Title: Commonwealth v. Zucchino

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13384 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRADLEY ZUCCHINO. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 6, 2023. – April 1, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence, Homicide.  
Evidence, Blood alcohol test.  Practice, Criminal, Motion 
to suppress.  Consent.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 10, 2020. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Salim 
Rodriguez Tabit, J., and a question of law was reported by him 
to the Appeals Court. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Murat Erkan (Eric Burdette also present) for the defendant. 
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the  
Commonwealth. 
 
Barbara A. Smith & George G. Brell, of Missouri, & Matthew 
J. Stanford, of Arizona, for Mothers Against Drunk Driving, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The defendant, Bradley Zucchino, was charged 
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
2 
 
alcohol causing serious bodily injury and death.   The defendant 
contends that pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) 
(§ 24 [1] [e]), evidence of his blood alcohol content (BAC) at 
the time of the accident is inadmissible at trial because, 
although his blood was drawn in the course of treatment, the BAC 
analysis was conducted without his consent.  As discussed infra, 
the defendant's reading of § 24 (1) (e) is too broad.1   
1.  Facts and prior proceedings.  We summarize the relevant 
facts from the pleadings, which are undisputed for the purposes 
of the instant appeal.  On the evening of January 12, 2020, 
police responded to the scene of a two-car accident.  In one 
car, first responders located Yahaira Colon, the driver, and her 
front seat passenger, Jessica Mercado.  The other car was empty 
when police arrived, its airbags deployed.  The responding 
officer observed the defendant sitting outside of the car with a 
bloody nose.  A firefighter at the scene noted that the 
defendant smelled of alcohol.  The defendant told police he was 
heading home from a bar and initially claimed a friend had been 
driving.  The defendant later told emergency responders that he 
was the one driving.  All three individuals were transported to 
the hospital, where Colon was pronounced deceased.   
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving.   
3 
 
At the hospital, the defendant's blood was drawn in the 
ordinary course of treatment.  The next day, law enforcement 
applied for, obtained, and executed a search warrant to collect 
the defendant's blood samples to perform a BAC test.  A chemist 
determined that the defendant's BAC on the night of the accident 
was between .322 and .326 percent.2  The defendant was arraigned 
in the Superior Court and was later indicted for, as relevant 
here, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol causing serious bodily injury (OUI-SBI) pursuant to 
G. L. c. 90, § 24L (1),3 and manslaughter by means of operating 
while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13 1/2.4  
 
2 A blood alcohol content of .08 percent or above is over 
the legal limit.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); G. L. 
c. 90, § 24L (1). 
 
3 General Laws c. 90, § 24L (1), provides in part:   
 
"Whoever . . . operates a motor vehicle with a percentage, 
by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one-
hundredths or greater, or while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, or marihuana, narcotic drugs, 
depressants, or stimulant substances, all as defined in 
[G. L. c. 94C, § 1,], . . . and so operates a motor vehicle 
recklessly or negligently so that the lives or safety of 
the public might be endangered, and by any such operation 
so described causes serious bodily injury, shall be 
punished . . . ."   
 
4 General Laws c. 265, § 13 1/2, provides in part:  "Whoever 
commits manslaughter while operating a motor vehicle in 
violation of [G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a), or G. L. c. 90B, § 8A], 
shall be punished . . . ."   
4 
 
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the BAC results 
pursuant to § 24 (1) (e), contending that because he did not 
give his consent to have his blood tested, his BAC results were 
not admissible at trial.  The judge denied the defendant's 
motion but reported the following question to the Appeals Court:  
"Is the Commonwealth required to seek a defendant's consent in 
order to admit his blood testing results in the prosecution of a 
G. L. c. 90, § 24L [OUI-SBI] offense?"  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004).  This court granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review, and we now 
affirm the denial of his motion to suppress.   
2.  Discussion.  "[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the 
first instance, be sought in language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the 
courts is to enforce it according to its terms."  Commonwealth 
v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 557 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Boe, 456 Mass. 337, 347 (2010).  See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 
475 Mass. 820, 821 (2016) ("Clear and unambiguous language is 
conclusive as to legislative intent" [citation omitted]).   
Section 24 (1) (e) provides in pertinent part: 
"In any prosecution for a violation of paragraph (a), 
evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the 
defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense, . . . 
shall be admissible . . . provided, however, that . . . 
such test or analysis . . . was made with the consent of 
the defendant . . . ." 
 
5 
 
Paragraph (a) refers to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (§ 24 [1] 
[a]), which punishes operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI).5  Thus, a defendant's BAC is 
admissible in a prosecution for OUI under § 24 (1) (a) only if 
the test had been performed with the defendant's permission.  
See Commonwealth v. Moreau, 490 Mass. 387, 392-393 (2022); 
Commonwealth v. Bohigian, 486 Mass. 209, 211 (2020).  Despite 
this unambiguous language, the defendant contends that, read as 
a whole, § 24 (1) (e) applies not only to simple OUI, but also 
to the aggravated OUI-related offenses with which he has been 
charged.6  
 
5 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (a), states in relevant part: 
 
"Whoever, upon any way or in any place to which the public 
has a right of access . . . operates a motor vehicle with a 
percentage, by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight 
one-hundredths or greater, or while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, or of marijuana, narcotic drugs, 
depressants or stimulant substances . . . shall be punished 
. . . ."  
 
6 Although § 24 (1) (a) is the only offense mentioned in 
§ 24 (1) (e), the defendant posits that the phrase "[i]n any 
prosecution for a violation of paragraph (a)" is "shorthand" for 
all types of OUI offenses.  This reasoning ignores the most 
basic canon of statutory construction:  words in a statute are 
presumed to mean what they say.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 453 
Mass. 707, 713 (2009).  Moreover, the Legislature has amended 
various provisions of § 24, including § 24 (1) (e) after the 
enactment of § 24L (OUI-SBI), as recently as 2020.  See, e.g., 
St. 2005, c. 122, § 9 (added cross references of §§ 24G and 24L, 
and G. L. c. 265, § 13 1/2, to § 24 [1] [f] [1]); St. 2002, 
c. 52, § 2.  It readily is apparent, then, that the Legislature 
could have amended the consent requirement of § 24 (1) (e) to 
apply to aggravated OUI offenses had it wished to do so.   
6 
 
As support for this interpretation, the defendant reasons 
that because simple OUI is a lesser included offense of both 
OUI-SBI and manslaughter-OUI, prosecution of the more serious 
offenses necessarily includes the prosecution of the lesser 
included offense.  This reading ignores the plain language of 
§ 24 (1) (e), which clearly limits its application to 
prosecutions for violations of § 24 (1) (a).  Had the 
Legislature wanted § 24 (1) (e) to apply to every offense that 
includes the elements of § 24 (1) (a), it could have done so.  
See, e.g., G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1) ("The commonwealth may move, 
based on dangerousness, for an order of pretrial detention or 
release on conditions for a felony offense that has as an 
element of the offense the use, attempted use or threatened use 
of physical force against the person of another . . ." [emphasis 
added]).  There is a difference between being charged with 
simple OUI and being charged with an aggravated OUI offense, 
including that § 24 (1) (e) applies to the former but not the 
latter.   
Nor does a plain language interpretation of § 24 (1) (e) 
lead to absurd results.  Given the Legislature's interest in 
reducing serious injury and loss of life due to impaired 
driving, it is well within the purview of the Legislature to 
treat simple OUI and aggravated OUI offenses differently, 
7 
 
including with regard to the admissibility of evidence.7  See 
Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 523 (2001), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Leno, 415 Mass. 835, 841 (1993).  See also 
Moreau, 490 Mass. at 395 ("it is for the Legislature to weigh 
the benefits and drawbacks of the statutory scheme").  The 
defendant's remaining arguments similarly do not persuade us to 
ignore the plain language of § 24 (1) (e).   
3.  Conclusion.  The language of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), 
requiring consent for blood test results to be admissible is 
clear and unambiguous in its specific reference to violations of 
§ 24 (1) (a).  As the consent provision of § 24 (1) (e) does not 
reference violations under any other section or chapter, 
including G. L. c. 265, § 13 1/2, or G. L. c. 90, § 24L, the 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
7 The preamble of the bill that introduced § 24L noted that 
the purpose of the law was to "preserv[e] . . . public safety" 
and "avoid loss of life."  2003 House Doc. No. 3929.  Similarly, 
the preamble of the equivalent act that introduced G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13 1/2, stated that its purpose was "to increase penalties for 
drunk drivers in the Commonwealth . . . necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public safety."  2005 House Doc. 
No. 4403.