Title: In re JLD Properties of St. Albans, LLC

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 87













In re JLD Properties of St.
Albans, LLC (2010-097)
 
2011 VT 87
 
[Filed 05-Aug-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street,
Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that corrections may be
made before this opinion goes to press.
 
2011 VT 87
 
No. 2010-097
 
In re JLD Properties of St.
  Albans, LLC
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
 
Environmental Court
 
 
 
March Term, 2011
 
Thomas S. Durkin, J.
 
Jon Groveman and Jared M. Margolis,
  Vermont Natural Resources Council, Montpelier, for
  Appellants.
 
Stewart McConaughy, Robert F.
  O'Neill and Ross A. Feldmann of Gravel and Shea,
  Burlington, for Appellee
  JLD Properties of St. Albans, LLC.
 
David A. Barra of Unsworth
  & Barra, PLC, Essex Junction, for Appellee Town of St. Albans.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and
Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
JOHNSON, J.   This is an appeal from an Environmental
Court decision granting site plan, conditional use, subdivision, and Act 250
permits for the development of a large retail Wal-Mart store in the Town of St.
Albans.   Appellants are comprised of a number of interested
individuals and groups opposed to the project.  They contend the trial
court erred in: (1) approving site plan and conditional use permits despite the
alleged conflict of interest of several members of the Town's development
review board; (2) finding that the subdivision is compatible with adjacent land
uses; and (3) concluding that the developer may reapply for an Act 250
permit  despite an earlier denial.  We affirm.  
¶ 2.            
This is the latest skirmish in a long-running dispute over plans to
develop a Wal-Mart discount retail store on an undeveloped 100-acre parcel
adjacent to Route 7 just north of the City of St. Albans and south of the
boundary with the Town of Swanton.  In September 1993, the St. Albans
Groupthe project's original developerapplied for an Act 250 permit to build a
proposed 126,090 square-foot Wal-Mart store on the site.  The District No.
6 Environmental Commission granted the permit but the Environmental Board
reversed, concluding that the proposal failed to meet several review
criteria.  The Board authorized reconsideration of the application,
however, if the developer provided "a credible study of secondary growth
impacts."  In re Wal*Mart Stores, Inc., 167 Vt. 75, 79, 702 A. 22d
397, 400 (1997).  Rather than apply for reconsideration, the developer
chose to appeal.  We affirmed, upholding the Board's finding that the
proposed store would "accelerate and attract substantial secondary growth"
under 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(9)(A) (Criterion 9(A))[1] and thus required additional 
evidence of "expected secondary growth and its associated costs and benefits to
determine whether the project would cause an undue burden on the financial
capacity of the town and region."  Id. at 83, 702 A.2d  at
402.  We also affirmed the Board's conclusion that the term "growth" under
Criterion 9(A) includes not only population but also economic and commercial
growth.  Id. at 85, 702 A.2d  at 404.  
¶ 3.            
In December 2005, some eight years after our decision and twelve years
after the initial application, the original developer's successor-in-interest,
appellee JLD Properties, filed a new Act 250 permit application to build a
larger Wal-Mart store (about 147,000 square feet) on the same site.  At
roughly the same time, JLD applied to the Town's development review board (DRB)
for site plan, conditional use, and subdivision permits for the project. 
The DRB granted the zoning permits in April 2008.  The District Commission
approved the Act 250 application the following month.  All of the permits
were subsequently appealed to the Environmental Court and consolidated for
review.
¶ 4.            
The Environmental Court issued a decision in March 2009, disposing of a
several pre-trial motions.  The court rejected appellants' claim that the
doctrine of res judicata barred the new Act 250 application.  The court
ruled, instead, that the successive-application doctrine controlled, but
deferred deciding the matter until disputed factual issues were resolved at
trial.  The court also addressed appellants' claim that conflicts of
interest among several DRB members required that the case be remanded for a new
hearing.  The court found that appellants had "good reasons to be
concerned that the DRB chair did not review the Wal-Mart application
objectively."  Nevertheless, it concluded that, "egregious as [his] statements
were," the proper course was to "complete [the court's] de novo
review of the pending applications."  The court also rejected appellants'
claim that five other DRB members were biased "simply because they [had] voted
in favor of an earlier application."    
¶ 5.            
 An evidentiary hearing was conducted over several days in June
2009.  Following the submission of additional briefing, the court issued
its decision in January 2010, approving the project with conditions.  In
response to appellants' motion to alter, the court issued a revised judgment in
May 2010, amending several of its earlier findings but not its decision
granting approval.  This appeal followed.
I.
¶ 6.            
We begin with the conflict-of-interest claim.  It is beyond dispute
that "[a] fair trial before an impartial decisionmaker is a basic requirement
of due process, applicable to administrative agencies as well as to the
courts."  Sec'y, Agency of Natural Res. v. Upper Valley Reg'l Landfill
Corp., 167 Vt. 228, 234-35, 705 A.2d 1001, 1005 (1997).  Municipal
zoning hearings, "like any quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, must
faithfully observe the rudiments of fair play."  In re Bassette,
147 Vt. 359, 362, 518 A.2d 15, 16 (1986) (quotation omitted).  Thus, it is
settled that "due process demands impartiality on the part of those who
function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities."  Schweiker v.
McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); see, e.g., Rissler v. Jefferson Cnty.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 693 S.E.2d 321, 329 (W.Va. 2010) (applying due
process principles to hold that member of local zoning board should have been
disqualified from considering application for conditional use permit based on
conflict of interest).     
¶ 7.            
It is equally settled that "[a]ll questions" regarding a decisionmaker's
impartiality do not necessarily "involve [issues of] constitutional
validity."  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948) (observing that
"most matters relating to judicial qualification [do] not rise to a
constitutional level").  Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has
observed, opinions formed by a decisionmaker "on the basis of facts introduced
or events occurring in the course . . . of prior proceedings . . . do not
constitute a basis" for disqualification "unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."  Liteky
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also Hortonville Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976)
(holding that disqualification of decisionmaker is not compelled by "[m]ere
familiarity with the facts of a case" through prior proceedings).  Nor is
an administrative decisionmaker necessarily disqualified as a matter of law
even where he or she "has taken a position . . . in public, on a policy issue
related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing that he [or she] is not
capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances."  Hortonville, 426 U.S.  at 493 (quotation
omitted).   
¶ 8.            
Although the disqualification standards are thus generous, and the
decisionmaker enjoys a presumption of impartiality, Ball v. Melsur Corp.,
161 Vt. 35, 39, 633 A.2d 705, 709 (1993), the conclusion is unavoidable here
thatat a minimumthe appearance of fairness was compromised by the
participation of the DRB chair.  At the time of the original Wal-Mart
application, the chair was a member of the Town's selectboard, vigorously
supported the project, and spoke on behalf of himself and the board at the DRB
hearings.  As noted, such public support would not be a conflict of
interest per se.  The chair's remarks, however, ventured beyond the merits
of the issue into an ad hominem attack on appellant Vermont Natural Resources
Council (VNRC), one of the interested parties that then, as now, opposed the
project.  He referred to the VNRC as the "sister agency of the infamous
Conservation Law Foundation" and denigrated the group as intermeddling
outsiders, asserting that it "needs a map to find Northwestern Vermont" and was
comprised of "a bunch of elitists with nothing invested in the
community."  Later, in criticizing a report of the Northwest Regional
Planning Commission (NRPC) that raised concerns about the project, he was
quoted as stating that it was "a sad day when NRPC now qualifies to be lumped
together with the VNRC . . . and CLF . . . as an organization devoted to their
personal ideals rather than to the realities of growth."    
¶ 9.            
As noted, only in "the most extreme of cases" is disqualification for
bias constitutionally required, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986), but this was such a case.  The chair's remarks about the
VNRC evinced "a deep seated . . . antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible."  Litecky, 510 U.S.  at 555.  He expressed open
contempt for the group as outsiders and elitists, implying that they were
illegitimate participants in the proceedings before the board.  Under the
circumstances, appellant VNRC could hardly expect a fair and impartial hearing
from the DRB chair.  We conclude that his participation violated due
process.       
¶ 10.        
The separate question of a remedy remains.  The trial court
concluded that a de novo hearing would cure any harm resulting from the DRB
chair's participation, and we agree.  Although the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that there may be circumstances where de novo review is
inadequate to cure a due process violation, it has generally been in cases of
systemic or "structural" error undermining public confidence in the procedural
framework as a whole.  See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,
468 (1997) (explaining that "structural error . . . is a defect affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the
trial process itself") (quotation omitted).  Thus, in Ward v. Village
of Monroeville, the Court found an inherent due-process violation in Ohio's
system of trying traffic offenses in mayoral courts where a substantial portion
of local revenues was derived from traffic fines and fees.  409 U.S. 57,
59 (1972).  In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the mayor's
"executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to
maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court," id. at
60, and thus "necessarily involve[d] a lack of due process of law."  Id.
(quotation omitted).  The Court found unpersuasive the claim that any
unfairness in this regard could be corrected "on appeal and trial de novo in
the County Court of Common Pleas," rejecting the proposition that "the State's
trial court procedure [could] be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply
because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial
adjudication."  Id. at
61.            
¶ 11.        
The high court employed similar reasoning in Vasquez v. Hillery,
holding that systematic racial discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury "undermined the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself" and
thus represented a fundamental flaw that could not be "purged" by a subsequent
fair trial and conviction.  474 U.S. 254, 260, 263-64 (1986); see also United
Church of the Med. Ctr. v. Med. Ctr. Comm'n, 689 F.2d 693, 700 (7th Cir.
1982) (holding that statute which authorized medical commission to judge case
in which it was also a party represented due process violation that de novo
review did not remedy); cf. In re Hunt, 163 Vt. 383, 387-88, 658 A.2d 919, 922 (1995) (holding that petitioner's claim of individual judicial bias
did not represent the sort of "structural error" that compelled reversal in Vasquez).      

¶ 12.        
In contrast to errors of a "structural" nature, due process violations
resulting from an individual decisionmaker's personal bias have often been held
to be subject to cure on de novo review.  For example, in Kelly v.
Board of Education of Monticello Independent School  District, the
court conceded that the appellant's prospect of receiving a fair hearing before
a school board that had prejudged his case was "more illusory than real." 
566 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).  Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the appellant's right to a de novo evidentiary hearing in the
circuit court was "sufficient to cure any deficiencies in the due process
hearing at the Board level."  Id.  The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reached a similar conclusion in Katruska v. Bethlehem Center
School District, 767 A.2d 1051 (Pa. 2001), where a high school principal
claimed that his demotion violated due process because a school board member's
wife, also a high school employee, had testified at the hearing.  The
court concluded that, where the Secretary of Education was vested with plenary
authority "to conduct a de novo review of the [board] proceedings," id.
at 1055, and it was the Secretary's determination that was ultimately reviewed
on appeal, the Secretary's "de novo review of the decision . . . ensured[d]
that the requirements of due process [were] satisfied."  Id.
at  1056.  Katruska was followed by  Hovnanian
Pennslyvania Acquisitions, LLC v. Newtown Township Board of Supervisors,
954 A.2d 718 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008), whereas hereit was alleged that a
municipal zoning board considering a conditional use application was
biased.  The applicant received a de novo hearing in the trial court,
however, and the appeals court concluded that, "[b]ecause the trial court
conducted a de novo review in this matter, any prior due process
problems were cured."  Id. at 724; see also Ross v. Med. Univ.
of S.C., 492 S.E.2d 62, 72-73 (S.C. 1997) (holding that, despite due
process concerns in medical committee's termination of tenured professor,
medical board's "independent consideration of [plaintiff's] grievance cured the
constitutional violation").
¶ 13.        
We thus find ample support for the trial court's conclusion that any due
process concerns arising from the participation of the DRB chair in the permit
proceedings were effectively cured by the subsequent trial de novo in the
Environmental Court.  This does not, of course, mitigate the egregious
lapse of judgment that gave rise to the due process claim in the first instance
or excuse such disreputable conduct in the future.  Nor can review in the
Environmental Court absolve questionable conduct in the ultimate court of
public opinion.  That is an entirely separate matter,  however, from
the one we consider here.
¶ 14.        
As for appellants' corollary claim concerning the other DRB members, it
is sufficient to recall that mere participation in an earlier proceeding does
not, without more, demonstrate a disqualifying bias.  Liteky, 510 U.S.  at 555.  As this was the sole basis of the due process claim
concerning the other members, we find that it lacks
merit.       
II.
¶ 15.        
We turn to appellants' assertion that the trial court erred in analyzing
the Act 250 permit application under the successive-application doctrine. 
Citing the statute and rule governing reconsideration of Act 250 applications,
appellants maintain that the Legislature "has provided that reconsideration is
the sole remedy for reapplying for an Act 250 permit that has been
denied."  (Emphasis added.)  The assertion is unpersuasive.  The
statute merely provides that, when an Act 250 permit has been denied, the
applicant may apply for reconsideration within six months of the denial with an
affidavit attesting that any identified "deficiencies have been
corrected."  10 V.S.A. § 6087(c).  In reviewing the application, the Natural
Resources Board rule provides that a district commission may limit its "scope
of review to those aspects of the project or application which have been
modified to correct deficiencies" and that findings not otherwise affected by
the proposed modifications are "entitled to a presumption of validity." 
Natural Resources Board Rule 31(B)(2), 6 Code of Vt. Rules 12 004 060-13. 
Together these provisions simply serve to encourage and reward timely
reconsideration motions by obviating the need to relitigate any positive
findings from the initial permit proceeding.  See In re Times and
Seasons, LLC Act 250 Reconsideration, 2011 VT 76, ¶ 10, ___ Vt. ___, ___
A.3d ___  (observing that "the reconsideration process allows an applicant
to maintain the benefit of initial affirmative findings made on the original
application and to receive additional review only in those areas found
deficient").   We discern nothing in the statute or rule, however, to
prevent an applicant from reapplying after the six-month reconsideration period
has expired, albeit without the benefit of the presumption.[2]  See id. ¶ 16 (noting that,
to take advantage of subsequent change in law, "applicant must begin the Act
250 process anew").  
¶ 16.        
The trial court here thus correctly concluded that the new Act 250
application was not automatically barred by the failure to apply for
reconsideration, but rather was governed by the successive-application
doctrine.  This conclusion was sound.  As the court accurately
observed, the doctrine's ability to strike the proper balance between finality
and flexibility in municipal zoning decisions applies with equal force to the
planning and environmental concerns underlying Act 250.  See In re
Dunkin Donuts S.P. Approval, 2008 VT 139, ¶ 9 n.2, 185 Vt. 583, 969 A.2d 683 (mem.) (noting that successive-application doctrine "is an attempt to
balance the competing concerns of flexibility and finality in zoning
decisions," concerns that "have been treated extensively in the context of Act
250 permitting" as well).  Under this doctrine, the general rule is that a
board may not entertain a second application concerning the same property after
a previous application has been denied "unless a substantial change of conditions
ha[s] occurred or other considerations materially affecting the merits of the
request have intervened between the first and second application."  In
re Carrier, 155 Vt. 152, 158, 582 A.2d 110, 113 (1990) (quotation
omitted).   
¶ 17.        
Assuming the doctrine applies, appellants alternatively contend the
evidence fails to support the court's finding that circumstances had changed
sufficiently in the last twelve years to permit the new Act 250
application.  In assessing the court's finding that the developer
 demonstrated the requisite change of circumstances to support its new
application, our review is limited.  The trial court determines the
credibility of witnesses and weighs the persuasive effect of evidence, and we
will not disturb its findings "unless, taking them in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, they are clearly erroneous."  In re Route 103
Quarry, 2008 VT 88, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 283, 958 A.2d 694 (quotation
omitted).   Thus, the court's findings may "not be disturbed merely
because they are contradicted by substantial evidence" where "credible
evidence" otherwise supports them.  In re Miller Subdivision Final Plan,
2008 VT 74, ¶ 13, 184 Vt. 188, 955 A.2d 1200.   
¶ 18.        
In reaching its decision here, the trial court relied principally on
engineering and economic analyses showing that much of the potential secondary
commercial growth that  concerned the Board in 1993 had already occurred
during the intervening years.  Included in "this conglomeration of commercial
developments within a mile-and-a-half radius of the proposed project site," the
court found, were fifty-one new commercial enterprises, including fast-food
restaurants, bank offices, automobile sales and service centers, and large
retailers such as supermarkets and home supply centers.  This extensive
commercial development was facilitated, in turn, by the City's specific
designation of the area as a "growth center" and extension of sewer
lines.  The court also found that the Board's original concern with the
project's potential effect on other large discount stores in the area,
specifically an Ames, Woolworths, and Ben Franklin store, was obviated by the
fact that all three had since closed, so thatin factthere was now evidence of
need for a local discount store such as Wal-Mart.  As thus summarized by
the trial court, the evidence showed that "commercial growth is now encouraged
for this area and that the proposed Wal-Mart will fill a void that now exists
in the local discount retail market."  Additionally, the court found that
the Board's original concerns about the project's impact on population growth
and its effect on educational services had largely evaporated because of
declining school enrollment over the years, and that other potentially adverse
economic impacts had been minimized or negated by the developer's pledge of
financial investments and other benefits to the local municipalities. 
Accordingly, the trial court found "a significant change in the circumstances
that led to the denial of the prior Wal-Mart development proposal" sufficient
to permit the new Act 250 application.       
¶ 19.        
Appellants contend the trial court relied on flawed or insufficient
evidence, or ignored conflicting evidence, in reaching this conclusion. 
In this respect, they claim that there was no evidence showing how the loss of
three large discount stores had affected commercial growth in the area, thus
undermining the trial court's finding that the fifty-one new stores represented
substantial commercial growth and negated the Board's original concern about
secondary growth.  The record evidence disclosed, however, that even with
the loss of the three major discount stores the total square footage of stores
in the area had more than doubled since 1993, thus amply supporting the court's
finding of significant new commercial expansion.  Appellants also fault
the trial court for failing to address the difference in square footage between
the original and current Wal-Mart store proposals, but the record shows all of
the expert analyses on which the court relied took account of the expanded
proposal.  Appellants additionally criticize the developer's
secondary-growth analysis for failing to consider the project's impact on the
development or expansion of shopping centers.  The developer's expert
economist specifically testified, however, that his secondary-growth study
included the potential expansion or addition of shopping malls and concluded
that further growth was unlikely in view of the several shopping centers already
serving the area.  
¶ 20.        
Appellants further allege flaws in the economic model used by JLD's
expert to demonstrate little or no secondary-growth associated with other
Wal-Mart stores in Vermont and the region.  As noted, however, the
evidence showedand the trial court foundthat "significant expansion in
commercial development" in the area surrounding the St. Albans site had already
occurred such that secondary growth was no longer a concern; thus, any evidence
concerning secondary growth specifically related to Wal-Marts in other areas
was largely superfluous.  In essence, the trial court here found the
substantial evidence adduced by JLD relating to secondary growth and its
associated social and economic impacts to be more compelling and persuasive
than the countervailing evidence adduced by appellants.  Under the
applicable standard of review, therefore, we have no basis to disturb the
court's findings, or reverse its conclusion that significant changes over the
past twelve to fifteen years validated the new Act 250 application.
III.
¶ 21.        
Lastly, appellants contend the trial court erred in finding that the
project was "compatible with adjacent uses (especially agricultural)" under the
Town's subdivision requirements.  Town of St. Albans Zoning Bylaws and
Subdivision Regulations § 220(3) (2006).  In its initial decision, the
trial court found that "[n]o adjoining property hosts agricultural uses,"
observing in this regard that the nearest agricultural operation is the Hudak
farm, which it described as located in a "separate zoning district in the Town
of Swanton" and physically separated from the project by Stevens Brook, a
55-acre buffer along Stevens Brook that the developer had pledged to preserve,
and many adjacent commercial uses.  In response to appellants' motion to
alter, the court revised its decision to acknowledge that a portion of the
Hudak farm is, in fact, located within the Town of St. Albans and the zoning
district of the proposed Wal-Mart site and that Stevens Brook does not separate
the project from a portion of the Hudak farm.  The court further
acknowledged that it had mistakenly referred to "adjoining" rather than
"adjacent" property at several points in its original decision, and thatas
appellants arguedadjacent could have a slightly broader meaning than
adjoining, encompassing properties that are not only contiguous but also nearby
or close but not necessarily touching.    See Webster's II New
Riverside University Dictionary 78 (1984) (defining adjacent as "close to" or
"nearby"); Vermont Marble Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 454, 101 A. 151,
163 (1917) (noting that dictionary defines objects as adjacent "when they lie
close to each other, but not necessarily in actual contact") (quotation
omitted).   
¶ 22.        
In reaffirming its decision, however, the court here underscored its
earlier undisputed findings that numerous uses separate the Hudak farm
operations west of Route 7 from the project site, including a town highway
known as Jewett Avenue, Stevens Brook, a woodland, and a host of commercial
properties and uses, including "the commercial developments known as Cobb Auto,
Senesac Auto Body, Champlain Commons store complex, Progressive Auto Sales, and
a storage and distribution facility."  The trial court thus concluded that
even substituting "adjacent" for "adjoining" the Hudak Farm was not an adjacent
property requiring a specific compatability analysis under the ordinance.
  
¶ 23.        
Appellants claim that the court erred in concluding that the terms
"adjacent" and "adjoining" are identical and that JLD was not required to
analyze the project's compatability with the Hudak farm because it did not
actually touch the property boundary of the proposed Wal-Mart.  This was
not the court's reasoning.  On the contrary, the trial court expressly
acknowledged appellants' "somewhat convincing argument of the difference
between the terms," although it observed that the difference was less
"dramatic" than appellants claimed and that one dictionary referred to them as
synonyms.  (Emphasis added.)  Appellants also dispute whether the
project is, in fact, compatible with adjacent agricultural uses.  Although
the trial court suggested that the intervening commercial uses would "dilute"
any impact on the Hudak farm, its ruling was predicated on a fact-specific
determination that the Hudak farm was not adjacent to the project in the
broader sense advocated by appellants, and thus did not trigger the subdivision
requirement.  Appellants have not shown that this finding was clearly erroneous
or unsupported by any credible evidence.  In re Route 103 Quarry,
2008 VT 88, ¶ 4; In re Miller Subdivision Final Plan, 2008 VT 74, ¶ 13,
184 Vt. 188, 955 A.2d 1200.  Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb it,
or the judgment as a whole.  
Affirmed.
          
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 

[1] 
This section provides, in pertinent part, that the District Commission must
consider "the growth in population experienced by the town and region" and
whether the proposed development "would significantly affect their existing and
potential financial capacity to reasonably accommodate" the expected
growth.  10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(9)(A).    
[2] 
Appellants also suggest that the Environmental Board order denying the original
Wal-Mart application in this case provided that the developer's sole recourse
was to apply for reconsideration.  On the contrary, the order merely
stated that "to be eligible for the procedure under 10 V.S.A. § 6087(c) and
Rule 31(B), an applicant must correct the deficiencies in the prior denial."
 Nothing in the order or in the other Board decisions cited by appellants
suggest that reconsideration is the exclusive means of reapplying for an Act
250 permit.