Title: Furnas v. Cirone

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13429 
 
JANE K. FURNAS  vs.  CATHLEEN M. CIRONE, personal 
representative.1 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 11, 2023. - November 21, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Joint Tenants.  Real Property, Joint tenancy, Partition.  
Contempt.  Practice, Civil, Contempt, Motion to dismiss.  
Jurisdiction, Probate Court, Equitable.  Probate Court, 
Jurisdiction, General equity power.  Judgment, Enforcement. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for partition filed in the Hampden Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on December 20, 2016. 
 
 
A complaint for contempt, filed on January 22, 2021, was 
heard by Barbara M. Hyland, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Talia K. Williams (Jesse W. Belcher-Timme also present) for 
the petitioner. 
Mark J. Esposito for the respondent. 
 
 
 
1 Of the estate of Anthony P. Cirone. 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  Anthony P. Cirone and Jane K. Furnas owned a 
property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.  
Following proceedings to partition the property, they settled on 
an agreement whereby Anthony2 would make monthly payments to 
Furnas, who would keep the mortgage current and either refinance 
or list the property for sale.  After a decree was entered 
incorporating their agreement, Anthony passed away.  His 
daughter, acting as personal representative of his estate, 
sought to hold Furnas in contempt for failing either to 
refinance or to list the property for sale.  A judge found 
Furnas in civil contempt. 
 
This case asks us to determine whether Anthony's and 
Furnas's joint tenancy was severed by the agreement, thereby 
terminating Furnas's right of survivorship.  We also are asked 
to determine whether the agreement was enforceable by the 
probate court, even if the joint tenancy was not severed.  We 
conclude both that the agreement severed the joint tenancy and 
that the probate court had jurisdiction to enforce the 
agreement.  We therefore affirm the judgment of civil contempt. 
1.  Background.  The following facts were found by the 
motion judge after an evidentiary hearing and generally are 
undisputed. 
 
2 Because Anthony P. Cirone and Cathleen M. Cirone share the 
same surname, we use their first names for clarity. 
3 
 
Anthony and Furnas owned a home in East Longmeadow 
(property) as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.  In 
December 2016, Furnas filed a petition to partition the property 
pursuant to G. L. c. 241, § 1.  On August 9, 2018, Anthony and 
Furnas presented a negotiated agreement to a judge of the 
probate court. 
 
Under the agreement, Anthony would make monthly payments to 
Furnas in the amount of one-half of the mortgage and remove his 
personal belongings from the property.  Furnas was obligated to 
keep the mortgage current and either (1) refinance the property 
and remove Anthony from the note and mortgage by September 1, 
2020, or, alternatively, (2) list the property for sale by 
June 1, 2020, with the proceeds from the sale to be divided 
between the parties.  The judge approved the parties' agreement, 
entering a decree that incorporated and merged the terms of the 
agreement.  Neither party appealed from the decree. 
Anthony made seven mortgage payments to Furnas before 
becoming medically incapacitated in February 2019.  Thereafter, 
his daughter, Cathleen M. Cirone, was appointed as his 
conservator.  Cathleen made an additional twelve payments before 
pausing payments temporarily to seek a forbearance on the 
mortgage.  On June 4, 2020, Anthony died, and Cathleen was 
subsequently appointed as personal representative of his estate.  
In September 2020, Cathleen brought the payments to Furnas 
4 
 
current; however, Furnas did not cash the checks because she 
claimed that, on Anthony's death, she became the sole owner of 
the property by operation of law. 
In January 2021, Cathleen filed a complaint for contempt 
against Furnas alleging that she had failed to comply with the 
terms of the decree.  Furnas filed an answer, setting forth 
affirmative defenses challenging the validity of the agreement, 
and a purported counterclaim.3  Furnas also filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint, arguing that the decree did not sever the 
joint tenancy and, consequently, that Cathleen and the estate 
lacked standing to bring the complaint. 
Following a contested hearing, the judge denied Furnas's 
motion to dismiss.  An evidentiary hearing was held, and the 
judge issued written findings of fact and rulings of law.  The 
judge concluded that the decree destroyed the joint tenancy; 
that each party was entitled to the benefit of the agreement; 
and that, because the decree constituted a final adjudication of 
Furnas's original petition, it resolved all issues relating to 
the parties' rights to the property and must be "afforded the 
 
3 The counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment and a 
finding of contempt against Cathleen.  At a preliminary hearing, 
the judge informed the parties that the counterclaim was 
"procedurally ineffective" and instructed Furnas to file her own 
complaint.  Furnas failed to do so.  Nevertheless, the judge 
later ruled on the merits of the counterclaim.  The parties do 
not dispute that the judgment on the counterclaim must be 
vacated. 
5 
 
protection of finality afforded a decree entered after [a] 
hearing."  Based on these rulings, and finding that Furnas had 
not complied with the provision of the agreement mandating that 
she either refinance or sell the property, the judge found 
Furnas in civil contempt.4  Furnas appealed, and after review by 
the Appeals Court, we granted her application for further 
appellate review. 
Furnas presses several arguments for why the judge erred in 
finding that the agreement, as merged with the decree, severed 
the joint tenancy.5  Because we conclude that the agreement, 
which was enforceable, clearly (1) severed the joint tenancy by 
destroying the unity of possession and, in addition, (2) waived 
the statutory formalities of the partition statute upon its 
merger with the decree, Furnas's remaining arguments do not 
 
4 At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Furnas had not 
listed the property for sale, nor had she refinanced the 
property or paid off the mortgage in full. 
 
5 Furnas's many arguments all are derivative of her central 
claim that, on Anthony's death, his interest in the property 
immediately passed to her by operation of law.  See Smith v. 
Smith, 361 Mass. 733, 737-738 (1972) (property held by joint 
tenancy passes to survivor by operation of law and does not 
constitute part of decedent's estate).  In support, Furnas 
points to the common law of property, the plain language of our 
partition statute, G. L. c. 241, and this court's most recent 
decision on joint tenancies, Battle v. Howard, 489 Mass. 480 
(2022), as standing for the proposition that a joint tenancy 
cannot be severed or terminated absent a transfer, conveyance, 
or other alienation of interest. 
6 
 
warrant discussion except to the extent that we address them in 
notes 10, 14, 15, and 17, infra. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  The standard of 
review for a judge's decision is well established.  "The 
findings of fact of the judge are accepted unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 
456 Mass. 562, 569 (2010).  However, "[w]e review the judge's 
legal conclusions de novo."  Id.  See Anastos v. Sable, 443 
Mass. 146, 149 (2004). 
b.  Joint tenancy.  Joint tenancy "is a form of coownership 
arising under the common law and characterized by the right of 
survivorship."  Battle v. Howard, 489 Mass. 480, 483 (2022).  
The right of survivorship "grows out of the application of 
common law principles wholly independent of statute."  Weaver v. 
New Bedford, 335 Mass. 644, 646 (1957).  "The creation and 
maintenance of a joint tenancy depends on the existence of four 
'unities':  the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity 
of time, and the unity of possession.  Battle, supra at 484 
(joint tenancy exists so long as coowners of property "have one 
and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, 
commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the 
same undivided possession" [citation omitted]).  "A joint 
tenancy is severed when any one of the four unities is 
7 
 
destroyed, including due to a unilateral act of one of the 
parties."  Id.6 
Here, the unities of time and title are not in dispute 
because Anthony and Furnas took title to the property under the 
same instrument and at the same time.7  Therefore, the discussion 
shifts to the remaining unities:  possession and interest. 
c.  Unity of possession.  There is a lacuna of 
Massachusetts cases dealing with the unity of possession; we 
therefore look to sister States, as well as esteemed treatises, 
for guidance.  As one of the four unities that make up a joint 
tenancy, "unity of possession" requires that "each joint tenant 
is in possession of the whole estate, and that each is also 
entitled to an equal undivided share of the whole."  Swink v. 
Fingado, 115 N.M. 275, 286 n.15 (1993), quoting 4A R. Powell, 
Real Property ¶ 617[1], at 51-9 (rev. ed. 1992).  7 R. Powell, 
Real Property § 51.03[1] (M. Wolf ed. 2023) (Powell).  See 
Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 99 Idaho 361, 367 (1978) 
 
6 Generally, in order to sever, the unilateral act "must 
clearly and unequivocally signify an intent to sever[; the] mere 
expression of intent to sever without a legally sufficient act 
does not effectuate a severance."  7 R. Powell, Real Property 
§ 51.04[1][a] (M. Wolf ed. 2023). 
 
7 It is a rare case where the unity of time could seriously 
be said to be in dispute.  See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 
*133  (unity of time, "which respects only the original 
commencement of the joint-estate, cannot, indeed, [being now 
past] be affected by any subsequent transactions"). 
8 
 
("The unity of possession essential to the existence of a joint 
tenancy means that each joint tenant is entitled to the use and 
enjoyment of the whole property, as if a sole owner, subject to 
the other joint tenants' equal and undivided rights of 
possession").  Unity of possession likewise "requires joint 
tenants to have undivided interests in the whole, not undivided 
interests in the several parts."  Valdez v. Occupants of 3908 SW 
24th St., Okla. City, 2011 OK 99, ¶ 13 n.5. 
The agreement, as incorporated and merged with the decree, 
states in relevant part:  "[Anthony] agrees to remove his 
remaining personal items on or before September 30, 2018."8  
Arguing that the decree did not sever the unity of possession, 
Furnas makes a distinction between the right of legal possession 
(and use) of property and mere physical possession of property;9 
specifically that, on signing the agreement, Anthony lost his 
right to the latter, not the former. 
We disagree.  A joint tenancy is "terminated by any act 
destructive of its constituent unities."  4 Thompson on Real 
Property § 31.08(a) (3d Thomas ed. 2021).  Here, the decree 
 
8 Neither party disputes that Anthony complied with this 
term. 
 
9 Put another way, while Anthony's agreement to vacate the 
property may have had an impact on his physical possession, "it 
had no impact on [his] legal rights to the [p]roperty," 
inclusive of ownership status or how the property was titled. 
9 
 
altered Anthony's right to possession, thus severing the joint 
tenancy.10  It is true that, at common law, a joint tenant's 
decision to move out voluntarily does not destroy the unity of 
possession.  See Goetz v. Slobey, 76 A.D.3d 954, 956 (N.Y. 2010) 
(commencing partition action and moving out of property did not 
sever unity of possession because parties "were each still 
entitled to common possession of the entire . . . [p]roperty" 
until final partition decree).  However, Anthony did more than 
move out.  Per the terms of the agreement, Anthony lost his 
legal right to possess and enjoy the whole property prior to 
formal conveyance or alienation.  See Ogilvie, 99 Idaho at 367.  
In sum, Anthony's legal rights changed:  he could no longer have 
his possessions on the property.  Furnas's reliance on the 
distinction between legal possession and use versus physical 
possession and use therefore is inapt; Anthony clearly lost his 
"right" to both upon execution of the agreement. 
 
10 We therefore need not reach the question whether the 
decree also destroyed the unity of interest except to note that, 
contrary to Furnas's position, it cannot be that conveyance or 
sale of the subject property is, in every case, the only means 
to sever both the unity of interest and the unity of possession.  
If the unity of possession could never be severed without 
conveyance, then it would be duplicative of the unity of 
interest.  See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 293 
(1915) ("A joint tenant . . . always may terminate the joint 
tenancy by transfer or conveyance of his interest" [emphasis 
added]). 
10 
 
d.  Partition.  Further, the incorporation of the parties' 
agreement into the decree severed the joint tenancy; parties to 
a partition are free to agree to terms different from those 
enumerated in the partition statute. 
Since colonial times, a coowner of a property in the 
Commonwealth has had "a statutory right to petition the courts 
to divide property that he or she no longer wishes to own 
jointly with another."  Battle, 489 Mass. at 485, citing Cook v. 
Allen, 2 Mass. 462, 469 (1807).  In its current form, the 
partition statute allows "[a]ny person, except a tenant by the 
entirety, owning a present undivided legal estate in land, not 
subject to redemption . . . to have partition."  G. L. c. 241, 
§ 1.  Here, Furnas filed a petition to partition the property 
under G. L. c. 241, § 1; that petition was resolved two years 
later by the parties' negotiated agreement, which was 
incorporated and merged with the partition decree.11  Against 
that backdrop, Furnas argues that this court's holding in Battle 
states that it is conveyance alone that severs the unities, see 
generally Battle, supra at 483-485, and because no sale, 
conveyance, refinance, payment, or other divestment of the 
 
11 The agreement provided in its introductory section that 
"[t]he parties . . . hereby agree to resolve the matters 
involving the [property] . . . as follows," and concluded with 
the provision stating that "[t]he parties agree that this 
[a]greement shall enter as the [j]udgment in this case." 
11 
 
property took place, all legal rights of the parties remained 
intact until Anthony's death.  Furnas misapprehends our holding 
in Battle. 
In Battle, 489 Mass. at 481, a joint tenant filed a 
petition under G. L. c. 241, § 1, seeking a partition by sale.  
Pursuant to an interim order, the judge appointed a commissioner 
to sell the property.  Id. at 481-482.  After filing a valuation 
with the court and obtaining a warrant for the sale, the 
commissioner accepted an offer to purchase the property and 
filed a motion for authority to enter into a purchase and sale 
agreement.  Id. at 482. 
Prior to a hearing on the commissioner's motion, the joint 
tenant who filed the original petition died.  Battle, 489 Mass. 
at 482.  The court held that the joint tenancy was not severed 
because, per the terms of the judge's interim order as well as 
the warrant, the final sale remained subject to the approval of 
the judge and the parties' right to object.  Id. at 491.12  The 
court clarified that, "with respect to a partition by sale, the 
operative act that upsets the four unities and severs a joint 
tenancy is the commissioner's conveyance of the property by deed 
to a buyer."  Id at 487. 
 
12 Indeed, the warrant expressly provided that the parties 
remained free to settle the matter consensually, including "by 
terminating the action for partition and maintaining . . . their 
joint tenancy."  Battle, 489 Mass. at 491. 
12 
 
The facts in Battle are readily distinguishable from those 
in the case at bar.  While both sets of parties sought to 
dissolve their respective joint tenancies and relied initially 
on the partition statute, G. L. c. 241,13 to do so, the parties 
here resolved their dispute through a private agreement that 
expressly resolved the partition action.14  The parties in 
Battle, by contrast, did not.  Of course, parties to a partition 
may agree to terms different from those enumerated in the 
statute; however, on regretting that decision, neither party 
 
13 The partition statute provides for two forms of court-
supervised partition:  division and sale.  G. L. c. 241, § 18.  
The former divides the subject property among the existing 
tenants and is binding on the entrance of "a final decree" by 
the court.  Id.  The latter splits the proceeds of sale amongst 
the tenants and is binding "at sale."  Id.  As Anthony was to 
receive proceeds for his interest in the property regardless of 
Furnas's choice to sell or refinance, only those portions of the 
statute concerning partition by sale are relevant here. 
 
14 To the extent Furnas argues that the agreement does not 
require her to sell the property ("the agreement only requires 
that [she] list the property for sale, because there are no 
defined terms requiring acceptance of an offer or the actual 
sale, only payment terms if a sale is actually effectuated"), 
that argument need not be discussed at length.  The agreement, 
by its terms, clearly contemplates a sale in the event Furnas is 
unable to refinance or pay off the mortgage ("Upon the sale, 
each party shall receive . . .").  See Robbins v. Krock, 73 
Mass. App. Ct. 134, 139 (2008), quoting Fried v. Fried, 5 Mass. 
App. Ct. 660, 664 (1977) ("We are guided by '[j]ustice, common 
sense and the probable intent of the parties' when interpreting 
the written agreement"); Cadle Co. v. Vargas, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 
361, 366 (2002), quoting Fishman v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 247 F.3d 
300, 302 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Common sense is as much a part of 
contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of 
canons"). 
13 
 
should expect to rely on the procedural rights and protections 
of the partition statute after electing to contract around it.  
See Nichols v. Nichols, 181 Mass. 490, 491-492 (1902) (objection 
to partition decree failed where party to partition proceedings 
waived statutory right to formal findings by requesting 
commissioners partition property certain way and "agreeing that 
it was the most advantageous [division] that could be made").  
See, e.g., Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 506 (1940) (tenants 
in common temporarily may waive right to partition by mutual 
agreement).15 
In Battle, we held that "with respect to a partition by 
sale, the operative act that upsets the four unities and severs 
a joint tenancy is the commissioner's conveyance of the property 
by deed to a buyer" (emphasis added).  Battle, 489 Mass. at 487.  
For parties relying on the partition statute to effectuate a 
partition by sale, see G. L. c. 241, § 18, conveyance of the 
property is the sole act whereby all four unities are destroyed 
and the joint tenancy is legally severed.  Battle, supra.  See 
Cowden v. Cutting, 339 Mass. 164, 169-170 (1959) (property 
interests of coowners in action for partition by sale remain 
unchanged unless property is conveyed to buyer by commissioner's 
 
15 Consequently, Furnas's subordinate argument that the 
decree did not contain all the statutory requirements of 
partition under G. L. c. 241, § 10, must likewise fail.  See 
Nichols, 181 Mass. at 491-492. 
14 
 
deed).16  Parties are free, however, to destroy the unities in 
all the usual ways prescribed by common law, or they may elect 
to partition the property through private settlement even after 
filing a formal petition.  See Calhoun v. Rawlins, 93 Mass. App. 
Ct. 458, 466 n.14 (2018), quoting Ratchford v. Ratchford, 397 
Mass. 114, 116 (1986) (public policy of Massachusetts favors 
settlement of property disputes).  Here, the agreement signed by 
the parties accomplished both:  (i) it resolved all "matters 
involving the [property]" on its merger with the decree while 
(ii) simultaneously destroying the unity of possession.  See 
Battle, supra at 484; Goetz, 76 A.D.3d at 956. 
e.  Enforcement.  General Laws c. 241, § 25, states, in 
relevant part:  "The court in which a petition has been brought 
under this chapter shall have jurisdiction in equity over all 
matters relating to the partition, and, in case of sale, over 
the distribution of the proceeds thereof . . . ."  By its terms, 
§ 25 "does not address the trial courts' jurisdiction over a 
petition for partition.  That is the function of [G. L. c. 241,] 
§ 2 ('Probate courts and the land court shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction of all petitions for partition')."  Battle, 489 
Mass. at 496, quoting G. L. c. 241, § 2.  "Instead, § 25 
 
16 See also G. L. c. 241, § 18 ("The partition by division, 
when confirmed by a final decree under [§ 16], or the sale if 
partition is made by sale, shall be conclusive upon all persons 
named in the petition . . ." [emphasis added]). 
15 
 
establishes that a court having jurisdiction over a petition for 
partition also has supplemental jurisdiction 'in equity over all 
matters relating to the partition.'"  Id., quoting G. L. c. 241, 
§ 25. 
Here, the probate court entered the decree as a final 
judgment.  It is axiomatic that courts have the power to enforce 
valid judgments.  See Sommer v. Maharaj, 451 Mass. 615, 621 
(2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 (2009).  Notwithstanding, 
Furnas argues that the decree is not enforceable because the 
property vested fully in Furnas on Anthony's death.  
Consequently, the estate lacked standing to pursue its claim17 
and the probate court relied improperly on its equitable powers 
to enforce the agreement.  See Weaver, 335 Mass. at 646.  Furnas 
is in error. 
We have observed that "joint tenancies and the right of 
survivorship [are] . . . creatures of common law, and they have 
existed alongside . . . statutory scheme[s] for partition," such 
as G. L. c. 241, since colonial times (footnote omitted).  
 
17 Furnas argues that the trial judge erred in denying her 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because the estate lacked standing.  "[S]tanding to bring an 
action for partition of land is conditioned on the petitioner's 
owning a present undivided legal estate in the land."  Battle, 
489 Mass. at 485.  Based on our discussion infra, because we 
hold that Anthony's ownership interest in the property passed to 
his estate, Cathleen, as personal representative, had standing 
to enforce the decree on behalf of the estate. 
16 
 
Battle, 489 Mass. at 496.18  Additionally, parties generally may 
alter common-law survivorship rights by agreement.  See Finn v. 
Finn, 348 Mass. 443, 446 (1965) (separation agreement may 
preserve joint ownership of asset after divorce and bypass 
common-law rule converting marital joint ownership to 
postdivorce tenancy in common). 
Based on the foregoing, the decree destroyed the unity of 
possession, thereby severing the joint tenancy and terminating 
the right of survivorship.  See Powell, supra at § 51.04[1][a] 
(act "that operates to destroy or terminate any one or more of 
the essential unities . . . effects conversion of the joint 
tenancy into a tenancy in common and destruction of the right to 
survivorship").  As the decree entered prior to his death, 
Anthony's ownership interest in the property therefore passed to 
his estate.  See West v. First Agric. Bank, 382 Mass. 534, 536 
n.4 (1981), superseded by statute on other grounds, citing M. 
Park, Conveyancing § 125, at 120 (1968) ("at death the interest 
of a tenant [in common] descends to his heirs or passes to his 
devisees").  See also Yanolis v. Yanolis, 402 Mass. 470, 473 
(1988) (if party to divorce dies after entry of judgment but 
 
18 See Cook v. Allen, 2 Mass. 462, 469 (1807) (referring to 
writs of partition under English common law prior to enactment 
of statute by Parliament); Province Laws 1693, c. 8, § 1 
(predecessor to G. L. c. 241).  See also Battle, 489 Mass. at 
496 n.15 (joint tenancy and right of survivorship briefly 
abolished by statute between 1783 and 1785). 
17 
 
before resolution of appeal, judgment survives death).  The 
estate, in turn, was entitled to commence an action to enforce 
the decree.  See Sommer, 451 Mass. at 619, 621 (civil judgment 
generally enforceable against decedent's estate if decedent dies 
after entry of judgment).  Finally, because the issue of the 
agreement's effect on common-law survivorship rights is 
"'intimately interwoven with the petition for partition,' 
exclusive jurisdiction over the [estate]'s claim[] rest[s] with 
the probate court under [G. L. c. 241,] § 25."  Battle, 489 
Mass. at 497, quoting O'Connor v. Boyden, 268 Mass. 111, 114-115 
(1929). 
Contrary to Furnas's position, the probate court had 
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement; it did not need to resort 
to its general equity powers.  See G. L. c. 241, §§ 2, 25. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we hold that 
Furnas's right of survivorship was terminated and that the 
agreement was enforceable by Anthony's estate.  We therefore 
affirm the judgment of civil contempt.  The dismissal of the 
counterclaim on the merits is vacated, and the case is remanded 
for entry of a judgment dismissing the counterclaim without 
prejudice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.