Title: Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13219 
 
JOHN DOE  vs.  ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SPRINGFIELD & others.1 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 4, 2022. - July 28, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Charity.  Corporation, Charitable corporation, Religious.  
Immunity from Suit.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, 
Interlocutory appeal.  Constitutional Law, Freedom of 
religion. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 28, 2021. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Karen L. Goodwin, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Michael G. McDonough (Kevin D. Withers & John G. Bagley 
also present) for the defendants. 
Nancy Frankel Pelletier for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
1 Mitchell T. Rozanski; Patricia McManamy; Christopher 
Connelly; Jeffrey Trant; Kevin Murphy; Mark Dupont; John J. 
Egan; and John Hale. 
2 
 
LOWY, J.  The plaintiff brought suit against the Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Springfield, a corporation sole (Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Springfield), and church officials for the 
sexual abuse by church leadership that he allegedly endured as a 
child in the 1960s and for the church's handling of his 
complaint beginning in 2014.2  The defendants moved to dismiss 
the complaint on the grounds of common-law charitable immunity 
and the doctrine of church autonomy, the latter of which is 
derived largely from the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution; a Superior Court judge denied 
the motion. 
The primary issue presented is whether the defendants may 
use the doctrine of present execution to appeal immediately from 
the denial of their motion to dismiss even though final judgment 
has not yet issued.3  The doctrine of present execution permits 
an appeal before final judgment when the appellate issue 
concerns a matter that is collateral to the underlying 
 
2 A "corporation sole" is "[a] series of successive persons 
holding an office; a continuous legal personality that is 
attributed to successive holders of certain monarchical or 
ecclesiastical positions, such as kings, bishops, rectors, 
vicars, and the like.  This continuous personality is viewed, by 
legal fiction, as having the qualities of a corporation."  
Black's Law Dictionary 430 (11th ed. 2019). 
 
3 The parties have not pointed us to, and we have not found, 
any cases addressing whether the doctrine of present execution 
applies to issues involving common-law charitable immunity or 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
3 
 
litigation and that cannot be addressed fully after final 
judgment.  See CP 200 State, LLC v. CIEE, Inc., 488 Mass. 847, 
849 (2022). 
We conclude that the doctrine of present execution does not 
apply to the defendants' church autonomy arguments, because they 
can be addressed adequately on appeal should the plaintiff 
prevail.  Accordingly, we do not address these arguments' 
merits.  In contrast, we conclude that common-law charitable 
immunity, as it existed before the Legislature abolished it in 
1971, would be lost if a charity protected by the immunity 
nevertheless had to litigate.  The arguments pertaining to 
common-law charitable immunity, therefore, fall within the 
doctrine of present execution and properly are before us.  
Reaching the merits, we determine that common-law charitable 
immunity insulates the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield only 
from the count alleging negligent hiring and supervision.  It 
does not protect the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield from 
the counts alleging sexual assault against the plaintiff, as 
these allegations do not involve conduct related to a charitable 
mission. 
 
Background.  We take the following facts from the complaint 
and documents attached to it.  See Sacks v. Dissinger, 488 Mass. 
780, 781 (2021); Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 
(2000). 
4 
 
 
In the 1960s, when the plaintiff was approximately from 
nine to eleven years old, he served as an altar boy at a parish 
in Massachusetts.  He was abused sexually by multiple church 
officials, including a priest at the parish, the pastor of the 
parish, and then Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield 
Christopher J. Weldon.  The abuse included "severe anal 
penetration" and occurred in a rectory bedroom at the parish, a 
camp in a different town, and a building adjacent to the parish.  
On one occasion, the plaintiff grabbed onto door frames to 
prevent Weldon from taking him into a room.  Weldon nevertheless 
dragged the plaintiff into the room, where at least one other 
altar boy and two priests were present, and commanded one of the 
altar boys or priests to get the plaintiff onto the bed.  The 
altar boys and priests grabbed the plaintiff, flipped him onto 
his stomach, and pinned him to the bed while Weldon and others 
"brutally raped" him. 
 
The plaintiff did not remember these events as an adult 
until March 2013, when a television program about the Vatican 
triggered memories of the abuse.  In November 2014, he recounted 
his abuse to defendant Reverend Monsignor Christopher Connelly, 
an employee of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, and 
defendant Patricia Finn McManamy, the Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Springfield's director of counseling, prevention, and victim 
services.  Neither Connelly nor McManamy reported the 
5 
 
allegations to the district attorney's office at that time.  Nor 
did McManamy report the alleged abuse after meeting with the 
plaintiff again in 2016.  She ultimately reported the 
allegations to the district attorney's office in August 2018. 
 
In April 2018, McManamy referred the matter to an 
investigator for the church, defendant Kevin Murphy.  Murphy 
interviewed the plaintiff one time, and then presented a report 
to the diocesan review board.4  There were four drafts of this 
report.  Two of the drafts indicated, without explanation, that 
the plaintiff had stated both that he had been molested by 
Weldon and that he had not been molested by Weldon.  Two other 
drafts did not include the plaintiff's assertion that Weldon had 
molested him.  Murphy gave the board one of the latter drafts.  
During a June 2018 meeting of the review board, the plaintiff 
 
4 The role of the diocesan review board is explained in the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops's Charter for the 
Protection of Children and Young People (rev. June 2018), which 
was attached to the complaint: 
 
"Dioceses/eparchies are . . . to have a review board that 
functions as a confidential consultative body to the 
bishop/eparch.  The majority of its members are to be lay 
persons not in the employ of the diocese/eparchy . . . .  
This board is to advise the diocesan/eparchial bishop in 
his assessment of allegations of sexual abuse of minors and 
in his determination of a cleric's suitability for 
ministry.  It is regularly to review diocesan/eparchial 
policies and procedures for dealing with sexual abuse of 
minors.  Also, the board can review these matters both 
retrospectively and prospectively and give advice on all 
aspects of responses in connection with these cases." 
6 
 
described being abused by Weldon.  After an additional meeting 
in September 2018, the review board found that the plaintiff's 
allegations relating to various officials, including Weldon, 
were "compelling and credible." 
 
In May 2019, a reporter for the Berkshire Eagle newspaper 
sent an e-mail message to the Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Springfield's communications director, defendant Mark Dupont, 
asking why Weldon was not on a list of priests credibly accused 
of sexual abuse even though the review board had found the 
plaintiff's allegations to be "compelling and credible."  Dupont 
replied, "You should know that there is NO finding of sexual 
abuse of any person involving . . . Weldon -- NONE. . . .  In 
fact even the unnamed victim acknowledged that Weldon did not 
abuse him in statements made to our investigator."  He repeated 
this position in another statement to the reporter in June 2019.  
He also told the reporter that the notes of the review board 
meetings "don't indicate the victim contradicting his previous 
statement to our investigator that they had not been molested by 
the former bishop," even though Dupont had received an e-mail 
message stating that, according to the minutes of the June 2018 
review board meeting, the plaintiff had described "abuse by 
. . . Weldon" at that meeting.  The Berkshire Eagle then 
published an article with a statement from the chair of the 
review board, defendant John Hale, asserting that the review 
7 
 
board had never found that Weldon "engaged in improper contact 
with anyone." 
 
After the Berkshire Eagle article was published, a former 
judge conducted an investigation at the request of the Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Springfield.  The former judge concluded that 
the plaintiff's allegations against Weldon were "unequivocally 
credible" and that the church's response to the allegations had 
been "greatly flawed."  The Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield 
at the time, defendant Mitchell T. Rozanski, wrote to the 
plaintiff in June 2020 stating that he accepted the former 
judge's conclusion and asking the plaintiff to "accept [his] 
apology for the terrible abuse [the plaintiff] had to endure as 
a young child . . . [and] the chronic mishandling of [the 
plaintiff's] report by the diocese time and time again since 
2014." 
 
The plaintiff commenced an action in the Superior Court in 
January 2021 against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield 
and several church officials who had helped investigate the 
plaintiff's allegations.  Counts one through seven arose out of 
the alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff in the 1960s.5  Counts 
 
5 The complaint alleged assault, battery, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, conspiracy, negligent supervision, and 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
8 
 
eight through fourteen arose out of how the church handled the 
plaintiff's accusations starting in 2014.6 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss counts one through seven 
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, on 
the ground of common-law charitable immunity.  See Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  They moved to dismiss 
counts eight through fourteen on the ground that resolving them 
would require the court to become entangled in a religious 
organization's review process (namely, that of the diocesan 
review board) in violation of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment.  A Superior Court judge denied the motion to dismiss, 
reasoning that further factual development was needed to decide 
the common-law charitable immunity issue and that the 
complaint's allegations did not implicate the religion clauses 
of the First Amendment.  The defendants appealed, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion.7 
 
6 The complaint alleged negligence; negligent supervision; 
negligent infliction of emotional distress; intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; civil conspiracy; violation of 
G. L. c. 12, § 11I (addressing violations of constitutional 
rights); and defamation. 
 
7 There has been parallel litigation involving a motion to 
stay pending appeal.  The defendants moved in the Superior Court 
for a stay, and the motion was denied.  The defendants then 
filed in the Appeals Court a motion to stay the trial court 
proceedings pending appeal.  A single justice of the Appeals 
Court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed from that 
ruling to a panel.  That appeal was consolidated in the Appeals 
 
9 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Doctrine of present execution.  We first 
address whether the defendants' arguments properly are before 
us.  We conclude that the charitable immunity arguments, 
relating to counts one through seven, are, and that the church 
autonomy arguments, relating to counts eight through fourteen, 
are not.  See Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 264-265 
(2013) (applying doctrine of present execution to some, but not 
all, claims raised on appeal).8 
 
"As a general rule, there is no right to appeal from an 
interlocutory order unless a statute or rule authorizes it."  CP 
200 State, LLC, 488 Mass. at 848, quoting Maddocks v. Ricker, 
403 Mass. 592, 597 (1988).  Accordingly, "the denial of a motion 
to dismiss is ordinarily not an appealable order."  Fabre v. 
 
Court with the appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss, 
and we transferred the consolidated appeal to our own docket sua 
sponte.  The defendants then filed, in the full court, a new 
motion for a stay of the Superior Court proceedings pending 
appeal.  The full court referred that motion to a single justice 
of this court, who denied the motion.  The defendants have not 
appealed from that denial.  Although the defendants' appeal from 
the ruling of the single justice of the Appeals Court is before 
us, the defendants do not address that ruling in their briefs.  
Accordingly, the issue is waived.  See Mass. R. A. P. 
16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) ("The 
appellate court need not pass upon questions or issues not 
argued in the brief"). 
 
8 The defendants also raise arguments on appeal about the 
extent to which the conduct of Weldon and others may be 
attributed to the corporation sole.  Because these arguments 
clearly do not fall within the doctrine of present execution, we 
do not consider them. 
10 
 
Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004).  
"The doctrine of present execution is a long-standing exception 
to this principle, applicable in limited circumstances."  CP 200 
State, LLC, supra at 849.  The doctrine allows an appeal from 
otherwise nonfinal orders that (1) are "collateral to the rest 
of the controversy" and (2) "interfere[] with rights in a way 
that cannot be remedied on appeal from a final judgment," 
because, for example, "protection from the burden of litigation 
and trial is precisely the right to which [a party] asserts an 
entitlement."  Id., quoting Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 
Mass. 478, 485 (2014), and Patel v. Martin, 481 Mass. 29, 33 
(2018).9 
Whether an appeal falls within the doctrine of present 
execution is a threshold issue that an appellate court must 
resolve before reaching an appeal's merits.  Estate of Moulton, 
467 Mass. at 485 ("Before considering the merits of the director 
defendants' claims . . . , we consider first whether the 
defendants are entitled, by virtue of the doctrine of present 
 
9 There are other avenues to obtaining interlocutory relief, 
none of which is implicated here.  See G. L. c. 231, § 118, 
first par. (single justice of Appeals Court may grant certain 
relief regarding interlocutory order); Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), 
as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996) (judge may report 
interlocutory finding or order to Appeals Court).  See also CP 
200 State, LLC, 488 Mass. at 848 n.2, citing Patel, 481 Mass. at 
31-32 (discussing how to seek relief from interlocutory orders). 
11 
 
execution, to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of 
their motion to dismiss"). 
Moreover, the present execution analysis does not consider 
whether the appellant ultimately will prevail on the merits.  
Id. at 485-486 ("regardless of whether the director defendants 
are correct in their assertion that they are employers immune 
from liability under the exclusive remedy provision, 
interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present execution is 
permissible to challenge the denial of that contention").  See 
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 
(1994) (regarding Federal collateral order doctrine, which 
addresses appeals before final judgment, "the issue of 
appealability . . . is to be determined for the entire category 
to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the 
litigation at hand might be speeded, or a 'particular injustice' 
averted, . . . by a prompt appellate court decision" [citation 
and alteration omitted]). 
 
"Where absolute or qualified immunity is provided by 
statute or common law, we discern whether the right to immunity 
is from suit or from liability, because only immunity from suit 
entitles a party to an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine 
of present execution."  Lynch v. Crawford, 483 Mass. 631, 634-
635 (2019).  See id. at 635 ("In considering claims of absolute 
or qualified immunity by governmental entities or employees, we 
12 
 
have interpreted the immunity to provide protection from suit, 
not merely from liability; therefore, we have applied the 
doctrine of present execution to allow an interlocutory appeal 
from an order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment brought by someone asserting such immunity"). 
An erroneous denial of immunity from suit cannot, by 
definition, be remedied after the party asserting the immunity 
already has litigated the matter to final judgment.  And 
immunity from suit always is considered collateral to the 
underlying litigation.  See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 
317 (2002), quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-529 
(1985) ("the denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds 
is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying 
action because it 'is conceptually distinct from the merits of 
the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated . . . 
even though a reviewing court must consider the plaintiff's 
factual allegations in resolving the immunity issue'"). 
In distinguishing between immunity from liability and 
immunity from suit, we look to the purpose behind the immunity 
rather than the words used to describe it.  See Lynch, 483 Mass. 
at 633 ("That the statute speaks only of liability and does not 
specifically spell out immunity from suit is not dispositive"). 
If the purpose of the immunity is to protect a party "from 
the burden of litigation and trial," id. at 634, then the 
13 
 
immunity provides immunity from suit, see, e.g., id. at 640 ("if 
volunteer organizations are to avoid the need to incur 
'unwarranted litigation costs' and, by doing so, avoid 'higher 
costs in purchasing insurance,' Congress must have intended the 
[Federal statute providing qualified immunity to certain 
volunteers] to provide qualified immunity from suit, not merely 
immunity from liability"); Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 
460 Mass. 91, 98 (2011) ("St. 1996, c. 427, § 13, is designed to 
ensure that insurers err on the side of overreporting 
potentially fraudulent conduct. . . .  Reporting to the 
[insurance fraud bureau] might be chilled if protection could be 
secured only after litigating a claim through to conclusion, so 
we conclude that St. 1996, c. 427, § 13 [i], should be 
interpreted as providing immunity from suit rather than mere 
immunity from liability"); Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 688 
(1999) ("This court has noted the importance of 'determining 
[governmental] immunity issues early if immunity is to serve one 
of its primary purposes:  to protect public officials from 
harassing litigation'").10 
 
10 The plaintiff argues that common-law charitable immunity 
and the First Amendment prohibition against entanglement in 
religious matters provide immunity only from liability because 
they are affirmative defenses and, therefore, must be raised 
through litigation.  This reasoning is unpersuasive because, 
logically, a defendant must make at least some showing on all 
immunities, even those that we have considered to be immunities 
 
14 
 
 
We turn now to the two immunities at issue here. 
 
a.  Church autonomy.  "The First Amendment prohibits civil 
courts from intervening in disputes concerning religious 
doctrine, discipline, faith, or internal organization" 
(alteration omitted).  Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 
Mass. 505, 510 (2002), quoting Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 
72, cert. denied sub nom. Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 
(1985).  "It 'permits hierarchical religious organizations to 
establish their own rules and regulations for internal 
discipline and government, and to create tribunals for 
adjudicating disputes over these matters.'"  Hiles, supra, 
quoting Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 
Mass. 58, 61, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).  This rule has 
been called the "church autonomy doctrine" and "ecclesiastical 
abstention."  Hyung Jin Moon v. Hak Ja Han Moon, 431 F. Supp. 3d 
394, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), modified on another ground by 833 Fed. 
Appx. 876 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2757 (2021). 
 
from suit.  Otherwise, the court will not know whether the 
immunity applies.  See, e.g., Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., 
483 Mass. 200, 203 (2019) (describing initial burden of party 
alleging it has been target of strategic lawsuit against public 
participation [SLAPP]); Fabre, 436 Mass. at 521-522 (denial of 
special motion to dismiss pursuant to anti-SLAPP statute subject 
to interlocutory appeal).  The important issue is not whether 
any litigation must occur before the defendant may invoke the 
immunity, but whether the immunity's rationale contemplates 
immunity from suit. 
15 
 
The rule's central purpose is to address the historic, 
philosophical concern with government interference in religious 
affairs by maintaining the constitutional separation between 
religion and government; at least originally, another purpose 
was to prevent civil courts from addressing matters in which 
they lack competence.  See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-729 
(1871) ("In this country the full and free right to entertain 
any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and 
to teach any religious doctrine . . . is conceded to all. . . .  
The right to organize voluntary religious associations . . . is 
unquestioned. . . .  But it would . . . lead to the total 
subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one 
of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have 
them reversed"); id. at 729 ("It is not to be supposed that the 
judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the 
ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as 
the ablest [people] in each are in reference to their own").  
See also Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 115-116 (1952) ("Watson 
v. Jones, although it contains a reference to the relations of 
church and state under our system of laws, was decided without 
depending upon prohibition of state interference with the free 
exercise of religion. . . .  Freedom to select the clergy . . . 
must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a 
16 
 
part of the free exercise of religion against state 
interference" [footnotes omitted]); 31 J.R. Nolan & L.J. 
Sartorio, Equitable Remedies § 13.16 (3d ed. 2007), citing 
Moustakis v. Hellenic Orthodox Soc'y of Salem & Peabody, 261 
Mass. 462, 466 (1928) ("Judicial restraint in the area of 
religious disputes is based on constitutional grounds as well as 
the court's lack of competence in the area").  See generally 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 182-187 (2012) 
(describing history of principle that civil courts may not rule 
on religious body's leadership decisions). 
Both these concerns can be addressed on appeal after final 
judgment if a lower court inadvertently rules on a religious 
issue.  See Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int'l, 36 F.4th 1021, 
1047 (10th Cir. 2022) ("the 'ministerial exception'[, an 
application of ecclesiastical abstention that exempts religious 
institutions from liability for certain employment decisions,] 
is not analogous to qualified immunity and does not immunize 
religious employers from the burdens of litigation itself"); 
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 
1090 (7th Cir. 2014) ("although the statutory and constitutional 
rights asserted in defense of this suit are undoubtedly 
important, the Diocese has not established that . . . the First 
Amendment . . . provides an immunity from trial, as opposed to 
17 
 
an ordinary defense to liability"); McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 
971, 976 (7th Cir. 2013) (allowing interlocutory appeal on First 
Amendment issue, but acknowledging that "the error of the 
secular court . . . in deciding that whether [the defendant] is 
a member of a religious order is a proper question to put to a 
jury, allowing the jury to disregard the ruling by the Holy See, 
can in principle be corrected on appeal from a final judgment"); 
Smith & Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception, 
86 Fordham L. Rev. 1847, 1881 (Mar. 2018) (recommending that 
ecclesiastical abstention issues be resolved on interlocutory 
appeal, but admitting that "the fundamental value of the 
ministerial exception would not be entirely lost by waiting for 
a final judgment before permitting an appeal. . . .  That is, 
the ministerial exception, at bottom, is . . . a defense to 
liability rather than a comprehensive immunity from suit").  Cf. 
Matter of Hamm, 487 Mass. 394, 400 (2021) (ruling on subject 
matter jurisdiction not "necessarily a proper subject for 
interlocutory appeal"). 
Accordingly, there is no need to allow an appeal before 
final judgment of an ecclesiastical abstention issue. 
Other courts have held otherwise.  The Connecticut Supreme 
Court, for instance, has reasoned that the philosophical breach 
of separation between religion and government cannot be remedied 
after a final judgment.  Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 
18 
 
Conn. 759, 770-771 (2011) (ministerial exception provided 
immunity from suit because "the very act of litigating a dispute 
that is subject to the ministerial exception would result in the 
entanglement of the civil justice system with matters of 
religious policy, making the discovery and trial process itself 
a [F]irst [A]mendment violation").  The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has reasoned similarly, and it also has emphasized the 
First Amendment's importance.  Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 
271 (2007) ("defendant's substantial First Amendment rights are 
affected by the trial court's order denying his motion to 
dismiss.  Further, these rights will be impaired or lost and 
defendant will be irreparably injured if the trial court becomes 
entangled in ecclesiastical matters from which it should have 
abstained").  See McCarthy, 714 F.3d at 976 ("The harm of such a 
governmental intrusion into religious affairs would be 
irreparable . . ."). 
However, if we extend the doctrine of present execution to 
all important issues that theoretically cannot be remedied after 
final judgment, then the exception will swallow the rule.  See 
Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 872 ("almost every pretrial or 
trial order might be called 'effectively unreviewable' in the 
sense that relief from error can never extend to rewriting 
history. . . .  But if immediate appellate review were available 
19 
 
every such time, . . . [the] final decision rule would end up a 
pretty puny one"). 
Accordingly, the defendants' church autonomy arguments are 
not before us properly, and we will not address their merits.  
See CP 200 State, LLC, 488 Mass. at 853 ("we decline to exercise 
our discretion to consider the merits," under superintendence 
authority, of issue not within doctrine of present execution).11 
b.  Common-law charitable immunity.  Common-law charitable 
immunity was abolished by the Legislature in 1971.  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 85K, inserted by St. 1971, c. 785, § 1.  Nonetheless, 
common-law charitable immunity applies to counts one through 
seven here because those counts describe conduct that allegedly 
occurred in the 1960s, and the abolishment of charitable 
immunity was prospective.  See Doe No. 4 v. Levine, 77 Mass. 
App. Ct. 117, 119 (2010), citing Ricker v. Northeastern Univ., 
361 Mass. 169, 172 (1972) (describing charitable immunity 
statute's history). 
 
In protecting charities under the common law, Massachusetts 
courts reasoned that funds held in trust for a charitable 
purpose should be used only for that purpose.  See Roosen v. 
Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 69 (1920), citing 
 
11 We do not address whether the doctrine of present 
execution might apply to a situation where a civil court has 
ruled, or is about to rule, on an issue that obviously 
implicates religious doctrine. 
20 
 
McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876) 
(considering other rationales but concluding principal one is 
that "the funds of a public hospital are devoted to a charitable 
trust and . . . to subject them to the payment of a judgment for 
negligence of its servants would be an unlawful diversion of the 
trust").  See also Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 439 
Mass. 223, 238 n.25 (2003) ("Under common law, a nonprofit 
hospital . . . enjoyed charitable immunity from tort liability, 
because funds donated for charitable purposes ought not to be 
diverted from those purposes to pay damages in tort actions"); 
English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 424-425 
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) ("The court reasoned 
[in McDonald, supra,] that the hospital held its funds in trust 
for the benefit of the public, and that it would be an unlawful 
diversion of those funds to apply them to the satisfaction of a 
judgment based on the negligence of hospital agents"); St. Clair 
v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 662, 667 (1988) 
("Massachusetts has . . . rigorously followed the trust fund 
rationale").  Using this reasoning, "Massachusetts . . . applied 
the [common-law charitable immunity] doctrine broadly" and 
rejected "exceptions to the doctrine which were adopted in other 
States."  St. Clair, supra (collecting cases). 
 
That our cases justifying charitable immunity have 
sometimes referred to payment of "damages" to satisfy a 
21 
 
"judgment" at first glance suggests that common-law charitable 
immunity merely was immunity from liability, not suit.  In other 
cases, however, we have referred to charitable immunity as 
"immunity from suit," albeit not in the present execution 
context.  See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 385 
n.18 (2010) (describing "governmental immunity" and common-law 
"charitable immunity" as "immunity from suit"); Payton v. Abbott 
Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 567 (1982) (describing "municipal immunity" 
and common-law "charitable immunity" as having "afforded 
complete immunity from suit"); Ricker, 361 Mass. at 169, 172 
(answering in affirmative reported question whether charity was 
"immune from a suit").  The Lynch case teaches, moreover, that 
we should look beyond the language used to describe an immunity 
and focus instead on whether immunity from suit would best serve 
the immunity's purpose.  Lynch, 483 Mass. at 633 ("That the 
statute speaks only of liability and does not specifically spell 
out immunity from suit is not dispositive"). 
The cases discussed above that address common-law 
charitable immunity's rationale do not discuss the doctrine of 
present execution and, therefore, do not grapple with the 
distinction between immunity from liability and immunity from 
suit.  There is no reason to think, however, that the courts 
addressing charitable immunity before it was abolished would 
have wanted to protect charities from paying judgments but not 
22 
 
from paying attorneys to carry out litigation.  The trust fund 
rationale was premised on charities not spending funds on 
noncharitable purposes, and Massachusetts courts interpreted the 
immunity broadly in favor of charities.  See St. Clair, 25 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 667.  Accordingly, we conclude that common-law 
charitable immunity was meant to protect charities from 
litigation, not merely from liability.  See 15 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Charities § 178 (2020) ("Some courts support the view that a 
privately conducted charitable institution, because of its 
charitable nature, enjoys complete immunity from tort liability.  
Under this view, charitable immunity is immunity from suit, not 
simply immunity from liability.  Decisions sustaining the 
complete immunity view rationalize that the resources of 
charitable institutions are better used to further the 
institution's charitable purposes than to pay tort claims lodged 
by the charity's beneficiaries" [footnotes omitted]). 
 
Unlike ecclesiastical abstention, then, the purpose of 
common-law charitable immunity was to protect certain parties 
"from the burden of litigation and trial."  Lynch, 483 Mass. at 
634.  Therefore, an interlocutory appeal is necessary to protect 
the rights of charities claiming common-law immunity, and the 
doctrine of present execution applies to the charitable immunity 
arguments here. 
23 
 
As the common-law charitable immunity arguments properly 
are before us, we will now consider their merits and determine 
whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield is immune from 
any of the alleged conduct. 
 
2.  Merits of common-law charitable immunity argument.  At 
common law, charitable immunity extended only to wrongdoing 
"committed in the course of activities carried on to accomplish 
charitable activities."  Keene, 439 Mass. at 239-240.  See 
Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300, 301 (1933) ("A 
charitable corporation is not liable for negligence in the 
course of activities within its corporate powers carried on to 
accomplish directly its charitable purposes").  The abuse 
allegedly carried out by Weldon and other church leaders was 
not, and could not be, related in any way to a charitable 
mission.  Cf. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the 
Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953, 960 (5th Cir. 1994) 
("It would be hard to imagine a more difficult argument than 
that [the defendant]'s illicit sexual pursuits were somehow 
related to his duties as a priest or that they in any way 
furthered the interests of [his church]"); Heinrich v. Sweet, 
118 F. Supp. 2d 73, 92 (D. Mass. 2000), vacated on other 
grounds, 308 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 914 
(2003) ("Mass General simply cannot cloak conduct violative of 
medical ethics with charitable immunity").  Accordingly, the 
24 
 
judge properly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of 
charitable immunity for the counts alleging sexual abuse of the 
plaintiff.12 
 
However, one count should have been dismissed under the 
common-law doctrine of charitable immunity.  Count six alleges 
that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield negligently hired 
and supervised the church leaders who allegedly assaulted the 
plaintiff.  A negligent supervision claim is exactly the sort of 
allegation against which common-law charitable immunity was 
meant to protect.  See Roosen, 235 Mass. at 72 ("The inevitable 
result of our own decisions is to relieve a hospital from 
liability for negligence of the managers in selecting 
incompetent subordinate agents . . .").  See also Doe No. 4, 77 
Mass. App. Ct. at 117, 121 (common-law charitable immunity 
protected hospital from plaintiff's claim of negligent hiring, 
training, and supervision of doctor who allegedly sexually 
assaulted plaintiff).  Therefore, count six should have been 
dismissed.  See Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 396 Mass. 836, 838 (1986) 
("if the complaint shows on its face the existence of an 
affirmative defense, the complaint does not state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted"). 
 
12 We do not address whether common-law charitable immunity 
can ever protect against claims arising out of intentional 
misconduct. 
25 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendants' motion to 
dismiss is affirmed as to all counts except count six, on which 
judgment shall enter for the Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Springfield.  The case is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
13 We decline to award attorney's fees and costs to the 
plaintiff.