Title: Gilmer v. Fauteux

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Gilmer v. Fauteux  (97-323); 168 Vt. 636; 723 A.2d 1150

[Filed 22-Dec-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-323

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 1998

James David Gilmer	        }	APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.	                        }	Windsor Superior Court
                                }	
Norman Fauteux and Land East	}
Construction Company 	        }	DOCKET NO. S315-95Wrcv	

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendants appeal the superior court's decision awarding plaintiff
  James Gilmer a real estate commission.  We reverse based on our
  determination that the record does not support the court's conclusion that
  plaintiff procured the sale of the subject property.

       Defendant Norman Fauteux was designated in a 1991 divorce decree as
  the agent responsible for liquidating the divorcing couple's marital
  property, including properties owned by defendant Land East Construction
  Corporation (Land East).  Fauteux sold eighteen properties without the
  services of a broker, but eventually hired plaintiff to help him sell the
  remaining properties.  Between 1992 and 1995, Gilmer received commission
  payments for selling approximately fifteen parcels.

       In September 1992, Fauteux and Gilmer entered into a nonexclusive
  one-year listing agreement concerning the subject property, known as the
  North Hartland Dry Kiln, which was owned by Land East.  Fauteux agreed to
  pay Gilmer a commission if Gilmer procured a buyer for the property, which
  was listed at $1,000,000.  As soon as the agreement was signed, Gilmer
  contacted the Cersosimo Lumber Company (Cersosimo) regarding the property,
  but the company expressed no interest in purchasing it.  In September 1993,
  Fauteux and Gilmer signed a renewal one-year listing agreement concerning
  the property.  By September 1994, the property had not sold, and Gilmer
  asked Fauteux to renew the listing agreement once again.  Fauteux told
  Gilmer that he was reluctant to sign a renewal agreement because he was not
  sure whether his authority as liquidating agent would extend beyond
  December 1994.  Nevertheless, Fauteux asked Gilmer to continue to seek a
  buyer for the property, assuring him that he would be paid a commission. 
  Gilmer agreed to continue looking for a buyer with the understanding that
  Fauteux would sign a new listing agreement if he were reappointed as
  liquidating agent.

       In January 1995, Gilmer notified Cersosimo that the asking price for
  the subject property had been reduced from $1,000,000 to $750,000.  Soon
  thereafter, Gilmer began negotiating a deal with one prospective buyer and
  then with another when the first one withdrew its offer.  On May 22, 1995,
  after Gilmer gave Fauteux the latest draft of a purchase and sale agreement
  negotiated with the second prospective buyer, Fauteux told Gilmer that he
  expected to be reappointed as liquidating agent.  That same day, Gilmer
  gave Fauteux a renewal listing agreement with the understanding that he
  would sign it.  Fauteux never signed the agreement and, in September 1995,
  sold the subject property to Cersosimo.  When Fauteux refused to give
  Gilmer a commission, Gilmer sued Fauteux and Land East, seeking a broker's
  fee for the sale of the property.

       Following a hearing, the superior court determined that Gilmer had
  procured the sale of the kiln, and thus was entitled to a commission in the
  amount of $58,750.  The court acknowledged the general rule barring real
  estate commissions absent an executed written listing agreement, but
  concluded that an exception should apply in this case because the parties
  had expressed a mutual intent to abide by a written listing agreement that,
  though unsigned, contained the same terms as those contained in their prior
  agreements.  Given the clear terms of the parties' agreement, the court
  found no reason to invoke the rule requiring an executed written agreement,
  which is aimed at ensuring that the parties are fully aware of the terms of
  the agreement.  See MacDonald v. Roderick, 158 Vt. 1, 7, 603 A.2d 369, 373
  (1992) (when listing agreement is oral, recovery of real estate commission
  will always be barred because the requirement of written agreement ensures
  that parties are fully aware of terms of agreement).  On appeal, defendants
  argue that the superior court erred in allowing a commission without an
  executed written listing agreement and in concluding that Gilmer procured
  the sale to Cersosimo.

       Because the record does not support the trial court's conclusion that
  Gilmer procured the sale of the subject property, we need not consider
  whether the absence of an executed written listing agreement in these
  circumstances precluded Gilmer from recovering a broker's fee.  Merely
  listing a property with one broker does not preclude sale of the property
  through the efforts of the owner or another broker.  See Kelly v. Beaudoin,
  131 Vt. 27, 32-33,