Title: Attorney Grievance v. DiCicco

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Robert A. DiCicco
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG), No. 40, September Term, 2000
HEADNOTES:
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE—DISCIPLINARY ACTION—RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT—SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY—MISCONDUCT—MARYLAND RULES—
COMMINGLING OF FUNDS—PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS. 
Indefinite suspension from the practice of law with the right to seek reinstatement after 90
days is appropriate where an attorney violated the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
1.15(a) & (c) and 8.4(a), and Maryland Rules 16-607(a) and 16-609, in connection with his
trust account records for the period of 1997-1999.   While the evidence presented showed
that the attorney was negligent and sloppy in the management of his trust account, there was
no clear and convincing evidence that his misconduct was willful or deceitful requiring a
sanction of disbarment.  Moreover, the attorney’s failure to hold the disputed funds separate,
while probative of risk of loss, did not in and of itself, compel a finding of actual financial
loss to clients. Where there is no finding of intentional misappropriation and where the
conduct did not result in financial loss to any of the attorney’s clients, an indefinite
suspension ordinarily is the appropriate sanction.  
The initial investigation of the attorney stemmed from two unrelated complaints
initiated by a medical provider and a former client.  After an analysis of the attorney’s trust
account records for the period of 1997-1999, however, Petitioner Bar Counsel, on behalf of
the Attorney Grievance Commission, instituted charges on the basis of the attorney’s general
trust account activity.  The analysis proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that on
numerous occasions the balance of the attorney’s escrow account had been out of trust.
Moreover, the attorney failed to keep disputed funds separate in connection with his
representation of a client in a dispute with the client’s medical provider.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case # 03-C-00-013250
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No.  40
September Term, 2000
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
      COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
ROBERT A. DICICCO
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed: July 18, 2002
1  The charges in this case were filed on 5 December 2000 and processed below prior
to 1 July 2001; thus, we refer to the attorney grievance procedural rules and terminology in
effect prior to that date.  Maryland Rule 16-709(a), states that “[c]harges against an attorney
shall be filed by the Bar Counsel acting at direction of the Review Board.”
2  Unless otherwise provided, all statutory references are to Maryland Code (1989,
2000 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Business Occupations and Professions Article, §10-306.
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a), 1 Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney
Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), and at the direction of the Review Board, filed a
petition with this Court initiating disciplinary proceedings against Robert A. DiCicco,
Esquire (“Respondent”), a member of the Maryland Bar since November 1964.  In the
petition, Bar Counsel alleged violations of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
(“MRPC”) 1.15 (safekeeping property) and 8.4 (misconduct); Maryland Rules 16-607
(commingling of funds) and 16-609 (prohibited transactions); and Maryland Code (1989,
2000 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Business Occupations and Professions Article, §10-306
(misuse of trust money).2
Petitioner’s initial investigation of Respondent stemmed from two unrelated
complaints initiated by Chiroplus of Fullerton, a medical provider, and P. Dianne Hite, a
former client of Respondent.  After an analysis of Respondent’s trust account records for the
period of 1997-1999, however, Petitioner alleged additional violations, unrelated to the
complaints, based on Respondent’s general trust account activity.
3  Maryland Rule 16-706(d) states, in pertinent part, that “[e]xcept as provided by
these Rules, no action except dismissal of the complaint may be taken unless the attorney
against whom the complaint has been made has been afforded an opportunity to examine and
controvert the complaint and be represented by counsel.”
4  Maryland Rule 16-709(b) states that the “Court of Appeals by order may direct that
the charges be transmitted to and heard in any court and shall designate the judge or judges
to hear the charges and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record in the proceeding.”
5  Maryland Rule 16-711(a) requires that “[a] written statement of the findings of facts
and conclusions of law shall be filed in the record of the proceedings and copies sent to all
parties.”
6  Maryland Rule 16-711(b)(2) states that “[w]ithin 15 days after the filing of the
record in the Court of Appeals, the attorney or the Bar Counsel may file in the Court of
(continued...)
2
In accordance with Md. Rule 16-706(d),3 an inquiry panel hearing was scheduled.
Respondent, following the advice of his counsel, waived his right to a panel review after
Respondent’s counsel was unable to 
obtain a postponement in order to review documents and
prepare a defense. 
We referred the matter to Judge Robert E. Cahill of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law
in accordance with Md. Rules 16-709(b)4 and 16-711(a).5  Following a two-day evidentiary
hearing, at which Respondent was present and represented by counsel, the hearing judge
concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(a) & (c),
MRPC 8.4(a), and Md. Rules 16-607(a) and 16-609.  The hearing judge further concluded
that Respondent did not violate MRPC 1.15(b), MRPC 8.4(c), or §10-306.  Petitioner,
pursuant to Md. Rule 16-711(b)(2),6 filed with this Court exceptions to the hearing judge’s
6(...continued)
Appeals exceptions to the findings and conclusions and may make recommendations
respecting the disciplinary sanction to be imposed.”
7  Md. Rule 2-403 states, in pertinent part, that “[o]n motion of a party or of a person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may enter any order
that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense.”
3
findings of fact and conclusion of law that Respondent did not violate MRPC 8.4(c), and
recommended Respondent’s disbarment as the appropriate sanction.  Respondent filed a reply
to Petitioner’s exceptions and recommendation for sanction, urging a short period of
suspension as the appropriate sanction, but took no written exceptions of his own.
I.
A. 
Background
After filing a petition for disciplinary action with this Court, Petitioner also referred
the matter of Respondent’s alleged misconduct to the State’s Attorney for Baltimore County
for criminal investigation.  On 22 January 2001, Respondent, pursuant to Md. Rule 2-403,7
requested a protective order to stay temporarily the disciplinary proceedings until the
conclusion of the criminal investigation.  This motion was denied.  On 28 March 2001,
Petitioner deposed Respondent as part of its investigation.  Respondent’s counsel advised
Respondent, in light of the pending criminal investigation, to decline to answer substantive
8  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, that
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
9  At the evidentiary hearing, Respondent submitted into evidence a letter, dated 26
March 2001, indicating a psychiatrist’s diagnosis as follows:  “Mr. DiCicco has Major
Depression.  He is also complaining of intermittent chest pain and other physical symptoms.
He is currently significantly symptomatic.”
4
questions, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.8  Respondent
followed the advice of his counsel at the deposition.
At the start of the evidentiary hearing before the hearing judge on the petition for
disciplinary action, counsel for Respondent again raised the Fifth Amendment issue.  The
parties came to an agreement, which the hearing judge summarized as follows:
[Petitioner] had intended to call the Respondent as part of his
case.  He was informed by [Respondent’s counsel], however,
that he expected his client to follow his recommendation to
exercise his right under the Fifth Amendment to decline to
answer substantive questions.  The Respondent proposed that he
be permitted to do that in a pre-hearing deposition and, in return,
waive his right to testify in his own defense.  The Commission
then would offer the deposition as evidence, without objection,
thereby avoiding the Respondent having to testify in open court
and risk further health problems.[9]
Petitioner presented the testimony of William M. Ramsey, its investigator assigned
to this matter.  Petitioner also offered the testimony of John DeBone, a paralegal in Bar
Counsel’s office who, after subpoenaing and reviewing Respondent’s bank records,
conducted a computerized analysis of those records for the period 1 January 1997 through
23 February 2000.  Consistent with the aforementioned “agreement,” Petitioner also
introduced, as its Exhibit No. 2, a transcript of Respondent’s pre-hearing deposition.
10   The hearing judge noted that Mr. Grandizio did not prepare a report based upon
his own analysis of Respondent’s trust account records.
5
Respondent’s sole witness was Henry A. Grandizio, C.P.A., who reviewed and commented
on Mr. DeBone’s analysis of the trust account records.10
B. 
Evidence Produced at the Hearing
i. The Chiroplus Complaint
The Chiroplus complaint arose from Respondent’s  representation of  Brian Gerhold
in a negligence suit stemming from a traffic accident.  Gerhold received medical treatment
from Chiroplus for injuries sustained in the accident.  Gerhold subsequently discontinued his
treatment with Chiroplus due to a dispute over insurance coverage.  In 1997, Gerhold’s
negligence claim settled for $7,000.  The settlement proceeds were deposited into
Respondent’s escrow account.  In accordance with Gerhold’s instructions, Respondent paid
the client’s outstanding medical bills from the escrow account, with the exception of the
Chiroplus bill for $4,326, which was disputed by the client.  The dispute between Chiroplus
and Gerhold eventually settled in 1999 for $3,500, at which time Respondent paid Chiroplus
that amount from his escrow account.  Chiroplus complained to Petitioner about the
Respondent’s alleged failure to make prompt payment to it following settlement of Gerhold’s
negligence claim.  
The hearing judge summarized Mr. DeBone’s analysis of Respondent’s trust account
regarding the Chiroplus complaint as follows:
6
[O]n April 2, 1997[,] a $7,000 settlement draft from State Farm
Insurance Company was deposited in the escrow account on
behalf of Brian Gerhold.  Two years later, on May 4, 1999,
check number 2794 for $3,500 was sent to Chiroplus.  On
numerous occasions during that two-year period, the trust
account balance fell below not only the $4,326 claimed by
Chiroplus but also the $3,500 ultimately disbursed to Chiroplus.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 is a copy of the bank statement for June,
1997.  It reflects a balance on June 30, 1997 of $239.01.  Mr.
DeBone testified that on every day between August 6 and
August 25, 1997 the balance was below the $3,500 paid to
Chiroplus as well as the $4,326 it had been claiming for the
services to Mr. Gerhold.
Based on Investigator Ramsey’s testimony regarding his interview with Mr. Gerhold,
the hearing judge noted that Mr. Gerhold expressed “satisf[action] with the representation
of the Respondent even though he didn’t receive any proceeds from the settlement after the
medical bills were paid and the Respondent settled the Chiroplus claim for $3,500.”
ii. The Hite Complaint
Ms. Hite engaged Respondent to represent her in a personal injury claim arising from
a traffic accident in 1997.  Ms. Hite filed a complaint with Petitioner in November 1999
alleging difficulty in obtaining the proceeds of the October 1999 settlement of her claim.
The hearing judge summarized Investigator Ramsey’s testimony regarding the Hite complaint
as follows:
[Ms. Hite] filed her complaint on November, 10, 1999,
apparently alleging that after her personal injury claim was
settled by the Respondent he had not responded to her numerous
calls requesting disbursement of the net proceeds.  The
Respondent told Mr. Ramsey that he had disbursed the proceeds
7
to Ms. Hite in November, 1999.  On cross-examination, Mr.
Ramsey acknowledged that it was “his understanding” that Ms.
Hite was paid “within weeks of making the complaint”.
Respondent’s Exhibit 9 is a copy of his December 1,
1999 letter to [Petitioner] detailing the facts concerning his
representation of Ms. Hite and enclosing copies of her
Settlement Disbursement Record and his letter transmitting it to
her on November 5, 1999 - two weeks after she had endorsed
the settlement draft.  She approved the Disbursement Record by
signing and returning it to the Respondent on November 13,
1999.  She received the net proceeds on November 15, 1999 -
five days after she filed her alleged complaint.
iii. Miscellaneous Trust Account Discrepancies
Recounting Mr. DeBone’s testimony regarding further discrepancies revealed during
his review of Respondent’s trust account records, Judge Cahill noted the following:
[F]or client William Schlmalzer there was a deposit on January
9, 1997 of $7,500.  The client was paid the sum of $4,599 on
March 17, 1997.  Between January 9th and March 17th the
balance in Respondent’s trust account fell below [$4,599] on
nine occasions.
[O]n June 9, 1998 (sic.1997) an insurance check for $9,500 was
deposited on behalf of Delores Melchoir and on July 25, 1997
she negotiated a check for her share of $6,103.67.  On ten days
between those two dates the balance in the account was below
$6,103.67.
[S]imilar deficiencies [were found] in Respondent’s trust
account with respect to client Rae Spaugh, Dianne Kinzer,
Catherine Hall, Brenda Rimgus, Samantha Fuller, John and
Dorris Requardt, Dawn Smith, Ruth Beitler and several others.
[Mr. DeBone] also noted that the lowest positive balance in the
account was $3.55 on July 24, 1998, followed by negative
balances of $3,098.64 on September 15, 1998, $782.64 on
September 21, 1998 and $482.64 on October 6, 1998.
8
With respect to client Patrick DeBorde there were
disbursements from the account totaling $27,872.49 between
June 16, 1997 and May 11, 1999, but no deposits attributable to
Mr. DeBorde.  Additionally, on July 7, 1999, there was a
$16,999.90 deposit, followed by a disbursement to the
Respondent of $23,000 the next day.  Mr. DeBone did not
understand these transactions.
Moreover, the hearing judge recounted that Mr. DeBone also testified that there were
disbursements from Respondent’s trust account that appeared to be unrelated to any of
Respondent’s clients, including checks written to the Maryland Unemployment Insurance
Fund, Maryland Comptroller of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Ford Motor
Company, Baltimore Gas & Electric, the Clients’ Security Trust Fund of Maryland, Cooks
Fuel, Rosedale Federal, and the Baltimore County Bar Association.
Respondent argued that Mr. DeBone’s analysis of the trust account was flawed in
three respects.  First, Respondent argued that the analysis failed to recognize the connection
between a Mr. Ben Cadwalader and DiCicco’s client Patrick DeBorde.  As a result, the
analysis incorrectly assigned transactions to an account for Mr. Cadwalader when in fact
these transactions applied to the DeBorde account.  Next, Respondent claimed that a
transaction appearing as a $14,703.14 debit in Mr. DeBone’s analysis was in actuality an
unauthorized electronic check.  Finally, Respondent argued that Mr. DeBone’s analysis failed
to take into consideration that the bank erroneously failed to credit Respondent’s trust
account with a $10,000 deposit in 1997.
9
Regarding the DeBorde matter, Judge Cahill summarized the cross-examination of
Mr. DeBone as follows:
Mr. DeBone’s analysis included a client account under the name
Ben Cadwalader.  That account, ID Code No. 127, reflected a
deposit of approximately $67,000, deductions for payments to
Baltimore County and a substantial positive balance, as to which
there is no record of a further payment.  Mr. DeBone conceded
that, if the transactions he attributed to Cadwalader, in fact,
related to DeBorde (I.D. Code 131), that would impact on his
conclusion that the DeBorde account was out of trust.
Commenting on Respondent’s evidence concerning this matter, the hearing judge noted:
Respondent’s Exhibit 10, which allegedly consists of copies of
some of the records produced at Respondent’s deposition, shows
that the $67,000 that Mr. DeBone had credited to the
Cadwalader account had been disbursed by Cadwalader to the
Respondent as Trustee for Patrick DeBorde.  Other documents
in the exhibit are various accountings made by the Respondent
to [the Circuit Court] for trust monies he had received since the
trust was established in 1985.  A true test copy of the Petition
and Order of the Circuit Court reflects that the trust was
dissolved and the proceeds distributed to the beneficiary, who
certified that the accounting was true, accurate and accepted by
him.
Regarding the factual dispute whether Mr. DeBone’s analysis with regard to a debit
of $14,703.14 was actually an unauthorized electronic check as alleged by Respondent, the
hearing judge observed:
Mr. DeBone was questioned about another item in his analysis -
a debit of $14,703.14 in June, 1997.  The bank statement lists
that item as check number 2695.  However, Resp. Ex. No.4
shows that it is not an escrow check; it is an electronically
generated check, bearing number 2695 and dated June 26, 1997.
It also bears the Respondent’s printed name but shows an
10
address other than his law office.  It is payable to Baltimore Gas
& Electric and signed electronically by Baltimore Gas &
Electric “as authority signatory for Robert DiCicco”.
The next-to-last page of Respondent’s Exhibit 4A contains an
undated, handwritten notation initialed by the Respondent
stating: “This check out of sequence and not issued.  I called
bank and they said it was ‘electronic’ check to BGE.  I never
authorized such a check.  Bank said they would return money to
account.  Please follow up.  RAD.”  The Respondent offered no
other documents relating to this transaction.
Finally, as to Respondent’s assertion that Mr. DeBone’s analysis neglected to
recognize that the bank erred by failing to credit DiCicco’s trust account with a $10,000
deposit in 1997 and, therefore, had the alleged deposit of $10,000 been properly credited, the
account would not have been out of trust, Judge Cahill explained:
On cross-examination, Mr. DeBone was shown Respondent’s
Exhibit 2A, alleged to have been part of the bank records
produced by Respondent at the March 28, 2001 deposition,
showing that $10,000 was deposited in the trust account on
January 3, 1997.  The second item of the Exhibit is an undated
“Deposit Correction Notice” issued by the bank to advise the
Respondent that an error was found regarding the deposit and
that the error was corrected by crediting the account for
$10,000.  Mr. DeBone said that these two documents were not
amongst the subpoenaed bank records he got from the bank in
February, 2000 and furthermore: “That $10,000 would have no
bearing on what we went over this morning [during my direct].”
Judge Cahill noted M r.Grandizio’s testimony regarding this matter:
Mr. Grandizio reviewed Mr. DeBone’s analysis, and the bank
records and exhibits relating to the apparent failure to credit the
account to reflect the $10,000 deposit, and the BG&E electronic
withdrawal.  In his opinion, had the missing $10,000 deposit
been credited to the account, it would not have been out of trust.
11
However, he conceded he made no inquiries of bank personnel
about the missing $10,000 credit and did not prepare a report or
analysis in support of his conclusion.
C. 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
Based on the evidence presented, the hearing judge made the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law:
i. The Chiroplus Complaint
The hearing judge found that, although Respondent failed to deliver funds to
Chiroplus until two years after the settlement of Gerhold’s negligence claim, he did so at the
instruction of his client.  The hearing judge further noted that the dispute with Chiroplus was
settled ultimately for an amount less than the face value claimed by Chiroplus.  Nonetheless,
the hearing judge determined that Respondent did not keep the disputed funds separate and
because, on numerous occasions in 1997, the balance of the escrow account fell below the
$3,500 Respondent ultimately paid to Chiroplus in 1999, the account had been out of trust.
Accordingly, Judge Cahill concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(c), discussed
infra at 12-13.
ii. The Hite Complaint
The hearing judge determined that Ms. Hite’s allegation that the Respondent ignored
her inquiries about her settlement proceeds was “completely discredited by the Respondent’s
letters to her before and immediately after she lodged her complaint.”   The hearing judge
12
thus concluded that “[t]he Commission failed to prove any ethical or statutory violations by
the Respondent in his handling of the settlement of Mrs. Hite’s personal injury claim.”
iii.  Violation of MRPC 1.15
Rule 1.15.  Safekeeping property.
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third
persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds
shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title
16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.  Other property shall be
identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.  Complete
records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept
by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years
after termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly
notify the client or third person.  Except as stated in this Rule or
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled
to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their
interests.  If a dispute arises concerning their respective
interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(a) by failing to
hold property of clients or third persons separate from his own.  Relying on the evidence
presented by Petitioner, and further supported by adverse inferences drawn from
11 Citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L. Ed. 2d
810 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to
civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against
them.”), Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368, 514 A.2d 4 (1986), and Kramer
v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 575, 558 A.2d 760 (1989), the hearing judge concluded that adverse
inferences should be drawn from Respondent’s Fifth Amendment refusal to answer certain
substantive questions at the pre-hearing deposition.
Although Respondent argued to the hearing judge in his post-hearing proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law that no adverse inferences could be drawn from his
refusal to testify, Respondent ultimately did not take exception to the hearing judge’s
findings of fact or conclusions of law.  Nor did Respondent contest at oral argument before
this Court the hearing judge’s treatment of adverse inferences.  Therefore, we shall not
address this point substantively here.  In any event, had Respondent pursued such a
challenge, it would not have affected the outcome.  The adverse inferences drawn by the
hearing judge from certain of Respondent’s refusals to respond to questions, on the record
before us, were either merely supplementary to Petitioner’s affirmative evidence (or
inferences drawable therefrom) regarding the relevant violations (as in the case of MRPC
1.15(a)) or so amorphous as not to be particularly probative of whether a violation occurred,
i.e., were not unduly prejudicial to Respondent (see infra at 15-16).
13
Respondent’s refusal to answer certain questions at his deposition,11 Judge Cahill determined
that Respondent, on occasion, “used [the escrow account] as if it also served as his personal
bank account.”
With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that Respondent failed to disburse prompt
payment to Chiroplus, the hearing judge concluded that “[d]ue to the absence of any
testimony from a representative of Chiroplus, the evidence [was] not clear and convincing
that the Respondent violated Md. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.[1]5(b).”
As previously suggested, Judge Cahill found by clear and convincing evidence that,
in regard to the Chiroplus matter, Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(c) by failing to keep the
disputed funds separate until the matter between Gerhold and Chiroplus was resolved.  The
14
hearing judge noted, however, that the violation was “mitigated by the fact that Chiroplus
voluntarily settled its claim not long after contacting Bar Counsel.”
iv.  Violation of MRPC 8.4
Rule 8.4.  Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another;
 . . . 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation; . . . .
With regard to Respondent’s violation of MRPC 8.4(a), the hearing judge concluded
that “[i]t necessarily follows from the aforegoing conclusions that paragraph (a) of this Rule
has been violated.” The hearing judge concluded that Respondent did not violate MRPC
8.4(c), rejecting Petitioner’s argument that “multiple invasions of client funds can only be
deemed  to be intentional conduct.”  (Emphasis omitted).  The hearing judge noted that other
factors should be considered when determining whether an attorney violated MRPC 8.4(c).
Specifically, Judge Cahill considered that Respondent had not been charged with violating
MRPC 8.1(b).  The hearing judge explained his consideration of this factor:
[O]ther factors should be considered in deciding if proven
violations of the several rules or the statute relating to escrow
accounts rise to the level of dishonest, fraudulent and deceitful
misconduct.  Of importance, for example, is whether the
attorney also was found to have violated Rule 8.1(b) by failing
to cooperate with Bar Counsel during the investigation. . . . Bar
Counsel elicited testimony from his witnesses about the
Respondent not answering certain questions and not providing
records, but I make no finding based upon that conduct since the
12 At Petitioner’s deposition of Respondent, the parties agreed that Respondent could
say “same answer” to indicate the following: “On advice of counsel, I respectfully decline
to answer that question based upon my Fifth Amendment privilege.”
15
Commission chose not to charge him with a Rule 8.1(b)
violation.
Judge Cahill also noted that “[t]here is no evidence that a client sustained an actual loss.”
The hearing judge further commented that “[w]hile [actual financial loss] is not a necessary
element of the commingling violations, it does have relevance to the charge that the
Respondent’s conduct involved dishonesty.”
In addition, the hearing judge addressed the issue of adverse inferences with regard
to Respondent’s violation of MRPC 8.4(c).  Regarding Respondent’s refusal to answer a
specific question at his deposition, Judge Cahill explained:
Bar Counsel did ask the Respondent the following
question at the conclusion of his deposition, knowing that the
privilege would be claimed:
Q.  Okay.  When you were interviewed by Mr.
Ramsey who is here today and Mr. DeBone, you
promised to provide explanation for the problems
in your trust account.  Do you recall them making
that request of you?
[A. Same answer.12]
The adverse inference I draw, as fact-finder, from his
lawful refusal to respond to this question is that he could not
“explain” why he knowingly commingled personal and escrow
funds so as to cause his escrow account to be frequently out of
trust.  I do not infer that his answer would have been that it was
because he knowingly and willfully misappropriated client
16
funds. Bar Counsel could have, but did not, put that very
question to him. In fact, virtually every unanswered question
during the deposition asked for an explanation - not an
admission, making the permissible adverse inference difficult to
conceptualize.
The Respondent properly gave up his right to testify as to
whether his conduct was willful when he claimed his Fifth
Amendment privilege.  However, he did not waive the
requirement that the Petitioner prove by clear and convincing
evidence, that the implied misappropriation of client trust funds
was consciously and deliberately done for an unlawful purpose.
The hearing judge summarized his conclusion of law regarding Petitioner’s charge
that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(c) as follows:
In conclusion, unless the length of time that the commingling
persisted, coupled with the frequency of the account being out
of trust, is deemed to be sufficient proof that the Respondent
willfully misappropriated trust funds, I would find that the
Commission’s evidence does not prove that he violated Rule
8.4(c).
v.  Violation of Md. Rule 16-607
Rule 16-607.  Commingling of funds.
a. General prohibition.  An attorney or law firm may
deposit in an attorney trust account only those funds required to
be deposited in that account by Rule 16-604 or permitted to be
so deposited by section b. of this Rule.
b. Exceptions.  1.  An attorney or law firm shall either
(A) deposit into an attorney trust account funds to pay any fees,
service charges, or minimum balance required by the financial
institution to open or maintain the account, including those fees
that cannot be charged against interest due to the Maryland
Legal Services Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 16-610 b 1
(D), or (B) enter into an agreement with the financial institution
to have any fees or charges deducted from an operating account
maintained by the attorney or law firm.  The attorney or law firm
17
may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds expected to
be advanced on behalf of a client and expected to be reimbursed
to the attorney by the client.
2. An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney
trust account funds belonging in part to a client and in part
presently or potentially to the attorney or law firm.  The portion
belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be withdrawn
promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes entitled to the
funds, but any portion disputed by the client shall remain in the
account until the dispute is resolved.
3. Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled
and commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held
for other clients or beneficial owners.
Judge Cahill explained that “[t]he same clear and convincing evidence that proved the
Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) requires me to also find that he violated the general
prohibition against commingling in paragraph (a) of [Md. Rule 16-607].”
vi.  Violation of Md. Rule 16-609
Rule 16-609.  Prohibited transactions.
An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds
required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust
account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution
for depositing any funds in the account, or use any funds for any
unauthorized purpose.  An instrument drawn on an attorney trust
account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer.
The hearing judge concluded that “[t]he general prohibition against using escrow
funds ‘for any unauthorized purpose’ would encompass using escrow funds to pay personal
obligations.  Therefore, the uncontraverted evidence of commingling  necessarily proves the
escrow funds, at times, were being used for that unauthorized purpose, thereby also violating
[Md. Rule 16-609].”
18
vii.  §10-306
§10-306.  Misuse of trust money.
A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the
purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.
In concluding that Respondent did not violate § 10-306, the hearing judge noted that
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent intended to misappropriate funds.  In this regard,
Judge Cahill explained:
[T]he Commission’s evidence does not clearly and convincingly
establish that the Respondent willfully intended to commit this
quasi-crime.  The length of time the account was out of trust,
standing alone, does not establish the Respondent’s general
intent to misappropriate the funds of clients or third persons -
particularly when it is reasonable to infer, based upon the lack
of evidence, that not a single client sustained a monetary loss.
The only exceptions to the hearing judge’s report that are before us are those taken
by Petitioner.
II.
It is well established that “[t]his Court has original jurisdiction over all attorney
disciplinary proceedings.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz, 368 Md. 419, 427, 795
A.2d 706, 710-11 (2002) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Snyder,  368 Md. 242, 253,
793 A.2d 515, 521 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 388, 784
A.2d 516, 523 (2001); Md. Rule 16-709(b) (stating that “[c]harges against an attorney shall
be filed on behalf of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission in the Court of Appeals”)).
Furthermore, “[a]s the Court of original and complete jurisdiction for attorney disciplinary
19
proceedings in Maryland, we conduct an independent review of the record.”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, _ Md. _, _, _ A.2d _, _ (2002) (Slip op. No. 7 at 10, 2001
Term) (quoting Snyder, 368 Md. at 253, 793 A.2d at 521 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997)).
In our review of the record, “[t]he hearing judge’s findings of fact will be accepted
unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.”  Id. (quoting Snyder, 368 Md. at 253,
793 A.2d at 521 (citations omitted)).  See also Dunietz, 368 Md. at 427-28, 706 A.2d at 711
(“The hearing judge’s findings of fact are ‘prima facia [sic] correct and will not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous.’”) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md.
1, 21, 762 A.2d 950, 960-61 (2000)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373,
388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002) (“Factual findings of the hearing judge will not be disturbed
if they are based on clear and convincing evidence.”).  Clear and convincing evidence “must
be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Harris, 366 Md.
at 389, 784 A.2d at 523-24 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56,
79, 753 A.2d 17, 29 (2000)).  We recently explained in Dunietz that “[a]s to the hearing
judge’s conclusions of law, ‘our consideration is essentially de novo.’”  Dunietz, 368 Md. at
428, 706 A.2d at 711 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 322,
786 A.2d 763, 768 (2001) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554,
562, 745 A.2d 1037, 1041 (2000))).
20
III.
Upon a review of the record, we shall overrule Petitioner’s exceptions and affirm the
hearing judge’s findings of facts and conclusions of law.
A. 
Petitioner’s Exceptions to Findings of Fact
Petitioner took two exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.  First, Petitioner
excepted to Judge Cahill’s treatment of Mr. Grandizio’s testimony that Respondent’s escrow
account would not have been out of trust if the bank had properly credited the account when
Respondent allegedly deposited $10,000 in 1997.  Additionally, Petitioner excepted to the
hearing judge’s finding that none of Respondent’s clients incurred financial loss resulting
from Respondent’s misconduct.
With regard to the alleged $10,000 deposit error attributed to the bank, Petitioner
argues that the evidence did not indicate indisputably the existence of such an error.
Moreover, Petitioner argues that “even if one accepts the Respondent’s evidence of an
uncredited deposit of $10,000.00 on January 3, 1997, the Respondent was still out of trust
on several occasions.”  While Petitioner claims that this $10,000 dispute has “muddied the
evidence demonstrating that Respondent has misused funds,” the hearing judge did not  make
a discrete finding as to the alleged $10,000 deposit.  Moreover, the hearing judge determined,
in accord with Petitioner’s allegations, that Respondent’s escrow account was out of trust,
finding a violation of MRPC 1.15(a).  Furthermore, the conclusion that Respondent did not
violate MRPC 8.4(c), to which Petitioner excepts, does not turn on the disputed “finding of
21
fact” as to the $10,000 deposit.  A violation of MRPC 8.4(c) requires evidence that
Respondent “engage[d] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
Even absent credit being given to the evidence of a $10,000 bank error, Petitioner did not
present sufficient evidence that Respondent’s misconduct was dishonest, fraudulent, or
deceitful.  While a $10,000 bank error may affect whether the account was out of trust at a
certain time, the number of times the account is out of trust, standing alone, does not compel
finding a violation of MRPC 8.4(c) if other evidence supports a finding that the misconduct
is the result of negligence, as opposed to fraud or dishonesty.  See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 614 A.2d 102 (1992); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Kramer, 325 Md. 39, 599 A.2d 100 (1991).  See infra at page 18.
Regarding the hearing judge’s finding that none of Respondent’s clients incurred
monetary loss, Petitioner argues that Gerhold suffered a loss when the funds disputed by
Gerhold and Chiroplus were not held separately by Respondent.  This Court has recognized,
however, that failing to hold funds separately does not cause necessarily actual economic loss
to  clients.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldberg, 292 Md. 650, 441 A.2d 338
(1982).  In Goldberg, as a result of the attorney’s failure to supervise properly his employee,
client funds were not held separately and the attorney’s escrow account was out of trust.  This
Court determined, however, that there was “no actual loss to [the respondent’s] clients by
virtue of the negative balances in his escrow account.”  Goldberg, 292 Md. at 657, 441 A.2d
22
at 342.  But see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 489, 671 A.2d 463, 483
(1996) (noting that while “neither client suffered actual financial loss” as a result of the
respondent’s misappropriation of funds, the risk of loss involved is significant because
“failure to keep client funds separate subjects the funds to the claims of creditors of the
lawyer”).  We hold, therefore, on this record that Respondent’s failure to hold the disputed
funds separately, although probative of risk of loss, does not, in and of itself, compel a
finding of actual financial loss to clients.  Furthermore, none of Respondent’s clients,
including Gerhold, claimed economic loss or sought compensation or reimbursement from
Respondent.  Accordingly, there is no clear and convincing evidence suggesting that any of
Respondent’s clients suffered actual financial loss because of Respondent’s misconduct.
Moreover, “[t]he hearing judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses and to decide which one to believe and, as we have said, to pick and choose which
evidence to rely upon.”  Monfried, 368 Md. at 390, 794 A.2d at 101.  See also Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17, 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999) (stating that the
hearing judge is “in the best position to assess first hand a witness’s credibility.”); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 675, 496 A.2d 672, 677 (1985)).  Thus, if Judge
Cahill gave more weight to Mr. Grandizio’s testimony than to Mr. DeBone’s testimony
regarding these disputed factual matters, such weighing is within his discretion.  
The findings of fact excepted to are based on clear and convincing evidence and are
not clearly erroneous; thus, we will not disturb them.  See Garfield, _ Md. at  _, _ A.2d at _
23
(Slip op. at 10); Dunietz, 368 Md. at 427-28, 706 A.2d at 711;  Monfried, 368 Md. at 388,
794 A.2d at 100.  We therefore overrule Petitioner’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s
findings of fact.
B. 
Petitioner’s Exceptions to Conclusions of Law
Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate
MRPC 8.4(c) by “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”  Petitioner argues that “[t]he Commission’s evidence of the multiple
times the Respondent[’s trust account] was out of trust demonstrates that the Respondent
knowingly and recklessly operated his trust account.”  Petitioner asserts that this satisfies “the
willfulness requirement to sustain a violation of Rule 8.4(c).”  We reject this argument and
hold that while the evidence presented shows that Respondent was negligent, Petitioner
failed to prove that Respondent’s misconduct was willful or deceitful.  It is well settled that
this Court will not find a violation of MRPC 8.4(c) when the attorney’s misconduct is the
product of “negligent rather than intentional misconduct.”  Awuah, 346 Md. at 435, 697 A.2d
at 454.  See also Powell, 328 Md. at 292, 614 A.2d at 110; Kramer, 325 Md. at 47, 599 A.2d
at 104.
In Awuah, this Court determined that the respondent commingled client funds with
his own funds on numerous occasions.  We concluded that the attorney did not violate MRPC
8.4(c), however, because the attorney’s misconduct was “motivated by ignorance of his
obligations and not by fraud, dishonesty or deceit.”  Awuah, 346 Md. at 433, 697 A.2d at 453.
13 The predecessor to MRPC 8.4 was Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility
DR-102(A) which stated, in pertinent part, as follows: “A lawyer shall not: . . . (4) Engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”
24
We further noted that the respondent did not misappropriate funds entrusted to him and that
his misconduct did not result in actual financial loss to any of his clients.
In Powell, 328 Md. at 292, 614 A.2d at 110, the Court concluded that the respondent,
who unintentionally misappropriated client funds, did not violate MRPC 8.4(c) because
“there was no clear and convincing evidence of ‘dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation’ on the part of [the respondent] in dealings with his client.”  Similarly, in
Kramer, we did not find a violation of the former Maryland Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4)13 where the respondent engaged in misconduct with regard
to his escrow account because the evidence presented did not show that the respondent
“intentionally deceived or defrauded” his client.  Kramer, 325 Md. at 47, 599 A.2d at 104.
In Kramer, the lack of clear and convincing evidence of “deceit or misappropriation” was
noted specifically.  Kramer, 325 Md. at 46, 599 A.2d at 104.
While the evidence presented supports Judge Cahill’s finding of negligence or
sloppiness, there is no clear and convincing evidence on this record to support a finding of
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation on Respondent’s part.  We further note the
lack of clear and convincing evidence of misappropriation or actual financial loss to any of
Respondent’s clients.  We therefore overrule Petitioner’s exception to the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Respondent did not violate MRPC 8.4(c).
25
IV.
Confirming the violations of MRPC 1.15(a) & (c),  MRPC 8.4(a), and Md. Rules 16-
607(a) and 16-609 found by the hearing judge, we turn now to the appropriate sanction.
Petitioner, citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 768 A.2d 607
(2001), recommends that Respondent be disbarred because “misappropriation of funds by
an attorney warrants disbarment absent compelling extenuating circumstances.”  Respondent,
on the other hand, urges that “a short period of suspension is appropriate.”
It is well established that
[t]he purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public
rather than to punish the erring attorney.  The public interest is
served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates
to members of this legal profession the type of conduct that will
not be tolerated.  By imposing such a sanction, this Court fulfills
its responsibility to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity
of the Bar and to prevent the transgression of an individual
lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.  Therefore, the
public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect
general and specific deterrence are imposed on an attorney who
violates the disciplinary rules.
Garfield, _ Md. at _, _ A.2d at _ (Slip op. at 11) (quoting Dunietz, 368 Md. at 428-29, 706
A.2d at 711 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)).  In considering the appropriate
sanction in an attorney disciplinary action, this Court usually considers the following factors,
among others:
‘[A]bsence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
26
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.’
Dunietz, 368 Md. at 430, 706 A.2d at 711 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jaseb,
364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526 (2001) (quoting Glenn, 341 Md. at 488-89, 671
A.2d at 483)).
We recognize that “misappropriation of client funds or funds entrusted to an attorney
‘is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty and will result in disbarment in the absence of
compelling extenuating circumstances justifying the lesser sanction.’”   Awuah, 346 Md. at
434, 697 A.2d at 454 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593
A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991)).  Where there is no finding of intentional misappropriation,
however, and where the misconduct did not result in financial loss to any of the respondent’s
clients, an indefinite suspension ordinarily is the appropriate sanction.  Id.  In this regard we
have stated:
Although ignorance does not excuse a violation of disciplinary
rules, a finding with respect to the intent with which a violation
was committed is relevant on the issue of the appropriate
sanction.  This is consistent with the purpose of a disciplinary
proceeding: to protect the public, as well as to promote general
and specific deterrence.
Awuah, 346 Md. at 435, 697 A.2d at 454.  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jeter, 365
Md. 279, 293, 778 A.2d 390, 398 (2001) (issuing an indefinite suspension where “the
respondent did not intend to defraud”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86,
27
98-99, 706 A.2d 1080, 1086 (1998) (holding that a 30-day suspension is appropriate where
the respondent did not intentionally misuse client funds).
In Jeter, the respondent was found to have violated MRPC 1.15 (safekeeping
property) and § 10-306 (misuse of trust money) by failing to keep client funds in a separate
escrow account and by failing to pay a client’s physical therapist until six months after
receiving the client funds to do so.  Considering that “the respondent did not intend to
defraud,” we ordered an indefinite suspension rather than disbarment.  Jeter, 365 Md. at 293,
778 A.2d at 398.  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Drew, 341 Md. 139, 154, 669
A.2d 1344, 1351 (1996) (holding that failure to safe keep property in the attorney’s escrow
fund, absent clear and convincing evidence to support intentional misappropriation,
warranted suspension as opposed to disbarment).
Considering all of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the appropriate
sanction to be imposed in this matter is an indefinite suspension from the practice of law with
the right to seek reinstatement after 90 days.  The suspension shall take effect 30 days from
the date of the filing of the opinion.  In doing so, we consider the absence of fraudulent intent
and the lack of evidence that any client suffered financial loss resulting from Respondent’s
misconduct.  We further note the lack of evidence of any prior disciplinary problems in
Respondent’s nearly 38-year membership before this Bar.  
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT; INCLUDING THE COSTS
OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
28
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(C), FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
A T T O R N EY 
GR IEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
ROBERT A. DICICCO; RESPONDENT’S
SUSPENSION SHALL COMMENCE THIRTY
DAYS FROM THE FILING OF THIS OPINION.