Title: State v. Lavender

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

365 P.2d 652 (1961) 69 N.M. 220 STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Relator, v. George LAVENDER, Chairman, John F. Sudderth, Vice Chairman, J. R. Kastler, Secretary, Frank Tatsch, H. E. Leonard, Members of the State Highway Commission of the State of New Mexico; State Highway Commission of New Mexico; and D. B. Dixon, Chief Highway Engineer of State Highway Commission of New Mexico, Respondents. No. 6780. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 13, 1961. Rehearing Denied November 3, 1961. *653 Frank Horan, Malcolm W. deVesty, James L. Parmelee, Jr., Stanley P. Zuris, Albuquerque, for relator. Fred M. Standley, Hadley Kelsey, Joseph L. Droege, John C. Worden, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Thomas O. Olson, First Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents. John E. Hall, Albuquerque, amicus curiae. CARMODY, Justice. This is an original proceeding in mandamus, in which the city of Albuquerque seeks to require the state highway commission to reimburse it for relocations of water and sewer lines, made necessary by reason of the construction of federal-aid highways on the interstate and primary system. The parties will be referred to hereafter as the "city" and the "commission," respectively. In 1957, the New Mexico legislature enacted Chapter 237, Laws of 1957, amending § 55-7-18, N.M.S.A., 1953, and which provided for reimbursement to public utilities for the relocation of their facilities. Portions of this chapter were adjudged unconstitutional in State Highway Commission v. Southern Union Gas Co., 1958, 65 N.M. 84, 332 P.2d 1007. However, in that case, the court declined to rule as to whether the city of Albuquerque was entitled to repayment of relocation costs which it had by reason of moving municipally owned facilities from its municipally owned right-of-way. Actually, by reason of this reservation in the above case, and additionally by reason of the enactment of Chapters 289 and 310 of the Laws of 1959 (§§ 55-7-21 through 55-7-29, N.M.S.A., 1953 Supp.), the city is seeking its relief. Chapter 310, Laws of 1959, was enacted by the legislature in what was apparently an attempt to satisfy the constitutional objections announced in the Southern Union case, and a more detailed discussion of the statute will be attempted hereinafter. The commission's return to the alternative writ seeks to justify its refusal to comply with the statutes, on the basis that it claims that there is a violation of art. IX, § 14, of the New Mexico Constitution, and the additional contention that the city has no property or property interest which can be compensated under art. II, § 20, of the New Mexico Constitution. Although the city urges in three separate grounds its contention as to why the statutes referred to are constitutional, the contention can be summarized that municipalities are vastly different from private utilities, and therefore should be treated differently because of the public services rendered by them, and that a municipality is an arm of the state. Thus, the city attempts to circumvent the Southern Union holding, and both parties in their briefs deal, basically, only with the effect of the statutes on a municipality. Without discussing the question as to the claimed differences between public and private utilities at any great length, we are of the opinion that the operation of water and sewer systems is a proprietary *654 function of a municipality, not a governmental function, and therefore must stand on the same footing as privately owned utility facilities. We feel that State ex rel. Highway Comm. v. Town of Grants, 1960, 66 N.M. 355, 348 P.2d 274, answers this question, and that there is no necessity in considering the matter further, although we are cognizant that the city seeks to avoid the implication of the Grants case, but we are not impressed with this argument. We are cognizant also that § 2, subd. A of Chapter 310, defining "utility," states that: Thus, if the statute is unconstitutional at all, it is unconstitutional as to municipalities operating utilities in a proprietary capacity, just as it is to a private utility. We can see no other possible construction of the language of art. IX, § 14, New Mexico Constitution, wherein the words "public or private corporation" are used. See, also, McQuillin, vol. 1, § 2.03, at 448, 449 and 450. As above stated, the city in its brief argues the limited question as to the difference between a municipally owned utility and a privately owned utility, insofar as the constitutionality of the statute is concerned. The commission by its brief answers this proposition, and by a general statement only, claims that the statute is unconstitutional under the Southern Union case. The court is referred by counsel to the briefs in the Southern Union case as though this were dispositive of all contentions, and, impliedly at least, that the 1959 legislation is identical with the 1957 legislation. In any event, in view of our determination that there is no practical difference between municipally owned utilities and those privately owned, it therefore becomes necessary to dispose of the constitutionality of the statute, even though the point is not directly raised and is certainly not in any sense properly or adequately briefed. In declaring certain portions of the 1957 Act unconstitutional, the court made the following statement: The legislature attempted at least to get around this particular statement by including certain protective provisions in the 1959 Act (Chapter 310) as follows: In addition, as a part of Chapter 310, there was a declaration of public policy, a portion of which reads as follows: It is not deemed necessary to set out the pertinent provisions of the 1957 Act as the same are set out in Southern Union, supra, but it is apparent that under the 1959 Act the highway commission itself is authorized to undertake the relocation work on behalf of the state, and it may contract the work, or may require the utility to perform the same under the control of the commission. Under § 4, subd. B(1), reimbursement is expressly prohibited if the utility facilities were initially installed pursuant to a valid statute, regulation or contract which required the owner to relocate the facilities at its own expense. So, also, reimbursement is prohibited if the facilities were installed without proper authorization. Thus, it would seem that under the 1959 Act, as distinguished from the 1957 Act, (1) the legislature has authorized the commission itself to expend public funds for the relocation of utility facilities; (2) the utility, as to relocations, is under the absolute control of the commission and is merely acting as a contractor for the state; and (3) the legislature has expressly prohibited reimbursement for relocation in cases where there is a specific obligation on the part of the utility to relocate. It need also be noted that § 4, subd. A, supra, is somewhat in the nature of a statement *657 of policy as heretofore recognized by the courts that the complete ouster of a utility from a public highway may constitute a taking of contract or property rights when the utility has been installed pursuant to statutory authority. See, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Town of Belen, 1952, 56 N.M. 415, 244 P.2d 1112; City of Roswell v. Mountain States Telephone & Tel. Co., 10 Cir., 1935, 78 F.2d 379; and Russell v. Sebastian, 1914, 233 U.S. 195, 34 S. Ct. 517, 58 L. Ed. 912. The above is a fundamental principle of the law in the state of New Mexico, which apparently was overlooked in the Southern Union decision. Whether this principle is recognized in Tennessee we do not know, but on the assumption that that court does not recognize this principle, our reliance to a considerable extent on State ex rel. (Leech) v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1958, 204 Tenn. 207, 319 S.W.2d 90, was of doubtful validity. Also, as an additional distinction between the 1957 and the 1959 Acts, the provisions of the 1959 Act apply only to cases involving the construction of interstate and defense system highways, rather than on all federal-aid highways. This distinction is of considerable importance when it is realized that these particular highways are designed primarily for the nation as a whole, not merely for a community or for the state of New Mexico. It would see that the bedrock basis of the decision in Southern Union was that the court felt that there was no "obligation" running between the state and the defendant in that case, and that therefore the reimbursement constituted a donation in aid of private enterprise, thus running counter to § 14 of art. IX, New Mexico Constitution. We recognize the doctrine that, under the common law, the state can compel a utility to relocate its facilities without expense to the state. See, Southern Union, supra, and State ex rel. Highway Comm. v. Town of Grants, 1960, 66 N.M. 355, 348 P.2d 274. It is thus apparent that the state may inflict injury under its police power without incurring liability for damages. However, does the mere fact that the state may do so without liability, contrariwise, impose an obligation on the utility for which the state may in no sense be responsible? We do not believe so. The legislature is the branch of the government charged with the duty of placing in operation the police power and providing how it is to be exercised. We mentioned in the Town of Grants case this principle of the police power of the state, which was apparently not recognized by the opinion of the court in Southern Union. Therefore, it would seem that the crux of the question must rest upon a determination of what is an "obligation." The court, in State v. City of Austin, Tex. 1960, 331 S.W.2d 737, 742, discussed this very problem. The Texas constitutional provisions are even more definite than ours. They read as follows: The opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas disposes of the question of the nature of "obligation" in this language: The Texas court is not alone in this construction, a similar view having been adopted by the highest courts of the following jurisdictions: New York, Maine, New Hampshire, Minnesota, North Dakota, Utah, Montana and Delaware. Since our decision in Southern Union, several other states have had occasion to construe relocation statutes. In only one, Idaho (State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power Company, 1959, 81 Idaho 487, 346 P.2d 596), was the statute declared unconstitutional. Other cases which have been decided subsequent to Southern Union, supra, sustaining the constitutionality of the statutes, are Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wentz, N.D. 1960, 103 N.W.2d 245; State Road Com. of Utah v. Utah Power & Light Co., 1960, 10 Utah 2d 333, 353 P.2d 171; Jones v. Burns, Mont. 1960, 357 P.2d 22; and State Highway Department v. Delaware Power & Light Co., Del. 1961, 167 A.2d 27. A discussion of some of these cases and the earlier ones mentioned in Southern Union is contained in the annotation, 75 A.L.R.2d 419. Thus, at the present time, Tennessee, New Mexico and Idaho stand alone in finding constitutional objections to such statutes, and it should be noted that the Tennessee decision was by a divided court, as was that in Idaho. On a numerical basis, therefore, it appears that at least eight states have sustained the constitutionality of relocation statutes, as against a minority of three holding to the contrary. Naturally, the verbiage of the various state constitutional provisions varies greatly, but in practically all instances the general meaning is the same. Having given serious consideration to the authorities from other jurisdictions, including their constitutional provisions, we are of the opinion that the majority holding is the better reasoned and more in keeping with the theory of a growing, living constitution. We are not persuaded otherwise by anything that was said in Southern Union, although a different statute was there being considered. We reach our conclusion that Chapter 310 does not constitute a release of an obligation to the state, not merely from what we have said, but also because of our view of what is encompassed within the doctrine of police power. It would unduly lengthen this opinion to discuss the history and background of the initial passage of the federal and state statutes dealing with relocation. Most of the above cases having done so, we do not feel it would be any aid for us to repeat what is said therein. The police power of the state has been variously defined, but, for our purposes, the following statement from State ex rel. Hughes v. Cleveland, 1943, 47 N.M. 230 at page 242, 141 P.2d 192, 200, is a well considered expression of the meaning of the power: In addition, in State v. Spears, 1953, 57 N.M. 400, 259 P.2d 356, 363, 39 A.L.R.2d 595, we stated: *660 Also, in Barwin v. Reidy, 1957, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175, 181, we approved of the following definition of "public policy": It is the policy of this court to construe statutes in the light that they are presumed constitutional rather than unconstitutional. We have stated this principle in varying ways, on many different occasions. See, for example, Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 1941, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779; State ex rel. New Mexico Dry Cleaning Board v. Cauthen, 1944, 48 N.M. 436, 152 P.2d 255; Fowler v. Corlett, 1952, 56 N.M. 430, 244 P.2d 1122; State v. Thompson, 1952, 57 N.M. 459, 260 P.2d 370; and State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205. Here the legislature has determined that as a matter of public policy the non-betterment cost of the relocation of utility facilities should in certain instances be borne by the state. This determination is entitled to great weight, and unless the act is violative of the constitution, the legislative pronouncement is very persuasive. Were it otherwise, the court would be substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. In the passage of Chapter 310, Laws of 1959, the legislature apparently considered that the construction of interstate highways, through a locality such as Albuquerque, is for the primary benefit of interstate travelers and public transportation facilities making use of such thoroughfares, rather than the citizens of the community itself. It was also common knowledge that the construction of these interstate highways would of necessity require the relocation of many utility facilities. Thus, the legislature was attempting to aid the citizens of the state of New Mexico, as distinguished from making any type of donation from the funds of the state. We believe that the statute in question is an exercise of police power, and the mere fact that the legislature did not see fit to exercise the power to its fullest extent does not make the act any the less effective. It is obvious that unless the legislature made some provision for the orderly relocation of utility facilities in the path of highway construction, great danger could result affecting not only the traveling public but the health, safety, welfare and convenience of the tremendous group of utility consuming public, which is dependent on the services furnished. It is also obvious that unless relocation costs are paid out of the public highway fund, the utility users will ultimately pay more than their fair share of the costs of interstate and defense highways. The utility companies, if required to bear relocation costs, will simply raise their rates to cover such costs. The relatively small portion of the public affected by such raises will therefore be forced to bear highway costs which benefit the entire public and this after they have already paid a proportionate share of the total highway expenses. In exercising its police power, we think the state may legitimately *661 and properly consider the effect, not only upon the entire public, but also upon particular segments thereof, and evolve a plan and scheme which will accomplish the greatest public good at the least expense to those adversely affected. When we speak of forcing the utility companies to bear relocation costs, we are overlooking the practical fact that such costs will be passed on to the utility consuming public. Thus, we see in the statute under consideration a legitimate and equitable apportionment of costs of relocations rather than a donation to utility companies. The legislature may enact laws for the benefit of society at large. State v. Brooken, 1914, 19 N.M. 404, 143 P. 479, L.R.A. 1915B, 213; see, also, State ex rel. Hughes v. Cleveland, supra. We are of the opinion that Chapter 310 is such a law, although we do not say that the primary purpose of rights-of-way is for the location of utility facilities. Certainly, it is a very important and necessary purpose. In congested areas, it would be practically impossible to provide for water, sewer, light, heat, or communication services without the use of rights-of-way. These and other uses are of almost equal importance to residents of the communities served, as are the highways themselves. The statement in Southern Union, that New Mexico has never recognized that one of the primary purposes for which highways are designed is for location of utility facilities, was made in order to distinguish the leading contrary case, Minneapolis Gas Company v. Zimmerman, 1958, 253 Minn. 164, 91 N.W.2d 642. Actually, this statement is erroneous when it is considered that there has been unquestioned statutory authority for such use of highway rights-of-way for more than fifty years. See, Session Laws of 1909, ch. 141 (§ 68-1-1, N.M.S.A., 1953), and see also, § 55-2-7(c), N.M.S.A., 1953, and the rights of the utility established thereby recognized in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Town of Belen, supra; City of Roswell v. Mountain States Telephone & Tel. Co., supra; and Russell v. Sebastian, supra. The Minnesota decision was soundly based on a prior decision of that court in Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 1895, 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. 111, 28 L.R.A. 310, which held that the use of highway easements for utility services was within the general purpose for which highways are designed, in addition to their use for transportation of movable vehicles. We agree. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the practical, as well as the legal, aspects of the situation. We believe that Justice Cardozo's opinion in Oswego & S.R. Co. v. State, 1919, 226 N.Y. 351, 124 N.E. 8, 10, (which received so little note in Southern Union, but is quoted at length in the Minneapolis Gas case), is particularly applicable to the present case. The Oswego case was decided years before the current highway program was instituted, but the analogy is clear. The case involved the expense of rebuilding a railroad bridge to meet the specifications of the state operated Barge Canal. The bridge was originally constructed under a permit from the state, which provided that the bridge must be removed when required at the "cost and expense" of the railroad. The decision allowed the railroad to recover its expenses for the new bridge and held that the existence of the written permit made no difference, i.e., that the duty on the part of the railroad to remove was the same, whether the reservation was express or implied. Justice Cardozo's reasoning applies to the present case, just as it did to the case before the New York Court of Appeals. We approve a proper balancing of the benefits to be obtained by the exercise of the state's police power in requiring the relocations of utilities at the sole expense of the owners thereof, as opposed to the burdens, fully justifies the expenditure of public monies for the purpose of doing equity. The basic theory as stated by Justice Cardozo has been substantially followed by all of the courts entertaining the majority view on this problem, as is well illustrated by what was recently said in State Road Comm. of Utah v. Utah Power & Light Co., supra: Respondents rely in part on State ex rel. Mechem v. Hannah, 1957, 63 N.M. 110, 314 P.2d 714. However, that case involved a law which provided for donations or gifts out of the public treasury to individuals not falling within the classification of "sick or indigent persons." The donations were not for a public purpose and were of a character which under art. IX, § 14, could not be for a public purpose unless made "for the care and maintenance of sick and indigent persons." That case did not in the slightest degree involve the taking or damaging by the state under its police power of any property belonging to the donee. Therefore we feel that that case is not authority for respondents' position and that there is no conflict between its holding and that expressed in this opinion. One other matter that merits comment is the fact that, in Southern Union, we said that public funds could only be paid over to a subordinate governmental agency under the absolute control of the state. This statement arose because of a long-standing error that was made in one of the opinions in Harrington v. Atteberry, 1915, 21 N.M. 50, 153 P. 1041, and which was carried forward in Hutcheson v. Atherton, 1940, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d 462. In the original Harrington case, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion is given as the opinion of the court, although it was not concurred in by the other two justices. The actual opinion in that case was to the effect that the appropriation was in violation of § 31 of art. IV of the Constitution, which contains the language, "not under the absolute control of the state." With the passage of time, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, which said that the appropriation was in conflict with § 14 of art. IX, became somehow interwoven with the actual majority opinion. In any event, § 31 of art. IV of the New Mexico Constitution is not at issue and can have no bearing on this proceeding, it having to do with appropriations to charitable, educational or other benevolent purposes. However, it is *663 quite apparent that the blending together of the two constitutional provisions has caused considerable difficulty, and may have contributed, in part at least, to the determination that the 1957 Act was unconstitutional. We are of the opinion that Chapter 310 is not unconstitutional on any of the grounds contended by the commission. The decision in State Highway Commission v. Southern Union Gas Co., 1958, 65 N.M. 84, 332 P.2d 1007, is overruled in all aspects in which it is in conflict with our views herein expressed. However, we do not intend thereby to impliedly signify our approval of the 1957 statute, and it should suffice to say that it is within the province of the legislature to repeal the present law at any time, in which event the costs for relocation would again be the responsibility of the utility, in accordance with the common law as it heretofore existed. In the briefs as originally submitted, no particular argument was made as to the applicability or constitutionality of Chapter 289, Laws of 1959 (§§ 55-7-21 and 55-7-22, Pocket Supp., N.M.S.A., 1953). However, by motion for rehearing, relators and certain other municipalities as amici curiae earnestly maintain that this chapter is constitutional, which is vigorously opposed by respondents. Relator and the amici curiae are particularly interested as to this chapter because it, in substance, provides that the state shall pay for municipally owned relocations on the primary system, in addition to those provided for under Chapter 310, i.e., interstate and defense system highways, and, in addition, Chapter 289 provides that payment shall be made for all such relocations since the initial passage of the 1957 Act. We have herein concluded that there is little distinction between privately owned and municipally owned utilities. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter 289 which attempt to provide for reimbursement of relocation costs retrospectively to March 29, 1957, are in direct conflict with the following two sections of the New Mexico Constitution: Art. IX, § 14; and Art. IV, § 24. In this connection, see quotations from State v. City of Austin, supra. The act in question also offends Art. IV, § 24, in another manner, in the sense that it is special legislation applying arbitrarily to municipally owned utilities and not based on any substantial distinction between all utilities as a class. See, State v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 1915, 20 N.M. 562, 151 P. 305. It would also appear that the act attempts to grant rights, privileges or immunities in an unequal manner so as to be contrary to Art. IV, § 26, of the New Mexico Constitution. In addition, there is serious doubt as to the validity of the chapter in question when we consider the equal protection clause of Art. II, § 18, New Mexico Constitution. In any event, we are of the opinion that this particular chapter is unconstitutional and void. From what has been said, therefore, the alternative writ of mandamus will be made absolute and will be considered as effective with respect to the present members of the state highway commission as though they had been named in this cause. It is so ordered. SAMUEL Z. MONTOYA and GEO. L. REESE, Jr., District Judges, concur. COMPTON, C.J., and E.T. HENSLEY, Jr., District Judge, dissenting. CHAVEZ, MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., not participating. E.T. HENSLEY, Jr., District Judge (dissenting). The majority state that the issue to be determined is whether or not Chapter 310, Laws of 1959, violates Article IX, section 14, of the New Mexico Constitution. With that analysis I agree. The majority state that the city of Albuquerque for all practical purposes in this case must stand on the same footing as a private utility, or corporation. With that appraisal I agree. The majority opinion does not include the rule by which the statute in controversy *664 in this case must be measured. It is as follows: Article IX, section 14. This is a positive restriction. It builds with clear and simple words a barrier not to be broken. The language of Chief Justice Watson in State v. Henry, 37 N.M. 536, 25 P.2d 204, 208, 90 A.L.R. 805, although concerned with another section of our Constitution, should again be called to mind. It is as follows: The principle here involved is no different than it was in State ex rel. Mechem v. Hannah, 63 N.M. 110, 314 P.2d 714. The majority would distinguish the two cases with the statement that in State v. Hannah the police power was not considered. That does not constitute a distinction. It must be borne in mind that the legislature possesses no force, either through the exercise of the police power, or any other words of magic sufficient to dissolve the barrier of the constitutional limitation. Admittedly it is within the province of the legislature to exercise the police power of the state. When done, it is not a function of the court to question, approve or disapprove of the exercise if it is not void. On the other hand, if the exercise does violence to the constitution, it is the duty of the court to point out wherein the legislation is void. Whether or not the legislation is economically expedient, whether or not a super highway through a metropolitan center will promote national defense, whether or not the cost is to be borne by few or many, all these are considerations foreign to this forum in this case. Believing that the majority opinion sanctions a violation of Article IX, section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution, I dissent. COMPTON, C.J., concurs.