Title: Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 39297 
 
 
CITIZENS AGAINST RANGE 
EXPANSION, an unincorporated non-profit 
association; JEANNE J. HOM, a single 
woman, EUGENE and KATHLEEN RILEY, 
husband and wife, LAMBERT and DENISE 
RILEY, husband and wife, GABRIELLE 
GROTH-MARNAT, a single woman, 
GERALD PRICE, a single man, RONALD 
ELDRIDGE and DOROTHY ELDRIDGE, 
husband and wife, GLENN and LUCY 
CHAPIN, husband and wife, SHERYL 
PUCKETT, a single woman, CHARLES and 
CYNTHIA MURRAY, husband and wife, 
DAVE VIG a single man, 
 
       Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO FISH AND GAME DEPARTMENT, 
an agency of the STATE OF IDAHO, and 
VIRGIL MOORE, Director of the IDAHO 
FISH AND GAME DEPARTMENT, 
 
       Defendants-Appellants. 
______________________________________ 
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Coeur d’Alene, September 2012 
Term 
 
2012 Opinion No. 137 
 
Filed: November 15, 2012 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County.  Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
 
The post-judgment orders of the district court are reversed and the case is 
remanded. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellants. Kathleen E. 
Trever argued. 
 
Scott W. Reed, Coeur d’Alene, and Harvey Richman, Athol, for respondents. 
Harvey Richman argued. 
_____________________ 
 
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J. JONES, Justice. 
 
The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) appeals the district court’s post-judgment 
orders (1) refusing to lift a portion of an injunction and (2) declaring the Idaho Outdoor Sport 
Shooting Range Act unconstitutional. We reverse both orders and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Farragut Shooting Range, near Bayview, Idaho, has been owned and operated by 
IDFG since World War II. It sits on approximately 160 acres and is surrounded by a residential 
neighborhood, a public road, and hiking trails. Public use of the range has been expanding, from 
some 176 shooters in 2002, to at least 509 shooters in 2005.  
In 2004, IDFG made a public proposal to renovate the range, based on the “Vargas Master 
Plan,” authored by range design expert Clark Vargas. The plan was designed to improve access, 
noise control, and range management. Citizens Against Range Expansion (CARE), an 
unincorporated non-profit association comprised of individuals who reside near the range, 
contended that the plan would greatly increase range usage, and harm the community.  
CARE sued IDFG in 2005 for nuisance and other related causes of action regarding the 
range’s operation. CARE’s claims were grounded in both safety and noise concerns regarding the 
increased use of the range, and its proposed expansion. Among other relief, CARE sought to enjoin 
IDFG’s operation of the range. The case proceeded to a court trial in December of 2006 and in 
February of 2007 the court issued its memorandum decision wherein it determined that CARE was 
entitled to relief enjoining further operation of the Farragut Range until IDFG completed certain 
safety improvements.  
 
The court laid out two separate components for lifting the injunction. The first component 
was for up to 500 shooters per year (the 500-shooter component). This component provided that 
the Farragut Range would remain closed “to all persons with pistols, rifles and firearms using or 
intending to use live ammunition until a baffle is installed over every firing position.” The court’s 
judgment specified: 
[Each] baffle must be placed and be of sufficient size that the shooter, in any 
position (standing, kneeling, prone), cannot fire his or her weapon above the berm 
behind the target. Either the parties shall agree that the baffles have been adequately 
installed or that issue shall be submitted for view of the premises by the Court. . . . 
3 
 
[A]t such time as baffles are installed over every firing position and approved in the 
manner set forth, [IDFG] may operate the Farragut Shooting Range in the same 
manner in which it historically has (i.e., without any site supervision), for up to 500 
shooters per year. 
 
The second component of the injunction was for opening the Farragut Range to more than 500 
shooters per year (the 501-shooter component). This part of the judgment had two concerns―noise 
and safety. It stated: 
[U]se level shall not exceed 500 shooters per year until and unless [IDFG] has 
constructed and installed safety measures adequate to prevent bullet escapement 
beyond the boundaries owned and controlled by [IDFG] and constructed and 
installed noise abatement measures to reduce noise to a decibel level agreed upon 
by the parties in the first instance, or, if the parties are unable to agree, to be set by 
the Court following further evidence. 
 
Neither party appealed the judgment. Rather, IDFG began work on addressing the requirements of 
the injunction. Specifically, it constructed a partially contained 100-yard shooting range, in which 
it installed baffles “sufficient to prevent shooters from ‘directly’ firing above the berm behind the 
target from any of the 12 shooting positions (from prone to standing).” 
 
Although the district court discussed noise standards in its memorandum decision, it did 
not incorporate any standards in the judgment. During the following legislative session, the Idaho 
Legislature took action on this subject. In 2008, the Legislature enacted the Idaho Outdoor Sport 
Shooting Range Act. 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 322–33. The Act set a uniform noise standard for all 
state-owned, non-military, non-law enforcement outdoor shooting ranges. I.C. §§ 67-9101, 67-
9102. The statute provides that “[t]he noise emitted from a state outdoor sport shooting range shall 
not exceed an Leq(h) of sixty-four (64) dBA.” I.C. § 67-9102(3). Also in the 2008 session, the 
Legislature passed HB 604 to amend the laws affecting sport shooting ranges in general. 2008 
Idaho Sess. Laws 880–81. HB 604 makes references to, and incorporates standards from, the Act. 
I.C. §§ 55-2604, 55-2605. The effect of HB 604 and the Act is that all non-military outdoor 
shooting ranges are subjected to the Act’s noise standard. I.C. §§ 55-2604, 55-2605, 67-9101, 67-
9102. 
Upon completion of its range improvements, IDFG filed a Motion for Partial Lifting of 
Injunction (Relief Motion) for the 100-yard range. IDFG sought to lift both components of the 
injunction. CARE then moved for summary judgment, claiming that the Act was a special law in 
violation of art. III, § 19 of the Idaho Constitution, and a deprivation of judicial power in violation 
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of art. V, § 13.  
The district court issued summary judgment in favor of CARE on the constitutional 
issues in March of 2011. In its order, the court found that the Act was unconstitutional as a 
special law and a deprivation of judicial power. For this reason alone, it denied IDFG’s Relief 
Motion with regard to the 501-shooter component. The court found that there remained disputed 
issues of fact regarding range safety. Thus, the court set an evidentiary hearing on IDFG’s motion 
with regard to the 500-shooter component. 
On August 25, 2011, following the evidentiary hearing on safety issues, the district court 
denied IDFG’s Relief Motion with regard to the 500-shooter component. Despite finding that the 
“[t]he baffles at the 100-yard shooting area are sufficient to prevent shooters from ‘directly’ firing 
above the berm behind the target from any of the 12 shooting positions,” the court concluded that 
IDFG had still failed to comply with the requirements of the injunction. This was because, it found, 
the “baffles do nothing to contain ricochets that hit the floor of the range from escaping the range.” 
The court reasoned that the injunction was not just limited to direct fire, but included ricochets, and 
found that: 
[I]t does not violate I.R.C.P 65(d) to interpret the plain language and context of the 
Court’s 2007 Order condition for up to 500 shooters (the installation of a baffle 
over every shooting position to prevent a shooter from firing over the berm behind 
the target), to encompass shooters firing at, below, or in directions to the side of or 
away from the berm behind the target. Simply because IDFG has installed at least 
one baffle over all 12 designated shooting positions at the 100-yard shooting area, 
and such baffles are placed and of sufficient size that a shooter in any position 
(standing, kneeling, prone) cannot fire his or her weapon above the berm behind the 
target at the 100-yard shooting area does not mean IDFG has complied with the 
Court’s 2007 condition to lift its 2007 injunction for these 12 designated shooting 
positions, for up to 500 shooters per year . . . In 2007, this Court was concerned 
with bullets that went over the back berm. Whether by ricochet or direct fire, the 
problem is still bullets going over the back berm. 
 
In denying the motion, the district court went on to state that, although the 100-yard range at 
Farragut did not comply with the 2007 injunction, if IDFG “incorporated any of the simple and 
relatively inexpensive measures to attempt to contain ricochets,” such as “ground baffles in 
conjunction with overhead baffles . . . and an eyebrow berm or bullet catcher near the top of the 
back berm,” that then, “partial lifting should occur.” The court reiterated, however, that for the 
500-shooter standard, “complete containment” was not required. IDFG timely appealed to this 
Court. 
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II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
I. 
Did the district court err in concluding that IDFG has not complied with the 500-shooter 
component of the injunction? 
 
II. 
Is the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act an unconstitutional “special law” in 
violation of art. III, § 19 of the Idaho Constitution? 
 
III. 
Was the Legislature’s enactment of the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act a 
deprivation of judicial power in violation of art. V, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution? 
 
IV. 
Has IDFG complied with the 501-shooter component of the injunction? 
 
V. 
Is CARE entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal? 
 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standard of Review. 
 
When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, this Court exercises free review. Idaho 
Sch. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State (ISEEO IV), 140 Idaho 586, 590, 97 P.3d 453, 457 
(2004). To prevail, a challenger must show that the statute is “unconstitutional as a whole, without 
any valid application.” Id. This Court makes “every presumption [] in favor of the constitutionality 
of the statute, and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statutory provision rests 
upon the challenger.” Id.  
No prior Idaho case directly addresses the standard for reviewing a lower court’s 
interpretation of an injunction issued under IRCP 65(d). However, other courts have reviewed 
the interpretation of injunction orders issued under the Idaho rule’s federal analog—FRCP 
65(d)—and have reached conclusions that are instructive here. For an injunction issued under 
Rule 65(d), “[a] district court’s interpretation of its own order is generally reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.” Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2009). This is in keeping 
with the basic principle that a “district court’s interpretation of its own order is properly accorded 
deference on appeal when its interpretation is reasonable.” Cave v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1350, 
1354 (11th Cir. 1996). Other courts have gone further and found that “[g]reat deference is due 
the interpretation placed on the terms of an injunctive order by the court who issued and must 
enforce it.” Alabama Nursing Home Assʼn v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1980). Still, this 
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deference is constrained when “the order is too clear to permit any interpretation” contrary to the 
order’s plain meaning. DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 2006). 
In accord with these holdings, we will review a district court’s interpretation of its 
injunctive order with an abuse of discretion standard. In other words, we will give a district 
court’s reasonable interpretation of its own injunction deference on appeal, and uphold such an 
interpretation unless the record shows an abuse of discretion. 
B. The district court erred by refusing to lift the 500-shooter component of the 
injunction. 
 
Upon consideration of IDFG’s Relief Motion, the district court concluded that IDFG had 
not complied with the requirements of the 500-shooter component of the injunction. Its reasoning 
was that because “[the range] as presently in place will not contain rounds that ricochet over the 
back berm,” the plain terms of the injunction had not been satisfied. The court predicted that if 
IDFG made further improvements that incorporated ground baffles in conjunction with overhead 
baffles, plus an eyebrow berm or a bullet catcher, then “partial lifting [of the injunction] should 
occur.” 
IDFG claims on appeal that its improvements complied with the plain terms specified in 
the judgment, and therefore the first component of the injunction should be lifted to allow up to 
500 shooters per year at Farragut. It further argues that the injunction says nothing about 
ricochets, and therefore the district court abused its discretion by making ricochets an issue. 
IDFG also contends that overheard baffles, eyebrow berms, and bullet catchers are not required 
by the 501-shooter component of the injunction, and therefore it is unreasonable for the district 
court to read such a requirement into the less stringent 500-shooter component. 
CARE argues in response that this Court should defer to the district court’s interpretation 
of the injunction, and agrees with the district court that the injunction is “all-inclusive.” It 
contends in its briefing that the injunction language barring downrange fire above the back berm 
implicitly includes “ANY and EVERY round fired from the firing line,” which would include 
ricochets. 
Idaho’s Rules of Civil Procedure govern a court’s ability to issue an injunction. I.R.C.P. 
65. The scope of an order for an injunction is constrained by Rule 65(d), which states that 
“[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its 
issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to 
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the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . .” I.R.C.P. 65(d). 
Courts construing this Rule’s federal counterpart have explained that its purpose is to prevent the 
issuance “of an order so vague that an enjoined party may unwittingly and unintentionally 
transcend its bounds,” and that “[t]hus, Rule 65(d) ‘is satisfied only if the enjoined party can 
ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden’ or required.” 
Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, “[i]n determining whether a 
particular act falls within the scope of an injunction’s prohibition, particular emphasis must be 
given to the express terms of the order. An injunction does not prohibit those acts that are not 
within its terms as reasonably construed.” Alabama Nursing Home Ass’n, 617 F.2d at 388. 
Here, the district court’s interpretation of the 500-shooter component of its injunction 
was an abuse of discretion because it took its original, and unambiguous, 500-shooter 
requirement—installing “a baffle . . . over every firing position”—and expanded it into a 
requirement for “ground baffles in conjunction with overhead baffles . . . and an eyebrow berm 
or bullet catcher near the top of the back berm.” This interpretation does not follow from the 
plain language of the injunction because the judgment never referred to these other devices. 
Moreover, preventing bullet escapement via ricochet—the stated rationale for requiring these 
additional improvements—was similarly absent from the judgment. Although a district court is 
given deference in its interpretation of its own order, that deference cannot extend so far as to 
allow interpretation to become revision. Asking IDFG to now comply with requirements that the 
judgment never contained, to achieve objectives that the court never specified, is a far cry from 
the requirement that “the enjoined party can ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely 
what acts are forbidden.” Indeed, even now IDFG cannot be certain that complying with the 
attempted revision of the injunction language will ultimately be sufficient to lift it, because the 
district court stated that new baffles, eyebrow berms, and bullet catchers “should” result in a 
partially lifted injunction—but it gave no guarantees.  
Perhaps the most baffling conclusion reached by the district court is contained in the 
following statement:  
Simply because IDFG has installed at least one baffle over all 12 designated 
shooting positions at the 100-yard shooting area, and such baffles are placed and 
of sufficient size that a shooter in any position (standing, kneeling, prone) cannot 
fire his or her weapon above the berm behind the target at the 100-yard shooting 
area does not mean IDFG has complied with the Court’s 2007 condition to lift its 
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2007 injunction for these 12 designated shooting positions, for up to 500 shooters 
per year. 
 
When the factual substance of this statement is compared with the express terms of the 500-
shooter component of the injunction―that a baffle be installed over every firing position, to be 
“placed and be of sufficient size that the shooter, in any position (standing, kneeling, prone), 
cannot fire his or her weapon above the berm behind the target”―it is obvious that IDFG has 
complied. The district court’s explanation of what IDFG has done, and the text of the injunction, 
are identical. Consequently, the court’s statement essentially says that, “[s]imply because [IDFG 
has complied with the express terms of the injunction,] does not mean that IDFG has complied 
with the Court’s 2007 condition to lift its injunction.” Reading the plain language of the 
injunction to reach this unsupportable conclusion was clearly an abuse of the district court’s 
discretion, requiring reversal. Accordingly, we lift the injunction to allow IDFG to open the 
Farragut Range for up to 500 shooters per year. 
C. The Act is a constitutional general law, and not a special law. 
The district court granted summary judgment to CARE on the 501-shooter component 
based solely on its conclusion that the Act was unconstitutional. It concluded that the Act was a 
special law violative of art. III, § 19 the Idaho Constitution and a deprivation of judicial power in 
violation of art. V, § 13. The court’s conclusion that the Act was a special law is based on 
findings that: 1) the Act does not apply to all outdoor shooting ranges in like situations; 2) the 
legislative history showed that the Act has a single, illegitimate purpose—to benefit IDFG in this 
litigation; and 3) the Legislature passed the Act in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable 
manner. Because the district court determined that the Act was a special law that limited “civil 
and criminal actions,” it held that it was unconstitutional, and an improper basis for lifting the 
501-shooter component of the injunction. 
On appeal, IDFG argues that the Act is a general law, and not a special law. It first 
contends that the Act must be considered in tandem with HB 604. IDFG’s position is that the Act 
and HB 604, when taken together, apply a statewide noise standard to all non-military outdoor 
shooting ranges; thus, the Act functions as a general law. Alternatively, IDFG argues that the Act 
is a general law, even if HB 604 is not considered, because all state-owned shooting ranges 
within the Act’s scope are subject to it. IDFG further argues that the Act is not a special law 
because it was not enacted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner. Finally, IDFG 
9 
 
contends that even if the Act is a special law, it is not one of the prohibited types of special laws 
enumerated in art. III, § 19, and is therefore constitutional. 
In response, CARE argues that the Act is a special law because it applies only to four state-
owned shooting ranges in Idaho, and “three of [these] are so isolated that noise levels have no 
meaning.”1 Based on this, and pertinent legislative history, CARE contends that the Act was truly 
designed to affect only the Farragut Range, and this lawsuit. 
General laws are those laws that “apply to all persons and subject matters in a like 
situation,” and they are constitutional for the purposes of Article III, § 19 of the Idaho 
Constitution.  Arel v. T & L Enter., Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 35, 189 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2008); see also 
ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 591, 97 P.3d at 458; Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 140 Idaho 536, 
546, 96 P.3d 637, 647 (2004); Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 876–77, 555 P.2d 399, 
416–17 (1976). On the other hand, § 19 provides that “[t]he legislature shall not pass local or 
special laws” if those laws are enacted, among other things, “[f]or limitation of civil or criminal 
actions.” IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 19. This provision is modeled after similar state constitutional 
prohibitions aimed at “prevent[ing] legislation bestowing favors on preferred groups or 
localities.” Jones, 97 Idaho at 876, 555 P.2d at 416. 
This Court has clearly set forth three characteristics of special laws. First, “[a] special law 
applies only to an individual or number of individuals out of a single class similarly situated and 
affected or to a special locality.” ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 591, 97 P.3d at 458. It is important to 
note that “[a] law is not special simply because it may have only a local application or apply only 
to a special class if, in fact, it does apply to all such cases and all similar localities and to all 
belonging to the specified class to which the law is made applicable.” Id. Second, we have found 
that when the Legislature pursues a “legitimate interest in protecting citizens of the state” in 
enacting a law, then it is not special. Id. Lastly, courts must determine “whether the [statute’s] 
classification is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.” Arel, 146 Idaho at 35, 189 P.3d at 1155. If 
a law’s classification is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, it is a special law. Id. In assessing 
the legitimacy of a particular law, as well as whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, 
this Court has on occasion examined not just the law itself, but its legislative history. Kirkland v. 
Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 470, 4 P.3d 1115, 1121 (2000). 
                                                 
1 The other three ranges referred to are the Black’s Creek Range, the Garden Valley Range, and the George Nourse 
Range.  
10 
 
The Act is a general law because it applies to all shooting ranges in like situations. This is 
true whether the Act is considered in conjunction with HB 604, or in isolation. IDFG urges that 
this Court analyze the Act along with HB 604, and that when “taken together, these two laws 
subject all current and future outdoor shooting ranges” in Idaho to the same noise standard. 
Idaho’s case law supports this kind of analysis. For example, in Moon, a “sole [statutory] 
provision” was alleged to be an unconstitutional special law. Moon, 140 Idaho at 547, 96 P.3d at 
648. We did not look to that provision in isolation, but rather, at how the provision would 
function within the entire statutory scheme created by the bill at issue. Id. Because the Act and 
HB 604 deal with the same subject matter, make internal references to one another, and were 
passed within seventeen days of one another, logically, that same principle from Moon could be 
applied here. Taken together, the Act and HB 604 certainly apply equally to shooting ranges in 
like situations—their combined effect is that the same noise standard applies to all non-military 
outdoor shooting ranges. See I.C. §§ 55-2605, 67-9102. Because the noise standard set forth in 
the Act and HB 604 would apply equally to all similarly situated outdoor ranges, the Act is a 
general law. 
However, even if we did not consider the combined effect of the Act and HB 604, and 
looked solely to the Act, it would still be a general law. This is because the Act and its noise 
standard applies equally to all non-law enforcement, non-military, state-owned shooting ranges. 
I.C. §§ 67-9101(3), 67-9102(2). 
While CARE concedes that the Act is indeed “directed at all state owned shooting ranges,” 
it argues that the Act is not general because it affects only four ranges, “three of which are so 
isolated that noise levels have no meaning and two of which are entirely upon open land devoid 
of any habitation within gun range.” But this is immaterial. “A law is not special simply because 
it may have only a local application or apply only to a special class if, in fact, it does apply to all 
such cases and all similar localities and to all belonging to the specified class to which the law is 
made applicable.” ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 591, 97 P.3d at 458. Here, the Act’s noise standard is 
applicable to the specified class of state-owned shooting ranges, and it applies equally to all 
ranges within that class. The fact that there may be a small number of such ranges in existence, or 
that some of those ranges happen to be in less populated areas, does not mean that the noise 
standard applies any less forcefully across the board. Simply put, the exact same noise standard 
applies to the Farragut Range, as to the Black’s Creek Range, as to the Garden Valley Range, as 
11 
 
to the George Nourse Range. Not only that, but the Act will also affect any future state-owned 
shooting ranges within its scope. Because the Act applies equally to all state-owned shooting 
ranges in like situations, it meets the definition of general legislation. 
The Act not only meets the standard for general laws, but it has none of the hallmarks of 
special laws. First, the Act does not disproportionately affect one member of a similarly situated 
class—it applies equally to all state-owned shooting ranges meeting its criteria. Second, the Act 
does not have an illegitimate purpose. CARE disagreed, as did the district court, which found it 
“difficult to see what ‘legitimate interest in protecting the citizens of the state’ is accomplished by 
[the Act].” But the district court’s own factual findings undercut this—it admitted that 
“[c]ertainly there is a noise standard being established, and that protects citizens, but the real 
focus of the Act is to immunize the ‘state.’” Though the noise standard does not truly 
“immunize” the State—at most, it could make compliance with one component of the injunction 
easier—the crucial finding is that the noise standard protects citizens. This Court simply looks to 
whether a statute has a legitimate purpose, and a state protecting its citizens with a noise standard 
is unquestionably that. Finally, the Act is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The district 
court found that it was, because the Legislature “a) did not ask for any scientific information, b) 
accepted information [that] is incomplete and at times false, and c) either failed to realize (best 
case) or ignored the fact (worst case) that what they were being asked to do was in direct 
response to litigation.” Even if these findings were correct, they would provide no basis for 
declaring the Act to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. There is no requirement that the 
Legislature ask for or utilize scientific information in carrying out its legislative duties. Nor is it 
banned from accepting information that is not complete or totally accurate. Nor must it refrain 
from carrying out its constitutional duties when decisions of this or other courts in the State 
indicate a potential need for remedial legislative action. If we were to accept the district court’s 
findings as grounds for holding legislative acts to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, a wide 
range of legislative acts would likely be in jeopardy. There is simply no indication in the record 
that the Legislature’s decision-making was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  
In arguing that the Act was an unconstitutional special law, CARE emphasized the 
legislative history of the Act. Its contention is that the “legislative record here . . . is explicitly 
aimed” at Farragut alone, and that the Act was not meant to apply at any other range. The district 
court agreed, and quoted from the legislative history at length. While the Act’s legislative history 
12 
 
does contain specific references to Farragut and to this litigation, this does not affect its 
constitutionality, for two reasons. First, though this Court has examined legislative history in 
assessing whether a law is legitimate, or whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, it has 
not done so when determining to whom or what a law applies. This was the case in ISEEO IV, 
where we found that “the language of the bill plainly states that it is meant to specifically apply” 
to the ISEEO IV litigation. ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 592, 97 P.3d at 459. Our sole concern there 
was the statute’s text, and not its legislative history. And the language of the statute there was 
“aimed at essentially disbanding the ISEEO case and restructuring it in a manner that destroys the 
Plaintiffs’ cause of action against the Legislature.” Id. Here, the Act itself makes no mention of 
Farragut, nor does it attempt to “destroy” CARE’s cause of action; it just applies a noise standard 
to a certain type of state-owned shooting range, of which there are several, and of which the 
Farragut Range is one. And, even if the Act was meant to apply just to this one facility, that 
would not make it a special law. To follow CARE’s line of reasoning, the Legislature would 
never be able to set safety standards for a one-of-a-kind State facility without running afoul of art. 
III, § 19. That would perhaps bode ill for limiting the level of noise in the State Capitol.  
But beyond this, even if the Act’s legislative history should be considered, the district court 
made no serious effort to meet its burden of making “every presumption [] in favor of the 
constitutionality of the statute” while doing so. To the contrary, while quoting legislative history, 
the district court emphasized references to Farragut while quoting legislative history, and 
minimized references to other shooting ranges statewide.2 Presuming the Act is constitutional 
                                                 
2 For example, the district court quoted the House Resources and Conservation Committee like so: 
 
The last item of business on the agenda was HB 515. Rep. Eskridge presented this bill which 
creates a new section in Idaho Code to provide for the operation and use of State outdoor shooting 
ranges. Rep. Eskridge explained that this bill also helps deal with the the litigation issue at 
Farragut State Park and will help protect the State against similar litigation in the future.  
*** 
Sharon Kiefer, representing [IDFG] stood to testify in favor of HB515. She reviewed the merits of 
this bill and related that [IDFG] has worked closely with the Attorney General’s Office to 
address noise related issues raised in litigation at Farragut State Park and future concerns at 
other ranges. 
 
 (Emphasis in original.) The district court’s use of boldface portrays the Act as being targeted at Farragut. But 
making every presumption of constitutionality—that is, as to the Act’s general character—leads to completely 
different emphases: 
 
The last item of business on the agenda was HB 515. Rep. Eskridge presented this bill which 
creates a new section in Idaho Code to provide for the operation and use of State outdoor 
13 
 
would require at least a neutral reading of its legislative history, which indeed refers to more 
ranges than just Farragut, and more circumstances than just this litigation. Thus, even if the Act’s 
legislative record was a proper area for this Court’s consideration on appeal, that record, fairly 
considered, does not show that the Act is aimed at Farragut and Farragut only; therefore, the 
legislative history only reinforces the Act’s general, and not special, character. 
Based on the above, we reverse the district court’s finding that the Act was a special law 
that violated art. III, § 19 of the Idaho Constitution. 
D. The Act is not an unconstitutional deprivation of judicial power. 
The other constitutional issue before this Court is whether the Act violates art. V, § 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution by depriving the judicial branch of its power. The district court held that 
the Act did so. The court’s rationale was that the Legislature had attempted to “legislate itself” 
out of this case by passing the Act, and that based on precedent from ISEEO IV, the Act was 
unconstitutional. The district court further found that the Act was “simply not a valid exercise of 
the State’s police power,” because the Act’s focus was not to protect public health, but to 
“insulate [IDFG] from liability.” 
IDFG argues that the Act is not a deprivation of judicial power, as the Legislature’s police 
powers give it the authority to set noise standards for state-owned property, and that it is not an 
attempt to “regulate the courts in the exercise of their powers.” IDFG further contends that an 
injunction is subject to “changes in law or circumstance,” such as the Act’s noise standards, and 
such a change is not a Legislative deprivation of judicial power. CARE’s responds that “[the Act 
is] ‘. . . a special enactment designed only to affect one particular lawsuit . . .’ in violation of 
separation of powers,” and thus violative of art. V, § 13. 
Article V, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that, “[t]he legislature shall have no power 
to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a 
coordinate department of the government.” This Court most recently addressed legislative 
deprivation of power in ISEEO IV. There, an association of school superintendents and parents 
                                                                                                                                                             
shooting ranges. Rep. Eskridge explained that this bill also helps deal with the the litigation issue 
at Farragut State Park and will help protect the State against similar litigation in the future.  
*** 
Sharon Kiefer, representing [IDFG] stood to testify in favor of HB515. She reviewed the merits of 
this bill and related that [IDFG] has worked closely with the Attorney General’s Office to address 
noise related issues raised in litigation at Farragut State Park and future concerns at other 
ranges. 
14 
 
brought suit against the State for not providing proper funding to Idaho public schools.  ISEEO IV, 
140 Idaho at 588, 97 P.3d at 455. The Legislature passed HB 403 as part of an effort to end that 
litigation. Id. at 589, 97 P.3d at 456. Among other things, HB 403 provided that the plaintiffs 
would have to sue school districts where underfunded, and thus unsafe, school buildings were 
located; that the venues for the suits would be changed to where those districts were found; and 
that, if the ISEEO IV plaintiffs did not refile their suits to comply with these procedures, their cases 
would be dismissed. Id. at 589–90, 97 P.3d at 456–57. This Court found that HB 403 was a 
deprivation of judicial power because it “directly contradict[ed] Idaho court procedure and 
effectively dismisse[d] parties to a pending lawsuit without any court action.” Id. at 593, 97 P.3d at 
460. HB 403 also altered the typical procedures by which courts could issue a stay of 
proceedings—another legislative attempt to “make decisions regarding this litigation that only the 
district court [could] make.” Id. After questioning “whether the Legislature itself can say when a 
law altering procedural rules is necessary,” and after weighing the State’s interests in the suit, the 
ISEEO IV Court concluded: 
The State is attempting to end legislatively the ISEEO suit and effectively remove 
itself from any further responsibility or liability. Such a motive may be a necessity 
as viewed by the Legislature but, given the claims made by the school districts, it is 
not sufficiently necessary so as to justify rewriting the Court’s rules of procedure. 
 
Id. We held that because “there [was] no necessity . . . meriting the legislature’s attempt to legislate 
itself out of this lawsuit by rewriting the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,” HB 403 was an 
unconstitutional deprivation of judicial power. Id. 
 
Just as courts have certain inherent powers that may not be infringed upon, so does the 
Legislature. It may, “under the broad concept of police power . . . enact laws concerning the health, 
safety and welfare of the people so long as the regulations are not arbitrary or unreasonable.” Van 
Orden v. State, 102 Idaho 663, 667, 637 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1981). We find that a noise standard is a 
clear example of a law concerning the health and welfare of citizens. Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that “[c]ontrol of noise is of course deep-seated in the police power of the 
States.” City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638, 93 S. Ct. 1854, 1862 
(1973); see also 122 A.L.R. 5th 593 § 2[a] (2004) (“A municipality or state has the authority 
pursuant to its police powers to protect its citizens from unwelcome noise or sounds.”). While 
“[t]here are . . . limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go,” generally speaking, “every 
possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute.” Ex parte Crane, 27 
15 
 
Idaho 671, 682, 151 P. 1006, 1009 (1915).  
 
The enactment of the Act and its noise standard was not a legislative deprivation of judicial 
power; rather, it was a valid use of the Legislature’s police power. Unlike the ISEEO IV case, the 
Act had zero effect, directly or indirectly, on the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other 
traditional province of the courts. Further, while the statute in ISEEO IV deprived judicial power 
by directly affecting the litigation at issue there, the Act does not have such an effect. The Act itself 
does not even refer to the Farragut Range or this litigation. And though the Act’s legislative history 
does refer to Farragut and to this case, that history is peppered with similar references to other 
cases, and other ranges. Moreover, unlike the law in ISEEO IV,  the Act does not dismiss IDFG 
from this case, or disrupt or effectively end this litigation in IDFG’s favor, or stage an attempt to 
“effectively remove [the State] from any responsibility or liability.” To the contrary, establishing a 
noise standard here—at any decibel level—would not end this litigation. This is because, as the 
district court noted, “noise . . . [is] not a factor” for lifting the 500-shooter component of the 
injunction. And, though noise is a factor of the 501-shooter component, it would take more than 
IDFG’s compliance with regard to noise to lift that part of the injunction; per the terms of the 501-
shooter component, IDFG would still need to address safety concerns. Put simply, although the Act 
does, at most, potentially make compliance with part of the injunction easier, it does not by itself 
lift the injunction, or “legislatively remove” IDFG from this lawsuit, or end IDFG’s responsibility 
in this matter. Thus, the Act does not rise to the level of an ISEEO IV-like interference with the 
judiciary, and does not violate art. V, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. We reverse the district court’s 
holding to the contrary.  
E. The case must be remanded to the district court to determine IDFG’s compliance 
with both the safety and noise requirements of the 501-shooter standard. 
 
The district court denied IDFG’s motion to lift the injunction with regard to the 501-shooter 
component, “due solely to the finding that the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act is 
unconstitutional, due to failure to address noise considerations alone.” Therefore, the district court 
did not consider the safety and noise issues argued by the parties. The case must be remanded to 
the district court for consideration of those issues in conjunction with IDFG’s Relief Motion for the 
501-shooter component. In considering the noise aspect, the district court must apply the noise 
standards established in the Act.  
 
16 
 
F. CARE is not entitled to attorney’s fees. 
CARE argues that it is entitled to attorney’s fees under I.C. § 12-117, which allows for 
attorney’s fees for the prevailing party on appeal “in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
state agency or a political subdivision and a person,” so long as “the nonprevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” Here, because IDFG has prevailed on appeal, CARE is 
not awarded attorney’s fees.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we: 1) reverse the district court’s order holding that IDFG has 
not complied with the 500-shooter component of the injunction; 2) conclude as a matter of law 
that IDFG has complied with the 500-shooter component, and lift that component of the 
injunction; 3) reverse the district court’s order holding the Act to be unconstitutional; 4) remand 
this case to the district court to determine whether IDFG has complied with the 501-shooter 
component of the injunction. IDFG is awarded its costs on appeal. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES, and HORTON 
CONCUR.