Title: DONALD S. QUINN V. SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DONALD S. QUINN V. SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES2007 WY 91158 P.3d 711Case Number: 06-194Decided: 05/30/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DONALD S. 
QUINN,

 
 
Appellant

(Claimant),

 
 
v.

 
 
SECURITAS SECURITY 
SERVICES

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofConverseCounty

The Honorable John C. 
Brooks, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Bill G. 
Hibbler, Bill G. Hibbler, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Keith R. 
Nachbar, Keith R. Nachbar, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, Justice, files a dissenting 
opinion, in which KITE, Justice, joins.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this worker's 
compensation appeal, Donald S. Quinn challenges the denial of benefits for 
injuries he sustained while traveling to work.  He contends the hearing examiner erred 
by entering summary judgment in favor of his employer, Securitas Security 
Services ("Securitas").  Mr. Quinn 
asserts he was being transported by a vehicle of his employer when he was 
injured and, as a result, his injuries are compensable pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  The 
district court affirmed the summary judgment.  We also affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Was Mr. Quinn 
injured while he was traveling in a vehicle of his employer pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D)? 

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]      The facts are not 
in dispute. Securitas employed Mr. Quinn as a security guard/EMT and assigned 
him to the North Antelope Rochelle Coal Mine ("mine") in CampbellCounty.  Securitas provided services to the mine 
pursuant to a contract.  As a 
courtesy, the mine permitted Securitas' employees to ride a bus that the mine 
provided for its employees.  The 
mine arranged bus transportation from Douglas to Gillette, through Powder River 
Bus Company ("Powder River").  Securitas did not have any agreement 
with Powder River and did not pay any amount 
for bus transportation.

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Quinn was 
informed during the hiring process that he would have the option of riding the 
mine's bus if he desired.  He 
considered the bus transportation an important benefit because he commuted to 
the mine from his home in Glendo, Wyoming.  
Mr. Quinn claims he would not have accepted employment with Securitas if 
such transportation had not been available. 

 
 
[¶5]      On July 22, 2004, 
Mr. Quinn was riding the bus from Douglas to 
Gillette, via Highway 59, heading to the mine to report for his evening 
shift.  The bus collided with 
another vehicle and rolled.  Mr. 
Quinn sustained injuries to his head, left arm, back, left ribs and left 
hip.  He sought worker's 
compensation benefits for his injuries.

 
 
[¶6]      Securitas 
objected to Mr. Quinn's claim, asserting that he was not in the course and scope 
of his employment at the time of the bus accident.  The matter was referred to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) for contested case proceedings.  Both parties moved for summary judgment, 
and the hearing officer heard oral argument on the motions.  The hearing officer concluded that the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment presented no issues of material fact 
and involved only questions of law.  
The hearing officer granted summary judgment to Securitas and denied Mr. 
Quinn's motion for summary judgment.  
Mr. Quinn appealed to the district court, which affirmed the OAH 
decision.  This appeal 
followed.

            

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      We review agency 
action pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005).  We "[h]old unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings and conclusions found to be  [a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A).  We afford no 
deference to the district court's decision and, instead, review the case as if 
it came directly from the agency.  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 2002).  The interpretation and correct 
application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are 
questions of law, which we review de 
novo. Alcorn v. Sauer Drilling 
Co., 2006 WY 15, ¶ 6, 126 P.3d 924, 925 
(Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶8]      The summary 
judgment procedures set forth in W.R.C.P. 56 apply to worker's compensation 
cases, and we apply our well-established standard for reviewing summary 
judgments.  Chavez v. Mem'l Hosp. of SweetwaterCounty, 2006 WY 82, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d 185, 
188 (Wyo. 2006).  The purpose of 
summary judgment is to dispose of suits before trial that present no genuine 
issue of material fact. Id.  Summary judgment motions 
are determined under the following language from W.R.C.P. 
56(c):

 
 
The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
This Court reviews a 
summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same 
materials and following the same standards.  Chavez, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d  at 188.  We view the record from the vantage point 
most favorable to the party who opposed the motion and give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. 
 Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      We begin our 
analysis with the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (LexisNexis 
2003), which provides:

 
 
            
(xi) "Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism 
other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial 
replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at 
work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and 
incurred while at work in places where the employer's business requires an 
employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties 
incident to the business. "Injury" does 
not include:

            

            


 
 

(D) Any injury sustained during travel to or 
from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is 
transported by a vehicle of the employer;

 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Mr. Quinn asserts that his injuries are 
not excluded from worker's compensation coverage by this statute because the 
second exception stated in subsection (D) applies.  Thus, our focus in resolving this appeal 
is upon the "transported by a vehicle of the employer" language in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  Because 
the undisputed facts demonstrate Mr. Quinn was traveling to work when he was 
injured, his injuries are not compensable unless he was being transported by a 
vehicle of his employer.  

 
 
[¶10]   The hearing officer granted 
Securitas' motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that Mr. 
Quinn was injured while traveling to work and that the bus was not a vehicle of 
Securitas.  Mr. Quinn contends the 
hearing officer's determination was erroneous and maintains that he was in the 
course of his employment when he was injured.  He reasons that his injuries are 
compensable because Securitas provided transportation for its employees.  According to Mr. Quinn, proper 
interpretation of the contract establishes that at the time he was injured, he 
was being transported by a vehicle of his employer as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  

 
 
[¶11]   We have previously construed the 
definition of injury provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a) and the 
exclusion set forth in subsection (D) of that statute.  An injury within the meaning of the 
statute requires a causal nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, 
environment or requirement of the employment.  Archuleta v. CarbonCountySch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 
(Wyo. 
1990).  Generally, this causal nexus 
is lacking when an employee is traveling to work.  Id., 787 P.2d  at 
93.  Subsection (D) codified this 
long-standing common law rule that injuries incurred while either going to or 
coming from work are not compensable.  
It also codified the recognized exceptions to the general rule.  Those exceptions find a causal nexus 
where the employer has in some fashion provided the employee with transportation 
or has reimbursed him for the costs of those travels.  Berg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 23, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2005); Archuleta, 787 P.2d  at 92; In re Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 
1241 (Wyo. 1986).  The language of 
subsection (D) of this statute is unambiguous.  Berg, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d  at 871; Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2004 WY 85, ¶ 13, 93 P.3d 1001, 1004 (Wyo. 
2004).   

 
 
[¶12]   Relying upon our decision in Berg, Mr. Quinn argues that his injuries 
are compensable because Securitas "provided transportation" for its employees 
"in some fashion."  He asserts that 
he was being "transported by a vehicle of the employer" within the meaning of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) when he was riding the bus to the mine. 
 In Mr. Quinn's analysis, he equates 
the contract between the mine and Securitas to a negotiated contract securing 
transportation for Securitas employees.  
However, the contract language does not support his theory.  The contract between Securitas and the 
mine provides, in pertinent part: 

 
 
[Securitas] personnel, at 
their risk and discretion, may ride bus transportation provided by the [mine] 
for the convenience of their employees.  
The [mine] does not warrant or represent in any manner the safety or 
availability of such bus service.  
The unavailability of such bus service shall not excuse or alter 
[Securitas'] responsibility hereunder.  
The [mine] reserves the right at any time and for any reason (including 
space availability or their own convenience) to deny such privilege entirely as 
to [Securitas].

 
 
We agree with the hearing 
officer that this contractual provision does not demonstrate Securitas provided 
transportation for its employees.  

 
 
[¶13]   The mine could discontinue bus 
transportation or revoke its permission at any time, and doing so would not 
affect Securitas' obligations under the contract.  Securitas did not control, operate, or 
pay for the bus transportation.  As 
was made clear by the deposition of its branch manager, Securitas did not have 
any knowledge or control over the details of the bus transportation.  The mine arranged for the bus for its 
own employees, and the bus was operated by Powder 
River.  Mr. Quinn was 
not required to ride the bus as a condition of his employment.  When he opted to do so, it was without 
specific direction or knowledge of Securitas.  He was not compensated for the time he 
spent on the bus.  

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Quinn emphasizes his reliance 
upon the transportation in accepting employment with Securitas.  However, Mr. Quinn's use of, or reliance 
upon, the bus does not transform it into a vehicle of Securitas.  We find these circumstances similar to 
those presented in Berg, where we 
recognized that a benefit provided to employees for use at their discretion does 
not constitute a condition of employment.  ¶ 14, 106 P.3d  at 872.  This is so even if the benefit is "the 
most practical and convenient option."  
Id.  Here, the record simply does not reflect 
that Securitas "assumed the cost of that travel."  Archuleta, 787 P.2d  at 93.  Therefore, the general rule applies, and 
the injuries Mr. Quinn suffered while he was traveling to work are not 
compensable.  Id.

 
 
CONCLUSION

            

[¶15]   We find that the injuries Mr. Quinn 
suffered in the bus accident are not compensable.  He was traveling to work when he was 
injured, and the bus was not a "vehicle of the employer" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  Accordingly, 
the hearing officer properly granted summary judgment to the 
employer.

 
 
[¶16]   Affirmed.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice, dissenting, in which KITE, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶17]   
I respectfully dissent because I do not agree that Securitas was entitled 
to summary judgment under the circumstances of this case.  The parties basically agree that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact.  
The difference in their views is this:  Which of the two of them is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law?  I 
would remand this matter to the district court, with directions that the 
district court further remand it to the Office of Administrative Hearings with 
directions that it enter summary judgment in favor of 
Quinn.

 
 
[¶18]   
It bears repeating here that the worker's compensation system is a 
constitutional compromise that is intended to benefit both workers and 
employers.  Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 
provides:

 
 
(a)  No law shall be enacted limiting the 
amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any 
person.

            
(b)  Any section of this constitution to the contrary 
notwithstanding, for any civil action where a person alleges that a health care 
provider's act or omission in the provision of health care resulted in death or 
injury, the legislature may by general law:

(i)  Mandate alternative dispute resolution 
or review by a medical review panel before the filing of a civil action against 
the health care provider.

            
(c)  Any contract or 
agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the 
death or injury of any employee shall be void.  As to all extrahazardous employments the 
legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund 
or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as may be fixed by law 
according to proper classifications to each person injured in such employment or 
to the dependent families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except 
in case of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured 
employee.  The fund or funds shall 
be accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as 
may be provided by law.  Monies in 
the fund shall be expended only for compensation authorized by this section, for 
administration and management of the Worker's Compensation Act, debt service 
related to the fund and for workplace safety programs conducted by the state as 
authorized by law.  The right of 
each employee to compensation from the fund shall be in lieu of and shall take 
the place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as 
required by law to the fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of the 
injuries or death.  Subject to 
conditions specified by law, the legislature may allow employments not 
designated extrahazardous to be covered by the state fund at the option of the 
employer.  To the extent an employer 
elects to be covered by the state fund and contributes to the fund as required 
by law, the employer shall enjoy the same immunity as provided for 
extrahazardous employments.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
The authors of Wyoming's Constitution also singled out 
workers for special protection in Wyo. Const. art 1, § 22 ("The rights of labor 
shall have just protection through laws calculated to secure the laborer proper 
rewards for his service and to promote the industrial welfare of the 
state.").  Also see Torres v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 2005 WY 7, ¶ 22, 105 P.3d 101, 112 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶19]   
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(b) provides:  "No contract, rule, regulation or device 
shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability created by this act 
except as otherwise provided by this act."  
See 8 Larsen's Workers' Compensation Law, §§ 
132.03[3] (Statutes Prohibiting Waiver of Right by Agreement) and 132.04[1] 
(Public Interest in Full Benefits) (2006).  
I am not convinced that the contract between Securitas and the coal 
company has anything to do with this case, but if it does, it runs afoul of the 
constitutional and statutory prohibition of a contract between a worker and an 
employer that operates as a waiver of benefits provided by the worker's 
compensation statutes.

 
 
[¶20]   
The majority also rests its decision on Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D), which provides that an injury, as contemplated by 
the Worker's Compensation Act, does not include:  "Any injury sustained during travel to 
or from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is 
transported by a vehicle of the employer."  
The majority concludes that, as a matter of law, the vehicle in which 
Quinn was riding was not a "vehicle of the employer."  I am unable to agree that either Berg v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 2005 WY 23, 106 P.3d 867 (Wyo. 2005), or Archuleta v. Carbon County School District 
No. 1, 787 P.2d 91 (Wyo. 1990) speak anything more than 
tangentially to the circumstances of this case.  I do agree that we have repeatedly held 
that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is not ambiguous, but we have done so in these 
words:  "Subsection (D) is the 
codification of a long-standing common law rule that injuries incurred while 
either going to or coming from work are not compensable unless the employer has in some 
fashion provided the employee with transportation or has reimbursed him 
for the costs of those travels.'"  
Berg, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d  at 
871 [Emphasis added].  My take on 
the facts of this case is that Securitas was, in its own fashion, providing 
transportation to Quinn in a vehicle "of the employer."  A word of some import here is a very 
small word that has many meanings and usages, "of."  It connotes the "agent or doer of an act 
or action," "the means or instrument by which an action is carried out," and "a 
possessive relationship," and maybe a few other things, given the context.  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1565 (1986).  While 
"of" is a word of many meanings and usages, that does not create an 
ambiguity.  However, it does provide 
several avenues by which one could conclude that the vehicle in question was "of 
the employer."

 
 
[¶21]   
The hearing officer and the majority rely on a written contract and/or 
oral agreements/understandings entered into by Securitas and the coal mines it 
serves, as well as the fact that the mines allowed Securitas's employees to ride 
the buses as a "courtesy."  See 1 Larsen's Workers' Compensation Law, § 
15.03 (Non-Contractual or Casual Provision of Transportation) (2006) ("However, 
the distinction between transportation provided by contract and transportation 
without agreement or as a courtesy is being increasingly questioned, since the 
fundamental reason for extension of liability  the extension of the actual 
employment-controlled risks of employment  is not affected by the question 
whether the transportation was furnished because of obligation or out of 
courtesy.").  The majority 
categorizes the transportation at issue as "free" and provided by the employer 
to employees voluntarily and without incurring any liability.  I think that defies the reality of these 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶22]   
My conclusion is that, as a practical matter, Securitas provided Quinn 
with transportation to and from work, and Quinn suffered an injury during that 
transport.  What the agreement was 
between Securitas and the coal mine is of no consequence to the resolution of 
this case, and Securitas's extraction of what amounts to a waiver of benefits is 
contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the governing 
statutes.