Title: SCOTT RAYMOND BUDIG v. THE STATE OF WYOM ING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SCOTT RAYMOND BUDIG v. THE STATE OF WYOM ING2010 WY 1222 P.3d 148Case Number: NO. S-09-0038Decided: 01/04/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
SCOTT 
RAYMOND BUDIG,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Harry 
G. Bondi of Harry G. Bondi Law Offices, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this appeal, 
Scott Raymond Budig (the appellant) challenges his conviction for third-degree 
sexual assault and second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.  The appellant asserts that his 
constitutionally protected right to confrontation was violated and that the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim witnesses.  Finding no error, we will affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.    Whether the district court 
abridged the appellant's right to confrontation when it limited the scope of his 
cross-examination of the victims?

 
 
2.    Whether the prosecutor 
unfairly vouched for the credibility of the victims during closing 
argument?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On February 
21, 2008, the appellant was arrested and charged with five counts of 
third-degree sexual assault on one of his stepdaughters (older sister), and one 
count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor on his other stepdaughter 
(younger sister). The appellant pled not guilty and received a jury trial.  

 
 
[¶4]      At the trial, the 
appellant advanced the theory that his stepdaughters had fabricated their 
allegations.  To support his theory, 
the appellant moved the district court for permission to admit evidence of, 
among other things, the girls' prior sexual conduct, their manipulative 
character traits, and their propensity for "meanness."  The district court heard the appellant's 
motion and determined that only evidence directly related to the girls' 
relationship with the appellant was admissible, and evidence of other instances 
of specific conduct not directly related to the appellant was not admissible to 
prove the girls' general character.  The district court also held that 
evidence of the girls' past sexual conduct was not 
admissible.

 
 
[¶5]      The matter 
proceeded to trial.  The evidence 
presented included the testimony of an expert witness who described common 
misconceptions about the behaviors and reactions of victims of sexual abuse.1  Upon hearing the evidence, the jury 
convicted the appellant of two counts of third-degree sexual assault and one 
count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.  The appellant was sentenced to 
incarceration for a period of not less than four years nor more than nine years 
on both of the third-degree sexual assault convictions, to be served 
concurrently.  He was also sentenced 
to not less than four nor more than nine years for the second-degree sexual 
abuse of a minor, to be served consecutively to the sentence from the 
third-degree sexual assault convictions.  
A timely notice of appeal followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
raises two issues in this appeal.  
In the first, the appellant claims that his right to confront the 
witnesses was abridged when the district court prevented him from 
cross-examining the victims about their past sexual conduct, their manipulative 
character traits, and their propensity for "meanness."  In the second issue, the appellant claims 
the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly vouching for the 
credibility of the victims during its closing argument.  We will address each of the appellant's 
claims in turn.

 
 
Whether 
the district court abridged the appellant's right to 
confrontationwhen it limited the scope of his cross-examination of the 
victims?

 
 
[¶7]      The 
constitutional right to confront a witness arises under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.2  A district court's limitation on a 
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation is a question of law which we 
review de novo.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004).  Restrictions on a defendant's right to confront witnesses are 
subject to harmless error analysis.  Id.  We have previously addressed the 
application of the harmless error standard of review to an alleged abridgment of 
the right to cross-examine a witness as follows:

 
 
[T]he 
correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the 
cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Whether such an error is harmless in a 
particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to 
reviewing courts.  These factors 
include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, 
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, 
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 25, at 332-33 (quoting Olden v. 
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232-33, 109 S. Ct. 480, 483-84, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513 
(1988)).

 
 
[¶8]      We recently 
summarized the limits that a court may properly place upon 
cross-examination:

 
 
            
The primary right secured by the Confrontation Clause of the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions is the right of cross-examination.  In order for there to be a violation of 
the right of confrontation, a defendant must show more than just a denial of the 
ability to ask specific questions of a particular witness.  Rather, a defendant must show that he 
was prohibited "from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination 
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness . . . 
to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'"  Hannon, ¶ 18, 84 P.3d  at 330 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
680, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause 
guarantees a defendant an "opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and 
to whatever extent, the defense might wish."  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 679, 106 S. Ct. 
at 1435 (quoting Delaware v. 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 295, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)). A 
defendant's right to cross-examination of a witness is not unfettered, but is 
subject to the trial court's "discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination 
to prevent, among other things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal 
relevance." Hannon, ¶ 22, 84 P.3d  at 
331-32 (quoting United States v. 
DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S. Ct. 480, 483, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1988) (per curiam).

 
 

Miller 
v. State, 
2006 WY 17, ¶ 8, 127 P.3d 793, 796 (Wyo. 2006) (some citations omitted; 
emphasis in original).  Thus, a 
district court may reasonably limit a defendant's right to cross-examination 
without abridging his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  See Id. at ¶¶ 7-13, at 796-97; Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, ¶¶ 7-13, 
116 P.3d 1088, 1091-1093 (Wyo. 2005); Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 30, 29 P.3d 76, 85-86 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶9]      Prior to 
trial, the appellant filed a Motion to Admit Evidence of Alleged Victims wherein 
he described character evidence he intended to address during cross-examination 
for the purpose of showing the victims' bias or prejudice.  The evidence included allegations 
related to the victims' past sexual conduct, evidence of their lying, their 
manipulative character traits, and their propensity for meanness.  The appellant also requested that he be 
allowed to cross-examine the older sister regarding a "burn book" and that it be 
admitted into evidence.  This "burn 
book" was a notebook containing disparaging and strongly-worded statements 
regarding friends, acquaintances, and schoolmates.  The state filed a response and the 
district court held a hearing.  In 
its Order on Defendant's Motion to Admit Evidence of Alleged Victims, the 
district court examined and specifically addressed each category of character 
evidence the appellant hoped to use.  
The district court determined that it would allow the appellant to 
cross-examine the victims regarding evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness 
or character for truthfulness, evidence of turning on and off their affections 
toward appellant, and any facts showing meanness or manipulation that were 
directly related to the appellant.  
Also, although the district court refused to allow the appellant to offer 
the entire "burn book" into evidence, it ruled that the appellant could use one 
page specifically related to the appellant.  The district court, however, refused to 
permit the appellant to cross-examine the victims about alleged past sexual 
conduct or other reputation or character evidence not directly related to their 
interactions with, or attitudes toward, the 
appellant.

 
 
[¶10]   In this 
appeal, the appellant contends that the district court erred when it refused to 
allow him to cross-examine the victims about 1) past sexual conduct, 2) 
manipulation, and 3) meanness.  In 
sexual assault cases, such as this, the admissibility of this type of evidence 
is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312 (LexisNexis 2009), commonly referred to 
as the "Rape Shield Law."3  This statute sets forth a specific 
procedure the defendant must follow if he intends to offer "evidence of the 
prior sexual conduct of the victim, reputation evidence or opinion evidence as 
to the character of the victim."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312(a); 
Grady 
v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 20, 197 P.3d 722, 729 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
statute requires the defendant to give notice of intent to use such evidence and 
make an offer of proof of its relevancy to the defense, with accompanying 
affidavits.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-312(a)(i) and (ii); Velos v. 
State, 752 P.2d 411, 414 (Wyo. 1988).  
If the district court finds the offer of proof sufficient, it conducts an 
in-camera hearing to decide the admissibility of the evidence by examining 
whether the "probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the 
probability that its admission will create prejudice."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312(a)(iv); Velos, 752 P.2d  at 
414.

 
 
[¶11]   The 
appellant's motion, filed pursuant to this statute, set forth the following 
allegations with respect to the three above-mentioned categories of 
evidence:

 
 
1.    Evidence of both girls 
manipulation of the Budig and [girls' father] families.  These girls have threatened the Budig 
family with threats of returning to California at times when they didn't get 
their ways.  On the other hand, in 
the summer of 2004 when the girls wanted to stay in Casper, they called their 
father a "dick".  The girls do a 
variety of actions depending upon where they want to stay.  Recently, and may be pertinent to the 
present case, they referred to [another family] as the perfect family long 
before they were placed with them.

 
 
This 
evidence is relevant in that it provides the motivation and the intent, among 
other things, for these girls to make false accusations.

 
 
2.    Evidence of the girls' 
meanness.  These girls have 
displayed mean characteristics from time to time.  Examples of mean behavior include making 
fun of a disabled aunt and then lying about it.  Upon hearing their father, . . . . being 
pistol whipped in an armed robbery, that for a long period of time they laughed 
about it, calling him such things as a "pussy" and stating that if he was a real 
man like their "dad", [the appellant], it wouldn't have happened to 
him.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
4.    Evidence of the girls' past 
sexual conduct.  This evidence is 
relevant in that without some evidence being put forth of these girls' prior 
sexual knowledge, any fact finder might believe these little girls couldn't 
possibly know anything about sex unless [the appellant] had done what he is 
accused of.  Instead, the truth of 
the matter is that [the older sister] has had at least one groping and heavy 
petting relationship with a boy (her step cousin) a few years older than her, in 
which she crawled into bed with him on a couple of occasions.  [The younger sister] has repeatedly 
grabbed a boy in the crotch or kicked him in the crotch.  It further appears that these girls set 
up a "My Space" porn account which they never acknowledged.  In a so-called "Burn Book" attached, [the 
older sister] refers to "fingering" on numerous pages.  "Fingering" is the sex act the defendant 
is accused of doing.  In a 
recording, the girls laugh about there being nothing to do at their house other 
than "[f_ _ _]."

 
 
5.    In [the older sister]'s Burn 
Book.  This book speaks for itself 
and the finder of fact should be entitled to determine her character from what 
is written in that book.  It is 
relevant in that it is an indication of her meanness, her knowledge of sex, her 
sexual accusations against others, her attitude towards any young girl who might 
submit to any sex by an older male, as well as a page that shows her attitude 
toward her step dad.

 
 
[¶12]   The 
appellant summarizes his argument that the above evidence should have been 
admitted as follows:

 
 
Because 
the girls were mean to their family members as well as friends and classmates in 
their burn book, their disregard for people's feelings and reputation was not 
isolated, but prevalent in all aspects of their lives, and social lives, family 
lives, and school lives.  Therefore, 
it is likely that the girls would have the motivation to lie about accusing 
their step-father of sexual assault because they demonstrated a past of not 
being sensitive to an individual's reputation.

 
 
            
Thus, character evidence of the girls past sexual conduct, manipulation, 
and meanness are all relevant to proving that the girls may have had a motive to 
fabricate allegations of sexual assault.

 
 
The 
appellant's position is simply flawed.  
These allegations, even if true, do virtually nothing to show the 
victims' bias or prejudice against the appellant.  Because none of the evidence relates 
directly to the appellant, its relevance is marginal and its probative value, if 
any, is very limited.  Furthermore, 
to allow the appellant to argue to the jury that the victims made false 
allegations against the appellant because they had been manipulative or mean to 
other family members or peers in the past requires a significant leap in logic 
and has the potential to confuse the issues.  

 
 
[¶13]   Finally, 
we turn to the appellant's contention that the evidence of the victims' past 
sexual conduct should have been admitted.  
These allegations regarding the victims' prior sexual knowledge are in 
the class of evidence the rape shield law is specifically designed to 
exclude.  However, the appellant attempts to avoid application of 
the rape shield law by arguing that the evidence was merely intended to show 
that the victims had independent "sexual knowledge," and not to embarrass or 
prejudice the victims or show that they were more likely consensually to engage 
in the conduct of which he is accused.  
The appellant's attempted circumvention of the rape shield law runs 
counter to the intent and stated purpose of the 
statute.

 
 

Wyoming, 
along with most other jurisdictions, enacted a "rape-shield" 
statute to bring under control a long-standing tradition that rape victims could 
be discredited as witnesses based on prior sexual conduct.  This 
tradition was based on the faulty notion that women who engaged in nonmarital 
intercourse were immoral and likely to engage in such conduct on any given 
occasion, and was deemed prejudicial and humiliating to the victim. 

 
 

Stogner 
v. State, 
792 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Wyo. 1990) (citations omitted).  We 
have said that this statute is "designed 
to protect the victim from 
embarrassment and abuse at trial and also to encourage the reporting of sexual 
assaults to the authorities.  They 
are not enacted for the protection of the accused."  Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 
646 (Wyo. 1981) (emphasis in original).  To 
allow this type of evidence under the appellant's proffered justification would 
open the door for defendants in sexual assault prosecutions (particularly cases 
involving children) to explore freely the knowledge and prior sexual 
practices/experiences of their victims.  
Such a result would be entirely inconsistent with the intent of our 
enacted rape shield law.

 
 
[¶14]   We hold 
that because the evidence of meanness, manipulation, and prior sexual conduct 
was not admissible, and because the appellant was given the opportunity to 
challenge the victims' credibility, motives, and biases using other admissible 
evidence, the appellant was not denied his constitutionally protected right to 
confrontation.

 
 

Whether 
the prosecutor unfairly vouched for the credibility ofthe victims during 
closing argument?

 
 
[¶15]   The 
appellant asserts that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of 
the victim witnesses in statements he made during closing argument.  This claim is one of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  

 

Our 
standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is 
well established:

 
 
In 
reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the court 
looks at the entire record to determine whether the defendant's case was so 
prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair trial. 
 Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 567 (Wyo. 2000); 
Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 910 (Wyo. 2000). The challenged comments are judged in the context of the 
prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the statements and 
comparing them with the evidence produced at the trial.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 

. 
. . When an objection is launched to a statement made in closing argument, we 
defer to the trial court's ruling in the absence of a clear or patent abuse of 
discretion. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 

Harris 
v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 14, 177 P.3d 1166, 1170-71 (Wyo. 
2008) (quoting Burton v. 
State, 2002 WY 71, ¶¶ 11-12, 46 P.3d 309, 
313 (Wyo. 2002)).  "If the 
trial court abused its discretion by allowing impermissible argument, we will 
only reverse if a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.'"  Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 17, 110 P.3d 1206, 1212 (Wyo. 2005) 
(quoting Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000)). 

 
 
[¶16]   We have 
addressed the issue of an expert witness vouching for the credibility of the 
testimony of an alleged sexual assault victim on a number of prior 
occasions.  See Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶¶ 
9-26, 98 P.3d 143, 146-151 (Wyo. 2004); Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶¶ 18-29, 
76 P.3d 805, 812-18 (Wyo. 2003); Wilde v. 
State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 15-19, 74 P.3d 699, 708-09 (Wyo. 2003); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 
(Wyo. 1989), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807, 816 (Wyo. 2008).  Before examining the appellant's 
specific claims, we note that this case is unlike the above-cited cases in that 
the appellant does not argue that the expert improperly vouched for the 
credibility of the victim witnesses.  
Instead, he claims that "the prosecutor used the statements of the 
expert testimony to vouch for the credibility of the witness and achieved the 
same result."  (Emphasis in 
original.)  The appellant points to 
three statements, all made during closing argument, where he contends the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim witnesses.  The first two, in which the prosecutor 
references testimony of the expert witness, are set forth below with emphasis 
added to the specific portions to which the appellant takes 
exception:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Just because [the younger sister] did 
not want to talk about it does not mean that it didn't happen.  Just because [the younger sister] didn't 
disclose the sexual molestation in detail does not mean that it didn't 
happen.

 
 
The 
expert, the psychologist, Fred Lindberg, explained to you the disclosure process 
in these kinds of situations where children have been sexual[ly] abused.  He told you that there was partial or 
piece-by-piece disclosure, if you will, in many of these cases, and that's exactly what happened with [the 
younger sister].  You saw her, 
ladies and gentlemen.  She was 
absolutely petrified in the CAP interview.[4]  She was absolutely petrified when she 
took the stand.

 
 
            
He explained to you, piece-by-piece disclosure is when they're testing 
the waters, you know, and they are so embarrassed and so humiliated that they're 
going to tell a person just a little bit at a time until they see - - 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Defense counsel objected at 
this point and the following exchange occurred at the 
bench:

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  I hate interrupting the 
closing argument but, Your Honor, this is exactly what I objected to before Dr. 
Lindberg testified.  I think it 
amounts to vouching for the credibility of the 
witness.

 
 
The 
Court:  I don't believe so.  I think he's talked about the 
characteristics -- behavioral characteristics, and I think that's appropriate 
under the case law.

 
 
So 
I'll overrule the objection.

 
 
Mr. 
Schafer may continue.  As long as 
he's talking about behavior characteristics, that's fine.  But if it gets into truth and veracity, 
that's another [sic].

 
 
The 
next instance of alleged vouching occurred right after the prosecutor continued 
his closing argument:

 
 
[Prosecutor:]  Like I was trying to indicate to you, 
ladies and gentlemen, the expert, Dr. Lindberg, was trying to explain to you the 
common misconceptions of the way sexual disclosure occurs with children, 
children like [the younger sister], in these cases.  

 
 
It's 
a very emotional, traumatic thing for them to go to [sic].  And what they do is, they test the 
waters, and they won't always disclose everything that happened to them each and 
every time.

 
 
You 
heard Dr. Lindberg's testimony that there are victims who never even report 
sexual abuse at all.  And in his 
testimony, also, a third of them never even indicate what the sexual abuse is 
until after five years.

 
 

And 
isn't this exactly what happened with [the older sister] in this 
case?  It took her 3 ½, 4 years to disclose the 
sexual abuse . . . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶17]   The 
appellant argues that by saying that the behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg are 
"exactly what happened" in this case, the prosecutor gave more credibility to 
the victims' testimony, thereby improperly vouching for their credibility.  We disagree with the appellant's 
conclusion.  When addressing 
vouching issues in the context of prosecutorial misconduct, we have said:  

 
 
Counsel 
are allowed wide latitude during the scope of their closing arguments, and a 
prosecutor may comment on all of the evidence in the record and suggest 
reasonable inferences from that evidence.  However, the prosecutor may not inflame 
or mislead the jury or express his personal beliefs or opinions about the 
evidence.  Davis v. 
State, 2005 WY 93, ¶ 25, 
117 P.3d 454, 463 (Wyo. 2005).  Similarly, a prosecutor cannot personally 
vouch for the credibility of a state's witness, nor can a prosecutor assert his 
own credibility as a basis for conviction of a defendant.

 
 
[W]hen 
the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an additional factor 
is injected into the case. This additional factor is that counsel may be 
perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than 
their own opinion; that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the 
evidence, but rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because 
of his position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with 
enforcing the criminal laws of a sovereign state.  While the prosecutor is expected to be an 
advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the 
evidence or misapply the law.

 
 

Condra 
v. State, 
2004 WY 131, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 386, 390 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

Teniente 
v. State, 
2007 WY 165, ¶ 30, 169 P.3d 512, 524 (Wyo. 2007).  With regard to the admissibility and 
appropriate use of expert testimony in sexual assault cases, we have said:  

 
 
Expert 
testimony that discusses the behavior and characteristics of sexual assault 
victims and the range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is 
admissible.  Scadden v. 
State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 
1987). Such testimony is relevant and helpful in explaining to the jury the 
typical behavior patterns of adolescent victims of sexual assault.  Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988).  It assists the jury in understanding some 
of the aspects of the behavior of victims and, so long as there is no comment on 
the credibility or truthfulness of the victims, it does not invade the province 
of the jury.  Zabel v. 
State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 
1988). 

 
 

Rivera 
v. State, 
840 P.2d 933, 939 (Wyo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Springfield v. 
State, 860 P.2d 435 
(Wyo.1993).  

 
 
[¶18]   After 
reviewing the entire record on appeal, and particularly the trial transcripts, 
we find that the prosecutor's comments relating the victims' actions to the 
general behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg were not tantamount to vouching for 
the victims' credibility.  The 
prosecutor's statements merely informed the jury about the relevance of 
Dr. Lindberg's testimony and suggested how that testimony might assist the jury 
in determining the facts at issue.  
Such use of expert testimony is proper.  See Lessard v. 
State, 719 P.2d 227, 233-34 (Wyo. 1986) 
(expert testimony as to why sexual assault victim would ask assailant not to 
tell about sexual encounter was admissible in that it did not constitute 
testimony with respect to veracity of victim, but rather assisted jury in 
understanding evidence).  
Furthermore, relating the general behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg to 
the behaviors exhibited by the victims in this case was particularly important 
to effective prosecution of the case inasmuch as one of the appellant's defense 
strategies was to argue that the victims' behaviors were inconsistent with the 
allegations they were making against the appellant.  Specifically, the appellant attempted to 
discredit the victims by raising questions regarding:  1) the victims' delay in reporting, 2) 
their methods of disclosure, 3) their maintaining a relationship and continued 
contact with the appellant, 4) their inconsistent or incomplete disclosure, and 
5) their lack of overt manifestations of distress.  Without expert testimony to educate the 
jury about common misconceptions concerning the general behaviors of child 
victims, the jury might have drawn inappropriate conclusions.  

 
 
[¶19]   The third 
and final statement the appellant argues amounted to improper vouching by the 
prosecutor was also made during his closing statement: 

 
 
Now, 
[the younger sister] went through two traumatic experiences.  The first time was when she was 
molested, February 18th of 2008, and that will be a day that she'll never 
forget.  

 
 
But 
the second time is when she went through the judicial process.  She had the  she didn't have the power 
and the time or the ability to stop what that man was doing to her in the 
bedroom.  But she did have the 
ability, the time, and the power to stop what the defendant says she is doing 
[now, which is] fabricating this whole thing.  But she didn't do that because she has 
the courage, and she knows what's right.  
And she came in here with all that difficulty and rose her right hand and 
told you, ladies and gentlemen, that she would tell the truth.  And she's a human being just like 
everybody in this courtroom, and she has a conscience.  

 
 
The 
appellant asserts that this statement is similar to one made in Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, 98 P.3d 143 
(Wyo. 2004).  Lopez is another in the line of vouching 
cases where we found that an expert improperly vouched for the credibility of 
the child victim.  In that case, the 
prosecutor made the following statement:  "if you believe that 12-year-old child 
when she was sitting on that witness stand, and you believe what she told you 
was the truth, that is all the evidence you need."  Id. at ¶ 24, at 151.  The appellant argues that both the Lopez statement and the above-quoted 
statement made by the prosecutor in this case resulted in improper 
vouching.  

 
 
[¶20]   The 
appellant's reliance on Lopez is 
misplaced.  To begin, we did not 
find that the statement in Lopez was 
improper, but only quoted it in the course of examining the improper vouching 
testimony of the expert witness.  
Furthermore, the substance and context of the two statements is 
different.  A more analogous 
statement can be found in Teniente v. 
State, 2007 WY 165, 169 P.3d 512 (Wyo. 2007), where the prosecutor made the 
following comment regarding an eye-witness's testimony in a first-degree murder 
trial:

 
 
[W]e 
have one eyewitness, one eyewitness that stepped up to the plate February 18th, 
and said, I was there. This is what happened.'  . . . .

 
 

. 
. . . 

 
 
He 
saw what happened, and he decided to step forward and tell the truth, even 
though the first time, it's against his very own brother, and now the second 
time, against his cousin.  Courage.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 32, at 525.  
Both the statement in Teniente and the statement made here are 
comments about the courage of the witness to come forward in the face of 
opposition and testify "truthfully."  
We sustained the prosecutor's statement in Teniente holding:

 
 
While a prosecutor cannot continuously and repeatedly express 
his opinions or 
beliefs as to the truth or falsity of testimony or the innocence or guilt of the 
defendant, he may comment on evidence and present reasonable inferences that 
logically flow from that evidence including making a reasonable inference that a 
witness is not truthful, assuming that the evidence supports such an 
inference. 

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Teniente 
claims that this is improper vouching for the credibility of [the witness]. 
 We do not interpret the comments in 
the same fashion.  The prosecutor 
was not vouching for the credibility of [the witness].  Rather, he was arguing reasonable 
inferences, drawn from evidence introduced at trial, that [the witness]' 
testimony could be seen as reliable.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶¶ 31-33, at 524-25.  In neither 
statement does the prosecutor express a personal belief or opinion about the 
credibility of the witness, witness's testimony, or truth or falsity of the 
evidence.  Given the context in 
which they were made, we find neither statement to be improper.  However, we note that the Teniente statement that the witness came 
forward to "tell the truth" draws closer to the line of misconduct than the 
statement made here.  The Teniente statement, made in a different 
context, might reasonably lead a jury to believe the prosecutor has a personal 
belief or opinion about the credibility of that witness.  In contrast, the prosecutor's statement 
here, that the witness "rose her right hand and swore to tell the truth," 
carries no express message that the prosecutor believes or has an opinion about 
the credibility of the witness but merely reiterates what the jury already knows 
and witnessed.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   
We hold that the appellant's constitutionally protected right to 
confrontation was not abridged when the district court refused to allow him to 
question the victims about prior alleged sexual conduct or about specific 
instances showing the victims' mean or manipulative character traits, which 
instances did not involve the appellant.  
Further, we find that the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the 
victims' credibility when, during closing argument, he referenced the testimony 
of an expert witness and related it to the victims' behavior, or when he stated 
that the younger sister "rose her right hand and told 
[the jury], that she would tell the truth." 

 
 
[¶22]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
appellant moved in limine to exclude 
the testimony of the expert, citing concerns that the expert would vouch for the 
credibility of the victims.  The 
district court determined that the expert would be permitted to testify but 
specifically limited his testimony to general characteristics of sexual abuse 
victims and admonished him to make no comment about the credibility or 
truthfulness of the victims.

 
 

2Although 
the appellant cites both the United States and Wyoming Constitutions in his 
brief, he does not differentiate between the two provisions or otherwise provide 
separate analysis of the Wyoming constitutional provision in question.  We have said that as a matter of policy, 
we will not consider separate state constitutional analysis unless the party 
presents proper argument supporting independent state grounds.  Cohen v. State, 2008 WY 78, ¶ 23, 191 P.3d 956, 962 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312, entitled "Evidence of victim's prior sexual conduct or 
reputation; procedure for introduction," provides:

(a)     In any prosecution 
under this article or for any lesser included offense, if evidence of the prior 
sexual conduct of the victim, reputation evidence or opinion evidence as to the 
character of the victim is to be offered the following procedure shall be 
used:

(i)      A written motion 
shall be made by the defendant to the court at least ten (10) days prior to the 
trial stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of 
evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim and its relevancy to the defense; 

(ii)      The written 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits in which the offer of proof is stated; 

(iii)     If the court finds the 
offer of proof sufficient, the court shall order a hearing in chambers, and at 
the hearing allow the questioning of the victim regarding the offer of proof 
made by the defendant and other pertinent evidence; 

(iv)     At the conclusion of 
the hearing, if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence 
substantially outweighs the probability that its admission will create 
prejudice, the evidence shall be admissible pursuant to this section. The court 
may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, 
which order may include the nature of the questions to be permitted. 

(b)     This section does not 
limit the introduction of evidence as to prior sexual conduct of the victim with 
the actor.

(c)     Any motion or affidavit 
submitted pursuant to this section is privileged information and shall not be 
released or made available for public use or scrutiny in any manner, including 
posttrial proceedings.

 
 

4The 
CAP (Children's Advocacy Project) interview was a videotaped interview conducted 
as part of the sexual assault investigation and presented to the 
jury.