Title: Ex Parte Dial

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

387 So. 2d 879 (1980)
Ex parte Jake M. DIAL.
(In re Jake M. Dial v. State of Alabama).
79-270.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 7, 1980.
SHORES, Justice.
We granted the petition for writ of certiorari in this case because the petitioner, through the utilization of Rule 39(k) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, demonstrated that the Court of Criminal Appeals, 387 So. 2d 871, in its opinion had not addressed an issue, properly preserved at the trial below, the effect of which was to render the opinion in conflict with other decisions on the exact same issue.
We agree and reverse and remand.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held, and we think properly so, that the state had discharged its burden of showing that the inculpatory statements made by the defendant, Dial, to Investigator Billingsley were admissible. The record shows that the district attorney was allowed to elicit from Officer Billingsley the inculpatory statements. The following appears from the record:
On cross-examination, the defense attorney asked this witness:
The witness then answered "Yes."
On re-direct, the district attorney continued the questioning of Officer Billingsley:
It has long been the law that a witness may not give his opinion on a question of law or upon matters which involve questions of law. In Fiorella v. City of Birmingham, 35 Ala.App. 384, 48 So. 2d 761 (1950), Judge Harwood quoted from 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 799 (1939), as follows:
35 Ala.App. at pp. 388-389, 48 So.2d at p. 766.
Judge McElroy in McElroy's Alabama Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 128.07, states the rule as follows:
The rule is restated in 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 69 (1967), as follows:
In this case, over objection, the court has allowed Officer Billingsley to testify that, in his opinion, Booger-Red was an accomplice. That is a question of law. In Russell v. State, 365 So. 2d 343 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), the Court of Criminal Appeals said:
Even if it were assumed that a lawyer should be able to express his opinion with respect to whether or not Booger-Red was an accomplice, under the uncontroverted facts elicited from the statement made by defendant, Dial, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Officer Billingsley was shown to be a lawyer. The only reference to that is the statement of the district attorney in response to the defendant's objection to the question put to Billingsley that "he's qualified as a lawyer."
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FAULKNER, JONES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with the majority that the law is well-settled that a witness may not give his opinion on a question of law or on matters which involve questions of law, but I do not think that counsel preserved the point for review, because his objection was general rather than specific; therefore, I would apply the rule that a trial court will not be reversed for overruling an objection which fails to specify the proper grounds unless such evidence is patently illegal. W. T. Ratliff Company, Inc. v. Purvis, 292 Ala. 171, 291 So. 2d 289 (1974).
As the majority opinion shows, defense counsel, during his cross-examination of the witness Billingsley, attempted to show that a person named "Booger Red" had not been charged with the offense. Faced with this evidence, the district attorney had a right to counter with evidence which would show the reason why the witness had not charged "Booger Red" with the offense. The witness testified that he considered "Booger Red" an accomplice but that he had nothing other than Dial's statement upon which to make a case against "Booger Red." It is axiomatic that "[a] conviction of felony cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." Code 1975, § 12-21-222; see also Senn v. State, 344 So. 2d 192 (Ala.1977). Since the defendant tried to discredit the officer by showing that the officer had not charged "Booger Red" with the offense, I think, on rebuttal, the witness could, and did, explain why he did not charge "Booger Red"; in short, I think that the witness had a right to give a shorthand rendition of the reasons why he did not charge "Booger Red." In any event, under the facts in this case, I do not consider the evidence that the witness considered "Booger Red" an "accomplice" was prejudicial, even if inadmissible. Rule 45, ARAP.