Title: Chernov v. St. Luke's Hospital Medical Ctr.

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

123 Ariz. 521 (1979) 601 P.2d 284 Henry CHERNOV and Minnie Chernov, his wife, Appellants, v. ST. LUKE'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, an Arizona Corporation, Appellee. No. 14449. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 27, 1979. *522 Leibsohn, Eaton, Gooding & Romley by Jeffrey M. Proper, Marilyn A. Pollard, Phoenix, for appellants. Burch, Cracchiolo, Levie, Guyer & Weyl by Michael E. Bradford, Phoenix, for appellee. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal by Henry Chernov from a summary judgment entered in favor of St. Luke's Hospital Medical Center on his complaint charging that it negligently maintained its parking lot. We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 19(e), Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 17A A.R.S. Reversed. On May 12, 1975, Chernov drove to St. Luke's Hospital to visit his wife, who was a patient there. He entered the hospital grounds traveling in a southerly direction and approached a "T" intersection in its parking lot. Chernov was traveling up the shaft of the "T", while a woman, Mary Arena, was driving a motor vehicle across the top of the "T" from right to left. He came to a stop in response to a traffic control signal "STOP" painted on the roadway in the lane and direction he was traveling. At approximately the same time, Mary Arena approached the intersection from the west. Chernov entered the intersection, turning left, when his vehicle was struck by the vehicle driven by Mary Arena. Appellant in his suit alleged that: The Superior Court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment and this appeal followed. We have said before that negligence cases can rarely be disposed of by summary judgment, Boozer v. Arizona Country Club, 102 Ariz. 544, 434 P.2d 630 (1967), because: Here, an inference can be drawn favorable to Chernov. The parties agree that Chernov was a business invitee. But the hospital argues that its duty to invitees using its parking lot is set forth in § 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and that it is subject to liability for a condition on the land only if it "knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger * * *." It urges that since the intersection was unobstructed and obvious, either the negligence of appellant or Mrs. Arena was the cause of the accident, and, hence, appellant cannot recover from the hospital as a matter of law. However, the hospital's duty to Chernov is not governed by § 343, but, rather, is as set forth in § 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 344 provides: The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, citing § 344, said this concerning those in control of parking lots: In answering interrogatories, the hospital acknowledged that it undertook measures to control traffic within its driveway and parking areas. It was therefore incumbent upon the hospital to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of traffic control devices so that its invitees would not be confused or misled. Chernov testified by deposition: When Mrs. Arena was deposed, she testified: In viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, see Boyle v. City of Phoenix, 115 Ariz. 106, 563 P.2d 905 (1977), it is clear that St. Luke's Hospital was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The uncontroverted facts show that Chernov proceeded into the intersection believing Mrs. Arena would stop. But Mrs. Arena was not aware that there was a traffic control signal painted on the roadway because of its faded condition and by reason thereof ran into Chernov. A jury, upon consideration of this evidence, could conclude that the hospital negligently failed to properly maintain the traffic control signals which it had placed in the parking lot, and that such was a proximate cause of the accident. *524 Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CAMERON, C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur.