Title: WELCH v. HAT SIX HOMES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WELCH v. HAT SIX HOMES2002 WY 8147 P.3d 199Case Number: 00-209, 00-210Decided: 05/28/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

DAWN WELCH 
and CONNIE HARN, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

HAT SIX 
HOMES, a Wyoming

corporation, 
JIM JERETT and

MARALYNE 
MIDDOUR, individually, 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

HAT SIX 
HOMES, a Wyoming

corporation, 
JIM JERETT and

MARALYNE 
MIDDOUR, individually, 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

DAWN 
WELCH, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge 

 

Representing 
Dawn M. Welch and Connie Harn:

Phillip 
T. Willoughby and Cameron S. Walker, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Walker.

Representing 
Hat Six Homes, Inc., and James W. Jerrett and Maralyne S. 
Middour:

Les 
Bowron and Frank Chapman of Beech Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Chapman.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
  

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
These 
two consolidated appeals arise from an award of attorney's fees and costs.  In appeal number 00-209, Appellants Dawn 
Welch and Connie Harn appeal a court award of attorney's fees against them and 
their attorney.  In appeal number 
00-210, Appellants Hat Six Homes, Jim Jerett and Maralyne Middour appeal the 
amount of the attorney's fees awarded, complaining that the amount is 
insufficient.  Finding the district 
court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees under the circumstances, 
we reverse.  Appeal number 00-210 is 
dismissed as moot.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
In 
appeal number 00-209, Appellants Welch and Harn present the following 
issues:

 

1.  Did the trial court err as a matter of 
law awarding attorney's fees and costs against Plaintiffs' counsel under Count 
One of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Sexual Discrimination, under 42 U.S.C. 
§2000(e)?

2.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
as a matter of public policy and under the facts of this case by awarding 
attorney's fees against the Plaintiffs under Count One of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Sexual Discrimination, under 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) and its 
subsections?

3.  The trial court erred as a matter of law 
deciding issues concerning 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) and its subsections without 
determining if Defendants were "prevailing parties" and that any such 
determination under the facts of this case would be contrary to 
law.

4.  Did the trial court err as a matter of 
law imposing sanctions as a violation of W.R.C.P. Rule 11(b) against Plaintiffs 
and Plaintiffs' counsel as a result of pleading as Count One of their Complaint, 
Sexual Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) based on Plaintiffs' reasonable 
belief as to the number of employed persons of the 
Defendant?

5.  Did the trial court err as a matter of 
law finding the Plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress was pled in violation of W.R.C.P. Rule 11(b) because Plaintiffs had not 
sought treatment for distress and an award of attorney's fees was appropriate as 
a sanction?

6.  Did the trial court err awarding Rule 11 
sanctions against Plaintiffs if any counts of a multiple count complaint 
survived summary judgment and the surviving counts, prior to trial, were 
voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiffs?

 

Appellees 
rephrase the issues as:

 

1.  May Plaintiffs raise for the first time 
on appeal the issue of possible error by the District Court regarding the 
District Court's award of attorney's fees and costs under Title VII against 
Plaintiffs' counsel?

2.  Did the District Court commit reversible 
error by finding that Defendants were the prevailing 
parties?

3.  Did the District Court commit reversible 
error in its award to Defendants of part of their attorney's fees and costs as a 
sanction under W.R.C.P. 11 as to Count I?

4.  Did the District Court commit reversible 
error in its award to Defendants of part of their attorney's fees and costs as a 
sanction under W.R.C.P. 11 as to Count V?

5.  Did the District Court commit reversible 
error in awarding attorney's fees and costs under Rule 11 in light of 
Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the rest of their baseless 
complaint?

 

[¶3]           
In 
appeal number 00-210, Appellants' single issue is: "Did the District Court 
commit reversible error by abusing it's [sic] discretion in denying Defendants a 
complete award of their attorney's fees under Title VII and a more appropriate 
sanction pursuant to W.R.C.P. 11?"  
Only Appellee Welch filed a brief in answer to Appellants and 
substantially agreed with the statement of the issue.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
Dawn 
Welch and Connie Harn worked for Hat Six Homes.  Jim Jerett and Maralyne Middour are 
officers and employees of Hat Six Homes.  
Among other complaints, Welch and Harn both alleged that Jerett was 
guilty of continuing instances of sexual harassment in the workplace.  Welch filed an affidavit in the case 
below in which she alleged that, although she continuously protested against 
such conduct, Jerett would repeatedly put "his hands on the back of my neck, 
down the back of my shirt or sweater, up the back of my shirt or sweater, under 
my arms from behind, often times extending his hands to the front and touching 
my breasts."  Based upon this 
conduct, Welch and Harn, through their attorney Phillip T. Willoughby, in 
December 1997 filed a multiple-count complaint against Hat Six Homes, Jerett and 
Middour (hereinafter collectively "Hat Six"), alleging various claims for 
relief.

 

[¶5]           
Of 
importance to the instant appeal are two particular counts of the 
complaint.  One count alleged a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Another count alleged intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  
Hat Six moved for summary judgment on all counts.  Although some counts survived the motion 
for summary judgment, in March 1999 summary judgment was granted to Hat Six on 
the above-described two counts.

 

[¶6]           
With 
regard to the alleged Title VII violation, Title VII only applies to employers 
who employ a minimum number of employees.  
Hat Six originally averred that Welch and Harn were independent 
contractors and not employees.  In 
support of its motion for summary judgment, Hat Six submitted an affidavit 
stating that it never employed the requisite number of employees during the 
applicable time period.  At the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Welch and Harn conceded that Hat Six 
did not have the requisite number of employees during the applicable time 
period, and summary judgment was entered against them on Title VII on this 
ground.  With regard to the claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the district court granted 
summary judgment on the grounds that the alleged conduct was not outrageous 
enough to be actionable and that any alleged distress suffered was not 
sufficiently severe.1  

 

[¶7]           
Welch 
and Harn have not appealed the grant of summary judgment on any count.  Ultimately, Welch and Harn determined 
that they did not wish to continue with the litigation and moved for a voluntary 
dismissal.  A voluntary dismissal 
with prejudice was granted in December 1999, with the court specifically 
reserving the issue of the grant of attorney's fees and 
costs.

 

[¶8]           
In 
February 2000, Hat Six moved for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
provisions in Title VII and separately moved for sanctions pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
11.  For the count alleging a 
violation of Title VII, the district court awarded a total of $1,000.  The district court awarded the amount 
both as attorney's fees under Title VII and also as a sanction under Rule 
11.  Pursuant to Rule 11, the 
district court made the amount payable by Welch and Harn and by their attorney, 
Willoughby.  The court specifically 
found that the suit was meritless because Hat Six did not employ the requisite 
number of employees and that Willoughby failed to make a reasonable inquiry into 
the number of employees before filing the complaint.

 

[¶9]           
The 
district court also awarded $500 as sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 for the count 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Neither plaintiff had sought treatment 
for severe emotional distress in this case.  The district court considered seeking 
treatment for severe distress to be a prerequisite to filing a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and reasoned that Willoughby should 
have known he could not meet this prerequisite and should not have filed the 
claim.  Welch and Harn timely 
appealed the award of attorney's fees,2 and Hat Six timely appealed the 
amount awarded.

  

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶10]       
We apply 
an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing an award of sanctions.  Bender v. Phillips, 8 P.3d 1074, 
1077 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 517 (Wyo. 
1995)).  We also review the grant of 
attorney's fees under Title VII under an abuse of discretion standard.  Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994) ("We will not reverse a district court's 
award of fees to a prevailing party unless the award represents an abuse of 
discretion."); see also Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial 
Ctr., 963 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1992); Reazin v. Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 980 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
497 U.S. 1005 (1990).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]       
As their 
initial issue, Appellants Welch and Harn question the propriety of the award of 
attorney's fees against their attorney, Willoughby.  The specific issue of the award of 
attorney's fees against Willoughby, however, is not properly before this 
Court.  As this appeal is presented 
to this Court, it is abundantly clear that the only appealing parties are Welch 
and Harn.  The notice of appeal in 
this case clearly designates the appellants as Welch and Harn and appeals the 
"Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs," an order which applies to them.  The notice gives no indication that 
Willoughby is appealing.  In fact, 
the language of the briefs makes it clear that Willoughby is not appealing; 
rather, only Welch and Harn are appealing.  
The appellants' brief is specifically submitted in the names of Welch and 
Harn.  Further, the answer brief for 
the cross-appeal is in the name of Welch only and refers to the appellants' 
brief in appeal number 00-209 as the "Welch-Harn" brief.  

 

[¶12]       
The 
problem this creates is that Welch and Harn, the appellants in appeal number 
00-209, do not have standing to appeal an award of attorney's fees against 
Willoughby.  Clients do not have 
standing to appeal the award of attorney's fees against their attorney.  Laurino v. Tate, 220 F.3d 1213, 
1218 (10th Cir. 2000); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998).  
Clients simply do not possess the requisite interest, pecuniary or 
otherwise, to support standing.   
Estate of Bishop v. Bechtel Power Corp., 905 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Because a party can hardly be 
expected to shoulder the financial burden of sanctions entered against its 
attorney, it lacks the requisite interest for standing to appeal.")   

 

[¶13]       
It is 
the attorney's interest that is at stake, and it is the attorney that should 
bring the appeal in his own name.  
An appeal is begun by the filing of a notice of appeal.  W.R.A.P. 2.07(a)(1) states that the 
party or parties taking the appeal must be specified in the notice of 
appeal.  Thus, if an attorney wishes 
to appeal the award of sanctions against him, the attorney must file a notice of 
appeal in his own name.  Willoughby 
never filed a notice of appeal in his name.  W.R.A.P. 1.03 states "[t]he timely 
filing of a notice of appeal, which complies with Rule 2.07(a), is 
jurisdictional."  Simply put, 
because Willoughby never appealed the award of sanctions against him, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue.

 

[¶14]       
In the 
recent appeal involving the award of sanctions against an attorney, Caldwell 
v. Cummings, 2001 WY 106, 33 P.3d 1138 (Wyo. 2001), this Court, on its own 
motion, substituted appellants.  
Originally, the client, who we recognized as having no appealable 
interest, brought the appeal.  This 
Court decided that it was appropriate to substitute appellants in Caldwell 
because the appeal was from an order imposing sanctions against the attorney 
only.  Id. at n.1.  Because the award was against the 
attorney only, it was obvious that the attorney was the only person who could 
bring the appeal.  Thus, it was 
objectively clear that the attorney intended to take the appeal.  See Laurino, 220 F.3d  at 
1218 ("The notice of appeal here specifically purports to appeal, among other 
things, from an order . . .  that 
only concerns the sanctions entered against [the attorney].  Designation of this order provides 
sufficient evidence, by implication, of [the attorney's] intention to take an 
appeal from the order of sanctions." (emphasis in original)).  

 

[¶15]       
In 
Caldwell, then, because it was objectively apparent from the face of the 
notice of appeal that the attorney was the proper party to the appeal, we 
allowed the appeal to be maintained in the name of the attorney.  This appeal does not invoke the same 
leniency.  Here, it is obvious that 
Willoughby did not intend to appeal.  
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Torres v. Oakland 
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315-16, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2408, 101 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1988), "[p]ermitting imperfect but substantial compliance with a technical 
requirement is not the same as waiving the requirement altogether as a 
jurisdictional threshold."  In 
Torres, the Court made it clear that the party taking the appeal must be 
identifiable from the notice of appeal in order to invoke the appellate court's 
jurisdiction.  As the Court 
reasoned: 

 

[p]ermitting courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the time for filing a notice of appeal 
has passed is equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for filing a 
notice of appeal.  Because the Rules 
do not grant courts the latter power, we hold that the Rules likewise withhold 
the former.

 

Id. 
at 315, 
108 S. Ct.  at 2408.  

 

[¶16]       
Looking 
at the notice of appeal in this action, there is no way of telling that 
Willoughby intended to take an appeal from the order of sanctions as it applied 
to him.  In fact, the notice and the 
briefs filed in this action clearly evidence that Willoughby never intended to 
be, and in fact is not, a party to this appeal.  Willoughby has not invoked the 
jurisdiction of this Court.  Having 
no jurisdiction over Willoughby, we have no jurisdiction over matters that 
concern only Willoughby, and we thus decline to address the first 
issue.

 

[¶17]       
Although 
we have determined that we lack jurisdiction to review the order as it relates 
to awarding attorney's fees against Willoughby, this determination does not end 
the discussion.  The order appealed 
from awards sanctions against both the appellants and Willoughby.  The general rule is that a non-appealing 
party will not benefit from a judgment in favor of an appealing party.  5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 930 
(1993).  There is an exception, 
however, where the rights and interests of the parties are so intermingled and 
interdependent that reversal in favor of only one party would not affect a just 
result as to both the appealing and the nonappealing parties.  See e.g. Swinney v. Mosher, 830 S.W.2d 187, 197 (Tex. App. 1992) (general rule does not apply "where the 
respective rights of the appealing and nonappealing parties are so interwoven 
and dependent on each other as to require a reversal of the entire 
judgment").  Because the attorney's 
fees are payable by both appellants and Willoughby, and because Hat Six is 
appealing the amount awarded, Willoughby's interests will be prejudiced if he is 
not granted the benefit of this reversal.  
We therefore will hold that the results of these appeals apply equally to 
Willoughby.

 

 

 

[¶18]       
While we 
have great doubt regarding the reasoning employed by the district court in the 
granting of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, we need not reach the merits of the 
discussion because Hat Six failed to follow the procedure required to bring an 
appropriate motion for Rule 11 sanctions.  
Hat Six did not file its motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 until 
after the case had been dismissed.  
Such a motion runs contrary to the letter and the spirit of Rule 11.  Rule 11 states, in pertinent 
part:

 

Rule 11. 
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court; 
sanctions.

 

(a) 
Signature. --Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, 
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the 
party.  Each paper shall state the 
signer's address and telephone number, if any.  Except when otherwise specifically 
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by 
affidavit.  An unsigned paper shall 
be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being 
called to the attention of the attorney or party.

 

(b) 
Representations to court. --By presenting to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances:

 

(1) 
It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation;

 

(2) 
The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;

 

(3) 
The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; 
and

 

(4) 
The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief.

 

(c) 
Sanctions.  --If, after 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that 
subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or 
parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the 
violation.

 

            
(1) How Initiated.

 

(A) By 
motion.  --A motion for sanctions 
under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and 
shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b).  It shall be served as provided in Rule 
5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days 
after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), 
the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not 
withdrawn or appropriately corrected.  
If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion 
the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing 
the motion.  Absent exceptional 
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations 
committed by its partners, associates, and employees.

 

(B) On 
court's initiative.  --On its own 
initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that 
appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party 
to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect 
thereto.

 

(2) 
Nature of sanction; limitations.  
--A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what 
is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated.  Subject 
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or 
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into 
court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order 
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney's fees 
and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the 
violation.

 

[¶19]       
Rule 11 
sanctions are not to be cavalierly threatened or imposed.  We recently discussed the procedural 
requirements of Rule 11 in Caldwell.  Caldwell presented a similar 
procedural background: a motion for sanctions was filed after the case was 
resolved.  We vacated the order 
awarding sanctions under Rule 11 because the strict procedural requirements of 
Rule 11 were not followed.  2001 WY 
106, ¶12, 33 P.3d 1138, ¶12.  As we 
emphasized in Caldwell, Rule 11 contains a "safe harbor" provision by 
which counsel provides a warning to opposing counsel through the service of a 
motion for sanctions upon opposing counsel only.  Id. at ¶10.  This motion is not to be filed with the 
court until at least twenty-one days after its service, in order to give 
opposing counsel an opportunity to correct or withdraw any allegedly 
sanctionable paper.  Obviously, 
opposing counsel has no opportunity to correct or withdraw the allegedly 
offending paper if a motion for sanctions is served after the case is 
ended.  Here, the motion for Rule 11 
sanctions was filed directly with the district court after the case was 
settled.  Such a motion should not 
be entertained.  The award of 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 is vacated.

 

 

 

[¶20]       
The 
district court also awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 706(k) of Title VII.3  A fairly stringent standard is applied 
to the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII 
case.  A prevailing defendant in a 
Title VII action is entitled to attorney's fees only in the very limited 
circumstance where "a court finds that [plaintiff's] claim was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after 
it clearly became so."  
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S. Ct. 694, 701, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978).  
Attorney's fees cannot be awarded against a plaintiff simply because the 
plaintiff lost the case.  The 
Supreme Court specifically cautioned that courts must:

 

resist 
the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by 
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must 
have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could 
discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective 
plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. 

 

Id. 
at 
421-22, 98 S. Ct.  at 700.

 

[¶21]       
Strong 
policy considerations support restricting the award of attorney's fees to 
prevailing defendants in Title VII cases.  
Legislative policy encourages the vindication of civil rights through 
private litigation.  Id. at 
418, 98 S. Ct.  at 699 ("the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to 
vindicate a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority'" (quoting 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))).  Thus, limiting the award of attorney's 
fees to prevailing defendants under Title VII is appropriate and necessary in 
order to protect and encourage plaintiffs to file meritorious claims, especially 
plaintiffs of limited means.  

 

[¶22]       
Applying 
this law and these policy considerations to the instant appeal, we find that it 
was an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees to Hat Six.  While the parties raise the issue 
whether or not Hat Six was a prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-5(k), we need not determine this issue because the suit clearly was not 
frivolous.  Hat Six denied that 
Welch and Harn were employees, claiming instead that they were independent 
contractors.  Thus, Hat Six 
presented a question of fact as to the status of anyone working for it.  Affidavits from Welch and Willoughby 
state that, as of the time the complaint was filed, they thought that Hat Six 
employed the requisite number of employees.  Grounds existed to file the complaint 
and start the formal discovery process.  
That discovery did not ultimately confirm Hat Six employed the requisite 
number of people does not make the filing of the complaint frivolous or 
groundless.  Strong allegations of 
sexual harassment formed the foundation for the complaint and every count 
therein, and there was never a ruling on these allegations.  Under these circumstances, Hat Six is 
not entitled to recover any of its attorney's fees.

 

 

 

[¶23]       
Rule 11 
of the W.R.C.P. involves serious consequences and should not be lightly 
invoked.  Rule 11 contains very 
specific procedural requirements that are mandatory.  Hat Six did not follow the required 
procedure, and therefore Rule 11 sanctions should not have been imposed.  

 

[¶24]       
This 
case involved significant allegations of sexual harassment in the 
workplace.  Adequate grounds existed 
to bring the complaint.  Hat Six 
denied being an employer as defined by Title VII.  This raised a question of fact, 
requiring resolution through formal discovery.  Summary judgment was granted to Hat Six 
on the Title VII claim after the issue was clarified through discovery and the 
motion for summary judgment.  There 
was nothing frivolous or groundless in bringing or maintaining the Title VII 
claim under these facts.  An award 
of attorney's fees to Hat Six is not appropriate in this 
case.

 

[¶25]       
The 
judgment of the district court regarding attorney's fees and sanctions is 
reversed.  This ruling applies 
equally to attorney Willoughby as to the appealing parties.  Appeal number 00-210 is dismissed as 
moot.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Although the issue is not before us, we recently addressed the proper 
analysis of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in the context 
of summary judgments in Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, 42 P.2d 1013 (Wyo. 
2002).

2The district court also awarded costs against appellants pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 54(d)(1).  The award of 
costs was not raised as an issue in appellants' brief so is not subject to this 
appeal.

3(k) Attorney's fee; liability of Commission and United States for 
costs.

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of 
the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs 
the same as a private person.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).