Title: ELIASON v WALLACE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 83-300 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984 JON ERIC ELIASON, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- DONALD E. WALLACE, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorable John S. Benson, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Tipp, Hoven, Skjelset & Frizzell, P4issoula, Montana For Respondent : Kristine Davenport, Missoula, Montana Mulroney, Delaney & Dalby; P. Mars Scott, Missoula, Montana . - - - Submitted on Briefs: January 19, 1984 Decided: April 30, 3984 Filed: Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e a p i n i o n of t h e Court. T h i s c a s e comes on a p p e a l from a judgment of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, Missoula County, f i n d i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t l i a b l e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r p r o p e r t y damage, medical c o s t s , l o s t wages, p a i n and s u f f e r i n g , p u n i t i v e damages and c o s t s . W e a f f i r m . A t approximately 10:20 p.m. on J u n e 20, 1980, t h e p l a i n t i f f l e f t t h e Cozy Court T r a i l e r Park i n Lolo, Montana on h i s 1980 Yamaha motorcycle. P l a i n t i f f ' s motorcycle had an a u t o m a t i c turn-on h e a d l i g h t which could n o t be t u r n e d o f f a s long a s t h e e n g i n e was i n an "on" p o s i t i o n . A f t e r l e a v i n g t h e t r a i l e r c o u r t , t h e p l a i n t i f f proceeded n o r t h on Highway 93. A t t h e same t i m e , d e f e n d a n t was proceeding s o u t h on Highway 93 i n a 1953 Volkswagon. A s t h e v e h i c l e s a p p r o a c h e d t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e i n L o l o , d e f e n d a n t made a l e f t hand t u r n c r o s s i n g i n f r o n t o f p l a i n t i f f ' s p a t h . When t h e p l a i n t i f f swerved t o avoid h i t t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e h e l o s t c o n t r o l o f h i s motorcycle and c r a s h e d s u s t a i n i n g p e r s o n a l and p r o p e r t y damage. Montana Highway Patrolman James Wierson immediately i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e a c c i d e n t and concluded t h a t p l a i n t i f f had been d r i v i n g w i t h i n t h e p o s t e d speed l i m i t . Wierson i s s u e d a c i t a t i o n t o d e f e n d a n t f o r f a i l u r e t o make a p r o p e r l e f t t u r n . On November 1 4 , 1980, p l a i n t i f f brought an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t a l l e g i n g d e f e n d a n t was n e g l i g e n t and l i a b l e f o r p e r s o n a l and p r o p e r t y damage a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The m a t t e r was heard on J a n u a r y 4 , 1983, b e f o r e t h e c o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a j u r y and on March 8 , 1983, t h e c o u r t r e n d e r e d its d e c i s i o n . Based upon t h e t e s t i m o n y and e x h i b i t s o f b o t h p a r t i e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t o p l a i n t i f f c o n s t i t u t e d g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e and awarded p l a i n t i f f $4,346.51 i n compensatory and p u n i t i v e damages p l u s c o s t s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o found t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t n e g l i g e n t . From t h e o r d e r of t h e District C o u r t d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s r a i s i n g f o u r i s s u e s . I n i t i a l l y , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n its d e c i s i o n because t h e w e i g h t of e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f was s o l e l y o r c o m p a r a t i v e l y n e g l i g e n t i n t h e a c c i d e n t . Although t h e r e was c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e s u r r o u n d i n g t h e f a c t s o f t h e a c c i d e n t , o u r f u n c t i o n i n r e v i e w i n g f i n d i n g s o f f a c t i n a c i v i l a c t i o n t r i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h o u t a j u r y is n o t t o s u b s t i t u t e our judgment i n p l a c e of t h e t r i e r o f f a c t s b u t r a t h e r i t is c o n f i n e d t o d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law. i-lorning v. E s t a t e o f L a g e r q u i s t ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 412, 473 P.2d 541; Cameron v. Cameron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 219, 587 P.2d 939. A s t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Cameron: "A1 t h o u g h c o n £ l i c t s may e x i s t i n t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , it is t h e d u t y of t h e t r i a l judge t o r e s o l v e s u c h c o n f l i c t s . H i s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t b e d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l w h e r e t h e y a r e b a s e d o n s u b s t a n t i a l though c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r preponderance of e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t s u c h f i n d i n g s . " Cameron, s u p r a , 179 Mont. a t 227. I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s were s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e w e must view t h e e v i d e n c e in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Hellickson v . Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc. (1973), 161 Mont. 455, 507 P.2d 523. Substantial evidence is evidence such as will convince reasonable men and on which such men may not reasonably differ as to whether it establishes the prevailing party's case, and, if all reasonable men must conclude that the evidence does not establish such case, then it is not substantial evidence. Staggers v. USF & G (1972), 159 Idont. 254, 496 P.2d 1161. The evidence may be inherently weak and still be deemed "substantial" and substantial evidence may conflict with other evidence presented. Campeau v. Lewis (1965), 144 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960. Moreover, Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. provides, in part, the "[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The record before us indicates substantial evidence upon which the District Court based its decision. Next, the appellant asserts the District Court erred in awarding respondent punitive damages because there was no showing that appellant acted with malice. In awarding respondent punitive damages the District Court found that appellant's failure to yield to oncoming traffic constituted gross negligence and recklessness. Appellant has not demonstrated by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the District Court's finding was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the award of punitive damages was proper. In Harrington v. Holiday Rambler Corporation (1978), 176 Mont. 37, 575 P.2d 578, we held that it is not necessary to show actual malice to recover punitive damages. The trier of fact may take into account whether the acts complained of are "of such a character as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff" in awarding punitive damages. Butcher v. Petranek (1979), 181 ?rMont. 358, 593 P.2d 743. Moreover, the District Court's findings meet the standa.rd for presumed malice this Court recently set forth in Owens v . Parker Drilling Co. (Mont. 1984), No. 83-172. In Owens, this Court said: "When a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliberately proceeds to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or recklessly proceeds in unreasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his conduct meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which the law of this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on the basis of presumed malice." The appellant also argues the District Court erred in measuring respondent's damages because the amounts awarded for lost wages and for pain and suffering were inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. Specifically, appellant asserts it was an error to award respondent $463 in lost wages because respondent testified he only made $56 per day and only missed one day of work as a result of the accident. In addition, respondent maintains that the District Court erroneously awarded respondent $2,500 for pain and suffering because there was no objective evidence substantiating the damages. The record shows respondent did not miss more than one day from work because he had scheduled two weeks vacation time prior to the accident and he used that time to recuperate. Accordingly, the District Court's computation of lost wages was reasonable and supported by the record. Likewise, the District Court's decision to award $2,500 for pain and suffering was proper. Montana law requires only that the trier of fact exercise calm and reasonable judgment in determining an award of damages and the amount of the award rests in the sound discretion of the trier of fact. Jarussi v . Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 28, Lake County (Mont. 1983), 664 P.2d 316, 40 St.Rep. 720. Moreover, in Cremer v . Cremer Rodeo Land and Livestock Co. (Mont. 1981), 627 P.2d 1199, 38 St.Rep. 574, we said that a recovery of damages will not be denied, even if the mathematical precision of the figure is challenged, provided the evidence is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for determining the amount awarded. Here the record afforded the District Court a reasonable basis for awarding respondent $2,500 for pain and suffering. Finally, appellant argues that respondent should not have recovered for damages that were partially paid by respondent's insurance companies because respondent was not the real party in interest and appellant would be exposed to multiple lawsuits. At trial, appellant had ample opportunity to object that all real parties in interest had not been joined and compel respondent under Rule 17, M.R.Civ.P., to join as necessary parties any insurance companies who were subrogated to respondent's loss. Moreover, appellant raises this issue for the first time on appeal so we cannot now consider its merits. ~fpfrmed. $ 2 ' ' We concur: Justices Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a special concurrence at a later time.