Title: Boone v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
LONNIE LORENZO BOONE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY  
 v. Record No. 121144 
  
    
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    April 18, 2013 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
  
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 18.2-308.2(A) 
limits the number of convictions the Commonwealth may prove in 
a trial upon an indictment charging possession of a firearm by 
a person previously convicted of a violent felony. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Lonnie Lorenzo Boone was indicted upon a charge of 
knowingly and intentionally possessing or transporting a 
firearm after having previously been convicted of a violent 
felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2(A).  At a jury trial, 
the Commonwealth offered as evidence one prior conviction for 
robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58, and four prior 
convictions for burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-91.  Each 
of these offenses is a violent felony.  Code § 18.2-308.2(A) 
(incorporating Code § 17.1-805(C)). 
Boone objected to the Commonwealth’s evidence, arguing 
that the phrase “previously convicted of a violent felony” in 
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) limited the Commonwealth to adducing 
evidence of only one prior conviction for a violent felony.  
 
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Admitting all five prior convictions into evidence, Boone 
continued, would be cumulative and prejudicial.  The circuit 
court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence.  
Thereafter, the jury returned a guilty verdict and imposed a 
sentence of five years’ incarceration. 
Boone appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 
circuit court’s judgment by unpublished, per curiam order.  
This appeal followed. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The only issue is whether Code § 18.2-308.2(A) limits the 
evidence the Commonwealth may adduce to prove the offense.  
That is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review 
de novo.  Belew v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 173, 177, 726 S.E.2d 
257, 259 (2012). 
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) provides that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for . . . any person 
who has been convicted of a felony . . . to 
knowingly and intentionally possess or 
transport any firearm . . . .  [A]ny person 
who violates this section by knowingly and 
intentionally possessing or transporting 
any firearm and who was previously 
convicted of a violent felony as defined in 
§ 17.1-805 shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 
five years. 
 
Boone contends that by using the phrase “previously 
convicted of a violent felony,” the General Assembly intended 
to permit the Commonwealth to adduce evidence of only one prior 
 
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violent felony conviction.  Accordingly, he continues, the 
Commonwealth was required to choose one prior conviction from 
the five available.  He asserts the other four convictions were 
cumulative and prejudicial, and the circuit court erred in 
admitting them as evidence.  We disagree. 
In Pittman v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 33, 434 S.E.2d 694 
(1993), the Court of Appeals acknowledged the Commonwealth’s 
prerogative to choose what evidence to offer to the fact-finder 
to meet its burden of proof.  The court held that “[t]he 
Commonwealth . . . is entitled to prove its case by evidence 
that is relevant, competent and material.  [A]n accused cannot 
. . . require the Commonwealth to pick and choose among its 
proofs, to elect which to present and which to forego.”  Id. at 
35, 434 S.E.2d at 695-96.  Accordingly, where the existence of 
one or more prior convictions is a necessary element to obtain 
a conviction, “the Commonwealth [i]s not obliged to have faith 
that the jury would be satisfied with any particular one or 
more of the items of proof.  Therefore, it was entitled to 
utilize its entire arsenal” of prior convictions to meet its 
burden.  Id. at 35-36, 434 S.E.2d at 696.  We agree. 
Boone argues that his case is distinguishable from Pittman 
because the defendant in that case was charged with felony 
larceny, in violation of former Code § 18.2-104(b).  Under that 
statute, a person convicted of larceny after a third or 
 
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subsequent prior conviction for larceny was guilty of a Class 6 
felony.  Former Code § 18.2-104(b) (1988 Repl. vol.).    
Therefore, the Commonwealth was required to prove multiple 
prior convictions in Pittman.  By contrast, Boone argues, the 
Commonwealth was limited to proving only “a” prior violent 
felony conviction in his case.  This is a distinction without a 
difference. 
Both former Code § 18.2-104(b) and Code § 18.2-308.2(A) 
establish the elements of their respective offenses.  Neither 
provides a rule of evidence constraining the Commonwealth’s 
prerogative to prove those elements with its choice of the 
available evidence.  Like the phrase “a third[] or any 
subsequent offense” in former Code § 18.2-104(b), the phrase 
“previously convicted of a violent felony” in Code § 18.2-
308.2(A) merely sets forth an additional element the 
Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to 
obtain an enhanced sentence.  Compare former Code § 18.2-104(b) 
(elevating larceny from a Class 1 misdemeanor to a Class 6 
felony when the additional element is proven) with Code § 18.2-
308.2(A) (imposing a five-year mandatory minimum sentence when 
the additional element is proven).  Accordingly, while the 
article “a” in Code § 18.2-308.2(A) does, as Boone argues, 
reflect legislative intent that proof of only one violent 
felony is necessary to obtain the enhanced sentence, that 
 
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article does not limit the evidence the Commonwealth may adduce 
to prove it. 
Two considerations support this reading of the statute.  
First, as noted in Pittman, the jury may not be satisfied with 
the evidence of one or more of the convictions upon which the 
Commonwealth relies.  17 Va. App. at 35-36, 434 S.E.2d at 696.  
Second, one or more of the convictions may later be vacated by 
appellate or collateral proceedings.  For example, in Conley v. 
Commonwealth, 284 Va. 691, 733 S.E.2d 927 (2012), the defendant 
was convicted of felony third-offense driving under the 
influence (“DUI”) while a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
with respect to his second DUI conviction was pending in this 
Court.  We granted the defendant’s petition and the second DUI 
conviction thereafter was dismissed.  The validity of his 
felony third-offense DUI conviction therefore was in doubt and 
that conviction became the subject of a petition for a writ of 
actual innocence in the Court of Appeals.  Id. at 692-93, 733 
S.E.2d at 928. 
It thus behooves the Commonwealth to create a record at 
trial that will preserve the integrity of the conviction being 
sought, in the event a conviction on which it relies at trial 
is subsequently overturned in later appellate or collateral 
proceedings.  Cf. Rushing v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 270, 277-78, 
726 S.E.2d 333, 338-39 (2012) (vacating a conviction where the 
 
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evidence in the record was insufficient to prove a necessary 
element after the exclusion of evidence improperly admitted at 
trial). 
This conclusion does not give the Commonwealth unfettered 
license to admit every relevant conviction of a serial 
criminal.  To the contrary, the trial court retains its 
discretion to exclude evidence as repetitious and cumulative.  
See Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 585, 423 S.E.2d 160, 
165 (1992).  Similarly, the trial court may exclude evidence 
when, in the court’s sound discretion, its prejudicial effect 
substantially exceeds its probative value.  Juniper v. 
Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 412, 626 S.E.2d 383, 415 (2006); 
Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 461-62, 470 S.E.2d 114, 127 
(1996); see also Va. R. Evid. 2:403. 
Citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), 
Boone argues that evidence of his prior convictions was 
especially prejudicial.  In Old Chief, the defendant was 
charged with possession of a firearm after having previously 
been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1).  The indictment specifically charged that the 
defendant had previously been convicted of assault.  He moved 
to exclude any evidence of the prior conviction, other than the 
fact of its existence, and offered to stipulate that the prior 
 
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conviction was entered upon a felony charge within the meaning 
of the federal statute.  Id. at 174-75. 
The United States refused the offered stipulation.  The 
federal district court acknowledged the prosecution’s 
prerogative to prove its case with the evidence of its choosing 
and denied the defendant’s motion.  Id. at 177.  He appealed to 
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, which affirmed.  Id. 
On further appeal, however, the Supreme Court of the 
United States reversed.  The Court held that the fact the 
prosecution was required to prove was the existence of a 
conviction for a crime within the class of crimes set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Because the defendant had offered to 
stipulate to that fact, the probative value of the conviction 
record itself was outweighed by the substantial risk of 
prejudice to the defendant.  It therefore should have been 
excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id. 
at 190-92. 
The conspicuous factor distinguishing Old Chief from this 
case is the absence of any offer by Boone to stipulate to the 
fact that he had previously been convicted of a violent felony.  
In the absence of such a stipulation, the Commonwealth retained 
the burden of proving that fact beyond reasonable doubt.  As 
discussed above, within certain limits the Commonwealth was 
 
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entitled to offer whatever evidence was available in its 
attempt to meet that burden. 
Boone argues that, under Glover v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. 
App. 152, 348 S.E.2d 434 (1986), which we summarily affirmed, 
236 Va. 1, 372 S.E.2d 134 (1988) (per curiam), he was not 
permitted to offer to stipulate to the fact of conviction.  
However, nothing in Glover prohibits a defendant from offering 
to stipulate to a fact the Commonwealth must prove at trial.  
Rather, Glover merely concludes that the Commonwealth is not 
required to accept such an offer if one is made.  Id. at 162, 
348 S.E.2d at 441.  Boone made no such offer, so there was 
nothing for the Commonwealth to accept or reject.* 
Because Code § 18.2-308.2(A) establishes the elements of 
the offense rather than a rule of evidence by which the 
elements may be proven, the statute does not limit the 
Commonwealth’s prerogative to meet its burden of proof using 
whatever available evidence it chooses.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
five conviction orders and the Court of Appeals did not err in 
affirming Boone’s conviction and sentence.  We therefore will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
                                                 
* This case therefore does not present and we do not 
consider the question whether Old Chief affects the continuing 
validity of Glover. 
 
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Affirmed.