Title: Cynthia Hill, Appellant, vs. Ford Motor Company, Ken Hune, and Paul Edds, Respondents.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
Cynthia Hill, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No.  SC88981 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Ford Motor Company, Ken Hune, 
) 
And Paul Edds, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
Honorable David Lee Vincent III, Judge 
 
 
Cynthia Hill appeals the grant of summary judgment to Ford Motor Company and 
Paul Edds1 on her claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).2  She alleges 
that while working at a Ford assembly plant, she was subjected to sexual harassment by a 
supervisory level employee, Ken Hune, which created a hostile work environment.  She 
further alleges that she was suspended and directed to obtain psychiatric treatment in re-
taliation for rejecting Mr. Hune’s sexual harassment and in return for previously having 
filed an unrelated discrimination claim. 
                                             
 
1 The trial court’s grant of summary judgment was only as to Ford and Mr. Edds. 
2 The MHRA includes sections 213.010 to 213.137, RSMo 2000 and RSMo Supp 2008.  
All further statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2
 
This Court reverses the judgment and remands the case.  Factual questions exist as 
to the cause of Ford’s referral of Ms. Hill for psychiatric treatment and her suspension 
that preclude the grant of summary judgment on her hostile work environment claims of 
sexual harassment against Ford.  Similarly, fact issues exist that preclude summary 
judgment on her claim that the suspension and referral for psychiatric treatment 
constituted retaliation by Ford against her for complaining about Mr. Hune’s harassment 
and for filing her earlier claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”).  Both the claim for a hostile work environment and the claim for retaliation 
are governed by the MHRA, not by federal law.  See §§ 213.055 and 213.070; 
Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. banc 2007).  
 
The Court reverses the grant of summary judgment to Mr. Edds as well.  The 
MHRA permits suit to be brought against supervisory employees such as Mr. Edds, not 
just against the company itself, and the failure to make him a party at the administrative 
action before the EEOC or the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”) will 
bar suit against him only if it resulted in prejudice.  This Court therefore remands so that 
the trial court can consider whether such prejudice occurred.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Cynthia Hill worked as a production employee at Ford Motor Company’s 
assembly plant in Hazelwood.  In 2001, Ms. Hill filed a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC and the MCHR.  She received “right to sue” letters from both agencies in June 
2002.  Shortly thereafter, Ford removed Ms. Hill from her permanent position in Ford’s 
trim department (“trim”) and made her a “floater,” meaning she moved from job to job, 
 
3
as assigned, within that department.  She does not sue over the assignment as a floater. 3 
While working as a floater in trim, Ms. Hill worked with a variety of people, 
sometimes including a supervisor named Kenny Hune.  Mr. Hune had become a 
supervisor in trim in April 2002.  He frequently asked Ms. Hill for details about her 
panties and bra, such as whether she wore zebra prints, and if so, did that reflect her 
animal instincts, and made other sexual comments.  He asked Ms. Hill how much she 
weighed and said he could bench press her.  Ms. Hill let Mr. Hune know she was 
offended by and did not like the sexual comments he made.  Mr. Hune told Ms. Hill and 
another female employee that he wanted one on top and one on bottom and once told Ms. 
Hill he could use an hour of “h--d.”  Ms. Hill rejected these sexual advances.  In mid to 
late August, Mr. Hune asked Ms. Hill “what is it about me that you don’t like?”  Ms. Hill 
explained that she was not interested in him in any way except professionally. 
Ms. Hill and other female Ford employees spoke to their group leader, Pete Wade, 
about the problem with Mr. Hune’s inappropriate sexual comments.  Within one or two 
months after Mr. Hune became a supervisor in trim, Mr. Wade spoke with Mr. Hune’s 
own supervisor, superintendent Maurice Woods, and told him of Mr. Hune’s inappro-
priate, sexually harassing behavior.  Superintendent Woods said he would talk to Mr. 
Hune.   
In September 2002, Superintendent Woods told Ms. Hill to give him a list of  
                                             
 
3 These facts are set out in the light most favorable to Ms. Hill, because the Court is 
required to review the facts to see whether fact issues exist that preclude the grant of 
summary judgment.   ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 
854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). 
 
4
available permanent jobs within her medical restrictions, as he did not like having 
unassigned “floater” employees; he also said he then would decide which job she would 
fill. Ms. Hill identified three open positions, only one of which, the “cladding” job, would 
require her to work continuously under Mr. Hune’s direct supervision.4  Superintendent 
Woods nonetheless assigned her to the cladding position. Mr. Hune told Superintendent 
Woods that he did not want Ms. Hill working for him and that she would work there over 
his dead body.  Ms. Hill claims that the following day, September 5, 2002, when she 
showed up at Mr. Hune’s office to start her job in cladding, Mr. Hune slammed the door 
in her face and told her he was not going to let her have the job. 
While what happened next is disputed hotly by the parties, according to Ms. Hill, 
Mr. Hune became increasingly angry and came at her in an aggressive way.  As she 
backed away, she says, she pushed her safety glasses up on her head.  Mr. Hune then 
said, “Aha, you’re not wearing your glasses.  Go upstairs for not wearing your glasses” – 
a safety infraction.  Mr. Hune then called security and announced he had a “hostile 
worker.”  Security arrived and led Ms. Hill upstairs to the labor relations department. 
Once in labor relations, management employee Sheron Wright led a meeting with 
Ms. Hill and Mr. Hune and two union representatives to discuss what just had occurred.  
When Ms. Wright learned that Ms. Hill believed the incident arose out of Mr. Hune’s 
sexual harassment of her, the meeting was paused until Paul Edds, labor relations 
supervisor, could join them. Ms. Wright later denied this was why the meeting was 
                                             
 
4 Assembly production lines run throughout the plant. Various lines and sections of lines 
add different parts to each vehicle being assembled.  Cladding is one of those sections. 
 
5
paused, but admits Mr. Edds did attend. Ms. Hill says that as she told her story about Mr. 
Hune’s harassment of her, Mr. Edds interrupted and told her not to come back to work 
until she got psychiatric help.  Mr. Edds then instructed the employee assistance program 
coordinator to take Ms. Hill to the plant physician and set up a consultation.  The 
physician was not in, so no appointment was scheduled.   
 
During the September 5, 2002, meeting, Ms. Hill at first thought Mr. Edds meant 
that he understood she might need counseling to help her deal with the harassment, but 
later she realized that was not the case.  Therefore, she called Ford’s 24-hour “Hotline,” 
(established to receive reports of sexual harassment) on September 9, 2002, and reported 
that after she complained about being sexually harassed, she was told she was crazy, 
needed psychiatric help, and was sent home from work. 
 
An hour after Ms. Hill called the hotline, Mr. Edds called Ms. Hill at home and 
rescinded his order that she see a psychiatrist.  Mr. Edds then suspended Ms. Hill for 
three days for “disrespecting” her supervisor, including refusing to put on her safety 
glasses when instructed to do so.  At the time of or after Ms. Hill’s call to the hotline, 
another employee complained to Superintendent Wood about Mr. Hune’s sexual harass-
ment. Mr. Edds began an investigation of Mr. Hune and, eventually, fired Mr. Hune.  In 
that investigation, Mr. Edds did not ask interviewees about Mr. Hune’s conduct toward 
Ms. Hill, although he did ask about conduct toward the other employee who had 
complained about him. Mr. Edds never interviewed Ms. Hill while investigating Mr. 
Hune.  
 
 
 
6
Ms. Hill did not return to work immediately at the conclusion of her three-day 
suspension as her personal physician recommended that she take a medical leave from 
her job.  Ms. Hill returned from her medical leave December 1, 2002; Mr. Hune already 
had been terminated when she returned. 
In November 2002, Ms. Hill filed with the MCHR and EEOC her charges of 
discrimination against Ford, alleging unlawful discrimination in the form of sexual 
harassment resulting in a hostile work environment and retaliation in the form of 
suspension and mandatory referral for psychiatric help, based on her reporting of the 
above facts and on the fact that she previously had filed a claim with the EEOC and 
MCHR.  
Ms. Hill did not name Mr. Edds as a party in the formal charge filed with the 
MHRC and the EEOC.  No attempt at conciliation was undertaken at the administrative 
level by either the MHRC or the EEOC; both simply issued her a right to sue letter.  She 
then filed suit against Ford, Mr. Hune, and Mr. Edds.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The propriety of a grant of summary judgment is purely an issue of law which this 
Court reviews de novo.  ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 
854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of 
summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial 
court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially.  Id. This Court reviews 
the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. 
Id.  Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated, on the 
 
7
basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of 
law. Id.   Summary judgment seldom should be used in employment discrimination cases, 
because such cases are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences rather than 
on direct evidence.  Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818.  Summary judgment should not be 
granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the non-
movant.  Id. 
III. 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER THE MHRA  
A. The Missouri Human Rights Act, Not Federal Case Law, Provides the 
Framework for Analyzing Discrimination and Retaliation Claims.  
 
The parties disagree as to whether this Court should apply the MHRA as 
interpreted in Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818-19, or federal case law under Title VII as 
interpreted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), in 
determining the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.  While 
Missouri appellate courts are guided by both Missouri and federal law in deciding cases 
under the MHRA, the protections of the MHRA are not identical to those found in federal 
statutory schemes, such as Title VII, and, indeed, Missouri has adopted a different 
definition of “discrimination” that in some respects offers greater protection to workers 
than does federal law. See §§ 213.010.5 and 213.055. 
Defendants recognize that the law governing trial of Ms. Hill’s claim of sexual 
harassment is that set out in Daughtery, 231 S.W.3d at 818-20.  Daugherty rejected 
defendant’s argument in that case that the burden-shifting analysis that McDonnell 
Douglas requires be applied to Title VII cases to make out an indirect federal 
 
8
discrimination claim applies to claims of harassment under state law.  Rather, Daugherty 
teaches, the right to sue under Missouri law is quite naturally governed by the relevant 
Missouri statute, the MHRA.5  That statute: 
defines “discrimination” to include “any unfair treatment based on race, 
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to 
employment, disability, or familial status as it relates to housing.” Section 
213.010(5) (emphasis added). Nothing in this statutory language of the 
MHRA requires a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial or 
determining factor in an employment decision; if consideration of age, 
disability, or other protected characteristics contributed to the unfair 
treatment, that is sufficient. 
   
Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 819 (citation omitted). 
Separate from her claim of a hostile work environment, Ms. Hill asserts that Ford 
retaliated against her for reporting Mr. Hune’s harassment and because she previously 
had filed a claim with the EEOC and that this retaliation took the form of her referral for 
psychiatric treatment and her suspension.  Ford argues that claims for retaliation are and 
should be treated, under Missouri law, differently from other claims of discrimination.  
More specifically, Ford argues that even though this Court rejected the argument in 
Daugherty that federal law as interpreted in McDonnell Douglas should govern Missouri 
courts’ interpretation of a Missouri statute (the MHRA), this Court now should hold that 
federal rather than Missouri law governs claims of retaliation under section 213.070.  
See, e.g., Brannum v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 518 F.3d 542, 548 (8th Cir. 2008) 
                                             
 
5 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. 411 U.S. at 802.  If the employer 
meets this burden, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the 
 
9
(applying federal law). 
Defendant does not point to anything in the MHRA that would lead to this result, 
other than to note that retaliation claims are placed in a separate section from many other 
forms of discrimination claims barred under the MHRA.  Compare § 213.070 and § 
213.055.  While factually correct, defendant does not explain why a claim for retaliation 
brought under section 213.070 should be treated differently from a claim for 
discrimination brought under section 213.055.  In fact, section 213.070 describes 
retaliation as a form of discrimination, stating: 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: 
 
. . . . 
(2) To retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any other per-
son because such person has opposed any practice prohibited by this chap-
ter or because such person has filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing con-
ducted pursuant to this chapter;  
 
§ 213.070.2.  Retaliation for opposing discrimination or for filing a complaint constitutes 
discrimination under the MHRA and, like other forms of discrimination, is proved by 
showing the elements required by the MHRA, rather than by reference to cases such as 
McDonnell Douglas analyzing violations of federal law.  To the extent Missouri cases 
decided prior to Daugherty suggest to the contrary, they are not to be followed. 
B.  
Hostile Work Environment Claim. 
 
Ms. Hill’s first claim is for sexual harassment resulting in a hostile work 
environment.  It is governed by section 213.055, which, as relevant here, states in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by offering evidence demonstrating that the 
employer’s explanation is pretextual. 
 
10
subsection 1.1 that it shall be an unlawful employment practice: 
(1) 
for an employer, because of the race, color, religion, national origin, 
sex, ancestry, age or disability of any individual: 
 
(a) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, 
sex, ancestry, age or disability. 
 
A claim of violation of this section is submitted to the jury as follows:  
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: 
 
First, defendant (here insert the alleged discriminatory act, such as “failed 
to hire,” “discharged” or other act within the scope of Section 213.055, 
RSMo) plaintiff, and 
 
Second, (here insert one or more of the protected classifications supported 
by the evidence such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, 
age, or disability) was a contributing factor in such (here, repeat alleged 
discriminatory act, such as “failure to hire,” “discharge,” etc.), and 
 
Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damage. 
 
*[unless you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of 
Instruction Number (here insert number of affirmative defense instruction)]. 
 
MAI 31.24 (6th Ed. Supp. 2007).  Ford reluctantly recognizes that, under Daugherty, the 
law as set out in section 213.055.1(1)(a), rather than as set out in McDonnell Douglas, 
governs Ms. Hill’s hostile work environment claim. 
 
Ms. Hill claims that Mr. Hune sexually harassed her to such a degree that it 
created a “hostile work environment.”  “Sexual harassment creates a hostile work 
environment when sexual conduct either creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
work environment or has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
 
11
individual’s work performance.”  Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W.3d 675, 679 
(Mo. App. S. D. 2007) (citation omitted).  
To prevail on a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff 
must prove: (1) she (or he if the claim is brought by a male) is a member of a protected 
group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) her gender was a 
contributing factor in the harassment; and (4) a term, condition or privilege of her 
employment was affected by the harassment.6  
 
A plaintiff can meet the requirement of proving that the harassment affected a 
term or condition of her employment by showing that the harassment contributed to cause 
a “tangible employment action.”  Missouri regulations define a “tangible employment 
action” as a “significant change in employment status” and as “the means by which the 
supervisor brings official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.”  8 CSR 60-
3.040(17)(D)(3).  Such an action usually but not always involves direct economic harm. 
Id.  
Examples of tangible employment actions include but are not limited to: 
hiring and firing; promotion and failure to promote; demotion; undesirable 
reassignment; a decision causing a significant change in benefits; 
compensation decisions; and work assignments.7 
 
8 CSR 60-3.040(17)(D)(4). “No affirmative defense is available … when the 
                                             
 
6 “If the alleged harassers are co-workers, the plaintiff must also show that the employer 
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective 
remedial action.”  37 MOPRAC § 5:11.  See Barekman, 232 S.W.3d at 679.   
7 As amended in 2001, the MHRA “(a) expands the definition of “supervisor” to include 
employees other than the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, even if that employee is 
outside of the plaintiff’s direct chain of command; and (b) expands the definition of 
 
12
supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action.  Id. at                  
60-3.040(17)(D)(2). 
If the harassment did not result in a tangible employment action, then:  
an employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, 
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises 
two necessary elements: a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and b) that 
the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.  
 
Id. at 60-3.040(17)(D)(1).   
Here, Ford alleges that it was entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Hill’s hostile 
work environment claim because she failed to show that she suffered a tangible 
employment action in that her suspension did not result from Mr. Hune’s sexual 
misconduct; rather she was suspended for disrespect toward her supervisor, including 
failing to keep on her safety glasses, and that the referral for psychiatric treatment was 
based on her conduct at the plant and was later withdrawn. 
While a jury could believe Ford’s evidence in this regard, on summary judgment a 
court is required to resolve all factual issues in favor of the non-moving party – here, Ms. 
Hill.  She presented evidence that the suspension and the referral to a psychiatrist were in 
direct response to her refusal of Mr. Hune’s advances and that the other explanations 
offered by Ford are pretextual. 
Ms. Hill also presented evidence that she and others had complained to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
“tangible employment action” to potentially include changes in work assignments.”  37 
MOPRAC § 4.29.  (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
13
supervisors about Mr. Hune’s conduct weeks before the September incident related to her 
reassignment to cladding and, in fact, that incident occurred because of anger at her 
complaints. Yet, she asserts, management did nothing to discipline Mr. Hune until she 
called the hotline and reported to Ford corporate headquarters, shortly after she 
complained about the harassment and Mr. Hune said he would not let her work for him,  
Further, she alleges that Ford did not even contact her when it was investigating Mr. 
Hune’s conduct and that it fired him for other misconduct, not because of her complaints. 
A reasonable fact-finder could accept Ms. Hill’s evidence and conclude that her 
referral for psychiatric treatment and her suspension constituted tangible employment 
actions that were caused or contributed to by the sexual harassment. If the jury so finds, 
then Ford is not entitled to an affirmative defense that she did not timely complain or that 
it timely responded to her complaints. 
Even were Ford’s conduct insufficient to constitute tangible employment actions, 
however, Ford is not entitled to summary judgment based on its affirmative defense.  As 
noted, to establish that defense it must show that it exercised reasonable care to prevent 
and correct the sexually harassing behavior and that Ms. Hill unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities it offered. If Ms. Hill’s evidence is 
believed by the jury, however, it could find that she and other female Ford employees 
spoke to their group leader, Pete Wade, about the problem with Mr. Hune’s inappropriate 
sexual comments and that in May or June 2002, prior to her September 2002 suspension 
and referral for psychiatric treatment, Mr. Wade spoke with Mr. Hune’s own supervisor, 
Superintendent Maurice Woods, and told him of Mr. Hune’s inappropriate, sexually 
 
14
harassing behavior. 
Superintendent Woods said he would talk to Mr. Hune.  However, according to 
Ms. Hill, the conduct continued.  Ms. Hill presented evidence that after Superintendent 
Woods learned about Mr. Hune’s sexual harassment of Ms. Hill and other female 
employees, he nonetheless assigned Ms. Hill to the job in cladding, which Mr. Hune 
supervised.  Further, she presented evidence that even after her hotline call to Ford, 
Ford’s investigation of her claim was inadequate in that it failed to even interview her, 
and Ford apparently fired Mr. Hune for other misconduct uncovered in its investigation. 
This evidence, if believed, would be sufficient to defeat Ford’s affirmative defense. For 
all of these reasons, it was error to grant summary judgment on Ms. Hill’s claims of a 
hostile work environment.  
C. 
Retaliation Claim. 
Ms. Hill also alleges that her referral to a psychiatrist and her suspension were in 
retaliation for her complaints about Mr. Hune and for her 2001 filing of a different 
discrimination claim.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment was granted, Ms. Hill has adduced sufficient evidence 
that her rejection of and opposition to Mr. Hune’s sexual harassment was a contributing 
factor in her referral for psychiatric treatment and suspension. The undisputed evidence 
further shows that Ms. Hill filed a charge of discrimination in 2001 and that the deadline 
for her right to sue on that charge was imminent around the time Mr. Edds required her to 
obtain psychiatric treatment and suspended her. Ms. Hill presented evidence that she 
rejected sexual advances by Mr. Hune numerous times in the summer of 2002. 
 
15
Evidence presented by Ms. Hill showed that she was ordered to obtain psychiatric 
care on September 5, 2002, the very day she reported to Ms. Wright and Mr. Edds the 
sexually harassing behavior of Mr. Hune.  Her evidence showed that Mr. Edds responded 
to her reporting of Mr. Hune’s sexual harassing conduct by interrupting and cutting her 
off mid-complaint.  Mr. Edds claimed that Ms. Hill did not complain of Mr. Hune’s 
sexual harassment on September 5, 2002, and further claimed that he told her that she 
was suspended on September 5, 2002.  Ms. Hill presented evidence, however, that Mr. 
Edds suspended her only after she complained to corporate on the employee Hotline 
about Mr. Edds’ comment that she was crazy and his mandate that she obtain psychiatric 
treatment. 
Ms. Hill also presented evidence that when she initially reported Mr. Hune’s 
sexually harassing behavior to HR management employee Sheron Wright, Ms. Wright 
interrupted the meeting so that she could confer with Mr. Edds, but then later denied that 
Ms. Hill even had reported sexual harassment during that first meeting.  A jury could find 
Ms. Wright’s testimony was not credible because it is undisputed that she interrupted the 
meeting and got Mr. Edds to join them.  A jury also could believe that Mr. Edds’ hasty 
act of ordering Ms. Hill to obtain psychiatric treatment before she could finish reporting 
the harassment demonstrated that Ms. Hill’s complaint about Mr. Hune’s sexual 
harassment already had been conveyed to Mr. Edds by Ms. Wright.   
The record, which, again, must be viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Hill, 
establishes two plausible accounts of the essential facts.  The court, therefore, erred in 
granting summary judgment to Ford and Mr. Edds on Ms. Hill’s retaliation claim.   
 
16
 
D. Summary Judgment in Favor of Mr. Edds Precluded 
Mr. Edds argues that even if Ms. Hill is entitled to sue Ford, the MHRA does not 
permit her to assert additional claims against individual supervisors such as himself.  
However, the MHRA contains a broad definition of employer, stating that under MHRA:  
(7) ‘Employer’ includes … any person employing six or more persons 
within the state, and any person directly acting in the interest of an 
employer … 
 
§ 213.010.7.  As a number of decisions from Missouri’s court of appeals have noted, “We 
find that the plain and unambiguous language within the definition of ‘employer’ under 
the MHRA imposes individual liability in the event of discriminatory conduct.”  Cooper 
v. Albacore Holdings, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006); Brady v. 
Curators of University of Missouri, 213 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).  This 
Court agrees.  The statute is clear that the MHRA is intended to reach not just the 
corporate or public employer but any person acting directly in the interest of the 
employer.  A supervisory employee clearly falls into that category.  Id.  
Mr. Edds asserts that, in any event, Ms. Hill is precluded from suing him because 
she failed to name him in her EEOC or MHRA charge of discrimination, as she should 
have done under section 213.075.1.  Because there are no relevant Missouri cases as to 
the effect of failure to name a person in a charge who is later included in the civil lawsuit, 
the Court looks to federal law for guidance.  Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818. 
Federal cases construing a similar federal requirement have held that requiring an 
individual to be named in the charge in order to be included in the later civil suit serves 
 
17
two purposes: to give notice to the charged party and to provide an avenue for voluntary 
compliance without resort to litigation, such as through the EEOC’s conciliation process.  
Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3rd Cir. 1977); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).  If allowing suit would not be 
inconsistent with these purposes, then some federal cases have forgiven a failure to join 
the individual in the initial charge.  Id. 
 Glus holds that these requirements are met where there is a substantial identity of 
interest between the parties sued and those charged and states that whether a sufficient 
identity of interest exists requires consideration of numerous factors, including:  
1) whether the role of the unnamed party could through reasonable effort by 
the complainant be ascertained at the time of the filing of the EEOC 
complaint; 2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named are 
so similar as the unnamed party’s that for the purpose of obtaining 
voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include 
the unnamed party in the EEOC proceedings; 3) whether its absence from 
the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the 
unnamed party; 4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented 
to the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be 
through the named party. 
 
Glus, 562 F.2d at 888.  While Glus recognized the importance of conciliation as a means 
of possibly resolving matters without resorting to an already overburdened federal court 
system, it found that:  
equally important is the availability of complete redress of legitimate 
grievances without undue encumbrance by procedural requirements 
especially when demanding full and technical compliance would have no 
relation to the purposes for requiring those procedures in the first 
instance. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
18
 
Ms. Hill argues that Mr. Edds was not prejudiced by being absent from the 
administrative proceedings. She contends he may have had actual notice that Ms. Hill 
was complaining that his conduct violated the MHRA because he was a senior supervisor 
in human resources and Ford’s procedures for processing MHRA charges, ironically, 
dictated that those charges be directed to the position he occupied.  She also argues that, 
because there was no conciliation by the EEOC or MCHR, he was not deprived of 
participation in conciliation and, hence, suffered no prejudice by the failure to name him 
as a party in the charge.  It does not appear that the trial court considered any of these 
factors before granting summary judgment as to Mr. Edds.  On remand, the trial court 
should consider whether the factors permitting suit to proceed against Mr. Edds, despite 
failure to join him during the administrative portion of the process, are satisfied.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hill’s sexual 
harassment through a hostile work environment and retaliation claims.  The trial court’s 
judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
 
Price, Teitelman, Wolff and Breckenridge, JJ., 
and Hardwick and McGraw, Sp.JJ., concur. 
Russell and Fischer, JJ., not participating.