Title: Garcia v. Lawson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Garcia v. Lawson1996 WY 159928 P.2d 1164Case Number: 96-132Decided: 12/06/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Charlene GARCIA,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Officer Roger 
LAWSON,

 Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Anthony F. Ross 
of Ross & Ross, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Terry L. 
Armitage, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
Charlene Garcia appeals from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of 
Appellee Officer Roger Lawson on Garcia's claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Garcia presents a 
single issue for our review:

I.          
Was the defendant Lawson entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or are there genuine 
issues of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary 
judgment?

FACTS

[¶4]      We are familiar 
with this case as it was previously before us on a different issue. Lawson v. 
Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136 (Wyo. 1996). We enumerated the facts in the following 
way:

The following recitation 
of facts is based upon the undisputed facts as demonstrated by the summary 
judgment materials and states those facts in the light most beneficial to the 
nonmoving party affording that party the benefit of all favorable inferences 
that may be drawn from them. The nonmoving party in this case is appellee, 
Charlene Garcia (Garcia). From February 22, 1990 until February 24, 1990, Garcia 
was held captive by her estranged boyfriend in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On February 
24, 1990, Garcia escaped and eventually contacted the Cheyenne Police 
Department. Officer Roger Lawson (Lawson) was dispatched to investigate Garcia's 
case. Garcia informed Lawson that her ex-boyfriend broke into her sister's 
house, where she was house-sitting, on February 22, 1990 and held Garcia against 
her will until February 24, 1990. Further, Garcia informed Lawson that her 
ex-boyfriend repeatedly raped her and physically abused her during her 
confinement.

The physical evidence 
corroborated Garcia's claims. The back door of her sister's home showed signs of 
forced entry; there was a broken statue that Garcia claimed her attacker threw 
at her, hitting her in the shoulder; there was a fist-sized hole in the wall; 
and Garcia had bruises on her arm and head. Lawson was made aware of this 
physical evidence. In spite of the overwhelming evidence, Lawson refused to have 
a rape kit performed on Garcia and further informed her that neither he nor the 
Cheyenne Police Department could do anything about the matter since it was a 
boyfriend/girlfriend situation and it would be her word against his. Lawson did 
not collect any evidence while he was at Garcia's sister's home. However, while 
continuing the investigation, Lawson did take the opportunity to discuss the 
size of a mutual acquaintance's breasts and to invite Garcia to go out for a 
beer with him.

Lawson ultimately sought 
advice concerning how the situation should be reported, but could find no one in 
the Cheyenne Police Department to advise him. Unable to find an experienced 
officer, he performed his own research and concluded that there was no basis for 
felony charges. Finally, Lawson wrote a citation and complaint charging Garcia's 
assailant with disturbance of the peace.

Lawson was suspended by 
the Cheyenne Police Department, and other officers within the department were 
placed in charge of the investigation. However, the charges filed with the 
district attorney's office were eventually dismissed for lack of evidence. 
Garcia filed a complaint on February 11, 1993, and later amended that complaint 
to include a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Lawson 
violated her constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Lawson 
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming, among other things, that he was 
immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. The district 
court refused to grant that motion, and Lawson filed this interlocutory 
appeal.

912 P.2d  at 
1137-38.

[¶5]      In that appeal, 
we reversed the district court's order, holding that Lawson was entitled to 
invoke the defense of qualified immunity. 912 P.2d  at 1139. In this appeal, 
Garcia contests the district court's order which granted Lawson's motion for a 
summary judgment on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Roitz v. 
Kidman, 913 P.2d 431, 432 (Wyo. 1996); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. JCI v. TL By TL (Paternity of TS), 917 P.2d 183, 185 (Wyo. 1996). We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by 
employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed 
and used by the lower court. Scott v. Scott, 918 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo. 1996). We 
do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. 
Koopman By and Through Koopman v. Fremont County School District, 911 P.2d 1049, 
1051 (Wyo. 1996).

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      We first 
recognized the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress cause of action in 
Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986). In doing so, we 
adopted § 46 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:

"Outrageous Conduct 
Causing Severe Emotional Distress

"(1)      One who by extreme and 
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress 
to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily 
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."

Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46 (1965)).

[¶8]      Outrageous 
conduct is defined as "conduct which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, 
is regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 
721 P.2d  at 1066 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra, § 46 cmt. d). Severe emotional 
distress is defined as distress which is "so severe that no reasonable man could 
be expected to endure it." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra, § 46 cmt. 
j).

[¶9]      In Leithead, we 
recognized that adoption of the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress 
cause of action could flood the courts with fraudulent claims and create 
potentially unlimited liability for every type of mental disturbance. 721 P.2d  
at 1065. We also noted, however, that frivolous claims can be weeded out at the 
summary judgment stage. 721 P.2d  at 1066.

"Court and jury. It is 
for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's 
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it 
is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in 
the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to 
result in liability."

Id. (quoting 
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 46 cmt. h).

[¶10]   After having examined the record in 
this case in the light most favorable to Garcia, we agree that Lawson failed to 
complete a quality investigation and that he made two offensive remarks. 
Although Lawson could certainly have been more considerate in his dealings with 
Garcia, his conduct was at most annoying, insulting, and insensitive. His 
conduct was not, however, what we would characterize as being beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, atrocious, or utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. "`[T]he law does not afford a cause of action for bad taste, 
boorishness, condescension, obnoxiousness, or social ineptitude.'" Drejza v. 
Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C. 1994).

[¶11]   We conclude that no genuine issue 
of material fact existed with regard to whether Lawson's conduct was 
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support an 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim and that Lawson is, 
therefore, entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Having concluded that 
Lawson's conduct did not sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, we do not need to address whether Garcia suffered severe 
emotional distress as a result of this conduct.

[¶12]   Affirmed.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶13]   I concur with the majority opinion 
of the Court in this case, but I choose to add some comments of my own. There 
can be no question that Lawson's approach to the situation with Garcia was 
insensitive. It quite likely was disappointing to the police department of the 
City of Cheyenne. The question, however, is whether Lawson committed the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress by failure to investigate Garcia's 
allegation of rape more diligently.

[¶14]   It is the law of this case that 
Garcia did not enjoy a right to a "quality investigation." Lawson v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136 (Wyo. 1996). Indeed it is the law of this case that Lawson enjoyed 
qualified immunity for his failure to investigate Garcia's allegations. Without 
citing Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo. 1992), we held that 
Lawson was not charged with knowing that a reasonable police officer would have 
conducted a more diligent investigation. I am satisfied that our holdings in 
Lawson and Keehn are correct, although perhaps Keehn could have gone further in 
analyzing whether an officer owes a duty to an individual citizen as 
distinguished from the duty owed to the community. The law should not shackle 
law enforcement officers with a duty to investigate all possible citizen 
complaints at the hazard of defending a lawsuit.

[¶15]   Be that as it may, Lawson did 
undertake to do something in this situation, and the question before the court 
is whether he did it in a manner that the law accepts. The logic of how an 
officer can by the same conduct invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity 
because no reasonable police officer would be charged with knowledge of a rule 
of law requiring more in the way of investigation and commit the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress escapes me. The definition of and 
the test for the outrageous conduct required is articulated in RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965):

d.         
Extreme and outrageous conduct. The cases thus far decided have found 
liability only where the defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It 
has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is 
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional 
distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a 
degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for 
another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the 
facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against 
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"

I submit that 
conduct that qualifies for immunity as we held in Lawson cannot possibly satisfy 
this language. The reliance upon the sense of an average member of the community 
is no more amorphous than the "reasonable prudent man" standard so common to the 
law of torts generally.

[¶16]   In my opinion, when this court 
chooses to adopt the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) as the rule of law for 
Wyoming, we must accept the collective wisdom that surrounds the black letter 
rule. That includes the comments and the illustrations in those comments that 
are an inseparable part of the rule.

[¶17]   Neither, should we ignore the role 
of the court as a gatekeeper. In this regard the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
46 cmt. h (1965) has this to say:

h. Court and 
jury. 
     It is for the 
court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may 
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or 
whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the 
jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the 
particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to 
result in liability.

(Emphasis 
added.) In light of this language, I return to my thesis that conduct which 
achieves qualified immunity under the law may not reasonably be regarded "as so 
extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery" nor is it "necessarily so." 
Certainly conduct that would permit the court to send the issue to a jury would 
have to be recognized by a reasonable police officer as beyond the protection of 
qualified immunity.

GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom LEHMAN, Justice, joins.

[¶18]   I respectfully dissent. This case 
serves to highlight several concerns I have about summary judgment 
decision-making with respect to claims of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The concerns, which are inter-related, have to do with the court's 
role in determining the sufficiency of the evidence and the court's 
establishment and principled application of standards relating to the nature of 
the actor's alleged conduct and to the level of severity of the plaintiff's 
alleged emotional reaction to the alleged conduct.

[¶19]   In this case, the dispositive 
issues are (1) whether an impartial jury could reasonably view Officer Lawson's 
alleged conduct, as described by Ms. Garcia, as extreme and outrageous, and (2) 
whether an impartial jury could reasonably view Ms. Garcia's emotional reaction 
to Officer Lawson's alleged conduct, as described by Ms. Garcia, as severe. 
Having concluded as a matter of law that Officer Lawson's alleged conduct "was 
not . . . what we would characterize as being beyond all possible bounds 
of decency, atrocious, or utterly intolerable in a civilized community," the 
majority does not address the second issue of Ms. Garcia's severe emotional 
distress. (Emphasis added). 

[¶20]   Focusing on the first issue, then, 
what is the legal standard of measurement used by the court to characterize 
Officer Lawson's alleged conduct? I find no standard stated in the opinion. Is 
the standard objective or subjective? Is "outrageousness" in the eye of the 
beholder? A few years ago we had a similar problem in Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994). In that case, against my dissent, 
this court reversed a summary judgment in favor of an employer, holding that 
genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the employer's conduct, 
before and after termination of employment, toward an employee and concerning 
the employee's emotional reaction to that conduct. One searches that opinion in 
vain for a standard against which to measure the employer's conduct. Should the 
standard established and applied in an employer-employee case be the same as the 
standard established and applied in a police officer-citizen/crime victim case? 
It seems to me we must establish useful and helpful standards against which to 
measure conduct and emotional reaction to conduct because we strive to make 
principled decision-making in order to treat similarly situated citizens 
similarly. The result in this case must be better explained than to say Officer 
Lawson's conduct was not outrageous because a majority of this court's members 
are not sufficiently offended by it. The result in Wilder must be better 
explained than to say the employer's conduct was outrageous because a majority 
of this court's members were sufficiently offended by it. We must have a rule of 
law, not a rule of man. I fear what others have feared:

[T]he Court embarks on 
what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual circumstances, 
meandering this way and that, blown about by bias and inclination, and guided by 
nothing steadier than the personal preferences of the helmsmen, who change with 
every watch.

Wornick Co. v. 
Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, Justice, concurring).

[¶21]   With respect to the establishment 
and application of standards in this area of the law, several courts have risen 
to the task. From these cases, an analytical framework emerges, one that uses 
several factors to assist the court in determining whether the particular 
conduct in question is outrageous in nature under the circumstances:

1.         The 
actor is in a position of authority and trust. Crump v. P & C Food Markets, 
Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 576 A.2d 441, 448 (1990) (abuse of authority in 
employer-employee setting); Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312-17 (D.C.App. 
1994) (police officer); Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 204 Ill.Dec. 274, 
641 N.E.2d 498, 507-08 (1994) (police officer).

2.         The 
plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress and the actor knows, 
or should know, of that condition. Doe, 204 Ill.Dec. 274, 641 N.E.2d at 507-08; 
Drejza, 650 A.2d at 1312-17; Denton v. Chittenden Bank, 163 Vt. 62, 655 A.2d 703, 707 (1994); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 204 Ill. App.3d 235, 149 Ill.Dec. 549, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (1990).

And see 
generally Merle H. Weiner, 
Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L.REV. 183, 200-207 
(1995); and Angela M. Elsperger, Comment, Damages - Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress in the Workplace: Defining Extreme and Outrageous Conduct in 
North Dakota's Job Description, 70 N.D.L.REV. 187, 194-95 (1994).

[¶22]   Applying the above and foregoing 
factors to the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Ms. Garcia, I 
conclude that reasonable persons could differ in their conclusion as to whether 
Officer Lawson's conduct was extreme and outrageous. As an investigating police 
officer, he was in a position of authority and trust with respect to Ms. Garcia. 
He knew Ms. Garcia was particularly susceptible to emotional distress because of 
the violent crimes of which she was the victim. Considering the demeaning manner 
in which he dealt with her, his reference to another woman's breasts, and his 
expression of interest in initiating a personal relationship with Ms. Garcia, an 
average member of the community would no doubt resent a police officer who 
treated a sexual assault victim in a rude and demeaning way and would consider 
such conduct as extreme and outrageous.

[¶23]   With respect to the evidence of Ms. 
Garcia's emotional distress, I have considered it in the light most favorable to 
Ms. Garcia, as I must, and have concluded that it passes muster for jury 
consideration.

[¶24]   I would reverse the summary 
judgment and remand for trial.