Title: Sullins v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JEROME SULLINS, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 466, 2006     
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0405017780 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 23, 2007 
 
 
Decided: 
July 23, 2007 
 
Before , HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
Jan A.T. van Amerongen, Jr., Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware; for 
Appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
Jerome Sullins (“Sullins”) appeals from his Superior Court convictions and 
sentences on various drug charges.  Sullins claims that the Superior Court 
reversibly erred in:  (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on Double 
Jeopardy grounds after the Superior Court declared a mistrial; and (2) permitting 
the State to introduce testimony that Sullins was under probation supervision at the 
time of his arrest.  We find no merit to Sullins’ claims and, therefore, affirm. 
FACTS 
On April 21, 2004, Delaware State Police Detective Vincent Clemons 
(“Detective Clemons”) learned from an informant that Sullins had crack cocaine 
for sale at his residence on Carter Street in Wilmington.  At Detective Clemons’ 
request, the informant telephoned Sullins and arranged to buy cocaine from him.  
Clemons then notified the Wilmington police of the impending drug transaction.  
Because Sullins was on probation, Wilmington police notified officials at 
Probation and Parole. 
Probation officers, accompanied by Wilmington police, drove to Sullins’ 
Carter Street residence, where Sullins was standing in his doorway.  Upon seeing 
the probation officers, whose shirts identified them as such, Sullins went inside his 
house and shut the door.  The officers followed.  While inside, the officers heard 
noises coming from the second floor, and ordered Sullins to surrender.  Sullins 
complied.  He came downstairs from a second floor bedroom, and was 
 
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apprehended in the kitchen.  On Sullins’ person, police officers found $1,630.  
Checking the bedroom from which he had come, officers noted that a vent cover 
had been removed from the wall.  At the bottom of the duct, in the basement police 
officers found two bags of crack cocaine weighing approximately two and half 
ounces.  Sullins admitted that the drugs belonged to him.  The police also found an 
electronic scale. 
Sullins was indicted for Trafficking Cocaine in Excess of 50 grams, 
Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping 
Controlled Substances, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and Resisting Arrest.  At 
Sullins’ first trial, which began on February 15, 2005, Sullins’ defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial when the prosecutor asked the first witness, Detective 
Clemons, whether he was “working with an individual or an informant.”  Defense 
counsel argued that the reference to an informant would unfairly buttress the 
credibility of the police witnesses.  The trial court denied the mistrial motion, but 
cautioned the prosecution that the police witness should not “even come close to 
testifying as to what an informant told him.” 
On re-direct examination, the prosecutor asked Detective Clemons to 
describe his “role in this, what actually went down on April 21st, 2004.”  Clemons 
replied that he “had information that a black male named George who lived on 
Carter Street was selling crack cocaine.”  (Another witness testified that George 
 
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was a name used by Sullins.)  At this point defense counsel renewed his motion for 
a mistrial, arguing that both the existence of an informant had been disclosed as 
well as the information the informant had supplied.  The trial court denied the 
motion but instructed the jury to disregard the testimony as hearsay.1  Later that 
day, the defense requested a Flowers2 hearing to determine whether the 
confidential informant could testify favorably to the defense case.  The Superior 
Court denied the motion, based on its recollection of the Flowers opinion.   
During the overnight recess, the trial judge re-read Flowers and concluded 
that his previous day’s ruling was erroneous.  At the beginning of the next trial 
day, the trial court discussed possibly reversing its ruling.  The prosecutor 
protested that the motion for a Flowers hearing should have been made before trial, 
but stated that “if I need some time to do that and I’ll need to contact Detective 
Clemons. . . .”  The trial judge then addressed defense counsel: 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Malik [defense counsel], I don’t know if 
there’s anything for you to say since I told you I’m about 98 percent 
toward granting your motion. 
MR. MALIK: Sometimes, Your Honor, it’s better to say nothing and 
just sit down.  That’s what I’m going to do.  I agree with the Court. 
                                                 
1 The trial judge instructed jury that: 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the testimony that the officer just gave you that he had 
gotten information about somebody named George is plainly hearsay.  It’s what 
somebody else told him.  That person is not present here to be—to be—to give 
testimony under oath or to be questioned by either side.  The jury’s to disregard 
that statement, and it’s not to play any part in your deliberations in this case. 
  
2 State v. Flowers, 316 A.2d 564 (Del. 1973). 
 
4
THE COURT: I will grant then the defendant’s motion for a mistrial 
based on not having had an opportunity to have a Flowers hearing 
pretrial.  The case will go back on the list so the State can then 
determine whether it’s necessary at the subsequent trial to refer to the 
informer because that appears to be the key element here.  So a 
mistrial is declared.  
 
The prosecutor then began to re-argue the merits of his Flowers position: 
MR. CHAPMAN [prosecutor]: Mr. Malik didn’t file the pretrial 
Flowers hearing before the trial.  I don’t see why the State is being – 
why the case – there’s got to be a mistrial declared. 
MR. MALIK: Your Honor, if I can just respond just for the purposes 
of the record. I’d like to respond to why I didn’t file for a Flowers 
hearing before trial. That was because under the three scenarios of 
Flowers, I didn’t think that anything applied where there was a basis 
for it when we got into trial. And then when the State started 
mentioning the informant – they mentioned the informant, not me. 
 
THE COURT: I find that as well. 
 
After the Superior Court declared a mistrial, Sullins then moved to dismiss 
the indictment, claiming that a second trial would violate his constitutional right 
against double jeopardy, because the Superior Court had declared a mistrial sua 
sponte.  Delaware case law holds that the Double Jeopardy clause does not 
preclude a defendant’s retrial if the record shows that the mistrial was declared sua 
sponte by the Court for reasons of “manifest necessity.”3  The Superior Court 
conceded that it did “not consider whether there was a manifest necessity for a 
mistrial.”4  Nevertheless, it denied Sullins’ motion to dismiss, ruling that Sullins’ 
                                                 
3 Hughey v. State, 522 A.2d 335, 338 (Del. 1987), citing Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069 (Del. 
1986). 
 
4 State v. Sullins, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 121, at *5 (Del. Super. Apr. 11, 2006). 
 
5
double jeopardy argument lacked merit because there was no indication that the 
prosecution had deliberately provoked a mistrial.5   
At his second trial, Sullins produced two witnesses, James Brown and 
Robert Truitt.  Both witnesses claimed that they had been living with Sullins at his 
Carter Street residence at the time of the search and arrest.  In rebuttal, the State 
proffered the testimony of Andrea Sullivan, Sullins’ probation officer.  Sullivan  
testified that, as a condition of Sullins’ probation, Sullins was required to notify her 
of the persons with whom he was living, and that Sullins had never notified her of 
either Brown or Truitt.  Sullins objected to Sullivan’s testimony under D.R.E. 403, 
arguing that the relevance of that evidence was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice to the defense from Sullins being identified as a 
probationer.  The trial judge overruled the objection, and after Sullivan testified, 
gave the jury an appropriate limiting instruction.   
In April 2006, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of the charges of 
Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine (a lesser included offense of 
Possession with Intent to Deliver), Maintaining a Dwelling, and Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia.  The jury found Sullins not guilty of Possession with Intent to 
Deliver and Resisting Arrest.  Following the verdict, Sullins moved for a new trial, 
claiming that the Superior Court had abused its discretion in permitting the 
                                                 
5 State v. Sullins, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 121 (Del. Super. Apr. 11, 2006). 
 
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proffered probation officer’s testimony that Sullins was on probation at the time of 
the alleged offense.  The Superior Court denied Sullins’ motion.  
In August 2006, the court sentenced Sullins to fifteen years at Supervision 
Level 5, suspended after ten years for eighteen months at Supervision Level 3 for 
Trafficking in Cocaine; and for the other convictions, for a total of five years at 
Supervision Level 5, suspended immediately for Supervision Level 3.   
On appeal, Sullins presents two issues.  The first is whether the Superior 
Court erroneously denied Sullins’ motion to dismiss his indictments based on 
violations of the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Delaware and United States 
Constitutions.  The second is whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting Sullins’ probation officer’s testimony that Sullins was under probation 
supervision at the time of his arrest.  These issues are addressed in that order. 
ANALYSIS 
I.  The Double Jeopardy Claim 
We review claims alleging an infringement of a constitutionally protected 
right, including the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy, de novo.6   
The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and the Delaware 
Constitutions protect a criminal defendant against multiple punishments or 
                                                 
6 Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 961 (Del. 2006).  
 
7
successive prosecutions for the same offense.7  In Green v. United States,8 the 
United States Supreme Court described the policy underlying the Double Jeopardy 
provision as follows:  
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though 
innocent he may be found guilty.9 
 
A criminal defendant owns “the valued right to have his trial completed by a 
particular tribunal.”10  The declaration of a mistrial implicates that right.  The 
declaration of a mistrial does not always contravene the double jeopardy 
prohibition, however.  As the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment . . . does not 
mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent 
tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final 
judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable obstacle to the 
administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance 
of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy 
prohibition is aimed.11 
 
                                                 
7 U.S. Const. amend V; Del Const art. I, § 8. 
 
8 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
 
9 Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88.   
 
10 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). 
 
11 Id. at 688-89. 
 
 
8
Generally, where a trial is not completed and a mistrial has been declared, 
the Double Jeopardy clause precludes a retrial of the defendant, unless the 
defendant has consented to the mistrial or the mistrial was compelled by “manifest 
necessity.”12  An exception to this principle arises, however, “when a defendant’s 
motion for mistrial is the result of judicial or prosecutorial impropriety that was 
intended to provoke the defendant into filing the motion. . . .  [In those 
circumstances], there has been no consent and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 
retrial.”13 
In Delaware, “[a] motion by the defendant for a mistrial, which is granted, 
generally removes any barrier to reprosecution.”14  Because the mistrial was 
declared at Sullins’ urging, the Double Jeopardy clause bars a retrial only if Sullins 
can show that prosecution’s conduct “was intended to provoke a mistrial.”15  It is 
the defendant’s burden to prove that the prosecutor acted with intent to provoke a 
                                                 
12 Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 1996), citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 
U.S. 600, 607 (1976) and Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). 
 
13 Id., citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982). 
 
14 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1075 (Del. 1987), citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 
(1982).  See also, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (holding that a defendant's motion 
for a mistrial is deemed to be a waiver of his “valued right to have his guilt or innocence 
determined before the first trier of fact.”  Id. at 93.   
 
15 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d at 1078 (emphasis in original), see also Camden v. Circuit Court of 
Second Judicial Circuit, 892 F.2d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 
 
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mistrial.16  That is an “extremely exacting standard.”17  As the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressed it, “only a high-handed wrong 
intentionally directed against [a] defendant’s constitutional right will trigger his 
right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”18  The United States 
Supreme Court has held that determining whether a prosecutor intended to goad 
the defense “merely calls for the court to make a finding of fact.”19  Thus, in the 
specific context of “double jeopardy goading cases,”20 we must uphold the 
Superior Court’s factual determination unless we find it to be clearly erroneous. 
In this case, despite Sullins’ contrary assertion, there was no judicial or 
prosecutorial goading that would negate the voluntary nature of Sullins’ motion for 
a mistrial.  Although the prosecutor elicited inadmissible testimony from Detective 
Clemons, there is no evidence that the prosecutor sought to goad the defense into 
moving for a mistrial.  Indeed, the prosecutor seemed unaware of his mistake and 
contested the defendant’s mistrial motion after the court’s mistrial declaration: 
MR. CHAPMAN [the prosecutor]: Your honor, I wasn’t under the 
impression that we were even discussing a mistrial.  I was under the 
impression that the Court was going to put the trial on hold and 
                                                 
16 See United States v. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 
17 Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 1996).   
 
18 United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1469 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
19 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675. 
 
20 United States v. De Jesus Valadez-Camarena, 163 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1998).  
 
10
possibly order a Flowers hearing to take place either today or 
sometime tomorrow.  I was totally caught blind-sided by the fact the 
Court was considering declaring a mistrial. 
 
Thus, the record strongly supports the Superior Court’s finding that the 
prosecution did not “act in bad faith or intent to provoke a mistrial.”21  Nor is there 
any evidence of the record indicating any such intent on the part of the trial court.  
Because Sullins has failed to show that he was goaded to move for mistrial by 
improper prosecutorial conduct, Sullins’ first claim of error fails under the Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the Delaware and the United States Constitutions.      
II.  The Disclosure-of-Probation-Status Claim 
Sullins next claims that the Superior Court erred by admitting Probation 
Officer Sullivan’s testimony that Sullins was under probation supervision at the 
time of his arrest.  Sullins asserts that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighed the relevance of this testimony under D.R.E. 403.22  We review the 
                                                 
21 State v. Sullins, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 121, at *7 (Del. Super. Apr. 11, 2006). 
 
22 Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence 403 Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion or waste of time provides:  
 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
 
D.R.E. 403.   
 
 
11
trial judge’s refusal to grant a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of 
discretion.23   
 
Under D.R.E. 403, evidence, even if logically relevant, may be excluded as 
not legally relevant “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. . . .”24  In 
a factually similar case,  the North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that the 
probative value of a probation officer’s testimony that the defendant was a 
probationer and that the defendant verified that the place where drugs were  found 
was his residence, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.25   
Similarly, here, Sullins chose to present the testimony of two witnesses that 
they shared living quarters with him.  Sullins’ purpose was to suggest that the 
drugs that police found in the Carter Street residence may have belonged to 
someone other than himself.  As a condition of his probation, however, Sullins was 
required to keep the probation department apprised of his living arrangements, 
including the persons with whom he was living.  During rebuttal, Sullivan testified 
                                                 
23 See Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198, 1200 (Del. 1992); Virdin v. State, 780 A.2d 1024, 1030 
(Del. 2001). 
 
24 Id.  
 
25 See State v. Shine, 619 S.E.2d 895, 898 (N.C. App. 2005). 
 
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that Sullins never reported to his probation officer, Ms. Sullivan, that he shared his 
residence with either of those witnesses.   
Ms. Sullivan’s rebuttal testimony was both an adequate and a necessary link 
between Sullins and his residence where the drugs were found, and its probative 
value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  The 
Superior Court, fully aware of the risk surrounding testimony given by Sullins’ 
probation officer, gave the jury an appropriate instruction.  Thus, “[t]o the extent 
that there was prejudice it was mitigated by an instruction given by the [Superior 
Court] to the effect that the jury should not consider the defendant’s probationary 
status as evidence of guilt.”26  We find that in concluding that the prejudicial effect 
of Sullivan’s testimony was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 State v. Sullins, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 220, at *2 (Del. Super. May 31, 2006).  
 
13
Sullins argues, in the alternative, that Ms. Sullivan’s testimony should have 
been excluded under D.R.E. 404(b),27 citing Getz v. State.28  Sullins argues that the 
testimony would have revealed that Sullins had been convicted of some other 
crime, yet invited speculation as to the nature of the conviction and the underlying 
conduct.  Essentially, Sullins argues that Ms. Sullivan’s testimony did not satisfy 
the fifth Getz prong, which requires that the trial judge exclude the evidence unless 
the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice.  
                                                 
27 D.R.E. 404 provides:  
 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. 
 
D.R.E. 404 (2001).  
 
28 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). In Getz, this Court illustrated the following guidelines for the 
admissibility of other crimes evidence under D.R.E. 404(b):  
 
(1) The evidence of other crimes must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in 
dispute in the case.  If the State elects to present such evidence in its case-in-chief 
it must demonstrate the existence, or reasonable anticipation, of such a material 
issue. 
(2) The evidence of other crimes must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned by 
Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not inconsistent with the basic prohibition 
against evidence of bad character or criminal disposition. 
(3) The other crimes must be proved by evidence which is “plain, clear and 
conclusive.”  
(4) The other crimes must not be too remote in time from the charged offense. 
(5) The Court must balance the probative value of such evidence against its 
unfairly prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403. 
(6) Because such evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the jury should be 
instructed concerning the purpose for its admission as required by D.R.E. 105.  
 
Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988). 
 
 
14
Because Sullivan’s testimony was admissible under D.R.E. 403, Sullins’ Getz 
argument fails for the same reasons.  And, because Sullins failed to identify what 
other Getz prongs were not satisfied, we need go no further in reviewing his Getz 
claim.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.