Title: TRACY HALL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TRACY HALL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 138166 P.3d 875Case Number: 06-230Decided: 08/28/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
TRACY 
HALL,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. 
Terry 
Rogers, InterimState Public Defender; and Tina N. Kerin, 
Post-Conviction Counsel.  Argument 
by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Melissa M. Swearingen, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General*.  
Argument by Mr. Armitage.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Order 
Granting Motion to Withdraw entered February 7, 2007.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Tracy 
Hall, entered a conditional guilty plea (contingent on the outcome of this 
appeal) to a single felony count of possession of methamphetamine under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (Michie Supp. 1998).  She contests the district court's denial 
of her pretrial motion to suppress certain evidence.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it refused to suppress drugs confiscated from 
Appellant during a pat-down search preceding her incarceration in the county 
jail, where Appellant was arrested pursuant to a legitimate traffic stop, but 
where the officer's first observation of Appellant was precipitated by knowledge 
gained from a wiretap later discovered to be illegal?

 
 
FACTS1

 
 
[¶3]      In 1998, federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies were involved in an undercover drug 
operation involving multiple wiretaps and other monitoring activities.  It was later discovered that the 
Wyoming 
Communication Interception Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-601 through 7-3-611 
(LexisNexis 2000) (repealed 2001), the statutes under which the wiretaps used in 
the investigation were authorized, had expired long before the investigation 
began,2 rendering those wiretaps 
illegal.  On November 13, 1998, a 
female named Tracy (Appellant's first name) called one of 
the monitored phone numbers and arranged to purchase methamphetamine from one of 
the suspects being watched by law enforcement.  Law enforcement officers observed 
Appellant's car arrive at the location agreed upon for the purchase.  The suspect, who had earlier agreed to 
sell "Tracy" 
drugs on the phone, entered the car.  
A few moments later, the suspect exited the car and Appellant drove 
away.  Officers in charge of the 
operation contacted Casper police officer 
Weischedel and requested that he identify the driver of the vehicle, believed to 
be a female named Tracy.

 
 
[¶4]      Officer 
Weischedel followed Appellant's vehicle and ran her plates for information.  Upon being informed that the plates on 
the Appellant's truck did not match the vehicle, the officer pulled Appellant 
over and requested her license, registration, and proof of insurance.  Appellant was unable to produce proof of 
insurance on the vehicle she was driving, and her driver's license was under 
suspension.  Officer Weischedel 
followed department procedure and arrested Appellant for driving under a 
suspended license.  Appellant was 
transported to the detention center and patted down during booking.  A bag containing methamphetamine was 
found in her sock.  Appellant 
was charged with possession of methamphetamine and pled guilty.  She was sentenced to 36-60 months in 
prison, and completed her sentence, serving a combination of probation, 
incarceration, and parole.  In 2001, 
Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the discovery 
that the wiretap under which her call was intercepted was illegal.  In 2005, that petition was granted and 
Appellant was allowed to withdraw her 1999 guilty plea.  She sought suppression of the drugs 
discovered on her person pursuant to her arrest, but her motion to suppress was 
denied.  Appellant then pled guilty 
again, conditional on the outcome of this timely appeal of the district court's 
denial of her motion to suppress.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]                  
In general, evidentiary rulings of a district court are not disturbed on 
appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. . . .  Since the district court conducts the 
hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to:  assess the credibility of the witnesses; 
the weight given the evidence; and make the necessary inferences, deductions and 
conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district 
court's determination.

 
 

Wilson 
v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994) (citation omitted).  "We will not disturb the factual findings 
of a district court in determining a motion to suppress unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous."  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 8, 146 P.3d 492, 495 (Wyo. 2006) (citation omitted).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      Both parties 
agree that the original wiretap in this case was illegal.  There is also no debate as to the 
propriety of the search conducted on Appellant at the detention facility.  The sole question here relates to the 
applicability of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the exclusionary 
rule to these facts.  

 
 
[¶7]      When law 
enforcement obtains evidence through unlawful search or seizure, that evidence 
is inadmissible against the victim of the unlawful action.  Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 
83 S. Ct. 407, 416, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).  
This long-standing remedy for the accused is necessary to give effect to 
the fundamental protections against unreasonable search and seizure.  Id.  "[I]f the initial search is held 
improper, not only the evidence obtained by such search but everything which 
becomes accessible to the prosecution by reason of the initial search would be 
inadmissible as a fruit of the poisonous tree.'"  Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1097 
(Wyo. 1987) (quoting Goddard v. State, 481 P.2d 343, 345 
(Wyo. 
1971)).  However, "this does not 
mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible."  Wong Sun, 371 U.S.  at 485, 83 S. Ct.  at 416.  

 
 
We need 
not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it 
would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.  Rather, the more apt question in such a 
case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence 
to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint."

 
 

Id. at 
487-88, 83 S. Ct.  at 417 (citation omitted).  

 
 
"[T]he 
derivative taint of illegal activity does not extend to the ends of the earth 
but only until it is dissipated by an intervening event."  United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 1845, 
40 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

 
 
[¶8]      In Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984), the United States Supreme Court found that the operative question 
was "whether the challenged evidence was come at by exploitation of [the 
initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint.'"  Id. at 804-05, 104 S. Ct.  at 
3385 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S.  at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417).  Segura involved an improper 
warrantless entry followed by a second entry supported by a warrant.  Id. 
at 799, 104 S. Ct.  at 3382.  In order 
to determine whether the warrant was tainted by the illegal entry, the Court 
analyzed the warrant and found that "[n]o information obtained during the 
initial entry or occupation of the apartment was needed or used by the agents to 
secure the warrant" and that the evidence in question "was the product of that 
search, wholly unrelated to the prior entry."  Id. 
at 814, 104 S. Ct.  at 3390.  

 
 
[¶9]      In Appellant's 
case, the trial court excluded all evidence directly related to the wiretap, 
including any photographs, video, and voice recordings of the Appellant that 
existed because of the illegal monitoring.  
The court determined that those items were obtained as a direct result of 
the illegal wiretap and, as such, were fruit of the poisonous tree.  The only evidence at issue here is the 
drug evidence found on Appellant's person during her booking for driving under 
suspension.  It is true that the 
officer was in the area where the traffic stop occurred on specific instructions 
to observe Appellant based on information gained through an illegal 
wiretap.  However, eliminating any 
information connected to the tainted wiretap, the officer still had probable 
cause to perform the traffic stop because he observed the violation.  Therefore, the traffic stop and booking 
pat-down were sufficiently separate from the original wiretap to obviate  the use of the exclusionary rule in this 
situation.  

 
 
[¶10]   Appellant was in violation of the 
law.  The truck she was driving did 
not have valid plates.  The officer 
had the clear right to be where he was (on a public street) when he observed 
that violation.  He acted 
appropriately and according to protocol by pulling Appellant over, and by 
arresting her when he discovered she was driving with a suspended license.  Nothing in the record suggests he lacked 
probable cause for that stop.  He 
then followed the standard procedure by taking Appellant to the jail, where she 
was processed and booked as normal.  
The fact that the officer's initial observation of Appellant was 
motivated by information garnered through an illegal wiretap does not change the 
fact that the evidence at issue was properly gathered during a stop and arrest 
fully supported by probable cause.  
This evidence, unlike the excluded evidence related to the drug sting, 
was a product of the traffic stop and subsequent pat-down booking search.  As such, it need not be excluded as 
fruit of the poisonous tree.

 
 
[¶11]   Even were it possible to apply the 
exclusionary rule to this evidence, there would be very little incentive for a 
court to do so under these facts.  
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement from 
obtaining evidence through illegal means.  
Wong Sun, 371 U.S.  at 485-86, 83 S. Ct.  at 416.  However, the public has a vital 
"interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or 
convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth."  United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 
1060, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75, 89 S. Ct. 961, 967, 
22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969)).  
"[A]pplication of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."  Ceccolini, 435 U.S.  at 275, 98 S. Ct.  at 1060 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974)).  "The penalties 
visited upon the Government, and in turn upon the public because its officers 
have violated the law, must bear some relation to the purposes which the law is 
to serve."  Ceccolini, 435 U.S.  at 279, 98 
S.Ct at 1061-62.

 
 
[¶12]   Application of the exclusionary 
rule and extension of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would serve no 
purpose here.  Law enforcement 
officers believed they were working pursuant to a valid, statutorily authorized 
wiretap.  As the 10th Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated when it rejected a claim based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failure to notice the expiration of the wiretapping statute, "the 
Wyoming Attorney General's Office, several state district court judges, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court, the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming, dozens of defense attorneys, the Wyoming Legislature, the United States 
Attorney's Office, and the Natrona County District Attorney's Office also failed 
to notice the expiration of the statute."  
United States v. Salazar, 323 F.3d 852, 857 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).  We fail to see how law enforcement can 
be deterred from inadvertent illegal behavior.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's motion to suppress evidence collected during her arrest for driving 
under suspension even though she was initially placed under surveillance because 
of information gained through use of a wiretap that law enforcement officers 
later discovered to be illegal.

 
 
[¶14]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
parties stipulated to the relevant facts at the district court 
level.

 
 

2Apparently 
the Act had a sunset date of July 1, 1995, which was omitted in the original 
publication.  This oversight 
resulted in continued publication and use of the Act through 2000, when the 
omission was finally discovered.  
The Act was reauthorized in 2001, but the wiretap authorizations granted 
in the interim were obtained without statutory 
authority.