Title: Govan v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ARTHUR GOVAN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 256, 2003  
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN92-10-1586 thru  
§  -1596 
§  Cr. ID 92010166DI 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 25, 2003 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: September 24, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 24th day of September 2003, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, 
it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Arthur Govan, was convicted in June 
1993 of multiple counts of first degree murder, weapon charges, and related 
offenses.  The Superior Court sentenced Govan to four life terms of 
imprisonment without parole plus an additional 115 years imprisonment.  
His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. 1 Govan also 
                                                 
1 Govan v. State, Del. Supr., No. 363, 1993, Walsh, J. (Jan. 30, 1995). 
 
2 
has unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief. 2  In January 2003, Govan 
filed a motion for correction of sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 35(a).  Govan argued in his motion that the sentences associated with 
his weapon convictions should be corrected to reflect that the sentences 
imposed were not minimum mandatory terms of incarceration.  The Superior 
Court denied Govan’s motion.  This appeal ensued.   
(2) 
After careful consideration, we find the Superior Court’s denial 
of Govan’s motion to be manifestly correct.  We first note that the issue 
Govan raises regarding his sentences on the weapon offenses does not 
appear to be ripe for consideration in light of Govan’s four life sentences 
without parole.3  More importantly, it is clear that Govan’s contention lacks 
merit.  At the time of his offenses, the weapon statute provided that a 
sentence pursuant to that statute “shall not be subject to suspension and no 
person convicted for a violation of this section shall be eligible for parole or 
probation. . . .”
4 That language had been interpreted to require a minimum 
                                                 
2 See Govan v. State, Del. Supr., No. 11, 1996, Holland, J. (Feb. 5, 1996). 
3 Govan must serve his four life sentences before he begins serving the sentences 
on the weapon convictions.  Thus, Govan’s argument about the minimum mandatory 
designation of those sentences does not appear to present an “actual controversy” because 
Govan is unlikely ever to serve those sentences. Unless he can establish that the 
minimum mandatory designation has some current impact on him, Delaware courts are 
not required to expend judicial resources to answer questions that have no significant 
current impact.  See Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1989). 
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1447(b) (Repl. 1987).  
 
3 
mandatory term of incarceration, an interpretation that was not altered by 
subsequent legislation.5  Thus, at the time of his sentencing, the minimum 
mandatory designation was entirely correct.  Accordingly, the Superior 
Court did not err in denying Govan’s motion for correction of sentence.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
5 See Richmond v. State, 446 A.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Del. 1982) (citing Woodward 
v. Department of Correction, 415 A.2d 782, 785 (Del. Super. 1980)).