Title: LANCASTER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LANCASTER v. STATE2002 WY 4543 P.3d 80Case Number: 00-235Decided: 03/28/2002
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

JAMES 
LANCASTER, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. 
Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice, filed a dissenting opinion.

  

[¶1]      James Norman 
Lancaster appeals his convictions for the first-degree premeditated murder of 
Dana Penn and the attempted first-degree premeditated murder of Monte 
Hanson.  Finding harmless error in 
the trial court's admission into evidence of a videotaped re-enactment of the 
crimes, finding either no error or harmless error in the allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, and finding that defense counsel was not ineffective 
in failing to file a motion to suppress evidence, we 
affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      Three issues are 
presented in this appeal:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

Whether 
the district court erred when it allowed a videotaped re-enactment of the crime 
to be admitted into evidence?

 

ISSUE 
II

 

Whether 
the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when he elicited from 
witnesses  [1] a comment on 
[Lancaster's] right to remain silent, [2] victim impact statements, and [3] 
comments on Lancaster's veracity?

 

ISSUE 
III

 

Whether 
defense counsel's failure to move to suppress evidence seized during an illegal 
search of Lancaster rendered counsel's assistance 
ineffective?

 

The 
State of Wyoming phrases the issues in substantially the same 
manner.

 

 

[¶3]      In May 1999, 
James Lancaster (the appellant) and Monte Hanson (Hanson) lived in separate 
apartments in the Star Apartments in Casper.  Hanson's friend, Dana Penn (Penn), often 
visited Hanson.  On May 16, 1999, 
Hanson and Penn spent the day drinking beer at Hanson's apartment.  At about 10:00 p.m., the appellant 
invited Hanson and Penn to his apartment to drink whiskey.

 

[¶4]      Upon arriving at 
the appellant's apartment, the trio began drinking double shots of whiskey while 
watching television and talking.  
Hanson and Penn were in the appellant's apartment for thirty minutes to 
an hour.  As they talked, Hanson and 
the appellant sat on the couch; Penn sat on the floor.  At some point, the appellant showed 
Hanson and Penn two knives, one "a big knife, real big knife" and one "a littler 
knife . . . like a Bowie knife, maybe," according to Hanson.  Penn eventually fell asleep or passed 
out on the floor.1

 

[¶5]      Hanson and the 
appellant, both of whom testified at trial, told vastly different stories as to 
how the evening's events came to an end.  
Hanson testified that he decided it was time to leave, so he tried to 
awaken Penn.  Suddenly, and with no 
provocation, the appellant stabbed Hanson and cut his throat.  The two then battled throughout the 
apartment, with Hanson trying to escape and the appellant continuing to stab 
him.  During a lull in the attack, 
as Hanson hid behind a door, he feared that the appellant had "gone after" 
Penn.  Hanson then ventured back 
toward the living room, only to encounter the appellant holding a rifle.2  Hanson testified that the appellant 
began shooting at him, hitting him once in the neck.  Hanson grabbed the gun, and as they 
wrestled over it, Hanson was able to pull the trigger until the gun was 
empty.  The appellant then 
disappeared and Hanson escaped to the landlord's apartment, where the police 
were called.

 

[¶6]      The appellant's 
version of these events differed significantly from Hanson's.  The appellant testified that, as he and 
Hanson talked on the couch and Penn slept on the floor, Hanson asked to see the 
appellant's rifle and inquired about purchasing it.  The appellant retrieved the loaded rifle 
from its accustomed location in the bedroom closet.  Not being comfortable handing a loaded 
rifle to anyone, the appellant commenced to unload it the only way he knew 
howby pulling the bolt back "until bullets jump out of it."  As he did so, Hanson grabbed the barrel 
without warning, and the gun fired.  
The two then began fighting for the rifle, with the appellant's hands on 
the stock, Hanson pulling the trigger, and the rifle firing.  The appellant then grabbed a knife and 
"cut" Hanson to get him to release the rifle.  When the rifle was empty, Hanson let go 
of it.  The appellant then fled the 
apartment, but only after stopping to reload the rifle, which he took with 
him.

 

[¶7]      Police officers 
responding to the Star Apartments found Penn lying dead on the appellant's 
living room floor.  An autopsy 
determined that Penn bled to death from twelve stab wounds to the upper body and 
a gunshot wound to the head, the gunshot wound occurring after the stab 
wounds.

 

WHETHER 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED

A 
VIDEOTAPED RE-ENACTMENT OF THE CRIME TO BE

ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE?

 

            
Factual and Procedural 
Background

 

[¶8]      On May 24, 1999, 
Hanson accompanied police officers to the Star Apartments, where a videotape was 
made of his actions and statements during a re-enactment of the crimes.  The videotape, which is approximately 
eighteen minutes in length, shows Hanson moving about in the appellant's 
apartment, alternatively making statements and answering the officers' 
questions.  At the beginning of the 
videotape, Hanson removes his shirt, the result being that his considerable 
knife and bullet wounds are visible throughout the taping.

 

[¶9]      Prior to trial, 
the appellant filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence directed in part to this 
videotape.3  The motion alleged that the videotaped 
statement was hearsay and that its introduction into evidence would violate 
W.R.E. 801(c).4  The motion was set for hearing on May 3, 
2000.  At the hearing, the parties 
stipulated that the videotape would not be offered as evidence by the State 
"absent rehabilitation or a prior consistent statement . . 
.."

 

[¶10]   Hanson testified at trial and was 
cross-examined by defense counsel.  
At the end of redirect examination, the State offered the videotape into 
evidence and asked that it be played for the jury.  Defense counsel objected.  After hearing arguments on the 
objection, and after viewing the videotape, the trial court overruled the 
appellant's objection and allowed the videotape to be played for the jury.  At defense counsel's request, the trial 
court then gave the following limiting instruction:

 

Ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury, the videotape statement of Mr. Hanson, which you just 
viewed, is offered to you and should be considered by you only for the limited 
purposes of evaluating the credibility of the declarant, Mr. Hanson.  It should not be considered by you for 
any other purpose, and I'm specifically instructing you that it should not be 
considered directly as proof of the matters asserted within that 
tape.

 

            
Standard of 
Review

 

[¶11]   The standard for reviewing a trial 
court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence is well known.  Such decisions are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Story v. State, 
2001 WY 3, ¶ 9, 15 P.3d 1066, 1068 (Wyo. 2001); 
Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 892 (Wyo. 2000).  Determining whether the trial court 
abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner.  Trujillo v. 
State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999)).

 

[¶12]   A trial court's evidentiary rulings 
"are entitled to considerable deference,'" and will not be reversed on appeal 
so long as "there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling . . 
..'"  Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001) (quoting 
Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Wyo. 1997)).  The appellant bears the burden of 
proving an abuse of discretion.  
Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 11 (Wyo. 2000); 
Trujillo, 2 P.3d  at 571 (quoting Solis, 981 P.2d at 
36).  Even where a trial objection has been 
made to the admission of evidence, error cannot be found unless "a substantial 
right of the party is affected . . .."  
W.R.E. 103(a)(1).  These 
general rules apply to rulings on the admissibility of hearsay evidence.  Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 
6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001); 
Robinson, 11 P.3d  at 367.

 

            
W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(b)

 

[¶13]   Hearsay is inadmissible under 
W.R.E. 802, "except as provided by these rules . . .."  In that regard, the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence provide two types of exceptions whereby statements that might otherwise 
be excluded as hearsay may be admitted into evidence.  First, W.R.E. 801(d) declares that 
certain prior statements by witnesses and certain admissions by a party opponent 
are "not hearsay."  Second, W.R.E. 
803 and 804 contain lists of "[h]earsay exceptions."  W.R.E. 801(d) statements are admissible 
because they are "defined out" of the hearsay definition.  W.R.E. 803 and 804 statements are 
admissible because, though they are hearsay, they have sufficient "guarantees of 
trustworthiness . . .."  See 
W.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6).

 

[¶14]   In the instant case, we are 
concerned with W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), which reads as 
follows:

 

            
(d)  . . .  A statement is not hearsay 
if:

 

            
(1)  . . .  The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is . . . (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive[.]

 

[¶15]   The focus of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is 
the use of a prior consistent statement as rehabilitation of a witness whose 
credibility has been impeached in the particular manner described in the 
rule.  Because of the limited 
purpose for which the statement may be offered, the party contesting admission 
of the statement is entitled to a limiting instruction to that effect.5  W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) removes from the 
hearsay category only a prior consistent "statement," as that term is defined in 
W.R.E. 801(a):  "A statement' is 
(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended by him as an assertion."  
As so defined, "statement" refers to a "single declaration or remark'" 
rather than a "report or narrative.'"  
Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Kolb 
v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Wyo. 1996), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839 
(2000)).  It is necessary, therefore, to "break 
down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each single 
declaration or remark.'"  Kolb, 
930 P.2d  at 1245 (quoting State v. Phillips, 194 W.Va. 569, 461 S.E.2d 75, 91 (1995)).6

 

[¶16]   The United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted the federal rule upon which W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is based as allowing 
prior consistent statements into evidence only when the statement was made 
before the motive to fabricate or the improper influence occurred.  Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 165, 115 S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1995).  In the past, this Court interpreted 
W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) in the same way.  
Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Wyo. 1986).  We have since receded from that 
conclusion, holding instead that since there is no such temporal condition in 
the rule, it should be left to the discretion of the trial court whether a 
particular statement should be admitted.  
Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1987).  With some lack of unanimity, we have 
continued to apply the Makinen holding.  Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 145 (Wyo. 2000); 
Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 (Wyo. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1078 (2000).  In departing from federal precedent, 
this Court emphasized the inherent difficulty in determining when an improper 
motive may have arisen, and chose to leave such matters to the trier of 
fact.  Makinen, 737 P.2d  at 
349.

 

[¶17]    W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) has four 
requirements:  (1) that the 
declarant testify at trial; (2) that the declarant be subject to 
cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (3) that the prior statement 
be consistent with the declarant's trial testimony; and (4) that the prior 
statement be offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant 
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.  Evidently because the first two 
requirements have not been problematic, appellate review has focused on the 
consistency and rebuttal issues.  In 
Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 1995), we 
reiterated what "consistent" means under Wyoming's rule:

 

            
Curl correctly points out that statements must be "consistent" to merit 
admission under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  
Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 368 (Wyo.1991).  However, little supportive case law and 
less logic is offered to bolster his argument that consistency requires a 
virtual identity or congruence between the testimony of the principal witness 
and the subsequent statements.

 

            
Professor Mueller points out that "[w]hat seems important is that the 
exception should not be the means to prove new points not covered in the 
testimony of the [primary witness]."  
4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 405 at 181 (2d ed. 1994).  
Professor Mueller notes that it is the consistency, rather 
than the substance of the consistent statement, which takes such a statement out 
of the realm of objectionable hearsay and tends to prove the value of the 
original statement.  Id., § 
406 at 194.

 

            
We have, essentially, embraced the foregoing theoretical framework, 
asserting that consistency itself is what removes such statements from the realm 
of inadmissible hearsay.  
Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 368.  
Error, if any, may be considered harmless when the content of challenged 
consistent statements is clearly cumulative of prior testimony.  Id.  Logically, however, material 
information presented for the first time to support a prior "consistent 
statement" has no antecedent with which to be consistent or inconsistent and is, 
therefore, inadmissible.

 

(Emphasis 
in original.)

 

[¶18]   The fourth requirement of W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B) is that there must be an express or implied charge of recent 
fabrication or improper motive.  
Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Makinen, 737 P.2d at 
349).  The charge of fabrication or improper 
motive need not come only as a specific allegation during cross-examination; 
rather, it may be made by implication or innuendo, and it may be found in the 
"thrust" of the defenses and testimony presented.  Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 
698-99 (Wyo. 2000); 
Cook, 7 P.3d  at 57-58.  Further, it is not necessarily error 
that the prior consistent statement was received in evidence before the 
allegation of fabrication or improper motive.  Humphrey, 962 P.2d  at 
872.

 

 

[¶19]    The appellant's Motion to 
Exclude Evidence referenced hearsay and W.R.E. 801(c).  At the motion hearing, counsel 
stipulated that the videotape would be offered, if at all, only as 
"rehabilitation or a prior consistent statement . . .."  As a result, the admissibility of the 
videotape is to be determined by reference to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  When the videotape was offered at trial, 
defense counsel objected, and the following colloquy took 
place:

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your 
Honor, at this particular point, I would again interpose my objection to using 
the videotaped interview, which we had made a liminal motion with respect to 
earlier and a motion to exclude evidence which was heard by the Court prior to 
trial.

 

            
This videotaped interview is an interview with Mr. Hanson, conducted by 
the police officers, in which Mr. Hanson does a re-enactment, basically, and a 
walk-through of the apartment on the 20th.  The Court sustained my objection to the 
use of this videotape.  We would 
object to the use of the videotape.

 

            
The only possible way that it could be admitted would be to be admitted 
in part to talk about the single thing that I had asked him about, which is 
whether or not he had told the police about Mr.  about Mr. Penn sitting up, 
with blood on his cheek, prior to the time that he did the videotaped 
interview.  And, basically, that was 
the only mention of the videotaped interview.

 

            
So with respect to the part in which he does obviously tell the detective 
about Mr. Penn sitting up, in the videotaped interview, that part might possibly 
be admissible; but the rest of it certainly is not admissible.  And we object to the admission or the 
playing of that videotape interview in all or in part.

 

            
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, as 
the Court recalls from the liminal motions, we basically conceded that we would 
not attempt to offer that statement as a hearsay statement since Mr. Hanson was 
available.  However, as the Court is 
aware, under the rules of evidence, we are allowed to put into evidence prior 
consistent statements to rebut allegations of either lying or poor 
memory.

 

            
[Defense counsel], throughout his cross-examination, has implied  in 
fact, readily accused Mr. Hanson of being too drunk, too stoned to remember and, 
in fact, lying about what happened.

 

            
We are offering this statement as a consistent  prior consistent 
statement.  And if the Court wants 
to enter a limiting instruction to the jury in that regard, we don't have a 
problem with that.  But I think 
[defense counsel] has opened the door, and I would like to offer this statement 
at this time.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I haven't 
opened the door to the entire statement.  
I offered the  at best, it's arguable, I may have opened the door to 
that portion of the statement of when he told the police officers that he saw 
Penn sitting up, with blood on his cheek.  
But he admitted telling  he admitted in court that he did say that on 
the videotaped interview and had not told the police officers that 
previously.  And that's the only use 
of that videotaped interview.  
You're talking about a video interview that's a hearsay statement.  It cannot be introduced as a prior 
consistent statement in total.  He 
might be able to introduce little parts and pieces of it, but certainly not the 
entire thing, which is a re-enactment.  
Everything of what he said on the tape has not even been attacked, 
certainly, by prior inconsistent statements.  The only thing that's really been 
attacked is whether or not he had told the police in the hospital that Penn was 
sitting up, with blood on his cheek.

 

            
[PROSECUTOR]:  I think the 
entire statement should be allowed simply because of the attack on this 
witness's memory.

 

            
* * *

 

            
THE COURT:  We're here, not 
in the presence of the jury.

 

            
[Defense counsel], do you have further comments on [the prosecutor's] 
argument that this is offered because you are attempting to attack Mr. Hanson's 
testimony as being fabricated?

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your 
Honor, I'm  there are pieces of his testimony, particularly the only piece that 
I can remember that I attacked, as him not mentioning before, was Penn sitting 
up, with blood on his cheek.  For 
that particular purpose, I think that possibly a prior consistent statement 
might be admitted.  But he's already 
 he's already testified that he did, in fact, say that on the videotaped 
interview.

 

            
But I haven't opened up the door for the entire thing to come in.  The entire thing talks about a lot of 
different things.  It has character 
stuff on there.  And if the Court 
would view that, it would be surprised by the length and by the amount of 
inadmissible testimony and character evidence which is on that videotaped 
interview.  I'm not able to attack 
the videotaped interview at all.  
And, obviously, my cross-examination goes to attack the credibility of 
Mr. Hanson but certainly not what was in the videotaped interview.  That thing should not be admitted under 
any circumstance.  And I object to 
admission of that strenuously.  I 
ask the Court to view it.

 

            
THE COURT:  Mr. [Prosecutor], 
anything further?

 

            
[PROSECUTOR]:  No, Your 
Honor; except I think the Court listened to the examination; and it's clear with 
the attempt to establish prior consistent statements, the challenge as to his 
state of mind, his intoxication, drunkenness, and use of marijuana, I think it's 
useful to show what this witness remembers and if what he is saying is truthful 
or what he is saying is fabricated.

 

            
* * *

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your 
Honor, also, I would mention that it's not a prior consistent statement.  There is not a prior consistent 
statement, because they are offering it to  its  it was well after the 
events.  And they are offering it to 
bolster his testimony here today.  
So it's not a prior consistent statement, and it certainly is not under 
oath.

 

            
[PROSECUTOR]:  I agree it's 
not under oath.

 

            
* * *

 

            
THE COURT:  If court could 
come to order.

 

We are 
back.  The jury is not 
present.

 

            
I have reviewed the tape.  
After having reviewed the tape, my decision is that the objection of 
[defense counsel] is overruled, and the State may  the tape may be played for 
the jury almost in its entirety.  
There is a part towards the end of the tape  there's just a few minutes 
or seconds left at the end of the tape, there's a pause, and Detective 
Kirkendall says, Were you in fear of your life.  The tape should be stopped before that 
question is asked and answered.  
It's right toward the end of the tape.  And you might want to fast forward and 
find that.  But there's an obvious 
pause, and then Detective Kirkendall asks that question.

 

            
* * *

 

            
[PROSECUTOR]:  Judge, I just 
 to clarify for the record, it's as a prior consistent statement.  It's offered for purposes of 
rehabilitation not for the truth of the matter asserted.  I misspoke that a little bit earlier 
during my argument.

 

            
THE COURT:  And the defense, 
if they wish, may have a limiting instruction to that 
effect.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We would 
request a limiting instruction, Your Honor, although I don't have it right 
now.  I didn't anticipate, frankly, 
that this statement was going to be admitted.

 

[¶20]   These passages have been quoted at 
length to show the specific positions taken at trial in regard to the issues now 
before this Court.  The State's 
arguments may be summarized as follows:

 

             
1.        The 
videotape is offered as a prior consistent statement.

 

             
2.        The 
videotape is offered for the purpose of rebutting allegations that Hanson either 
had poor memory as a result of intoxication and use of marijuana or he was 
lying.

 

             
3.        The 
videotape is not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted 
therein.

 

[¶21]    In turn, the appellant's 
arguments are as follows:

 

             
1.        The 
objection is fundamentally a hearsay objection.

 

             
2.        The 
total videotape cannot be admitted as non-hearsay under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) 
because the total videotape is not a prior consistent 
statement.

 

             
3.        The 
total videotape contains much more than a possible consistent statement, 
including the fact that it is a re-enactment and that it contains "different 
things" such as  "inadmissible 
testimony" and "character stuff."

 

             
4.        The 
videotape is offered to bolster Hanson's trial testimony.

 

[¶22]    In its appellate brief, the 
State defends the position taken by the prosecutor that a general attack on a 
trial witness's credibility is sufficient to invoke W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), citing 
Humphrey, 962 P.2d  at 871-72, 
Curl, 898 P.2d  at 374, and 
Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 600 (Wyo. 1993).  A review of these cases reveals that 
they do, indeed, countenance this rather broad interpretation of the use of 
prior consistent statements.  The 
appellant contends that it is "ludicrous" to interpret W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) in 
this fashion because such an interpretation would allow litigants to make a 
videotape of all witnesses, and then, when each witness is cross-examined, play 
the videotape for the jury.  The 
outcome, according to the appellant, would be a battle of videotapes made to 
rehabilitate witnesses before the trial begins.7

 

[¶23]    We have detailed the parties' 
trial court contentions in order to compare them to the arguments made on 
appeal.  This step is necessary 
because this Court generally will not consider issues which are raised for the 
first time on appeal unless they are jurisdictional or of a fundamental 
nature.  Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 957 (Wyo. 2000). Consequently, we must next determine whether 
the appellant's stated issues on appeal are the same as those he raised at 
trial.

 

[¶24]    In his appellate brief, the 
appellant finds fault with the admission of the videotape on three grounds:  (1) the videotape is an inconsistent, 
rather than a consistent, statement; (2) prior consistent statements should not 
be admissible where there has only been general impeachment as to credibility 
rather than an allegation of recent fabrication or improper motivation; and (3) 
the videotape violated W.R.E. 403 in that it was more prejudicial than 
probative.  We find that, though 
they are stated somewhat differently than stated by trial counsel, these are the 
same issues raised at trial.8

 

[¶25]    Resolution of the specific 
question before this Courtwhether the videotape should have been admittedmust 
begin with a recognition that the videotape does not meet the definition of 
"statement" found in W.R.E. 801(c) as interpreted by Humphrey, 962 P.2d  
at 871; Kolb, 
930 P.2d  at 1245; 
and Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358, 363 (Wyo. 1996).  The videotape is not a "single 
declaration or remark.'"  Humphrey, 962 P.2d  at 871 (quoting Kolb, 930 P.2d at 
1245).  There was no attempt to "break down the 
narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each single declaration 
or remark.'" Kolb, 930 P.2d  at 1245 (quoting Phillips, 461 S.E.2d at 91).  Indeed, the 
videotape is not even limited to being the "report or narrative" of Hanson.  It is, in the main, 
a re-enactment of the crimes, done to show how the crimes were committed.  This is certainly 
more than a consistent statement introduced only to rebut impeachment of 
credibility.9

 

[¶26]    The second problem with the 
admission of the videotape is that the trial court did not engage in any 
analysis under W.R.E. 403 to determine whether the videotape was more probative 
than it was unfairly prejudicial.  The State offered the videotape for the 
limited purpose of rehabilitation; that is, it was offered as proof that 
Hanson's in-court testimony should be believed because he had made a consistent 
statement in the past.  In making the offer of the videotape, 
however, the prosecutor made no effort to identify anything in particular 
contained on the videotape that was consistent with anything in particular from 
Hanson's in-court testimony.  Surely, if a statement is to be admitted into 
evidence because it is consistent with in-court testimony, the trial court must 
make the preliminary determination that the statements are, indeed, 
consistent.  
This requires some amount of specificity.  That did not happen here.  We are left to 
speculate as to the probative value of statements that have not been 
identified.

 

[¶27]    The same deficiency exists with 
regard to the lack of any analysis of the videotape's potential for unfair 
prejudice.  In 
a case involving the admissibility of a videotape of a defendant's statement to 
the police, the Supreme Court of Georgia approved introduction of the videotape, 
but only because of the trial court's careful exercise of its discretion:

 

            
Where evidence is challenged on the ground that its probative value is 
out-weighed by its tendency to unduly prejudice the jury, the trial court must 
exercise its discretion in determining admissibility.  Smith v. State, [255 Ga. 685, 341 S.E.2d 451 
(1986)].  We 
find no abuse of discretion in this instance.  . . .  The trial court went through each page of a 
transcript of the videotaped interview before it was heard by the jury and made 
separate rulings regarding each statement that defendant found 
objectionable.  
The court properly required the prosecution to edit the tape to remove 
material that was irrelevant or that put appellant's character in issue.  The court committed 
no error.

 

Carroll v. 
State, 261 Ga. 553, 408 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1991).  Nothing resembling 
this process took place in the instant case.  While the trial judge did view the videotape 
prior to making a ruling, the record does not reflect that he identified any 
statement or statements that he found to be consistent, or that he determined 
the relative probative value of such statements, or that he determined the 
potential for unfair prejudice if such statements were admitted.

 

[¶28]    We can only conclude that it was 
error for the trial court to admit this videotape into evidence.  That conclusion 
leads to the ultimate question of whether such error requires reversal of the 
appellant's convictions.  W.R.A.P. 9.04 provides that "[a]ny error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded by the reviewing court."  W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.E. 1.03(a) are 
substantially similar.  The test for "harmless error," stated in its 
reverse sense, is as follows:

 

"An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility 
that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error 
had never occurred.  
To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under 
circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct 
which offends the public sense of fair play.'  Johnson v. State, 
790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo.1990)."

 

Skinner v. 
State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 767 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Solis, 981 P.2d at 36).  The appellant has 
the burden of proving that an error has been prejudicial.  Spilman v. State, 633 P.2d 183, 185 (Wyo. 
1981).

 

[¶29]   There is no reasonable possibility that 
the appellant in the instant case would have been acquitted absent introduction 
of the videotape.  
The videotape was merely cumulative to the voluminous evidence produced 
by the State that tended to prove the appellant's guilt.  See Curl, 898 P.2d  at 374.  Another videotape 
of the appellant's apartment, showing Penn's deceased body and the bloody crime 
scene, was introduced into evidence.  Numerous photographs, crime scene schematics, 
medical reports and Penn's autopsy report went to the jury.  The testimony by 
both of the apartment managers as to the immediate aftermath of the crimes 
corroborated Hanson's version.  Several of the appellant's knives and the 
rifle were admitted.  
The business records showing the appellant's purchase of the rifle came 
into evidence.  
In short, there was a massive amount of evidence incriminating the 
appellant.

 

[¶30]    Other circumstances tended to 
reduce or eliminate any unfairly prejudicial effect that the videotape might 
have had.  The 
videotaped witness, Hanson, testified at trial and was subject to 
cross-examination as to both his trial testimony and the videotape. In addition, 
the jury's consideration of the videotape was strictly limited by the 
accompanying cautionary instruction.  Beyond that, there was an insufficient 
identification by the appellant, both at trial and in this appeal, of the 
specific portion or portions of the videotape that he contended created unfair 
prejudice.  
Under the particular circumstances of this case, the appellant has not 
met his burden of proving that admission of the videotape resulted in 
prejudicial error.

 

WHETHER THE 
PROSECUTOR COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHEN HE ELICITED FROM WITNESSES 
(1) A COMMENT ON APPELLANT'S 
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, (2) VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS, AND (3) COMMENTS ON 
APPELLANT'S VERACITY?

 

[¶31]   We have twice recently reiterated the 
appropriate standard for review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct:

 

            
Prosecutorial misconduct "has always been condemned in this state."  Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo.1974).  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error . . . affected the accused's 
"substantial rights."  
The accused's right to a fair trial is a substantial right.  Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§§ 6, 9, and 10; and see e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo.1978).  Before we hold that an error has affected an 
accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must 
conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, 
in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
accused.  Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo.1987).  We read this 
standard to be in consonance with the standard followed by the United States 
Supreme Court[.]"

 

Earll v. 
State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, 
789-90 (Wyo. 2001).  See also Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 18, 28 P.3d 21, 27 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶32]    The burden of establishing 
prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue.  Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 19, 17 P.3d 715, 722 
(Wyo. 2001).  Because there were no objections at trial to 
any of the three alleged violations in the instant case, our analysis here will 
be under the plain error standard.  The appellant must show that the record 
clearly reflects an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law, 
and that such error materially prejudiced a substantial right of the 
appellant.  Id. at ¶ 16, 17 P.3d  at 721; Seymour v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

            
Comment on the Right to Silence

 

[¶33]   After the incident with Hanson and 
Penn, the appellant left the Star Apartments.  Law enforcement officers in the Casper area 
began to look for him.  While on routine patrol early the following 
morning, an Evansville police officer noticed a man later identified as the 
appellant walking down a roadway.  Having in mind the homicide report from the 
previous evening, the officer contacted the man.  On direct examination, the officer testified 
as follows:

 

            
Q.         
Okay.  
So what, if anything, did you do, Officer?

 

            
A.         
Once I observed the male and I pulled up next to him, he was 
walking.  He 
had his head down.  
He looked over at me, and he turned his head quick back to look at the 
ground.  I 
rolled down my window, and I attempted to contact the male, where I began to ask 
him questions:  
Are you okay?  
Is everything all right?  And he ignored me or at least I felt he ignored me.  He didn't respond 
to me at all.  
I drove past him.  I turned my vehicle around again.  I attempted to 
contact him a second time, where I asked him similar questions:  Where are you 
headed?  Where 
are you coming from?  
And he responded.

 

            
Q.         And 
what, if anything, did he tell you?

 

            
A.         I 
asked him if  if everything was okay.  And he said, Yes.  I asked him if he 
lived in Casper.  
And he said, Yes.  I asked him where he was coming from.  He said, 
Casper.

 

            
Talking to the male, I observed his clothing was soaked.  He was soaken [sic] 
from head to toe.  
His skin, in my opinion, was very pale looking, as if he had been out for 
a long period of time.  He was cold.  He acted like he was cold.  His hands were in 
his pockets.  
And he was more or less shriveled up, you know, as he was walking.  Concerned about his 
demeanor, his character, I asked if everything was okay.  And he said, 
Yes.  He asked 
me if I 

 

            
Q.         
What kind of clothing was he wearing?

 

            
A.         
Pardon me, sir?

 

            
Q.         
What kind of clothing was he wearing?

 

            
A.         He 
was wearing what appeared to be a plaid shirt or an overcoat, like a flannel 
shirt, with khaki, tan pants.

 

            
Q.         
Now, I interrupted you.  You started to say he asked you  what did he 
ask you?

 

            
A.         He 
asked me if I knew where the interstate was at, at which time I pointed.  The interstate is 
south, and I gave the direction.

 

            
Q.         Did 
you make any attempt to determine if this was the individual being sought by the 
Casper Police Department?

 

            
A.         I 
did.  I 
contacted the Casper Police Department via my dispatch to contact their 
dispatch.  And 
I was advised, with the description I gave them, that this was not the guy they 
were looking for.

 

            
Q.         
Because the clothing didn't match or what?

 

            
A.         
Because the clothing didn't match.  They said it was similar but not the 
same.

 

            
Q.         All 
right.  So then 
what did you do?

 

            
A.         I 
advanced forward, continued driving on Lathrop Road probably at 1, 2 miles an 
hour.  As I was 
watching my rearview mirror, I saw the gentleman run across the street to a road 
called Elkhorn Road, which is a dirt road, and he began walking that.

 

            
Q.         
Heading towards the interstate?

 

            
A.         
Heading towards the interstate.

 

            
Q.         So 
what did you do then?

 

            
A.         I 
then turned my patrol vehicle around, further up towards the Lathrop Feed and 
Equipment, and I went back to make contact with the gentleman for a third 
time.

 

            
Q.         
Okay.  
Did you have some 
suspicions or concerns?

 

            
A.         
Yes.

 

            
Q.         And 
what was that?

 

            
A.         
Based on the fact that he ran across the road; and from the first attempt 
where I tried to contact him and he  I felt that he ignored me, I felt that was 
suspicious.  
The fact that his clothing was soaked and that his skin was pale, I was 
concerned.  I 
didn't understand what  where the guy had been, so I wanted to gain more 
information.

 

 (Emphasis added.)

 

[¶34]   The appellant contends that the 
emphasized portions of the officer's testimony were improper comments on his 
right to remain silent.  He cites to Tortolito 
v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1995) (footnote omitted), where we 
said:

 

            
Since the right to remain silent is a self-executing right, an accused is 
presumed to be exercising the right by his silence, pre-arrest and pre-Miranda when questioned by the state's agents for 
purposes of a criminal investigation.  Accordingly, the prosecutorial use of the 
citizen's silence to infer the guilt of the citizen is constitutionally 
prohibited.

 

            
Prosecutorial violations are subject to the Clenin [v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978)] rule's 
mandate that failure to respect the constitutional right of the citizen-accused 
not to have his silence called to the jury's attention will entitle the accused 
to a reversal of conviction.

 

[¶35]   In Tortolito, 
we reinvigorated Clenin's reliance on the 
Wyoming Constitution's prohibition against self-incrimination rather than on due 
process analysis in "right to silence" cases, and we extended that protection to 
pre-arrest silence.10  Tortolito, 901 P.2d  at 389-91.  We continued to recognize, however, that a 
"reference to silence which is not a comment' will not be reversed absent a 
showing of prejudice."  Id. at 390.  A "reference" to silence is a "comment" upon 
the exercise of the right to silence when it is "used to the state's advantage 
either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the 
silence was an admission of guilt."  Id. at 391.

 

[¶36]    We continue to adhere to the 
specific rule of Tortolito; that is, prosecutorial 
comment upon a defendant's pre-arrest exercise of his constitutional right to 
remain silent is reversible error.  Nevertheless, we find that the facts of Tortolito are not similar to the facts of the instant 
case, and we also find that the ratio decidendi of 
Tortolito does not apply in this case.  In Tortolito, the defendant was identified to the police 
as having committed a robbery.  Following those accusations, officers 
detained and interrogated Tortolito.  Tortolito "remained silent" in the face of 
those accusations.  
In direct examination of the officers, the prosecutor elicited numerous 
statements about Tortolito's failure to respond to the allegations, and in 
closing argument, the prosecutor characterized Tortolito's silence as an 
admission of guilt.  
Id.  We found reversible error in these 
circumstances:

 

            
Under the erroneous view that no constitutional right to pre-arrest 
silence exists, a citizen who stands mute in the face of accusatory 
interrogation about the crime during a law enforcement   investigation 
and inquiry is without constitutional protection against law enforcement 
personnel who treat silence as probative evidence of guilt.  Law enforcement 
personnel can time the citizen's arrest to occur after the citizen stands mute 
in the face of the accusation.  This practice, which encourages manipulative 
timing of arrests, does not serve the constitutional provision's purpose of 
protecting the right to silence during pre-arrest, accusatory interrogation by 
the state's agents.  
Permitting prosecutorial use of that silence discourages a law 
enforcement system's reliance upon extrinsic evidence independently secured 
through skillful investigation and, instead, encourages reliance upon compulsory 
self-disclosure.  
See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).

 

Tortolito, 901 P.2d  at 
390.

 

[¶37]   In making his "right to silence" 
argument in his appellate brief, the appellant quoted only the two specific 
questions and answers from the arresting officer's testimony in which the 
emphasized responses occurred:  "And he ignored me or at least I felt he 
ignored me.  He 
didn't respond to me at all."  "I felt that he ignored me, I felt that was 
suspicious."  
We have set out more of the officer's testimony to show the totality of 
the circumstances in which these words were spoken.11  This was not a case 
where, faced with the accusations of investigating officers, the appellant made 
no response, only to have his silence used against him at trial as evidence of 
guilt.  
Instead, the fact that the appellant initially ignored the officer and 
failed to respond to him was presented in direct testimony simply as part of the 
circumstances under which the officer first encountered the appellant.  It is significant 
that the questions and answers had nothing to do with the crime itself.  It is also 
significant that, unlike in Tortolito, the 
prosecutor did not mention in opening or argue in closing that the appellant's 
silence somehow proved guilt.

 

[¶38]   There are many situations where, 
without reversible error, evidence may be adduced that a defendant "remained 
silent" at some point.  Since Tortolito, 
we have had occasion to note several such situations:  Shipman v. State, 2001 WY 11, ¶ 5, 17 P.3d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
2001) (officer testified that, at murder scene, the 
defendant said that he "did not want to say anything else"); Robinson, 11 P.3d at 373 (prosecutor noted 
what the defendant "left out" when he made a statement to the police); Beartusk, 6 P.3d at 144 (officer testified 
that, after answering some innocuous questions, the defendant indicated he did 
not wish to answer any more questions); Helm v. 
State, 1 P.3d 635, 640-41 (Wyo. 2000) (prosecutor noted 
there was a lack of expert testimony to support the defendant's theory); and Emerson v. State, 988 P.2d 518, 522 (Wyo. 
1999) (prosecutor noted facts the defendant did not 
include in his statements).

 

[¶39]    A prosecutor does not "comment" 
on a defendant's exercise of his right to silence where he does not attempt to 
use the silence to the state's advantage, where he does not argue to the jury 
that the silence was evidence of guilt or an admission of guilt, and where the 
defendant does not show any prejudice.  Shipman, 2001 WY 
11, ¶ 24, 17 P.3d  at 39.  Material prejudice is shown only where there 
is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been more favorable to 
the defendant if the evidence or prosecutorial comment had not been 
allowed.  Emerson, 988 P.2d  at 522.  In analyzing right 
to silence cases, we will not single out or take words and phrases out of 
context.  Robinson, 11 P.3d  at 373.  We will consider 
whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he emphasized or 
followed up on the silence issue, and whether he attempted to exploit the issue 
in any way.  Beartusk, 6 P.3d  at 144.

 

[¶40]   In the case now before this Court, an 
Evansville police officer not directly involved in the murder investigation 
being conducted by the Casper Police Department, but knowing of the murder, 
happened to come across the appellant in somewhat unusual circumstanceswalking 
along a dirt road in a rural area at about 6:00 a.m.  In describing the 
suspicious nature of his encounter with the appellant, the officer testified as 
to the appellant's appearance and conduct, as well as what the appellant 
said.  None of 
this was elicited from the officer as a comment on the appellant's exercise of 
his right to remain silent; rather, it was all part of the officer's explanation 
for his continuing contact with the appellant.  Further, given all of the evidence against 
the appellant, there is no reasonable possibility that, absent this evidence, 
the verdict would have been more favorable to the appellant.  Prejudicial error 
did not occur.

 

            
Victim Impact Statements

 

[¶41]   The appellant was convicted of killing 
Penn and attempting to kill Hanson.  Hanson suffered a gunshot wound and numerous 
knife wounds.  
During his direct examination, Hanson described the effect of his many 
injuries:

 

            
Q.         How 
long did it take you to recover, physically, from what had happened to you?

 

            
A.         Oh, 
probably two  probably two or three weeks, I imagine, at least.  I was in the 
hospital for five days.  I was on morphine for three days.  You know I was  I 
couldn't move for two days.

 

            
Q.         
What has been the emotional fallout from this incident for you?

 

            
A.         
It's been terrible.  I mean, it's  it's unbelievable how bad it 
is.  I mean, 
it's done  you just don't think stuff like that is going to happen.

 

In addition, Hanson's treating physician testified as 
follows:

 

            
Q.         . . 
.  Doctor, to 
your knowledge, Mr. Hanson has recovered physically from the wounds 
inflicted?

 

            
A.         I 
have very little knowledge.  I saw him a couple of weeks afterwards in my 
office, and I haven't seen him since.  I know he's obviously here today.

 

            
Q.         All 
right.  And I 
guess one final question.  And the jury has seen Mr. Hanson reference 
some scarring that has remained from surgery and from the stab wounds themselves 
and the slicing cuts.  
Is that consistent, from your medical training and experience, with 
long-lasting effects he'll have from these injuries?

 

            
A.         Oh, 
the scars will resolve a little bit more; but by, basically, a year, that's 
basically what he's going to have; yes.

 

[¶42]   The appellant characterizes this 
testimony as inadmissible victim impact statements, offered for the sole purpose 
of garnering sympathy for Hanson.  His plain error argument is that the 
admission of this evidence violated a clear rule that irrelevant evidence is not 
admissible, and that its prejudicial effect upon the appellant is "obvious" 
where the primary issue was the credibility contest between Hanson and the 
appellant.  In 
Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 672, 676 (Wyo. 
1999), we described the process of reviewing claims of this 
nature:

 

            
Before evidence can be admissible, it must be relevant.  W.R.E. 402.  Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  W.R.E. 401.  In criminal cases, "[e]vidence is always 
relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime 
charged."  Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 (Wyo.1980).  See also Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 
(Wyo.1993).

 

            
Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  W.R.E. 403.  Victim impact 
testimony must not be permitted "unless there is a clear justification of 
relevance."  Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Wyo.1989).  For this Court to 
conclude that the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence in violation 
of W.R.E. 403, [the appellant] must demonstrate "that the evidence had little or 
no probative value and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the 
purpose of inflaming the jury."  Apodoca v. State, 
627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1981).  See also Geiger, 
859 P.2d  at 668.

 

[¶43]   The charge in Hernandez was aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon.  We 
found in that case that, though some of the individual questions and answers 
"might have been irrelevant," the testimony at issue describing the pain and 
problems suffered by the victim after a stabbing was relevant as proof that the 
defendant inflicted bodily injury with a deadly weapon, one of the elements of 
the crime charged.  
Hernandez, 976 P.2d  at 676.  The Geiger case cited in Hernandez involved a charge of attempted murder.  In Geiger, under a plain error analysis, we concluded that 
victim impact testimony describing the victim's injuries, his feelings at the 
time, and his remarks concerning a potential civil action against the defendant 
were relevant as proof of the element of intent to kill.  Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 668 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

[¶44]    In Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010-11 (Wyo. 
1989), another case cited in Hernandez, 
we addressed victim impact evidence that was not found to be relevant:

 

            
It is clear that the testimony offered by the victims of this crime with 
respect to how it affected them in connection with their lives after the crime 
is absolutely irrelevant with respect to the issues before the jury.  Their discussion of 
the impact of the crime upon them could not in any way serve to establish any of 
the elements of the crime of aggravated robbery.  The only purpose must have been to attempt to 
arouse the passions of the jury.  Consequently, we are satisfied that the 
admission of such evidence is error, and the trial courts are cautioned not to 
permit such evidence to be presented unless there is a clear justification of 
relevance.  In 
the context of this case, however, we are persuaded that such evidence was 
harmless.  
Given the other evidence against Justice, which the trial court aptly 
described as overwhelming, the admission of the testimony about the impact on 
the victims did not constitute prejudicial error.  See Hyde v. State, 
769 P.2d 376 (Wyo.1989); Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 (Wyo.1983).

 

[¶45]   Applying these standards to the facts 
of this case, we conclude that the questioned testimony is quite similar to that 
involved in Hernandez, in that, while some of it 
"might be irrelevant," the testimony in totality is relevant to the issue of 
whether the appellant intended to kill Hanson.  The two questions to Hanson, and his answers, 
and the two questions to the treating physician, and his answers, are actually a 
small part of lengthy testimony about Hanson's injuries.  The direct 
examination of Hanson just prior to that quoted above went as follows:

 

            
Q.         And 
then you had surgery?

 

            
A.         
Yeah.  I 
had made  I got scars from here to here.  Yeah.

 

            
Q.         Do 
you know how many times you were stabbed?

 

            
A.         I 
got one big one that goes down here, one that goes across here.  I got one  stab 
wounds here, plus this.  I got stab wounds in my shoulder.  I'm  I don't know 
how many.  I 
got stabbed here.

 

            
Q.         
You're pointing above your left eye?

 

            
A.         
Yeah.  
Right here.  
There is a big scar  I've still got a big knot there.  I got stabbed in 
the head a few times, a bunch of times.

 

            
Q.         How 
long were you in surgery; do you know?

 

            
A.         I 
was in  the next thing  I woke  I don't know.  I would say two or three hours, 
probably.  He 
had to sew up  my larynx was cut in half; my liver, he put some stitches in 
it.  My lung 
was nicked, and a bunch of stuff like that.

 

[¶46]   As part of this examination, in the 
context of the charge of attempted murder, the prosecutor's question to Hanson 
as to how long it took to recover from his injuries did not seek irrelevant 
information.  
While the topic of the next questionthe "emotional fallout" from the 
incidentwas irrelevant, we find that it was not unduly prejudicial to the 
appellant, given the nature and amount of other evidence.  The same can be 
said of the questions to the doctor and his answers.  Testimony about 
scarring from the many wounds may be seen as relevant, although not particularly 
probative, on the issue of an attempt to kill.  The long-lasting effect of that scarring is 
probably not relevant, but neither was it unduly prejudicial.  These two questions 
to the doctor followed lengthy questioning as to the nature and location of 
Hanson's injuries.  
This testimony was detailed and graphic, and was surely much more 
damaging to the appellant than any mention of scarring.  The first 
substantive question posed to the doctor, and his answer, may suffice to reveal 
the context in which the "scarring" questions were asked:

 

            
Q.         
Would you tell the jury, if you would, how Mr. Hanson was presented to 
you and what the nature of his injuries were as you observed them first.

 

            
A.         He 
was in the emergency room when I arrived there.  At that time, he was seen to be covered in 
blood from  literally from the top of his head down to his knees.  He had a number of 
knife wounds and stab wounds.  He had one on the right forehead; had a 
couple on his neck; a deeper one on the right side of the neck, just below the 
angle of his jaw.  
He had one, I believe, on his right shoulder.  There were two 
large stab wounds in the lower chest area.  And he had a gunshot wound to the left neck, 
the base of the left neck.

 

With such testimony before the jury, there is no reasonable 
possibility that the brief testimony about long-term scarring or the emotional 
impact of Hanson's injuries had any effect upon the verdict.12

 

            
Comments on the Appellant's Veracity

 

[¶47]   During his direct examination of 
Hanson, the prosecutor twice asked whether Hanson believed something the 
appellant had said while Hanson, Penn, and the appellant were sitting in the 
appellant's apartment before the attack:

 

            
Q.         
Okay.  
What was the nature of the conversation?

 

            
A.         Mr. 
Lancaster was telling us  I don't know.  He was telling us a story about being in the 
armed forces and stuff like that 

 

            
* * *

 

            
Q.         Did you believe his 
stories?

 

            
A.         No, 
I didn't.  I 
just 

 

            
* * *

 

            
Q.         And 
what did the knives look like and where were they?

 

            
A.         The 
 the knife he  the one knife was a big knife, real big knife.  And it was hanging 
in a sheath behind the couch.  And it had some holes in it, in the 
blade.  And he 
was saying  another story, I think.  He was saying that he made that knife.  And he 

 

            
Q.         And you didn't believe 
him?

 

            
A.         No, 
not really.

 

 (Emphasis added.)

 

[¶48]   The appellant complains that these 
questions violated the principle that forbids one witness from commenting on the 
credibility of another witness.  It is true that we have long accepted this 
rule of law:

 

            
This Court has consistently recognized that it is the jury's duty to 
resolve the factual issues, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and 
determine the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo.1998); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo.1988).  A witness may not, 
therefore, comment on the veracity or truthfulness of another witness.  Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860; Curl 
v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373-74 (Wyo.1995).

 

Huff v. State, 
992 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Wyo. 1999).  "Like opinions as 
to guilt, opinions as to the veracity, or lack thereof, of the victim or 
defendant are fundamentally objectionable if those opinions have the capacity to 
decide the case for the 
jury."  Curl, 898 P.2d at 374 (emphasis in 
original).

 

[¶49]   There are instances, however, where 
testimony that appears to comment on another witness's credibility may not be 
objectionable.  
For that reason, "we must look carefully at the question asked and the 
testimony elicited to determine whether a witness actually made an improper 
comment about another witness' credibility."  Huff, 992 P.2d  at 
1079.  For instance, "testimony assisting the jury 
in understanding some aspect of the testimony of another witness that does not 
comment directly on that witness' credibility or veracity is not invasive of the 
role of the jury."  
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 618 (Wyo. 
1993).  Testimony that merely has the collateral 
effect of supporting or denigrating another witness's credibility is not 
objectionable on that basis.  Id.; Curl, 898 P.2d  at 374.

 

[¶50]   There were no objections to this 
testimony at trial, so we review the record for plain error.  Huff, 992 P.2d  at 1078-79.  We defer to the 
sound discretion of the trial court, reversing only where there has been an 
abuse of that discretion.  Saldana, 846 P.2d  
at 618.  An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 
court "exceeds the bounds of measured reason in light of those matters properly 
before that court."  
Curl, 898 P.2d  at 373.  Finally, as part of 
his plain error burden, the appellant must demonstrate that a substantial right 
has been denied to him, as a result of which he has been materially 
prejudiced.  Huff, 992 P.2d  at 1079 (quoting 
Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo.1981)).

 

[¶51]   A narrow view of this issue would be 
that the only direct comment on another witness's credibility is a statement 
that "he told the truth" or "he lied."  Such a view is too narrow.  Surely, testimony 
that "I believed him" or "I didn't believe him" is just as much a comment on 
credibility.  
Unless the fact of this belief or disbelief is independently relevant to 
the issues to be determined by the jury, it is difficult to conclude that such 
testimony is admissible.13

 

[¶52]   This Court cannot perceive anything in 
the record that supports the prosecutor's having asked Hanson these two 
credibility questions.  Whether the appellant had been in the armed 
forces, or whether he had made the knife, did not matter.  Whether Hanson 
believed the appellant had been in the armed forces, or whether Hanson believed 
the appellant had made the knife, did not matter.  This information did not have a tendency to 
prove or disprove any element of a charged crime or a defense.  The questions 
should not have been asked, and, had there been an objection, such should have 
been sustained.

 

[¶53]   The conclusion that this evidence 
should not have been admitted, however, is not the same as concluding that 
reversible error occurred.  There is no reasonable possibility that these 
brief comments on an immaterial issue in any way affected the jury's 
verdict.  As we 
have pointed out several times already, the State presented a huge amount of 
evidence against the appellant.  In addition, Hanson was fully subject to 
cross-examination as to the conversation during which the subjects of the armed 
forces and making the knife arose.  The error was harmless.

 

WHETHER DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH 
OF APPELLANT RENDERED COUNSEL'S ASSISTANCE INEFFECTIVE?

 

            
Facts

 

[¶54]   We have already quoted at length from 
the arresting officer's trial testimony in describing his initial contacts with 
the appellant.  
Those contacts resulted in the appellant's arrest after the officer 
determined the appellant's identity by checking the driver's license in the 
appellant's wallet.  
The appellant now contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in not 
moving to suppress all statements and evidence obtained as a result of the 
officer's search of his wallet.  The appellant's argument focuses on the 
following portion of the officer's testimony, which takes up after the officer 
got out of his vehicle to talk to the appellant:

 

            
Q.         
What happened then?

 

            
A.         We 
had a brief conversation about his well-being, and I asked him if he would like 
to warm up inside my patrol car.

 

            
Q.         And 
what was the conversation then?

 

            
A.         He 
said, Okay.  I 
asked him if he would advance forward, place his hands on my car.  I told him that he 
wasn't under arrest, and I wasn't going to take him to jail.  But as my policy 
indicates, before I place somebody in my patrol car, I have to  I have to pat 
them down, for safety issues, make sure there is no weapon they are going to 
harm me with, make sure there is no weapon they are going to harm themselves 
with once they get inside my car.

 

            
Q.         Did 
you inquire of him whether he had any weapons?

 

            
A.         
Yes.

 

            
Q.         And 
what did he tell you?

 

            
A.         He 
didn't -- he didn't verbally say anything.  He did place his hands on my car, and he did 
allow me to check.

 

            
Q.         And 
did you find any weapons on him?

 

            
A.         
Yes.  As 
I began to check, I started with his left side.  And as I got down towards his shoulder and 
the base of the coat, the outer coat, as I attempted to reach in, he moved his 
arm.  I asked 
him to place his hands back on the car, which he did.  Do not  if there's 
something in there, let me remove it.  I'll show you what it is, and I'll place it 
in front of you.  
As I entered into his pocket, I did pull out what appeared to be a 
knife.

 

            
Q.         Did 
you find any other weapons on his person?

 

            
A.         I 
did.

 

            
Q.         And 
what was that?

 

            
A.         On 
his right side, in the same pocket  excuse me  not the same pocket, but the 
pocket on the other side, I pulled out another knife.

 

            
Q.         
Okay.  
Did you make any attempt to find any identification of this 
individual?

 

            
A.         
Yes, I did.

 

            
Q.         And 
what was that?

 

            
A.         I 
found  I located his wallet in his rear pocket, at which time I set it on the 
hood of my car so that he would know that the contents in his wallet was 
safe.

 

            
Q.         Did 
you ever ask him his identity during the earlier time that you were speaking 
with him?

 

            
A.         
Yes.

 

            
Q.         
What, if anything, did he tell you?

 

            
A.         He 
identified himself as Norman.

 

            
Q.         
Okay.  
Did you make any attempt, yourself, to look at the wallet to determine 
identification?

 

            
A.         I 
did.

 

            
Q.         And 
what was the identification contained in that wallet?

 

            
A.         His 
driver's license said his name was James Norman Lancaster.

 

            
Q.         Was 
that the name that had been given to you by the Casper Police Department?

 

            
A.         It 
was.

 

[¶55]   The appellant contends that this 
warrantless search of his wallet was not justified by any exception to the 
constitutional requirement for a warrant.  Further, he insists that, without the 
warrantless search, the State would not have obtained a New Mexico 
identification card that linked him to the purchase of the rifle.

 

            
Standard of Review

 

[¶56]   The standard for appellate review of a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under the state and 
federal constitutions.  In Interest of LDO, 
858 P.2d 553, 556 (Wyo. 1993).  As we stated in Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 901-02 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Beadles v. State, 984 P.2d 1083, 1085-86 (Wyo. 
1999)), such claims are reviewed under the standard set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984):

 

            
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient.  
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.  
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.  
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable."

 

[¶57]   In reviewing claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we invoke a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable judgment.  
Eustice, 11 P.3d  at 902 (quoting Beadles, 984 P.2d at 1085-86); Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 660 (Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1093 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. State, 902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 
1995)).  "[T]he paramount determination is whether, 
in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'"  Sorensen, 6 P.3d  at 660 (quoting Jackson, 902 P.2d at 1295).  See also Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 
1995).  The burden of proving ineffective assistance 
of counsel rests with the appellant.  Sorensen, 6 P.3d  
at 660.

 

[¶58]   The failure to file a suppression 
motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per se.  Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 821 (Wyo. 1996); Dickeson v. 
State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 (Wyo. 1992).  Instead, the 
reasonableness of counsel's action or inaction is evaluated from the perspective 
of counsel at the time and in light of all the circumstances of the case.  Bloomquist, 914 P.2d  at 821; Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 610.  For instance, 
where counsel fails to move to suppress his client's statement, and that failure 
is based on counsel's failure to investigate and discover a Miranda violation that likely would have made the 
statement inadmissible, such failure is ineffective assistance of counsel.  In Interest of LDO, 858 P.2d  at 559.  However, where the 
decision not to file a motion to suppress is part of counsel's trial strategy, 
"it will not, in hindsight, be judged as unconstitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel."  Hornecker v. State, 
977 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Wyo. 1999); Dennis v. State, 963 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 
1998).  Furthermore, ineffective assistance of 
counsel is not shown where counsel had no defense to present.  Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 624 (Wyo. 
1985).  In particular, counsel is not ineffective for 
failing to pursue a motion to suppress where there is no underlying 
justification for the motion.  Beadles, 984 P.2d  
at 1086; Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266 (Wyo. 1995), overruled on other grounds sub 
nom. Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶59]   The second element of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
assuming counsel's deficient performance has been shown, is proof that prejudice 
to the appellant resulted.  This requires a showing of the existence of 
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different."  Herdt, 891 P.2d  
at 799; Starr, 888 P.2d  at 
1266.  In the case of a failure to seek suppression 
of inadmissible evidence, prejudice will result where, in the absence of that 
evidence, "only a limited amount of evidence was available to the prosecution to 
support a conviction."  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 612.

 

            
Discussion

 

[¶60]   The allegation underlying the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in this case is that trial counsel failed to 
move to suppress the statements and evidence obtained as a result of the 
arresting officer's search of appellant's wallet.14  The focus of our 
inquiry, then, is the law of search and seizure as it relates to such incidents 
of police-citizen contact.15

 

[¶61]   Neither the federal nor the state 
constitution forbids all 
searches and seizures; rather, they prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 452 (Wyo. 
1995).  Warrantless searches and seizures are 
unreasonable per se, with but a few exceptions.  Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 
1998); Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo. 1995).  Those exceptions include:

 

"1) search of an arrested suspect and the area within his 
control; 2) a search conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a 
search and/or seizure to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a 
search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search which 
results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of police officers 
while they are where they have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure 
conducted pursuant to consent; and 7) a search which results from an entry into 
a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or property."

 

Morris, 
908 P.2d at 935 (quoting Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 940-41 (Wyo. 
1983), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Jones, 
902 P.2d at 692).  When a proper objection or motion is made by 
a defendant, the state bears the burden of proving that one of these exceptions 
applies.  Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Wyo. 
1995); Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 
610.

 

[¶62]   The appellant relies primarily on two 
cases to support his assertion that his attorney was ineffective.  In Dickeson, the defendant's arson conviction was reversed 
because she did not receive effective assistance of counsel.  Counsel's 
deficiency was the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence seized without 
a warrant under circumstances not fitting one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  
Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 613.   Similarly, in 
Morris, the defendant's controlled substance 
convictions were reversed because the court did not suppress evidence seized 
from the defendant's wallet, where there was no warrant and no exception 
applied.  Morris, 908 P.2d  at 937.  In the instant 
case, the appellant insists that, although he consented to a pat-down search for 
weapons before getting into the patrol car, the scope of that consensual search 
was exceeded when the officer searched the appellant's wallet.

 

[¶63]   The State counters the appellant's 
argument by reviewing the concept of "levels of interaction between police and 
citizens," citing Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 
691-92 (Wyo. 1993).  We addressed these interactions in Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Wyo. 
1997):

 

            
Because in this case the reason for stopping the car is different from 
the articulable facts and suspicion which led [the officer] to implement 
intrusive measures after the stop, we employ three steps of analysis.  In order for 
Brown's arrest to be valid, the initial stop must have been justified at the 
inception.  Collins v. State, 854 P.2d  at 691 (brief seizures or Terry stops, must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion); see also United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir.1993) (To determine whether 
an investigative detention or protective search is reasonable, the court must 
decide whether the stop is justified at its inception, and whether the officer's 
actions are reasonably related to the scope of the circumstances.).  Second, articulable 
facts must have existed to demonstrate that [the officer] had a reasonable 
suspicion to justify the intrusive measures used to ensure his safety.  United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th 
Cir.1993) (a seizure has to be reasonable at its inception and reasonable as 
conducted).  Third, [the officer] must have had probable 
cause at the time of Brown's arrest.  See, e.g., Wilson, 
874 P.2d [215] at 220 [(Wyo. 1994)].

 

[¶64]   In Brown, a 
police officer, suspecting that he was witnessing drunk driving, stopped a 
vehicle that was being driven erratically.  About an hour earlier, the officer had 
received a report of an armed robbery perpetrated by two black males.  As he approached 
the stopped car, the officer became alarmed because he could not see anyone in 
it.  He then 
saw two black males slouched down in the front seat so their heads were not 
visible above the seat.  He ceased his approach to the vehicle and 
called for backup.  
When other officers arrived, they ordered the two men out of the car at 
gunpoint.  The 
men were handcuffed and placed in separate police cars.  In response to a 
request for identification, Brown lied.  When the truth of his identity was learned, 
Brown was arrested for interference with a police officer.  While Brown was 
being booked into jail, police discovered in his clothing money stolen in the 
armed robbery.  
Brown, 944 P.2d  at 1170.

 

[¶65]   Brown filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence that was obtained after he was ordered out of the car at gunpoint.  The district court 
found Brown's arrest lawful and Brown appealed.  Id.  In affirming the 
district court's decision, we described the analysis that must be followed in 
reviewing such police-citizen encounters:

 

            
To decide this issue, we must consider whether the facts [the officer] 
learned during the first few moments of his investigation along with the 
information in the radio transmission are sufficient to justify the use of the 
intrusive measures.  
In this regard the case at bar is notably similar to Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804 (Wyo.1996), in that 
during the police investigation of both cases new facts came to light that 
created a new suspicion.  In Medrano, we 
upheld a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute a controlled 
substance, even though the initial suspicion articulated for stopping Medrano 
was that he generally fit the description of a robbery suspect.  914 P.2d  at 
808.  Once the 
police officer determined Medrano was not the robbery suspect, this court held 
that the facts and circumstances which came to light during the investigation 
constituted sufficient grounds for a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 
was afoot.  914 P.2d  at 808.  
See also Collins v. State, 854 P.2d  at 695 (a 
detention based on reasonable suspicion can, through the development of 
additional facts during the investigation, evolve into probable cause for 
arrest).

 

            
Although we have not previously considered whether the use of intrusive 
measures as invoked in this case transforms an investigatory stop into an 
arrest, with regard to officer safety we have recently said:

 

"Nothing written here should be cited for the proposition 
that proper regard for officer safety might run police afoul of an arrestee's 
constitutional rights.  The concerns for officer safety articulated 
by Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)] have only increased exponentially over the years."

 

Mickelson v. 
State, 906 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo.1995).

 

Brown, 944 P.2d  at 
1171-72.

 

[¶66]   A somewhat similar situation occurred 
in Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 
1994), but with a different result.  A police officer 
observed Wilson shortly after midnight walking along a street.  Wilson was walking 
rapidly, but with "lurching" steps.  The officer pulled his patrol car up near 
Wilson and asked if he was okay.  Smelling alcohol on Wilson's breath, the 
officer asked Wilson for identification, which Wilson provided.  Pursuant to 
department policy, the officer then radioed for a routine warrants check, which 
took less than two minutes.  The encounter with Wilson was interrupted 
when the officer saw smoke coming from a nearby building.  The officer went to 
investigate, telling Wilson to "stay in the area."  Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 217.

 

[¶67]   After directing fire trucks to the 
fire, the officer returned to find Wilson.  He helped Wilson cross the street, and then 
once again asked him to wait while he checked on the fire.  As the officer 
worked traffic control at the fire, he received a radio report that Wilson had 
two outstanding arrest warrants.  The officer went back to Wilson's location, 
told him about the warrants, and arrested him.  In the process, the officer noticed an oily 
patch on Wilson's shirt.  The officer touched the stained area, at 
which time Wilson said, "What are you doing?  I don't smell like smoke."  The next day, while 
in custody on the existing warrants, Wilson made voluntary incriminating 
statements about the fire.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  
at 217-18.

 

[¶68]   The district court denied Wilson's 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained after the officer's initial stop of 
Wilson.  On 
appeal, this Court reversed, holding that, while the officer's initial contacts 
with Wilson were legal as part of the officer's "community caretaker" function, 
the continued detention of Wilson thereafter for the purpose of running a 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) records check, in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, was an illegal seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.  
Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220-26.

 

[¶69]   The lesson to be learned from these 
cases is that resolution of a search and seizure issue in the context of an 
investigatory stop that becomes an arrest requires application of a totality of 
the circumstances test.  Martindale v. State, 
2001 WY 52, ¶ 11, 24 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2001); Buckles v. State, 998 P.2d 927, 930 (Wyo. 
2000).  The same test must be used in cases such as 
Wilson and Morris and 
the instant case, where the initial contact with the defendant did not arise out 
of an investigatory stop, but was initiated out of concern for the defendant's 
welfare.  When 
an officer observes conduct that suggests a person may be injured or otherwise 
in need of assistance, the officer's community caretaker function allows him to 
contact that person regardless of the lack of any articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity.  
Instead, the contact may be justified by showing the "specific and 
articulable facts" upon which the officer relied in exercising his community 
caretaker function; that is, in acting to enhance public safety.  Morris, 908 P.2d  at 936.  Facts learned 
during that initial contact may lead to reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, and that reasonable suspicion may lead to further investigation and an 
eventual arrest.

 

[¶70]   Application of these legal precepts to 
the facts of the instant case leads to the conclusion that the arresting 
officer's contacts with the appellant did not constitute an unreasonable search 
and seizure and, thus, to the further conclusion that the appellant's trial 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek suppression of the evidence 
resulting from those contacts.  A review of the chronology of this particular 
police/citizen encounter supports those conclusions.

 

[¶71]   The officer who eventually arrested the 
appellant was working the night shift in Evansville, which is adjacent to 
Casper.  During 
his shift, he had received a radio report of a murder in Casper, with a request 
to be on the lookout for the person suspected of being involved.  Prior to going off 
duty at 7:00 a.m., the officer "decided to make one last pass through 
Evansville, make sure nobody was broke down, nobody was stranded on the 
roadway."  As 
the officer drove down Lathrop Road, he noticed someone walking down the 
road.  Having 
in mind the radio report of the murder in Casper, the officer pulled up next to 
the person, who was later identified as the appellant.  The officer rolled 
down his window and asked the appellant whether he was okay and whether 
everything was all right.  The appellant ignored the officer and made no 
response.  The 
officer then drove past the appellant and turned around.  Once again, he 
asked the appellant if everything was okay.  This time, the appellant said, "yes."  The officer 
observed that the appellant's clothing was soaked "from head to toe," and that 
the appellant's skin looked very pale.  The appellant acted as if he was cold.  His hands were in 
his pockets and he looked "shriveled up" as he walked.  At the appellant's 
request, the officer directed him towards the interstate highway.

 

[¶72]   As the appellant continued walking, the 
officer contacted dispatch and gave a physical description of the 
appellant.  The 
dispatcher forwarded this information to the Casper Police Department, and then 
relayed to the officer that this description did not appear to match their 
suspect.  The 
officer then noticed in his rear view mirror that the appellant had run across 
the road and was walking along another road toward the interstate.  The officer decided 
to contact the appellant a third time.  He testified that his suspicions had been 
raised because (1) the appellant had at first ignored him; (2) the appellant's 
clothing was soaked and his skin was pale, as if he had been walking all night; 
(3) it was very early in the morning; (4) the appellant was on a dirt road in a 
relatively rural area; and (5) the appellant ran across the road after their 
contact.

 

[¶73]   The officer again stopped his vehicle, 
this time waiting for the appellant to approach.  He saw the appellant make a movement with his 
left hand, as if throwing something or gesturing the officer away.  The officer got out 
of his car and walked over to the appellant.  As they stood there face-to-face, the 
appellant's coat was open, allowing the officer to see what appeared to be blood 
on the appellant's shirt.  The officer asked the appellant if he was cut 
and if he needed medical attention, to which the appellant responded, "no."

 

[¶74]   The officer asked questions of the 
appellant for three or four minutes, all directed to the appellant's safety and 
welfare.  When 
the appellant said that he was cold, the officer told him he could warm up in 
the patrol car, but department policy required that he would first have to be 
"patted down" for weapons.  The appellant did not verbally consent to be 
searched for weapons, but he manifested his consent by placing his hands on the 
patrol car to accommodate the search.  The officer found two knives on the 
appellant, one in each of the appellant's coat pockets.

 

[¶75]   During the weapons search, the officer 
located the appellant's wallet, which he placed on the hood of the patrol 
car.  Having 
removed the appellant's weapons, the officer looked in the wallet to attempt to 
determine the appellant's identity.  He found a driver's license bearing the name 
James Norman Lancaster, which he recognized as the name of the Casper Police 
Department's homicide suspect.16  At this point, despite the realization that 
he was, indeed, dealing with a murder suspect, the officer determined that he 
would not "lose my cool," but would "[maintain] a professional posture."  He continued his 
conversation with the appellant about the cold weather and the appellant being 
soaked, once again inviting the appellant to warm up in the back seat of the 
patrol car.  He 
told the appellant that he was not under arrest, but that department policy 
required anyone sitting in the back seat of the patrol car to be 
handcuffed.  He 
then handcuffed the appellant "to the front" and placed him in the vehicle.17  The officer contacted the Casper police to 
inform them that he had their suspect in custody.  The officer did not question the appellant 
after he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car.  While the two men 
sat waiting for the Casper police, however, the appellant volunteered the 
statement that he had been drinking with some friends and that he had had a 
rough night.

 

[¶76]   Sometimes, it is helpful to analyze the 
reasonableness of police conduct by considering what it is society expects its 
police officers to do given certain circumstances.  Here, an officer on 
routine patrol early in the morning after a cold, wet night, sees someone 
walking along a dirt road.  The officer is aware of a murder the night 
before in neighboring Casper and he has been told to be on the lookout for the 
murder suspect, who is still at large.  While he did not testify so directly, it is 
clear from the officer's testimony that it is unusual to find someone walking 
along the road at that place and time.  Surely, the officer should not be expected to 
ignore the man and drive away.  The officer's initial contact with the 
appellant was not unreasonable.

 

[¶77]   As the officer talked with the 
appellant, the appellant's appearance and conduct, detailed above, justified the 
further brief detention that resulted from the officer's continued questioning 
about the appellant's health and welfare.  It is telling that, even when informed via 
dispatch that this man was likely not the homicide suspect, the officer 
continued to try to ascertain the appellant's condition and destination.  Only upon discovery 
of what appeared to be blood on the appellant's shirt and discovery of the two 
knives did the encounter shift from a community caretaker function to an 
investigatory stop and then to an arrest.  It was reasonable and appropriate as those 
events occurred for the officer to determine the appellant's true identity.  Viewing the 
totality of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the contact was 
justified at its inception, that articulable facts have been shown to justify 
the intrusive measures taken by the officer during the encounter, and that 
probable cause existed at the time the appellant was arrested.

 

[¶78]   Perhaps a final word or two should be 
said about the officer's use of a certain amount of guile in accomplishing the 
appellant's arrest.  
It is true that, upon encountering the appellant, the officer did not 
immediately ask him whether he was the murderer the Casper police were looking 
for.  Neither 
did the officer, upon determining the appellant's identity, immediately state 
that he was under arrest for that crime.  In a perfect world, we might want our police 
officers to act that way.  But, in a perfect world, there would be no 
murders and we would not need police officers.  Our constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures must be interpreted in light of the real 
world's limitations and dangers.  More often than not, complaints about 
police/citizen encounters describe law enforcement officers who are too quick to 
resort to force.  
In the case now before this Court, a police officer on routine patrol in 
a remote area, alone with a murder suspect, accomplished an arrest with minimal 
intrusion and with no 
use of force.

 

[¶79]   The above conclusions mean that the 
first element of the Strickland test has not been 
met in that trial counsel's performance was not deficient.  While this 
determination makes it unnecessary to address the second elementprejudice to 
the appellantwe will make a few brief comments in that regard.  In his appellate 
brief, the appellant's prejudice argument focuses on two pieces of evidence: the 
identification card found in the appellant's wallet and appellant's statement in 
the patrol car about drinking with friends and having a rough night.   However, even 
had this evidence been illegally obtained, no substantial prejudice to the 
appellant resulted from its introduction.  It is true that the New Mexico identification 
found in the appellant's wallet was used when the appellant purchased the rifle 
which allegedly was used in shooting Penn and Hanson, and that this became 
direct evidence that the appellant owned the rifle.  It is also true 
that when officers searched the area of the Star Apartments after the murder, 
they found the rifle hidden in high weeds together with a suitcase containing 
the appellant's identification.  Further, the crime occurred in the 
appellant's apartment and the appellant was seen just outside the apartment 
holding the rifle.  
In short, there was considerable evidence besides the New Mexico 
identification card connecting the appellant to the rifle.  Absence of the New 
Mexico identification would not have changed the outcome of the trial.

 

[¶80]   The same can be said of receipt into 
evidence of the appellant's statement in the patrol car.  The statementthat 
he had been drinking with friends and had had a rough nightwas not needed to 
identify the appellant as the person who had been involved in the incident.  There was 
overwhelming evidence of that fact.  Beyond that, the statement is not really even 
inculpatory; drinking and having a rough night is as consistent with the 
appellant's version of the incident as it is with Hanson's version.  If any prejudice to 
the appellant resulted from admission of his statement, such prejudice was 
neither unfair nor undue.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶81]   The trial court committed error in 
admitting into evidence a videotaped re-enactment of the appellant's attack upon 
Penn and Hanson, but such error was harmless.  There is no reasonable possibility that the 
verdict would have been more favorable to the appellant absent introduction of 
the videotape.  
The videotape was merely cumulative of the voluminous admissible evidence 
pointing to the appellant's guilt.

 

[¶82]   Under the circumstances of this case, 
the prosecutor's questions to a police officer about the appellant having 
"ignored" the officer and having "not responded" to the officer were not 
improper comments upon the appellant's exercise of his right to silence and were 
not, therefore, prosecutorial misconduct.  Rather, the officer's testimony merely 
described his contact with the appellant and the appellant's conduct and 
demeanor during that contact.

 

[¶83]   The prosecutor questioned Hanson and 
his doctor about the long-term effects of scarring from Hanson's wounds, and he 
also asked Hanson about the emotional effects of the attack.  The extent of the 
scarring is related to the extent of the wounds and is, therefore, relevant to 
the issue of an attempt to kill.  Testimony about the emotional impact on 
Hanson was not relevant.  Introduction of this evidence was not 
prosecutorial misconduct, however, because there is no reasonable possibility 
that the verdict would have been different absent the evidence.

 

[¶84]   The prosecutor asked Hanson two rather 
innocuous questions as to whether Hanson believed the appellant's "stories" 
about being in the armed forces and making one of the knives he was showing 
Hanson and Penn.  
It was improper for the prosecutor to ask these questions, because the 
information was irrelevant and because the questions tended to seek an opinion 
as to the appellant's veracity.  Nevertheless, the error was harmless, given 
that there is no reasonable possibility that these two brief answers resulted in 
a verdict that would have otherwise been more favorable to the appellant.

 

[¶85]   Trial counsel's failure or decision not 
to move to suppress the evidence obtained after the appellant was placed in the 
patrol car cannot be categorized as ineffective assistance of counsel.  Under the totality 
of the circumstances, the officer's conduct was reasonable throughout his 
encounter with the appellant, and such a motion would not have been granted.

 

[¶86]   Affirmed.

  

LEHMAN, Chief Justice, dissenting. 

[¶87]   I respectfully dissent.  I agree with the 
majority that the introduction of the Hanson videotape into evidence was 
error.  I do 
not agree, however, that a "massive amount of evidence" exists to support the 
majority's conclusion that the error was harmless.

 

[¶88]   The facts set forth in the majority 
opinion discuss the contrasting stories of the appellant and the only witness, 
Hanson.  The 
"massive amount of evidence" referred to by the majority is simply the physical 
evidence at the scene of the crime.  No one other than Hanson and the appellant 
testified as having actually observed the events that transpired on the evening 
in question.  
Therefore, it was the videotape, which the judge instructed the jury was 
for the "limited purposes of evaluating the credibility of the declarant, Mr. 
Hanson," that provided the jury a court-approved vehicle to examine for a second 
time Hanson's versions of the events.  This bolstering of Hanson's credibility 
certainly cannot be dismissed as harmless error in a trial that amounted to a 
"swearing match" between Hanson and the appellant.

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1Penn's blood-alcohol content was later determined to 
be .48 percent.

  2A .22 
caliber Marlin or Glenfield, model 60.

  3Counsel 
sometimes refer to the videotape as a re-enactment, sometimes as a statement, 
and sometimes as an interview.  A viewing of the videotape reveals that it is 
a combination of all three.

  4W.R.E. 
801(c) contains the definition of hearsay:  "Hearsay' is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  It is actually 
W.R.E. 802 that prohibits the introduction of hearsay:  "Hearsay is not 
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute."

  5In the 
instant case, the State limited its offer of the videotape for the purposes of 
rehabilitation as a prior consistent statement, and the appellant's requested 
limiting instruction was given.  We will not, therefore, venture to address 
the question of whether a prior consistent statement may under certain 
circumstances be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.  See Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 (Wyo. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1078 (2000); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 71 (Wyo. 1989); 
4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 406 at 194 (2d ed. 1994); and Debra T. Landis, 
Annotation, Admissibility of Impeached Witness' Prior 
Consistent StatementModern State Criminal Cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1014, 1029-35 (1987).

  6See also Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358, 362-63 (Wyo. 
1996) for a similar holding in the context of a statement against interest under 
W.R.E. 804(b)(3).

  7Not all 
jurisdictions follow Wyoming's approach to this issue.  Some courts contend 
that admitting prior consistent statements whenever a witness is subject to 
general impeachment has the effect of negating the requirement for an allegation 
of recent fabrication or improper motive.  See Keller v. State, 586 So. 2d 1258, 1259-60 (Fla.App. 
1991); State 
v. Mensing, 297 Mont. 172, 991 P.2d 950, 953 
(1999); and 
Annotation, supra, 58 A.L.R.4th 1014 at 
1029-35.  Absent an 
allegation of recent fabrication or improper motive, admitting prior consistent 
statements merely bolsters the witness's in-court testimony.  Fields v. Com., 12 S.W.3d 275, 280 (Ky. 
2000).  Such statements are 
self-serving and cumulative.  Harris v. State, 
339 Ark. 35, 2 S.W.3d 768, 770 (1999).  Trial by re-enactment could result.  Pickren v. State, 269 Ga. 453, 500 S.E.2d 566, 570 
(1998).

  8The 
State argues that no objection was made at trial based on an unfair prejudice 
concept under  
W.R.E. 403 and that, therefore, plain error analysis is required.  See Delacruz v. State, 10 P.3d 1131, 1132 n.1 (Wyo. 
2000).  Trial counsel's interrelated arguments that 
the "total" videotape went beyond a consistent statement, and that the videotape 
contained inadmissible testimony and character evidence can be seen as the 
equivalent of that argument, even though counsel did not specifically cite 
W.R.E. 403, and we choose to accept it as such.  Trial counsel also argued that the appellant 
was prejudiced by his inability to cross-examine the videotape.

  9Interestingly enough, while the prosecutor assured the 
trial court that the videotape was introduced solely for rehabilitation, the 
State in its appellate brief opined as how the videotape "was relevant to 
explain to the jury exactly how the attack occurred . . .."

  10Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 11: "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in 
any criminal case . . .."

  11The 
officer's direct examination description of his initial contacts with the 
appellant, from the time he first saw the appellant until the appellant agreed 
to sit in the police car, takes up twelve pages of the trial transcript.

  12The 
discussion herein is not relevant to the admissibility at sentencing of victim 
impact statements pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-21-101 through 7-21-103 (LexisNexis 2001).

  13For 
instance, in a civil action where detrimental reliance is an element of a cause 
of action, the fact of belief may be directly at issue.

  14Counsel 
did object to the admission of statements made by the appellant, but on 
discovery grounds rather than those raised here.  A hearing on that objection occurred outside 
the presence of the jury.  Thus, the trial court was able to rely upon, 
and the record contains, the arresting officer's testimony from this hearing and 
his in-court testimony.

  15The 
appellant has made no effort to pursue a separate state constitutional analysis 
of this issue, so we will follow his lead.  See Vasquez v. State, 
990 P.2d 476, 482-89 (Wyo. 1999); Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo. 
1996); and Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 
1994).

  16Earlier, the appellant had told the officer that his name 
was "Norman."

17Arrestees are generally handcuffed with their hands behind 
their back, an uncomfortable position.  The officer handcuffed the appellant's hands 
in front of him.