Title: DONALD RAYMOND MARTIN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DONALD RAYMOND MARTIN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 187780 P.2d 1354Case Number: 88-155Decided: 10/11/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD RAYMOND MARTIN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, UintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, for appellant.

Donald Raymond 
Martin, pro se.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Gerald P. 
Luckhaupt, Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     The essential concern 
of the court, in this case, is with the effective assistance of counsel in a 
post-conviction proceeding conducted pursuant to the provisions of §§ 7-14-101 
to 7-14-108, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.). This issue is invoked by the pro se 
brief of the appellant. Woven into the question of effective representation is 
the validity of Donald R. Martin's plea of nolo contendere pursuant to which he 
was sentenced to the state penitentiary. Dependant upon the propriety of that 
plea, as a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt, is the resolution of 
whether the district court properly dismissed the petition for post-conviction 
relief for failure to state a claim. We hold that Martin's plea of nolo 
contendere was a knowing and voluntary plea; the effect of that plea is to waive 
all defenses to the charge other than a claim that the court lacked 
jurisdiction; the record presents no suggestion of any facts that would support 
a conclusion that the court was without jurisdiction; and the record does not 
disclose any failure of counsel under these circumstances. Consequently, we 
affirm the Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief entered by the district court in 
this case.

[¶2.]     In the brief filed by 
counsel appointed to represent Martin, six issues are articulated as 
follows:

"1. Do Alberts, 
Long, and Fondren dictate that counsel must be appointed upon demand where a 
request is made but before the petitioner files his claim for post-conviction 
relief?

"2. What is the 
district court's responsibility in deciding to appoint counsel?

"3. What is 
counsel's responsibility after the appointment?

"4. Does a 
post-conviction claim require that the court make an evaluation of its 
meritorious or frivolous nature?

"5. How should 
the trial court treat the record of the proceedings where a guilty plea or nolo 
contendere plea has been accepted pursuant to Rule 15, W.R. Cr.P.?

"6. What is the 
applicable standard for review on appeal?"

In the pro se 
brief of the appellant, this statement of issues appears:

"Whether there 
was ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

"Whether the 
trial court was in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to The 
United States Constitution."

The only issue 
stated in the brief of appellee is:

"I. Was the 
petition properly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted?"

The brief of 
appellant filed by appointed counsel contains a lengthy dissertation with 
respect to the propriety of appointing counsel in the post-conviction proceeding 
in an instance such as this. While that question is not without interest, we do 
not perceive that it should be addressed in this case because the fact is that 
the district court did appoint counsel to represent Martin. The State has not 
appealed that ruling, and the question simply is not present in this 
case.

Martin was 
charged with obtaining $1,247.05 from two people in Lyman by false pretenses and 
with intent to defraud in violation of § 6-3-407(a)(i), W.S. 1977.1 It appears that they agreed to pay 
him that money to refinish an antique "player piano." The money was paid in 
advance, and Martin then picked up the piano. Martin, the piano, and the cash 
all disappeared. Martin later was apprehended. The piano was returned with no 
work done upon it. The money paid was not recovered.

Martin was bound 
over to the district court following a preliminary examination and, at his 
arraignment, he entered a plea of "Not Guilty." He was again before the court 
for a potential change of plea some two and one-half months later but, after 
reporting extensive plea negotiations with the prosecuting attorney, counsel for 
Martin advised the court that Martin wished to persist in the plea of not 
guilty. A little more than a month after that, Martin again appeared in court 
with his counsel and, at the conclusion of some rather lengthy proceedings 
during which the court explored a possible claim of deprivation of the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a claim of excessive bail, the 
following appears of record:

"THE COURT: * * 
* How do you plead to that, Mr. Martin?

"DEFENDANT 
MARTIN: I plead nolo contendere."

Although not 
required to, the district court then proceeded to establish a factual basis for 
Martin's plea.

At the initial 
arraignment, and also at the change of plea hearing, the district court strictly 
complied with the requirements of Rule 15(c), W.R.Cr.P. It is clear that the 
court advised Martin of the nature of the charge to which the plea would be 
offered and the maximum possible penalty provided by law. Martin, who was 
represented by an attorney, was advised that he had the right to plead not 
guilty and to persist in that plea. His right to a trial by jury, and to the 
assistance of counsel at that trial, was explained to him. He understood that he 
had the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and, further, had 
the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Additional explanation was 
made of the fact that, if he should plead guilty or nolo contendere, there would 
be no trial and that, by such a plea, he waived his right to a trial. He was 
also informed that, if he should plead either guilty or nolo contendere, the 
court would be entitled to ask him questions about the offense to which he had 
pleaded and that the possibility of prosecution for perjury existed if he 
answered those questions falsely while under oath. The court, in accordance with 
Rule 15(d), W.R.Cr.P., addressed Martin personally in open court and determined 
that his plea was voluntary. The nature of the plea agreement process between 
the State and Martin was fully explored in accordance with Rule 15(e), W.R.Cr.P. 
The court went to some pains to expand upon the requirements of Rule 15, 
W.R.Cr.P., and explained to Martin those rights that he would be waiving by a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere. The court also explored Martin's health 
problems, relating to a heart condition that had manifested itself during 
confinement, and explained that his condition would have to be treated at the 
penitentiary if he were incarcerated.

After all of 
this, Martin advised the court that he was pleading nolo contendere of his own 
free will and that the plea was what he wanted to do. The court specifically 
asked him if he was entering that plea because he felt forced to do so. Martin 
replied in the negative. From an examination of the entire record, there appears 
to be no basis to question the proposition that Martin's plea of nolo contendere 
was voluntarily and knowingly entered. Gist v. State, 768 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1989).

This court has 
ruled that a plea of nolo contendere, within the criminal context, is the same 
as a plea of guilty. State v. Steele, 620 P.2d 1026 (Wyo. 1980); followed in Keller v. State, 723 P.2d 1244 
(Wyo. 1986). 
If the plea of nolo contendere is treated as the substantial equivalent of a 
plea of guilty, it must follow that the effect of that plea is to waive all 
"non-jurisdictional" claims. Sword v. State, 746 P.2d 423 (Wyo. 1987), citing Vallo v. State, 726 P.2d 1045 
(Wyo. 1986); and Tompkins v. State, 705 P.2d 836 (Wyo. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986). Cf. Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864 (Wyo. 1984).

This brings us 
to Martin's effort to seek post-conviction relief. Martin initially filed a 
motion for the appointment of counsel. Although there was no petition for 
post-conviction relief filed, the court appointed counsel to represent Martin. 
While the question of whether a proper proceeding had been initiated was being 
debated, Martin did file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In his 
petition, he contended that he had been denied due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 
because:

1. He did not 
receive a quick and speedy trial; 

2. The State's 
filing, in the County Court, of three separate complaints with three separate 
charges represented prosecutorial misconduct and harassment;

3. The State 
refused to permit Donald R. Martin to take a polygraph test which would 
constitute exculpatory evidence;

4. The Court 
refused to set bail in an amount that defendant Donald R. Martin could 
make;

5. The 
defendant, Donald R. Martin, had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment 
by being kept in the Uinta County Jail, and ultimately placed in the 
penitentiary, despite the fact that he had experienced a severe heart 
attack;

6. The State 
used the fact that he had contested extradition to justify its argument for a 
high bond and its prosecution on a criminal matter that should have been 
resolved more appropriately as a civil matter.

No additional 
claims of any constitutional bases for post-conviction relief were presented by 
counsel although counsel did brief the law with respect to the claims which 
Martin had asserted.

Subsequently, 
Martin filed a pro se response, supplemental to the one filed by counsel, to the 
State's motion to dismiss. In that document, he restated his claims relating to 
the filing of three separate complaints; his polygraph question; a denial of 
reasonable bail; and his subjection to cruel and unusual punishment. In 
addition, he complained that: his plea of nolo contendere had been coerced; he 
was not advised that he could have a direct appeal, and that both court and 
counsel failed in that regard; his plea was coerced; he was not allowed to 
withdraw his plea in accordance with Rule 30, W.R.Cr.P.;2 papers he had prepared were filed 
but not presented to the court; certain motions were never presented; he had 
difficulty getting papers notarized or copied; he was moved between the jail in 
Lincoln County and the jail in Uinta County and, therefore, rendered unavailable 
for court appearance; and that he was denied his constitutional rights in 
general. Ultimately, the district court entered its Order Denying 
Post-Conviction Relief. The appeal in this case is taken from that 
order.

The substance of 
Martin's claims for post-conviction relief can be addressed concisely. None of 
those which relate to matters prior to his entry of nolo contendere raise any 
jurisdictional defects. Consequently, under the law pronounced in Sword, 746 P.2d 423, these contentions are waived. Some of them relate to his sentence. 
These do not lead to a viable claim for relief in post-conviction proceedings. 
Sanchez v. State, 755 P.2d 245 (Wyo. 1988); 
Whitney v. State, 745 P.2d 902 (Wyo. 1987). Furthermore, there is nothing to 
suggest that the failure to raise these issues by a direct appeal would survive 
the requirements articulated in Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988). In that case, 
we explained clearly that a convicted party is foreclosed from raising, in a 
post-conviction proceeding, any claims of error that could, or should, have been 
presented on direct appeal unless he demonstrates good cause for his failure to 
do so and that he suffers actual prejudice as a result.

The careful and 
thorough work of counsel appointed in connection with Martin's prosecution is 
evidenced by the record. The arraignment proceedings and the proceedings at the 
change of plea hearing speak for themselves in terms of the thoroughness with 
which the trial court pursued the case. On this record, there was no viable 
claim for post-conviction relief available to Martin so far as counsel was able 
to discern or so far as Martin was able to articulate.

Given the 
circumstances of this case, in which any possible claims for post-conviction 
relief were foreclosed as a matter of law, Martin's claim that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel in the post-conviction proceeding has no merit. 
Nothing in the record suggests that counsel was not faithful in attempting to 
identify some valid ground for post-conviction relief. The record does offer 
assurance that counsel also was faithful to the professional duty owed to the 
court. The applicable law was evaluated and correctly reported to the trial 
court. When a case such as this has been appropriately pursued and disposed of 
by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the process should lead to an absence of 
claims for post-conviction relief. That is why we have insisted upon strict 
compliance with Rule 15, W.R.Cr. P. That is what occurred in this case and, in 
such an instance, the claim of lack of effective assistance of counsel in 
connection with the post-conviction proceeding simply fails. When there is 
nothing that can be accomplished, effectiveness of counsel is not an 
issue.

The Order 
Denying Post-Conviction Relief is affirmed.

1 Section 6-3-407(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) A person 
who knowingly obtains property from another person by false pretenses with 
intent to defraud the person is guilty of:

"A felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is 
five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more; * * *."

2 The appropriate rule 
regarding this issue is Rule 33(d), W.R.Cr.P., Withdrawal of plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice, dissenting.

At first glance, 
this case appears but a new pearl for the Cutbirth1 necklace of cases2 where those who can afford private 
attorneys explain through prison bars to those who cannot that "the simple 
failure [by their appointed counsel] to raise certain issues on appeal, even if 
they were meritorious, does not require a conclusion of ineffective assistance 
of counsel."3 But the State reports Donald Martin 
to have a "borderline retarded intelligence" and to be too poor to afford an 
attorney.4 Demanding Martin make his claims in 
legal terms after denying him the services of an attorney must make this case so 
exceptional even our standard Cutbirth explanation to the poor will not suffice. 
Martin had tuned pianos for a living and articulating legal arguments is no job 
for someone unable to feel his way through our judicial hall-of-mirrors. We are 
capable of better than lockstep jurisprudence. I dissent.

The public 
defender was appointed by the district court and paid by the State to represent 
Donald R. Martin (Martin). The public defender displayed absolutely no loyalty 
to his client;5 in fact, he argued against the 
interests of his client to the district court and to this court. There is a 
ready argument to support the claim that evidence in the record is insufficient 
to support a charge requiring an intent to defraud; although this may simply 
support my claim that Martin had, at best, an attorney in name only and, at 
worst, an attorney in sheep's clothing.

Finally, the 
working assumption by the majority that the difference between a plea of nolo 
contendere and a plea of guilty is without distinction seems an indefensible 
claim under W.R.Cr.P. 15, the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.

Profoundly 
disturbing to me is the behavior of the public defender appointed by the 
district court to represent Martin. His behavior raises fundamental questions 
about which ethical responsibilities attach to the relationship between an 
appointed attorney and an indigent client. A thumbnail sketch now of the 
"professional services" Martin received at the hands of the public defender lays 
out why I claim Martin had no attorney.

The public 
defender, early on, wrote his "borderline retarded" client to inform him there 
was "no way for the Court or [the public defender] to guess what the grounds for 
relief could be unless stated by" the prisoner and it "would be helpful if [he] 
could tailor a petition for relief in [his] sentencing court along the lines set 
out in the form used by the United States District Court." After spelling out 
his demands to this borderline retarded and indigent prisoner, the public 
defender announced, "In the event that you can state a sufficient basis for 
relief, then an effort will be made to give you further assistance and pursue 
the matter before the sentencing court." (Emphasis added.)

Later, the 
public defender dispatched an ex parte letter to the district judge but sent no 
copy to his "client". Normally, one would not rush to describe such an action as 
an attorney's good faith effort to provide a client with "further assistance."6 The ex parte letter to the district 
judge stated, in part:

I take issue 
with the appointment of counsel in this case because after having reviewed the 
record, I think the issues are frivolous and your first order in this case 
indicates that you feel the same. * * *

* * * * * 
*

Letters from my 
client indicate that he would like to know my plan of action. * * * I have 
reviewed all of the court hearings and I am forwarding those hearings, which 
reflect all of his issues and your rulings, to Mr. Martin so that he can amend 
or supplement the record. I have also filed a motion for an extension of time so 
that he might do that if he wishes, pro se.

Although the 
memorandum and previous brief were submitted in apparent disagreement with your 
original order and my client's wishes it was done so with a deep concern about 
the matter.

(Emphasis 
added.)

The history of 
this case begins in Green 
River, Wyoming where 
Martin repaired and tuned pianos. In the fall of 1985, he agreed to recondition 
an antique player piano owned by a BridgerValley family. The family delivered the 
piano to Martin and gave him three cash advances totaling $1,248.05.7 Soon after, Martin moved his piano 
business to Greeley, 
Colorado and took with him the 
unrepaired piano. His explanation for the delay in completing the repairs was 
the required antique player piano repair parts remained unavailable.8 The customer filed a criminal 
complaint. Martin was arrested in Colorado on February 26, 1986 for the offense 
of conversion by bailee of the piano. The piano was returned when Martin was 
extradited.

In quick order, 
the conversion by bailee charge was reformed to a charge of converting the 
advanced funds; the prosecutor filed a final charge of obtaining the $1,247.059 with intent to defraud under W.S. 
6-3-407(a)(i). The "borderline retarded" Martin now found himself charged with 
intentionally defrauding the BridgerValley family. Little did he realize to 
fight those charges all the way to this high court, he would have to find within 
himself the talent and resources to formulate his legal arguments in legal 
terms. Bond was set too high10 for Martin to remain free pending 
his trial and he remained confined from the time of his arrest on February 26, 
1986. He entered his plea of nolo contendere on October 2, 1986. On November 26, 
1986, he was sentenced to three-to-seven years confinement with credit for the 
nine months he had already spent in confinement.11

The information 
was filed in the district court on May 28, 1986 and arraignment occurred on June 
3 when Martin plead not guilty. Ten days were granted for defense counsel to 
negotiate a plea and file motions. A change of plea hearing was scheduled for 
July 30. But on July 25, Martin suffered a severe heart attack while imprisoned 
in the UintaCounty jail. He reappeared 
in district court on August 20 to reaffirm his innocence but was denied any bond 
reduction and remained confined. Apparently at this time, he rejected a possible 
plea bargain of two-to-nine years with credit for time served.

On September 5, 
counsel filed a motion for a bill of particulars for production, a motion in 
limine, a W.R.E. 404(b) determination, a motion to dismiss, a polygraph test, 
and a motion for bail reduction. On September 30, Martin filed a pro se 
handwritten habeas corpus motion for release because he had been jailed 
eighty-eight days beyond the 120 days allowed to bring a defendant to trial 
after an information or indictment has been filed. Rule 204, Uniform Rules for 
the District Courts of the State of Wyoming (Rule 204).

A hearing 
scheduled for September 25 was postponed when Martin was again hospitalized 
because of his heart condition. The hearing reconvened on October 2 when a 
speedy trial dismissal was rejected by the district court. A nolo contendere 
plea pursuant to a plea bargain was entered, although the record makes clear the 
district court knew that Martin continued to assert his innocence of the charged 
crime.

THE COURT: Now, 
I want to interject because Mr. Martin talked aloud enough during the conference 
with you, Mr. Thomas, for the Court to hear. And the Court would say marvelous, 
first of all; and secondly, the Court would say that Mr. Martin told this Court 
that he recognized that he waived his right to defend himself on the charges 
when he plead nolo contendere. In other words, Mr. Martin, you gave up the right 
to contest the evidence that Mr. Anderson presented as being the State's side of 
the case and you gave up your right to tell your side of the story, to defend 
yourself on the charges. And what you were doing, when you were talking to your 
attorney, is defending yourself. And when your attorney stands up to 
cross-examine in this matter, the thrust of his cross-examination is to pick 
holes in the State's case and to defend you.

Now, that's not 
the purpose that the Court has required the State to present this evidence. The 
purpose for which the Court had in mind was to make sure that this wasn't a 
frivolous prosecution and unsubstantiated charge. The purpose was is [sic] to 
make sure that there was - that the State presented its side of the case because 
your side of the case becomes irrelevant when you plead nolo contendere and the 
only thing that becomes relevant at that point is whether or not there's some 
substantiation for what the Court has done or not done.

Now, I want that 
in the record and that's why I interrupted, Mr. Thomas. Nevertheless, you may 
proceed with the cross-examination.

On February 11, 
1987, through counsel, Martin's motion for sentence reduction was again denied. 
On December 2, 1987, Martin filed a motion for appointment of counsel for 
post-conviction relief citing this court's discussions in Alberts v. State, 745 P.2d 898 (Wyo. 1987) and Long v. State, 745 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 
1987), accompanied by an affidavit of indigence. By order filed December 4, 
1987, the district court appointed Rex O. Arney, Gary L. Yordy, David H. 
Carmichael as well as Leonard Munker to represent Martin for purposes of 
post-conviction relief, after which the appointments of Arney, Yordy and 
Carmichael were vacated on December 7, 1987.12

The State filed 
an opposition to the appointment of counsel on December 15, 1987. About a month 
later, the office of the public defender, through its director, joined to oppose 
the appointment of counsel as well. It was then the public defender wrote 
Martin:

I am in receipt 
of your letter of January 11, 1988, and in reply can advise you of the 
following. Originally, Judge Troughton, in his Order dated December 5, 1987, 
appointed counsel pursuant to Alberts v. State, and Long v. State; those 
attorneys, in addition to myself, are:

Rex. O. Arney 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney 
319 West 
Dow Street P.O. Box 6288Sheridan, 
WY82801-6288

Gary L. Yordy 
Attorney at Law 733 Dogwood Cheyenne, WY82009-1009

David H. 
Carmichael Carmichael, McNiff & Patton 1920 Thomas [sic] Avenue, Suite 600 
P.O. Box 945 Cheyenne, WY 82003-0945

Thereafter on 
December 7, 1987, there was an Order Vacating Appointment of Counsel, which 
included Rex Arney, Gary Yordy and David Carmichael. That Order did not refer to 
me for the reason that the appointment of counsel, pursuant to the statute in 
light of the Alberts and Long cases, is limited to my office.

I then filed 
with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Post-Conviction Procedure 
that was utilized by Judge Troughton. A copy of that was sent to you on January 
8, 1988. The reason for that Motion was the noncompliance of the statutes and 
rules for the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief and the request 
for counsel. I am forwarding to you an approved form utilized in the United 
States District Court for the District of Wyoming. It would be helpful if you 
could tailor a petition for relief in your sentencing court along the lines set 
out in the form used by the United States District Court. Until such a petition 
is filed of record and served upon the respondent Attorney General of this 
State, this office will take no further action until ordered by the Court. There 
is no way for the Court or myself to guess what the grounds for relief could be 
unless stated by you. In the event that you can state a sufficient basis for 
relief, then an effort will be made to give you further assistance and pursue 
the matter before the sentencing court.

This 
demonstrates the standard of legal care this court tolerates when provided by an 
appointed attorney - for a "borderline retarded," indigent prisoner.

The district 
court entered an order for additional briefing on the right to counsel on 
January 22, 1988. On the same day, Martin filed a pleading pro se to which he 
attached his previous motion for appointment of counsel. On the issue of 
appointment of counsel, the State and the public defender filed required 
briefs.13 

Habeas corpus 
was denied on March 3, 1988 and a briefing schedule and hearing was set for 
post-conviction relief. On April 27, 1988, the State filed a motion to dismiss. 
The public defender made a less than strategic three-pronged "response." The 
public defender first wrote to the district judge the now infamous ex parte 
letter, excerpted earlier in this dissent.

I have attempted 
to reach you by phone on a number of occasions and have been 
unsuccessful.

I apologize for 
the delay in filing the current brief pursuant to your order of March 3rd. 
However, there are no amendments to the Petition, no new issues, and I have 
reviewed the record in a vain searching for error. If it exists, I cannot find 
it.

I take issue 
with the appointment of counsel in this case because after having reviewed the 
record, I think the issues are frivolous and your first order in this case 
indicates that you feel the same. I think that is a finding that could be made, 
especially in light of the new statutes regarding post conviction procedure. Had 
Mr. Martin contacted me initially in this ca[se], I would have advised him his 
claim was without merit, especially after reviewing the record.

Your appointment 
of counsel and order in this case reflects some disagreement with the Supreme 
Court rulings in Alberts and Long. Although I share your view of the court's 
rulings, I believe them to be untenable in view of the current state of the law, 
the time and expense, and the economic constraints placed on my office. It is 
for that reason that I suggest that you, as a trial judge, adopt the procedure 
employed by the federal courts in their rules that some merit must be found in 
the post conviction petition or a meritorious claim made before counsel is 
appointed. I am reluctant to see post conviction procedures revoked by the 
legislature, but maybe the new changes will be beneficial. However, I have a 
hard time adhering to the current state of affairs as set forth in a variety of 
Wyoming Supreme Court decisions. The delay in the filing of this memorandum is 
occasioned by the fact that my office is dealing with an excessive number of 
frivolous requests for counsel, put in motion by inmate writ writers who charge 
for their services and then fail to file a petition or make substantial claims 
as required by the Supreme Court.

Letters from my 
client indicate that he would like to know my plan of action. I think my 
memorandum is clear in that regard. His inquiries would suggest that he would 
like some type of hearing; that is a court decision. He would also like to be 
present at the hearing and that too is a court decision. I have reviewed all of 
the court hearings and I am forwarding those hearings, which reflect all of his 
issues and your rulings, to Mr. Martin so that he can amend or supplement the 
record. I have also filed a motion for an extension of time so that he might do 
that if he wishes, pro se.

Although the 
memorandum and previous brief were submitted in apparent disagreement with your 
original order and my client's wishes, it was done so with a deep concern about 
the matter.

That was but the 
first prong in the public defender's strategy to represent Martin. The second 
and third prongs consisted of a motion for an extension of time to permit Martin 
to proceed pro se to amend and a five-page pleading entitled "Response to Court 
Order Filed March 3, 1988 Subject: Paragraph Four." Most of this pleading was 
exploited by the public defender to broadcast his opposition to being appointed 
public defender for Martin, keeping in mind a private attorney would only have 
been responding to the State's motion to dismiss. Following his prolonged 
objection to being appointed counsel for Martin, the public defender finally 
found time to give his professional opinion on the merits of Martin's 
claims:

Having reviewed 
the record, there appears to be no issue raised by Donald R. Martin that would 
require an evidentiary hearing or that could not be resolved without the present 
record now before the court.

The Petitioner, 
Donald R. Martin, having had access to the court, having had his file reviewed 
by counsel and the court, the argument is whether counsel was necessary to begin 
with and it is this attorney's opinion that counsel was not necessary in the 
instant case. Mr. Martin's rights and interests were fully protected without 
counsel, and counsel's only role or function in this case was to agree with the 
arguments of the Attorney General's Office, to its acquiescence with the court's 
appointment of counsel, and to advise the defendant that his issues were 
non-meritorious. This proceeding is a discretionary proceeding.

The appointment 
of counsel has not enhanced the liberty interest of the Petitioner, and yet the 
Petitioner would have hoped that counsel's skill, judgment and diligence would 
result in a revocation or a setting aside his sentence and guilty plea. His 
rights as a matter of due process have now been protected.

The post 
conviction procedure to correct an unconstitutional allegation of deprivation of 
liberty has been examined. The appointment of counsel in the instant case was 
again unnecessary.

Mr. Martin's 
issues, raised in his post conviction petition, had been reviewed in an earlier 
brief, and the Attorney General has filed his response. It is unnecessary to 
review those allegations for a second time in this brief. Only the guilty plea 
itself will be re-examined.

Within the body 
of the record it appears Rule 15 has been complied with; that Rule 15(b), nolo 
contendere, was allowed; that Rule 15(c) was complied with. It appears within 
the record that the court complied with Rule 15(d) regarding plea agreements and 
that in regard to Rule 15(e), the prosecution complied with that portion. It 
appears that within the record the court accepted the plea agreement. Lastly, 
the court determined in Rule 15(f) that there was a basis to accept the plea and 
that a verbatim record of the proceedings under Rule 15(g) would be made. Having 
now advised the defendant that his request for post conviction relief is without 
merit and the proceedings of the court are correct, counsel's request to be 
relieved is now moot, in that the issues, facts, claims and rulings can now be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court and such review can include the concept of 
miscarriage of justice or that the claim could have been made and raised in a 
direct appeal, and lastly, it should be determined whether or not the claim was 
frivolous to begin with before appointing counsel.

(Emphasis 
added.) That "[t]he appointment of counsel has not enhanced the liberty interest 
of the Petitioner" is beyond obvious in this case.14 

The public 
defender did not list, much less address, Martin's earlier claims. Martin's 
claims include that he was denied a speedy trial; no response was made to his 
motion for a lie detector test to prove his innocence; he was unreasonably 
denied affordable bail; and his medical condition was held over his head to 
coerce his nolo contendere plea.15 The public defender failed to 
explore the possibility that the evidence in the record was insufficient to 
support the charge that Martin "intended" to defraud the BridgerValley family - an obvious element in an 
intent to defraud charge.16

It should come 
as little surprise to learn this less than strategic three-pronged response 
deployed by the public defender was simply overwhelmed by the prosecutor's legal 
acumen and so the district court dismissed Martin's Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief. The order of denial was entered May 12, 1988:

After review of 
the pleadings and papers filed in this case, the Court finds and concludes there 
has been no substantial denial of Donald R. Martin's rights under the 
Constitution of the United 
States or the State of Wyoming or both.

Therefore, the 
relief requested in the Petition for Post Conviction Relief is denied; and the 
Petition is hereby dismissed.

Martin and the 
public defender both filed notices of appeal, accompanied by very different 
briefs. The public defender never discussed any substantive issue, let alone 
argued the merits of his "client's" appeal. Martin proceeded pro se to confront 
both his attorney and the attorney general. The twenty-seven-page brief from the 
public defender simply claimed Martin's rights were foreclosed by his nolo 
contendere plea and coercion was not available as a basis to attack the plea. 
Problems with former strategies of the public defender are not unknown.17 No consideration was given to the 
question of speedy trial nor whether the actual criminal offense had even 
occurred. The brief also digressed to consider and pledge fidelity to Anders v. 
State of California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, reh'g denied 
388 U.S. 924, 87 S. Ct. 2094, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1967). I agree the issue of 
appointment of counsel should not have been addressed in district court or this 
court since counsel had been officially appointed and the State did not 
appeal.

But, rather than 
arguing Martin's case, the public defender spent thirty minutes decrying the 
inconvenience of the public defender's office being appointed to represent the 
imprisoned poor in post-conviction-relief petitions.18 He said he had no responsibility 
to review the record, asserting all the while his brief complied with Anders. He 
would only consider constitutional errors - which would have to dance magically 
atop the record - not errors suggested by a defendant with no legal training. 
Had the public defender reviewed the record, he might have noticed the State's 
report of Martin having a "borderline retarded intelligence." It could have 
gelled into a passing thought that Martin was unable to articulate his legal 
arguments in legal terms.

The public 
defender seemed not to have read the pro se brief filed by Martin. Of course, 
judicial etiquette would not permit Martin an invitation to appear before this 
court to argue the merits of his claims even though he had no one to do so. 
Naturally, no oral argument was provided to discuss the contentions raised by 
the pro se brief which included:

Whether there 
was Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Whether the 
trial court was in violation of the Fifth and Fourtee[n]th Amendments to The 
United States Constitution.

Martin's brief 
cited the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct as a standard for the duties 
owed a client by an attorney, including an initial personal conference between 
attorney and client. Martin's notion that the Wyoming Rules of Professional 
Conduct govern attorneys in their relations with clients is naive. But then he 
was unaware we had sub silentio amended that rule to read "for privately paid 
attorneys."

Obviously, 
Martin, with his modest education, was unable to make his legal claims in legal 
terms, except the roughly understood notions that he did not secure a speedy 
trial, felt coerced by his medical condition to enter a nolo contendere plea, 
and was innocent of intending to defraud anyone. Even a casual review of the 
record reveals at least an arguable speedy trial issue under the Wyoming 
Constitution, the United States Constitution and our current literature on the 
subject. Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 
1989); Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989); DeSpain v. State, 774 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 1989). The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently and conclusively addressed a similar 
appellant brief where the case was remanded for appointment of another appellant 
counsel:

The brief 
submitted to this Court provides a cursory treatment of the facts and a 
conclusory presentation of illogical arguments. When presented with such 
inadequate legal arguments, a court should not attempt to assess the legitimacy 
of the underlying claims, because to do so would be to make a judgment in a case 
where the appellate representation is wholly inadequate. We find, as the 
Superior Court did, that appellant's brief is completely lacking in substance 
and we grant appellant relief because we conclude that appellant was afforded 
ineffective representation in his PCHA [Post Conviction Hearing Act] 
appeal.

Com. v. Albert, 
561 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1989).

I can find 
nothing in this record to reflect the offense charged of intending to obtain 
money under false pretenses occurred. Conversion of the money obtained for 
possible purchase of repair parts arguably could have been charged or, when 
charged, could have been retained as the charge. But nothing presented in the 
record suggests Martin, being in the business of repairing pianos, did not 
intend to repair the piano19. 

It is not 
difficult to address what should be provided by an Anders brief. A good faith 
reading of Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493; McCoy v. Court 
of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 100 L. Ed. 2d 440 
(1988); and Penson v. Ohio, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988) 
makes clear the constitutional criteria laid out by the United States Supreme 
Court. In this case, we hardly have the bare conclusion proscribed in Anders, 
386 U.S.  at 742-43, 87 S.Ct. at 1399-1400: "Such a procedure, this Court said, 
`cannot be an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate review 
available to all defendants' who may not be able to afford such an expense." We 
certainly are not presented, by Martin, the schizophrenic brief characterized in 
McCoy, 108 S. Ct.  at 1898-1902 (footnotes omitted and emphasis 
added):

Appellant's 
counsel then prepared a brief that can fairly be characterized as schizophrenic. 
In his role as an advocate for appellant, counsel stated the facts, advanced 
four arguments for reversal, and prayed that the conviction be set aside. In his 
role as an officer of the court, counsel stated that further appellate 
proceedings on behalf of his client "would be frivolous and without any arguable 
merit," App. 14, and prayed that he be permitted to withdraw, id., at 27. Thus, 
in the same documents, the lawyer purported to maintain that there were 
arguments warranting a reversal and also that those arguments were wholly 
without merit. The brief did not contain an explanation of the reasons for 
counsel's conclusion. * * *

* * * * * 
*

The principle of 
substantial equality does, however, require that appointed counsel make the same 
diligent and thorough evaluation of the case as a retained lawyer before 
concluding that an appeal is frivolous. Every advocate has essentially the same 
professional responsibility whether he or she accepted a retainer from a paying 
client or an appointment from a court. The appellate lawyer must master the 
trial record, thoroughly research the law, and exercise judgment in identifying 
the arguments that may be advanced on appeal. In preparing and evaluating the 
case, and in advising the client as to the prospects for success, counsel must 
consistently serve the client's interest to the best of his or her ability. Only 
after such an evaluation has led counsel to the conclusion that the appeal is 
"wholly frivolous" is counsel justified in making a motion to withdraw. This is 
the central teaching of Anders.

The requirement 
of an Anders brief was further considered by Justice Stevens in Penson, 109 S. Ct. 346. What was done in the Penson "brief" is markedly similar to what was 
done in Anders. That court said:

The so-called 
"Anders brief" serves the valuable purpose of assisting the court in determining 
both that counsel in fact conducted the required detailed review of the case and 
that the appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an 
adversary presentation. * * * Counsel's failure to file such a brief left the 
Ohio court without an adequate basis for determining that he had performed his 
duty carefully to search the case for arguable error and also deprived the court 
of the assistance of an advocate in its own review of the cold record on 
appeal.

Penson, 109 S. Ct.  at 350-51 (footnote omitted).

Discussion of 
Anders briefs by state and federal courts is legion. The public defender would 
not be sorely disadvantaged by reading Forrester v. State, 542 So. 2d 1358, 1361 
(Fla.App. 1989) (emphasis in original and added).

[T]he brief at 
the very minimum should draw attention to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal in order to assist the court in determining whether 
counsel conducted the required detailed review of the case, and whether the 
appeal is so frivolous that the case may be disposed of without the assistance 
of counsel. * * *

Finally, a brief 
that fails to make any reasonable argument in support of the designated judicial 
acts, but which otherwise abides by Anders, as above stated, must contain a 
representation in the brief that appellate counsel has discussed the designated 
acts with trial counsel and has also communicated with the defendant, together 
with the statement that trial counsel agrees that the designations present 
wholly frivolous issues. If appellate counsel is unable to acquire the 
concurrence of trial counsel in such conclusion, then he or she must include as 
well a satisfactory explanation of why such concurrence could not be 
obtained.

The Florida court argues the 
first professional obligation owed a client is proper communication with the 
client and appellate counsel. The Florida court would certainly be at odds with 
the assertions made by the public defender in this case at oral argument but 
would readily agree with Martin's pro se brief.

It may be 
difficult in Wyoming to heed the Florida court that the 
client's interest is not subservient to amiable relations between trial and 
appellate counsel because of our unavoidable institutional identity. Appellate 
briefing is prepared by the director of the office of the public defender; that 
same office sees to defense representation at trial level.

The public 
defender relies on Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 
1993, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 546 (1987) to highlight the current tide of constitutional 
construction by the United States Supreme Court which denies and disparages, 
because unenumerated, any federal constitutional right to counsel in 
post-conviction relief; Finley goes even further to suggest, in dicta, there is 
no federal right to any appeal whatsoever.20 See also Murray v. Giarratano, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989). The issue presented is not a Finley scenario. 
Here, counsel has been provided in name only because the public defender did 
little but lament his woes in being appointed as counsel.

The public 
defender claimed in his brief:

It would appear 
to counsel in this case that Anders v. California, supra, was complied with but that 
Anders is only applicable to direct appeals, not post-conviction matters and 
that duty, procedurally as well as ethically was made in the handling of the 
instant case as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in 
McCoy.

That claim makes 
no sense since McCoy requires a basic compliance with Anders. Any reading of the 
record could reveal the questions raised by Martin during the period he was 
confined, from the time he was charged to after the time of his sentencing. He 
questioned the justice of his bail set so high it was unattainable. He 
questioned why he had not been told he had the right to appeal. He questioned 
how it was proper to wring a nolo contendere plea from him by institutional 
indifference to his heart condition. He questioned why he was denied a speedy 
trial in violation of Rule 204. He continually denied his guilt and argued no 
crime had occurred. Not one of these issues were addressed in good faith by the 
public defender. Yet the majority summarily disposes of Martin's issues on the 
basis of waiver by plea, a kind of judicial black hole which crushes to its 
breast everything within its gravitational reach.

A threshold 
obstacle to this summary disposal is that the public defender made no effort to 
brief the issues, even if he argued for disposition by waiver. Leaving behind 
the lack of briefing, it is apparent the factual situation presents several 
difficult areas of inquiry yet to be briefed and addressed.

The first 
inquiry is whether the district court, even as a matter of discretion, should 
have accepted the nolo contendere plea given the severity of Martin's medical 
condition and his continued professing of innocence. The second inquiry relates 
to the kind of information an accused should be furnished about the offense 
charged since Martin denied his guilt but was not clearly informed that proof of 
"intent" was needed to convict him. Intent is, of course, indispensable. Miller 
v. State, 732 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Kraft, 413 N.W.2d 303 
(N.D. 1987). A third inquiry is where, within W.R.Cr.P. 15, is the principle of 
waiver under a nolo contendere plea located if a finding of guilt is not 
required? Tangent to the waiver question is the principle that jurisdiction is 
not waived and if a crime did not exist, the plea cannot constitute a waiver. 
See Williams v. State, 516 So. 2d 975 (Fla.App. 1987) and Patton v. State, 517 N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 1987). Finally, related inquiry is 
required into the nature of the charged offense as it involves the admitted, 
recognized and unquestioned facts in this case of a piano repairman who received 
advanced payments for repair and had not completed the contractually agreed 
services.

From an early 
stage of his imprisonment, Martin questioned his denial of a speedy trial 
against Rule 204. It is not my province in this dissent, where the public 
defender was not even inclined to provide representation and review for his 
client, to address what this court faced in Phillips, 774 P.2d 118; Harvey, 774 P.2d 87; and DeSpain, 774 P.2d 77. May it suffice for the purpose of a proper 
Anders brief that the public defender had a responsibility to, at least, discuss 
the issue and advise why the speedy trial requirements of Rule 204 should not be 
applied. Cf. DeSpain, 774 P.2d 77. See also Phillips, 774 P.2d 118 and Harvey, 774 P.2d 87. In 
the absence of that discussion, the public defender failed in his responsibility 
to address the district court for consideration of post-conviction relief or to 
represent his client in the appellate proceedings. See Penson, 109 S. Ct. 346.

We are also 
faced with the need for a standard to evaluate district court acceptance of a 
nolo contendere plea, not just when the accused refuses to admit guilt for the 
purposes of potential civil liability or otherwise, but when a "borderline 
retarded" accused consistently professes innocence. In a due process context, we 
are called to consider the repellent attributes of a nolo contendere plea as if 
it were an admission of guilt and then to fence in claimed remedies by 
application of Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 
(1984); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 
(1973); and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 
(1970). I am not willing to concede a nolo contendere plea, when accompanied by 
a continued recitation of innocence, necessarily encumbers the defendant to the 
same preclusion which results from a guilty plea. Cf. Patton, 517 N.E.2d  at 
374.

Even without 
correcting for due process, the majority's broadly stated rule of preclusion has 
clear exceptions such that a nolo plea will not necessarily preclude 
reexamination. People v. Komatsu, 212 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 261 Cal. Rptr. 681 
(1989).

It is apparent 
from a review of the cases that broad exceptions exist. First, the rule of 
preclusion by plea relates to issues predating the entry of the plea and not to 
the entry of the plea itself. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974), which distinguishes Tollett, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602; and the guilty plea trilogy; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S. Ct. 1458, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1970); McMann, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441; and 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970), 
where the guilty plea is characterized as a break in the chain of events which 
has proceeded it in the criminal process. Consequently, events involved in the 
voluntariness or propriety of the plea itself are not foreclosed from 
examination.

Second, the 
question of jurisdiction is not precluded. Intrinsic to this exception is the 
very power of the state to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him. Double jeopardy cases, for example, have encountered some 
vicissitudes under this inquiry. See most recently, United States v. Broce, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 757, 102 L. Ed. 2d 927 (1989). Compare Menna v. New 
York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S. Ct. 241, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975) and Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098.

Another 
exception is where a crime itself did not occur. Williams, 516 So. 2d 975. A 
consistent rule is applied that waiver by plea cannot be applied if there was no 
actual crime for the entry of a proper guilty plea since entry of the plea only 
admits facts well-pleaded. Lott v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 421, 81 S. Ct. 1563, 6 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1961); United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United 
States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S. Ct. 775, 91 L. Ed. 973 
(1947); United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1978); Zebelman v. 
United States, 339 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1964); Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United 
States, 258 F.2d 726 (4th Cir.), cert. granted 358 U.S. 878, 79 S. Ct. 125, 3 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1958), judgment aff'd 359 U.S. 271, 79 S. Ct. 763, 3 L. Ed. 2d 800 
(1959); Crolich v. United States, 196 F.2d 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S. 830, 73 S. Ct. 36, 97 L. Ed. 646 (1952). The rule is stated by Wright, Federal 
Practice & Procedure: Criminal 2d § 177 at 664-65 (1982) (footnote 
omitted):

The plea [nolo 
contendere] is like a guilty plea in that the sufficiency of the indictment or 
information or other defects going to the power of the government to bring the 
defendant into court to answer the charge can still be challenged, but that 
nonjurisdictional defects in the proceeding are waived.

The principle of 
non-waiver of jurisdiction is apposite to the broad language of State v. Steele, 
620 P.2d 1026 (Wyo. 1980). Although that case is directed to 
admission of commission of the offense by nolo contendere, I would not consider 
its text to establish the unchallenged status of a total nonexistence of 
offense. "The court may accept it [nolo contendere] without first satisfying 
itself that the defendant committed the crime charged as it must do on a plea of 
guilty."21 Id. at 1028.

After the 
initial complaint of larceny by bailee of the piano, followed by larceny by 
bailee for the advance payments for repair costs, the third complaint to that 
series, as identically stated in the information, was "did knowingly obtain 
property, to-wit: one thousand two hundred and forty seven dollars and five 
cents, ($1,247.05), in cash from other people, to-wit: Rex and Judy Condos, by 
false pretenses, with intent to defraud the Condos, in violation of Section 
6-3-407(a)(i) W.S. 1977, as amended 1985."

The affidavit 
attached to the criminal complaint revealed that "[t]he price of $1,200 was 
agreed upon and was paid in advance on three separate dates in Lyman, Uinta 
County, Wyoming 8-2-85, check # 735 for $500.00; 8-15-85, check # 745 for 
$402.46; and 9-16-85, check # 764 for $345.59, to Donald Raymond Martin by Judy 
Condos."22

There is nothing 
in the initial complaint, affidavit or other documentary submission or 
allegation which claimed Martin did not intend to repair the piano. To the 
contrary, letters were mailed as recited in affidavit for warrant which gave 
Martin's excuses for delay.

The district 
court said:

The Court finds 
that there is a factual basis for the Court's side of this case. That it was not 
a frivolous charge[,] it was not a case that was filed without substantiation, 
that there's a factual basis for the Court's point of view - or for the State's 
point of view that Mr. Martin deceived Mr. and Mrs. Condos into not only giving 
him a piano, but deceived them into giving him money so that he could later skip 
out on them, which he, in fact, did. And that there is a factual basis for the 
Court - for the State and the Condoses believing that that's what Mr. Martin 
did, Mr. Martin's protestation to the contrary, notwithstanding.

The Court, 
therefore, will accept the plea of nolo contendere.

The district 
court did not find, and nothing in the statements made at plea indicated, Martin 
did not intend to repair the player piano. The statute, W.S. 6-3-407, obtaining 
property by false pretenses, provides in part: "(a) A person who knowingly 
obtains property from another person by false pretenses with intent to defraud * 
* *." (Emphasis added.) Cf. Martins v. State, 17 Wyo. 319, 98 P. 709 (1908). See also Anderson v. State, 27 Wyo. 345, 196 P. 1047 (1921). Missing from 
this scenario is evidence of intent to defraud which can only be construed from 
a developed plan not to provide the services which were the subject of the 
contract. This indispensable element of the offense is missing. This case 
presents the same issue as Miller, 732 P.2d 1054,23 where we discussed the false 
pretense statute in detail, finding the requisite intent to defraud was missing 
and the conviction was reversed. "The final and dispositive criminal-conviction 
requirement is intent to defraud. This factor uniformly required in the 
Wyoming cases, 
is discussed in a myriad of cases in other jurisdictions." Id. at 1063.

Fundamental in 
any proceeding finding criminal liability is the idea that one accused of a 
crime must have possessed a guilty mind as well as performed the proscribed act. 
* * * While modern statutory law has, to a limited degree, modified the 
traditional rule requiring a specific intent for every proscribed act * * *, it 
remains an essential element of the crime of theft * * *.

Kraft, 413 N.W.2d  at 306. In that case, an obvious error (plain error) reversal was 
required when the failure to give an intent instruction at trial had 
occurred.

In Haines v. 
Territory, 3 Wyo. 167, 179, 13 P. 8 (1887), the criminal elements listed were 
"intent to defraud; actual fraud must be committed; false pretenses must be used 
for the perpetration of the fraud; false pretenses must be the cause which 
induced the owner to part with his property." It was also clear in Driver v. 
State, 589 P.2d 391 (Wyo. 1979) the extension of the Wyoming law making criminal 
a misrepresentation of existing or past facts was not adopted to future acts. 
Miller, 732 P.2d 1054 followed the same thesis since intent to defraud could not 
be construed from subsequent non-payment. This was considered in People v. 
Rolston, 113 Ill. App.3d 727, 70 Ill.Dec. 87, 90, 448 N.E.2d 965, 968 (1983) that "failure to fulfill a contract is not proof of a 
specific intent to defraud." See also Fitzgerald v. State, 599 P.2d 572 
(Wyo. 1979), 
where the finding of fraudulent intent was not premised upon an intent not to 
deliver merchandise. Indeed, it was premised upon false pretenses found in the 
"advertisement." See also Anderson, 196 P. 1047 and Martins, 98 P. 709. 
Cf. Annotation, Modern Statutes of Rule that Crime of False Pretenses Cannot be 
Predicated upon Present Intention Not to Comply With Promise or Statement as to 
Future Act, 19 A.L.R.4th 959 (1983).24 

I see no need to 
whitewash the behavior of the public defender by recharacterizing that behavior. 
If the public defender had taken every issue discussed in this dissent, and 
after a good faith analysis came to a conclusion contrary to that of his client, 
there would at least have been a proper Anders brief presented to this 
court.

Now released on 
parole, Donald R. Martin will not be mesmerized by the result of this holding 
unless he violates the condition of his parole, but our reaction or lack of 
reaction, as a high court, to his lack of representative counsel is significant 
beyond the concerns of immediate participants. The behavior we condone from 
attorneys is the behavior the public receives. I would reverse.

1 Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988).

2 Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1989); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1989); Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1989); Cutbirth, 751 P.2d 1257.

3 Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 
1263. Not only do such failures merit no conclusion that the appointed attorney 
was ineffective, they do not even establish a rebuttable presumption that the 
appointed attorney was ineffective. The penniless prisoner is told to prove the 
appointed attorney's performance was so bad that the same judges looking over 
his case during post-conviction relief would have been unable to give the 
prisoner a fair review during appeal before they affirmed his conviction. This 
is what Cutbirth calls ineffectiveness to the point of prejudice.

For prejudice to 
be inherent, the attorney must literally sleep "through a substantial portion of 
the trial." Javor v. United 
States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 
1984).

4 Apparently as a joke, 
four attorneys were initially appointed by the court to represent Martin. See n. 
12, infra.

5 The public defender has 
encountered this problem before:

A defense 
attorney who abandons his duty of loyalty to his client and effectively joins 
the state in an effort to attain a conviction or death sentence suffers from an 
obvious conflict of interest. Such an attorney, like unwanted counsel, 
"`represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal 
fiction."

Osborn v. 
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 629 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2534, 
45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)).

6 If this kind of behavior 
by an attorney is acceptable to this court, then we certainly demand much more 
from the medical profession, Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989), than we demand from the 
attorneys we supervise, Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283 (Wyo. 
1989).

7 See n. 22, 
infra.

8 Within the status of 
this case where "facts" and "evidence" are de minimis, it is possible to find 
one factual controversy. In an affidavit attached to the original complaint, 
there was hearsay information obtained by the investigator that the parts had 
never been ordered. Martin contended in communications in the record that his 
invoices, which were mailed to him after arrest and confinement, had been 
removed by someone so that he only received the empty and previously opened 
envelope and the documents had disappeared. Development of the issue of 
validating evidence by either party did not occur within this 
record.

9 See n. 22, 
infra.

10 Martin had an indigent 
wife who had just had a baby.

11 Actually, although the 
information was not relayed by counsel or included in the briefing or oral 
argument, Martin was released on parole in August 1988, which was substantially 
in advance of oral argument on October 13, 1988. Had he been informed, he could 
have appeared for oral argument since he was no longer confined at the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary.

12 Senator Rex Arney was 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee of the Wyoming State Legislature. 
Representative Gary Yordy was a member of the House and also an active 
participant as a member of the Judiciary Committee. At that time, David 
Carmichael was serving as president of the Wyoming State Bar. Clearly, the 
appointments were a "bad joke" by virtue of the distaste of the district court 
and apparently the public defender for the appointment of counsel in 
post-conviction-relief cases.

13 Included in brief "in 
behalf" of Martin, the public defender stated:

To begin with, 
the Supreme Court Opinion in Alberts, was dealing with a case where the 
Petitioner Alberts had filed with the District Court a petition for 
post-conviction relief. The issue in the case centered around the appointment of 
counsel to help develop the issues, an evidentiary hearing, or briefing. The 
District Court disallowed the appointment of counsel and those were the basic 
facts before the Wyoming Supreme Court at the time of that argument. Justice 
Urbigkit in the Opinion indicated that counsel should be provided for the 
preparation of the post-conviction petition - that being dicta of the Court. 
Inmates at the Penitentiary promptly pumped out twenty odd requests for counsel 
to prepare petitions on demand. The office obligated with the choice of feeding 
the District Court and ultimately the Wyoming Supreme Court a menu of 
post-conviction petitions was the Public Defender's Office. There exists no 
other authority for this procedure other than the statements found in the 
Alberts opinion. It may be the client's decision to press a particular 
contention on appeal, but when counsel is asked by a client of his estimate of 
the merits of his case on appeal, professional duty requires an honest response. 
The attorney can state to the client the probable outcome, but the Defendant has 
no constitutional right to compel an appointed attorney to press frivolous or 
non-frivolous points requested by a client.

As a fact, this 
writer did not author Alberts, 745 P.2d 898. Writing the majority opinion was 
Justice Macy. In Long, 745 P.2d 547, which was authored by this writer, the 
counsel appointment request had accompanied a filed petition for post-conviction 
relief. See also Fondren v. State, 749 P.2d 767 (Wyo. 1988). This egregious mistake, repeated 
in appellate brief, adds little challenge to acceptability of the contentions 
made as to why the attorney should not "represent" his appointed 
client.

14 Counsel for defendant 
said he did not believe (or essentially believe in) the client for whom he was 
appointed. This is no different than State v. Burgins, 44 Ohio App.3d 158, 542 N.E.2d 707 (1988), where defense counsel in final argument stated he did not 
believe his client. It is also similar to what appointed defense counsel (a 
former commissioner of the Missouri Supreme Court) did in Schlup v. State, 771 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. App. 1989) in failure to appeal a conviction for his appointed 
client. In both cases, ineffectiveness of counsel was readily recognized by the 
appellate tribunal by reversal and remand.

15 All of these 
contentions, except the last, had been clearly enunciated by Martin 
significantly in advance of the brief filing date established for May 9, 1988, 
except the one involving a contention of coerced plea. That contention was 
implicit in other materials filed in the district court by Martin discussing 
speedy trial, his heart condition and denied bail. By coincidence, Martin also 
filed a response to the State's motion to dismiss on the same day that the 
response document was filed by the public defender. Even a casual comparison 
between the material filed by Martin pro se and the public defender, who had 
been paid to represent Martin, reveals the public defender was not communicating 
with Martin on issues Martin wanted raised.

16 In Miller v. State, 732 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1987), Mr. Miller had also been charged 
with receipt of money under the false pretense statute. The obvious difference 
between Mr. Miller and Mr. Martin, aside from the fact that Mr. Miller had no 
"borderline retarded intelligence," was that Martin served out most of his 
sentence. Mr. Miller's private attorney was successful in convincing this court 
to reverse the conviction of his client by presenting a credible argument to 
support his claim. No one has even suggested by viable evidence that Martin did 
not "intend" to repair the piano "sometime."

The legal 
fiction that the imprisoned poor can reasonably be expected to prepare a 
worthwhile petition for post-conviction relief is a patent absurdity used to 
justify denial of effective court review. To say the imprisoned poor possess a 
working knowledge of the law is a fiction which but thinly veils our 
indifference to the poor or the imprisoned. The lack of legal expertise by the 
imprisoned poor proceeding pro se is responsible, in part, for the volumes of 
petitions this court receives which have little legal merit to justify the 
relief sought.

17 Osborn, 861 F.2d  at 615. 
See n. 5, supra.

18 The public defender then 
went to the Wyoming legislature in its 1988 session and 
secured partial release of the obligation of his office for criminal 
representation previously provided by the statute by passage of the 1988 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 46 enactment of a substitute section for W.S. 7-14-104. The 
effective effort was to reverse Fondren, 749 P.2d 767; Alberts, 745 P.2d 898; 
and Long, 745 P.2d 547.

19 See Annotation, Modern 
Status of Rule that Crime of False Pretenses Cannot be Predicated Upon Present 
Intention Not to Comply with Promise or Statement as the Future Act, 19 
A.L.R.4th 959 (1983).

20 Cf. U.S. Const. amend. 
IX; Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 36.

21 Under W.R.Cr.P. 15 and 
the constitutional requirements of our state and federal constitutions, I do not 
necessarily concede an effect to nolo contendere that affords less protection to 
the defendant than would be the case if an explicit plea of guilty is entered. 
However, that issue need not be addressed here since at issue is whether there 
is an offense, not whether defendant committed an offense as charged. If there 
was a criminal offense committed involving the piano and anticipated repairs, 
Martin certainly did it. The entire case was postured in the perception of 
Martin that a crime never occurred. In the face of the constitutional 
prohibition in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 5, imprisonment for debt, the formulation 
of a criminal offense can only be founded upon a fraudulent act 
interdiction.

22 The checks, numbered as 
735, 745 and 764, equal $1,248.05 instead of $1,247.05.

23  See n. 16, 
supra.

24  I am aware of the incongruity of this 
case where the nolo contendere plea is accepted by the court because the 
requisite criminal intent can be construed from the delayed delivery, but in the 
absence of that plea, proof of the offense could never be made. The problem 
involved is whether the allegation of the statute itself can create a crime even 
where there is no factual basis upon which the statute can be located to define 
the proscribed criminal conduct. The obvious answer is if the counseled plea 
created a crime that did not otherwise exist, then ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel might be authenticated as a posture for the purpose of this appeal which 
I am not particularly inclined to pursue. Obviously, there is always a problem 
when the defendant credibly proclaims his innocence in proposing a plea bargain 
unless the terms are singularly better than might be expected with a guilty 
plea. This case is exasperated in context because of the difficulty that 
prosecution would have had to ever define a crime. The only real issue advanced 
within the bits and pieces of events which are related in file documents of 
variant kinds is whether or not Martin had ever ordered parts for the piano. The 
explicit dispute regarding the character of Martin's army discharge as related 
to the pre-sentence investigation report and at least an apparent, if not 
obvious, error of the parole officer does not come to an issue presently 
circumscribed for review in this appeal.