Title: Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S241324 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B266931 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
00465793-CU-UD-VTA 
 
December 17, 2018 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Peña* concurred. 
 
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
S241324 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
In this case, we decide a procedural question related to the 
timing of the notice that must precede an unlawful detainer 
action, where the action is not brought by a landlord but rather 
by a new owner that has acquired title to the property under a 
power of sale contained in a deed of trust.  The question we 
decide is whether perfection of title, which includes recording 
the trustee’s deed, is necessary before the new owner serves a 
three-day written notice to quit on the possessor of the property 
or whether perfection of title need only precede the filing of the 
unlawful detainer action.  We conclude that the new owner must 
perfect title before serving the three-day written notice to quit.  
Because the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTS 
Westlake Village Property, L.P. (Westlake Village) owned 
property in Thousand Oaks that it leased in 2002 to defendant 
Westlake Health Care Center (Westlake Health) so the latter 
could operate a skilled nursing facility on the property.  Six 
years later, Westlake Village obtained a bank loan, executing a 
promissory note and a deed of trust on the property (the latter 
to secure the promissory note).  After Westlake Village defaulted 
on the loan, the bank sold the promissory note and the deed of 
trust to Dr. Leevil, LLC (Dr. Leevil), plaintiff in this action.  
Dr. Leevil then instituted a nonjudicial foreclosure and bought 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
the property at a trustee’s sale.  The next day, Dr. Leevil served 
a three-day written notice to quit upon the property’s tenant, 
Westlake Health, and five days after that, Dr. Leevil recorded 
title to the property.  Westlake Health did not vacate the 
property, and Dr. Leevil initiated this unlawful detainer action 
40 days after service of the written notice to quit. 
Proceedings in the trial court ended in a judgment against 
Westlake Health, based on stipulated facts, with Westlake 
Health preserving its right to appeal various legal rulings of the 
court.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed.  (Dr. Leevil, 
LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 450.)  
Among other things, the Court of Appeal concluded that, under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, subdivision (b) (section 
1161a(b)), an owner that acquires title to property under a 
power of sale contained in a deed of trust need not perfect title 
before it serves a three-day written notice to quit on the 
possessor of the property.  Instead, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the new owner may serve the notice to quit 
immediately after acquiring ownership, after which it may 
perfect title, so long as title is perfected before the new owner 
files an unlawful detainer action.  (9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 455–
457.)  In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal expressly 
disagreed with the Appellate Division of the San Diego County 
Superior Court, which addressed the same issue in U.S. 
Financial, L.P. v. McLitus (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 
(McLitus).  (9 Cal.App.5th at p. 455.)  Because Dr. Leevil 
perfected title before initiating this unlawful detainer action, 
although not before serving the notice to quit, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the action complied with section 
1161a(b).  (9 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
Westlake Health petitioned for review, which we granted, 
limiting the issue to the section 1161a(b) issue described above. 
DISCUSSION 
“Our role in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and 
effectuate the intended legislative purpose.  [Citations.]  We 
begin with the text, construing words in their broader statutory 
context and, where possible, harmonizing provisions concerning 
the same subject.  [Citations.]  If this contextual reading of the 
statute’s language reveals no ambiguity, we need not refer to 
extrinsic sources.  [Citations.]”  (United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. 
v. Coast Iron & Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1089–1090.) 
Section 1161a(b) authorizes a summary proceeding to 
remove the possessor of real property in specified circumstances.  
It is structured to enumerate five “cases” in which its 
substantive provision applies.  Specifically, section 1161a(b) 
opens with the phrase “[i]n any of the following cases,” then it 
sets forth its substantive provision (authorizing an unlawful 
detainer action to remove “a person who holds over and 
continues in possession of . . . real property after a three-day 
written notice to quit the property has been served”), and then 
it enumerates five separate situations in which its substantive 
provision comes into play.1  Thus, the substantive provision of 
                                        
1  
Section 1161a(b) provides in full:  “In any of the following 
cases, a person who holds over and continues in possession of a 
manufactured home, mobilehome, floating home, or real 
property after a three-day written notice to quit the property has 
been served upon the person, or if there is a subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as 
prescribed in Section 1162, may be removed therefrom as 
prescribed in this chapter:  [¶] (1) Where the property has been 
 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
section 1161a(b) has no operative effect unless one of the five 
enumerated situations (what the statute calls “cases”) is 
present.  Put another way, section 1161a(b) contemplates that a 
property owner seeking to avail itself of the statute’s remedy 
will begin by looking at the five enumerated “cases,” considering 
whether the conditions of any of them are satisfied.  Only when 
one of the cases is satisfied may the substantive provision of the 
statute be invoked. 
Section 1161a(b)(3) is one of those “cases,” and it is the 
only provision on which Dr. Leevil relies.  Therefore, Dr. Leevil 
was not entitled to the remedy provided by the substantive 
provision of section 1161a(b) unless it first satisfied the 
conditions of section 1161a(b)(3).  Section 1161a(b)(3) describes 
the following case:  “Where the property [(A)] has been sold in 
                                        
sold pursuant to a writ of execution against such person, or a 
person under whom such person claims, and the title under the 
sale has been duly perfected.  [¶] (2) Where the property has 
been sold pursuant to a writ of sale, upon the foreclosure by 
proceedings taken as prescribed in this code of a mortgage, or 
under an express power of sale contained therein, executed by 
such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and 
the title under the foreclosure has been duly perfected.  [¶] (3) 
Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section 
2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed 
of trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such 
person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly 
perfected.  [¶] (4) Where the property has been sold by such 
person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the 
title under the sale has been duly perfected.  [¶] (5) Where the 
property has been sold in accordance with Section 18037.5 of the 
Health and Safety Code under the default provisions of a 
conditional sale contract or security agreement executed by such 
person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the 
title under the sale has been duly perfected.” 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, [(B)] under a 
power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by [the 
holdover possessor], or a person under whom such person 
claims, and [(C)] the title under the sale has been duly 
perfected.”  (Italics added.)  There are two things to notice about 
the language of section 1161a(b)(3).  First, the provision is in the 
past tense (“has been sold” and “has been duly perfected”), 
suggesting completion.  By contrast, the substantive provision 
of section 1161a(b) uses the present tense (“holds over and 
continues” and “may be removed”).  These choices of verb tense 
strongly support the conclusion that section 1161a(b)(3), when 
it is relied upon by a plaintiff, enumerates conditions precedent 
that the plaintiff must satisfy before invoking the substantive 
provision of section 1161a(b) — that is, before serving a notice 
to quit.  (See Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 763, 776 [“In construing statutes, the use of verb 
tense by the Legislature is considered significant.”].) 
Second, the sale of the property in question is only one of 
three distinct conditions set forth in section 1161a(b)(3), and the 
use of the conjunctive word “and” to connect the three conditions 
can only mean that all three conditions must be satisfied.  In 
other words, all three conditions of section 1161a(b)(3), 
including perfection of title, were prerequisites to Dr. Leevil 
having any right to the remedy section 1161a(b) affords.  And in 
this context, perfection of title requires that the instrument of 
conveyance (the trustee’s deed) be recorded pursuant to 
Government Code section 27280.  As the Court of Appeal 
explained in Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837, 
“[t]itle is duly perfected when all steps have been taken to make 
it perfect, i.e., to convey to the purchaser that which he has 
purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt[] 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
[citation], which includes good record title [citation], but is not 
limited to good record title, as between the parties to the 
transaction. . . .  The court in an unlawful detainer [action] . . . 
has jurisdiction to determine the validity of such defenses.”  (Id. 
at p. 841, italics added.)  Because one of the conditions set forth 
in section 1161a(b)(3) is that “title under the sale has been duly 
perfected,” Dr. Leevil was not entitled to a section 1161a(b) 
remedy until it first perfected title, which required, among other 
things, that the instrument of sale (the trustee’s deed) be 
recorded.  That being so, the most natural reading of the statute 
required Dr. Leevil to perfect title before invoking section 
1161a(b) — but it is undisputed that Dr. Leevil served the three-
day written notice to quit before it perfected title to the property.  
Dr. Leevil, therefore, took the first step in the removal process 
authorized by section 1161a(b) before satisfying all of the 
prerequisite conditions. 
“It has long been recognized that the unlawful detainer 
statutes are to be strictly construed and that relief not 
statutorily authorized may not be given due to the summary 
nature of the proceedings.  [Citation.]  The statutory 
requirements in 
such proceedings 
‘ “must 
be followed 
strictly . . . .” ’ ”  (WDT–Winchester v. Nilsson (1994) 27 
Cal.App.4th 516, 526; see Underwood v. Corsino (2005) 133 
Cal.App.4th 132, 135; Cal–American Income Property Fund IV 
v. Ho (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 583, 585.)  “The remedy of unlawful 
detainer is a summary proceeding to determine the right to 
possession of real property.  Since it is purely statutory in 
nature, it is essential that a party seeking the remedy bring 
himself clearly within the statute.”  (Baugh v. Consumers 
Associates, Ltd. (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 672, 674.)  Because 
Dr. Leevil served the three-day notice to quit before it perfected 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
title, it did not bring itself within the scope of section 1161a(b), 
as that provision is most naturally read, before taking the first 
step in the removal process that the statute authorizes.  Its 
notice to quit was, therefore, premature and void, and its 
unlawful detainer action, improper. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the foregoing reading of 
section 1161a(b) because it did not focus on the statute’s 
structure.  As noted, section 1161a(b) opens with the phrase “[i]n 
any of the following cases,” and it enumerates five separate 
situations, one of which must be satisfied before the substantive 
provision of the statute has any operative effect.  The Court of 
Appeal ignored that structure, instead construing the statute as 
if the opening phrase were omitted and as if the requirements 
of section 1161a(b)(3) merely qualified the words “may be 
removed.”  (§ 1161a(b).)  Based on that reading, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that a holdover possessor of real property 
“may be removed” (§ 1161a(b)) only after section 1161a(b)(3) is 
satisfied, but the three-day written notice to quit may be served 
before section 1161a(b)(3) is satisfied, because the three-day 
notice does not, by itself, remove the property’s possessor.  
(Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center, supra, 9 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 456–457.)  In so concluding, the Court of 
Appeal failed to discern the most natural reading of section 
1161a(b). 
That reading, moreover, is confirmed by consideration of 
the broader context in which section 1161a(b) was enacted.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008 [“When the 
[statutory] language is susceptible of more than one reasonable 
interpretation, . . . we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, 
including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be 
remedied, 
the 
legislative 
history, 
public 
policy, 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
contemporaneous 
administrative 
construction, 
and 
the 
statutory scheme of which the statute is a part”].)  The unlawful 
detainer action was created to provide property owners who 
sought to recover possession of their property with a relatively 
inexpensive and quick legal remedy, thus discouraging property 
owners from resorting to self-help methods.  In 1917, however, 
this court decided Francis v. West Virginia Oil Co. (1917) 174 
Cal. 168, holding that the unlawful detainer remedy was limited 
to landlord–tenant disputes, and therefore a new owner could 
not bring an unlawful detainer action against a former owner 
who refused to relinquish possession.  In 1929, in apparent 
response to Francis, section 1161a was added to the Code of Civil 
Procedure, expanding the unlawful detainer remedy to bring 
within its scope actions by property owners who acquired 
ownership as a result of:  (1) an execution against the former 
owner, (2) a foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the former 
owner, or (3) a power of sale clause in a deed of trust executed 
by the former owner.  (Stats. 1929, ch. 393, § 1, p. 719; see Vella 
v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255 (Vella).)  Since 1929, 
section 1161a has been expanded in several ways, but as to its 
general structure, it has not been substantively changed.  
Significantly, there is no indication, in the history of section 
1161a or in the case law interpreting it, that the Legislature 
intended the unlawful detainer remedy that the statute affords 
to be available to a party that does not strictly satisfy all the 
conditions of one of the statute’s “cases.” 
Dr. Leevil argues that the perfection of its title — which 
occurred six days after the sale — was retroactive to the original 
sale date under Civil Code section 2924h, subdivision (c) (section 
2924h(c)).  Section 2924h(c) governs the means by which 
payment can be made at a trustee’s sale, and it expressly 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
permits the trustee to withhold the trustee’s deed until the 
funds constituting the purchase price become available to the 
payee.  It provides:  “In the event the trustee accepts a check 
drawn by a credit union or a savings and loan association 
pursuant to this subdivision or a cash equivalent designated in 
the notice of sale, the trustee may withhold the issuance of the 
trustee’s deed to the successful bidder . . . until funds become 
available to the payee or endorsee as a matter of right.  [¶]  For 
the purposes of this subdivision, the trustee’s sale shall be 
deemed final upon the acceptance of the last and highest bid, 
and shall be deemed perfected as of 8 a.m. on the actual date of 
sale if the trustee’s deed is recorded within 15 calendar days after 
the sale . . . .”  (§ 2924h(c), italics added.) 
The purpose of section 2924h(c) is clear from its text.  A 
bidder at a trustee’s sale might present a check for the purchase 
price of the property, but whether the bank account on which 
the check is drawn contains sufficient funds to cover the amount 
of the check remains to be seen.  Therefore, the trustee is 
authorized to withhold the deed until the check clears.  But 
withholding the deed prevents the purchaser from recording the 
sale and perfecting its title.  The subdivision, therefore, affords 
a 15-day period during which the deed may be recorded and the 
sale “deemed perfected” as of the original sale date.  (§ 2924h(c).)  
That way, the original sale date may be memorialized even if 
the deed is withheld pending confirmation of the purchaser’s 
payment of the purchase price. 
Dr. Leevil argues that it recorded title just six days after 
the date of the sale, and therefore, under section 2924h(c), the 
sale is “deemed perfected” as of the original sale date.  Hence, 
Dr. Leevil should be deemed to have perfected title for purposes 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
of section 1161a(b) before it served the three-day written notice 
to quit on Westlake Health. 
The problem with this argument is that, under section 
2924h(c), the sale is not “deemed perfected” on the original sale 
date until the deed is recorded.  Before the deed is recorded, the 
sale is neither “perfected” (§ 1161a(b)(3)) nor “deemed perfected” 
(§ 2924h(c)) — it is just a sale — and it was before the deed was 
recorded that Dr. Leevil served the three-day written notice at 
issue in this case.  Thus, as of the time Dr. Leevil served the 
notice, Dr. Leevil did not meet the conditions of section 
1161a(b)(3), and therefore its notice was premature and void.  
The fact that Dr. Leevil later met those conditions, and the fact 
that the conduct that satisfied those conditions was deemed to 
be retroactive, does not change the fact that Dr. Leevil was not 
in strict compliance with section 1161a(b) when it took the first 
step in the removal process that the statute authorizes. 
Moreover, as the appellate division noted in McLitus, the 
apparent policy aims of the statute support an inference that the 
Legislature intended that a new owner of real property should 
perfect title before serving a three-day written notice to quit on 
the possessor of the property.  In cases where the possessor of 
the property is a tenant of the former owner, not the former 
owner itself, the tenant may not know whether the entity 
serving the notice to quit is a bona fide owner.  Thus, section 
1161a(b)’s requirement that the new owner perfect title before 
serving a notice to quit protects the interests of such a tenant.  
As the appellate division stated in McLitus:  “[Plaintiff’s] 
interpretation . . . would suggest that a post-foreclosure plaintiff 
could routinely prematurely issue a three-day notice . . . , 
[a]nd . . . such a practice would practically prevent a defendant 
from effectively verifying the identity of the alleged purchaser 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
of a property[,] as a search of recorded documents would prove 
futile.”  (McLitus, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. Supp. 4.)2 
As the McLitus court explained, Dr. Leevil’s statutory 
interpretation would put a tenant in a precarious position.  A 
tenant would be forced to choose between vacating the property 
without assurance that title will ever actually be perfected or 
remaining in possession of the property and potentially 
incurring damages as a holdover tenant if title is, in fact, 
perfected.  In the first scenario, if the successful bidder at the 
trustee’s sale fails to pay the purchase price, the sale could be 
rescinded, in which case the tenant vacated the property 
unnecessarily.  In the second scenario, the tenant could be liable 
for damages that exceed the rent specified in the tenant’s lease.  
(See Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 
Cal.App.3d 1032, 1069.)  Our conclusion that a new owner must 
perfect title before serving a three-day written notice to quit 
eliminates these uncertainties by allowing the tenant to verify 
title during the three-day notice period.  It thus effectuates the 
                                        
2  
Dr. Leevil argues that the tenant here was a business 
entity that was closely related to the property’s former owner, 
and therefore the tenant knew that Dr. Leevil was the bona fide 
owner.  That may be so, but we must interpret section 1161a(b) 
considering every situation in which the statute might apply, 
including the situation in which the tenant has no such insider 
knowledge.  Moreover, “the code requirements [governing 
unlawful detainer] must be followed strictly . . . .”  (Cal–
American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 585, italics added.)  The phrase “followed strictly” does not 
suggest that an owner need only meet those requirements that 
the owner considers to be significant in the context of the 
transaction at issue. 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
purposes of section 1161a(b), protecting the tenant’s interests 
without excessively burdening the new owner. 
In response to the foregoing reasoning, the Court of 
Appeal asserted:  “Westlake Health was free to challenge 
[Dr.] Leevil’s claimed ownership in court.  (Orcilla v. Big Sur, 
Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1010 [198 Cal.Rptr.3d 715] 
[title can be litigated in a § 1161a unlawful detainer action].)”  
(Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center, supra, 9 
Cal.App.5th at p. 456.)  On this point, the Court of Appeal was 
misleading.  Orcilla and the cases on which it relies establish 
only that Westlake Health could use the unlawful detainer 
action to litigate whether Dr. Leevil “ ‘acquired the property at 
a regularly conducted sale and thereafter “duly perfected” [its] 
title.’ ”  (Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 
1011, quoting Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 255.)  The unlawful 
detainer action did not permit Westlake Health to litigate every 
possible issue related to Dr. Leevil’s claim of ownership.  
“Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary 
obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiff’s title, are 
neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for 
possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.”  (Cheney v. 
Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 160; see Vella, at p. 258 
[“[S]ection 1161a does not require a defendant to litigate, in a 
summary action within the statutory time constraints 
[citations], a complex fraud claim involving activities not 
directly related to the technical regularity of the trustee’s 
sale”].) 
Therefore, 
Westlake 
Health’s 
ability 
to 
challenge 
Dr. Leevil’s claim of ownership was limited, and the Court of 
Appeal erred in suggesting otherwise.  And more generally, if 
the cloud on a new owner’s title concerns an issue that cannot 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
be litigated in an unlawful detainer action, and if, as the Court 
of Appeal concluded, a new owner can serve a three-day written 
notice to quit before perfecting title, then a holdover possessor 
of the property would have no choice but to vacate the property 
upon receipt of the notice.  It is possible, however, that the cloud 
on the title would prevent the title from ever being perfected, in 
which case the holdover possessor would have vacated the 
property unnecessarily.  Therefore, a rule requiring a new owner 
to perfect title before serving its three-day notice would avoid 
the imposition of possibly unnecessary relocation expenses on 
the possessor of the property. 
Dr. Leevil argues that such a rule will lead to a delay 
ranging from several days (in a typical case) to several weeks (in 
a less typical case) and that the delay will increase the new 
owner’s “carrying charges” (i.e., interest payments on debt, 
property taxes, insurance, etc.), which will increase the damages 
that a holdover possessor of the property will owe once the new 
owner prevails in an unlawful detainer action.  (See Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1174, subd. (b).)  In the case of a large commercial 
property, a delay of a week or two might increase damages 
significantly.  Dr. Leevil argues that this increase in damages 
will increase the number of unlawful detainer actions that can 
be filed as “unlimited civil cases” — cases, that is, where the 
amount in dispute exceeds $25,000 (see Code Civ. Proc., § 86, 
subd. (a)(4)) — thus “clogging the court system.”  We are not 
persuaded by the argument.  As an initial matter, we doubt that 
a significant number of unlawful detainer cases will shift, as a 
result of our decision, from limited civil cases to unlimited civil 
cases (Code Civ. Proc., § 88).  In the typical case, the far greater 
proportion of the amount in dispute will likely depend on when 
the unlawful detainer action is filed, as opposed to when the 
DR. LEEVIL, LLC v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
three-day written notice to quit is served.  Here, for example, 
Dr. Leevil perfected title five days after service of the notice to 
quit, but it did not initiate this unlawful detainer action until a 
month later, and during that time damages continued to mount.  
In any event, our task is to read the statute as written, and for 
reasons already explained, we read the statute as calling for title 
to be perfected before the three-day notice is served. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that an owner that acquires title to property 
under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust must perfect 
title before serving the three-day written notice to quit required 
by Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a(b).  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
PEÑA, J.*
                                        
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 9 Cal.App.5th 450 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S241324 
Date Filed: December 17, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Ventura 
Judge: Vincent J. O’Neill, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Enenstein Ribakoff LaViña & Pham, Enenstein Pham & Glass, Teri T. Pham and Courtney M. Havens for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, Ronald N. Richards, Nicholas Bravo; Wilson, Elser, 
Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Robert Cooper; Law Offices of Geoffrey Long and Geoffrey S. Long for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Teri T. Pham 
Enenstein Pham & Glass 
12121 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600 
Los Angeles, CA  90025 
(310) 899-2070 
 
Ronald N. Richards 
Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates 
P.O. Box 11480 
Beverly Hills, CA  90213 
(310) 556-1001