Title: COX v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

COX v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES  COX v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES 2004 OK 17 87 P.3d 607 Case Number: 96899 Decided: 03/09/2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA BRUCE R. COX, Petitioner/Appellee, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel., OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent/Appellant, and OKLAHOMA MERIT PROTECTION COMMISSION, Respondent. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I Honorable Ryan D. Reddick, Trial Judge ¶0 Following a pre-termination hearing, the respondent/appellant, Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS/employer), discharged the petitioner/appellee, Bruce R. Cox (Cox/employee), a permanent classified employee, for sexual harassment and retaliation against complaining employees. The employee filed a petition for reconsideration with the respondent, Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (Merit Protection Commission). The administrative hearing officer upheld the discharge, as did the Commission en banc, and the employee appealed to the district court. Considering the parties' briefs and oral argument, the trial judge, Honorable Ryan D. Reddick, left undisturbed the administrative hearing officer's findings of fact but determined that the employer failed to follow statutory mandates for progressive discipline, reversed the administrative decision and ordered the employee reinstated. The employer appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We hold that: 1) CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. Charles L. Waters, General Counsel, Richard A. Resetaritz, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent/Appellant, Robert W. Cole, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner/Appellee. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 We granted certiorari to determine whether: 1) in all instances, CONTESTED FACTS ¶2 On December 3, 1974, the petitioner/appellee, Bruce R. Cox (Cox), went to work as a permanent classified employee for the respondent/appellant, Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS/employer). In May of 1999, while Cox occupied the position of County Director, the Office for Civil Rights received a complaint indicating that he had engaged in sexual harassment and created a hostile work environment. Cox's supervisor filed the complaint based upon the allegations of Glenda Trekell (Trekell/complainant). Trekell asserted that Cox made unwelcome sexual remarks, repeatedly told dirty jokes, traded "favors for favors", and engaged in physical contact with other female employees. Representatives of the Office of Civil Rights: interviewed staff from Cimarron, Beaver, Texas, Woodward and Alfalfa Counties; reviewed electronic mail sent to and received from Cox; and perused personnel files to determine whether Cox had promoted an employee from Secretary I to Social Worker Assistant without her having met the requirements for the position. ¶3 When interviewed, Cox did not deny making sexual remarks. Rather, he indicated that he had made such remarks "to half the state". Documentation did not indicate that the secretary met the requirements for a promotion to a social worker position. Although not directly supervised by Cox, the Office of Civil Rights determined that one female employee had taken a voluntary demotion to avoid the hostile work environment Cox created. Furthermore, it uncovered evidence demonstrating Cox's use of DHS's electronic mail system to conduct personal romances and to send sexually oriented jokes demeaning to women. It determined that Cox violated DHS policy relating to: the courteous treatment of clients and employees; conduct unbecoming a public employee; and willful violation of the Oklahoma Personnel Act, ¶4 On January 4, 2000, Cox's supervisor wrote Cox indicating that he was being given notice of a proposed adverse action -- discharge. A revised letter was forwarded on January 11, 2000. On the same dates, under separate cover, Cox was provided documents relating to the termination decision. Although Cox contends that he was never advised that the investigative materials were confidential, both these transmittals provide that the investigative summary was a confidential document maintained separately from the employee's local personnel file. Furthermore, the investigators with the Office of Civil Rights and Cox's supervisor assert that they discussed with Cox, in-depth, his responsibility in regard to confidentiality and retaliation. ¶5 Following receipt of the termination notice, Cox called a meeting of all staff on January 12, 2000, having employees sign a sheet indicating the meeting was called for sexual harassment training. Following this meeting, an employee called Cox's supervisor. Because Cox stated that he would make the confidential investigative materials available to anyone who cared to read them, she was upset and feared reprisal. According to the employee, Cox even went so far as to say he would publish the report on the internet. The employee alleged that Cox called those who made statements against him liars and pressured other employees to write letters in his support. He also allegedly encouraged male employees to file complaints against female staff members who were not "lily white". On January 20, 2000, the Office of Civil Rights received a telephone call from an employee in Texas County who had read the confidential investigative report and was upset because she believed that the relationship between herself and Cox had been mischaracterized and she had been slandered. ¶6 As a result of these contacts, the Office of Civil Rights launched a second investigation. On January 21, 2000, it requested that Cox be removed from duty pending completion of the investigation concerning alleged retaliation. The Office of Civil Rights determined that the allegations relating to the coercive nature of the January 12th meeting were well founded, that a hostile work environment was created, and recommended that disciplinary action be imposed. On January 31, 2000, Cox was forwarded an amended notice of proposed adverse action calling for his discharge and setting a pre-termination hearing for February 15th. The administrative hearing officer's report of the pre-termination hearing provides that testimony elicited at the hearing was contradictory. Nevertheless, she deemed the evidence sufficient to support the sexual harassment and hostile work environment charges warranting discharge. ¶7 Cox was issued a final notice of formal disciplinary action -- discharge -- on March 6, 2000. He filed a petition for reconsideration with the respondent, Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (Merit Protection Commission). The testimony at the hearing on August 22, 2000, like that at the pre-termination hearing, was sharply divided between that detrimental to his cause and that in his favor. The original complainant testified that on two different occasions, Cox had asked her if she knew what "kinky sex was". Both times, he told her that it was "sex with a fat woman, 'cause there's so many kinks to put it in." The complainant also stated that Cox asked her at a training conference mixer if she'd ever needed "to go pee real bad". When she responded affirmatively, he asked her to "feel of me and see if I need to go". ¶8 Another social worker testified that when a young, attractive female came into Cox's office to apply for food stamps, he would make comments indicating that, based on her looks, she could qualify for assistance. ¶9 Another thirty-year DHS employee testified that Cox would often comment on attractive women coming into the office saying that he would like to take them home with him or "have" them. ¶10 The investigator for the Office of Civil Rights testified that Cox admitted to telling many of the sexual jokes described. ¶11 Following the meeting called by Cox concerning the investigation, the investigator received approximately five calls from employees who said, because of the information that Cox revealed, they had been accosted by other employees, humiliated, embarrassed and intimidated. ¶12 Cox's supervisor stated that once she reviewed the evidence from the investigation she became convinced that termination was justified rather than some lesser discipline. She based the decision not only on the original complaints involving sexual harassment but also on his decision to call a meeting and to intimidate employees once he was notified that he might lose his job. The supervisor simply felt there was no justification for not terminating him. ¶13 In rebuttal, Cox testified that the meeting which was held on January 12th had been previously scheduled as family support training and that, after he received the investigative report, he asked his secretary to gather everyone who was there. He denied having a sexually inappropriate relationship with an employee and stated that the only time he referred to the "elbow test" was when he was talking about a former supervisor who had used the test as a hiring procedure. He did admit to telling the jokes related to "kinky sex" and employing the "pee test" at parties or around the table at dinner as an ice breaker. He denied asking an employee to touch him to see if he needed to urinate. Cox testified that he had not asked his secretary to stay with him because she had seen a mouse in her room and that the incident concerning the new secretary and the "puppy conversation" occurred because other female employees shared a picture of a stripper with him. According to Cox, the new secretary walked in on the conversation, heard the term "puppies" and said she had some puppies and asked if anyone wanted to see them. When questioned about his electronic mail, Cox stated that he didn't believe any communications to be inappropriate. ¶14 Cox testified that during the meeting called on January 12th, he explained the complaint against him. He stated that he was never told the report was confidential and that he did not harass or intimidate anyone, nor did he encourage his male associates to file frivolous claims. He also indicated, that given the chance, he would change his behavior. ¶15 Four DHS employees testified that Cox did not tell sexually implicit jokes in the office and that they had never heard him refer to the "elbow test" or tell a joke about "kinky sex". Other witnesses said that Cox might tell a joke of a sexual nature on occasion ¶16 The administrative hearing officer issued a final order on September 13, 2000, finding that: 1) progressive discipline need not always be imposed; 2) a preponderance of the evidence supported Cox's discharge; and 3) there had been no abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of the cause. The Commissioners en banc reviewed the hearing officer's ruling on October 30, 2000, denying Cox's request for rehearing or reconsideration of the order. On November 27th, Cox filed a petition for review with the district court. I. ¶17 TITLE ¶18 DHS contends that neither 74 O.S. 2001 §840-6.328 nor Merit Protection Commission Rule OAC 455:10-11-429 mandate the imposition of progressive discipline in all causes. Cox does not dispute seriously this premise. Rather, he argues that public policy mandates that only when an agency demonstrates that no lesser alternative punishment would properly address the problem may an employee be discharged without being given the opportunity to correct behavior through the progressive disciplinary process. DHS asserts that neither the statute nor the rule impose such a burden on the employer.30 We agree. ¶19 In determining whether a statute applies to a given set of facts, we focus on legislative intent31 which controls statutory interpretation.32 Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective33 considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.34 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.35 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end36 championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them.37 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.38 ¶20 Title "A. Each appointing authority shall establish written policies and procedures for progressive discipline of employees according to the rules established by the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission. . . . B. Progressive discipline is a system designed to ensure not only the consistency, impartiality and predictability of discipline, but also the flexibility to vary penalties if justified by aggravating or mitigating conditions. Typically, penalties range from verbal warning to discharge, with intermediate levels of a written warning, suspension or demotion. . . . C. Each supervisor shall be responsible for applying discipline when necessary that is progressive in nature, appropriate for the offense, and equitable. Each supervisor shall consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances when determining the proper disciplinary action. Each supervisor shall use prompt, positive action to avoid more serious disciplinary actions. The Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission shall promulgate rules to establish the requirements and guidelines for discipline." [Emphasis provided.] ¶21 Cox finds support for his premise in the apparently mandatory language of the statute providing that: a progressive disciplinary process "shall" be established; supervisors "shall" be responsible for applying discipline progressively; and the requirement that supervisors "shall" move promptly to avoid more serious disciplinary actions. Although the use of "shall" generally signifies a legislative command, ¶22 The Legislature may delegate rule making authority to agencies, boards and commissions to facilitate the administration of legislative policy pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, ". . . Based on relevant circumstances, a single incident may justify a higher step of discipline without proceeding through lower steps of discipline." [Emphasis supplied.] ¶23 Taken together, the language of ¶24 The Legislature has acquiesced in the Merit Commission Board's interpretation. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the Legislature may: 1) approve, delay, suspend, veto or amend any rule or proposed rule under review by joint resolution; ¶25 Through the promulgation of OAC 455:10-11-4, the Merit Commission made it clear that there may be instances in which progressive disciplinary steps are not warranted. The Legislature amended ¶26 Neither II. ¶27 ALTHOUGH CONFLICTING EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED ON THE ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION, THE FACTUAL DETERMINATION TO UPHOLD THE EMPLOYEE'S DISCHARGE WAS NEITHER CLEARLY ERRONEOUS IN VIEW OF THE RELIABLE, MATERIAL, PROBATIVE AND SUBSTANTIALLY COMPETENT EVIDENCE NOR WAS IT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS; THEREFORE, WE MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE OUR JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE AGENCY'S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS. ¶28 DHS argues that the record evidence is sufficient to support the Merit Protection Commission's final order upholding Cox's discharge. Cox contends that the evidence does not support a finding of sexual harassment or the creation of a hostile work environment and that discharge was too severe a penalty to impose.55 ¶29 In reviewing an administrative order our province is not to determine whether, in the first instance, this Court would reach the same result as the administrative agency. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the agency on its factual determinations. Rather, we review the record to determine whether the petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced by a clearly erroneous decision considering the reliable, material, probative and substantially competent evidence resulting in an arbitrary or capricious result.56 ¶30 Although there was evidence presented at the administrative hearing which would support a finding both that Cox engaged in sexually harassing behavior and created a hostile work environment through his retaliatory actions during the staff meeting held on January 12, 2000, there was also evidence from several of Cox's subordinates indicating that he did not engage in sexually explicit behavior or create a stressful environment in the work place. Nevertheless, the record contains multiple electronic mail messages from Cox to female employees which are rife with sexual inneundo. Cox testified at the hearing that he did not find these messages to be inappropriate.57 Furthermore, following the January staff meeting, the Office of Civil Rights received a number of calls from individuals who were concerned that they would face retaliation because of the manner in which Cox handled the confidential investigatory report. One of the calls came from an employee who felt she had been slandered because of information contained in the report indicating she and Cox engaged in an inappropriate relationship.58 Finally, the record indicates that at least one other DHS employee, engaging in similar behavior, was terminated59 and that the investigators specifically believed that no lesser form of penalty would result in reformation of Cox's behavior.60 ¶31 Under the record presented, we hold that although conflicting evidence was presented on the issues of sexual harassment and retaliation, the factual determination to uphold the employee's discharge was neither clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantially competent evidence nor was it arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency's factual determinations. CONCLUSIONS ¶32 We recognize that Cox's discharge seems a high price to pay for a supervisor nearing retirement. Nevertheless, a balance must be struck between the rights of the employee and the need to have governmental operations run smoothly. The Legislature has established a clear policy against sexual harassment in state agencies.61 Furthermore, it recently added a new subsection to the progressive discipline regime indicating that evidence over four years old shall not be considered in imposing an increased penalty to a formerly disciplined employee [much of the evidence introduced in relation to Cox was contemporaneous with the charges and, at the oldest, two years preceding the disciplinary action]. However, one of the specific exemptions from the stale evidence rule is any incident involving sexual misconduct and/or harassment.62 Here, in performing his duties, the employee violated standards, restraints and restrictions on conduct, clearly and explicitly prohibited by the Legislature. Certainly, as a general rule, employers should utilize progressive disciplinary standards to correct inadequate job performance whenever appropriate. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, requiring an employer to retain such an employee would contravene the legislatively created policy against sexual harassment -- especially where 74 O.S. 2001 §840-6.363 and Merit Protection Commission Rule OAC 455:10-11-464 do not mandate the imposition of progressive discipline in all instances or require employers to prove that some less severe disciplinary act would be ineffective before imposing a more stringent penalty. ¶33 The record contains conflicting evidence on the issues of sexual harassment and retaliation. Nevertheless, the factual determination to uphold the employee's discharge was neither clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantially competent evidence nor was it arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency's factual determinations.65 CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. Watt, C.J., Hodges, Hargrave, Kauger, Winchester, Edmondson, J.J. concur. Boudreau, J. concurs in result. Opala, V.C.J. and Lavender, J. concur in part and dissent in part. Opala, V.C.J., with whom Lavender, J., joins, dissenting in part. I would affirm the trial court's judgment. FOOT