Title: Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. RBMW Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 002894 
 
RBMW, INC., t/a JORDAN POINT 
YACHT HAVEN, et al. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 14, 2001 
 
ROBINS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., et al. 
 
v.  Record No. 002532 
 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY 
James A. Luke, Judge 
 
 
In this opinion we consider two appeals arising out of 
the same case in the trial court.  In the first appeal, we 
consider whether the trial court erred in ruling that an 
exclusion in a Piers, Wharfs, and Docks Coverage Form (“PWD”) 
contained in an insurance policy issued by Transcontinental 
Insurance Company (“Transcontinental”) to RBMW, Inc. (“RBMW”), 
t/a Jordan Point Yacht Haven (“Jordan Point”) did not apply.  
In the second appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
erred in permitting RBMW to take a nonsuit of its cause of 
action against Robins Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Robins 
Insurance”) and William Raleigh Robins (“Mr. Robins”). 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
RBMW is a Virginia corporation which operates a marina 
known as Jordan Point on the James River near the Benjamin 
Harrison Bridge in Hopewell, Virginia.  William Michael Winn 
(“Winn”) is the president of RBMW and manages Jordan Point. 
 
On March 20, 1995, Robins Insurance, through its agent 
Mr. Robins, sold a commercial package policy to RBMW.  The 
policy included workers’ compensation, automobile, property, 
general liability, and various other coverages, and was 
underwritten by Transcontinental.  In addition, the policy 
offered the option of purchasing PWD coverage.  RBMW purchased 
PWD coverage at an annual cost of $4,231. 
 
The PWD policy provides in pertinent part: 
A. COVERAGE 
 
We will pay for “loss” to Covered 
Property from any of the Covered Causes 
of Loss. 
 
1. COVERED PROPERTY, as used in this  
Coverage Form means: 
 
a. Floating or fixed piers, wharfs 
and docks; 
 
. . . . 
 
3. COVERED CAUSES OF LOSS 
 
Covered Causes of Loss means RISKS 
OF DIRECT PHYSICAL “LOSS” to Covered 
Property except those causes of 
“loss” listed in the exclusions. 
 
4. a. ADDITIONAL COVERAGE – COLLAPSE 
 
 
2
We will pay for direct “loss” 
caused by or resulting from risks 
of direct physical “loss” 
involving collapse of all or part 
of a building or structure caused 
by one or more of the following: 
 
(1) Fire; lightning; windstorm; 
hail; explosion; smoke; 
aircraft; vehicles; riot; 
civil commotion; vandalism; 
breakage of glass; falling 
object; weight of snow, ice 
or sleet; water damage; all 
only as covered in the 
Coverage Form; 
 
. . . . 
 
B. EXCLUSIONS 
 
1. We will not pay for a “loss” caused 
directly or indirectly by any of the 
following.  Such “loss” is excluded 
regardless of any other cause or event 
that contributes concurrently or in any 
sequence to the “loss”: 
 
. . . . 
 
e. WATER 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) Flood, surface water, waves, 
tides, tidal waves, overflowing 
of any body of water, or their 
spray, all whether driven by wind 
or not. 
 
Additionally, the PWD policy defines “loss” as “accidental 
loss or damage.”  Transcontinental and RBMW agree that the 
Transcontinental policy, including PWD coverage, was in effect 
at the time of the loss on September 6, 1996. 
 
3
 
In early September 1996, Hurricane Fran battered the east 
coast of the United States.  On September 6, 1996, the storm 
reached Hopewell and severely damaged Jordan Point.  RBMW 
submitted a claim to Transcontinental for $139,712.17.  
However, Transcontinental only paid $18,143.80 and denied the 
remainder of RBMW’s claim relating to damage to its piers, 
wharves, and docks along with damage to a boathouse and 
replacement of a sign.1  
 
On June 22, 1998, RBMW filed a motion for judgment in the 
trial court against Transcontinental, Robins Insurance, and 
Mr. Robins.2  RBMW alleged Transcontinental breached its 
contract when it failed to pay the entire claim.  
Additionally, RBMW alleged, in the alternative, that Robins 
Insurance and Mr. Robins (collectively, “Robins”) 
intentionally or negligently misrepresented to RBMW that storm 
damage was covered under the PWD policy. 
                     
1 In its motion for judgment, RBMW stated that its damages 
totaled $139,712.17.  This amount included the $18,143.80 that 
Transcontinental subsequently paid.  Later, Transcontinental 
and RBMW stipulated that the amount of the damage claim that 
Transcontinental did not pay was $111,597.55. 
2 The motion for judgment named 18 defendants, including 
Robins Insurance, Mr. Robins, Transcontinental, and additional 
insurance companies.  By stipulation, Transcontinental agreed 
that it underwrote the only insurance policy in question in 
this case and the trial court, with the exception of Robins 
Insurance, dismissed with prejudice the remaining 15 insurance 
companies.  
 
4
 
At a bench trial on May 1, 2000, Winn testified 
concerning the damage that occurred to Jordan Point as a 
result of the hurricane.  On cross-examination, the following 
colloquy took place between counsel for Transcontinental and 
Winn: 
Q:  And also, as I understand from your 
deposition, the waves or the wave action 
on the boat did most of the damage to what 
occurred to the docks and to the 
boathouse? 
 
A:  That was my opinion. 
 
 
The trial court also viewed a video tape that was a 
compilation of different video tapes people took the night of 
the hurricane.  Additionally, the trial court received as 
evidence the insurance policy, including the PWD form. 
 
After Winn testified, counsel for Transcontinental and 
RBMW agreed that it was an appropriate time to argue whether 
the exclusions in Section B(1)(e)(4) of the PWD policy 
precluded coverage.  The trial court concurred, “with the 
understanding that we are excluding from this [RBMW’s] claim 
against Robins.” 
 
The trial court ultimately ruled that the exclusions in 
the PWD policy did not apply.  Specifically, the trial court 
stated: 
 
 
the beginning of the rider under coverage, 
it says we’ll pay for loss of covered property.  
For many of the covered causes, under covered 
 
5
causes, we find subsection A to be floating or 
fixed piers, wharves, and docks. 
 
 
In section 4 under A dealing with 
coverages, we get specific as to collapse, and 
it talked about direct loss caused by or 
resulting from a risk of direct physical loss, 
involving collapse of all or part of a building 
or structure caused by one or more of the 
following: And it lists several things; 2 of 
which are windstorm and water damage. 
 
 
That gets us to the exclusions section.  
In number one under exclusions, it says we will 
not pay for a loss caused directly or 
indirectly by any of the following: Subsection 
E there says water. 
 
 
And that gets us to the crux of this 
matter where under E4, it excludes flood, 
surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves 
overflowing of any body of water, or their 
spray, all [whether] driven by wind or not.  
The first word there is flood. 
 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines flood as an 
inundation of water over land not usually 
covered by it.  And flood water is defined as 
water which escapes from a stream or other body 
and overflows adjacent territory. 
 
 
By definition, this ain’t a flood.  
Because the damage is over water where water 
not only flows, over the stream.  In this case, 
the stream is rather large.  It’s the James 
River. 
 
 
Then we get to waves and tides overflowing 
of any body of water.  Turning to Black’s 
again, overflow, the dictionary says, is to 
flow or spread beyond the limits.  These piers 
and docks and wharves were not beyond the 
limits of the river.  They were in the river.  
It can’t be a flood.  Its waves and tides were 
not beyond the limit; not up on the beach 
somewhere.  It’s in the river. 
 
 
So if I were to take waves and tides, it’s 
not those overflowing of the body of water. 
 
 
Counsel for Transcontinental argued that under the clear 
language of the policy, “overflow is not a requirement for the 
 
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wave to be excluded” and suggested that, at the very least, 
the issue should be briefed before the trial court rendered a 
final decision.  However, the trial court disagreed, stating, 
“I don’t see where anything is going to be gained by briefing 
it.  This thing is written with each one of these: Flood, 
surface, waves, tides, tidal waves.  Comma after each one.  
And then saying overflowing of any body of water.” 
 
After the trial court’s ruling, counsel for RBMW stated 
the following: 
 
Your Honor, I don’t think we have a further 
cause of action against the agency based on 
that ruling, and I suggest that they be allowed 
to leave.  If the court’s ruling is that the 
coverage applies, then our allegation to the 
agency should have told us it didn’t.  It’s 
been decided by the court’s opinion. 
 
The trial court agreed and excused counsel for Robins from the 
remainder of the proceedings. 
 
On May 8, 2000, counsel for Robins received a nonsuit 
order from RBMW that had not been endorsed by all counsel of 
record.  Robins filed a motion for entry of a dismissal order, 
asserting that because the trial court determined that there 
was coverage under the Transcontinental policy, Robins should 
be dismissed from the case with prejudice.  The trial court 
heard argument and issued a letter opinion on June 30, 2000, 
stating that it would permit RBMW to nonsuit Robins.  
Specifically, the trial court noted that RBMW’s intentional or 
 
7
negligent misrepresentation count against Robins had not been 
presented to the trial court for decision and therefore, under 
Code § 8.01-380, the granting of a nonsuit was appropriate.  A 
July 26, 2000 order memorialized this decision. 
 
Both Transcontinental and RBMW stipulated that the amount 
of the damage claim that Transcontinental did not pay was 
$111,597.55.  On September 11, 2000, the trial court issued an 
order that reiterated its ruling that the exclusion in the PWD 
policy relied upon by Transcontinental did not apply and 
awarded RBMW $111,597.55 plus interest in damages.  
 
Transcontinental and Robins appeal the respective adverse 
rulings of the trial court.  In its brief before this Court, 
RBMW states that “[a]ll Jordan Point seeks is to retain its 
status quo in this case against Robins pending this Court’s 
decision on the appeal of Transcontinental’s case.”  RBMW 
merely seeks to “preserve its causes of action against Robins 
if this Court should reverse or remand the Judgment Order 
entered against Transcontinental.” 
II. The PWD Coverage Exclusion 
a. Standard of Review 
 
The trial court’s determination that the exclusion in the 
PWD policy did not apply to the damage sustained by Jordan 
Point presents a mixed question of law and fact.  The factual 
findings of the trial court are entitled to the same weight as 
 
8
a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears 
from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  Code § 8.01-680; Cardinal 
Dev. Co. v. Stanley Constr. Co., 255 Va. 300, 302, 497 S.E.2d 
847, 849 (1998).  However, interpretation of the provisions of 
an insurance contract presents a question of law that we 
consider de novo.  See C.F. Garcia Enters., Inc. v. Enterprise 
Ford Tractor, Inc., 253 Va. 104, 107, 480 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 
(1997). 
b. Analysis 
 
The trial court heard testimony from Winn regarding the 
hurricane on Jordan Point and viewed a video tape depicting 
the same.  Neither RBMW nor Transcontinental disputes the 
events causing the damages sustained by Jordan Point and both 
parties stipulated to the amount of damages Transcontinental 
refused to pay.  Therefore, the only issue before us on appeal 
is the trial court’s interpretation of the exclusions 
contained in Section B(1)(e)(4) of the PWD policy. 
 
Both RBMW and Transcontinental assert on appeal that our 
recent decision in Lower Chesapeake Assocs. v. Valley Forge 
Ins. Co., 260 Va. 77, 532 S.E.2d 325 (2000), governs the 
resolution of this case.  Transcontinental posits that in 
Lower Chesapeake we specifically upheld an exclusion, 
virtually identical to the one present in the case at bar, 
 
9
holding that it was clear and unambiguous.  RBMW disagrees and 
claims that we ruled in Lower Chesapeake that the exclusion 
was ambiguous when read in conjunction with the portion of the 
insurance policy regarding “Additional Coverage – Collapse.”  
RBMW’s interpretation of our decision in Lower Chesapeake is 
the more accurate of the two positions. 
 
Lower Chesapeake involved a dispute over whether a PWD 
policy, virtually identical to the policy at issue in the 
present case, covered damage sustained during Hurricane Fran 
to four docks at a marina.  Initially, we considered the 
meaning of the word “collapse” as it was used in Section 
A(4)(a), “Additional Coverage – Collapse,” of the PWD policy.  
We applied the ordinary and customary meaning of the word as 
it was defined in the dictionary and held that “collapse” 
means “ ‘to break down completely: fall apart in confused 
disorganization: . . . disintegrate.' ”  Id. at 86, 532 S.E.2d 
at 330 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
443 (1993)).  Under this definition, only part of one dock in 
Lower Chesapeake suffered a “collapse.”  Id. at 86-87, 532 
S.E.2d at 331. 
 
In Lower Chesapeake, we also considered the application 
of the exclusions in the PWD policy.  We held that the damage 
incurred by the docks that were battered by the storm, but did 
not collapse, resulted from excluded causes.  Id. at 87, 532 
 
10
S.E.2d 331.  Specifically, we said that the evidence amply 
supported the trial court’s finding that the damage to these 
docks “resulted, at least in part, from the excluded causes of 
‘[f]lood, . . . waves, tides, tidal waves, . . . all whether 
driven by wind or not.’ ”  Id.  As to the one dock that 
suffered a “collapse,” Valley Forge, the insurance carrier, 
argued that the same exclusions that nullified coverage to the 
docks that had not collapsed applied to the dock that did.  
Id.  We disagreed, holding that “[b]ecause these provisions of 
the dock coverage form are ambiguous, we construe the policy 
in favor of providing coverage and hold that the exclusions in 
Section B are inapplicable to the collapse coverage of Section 
A(4)(a)[Additional Coverage – Collapse].”  Id. at 88, 532 
S.E.2d at 332.  We based this decision on the fact that the 
disputed policy language permitted more than one reasonable 
interpretation of the application of the exclusion provision 
in Section B to the collapse provision in Section A(4)(a).  
Id.
 
The trial court’s decision in the present case occurred 
about one month prior to our decision in Lower Chesapeake.  
Despite RBMW’s argument that they were covered by either 
direct loss caused by the storm or collapse of structures due 
to windstorm, the trial court made no factual findings 
regarding collapse.  Instead, the trial court merely held that 
 
11
the exclusion in Section B(1)(e)(4) did not apply to RBMW’s 
claims.  Therefore, on appeal, we consider only the trial 
court’s interpretation of this exclusion.  
 
In general, “[c]ourts interpret insurance policies, like 
other contracts, in accordance with the intention of the 
parties gleaned from the words they have used in the 
document.”  Floyd v. Northern Neck Ins. Co., 245 Va. 153, 158, 
427 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1993).  Each component of an insurance 
contract “should be considered and construed together and 
seemingly conflicting provisions harmonized when that can be 
reasonably done, so as to effectuate the intention of the 
parties as expressed therein.”  Suggs v. The Life Ins. Co. of 
Virginia, 207 Va. 7, 11, 147 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1966).  When a 
policy does not define a given term, we give the word its 
“ordinary and accepted meaning.”  Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. 
Glick, 240 Va. 283, 288, 397 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1990). 
 
With regard to the exclusions in the PWD coverage, our 
consideration is governed by well-settled principles. 
Exclusionary language in an insurance policy 
will be construed most strongly against the 
insurer and the burden is upon the insurer to 
prove that an exclusion applies.  Reasonable 
exclusions not in conflict with statute will be 
enforced, but it is incumbent upon the insurer 
to employ exclusionary language that is clear 
and unambiguous.  
 
 
12
American Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 238 Va. 543, 547, 385 
S.E.2d 583, 585 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
 
Exclusion B(1)(e)(4) excludes from coverage direct or 
indirect loss caused by “[f]lood, surface water, waves, tides, 
tidal waves, overflowing of any body of water, or their spray, 
all whether driven by wind or not.”  Initially, the trial 
court found that the damage to Jordan Point was not caused by 
a flood.3
 
However, instead of considering the remaining excluded 
causes of loss on an individual basis, the trial court read 
the exclusion as if the phrase “overflowing of any body of 
water” modified the words “flood,” “surface water,” “waves,” 
“tides,” and “tidal waves.”  As such, the trial court held 
that because the waves and tides were “not beyond the limits 
of the river,” they were not “overflowing of the body of 
water.”4
                     
3 The trial court based its finding on the fact that 
Black’s Law Dictionary defined “flood” as “an inundation of 
water over land not usually covered by it.”  This definition 
is found in the sixth edition of Black’s.  The seventh, and 
most current, edition does not contain a definition for 
“flood.”  However, Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines 
“flood” as “a rising and overflowing of a body of water esp. 
onto normally dry land.”  
4 The trial court stated that Black’s defines “overflow” 
as “to flow or spread beyond the limits.”  Neither the sixth 
nor seventh edition of Black’s contains a definition for 
“overflow.”  Because we disagree with the trial court’s 
grammatical reading of the exclusion, we need not consider 
 
13
 
We disagree with this grammatical construction of the 
exclusion.  Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the 
placement of commas in the exclusion indicates that each 
subject matter must be separately considered, including, 
“overflowing of any body of water.”  In this context, the 
phrase, “overflowing of any body of water,” is a verbal noun 
known as a gerund.  See William Strunk, Jr. & E.B. White, The 
Elements of Style 55 (4th ed. 2000).  Accordingly, the trial 
court erred in failing to consider each of the excluded causes 
of loss on an individual basis to determine whether coverage 
was excluded. 
 
Having determined that the damage to Jordan Point did not 
result from a “flood,” the trial court should then have 
considered the remaining excluded causes in Section B(1)(e)(4) 
separately, starting with a “wave.”  A “wave” is defined in 
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as “a moving ridge or swell on 
the surface of a liquid (as of the sea).”  Significantly, 
unlike a “flood,” a “wave” does not require movement of water 
into an area not typically covered by it.  It is clear that 
the damage to Jordan Point was caused, at least in part, by 
waves.  Winn admitted that, in his opinion, waves did most of 
the damage to the docks and the boathouse.  We therefore hold 
                                                                
whether “to flow or spread beyond the limits” is the ordinary 
or accepted meaning of “overflow.” 
 
14
that the trial court erred in ruling that exclusion B(1)(e)(4) 
by its terms did not apply to any of the damage to Jordan 
Point. 
 
Obviously, the trial court determined that the losses 
sustained by Jordan Point were covered losses; however, the 
trial court did not determine whether the losses were covered 
by provisions A(1),(2), and (3) or by the additional coverage 
for collapse provided by A(4)(a).  The significance is readily 
apparent in light of our decision in Lower Chesapeake, 
involving virtually identical policy language, wherein we held 
that “the exclusions in Section B are inapplicable to the 
collapse coverage of Section A(4)(a).”  Lower Chesapeake, 260 
Va. at 88, 532 S.E.2d at 332.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and remand for determination 
of the source of coverage and proper application of 
exclusions. 
III. RBMW’s Nonsuit 
a. Standard of Review 
 
On appeal, Robins maintains that the trial court erred in 
permitting RBMW to take a nonsuit of its claim against Robins.  
This issue presents a question of law and as such is reviewed 
on appeal under a de novo standard. 
b. Analysis 
 
Code § 8.01-380(A) provides in pertinent part: 
 
15
 
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a 
nonsuit as to any cause of action or claim, or 
any other party to the proceeding, unless he 
does so before a motion to strike the evidence 
has been sustained or before the jury retires 
from the bar or before the action has been 
submitted to the court for decision. 
 
 
We have stated, when construing the nonsuit statute, that 
for an action to be “submitted to the court,” it is “necessary 
for the parties, by counsel, to have both yielded the issues 
to the court for consideration and decision.”  Moore v. Moore, 
218 Va. 790, 795, 240 S.E.2d 535, 538 (1978).  We stated that 
this could be accomplished “either as the result of oral or 
written argument, formal notice and motion, or by tendering a 
jointly endorsed sketch for a decree.”  Id. at 795-96, 240 
S.E.2d at 538.  However, in City of Hopewell v. Cogar, 237 Va. 
264, 268, 377 S.E.2d 385, 387-88 (1989), we stated that “[i]n 
Moore, we made no attempt to delineate every possible 
situation when an action would or would not be ‘submitted’ to 
the court for decision under the nonsuit statute.” 
 
We have previously approved a trial court’s granting of a 
nonsuit even though motions had been presented to the court 
and argument had occurred.  See Kelly v. Carrico, 256 Va. 282, 
286, 504 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1998)(holding that there was no 
submission because the motion for nonsuit was made before the 
court recessed after oral argument to consider the merits of 
the motion for judgment on the pleadings); Cogar, 237 Va. at 
 
16
267, 377 S.E.2d at 387 (holding that there was no submission 
because the motion for nonsuit was made within period allowed 
by court, after oral argument, for litigants to file 
additional memoranda in support of their positions on a motion 
for summary judgment). 
 
In the present case, RBMW’s motion for judgment contained 
alternative causes of action against different parties:  
breach of contract against Transcontinental, and intentional 
or negligent misrepresentation against Robins.  In response, 
both Transcontinental and Robins submitted separate grounds of 
defense.  At trial, Transcontinental argued that the exclusion 
in the PWD policy operated to preclude coverage.  Prior to 
hearing argument on this issue, the trial court specifically 
noted that the claims against Robins were being excluded from 
consideration at this point.  Indeed, as counsel for RBMW 
noted, “I don’t think they have a dog in this fight, this 
particular fight.”  The trial court astutely noted, “[n]ot in 
this particular one.”  Following the trial court’s decision, 
Robins did not present any argument to the trial court.  
Instead, Robins was “excused from the remainder of the 
proceedings.” 
 
Therefore, at no time was the issue of RBMW’s cause of 
action against Robins yielded by both Robins and RBMW to the 
trial court for consideration and decision.  The only issue 
 
17
considered by the trial court was the application of the 
exclusion in the PWD policy; an issue only Transcontinental 
and RBMW yielded to the trial court for consideration and 
decision.  Accordingly, we hold that RBMW’s action against 
Robins had not been “submitted to the court for decision” 
within the meaning of Code § 8.01-380(A). 
 
Robins also claims that RBMW should not have been 
permitted to suffer a nonsuit because the trial court had 
already made a ruling that was dispositive as to the cause of 
action against Robins.  For support of this proposition, 
Robins relies upon our decision in Wells v. Lorcom House 
Condominiums’ Council of Co-Owners, 237 Va. 247, 377 S.E.2d 
381 (1989).  In Wells, the plaintiff and defendants had argued 
before the trial court defendants’ demurrer attacking the 
legal sufficiency of an amended motion for judgment, 
defendants’ plea in bar based on various statutes of 
limitations, and defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Id. at 252, 
377 S.E.2d at 384.  The trial court took the matters “under 
advisement.”  Id. at 250, 377 S.E.2d at 382.  The plaintiff 
requested a nonsuit before the trial court issued its ruling, 
but we held that the request came too late, noting: 
 
Any one of those pleadings were case 
dispositive if the court ruled in favor of the 
defendants.  Moreover, the record is clear that 
no one, neither the trial judge nor the 
attorneys, contemplated that any further 
 
18
action, such as briefing, was necessary in 
order to enable the court to decide the issues. 
 
Id. at 252, 377 S.E.2d at 384.  Robins also points to RBMW’s 
counsel’s assertion, following the trial court’s ruling on the 
applicability of the exclusion in the PWD policy, that RBMW 
did not have a further cause of action against Robins.  Wells 
is distinguished from the present case.  Unlike Wells, where 
all parties had presented argument to the court on all issues, 
in the case at bar, RBMW and Robins never yielded the issue of 
Robins’ alleged intentional or negligent misrepresentation to 
the trial court. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
The trial court did not err in granting a nonsuit of 
RBMW’s claims against Robins.  The trial court erred in its 
interpretation of the exclusion in the applicable policy.  We 
will affirm the trial court’s judgment in the case of Robins 
v. Transcontinental (Record No. 002532) and will reverse the 
trial court’s judgment in Transcontinental v. RBMW (Record No. 
002894) and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Record No. 002894 — Reversed and remanded. 
        Record No. 002532 — Affirmed. 
 
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