Title: GEORGE KALEI SMITH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GEORGE KALEI SMITH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 113119 P.3d 411Case Number: No. 04-61Decided: 09/09/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
GEORGE 
KALEI SMITH,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Pauling.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
George 
Kallei Smith (Smith) appeals his convictions and sentences after a jury trial on 
five counts of third-degree sexual assault and one count of taking indecent 
liberties with a child.  He claims 
plain error occurred when the prosecution used improper victim impact argument 
and testimony; his due process right to a fair trial was violated when, without 
objection, one of the alleged victims testified while holding a teddy bear; and 
two types of reversible error occurred during sentencing, viz., unfounded, unproven information 
was used to penalize him and he was punished for not incriminating himself by 
expressing remorse to the probation and parole agent and the trial 
court.

 
 

[¶2]           
After 
careful review of Smith's claims, this Court does not find reversible error and, 
consequently, affirms the judgment and sentences following his 
convictions.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
The 
record, including the transcripts of the trial and sentencing hearing, reveals 
the following information.  From 
late November of 2001 through early April of 2002, Smith repeatedly imposed 
himself sexually on his fourteen-year-old niece, DH.  He began this activity by finding 
occasions to engage in conversations about sex, eventually becoming increasingly 
explicit and suggesting he could teach her.  Then, while taking her driving in early 
December of 2001, he put his hand under her shirt and bra and rubbed her 
nipples, unbuttoned her pants, and touched her vagina with his hand, first above 
and then beneath her underwear.  
Approximately a month later, when DH and her brothers were spending the 
night at Smith's home and everyone else had gone to sleep while watching movies, 
he approached her again.  He began 
to rub her vagina over her clothes but progressed to doing the same both over 
and under her undergarments.  He 
then removed her shorts and underwear, spread her legs, and used his tongue on 
her vagina, telling her she made him "horny." 

 
 

[¶4]           
That 
scene repeated itself in early February of 2002 when DH again spent the night as 
a prelude to a family get-together for the next day's Super Bowl.  Then, early the next morning, apparently 
referencing his having performed cunnilingus on DH a few hours earlier, Smith 
again approached her and told her she needed to learn how to "return the 
favor."  He then took out his penis 
and told her to suck on the top of it and rub it with her hand.  Because she was afraid of making him 
mad, she "did it" for a couple of seconds when he started pushing her head down. 

 
 

[¶5]           
DH again 
spent the night at her aunt's and Smith's home in early March to babysit while 
her aunt was out of town.  Because 
Smith usually slept in the basement, DH went to sleep in her aunt's bed.  Eventually, Smith entered the room, told 
DH no panties were allowed in that bed, removed her panties, and began to 
perform cunnilingus on her again.  
He then put on a condom and penetrated DH slightly with his penis, 
telling her he wanted to have sex with her and take her virginity.  When the child resisted and pushed him, 
he removed the condom, and she put on her clothes and went to a spare bedroom to 
sleep.  Undeterred, Smith followed 
her and told her, "If I can't do you there, then I'll have to do you in the 
back."  At that point, Smith had 
anal sex with the girl to the point of ejaculation.  Later that month or in early April of 
2002, while again babysitting for her aunt, DH again had her sleep interrupted 
when Smith digitally penetrated her vagina.  

 
 

[¶6]           
Approximately 
a week later, DH once more spent the night at Smith's home.  While trying to get to sleep in the 
basement, she heard what sounded like Smith and her aunt arguing.  Later, Smith came to the basement in a 
seemingly angry mood, put on a condom, pulled down DH's underwear and put his 
penis in her vagina.  Crying from 
the pain, the girl hid her tears until he was finished.  She then rolled over, crying and 
shaking, and curled into a ball and went to sleep.  

 
 

[¶7]           
Because 
she was scared and knew knowledge of these events would tear her family apart, 
DH did not report them to any adult until May 31, 2002, when a casual 
conversation with her parents about a gift for her mother led to an inquiry into 
whether there was anything she wanted to know about sex and if she had ever had 
sex.  DH had tried to forget what 
Smith had done to her but could not due to the ways it had changed her.  Her grades had gone down, she had lost 
friends, she became withdrawn, and she slept a lot during the day because she 
did not feel safe at night.  After 
she confided in her mother and step-father, they first took the matter up within 
the family and finally reported it to the Powell Police Department on June 2, 
2002.  

 
 

[¶8]           
During 
the ensuing investigation, it came to light that Smith had molested another 
young female family member, RT, in June of 1997 when the then fifteen-year-old 
girl and her family had traveled from Minnesota to Powell for her mother's high 
school reunion.  While RT was 
attempting to sleep in the basement of the home of Smith's mother-in-law, Smith 
put his hand down her pants and penetrated her vagina with his fingers.  He then pulled down her shorts and got 
on top of her, trying to have intercourse with her and telling her not to worry 
-- that he could not get her pregnant.  
The girl, however, squeezed her legs tightly together and pushed him 
away.  When he finally quit trying, 
Smith told RT, "Whoever takes your virginity is going to be a lucky man."  RT never reported the incident at the 
time because she knew she would not have to see Smith again, and because she was 
afraid she would not be believed or be accused of having herself done something 
wrong.  

 
 

[¶9]           
As a 
result of this investigation, Smith was charged on August 1, 2002, with seven 
felonies:  Count I, the third-degree 
sexual assault of RT; Count II, taking indecent liberties with DH in December of 
2001; Counts III, IV and VI, the third-degree sexual assault of DH in, 
respectively, January, early February and April of 2002; and Counts V and VII, 
the second-degree sexual assault of DH in, respectively, March and April of 
2002.  The Information was 
thereafter amended to correct the spelling of DH's name, to change the dates for 
the offense charged in Count VI -- from April 1 through April 30, to March 28 
through March 29 -- and to lower the second-degree sexual assault charges in 
Counts V and VII to charges of third-degree sexual assault. 

 
 

[¶10]       
On 
October 29, 2002, Smith waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to the 
district court where, on January 24, 2003, he was arraigned and entered not 
guilty pleas.  His trial commenced 
on July 15, 2003.  On July 18, the 
jury returned its verdict, finding him not guilty with respect to Count IV, but 
guilty of all remaining counts.  
Following a hearing on December 4, 2003, Smith was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of five to seven years on the indecent liberties count and to terms 
of eight to ten years on each sexual assault count.  All terms were ordered to run 
consecutively except for those relating to two of the sexual assault convictions 
on Counts V and VI, which were ordered to run concurrently only to each other. 

 
 

[¶11]       
Additional 
facts will be set out below in relation to the particular issues to which they 
pertain.

 
 
 
 

Issue 
One:  Whether plain error occurred when the 
prosecutor used improper victim impact argument and testimony.

 
 

[¶12]       
Smith 
claims that the prosecutor used irrelevant victim impact argument and testimony 
which "permeated the trial, fatally tainting the evidence against" him.  He recognizes that we must apply the 
plain error standard of review to this claim because he did not object at trial 
to the several instances he now identifies.  Under that standard of review, he must 
show the record is clear as to the instances alleged to be error, a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was clearly violated, and he was materially prejudiced 
by the error.  Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, ¶32, 100 P.3d 1270, 1285-86 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

[¶13]       
The 
instances of argument and testimony about which Smith complains fall into three 
groups.  In the first group, the 
instances concern the impact of Smith's alleged acts on DH; in the second group, 
the instances concern the impact of DH's reporting of Smith's alleged acts on 
the relationships of DH and DH's mother with other family members; and in a 
third group, Smith identifies one brief question-and-answer exchange between the 
prosecutor and victim RT as another instance of improper victim impact evidence. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact of Smith's alleged acts on victim DH

 
 

[¶14]       
Smith identifies the following instances of argument and 
testimony in this group: 1) To the prosecutor's question why she had not 
reported her allegations earlier, DH answered:

 
 
I was scared, and I kind of knew it would tear my family 
apart.  You 
know, I couldn't even imagine what kind of damage it would do, or if I'd ever be 
able to  you know, I know  too, I think I kind of also, I tried to ignore the 
fact that it happened as much as possible.  But it didn't really work, because it changed 
me in a lot of ways.

 
 
The prosecutor then asked, "How did it change you, if you 
can articulate, if you can say?"  DH responded:

 
 
My grades went down.  I lost a lot of my friends.  I lost my aunt, and 
she was like my best friend.  After I told, I couldn't sleep alone by 
myself.  I 
slept  I pretty much slept a lot of the day and stayed up a lot of the 
night.  And 
whenever I did sleep in the night, early hours, I had to sleep upstairs in the 
living room, because I left the TV on and I had lights on, and so that way I 
could sleep with my dog because it made me feel safe. 

 
 
2) In the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor 
said:

 
 
He put on a condom, and he penetrated her vagina with his 
penis.  And you 
recall her saying that that was the worst day of her life. 

 
 
* * * *

 
 
Of course, [DH] further testified about -- about the 
trouble she's had since these acts occurred, the trouble with sleeping.  Of course, the 
worst part is the lost family relationships, particularly with Cindy.  Her grades 
dropped.  She 
testified she wouldn't sleep in the basement of her own house.  She slept on the 
couch with the TV going.  I think she said something about having the 
dog around all the time.  Those were the kinds of things that [DH] 
testified to that bothered her, the kind of symptoms that she experienced since 
this has happened.

Dr. Jakai Hassler testified as an expert.  She testified that 
she's counseled -- you heard her testimony -- numerous children, victims of 
sexual assault.  
You heard her testify about the research.  She talks about various symptoms and 
characteristics of sexual assault, her experience, the research.  She talked about 
those things with teenaged, minor victims of sexual assault, and then she talked 
about the kinds of symptoms [DH] demonstrated and that those symptoms were 
consistent with symptoms of victims of sexual assault, both that she's seen in 
her practice and in the research.

 
 
She testified to numerous symptoms: Fear on [DH]'s part, 
pain, stomachaches, headaches, fear, of course, that reporting would split up 
the family, general withdrawal, weepiness, clinginess to her mother, self-doubt, 
shame, guilt, a loss of sense of security, reduced interest in activities.  She even testified 
to suicidal thoughts, sleep dysfunctions. [DH] testified about her sleep 
dysfunctions as well.  
So her symptoms were consistent with those of victims of sexual assault. 

 
 
* * * *

 
 
. . . [DH's mother] testified that [DH] no longer 
participates in family affairs.  Her grades are down.  She's moody.  She's 
short-tempered with her brothers, depressed, sad.  All these symptoms [DH] has demonstrated that 
are consistent with the story she told in court this week. 

 
 
3)  Smith asserts the testimony of prosecution 
witness Dr. Jakai Hassler, DH's counselor, served to reiterate and emphasize 
"the post-crime effects on DH."  Dr. Hassler identified and described the 
typical behavior patterns of adolescent victims of sexual assault and abuse and 
then compared those patterns with DH's behavior, as related by DH and DH's 
mother, finding DH's behavior was consistent with those patterns.  Smith correctly 
recognizes that Dr. Hassler's testimony neither vouched for DH's credibility nor 
concluded that Smith had sexually assaulted and abused DH.

 
 

[¶15]       
Because these instances are clearly revealed in the record, 
indeed the State does not argue to the contrary, the first part of the plain 
error standard of review is satisfied.  The State and Smith part company, however, on 
the second part of that standard of review, namely, whether a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was clearly violated.  Broadly speaking, victim impact evidence is 
that evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and to the 
physical, emotional, or social impact of a crime on its victim and the victim's 
family.  Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶151, 67 P.3d 536, 592 (Wyo. 2003); Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47, ¶48, 70 P.3d 179, 196 (Wyo. 
2003).  Smith 
argues that these instances of argument and testimony were irrelevant to the 
issues before the jury, relying on Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010-11 
(Wyo. 1989) (victim impact testimony 
inadmissible unless there is "clear justification of relevance").  The State counters 
that a clear justification of relevance was present in this case:  DH's 
credibility.  
We agree.  
As the State explains, before trial Smith made it evident his defense 
would be based on his denial of DH's allegations and an attack upon her 
credibility.  
Six months before trial, he gave notice of his intent to introduce alibi 
witnesses in relation to a number of those allegations -- a fact noted by the 
district court three months later when, in the course of explaining its ruling 
during a motion hearing, it concluded his denial of the allegations had put the 
credibility of DH at issue in the case.  The tenor of that issue became clear during 
defense counsel's opening statement at trial.  At that time, defense counsel posited his 
theory that, for unknown reasons, DH had fabricated all her allegations and, 
because of the turmoil they had caused in her family and her resulting 
repetition of them to a therapist, soon found it too late for her to withdraw 
them and tell the truth.  Defense counsel then characterized those 
allegations as unbelievable in light of the fact DH repeatedly kept spending the 
night at Smith's home after he had allegedly assaulted her and, during that 
time, she never gave any sign to her aunt or her parents as to what was 
allegedly going on.  

 
 

[¶16]       
In order to counter that attack, the State introduced the 
evidence now challenged on appeal to convey to the jury:  (1) the realistic 
pressures and fears which caused DH -- in the absence of any overt threats by 
Smith, or his use of force or his position of authority as her uncle -- to 
tolerate his assaults and delay reporting them; and (2) the countervailing 
pressures created by those assaults and her silence, which eventually caused 
that silence to be broken.  Thus, DH testified that, while Appellant's 
conduct made her uncomfortable and scared, she did not report it for fear of the 
havoc such would cause in her family.  She simply tried to forget it, but could not 
due to the deleterious effects it was having on her life.  Then, after she 
broached the matter to her parents, her fears as to the effect such would have 
on her family were fully realized. 

 
 

[¶17]       
DH's testimony relating to the personality and behavioral 
changes she experienced prior to reporting Smith's assaults was briefly 
corroborated by DH's mother, as was her testimony concerning the effect such 
reporting had on her family.  DH's testimony regarding the pressures she 
experienced because of the assaults and her failure to report them was 
corroborated by her therapist, Dr. Hassler, who first outlined the sort of 
anxieties and resulting symptoms commonly experienced by young sex assault 
victims.  Dr. 
Hassler then noted the anxieties expressed to her by DH were among those 
commonly experienced by such victims and the observable symptoms of those 
pressures and fears DH was manifesting were likewise consistent with those 
observed in sexual assault victims.  In particular, Dr. Hassler testified that the 
fear of adversely affecting one's family frequently causes such victims to delay 
reporting assaults for a considerable time, until "they can't hold onto it any 
more."  

 
 

[¶18]       
Certainly, all such evidence was relevant to counter 
Smith's position at trial that DH should not be believed because, if her 
allegations were true, she would have reported them earlier.   White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶¶17-20, 80 P.3d 642, 650-51 (Wyo. 2003); Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 534-35 
(Wyo. 1993).  Because the challenged argument and testimony 
were relevant to DH's credibility and to Dr. Hassler's testimony, we hold Smith 
has failed to demonstrate the clear violation of a clear rule of law.  

 
 
 
 
Impact of DH's reporting of Smith's alleged acts on family 
relationships

 
 

[¶19]       
In this group of instances, Smith identifies the following 
argument and testimony: 1)  During his opening statement, the prosecutor 
said the testimony would show that DH lost her position in a fairly 
close-knit-type family and the State would call DH's mother to testify about the 
effect of DH's reporting on the family; 2) during DH's testimony, she described 
how her aunt, Smith's wife, used to be her best friend and role model, but now 
they no longer talked.  She testified her grandmother no longer 
treated her as a granddaughter and would not have much to do with her.  She also testified 
that the extended family had discontinued family get-togethers; 3) during the 
testimony of DH's mother, she testified that neither her sister, Smith's wife, 
nor her mother, DH's grandmother, would talk to her; and 4) during the 
prosecutor's closing argument, he variously mentioned the testimony of both DH 
and DH's mother concerning the lost family relationships and discontinued family 
gatherings.

 
 

[¶20]       
Smith and the State rely on their respective arguments made 
in connection with the first group of instances.  The record is clear as to these instances; 
the parties disagree about the clear violation of a clear rule of law and 
whether Smith was materially prejudiced if a clear rule of law was clearly 
violated.  We 
fail to see the relevance of this group of instances to the issues before the 
jury and hold, therefore, that these instances clearly violated the clear rule 
against irrelevant impact evidence.  We also hold, however, that Smith was not 
materially prejudiced by the error.  The quantity and quality of these instances 
was insubstantial in comparison with the quantity and quality of admissible 
evidence against Smith.  In the total context of this case, therefore, 
we are persuaded that such error was harmless.  Admission of evidence of this group of 
instances did not constitute prejudicial error.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The question-and-answer-exchange between the prosecutor and 
victim RT

 
 

[¶21]       
Again claiming another instance of improper victim impact 
evidence, Smith challenges the last question and answer in the prosecutor's 
direct examination of victim RT:

 
 
Q:        Are you 
nervous today?

 
 
A:        Very 
nervous.

 
 
The State invites us to consider the context of RT's 
testimony leading up to that brief exchange:

 
 
Q:        Why did 
you report it [Smith's assault on her]?

 
 
A:        Because I 
don't 

 
 
Q:        Excuse 
me?

 
 
A:        
Sorry.  
Because I don't want it to happen to anybody else.

 
 
Q:        Are you 
nervous today?

 
 
A:        Very 
nervous.

 
 
 
 

[¶22]       
We agree with the State's argument that this testimony was 
not victim impact testimony.  It is clear the prosecutor's question was 
directed not to the effect of Smith's crime on RT but to the stress she was 
experiencing with the unfamiliar circumstance of testifying at a trial.  While RT's earlier 
testimony had by and large been clear, responsive, and cogent, immediately 
before the challenged question and answer she appears to have given either a 
halting or partially inaudible answer to a question why she had reported Smith's 
crime against her.  
The prosecutor then asked, "Excuse me?," and she apologized and gave her 
answer to what would presumably have been the State's last question.  We find no merit in 
Smith's challenge to this testimony.

 
 
 
 

Issue Two:  Whether Smith's due process right to a fair 
trial was violated when alleged victim DH testified while holding a teddy 
bear.

 
 

[¶23]       
Smith claims that when fifteen-year-old victim DH testified 
while holding a teddy bear without any showing by the prosecutor that a 
compelling need existed for DH to hold the teddy bear, Smith's due process right 
to a fair trial was violated because DH's holding the teddy bear garnered 
improper sympathy from the jury.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6; Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶50, 73 P.3d 1041, 1089 (Wyo. 
2003).  Smith 
concedes that he made no objection to DH's holding the teddy bear, and the State 
correctly notes that we must review Smith's claim under the plain error standard 
of review.  Person, 2004 WY 149, ¶31, 100 P.3d  
at 1285.

 
 

[¶24]       
The State asserts Smith cannot show that the record clearly 
reveals that DH in fact held the teddy bear while testifying; even if DH held 
the teddy bear while testifying, Smith cannot show the existence of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law prohibiting a witness's holding a teddy bear while 
testifying; and, even if DH held the teddy bear and a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law prohibited that, Smith cannot show material prejudice.

 
 

[¶25]       
Smith candidly recognizes that in that part of the trial 
transcript covering DH's testimony, there is no indication that DH held a teddy 
bear while testifying.  The only reference in the record to this 
having happened is found in the closing argument of Smith's counsel at a point 
when he is commenting on a jury instruction that the jury is not to be 
influenced by passion or pity:

 
 
Pity is something that is easy to feel for the witnesses on 
the stand.  
Remember the teddy bear that [DH] clutched in her hand.  Remember the Powerpuff Girls 
T-Shirt.  
They're trying to present an image which I submit just simply isn't 
true.

 
 
Smith and the State disagree about whether this record 
reference establishes with clarity that DH actually held a teddy bear while 
testifying.  
The question is a close one, but we will agree with Smith that this 
reference establishes the fact with sufficient clarity for us to proceed to the 
second part of the plain error standard.

 
 

[¶26]       
Smith correctly notes first that this Court has never had 
the occasion to decide whether, or under what circumstances, a witness may 
testify while holding a teddy bear.  Smith next refers us to a handful of 
decisions from courts in other states in his effort to establish the existence 
of the clear and unequivocal rule that the use of a prop such as a teddy bear or 
doll is a due process violation absent a compelling reason for the testifying 
witness to need a prop.  In State v. Palabay, 844 P.2d 1 (Haw. 1992), a sexual assault case, during the twelve-year-old victim's 
direct testimony defense counsel objected to the victim's holding a teddy bear, 
arguing the state had made no showing that it was absolutely necessary for the 
victim's comfort that she hold a teddy bear while testifying.  The trial court 
overruled the objection.  Later, but still during the victim's direct 
testimony, defense counsel repeated the objection.  This time the trial 
court sustained the objection. Id. at 5. On appeal of his 
conviction to the intermediate court of appeals, Palabay argued the trial court 
abused its discretion when it failed to sustain his first objection, thus 
violating his constitutional due process right to a fair trial.  The intermediate 
appellate court agreed.  Id. at 7. In addressing this 
issue, the intermediate court of appeals noted that the Hawaii Supreme Court had 
not had occasion to consider the issue. Id. at 6. The court then turned 
to State v. 
Cliff, 782 P.2d 44 (Id. 1989), and State v. Gevrez, 148 P.2d 829 (Ariz. 1944), overruled in part on 
other grounds, State v. Clark, 543 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Ariz. 1975), to both of 
which Smith has also referred us.  In Cliff, a sexual assault case, when the eight-year-old 
victim entered the courtroom to take the stand while holding a doll, defense 
counsel objected; the trial court held a hearing outside the jury's presence 
during which the victim's court-appointed guardian ad litem testified about the 
victim's unease when testifying and opined that the victim would be put at ease 
if allowed to hold the doll.  The trial court ruled the victim could hold 
the doll while testifying.  782 P.2d  at 46. On appeal of his conviction, 
Cliff argued the ruling violated his due process right to a fair trial.  The intermediate 
court of appeals disagreed.  It accepted the trial court's conclusions 
that the benefit of having coherent testimony from the witness outweighed any 
possible prejudice to Cliff, and the doll could have a calming effect on the 
witness.  
Id. at 47.  The Idaho court noted that in cases in which young 
children are witnesses the court must strike a balance between the accused's 
fair trial right and the young witness's need for an unintimidating 
environment.  
Id.

 
 

[¶27]       
In Gevrez, in which the accused was on trial for murdering 
his ex-wife, the accused's mother-in-law sat near the jury throughout the trial 
and wept bitterly on different occasions; also, the fifth-grade child of the 
accused and his deceased ex-wife testified while holding her deceased mother's 
doll. 148 P.3d  at 832-33. On appeal of the accused's conviction, the Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed on three grounds:  the sanity opinion of the state's expert 
witness rested on an improper basis, the mother-in-law's deportment during the 
trial was prejudicial to the accused, and it affirmatively appeared that the 
prosecution staged and prearranged the child witness's carrying the doll.  Id. at 833.  Interestingly, in 
its remarks about the carrying of the doll, the Arizona Supreme Court added:

 
 
So, we have an instance of where a girl in the fifth grade 
carried her mother's doll in the trial of the case and the influence on the jury 
was not fair to the [accused], and it was a very strong appeal to the jury put 
forward by the prosecution, and while no error can be 
claimed by reason of it, yet it has the great tendency, as in the other 
matter just mentioned, to arouse the sympathy of the jury.

 
 

Id. (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶28]       
In its brief, the State analyzes Palabay, Cliff, and 
Gevrez and 
concludes, correctly, we think, that Smith's reliance on them for showing the 
establishment of a clear and unequivocal rule of law is misplaced.  Neither Gevrez nor Cliff established 
such a rule, as a plain reading of these decisions clearly reveals.  Palabay's reliance 
on those two decisions as authority for such a rule seems ill-considered and 
ill-advised; moreover, Palabay is the decision of an intermediate appellate 
court, not the state's highest court.

 
 

[¶29]       
  The State has also referred us to 
several other decisions on this issue which are worthy of note.  In State v. Marquez, 
951 P.2d 1070 (N.M. App. 
1997), a sexual assault case, trial defense counsel raised the issue of the 
twelve-year-old victim's testifying while holding a teddy bear.  The state and the 
defense argued their respective positions; the trial judge reserved ruling until 
after opening statements, at which time the court held a hearing and both 
counsel and the court questioned the child.  The court then ruled that the child could 
testify holding the teddy bear, explaining the child preferred it, the jury 
would not be prejudiced by its presence, and counsel could question the child 
about it.  
Id. at 1074. On appeal 
of the accused's conviction, the intermediate court of appeals affirmed, 
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to review the trial court's ruling 
because New Mexico's counterpart to W.R.E. 611(a) allows the trial court 
latitude in exercising "reasonable control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, . . 
. and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."  Id. at 1072.  The appellate court 
held that the trial court properly balanced the teddy bear's prejudicial effect 
against its calming effect.  Id. at 1074. To similar effect 
is State v. 
Hakimi, 98 P.3d 809, 811-12 (Wash. App. 2004).

 
 

[¶30]       
Having considered the authority offered by Smith and the 
State, we hold that Smith has failed to establish the existence of the clear and 
unequivocal rule of law for which he contends.  Consequently, he has failed to show plain 
error on this issue.

 
 
 
 

Issue Three:  Whether reversible error occurred during 
sentencing.

 
 

[¶31]       
Smith asserts that the trial court committed two types of 
error during his sentencing hearing.  Smith claims the trial court used unfounded, 
unproven, and inaccurate information in the PSI report as well as his failure to 
admit guilt and express remorse as a basis for the sentences imposed.

 
 

[¶32]       
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court 
determined Smith had "at least over a month" a copy of the probation officer's 
PSI report, which included that officer's opinions and sentencing 
recommendations.  
As required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(A) and (C), the trial court asked 
whether Smith had corrections to make in the report, and Smith's counsel said, 
"Your Honor, I don't believe we have any factual corrections to make.  Of course, we will 
speak to the recommendation made, but there are no factual errors of any 
significance." Neither the State nor Smith made opening statements.  The State called DH 
as its only witness who testified under both direct and cross-examination about 
the effects of the crimes committed by Smith against her.  In summary, she 
testified she had been and was still suffering depression and post-traumatic 
symptoms for which she was receiving counseling and medication.  She disclosed that, 
because of suicidal ideation and emotions of guilt, she had intentionally been 
cutting herself.  
She recommended that Smith receive a sentence of "forever if I knew it 
was realistic, but probably 50 years" because "I don't want anyone else to go 
through what I went through. And also, there's a fear of  that he might attack 
me or something of the sort."  Smith presented no evidence. 

 
 

[¶33]       
Both the State and Smith's counsel made brief closing 
arguments.  The 
State's counsel spoke of "the continuing nature of those crimes committed 
against young females, vulnerable family members," the emotional trauma suffered 
by DH, the crimes' social and emotional impact on the two victims' lives, and 
the probation officer's recommendation in the PSI report, which included the 
statement that Smith had not shown remorse and remained adamant of his 
innocence. Smith's counsel spoke of Smith's maintaining his innocence, 
challenged the probation officer's "conclusion" that Smith was a sexual 
predator, asked the trial court to consider Smith's good record of having had a 
normal childhood, having attended school and college, having been a volunteer 
fireman, being the father of two young children, and having no prior 
convictions.  
The trial court asked Smith if he had anything to say, and Smith said 
no.  After a 
forty minute recess, the trial court began its pronouncement of the 
sentence.

 
 

[¶34]       
In pronouncing the sentences, the trial court began by 
listing the counts involving the victim DH; it did not mention Count IV, on 
which the jury had acquitted Smith.  The trial court then identified the count 
involving RT.  Next, referencing DH's sentencing testimony, 
the trial court said it was no wonder that, at the end of the PSI report, the 
probation agent wrote:

 
 
Before the court stands George "Keoki" Smith found guilty 
of six sexual offenses and pending sentencing.  During the interview Mr. Smith showed no 
remorse toward the victims nor the extent of the damage and devastating impact 
he placed on not only the victims but their families as well.  Mr. Smith was 
adamant of his innocence throughout the interview, stating he was set up.  However, he was 
found guilty through a jury trial. 

 
 
After reading that passage from the PSI report, the trial 
court remarked:

 
 
            
Mr. Smith, if you were set up, you were set up by two different persons 
on incidents that had a spread of some four years, from 1997 to 2001.  The jury didn't 
believe you, obviously. 

 
 
The trial court then continued reading from the PSI 
report:

 
 
            
In the opinion of this agent the [appellant] is a sexual predator.  He used his 
position as an adult in a close family to victimize friends of the family.  He knowingly placed 
himself in situations that did benefit his sexual desires.  Due to Mr. Smith's 
showing no remorse or regret toward the victims or their families, it is 
recommended that he be sentenced to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a 
substantial period of time, as deemed appropriate by the Court, . . . . 

 
 
After noting that the PSI report was ten pages long, the 
trial court stated:

 
 
            
And we consider the testimony of [DH] and her testimony about her fear, 
her feelings of guilt and blame, feelings so intense that she required treatment 
in the WyomingBehavioralCenter, where she was 
diagnosed with depression and posttraumatic stress syndrome.  And it still is 
necessary for her to have ongoing counseling.  For how long, we don't know.  She even attempted 
to kill herself because of you, Mr. Smith.

            
The Court has considered and rejected any possibility of probation on 
these matters.  
We heard enough from [DH] today to realize the importance and necessity 
of removing you from society for a long time, not only for the protection of 
[DH] and [RT], but for the protection as well of other potential future 
victims.  

 
 
The trial court then declared the sentences. 

 
 
 
 

Unfounded, unproven, and inaccurate information in the PSI 
report

 
 

[¶35]       
Smith contends the sentences were the product of the trial 
court's abuse of discretion because they were based upon inappropriate 
information in the PSI report.  Smith cites the probation agent's conclusion 
that Smith was a "sexual predator," the allegation that while bowling Smith 
patted DH's mother's butt, DH's mother's suspicion that Smith was unfaithful to 
his wife, and the allegation that Smith had put his hand on the thigh of one of 
DH's friends.  
Smith also contends that because the PSI report also contained the 
charging information with supporting affidavit for Count IV, of which the jury 
had acquitted Smith, and because the trial court had read the report, the trial 
court must have also considered that information in arriving at the 
sentences.

 
 

[¶36]       
Responding to Smith's contentions, the State first notes 
that the trial court followed the sentencing procedure required by W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(3)(A) and (C) when it afforded Smith and his counsel an opportunity to 
comment on the PSI report and to introduce any information relating to any 
alleged factual inaccuracy contained in it.  The State correctly observes that Smith's 
counsel affirmatively stated, "I don't believe we have any factual corrections 
to make . . . . [T]here are no factual errors of any significance."  In a similar case, 
this Court stated in Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 
(Wyo. 1987):

 
 
            
A criminal defendant has . . . the further opportunity to deny or contest 
presentence investigation data or submit information in mitigation before the 
sentence is rendered. . . . In the absence of denial or objection by defendant, 
the court can rely on presentence reports . . . or other information, including 
trial testimony, as available in the file and otherwise uncontroverted, 
involving the events of the crime or relating to the character of the 
defendant.

 
 
Smith complains much about the probation officer's opinion 
that Smith is a sexual predator.  But, as the State correctly responds, that is 
simply an opinion, not a "factual inaccuracy."  In the State's view, and in this Court's 
view, such a characterization made in the context of the evidence in this 
prosecution, is not "fact," but "opinion."  See, e.g., Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 914-20 
(Wyo. 1992) (discussing fact versus opinion in 
the defamation context and identifying name-calling terms as "imaginative 
expression" and "rhetorical hyperbole").  The State also correctly notes that the trial 
court did not include Count IV when it identified the crimes for which it was 
sentencing Smith in its prelude to declaring those sentences.  Because Smith 
affirmatively denied the presence of factual inaccuracies in the PSI report, did 
not introduce any testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual 
inaccuracy contained in the PSI report, and vigorously challenged the probation 
officer's "opinion" in his argument to the trial court, Smith's contentions are 
without merit.

 
 

[¶37]       
In a final stab at the trial court's exercise of sentencing 
discretion, Smith contends, without cogent argument, that the inclusion of "this 
type of information" "appears on its face to violate the precepts of" Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).  The absence of cogent argument alone is fatal 
to this contention.  
But, because it is clear that Smith misunderstands Apprendi and Blakely, as the 
State explains, we shall briefly comment.  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court noted that any fact which permits a 
trial court to exceed the maximum penalty set out in the standard sentencing 
category for a given offense -- and to therefore place a defendant in a more 
severe category -- was much like an element of the offense, requiring proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, the Court held that, "[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 120 S. Ct.  at 2363.  The Apprendi Court
 drew a distinction, however, 
between a trial court impermissibly finding facts which place a defendant in a 
more severe sentencing category, and its exercise of discretion in imposing a 
sentence within the range permitted by a sentencing category whose use is 
supported by a jury verdict.  With respect to the latter, the Court 
emphasized that sentencing judges were still free to exercise their traditional 
discretion in considering various facts relating to the crime and the offender 
in imposing sentence within the prescribed statutory limits.  
Id. at 481, 120 S. Ct.  at 2358.  In 
Blakely, the Court did no more than apply Apprendi to a sentence which departed from the standard sentencing 
range for the charged offense based on the trial court's finding of a fact that 
justified the departure, but which was not admitted by the defendant when he 
entered his guilty plea.  Blakely, 124 S. Ct.  at 2536-38.  In the present case, the jury verdict on each 
count established all the facts necessary for the trial court to sentence Smith, 
as it did, according to the standard statutory sentencing range for each of the 
charged crimes.  
Under Apprendi and its progeny, the trial court was further free, in the 
exercise of its sentencing discretion, to consider victim impact statements, the 
PSI and other factors relating to Smith and his crimes in imposing an 
appropriate sentence within that statutory range.  Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 481, 120 S. Ct.  at 2358.  

 
 
 
 

Smith's failure to admit guilt and express 
remorse

 
 

[¶38]       
Smith contends the sentences were the product of the trial 
court's abuse of discretion because they were based upon Smith's failure to 
admit guilt and express remorse toward the victims and the victims' families and 
about the harm he had caused.  He points to the trial court's reading of 
that part of the PSI report which comments upon Smith's showing no remorse and 
maintaining his innocence.  In support of this contention, Smith argues 
for the applicability of the holding in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1999), that in determining facts about the crime which 
bear upon the severity of the sentence, a trial court may not draw an adverse 
inference from the defendant's silence.

 
 

[¶39]       
In response, the State, while acknowledging these comments 
from the probation officer and the prosecutor and the trial court's reading of 
these comments before declaring the sentences, maintains that the trial court 
placed no emphasis on these particular comments.  What the trial court did emphasize, the State 
asserts, was the probation officer's comment that Smith, in his interview with 
that officer, was adamant of his innocence, stating he was set up.  Responding to those 
expressions of innocence and of having been set up, the trial court, as the 
State argued, addressed Smith, saying, "if you were set up, you were set up by 
two different persons on incidents that had a spread of some four years, from 
1997 to 2001.  
The jury didn't believe you, obviously."  As argued by the State, the trial court was 
referring not to Smith's silence but to Smith's own expressions.  We agree with the 
State.  
Moreover, we also find it significant that the trial court, immediately 
before declaring the sentences, said:

 
 
We heard enough from [DH] today to realize the importance 
and necessity of removing you from society for a long time, not only for the 
protection of [DH] and [RT], but for the protection as well of other potential 
future victims.

 
 
 
 

[¶40]       
We also find Smith's contentions without merit for another 
reason.  Having 
carefully read Mitchell, relied on by Smith, we believe that Mitchell does not 
apply here.  To 
correctly understand the holding in Mitchell, one must understand the particular facts from 
which the holding emerged.  Mitchell and twenty-two others were indicted 
for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine over a five-year 
period.  
Mitchell was charged with three counts of distributing cocaine within 
1000 feet of a school or playground and one count of conspiring to distribute 
five or more kilograms of cocaine. Id. at 317, 119 S. Ct.  at 
1309-10.  Without a plea agreement, Mitchell pleaded 
guilty to all four counts but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity 
attributable to her under the conspiracy count.  The trial court advised her that the drug 
quantity would be determined at her sentencing hearing.  Before accepting 
Mitchell's plea, the trial court informed her of the penalties for her 
offenses.  In 
this regard, the trial court informed her that the punishment range was very 
complex because it was as yet not known what the prosecutor's proof of drug 
quantity was going to be in her case.  The trial court told her that, for 
distributing cocaine near a school or playground, she faced a mandatory minimum 
of one year in prison; and for the conspiracy, she faced serious punishment 
depending on the drug quantity involved.  In that regard, the trial court informed her 
that if the prosecutor's proof was at least five but less than fifteen kilograms 
of cocaine, then she faced a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison.  The trial court 
explained to her that she would waive the right at trial to remain silent if she 
pleaded guilty. Id. at 317-18, 119 S. Ct.  at 
1310.  The 
prosecution then explained the factual basis for the charges against Mitchell 
but withheld drug quantity proof until the sentencing hearing to be held 
later.  
Mitchell told the trial court that she had done some of what the 
prosecution explained and she confirmed her intention to plead guilty.  The trial court 
accepted her plea.  
Later, at Mitchell's sentencing hearing, one of Mitchell's codefendants 
furnished information on the drug quantity attributable to Mitchell.  According to this 
witness, from April to August 1992, Mitchell worked two to three times a week, 
selling one and a half to two ounces of cocaine a day; and from August 1992 to 
December 1993, Mitchell worked three to five times a week, and from January to 
March 1994, she was one of those in charge of cocaine distribution.  Another witness's 
trial testimony indicated that Mitchell had sold him a total of two ounces in 
the course of three purchases.  Mitchell offered no evidence at sentencing 
and she did not testify to rebut the prosecutor's drug quantity evidence.  Id. at 318-19, 119 S. Ct.  at 
1310.  The 
trial court ruled that Mitchell had no right to remain silent about the details 
of her crimes because of her guilty plea.  The trial court found credible the 
prosecution's drug quantity evidence that put Mitchell over the five kilogram 
threshold, thus mandating a minimum sentence of ten years.  That Mitchell had 
not testified to the contrary of the prosecution's drug quantity evidence was 
one of the factors which persuaded the trial court to rely on the prosecution's 
evidence.  Mitchell,  The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Mitchell's statutory minimum sentence of ten 
years, ruling that Mitchell's declination to testify on drug quantity could 
properly be held against her.  Id. at 319, 119 S. Ct.  at 
1310-11.

 
 

[¶41]       
On Mitchell's appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 
the Court held that (1) neither Mitchell's guilty plea nor her statements at the 
plea colloquy functioned as a waiver of her right to remain silent at 
sentencing, id. 
at 321-25, 119 S. Ct.  at 1311-13, and (2) at the sentencing phase of a criminal 
prosecution when the trial court is determining facts about the crime which bear 
upon the severity of the sentence, the government bears the burden of proving 
those facts, and the trial court may not draw an adverse inference from the 
defendant's silence.  
Id. at 327-30, 119 S. Ct.  at 
1314-16.  The 
critical fact about Mitchell's crime bearing upon the severity of her sentence 
was the drug quantity attributable to her.  If the drug quantity was at least five but 
less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine, she faced a mandatory minimum of ten 
years in prison.  
That critical fact was contested at sentencing. An adverse inference as 
to the existence of that critical fact could not be drawn from Mitchell's 
silence about that critical fact.

 
 

[¶42]       
In this case before us, however, at Smith's sentencing 
hearing the trial court was not making a determination of facts about the crimes 
bearing upon the severity of the sentences to be imposed on Smith.  The jury which had 
found Smith guilty of crimes against DH and RT had already determined the 
critical facts which had bearing upon the severity of the sentences.  No contested 
critical fact about those crimes which had bearing upon the severity of the 
sentences remained for the prosecution to prove.  Mitchell is inapposite and of no value to Smith in this 
aspect of his appeal.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶43]       
Finding no reversible error in the several contentions 
raised by Smith, we affirm the judgment and sentences following his 
convictions.