Title: Boston v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Sterling BOSTON v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-589                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 9, 1997


1.   Statutes -- construction -- fundamental rule. -- The fundamental rule
     in considering the meaning of a statute is to construe the
     meaning of the statute just as it reads, giving the words
     their ordinary and usually accepted meaning.

2.   Statutes -- construction -- doctrine of noscitur a sociis discussed. --
     The rule of construction known as the doctrine of noscitur a
     sociis means þit is known from its associatesþ; the practical
     application means that a word can be defined by accompanying
     words.

3.   Statutes -- construction -- legislature did not intend "business" exception
     to apply to criminal prohibition of carrying weapon in vehicle. -- Where
     the legislature clearly criminalized the carrying of a weapon
     in "a vehicle" in Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-120(a) (Supp. 1995),
     and the statutory exemption for a þbusinessþ in subsection
     (c)(1) pertained to real property, the supreme court concluded
     that the legislature did not intend for the exception to
     include automobiles.

4.   Statutes -- construction -- "business" does not include vehicular
     businesses under Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-120. -- Applying the principle
     of construction noscitur a sociis, the supreme court held that
     the word þbusinessþ does not include vehicular businesses and
     that Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-120(c)(1) did not provide a defense
     to appellant, who was convicted of the unauthorized carrying
     of a weapon in his taxicab.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John W. Langston, Judge;
affirmed.
     William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by:  Deborah H.
Sallings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly Terry, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     W.H. "Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     Appellant Sterling Boston was convicted in violation of Ark.
Code Ann.  5-73-120 (Supp. 1995), the unauthorized carrying of a
weapon.  An officer approached Boston while he was sitting in his
taxicab and asked for his license and registration.  The officer
requested that Boston get out of the vehicle; upon getting out,
Boston informed the officer that he had a weapon in his back
pocket.  The officer arrested Boston for carrying a weapon without
a license.  Boston appeals the conviction claiming that the
statutory defense for carrying a weapon in oneþs place of business
authorized Bostonþs carrying the weapon in his taxicab because this
was his place of business.  
     This case involves interpretation of the Arkansas Code and
whether the term þbusinessþ includes a taxi cab or any motor
vehicle used for commercial purposes.  Specifically, Ark. Code Ann.
5-73-120 provides:
     (a) A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if
     he possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his
     person, in a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise
     readily available for use with a purpose to employ it as
     a weapon against a person.
     ....
     (c) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section
     that at the time of the act of carrying:

          (1) The person is in his own dwelling, place
          of business, or on property in which he has a
          possessory or proprietary interest.

There is no definition of the term þplace of businessþ in this
statute.  

     Appellant contends that a vehicle should be considered a
þbusinessþ in certain instances for purposes of 5-73-120(c)(1);
although this specific code section does not define the term þplace
of business,þ appellant contends that a definition in the
commercial burglary statute should be persuasive.  Ark. Code Ann.
 5-39-101 (2)(A) criminalizes commercial burglary; this statute
defines þcommercial occupiable structureþ as any þvehicle where any
person carries on a business or calling.þ  Relying upon the
definition contained in the commercial burglary statute, appellant
argues that his cab should be considered a business for Ark. Code
Ann. 5-73-120(c)(1).
     In subsection (a) of 5-73-120, the legislature clearly
criminalized the carrying of a weapon in þa vehicle.þ  Appellant
relies on the term þbusinessþ in the exemptions to the rule found
in subsection (c)(1).  However, the specific language of that
section exempts certain areas clearly relating to real property. 
Specifically, (c)(1) excludes from criminal prosecution the
carrying of a gun in a personþs þown dwelling, place of business,
or on property in which he has a possessory or proprietary
interest.þ  The plain meaning of this exception does not include
automobiles, nor is there general language which suggests that the
list is expandable.
     The fundamental rule in considering the meaning of a statute
is to construe the meaning of the statute just as it reads, giving
the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning.  Rush v.
State, 324 Ark. 147, 151, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996).  The rule of
construction applicable in this case is nonscitur a sociis.  This
doctrine means þit is known from its associates.þ  The practical
application means that a word can be defined by accompanying words. 
See, McKinney v. Robbins, 319 Ark. 596,