Title: State v. Sholes

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 35 
Docket: 
Yor-19-214 
Argued: 
February 12, 2020 
Decided: 
March 19, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
FRANK C. SHOLES 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Frank C. Sholes appeals from a judgment of conviction for unlawful 
sexual contact (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(B) (2018), and domestic 
violence assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2018), entered in the trial 
court (York County, Douglas, J.), following a jury trial and after the court denied 
Sholes’s motion for a new trial, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 33.  Sholes argues that (1) the 
prosecutor committed multiple instances of misconduct and (2) the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Sholes the opportunity to call the victim 
witness advocate to testify.  We affirm the judgment. 
                                         
*  Although not available at oral argument, Justice Gorman participated in the development of this 
opinion.  See M.R. App. P. 12(a)(2) ("A qualified justice may participate in a decision even though not 
present at oral argument."). 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  We view the evidence, which supports the jury’s verdict, in the light 
most favorable to the State.  See State v. Daluz, 2016 ME 102, ¶ 2, 143 A.3d 800; 
State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 3, 58 A.3d 1032. 
 
[¶3]  For approximately twelve years, Sholes and the victim were in a 
romantic relationship.  The couple lived together toward the end of their 
relationship, first in a rental property and then in a house that the victim 
purchased.  Sholes moved out of the house in March 2017.  After that time, the 
couple were no longer romantically involved but remained in communication 
because Sholes wanted to maintain contact with the victim’s daughter, whom 
he had helped raise.  On July 28, 2017, Sholes entered the victim’s house while 
the victim was home preparing to exercise.  The victim asked Sholes to leave, 
but Sholes wanted to “talk.”  Sholes proceeded to force the victim to engage in 
sexual activities, despite her telling him to stop numerous times. 
 
[¶4]  On October 3, 2017, Sholes was indicted on four charges: gross 
sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(A) (2018); aggravated criminal 
trespass (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 402-A(1)(A) (2018); unlawful sexual contact 
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(B); and domestic violence assault (Class D), 
 
 
3 
17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A).  Sholes entered a plea of not guilty to each of the four 
charges. 
 
[¶5]  The trial court held a two-day jury trial on February 27 and 28, 
2019.  The jury found Sholes guilty of unlawful sexual contact and domestic 
violence assault, and not guilty of gross sexual assault and aggravated criminal 
trespass. 
 
[¶6]  Sholes filed a timely motion for a new trial, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 33, on 
the same bases that he argues on appeal: (1) that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct when he used the word “rape” during closing argument and when 
he made statements about the victim’s cell phone that he knew were not true, 
and (2) that the court should have allowed Sholes to call the victim witness 
advocate (VWA) to impeach the victim’s credibility.  Following a hearing, the 
court denied Sholes’s motion. 
 
[¶7]  The court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Sholes to 
two years and six months in prison, with all but six months suspended, and two 
years of probation.  Sholes timely appealed.  See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2018); 
M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1). 
 
 
4 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
[¶8]  We “review the denial of a motion for a new trial for clear error or 
an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Robinson, 2016 ME 24, ¶ 24, 134 A.3d 828 
(quotation marks omitted).  In analyzing allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct, we have repeatedly recognized the prosecutor’s special role and 
accompanying responsibilities.  See id. ¶ 23. 
 
[¶9]  When a defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct, we first determine whether misconduct in fact occurred.  See State 
v. Clark, 2008 ME 136, ¶ 7, 954 A.2d 1066.  If misconduct occurred, we review 
the prosecutor’s statements for either harmless or obvious error, depending on 
whether the defense objected to the statements at trial.  See id.; see also Dolloff, 
2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 31-39, 58 A.3d 1032 (explaining the harmless error and 
obvious error standards in the prosecutorial misconduct context).  Finally, we 
consider whether “[m]ultiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, none of 
which individually would require reversal, taken together . . . have a cumulative 
effect of violating a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 74, 
58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
5 
 
1. 
The Prosecutor’s Use of the Word “Rape” 
 
[¶10]  Sholes contends that the prosecutor’s use of the word “rape” in his 
closing rebuttal argument amounts to misconduct because it was “purposefully 
aimed at inciting the jury’s emotions.”  In order to analyze this challenge, it is 
important to consider the alleged misconduct in the context of the entire trial. 
 
[¶11]  In his opening statement, the prosecutor said, “Mr. Sholes the 
defendant . . . enters the house without [the victim’s] permission and rapes her.  
That’s gross sexual assault.”  Sholes objected on the grounds that the term was 
inappropriate and designed to incite the jury’s emotions.  The court issued a 
curative instruction to the jury that it was to “disregard any reference to [the 
word ‘rape’] . . . as presented in the opening statement by counsel.” 
 
[¶12]  Throughout the trial, the victim and a law enforcement witness 
used the word “rape,” eliciting no objection from the defense.  In the State’s 
closing arguments, the prosecutor uttered the word on two occasions.  First, in 
his initial closing argument he used the word “rape” in reference to a rape kit, 
quickly adding “excuse me, your sexual assault kit.”  The defense did not object 
to this mention of the word.  Later, in his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor 
said, “The blanket statement was made that memory fades over time.  We all 
know that.  Being forcibly raped in your house—,” at which time the defense 
 
 
6 
objected, and the prosecutor corrected himself, “forcibly assaulted in your 
house.”  It is this final use of the word “rape” that Sholes challenges on appeal. 
 
[¶13]  We are not persuaded by Sholes’s assertion that “rape” is more 
inflammatory than “gross sexual assault” and therefore prejudicial, nor do we 
accept Sholes’s unfounded accusation that the prosecutor’s use of the word was 
intentional.1  The prosecutor’s use of the phrase “forcibly raped” therefore did 
not constitute misconduct.  Thus, there is no error for us to analyze under the 
harmless error standard.  See id. ¶¶ 32-34; State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶ 21, 
43 A.3d 952. 
 
2. 
The Prosecutor’s Comments Regarding the Victim’s Cell Phone 
 
[¶14]  Sholes asserts that a second instance of prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred when the prosecutor invited the jury to make an inference about the 
police department’s handling of the victim’s cell phone. 
                                         
1  Sholes’s contention—that the court erred in finding that the prosecutor’s use of the word “rape” 
during closing arguments was “ostensibly by inadvertence”—has two components, neither of which 
is availing.  First, Sholes argues that the prosecutor’s statement at sidebar following the objection 
during the prosecutor’s opening statement suggests that the prosecutor intended to repeat the word 
after opening arguments.  The prosecutor said, “I guess, as a middle ground, I’m fine with not using 
that term again in my opening statement.”  This statement, standing alone, does not demonstrate that 
the prosecutor’s two later mentions were intentional.  Second, Sholes asserts that the prosecutor “did 
not exhibit the same slips of the tongue in chambers, when he was careful to use the term ‘sexual 
assault’ as opposed to ‘rape,’” insinuating a strategy on the prosecutor’s part to hide the term “rape” 
from the court but employ the word before the jury.  In fact, the prosecutor used the term “rape” in 
chambers on one occasion and used the phrase “sexual assault” before the jury on multiple occasions. 
 
 
7 
 
[¶15]  Two pieces of digital evidence, which both the defense and 
prosecution had, were retrieved from the victim’s cell phone: (1) an audio 
recording of the victim’s interview with the lead detective, recorded at the 
hospital, and (2) a video recording made while the victim was holding her cell 
phone and talking to Sholes.  The latter was not admitted in evidence and was 
not disclosed to the jury. 
 
[¶16]  During her testimony, the victim said that she dropped her phone 
off at the police station sometime after her hospital exam.  The victim also 
referenced text messages that were not in evidence, including stating that 
Sholes had texted her offering her $600 in exchange for sex. 
 
[¶17]  The alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct occurred during 
the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument.  The defense asserted in its closing 
argument:  
[The victim] said [Sholes] texted her about this sex for money and 
she provided that.  I think she provided her phone to the detective 
in the case.  Do we have a copy of any text that said he was asking 
for sex for money?  No.  There is no evidence like that in this case. 
 
. . . .  
 
You can consider whether a witness’s story was corroborated or 
contradicted by the testimony of another witness or exhibit.  Was 
there a witness or exhibit that corroborated any of that stuff?  Was 
there a picture?  Was there a photo?  Was there a text?  We live in a 
modern era, have stuff on phones.  Pictures are on everybody’s 
 
 
8 
phones.  Any of that presented in this case?  Did anything 
corroborate her story? 
 
 
[¶18]  In rebuttal, the prosecutor said:  
This whole idea that because the police department didn’t collect 
the evidence she says she had, that that somehow reflects on [the 
victim].  She gave [the lead detective] the phone.  You could make 
the reasonable inference [the lead detective] did not take that 
information off the phone.  That’s a reasonable conclusion from 
that.  That doesn’t mean [the victim] didn’t give him the phone and 
say take whatever you want to take, which is what she told you.  
You can’t blame [the victim] for the police department not taking 
evidence off the phone after he interviewed her.  If it’s there— 
 
At this point the defense objected and a heated sidebar discussion ensued.  
During sidebar, the defense, referencing a pre-trial exchange with the 
prosecutor, argued that the prosecutor knew that his statement that the police 
did not collect the evidence was false, and the prosecutor disagreed.  The court 
noted Sholes’s objection and overruled it. 
 
[¶19]  There was no record evidence from the police department to prove 
that the police received the phone at the station;2 what was presented, as the 
court noted, was the victim’s testimony that she gave the police the phone.  
                                         
2  As the trial court observed, there was no “written report of the forensic evaluation of the phone,” 
as “would have been (or should have been) generated as a matter of course.”  As the court noted, it is 
both “troubling that this [report] may not have been done,” and “troubling that counsel did not attend 
to this issue before the morning of trial.  The State should have made further inquiry well before then 
to determine the existence or non-existence of a report and confirm the state of the evidence.  Defense 
counsel also should have followed up well before day one of the trial.”  Although concerning, the lack 
of trial preparation by trial counsel (who were not counsel on this appeal) does not resolve the matter 
at issue here, which is prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
 
9 
Additionally, no evidence was presented that would establish whether the 
recordings that were taken from the victim’s phone were removed during the 
hospital interview or at a later date.  Based on the evidence in the record, it was 
not improper for the prosecutor to suggest to the jury that it could infer that 
the text messages the victim referenced may have existed but that they had not 
been retrieved by law enforcement officers.  See State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, 
¶¶ 19-21, 43 A.3d 952. 
 
[¶20]  We consider the prosecutor’s statement in the “overall context of 
the trial,” Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 44, 58 A.3d 1032, and note that, like with the 
prosecutor’s use of the word “rape,” his statement about the cell phone was 
made during the State’s rebuttal argument.  The court repeatedly instructed the 
jury that statements made by the attorneys in closing arguments are not 
evidence.  See id. ¶ 72 (“We presume that a jury follows a curative instruction 
unless there are exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad 
faith.”  (quotation marks omitted)).  Given this instruction, even if we assume 
that the prosecutor’s statement was improper, it does not amount to harmful 
error.  See id. ¶¶ 32-34; State v. Clarke, 1999 ME 141, ¶ 24, 738 A.2d 1233. 
 
[¶21]  In addition, the prosecutor’s comment was in response to the 
defense attorney’s attempts during closing argument to discredit the victim’s 
 
 
10 
credibility based on the lack of evidence from her phone.  We have held that 
when the prosecutor’s comment was “invited” by the defendant, the comment 
will not “warrant reversing a conviction” if the prosecutor “did no more than 
respond substantially in order to right the scale.”  Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 64, 
58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks omitted); see id. ¶ 44 (citing United States v. 
Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he prosecutor is given 
somewhat greater leeway in rebuttal to rehabilitate his witnesses in response 
to defense counsel’s inflammatory statements.” (quotation marks omitted))). 
 
[¶22]  Finally, the defense attorney made no request of the court for a 
specific instruction or other remedy following his objection.  Contrary to 
Sholes’s contention that the “trial court failed to afford the defense a remedy,” 
it was the attorney’s responsibility to request a form of relief, which he failed 
to do, see Daluz, 2016 ME 102, ¶ 49, 143 A.3d 800, and in any event the court 
issued broad curative instructions regarding closing arguments, as described 
above.  Again, any error arising from the prosecutor’s remarks regarding the 
victim’s cell phone was harmless.  See Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 32-34, 
58 A.3d 1032. 
 
 
11 
 
3. 
Cumulative Effect of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
[¶23]  Finally, we review Sholes’s alleged instances of misconduct 
“cumulatively and in context to determine whether [he] received an unfair trial 
that deprived [him] of due process.”  Id. ¶ 74; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 
Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A.  Because neither allegation amounted to misconduct, the 
comments did not deprive Sholes of a fair trial when considered in the 
aggregate.  See Daluz, 2016 ME 102, ¶¶ 67-68, 143 A.3d 800.  We therefore 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Sholes’s 
motion for a new trial.  See id. ¶¶ 68-69. 
B. 
Evidentiary Challenge 
 
[¶24]  Sholes argues that the court abused its discretion in denying him 
the opportunity to call as a witness the district attorney’s VWA.  See Dolloff, 
2012 ME 130, ¶ 24, 58 A.3d 1032. 
 
[¶25]  The victim’s description of the incident during her direct testimony 
included six facts that Sholes asserts she had not disclosed previously.3  Sholes’s 
attorney questioned the victim and law enforcement officers about whether the 
                                         
3  The six previously undisclosed facts were (1) that Sholes held her down by kneeling on one leg 
and holding down the other; (2) that he picked up an exercise bar from the ground and threatened 
her with it; (3) that she attempted to make a 911 call on her Alexa device; (4) that he forced her head 
back; (5) that she tried to push him off of her; and (6) that when Sholes was leaving, he told her that 
she should have taken the $600, referencing a prior text message exchange. 
 
 
 
12 
victim had told law enforcement or the hospital nurse the six facts.  For the most 
part, the victim did not recall whether she had shared the facts with law 
enforcement.4  The State made an offer of proof that if the VWA were to testify, 
she would say that she did not recall the victim telling her any of the six 
previously undisclosed facts.5 
 
[¶26]  Sholes’s attorney sought to call the VWA to testify in order to 
impeach the victim through prior inconsistent statements and to challenge the 
victim’s “recall and credibility.”  It is this latter contention that Sholes focuses 
on in this appeal.  In particular, he argues that the court improperly limited its 
evidentiary analysis to whether the VWA’s testimony could establish that the 
victim made prior inconsistent statements, thereby preventing Sholes from 
impeaching the victim’s credibility.  We disagree. 
                                         
4  In the hospital following the incident, the lead detective, who was not called to testify, recorded 
an interview with the victim, which the victim listened to in preparation for trial.  When 
cross-examined about five of the six facts, the victim testified that she did not mention four of the 
facts in the recorded interview and could not remember whether she had mentioned the fifth.  
Regarding what she told other law enforcement officers or the nurse immediately following the 
incident, the victim could not recall whether she had shared three of the facts and thought that she 
had disclosed a fourth.  On cross-examination of the two law enforcement officers, when Sholes’s 
attorney asked about some of the previously unmentioned facts, both the patrol officer and detective 
sergeant responded definitively that the victim had not told them about those facts in their 
discussions with her following the incident. 
 
5  We reject Sholes’s contention that the court abused its discretion in relying on the State’s offer 
of proof regarding what the VWA’s testimony would be.  Although the record reflects that the VWA 
had not reviewed her notes before trial, the prosecutor asserted that he had reviewed the notes. 
 
 
13 
 
[¶27]  The court addressed the issue of the victim’s memory in its ruling.  
In excluding the VWA as a witness, the court stated,  
Mr. Gordon, I’ve heard the argument, I understand the argument.  
The request is denied.  You effectively established on 
cross-examination that the witness gave a number—made a 
number of inconsistent statements and had a lapse of memory.  All 
of that is fair game for you to argue to the jury consistent with the 
Court’s instructions. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The court emphasized that the defense had conducted 
ample cross-examination regarding the previously undisclosed facts.  In doing 
so, the court reasoned that further testimony regarding the victim’s memory 
would be cumulative.  See M.R. Evid. 403.  Contrary to Sholes’s assertion, the 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request that the VWA testify.6 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
6  Sholes additionally suggests that the court should have ordered disclosure of the VWA’s notes, 
which constitute privileged communications, on the basis that the trial court has the ability to 
determine that disclosure of privileged victim advocate information is “necessary to the proper 
administration of justice.”  16 M.R.S. § 53-C(3)(C) (2018); see 17-A M.R.S. § 1177(3) (2018) (section 
1177 has since been repealed and replaced; see P.L. 2019, ch. 113, §§ A-1, A-2 (effective 
Sept. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 2109(3))).  The court was aware of its discretionary 
authority to overcome the statutory privilege afforded victim advocate communications and did not 
abuse its discretion when it refused to order disclosure of the notes. 
 
 
14 
Patrick H. Gordon, Esq., and Joshua T. Avery, Esq. (orally), Fairfield and 
Associates, P.A., Lyman, for appellant Frank C. Sholes 
 
Kathryn Loftus Slattery, District Attorney, and Lauren K. Daley, Asst. Dist. Atty. 
(orally), Prosecutorial District 1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
York County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-592 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY