Title: Mollman v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mollman v. State1990 WY 104800 P.2d 466Case Number: 89-21Decided: 10/05/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
MATTHEW MOLLMAN, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Mike Cornia, 
Appellate Counsel, Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Paul S. 
Rehurek, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal, 
Matthew Mollman, convicted of burglary, raises the three major issues that were 
recently raised in State v. Lowry, No. 88-312 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Vigil v. 
State, No. 88-310 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); McIver v. State, No. 88-311 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 
1990); Moon v. State, No. 88-304 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Magarahan v. State, No. 
89-4 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); and Billis v. State, No. 88-250 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990) 
[800 P.2d 401]. These issues concern the constitutionality of W.S. 7-13-301 
(June 1987 Repl.) ("new 301"), which provides procedures for deferral of 
prosecution and placement on probation without entry of adjudication of guilt in 
the case of first offenders.

[¶2]      Based upon 
information that Matthew Mollman, who lived across the hall from Frank Gambino 
in an apartment building, had been seen in the latter's apartment, law 
enforcement authorities interviewed Mr. Mollman concerning the theft of Mr. 
Gambino's portable television and a television converter box. Mr. Mollman 
voluntarily admitted to having taken that property without the owner's 
permission. The state charged him with burglary in violation of W.S. 6-3-301 (a) 
and (b) (June 1988 Repl.). Under a plea agreement, in exchange for Mr. Mollman's 
plea of guilty to the felony, the state agreed it would not seek penitentiary 
time at sentencing, if Mr. Mollman had no prior felony convictions, and would 
also consent to probation without entry of adjudication of guilt under "new 301" 
if the presentence investigation report revealed nothing more serious than minor 
traffic offenses.

[¶3]      The presentence 
investigation report revealed that Mr. Mollman had previously been convicted of 
careless driving, running a stop sign, vandalism, driving while under the 
influence, improper passing, delayed entry, and driving left of center. At the 
sentencing proceeding the prosecutor said that the state refused to consent 
under "new 301" because vandalism was more serious than minor traffic offenses. 
The district court judge imposed a sentence of one year's supervised probation, 
payment of restitution, and payment of $50 to the victims' compensation 
account.

[¶4]      In his appeal, 
Mr. Mollman raises these three issues that were raised in Lowry, Vigil, McIver, 
Moon, Magarahan, and Billis:

1. Whether W.S. 7-13-301 
(June 1987 Repl.), requiring the state's consent to the court's deferring 
further proceedings and placing a defendant on probation without entry of a 
judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department's sentencing power 
in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. 
Const. art. 2, § 1.

2. Whether 1987 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted 
in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, which proscribes altering or amending 
a bill during its passage through the legislature so as to change the bill's 
original purpose.

3. Whether 1987 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted 
in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, which mandates the passage of a bill 
containing only one subject which must be clearly expressed in the bill's 
title.

[¶5]      Although the 
state asserts that Mr. Mollman did not adequately raise these issues in the 
district court and we should not consider them here for the first time, we have 
chosen to consider them as explained in Lowry, Vigil, McIver, Moon, Magarahan, 
and Billis.

[¶6]      Our decisions in 
Lowry and its companion cases are dispositive here. Applying our decisions in 
those cases, we hold that "new 301" is constitutional in terms of the three 
issues raised here. Accordingly, we affirm.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.

[¶7]      In exercise of 
prosecutorial veto upon sentencing, this case portrays the bottom pit of 
absurdity to which an advocate's control over judicial discretion can and 
consequently will be taken.

[¶8]      In 1988, Matthew 
J. Mollman, age twenty-two and a University student then attending Casper 
College, got drunk one night and, for no particular reason and without 
permission, entered and removed a portable television set from an adjoining 
apartment. He then gave it away. An eyewitness in the apartment observed the 
removal and upon occurrence of the inevitable and resulting police interview, 
Mollman admitted what he had done.

[¶9]      Mollman was 
charged with burglary, W.S. 6-3-301(a) and (b) (a ten year, $10,000 fine 
offense), and a plea bargain was made:

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Yes, Your Honor. We have a negotiated disposition in this case.

     Mr. Mollman has waived 
his preliminary hearing and we'll be asking the Court to review a Presentence 
Investigation to see if it is appropriate for treatment under the provisions of 
301 [W.S. 7-13-301], and whether the Court would like to accept his guilty plea 
today but defer accepting it on the record or whether you would like to wait 
until after the review of the Presentence. That is something [prosecuting 
attorney] and I were discussing but our agreement is that if he has no prior 
felonies, then the State has agreed to no Penitentiary time and that if the 
Investigation discloses that he has nothing other than minor traffic offenses, 
the State has agreed that this is an appropriate case for sentencing under 
301.

     The conditions of 
probation under either situation would be whatever the Court deemed appropriate 
by way of a fine and public defender reimbursement, and then restitution would 
also be an issue. There has been recovery of some property and we would have to 
determine from the Police Department whether all property was recovered or if 
this was going to require a cash restitution as well.

* * * * * *

     [PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, that is my understanding also, that if the Presentence 
Investigation discloses nothing other than minor traffic offenses, the State 
would stipulate that this should be treated under 301.

     If that is not the 
case, however, then the only agreement as to sentencing in this matter would be 
that the State would then be free to argue for Penitentiary time should there be 
no prior felonies.

     THE COURT: All right, 
let's take the plea but withhold entering it in to the record until we receive 
that report.

[¶10]   Mollman then entered a guilty 
plea:

     THE COURT: All right, 
to the Information then as read, how do you plead?

                 THE DEFENDANT: 
Guilty, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: What is 
your plea?

     THE DEFENDANT: 
Guilty.

     THE COURT: We won't 
put that in the record at this point. It will be in the record but not made a 
formal part of the record until the probation report is returned because that 
might involve a situation where the plea would not, in fact, be 
accepted.

A factual basis 
for the plea was then established on the record to be followed:

     THE COURT: I find 
there is a factual basis for the charge and that the plea that has not yet been 
accepted is being made voluntarily and without promise or force or coercion and 
after discussions with competent counsel of record.

An exchange 
followed at the subsequent sentencing after the presentence investigation report 
had been obtained:

     THE COURT: * * 
*

     * * *, my records 
indicate that the Defendant has heretofore entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge contained in the Information; is that correct?

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
That is correct, Your Honor, although that plea was not taken on the record 
pending this Presentence Investigation for treatment under 301.

     THE COURT: All right, 
I have received a copy of the Presentence Investigation and have reviewed the 
same. I presume you have had the same opportunity?

      [DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]: Yes I have, Your Honor.

* * * * * *

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Your Honor, we are here before the Court on the plea that was given by Mr. 
Mollman but was not accepted by the Court pending this review. Our disposition 
agreement with the State sets forth that if the Presentence Investigation 
disclosed nothing other than minor traffic offenses, they would agree to 
treatment under the provisions of 301 and that any fine or public defender 
reimbursement under probation would be at the discretion of the 
Court.

     I would submit to the 
Court that, in fact, the Presentence Investigation has come back as we 
anticipated and that there are nothing but minor offenses on his record and that 
it would be appropriate for the Court to now place him under the provisions of 
Wyoming Statutes 7-13-301 and that would be to again defer acceptance of the 
plea, place him on probation with the terms to be set by this Court.

     Mr. Mollman cooperated 
fully with the agent in the preparation of this Report, and there has been an 
indication that there is restitution to be paid and I think that that is not a 
problem, and Mr. Mollman will make whatever restitution needs to be paid. He has 
been working and has been very good at reporting to my office even though he has 
been out of State under an agreement that his bond allows him to work out of 
State.

     I think he is a good 
candidate for this treatment. He has been very cooperative and will continue to 
do well on probation. At his age, I think it is appropriate that we consider 
this treatment. Hopefully this was an isolated act that will not occur again and 
I think that it is appropriate to give him this opportunity to keep a felony off 
of his record.

* * * * * *

     [PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, the agreement with the Defendant was that as long as the 
Presentence Investigation discloses nothing other than minor traffic offenses, 
that he should receive 301 treatment. Your Honor, I see a vandalism, a driving 
while under the influence - which perhaps could be considered to be a minor 
traffic offense - but vandalism would not be.

     Your Honor, the State 
would recommend that the Defendant be sentenced to two years of supervised 
probation; that this Court enter the plea on the record; that he undertake any 
counseling and perform any community service as is recommended by the Department 
of Probation and Parole; that he pay restitution as determined by the Department 
of Probation and Parole; and that he pay $50 to the Victims Compensation Fund 
within 10 days from today's date.

     THE COURT: Does that 
mean the State does not agree to treatment under 301?

     [PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor.

[¶11]   The vandalism incident was then 
described by Mollman in this sentencing session:

     THE DEFENDANT: I have 
one question. What is the vandalism that they are talking about?

     THE COURT: Well, why 
don't you tell me about that?

     THE DEFENDANT: Okay, on that 
vandalism, a friend of mine with me was out drinking on that evening too, and I 
went out and I talked to the Judge and the City person down at Glenrock and I 
told them I would repair it, and I repaired it, did all the work myself and paid 
for it and fixed it all up to their satisfaction. There were walls on the 
bathroom that I wrecked like a wooden barrier on the outside and we had broke 
[sic] some of the wooden parts. It originally, one of them got broke originally 
by me and this friend of mine wrestling around and we went through one of the 
pieces that was like a plywood wall out there, and then we thought it was kind 
of fun because we was [sic] drinking and stuff, so we broke a couple more, and 
then the officer came down and talked to us about it, and we told him what 
happened and everything, and we said that we would fix everything, and we 
repaired everything ourselves.

     THE COURT: All 
right.

     Do you have anything 
further to say before Sentence is passed?

     I think probably this 
is a case I would have handled under 7-13-301 if I had the discretion, but as I 
understand the Statute, I don't have.'

[¶12]   The testimony given by Mollman 
about the "vandalism incident" was not challenged by other evidence. The only 
other      
evidence was an entry on the presentence investigation report involving 
the incident some three years earlier which stated: "12/29/85, Vandalism, 
Glenrock, Wyoming, Fine suspended, damages repaired."

[¶13]   What this means in this record is 
that Mollman has been punished by imposition of the felony conviction status 
which includes loss of citizenship rights and sportsman privileges because at 
age twenty-two while "horsing around," some damage to a Glenrock, Wyoming 
apartment was done which was then repaired. Whether or not there is any 
conviction resulting from that offense is seriously in question.

[¶14]   In reality, the prosecutor probably 
exercised his veto because of the driving while under the influence charge, but 
felt he was safer in breaking the plea bargain on a vandalism explanation. 
Either way, the result is senseless and question exists whether plea bargain 
sentencing performance could not have been appropriately applied.

[¶15]   Taken to the essence, we have in 
this case prosecutorial exercise of a sentencing veto over a perhaps 
unprosecuted vandalism charge. This is status prosecution; prosecutorial 
responsibility directed neither to inhibit nor to rehabilitate, but only to 
damage, harm and inflict maximum pain for permanent lifetime activity 
inhibitions otherwise normally pursued or enjoyed by each person who is favored 
to survive past college age "mistakes." If this vandalism misconduct justifies a 
felony conviction, there will only be a few of us who will be left to either 
vote or "keep and bear arms."

[¶16]   Based on the totally contrary case 
law and authoritative precedent which is adapted no better to this case than 
others currently under review, I again dissent. See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 435 (Wyo. 1990) (Nos. 88-250, 304, 310, 311, 312 and 89-4, 10/5/90), 
Urbigkit, Chief Justice, dissenting; Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475 (Wyo. 1990) 
(No. 89-84, 10/5/90), Urbigkit, Chief Justice, dissenting; Hudson v. State, 800 P.2d 471 (Wyo. 1990) (No. 89-83, 10/5/90), Urbigkit, Chief Justice dissenting; 
and Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482 (Wyo. 1990) (No. 89-169, 10/5/90), Urbigkit, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.1

MACY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.

[¶17]   I dissent. I am convinced that "new 
301" violates the separation of powers doctrine for the reasons articulated in 
my dissent to Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. Nos. 88-250, 88-304, 88-310, 
88-311, 88-312 and 89-4, Oct. 5, 1990).

FOOTNOTES

 1 An interested examiner 
on these not so only academic subjects are directed to the most current 
literature, Mank, Rewarding Defendant Cooperation Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Judges vs. Prosecutors, 26 Crim.L.Bull. 399 (1990); Schwartz, 
Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court's Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 
Notre Dame L.Rev. 587 (1990).