Title: STATE v SHORT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 84-427 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- CURTIS VAUGHAN SHORT, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorable James B . Wheelis, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: John E . Riddiough argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Paulson argued, Asst. Atty. General, Helena Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula Montana: Karen Townsend argued, Deputy County Atty. Submitted: April 15, 1985 Decided: July 11, 1985 Filed: me. j. 3 1 9 0 5 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e L.C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. The defendant a p p e a l s from a judgment and a d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l by t h e District Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Missoula County. T h e judgment was e n t e r e d and t h e motion denied on May 2 4 , 1984, a f t e r a j u r y v e r d i c t o f g u i l t y on two counts oF felony t h e f t . W e a f f i r m . I n January 1983, t h e Oregon S t a t e P o l i c e contacted Fred Simmons, an informant, t o a s s i s t i n an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of C u r t i s S h o r t , t h e defendant, being conducted by t h e Missoula County S h e r i f f ' s Office. Simmons had known and worked w i t h Short about eleven o r twelve y e a r s e a r l i e r . The Oregon S t a t e P o l i c e arranged f o r Simmons t o c o n t a c t Short. During a meeting t h e next day, Simmons and S h o r t discussed "honing o u t " o r disassembling t r u c k s and t h e y agreed Simmons would provide t i t l e s and l i c e n s e p l a t e s f o r v e h i c l e s which S h o r t would s t e a l . S h o r t planned t o t r a v e l t o Missoula on January 2 6 , 1983, t o a r r a n g e f o r t h e t h e f t o f a s e m i - t r a c t o r which had been " s p e c i a l ordered" by someone i n C a l i f o r n i a . Simmons informed t h e Oregon a u t h o r i t i e s o f t h e p l a n s and they passed t h e information along t o t h e Missoula County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e . The Oregon p o l i c e rented a maroon Buick f o r Simmons, gave him money f o r expenses and s e n t another informant, Mike West, t o accompany Simmons and S h o r t t o Missoula. S h o r t , Simmons and West w e r e under c o n s t a n t s u r v e i l l a n c e by t h e Missoula a u t h o r i t i e s from t h e t i m e t h e y a r r i v e d i n S t . Regis and Missoula u n t i l t h e y r e t u r n e d t o Oregon. When t h e y a r r i v e d i n Missoula, Simmons and W e s t contacted t h e Missoula County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e and West was f i t t e d w i t h a concealed r a d i o t r a n s m i t t e r . The t h r e e men m e t w i t h s e v e r a l o t h e r people t o arrange f o r t h e t h e f t o f two s e m i - t r a c t o r s , a green 1981 Kenworth owned by G e b e r t ' s Trucking of Missoula and a white 1977 P e t e r b i l t owned by Montana Medical Supply of Missoula. These t r u c k s w e r e s u b s t i t u t e s f o r t h e one S h o r t o r i g i n a l l y intended t o s t e a l because t h a t v e h i c l e was no longer a v a i l a b l e . S h o r t a l s o m e t w i t h a Missoula businessman and discussed camouflaging s e r i a l numbers. A t about 9:15 p.m. on January 27, 1983, a Missoula deputy observed t h e maroon Buick and S h o r t a t t h e site where t h e Gebert s e m i was parked. S h o r t g o t o u t o f t h e c a r , e n t e r e d t h e s e m i through t h e bottom p o r t i o n o f t h e passenger s i d e and drove it away without t u r n i n g on t h e h e a d l i g h t s . With t h e Buick following, S h o r t drove t h e s e m i t o t h e I n t e r s t a t e , exchanged p l a c e s w i t h someone i n t h e c a r and drove t o t h e Montana Medical f a c i l i t y . There he drove o f f i n t h e Montana Medical t r u c k and t r a i l e r . Deputies followed t h e t r u c k t o East Missoula, where S h o r t dropped t h e t r a i l e r and then headed w e s t on t h e I n t e r s t a t e . The two t r u c k s and t h e Buick were under s u r v e i l l a n c e u n t i l t h e y a r r i v e d a t S h o r t ' s farm a t Canby, Oregon. Oregon a u t h o r i t i e s continued t o monitor S h o r t ' s a c t i v i t i e s . They e s t a b l i s h e d a " s a f e house" f o r Simmons t o l i v e i n which was equipped with a telephone r e c o r d e r , formed Suncrest Trucking, I n c . , t o do b u s i n e s s and provided phony t r u c k t i t l e s and v e h i c l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers f o r Simmons' use i n t h e o p e r a t i o n . The a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e unable t o keep up w i t h t h e i n c r e a s i n g number o f v e h i c l e s being s t o l e n by S h o r t , s o i n A p r i l 1983, t h e y terminated t h e o p e r a t i o n . O n October 28, 1983, an information was f i l e d charging Short w i t h two counts o f felony t h e f t . A f t e r t h e omnibus h e a r i n g on March 9 , 1984, t h e S t a t e gave n o t i c e o f i n t e n t t o r e l y on o t h e r crimes evidence. The t r i a l began on A p r i l 9, 1984. A t t r i a l t h e S t a t e presented t h e testimony o f o f f i c e r s from t h e Oregon S t a t e P o l i c e and t h e Missoula County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n and s u r v e i l l a n c e . Simmons, W e s t and two men who had m e t w i t h S h o r t and Simmons i n Missoula p r i o r t o t h e t h e f t s , a l s o t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e S t a t e . S h o r t ' s p r i o r s t a t e m e n t and a n o r a l admission t o a n Oregon o f f i c e r w e r e a l s o i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l . During cross-examination o f Simmons, c o u n s e l f o r S h o r t sought t o i n t r o d u c e c o p i e s o f bench w a r r a n t s i s s u e d f o r Simmons i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s f a i l u r e t o a p p e a r o n t h e f t c h a r g e s i n Washington. When Simmons acknowledged on t h e s t a n d t h a t he had f a i l e d t o a p p e a r w i t h o u t l a w f u l e x c u s e , t h e c o u r t r e f u s e d t o admit t h e w a r r a n t c o p i e s . Simmons i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e d i d n o t wish t o d i s c u s s t h e pending c h a r g e s i n Washington, a s s e r t i n g h i s p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . A f t e r e l i c i t i n g t h a t t h e c h a r g e s involved t h e t h e f t o f S h o r t s p r o p e r t y , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a t t e m p t e d t o d i s c u s s t h e d e t a i l s o f t h o s e c h a r g e s , and t h e S t a t e ' s o b j e c t i o n was s u s t a i n e d . A n Oregon d e t e c t i v e later t e s t i f i e d r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p u t e between S h o r t and Simmons. Defense c o u n s e l p r e s e n t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Thomas Cromwell, a b r o t h e r o f one o f t h e a l l e g e d p a r t n e r s i n t h e Oregon t h e f t s , who r e l a t e d c e r t a i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s h e had w i t h Simmons i n l a t e December 1983 and e a r l y J a n u a r y 1984. H e a t t e m p t e d t o i n t r o d u c e t a p e r e c o r d i n g s o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , b u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d t o admit them. The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o r e f u s e d two proposed d e f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n s s e t t i n g f o r t h S h o r t ' s "theory" o f d e f e n s e . A t t h e c l o s e o f t h e t r i a l , on A p r i l 13, 1984, t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t o f " g u i l t y " on b o t h c o u n t s o f t h e f t . L a t e r , Simmons was a r r e s t e d o n t h e Washington c h a r g e s and gave a s t a t e m e n t t o an Oregon a t t o r n e y c o n t a i n i n q information not testified to at Short's trial. Short made a motion for a new trial based on this information which was argued before the District Court on May 24, 1984. The court denied the motion and sentenced Short to a total of twenty years with twelve suspended. He was designated a non-dangerous offender for purposes of parole. The four issues presented on appeal are: (1) Whether the District Court violated defendant ' s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses by not allowing examination of Simmons regarding Washington charges against him for the purpose of showing bias or motive to be untruthful during defendant's trial? (2) Whether the District Court erred in not allowing the introduction of tape recordings of telephone conversations between Simmons and another witness, Cromwell, which were offered by defendant to impeach Simmons? (3) Whether the District Court erred in not giving two of defendant's proposed instructions which explained his "quasi-entrapment" theory of the case? (4) Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial on the above grounds and on the basis of newly discovered evidence? The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This right is secured for defendants in state as we11 as in federal criminal proceedings. Pointer v. Texas (1965) , 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923. "A primary interest secured by the confrontation clause is that of cross-examination." State v. Camitsch (Mont. 1981), 626 P.2d 1250, 1255, 38 St.Rep. 563, 568, citing Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347. A witness' credibility may be attacked through cross-examination to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives if they relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. Davis, 415 U.S. at 315, Camitsch, 626 P.2d at 1254-1256. However, the extent of cross-examination on whether a witness has been accused of another or prior crime is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Carns (1959), 136 Mont. 126, 136, 345 P.2d 735, 741; State v . Howard (1904), 30 Mont. 518, 77 P. 50; see also, Alford v. United States (1931), 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624. The extent of cross-examination for these purposes is restricted because of the limited probative value in relation to credibility. An unproven charge does not necessarily indicate a witness' credibility, since innocent persons may be arrested or accused of a crime and are presumed innocent until guilt is legally established. 81 Arn.Jur.2dI Witnesses $587. This Court has permitted cross-examination on threats or inducements by the State, the failure to charge the witness with a crime and the reason for the witness' presence in jail, State v. Ponthier (1959), 136 Mont. 198, 346 P.2d 974; on claimed intimidation of witnesses, State v. Booke (1978), 178 Mont. 225, 583 P.2d 405; and on threats and assaults to the witness by a party, Cissel v. Western Plumbing and Heating (Mont. 1980), 612 P.2d 206, 37 St.Rep. 966. Short argues that the trial court unconstitutionally restricted his cross-examination of Simmons by not allowing extensive examination of pending charges against Simmons. Simmons admitted under cross-examination that he had failed to appear on bench warrants from the State of Washington. He also acknowledged that the charges in Washington involved an allegation that he had stolen Short's property. The jury heard about Simmons' participation in Short's crimes, his alleged theft of Short's property, his fear of "the mob" and his desire for protection. This cross-examination brought out all the information necessary to argue the credibility, motive and bias of this witness to the jury. We hold that limiting the extent of the cross-examination on. the pending charges in Washington did not violate Short's right to confrontation of witnesses and was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. During cross-examination, Simmons asserted his privilege against self-incrimination concerning the pending charges in Washington. That privilege is not waived by testifying for the prosecution. Rule 608(b), M.R.Evid. The trial court property restricted inquiry into those charges on this basis as well. Short also contended, as part of this issue, that the trial court should have admitted copies of the Washington bench warrants into evidence for the purpose of showing Simmons' bias or motive to be untruthful. Rule 608 (b) , M.R.Evid. provides: "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . ." The trial court exercised its discretion by allowing inquiry into a specific instance of conduct, Simmons' failure to appear on the warrants, and would have admitted the exhibits if he had denied his failure to appear. We hold the trial court acted within the limits of its discretion by restricting the impeachment evidence. A s t o t h e second i s s u e , Short contends t h a t t a p e recordings of c o n v e r s a t i o n s made n e a r l y a y e a r a f t e r t h e t h e f t s between Simmons and another w i t n e s s , Thomas Cromwell, w e r e p r o b a t i v e because t h e y would have allowed t h e j u r y t o hear Simmons' v o i c e t e l l how S h o r t had been framed. The t r i a l c o u r t agreed t o permit use o f t h e t a p e s f o r impeachment o r r e f r e s h i n g r e c o l l e c t i o n s of a witness. The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o expressed concern about Simmons n o t being a v a i l a b l e f o r cross-examination s i n c e he had been excused a s a w i t n e s s . A f t e r Cromwell t e s t i f i e d about c e r t a i n s t a t e m e n t s by Simmons which w e r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s e a r l i e r testimony, t h e t a p e s w e r e o f f e r e d a t t r i a l t o r e b u t t h a t e a r l i e r testimony and a s p r i o r c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s by Cromwell t o r e b u t a charge o f subsequent f a b r i c a t i o n . Rule 403, M.R.Evid,provides: "Although r e l e v a n t , evidence may be excluded i f i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e is s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by t h e danger o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e , confusion o f t h e i s s u e s , o r misleading t h e j u r y , o r by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f undue d e l a y , waste of t i m e , o r n e e d l e s s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f cumulative evidence." Both p a r t i e s acknowledge t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s given wide d i s c r e t i o n t o exclude evidence a s cumulative even though it i s r e l e v a n t . I n S t a t e v. B r e i t e n s t e i n (1979), 180 Mont. 503, 591 P.2d 233, t h i s Court held t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by r u l i n g t h a t r e p e t i t i o u s testimony should be excluded under Rule 403. The defendant i n B r e i t e n s t e i n sought t o introduce c o r r o b o r a t i n g evidence o f a t h r e a t which t h e v i c t i m had made t o t h e defendant. Since t h e defendant had p r e v i o u s l y t e s t i f i e d about t h e t h r e a t , t h e c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h e a d d i t i o n a l evidence was s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by t h e f a c t o r s l i s t e d i n Rule 403. C i t i n g S t a t e v. Hanlon (1909) , 38 Mont. 557, 100 P. 1035, t h i s Court quoted t h e following passage w i t h approval: 8 "As the admissibility of the evidence itself must rest largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, so must the extent to which the investigation of collateral issues arising thereon may so be lodged in its discretion, and its action will not be reviewed except where its discretionary power has been manifestly abused." 180 Mont. at 509, 591 P.2d at 236. Even if the tapes were otherwise admissible, the trial court had discretion to exclude them where the time necessary to hear them would not be judiciously expended because the evidence was merely cumulative and otherwise before the jury. 31A C.J.S. Evidence, S 166. Faced with the request to play several hours' worth of tapes which would merely repeat the testimony of a previous witness regarding collateral matters, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the tapes. The trial court refused two instructions offered by Short on his quasi-entrapment theory of the case. He contends on appea 1 that fundamental fairness requires an instruction on his theory that if he did exert unauthorized control over the trucks, he did so negligently ratber than purposely and knowingly and therefore he was not guilty. The instructions must be viewed as a whole to determine whether the defendant was limited in fairly presenting his theory. State v. Graves (Mont. 1981), 622 P.2d 203, 210, 38 St-Rep. 9, 16. The jury was instructed that the State had to prove each and every element of the crime by evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt (No. 2); that an element of theft is the state of mind of "purposely" or "knowingly" (No. 10); and that another element of this offense is that the defendant must have the purpose of depriving the owner of the property (No. 10) . The jury was given the definitions of "purposely" and "knowingly" (No. 5). The jury was instructed on "mere passivity or negative acquiescence" and "mere presence and f a i l u r e t o disapprove o r oppose t h e crime" (No. 1 3 ) , and t h e e f f e c t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s possession o f s t o l e n p r o p e r t y (No. 1 7 ) . The c o u r t gave a "duress o r coercion" i n s t r u c t i o n (No. 19) . The proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s a t i s s u e merely p r e s e n t h i s argument o r t h e o r y t h a t he d i d n o t have t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e t o commit t h e o f f e n s e . While a defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o have i n s t r u c t i o n s on h i s t h e o r y , S t a t e v. Thomas (1966), 147 Mont. 325, 413 P.2d 315, he i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o p u t h i s arguments i n t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , Hunsacker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation (1978), 179 Mont. 305, 333, 588 ~ . 2 d 493, 509. W e hold t h a t t h e defendant was denied n e i t h e r fundamenta 1 f a i r n e s s nor t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t h i s theory t o t h e jury. S h o r t requested a n e w t r i a l on t h e b a s i s t h a t he was denied f u l l c o n f r o n t a t i o n and impeachment o f Simmons, discussed above, and on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e new evidence presented a t t h e t i m e o f t h e h e a r i n g on t h e motion f o r new t r i a l showed Simmons made s t a t e m e n t s a f t e r t r i a l demonstrating t h e testimony he gave was f a l s e . In S t a t e v. Greeno (1959), 135 Mont. 580, 342 P.2d 1052, t h i s Court set f o r t h r u l e s governing t h e g r a n t i n g o f new t r i a l s on t h e ground of newly discovered evidence a s follows: "(1) That t h e evidence must have come t o t h e knowledge o f t h e a p p l i c a n t s i n c e t h e t r i a l ; (2) t h a t it was n o t through want o f d i l i g e n c e t h a t it was n o t discovered e a r l i e r ; (3) t h a t it is s o m a t e r i a l t h a t it would probably produce a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t upon a n o t h e r t r i a l ; ( 4 ) t h a t it is n o t cumulative merely--that i s , does n o t speak a s t o f a c t s i n r e l a t i o n t o which t h e r e was evidence a t t h e t r i a l ; (5) t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n must be supported by t h e a f f i d a v i t o f t h e w i t n e s s whose evidence i s a l l e g e d t o have been newly discovered, o r i t s absence accounted f o r ; and (6) t h a t t h e evidence must n o t be such a s w i l l only tend t o impeach t h e c h a r a c t e r o r c r e d i t o f a witness. I' ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) 135 Mont. a t 586, 3 4 2 P.2d a t 1055. The t r i a l c o u r t reviewed t h e new evidence, a t a p e recording o f an Oregon a t t o r n e y ' s i n t e r v i e w with Simmons, and held a h e a r i n g o n t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l on May 2 1 and May 24, 1984. A t t h a t h e a r i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u r t adopted t h e S t a t e ' s reasoning t h a t t h e evidence was n o t s o material. t h a t it would have produced a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t ; t h e evidence was cumulative a s o t h e r impeachment evidence; and t h a t t h e r e was o t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l evidence of S h o r t ' s g u i l t . The defendant has n o t shown any e r r o r i n t h i s reasoning. W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t e r r by denying S h o r t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l . on t h e b a s i s o f newly discovered evidence o r on t h e