Title: Commonwealth v. Ortiz

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11426 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LUIS ORTIZ. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 10, 2014. - November 26, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case.  Self-
Defense. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 24, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant appeals from his conviction of 
murder in the first degree, on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, in the shooting death of Philip Meltzer.  
Although the defendant concedes that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the jury's verdict, and does not suggest that any 
error occurred at trial, he contends that the verdict was 
2 
against the weight of the evidence.  The defendant asks that we 
exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or to reduce his conviction to a lesser degree of guilt.  
Having reviewed the entire record, we decline to do so, and 
affirm the defendant's conviction. 
 
Because the defendant maintains that the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence, we summarize that evidence 
without drawing all inferences favorable to the Commonwealth.  
See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 896 (2013). 
 
On May 29, 2010, the defendant's sister, Angelie Ortiz,1 was 
kidnapped by her former boy friend, Gilberto Cartagena.  
Cartagena trapped Angelie and their two year old son in a van 
and drove to the Lowell home of his acquaintance, Timothy Brown.  
Brown got into the van with Angelie and Cartagena and drove them 
to Lawrence.  Brown had given Cartagena a gun, and on the way to 
Lawrence, Cartagena pointed the gun at different parts of 
Angelie's body, including her genitals, and threatened to kill 
her. 
 
At some point, Angelie inadvertently dialed her brother's 
telephone number.  A resulting message on the defendant's 
telephone's voicemail recorded Angelie crying and screaming for 
several minutes. 
                     
 
1 Because Angelie Ortiz shares a last name with the 
defendant, we refer to her by her first name. 
3 
 
In Lawrence, Angelie escaped with her son.  She arranged 
for the defendant to meet them, and the defendant drove them to 
Angelie's aunt's home.  Angelie told the defendant that 
Cartagena had kidnapped her and her son and had threatened her 
with a gun. 
 
In the early hours of May 30, 2010, the defendant picked up 
Angelie and their cousin, Luis Fontanez.2  Angelie and Fontanez 
believed that they were driving to New Hampshire.  On the way, 
Angelie, Fontanez, and the defendant stopped at a wake, where 
the defendant had a drink.  Angelie told guests at the wake that 
she had been kidnapped.  She also gave the defendant additional 
details about her ordeal, including the fact that Cartagena had 
pointed a gun at her genitals. 
 
After returning to their vehicle, Angelie, Fontanez, and 
the defendant stopped at a nearby gasoline station, where 
Angelie pumped gasoline and the defendant went into a 
convenience store.  His image and that of the clothing he wore, 
including a striped red shirt, were captured by the store's 
security camera.  After they left the store, Angelie drove, and 
the defendant directed her to Brown's neighborhood.  When they 
passed Brown's house, Angelie pointed it out as the house to 
which Cartagena had taken her. 
                     
 
2 Both Angelie and Luis Fontanez testified pursuant to 
grants of immunity. 
4 
 
Angelie, Fontanez, and the defendant circled the block 
twice.  The defendant instructed Angelie to stop the vehicle, 
saying that he was "going to handle something."  At some point, 
Fontanez had heard the defendant say that Cartagena was "going 
to get his."  Angelie left the engine running; according to her 
testimony, the defendant had instructed her to do so.  Angelie 
also turned off the headlights.  The defendant asked Fontanez to 
hand him gloves, and he put on one or both of the gloves.  
Somewhere en route from the gasoline station to Brown's house, 
the defendant had changed out of his striped red shirt and into 
a dark T-shirt.  The defendant stepped out of the vehicle, went 
to the trunk, pulled out a gun, and put it in his waistband.  He 
walked towards Brown's house. 
 
Cartagena was not at the house, but Brown was there.  The 
victim, Meltzer, was Brown's roommate, and he was also at the 
house, along with Megan Grover, the victim's girl friend.  
Earlier that day, Brown had stolen heroin from Cartagena.  
Brown, Grover, and the victim were mixing the stolen heroin with 
cocaine and using both.  Cartagena telephoned Grover on one or 
more occasions, looking for Brown and threatening to kill him. 
 
The defendant knocked on the door to Brown's house sometime 
after 3 A.M.  Brown ran out the back door and into the basement.  
Grover stood in the doorway of Brown's room.  The victim went to 
open the front door.  Grover testified at trial that the victim 
5 
was not holding anything in his hands, and that she had never 
seen him with a weapon.  When the door opened, the defendant 
pulled a gun out of his jeans, shooting himself in the leg in 
the process.  The defendant then shot the victim twice, killing 
him.  The defendant returned to the car, where he told Angelie, 
"I think I shot myself."3 
 
Angelie took the defendant to the hospital.  Before 
entering the hospital, the defendant took off his bloody jeans 
and his underwear.  Angelie then drove to an ice cream shop and 
delivered the defendant's rolled-up jeans to some friends.  The 
clothing, but not the gun, were later recovered by police. 
 
The defendant instructed Angelie and Fontanez to tell 
police that he had been shot in front of a nearby liquor store.  
The defendant himself told police on multiple occasions that he 
had been shot at that liquor store.  During the course of their 
investigation, officers asked the defendant several times, "If 
it was self-defense, let us know."  The defendant answered, "No, 
I was never there."  
 
The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, 
armed entry and assault with intent to commit a felony, and 
                     
 
3 Fontanez testified at trial that the defendant had said, 
"I got shot, but I shot him back."  In his grand jury testimony, 
which was introduced at trial as a prior inconsistent statement, 
Fontanez had said that the defendant "not only said he shot 
himself, he said he shot someone else." 
6 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  At trial, the defendant's 
theory was self-defense.  He testified that, at the wake, he 
heard for the first time the voicemail message that recorded his 
sister screaming.  He decided to confront Cartagena, and he went 
to Brown's house intending to fight Cartagena, whom he knew 
well, or Brown, whom he did not know.  The defendant explained 
that he had taken a gun with him because he knew that Cartagena 
was a violent man who owned guns of his own.  Indeed, Cartagena 
had given the defendant the gun that he used that night.  
According to the defendant, the victim, whom the defendant also 
did not know, opened the door, pointed a gun at the defendant, 
and fired.  The defendant shot his own gun only because he did 
not believe that he could run away. 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the judge 
allowed the defendant's motion for a required finding of not 
guilty on the theory of felony-murder.  The only theory of 
murder in the first degree on which the judge instructed the 
jury was deliberate premeditation.  The judge also instructed 
the jury on murder in the second degree and on voluntary 
manslaughter based on heat of passion upon reasonable 
provocation, heat of passion induced by sudden combat, and 
excessive use of force in self-defense.  In addition, the judge 
provided a detailed instruction on self-defense. 
7 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree and of unlawful possession of a firearm.  They acquitted 
him of the charge of armed entry and assault with intent to 
commit a felony.  The defendant filed a motion for a finding of 
guilty of murder in the second degree, which the trial judge 
denied. 
 
The defendant argues on appeal that the verdict was against 
the weight of the evidence.  He contends that considerable 
evidence suggested that he acted in self-defense.  Other 
evidence, according to the defendant, pointed to mitigating 
factors, and particularly to mitigation based on heat of 
passion.  Finally, the defendant notes that he had virtually no 
criminal record before this offense, and that his life has 
featured meaningful family relationships and professional 
accomplishments. 
 
General Laws c. 278, § 33E, requires us to determine if a 
new trial or a reduction of a conviction to a lesser degree of 
guilt is required because "the verdict was against the law or 
the weight of the evidence . . . or for any other reason that 
justice may require."  "Regard for the public interest impels us 
to use with restraint our power under § 33E to modify the jury's 
verdict."  Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431 (2008), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 151 (1973).  We 
thus have stressed time and again that "[w]e do not sit as a 
8 
second jury to pass anew on the question of the defendant's 
guilt."  Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 80 (2007), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 501 (2005).  See 
Commonwealth v. Reddick, 372 Mass. 460, 464 (1977).  In order 
for this court to "grant a new trial on the ground that the 
verdict was against the weight of the evidence, it must appear 
that the verdict, if allowed to stand, would work a miscarriage 
of justice."  Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 916 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 416 Mass. 258, 266 
(1993).  See Commonwealth v. Coyne, 420 Mass. 33, 35 (1995).  
The record in this case does not indicate that the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence, or that it otherwise worked 
a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Turning first to the matter of self-defense, to which the 
defendant testified, the defendant sought to undermine Grover's 
contrary testimony that the victim was not holding a gun.  He 
did so by exploring her history of drug use and by introducing 
evidence that she could not have seen what she claimed to have 
observed about the shooting.4  Even if the jury were to discount 
                     
 
4 The defendant introduced photographs and other evidence 
purporting to show that, given the layout of the house, Grover 
only could have seen the killer's gun, as she claimed, if it had 
come within an inch or two of the victim.  The evidence 
indicated that, at so close a range, the killer's shots likely 
would have left marks known as "stippling" on the victim's body, 
but that no such stippling was discovered. 
9 
aspects of Grover's testimony, they were free to credit her 
testimony that the victim was unarmed when he answered the door, 
just as they were free to discredit the defendant's claim that 
he shot the victim in self-defense.  "The jury could believe 
all, some, or none of the testimony of any witness."  
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 203 (2011), citing 
Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 658–659 (2002). 
 
There were also multiple factors that supported Grover's 
account.  Unlike the defendant, Grover had no apparent reason to 
lie.  A search of Brown's house by police did not turn up the 
gun that, according to the defendant, the victim had been 
holding.  And both Angelie and a neighbor testified that they 
had heard three shots; because the defendant fired two shots at 
the victim and one, inadvertently, at himself, if the victim had 
first shot at the defendant, nearby witnesses would have been 
expected to hear four shots.5  In sum, "the question of self-
defense was fully aired at the trial," Commonwealth v. Walker, 
443 Mass. 213, 229 (2005), and we see no reason to disturb the 
jury's resolution of this question. 
                     
 
5 Fontanez testified at trial that he had heard four shots.  
This evidence was impeached with Fontanez's statements to police 
that he had heard three shots.  Fontanez's grand jury testimony 
on this subject was ambiguous.  Angelie testified before the 
grand jury that she had heard "three or four" shots.  Another 
neighbor heard only two shots, as did Megan Grover. 
10 
 
The jury's conclusion that the defendant's actions were not 
mitigated by heat of passion was also not against the weight of 
the evidence.  The defendant had learned sometime the previous 
day that Angelie had been kidnapped.  It is possible that the 
defendant, as he alone testified, first heard Angelie's 
unintended voicemail message at the wake.  But the defendant 
left the wake, went into a convenience store, returned to his 
vehicle, traveled to Brown's neighborhood, and twice circled the 
block before arriving at Brown's house.  The defendant also took 
various measures in apparent preparation for the shooting:  he 
changed from a conspicuous striped shirt into a nondescript dark 
one; asked his cousin for a glove or two and put them on; took a 
gun out of the trunk and placed it in his waistband; and left 
behind a car primed for a speedy, undetected escape, its motor 
running and its lights off.  After leaving the scene, the 
defendant evidently arranged for the disposal of his gun and 
bloody clothing, and he concocted a false story to explain his 
wound, which he instructed his sister and his cousin to tell 
police.  The jury were entitled to conclude, based on this 
evidence, that the defendant's actions reflected premeditation 
rather than spontaneity, and that a conviction of murder in the 
first degree, rather than a lesser offense, was warranted.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. at 432, citing Commonwealth 
v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 556 (1981). 
11 
 
Finally, the personal characteristics to which the 
defendant points, while relevant to our analysis, are 
insufficient in this case to disturb the verdict.  See 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 229; Commonwealth v. Almon, 
387 Mass. 599, 607-608 (1982). 
 
We have reviewed the entire record pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We are satisfied that the defendant's trial was 
conducted fairly and without error, and we discern no cause to 
reduce the defendant's conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or 
to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.