Title: Corder v. Corder

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 7/5/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SHAOPING CORDER, 
) 
 
 
) 
S138666 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G033608 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Orange County 
LISA R. CORDER, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 
 
) 
01CC10590 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
 
 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
LISA R. CORDER, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
v. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 
 
 
) 
01CC00182 
SHAOPING CORDER, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In a consolidated wrongful death action, one defendant settled with the 
decedent’s wife and his adult daughter for an unapportioned lump sum of $1.1 
million, and the two nonsettling defendants ultimately prevailed at trial.  At a 
subsequent court proceeding, the wife and the daughter offered evidence 
pertaining to the allocation of the settlement proceeds.  Based on testimony from 
third party witnesses claiming the decedent was unhappy in his marriage and 
 
2 
intended to get a divorce, the trial court found the marriage was “on the verge of 
ending,” even though there was no evidence the decedent had actually separated 
from his wife or filed for a legal separation or a marital dissolution.  The court 
then allocated 90 percent of the settlement proceeds to the decedent’s daughter and 
10 percent to the wife.  We granted the wife’s petition for review, which 
challenged the trial court’s judgment and the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of that 
judgment. 
We conclude, contrary to the wife’s assertions, that the trial court did not 
violate statutory law or act in excess of jurisdiction in undertaking to apportion the 
settlement proceeds.  We also find the court was not required to allocate the 
proceeds based solely on the evidence admitted at the trial against the nonsettling 
defendants or on the perceived contribution that each heir’s damages claim 
supposedly made to the settlement amount.  However, we further conclude the 
record fails to support the court’s finding that the marriage between the decedent 
and his wife was about to end.  Because that finding cannot be sustained, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court 
for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Raymond Corder (Corder) married Shaoping (Sherry) Corder (Wife) in 
September 2000.  Lisa R. Corder (Daughter) is Corder’s adult daughter from a 
previous marriage.  In May 2001, eight months after the marriage to Wife, Corder 
was killed in a construction accident. 
Wife and Daughter separately filed wrongful death actions in Orange 
County against defendant Morrow Equipment Company (Morrow) and others.  
After the two actions were consolidated, Morrow settled with both plaintiffs for an 
unapportioned lump sum of $1.1 million.  Wife and Daughter then entered into the 
following stipulation:  “Following the verdict or settlement of the [wrongful death] 
 
3 
case, should the Plaintiffs fail to agree on an allocation or apportionment of 
damages between the heirs, that either Plaintiff shall have the right to a further 
trial regarding the allocation or apportionment of damages among or between the 
Plaintiffs.  Furthermore, either party may supplement their witness list by 
identifying witnesses not previously disclosed and that those witnesses may be 
called as witnesses at the further trial proceeding.” 
Wife and Daughter went to trial against the two remaining defendants.  The 
jury found neither defendant was negligent, and judgment was entered in their 
favor.  Shortly thereafter, Wife and Daughter began preparing for a further trial on 
apportionment of the $1.1 million settlement proceeds from Morrow.  Meanwhile, 
Wife filed a separate action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, seeking to 
quiet title to the proceeds.  Daughter responded by moving to set a trial date in the 
Orange County case. 
Over Wife’s objection, the Orange County court ruled it had jurisdiction to 
apportion the settlement proceeds and set a hearing for that purpose.  The court 
then indicated that, as part of the apportionment proceeding, it would consider not 
only the evidence it had heard in the wrongful death trial, but also, as the parties 
stipulated, new evidence that had not been previously presented.  At the 
apportionment proceeding, much of the new evidence concerned Daughter’s 
contention that Corder, at the time of his death, was contemplating dissolving his 
marriage to Wife because he suspected she was engaging in prostitution.  
Specifically, Daughter and Wife presented various witnesses who gave conflicting 
testimony regarding statements Corder allegedly made about his marriage and 
Wife prior to his death.  There was no evidence, however, that Corder actually 
separated from Wife or acted to initiate a legal separation or a marital dissolution.  
Daughter also presented evidence of her relationship with Corder. 
 
4 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court filed a “judgment” containing the 
following findings and conclusions.  “Evidence at the allocation Trial 
demonstrated two conflicting views of the Decedent’s relationship to his wife, 
Shaoping Corder.  Lisa Corder, Decedent’s daughter, presented witnesses who 
testified that the Decedent intended to divorce his wife.  According to them the 
Decedent felt that his marriage was a mistake because his wife had continued to 
work as a prostitute despite her promises to stop.[1]  Witnesses also testified that 
Lisa Corder and her father had a very close relationship.  Lisa Corder’s argument 
was that since Decedent was on the verge of divorcing his wife, the wife’s share of 
the proceeds should be reduced drastically from what it would otherwise have 
been. 
“On the other hand, Shaoping Corder’s witnesses indicated that the 
marriage was a good one and there was no intent manifested by the [Decedent] to 
divorce his wife.  Shaoping Corder argued that because she would have been 
legally entitled to support from the Decedent during the marriage, the lion’s share 
of the proceeds should go to her. 
“Having considered the conflicting evidence presented and the arguments 
of counsel, the Court finds most persuasive and credible the evidence that the 
marriage between Shaoping Corder and Decedent was on the verge of ending.  
While it is true that Decedent had not yet filed for divorce or contacted an 
attorney, the Court finds that had the Decedent lived the marriage would have 
lasted a relatively short period of time given Decedent’s belief, expressed to 
several persons, that his wife was working as a prostitute against his wishes.  
Decedent may not have expressed his state of mind to all of those close to him, but 
                                              
1  
Daughter’s witnesses claimed Corder knew Wife engaged in prostitution 
before he married her. 
 
5 
such is life.  For reasons that are usually unknown, people often keep secrets from 
some close friends or relatives and not from others.  The Court finds unpersuasive 
the contention that Lisa Corder’s witnesses came into Court to commit perjury 
regarding the prostitution allegations. 
“Given the above findings, the Court makes the following allocation as to 
the 1.1 million dollar settlement proceeds:  Lisa Corder 90%.  Shaoping Corder 
10%.  [¶] In making these findings the Court has considered the total loss that each 
Plaintiff suffered from the Decedent’s death . . . .”  (Capitalization of names 
omitted.)  The trial court denied Wife’s motions to vacate the judgment and to 
enter a different judgment or for a new trial.  Judgment was entered accordingly. 
Wife appealed the apportionment judgment and the denial of her posttrial 
motions.  The Court of Appeal affirmed in a split decision.  While all three justices 
agreed the trial court had jurisdiction to apportion the settlement proceeds, there 
was vigorous disagreement over the propriety of the apportionment.  The majority 
concluded that:  (1) Daughter had standing to challenge the amount of Wife’s 
share and was not estopped from doing so; (2) the evidence was sufficient to 
support the finding that Raymond Corder intended to divorce Wife; (3) the award 
was not excessive as to Daughter and inadequate as to Wife, given the decedent’s 
intention to divorce, his close relationship with Daughter, and the fact that Wife’s 
award was significantly more than she was likely to have received as spousal 
support following an eight-month marriage, had Corder not died; and (4) evidence 
of the settling defendant’s motives was properly excluded.  These conclusions 
prompted the dissenting justice to declare:  “There is something profoundly wrong 
in allocating 90 percent of a wrongful death award to an adult child and only 10 
percent to the widow or widower.”  Claiming the majority ignored California case 
law dealing with wrongful death damages, the dissenting justice contended that 
 
6 
evidence of the decedent’s mere intention to divorce Wife was irrelevant because 
the decedent had taken no concrete steps to effectuate or even initiate such action. 
DISCUSSION 
We granted Wife’s petition for review to address essentially three issues.  
First, does the trial court in a wrongful death action have jurisdiction to apportion 
among the plaintiffs the proceeds of a settlement obtained in the action, or is the 
court’s authority otherwise limited to apportioning an award of damages in such 
an action?  Second, in a proceeding to apportion a settlement, is the trial court 
limited to consideration of the evidence introduced in the wrongful death action 
itself or the evidence that the defendant considered in arriving at the amount of the 
settlement?  Third, did the evidence at the apportionment proceeding here, 
including the testimony of the witnesses who claimed the decedent intended to 
divorce Wife, support the trial court’s allocation of 90 percent of the settlement 
proceeds to Daughter and only 10 percent to Wife? 
A.  “Jurisdiction” to Apportion Settlement Proceeds 
Wrongful death actions are statutory in nature and governed by the Code of 
Civil Procedure.2  Section 377.60 establishes a cause of action in favor of 
specified heirs of a person whose death is “caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another.”  The damages that may be awarded in a wrongful death action are 
those that, “under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.”  (§ 377.61.) 
While each heir designated in section 377.60 has a personal and separate 
wrongful death cause of action, the actions are deemed joint, single and indivisible 
and must be joined together in one suit.3  (Cross, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 692-693.)  
                                              
2  
All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated. 
3  
An heir who files a wrongful death action is required to properly join all 
known heirs in that action.  (Cross v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
7 
Accordingly, “the court or jury must compute the damages, if any, by considering 
the pecuniary damage suffered by all the heirs and return a verdict for one sum.”  
(Watkins v. Nutting (1941) 17 Cal.2d 490, 498, italics added; see Rickards v. 
Noonan (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 266, 271.)  In view of the lump-sum nature of 
wrongful death awards, section 377.61 provides:  “The court shall determine the 
respective rights in an award of the persons entitled to assert the cause of action.” 
Wife first contends that a settlement is not an award, and that section 
377.61’s failure to employ the phrase “an award or settlement” in the above 
quoted sentence indicates the Legislature did not intend to confer jurisdiction upon 
a trial court in a wrongful death action to apportion settlement proceeds.  Because 
section 377.61 does not confer such jurisdiction, she argues, the only way a trial 
court is authorized to apportion a wrongful death settlement is in an action that is 
independent of the wrongful death action, such as an heir’s separately filed 
interpleader or quiet title action.  Wife also suggests that construing section 377.61 
as allowing judicial apportionment of settlement proceeds in a wrongful death 
action would defeat an heir’s right to a jury determination of disputed issues of 
fact relevant to the competing claims to a settlement fund where such issues were 
not presented to or considered by the jury in the wrongful death action.  Thus, 
Wife evidently contends that section 377.61, by implication, either reserves or 
confers a right to a jury apportionment of any wrongful death recovery other than 
“an award.” 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
690, 692-693 (Cross) [addressing former § 377]; Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 
53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.)  Any heir who fails in this burden may be liable to the 
heirs who were intentionally omitted from the suit.  (Ruttenberg, supra, 53 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 809-811.) 
 
8 
As a preliminary matter, we address Wife’s characterization of this issue as 
one of jurisdiction.  Generally, when the state Constitution or a statute provides a 
right to a jury trial, a trial court’s invalid denial or curtailment of that right is 
considered an act in excess of jurisdiction and reversible error.  (See generally 7 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Trial, § 85, p. 86.)  Section 377.61, however, 
represents “a ‘procedural’ and ‘not jurisdictional’ statute whose procedural 
provisions can be waived.”  (Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1983) 148 
Cal.App.3d 512, 536 (Canavin), quoting Cross, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 692-694 
[addressing former § 3774].)  In light of Wife’s various assertions, we must decide 
whether the trial court acted either in excess of jurisdiction or in contravention of 
section 377.61 when it resolved the competing claims between Wife and Daughter 
and apportioned the $1.1 million in settlement proceeds. 
In determining what the Legislature intended with section 377.61, we look 
first to the words of the statute.  (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 
83.)  Section 377.61 provides in full:  “In an action under this article, damages 
may be awarded that, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, but may 
not include damages recoverable under Section 377.34 [pertaining to a decedent’s 
cause of action].  The court shall determine the respective rights in an award of 
the persons entitled to assert the cause of action.”  (Italics added.)  True, section 
377.61 omits express reference to settlements.  But given that its first sentence 
undertakes to describe the damages that “may be awarded” in a wrongful death 
                                              
4  
The Legislature first provided for judicial apportionment of awards in 
wrongful death actions as part of a 1949 amendment to former section 377.  The 
original provision stated in relevant part:  “The respective rights of the heirs in any 
award shall be determined by the court.”  (Stats. 1949, ch. 1380, § 4, p. 2402; see 
Kim v. Yi (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 543, 546-547, fn. 3 (Kim).) 
 
9 
action, the circumstance that its second sentence employs the related term “an 
award” provides no compelling basis for distinguishing between awards and 
settlements as far as judicial apportionment is concerned.  Indeed, the statutory 
language does not purport to prohibit judicial apportionment in a wrongful death 
action that is resolved through settlement.  Nor does it suggest that jury 
apportionment is either authorized or required when a settlement occurs. 
In this particular context, moreover, there appears no meaningful 
distinction between a lump-sum award and a lump-sum settlement.  After a jury 
trial, the trial court must apportion an award among the heirs based on the 
pecuniary damages suffered by each heir.  Similarly, after a settlement, the trial 
court must apportion the settlement proceeds based on the identical criteria—the 
pecuniary damages suffered by each heir.  (See, e.g., Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 
543.)  Additionally, where, as here, a trial court has heard evidence of damages at 
the wrongful death trial against nonsettling defendants, having the same court 
apportion the heirs’ recovery of an award and/or a settlement promotes judicial 
economy and efficiency, even if the court takes further evidence regarding the 
heirs’ competing interests therein. 
Notably, the relevant legislative history contains no suggestion the judicial 
apportionment provision was adopted to limit or otherwise alter existing decisional 
law that recognized the general equitable nature of apportionment proceedings and 
the specific propriety of judicial apportionment in wrongful death actions.5  “The 
                                              
5  
While it is settled that the parties to a wrongful death action have a right to 
trial by jury (Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 531; § 592), it appears equally 
settled that a proceeding to apportion the recovery in such an action “is equitable 
in character as well as akin to a special proceeding.”  (Canavin, supra, 148 
Cal.App.3d at p. 534, fn. 10; see also Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.)  
Indeed, long before section 377.61 and its 1949 predecessor provided statutory 
authorization for judicial apportionment in wrongful death actions, “the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
10 
1949 statutory amendment to provide for judicial apportionment appears based 
upon legislative acknowledgement of the respective heirs’ competing interests in 
the lump-sum award.  The amendment reflects a belief it was more desirable not to 
add to the jury’s burden the task of apportioning the damages [citation], and the 
practical consideration the trial judge had already heard the evidence of the 
pecuniary loss as to each heir and thus was the most desirable party to apportion 
the damages.  [Citations.] . . .  [¶] . . .  [The] legislative delegation of 
apportionment to the court is constitutional, promoting the nature of the remedy as 
envisioned by its creators without substantively depriving any heir of the right to a 
jury trial.”  (Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 533.)  Thus, while the statutory 
provision is fairly viewed as codifying early case law establishing the propriety of 
judicial apportionment of wrongful death awards (see ante, fn. 5), neither its text 
nor its history suggests a purpose to limit the type of recovery appropriate for 
judicial apportionment, or an aim to expand the right to a jury trial to situations 
where none previously existed. 
In view of the foregoing, we find no interpretive or other reasoned basis for 
construing section 377.61 as precluding a trial court in a wrongful death action 
from apportioning a recovery obtained through settlement.  (Cf. Estate of Rogers 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
established procedure in this state where plaintiffs recovered judgment was for the 
court, in a separate proceeding, to apportion the amount to be awarded each heir.”  
(Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 530, relying on Watkins v. Nutting, supra, 
17 Cal.2d at p. 498.)  Thus, judicial apportionment in a wrongful death action “is 
consistent with historical precedent which has relied upon the equity powers of the 
court in dividing such funds, regardless whether the recovery was the result of 
compromise, settlement, litigation instituted by a personal representative of the 
decedent as a statutory trustee for the heirs, or trial litigation pursued by any of the 
heirs.”  (Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 534, fn. 10.) 
 
11 
(1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 [similarly concluding that compromise settlements 
fell within purview of a statute providing only that “damages . . . awarded” were 
separate property].)  In any case, even apart from section 377.61, judicial 
apportionment of a wrongful death settlement falls squarely within the 
contemplation of section 578, providing that “when the justice of the case requires 
it, [the judgment may] determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side, as 
between themselves.” 
Case law is consistent with the conclusion that trial courts may complete 
the adjudication of all contested issues in a wrongful death by determining the 
appropriate allocation of settlement proceeds between competing heirs.  (E.g., 
Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 547-548 [determining that, in light of the 
statutory language and history, section 377.61 provides for judicial apportionment 
of settlement proceeds, whether the competing claims are between the heirs of a 
single or multiple decedents]; Smith v. Premier Alliance Ins. Co. (1995) 41 
Cal.App.4th 691, 698 [“[w]hen the claims of all heirs are encompassed in a lump-
sum settlement, the court has authority to apportion the settlement”]; Estate of 
Kuebler v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 500, 504 [“the court has 
jurisdiction to apportion the settlement proceeds”]; see also Canavin, supra, 148 
Cal.App.3d at p. 534, fn. 10].) 
Although the foregoing decisions did not specifically address the issues 
raised here, Wife offers no authority contradicting their conclusions and 
statements.  Instead, she relies on Changaris v. Marvel (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 308 
(Changaris) to argue the competing claims of heirs to a settlement fund “can only 
be resolved by a court that has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute—
subject matter jurisdiction conveyed by bringing a separate interpleader or quiet 
title action.”  Changaris involved a situation where one attorney had represented 
five different heirs in a wrongful death action.  The heirs settled with the 
 
12 
defendant tortfeasor for a lump-sum amount, but subsequently could not agree on 
its allocation.  Facing a clear conflict of interest, the attorney filed an interpleader 
action and was discharged from further responsibility.  (Changaris, supra, 231 
Cal.App.2d at p. 310.)  Changaris held, in the context of the interpleader action, 
that “the trial court properly received evidence of the damage suffered by each of 
the parties whose rights had been compromised, and the evidence so taken 
supports the apportionment made.”  (Id. at p. 313.) 
Like the Court of Appeal below, we find Changaris unhelpful to Wife’s 
position.  Even assuming a separate interpleader action was appropriate for the 
type of situation presented in Changaris, that decision does not suggest that, where 
recovery in the wrongful death action is obtained by settlement and not by an 
award, the filing of an independent interpleader or other action is required to 
confer jurisdiction on a trial court to apportion the recovery.6 
Although Wife does not appear to assert a constitutional right to a jury trial 
on the issue of apportionment,7 she does contend that judicial apportionment of a 
                                              
6  
Wife further argues that a separate action should be required so that 
competing heirs can be given fair notice of the nature of the competing claims, full 
discovery, and an opportunity at summary adjudication.  But she fails to establish 
that fair notice, a reasonable opportunity for discovery, and trial court rulings akin 
to summary adjudication are unavailable or unobtainable in a wrongful death 
action.  The proceeding below, we observe, did not appear to suffer from these 
perceived deficiencies. 
7  
Our state Constitution expressly guarantees the right to a jury trial.  (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 16.)  But the right guaranteed is that of a jury trial as it existed at 
common law, when the state Constitution was first adopted.  (Cornette v. 
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 75-76.)  Consequently, the 
constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to actions in equity (Matter of 
Coburn (1913) 165 Cal. 202, 219) or to special proceedings (Cornette, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 76), although the Legislature may provide for a jury trial in these 
situations by statute (ibid.; Estate of Dolbeer (1908) 153 Cal. 652, 657.) 
 
13 
settlement threatens to deprive litigants of an asserted right under section 592 “to 
have a jury determine issues of fact . . . , if the judge is permitted to make a 
determination of the value of each heirs’ [sic] claims independent of the factors 
used to reach the settlement.”  For the reasons below, we conclude section 592 
does not provide an alternative statutory basis for jury apportionment of a 
settlement or for requiring a jury determination of all facts relevant to such an 
apportionment. 
Section 592 provides in full:  “In actions for the recovery of specific, real, 
or personal property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon 
contract, or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact must 
be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference is ordered, as 
provided in this Code.  Where in these cases there are issues both of law and fact, 
the issue of law must be first disposed of.  In other cases, issues of fact must be 
tried by the Court, subject to its power to order any such issue to be tried by a jury, 
or to be referred to a referee, as provided in this Code.” 
Like the constitutional provision (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16), section 592 is 
historically based and does not expand the jury trial right beyond its common law 
scope.  (Crouchman v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1167, 1174; see generally 
ante, fn. 7.)  Accordingly, section 592 provides no independent basis for a right to 
a jury in the apportionment of wrongful death settlement proceeds.  Furthermore, 
to the extent Wife assumes a separate interpleader action or a separate quiet title 
action would afford the right to a jury, she is wrong.  (Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
v. Broderick (1925) 196 Cal. 497, 502 [interpleader]; Thomson v. Thomson (1936) 
7 Cal.2d 671, 681 [quiet title action when possession of the property not 
involved]; see Estate of Phelps (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 332, 340 [quiet title].) 
Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 543, offers additional reasons for rejecting 
section 592 as a basis for jury involvement in the apportionment context.  As Kim 
 
14 
recognizes, proceedings to apportion a settlement fund among heirs are not actions 
“for injuries” within section 592’s contemplation, because they typically involve 
no allegation of injury infliction or wrongdoing by one heir against other heirs.  
(Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 549.)  Such proceedings simply concern two or 
more heirs who, as wrongful death plaintiffs, may or may not agree on the 
distribution of the recovery obtained and seek a determination as to the proper 
apportionment.  (See ibid.) 
Also relevant here is Kim’s rejection of the contention that heirs are entitled 
to a jury “to decide the amount of damages each . . . suffered, according to the 
rules applicable to wrongful death damages.”  (Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 
549.)  As Kim explains, “[t]his is an action for apportionment.  The amount of 
damages was determined by the settlement, and no jury can now decide, as if in 
the first instance, the amount each plaintiff might have been entitled to recover 
from the alleged [settling] tortfeasors.  Appellants argue that ‘the fact that the 
monies are available for disbursement does not negate [their] right to have a jury 
decide their damages.’  They are wrong.  They gave up their right to have a jury 
decide their damages when they settled the wrongful death case.  The only issue 
remaining is, indeed, apportionment.  The fact that the apportionment will be 
made according to the law on wrongful death damages does not change that.”  
(Ibid.) 
In sum, we conclude the trial court did not act in contravention of section 
377.61 or in excess of jurisdiction when it apportioned the settlement proceeds 
between Wife and Daughter. 
B.  Allocation Based on Contribution of Each Heir’s Claim to the 
Settlement Fund 
Wife contends the trial court erred in apportioning the settlement fund 
based on evidence of the decedent’s alleged intent to divorce her, because that 
 
15 
evidence was not introduced in the wrongful death action itself or considered in 
arriving at the amount of the settlement.  To support this contention, she relies on 
the following passage from Changaris, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at page 313:  
“[W]hether the lump sum be ascertained by trial or by compromise, no plaintiff 
can have any proper reason for contesting the right of any other plaintiff.  If a 
party be defeated in his right to share, that does not increase the right of any other 
to a larger award.  The right of each party plaintiff to recover, as well as the 
amount rightfully to be recovered, is separate and apart from the like rights of all 
the others and is neither added to nor lessened by the success or failure of any 
other party in establishing a right to recover or in proving the amount to be 
awarded under such right.”  (Italics added.)  This passage, Wife argues, 
establishes a rule that prohibits heirs from attempting to increase their damages by 
attacking the claims of other heirs and precludes the trial court from allocating a 
settlement based on evidence the alleged tortfeasor did not consider in calculating 
the settlement amount.  In other words, she explains, a trial court must allocate a 
settlement by considering the relative contribution that each heir’s claim made to 
the settlement fund, just as the trial court’s role after a wrongful death jury award 
is to make an allocation that reflects the extent to which each heir’s claim for 
damages contributed to the total award.8  We find multiple reasons for rejecting 
these contentions. 
                                              
8  
In this regard, Wife contends that, to the extent the trial court had the 
jurisdiction and authority to allocate the settlement proceeds, it should have based 
its decision on the evidence that:  (1) at the wrongful death trial, Wife was the only 
one with a claim for Corder’s loss of earnings; and (2) according to defendant 
Morrow’s attorney, Morrow made its settlement on the strength of Wife’s claim, 
not Daughter’s claim, and if Wife’s loss of earnings claim had not been 
established, the settlement sum, if any, would have been one-tenth as much.  Wife 
further contends the trial court should not have considered the disputed evidence 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
16 
First, Wife overlooks a significant fact in this case.  Wife and Daughter, 
while represented by separate counsel, entered into a stipulation providing, in the 
event they could not agree on an allocation of damages following the verdict or 
settlement of the wrongful death action, that either party would have the right to a 
further trial regarding apportionment, and that either party could call additional 
witnesses not previously disclosed.  Reasonably viewed, their stipulation reflected 
an agreement that resolution of the competing interests of Wife and Daughter in 
the $1.1 million settlement could be based on consideration of otherwise 
admissible testimony from witnesses who did not testify at the trial against the 
nonsettling defendants.  We see no reason why this stipulation should not be 
honored.  (See Cohn v. Bugas (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 381, 392; Bemer v. Bemer 
(1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 766, 771 [a stipulation may lawfully include or limit the 
issues to be tried, whether or not such issues are pleaded].) 
Second, we find the reasoning of Changaris flawed because it fails to 
recognize that heirs may have competing interests in a settlement fund, which will 
often be less than the sum of the separate claims.  As the Court of Appeal reasoned 
below, “In the face of this reality, the Changaris court inexplicably denied the 
existence of any adversity between the wrongful death plaintiffs, saying ‘no 
plaintiff can have any proper reason for contesting the right of any other plaintiff.’  
(Changaris, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 313.)  If that proposition were true, a 
statutory provision for judicial apportionment would be [largely] unnecessary.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
of Corder’s intent to divorce because it was not a factor disclosed at the wrongful 
death trial against the two nonsettling defendants and was not known or 
considered by Morrow when arriving at its settlement amount. 
 
17 
Courts adjudicate disputes, and disputes do not arise unless the litigants’ 
respective interests are adverse.  [¶] The Canavin court identified the potential 
tension between coplaintiffs in a wrongful death case as the raison d’etre for 
judicial apportionment.  ‘The 1949 statutory amendment to provide for judicial 
apportionment appears based upon legislative acknowledgment of the respective 
heirs’ competing interests in the lump-sum award.’  (Canavin, supra, 148 
Cal.App.3d at p. 533, italics added.)  And quite obviously, competing interests 
cannot be adjudicated unless litigants are entitled to challenge their adversary’s 
position.”9 
Third, the assessments and intentions of a settling defendant are irrelevant 
to the merits of the heirs’ competing claims; therefore, they deserve no 
consideration in a judicial apportionment proceeding.  Just as a defendant “has no 
interest in the division which the plaintiffs may make among themselves, or which 
may be made for them, of the damages recovered” in a wrongful death trial 
(Robinson v. Western States Gas etc. Co. (1920) 184 Cal. 401, 410; see Canavin, 
supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 537), so, too, the division of a lump-sum wrongful 
death settlement is of no concern to the settling defendant (Smith v. Premier 
Alliance Ins. Co., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 698; Spearman v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1113, fn. 3).  Indeed, a defendant’s 
offer to settle may be based on inadequate information due to incomplete 
discovery, or a failure to reasonably investigate the claims, or some other 
                                              
9  
Strictly speaking, the relationship between heirs in wrongful death actions 
is not wholly adverse given the mandatory joinder burden.  (See ante, fn. 3.)  
However, once the joinder burden is satisfied, heirs ordinarily have no duty to 
each other with respect to advancing their respective claims for damages.  (See 
Watkins v. Nutting, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 499.) 
 
18 
consideration having little to do with the merits of the heirs’ competing claims.  
Thus, whether or not the heirs have stipulated to the introduction of additional 
witness testimony on the issue of apportionment, the trial court’s decision should 
not be dependent upon what a settling defendant considered relevant in calculating 
a compromise sum. 
Wife also relies on Collins v. Hemet Valley Hospital Dist. (1986) 186 
Cal.App.3d 922 (Collins) to support her position.  In that case, the trial court 
granted a petition filed on behalf of a decedent’s minor child for approval of a 
$100,000 settlement with a defendant in a wrongful death action; it then issued a 
second order determining that the parents of the decedent, who filed the action 
along with the minor, were not heirs or “dependent parents” of the decedent and 
therefore were not entitled to share in the settlement.  (Id. at pp. 925-926.)  Collins 
reversed, finding:  “The trial court was not called upon to determine whether Mr. 
and Mrs. Collins were actually ‘dependent’ parents of the decedent.  That would 
have been a proper question to be determined in a trial of the wrongful death 
action, but there was no trial; there was a settlement based not on actual facts but 
claimed facts, and the fairness of the proposed settlement and division of the 
proceeds should have been determined on the basis of the claimed facts and the 
circumstances that produced the settlement offer.”  (Id. at p. 928.) 
Collins is not on point.  Unlike the case before us, Collins concerned a 
guardian ad litem’s petition for court approval of a settlement of a minor’s claim, 
and, presumably, the showing required for such approval.  (§ 372 [guardian ad 
litem may compromise a minor’s claim with court approval]; see Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 7.950 [requirements for petitions for approval of a compromise of a 
minor’s claim].)  Moreover, while Collins purported to speak to the issue of 
apportionment, it did not involve any stipulation between the decedent’s parents 
and the minor’s guardian ad litem for a further trial on apportionment, so it is 
 
19 
unclear how Collins might have ruled had “[t]he trial court [been] called upon to 
determine whether Mr. and Mrs. Collins were actually ‘dependent’ parents of the 
decedent.”  (Collins, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 928.)  Finally, Collins did not 
identify any case law or other authority in reaching the conclusions quoted above.  
Accordingly, Collins fails to provide meaningful support for Wife’s contrary 
views. 
We conclude the trial court was not required to allocate the $1.1 million in 
settlement proceeds based solely on the evidence admitted at the trial against the 
nonsettling defendants or on the perceived contribution that each heir’s damages 
claim supposedly made to the settlement amount. 
C.  Testimony Regarding Decedent’s Intent to Divorce and Sufficiency 
of the Evidence to Support the Trial Court’s Allocation 
As relevant here, the trial court explained its allocation decision as follows:  
“Lisa Corder, Decedent’s daughter, presented witnesses who testified that the 
Decedent intended to divorce his wife.  According to them the Decedent felt that 
his marriage was a mistake because his wife had continued to work as a prostitute 
despite her promises to stop. . . .  [¶] On the other hand, Shaoping Corder’s 
witnesses indicated that the marriage was a good one and there was no intent 
manifested by the [Decedent] to divorce his wife. . . .  [¶] Having considered the 
conflicting evidence presented . . . , the Court finds most persuasive and credible 
the evidence that the marriage between Shaoping Corder and Decedent was on the 
verge of ending.  While it is true that Decedent had not yet filed for divorce or 
contacted an attorney, the Court finds that had the Decedent lived the marriage 
would have lasted a relatively short period of time given Decedent’s belief, 
expressed to several persons, that his wife was working as a prostitute against his 
wishes.”  (Capitalization of names omitted.)  As these findings indicate, the trial 
court focused on the disputed evidence regarding Corder’s state of mind and his 
 
20 
intentions shortly before his death.  The court did not consider any evidence 
purporting to show that Wife actually engaged in prostitution. 
In this court, Wife asserts the evidence at the apportionment proceeding, 
especially the testimony regarding Corder’s alleged intent to divorce her, did not 
substantially support the trial court’s allocation of only 10 percent of the 
settlement fund to her and the remaining 90 percent to Daughter.  In this regard, 
Wife argues a surviving spouse’s claim for future financial support cannot be 
reduced based on a decedent spouse’s unacted-upon expressions of an intent to 
obtain a dissolution of the marriage at some point in the future. 
Before elaborating on Wife’s contentions, we find it useful to review the 
rules governing the recovery available in wrongful death actions.  As a general 
matter, damages for wrongful death “ ‘are measured by the financial benefits the 
heirs were receiving at the time of death, those reasonably to be expected in the 
future, and the monetary equivalent of loss of comfort, society and protection.’ ”  
(Benwell v. Dean (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 345, 349 (Benwell).)  Specifically, this 
means that “[n]o damages can be given for the pain or anguish suffered by the 
person who is killed, the damages . . . being limited to the pecuniary loss suffered 
by the person or persons for whose benefit the right of action is given by reason of 
the death of the victim.  [Citation.]  This pecuniary loss may be a loss arising from 
a deprivation of something to which the statutory beneficiary would have been 
legally entitled if the person had lived, or it may be a pecuniary loss arising from 
the deprivation of something which, from all the circumstances of the particular 
case, it could reasonably be expected such beneficiary would have received from 
the deceased had his life not been taken—even though the obligation resting on 
the deceased to bestow such benefit may have been but a moral obligation.  
[Citations.]  Thus, there might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a 
deceased had continued he might have accumulated a greater estate, and that the 
 
21 
increased estate would have been inherited by the statutory beneficiaries as his 
heirs.  Or, there might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a deceased had 
not been taken the statutory beneficiaries, or some of them, would have continued 
to receive from the one who was killed financial assistance, or services having a 
financial value.  These are illustrations of direct financial benefits for the loss of 
which damages may be awarded.”  (Griffey v. Pacific Electric Railway Co. (1922) 
58 Cal.App. 509, 516-517 (Griffey).) 
In addition to these types of direct financial benefits, “there is that less 
tangible and not so immediate, but nevertheless real, pecuniary benefit which 
often may reasonably be expected from a continuance of the ‘society, comfort and 
protection’ of the deceased.”  (Griffey, supra, 58 Cal.App. at p. 517.)  The 
pecuniary value of the society, comfort, and protection that is lost through the 
wrongful death of a spouse, parent, or child may be considerable in cases where, 
for instance, the decedent had demonstrated a “kindly demeanor” toward the 
statutory beneficiary and rendered assistance or “kindly offices” to that person.  
(Beeson v. Green Mountain G.M. Co. (1880) 57 Cal. 20, 38 [opn. on rehg.].)  In 
this regard, however, recovery is not available in wrongful death actions for the 
grief or sorrow attendant upon the death of a loved one.  (See Krouse v. Graham 
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 69.) 
Powers v. Sutherland Auto Stage Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 487 (Powers) 
illustrates the distinction between the tangible and intangible benefits of a 
marriage relationship, and the circumstances that are relevant in assessing the 
pecuniary value of their loss.  In Powers, a husband and wife had been living 
separate and apart for over 13 years, although they had not legally separated or 
divorced.  The wife had not received any significant or consistent support from the 
husband during that time, and did not know his whereabouts in the years before he 
died.  In addition, the husband had been living in “illicit relations” with and 
 
22 
supporting another woman for three or four years prior to his death.  (Id. at p. 
489.) 
Despite these circumstances, Powers concluded the husband’s death had 
caused the wife to suffer pecuniary loss of her legally enforceable right of support.  
As Powers explained, even though the husband had deserted the wife and for a 
long time contributed nothing to her support, and even though he may have 
intended never to return, “yet so long as the marriage relation existed she was 
entitled to support from him in the absence of any evidence that she had forfeited 
the right by her own wrong.  This was a right which she could at any time during 
his life have legally enforced.  It was a right created by the marriage relation and 
would exist so long as the marriage relation itself existed.”  (Powers, supra, 190 
Cal. at pp. 489-490; but see Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 537, 
544-545 [indicating in dictum, and without reference to Powers, that evidence of 
husband’s abandonment and nonsupport of family was relevant to issue of 
damages for loss of earnings].) 
While finding that an award of approximately $15 per month over the 
husband’s estimated life expectancy was reasonable as compensation for the 
wife’s loss of her right of support, Powers determined that a different conclusion 
was warranted regarding any claimed loss of the intangible benefits of the 
marriage:  “In view of the fact that the [wife] and deceased had been living apart, 
nothing could have been awarded to [her] for the loss of the society, comfort, and 
protection of the deceased.”  (Powers, supra, 190 Cal. at p. 491.)  This conclusion 
is consistent with other decisions recognizing that factors relevant in assessing a 
claimed loss of society, comfort, and protection may include the closeness of the 
family unit at issue, the warmth of feeling between the family members, and the 
character of the deceased as “ ‘kind and attentive’ ” or “ ‘kind and loving.’ ”  
(Krouse v. Graham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 68, and cases cited therein.) 
 
23 
Here, Wife concedes the quality of her marriage and Corder’s state of mind 
toward her may have some bearing on a claim for loss of society, comfort, and 
protection.  Based on Powers and the case law above, we agree.  (See also 
Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 349 [“evidence of the nature of the personal 
relationship that existed between the decedent and the beneficiaries of a wrongful 
death action has a bearing on the compensation for loss of society, comfort and 
protection, and is therefore ordinarily admissible in such an action”]; id. at p. 350 
[“if it is proper for the beneficiary to produce evidence of the attitude and affection 
on the part of the decedent for the beneficiaries . . . then defendant should properly 
be able to rebut or negate such evidence”].)  Accordingly, evidence of a 
decedent’s intent to seek a divorce, as well as other evidence reflecting a strained 
relationship, may not be categorically excluded from the determination of a 
surviving spouse’s wrongful death damages. 
Nonetheless, Wife contends the evidence concerning Corder’s intent to 
seek a divorce should not have been considered with respect to her claim for loss 
of the right of support.  As in Powers, she argues, such support was a direct 
financial benefit to which she was legally entitled by virtue of her marital status at 
the time of Corder’s death.  Alternatively, she asserts, a decedent’s expression of 
an intent to divorce a spouse deserves consideration only where there is evidence 
the decedent engaged in affirmative action that manifested such intent.  In this 
case, she emphasizes, there was no evidence that Corder had initiated a marital 
dissolution or separation. 
We do not view Powers, supra, 190 Cal. 487, as compelling the conclusion 
that, so long as a marriage relationship remains legally intact at the time of the 
decedent’s death, evidence of the decedent’s declared intent to end the marriage 
deserves no consideration in evaluating the surviving spouse’s claim for loss of 
future financial support.  Nor do we adopt such a conclusion here.  As the 
 
24 
wrongful death statute expressly contemplates, damages must be assessed based 
on the totality of the circumstances in each case.  (§ 377.61 [recoverable damages 
in a wrongful death action are those that, “under all the circumstances of the case, 
may be just” (italics added)].)  Evidence that tends to show that a marriage is on 
the brink of being legally terminated appears to be material and to bear directly on 
the issue whether financial support is properly found a benefit “ ‘reasonably to be 
expected in the future’ ” had the decedent lived.  (Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 
at p. 349.) 
At the same time, there is merit to the concern that evidence of a decedent’s 
mere expression of a desire to divorce a spouse, when the decedent had taken no 
steps to effectuate a marital dissolution or legal separation, seems a speculative 
basis for finding that a marriage would have been short-lived had the decedent not 
died.  As Wife points out, the reasons why couples stay married are complicated 
and personal, just as are the reasons why and when they get divorced.  And as the 
dissenting justice below commented:  “No doubt there are some relationships 
where the spouses form an intention to divorce on a daily basis, and the intention 
evaporates just as quickly.  Mere intentions can be wonderfully evanescent.”  
Moreover, we are mindful that California has a public policy in favor of promoting 
marriage.  Thus, even when spouses have formally commenced the process of 
legal separation or marriage dissolution, the governing law contemplates the 
possibility of reconciliation as “ ‘the important issue.’ ”  (In re Marriage of 
McKim (1972) 6 Cal.3d 673, 679; see 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36, 38 (1978) 
[California eliminated the concept of fault in marriage dissolutions “in order to 
reduce the emotionally charged atmosphere and perhaps effect a reconciliation”].) 
Emphasizing that one is legally entitled to support from one’s spouse (see 
e.g. Fam. Code §§ 4300, 4301), the dissenting justice found that, at the time of a 
spouse’s death, the surviving spouse would have “every expectation of the 
 
25 
pecuniarily measurable support embodied in the wrongful death award predicated 
on [the late spouse’s] earnings.”  In concluding that evidence of a decedent’s mere 
intent to divorce is too speculative to affect a surviving spouse’s wrongful death 
recovery for the loss of such earnings, he urged adoption of the following 
restriction regarding such evidence:  “[U]nless legally cognizable, concrete steps 
are taken—either actual separation or filing for separation or dissolution—the 
existing legal rights and expectations between spouses remain intact, including 
expectations of continued support.  California’s family law takes no account of a 
mere unacted-upon intention to separate or divorce.  Even taking the step of seeing 
a lawyer does nothing to alter legal rights already in place.” 
For purposes of this case, we need not decide whether evidence of these 
identified “legally cognizable, concrete steps” is either necessary or sufficient to 
establish that a marriage would not have lasted had the decedent lived.10  Here, the 
trial court found that Corder’s marriage was “on the verge of ending” and “would 
have lasted a relatively short period of time” had Corder lived, based solely on 
testimony from Daughter’s witnesses claiming that Corder said he felt his 
marriage was a mistake and he intended to divorce Wife.  As we shall explain, that 
testimony was insufficient to sustain these findings. 
Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, is instructive on this point.  Similar to 
the situation here, Benwell involved a wrongful death action in which a husband, 
shortly before his death, allegedly told a witness that he was getting ready to leave 
his wife (the plaintiff) and that he could not stand her behavior.  (Id. at p. 348.)  
Yet the record disclosed that the husband “did not leave plaintiff and that at the 
time of his death they were living together.”  (Id. at p. 354.)  As pertinent here, 
                                              
10  
As indicated, it is undisputed that Corder had not taken any of these 
specific steps before his death. 
 
26 
Benwell concluded the decedent’s statements to the witness regarding his attitude 
and feelings toward the plaintiff were relevant to and admissible on the issue of 
the plaintiff’s loss of comfort and society, “since such conversations were 
indicative of [the] deceased’s feelings and attitude at the time they were uttered.”  
(Id. at p. 353.)  Nonetheless, Benwell noted such evidence could not be used “to 
prove that [the] deceased was going to leave plaintiff as a matter of fact or to 
prove any acts of misconduct on the part of plaintiff.”  (Id. at p. 350 [relying in 
part on Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (b)].) 
Ultimately, Benwell determined the trial court did not err in excluding the 
evidence of the decedent’s alleged statements, because their “true evidentiary 
bearing” was “at best slight and remote, yet of a nature as to make them very 
prejudicial against plaintiff.”  (Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 354.)  That is, 
given the absence of any other evidence in the record showing the decedent 
contemplated leaving plaintiff, “[t]he jury could draw inferences, which would be 
no more than conjecture or speculation, that decedent, had he lived, would have 
left plaintiff and that her behavior was less than exemplary.”  (Ibid.)11 
Daughter does not address Benwell’s conclusions on these points.  Instead, 
she relies on Foss v. Anthony Industries (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 794 (Foss), which 
held a trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence of a decedent’s 
oral expression of intent on the issue of financial support damages in a wrongful 
death action.  (Id. at pp. 800-801.)  In Foss, the plaintiff sought to introduce 
testimony of a witness who said the decedent told him he intended to take a job 
                                              
11  
Benwell also held that evidence of the remarriage of the surviving spouse 
does not affect the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action.  (Benwell, 
supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at pp. 355-356.)  We agree with Daughter that this aspect 
of the Benwell opinion is not implicated here. 
 
27 
after retiring from the Navy.  Foss found this evidence relevant because it might 
have supported a significantly higher amount of financial support damages for the 
decedent’s children than what the jury had awarded.  (Id. at p. 801.)  Although the 
proffered witness testimony was hearsay, Foss held the decedent’s statement of his 
intent to continue working should have been admitted under Evidence Code 
section 1250, which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of 
intent.  (Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 800-801.) 
We do not read Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, and Foss, supra, 139 
Cal.App.3d 794, as presenting a conflict of authority.  In Benwell, the court was 
unimpressed by the evidentiary bearing of the decedent’s alleged statement 
because the record disclosed the decedent was living with his wife and had not left 
her at the time of his death; nor was there any other evidence that he contemplated 
leaving her.  (Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 354.)  Meanwhile, the court in 
Foss determined the evidence of the decedent’s intent was relevant on the question 
of damages in light of “testimony of an expert witness who said the deceased’s 
children would have received over $100,000 more support from the deceased if he 
had taken the new job rather than completely retiring at the end of his naval 
career.”  (Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 800, italics added; see also ibid. [“the 
witness would have testified the deceased told him he intended to take the job 
following his retirement from the Navy” (italics added)].)  This quoted passage 
indicates there was other evidence in the record of an identified job prospect that 
the decedent had been offered, but had not yet accepted, before his untimely death. 
Consistent with both Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, and Foss, supra, 
139 Cal.App.3d 794, we conclude that the statements of Daughter’s witnesses, by 
themselves, do not support the trial court’s factual finding that Corder’s marriage 
would not have lasted for more than a short period of time had he lived.  Although 
declarations of marital unhappiness and a desire to dissolve a marriage may be 
 
28 
considered in corroboration of other evidence offered to prove a marriage is on the 
verge of ending, such declarations, standing alone, are insufficient to support a 
finding to that effect.12  In this regard, we are mindful that Powers, supra, 190 
Cal. 487, stands as a compelling illustration of the principle that, in assessing 
wrongful death damages, a surviving spouse has a legally enforceable right of 
support that is not easily defeated or diminished by evidence that the marital 
relationship was strained or disaffected.  (See id. at pp. 489-490.) 
In the proceeding below, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the trial 
court “found as a factual matter that the marriage was on the verge of ending.”  
Given this factual finding, the Court of Appeal explained, “substantial evidence 
supports the allocation” of 90 percent of the settlement proceeds to Daughter and 
10 percent to Wife.  Along the same lines, the court concluded that “if, as found 
by the trial court,” Corder’s eight-month marriage was “about the end,” that 
finding supported the amount of Wife’s allocated share because it was 
“significantly more than she was likely to receive” with respect to her legal right 
of support had Corder not died.  In light of our determination that substantial 
evidence did not support the trial court’s findings, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal with respect to the allocation issue. 
                                              
12  
These conclusions in no way alter the existing law that mere declarations of 
a decedent regarding his or her unhappiness in a marriage may suffice to negate or 
minimize the surviving spouse’s recovery for loss of the decedent’s society, 
comfort, and protection.  (See Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.3d at p. 353.) 
 
29 
Disposition 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter remanded 
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Corder v. Corder 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 132 Cal.App.4th 1261 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S138666 
Date Filed: July 5, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Randell L. Wilkinson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Davis & Heubeck, Law Offices of John C. Heubeck and John C. Heubeck for Plaintiff and Appellant and 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of Ronald E. Harrington, G. David Tenenbaum and Ronald E. Harrington for Plaintiff and 
Respondent and for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John C. Heubeck 
Law Offices of John C. Heubeck 
400 Continental Boulevard, 6th Floor 
El Segundo, CA  90245 
(310) 426-2478 
 
G. David Tenenbaum 
Law Offices of Ronald E. Harrington 
202 Newport Center Drive, 2nd Floor 
Newport Beach, CA  92660 
(949) 729-4440 
 
Ronald E. Harrington 
Law Offices of Ronald E. Harrington 
202 Newport Center Drive, 2nd Floor 
Newport Beach, CA  92660 
(949) 729-4440