Title: Ex Parte Tyson

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

784 So. 2d 357 (2000)
Ex parte Anthony TYSON.
(In re Anthony Tyson v. State).
1991309.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 17, 2000.
*358 Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Thomas F. Parker IV, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Anthony Tyson was convicted of capital murder for the deaths of Derek Cowan and Damien Thompson. Tyson was convicted of two counts under § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975murder committed during the course of a robbery in the first degreeand of one count under § 13A-5-40(a)(10)the murder of two or more people during one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. By a vote of 10-2, the jury recommended that Tyson be sentenced to death. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Tyson to death by electrocution. In a unanimous decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Tyson's conviction and sentence. Tyson v. State, 784 So. 2d 328 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). We granted certiorari review, pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P.[1] We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Tyson has raised 13 issues for our review. The Court of Criminal Appeals fully addressed and correctly resolved each of these issues in its thorough and well-researched opinion. Only four of those issues warrant further discussion. Three of them question the validity of the search warrant; the final issue challenges limitations the trial court placed on Tyson's cross-examination of the prosecution's expert witness on DNA evidence.
On January 4, 1997, Porter Key was driving on Franklin Road in Macon County when he discovered Cowan's body in the middle of the road. Key said he had to drive off the road to avoid the body. He *359 said that he saw a green Acura automobile roll off the road and strike a fence, and that the car then backed up onto the road and sped off in the direction of Tuskegee. Key said he thought the driver of this car had been involved in a hit-and-run accident, so, he said, he chased the car in an attempt to get the license-plate number. He was unable to keep up and lost the car somewhere in Tuskegee. Later, law-enforcement personnel discovered that Cowan had not been the victim of a hit-andrun accident, but had been shot twice in the back of the head.
Within minutes after Key discovered Cowan's body, Thompson's body was discovered slumped forward on the passenger side of an Acura automobile that was in the bushes at an intersection in Tuskegee. The keys were in the car and it was still running. Thompson had also been shot twice in the head.
Alphonso Cardwell testified that he and Cowan had been scheduled to meet for a drug exchange on a dirt road off County Road 36 on January 4, 1997. He testified that as he was driving to the designated location he saw Cowan, Thompson, and a third male, whom he identified at trial as Anthony Tyson, drive by in a green Acura. The Acura was being followed, he said, by another vehicle, driven by Cornelius "D'Rock" Drisker. Cardwell testified that when he arrived at the location of the planned exchange, he gave Cowan $300 in exchange for cocaine. Minutes later, Cowan's body was discovered. Witnesses testified that one of his pockets was turned inside out. The $300 was missing.
Police connected Tyson to the murders while investigating a shooting in Union Springs that occurred 10 days after the double murder in Macon County. Nicholas Martin testified that Tyson and three other people shot at him from a car as he was walking his dog. He testified that he recognized Tyson and that he went to the police station and signed a warrant for Tyson's arrest.[2] Law-enforcement authorities later determined that the gun identified as the weapon used in the Union Springs shooting was the same weapon used in the murder of Cowan and Thompson.
Substantial forensic evidence connected Tyson to the double murder. After executing a search warrant, based on evidence obtained in the investigation of the Union Springs shooting, the police recovered from Tyson's apartment a Lorcin chrome.380 pistol and bloodstained sneakers. A DNA analysis of the blood on the sneakers showed that the blood matched Thompson's blood. Police recovered Tyson's fingerprints from the green Acura. Spent shell casings recovered from the Acura, from near Cowan's body, and from the Union Springs shooting were identified as having been fired by the same gun, a Lorcin .380, which was identified as belonging to Tyson.
Tyson's defense at trial was that he did not kill Cowan and Thompson. He attempted to show that another person could have committed the murders, specifically, the man who had been seen in a car with the victims earlier on the day of the murders.
Tyson argues that evidence seized from his apartment should have been suppressed because, he says, the search warrant was not based on sufficient probable cause, listed the wrong address, and did not authorize a nighttime search. The affidavit *360 in support of the search warrant reads:
When reviewing the question whether officers had probable cause, this Court has stated:
Crittenden v. State, 476 So. 2d 632, 633-34 (Ala.1985) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (emphasis omitted)). The affidavit supporting the warrant in this case presents significant information, not merely conclusory statements "that [give] the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause." Id. at 633. Agent Smith's affidavit provides a detailed description of the investigation leading to his belief that the weapon used in the Union Springs shooting would be found at Tyson's apartment. The affidavit provides sufficient information to allow the magistrate to make an independent determination as to the existence of probable cause. Therefore, we conclude that the warrant was based on probable cause.
Tyson contends that his address was 401-C North Church Street. Therefore, he argues, because the warrant was issued for the search of 401-A North Church Street, it failed to designate with particularity the location actually searched and is therefore invalid. Tyson's argument is without merit. An error in the address does not necessarily invalidate a warrant.
In United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1092 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S. Ct. 2901, 90 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted:
In this case, law-enforcement officers, while attempting to execute an arrest warrant issued against Tyson, located his residence. The officers did not find Tyson; instead, they found several armed persons in his residence. In their opinion, that circumstance indicated a high degree of probability that the weapon used in the Union Springs shooting would be found on the premises. At that time, Agent Smith *362 left officers securing the premises while he sought the search warrant.
In his effort to secure the search warrant, Agent Smith spoke with Tyson's landlord and obtained a copy of Tyson's lease agreement, which lists Tyson's apartment number as 401-A rather than 401-C. Considering that Agent Smith, the executing officer, had been to Tyson's residence and had left officers securing that residence, there can be little doubt that he planned to return to the correct residence to conduct the search. The actions of Agent Smith and the officers who stayed behind to secure the premises ensured that there would be no mistake as to which apartment the police intended to search. Under these circumstances, we decline to say that, because the wrong apartment number appeared on the face of the warrant, the warrant was invalid.
Tyson argues that the warrant to search his apartment contained a box that the judge should have checked in order to authorize a nighttime search. That box was not checked, yet the search was made at night.
Rule 3.10, Ala.R.Crim.P., provides, in pertinent part:
Similarly, § 15-5-8, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
Tyson argues that because the warrant did not authorize a nighttime search, any evidence found at his residence is the fruit of an illegal search. Quoting Ex parte Turner, [Ms. 1971735, April 7, 2000] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2000), Tyson argues: "`There is no common law authorizing search warrants. Statutes authorizing searches are strictly construed against the prosecution [and] in favor of the liberty of the citizen.'" ___ So.2d at ___ (quoting Kelley v. State, 55 Ala.App. 402, 403, 316 So. 2d 233, 234 (Ala.Crim.App.1975)). Turner dealt with a search predicated on an anticipatory search warrant issued in September 1995. This Court held that the search was unconstitutional because at that time there was no Alabama statute *363 authorizing anticipatory search warrants.[3]Turner, ___ So.2d at ___. This case is distinguishable from Turner because § 15-5-8 specifically authorizes the execution of nighttime warrants.
In rejecting Tyson's argument as to this issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Gamble v. State, 473 So. 2d 1188 (Ala. Crim.App.1985). In Gamble, the court stated:
473 So. 2d  at 1194-95. It is clear in this case, as it was in Gamble, that the police officers were acting in good faith. Agent Smith had every intention of obtaining a search warrant authorizing a nighttime search and submitted an affidavit clearly establishing grounds for a nighttime search. Furthermore, he requested the warrant at 7:45 p.m., after dark, and executed the warrant at 8:00 p.m. Agent Smith also informed the magistrate issuing the warrant that other officers at Tyson's residence were waiting for the warrant. *364 Had the warrant been issued in the daytime, the necessity for checking the box authorizing a nighttime search would be readily understandable. However, where, as here, the warrant was issued after dark and the magistrate knew of its imminent execution, for us to require that the box be checked would be to exalt form over substance. The magistrate issued the warrant knowing that Agent Smith planned to execute it immediately.[4] Therefore, applying the exclusionary rule in this case would serve no purpose.
Discussing the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984), a case in which police officers, acting in good faith, secured a search warrant that later was held invalid because of a clerical error committed by the magistrate who issued the warrant, the United States Supreme Court held:
468 U.S.  at 990-91, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (footnote omitted). The same rationale applies in the case before us. As noted previously, when the warrant was issued, the issuing judge was fully aware that Agent Smith intended to conduct a nighttime *365 search. The officers were acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a belief that the search warrant was valid. Therefore, suppressing the evidence gained from the search would not serve as a deterrent. We decline to exclude the evidence recovered from Tyson's apartment because of a clerical error made by the issuing judgefailing to check the box authorizing a nighttime search. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard.
Tyson argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied him what he characterizes as the right to fully cross-examine the prosecution's expert witness on DNA evidence. Tyson contends he should have been able to cross-examine the DNA expert regarding the possible effects of genetic subgroups in Alabama on the reliability of DNA statistics. In regard to a defendant's claim that he was denied his right of cross-examination, this Court has stated:
Ex parte Pope, 562 So. 2d 131, 134 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 118, 112 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1990). We conclude, however, that Tyson has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to cross-examine the DNA expert as he wanted to do.
Tyson argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the following line of questioning to continue:
In sustaining the objection, the trial court stated:
We agree with the trial court that the line of questioning and the tactics employed by Tyson's counsel were irrelevant and could have misled the jury.
Furthermore, the DNA expert had previously testified during cross-examination as follows:
Tyson's counsel had already questioned the DNA expert regarding genetic subgroups and the possible effect such subgroups would have on statistical analyses of the population of Alabama. The witness gave a very thorough explanation regarding the effect of genetic subgroups in Alabama. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Tyson the privilege of repeating such questioning in a manner likely to mislead the jury.
We have carefully reviewed all the issues presented in Tyson's petition, in the parties' briefs, and at oral argument. We find no error, in either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of Tyson's trial, that would warrant a reversal of his convictions or his sentence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
*367 HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, COOK,[*] SEE, LYONS, BROWN, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
[1]  Because this case was under review before May 19, 2000, the effective date of the recently revised version of Rule 39, Ala.R.App.P., we have searched the record in this case for plain error.
[2]  Tyson later pleaded guilty to attempted murder as a result of the events that occurred in Union Springs.
[3]  Anticipatory search warrants are now permitted in Alabama. See Rules 3.7 and 3.8, Ala.R.Crim.P., effective December 1, 1997.
[4]  The warrant contains the following language:

"Affidavit in support of application for a search warrant having been made before me, and the Court's finding that grounds for the issuance exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, pursuant to Rule 3.8, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, you are hereby ordered and authorized to forthwith search:"
(Emphasis added.) "Forthwith" means "immediately." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 459 (10th ed.1997). The warrant, issued at 7:45 P.M., thus authorized an immediate search, a search that clearly would be a nighttime search.
[*]  Although Justice Cook did not sit at oral argument of this case, he has listened to the tape of oral argument.