Title: Linda Rohde-Giovanni v. Paul Albert Baumgart

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 27 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3014 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
Linda Rohde-Giovanni p/k/a Linda Susan  
Baumgart,  
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Paul Albert Baumgart,  
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 136 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 339, 667 N.W.2d 718 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 25, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 14, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Fiedler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK. J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Linda Roberson, Anthony J. Lucchesi, and Balisle & Roberson, 
S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Linda Roberson. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Stephen 
C. Beilke and Murphy Desmond, S.C., Madison, and oral argument 
by Stephen C. Beilke. 
 
2004 WI 27 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3014  
(L.C. No. 
90 FA 2032) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Linda Rohde-Giovanni p/k/a Linda Susan  
Baumgart,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul Albert Baumgart,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The petitioner in this case, 
Linda Rohde-Giovanni (Rohde-Giovanni), formerly Linda Baumgart, 
seeks review of a published court of appeals' decision, 
affirming an order of the Dane County Circuit Court, which 
terminated maintenance.  Paul Baumgart (Baumgart) and Rohde-
Giovanni were divorced in 1992.  In the divorce judgment, 
Baumgart was ordered to make both child support and maintenance 
payments to Rohde-Giovanni.  In 2001, Baumgart brought a motion 
to terminate maintenance.  The circuit court concluded that a 
No. 
01-3014   
 
2 
 
substantial change in circumstances was present such that 
terminating 
maintenance 
was 
appropriate. 
 
Rohde-Giovanni 
appealed, and a divided court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court order. 
¶2 
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from 
which the circuit court could reasonably find a substantial 
change in the parties' circumstances, and from which the court 
could conclude that such circumstances justified the termination 
of maintenance after two more years.  The test for whether there 
is a substantial change in circumstances is the same, regardless 
of whether or not the issue of maintenance was stipulated to or 
contested during the divorce proceedings.  The objectives of 
support and fairness must both be considered on the issue of 
modification of a maintenance award as well, whether there was a 
stipulation or a contest in the original proceedings.  Moreover, 
we conclude that educational expenses a party incurs on behalf 
of an adult child may, but do not have to be, considered when 
examining the party's budget.  This is a decision left to the 
sound discretion of the circuit court.  While we do not 
anticipate frequent consideration of such educational expenses, 
we recognize that unusual or extraordinary circumstances could 
justify such consideration. 
I 
 
¶3 
Baumgart and Rohde-Giovanni were married on April 15, 
1973.  During their marriage, the parties had four children.  
Rohde-Giovanni 
worked 
inside 
the 
home 
and 
was 
primarily 
responsible for the care of the parties' children, while 
No. 
01-3014   
 
3 
 
Baumgart was employed outside the home.  After 17 years of 
marriage, Rohde-Giovanni commenced a divorce action in December 
1990.  In December 1992, Judge Susan Steingass of the Dane 
County Circuit Court granted a judgment of divorce. 
 
¶4 
During the divorce proceedings, the parties stipulated 
that Baumgart would pay $1980 per month in child support, plus 
29 percent of the gross amount of his bonus.  Although the 
parties were to have joint legal and physical custody, the 
children would continue to live with Rohde-Giovanni, and she 
would continue to be the children's primary caregiver.  The 
issue of maintenance for Rohde-Giovanni, however, was contested. 
 
¶5 
At the time of the divorce proceedings, Rohde-Giovanni 
was taking classes at a local college and grossing approximately 
$734 per month, or $8808 per year, as a group counselor.  She 
expected to receive her degree in two years.  Rohde-Giovanni's 
goal was to teach special needs children, and she anticipated 
that she could earn between $22,000 and $28,000 per year.  She 
expected that the maximum amount of income she could earn would 
be $40,000 per year, approximately 15 years after entering the 
work force.  When considering the appropriate amount of 
maintenance to award, Judge Steingass also considered the fact 
that 
Rohde-Giovanni 
suffered 
from 
the 
following 
physical 
ailments:  depression, poor health, chronic back pain, a 
prediabetic condition, arthritis in her hands, tendonitis in her 
feet, and basic fatigue.  At the time of the divorce, Baumgart 
had an M.B.A., which he earned during the early part of the 
No. 
01-3014   
 
4 
 
parties' marriage, and was earning $7750 in gross income per 
month, or $93,000 per year.   
¶6 
Judge Steingass concluded that the circumstances were 
appropriate for an award of indefinite term maintenance and 
awarded maintenance to Rohde-Giovanni in the amount of $950 per 
month.  The maintenance award left both parties unable to meet 
their projected monthly budgets.  However, Judge Steingass noted 
that, in the interest of fairness, the burden of operating with 
less money than originally budgeted should fall on both parties.   
¶7 
Judge 
Steingass 
further 
recognized 
that 
Rohde-
Giovanni's years of exclusively dedicating herself to caring for 
her family had left her unable to generate the amount of income 
that Baumgart was capable of generating.  The circuit judge 
noted that given the fact that Rohde-Giovanni was primarily 
responsible for the care of the parties' children, her low pay 
and limited availability to work would not allow her to enjoy a 
standard of living comparable to the standard she enjoyed while 
married.  Nevertheless, the circuit judge ultimately concluded 
that this financial arrangement should only be applicable when 
child support obligations were being paid as agreed and Rohde-
Giovanni was in school.  Moreover, the circuit judge noted that 
her calculations would become outdated once Rohde-Giovanni 
earned in accordance with her full capacity after completing her 
education and when the child support amount changed.1 
                                                 
1 In Finding of Fact #40, as listed in the judgment of 
divorce, the following was stated: 
No. 
01-3014   
 
5 
 
¶8 
In June 2001, Baumgart filed a motion in Dane County 
Circuit Court to terminate or reduce his maintenance payments to 
Rohde-Giovanni.  Conversely, Rohde-Giovanni moved the court for 
an increase in maintenance.  A family court commissioner 
dismissed the parties' motions, indicating that neither an 
increase nor a decrease in maintenance was appropriate.  The 
commissioner noted that even though there were substantial 
changes in the parties' situations, such as the fact that Rohde-
Giovanni's 
income 
had 
substantially 
increased, 
that 
she 
completed the degree she was pursuing at the time of the divorce 
and also obtained a Master's Degree, and that three of the 
parties' 
four 
children 
were 
now 
adults, 
the 
amount 
of 
maintenance should not be adjusted. 
¶9 
Baumgart then requested a de novo hearing.  Judge 
Patrick J. Fiedler, Dane County Circuit Court, heard Baumgart's 
motion to terminate maintenance and Rohde-Giovanni's motion to 
increase maintenance in October 2001.  In the proceedings before 
Judge Fiedler, the following new facts were brought to light:  
Rohde-Giovanni obtained her Master's Degree in special education 
                                                                                                                                                             
This 
division 
is 
based 
upon 
a 
number 
of 
assumptions.  It applies only during the period of 
time when child support is being paid as agreed, and 
Ms. Baumgart is in school.  This analysis becomes 
outdated once she earns in accordance with her 
capacity with completion of her education, and once 
the child support figures change.  This also assumes 
that each party will file as head of household, that 
Paul will claim the four children as dependents, and 
that Linda Baumgart will claim real estate taxes and 
home mortgage interest as itemized deductions. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
6 
 
in 1994.  Rohde-Giovanni grossed $43,355 per year from her job 
working with emotionally disturbed children and approximately 
$13,968 per year from her part-time work as a counselor.  Rohde-
Giovanni also received approximately $3000 per year in interest 
and dividend income, bringing her total gross income to 
approximately $61,000 per year.  Rohde-Giovanni had over $70,000 
in a money market account at the time of the hearing before 
Judge Fiedler.  Rohde-Giovanni continued to suffer from health 
problems, but her ailments had not significantly increased since 
the time of the divorce.  Moreover, Rohde-Giovanni did not 
submit any evidence that, because of her health condition, she 
was unable to earn a living.  The parties' one remaining minor 
child lived with Rohde-Giovanni.  As a result of the decrease in 
the number of minor children living with Rohde-Giovanni, 
Baumgart's child support obligation was decreased to $1513 per 
month.  Rohde-Giovanni allowed her 19-year-old son to live with 
her rent-free.  Rohde-Giovanni also paid for his tuition, books, 
car, and other living expenses.  An adult friend of Rohde-
Giovanni's resided in her basement rent-free.  The parties' 
adult daughter also lived with Rohde-Giovanni at times, although 
there was some discrepancy as to the exact duration and timing 
of her stay.2  Baumgart grossed $104,665 per year from his job, 
and he also received $2200 per year for speaking engagements.  
                                                 
2 The dissent has provided a calculation, which takes into 
account Rohde-Giovanni's budget, expenses, and the cost of 
living increase.  Dissent, ¶68.  We note that this calculation 
was not contained in the record and has gone beyond the 
information contained therein. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
7 
 
Baumgart's current wife earned a base salary of approximately 
$69,000 gross per year.  According to the information submitted 
to the circuit court, Baumgart's monthly expenses have increased 
approximately 20 percent since the divorce.  Those monthly 
expenses included his mortgage payment of approximately $1577, 
condominium association fees of $135, life and health insurance 
payments of approximately $230, payments for his minor son's 
orthodontia work, medical and drug expenses not covered by 
insurance of $450, vehicle payments of approximately $732, debt 
or installment payments of approximately $1247, aviation hobby 
expenses of $250, clothing budget of $200, and an entertainment 
budget of $300.          
¶10 After hearing testimony and receiving exhibits from 
both parties, Judge Fiedler concluded that there had been a 
substantial change in circumstances, such that the award of 
indefinite term maintenance in the divorce judgment should be 
converted to limited term maintenance that would end in December 
2003, a full six months after Baumgart was to make the last 
child support payment to Rohde-Giovanni.  The court noted that 
while Rohde-Giovanni was within her right to provide financial 
assistance to the parties' adult children, as she was free to 
spend her discretionary funds in a manner of her choosing, she 
could not expect Baumgart to be required to subsidize this 
decision.  The court noted that although Baumgart was able to 
share his living expenses with his current wife, he could not 
use Baumgart's current wife's income as a basis to grant an 
increase in maintenance. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
8 
 
¶11 Judge 
Fiedler 
also 
stated 
that 
Judge 
Steingass 
contemplated that her order would likely need to be reconsidered 
once Rohde-Giovanni completed her education.  Noting that Rohde-
Giovanni had apparently completed all of the education that she 
had set out to obtain and was earning above her anticipated 
maximum salary, the court stated that she should now be able to 
closely approximate the marital standard of living.  The court 
noted that Rohde-Giovanni's current standard of living could 
approximate the standard she enjoyed during marriage, provided 
that she was willing to tighten up her expenditures with respect 
to her adult children.  Rohde-Giovanni appealed. 
¶12 On appeal, Rohde-Giovanni stated that the circuit 
court erred in terminating maintenance because the circuit court 
erroneously concluded that Rohde-Giovanni could live at the 
marital standard of living without maintenance payments from 
Baumgart.  The court did not factor in the financial support 
that she was providing to her adult child for education 
expenses.  Rohde-Giovanni further argued that the circuit court 
did not properly apply the fairness objective of maintenance, 
and that the conversion of her indefinite term maintenance to 
limited term maintenance was due to the circuit court's failure 
to apply the appropriate legal test. 
¶13 A divided court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court appropriately exercised its discretion in deciding to 
terminate maintenance at the end of December 2003, and it thus 
affirmed the circuit court's decision.  The court of appeals, 
Judges Paul Lundsten and David G. Deininger, stated that it 
No. 
01-3014   
 
9 
 
first had to consider whether a substantial change in the 
parties' circumstances had occurred.  In deciding whether or not 
to grant maintenance, the court of appeals noted that the 
circuit 
court 
must 
consider 
the 
factors 
listed 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (1999-2000).3  The court of appeals stated 
                                                 
3 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 
edition.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.26 provides, in relevant part: 
Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal 
separation, or in rendering a judgment in an action 
under s. 767.02(1)(g) or (j), the court may grant an 
order requiring maintenance payments to either party 
for a limited or indefinite length of time after 
considering: 
 
(1)  The length of the marriage. 
 
(2)  The age and physical and emotional health of 
the parties. 
 
(3)  The division of property made under s. 
767.255. 
 
(4)  The educational level of each party at the 
time of marriage and at the time the action is 
commenced. 
 
(5)  The earning capacity of the party seeking 
maintenance, 
including 
educational 
background, 
training, employment skills, work experience, length 
of 
absence 
from 
the 
job 
market, 
custodial 
responsibilities for children and the time and expense 
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training 
to enable the party to find appropriate employment. 
 
(6)  The feasibility that the party seeking 
maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard 
of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during 
the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary 
to achieve this goal. 
 
(7)  The tax consequences to each party. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
10 
 
that these factors are designed to further two important 
objectives:  (1) support to the spouse in keeping with the 
parties' needs and earning capacities and (2) fairness in the 
financial arrangements between the parties.  The court of 
appeals 
further 
stated 
that 
the 
fairness 
objective 
was 
applicable 
even 
during 
postdivorce 
proceedings 
involving 
maintenance award modifications.  Further, the court of appeals 
did not accept Rohde-Giovanni's argument that Judge Fiedler did 
not find that she could reach the marital standard of living, 
citing to his statement that, if she would tighten her budget, 
she could be close to the marital standard of living. 
¶14 The court of appeals also rejected Rohde-Giovanni's 
argument that her contributions to her adult son's education 
expenses should be considered when determining her current 
standard of living.  The court of appeals noted that, because 
the circuit court found that the parties never agreed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(8)  Any mutual agreement made by the parties 
before or during the marriage, according to the terms 
of which one party has made financial or service 
contributions to the other with the expectation of 
reciprocation or other compensation in the future, 
where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual 
agreement made by the parties before or during the 
marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial 
support of the parties. 
 
(9)  The contribution by one party to the 
education, training or increased earning power of the 
other. 
 
(10)  Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
11 
 
contribute to their children's higher education expenses, Rohde-
Giovanni could not demonstrate that this finding was clearly 
erroneous.  The court of appeals stated that:  
it would be incongruous to allow maintenance for the 
purpose of providing the payee spouse with money to 
pay for the education of an adult child when the child 
support statutes prohibit such payments as child 
support.  The effect of adopting (Rohde-Giovanni)'s 
position would be to render the child support statute 
prohibition on such payments meaningless.   
Marriage of Rohde-Giovanni v. Baumgart, 2003 WI App 136, ¶17, 
266 Wis. 2d 339, 667 N.W.2d 718 (citation omitted). 
 
¶15 The court of appeals concluded that Judge Fiedler's 
finding that Rohde-Giovanni could attain a standard of living 
comparable to that enjoyed during her marriage was not clearly 
erroneous.  The court of appeals' majority stated that, although 
she claimed that her budgets for food and clothing are less than 
when she was married, Rohde-Giovanni did not specify the exact 
amount of the difference.  The court of appeals further noted 
that her budget might be stretched in other areas due to her 
continued financial support of the parties' adult son.  Finally, 
the court of appeals stated that there was no evidence 
supporting 
Rohde-Giovanni's 
contention 
that 
"the 
fairness 
objective requires increased or continued maintenance owing to 
the fact that the payor spouse enjoys a higher standard of 
living relative to the marital standard, where the payee spouse 
is able to live at or above the marital standard without 
maintenance payments."  Id., ¶29.   
No. 
01-3014   
 
12 
 
 
¶16 In her dissent, then court of appeals Judge Patience 
D. Roggensack stated that the appropriate issue to consider in 
this case was whether a change in circumstances made it unjust 
or inequitable for the payor to continue making maintenance 
payments.  The dissent noted that, because Judge Steingass 
considered Rohde-Giovanni's potential for increased earnings 
when entering the divorce judgment, it cannot now be used as a 
basis to conclude that there is a substantial change in 
circumstances that justifies the termination of maintenance.  
Judge Roggensack also concluded that the fact that Rohde-
Giovanni used a portion of the maintenance payments to assist 
her adult son with his expenses did not produce an unjust or 
inequitable 
result 
for 
Baumgart. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
dissent 
disagreed with the majority's characterization of the continued 
maintenance payments as amounting to indirect child support 
payments. 
II 
 
¶17 We now consider whether there was sufficient evidence 
from which the circuit court could reasonably find a substantial 
change in the parties' circumstances that would justify the 
termination of maintenance after two more years.  Circuit courts 
exercise their discretion when determining the amount and 
duration of maintenance.  In re Marriage of King v. King, 224 
Wis. 2d 235, 247, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999); In re Marriage of Olski 
v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 237, 243 n.2, 540 N.W.2d 412 (1995).  We 
will 
not 
disturb 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
regarding 
maintenance unless the award represents an erroneous exercise of 
No. 
01-3014   
 
13 
 
discretion.  King 224 Wis. 2d at 248; Olski, 197 Wis. 2d at 243 
n. 2.   
¶18 A circuit court engages in an erroneous exercise of 
discretion when it fails to consider relevant factors, bases its 
award on factual errors, makes an error of law, or grants an 
excessive or inadequate award.  Olski, 197 Wis. 2d at 243 n. 2.  
Moreover, "(a) discretionary determination must be the product 
of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and 
law relied upon are stated and are considered together for the 
purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination."  
Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).  
See also King, 224 Wis. 2d at 248.   
 
¶19 When a question of law arises during our review of the 
circuit 
court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion, 
we 
decide 
it 
independently of both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Id.; Olski, 197 Wis. 2d at 243 n. 2.  Nevertheless, we 
benefit from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2003 WI 2, ¶17, 258 
Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113; King, 224 Wis. 2d at 248-49. 
 
¶20 Rohde-Giovanni asserts that the appropriate standard 
for modification of a maintenance award is "substantial change 
in circumstances."  Rohde-Giovanni further states that the 
substantial change standard must be used in harmony with the 
unjust or inequitable standard, which states that a court may 
not modify a divorce court's judgment regarding maintenance, 
unless it would be unjust or inequitable to continue with those 
terms.  Rohde-Giovanni contends that this standard applies 
No. 
01-3014   
 
14 
 
regardless of whether the issue of maintenance was originally 
stipulated to or contested by the parties. 
 
¶21 Rohde-Giovanni further 
states 
that the 
court of 
appeals incorrectly concluded that it need not analyze In re 
Marriage of Hefty v. Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d 124, 493 N.W.2d 33 
(1992), because she did not provide any factual evidence that 
she had, in fact, fallen below the marital standard of living.  
Rohde-Giovanni counters that Baumgart had the burden of proof, 
in order to establish that a modification of maintenance was 
justified; thus, the Hefty decision should be applied in this 
case.  Rohde-Giovanni notes that the only explanation for the 
court of appeals' decision to affirm the circuit court's 
modification must be a result of that court's failure to give 
sufficient weight to the fairness objective of maintenance.  As 
the fairness objective applies in every case, according to 
Rohde-Giovanni, it must be applied even in cases involving 
postdivorce judgments, such as this. 
 
¶22 Rohde-Giovanni asserts that the factors used by Judge 
Feidler to adjust the maintenance were already recognized by 
Judge Steingass at the time she awarded indefinite maintenance; 
thus, reduction and eventual termination of maintenance was 
unwarranted in this case.  Moreover, Rohde-Giovanni contends 
that the expenses she incurs for assisting her adult son with 
his education should be included within her projected budget.  
While recognizing that this court cannot order Baumgart to pay 
his adult children's expenses, Rohde-Giovanni states that she 
should not be penalized for choosing to spend her discretionary 
No. 
01-3014   
 
15 
 
funds in such a way that benefits her adult children.  Further, 
Rohde-Giovanni 
notes 
that 
supporting 
their 
children's 
educational goals was something both parties believed in during 
the 
marriage, 
and 
they 
would 
have 
contributed 
to 
their 
children's expenses in this manner had their marriage remained 
intact. 
 
¶23 Baumgart agrees with Rohde-Giovanni's statement of the 
requisite standard in order to modify maintenance, including the 
"unjust or inequitable" facet, but states that modification was 
justified in this case because he satisfied the standard.  
Baumgart further agrees that the fairness objective applies 
during modifications of maintenance awards.  Baumgart also 
agrees 
with 
Rohde-Giovanni 
that 
this 
standard 
applies, 
regardless of whether the original maintenance award was 
stipulated to or contested by the parties.   
¶24 However, 
Baumgart 
disagrees 
with 
Rohde-Giovanni's 
assertion that the fairness objective was disregarded in this 
case,  as Rohde-Giovanni is capable of living at the marital 
standard without maintenance.  Baumgart states that Rohde-
Giovanni is not entitled to maintenance in an amount that would 
put her above the marital standard of living.  Baumgart also 
contends that Judge Fiedler did not ignore the findings of fact 
made by Judge Steingass at the time of the divorce.  Instead, 
Baumgart cites the fact that Rohde-Giovanni well exceeded her 
projected income, as a basis for the modification he requested. 
¶25 According to Baumgart, he is not required to provide 
Rohde-Giovanni with a lifestyle higher than that enjoyed during 
No. 
01-3014   
 
16 
 
marriage, simply because he earns more money now than when they 
were married.  Baumgart notes that, even though his salary is 
higher now than when the parties were first divorced, he has 
taken a $20,000 pay cut in the last four years.  Conversely, 
Baumgart argues that Rohde-Giovanni's salary has significantly 
increased since the divorce.  Moreover, Baumgart suggests that 
Rohde-Giovanni's difficulty in meeting her monthly budget is a 
result of her own poor financial decisions.  Baumgart argues 
that he should not be required to finance Rohde-Giovanni's 
decisions to let an adult friend, and at least one adult child, 
live with her rent free, and pay for all of her adult son's 
education, car, and other living expenses.  Baumgart notes that 
the record demonstrates that Rohde-Giovanni has significant 
savings such as approximately $80,000 in stocks, over $70,000 in 
a money market account, and $5000 cash received from an 
inheritance.  Although Rohde-Giovanni has other consumer debts, 
Baumgart argues that she could pay off these debts with her 
liquid assets, but chooses not to. 
¶26 Finally, 
Baumgart 
asserts 
that 
maintenance 
law 
precludes consideration of a payee's expenses in relation to an 
adult child's education expenses.  Baumgart contends that the 
child support statutes state that he is not required to provide 
child support to an adult child.  Moreover, Baumgart states that 
the parties never formally agreed to contribute to their adult 
children's educational expenses; thus, if he contributes to 
these expenses it should be of his own volition, not as mandated 
through a maintenance award. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
17 
 
¶27 We conclude that, in the present case, there was 
sufficient evidence from which the circuit court that modified 
the maintenance order could reasonably find a substantial change 
in the parties' circumstances, such that modification of 
maintenance was appropriate.   
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.26 sets out numerous factors for 
circuit 
courts 
to 
consider 
when 
deciding 
the 
issue 
of 
maintenance. 
 
These 
factors 
cover 
a 
broad 
range 
of 
considerations, 
from 
the 
length 
of 
the 
marriage 
to 
the 
feasibility that the party seeking maintenance will be capable 
of supporting himself or herself at the marital standard of 
living.  Section 767.26 further states that the court may 
consider other factors it deems relevant in determining whether, 
and for what duration, a party is entitled to maintenance.  
While some of these factors clearly focus on the financial needs 
of the recipient spouse, other factors appear to recognize a 
spouse's non-financial contribution to the marriage. 
¶29 The factors listed in Wis. Stat. § 767.26 are designed 
to further two distinct goals with respect to maintenance.  
First, maintenance is designed to support the recipient spouse 
in accordance with the needs and earning capacities of both the 
recipient spouse and the payor spouse.  In re Marriage of 
LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987).  Second, a 
maintenance award must ensure that there is a fair and equitable 
financial arrangement between the parties.  Id.  The factors 
listed in § 767.26 must be considered in light of these 
No. 
01-3014   
 
18 
 
objectives when the circuit court is setting the amount of the 
maintenance award.  King, 224 Wis. 2d at 249. 
¶30 Although a maintenance award may be appropriate at the 
time of the divorce, the parties' circumstances may change and 
the 
award 
may 
need 
to 
be 
modified.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32(1)(a)4 
provides 
for 
the 
subsequent 
modification 
of 
maintenance 
payments 
made 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.26.  In order to modify a maintenance award, 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32(1)(a) provides in relevant part: 
After a judgment or order providing for  . . . 
maintenance payments under s. 767.26  . . . the court 
may, from time to time, on the petition, motion or 
order to show cause of either of the parties, 
 . . . revise 
and 
alter 
such 
judgment 
or 
order 
respecting the amount of such maintenance or child 
support and the payment thereof, and also respecting 
the appropriation and payment of the principal and 
income of the property so held in trust, and may make 
any judgment or order respecting any of the matters 
that such court might have made in the original 
action, except that a judgment or order that waives 
maintenance payments 
for 
either 
party 
shall not 
thereafter be revised or altered in that respect nor 
shall the provisions of a judgment or order with 
respect to final division of property be subject to 
revision or modification.  A revision, under this 
section, of a judgment or order with respect to an 
amount of child or family support may be made only 
upon 
a 
finding 
of 
a 
substantial 
change 
in 
circumstances.  In any action under this section to 
revise a judgment or order with respect to maintenance 
payments, a substantial change in the cost of living 
by either party or as measured by the federal bureau 
of labor statistics may be sufficient to justify a 
revision of judgment or order with respect to the 
amount of maintenance, except that a change in an 
obligor's cost of living is not in itself sufficient 
if payments are expressed as a percentage of income. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
19 
 
the party seeking modification must demonstrate that there has 
been a substantial change in circumstances warranting the 
proposed modification.  Fobes v. Fobes, 124 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 368 
N.W.2d 643 (1985).  We note that, in these circumstances, the 
focus should be on any financial changes the parties have 
experienced.  In re Marriage of Johnson v. Johnson, 217 
Wis. 2d 124, 127, 576 N.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1998) (Johnson I); In 
re Marriage of Gerrits v. Gerrits, 167 Wis. 2d 429, 437, 482 
N.W.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1992).  We note that the parties in Johnson 
I and Fobes entered into a stipulation regarding maintenance, 
while the circuit court made the decision regarding maintenance 
in the Gerrits case.  Regardless of whether there has been a 
stipulation by the parties or a contest resulting in a judgment 
awarding maintenance, the applicable standards for maintenance 
modification remain the same.  The parties in the present case 
agreed that such standards, involving a substantial change in 
circumstances, and an evaluation of support and fairness 
factors, must be applied in either case.  The case law certainly 
supports that conclusion.  LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 32-33.  
¶31 While a change in circumstances regarding the support 
objective of maintenance frequently gives rise to parties' 
motions for modification, it is important to note that a court 
reviewing a previous award of maintenance must not solely limit 
its inquiry to the support objective.  The objective of fairness 
also must be considered, even in postdivorce proceedings.  
Fairness must be considered with respect to the situations of 
both parties in determining whether maintenance should be 
No. 
01-3014   
 
20 
 
continued indefinitely, continued for a limited amount of time, 
reduced, or terminated.  In Johnson I, the court of appeals 
reached the opposite conclusion, stating that the "'fairness 
objective' does not apply to a postdivorce situation.  Rather, 
the 'fairness objective' is a factor focusing on noneconomic 
contributions made by the spouses "'during the marriage."'"  
Johnson I, 217 Wis. 2d at 128 (citations omitted).  We disagree 
with that court's conclusion that the fairness objective does 
not apply to postdivorce modifications of maintenance and 
withdraw any language that reflects that premise.   
¶32 We recognize that this court has, on occasion, used 
the terms "unjust" and "inequitable," when considering whether 
there has been a substantial change in circumstances, such that 
the maintenance award should be modified.  Miner v. Miner, 10 
Wis. 2d 438, 441-42, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960) ("'(T)he substantial or 
material change in the circumstances should be such that it 
would be unjust or inequitable to strictly hold either party to 
the judgment.'")(citation omitted).  See also Fobes, 124 
Wis. 2d at 81.  However, we emphasize that we have moved away 
from 
those 
terms 
and 
that 
the 
correct 
test 
regarding 
modification of maintenance should consider fairness to both of 
the parties under all of the circumstances, not whether it is 
unjust or inequitable to alter the original maintenance award.5  
                                                 
5 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, we have not created a 
new standard governing maintenance modification.  See dissent, 
¶57.  Instead, we are simply clarifying the already existing 
standard, which recognizes that both support and fairness 
considerations must be weighed when determining whether to 
modify a maintenance award.  
No. 
01-3014   
 
21 
 
See LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 33, and Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d at 136.  
The unjust or inequitable standard is qualitatively different 
than the fairness standard, since it seems, in practice, to 
focus primarily on a single party.  We conclude that the 
fairness standard is the better approach, since there the focus 
should be on what is fair to both parties, not just one party.6 
¶33 We further note that a judge who reviews a request to 
modify a maintenance award should adhere to the findings of fact 
made by the circuit court that handled the parties' divorce 
proceedings.  As stated by this court in Van Gorder v. Van 
Gorder: 
"The court's power to modify the provisions of 
the judgment of divorce is not the power to grant a 
new trial or to re-try the issues determined by the 
original hearing, but only to adapt the decree to some 
distinct 
and 
definite 
change 
in 
the 
financial 
circumstances of the parties or children." 
                                                 
6 Although 
the 
dissent 
contends 
that 
an 
unjust 
or 
inequitable standard would take into account both parties' 
circumstances, we cannot agree.  See dissent, ¶56.  In fact, 
Rohde-Giovanni's counsel, Linda Roberson, belied this fact at 
oral argument when she made the following statement:   
I believe that, in any case where on the record a 
maintenance payor can show that it would be unjust or 
inequitable to continue the prior court's order of 
maintenance, a modification court has the authority to 
change the maintenance award.   I don't believe that 
that standard was met in this case.  I don't believe 
that any reasonable court on the record that we have 
here could find that it was unjust or inequitable to 
Paul to continue the maintenance amount.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
No. 
01-3014   
 
22 
 
Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 195, 327 N.W.2d 674 
(1983) (citing Thies v. MacDonald, 51 Wis. 2d 296, 302, 187 
N.W.2d 186 (1971)). 
¶34 Where there is a substantial change in circumstances, 
the circuit judge reviewing the request for modification must 
adhere to this abovementioned principle and recognize the facts 
as they were at the time of the divorce.  More specifically, the 
circuit court deciding the modification motion may not modify a 
maintenance award based solely on the fact that, had the parties 
been before it for their divorce action, that court would have 
decided the matter differently.  The findings of fact made by 
the original divorce court properly may be reviewed by the 
modification judge in the light of substantial changes in the 
parties' circumstances, and we anticipate that the modification 
judge will need to consider additional facts that were not 
before the original divorce court because of the substantial 
changes that have occurred.    
¶35 Whether or not the parties have children may also 
interject unique issues that the circuit court must consider 
when determining the appropriate maintenance award.  This is 
especially true in situations where the children have reached 
the age of majority, yet one or both of the parties seeks to 
provide continuing financial support to an adult child or 
children.  As an initial matter, it is important to note that 
Wisconsin law is clear:  Under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(4),7 a court 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. § 767.25(4) states the following: 
No. 
01-3014   
 
23 
 
cannot order child support payments for children that have 
reached the age of majority, unless the very specific criteria 
in the statute are satisfied.  Nevertheless, parents may want to 
continue to provide financial support to their adult children, 
including 
assisting 
in 
their 
adult 
children's 
education 
expenses.  Parties may project that a sizeable amount of their 
monthly budgets may be used toward assisting adult children with 
such expenses.  Given these circumstances, it may be difficult 
for a court to decide whether such expenses should be factored 
into the parties' monthly budgets for purposes of determining an 
appropriate maintenance award.   
¶36 Although the issue of whether education expenses for 
adult children may be considered when a court examines a party's 
maintenance award never has been squarely before this court, the 
court of appeals has previously had the opportunity to address 
this issue.  In Dahlke v. Dahlke, the court of appeals noted 
that parties had no legal obligation to pay for their adult 
children's education expenses and could not be ordered to do so 
by the court.  Dahlke v. Dahlke, 2002 WI App 282, ¶¶14, 22, 258 
Wis. 2d 764, 654 N.W.2d 73.  The circuit judge in that case 
concluded that the education expenses in the parties' budgets 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court shall order either party or both to pay for 
the support of any child of the parties who is less 
than 18 years old, or any child of the parties who is 
less than 19 years old if the child is pursuing an 
accredited 
course 
of 
instruction 
leading 
to the 
acquisition 
of 
a 
high 
school 
diploma 
or 
its 
equivalent. 
No. 
01-3014   
 
24 
 
were legitimate, but these expenses did not ultimately influence 
the judge's decision regarding maintenance.   
¶37 In Resong v. Vier, the court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court erred in considering a minor child's future 
post-high school education expenses for purposes of determining 
an appropriate child support award.  In re Marriage of Resong v. 
Vier, 157 Wis. 2d 382, 388, 459 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1990).  The 
court noted that "although there may be strong reasons or even a 
moral responsibility to do so, the law does not require any 
parent to support his or her adult children.  . . .  Although 
parents should take an interest in their children's education 
beyond high school, we cannot dictate that they do so."  Id. at 
391.  While there are different considerations when dealing with 
child support versus maintenance awards, we note that a similar 
theme runs through both of these areas of family law:  a parent 
cannot be required to provide financial support to adult 
children for their education expenses. 
¶38 We conclude that education expenses for an adult child 
do not have to be considered by the modifying court when 
examining a party's budget, but they can be.  This is a 
discretionary decision that should be left to the circuit court.  
As noted above, courts recognize that assisting adult children 
with their education expenses is a worthwhile and laudable 
endeavor.  Nevertheless, we do not want to open a Pandora's box 
where payors could seek to reduce the amount of maintenance paid 
to recipients simply because the payors are making sizeable 
contributions to their adult children's education expenses.  We 
No. 
01-3014   
 
25 
 
feel compelled to emphasize that it will be the rare situation 
when these expenses should be considered.  Thus, we leave the 
decision of whether or not to consider such expenses when 
determining maintenance awards for the circuit courts to decide 
in the exercise of sound discretion, subject to appellate review 
on an erroneous exercise of discretion basis.  While we do not 
anticipate a frequent need to consider such expenses, we 
recognize 
that 
unusual 
circumstances 
could 
justify 
such 
consideration. 
¶39 After examining the record, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
modifying the maintenance award in this case.  We conclude that, 
in the present case, the circuit court could reasonably find 
that there had been a substantial change in the parties' 
circumstances.  Moreover, Judge Fiedler considered both the 
amount of maintenance, if any, necessary for both parties to 
live within their budgets, and the fairness for both parties of 
a limited maintenance award, when reaching his decision.   
¶40 The record contains sufficient evidence from which 
Judge 
Fiedler 
could 
have 
concluded 
that 
modification 
of 
maintenance was appropriate.  At the time Judge Steingass 
entered the divorce judgment, Rohde-Giovanni was in the middle 
of completing an undergraduate degree program.  At the time of 
the modification, 
Rohde-Giovanni had 
completed 
the 
degree 
program she was pursuing at the time of divorce, and, in 
addition, she had obtained a Master's Degree in special 
education.  Moreover, although Judge Steingass anticipated that 
No. 
01-3014   
 
26 
 
Rohde-Giovanni's earning capacity would increase over the years, 
her current income far surpassed her projected income at the 
time of the divorce.   
¶41 At the time of the divorce, Rohde-Giovanni earned 
$8808 per year as a part-time counselor.  Rohde-Giovanni 
projected that she could earn between $22,000 to $28,000 as a 
teacher, 
with 
a 
maximum 
earning 
capacity 
of 
$40,000 
approximately 15 years later.  At the time of the modification, 
Rohde-Giovanni earned approximately $61,000 per year.  In the 
divorce judgment, the circuit judge noted that the maintenance 
determination was based upon a number of assumptions, such as 
the amount of the child support award and the fact that Rohde-
Giovanni was in school.  The circuit judge who granted the 
divorce further noted that her analysis would become outdated 
once Rohde-Giovanni had earned her degree and begun earning in 
accordance with her capacity.  At the time of the modification, 
Rohde-Giovanni not only finished her degree, but she surpassed 
the estimates of her earning capacity by a significant amount.  
Further, 
the 
record 
demonstrates 
that 
Rohde-Giovanni 
has 
significant reserve assets as well.  At the hearing before Judge 
Fiedler, Rohde-Giovanni testified that she had approximately 
$80,000 in stocks, over $70,000 in a money market account, and 
$5000 cash from an inheritance.   
¶42 Rohde-Giovanni contended that she was dependent upon 
Baumgart's maintenance payments and would be unable to meet her 
monthly budget without it.  Rohde-Giovanni testified that the 
marital home is now in a "deteriorated" condition because she is 
No. 
01-3014   
 
27 
 
unable to afford the necessary repairs.  She also testified that 
she has some consumer debt, but conceded that she could pay off 
that debt with the significant amount of money she had saved.  
Baumgart did not contest the fact that Rohde-Giovanni has 
consumer debt or that her home may need repairs.  However, he 
pointed out that, as affirmed by her own testimony, Rohde-
Giovanni 
has 
taken 
several 
vacations 
since 
the 
divorce.  
Baumgart also suggests that Rohde-Giovanni has made several 
other choices that may have negatively impacted her financial 
situation, such as allowing an adult friend live with her rent-
free, allowing an adult son live with her rent-free, and 
devoting over $900 per month to an adult son's education and 
other living expenses.  Baumgart contends that, in accordance 
with Murray v. Murray, a payor should not be required to finance 
imprudent financial decisions made by the recipient spouse.  In 
re Marriage of Murray v. Murray, 231 Wis. 2d 71, 82, 604 
N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶43 It is ultimately Rohde-Giovanni's decision as to how 
best to use her income, and we do not suggest that she should 
spend it differently.  Nevertheless, we conclude that Judge 
Fiedler did not err when he stated that some problems Rohde-
Giovanni was experiencing in trying to meet her budget could be 
alleviated if she scaled back some of her monthly expenditures. 
¶44 We disagree with Rohde-Giovanni's assertion that Hefty 
involved the same circumstances as presented in this case.  In 
Hefty, the circuit court took into account the fact that the 
husband's postdivorce salary more than doubled, in comparison to 
No. 
01-3014   
 
28 
 
his salary during the marriage, in deciding the appropriate 
maintenance award.  Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d at 129.  We noted that 
the parties likely anticipated the substantial increase in 
income given the husband's promotion to president of a major 
corporation.  Id. at 135.  We stated that the Hefty case only 
applied 
to 
couples 
who 
could 
anticipate 
such 
"marked 
fluctuations in income."  Id. 
¶45 The circumstances in this case can be distinguished 
from the facts in Hefty.  Although Baumgart's income has 
increased since the divorce, he has recently taken a paycut of 
$20,000 in the past four years.  Baumgart's position was 
eliminated at his former company, and he moved out of the state 
for another job.  Ultimately, Baumgart decided to move back to 
Wisconsin, 
and 
he 
accepted 
a 
job 
at 
which 
he 
grosses 
approximately $104,000 per year.  This overall increase in 
income from $93,000 at the time of the divorce to about $104,000 
now is slight when compared with the amount Rohde-Giovanni's 
income has increased since the divorce.  Simply because there 
has been a marginal increase in Baumgart's salary does not mean 
that Rohde-Giovanni is entitled to share in that amount.  See  
Murray, 231 Wis. 2d at 83; In re Marriage of Johnson v. Johnson, 
225 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 593 N.W.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1999) (Johnson 
II).  We also agree with Judge Fiedler's comment that, although 
Baumgart had the benefit of his current wife's income, the court 
could not make Baumgart's current wife finance Rohde-Giovanni's 
financial decisions.  Rohde-Giovanni is earning far beyond the 
salary projected at the time of divorce, and it was not 
No. 
01-3014   
 
29 
 
unreasonable for the court to decide that maintenance should be 
terminated after two more years.  
¶46 Finally, we conclude that Judge Fiedler did not err 
when he decided not to consider Rohde-Giovanni's contribution to 
her adult son's education expenses when deciding to grant 
limited term maintenance.  As noted previously, there may be 
unusual situations where consideration of a party's contribution 
toward an adult child's education expenses is appropriate with 
respect to maintenance modification.  However, this is not such 
a case.  There was not a formal agreement between Baumgart and 
Rohde-Giovanni that they would contribute to an adult child's 
education expenses.  Thus, Rohde-Giovanni was unable to provide 
evidence that financing their adult child's educational pursuits 
was part of the marital standard of living the couple would have 
enjoyed had the marriage remained intact.  Had such an agreement 
been present, the circuit judge could have, but was not required 
to, consider this fact when determining maintenance.  In this 
case, each party is entitled to provide financial support for an 
adult child's education expenses in a manner that each sees fit.  
Nevertheless, we conclude that Baumgart cannot be forced to 
contribute towards his adult son's expenses through maintenance 
payments to Rohde-Giovanni and that the modification judge was 
not in error when he reached that conclusion. 
III 
 
¶47 In sum, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence 
from which the circuit court could reasonably find a substantial 
change in the parties' circumstances, and from which the court 
No. 
01-3014   
 
30 
 
could conclude that such circumstances justified the termination 
of maintenance after two more years.  The test for whether there 
is a substantial change in circumstances is the same, regardless 
of whether or not the issue of maintenance was stipulated to or 
contested during the divorce proceedings.  The objectives of 
support and fairness must both be considered on the issue of 
modification of a maintenance award as well, whether there was a 
stipulation or a contest in the original proceedings.  Moreover, 
we conclude that educational expenses a party incurs on behalf 
of an adult child may, but do not have to be, considered when 
examining the party's budget.  This is a decision left to the 
sound discretion of the circuit court.  While we do not 
anticipate frequent consideration of such educational expenses, 
we recognize that unusual or extraordinary circumstances could 
justify such consideration. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
¶48 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with much of the majority opinion.  I agree that the test for 
whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred is 
the same regardless of whether the original maintenance order 
resulted from a stipulation or from a contested hearing.8  I 
agree that expenses incurred for an adult child's post-secondary 
education may properly be considered in a party's budget in a 
maintenance award.9  I agree that the fairness objective is 
applicable in a postdivorce maintenance modification case and 
that any language to the contrary in any case should be 
withdrawn.10   
¶50 I write separately for three reasons:  (1) the 
majority opinion unnecessarily muddies the already unclear 
waters of maintenance modification by setting forth what 
purports to be a different standard than the courts have used in 
past modification cases; (2) a circuit court should use great 
care before excluding expenses for an adult child's post-
secondary education; and (3) I disagree with the majority 
opinion that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion 
in this case when it terminated the indefinite maintenance 
award. 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶30. 
9 Majority op., ¶38. 
10 See majority op., ¶31 (withdrawing language from Johnson 
v. Johnson, 217 Wis. 2d 124, 576 N.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(Johnson 
I), 
suggesting 
that 
postdivorce 
maintenance 
modification cases are not subject to the fairness standard). 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
2 
 
I 
¶51 The 
majority 
opinion 
correctly 
states 
that 
the 
threshold test used in past maintenance modification decisions 
has been to determine whether there has been a substantial 
change in the parties' circumstances "'such that it would be 
unjust or inequitable to strictly hold either party to the 
judgment.'"11  The majority opinion then proceeds in the text of 
the opinion, in contrast to a footnote comment,12 to "emphasize 
that we have moved away from those terms ['unjust' and 
'inequitable']" and adopts a new "correct" test for determining 
whether to modify a maintenance award, holding that courts must 
consider the "fairness [of a modification] to both of the 
parties under all of the circumstances."13   
¶52 The majority opinion cites two cases in support of 
this proposition, neither of which supports its claim.  Hefty v. 
Hefty, 
172 
Wis. 2d 124, 
493 
N.W.2d 33 
(1992), 
is 
not 
a 
modification case and therefore not relevant.  Although LaRocque 
v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987), did involve 
both an initial maintenance determination and a modification, 
the case does not discuss the standard for modification but 
                                                 
11 Majority 
op., 
¶32 
(quoting 
Miner 
v. 
Miner, 
10 
Wis. 2d 438, 441-42, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960)).  See also Van Gorder 
v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 195, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1983); 
Moore v. Moore, 89 Wis. 2d 665, 699, 278 N.W.2d 881 (1979); 
Murray v. Murray, 231 Wis. 2d 71, 74, 604 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
12 See majority op., ¶32 n.5. 
13 Majority op., ¶32; see also majority op., ¶32 n.6. 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
3 
 
merely makes clear that maintenance has both support and 
fairness objectives.14   
¶53 The majority opinion's apparent attempt to distinguish 
between an order that is "unjust or inequitable" and one that is 
"unfair" forges a semantic distinction without a difference.  
The 
words 
"just," 
"equitable," 
and 
"fair" 
are 
commonly 
understood to be synonyms.15  The majority opinion states that 
the "unjust or inequitable" standard is "qualitatively different 
than the fairness standard, since it seems, in practice, to 
focus primarily on a single party," while the fairness standard 
focuses on both parties.16   
¶54 The majority opinion's reasoning fails for several 
reasons.  First, the majority opinion cites no cases in which 
the unjust or inequitable standard resulted in a circuit court's 
focusing on only one party instead of on both parties.  The 
majority opinion instead focuses on a statement made by Rohde-
Giovanni's counsel at oral argument, in which she argued that no 
reasonable court could find on the record of the present case 
that it would be unjust or inequitable for Baumgart to continue 
paying the maintenance amount ordered at the time of the 
                                                 
14 LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 
(1987) 
15 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
622, 655, 979 (3d ed. 1992), defines "just" as "[h]onorable and 
fair in one's dealings and actions . . . See [s]ynonyms at 
fair."  "Equitable" is defined as "[m]arked by or having equity; 
just and impartial."  "Fair" is defined as "[j]ust to all 
parties; equitable." 
16 Majority op., ¶32. 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
4 
 
divorce.17  The majority opinion does not explain how a single 
statement from oral argument, read in isolation, leads to the 
conclusion it appears to reach——that the "unjust or inequitable" 
standard, in practice, has been improperly applied by the courts 
and has resulted in some sort of unfairness.     
¶55 Second, 
the 
cases 
using 
the 
phrase 
"unjust 
or 
inequitable" in maintenance modification situations explicitly 
state that the court should examine the circumstances of both 
parties: 
"the 
substantial 
or 
material 
change 
in 
the 
circumstances should be such that it would be unjust or 
inequitable to strictly hold either party to the judgment."18  
¶56 Third, an "unjust or inequitable" analysis necessarily 
requires a court to evaluate the circumstances of both parties.  
It would be impossible to look only at a maintenance payor's 
circumstances, 
or 
only 
at 
a 
maintenance 
recipient's 
circumstances, and determine whether the maintenance order was 
unjust or inequitable.   
¶57 I see no reason to add to the confusion surrounding 
the proper standard to be applied in maintenance modification by 
announcing a "new" standard that is actually no different from 
the established standard.19 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶32 n.6. 
18 Fobes v. Fobes, 124 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 368 N.W.2d 643 
(1985); Moore v. Moore, 89 Wis. 2d 665, 669, 278 N.W.2d 881 
(1979) (emphasis added). 
19 For the court of appeals' discussion of the confusing 
law, see Rohde-Giovanni v. Baumgart, 2003 WI App 136, ¶7 n.1, 
266 Wis. 2d 339, 667 N.W.2d 718 (case law on maintenance is not 
a paragon of clarity).   
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
5 
 
II 
¶58 Although 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion that a court may, in an appropriate case, consider 
expenses incurred for an adult child's education in a party's 
budget when modifying a maintenance award, I would advise 
circuit courts to use great care before excluding such expenses.   
¶59 The majority opinion concludes that the circuit court 
properly excluded those expenses from Rohde-Giovanni's budget 
because the parties had not formally agreed to pay for their 
children's education beyond age 18.  A formal agreement is not 
always necessary, however. 
¶60 An analysis of a maintenance award addresses the 
marital standard of living prior to the divorce and the standard 
of living the parties "could anticipate enjoying if they stayed 
married."20  The standard of living, including the family's 
income, educational background, and aspirations, may very well 
include an adult child's post-secondary education.  I agree with 
Rohde-Giovanni that even if courts cannot order parties to pay 
for the education of adult children,  
[i]t cannot be disputed that contributions to an adult 
child pursuing post-secondary education are part of 
the lifestyle that many couples enjoy in years leading 
up to a divorce or would have anticipated enjoying had 
they remained married.  Thus, given the right facts, 
expenses for an adult child pursuing post-secondary 
education may be an integral part of the marital 
standard of living or anticipated standard of living 
                                                 
20 Hefty v. Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d 124, 134, 493 N.W.2d 33 
(1992). 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
6 
 
and therefore a proper consideration in an maintenance 
determination.21   
¶61  It is significant that the purpose of a maintenance 
award is to allocate disposable income fairly between the 
parties and not to direct the manner in which each party spends 
discretionary funds.  No prior case law restricts a spouse from 
making reasonable and legitimate discretionary expenditures 
consistent with the parties' marital standard of living.   
¶62 
The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
in 
this 
case 
acknowledged that its conclusion to consider Rohde-Giovanni's 
payments for her adult child's post-secondary education expenses 
differently from its consideration 
of 
other 
discretionary 
expenses, like vacations, hobbies, or charitable contributions,22 
presented a "curious juxtaposition."23  Oddly, however, although 
the court of appeals did not consider negatively the maintenance 
payor's large budget for clothing, travel, and hobbies, it did 
consider negatively the maintenance recipient's expenditures for 
her adult children.  I agree that its decision on this issue is 
problematic.  The circuit court should, in my opinion, reexamine 
this issue on remand. 
III 
                                                 
21 Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner at 
34-35.  For cases considering an adult child's college expenses 
in the parties' budgets and in maintenance awards, see Finley v. 
Finley, 2002 WI App 144, ¶30, 256 Wis. 2d 508, 648 N.W.2d 536; 
Hubert v. Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d 803, 820, 465 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 
1990).  
22 Rohde-Giovanni, 266 Wis. 2d 339, ¶12. 
23 Id., ¶17 n.5. 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶63 Finally, I dissent because I conclude that the circuit 
court's termination of the maintenance award after two years was 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.   
¶64 The appropriate standard of review in evaluating 
whether a circuit court properly terminated an indefinite 
maintenance award is whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  This court has often said that "a 
discretionary determination must be the product of a rational 
mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon 
are stated and are considered together for the purposes of 
achieving a reasonable determination."24  An appellate court will 
affirm a circuit court's discretionary decision as long as the 
circuit court "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, 
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."25  
Therefore, the record on appeal must "reflect the circuit 
court's reasoned application of the appropriate legal standard 
to the relevant facts in the case."26  "If a judge bases the 
                                                 
24 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981). 
25 Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 695, 539 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. 
App. 1995).  See also State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 
Wis. 2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985); Shuput v. Lauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 164, 177-78, 325 N.W.2d 321 (1982). 
26 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 
(1999). 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
8 
 
exercise of his discretion upon an error of law, his conduct is 
beyond the limits of discretion."27 
¶65 According to our case law, a circuit court should 
consider three factors in granting limited maintenance: (1) the 
ability of the recipient spouse to become self-supporting at a 
standard of living similar to that enjoyed before the divorce; 
(2) the ability of the payor spouse to continue the obligation 
of support for an indefinite time; and (3) the need for the 
court to continue jurisdiction regarding maintenance.28  The 
circuit court and court of appeals only considered the first 
factor in this case: whether Rohde-Giovanni would be self-
supporting at the marital standard. 
¶66 Because the circuit court failed to consider the 
second two factors in this case, I cannot agree that it properly 
exercised its discretion.  However, even to the extent that the 
circuit court did consider the first factor, I conclude that it 
erred in doing so. 
¶67 The record shows that even if the expenditures for the 
parties' adult child's education are excluded from Rohde-
Giovanni's budget, she still cannot meet the marital standard of 
living as it existed at the time of divorce, let alone the 
                                                 
27 State v. Hutnik 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968); see also In re Settlement for Personal Injuries of 
Konicki 186 Wis. 2d 140, 150, 519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("[A] trial court erroneously exercises its discretion when its 
decision is based on a misapplication or erroneous view of the 
law."). 
28 Bentz v. Bentz, 148 Wis. 2d 400, 406, 435 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
9 
 
standard of living that the parties would have enjoyed if they 
had remained married, she had obtained a degree, and his salary 
continued to rise.   
¶68 The circuit court's conclusion that Rohde-Giovanni 
could achieve the marital standard of living without maintenance 
if she eliminated financial support for her adult children29 is 
clearly erroneous.  The marital standard of living is properly 
updated by taking Rohde-Giovanni's budget at the time of 
divorce, subtracting from it the expenditures she made on the 
couple's children, and multiplying the result by 26.33%, the 
cost of living multiplier stipulated to by the parties.30  
Performing these calculations yields the following results: 
 
 
5149.56 (budget at divorce)31 
 
    -2078.75 (amount spent on adult and minor children)32 
 
 
3070.81 
 
    x  .2633 (cost of living multiplier)33 
 
 
 808.54 
 
    +3070.81 
 
    $3879.35 (updated marital standard of living) 
                                                 
29 See Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner 
at B29 (Transcript of Judge Patrick J. Fiedler's Oral Decision 
of October 8, 2001). 
30 See R. 45 at 172. 
31 See R. 17-2, ex. 1. 
32 See id. 
33 See R. 45 at 172. 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶69 Rohde-Giovanni's total gross monthly income from her 
full-time teaching job and her part-time counselor job at the 
time of the modification hearing was $4834.96.34  Her net monthly 
income from both jobs was $3596.60, precisely $282.75 per month 
less than the standard she enjoyed at the time of divorce.   
¶70 Rohde-Giovanni asserts 
that 
she was 
required to 
liquidate retirement assets to pay for routine living expenses, 
cannot afford repairs to her home, has had to work two jobs to 
support herself, and cannot meet her monthly budget.  All of 
this she has done to the detriment of her health, which was in a 
fragile condition at the time of her divorce.  The circuit court 
commented that if Ms. Rohde-Giovanni "tighten[ed] up [her] 
budget" she would be living at the marital standard,  but the 
record belies this conclusion.35  Even if Ms. Rohde-Giovanni 
"tightened" her budget, she is still worse off in real dollars 
than she was on the day of the divorce.  These circumstances 
have to be considered in modifying maintenance. 
¶71 The circuit court, the court of appeals, and the 
majority opinion ignore the ex-husband's income, expenses, and 
higher standard of living, his increased ability to pay 
maintenance after his child support was reduced, and his ex-
wife's contributions to the marriage and care of the children.  
                                                 
34 See 
R. 
41-2, 
ex. 
14 
(Wife's 
Financial 
Disclosure 
Statement). 
35 The court of appeals complains that the factual record is 
flawed.  It does not, however, determine which party has the 
burden of proof or explain what additional evidence was needed. 
Rohde-Giovanni, 266 Wis. 2d 339, ¶24 n.6. 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
11 
 
In applying the fairness test, the circuit court and court of 
appeals failed to consider the same statutory factors that 
govern the initial determination of maintenance.36  They ignored 
the ex-husband's increase in income and decrease in expenses as 
well as the noneconomic contributions of both parties.  The 
fairness test focuses not only on the economic circumstances of 
the parties but also on the noneconomic contributions made by 
the spouses during the marriage.37  During the 19-year marriage 
Rohde-Giovanni was primarily responsible for the care of the 
four children while Mr. Baumgart pursued his career development 
and provided financial support.  After the divorce she continued 
to be the primary caregiver for the children.  Her many years of 
contributing to the domestic responsibilities, as the initial 
circuit court found, permanently affected her ability to 
generate income.  
¶72 If the majority opinion has considered, as it claims 
to have done, the "fairness to both of the parties under all of 
the circumstances," why isn't there any real discussion of the 
husband's circumstances?  The majority opinion's failure to look 
with the same intensity at both parties skews the outcome of 
this action in favor of the ex-husband.  
                                                 
36 The 
statutory 
factors 
are 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (1999-2000).  See, e.g., Poindexter v. 
Poindexter, 142 Wis. 2d 517, 531-32, 419 N.W.2d 223 (1988); Van 
Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 198, 327 N.W.2d 674 
(1982). 
37 LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 37-38. 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶73 The unfortunate effect of the majority opinion is to 
penalize a spouse who improves her own earning ability and 
reduces her expenses to help an adult child achieve post-
secondary education.  How can that be the result of a proper 
exercise of discretion?   
¶74 I conclude that because the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion, "the correct course of action is to 
reverse the award and remand the case to the circuit court,"38 to 
reinstate the indefinite maintenance, and to set an amount of 
maintenance that is consistent with both the support and 
fairness objectives of maintenance modification.   
¶75 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶76 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
                                                 
38 King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 254, 590 N.W.2d 480 
(1999). 
No.  01-3014.ssa 
 
 
 
1