Title: Stephens v. Claridy

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 30, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
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Damon Stephens
v.
Michael F. Claridy
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-17-901604)
SELLERS, Justice.
Damon Stephens appeals from a judgment of the Madison Circuit
Court ordering that certain property located on Old Railroad Bed Road in
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Toney, consisting of approximately 7.82 acres ("the property"), be
partitioned by sale, pursuant to the Alabama Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act ("the Heirs Act"), § 35-6A-1 et seq.,  Ala. Code 1975.1  We
affirm.
Facts    
  
This appeal involves whether, under the Heirs Act, the property is
susceptible to partition in kind or whether, as determined by the circuit
court, it must be partitioned by sale.2  Pursuant to the Heirs Act, if a court
determines that property is heirs property, see § 35-6A-2(5), Ala. Code
1975, the court can, after determining the fair market value of the
property, order the division of the heirs property by partition in kind or by
partition by sale.  The Heirs Act presumes that a partition in kind can be
1The Heirs Act, effective April 7, 2014,  applies to partition actions
commenced on or after January 1, 2015.  § 35-6A-3, Ala. Code 1975.  The
Heirs Act defines "heirs property" as "[r]eal property held in tenancy in
common which satisfies [certain specified] requirements."  § 35-6A-2(5),
Ala. Code 1975.  
2"Partition in kind" is defined as "[t]he division of heirs property into
physically distinct and separately titled parcels." § 35-6A-2(7), Ala. Code
1975.  "Partition by sale" is defined as a "court-ordered sale of the entire
heirs property, whether by auction, sealed bids, or open market sale
conducted under § 35-6A-10[, Ala. Code 1975]." § 35-6A-2(6).
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ordered unless such a partition would "result in great prejudice to the
cotenants." § 35-6A-8(a), Ala. Code 1975.  If heirs property cannot be
partitioned in kind, then a partition by sale must be ordered pursuant to
§ 35-6A-10, Ala. Code 1975. 
In September 2017, Michael F. Claridy filed a complaint to quiet
title to the property and requested that the circuit court partition the
property by sale on the basis that the property could not be equitably
divided or partitioned in kind. Following an initial hearing, the circuit
court determined that the property was heirs property governed by the
Heirs Act.   Specifically, the court determined that the property has been
in the Riddle family since 1944.  Claude Riddle and Mary G. Riddle
initially owned the property.  Claude died first, and Mary died intestate
in 2000, so  title to the property vested equally in their children: Jimmie
C. Riddle, Billy Riddle, and Bobby Riddle. Jimmie died in 2005. After
several conveyances and reconveyances, Billy held title to a two-thirds
interest in the property, which he conveyed to Claridy in 2017.   Bobby
conveyed half of his one-third interest in the property to Stephens in 2019,
and Stephens was subsequently added as a party to the action.  Thus, the
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circuit court declared that Claridy owned an undivided two-thirds interest
in the property and that Stephens and Bobby owned an undivided
one-third interest as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. 
After establishing that the property was governed by the Heirs Act,
the circuit court adopted an appraisal indicating that the fair market
value of the property was $140,000.  See § 35-6A-6, Ala. Code 1975
(requiring a circuit court to order an appraisal of the property at issue
before determining how to partition the property).  According to the
appraisal, there are several structures located on the property, including
a house that Bobby personally built, valued at $44,100; a freestanding
carport located at or near  Bobby's house, valued at $2,000; and a house
in which Bobby's parents, Claude and Mary, lived before their deaths,
valued at $7,200 ("the original house"). The appraisal also indicated that
the land alone was valued at $86,700, with an average value of $11,087
per acre.  Based on the fair market value of the property, the circuit court,
pursuant to § 35-6A-7(e), Ala. Code 1975, allowed Stephens and Bobby 30
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days in which to elect to buy Claridy's two-thirds interest in the property.3 
Neither Bobby nor Stevens elected to buy Claridy's interest in the
property; thus, the circuit court conducted a bench trial to determine
whether  a partition in kind or a partition by sale was appropriate under
the Heirs Act.
During the trial, the circuit court heard testimony from Bobby,
Claridy, and Stephens; the court also considered depositions and other
evidentiary materials.   The evidence indicates that Bobby began living in
a camper-trailer on the property in approximately 1972; that, over the
years, he converted the camper-trailer into a house; and that he continued
to make improvements to the house until approximately 2002.  Bobby does
not have independent water and septic lines running to his house. Rather,
his house uses the water and septic lines running to the original house. 
3Section 35-6A-7(e) provides, in pertinent part:
"If any cotenant, including the petitioner, has requested
partition by sale, after the determination of value under
Section 35-6A-6[, Ala. Code 1975], the court shall send notice
to the parties that any cotenant except a cotenant that
requested partition by sale may buy all the interests of the
cotenants that requested partition by sale." 
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Bobby also stated that he had made improvements to the original house. 
Bobby testified that no one in his family ever objected to his building the
house on the property or making improvements thereto.  Bobby stated
that he had been the caretaker of the property from 2000 until 2015 and
that he had paid the taxes on the property during that time.  He indicated
that he did not know who had paid the property taxes after  2015.   Bobby
finally stated that he has a sentimental attachment to the property
because he has always lived there.  As indicated, Claridy acquired his
interest in the property in 2017.  Although Claridy is related to the
Riddles and has visited the property since his youth, he has never lived on
the property and indicated that he had no intentions of doing so. Claridy
stated that he had paid the taxes on the property for the past three years. 
Stephens acquired his interest in the property in 2019;  he has neither
lived on the property nor paid taxes on the property. Stephens testified
that, as a teenager, i.e., from approximately the mid-1980s until the early
1990s, he lived with his mother, who is now deceased, in Bobby's house. 
Bobby and Stephens's mother were in a relationship for a long period, but
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they never married.  Stephens stated that, when he had lived with his
mother and Bobby, he had helped Bobby build additions to Bobby's house. 
After hearing the testimony and considering the evidentiary
materials, the circuit-court judge personally viewed the property. The
circuit court indicated in its judgment that the property was overgrown
and that the buildings on it were dilapidated; that Bobby had failed to
maintain the buildings in good working order; that the roof of the original
house was falling in; that Bobby's house did not have independent water
or septic lines running to it; that there was a large hole on approximately
three acres of the property negatively impacting the potential use of those
acres; and that the differences in terrain, elevation, and condition of the
property rendered some of the property to be of significantly lower value
than the rest of the property. Based on the testimony, the evidentiary
materials, and the judge's personal observation of the property, the circuit
court concluded that there was no method by which the property could be
partitioned in kind to adequately preserve each cotenant's interest in the
property.  Accordingly, the circuit court entered a detailed judgment
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ordering that the property be partitioned by sale via public auction,
pursuant to § 35-6A-10.  Stephens appealed; however, Bobby did not.   
Standard of Review
"The ore tenus rule affords a presumption of correctness
to a trial court's findings of fact based on ore tenus evidence,
and the judgment based on those findings will not be disturbed
unless those findings are clearly erroneous and against the
great weight of the evidence. Reed v. Board of Trs. for
Alabama State Univ., 778 So.  2d 791, 795 (Ala. 2000). It is
grounded upon the principle that when a trial court hears oral
testimony it has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and
credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408,
410 (Ala. 1986). The ore tenus rule does not cloak a trial
court's conclusions of law or the application of the law to the
facts with a presumption of correctness. Kennedy v. Boles
Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60 (Ala. 2010)."
Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 958 (Ala. 2011).
Discussion 
The main issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in
holding that the property was incapable of being partitioned in kind, thus
warranting a partition by sale.  Section 35-6A-8(a) provides, in relevant
part, that,
"[i]f all the interests of all cotenants that requested partition
by sale are not purchased by other cotenants pursuant to
Section 35-6A-7[, Ala. Code 1975], ... the court shall order
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partition in kind unless the court, after consideration of the
factors listed in Section 35-6A-9[, Ala. Code 1975], finds that
partition in kind will result in great prejudice to the
cotenants."
(Emphasis added.)
In determining whether a partition in kind will result in "great
prejudice" to the cotenants,  a court is required to consider all the factors
stated in § 35-6A-9(a), Ala. Code 1975:  
"(1) Whether the heirs property practicably can be
divided among the cotenants.
"(2) Whether partition in kind would apportion the
property in such a way that the aggregate fair market value of
the parcels resulting from the division would be materially less
than the value of the property if it were sold as a whole, taking
into account the condition under which a court-ordered sale
likely would occur.
"(3) Evidence of the collective duration of ownership or
possession of the property by a cotenant and one or more
predecessors in title or predecessors in possession to the
cotenant who are or were relatives of the cotenant or each
other.
"(4) A cotenant's sentimental attachment to the property,
including any attachment arising because the property has
ancestral or other unique or special value to the cotenant.
"(5) The lawful use being made of the property by a
cotenant and the degree to which the cotenant would be
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harmed if the cotenant could not continue the same use of the
property.
"(6) The degree to which the cotenants have contributed
their pro rata share of the property taxes, insurance, and other
expenses associated with maintaining ownership of the
property or have contributed to the physical improvement,
maintenance, or upkeep of the property.
"(7) Any other relevant factor."
Additionally, § 35-6A-9(b)  provides that "[t]he court may not
consider any one factor ... to be dispositive without weighing the totality
of all relevant factors and circumstances."  Stephens contends that the
circuit court erred by ordering a partition by sale because, he says, the
court considered only the second factor in its analysis.  He asserts that the
circuit court provided no discussion of the other factors and provided no
analysis regarding whether any particular cotenant would be greatly
prejudiced by a partition in kind.  Contrary to Stephens's assertions, § 35-
6A-9 does not require a circuit court to provide a detailed written analysis
of each factor, nor does it require a written analysis regarding whether a
partition in kind would result in great prejudice to any particular
cotenant.  Rather, § 35-6A-9 requires only that the court consider all the
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factors and weigh the relevant factors accordingly in light of the evidence
or circumstances presented.  In this case, the circuit court entered a
detailed judgment, noting that it had "considered and reviewed all of the
evidence in [the] case, as well as, the factors [set out in § 35-6A-9(a)] to
determine if a partition in kind will result in great prejudice to the
cotenants."  The circuit court then indicated that the property "was in
disrepair and any partition of the property would decrease the value of the
property 'in such a way that the aggregate fair market value of the parcels
resulting from the division would be materially less than the value of the
property if it were sold as a whole.'  [§ 35-6A-9(a)(2)]."  Although the
circuit court "quoted" only the second factor, that does not imply that the
court considered only that factor to the exclusion of all others.  Rather,
given the extensive details contained in the circuit court's judgment, it is
clear  that the court considered all the factors but accorded the second
factor more weight given the evidence presented regarding the use and
quality of the property.  As indicated, the judge personally visited the
property and observed that it was overgrown and that the buildings on it
were dilapidated, that it had not been properly maintained, that there was
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a large hole on approximately three acres negatively impacting the
potential use of those acres, and that the differences in terrain, elevation,
and condition of the property rendered some of the property to be of a
significantly lower value than the rest of the property. In addition, the
circuit court heard evidence implicating the other factors, including
evidence regarding the degree to which the cotenants had contributed to
the payment of property taxes, their upkeep and maintenance of the
property, and their sentimental attachments to the property.  Being
mindful that the circuit court received oral testimony, considered
evidentiary materials, personally inspected the property, and entered a
thorough judgment containing its findings, we find no error in the circuit
court's judgment ordering a partition by sale.  "A trial court's finding that
land cannot be equitably partitioned is entitled to a presumption of
correctness and will be overturned only if plainly or palpably erroneous."
Black v. Stimpson, 602 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. 1992)(citing Moore v.
McNider, 551 So. 2d 1028 (Ala.1989)).  
Stephens also argues that the circuit court erred by failing to award
an equitable lien "to Bobby and Stephens for the improvements Bobby
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and, by extension, Stephens, made to the property," specifically the
construction of Bobby's house, valued at $44,100.  As indicated, Stephens
testified that, from approximately the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, he
lived with his mother, who is now deceased, in Bobby's house.  Stephens
stated that, during that time, he helped Bobby build additions  to the
house.  It is undisputed that Bobby built the house on the property and
that he continued to make improvements to the house until approximately
2002.  Stephens, however, did not acquire any interest in the property,
i.e., including the house, until 2019.  In contravention of Rule 28, Ala. R.
App. P., Stephens has not cited any authority for the proposition that he
is entitled to an equitable lien "by extension" or that he possesses any
right to make arguments on behalf of Bobby, who is not a party to this
appeal. Accordingly, Stephens has failed to provide a valid reason
supported by legal authority for reversing the circuit court's judgment
insofar as it failed to award an equitable lien in favor of Stephens or
Bobby. 
Conclusion
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For the above-stated reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
ordering a partition of the property by sale pursuant to the Heirs Act is
affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, C.J., dissents.
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