Title: Dan Fox et al. v. City of Huntsville

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 11/26/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1051276
____________________
Dan Fox et al.
v.
City of Huntsville
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court 
(CV-04-1398)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Dan Fox, Ken Guffey, Paul Jones, Phil Kramer, Charlie
Lifer, Randy Mearse, Coleman Sanders, Floyd Smith, and Danny
Vaughn, police officers for the City of Huntsville Police
Department ("the officers"), appeal from a denial of their
1051276
As a general rule, TTF officers use motorcycles to
1
perform their duties.
2
petition for a common-law writ of certiorari filed against the
City of Huntsville ("the City") in a payroll dispute.  We
reverse.
I. Facts and Procedural History
At the time of the events in question, the officers were
patrol-car police officers.  Beginning around January or
February 2002, the officers were regularly assigned traffic-
patrol duties, which included issuing a certain number of
traffic tickets and performing traffic-flow services for
funerals in the Huntsville area.  In April 2002, the officers
filed a grievance against the City asserting that they were
performing traffic task force ("TTF") duties without receiving
the mandatory five percent increase in pay that TTF officers
receive for performing their special duties.   
1
The chief of police for the City, Compton Owens,
responded to the grievance on April 23, 2002, with a written
denial, in which he explained that in his view the officers
were not entitled to the five percent pay increase because
"[e]nforcement of vehicle and traffic laws is a requirement
for all police officers without regard to where they are
1051276
3
assigned," whereas TTF officers receive extra pay because they
are deemed by Chief Owens to be in a "special assignment
capacity" under City of Huntsville Ordinance No. 97-216, §
8.7(A).  Section 8.7(A) provides, in pertinent part:
"Police Officers, while serving at the direction of
the Chief of Police in a special assignment capacity
to Criminal Investigation Division, Internal Affairs
Division, Special Response, Bomb Squad, or other
comparable assignment as determined by the Chief of
Police, shall receive a five (5) percent higher rate
of pay than the established rate of pay for the
employee(s) concerned."
(Emphasis added.)  
The officers appealed Chief Owens's decision to the
City's personnel committee ("the personnel committee"),
maintaining that, if they were going to be assigned traffic-
patrol duties at specified times, they should be considered to
be on special assignment and therefore were entitled to
receive the same rate of pay as TTF officers.  For its part,
the City contended that the officers' grievance constituted an
impermissible challenge to a validly adopted ordinance.
Section 14.1(B)(1) of the Personnel Policies and Procedures
Manual for the City ("the manual") provides that "[a]
grievance shall not be filed to," among other things, "contest
the validity of an adopted, approved ordinance or a properly
1051276
4
enacted resolution of the City Council."  City of Huntsville
Ordinance No. 94-375 (Personnel Policies and Procedures
Manual), § 14.1. 
The personnel committee heard arguments, testimony, and
accepted written evidence in the course of the grievance
proceeding.  On February 20, 2003, the personnel committee
issued its decision, stating, in pertinent part:
"The Personnel Committee unanimously concludes
there is sufficient evidence to support your
grievance.  Ordinance 97-216 states that Police
officers while serving at the direction of the Chief
of Police in a Special Assignment shall receive
Special Assignment Pay.  The Personnel Committee by
Ordinance 9[7]-216 does not have the authority to
grant you Special Assignment Pay, nor does the
Personnel Committee have the authority to grant you
any retroactive pay.  The Personnel Committee
recommends that the Chief of Police re-evaluate his
policy of Special Assignment Pay to the Traffic Task
Force to make sure it is equitable to those officers
who are performing Traffic Task Force Assignments or
duties."
On March 6, 2003, the officers appealed the decision of
the personnel committee to the Huntsville City Council ("the
city council"), contending that the personnel committee erred
in determining that it did not have the power to order the pay
increase for the officers.  The city council, pursuant to the
grievance procedures spelled out in the manual, reviewed all
1051276
5
the evidence from the personnel committee grievance hearing
and received some additional testimony.  The city council
issued its decision on December 11, 2003, stating, in
pertinent part:
"[T]he City Council, by majority vote on December 4,
2003, modified the decision of the Personnel
Committee.  The City Council determined that the
grievance contests the validity of an adopted,
approved ordinance or a properly enacted resolution
of the City Council.  Ordinance No. 97-216, upon
which your grievance is based, gives the Chief of
Police the authority and discretion to grant special
assignment pay under the circumstances complained of
in your grievance. Accordingly, Section 14.1(B)(1)
of the Person[nel] Policies and Procedures Manual,
as amended, bars your grievance."
There is no statute or ordinance specifying a method of
appealing an employment decision by the city council.
Accordingly, the officers sought review of the city council's
decision by filing a petition for a common-law writ of
certiorari in the Madison Circuit Court on June 8, 2004.  The
officers contended that the city council had impermissibly
substituted its judgment for that of the personnel committee
in ruling that their grievance was barred by § 14.1(B)(1) of
the manual.  Following the submission of briefs and two
hearings at which oral argument was presented, the circuit
court issued a written decision on April 20, 2006.  The
1051276
Counsel for both sides stipulated in the circuit court
2
that Chief Owens had accepted the recommendation of the
personnel committee by limiting TTF officers' pay to the same
rate as other police officers' pay.  
6
circuit court emphasized the limited nature of the review
available on a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari,
and it agreed with the officers that they were not challenging
the validity of Ordinance No. 97-216.  The circuit court
concluded, however, that the city council "'adopted' the
judgment of the personnel committee rather than substituting
its judgment for that entity."  Because "[t]he Personnel
Committee denied the petitioning officers' grievance and the
[City] Council affirmed the decision of the Personnel
Committee," the circuit court concluded that it lacked "the
statutory authority to quash the decision made by the City
Council."   The officers appeal from that decision.
2
II.  Standard of Review
"'Alabama law is clear that, in the absence of a right of
appeal, 
a 
party 
seeking 
review 
of 
a 
ruling 
by 
an
administrative agency may petition the circuit court for a
common law writ of certiorari.'"  Ex parte Boykins, 862 So. 2d
587, 593 (Ala. 2002) (quoting State Personnel Bd. v. State
Dep't of Mental Health & Retardation, 694 So. 2d 1367, 1371
1051276
7
(Ala. Civ. App. 1997)).  See also Hardy v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 634 So. 2d 574, 576 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (explaining
that "where an applicable statute provides no right of appeal
and no statutory certiorari review, the only means of review
is the common law writ of certiorari"). 
"'[T]he standard 
of 
review 
for 
certiorari 
limits
the scope of review to questions of law and does not
extend to review of the weight and preponderance of
the evidence.'  Parker v. Reaves, 531 So. 2d 853
(Ala. 1988).  Thus, 'if there is any legal evidence
to support the decision of the lower tribunal, such
is conclusive on the reviewing court.'  Lovelady v.
Lovelady, 281 Ala. 642, 206 So. 2d 886 (1968).  In
other words, the only question for the reviewing
court is 'whether the evidence will justify the
finding [of the lower tribunal] as a legitimate
inference from the facts proved regardless of
whether such inference would or would not have been
drawn by the appellate tribunal.'  Alabama Electric
Cooperative v. Alabama Power Co., 278 Ala. 123, 126,
176 So. 2d 483, 485 (1965)." 
Sanders v. City of Dothan, 642 So. 2d 437, 440 (Ala. 1994).
Furthermore, because the circuit court's review on a common-
law writ of certiorari was limited to the record before the
city council,  see, e.g., Sanders, 642 So. 2d at 440 n.4, this
Court reviews the circuit court's decision de novo.
III. Analysis
The officers contend that the circuit court erred in
ruling that the city council in effect "adopted" the ruling of
1051276
8
the personnel committee.  They argue that the city council in
fact substituted its own judgment for that of the personnel
committee, which the guidelines in the manual specifically
prohibit it from doing.  The City argues that those same
guidelines authorize the city council, by a majority vote, to
modify the decision of the personnel committee in whole or in
part, which, the City argues, is what the city council did.
Ultimately, according to the City, the result reached by the
city council was the same as that reached by the personnel
committee, so the city council "essentially affirmed the
decision of the Personnel Committee."  City's brief, p. 21. 
Section 14.2 of the manual provides the guidelines under
which the city council reviews an appeal from the personnel
committee:
"The [City] Council shall consider the record on
appeal and any supplemental testimony presented at
the hearing, together with the arguments of each
party made at the hearing, and may question the
parties concerning any relevant matter.  A majority
vote of those members elected to the City Council is
required in order to alter a decision of the
Personnel Committee.  If the City Council is unable,
by a majority of those members elected to the [City]
Council, to alter the decision of the Personnel
Committee, then the decision of the Personnel
Committee shall stand unmodified.  The [City]
Council shall render a decision within fourteen (14)
days after the hearing, either upholding the
1051276
9
[Personnel] Committee's decision or modifying it in
part or in full.  The [City] Council shall state the
reason(s) for any modification of the Personnel
Committee's 
decision 
and 
shall 
give 
specific
instructions, in writing, as to the steps to be
taken to carry out its decision.
"The Standard of Review before the City Council
shall be whether the record before the Personnel
Committee, as it may be supplemented before the
[City] Council, contains evidence supporting the
findings of the Personnel Committee.  Determination
of the weight and credibility of the evidence before
the Personnel Committee is for the [Personnel]
Committee, and not the [City] Council, to decide,
but the [City] Council may consider the weight and
credibility of testimony actually presented before
the [City] Council in rendering any decision on the
grievance.  The [City] Council may not substitute
its judgment for that of the Personnel Committee as
long as there is sufficient evidence in the record
or in supplemental form to support the Personnel
Committee's findings and decision."  
(Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the quoted portion of § 14.2 of the
manual that the city council does possess the authority to
amend, by a majority vote, in whole or in part the personnel
committee's decision.  It is also clear, however, that the
city council's ability to modify the personnel committee's
decision is limited by the standard of review imposed upon the
city council.  If sufficient evidence exists in the record to
support the finding of the personnel committee, then the city
1051276
10
council may not substitute its judgment for that of the
personnel committee as to that finding.
The personnel committee explicitly determined that the
officers presented sufficient evidence to support their
grievance that being assigned traffic-patrol duty at specified
times constituted "a special assignment" that should entitle
them to receive "special assignment pay."  The personnel
committee 
declined 
to 
award the salary-related relief
requested by the officers, however, because of its conclusion,
as a matter of law, that it had no authority to do so.  For
its part, the city council concluded that the officers'
grievance did not even fall within the types of grievances
allowed under § 14.1(B)(1) of the manual, citing the
prohibition in that section of grievances "to contest the
validity of an adopted, approved ordinance or a properly
enacted resolution of the City Council."  
In actuality, however, the officers were not challenging
the validity of § 8.7(A) of Ordinance No. 97-216, which
authorizes a five percent pay increase for any police officer
placed in a "special assignment capacity" by the chief of
police.  To the contrary, they were asking that the ordinance
1051276
11
be enforced to their benefit.  The officers contended that
being assigned to traffic-patrol duty at specified times when
it is not within the regular duties of a vehicle patrol
officer is akin to being on the TTF, a designated "special
assignment."
The circuit court concluded that even though the city
council had incorrectly categorized the officers' grievance as
a challenge to the validity of the ordinance, the court had no
authority to do anything other than affirm that decision
because, it reasoned, the city council had reached the same
result as had the personnel committee and therefore, in
effect, had "'adopted' the judgment of the personnel committee
rather than substituting its judgment for that entity."  The
circuit court erred in this reasoning.  Although the personnel
committee determined that there was sufficient evidence to
support 
the 
officers' 
grievance, 
the 
city 
council's
modification of the personnel committee's decision never even
addressed this issue and therefore did not implicate the
deferential standard of review found in § 14.2 of the manual.
(Nor did the city council address the other determination made
by the personnel committee, i.e., that it had no authority to
1051276
12
grant the officers' requested relief.)  Instead, the city
council determined that § 14.1(B)(1) of the manual barred the
officers' grievance altogether. 
In other words, although it is true that the city council
did not substitute its judgment for that of the personnel
committee on the issue whether the officers' presented
sufficient evidence to sustain their grievance, it is true
only because the city council did not reach this issue.  It
did not reach this issue because it mistakenly treated the
officers' grievance as an attempt to contest the validity of
an ordinance, which was not permitted as a matter of law,
rather than as an attempt to enforce the ordinance, which it
plainly was.
A common-law writ of certiorari is available to "correct
errors of law apparent on the face of the record. ...[T]he
only matter to be determined is the quashing, or affirmation,
of the proceedings brought up for review."  Jefferson County
v. Berkshire Dev. Corp., 277 Ala. 170, 173, 168 So. 2d 13, 16
(1964).  It was legal error for the city council to foreclose
any determination on the officers' grievance by categorizing
it as a challenge to the validity of an ordinance.  Once the
1051276
13
circuit court reached this conclusion, the proper course of
action was to grant the writ and quash the proceedings below
because the city council never made a determination about the
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
officers'
grievance.  
Accordingly, because the circuit court erroneously
affirmed the proceedings before the city council, we reverse
its judgment and remand the case with the instruction that
the circuit court grant the writ to allow the city council to
further consider the officers' grievance.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.