Title: Hubbard v. Reed

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Poritz, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this appeal is whether a plaintiff in a common knowledge malpractice action must comply with the affidavit requirement of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. On August 9, 1996, an orthodontist referred plaintiff, age sixteen, to defendant Robert Kardon, D.D.S., with instructions to extract a particular incisor. Dr. Kardon referred plaintiff to his associate, defendant Joseph Reed, D.D.S., who extracted a different tooth than the one directed to be pulled by the orthodontist. Plaintiff and her mother, as guardian ad litem, filed a complaint against Drs. Reed and Kardon for dental malpractice. In his answer to the complaint, Dr. Kardon requested that plaintiffs provide him with an affidavit of merit. Plaintiffs failed to file the affidavit within the time period prescribed by the statute. Defendants moved to dismiss based on that failure. In response, plaintiffs asserted that they were not obligated to provide an affidavit of merit because they intended to rely at trial on the common knowledge doctrine and res ipsa loquitur. The trial court granted defendants' motions, finding that plaintiffs are required to comply with the Affidavit of Merit Statute even in common knowledge cases. The Appellate Division affirmed. Hubbard v. Reed, 331 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 2000). HELD: An affidavit of merit need not be provided in common knowledge cases when an expert will not be called to testify that the defendant's care, skill or knowledge fell outside acceptable professional standards or treatment practices. 1. In determining the Legislature's intent, the Court looks first to the plain language of the statute. In general, if the language of a statute is clear on its face, the court must enforce it according to its terms. However, where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy and the overall purpose of the statute, the literal interpretation should be rejected. (Pp. 6- 7). 2. On its face, the Affidavit of Merit Statute applies to any action involving professional malpractice and makes no exception for common knowledge cases. Nor does the legislative history address the question. The primary purpose of the statute, however, is to require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, so that meritless lawsuits can be identified readily at an early stage of litigation. (Pp. 7-9). 3. The Affidavit of Merit Statute is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint, but with whether there is some objective threshold merit to the allegation. To demonstrate the objective threshold of merit, the statute requires plaintiffs to provide an expert opinion, given under oath, that a duty of care existed and that the defendant breached that duty. Yet, by definition, in common knowledge cases an expert is not needed to demonstrate that a defendant breached a duty of care. The doctrine applies where juror common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary understanding and experience, to determine a defendant's negligence without the benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts. Thus, a plaintiff in a common knowledge malpractice case will not need expert testimony at trial to establish the standard of care or a deviation therefrom. (Pp. 9). 4. In resolving the question of whether an expert is nonetheless required in common knowledge cases to establish that plaintiff's claims meet the required threshold of merit, the Court considers the statute's purpose to weed out frivolous lawsuits early in the litigation while, at the same time, ensuring that plaintiffs with meritorious claims will have their day in court. If jurors, using ordinary understanding and experience and without the assistance of an expert, can determine whether a defendant has been negligent, the threshold of merit should be readily apparent from a reading of the plaintiff's complaint. In a common knowledge case an expert is no more qualified to attest to the merit of a plaintiff's claim than a non-expert. ( Pp. 9 -11). 5. Although it is not known whether the drafters of the legislation contemplated a common knowledge exception, such an exception comports with their likely intent and with a practical common sense interpretation of the statute. Having considered both the purpose of the statute and its silence on the issue, the Court determines that an affidavit of merit is not required in common knowledge cases. The Court does not resolve whether a separate exception exists in respect of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. (Pp. 11-12). 6. The average layperson could apply his or her general understanding and knowledge to find that the defendant in this case breached a duty of care by pulling the wrong tooth. Plaintiffs will not present expert testimony to establish defendant's negligence at trial and, therefore, are not required to obtain an expert's affidavit prior to trial to demonstrate that their claim has threshold merit. (P. 12-13). 7. Because the Court construes the exception to the Affidavit of Merit Statute narrowly, however, the wise course of action in all malpractice cases would be for plaintiffs to provide affidavits even when they do not intend to rely on expert testimony at trial. In most cases, expert testimony will be required to establish both a standard of care and breach of that standard by the defendant and a plaintiff who fails to present such testimony could be subject to involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b). As such, there is some uncertainty in relying on common knowledge in professional malpractice cases and a timely filed affidavit would prevent the risk of a later dismissal. (Pp. 13-14). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA AND ZAZZALI join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. NINA HUBBARD, as Guardian Ad Litem of NIA HUBBARD, her minor child, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DR. JOSEPH REED, D.D.S., Defendant-Respondent, and DR. ROBERT KARDON, D.D.S., Defendant. Argued January 29, 2001 -- Decided June 21, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported 331 N.J. Super. 283 (2000). Edward J. Crisonino argued the cause for appellant. Timothy P. Mullin argued the cause for respondent (Mintzer, Sarowitz, Zeris & Ledva, attorneys; Mr. Mullin and Kimberly A. Jubanyik, on the briefs). William L. Gold submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers - New Jersey (Bendit Weinstock, attorneys; Mr. Gold and Abbott S. Brown, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J. In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. The court may grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause. Defendants argue that the clear and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 requires that an affidavit of merit be filed in all malpractice cases. Defendants contend that only after a plaintiff has made a threshold showing of merit by way of an expert affidavit can he or she then select a theory of liability under which to seek damages. Without that affidavit, according to defendants, attorneys would be attesting to the merits of their clients' claims. Plaintiffs respond that when a defendant's negligence is so apparent that expert testimony will not be needed at trial, the purpose of the statute -- to reduce frivolous lawsuits -- would not be furthered by requiring an affidavit of merit. Plaintiffs further assert that the cost of obtaining an affidavit in a common knowledge case involving minor injuries would make bringing an action for recovery, no matter how meritorious, too expensive. NO. A-6 NINA HUBBARD, as Guardian Ad Litem of NIA HUBBARD, her minor child, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DR. JOSEPH REED, D.D.S., Defendant-Respondent, and DR. ROBERT KARDON, D.D.S., Defendant. DECIDED June 21, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz