Title: Panuski v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM PANUSKI,
 
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No. 88, 2010
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below:  Superior Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for New Castle County
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Cr. No. 0903002643
Plaintiff Below, 
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Appellee.
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Submitted:  August 11, 2010
Decided:  August 30, 2010
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER,  Justices.
O R D E R
This 30  day of August, 2010, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties,
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it appears to the Court that:
1) William Panuski appeals from his conviction, following a guilty plea, of two
counts of dealing in child pornography.  Panuski argues that:  1) his conviction
violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitutions;
and 2) because the indictment was not specific, he should have been sentenced for the
crime of possession of child pornography rather than the crime of dealing in child
pornography.  Panuski’s arguments lack merit.
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2) Because Panuski pled guilty, the relevant facts are drawn from the Affidavit
of Probable Cause used to obtain the warrant to search Panuski’s home.  In January
2009, Lt. Robert Moses, of the Delaware State Police High Technology Crimes Unit,
identified a computer in the Wilmington, Delaware area that was using a peer-to-peer
file sharing network known to contain child pornography.  After connecting to that
network, Moses identified more than 20 hard core child sexual abuse videos available
for uploading at a particular IP address.  Comcast Communications Company
identified Panuski as the subscriber with that IP address.
3) The police seized multiple computers and other digital media at Panuski’s
house.  Analysis of those computers revealed hundreds of pictures and videos,
including videos of adult males repeatedly raping 2 and 3 year-old girls, a male  raping
an infant, and the anal rape of a young child.  The State indicted Panuski on 29 counts
of dealing in child pornography in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1109 (4).  Each count
involved a different video of child pornography, although the indictment did  not
identify the specific videos.
4) Panuski entered into a plea bargain whereby he pled guilty to two counts of
dealing in child pornography and the State entered a nolle prosequi for  the remaining
27 counts.  After the trial court accepted the plea, but before sentencing, Panuski filed
a Motion to Merge and/or Downgrade Counts for Sentencing.  He argued that, because
Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Del. 2002) (Internal citations omitted; emphasis in
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original.).
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the indictment did not specify whether Panuski dealt in child pornography or simply
possessed it, he should be sentenced for violation of 11 Del. C. § 1111 – possession of
child pornography.  The trial court rejected that argument, and sentenced Panuski to
the minimum mandatory term of 2 years at Level V for each count.
5) “Double jeopardy, as a constitutional principle, provides the following
protections:  (1) against successive prosecutions; (2) against multiple charges under
separate statutes; and (3) against being charged multiple times under the same
statute.”   Panuski appears to be arguing that 11 Del. C. § 1109 (4) and 11 Del. C. §
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1111 both punish the same wrongdoing – possession of child pornography – and that
convictions under both statutes would violate double jeopardy.  The problem with this
argument is that Panuski was not charged with the same offense under two different
statutes.  He was charged with multiple offenses under only one statute – § 1109(4).
6) Alternatively, Panuski argues that the indictment did not specify what he did
other than possess child pornography.  Accordingly, he should have been sentenced
under § 1111, not § 1109 (4).  This argument totally overlooks the fact that he was
charged with violations of § 1109 (4) for dealing in child pornography, not just
possessing it.  If he wanted to contest whether he committed the crime of dealing in
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1988).
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child pornography, he was free to do so at trial.  Instead, he accepted a generous plea
bargain that allowed him to plead guilty to only two of the 29 counts against him.
Moreover, the trial court told Panuski that he could withdraw his guilty plea if he
wanted to pursue any legal theories about the differences between the two crimes.
Panuski declined.  In sum, Panuski has no right to choose the crime he prefers.   He
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pled guilty to dealing in child pornography and was sentenced for committing those
crimes. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby are, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice