Title: Kelley v. North East Insurance Co.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 166 
Docket: 
Pen-16-536 
Argued: 
June 15, 2017 
Decided: 
July 25, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
RICHARDIE KELLEY 
 
v. 
 
NORTH EAST INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  Richardie Kelley appeals from the entry of a summary judgment in 
the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) in favor of North East 
Insurance Company on the reach and apply action she brought pursuant to 
24-A M.R.S. § 2904 (2016).  The court concluded that the damages awarded to 
Kelley in the underlying action, see 7 M.R.S. § 3961(2) (2016), were based on a 
claim that was not covered by the North East automobile insurance policy.  
We agree and affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts are undisputed.  Teresa Snyder held an 
automobile insurance policy from North East pursuant to which she was the 
“named insured” and her 1999 Ford Mustang was the “covered auto.”  Snyder 
 
2 
and Tim McCann were the unmarried co-owners of a dog.  On February 21, 
2009, McCann drove one of his employer’s cars to Frankfort to meet Kelley, 
who had purchased an old pickup truck from McCann’s son.  McCann brought 
the dog with him in the car.  During the transfer of the pickup truck, someone1 
opened the door to the car containing the dog, and the dog, without leaving 
the car, bit Kelley in the face.  Snyder was not present during this incident and 
was not a driver, passenger, or owner of the car that the dog was in when it bit 
Kelley.  Kelley filed a lawsuit against Snyder and McCann, for which North East 
declined to defend or indemnify Snyder.  See 7 M.R.S. § 3961(2).  The parties 
to that suit stipulated to a judgment of $100,000.   
 
[¶3]  On December 4, 2015, Kelley filed a complaint against North East 
pursuant to 24-A M.R.S. § 2904, seeking to satisfy her judgment against 
Snyder through Snyder’s auto insurance policy.2  After discovery, the parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  On November 16, 2016, the court 
granted North East’s motion for the entry of a summary judgment and denied 
Kelley’s.  The court concluded that, pursuant to the definition in the policy, 
                                         
1  The parties dispute whether McCann or Kelley opened the door to the car, an issue that is not 
material to our resolution of this case.  See Strong v. Brakeley, 2016 ME 60, ¶ 4, 137 A.3d 1007 
(“[A]n issue is material if it could potentially affect the outcome of the matter.” (quotation marks 
omitted)).   
2  Neither Snyder nor McCann had a homeowner’s insurance policy.  The record contains no 
information about any insurance policy covering the vehicle McCann was driving. 
 
3 
Snyder was not an “insured” for the purposes of Kelley’s suit and that Kelley’s 
bodily injury did not arise from an “auto accident” as required by the policy.  
Kelley timely appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶4]  We review de novo both a court’s grant of summary judgment and 
its interpretation of an insurance policy.  Cox v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Ins. Co., 2013 ME 8, ¶ 8, 59 A.3d 1280.  Where, as here, the material facts are 
not in dispute, we limit our review to whether the prevailing party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2013 ME 
55, ¶ 7, 66 A.3d 585; see M.R. Civ. P. 56. 
 
[¶5]  The review of a judgment in a reach and apply action requires us 
to first “identify the basis of liability and damages from the underlying 
complaint and judgment” and then to “review the . . . insurance policy to 
determine if any of the damages awarded in the underlying judgment are 
based on claims that would be recoverable pursuant to the . . . policy.”  
Langevin, 2013 ME 55, ¶ 8, 66 A.3d 585 (quotation marks omitted); 
see 24-A M.R.S. § 2904.  If the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous, 
we interpret it in accordance with its plain meaning, but we “construe 
ambiguous policy language strictly against the insurance company and 
 
4 
liberally in favor of the policyholder.”3  Langevin, 2013 ME 55, ¶ 9, 66 A.3d 
585 (quotation marks omitted).  Further, we view the language of the policy 
“from the perspective of an average person untrained in either the law or the 
insurance field in light of what a more than casual reading of the policy would 
reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured.”  Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 308, 310 (Me. 1987) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
[¶6]  Kelley bears the burden of showing that the damages she was 
awarded in the underlying action are based on a claim that falls within the 
scope of Snyder’s policy with North East.  See Langevin, 2013 ME 55, ¶ 8, 
66 A.3d 585.  The policy obligated North East to indemnify Snyder for “‘bodily 
injury’ . . . for which any ‘insured’ becomes legally responsible because of an 
auto accident.”  The policy did not define the term “auto accident.”  Kelley 
urges us to conclude that the term is broad enough to include a dog bite that 
occurred in or near a car because, she contends, the bite arose out of the use 
                                         
3  One of Kelley’s arguments is that we must construe all policy language in favor of the insured.  
To the extent that we have been less than clear on this point in the past, we clarify that we construe 
insurance policy language “strictly against the insurance company and liberally in favor of the 
policyholder” only where that language is ambiguous.  Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2013 ME 55, ¶ 9, 
66 A.3d 585 (quotation marks omitted).  As with any contract, where the language of an insurance 
policy is clear and unambiguous, we interpret it in accordance with its plain meaning.  See Cookson 
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2012 ME 7, ¶ 8, 34 A.3d 1156 (“Unambiguous language in an insurance 
contract must be interpreted according to its plain and commonly accepted meaning.” (quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Richardson v. Winthrop Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 109, ¶ 9, 983 A.2d 400. 
 
5 
of a vehicle.  Interpreting “auto accident” in accordance with its “plain and 
commonly accepted meaning,” Cookson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2012 ME 7, 
¶ 8, 34 A.3d 1156 (quotation marks omitted), we conclude otherwise. 
 
[¶7]  “Accident,” which is also undefined in the policy, is commonly 
understood to mean “[a]n event that is without apparent cause or unexpected; 
an unfortunate event, [especially] one causing injury or damage.”  1 Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary 14 (6th ed. 2007); see Patrick v. J. B. Ham Co., 
119 Me. 510, 517, 111 A. 912 (1921) (“[A]n accident is a befalling; an event 
that takes place without one’s forethought or expectation; an undesigned, 
sudden, and unexpected event.  Its synonyms include mishap, mischance, 
misfortune[,] disaster, calamity, catastrophe.”).  We therefore interpret “auto 
accident”—an unambiguous term—to mean an unintended and unforeseen 
injurious occurrence involving an automobile.  “[V]iewed from the perspective 
of an average person,” Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 521 A.2d at 310, the plain 
meaning of “auto accident”—although broader than a collision or car crash—
does not stretch so far as to encompass bodily injury from a dog bite that 
occurred in a car that had absolutely no causal connection to the injury and 
that was not even in operation.4  
                                         
4  Our conclusion that this dog bite injury does not fit within the term “auto accident” is 
bolstered by the current definition of that term in legal dictionaries, which would support an even 
 
6 
 
[¶8]  Kelley contends that our decision in Union Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 521 A.2d 308 (Me. 1987), 
obliges us to conclude that her damages are recoverable pursuant to the 
policy because her bodily injury arose from the “use” of an automobile.  
Although the auto insurance policy in that case contained language nearly 
identical to the language we consider today, our holding in Union Mutual is 
inapposite here.5  See id. at 309.  There, we accepted two certified questions of 
state law from the United States District Court for the District of Maine.  Id. at 
310.  Those questions asked us to determine whether a particular injury arose 
from the “use” of a vehicle—language contained in one clause of the policy.  Id.  
Constrained by the questions presented, we did not consider whether that 
injury resulted from an “auto accident”—language contained in another 
clause.  See id. at 309-11.  Consequently, Union Mutual is not controlling in this 
case, in which our de novo review is not limited to the interpretation of the 
“use” clause of the policy.  
                                                                                                                                   
more restrictive interpretation.  See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 18 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “car 
accident” as “[a]n accident in which a motor vehicle collides with another vehicle or with a person, 
animal, or object, [usually] causing damage or injury. — Also termed automobile accident . . . .”). 
5  The auto insurance policy in Union Mutual obligated the insurer to “pay damages for bodily 
injury . . . for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident,” 
cf. supra ¶ 6, and defined “covered person” as “the named insured or any family member for the 
ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer.”  Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union 
Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 308, 309 (Me. 1987) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
7 
 
[¶9]  Because we conclude that Kelley’s claim in the underlying action is 
not covered by the North East policy, she has failed to carry her burden, 
see 24-A M.R.S. § 2904; Langevin, 2013 ME 55, ¶ 8, 66 A.3d 585, and we affirm 
the judgment.6 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arthur J. Greif, Esq. (orally), Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, for appellant 
Richardie Kelley 
 
John S. Whitman, Esq. (orally), Richardson, Whitman, Large & Badger, 
Portland, for appellee North East Insurance Company 
 
 
Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CV-2015-236 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
6  We find Kelley’s contention that Snyder was an “insured” for this accident wholly 
unpersuasive and decline to address it.