Title: Deck v. State

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
CARMAN L. DECK 
 
 
  
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No. SC91746 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
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v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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) 
STATE OF MISSOURI 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Gary P. Kramer, Judge 
 
Opinion issued July 3, 2012 
 
 
This is the fifth action to come before this Court involving murders committed in 
1996 by Carman Deck (“Movant”).  Movant filed this Rule 29.15 post-conviction 
proceeding, asserting that his counsel at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial was 
ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses and for other alleged deficient 
performance.  He also alleges that the motion court erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial.  This Court finds no error and affirms the denial of Rule 29.15 relief and the denial 
of Movant’s request for a new trial.  
 
 
I. Background 
 
In February 1998, a jury found Movant guilty of two counts of first-degree 
murder, two counts of armed criminal action, one count of first-degree robbery, and one 
count of first-degree burglary for the 1996 robbery and shooting deaths of James and 
Zelma Long.  He received two death sentences.  This Court affirmed those convictions 
and sentences in State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. banc 1999) (“Deck I”).1  Movant 
filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15, which was overruled by 
the circuit court.  On appeal, this Court reversed the death sentences but affirmed the 
findings of guilt for his convictions. Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. banc 2002) 
(“Deck II”).  At the penalty phase retrial, he was again sentenced to two death sentences.  
This Court affirmed the death sentences in State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d 481 (Mo. banc 
2004) (“Deck III”), but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and found 
Movant was denied a fair trial because he appeared in shackles in the presence of the jury 
during the penalty phase without a showing of circumstances that required shackling for 
the safety of those in the courtroom. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005).  This 
Court ordered a second penalty phase retrial, and Deck again received two death 
sentences.  This Court affirmed the death sentences. See State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527 
(Mo. banc 2010) (“Deck IV”).  Movant filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction 
relief on multiple grounds, claiming that his penalty phase counsel was ineffective for (1) 
failing to ask specific questions during voir dire, (2) failing to call additional mitigation 
witnesses, (3) failing to conduct neuropsychological testing on Movant, and (4) failing to 
                                             
 
1 A full recitation of facts underlying Movant’s conviction is available in Deck I. 
object during the cross-examination of Movant’s expert and during the prosecutor’s 
closing arguments.  The motion court denied Movant post-conviction relief on all points. 
He now appeals.  Movant also asserts that the motion court erred in denying him a new 
trial because the trial court improperly destroyed the jury questionnaires from his penalty 
phase hearing.2   
II. Standard of review for Rule 29.15 
On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the motion court’s findings are 
presumed correct. Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Mo. banc 2009).  The motion 
court’s judgment will be reversed if it clearly erred in its findings of fact or conclusions 
of law. Id.; Rule 29.15(k). A clear error is a ruling that leaves the appellate court with a 
definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Id. 
III. Ineffective assistance of counsel 
 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel meriting post-conviction relief, the 
movant must satisfy the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  First, the movant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient by falling 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688.  If counsel’s performance was 
deficient, the movant must then prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency. Id. 
at 687.  Prejudice, in the Strickland context, is defined as “a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
                                             
 
2 Because the death penalty was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, 
section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.   
 
3
different.” Id. at 694.  A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. Id.  
 
There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and effective. 
Id. at 689.  To overcome this presumption, the movant must point to specific acts or 
omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of 
effective assistance. Id. at 690.  Further, the choice of one reasonable trial strategy over 
another is not ineffective assistance. Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 176.  Strategic choices made 
after a thorough investigation of the law and the facts are virtually unchallengeable. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
A. Penalty phase counsel was not ineffective during voir dire 
Movant alleges that penalty phase counsel failed to adequately ask questions of the 
venire panel to expose potential bias.  Specifically, Movant contends that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to ask the veniremembers “whether they could look at [Movant]’s 
childhood experience and give that meaningful consideration as a reason to vote against 
the death penalty.”  
When imposing the death penalty, the sentencer must consider the character and 
record of the defendant and the circumstances of the particular offense. Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).  To meet constitutional Eighth and Fourteenth 
amendment requirements, a death penalty statute cannot preclude consideration of 
relevant mitigating evidence. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).  Further, a 
sentencer may not, as a matter of law, refuse to consider any relevant mitigating 
evidence. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982). 
 
4
A juror in a death penalty case may not refuse to consider mitigating evidence 
outright. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992).  In Morgan, the Supreme 
Court held that the trial judge’s refusal to allow defense counsel to ask the venire panel 
whether they would automatically vote for death if the defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder violated the defendant’s right to an impartial jury. Id. at 735-40. A juror 
who would automatically impose the death penalty, the Court reasoned, is not an 
impartial juror, and the Fourteenth Amendment mandates such a juror be removed for 
cause. Id. at 728-29.  The Court held:  
A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will 
fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances as the instructions require him to do.  Indeed, because such a 
juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence 
of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to 
such a juror.  Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital 
defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains 
such views.  If even one such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is 
imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence. 
 
Id. 729.  Jurors who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty “not only 
refuse to give such evidence any weight but are also plainly saying that mitigating 
evidence is not worth their consideration and that they will not consider it.” Id. at 736.  
Movant argues that Morgan prohibits the empaneling of any juror who would not 
view childhood evidence as a reason to vote against the death penalty.  Movant 
essentially contends that Morgan requires that counsel be permitted to ask the venire 
panel how certain mitigating evidence would impact their deliberations and, further, that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to do so.  Movant’s contention is that failing to ask the 
 
5
venire panel during voir dire, “whether they could look at [Movant]’s childhood 
experience and give that meaningful consideration as a reason to vote against the death 
penalty” was a violation of Rule 29.15.  
Movant’s proposed question is not essential to his effective assistance of counsel, 
as asking the potential jurors whether they would view Movant’s childhood experience as 
a reason to vote against the death penalty is improper because it asks the potential jurors 
to commit to the weight they would give the evidence before they hear it.  Although the 
jury is clearly required to consider mitigating evidence in deciding whether to impose the 
death penalty under Lockett, Eddings, and Morgan, the court and the parties may not 
inquire as to how such evidence will affect the potential jury’s decision.  Although a 
sentencer may not give mitigating evidence no weight by excluding such evidence from 
consideration, he or she may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating 
evidence. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-115.  Under these facts, counsel’s performance was 
not deficient.  
Although the questioning that Movant proposes is improper, exploration of juror 
biases regarding certain types of evidence is appropriate during voir dire.  It is possible 
that a juror could be biased by the introduction of childhood evidence.  The prosecution 
here adequately explored this possibility when it asked the following question to the 
venire panel: 
And I guess the question I want to ask you is that you’ll hear—I 
anticipate you’ll hear some evidence concerning [Movant]’s childhood, his 
upbringing. 
 
… 
 
6
 
Is there anybody here, that if you start hearing evidence about 
troubled childhoods, things like that, it’s going to [a]ffect your ability to be 
fair in this case, one way or the other? 
 
No venireperson indicated that such evidence would affect his or her ability to be fair in 
the case.   
 
The prosecution’s question adequately probed the potential jurors’ bias without 
asking them to improperly commit to how certain evidence would affect their 
deliberations.  The duty of counsel and the court in voir dire is to uncover biases of 
potential jurors to ensure an impartial jury.  It is not the duty of counsel to ensure that 
biased jurors partial to their side are empaneled.   
 
Because Movant failed to prove defense counsel’s performance was deficient, 
Movant did not satisfy the first prong of Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
test.  The motion court did not clearly err in denying Movant post-conviction relief on 
this issue.3 
B. Counsel was not ineffective by not calling additional mitigation witnesses 
 
Movant argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to call the following 
mitigation witnesses: Michael Johnson, Carol and Arturo Misserocchi, Latisha Deck, 
Elvina Deck, Wilma Laird, Rita Deck, Stacey Tesreau-Bryant, and Tonia Cummings .  
He also contends that counsel was deficient for failing to present the deposition testimony 
of D.L. Hood and Pete Deck.  Movant argues that the additional mitigation witnesses 
                                             
 
3 Because counsel’s performance was not deficient, there is no need to address Movant’s 
argument that the motion court’s refusal to permit him to interview the jurors prevented him 
from proving prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.  
 
7
would have provided “additional detail” about (1) the abuse and neglect suffered by 
Movant, (2) the care that Movant provided his younger siblings during their childhood, 
and (3) the bad character of Movant’s caregivers during his childhood.  Further, Movant 
argues that counsel was ineffective for choosing to present mitigating evidence through 
experts and prior deposition testimony rather than “live lay witnesses.”  Movant states 
that “live lay witnesses” would have conveyed to the jury that his life had value. 
Counsel’s decision not to call a witness is presumptively a matter of trial strategy 
and will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant 
clearly establishes otherwise. Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292, 304 (Mo. banc 2004).    
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness, a 
defendant must show that: (1) counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the 
witness; (2) the witness could be located through reasonable investigation; (3) the witness 
would testify; and (4) the witness’s testimony would have produced a viable defense.  Id.; 
State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 817 (Mo. banc 1994).   
 Because Movant is challenging counsel’s failure to call certain witnesses during 
the penalty phase, a “viable defense” is one in which there is a reasonable probability4 
that the additional mitigating evidence those witnesses would have provided would have 
outweighed the aggravating evidence presented by the prosecutor resulting in the jury 
voting against the death penalty.  See Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 138 (Mo. banc 
2005) (stating that the introduction of additional mitigating evidence of the same nature 
                                             
 
4 A “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 
8
as the evidence that was presented would not have outweighed the particularly disturbing 
photographs introduced as aggravating evidence).   
1.  The motion court did not clearly err in finding that counsel was not ineffective 
for not calling additional witnesses 
 
a. Testimony of mitigation witnesses presented to the jury 
 
At the penalty phase hearing, counsel presented the live testimony of Dr. Wanda 
Draper, a child development expert, and Dr. Eleatha Suratt, a psychiatrist.  Counsel also 
presented the videotaped depositions of Mike Deck (Movant’s brother) and Mary Banks 
(Movant’s aunt).  Finally, counsel read aloud the depositions of Major Puckett (Movant’s 
short-term foster parent) and Beverly Dulinsky (Movant’s aunt).  The jury heard the 
following testimony.   
Movant’s parents were unmarried when he was born.  They had three other 
children, Tonia, Latisha, and Mike.  Neither parent was willing to accept responsibility 
for Movant’s poor upbringing.  
 
As an infant, Movant suffered physical problems as the result of being kept in a 
home with no air conditioning in August.  His parents had been feeding Movant 
powdered commodity milk instead of baby formula.  Relatives purchased baby formula 
for Movant and would mix it up before they gave it to Movant’s parents because his 
parents would use the canned cream in their coffee and cereal.    
 
The experts detailed Movant’s difficult childhood.  When Movant was three 
months old, he was taken to the hospital for dehydration and possible pneumonia because 
he did not have enough liquid or food.  His mother had an explosive temper, and she 
 
9
would beat Movant often during his early years, leaving marks on him.  Dr. Draper stated 
that Movant’s mother was “quite abusive.”   
In addition to the physical abuse, Movant also did not have much emotional 
stability during his early years.  Movant and his siblings were often left with relatives and 
babysitters while his parents went to nightclubs and bars.  Movant’s parents frequently 
brought their children to the bars, where they would sit in the bar, be left in the car, or be 
permitted to run free in the parking lot. 
There were several times when the children were left at home alone.  They did not 
know where their mother was, they were dressed “shabby,” and there was no food in the 
house. 
Movant’s mother neglected the children because she was busy pursuing sexual 
relationships with various men.  She would even have sex in her car in front of her 
children.  Eventually, Movant’s parents separated, and his mother moved in with her 
band member and boyfriend, D.L. Hood.  Hood did not want anything to do with the 
children, so Movant’s mother left the children with the Division of Family Services 
(“DFS”).   
During periods of extreme neglect, Movant took on the primary parenting role for 
his brothers and sisters.  He was their major caregiver and the only person on whom they 
could count.  Movant’s brother testified that Movant “pretty much took care of [the Deck 
children].”  He would steal food or go door-to-door to beg for food so that the Deck 
children would have something to eat.  Movant’s mother also taught Movant how to steal 
and encouraged him to do so. The children were also sexually abused.   
 
10
From reading the depositions of Movant’s brother and father, Dr. Draper related to 
the jury that one Thanksgiving, the sheriff’s office discovered that Movant and his 
siblings had been left alone for a couple of days without food or supervision.  While 
being fed Thanksgiving dinner by relatives, Movant’s brother was so hungry that he ate 
his food too fast, causing him to vomit onto his plate.  He was so desperately hungry that 
he tried to eat his own vomit off the plate.     
When Movant was in fourth grade, Pete Deck, Movant’s father, began living with 
a woman named Rita.  Movant’s father left Rita and married a woman named Marrietta 
who was an alcoholic and did not want the children. Marietta would feed her own 
children a regular meal but would give the Deck children cold bologna and hot dogs 
without bread for dinner.  Movant’s brother stated that she would also “torture” the 
children by making them kneel on broomsticks “just because she didn’t like us” and that 
“[s]he pretty much wanted my dad to herself.” 
Dr. Draper and Dr. Surratt also related to the jury one of Marrietta’s particularly 
disturbing abusive acts.  When 11- or 12-year-old Movant was riding in the car with 
Marietta, he told her that he needed to go to the bathroom.  Marietta told him to wait, but 
he could not, so he defecated in his pants.  Marietta was so furious that she took off his 
clothes, took his own fecal matter, and smeared it on his face.   She made him keep the 
fecal matter there so long that it began to dry.  She also took a photograph of Movant 
with the feces smeared on his face and showed it to others.  Movant’s brother 
corroborated Marrietta’s actions.  Mary Banks, Movant’s aunt, stated that Movant’s 
mother showed her the picture.  She described the picture in her deposition.  Eventually, 
 
11
Marrietta drove the Deck children to DFS and left them there.  Movant was placed with a 
foster family, separated from his younger siblings.  
Movant was initially placed with Carol and Arturo Misserocchi, but he did not 
stay with them very long. He did not make a connection with the Misserocchis.  When 
Movant was about 13 years old, his aunt and uncle, Mary Banks and Dorman Deck, 
sought to adopt him.  His mother refused to allow the adoption unless they paid her the 
same sum she was receiving in government assistance.  Because his aunt and uncle could 
not afford to do so, Movant was not adopted and he was again placed in foster care.  
From the time he was removed from the Misserocchis’ home, he was placed in three 
different homes before he was placed in the care of Major and Linnie Puckett.   
The Pucketts provided Movant with a regimented environment, and he thrived in 
that environment.  The Pucketts would establish a routine for all of their foster children of 
homework and chores, and they would always have dinner together so that they could 
talk about whatever was on their minds.  Movant had such a good relationship with 
Linnie Puckett that he began to call her “mom.”  About a year after Movant was placed 
with the Pucketts, however, Movant’s mother showed up without warning and took him 
away.  He begged her not to take him, saying that “if you take me away, you are killing 
me inside.”   
Movant’s mother took him to live with her and Ron Wurst, her boyfriend at the 
time, who physically abused Movant’s mother.  About three months after he was 
removed from the Pucketts’ home, Movant returned to their home asking to stay because 
his mother knocked him through a plate glass door.  When Movant was 17, he dropped 
 
12
out of school and moved into his own living quarters.  He asked his mother to move in 
with him to protect her from Wurst.  
When Movant was 29 he became engaged to Stacey Tesereau-Bryant.  She had a 
child with whom Movant had a good relationship.  
Dr. Draper opined that all of Movant’s childhood experiences made him the 
person he was at the time of the crime. Although “he was of normal intelligence” and 
“had potential,” he had “no way to develop into a responsible, caring citizen.”  She also 
stated that she believed Movant suffered an “extreme case of a horrendous childhood” 
because he moved 22 times in 21 years, along with the abuse, neglect, and lack of 
guidance.  Dr. Surratt opined that Movant’s childhood was similar to one of the “most 
extreme cases of child abuse ever described.”   
Movant’s brother testified that he and the rest of the Deck children were separated 
from Movant during their childhood.  The rest of the Deck children went to live with 
Norman and Elvina Deck, but Movant continued to live with his mother.  Movant’s 
brother testified that if Movant had been afforded the same opportunities as himself, 
namely to live in a stable environment with Norman and Elvina for seven years, things 
might have turned out differently for Movant.  Major Puckett also testified that if Movant 
had been allowed to stay with him, he believed that Movant would have been a 
“wonderful man.” 
Dr. Draper studied the depositions of Movant’s parents, Movant’s brother, Tonia 
Cummings, Mary Banks, Elvina and Norman Deck, Stacey Tesreau-Bryant and her son, 
Major Puckett, and the Misserochis.   
 
13
Dr. Surratt interviewed Movant’s parents, Movant’s brother, Tonia Cummings, 
Latisha Deck, Mary Banks, Elvina Deck, Rita Deck, Wilma Laird, Stacey Tesreau-
Bryant, and Beverly Dulinsky.  She also read the depositions of D.L. Hood, Major 
Puckett, and the Misserochis. 
b. The testimony of Michael Johnson, the Misserochis, and D.L. Hood 
 was inconsequential 
 
 
The motion court did not clearly err in finding that the testimony of the following 
four witnesses would have been inconsequential. 
Michael Johnson 
 
Michael Johnson was Marietta’s son and Movant’s stepbrother.  He would have 
testified that Movant’s grandfather did not like him and that he was verbally abusive.  He 
also would have testified that the Deck children were “closed off.” 
Carol Misserocchi 
 
Carol Misserocchi, Movant’s short-term foster parent, would have testified that 
Movant was placed with her family for about six to eight months when he was 10 or 11 
years old. She would have testified that Movant’s family made no attempt to contact him, 
and that Movant showed very little emotion and that he did not bond with her.  The other 
children at the Misserochis’ did not like Movant, and he was “sassy.” 
Arturo Misserocchi 
 
Arturo Misserocchi, Carol’s husband, would have testified that he believed 
Movant’s parents might have tried to call Movant when he lived at his and Carol’s home. 
 
14
Movant also did not bond with Arturo, although he described Movant as “a cute little 
kid,” with a “wonderful personality.”  
D.L. Hood 
 
D.L. Hood, who is now deceased, was a former band-mate and boyfriend of 
Movant’s mother.  His previous deposition stated that Movant’s mother was “crazy” and 
that she tried to stab Hood one night.  He also stated that Movant’s mother was 
promiscuous.  Movant’s mother also told him that she had taken the kids to the welfare 
office and left them on the steps.  
Movant failed to show that, had the additional mitigating witnesses been called to 
testify, their testimony would have outweighed the aggravating evidence so that there 
was a reasonable probability the jury would have voted for life.  The additional 
witnesses’ testimony would not have produced a “viable defense.” Hutchison, 150 
S.W.3d at 304.  Michael Johnson only added that Movant’s grandfather was “verbally 
abusive.” The Misserrochis had a brief interaction with Movant in the distant past.  Hood 
only spoke to the interactions he had with Movant’s mother and recounted the same 
stories the jury had heard from other witnesses about the mother’s sexual promiscuity and 
neglect of her children. These witnesses’ testimony was so lacking in substance that it 
would not have had an impact on the jury in their decision.  The motion court did not 
clearly err in finding that these four witnesses’ testimony would not have been 
compelling. 
 
 
15
c. The testimony of Latisha Deck, Elvina Deck, Wilma Laird, Rita Deck, and Pete 
Deck was cumulative 
 
 
The motion court did not clearly err in finding that the testimony of the following 
five witnesses would have been cumulative to the evidence presented by counsel at the 
penalty phase. 
Latisha Deck5 
 
Latisha Deck, Movant’s mentally disabled sister, would have testified that Movant 
took care of her when she was little.  
Elvina Deck 
 
Elvina Deck, Movant’s aunt, would have testified that Movant’s mother beat him.  
She also would have testified that his mother was very promiscuous—so much so that she 
even prostituted herself.  She would have told her account of the incident in which the 
Deck children were brought to her home, dirty and starving, on Thanksgiving Day.  She 
also would have provided her account of Marietta, Movant’s stepmother, making the 
children kneel on broomsticks and her account of the “feces incident.” She would have 
testified that Marrietta encouraged Movant and his sister to steal for her.  Elvina also 
would have testified that she still loved Movant very much.  Counsel hired an 
investigator and made attempts to contact Elvina Deck to testify at the penalty phase, but 
she could not be found. 
 
                                             
 
5 Movant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Latisha Deck 
was not competent to testify due to her mental disabilities.  This Court need not address whether 
the trial court abused its discretion because Latisha’s testimony would have been cumulative.    
 
16
Wilma Laird 
 
Wilma Laird was Movant’s aunt.  She would have testified that she saw Movant’s 
mother hit Movant in the temple with a flip-flop when he was one or two years old, 
although she downplayed the incident as “nothing drastic.” She also would have testified 
that Movant’s parents could be “good” parents.  She stated that Movant’s father tried to 
do the best he could for his children. 
Rita Deck 
 
Rita Deck, Movant’s stepmother, would have given her account of the 
Thanksgiving Day incident.  She would have testified that when Movant’s father left her, 
she continued to care for the Deck children because she did not know where Movant’s 
mother was.  Movant’s aunt came for the children one day and gave them to Movant’s 
father and his new wife, Marrietta.  Rita was upset that the children were in Movant’s 
father’s and Marrietta’s care because Rita “really cared for the kids.” 
 
Rita would have testified that Movant was “a good kid” and that he did not give 
her any trouble.  She also would have testified that the four Deck children were very 
close.    
 
Counsel subpoenaed Rita, but she was not cooperative and did not comply with 
her subpoena. Counsel stated that Rita did not want to be involved in the third retrial.  
Pete Deck 
 
Pete Deck, Movant’s father, would have testified that, after he left Movant’s 
mother and the Deck children, he continued to take money to Movant’s mother to provide 
for the children.  He also would have testified regarding the incident in which the sheriff 
 
17
called him to pick up his children from Movant’s mother’s house on Thanksgiving Day 
because they had been left alone.  He also would have testified to his former wife 
Marrietta’s poor treatment of the children, including the “feces incident.”  He would have 
testified that Marietta suggested foster care in front of Movant, and when Movant’s father 
asked Movant how he felt about foster care, he stated that he would rather live in foster 
care than live with Marietta.  
 
When Movant’s father was asked how many places Movant had lived from birth 
to age 16, he responded “four or five.” He was surprised to hear that Movant had lived in 
more than 20 places in that time period.   
 
Movant’s father attended Movant’s first trial, but Movant’s counsel in the first 
penalty phase hearing did not call him to testify because he was in poor health and had 
high blood pressure.  Movant’s second post-conviction counsel subpoenaed Movant’s 
father to testify at the penalty phase.  At that time, he was living with Rita again, and she 
called counsel to report that he was too ill to testify.  Counsel then received a doctor’s 
note that stated testifying in court would be hazardous to his health.  Counsel considered 
Rita and Movant’s father to be uncooperative and had doubts about his medical 
condition.  Rita and Movant’s father did not comply with their subpoenas. 
The testimony that these five witnesses would have offered was repetitive to the 
mitigation testimony heard by the jury from the expert witnesses and previous 
depositions presented.  Movant’s argument that these five witnesses would have provided 
“additional detail” of his case in mitigation all but concedes that their testimony would 
 
18
have been cumulative.  Counsel is not ineffective for not presenting cumulative evidence. 
Skillicorn v. State, 22 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Mo. banc 2000).    
Neither was counsel ineffective for failing to provide the jury with “live lay 
witnesses” rather than the experts’ testimony that included the lay witnesses’ statements.  
Significantly, the motion court noted:  
While Movant claims that the live testimony of these witnesses would 
bolster the believability of his claims of a difficult childhood, the [c]ourt 
has already indicated that the testimony was not compelling.  Most of these 
witnesses were family members whose perceived motive to exaggerate was 
just as great as the experts, if not significantly greater. 
 
Movant’s contention that counsel was ineffective for failing to call live “lay 
witnesses” to provide “additional detail” of Movant’s childhood is similar to the claims 
of the movant in Storey, 175 S.W.3d 116.  In Storey, counsel presented the testimony of 
Storey’s family members as well as a clinical forensic psychologist to show “all of the 
bad influences and discord that surrounded Storey’s childhood.” Id. at 123-24.  His 
counsel also presented the testimony of an expert in the field of corrections and criminal 
justice to testify about Storey’s nonviolent prison record. Id. at 123.  In his motion for 
post-conviction relief, Storey claimed, inter alia, that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call additional mitigation witnesses. Id. at 137.  Specifically, Storey claimed his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to call non-family witnesses to testify about his 
childhood because non-family evidence would have been inherently more credible than 
the family evidence presented by counsel. Id.  
This Court held that the Storey’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to call 
additional non-family mitigation witnesses because additional witnesses would “reiterate 
 
19
the same stories already presented by witnesses who testified at trial.” Id. at 138.  Storey 
also argued that his counsel should have presented more family mitigation witnesses who 
would have provided additional details of his childhood and additional details of his good 
character. Id.  This Court found that Storey’s counsel had introduced this type of 
mitigation evidence through other family members, and that he failed to show that any of 
the additional witnesses would have presented a viable defense. Id. at 137-38.  “Counsel 
was not ‘ineffective for not putting on cumulative evidence.’” Id. at 138 (quoting 
Skillicorn, 22 S.W.3d at 683).  
The motion court here did not clearly err in finding that Movant was not 
prejudiced by counsel’s strategic decision to tell the story of his childhood through 
experts rather than presenting a piecemeal picture of his childhood through uncooperative 
witnesses who had written Movant out of their lives (such as Movant’s father and Rita 
Deck), through a witness who could not be located (Elvina Deck), or through a witness of 
questionable competence to testify (Latisha Deck). Additionally, Wilma Laird would 
have undermined counsel’s strategy to highlight Movant’s parents’ horrible parenting by 
painting them in a favorable light.   
Counsel’s decision not to call cumulative “live lay witnesses” was an exercise of 
reasonable trial strategy.  The motion court did not clearly err in finding that counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to call these five witnesses. 
d. Counsel made reasonable efforts to locate Stacey Tesreau-Bryant 
 
Stacey Tesreau-Bryant, Movant’s former fiancée, would have testified that she 
previously dated and lived with Movant for one year.  At the time they dated, her son 
 
20
Dylan was approximately two years old.  Movant helped take care of Dylan, and he 
treated him like a son.  Dylan even called Movant “Daddy P.”  Movant continued to have 
a relationship with Dylan after Movant and Stacey’s relationship ended.  Movant told 
Stacey that his mom used to date a lot of men when he was young and that he had been 
molested by some of the men.  She also would have testified that Movant shared with her 
that he was raped in prison. 
 
Penalty phase counsel sent an investigator to Stacey’s home.  Stacey’s husband at 
the time was hostile to the investigator and refused to provide Stacey’s employer or work 
phone number. Counsel testified that given the husband’s hostile nature and the 
tangential nature of Stacey’s testimony, they decided to bring out Stacey’s information 
through the experts.  
 
Because Stacey has since separated from her husband, post-conviction counsel 
was able to locate her.  Stacey testified that the only way for Movant’s counsel to contact 
her would have been to ask her husband because she was disabled and unemployed, and 
her husband was always home.  He was “totally against” Stacey’s involvement in 
Movant’s penalty phase hearing.  Movant did not carry his burden to show that Stacey 
could have been located through reasonable investigation to testify at the penalty phase. 
Additionally, much of Stacey’s testimony was cumulative, and that Movant was 
raped in prison called attention to his adult criminal life rather than focusing on his 
traumatic childhood.  Movant did not carry his burden to show that, had Stacey been 
located and testified at Movant’s third penalty phase hearing, there was a reasonable 
probability the jury would have voted for life instead of imposing the death penalty.  
 
21
e. Counsel’s decision not to call Tonia Cummings was reasonable trial strategy 
 
Tonia Cummings, Movant’s sister, was also his codefendant in the murders 
underlying this case.  Tonia would have largely given the jury another account of the 
same testimony that they heard at trial.  To that extent, Tonia’s testimony would have 
been cumulative.  However, Tonia did provide a few additional details. She stated that 
Marrietta would make the Deck children stay outside all day long and that she would 
make them use the bathroom outside as well. They were constantly thirsty and hungry in 
her care.  She recounted a particular incident in which Movant found a big bag of dog 
food and fed it to the Deck children because they were so hungry.  Marietta would also 
squirt dish soap in the children’s mouths and make them swallow it.  She also would have 
testified that Marietta was particularly hard on Movant, saying that “he’s never going to 
amount to nothing, he’s a piece of shit, we’re bastards, our mother’s a whore.”   
 
Tonia would have testified that when Movant was a teenager, their mother would 
fist-fight him.  Movant also told Tonia that he was a “worthless piece of shit, that he’s 
never going to amount to anything, that nobody ever loved him, all he wanted was for 
somebody to love him.” 
 
Although Tonia’s testimony helped provide a complete picture of Movant’s 
traumatic childhood, the decision not to call her as a witness at the penalty phase was 
undoubtedly reasonable trial strategy.  Counsel did not want to put Movant’s codefendant 
on the stand because counsel did not want to allow the prosecution to cross-examine her 
about the murders.  Also, counsel was concerned that Tonia may be viewed as an 
additional victim because she was in prison for the crimes that she committed with 
 
22
Movant.  “Generally, the selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence are 
questions of trial strategy and virtually unchallengeable.” Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 
28, 37 (Mo. banc 2006); Strickland, 466 U.S.at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable….”).  As counsel’s decision not to call Tonia Cummings was one of 
reasonable trial strategy, counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to put her on the 
stand. 
C. Movant was not prejudiced by counsel’s decision not to present a 
neuropsychologist’s testimony 
 
 
Movant claims that counsel was ineffective because they were aware that he had 
sustained multiple head injuries and was malnourished as a child, yet they did not request 
funding to conduct neuropsychological testing on Movant.  Movant’s hospital records 
reflected the following head injuries: a “laceration on his forehead” when Movant was 6 
years old, a “possible concussion” when he was in a car accident at age 13, an incident 
where he hit his head on the bars in prison when he was 19 that caused him temporary 
blurred vision and a “spinning” head, and a laceration on his head in 1992.  Movant also 
told counsel that he hit his head during a car accident and that he had been struck in the 
head with a baseball bat during a fight.  Finally, there was evidence that Movant woke up 
one morning with a knot on his head, not able to remember the previous night. 
 
Although Movant presents a list of injuries to his head, he does not present any 
evidence that his counsel was aware that those injuries caused brain damage.  Further, he 
does not present any evidence, independent of his own post-conviction expert’s 
 
23
testimony, that these injuries caused permanent damage at all.  Because counsel did not 
have any reason to believe that Movant suffered from a neuropsychological impairment, 
counsel did not explore presenting that type of evidence in mitigation.  Movant fails to 
prove that counsel was ineffective for failing to do so because he was not prejudiced by 
the decision.  
In an attempt to prove prejudice, Movant presented the testimony of a 
neuropsychologist, Dr. Gelbort, at the post-conviction hearing.  Dr. Gelbort’s findings, 
however, did not suggest that Movant suffered from impaired mental functioning.  The 
results of testing showed that Movant had an IQ score of 91, which is within the normal 
range.  Movant admits that “Dr. Gelbort did not find significant or moderate impairment 
on any of the [IQ tests, and his] scores were grossly within the normal range.”  Dr. 
Gelbort also stated in his testimony, “And for what it’s worth, and to be … very upfront 
with it, I’ve not described significant or even moderate impairment on any of these [IQ] 
tests.”  Dr. Gelbort also described Movant as performing in the “borderline defective 
range” on the Category Test.  Movant admits, however, that “[i]n and of itself, the 
borderline impairment score on the Category Test does not mean anything.”  
To support his contention that counsel was ineffective in deciding not to pursue 
evidence of impaired neuropsychological functioning, Movant relies on Hutchison’s 
statement that “evidence of impaired intellectual functioning is inherently mitigating ….” 
150 S.W.3d at 308.  Dr. Gelbort admitted, however, that he did not find significant or 
even moderate impairment on any IQ tests.  
 
24
Further, Movant’s case is readily distinguishable from Hutchison.  Hutchison 
involved a movant who displayed objective signs of impaired intellectual functioning that 
his counsel failed to investigate.  Hutchison’s records showed that he had been diagnosed 
with significant mental disabilities and had an IQ of 78. Id. at 306; id. at 309 (Limbaugh, 
J., dissenting).   Further, Hutchison’s counsel was woefully unprepared for the penalty 
phase because they failed to conduct an investigation into Hutchison’s life history, 
troubled background, and mental and emotional deficits.  Id. at 297.  Counsel obtained a 
cursory report from a mental health expert that identified some problems but failed to 
follow up on the issues uncovered in that report. Id. at 306.  This Court held that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to conduct a thorough investigation and evaluation of these 
possible mitigators. Id. at 307-08.  
In contrast, counsel in Movant’s case conducted a thorough investigation into 
Movant’s childhood, and there was no evidence of brain damage or impaired 
psychological functioning.  Counsel made a decision not to pursue neuropsychological 
testing based on the facts they had gathered from their investigation.  This Court, 
however, need not address whether this decision was one of reasonable trial strategy 
because Movant fails in his burden to show a reasonable probability that, had a 
neuropsychologist like Dr. Gelbort testified at his penalty phase hearing, the jury would 
have voted for life.  Dr. Gelbort’s testimony shows that Movant was not intellectually 
impaired, and his “borderline defective” score on the Category Test “did not mean 
anything” by itself.  Movant was not prejudiced by counsel’s decision not to conduct 
neuropsychological testing. 
 
25
D. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s  
cross-examination of Dr. Surratt 
 
 
During Movant’s penalty phase hearing, the prosecutor and Dr. Surratt engaged in 
the following transaction on cross-examination:  
Prosecutor: -- Well I’m asking you – I didn’t mean to cut you off – but I’m 
asking you about you being here today.  Not prior work in this case, but 
being here today, you’re here today to explain his behavior? 
 
Dr. Surratt: Yes. 
 
Prosecutor: And wouldn’t it be easy or helpful to explain his behavior, if 
you had asked him why did you put a gun against these people’s head and 
kill them? 
 
Dr. Surratt: And it could have, yes. 
 
Prosecutor: It could have, but it also could have been pretty detrimental to  
Mr. Deck, if he said, the reason I killed them is because I’m a no-good 
s.o.b. and wanted them dead, because I didn’t want to go to prison.  That 
wouldn’t be a very good answer for Mr. Deck, would it? 
 
Dr. Surratt: It would have went along with my findings of how he 
responds to things; is it good or bad, not for me to say, but it certainly 
would have been fitting.  
 
Prosecutor: He wanting these people dead just because he wanted their 
money fits along with what you believe? 
 
Counsel Tucci: Objection; asked and answered.  
 
The Court: Sustained; move on, please. 
 
(Emphasis added).  
 Movant contends that the prosecutor’s question to Dr. Surratt, including the 
statement that “it also could have been pretty detrimental to Mr. Deck, if he said, the 
reason I killed them is because I’m a no-good s.o.b. and wanted them dead,” was 
 
26
improper name-calling and an ad hominem personal attack on Movant designed to 
inflame the passions of the jury.  Movant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the statement. 
In support of this proposition, Movant cites State v. Banks, 215 S.W.3d 118 (Mo. 
banc 2007).  In Banks, during rebuttal to the defense’s closing argument, the prosecutor 
stated:  
And, ladies and gentlemen, when the scene is set and held[6] and we have 
to go and catch the Devil, there are no angels as witnesses.  This is Hell. He 
is the Devil.  They aren't angels. He is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Id. at 119. 
 
 
The trial court permitted the prosecutor’s argument over the defense’s objection. 
Id.  On appeal, this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the 
defense’s objection because the prosecutor’s remark was “pure hyperbole, an ad 
hominem personal attack designed to inflame the jury.”  Id. at 121.  Although Banks is 
instructive about what constitutes improper prosecutorial argument, it does not provide 
guidance as to when counsel’s failure to object to such an argument would constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 
More on point, State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. banc. 1995), addresses when 
counsel is ineffective for failing to object.  In Storey the prosecutor made multiple 
objectionable statements during opening and closing arguments. Id. at 900-02.  The 
prosecutor argued facts outside the record by declaring that “[t]his case is about the most 
                                             
 
6 It was noted in Banks that this was likely a transcription error and should have read “the scene 
is set in Hell.” Id. at 119 n.2.  
 
27
brutal slaying in the history of this county.” Id. at 900.  He also improperly personalized 
his argument to the jury:  
Think for just this moment. Try to put yourselves in [the victim]’s place. 
Can you imagine? And, then—and then, to have your head yanked back by 
its hair and to feel the blade of that knife slicing through your flesh, 
severing your vocal cords, wanting to scream out in terror, but not being 
able to. Trying to breathe, but not being able to for the blood pouring down 
into your esophagus. 
 
Id. at 901. He also argued:  
 
I want you to think about that guy right there on the front row, [the victim’s 
brother]. What if he had happened onto this brutal thing and seen his very 
close sister in the process of murdered? Would he have been justified in 
taking the Defendant's life? Yes. Without question. Without question. 
 
Id. at 901-02.  The victim’s brother did not see the murder, and suggesting that he did 
only served to inflame the jury. Id. at 902. The argument also improperly equated the 
jury’s sentencing function with self-defense by asking if the victim’s brother would have 
been justified in taking the defendant’s life if he was, in fact, present during the victim’s 
murder. Id.  
 
Finally, the prosecutor improperly weighed the value of the defendant’s life 
against the value of the victim’s, stating:  
Why do we have the death penalty? The reason we have the death penalty 
is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighs—by huge 
leaps and bounds, outweighs the right of the guilty not to die. The right of 
the innocent completely outweighs the right of the guilty not to die, and, so, 
it comes down to one basic thing. Whose life is more important to you? 
Whose life has more value? The Defendant's or [the victim]’s? 
 
Id.  
 
 
28
In spite of the fact that the prosecutor’s arguments were obviously objectionable, 
Storey’s counsel failed to object to any of them. Id.  This Court held that “counsel’s 
failure to object cannot be justified as trial strategy.” Id.  “A reasonably competent lawyer 
would have objected to the obviously improper arguments.” Id.  Further, this Court found 
that the counsel’s failure to object was prejudicial and reversed Storey’s death sentence. 
Id. at 902-03.  
 
Storey was an extreme case of multiple inflammatory improper prosecutorial 
arguments that were presented at key junctures in the penalty phase hearing.  Storey’s 
counsel’s failure to object under those circumstances clearly amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In this case, Movant’s counsel did not fail their client as counsel in 
Storey did.   
State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. banc 1996), is more analogous to Movant’s 
counsel’s performance in this case.  In Tokar, the prosecutor stated that the “jurors might 
pray that their children will not have to experience what the [victim’s] children went 
through with the murder of their father.” Id. at 768.  This Court reasoned that the movant 
correctly argued that the prosecutor’s statement improperly personalized the argument 
and was error. Id.  The prosecutor’s error, however, did not justify reversal. Id.  Applying 
Strickland, the movant was still required to prove that “trial counsel’s failure to object did 
not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney 
and that he was prejudiced.” Id.  This Court noted:  
In many instances seasoned trial counsel do not object to otherwise 
improper questions or arguments for strategic purposes. It is feared that 
 
29
frequent objections irritate the jury and highlight the statements complained 
of, resulting in more harm than good. 
 
Id.  Tokar held that the movant failed to overcome the presumption that the failure to 
object was a strategic choice by competent counsel. Id.  This Court also held that the 
movant failed to prove prejudice. Id.  “The level of aggravating circumstances in this case 
overcomes any reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing phase would 
have been any different in the absence of this remark by the prosecutor when considered 
in the context of the trial as a whole.” Id. 
 
Finally, this Court noted:  
[T]he alleged mistakes in this case do not equate to the “egregious errors, 
each compounding the other” that we found in State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 
886, 902 (Mo. banc 1995). In that case, we reversed the defendant's 
sentence of death and remanded the cause for a new sentencing proceeding 
because defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 
prosecutor's repeated argument of facts outside the record, personalization 
of the argument, and misstatement of the law. Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902–
03. The statements argued here simply do not compare.  
 
Id. at 769. 
 
 
Although the movant in Tokar failed to present any evidence during the post-
conviction hearing regarding his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper 
argument, the testimony of Movant’s counsel in this case only bolsters the conclusion 
that counsel’s decision not to object was the exercise of reasonable trial strategy. See id. 
at 768. 
Counsel Tucci could not specifically remember why he did not object to the 
prosecutor’s statement, but he did state that he must have had a reason.  Counsel 
Reynolds did not object because it was Tucci’s witness, but he believed that Tucci may 
 
30
have not objected because he did not want to highlight the issue for the jury.  He further 
noted that Tucci did object very quickly after the prosecutor’s statement in question to 
“shut down” the prosecutor’s argumentative line of questioning.  
Although the hypothetical posed to Dr. Surratt in which Movant called himself a 
“no-good s.o.b.” was improper on behalf of the prosecutor, counsel exercised reasonable 
trial strategy in not objecting to the statement.  Counsel did not want to highlight the 
prosecutor’s statement.  Movant fails to overcome the presumption that counsel’s failure 
to object was an exercise of reasonable trial strategy.   
Further, Movant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s statement when 
considering it within the context of the entire record.  It was a brief statement that was 
subsequently “shut down” by counsel’s objection.  Just as in Tokar, “the alleged mistakes 
in this case do not equate to the ‘egregious errors, each compounding the other’ that we 
found in State v. Storey.” Id. at 769 (quoting Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902).  “The 
statements argued here simply do not compare.” Id.  The motion court did not clearly err 
in concluding that counsel’s decision not to object was an exercise of reasonable trial 
strategy.  
E. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s arguments 
about Movant’s prior conviction for aiding escape 
 
 
Movant was convicted of aiding an escape from prison in 1985.  This evidence 
was introduced at trial in the form of Movant’s sentence and judgment for the crime.  No 
other evidence was admitted.  During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: 
“You can consider all his prior escapes.”  The transcript also reads:  
 
31
Prosecutor: While he’s going to be in prison for the rest of his life if you 
let him live, remember, he knows how to escape.  He aided and abetted 
others trying to.  
 
[Movant’s Counsel]: Objection; not a noticed aggravator. 
 
The Court: Overruled. 
 
[Movant’s Cousel]: Irrelevant. 
 
The Court: Overruled. 
 
Prosecutor: He knows how to escape, helping people that were in for the 
rest of their lives. 
 
 
Movant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to: (1) the 
prosecutor’s use of the term “all his prior escapes,” when Movant was, in fact, only 
convicted once of aiding others in their escape; and (2) the prosecutor’s statement that 
Movant helped individuals escape “that were in for the rest of their lives,” when there 
was no evidence as to how long the individuals’ sentences were.  
 
On direct appeal, this Court reviewed these same prosecutorial statements for plain 
error and found that after reviewing the entire record, movant was not prejudiced by 
those statements. Deck IV, 303 S.W.3d at 542-43.    
 
This Court’s determination that no plain error prejudice resulted from the 
prosecutor’s statements does not end the inquiry in this case, as the Strickland standard of 
prejudice is less exacting than the plain error standard. Deck II, 68 S.W.3d at 425-29. 
Plain error can serve as the basis for granting a new trial on direct appeal only if the error 
was outcome determinative. Id. at 427.  In contrast, Strickland prejudice requires a 
reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
 
32
694.  However, “this theoretical difference in the two standards of review will seldom 
cause a court to grant post-conviction relief after it has denied relief on direct appeal….” 
Deck II, 68 S.W.3d at 428.  There are only a “small number of cases in which the 
application of the two tests will produce different results.” Id.  Movant’s case is not one 
of those cases.  
 
Looking at the prosecutor’s misstatement in the context of the entire record, the 
failure of counsel to object to the prosecutor’s simple misstatement in using the plural 
form did not prejudice Movant under the plain error standard or the Strickland standard.  
Further, in the context of the entire record, the motion court did not clearly err in 
determining that the length of the sentences of the individuals whom Movant aided in 
escape was not “consequential or significant.”  Movant fails to prove that, but for 
counsel’s failure to object to these prosecutorial misstatements, there was reasonable 
probability that the result of Movant’s sentencing phase would have been different.  The 
motion court did not clearly err in denying Movant relief on this point.  
IV. Movant is not entitled to a new trial based on the trial court’s alleged 
destruction of the juror questionnaires 
 
Movant argues that the motion court erred in denying his motion for a new trial 
because the trial court destroyed the juror questionnaires in violation of Court Operating 
Rule 4.21 and Rule 27.09(b).  Movant contends that if he had been able to review the 
juror questionnaires of three particular jurors, he would have been able to determine 
whether their responses to the questions showed any bias against the defense.  He 
contends that two of the jurors in question may have been biased because counsel noted 
 
33
juror Wheeler was “staring down [Movant]” and that Movant “does not like” juror 
Hayden. He also contends that the juror questionnaire may have provided more insight 
into why juror Holt knew a few Jefferson County bailiffs.7 
Movant contends that, under the standard set forth in In re R.R.M v. Juvenile 
Officer, 226 S.W.3d 864, 866 (Mo. App. 2007), a defendant is entitled to a new trial if he 
exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain a complete record and is prejudiced by the 
incomplete nature of the record.  It is not clear from the record whether the juror 
questionnaires were actually destroyed by the trial court, but the motion court’s denial of 
Movant’s request to review the juror questionnaires stated they had been destroyed.8  
Regardless of whether the questionnaires were destroyed by the trial court, copies of the 
juror questionnaires for the 12 jurors who served during the penalty phase trial have been 
filed with this Court and stipulated to by both parties.  The questionnaires asked general 
                                             
 
7 Movant also stated that he wanted access to the juror questionnaires to obtain juror contact 
information so that he could contact the jurors.  As discussed above, Movant was not entitled to 
contact the jurors.  The failure to obtain contact information did not result in prejudice. 
8 In Movant’s motion below, his counsel explained:  
 
Counsel then called Division 2 and explained that she was trying to get a copy of 
the questionnaires, and she was forwarded to Pam with the Circuit Clerk's office. 
Counsel explained the specific circumstances of the case. Pam informed counsel 
that the questionnaires had been destroyed. As such, counsel had not been able to 
locate the questionnaires or obtain all of the jurors' correct addresses and 
information. On Thursday afternoon, August 26, counsel learned that the 
questionnaires are in the court file (a public defender investigator went to 
Division 2, and the clerk then discovered that the questionnaires were in the file 
but could not release them without the Judge's approval). Counsel had court out of 
town on Friday, August 27, and so will not be able to seek to obtain copies of the 
questionnaires, by motion, on or after the due date of this amended motion 
(August 30,2010). 
 
Then, on October 12, 2010, the motion court denied Movant’s motion to review juror 
questionnaires because “the questionnaires have been destroyed.”   
 
34
questions about the juror’s personal information, including name, address, employer, 
marital status, duration of residence in the county, persons living with the juror, and 
contact information.  Additionally, each questionnaire asked the juror to check “yes” or 
“no” in response to the following questions: 
 
3. Have you previously served as a juror anywhere? 
 
…. 
 
6. Have you or members of your immediate family ever suffered an 
accidental physical injury? 
 
…. 
 
7. Have you or members of your immediate family ever been a party to any 
lawsuit for damages? 
 
…. 
 
8. Has a CLAIM for personal injury ever been made against YOU? 
 
…. 
 
9. Have you ever made any CLAIM for personal injury? 
 
…. 
 
10. Are you related to or close friends with any law enforcement officer? 
 
 
Movant fails to prove prejudice as required by In re R.R.M.  Jurors Wheeler and 
Hayden provided no additional information on their juror questionnaires other than their 
basic personal information and the answers to the yes or no questions contained in the 
questionnaire.  Nothing in their responses indicates they would be biased against the 
defense.  Juror Holt’s juror questionnaire also contained no information beyond the yes or 
 
35
 
36
no responses requested on the form.  Movant was not prejudiced because the juror 
questionnaires did not provide evidence that any juror was biased against the defense.  
Movant was not entitled to a new trial.  
V. Conclusion 
 
Movant has failed to prove that the motion court clearly erred in denying him post-
conviction relief or erred in denying his request for a new trial.  The judgment is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge 
 
All concur.