Title: STATE OF WYOMING, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION V. KEITH JEROME THOMASON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF WYOMING, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION V. KEITH JEROME THOMASON2008 WY 143197 P.3d 144Case Number: S-08-0056Decided: 12/08/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
DIVISION OF CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION,Appellant(Respondent),v.KEITH JEROME 
THOMASON,Appellee(Petitioner),

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; David 
L. Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Dion 
J. Custis of Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
by the Division of Criminal Investigation of the Office of the Wyoming Attorney 
General ("Division").  The Division 
is charged with maintaining and overseeing the Wyoming sex offender registration 
process.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-19-301 et seq. (LexisNexis 
2007).  The district court relieved 
Keith Jerome Thomason ("the appellee") of his duty to register as a sex 
offender.  The Division appealed 
that determination.  We will 
reverse. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      We will 
address the following two issues, as stated by the 
appellee:

 
 
1.    Was the district court 
decision to relieve [the appellee] from his statutory duty to register as a sex 
offender contrary to statute?

 
 
2.    Did the State waive its right 
to appeal by failing to appear at either of the two motion 
hearings?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In August of 
1997, the appellee plead guilty to two counts of fourth degree sexual assault, 
as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-305 (Michie 1977).  In November of 2002, the appellee was 
notified by the Division that under the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act, 
as it existed at that time, he was not required to register or provide changes 
of address to the county sheriffs in Wyoming.  
In June of 2007, the Division sent a letter to the appellee notifying him 
of recent changes to the Wyoming sex offender registration laws, and 
informing him that under the new laws he would be required to 
register.

 
 
[¶4]      On September 10, 
2007, the appellee filed a Petition for Relief of Duty to Register.  In his petition, the appellee requested 
that his duty to register be terminated pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-19-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).  
This statute allows for termination of the duty to register after fifteen 
years, with a reduction of five years if the offender has maintained a clean 
record during that time.  The 
Division filed an answer opposing appellee's petition on September 18, 
2007.  A hearing was held and the 
district court entered an order relieving the appellee of his duty to 
register.  The Division filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      This case 
presents a question of statutory construction.  We review issues of statutory 
construction de novo without giving 
any deference to the decision of the district court.  RK v. State ex rel. NatronaCounty Child Support Enforcement 
Dep't, 2008 WY 1, ¶ 10,  174 P.3d 166, 
169 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Relevant 
Statutes

 
 
[¶6]      Before addressing 
the specifics of this case, we will briefly examine relevant portions of the 
Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act ("Act").  To be subject to the Act, an 
individual must meet the definition of "offender" found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-19-301(a)(viii) (LexisNexis 2007). 

 
 
(viii)    "Offender" means a person 
convicted of a criminal offense specified in W.S. 7-19-302(g) through (j), or 
convicted of a criminal offense from Wyoming or any other jurisdiction 
containing the same or similar elements, or arising out of the same or similar 
facts or circumstances, as a criminal offense specified in W.S. 7-19-302(g) 
through (j)[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(g) through (j) (LexisNexis 2007) separates the crimes for 
which registration is mandated into three categories with different reporting 
requirements for each category.1   Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-19-304(a) (LexisNexis 2007), an offender's duty to register and report 
continues for the offender's lifetime.  
However, an offender whose crime falls within the category of crimes 
enumerated in subsections (g) and (h) may be granted relief from his duty to 
register.

 
 
(a)    The duty to register under 
W.S. 7-19-302 shall begin on the date of sentencing and continue for the 
duration of the offender's life, subject to the following:

 
 
(i)     For an offender 
specified in W.S. 7-19-302(g), the duty to register shall end fifteen (15) years 
after the offender was released from prison, placed on parole, supervised 
release or probation, provided the registration period shall be tolled for 
subsequent periods of confinement. The period of registration under this 
paragraph may be reduced by five (5) years if the offender maintains a clean 
record as provided in subsection (d) of this section; and

 
 
(ii)    An offender specified in W.S. 
7-19-302(h) who has been registered for at least twenty-five (25) years, 
exclusive of periods of confinement, may petition the district court for the 
district in which the offender is registered to be relieved of the duty to 
continue to register.  Upon a 
showing that the offender has had no further felony or misdemeanor convictions 
during the period of registration, the district court may order the offender 
relieved of the duty to continue registration.

 
 
Was 
the district court decision to relieve [the appellee] from his statutory duty to 
register as a sex offender contrary to statute?

 
 
[¶7]      The question with 
which we are confronted involves the proper interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-19-302(g) and (h).  Specifically, 
we must determine whether the appellee's crime falls within subsection (g), 
permitting termination of the duty to register after ten years, or subsection 
(h), which subsection allows termination after twenty-five years.  

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court found that the appellee's offense fell within subsection (g), and because 
the appellee had a clean record and it had been ten years since he was placed on 
probation, the district court relieved him of his duty to register.  On appeal, the Division contends that 
the appellee's crime should have fallen under subsection (h) and that the 
appellee should not be eligible for relief from his duty to register until the 
expiration of twenty-five years. 

 
 
[¶9]      The crime to 
which the appellee pled guilty was a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-305 
(Michie 1977) (sexual assault in the fourth degree).

 
 
Except 
under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 14-3-105, any actor who 
subjects a victim to sexual contact under any of the circumstances of W.S. 
6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting 
sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim commits sexual assault in the fourth degree.

 
 
This 
statute was repealed in 1997, and thus is not one of the crimes specified in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(g) through (j).  Therefore, for the appellee to be 
considered an "offender" for purposes of the Act, his crime must contain the 
"same or similar elements" as a criminal offense enumerated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-19-302 (g) through (j).  The 
elements of sexual assault in the fourth degree are virtually identical to the 
elements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304 (a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007) (sexual assault 
in the third degree), which reads:  
 

 
 
(a)    An actor commits sexual 
assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual 
assault in the first or second degree:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(iii)      The actor 
subjects a victim to sexual contact under any of the circumstances of W.S. 
6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting 
sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim.

 
 
[¶10]   The Division argues that the 
district court erred when it applied subsection (g) because the elements of the 
crime to which the appellee pled guilty are the same as those of sexual assault 
in the third degree, a subsection (h) offense.  The district court's order is one 
sentence and merely states "pursuant to W.S. 7-19-304(a)(i), the above-entitled 
Petitioner is hereby relieved from the duty of registering."  While the district court was apparently 
treating the appellee's crime as a subsection (g) offense, it did not state the 
specific subsection (g) offense to which it found the appellee's crime 
comparable.  

 
 
[¶11]   The appellee contends that the 
district court must have considered his offense to have the same or similar 
elements as those of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2007) (sexual 
abuse of a minor in the second degree), a subsection (g) offense which 
reads:

 
 
(a)    Except under circumstances 
constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree as defined by W.S. 
6-2-314, an actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the second 
degree if:

 
 
        . . . 
.

 
 
(iv)    Being eighteen (18) years of 
age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact with a victim who is less than 
sixteen (16) years of age and the actor occupies a position of authority in 
relation to the victim. 

 
 
[¶12]   We conclude that the statutes are 
unambiguous and that the elements of sexual assault in the third degree are the 
same as the elements of sexual assault in the fourth degree, as described in the 
1977 statute under which the appellee was convicted.  Because sexual assault in the third 
degree is one of the offenses enumerated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(h), 
the twenty-five-year termination provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(ii) 
applies.  Therefore, the district 
court erred in ordering the appellee's registration duty terminated pursuant to 
the ten-year provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i).   

 
 
Did 
the State waive its right to appeal by failing to appear at either of the two 
motion hearings?

 
 
[¶13]   The 
Division filed an Answer to Petition for Relief of Duty to Register.  The record is unclear whether the 
Division received notice of the hearing in which this matter was decided, but 
the Division denies ever having received such notice.   The appellee asserts that 
the Division waived its right to challenge the district court's determination 
because it failed to appear at the hearing.  In support of its position, the appellee 
offers two unpublished United States District Court cases for the District of 
Colorado, Namoko v. Cornish and 
Dell'Ollio Law Firm, No. 07-CV-0225-WDM-CBS, 2008 
WL 2037980, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr 21, 2008) and Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Western Int'l 
Grain Co., No. 07-CV-01028-RPM-CBS, 2008 WL 926545, at *1 (D. Colo. April 7, 
2008).  It is unclear what specific 
legal principle or concept the appellee hopes us to glean from these two cases, 
as he fails to cite to any specific portion of either case.  After reading both cases, we find them 
to be irrelevant to the facts presented here and thus we will not consider the 
appellee's argument on this issue any further as it is unsupported by cogent 
legal argument or citation to authority.  Abitbol v. State, 2008 WY 28. ¶ 19, 178 P.3d 415, 420 (Wyo. 
2008).  In 
particular, the appellee presents no authority for the proposition that failure 
to attend a hearing constitutes waiver of the right to appeal a decision 
resulting from that hearing.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   The district court erred when it 
interpreted the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act to relieve the appellee of 
his duty to register.  Further, the 
record does not show that the Division waived its right to pursue this 
appeal.  We reverse the decision of 
the district court, and remand to the district court for entry of an order 
consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-19-302(g) through (j) reads:

 
 
(g) For 
an offender convicted of a violation of W.S. 6-2-202 if the victim was a minor 
and the offender is not the victim's parent or guardian, W.S. 6-2-203 if the 
victim was a minor and the offender is not the victim's parent or guardian, W.S. 
6-2-315(a)(iv), 6-2-316(a)(iii) and (iv), 6-2- 317(a)(i), 6-4-303(b)(iv) or W.S. 
6-4-304(b) if the victim was a minor, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any 
of the offenses specified in this subsection, the division shall annually verify 
the accuracy of the offender's registered address, and the offender shall 
annually report, in person, his current address to the sheriff in the county in 
which the offender resides, during the period in which he is required to 
register. Any person under this subsection who has not established a residence 
or is transient, and who is reporting to the sheriff as required under 
subsection (e) of this section, shall be deemed in compliance with the address 
verification requirements of this section.

 
 
(h) For 
an offender convicted of a violation of W.S. 6-2-304(a)(iii) if the victim was 
at least fourteen (14) years of age, W.S. 6-2-314(a)(ii) and (iii), 
6-2-315(a)(iii), 6-2-316(a)(i), 6-2-317(a)(ii) or 6-2-318, W.S. 6-4-102 if the 
person solicited was a minor, W.S. 6-4-103 if the person enticed or compelled 
was a minor, W.S. 6-4-302(a)(i) if the offense involves the use of a minor in a 
sexual performance or W.S. 6-4- 303(b)(i) through (iii), an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit any of the offenses specified in this subsection, or any 
felony enumerated in this section if the offender was previously convicted of a 
felony under subsection (g) of this section, the division shall verify the 
accuracy of the offender's registered address, and the offender shall report, in 
person, his current address to the sheriff in the county in which the offender 
resides, every six (6) months after the date of the initial release or 
commencement of parole.  Any person 
under this subsection who has not established a residence or is transient, and 
who is reporting to the sheriff as required under subsection (e) of this 
section, shall be deemed in compliance with the address verification 
requirements of this section.

 
 

(j) 
For an 
offender convicted of a violation of W.S. 6-2-201 if the victim was a minor, 
W.S. 6-2-302 or 6-2-303, W.S. 6-2-304(a)(iii) if the victim was under fourteen 
(14) years of age, W.S. 6-2-314(a)(i), 6-2-315(a)(i) and (ii), 6-2-316(a)(ii), 
6-4-402, an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses specified in 
this subsection, or any felony enumerated in this section if the offender was 
previously convicted of a felony under subsection (g) or (h) of this section, 
the division shall verify the accuracy of the offender's registered address, and 
the offender shall report, in person, his current address to the sheriff in the 
county in which the offender resides every three (3) months after the date of 
the initial release or commencement of parole.  Any person under this subsection who has 
not established a residence or is transient, and who is reporting to the sheriff 
as required under subsection (e) of this section, shall be deemed in compliance 
with the address verification requirements of this 
section.