Title: In re J.R.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

IN_RE_JR.94-038; 164 Vt 267; 668 A.2d 670

[Filed 20-Oct-1995]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.




                                 No. 94-038


In re J.R., Juvenile                              Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
                                                  Chittenden Family Court

                                                  October Term, 1994



Ronald F. Kilburn, J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Harrison B.
  Lebowitz, Assistant Attorney General, and James R. Willmuth, Law Clerk (On
  the Brief), Waterbury, for appellee Vermont Department of Social and
  Rehabilitation Services

       Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for appellee juvenile

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Defender,
  Montpelier, for appellant


  PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       MORSE, J.  J.R.'s mother appeals an order of the Chittenden Family
  Court terminating her parental rights.  Mother claims the court erred (1)
  by not hearing and deciding a 33 V.S.A. § 5532(a) motion to vacate a
  disposition order removing J.R. from the parental home, and (2) by
  excluding all of mother's witnesses at a termination of parental rights
  (TPR) hearing.  We decide that findings of fact in a CHINS (child in need
  of care or supervision) proceeding founded on a preponderance of the
  evidence do not preclude relitigation of issues required to be decided on
  clear and convincing evidence in a TPR proceeding.  We therefore reverse.

       J.R. was removed from her mother and stepfather's home in February
  1991 based on allegations that her stepfather had sexually abused her.  At
  a contested merits hearing, the court determined that J.R. was a child in
  need of care or supervision, explicitly stating that its factual findings
  -- the critical one being that father had sexually abused J.R. -- were
  based on a preponderance of the evidence.  Legal custody, including
  guardianship of J.R., was transferred

 

  to the Commissioner of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation
  Services (SRS).

       In April 1992, mother and stepfather filed a motion under 33 V.S.A. §
  5532(a) to vacate the disposition order, alleging that the court had based
  its decision to remove J.R. from the home on fraudulent evidence.  Although
  the motion challenged the disposition order, no new evidence was admitted
  at the disposition proceeding.  Thus, it is evident that mother took issue
  with evidence admitted in the CHINS proceeding that subsequently became the
  basis for the disposition order.

       In support of her motion, mother offered three letters and an
  affidavit.  She claimed her exhibits showed that J.R.'s maternal
  grandmother had fabricated the sexual abuse allegations against J.R.'s
  stepfather.  SRS opposed the motion to vacate, claiming that the letters
  submitted by the parents themselves were fraudulent.  SRS submitted an
  affidavit of mother's sister in which she denied writing one of the letters
  J.R.'s parents attributed to her.  At the suggestion of SRS, the parties
  stipulated to the taking of handwriting exemplars to be analyzed by a
  handwriting expert.

       In August 1992, SRS petitioned for termination of mother's parental
  rights.  After the parties skirmished over procedure, the family court
  determined that "regardless of the outcome of any hearing required by 33
  V.S.A. § 5532 based upon an allegation of fraud, the Court would still be
  required to respond to the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. . . ." 
  The court bypassed the motion to vacate and heard the TPR petition.

       At the TPR hearing, mother produced the letters on the issue of fraud,
  as well as witnesses who would verify the handwriting in the letters.  She
  claimed that J.R. had not been abused, that J.R.'s maternal grandmother had
  fabricated the child abuse claims, and that mother had faced a
  confrontational atmosphere during the original police investigation.  SRS
  objected to introduction of this evidence, claiming that mother was
  attempting to relitigate the issue of child abuse.  SRS argued, as it
  argues on appeal, that these issues were fully and fairly litigated at the
  CHINS proceeding, and that issue preclusion barred the mother from
  submitting the evidence at a TPR proceeding.  The court agreed with SRS on
  issue preclusion and did not admit

 

  testimony challenging the allegations of abuse.

                                     I.

       We first consider whether the court erred in failing to hold an
  evidentiary hearing to decide mother's motion to vacate.  Section 5532(a)
  of Title 33 provides that "[a]n order of the court may be set aside by a
  subsequent order of that court . . . when it appears that the initial order
  was obtained by fraud or mistake sufficient therefor in a civil action."

       We have affirmed the denial of similar post-trial motions without
  evidentiary hearings where the court had considered the proffered evidence
  and found that evidence other than that challenged in the motion
  sufficiently supported the initial order.  See, e.g., In re D.M., ___ Vt.
  ___, ___,