Title: The People v. Juwanna Wrotten

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 199  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Juwanna Wrotten,
            Respondent.
Peter D. Coddington, for appellant.
Daniel A. Warshawsky, for respondent.
New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
amicus curiae.
CIPARICK, J.:
In People v Cintron (75 NY2d 249 [1990]), we upheld the
use of two-way televised testimony of a vulnerable child witness
and concluded that no violation of either the Federal or State
Constitution existed.  On this appeal, we are asked to determine
whether Supreme Court erred in permitting an adult complainant
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No. 199
1 The People alternatively sought to examine the complaining
witness upon commission in California pursuant to CPL 680.20 and
680.30.  This relief was denied because the statute provides that
such commission is available only upon "the application of the
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living in another state to testify via real-time, two-way video
after finding that because of age and poor health he was unable
to travel to New York to attend court.  We conclude that Supreme
Court did not err, as the court's inherent powers and Judiciary
Law § 2-b vest it with the authority to fashion a procedure such
as the one employed here.  Furthermore, we conclude that
defendant's confrontation rights have not been unconstitutionally
impaired.
In June 2003, defendant, a home health aide, was with
83-year-old complainant at his home in the Bronx.  They were
making food to bring to complainant's wife, who was in a nursing
home.  According to complainant, defendant suddenly hit him from
behind with a hammer and demanded money, which he gave her. 
According to defendant, she hit complainant with “something” only
after he grabbed her breast, and she neither asked for nor
received money.  Complainant suffered five head wounds and two
broken fingers.  Shortly after the incident, he moved to
California to be near his children.  Defendant was indicted for
assault in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the
first degree.
Prior to trial, the People sought and were granted a
conditional examination of complainant pursuant to CPL 660.20.1
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No. 199
defendant" (CPL 680.30).
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This examination proved unfeasible, however, because CPL 660
requires that the examination be conducted in New York State and
complainant was unable to travel.  The People then requested that
the conditional examination be allowed to proceed via two-way
video conferencing, with the witness remaining in California and
the commissioners conducting the examination in New York. 
Supreme Court granted the relief sought, but required that
complainant's video appearance be live at trial and that the
People first demonstrate that the witness would otherwise be
unavailable to testify in New York.  
After a hearing at which both the People and the
defendant presented expert medical testimony, the court,
crediting the People’s experts, held that complainant -- at that
time 85-years-old, frail, unsteady on his feet, and with a
history of coronary disease -- could not travel to New York
without endangering his health, and was therefore unavailable. 
At trial, complainant testified live from a courtroom in
California via two-way video, appearing "on screen."  He stated
that he could see the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel,
defendant, and jury.  The judge stated that the witness could be
seen "very clearly," including "any expressions on his face."  
Defendant was convicted of second degree assault only. 
On appeal, a divided Appellate Division reversed and vacated the
conviction, holding that, in the absence of any express
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No. 199
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legislative authorization, Supreme Court lacked authority to
permit the admission of televised testimony (People v Wrotten, 60
AD3d 165, 167 [1st Dept 2008]).  The dissent concluded that
Supreme Court retained discretion under its inherent powers and
Judiciary Law § 2-b (3) to utilize this new procedure without
legislative authorization (Wrotten, 60 AD3d at 192).  A Justice
of that court granted leave to appeal and we now reverse.
Although the Legislature has primary authority to
regulate court procedure, "the Constitution permits the courts
latitude to adopt procedures consistent with general practice as
provided by statute" (People v Ricardo B., 73 NY2d 228, 232
[1989]).  By enacting Judiciary Law § 2-b (3), the Legislature
has explicitly authorized the courts' use of innovative
procedures where "necessary to carry into effect the powers and
jurisdiction possessed by [the court]."  Thus, as we have
acknowledged, courts may fashion necessary procedures consistent
with constitutional, statutory, and decisional law (see Ricardo
B., 73 NY2d at 232-233 [a trial court has authority to empanel
two juries, despite clear statutory references to a single jury
and no statutory authorization for multiple juries]).
Unable to find any explicit statutory prohibition
regarding two-way televised testimony at trial, defendant argues
that extant statutes implicitly preclude its admission.  However,
there is no specific statutory authority evincing legislative
policy proscribing televised testimony.  Indeed, the CPL requires
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No. 199
2 Article 65 mandates that, on the motion of either party, a
court must consider evidence of a child witness's vulnerability
and, if the court finds the child to be vulnerable, it must
permit video testimony (CPL 65.00-65.30). 
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live video testimony of a child witness in a prosecution of a sex
crime after a judicial finding of "vulnerability" (CPL 65.00-
65.30).2  The CPL is silent as to other types of witnesses, like
complainant here who the trial court found to be elderly, infirm,
and physically incapable of appearing in court.  Because article
65 addresses only a single, discrete circumstance and otherwise
leaves courts' pre-existing authority unaffected (CPL 65.10 [3]
["[n]othing herein shall be construed to preclude the court from
exercising . . . any authority it otherwise may have to protect
the well-being of a witness and the rights of the defendant"]),
such witnesses' testimony via two-way televised transmission is
presumably left to the trial court's discretion. 
Neither do the statutes providing for preservation of
pre-trial testimony implicitly preclude the admission of live
video testimony.  CPL 680 permits testimony taken by "examination
on a commission" outside New York on defendant's application to
be received as evidence at trial (CPL 680.10, 680.20).  CPL 660
allows either party to secure testimony -- including videotaped
testimony -- for subsequent use in a case where the witness will
be unavailable for trial (CPL 660.10, 660.20).  These statutes do
not speak to the permissibility of real-time video testimony
subject to cross-examination in front of a jury.  Nowhere does
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No. 199
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the CPL purport to list all instances where live video testimony
is permissible or all possible solutions to the problem of an
unavailable witness.  Supreme Court, acting pursuant to its
inherent powers as defined in the New York Constitution and
Judiciary Law, was therefore not precluded from exercising its
authority to utilize necessary, extra-statutory procedures. 
Moreover, the exercise of this authority following a
finding of necessity is permissible under the Confrontation
Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions.  We held in
Cintron that CPL article 65's authorization of two-way closed-
circuit testimony in a criminal trial passes constitutional
muster (75 NY2d at 253).  Soon after, the United States Supreme
Court held that live testimony via one-way closed-circuit
television is permissible under the Federal Constitution,
provided there is an individualized determination that denial of
"physical, face-to-face confrontation" is "necessary to further
an important public policy" and "the reliability of the testimony
is otherwise assured" (Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836, 850 [1990]). 
Thus, assuming without deciding that two-way video does not
always satisfy the Confrontation Clause's "face-to-face meeting"
requirement (cf. People v Gigante, 166 F3d 75, 81 [2d Cir 1999]
[not applying the Craig standard because the trial court's use of
two-way video "preserved the face-to-face confrontation"]),
complainant's testimony would nonetheless be admissible under the
federal standard if findings of necessity and reliability were
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No. 199
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made by the trial court.  
Live two-way video may preserve the essential
safeguards of testimonial reliability, and so satisfy the
Confrontation Clause's primary concern with "ensur[ing] the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact" (Craig, 497 US at 845). 
Essential to the holding in Craig was that "all of the other
elements of the confrontation right" were preserved, including
testimony under oath, the opportunity for contemporaneous cross-
examination, and the opportunity for the judge, jury, and
defendant to view the witness's demeanor as he or she testifies
(id. at 851).  These traditional indicia of reliability were all
present in this case.
Additionally, if Supreme Court's findings were
supported by clear and convincing evidence, Craig's public policy
requirement is satisfied here.  Nowhere does Craig suggest that
it is limited to child witnesses or that a "public policy" basis
for finding necessity must be codified.  Indeed, federal courts
have permitted live video testimony in a variety of
circumstances, including instances where public policy is
implicated by a key witness too ill to appear in court (see e.g.
Horn v Quarterman, 508 F3d 306, 317-318 [5th Cir 2007] [denying
habeas relief where state court admitted two-way video testimony
of witness too ill to travel]; United States v Benson, 79 Fed
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No. 199
3 See e.g. Bush v State of Wyoming (2008 Wy 108, 193 P3d
203, 215-216 [2008] [approving live video testimony of a witness
too ill to travel to court in Wyoming]); State v Sewell (595 NW2d
207, 210 [Minn App 1999] [approving live video testimony of a
witness too ill to travel to court in Minnesota]); Harrell v
State (23 Fla L Weekly 236, 709 So2d 1364, 1368-1371 [1998]
[approving live video testimony where witnesses could not travel
to court in Florida, in part because of one witness's ill
health]). 
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Appx 813 [6th Cir 2003] [permitting the two-way video testimony
of an elderly witness too ill to travel]; People v Gigante, 166
F3d 75, 79 [2d Cir 1999] [permitting two-way video testimony of
key prosecution witness too ill to travel]).  Other states have
likewise allowed the admissibility of two-way video testimony.3 
We agree that the public policy of justly resolving criminal
cases while at the same time protecting the well-being of a
witness can require live two-way video testimony in the rare case
where a key witness cannot physically travel to court in New York
and where, as here, defendant's confrontation rights have been
minimally impaired. 
Live televised testimony is certainly not the
equivalent of in-person testimony, and the decision to excuse a
witness's presence in the courtroom should be weighed carefully. 
Televised testimony requires a case-specific finding of
necessity; it is an exceptional procedure to be used only in
exceptional circumstances.  We do not decide here whether Supreme
Court's finding of necessity rested on clear and convincing
evidence, as the Appellate Division did not address that
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No. 199
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question.  We only pass on whether Supreme Court had authority to
utilize a procedure "necessary to carry into effect the powers
and jurisdiction possessed by it" (Judiciary Law § 2-b [3]).  As
the dissent below correctly noted, "[i]n the absence of direction
from the Legislature, Supreme Court retained discretion . . . to
determine what steps, if any, could be taken to permit this
prosecution to proceed notwithstanding the complaining witness's
inability to be physically present in the courtroom" (Wrotten, 60
AD3d at 192).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and the case remitted to that court for consideration
of the facts (see CPL 470.25 [2] [d]; 470.40 [2] [b]) and all
other issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that
Court.
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People v Juwanna Wrotten
No. 199 
JONES, J.(dissenting):
In the absence of any express legislative
authorization, the trial court here lacked the inherent authority
to permit the complainant to testify from California via live
two-way television.  Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the
order of the Appellate Division.
The Legislature provided for the taking of testimony by
live two-way television only under the limited circumstances set
forth under Article 65 of the Criminal Procedure Law (L 1985, ch
505), which was enacted in response to the widespread recognition
that child victims of sex abuse crimes typically suffer from
acute anxiety and psychological trauma when giving live testimony
(see People v Cintron, 75 NY2d 249, 254 [1990] ["The legislative
purpose for permitting (certain child witnesses to testify via
live two-way closed circuit television) is the avoidance of the
severe mental or emotional harm that may result from requiring a
child witness to testify in the public atmosphere of the
courtroom concerning the intimate sexual details of the
crime."]).  In enacting Article 65, the Legislature promulgated a
comprehensive scheme 
"designed to further the aim of insulating
child witnesses from the trauma of testifying
in open court and also, under certain
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No. 199
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conditions, from having to testify in the
presence of the defendant while, at the same
time, fully preserving the defendant's
constitutional rights (see Mem of Dept of
Law, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 505, at 34-38;
Preiser, 1985 Practice Commentary, McKinney's
Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 65.00, 1990
Supp Pamph, at 485-486)"
(id.).  "The Legislature drafted article 65 with full recognition
of the necessity of safeguarding a defendant's confrontation
rights and with the explicit aim of providing sufficient
limitations and protections to meet the constitutional
requirements" (id. at 260, citing Mem of Dept of Law and numerous
other memoranda in support, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 505). 
Further, among other things, the Legislature explicitly detailed
that (1) Article 65 applies only in prosecutions for incest or
sex crimes under Article 130 of the Penal Law where the
testifying witness is 14 years of age or younger and found to be
vulnerable to psychological harm if compelled to testify in the
presence of the defendant, (2) in order for a child witness to be
declared vulnerable (in such case, trial court must permit the
televised testimony), the trial court must "determine[] by clear
and convincing evidence that the child witness would suffer
serious mental or emotional harm that would substantially impair
the child witness' ability to communicate with the finder of fact
without the use of live, two-way closed-circuit television" (CPL
65.20[2]) and (3) a trial court, in considering a vulnerability
application, may consider whether any one or more of 12
enumerated circumstances have been established by clear and
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No. 199
* The level of specificity employed by the Legislature in
enacting Article 65 and addressing when witnesses can testify
outside the courtroom (by depositions, conditional examinations
[CPL Article 660] and examinations on commission [CPL Article
680]), implies that similar activities not specifically
authorized are forbidden.
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convincing evidence (see CPL 65.20[10]).
In this case the trial court allowed the televised
testimony based on its finding that the People established by
clear and convincing evidence that complainant was unable to
travel to New York without seriously endangering his health and
was thus unavailable to testify.  This was error.  
From the exhaustive nature of the Legislature's grant
of authority permitting courts to receive televised testimony
under the specific limited circumstances discussed above, there
is a strong inference that the Legislature intended to exclude
grants of authority under other circumstances (such as those
present here).*  In my view, the detail that attends CPL Article
65, coupled with the CPL's silence as to other circumstances
authorizing the admission of live two-way televised testimony,
sets the parameters of the trial court's discretion.  Thus, by
allowing the instant complainant's testimony, the trial court
exceeded its discretionary authority.  Contrary to the majority's
suggestion, the trial court did not have "pre-existing authority"
to admit complainant's testimony pursuant to CPL 65.10(3).  That
provision, which must be read in the context of the child
witnesses covered under Article 65, speaks to a court's inherent
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authority to protect the well-being of such witnesses, not the
general (and amorphous) "pre-existing authority" the majority
speaks of.  According to this article's bill jacket,
"[s]ection 65.10 . . . clarifies that the
power to order the use of closed-circuit
television in no way supplants the court's  
. . . inherent authority to otherwise protect
the well-being of the child.  The bill leaves
undisturbed the court's power to, among other
measures, allow for the presence of a person
who can provide emotional support to the
child witness when he or she testifies or
adjust the courtroom setting to make it more
comfortable and less threatening to the child
witness"
(Mem of Dept of Law, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 505, at 21).
In light of the fact that the Legislature has with 
painstaking detail addressed the subject of when certain absent
witnesses can testify by means of two-way television, Judiciary
Law § 2-b(3) cannot serve as the basis for granting trial courts
the authority to receive such testimony.  Section 2-b(3)
authorizes a court of record to create new procedures "necessary
to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by
[the court]."  However, it does not authorize a court to fashion
a procedure that is inconsistent with existing law.  Nor does it
authorize a court to disregard the critical policy decisions
already made by the Legislature.  In reversing the Appellate
Division, the majority, under the guise of upholding the inherent
powers of the courts, has recognized a trial court ruling that is
wholly inconsistent with Article 65 (the existing law) and
accorded no weight to the substantive policy choices made by the
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Legislature.  Under the circumstances of this case, therefore,
section 2-b(3) is inapposite.
If the inherent powers of the courts are sufficient to
authorize the televised testimony in this case or, as stated by
the majority, allow a trial court to make a "discretionary
finding of necessity" regarding such testimony, these powers
necessarily represent a broad source of authority that would
permit trial courts to use live, two-way, televised testimony in
ways not contemplated under Article 65.  That is, there would
have been no need for the Legislature to enact Article 65 in the
first place.  For example, a court, under its inherent powers,
could be authorized to use such testimony in cases where it would
be medically unsafe for any witness, regardless of age or where
the witness resides, to travel to the particular New York court
where the criminal matter is pending.  
In addition, the majority's use of the phrase
"discretionary finding of necessity" is confusing.  If the
majority is arguing that allowing complainant's testimony was
"necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction
possessed by [the court]" (Judiciary Law § 2-b[3]), that argument
fails because the majority has not established, outside the
circumstances prescribed in CPL Article 65, that trial courts
have the authority (discretionary or otherwise) to admit the
testimony at issue.  If the majority is arguing that allowing
such testimony furthers an important public policy, they are
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necessarily referring to a policy decision the Legislature has
not to this point made. 
Moreover, the majority's view of the courts' inherent
powers presents a number of problems.  First, there does not
appear to be any discernible limitation, within the inherent
powers of the courts, on a court's authority to allow the
admission of an absent witness's televised testimony as long as
it is "necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction
possessed by [the court]" (Judiciary Law § 2-b[3]).  Second, what
happens when individual courts, on similar facts, reach different
conclusions as to whether to allow the admission of televised
testimony or some other subject pertaining to the state's public
policy?  Third, it appears that the majority's ruling effectively
circumscribes the Legislature's role by allowing trial courts to 
(a) determine issues with public policy implications on a case by
case basis and (b) create procedural rules for the sole purpose
of allowing prosecutions to proceed (in direct contravention to
state law). 
In sum, because there was no express legislative
authorization permitting the complainant to testify from
California via live two-way television, the trial court here
lacked the authority to admit complainant's testimony.
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People v Juwanna Wrotten
No. 199
SMITH, J.(dissenting):
I join Judge Jones's dissent, but add my own because I
think that the majority's opinion is wrong on the constitutional
issue as well as the statutory one. 
Article I, §6 of the New York State Constitution ("In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused . . . shall . .
. be confronted with the witnesses against him or her") and the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him") protect the right
of confrontation.  (I assume here that the content of the state
and federal rights is the same; I know of no authority holding
otherwise.)  If, as the majority holds, what happened in this
case is permissible under the Criminal Procedure Law, the
constitutional questions presented are whether defendant was
denied her right of confrontation and if so whether there is an
adequate excuse for the denial.  I answer yes to the first
question and no to the second. 
The right of confrontation includes -- indeed, is, at
its core -- the right to meet one's accuser face to face (Coy v
Iowa, 487 US 1012, 1016 [1988]).  Neither our Court nor the
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No. 199
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United States Supreme Court has held, and I would not now hold,
that a two-way-television encounter is "face to face" in this
sense.  The assumption underlying the constitutional right of
confrontation is that a witness brought into the presence of the
accused will be less likely to swear to a false accusation, or to
do so convincingly (id. at 1019).  The point of confrontation is
thus the psychological effect it has on the witness.  That effect
is, beyond question, substantially diluted when, though the
witness and the accused can see each other, the witness knows
that the accused is far away.  I therefore conclude that
defendant in this case was not permitted to "confront" her
accuser in the constitutional sense, and I would reject so much
of United States v Gigante (166 F3d 75, 80-81 [2d Cir 1999]) as
may be read to hold otherwise. 
That conclusion does not resolve the case, because we
held in People v Cintron (75 NY2d 249 [1990]) and the United
States Supreme Court held in Maryland v Craig (497 US 836 [1990])
that the right of face to face confrontation is not absolute, and
may be denied where "an appropriate individualized showing of
necessity is made" (Cintron, 75 NY2d at 258) -- or, as the
Supreme Court put it, where "denial of such confrontation is
necessary to further an important public policy" (Craig, 497 US
at 850).  But Cintron and Craig involved child victims in sexual
assault cases, and presented a far more compelling case than this
one for making an exception to the right of confrontation.
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In Cintron and Craig, the harm to be avoided --
emotional trauma to a child -- would be caused by the
confrontation itself; there was no way to avoid the harm except
by dispensing with face to face confrontation.  Here, the
threatened harm is to the health of an elderly witness from the
stress of travel, and there is a way to avoid that harm without
depriving defendant of her confrontation right: bring the accused
to the witness, instead of bringing the witness to the accused. 
In other words, the dilemma could be resolved by allowing the
deposition or conditional examination of the complainant to be
taken in California, with defendant present.  It may well be that
that solution is not available under New York's statutes, but
this does not affect the constitutional analysis.  New York
cannot deprive defendant of her constitutional right by its
Legislature's choice not to provide for a way of accommodating
both that right and the witness's legitimate interest. 
Thus, while I agree with Judge Jones that the Appellate
Division's reversal of defendant's conviction on statutory
grounds -- a result that has the virtue of avoiding the
constitutional issue -- was correct, I also believe that, if the
constitutional issue is reached, we should decide it in
defendant's favor. 
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division, First
Department, for consideration of the facts (see CPL 470.25[2][d];
470.40[2][b]) and issues raised but not determined on the appeal
to that court.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Judges Graffeo, Read
and Pigott concur.  Judge Jones dissents and votes to affirm in
an opinion in which Judge Smith concurs, Judge Smith in a 
separate dissenting opinion.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided December 15, 2009