Title: Nelson v. Sheridan Manor

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nelson v. Sheridan Manor1997 WY 77939 P.2d 252Case Number: 96-110Decided: 06/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the 
Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of: BEVERLY NELSON,

Appellant(Employee-Petitioner),

 

v. 

 

SHERIDAN MANOR, 

Appellee(Employer-Respondent), 

 

v. 

 

STATE OF WYOMING ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

 Appellee(Objector-Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Sheridan County

 The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Rene Botten of Northern Wyoming Law Associates, 
Sheridan.

 Representing Appellee 
Sheridan Manor: 

Kathleen B. Dixon of Murane & Bostwick, 
Casper.

 Representing Appellee 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Division: 

Robert R. Rogers and Anthony T. Wendtland of Davis 
& Cannon, Sheridan.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice.

 [¶1]      Beverly Nelson 
(Nelson) appeals the denial of her worker's compensation claim for temporary 
total disability benefits. Nelson was allegedly injured while on duty as a 
cook-trainee at Sheridan Manor in Sheridan, Wyoming. After a contested case 
hearing, the hearing examiner concluded that Nelson failed to establish that her 
employment at Sheridan Manor was the cause of her symptoms. Nelson contends the 
hearing examiner erroneously considered deposition testimony which was not 
formally offered into evidence at the contested case hearing. She further 
asserts the delay between the hearing and the decision caused substantial 
prejudice to her case. Finding no error in the consideration of the deposition 
testimony nor any prejudice to Nelson caused by delay, we 
affirm.

 

I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      As appellant, 
Nelson states the issues as follows:

I.          
Is the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of the hearing officer denying the award of 
benefits arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law?

II.          
Did the hearing officer abuse his discretion in waiting nine months to 
render a decision?

 

[¶3]      Appellee, 
Sheridan Manor, states similar issues:

I.          
The hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law because the hearing examiner relied upon deposition testimony of 
which he took judicial notice.

II.          
The Appellant has failed to prove that an alleged delay between the 
hearing on May 4, 1995 and the hearing officer's final decision on February 15, 
1996 caused her prejudice.

 

[¶4]      Appellee, State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) states 
their issues:

I.          
Should issues raised by Petitioner the first time on appeal be 
considered?

II.          
Did the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contain 
prejudicial error?

 

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      On October 27, 
1994, Nelson began her eleven-day employment with Sheridan Manor. Originally 
hired to work as a kitchen aid, Nelson was quickly advanced to cook-trainee. Her 
last day of work was November 10, 1994. Prior to her employment with Sheridan 
Manor, Nelson was employed for two years as a seamstress with Big Horn Threads. 
While a seamstress, Nelson worked on a double needle sewing machine attaching 
zippers and stitching hemwork which routinely entailed cutting thread and 
manipulating material.

 

[¶6]      On November 15, 
1994, Nelson filed a worker's compensation claim for temporary total benefits 
due to carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists allegedly received or exacerbated 
while working at Sheridan Manor. Sheridan Manor objected to the claim and a 
contested hearing was held on May 4, 1995.

 

[¶7]      At the contested 
case hearing, Nelson introduced her own testimony, that of her daughter, and the 
deposition testimony of Dr. Batty, her treating physician. Nelson testified that 
on November 8, 1994, her first day as a cook-trainee, she felt "three pops" in 
her left wrist while removing a pan from a low oven. She then experienced a 
"sharp pain" up toward her elbow. Two days later, she felt a "grinding" in her 
neck and "something sharp" in her right elbow. The next day, her arms, hands and 
wrists were swollen and painful. She stated she never had experienced any 
similar symptoms and since it was her day off, she waited to see if the swelling 
would go down.

 

[¶8]      Nelson testified 
that when the symptoms continued into the following day, November 12, she 
attempted to call several physicians for an appointment. Dr. Batty, a local 
physician, returned her call and made an appointment for a consultation on 
Monday, November 14, 1994. After examining Nelson on November 14, Dr. Batty 
diagnosed her condition as "bilateral carpal tunnel in both 
wrists."

 

[¶9]      Sheridan Manor 
called Virginia Fisher (Fisher), Nelson's supervisor, who testified Nelson 
telephoned her on November 12, at which time she told Fisher she would not be 
coming in the next day because her hands were swollen. When Fisher asked Nelson 
if she had been "injured on the job," Nelson replied no, she had "carpal tunnel" 
and "she had it a long time." Fisher also testified that on November 15, 1994, 
the same day Nelson filled out her injury report with the court clerk, Nelson 
came to Sheridan Manor to return her keys. At that time, Nelson told Fisher that 
Dr. Batty had diagnosed her condition as carpal tunnel and she did not know if 
she would return to work. Fisher testified Nelson never said anything to Fisher 
about the injury being related to work at Sheridan Manor and that Fisher only 
learned of the alleged work/injury relationship a few days later from Nelson's 
co-employee.

 

[¶10]   Over a period of time, Dr. Batty 
referred Nelson to several physicians for further testing. Eventually, Nelson's 
physicians concluded that Nelson's tests indicated carpal tunnel syndrome in her 
left wrist, tendinitis in her right elbow, and cervical radiculopathy. Her 
condition was treated with home cervical traction and nonsteroidal 
anti-inflammatory agents.

 

[¶11]   Dr. Cole, a neurologist in Casper, 
Wyoming, conducted an independent medical examination of Nelson at the request 
of the Division and Sheridan Manor. He later submitted a report and was deposed 
by Nelson. During the contested case hearing at the close of Nelson's evidence, 
the Division stated it would present no witnesses, but would "rely on what is in 
Dr. Cole's deposition and the cross-examination of plaintiff's case." Nelson 
made no objection to the Division's reliance on the deposition 
testimony.

 

[¶12]   At the close of the proceeding, the 
hearing examiner told counsel he would be unable to render an immediate decision 
because the "pivotal" testimony would be found in the, as yet, unread 
depositions of Dr. Cole and Dr. Batty. After nine months passed without a 
decision, Nelson petitioned the district court for a Peremptory Writ of 
Mandamus. Eight days later, on February 15, 1996, the hearing examiner issued 
its order denying benefits which cited deposition testimony from the depositions 
of Dr. Batty, Dr. Cole and Fisher. On March 11, 1996, Nelson filed a petition 
for review with the district court. Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09, this case was 
certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

 

III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶13]   Judicial review of an agency action 
is conducted in accordance with Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1990). W.R.A.P. 12.09. 
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A), the reviewing court shall "[h]old 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be * * * 
[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law[.]" See Wyoming Steel & Fab, 
Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1994). An agency's findings of fact 
will not be adjusted unless clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. Id. at 875. We do not 
afford the same deference, however, to an agency's conclusion of law. An 
agency's decision is affirmed only if the conclusion of law is correct; 
otherwise, we correct it. Matter of 
Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996). When the determination before us is a 
mixed question of fact and law, we defer to the agency's findings of basic fact 
but correct misapplications of the law to those facts. Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 1992).

 

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A.        RELIANCE ON 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY NOT FORMALLY INTRODUCED AT THE CONTESTED CASE 
HEARING

 

[¶14]   Nelson claims the hearing examiner 
improperly relied on the deposition testimony of Dr. Cole and Fisher in reaching 
his conclusions because the depositions "were never introduced or made a part of 
the record." (Emphasis in original.) Not only does this argument lack merit, 
it is not properly before us on appeal due to Nelson's failure to raise the 
issue below.

 

[¶15]   As we have consistently stated over 
many years, Wyoming appellate courts do not review issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. Stuckey v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Wyo. 1995); Campbell v. Department of Family 
Services, 881 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Wyo. 1994). This rule is equally applicable 
to appeals from administrative decisions as to those from district courts. Matter of State Bank Charter Application of 
Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d 296, 299-300 (Wyo. 1980). In Matter of State Bank Charter Application of 
Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d  at 299, we refused to consider appellant's 
claim that the hearing examiner took into account evidence which was not part of 
the administrative record, quoting Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974):

"Unless adverse parties appearing before 
administrators or administrative bodies are required to frame issues and 
contentions for decision by the hearing body, such hearings will become 
meaningless charades necessitating upon appeal what would be factually a trial 
de novo contrary to the purpose and philosophy of the Administrative Procedures 
Act."

 

Nelson never presented the 
hearing examiner with objections to the use of the deposition testimony at the 
contested case hearing nor did she utilize any procedure to raise her objections 
after the decision was rendered. Matter 
of State Bank Charter Application of Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d  at 299 n. 
4; Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-109 (1990).

 

[¶16]   Nelson counters it is "ludicrous" 
to require an objection to the hearing examiner's use of the depositions at the 
contested case hearing because "she had no idea that the hearing officer would 
improperly use them * * *." We find this argument disingenuous not only because 
it ignores the opportunity to object after receiving the hearing examiner's 
decision, but also because the record clearly shows Nelson knew the hearing 
examiner was going to consider the entire deposition testimony of Dr. Cole. 
Indeed, her counsel invited him to do so.

 

[¶17]   On three separate occasions prior 
to the contested case hearing, the hearing examiner notified the parties it 
would take official notice of the entire administrative file. Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-107(r) (Cum.Supp. 1996). At the outset of the proceeding, the record 
reflects the following exchange:

 

[HEARING EXAMINER]: I notice that we have depositions 
of some length. I received them yesterday. As we proceed here we will decide 
whether or not I can digest these rapidly enough to accommodate you with some 
sort of a resolution today. These depositions are Dr. Cole and Dr. 
Batty.

* 
* * I want to ask counsel what their anticipation of witnesses and testimony 
will be. * * *

* 
* *

[DIVISION'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I don't have any 
witnesses other than my reliance on a Malvin Cole * * *. I don't have anybody 
other than Dr. Cole, cross-examination, and [employer's counsel's] 
witnesses.

* 
* *

[EMPLOYER'S COUNSEL]: * * * We also have Dr. Cole. * 
* *

[HEARING EXAMINER]: * * * [Appellant's Counsel], do 
you want to introduce the case and tell us where we are 
going.

[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. I would 
question first the - would you like to change the two copies of the depositions 
for the original depositions?

[HEARING EXAMINER]: No, thank you. You can file those 
* * * upstairs.

[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: Okay. Sure 
will.

 

[¶18]   However, this was not the end of 
the matter. During the hearing, the Division unequivocally stated its intention 
to rely on the deposition testimony of Dr. Cole, without objection by Nelson's 
counsel. Closing argument also afforded numerous opportunities to object to the 
use of Dr. Cole's deposition testimony. Instead, Nelson's counsel made extensive 
reference to Dr. Cole's deposition, including the 
following:

 

Now, the employer is basing their whole case on 
Dr. Malvin Cole's deposition. Dr. Cole is a neurosurgeon[1] down in Casper. And we did a 
deposition of Dr. Cole. And actually * * * Exhibits 7 through 9 are Dr. Cole's 
notes that I subpoenaed. And I subpoenaed them for a 
purpose.

* 
* *

Now, the reason I brought that up is because if you read Dr. Cole's deposition 
more thoroughly, he states in there she never mentioned she had neck 
pain. * * * But there it is right on his own notes that I subpoenaed, Exhibit 
No. 8.

 

(Emphasis added.) At no time 
did Nelson's counsel suggest the entire deposition was not properly before the 
hearing examiner. Neither did Nelson's counsel object during closing arguments 
by Sheridan Manor and the Division which repeatedly and specifically referenced 
Dr. Cole's testimony, going so far as to state, "the likelihood of Ms. Nelson 
actually developing and/or aggravating a simultaneous carpal tunnel syndrome and 
severe radiculopathy all at the same time is according to Dr. Cole's own words 
virtually nil."

 

[¶19]   Finally, the hearing examiner made 
it clear at the close of the proceeding that he intended to read the entire 
deposition testimony of Dr. Cole and Dr. Batty, and that he thought it would be 
"pivotal." Thus, the record demonstrates that despite many opportunities to 
bring this alleged error to the attention of the hearing examiner, Nelson failed 
to do so. Therefore, there is no question that in the case of Dr. Cole's 
testimony, Nelson waived any issue below.

 

[¶20]   Nelson also argues that 
consideration of Fisher's deposition testimony was a denial of due process 
because it was not in the case file. While it is true that Fisher's deposition 
testimony was disregarded at the contested case hearing due to her presence to 
testify in person, this does not negate an appellant's duty to request 
post-decision relief in such situations. Even had this issue been raised below, 
"an error must be prejudicial and affect the substantial rights of the 
appellant" in order to constitute grounds for reversal. Matter of Jones, 702 P.2d 1299, 1302 
(Wyo. 1985).

 

[¶21]   Nelson had the opportunity to 
cross-examine Fisher at the deposition and again at the contested case hearing. 
See Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1970) (physician's letter and reports not offered into evidence 
could not be basis for award of benefits because of lack of opportunity for 
cross-examination). Nelson also fails to point to any portion of Fisher's 
deposition which was contrary to the testimony given at the hearing. See Matter of Jones, 702 P.2d  at 1302 
(material not formally admitted identical to evidence properly admitted 
obviating any problem concerning due process). Therefore, Nelson fails to show 
any prejudice resulting from consideration of Fisher's deposition testimony. 

 

B. DELAY 
IN ISSUING A FINAL DECISION

 

[¶22]   Nelson's claim that reversal is 
warranted by virtue of the nine-month delay must also fail as she does not cite 
to any authority for reversal or establish any prejudice caused by the delay. Matter of Smith, 762 P.2d 1193, 1198 
(Wyo. 1988). Nelson's first claim of prejudice is based on financial hardship 
caused by the Division's failure to pay benefits while waiting for the hearing 
examiner's decision. Financial hardship is not a proper consideration in 
determining prejudice. If the facts in evidence demonstrate that Nelson was not 
entitled to benefits at the time of the hearing, she cannot show her financial 
difficulties were due to a delay in awarding those 
benefits.

 

[¶23]   Nelson also alleges she was 
prejudiced because the delay caused the hearing examiner to forget the evidence 
presented at the hearing. Nelson points to several alleged inconsistencies 
between the record of the hearing and the hearing examiner's Findings of Fact. 
The real question, however, is whether the discrepancies undermine the 
evidentiary support for the hearing examiner's 
conclusions.

 

[¶24]   The hearing examiner summarized his 
conclusions in relevant part as follows:

THIS HEARING OFFICER HAS CONCLUDED that Beverly 
Nelson has failed in carrying her burden of proof by establishing by 
preponderance of the evidence all the essential elements of her claim against 
Sheridan Manor. In short, her failure to report the accident or incident to her 
employer, the equivocal and speculative testimony of Dr. Batty in 
contradistinction to the unequivocal testimony of Dr. Cole, and the innumerable 
inconsistencies in the Claimant's testimony all result in such a 
failure.

 

[¶25]   Nelson initially notes that the 
hearing examiner misidentified a hearing exhibit, citing the Division's hearing 
Exhibit 16 which was not admitted into evidence, rather than citing the 
identical material admitted into evidence by Sheridan Manor. We see no prejudice 
to Nelson's case in this clerical error. The material considered by the hearing 
examiner was properly admitted.

 

[¶26]   Nelson also claims the hearing 
examiner misstated the evidence in two instances. First, Nelson correctly notes 
the hearing examiner found "Sheridan Manor was never advised of an incident or 
injury or accident at Sheridan Manor" when, in fact, Fisher testified she heard 
about the claim from a co-employee a few days after Nelson's resignation. We see 
no error in this statement when read with the hearing examiner's conclusion. 
Fisher's testimony established that Nelson never personally informed Fisher of 
an injury nor filled out a report, even though company policy required such 
report. A discussion with a co-employee which later finds its way to the 
supervisor does not undermine the hearing examiner's conclusions based on 
Nelson's failure to report the injury to her employer.

 

[¶27]   Nelson further points out that the 
hearing examiner erroneously found that Nelson told Dr. Batty in her first 
telephone call that her problem could be carpal tunnel. To the contrary, the 
hearing transcript indicates Nelson testified that Dr. 
Batty told her the condition could be carpal tunnel. Again, this error 
does not remove evidentiary support for the hearing examiner's conclusions in 
light of Fisher's testimony that Nelson stated she had carpal tunnel for "a long 
time."

 

[¶28]   None of the inconsistencies 
identified by Nelson address uncontested facts which were essential to the 
hearing examiner's determination and, therefore, there is no substantial 
prejudice to Nelson's claim. We decline to consider Nelson's allegation that the 
hearing examiner's decision is a form of retaliation for petitioning for a 
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus as it is not supported by cogent argument or 
authority. We also note that the conclusions of the hearing examiner were 
abundantly supported by the record.

 

V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   Nelson failed to preserve her claim 
that deposition testimony was improperly considered by the hearing examiner. 
Neither did Nelson establish substantial prejudice caused by the delay between 
the time of the hearing and the time the decision was issued. We, therefore, 
affirm.

 

Footnotes

1 This was a misstatement. Dr. Cole is a 
neurologist.