Title: State ex rel. Newell v. Jackson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Newell v. Jackson, 118 Ohio St.3d 138, 2008-Ohio-1965.] 
 
 
STATE EX REL. NEWELL, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF  
JACKSON ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Newell v. Jackson, 118 Ohio St.3d 138, 2008-Ohio-1965.] 
Appeal from judgment denying writ of quo warranto to oust fire-department chief 
because of civil service commission’s alleged failure to comply with R.C. 
121.22 — Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed — Appellant failed to 
challenge the appointment before new fire chief’s probationary period 
expired, after which he could be removed only for cause — R.C 124.34. 
(No. 2007-1925 ─ Submitted April 23, 2008 ─ Decided April 30, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Jackson County, No. 06 CA 20. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of quo warranto 
to oust appellee Doug Reed from the office of chief of the Jackson Fire 
Department and to appoint appellant, Kida Newell, fire chief, or to permit Newell 
to compete for that office as provided by law.  Because Newell failed to establish 
that the office is being unlawfully held and exercised by Reed and that she is 
entitled to the office, we affirm. 
Appointment of Reed as Fire Chief 
{¶ 2} In June 2004, the office of chief of the Jackson Fire Department 
became vacant.  On December 8, 2004, appellee Jackson Civil Service 
Commission scheduled a promotional examination for the office of fire chief for 
February 7, 2005.  Appellee Douglas Reed was one of five people who took the 
examination.  On February 15, 2005, the chairman of the civil service commission 
notified the mayor that Reed was the only applicant who had received a passing 
score.  On February 24, 2005, Reed was appointed fire chief.  Reed was not 
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informed of a specific probation period, but he has never received notification 
from any city official that he has not satisfactorily performed his duties. 
Action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
{¶ 3} Nearly eight months after Reed’s appointment as fire chief, in 
October 2005, appellant, Kida Newell, challenged it by filing a complaint for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Jackson County Court of 
Common Pleas.  In April 2006, Newell amended her complaint to include Reed as 
a defendant.  Newell claimed that the civil service commission’s failure to follow 
the requirements of the Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22, in scheduling the 
examination, grading it, and certifying the results rendered the city’s appointment 
of Reed as fire chief void and required that a new examination be given and that 
Newell be permitted to take it.  The common pleas court characterized Newell’s 
case as one seeking relief in quo warranto and dismissed it for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.  The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.  Newell v. 
Jackson, Jackson App. No. 06 CA 19, 2007-Ohio-4729, 2007 WL 2694404. 
Action for Quo Warranto 
{¶ 4} In December 2006, Newell filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Jackson County for a writ of quo warranto to remove Reed from the 
office of fire chief and either appoint Newell as fire chief or permit her to 
compete for that office.  As in her previous action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, Newell claimed that the civil service commission failed to comply with 
R.C. 121.22 in relation to its decisions regarding the examination process.  After 
the parties filed evidence and briefs, the court of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 5} This cause is now before the court upon Newell’s appeal as of 
right. 
Quo Warranto: Newell’s Claim to the Office of Fire Chief 
{¶ 6} For a writ of quo warranto to issue, “a relator must establish (1) 
that the office is being unlawfully held and exercised by respondent, and (2) that 
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relator is entitled to the office.”  State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 
138, 141, 630 N.E.2d 708.  A person other than the attorney general or a 
prosecuting attorney can bring a quo warranto action as a private citizen, only 
when the person is personally claiming title to a public office.  State ex rel. 
Hawthorn v. Russell, 107 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-6431, 838 N.E.2d 666, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 7} Although Newell does claim that she should be appointed fire 
chief, she did not establish her entitlement to be fire chief.  She did not pass the 
promotional examination, and there was no list naming eligible candidates.  
Therefore, Newell was not entitled to the writ of quo warranto to compel her 
appointment to the office of fire chief. 
Quo Warranto:  Newell’s Claim that Reed Should Be Ousted 
{¶ 8} Newell’s failure to establish her entitlement to be appointed fire 
chief did not preclude a writ of quo warranto.  “If a relator in a quo warranto 
proceeding fails to establish entitlement to the office, judgment may still be 
rendered on the issue of whether respondent lawfully holds the disputed office.”  
State ex rel. Myers v. Brown (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 545, 547, 721 N.E.2d 1053; 
see also State ex rel. Ethell v. Hendricks (1956), 165 Ohio St. 217, 226-227, 59 
O.O. 298, 135 N.E.2d 362.  Thus, if Newell established that Reed is unlawfully 
holding the office of fire chief, she would be entitled to the writ to oust him. 
{¶ 9} But Newell is not entitled to the ouster of Reed from the office of 
fire chief.  “[I]rregularities in the appointment procedure will not divest a 
classified government employee of his statutory rights, at least where those 
irregularities are the result of a mistake or dereliction of duty on the part of the 
civil service commission.”  State ex rel. Alford v. Willoughby Civ. Serv. Comm. 
(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 221, 227-228, 12 O.O.3d 229, 390 N.E.2d 782, overruled in 
part on other grounds, State ex rel. Shine v. Garofalo (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 253, 
23 O.O.3d 251, 431 N.E.2d 680; Lewis v. Fairborn (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 292, 
295, 706 N.E.2d 24. 
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{¶ 10} More specifically, “where an appointee in the classified service has 
completed his probationary period, he cannot be ousted by quo warranto even 
though testing or grading procedures were fraudulent and efficiency credits were 
not counted.”  State ex rel. Hanley v. Roberts (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 17 OBR 
1, 476 N.E.2d 1019, fn. 7; see also State ex rel. Polen v. Wymer (1973), 36 Ohio 
St.2d 24, 65 O.O.2d 96, 302 N.E.2d 889, syllabus (“Where a candidate is certified 
as having the highest grade in a promotional civil service examination that was 
not graded in full conformity with civil service law, and where it does not appear 
that the candidate so certified knew of or participated in the irregular grading, he 
will not be replaced by one bringing an action in quo warranto who failed to take 
affirmative action to prevent the certification and permanent appointment”). 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to a writ of quo warranto to oust a good-faith 
appointee, a relator must take affirmative action by either filing a quo warranto 
action or an injunction challenging the appointment before the appointee 
completes the probationary period and becomes a permanent employee.  See State 
ex rel. Delph v. Barr (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 541 N.E.2d 59 (relator’s quo 
warranto action filed shortly after an improper civil service appointment that 
violated R.C. 121.22 and before appointment became permanent constituted 
sufficient affirmative action to warrant consideration of merits of quo warranto 
claim); Hanley, 17 Ohio St.3d at 6, 17 OBR 1, 476 N.E.2d 1019 (filing of 
complaint for injunctive relief challenging improper appointment before 
probationary period of appointee expired was sufficient affirmative action to 
prevent appointment from becoming permanent and thus insulated from quo 
warranto); see also Levinsky v. Lamping, Mahoning App. No. 05 MA 71, 2005-
Ohio-6924, 2005 WL 3536479, ¶ 36. 
{¶ 12} The evidence is uncontroverted here that Reed is a good-faith 
appointee who was not aware of and did not participate in any irregularities in the 
civil service commission’s proceedings.  In addition, Newell did not take 
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affirmative action to challenge Reed’s appointment until after his probationary 
period had expired.  R.C. 124.49 (“All promotional appointments in a fire 
department may be for a probationary period to be fixed by the rules of the civil 
service commission and not to exceed six months.  No promotion shall be deemed 
final until the appointee has satisfactorily served his probationary period”). 
{¶ 13} Newell does not contest the foregoing facts.  Instead, she claims 
that the court’s precedent requiring affirmative action challenging an appointment 
by a relator in a quo warranto action before the appointment becomes permanent 
is inapplicable when the claimed irregularity involves noncompliance with R.C. 
121.22. 
{¶ 14} Newell’s contention lacks merit.  We have not held that this 
precedent is restricted to civil service statutory violations.  See Alford, 58 Ohio 
St.2d at 227, 12 O.O.3d 229, 390 N.E.2d 782, broadly referring to “irregularities 
in the appointment procedure.”  (Emphasis added.)  In fact, we have expressly 
applied the affirmative-action requirement to a quo warranto case in which the 
claimed irregularity involved a violation of the open-meeting provisions of R.C. 
121.22.  Delph, 44 Ohio St.3d 77, 541 N.E.2d 59. 
{¶ 15} Therefore, the court of appeals properly held that Newell is not 
entitled to a writ of quo warranto to oust Reed from the office of fire chief, 
because she failed to take affirmative action to challenge the appointment before 
Reed’s probationary period expired, after which he could be removed only for 
cause.  R.C. 124.34.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
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Biddlestone, Winkelmann, Bradford & Baer, David J. Winkelmann, and 
William R. Biddlestone, for appellant. 
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Shoemaker & Howarth, L.L.P., and Kevin L. Shoemaker, for appellees. 
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