Title: VERN LOREN BELL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VERN LOREN BELL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 5693 P.2d 769Case Number: 83-262Decided: 01/18/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
VERN LOREN BELL, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 

Representing Appellant: 
Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, and David 
E. Erickson, Asst. Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program; oral 
argument by Mr. Erickson.

Representing Appellee: 
A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, 
Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen.; oral 
argument by Blonigen.

Before THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN, and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Vern Loren 
Bell appeals from the habitual criminal enhanced penalty imposed following his 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter. We affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant's wife was 
badly beaten on July 15, 1983. She subsequently died from these injuries. 
Appellant was charged with and convicted of involuntary manslaughter and his 
sentence was enhanced upon his being found an habitual criminal. He is not 
appealing his involuntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant contends only that 
the enhanced penalty, provided by the habitual criminal statute § 6-10-201, 
ante, is a violation of constitutional guarantees of equal protection and, 
therefore, is unconstitutional.

[¶3.]     The crime of 
involuntary manslaughter is found in § 6-2-105(a)(ii)(A), W.S. 1977, which 
provides:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed 
or implied * * *:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Involuntarily, 
but:

"(A) In the commission of 
some unlawful act except as provided in W.S. 6-2-106 * * 
*."

The provision 
for penalty enhancement is found in § 6-10-201, W.S. 1977, which is as 
follows:

"(a) A person is an 
habitual criminal if:

"(i) He is convicted of a 
violent felony; 
and

"(ii) He has been 
convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately brought and 
tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere.

"(b) An habitual criminal 
shall be punished by imprisonment for:

"(i) Not less than ten 
(10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) previous 
convictions;

"(ii) Life, if he has 
three (3) or more previous convictions." (Emphasis added.)

The underlying 
conviction for an enhanced penalty under the habitual criminal statute must be a 
violent felony which is defined by § 
6-1-104(a)(xii), W.S. 1977, as:

"`Violent felony' means 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first or second degree, 
robbery, aggravated assault, aircraft hijacking, arson in the first or second 
degree or aggravated burglary."

Section 
6-2-106(b), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1984, aggravated vehicular homicide, not 
included as a violent felony for sentence enhancement purposes, provides as 
follows:

"A person is guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if, while driving a motor 
vehicle in violation of W.S. 31-5-233, he unlawfully causes the death of another 
person and the violation is the proximate cause of the 
death."

Section 
31-5-233, W.S. 1977, makes it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor or any controlled substance to a degree 
which renders the operator incapable of safely driving the 
vehicle.

[¶4.]     The question we are 
presented is whether our habitual criminal statute, § 6-10-201, supra, violates 
equal protection and is therefore unconstitutional because it includes 
manslaughter within the definition of violent felonies but does not include 
aggravated vehicular homicide.

[¶5.]     Appellant is not 
contending that the legislature is without power to prescribe punishment for 
criminal offenses. Evans v. State, 
Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214, 1223 (1982). Nor is he challenging the constitutionality of habitual 
criminal statutes. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S. Ct. 648, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967); 
Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 16 S. Ct. 179, 40 L. Ed. 301 
(1895).

[¶6.]     Equal protection 
guarantees that similar people will be dealt with similarly and that people in 
different circumstances will not be treated as though they were similar. Nowak, 
Rotunda and Young, Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1983), p. 
587.

"Under our constitutional 
system the States in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation 
need not provide `abstract symmetry'. [Citation.] They may mark and set apart 
the classes and types of problems according to the needs and as dictated or 
suggested by experience. * * * [T]he equal protection clause does not prevent 
the legislature from recognizing `degrees of evil' * * *." Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1112-1113, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942).

There must be 
some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation 
pertaining to different classes. United 
States Steel Corporation v. Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Council, Wyo., 575 P.2d 749 (1978). The differences 
involved must not be arbitrary and without a just relation to the matter being 
legislated. Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
v. Emerson, Wyo., 
578 P.2d 1351 (1978).

"The problem of 
legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire 
definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and 
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. 
[Citation.] Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the 
phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461, 465, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955).

[¶7.]     Legislative burdens 
which are underinclusive are not reviewed as strictly by the court as 
overinclusive statutes because the people who are burdened by the classification 
are properly identified. Nowak, Rotunda and Young, supra, p. 589. Appellate 
courts

"* * * should grant 
substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily 
possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well 
as to the discretion the trial courts possess in sentencing convicted 
criminals." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983).

[¶8.]     Equal protection does 
not require exact equality. Only discrimination which is arbitrary and invidious 
is prohibited. State v. Laude, Wyo., 654 P.2d 1223 (1982); Cavanagh v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 311 
(1973). Acts which have a greater social impact and graver consequences may have 
more severe penalties. People v. Thatcher, Colo., 638 P.2d 760 (1981). The State has a 
legitimate interest in discouraging specific evils which are believed to be of 
greater social consequences. People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302, 557 P.2d 1205 
(1976).

"Normally, the widest 
discretion is allowed the legislative judgment in determining whether to attack 
some, rather than all, of the manifestations of the evil aimed at; and normally 
that judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable circumstance which might 
suffice to characterize the classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary 
and invidious." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S. Ct. 283, 288, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964).

[¶9.]     The legislature 
included involuntary manslaughter within the definition of a violent felony. A 
death occurring during the commission of an unlawful act, therefore, can, by 
enhancement, result in a punishment of life imprisonment. The legislature did 
not include as a violent felony death resulting from the operation of a motor 
vehicle driven while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. The statute 
is underinclusive and, if there is a reasonable basis for this exclusion, it 
will be upheld.

[¶10.]  The purpose of the habitual criminal 
statute is to remove from society repeat offenders who commit a violent felony. 
An automobile driver who becomes involved in an accident resulting in death as a 
result of the driver's intoxication is guilty of a felony. The driver is not, 
however, guilty of the kind of violent felony the legislature has classified as 
necessary to sentence enhancement pursuant to the habitual criminal statute. The 
automobile is an integral part of our society. It is thought of as a necessity; 
and it may be so. We are licensed to drive in our teens and continue driving 
most of our lives. Drinking alcoholic beverages, at least socially, is 
unfortunately also a common occurrence. These activities involve a large segment 
of the generally law-abiding community who are not repeat offenders, and when an 
accident and death occurs while operating a motor vehicle, it is appropriate to 
classify the offense differently from the enumerated violent felonies. 
Legislative classifications will be upheld as long as the differences are 
reasonably related to the objects or the persons dealt with and to the public 
purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation. People v. Marcy, Colo., 628 P.2d 69 (1981); People v. Taggart, Colo., 
621 P.2d 1375 (1981). The classification in this case is reasonable and does not 
offend due process.

[¶11.]  Statutes carry a presumption of 
constitutionality. Carfield v. State, 
Wyo., 649 P.2d 865 (1982); Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031 
(1979). All reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality. Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 
(1979). The alleged unconstitutionality must be shown clearly and exactly beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Nickelson v. 
People, Wyo., 607 P.2d 904 
(1980).

[¶12.]  Other jurisdictions have looked at the 
question of equal protection as it applies to criminal offenses. State ex rel. Zander v. District Court of 
Fourth Judicial District in and for Missoula County, 180 Mont. 548, 591 P.2d 656 (1979), held that to criminalize the growing of marijuana did not violate 
equal protection even though it was not a crime to cultivate tobacco. They 
stated that criminal statutes need not apply to all areas that might be 
injurious to public health and that the failure to do so was, therefore, not a 
violation of equal protection. Arizona answered the question of whether 
classifying a nonviolent burglary as a crime of violence under the habitual 
criminal statute violated equal protection in State v. Harmon, 25 Ariz. App. 137, 541 P.2d 600 (1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 942, 96 S. Ct. 1681, 48 L. Ed. 2d 185 
(1976). The court held that in a burglary the possibility of confrontation and 
violence is possible and the contention was, therefore, without merit. State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 602 P.2d 914 (1979), dealt with a question similar to the one at bar. Appellant contended 
in that case that equal protection was violated because the habitual criminal 
statute was overinclusive and also underinclusive in including burglary but 
excluding other violent acts. The court stated, "[a] statute does not violate 
the equal protection clause merely because it could have included other persons, 
objects, or conduct within its reach," holding that it was for the legislature 
to determine which crimes were more serious and to provide for a more severe 
punishment for the offenses considered to impose the greatest 
danger.

[¶13.]  The general rules of equal protection as 
applied to this situation preclude a finding of unconstitutionality. The 
classification of manslaughter as a violent felony and the exclusion of 
aggravated vehicular homicide within the definition of violent crimes are 
reasonable and related to a legitimate state interest. There is a rational basis 
for enhancing the punishment of one who kills during the commission of an 
unlawful act with a past history of repeated felony convictions. There is also a 
rational basis for excluding one who negligently becomes intoxicated and, in the 
act of driving a motor vehicle, kills another.

[¶14.]  The legislature could have included other 
crimes in the definition of "violent crimes"; however, they chose not to do so. 
Appellant administered a violent beating on his wife; she died as a result. It 
is obvious that the crime for which he was convicted was properly included in 
the definition of violent felony. It is for the legislature to determine the 
various classes of offenses and the severity of punishment. The fact that 
aggravated vehicular homicide could have been included in the habitual criminal 
statute does not render the statute unconstitutional. The State has a valid 
interest in punishing those who have shown themselves to be unable to live with 
the mores and restrictions of society; the State also had an interest in 
defining those offenses which should be enhanced, and we cannot say that 
excluding death resulting from operation of a motor vehicle was unreasonable, 
arbitrary or invidious. The State can provide a more severe penalty for acts 
which are believed to be of a greater social consequence. People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 
(1977). The classification being reasonable and not arbitrary nor invidious, the 
decision of the trial court is affirmed.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶15.]  I have no fundamental disagreement with 
the justification for affirming this judgment and sentence articulated in the 
majority opinion. Because of my views set forth in State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 
686 P.2d 521 (1984), I identify some additional reasons for affirming the 
district court.

[¶16.]  As I read §§ 6-2-105 and 6-2-106, W.S. 
1977 (June 1983 Rev.), together with the definitions found in § 6-1-104(a)(iii) 
and (ix), the statutory distinctions upon which I based my position in State v. Sodergren, supra, were carried 
forward into the 1983 criminal code. I therefore would hold that those homicides 
which involve the use of a motor vehicle but also constitute the killing of a 
human being recklessly still may be prosecuted as involuntary manslaughters. As 
far as I am concerned then Bell's claim of disparate treatment vanishes 
because those homicide cases which involve an automobile but which are 
prosecutable under the manslaughter statute become violent felonies subject to 
the invocation of the habitual criminal sanctions.

[¶17.]  As to those homicides involving the use 
of a motor vehicle which cannot be charged as homicides committed involuntarily 
but recklessly, the elements of proof are not exactly the same and consequently, 
contrary to Bell's claim, the statutes do not proscribe 
substantially the same conduct. See Bell v. State, Alaska, 598 P.2d 908 
(1979); and State v. Modica, 58 Haw. 
249 Hawaii, 
567 P.2d 420 (1977). I recognize that in his argument Bell here focuses upon the 
aggravated negligent homicide section of our 1983 Criminal Code. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that aggravated vehicular homicide is simply a degree of 
vehicular homicide, and if vehicular homicide is distinguishable from 
manslaughter it follows that aggravated vehicular homicide is distinguishable 
for the same reasons. The increased sanction for aggravated vehicular homicide 
is based upon a matter of degree which the legislature is entitled to classify 
differently.

[¶18.]  For these additional reasons I would 
affirm the judgment of the district court in this case.