Title: JAMIE STANTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMIE STANTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 31130 P.3d 486Case Number: 05-87Decided: 03/20/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JAMIE 
STANTON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.    

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and WALDRIP, 
DJ.

 
 
KITE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]  Jamie Stanton was convicted by a jury of 
bribery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).  The district court sentenced him to six 
to ten years in prison with credit for 259 days served prior to imposition of 
the sentence.  Mr. Stanton appeals, 
claiming the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
acquittal when no evidence showed he was a public servant performing a 
governmental function, necessary elements for conviction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-102(a)(ii).  Mr. Stanton also 
claims the statute is unconstitutionally vague.  We affirm.    

  

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Stanton 
states the issues as follows:

 
 
ISSUE 
I

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred when it denied the motion for judgment of 
acquittal.

 
 

ISSUE 
II

 
 
Whether 
the public official bribery statutes are unconstitutionally 
vague.

 
 
The 
State re-phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court properly deny appellant's motion for judgment of 
acquittal?

 
 
II.          
Are Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-5-102(a)(ii) and 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) 
unconstitutionally vague, either on their face or as applied to 
appellant?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  Mr. Stanton was an employee of Juvenile 
Electronic Management Services (JEMS), a youth and family counseling agency and 
diversion services1 provider for youth and families 
involved in the juvenile justice system.  
JEMS was owned and operated by Rick Clifton.  JEMS had collaborative agreements with 
most of the social services agencies in Cheyenne, including an agreement with Frontier 
Correctional Systems (FCS) to provide case management for youth having to pursue 
educational opportunities outside the traditional school environment.  JEMS obtained all of its clients through 
court order and one hundred percent of its funding came from city, county and 
state entities. 

            

[¶4]  On October 3, 2003, the district court 
ordered JRJ, a minor involved in the juvenile justice system, to participate in 
the day treatment school offered at FCS by collaborative agreement between FCS 
and JEMS.  Mr. Stanton was JEMS' 
liaison with FCS.  In that capacity, 
he was responsible for reporting JRJ's progress to Mr. Clifton, JRJ's parents 
and the multidisciplinary team assigned to JRJ's case.

            

[¶5] On 
April 19, 2004, Mr. Stanton telephoned JRJ's mother and told her JRJ had been 
caught with methamphetamine.  Two 
days later, he called again and said he wanted to come to her home to discuss 
her son's situation.  When Mr. 
Stanton arrived at the home a short time later, he discussed with JRJ's mother 
the fact that she was moving to Greeley, 
Colorado and might have to hire a Colorado attorney to 
represent her son.  He asked her how 
much money she could come up with to pay a retainer fee.  Ultimately, she indicated she could come 
up with $750 in a couple of days.  
Mr. Stanton advised her that hiring an "outside" attorney who was not 
familiar with JRJ's case would make things worse for her son.  He suggested her son might be taken away 
from her until he reached the age of twenty-one and she could be charged with 
abandonment if she moved out of Wyoming.  
He indicated the $750 could be used as "persuasion money" to make things 
better for her son. 

 
 
[¶6]  Mr. Stanton called JRJ's mother again on 
April 21, 2004.  They set up a time 
to meet in order for her to give him the money.  Prior to meeting with Mr. Stanton, JRJ's 
mother went to JEMS to speak with Mr. Clifton.  She was upset and told Mr. Clifton she thought JEMS 
was trying to help her son and did not understand how the "persuasion money" 
would accomplish that.  Mr. Clifton 
did not understand and asked her to explain.  When he learned what had happened, Mr. 
Clifton telephoned the police.  Mr. 
Clifton and JRJ's mother met with police officers, who photocopied the money and 
then followed JRJ's mother to her house to meet Mr. Stanton.  The officers waited in the back 
room.  When Mr. Stanton arrived, he 
asked JRJ's mother if she had the money.  
She handed him $580, the amount she had managed to obtain.  As Mr. Stanton left the home, the 
officers arrested him.        
    

 
 
 [¶7]  Mr. Stanton was charged with bribery 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii), which provides:

 
 

(a)   A person 
commits bribery, if:

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
(ii) 
While a public servant, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary 
benefit, testimonial, privilege, or personal advantage upon an agreement or 
understanding that his vote, exercise of discretion or other action as a public 
servant will thereby be influenced. 

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) (LexisNexis 2005) further 
provide:

 
 
   (ii) "Governmental function" 
includes any activity which a public servant is legally authorized to undertake 
on behalf of a government;

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
   
(vi) "Public servant" means any officer or employee of government, 
including legislators and judges, and any person participating, as juror, 
witness, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmental 
function.  

 
 
[¶8]  Trial on the charge against Mr. Stanton 
began October 18, 2004.  At the 
close of the State's case, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal, 
arguing that no evidence had been presented showing that at the time of the 
alleged offense Mr. Stanton was a public servant performing a governmental 
function within the meaning of the statutes.  Rather, the defense asserted, the 
evidence showed Mr. Stanton was employed by JEMS, a private company, and was 
performing a function on behalf of JEMS.  
After hearing argument from counsel, the district court reserved ruling 
and requested the parties to submit law supporting their respective arguments 
the following morning. 

 
 
[¶9]  The following day, after the close of 
the evidence, defense counsel renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal.  The district court again reserved ruling 
and directed the parties to brief the issue of whether Mr. Stanton was a public 
servant performing a governmental function at the time he accepted the 
money.  Meanwhile, the jury returned 
a verdict finding Mr. Stanton guilty of bribery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-102(a)(ii).

 
 
[¶10]  Following the jury verdict, defense 
counsel filed a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, and the State filed a 
response.  On November 18, 2004, the 
district court entered an order denying the motion.  In its order, the district court 
found:

 
 
[T]he 
definition of "public servant" is clear and unambiguous. Public servant means 
any officer or employee, including any person participating as, juror, witness, 
advisor, consultant or otherwise who is performing a governmental function. 
Pursuant to W.S. §14-6-301(a)(v), "probation" is:

 
 
A legal 
status created by court order following an adjudication of delinquency or in 
need of supervision, where a child is permitted to remain in the child's home 
subject to supervision by a city, county or state probation officer, the 
department of family services or other qualified private organization the court 
may designate. A child is subject to return to the court for violation of the 
terms or conditions of probation.

 
 
"Probation 
officer" means a local, county or private agency assigned by a juvenile court to 
perform probation supervision services. W.S. 
§14-6-301(a)(vi).

 
 
            
The evidence at trial revealed that JEMS contracts with the State to 
provide services to juveniles who have been placed on probation. JR was on 
probation and ordered by Judge Kalokathis to complete the JEMS program. As an 
employee of JEMS, the Defendant was a private agent providing probationary 
services on behalf of the state. Probation is a governmental function. Probation 
officers are public servants. The Court finds that the Defendant is a public 
servant as defined by W.S. § 6-5-101(a)(vi), because he was acting as a 
probation officer while performing a governmental function. 

 
 
Addressing 
defense counsel's claim that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102 is unconstitutionally 
vague, the district court concluded:  

 
 
As noted 
above, this Court found W.S. § 6-5-102(a)(ii) to be clear and unambiguous. This 
Court also finds that W.S. § 6-5-102(a)(ii) is constitutional.  The statute provides a clear statement 
that a person who is a public servant performing a governmental function fits 
within the statute.

 
 
The 
district court entered judgment and sentence on January 12, 2005. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]  Our standard for reviewing the denial of 
a motion for a judgment of acquittal is as follows:

 
 
      "[W]e accept as 
true the evidence of the prosecution, together with all logical and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, leaving out entirely the evidence of the 
defendant in conflict. 

 
 
A 
motion for judgment of acquittal is to be granted only when the evidence is such 
that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any 
of the essential elements of the crime. Or, stated another way, if there is 
substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of the crime, the motion should not 
be granted.  This standard applies 
whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.'"  

 
 

Harlow v. 
State, 2005 
WY 12, ¶ 51, 105 P.3d 1049, 1070-71 (Wyo. 2005).  We analyze the question of whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the denial of motion for acquittal in the 
following manner:

 
 
      "This Court 
assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form 
the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our 
only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did."  

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶12] 
Along with these standards, our review of the issues Mr. Stanton presents 
requires application of our well established standards of statutory 
interpretation.

 
 
"In 
interpreting statutes, we primarily determine the legislature's intent. If the 
language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to rules of construction. We 
apply our general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a 
statute when the language is unambiguous.'" We construe together all parts of 
the statutes in pari materia, and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, 
we consider and construe in harmony all statutes relating to the same subject or 
having the same general purpose.

When the 
language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the 
statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, 
the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and 
contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of 
construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent."

 
 

Merrill 
v. Jansma, 2004 
WY 26, ¶ 28, 86 P.3d 270, 284-85 (Wyo. 2004) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶13] 
The question of whether a statute is constitutional is one of law.  Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Wyo. 2004). We presume statutes to be constitutional and any 
doubt is resolved in favor of constitutionality.  Id. 
The party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving it is 
unconstitutional.  Id. A party 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden and must 
clearly and exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable 
doubt.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.   Denial of Motion for 
Acquittal

 
 
[¶14] 
Mr. Stanton contends the district court erred in denying his motion for 
acquittal because no evidence was presented to show that he was a public servant 
performing a governmental function at the time of the alleged offense.  He asserts the evidence showed he worked 
for a private company and was performing a function for his private 
employer.  Therefore, he argues, the 
evidence did not prove the elements required to be proven under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-5-102(a)(ii) for a bribery conviction. 

 
 
[¶15] 
The State contends, and the district court held, that Mr. Stanton was a public 
servant within the meaning of the statute because, as provided in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi), he was a "person participating in performing," 
an "activity" which he "was legally authorized to undertake on behalf of the 
government."  The district court 
reached this result by concluding that the provision of probationary services is 
a governmental function; therefore, people who provide probationary services are 
public servants; Mr. Stanton was providing probationary services; therefore, he 
was a public servant performing a governmental function when he accepted the 
money from JRJ's mother as consideration for his help in making things easier 
for her son.

 
 
[¶16] We 
agree with the district court's conclusion.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-101(a)(vi) clearly 
and unambiguously provides that the term "public servant" means, in addition to 
officers and employees of government, "any person participating . . . in 
performing a governmental function."  
The term "governmental function" is defined in subsection (ii) of the 
same provision as including "any activity which a public servant is legally 
authorized to undertake on behalf of the government."  At the time he obtained the "persuasion 
money" from JRJ's mother, Mr. Stanton was "a person participating" in an 
"activity which [he was] legally authorized to undertake on behalf of the 
government."  Mr. Stanton, as an 
employee of JEMS, was participating in the court ordered treatment of JRJ 
resulting from his involvement in the juvenile justice system. 

 
 
[¶17] In 
considering this issue, we looked to other jurisdictions for cases in which 
courts have interpreted similar provisions.  None of the cases we found involved the 
precise language contained in our statute and, therefore, none of the cases are 
directly on point.  Still, we find 
discussion of those cases to be of interest.

 
 
[¶18] In 
State v. Mullin, 778 P.2d 233 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1989), the court held an employee of a private company that contracted 
with the state to provide counseling services to inmates at the Fairbanks 
Correctional Center was not a public servant within the meaning of Alaska's 
bribery statute. Alaska Stat. § 11.56.120(a) provided that a public servant 
committed the crime of bribery if he or she solicited, accepted or agreed to 
accept a benefit for engaging in an authorized or required official act.2  Alaska Stat. §  11.81.900(b)(48) 
provided:

 
 
 "Public servant" means each of the 
following, whether compensated or not, but does not include jurors or 
witnesses:

 
 
(A)  an officer or employee of the state, a 
municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or a governmental 
instrumentality of the state, including legislators, members of the judiciary, 
and peace officers;

(B)  a person who participates as an advisor, 
consultant, or assistant at the request of, the direction of or under contract 
with the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or 
another governmental instrumentality;

(C)  a person who serves as a member of the 
board or commission created by statute or by legislative, judicial, or 
administrative action by the state, a municipality or other political 
subdivision of the state, or a governmental instrumentality; 

(D)  a person nominated, elected, appointed, 
employed, or designated to act in a capacity defined in (A) through (C) of this 
paragraph, but who does not occupy the position.   

    

Mullin, 778 P.2d  at 234.  The court concluded 
the statute was ambiguous in that it did not state whether an employee of a 
private organization contracting with the state to provide services was a public 
servant.  Id. at 
236.

 
 
[¶19] In 
contrast, in State v. Cooper, 1997 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5319, the court held an employee of a company that contracted 
with the state to provide emissions checks was a public servant within the 
meaning of the Ohio bribery statute.  
The statute at issue defined public servant as:  (1) any public official; (2) any person 
performing ad hoc a governmental function, including, but not limited to, a 
juror, member of a temporary commission, master, arbitrator, advisor or 
consultant.  O.R.C. 2921.01(B).  In determining whether this provision 
applied to an employee of a private company that contracted with the state, the 
court considered an Ohio Ethics Commission advisory opinion defining a person as 
an agent of the state and a public official when:  he or she has the power to act on behalf 
of and bind the state by his actions; the state has the right to control the 
person's actions; and the person's actions are directed toward the attainment of 
a state objective.  The court 
concluded Cooper was a public servant because in conducting emissions testing, 
he was performing an ad hoc government function and had the power to bind the 
state by his actions; state procedures for emissions testing controlled his 
actions; and his actions were directed toward attainment of a state 
objective.  Id.

 
 
[¶20] 
The case involving statutory language most like ours is Bailey v. People, 617 P.2d 549 
(Colo. 
1980).  The statute at issue defined 
public servant as:  

 
 
[A]ny 
officer or employee of government, whether elected or appointed, and any person 
participating as an advisor, or consultant, engaged in the service of process, 
or otherwise performing a governmental function.

 
 
Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-8-101(3) (1973).  
The court held an employee of the Colorado Springs Urban Renewal Effort 
(CURE), a corporate body created under the authority of the Colorado Urban 
Renewal Law, was not a public servant within the meaning of the state's bribery 
statute.  However, in reaching that 
result, the court looked not to the definition of "governmental function," but 
of "government," which included "any branch, subdivision, institution, or agency 
of the government of the state or any political subdivision within it."  Bailey, 617 P.2d  at 552.  Because the definition of government did 
not include "any corporation," the court concluded an employee of CURE was not a 
"public servant" performing a "governmental function" on behalf of a 
"government" and could not be convicted of bribery. 

 
 
[¶21] 
Despite the result reached by the Colorado and Alaska courts in construing 
similar statutory language, we remain convinced that under our statute Mr. 
Stanton was a public servant performing a governmental function at the time he 
solicited and accepted the money.  
In our view, the definition of "governmental function," rather than 
"government" is the more appropriate focus for resolving the question of when a 
person is a public servant.  The 
broad language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) clearly indicates 
that when any person participates in 
performing an activity which he is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of 
the government, such as court-ordered treatment for a juvenile involved in the 
juvenile justice system, he is acting as a public servant, even though his 
immediate employer may be a private company who contracts with the state.     

 
 
[¶22] 
Interpreting the federal bribery statute, the United States Supreme Court has 
said:  

 
 
The 
proper inquiry is not simply whether the person had signed a contract with the 
United 
States or agreed to serve as the Government's 
agent, but rather whether the person occupies a position of public trust with 
official federal responsibilities. 

 
 

Dixson 
v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496, 104 S. Ct. 1172, 79 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984).3  By analogy, we find the "public trust" 
language appropriate in the context of Wyoming's comprehensive statutory 
language.  The intent of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-102(a) clearly was to proscribe "any person," who is performing an 
activity he or she is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of a government, 
from using that authority for pecuniary benefit or personal advantage.  Mr. Stanton's actions in attempting to 
use for personal financial gain his involvement in court-ordered treatment 
provided by the juvenile justice system by leading JRJ's mother to believe that 
things would go easier for her son if she paid him the money falls squarely 
within the scope of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a).   

 
 
2.  Unconstitutionality of 
Statute

 
 
[¶23] 
Mr. Stanton argues next that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-5-102(a)(ii) and 
6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) are unconstitutionally vague because they do not apprise 
a person of ordinary intelligence when a person is a public servant performing a 
governmental function.  He presents 
his claim in two parts, arguing first that the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague on its face, and second, that it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
him.  We address these challenges 
separately. 

 
 
[¶24]  Successful challenges to statutes for 
facial vagueness are rare.  Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 
(Wyo. 
1988).  Courts do not ordinarily 
permit a party whose particular conduct is adequately described by a criminal 
statute to challenge the statute on the grounds it does not provide adequate 
warning concerning other conduct that might fall within its ambit.  Id.  It is only where a statute reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct or specifies no 
standard of conduct at all that such challenges will be considered.  Id. 

 
 
[¶25] 
Mr. Stanton does not argue that the bribery statute reaches any constitutionally 
protected conduct. We, therefore, consider his challenge only if the statute 
specifies no standard of conduct at all.  
We conclude the bribery statute adequately specifies the standard of 
conduct it proscribes.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-102(a) clearly specifies that the offense of bribery is committed 
when a public servant solicits, accepts or agrees to accept pecuniary benefit or 
personal advantage upon an agreement or understanding that his action as a 
public servant will be influenced thereby.  
The standard of conduct proscribed is the agreement or acceptance that 
the public servant's actions will be influenced by the promises of pecuniary 
benefit or personal advantage.  The 
definition of public servant contained in the preceding provision provides 
adequate notice that any person participating in a legally authorized act on 
behalf of a government is subject to penalty for violating the statute.  The statute is not so vague as to 
specify no standard of conduct at all.  
We turn to Mr. Stanton's claim that the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to him.

 
 
[¶26]  In making this determination, we decide 
whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that Mr. Stanton's conduct was illegal.  Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976.  We also decide whether the facts of the 
case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Id.  We have already said in addressing Mr. 
Stanton's first issue that the statute clearly and unambiguously makes it 
illegal for any person participating in performing any activity which he is 
legally authorized to undertake on behalf of a government to solicit, accept or 
agree to accept pecuniary gain or personal advantage based upon an agreement or 
understanding that his actions will be influenced thereby.  The statute provides sufficient notice 
to a person of ordinary intelligence that Mr. Stanton's conduct in soliciting 
and accepting money in exchange for making things easier on JRJ was illegal. 

 
 
[¶27]  Mr. Stanton argues the facts of this 
case demonstrate arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the statute in that 
this jury concluded he was a public servant performing a governmental function 
while another jury might have concluded otherwise.  As in all criminal cases, the jury 
impaneled to decide Mr. Stanton's case was instructed on the law necessary to 
support a conviction for bribery.  
Thus, the jury was instructed verbatim on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-102(a)(ii), the elements of bribery, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-101(a)(ii) 
and (vi), the definitions of the terms "public servant" and "governmental 
function" found in the bribery statute.  
It was then the jury's task, as it is in all criminal cases, to apply the 
evidence presented to the instructions on the law to determine whether the State 
met its burden of proving each of the elements necessary to support a 
conviction.  While it is always the 
case that one jury might reach a different result than another on the basis of 
the same evidence and instructions, that fact does not demonstrate arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement in the sense required for finding a statute 
unconstitutional as applied.  There 
is simply nothing in the facts presented here supporting a finding that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-5-102(a)(ii) and 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) were unconstitutional 
as applied to Mr. Stanton.     

               

[¶28] 
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. 
Clifton 
testified that diversion services include counseling, mentoring and behavior 
modification.

 
 

2Alaska Stat. § 11.56.120(a) 
provides: 

 
 
            
A public servant commits the crime of receiving unlawful gratuities if, 
for having engaged in an official act which was required or authorized and for 
which the public servant was not entitled to any special or additional 
compensation, the public servant

            
(1) solicits a benefit, regardless of value; 
or

            
(2) accepts or agrees to accept a benefit having a value of $50 or 
more.

 
 

3Like the 
statutes we have mentioned from other states, the language contained in the 
federal statute is different from that found in Wyoming's bribery statute. 18 U.S.C. § 
201(a)(1) prohibits "public officials" from accepting anything of value in 
return for being influenced in the performance of their official duties. Public 
official is defined as: 

 
 
Member of Congress, 
Delegates from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner . . . or an 
officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or 
any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District 
of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such 
department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror.