Title: People v. Lavariega

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the 
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are 
subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior 
to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, 
because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to 
the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the 
final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of 
Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final 
action by the Court. 
 
              Docket No. 80560--Agenda 15--September 1996. 
         THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ELVIO 
                          LAVARIEGA, Appellant. 
                     Opinion filed January 30, 1997. 
 
     CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
     Defendant, Elvio Lavariega, was arrested and charged with 
driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter DUI). 625 ILCS 
5/11--501(a)(2) (West 1994). Immediately following his arrest, 
defendant refused to consent to or failed to complete a blood- 
alcohol test and his driver's license was summarily suspended under 
the implied-consent statute. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 et seq. (West 
1994). The circuit court of Winnebago County refused to rescind the 
suspension in a subsequent rescission hearing. Thereafter, 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the DUI prosecution proceeding 
against him, arguing that it constituted an attempt to subject him 
to an additional punishment for the same offense in violation of 
the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois 
Constitutions. After defendant's double jeopardy motion was denied, 
defendant filed an interlocutory appeal raising the same argument. 
145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f). The appellate court held that the summary 
suspension of defendant's driver's license did not constitute 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes and therefore that 
prosecution for DUI was not barred by the license suspension. No. 
2--95--0595 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This 
court accepted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 
2d R. 315) and, for the following reasons, we affirm. 
 
                                 ANALYSIS 
     Defendant argues that by suspending his driver's license and 
subsequently prosecuting him for DUI for the same incident, the 
State is violating the prohibition against multiple punishments 
contained in the Illinois and United States Constitutions. Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, 10 ("[n]o person shall *** be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense"); U.S. Const., amend. V ("[n]o 
person *** shall *** be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb"). As a threshold matter, then, it 
must be determined whether the summary suspension of defendant's 
license pursuant to the implied-consent statute constitutes 
punishment. 
     We observe that the Supreme Court has employed different 
analyses in determining whether taxes, fines and civil forfeitures 
constitute punishment. Considering these, we find that the summary 
suspension of a driver's license most resembles the civil 
forfeiture of property, though we are cognizant that it is not the 
license, per se, that is proceeded against in a summary suspension 
proceeding. Accordingly, to determine whether this sanction is 
punishment for purposes of the United States Constitution's double 
jeopardy clause, we consider whether the General Assembly intended 
the proceedings to be civil and, if so, whether the proceedings are 
nevertheless so punitive in fact as to persuade the court that the 
proceedings may not be legitimately viewed as civil in nature 
despite Congress' intent. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 
___, ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 568, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996), 
quoting 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.  at 366, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 371, 104 S. Ct.  at 1107 (applying the same analysis to congressional forfeiture 
statutes); In re P.S., Nos. 78910, 78944 cons. (January 30, 1997). 
If not, then the civil sanction does not constitute punishment. 
     Applying this test we initially observe that the General 
Assembly expressly provided that the summary suspension proceeding 
under the implied-consent statute is a civil proceeding (625 ILCS 
5/2--118.1(b) (West 1994) (a summary suspension "hearing shall 
proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil 
proceedings" (emphasis added)). A legislature demonstrates its 
intent most directly by the procedural mechanisms it establishes to 
impose and enforce the sanction. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d  at 568, 116 S. Ct.  at 2147, citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.  
at 363, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 368-69, 104 S. Ct.  at 1105. Indeed, this 
court has previously determined that the summary suspension is a 
civil sanction where it ruled that the driver bears the burden of 
proof in a summary suspension hearing. People v. Orth,  124 Ill. 2d 326  (1988); see also Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 568- 
69, 116 S. Ct.  at 2147-48 (finding who bears the burden significant 
in determining whether the sanction is civil or criminal). 
Accordingly, we find that the legislature intended the sanction to 
be civil in nature. 
     We next consider whether the statutory summary suspension of 
a driver's license under the implied-consent statute is so punitive 
that it is equivalent to a criminal proceeding, irrespective of the 
legislature's intent. In making this determination, the court 
requires the "clearest proof" and considers, inter alia: (1) 
whether important nonpunitive goals are advanced by the statute; 
(2) whether the civil sanction has been traditionally regarded as 
punishment; and (3) whether the civil sanction requires scienter. 
Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d  at 570, 116 S. Ct. at 2148- 
49. 
     Regarding these factors, we first observe that the summary 
suspension of a license for the failure to pass a blood-alcohol 
test advances the important policy goal of keeping the roads safe 
from intoxicated drivers. People v. Esposito,  121 Ill. 2d 491 
(1988) (the state has a compelling interest in protecting the 
public from drunk drivers). As the statute itself declares: 
               "[T]he driver who is impaired by alcohol or other 
          drugs is a threat to the public safety and welfare. 
          Therefore, to provide a deterrent to such practice and to 
          remove problem drivers from the highway, a statutory 
          summary driver's license suspension is appropriate." 625 
          ILCS 5/6--206.1 (West 1994). 
Defendant argues that the statement shows that the suspension is 
punishment since it purports to provide a "deterrent" to drunk 
driving. However, a civil sanction need not be solely remedial in 
order to be nonpunitive under the double jeopardy clause. Ursery, 
518 U.S. at ___ n.2, 135 L. Ed. 2d  at 566 n.2, 116 S. Ct.  at 2145 
n.2 ("it is hard to imagine a sanction that has no punitive aspect 
whatsoever"). 
     Also, Illinois courts have traditionally viewed the purpose of 
a driver's license suspension as being remedial and nonpunitive. 
People v. Kobylak, 383 Ill. 432, 435 (1943) (revocation of a 
driver's license is part of the regulatory measures under the 
police power of the state governing traffic upon the highways and 
is not part of the punishment administered by the court); People v. 
Esposito,  121 Ill. 2d 491  (1988) (implied-consent concept and the 
statutory summary suspension procedure were intended to protect the 
public, not to punish the licensee); People v. Wegielnik,  152 Ill. 2d 418  (1992) (implied-consent statute remedial in that its 
overriding purpose is to make the roads safer). 
     Finally, we observe that there is no scienter element to the 
statutory summary suspension provision, further suggesting that it 
is not intended as punishment. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 et seq. (West 
1994); Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d  at 570, 116 S. Ct.  at 
2149. Defendant counters that the suspension is punitive because 
the statute provides defenses which allow the suspension to be 
rescinded, thus indicating the retributive purpose of the statute. 
However, as the Court in Ursery noted, the mere presence of 
innocence defenses to a civil sanction is irrelevant to whether the 
sanction is punitive under the double jeopardy clause. Ursery, 518 
U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d  at 570, 116 S. Ct.  at 2149. 
     Accordingly, we hold that the summary suspension of 
defendant's driver's license was not punishment for purposes of the 
United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause. Insofar as 
this court has continuously classified the instant summary 
suspension proceeding as primarily nonpunitive, with the remedial 
goal of making roads safer by removing drunk drivers, we similarly 
conclude that the summary suspension is not punishment for purposes 
of the Illinois Constitution's double jeopardy clause. See People 
v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d  at 337 (suspension proceeding civil in 
nature); Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d  at 503 (suspension intended to 
reduce the risks attendant to drunk driving). Thus there exists no 
double jeopardy bar to a subsequent DUI prosecution based on the 
same driving incident. 
 
                                CONCLUSION 
     For the foregoing reasons, we find that the statutory summary 
suspension of a driver's license because of a failed blood-alcohol 
test is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes and therefore 
does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. We affirm the decisions of the circuit 
court and the appellate court. 
 
 Affirmed.