Title: Ex parte Gudel AG.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:05/29/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
_________________________
1131341
_________________________
Ex parte Güdel AG
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Robert Rutledge and Cindy Rutledge
v.
Smart Alabama, LLC, et al.)
(Crenshaw Circuit Court, CV-13-900016)
SHAW, Justice.
Güdel AG ("Güdel"), one of several defendants below,
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
1131341
Crenshaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Güdel's
motion to dismiss the personal-injury claims filed against it
by Robert Rutledge ("Robert") 
and 
Cindy 
Rutledge ("Cindy") and
to enter an order dismissing the Rutledges' claims on the
basis of a lack of in personam jurisdiction.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ. 
Facts and Procedural History
In February 2013, Robert sued Smart Alabama, LLC ("SAL"),
an automotive-parts manufacturer located in Crenshaw County,
seeking 
to 
recover 
worker's 
compensation benefits 
in
connection 
with 
an 
alleged 
work-related 
injury 
Robert 
suffered
in November 2011 while in SAL's employ.  More specifically,
Robert's complaint alleged that, while he was attempting to
enter a doorway on a stamping-press unit the cable on the
overhead, roll-up door to the unit broke, and Robert was hit
by the door and was knocked to the floor.  The door apparently
came down on Robert's leg, resulting in a crushing injury and,
ultimately, an amputation.  
In November 2013, Robert amended his original complaint 
to add a count pursuant to Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's
Liability Doctrine as well as negligence and wantonness
2
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claims.  In addition, the amended complaint added both Hyundai
WIA ("Hyundai") and Güdel, as well as several fictitiously
named entities, as defendants.   The amended complaint alleged
1
that 
Güdel, 
a 
foreign 
corporation 
headquartered 
in
Switzerland, "designed, built, manufactured, tested and sold
[the] subject machine/equipment that is the subject matter of
[the Rutledges'] lawsuit." 
Güdel, in February 2014, moved, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the claims against it
for lack of personal jurisdiction on grounds that Güdel was
subject to neither general nor specific jurisdiction in
Alabama.  See Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 730 (Ala.
2002) ("'Two types of contacts can form a basis for personal
jurisdiction: 
general 
contacts 
and 
specific 
contacts. 
 
General
contacts, which give rise to general personal jurisdiction,
consist of the defendant's contacts with the forum state that
are unrelated to the cause of action and that are both
"continuous 
and 
systematic." 
... 
Specific 
contacts, 
which 
give
rise to specific jurisdiction, consist of the defendant's
Robert's amendment also added his wife, Cindy, as an
1
additional named plaintiff; Cindy's claims are based on a
loss-of-consortium theory of recovery.
3
1131341
contacts with the forum state that are related to the cause of
action.'" (quoting Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So.
3d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in the
result))).  Güdel's motion alleged that it did not, as the
Rutledges' contended, manufacture the subject stamping-press
unit.  Instead, Güdel asserted that it merely "supplied to
Hyundai ... a component system of the machine," namely "a
['Transfer Automation System,' to serve as 
the] control system
for the conveyor system running through the press,"  which was
2
wholly designed and manufactured in Switzerland before being
sold to Hyundai, a Korean entity.  Güdel's motion was further
supported by affidavit testimony and authority aimed at
establishing the limited extent of Güdel's contacts with
Alabama, including, but not limited to, testimony indicating
that it had not conducted any systematic and/or continuous
business activities in Alabama; that it was not licensed to do
business in Alabama; and that it had no registered agent for
service of process in Alabama.  Thus, Güdel contended, to be
According to Güdel, the Transfer Automation System is,
2
in essence, a conveyor system, which system Güdel more
particularly describes as a "3-axis servo transfer system and
destacker," that is used to move sheets of metal through the
press. 
4
1131341
subjected to suit in Alabama violated "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."  International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  See, e.g., Frye v.
Smith, 67 So. 3d 882, 892 (Ala. 2011) ("[T]he critical
question with regard to the nonresident defendant's contacts
is whether the contacts are such that the nonresident
defendant '"should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court"' in the forum state." (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 486 (1985), quoting in turn World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980))). 
In its motion, Güdel did admit that, after shipping the
conveyor system to SAL pursuant to Hyundai's instructions, it
"provided assistance to Hyundai" with respect to the
installation of the conveyor system, including sending a
representative to the SAL facility to assist in installation
of the system and to train SAL employees with regard to its
operation; 
however, Güdel 
denied participating in any way 
with
the installation of the overhead door by which Robert was 
allegedly injured. The accompanying affidavit testimony
asserted that Güdel's automation system is in no way connected
to nor does it control the operation of the cable and overhead
5
1131341
door that Robert alleges caused his injury.  Thus, Güdel
contended, it both lacked the systematic and continuous
contacts with Alabama that would support a finding of general
jurisdiction and, because its product indisputably did not
cause Robert's injuries, there was no basis for a finding of
specific jurisdiction.
In opposition to Güdel's motion, the Rutledges countered
that Güdel, which both shipped parts directly to Alabama and
sent employees to install and train in the use of those parts,
had 
minimum 
sufficient 
contacts 
to 
support 
personal
jurisdiction in Alabama, given that its contacts with the
State were, according to the Rutledges, directly "related to
the action against Güdel."  Alternatively, the Rutledges
asserted that Güdel's motion was "premature" in that
additional 
"jurisdictional 
discovery" 
was 
necessary, 
and 
that,
assuming 
that 
discovery 
"determine[d] 
that 
Güdel['s]
involvement [was] not related to [Robert's] injuries," the
Rutledges would voluntarily dismiss Güdel as a defendant to
the action.  In an order, which did not include the findings
on which the ruling was based, the trial court denied Güdel's
6
1131341
motion to dismiss.  In response, Güdel filed this petition for
a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
"'[A] petition for a writ of mandamus
is the proper device by which to challenge
the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack
of in personam jurisdiction.  See Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795 (Ala. 2001); Ex
parte Paul Maclean Land Servs., Inc., 613
So. 2d 1284, 1286 (Ala. 1993).  "'An
appellate court considers de novo a trial
court's judgment on a party's motion to
dismiss 
for 
lack 
of 
personal
jurisdiction.'"  Ex parte Lagrone, 839 So.
2d 620, 623 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Elliott v.
Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala.
2002)).  Moreover, "[t]he plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the court's personal
jurisdiction over the defendant."  Daynard
v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson &
Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.
2002).'
"Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings,
P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003).
"'"In considering a Rule
12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, 
a 
court 
must
consider as true the allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, 
 
Robinson 
v.
Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d
253 
(11th 
Cir. 
1996), 
and
Cable/Home Communication Corp. v.
Network Productions, Inc., 902
F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990), and
7
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'where the plaintiff's complaint
and the defendant's affidavits
conflict, the ... court must
construe 
all 
reasonable
inferences 
in 
favor 
of 
the
plaintiff.'  Robinson, 74 F.3d at
255 (quoting Madara v. Hall, 916
F.2d 
1510, 
1514 
(11th 
Cir.
1990))."'
"Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc.,
853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).  However,
if the defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
showing that the Court has no personal jurisdiction,
'the plaintiff is then required to substantiate the
jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by
affidavits or other competent proof, and he may not
merely reiterate the factual allegations in the
complaint.'  Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal
Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D.
Ala. 2002)(citing Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF
Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir.
2000)).  See also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163
F.R.D. 471, 474–75 (D. Del. 1995) ('When a defendant
files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 
12(b)(2), 
and 
supports 
that 
motion 
with
affidavits, plaintiff is required to controvert
those affidavits with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to survive the motion.') 
(citing Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic
Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984))."
Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30
(Ala. 2004) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Discussion
In its petition, Güdel argues that the trial court erred
in concluding that it had jurisdiction over Güdel. More
8
1131341
specifically, Güdel, citing Ex parte Excelsior Financial,
Inc., 42 So. 3d 96 (Ala. 2010), contends that the Rutledges
failed to refute Güdel's prima facie demonstration that,
contrary to the allegations in the 
Rutledges' 
complaint, Güdel
does not have sufficient contacts with the State of Alabama to
subject it to the jurisdiction of the trial court.  We agree.
As set out in Ex parte McNeese Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670,
673 (Ala. 2011), 
"[j]urisdiction over out-of-state defendants is
acquired pursuant to Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
which provides, in pertinent part:
"'An appropriate basis exists for service
of process outside of this state upon a
person or entity in any action in this
state when the person or entity has such
contacts 
with 
this 
state 
that 
the
prosecution of the action against the
person or entity in this state is not
inconsistent with the constitution of this
state or the Constitution of the United
States....'
"In other words, '[t]his rule extends the personal
jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limit of due
process under the United States and Alabama
Constitutions.' Hiller Invs., Inc. v. Insultech
Group, Inc., 957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006).
Under this rule, the exercise of jurisdiction is
appropriate so long as the out-of-state defendant
has '"some minimum contacts with this state [so
that] ... it is fair and reasonable to require the
person to come to this state to defend an action."'
Dillon Equities v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 501 So. 2d
9
1131341
459, 
461 
(Ala. 
1986) 
(quoting 
former 
Rule
4.2(a)(2)(I), Ala. R. Civ. P.)."
This Court has also stated: 
"The sufficiency of a party's contacts are assessed
as follows:
"'"Two types of contacts can
form 
a 
basis 
for 
personal
jurisdiction: general contacts
and specific contacts. General
contacts, which give rise to
general 
personal 
jurisdiction
consist 
of 
the 
defendant's
contacts with the forum state
that are unrelated to the cause
of action and that are both
'continuous 
and 
systematic.'
Helicopteros 
Nacionales 
de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n. 9, 415, 104 S.Ct.
1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984);
[citations 
omitted]. 
Specific
contacts, which give rise to
specific jurisdiction, consist of
the defendant's contacts with the
forum state that are related to
the cause of action.  Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472-75, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 528 (1985).  Although the
related contacts need not be
continuous and systematic, they
must rise to such a level as to
cause the defendant to anticipate
being haled into court in the
forum state. Id."
"'Ex parte  Phase III Constr., Inc., 723
So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J.,
concurring in the result). Furthermore,
10
1131341
this Court has held that, for specific in
personam jurisdiction, there must exist "a
clear, firm nexus between the acts of the
defendant and the consequences complained
of." Duke v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37, 39 (Ala.
1986). See also Ex parte  Kamilewicz, 700
So. 2d 340, 345 n. 2 (Ala. 1997).
"'In the case of either general in
personam 
jurisdiction 
or 
specific 
in
personam jurisdiction, "[t]he 'substantial
connection' between the defendant and the
forum state necessary for a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an
action 
of 
the 
defendant 
purposefully
directed toward the forum State."  Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987). This
purposeful-availment requirement assures
that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the
"'unilateral activity of another person or
a third person.'"  Burger King, 471 U.S. at
475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 417, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed.
2d 404 (1984).'
"In Burger King the United States Supreme Court
explained:
"'[I]t is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant
purposefully 
avails 
itself 
of 
the 
privilege
of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.
"'This 
purposeful 
availment
requirement ensures that a defendant will
not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as
11
1131341
a 
result 
of 
random, 
fortuitous, 
or
attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral
activity of another party or a third
person. Jurisdiction is proper, however,
where the contacts proximately result from
actions by the defendant himself that
create a substantial connection with the
forum State. Thus where the defendant
deliberately has engaged in significant
activities within a State, or has created
continuing obligations between himself and
residents of the forum, he manifestly has
availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business there, and because his
activities are shielded by the benefits and
protections of the forum's laws it is
presumptively not unreasonable to require
him to submit to the burdens of litigation
in that forum as well.'
"471 U.S. at 475-76, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (internal
quotations and citations omitted).  In the words of
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307, 112
S. Ct. 1904, 119 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1992), 'if a foreign
corporation purposefully avails itself of the
benefits of an economic market in the forum State,
it may subject itself to the State's in personam
jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in
the State.'"
Ex parte Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 889 So. 2d
545, 550-51 (Ala. 2004).
Further,  
"'[i]f there are substantial contacts with the
state, for example a substantial and continuing
business, and if the cause of action arises out of
the business done in the state, jurisdiction will be
sustained.  If there are substantial contacts with
the state, but the cause of action does not arise
12
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out 
of 
these 
contacts, 
jurisdiction 
may 
be
sustained.  But if there is a minimum of contacts,
and the cause of action arises out of the contacts,
it will normally be fair and reasonable to sustain
jurisdiction.  If there is a minimum of contacts and
the cause of action does not arise out of the
contacts, there will normally be no basis of
jurisdiction, since it is difficult to establish the
factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable
test.'"
View-All, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 435 So. 2d 1198, 1201
(Ala. 1983) (quoting 2 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 4.25, pp.
4-258 through 4-267 (2d ed. 1982)) (emphasis added).
As Güdel notes in its petition, the Rutledges appear to
concede, because the accident giving rise to the Rutledges'
complaint clearly 
did not arise from continuous and systematic
general business contacts by Güdel with Alabama, that the only
potential basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over
Güdel would, of necessity, have to be specific personal
jurisdiction.  See Ex parte Georgia Farm Bureau, 889 So. 2d at
550-51 ("'"Specific contacts, which give rise to specific
jurisdiction, consist  of the defendant's contacts with the
forum state that are related to the cause of action.  ...
Although the related contacts need not be continuous and
systematic, they must rise to such a level as to cause the
defendant to anticipate being haled into court in the forum
13
1131341
state."'" (quoting Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So.
2d at 1266)).   
Here, the Rutledges' complaint alleges that Güdel
designed, 
manufactured, 
and 
sold 
the 
stamping-press 
unit 
that,
they say, caused Robert's injuries.  In their answer to
Güdel's petition, the Rutledges maintain that those facts
support a "colorable claim of jurisdiction" against Güdel. 
Contrary to those assertions, Güdel's evidentiary submissions
--  specifically the affidavit testimony of Kurt Haldi, "a
Member of Management for Güdel" -- establishes that "Güdel ...
did not design, build, or manufacture the Press Machine or any
part that is related to the overhead roll-up doors."  Instead,
Güdel manufactured the control system for conveyors running
through the stamping-press unit.  The Rutledges fail to
dispute 
Güdel's 
contention 
or 
to 
substantiate 
the
jurisdictional allegations in their complaint with their own
evidentiary submissions establishing jurisdiction.  In fact,
the Rutledges' sole response to Güdel's petition for a writ of
mandamus is their continued insistence that Güdel's dismissal
efforts are premature and that jurisdictional discovery is
required. As the Rutledges argue, this Court in Ex parte
14
1131341
Bufkin, 936 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. 2006), embraced a permissive
rule sustaining a plaintiff's right to conduct jurisdictional
discovery when the plaintiff has alleged particular facts
suggesting the possible existence of the requisite contacts
with the forum state and when the basis for the plaintiff's
claim of jurisdiction is not facially frivolous.  936 So. 2d
at 1048.  As Bufkin notes, however, although the standard for
permitting jurisdictional discovery is "quite low," the
plaintiff 
requesting 
jurisdictional 
discovery 
"'must 
offer 
the
court "more than conjecture and surmise in support of [the]
jurisdictional theory,"'" and a request for discovery that is
predicated "'"upon 'bare,' 'attenuated,' or 'unsupported'
assertions of personal jurisdiction"'" is due to be denied. 
936 So. 2d at 1047 (quoting Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler
Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 876 So. 2d 459, 468 (Ala. 2003), quoting
in turn Anderson v. Sportmart, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 236, 242 (N.D.
Ind. 1998)).  Here, the Rutledges may have, as they contend,
alleged facts supporting a colorable claim of jurisdiction. 
Our analysis, however, does not end there –- especially in
circumstances where the facts purportedly establishing a
colorable claim of jurisdiction were directly controverted by
15
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the evidentiary submissions subsequently offered by the
defendant in support of a dismissal request. 
Specifically, this Court, in Excelsior Financial,
explained:
"'The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
trial court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.  Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904
So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2004).'  J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. West, 991 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala.
2008).
"'"'In considering a Rule
12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, 
a 
court 
must
consider as true the allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco
& Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th
Cir. 
1996), 
and 
Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network
Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829
(11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict,
the ... court must construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff."  Robinson, 74
F.3d at 255 (quoting Madara v.
Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990)).'"
"'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &
Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d
795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).  However, if the
defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
16
1131341
showing that the Court has no personal
jurisdiction, 
"the 
plaintiff 
is 
then
required 
to 
substantiate 
the 
jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits
or other competent proof, and he may not
merely 
reiterate 
the 
factual 
allegations 
in
the complaint."  Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing Future
Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)).  See
also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D.
471, 474–75 (D. Del. 1995) ("When a
defendant files a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and
supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those
affidavits with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to survive the
motion.") (citing Time Share Vacation Club
v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d
226, 229–30 (Ala. 2004) (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)."
42 So. 3d at 103.  See also Ex parte Edgetech I.G., Inc., 159
So. 3d 629, 632-33 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d
635, 642–43 (Ala. 2009).
As was the case in Excelsior Financial, the moving
defendant, namely Güdel, argues that it made a prima facie
evidentiary showing that the trial court lacked both general
and specific personal jurisdiction over it and that the
Rutledges did not satisfy their burden of then substantiating
17
1131341
the jurisdictional allegations of their complaint.   See
3
Covington Pike Dodge, supra.  The Rutledges, too, appear to
concede their failure to counter Haldi's testimony, but
attribute that failure to a lack of discovery.  Despite this
claim, however, the Rutledges fail to explain why, in the
months following the filing of Robert's original complaint,
the subsequent amendment thereto, and their response to
Güdel's motion to dismiss,  they could not, at the very least,
4
obtain an affidavit from Robert or from another SAL employee
experienced with operating the subject stamping-press unit,
indicating that a malfunction of Güdel's product could have
either caused or contributed to the failure of the overhead
door that ultimately caused Robert's injury.  Further, the
Rutledges fail to allege that they were deprived of adequate
Güdel's evidentiary submissions also disprove any
3
contention that the product, which it allegedly manufactured
and placed into the "stream of commerce," was responsible for
Robert's claimed injuries.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
Robert's original complaint was filed on February 27,
4
2013, and amended on November 22, 2013.  Güdel's motion to
dismiss was filed on February 28, 2014; the Rutledges'
response thereto was filed on March 28, 2014; and the trial
court's order denying Güdel's motion to dismiss was entered on
July 18, 2014. 
18
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opportunity to discover evidence to support their claim that
the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Güdel or even
to outline what, if any, discovery efforts they have
undertaken.  In fact, as Güdel notes, the Rutledges fail to
identify any discovery efforts undertaken by them in an effort
to disprove Güdel's claims, and they do not explain why they
were unable to obtain that discovery in time to properly rebut
Güdel's motion to dismiss.  See Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler
Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 876 So. 2d at 468 ("A request for
jurisdictional discovery must offer the court 'more than
conjecture and surmise in support of [the] jurisdictional
theory.'" (quoting Crist v. Republic of Turkey, 995 F. Supp.
5, 13 (D. D.C. 1998))).  
Here, the Rutledges' only jurisdictional allegations are
that Güdel manufactured, designed, or sold the stamping-press
unit, that Güdel assisted with its installation, and that
Güdel provided training with respect to its operation.  Güdel
has, however, successfully demonstrated by unrefuted evidence
that the portion of the stamping-press unit it either
manufactured, designed, or installed is in no way connected to
Robert's 
injuries.  The Rutledges merely "speculate[] ... 
that
19
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... discovery could uncover evidence indicating that [Güdel's
limited contacts were in some way related to the door's
malfunction] 
despite 
[Güdel's] 
clear evidence 
to 
the
contrary."  Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d at 233.  
Because 
Güdel's 
evidence 
disproved 
the 
factual
allegations asserted in the Rutledges' complaint that would
establish specific jurisdiction and constituted a prima facie
showing that no specific jurisdiction existed, the Rutledges
were 
required 
to 
substantiate 
their 
jurisdictional 
allegations
with affidavits or other competent evidence –- which they
indisputably failed to do.  Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904
So. 2d at 232.  Further, the Rutledges' "bare allegations"
that additional discovery could possibly reveal evidence
establishing 
personal 
jurisdiction 
are 
insufficient 
to 
entitle
the Rutledges to further discovery on the jurisdictional
issue.  904 So. 2d at 233.  Having determined that the
Rutledges failed to rebut Güdel's assertion that its limited
contact with Alabama is wholly unrelated to the Rutledges'
claims, we conclude that it offends "'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice'" to subject Güdel to
20
1131341
personal jurisdiction.  See Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 731
(quoting Brooks v. Inlow, 453 So. 2d 349, 351 (Ala. 1984),
quoting in turn International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
at 316). 
Conclusion
In consideration of the foregoing, we hold that the trial
court exceeded its discretion 
in 
determining that it possessed
personal jurisdiction over Güdel.  Accordingly, Güdel has
established a clear legal right to the dismissal of the claims
against it; therefore, we grant the petition and direct the
trial court to vacate its order denying Güdel's motion to
dismiss and to dismiss the Rutledges' claims against Güdel.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.  
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, and Wise, JJ., concur. 
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.  
Moore, C.J., dissents.
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