Title: Marcus, Santoro & Kozak v. Wu

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
MARCUS, SANTORO & KOZAK, P.C., ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 062357 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 2, 2007 
HUNG-LIN WU, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Joseph Canada, Jr., Judge 
 
Marcus, Santoro & Kozak, P.C. (MSK) and Kaufman & Canoles 
(K&C) (collectively “the Firms”) appeal from the judgment of the 
circuit court of the City of Virginia Beach which found both 
parties liable upon a garnishment summons for the payment of 
funds held in their respective trust accounts from a judgment 
debtor who was their client.  The circuit court determined that 
the lien of a writ of fieri facias under Code § 8.01-501 
required the Firms to cease disbursing funds from their trust 
accounts in satisfaction of accrued legal fees and related costs 
and to pay those funds to a judgment creditor effective with the 
issuance of the writ of fieri facias.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On May 12, 2005, Hung-Lin Wu and the Wu Trust (collectively 
“Wu”) obtained two judgments in a Florida state court, one 
                     
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
August 16, 2007. 
 
 
2
against Stanley F.C. Tseng and another against several business 
entities affiliated with Tseng (collectively “Tseng”).2  Wu 
domesticated the judgments in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Virginia Beach on August 16, 2005. 
Tseng retained MSK to represent him personally, and K&C to 
represent his affiliated business entities, with regard to 
various proceedings initiated by Wu in an attempt to collect on 
the judgments in both Virginia and Florida.  Tseng entered into 
a written representation agreement with each law firm which 
provided that he would deposit a sum certain into a trust 
account maintained by the law firm as a “retainer.”  The written 
agreement with K&C provided “This retainer will be applied 
toward services heretofore and hereafter rendered and out-of-
pocket costs,” but gave no further explanation as to the basis 
for withdrawals from the trust account.  The written agreement 
with MSK did not specifically address the disbursement of funds.  
As agreed, Tseng deposited $155,000 into K&C’s trust account and 
$125,000 into MSK’s trust account.  K&C made the first 
disbursement from its trust account for payment of its fees and 
costs on August 26, 2005.  MSK made the first disbursement from 
its trust account for fees and costs on August 19, 2005. 
                     
2 The judgment against Tseng was for $8,459,789 and the 
judgment against the business entities was for $11,279,836. 
 
 
3
In an attempt to collect on the judgments, Wu requested 
that the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach deliver a 
writ of fieri facias against Tseng to the Sheriff of Virginia 
Beach pursuant to Code § 8.01-466.3   The writ was delivered to 
the sheriff on October 7, 2005.  In its June 14, 2006 letter 
opinion, incorporated into the final order, the circuit court 
found that K&C and MSK were served with a notice of the lien of 
fieri facias on October 7, 2005.  The Firms made no assignment 
of error to that finding.  Tseng was not served with the notice 
of lien. 
On October 14, 2005, the circuit court issued a garnishment 
summons against each law firm.  Each garnishment summons 
contained a new writ of fieri facias and provided another notice 
of the lien of fieri facias.  Tseng was served with the MSK 
garnishment summons on October 21, 2005 and MSK was served with 
that garnishment summons on October 24, 2005.  K&C and Tseng 
were served with the K&C garnishment summons on November 14, 
2005.  The Firms had continued to disburse funds from their 
respective trust accounts during the period between the date of 
the issuance of the writ of fieri facias and service of notice 
on the Firms, October 7, 2005, and the dates of service of the 
respective garnishment summonses. 
                     
3 A writ of fieri facias commands “the officer . . . to make 
the money therein mentioned out of the goods and chattels of the 
 
 
4
On November 18, 2005, the return date on the garnishment 
summonses, the Firms filed separate motions to dismiss the 
garnishments.  In addition, each law firm delivered to the 
circuit court a check payable to Wu in an amount equal to the 
balance of its trust account as of the date that law firm and 
Tseng had been served the applicable garnishment summons.  K&C 
paid $48,600.13, the remaining balance in its account as of 
November 14, 2005 when K&C and Tseng were served the garnishment 
summons.  MSK paid $19,574.53, the remaining balance in its 
account as of October 24, 2005, the date by which both it and 
Tseng had been served with the garnishment summons. 
In the motions for summary judgment the Firms contended 
that they had remitted all the funds to which Tseng was 
entitled.  At a hearing and in memoranda filed in the circuit 
court, Wu contended that the law firms should have remitted 
amounts equal to the account balances on October 7, 2005, the 
date the writ of fieri facias was delivered to the sheriff, and 
therefore that the sums remitted were deficient.  Citing Code 
§ 8.01-501 for the proposition that the issuance of the writ of 
fieri facias on October 7 perfected a lien on the funds in the 
trust accounts, Wu contended that the Firms were obliged to 
cease disbursing funds from their respective trust accounts on 
                                                                  
person against whom the judgment is.”  Code § 8.01-474. 
 
 
5
that date and were liable to him for any funds disbursed after 
that date. 
The Firms did not contest in the circuit court that Wu 
could proceed by garnishment, but argued the garnishment process 
he used was ineffective as a matter of law to reach any funds 
prior to the actual date of service of the garnishment summons.  
The Firms asserted that they were “person[s] making a payment to 
the judgment debtor” under Code § 8.01-502, and as such, the 
liens created under Code § 8.01-501 were ineffective against 
them without the statutory conditions precedent being met.  That 
statutory condition precedent under Code § 8.01-502 included 
service of a notice of lien on both the Firms as garnishees and 
the judgment debtor, Tseng.  For that reason, the Firms 
contended they were entitled to disburse funds from the trust 
accounts until the date on which both they and Tseng were served 
with the garnishment summonses. 
In its letter opinion, the circuit court ruled that the 
Firms were liable to Wu for the balances remaining in the 
respective trust accounts as of October 7, 2005, because:  
“According to [Code] § 8.01-501, the lien of fieri facias was 
effective on the date it was delivered to the sheriff, which the 
parties agree was October 7, 2005, unless the § 8.01-502 
provision applies.”  The circuit court rejected the Firms’ 
argument that they were “person[s] making a payment to the 
 
 
6
judgment debtor” under Code § 8.01-502 when they disbursed funds 
from the trust accounts.  The circuit court opined that funds 
held in the trust accounts represented payment in advance for 
legal fees not yet incurred and that the balances in the trust 
accounts at any particular time remained Tseng’s property.  The 
circuit court found that although the Firms would be obligated 
to refund to Tseng any portion of an advanced legal fee that had 
not been earned when the representation terminated, a “potential 
future obligation” to pay Tseng did not qualify the law firms as 
“person[s] making a payment to the judgment debtor.”  
Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that the lien under the 
writ of fieri facias on the funds in the trust accounts was 
effective on October 7 despite the lack of service of a notice 
of lien on Tseng until a later date. 
Pursuant to its letter opinion, the circuit court entered 
an order denying the Firms’ motions for summary judgment.  The 
circuit court ordered that K&C pay to Wu $67,903.24, which 
represented the amount K&C disbursed from its trust account 
between October 7, 2005 and November 14, 2005, the date by which 
service of the K&C garnishment summons was made on both K&C and 
Tseng.  The circuit court also ordered that MSK pay to Wu 
$27,661.76, which represented the amount MSK disbursed from its 
trust account between October 7, 2005, and October 24, 2005, the 
 
 
7
date by which the MSK garnishment summons had been served on MSK 
and Tseng.  We awarded the Firms this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
The issues raised in this appeal solely involve issues of 
law, which we review de novo.  Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 
363, 634 S.E.2d 754, 759 (2006); Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 
410, 559 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2002). 
The Firms make six assignments of error to the judgment of 
the circuit court which can be condensed to four arguments:  (1) 
The circuit court erred in ruling that the funds in the Firms’ 
trust accounts were property owned by Tseng instead of a 
contract obligation by the Firms to pay Tseng any unearned funds 
upon the termination of representation;  (2) The circuit court 
erred in holding the lien of the writ of fieri facias “directly 
reached the trust accounts” instead of the Firms’ contractual 
obligation to Tseng; (3) The circuit court erred in its 
application of Code § 8.01-502 by finding that the Firms were 
not “persons making a payment to the judgment debtor”, and (4) 
the circuit court “erred in holding that the execution lien” of 
the writ of fieri facias under Code § 8.01-501 “was perfected 
and fully effective” as to the Firms upon delivery of the writ 
to the sheriff without “service of the notice of that lien upon 
anyone.”  We address each argument in turn. 
A.  Tseng’s Interest in the Trust Accounts 
 
 
8
The Firms argue that Tseng’s interest in the trust 
accounts, into which he deposited his funds under the retainer 
agreements, was only a bare contract right.  They contend Tseng 
had no property right or ownership interest in the trust account 
funds.4  Instead, the Firms argue that they and “Tseng were in a 
debtor-creditor relationship” essentially in the same capacity 
as a commercial bank and a depositor.  The Firms posit they only 
had a “legally enforceable contractual obligation . . . to repay 
Tseng the unearned and unused retainer deposits.”  Thus, the 
Firms contend the circuit court’s finding that the funds in the 
trust account “remain the property of the client” is in error. 
Our jurisprudence clearly supports the conclusion reached 
by the circuit court.  An attorney who receives funds from a 
client for the future payment of legal fees for services not yet 
rendered holds those funds in trust.  The funds are the corpus 
of a trust of which the attorney is the trustee and the client 
the beneficiary.  In re Equip. Servs., 290 F.3d 739, 746 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (citing Indian Motocycle Assocs. v. Massachusetts 
Housing Fin. Agency, 66 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (1st Cir. 1995)) 
(“the relationship is a trust arrangement in which the attorney 
holds the retainer for the client” and “the retainer so held, 
                     
4 The Firms did not contend the trust status (and Tseng’s 
equitable ownership interest) in the funds in the trust accounts 
ended before the lien of fieri facias attached on October 7, 
 
 
9
less any fees charged against it, constitutes the property of 
the client”).  Although not a case involving an attorney’s trust 
account, we explained such a general fiduciary relationship, and 
distinguished it from a debtor/creditor relationship, in 
Broaddus v. Gresham, 181 Va. 725, 26 S.E.2d 33 (1943). 
The question frequently arises as to whether the 
relation created is a trust or a debt.  With respect 
to this distinction, in Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, 
section 12.1, p. 86, the author says:  “A trust 
involves a duty to deal as fiduciary with some 
specific property for the benefit of another.  A debt 
involves a merely personal obligation to make payment 
of a sum of money to another.  A creditor as such has 
merely a personal claim against the debtor.  He can 
enforce his claim by judicial proceedings to reach the 
debtor’s property and subject it to the satisfaction 
of his claim, but until he does so he has no legal or 
equitable interest in the property of his debtor.  ***  
On the other hand, the beneficiary of a trust has an 
equitable interest in the trust property.  The 
beneficiary of a trust has something more than a mere 
chose in action, something more than the merely 
personal claim which a creditor has against the 
debtor.  He is equitable owner of the trust property.  
If the trustee transfers the trust property to a 
person who is not a bona fide purchaser, or if the 
trustee becomes insolvent, the beneficiary is still 
entitled to the property . . . .” 
 
Id. at 731-32, 26 S.E.2d at 35-36. 
The Firms were in a fiduciary relationship to Tseng, 
holding his property (the funds he tendered to the Firms) as the 
corpus of a trust of which Tseng was the beneficiary.  Nothing 
in either representation agreement evidences any other type of 
                                                                  
2005, by virtue of any contractual agreement between the 
parties. 
 
 
10
relationship.  The Firms were thus under a fiduciary duty to, 
among other things, return the funds in the fiduciary trust 
account to Tseng upon his request.  This obligation, fiduciary 
in nature, did not convert the parties’ relationship to that of 
debtor and creditor as to the trust funds although Tseng could 
have sought many of the same remedies as a creditor had the 
Firms failed to discharge their fiduciary duty.  We reiterated 
this point in Broaddus: 
The fact that the trustee may be indebted to the 
beneficiary in a fixed and definite amount which is 
due and payable immediately and which may be recovered 
by the beneficiary in an action at law, is not, as 
contended by the appellant, determinative of the 
existing relation.  If the trustee is under a duty to 
pay money immediately and unconditionally to the 
beneficiary, the beneficiary can maintain an action at 
law against the trustee to enforce payment.  This does 
not mean, however, that a trustee who is under an 
immediate and unconditional duty to pay to the 
beneficiary money held in trust has ceased to be a 
trustee and has become a debtor. 
 
Id. at 732-33, 26 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting Restatement of 
Torts §§ 198-199) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
We specifically applied these principles in the context of 
trust accounts held by an attorney in Virginia State Bar v. 
Goggin, 260 Va. 31, 530 S.E.2d 415 (2000), and plainly held the 
client had an ownership interest as a trust beneficiary, not a 
mere creditor: 
Clients’ funds deposited in an attorney’s trust 
account are funds held in trust.  As such, the claim 
of such clients for return of funds is more than 
 
 
11
merely a personal claim against the attorney for the 
payment of the sum of money on deposit.  The clients 
retain an equitable or beneficial ownership interest 
in the funds.  The deposit of one client’s funds in an 
account with funds of other clients does not destroy 
the beneficial interest of the clients in the funds so 
deposited.  Thus, the clients are entitled to those 
funds to the extent their equitable ownership 
interests can be traced. 
 
Goggin, 260 Va. at 33, 530 S.E.2d at 416-17 (citing 
Broaddus, 181 Va. at 731-32, 26 S.E.2d at 35-36); accord 
Iowa Supreme Court Bd. Of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. 
Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2003) (Advance payment 
for future services “represent[s] money that still belongs 
to the client after it is paid to an attorney and must be 
deposited in a client trust account.”); In re Lochow, 469 
N.W.2d 91, 98 (Minn. 1991) (“[A]dvance payments for future 
services are client funds until earned. . . . Furthermore, 
attorney fees for payment of services to be performed in 
the future must be placed in a trust account and removed 
only by giving the client notice in writing of the time, 
amount, and purpose of the withdrawal, together with a 
complete accounting thereof.”). 
The Firms’ analogy to a lawyer’s trust account and the 
relationship between a bank and its depositor is untenable.  
While a depositor is only a creditor of the bank as to his 
account in the depository bank, Bennet v. First & Merchants 
Nat’l Bank, 233 Va. 355, 360, 355 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987) 
 
 
12
(citing Bernardini v. Central Nat’l Bank, 223 Va. 519, 521, 290 
S.E.2d 863, 864 (1982)), that contractual indebtedness is 
qualitatively and legally distinct from that of the client whose 
own funds are being held by his attorney.  A depositor in a bank 
retains no ownership interest in the funds deposited, but 
becomes a general creditor of the bank.  Should the bank become 
insolvent, the depositor is a mere creditor with all others.  
See First Nat’l Bank v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 163 Va. 
162, 169, 175 S.E. 775, 777 (1934) (a depositor “has no claim 
upon the assets of the bank superior to that of the bank’s 
general creditors”). 
Should a lawyer’s client, having tendered funds into the 
lawyer’s trust account, file a petition in bankruptcy, the funds 
in the trust account at the time of filing are assets of the 
client’s bankruptcy estate because of the client’s ownership 
interest.  E.g., In re U.S.A. Diversified Prods., Inc., 196 B.R. 
801, 807 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (“[T]he funds in [firm’s] trust 
account became the property of the bankruptcy estate upon the 
filing of the petition.”); see also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 
329.04[1][e] & n.22 (Lawrence P. King et al., eds. 15th ed. 
2007) (supplying cases).  Conversely, if the attorney holding a 
client’s funds files a petition in bankruptcy, the client’s 
funds in the trust account are not part of the attorney’s estate 
in bankruptcy.  Those funds remain the separate property of the 
 
 
13
client because it is the client who has equitable ownership, not 
the attorney. 
We hold that Tseng had an equitable ownership of the funds 
held by the Firms in trust and was not simply a contractual 
creditor of the Firms as they contend.  The circuit court thus 
did not err in its holding that the trust account funds were 
Tseng’s property. 
B.  Scope of the Garnishment Summons 
Garnishment is the process by which a judgment creditor may 
enforce the lien of his writ of fieri facias against any debt or 
property due his judgment debtor that is held by a third party, 
the garnishee.  Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 520, 84 S.E.2d 
419, 421 (1954); Code § 8.01-511.  The creditor can assert no 
greater rights against the garnishee than the judgment debtor, 
himself, possesses.  Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro 
International, Inc., 259 Va. 759, 768, 529 S.E.2d 80, 85 (2000).  
“A garnishment summons does not create a lien itself, but, 
instead, is ‘a means of enforcing the lien of an execution 
placed in the hands of an officer to be levied.’ ”  Id. at 768-
69, 529 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting Knight v. The Peoples Nat’l Bank 
of Lynchburg, 182 Va. 380, 392, 29 S.E.2d 364, 370 (1944)). 
Under Virginia law, a garnishment proceeding is a 
separate proceeding in which the judgment creditor 
enforces the "lien of his execution" against property 
or contractual rights of the judgment debtor which are 
in the hands of a third person, the garnishee.  The 
 
 
14
summons issued in a garnishment proceeding "warns" the 
garnishee not to pay the judgment debtor’s money to 
the judgment debtor, with the sanction that if the 
garnishee were to do so, it would become personally 
liable for the amount paid. 
 
United States ex rel. Global Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Harkins 
Builders, Inc., 45 F.3d 830, 833 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Lynch, 
196 Va. at 520, 84 S.E.2d at 421) (internal citations omitted). 
The Firms contend the circuit court erred by permitting 
Wu’s garnishment to, in effect, reach the respective trust 
accounts for any amounts disbursed after the writ of fieri 
facias was issued to the sheriff and served upon them, but 
before there was service upon Tseng.  In part, the Firms argue 
their position is correct because a garnishment could only reach 
their contractual indebtedness to Tseng and they held no 
property Tseng owned.  We have just rejected that argument 
because Tseng had equitable ownership of the funds deposited in 
the trust accounts and possessed more than a mere contract 
right. 
The Firms also appear to argue that a garnishment can only 
reach a debt the garnishee owes a judgment debtor, but no other 
property interest of that judgment debtor that the garnishee may 
hold.  The Firms misapprehend the law of garnishment. 
 
Our precedent reflects that a garnishment reaches any 
intangible property interest of a debtor and that property 
interest is not constricted to a narrow category of a debtor-
 
 
15
creditor obligation.  We succinctly explained the scope of 
garnishment in Lynch. 
If it appear upon proof or upon confession of the 
garnishee that he owes the judgment debtor any debt or 
property, the court “may give judgment against him 
. . . .”  The court cannot, [however], enter any order 
or judgment against the garnishee unless he is found 
either to be indebted to the judgment debtor, or to 
have possession of property of such debtor for which 
debt or property the judgment debtor himself could 
maintain an action at law. 
 
196 Va. at 520, 84 S.E.2d at 422 (citing Levine’s Loan Office, 
Inc. v. Starke, 140 Va. 712, 125 S.E. 683 (1924); Freitas v. 
Griffith, 112 Va. 343, 71 S.E. 531 (1911)) (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is the debtor’s intangible property interest that 
the garnishee may hold, not just an indebtedness from the 
garnishee, that is properly subject to garnishment.  Network 
Solutions, Inc., 259 Va. at 768, 529 S.E.2d at 85.  The Firms, 
as garnishees, held the intangible equitable property interest 
of Tseng in their trust accounts and were under a fiduciary duty 
not only to hold that interest but return the property to Tseng 
when the trust obligation ends.   As such, Tseng’s property 
interest in the trust accounts could be attached in garnishment 
by Wu as “the judgment creditor [who] enforces the ‘lien of his 
execution’ against property . . . of the judgment debtor [Tseng] 
in the hands of a third person, the garnishee,” the Firms.  
 
 
16
Harkins Builders, 45 F.3d at 833 (quoting Lynch, 196 Va. at 520, 
84 S.E.2d at 421).5 
C. Person Making a Payment to the Judgment Debtor 
 
The Firms contend that even if their prior arguments are 
incorrect, and Wu’s garnishment summons can reach the trust 
account interests owned by Tseng, the circuit court nonetheless 
erred because the requirements of Code § 8.01-502 were not met.  
The Firms argue this is so because they were persons “making a 
payment to the judgment debtor” within the meaning of Code 
§ 8.01-502 and thus entitled to require strict compliance with 
the statute’s requirements, including service of the notice of 
lien upon Tseng, before the lien of the writ of fieri facias was 
effective. 
 
We have not previously considered who is “a person making a 
payment to the judgment debtor” under Code § 8.01-502.  However, 
if a party falls within that category, the Firms are correct 
that no liability under the writ of fieri facias attaches as to 
them until the notice requirements of the statute have been met.  
“Garnishment, like other lien enforcement remedies authorizing 
                     
5 The Firms cite Code § 8.01-512.3 on brief as being 
inconsistent with the circuit court’s judgment by virtue of 
language in the statutory form that the garnishee withhold funds 
from “the date of service of this summons on you.”  This 
argument was not made in the circuit court and will not be 
considered under Rule 5:25.  Further, other than citing the 
statute, the Firms do not make any further analysis in their 
 
 
17
seizure of property, is a creature of statute unknown to the 
common law, and hence the provisions of the statute must be 
strictly satisfied.”  Network Solutions, Inc., 259 Va. at 768, 
529 S.E.2d at 85 (citing Long v. Ryan, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 718, 
724 (1878); Mantz v. Hendley, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 308, 315 
(1808)). 
 
If Tseng were a plumber and provided plumbing services to 
the Firms, then their payment to Tseng for those services would 
clearly be a Code § 8.01-502 “payment to the judgment debtor.”  
In that case, the lien of fieri facias would not cause a 
liability on the part of the Firms for making the plumbing 
payment to Tseng until he had been properly served with notice 
of the lien.  However, the Firms’ claim of a statutory payment 
in this case is far more attenuated, if not illusory, than the 
foregoing example. 
 
Without citation to any authority, the Firms contend that 
they made a “constructive payment” to Tseng each time the Firms 
withdrew money from the trust accounts to pay their legal fees 
and costs.6  Based on their view that any obligation on their 
part to Tseng was purely a contractual indebtedness to him, the 
Firms argue that each time they paid themselves from the trust 
                                                                  
brief and as such, the argument would also be waived under Rule 
5:17(c)(4). 
6 The record is silent as to whether Tseng consented to or 
knew about any particular withdrawals. 
 
 
18
accounts they were “simultaneously discharging their own 
obligation to pay Tseng the identical sum from the retainer 
deposits.” 
 
This legal fiction was the basis for the Code § 8.01-502 
defense the Firms argued to the circuit court. 
In effect, what has happened, Your Honor, is the law 
firms did the work, the obligation to pay us was 
incurred.  Rather than give the money back to Mr. 
Tseng so that he could then pay us, what happened was 
in the nature of a setoff, and that is a payment.  
[O]ur obligation to Mr. Tseng for what he deposited 
with us was reduced pro tanto by the amount that he 
was obligated to pay us for our services, or reimburse 
us for the expenses we had incurred in the course of 
that representation . . . . And by discharging the 
obligation that we had to Mr. Tseng, we made a payment 
to him. 
 
We disagree with the Firms. 
 
There is no hint in Code § 8.01-502 that any artifice or 
legal fiction is contemplated by the plain language of the 
statute.  The words of the statute mean what they say and we may 
not read into a statute a meaning contrary to its clear 
language.  Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 74, 155 S.E.2d 351, 356 
(1967) (when construing “simple, clear and unambiguous language 
. . . we read it to mean what it says.”); Chase v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547-48, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 
(2003) (“[T]he intention of the legislature . . . must be 
gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction 
would involve a manifest absurdity.”).  The service requirements 
 
 
19
of Code § 8.01-502 apply only where the garnishee actually makes 
a payment to the judgment debtor. 
 
Simply put, the Firms never made a payment to Tseng; they 
paid themselves.  When the Firms withdrew Tseng’s property from 
the trust accounts, they made no payment to Tseng, Wu’s judgment 
debtor.  Instead, the Firms put Tseng’s money into their pockets 
or the pockets of their nominees, but never Tseng.  
Consequently, the Firms are not “person[s] making a payment to 
the judgment debtor” within the intendment of Code § 8.01-502 
and the notice requirements of that statute cannot be claimed by 
them.  Therefore, the failure to make service upon Tseng under 
that statute has no effect on the Firms’ liability to Wu under 
the garnishments. 
D. Effective date of the Fieri Facias Lien 
 
The Firms’ final assignment of error is that the circuit 
court erred in holding the Code § 8.01-501 lien could attach to 
the funds in the trust accounts “without regard to service of 
the notice of lien upon anyone.”  The circuit court actually 
ruled in its opinion letter that:  “According to Code § 8.01-
501, the lien of fieri facias was effective on the date it was 
delivered to the sheriff, which the parties agree was October 7, 
2005.”  The court then cited the statute, which provides:  
“Every writ of fieri facias shall . . . be a lien from the time 
it is delivered to a sheriff . . . on all the personal estate of 
 
 
20
or to which the judgment debtor is . . . possessed or entitled.”  
Code § 8.01-501 (emphasis added).  The Firms’ only argument to 
the circuit court was that the lien was not effective as to them 
because of the failure to serve the notice of lien under Code 
§ 8.01-502.  Otherwise, the Firms conceded the effective 
attachment of the fieri facias lien before the circuit court. 
[A]lthough the lien became effective – was created I 
guess is a better way to put it, statewide territorial 
lien on intangible property was created when that writ 
of execution was placed in the hands of the Virginia 
Beach sheriff on October 7th, it was not binding upon, 
it was not effective against the two law firms until 
all the procedures set forth in [Code §] 8.01-502 were 
met. 
 
 
Having failed in their argument under Code § 8.01-502, as 
just addressed above, the Firms made no other argument in the 
circuit court that related to any notice defect in the 
garnishment.7  Moreover, the Firms’ argument that there was no 
service of notice of the fieri facias lien is contrary to the 
law of this case.  As noted previously, the circuit court found 
as a fact that the Firms had been served on October 7, 2005, the 
same date the fieri facias writ was delivered to the sheriff and 
the Firms assigned no error to that finding.  Whether failure to 
have made service on the Firms upon the day of the delivery of 
                     
7 No issue was raised below regarding any other defect in 
the notice of the lien of fieri facias, such as a claim of lack 
of due process, or that the Firms had a lien interest of their 
own under Code § 54.1-3932 or otherwise. 
 
 
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the writ to the sheriff would have affected the lien under Code 
§ 8.01-501 is not an issue before the court in this case. 
 
Accordingly, as the provisions of Code § 8.01-502 did not 
apply to the Firms, the circuit court did not err in finding the 
lien of the writ of fieri facias became effective against the 
Firms as of October 7, 2005. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.