Title: Richardson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ERNEST RICHARDSON, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 60, 2019 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 0909018120 (N) 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 8, 2019 
Decided: 
May 14, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; SEITZ and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
The appellant, Ernest Richardson, appeals from the Superior Court’s 
order dated January 17, 2019, denying his third motion for postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The State has filed a motion to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Richardson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm, 
though on a different basis than that articulated by the Superior Court. 
(2) 
In 2010, a Superior Court jury found Richardson guilty of Rape First 
Degree, two counts of Rape Second Degree, and Rape Fourth Degree.  The jury 
 
2 
found Richardson not guilty of Sexual Solicitation of a Child and Unlawful Contact 
Second Degree.  The Superior Court sentenced Richardson to fifty years of Level V 
incarceration, followed by probation.   
(3) 
On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.1  On 
remand, Richardson pleaded no contest to Rape Fourth Degree and Unlawful Sexual 
Contact First Degree.  In exchange, the State dismissed the other charges.  The plea 
agreement form indicates that Richardson would be required to register as a sex 
offender under 11 Del. C. §§ 4120, 4121 and that his Risk Assessment Tier would 
be Tier II.  The Superior Court sentenced Richardson as follows:  for Rape Fourth 
Degree, to fifteen years of Level V incarceration, suspended after thirty months for 
two years of probation, and for Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree, to eight years 
of Level V incarceration, suspended after eighteen months for two years of 
probation.  The sentence also required Richardson to “register as [a] sex offender 
pursuant to statute.”  The sentencing order does not state the applicable Risk 
Assessment Tier, although during the sentencing hearing counsel and the Superior 
Court repeatedly stated that Richardson would be required to register as Tier II. 
(4) 
When the date on which Richardson would be released from prison and 
begin serving probation was approaching, the Department of Correction apparently 
informed him that he would be required to register as a Tier III sex offender, rather 
                                               
 
1 Richardson v. State, 43 A.3d 906 (Del. 2012). 
 
3 
than as Tier II.  In 2013, he filed two motions seeking to modify the tier designation 
from Tier III to Tier II.  Each of those motions was denied when Richardson failed 
to appear for the scheduled hearings. 
(5) 
In April 2015, Richardson filed a motion for postconviction relief in 
which he challenged the requirement that he register as a Tier III sex offender, rather 
than as Tier II.  On November 4, 2015, the Superior Court dismissed that motion, 
holding that, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, only a person who is “in 
custody” may bring a motion for postconviction relief.2  Because by that time 
Richardson had been discharged from probation and his case had been closed, the 
Superior Court held that he was not “in custody” and therefore lacked standing to 
seek postconviction relief.  In February 2016, he filed a second motion for 
postconviction relief raising the same issues; the Superior Court dismissed that 
motion because he was not “in custody” and therefore lacked standing under Rule 
61. 
(6) 
On December 3, 2018, Richardson filed a third motion for 
postconviction relief, again arguing that he should be required to register under Tier 
II and not Tier III or should be permitted to withdraw his no-contest plea.  The 
                                               
 
2 See SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(a)(1) (“This rule governs the procedure on an application by a person 
in custody under a sentence of this court seeking to set aside the judgment of conviction or a 
sentence of death on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or on any other ground that is a 
sufficient factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon a criminal conviction or a capital 
sentence.”). 
 
4 
Superior Court also dismissed that motion because he was not “in custody.”  
Richardson has appealed. 
(7) 
The State argues that the Superior Court did not err by summarily 
dismissing Richardson’s third postconviction motion on the grounds that Richardson 
was no longer “in custody” for his sentence in this case as required by Rule 61.3  
This Court has held that: 
Under Delaware law, once a criminal sentence is completed, any 
postconviction claim with respect to that conviction is moot because the 
defendant is no longer “in custody or subject to future custody” as a result of 
that conviction.  The only exception to the rule is when the defendant “suffers 
collateral legal disabilities or burdens.”  The defendant has the burden of 
“demonstrating specifically a right lost or disability or burden imposed, by 
reason of the instant conviction.”4 
 
Richardson argues that Tier III sex offender registration imposes collateral legal 
disabilities or burdens, as compared with Tier II registration, and therefore he is “in 
custody” for purposes of Rule 61.   
(8) 
This Court has not decided whether an ongoing requirement for 
registration as a sex offender after the other terms of a sentence have been completed 
                                               
 
3 It appears that on May 21, 2018, Richardson pleaded guilty to a new charge of Rape Second 
Degree and was sentenced to twenty-five years of incarceration, suspended after fifteen years for 
decreasing levels of supervision. 
4 Paul v. State, 2011 WL 3585623, at *1 (Del. Aug. 15, 2011) (citations omitted).  See also Gural 
v. State, 251 A.2d 344 (Del. 1969) (adopting the federal “collateral consequences” rule for 
postconviction proceedings, which held that “the satisfaction of the sentence renders the case moot 
unless, in consequence of the conviction or sentence, the defendant suffers collateral legal 
disabilities or burdens; in which event the defendant is considered to have a sufficient stake in the 
conviction or sentence to survive the satisfaction of the sentence and to permit him to obtain a 
review or institute a challenge”). 
 
5 
constitutes “custody” or a collateral legal disability or burden under Delaware law.5  
Nor has the Court considered whether the differences between Tier II and Tier III 
registration are sufficiently significant to constitute a collateral legal disability or 
burden.  But we need not do so in this case because, even if Richardson were deemed 
to be “in custody,” Richardson’s motion was procedurally barred by the other 
provisions of Rule 61.6   
(9) 
Under Rule 61, no second or subsequent motion is permitted under this 
Rule unless the motion pleads with particularity the existence of new evidence that 
creates a strong inference of actual innocence or a new rule of constitutional law that 
is retroactively applicable,7 or the motion asserts a claim that the court lacked 
jurisdiction.8  Moreover, “any first motion for relief under this rule and that first 
motion’s amendments shall be deemed to have set forth all grounds for relief 
                                               
 
5 Many federal courts have determined that a challenge to a sex offender registration requirement 
is not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding because sex offender registration does not satisfy 
the “in custody” requirement of the federal habeas corpus statute.  E.g., Cravener v. Cameron, 
2010 WL 235119 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2010) (discussing cases).  Cf. also Mitchell v. United States, 
977 A.2d 959, 964 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]hose jurisdictions that have addressed whether sex 
offender registration requirements render prospective registrants ‘in custody’ have all concluded 
that the custody requirement turns largely on the notion of a physical sense of liberty—that is, 
whether the legal disability in question somehow limits one’s freedom of movement.  Those courts 
have held that the classification, registration, and notification requirements are more properly 
characterized as a collateral consequence of conviction rather than as a physical restraint on liberty.  
As such, they have concluded that imposition of sex offender registration does not render habeas 
petitioners ‘in custody.’” (citation omitted)). 
6 This Court may affirm the Superior Court’s judgment “on the basis of a different rationale than 
that which was articulated by the trial court.”  Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 
1995). 
7 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(2)(i), (d)(2)(i)-(ii).   
8 Id. R. 61(i)(5). 
 
6 
available to the movant,”9 and “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, 
whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a 
postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter 
barred.”10  Richardson’s third motion for postconviction relief did not plead with 
particularity the existence of new evidence that creates a strong inference of actual 
innocence or a new rule of constitutional law that applies to his case.11  Nor did it 
assert that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction 
and sentence him.  The Superior Court has previously adjudicated his challenge to 
the Tier III designation, from which he did not timely appeal,12 and any arguments 
that Richardson may be attempting to raise that he did not raise in his earlier motions 
have been waived.13 
(10) Finally, we note that Richardson pleaded guilty in May 2018 to Rape 
Second Degree, and he is serving a lengthy prison sentence.  Upon his release from 
                                               
 
9 Id. R. 61(i)(2)(ii). 
10 Id. R. 61(i)(4). 
11 Richardson asserts, without explanation, that Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), 
applies to his case.  In Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court held that its ruling in Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited mandatory sentences of life without parole for 
juvenile offenders, was retroactively applicable.  Montgomery and Miller do not apply in this case, 
because Richardson was not a juvenile subject to a mandatory sentence of life without parole.  
Moreover, Richardson did not bring his third motion for postconviction relief within one year of 
the Montgomery decision.  SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(1). 
12 On May 4, 2018, Richardson filed a notice of appeal from the Superior Court’s November 4, 
2015 order dismissing his first Rule 61 motion.  This Court dismissed that appeal as untimely.  
Richardson v. State, 238, 2018, Docket Entry No. 8 (Del. May 31, 2018). 
13 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(2)(ii). 
 
7 
incarceration for that conviction, he will be required to register as a Tier III sex 
offender.14  Thus, the requirement that he register as a Tier III sex offender in this 
case is without any real consequence. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                               
 
14 See 11 Del. C. § 4121(d)(1)a (providing that persons convicted of Rape Second Degree shall be 
assigned to Risk Assessment Tier III).