Title: State ex rel. McCuller v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. McCuller v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-
1563.] 
  
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1563 
THE STATE EX REL. MCCULLER, APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY COURT 
OF COMMON PLEAS, JUVENILE DIVISION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. McCuller v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1563.] 
Mandamus—Procedendo—Bindover orders from 1979 allegedly not signed by 
judge or journalized by clerk—Writ ordering judge to proceed to judgment 
properly denied—Petitioner had adequate remedies at law or meaningful 
relief not available. 
(No. 2014-1197—Submitted February 3, 2015—Decided April 28, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
NO.100143, 2013-Ohio-4929. 
_____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment denying the petition of 
appellant, Charles McCuller, for a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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McCuller was charged in 1979 in juvenile court in five cases.  In each of the 
cases, the juvenile court held a bindover hearing and transferred the case to the 
common pleas court.  McCuller was eventually convicted in three of the five 
cases. 
{¶ 2} In 2013, he filed a complaint for a writ of procedendo and/or 
mandamus in the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, arguing that the juvenile 
judge failed to sign and the clerk failed to journalize each bindover order.  He 
asks for an order requiring respondent-appellee, the juvenile division of the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, “to proceed to judgment on the state’s 
motion to relinquish jurisdiction.” 
{¶ 3} Because he had adequate remedies at law in three cases, and because 
the issue is res judicata as to four cases, the court of appeals properly denied the 
writ.  No meaningful relief is available in the fifth case, and therefore the writ was 
properly denied in that instance as well. 
Facts and procedural history 
Case No. DL-7900442/CR-79-048254-ZA 
{¶ 4} On April 17, 1979, McCuller, then 17 years old, was charged in 
juvenile court with one count of attempted rape and one count of felonious 
assault.  On June 1 of that year, the juvenile court had a bindover hearing and 
transferred the case to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  On July 
26, McCuller was indicted by the grand jury, and on January 11, 1980, he pleaded 
guilty to the indictment.  He was sentenced to 5 to 15 years on February 15, 1980.  
His sentence for those offenses and for others was completed on October 8, 2002. 
Case No. DL-7905098/CR-79-048919-ZA 
{¶ 5} On June 27, 1979, McCuller was charged in juvenile court with one 
count of attempted rape.  On July 9, the juvenile court conducted a bindover 
hearing and transferred the case to the common pleas court.  On August 14, 
January Term, 2015 
 
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McCuller was indicted, and on January 11, 1980, he pleaded guilty.  He was 
sentenced on February 15 to 7 to 25 years.  He was released on October 8, 2002. 
Case No. DL-7909646/CR-79-052011-ZA 
{¶ 6} On June 27, 1979, McCuller was charged in juvenile court with one 
count of kidnapping and one count of rape.  On July 9, the court held a bindover 
hearing and transferred the case to the court of common pleas.  On December 5, 
McCuller was indicted, and on January 11, 1980, he pleaded guilty to one count 
of rape.  On February 15, he was sentenced to 7 to 25 years.  He was released on 
October 8, 2002. 
Case No. DL-7906998/CR-79-049139-A 
{¶ 7} On May 11, 1979, McCuller was charged in juvenile court with 
breaking and entering and possession of criminal tools.  On June 1, the juvenile 
court held a bindover hearing and transferred the case to the court of common 
pleas.  On July 26, McCuller was indicted, but on January 11, 1980, both counts 
were nolled. 
Case No. DL-7909498 
{¶ 8} On June 28, 1979, McCuller was charged in juvenile court with 
breaking and entering and possession of criminal tools.  The juvenile court held a 
bindover hearing and transferred the case to the court of common pleas.  No 
record exists showing that McCuller was ever indicted in common pleas court for 
these offenses. 
Petition for procedendo/mandamus  
{¶ 9} Even though he has completed his sentences on these convictions 
and was released in 2002,1 McCuller, on July 22, 2013, filed a complaint for a 
writ of procedendo/mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District, 
arguing that the bindovers were invalid because they had not been signed by a 
                                          
 
1 McCuller was reincarcerated on April 7, 2005, for various offenses, including rape, robbery, and 
felonious assault.  
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judge or journalized by the court’s clerk and therefore violated Crim.R. 32 and 
Civ.R. 58.  He apparently wants a writ ordering the juvenile court to proceed to 
judgment on the motions for bindover.  He claims that the delay has robbed him 
of due process.  The juvenile court filed a motion for summary judgment, and 
McCuller responded. 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals granted summary judgment to respondent and 
denied the writ. McCuller appealed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to a writ of procedendo, McCuller must show a clear 
legal right to require the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the 
court to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law.  State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio 
St.3d 461, 462, 650 N.E.2d 899 (1995).  A writ of procedendo is proper when a 
court has refused to enter judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to 
judgment.  State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna, 73 Ohio 
St.3d 180, 184, 652 N.E.2d 742 (1995). 
{¶ 12} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, McCuller must establish a 
clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the court to 
grant it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, 
¶ 6.  Appeal is generally considered an adequate remedy sufficient to preclude a 
writ.  State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 
(1967), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 13} Thus, if McCuller has an adequate remedy at law, he is precluded 
from receiving relief in either procedendo or mandamus.  The court of appeals 
concluded that McCuller had an adequate remedy at law by way of a direct appeal 
of his convictions and sentences. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 14} McCuller claims that he is not challenging the bindover procedure 
itself.  Instead, he wants the court to “proceed to judgment” on the cases he claims 
are still pending because the bindover entries were never signed by the judge and 
were never journalized.  However, in three of the five cases, McCuller was in fact 
transferred to the common pleas court, pleaded guilty, and was convicted and 
sentenced.  The court has clearly “proceeded to judgment” on those bindovers, 
whether they were proper or not.  He could have challenged these bindovers in his 
appeal of the criminal convictions, and therefore he had an adequate remedy. 
{¶ 15} In the remaining two cases, one (CR-79-049139-A) was dismissed 
because all charges were nolled.  Before filing this action, McCuller filed a 
similar action in mandamus and prohibition arguing that this bindover, along with 
the bindover in case No. CR-79-052011-ZA, was improper and thus that his 
criminal cases were void ab initio.  State ex rel. McCuller v. Calabrese, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 96764, 2011-Ohio-3992.  In that case, the Eighth District noted 
that the charges in case No. CR-79-049139-A had been nolled and denied the 
writs.  The court concluded that “[i]t is difficult to see how any meaningful relief 
could be granted in that case.  A writ will not issue to compel a vain act.”  Id. at  
¶ 10.  McCuller apparently did not appeal that decision further. 
{¶ 16} Thus, res judicata prevents any court from issuing a writ on behalf 
of McCuller for four of the five claims here.  The doctrine of res judicata involves 
both claim preclusion (historically called estoppel by judgment in Ohio) and issue 
preclusion (traditionally known as collateral estoppel).  Grava v. Parkman Twp., 
73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995), citing Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. 
Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 
103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989).  As to claim preclusion, a final judgment or 
decree rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is a complete 
bar to any subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties or those 
in privity with them.  Id., citing Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 
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N.E.2d 67 (1943), paragraph one of the syllabus, and Whitehead, paragraph one 
of the syllabus.  Moreover, an existing final judgment or decree between the 
parties is conclusive as to all claims that were or might have been litigated in a 
first lawsuit.  Id. at 382, citing Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio 
St.3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990), and Rogers v. Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 
69, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986).  Res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every 
ground for relief in the first action or be forever barred from asserting it.  Id., 
quoting Natl. Amusements at 62. 
{¶ 17} Here, McCuller filed a previous writ action in which he asserted his 
claims regarding faulty bindover in two of the cases he now complains of.  2011-
Ohio-3992.  Whatever arguments he makes here about the court proceeding to 
judgment on those bindovers could have been made in the earlier case.  Two of 
the other bindovers could have been challenged on direct appeal of McCuller’s 
convictions.  His claims in four of the five cases are therefore res judicata, and the 
court of appeals was correct to deny the writ with respect to those claims. 
{¶ 18} In his final case, juvenile court case No. DL-7909498, no record 
exists of any prosecution or conviction after the bindover.  It appears that for 
whatever reason, McCuller escaped the consequences that typically follow a 
bindover.  Therefore, McCuller suffered no harm from any error that might have 
been committed by the juvenile court regarding this bindover.  Granting a writ to 
compel the juvenile court to issue a new bindover order would not result in any 
meaningful relief for McCuller, as he would receive no benefit from such an 
order.  A writ will not issue to compel a vain act.  State ex rel. Vaughn v. Money, 
104 Ohio St.3d 322, 2004-Ohio-6561, 323, 819 N.E.2d 681, ¶ 11, quoting State ex 
rel. Cotton v. Ghee, 84 Ohio St.3d 54, 55, 701 N.E.2d 989 (1998). 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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_____________________ 
 
Charles D. McCuller, pro se. 
 
Timothy McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. 
Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_____________________