Title: Samara v. Matar

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/25/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
RANA SAMARA, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S240918 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B265752 
HAITHAM MATAR, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. EC056720 
 
____________________________________) 
 
When a trial court judgment rests on more than one ground, it may be 
impossible for a losing party to obtain appellate review of all of the court’s 
determinations.  In a breach of contract action, for example, a trial court might 
grant a defense motion for summary judgment because no contract was formed, 
and because in any event there was no breach.  On direct review, an appellate 
court could affirm if either of those conclusions was correct, without resolving or 
even considering the other one.  Thus, a plaintiff who argues on appeal that there 
was a contract (and that the contract was breached) might lose based on a lack of 
breach without appellate review of whether a contract existed in the first place.     
This case concerns the claim- and issue-preclusive significance, in future 
litigation, of a conclusion relied on by the trial court and challenged on appeal, but 
not addressed by the appellate court.  We hold that the preclusive effect of the 
judgment should be evaluated as though the trial court had not relied on the 
 
2 
unreviewed ground.  Our contrary decision in People v. Skidmore (1865) 27 
Cal. 287 (Skidmore) is overruled. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Claim and Issue Preclusion 
The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a dispute resolved in one case is 
not relitigated in a later case.  Although the doctrine has ancient roots (see Note, 
Developments in the Law: Res Judicata (1952) 65 Harv. L.Rev. 818, 820-822), its 
contours and associated terminology have evolved over time.  We now refer to 
“claim preclusion” rather than “res judicata” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897 (Mycogen)), and use “issue preclusion” in place of 
“direct or collateral estoppel” (Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. 
(1984) 465 U.S. 75, 77, fn. 1; see Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 
815, 824 (Vandenberg)).1   
Claim and issue preclusion have different requirements and effects.  Claim 
preclusion prevents relitigation of entire causes of action.  (Mycogen, supra¸ 
28 Cal.4th at p. 896; see also id., at p. 904 [discussing “primary right theory,” 
which defines the scope of a cause of action].)  Claim preclusion applies only 
when “a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same 
parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.”  
                                              
1  
We also avoid using “ ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella term” capable of 
referring to claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or both.  (DKN Holdings v. Faerber 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823 (DKN Holdings); see Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 
51 Cal.3d 335, 341, fn. 3 (Lucido).)  Even the more modern terminology of 
“claim” and “issue” preclusion can be further refined.  (See, e.g., Standefer v. 
United States (1980) 447 U.S. 10, 21 [describing “nonmutual” issue preclusion]; 
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore (1979) 439 U.S. 322, 329 [distinguishing 
“offensive” and “defensive” issue preclusion].)  But for present purposes, “claim” 
and “issue” preclusion will suffice.   
 
3 
(DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.)  Issue preclusion, by contrast, 
prevents “relitigation of previously decided issues,” rather than causes of action as 
a whole.  (Ibid.)  It applies only “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical 
issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted 
against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.”  
(Id., at p. 825.)  Courts have understood the “ ‘necessarily decided’ ” prong to 
“require[] only that the issue not have been ‘entirely unnecessary’ to the judgment 
in the initial proceeding” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 342) — leaving room for 
a decision based on two grounds to be preclusive as to both.   
B. Facts and Procedural History 
Plaintiff Rana Samara was missing a tooth.  Dr. Haitham Matar 
recommended that she receive a dental implant, and Dr. Stephen Nahigian 
performed the implantation surgery.  Samara later sued them both for professional 
negligence.  Our focus is Samara’s contention that defendant Matar is vicariously 
liable for former defendant Nahigian’s alleged tort.  
1.  First judgment, in favor of Nahigian 
Nahigian moved for summary judgment.  He argued, in pertinent part, that 
the suit against him was untimely and that he did not cause Samara’s alleged 
injuries.  The trial court agreed that the suit was untimely with respect to Nahigian 
(unlike Matar) and further agreed that no material factual dispute prevented 
judgment in Nahigian’s favor on the issue of causation.  The court entered 
judgment on both grounds.   
Samara appealed.  She conceded that the judgment against her could be 
affirmed based on the statute of limitations.  Concerned about the potential 
preclusive effect of the trial court’s determination regarding a lack of causation, 
however, she urged the Court of Appeal to reverse that portion of the trial court’s 
 
4 
decision.  The Court of Appeal declined to do so in an unpublished opinion, 
stating, “We need not, and do not, reach the court’s alternative ground for granting 
summary judgment.”  It added, “Because the question is not before us, we also do 
not address whether collateral estoppel may be used with regard to an alternative 
ground for judgment not reviewed by the appellate court.”  
2.  Second judgment, in favor of Matar 
Around the time Samara noticed an appeal from the first judgment, Matar 
moved for summary judgment in the trial court.  As relevant here, Matar argued 
that the court’s earlier no-causation determination precluded holding him liable for 
Nahigian’s conduct.  After the remittitur issued in the first appeal, the trial court 
agreed, granting Matar’s motion for summary judgment.  Although the particulars 
of the trial court’s reasoning are not entirely clear, the core of its rationale was that 
because Nahigian was not liable to Samara for his conduct, Matar could not be 
liable for that conduct vicariously.  
The Court of Appeal, in an opinion issued by the same panel that decided 
the first appeal, reversed and remanded the matter.  It concluded that preclusion 
provided no basis for the trial court’s decision.  The court’s analysis of claim 
preclusion focused on whether there had been “a final judgment on the merits in 
the first suit.”  (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.)  The court observed 
that the prior judgment was affirmed solely because of the statute of limitations, 
which the court believed to be a “purely procedural ground” rather than a decision 
on the merits.  Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that under our decision in 
Skidmore, supra, 27 Cal. 287, a judgment on the merits affirmed on purely 
procedural grounds might qualify as a judgment on the merits in the relevant 
sense.  Noting that “the Supreme Court [of California] might want to address” the 
continuing vitality of the “Civil War-era” Skidmore decision, the Court of Appeal 
 
5 
instead ruled that claim preclusion was unavailable because Samara sued Nahigian 
and Matar in a single lawsuit, rather than two successive suits.  The court further 
held that Skidmore was inapplicable to issue preclusion, concluding that “an 
affirmance on an alternative ground operates as collateral estoppel/issue 
preclusion only on the ground reached by the appellate court.”   
We granted Matar’s petition for review.  He contends that the Court of 
Appeal’s claim- and issue-preclusion analysis is inconsistent with Skidmore and 
asks us to “address the viability of” that 1865 decision.  Because we conclude that 
Skidmore must be overruled, we agree with the Court of Appeal that Matar is not 
entitled to summary judgment on preclusion grounds.   
II.  SKIDMORE’S VIABILITY 
A. The Skidmore Decision 
To contextualize Skidmore’s analysis of the preclusive effect of a particular 
judgment, we begin by describing the litigation resulting in that judgment.  
Walter Skidmore was charged with murder.  (Skidmore, supra, 27 Cal. at 
p. 289.)  To secure his appearance to answer the charge, Skidmore and his sureties 
entered into a recognizance, something roughly akin to a bail bond.  (See ibid.)  
Skidmore also created a trust for his sureties’ financial protection, pledging 
property toward the payment and extinguishment of the recognizance should he 
fail to appear.  (People v. Skidmore (1861) 17 Cal. 260, 261; unless otherwise 
noted, all short-form Skidmore citations concern the 1865 appellate decision.)  
After he failed to appear, the People sued.  (Ibid.)  The suit sought equitable relief 
against the trustee, urging that the property held in trust “be applied to the debt due 
by the recognizance.”  (Ibid.; see also Skidmore, supra, 27 Cal. at p. 289.)  The 
trial court entered judgment against the People, and the People appealed.    
 
6 
We affirmed.  (People v. Skidmore, supra, 17 Cal. at p. 262 [initial 
appeal].)  Our opinion addressed a demurrer based on “a misjoinder of causes of 
action, among other [objections].”  (Id., at p. 261.)  Declining to reach those other 
objections, we agreed that there had been a misjoinder:  “It may be that the 
sureties will not be held liable at all; or it may be, if they are, that they are ready 
and willing to pay whenever their liability is declared; and in that case, there 
would be no necessity of coming upon this fund.  If, after judgment, the 
defendants are insolvent, another question might arise, or the question might arise 
of a right to sell or subject this property as the property of Skidmore.  But it is not 
necessary to pass upon this matter in advance of the proper stage of the inquiry.”  
(Id., at p. 262.)  “The effect of the judgment and of this affirmance,” we added, 
“will not be to preclude the plaintiff from suing again when the cause of action can 
be more formally set out.” (Ibid.) 
A second suit followed.  (See Skidmore, supra, 27 Cal. at p. 289.)  In the 
decision at the core of this case, we held that the People’s claim was barred.  In 
determining whether the decision in the first case barred the second suit, we 
treated as dictum our earlier statement that the first suit would not preclude a 
second one (id., at p. 293) and deemed the dispositive issue whether the judgment 
in the first suit was “based upon the merits” (id., at p. 289).  We concluded that it 
was.  (Id., at p. 294.)  The judgment entered by the trial court, we reasoned, was 
“based upon the merits of the claim, and not upon the dilatory matters raised by 
the demurrer nor any other mere technical defect.”  (Ibid.)  And although our 
affirmance had been limited to the misjoinder problem — a non-merits issue — 
we noted that we had not reversed or modified the trial court’s judgment.  (Id., at 
pp. 292-293.)  As we explained, “in examining the judgment in connection with 
the errors assigned, [we] found that there was at least one ground upon which the 
judgment could be justified, and therefore very properly refrained from 
 
7 
considering it in connection with the other errors.  But the affirmance, still, was an 
affirmance to the whole extent of the legal effect of the judgment at the time when 
it was entered in the court below.  [We] found no error in the record, and therefore 
not only allowed it to stand, but affirmed it as an entirety, and by direct 
expression.”  (Ibid.)  Treating “the judgment rendered in the first action . . . now as 
it was in the beginning,” we held that the People’s claim was barred.  (Id., at 
p. 293.)  In doing so, we allowed a trial court’s ruling to determine the preclusive 
effect of the judgment, without regard for whether that ruling was addressed on 
appeal. 
Courts considering Skidmore have disagreed about whether its precedential 
force extends to issue preclusion.  (Compare, e.g., Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 
159 Cal.App.4th 76, 86 (Zevnik) [no] with, e.g., Diruzza v. County of Tehama (9th 
Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 1147, 1153 (Diruzza) [yes].)  It might be argued that Skidmore 
addressed only claim preclusion and that requirements unique to issue preclusion 
make Skidmore inapplicable in that context.  (See, e.g., Zevnik, at p. 86 [“Skidmore 
involved res judicata rather than collateral estoppel and therefore is not on 
point”].)  Skidmore, however, cannot be so easily limited.  It is not enough to 
observe, for example, that issue preclusion applies only to issues “actually 
litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 
Cal.4th at p. 825; see Zevnik, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 88), because it matters which 
court’s decision is the focus of the inquiry.  If, as in Skidmore, the focus of the 
preclusion inquiry is the trial court’s decision, then an issue might have been 
“actually litigated and necessarily decided” (DKN Holdings, at p. 825) whether or 
not an appellate court agreed with the trial court’s disposition of the issue. 
We need not decide exactly what Skidmore means for the law of issue 
preclusion.  (Cf. Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 396, 401 [disapproving 
a prior decision “insofar as it might be read to apply” to certain orders]; People v. 
 
8 
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126 [disapproving a prior decision “insofar as 
[it] may be read” in a particular way].)  For present purposes, it is enough to say 
that Skidmore’s focus on the trial court’s decision, without regard for the basis of 
the appellate court’s affirmance, could reasonably be understood to bear on the 
issue preclusion inquiry.  (See Diruzza, supra, 323 F.3d at p. 1153; see also 
People ex rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1549, 
1574-1575 [suggesting that Skidmore was relevant to issue preclusion, but 
refusing to follow it]; Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. v. Founding Members of 
Newport Beach Country Club (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1130-1132 [same].) 
B. Skidmore’s Aftermath 
Although Skidmore has not been widely cited, there was once broad support 
for the view that the preclusive effect of an affirmed judgment should be 
determined without regard for the basis of the affirmance.  (See, e.g., Bank of 
America v. McLaughlin etc. Co. (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 620, 628-629; State ex rel. 
Squire v. City of Cleveland (Ohio 1937) 22 N.E.2d 223, 225-226; Kinsley Bank v. 
Woods (Mo.Ct.App. 1934) 78 S.W.2d 148, 149; Russell v. Russell (3d Cir. 1905) 
134 F. 840, 840-841; Town of Fulton v. Pomeroy (Wis. 1901) 831, 832-834; Finch 
v. Hollinger (1877) 46 Iowa 216, 217-218; but see, e.g., Moran Towing & 
Transportation Co. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S.A. (2d Cir. 1937) 92 F.2d 
37, 40-41.)  
However, courts’ understanding of preclusion has evolved in the more than 
150 years since Skidmore was decided.  Although no precise turning point can or 
must be identified, one influential development occurred in 1942, when the 
Restatement First of Judgments diverged from Skidmore’s reasoning.  The 
Restatement, concerning claim preclusion, conveyed that “[w]here the trial court 
bases the judgment for the defendant upon two alternative grounds, one on the 
 
9 
merits and the other not on the merits, and an appellate court affirms the judgment 
solely on the ground which is not on the merits, the judgment does not bar a 
subsequent action by the plaintiff based upon the same cause of action.”  (Rest., 
Judgments (1942) § 49, com. c., p. 196; see also Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
pp. 896-897 [dividing claim preclusion into “merge[r]” and “bar”].)  The 
Restatement similarly opined, in passages addressing issue preclusion, that a 
judgment affirmed on one of two alternative grounds “is not conclusive in a 
subsequent action in which the other ground is in issue” (Rest., Judgments, supra, 
§ 68, com. n, p. 308), and that “[i]f the appellate court determines that one of these 
grounds is sufficient and refuses to consider whether or not the other ground is 
sufficient, and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive only 
as to the first ground” (id., § 69, com. b, p. 316).  In short, the Restatement would 
evaluate the claim- and issue-preclusive effect of the judgment without regard for 
a determination relied upon by the trial court but not embraced on appeal.   
The Restatement Second of Judgments, published in 1982, echoes the 
position of the Restatement First of Judgments with respect to issue preclusion. 
(See Rest.2d Judgments (1982) § 27, com. o, p. 263.)  The second Restatement 
does not appear to take an explicit position on the claim preclusive effect of a 
judgment affirmed on a non-merits ground, perhaps reflecting aversion to the 
terminology “ ‘on the merits[,]’ ” which has “possibly misleading connotations.”  
(Id., § 19, com. a, p. 161.)  Regardless, the second Restatement conveys that in the 
absence of an appeal, a trial court “dismissal . . . based on two or more 
determinations, at least one of which, standing alone, would not render the 
judgment a bar to another action on the same claim . . . should not operate as a 
bar.”  (Id., § 20, com. e, p. 172.)  Nothing in the second Restatement suggests that 
if such a judgment is affirmed solely on grounds that would not trigger claim 
preclusion, the judgment should be imbued with claim preclusive effect. 
 
10 
The weight of more recent authority is in accord with these Restatements, 
at least with respect to cases in which an appeal has been taken.  (See 18 Wright et 
al., Fed. Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction & Related Matters (3d ed. 2016) 
§ 4421, p. 619 [“The federal decisions agree with the Restatement view that once 
an appellate court has affirmed on one ground and passed over another, preclusion 
does not attach to the ground omitted from its decision”]; 18A Wright et al., supra, 
§ 4432, p. 60 [“the nature of the ultimate final judgment in a case ordinarily is 
controlled by the actual appellate disposition”]; see also, e.g., Omimex Canada, 
Ltd. v. State, Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 2015) 346 P.3d 1125, 1129-1130; Tydings 
v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP (N.Y. 2008) 897 N.E.2d 1044, 1046-1047; 
Beaver v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, L.P. (Ark. 2003) 138 S.W.3d 664, 666-670; 
Stanton v. Schultz (Colo. 2010) 222 P.3d 303, 309; Connecticut Nat. Bank v. 
Rytman (Conn. 1997) 694 A.2d 1246, 1254; Humana, Inc. v. Davis (Ga. 1991) 407 
S.E.2d 725, 726-727; but see, e.g., Markoff v. New York Life Ins. Co (9th Cir. 
1976) 530 F.2d 841, 842 [attempting to discern Nevada law].)  Although most of 
these authorities concern issue rather than claim preclusion, their refusal to afford 
preclusive significance to a trial court determination that evades appellate review 
is informative.   
C. Skidmore’s Continuing Vitality 
1.  Skidmore reflects a flawed view of preclusion 
We agree with the weight of modern authority that Skidmore’s approach to 
preclusion is flawed.   
Rules of claim and issue preclusion are, or at least should be, inextricably 
intertwined with rules of procedure.  (See Rest.2d Judgments, supra, Introduction, 
pp. 5-13.)  The law of preclusion reflects a view “that at some point arguable 
questions of right and wrong for practical purposes simply cannot be argued any 
 
11 
more.  It compels repose.  In substituting compulsion for persuasion, the law of 
[preclusion] trenches upon freedom to petition about grievances and autonomy of 
action, very serious concerns in an open society.”  (Id., at p. 11.)  This finality “has 
to be accepted if the idea of law is to be accepted, certainly if there is to be 
practical meaning to the idea that legal disputes can be resolved by judicial 
process.”  (Ibid.)  But that does not mean finality should be embraced reflexively, 
nor attached to every decision rendered.  “The ‘chance’ to litigate is not simply 
some unspecified opportunity for disputation over legal rights; it is the opportunity 
to submit a dispute over legal rights to a tribunal legally empowered to decide it 
according to definite procedural rules.”  (Id., at pp. 6-7.)  The less robust the 
process involved in resolving litigation the first time, the stronger the argument for 
permitting litigation once more.  (Compare, e.g., Sanderson v. Niemann (1941) 
17 Cal.2d 563 [deeming small claims court too informal to support issue 
preclusion] with, e.g., Perez v. City of San Bruno (1980) 27 Cal.3d 875, 884-885 
[more formal trial on appeal from small claims court judgment can support issue 
preclusion].)      
The availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the 
process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve 
litigation conclusively.  Of course, a litigant’s ability to secure appellate review 
may be waived or forfeited, as when a litigant fails to file a timely notice of appeal 
or fails to make an objection in the trial court.  But when a litigant properly seeks 
appellate review of a ground underlying a trial court’s determination, the fortuity 
that the judgment may be sustained on some other ground should not imbue the 
challenged ground with final and conclusive effect.  The challenged ground is no 
more reliable — no more deserving of finality — merely because it need not be 
evaluated to resolve the appeal.  (See Zevnik, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 85.) 
 
12 
Recall, for example, the hypothetical breach of contract action in which the 
trial court concludes that no contract existed, and that even if a contract existed, 
the contract was not breached.  (See ante, at p. 1.)  If an appellate court agrees that 
any existing contract was not breached — but does not consider whether any 
contract existed in the first place — it would be harsh indeed to bind the plaintiff 
to the trial court’s “no contract” determination, preventing the plaintiff from suing 
the defendant on the contract even for subsequent conduct that clearly would 
constitute a material breach.  Perhaps there was a contract, perhaps not.  But the 
trial court’s answer to that question should not be final merely because the 
judgment could be affirmed on another ground.  Skidmore’s focus on the trial 
court’s reasoning, however, is in tension with this conclusion. 
Skidmore also is in tension with some of our other preclusion case law.  We 
have repeatedly underscored the important role that the availability of appellate 
review plays in ensuring that a determination is sufficiently reliable to be 
conclusive in future litigation.  We have, for example:  
• Refused to give preclusive effect to a trial court’s legal ruling on child 
custody issues presented by writ of habeas corpus, acknowledging that, “[s]ince 
an order denying an application for writ of habeas corpus is not appealable,” 
finding preclusion would “wrongfully deprive[]” “the unsuccessful petitioner” “of 
custody until such time as he could allege a change in circumstances” (In re 
Richard M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 783, 790);   
• Held that a finding made in connection with a cause of action should not 
have preclusive effect when the finding was adverse to the party that prevailed on 
that cause of action, in part because the party could not appeal (see Albertson v. 
Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 384-385);  
• Embraced a rule that an entity cannot be bound by a judgment as a 
privy, based on alleged control over the underlying litigation, if the entity lacks 
 
13 
control over whether to take an appeal (see Minton v. Cavaney (1961) 56 Cal.2d 
576, 581-582); 
• Held that at least a certain type of issue preclusion might not attach to 
the decision of a private arbitrator, in part because “the arbitrator’s errors must be 
accepted without opportunity for review” (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 
p. 832); and 
• Explained that, when evaluating the preclusive effect of an 
administrative determination, “ ‘[t]he opportunity for judicial review of adverse 
rulings’ is an important procedural protection against a potentially erroneous 
determination and is a factor to consider in determining whether collateral 
estoppel [(that is, issue preclusion)] applies.  ([Citation]; see also Rest.2d 
Judgments, § 28(1), p. 273 [issue preclusion will not apply if the party to be 
precluded could not, as a matter of law, obtain review].)”  (Murray v. Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 875-876.)2   
The fundamental problem with Skidmore, then, is that it improperly gave 
effect to a trial court determination that evaded appellate review.  Our opinion in 
the appeal preceding Skidmore considered only whether there had been a 
misjoinder of causes of action.  We nevertheless held in Skidmore that the 
judgment at issue in the first case was “upon the merits,” because of a trial court 
determination that we did not embrace on appeal.   (Skidmore, supra, 27 Cal. at 
p. 293.)  More than a century later, and consistent with the modern approach to 
preclusion described above, we now conclude that a ground reached by the trial 
court and properly challenged on appeal, but not embraced by the appellate court’s 
                                              
2  
Our law’s emphasis on the importance of some form of judicial review is 
not limited to the preclusion context.  (See generally Powers v. City of Richmond 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 85 [discussing state constitutional right of review].) 
 
14 
decision, should not affect the judgment’s preclusive effect.  This approach aligns 
far better with the recognition that although trial court decisions are often 
thorough, thoughtful, and correct, litigants should be afforded more procedural 
fairness before being bound by all aspects of a trial court’s challenged 
determination.   
Matar contends, however, that Skidmore properly reflects the principle that 
a trial court’s judgment is presumptively correct.  (See, e.g., Denham v. Superior 
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)  This argument confuses two concepts.  It is true 
that a trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and so ordinarily will not be set 
aside on appeal absent an affirmative showing of reversible error.  (See id.; but 
see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8) [stipulated reversals].)  But that 
principle governs how appellate courts should review trial court determinations; it 
does not speak to the preclusive effect, in future litigation, of a challenged trial 
court determination that evaded appellate review.  The distinction is particularly 
clear under California law:  Although the presumption of correctness applies while 
direct review is ongoing (see Denham, at p. 564), under California law, an 
unsatisfied trial court judgment has no preclusive effect until the appellate process 
is complete (see, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 954; Brown v. 
Campbell (1893) 100 Cal. 635, 646-647). 
Matar also argues that affording preclusive effect to a trial court’s 
alternative (but ultimately unnecessary) determination would reduce litigation, 
thereby promoting judicial economy.  We are not so sure.  “While the rules of 
preclusion are supported in part by considerations of efficiency, affording the 
possibility of reconsideration is also a matter of efficiency, for it relaxes the 
requirements of procedural meticulousness in the first instance.”  (Rest.2d 
Judgments, supra, Introduction, p. 12.)  To hold that an unreviewed alternative 
ground has preclusive effect “would put pressure on appellate courts to review 
 
15 
alternative grounds as a matter of course . . . .”  (Zevnik, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 85 [discussing issue preclusion].)  Thus, “[a]ny benefit that might result from 
precluding” relitigation in future cases — cases “which may or may not arise” — 
“would come at the cost of increasing the burden on the appellate court in the 
initial action.”  (Ibid.)   
Nor is it clear that affording preclusive effect to such an alternative ground 
would protect parties from the burdens of litigation, as Matar also argues.  If all 
unreversed trial court determinations must be given preclusive effect, then 
nonparties, armed with the issue preclusive effect of the trial court’s unreviewed 
determination, may be encouraged to engage in litigation with the party bound by 
the effectively unappealable determination.  (Cf. Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 
pp. 831-834.)   
In any event, our judicial system does not exist simply to resolve cases 
quickly, nor to prevent litigation from ever taking place.  It is a serious matter 
whether a decision is correct in law and results from a fair process for all sides.  
Affording preclusive effect to a trial court determination that evades appellate 
review might speed up the resolution of controversies, but it would do so at the 
expense of fairness, accuracy, and the integrity of the judicial system.  We decline 
to endorse that tradeoff.  (Cf. Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 
77 (Johnson) [refusing to give preclusive effect to a judgment based on laches, 
notwithstanding “the public policies of giving certainty to legal proceedings, 
preventing parties from being unfairly subjected to repetitive litigation, and 
preserving judicial resources”].) 
We further observe that Matar’s concerns about repetitive litigation are 
overstated.  For one thing, if Matar had sought summary judgment on causation 
grounds when Nahigian did, Matar, too, would have had the benefit of the trial 
court’s decision.  Had Samara appealed, the judgment would not have been 
 
16 
affirmed with respect to Matar simply because Samara’s suit against Nahigian 
was untimely; the Court of Appeal would likely have confronted the merits of the 
trial court’s no-causation ruling.  In other words, Matar could have promoted 
judicial economy and protected himself from the burdens of further litigation 
simply by timely filing such a motion.  (Cf. Love v. Waltz (1857) 7 Cal. 250, 252 
[“If defendants had any doubt in regard to the right of plaintiff to sue, and wished 
to be protected from any further liability to Mrs. Love, they should have made her 
a party to the first suit, and then the judgment would have been conclusive upon 
all parties that could have any interest”].)    
More generally, courts are not powerless to prevent a waste of judicial 
resources.  Appellate courts can affirm on multiple grounds where appropriate.  
Trial courts can decline to reach issues that are unnecessary for judgment.  And 
although, on remand, the trial court in this case should resolve Matar’s motion for 
summary judgment without relying on the supposedly preclusive effect of the 
judgment in favor of Nahigian, the court need not forget or ignore the work it has 
already completed in this litigation.  Declining to find preclusion does not require 
that a new judge be assigned and the case start afresh; it means only that a prior 
determination by itself does not necessarily, as a matter of law, bind the future one 
— and that the correctness of that future determination, if appealed, can be 
reviewed on its merits. 
2.  Stare decisis does not compel continued adherence to Skidmore  
“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis” is “a fundamental jurisprudential policy 
that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if 
considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices.”  (Moradi-
Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.)  But the 
policy is just that — a policy — and it admits of exceptions in rare and appropriate 
 
17 
cases.  Factors that have contributed to our reconsideration of precedent include:  
“a . . . tide of critical or contrary authority from other jurisdictions” (Freeman & 
Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 100); our precedent’s 
“divergence from the path followed by the Restatements” (Riverisland Cold 
Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 
1179); and our concern that no “satisfactory rationalization has been advanced” 
for the decision at issue (Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 
[overruling mutuality requirement for issue preclusion]).  As discussed, these rare 
factors are present here, as is tension between Skidmore and our other preclusion 
case law. 
Moreover, several of the concerns that can give stare decisis particular 
force are not applicable in this case.  When the party urging us to overrule a 
decision could have easily avoided the decision’s effect, for example, we are less 
inclined to disturb our precedent.  (See, e.g., Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, 
Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 272 [declining to overrule principle that nonparty class 
member cannot appeal, where other options meant that member would not be 
“discourage[d] . . . from filing a meritorious appeal”]; cf. Kimble v. Marvel 
Entertainment, LLC (2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2401, 2408] [declining to 
overrule case that contracting “parties can often find ways around”].)  Under 
Skidmore, however, a party that has lost in the trial court and has appealed the trial 
court’s rulings can do little to ensure reversal of an adverse but ultimately 
unnecessary trial court determination.   
Nor does Skidmore implicate the reliance concerns that have encouraged 
adherence to precedent in other contexts.  We are particularly reluctant to overrule 
precedent when, unlike here, “[d]oubtless many people” have entered into 
transactions in reliance upon that precedent.  (Sacramento Bank v. Alcorn (1898) 
121 Cal. 379, 382.)  Although Skidmore might theoretically have induced some 
 
18 
number of settlements following unsuccessful appeals, it is not the sort of “rule of 
property” that encourages strict adherence to precedent.  (Security Pacific 
National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 1000.)  Perhaps for this reason, no 
party has urged us to depart from “the general rule that a decision of a court of 
supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation,” 
rather than purely prospective.  (County of Los Angeles v. Faus (1957) 48 Cal.2d 
672, 680-681.)   
Under all these circumstances, we conclude that People v. Skidmore, supra, 
27 Cal. 287 should be — and is now — overruled.  We caution, however, that we 
take no position on the significance of an independently sufficient alternative 
ground reached by the trial court and not challenged on appeal.   
III.  NEITHER CLAIM NOR ISSUE PRECLUSION SUPPORTS  
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MATAR 
Whether the trial court erred by granting Matar’s motion for summary judgment 
is a question of law we review de novo.  (See, e.g., Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 
pp. 67-68.)  We hold that it did.  The critical point here is that the preclusive effect of 
the judgment in favor of Nahigian should be evaluated as though the trial court had not 
reached the causation issue.  (See ante, Part II.C.)  That premise implies that the 
causation issue was not “necessarily decided in the first suit,” or even “decided” at all, 
rendering issue preclusion unavailable.  (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 825.)  
Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded, and Matar’s briefing does not dispute, that a 
decision on timeliness grounds is not a decision “on the merits” in the relevant sense.  
Accepting that premise as undisputed (and without deciding its correctness), it follows 
that the ruling in favor of Nahigian was not a “final judgment on the merits,” and that 
claim preclusion is likewise unavailable.  (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.)  
Thus, neither claim nor issue preclusion can support the summary judgment entered in 
favor of Matar, and the trial court’s ruling to the contrary was erroneous. 
 
19 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal; overrule Skidmore, supra, 
27 Cal. 287; and disapprove Bank of America v. McLaughlin etc. Co., supra, 
40 Cal.App.2d 620, to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.3     
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
HOCH, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
3 
We decline to address any other issues raised by the parties.  (See Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).) 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Samara v. Matar 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 8 Cal.App.5th 796 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S240918 
Date Filed: June 25, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William D. Stewart 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Curd, Galindo & Smith, Alexis Galindo and Tracy Labrusciano for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Katherine M. Harwood; Tardiff Law Offices and Neil S. Tardiff for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
McGarrigle Kenney & Zampiello, Patrick C. McGarrigle and Michael J. Kenney for Kenneth Barton as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Law Offices of Mary A. Lehman and Mary A. Lehman for Stephen H. Bennett, Richard T. Letwak and 
Letwak & Bennett as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Tracy Labrusciano 
Curd, Galindo & Smith 
301 East Ocean Boulevard, #1700 
Long Beach, CA  90802 
(562) 624-1177 
 
Neil S. Tardiff 
Tardiff Law Offices 
P.O. Box 1446 
San Luis Obispo, CA  93406 
(805) 544-8100 
 
Patrick C. McGarrigle 
McGarrigle Kenney & Zampiello 
9600 Topanga Canyon Boulevard, Suite 200 
Chatsworth, CA  91311 
(818) 998-3300