Title: STATE v PARKER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12198 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1973 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs - A L T O N MAURICE PARKER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : W e D. H i r s t argued, Missoula, Montana James Sadler argued, Missoula , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. C. Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, appeared, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps, County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: January 26, 1973 Decided : FEB 2 1 1973 M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by Alton Maurice Parker from his conviction of armed robbery and assault i n Missoula County. H e was found guilty by a jury of seven counts of robbery and one count of assault. The issue presented i n this case i s whether the denial of appel- lant's motion for substitution of judge was an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process of law. The appellant was charged with the commission of an armed robbery a t a bar i n Mill town, Montana, on December 26, 1970, and an information was filed on July 12, 1971. Counsel was appointed for the appellant on July 30, 1971, and he was arraigned on an amended information on August 30, 1971. The t r i a l of the cause was set down as the fourth case of the week starting September 13, 1971. This setting was later changed to the f i r s t case of the week of September 13, 1971. Through the operation of local d i s t r i c t court rules the case was f i r s t assigned to Judge Glore i n Department 1. On September 7, 1971, a motion for substitution of judge was filed on behalf of appellant. The following day an amended motion was filed. The amendment pointed out that the motion was made pursuant to section 95-1709(a), R.C.M. 1947, which reads: "The defendant or the prosecution may move the court in writing for a substitution of judge on the ground that he cannot have a f a i r and impartial hearing or t r i a l before said judge. The motion shall be made a t least fifteen (15) days prior to the t r i a l of the case, or any retrial thereof after appeal , except for good cause shown. * * *" On September 13, 1971, Judge Glore stepped down from the case. The record is not clear but i t appears from the order signed by Judge Brownlee on September 13, that Judge Glore removed himself because of the motion. There has been some question raised as to this motion i n regard t o its timeliness. There was no objection raised to i t i n the d i s t r i c t court and from the order mentioned above i t appears to have been treated as timely by the d i s t r i c t court. However, w e take no position on i t i n this opinion. On September 13, 1971, the motion which i s the subject of this appeal was filed. This motion asked for the substitution of Judge Brownlee for cause under section 95-1709(b), which reads: "In addition t o the provision of subsection (a) any defendant may move a t any time for substitution of judge for cause, supported by affidavit. Upon the filing of such motion the court shall conduct a hearing and determine the merits of the motion." The motion was supported by an affidavit of appellant alleging he could not receive a f a i r trial from Judge Brownlee because of a dispute between appellant and Judge Brownlee over credit for jail time in a prior sentencing. A hearing was held upon the motion as required by the statute. A t this hearing testimony from appellant was presented, Judge Brownlee denied the motion and the case went to t r i a l . W e will f i r s t deal with whether i t was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the motion. There i s nothing in the record which would indicate to this Court any other decision could have been made and this Court has held repeatedly that i t will not substitute i t s judg- ment for that of the trial court unless there i s clear showing that the evidence or circumstances require the opposite. Counsel for appel 1 ant argues the holding of the hearing on his o w n prejudice by Judge Brownlee, the prior sentencing of appellant by Judge Brownlee, and denial of a recess to allow counsel for appellant to commence an original proceeding in this Court are all indications of an abuse of discretion. The fact that appellant's counsel was not allowed to seek a writ of supervisory control would not be an abuse of discretion as appellant has a remedy by appeal and was not prejudiced by denial of the recess. W e turn then to the question of whether the denial of the motion was a violation of due process of law. Appellant has not clearly framed the issue on this point. I t i s difficult to determine if he i s arguing that the statute i s unconstitutional or if the action of the judge applied the statute unconstitutionally to appellant. The question of whether the stat- ute is constitutional is not properly before this Court and w e take no position in respect t o the question other than to apply the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to all statutes coming before this Court. Harrison v. City o f Missoula, 146 Mont. 420, 425, 407 P.2d 703. Appellant urges t h i s Court t o take the view t h a t Judge Brownlee's action o f denying the motion was a denial o f due process because he had previously sentenced appellant and i n t h a t sentencing a dispute had arisen over the amount o f j a i l time appellant was t o be credited with. W e f i n d no e r r o r i n what was done. A s - f a r as the contention t h a t t h i s i s a vio- l a t i o n o f due process. there has been no showing o f prejudice by appellant. It i s n o t enough t o claim a v i o l a t i o n o f constitutional rights; there must be some a f f i r m a t i v e showing o f harm as well. There i s a l i n e o f federal cases a l l holding t h a t i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t reason t o remove a judge j u s t because t h a t same judge has presided i n matters t o which the party was be- f o r e the judge previously. I n a case involving a criminal prosecution for income tax evasion the court o f appeals held i n United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 132 (7th C i r . 1971): " * * * The denial o f the motion t o recuse was not error. The f a c t t h a t the judge might have formed an opinion concerning the g u i l t o r innocence o f the defendant from the evidence presented a t an e a r l i e r t r i a l involving the same person i s not the kind o f bias o r prejudice which requires disqualification." The n i n t h c i r c u i t court o f appeals i n Westover v. United States, 394 F.2d 164-166 (9th C i r . 1968), a case involving the robbery o f a savings and loan association held: "We f i n d no e r r o r i n the action of the l a t e D i s t r i c t Judge William C, Mathes i n denying the motion t o dis- qualify the t r i a l judge who t r i e d both the f i r s t and second Westover cases. And, we find no e r r o r i n ' the l a t t e r ' s f a i l u r e t o recuse himself." The same r u l e , c i t e d i n Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252, 254 (9th C i r . 1956), holds t r u e f o r the c i v i l cases as we1 1 : " * * * The conduct o f the t r i a l judge and h i s r u l i n g s i n a former case are not the basis for d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n here. A l l o f the r u l i n g s i n former cases, as well as the a t t i - tude o f the judge, could have been raised upon appeal i n such cases. Because a judge has decided one case against a l i t i g a n t i s no reason why he cannot s i t i n another." Turning now t o the question o f whether the holding of the hearing by Judge Brownlee on the question o f h i s own bias was a v i o l a t i o n o f due process the appellant argues: "The purpose o f such a hearing i s t o l e t an objective mind weigh the merits o f the s i t u a t i o n . Can one harboring prejudice exercise objective judgment? Human experience would seem t o d i c t a t e t h a t the human mind, no matter how well disciplined, cannot render an impartial judgment when prejudice exists. The whole idea behind substituting a judge alleged t o be biased o r prejudiced i s t o d i s q u a l i f y him because he i s not thought capable o f rendering an impartial judg- ment. Having the judge who i s accused o f prejudice conduct the hearing i s akin t o begging the question. Despite a l l outward appearances o f o b j e c t i v i t y , a prejudiced mind i s f i l l e d w i t h predilection, i n c l i n a t i o n and biased opinion even though i t may be unconscious." Appellant f a i l s t o c i t e any a u t h o r i t y t o support t h i s argument. Again appellant makes no showing o f any prejudice by going t o t r i a l before Judge Brownlee, only the bare assertion o f a v i o l a t i o n o f due process. I n f a c t , appellant's counsel during o r a l argument before t h i s Court stated i n h i s opinion the appellant received a very f a i r t r i a l . The complete t r a n s c r i p t i s not before t h i s Court so we are unable t o review it for any possible errors which would show how the appellant was harmed. The f a c t Judge Brownlee presided a t the hearing would not be e r r o r i n our judgment. Looking a t the federal j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e i r s t a t u t e 28 U.S.C. 144, the judge has a duty t o review the motion t o determine whether o r not t o recuse himself. I n Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen's U. Loc. No. 2 o f State o f N.Y., 444 F.2d 1344, 1348 (2nd C i r . 1971) i t i s stated: "However, the t r i a l judge must a t the outset determine whether the facts so stated would c o n s t i t u t e l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r recusal, ( c i t a t i o n s omitted), and i f the a f f i d a v i t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t , he i s under j u s t as much o f a duty t o deny the application as he would be t o recuse himself i f i t were s u f f i c i e n t . " Our code provision was taken from the I l l i n o i s Code o f Criminal Procedure. I11 .Rev.Stat. Ch. 38, g 114-5(c). Under the I l l i n o i s cases the courts have construed the s t a t u t e as allowing the t r i a l court judge t o con- duct the hearing. The appellate court o f I l l i n o i s i n reviewing a t h e f t con- v i c t i o n held i n People v. Arnold, 76 111.App.2d 269, 222 N.E.2d 160, 164: "Section 114-5(c), supra, then provides the t r i a l 'udqe shall conduct a hearinc~ t o determine t G r i t s i f the p e t i t i o n . " (Emphasi s suppl i ed) . Therefore, it i s the opinion o f due process o f law and the conv W e concur: / ~ s b o c i a t e Justices