Title: State v. Tonzola

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-526


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Nicholas Tonzola                             November Term, 1992



 Linda Levitt, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
   General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Paul D. Jarvis of Jarvis & Kaplan, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      MORSE, J.     Defendant Nicholas Tonzola appeals his conviction,
 following a bench trial, of three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct (L &
 L) and two counts of perjury.  The State charged defendant with six counts
 of sexual misconduct with five women while defendant was employed as an
 electroencephalogram (EEG) technician at Vermont State Hospital and Medical
 Center Hospital of Vermont, where, at various times during the latter part
 of 1988, the women were patients.  The court acquitted defendant on one
 count of L & L and two counts of sexual assault involving two of the
 patients.  The perjury charges arose from alleged false statements made by
 defendant at inquest proceedings prior to the filing of criminal charges.
 We affirm.
      The patients claiming sexual mistreatment suffered from a variety of
 mental disorders, including depression, borderline personality, and
 epilepsy.  They exhibited various abnormal mental states, such as self-
 destructive behavior, memory loss, delusional and paranoid thinking,
 hallucinations, and hysteria.  The EEG tests record brain activity.  The
 tests normally last sixty to ninety minutes, and were administered while the
 patients were under medication to help them relax.
      One patient testified that during the course of the EEG, defendant
 fondled her breast, touched her pubic area, and wet her lips with his
 fingers.  The court found defendant guilty of L & L.  A second patient
 testified that during her EEG, defendant touched her breast and pubic area,
 and told her to "suck on" his penis.  Defendant told her not to tell
 anyone.  Defendant was found guilty of L & L.  The third patient testified
 that defendant wet her lips with his fingers, and then put his fingers in
 her mouth.  When she tried to remove his fingers by using her tongue,
 defendant asked her if she'd "like to have something else to suck on."
 Although she said no, defendant exposed his penis.  She turned her head away
 and asked him to call a nurse.  Defendant was found guilty of L & L.
      The court could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that similar
 behavior toward two other patients was not willingly accepted by them and
 acquitted defendant on those two counts.
      The perjury charges stemmed from an inquest at which defendant was
 asked, "Have you ever touched a patient's breast while performing this
 procedure at the Vermont State Hospital?" and "Did you ask the patient to
 masturbate your penis during the EEG test?"  Defendant answered "No" each
 time.  The court found his responses to have been intentionally false.
      Defendant claims numerous points of error: (1) the findings of fact
 were not supported by the evidence; (2) defendant's motion for acquittal
 should have been granted because lack of consent for L & L was not
 established, and, regarding the perjury charges, the taking of an oath was
 not proved, the perjury counts were not sufficiently corroborated, the
 counts were based on a "perjury trap," and the defendant's statements at the
 inquest should have been suppressed because no Miranda warnings were given;
 (3) the court should have granted severance of the sexual abuse counts and
 not considered one incident to prove another; and (4) defendant should have
 been allowed access to all the victims' psychiatric records and allowed
 independent psychological examination of each victim.
                                     I.
      We first consider defendant's claim that the court's findings are not
 supported by the evidence.  Under V.R.Cr.P. 23, in a case tried without a
 jury, the court must "make a general finding" and "on request find the facts
 specially."  V.R.Cr.P. 23(c).  Defendant did not request any findings of
 fact prior to issuance of the trial court's decision; he simply asserts that
 the court's guilty verdicts were not sufficiently explained.  Defendant
 waived findings by not requesting them, and even had he made a request, the
 trial court made numerous and complete findings which sufficiently explained
 the outcome.  We have had no trouble determining how and why the court
 reached its judgments.  See Mayer v. Mayer, 144 Vt. 214, 216,