Title: State v. Soldahl

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  December 21, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
		Petitioner on Review,
	v.
GERALD NORMAN SOLDAHL,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 96-1257; CA A96217; SC S46243)

	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 7, 2000.
	Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on
the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Robin A. Jones, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief was David
E. Groom, Public Defender.
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Richard L. Unis, Senior Judge. 157 Or App 578, 972 P2d 898 (1998).
		LEESON, J.
		In this criminal proceeding, the issue is whether the
trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress
evidence obtained after a police officer stopped defendant's car. 
The trial court held that, because the officer who stopped
defendant lacked probable cause to believe that defendant was
committing a traffic infraction, the evidence must be suppressed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  State v. Soldahl, 157 Or App 578,
972 P2d 898 (1998).  We allowed the state's petition for review. 
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals, reverse the order of the trial court, and remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
		The material facts are not in dispute.  On February 22,
1996, Clackamas County Deputy Sheriff Millette was on duty
wearing plain clothes while he conducted surveillance of the
apartment where defendant and his girlfriend lived.  Millette was
watching defendant's apartment, because he believed that Harland
and Kashuba, who were wanted on felony arrest warrants, were in
the apartment hiding from police.  Eventually, Millette observed
two people drive away from the apartment in a car that was
registered to defendant's girlfriend.  Millette did not see the
two people well enough to identify them when they entered the
car, but he believed that they might be Harland and Kashuba.  He
followed the car in an unmarked police car.
		In an attempt to verify whether Harland and Kashuba
were in the car, Millette pulled even with the driver-side
window.  The tint on the window was so dark that Millette could
not see who was inside.  Millette knew that the tinted driver-side window furnished probable cause to stop the car for a
traffic infraction.  ORS 815.220; (1) ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1995). (2)
		Because Millette was concerned that he might compromise
his surveillance if he stopped the car himself, he called the
police dispatcher to request that some other officer make the
stop.  An unidentified state trooper heard Millette's request 
and volunteered to stop the car, because he was closer to it than
any other Clackamas County police officer.  Millette did not tell
the trooper that the tinted window provided the basis for the
stop.  Rather, he stated that there were "possible wanted people
in the car."  
		After the trooper stopped defendant's car, Millette
stopped his car behind the trooper's car.  At that point,
Millette realized that the driver was defendant, not Harland. 
Millette engaged defendant in conversation and persuaded
defendant to assist him in coaxing Harland and Kashuba out of
defendant's apartment so that Millette could arrest them.  During
a subsequent conversation with defendant as defendant was
returning to his apartment, defendant told Millette that his
driver license had been revoked.  Thereafter, defendant was
indicted for felony driving while revoked.  ORS 811.182 (1995).  
		Before trial, defendant moved to suppress
	"all statements made by defendant and all evidence
gathered as a result of [the traffic] stop on the
grounds * * * that the stop was [made] without
reasonable suspicion to believe a crime had been
committed and without probable cause to believe an
infraction had occurred[.]"
Defendant relied on ORS 131.615 (1995) for his argument that the
trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime
had been committed, and Article I, sections 9 and 12, of the
Oregon Constitution, for his argument that the trooper lacked
probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had
occurred. (3)  The state opposed defendant's motion.  It argued that
Millette had probable cause to stop the car because he had
observed the unlawful tint in the window of defendant's car. 
Accordingly, it contended, under the "collective knowledge"
doctrine, Millette could ask the trooper to stop the car.  Under
that doctrine, the state argued, so long as any officer involved
in requesting or making a stop for a traffic infraction has
probable cause, the stop is valid.  Defendant responded that the
collective knowledge doctrine required Millette to communicate to
the trooper the basis for the stop so that the trooper himself
could form subjective probable cause.  Because Millette did not
tell the trooper that the tinted window provided the basis for
the stop, defendant concluded, the trooper did not have probable
cause to stop defendant's car.
		In colloquy with counsel on defendant's motion to
suppress, the trial court explained that, in its view, Millette
did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Harland and
Kashuba were in the car. (4)  The trial court then identified ORS
810.410(3)(b) and this court's decision in State v. Matthews, 320
Or 398, 884 P2d 1224 (1994), as providing the proper framework
for analyzing whether the trooper had probable cause to stop the
car.  According to the trial court, this court's holding in
Matthews -- that a stop for a traffic infraction under ORS
810.410(3)(b) requires probable cause -- means that the officer
who makes the stop must have subjective probable cause to believe
that an infraction has occurred.  The trial court reasoned that
the trooper who made the stop did not have probable cause to
believe that a traffic infraction had occurred, because Millette
had not told the trooper about the traffic infraction.  The trial
court therefore granted defendant's motion to suppress.  
		The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Soldahl, 157 Or App at
584.  That court reasoned that an essential element of the
collective knowledge doctrine is that an officer who makes a stop
for a traffic infraction must himself or herself "'subjectively
believe' that the requesting officer had sufficient grounds for
the arrest or stop."  Id. (citing State v. Koester, 117 Or App
139, 144, 843 P2d 968 (1992)) (emphasis in original).  The Court
of Appeals faulted the state for not offering evidence of the
trooper's subjective belief at the hearing on defendant's motion
to suppress, and Millette for not telling the trooper that the
tinted window provided the basis for the stop.  The Court of
Appeals held that, because there was no evidence that the trooper
subjectively believed that he had probable cause to stop
defendant's car for the traffic infraction, the stop was invalid. 
Id.  We allowed the state's petition for review to determine
whether, under the collective knowledge doctrine, the trooper had
authority to stop defendant's car.  
		ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1995) provides that a police officer
may stop and detain a person for a traffic infraction.  As noted,
this court has held that, under Article I, section 9, an officer
must have probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction has
occurred.  Matthews, 320 Or at 402-03.  In State v. Owens, 302 Or
196, 204, 729 P2d 524 (1986), this court held that probable cause
has both a subjective and an objective component:
		"An officer must subjectively believe that a crime
has been committed and thus that a person or thing is
subject to seizure, and this belief must be objectively
reasonable in the circumstances."
Whether an officer had subjective probable cause may be inferred
from the officer's conduct if no evidence provides a contrary
explanation for that conduct.  State v. Belt, 325 Or 6, 11-12,
932 P2d 1177 (1997).
		In this case, defendant concedes that Millette had both
subjective and objective probable cause to stop defendant's car
for the traffic infraction of driving with tinted windows.  The
issue is whether Millette had to communicate his knowledge to the
trooper so that the trooper also could form a subjective belief
that there was probable cause to stop defendant's car for the
traffic infraction.  As noted, the Court of Appeals held that the
collective knowledge doctrine required Millette to do so. 
Soldahl, 157 Or App at 584.  In our view, the Court of Appeals
misunderstood the collective knowledge doctrine, which also is
known as the fellow-officer rule.  We turn to an explanation of
that doctrine, which was discussed most recently in State v.
Pratt, 309 Or 205, 785 P2d 350 (1990).
		In Pratt, the defendant operated a long-haul trucking
company, North Star Trucking.  One of North Star's employees was
murdered, triggering a police investigation.  While the officers
were at North Star's office, the defendant called.  The officers
told the defendant about the murder, and the defendant told them
that he was on his way to Phoenix and would be returning in a few
days.  The defendant also described his truck.  Subsequently,
Oregon officers sent a request by teletype to Arizona police
officers asking them to arrest the defendant and to seize his
truck.  An Arizona officer did so.  Id. at 215.  
		The defendant moved to suppress all evidence, arguing
that "'[t]here was simply inadequate evidence that [the arresting
officer in Arizona] had a reasonable belief [that] the Oregon
officers had information sufficient to establish probable
cause.'"  Id. at 216.  This court affirmed the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion.  Id. at 217.  It explained that the
Arizona officers reasonably had relied on the teletype message:
		"A peace officer who does not himself have
probable cause to arrest a felony suspect nonetheless
may arrest the suspect if he reasonably believes that
the officer or officers who have requested the arrest
do have probable cause to make that arrest and if
probable cause to arrest does, in fact, exist."
Id. at 216 (emphasis in original omitted; emphasis added).  The
court held that police officers reasonably may rely on messages
from fellow officers.  Id. at 217.
		The collective knowledge doctrine focuses on the shared
knowledge of the police as a unit rather than merely on the
knowledge of the officer who acts.  The doctrine therefore
permits a police officer to act if the officer reasonably relies
on instructions from an officer who has probable cause.   As this
court explained in State v. Groda, 285 Or 321, 324, 591 P2d 1354
(1979):
	"[T]he searching officer personally must have
information which constitutes probable cause, or the
searching officer must be directed to make the search
by an officer who personally has that knowledge."
(Emphasis added.)  Pratt did not modify the collective knowledge
doctrine, as explained in Groda, to require officers who act at
the direction of fellow officers to form independent subjective
probable cause.  However, Pratt did identify the rationale for
the collective knowledge doctrine:
	"Officers must be able to rely on such messages from
fellow officers elsewhere in order to counteract the
high degree of mobility criminals enjoy in this
society.  To hold otherwise would either prevent
emergency requests for assistance, or would require
that such requests contain long evidentiary summaries
which each individual officer then would have to
evaluate for probable cause, perhaps while driving down
a highway following a suspect."
309 Or at 217 (footnote omitted).
	Pratt involved application of the collective knowledge
doctrine to an arrest.  Groda applied the doctrine to a search. 
If an officer reasonably may rely on a fellow officer's direction
to arrest or to search, then it follows that an officer
reasonably may rely on a fellow officer's direction to stop a
vehicle for a traffic infraction.
	The collective knowledge doctrine in no way undermines
the probable cause requirement.  The doctrine merely views law
enforcement agencies as a unit.  As a unit, officers may direct
one another to carry out lawful police activities.  However, the
state retains the obligation at trial to establish that police
action was initiated by an officer who had both objective and
subjective probable cause.
	We turn to the facts in this case.  Millette testified
that he subjectively believed that he had probable cause to stop
defendant's car.  His objective basis for that belief was his
observation of the tinted window in defendant's car.  As noted,
defendant concedes that Millette had probable cause to stop his
car. (5)  Rather than making the stop himself, however, Millette
requested that another officer make it for him.  Consistent with
this court's holdings in Pratt and Groda, we hold that, under the
collective knowledge doctrine, the trooper who responded to
Millette's request lawfully stopped defendant's car, because he
reasonably acted at the request of an officer who had probable
cause to believe that a traffic infraction had occurred.  The
trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. 	ORS 815.220 provides, in part:
		"(1) A person commits the offense of obstruction
of vehicle windows if the person drives or moves on any
highway or owns and causes or knowingly permits to be
driven or moved on any highway any vehicle with windows
obstructed in a manner prohibited under this section.
		"(2) The windows of a vehicle are obstructed in a
manner prohibited by this section if any material that
prohibits or impairs the ability to see into or out of
the vehicle is upon any vehicle window described in
this subsection. * * * This subsection only applies to
the following windows of the vehicle:
		"* * * * *
		"(c) The side windows on either side forward of or
adjacent to the operator's seat."

2. 	ORS 810.410 (1995) provides, in part:
		"(3) A police officer:
		"* * * * *
		"(b) May stop and detain a person for a traffic
infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably
related to the traffic infraction, identification and
issuance of citation."
		In State v. Matthews, 320 Or 398, 401, 884 P2d 1224
(1994), this court explained that ORS 810.410(3)(b)
	"states the purpose for which an officer may detain a
person, i.e., for investigation, identification, and
citation concerning a traffic infraction.  However, the
statute is silent on the question of the level of
information about the traffic infraction that the officer
must possess in order to effect a lawful stop."
(Emphasis in original.)  The court held that an officer must have
probable cause under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution, to believe that a traffic infraction has occurred
before executing a traffic stop under ORS 810.410(3)(b).  Id. at
402-03.  Thus, although ORS 810.410(3)(b) does not contain a
probable cause requirement, this court has held that the Oregon
Constitution requires an officer to have probable cause before
making a stop for a traffic infraction.  

3. 	ORS 131.615 (1995) provides, in part:
		"(1) A peace officer who reasonably suspects that
a person has committed a crime may stop the person and,
after informing the person that the peace officer is a
peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry."
		Article I, section 9, provides:
		"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."
		Article I, section 12, provides:
		"No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the
same offence (sic), nor be compelled in any criminal
prosecution to testify against himself."

4. 	The Court of Appeals agreed, Soldahl, 157 Or App at
583, and that issue is not before this court. 

5. 	Defendant asserts that Millette nonetheless might have
lacked authority to stop defendant's car because he was not in
uniform.  ORS 810.400 provides that any police officer attempting
to enforce Oregon's traffic laws "shall be in uniform or shall
conspicuously display an official identification card showing the
officer's lawful authority."  However, as the trial court noted,
the relevant inquiry is whether the trooper lawfully could stop
the car, not whether ORS 810.400 prevented Millette from making
the stop.