Title: Porterfield v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ANTHONY PORTERFIELD,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 335, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr. ID 9908003333
§
§
Submitted: April 12, 2002
  Decided:
May 30, 2002
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 30th day of May 2002, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Anthony Porterfield, filed this appeal
from the Superior Court’s order dated July 5, 2001, which denied his first
petition for postconviction relief.  We find no merit to Porterfield’s appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(2)
The record reflects that Porterfield pleaded guilty in October
2000 to first degree robbery and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony.  In exchange for his guilty plea, the State dismissed
eight other felony charges.  The Superior Court sentenced Porterfield on
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both charges to a total period of thirteen years at Level V incarceration
suspended after eight years for five years of Level III probation.  Porterfield
did not appeal to this Court.  Instead, in April 2001, Porterfield filed a
motion in the Superior Court seeking postconviction relief pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  Porterfield raised four claims in his
petition: (i) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (ii) his guilty plea was
coerced; (iii) he was denied his right to appeal; and (iv) his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance.  The Superior Court denied Porterfield’s
claims.  This appeal ensued.
(3)
In his opening brief on appeal, Porterfield raises one argument.
He contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to adversarily
challenge the prosecution’s case” and for allowing Porterfield to plead guilty
while under the influence of drugs.  In order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant
must show that: (i) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
defendant would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to
-3-
trial.1  A review of counsel’s representation is subject to a “strong
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”2
(4)
We have reviewed the parties’ contentions and the record
carefully.  We agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that Porterfield’s
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were conclusory and
warranted summary dismissal of his Rule 61 petition. Porterfield offered no
evidence that his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.  With respect to his allegation that his counsel permitted him
to plead guilty while under the influence of the drugs, the record reflects that
counsel informed the Superior Court that Porterfield was taking a
prescription antidepressant.  The Superior Court questioned Porterfield about
his medication and its effects.  Porterfield stated that, despite his medication,
he understood the gravity of his situation and desired to plead guilty.
(5)
Moreover, Porterfield indicated in his signed guilty plea
agreement that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, he
understood the range of penalties that could be imposed, he understood he
was giving up his right to appeal, and he was pleading guilty because he had
committed the offenses of which he was accused.  In the absence of clear
                                                
1 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (citations omitted).
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and convincing evidence to the contrary, Porterfield is bound by these sworn
representations to the Superior Court prior to the acceptance of the guilty
plea.3  He has failed to sustain his burden of proving that his counsel
rendered ineffective assistance.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice
                                                                                                                                                
2 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
3 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 632.