Title: Sandlin v. Sanders

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

360 So. 2d 977 (1978)
Thomas Harold SANDLIN
v.
Willis A. SANDERS et al.
SC 2625.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 23, 1978.
*978 Thomas E. Ellis, Birmingham, for appellant.
Bishop K. Walker, Jr., of Nash & Walker, Oneonta, for appellees.
FAULKNER, Justice.
Sanders and Woolsteen brought an action pursuant to § 35-3-1, Code of Alabama 1975, in the Circuit Court of Blount County to determine the boundary between themselves and Sandlin as coterminous land owners. Their complaint asserted ownership *979 up to the center of a dirt road, allegedly a public road, either by deed description or by adverse possession for 20 years. Sandlin filed an answer and counterclaim alleging the dirt road to be a private road lying wholly within his property.
The dispute over the proper location of the common boundary arose when Sanders and Woolsteen attempted to cut driveways from the road to the lot owned by the Woolsteens. Sandlin and his father objected. They placed logs across the driveways and erected a gate across the dirt road. The trial court held the common boundaries of the parties to be the center of the dirt road, declared the dirt road a public road and enjoined Sandlin from obstructing the road. Sandlin appeals from the judgment. We affirm.
Sanders acquired title to the NW ¼ of the SE ¼ of Section 31, Township 13 South, Range 3 West by a 1947 deed from his father, with the following description:
In 1975 Sanders and his wife executed a deed to themselves transferring the same property to a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, describing the property as follows:
In that same year, the Sanders also conveyed a portion of the land to their daughter and son-in-law, the Woolsteens.
Sandlin acquired title to the following property by deed from his parents in 1967:
Sanders testified that when he went into possession of his property in 1947, the road was the boundary. He used the road in 1955 for access to a watermelon patch located west of the property in dispute and, after selling that west property in 1964, had used the road three or four times a year to inspect his northern boundary. He has not resided on the property since 1953. Since 1955 he has cut a few poles off his property and, after selling part of the property to his daughter, fenced his part of the property. Sanders testified that the first time he saw "no trespassing" signs on both sides of the road was October, 1975.
Sandlin testified that he has farmed on the north side of the road but has never farmed south of the road. However, he keeps the south side of the road bushhogged and several years ago planted fescue on both sides. He has also cut tree limbs from the south side to clear passage of the road. The road is the only means of ingress and egress to the homes of Sandlin, his father, and his son. In fact, the dirt road deadends at their homes. Since he acquired the property in 1967, Sandlin has posted "no trespassing" signs on both sides of the road.
H. J. Lang testified that he and his father had tended what is now the Sandlin's property 40 years ago. It was always his *980 understanding that the Sanders owned the left and Doc Johnson, Sandlin's predecessor in title, owned the right. The road was considered the boundary. According to Lang, anyone who wanted, had traveled the dirt road, and that hunters had used the road.
Jim Tyler, a friend of Sandlin's father for 17 years, testified that "no trespassing" signs had been on both sides of the road ever since he had been going there.
Larry Blaylock, a neighbor, testified that he had always heard the road referred to as Sandlin's road, that "no trespassing" and "no hunting" signs had been posted on both sides of the road as long as he could remember, and that he had seen Sandlin cutting trees on the south side of the road one time.
Sandlin's father, Hershel Sandlin, testified that he had posted signs on both sides of the road when he acquired the property in 1960. He uses the road every day and had sold three or four pine trees off of the property south of the road.
Gene Blaylock, a member of the County Commission representing District I, in which the disputed property lies, testified that Sandlin owns land on both sides of the road. Until two years ago, the County worked anyone's private road, but now maintains only public roads. The County has maintained the dirt road in question both prior and subsequent to this policy change. Blaylock stated that the road is used by public vehicles such as county school buses and mail carriers.
Sanders presented three "surveys," all setting the boundary between the NW ¼ of the SE ¼ and the SW ¼ of the NE ¼ of Section 31 in the center of the dirt road. Sandlin introduced a survey establishing the boundary approximately 20 feet south of the road. The different conclusions of the surveys revolves around the measurement of the length of the northern interior quarter-quarter line of the NW ¼ of the SE ¼ of Section 31, thus affecting the location of the half section line under the methods used in Sanders' surveys.
A 1960 "possession" plat, performed by Rice, recorded the measurement of this northern interior quarter-quarter line as 1366.03 feet. The 1975 Hollis survey, adopted by the trial court in its final judgment, relies on this measurement in locating the half section line which divides the properties, as did plaintiff's Exhibit 17, performed during the trial in an attempt to verify the findings of the Hollis survey.
The issues presented for our review are (1) whether the trial court was plainly and palpably erroneous in determining the boundary to be the center of the dirt road; (2) whether the trial court was plainly and palpably erroneous in holding that the road is a public road; (3) whether the exclusion of Hershel Sandlin's offered testimony concerning statements by Johnson as to the location of the boundary was error; and (4) whether denial of Sandlin's motion for appointment of an independent surveyor was reversible error.
The trial court held:
It is well settled that the decree of a trial court, hearing the evidence ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless the *981 decree is plainly and palpably erroneous. Varner v. Carr, 291 Ala. 654, 286 So. 2d 294 (1973); Deese v. Odom, 283 Ala. 420, 218 So. 2d 134 (1969). Sandlin contends that this presumption is overcome because the Hollis survey, adopted by the trial court, fatally relies upon the Rice survey's 1366.03 feet measurement of the northern interior quarter-quarter line. It is undisputed that the Hollis survey did rely heavily upon this measurement for determining the location of Sanders' northern boundary. Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, introduced to bolster the conclusions of the Hollis survey, likewise relies upon this measurement. (Although other calculations were made to determine the proper location of the half section line, Mr. Allred in constructing Exhibit 17 admittedly measured 1366.03 feet north to determine the northern boundary.)
In Merchants National Bank v. Hall, 278 Ala. 319, 178 So. 2d 146 (1965), the court stated:
The instant case is analagous. Here Mr. Rice, who performed the 1960 survey from which Sanders acquired the 1366.03 feet measurement, testified as follows:
Thus, the Hollis survey, as well as plaintiff's Exhibit 17, are subject to the same criticism as the Rice survey: that they did not determine the boundary by metes and bounds. Consequently, the trial court's decree, if based solely upon the Hollis survey, must be reversed.
However, additional evidence was presented to support the decree. There was conflicting evidence that the road was considered the boundary line. Furthermore, there was a great deal of discussion of the location of monuments or even whether some of the markers were indeed monuments. The Hollis survey determined a concrete monument on the northern interior quarter line to be approximately 30 feet south of the center of the road. There was, however, testimony that such a set-off was not unusual. The Brown survey, relied upon by Sandlin, on the other hand, determined a concrete monument near the NE and SE corner of the SE ¼ of Section 31 to be located 35 feet too far south. While the above is not exhaustive of the testimony at trial, it does illustrate the conflict in evidence and interpretations of the surveyors.
W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. Bryan, 272 Ala. 303, 130 So. 2d 15 (1960). We opine that the evidence of the reputation of the road as the boundary and the conflicting conclusions regarding the significance of the location of the monuments and purported monuments are sufficient evidence to justify the trial court's decree establishing the boundary at the center of the road.
Because the trial court made no findings of adverse possession of the disputed strip of woodland, we decline to comment on the sufficiency of Sanders' alleged adverse possession.
We do not agree with Sanders' contention that the trial court erred in declaring:
This dirt road is bounded by woodland to the south and farmland to the north. It leads only to the property of Sandlin on which three families resideSandlin, his father, and his son. In addition to the evidence set out in the trial court's decree, there was also testimony that the road had been used by Sanders to reach a watermelon *983 patch in 1955 and three or four times a year to inspect his timber. Hunters had used the road as well as the Sandlins' visitors.
Sandlin contends that this case is governed by the principles set out in Benson v. Pickens County, 260 Ala. 436, 70 So. 2d 647 (1954) where the court, in applying a presumption of permissive use, stated:
We, however, agree with Sanders' contention that the character of the land on which the road lies, the condition of the road, and, of course, the use to which it has been put require application of the presumption of dedication to public use as defined in Ayers v. Stidham, 260 Ala. 390, 71 So. 2d 95 (1954).
Davis v. Linden, 340 So. 2d 775 (Ala.Sup.Ct. 1976); Baptist Foundation of Alabama v. Penn, 295 Ala. 122, 324 So. 2d 766 (1975).
Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that the road deadends on the Sandlin property, Baptist Foundation, nor by the fact that ". . . as a practical matter the road was used primarily, if not solely, by the landowners bordering the road, and rarely by anyone else." 340 So. 2d  at 777. Appellant failed to satisfy the burden ". . . to show the user was permissive only, in recognition of his title and right to reclaim the possession." 260 Ala. at 392, 71 So. 2d  at 97. The trial court did not err in holding the road in question to be a public road.
The trial court refused to admit testimony of Sandlin's father, Hershel Sandlin, concerning conversations with his predecessor in title, Doc Johnson, now deceased. The offered testimony referred to the location of the southern boundary of the property now owned by Sandlin.
Later, the trial court made it clear that he sustained the objection on the grounds of the Dead Man's Statute and on hearsay and self-serving declaration.
We find no error in the court's ruling because the offered testimony violates the hearsay rule. Sandlin failed to establish the necessary predicate that Johnson's declarations were made while he was in possession of the land and claiming as owner.
Southern Iron Works v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 131 Ala. 649, 31 So. 723 (1901).
The court denied Sandlin's motion to appoint an independent surveyor. Section 35-3-20(a), Code of Alabama 1975, provides:
This provision is discretionary with the trial court. W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. Cobb, 266 Ala. 146, 94 So. 2d 763 (1957); Redden v. Otwell, 252 Ala. 653, 42 So. 2d 454 (1949); Stansell v. Tharp, 245 Ala. 270, 16 So. 2d 857 (1944). While appointment of an independent surveyor "is usual and recommended," Deese v. Odom, we will not place the lower court in error for failing to do so where both parties have presented surveys, albeit conflicting in their conclusion.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, ALMON, and EMBRY, JJ., concur.