Title: Griffin v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates LTD.

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47703 
 
MARY CLARE GRIFFIN, individual, and as 
parent and guardian of her minor child, G.G; and 
G.G., a minor child, by and through his parent 
and guardian, Mary Clare Griffin, 
 
     Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
STE. MICHELLE WINE ESTATES LTD., a 
Washington corporation; MARCHESI 
ANTINORI S.R.L., a foreign societa 
responsabilita limitata; ZIGNANO VETRO 
S.P.A., a foreign societa per azioni, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
ALBERTSON'S LLC, a Delaware limited liability 
company; S & C IMPORTERS AND 
DISTRIBUTORS, INC., dba S&C WINES, an 
Idaho corporation; and DOES I through X, 
 
     Defendants. 
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Boise, February 2021 Term 
 
Substitute Opinion filed: July 19, 
2021 
 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION.   THE 
COURT’S PRIOR OPINION 
DATED APRIL 14, 2021, IS 
HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Blaine County. Ned C. Williamson, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded 
in part. 
 
 
Powers Farley, PC, Boise, for Appellants. Donald Farley argued. 
 
DLA Piper LLP (US), Seattle, for Respondents Ste. Michelle Wine Estates LTD and 
Marchesi Antinori S.R.L. Anthony Todaro argued. 
 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, Boise, for Respondent Zignano Vetro S.P.A. Brendan T.  
Fitzpatrick argued.  
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
2 
MOELLER, Justice. 
 
This case, involving international parties and addressing fundamental questions of 
jurisdictional law, stems from an unfortunate kitchen accident. Mary Clare Griffin purchased a 
bottle of Italian wine, which broke in her hands as she attempted to open it, causing substantial 
injuries. Griffin and her son,1 a minor who witnessed the event, brought a product liability suit 
against Zignago Vetro S.P.A. (Zignago), the Italian manufacturer of the wine bottle; Marchesi 
Antinori SRL (Antinori), the Italian wine company that purchased the bottle from Zignago, filled 
it with wine, and exported it to the United States; Chateau Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, Ltd. (Ste. 
Michelle), the United States importer; S & C Importers and Distributors, Inc. (S&C), the Idaho 
distributor who purchased the bottle from Ste. Michelle; and, Albertson’s LLC (Albertson’s), the 
retailer that sold the bottle to Griffin.  
Zignago successfully moved the district court to dismiss Griffin’s complaint based on a 
lack of personal jurisdiction. Griffin appeals the district court’s decision, asking this Court to 
apply the personal jurisdiction framework established by the United States Supreme Court in 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Zignago asserts that the 
district court did not err by applying the stricter test that the United States Supreme Court offered 
in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) 
(plurality). Griffin also appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Antinori 
and Ste. Michelle on the grounds that Griffin failed to meet her burden to show a prima facie 
case for a product liability claim. Additionally, Griffin appeals several adverse discovery rulings. 
S&C and Albertson’s are not parties to this appeal.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background  
On October 5, 2017, Mary Clare Griffin purchased a 2011 Villa Antinori Chianti 
Classico D.O.C.G. Riserva bottle of wine (hereinafter “the bottle”) from Albertson’s grocery 
store in Hailey, Idaho. Griffin is a professional chef who provides cooking services to individuals 
and entities in Idaho. She purchased the wine to use in making tomato sauce for her clients. The 
day after purchasing the bottle, Griffin used a corkscrew to open it. For purposes of the appeal, it 
is undisputed that a defect in the neck of the bottle caused it to fracture, break, and severely 
injure Griffin’s left hand when she attempted to open it.  
                                                 
1 For ease of reference, Griffin will be referred to in the singular throughout this opinion. 
 
3 
Zignago manufactured the glass bottle that caused injury to Griffin. Zignago is a foreign 
limited liability company that operates in Italy, but also engages in international trade. Zignago 
sold many of its manufactured bottles to Antinori. Antinori is an Italian wine company that 
produces a variety of wines, including a product known as “Villa Antinori Chianti Classico 
Riserva.” From 2008 to June 30, 2018, Antinori purchased over 92 million wine bottles from 
Zignago. During the same time period, Antinori exported over 43 million bottles of wine to the 
United States. Since 2013, Ste. Michelle, acting as an exporter, has shipped 1,308 bottles of Villa 
Antinori Chianti Classico Riserva to various Idaho distributors, in bottles manufactured by 
Zignago and filled by Antinori. One of those distributors, S&C, sold 138 bottles of Villa Antinori 
Chianti Classico Riserva to Idaho customers and consumers between January 1, 2013, and 
August 31, 2018. One of those customers was Albertson’s. From October of 2015 to September 
of 2018, Albertson’s sold 289 bottles of Villa Antinori Chianti Classico Riserva wine.  
Antinori and Zignago have an agreement for the supply of the wine bottles. Their 
agreement discusses the details of the relationship and the product to be purchased. Before 
entering the agreement, Zignago acknowledges it discussed the markets in which Antinori 
operates with Antinori. The agreement requires each bottle to have a special label for tracing. 
Antinori confirmed the bottle that caused Griffin’s injuries was manufactured by Zignago.  
Zignago maintains a website that is accessible in Idaho. The website shows Zignago’s 
products and specifications, including a bottle identical to the one at issue in this case. However, 
the website does not direct advertisements to the United States or Idaho. Individuals cannot 
purchase products from the website and no products have been directly sold from the website. 
Those who visit the website do not have to provide personal information. 
B. Procedural History  
Griffin’s complaint alleged seven causes of action: (1) strict liability, (2) negligent 
design, (3) negligent manufacture, (4) failure to warn, (5) negligence, (6) breach of express 
warranty, and (7) breach of implied warranty. Griffin alleged that Zignago and Antinori 
“designed, produced, manufactured, bottled, assembled, packaged, sold, shipped, and/or caused 
to be imported into the United States of America . . . a bottle of wine known as and labeled Villa 
Antinori Chianti Classico D.O.C.G. Riserva 2011.” Griffin alleged that Ste. Michelle imported 
the bottle to the United States, which was later sold to S&C and then to Albertson’s, which sold 
the bottle to Griffin. Griffin further alleged that the defect in the bottle was caused by the design, 
 
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manufacture, or filling of the bottle and was present at the time the bottle left Zignago’s or 
Antinori’s possession. Griffin complained that the defect in the bottle caused her injury, resulting 
in severe and permanent damage. In order to satisfy personal jurisdiction, Griffin alleged that 
Zignago and Antinori placed the bottle within the stream of commerce and knew or should have 
known that the bottle would reach Griffin, or a similarly situated individual, in Idaho.  
Zignago made a special appearance to contest the district court’s personal jurisdiction on 
May 23, 2018. Zignago moved the district court to quash Griffin’s service and/or dismiss the 
action under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.2 Griffin 
opposed Zignago’s motion and requested the district court to stay the hearing on Zignago’s 
motion to dismiss in order to allow Griffin to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Griffin also 
requested to depose Zignago’s Chief Financial Officer, Roberto Celot, in Idaho. Griffin asserted 
that because Celot submitted an affidavit with Zignago’s motion to dismiss that stated, “I am 
submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Idaho as it relates to this declaration,” that 
Celot submitted to Idaho’s jurisdiction and Griffin should be able to depose him.  
The district court denied Griffin’s request to depose Celot in Idaho. It reasoned that Celot 
filed a declaration and made a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction – a reasonable 
and common action for a foreign individual or company. However, it would be unreasonable to 
compel the declarant to be deposed in the jurisdiction before the district court determined 
whether it had personal jurisdiction. The district court further rejected Griffin’s argument that 
Celot’s language in his declaration fully submitted him to jurisdiction in Idaho; the statement in 
the affidavit was only made to indicate that Celot was submitting to jurisdiction as it related to 
the special appearance.  
On October 22, 2018, the district court issued a written decision on Griffin’s motion to 
compel discovery and granted Griffin’s motion to stay Zignago’s hearing on its motion to 
dismiss. In order to determine the limitations of discovery, the district court conducted a 
preliminary analysis on personal jurisdiction over Zignago. In its motion, Zignago did not 
contend that its actions fell outside the reach of Idaho’s long-arm statute. Instead, Zignago 
focused on the other aspect of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it was against the constitutional 
standards of due process to exercise personal jurisdiction over it.  
                                                 
2 Zignago moved for dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (4), and (5); however, only the 
district court’s ruling regarding Rule 12(b)(2) (“lack of personal jurisdiction”) has been raised on appeal.  
 
5 
The district court reviewed the history of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, 
commencing with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and continuing through Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, (1945), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186 (1977), World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), Asahi Metal 
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct. of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987), and, J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). The district court noted that World-
Wide Volkswagen employed the “stream of commerce” test, which allowed personal jurisdiction 
to be exercised when a defendant places a product within the stream of commerce with an 
awareness that the product would be sold in the forum state. On the other hand, the district court 
observed that the plurality in Asahi pushed for a stricter constitutional test, known as the “stream 
of commerce plus” test, which required a defendant to purposefully direct actions at the forum 
state in order to be haled into court there, rather than merely placing a product into the stream of 
commerce.  
The district court also correctly noted that Idaho employs the “narrowest grounds 
analysis” for interpreting U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which is, “ ‘[w]hen a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in 
the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ ” State v. Wass, 162 Idaho 361, 366, 396 P.3d 1243, 
1248 (2017) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Since no Idaho 
appellate court had previously performed a narrowest-grounds analysis on either Asahi or J. 
McIntyre, the district court turned to Colorado, which performed a narrowest-grounds analysis 
on Asahi and J. McIntyre in Align Corp. Ltd. v. Allister Mark Boustred, 421 P.3d 163 (Colo. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 2623 (2018). Colorado employs the same narrowest grounds 
analysis as Idaho and uses the same two-part test for personal jurisdiction: whether the 
defendant’s conduct falls within the State’s long-arm statute and whether exercising jurisdiction 
does not violate the defendant’s constitutional due process rights. Align, 421 P.3d at 167, 170.  
Although the Colorado Supreme Court in Align concluded that the majority opinion in 
World-Wide Volkswagen represented the narrowest grounds of the concurrences in Asahi and J. 
McIntyre, the district court rejected this approach. Instead, it reasoned:  
Despite the narrowest grounds analysis by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Align, this Court believes the “stream of commerce plus” test is the appropriate 
test to apply in a specific jurisdiction case. Admittedly, the Idaho Supreme Court 
 
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observed that personal jurisdiction shall be liberally construed (Doggett at 31, 454 
P.2d at 68) and found that personal jurisdiction may be based on a singular act 
(see e.g., Doggett, 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 and Duignan, 98 Idaho 134, 559 P.2d 
750). But, these Idaho Supreme Court decisions preceded World-Wide 
Volkswagen.  
At the end of the day, the federal evolution towards a stricter personal 
jurisdiction standard, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in J. McIntyre and the 
requirements of additional acts in Schneider3 and Profits Plus4 tip the scale in 
favor of the “stream of commerce plus” test. . . . In the concurrence in J. McIntyre 
(which represents the narrowest grounds of the Asahi decision), Justice Breyer 
wrote ‘[n]one of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if 
accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.’ J. McIntyre 
at 887, 131 S.Ct. at 2791. Schneider and Profits Plus also demonstrate a singular 
act is not sufficient for personal jurisdiction. Profits Plus held that a contract 
alone was not enough to establish personal jurisdiction and instead required 
another act(s) such as ‘prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the 
terms of the contract, and the parties’ actual course of dealing.’ Id. at 884, 332 
P.3d at 796. These additional acts are similar to acts which can establish specific 
personal jurisdiction, such as designing, advertising, marketing, establishing 
channels for advice to customers, attendance at trade shows, maintenance of an 
office, employing employees and/or creating, controlling or employing a 
distribution system. J. McIntyre at 890, 131 S.Ct. 2792; Align Corporation 
Limited at 169. For these reasons, the Court concludes that specific personal 
jurisdiction can be established in this case by a “stream of commerce plus” test.  
The district court then ordered Zignago to comply with certain jurisdictional discovery requests 
by Griffin, consistent with conducting a “stream of commerce plus” analysis, and granted 
Griffin’s request to stay Zignago’s motion to dismiss pending discovery. 
After the district court permitted almost one year for additional jurisdictional discovery, it 
rendered its decision regarding Zignago’s motion to dismiss on February 4, 2019. In its analysis, 
the district court addressed the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under the 
“stream of commerce plus” test. The district court determined that Zignago, other than selling its 
bottles to a company that did business in the United States, directed no additional acts toward 
Idaho as required by the “stream of commerce plus” test. It reasoned, that although Zignago is a 
large manufacturer of bottles, Zignago did not design its bottles for the Idaho market, advertise 
in Idaho, establish channels for providing regular advice to Idaho consumers, employ distributors 
as sales agents in Idaho, operate an office in Idaho, own or lease property in Idaho, or send 
                                                 
3 Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co., Inc., 104 Idaho 210, 657 P.2d 1078 (1983).  
4 Profits Plus Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 332 P.3d 785 (2014).  
 
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employees to Idaho for any reason. The district court also rejected Griffin’s argument that 
Zignago’s web presence established minimum contacts to satisfy the “stream of commerce plus” 
standard. The district court rationalized that Zignago’s website was a mere web presence and it 
was passive; it did nothing to encourage residents of Idaho to use it and it was not interactive 
with users because the website did not exchange any personal information with visitors. The 
website simply provided information about Zignago’s products, and a passive website is 
insufficient to satisfy personal jurisdiction. Therefore, because Zignago merely placed bottles 
into the stream of commerce, had a passive website, and did not take an additional targeted step 
directed at Idaho, the district court held that Griffin had not established minimum contacts to 
satisfy the “stream of commerce plus” test. The district court granted Zignago’s motion to 
dismiss because Idaho could not assert personal jurisdiction over Zignago.  
Griffin continued to exchange discovery with Antinori and Ste. Michelle. Griffin filed her 
first set of discovery requests with Antinori and Ste. Michelle on May 15, 2018, her second set of 
requests on July 10, 2018, her third set of requests on August 13, 2018, and then finally, Griffin 
filed a fourth set of requests on June 28, 2019. On July 22, 2019, Antinori and Ste. Michelle filed 
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Griffin’s evidence of liability was speculative and 
Griffin could not establish causation to maintain a product liability claim. Griffin opposed the 
motion. Griffin argued that in order to establish a prima facie case of product liability, all she 
had to show was: (1) injury; (2) the product was defective; and, (3) the defect existed when it left 
the control of the manufacturer. Farmer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 746-47, 553 P.2d 
1306, 1310-11 (1976). However, because direct evidence in product liability cases is rare, Griffin 
asserted that she could also establish a prima facie case through circumstantial evidence of a 
defect. This alternative theory required Griffin to show: (1) malfunction of the product; (2) lack 
of evidence of abnormal use; and (3) proof excluding the possibility of other reasonable causes. 
Id. at 747, 553 P.2d 1311.  
Griffin relied on an expert opinion from Jim Goldman to show there was a defect and to 
eliminate other reasonable causes.5 Goldman is a glass packaging engineer and certified packing 
professional. He prepared a report centered on a fracture analysis of the bottle, and noted his 
experience as a packing engineer, his experience in glass fracture, and his experience in supply 
                                                 
5 Griffin retained another expert, Jim Del Ciello, but Griffin did not submit his report at summary judgment and the 
district court explicitly noted that it was not considered. Therefore, we will not consider it either.  
 
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chain development and distribution. Goldman based his conclusions on a “more likely than not” 
standard. Goldman concluded that Griffin opened the bottle properly and the corkscrew she used 
was in good working condition. He opined that the cause of the malfunction was a pre-existing 
“Hertzian Conoid,” or in other words, cone-shaped damage to brittle material (like glass) caused 
by “contact impact stress to the outside top corner of the finish by a hard, blunt object.” Potential 
objects that could cause this type of damage could include “equipment in the glass plant or 
winery, shipping equipment, or another bottle during shelf restocking.” However, Goldman 
could not pinpoint the exact cause of the Hertzian Conoid. He opined that “S&C Wine’s practice 
of distributing wine in less-than-[full] case quantities and their handling methods for less-than-
[full] case orders created a hazardous condition.” He also opined that Albertson’s method for 
restocking wine was “abusive.” Goldman further speculated, “Antinori Filling Line Damage a 
Possibility.” Goldman noted multiple places at the Antinori facility that could cause a Hertzian 
Conoid. First, Goldman identified a small clearance between the top of the bottles and metal in 
“the Maspack Casepacker which collects filled, vertical bottles from a conveyor and places them 
horizontally into the corrugated box.” Second, Goldman determined,  
[t]here are also four times in the filling video [bottle rinser, pre-fill, filler, post-
fill] that the top of the bottle is contacted, and a stainless steel tube is inserted 
through the finish bore. If misadjusted, damaged, or poorly maintained, each of 
these points of contact have the potential to damage the top of the finish. 
(Emphasis added). However, Goldman never noted any evidence that Antinori’s bottling 
machinery appeared to be “misadjusted, damaged, or poorly maintained.” 
The district court heard argument from the parties regarding summary judgment on 
August 19, 2019, and took the matter under advisement. On September 30, 2019, over one month 
after the district court heard argument from the parties regarding summary judgment and over 
two months after Antinori and Ste. Michelle filed their motion for summary judgment, Griffin 
moved the district court to compel discovery regarding Antinori and Ste. Michelle before 
deciding the motion for summary judgment. Griffin was not satisfied with Antinori and Ste. 
Michelle’s responses to her requests, claiming that they did not fully disclose the information 
Griffin sought: photographs and chain of custody after the bottle broke, similar events of bottle 
breakages, communications between defendants regarding the bottle, and any demands for 
indemnity between the defendants. Griffin did not raise these issues in her response brief to 
 
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summary judgment or at oral argument. Griffin noticed the motion to be heard on October 15, 
2019.  
On October 8, 2019, the district court issued its decision on Antinori and Ste. Michelle’s 
motion for summary judgment. The district court initially outlined that to maintain a product 
liability cause of action, Griffin had to meet a three part test: “1) injury; 2) that the injury was 
caused by a defect; and 3) that the defect existed at the time of the product left the control of the 
manufacturer.” The district court focused on the third element and acknowledged that it was 
undisputed that the bottle was defective, and it caused injury.  
To establish evidence on the third element, Griffin relied on her own experience opening 
wine bottles, along with the Goldman’s expert testimony and report. The district court found 
Goldman’s opinion to be insufficient to meet the third element:  
 
Mr. Goldman asserts that the Maspack Casepacker and the four insertions 
of a stainless steel tube in the Bottle create an opportunity to cause a Hertzian 
Conoid defect. For the four processes involving the insertion of a stainless steel 
tube into a wine bottle, Mr. Goldman predicates his opinion on the existence of 
improper adjustment, damage or poor maintenance of the equipment used during 
the process. In other words, to make the inference that these processes potentially 
caused the defect to the Bottle, it is necessary to prove the equipment was 
improperly adjusted, damaged or maintained. The Court notes that Mr. Goldman 
only discusses adjustment, damage or maintenance of the equipment involving the 
bottle rinser, pre-fill, fill and post-fill, not involving the Maspack Casepacker. 
Despite the ‘small clearance between glass and metal’ identified in the photo of 
the Maspack Casepacker, the Court cannot find the ‘small clearance’ to be a cause 
of Hertzian Conoid defect. Like the four processes involving the insertion of the 
stainless steel tube, there would have to be evidence that the Maspack Casepacker 
is improperly adjusted, damaged or maintained to establish sufficient evidence of 
the cause of the defect. Such evidence is not in the record and therefore any 
potential or possible inference cannot be reasonably made thereafter.  
 
The district court, therefore, granted Antinori’s and Ste. Michelle’s motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed Griffin’s suit. The district court did not address Griffin’s outstanding 
motion to compel discovery after dismissal.  
 
Griffin now appeals and argues the district court erred by: (1) granting Zignago’s motion 
to dismiss by applying the “stream of commerce plus” test from Asahi; (2) denying Griffin’s 
motion to compel the deposition of Celot; (3) granting Antinori’s and Ste. Michelle’s motion for 
summary judgment; and, (4) failing to consider Griffin’s motion to compel discovery before 
rendering a decision on Antinori’s and Ste. Michelle’s motion for summary judgment.  
 
10 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing Zignago’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we apply the 
same standard as when reviewing appeals from summary judgment orders: “we construe the 
evidence presented to the district court in favor of the party opposing the order and accord that 
party the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drawn.” Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 
Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024, 1026 (2005). This Court reviews freely the determination of 
whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Id.  
 Concerning Antinori’s and Ste. Michelle’s motion for summary judgment, “[t]his Court 
exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment and the ‘standard of review is the 
same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.’ ” 
AED, Inc. v. KDC Invest, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013) (quoting 
Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 376 
(2012)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). 
A material fact exists when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party 
based on the evidence presented. Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 220, 384 P.3d 975, 984 
(2016). “This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary judgment and draws any reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party’s favor.” 
Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953, (2003).    
In regards to the disputed discovering rulings, a district court enjoys broad discretion in 
determining whether to grant a motion to compel, and such decisions will only be reversed by 
this Court when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 
Idaho 697, 700-01, 116 P.3d 27, 30-31 (2005). To determine whether the district court abused its 
discretion, this Court applies a four-prong test: whether the trial court “(1) correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) 
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 867, 
421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The district court erred in dismissing Griffin’s claims against Zignago for lack of 
personal jurisdiction by applying the “stream of commerce plus” test from Asahi. 
 
11 
The “stream of commerce” test from World-Wide Volkswagen remains the standard 
in Idaho. 
Griffin contends the district court erred by first applying the “stream of commerce plus” 
test, and by granting Zignago’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. “There are 
two requirements for an Idaho court to properly exercise jurisdiction over non-resident 
defendants: (1) the non-resident’s actions must fall within the scope of Idaho’s long-arm statute; 
and (2) jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant must not violate the defendant’s due process 
rights.” Profits Plus, 156 Idaho at 881, 332 P.3d at 793. Identical to the proceedings below, 
Zignago does not contend on appeal that its actions fall outside Idaho’s long-arm statute. See I.C. 
§ 5-514. Rather, Zignago focuses its argument on the second prong—that the exercise of 
jurisdiction over it by an Idaho court would violate its due process rights. Therefore, our analysis 
is limited to whether Zignago’s contacts with Idaho were sufficient, under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to permit the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in this case.  
1. Personal jurisdiction framework.  
In International Shoe, the seminal case for modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, 
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether, within the limitations of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” a Delaware corporation had “by its activities 
in the State of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that state . . .” 
326 U.S. at 311. The Supreme Court recognized two categories of personal jurisdiction: specific 
jurisdiction—based on “activities in a state”—and general jurisdiction—based on “presence in 
the state.” 326 U.S. at 317-18.  Regarding specific jurisdiction, the Court held that a State may 
exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant “[has] certain 
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 316 (citation omitted). The Court 
created a two-prong test for specific jurisdiction: (1) the out-of-state defendant must have 
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must be fair. Id. 
The Court further elaborated on “minimum contacts,” explaining that they arise “when the 
activities of the corporation [in the forum] have not only been continuous and systematic, but 
also give rise to the liabilities sued on.” Id. at 317. Yet, the Court limited the reach of specific 
jurisdiction, recognizing that “the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of 
 
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single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to 
subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.” Id.  
On the other hand, the Court in International Shoe recognized that general jurisdiction 
allows a State to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even on non-related issues, 
because the out-of-state defendant’s contacts with the forum are so substantial. Id. “[T]here [are] 
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.” Id. at 318. General jurisdiction has largely remained unchanged 
since International Shoe, while specific jurisdiction has been at the center of many United States 
Supreme Court decisions.6 Only specific jurisdiction is at issue here.  
In Hanson v. Denckla, the United States Supreme Court identified an essential 
component of the minimum contact analysis: purposeful availment. 357 U.S. 235, 251-54 
(1958). In denying specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the Court held that the 
minimum contacts with the forum state cannot be “unilateral” on the part of the plaintiff; rather, 
the defendant must reach out to the forum in some way. Id. at 253. “[I]t is essential in each case 
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.” Id. This is consistent with the observation made thirteen years earlier in International 
Shoe:  
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting 
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that 
state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as 
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, 
a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce 
them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue. 
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
                                                 
6 This distinction between general and specific jurisdiction remains vital today. See e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927 (2011) (“Flow of a manufacturer's products into the forum, we have 
explained, may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction. But ties serving to bolster the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over 
a defendant. See, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203, 
n. 5 (C.A.D.C.1981) (defendants' marketing arrangements, although “adequate to permit litigation of claims relating 
to [their] introduction of ... wine into the United States stream of commerce, ... would not be adequate to support 
general, ‘all purpose’ adjudicatory authority.”) (some internal citations omitted). 
 
 
 
13 
In addition to purposeful availment, the principle of minimum contacts also requires that 
it be foreseeable that the defendant will be haled into court in the forum state due to its activities 
within the state. For example, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a magazine publisher, which had “continuously and deliberately exploit[ed] the New 
Hampshire market, [] must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action 
based on the contents of its magazine.” 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984). The Court focused on the 
foreseeability of the potential harm and explained that such an outcome was proper because 
“[t]here is no unfairness in calling it to answer for the contents of that publication wherever a 
substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.” Id.  
The second prong of the due process analysis, as articulated by the Court in International 
Shoe, considers the fairness of a court exercising jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant. See 
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“maintenance of the suit [should] not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”) (citation omitted). The Court has identified the 
reasonableness, or “fairness” factors as: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the 
forum State; (3) plaintiff’s interests in obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest 
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and, (5) the shared interest of the 
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
571 U.S. 117, 139 n. 20 (2014). 
Therefore, under the Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court’s framework 
for courts analyzing a personal jurisdiction issue can be summarized as follows: a State may 
exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant “[has] certain 
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 
(citation omitted). When determining the sufficiency of the alleged “minimum contacts,” courts 
should first look to whether the defendant “purposefully availed” itself to the forum state. For 
example, whether “there [is] some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. Second, courts should determine whether it is 
foreseeable that the defendant would be haled into that forum state’s court. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 
781. The final determination a court should undertake is whether exercise of jurisdiction over the 
out-of-state defendant is fair. This consideration is guided by (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) 
 
14 
the interests of the forum State; (3) plaintiff’s interests in obtaining relief; (4) the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and, (5) the 
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n. 20.   
2. The birth of the “stream of commerce” doctrine. 
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court tackled a difficult question regarding minimum 
contacts and purposeful availment in World-Wide Volkswagen: the situation in which a company 
manufactures its product in State or Country A, sells the product to a party in State B by placing 
the product into “the stream of commerce,” and then the product ends up in State C and causes 
an injury there. World-Wide Volkswagen is the first of a trio of cases addressing this unique 
situation, which lies at the heart of this case.  
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Robinson family purchased an Audi vehicle from a 
dealership in New York and the following year moved to Arizona. 444 U.S. at 288. During the 
drive from New York to Arizona, the family’s car was rear-ended in Oklahoma causing a fire 
which resulted in severe injuries. Id. The Robinsons brought a product liability suit in Oklahoma, 
joining the manufacturer, its importer, the regional distributor, and the retailer, claiming a 
defective design and placement of the Audi’s gas tank. Id. Importantly, the appeal only 
concerned the regional distributor and the retailer, which specially appeared in the underlying 
action to contest personal jurisdiction. Id. The regional distributor was incorporated in New York 
and had its business office in New York, but it also distributed cars, parts, and accessories to 
retailers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Id. at 288-89. The retailer was incorporated 
in New York and had its principal place of business there. Id. at 289.  
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that a “forum State does not exceed its 
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that 
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be 
purchased by consumers in the forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. This 
became known as the “stream of commerce” test. Id. The Court reasoned:  
When a corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities with the forum State, it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, 
and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, 
passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing 
its connection with the State. Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or 
distributor . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of 
 
15 
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its 
product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those 
States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to 
its owners or others.  
 
Id. at 297 (emphasis added, internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court explained that 
the “stream of commerce” refers to the formal or informal distribution networks that a 
manufacturer uses to “serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States.” Id. 
at 297.  
In the Robinsons’ case, neither the distributor nor the retailer carried on any activity in 
Oklahoma. Id. at 295. They did not close any sales, perform any services, or solicit any business 
in Oklahoma. Id. While the Robinsons argued that vehicles are mobile by their very design and 
purpose and, therefore, it was foreseeable that the vehicle could end up in Oklahoma, the Court 
dismissed this argument, reasoning: 
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere 
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that 
the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he 
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. 
Id. at 297. In the Robinsons’ case, the vehicle happened to find its way into the forum state 
solely by the actions of the plaintiffs, rather than by the distributor and the retailer actively 
reaching out and “avail[ing] themselves of [any] of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma 
law.” Id. at 295. Therefore, the Court reversed the exercise of jurisdiction by the Oklahoma 
courts over the distributor and the retailer. World-Wide Volkswagen became a landmark decision, 
however, because the majority set forth what we now call the “stream of commerce” theory of 
jurisdiction, which provides a basis for courts to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
manufacturers consistent with the Due Process Clause. Id. at 297.  
3. Challenges to the “stream of commerce” doctrine. 
Just seven years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the “stream of 
commerce” theory in Asahi. Gary Zurcher brought suit after he lost control of his motorcycle and 
collided with a tractor, causing him substantial injuries and killing his wife, who was his 
passenger. 480 U.S. at 105. Zurcher filed suit in California alleging a defective rear tire, tube, 
and sealant. Id. at 106. He sued the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, which in turn filed a 
cross-complaint seeking indemnification from Asahi, the tube’s valve assembly manufacturer. 
 
16 
Id. Zurcher’s claims with the Taiwanese manufacturer were settled, leaving the manufacturer’s 
indemnity action against Asahi. Id.  
Asahi was a Japanese corporation that manufactured tire valve assemblies in Japan. Id. 
Asahi sold the assemblies to several manufacturers to use in finished tire tubes. Id. Asahi’s sales 
to the Taiwanese manufacturer in this case took place in Taiwan. Id. Over a five-year period, the 
Taiwanese manufacturer bought and incorporated 1.25 million valve assemblies from Asahi. Id. 
Approximately twenty percent of the Taiwanese manufacturer’s sales occurred in California. Id. 
Asahi contested personal jurisdiction in California. Id. at 106-07. The parties filed competing 
statements – Asahi stated that it never contemplated its sales of valve assemblies in Taiwan 
would subject it to suit in California; while the Taiwanese manufacturer stated that it informed 
Asahi, and believed Asahi to be fully aware, that the valve assemblies would be sold throughout 
the United States, including California. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the district 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi.  
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, none of the three opinions in Asahi 
garnered a majority vote. Justice O’Connor penned the plurality opinion for the Court and noted 
that since World-Wide Volkswagen, courts have taken two different approaches in its application. 
Id. at 110. First, some courts had applied the straight “stream of commerce” test from World-
Wide Volkswagen, allowing an exercise of personal jurisdiction on no more than a defendant’s 
action of placing the product in the stream of commerce, coupled with an awareness that the 
product would be sold in the forum State. Id. at 110-11. Other courts demanded more, requiring 
“the action of the defendant to be more purposefully directed at the forum State than the mere act 
of placing a product in the stream of commerce.” Id. at 110. The plurality endorsed the 
requirement for “more”; thus, what is now known as the “stream of commerce plus” test was 
born.7 Id. at 112. Justice O’Connor explained the rationale for adding an additional requirement 
to the existing “stream of commerce” test: 
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an 
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional 
conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in 
the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum 
State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing for 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the phrase, “stream of commerce plus” test, does not appear in Asahi. Its first use in a 
reported decision in this context may date back to 1990. See Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (D. 
Guam 1990) (“[T]his Court will refer to [the test] as the ‘stream-of-commerce plus’ test.”). 
 
17 
regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a 
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But a 
defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the 
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product 
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.  
 
Id. at 112. The plurality went further, reasoning that even if Asahi were aware that some of its 
valve assemblies would be sold in California – that would not be enough to establish Asahi’s 
purposeful availment to the California market. Id. This was because Asahi had no office, agents, 
employees, or property in California and it did not advertise or solicit business there, and it did 
not create or control the distribution system. Id. The plurality went on to analyze the “fairness” 
factors and concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would also offend the 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 113-16.  
 
Justice Brennan penned a concurrence in which he agreed that a consideration of the 
fairness factors led to the conclusion that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the 
Due Process Clause. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
Therefore, he concurred in the judgment of the Court. Id. However, he explicitly disavowed the 
plurality’s adoption of the “stream of commerce plus” test. Id. at 116-21. He noted that the 
“stream of commerce plus” test was a minority view among the Federal Courts of Appeals at the 
time and represented a marked retreat from World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. at 118. Justice Brennan 
saw no need for a requirement to show “additional conduct” directed toward the forum state. Id.  
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the 
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail 
sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is 
being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come 
as a surprise. . . . A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce 
benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State, 
and indirectly benefits from the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate 
commercial activity. These benefits accrue regardless of whether that participant 
directly conducts business in the forum State, or engages in additional conduct 
directed toward that State.  
 
Id. at 117.   
Almost twenty-five years after Asahi, the Court was again presented with a “stream of 
commerce” case in J. McIntyre. There, Robert Nicastro seriously injured his hand while using a 
metal-shearing machine manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 564 U.S. at 878. J. 
McIntyre was incorporated and operated in England, which is also where the machine was made. 
 
18 
Id. However, the accident occurred in New Jersey. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
determined that the New Jersey courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre 
because: (1) an independent company agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s machines in the United States; 
(2) J. McIntyre officials attended many conventions in various states, but never New Jersey; (3) 
four machines identical to the one that caused Nicastro’s injury ended up in New Jersey; (4) J. 
McIntyre held patents on its recycling technology in Europe and the United States; and, (5) the 
U.S. distributor “structured [its] advertising and sales efforts in accordance with J. McIntyre’s 
direction and guidance whenever possible, and that at least some of the machines were sold on 
consignment to the distributor.” Id. at 878-79 (internal quotes and citations omitted). On appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court, a plurality of the Court reversed the judgment of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court; however, once again, no opinion obtained a majority vote. Id. at 879.  
Justice Kennedy authored the plurality opinion, which endorsed the “stream of commerce 
plus” test articulated by Justice O’Connor in Asahi. Id. at 881-86.8 He described the principal 
inquiry as, “whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a 
sovereign. In other words, a defendant must ‘purposefully avail itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.’ ” Id. at 882. The plurality again supported the “stream of commerce plus” test, writing, 
“[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the 
defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the 
defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.” Id. The plurality 
applied the “stream of commerce plus” test to the facts at hand and concluded that J. McIntyre 
never purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market. Id. at 886. The plaintiff had failed to 
show any evidence that J. McIntyre purposefully directed any conduct toward New Jersey, even 
though it directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States generally. Id. Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice 
Thomas.  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment, but not the reasoning 
of the plurality. Id. at 887-93 (Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer opined that 
                                                 
8 Of note, Justice Kennedy never used the phrase “stream of commerce plus” in J. McIntyre. His plurality opinion, 
which expressly rejected the broad “stream of commerce” approach from World-Wide Volkswagen, required 
additional conduct purposefully directed at the forum. This is precisely what the “stream of commerce plus” test 
requires.  
 
19 
the same outcome could be reached merely by relying on precedent, such as World-Wide 
Volkswagen. He noted that the plurality did not need to “mak[e] broad pronouncements that 
refashion basic jurisdictional rules.” Id. at 890. Adhering to precedent, Justice Breyer noted that 
a single isolated sale was insufficient for asserting jurisdiction, and that precedent would resolve 
the case here. Id. Notably, Justice Breyer questioned the plurality’s strict jurisdictional rule 
requiring a defendant “to submit to the power of a sovereign” and to “have targeted the forum.” 
Id. He reasoned:  
But what do those standards mean when a company targets the world by selling 
products from its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of shipping the products 
directly, a company consigns the products through an intermediary (say, 
Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders? And what if the company 
markets its products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in 
a forum? Those issues have serious commercial consequences but are totally 
absent in this case. 
 
Id. at 890. Interestingly, some of the very same issues raised by Justice Breyer, which were 
absent in J. McIntyre, are present in the case at bar.  
4. The “stream of commerce” test remains the controlling precedent in Idaho.  
Since the confusing plurality opinions in Asahi and J. McIntyre, this Court has yet to 
analyze their precedential effect in Idaho.9 When examining plurality opinions, Idaho courts 
adhere to the “narrowest grounds” analysis. Again, that analysis provides, “ ‘[w]hen a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ ” Wass, 162 Idaho at 366, 396 P.3d 
at 1248 (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).   
As astutely noted below by the district court, the Colorado Supreme Court recently 
conducted an identical analysis in Align, 421 P.3d 163. There, a plaintiff brought suit in 
                                                 
9 This Court recently addressed personal jurisdiction issues in Profits Plus, 156 Idaho 873, 332 P.3d 785 (2014), and 
H20 Envtl. Inc. v. Proimtu MMI, LLC, 162 Idaho 368, 397 P.3d 398 (2017). However, neither case discussed the 
“stream of commerce” test, as both cases involved contracts. See Profits Plus, 156 Idaho at 884 (contract provided 
for ownership of Idaho company); H20 Envtl., 162 Idaho at 371 (contract provided that some essential services were 
to be performed in Idaho). On the other hand, this Court in Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, 93 Idaho 26, 
454 P.2d 63 (1969) and Duignan v. A.H. Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134, 559 P.2d 750 (1977) adopted a stream of 
commerce type rationale before World-Wide Volkswagen was decided. See Doggett, 93 Idaho at 31-32 (“In placing 
their goods in the flow of interstate commerce, the respondents must have had the reasonable expectation that such 
items would be shipped indiscriminately throughout the United States. If dangerously defective goods are placed in 
the interstate flow of commerce, those whose negligence created the defect should be prepared to defend themselves 
wherever injury should occur.”); Duignan, 98 Idaho at 138 (same).  
 
20 
Colorado against a foreign manufacturer when the manufacturer’s “rotor holder” failed and 
caused the plaintiff’s radio-controlled helicopter blade to strike the plaintiff in the eye. Id. After 
analyzing World-Wide Volkswagen and the plurality opinions in Asahi and J. McIntyre, the 
Colorado Supreme Court found World-Wide Volkswagen to be the controlling precedent and held 
that Colorado courts had specific personal jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer. Id. We 
reach the same conclusion as the Colorado Supreme Court in Align: that World-Wide 
Volkswagen is still controlling precedent.  
In Asahi, Justice O’Connor’s opinion attempted to transform the United States Supreme 
Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence from the World-Wide Volkswagen “stream of commerce” 
test into a more stringent “stream of commerce plus” test by adding the requirement that the 
defendant must have additional directed conduct with the forum state. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
However, this was a plurality opinion. Justice Brennan’s concurrence—joined by three other 
Justices—only concurred with the plurality on the “fairness” factors and in the judgment of the 
Court; otherwise, Justice Brennan relied on the framework of World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. at 
120-21. This left Justice Brennan’s view with the narrowest grounds, and thus World-Wide 
Volkswagen was not overturned but remained unaltered.  
Similarly, in J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy issued an opinion that attempted to alter 
World-Wide Volkswagen and add the requirement that the defendant must purposefully target the 
forum state—essentially a nuanced variation on the “stream of commerce plus” test. Id. at 879. 
However, again, this was a plurality opinion. It was Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the overall 
judgment that decided the case. Id. at 890. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, rejected the 
plurality’s new approach and instead opined that the case could be decided by relying on the 
Court’s precedential opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. at 890. His concurrence, similar to 
Justice Brennan’s in Asahi, is once again the narrowest grounds. Therefore, the “stream of 
commerce plus” test has never had the assent of the majority of the United States Supreme 
Court. Accordingly, World-Wide Volkswagen remains the precedential and controlling opinion 
when it comes to stream of commerce cases.  
Turning to the case at hand, the district court recognized that Idaho employs the 
narrowest grounds analysis and came to the same conclusion as the Court in Align. Yet, the 
district court did not adhere to the narrowest grounds analysis or World-Wide Volkswagen’s 
precedent. Instead, the district court stated that it “believes the ‘stream of commerce plus’ test is 
 
21 
the appropriate test to apply in a specific jurisdiction case.” In its decision, the district court 
noted that, “the requirements of additional acts in Schneider and Profits Plus tip the scale in 
favor of the ‘stream of commerce plus’ test.” As noted above, Profits Plus was a contract case, 
and did not deal with the “stream of commerce” jurisdictional theory.  
In Schneider, a widowed spouse brought suit against two Pennsylvania corporations, 
Cambria Corp. and Keystone Corp., after her husband’s death in a helicopter accident. 104 Idaho 
at 211, 657 P.3d at 1079. The malfunctioning helicopter was originally owned by Keystone, 
which then sold it to Cambria. Id. Cambria owned the helicopter for five years and employed 
Keystone to maintain it. Id. Then, Cambria sold the helicopter to another Pennsylvania 
corporation and that corporation then sold it to decedent’s employer.  Id. The Idaho Supreme 
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Cambria and Keystone. Id. at 212-215, 657 P.3d at 
1080-1083. Although the plaintiff argued the “stream of commerce” theory, neither corporation 
had any contacts with Idaho: they did not conduct activities here, they did not conduct any 
business here, and they did not have any offices here. Id. At one point Cambria merely owned 
the helicopter and sold it to another Pennsylvania corporation. Id. Keystone also owned the 
helicopter at one point and was employed to maintain it. Id. Keystone was not a manufacturer 
and did not place the helicopter into the stream of commerce as a manufacturer would do when it 
sells its product. As the Schneider court concluded: 
Under the rule of World-Wide Volkswagen, we cannot predicate jurisdiction on 
the fortuitous circumstance that a helicopter serviced in Pennsylvania by a 
Pennsylvania corporation for a Pennsylvania corporation happened to be 
purchased by an Idaho corporation and was involved in an accident which 
resulted in the death of an Idaho resident. 
Id. at 213–14, 657 P.2d at 1081–82. Keystone’s only connection with Idaho, as the forum state, 
was based on a single “fortuitous circumstance” that brought the helicopter to Idaho. There was 
no “purposeful availment” of Idaho’s markets and consumers, just a single product brought into 
Idaho by a customer through no effort or awareness of Keystone. Thus, we do not read Schneider 
as the district court did to require additional conduct directed towards Idaho. Rather, Schneider 
deals with a scenario where application of a straight “stream of commerce” analysis, without 
adding the Asahi “plus,” was sufficient to deny jurisdiction because the case concerned an 
isolated incident.  
 In the case at bar, the district court applied the “stream of commerce plus” test, opining 
that there is a “federal evolution towards [sic] a stricter personal jurisdiction standard . . . .” 
 
22 
However, in a case such as this, the proper determination for a trial court is not to predict where 
it believes the law is headed in the future, but to follow the law as it exists today.10 Based on the 
forgoing analysis, we conclude that we are bound by World-Wide Volkswagen, the reasoning in 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Asahi, and Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in J. 
McIntyre. Accordingly, the district court erred by applying the stricter “stream of commerce 
plus” test to Zignago’s motion to dismiss. 
5. Applying the “stream of commerce” test, exercising personal jurisdiction would not 
violate Zignago’s constitutional right to due process.  
To satisfy World-Wide Volkswagen’s test, Griffin must show that Zignago “deliver[ed] its 
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers in the forum State.” 444 U.S. at 297-98. An isolated occurrence, or a single sale of a 
product will not be sufficient. Id. at 297; J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
This theory was affirmed in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Asahi:  
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the 
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail 
sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is 
being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come 
as a surprise. 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J. concurring).  
                                                 
10 While the district court’s view of where the United States Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is 
heading may ultimately prove correct, it is by no means a certainty. A closer analysis suggests that the perceived 
inertia towards the “stream of commerce plus” test may have stalled, or even reversed course. The test was first 
suggested by Justice O’Connor in 1987 in Asahi. It is reasonable to conclude that many scholars believed that was 
where the law was heading after Asahi. However, almost twenty-five years later in J. McIntyre, there was still no 
majority support for the “stream of commerce plus” test. Also of note, the plurality who favored the “stream of 
commerce plus” test in J. McIntyre lost two of its votes (J. Kennedy and J. Scalia) while the concurrence that 
followed World-Wide Volkswagen is still intact (J. Breyer and J. Alito). Moreover, the dissent in J. McIntyre lost one 
vote (J. Ginsburg). If the J. McIntyre case were heard today, there would presumably be two votes for the plurality, 
two for the concurrence, and two for the dissent (not considering the three new justices – Justice Gorsuch, Justice 
Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett – who did not participate in the original J. McIntyre decision.) Only Justice Barrett 
has issued a reported opinion (during her tenure on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals) that addressed the “stream 
of commerce” issue. See J.S.T. Corp. v. Foxconn Interconnect Tech. Ltd., 965 F.3d 571 (2020). There, Justice 
Barrett applied the “stream of commerce” test from World-Wide Volkswagen, noting that it has yet to be overruled 
by the United States Supreme Court.  
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court cited World-Wide Volkswagen multiple times in its recent 
decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021). The Court, with eight justices 
concurring in the judgment (Justice Barrett did not participate), held that Montana had specific jurisdiction to hear a 
product liability claim. The Court noted: “[T]his Court has stated that specific jurisdiction attaches in cases identical 
to this one—when a company cultivates a market for a product in the forum State and the product malfunctions 
there.” Id. at 1019 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S. at 100). In short, rumors of World-Wide Volkswagen’s 
imminent demise may be greatly exaggerated. 
 
 
 
23 
Here, Zignago’s forum contacts most resemble those in Asahi. The plurality in Asahi 
applied the stricter “stream of commerce plus” test; however, Zignago’s contacts with Idaho 
were not isolated, minimal, or fortuitous; but part of the formal and informal distribution 
networks that Zignago used to “serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other 
States.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. It is true Zignago did not design its bottles 
specifically for the Idaho market, advertise in Idaho, establish channels for providing regular 
advice to Idaho consumers, employ distributors as sales agents in Idaho, operate an office in 
Idaho, own or lease property in Idaho, or send employees to Idaho for any reason. However, 
these are examples of additional conduct—or the “plus”—the Court in Asahi required to meet the 
stricter version of the stream of commerce test. What the record shows that Zignago did do was 
place millions of its bottles in the United States by selling them to a manufacturer it reasonably 
knew exported those bottles throughout the United States through a network of exporters, 
distributors, and retailers. 
Although the district court applied the wrong test, the district court’s findings actually 
satisfy the “stream of commerce” standard. The district court noted that it would have found 
specific personal jurisdiction had it applied the “stream of commerce” test:  
Without a doubt, Zignago is a large foreign manufacturer of bottles. Antinori 
purchased 92,209,000 wine bottles from Zignago between 2008 and June 30, 
2018. In that same time period, Antinori exported 43,800,000 bottles of wine to 
the United States. These facts support the Court’s conclusion that Zignago placed 
the Bottle within the stream of commerce in Italy with the expectation that its 
manufactured wine bottles, including the Bottle, would be sold throughout the 
United States. In fact, thousands of Zignago’s bottles have reached Idaho. But the 
expectation that the Bottle would enter the stream of commerce is not enough to 
establish personal jurisdiction under the “stream of commerce plus” test. 
There can be no doubt that Zignago placed its product into the stream of commerce. During a 
ten-year period, Zignago sold over 92 million bottles to Antinori alone, and Antinori exported 
over 46 percent of those – 43 million bottles – to the United States. This does not include any 
other U.S. importers, distributors, or retailers beyond those involved in this case. Moreover, Ste. 
Michelle has exported 1,308 bottles of Villa Antinori Classico Riserva to Idaho since 2013. In 
the same period, S&C, only one Idaho distributor, sold 138 bottles. Albertson’s sold almost 300 
bottles. Given the extensive network into which Zignago sent its bottles, it cannot credibly 
maintain it was unforeseeable that its bottles would end up in the hands of a chef in Idaho. 
Zignago’s wide and massive distribution network takes it out of the realm of isolated or single 
 
24 
contacts and satisfies the World-Wide Volkswagen’s definition of placing a product into the 
stream of commerce.  
Beyond merely placing its bottles into the stream of commerce, Zignago knew its bottles 
were being sold and distributed in the United States. Even though Celot declared in his affidavit 
that he did not know any bottles would end up in the United States, the district court found 
otherwise: “[t]hese facts support the Court’s conclusion that Zignago placed the Bottle within the 
stream of commerce in Italy with the expectation that its manufactured wine bottles, including 
the Bottle, would be sold throughout the United States.” (Emphasis added). We agree. Zignago’s 
sheer volume of sales gave it at least implicit knowledge of its contacts with the United States. 
Additionally, the district court found that before entering into their agreement, Zignago discussed 
with Antinori “the details of the relationship, including the product to be purchased and the 
markets Antinori operates in.” Zignago cannot now place its head in the sand and claim it did not 
know where its bottles were going.  
Because of Zignago’s mass production and Antinori’s exportation of over 43 million 
bottles to the United States, Zignago cannot reasonably assert that is was “surprised” to be haled 
into any state court in the United States. Again, the sheer volume of its operation likely 
constitutes purposeful availment to each and every state. It maintains two subsidiaries that 
operate in the United States, and its subsidiaries define Zignago as “a manufacturer and 
distributor in North America.” Zignago clearly enjoyed the monetary benefits of selling and 
distributing its bottles to the United States. This is what Justice Brennan referred to as the 
“regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail to sale” not 
“unpredictable currents or eddies.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Indeed, 
while Idaho may be a relatively small market, it should not be surprising to Zignago that many of 
the bottles it placed into the stream of commerce were carried by market currents until they 
wended their way into Idaho. 
Turning to our consideration of the “fairness” factors, this is where this case significantly 
departs from the facts of Asahi and we find that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
Zignago would not violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 
326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation omitted). In Asahi, Zurcher’s claims against the Taiwanese 
manufacturer and Asahi were dismissed, which only left the indemnity claim between Asahi and 
the manufacturer. 480 U.S. at 106. Therefore, the interest of California in this dispute was 
 
25 
minimal. Id. at 114. Asahi would be forced to defend itself in California to resolve its dispute 
with the Taiwanese manufacturer when the claim could be more easily resolved in Taiwan or 
Japan. In addition, although the accident occurred in California, Zurcher was not a California 
resident and was no longer involved in the case; thus, California no longer held an interest in 
adjudicating the matter. Furthermore, the Court questioned applying California law to an 
indemnity action between two foreign entities. It thus concluded: “[c]onsidering the international 
context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the 
forum State, the exercise of jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would 
be unreasonable and unfair.” Id. at 116. 
 
Here, the parties, apparently assuming the remaining fairness factors are not relevant, 
only discuss the first three factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum 
State; and, (3) plaintiff’s interests in obtaining relief. First, the burden on Zignago would be 
great. It would be forced to travel to Idaho, an entirely different country and foreign jurisdiction 
to defend one of the ninety-two million bottles it produced. However, a forum is constitutionally 
acceptable unless it is so “gravely difficult and inconvenient that a party is unfairly put at a 
severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 478 (1985). While this burden on Zignago is real, it is no greater than any other foreign 
manufacturer. It is also a reasonable burden imposed on a defendant who has availed itself of the 
privileges and benefits of conducting business in Idaho. Zignago suffers no additional burden by 
defending in Idaho as it would in any other State.  
Second, Idaho has a clear and strong interest in providing its residents with a forum to 
adjudicate product liability claims. Idaho’s interest in protecting its citizens is neither unique nor 
provincial. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Burger King, “[a] state generally has a 
‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries 
inflicted by out of state actors.” Id. at 473. Burger King further explains that this interest is 
especially acute in cases where the out-of-state actor intends to be profited by its contact with the 
forum state:   
Moreover, where individuals “purposefully derive benefit” from their interstate 
activities, it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other 
States for consequences that arise proximately from such activities; the Due 
Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid 
interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed. 
Id. at 473-74 (internal citations omitted).   
 
26 
Third, Griffin has a strong interest in obtaining relief in her home state. She lives in 
Idaho, she purchased the defective bottle in Idaho, the incident occurred in Idaho, and the bulk of 
her evidence is in Idaho. Importantly, Griffin did not travel to Italy to purchase the bottle and 
bring it back to Idaho; rather, the bottle was shipped, sold, and caused damage in Idaho. 
Therefore, it would place an unreasonable burden to force Griffin to venture to Italy to seek 
redress. All of the “fairness” factors weigh in favor of an Idaho court reasonably and fairly 
exercising jurisdiction over Zignago.  
 
In sum, the district court erred when it adopted the “stream of commerce plus” test to 
determine personal jurisdiction. We clarify that the proper method today in Idaho is still the 
“stream of commerce” test from World-Wide Volkswagen. Applying that test to the facts of this 
case, Zignago placed its product into the stream of commerce with the expectation it would be 
sold in the United States, including Idaho. Zignago purposefully availed itself of the monetary 
benefits of conducting activity in Idaho and it was not unforeseeable or a surprise for Zignago to 
be haled into court in Idaho. This decision does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice because the burden on Zignago to defend here is relatively minimal compared 
to Idaho’s strong interest in protecting its citizens from defective products and Griffin’s strong 
interest in seeking redress here. Therefore, this Court reverses the district court’s adoption of the 
“stream of commerce plus” test and, accordingly, also reverses the decision to grant Zignago’s 
motion to dismiss Griffin’s case against Zignago for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
B. Because the case will be remanded, we need not decide whether the district court 
erred by denying Griffin’s motion to compel the deposition of Roberto Celot.  
 
Griffin contends that the district court’s denial of her motion to compel Celot’s 
deposition in Idaho was an abuse of discretion because the district court failed to consider the 
correct legal standard in making its decision. At the time the deposition was requested, it solely 
concerned the issue of jurisdiction. Because we have reversed the district court’s decision and 
concluded that Idaho has personal jurisdiction to hear Griffin’s claims against Zignago, we need 
not decide whether it was error for the trial court to deny Griffin’s motion to compel Celot’s 
deposition in Idaho.  
C. The district court did not err in granting Antinori and Ste. Michelle’s motion for 
summary judgment because Griffin failed to show she could establish a prima facie 
product liability case.  
 
27 
 
Griffin contends the district court erred when it granted summary judgment because the 
district court only relied on the “specific-defect” test, instead of also applying the “malfunction” 
test. Furthermore, Griffin claims the district court required Griffin to show that Antinori caused 
the defect in the bottle; instead, she asserts that she must only show that the defect existed when 
it left the control of the manufacturer, or a lack of reasonable secondary causes.  
 
Griffin’s assertion that the district court only applied the “specific-defect” test instead of 
also applying the “malfunction” test warrants explanation. In Farmer, 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 
1306, this Court explained the methods by which a plaintiff can show a product is defective. 
What Griffin calls the “specific-defect” test, was the traditional way of showing a prima facie 
case of strict product liability prior to Farmer. 97 Idaho at 746, 553 P.2d at 1310. It required a 
plaintiff to allege and prove: “1) he was injured by the product; 2) the injury was the result of a 
defective or unsafe product; and 3) the defect existed when the product left the control of the 
manufacturer.” Id. at 746-47, 553 P.3d at 1310-11. However, this Court noted that, “[w]hile 
direct evidence of [an] identifiable defect is the strongest evidence of a product’s defective 
condition, . . . such evidence of a defect in a product which was present when it left the 
manufacturer’s control will be rare and unusual.” Id. at 747, 553 P.2d at 1311. Therefore, this 
Court adopted an additional way by which a plaintiff can show a product is defective – what 
Griffin calls the “malfunction” test. See id. 
In Farmer, this Court described the “malfunction” test as follows: “[a] prima facie case 
may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence of [1] a malfunction of the product and [2] 
the absence of evidence of abnormal use and [3] the absence of evidence of reasonable 
secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the defendant.” Id. The Court drew no 
distinction between a defect and a malfunction, reasoning that a malfunction is circumstantial 
evidence of a defect because a product will not ordinarily malfunction. Id. at 748, 553 P.2d at 
1312. The second element is related to malfunction in that a plaintiff must show that the 
malfunction was not caused by abnormal use. Id. Finally, regarding the elimination of reasonable 
secondary causes, this Court stated, “[o]f additional relevance are the age of a product and the 
length of its use, the severity of its use, the state of its repair, its expected useful life and the fact 
that the source of the malfunction is an enclosed system relatively immune from tampering or 
alteration once the product leaves the manufacturer’s control.” Id. (Emphasis added). “A 
 
28 
plaintiff need not exclude every possible cause but only reasonably likely causes.” Id. at 749, 553 
P.2d at 1313.  
Thus, Farmer clarifies that when there is evidence of a malfunction of the product, the 
absence of evidence of abnormal use is circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of a defect in the product. Additionally, “the absence of evidence of reasonable 
secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the defendant” constitutes circumstantial 
evidence that, in the absence of direct evidence, the defect in the product existed when it left the 
manufacturer. Id. The weight to be afforded such evidence is typically a question for the trier of 
fact. Id. at 748-49, 553 P.2d at 1312-13. 
We revisited the issue in Massey v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho 476, 328 P.3d 456 
(2014). This Court was tasked with determining whether a poultry pot pie contaminated with 
salmonella was a “defect” sufficient to avoid summary judgment dismissal against the plaintiff. 
Id. at 480-81, 328 P.3d at 460-61. The disputed evidence showed that samples of the strain of 
salmonella from the plaintiff matched strains found in Conagra’s Delaware production facility. 
Id. at 479, 328 P.3d at 459. In its analysis, this Court stated that the “malfunction” test is an 
alternative method to show a “defect” through circumstantial evidence. Id. at 480, 328 P.3d at 
460. However, the central issue in Massey centered on whether there was a defect in the pot pie. 
The Court held that the plaintiff’s testimony alone created enough of an inference to establish 
that fact for summary judgment purposes. Id. at 481, 328 P.3d at 461. In the case at bar, the 
dispute is not whether there was a defect in the bottle. Rather, this appeal concerns whether there 
was evidence of a defect before it left Antinori’s control or, whether “an absence of evidence of 
reasonable secondary causes” which would eliminate Antinori and Ste. Michelle’s from liability. 
Farmer, 97 Idaho at 747, 553 P.2d at 1311.   
Turning to the case at hand, this Court finds under either the “specific-defect” test or the 
“malfunction” test, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Antinori and Ste. 
Michelle. Griffin’s contention is accurate: the district court did not explicitly analyze her claim 
under the “malfunction” test. At summary judgment, as noted, Antinori and Ste. Michelle only 
challenged the third element of either test – that “the defect existed when it left the control of the 
manufacturer” or “the absence of evidence of reasonable secondary causes which would 
eliminate liability of the defendant.” See Farmer, at 746-47, 553 P.3d at 1310-11. The district 
court clearly analyzed Griffin’s claim under the third prong of both tests. Contrary to Griffin’s 
 
29 
assertions, while the court may not have explicitly referenced the “malfunction test” it clearly 
applied it because it referred to the circumstantial evidence in the record and acknowledged in its 
memorandum decision, quoting directly from Farmer, that direct evidence would be “rare and 
unusual.” Id. at 747, 553 P.2d at 1311. The court even cited from the Idaho Civil Jury 
Instructions and noted that “[e]vidence may be either direct or circumstantial.” IDJI 1.24.2. The 
totality of its analysis demonstrates the court recognized that Griffin could establish that the 
defect existed when it left the control of the manufacturer through circumstantial evidence by 
showing the absence of evidence of reasonable secondary causes for the defect.   
Griffin failed to show direct or circumstantial evidence of a defect in the bottle at the time 
it left Antinori. Although Goldman noted multiple production processes in Antinori’s facility that 
could have resulted in a Hertzian Conoid, he offered no definitive statement. Instead, Goldman 
qualified each of his conclusions regarding Antinori’s culpability. For example, Goldman stated, 
“[i]f misadjusted, damaged, or poorly maintained, each of these points of contact have the 
potential to damage the top of the finish.” (Emphasis added). The district court noted this 
speculation as well:   
For the four processes involving the insertion of a stainless steel tube into a wine 
bottle, Mr. Goldman predicates his opinion on the existence of improper 
adjustment, damage or poor maintenance of the equipment used during the 
process. In other words, to make the inference that these processes potentially 
caused the defect to the Bottle, it is necessary to prove the equipment was 
improperly adjusted, damaged or maintained. . . . Like the four processes 
involving the insertion of the stainless steel tube, there would have to be evidence 
that the Maspack Casepacker is improperly adjusted, damaged or maintained to 
establish sufficient evidence of the cause of the defect. Such evidence is not in the 
record and therefore any potential or possible inference cannot be reasonably 
made thereafter. 
In other words, Goldman opined that the machine used by Antinori that inserted a stainless steel 
hose down into the bottle would only potentially cause a Hertzian Conoid if the machine were 
misadjusted, damaged, or poorly maintained. Griffin offered no evidence to satisfy Goldman’s 
qualifier that the machine was misadjusted, damaged, or poorly maintained.  
Under the “specific-defect’ test, taking all evidence and inferences in the light most 
favorable to Griffin, this Court  cannot make a reasonable inference that the machinery in 
question was misadjusted, damaged, or poorly maintained, where there is no evidence to support 
it. Therefore, Griffin’s proffer of evidence did not meet her burden of establishing direct 
 
30 
evidence under the “specific-defect” test that the Hertzian Conoid was present when the bottle 
left the manufacturer.  
Even applying the more lenient “malfunction” test, Griffin failed to meet her burden on 
the third prong. Again, the third element of the “malfunction” test required Griffin to show “the 
absence of evidence of reasonable secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the 
defendant.” Farmer, 97 Idaho at 747, 553 P.3d at 1311. Goldman’s report does the opposite of 
what was needed for Griffin’s case to survive summary judgment: it provides compelling 
evidence of reasonable secondary causes of the Hertzian Conoid that eliminate Antinori and Ste. 
Michelle from liability. Goldman’s report concluded that S&C’s distribution practices and 
handling methods created a “hazardous condition.” Goldman pointed to two instances during 
S&C’s distribution and handling practices where a Hertzian Conoid could occur. Moreover, 
Goldman opined that Albertson’s method of restocking wine was “abusive” because it routinely 
dumped filled bottles “neck-down” into boxes already holding other filled bottles standing 
“neck-up.” Goldman stated that this practice is known to cause a Hertzian Conoid. Additionally, 
Albertson’s records showed it received a replacement bottle of wine (Wayfarer Pinot Noir) from 
S&C on the same day as Griffin’s incident due to another broken bottle.  
We conclude that the portions of Goldman’s opinion about Antinori causing the Hertzian 
Conoid were pure speculation. “[T]he nonmoving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a 
scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Bollinger v. Fall 
River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 637, 272 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2012). Using 
Goldman’s “more likely than not” standard, his report essentially concludes that the defect was 
likely caused by S&C and/or Albertson’s. Griffin contends she satisfied this element because she 
ruled out all secondary causes of her own doing and narrowed it down to the defendants in the 
chain of distribution. This contention goes against Farmer’s original intent, which, as Farmer 
explained, relevant to the third element of the “malfunction” test is: “the fact that the source of 
the malfunction is an enclosed system relatively immune from tampering or alteration once the 
product leaves the manufacturer’s control.” Farmer, 97 Idaho at 748, 553 P.2d at 1312. This 
system was not “enclosed”; to the contrary, it extended from the bottling plant in Italy over 
thousands of miles, an intervening ocean, and two continents before it was conveyed to a grocery 
store in Idaho, with plenty of intervening handlers in between. 
 
 
31 
Nevertheless, Griffin asserts that the Idaho Products Liability Reform Act (IPLRA), 
Idaho Code sections 6-1401–1410,  adopted four years after Farmer, alters the analysis of this 
question. Specifically, Griffin argues that Farmer’s reliance on an “enclosed system” factor has 
been supplanted by the “comparative responsibility” analysis contained in Idaho Code section 6-
1404 and 6-1405(4). Section 6-1404 provides: 
Comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for product liability resulting in death 
or injury to person or property, if such responsibility was not as great as the 
responsibility of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of responsibility 
attributable to the person recovering. 
 
This language addresses cases where the comparative responsibility between the injured party 
and the parties alleged to be responsible are apportioned in order to ascertain the proportionate 
amount of damages to which the plaintiff may be entitled. It does not pertain to the quantum of 
proof needed to bring a product liability claim.  
Section 6-1405 addresses the type of conduct giving rise to comparative responsibility. It 
sets forth four different types of conduct by either a claimant or a nonclaimant: (1) “[f]ailure to 
discover a defective condition”; (2) “[u]se of a product with a known defective condition”; (3) 
“[m]isuse of a product”; and (4) “[a]lteration or modification of a product.” Idaho Code § 6-
1405. Griffin focuses on the fourth factor, “alteration or modification,” and argues that the 
following language switches the burden of proving where the defect arose from the claimant to 
the seller: 
(a) “Alteration or modification” occurs when a person or entity other than the 
product seller changes the design, construction, or formula of the product, or 
changes or removes warnings or instructions that accompanied or were displayed 
on the product. “Alteration or modification” of a product includes the failure to 
observe routine care and maintenance, but does not include ordinary wear and 
tear. 
 
(b) When the product seller proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an 
alteration or modification of the product by the claimant, or by a party other than 
the claimant or the product seller has proximately caused the claimant’s harm, the 
claimant’s damages shall be subject to reduction or apportionment to the extent 
that the alteration or modification was a proximate cause of the harm. 
 
Idaho Code § 6-1405(4)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). 
 
Griffin argues that the language in section 6-1405(4)(b) effectively shifts the burden of 
proof from Griffin and places it on Antinori to show that an alteration or defect caused by “the 
 
32 
failure to observe routine care and maintenance” was caused by another entity outside of its 
enclosed system (i.e., mishandling of the bottle by S&C and Albertson’s). However, this 
argument misses the point of section 6-1405 and ignores the effect of Goldman’s report. Antinori 
did not need to put on additional evidence to prove that the alteration or defect occurred outside 
its enclosed system when such evidence was supplied by Griffin’s own expert.  
As discussed above, Goldman’s conclusions were based on his observations, reached to a 
“reasonable degree of engineering certainty,” that more likely than not (1) S&C’s “practice of 
distributing wine in less-than-case quantities and their handling methods for less-than-case 
orders created a hazardous condition,” and (2) “bottle handling during wine restocking at the 
Albertson’s in Hailey, Idaho continues to be abusive.”  Regarding Antinori, Goldman only 
generally opined that “there are numerous areas in a winery” which can cause a Hertzian Conoid 
fracture in the glass. Importantly, while noting that if “misadjusted, damaged, or poorly 
maintained, each of [the identified] points of contact [in Antinori’s filling process] have the 
potential to damage the top of the finish,” Goldman could not say “to a reasonable degree of 
engineering certainty that more likely than not” this occurred. Such a generic assessment of 
responsibility could conceivably apply to the manufacturer of any product—i.e., if the machinery 
used to produce rubber bands was not properly maintained or adjusted, it could result in a 
defective rubber band. Of the 16 “professional opinions” Goldman sets forth in his report, none 
identified any actual fault on the part of Antinori; he merely speculated as to what might happen 
if Antinori’s equipment malfunctioned. Thus, Goldman’s statements regarding Antinori’s 
production practices provide no basis to conclude that Antinori shares any comparative fault, and 
there is no reason why Antinori could not rely on the same evidence to assert it was not at fault. 
Unlike the documented instances of S&C and Albertson’s mishandling wine bottles, there were 
no examples of Antinori’s machinery being maladjusted, damaged, or poorly maintained. Put 
simply, Goldman’s opinion not only negates Griffin’s ability to show Antinori’s actions amount 
to comparative fault for the defect in the bottle, it also simultaneously provided Antinori with 
evidence that the comparative fault rests with S&C and Albertson’s.11  
                                                 
11 Notably, Griffin did not address the following exclusionary language contained at the end of 
section 6-1405(4)(b):  
This subsection shall not be applicable if: 
1. The alteration or modification was in accord with the product seller’s 
instructions or specifications; 
 
33 
Similarly, Griffin references the Restatement (Second) of Torts to support shifting the 
burden to Antinori to show it was not the cause of the defect: 
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has 
been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to 
which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has 
not caused the harm. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433B(3) (1965). This Court has not previously addressed 
Section 433(B) of the Restatement; however, it was generally discussed by the Court of Appeals 
in Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 252, 646 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Ct. App. 1982).  
Although we have not specifically adopted this provision, we have adopted similar provisions 
from the Restatement concerning products liability. See, e.g. Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 
Idaho 674, 676, 518 P.2d 857, 859 (1974) (“An examination of what appears to us to be the 
better reasoned cases leads us today to the adoption of the rule of strict liability in tort as it 
appears in The Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, s 402A (1965)).”  
 
Notwithstanding the language of the Restatement, the record in this case provided ample 
evidence to support the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Antinori. Here, 
although Goldman positively identified the practices of two of the three actors as responsible for 
her injury to a “reasonable degree of engineering certainty,” he could not say the same about 
Antinori. Thus, Griffin’s own expert provided competent evidence in the record that Antinori did 
not cause the harm. 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment 
in favor of Antinori and Ste. Michelle and to dismiss Griffin’s claims against them. Under the 
“specific-defect” test, Griffin has not provided direct evidence to show that the Hertzian Conoid 
existed when it left Antinori or Ste. Michelle. While the district court did not explicitly analyze 
the “malfunction” test, Griffin failed here, too. Instead of eliminating secondary causes of the 
Hertzian Conoid, Griffin’s testimony highlighted that the Hertzian Conoid was more likely than 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. The alteration or modification was made with the express or implied 
consent of the product seller; or  
3. The alteration or modification was reasonably anticipated conduct, and the 
product was defective because of the product seller’s failure to provide 
adequate warnings or instructions with respect to the alteration or 
modification. 
Griffin has pointed to nothing in the record suggesting that the mishandling of the bottle by S&C and Albertson’s 
was consistent with Antinori’s instructions, expressly or impliedly consented to by Antinori, or reasonably 
anticipated conduct. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that the district court erred in its ultimate conclusion. 
 
 
34 
not caused by S&C and/or Albertson’s. In other words, Griffin failed to eliminate reasonable 
secondary causes of the defect. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment and dismissal of Griffin’s case against Antinori and Ste. Michelle.12  
D. The district court did not err in declining to address Griffin’s late motion to 
compel discovery against Antinori and Ste. Michelle before rendering its decision on 
summary judgment.  
Griffin contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment before her motion 
to compel was resolved. Griffin moved to compel Antinori and Ste. Michelle to respond to 
Griffin’s requests regarding whether any similar bottle breakages had occurred. Griffin argues 
that both Antinori and Ste. Michelle delayed fully responding to this request adequately for over 
one year.  
Griffin served four sets of discovery requests upon Antinori and Ste. Michelle on May 
15, 2018; July 10, 2018; August 13, 2018; and June 28, 2019. Griffin alleges that Antinori and 
Ste. Michelle “dodged” her discovery requests for well over one year. However, Griffin waited 
to file a motion to compel discovery until September 30, 2019. This occurred over one month 
after the district court had heard oral arguments regarding Antinori’s and Ste. Michelle’s motions 
for summary judgment, and two months after the motion for summary judgment was originally 
filed. Griffin did not raise the discovery issue in her written response to summary judgment or at 
oral argument. See I.R.C.P. 56(d) (explaining that the court may defer considering a motion for 
summary judgment and allow additional discovery if the nonmovant shows “it cannot present 
facts essential to justify its opposition.”). Furthermore, due to Griffin’s extremely late motion, 
her motion to compel was not noticed to be heard until one week after the district court issued its 
decision on summary judgment.  
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider Griffin’s 
motion to compel before issuing its decision on summary judgment. Bluntly put, Griffin’s 
motion to compel was far too late and Griffin failed to timely seek relief under Rule 56(d) when 
the motion for summary judgment was filed. Even though Griffin alleged Antinori and Ste. 
Michelle “dodged” her discovery requests for one year, Griffin did not move to compel until well 
                                                 
12 This result necessarily dismisses Griffin’s alternative argument that Ste. Michelle had a duty to inspect the bottle 
because Griffin has not shown the defect was present when it left Antinori, the winery that placed the wine into the 
bottle. We also recognize that this ruling, by implication, will likely have an impact on Griffin’s ability to pursue her 
remaining claims against Zignago, which have not yet been addressed on the merits. Nevertheless, those issues will 
need to be litigated by the parties on remand. 
 
 
35 
after the summary judgment motion was filed, briefs had been submitted, and oral argument had 
taken place. In fact, the motion for summary judgment was already under advisement for one 
month before Griffin moved to compel. After the district court granted Antinori’s and Ste. 
Michelle’s motions for summary judgment, Griffin’s motion became moot when she failed to 
seek reconsideration. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 
address Griffin’s motion to compel before rendering its decision on summary judgment.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Court holds that the correct test when determining personal 
jurisdictional issues remains the “stream of commerce” test adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen. Applying that test to the case here, we reverse the 
district court’s decision to grant Zignago’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal, as a matter 
of course, are awarded to Griffin against Zignago for prevailing in her appeal on the issue of 
personal jurisdiction. 
We affirm the district court’s decision granting Antinori’s and Ste. Michelle’s motions 
for summary judgment and hold that it did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Griffin’s 
motion to compel discovery against Antinori and Ste. Michelle. As the prevailing parties, costs 
on appeal are awarded as a matter of course to Antinori and Ste. Michelle.   
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, STEGNER and BURDICK CONCUR.