Title: State v. Jackson

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 12A96
FILED: 3 APRIL 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RICHARD ALLEN JACKSON
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Downs, J., at
the 6 November 1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Buncombe
County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. 
The defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to
additional judgments for first-degree rape and first-degree
kidnapping was allowed 17 July 1997.  Heard in the Supreme Court
18 December 1997.
On 31 October 1994, Karen Styles went jogging and did
not return.  On 25 November 1994, her body was found nude from
the waist down and taped to a tree.  The defendant became a
suspect in the commission of the crime, and on 20 December 1994,
members of the Sheriff’s Department requested that the defendant
come to the sheriff’s office with them.  At the sheriff’s office,
the defendant made inculpatory statements.  Subsequently, the
defendant was charged in Buncombe County with the first-degree
murder, first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree rape of Karen
Styles.
Prior to the trial, the defendant made a motion to
suppress his inculpatory statements.  At the hearing on this
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motion, the testimony revealed the following essentially
undisputed facts.  Two detectives went to the defendant’s place
of work at 11:00 a.m. on 20 December 1994 and, after telling him
he was not under arrest, requested that he accompany them to the
sheriff’s office to answer some questions.  The defendant agreed
and was then driven for a period of ten to twelve minutes from
his place of work to the sheriff’s office.  The defendant was
told he was a suspect in the murder of Karen Styles.  The
defendant denied any implication in the murder.
At the sheriff’s office, the defendant was taken to the
interview room and warned of his rights pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  He was again
told he was not under arrest.  The defendant then consented to a
search of his person and to have fingerprints and blood and hair
samples taken.  The defendant was again told he was not under
arrest.  The defendant stated he wanted to cooperate and told the
officers that he had a chemical imbalance in his brain and that
he had been abused as a child.  
In response to questioning, the defendant again stated
he knew nothing about the murder of Karen Styles and denied
owning a gun.  The jail nurse came and took fingerprints and
blood and hair samples from the defendant.  After this, the
defendant told the officers of his psychiatric problems -- his
nervous breakdown, his discharge from the Navy for mental
illness, his attempted suicides, and his depression.  After the
defendant had been questioned for approximately three hours, the
sheriff entered the room at approximately 2:00 p.m.  The sheriff
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asked the defendant, “What did you do with the rifle that Karen
Styles was shot with?”  A detective present at the time stated
that the defendant replied by stating, “I think I need a lawyer
present.”  The detective’s handwritten notes, taken during the
interview, read, “2:04 P.M. on 12-20-94, wants a lawyer present.” 
The sheriff testified that the defendant said, “I think I might
need a lawyer.”  The trial court found that the defendant stated,
“I think I need a lawyer present.”
In response to this statement, the sheriff told the
defendant he did not want the defendant to answer any more
questions, but he wanted to tell him something.  The detective
testified that the sheriff stated, “Son, I know you bought the
rifle and the duct tape at K-Mart on the 28th of October.  I know
you were in Bent Creek on the day she was killed, and that’s
fine, but you need help.”  According to the detective, the
defendant then began crying and stated, “But I didn’t mean to
kill nobody.  I didn’t.”  He continued crying, “I’m sorry; I
didn’t mean to kill her.”  The detective advised the defendant he
needed to calm down, and after he did so, the sheriff and the
detective left the defendant in the room and went to call an
assistant district attorney for advice as to how to proceed. 
After speaking with the assistant district attorney, the
detective and a captain with the Sheriff’s Department returned
and readvised the defendant of his Miranda rights.  The defendant
waived those rights and then made a statement admitting he killed
Karen Styles.  
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The court concluded that there were no threats or
inducements to make the statements; that the statements were made
voluntarily and understandingly; and that the defendant
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
constitutional rights before making the statements to the
officers.  The motion to suppress the statement was denied. 
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder,
first-degree rape, and first-degree kidnapping.  Upon the jury’s
recommendation, the court imposed the death penalty for the
murder conviction.  The trial court imposed additional sentences
of imprisonment for the rape and kidnapping convictions.  The
defendant appealed.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jill Ledford
Cheek, Assistant Attorney General, and Tina A. Krasner,
Associate Attorney General, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, for
defendant-appellant.
WEBB, Justice.
The defendant contends that at the time his inculpatory
statements were made, he was in custody and had invoked his right
to counsel.  He assigns error to the admission into evidence of
these statements.  This assignment of error has merit.  
The State argues that the defendant’s statement was
properly admitted into evidence at trial because: (1) the
defendant was not in custody at the time he stated he thought he
needed a lawyer; and (2) even if the defendant was in custody,
his statement was not an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel.  We disagree.
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If at any time during an interrogation of a person in
custody the person invokes his right to counsel, the
interrogation must cease, and it cannot be resumed without an
attorney being present unless the defendant initiates a further
discussion with the officers.  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694.  A suspect is in custody when, considering the
totality of circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s
position would not feel free to leave.  “This test is necessarily
an objective one to be applied on a case-by-case basis
considering all the facts and circumstances.”  State v. Medlin,
333 N.C. 280, 291, 426 S.E.2d 402, 407 (1993).
We are faced with two questions.  The first question is
whether the defendant was in custody at the time he made his
incriminating statements.  The second question is whether the
defendant, during the interrogation, invoked his right to counsel
before he incriminated himself.
In determining the custody issue, we first note that
the trial court made no finding as to whether the defendant was
in custody when he made his statement in regard to needing a
lawyer.  However, the lack of such a finding does not prevent
this Court from evaluating the evidence and deciding whether the
defendant was in custody.  State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 525,
412 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1992).
In this case, we conclude that a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position when he was confronted by the sheriff
would have felt he was in custody and would not have felt free to
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leave.  The evidence showed that, at the request of two deputy
sheriffs, the defendant accompanied them to the sheriff’s office. 
While at the sheriff’s office, the defendant consented to
fingerprinting and gave blood and hair samples.  He was under
constant supervision.  The defendant had told the officers he was
anxious to return to work, and despite answering all questions
from them and telling them he had no knowledge of the crime, he
was never told that he was free to leave or that he would be
given a ride to his home or place of work if he decided to leave.
After being in the interrogation room for a period of
approximately three hours, during which time he was questioned by
the officers in regard to the murder, had hair and blood samples
taken, and was fingerprinted, a reasonable man at the least would
have wondered whether he was free to leave.  When the sheriff
asked him what he had done with the rifle he had used to kill the
victim, this informed the defendant that the sheriff thought he
had committed murder.  A reasonable man in the defendant’s
position who had been interrogated for approximately three hours
and thought the sheriff believed he had committed murder would
not have thought he was free to leave.  He would have thought the
sheriff intended to hold him for prosecution for murder.  Thus,
we hold that the defendant was in custody when he inquired about
an attorney.
Having held that the defendant was in custody when he
made his statement in regard to counsel, we must now determine
whether the defendant articulated his desire for counsel
sufficiently that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would
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have understood the statement to be a request for an attorney. 
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994). 
The trial court found, based on sufficient evidence, that the
defendant said, “I think I need a lawyer present.”  The State,
relying on Davis, says that this statement was ambiguous and that
the officers were not required to stop questioning the defendant. 
In Davis, the defendant said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” 
Id. at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 368.  The United States Supreme
Court held this was not a request for counsel.
Davis is not precedent for this case.  The use of the
word “[m]aybe” by the defendant in Davis connotes uncertainty. 
There was no uncertainty by the defendant.  When he said, “I
think I need a lawyer present,” he told the officers what he
thought.  He thought he needed a lawyer.  This was not an
ambiguous statement.  The interrogation should have stopped at
that time.
We are reinforced in our decision by the notes of one
of the officers which were made during the interrogation.  The
notes say, “2:04 P.M. on 12-20-94, wants a lawyer present.” 
Although not binding on us, this is an indication of how a
reasonable officer conducting an interrogation would have
interpreted the defendant’s statement.
We have held that the defendant was in custody and had
invoked his right to counsel when he made his inculpatory
statements.  The inculpatory statements made to the detectives
should have been excluded because they were made after the
defendant invoked his right to counsel.  The defendant did not
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initiate the communication that led to his statements, nor was
his attorney present when they were made.  Therefore, once the
defendant had invoked his right to counsel, no further
interrogation could occur.
We cannot hold beyond a reasonable doubt that the
admission of this testimony was harmless.  N.C.G.S. § 
15A-1443(b) (1988).  Therefore, for this error, there must be a
new trial.
In light of the fact that the defendant will receive a
new trial, we do not discuss the defendant’s other assignments of
error, for the questions they raise may not recur at a new trial. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the defendant must have a
new trial.
NEW TRIAL.
Justice ORR did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.