Title: State v. Grow

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

255 Ind. 183 (1970)
263 N.E.2d 277
STATE OF INDIANA
v.
GROW.
No. 769S155.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 4, 1970.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, William F. Thompson and Robert F. Hassett, Deputies Attorney General, for appellant.
Robinson & Sammons, of Morocco, Bowen, Myers, Northam & Soards, of Indianapolis, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal taken by the Attorney General of the State of Indiana on behalf of the State from a judgment dismissing a criminal action instituted by the State of Indiana by affidavit in two counts charging the appellee with assault and battery with intent to gratify sexual desires, Count One, and assault and battery alone in Count Two.
*184 The only issue in this appeal relates to the appellant's contention that the appellee was not entitled to be discharged under Rule 1-4D for delay in bringing the defendant to trial. Rule 1-4D (3) provides that no person shall be held by recognizance without trial for a period of more than one year from the date upon which the recognizance was taken except as provided in paragraph (1) of the same rule. Paragraph (1) of Rule 1-4D reads as follows:
Essentially, the argument is made that the granting of the motion for a change of venue on the request of the defendant was not a delay "caused by his act." The facts are essentially as follows:
Appellee posted his recognizance on January 5, 1968, and was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on February 28, 1968. On March 8, 1968, he moved for a change of venue from the judge. Although two panels were named by the presiding judge, in each case the nominee failed to qualify. As a result, the Supreme Court designated a special judge who qualified on September 7, 1968. The cause was set for trial on the prosecutor's motion on November 11, 1968, and again on the prosecutor's motion on January 23, 1969. On January 31, 1969, appellee filed his verified motion for a discharge for *185 delay in trial, alleging that no continuance was had on his own motion and that no trial delay was caused by his act. To that motion the prosecuting attorney filed an affidavit stating that defendant's attorney would not consent or agree to try the case on November 11th, since it was a holiday.
The evidence is undisputed that the defendant filed no formal motion for a continuance. Our only consideration in this case must be given to a proper interpretation of the wording of the rule involved when it states the defendant shall not be entitled to count the time to his own credit for the one-year period involved when "the delay was caused by his act." There is nothing in this phraseology which qualifies it with respect to whether or not the act causing the delay was justifiable or meritorious. This is demonstrated in the case of State ex rel. Demers v. Miami Circuit Court (1968), 249 Ind. 616, 233 N.E.2d 777, in which case the appellant was indicted for second degree murder and sought discharge, claiming the time the case was delayed by a plea of temporary insanity and the procedure involved in connection therewith should not be charged against her. This Court held to the contrary, that the delay was caused by her act.
There are, however, cases directly on point by this Court that fix the rule in this jurisdiction. In Colglazier v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 571, 575, 110 N.E.2d 2, 4, this Court had occasion to say:
In Wedmore v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 212, 216, 143 N.E.2d 649, 651, this Court further said:
*186 More recently this Court stated in Norris v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 155, 240 N.E.2d 45, that where appellant had inaugurated the change of venue proceedings voluntarily, he may not be heard to say that this delay forces his discharge.
Where a change of venue from the county has been granted, we have held the time begins to run anew when the court to which the venue is changed receives the transcript and original papers and assumes jurisdiction. State v. Mabrey (1927), 199 Ind. 276, 157 N.E. 97. It follows that the time begins to run anew where a change of venue is taken from a judge when the new judge qualifies and assumes jurisdiction. Norris v. State, supra.
In this case one year had not elapsed when the motion for discharge was granted on January 31, 1969.
The judgment of dismissal by the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate the case for trial.
Hunter, C.J., concurs; Jackson, J., dissents with opinion: Givan and DeBruler, JJ., not participating.
JACKSON, J.
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion herein and dissent thereto.
This appeal principally concerns appellant's contention that the appellee was not entitled to be discharged under Rule 1-4D for delay in bringing the defendant to trial.
The Majority opinion factually states "(t)he evidence is undisputed that the defendant filed no formal motion for a continuance." The record in the case at bar presents the following chronology of events:
1. Affidavit in two counts filed against appellee January 4, 1965;
2. Appellee arrested January 5, 1968, and, on said date, he posted bond;
*187 3. On February 28, 1968, defendant, with counsel, appeared in open court, waived arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty";
4. Within ten days after arraignment, on March 8, 1968, defendant filed a motion for change of venue from the Judge of the Jasper Circuit Court, on the same day the Judge of that court named a panel;
5. On March 11, 1968, appellee struck a name from the panel;
6. March 15, 1968, the prosecuting attorney struck;
7. July 10, 1968, the prosecuting attorney advised the court that the remaining nominee failed to qualify and requested the court to name a new panel, which the court that day did;
8. July 12, 1968, both parties struck, and again the remaining nominee failed to qualify;
9. August 9, 1968, the Presiding Judge requested the Supreme Court to appoint a Special Judge and certified that the remaining nominees of the two panels had failed to qualify;
10. August 19, 1968, the Supreme Court appointed Frank Dice as Special Judge;
11. September 7, 1968, Frank Dice qualified as Special Judge;
12. October 17, 1968, on motion of the prosecuting attorney, the cause was set for trial on November 11, 1968;
13. Later, on motion of the prosecutor, the cause was set for trial May 19, 1969;
14. January 31, 1969, appellee filed a verified motion for discharge for delay in trial.
The defendant's verified motion for discharge, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
15. On March 15, 1969, argument was had on appellee's motion for discharge, and in connection therewith and on the same day, the prosecutor filed an affidavit which reads as follows:
16. On April 16, 1969, the court granted appellee's Motion for Discharge and ordered him discharged. The entry reads as follows:
17. On May 20, 1969, praecipe for transcript was filed.
18. On June 3, 1969, the clerk of the Jasper Circuit Court certified the transcript.
19. On July 9, 1969, appellant filed its transcript and assignment of errors with the clerk of this court. The Assignment of Errors, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
*191 Appellant's argument is as follows:
Rule 1-4D provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Paragraph one (1) of the rule provides as follows:
Appellee's Reply Brief devotes attention to each of the cases cited by appellant and distinguishes them from the case at bar. He further goes, at length, into the constitutional requirements of Indiana and the implementing statute, Burns' *194 § 9-1403, 1942 Replacement (former Rule 1-4D), now, under the rules adopted effective January 1, 1970, being Criminal Rule 4.
For convenience we will address the cases in the order they are cited in the briefs. Appellee states:
We further point out that in the cited case the appellant, defendant there, had twice filed applications for discharge in the trial court under Rule 1-4D, both of which were denied. She thereafter in this court filed an original action "A Petition for a Writ of Mandate" to require the trial court to discharge appellant for delay in trial. The situation there and in the case at bar are vastly different. Two rules distinguish the cases. (1) The rule of this Court that if there is any evidence to sustain the judgment of the trial court it will be sustained; (2) Original actions for writs are viewed with disfavor. Counsel will not be allowed to use such writs as a vehicle for circumventing the normal appellate process. Writs will be granted only when a denial would result in extreme hardship. *195 The distinguishing feature between the cited case and the one at bar is that in the case at bar appellee successfully discharged the burden of showing he did not cause the delay complained of, as evidenced by the judgment of the court discharging him. Therefore, the cited case supports the appellee, not the appellant.
We point out that in the cited case the appellant, defendant there, had filed his application for a discharge under Rule 1-4D which application had been denied in the trial court. There, on appeal, the cause was reversed for the failure of the trial court to grant the relief sought. Again we have the distinguishing feature in the cited cases; there the trial court on application refused to grant the relief sought and as a result, on appeal to this Court, was reversed. In the case at bar the defendant-appellee was by the trial court granted the relief sought and thus sustained the burden of defendant showing he did not cause the delay he complained of. The judgment of the trial court supports the position of the appellee in the case at bar, and, under our rules, if there is any evidence to sustain the same the judgment of the trial court must be sustained.
The case of Wedmore v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 is cited by the appellant. The appellant-defendant there had filed his application for a discharge under the statute § 9-1403 Burns' 1956 Replacement and had been denied relief by the trial court. Appellee's argument is:
Again we point out that in the cited case the trial court denied the relief and on appeal, taking into account other matters as well, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. The case cited is distinguished from the case at bar in that in the case at bar the appellee sustained his burden and was granted relief by the trial court. This judgment under our rules should be affirmed.
The majority opinion next discusses the case of Norris v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 155, 240 N.E.2d 45 and there holds:
Again the distinguishing feature of the cited case is that there appellant unsuccessfully sought a discharge based on the ground that appellant there was not tried within one year. In the cited case appellant filed not one, but two motions to dismiss. The court stated:
In the case at bar appellee successfully sustained the burden of proof in the trial court and was granted the relief sought *201 by judgment of that court. Under our rules the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
The case of State v. Mabrey (1927), 199 Ind. 276, 157 N.E. 97, is hardly in point since in that case the affidavit for change of venue from the county was filed on the morning the case was set for trial. Furthermore, the cases, later in time than Mabrey, cited by the appellant, the appellee and the majority opinion indicate the rule therein enunciated no longer applies in view of the constitutional requirement and implementing statute since supplanted by rule.
From a careful consideration of all the factors and the law here involved it appears that the judgment of the trial court should in all things be affirmed.
NOTE.  Reported in 263 N.E.2d 277.