Title: State v. Amick

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) No. SC94324 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MICHAEL E. AMICK, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
) 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF OREGON COUNTY 
Honorable J. Max Price, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 16, 2015 
 
 
Michael Amick appeals a judgment convicting him of second-degree 
murder and second-degree arson.  The judgment is reversed, and the case is 
remanded because the trial court violated section 494.4851 by substituting a 
discharged alternate juror after the jury had begun its deliberations.  
Facts 
 
Mr. Amick was charged with first-degree murder, section 565.020, and 
second-degree arson, section 569.050.1, for killing Leona Maxine Vaughan and 
setting fire to a house.  A jury found Mr. Amick guilty of murder in the second 
degree and arson in the second degree.  The court entered a judgment of 
                                                 
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000.  
conviction consistent with the jury’s verdict and sentenced Mr. Amick to 
concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for murder and seven years for arson.  
 
After the evidence was presented, and before the jury began deliberating, 
the trial court excused Juror 14, who was an alternate juror.  Juror 14 returned 
home, and the jury began deliberating.   
 
The jury deliberated for more than five hours before the trial court excused 
Juror 12 from service due to health concerns.  The trial court instructed Juror 14 to 
return to the courthouse.  The court then substituted Juror 14 for Juror 12 and 
instructed the jury to “continue deliberations.”   
 
Prior to the substitution of Juror 14 for Juror 12, defense counsel requested 
a mistrial because: (1) Juror 14 could not get “caught up on what’s been 
discussed” after five hours of deliberation; and (2) it was possible she had 
discussed the case with someone after being released, even though she had denied 
any such discussions.  Defense counsel stated that calling Juror 14 back after the 
jury had begun deliberating would “create an enormous amount of error at this 
point” and that “after five and a half or six hours of deliberation, we can’t just 
throw somebody else into the ring.”  Alternatively, defense counsel asked that the 
jury be sent home over the weekend to see whether Juror 12 would recover and be 
able to continue deliberating.  The court overruled the motion.  The jury resumed 
deliberations and, in less than an hour, found Mr. Amick guilty of second-degree 
 
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murder and second-degree arson.  This appeal followed.  This Court granted 
transfer and has jurisdiction. 2  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. 
Preservation 
 
The State asserts that Mr. Amick did not preserve his argument that the trial 
court improperly substituted Juror 14 after deliberations had begun.  Mr. Amick 
preserved his argument by objecting to the procedure and including that claim in 
his motion for a new trial.  
 
 “To preserve a claim of error, counsel must object with sufficient 
specificity to apprise the trial court of the grounds for the objection.”  State v. 
Stepter, 794 S.W.2d 649, 655 (Mo. banc 1990).  “Our rules for preservation of 
error for review are applied, not to enable the court to avoid the task of review, nor 
to make preservation of error difficult for the appellant, but, to enable the court—
the trial court first, then the appellate court—to define the precise claim made by 
the defendant.”  State v. Pointer, 887 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Mo. App. 1994).  
 
Defense counsel objected with sufficient specificity to apprise the trial 
court of the alleged juror substitution error.  When the trial court proposed to 
substitute alternate Juror 14 after the jury had been deliberating for more than five 
hours, defense counsel requested a mistrial and specifically asserted that the 
                                                 
2 Mr. Amick raises three points on appeal.  He asserts that:  (1) the trial court erred 
by failing to grant a mistrial when a juror had to be dismissed for health reasons 
after deliberations had begun; (2) the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte 
declaring a mistrial following the prosecutor’s closing argument; and (3) the trial 
court plainly erred by commenting on the evidence.  Mr. Amick’s first point is 
dispositive.  Therefore, his second and third points will not be addressed.  
 
 
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proposed substitution would “create an enormous amount of error at this point” 
and that “after five and a half or six hours of deliberation, we can’t just throw 
somebody else into the ring.”  Although defense counsel did not cite section 
494.485 in his objection or motion for a new trial, the objection plainly and 
unequivocally informed the trial court of Mr. Amick’s position that the proposed 
juror substitution was error.  Further, trial judges are presumed to know the law 
and to apply it in making their decisions.  State v. Finley, 403 S.W.3d 625, 629 
(Mo. App. 2012); see also Dycus v. Cross, 869 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Mo. banc 1994) 
(trial courts are assumed to know the law).  This presumption, in addition to  
Mr. Amick’s timely and specific objection to the precise issue of the propriety of 
substituting alternate Juror 14 for Juror 12 after the jury had commenced 
deliberations, is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.   
Standard of Review 
 
Mr. Amick’s argument that the juror substitution violated section 494.485 
presents a legal issue subject to de novo review.  See In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 
445, 446-47 (Mo. banc 2014). 
Juror Substitution 
 
Mr. Amick argues that the trial court erred by overruling defense counsel’s 
objection and request for a mistrial relating to the replacement of a juror after 
deliberations had begun.  Specifically, Mr. Amick asserts that, by substituting 
Juror 14 for Juror 12 after deliberations were underway, the trial court violated 
 
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section 494.485 and his due process right to a fair trial.  Mr. Amick’s statutory 
argument is dispositive.   
 
In pertinent part, section 494.485 provides: 
If in any case to be tried before a jury it appears to the court to 
be appropriate, the court may direct that a number of jurors in 
addition to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as 
alternate jurors.  Alternate jurors, in the order in which they 
are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be 
unable or disqualified to perform their duties.  Alternate jurors 
shall be selected in the same manner, shall have the same 
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and 
challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same 
functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the principal 
jurors.  Alternate jurors who do not replace principal jurors 
shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.  
  
(Emphasis added). 
 
The emphasized language establishes two statutory requirements central to 
this case.  First, alternate jurors can replace another juror “prior to the time the 
jury retires to consider its verdict.”  This means that, once the jury begins to 
deliberate, the trial court cannot substitute one juror for another.  Second, after the 
jury retires to consider its verdict, the alternate jurors who did not replace a 
principal juror are “discharged.”  This means that, once the jury retires for 
deliberation, the alternate juror is discharged and is no longer part of the jury.   See 
State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tenn. 1991) (court rule requiring the 
alternate juror to be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict means 
that the discharged alternate is no longer a member of the jury because the 
function of the alternate juror ceases when the jury commences deliberations).  
 
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Taken together, these two directives demonstrate that section 494.485 forecloses 
not only the option of a substitution after the jury begins to deliberate but also the 
possibility of a substitution because the statute requires that all alternate jurors 
must be discharged once the jury retires to consider its verdict.  The trial court 
erred by substituting a discharged alternate juror after the jury had retired to 
consider its verdict.   
 
The violation of section 494.485 constitutes reversible error.  The right to a 
jury trial is a fundamental constitutional right guaranteeing every Missouri citizen 
the right to a unanimous jury verdict before they can be convicted of a crime.  
State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo.banc 1991).  Section 494.485 regulates 
the jury process in a manner consistent with the constitutionally mandated 
unanimous verdict.  In this case, the clear violation of section 494.485 deprived 
Mr. Amick of his statutory right to have the same twelve jurors deliberate and 
decide his case.3   
 
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge  
  
All concur. 
 
                                                 
3 This Court’s decision in this case does not cast doubt on State v. Johnson, 968 
S.W.2d 123, 132 (Mo. banc 1998), in which the Court held that section 494.485 
does not prevent, in a bifurcated trial, an alternate juror who did not deliberate 
during the guilt phase of trial from deliberating during the penalty phase.