Title: Gosciminski v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2234 
____________ 
 
ANDREW MICHAEL GOSCIMINSKI, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[September 12, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Andrew Michael Gosciminski appeals his conviction of first-degree murder 
and sentence of death for the murder of Joan Loughman in Fort Pierce.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we 
affirm both the conviction and the sentence. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Gosciminski was indicted, tried, and convicted of robbery with a deadly 
weapon, burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery, and the first-degree 
murder of Joan Loughman.  Loughman was bludgeoned and stabbed and her throat 
was cut in her father’s residence on Hutchinson Island in Fort Pierce on September 
 
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24, 2002.  A number of jewelry items, including a two-carat diamond ring, were 
taken from Loughman.  Gosciminski was sentenced to death for Loughman’s 
murder in 2005. 
 
On appeal, this Court reversed the convictions and the sentences and 
remanded for a new trial.  Gosciminski v. State, 994 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2008).  We 
concluded that several rulings by the trial court relating to questioning by the 
prosecutor and the admission of hearsay statements constituted prejudicial error 
that denied Gosciminski a fair trial.  Id. at 1027-28.    
 
The evidence presented at Gosciminski’s retrial established the following 
facts.  Joan Loughman flew down to Fort Pierce from Connecticut on September 
13, 2002, in order to arrange for her father, Frank Vala, to move into an assisted 
living facility.  Loughman stayed at her father’s residence during her visit to Fort 
Pierce.  As was her custom, Loughman wore all of her jewelry daily.  This jewelry 
included a two-carat diamond ring1
 
Gosciminski was the director of marketing at Lyford Cove, an assisted living 
facility.  After Loughman met with Gosciminski, her father was admitted to Lyford 
Cove by Gosciminski on September 18, 2002.  The day before the father’s 
 and several other rings, several bracelets, 
including a diamond tennis bracelet, and earrings with diamonds and emeralds.   
                                         
 
1.  Loughman’s husband Thomas Loughman described the ring as a two-
carat round diamond set in platinum with a diamond baguette on each side. 
 
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admission Gosciminski went to Vala’s home to help Loughman move Vala’s 
belongings and furniture to Lyford Cove.  However, after being at Lyford Cove for 
just one night, Vala had to be transferred to the hospital.  Vala did not return to 
Lyford Cove and was subsequently transferred to hospice on September 24, 2002.  
Loughman arranged to meet Gosciminski at Lyford Cove on the evening of 
September 23, 2002, in order to pick up her father’s belongings.  Gosciminski 
carried Vala’s suitcase to Loughman’s car.  That suitcase was still present in 
Loughman’s rental car, which was parked in the driveway of her father’s house, 
when the police came to investigate her murder on the evening of September 24. 
 
On the morning of September 24, 2002, Loughman spoke with her twin 
sister, Janet Vala-Terry, using the telephone at her father’s house.  This telephone 
conversation lasted five minutes and ended at 8:47 a.m. when Loughman told her 
sister that she had to hang up because someone was at the front door.  Loughman 
did not say who was at the door.  Loughman was found dead in the bedroom of her 
father’s home on the evening of September 24, 2002, by her sister Janet, her 
brother, and her brother’s wife, who had flown down to Florida in order to meet 
Loughman at the hospice where Vala had been transferred.  Loughman had plans 
to fly back to Connecticut on September 25, 2002.   
 
On the morning of September 24, 2002, Gosciminski was scheduled to 
attend a staff meeting at Lyford Cove at 8:00 a.m.  However, according to his cell 
 
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phone records, at 8:15 a.m. Gosciminski called Lois Bosworth, one of the 
corporate directors of Lyford Cove, to inform her that he would not be able to 
attend the staff meeting because he was going to Life Care Center in Fort Pierce to 
make a presentation that morning.  Gosciminski arrived at Lyford Cove shortly 
after lunch on that day.  Upon arriving, he met with Debra Flynn, the executive 
director of the facility, and Nicole Rizzolo, the administrative assistant to Debra 
Flynn, and showed them a two-carat diamond ring which he removed from a tissue 
or napkin in his pocket.  Gosciminski had talked about buying a ring for his 
girlfriend, Debra Thomas, for some time before the murder. 
 
Flynn testified that when Gosciminski arrived at Lyford Cove around 1:30 
p.m. on the day of the murder he appeared freshly scrubbed and his hair was slick 
and freshly combed.  Flynn also testified that the ring Gosciminski showed her was 
a white or platinum band with a round diamond center stone and diamond 
baguettes on each side.  Flynn also testified that the ring looked old and dirty and 
had “something black” on it.  Gosciminski also talked to Flynn and Rizzolo about 
other jewelry he had for Thomas, including a tennis bracelet.  Rizzolo testified that 
Gosciminski came to work sometime after lunch and that he looked like he had just 
showered and his skin was “scrubbed pink.”  Gosciminski also showed Rizzolo the 
ring and mentioned a tennis bracelet.  On cross-examination, defense counsel 
pointed to Rizzolo’s deposition in which she had stated that Gosciminski had 
 
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shown her the ring before the day of Loughman’s murder.  Rizzolo stated that 
although she had said that in her deposition, she was sure that Gosciminski had 
shown her the ring after Loughman’s murder. 
 
Until a short time before the murder, Gosciminski was dating and living with 
Debra Thomas.  Debra Thomas started having an affair with Ben Thomas2
 
During the investigation, Detective Thomas Hickox learned that 
Gosciminski had been with Loughman the evening before the murder.  On October 
1, 2002, Detective Hickox went to Lyford Cove to talk to Debra Flynn and 
Gosciminski.  On October 2, 2002, Detective Hickox called Gosciminski to the 
police station for a recorded interview, in which Gosciminski participated 
voluntarily.  At the same time, two other officers were sent to the new home of 
Debra Thomas and Gosciminski to question Thomas about Loughman’s murder.  
 in July 
2002.  At that time, Ben Thomas had been married to Deborah Pelletier for five 
years and lived with Pelletier in a home on Import Drive in Port St. Lucie.  Around 
the last week of July 2002, Debra Thomas and Ben Thomas moved into the house 
on Import Drive.  One week later, both Debra Thomas and Ben Thomas moved out 
and Deborah Pelletier moved back into the house.   Ben Thomas moved to another 
house by himself and Debra Thomas moved back with Gosciminski.   
                                         
2.  At the time of Gosciminski’s initial trial in April 2005, Ben Thomas and 
Debra Thomas had been married for close to two years.  Thomas is Debra 
Thomas’s maiden name, as well as Ben Thomas’s surname.   
 
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The detectives asked Thomas about the engagement ring Gosciminski had given 
her.  Thomas stated that it was the same engagement ring Gosciminski had given 
her during their previous engagement in 2001.  At trial, Thomas testified that she 
had not told the detectives the truth about the ring because she was afraid.  She also 
testified that after the officers left, she got a phone call from Gosciminski stating 
that they had to get rid of the ring because it was “hot.”  After Gosciminski 
returned home, he took the ring and went out toward the beach.  Thomas has not 
seen the ring since that day. 
 
Gosciminski was arrested on October 3, 2002, and indicted for the crimes on 
October 22, 2002.  A few weeks later, Deborah Pelletier’s father found a bag of 
jewelry in the shed behind Pelletier’s house on Import Drive.  The jewelry, which 
was found inside a Geoffrey Beene cologne pouch, included two sets of earrings, a 
ring, and a diamond and emerald tennis bracelet.  The jewelry was identified as the 
jewelry owned by Loughman and missing from her body after she was murdered.  
Pelletier testified that in the beginning of August Gosciminski had come over to 
her Import Drive house several times a week in order to discuss the affair between 
Debra Thomas and Ben Thomas.  Gosciminski also went to Pelletier’s house 
sometime in August when Pelletier’s water was not working.  Gosciminski had 
accompanied Pelletier to fix something near the shed where the jewelry was later 
found.  Pelletier also testified that on one occasion after October 2, 2002, but 
 
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before the jewelry was found, Ben Thomas came over to the house with a group of 
friends to remove his belongings from the house and garage.  Pelletier had visited 
Gosciminski in jail.  When Pelletier told him about the jewelry found in her shed, 
Gosciminski said “it’s over, I’m done” and told Pelletier not to visit him again. 
At trial, the State called numerous witnesses, including detectives who had 
examined the crime scene and who were involved in the investigation, and 
Loughman’s family members who knew about the jewelry she wore and who had 
talked to her while she was in Florida.  The State also called witnesses who had 
seen the ring that Gosciminski gave Debra Thomas on the evening of September 
24, 2002, and who had identified the ring they saw in a lineup.3  The detectives 
who were involved with the investigation testified that they took fingerprints from 
the Vala residence as well as both of Gosciminski’s residences4
 
Debra Thomas testified that on the morning of September 24, 2002, 
Gosciminski left their home sometime between 7 and 8 a.m. and came back home 
 and his truck, but 
did not find any matching fingerprints or any other scientific or forensic evidence 
to link Gosciminski to the crime. 
                                         
 
3.  A replica of Loughman’s ring was made by the jeweler who made the 
original ring.  This ring was put in a line-up with five other rings, and witnesses 
who had seen the ring Gosciminski gave Debra Thomas were asked to identify the 
ring they saw.   
 
4.  Gosciminski had moved to a new residence around the time of 
Loughman’s murder. 
 
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around lunch time.  She testified that she was not sure exactly what time 
Gosciminski came home because she was not aware that he had returned home as 
he did not enter through the front door.  She stated that it could have been between 
11 a.m. and 1 p.m.  Thomas first noticed Gosciminski was home when she saw him 
in the master bathroom.  She saw Gosciminski washing up at the bathroom sink 
and noticed that he had blood on the right side of his arm.  She also saw a pile of 
Gosciminski’s clothes on the floor that were soiled with blood.  When Thomas 
questioned Gosciminski about the bloody clothes, he explained that he had gone to 
collect some money for a friend in West Palm Beach and had to “rough some guy 
up.”  On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Thomas about her deposition 
statements regarding the time Gosciminski came home.  In her deposition, Thomas 
had stated that Gosciminski came home around 1 p.m. and left at 3 p.m.  Thomas 
responded that defense counsel had badgered her into stating this time frame at the 
deposition and that she was not sure about the exact time of Gosciminski’s arrival, 
but it was around lunchtime.  Thomas also testified that Gosciminski gave her an 
engagement ring on the evening of September 24, 2002.  She described the ring as 
a large diamond with baguettes on each side set in a white gold or platinum band.  
She described the condition of the ring as being rather dull, as if it needed to be 
cleaned.   
 
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Nextel engineer Juan Portillo testified at the trial about Gosciminski’s cell 
phone activity and created a cell phone tower diagram, which indicated the area in 
which Gosciminski was located during his phone calls on the morning of 
September 24, 2002.  Gosciminski’s cell phone records indicated that he had cell 
phone activity between 6:31 a.m. and 8:25 a.m.  His last call at 8:25 a.m. was an 
inbound call that lasted twelve minutes, eleven seconds.  There was no activity on 
his phone from 8:37 a.m. until 9:12 a.m.  According to the cell tower diagram and 
which cell tower the call hit, Gosciminski received a call at 9:12 a.m. while he was 
located in an area close to the Vala residence where Loughman was murdered.  
Two other phone calls, one at 9:27 a.m. when Gosciminski accessed his voicemail 
and one at 9:28 a.m. when he made an outbound call, also hit the cell tower close 
to the Vala residence.  The next phone call at 10:23 a.m. hit a cell tower close to 
the Harbor Federal Bank in Palm City.  The evidence also showed that on the 
morning of the murder Gosciminski made a cash deposit of $430 at this particular 
bank at 10:08 a.m.  The next phone call at 10:36 a.m. hit a cell tower in the vicinity 
of where Loughman’s fanny pack was later found.5
                                         
 
5.  A State witness testified that he found a fanny pack on February 24, 
2003, on Martin Highway right under the overpass of Interstate 95.  There was no 
money in the fanny pack, but there were several credit cards and a checkbook.  The 
fanny pack was identified as Loughman’s based on its contents. 
  Evidence also showed that a 
fifty-seven dollar check made out to Gosciminski’s mother was deposited by 
 
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Gosciminski at 11:04 a.m. at another Harbor Federal Bank located at Darwin 
Square.  The last two phone calls at 11:29 a.m. and 11:39 a.m. hit cell towers in the 
vicinity of where Gosciminski lived. 
 
Associate medical examiner Dr. Linda Rush O’Neill testified in the place of 
Dr. Charles Diggs, the medical examiner who had conducted the autopsy and 
testified at the first trial.6
                                         
 
6.  Dr. Diggs suffered a stroke after the first trial and was in ill health at the 
time of the retrial. 
  In preparation for her testimony, Dr. O’Neill reviewed 
the medical examiner’s file, which included the autopsy report, diagrams, and 
notes, the testimony and deposition of Dr. Diggs, the crime scene photographs, and 
the autopsy photographs.  According to Dr. O’Neill’s medical testimony, 
Loughman suffered three different types of injuries:  blunt force trauma bruising 
and lacerations, incise or stab wounds, and abrasions or scraping.  The fatal injury 
was a cut to Loughman’s throat with a knife or knife-like object that severed the 
left jugular vein and caused her to bleed out.  Loughman was first attacked in the 
hallway, as indicated by blood in the hallway and her eyeglasses that were 
apparently knocked from her face.  She was then dragged into a bedroom by her 
feet, where she was severely bludgeoned with an ashtray stand statue, stabbed 
(possibly with sharp pieces of the glass ashtray statue based on a piece of glass that 
was removed from the back wound during the autopsy), and cut in the throat.  
 
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Loughman also suffered lacerations and bruising to her face and head, fractures to 
the bones of her face, including her jaw from which four teeth were dislodged by 
the root.  The dislodged teeth indicated that significant force was used in the blunt 
trauma to the head.  Loughman also had stab wounds on the back of her neck, her 
right back torso, and her left chest.  The stab wound to Loughman’s back torso 
perforated the right lung.  At some point in the attack, Loughman suffered a 
defensive wound to her left hand, indicating that she was conscious during some of 
the attack.  The variety of wounds and their placement on both the front and back 
of Loughman’s body also indicated that she was conscious and struggling with her 
attacker.  The bludgeoning injuries were consistent with someone using the ashtray 
statue that was found at the scene as a weapon.  The stabbing or sharp force 
wounds could have been inflicted with a knife or one of the broken pieces of glass 
from the statue.  The stabbing wounds were “somewhat irregular” and not like the 
margins that would occur with a stab wound from an ice pick or knife.  Dr. O’Neill 
opined that the defensive wound on Loughman’s left hand was caused by a portion 
of the broken statue.  The body temperature of the victim, the rigor mortis, and the 
livor mortis were consistent with Loughman being killed between 8:47 a.m. and 
10:30 a.m. on September 24.  Based on the scene and the injuries to the victim, 
Loughman’s attacker would have blood on his clothing and body. 
 
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By an interrogatory response on the verdict, the jury found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the murder was both premeditated murder and felony 
murder.  After a two-day penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence by 
a vote of nine to three.  Both the State and Gosciminski were permitted to present 
additional evidence as to the appropriate sentence at a Spencer7
 
The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and imposed a death 
sentence.  The trial court found three aggravating factors were applicable:  the 
murder was cold, calculated and premeditated (CCP) (given great weight); the 
murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (given great weight); and the 
murder was committed during the commission of a robbery or burglary (given 
great weight), which was merged with the committed for pecuniary gain 
aggravator.  The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance:  
Gosciminski had no significant history of criminal activity (given some weight).  
The trial court found thirteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
 hearing.  
Gosciminski also presented a written statement to the court. 
8
                                         
 
7.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 which were 
 
8.  The thirteen nonstatutory circumstances found by the trial court included  
a life sentence means Gosciminski will never get out of prison; he has orthopedic 
injuries from a motorcycle accident; he had difficulty coping with the loss of his 
father from a massive heart attack in 1982; he demonstrated good behavior during 
his trial; he had a relatively normal upbringing and did not engage in disruptive, 
disturbed or delinquent behavior as a child or young adult; he has a good work 
history in the medical field and has been self-employed; he presents with a mixture 
 
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given little to moderate weight.  The trial court determined that the mitigating 
factors did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and sentenced Gosciminski 
to death on the count of first-degree murder and to life in prison for burglary and 
robbery. 
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Gosciminski raises eighteen claims of error.9
                                                                                                                                   
of disordered personality characteristics; his execution would have a negative 
effect on his elderly aunt; he served in the Air Force and was honorably 
discharged; he has demonstrated a positive correctional adjustment; his history 
does not indicate future dangerousness; he acted as a Good Samaritan by pulling a 
driver from a burning vehicle after an accident; and the cumulative effect of all the 
mitigating circumstances. 
  The State also 
raises a claim regarding the proportionality of the death sentence in this case.  We 
 
9.  Gosciminski asserts the following claims:  (1) the trial court erred by 
allowing Debra Thomas to testify that she moved back with Gosciminski because 
he had threatened her and her family; (2) the trial court erred by prohibiting the 
defense from cross-examining Debra Thomas about drug and alcohol use; (3) the 
trial court erred by permitting Debra Thomas to testify that Gosciminski 
intercepted her mail, thereby causing her not to get her nursing license in Arizona; 
(4) the trial court erred in denying Gosciminski’s motion for disclosure of Debra 
Thomas’s grand jury testimony; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Gosciminski’s requested instruction on circumstantial evidence and in overruling 
his objection to the State’s closing argument regarding circumstantial evidence; (6) 
the trial court improperly limited Gosciminski’s cross-examination questioning of 
witness Maureen Reape; (7) the trial court erred by permitting witness Joan Cox to 
testify that Gosciminski had noticed her diamond ring in 2001; (8) the trial court 
improperly denied Gosciminski’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (9) the trial 
court erred in excluding the results of Gosciminski’s polygraph tests, which were 
exculpatory evidence as to his guilt; (10) and (11) the trial court erred and abused 
its discretion in allowing testimony and exhibits regarding the coverage of the cell 
phone towers on the day of the murder; (12) the trial court erred in admitting 
 
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conclude that Gosciminski’s claims are without merit, with the exception of Issue 2 
regarding the scope of cross-examination.  However, as discussed below, we 
conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We also 
conclude that the death sentence is proportionally warranted in this case.  We 
address each claim in turn below. 
I.  Testimonial and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
A number of the issues raised by Gosciminski regard testimonial and 
evidentiary rulings by the trial court.  Issues 1, 3, 7, and 10 through 14 involve 
evidence that Gosciminski contends was improperly admitted.  An appellate court 
will not disturb a trial court’s determination that evidence is relevant and 
admissible absent an abuse of discretion.  See Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87, 98 
(Fla. 2009).  Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless precluded by a 
specific rule of exclusion.  Id. (citing § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2004)). 
1.  Evidence of “Bad Conduct” 
                                                                                                                                   
testimony regarding test drive results (i.e., testimony as to the time it took officers 
to drive to and from certain locations, including the crime scene, the banks where 
the deposits were made, and the area where Loughman’s fanny pack was found); 
(13) the trial court erred in admitting a cash receipt produced by Ben Thomas 
because it was not properly authenticated; (14) the trial court erred in admitting 
into evidence two photographs of the victim wearing the jewelry that was taken 
during the robbery-murder; (15) and (16) the trial court erred in finding the CCP 
aggravator in this case; (17) the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator; 
and (18) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. 
 
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In Issue 1, Gosciminski asserts that it was improper to allow Debra Thomas 
to testify that she moved back with him in August 2002 because he threatened to 
harm her, her family, and Ben Thomas.  The defense objected to this questioning, 
noting that there had been no Williams10
 
There are two categories under which evidence of uncharged crimes or bad 
acts will be admissible—similar fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams rule 
evidence, and dissimilar fact evidence.  Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87, 98 (Fla. 
2009) (citing Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 2000)).  The requirements and 
limitations of section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2009), govern similar fact evidence 
 rule notice and arguing the information 
was irrelevant to the charges against Gosciminski.  The trial court overruled the 
defense objection, finding that this evidence was intricately intertwined with the 
sequence of events that preceded the murder and explained the motive for the 
murder.  The trial court also stated that the lack of Williams rule notice was not of 
consequence, that the threats would not be made a feature of the trial, and the 
parties should move on.  Because Thomas’s answer had been interrupted by the 
defense objection, the State asked her again why she had moved back in with 
Gosciminski and she responded, “Because I didn’t want anyone to get hurt after he 
threatened me and my family and Ben.”  The State then moved on to other 
questions about the sequence of events that preceded the murder. 
                                         
 
10.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 
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while the general rule of relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar 
fact evidence.  Id. at 98-99.  This Court has explained the test for dissimilar fact 
evidence as follows: 
[E]vidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable from the crime 
charged, or evidence which is inextricably intertwined with the crime 
charged, is not Williams
Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, 
Florida Evidence, § 404.17 (1993 ed.)). 
 rule evidence. It is admissible under section 
90.402 because “it is a relevant and inseparable part of the act which 
is in issue. . . . [I]t is necessary to admit the evidence to adequately 
describe the deed.” 
 
Dissimilar fact evidence of uncharged misconduct—which is governed by 
section 90.402’s general rule of relevancy—is admissible to “establish[ ] the 
relevant context in which the [charged] criminal acts occurred.”  Caruso v. State, 
645 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1994).  “[T]o prove its case, the State is entitled to 
present evidence which paints an accurate picture of the events surrounding the 
crimes charged.”  Griffin, 639 So. 2d at 970.  Accordingly, evidence of uncharged 
misconduct is relevant when its admission is “necessary to adequately describe the 
events leading up to” the commission of the charged offense.  Id. 
 
The evidence at issue here explained Gosciminski’s decision to kill 
Loughman for her jewelry and showed the sequence of events leading up to the 
murder.  See McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 786-87 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 2100 (2011) (finding evidence about the defendant’s drug-based relationship 
 
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with the victims’ daughter was relevant and inextricably intertwined with the 
crimes charged).  Through Thomas’s testimony at the instant trial and 
Gosciminski’s videotaped testimony from the 2005 trial,11
                                         
 
11.  The State introduced Gosciminski’s videotaped testimony from the 2005 
trial in its case-in-chief in the instant trial. 
 the jury learned that the 
pair had an on-again off-again relationship for at least six months preceding the 
murder.  Thomas moved out of Gosciminski’s home in April 2002, June 2002, and 
August 2002, but returned each time.  Through this testimony and the testimony of 
other witnesses, the jury also learned that Debra Thomas and Ben Thomas met 
sometime in the spring of 2002 and lived together for about one month in July and 
August.  Gosciminski was aware of this relationship between Debra and Ben and 
visited Ben’s wife Deborah Pelletier regularly for several weeks in August 2002 to 
get more information about Ben, discuss the relationship between Ben and Debra, 
tell Pelletier what he knew about the activities of Ben and Debra, and talk about his 
efforts to get Debra to move back with him.  Debra Thomas also testified that 
when she moved away from Gosciminski, he sent her flowers and gifts of jewelry 
to convince her to move back with him.  Thomas also stated that Gosciminski 
made false statements and created false documents to convince her that he was 
very wealthy.  Gosciminski was aware of Debra’s relationship with Ben Thomas 
and was competing with Ben to get Debra back.  Gosciminski made statements to 
 
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many individuals, including Debra Thomas, that he was going to get Debra a two-
carat diamond engagement ring.  The threat testimony was part of the progression 
of Gosciminski’s plan to get Debra back.  He started with flowers and small gifts 
of jewelry, progressed to getting her a new car and a home on the beach, made 
promises of a two-carat diamond engagement ring, and then made threats.  All of 
this behavior explains Gosciminski’s motive for the murder.  See Victorino, 23 So. 
3d at 100 (finding evidence of fight and shooting at a park was properly admitted 
as dissimilar fact evidence because it presented a complete picture of the 
defendant’s successive and violent attempts to get his property back which 
culminated in the murders of six individuals).  Moreover, the threat testimony did 
not become a feature of Gosciminski’s trial. 
 
Thus, we reject Gosciminski’s claim that the threat evidence constitutes 
Williams rule evidence subject to the requirements of section 90.404(2).  We also 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Debra 
Thomas’s testimony as relevant evidence pursuant to section 90.402 in order to 
establish the context in which the charged criminal acts occurred. 
 
Gosciminski also contends that it was error to allow Debra Thomas to testify 
that he intercepted her mail, thereby causing her not to obtain her nursing license in 
Arizona (Issue 3).  Gosciminski argues that he was prejudiced by this evidence of 
bad character and an uncharged crime.  
 
- 19 - 
 
In discussing her relationship with Gosciminski, Thomas testified that after 
moving back with Gosciminski she took a trip to Arizona to apply for a nursing 
license with the intent of moving there permanently.  Thomas gave Gosciminski’s 
address to the licensing board, but she never received her license because, 
according to Thomas, her “mail was intercepted.”  When the State asked if 
Gosciminski was the only person living at the address at the time, the defense 
objected on the basis that the answer would be speculation and constituted bad 
character evidence because intercepting United States mail is a federal offense.   
 
The defense also moved for a mistrial.  The trial court overruled the 
speculation objection, finding that it was within Thomas’s knowledge who was 
living in the house she shared with Gosciminski.  Thomas had already testified that 
only she and Gosciminski had lived in the house in the preceding five months.  As 
the trial court explained, people generally know who is living in their house even 
when they go on a trip.  The court ruled that the objection to the “intercepting 
mail” comment was untimely because the defense had not made a 
contemporaneous objection to that testimony.  However, despite the untimeliness 
of the objection, the court still allowed Gosciminski’s counsel to argue the bad 
character objection.  The court noted that Gosciminski lived at the home and could 
properly accept any mail that arrived there.  When the court inquired if the defense 
wanted the State to clarify this matter through further questioning of the witness, 
 
- 20 - 
the defense declined the offer.  Finally, the trial court concluded that neither 
comment required a mistrial. 
 
A trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed by an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 1997).  Discretion is 
abused only “when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which 
is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.”  Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 
1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990); see also Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 813 (Fla. 2007). 
 
The granting of a motion for mistrial is not based on whether the error is 
“prejudicial.”  Rather, the standard requires that a mistrial be granted only “when 
an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial,” England v. State, 940 So. 2d 
389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006), such that a mistrial is “necessary to ensure that the 
defendant receives a fair trial.”  McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 790 (Fla. 2010).  
“It has been long established and continuously adhered to that the power to declare 
a mistrial and discharge the jury should be exercised with great care and caution 
and should be done only in cases of absolute necessity.”  England, 940 So. 2d at 
402 (quoting Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 980 (Fla. 1999)).  Therefore, “[i]n 
order for [Debra’s testimony] to merit a new trial, the comments must either 
deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, materially contribute to the 
conviction, be so harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be 
 
- 21 - 
so inflammatory that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe 
verdict than that it would have otherwise.”  Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 372 
(Fla. 2008) (quoting Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1994)).  Neither of 
the comments at issue here rose to that level.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings on the comments or its denial of 
Gosciminski’s motion for a mistrial. 
 
In Issue 7, Gosciminski argues that the trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony of Joan Cox that Gosciminski noticed her diamond ring when she met 
him in June 2001.  The State proffered the direct testimony of Cox about an 
encounter she had with Gosciminski when she was seeking an assisted living 
facility for her mother.  Cox stated that Gosciminski invited her and her 
granddaughter to have lunch at the facility and during lunch he noticed and made a 
favorable comment about Cox’s diamond ring.  Defense counsel objected that this 
evidence was irrelevant and was inadmissible Williams rule evidence for which the 
State had not given the required statutory notice.  The trial court ruled that Cox’s 
testimony was not Williams rule evidence because it involved an “innocuous” 
remark, not a collateral crime.  The court also ruled that the testimony was relevant 
because “[i]t shows the knowledge of rings, an awareness of rings” and “relates 
back” to Gosciminski’s statement to the police that he did not notice clients’ 
 
- 22 - 
jewelry because it was irrelevant to his job.  Thus, the trial court admitted Cox’s 
testimony into evidence. 
Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that “[s]imilar fact 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a 
material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, 
but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or 
propensity.”  When the state intends to offer similar fact evidence of other criminal 
offenses, it is required to give notice no fewer than ten days before trial of its intent 
to rely on Williams rule evidence and provide a written statement of the acts or 
offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an 
indictment or information.  § 90.404(2)(c)1, Fla. Stat. (2009).  However, no notice 
is required for evidence of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal.  Id. 
 
In his 2002 interview with the police, which was introduced into evidence by 
the State, Gosciminski stated that he had no clue whether Loughman had a lot of 
money.  When asked if he noticed the numerous diamond and emerald bracelets 
and other expensive jewelry that Loughman wore all of the time, Gosciminski 
replied that he “didn’t notice stuff like that” because it was totally irrelevant to his 
job.  Cox’s testimony that Gosciminski did in fact notice jewelry and even 
commented on her diamond ring was relevant to Gosciminski’s statement to the 
 
- 23 - 
contrary.  Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting this testimony that was 
relevant to the case.  
2.  Cell Phone Tower Evidence 
In Issues 10 and 11 Gosciminski contends that the trial court erred and also 
abused its discretion in allowing testimony and exhibits regarding the area of 
coverage of cell phone towers in the Fort Pierce area.  The State sought to present 
this evidence to prove that Gosciminski was in certain locations at certain times 
during the morning of the murder.  This proof was based on the phone calls sent 
and received on Gosciminski’s cell phone and the signals received by particular 
cell towers. 
 “The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed on appellate review 
absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”  Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 
2005).  The basic principles of cellular technology have been widely accepted and 
admitted into evidence.  See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 
2003) (stating that testimony about cell phone records and comparing them to 
locations on cell site maps was not expert testimony and was properly admitted); 
Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 1131-32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (ruling that cell 
phone records, cell site maps, and testimony explaining them was properly 
admitted and did not constitute expert testimony); Pullin v. State, 534 S.E.2d 69, 
 
- 24 - 
71 (Ga. 2000) (ruling that expert testimony pinpointing the location from which the 
defendant’s cellular telephone calls were placed was admissible).   
During the State’s case-in-chief, the State introduced the testimony of Nextel 
engineer Juan Portillo regarding maps of the cell towers, the coverage areas of the 
towers, propagation information, and specific cell phone calls made or received by 
Gosciminski.  Portillo discussed Gosciminski’s cell phone records for September 
24, 2002, which were admitted without objection.  Portillo explained how he 
developed the diagrams showing the cell tower locations with their sector coverage 
and propagation for each sector.  Portillo also testified about where Gosciminski’s 
calls had originated based on the sector that picked up the signal first.  When the 
State sought to introduce the diagrams into evidence, the defense objected that the 
diagrams were misleading and confusing and were hearsay unless Portillo knew 
from personal experience where the towers were located.   
In a sidebar conference, the trial court noted that the defense had not made a 
contemporaneous objection to Portillo’s oral testimony about the diagrams and the 
information contained on them.  The court also noted that cell phone records and 
cell tower site information have been routinely admitted in Florida for over fifteen 
years and that under Florida case law it was not necessary for an expert to testify 
about these matters because such information is understood by the average juror 
who owns a cell phone.  The trial court concluded that that the defense objection 
 
- 25 - 
went to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.  The court ruled that 
the diagrams were not misleading or hearsay and allowed them to be admitted. 
Later when Portillo was questioned by the State about locations that would 
hit the sector two of the Faber Cove tower,12
 
We agree with the trial court’s rulings that the diagrams and the testimony 
relating to them were properly admitted.  The testimony and diagrams regarding 
the cell tower coverage were relevant to Gosciminski’s possible location during the 
time of Loughman’s murder on the morning of September 24, 2002.   See Gordon 
v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2003) (finding that testimony on the cell 
phone record and cell site map was useful in assisting the jury to understand the 
phone records).   The defense had an opportunity to cast doubt on the weight of the 
evidence during its cross-examination of the witness as to the probability and 
likelihood of the cell tower coverage.   
 the defense objected and argued that 
the conditions had changed since 2002 and the time when Portillo made his pre-
trial measurements.  After the court confirmed that Portillo would be rendering his 
opinion regarding the coverage and power of the tower in September 2002, the 
court overruled the defense objection and again ruled that the objection went to the 
weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. 
                                         
 
12.  Portillo testified that this was the tower and sector on which 
Gosciminski’s cell phone registered three times during the time when Loughman 
was murdered. 
 
- 26 - 
Gosciminski also objected that Portillo did not have sufficient data regarding 
the cell towers at the time of the crime to render an opinion about the reach of the 
cell towers or their location.  Contrary to this argument, Portillo testified about his 
experience and training, which included twenty years working as a radio frequency 
engineer in telecommunications, a degree in electrical engineering and a number of 
continuing education courses, and being in charge of maintenance and coverage of 
Nextel cell towers for the southeast region of Florida for the preceding three years.  
Portillo also testified at length about the technology and science relating to cell 
phones and towers.  Portillo reported the results of his measurements and offered 
his opinion as to which tower would have picked up Gosciminski’s phone calls in 
September 2002.  The defense was able to thoroughly cross-examine Portillo about 
factors that could affect the tower signals, thereby calling the jury’s attention to the 
weight to be afforded Portillo’s opinion testimony.  The defense also presented its 
own telecommunications expert who offered a different opinion as to the coverage 
of the cell towers.   
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
overruling Gosciminski’s objections and allowing into evidence the cell tower 
diagrams and testimony relating to them. 
3.  Driving Test Results 
 
- 27 - 
In Issue 12, Gosciminski argues that the court erred in allowing testimony 
about the time it took law enforcement officers to drive to and from certain 
locations, including the crime scene, the banks where Gosciminski made the 
deposits on the day in question, and the area where Loughman’s fanny pack was 
found.  Gosciminski contends this testimony should not have been admitted 
because the officers did not know the traffic, weather or road conditions on 
September 24, 2002, and the officers may not have followed the route that 
Gosciminski took.   
Under Florida law, all relevant evidence, defined as that tending to prove or 
disprove a material fact, is admissible unless otherwise provided by law.  See §§ 
90.401, 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2009).  Relevant evidence is inadmissible, however, 
where the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.  See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2009).  The admissibility of 
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s 
determination will not be disturbed on appellate review absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion.  See Hildwin v. State, 951 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 2006); Ray v. State, 755 So. 
2d 604 (Fla. 2000).  However, even if it is found that the trial court erred and 
abused its discretion, the error is subject to a harmless error analysis.  See Brooks 
v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 194 (Fla. 2005) (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 
 
- 28 - 
1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)), receded from on other grounds by State v. Sturdivant, 94 
So. 3d 434, 436 (Fla. 2012).   
Goscminski objected to all of the driving test testimony13
Gosciminski argues that for the driving test evidence to be admissible, the 
test had to be conducted under conditions substantially similar to those which 
prevailed at the time of the incident.  See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ross, 
660 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Dempsey v. Shell Oil Co., 589 So. 2d 
373, 380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).   However, these cases cited by Gosciminski 
 on the basis of 
relevance and failure to lay a proper foundation as to the traffic and road 
conditions on the morning of September 24, 2002.  The trial court overruled all of 
the objections, noting that the time it takes to drive the most direct and logical 
route between these places was relevant to the question of whether it was within 
the ability of the defendant to cover this distance within a certain period of time.  
The court also ruled that the foundation objections went to the weight of the 
evidence, not its admissibility, and the defense could question the witnesses about 
these matters on cross-examination. 
                                         
 
13.  Detective Thomas Hickox testified that it took him fifty minutes to drive 
from Gosciminski’s home to the murder scene during the same time of day when 
the murder occurred.  Detective William Hall testified that he was able to drive 
from the murder scene to the bank in Stuart where Gosciminski made a deposit in 
forty-two minutes.  State Attorney Investigator Edward Arens testified about how 
long it took him to drive the thirty-five-mile route that Gosciminski testified he 
drove on the morning of the murder.  
 
- 29 - 
involved expert witnesses conducting scientific experiments and providing opinion 
testimony based on those experiments.  In a case involving the same type of 
driving test evidence, the district court noted that the defense could have explored 
the perceived weaknesses in such timeline results through voir dire of the witness 
or on cross-examination.  See Pierre v. State, 990 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2008).   
In the instant case, the officers were not conducting a scientific experiment 
and were not testifying as expert witnesses.  The officers explained the routes they 
took, the speed they traveled, and the conditions they encountered.  Defense 
counsel cross-examined them about their knowledge of the road conditions, the 
weather, and other factors that existed on September 24, 2002, and was able to 
elicit that the officers had little or no knowledge of those conditions.  The routes 
taken by the officers were based on the route that Gosciminski testified he took on 
the day of the murder or reasonable routes based on the cell phone records.  
The officers’ testimony regarding the time required to drive to and from 
certain locations was relevant to show that Gosciminski was capable of completing 
the crime within the known time-frame.  Further, the officers neither testified as 
expert witnesses nor offered opinion testimony.  The officers merely recounted 
their routes and the time it took them to drive this distance.  See Johnson v. State, 
442 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1983) (explaining that rule of “essential similarity” 
 
- 30 - 
between test conditions and actual conditions is an issue of the weight to be given 
to the evidence rather than its relevance or materiality).  Moreover, as the trial 
court noted here, such time and distance figures are facts that are easily 
ascertainable from sources like MapQuest, which are not reasonably subject to 
dispute, and the court could actually take judicial notice of such information.  
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 
testimony regarding the driving times. 
4.  Documentary and Photographic Evidence 
In Issue 13, Gosciminski contends that it was error to admit a Walgreen’s 
cash receipt produced by Ben Thomas because the receipt was not properly 
authenticated.  The State presented the testimony of Ben Thomas regarding his 
whereabouts on the morning of the murder in order to rebut Gosciminski’s theory 
that Ben Thomas had committed the murder.  Thomas testified that he ran a 
number of errands in the Fort Pierce area on the day of the murder and then drove 
to Miami in order to catch a 4 p.m. flight to Atlanta.  Thomas also testified that he 
did not fly back to Miami until the next day and then conducted several 
presentations for his employer in Miami on September 26.  Thomas drove back to 
the Fort Pierce area two days after the murder. 
The State presented a number of receipts that corroborated Thomas’s 
account of his activities, including a cash receipt from a Walgreens store on 
 
- 31 - 
Federal Highway in Fort Pierce, which was dated September 24, 2002, and time-
stamped at 9:19 a.m.  However, the receipt was missing the register number, 
cashier number, and the transaction number.  The defense argued that this receipt 
should not be admitted because it had not been authenticated by a Walgreens 
representative.  
Section 90.901, Florida Statutes (2009), requires the authentication or 
identification of a document prior to its admission into evidence.  However, the 
requirements of section 90.901 “are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”  § 90.901, Fla. 
Stat. (2009); see also State v. Love, 691 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).   
Evidence may be authenticated by examination of its appearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics in conjunction with 
the circumstances.  Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1000 (Fla. 2006) (finding that 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant’s confession 
was authentic because there was an abundance of evidence to support finding that 
the signed, written statement was drafted by the defendant).   Once a prima facie 
showing of authenticity is made, the evidence comes in, and the ultimate question 
of authenticity is for the jury.  See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 901.1, 
at 1092-93 (2013 ed.).  
 
- 32 - 
Here, the trial court ruled that the Walgreens receipt was admissible because 
it was printed on paper with a distinctive green Walgreens logo watermark, the 
Walgreens’ return policy was printed on the back of the receipt, the front of the 
receipt showed no evidence of tampering, and the time and date-stamp matched 
Thomas’s account of when he made the purchase at Walgreens.  These distinctive 
characteristics of the receipt in conjunction with the other circumstances, i.e., the 
trail of documentary evidence that supported Thomas’s testimony about his 
activities and whereabouts on the morning of the murder, were adequate 
authentication.  Thus, we conclude that the receipt was properly admitted. 
In Issue 14, Gosciminski contends that the trial court erred in admitting two 
photographs of Loughman wearing the jewelry that was taken during the robbery-
murder.  While Gosciminski objected to the admission of the photograph depicting 
Loughman holding a baby and standing next to a small child and a young woman, 
he raised had no objection to the admission of the second photograph that depicted 
Loughman standing next to a man.  Thus, only the admission of the first 
photograph was preserved for our appellate review.   
Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding the admissibility of 
photographic evidence, and this discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear 
showing of abuse.  See Pangburn v. State, 661 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 1995); 
Vargas v. State, 751 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).  A photograph’s 
 
- 33 - 
admissibility is based on its relevancy, not its necessity.  See Pope v. State, 679 So. 
2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1996).  If a photograph is relevant to an issue at trial, either 
independently or to corroborate other evidence, it is admissible unless the 
probative value is outweighed by undue prejudice.  Allen v. State, 662 So. 2d 323, 
327 (Fla. 1995); Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1981).  Relevancy 
requires that the photo of the deceased victim be probative of an issue that is in 
dispute. 
The photograph in question was admitted to depict the jewelry that 
Loughman wore.  The photograph corroborated witness testimony that Loughman 
wore all of her jewelry daily.  Further, the photograph was relevant to show what 
jewelry Gosciminski could have seen when he met Loughman, which was an issue 
in the case.  The jury’s attention was directed solely to the jewelry.  The presence 
of the family members was not mentioned when the photograph was published to 
the jury, nor was it made a feature of the trial.  Thus, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this photograph in to evidence. 
II. Admissibility of Polygraph Test Results 
 
In Issue 9, Gosciminski argues that the trial court improperly excluded the 
results of his polygraph examination, which he claims were exculpatory evidence.  
Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in its ruling as to the relevant 
 
- 34 - 
scientific community and its interpretation of the testimony of the State and 
defense experts.   
 
Polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible in Florida.  See Duest v. State, 
12 So. 3d 734, 746 (Fla. 2009); Walsh v. State, 418 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 1982) 
(“[P]olygraph evidence is inadmissible in an adversary proceeding in this state.”).  
However, as scientific discovery changes or advances, Florida courts apply the 
Frye 14
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting 
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle 
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs. 
 test in order to determine the reliability of new or novel scientific evidence.  
See Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997).  As the Frye court explained:  
 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 
 
As we explained in Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (Fla. 1995), 
the admission into evidence of expert opinion testimony concerning a new or novel 
scientific principle is a four-step process.  First, the trial judge must determine 
whether such expert testimony will assist the jury in understanding the evidence or 
                                         
 
14.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 
- 35 - 
in determining a fact in issue under section 90.702, Florida Statutes.  Id. at 1167.15   
Second, the trial judge must decide whether the expert’s testimony is based on a 
scientific principle or discovery that is “sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  Ramirez, 651 So. 
2d at 1167 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014).16
 
The second step, concerning whether to allow expert testimony on a new or 
novel subject, is especially important to the process.  The principal inquiry under 
the Frye test is whether the scientific theory or discovery from which an expert 
  Third, the trial judge must determine 
whether a particular witness is qualified as an expert to present opinion on the 
subject at issue.  Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1167.   Fourth, the judge may allow the 
expert to render an opinion, and it is then up to the jury to determine the credibility 
of that opinion.  Id.; Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1010 (Fla. 1994) (“[T]he 
finder of fact is not necessarily required to accept [expert] testimony.”). 
                                         
 
15.  Section 90.702, Florida Statutes (2009), governs the testimony of 
experts and provides:  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of 
an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be 
applied to evidence at trial. 
 
16.  This standard is commonly known as the Frye test.  It was expressly 
adopted by this Court in Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18 (Fla. 1985).  See 
Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1167. 
 
- 36 - 
derives an opinion is reliable.  Polygraph evidence has, as a matter of law, long 
been inadmissible as evidence in Florida.  See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 
(Fla. 1952).  The last time its admissibility was expressly decided by this Court 
was in Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (Fla. 1983), in which we concluded 
that polygraph testing had not “gained such reliability and scientific recognition in 
Florida as to warrant its admissibility.”  This rule of inadmissibility “reflects state 
judgment that polygraph evidence is too unreliable or too capable of 
misinterpretation to be admitted at trial.”  Id.  However, we did recognize that the 
parties may waive their evidentiary objection.  Id.  The use of a polygraph 
examination as evidence is premised on the waiver by both parties of evidentiary 
objections as to lack of scientific reliability.  Id.   
 
In utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to 
prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the 
testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts at hand.  The trial judge 
has the sole responsibility to determine this question.  The general acceptance 
under the Frye test must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1168.  Just as important as the burden of proof is the fact 
that the hearing must be conducted in a fair manner.  Id.  This is especially 
important in a criminal trial where the defendant is guaranteed certain 
 
- 37 - 
constitutional rights, not the least of which is the due process right to present 
witnesses in one’s behalf.  Id.   
 
The appropriate standard of review of a Frye issue is de novo.  See Hadden 
v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 579 (Fla. 1997).  Thus, an appellate court reviews a trial 
court’s ruling as a matter of law, rather than under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  
When undertaking such a review, the appellate court should consider the issue of 
general acceptance at the time of the appeal rather than at the time of trial.  Id.; 
Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 262-64 (Fla. 1995) (finding a Frye test not properly 
applied in light of a scientific report issued after the trial); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 
2d 9, 18 (Fla. 1985) (finding that in a case in which the trial court failed to conduct 
a Frye hearing, hypnotically refreshed testimony was not shown to be reliable at 
the time of appeal).  An appellate court may examine expert testimony, scientific 
and legal writings, and judicial opinions in making its determination.  See 
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (finding, after an examination 
of the relevant academic literature and case law, that sex offender profile evidence 
was not generally accepted). 
 
Here, the trial court held a Frye hearing and concluded that Gosciminski did 
not carry his burden of proof and did not show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that polygraph test results are generally accepted by the relevant scientific 
community.  At the Frye hearing, Gosciminski presented the testimony of Dr. John 
 
- 38 - 
Palmatier, a doctor of social sciences who conducts polygraph examinations and 
also teaches about the science of polygraphs.  Dr. Palmatier testified that polygraph 
examinations have eighty to ninety percent accuracy and that the relevant scientific 
community for assessing the acceptance of polygraphs is scientists who are 
engaged in psycho-physiological research.  Dr. Palmatier also testified that he had 
administered a polygraph examination to Gosciminski, which indicated 
Gosciminski’s truthfulness in declaring that he did not murder or harm Joan 
Loughman. 
 
The State presented the testimony of Dr. Stephen Fienberg, a professor of 
statistics and computer science at Carnegie Mellon University and the chair of a 
committee of the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of 
Sciences.17
                                         
 
17.  The committee was tasked with evaluating the effectiveness and utility 
of the polygraph for security screening at the request of Congress in 2000.  Dr. 
Fienberg testified that the committee members did not include any individuals who 
would have a vested interest in the outcome of this assessment of the polygraph.   
  The committee chaired by Dr. Fienberg reviewed the scientific 
evidence on the polygraph for nineteen months and published a report in 2003 
recommending against the use of polygraphs because they are inherently 
inaccurate.  Dr. Fienberg stated that there is considerable consensus in the 
 
- 39 - 
scientific community18
 
Following the hearing, the trial court ruled that polygraph results are not 
generally accepted in the scientific community and cited at length the 2003 report 
from the NRC committee and Dr. Fienberg’s testimony.  The court noted that the 
defense expert has a vested interest in the theory and had narrowly defined the 
relevant scientific community to include those with similar vested interests, i.e., 
those who accept, acknowledge, and use polygraphs.  The trial court also noted 
other scholarly literature that had reached the same conclusion as the NRC 
committee, namely that polygraph results are not accurate enough to be used as 
evidence in courts.  The trial court concluded that “polygraph examinations are not 
 that the polygraph is not sufficiently accurate to rely upon 
for any purpose.  Dr. Fienberg also served on another NRC committee in 2008 
which concluded that there were no new studies suggesting that measurements 
from the autonomic nervous system (such as polygraphs) were accurate in 
detecting deception.  Dr. Fienberg also criticized Dr. Palmatier’s methodology in 
determining the accuracy of polygraphs because it did not include any inconclusive 
results in the statistics.  The parties also submitted six volumes of literature, 
reports, and other documents relating to polygraphs for the trial court to consider.  
                                         
 
18.  Dr. Fienberg defined the relevant scientific community as those 
scientists capable of reading and assessing the validity of the studies related to 
polygraphs.  
 
- 40 - 
accepted within the realm of the scientific community” and the defense had “failed 
to meet its burden of proof for the admission of the polygraph generally.”   
 
Gosciminski asserts that Dr. Fienberg’s grouping ranged far beyond the 
community of scientists active in the field to which the evidence belongs.  This 
argument, however, is not persuasive.  Frye requires more than the testimony of an 
expert who has a personal stake in the theory or is prone to an institutional bias.  
Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 844 n.13 (Fla. 2001).  “[G]eneral scientific 
recognition requires the testimony of impartial experts or scientists.  It is this 
independent and impartial proof of general scientific acceptability that provides the 
necessary Frye foundation.”  Id. at 851.  Based on the evidence presented at the 
Frye hearing and our examination of the relevant scientific evidence, we agree with 
the trial court’s ruling that the polygraph test results were inadmissible. 
III.  Limiting Witness Cross-examination 
 
In Issues 2 and 6, Gosciminski argues that the trial court erred in limiting his 
cross-examination of witnesses Debra Thomas and Maureen Reape.  As explained 
below, we find no error regarding the scope of Reape’s cross-examination.  We do 
find that the trial court erred in limiting Gosciminski’s cross-examination of Debra 
Thomas, but conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Maureen Reape was a friend of Debra Thomas who testified for the State 
about the engagement ring that Gosciminski gave to Thomas.  Prior to Reape’s 
 
- 41 - 
testimony, defense counsel stated his intention to cross-examine Reape about her 
incarceration in jail for a driving under the influence (DUI) conviction.  However, 
because this is a misdemeanor offense, it could not be the basis for impeaching 
Reape.  See § 90.610, Fla. Stat. (2009)(providing for impeachment based on a 
witness’s conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison or a 
crime that involves dishonesty or a false statement). 
The defense also asserted that Reape’s incarceration was relevant to show 
that she was biased and trying to gain favor with the State for a possible 
modification of her sentence or the terms of her probation. While bias is a 
permissible basis for attacking a witness’s credibility under section 90.608(2), 
Florida Statutes (2009), there must be some foundation for the claim of bias.  Here, 
Reape’s sentence had been imposed more than sixty days earlier and thus her 
sentence could not be modified.  During the defense’s proffered cross-examination, 
Reape testified that she had never been convicted of a felony or a crime involving 
dishonesty, that her DUI conviction was a misdemeanor, and that she did not have 
a sentence of probation.  Thus, there was no proper basis for the defense to 
impeach Reape’s credibility based on her DUI incarceration. 
 
Finally, it is not clear that the defense even preserved this issue for appellate 
review.  During the proffered cross-examination, the court noted that if Reape’s 
2009 trial testimony following her DUI convictions was consistent with her 2005 
 
- 42 - 
trial testimony which had occurred before she had any DUI convictions, then there 
would be no bias or motive for the defense to point out.  Defense counsel agreed 
that the proper course was to proceed with Reape’s direct testimony and see if 
there were any inconsistencies.  Defense counsel never called any inconsistencies 
to the court’s attention and never sought to cross-examine Reape about her 
incarceration or possible bias for the State.  Thus, Gosciminski’s cross-
examination of Reape was not improperly limited by the trial court. 
 
However, we agree with Gosciminski that the trial court erred in prohibiting 
his cross-examination of Debra Thomas about drug and alcohol use (Issue 2).  
Gosciminski wanted to confront Thomas about her testimony that she had moved 
back with Gosciminski because he had threatened her and her family.  Gosciminski 
asserted that it was not Thomas’s decision to move out of their residence, but 
rather that he made her move out because she had an ongoing drug and alcohol 
problem.  During the defense’s cross-examination of Thomas, the court conducted 
a sidebar conference regarding this line of questioning.  The State asserted that this 
matter had been ruled on by the court at Gosciminski’s first trial and the evidence 
had been found irrelevant.  Defense counsel noted that evidence regarding 
Thomas’s drug and alcohol use had been proffered at Gosciminski’s first trial.  The 
parties stipulated that the same evidence would be proffered at this trial as well. 
 
- 43 - 
 
At the first trial, the defense proffered the following testimony from 
Gosciminski about his relationship with Debra Thomas.  Gosciminski met Thomas 
in 2000, and they had broken up and reunited a number of times throughout their 
relationship.  The breakups occurred during times when Thomas was drinking 
alcohol and using drugs that she obtained from her work.  Thomas was addicted to 
both drugs and alcohol and used multiple substances at the same time; her 
addiction affected her ability to be truthful; and she lost jobs and had licensing 
problems because of her addictions.  The breakups occurred each time 
Gosciminski learned that Thomas had relapsed into drug and alcohol use and was 
lying to him about various things.  After each breakup, Thomas would call 
Gosciminski, promise that she was sober, and ask to move back with him.  During 
questioning by the State, Gosciminski also asserted that Thomas had been using his 
credit cards without his permission to purchase beer and other items, had lied about 
her whereabouts to cover up the time she was spending time with Ben Thomas, and 
had stolen from Gosciminski. 
 
The State objected to the admission of any evidence of drug use by Debra 
Thomas as irrelevant, improper character evidence, and hearsay.  Gosciminski’s 
defense counsel argued that the proffered evidence would rebut Thomas’s 
testimony that she only returned to Gosciminski because he had threatened her.  
Instead, defense counsel argued, Thomas’s return had nothing to do with threats 
 
- 44 - 
from Gosciminski, but rather with his tolerance for someone who was an alcohol 
and drug abuser.  Defense counsel also asserted that the proffered evidence would 
rebut the State’s theory that financial problems were Gosciminski’s motive for 
committing the robbery.  To the contrary, counsel argued, this evidence showed 
that it was actually Debra Thomas who was in financial difficulty and who had put 
Gosciminski into difficulty.  The trial court ruled that Gosciminski would be 
confined to testifying about things he actually saw Debra Thomas do or actions 
that she had admitted doing.  During his testimony at the 2005 trial (which was 
played to the jury in the instant trial), Gosciminski testified that he personally 
observed Debra Thomas taking various prescription narcotic drugs and that she 
mixed them with alcohol.  He also testified that Thomas’s drug and alcohol use 
was the source of the problems in their relationship and the reason for their 
breakups, with Thomas requesting the reunions only to relapse into substance 
abuse each time.  Gosciminski also testified that Thomas made various financial 
demands of him, including that he purchase her a new car and a diamond ring and 
that they move to the beach.  However, Gosciminski’s counsel was not permitted 
to question Thomas about this alleged drug and alcohol use on cross-examination. 
 
The Florida Evidence Code provides that “[c]ross-examination of a witness 
is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the 
credibility of the witness.”  § 90.612(2), Fla. Stat. (2009).  The credibility of a 
 
- 45 - 
witness may be attacked “by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a 
crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved 
dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.”  § 90.610(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2009).  The trial judge has wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such 
cross-examination.  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also 
Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1997).  Limitation of cross-examination 
is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.  See Moore, 701 So. 2d at 549; 
Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. 1996).    
 
The State contends that prohibiting Gosciminski from questioning Debra 
Thomas about drug and alcohol use was proper under this Court’s previous case 
law.  The State specifically cites this Court’s decision in Trease v. State, 768 So. 
2d 1050 (Fla. 2000), which held that evidence of drug use for impeachment should 
be excluded unless:   
(a) it can be shown that the witness had been using drugs at or about 
the time of the incident which is the subject of the witness’s 
testimony; (b) it can be shown that the witness is using drugs at or 
about the time of the testimony itself; or (c) it is expressly shown by 
other relevant evidence that the prior drug use affects the witness’s 
ability to observe, remember, and recount. 
Id. at 1054 (quoting Edwards v. State, 548 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. 1989)).   However, 
the defense was not trying to impeach Thomas’s credibility with this evidence of 
drug and alcohol use, but rather to address her direct examination testimony that 
 
- 46 - 
she went back to Gosciminski in August 2002 because he had threatened her.  The 
State opened the door to this line of questioning in its direct examination by asking 
Thomas about her motivation for moving back with Gosciminski and thus it fell 
within the scope of cross-examination permitted by section 90.612(2).  As 
Gosciminski asserted to the trial court, this testimony was relevant to rebut the 
threat testimony as well as the financial motive for Gosciminski committing the 
robbery and murder.  
 
Errors in limiting or restricting the scope of cross-examination are subject to 
harmless error analysis.  See Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 920 (Fla. 2000) 
(finding restriction on cross-examination of deputy as to whether the police had 
provided a lawyer for defendant after his request for counsel was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt because the totality of the evidence demonstrated that the 
statements were voluntarily made and defendant was without counsel at the time 
he was talking to the police); Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 1993) 
(finding that any error in restricting cross-examination of medical examiner was 
harmless in light of the entire record). 
 
In the instant case, although defense counsel was not allowed to question 
Debra Thomas about what role drug and alcohol use played in her breakups with 
Gosciminski, the jury heard this information during the defense’s case-in-chief via 
Gosciminski’s videotaped testimony from the 2005 trial.  Gosciminski testified that 
 
- 47 - 
he personally saw Debra taking narcotic drugs not prescribed to her, that he saw 
her use alcohol along with the drugs, and that her substance addiction was the 
reason for their breakups.  In light of this record, we conclude that the error in 
limiting cross-examination on this issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986). 
IV.  Grand Jury Testimony 
 
In Issue 4, Gosciminski asserts that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for disclosure of Debra Thomas’s grand jury testimony.   Gosciminski filed 
a pretrial motion for disclosure of all grand jury testimony.  During a pretrial 
hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that Thomas’s testimony that she 
saw Gosciminski washing up in their home on the day of the murder had changed 
between her sworn deposition, which was made before the first trial, and her 
testimony at the first trial.  Thus, the defense requested that Thomas’s grand jury 
testimony be disclosed in order to reveal other inconsistencies in her testimony.  At 
the pretrial hearing, the parties presented the various statements that Thomas had 
made in regard to this incident and its timeline.  After conducting an in camera 
review of Thomas’s grand jury testimony to compare it with her deposition and 
trial testimony, the trial court found no evidence of perjury or material 
inconsistencies that would justify disclosure of secret grand jury proceedings.  The 
court found Thomas’s trial testimony and grand jury testimony to be generally 
 
- 48 - 
consistent.  In denying Gosciminski’s motion, the trial court noted, “It is clear that 
the witness, quite simply, does not know the exact time of the defendant’s arrival 
or departure, but can only reference it to somewhere around lunch time.”  During 
this appeal, Gosciminski filed a motion to supplement the record with the grand 
jury testimony.  We ordered the grand jury testimony to be submitted under seal.   
Under section 905.27, Florida Statutes (2009), the disclosure of grand jury 
testimony is not permitted except under three limited circumstances: (1) to 
determine whether the grand jury testimony is consistent with the testimony given 
by the witness before the court; (2) to determine whether the witness is guilty of 
perjury; or (3) in furtherance of justice.  In applying this provision, this Court 
initially held that “[t]here is no pretrial right to inspect grand jury testimony as an 
aid in preparing one’s defense and holding an in camera inspection of such 
testimony is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.”  Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d 
1024, 1027 (Fla. 1981).  In order to obtain access to such testimony, “a proper 
predicate must be laid.  Mere surmise or speculation regarding possible 
inconsistencies in testimony is not a proper predicate.”  Id. at 1027.  We later 
explained this standard in Keen v. State, 639 So. 2d 597, 600 (Fla. 1994), when we 
ruled that “a party must show a particularized need sufficient to justify the 
revelation of the generally secret grand jury proceedings.”  We also reiterated that 
 
- 49 - 
it is within the discretion of the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection of the 
grand jury testimony.  Id.   
In this case, Gosciminski made a narrow and specific request regarding 
Debra Thomas’s grand jury testimony.  The trial court responded to that request by 
conducting an in camera review of the testimony and concluding that the testimony 
did not meet any of the reasons for which grand jury testimony can be disclosed, 
i.e., it was not inconsistent with Thomas’s trial testimony, there was no evidence of 
perjury, and it was not required in the furtherance of justice.  Moreover, defense 
counsel was able to cross-examine Debra Thomas with her statements to the 
police, her deposition, and her prior trial testimony to show alleged inconsistencies 
or uncertainty as to when Gosciminski returned home on the day of murder.  This 
obviated any need to resort to the grand jury testimony.  See Brookings v. State, 
495 So. 2d 135, 138 (Fla. 1986) (finding allegations of inconsistencies in various 
statements of state witnesses were insufficient to require disclosure of witnesses’ 
grand jury testimony where defense was able during cross-examination to direct 
jury’s attention to any purported inconsistencies between the witnesses’ trial 
testimony and prior depositions).  
In her original statement to the police, Thomas stated that Gosciminski came 
home at around 1 p.m. on September 24, 2002.  A few days later, she told the 
police that it was “early afternoon.”  In her deposition, Thomas stated that 
 
- 50 - 
Gosciminski came home “around one o’clock.”  At the first trial, Thomas testified 
that she didn’t know exactly when Gosciminski came into the house, but it was in 
the vicinity of lunchtime and between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m.  Review of Thomas’s 
sealed grand jury testimony shows that there was no material inconsistency in her 
testimony.  Thus, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue. 
V.  Circumstantial Evidence Instruction 
 
Gosciminski makes two arguments in Issue 5 regarding his request that the 
trial court give the previous standard jury instruction on circumstantial evidence.19
                                         
 
19.  This Court deleted this instruction from the standard instructions in 
1981, finding that where the jury is properly instructed on the standard of 
reasonable doubt, the circumstantial evidence instruction was “confusing and 
incorrect.”  In re Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal 
Cases, 431 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1981) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 
121, 140 (1954)).  Since we deleted the instruction on circumstantial evidence 
from the standard jury instructions, we have consistently found that it is within the 
trial court’s discretion to not give such an instruction.  See, e.g., Huggins v. State, 
889 So. 2d 743, 767 (Fla. 2004); Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383, 400 (Fla. 2002) 
(“We have previously stated that when proper instructions on reasonable doubt and 
burden of proof are given, an instruction on circumstantial evidence is 
‘unnecessary.’ ”); Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2002); Monlyn v. State, 
705 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1997). 
  
He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the 
instruction he requested and the court erred in overruling his objection to the 
State’s closing argument regarding circumstantial evidence.  During the charge 
conference, the trial court stated that it was exercising its discretion not to give the 
requested instruction because it was fairly embraced within the definition of 
 
- 51 - 
reasonable doubt.  When defense counsel stated his intent to use a poster 
containing the instruction as a demonstrative aid during closing argument, the trial 
court responded that counsel could use the instruction as argument, but could not 
tell the jury that this was the law in Florida.  During closing argument, defense 
counsel discussed circumstantial evidence and essentially tracked the language of 
the previous standard instruction.  However, defense counsel also told the jury that 
“this is the standard you must apply,” “you are required” to follow this standard, 
and “you must accept the construction [of the evidence] indicating innocence.”  In 
its rebuttal closing argument, the State responded that the defendant’s argument 
and poster relating to circumstantial evidence was not the law, even though defense 
counsel referred to it as the law, and that the judge was not going to give this 
instruction to the jury.  When Gosciminski objected to the State’s closing 
argument, the trial court overruled the objection, finding that the defendant had 
invited the State’s response by presenting his closing argument in the format of a 
jury instruction and asserting that this was the law.  The State was permitted to 
explain that this was an argument the defense could make, but that it was not the 
law and the judge was not going to instruct the jury on it. 
 
There is no merit to either of Gosciminski’s claims relating to the 
circumstantial evidence instruction.  The trial court gave proper instructions on 
reasonable doubt and the burden of proof, and, thus, did not abuse its discretion in 
 
- 52 - 
refusing to give the requested instruction on circumstantial evidence.  The trial 
court specifically warned defense counsel that he could not refer to his 
circumstantial evidence argument as the law.  However, defense counsel persisted 
in stating that this was the law and that the jury was required to follow the 
circumstantial evidence instruction that he presented.  Thus, it was not error to 
permit the State to correctly inform the jury that this was not the law and they 
would not receive such an instruction from the court.  The jury was properly 
instructed on the standard of proof and the definition of reasonable doubt and that 
only the judge’s instructions were the law it was to follow.  There was no error in 
this regard.  
VI.  Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
 
In Issue 8, Gosciminski argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for judgment of acquittal (JOA).  At the close of the State’s case, 
Gosciminski’s trial counsel moved for JOA, arguing that the circumstantial 
evidence presented failed to prove that Gosciminski was the perpetrator of this 
crime.  In denying the motion for JOA, the trial court noted “the seamless web of 
circumstantial evidence” presented by the State and cited the long list of 
circumstantial evidence regarding the crime.  The trial court concluded that “the 
cumulative effect of this circumstantial evidence is more than sufficient to sustain 
a conviction.”  
 
- 53 - 
 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo 
standard of review applies.  Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002).  
Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction which is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  See Donaldson v. State, 722 So. 2d 177, 182 
(Fla. 1998); Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 964 (Fla. 1996).  If, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find 
the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient 
evidence exists to sustain a conviction.  Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 803. 
 
However, where a conviction is based wholly on circumstantial evidence,20
                                         
 
20.  “Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances 
from which the trier of fact may infer that the ultimate facts in dispute existed or 
did not exist.  The conclusion as to the ultimate facts must be one which in the 
common experiences of men may reasonably be made on the basis of the known 
facts and circumstances.”  Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956). 
 a 
special standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence applies.  Jaramillo v. 
State, 417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982).  Not only must there be sufficient evidence 
establishing each element of the offense, but the evidence must also exclude the 
defendant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  See Jackson v. State, 25 So. 3d 
518, 531 (Fla. 2009); Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1996).  “[I]n such 
cases, the test to be applied on motion for judgment of acquittal and on review of 
the denial of such a motion is not simply whether in the opinion of the trial judge 
or of the appellate court the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
 
- 54 - 
but that of guilt, but rather whether the jury must reasonably so conclude.”  
Hernandez v. State, 305 So. 2d 211, 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); see also Jones v. 
State, 466 So. 2d 301, 302 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), approved, 485 So. 2d 1283 
(Fla. 1986). 
 
We explained how the circumstantial evidence standard applies to a motion 
for a judgment of acquittal in State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989): 
Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how 
strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be 
sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence.  The question of whether the evidence fails 
to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to 
determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to 
support the jury verdict, we will not reverse. 
. . . . 
. . . A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a 
circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from 
which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 
guilt.  Consistent with the standard set forth in Lynch [v, State, 293 
So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974)], if the state does not offer evidence which is 
inconsistent with the defendant's hypothesis, “the evidence [would be] 
such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to 
the [state] can be sustained under the law.”  [Id.
 
It is the trial judge’s proper task to review the evidence to 
determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which 
the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences.  That 
view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the 
state.  The state is not required to “rebut conclusively every possible 
variation” of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but 
only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the 
]  The state’s evidence 
would be as a matter of law “insufficient to warrant a conviction.” Fla. 
R.Crim. P. 3.380. 
 
- 55 - 
defendant’s theory of events.  Once that threshold burden is met, it 
becomes the jury’s duty to determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 188-89 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 
This Court’s review is limited to ensuring that the State presented 
competent, substantial evidence that is consistent with defendant’s guilt and 
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  Jackson, 25 So. 3d at 
532.  We conclude that the State did so in this case. 
 
The State presented evidence showing that Gosciminski was the last person 
to see Loughman on the night before she was murdered.  Gosciminski stated his 
intent to get his girlfriend a two-carat diamond ring, like the ring that was stolen 
from Loughman when she was murdered.  He had been to the Vala residence at an 
earlier date, was familiar with the layout of the house, and knew that Loughman 
was staying in the house by herself.  On the morning of the murder, Gosciminski 
did not go to work even though he was scheduled to attend a meeting with one of 
the facility’s directors.  Instead, Gosciminski called the director and stated that he 
was going to be conducting a presentation at another facility that morning.  
However, when later questioned by the police about his whereabouts that morning, 
Gosciminski stated that he was home packing boxes.  In his 2005 trial testimony, 
which was played to the jury in 2009, Gosciminski stated that he had made a 
 
- 56 - 
presentation at another facility and then made numerous stops to deliver brochures 
and displays to various businesses.  Debra Thomas testified that she observed 
Gosciminski in the bathroom of their home at “lunchtime” on that day washing 
blood off his arm.  Thomas also observed a pile of bloody clothing on the 
bathroom floor.  Gosciminski showed up at work after lunch freshly scrubbed with 
his hair wet and slicked back.  He showed two co-workers a diamond ring that he 
intended to give Debra Thomas.  The ring was not in a box, but wrapped in a tissue 
or napkin in his pocket.  Gosciminski actually gave Thomas the ring that evening 
and a number of witnesses, including Thomas, described the ring as a two-carat 
round diamond in a platinum or white gold band with rectangular diamond 
baguettes on each side.  Several witnesses who saw the ring were able to identify a 
replica of Loughman’s ring from a lineup as matching the ring Gosciminski gave 
to Thomas.  After talking to the police, Gosciminski called Thomas and stated that 
the ring was hot.  Upon arriving home, Gosciminski took the ring out to the beach 
and it was never seen again.  The victim’s fanny pack, containing her credit cards 
and checkbook, was found along I-95 at a location where cell phone records 
showed that Gosciminski had made a phone call that morning.  Gosciminski also 
made a cash deposit at a location close to where the fanny pack was found and at a 
time consistent with his cell phone records.  The cell phone records also showed 
that Gosciminski’s phone hit a cell phone tower in the area of the murder three 
 
- 57 - 
times during the time frame when the victim was murdered.  The victim’s other 
jewelry was found in a shed at a home that Gosciminski visited regularly for 
several weeks and which Gosciminski had access to.  The jewelry found in the 
shed was inside a Geoffrey Bean cologne bag.  Debra Thomas testified she had 
bought this cologne for Gosciminski and that the bag had been in his dresser 
drawer until the murder. 
 
The evidence presented was also legally sufficient to contradict 
Gosciminski’s hypothesis of innocence.  Gosciminski’s theory of defense was that 
he did not kill the victim and someone else was the murderer.  The defense pointed 
a finger at Ben Thomas.  However, Ben Thomas testified as a State witness about 
his activities on the day of the murder.  Ben Thomas’s account of that day was 
supported by receipts and other records.  Additionally, Gosciminski’s assertion that 
he was in downtown Fort Pierce distributing brochures at a boutique when his cell 
phone activated the cell tower closest to the murder scene was rebutted by another 
State witness.  The owner of the boutique testified that she did not allow such 
displays in her shop and that she did not open the shop until 10 a.m.  
Gosciminski’s three phone calls hit that cell tower at 9:12 a.m., 9:27 a.m., and 9:28 
a.m.  The State also presented evidence that if Gosciminski had been in downtown 
Fort Pierce as he claimed, he had passed up a branch office of his bank in favor of 
two other branches well away from his work.   This evidence was legally sufficient 
 
- 58 - 
to support the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.  Thus, we 
find no error as to this issue. 
VII.  CCP Aggravating Circumstance 
 
Issues 15 and 16 both relate to the application of the cold, calculated, and 
premeditated (CCP) aggravating circumstance in this case.  Gosciminski argues 
that the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravator.  In reviewing the finding of 
an aggravating circumstance,  
it is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt—that is the trial court’s job.  Rather, [this Court’s] 
task on appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial 
court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance 
and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its 
finding.   
 
Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997) (footnote omitted); see also 
Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 905 (Fla. 1990) (“When there is a legal basis 
to support finding an aggravating factor, we will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial court . . . .”).  Thus, the scope of our review is limited “to ensuring 
that the trial court applied the correct rule of law, and if so, that there is competent, 
substantial evidence to support its findings” as to an aggravating factor.  Caballero 
v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 661 (Fla. 2003) (citing Willacy, 696 So. 2d at 695).  
 
A determination of whether CCP is present is properly based on a 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.  See Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 
 
- 59 - 
96, 116 (Fla. 2008); Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 372 (Fla. 2003).  For CCP to 
be found, the killing must be 
the product of a cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by 
emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold); that the defendant had 
a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal 
incident (calculated); that the defendant exhibited heightened 
premeditation (premeditated); and that the defendant had no pretense 
of moral or legal justification. 
 
Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007).  The trial court applied this four-
part rule of law in conducting its analysis in this case.  Thus, the only question here 
is whether the trial court’s conclusion that the murder was CCP is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence in the record.  See Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98.  
Simply proving a premeditated murder for purposes of guilt is not enough to 
support CCP; greater deliberation and reflection is required.  Walls v. State, 641 
So. 2d 381, 388 (Fla. 1994). 
 
As stated above, the CCP aggravator applies when the evidence supports 
each of the four elements described in Lynch.  First, the murder must have been 
“cold.”  This element has been found wanting “only for ‘heated’ murders of 
passion, in which the loss of emotional control is evident from the facts.”  Walls, 
641 So. 2d at 387-88.  Second, “[t]he calculated element applies in cases where the 
defendant arms himself in advance, kills execution-style, plans his actions, and has 
time to coldly and calmly decide to kill.”  Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 299 (Fla. 
 
- 60 - 
2009).  A plan to kill may be demonstrated by the defendant’s actions and the 
circumstances surrounding the murder even when there is evidence that the final 
decision to kill was not made until shortly before the murder itself.  Durocher v. 
State, 596 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1992).  Third, heightened premeditation can be 
established by examining the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the 
accused.  The CCP aggravator can be indicated by circumstances showing such 
facts as advance procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and 
the appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course.  Franklin, 965 So. 2d 
at 98.  Taking a victim to an isolated location or choosing an isolated location to 
carry out an attack can also be indicative of a plan or prearranged design to kill.  
See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 696 (Fla. 1994).  Lack of resistance 
or provocation by the victim can indicate both a cold plan to kill as well as negate 
any pretense of justification.  Id. (noting that there was no indication that one of the 
victims resisted the defendant); Eutzy v. State, 458 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 1984) 
(noting no evidence of a struggle).  The manner in which a murder is carried out 
can also indicate a cold and calm plan.  See, e.g., Eutzy, 458 So. 2d at 757 
(shooting the victim once in the head execution-style).  Finally, the murder must 
have been committed without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  Lynch, 
841 So. 2d at 371.  “[A] pretense of moral or legal justification is any colorable 
claim based at least partly on uncontroverted and believable factual evidence or 
 
- 61 - 
testimony that, but for its incompleteness, would constitute an excuse, justification, 
or defense as to the homicide.”  Walls, 641 So. 2d at 388.    
The sentencing order in the instant case cites the following facts as 
supporting the CCP aggravator.  Gosciminski wanted to obtain a ring for his 
girlfriend who had recently moved back with him after having an affair with 
another man; he noticed all of Loughman’s expensive jewelry, especially her two-
carat diamond ring, and commented to Loughman that he wanted to get his 
girlfriend a two-carat diamond ring.  About two weeks prior to the murder, 
Gosciminski went to the Vala residence to help Loughman move her father’s 
belongings and furniture to Lyford Cove, which gave Gosciminski the opportunity 
to learn that Loughman was staying at the house by herself and to see where the 
house was located and the layout of the residence.  On the night before the murder, 
Loughman arranged to meet Gosciminski at Lyford Cove to pick up her father’s 
belongings as he was being moved to a hospice facility.  Thus, Gosciminski knew 
that the opportunity to see Loughman in the future was rapidly coming to an end.  
On the morning of the murder, Gosciminski phoned Lyford Cove to excuse himself 
from a scheduled 8:00 a.m. staff meeting and stated that instead he would be 
making a presentation at another facility.  At 10:08 a.m., Gosciminski made a cash 
deposit at Palm City Harbor Federal Bank.  Gosciminski arrived at Lyford Cove 
shortly after lunch that day, appearing freshly scrubbed and showered.  Upon his 
 
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arrival, Gosciminski showed two co-workers a two-carat diamond ring that he 
intended to give to Debra Thomas.  All of Loughman’s jewelry was removed from 
her body, as well as her fanny pack containing her wallet, checkbook, and credit 
cards.   Cell phone records show no phone activity on Gosciminski’s phone 
between 8:37 a.m. and 9:12 a.m. on the morning of the murder.  At 8:47 a.m., 
Loughman told her sister that she had to get off the phone because someone was at 
the door.   
The sentencing order also noted the medical testimony related to 
Loughman’s murder.  The attack commenced near the front entrance as soon as the 
attacker entered the house, based on the blood and other evidence found in the 
hallway.  Loughman was then dragged into a bedroom where she was out of view 
of the front window.  In the bedroom, Loughman was severely bludgeoned with an 
ashtray stand and stabbed in the back.  She either turned over or was turned over 
by her attacker because she was also stabbed and cut on the face and neck.  Her 
throat was cut by a knife or knife-like object, severing her jugular vein and causing 
her death.  Loughman had a defensive wound on her left hand that matched a 
broken portion of the ashtray stand, indicating that she had already been stuck at 
least once because the stand had to have been broken by the force of a blow prior 
to the time the defensive wound was made.  Based on this evidence, the trial court 
found that Gosciminski armed himself with a knife or knife-like object either 
 
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before he went to the residence or after he arrived at the residence.  The 
investigation by law enforcement revealed no evidence of forced entry into the 
residence and no evidence to suggest that the murder was prompted by emotional 
frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage. 
These facts are sufficient to support the CCP aggravator as it evinces a pre-
arranged design to commit the murder and also exhibits heightened premeditation.  
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the CCP 
aggravating circumstance is applicable to this case. 
VIII.  HAC Aggravating Circumstance 
 
In Issue 17, Gosciminski argues that the trial court erred in finding the 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance (HAC).  As noted in the 
discussion of CCP above, in reviewing the finding of an aggravating circumstance, 
“it is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the 
State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is 
the trial court’s job.  Rather, [this Court’s] task on appeal is to review the record to 
determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating 
circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its 
finding.”  Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695-96 (Fla. 1997) (footnote omitted).  
 
The meaning of the HAC aggravating circumstance terms are “a matter of 
common knowledge” and are interpreted as follows:  “heinous means extremely 
 
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wicked or shockingly evil; . . . atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, 
. . . cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, 
or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.”  State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 
(Fla. 1973).  The HAC aggravator focuses on the means and manner in which 
death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death.  Barnhill 
v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2002).  In determining whether the HAC 
aggravator is present, the focus is upon the victim’s perceptions of the 
circumstances as opposed to those of the perpetrator.  Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 369.  
To support this aggravator, the evidence must demonstrate that the victim was 
conscious and aware of impending death.  Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1261 
(Fla. 2004).  Stated otherwise, the HAC aggravator is proper “only in torturous 
murders—those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified 
either by the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to or 
enjoyment of the suffering of another.”  Guzman v. State,721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 
(Fla. 1998).  The crime must be “conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim.”  Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992).   
The trial court applied the correct rule of law in determining that HAC 
applied.  Thus, the only question for this Court is whether there is sufficient 
competent evidence in the record from which the judge and jury could properly 
find the presence of HAC. 
 
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The sentencing order cited a number of facts as supporting the HAC 
aggravator, including the manner of the attack and the nature of the victim’s 
wounds.  The attack commenced shortly after Loughman let Gosciminski into the 
residence.  Due to her physical limitations, there was little Loughman could do to 
resist the attack.  She was struck so hard that her eyeglasses flew across the room.  
The autopsy revealed three types of wounds to Loughman: (1) blunt impact 
injuries to the head; (2) cutting wounds to the neck and face; and (3) stab wounds 
to the neck, back, and chest.  The lethal wound was a cutting wound over the neck 
that severed the jugular vein and caused Loughman to bleed to death.  Other 
wounds included three stab wounds – in the mid-back between her shoulder blades, 
to the right of her spine which perforated the right lung, and in her left chest which 
perforated a rib.  She also had a large laceration on the back of her left hand, which 
was a defensive wound.  The cutting wounds and stabbing wounds were both 
caused by a knife or knife-like object.  During the bludgeoning in the bedroom, 
two of Loughman’s teeth were knocked out of her head and two others were 
uprooted and lodged in the back of her mouth, indicating the intensity of the attack.  
Broken pieces of a metal ashtray stand found around Loughman’s head in the 
bedroom were consistent with the blunt head trauma.  The variety of wounds and 
their placement on both the front and back of Loughman’s body indicated that she 
was conscious and struggling during at least part of the attack.  All of these facts 
 
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are supported by sufficient competent evidence presented through the medical 
testimony.   
We have consistently affirmed the HAC aggravator where the victim was 
repeatedly stabbed and remained conscious during part of the attack.  Boyd v. 
State, 910 So 2d 167, 191 (Fla. 2005).  When a victim sustains defensive wounds 
during an attack, it indicates that the victim did not die instantaneously, and in such 
a circumstance, the trial court can properly find the HAC aggravator.  See Rolling 
v. State, 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997); see also Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 
1155 (Fla. 2006) (upholding trial court’s finding of the HAC aggravator where the 
testimony by the medical examiner established that the victims exhibited defensive 
wounds, indicating that they were conscious during some part of the attack and 
attempting to ward off their attacker).  While the exact order of Loughman’s 
wounds could not be established (except that the neck wound was the fatal wound), 
there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that 
Loughman was alive and conscious for some of the attack and struggled with her 
attacker.  See Boyd, 910 So. 2d at 191. 
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the HAC 
aggravating circumstance. 
IX.  Constitutionality of Florida’s Death Penalty Statute 
 
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In Issue 18, Gosciminski seeks relief pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002), where the United States Supreme Court held the Arizona capital 
sentencing statute unconstitutional “to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, 
sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition 
of the death penalty.”  Id. at 609.  This Court has consistently rejected 
constitutional challenges to Florida’s capital sentencing statute under Ring.  See 
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 
(Fla. 2002).  Moreover, “the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has reviewed 
and upheld Florida’s capital sentencing statute over the past quarter of a century.”  
Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695 (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 
(1983)).  
 
Gosciminski does not present any new arguments in challenging the 
constitutionality of Florida’s death-penalty statute.  Significantly, this Court has 
rejected similar Ring challenges where the trial court has found as an aggravating 
circumstance that the crime was committed in the course of a felony or that the 
defendant has a prior violent felony conviction as both of these aggravators involve 
facts that were already submitted to a jury and thus are in compliance with Ring.  
See McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 795 (Fla. 2010) (citing Robinson v. State, 865 
So. 2d 1259, 1265 (Fla. 2004)); Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 117-18 (Fla. 
 
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2008).   By a unanimous verdict, the jury found Gosciminski guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of robbing Joan Loughman and burglarizing the residence she 
was occupying at the time of her murder.  The “murder in the course of a felony” 
aggravator found by the trial court rests on these separate convictions of robbery 
and burglary, which satisfies the Sixth Amendment requirements.  See Johnson v. 
State, 969 So. 2d 938, 961 (Fla. 2007).  Thus, we find no merit to this claim. 
X.  Proportionality 
Although Gosciminski does not raise this issue on appeal, the State asserts 
that the death sentence is proportional in this case.  This Court has explained that 
“a proportionality review is inherent in this Court’s direct appellate review and the 
issue is considered regardless of whether it is discussed in the opinion or raised by 
a party.”  Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 380 (Fla. 2004). 
In deciding whether the death sentence is proportional in a particular case, 
this Court is required to consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the case 
and compare it to other capital cases.  See Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 
(Fla. 2000) (citing Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998)); Brown v. State, 721 
So. 2d 274, 282 (Fla. 1998).  The purpose of proportionality review by this Court is 
“to prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments contrary to article I, section 17 
of the Florida Constitution.”  Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 291 (Fla. 2004).  
Proportionality analysis “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating 
 
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and mitigating circumstances.”  Sexton, 775 So. 2d at 935 (citing Porter v. State, 
564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)).  “Rather, this entails ‘a qualitative review by 
this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a 
quantitative analysis.’ ”  Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1148 (Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 416).  
In the instant case, Gosciminski was convicted of the stabbing/bludgeoning 
murder of Joan Loughman along with robbery and burglary.  The trial court found 
three aggravators:  (1) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification; (2) the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (3) the murder for which 
Gosciminski was to be sentenced was committed while he was engaged in the 
commission of a robbery or burglary, which was merged with the pecuniary gain 
aggravator.  The trial court gave each of these aggravators great weight.  The court 
found the statutory mitigator of no significant history of criminal activity and 
thirteen nonstatutory mitigators, which were given little to moderate weight.   
This case is comparable to other cases in which we have upheld the death 
penalty based upon similar factual circumstances and a weighing of similar 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  See, e.g., Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 
47-48 (Fla. 2003) (holding death penalty proportionate in stabbing death where the 
court found three aggravators of prior violent felony, murder committed during the 
 
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course of a robbery merged with pecuniary gain, and HAC versus twelve 
nonstatutory mitigators); Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 246 (Fla. 1999) (finding 
death sentence proportionate in a bludgeoning and stabbing death where the trial 
court found the three aggravators of HAC, CCP, and committed during the course 
of a robbery versus one statutory mitigator of age and fifteen nonstatutory 
mitigators); Foster v. State, 654 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1995) (holding death penalty 
proportionate where victim was beaten and stabbed and trial court found the three 
aggravators of HAC, CCP, and murder in the course of felony versus fourteen 
nonstatutory mitigators).  Thus, we conclude that Gosciminski’s death sentence is 
proportionate.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the analysis above, we affirm Gosciminski’s convictions for first-
degree murder, robbery, and burglary and the sentence of death imposed for the 
murder. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J.,  and CANADY, J., concur in result. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
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PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
I concur in affirming the convictions and sentence of death but disagree with 
the majority’s analysis of two issues.  First, I disagree with the majority’s approach 
to, and conclusion regarding, the relevancy of the threats allegedly made by 
Gosciminski, as testified to by Debra Thomas.  Second, I also disagree with the 
majority that the evidence in this case supports a finding of the CCP aggravator, 
because in my view, the heightened premeditation supports a plan to rob—not to 
murder.  I discuss each of these issues in turn. 
First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that evidence of allegedly 
threatening comments made by Gosciminski to Debra Thomas was admissible in 
order to establish the context in which the charged criminal acts occurred.  In my 
view, the reason that Debra Thomas stayed with Gosciminski, which was allegedly 
his threats to harm Debra Thomas and others, has no relevance to the murder in 
question.   
Further, even if this testimony is considered marginally relevant, the 
majority does not analyze why this marginal relevance related to Gosciminski’s 
supposed obsession with Debra Thomas would not be substantially outweighed by 
the unduly prejudicial impact of the testimony that Gosciminski previously 
threatened to harm Debra Thomas and numerous other individuals.  See § 90.403, 
Fla. Stat. (2009).  Such testimony is the quintessential example of evidence that 
 
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would lead a jury to believe that this defendant was a “bad guy” based on other 
“bad conduct,” and for that reason should especially be excluded in light of its 
minimal probative value.   
The bottom line, however, is that although I believe that the threat testimony 
should have been excluded based on an evidentiary prejudice analysis under 
section 90.403, any error in not precluding this testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, based on the fact that the statement about the threats was 
mentioned only once during Debra Thomas’s testimony and was referred to only 
briefly during the State’s closing argument.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 
1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986).  In addition, it appears that the trial court did limit the 
scope of this testimony by precluding certain details, such as the mention of an 
alleged domestic violence incident in which Debra Thomas broke her arm.   
Second, I would strike the CCP aggravator as unsupported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  The trial court’s basis for finding CCP appears to be that 
Gosciminski wanted to obtain a ring for his girlfriend, noticed all of the victim’s 
expensive jewelry, and knew that the victim would be staying at the house by 
herself.  However, to me, all of these facts suggest a planned robbery, rather than a 
planned murder.   
The only evidence indicating that Gosciminski’s plan was to commit murder 
and not just robbery was that he arrived at the front door at a time when the victim 
 
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was at home, that there was no sign of forced entry, and that the attack commenced 
near the front entrance as soon as he entered the house.  It is unclear whether 
Gosciminski brought a weapon with him to the house, as the primary weapon 
appears to have been an ashtray stand statue that was located inside the house, and 
the trial court found that Gosciminski armed himself with a knife or knife-like 
object either before or after he arrived at the residence.   
Although the majority concludes that there was no evidence to suggest that 
the murder was prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage, this in itself 
does not establish CCP but only supports the “cold” element of the aggravator.  
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 195 (Fla. 2010) (“In order to establish 
the CCP aggravator, the evidence must show: (1) ‘the killing was the product of 
cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a 
fit of rage (cold)’; (2) ‘the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to 
commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated)’; (3) ‘the defendant exhibited 
heightened premeditation (premeditated)’; (4) ‘the defendant had no pretense of 
moral or legal justification.’ ” (quoting Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 
2007))).  However, the element of heightened premeditation to murder—noticeably 
absent here—is still required to establish CCP.       
In sum, I would conclude that there is not competent, substantial evidence to 
support CCP in this case because the motive for committing this crime appears to 
 
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have been the robbery, and the majority’s CCP analysis in my view all points to a 
planned robbery, rather than a planned murder.  Even without CCP, however, this 
case includes two other aggravating circumstances that were assigned great 
weight—HAC and during the commission of a burglary (merged with pecuniary 
gain)—and relatively little mitigation.  Accordingly, error in finding CCP in this 
case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139.  
For all these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority to affirm 
Gosciminski’s convictions and sentence of death, but do not join in the majority’s 
reasoning regarding the issues addressed above.    
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St. Lucie County,  
Robert Eugene Belanger, Judge - Case No. 562002CF003515A 
 
Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant 
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee