Title: Wylie v. Estate of Derrell Cockrell

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/30/2016 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1141405
____________________
Margie Wylie
v.
Estate of Derrell Cockrell, Timothy Cockrell, Miranda
Cockrell, Janet Cockrell, Dakoda Zarlip, and Kanada Zarlip
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-13-901826)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Margie Wylie appeals from the Montgomery Circuit Court's
affirmance 
of 
the 
Montgomery 
Probate 
Court's 
decision 
removing
her as personal representative of the estate of Derrell
1141405
Cockrell, appointing a successor personal representative for
the estate, and assessing over $19,000 in costs against Wylie. 
We affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part and
reverse it in part.  
I.  Facts
In 1996, Derrell Cockrell ("Derrell") formed Alabama
Steel Erectors, L.L.C. ("ASE"), a company that constructed
metal buildings.  The articles of organization of ASE stated
that Derrell and Wylie were ASE's initial members and that
"[o]perational management in [ASE] shall be solely vested in
Derrell Thomas Cockrell."  The articles also stated that
"[r]emaining members shall have the right to continue the
business 
of 
[ASE] 
following 
the 
death, 
retirement,
resignation, 
expulsion, 
bankruptcy, 
or 
dissolution 
of 
a 
member
or upon the occurrence of any other real event which
terminates the continued membership of a member."  The
"operating agreement" of ASE reiterated that Derrell would
have "sole operational authority in [ASE]," but it added that
"the duties of bookkeeping have been assigned to Marge Wylie."
The operating agreement also provided that "both 
parties 
shall
not be entitled to one-half of each of the profits from the
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operation of [ASE]" and that "the share of profits and losses
shall be determined by the managing partner, Derrell Thomas
Cockrell."  According to testimony in the hearing in the
probate court, as well as a 2009 federal tax return for ASE,
Derrell held a 90 percent interest and Wylie held a 10 percent
interest in ASE. 
Derrell died on October 4, 2009.  On November 30, 2009,
the Montgomery Probate Court issued letters testamentary to
Wylie as personal representative of Derrell's estate. 
Derrell's will devised his "house and curtilidge 
[sic] 
located
at 463 Larkwood Drive, Montgomery, Alabama," to Karen
Jankowski, a woman described by witnesses in 
the 
probate-court
hearing as Derrell's girlfriend who had been living with him
before his death.  In his will, Derrell left "all [his] guns,
[his] boat and [his] 1996 Pick Up Truck" to his brother, Edwin
Cockrell.  The will further provided:
"I hereby give and devise all of the rest,
residue and remainder of all property owned by me or
in which I have an interest, wherever located,
whether real, personal, or mixed, as follows:
"A. A One-fourth share each to Janet Cockrell,
Dakoda Zarlip, and Kanada Zarlip, per stirpes.
"B. A One-fourth share split between Miranda
Cockrell and Timothy Cockrell, per stirpes."
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Timothy Cockrell and Janet Cockrell are Derrell's children. 
Miranda Cockrell is Timothy's daughter, i.e., Derrell's
granddaughter.  The relationship, if any, of Dakoda Zarlip and
Kanada Zarlip to Derrell is not reflected in the record. 
Timothy, Janet, Miranda, Dakoda, and Kanada are hereinafter
collectively referred to as the "residuary devisees."  We note
that, at some point in the estate-administration proceedings,
the probate court appointed a guardian ad litem to protect the
interests of Miranda, Dakoda, and Kanada, who are minors. 
With regard to Wylie's duties as personal representative
of Derrell's estate, the will provided that Derrell 
"relieve[d Wylie] ... from making any inventory or
accounting to any person or Court for [her]
administration of my estate; .... [gave] and
grant[ed] to [Wylie] full power and authority in the
administration of my estate, including full power
and authority to manage, operate or liquidate any
business or businesses in which I may be engaged at
the time of my death, as full to all intents and
purposes as I myself could do, if I were living."
According to testimony from two witnesses at the probate-
court hearing, Wylie approached Timothy at Derrell's funeral
visitation on October 7, 2009 -- before she had been appointed
personal representative of Derrell's estate -- and told him
that he would be getting only $5,000 from Derrell's estate and
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that he should sign certain documents to acknowledge his
entitlement to the money.  According to the witnesses, Timothy
told Wylie to leave him alone.  
On September 26, 2011, Timothy filed a motion in the
probate court pursuant to § 43-2-530, Ala. Code 1975,  to
1
require Wylie to file an accounting of the estate.  
Wylie dissolved ASE on October 11, 2011.  
On October 13, 2011, the probate court entered an order
requiring Wylie to "appear and file an accounting and vouchers
and to give cause ... why [the estate administration] ha[d]
not been judicially settled."  The probate court reissued
identical orders to Wylie on December 2, 2011, and January 12,
Section 43-2-530, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
1
"Any executor or administrator may be required
by citation to file his accounts and vouchers and to
make a settlement, notwithstanding any provision in
any will or other instrument to the contrary; and,
if after service of the citation, he fails to file
his accounts and vouchers for a settlement on the
day named in the citation, the probate court or
other court having jurisdiction of the said estate
may compel him to do so by attachment or may proceed
to state the account against him from the materials
on file or such other information as may be
accessible, charging him with such assets as may
have come to his hands."
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2012, all of which ordered Wylie to provide an accounting with
vouchers of expenses that had been paid by the estate. 
Timothy's counsel also made repeated attempts to obtain
vouchers from Wylie's counsel.  He wrote letters requesting
such vouchers, and he filed two motions to compel Wylie to
provide vouchers, filed on June 25, 2012, and August 3, 2012,
respectively.  Wylie's counsel never provided the vouchers.  
On April 3, 2012, Wylie filed what she styled a "Petition
and Accounting for Final Settlement" of Derrell's estate. The
document contained no vouchers documenting expenses paid by
the estate, but it did contain copies of several checks
written on ASE's bank account and signed by Wylie.  In fact,
most of the documentation contained in the submission from
Wylie consisted of information about ASE's bank account. This
was a source of repeated confusion in the probate-court
hearing. For example, during one exchange in the hearing, the
guardian ad litem was questioning Wylie about a certain
expense listed in her accounting:
"[Wylie:] That's -- and this was income that was
earned [by ASE] after [Derrell Cockrell's] death.
"[Guardian ad Litem:] But you told the Court it
was estate income when you filed it under oath, the
estate of Derrell Cockrell.  You told the Court when
6
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you reported that you had received that for the
benefit of the estate.
"[Wylie's counsel]: Judge, 
I 
don't 
know what his
point is. I made the point to the Court, yes, that's
what it says, but that was a mistake.  It's for the
company, not the estate.  You've got to decide that.
Maybe the Court is going to rule that the assets of
the company are assets of the estate.  I don't know.
But he keeps trying to make her say something other
than what the documents are.
"We stipulate to the Court that we included,
maybe erroneously, matters in this accounting that
have to do with the company as opposed to
Mr. Cockrell personally.  That's what happened, and
that's what these facts are."
Wylie's counsel stated numerous times in the hearing that he
had "erroneously included in this accounting money and assets
that relate to the business" of ASE.  He even admitted that
the accounting 
"was inaccurate and incomplete," but 
nothing 
in
the record indicates that Wylie ever filed anything to correct
the accounting. 
Following Wylie's filing, Timothy filed a petition to
remove Wylie as personal representative of Derrell's estate.
On August 30, 2013, the probate court held a hearing on
Wylie's petition for final settlement and Timothy's petition
to remove Wylie as personal representative.  The probate court
7
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heard from four witnesses, with the majority of the testimony
coming from Wylie. 
In her testimony, Wylie, among other things, admitted
that she did not open an estate bank account and that she did
not segregate estate funds from ASE's funds.  Wylie stated
that she had written checks on ASE's bank account for a total
of $46,000 as repayment for a loan she claimed she had made to
ASE, but she also admitted that the loan was an unsecured debt
and that there was no documentation to support the loan. 
Wylie admitted that she paid Jankowski's personal 
expenses 
and
debts from ASE's account after Derrell's death.  Wylie stated
that she did this because it was what Derrell wanted, despite
the fact that such a request was not included in his will.
Wylie admitted that she gave all the furnishings in the house
to Jankowski because it was her understanding that the will
required this.  Wylie stated that she thought that "curtilage"
meant furnishings in the house.  Wylie admitted that she did
not consult an attorney to ascertain the meaning of terms in
the will.  Wylie admitted that she paid her personal credit-
card bills out of the ASE account following Derrell's death,
claiming that she had purchased supplies for ASE with her
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credit card because ASE did not have a corporate credit card. 
Wylie further stated that she "was living out of the account"
and that Derrell did the same when he was alive.  
According to the accounting Wylie submitted with the
petition for final settlement, ASE had $145,000 in its bank
account at the time of Derrell's death and it received
$206,000 in income in the two years following his death. In
contrast to that information, Wylie testified, however, that
"[t]here wasn't any money in the account when he
died except for the $55,000 that was left in the
bank account. And then you subtract what was the
payables from that, and I think it left something
like $10,000. Then we had -- that was in the account
that was available."
Wylie further testified that she believed the residuary
devisees were entitled to 90 percent of the profits held by
ASE at time of Derrell's death, or, according to her
calculation, $9,700.  She stated that overall she had
distributed $17,000 to the residuary devisees of the estate. 
A federal tax return for the calendar year 2010, filed as
a final return for ASE, reflected on a Schedule K-1 for Wylie
a beginning share of 10 percent of ASE and an ending share of
100 percent.  Wylie's personal tax returns for calendar year
9
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2010 also represented that Wylie held ASE as a sole
proprietorship.
On October 9, 2013, the probate court entered an order
denying Wylie's petition for final settlement and 
removing 
her
as personal representative of Derrell's estate.  In the order,
the probate court concluded that Wylie had:
"1. ... repeatedly and consistently failed to adhere
to and comply with the lawful Orders of the Judge of
Probate in this matter;
"2. ... wasted, misappropriated and/or converted
multiple assets of the Estate to her own use and
benefit or to the use and benefit of others;
"3. ... failed to identify and segregate the assets
of the Estate and failed to open a separate estate
checking account for the deposit of funds of the
Estate of Derrell T. Cockrell, Deceased.  [Wylie]
proceeded to commingle Estate assets with the assets
of [ASE], and continued to operate the business of
[ASE] without first identifying and segregating the
cash and other assets which were the property of the
Estate and subject to probate proceedings under the
Will of [Derrell];
"....
"5. ... attempt[ed] to claim and convert the
ownership of the assets of [ASE] to her own use and
benefit, in contravention of the rights of the
beneficiaries under the Will of [Derrell].  In
furtherance of this position, Ms. Wylie has made
affirmative representations in sworn oral testimony
and in written form on personal federal and state
tax returns filed with this Court in which she
stated that she was the sole owner of [ASE] for the
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year in which [ASE] was dissolved, and as part of
the dissolution process claimed its assets on her
individual income tax returns for that year, all in
derogation of the terms and conditions of the Will
of [Derrell] and the rights of the beneficiaries
under the Will."
The October 9, 2013, order also appointed a successor personal
representative for the estate and taxed "costs of this
proceeding in the amount of $19,856.20, which includes a
reasonable fee of $18,045.00 for the services of Carl Pilgrim,
Esq., as Guardian ad Litem, ... against the former personal
representative, Margie Wylie."  
On October 11, 2013, pursuant to § 12-2-21, Ala. Code
1975, Wylie filed an appeal of the probate court's order to
the Montgomery Circuit Court.   On September 21, 2015, the
2
circuit court entered an order affirming the probate court's
October 9, 2013, order.  Wylie appealed to this Court.  See
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-22-22 ("An appeal to the Supreme Court
may be taken from the judgment of the circuit court on an
After she filed her appeal from the probate court to the
2
circuit court, Wylie also filed a petition to remove the
administration of Derrell's estate to the circuit court.  On
October 17, 2013, the circuit court entered an order removing
the estate administration to the circuit court.  The issue
whether the estate administration was properly removed to the
circuit court is not before us in this appeal.
11
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appeal brought to such court under the provisions of this
division.").
II.  Standard of Review
As this Court recently stated in Hardy ex rel. Estate of
Carter v. Hardin, [Ms. 1130612, Jan. 22, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. 2016): 
"The circuit court was sitting as an appellate
court in this case and was bound by the ore tenus
rule.  The ore tenus rule required the circuit court
to 
defer 
to 
the 
probate 
court's 
factual
determinations 
where 
evidence 
supported 
those
determinations.  Specifically, where evidence is
presented ore tenus, the findings of the trial court
are presumed correct 'and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a showing of plain and palpable
error.'  Pilalas v. Baldwin Cnty. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
549 So. 2d 92, 95 (Ala. 1989); see also Williams v.
Thornton, 274 Ala. 143, 144, 145 So. 2d 828, 829
(1962) ('The finding of the Probate Court based on
the examination of witnesses ore tenus is presumed
to be correct, and will not be disturbed by this
court 
or 
the 
Circuit 
Court 
unless 
palpably
erroneous.').
"As this Court stated in Yeager v. Lucy, 998
So. 2d 460 (Ala. 2008):
"'"'The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the
principle that when the trial court hears
oral testimony it has an opportunity to
evaluate the demeanor and credibility of
witnesses.'  Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d
408, 410 (Ala. 1986).  The rule applies to
'disputed issues of fact,' whether the
dispute is based entirely upon oral
testimony or upon a combination of oral
12
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testimony and documentary evidence.  Born
v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala.
1995)."'
"998 So. 2d at 463 (quoting Reed v. Board of Trs.
for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 791, 795 (Ala.
2000)); see also, e.g., Woods v. Woods, 653 So. 2d
312, 314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) ('[I]n determining
the weight to be accorded to the testimony of any
witness, the trial court may consider the demeanor
of the witness and the witness's apparent candor or
evasiveness.... It is not the province of this court
to override the trial court's observations.'). 
'Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's
judgment and all implicit findings necessary to
support it carry a presumption of correctness.' 
Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. AmSouth Bank,
608 So. 2d 375, 378 (Ala. 1992).  However, '[t]he
ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a
presumption 
of 
correctness 
a 
trial 
judge's
conclusions of law or the incorrect application of
law to the facts.'  Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d
1083, 1086 (Ala. 2005)."
___ So. 3d at ___; see also Womack v. Estate of Womack, 826
So. 2d 138 (Ala. 2002).  "This Court '"review[s] the trial
court's conclusions of law and its application of law to the
facts under the de novo standard of review."'"  Espinoza v.
Rudolph, 46 So. 3d 403, 412 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Ex parte
J.E., 1 So. 3d 1002, 1008 (Ala. 2008), quoting in turn
Washington v. State, 922 So. 2d 145, 158 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005)).
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III.  Analysis
A.  Wylie's Removal as Personal Representative
Wylie contends that the circuit court erred by affirming
the 
probate 
court's 
order 
removing 
her 
as 
personal
representative of the estate.  Section 43-2-290, Ala. Code
1975, provides:
"An administrator may be removed, and his
letters revoked for his removal from the state; and
an administrator or executor may be removed and his
letters revoked for any of the following causes:
"(1) Imbecility 
of 
mind; 
intemperance;
continued 
sickness, 
rendering 
him 
incapable
of the discharge of his duties; or when
from his conduct or character there is
reason to believe that he is not a suitable
person to have the charge and control of
the estate.
"(2) Failure to make and return
inventories or accounts of sale; failure to
make settlements as required by law; or the
failure to do any act as such executor or
administrator, when lawfully required by
the judge of probate.
"(3) The wasting, embezzlement or any
other maladministration of the estate.
"(4) The using of any of the funds of
the estate for his own benefit.
"(5) A sentence of imprisonment in the
penitentiary, county jail or for hard labor
for the county for a term of 12 months or
more."
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The probate court concluded that evidence supported Wylie's
removal as personal representative under subparagraphs (2),
(3), and (4) of § 43-2-290; the circuit court affirmed.    
Wylie takes issue with the circuit court's affirmance of
the probate court's decision to remove her as personal
representative because, she says, that decision was based on
a misunderstanding of the facts and the law.  Specifically,
Wylie asserts in her appellate brief that 
"[a] reading of [the probate court's] decision makes
it abundantly clear that the Probate Court concluded
that the assets of [ASE] were assets of [Derrell's]
Estate and that Mrs. Wylie, in her management of
[ASE] 
after 
[Derrell's] 
death 
amounted 
to
'commingling' of funds and misappropriation of funds
by Mrs. Wylie.  It was based, in large part, on that
finding that Mrs. Wylie was removed as [personal
representative]."
Wylie contends that the only interest in ASE to which the
residuary devisees were entitled was 90 percent of the
undistributed "profits" held by ASE at the time of Derrell's
death -- which she says amounted to $9,700 -- and that the
residuary devisees had received more than that amount.  She
further argues that ASE's finances were separate from
Derrell's estate and that the residuary devisees have no say
in how Wylie chose to operate ASE after Derrell's death. 
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Consequently, she states, even if she did mismanage the
finances of ASE, the residuary devisees could not challenge
that mismanagement because it involves property of ASE in
which they have no interest.  
We first observe that Wylie failed to provide a complete
and accurate accounting of the estate and that in failing to
do so she violated no less than three orders of the probate
court directing her to provide such an accounting.  This
failure to follow multiple orders issued by the probate court
is sufficient in itself under § 43-2-290(2) to remove Wylie as
personal representative of the estate.
Furthermore, in the probate-court hearing, Wylie's
counsel admitted that the accounting Wylie did provide with
her petition for final settlement of the estate was
"inaccurate 
and 
incomplete" 
because 
it 
contained 
documentation
from the business records of ASE instead of documentation
regarding the estate.  It is clear from reviewing the
transcript of the probate-court hearing and the accounting
submitted by Wylie that this alleged mistake 
corresponded 
with
the probate court's conclusion that Wylie commingled funds of
the estate and of ASE and that she used funds of the estate
16
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for her personal benefit and for the benefit of others who
were not residuary devisees. 
In addition, Wylie admitted in her testimony that she
failed to consult an attorney regarding the meaning of terms
of Derrell's will.  This failure led Wylie, for example, to
assume that the word  "curtilage" referred to furnishings in
the house, and so she deeded all the furnishings to Jankowski. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "curtilage" as "[t]he land or
yard adjoining a house, usu[ally] within an enclosure." 
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).   The furnishings
3
should have been part of the residuary estate to be
distributed to the residuary devisees in shares according to
the will.  This admitted mistake constituted another
legitimate 
reason 
for 
Wylie's 
removal 
as 
personal
representative.  
In general, Wylie's arguments reflect an incorrect
understanding 
of 
the 
law 
regarding 
limited-liability
companies.  Wylie argues in her appellate brief:
"Since the operating agreement of [ASE] made no
provision about the death of [Derrell] and its
effect on his membership, state law provides that
As Black's also suggests, the meaning of "curtilage" may
3
be broader for Fourth Amendment purposes.
17
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[Derrell's] membership terminated.  Given that the
operating agreement allowed Mrs. Wylie to continue
the business after [Derrell's] death, she became the
sole member with freedom to operate [ASE] as saw
fit.
"Once [Derrell's] membership in the LLC ceased,
neither his estate nor his heirs became members and
hence had no further interest therein other than the
value of his membership interest on the date of his
death.
"Any claim of misappropriation of assets of the
LLC by its sole member is a claim belonging to the
LLC itself and thus neither a former member nor his
heirs have standing to complain."
(Emphasis added.)  
Wylie is correct that, under state law, upon his death
Derrell ceased to be a member of ASE.  Section 10A-5-6.06,
Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:4
"(b) Subject to contrary provisions in the
operating agreement, or written consent of all
members at the time, a person ceases to be a member
upon the occurrence of one or more of the following
events listed in the following subdivision or
paragraphs:
The operative limited-liability-company law in this case
4
is found in § 10A-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which governed
limited-liability companies for some time before and at the
time of Derrell's death.  We note that, subsequently, in 2014,
the legislature enacted the Alabama Limited Liability Company
Law of 2014, effective January 1, 2015. Act No. 2014–144, Ala.
Acts 
2014. 
Act 
No. 
2014–144 
updated 
Alabama's
limited-liability-company law, repealed existing law in
Chapter 5 of Title 10, and replaced Chapter 5 of Title 10 with
Chapter 5A.
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"....
"(3) In the case of a member who is an
individual:
"a. The member dies.
"....
"(e) Upon a member's cessation of membership
each of the following applies:
"(1) The member's governance rights
terminate."
This Court has previously explained:
"The 
LLC 
Law 
distinguishes 
between 
membership 
in
an LLC and 'financial rights' in an LLC.  It defines
a 'member' of an LLC as '[a] person reflected in the
required records of a limited liability company as
the owner of some governance rights of a membership
interest 
in 
the 
limited 
liability 
company.' 
§ 10A–5–1.02(7), Ala. Code 1975.  'Governance
rights' are defined as '[a]ll a member's rights as
a member of a limited liability company except
financial rights, including without limitation, the
rights to participate in the management of the
limited liability company and to bind the limited
liability 
company 
as 
provided 
in 
Section
10A–5–3.03.'  § 10A–5–1.02(5), Ala. Code 1975 .... 
'Financial rights' are '[r]ights to a. share in
profits 
and 
losses 
as 
provided 
in 
Section
10A–5–5.03, b. receive interim distributions as
provided in Section 10A–5–5.04, and c. receive
termination distributions as provided in Section
10A–5–7.05.'  § 10A–5–1.02(3), Ala. Code 1975."
L.B. Whitfield, III Family LLC v. Whitfield, 150 So. 3d 171,
183 (Ala. 2014) (emphasis omitted and emphasis added).  
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Section 10A-5-6.02, Ala. Code 1975, states, in pertinent
part:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in the
operating agreement:
"(1) A membership interest in a
limited liability company is assignable in
whole or in part.
"....
"(3) An assignment only entitles the
assignee to the financial rights of the
assignor to the extent assigned."
Section 10A-5-6.04, Ala. Code 1975, states, in pertinent part:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in the
governing documents:
"(1) If a member who is an individual
dies 
or 
if 
a 
court 
of 
competent
jurisdiction adjudges a member to be
incompetent to manage the member's person
or 
property, 
the 
member's 
personal
representative, 
conservator, 
legal
representative, heirs, or legatees may
exercise all the member's financial rights
for the purpose of settling the member's
estate 
or 
administering 
the 
member's
property, including any power the member
had to transfer the membership interest."
In Whitfield, this Court explained that "[s]ection
10A–5–6.04(a)(1) ... [is] concern[ed] with the decedent
member's 'financial rights' as and to the extent those rights
exist apart from other aspects of the membership in the
20
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limited liability company previously held by the decedent." 
150 So. 3d at 185 (emphasis omitted).
Under the foregoing law, when Derrell died, his
membership in ASE ceased, but his financial rights in ASE
passed to his estate, and his personal representative was
empowered to transfer those financial rights in accordance
with the directives in his will.  Derrell's will provided that
the residue of his property was to be divided among the
residuary devisees, so Derrell's financial rights in ASE were
due to be transferred to them.5
Thus, Wylie is correct that the residuary devisees did
not become members of ASE with governance rights and thus did
not have a say in how Wylie operated ASE or in her decision
ultimately to dissolve it.  But Wylie is incorrect that the
residuary devisees were entitled to only a 90 percent share of
the undistributed "profits" ASE held on the date of Derrell's
Although not directly applicable, see note 4, supra, we
5
note that § 10A-5A-5.02, Ala. Code 1975, of the limited-
liability-company law adopted by the legislature in 2014
states that "[a] transferee has the right to receive, in
accordance with the transfer, distributions to which the
transferor would otherwise be entitled."
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death.   As the Whitfield Court noted:  "'Financial rights'
6
are '[r]ights to a. share in profits and losses as provided in
Pursuant to § 10A-5-7.01, Ala. Code 1975, absent a
6
provision otherwise in the governing documents, a limited-
liability company continues its existence after the death of
one of its members.  If a provision terminating ASE upon the
death of a member had been adopted in the present case, ASE
would have had to be terminated at the time of Derrell's
death, and each member, or his or her estate or heirs, would
be entitled to a termination distribution.  But that is not
the case here.  (We note that the value of such a termination
distribution, i.e., the value of the decedent member's
interest in the limited-liability company at the time of his
or her death, would typically be more substantial than the
value of some of or all the undistributed "profits" earned by
the company during one or more recent accounting periods.)
Wylie's reliance on Fausak's Tire Center, Inc. v.
Blanchard, 959 So. 2d 1132 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), is misplaced
for a similar reason.  In Fausak's Tire Center, "the evidence
was undisputed that the members of the LLC had orally agreed
that, in the event of a member's death, the LLC would
purchase, and the member's estate would sell, the member's
interest in the LLC." 959 So. 2d at 1144 (emphasis added). 
The reason that the Court of Civil Appeals had to confirm the
value of the decedent member's interest in the LLC at the date
of his death was because -- unlike in this case -- the
remaining members of the LLC were going to buy that interest
from the decedent's estate.  Indeed, as the members' oral
agreement indicated, and as the trial court in Fausak's Tire
Center concluded without objection:  "'The twenty (20%)
percent member ownership interest in [the LLC] the decedent
owned at the time of his death constitutes an asset of the
decedent's estate."  959 So. 2d at 1136.  Thus, contrary to
Wylie's assertion, Fausak's Tire Center does not stand for the
proposition that the estate of a decedent member of an LLC in
all cases is entitled only to the value of the decedent
member's interest in the LLC at the time of his or her death.
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Section 10A–5–5.03,
 b. receive interim distributions as
[7]
provided in Section 10A–5–5.04, and c. receive termination
distributions 
as 
provided 
in 
Section 
10A–5–7.05.'
§ 10A–5–1.02(3), Ala. Code 1975."  150 So. 3d at 183.
It is undisputed that Timothy and the other residuary
devisees did not receive continuing distributions based on 
Derrell's financial rights in ASE for the years 2009 and 2010,
nor did they receive termination distributions when Wylie
dissolved ASE.  Instead, Wylie treated ASE as if she became
its sole owner following Derrell's death, even though there is
no evidence indicating that she purchased Derrell's interest
in ASE.  Wylie then proceeded to use ASE's finances to cover
her own personal expenses. As the appellees note, "[t]his is
a blatant conversion of the Estate assets for personal use." 
Section 10A-5-5.03, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
7
"The 
profits 
and 
losses, 
income, 
deductions, 
and
credits, and items of income, deduction, and credits
of the limited liability company shall be allocated
among the members in the manner provided in the
operating agreement.  If the operating agreement
does not so provide, profits and losses, income,
deductions, and credits, and items of income,
deductions, and credits shall be allocated on the
basis of the pro rata value of the contributions
made by each member to the extent they have been
made and not returned."
23
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In short, the evidence in the record and limited-
liability-company law support the probate court's conclusion
that Wylie converted assets of Derrell's estate for her own
use and benefit and for the benefit of others who were not the
residuary devisees and that she commingled funds of ASE and
assets of the estate.  Therefore, the circuit court did not
exceed its discretion in affirming the probate court's
decision to remove Wylie as personal representative of
Derrell's estate. 
B.  Payment of the Guardian ad Litem's Fee
Wylie next argues that the circuit court erred in
affirming the probate court's decision requiring Wylie to pay
the guardian ad litem's fee of $18,045.  Wylie concedes that
"[t]here is no dispute in this case that the appointment of a
[guardian ad litem] was necessary."  She argues, however, that
the fee entered by the probate court was erroneous because,
she contends, "there was never any motion, or evidentiary
submission in the record before the Probate Court requesting
or supporting a fee request from the [guardian ad litem]." 
Wylie also observes that the matter was not discussed in the
probate-court hearing held August 30, 2013. Wylie argues that
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"[t]o award an $18,000-plus [guardian ad litem] fee against
Mrs. Wylie without notice, proof, or hearing" violates due
process.  
8
 
The law is clear that the probate court had the power to
award a guardian ad litem fee as part of the costs in the
case.  Rule 17(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in part:
"In all cases in which a guardian ad litem is
required, the court must ascertain a reasonable fee
or compensation to be allowed and paid to such
guardian ad litem for services rendered in such
cause, to be taxed as a part of the costs in such
action, and which is to be paid when collected as
other costs in the action, to such guardian ad
litem."
See Rule 1(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.; see also Committee Comment to
the Amendment to Rule 1(a) effective January 1, 2013 ("[T]he
Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the probate court, when such
application 
is 
appropriate 
and 
except 
when 
particular 
statutes
provide otherwise.").  And, "[i]t is well settled that '[t]he
matter of the guardian ad litem's fee is within the discretion
of the trial court, subject to correction only for abuse of
discretion.'"  Historic Blakeley Found., Inc. v. Williams, 40
In this appeal, Wylie makes no meaningful argument
8
challenging the award of the guardian ad litem fee against her
personally. 
25
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So. 3d 698, 704 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Englund v. First Nat'l
Bank of Birmingham, 381 So. 2d 8, 12 (Ala. 1980)). 
Wylie is correct, however, that nothing in the submitted
record from the circuit court shows that the guardian ad litem
requested a fee from the probate court, nor does the record
contain any documentation of the time the guardian ad litem
spent working on the case that could justify the amount of the
fee awarded.  The probate court's October 9, 2013, order twice
referenced "the Report of the Guardian ad Litem" in
conjunction with the hearing as to Wylie's petition for final
settlement and the residuary devisees' petition to remove
Wylie as personal representative, but nothing in the record or
appellate briefs suggest that the guardian ad litem had filed
a fee petition or that the guardian ad litem's report included
a fee request with supporting documentation.  Moreover, the
residuary devisees, who are appellees in this case and some of
whom are represented by the guardian ad litem in this appeal,
fail to address Wylie's argument as to the guardian ad litem's
fee; they direct us to no evidence in the record to support
the guardian ad litem's fee award; and they make no assertion
26
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that such evidence was presented to the probate court but not
included in the record on appeal.  
This Court encountered a circumstance similar to the
present case in Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d
740 (Ala. 1988), in which a circuit court awarded $5,000 to
the guardian ad litem in an estate action:  
"Our review of the record discloses no evidence
regarding the services performed by the guardian ad
litem other than his presence at the July 21, 1986,
hearing on the Bank's petition for final settlement,
at which he asked several questions of Kathryn
Miree.  However, there was no testimony offered at
that hearing concerning the services the guardian ad
litem had performed, nor does the trial court's
order refer to the nature or character of the
services performed by the guardian ad litem.  We,
therefore, vacate the judgment as to the guardian ad
litem's fee and instruct that, on remand, an
evidentiary hearing be held for the purpose of
determining a reasonable guardian ad litem fee and
an 
order 
prepared 
setting 
forth 
'with 
some
particularity 
the 
findings 
from 
the 
evidence
adduced.'  Lolley v. Citizens Bank, 494 So. 2d [19,]
21 [(Ala. 1986)].  See also Clement v. Merchants
National Bank of Mobile, [493 So. 2d 1350 (Ala.
1986)]."
530 So. 2d at 750-51.
Similarly, in Wehle v. Bradley, [Ms. 1101290, Oct. 30,
2015] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2015), this Court found that the
evidence in the record in support of a circuit court's
attorney-fee award in an estate case was lacking.  The Court
27
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observed that "it does not appear that the circuit court had
an adequate factual record for making the particular award it
made," in part because of "the lack of any evidence of the
time consumed outside appearances before the circuit court,
and no evidence of the total amount of time consumed both in
and out of the courtroom," evidence that "typically is an
important 
consideration" 
in 
determining 
an 
attorney-fee 
award. 
___ So. 3d at ___.  The Court also 
"emphasize[d] that a 'trial court's order regarding
an attorney fee must allow for meaningful review by
articulating 
the 
decisions 
made, 
the 
reasons
supporting those decisions, and the performance of
the attorney-fee calculation.'  City of Birmingham
[v. Horn], 810 So. 2d [667,] 682 [(Ala. 2001)].  The
circuit court's order in this case, conclusory in
nature, fails to meet this standard."
___ So. 3d at ___.  In light of those considerations, the
Wehle Court reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it
determined the amount of the attorney fee and remanded the
case for the circuit court to conduct a hearing concerning the
attorney-fee award and to provide an order that could allow
for meaningful review of the decision.  
In light of Van Schaack and Wehle, we reverse the circuit
court's judgment to the extent it affirmed the probate court's
fee award to the guardian ad litem, and we remand the case to
28
1141405
allow whatever further proceedings may be necessary to
establish a proper record and to provide a decision that
allows for a meaningful review of any award to the guardian ad
litem.
IV.  Conclusion
The circuit court did not exceed its discretion in
affirming the probate court's decision to remove Wylie as
personal representative.  The record lacks supporting
documentation of the probate court's fee award to the guardian
ad litem, however, and orders from neither the probate court
nor the circuit court provide us with sufficient information
to perform a meaningful review of that decision.  We therefore
reverse that portion of circuit court's judgment affirming
that award and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
29