Title: STATE v ARMSTRONG

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13063 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 THE STATE OF MONTAlUA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, M K O L D AKMSTRONG , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal. from: 9 i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Courlsel of Record : For Appellant : John R. P r a t e r argued, Terry, Montana Donald W. Molloy argued, Law Student, Missoula, Montana Kubert C. P e r argued, Law Student, Mtssoula, Montana rF Daniel A. Piedalue argued, Law Student, Missoula, Montana Hon, Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana k!illiam J. Anderson argued, Assistant Attorney General, Yelena , Montana Harold Hanser argued, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Xontana Submitted: June 4, 1976 Decided :ml - - 2 ,I 1071: " , M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant was convicted by jury v e r d i c t of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and robbery i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County. Judge Charles Luedke sentenced him t o consecutive prison t e r m s of 1 0 0 years f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide and 40 years f o r robbery. Defendant appeals from t h e judgment of conviction. Because no eye-witness accounts of t h e crimes charged were presented a t t h e t r i a l , t h e s t a t e ' s case was b u i l t upon testimony concerning t h e events preceding and following t h e crimes, t h e physical evidence r e l a t e d t h e r e t o , and evidence re- garding p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n ~ . W e w i l l only set f o r t h those f a c t s p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s appeal which a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e record. A t about 8:00 a.m. on January 22, 1975, t h e body of t h e victim of t h e crimes involved, Lynn Lords, was found i n a b o i l e r room located i n an a l l e y i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. There were m u l t i p l e s t a b wounds i n Lords' neck, c h e s t and back; t h e cause of h i s death was determined t o be massive blood l o s s from a wound i n t h e neck. The weapon causing t h e s t a b wounds was medically determined t o be a r e l a t i v e l y heavy-duty k n i f e of some s o r t . Lords had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a poker game a t t h e C r y s t a l Lounge i n B i l l i n g s on t h e preceding n i g h t , January 21-22, 1975. H e played u n t i l approximately c l o s i n g t i m e then cashed i n c h i p s with a value of between two hundred and four hundred d o l l a r s . The defendant p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e s a m e poker game, cashed i n no more than about t h i r t y d o l l a r s worth of chips a t t h e end of t h e game. During t h e few days p r i o r t o t h e poker game, t h e defend- a n t had indicated t o a t l e a s t two witnesses t h a t he was without funds and had w r i t t e n checks on a bank account with i n s u f f i c i e n t funds. H e had r e c e n t l y been l a i d o f f from h i s job. The defendant and Lords s e p a r a t e l y entered t h e C r y s t a l Lounge e a r l y on t h e evening of January 2 1 , 1975; they apparently l e f t s e p a r a t e l y and by d i f f e r e n t e x i t s a t about 2:00 a.m., January 22. When defendant f i r s t entered t h e establishment on January 2 1 he was wearing a blue c o a t and a gun b e l t with a p i s t o l and hunting-type k n i f e t h e r e i n . The b e l t , gun and k n i f e were l e f t a t t h e bar and t h e p i s t o l was given t o a C r y s t a l em- ployee as s e c u r i t y f o r a loan of money t o defendant. The k n i f e was returned t o defendant a t about 12:30 a.m.; t h e gun was never returned t o him. Shortly a f t e r 2:30 a.m., January 22, t h e defendant drove h i s v e h i c l e i n t o a s e r v i c e s t a t i o n i n B i l l i n g s . H e requested t h e a t t e n d a n t t o perform c e r t a i n r e p a i r work on t h e v e h i c l e , f o r which defendant paid i n cash, giving a twenty-dollar b i l l and having considerable o t h e r money i n h i s possession. He a l s o clean- ed h i s v e h i c l e and washed t h e f l o o r mats and a p a i r of boots with water. The a t t e n d a n t later r e t r i e v e d some a r t i c l e s from a waste- basket which defendant had apparently thrown away. O n t h e afternoon of January 22, 1975, defendant w a s a r r e s t e d f o r s h o p l i f t i n g a blue c o a t from a hardware s t o r e i n B i l l i n g s . When he entered t h e s t o r e he w a s n o t wearing a c o a t . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e s h o p l i f t i n g a r r e s t eventually l e d t o t h e charges involved i n t h e i n s t a n t case. The t r i a l l a s t e d s i x days and involved t h e testimony of 3 9 s t a t e witnesses and t h e admission of 55 s t a t e e x h i b i t s and two defense e x h i b i t s . Fourteen B i l l i n g s p o l i c e o f f i c e r s testi- f i e d f o r t h e s t a t e on various a s p e c t s of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e crimes and of defendant's s h o p l i f t i n g a r r e s t . Counsel f o r t h e defense made no opening statement, and r e s t e d a t t h e c l o s e of t h e s t a t e ' s case i n c h i e f . The defendant d i d not t e s t i f y . The jury returned g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on both crimes charged. After sentencing, defendant made motion for a new trial, which was denied. The issues on appeal are as follows: 1. Were the prosecutor's comments to the jury on clos- ing argument tantamount to comments on the failure of defendant to testify and therefore in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana Constitution? 2. Did the district court commit prejudicial error in admitting evidence of other acts or conduct of the defendant? 3. Did the district court commit prejudicial error in admitting into evidence a coat and testimony pertaining to the alleged theft of the coat? 4. Did the district court err in its failure to instruct the jury on the elements of theft in the course of its instruc- tions on the elements of robbery? 5. Was the testimony of 14 police officers so unnecessary and unduly prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial? The first issue concerns certain remarks made by the county attorney during his closing argument to the jury. It is beyond question that the prosecution is strictly prohibited from commenting on a defendant's failure to testify, for such comment may negate the presumption of a defendant's innocence in vio- lation of his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L ed 2d 106. This federal constitu- tional right inures to the benefit of defendants in state courts by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con- stitution. Griffin, supra; State v. Hart, 154 Mont. 310, 316, 462 P.2d 885. The Montana constitutional guaranty affords no greater protection than that of the Federal constitution. State v. Anderson, 156 Mont. 122, 125, 4 7 6 P.2d 780. I n Anderson t h i s Court s a i d t h a t t h e test of t h e p r o p r i e t y of a prose- c u t o r ' s comments is: " ' * * * whether t h e language used w a s m a n i f e s t l y intended o r was of such c h a r a c t e r t h a t t h e jury would n a t u r a l l y and n e c e s s a r i l y t a k e it t o be a comment on t h e f a i l u r e of t h e accused t o t e s t i f y . ' " I n H a r t , w e found r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y d i d n o t s e e f i t t o o f f e r any evidence t o c o n t r o v e r t t h e s t o r y of a policeman who testi- f i e d t o searching t h e defendant and f i n d i n g i n c r i m i n a t i n g evi- dence. The foundation of t h a t d e c i s i o n was t h a t any c o n t r o v e r t - ing evidence " * * * could only come from t h e defendant himself * * *.I1 I n s o holding, t h e Court r e l i e d upon two f e d e r a l cases: Desmond v. United S t a t e s , 345 F.2d 225, 14 ALR3d 718 ( F i r s t C i r . 1965), and Rodriguez-Sandoval v. United S t a t e s , 409 F.2d 529 ( F i r s t C i r . 1969). I n both cases c o n v i c t i o n s w e r e reversed be- cause comment was made t h a t d i r e c t testimony of prosecution witnesses was n o t c o n t r a d i c t e d . I n a l l t h r e e c a s e s , t h e uncon- t r a d i c t e d testimony commented upon concerned s i t u a t i o n s where t h e government witness and t h e defendant himself w e r e p r e s e n t and no o t h e r witnesses t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r occurrences w e r e a v a i l - a b l e . Thus, t h e i n f e r e n c e t o be drawn from such comments i s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y negates t h e presumption of innocence. I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e f a c t s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h e county a t t o r n e y never made r e f e r e n c e t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y nor t o defense c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e t o c a l l defendant t o t h e witness stand. Second, t h e r e was no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e uncontradicted n a t u r e of t h e testimony of any witness who was p r e s e n t w i t h t h e defendant during o r immediately a f t e r t h e c r i m e s as w a s t h e case i n Hart, Desmond and Rodriguez- Sandoval. While it is t r u e t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y o f t e n asked r h e t o r i c a l questions which amounted t o comments t h a t t h e r e was "no evidence" o r "no testimony" t o r e b u t t h e inferences r a i s e d by t h e s t a t e ' s evidence, nowhere does it appear t h a t t h e s e comments would n e c e s s a r i l y imply t h a t defendant was t h e only source which could negate s t a t e ' s evidence. The most t h a t can be s a i d of t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s comments is t h a t they r e f e r r e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e defense presented no c a s e a t a l l . Certain- l y t h e prosecution, as an adversary f o r t h e s t a t e , cannot be prohibited from arguing t h e s t r e n g t h of its c a s e t o t h e jury. The manifest f a c t t h a t t h e defense presented no testimony of its own may be detrimental t o t h e defendant, but such f a c t cannot deny t h e prosecution its r i g h t t o s t r e s s t h e s t r e n g t h of i t s own evidence. Compare: United S t a t e s ex r e l . Leak v. F o l l e t t e , 418 F.2d 1266 ( 2d-.Cir. 1969), c e r t . den. 397 U.S. 1050, 90 S.Ct. 1388, 25 L ed 2d 665. Thus, we hold t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s comments regard- ing t h e absence of controverting evidence i n t h i s case d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of defendant's r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t under t h e United S t a t e s Constitution, 1972 Montana Constitution, A r t i c l e 11, Section 25; G r i f f i n , o r Hart. W e a l s o note here, a s we d i d i n S t a t e v. Caryl, Mont. , 543 P.2d 389, 32 St.Rep. 1207, 1221, where e r r o r w a s assigned t o prosecution comments made during t r i a l , t h a t : "A measure of t h e lack of s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s a l l e g e d e r r o r is found i n t h e f a i l u r e of t h e defendant t o move f o r a m i s t r i a l , submit an a d d i t i o n a l cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n , request t h e c o u r t t o admonish t h e county a t t o r n e y i n t h e presence of t h e jury, o r t o t a k e any f u r t h e r c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n . " I n t h e second assignment of e r r o r , defendant contends t h a t evidence was improperly admitted which served t h e s o l e pur- pose of c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e defendant a s an e v i l man with a v i o l e n t d i s p o s i t i o n , a s p l i t p e r s o n a l i t y , and a p e c u l i a r a f f i n i t y f o r weapons. I n p a r t i c u l a r , defendant o b j e c t s t o t h e testi- mony of t h e following: (1) county welfare employee J o Strobbe who t e s t i f i e d t h a t on January 21, 1975, t h e day before t h e k i l l - ing, defendant w a s i n her o f f i c e seeking b e n e f i t s and d i s - played an angry demeanor which frightened t h e witness and caused her t o leave t h e room i n tears, y e t a few moments later de- f e n d a n t ' s a t t i t u d e changed t o one of p o l i t e calm; (2) acquaintance Donald Finch and wife Peggy Finch, who both t e s t i f i e d t h a t while defendant stayed a t t h e i r home during January 19-21, 1975, de- fendant c a r r i e d loaded weapons i n t h e house i n t h e presence of t h e i r c h i l d r e n and s l e p t with h i s k n i f e and p i s t o l i n h i s bed. The s t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, argues t h a t t h e above testimony w a s properly admitted t o show defendant's i n t e n t and motive t o commit t h e crimes charged; t h a t is, t h e testimony of Strobbe showed h i s d e s t i t u t e f i n a n c i a l condition and t h e testi- mony of t h e Finches showed t h e high regard he had f o r h i s p i s t o l which he l a t e r on January 21 "hocked" f o r money t o play poker. Defendant relies primarily upon S t a t e v. Sanders, 158 Mont. 113, 489 P.2d 371, f o r t h e proposition t h a t admitted evi- dence must be r e l e v a n t as tending t o prove o r disprove f a c t s i n i s s u e i n t h e case, and t h a t evidence of p a s t a c t s o r conduct tend- ing t o show only bad c h a r a c t e r a r e c o l l a t e r a l , i r r e l e v a n t and p r e j u d i c i a l . Sanders is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . Here, u n l i k e Sanders, t h e testimony was admitted on t h e b a s i s of relevancy. The testimony taken a s a whole tends t o e s t a b l i s h t h e f a c t t h a t defendant, j u s t p r i o r t o t h e crimes, w a s desperate f o r money. Such circumstan- t i a l evidence may provide an inference f o r t h e motive of t h e crimes. See S t a t e v. Murdock, 160 Mont. 95, 1 0 4 , 500 P.2d 387; S t a t e v. Fine, 90 Mont. 311, 2 P.2d 1016. A s we s t a t e d i n Murdock: " * * * Although motive is n o t an element of t h e crime, motive o r lack of motive is a c i r - cumstance tending t o e s t a b l i s h g u i l t o r innocence * * *.I1 Furthermore, t h e record does n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t any testimony regarding defendant's c h a r a c t e r which was admitted a s p a r t of t h e motive evidence was p r e j u d i c i a l t o defendant. The t h i r d assignment of e r r o r is t h a t evidence of o t h e r crimes committed by an accused i s inadmissible t o show commission of t h e crime charged. A discussion of t h e general r u l e and i t s exceptions is contained i n S t a t e v. Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 239, 455 P.2d 631. There w e held t h a t t h e t e s t of t h e exception t o t h e r u l e of exclusion has t h r e e elements: " s i m i l a r i t y of crimes o r a c t s , nearness i n time, and tendency t o e s t a b l i s h a common scheme, plan o r system." Defendant contends t h a t testimony and e x h i b i t s concerning h i s a r r e s t f o r s h o p l i f t i n g a blue c o a t on January 2 2 , 1975 bear l i t t l e r e l a t i o n t o t h e Jensen test of ad- m i s s i b i l i t y . This argument misses t h e p o i n t . The testimony regarding t h e s h o p l i f t i n g o f f e n s e w a s admitted f o r t h e l e g i t i m a t e purpose of showing t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of evidence by t h e defendant. That is, t h e prosecution implied t h a t defendant destroyed t h e blue c o a t which he was seen wearing on t h e evening of January 21-22 because it w a s bloody, and w a s t r y i n g t o r e p l a c e it on t h e a f t e r - noon of January 22. The f a c t t h a t t h e blue c o a t w a s a l l e g e d l y s h o p l i f t e d was a n c i l l a r y and subordinate t o t h e f a c t t h a t defend- a n t was apparently replacing h i s o t h e r blue c o a t . The admission of t h e c o a t and t h e testimony surrounding it was proper under t h e s e circumstances. A s we s a i d i n S t a t e v. Francis, 58 Mont. 659, 671, 194 P. 304: " * * * This testimony tended t o show a destruc- t i o n o r suppression of evidence by t h e defendant, and was c l e a r l y admissible a s a circumstance tending toward defendant's g u i l t . From t h e record it i s c l e a r t h a t it was introduced f o r no o t h e r purpose and t h e jury must have s o understood t h e testimony." And w e s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Cesar, 72 Mont. 252, 255, 232 P. 1109: " I t i s t h e general r u l e t h a t , upon t h e t r i a l of one accused of a s p e c i f i c offense, evidence of d i s t i n c t and independent crimes is not admissible, and t h e reason f o r t h e r u l e is so apparent t h a t it does not c a l l f o r any discussion. But t h e r u l e is equally w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t , i f evidence tends t o prove t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e charged, it i s n o t rendered inadmissible because it tends a l s o t o prove t h a t t h e accused committed another crime. ( S t a t e v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 P. 1106.) The test is, not whether t h e o f f e r e d evidence tends t o prove an independent offense, b u t whether it is r e l e v a n t a s tending t o prove any f a c t m a t e r i a l t o t h e i s s u e i n t h e c a s e before t h e court.* * *" See a l s o : S t a t e v. Hughes, 76 Mont. 4 2 1 , 246 P. 959; S t a t e v. Quigg, 155 Mont. 119, 467 P.2d 692. The f o u r t h assignment of e r r o r i s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on t h e elements of robbery s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n t h e words of t h e robbery s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 94-5-401(1)(a), R.C.M. 1947, without d e f i n i n g " t h e f t " a s used i n t h a t s e c t i o n , i n t h e words of t h e t h e f t s t a t u t e s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1), R.C.M. 1947. This contention is without m e r i t . The record r e v e a l s no r e q u e s t by t h e defendant f o r a more s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n , o r , indeed, f o r any " t h e f t " i n s t r u c t i o n . " F a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t i n c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r s cannot be assigned as e r r o r , where t h e c o u r t has properly covered i s s u e s , s i n c e , i n t h e absence of request f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e r e i s no r u l i n g t o review. * * * " I t was incumbent upon defendant t o o f f e r and request more s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s had such been d e s i r e d . H i s f a i l u r e t o do s o cannot f u r n i s h him grounds f o r r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . " S t a t e v. Watson, 1 4 4 Mont. 576, 582, 584, 398 P.2d 949; s e e a l s o : S t a t e v. P e t e r s , 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642. F i n a l l y , defendant seeks r e v e r s a l on t h e ground t h a t he was denied due process of l a w by allowing t h e testimony of 1 4 p o l i c e o f f i c e r s on behalf of t h e s t a t e . The g i s t of h i s argument i s t h a t t h e "excessive number" of p o l i c e o f f i c e r s appearing on t h e witness stand denied him a f a i r t r i a l because t h e high re- spect which t h e uniform and t h e badge commands among conscientious c i t i z e n s g r e a t l y outweighs t h e necessity of t h e testimony. De- fendant simply f a i l s t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h i s c l a i m by bringing t o our a t t e n t i o n any f a c t s which would show prejudice--and i n our review of t h e record w e f i n d no such prejudice. I n any event, defense counsel never requested a l i m i t i n t h e number of p o l i c e witnesses a t any s t a g e of t h e proceedings, nor objected t o t h e i r testimony on such grounds; t h e question cannot be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t time on appeal. S t a t e v. Peters, supra. Two other s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r contained i n defend- a n t ' s o r i g i n a l b r i e f are so p a t e n t l y unmeritorious t h a t they r e q u i r e no discussion herein. Finding no e r r o r , t h e judgment of conviction is affirmed. / chief ~ ~ ~ t i c % , J u s t i c e