Title: JOSEPH MICHAEL SHAW V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOSEPH MICHAEL SHAW V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 18201 P.3d 1108Case Number: S-08-0055Decided: 02/12/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JOSEPH 
MICHAEL SHAW,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and 
Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Joseph 
Michael Shaw (Shaw), entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony possession 
of marijuana.  The condition was 
that he be given leave to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his car by a Wyoming State Trooper.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Shaw raises this 
issue: 

 
 
Was 
the detention of [Shaw], and the entry into the vehicle, illegal, and should his 
motion to suppress have been granted?

 
 
In 
response the State queries:

 
 
Were 
[Shaw's] constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution violated, and did the district court err in denying his motion to 
suppress?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On December 25, 
2006, at approximately 8:30 a.m., Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Beatriz 
Schulmeister, as part of her routine duties, was patrolling the Wagonhound Rest 
Area for motorists that might need assistance.  That rest area is located approximately 
40 miles west of Laramie and 60 miles east Rawlins on Interstate 80 in Carbon 
County.  The rest stop was a common 
place for motorists to become stuck during the winter months, especially when 
the roads were snow-packed and icy.  
Because it was Christmas Day, and because the roads were a hazard for 
both motorists as well as the trooper -- due to the packed snow, ice, and 
blowing and drifting snow -- the trooper was not engaging in speed 
enforcement.

 
 
[¶4]      In her role 
providing assistance, the trooper noticed a Honda Accord stuck in the middle of 
the semi-truck parking lot in a snow drift.  The trooper radioed dispatch with the 
license plate number of the vehicle.  
With the intention of helping Shaw, the driver and sole occupant of the 
vehicle, Trooper Schulmeister parked her patrol car slightly in front of the 
stuck vehicle at an angle.  The 
trooper's video and audio recorder were in operation, and thus much of her 
interaction with Shaw can be seen and/or heard (the audio is available only when 
both Shaw and the trooper were in her vehicle).  It is evident that the recordings were 
not of the highest quality but persistence in listening does tend to support the 
district court's ultimate findings.  
Shaw and the trooper simultaneously exited their vehicles and they met 
between the two cars.

 
 
[¶5]      Troopers are not 
required to pull stuck motorists out of the snow and do not typically do so 
without a release from the motorist.  
As an alternative, and to avoid liability, troopers will call a wrecker, 
which is very expensive, to tow the vehicle or to provide other assistance to 
the motorist.

 
 
[¶6]      Trooper 
Schulmeister asked Shaw if he needed help, and he responded that he did, noting 
that he had been stuck in the snow since 4:00 a.m. that morning.  The trooper offered to pull out the 
Honda with a tow strap because it only needed to be moved a short distance.  However, Shaw instead declined and asked 
the trooper if he could borrow a shovel.  
Because of the officer safety concerns involved when a law enforcement 
officer provides a citizen with an object that could be used as a weapon against 
the officer, and because the trooper was required by Wyoming Highway Patrol 
policy to fill out a form relating to her contact with, and the assistance that 
she provided to Shaw, she asked him for his driver's license, insurance, and 
registration.  In response, Shaw 
asked the trooper if she was "kidding."  
She told Shaw that she was not kidding and again asked him for the 
information, to which he responded, 
"Are you kidding, it's Christmas, let's just go home."  Finally, after she again told Shaw she 
was serious about her request, he confessed he did not have a driver's 
license.

 
 
[¶7]      Shaw's reaction 
to the trooper's offer of assistance caused her to become concerned for her 
safety, as citizens typically do not react the way Shaw had reacted when law 
enforcement attempts to help them.  
Thus, because he was making her nervous, the trooper created distance 
between Shaw and herself.  She asked 
Shaw if he had any weapons.  The 
videotape reveals that Shaw became somewhat agitated at this point and his 
movements became overly boisterous and odd.  That is, Shaw began stepping back and 
forth, as well as to the left and to the right, and turned and walked toward the 
Honda.  Shaw also started to put his 
hands into his coat pockets on several occasions and would partially remove his 
coat and then immediately put it back on.  
At one point, Shaw asked the trooper if he could put his coat into his 
car, despite the fact that he was standing outside on a freezing December 
morning.  Shaw literally begged the 
Trooper -- folding his hands in front of him, and making a slight rocking motion 
-- to let him get into his vehicle so he could leave.  Shaw, of course, could not leave, as he 
was stuck in the snow.  Finally, 
Shaw would not respond to the trooper's question as to why he was driving 
without a driver's license.  It was 
at this point that the trooper patted Shaw down for weapons and placed him into 
the back of her patrol car which, of course, was a safer and more comfortable 
place to continue their conversation regarding issuing Shaw a citation for 
driving under suspension, as well as to make arrangements to have his car 
towed.

 
 
[¶8]      While in the 
patrol car, the trooper asked Shaw for his name, address, social security 
number, date of birth, height, eye color and hair color, where he was born, and 
where he was traveling from, and where he was traveling to.  Shaw told the trooper his license was 
suspended for driving under the influence and that he had a "couple of 
warrants."  Dispatch confirmed that 
Shaw had a suspended license as a result of both driving under the influence as 
well as having no insurance, that he was not the owner of  the car, and that he had outstanding 
warrants out of Lander.

 
 
[¶9]      During this time, 
because Shaw was still acting very nervous, squirming around in the back of the 
patrol car, and talking fast, the trooper asked him to calm down.  However, even after Trooper Schulmeister 
told Shaw that she could not enforce the warrants out of the City of Lander and 
that she was not going to arrest him (which he thought was "awesome"), Shaw 
still acted nervous and stated that he was going to throw up.  After the trooper allowed him to roll 
down his window to throw up, he stated he was just being 
sarcastic.

 
 
[¶10]   Because Shaw legally could not 
drive the vehicle, due to the fact that he had a suspended driver's license, the 
trooper contacted dispatch and requested a wrecker to impound the vehicle.  The trooper also told Shaw that the 
wrecker driver would take him to Laramie, where he could call a friend or take a 
bus to his next destination.  
Because the trooper was still filling out the citation, she asked Shaw 
his address, weight, when he had arrived at the rest area, and if he had been 
drinking, as his eyes were bloodshot and red.  During this time, Shaw was still making 
the trooper nervous.

 
 
[¶11]   While the trooper continued writing 
Shaw a citation for driving under suspension, she again explained to him that 
she had requested a wrecker because he could not be permitted to drive, and she 
told Shaw that he needed to call for someone to come and pick him up.  The trooper also asked Shaw if he had 
money to pay for the wrecker and told him that he would need to speak with the 
tow truck driver regarding the cost.  
Shaw then asked to sit in the Honda until the tow truck came, to which 
the trooper responded that he would have to stay with her so he "did not go 
anywhere."  As the trooper finished 
writing the citation, she asked Shaw if the "paperwork" for the car was in the 
vehicle.  Shaw responded, "It might 
be in there. Do you want me to go get it?"  
Shaw also stated that he "kinda wanted to smoke a cigarette."  The trooper told Shaw that she needed to 
check for the insurance paperwork because she did not want to write him a ticket 
for having no insurance.  At that 
point, Shaw stated, "It might be in the glove box."

 
 
[¶12]   The trooper then left her patrol 
car and, upon opening the driver's side door of the Honda, immediately smelled 
raw marijuana and noticed, in plain view, marijuana leaves scattered around the 
gear shift.  Upon opening the glove 
box, the trooper found proof that the vehicle was, in fact, insured but she did 
not find proof of registration.  The 
trooper then continued looking for paperwork and found approximately two pounds 
of marijuana in the center console.  
Based on these circumstances, the trooper placed Shaw under arrest, and 
he was transported to Rawlins for processing.  Later, marijuana was also found in 
Shaw's jacket when he was processed at the detention center.  However, Trooper Schulmeister did not 
find this marijuana earlier during the pat down of Shaw, as she patted him down 
strictly for weapons and was not thinking about drugs 
whatsoever.

 
 
[¶13]   On December 26, 2006, Shaw was 
charged with one count of felony possession of marijuana, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).  On August 1, 2007, Shaw filed a motion 
to suppress the marijuana, arguing that his constitutional rights under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under article 1, section 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated because Trooper Schulmeister had no 
legal right to enter the vehicle.  
The State filed an objection to Shaw's motion, arguing that Shaw's 
detention by the trooper was reasonable, that Shaw gave the trooper consent to 
enter the vehicle, that upon entering the vehicle, the trooper noted a strong 
odor of marijuana which justified the search of the vehicle, and that the 
marijuana inevitably would have been discovered pursuant to an inventory 
search.  The trooper explained that 
Wyoming Highway Patrol policy requires that, whenever a vehicle is to be towed 
and impounded, the vehicle must be inventoried and troopers must complete a 
Vehicle Inventory Receipt.  The 
trooper further testified that this policy protects the officers, the wrecking 
company, as well as the owner of the property.

 
 
[¶14]   Shaw's motion to suppress was heard 
on August 23, 2007, and prior to taking testimony, the district court noted that 
it had reviewed the videotape of the contact between the trooper and Shaw.  During the suppression hearing, Trooper 
Schulmeister testified as outlined above, and Trooper Brad McConell testified 
that he performed an inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to Wyoming Highway 
Patrol policy at the "state shop" in Elk Mountain, and that no additional 
contraband was found in the vehicle.

 
 
[¶15]   Division of Criminal Investigation 
Special Agent Nicholas Biscelgia testified that on December 26, 2006, as a 
result of Trooper Schulmeister's request for assistance due to the large 
quantity of marijuana seized, he interviewed Trooper Schulmeister as well as 
Shaw.  The agent further testified 
that, after Shaw waived his constitutional rights, he described for the agent 
the events leading up to his arrest, including that he told Trooper Schulmeister 
"she could go into the glove box of the vehicle" to obtain the insurance 
information, while hoping the trooper 
would not smell the marijuana because of its low quality.  The agent also testified that Shaw made 
an unsolicited comment that Trooper Schulmeister "was really nice and [that she] 
had done a really good job."  Shaw 
did not call any witnesses.

 
 
[¶16]   In closing, the State argued that 
Trooper Schulmeister's actions throughout the encounter with Shaw were 
appropriate and reasonable: due to officer safety concerns; because Shaw had 
consented to the trooper's entry into the vehicle; because the smell of raw 
marijuana gave Trooper Schulmeister probable cause to search the vehicle; and 
that the mandatory inventory search would have made the discovery of the 
marijuana inevitable.  Shaw argued 
that he should not have been issued a citation for driving with a suspended 
license because the trooper had not witnessed him driving the vehicle and, thus, 
the trooper had no authority to request proof of insurance.  Shaw also argued that:  He did not consent to Trooper 
Schulmeister's entry into the vehicle; that he should have been provided the 
opportunity to call someone to come and get him and to drive the vehicle for 
him; that there were no officer safety concerns; and that his continued 
detention after the trooper asked for his insurance was 
unlawful.

 
 
[¶17]   In response to those arguments, the 
district court noted that the uncontroverted testimony from the DCI agent was 
that Shaw had admitted giving the trooper consent to enter the vehicle to obtain 
the insurance papers, that the trooper was trying to "cut Shaw some slack" by 
confirming the vehicle was insured so she did not have to write him another 
ticket, that the trooper had grounds to be nervous, that the trooper was doing 
exactly what she was expected to do when patrolling for stuck motorists, and 
that Trooper Schulmeister performed her duties courteously.  The district court concluded that under 
the totality of the circumstances, the trooper's actions were entirely 
appropriate and not the kind of actions criticized in O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005).  The court further 
noted that it would review the videotape again and issue a written 
decision.  Soon thereafter, on 
August 29, 2007, the district court issued a written opinion denying Shaw's 
motion.  In its opinion, the 
district court found that Shaw had consented to the trooper's entry into the 
vehicle to look for proof of insurance when he stated the insurance paperwork 
"might be in the glove box."  The 
district court went on to note that once the trooper had legally entered the 
vehicle and smelled marijuana, she had probable cause to search the vehicle for 
contraband.

 
 
[¶18]   On September 7, 2007, Shaw filed a 
notice of intent to change his plea to guilty, reserving the right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress.  
On that same day, Shaw filed a motion to alter or amend the district 
court's denial of his motion to suppress, alleging "errors of fact and 
law."  On October 26, Shaw changed 
his plea to guilty and was thereafter sentenced as noted above.  A timely notice of appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶19]   In this instance, the district 
court conducted a hearing and took evidence concerning the search and seizure at 
issue.  In reviewing a trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial 
court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court has an 
opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions.  The 
constitutionality of a particular search is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Sam v. State, 2008 WY 25, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 2008); Fenton v. 
State, 2007 WY 51, ¶ 5, 154 P.3d 974, 976 (Wyo.2007) (quoting Pe±a v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 25, 
98 P.3d 857, 869 (Wyo.2004)).

 
 
Propriety 
of the Search and Seizure

 
 
[¶20]   Our precedents on this subject are 
voluminous.  In Speten v. State, 2008 WY 63, ¶ 4, 
185 P.3d 25, 27-28 (Wyo. 2008) we described this analytical framework for 
evaluating issues such as those at hand:

 
 
            
The issue of the constitutionality of a search often focuses upon the 
question of whether or not the officer had probable cause to search, or the 
question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate an 
investigative detention.  These 
questions are resolved by resort to an objective test, taking into account the 
totality of the circumstances, rather than by analyzing the subjective thought 
process of the officer.  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 25, 
146 P.3d 492, 500 (Wyo.2006) (probable cause); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 17, 
65 P.3d 33, 37 (Wyo.2003) (investigative detention).  Probable cause to search exists "where 
the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable 
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found[.]" 
Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, 
¶ 17, 64 P.3d 700, 707 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
695-96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).  By contrast, reasonable suspicion is 
simply " 'a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity."  
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)).  Finally, while the test is objective, 
the officer's training, experience, and expertise are to be considered as part 
of the "totality of the circumstances."  
McKenney v. State, 2007 WY 
129, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 96, 98-99 (Wyo.2007); Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶ 24, 
142 P.3d 1155, 1167 (Wyo.2006); Vassar v. 
State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 18 n. 7, 99 P.3d 987, 994 n. 7 
(Wyo.2004).

 
 
Decisions 
such as those the district court made here are unfailingly fact 
intensive.

 
 
[¶21]   In Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14, 
169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007) we described the three tiers of interaction 
between police and citizens:

 
 
For 
Fourth Amendment purposes, we recognize three tiers of interaction between 
police and citizens.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 
624-25.  See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 
(Wyo.1993).  The least intrusive 
contact between a citizen and police is a consensual encounter.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 
624-25.  A consensual encounter is 
not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections.  The second tier is the investigatory or 
Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An 
investigatory detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 
624-25.  However, because of its 
limited nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show "the presence 
of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" 
in order to justify the detention.  
Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 
(Wyo.1994).  The most intrusive 
encounter between police and a citizen is an arrest.  An arrest "requires justification by 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.' 
"  Id. at 625, 135 P.3d 620 quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
219-20.

 
 
Also 
see Wagner v. State, 2008 WY 51, 
¶¶ 10-14, 182 P.2d 506, 509-10 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶22]   Furthermore, in Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 17, 
135 P.3d 620, 626 (Wyo. 2006) we elaborated:

 
 
            
As we recognized in Rice v. 
State, 2004 WY 130, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 371, 379 (Wyo.2004), a seizure does 
not occur simply when a police officer walks up to a person in a public place 
and asks a question, provided there is no showing of force or indication the 
person is restrained from leaving.  
See also, Innis v. State, 2003 
WY 66, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 413, 419 (Wyo.2003);  Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1163 
(Wyo.1996).  This principle is 
consistent with our ruling in Gompf, 
2005 WY 112, 120 P.3d 980, where we stated the Fourth Amendment was not 
implicated when officers approached a person's residence, knocked at the door, 
and asked questions. 

 
 
[¶23]   It is clear that the instant 
circumstances began as a consensual encounter between the state trooper and 
Shaw, and that it was not a "traffic stop" as that phrase is commonly used.  Indeed, the trooper stopped to render 
aid to Shaw who was stuck in deep snow.  
It is evident from the record that Shaw was solicitous of that 
assistance, although he rejected the trooper's initial offer to pull him out of 
the snow.  It is also evident from 
the context of the circumstances at the arrest, search and seizure scene that 
Shaw had been driving the car he was found in, and it was his intent to continue 
to drive it.  The trooper asked to 
see Shaw's driver's license, which is wholly consistent with the trooper's duty 
as a police officer.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-7-116 (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
Every 
licensee shall have his driver's license in his immediate possession at all 
times when driving a motor vehicle and shall display the license upon demand of 
any judicial officer, municipal court judge, any officer or agent of the 
division or any police officer as defined in W.S. 31-5-102(a)(xxxiii).  However, no person charged with 
violating this section shall be convicted if he produces in court a driver's 
license previously issued to him and valid at the time of his arrest.  For the purposes of this section 
"display" means the surrender of his license to the demanding officer.  After examination the officer shall 
immediately return the license to the licensee except as provided in W.S. 
31-5-1205(k).

 
 
[¶24]   The trooper's request to see Shaw's 
driver's license did not invoke any of the protections provided by the United 
States Constitution or the Wyoming Constitution.  See Rice v. State, 2004 WY 130, ¶ 25, 
100 P.3d 371, 379 (Wyo. 2004).  Once 
it was determined that Shaw had been driving, but had no driver's license, the 
initial consensual encounter (community caretaking activity) came to resemble a 
traffic stop or investigative detention.  
Id. at ¶ 7, 100 P.3d  at 
374.  From the point in time when 
the trooper ascertained that Shaw had no driver's license, until she found the 
marijuana in Shaw's car, was a very brief period of time.  Thus, we take note here that this case 
does not invoke our precedent set in O'Boyle (this holds true for other 
precedents akin to O'Boyle).

 
 
[¶25]   The trooper also wanted to see 
proof of insurance documentation.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-4-103(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added) 
provides:

 
 
(b)  Any 
police officer as defined by W.S. 31-5-102(a)(xxxiii), issuing a citation for 
any moving violation under W.S. 31-5-101 through 31-5-1402 or inspecting 
any vehicle, shall require the operator of any motor vehicle required to be 
registered to produce evidence of whether the operator or owner of the motor 
vehicle has in full force and effect a motor vehicle liability policy in amounts 
provided by W.S. 31-9-405(b) or a bond in amounts provided by W.S. 
31-9-102(a)(xi).  If the 
operator cannot show written proof of financial responsibility, the driver shall 
have seven (7) days to produce such proof.  
Any operator or owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered who is 
not able to demonstrate evidence of compliance with subsection (a) of this 
section may be charged with violating that subsection.  Additionally, the judge may order any 
driver failing to produce written proof of financial responsibility to pay 
restitution in accordance with W.S. 7-9-101 through 7-9-115.  Effective January 1, 1993, the 
displaying or exhibiting of a validly issued insurance identification card as 
provided by W.S. 31-8-201 by an operator or owner of the motor vehicle 
constitutes compliance with this section.  
No operator or owner of a motor vehicle charged with violating this 
section shall be convicted if he produces in court one (1) of the following 
which was valid at the time of arrest or at the time the citation was 
issued:

(i)   
A liability insurance policy previously issued to him;

(ii)  Evidence 
of a bond on file with the department in amounts provided by W.S. 
31-9-102(a)(xi).

 
 
[¶26]   Shaw argues that he was not stopped 
for a moving violation as contemplated by that statute and, therefore, he should 
not have been required to provide the insurance documentation or vehicle 
registration documentation demanded by the state trooper (although that was not 
at issue when Shaw gave his consent).  
Such violations as driving without a license, or with a suspended 
license, or without proof of insurance, are punishable under other chapters of 
the Motor Vehicles Code.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 31-4-103 (and § 31-4-104) and 31-7-134 (and § 31-7-136) (LexisNexis 
2007).  Continuing, Shaw asserts 
that the trooper's decision to enter into the automobile in Shaw's possession 
was not authorized by § 31-4-103(b), and Shaw's consent to the trooper's search 
for it was based upon a false premise posed to him by the 
trooper.

 
 
[¶27]   We read the statutes governing the 
use of motor vehicles in pari materia 
and to the extent that Shaw has focused his argument on "differences" between 
its various chapters, we are not persuaded that those "differences" undermine 
his conviction in any way.  
Moreover, we hasten to add that the trooper asked for Shaw's consent to 
look for proof of insurance, which is required by law, and Shaw tacitly 
consented, largely to avoid yet another potential citation.  The district court issued a decision 
letter which recited the same factual scenario that we have outlined above.  The district court concluded that 
Trooper Schulmeister had a legal right to enter the vehicle pursuant to Shaw's 
consent to search the glove box for proof of insurance, and once she entered the 
vehicle and smelled marijuana, she possessed the requisite probable cause to 
search the vehicle for contraband.  
Thus, the district court concluded that the marijuana seized by the 
trooper would be admissible at trial.

 
 
[¶28]   We do not discern competent 
evidence in the record that Shaw's consent was not knowing and voluntary, even 
given that some misinformation may 
have been conveyed to him by the state trooper.  Under the totality of these 
circumstances, we are persuaded that the district court's fact findings were not 
clearly erroneous or that the district court otherwise erred in denying the 
motion to suppress.  As was the case 
in the district court, we deem Shaw's consent for the trooper to enter his car 
to be dispositive and decline to address the matter of inevitable discovery of 
the contraband during the inventory process.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   The district court did not err in 
denying Shaw's motion to suppress and the judgment and sentence of the district 
court are affirmed.