Title: Chambers v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH CHAMBERS,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 282, 2006 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. I.D. 0305016220 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  February 21, 2007 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  May 21, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.   
 
 
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire (argued) and Peter W. Veith, Esquire, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.   
 
Kevin M. Carroll, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee.  
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
The defendant-appellant, Joseph L. Chambers (“Chambers”), was 
indicted on charges of Capital Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Firearm by 
a Person Prohibited.  A jury trial was held in the Superior Court.  Chambers 
was convicted on all charges.   
Following a penalty hearing, the jury unanimously found the existence 
of one statutory aggravating circumstance and voted seven to five that the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  
Chambers was sentenced on June 2, 2006.  The trial judge declined to 
impose a death sentence.  Chambers was sentenced to life imprisonment, 
without the possibility of probation or parole, on the Capital Murder in the 
First Degree conviction.  He was sentenced to an additional fifteen years on 
the weapons convictions. 
Chambers raises two arguments in this direct appeal.  First, he 
contends the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying a defense 
request for a mistrial, after the trial judge allowed the chief investigating 
officer to speak with a witness for the State, during a recess and before the 
witness had concluded his direct testimony.  Second, Chambers submits the 
 
3
Superior Court committed legal error when it refused to give a jury 
instruction concerning the testimony of accomplices or participants.1 
We have concluded that both of Chambers’ arguments are without 
merit.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
Facts 
 
On April 27, 2003, Gregory Graves, a resident of Simonds Gardens in 
New Castle, was shot multiple times. His body was found several hours later 
by William Butler.  Butler discovered Graves’ body in “the alley between 
Rosegate and Simonds [Gardens],” and called the police and emergency 
services through 911. 
 
Butler told police investigators that both he and his wife had been 
sleeping when they heard gunshots in the early morning hours of April 27, 
2003.  They ignored them, however, and went back to sleep.  During the 
course of the police investigation, officers spoke with another witness, 
Benita Evans.  Evans told the police that she witnessed an argument between 
Chambers and Graves.  Evans knew Graves and described him as a good 
friend, someone she could go to if she needed anything, including money or 
drugs.  Evans also recognized Chambers from the neighborhood.   
                                          
 
1 Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543, 544-45 (Del. 2000).   
 
4
 
On the night Graves was shot, Evans had been “partying” with drugs 
and alcohol.  She was on her way to a local liquor store when she saw 
Chambers and Graves arguing.  Evans was approximately fifteen feet away.  
Although Graves and Chambers were not loud, she could tell they were 
arguing “[b]ecause of their hands, language [and] body movement.”  Both 
Chamber and Graves were gone by the time Evans left the liquor store.   
 
After returning to her house, Evans heard Graves’ voice.  She looked 
out of a window and saw Graves in the common area outside her building. 
She remembers this being at approximately 3:00 a.m.  Evans went outside 
and asked if he could get her some cocaine.  He said no and indicated that he 
was waiting for someone.  Evans then saw Graves walk towards “[t]he alley 
[] leading to the park.”  A few minutes later, Evans saw Chambers follow 
Graves into that same alley. 
 
Officers also learned that Quinton Davis had been out during the 
general time of the shooting.  Davis was a resident of 117 Rose Avenue in 
the Rosegate neighborhood in New Castle.  Investigators spoke with Davis, 
who told several different stories about the night that Graves was shot.  
Initially, Davis told investigators that he was at a motel the night of the 
shooting.  He later changed his story and told investigators that he was with 
 
5
Chambers, whom he knew as “Bookie,” and Daniel Haye the night Graves 
was shot.  
 
According to Davis, on April 27, 2003, at around 3:00 a.m., he was 
sitting with Chambers and Haye, in Haye’s car, near Chambers’ residence. 
Chambers left the car and walked past a few of the houses on the street.  He 
then returned to the car and told Davis and Haye that he had something to do 
in one of the houses.  Chambers instructed Davis and Haye to meet him in 
Simonds Gardens, by “the path.” Davis did not know what Chambers had to 
do in the house.  Before driving to Simonds Gardens, Davis got into the 
front passenger seat of Haye’s car.  The two then drove to wait for 
Chambers. 
 
Several minutes later, Chambers met them at the car.  He was 
“walking fast” and “breathing kind of heavy.”  Chambers got into the back 
seat of Haye’s car.  He told Davis and Haye and that they all needed to get 
out of the area because he had just shot Graves. 
 
Haye drove to Philadelphia.  On the way up to Philadelphia, 
Chambers rolled the rear window down and back up once.  Haye told 
investigators that he “heard something thrown out of the window” and 
specifically indicated that a “gun was tossed out of the car in [Chambers’] 
black hooded sweatshirt along I95 near Philadelphia.”   
 
6
Motion for Mistrial Properly Denied 
 
Chambers appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for a 
mistrial.  Chambers asserts that it was reversible error for the chief 
investigating officer, Detective Armstrong, to speak with Quinton Davis 
during a brief recess in Davis’ direct examination.2  Chambers contends that 
the sole purpose of the recess was to give the State time to “rehabilitate” 
Davis’ direct testimony. 
 
The trial court judge rejected Chambers’ same argument and denied 
his motion for a mistrial, holding: 
                                          
 
2 The trial judge granted the State’s request to allow Detective Armstrong to speak with 
Davis: 
 
The Court:  [Defense counsel] hasn’t started cross-examination so you’re 
still free to confer with [Davis]. 
 
* * * 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  I just have one comment about [the prosecutor] 
talking to a witness after that witness has taken the stand and before that 
witness is done testifying. 
 
The Court:  I know it’s a long-standing rule that an attorney may not 
confer with a witness who’s on cross-examination.  But I know of no rule 
that prevents – 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  I don’t think – 
 
* * * 
 
The Court: . . . Can you advise me of any rule that would prevent an 
attorney from conferring with a witness during direct examination? 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Off the top of my head, no. 
 
7
Essentially, the defense is asking me to craft a new rule of 
procedure that would prohibit communications between an 
attorney and anybody who’s a witness while that witness is on 
direct examination.  That plainly is not the rule that was stated 
in Webb v. State.  There’s some discussion of how counsel and 
witnesses interact, but it’s basically descriptive and not a matter 
of a ruling.   
 
For example, our Supreme court quotes the United States 
Supreme Court as follows:  “It is a common practice for a judge 
to instruct a witness not to discuss his or testimony with third 
parties until the trial is completed.”  That’s plainly at variance 
with the practice in this state.  The rule in this state applies only 
to cross-examination.  And I don’t know of a rule that would 
prohibit the Court from allowing consultation during cross-
examination for proper purposes. 
 
That being the case, I allowed the consultation during trial for 
what it seemed to me was a proper purpose.  And as a 
consequence, the motion for mistrial is denied. 
 
 
The State asserts that the prosecutor’s request for a recess was not 
aimed at “rehabilitating” Davis’ testimony.  In support of this contention, the 
State points to the fact that the prosecutor did not initiate contact with the 
witness.  The record supports the State’s position.  It was the witness who 
requested to speak with Detective Armstrong.   
 
Detective Armstrong spoke with Davis at a brief recess during Davis’ 
direct examination.  According to Detective Armstrong, his conversation 
with Davis was not aimed at “controlling or putting a better face on 
testimonial damage caused by Davis’ testimony.”  Instead, the substance of 
the conversation, as recounted by Detective Armstrong, concerned the safety 
 
8
of Davis and his family.3  The State notes that there is support in the record 
concerning the validity of the perceived threat to Davis’ safety.  On March 
18, 2005, the trial judge called counsel to sidebar and explained the presence 
of extra security within the courtroom. The basis for the increased security 
was due to information communicated to the Department of Justice that 
Davis “was a dead man walking.” 
 
In United States v. Calderin-Rodriguez,4 the Eighth Circuit addressed 
the argument that “the district court erred in refusing to strike the testimony 
of [a] witness . . . because [he] discussed his testimony with the prosecutor 
and another witness during the evening recess midway through his direct 
                                          
 
3 After the brief recess, Detective Armstrong informed the court the nature of Davis’ 
concerns about testifying: 
 
Sir, I mean we all know, when this occurred, Quinton was 17.  He’s not 
19.  He still frequents the Rosegate area, okay. 
 
During the time period leading up to the trial, he’s been approached 
numerous times, nothing – no overt threats, just, you know, question him, 
what he’s going to testify to.  I’m familiar with the Chambers family, and 
some of the brothers.  And he feels intimidated.  He feels intimidated with 
them two in the back row, you know, according to him, staring him down.  
He does not feel comfortable at this point to sit there and tell the truth, 
basically. 
 
And that’s basically what he told me.  He wants to sit down, he wants to 
tell the truth.  Okay.  But he’s dealing with – and I notice, when he 
testified, he continuously looked to the back row, you know, for whatever 
reason.  But I was watching his eyesight when [the prosecutor] was 
interviewing him, and it was continuously directed on the other side.  So, 
there’s something going on there that makes him feel uncomfortable. 
4 United States v. Calderin-Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 977, 984 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 
9
testimony.”5  In Calderin-Rodriguez, a witness corrected testimony given the 
day prior.  On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the witness 
about the correction and the witness admitted that “[w]ith [the prosecutor’s] 
help I realized what I said was wrong.”6  The Eighth Circuit found no error 
in the trial judge’s denial of the codefendants’ motion to strike the witness’ 
testimony:7 
. . . the meeting between [the witness] and the prosecutor 
violated neither Federal Rule of Evidence 615 nor the 
sequestration order in this case.  Rule 615 . . . does not by its 
terms forbid an attorney from conferring with witnesses during 
trial . . . .  Nor is it inherently unethical for a lawyer to speak to 
a witness once the witness has begun to testify . . . .  Assuredly, 
the district court, in exercise of its discretion in regulating the 
conduct of the trial, may impose restriction on an attorney’s 
contact with witnesses during trial, not only to prevent 
unethical coaching, but also simply to preserve the status quo 
during breaks in testimony.8 
 
The Eighth Circuit ruled further that, even if an improper conference is 
assumed, the defendants failed to show prejudice because, “even without the 
                                          
 
5 Id.   
6 Id.   
7 The codefendants in Calderin-Rodriguez claimed a violation of their Confrontation 
Clause rights.  Codefendants argued that their cross-examination was less effective 
because of the conference between the witness, the prosecutor, and another testifying 
officer. Id. at 984.  The court rejected that argument, finding “no legal support” for such 
an argument.  Id. 
8 Id. at 984-85 (citing United states v. Kindle, 925 F.2d 272, 276 (8th Cir. 1991) (Rule 
615 does not require court to forbid contact between DEA case agent and witness during 
trial); United States v. De Jongh, 937 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991); 29 Charles Alan Wright 
and Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6243, at 64 (1997) (“During 
the course of a trial, an attorney customarily consults out-of-court with his client and 
other witnesses.”); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281-84 (1989) (quotation omitted)). 
 
10
conference, the government would likely have been able to help [the 
witness] correct his earlier testimony by showing [him] the reports in court 
as prior inconsistent statements or to refresh his recollections.”9 
 
Like its federal counterpart that was addressed in Calderin-Rodriguez, 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 615 vests great discretion in the trial judge in 
ordering the sequestration of witnesses.10  While there was a sequestration 
order in effect at Chambers’ trial, that order was not violated by the State.  
Before Detective Armstrong spoke with Davis, the prosecutor informed the 
trial judge that Davis had requested to speak with Detective Armstrong.  The 
prosecutor then requested the trial judge’s permission to allow Detective 
Armstrong to speak with Davis.  The trial judge granted the prosecutor’s 
request.  Accordingly, there is no support for Chambers’ claim that the trial 
judge’s sequestration order was violated.   
 
This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for 
abuse of discretion.11  A mistrial is appropriate “only when there is ‘manifest 
necessity’ or the ‘ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’”12  
Chambers acknowledges that the substance of Davis’ “revised” testimony 
following the recess would have been admissible pursuant to section 3507 of 
                                          
 
9 United States v. Calderin-Rodriguez, 244 F.3d at 985. 
10 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d 405, 408 (Del. 2004). 
11 Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 2003). 
12 See, .e.g, Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 552 (Del. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 
11
title 11.13  Accordingly, Chambers cannot show prejudice from Davis’ 
conversation with Detective Armstrong.14 
 
We conclude that the Superior Court properly exercised its discretion 
in allowing Detective Armstrong to speak with Davis.  Moreover, the record 
reflects no prejudice resulted from their conversation.  Accordingly, we hold 
there was no abuse of the trial judge’s discretion in denying Chambers’ 
motion for a mistrial.   
Requested Jury Instruction 
 
Chambers’ second claim on appeal challenges the Superior Court’s 
denial of his request that the jury be instructed to view the testimony of 
Davis and Haye with caution because both were “admitted participants” or 
accomplices in the murder of Graves.  The trial judge rejected defense 
counsel’s argument that Davis and Haye were either admitted participants or 
accomplices: 
There is no evidence here that either Davis or Haye were, in 
fact, accomplices or their participation in the events of the 27th 
would make them accomplices.  They aren’t charged in that 
fashion and, based on what they testified to, that’s the only 
information we have, what they did.  There wouldn’t be a basis 
to find them as accomplices.  That’s the basis I’m denying it. 
 
                                          
 
13 The record reflects that when the prosecutor realized he might have to introduce Davis’ 
prior voluntary statement under Title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code, he 
requested a recess to prepare for that eventuality.   
14 See United States v. Calderin-Rodriguez, 244 F.3d at 984-85 (citations omitted).   
 
12
* * * 
 
At the same time, the Court will give the general credibility 
question that allows counsel to argue that they are biased in 
some fashion, they had an interest in saying what they said, and 
basically attacking their credibility on the basis that they were 
participants in the events and were trying to protect their own 
hides.  
 
The Superior Court is given wide discretion in framing jury 
instructions.15  Accordingly, this Court’s review of such instructions is 
limited to determining whether the instruction “correctly states the law and 
is not so confusing or inaccurate as to undermine the jury’s ability to reach a 
verdict.”16  The record reflects that the Superior Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied the jury instruction requested by Chambers.   
There must be a rational evidentiary basis before a jury may be 
instructed on an issue of accomplice or co-conspirator credibility.17  
Delaware law defines an accomplice as a person who “[i]ntending to 
promote or facilitate the commission of the offense . . . solicits, requests, 
commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause the other person to 
commit it; or [a]ids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in 
                                          
 
15 See, .e.g., Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543 (Del. 2000). 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Guy v. State, 2006 Del. LEXIS 610, 7-8 (Del. Nov. 16, 2006) (citing Ayers v. 
State, 844 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. 2004); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 867, 869 
(Ky. App. 1961)). 
 
13
planning or committing it.”18  There is no basis in the record to conclude that 
either Davis or Haye were “admitted participants” or accomplices in the 
murder of Graves.  To the contrary, the record reflects there was no 
indication that either Davis or Haye knew of Chambers’ plan.  It was not 
until after Chambers shot Graves that either of them discovered what had 
happened.   
 
At trial, Chambers also argued alternatively that the “immunity 
agreement” between Haye and the prosecutor served as a basis for 
instructing the jury that both Haye and Davis were Chambers’ accomplices 
in the murder of Graves and to weigh their credibility with “greater caution.”  
The “immunity agreement” stated: 
Daniel Haye agrees to give a truthful, accurate and detailed 
statement regarding his activities on April 26th, and April 27th 
2003.  This statement is to include any knowledge of meetings 
and/or ongoing problems with Joseph Chambers and Gregory 
Graves and the disposal of any evidence. 
 
In turn the State of Delaware through [prosecutor], will not 
prosecute Daniel Haye as an accomplice for the death of 
Gregory Graves. 
 
Other jurisdictions have held that such an immunity agreement does 
not provide a basis for concluding that a witness was either an admitted 
                                          
 
18 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 271(2).  See also Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385 (Del. 
2006). 
 
14
participant or accomplice in shooting of Graves.19  We agree with the 
rationale of those decisions.  Thus, we hold Haye’s “immunity agreement” 
did not entitle Chambers to an instruction warning the jury to weigh Haye’s 
and Davis’ testimony with “greater caution.”20  Accordingly, there was no 
error in the trial judge’s denial of Chambers’ motion to have the jury 
instructed to assess the credibility of the testimony by Davis and Haye on the 
basis that they were Chambers’ accomplices in the shooting of Graves.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
 
 
                                          
 
19 See State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn. 2006) (general credibility 
instruction was appropriate where witness testified pursuant to an immunity agreement); 
Hopewell v. State, 712 A.2d 88, 93 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Pilcher v. State, 796 
S.W.2d 845, 848 (Ark. 1990) (“Mere presence at the scene of the crime or failure to 
inform law enforcement officers of a crime does not make one an accomplice as a matter 
of law.  Nor does a grant of immunity alone cause a witness to be an accomplice as a 
matter of law.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); People v. Stankewitz, 793 P.2d 23, 
35 (Cal. 1990) (“the fact that a witness has been charged or held to answer for the same 
crimes as the defendant and then has been granted immunity does not necessarily 
establish that he or she is an accomplice.”); People v. Stafford, 395 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (“Only where it is uncontroverted that a witness was an 
accomplice.”) (citation omitted); People v. Basch, 325 N.E.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. 1975).  See 
also Coleman v. State, 2000 Del. LEXIS 490 *5 (Del. Dec. 4, 2000). 
20 See State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 653; Pilcher v. State, 796 S.W.2d at 848.  See 
also Raynor v State, 36 S.W.3d 315, 316-17 (Ark. 2001) (citing Pilcher v. State).