Title: State ex rel. M. Weingold & Co. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. M. Weingold & Co. v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-5353.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. M. WEINGOLD & COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. M. Weingold & Co. v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 44, 
2002-Ohio-5353.] 
Workers’ compensation — Substantial inconsistencies between two C84s 
generated by the same examination — Industrial Commission’s awards 
of temporary total disability compensation vacated when not supported 
by “some evidence.” 
(No. 2001-0458 — Submitted July 24, 2002 — Decided October 16, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-317. 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee-claimant, James C. Borawski, sustained an industrial 
back injury on February 18, 1997.  On March 12, 1997, claimant saw Dr. Henry 
Fabian Jr.  Dr. Fabian saw claimant three more times—April 24, 1997, May 27, 
1997, and July 2, 1997.  Three C84 physician’s reports were generated by the last 
examination.  C84s dated July 16, 1997, and August 14, 1997, were nearly 
identical, naming cervical strain and sprain as the sole work-prohibiting 
conditions and reporting a lack of any objective medical findings corroborating 
claimant’s complaints of pain.  These forms nevertheless certified claimant as 
temporarily and totally disabled from February 18, 1997, through July 2, 1997. 
{¶2} 
On August 6, 1997, a district hearing officer (“DHO”) for appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio ordered temporary total disability compensation 
(“TTC”) from the date of injury through March 17, 1997, and to continue upon 
submission of medical proof of continuing disability.  The aforementioned C84s 
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generated TTC payment through July 1, 1997.  Payment, however, ceased when 
claimant submitted no further evidence of disability. 
{¶3} 
Between July 2, 1997, and the following February, claimant 
received no treatment.  On September 3, 1998, he was seen by Dr. Dennis Brooks.  
Dr. Brooks noted in his September 10 report that claimant was trying to 
exaggerate his disability and that claimant, to the contrary, had fully recovered 
from his industrial injury and was able to return to his former job. 
{¶4} 
On December 23, 1998, claimant moved the commission for 
reinstatement of TTC from July 2, 1997, forward.  He accompanied his motion 
with a C84 from Dr. Fabian dated July 17, 1998—54 weeks after his last 
examination.  Based on the same July 2, 1997 examination that had produced the 
two earlier C84s, this C84 recorded, for the first time, substantial lumbar and 
thoracic involvement as well as chronic spasm and polyneuropathy that “severely 
limits his ambulatory capacity.”  That document certified temporary total 
disability from February 18, 1997, through September 2, 1998. 
{¶5} 
A staff hearing officer awarded TTC from July 2, 1997, through 
February 5, 1998, based on Dr. Fabian’s July 17, 1998 C84.  TTC from February 
6, 1998, through October 1999 was paid pursuant to reports from Dr. Darin 
Upchurch.  Compensation was terminated as of October 20, 1999, per Dr. 
Brooks’s certification of claimant’s ability to return to his former position of 
employment.  The court of appeals denied the petition of claimant’s employer M. 
Weingold and Company (“Weingold”) for a writ of mandamus ordering the 
commission to vacate the award of TTC. 
{¶6} 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶7} 
Two periods of TTC are at issue: (1) July 2, 1997, through 
February 5, 1998, and (2) September 10, 1998, through October 20, 1999.  For the 
following reasons, we hereby order the commission to vacate both awards. 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶8} 
The first award was based on Dr. Fabian’s July 17, 1998 C84. 
Weingold’s complaints about that document relate to the amount of time without 
treatment and the time between the examination and the completion of the C84. 
{¶9} 
The first complaint is not, standing alone, compelling.  Lack of 
treatment may or may not suggest an absence of disability.  State ex rel. Simon v. 
Indus. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 186, 188, 642 N.E.2d 1096.  In this case, 
claimant’s seven months without treatment was largely attributable to the delay of 
the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation in processing Dr. Fabian’s request for 
authorization of treatment. 
{¶10} Weingold’s second criticism is more convincing.  Dr. Fabian last 
examined claimant on July 2, 1997, and that evaluation generated three C84s.  
Those prepared on July 16, 1997, and August 14, 1997, named cervical strain and 
sprain as the lone work-preventing condition.  Neither report listed any objective 
findings to corroborate claimant’s continued allegations of pain. 
{¶11} The July 17, 1998 C84, on the other hand, was very different.  
Suddenly, the July 2, 1997 examination also produced diagnoses of axial lumbar 
and cervicothoracic pain, as well as para-axial spasm and polyneuropathy.  
Lumbar and thoracic strain were now key players in claimant’s disability. 
{¶12} We view this discrepancy skeptically, and the time between the 
examination and the completion of the C84 makes the latter even more suspect.  
We have held that internally inconsistent doctor’s reports cannot be “some 
evidence” supporting a commission decision.  State ex rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm. 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 445, 633 N.E.2d 528.  By extension, substantial 
inconsistencies between two C84s generated by the same examination compel the 
same result.  We find, therefore, that Dr. Fabian’s July 19, 1998 C84 is not “some 
evidence” of TTC from July 2, 1997, through February 5, 1998. 
{¶13} The award of TTC from September 10, 1998, through October 1, 
1999, is also unsupported.  On September 10, 1998, Dr. Brooks concluded that 
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claimant could return to his former job.  On October 20, 1999, a DHO adopted 
that report as persuasive.  Weingold advocates the former as the date for 
termination of TTC, and the commission, the latter, based on State ex rel. Russell 
v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 516, 696 N.E.2d 1069. 
{¶14} In Russell, the commission ordered TTC to continue contingent on 
medical proof.  While the claimant continued to submit medical proof, the 
employer countered with evidence of maximum medical improvement—evidence 
ultimately favored by the commission.  Debate ensued as to the appropriate 
termination date—the date of hearing or the earlier date of the proof of the basis 
for termination.  We chose the former, declaring that where a claimant was 
receiving “ongoing TTD compensation pursuant to a prior order,” compensation 
must continue to the date of the hearing.  Id. at 521, 696 N.E.2d 1069. 
{¶15} Our litigants debate Russell’s applicability, i.e., whether claimant 
was receiving “ongoing TTD compensation pursuant to a prior order.”  We find 
that he was not. 
{¶16} On August 6, 1997, a DHO ordered TTC to be paid from February 
1, 1997, through March 17, 1997, and to continue upon submission of medical 
proof.  Claimant submitted proof of temporary total disability only through July 1, 
1997, and, when no further evidence was forthcoming, TTC ceased.  This is key.  
Claimant argues that because he later sought to recommence TTC as of July 2, 
1997, his receipt of compensation was ongoing.  But earlier cessation of TTC 
contradicts this.  Only because he filed a new motion 12 months later seeking 
TTC reinstatement did compensation start up again.  That the two compensation 
periods were contiguous does not make it an ongoing, unbroken chain of TTC.  
Consequently, Russell does not apply, and extension of TTC to the date of hearing 
was inappropriate. 
{¶17} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and a writ of 
mandamus is issued ordering the commission to vacate both periods of TTC. 
January Term, 2002 
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Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
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ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶18} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., and Donald E. Lampert, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Seaman & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Angelique M. Hartzell, for appellee 
James Borawski. 
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