Title: Motley v. Tarmac

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LUCILLE B. MOTLEY 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 982081 
June 11, 1999 
 
TARMAC AMERICA, INCORPORATED 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Code § 8.01-375, states in relevant part: 
"The court trying any civil case may upon its own 
motion and shall upon the motion of any party, 
require the exclusion of every witness.  However, 
each named party who is an individual, one officer 
or agent of each party which is a corporation or 
association . . . shall be exempt from the rule of 
this section as a matter of right." 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in denying the plaintiff's post-trial motion for a new 
trial because the corporate defendant designated as its agent, 
for purposes of Code § 8.01-375, its former employee, whose 
negligent acts and omissions were at issue in this litigation, 
thus permitting the former employee to observe the trial even 
though the circuit court had excluded the witnesses. 
 
Plaintiff, Lucille B. Motley, filed her motion for 
judgment against James N. Mobley, Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 
and Tarmac America, Inc.  She alleged that Mobley, while 
acting within the scope of his employment, negligently 
operated a truck, and that his negligence was a proximate 
cause of her injuries.  The plaintiff nonsuited Mobley and 
Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc., and the case was tried before a 
jury against Tarmac America, Inc. 
 
After the jury had been empanelled, defendant's counsel 
stated:  "Mr. Mobley is going to be my corporate designee.  
I'd make a motion to separate the witnesses . . . ."  The 
circuit court granted the motion.  Counsel for the litigants 
made their opening statements and presented evidence. 
 
According to the plaintiff's evidence, the plaintiff was 
driving a car in a westerly direction on Broad Street in 
Richmond on February 22, 1996, about 10:45 a.m.  This portion 
of Broad Street consists of four lanes of travel, two lanes 
extending in an easterly direction and two lanes extending in 
a westerly direction. 
 
The plaintiff testified that as she was driving her car, 
a white vehicle "whipped over in front" of her, and she 
swerved her car to the left to avoid it.  The plaintiff, who 
was driving approximately 25 m.p.h., lost control of her car 
and traveled across the two lanes of eastbound traffic, 
"slammed into a wall," "bounced back onto the street," and 
injured a pedestrian. 
 
The plaintiff was unable to identify the white vehicle 
that entered her lane of travel.  However, Thomas G. Aukward 
testified that as he was driving his car on Broad Street, he 
observed in his rearview mirror a white truck, similar to the 
 
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truck that Mobley was driving, approach his car "fairly 
quick."  Aukward "braced himself," thinking that the white 
truck was going to collide with his car.  As Aukward looked 
into his mirror a second time, the white truck "was gone," and 
as he was "trying to figure out where the vehicle went," he 
saw Motley's car "skidding" across the traffic lanes. 
 
Deborah K. Matthews, another witness, testified there was 
no doubt in her mind that the truck that Mobley was driving 
was the truck that entered the plaintiff's lane of travel.  
Floyd Marable, who also saw the accident, testified that the 
truck Mobley was operating was the only white truck in the 
area when the accident occurred.  Marable stated that he 
observed the truck move into the plaintiff's lane of travel, 
and that the operator of the truck did not give a turn signal 
when the truck changed lanes.  Charles B. Howard, a Richmond 
police officer, testified that Mobley stated at the scene of 
the accident that he had been operating his truck in the left 
westbound lane. 
 
Mobley, who was present during the entire trial, 
testified that his truck was not involved in the accident and 
he operated his truck in the "right lane all the time," and 
that Officer Howard's conflicting testimony was not true.  At 
the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed and 
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.   
 
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After the circuit court had entered a judgment on the 
verdict, but before the court lost jurisdiction, the plaintiff 
learned that the defendant had terminated Mobley's employment 
before the trial, but the defendant failed to inform the 
plaintiff of this fact.  The plaintiff filed a motion for a 
new trial and asked that the court vacate its judgment order 
because Mobley was not the defendant's employee and, 
therefore, he should not have been allowed to remain in the 
courtroom to observe the testimony of other witnesses. 
 
Counsel for the litigants filed memoranda in support of 
their respective positions, and the circuit court considered 
argument of counsel.  During the argument, defendant's counsel 
stated:  "At the time of trial [Mobley] was not an employee 
and the facts are that the plaintiff nonsuited him and that I 
said on the record that he was going to be the corporate 
designee."  The circuit court denied plaintiff's motion and 
entered a judgment in favor of the defendant.  Plaintiff 
appeals. 
 
The plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a new trial 
because Mobley was not an agent of the defendant within the 
intendment of Code § 8.01-375 and, therefore, he was not 
entitled to remain in the courtroom once the circuit court 
ordered the exclusion of witnesses.  The defendant responds 
that Code § 8.01-375 permits it to appoint any person as an 
 
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"agent of . . . a corporation" and, thus, Mobley was exempt 
from the statutory exclusion.  We disagree with the defendant. 
 
Code § 8.01-375 requires a circuit court trying any civil 
case, upon motion of any party, to exclude every witness.  The 
statute, however, contains an exception for each named party 
who is an individual or "one officer or agent of each party 
which is a corporation."  Code § 8.01-375.  The purpose of 
this statute is to discourage and expose fabrication and 
collusion by witnesses and to minimize the likelihood that 
witnesses will alter their testimony so that such testimony is 
consistent with testimony provided by other witnesses.  See, 
e.g., United Dentists, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 347, 352, 
173 S.E. 508, 509 (1934).  This statute is important to the 
administration of justice because the exclusion of witnesses 
will often assist the finder of fact in its quest to ascertain 
the truth.  And, as Professor Wigmore observed, the 
sequestration of witnesses "is (next to cross-examination) one 
of the greatest engines that the skill of man has ever 
invented for the detection of liars in a court of justice."  
6 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1838 at 463 (James H. 
Chadbourn ed. 1976). 
 
We hold that Mobley was not an agent of the defendant 
within the intendment of Code § 8.01-375 because he was 
neither employed by the defendant at the time of trial, nor 
 
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did he have any other relationship with the defendant at that 
time.  We reject the defendant's contention that it is 
entitled to appoint anyone as its agent for purposes of Code 
§ 8.01-375 because such an interpretation would permit 
litigants to circumvent and frustrate the very purposes that 
the statute was designed to achieve.  For example, the 
defendant's position, which we do not accept, would permit a 
corporate litigant to appoint as its "agent of the 
corporation" any witness whose testimony may be crucial to the 
determination of a case, thereby permitting that witness to 
observe the testimony of other witnesses and judicial rulings 
even though that person has no association or relationship 
with the corporate defendant.  
 
In view of our disposition of this case, we need not 
consider the plaintiff's remaining contentions.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and we will 
remand this case for a new trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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