Title: Barksdale v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KAREEM BARKSDALE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 140, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0206004613 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July 29, 2003 
Decided:  September 24, 2003 
 
Before BERGER, STEELE, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 24th day of September 2003, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court as follows: 
1. 
On the afternoon of June 6, 2002, the defendant-appellant Kareem 
Barksdale broke into the home of Laverne Barnes.  Barksdale cut both arms during 
his entry through the bathroom window and left a trail of blood from the bathroom 
into a bedroom, where blood was found on and underneath a mattress.  Nothing 
else in the bedroom was disturbed and nothing was stolen from the house.  
Barksdale admitted to entering the home but raised an affirmative claim-of-right 
 
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defense.1  Barksdale claimed that he broke into the home to retrieve either $65 or 
marijuana that Laverne Barnes’ son, Brian, allegedly owed to him. 
2. 
A jury found Barksdale guilty of second degree burglary, attempted 
theft, and criminal mischief.  During deliberations the jury sent four questions to 
the trial judge, each dealing with the claim-of-right defense.  The fourth question 
read as follows: “Can defendant be found not guilty of burglary if guilty of 
attempted theft?”  Over the defendant’s objection, the judge answered “No.”  On 
appeal, Barksdale contends that the trial judge impermissibly commented on the 
evidence contrary to Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution and that 
the comment directly influenced a verdict against the defendant. 
3. 
We hold that the trial judge answered the question correctly as a 
matter of law.  11 Del. Code § 825 defines second degree burglary:  
A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when 
the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully: (1) in 
a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein. 
 
Barksdale satisfied the “unlawful” requirement of the burglary statute by 
concededly breaking into the home via the bathroom window.  The only remaining 
factual issue for the jury was Barksdale’s claim-of-right defense.  Accordingly, if 
the jury rejected his claim-of-right defense and found the requisite intent to commit 
                                                 
1 11 Del. Code § 847 (a): “in any prosecution for theft or extortion it is an affirmative defense 
that the property was appropriated by the actor under a claim of right, made in good faith, to do 
substantially what the actor did in the manner in which it was done.” 
 
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theft, then under Section 825 he would also be guilty of burglary.  Conversely, if 
the jury accepted Barksdale’s claim-of-right defense, then there would be no intent 
to commit theft and Barksdale could only be guilty of trespass.  Thus, the trial 
judge correctly answered the jury’s question because Barksdale could not be found 
guilty of theft but not guilty of burglary.   
4. 
Further, the trial judge’s answer did not violate Article IV, Section 19 
of the Delaware Constitution.2  In Herring v. State, this court held that Article IV, 
Section 19 prohibits a trial judge from “commenting on the weight of the evidence 
or the credibility of the witnesses” but permits a trial judge to “instruct the jury on 
the law.”3   
5. 
The trial judge neither erred as a matter of law by answering the jury’s 
question nor did Herring prohibit that response.  While the better practice, given 
these facts, may have been simply to recharge the jury on the burglary and theft 
charges without further comment, the trial judge here did not err, nor did he 
unfairly prejudice Barksdale by proceeding in that manner. 
                                                 
2Article IV, Section 19 states that “judges may not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, 
but may state the questions of fact in the issue and declare the law.”   
3 805 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. 2002). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court 
be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice