Title: Hoyle v. DTJ Enters., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Hoyle v. DTJ Ents., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-843.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-843 
HOYLE, APPELLEE; THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, 
APPELLANT, v. DTJ ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Hoyle v. DTJ Ents., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-843.] 
Employer intentional torts—Exclusion from liability insurance coverage—R.C. 
2745.01—Presumption of intent to injure. 
(No. 2013-1405—Submitted June 10, 2014—Decided March 12, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
Nos. CA-26579 and CA-26587, 2013-Ohio-3223. 
______________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An insurance provision that excludes coverage for acts committed with the 
deliberate intent to injure an employee precludes coverage for employer 
intentional torts, which require a finding that the employer intended to 
injure the employee. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal presents questions regarding the insurability of 
employer intentional torts under R.C. 2745.01.  We hold that an insurance 
provision that excludes coverage for acts committed with the deliberate intent to 
injure an employee precludes coverage for employer intentional torts, which 
require a finding that the employer intended to injure the employee. 
Factual Background 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Duane Allen Hoyle, brought this action to recover for 
injuries he sustained when he fell from a ladder-jack scaffold while working as a 
carpenter on a construction project for his employers, appellees, DTJ Enterprises, 
Inc. (“DTJ”) and Cavanaugh Building Corporation (“Cavanaugh”).  Hoyle 
describes a ladder-jack scaffold as an apparatus consisting of two extension 
ladders positioned vertically, with a horizontal walkway platform supported by 
brackets spanning the space between them.  Ladder jacks are the brackets that 
support the platform.  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1262 (3d 
Ed.1993).  They are generally secured to the ladder with a bolt or pin that goes 
though the ladder jack and is secured in back by a nut. 
{¶ 3} Phillip L. Colleran, a certified safety professional and professional 
member of the American Society of Safety Engineers who executed an expert 
affidavit on Hoyle’s behalf, states that, for worker safety, each ladder-jack bracket 
must be secured to the ladder and the platform must be secured to each bracket.  
When Hoyle assembled the ladder-jack scaffold on this project, however, he did 
not have the bolts or pins to secure the ladder jacks to the ladders.  Hoyle claims 
that the job superintendent, Kevin Everett, kept the bolts in his office and told 
employees they did not need them because they take too much time to use. 
{¶ 4} On March 25, 2008, Hoyle fell approximately 14 feet from the 
ladder-jack scaffold and landed on a concrete pad.  Just before his fall, Hoyle 
stepped onto a portion of the platform that extended past the ladder jack on one 
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
end, causing the ladder jack on the opposite end to lift and detach from its ladder.  
As Hoyle moved back toward the center, the detached ladder jack lowered, but 
missed the rungs of the ladder and pushed the ladder outward.  The ladder and 
Hoyle fell to the concrete below. 
{¶ 5} Hoyle sued DTJ and Cavanaugh in the Summit County Court of 
Common Pleas, alleging claims of employer intentional tort.  Appellant, the 
Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”), which insured DTJ and Cavanaugh under 
a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy, intervened and filed a complaint 
for a declaratory judgment that it has no obligation to indemnify DTJ and 
Cavanaugh for Hoyle’s injuries.1  The only issue before us in this appeal is 
whether CIC has a duty to indemnify DTJ and Cavanaugh should Hoyle prevail 
on his employer-intentional-tort claims. 
{¶ 6} Unlike the broader duty to defend, an insurer’s duty to indemnify 
its insureds is based on whether there is, in fact, actual liability.  Chemstress 
Consultant Co., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 128 Ohio App.3d 396, 402, 715 
N.E.2d 208 (9th Dist.1998).  Before turning to the language of the CIC policy and 
the procedural history of this case, we first briefly examine the history and scope 
of civil liability for employer intentional torts in Ohio. 
Employer Intentional Torts 
{¶ 7} Because of the immunity conferred by R.C. 4123.74 and Article II, 
Section 35, Ohio Constitution, for the vast majority of workplace injuries, a 
workers’ compensation claim is an employee’s exclusive remedy.  See generally 
Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 110, 522 N.E.2d 489 
(1988).  But when an employee seeks damages resulting from an act or omission 
committed by the employer with the intent to injure, the claim arises outside of 
the employment relationship, and the workers’ compensation system does not 
preempt the employee’s cause of action.  Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 Ohio 
                                                          
 
1  CIC does not dispute its obligation to defend DTJ and Cavanaugh against Hoyle’s claims. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus.  This court first 
recognized an employee’s right to sue his or her employer for an intentional tort 
in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433 
N.E.2d 572 (1982), syllabus.  We reasoned that extending the immunity afforded 
to employers by the workers’ compensation system to intentional torts would not 
further the legislative goals underlying the Workers’ Compensation Act: 
“Affording an employer immunity for his intentional behavior certainly would not 
promote [a safe and injury-free work environment], for an employer could 
commit intentional acts with impunity with the knowledge that, at the very most, 
his workers’ compensation premiums may rise slightly.”  Id. at 615. 
{¶ 8} An intentional tort involves an act committed with the specific 
intent to injure or with the belief that injury is substantially certain to occur.  
Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 90, 95, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984), citing 1 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 8A (1965).  When the employer 
proceeds despite knowledge that injuries are certain or substantially certain to 
result, “he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”  
Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 118, 570 N.E.2d 1108 (1991).  Under 
Fyffe, an employee could establish intent based on substantial certainty by 
demonstrating the following: 
 
(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous 
process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business 
operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the employee is 
subjected by his employment to such dangerous process, 
procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to the employee 
will be a substantial certainty; and (3) that the employer, under 
such circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act to require 
the employee to continue to perform the dangerous task. 
January Term, 2015 
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Id. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 2745.01, which now governs employer intentional torts in 
Ohio, took effect on April 7, 2005, and provides as follows: 
 
(A) In an action brought against an employer by an 
employee * * * for damages resulting from an intentional tort 
committed by the employer during the course of employment, the 
employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the 
employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure 
another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain 
to occur. 
(B) As used in this section, “substantially certain” means 
that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee 
to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death. 
(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment 
safety guard * * * creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
removal * * * was committed with intent to injure another if an 
injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct 
result. 
 
R.C. 2745.01 passes constitutional muster, Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 
125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, syllabus, despite this 
court’s having struck down as unconstitutional prior attempts to codify employer-
intentional-tort liability in Ohio.  See Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722 
(1991); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 
582 (1994); Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107 
(1999). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 10} R.C. 2745.01(A) incorporates the definition of an employer 
intentional tort from Jones, 15 Ohio St.3d at 95, 472 N.E.2d 1046, and requires a 
plaintiff to prove either deliberate intent to injure or a belief that injury was 
substantially certain.  But R.C. 2745.01(B) equates “substantially certain” with 
“deliberate intent” to injure.  Thus, the “ ‘two options of proof [under R.C. 
2745.01(A)] become: (1) the employer acted with intent to injure or (2) the 
employer acted with deliberate intent to injure.’ ”  Kaminski at ¶ 55, quoting 
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 175 Ohio App.3d 227, 2008-Ohio-1521, 
886 N.E.2d 262, ¶ 31 (7th Dist.).  “[W]hat appears at first glance as two distinct 
bases for liability is revealed on closer examination to be one and the same.”  
Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595, 602-603 (6th Cir.2013) (describing 
R.C. 2745.01 as “a statute at war with itself”). 
{¶ 11} The General Assembly’s intent in enacting R.C. 2745.01 was to 
“significantly restrict” recovery for employer intentional torts to situations in 
which the employer “acts with specific intent to cause an injury.”  Kaminski at 
¶ 57; Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-
Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 26, citing Kaminski at ¶ 56.  “[A]bsent a 
deliberate intent to injure another, an employer is not liable for a claim alleging an 
employer intentional tort, and the injured employee’s exclusive remedy is within 
the workers’ compensation system.”  Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., 
Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 25. 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2745.01(C) permits an employee to prove the employer’s 
intent without direct evidence.  When the employee is injured as a direct result of 
the employer’s deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard,2 R.C. 
2745.01(C) creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer intended to injure.  
                                                          
 
2  This court has previously addressed the definition of “equipment safety guard.”  Hewitt v. L.E. 
Myers Co., 134 Ohio St.3d 199, 2012-Ohio-5317, 981 N.E.2d 795.  But the question whether the 
pins that might have been used to secure the ladder jacks qualify as equipment safety guards is not 
before this court.  
January Term, 2015 
7 
 
It “is not a separate tort, it merely provides a legally cognizable example of ‘intent 
to injure.’ ”  Irondale Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Virginia Sur. Co., Inc., 754 
F.Supp.2d 927, 933 (N.D.Ohio 2010).  The Irondale court rejected the suggestion 
that R.C. 2745.01(C) permits liability without a finding of intent to cause injury. 
Hoyle’s Claims 
{¶ 13} In his complaint, Hoyle alleged that DTJ and Cavanaugh “acted 
with deliberate intent (under R.C. §2745.01) to cause injury” and that their actions 
“constitute[d] or [were] equivalent to the ‘deliberate removal by an employer of 
an equipment safety guard’ as set forth in R.C. §2745.01.”  DTJ and Cavanaugh 
moved for summary judgment on Hoyle’s claims, arguing that he could not prove 
that they acted with intent to injure or that injury was substantially certain. 
{¶ 14} The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of DTJ 
and Cavanaugh “[t]o the extent that [Hoyle’s] claims rely on R.C. 2745.01(A) & 
(B) alone” because Hoyle “provide[d] no evidence that the Defendants acted with 
a specific intent to injure” him.  But the trial court stated that its decision “does 
not apply” to the extent that Hoyle’s cause of action relies upon R.C. 2745.01(C), 
which “necessarily include[s] the ‘intent to injure.’ ”  The trial court found 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pins normally used to secure the 
ladder jacks constitute an equipment safety guard and whether DTJ and/or 
Cavanaugh deliberately removed them.  Thus, the trial court has not finally 
adjudicated Hoyle’s employer-intentional-tort claims. 
{¶ 15} In light of R.C. 2745.01 and this court’s precedent regarding 
employer intentional torts, and because the question before this court is whether 
CIC is obligated to indemnify DTJ and Cavanaugh for any liability Hoyle may 
establish, we now turn to the language of the CIC policy.  CIC maintains that 
even if Hoyle prevails on his employer-intentional-tort claims, any liability would 
be excluded from coverage because it must be premised upon the employer’s 
deliberate intent to injure the employee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The Insurance Policy 
{¶ 16} The CIC policy covered a policy period of March 31, 2007, 
through March 31, 2010.  The policy’s CGL Coverage Form states, “We will pay 
those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because 
of ‘bodily injury’ * * * to which this insurance applies.”  But the CGL Coverage 
Form excludes coverage for bodily injuries that may reasonably be expected to 
result from the insured’s intentional acts or that the insured expected or intended.  
It also excludes bodily injury to employees sustained in the workplace or arising 
out of duties related to the insured’s business.  Thus, the CGL Coverage Form 
provides no coverage for Hoyle’s injuries.  But the policy’s coverage is not 
limited solely to that provided by the CGL Coverage Form. 
{¶ 17} The question of coverage here depends entirely upon a policy 
endorsement entitled “Employers Liability Coverage Form—Ohio,” which DTJ 
and Cavanaugh purchased for an additional premium.  The Employers Liability 
Coverage Form provides coverage for “those sums that an insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ sustained by your 
‘employee’ in the ‘workplace’ and caused by an ‘intentional act’ to which this 
insurance applies.”  The Employers Liability Coverage Form defines “intentional 
act” as “an act which is substantially certain to cause ‘bodily injury.’ ”  Thus, the 
Employers Liability Coverage Form purports to extend coverage to substantial-
certainty employer intentional torts that would otherwise be excluded from 
coverage under the CGL Coverage Form.  But the Employers Liability Coverage 
Form also expressly excludes coverage for “liability for acts committed by or at 
the direction of an insured with the deliberate intent to injure.” 
{¶ 18} In a summary entitled “Notice to Policyholders: Ohio Employers 
Liability,” CIC informed its insureds that the Employers Liability Coverage Form 
“provides coverage for employment intentional torts in which the employer had 
knowledge of the existence of a danger, knowledge that the danger would be 
January Term, 2015 
9 
 
substantially certain to result in harm, and required the employee to continue to 
perform the dangerous task.”  CIC also informed its insureds that R.C. 2745.01 
“changes the current law” and permits recovery for employer intentional torts 
only upon proof of the employer’s “intent to injure” or “deliberate intent” to 
injure.  In the notice, CIC implicitly recognizes the contradiction of providing 
coverage for substantial-certainty employer intentional torts in light of R.C. 
2745.01, which excludes liability for such torts, but CIC states that until 
challenges to R.C. 2745.01 have been resolved, CIC will continue to offer and 
provide employers liability coverage.  According to CIC’s appellate brief, 
following this court’s decision in Kaminski, 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 
927 N.E.2d 1066, which rejected constitutional challenges to R.C. 2745.01, CIC 
ceased issuing indemnity coverage for employer intentional torts in Ohio in lieu 
of defense-only coverage. 
CIC’s Declaratory-Judgment Claim 
{¶ 19} In its complaint, CIC alleged that it has no duty to indemnify DTJ 
and Cavanaugh under the CIC policy and that, additionally, R.C. 2745.01 and 
Ohio public policy preclude coverage for the employer intentional torts alleged 
against DTJ and Cavanaugh.  CIC argued in its motion for summary judgment 
that any recovery on Hoyle’s claims must be based upon a finding of intent to 
cause injury and would therefore be excluded from coverage under the Employers 
Liability Coverage Form.  Hoyle responded that an employer intentional tort 
proven with the rebuttable presumption of intent under R.C. 2745.01(C) does not 
involve deliberate intent to injure and would therefore not be excluded from 
coverage.  The trial court rejected Hoyle’s argument and instead held that any 
recovery under R.C. 2745.01 requires a finding that the employer acted with 
intent to cause injury.  The trial court concluded that any liability Hoyle might 
establish would fall within the policy exclusion for acts committed by an insured 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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with the deliberate intent to injure.  Accordingly, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of CIC. 
{¶ 20} A divided panel of the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the 
summary judgment in favor of CIC.  The majority framed the issue as “whether, if 
deliberate intent were to be presumed by operation of [R.C. 2745.01(C)], the 
claim would be excluded from coverage under the Employer Liability policy for 
actions taken with the ‘deliberate intent’ * * * to injure.”  (Emphasis sic.)  2013-
Ohio-3223, 994 N.E.2d 492, ¶ 17.  The court held, “Although the deliberate intent 
to injure may be presumed for purposes of the statute where there is a deliberate 
removal of a safety guard, * * * this does not in itself amount to ‘deliberate intent’ 
for the purposes of the insurance exclusion.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 19.  The 
court suggested that an employee may prevail on an employer-intentional-tort 
claim without proving deliberate intent under the policy.  Id. at ¶ 21.  Judge 
Hensal dissented, concluding that “deliberate intent” has the same meaning under 
the policy as under R.C. 2745.01 and rejecting the conclusion that liability may be 
imposed without a finding of deliberate intent under the policy. 
{¶ 21} This court accepted CIC’s discretionary appeal.  137 Ohio St.3d 
1421, 2013-Ohio-5285, 998 N.E.2d 1177.  CIC argues that both the terms of its 
policy and Ohio public policy preclude coverage.  Resolution of this appeal 
involves interpretation of statutory and contractual language, both of which 
present questions of law that we review de novo.  Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8; Sharonville v. Am. Employers 
Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-2180, 846 N.E.2d 833, ¶ 6. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
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Analysis 
{¶ 22} At the outset, we reiterate that the trial court has not determined 
the merits of Hoyle’s employer-intentional-tort claim under R.C. 2745.01(C).  
The court found that Hoyle did not present direct evidence of DTJ’s and 
Cavanaugh’s intent but held that genuine issues of material fact remained as to 
whether Hoyle could prevail on his claim by using the rebuttable presumption 
under R.C. 2745.01(C).  Thus, Hoyle may still demonstrate that DTJ and/or 
Cavanaugh deliberately removed an equipment safety guard and that his injuries 
occurred as a direct result, at which point he will be entitled to a presumption that 
DTJ and Cavanaugh intended to injure him.  But the question before us is a legal 
one—if the CIC policy excludes coverage for all employer intentional torts, CIC 
would have no duty to indemnify DTJ and Cavanaugh, even if Hoyle is able to 
establish liability.  In that regard, CIC is entitled to a declaratory judgment if its 
policy excludes coverage for an employer intentional tort using the R.C. 
2745.01(C) presumption. 
{¶ 23} The parties dispute the significance of the R.C. 2745.01(C) 
presumption and any resulting liability.  A presumption is a procedural device that 
courts resort to “only in the absence of evidence by the party in whose favor [the] 
presumption would otherwise operate.”  Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 140 
N.E.2d 401 (1957), paragraph three of the syllabus.  A legal presumption 
“imputes to certain facts or [a] group of facts a certain prima facie significance or 
operation.”  Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 15, 87 
N.E.2d 156 (1949).  “To establish a ‘presumption’ is to say that a finding of the 
predicate fact * * * produces ‘a required conclusion in the absence of explanation 
* * *.’ ”  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 
L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), quoting 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence, 
Section 67, 536 (1977).  Under R.C. 2745.01(C), the predicate facts—an 
employer’s deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard and directly resulting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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injury—give rise to a prima facie finding of intent to injure.  For purposes of this 
appeal, we must assume that Hoyle can establish that DTJ or Cavanaugh 
deliberately removed an equipment safety guard and that the removal was a direct 
cause of his injury. 
{¶ 24} The presumption under R.C. 2745.01(C) does not shift the ultimate 
burden of proof from Hoyle, but “a presumption imposes on the party against 
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet 
the presumption.”  Evid.R. 301.  If that party produces evidence that 
“counterbalances the presumption or * * * leave[s] the case in equipoise,” then 
the presumption disappears and the case must be disposed of on the evidence 
presented, without reference to the presumption.  In re Guardianship of Breece, 
173 Ohio St. 542, 555, 184 N.E.2d 386 (1962); Shepherd at 25.  But if the 
employer fails to produce evidence to rebut the presumption under R.C. 
2745.01(C), then the effect of the presumption is that “the employee ‘proves that 
the employer committed the [removal] with the intent to injure another.’ ”  Liberty 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ivex Protective Packaging, Inc., S.D.Ohio No. 3:13-cv-175, 
2014 WL 6687150, *2 (Nov. 26, 2014), quoting R.C. 2745.01(A). 
{¶ 25} It is tempting to look to the merits of Hoyle’s claims and hold that 
CIC has no duty to indemnify because, despite the presumption in R.C. 
2745.01(C), the trial court found that Hoyle produced no evidence that DTJ and 
Cavanaugh acted with a specific intent to injure him.  But “[t]he whole point of 
[R.C. 2745.01(C)] is to presume the injurious intent required under divisions (A) 
and (B)” in the absence of direct evidence.  Fickle v. Conversion Technologies 
Internatl., Inc., 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-10-016, 2011-Ohio-2960, ¶ 32, fn. 2.  
Because the trial court has not determined whether the presumption arises in this 
case, it cannot have determined whether DTJ and Cavanaugh can rebut the 
presumption. 
January Term, 2015 
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{¶ 26} If Hoyle establishes that DTJ and Cavanaugh deliberately removed 
an equipment safety guard and that the removal directly caused his injuries, he 
will be entitled to a presumption that DTJ and Cavanaugh acted with the intent to 
harm him.  If DTJ and Cavanaugh do not rebut the presumption, then Hoyle will 
have established that they acted with intent to harm him as a matter of law.  In any 
case, liability on Hoyle’s employer-intentional-tort claim will be based upon a 
finding that DTJ and Cavanaugh acted with intent to injure Hoyle.  Houdek, 134 
Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 25. 
{¶ 27} The Employers Liability Coverage Form purports to extend 
coverage for substantial-certainty employer intentional torts, but not direct-intent 
employer intentional torts.  While DTJ and Cavanaugh rely on the language of the 
Employers Liability Coverage Form to argue that “deliberate intent” has a more 
limited meaning under the policy than under R.C. 2745.01, that argument does not 
address the overarching prohibition against legal liability for employer intentional 
torts in the absence of the employer’s deliberate intent to cause injury.  See 
Kaminski, 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 56.  Under 
R.C. 2745.01, which took effect two years prior to the commencement of the 
policy period, DTJ and Cavanaugh cannot be legally obligated to pay damages for 
an employer intentional tort except based upon a finding that they acted with the 
intent to injure Hoyle.  Whether Hoyle proves that intent with direct evidence 
under R.C. 2745.01(A) or with an unrebutted presumption under R.C. 
2745.01(C), intent to injure is an essential element of his claim for employer 
intentional tort.  Id.  Thus, although Hoyle might prevail without direct evidence 
of a deliberate intent to injure, he cannot recover without a finding that DTJ and 
Cavanaugh acted with the intent to injure.  Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., S.D.Ohio 
No. 3:13-cv-175, 2014 WL 6687150, at *12.  Because the Employers Liability 
Coverage Form excludes from coverage “liability for acts committed by or at the 
direction of an insured with the deliberate intent to injure,” there is no set of facts 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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under which DTJ and Cavanaugh could be legally liable to Hoyle that falls within 
the policy’s coverage. 
Public Policy Against Insuring for Employer Intentional Torts 
{¶ 28} CIC additionally argues that it is not required to indemnify DTJ 
and Cavanaugh because any coverage under the Employers Liability Coverage 
Form would violate Ohio’s long-standing public policy prohibiting insurance 
against liability for an insured’s own intentional torts, now that it has been 
established that R.C. 2745.01 is constitutional.  That public policy is based on 
“ ‘the assumption that [intentionally tortious] conduct would be encouraged if 
insurance were available to shift the financial cost of the loss from the wrongdoer 
to his insurer.’ ”  Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 173, 176, 551 
N.E.2d 962 (1990), quoting Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission 
of Intentional Torts, 20 Hastings L.J. 1219, 1245-1246 (1969).  But not all 
intentional torts are uninsurable in Ohio.  Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. New England 
Ins. Co., 87 Ohio St.3d 280, 283, 720 N.E.2d 495 (1999).  Harasyn carved out 
from the general rule prohibiting insurance for intentional torts those employer 
intentional torts based solely on the substantial certainty of injury.  We reasoned 
that “where intent is inferred from ‘substantial certainty’ of injury, the presence of 
insurance has less effect on the tortfeasor’s actions.”  Harasyn at ¶ 176. 
{¶ 29} Because the terms of the Employers Liability Coverage Form 
preclude coverage in this case, we need not broadly determine whether the 
rationale in Harasyn remains applicable in light of the subsequent enactment of 
R.C. 2745.01 or whether Ohio public policy prohibits any type of indemnity 
coverage for employer intentional torts. 
Illusory Coverage 
{¶ 30} Finally, we turn to DTJ and Cavanaugh’s argument that if, as we 
have found, the CIC policy does not provide indemnity coverage for employer 
intentional torts, then the Employers Liability Coverage Form provides no 
January Term, 2015 
15 
 
coverage at all and is illusory.  Relying on Ward v. United Foundries, Inc., 129 
Ohio St.3d 292, 2011-Ohio-3176, 951 N.E.2d 770, CIC responds that the 
endorsement is not illusory, because even if it did not provide the coverage that 
DTJ and Cavanaugh intended to purchase, it provided other coverage, including 
negligence-only coverage when employers are sued in dual capacities and 
coverage in situations not involving the employment relationship. 
{¶ 31} DTJ and Cavanaugh did not raise the issue of illusory coverage in 
the trial court, and neither the trial court nor the court of appeals addressed this 
issue.  “ ‘Ordinarily, reviewing courts do not consider questions not presented to 
the court whose judgment is sought to be reversed.’ ”  State ex rel. Quarto Mining 
Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997), quoting Goldberg 
v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 131 Ohio St. 399, 404, 3 N.E.2d 364 (1936). Therefore, 
we decline to address DTJ and Cavanaugh’s argument that the Employers 
Liability Coverage Form provided only illusory coverage. 
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority 
{¶ 32} On July 1, 2014, subsequent to oral argument, CIC moved this 
court for leave to file supplemental authority, pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.09(A), 
which provides, “Unless ordered by the Supreme Court, the parties shall not 
tender for filing and the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall not file any additional 
briefs or other materials relating to the merits of the case after the case has been 
orally argued.”  CIC requests leave to file an affidavit from a vice president in its 
Commercial Lines Department regarding CIC’s actions with respect to Employers 
Liability Coverage following this court’s decisions in Kaminski, 125 Ohio St.3d 
250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, and Stetter, 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-
Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092.  CIC states that it obtained the new affidavit in 
response to questions posed by various justices during oral argument.  DTJ, 
Cavanaugh, and Hoyle oppose CIC’s motion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 33} The affidavit that CIC presents, having been obtained following 
oral argument, was not in the record before either the trial court or the court of 
appeals.  It is a fundamental principle that an appellate court is constrained to 
review only those matters contained in the record.  See Brown v. Cleveland, 66 
Ohio St.2d 93, 98, 429 N.E.2d 103 (1981).  The record on appeal in this court 
consists of the original papers and exhibits, transcripts, journal entries, and the 
docket from the trial court and the court of appeals.  Sup.Ct.Prac.R. 15.01(A).  
Thus, the new affidavit is not properly a part of the record, and we may not 
expand the record by permitting the filing of evidentiary material that was not 
before the lower courts.  Moreover, the substance of the evidence CIC requests to 
file—that CIC credited DTJ and Cavanaugh $15 for the eight-day period between 
our decisions in Kaminski and Stetter and the end of the applicable policy 
period—is not relevant to the legal questions we answer in this appeal.  
Accordingly, we deny CIC’s motion for leave to file post-oral-argument 
supplemental material. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 34} Because liability for an employer intentional tort under R.C. 
2745.01 requires a finding that the employer acted with the intention to injure an 
employee, we conclude that an insurance provision that excludes from coverage 
liability for an insured’s act committed with the deliberate intent to injure an 
employee precludes coverage for employer intentional torts.  As a result, no facts 
could give rise to a duty upon CIC to indemnify DTJ or Cavanaugh, even if Hoyle 
were to prevail on his claims against them.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment in favor of CIC on its claim for declaratory judgment.  
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the summary judgment in favor of CIC. 
 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, J., concur. 
January Term, 2015 
17 
 
LANZINGER and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in syllabus and judgment only. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
______________________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in syllabus and judgment only. 
{¶ 35} I concur in judgment, but I would frankly state that by defining 
“substantially certain” acts  as “deliberate” in R.C. 2745.01, the General 
Assembly has closed off employer intentional torts.  Even if a plaintiff proves the 
employer’s intent to injure directly under R.C. 2745.01(A) or (B), or by an 
unrebutted presumption under R.C. 2745.01(C), the act is not insurable as was the 
old substantial-certainty intentional tort.  Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc., 49 
Ohio St.3d 173, 176, 551 N.E.2d 962 (1990).  There is now nothing less than 
deliberate intent. As a practical matter, employees will be limited to workers’ 
compensation remedies for their workplace injuries. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
______________________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 36} Thirty-three years ago, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Blankenship v. 
Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982), 
declared that the very proposition that an employer could be immune  from civil 
liability arising from intentionally injuring its workers was an outrage.  Today is a 
good day to review the sordid history of so-called intentional torts in the 
workplaces of Ohio.  The case before us demonstrates the money-driven efforts to 
return once again to the pre-Blankenship days, when profits were never placed in 
peril by the egregious acts of management. 
{¶ 37} Let’s take a look at why Blankenship was so important.  The facts 
speak for themselves.  In Blankenship, the complaint alleged that workers had 
been intentionally exposed to toxic chemicals without warning and as a result had 
suffered chemical intoxication.  The trial court had dismissed the claim as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
insufficient under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and held that workers’ compensation was the 
exclusive remedy for the poisoned workers, and the court of appeals had affirmed. 
{¶ 38} The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. The court concluded, “Since 
an employer’s intentional conduct does not arise out of employment, R.C. 
4123.74 does not bestow upon employers immunity from civil liability for their 
intentional torts and an employee may resort to a civil suit for damages.”  
Blankenship at 613.  The court held, “An employee is not precluded by Section 
35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, or by R.C. 4123.74 and 4123.741 from 
enforcing his common law remedies against his employer for an intentional tort.”  
Id. at syllabus.  The court determined that it was unreasonable to equate the 
negligent conduct covered by the Ohio Workers’ Compensation Act with 
intentional conduct in terms of the degree of risk facing Ohioans while at work.  
Id. at 613. 
{¶ 39} In response, the General Assembly enacted former R.C. 4121.80, 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 733-737.  R.C. 4121.80 was 
invalidated by this court in Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 
N.E.2d 722 (1991).  Eight years later, this court affirmed the holding in Brady and 
clearly stated that   “any statute created to provide employers with immunity from 
liability for their intentional tortious conduct cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.”  Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 304, 707 N.E.2d 1107 
(1999).  In 1995, the General Assembly enacted yet another statute intended to 
eliminate liability for employer intentional torts.  Based on our holding in Brady 
and Blankenship, former R.C. 2745.01 was invalidated by this court in its entirety 
because it was unconstitutional and because the excessive statutory requirements 
and heightened burden of proof in the statute “created a cause of action that is 
simply illusory.”  Johnson at 306. 
{¶ 40} The current version of R.C. 2745.01 was challenged and upheld in 
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 
January Term, 2015 
19 
 
N.E.2d 1066.  As Justice Pfeifer lamented in his dissenting opinion, “the General 
Assembly has found a court that agrees with it: workers have no constitutionally 
protected right to seek redress for injuries suffered from their employers’ 
intentional torts.”  Id. at 278 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  The gradual extinction of the 
rights of workers to recover for injuries they suffer as a result of intentional 
conduct by their employers serves no one.  Indeed, “[T]his abdication of employer 
responsibility * * * is an affront to the dignity of every single working man and 
working woman in Ohio.”  Blankenship, 69 Ohio St.2d at 617, 433 N.E.2d 572 
(Celebrezze, C.J., concurring). 
{¶ 41} The lead opinion states that this case is merely about the 
insurability of employer intentional torts.  The lead opinion states and reiterates 
that Hoyle’s intentional-tort claim against his employer has yet to be decided and 
remains viable under the statute.  Lead opinion, ¶ 14, 22.  I wish I could agree.  
Hoyle deserves his day in court.  Unfortunately, I believe that Justice Lanzinger is 
correct when she writes that as a result of this decision, “[t]here is now nothing 
less than deliberate intent,” and that the practical effect of the lead opinion is that 
injured employees will be limited to workers’ compensation.  Id. at ¶ 35 
(Lanzinger, J., concurring in syllabus and judgment only). 
{¶ 42} Now we have insurance agents selling worthless pieces of paper 
that will never pay a claim to assuage the fears of managers as they, in the name 
of increased production and reduced labor costs,  remove saw guards, disable air-
filtration systems, and store time-consuming safety equipment in their offices.  
After all, they have been assured by their insurance agent that if they get caught 
intentionally injuring their employees, it will be an insured event. 
{¶ 43} In this case, DTJ Enterprises, Inc. and Cavanaugh Building 
Corporation stand in the spotlight and very well may be found culpable for the 
missing safety device.  In that event, they could be legally liable to Hoyle under 
R.C. 2745.01(A) if he can show that the employer acted with intent to injure.  One 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
of the ways that Hoyle can show intent, should this matter ever see the inside of a 
courtroom, is by using the presumption under R.C. 2745.01(C).  Most important 
to our inquiry here is that the insurance policy in question explicitly excludes 
coverage only for deliberate intentional torts.  And while the policy defines an 
intentional act as an act substantially certain to cause bodily injury, it is 
significant that the policy does not limit the definition of intent to mean deliberate 
intent.  Thus DTJ and Cavanaugh could be legally liable to Hoyle for intentional 
conduct under the statute and within the scope of the policy.  But somehow the 
lead opinion reaches the conclusion that there is no set of facts under which DTJ 
and Cavanaugh could be legally liable to Hoyle that falls within the policy’s 
coverage.  I disagree.  A single act could in fact be found to be substantially 
certain to cause an injury but not be driven by a deliberate intent to injure. 
{¶ 44} The lead opinion rationalizes its erroneous conclusion by adopting 
the assertion of Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”) that it is not required to 
indemnify DTJ and Cavanaugh, because any coverage under the Employers 
Liability Coverage Form–Ohio violates Ohio’s long-standing public policy 
prohibiting insurance against liability for an insured’s own intentional torts.  
CIC’s brazen assertion here is disingenuous at best, considering that it drafted the 
policy and collected premiums from DTJ.  Can this court truly countenance an 
insurance company’s assertion that it should be permitted to collect a premium for 
an event that is never going to happen?   
{¶ 45} More important, as the lead opinion points out, this court has 
determined that not all intentional torts are uninsurable. Lead opinion, ¶ 28, citing 
Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. New England Ins. Co., 87 Ohio St.3d 280, 283, 720 
N.E.2d 495 (1999) (minority opinion).  “[I]nsurance coverage should be 
prohibited only for direct-intent torts.” Buckeye Union at 283.  As Justice Pfeifer 
explained in his opinion in Buckeye Union, “in Harasyn, this court discussed the 
different levels of intent involved with intentional acts.  ‘The first level, * * * 
January Term, 2015 
21 
 
direct intent,’ is where the actor does something which brings about the exact 
result desired.  In the second, the actor does something which he believes is 
substantially certain to cause a particular result, even if the actor does not desire 
that result.’ ”  Id. at 283, quoting Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc., 49 Ohio 
St.3d 173, 175, 551 N.E.2d 962.  Nobody in this case seems to be arguing that 
DTJ or Cavanaugh directly intended Hoyle to fall 14 feet from the ladder-jack 
scaffold onto a concrete pad.  Rather, the genuine issue of material fact here is 
whether or not the job superintendent kept the bolts necessary to secure the ladder 
jacks to the ladders in his office because they took too much time to use.  That is 
the real question before this court.  This court has everything it needs to hold in 
favor of the policy holder in this case.  It has a statute, a policy bought and paid 
for, and relevant caselaw of the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Regardless of these 
binding guideposts, the majority forges ahead in the wrong direction.  “What is 
good for workers is good for Ohio.” Blankenship at 620, (Sweeny and Brown, JJ., 
concurring).  This statement is no less true today than it was in 1982.  The 
courthouse doors should not be closed to a person who suffered an intentional 
injury merely because they were at work.  Indeed, the General Assembly has 
clearly made that proposition the law of Ohio.  You intentionally hurt someone, 
you must pay—even if it happens in the workplace.  And until that determination 
has been made by a competent court, the duty to indemnify requires a defense.  
There is no other logical explanation for accepting the premiums on this particular 
insurance policy. 
{¶ 46} I would affirm the Ninth District’s holding in this case.  CIC got 
the benefit of its deal with DTJ, and now, under the express terms of its policy, it 
should absolutely be required, based on the language it authored itself, to 
indemnify DTJ and Cavanaugh for any intentional tort except for those acts 
committed with deliberate intent. 
{¶ 47} I dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
______________________________ 
 
Plevin & Gallucci and David R. Grant; and Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., 
and Paul W. Flowers,  for appellee Duane Allen Hoyle. 
Koehler Neal, L.L.C., and Timothy J. Fitzgerald; and Michael M. Neltner 
and Stephen J. Chuparkoff, for appellant, the Cincinnati Insurance Company. 
 
Jackson Kelly, P.L.L.C., and Mark W. Bernlohr; Davis & Young, L.P.A., 
and David G. Utley; and Morrow & Meyer, L.L.L., and Todd T. Morrow, for 
appellees DTJ Enterprises, Inc. and Cavanaugh Building Corporation. 
 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold and T. Andrew Vollman, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
Traska Kimbrell, Ltd., and Peter D. Traska, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae the Ohio Association of Justice. 
______________________________