Title: Daley v. COM'R, DEPT. OF MARINE RESOURCES

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

1997 ME 183 John DALEY, et al. v. COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES, STATE OF MAINE. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Submitted on Briefs March 24, 1997. Decided August 8, 1997. *1054 C. Clifton Fuller, III, The Attorneys Office, P.A., Belfast, for plaintiffs. Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Thomas A. Harnett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant. Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ. LIPEZ, Justice. [¶ 1] John Daley, et al.[1] (Daley) appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Washington County, Alexander, J.) in favor of the State in an action challenging the constitutionality of the 1995 Amendments to the Maine Lobster Fisheries Act, 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 6301-6463 (1994 & Supp.1996) (the 1995 Amendments). Daley claims several errors in the ruling. We find none and affirm the judgment. I. [¶ 2] In 1996 Daley filed a complaint making ten claims and seeking a declaratory judgment, 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951-5963 (1980), that the 1995 Amendments aimed at conserving the lobster resource along the coast of Maine, P.L.1995, ch. 468 (effective March 1, 1996), were illegal and unconstitutional. The State responded with a motion to dismiss, and Daley replied with both an opposition to the State's motion and a motion for a summary judgment. After a hearing, the court entered a summary judgment in the State's favor.[2] Daley's appeal concerns four of his original ten claims. II. [¶ 3] When reviewing an appeal from the entry of a summary judgment we *1055 view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered and review the trial court's decision for errors of law. Gonzales v. Commissioner, Dept. of Public Safety, 665 A.2d 681 , 682 (Me.1995). When the record generates no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, we affirm. Id. at 682-83. Family Member Exemption [¶ 4] The 1995 Amendments set a limit of 1,200 traps per boat, with a phase-in period and exceptions for license-holders who are family members fishing from the same boat. 12 M.R.S.A. § 6431-D(2)(B) (Supp. 1996).[3] Daley argues that the exemption draws an invidious distinction between classes of Maine citizens and thereby violates the equal protection clauses of the Maine and United States Constitutions. [¶ 5] The family member exemption to the boat trap limit implicates neither a fundamental right nor an inherently suspect classification, and therefore will survive an equal protection challenge if its different treatment of similarly situated persons bears any conceivable rational relation to a legitimate state interest. Aseptic Packaging Council v. State, 637 A.2d 457 , 459-60 (Me.1994). The family member exemption passes this test. There is no dispute that the 1995 Amendments advance legitimate state interests in protecting the marine environment and the conservation of natural resources. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 , 140, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2448, 91 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1986) (upholding statute prohibiting importation of out-of-state baitfish); State v. Richardson, 285 A.2d 842 , 844-45 (Me.1972) (state may legitimately prohibit possession of lobsters on board any boat rigged for otter or beam trawling). Moreover, the provision does not draw an invidious distinction between classes of Maine citizens. The Legislature may have determined that the tradition of family-related license-holders fishing from a single boat did not pose a threat to the lobster resource, while allowing an unlimited number of unrelated license-holders to do so would have placed too much pressure on the fishing resource.[4]See Aseptic Packaging, 637 A.2d at 460 (in performing rational basis analysis, court may go beyond face of statute to determine whether any conceivable state of facts exists to support it). Federal Preemption [¶ 6] Daley contends that the 1995 Amendments' per-licensee and boat trap limits, 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 6431-A(1), 6431-D(1), are preempted by the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-1883 (1985 & West Supp.1997), in which Congress assumed exclusive authority of fishery management within the federal "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ), an area extending 197 miles beyond Maine's three-mile maritime boundary. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(11). We have already decided that enactments such as the 1995 Amendments are not unconstitutional by virtue of preemption, State v. Hayes, 603 A.2d 869 , 870-71 (Me.1992), due primarily to the Magnuson *1056 Act's preservation of the states' authority to regulate state-registered vessels within the EEZ. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a)(3).[5] Moreover, the federal lobster management plan contains no limit on the number of traps that may be fished, authorizes concurrent state jurisdiction, and expressly allows the enforcement of more restrictive state law requirements.[6] Regulatory Taking [¶ 7] The 1995 Amendments set limits of 1,200 traps per license-holder, 12 M.R.S.A. § 6431-A(1), and 1,200 traps per boat, id. § 6431-D(1), with seven-year phase-in periods for both. Id. §§ 6431-A(2), 6431-D(2)(A)(1). Daley argues that these provisions constitute regulatory takings of property in violation of both the Maine and United States Constitutions because many of the plaintiffs entered the lobstering industry long before any limitations on traps had been contemplated, and the limitations therefore interfere with their legitimate investment-backed expectations as to the continued and profitable use of their boats and other equipment. We disagree because of the application of the three factors identified by the United States Supreme Court as particularly significant to the regulatory taking analysis.[7]See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 , 224-25, 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1025-26, 89 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986) (court must inquire as to economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and character of the governmental action). [¶ 8] First, there is nothing in the record which precludes the conclusion that the governmental action at issue here is permissible regulation that "adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Id. at 225, 106 S. Ct. at 1026. Second, the record on this challenge presents no evidence that the Amendments will impose a severe economic burden on the industry. Maine Beer & Wine Wholesalers v. State, 619 A.2d 94 , 99 & n. 7 (Me.1993).[8] Third, *1057 Daley has not demonstrated a legitimate investment expectation in a regulatory status quo. See id. at 99; see also Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227, 106 S. Ct. at 1027 ("Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." (quotation omitted)).[9] Unconstitutional Vagueness and Delegation of Power [¶ 9] The 1995 Amendments authorize the Commissioner of the Department of Marine Resources (DMR) to impose per-tag fees to cover the costs of a tag system to identify and track traps, 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 6431-B, 6431-C, as well as the costs of establishing lobster management zones and lobster management policy councils. 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 6446, 6447. Daley contends that these provisions are void for vagueness and constitute an improper delegation of the taxation power. See Me. Const. art. IX, § 9 ("The Legislature shall never, in any manner, suspend or surrender the power of taxation."). These arguments are unpersuasive. There is nothing unconstitutionally vague about the provision that empowers DMR to impose a fee to defray the costs of administering its regulatory program. Moreover, because the fee is designed to pay for administrative costs and not to raise general revenue, the Legislature did not improperly delegate its power to tax to the DMR. Board of Bar Overseers v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998 , 1004 (Me.1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1036, 101 S. Ct. 1751, 68 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1981) (distinguishing between a tax designed to raise revenue and license fees imposed to cover costs of program administration pursuant to the government's police power to regulate); Strater v. Town of York, 541 A.2d 938, 938 (Me.1988) (same principle in context of harbor usage fee). The entry is: Judgment affirmed.