Title: Northwest Building Company, LLC v. Northwest Distributing Co., Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
NORTHWEST 
BUILDING COMPANY, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.NORTHWEST 
DISTRIBUTING CO., INC., a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellee(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Greg 
L. Goddard, Christopher M. Wages and Tucker J. Ruby of Goddard, Wages & 
Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.  Argument 
by Mr. Ruby.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Thomas 
J. Klepperich, Dan B. Riggs and Amanda K. Roberts of Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Roberts.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]      Northwest 
Building Company, LLC (Contractor) performed construction services for Northwest 
Distributing Co., Inc. (Owner) on a Taco John’s/Good Times facility in Gillette, 
Wyoming.  Contractor brought an 
action against Owner seeking payment for its services, and Owner 
counterclaimed.  After Contractor’s 
attorney moved to withdraw, the district court ordered Contractor to find 
substitute counsel by the pretrial conference.  When Contractor was unable to find 
substitute counsel by the deadline, the district court sanctioned it by 
dismissing its complaint and granting judgment in favor of Owner on its 
counterclaims.  Contractor appealed, 
raising a number of procedural issues.  
 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.   
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      Contractor 
presents several issues for our review:
 
1.    
Whether 
the District Court abused its discretion when it allowed [Contractor’s] counsel 
to withdraw when no new counsel had entered a written appearance on 
[Contractor’s] behalf. 
 
2.    
Whether 
the District Court abused its discretion when it dismissed all of [Contractor’s] 
claims with prejudice and entered judgment against [Contractor] on all of 
[Owner’s] counterclaims in its Order 
Granting Motion to Withdraw and Imposing Sanctions, and denied 
[Contractor’s] motion to set aside those sanctions in its Order Denying Motion to Set Aside 
Sanctions.   
 
3.    
Whether 
the District Court erred when it considered [Contractor’s] Notice of Appeal, dated May 31, 2011, 
appealing the District Court’s Order 
Granting Motion to Withdraw and Imposing Sanctions and Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Sanctions 
premature.  

 
4.    
Whether 
the District Court erred when it maintained jurisdiction over the case, 
proceeded to a hearing on the damages owed [Owner] on [Owner’s] counterclaims on 
July 29, 2011, and awarded [Owner] damages pursuant to its counterclaims in its 
Judgment, dated September 19, 
2011.  
 
5.    
Whether 
the District Court abused its discretion when it struck [Contractor’s] Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings 
from the record on appeal in its entirety.
 
Owner’s 
statement of the issues is similar.  

 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      The 
underlying facts are of little relevance to the issues on appeal, so we will 
simply provide some basic background of the controversy.  In Spring 2006, Owner and Contractor 
entered into an oral agreement for construction services on a Taco John’s/Good 
Times facility in Gillette.  
Disputes arose over the scope and quality of Contractor’s work and its 
right to payment.  

 
[¶5]      On October 31, 
2008, Contractor filed suit against Owner stating claims for payment of debt, 
unjust enrichment, lost business opportunity and breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.  
Owner responded denying liability and counterclaiming for breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment.  The 
case proceeded, and the district court granted Owner’s motion to strike 
Contractor’s expert witness and motion for partial summary judgment on 
Contractor’s lost business opportunity claim.      

 
[¶6]      On March 22, 
2011, Contractor’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, and the district court 
held a hearing on the motion on April 12, 2011.  At that time, the district court 
indicated that it was going to allow Contractor’s attorney to withdraw and 
ordered it to obtain substitute counsel by the pretrial conference on April 19, 
2011.  The court stated that 
substitute counsel would have to be ready for trial commencing May 24, 
2011.    

 
[¶7]      Although it 
attempted to find substitute counsel by the April 19 deadline, Contractor was 
unable to finalize a representation agreement with its new counsel by that 
date.  Pursuant to Owner’s motion 
for sanctions, the district court dismissed Contractor’s complaint, entered 
judgment against Contractor on Owner’s counterclaims and stated that a hearing 
to determine Owner’s damages would be convened at a later date.  A few days later, Contractor finalized 
an agreement with new counsel who entered an appearance and filed a motion to 
set aside the sanctions.  The 
district court denied the motion to set aside the sanctions.    
 
[¶8]      On May 31, 2011, 
Contractor filed a notice of appeal from the order granting the motion to 
withdraw and imposing sanctions and the order denying its motion to set aside 
the sanctions.  Because the various 
court hearings had not been reported, Contractor also filed a “Statement of the 
Evidence or Proceedings” pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03, which Owner objected to as 
including improper argument and information that was not provided during the 
evidentiary hearings.    

 
[¶9]      The parties 
eventually stipulated to the amount of Owner’s damages, and, on September 19, 
2011, the district court entered judgment in accordance with the 
stipulation.  It also ordered the 
parties to supplement their submissions regarding the statement of the 
evidence.  Contractor filed a second 
notice of appeal from the judgment awarding Owner damages, but did not file a 
supplement to its statement of the evidence and the district court struck it 
from the record.      

DISCUSSION
 
1.    
Motion to 
Withdraw
 
[¶10]   Contractor claims the district 
court erred by allowing its attorney to withdraw without requiring substitute 
counsel to first enter an appearance.  
“[I]ssues concerning the withdrawal of counsel . . . are matters which 
are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be upset on 
appeal absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion.”  Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 671, 673 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
An 
abuse of discretion is found only when a court acts in a manner which exceeds 
the bounds of reason under the circumstances. The ultimate issue is whether the 
trial court could reasonably conclude as it did. 
 
Id.    
 
[¶11]   Rule 102(c) of the Uniform Rules 
for District Courts governs the procedure for an attorney to withdraw from a 
case:
 
(c) 
Counsel will not be permitted to 
withdraw from a case except upon 
court order. Except in the case of 
extraordinary circumstances the court shall condition withdrawal of counsel upon the substitution of other 
counsel by written 
appearance. In the alternative, the court shall allow withdrawal upon a statement submitted 
by the client acknowledging the withdrawal of counsel for the client, and stating a 
desire to proceed pro se. An attorney who has entered a limited 
entry of appearance shall be deemed to have withdrawn when the attorney has fulfilled the duties of 
the limited entry of appearance.
 
(emphasis 
added).  The requirement for 
substitute counsel is mandatory under Rule 102(c).  Sims v. Day, 2004 WY 124, ¶ 11, 99 P.3d 964, 968-69 (Wyo. 2004).  The only 
exceptions to the rule are when the client consents to proceed pro se, see, e.g., McGuire v. Solis, 2005 WY 129, ¶ 13, 120 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Wyo. 2005), or extraordinary circumstances exist.  The district court stated that because 
Contractor is an “entity,” it had to be represented by an attorney and could not 
proceed pro se.  U.R.D.C. 101.1  Consequently, the only justification for 
allowing Contractor’s attorney to withdraw before substitute counsel entered an 
appearance was the existence of extraordinary circumstances.  
 
[¶12]   Contractor’s attorney filed a 
motion stating several reasons for withdrawal, including Contractor failed 
to:  produce income tax returns 
needed by its expert to prepare his report, which resulted in the expert being 
stricken as a witness; accept a certified mailing from counsel and respond to a 
regular mailing; and consistently pay for his services.  After a hearing, the district court 
concluded that the attorney should be allowed to withdraw without substitute 
counsel first entering an appearance, but did not specifically find that 
extraordinary circumstances existed.   

 
[¶13]   In Byrd, we addressed the “extraordinary 
circumstances” requirement of Rule 102(c).  
The district court in that case also did not make a specific finding that 
extraordinary circumstances existed; however, we concluded the requirement was 
met because the record demonstrated that Byrd refused to keep appointments, did 
not respond to telephone calls, refused to execute a deed in accordance with an 
earlier agreement, communicated directly with the opposing party, refused to 
make payments to the opposing party as required by court order, and did not 
cooperate with discovery requests.  
Id., ¶¶ 15-16, 78 P.3d  at 
675-76.  The record also 
demonstrated that Byrd failed to “cooperate and obstructed the orderly 
progression” of the case, placing his counsel in a very difficult position.  Id., ¶ 16, 78 P.3d  at 676.  
 
[¶14]   In Sims, by contrast, we concluded 
extraordinary circumstances did not exist when the attorney’s motion to withdraw 
simply stated that representation had been “rendered unreasonably difficult by 
the client -- due to the client’s neglect in communicating and complying with 
requests of [c]ounsel.”  We 
additionally concluded that the district court erred in allowing withdrawal of 
counsel because the client had not been given an opportunity to respond to the 
attorney’s allegations before the motion was granted.  Sims, ¶¶ 11-13, 99 P.3d  at 969.  
 
[¶15]   Comparing the circumstances in Byrd with the reasons set forth in the 
motion to withdraw in this case, we cannot say that Contractor’s attorney’s 
motion satisfied the extraordinary circumstances requirement.  Byrd’s actions were a great deal more 
egregious then those set out in the motion here.  The first reason cited by Contractor’s 
attorney for withdrawal—failure to provide income tax returns that led to the 
order striking Contractor’s expert—is not entirely accurate.  The order striking the expert included 
several bases besides the lack of information from Contractor.  Moreover, the attorney’s assertion that 
Contractor did not respond to two mailings (one certified and one regular) does 
not indicate the attorney attempted other means of communicating with the client 
that were rejected.  Finally, lack 
of payment is not an “extraordinary circumstance.”  If we were to accept these grounds as 
adequate, the rule would essentially be swallowed by the 
exceptions.
 
[¶16]   However, unlike in Sims, the district court in this case 
held a hearing on the motion to withdraw.  
After the hearing, the district court found that the circumstances 
justified allowing the attorney to withdraw without substitute counsel having 
entered an appearance.  The district 
court recited the following basis for its decision:
 
[Contractor’s] 
counsel has worked extensively with the [Contractor] in an effort to resolve 
differences that have arisen among them, which differences include a lack of 
cooperation by the [Contractor] in the discovery process and in trial 
preparation.  Despite those efforts 
by [Contractor’s] counsel, the relationship between them has deteriorated to the 
point that it cannot be repaired.  
Consequently, the Motion of [Contractor’s] counsel to withdraw is hereby 
granted.
 
[¶17]   In determining 
whether withdrawal should be allowed in absence of replacement counsel, it is 
appropriate to consider the actions of the client and whether those actions 
contributed to the withdrawal request and weigh the right to counsel against the 
prompt administration of justice.  
“[T]he trial court is better able to judge the matter . . . and is more 
familiar with the background and general setting of the situation, which is 
frequently not embalmed in the formal record.”  Byrd, ¶ 19, 78 P.3d  at 676, citing Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 915-16 
(Wyo. 1983).  The record on appeal 
does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the attorney’s motion to 
withdraw and the record was not settled in accordance with W.R.A.P. 3.03.  Consequently, we are left with “no choice but to assume that the evidence supports the district court’s findings.”  Kruse v. Kruse, 2010 WY 144, ¶ 12, 242 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2010).  Given 
the lack of a record and the fact that we defer to the district court in such 
matters, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
allowed Contractor’s attorney to withdraw without first requiring substitute 
counsel to enter an appearance.
 
2.    
Sanctions
 
[¶18]   A district court has discretion in 
overseeing the conduct of court proceedings and imposing sanctions when a party 
violates its orders.  See, e.g. Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 
64, 208 P.3d 1296, 1314 (Wyo. 2009) (granting sanctions for violation of 
discovery requirements); Terry v. 
Sweeney, 10 P.3d 554 (Wyo. 2000) (imposing sanctions for violation of a 
liminal ruling that led to a mistrial).  We review the district court’s decision 
on sanctions for abuse of discretion.  
Dollarhide v. Bancroft, 2010 
WY 126, ¶ 4, 239 P.3d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 2010).  
 
[¶19]   After the district court allowed 
Contractor’s attorney to withdraw, it imposed sanctions against Contractor for 
failing to comply with its order to secure substitute counsel.  The sanctions included dismissal of 
Contractor’s claims and entry of judgment in favor of Owner on its 
counterclaims.  A few days later, 
new counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Contractor and filed a motion to 
set aside the sanctions, which the district court denied.  Contractor claims the district court 
erred by imposing the sanctions and refusing to set them 
aside.
 
[¶20]   W.R.C.P. 
41(b)(1) authorizes a district court to dismiss a case for failure to comply 
with its orders:
 
For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order 
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for 
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper 
venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 
19, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
 
In 
addition, a court has inherent authority to take actions necessary for it to 
perform its court functions.  Terry, 10 P.3d  at 558; Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of 
Ninth Judicial District, 735 P.2d 709, 713-14 (Wyo. 1987).  The sanction power extends to dismissal 
of a suit or entering default judgment against the offending party.  Dollarhide, ¶¶ 10-11, 193 P.3d  at 226; 
Lieberman, ¶ 64, 208 P.3d  at 
1314.  
 
[¶21]   This Court discussed the sanction 
of dismissal for want of prosecution in Dollarhide, ¶¶ 10-11, 193 P.3d  at 
226.  We stated that, while the 
district court has discretion to sanction a party by dismissing the suit, 
dismissal is not a favored course of action as it “'has always been the policy 
of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy.’”  
Id., ¶ 10, 193 P.3d  at 226, 
quoting Waldrop v. Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Wyo. 1985).  In 
determining whether the harsh sanction of dismissal is warranted, “the 
circumstances surrounding each case must be examined, keeping in mind the 
conflict between the need for the court to manage its docket for the purpose of 
preventing undue delay on the one hand, and the policy favoring disposition of 
cases on the merits on the other hand.”  
Randolph v. Hays, 665 P.2d 500, 503 (Wyo. 1983).  

 
[¶22]   The district court’s sanctions 
order stated:
 
3.    
The 
Scheduling Order entered on August 10, 2009, required that the parties be 
prepared for trial commencing May 24, 2011.  The [Contractor] does not have counsel 
to represent it as of the granting of the Motion to Withdraw.  Moreover, the [Contractor] is an entity 
and therefore cannot appear pro se.  Consequently, the [Contractor] is 
not prepared to proceed at this time.
 
4.    
The 
[Contractor] has had sufficient notice that its attorney intended to withdraw 
from this case to permit it to retain counsel prior to the Pretrial conference 
on April 19, 2011, but has failed to do so.  The [Contractor] has also made no 
showing that it will be able to retain counsel and be prepared for trial by May 
24, 2011, as required by the Court’s Scheduling Order.
 
5.    
If 
trial cannot be held on May 24, 2011, it is likely that the next available 
opening on the Court’s calendar will be a year or more later.  Requiring the [Owner] to wait that long 
for a trial because the [Contractor] is not able to honor the obligation placed 
upon it in the Scheduling Order would be unfairly detrimental to the 
[Owner].  
 
. 
. . .
 
IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
[Contractor’s] claims are dismissed with prejudice.  
 
IT 
IS[] FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
judgment be entered in favor of the [Owner] on its Counterclaim, and that, given 
the [Contractor’s] inability to rebut the same at tr[ia]l in accordance with the 
Scheduling Order herein, the . . . allegations in the [Owner’s] Counterclaim are 
accepted by the Court[.]   

[¶23]   Again, Contractor does not provide 
a transcript or a statement of the evidence presented at the sanctions hearing 
to support its position that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing the sanctions.  Faced with 
a similar situation in Terry, 10 P.3d  
at 558, we stated:  “As this 
evidence is unavailable, we must assume the trial court conducted itself in a 
reasonable and rational manner.”   
Here, it is clear Contractor did not comply with the district court’s 
order to have substitute counsel in place by the time of the pretrial 
conference.  Once the district court 
granted its attorney’s motion to withdraw, Contractor was unrepresented.  Given Contractor could not proceed pro se, it was unprepared to prosecute 
its own claims or defend against Owner’s counterclaims.  We acknowledge that the sanctions 
imposed here—dismissal of the primary suit and granting judgment in favor of 
Owner on its counterclaims—were harsh and, in general, are not favored.  Nevertheless, applying our precedent 
which gives a court authority to enforce its orders and requires that we accept 
the district court’s rationale when there is no evidence for us to review, we 
cannot conclude under the circumstances here that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing the sanctions. 
 
[¶24]   Contractor also fails to establish 
the district court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the 
sanctions.  The district court’s 
order explained:
 
1.    
This 
Court advised [Contractor] to secure new counsel prior [to] the pretrial 
conference scheduled for April 19, 2011.
 
2.    
[Contractor] 
failed to do so and, as a result, was not prepared to go forward with the trial 
commencing May 24, 2011, in violation of this Court’s scheduling 
order.
 
3.    
If 
[Contractor] could have been ready to proceed to trial at the scheduled time, 
then it should have made arrangements before the date of the pretrial conference 
as ordered by this Court – not after.
 
4.    
[Contractor’s] 
conduct in this matter has had detrimental consequences for both the [Owner] and 
this Court.
 
5.    
The 
trial date set to commence on May 24, 2011, has now been 
released.
 
6.    
Even 
if this Court were inclined to reset this matter, such would not likely occur 
for a year or more later.
 
7.    
This 
significant delay is unfairly detrimental to [Owner].
 
IT 
IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the [Contractor’s] Motion to set Aside Sanctions is hereby 
DENIED.
 
[¶25]   Contractor claims the district 
court should have set aside the sanctions because its new law firm entered an 
appearance three days after the case was dismissed and stated that it would be 
ready to try the case on the date originally set for trial.  While Contractor may have been prepared 
to try the case and, consequently, ultimately comply with the scheduling order, 
the fact remains that it violated the district court’s order to have substitute 
counsel in place by the pretrial conference.  By the time Contractor’s new counsel 
entered an appearance, the trial date had apparently already been released and 
there was no available date for a year or more.  Given the lack of record and the 
significant discretion we accord a district court to manage its docket 
for the purposes of preventing undue delay, we cannot 
say the district court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the 
sanctions.  

 
            
3.  
Premature Notice of 
Appeal/District Court Jurisdiction
 
[¶26]   In its third and fourth issues, 
Contractor challenges the district court’s declaration that its first notice of 
appeal was premature and claims the court did not have jurisdiction to determine 
Owner’s damages after Contractor filed its notice of appeal.  Both of these issues depend upon a 
determination of when a final appealable order was entered.  The question of whether an order is 
appealable involves the jurisdiction of this Court and is, therefore, subject to 
de novo review.  Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶ 10, 187 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2008).  W.R.A.P. 
1.05 defines an appealable order as:
 
(a) 
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; or
 
(b) 
An order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding; 
or
 
(c) 
An order made upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 
or
 
(d) 
An order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds 
stated in Rule 
59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; 
if an appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final and in 
effect for the purposes of appeal by another party; or
 
(e) 
Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts 
which:
 
            
(1) Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or 
refuse to dissolve or modify injunctions; or
 
            
(2) Appoint receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to 
take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other 
disposition of property.
 
[¶27]   In Public Serv. Comm’n v. Lower Valley Power 
and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980), we stated that an appealable 
order is “a judgment or order which determines the merits of the controversy and 
leaves nothing for future consideration.”  
This is consistent with W.R.A.P. 1.05(a)’s definition of an appealable 
order as one which affects a substantial right and effectively determines the 
action.  The district court’s 
sanctions order specifically stated that a hearing would be set in the future to 
determine Owner’s damages on its counterclaims.  Thus, the sanctions order did not 
finally determine the merits of the controversy.  In addition, the sanctions order was not 
made in a special proceeding, upon a summary application after judgment, or 
under W.R.C.P. 59 and, accordingly, did not fit the definition of an appealable 
order under W.R.A.P. 1.05 (b) through (d).  
There is, likewise, no argument that the sanctions order was an 
appealable interlocutory order under subsection (e).  As such, the sanctions order was not 
appealable, and the district court had the right and responsibility to decide 
the damages issue to conclude the matter.  
The final appealable order in the district court proceeding was the 
judgment entered on September 19, 2011.  

 
[¶28]   We note, however, Contractor’s 
position was not adversely affected by its early filing of the first notice of 
appeal.  W.R.A.P. 2.04 states “[a] 
notice of appeal 
filed prematurely shall be treated as though filed on the same day as entry of 
the appealable order, provided it complies with Rule 
2.07(a).”  Once the final judgment was entered in 
September 2011, the first notice of appeal became operative and Contractor 
properly filed a second notice of appeal to include the final judgment as one of 
the orders being appealed.2     
 
            
4.         
Statement of the 
Evidence
 
[¶29]   After Contractor filed its first 
notice of appeal, it presented a statement of the evidence to the district court 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03 because the various hearings had not been 
reported.  Owner objected to 
Contractor’s statement as including information and arguments not discussed at 
the hearings.  After entering 
judgment on the parties’ damages stipulation, the district court informed 
Contractor that it had ten days to file a supplement to its statement of the 
evidence and/or request a hearing.  
Contractor did not submit any additional information, and the district 
court entered an order striking Contractor’s  statement of the evidence, 
stating:
 
            
3.         
[Contractor’s] Statement of the Evidence o[r] Proceedings filed on 
June 27, 2011 does not accurately reflect the unreported hearings in this matter 
and improperly attempts to establish an evidentiary record that was not 
presented to the trial court.
 
            
4.         
The Court’s orders accurately reflect the status of the proceedings and 
record in this matter.
 
[¶30]   W.R.A.P. 3.03 
states:
 
            
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was 
made, or if a transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of 
the evidence or proceedings from the best available means including appellant’s 
recollection. The statement shall be filed and served on appellee within 35 days 
of the filing of the notice of appeal. Appellee may file and serve objections or 
propose amendments within 15 days after service. The trial court shall, within 
10 days, enter its order settling and approving the statement of evidence, which 
shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal.
 
“It 
is within the district court’s discretion whether to approve a statement 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.”  Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 444 
(Wyo. 1995).  Thus, we review the 
district court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  
 
[¶31]   The purpose of the W.R.A.P. 3.03 
procedure is to provide an accurate 
record of the evidence presented in the district court.  White v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners 
Assoc., Inc., 2006 WY 2, ¶ 8, 125 P.3d 1019, 1021 (Wyo. 2006).  To that end, Rule 3.03 sets out a 
process whereby the appellant submits a statement of the evidence, the opposing 
party objects or proposes amendments, and the district court settles and 
approves the statement.  In TOC v. TND, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 3, n. 1, 46 P.3d 863, 867, n. 1 (Wyo. 2002), we stated “W.R.A.P. 3.03 clearly requires trial 
court approval of a statement before it can properly be considered settled and 
become part of the record.”  

 
[¶32]   The district court determined that 
Contractor’s statement of the evidence did not accurately reflect the unreported 
hearings.  Its orders which were 
already part of the record recounted the status of the proceedings.  The determination that Contractor’s 
statement of the evidence was not accurate fell within the district court’s 
discretion and Contractor has not demonstrated the court abused its discretion 
by refusing to accept a statement that it found did not accurately reflect the 
evidence produced.  We have said 
that the district court’s refusal to settle the record “'insofar as [it] did not 
remember the matters suggested . . . is conclusive.’”  Jacobs, 895 P.2d  at 444, quoting Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 1097 
(Wyo. 1986).  The district court did 
not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept Contractor’s statement of the 
evidence and, instead, relying on its orders to establish the record on appeal 
in this case.  

 
[¶33]   Affirmed.  
 
FOOTNOTES
1URDC 
101(b) states:  “Corporations and unincorporated associations (other than 
partnerships and individual proprietorships) may appear only through an attorney 
licensed to practice in Wyoming.”  
Contractor is a limited liability company.  Although Rule 101(b) does not 
specifically state that it applies to limited liability companies, no issue is 
raised with regard to the district court’s ruling that Contractor had to be 
represented by an attorney.  

 
 
2Given our determination that the final order was the judgment entered in 
September 2011, we do not need to address Owner’s claim that Contractor’s motion 
to set aside sanctions did not toll the time for filing the first notice of 
appeal.  See, e.g., Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶¶ 5-9, 
125 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wyo. 2006).