Title: In re Disqualification of Lewis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Lewis, 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-7359.] 
 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF LEWIS. 
BUCKINGHAM COAL CO. v. SANTO. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Lewis,  
117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-7359.] 
Judges — Affidavit of disqualification — Disqualification denied, when. 
(No. 04-AP-074 — Decided July 26, 2004.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Perry County  
Court of Common Pleas, No. 03-CV-00252. 
____________________ 
Reporter's Note:  The previously published version of this opinion omitted a 
complete citation that has been added to this version of the opinion.  This version 
of the opinion supersedes the version that appears at 105 Ohio St.3d 1239, 826 
N.E.2d 299. 
____________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Attorney Michael Long has filed an affidavit with the Clerk of this 
court, under R.C. 2701.03, seeking the disqualification of Judge Linton Lewis 
from acting on any further proceedings in Buckingham Coal Co. v. Santo, case 
No. 03-CV-00252 in the Court of Common Pleas for Perry County. 
{¶ 2} Long alleges that Judge Lewis is biased against Long’s co-counsel, 
Dean Wilson.  Wilson serves as the part-time judge of the County Court of Perry 
County and also practices law with a law firm in Zanesville.  Wilson filed the 
pending suit in Perry County Common Pleas Court on behalf of the plaintiff coal 
company last year. 
{¶ 3} The allegation of bias stems from a criminal case filed against 
Judge Lewis’s brother in the county court over which Wilson presides.  Judge 
Lewis’s brother sought Wilson’s removal from the case in June of this year, 
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alleging that Wilson was prejudiced against the Lewis family.  Wilson recused 
himself, explaining that there was an appearance of impropriety because he 
practices law before the defendant’s brother.  In the entry recusing himself, 
Wilson acknowledged that in his personal capacity he had expressed his belief 
that collecting a judicial salary while at the same time receiving state retirement 
benefits for past judicial service, as Judge Lewis intended to do, was “highly 
inappropriate.”  Also in the entry, Wilson rejected the assertion that his private 
remarks indicated a prejudice against Judge Lewis or his brother. 
{¶ 4} The affidavit of disqualification filed here against Judge Lewis 
asserts that a “tense relationship” now exists between Wilson and Judge Lewis 
because of the entry mentioned above and because Judge Lewis has made public-
record requests for the tape recordings of county-court proceedings in Wilson’s 
courtroom involving Judge Lewis’s relatives:  his brother and his niece. 
{¶ 5} Judge Lewis has responded to the affidavit, and he indicates that he 
is willing and able to serve fairly and impartially as the judge for this and other 
cases in which Wilson represents a party.  Judge Lewis acknowledges that he and 
Wilson disagree about the propriety of Ohio judges collecting both a judicial 
salary and judicial retirement benefits, but he denies that the disagreement affects 
his ability to preside fairly over this case. 
{¶ 6} I find no basis for disqualifying Judge Lewis in this case.  Neither 
the affidavit nor the judge’s response points to any hostility on the judge’s part 
toward Wilson or toward the plaintiff, and the judge’s mere request for tape 
recordings of courtroom proceedings involving his relatives is not an act from 
which I can infer any bias or prejudice against Wilson. 
{¶ 7} To be sure, Wilson probably did not endear himself to Judge Lewis 
by publicly criticizing the possibility that Judge Lewis will collect both a salary 
and state retirement benefits.  And the circumstances of this case demonstrate the 
problems that can arise from the fact that the law in Ohio allows for part-time 
January Term, 2004 
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judges and permits lawyers who practice law one day to serve as a judge in the 
same jurisdiction on another day.  In the end, though, the affidavit presents 
nothing more than Long’s subjective belief that Judge Lewis may be biased 
against Wilson and the plaintiff.  Subjective belief of bias is generally not 
sufficient to support an affidavit of disqualification.  Flamm, Judicial 
Disqualification (1996) 162, Section 5.6.3.  See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 
(S.D.N.Y.1983), 557 F.Supp. 368, 376 (“The test is not the subjective feelings of 
the plaintiffs”). 
{¶ 8} The proper test for determining whether a judge’s participation in a 
case presents an appearance of impropriety is, instead, an objective one.  A judge 
should step aside or be removed if a reasonable and objective observer would 
harbor serious doubts about the judge’s impartiality.  Canon 3(E)(1) of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding 
in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”). 
{¶ 9} In this case, Judge Lewis appears to have taken no action and made 
no comment that might prompt a reasonable and informed observer to question 
his impartiality.  Certainly Judge Lewis should scrupulously avoid hearing any 
case that he feels he cannot approach with a spirit of fairness, but in this case, he 
has responded to the affidavit with a statement expressing his view that he can 
serve fairly and impartially, and he has done and said nothing to suggest 
otherwise. 
{¶ 10} I am not inclined to remove a judge from a case simply because an 
attorney, while acting as a judge, made unfavorable comments about the judge 
before whom he is appearing as an attorney.  Just as we ordinarily assume that an 
attorney’s or party’s vocal opposition to the election of a judge will not prevent 
the judge from fairly and impartially presiding over cases in which that attorney 
or party appears — see, e.g., In re Disqualification of Cleary (1996), 77 Ohio 
St.3d 1246, 674 N.E.2d 357 — so we assume that attorney Wilson’s criticism of 
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Judge Lewis’s possible collection of both a judicial salary and state retirement 
benefits will not cause Judge Lewis to harbor any bias that might affect his ability 
to serve impartially in Wilson’s cases. 
{¶ 11} And though a judge’s subjective belief as to his or her own 
impartiality is generally not the decisive factor in deciding a disqualification 
request, the judge’s own assessment is certainly entitled to some weight, as other 
courts have suggested.  Flamm, supra, 158, Section 5.6.2.  See, e.g., Ellis v. 
Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. (1993), 315 S.C. 283, 285, 433 S.E.2d 856 (“we 
accord great weight to the trial judge’s assurance of his own impartiality”); Wood 
v. Wood (Me.1992), 602 A.2d 672, 674 (a judge need not recuse herself if she 
believes she can act with complete impartiality and if there are no reasonable 
grounds for questioning that assessment). 
{¶ 12} Nothing in Judge Lewis’s response or in his administration of the 
case suggests to me that the “presumption of impartiality that is accorded all 
judges,” In re Disqualification of Celebrezze, 101 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2003-Ohio-
7352, 803 N.E.2d 823, ¶ 7, has been overcome in this case.  See, also, In re 
Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 
23, ¶ 5 (“A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the 
appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these 
presumptions”).  Absent some evidence of bias or some objective indication that a 
reasonable observer would question Judge Lewis’s impartiality, he need not step 
aside. 
{¶ 13} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case shall proceed before Judge Lewis. 
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