Title: Duncan v. Town of Jackson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Duncan v. Town of Jackson1995 WY 170903 P.2d 548Case Number: 94-177Decided: 10/05/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Etta Mae DUNCAN, as Personal

Representative 
of the Estate of 

David 
Willis Duncan,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

TOWN 
OF JACKSON, and its employees, Officer Larry Compton and Lt. David W. Foster, 
Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Teton County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Robert 
W. Tiedeken (argued), of Wolf & Tiedeken, Cheyenne; and Jeremy Michaels of 
Michaels & Michaels, Gillette, for Appellant.

Sara 
E. Van Genderen and R. Michael Mullikin (argued), of Mullikin, Larson & 
Swift, Jackson, for Appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Etta 
Mae Duncan, Personal Representative of the Estate of David Willis Duncan, filed 
a wrongful death suit against appellees Town of Jackson and its employee 
Lieutenant David Foster (Lt. Foster). Town of Jackson and Lt. Foster were 
granted summary judgment by the trial court, and appellant appeals. The issue we 
decide concerns whether the district court erred in concluding that Lt. Foster 
owed no duty to the deceased, David Duncan.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      On June 21, 1992, 
a dispatcher for the Town of Jackson received a 911 call reporting that a dark 
red pickup with camper shell had gone off the west side of Highway 89 in front 
of the caller. The dispatcher conveyed the report to the Wyoming Highway Patrol 
dispatch center and broadcast the report over a radio channel heard by several 
law enforcement agencies in the Jackson area.

[¶4]      Lt. Foster of the 
Jackson Police Department was the first person to answer the broadcast. Lt. 
Foster, off-duty in his unmarked police car, radioed dispatch and relayed that 
he was responding to the report. Activating siren and emergency lights, Lt. 
Foster proceeded to the reported accident scene pursuant to an emergency 
response.

[¶5]      Upon arrival, Lt. 
Foster immediately located a reddish pickup with camper shell in a field 
approximately 1,000 feet off of the highway and down an embankment. After 
verifying the vehicle description with dispatch, Lt. Foster exited his car and 
proceeded down the embankment to investigate. About a quarter of the way down 
the embankment, Lt. Foster became concerned about his young son being left alone 
in his car, and he proceeded back up the embankment to his car and his son. Once 
he had secured his son, Lt. Foster once again proceeded down the 
embankment.

[¶6]      While Lt. Foster 
was proceeding down the embankment a second time, a Teton county deputy sheriff 
arrived on the scene. Instead of proceeding down the embankment to the vehicle 
in the field, Lt. Foster went back up the embankment to talk with the deputy 
sheriff. Lt. Foster and the deputy then checked for tire marks leaving the 
highway and used binoculars to check for signs of a broken fence in the field 
and damage to the vehicle rather than physically going down the embankment to 
check for injured occupants and examine the scene.

[¶7]      Within minutes, 
the ambulance crew arrived at the scene and was directed to return to Jackson. 
Dispatch was notified that the report was false and that it should cancel the 
report. Dispatch notified the Wyoming Highway Patrol that the report was 
canceled. The next morning, a ranch hand found David Duncan dead in the driver's 
seat of the pickup.

[¶8]      Appellant filed 
suit pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and Wrongful Death Act, 
alleging that Lt. Foster was negligent in investigating the fatal car accident. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, ruling that 
an off-duty police officer, not acting within the scope of his duties, is not 
liable to a plaintiff where no special relationship is established. Appellant 
timely appeals.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶9]      When we review 
summary judgment, we follow our familiar standard of 
review:

"Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when 
the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law." 
Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994). See also W.R.C.P. 56(c). 
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proved, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense asserted by the parties. The party moving for summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for a summary 
judgment. If the movant carries this burden, the party opposing the summary 
judgment must come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine 
issue of material fact does exist.

Thunder 
Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045, 
1047 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted). We examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Kilmer v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 860 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 1993). We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and 
by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. 
Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen, 844 P.2d  at 1047.

Bidache, 
Inc. v. Martin, 899 P.2d 872, 873-74 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995)). We review the grant of summary judgment without 
according any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. 
Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo. 1995); Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1995). Summary judgment is not favored in negligence 
actions and is subject to more exacting scrutiny. Tidwell, at 1325 (citing 
MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990)). However, even in 
negligence actions, summary judgment may be appropriate, especially if a 
plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a duty on the part of a defendant. 
Tidwell, at 1325. We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be 
sustained on any legal ground appearing in the record. Bidache, at 874 (citing 
Moncrief v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 861 P.2d 516, 523 (Wyo. 
1993)).

[¶10]   This standard of review is 
applicable only to the designated record that has been transmitted to this 
court; materials not designated but included in the record will not be 
considered. W.R.A.P. 3.05. In the instant case, the record relied upon by 
appellees was not designated. Therefore, this court is hindered in its review 
because we do not have before us all of the information the trial court had. 
Nevertheless, we apply our standard of review to the record transmitted to us, 
giving all favorable inferences to appellant.

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Although the issue of duty is 
usually decided by the district court as a matter of law, we have held that when 
the duty issue involves questions which are basic issues of fact, it should be 
resolved by the jury. In Halpern, at 565, we stated:

In 
order to recover in any negligence action, a plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant owed a duty of care to him. See Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 111 
(Wyo. 1989). Generally, the issue of duty is decided by the court as a matter of 
law. Id. In certain instances, however, the duty issue involves questions which 
are basic issues of fact. For example, in Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1992), we adopted the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965) as the test to be utilized in 
determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a child trespasser under the 
"attractive nuisance" doctrine. 844 P.2d  at 1048-49. In Thunder Hawk by and 
through Jensen, we stated that genuine issues of material fact existed with 
regard to whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the child trespasser and 
ruled that those issues should be resolved by the jury. 
Id.

In 
order to resolve this appeal, we must determine whether the duty issue in this 
case is purely a question of law where the basic facts are undisputed or whether 
the duty issue can be determined only by resolving basic facts, similar to the 
situations in Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
844 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1992) and Halpern. 

[¶12]   As a preliminary matter, we 
acknowledge that appellant may prevail only if she has alleged sufficient facts 
to establish that Lt. Foster was acting within his scope of duties at the time 
he responded to the emergency bulletin. Wyoming Statute 1-39-112 (1988 Rpl.) 
provides that "[a] governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from 
tortious conduct of peace officers while acting within the scope of their 
duties." Section 1-39-103 (1992 Cum.Supp.) defines "scope of duties" as meaning 
"performing any duties which a governmental entity requests, requires or 
authorizes a public employee to perform regardless of the time and place of 
performance." Thus, appellant must allege sufficient facts to put into dispute 
that Lt. Foster owed a duty to Mr. Duncan, and demonstrate that such duty was 
within his scope of duties as a peace officer.

[¶13]   Duty sufficient to support a 
negligence action may be engendered by common law, statute or contract. Tidwell, 
at 1325. In Wyoming, peace officers acting within the scope of their duties have 
a common law duty to act as reasonable peace officers of ordinary prudence under 
like circumstances. Keehn v. Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 114 (Wyo. 1992); Brown v. 
Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 615 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶14]   In its summary judgment order, the 
district court concluded that based upon Hill v. Park County, 856 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 
1993), "it is apparent that an off-duty police officer not acting within the 
scope of his duties, is not liable to a plaintiff where no special relationship 
is established." We disagree. In Hill, we concluded that the appellant had 
failed to establish any common law duty or any other duty which required an 
off-duty police officer to corral or warn traffic of stray animals on or near a 
public roadway, other than the actions taken by him. As such, no issues of 
material fact remained, and appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Id., at 459-60. The entire proposition and basis for this holding was that 
the appellant had to establish a duty, either by common law, statute, or 
otherwise, owed by the appellee to the appellant. We did not resolve whether 
appellee was acting within his scope of duties at the time in question because 
appellant failed to establish any duty and because appellee acted reasonably 
under the circumstances. Because this case is distinguishable from Hill on its 
facts and circumstances, we must determine whether appellant can establish that 
Lt. Foster owed a duty to Mr. Duncan.

[¶15]   Appellant contends that Lt. Foster 
was authorized to respond to the emergency bulletin and that, once he did in 
fact respond to the emergency, he was acting within the scope of his duties and 
had a duty to act as a reasonable peace officer under the existing 
circumstances. Lt. Foster is a police officer for the Town of Jackson; the 
accident occurred outside Jackson's town limits, but within the boundaries of 
Teton County. A Joint Powers Agreement exists between Teton County and the Town 
of Jackson, which provides in part:

3. 
Authorization to Act. Those patrolmen of the Jackson Police Department 
designated from time to time as deputy sheriff for Teton County, Wyoming, as 
above set forth, are hereby authorized to act in the capacity of a deputy 
sheriff for Teton County, Wyoming outside the corporate limits of the Town of 
Jackson, Wyoming and otherwise within Teton County, Wyoming, when (1) On a case 
by case basis they are expressly requested to do so by the Teton County Sheriff, 
Undersheriff, any deputy sheriff, or radio dispatcher or other staff personnel 
of the Teton County Sheriff's Department; (2) When necessary to preserve life 
and limbs. * * *

* 
* * * * *

5. 
Off-Duty Personnel. The authority granted by this Agreement does not 
extend to "off-duty" personnel of the Teton County Sheriff's Department or the 
Jackson Police Department, except in life threatening 
situations.

(Emphasis 
added.) Thus, Jackson police officers are authorized to officially act outside 
Jackson's town limits and within Teton County under certain situations, even in 
situations when they may technically be "off-duty."

[¶16]   The Jackson police department 
manual also authorizes, and in some instances requires, off-duty officers to act 
within their scope of official duties in certain situations. Under Rule 4.07 of 
the manual, every Jackson police officer is assigned a department vehicle and is 
"encouraged to use Townowned vehicles in all off-duty activities within the 
Jackson Police service area, which is generally defined as within 10 miles of 
the Jackson Town limits." One of the stated purposes for this provision is the 
availability to summon off-duty officers to respond in emergency situations in 
equipped police vehicles. The regulations require off-duty officers to leave 
their police vehicle radios turned on. Additionally, Jackson Police Department 
Regulation 4.07.03(L) provides:

L. 
In minor cases encountered off-duty, the officer may summon an on-duty car to 
handle the call, and stand by and assist until the on-duty car arrives. In the 
event immediate action is necessary, the off-duty officer will handle the 
situation.

[¶17]   Appellees argue that the Joint 
Powers Agreement and the Jackson Police Department regulations did not create a 
duty upon Lt. Foster to respond to emergency calls outside Jackson's town limits 
while off-duty and, thus, he owed no duty to Mr. Duncan. The district court 
agreed, stating in its summary judgment order:

The 
Car Each Policy [Regulation Rule 4.07 et seq.] and the Joint Powers Agreement 
have purposes other than extending jurisdiction. The contract between the two 
entities did not act to extend a duty to the plaintiff.

We 
believe the crucial inquiry is whether Lt. Foster was authorized to officially 
respond outside the Jackson town limits. After reviewing the Joint Powers 
Agreement, together with the Jackson police department regulations, we believe 
that Lt. Foster was authorized to officially respond to emergency calls outside 
the Jackson town limits under certain circumstances, even while 
off-duty.

[¶18]   Was this one of those situations in 
which Lt. Foster was authorized to respond and act in his official capacity as a 
peace officer? That question cannot be answered without resolving the basic 
facts of the case, which will be dispositive of the issue. Because the issue of 
duty cannot be determined without resolving and developing basic facts, this 
issue becomes one for the trier of fact to determine. See Halpern, 890 P.2d  at 
565 and Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen, 844 P.2d  at 
1048-49.

[¶19]   Appellant has put forth sufficient 
evidence to put into dispute whether Lt. Foster owed Mr. Duncan a legal duty. 
Genuine issues of material fact exist, and they include but are not limited to: 
1) whether this was a situation to which Lt. Foster was authorized to officially 
respond and take action under the Joint Powers Agreement and the Jackson police 
department regulations; 2) whether Lt. Foster was acting within his scope of 
official duties; 3) whether, even if Lt. Foster was not required to respond to 
the emergency, once he did respond he owed a legal duty to Mr. Duncan; 4) 
whether, if Lt. Foster did owe a duty to Mr. Duncan, that duty was discharged 
upon the arrival of the Teton county deputy sheriff; and 5) whether, if the 
trier of fact determines Lt. Foster was acting within his scope of duties with 
authority, he acted as a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence under 
like circumstances. Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 114; Brown, 850 P.2d  at 615. All of these 
issues need to be resolved by the trier of fact. See Halpern, at 565 and Thunder 
Hawk by and through Jensen, at 1048-49.

[¶20]   Appellees additionally argue that 
it was not established whether Lt. Foster was deputized by the Teton county 
sheriff, as provided under the Joint Powers Agreement. This contention is 
premature and will be resolved by the trier of fact. Appellees also argue that 
none of Lt. Foster's actions were the proximate cause of Mr. Duncan's injuries 
and death. Proximate cause is usually a question of fact, reserved for the trier 
of fact's determination unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could 
not disagree. Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 
1994); Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1993). This issue 
has not been fully developed, and we cannot say that reasonable minds could not 
disagree. Therefore, this issue is also premature; and if it ripens into an 
issue, it should be resolved by the trier of fact. 

[¶21]   As a procedural matter, the trier 
of fact must decide whether Lt. Foster was acting within the scope of his 
official duties. See Halpern, at 566. If the trier of fact determines that he 
was not, then appellees will be insulated from liability under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. If, however, the trier of fact determines that Lt. 
Foster was acting within the scope of his official duties and was authorized to 
act at the accident scene, and that he, therefore, owed a legal duty to Mr. 
Duncan, liability should be determined as it would be in any negligence case. 
Id.

[¶22]   Finally, because it was unnecessary 
to consider Sheriff Millward's comments contained in appellant's brief in 
resolving this appeal, we decline to address appellees' argument regarding this 
issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶23]   We hold that the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
appellees.

[¶24]   Reversed and remanded.