certified notice to all parties of the decision thereon, 9*9 
9*9 9*9.

[¶17.]  This court cannot even agree whether the 
right to rehearing existed for this agency, although exercised historically in 
operational practice since administrative agencies came to Wyoming. See I.C.C., 107 S. Ct. 2360. The rule does not provide that if a litigant guesses one way, it may 
be after the original decision and if guessing another, that it is after the 
denied rehearing. Certainly reason and justice decree that if the agency grants 
a rehearing, rightly, wrongly, or with thoughtful indifference, that appeal time 
comes procedurally when the rule states that it does - after "denial of the 
petition for a rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) days 
after written, certified notice to all parties of the decision thereon, 9*9 9*9 
9*9." W.R.A.P. 12.04.

[¶18.]  If the court wants appeal time to start 
by a different schedule, it should restate the rule for clarity and not 
obfuscate the subject with doubt by case decision. Procedural requirements for 
time scheduling should not be confused with substantive authority of the 
administrative agency.2

[¶19.]  Justice Douglas in United Gas Imp. Co. v. 
Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 229, 86 S. Ct. 360, 364, 15 L. Ed. 2d 284 
(1965), reh'g denied 382 U.S. 1001, 86 S. Ct. 526, 15 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1966) 
succinctly espoused concerning this rehearing issue that "[a]n agency, like a 
court, can undo what is wrongfully done by virtue of its order." While the 
majority fails to grasp the real issue, precedent, as well as this record, 
support the impropriety of the district court's dismissal of the notice of 
appeal as untimely.

[¶20.]  Consequently, I would reverse, and 
respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 2 of the rules 
provides in part:

b. All cases taken under 
advisement will be reconsidered by the Board within ten days after the original 
public hearing and another public hearing will be conducted dealing specifically 
with the cases taken under advisement. Such meetings will be called to order by 
the Chairman and then the procedure outlined above shall be 
followed.

2 The engendered confusion 
can easily be illustrated. Assume that the Board, after hearing, immediately 
renders a decision and the contestant, just as effectively, moves for rehearing 
on the stated basis of fact, law and politics that the decision was senseless, 
absurd and irrational. The Board thereupon discerns that whether the attack is 
justified, the agency may or may not have authority either to reconsider or to 
rehear and would take the request for rehearing under advisement to visit with 
counsel, check the mood of the community and cogitate upon what the majority of 
the Wyoming Supreme Court stated in Hupp. Thirty days later, the decision on 
rehearing is made and entered to be: (a) no authority to rehear exists, and/or 
(b) on the merits, the rehearing would also be denied since originally sensible, 
valid and rational. Under W.R.A.P. 12.04 as a denial of rehearing, when did or 
does the thirty days start if the denial is or may be justified by a lack of 
authority to grant? Does the agency have the authority to determine whether it 
has the authority, and if it exercises the authority by denial, what effect does 
that have on the commencement of time for appeal for judicial review of the 
substantive merits of the decision?

Further assume in 
different context that the petition for rehearing accurately and validly 
provides reasoning as sensible, valid and relevant in law and fact why the 
initial conclusion of the Board was arbitrary, capricious and abuse of 
discretion, otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege or immunity and in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority or limitations and lacking statutory right, and as further adopted 
without observance of procedure required by law and unsupported by substantial 
evidence. Thoughtfully accepting the force of second consideration persuasion, 
the Board, thirty-one days later after the initial decision, grants the 
rehearing and reverses the decision, but in new decision does not satisfy either 
litigants so both determine to seek judicial review. When does the appeal time 
commence for each litigant?