Title: State v. Keiser

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Keiser; 174 Vt. 87; 807 A.2d 378

[Filed 28-Jun-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2001-132

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Wolf Keiser	                                 November Term, 2001


  Ben W. Joseph, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell and David Tartter,
    Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Devin McLaughlin and Christopher Davis of Langrock Sperry & Wool,
    Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

             
       MORSE, J.   Defendant Wolf Keiser appeals the judgment of the district
  court and its subsequent orders denying his motions for judgment of
  acquittal and for a new trial following a jury verdict finding defendant
  guilty of leaving the scene of an accident, fatality resulting, in
  violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1128(c).  On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the
  trial court issued an erroneous instruction regarding constructive
  knowledge in response to a jury question; (2) the trial court erroneously
  declined to include defendant's requested additional instruction in
  response to the jury question; (3) the trial court committed plain error by
  failing to instruct the jury that Vermont's hit-and-run statute requires
  actual knowledge that the accident involved a

 

  person or property of another; (4) the jury verdict is not supported by the
  evidence at trial; (5) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of
  defendant's past DWI convictions; and (6) the trial court's sentence of ten
  to fifteen years to serve violates the proportionality clause of the
  Vermont Constitution and is an abuse of the court's discretion. We affirm.

       In the early morning of September 12, 1999, while defendant was
  driving back to his home from a friend's house, he heard and felt an impact
  to the right side of his vehicle.  His passenger's side windshield cracked
  in a spider web formation, and, according to him, he stopped his car,
  backed up, and got out to see what he had hit or what had hit him. 
  Defendant testified that he found nothing, and then traveled to his home,
  retrieved a flashlight, and returned to the accident site to see if he had
  hit anything.  Again, he found nothing, and returned home.      

       Defendant's car had struck Joshua Welch, who was thrown to the side of
  the road.  The impact occurred between 12:00 and 1:00 a.m.  The victim was
  found at roughly 10:00 a.m. the next morning by two women who were on a
  walk.  He was taken to the hospital, where he died on September 13 from
  multiple head injuries.  

       The state charged defendant with leaving the scene of the accident,
  fatality resulting.  See 23 V.S.A. § 1128(c).  At the close of evidence the
  court gave instructions to the jury on the elements of the charged crime. 
  During deliberations the jury returned the following question regarding the
  court's instruction on one of the knowledge elements of the crime: "Did
  Wolf have to know he hit a person or did he have to think or suspect he hit
  a person . . . according to the law?" (Emphasis in original.)

       After discussion with counsel, the court issued the following reply:

 
   
    The State does not have to prove that the defendant had actual
    knowledge that a person had been injured.  The State can meet its
    burden of proof with regard to the element of knowledge of the
    resultant injury if it proves that, after conducting a reasonable
    investigation, a reasonable person would have anticipated injury
    to another person.  This is what is called "constructive
    knowledge" that I described to you in the Jury Instructions.

  In so doing, the trial court declined to issue defendant's requested
  instruction informing the jury that it could not find defendant guilty if
  it determined that defendant merely thought or suspected that he hit a
  person.  The jury returned a guilty verdict on February 12, 2001. 
  Defendant was sentenced to ten to fifteen years.  He now appeals.  We
  address his arguments in turn. 

                                     I.

       Defendant's main contention centers on whether the above instruction
  was an erroneous response to the jury's inquiry.  Defendant first argues
  that the court misconstrued the duties of 23 V.S.A.§ 1128(a), by including
  a reasonable investigation requirement in its constructive knowledge
  instruction. The language "after conducting a reasonable investigation,"
  defendant argues, created an affirmative duty to stop and investigate an
  accident regardless of whether a person has actual or constructive
  knowledge of injury to either the person or property of another.  The State
  argues not only that the supplemental instruction was within the letter of
  the law, but also that defendant did not preserve his right to appeal on
  this issue because he did not object after the instruction was given to the
  jury.  

                                     A.
   
       As a threshold matter, therefore, we must determine whether defendant
  properly preserved this issue for appeal. The State correctly argues that,
  in general, objecting before instructions are issued to the jury is
  insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal; counsel must

 

  object after they are given to the jury.  See State v. Wheelock, 158 Vt.
  302, 306, 609 A.2d 972, 975 (1992) ("According to V.R.Cr.P. 30, as
  interpreted in our cases, failure to object to an instruction after it is
  given to the jury is considered a waiver of any error even if the substance
  of the objection is made known before the jury charge."); see also State v.
  Tahair, 172 Vt. 101, 104-05, 772 A.2d 1079, 1082 (2001).  This case,
  however, involves a supplemental instruction issued to the jury in response
  to a jury question given to the court during deliberations.  The context
  differs from the circumstances at the conclusion of the initial charge to
  the jury, at which point counsel's obligation to object is well defined,
  see Wheelock, 158 Vt. at 306, 609 A.2d  at 975.  We have yet to address the
  question of whether counsel must renew an objection after a supplemental
  instruction.  Cf. Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 30 (noting that rule does not
  apply to "such further instructions as the jury may require after it has
  retired"). 

       Questions from a jury during its deliberations should be disclosed to
  counsel and counsel given an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge
  responds.  Rogers v. United States,