Title: Albert W. Key v. Eleanore K. Allison and Baldwin County, Alabama

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL 12/17/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1090582
_________________________
Albert W. Key
v.
Eleanore K. Allison and Baldwin County
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-08-376)
COBB, Chief Justice.
Albert W. Key appeals from a judgment as a matter of law
entered on his claims against Eleanore K. Allison and Baldwin
County.  We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
A walkway known locally as "the boardwalk" extends
alongside the bay side of a number of privately owned bayfront
1090582
Only that portion of the boardwalk that crosses Allison's
1
property is the subject of this action.
2
properties along Mobile Bay in Point Clear from south of
Zundel's Lane northward to the Grand Hotel, a distance of
about one mile.   The boardwalk has been in existence and in
1
use by the residents of Point Clear and the general public for
over 100 years. The boardwalk was originally constructed of
wooden boards, but it is currently composed of various
materials, including boards and concrete, and in some places
it is simply an unimproved path across the sand.  Property
owners along the boardwalk have historically maintained the
portion of the boardwalk that crossed their property in
accordance with their own wishes and judgment.
The landward side of the bayfront properties that the
boardwalk crosses abuts Scenic Highway 98.  Any destination
that can be reached by the boardwalk can also be accessed by
Scenic Highway 98. At the time of the trial of this case, the
portion of Scenic Highway 98 that parallels the boardwalk did
not have a sidewalk or a shoulder that could be used for
pedestrian traffic.  However, at the time of the trial of this
case, plans existed to create a bike path along Scenic Highway
98, which could also be used by pedestrians. 
1090582
3
For approximately 20 years, Key has lived on the bay in
a house just south of Zundel's Lane, which runs perpendicular
to Scenic Highway 98. Key is familiar with the boardwalk, and
he uses it regularly.  Key knows of no one who has ever
requested or received permission to use the boardwalk.  In the
past, Key regularly used the boardwalk to travel by foot
between his house and his office, which is located north of
the Grand Hotel.  Members of his family, including his
children and grandchildren, have also used the boardwalk for
beach access and to travel by foot and on bicycle to various
destinations along the bay.
In 1987, Allison purchased the bayfront property just
north of Zundel's Lane.  She moved a house onto the property
and has since lived there. The public has historically
accessed the boardwalk north of Zundel's Lane through a gap in
a fence that runs along Allison's southern property line. The
part of the boardwalk that crosses Allison's property is
composed of concrete slabs.  According to Allison, "lots of
people" have asked her for permission to use the part of the
boardwalk that traverses her property.  She testified at trial
that the people who asked for permission "usually ... were
from like Germany or something."
1090582
4
In 2004, Hurricane Ivan damaged the portion of the
boardwalk on Allison's property.  Allison's pier was also
destroyed in Hurricane Ivan, and Allison stacked the boards
from the pier on the damaged concrete slabs that had been the
boardwalk by her house.  Afterward, people using the boardwalk
walked around Allison's stack of boards.
At some point, Key and his wife asked Allison to move the
stack of boards from the area of the boardwalk. Allison did
not move the stack of boards; instead, she boarded up the gap
in her fence, effectively blocking public access to the
boardwalk north of Zundel's Lane.
On June 10, 2008, Key sued Allison, seeking a judgment
declaring that "the boardwalk is a dedicated public walkway"
across Allison's property and declaring that Key has a legal
right to maintain and repair the portion of the boardwalk that
crosses Allison's property.  In addition, Key sought an order
enjoining Allison from interfering with his repairs to that
portion of the boardwalk or from interfering with access to
the boardwalk through a gate Key proposed be installed in her
fence by Key.  On August 6, 2008, Key amended his complaint to
add Baldwin County as a defendant.  
On July 9, 2009, a bench trial was held.  Joey Dunley, an
engineer for Baldwin County, testified at trial that the
1090582
5
boardwalk had been in existence for approximately 100 years.
Dunley had studied the history of the boardwalk in preparation
for his testimony on behalf of the County at trial.  
John Brodbeck, an 83-year-old resident of Point Clear who
was born and reared in the area, testified that the boardwalk
had been in existence and used by the public for as long as he
could remember.  Brodbeck testified that he had used the
boardwalk throughout his life and that, to his knowledge,
neither he nor anyone else had ever asked for or obtained
permission to walk on the boardwalk.  According to Brodbeck,
other than Allison's recent closure of her portion of the
boardwalk, no property owner along the boardwalk had ever
attempted to close the boardwalk or to prevent members of the
general public from using it. 
The trial transcript includes the following exchange from
Brodbeck's testimony:
"Q [Allison's counsel]: In your experience using the
boardwalk, isn't it true it was your understanding
that you always had the consent or the permission of
whoever owned the property to walk along there?
 
"A [Brodbeck]: No, no.
"Q: You thought you were going on it against the
wishes of the landowner?
"A: No, no. Most people along there invited you to
walk the boardwalk, they were proud of it. 
1090582
6
"Q: That's what I mean. The boardwalk was installed
at the owners' expense, correct?
"A: Oh, yeah, yeah.
"Q: They improved it and maintained it and encour-—
"A: But they did it for the public.
"Q: Exactly. And they encouraged people to walk on
it, correct?
"A: Yeah.
"Q: And you're not saying that anyone other than the
adjoining owner worked to improve the boardwalk, to
build the boardwalk out of wood or whatever it was
built out of?
"A: Well, most people took enough pride in their
property that they maintained it themselves.
"Q: Right. You're not aware of any instance where
anyone else maintained it for them, are you?
"A: Not right off, I haven't been aware of it."
Key likewise testified at trial that members of the
public used the boardwalk without asking for permission to do
so.  His testimony on this point is reflected in the following
exchange:
"Q [Allison's counsel]: Is there anything more that
could have been done by Ms. Allison or by her
predecessors in title to make people think they were
welcome to walk along the boardwalk in front of her
property?
"A [Key]: I don't -- Other than putting up a sign,
you know, I mean, it was -- There was never any
question that people could walk there.
1090582
7
"Q: It opened straight onto Zundel's Lane, it was a
paved, level -- not paved, it was concrete, level
sidewalk. I mean, there was no reason to think any
owner was discouraging or in any way trying to
discourage people from walking across it, was there?
"A: No."
On January 7, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment in
favor of Allison on all claims, finding that Key had failed to
carry his burden of proving the existence of a private
easement or a public easement either by dedication or by
"public use of [the boardwalk] over a period of twenty years
because the public's use of the boardwalk was consensual and
with the express or implied permission of ... Allison and her
predecessors in title."  On January 26, 2010, Key filed a
notice of appeal to this Court.
Standard of Review
When evidence is presented ore tenus, the trial court is
"'unique[ly] position[ed] to directly observe the witnesses
and to assess their demeanor and credibility.'" Ex parte T.V.,
971 So. 2d 1, 4 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d
631, 633 (Ala. 2001)).  Therefore, a presumption of
correctness attaches to a trial court's factual findings
premised on conflicting ore tenus evidence. Ex parte J.E., 1
So. 3d 1002, 1008 (Ala. 2008). However, "'[w]here the evidence
before the trial court was undisputed the ore tenus rule is
1090582
8
inapplicable, and the Supreme Court will sit in judgment on
the evidence de novo, indulging no presumption in favor of the
trial court's application of the law to those facts.'" State
v. Hill,  690 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1996) (quoting Stiles v.
Brown, 380 So. 2d 792, 794 (Ala. 1980)). Because the evidence
here was undisputed, the ore tenus rule is inapplicable and
our review is de novo.
The trial court here made no findings of fact. When
evidence is presented ore tenus and the trial court makes no
express findings of fact, this Court will assume that the
trial court made those findings necessary to support its
judgment.  Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. AmSouth Bank,
N.A., 608 So. 2d 375, 378 (Ala. 1992) (citing Fitzner
Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Perkins & Assocs., 578 So. 2d
1061 (Ala. 1991)).  
We further note that "the ore tenus standard of review
has no application to a trial court's conclusions of law or
its application of law to the facts; a trial court's ruling on
a question of law carries no presumption of correctness on
appeal."  Ex parte J.E., 1 So. 3d at 1008 (citing Perkins, 646
So. 2d at 47, and Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113, 1144-45
(Ala. 1999)). This Court "'review[s] the trial court's
conclusions of law and its application of law to the facts
1090582
9
under the de novo standard of review.'" Id. (quoting
Washington v. State, 922 So. 2d 145, 158 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005)).
Analysis
A public prescriptive easement is created when the
public, under a claim of right, adversely uses an open,
defined roadway for an uninterrupted period of 20 years or
more without objection or hindrance from the landowner.
Osborn v. Champion Int'l Corp., 892 So. 2d 882, 885 (Ala.
2004); Newell v. Dempsey, 219 Ala. 634, 634, 122 So. 881, 881-
82 (1929); Locklin v. Tucker,  208 Ala. 155, 155, 93 So. 896,
896-97 (1922). When such circumstances are shown, and the
roadway 
lies 
across 
improved 
or 
reclaimed 
land, 
"'a
presumption of dedication or other appropriation to a public
use arises. The burden is then on the landowner to show the
user was permissive only, in recognition of his title and
right to reclaim the possession.  Ayers v. Stidham, 260 Ala.
390, 71 So. 2d 95 (1954).'"  Osborn, 892 So. 2d at 885
(quoting Ford v. Alabama By-Prods. Corp., 392 So. 2d 217, 218
(Ala. 1980)). 
The boardwalk is an "open, defined roadway."  Cf.
Davenport v. Cash, 261 Ala. 380, 382, 74 So. 2d 470, 470
(1950) (noting that, throughout various legal definitions of
1090582
10
the terms "public road" and "highway," "there seems to be
running the general idea of a current way of public passage").
It crosses Allison's backyard, which qualifies as improved or
"reclaimed" land. According to the testimony of the county
engineer for Baldwin County, who was familiar with the history
of the boardwalk, the public had used the boardwalk for more
than 100 years preceding the trial of this case.  The evidence
at trial indicated that, during that 100-year period, until
Allison closed the gap in the fence, the public's use has been
without 
objection 
or 
hindrance 
from 
Allison 
or 
her
predecessors in interest.  Therefore, a presumption of
dedication or other appropriation to a public use arises, and
the burden shifted to Allison to overcome that presumption
with evidence indicating that the public's use of the
boardwalk was "permissive only, in recognition of [her] title
and right to reclaim the possession."  Osborn, 892 So. 2d at
885.
Having thoroughly considered the evidence in the record
in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment,
see Transamerica, supra, we find no evidence from which the
trial court could have inferred that, during the first 20
years the boardwalk existed, the use by the public was
permissive.  At most, the oldest record evidence of permissive
1090582
11
use comes from 83-year-old John Brodbeck's testimony of his
childhood memories of using the boardwalk. Brodbeck testified
that, from the days of his childhood, he and others never
asked permission to use the boardwalk; Brodbeck also testified
that the landowners along the boardwalk "invited" and
"encouraged" the public to use the boardwalk.
It is clear from the record that Brodbeck's testimony as
to the nature of the public's use of the boardwalk does not
date back beyond 80 years.  Because the record contains no
evidence as to the nature of the public's use of the boardwalk
for the first 20 years of existence, no evidence exists to
overcome the presumption that, for the first 20 years of the
public's more-than-100-year use of the boardwalk, the public
used the boardwalk adversely under a claim of right, without
the permission of the landowners and without recognition of
the landowner's right to reclaim the property on which the
boardwalk lay.  See Osborn, supra (explaining the burden of
proof in a case involving a public easement by prescription
over reclaimed lands).  Accordingly, the only conclusion that
can be drawn from the evidence in the record in this case is
that an easement by prescription was created during the first
20 years of the existence of the boardwalk.  See Osborn, supra
(explaining the elements and burden of proof for establishing
1090582
12
an easement by prescription), and a presumption of dedication
to public use arose. Allison presented no evidence refuting
that presumption. Thus, the trial court's judgment is due to
be reversed.  State v. Hill,  690 So. 2d at 1203. We note that
Allison, Baldwin County, and Key are the only parties in this
case. There are other landowners whose properties the
boardwalk crosses and who are not parties to this case. We
further note that those landowners could present evidence
different from the evidence presented in this case with
different results. 
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
trial court, and we remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including
a determination of the duty, if any, of Baldwin County to
maintain the portion of the boardwalk determined here to be
dedicated to the public use.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
    Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
    Lyons and Stuart, JJ., recuse themselves.