Title: State v. Funk

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2765 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
David D. Funk, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 1, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau 
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Roemer, Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. joins dissent; PROSSER, J. 
joins Part II of dissent. 
PROSSER, J. dissents (Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs and oral 
argument by Michele Anne Tjader, Tjader Law, Inc., Madison. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 62
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP2765-CR 
(L.C. No. 
06CF209) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David D. Funk, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of an order of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review an order of 
the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court's2 order 
vacating a jury verdict finding David Funk (Funk) guilty of two 
counts of sexual assault of a child and granting him a new 
trial.  The circuit court ordered a new trial based on its post-
trial discovery that a juror, Tanya G., had not revealed during 
voir dire that she had been a victim of two prior incidents of 
                                                 
1 State v. Funk, No. 2008AP2765-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010). 
2 The Honorable John P. Roemer, Jr. of Juneau County 
presided. 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
2 
 
sexual assault and its findings that these experiences made her 
biased against Funk.  The issue presented in this case is 
whether Tanya G. was biased against Funk, thereby depriving Funk 
of his constitutional right to an impartial jury.  This issue 
requires us to address three sub-issues:  (1) whether Tanya G. 
failed to respond to a material question during voir dire, (2) 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
that 
Tanya 
G. 
was 
subjectively biased against Funk was clearly erroneous, and (3) 
whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable judge could have 
concluded that a reasonable person in Tanya G.'s position could 
not be impartial, and therefore, Tanya G. was objectively biased 
against Funk.  
¶2 
We conclude that Tanya G. failed to respond to a 
material question during voir dire when Funk's attorney asked if 
anyone on the jury panel had previously testified in a criminal 
case.  We also conclude that the circuit court's finding that 
Tanya G. was subjectively biased against Funk is unsupported by 
facts of record and is clearly erroneous.  Finally, we conclude 
that the facts necessary to ground a circuit court's reasonable 
legal conclusion that a reasonable person in Tanya G.'s position 
could not be impartial were not developed in this case, and 
therefore the circuit court's conclusion that Tanya G. was 
objectively biased was erroneous.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals order and reinstate the guilty verdict and 
judgment of conviction.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
3 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Funk was charged with two counts of sexual assault of 
a child under 13 years of age, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1) (2005-06).3  The charges were based on two encounters 
with 
C.M.F., 
who 
at 
the 
time 
was 
ten 
years 
of 
age.  
Specifically, Funk was alleged to have performed oral sex on 
C.M.F. and also to have anally penetrated the young girl.  The 
alleged incidents occurred at C.M.F.'s home when her mother was 
at work.  At the time, Funk was the boyfriend of C.M.F.'s 
mother.  
¶4 
In late April of 2008, Funk was tried to a jury for 
the assaults of C.M.F.  Relevant to the issue in this case is 
what occurred during voir dire.  First, toward the beginning of 
voir dire, the court highlighted the nature of the case and 
noted that the jurors would be asked whether they, themselves, 
or someone they knew, had ever been a victim of sexual assault.  
The court emphasized that the jurors could discuss any sensitive 
issues in chambers: 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) (2005-06) provides: 
Sexual assault of a child.  (1) First Degree 
Sexual Assault.  Whoever has sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 13 years is guilty of one of the following: 
. . . 
(b) If the sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
did not result in great bodily harm to the person, a 
Class B felony.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
4 
 
Now, one of the questions is going to be, I 
believe is, have anyone of you been a victim of sexual 
assault, or a brother or sister who's been sexually 
assaulted; possibly a neighbor of sexual assault? 
With respect to that question, to be quite frank 
with you, if somebody asked me, have you ever been a 
victim of sexual assault, I wouldn't answer it, but 
you are under oath; maybe it's a brother or a sister, 
maybe it's a neighbor, or maybe it's yourself. 
We could go into chambers, if you wish to; we 
certainly don't have to.  You need to be honest.  You 
need to answer the question, and what we will do is to 
avoid any embarrassment, we can go into chambers.   
Despite the court's proclamation that these questions would be 
asked, neither the court nor the attorneys asked whether any 
juror had been a victim of sexual assault or whether any juror 
knew someone who had been a victim of sexual assault.    
¶5 
Other questions asked by the parties, however, did 
lead to the disclosure by some jurors that they personally, or 
someone they knew, had been a victim of sexual assault.  For 
example, the State asked:  "Have you, or any of your family 
members, or close friends ever been accused of a crime by law 
enforcement?"  In response to this question, Juror E.4 disclosed 
that he had a friend who had been accused of a crime in a 
"situation like this."  The State asked to question Juror E. in 
chambers.  In chambers, Juror E. disclosed that a close friend 
of his had recently been caught trying to entice underage girls 
into having sexual relations, but assured the court he could 
still be fair and impartial to Funk.  The court did not excuse 
Juror E.   
                                                 
4 We use initials to protect the identities of the jurors.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The State also asked:  "Now, this case, as Judge 
Roemer noted, involves allegations of sexual assault of a child.  
Based upon those allegations, those charges, does anyone here 
believe they would have a difficult time being fair and 
impartial both to the State and to the Defendant?"  In response 
to this question, two jurors asked to speak privately in 
chambers.  Juror G. disclosed in chambers that when she was nine 
or ten, she was sexually molested by a family member.  She 
stated that it would be very difficult for her to put this 
experience aside if she were picked to sit on the jury.  The 
court excused Juror G.  The other juror, Juror J., disclosed 
that her granddaughter had been sexually assaulted and that 
there was currently a trial going on in Florida related to the 
assault.  She said she did not know if she could be fair and 
impartial to Funk.  The court excused Juror J.  
¶7 
The court replaced the two excused jurors.5  The State 
asked the two new jurors if they would have answered any of the 
previous questions affirmatively. Both jurors responded by 
requesting to go into chambers.  Of the two new jurors, one 
disclosed that he had heard about the case.  The court did not 
excuse the juror based on this information.  The other new 
                                                 
5 The replacement jurors had been in the room during the 
previous questioning, but were not actively answering the 
questions.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
6 
 
juror, Juror D.,6 disclosed that her ex-husband was raped when he 
was 14.  She stated that she would rather not sit on the jury.  
Consequently, Juror D. was excused from service. 
¶8 
Juror S. replaced Juror D.  Juror S. was similarly 
questioned about whether he would have answered affirmatively to 
any of the previous questions.  Juror S. asserted that he would 
have, but that he did not need to go into chambers to discuss 
the answer privately.  He then stated, in open court, "It has to 
do with knowing someone about a sexual assault case.  My uncle 
went to prison for it, and I don't think I could be fair to the 
party."  The court excused Juror S. 
¶9 
In addition to the above questions asked by the State, 
the panel was asked several other times if any juror believed he 
or she could not be fair to Funk or the State.7  These questions 
did not lead to any further assertions of partiality.  
                                                 
6 There appears to be an error in the voir dire transcript 
because the transcript reflects the juror we now refer to as 
Juror D. as being Juror G.  However, Juror G. had already been 
excused at the time that the questioning of Juror D. took place.   
7 Toward the end of its voir dire questioning, the State 
asked:  "[I]s there anything that, while you are sitting there, 
you were saying, 'I wish he'd ask this.'  And I didn't, but you 
just wanted to tell me something about your service as a juror 
in this trial?  Anything at all?"  The State closed its voir 
dire questioning by asking, "Ladies and gentlemen, is there 
anything that would make it difficult for you to serve as fair 
and impartial jurors?"    
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
7 
 
¶10 Of particular importance, Funk's attorney asked if any 
juror had ever testified as a witness before:  "Anyone ever go 
to court to testify in a criminal case as a witness?  Anyone 
ever go to court to testify in a civil case as a witness?"  
While numerous jurors answered "yes" to this question and 
explained the circumstances under which they had testified, 
Tanya G. did not respond.  The State also asked if anyone had 
ever had contact with the Juneau County District Attorney's 
Office.  Several jurors responded in the affirmative to this 
question.  Similarly, Tanya G. remained silent when this 
question was asked.  A review of the voir dire transcript shows 
that Tanya G. did not respond individually8 to any question posed 
during voir dire. 
¶11 Tanya G. was selected to sit on the jury.  During the 
two-day trial, C.M.F. testified about the assaults.  Moreover, 
both N.M.F., Funk's 13-year-old daughter, and A.M.F., Funk's 14-
year-old daughter, testified, corroborating much of C.M.F.'s 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, defense counsel concluded his voir dire by 
asking, "Is there anything about this case, sexual intercourse 
of a child, two counts, anything about questions that Judge 
Roemer has asked you, [the State] has asked you, or I have asked 
you, that make you think you can't sit on this jury?  No hands, 
so then, everyone thinks they can sit on this case and hear what 
comes from this witness stand, and what Judge Roemer instructs 
you as far as the law is concerned and base your decision in 
this case solely on what happens in this courtroom.  Agreed?  
Thank you."   
8 There were several questions posed to the entire panel 
that produced a collective response.  Assumedly, Tanya G. 
responded to these questions.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
8 
 
story.9  The jury convicted Funk of both counts of sexual assault 
of a child under 13 years of age.  
¶12 Sometime after the trial, Funk learned that Tanya G. 
had been a victim of sexual assault.  Consequently, several days 
before his scheduled sentencing, Funk moved to vacate the 
judgment of conviction and for a new trial on the grounds that 
Tanya G. was biased against him, and therefore, he had been 
deprived of his constitutional right to an impartial jury.  
According to Funk's motion, Tanya G. was the victim in an 18-
count sexual assault case that occurred in 1998.   
¶13 The 1998 sexual assaults occurred when Tanya G. was 
ten years old and involved Tanya G.'s school-bus driver touching 
her private areas when she would get on and off the bus.  The 
abuse happened on numerous occasions and Tanya G.'s two younger 
sisters were also victims.  Tanya G. reported the abuse to the 
authorities and was questioned by a Juneau County detective 
about the assaults.   
¶14 Subsequent to Funk's motion to vacate the judgment, it 
was also learned that Tanya G. had been the victim of a sexual 
assault that occurred in January of 2005.  According to the 
criminal complaint issued for the 2005 incident, Tanya G. was at 
a party when the perpetrator, Julian C., locked Tanya G. in a 
bedroom and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.  
                                                 
9 N.M.F. testified that she saw her father's penis in 
C.M.F.'s mouth, and A.M.F. testified that she saw C.M.F. 
standing, with her pants down, in front of Funk's chair on the 
day of the assaults. 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
9 
 
Tanya G. testified during the preliminary hearing in the case 
against Julian C.  Following the preliminary hearing, Julian C. 
pled no contest and was sentenced.  Tanya G. was 17 years old at 
the time of the assault by Julian C.  
¶15 In response to this newly discovered information about 
Tanya G., the circuit court held a post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing at which Tanya G. testified.  At the hearing, Tanya G. 
confirmed that her elementary-school bus driver had sexually 
molested her.  She explained that the abuse started when she was 
in kindergarten and that it occurred "every day" she rode the 
bus from kindergarten through third grade.  Moreover, Tanya G. 
testified that she witnessed the bus driver abuse her two 
younger 
sisters. 
 
Tanya 
G. 
reported 
the 
abuse 
to 
the 
authorities, but the record does not reflect that she testified 
in any proceeding related to the abuse.  Tanya G. also confirmed 
at the post-conviction hearing that she had been raped by Julian 
C. when she was 17 years old.  
¶16 The circuit court questioned Tanya G. about whether 
the allegations against Funk made her uncomfortable:   
[The Court]:  Now, the question I have for you is, 
when you heard what the allegations were involving Mr. 
Funk, did you feel uncomfortable at that point in 
time?  
[Tanya G.]:  No. 
[The 
Court]: 
 
You 
didn't 
feel 
uncomfortable 
whatsoever? 
[Tanya G.]:  No.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
10 
 
The court then asked Tanya G. why she did not disclose each 
specific incident of sexual assault.  With regard to the sexual 
assault by the bus driver, Tanya G. responded that she did not 
think she was allowed to talk about it because, under the 
settlement agreement in the case, her lawyer had told her that 
if she talked about it, she would be fined $5,000.10  Her 
explanation for why she did not disclose that her sisters had 
been victims of sexual abuse was:  "I understand that I should 
have said something, but since my sisters have nothing else on 
their records indicating sexual assault, I wasn't allowed to put 
them in jeopardy."  
¶17 With regard to the assault by Julian C., Tanya G. 
stated that she did not disclose the incident to the court 
"[b]ecause it's my past.  I don't go from day to day saying that 
this guy raped me, he did this.  It's not the way I live my 
life.  I put it in the back of my head, and I don't reveal it 
ever again." 
¶18 At the post-conviction hearing, Tanya G. consistently 
denied that the nature of the allegations against Funk caused 
her to recall her past experiences with sexual assault during 
Funk's trial, or that she had prejudged Funk in any way.11  She 
                                                 
10 The requirement that Tanya G. not disclose the assaults 
is seemingly part of a March 2008 settlement agreement in a 
civil case related to the sexual assaults by the bus driver.  
The suit was brought by Tanya G. and her parents against the 
school district.     
11 For example, one line of questioning went as follows: 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
[The Court]:  At [the point you heard the details of 
the allegations against Funk], did you have an 
occasion to think about what had happened to you then? 
[Tanya G.]:  No 
[The Court]:  So, when you were dealing with those 
incidences that related to Mr. Funk, you did not think 
about the time that you and your sisters were sexually 
assaulted? 
[Tanya G.]:  No. 
[The Court]:  Nor did you think about the time 
involving [Julian C.]? 
[Tanya G.]:  No. 
[The Court]:  With regard to the sexual assaults, did 
you harbor any hard feelings to Mr. Funk since you, in 
the past, had been a victim of sexual assault? 
[Tanya G.]:  No. 
[The Court]:  With respect to the evidence, did you 
feel uncomfortable hearing evidence involving the 
sexual assault of a child involving Mr. Funk? 
[Tanya G.]:  No. 
[The Court]:  What you are indicating is that after 
hearing the case of that trial, that you didn't 
ruminate or think about your occasions whatsoever that 
you were assaulted? 
[Tanya G.]:  No. 
. . . 
[The Court]:  With respect to the deliberations, as I 
understand your testimony, while you were deliberating 
in terms of your past regarding [the sexual assaults 
to which you were a victim], they did not come up in 
your mind whatsoever? 
[Tanya G.]:  No.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
12 
 
also noted that she did not discuss that she had been a victim 
of sexual assault with any other jurors.  Tanya G. was never 
asked why she did not respond to the question about whether any 
juror had been a witness in a criminal case.   
¶19 The 
circuit 
court 
expressed 
its 
difficulty 
in 
understanding Tanya G.'s answers.  The court said, "it's not so 
much that I'm not taking you at face value, but I just have a 
hard time understanding, but it seems to me that the incidences 
that involved you would probably be some of the most devastating 
of a person's life."  
¶20 Following the post-conviction hearing and a review of 
the voir dire transcript, the circuit court determined that at 
no time during voir dire was the question asked:  "'Have you 
been a victim of a sexual assault,' or, 'Have you or your family 
been victims of sexual assault?'"  However, the court concluded 
that Tanya G. did not respond to a material question when Funk's 
attorney asked whether anyone had testified as a witness in a 
criminal case.  This, the court concluded, was an incorrect 
answer given that Tanya G. had testified at Julian C.'s 
preliminary hearing. 
¶21 The court then concluded that Tanya G. was both 
subjectively and objectively biased.  With respect to subjective 
bias, the court opined: 
I have a very difficult time when an individual takes 
the voir dire oath, and I am not going to recite it, 
but swears to tell the truth, the whole truth to 
questions asked of you to a very solemn occasion, 
there's a black-robed man up here, and she did not 
answer affirmatively to the question of whether she 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
13 
 
was a victim of assault, or more specifically, as I've 
previously found, that she could not recall these 
incidences. 
. . . 
Now, I'm not calling Tanya [G.] a liar.  I 
believe all of us view things through [] a certain 
prism, but I have a very exceedingly, exceptionally 
difficult time finding subjectively that this woman 
who, as a young child, and who has as a young woman, 
been sexually assaulted, and hearing the testimony of 
three 
children, 
who, 
as 
one 
who 
was 
sexually 
assaulted, 
she 
didn't 
put 
that 
aside. 
 
So, 
subjectively, I do find there is bias. 
¶22 With respect to objective bias, the court noted that 
simply because Tanya G. was a victim of sexual assault, she was 
not precluded from sitting on the jury.  Rather, the court 
considered 
whether 
"a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
[Tanya 
G.'s] 
position, could they be impartial, objectively?"  In its 
analysis, the court compared the sexual assaults inflicted upon 
Tanya G. with the sexual assaults at issue in Funk's case.  The 
court noted that Tanya G. was assaulted by her bus driver at 
approximately the same age as C.M.F., when Funk's alleged 
assaults occurred.  The court also pointed out that Tanya G.'s 
sisters were sexually assaulted at the same young age, and noted 
that in Funk's case, both of Funk's daughters, who referred to 
C.M.F. as their "sister," had testified.  
¶23 In addition, the court noted that Tanya G. was 
sexually assaulted again when she was 17.  The court then 
concluded, "I believe that objectively when I look at the case 
that was tried, I look at this juror's past, objectively I find 
that the juror could not be fair and impartial."  As a result of 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
14 
 
the circuit court's conclusion that Tanya G. was biased against 
Funk, the court vacated Funk's guilty verdict and judgment of 
conviction and ordered a new trial. 
¶24 The State appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed in 
an unpublished order.  State v. Funk, No. 2008AP2765-CR, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010).  On appeal, the 
State argued that the circuit court improperly found that Tanya 
G. failed to answer a material question because Funk's motion 
focused on whether Tanya G. failed to answer whether she had 
been a victim of sexual assault, when no such question was asked 
of the jury panel.  Id. at 6.  The court of appeals rejected 
this argument, relying on Tanya G.'s failure to answer several 
questions correctly, "including whether she had any past 
contacts with the district attorney's office and any prior 
involvement in a civil case, as well as whether she had 
testified in a criminal case."  Id. at 7. 
¶25 Moving to subjective bias, the court of appeals 
rejected the State's argument that the circuit court was 
actually applying an objective test.  Id. at 8.  Instead, it 
concluded that "[l]ooking at all of the court's comments 
together, we are persuaded that the court was in fact rejecting 
Tanya G.'s testimony that she did not recall or think about any 
of her own past experiences of sexual assault or involvement in 
the court cases stemming from them."  Id.  In other words, Tanya 
G. "was simply not credible."  Id. at 9.   
¶26 The court of appeals did not address objective bias, 
noting that its affirmation of the circuit court's findings that 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
15 
 
Tanya G. incorrectly answered a material question and that she 
was subjectively biased was sufficient to support the circuit 
court's exercise of discretion.  Id. at 9-10.   
¶27 Judge Lundsten filed a dissenting opinion in which he 
concluded that the circuit court "misapprehended what is 
required for findings of subjective bias and objective bias."  
Id. at 10.  Namely, when analyzing subjective bias, Judge 
Lundsten concluded that the circuit court disregarded Tanya G.'s 
explanations and answers and instead substituted its own 
judgment as to how a person in Tanya G.'s position should have 
felt.  Id. at 10-11.  In his brief discussion of objective bias, 
Judge Lundsten declared that "[i]t is sufficient to say that I 
conclude that the pertinent voir dire questions were so 
inartfully posed that Tanya G.'s non-answers cannot reasonably 
be used to support a finding of objective bias."  Id. at 11.  
¶28 We granted review and now reverse the court of 
appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶29 We address whether juror Tanya G. was biased against 
Funk thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to an 
impartial jury.  In so doing, we determine whether Tanya G. was 
subjectively or objectively biased against Funk.  See State v. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 716, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999); State v. 
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 726, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 
N.W.2d 752 (1990).  Whether a juror was asked certain questions 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
16 
 
and incorrectly or incompletely responded to those questions is 
an issue of fact that we will not reverse unless it is clearly 
erroneous.  State ex rel. Pharm v. Bartow, 2007 WI 13, ¶12, 298 
Wis. 2d 702, 727 N.W.2d 1; see also State v. Casey, 166 Wis. 2d 
341, 348, 479 N.W.2d 251 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, whether the 
question at issue is "material" is a question of law that we 
review independently.  See Pharm, 298 Wis. 2d 702, ¶12.   
¶30 "[W]e will uphold the circuit court's factual finding 
that a prospective juror is or is not subjectively biased unless 
it is clearly erroneous."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.  
Objective bias, on the other hand, is a mixed question of fact 
and law.  Id. at 720.  "[A] circuit court's findings regarding 
the facts and circumstances surrounding voir dire and the case 
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.  Whether those 
facts fulfill the legal standard of objective bias is a question 
of law."  Id.  Although we do not defer to a circuit court's 
decision on a question of law, where the factual and legal 
determinations are intertwined as they are in determining 
objective bias, we give weight to the circuit court's legal 
conclusion.  We have said that we will reverse a circuit court's 
determination in regard to objective bias "only if as a matter 
of law a reasonable judge could not have reached such a 
conclusion."  Id. at 720-21.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
17 
 
B.  Principles for Assessing Juror Bias 
¶31 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution12 
and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution13 
guarantee criminal defendants the right to an impartial jury.  
Moreover, principles of due process under which a defendant is 
to be judged solely on evidence adduced at trial also protect a 
criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury.  State v. 
Kiernan, 
227 
Wis. 2d 
736, 
750, 
596 
N.W.2d 
760 
(1999). 
"Prospective jurors are presumed impartial."  State v. Louis, 
156 Wis. 2d 470, 478, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990).  The party 
challenging a juror's impartiality bears the burden of rebutting 
this presumption and proving bias.  Id.   
¶32 When we are asked to assess juror bias, we employ a 
two-step test developed in Wyss.  Under that test, in order to 
be granted a new trial, a litigant must prove:  
(1) 
that 
the 
juror 
incorrectly 
or 
incompletely 
responded to a material question on voir dire; and if 
so, (2) that it is more probable than not that under 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular 
case, the juror was biased against the moving party. 
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726. 
                                                 
12 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . ." 
13 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district wherein the offense shall have been 
committed . . . ."   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
18 
 
¶33 Under the first step of the Wyss test when, as is the 
case here, there is no factual dispute about what was asked and 
answered during voir dire,14 the issue we address is whether the 
question incorrectly or incompletely answered is material.  We 
have not previously had the opportunity to fully articulate what 
constitutes a material question.  However, our rationale in Wyss 
for rejecting the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court 
in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 
(1984), provides insight into what constitutes a material 
question.   
¶34 Pursuant to the McDonough test, the challenging party 
has to "'first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show 
that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause.'"  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 721 (quoting 
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556).  We rejected this approach in Wyss 
because we believed it to be too limited.  Id. at 727-28.  We 
explained that under the McDonough test, circumstances could 
arise where a juror's honest response to a question he or she 
incorrectly or incompletely responded to during voir dire may 
not, in and of itself, be enough to provide a valid basis to 
challenge the juror for cause.  Nonetheless, if the question had 
been answered correctly at voir dire, it may have led to further 
                                                 
14 As discussed above, Tanya G. remained silent when the 
panel was asked if anyone had ever testified as a witness in a 
criminal matter, although she had testified at the preliminary 
hearing in the case against Julian C. 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
19 
 
questioning that would have provided a valid basis to challenge 
for cause.  In other words, as we opined, "a narrow reading of 
McDonough fails to take into account the very real possibility 
that a correct and/or complete answer, although not providing a 
basis for challenge itself, may well provide the basis for 
further questions and responses that do uncover bias."  Id. at 
729.15 
                                                 
15 We provided a useful example to illustrate our concern 
with McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 
(1984): 
Take for example a personal injury case where all 
prospective 
jurors 
are 
asked 
if 
they 
have 
any 
children.  A juror who has a child fails to respond, 
but not only does she have a child, but her child had 
recently been badly injured in an automobile accident. 
If a litigant sought to have a new trial ordered once 
having learned of the juror's incorrect answer, that 
litigant would not prevail if the language of the 
McDonough opinion was applied narrowly.  A correct 
answer 
on 
voir 
dire 
would 
have 
been 
that 
the 
prospective juror did have a child.  However, applying 
the McDonough language literally, this correct answer 
would not prove to be sufficient to provide a basis to 
strike this juror for cause.  The correct answer 
("yes, I have a child") would not in and of itself 
provide a basis for a challenge for cause.  However, 
if further inquiry were allowed, it would reveal that 
not only did she have a child, but that that child had 
been seriously injured in an automobile accident and, 
possibly 
that 
she 
harbored 
antagonistic 
feelings 
against drivers of automobiles who caused accidents 
and insurance companies that contested benefits.  A 
complete 
inquiry 
would 
have 
revealed 
that 
the 
prospective juror was sufficiently biased to provide a 
valid basis for a challenge for cause. 
State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 728-29, 370 N.W.2d 745 
(1985), overruled on other grounds by State v. Poellinger, 
153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
20 
 
¶35 While this discussion in Wyss was used as support for 
our rejection of the second step of the McDonough test, it also 
is telling about what constitutes a material question under the 
Wisconsin juror bias test.  Our discussion demonstrates that it 
is important to consider follow-up questions that would likely 
have been asked had the juror answered the asked question 
correctly.  Consequently, material questions are not only those 
questions to which the direct or immediate answer reveals a 
juror's bias.  Rather, if the defendant proves that the question 
and its correct answer would have incited further inquiry, 
inquiry that would likely have uncovered bias, we consider the 
initial question to be material.  Stated another way, if the 
question the juror incompletely and/or incorrectly answered is 
of consequence to the determination of bias, it is material. 
¶36 In Faucher, we engaged in a thorough analysis of the 
three types of juror bias:  statutory bias, subjective bias, and 
objective bias.16  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 717-19.  The only 
                                                 
16 Prior to this court's discussion of juror bias in State 
v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999), Wisconsin 
jurisprudence used inconsistent terms to describe statutory, 
subjective, 
and 
objective 
juror 
bias. 
 
Id. 
at 
706.  
Specifically, 
prior 
to 
Faucher, 
Wisconsin 
juror 
bias 
jurisprudence used the terms "implied," "actual," and "inferred" 
bias.  Id.  While we cautioned in Faucher when we adopted the 
terms "statutory," "subjective," and "objective" to describe 
juror bias that they "do not neatly correspond to the terms 
'implied,' 'actual,' and 'inferred' as we have used those terms 
in our prior cases," we noted that "for the purposes of 
providing the circuit courts and practitioners with guidance, we 
do acknowledge that subjective bias is most closely akin to what 
we had called actual bias, and that objective bias in some ways 
contemplates both our use of the terms implied and inferred 
bias."  Id. at 716.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
21 
 
issues presented in this case are whether Tanya G. was 
subjectively or objectively biased.17  
¶37 The inquiry into whether a juror is subjectively 
biased is focused on the specific juror's state of mind.  Id. at 
718.  Jurors are subjectively biased when they have "expressed 
or formed any opinion" about the case prior to hearing the 
evidence.  Id. at 717.  A juror may reveal his or her subjective 
bias either through words, namely his or her explicit assertion 
of 
bias 
or 
partiality, 
through 
demeanor, 
or 
through 
a 
combination of the two.  Id.; see also State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 
108, ¶36, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.  "While there may be 
the occasion when a prospective juror explicitly admits to a 
prejudice, or explicitly admits to an inability to set aside a 
prejudice, most frequently the prospective juror's subjective 
bias will [] be revealed [only] through his or her demeanor."  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.  When subjective bias is evidenced 
by a juror's demeanor, the circuit court's assessment will often 
rest on its analysis of the juror's honesty and credibility.  
Id.   
¶38 Objective bias, on the other hand, shifts the inquiry 
from the specific juror's state of mind to an inquiry into 
"whether [a] reasonable person in the individual prospective 
                                                 
17 A juror is statutorily biased regardless of his ability 
to remain impartial, if he is related by "blood, marriage or 
adoption to any party or to any attorney appearing in the case, 
or has any financial interest in the case."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.08(1) (2009-10); see also Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 715 
(citing § 805.08(1) (1995-96)). 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
22 
 
juror's position could be impartial."  Id.  The focus is on the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the voir dire and trial, and 
whether given those facts and circumstances, a reasonable person 
in the juror's position would be biased.  Id. at 718-19.   
¶39 In cases involving a juror who was not forthcoming 
during voir dire and subsequently sat on the jury, a circuit 
court is to consider the following three, non-exclusive, factors 
to determine objective bias: 
(1) did the question asked sufficiently inquire 
into the subject matter to be disclosed by the juror; 
(2) were the responses of other jurors to the 
same question sufficient to put a reasonable person on 
notice that an answer was required; 
(3) did the juror become aware of his or her 
false or misleading answers at anytime during the 
trial and fail to notify the trial court? 
Id. at 727 (quoting Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 731).18  We examine 
these questions because a juror's responses under the facts and 
                                                 
18 Justice Bradley's dissent mistakenly infers that Faucher 
overruled Wyss, thereby discarding this analysis.  Justice 
Bradley's dissent, ¶86.  Justice Bradley's dissent misreads 
Faucher.  While, as discussed above, see supra note 16, we 
adopted new terms to discuss the three types of juror bias in 
Faucher, we explicitly stated that in adopting these new terms, 
we were not changing the existing juror bias jurisprudence.  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 706 ("Our adoption of these new terms 
does 
not, 
however, 
change 
our 
existing 
jurisprudence.") 
(emphasis added).   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In an attempt to argue that the jurisprudence was changed 
despite our proclamation in Faucher that we were not changing 
the existing jurisprudence, the dissent cites to case law 
describing 
the 
state 
of 
juror 
bias 
law 
pre-Faucher.  
Specifically, the dissent takes language from State v. Oswald, 
232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1999) and State v. 
Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 N.W.2d 240.  
Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶93.  The language cited by the 
dissent, however, refers to the terminology used pre-Faucher and 
its confusing and inconsistent application.  It does not refer 
to the Wyss test for objective bias.   
For example, in full, the sentence the dissent cites from 
Oswald reads:  "In [Faucher and other cases published at the 
same time], the court clarified the previously turbid state of 
juror bias jurisprudence in Wisconsin, adopting the terms 
'statutory,' 'subjective' and 'objective' bias to replace the 
misused 'implied,' 'actual' and 'inferred' bias terminology."  
Oswald, 232 Wis. 2d at 110.  Likewise, when referring to the 
"murky waters" of pre-Faucher juror bias jurisprudence, the 
Wolfe court was referring to the "misused 'implied,' 'actual' 
and 'inferred' terminology."  Wolfe, 246 Wis. 2d 233, ¶19.  What 
is more, the "new approach" that Professors Blinka and Hammer 
described in their 1999 article was the new terminology adopted 
by the Faucher court.  Daniel D. Blinka & Thomas J. Hammer, 
Wisconsin Lawyer, Sept. 1999, at 30, 40.  As discussed above, we 
are in complete agreement with the dissent that Faucher changed 
juror 
bias 
terminology. 
 
The 
dissent 
errs, 
however, 
in 
attempting to expand these changes, and reading them to overrule 
the test set forth in Wyss.  
Moreover, as support for its proposition that Faucher 
discarded the Wyss test, the dissent points out that Faucher 
"did not apply the three-part test at all."  Justice Bradley's 
dissent, ¶86.  While this assertion may be true, Faucher makes 
clear that the Wyss analysis is to be employed in "lack of juror 
candor cases," such as the case before us.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 
at 726-28.  Faucher was not a "lack of juror candor" case.  
Faucher concerned a juror who knew a witness and said that he 
believed that the witness was a "'person of integrity' who 
'wouldn't lie.'"  Id. at 705.  Faucher moved to strike the 
prospective juror for cause and his motion was denied.  Id.  
Therefore, there was no reason to employ the Wyss analysis in 
Faucher.  Additionally, neither Oswald nor Wolfe are "lack of 
juror candor" cases.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
24 
 
circumstances of a particular case must be compared with those 
of a reasonable person in the position of the juror.  State v. 
Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281-82, 558 N.W.2d 1 (1999).   
¶40 Sexual assault cases can be difficult for any juror.  
However, the "failure of a juror in a sexual assault case to 
answer correctly or completely a question during voir dire about 
his or her experience of sexual assault does not constitute bias 
per se."  Id. at 282; see also State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 
758, 777, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  The answers to the questions 
suggested in Wyss and Delgado will provide insight into whether 
the juror was so emotionally affected by the prior sexual 
assault that a reasonable person in the juror's position could 
not be impartial.  Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 285-86.  In our 
review, we perform an independent application of these factors 
to the facts and circumstances of the case to determine whether 
the juror was objectively biased as a matter of law.  See id. at 
283-85. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, the dissent cites to State v. Wilkinson, No. 02-
1206, unpublished per curiam, ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003).  
See Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶96.  While Wilkinson also is not 
a "lack of juror candor" case, and equally inapplicable here, we 
underscore the impropriety of citing to a 2003 unpublished, 
unauthored court of appeals opinion, a citation contrary to this 
court's rules.  To explain further, subsequent to July 1, 2009, 
an unpublished, authored opinion may be cited for persuasive, 
but 
not 
precedential 
value. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 809.23(3)(b).  
However, 
the 
Wilkinson 
decision 
does 
not 
come 
within 
§ 809.23(3)(b) because it is a per curiam decision and it was 
not issued subsequent to July 1, 2009.  Consequently, it is an 
improper citation.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
25 
 
C.  Application 
a.  Material question 
¶41 We now apply the legal standards set forth above to 
the facts and circumstances of this case.  Beginning with the 
first step of the two-step Wyss test, we agree with the circuit 
court and court of appeals that Tanya G. failed to answer 
defense counsel's questions:  "Anyone ever go to court to 
testify in a criminal case as a witness?  Anyone ever go to 
court to testify in a civil case as a witness?"   
¶42 Moreover, given the facts of this case, this question 
was material.  Funk's argument throughout has been that Tanya G. 
was biased based on her previous experiences as a victim of 
sexual assault.  Had Tanya G. correctly responded when asked if 
she had testified in a criminal case, this would likely have 
incited further questioning that may have uncovered that Tanya 
G. had been a victim of sexual assault.   
¶43 The likelihood that an affirmative response by Tanya 
G. may have led to the eventual disclosure that she had been a 
victim of sexual assault is evidenced by the responses of the 
other jurors to this question.  When Funk's attorney asked 
whether anyone on the panel had testified as a witness, four 
jurors answered in the affirmative.  All four disclosed the 
nature of the case in which he or she had testified, either in 
their initial answer to the question or in response to a follow-
up question by Funk's attorney.  Consequently, had Tanya G. 
correctly, 
and 
affirmatively, responded to that question, 
putting the court on notice that she had previously testified in 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
26 
 
a criminal case, it is likely Funk's attorney would have asked 
Tanya G. details about the nature of the case in which she 
testified.  The court, therefore, would have discovered that the 
case was a sexual assault case and that Tanya G. was the victim 
of that assault.  As such, the question was of consequence to 
the bias determination at issue here and is material. 
b.  Subjective bias 
¶44 Moving to the second step of Wyss, whether Funk proved 
that it was more probable than not that under the facts and 
circumstances surrounding this case, Tanya G. was biased against 
him, we first address subjective bias.  The question that Tanya 
G. did not answer was whether she had been a witness in a 
criminal case.  However, at the post-conviction hearing, no one 
asked her why she did not respond to that question.  Therefore, 
there is no record of why she failed to answer.  All of the 
questioning of Tanya G. in the post-conviction hearing focused 
on why she had not revealed that she was a victim of sexual 
assault.  However, no question about being the victim of sexual 
assault was asked during voir dire.   
¶45 As explained above, the inquiry required by law to 
determine whether Tanya G. is subjectively biased is focused on 
her state of mind.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.  A juror may 
reveal subjective bias by an explicit assertion of bias.  Id. at 
717.  Tanya G. did not say that she was biased against Funk.  To 
the contrary, Tanya G. explicitly and consistently asserted at 
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that she was not biased 
against Funk.  See, e.g., supra note 11.  Moreover, during voir 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
27 
 
dire, Tanya G. never indicated she was biased against Funk 
despite the panel being asked numerous times whether anyone 
would have difficulties being impartial.   
¶46 Subjective bias also may be revealed through a juror's 
demeanor, with a determination of bias resting on whether the 
circuit court finds the juror credible.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 
718.  Given this standard, the circuit court's explanation for 
its finding that Tanya G. was subjectively biased is difficult 
to understand.  In the portion of the circuit court's oral 
decision that explained its finding, the circuit court did not 
describe Tanya G.'s demeanor, either at voir dire or at the 
post-conviction 
hearing, 
and 
explain 
how 
her 
demeanor 
demonstrated to the court that she was biased.  Instead, the 
circuit court expressed its belief in her responses:  "Now, I'm 
not calling Tanya [G.] a liar.  I believe all of us view things 
through [] a certain prism."   
¶47 The court then found Tanya G. subjectively biased 
based on Tanya G.'s failure to answer a question that was never 
asked and the court's own belief that someone in Tanya's 
position could not be impartial:  
I have a very difficult time when an individual takes 
the voir dire oath, and I am not going to recite it, 
but swears to tell the truth, the whole truth to 
questions asked of you to a very solemn occasion, 
there's a black-robed man up here, and she did not 
answer affirmatively to the question of whether she 
was a victim of assault, or more specifically, as I've 
previously found, that she could not recall these 
incidences. 
. . . 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
28 
 
I have a very exceedingly, exceptionally difficult 
time finding subjectively that this woman who, as a 
young child, and who has as a young woman, been 
sexually assaulted, and hearing the testimony of three 
children, who, as one who was sexually assaulted, she 
didn't put that aside.  So, subjectively, I do find 
there is bias.   
¶48 Assessing what someone in Tanya G.'s position could or 
could not have done is not the correct standard on which to 
decide whether a juror is subjectively biased.  See Faucher, 227 
Wis. 2d at 718.  A finding of subjective bias must be based on 
factual findings that show the specific juror's state of mind.  
Id.  No such findings were made here.  To the contrary, the 
circuit court stated that it believed Tanya G.'s assertion that 
she was impartial.  The court also did not make any findings 
about her demeanor that indicated subjective bias.  Rather, the 
court determined that Tanya G. was subjectively biased based on 
her failure to answer a question that was never asked and its 
finding that someone who had been sexually assaulted in the 
manner that Tanya G. was, could not be impartial in a sexual 
assault trial.  Accordingly, the circuit court's finding that 
Tanya G. was subjectively biased against Funk is not supported 
by facts of record and is clearly erroneous.   
c.  Objective bias 
¶49 Next, we turn to objective bias and conclude that the 
circuit court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that 
Tanya G. was objectively biased against Funk.  Objective bias 
exists when a reasonable person in the juror's position could 
not be impartial.  Id.  The fact that a juror has been a victim 
of sexual assault does not make him or her per se biased against 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
29 
 
the defendant in a sexual assault case.  Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 
285.   
¶50 Delgado is instructive as we consider whether Funk has 
proved objective bias.  As aforementioned, in deciding whether 
there was objective bias in Delgado, we considered the following 
three non-exclusive factors:   
(1) did the question asked sufficiently inquire 
into the subject matter to be disclosed by the juror; 
(2) were the responses of other jurors to the 
same question sufficient to put a reasonable person on 
notice that an answer was required; 
(3) did the juror become aware of his or her 
false or misleading answers at anytime during the 
trial and fail to notify the trial court? 
Id. (citing Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 731); see also Faucher, 227 
Wis. 2d at 727.  
¶51 In Delgado, the defendant was tried for first-degree 
sexual assault of two young girls, aged seven and nine.  Id. at 
273.  Similar to the case at hand, in Delgado, sometime after 
the defendant was found guilty of the crime, it came to the 
court's attention that one of the jurors, Juror C., had herself 
been a victim of sexual assault, but did not disclose this 
during voir dire.19  Id. at 276.  The circuit court held two 
                                                 
19 Contrary to the situation here, the jury panel in State 
v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999), was asked:  
"Are there any members of the jury panel who either have a close 
friend or close relative or you yourself who have been the 
victim of a sexual assault, either as a child or as an adult?"  
Id. at 274-75.  Juror C. did not disclose that she had been a 
victim of the crime of sexual assault.  Id. at 275.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
30 
 
evidentiary hearings on the defendant's motion for a new trial 
to 
determine 
whether, 
under 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
surrounding the case, the two-step Wyss test was satisfied.20  
Id. at 276-78.  During the first hearing, Juror C. explained why 
she did not respond to the questioning that related to being the 
victim of sexual assault.  Id. at 276.  At the second hearing, 
evidence 
was 
presented 
demonstrating 
that 
during 
jury 
deliberations, Juror C. indicated that she had previously been a 
victim of sexual assault.  Id. at 278.  After listening to the 
evidence presented at the second hearing, the circuit court 
concluded that Juror C. was impartial and therefore, the second 
step of Wyss was not satisfied.  Id. at 278-79.   
                                                 
20 Following the first hearing, the circuit court found that 
the first step of the Wyss two-step test had not been satisfied, 
i.e., that Juror C. had not incorrectly or incompletely answered 
a material question during voir dire.  Id. at 277.  The 
defendant appealed this finding.  On appeal, the court of 
appeals disagreed and concluded that Juror C. failed to 
correctly or completely answer a material question during voir 
dire.  Id.  It remanded for a hearing on whether, under the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case, the second step of 
the Wyss test was satisfied, i.e., whether Juror C. was biased.  
Id. at 278. 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
31 
 
¶52 On review, we noted that the circuit court did not 
consider the three factors set out above.21  We conducted an 
independent review of the facts and circumstances of Delgado as 
they applied to the three factors.  Id. at 283-86.  Based on our 
independent review, we concluded Juror C. was objectively 
biased, and we ordered a new trial.  Id.   
¶53 With regard to the first factor, whether the question 
asked sufficiently inquired into the subject matter to be 
disclosed by the juror, the panel in Delgado was explicitly 
asked whether anyone in the panel had been a victim of sexual 
assault.  The exact question was:  "Are there any members of the 
jury panel who either have a close friend or close relative or 
you yourself who have been the victim of a sexual assault, 
either as a child or as an adult?"  Id. at 283.  Juror C. 
remained silent.  Id. at 275.  We agreed with the court of 
appeals that this explicit question inquired into the jurors' 
prior 
personal 
experiences 
with 
sexual 
assault 
and 
that 
"[n]othing in the record support[ed] a conclusion that the 
                                                 
21 Delgado was decided six months before Faucher and 
therefore, the term "inferred" bias is used instead of the term 
"objective" bias.  However, in Delgado, we were using an 
objective standard when deciding whether there was "inferred" 
bias.  As evidence, in our discussion of "inferred" bias, we 
noted that the circuit court used an incorrect analysis "to 
determine whether from an objective standard" there was bias.  
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).  Therefore, to avoid confusion, 
throughout this discussion, we will refer to the "inferred" bias 
in Delgado as if it were referred to in Delgado as "objective" 
bias.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
32 
 
phraseology of the question justified [J]uror C.'s silence."  
Id. at 284.   
¶54 With regard to Delgado's consideration of the second 
factor, whether the responses of other jurors to the same 
question sufficiently put a reasonable person on notice that an 
answer was required, we opined that the only reasonable 
conclusion was that Juror C. was put on such notice.  Id.  
Specifically, we pointed out that during voir dire, four jurors, 
in response to the above question and in open court, divulged 
that a close friend or relative had been sexually assaulted.  
Id.; see also id. at 275. 
¶55 With regard to the third factor, whether Juror C. 
became aware of her false or misleading answers at any time 
during the trial and failed to inform the trial court, we noted 
that Juror C. became aware of her failure to answer the question 
during jury deliberations.  Id. at 284.  As the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing revealed, during deliberations Juror C. 
became angry with one of the other jurors who did not think the 
State had proved its case against the defendant.  Through anger, 
she disclosed her prior experience with sexual assault, stating, 
"You don't know what it feels like, but I happen to know what it 
feels like to be taken advantage of."  Id. at 278.  The holdout 
juror replied by asking Juror C. why she did not report the 
abuse during voir dire.  Id. 
¶56 After considering the three factors for assessing 
whether the juror was biased, as well as the facts and 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
33 
 
circumstances of the case,22 we concluded that Juror C.'s 
emotional involvement with the case caused her to be objectively 
biased.  Id. at 285-86.  We stated: 
The probability that [J]uror C.'s substantial 
emotional 
involvement 
would 
adversely 
affect 
her 
impartiality was high.  Her emotional involvement was 
demonstrated by the close similarity of her experience 
with the crimes charged, her incorrect and incomplete 
responses during voir dire, her revelation of her 
experience during jury deliberations, and her failure 
to report her omission to the court. 
Id. 
¶57 While Delgado is factually similar to the case at hand 
because both cases are sexual assault cases and involved a juror 
who failed to disclose during voir dire that she had been a 
victim of 
sexual 
assault, our review of the facts and 
circumstances of this case, in light of the three factors for 
assessing juror bias, requires a conclusion opposite from the 
one reached in Delgado.  First, unlike the factual underpinnings 
of Delgado, the questions asked of Tanya G. during voir dire did 
not involve whether any juror had been a victim of sexual 
assault. 
 
Furthermore, at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing, Tanya G. was never asked why she did not respond to the 
question about whether any juror had been a witness in a 
criminal case, which was the question asked in voir dire to 
which she did not respond.  Therefore, Funk did not make a 
record at the post-conviction hearing of why Tanya G. failed to 
                                                 
22 Juror C. had been sexually assaulted when she was six or 
seven by someone she knew, but that was not a relative.  Id. at 
278.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
34 
 
answer the question that was asked.  It was his burden to do so 
in order to fully evaluate Tanya G.'s potential bias against 
him.  Id. at 278 (citing Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726).  Put another 
way, the questions asked at the post-conviction hearing do not 
provide a foundation on which to conclude that a reasonable 
person in Tanya G.'s position could not impartially decide 
Funk's case. 
¶58 To explain further, looking at the first factor, the 
questions 
asked 
of 
Tanya 
G. 
during 
voir 
dire 
did 
not 
sufficiently inquire into the subject matter of sexual assault.  
The material question that Tanya G. failed to answer was whether 
she had testified in a criminal case.  This question cannot be 
said to sufficiently inquire into the jurors' prior personal 
experiences with sexual assault, which is the basis on which a 
new trial was ordered by the circuit court.  That this 
unanswered question could have led to questions about sexual 
assault is insufficient because Tanya G. was never asked at the 
post-conviction hearing why she failed to respond to the 
question actually asked at voir dire.  The overarching question 
when evaluating Funk's claim of objective bias is whether a 
reasonable person in Tanya G.'s position could be impartial.  
This analysis requires us to consider whether a reasonable 
person who had a similar level of emotional involvement with 
hearing the testimony about sexual assault as Tanya G. had could 
be impartial.  The juror's level of emotional involvement is 
part of the "position" in which we place the reasonable person 
for our analysis.  Tanya G.'s failure to answer the question 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
35 
 
about testifying in a criminal case, with no explanation for her 
silence, however, gives us no insight into whether, because of 
her prior experiences with sexual assault, she was emotionally 
involved in Funk's case and therefore unable to objectively 
evaluate the evidence.  In other words, we are unable to place a 
"reasonable person" in Tanya G.'s "position" because we do not 
know the relevant factors that relate to her "position."   
¶59 With regard to the second factor, the responses of the 
other jurors during voir dire would not have put a reasonable 
juror in Tanya G.'s position on notice that she was required to 
disclose that she had previously been a victim of sexual 
assault.23  When the circuit court proclaimed during the 
beginning of voir dire that one of the questions was going to be 
whether anyone on the panel had been a victim of sexual assault 
or knew someone who had been a victim of sexual assault, no one 
in the jury panel took this proclamation as a question that 
needed to be answered.  The record shows that although one juror 
herself was a victim of sexual assault and numerous jurors on 
the panel knew someone who had been a victim of sexual assault, 
no juror responded to the circuit court's proclamation by 
disclosing information about sexual assault.  Rather, most of 
the information about sexual assault came out later in voir dire 
                                                 
23 Although Justice Bradley's dissent asserts that the three 
factors set forth in Wyss are no longer the correct standard 
under which to evaluate objective juror bias, see supra note 18, 
the dissent uses the second Wyss factor in conducting its 
analysis of whether there was juror bias in this case.  Justice 
Bradley's dissent, ¶¶107-112.   
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
36 
 
in response to the attorneys' more general questions about 
whether those on the panel could be impartial.  If Tanya G. felt 
she could be impartial, there was no reason for her to respond 
to those general questions.24 
¶60 On the other hand, the responses of other jurors to 
the question about whether anyone had testified in a criminal 
case would have put a reasonable juror in Tanya G.'s position on 
notice that an answer to that question was required.  Four 
jurors responded, and in their responses, they explained the 
case in which they testified.  These responses would have put a 
reasonable juror in Tanya G.'s position on notice that she 
should have disclosed her prior testimony.  However, at the 
post-conviction hearing, Tanya G. was never asked why she did 
                                                 
24 While the second factor is usually limited to the 
relevant question in the first factor, we also note that a 
review of the voir dire transcript does not indicate that the 
responses of other jurors throughout voir dire would put a 
reasonable juror in Tanya G.'s position on notice that she was 
required to disclose her prior experiences with sexual assault.  
Unlike the voir dire proceedings in Delgado where four jurors 
disclosed their experiences with sexual assault in open court, 
Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 284, only one juror, Juror S., in the 
case at hand, disclosed his experience with sexual assault in 
open court.  The other jurors disclosed their experiences 
privately in chambers.  Additionally, Juror S.'s open court 
disclosure did not follow a particular question to the entire 
panel, rather it occurred when he was called to the panel after 
another juror was excused, and he was asked individually if he 
would have answered any of the previous questions presented to 
the panel.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
37 
 
not answer that question.25  Perhaps she understood that question 
in a way that required no answer or perhaps she was not paying 
attention and missed the question all together.  The record 
provides no information in that regard.  Simply failing to 
answer a question during voir dire is insufficient to prove 
juror bias.  Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 282.   
¶61 Finally, in regard to the third factor, unlike Juror 
C. in Delgado, there is nothing in the record indicating that 
Tanya G. became aware of her failure to answer the question 
relating to serving as a witness in a criminal case at any time 
during Funk's trial.  Even more, this case is nothing like 
                                                 
25 Instead, much of the evidentiary hearing was focused on 
why Tanya G. did not respond to the circuit court's statement at 
the beginning of voir dire that "one of the questions is going 
to be . . . have anyone of you been a victim of sexual assault."  
However, as discussed, this question was never actually asked 
during voir dire so it was erroneous for the circuit court to 
expect Tanya 
G. to explain why she never answered it.  
Nonetheless, we do point out that despite what, to Tanya G., 
must 
have 
been a 
confusing line of questioning at the 
evidentiary hearing, Tanya G. did give explanations for not 
disclosing her experiences with sexual assault or her sisters' 
experiences, none of which implicate a bias towards Funk. For 
example, she did not want to be fined $5,000.  See supra section 
I.   
Funk 
argues that the reason Tanya G. gave at the 
evidentiary hearing for not disclosing the sexual assault by 
Julian C.——that it was her past and she had put it behind her——
also explains why she did not respond to the question of whether 
she had testified before.  Based on our review of the transcript 
of the evidentiary hearing, we do not conclude that the answer 
Tanya G. gave to why she failed to respond to a question that 
was not asked during voir dire (had she ever been a victim of 
sexual assault) can rightfully be considered her answer to a 
question she was not asked at the evidentiary hearing (why she 
didn't respond to the prior testimony question). 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
38 
 
Delgado in which Juror C.'s outburst during deliberations that 
"I happen to know what it feels like to be taken advantage of," 
id. at 278, clearly indicates that Juror C.'s experience as a 
previous victim of sexual assault influenced how she viewed the 
case (and she was arguably using this experience to influence 
other jurors). 
¶62 Accordingly, an application of the three factors to 
the facts and circumstances of this case gives us no insight 
about why Tanya G. failed to respond when the panel was asked if 
anyone had testified as a witness in a criminal case.  The 
failure to answer a question on voir dire is not sufficient to 
conclude Tanya G. was objectively biased against Funk.  Id. at 
282.  And, the failure to answer the question asked gives us 
insufficient information to conclude how a reasonable person in 
Tanya G.'s circumstances would have acted in regard to bias 
against Funk. 
¶63 In sum, jurors are presumed impartial, and Funk had 
the burden of rebutting this presumption and proving Tanya G.'s 
bias in this case.  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 478.  We agree with 
Judge Lundsten that the questions asked of Tanya G. were "so 
inartfully posed that Tanya G.'s non-answers cannot reasonably 
be used to support a finding of objective bias."  Funk, No. 
2008AP2765-CR, unpublished order, at 11.  As such, Funk has not 
met his burden because there is no proof that a reasonable juror 
in Tanya G.'s position could not be impartial.  Without such 
proof, the only basis on which we could conclude that she was 
objectively biased is to conclude she was per se biased against 
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
39 
 
Funk.  Delgado forbids such a per se bias rule based solely on 
having been the victim of sexual assault.  Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 
at 285.  Consequently, we hold that Funk has not met his burden 
to prove that Tanya G. was objectively biased.  Stated 
otherwise, the facts necessary to ground a circuit court's 
reasonable legal conclusion that Tanya G. was objectively biased 
were not developed in this case.26  Therefore, the circuit court 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that a reasonable person 
in Tanya G.'s position could not be impartial.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶64 We conclude that Tanya G. failed to respond to a 
material question during voir dire when Funk's attorney asked if 
anyone on the jury panel had previously testified in a criminal 
case.  We also conclude that the circuit court's finding that 
Tanya G. was subjectively biased against Funk is unsupported by 
facts of record and is clearly erroneous.  Finally, we conclude 
that the facts necessary to ground a circuit court's reasonable 
legal conclusion that a reasonable person in Tanya G.'s position 
could not be impartial were not developed in this case, and 
therefore the circuit court's conclusion that Tanya G. was 
objectively biased was erroneous.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals order and reinstate the guilty verdict against 
Funk.  
                                                 
26 Commentators have stressed the "importance of making a 
complete record concerning any allegation of juror bias."  
Blinka, supra note 18, at 40-41.  
No. 
2008AP2765-CR   
 
40 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶65 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Bradley's dissent.  I take this opportunity to write on 
the majority's application of the "subjective bias" element of 
juror bias. 
¶66 In the present case we are faced with a circuit 
court's determination of the subjective bias of a juror.  
"[S]ubjective bias . . . refers to the prospective juror's state 
of mind."  State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 717, 596 
N.W.2d 770 (1999).  Subjective bias means having "expressed or 
formed any opinion" about the case before hearing the evidence. 
Id.  Here the juror asserted that she was not biased against the 
defendant.     
¶67 The circuit court is tasked with determining whether a 
juror is subjectively biased.  The circuit court initially 
relies on a juror's self-assessment regarding whether she can be 
(or was) impartial.  Yet a circuit court cannot blindly rely on 
a juror's self-assessment.  The expressions of the juror 
regarding his or her impartiality "are not conclusive[;] 
evaluating the subjective sincerity of those expressions is a 
matter of the circuit court's discretion."  Faucher, 227 
Wis. 2d at 723 (quoting State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 33, 
280 N.W.2d 725 (1979).   
¶68 "[A] subjective inquiry will often not be susceptible 
to direct proof."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 717-18.  A circuit 
court determines whether it believes or doubts that the juror 
"honestly believed that he [or she] could remain impartial."  
No.  2008AP2765-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 723 (quoting State v. Gesch, 167 
Wis. 2d 660, 667, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992)).   
¶69 A circuit court must evaluate and assess the juror's 
responses, the juror's demeanor, the juror's "disposition," and 
the juror's honesty and credibility, among other relevant facts.  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.  
¶70 A juror's good-faith belief that she is not or was not 
biased, however, is not necessarily an accurate belief.  Even if 
we could be assured of truthfulness, some people are incapable 
of making correct assessments of self, especially on an issue 
such as bias.  A juror may emphatically believe that she is not 
biased, yet unknowingly lack the ability to be impartial.  The 
circuit court must evaluate whether the juror is correct in her 
subjective belief or whether she is incorrect in her subjective 
belief.  In other words, if a juror believes she can act as an 
impartial decision-maker, a circuit court may still conclude 
that the juror is not capable of being impartial.      
¶71 A purely subjective test is a practical impossibility.  
A circuit court cannot look inside the heads of individuals and 
definitively determine their thoughts and feelings.  A circuit 
court makes a determination regarding a person's subjective bias 
through the prism of its interpretation of the statements and 
the evidence before it.  This prism is a function of the circuit 
court's experiences and knowledge of human nature.       
¶72 A subjective standard is limited to an interpretation 
by the decision-maker of the statements that are made within the 
context of the evidence available, the disposition and demeanor 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
of the individual, and other factors in the record.  The more 
outlandish or unreasonable the juror's position seems to a 
circuit court, the more likely the circuit court will find 
subjective bias. 
¶73 I turn to the objective standard.  An objective 
standard does not use a fictional reasonable person.  Rather, 
the objective standard encompasses the characteristics of the 
person whose conduct is being judged.  The inquiry into 
objective bias is whether "the reasonable person in the 
individual prospective juror's position could be impartial."  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.  Thus objective bias, like 
subjective bias, deals with the facts relating to the specific 
person in question.  A blurring of the subjective and objective 
categories is therefore inevitable.  It is probable that the two 
categories overlap.  Sarvenaz J. Raissi, Comment, Analyzing 
Juror Bias Exhibited During Voir Dire in Wisconsin: How To 
Lessen the Confusion, 84 Marq. L. Rev. 517, 539 (2000).  
¶74 The circuit court in the present case evaluated the 
juror, her demeanor, her disposition, and the circumstances in 
the context of the case.  In doing so the circuit court declared 
the juror subjectively biased:  
Now, I'm not calling Tanya [G.] a liar.  I believe all 
of us view things through [] a certain prism, but I 
have a very exceedingly, exceptionally difficult time 
finding subjectively that this woman who, as a young 
child, and who has as a young woman, been sexually 
assaulted, 
and 
hearing 
the 
testimony 
of 
three 
children, who, as one who was sexually assaulted, she 
didn't put that aside.  So, subjectively, I do find 
there is bias. 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶75 The circuit court was "not calling Tanya [G.] a liar," 
because Tanya [G.] was not lying.  Tanya truly believed she 
could be free from bias.  The law tasks the circuit court with 
making a determination about the subjective state of mind of the 
juror.  The circuit court concluded that the juror did not hold 
a correct belief that she was impartial. 
¶76 In appellate review of a circuit court's finding of 
subjective bias, an appellate court determines whether the 
record 
supports 
"a 
[circuit 
court's] 
finding 
that 
the 
prospective juror is [or is not] a reasonable person who is 
sincerely 
willing 
to 
put 
aside 
an 
opinion 
or 
prior 
knowledge . . . ."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 724.  An appellate 
court defers to a large extent to the decision of the circuit 
court about subjective bias because the circuit court is in a 
superior position to assess the demeanor and disposition of 
prospective jurors and whether they are subjectively biased.  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.   
¶77 In the present case, the circuit court determined that 
the juror was subjectively biased.  The record supports the 
circuit court's determination that the juror was subjectively 
biased. 
¶78 The circuit court also determined, that the juror was 
objectively biased.  This determination is to be reversed "only 
if as a matter of law a reasonable judge could not have reached 
such a conclusion."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 721.  I cannot 
conclude on this record that as a matter of law a reasonable 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
judge could not have reached the conclusion that the juror was 
objectively biased.      
¶79 For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Justice 
Bradley's dissent, I would affirm the circuit court order 
vacating the judgment of conviction and granting the defendant a 
new trial.     
 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶80 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Day in and day 
out across this state, circuit court judges are on the front 
lines, making tough decisions.  This case reflects one of those 
tough decisions—ordering a new trial in a child sexual assault 
case. 
¶81 In reviewing the circuit court's objective bias 
determination, an appellate court asks the following question: 
Is this a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach?  When 
applying this test, we give deference to the decision of the 
circuit court because it has special competence in making  
objective bias determinations.  It is intimately familiar with 
the voir dire proceeding, and is best situated to reflect upon 
the prospective juror's response.  State v. Faucher, 227 
Wis. 2d 700, 720, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999). 
¶82 Here, the circuit court assessed the voir dire as a 
whole.  It compared the factual similarities between Tanya G.'s 
assaults 
and 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case, 
evaluated 
her 
nonresponsiveness, 
weighed 
her 
subsequent 
conflicting 
statements, and concluded, "I must follow the law."  Ultimately 
it determined that a reasonable person in Tanya G.'s position 
could not be impartial.  Rather than giving deference to those 
on the front lines making these tough decisions, the majority 
turns back the clock.  It applies a long-discarded test which 
skews its analysis and leaves confusion in its wake.   
¶83 When I apply the test adopted in Faucher and give the 
circuit court's determination the deference it deserves, I 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
determine that a reasonable judge could conclude that Tanya G. 
was objectively biased.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶84 The question before this court is whether the circuit 
court erred in concluding that a reasonable person in Tanya G.'s 
position could not be impartial.  The majority determines that 
"there is no proof that a reasonable juror in Tanya G.'s 
position could not be impartial," and "[w]ithout such proof, the 
only basis on which we could conclude that she was objectively 
biased is to conclude she was per se biased against Funk."  
Majority op., ¶63.   
¶85 In coming to that conclusion, the majority applies a 
three-factor test from State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 731, 370 
N.W.2d 745 (1985).1  Majority op., ¶39.  After applying the three 
factors to the facts and circumstances of the case, it concludes 
that "failure to answer a question on voir dire is not 
sufficient to conclude Tanya G. was objectively biased against 
Funk."  Id., ¶62.  In explaining its conclusion, the majority 
                                                 
1 The three factors set forth in Wyss are as follows: 
(1) did the question asked sufficiently inquire into 
the subject matter to be disclosed by the juror; 
(2) were the responses of other jurors to the same 
question sufficient to put a reasonable person on 
notice that an answer was required; 
(3) did the juror become aware of his or her false or 
misleading answers at anytime during the trial and 
fail to notify the trial court? 
State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 731, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985); see 
also State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999). 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
reasons that applying the three-factor test of Wyss "gives us no 
insight about why Tanya G. failed to respond when the panel was 
asked if anyone had testified as a witness in a criminal case."  
Id. 
¶86 The lack of insight provided by the application of 
Wyss's three-part test is telling.  The inadequacy of that test 
underscores why it was discarded over ten years ago when this 
court synthesized the law of juror bias in Faucher.  Indeed, 
Faucher did not apply the three-part test at all.  Instead, it 
fashioned a new test.   
¶87 The Faucher court set forth a new standard because it 
recognized that past decisions regarding jury bias "lacked the 
clarity necessary to properly guide the bench and bar."  227 
Wis. 2d at 706.  It explained that the inconsistent analysis and 
imprecise use of such terms as "implied," "actual," and 
"inferred" led to confusion among attorneys and judges alike.2  
Id. at 713.  
¶88 Faucher 
tracked 
the 
evolution 
of 
jury 
bias 
jurisprudence by citing to seven different cases, including Wyss 
and Delgado, and using them as a "primer for jury bias 
analysis."  Id. at 721.  It harmonized the rules from these 
                                                 
2 Prior to Delgado, the courts recognized only "actual" and 
"implied" juror bias.  Delgado created a third category, 
"inferred" bias, by relying on the language in Wyss that "bias 
may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances."  
State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 714, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999).  
Faucher explained that further confusion stemmed from the word 
"inferred" being used as both a verb to describe the process by 
which "actual" and "implied" bias is discovered, and also as an 
adjective.  Id.  Accordingly, Faucher revamped the jury bias 
analysis. 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
cases into a clear test for determining if it is more probable 
than not that a juror is objectively biased.   
¶89 The test is: whether a reasonable person in the 
juror's position could be impartial.  Id. at 718.  Not only did 
Faucher discard the Wyss test, it also indicated that the three-
factor test was never intended to apply to an analysis of 
objective bias at all.  Id. at 714.3 
¶90 The majority relies on the fifth paragraph of the 
Faucher opinion, which asserted that the court's adoption of new 
terms 
"does 
not . . . change 
our 
existing 
jurisprudence."  
Majority op., ¶39 n.18 (citing Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 706).  
Nevertheless, reading beyond that paragraph demonstrates that 
the Faucher court set forth not just new terminology but also 
new substantive standards to be applied by circuit courts and 
appellate courts alike.   
¶91 It explained that "there is not an absolute, direct 
correlation between the former terms and the terms we adopt 
today," that the old terms "do not neatly correspond to the 
[new] terms," and that objective bias "has a meaning independent 
of any one of the former terms."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 716-
17.  It further emphasized that the new terminology reflects 
"both the reason why a juror cannot be impartial, and the 
                                                 
3 The Faucher court indicated that the language immediately 
prior to the adoption of the three-factor test, that "[b]ias may 
be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances," was 
actually describing the process by which "actual" or "implied" 
bias is discovered.  227 Wis. 2d at 714.  The three-factor test 
was not meant to be used to determine the existence of 
"inferred" bias, the predecessor of objective bias. 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
analysis a circuit court should use to discern whether a 
prospective juror is or is not impartial."  Id. at 715 (emphasis 
added).  
¶92 Acknowledging that our prior case law set forth 
inconsistent standards of appellate review, the Faucher court 
plainly and succinctly determined that henceforth a deferential 
appellate 
standard 
should 
be 
applied 
when 
reviewing 
the 
objective bias of a prospective juror.  The court announced: 
Our jury bias case law demonstrates that in the past 
we have reviewed the circuit court's determination of 
whether a prospective juror was objectively biased 
under varying standards of review. . . . Although we 
have inconsistently reviewed the question in the past, 
we 
are 
convinced 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination on the question of objective bias should 
be reviewed under a deferential standard. 
Id. at 719. 
¶93 Courts and commentators have recognized that Faucher 
represents a sea change in the law.  The court of appeals has 
referred to the pre-Faucher era as "the previously turbid state 
of juror bias jurisprudence" and "the murky waters of juror bias 
jurisprudence in Wisconsin."  State v. Oswald, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 
110, 606 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Wolf, 2001 WI App 
136, ¶19, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 N.W.2d 240.4         
                                                 
4 See also State v. Smith, 2006 WI 74, ¶19 n.4, 291 Wis. 2d 
569, 716 N.W.2d 482 ("[A]s we emphasized in Faucher, 'the case 
law does not always use the former terms in a consistent manner, 
and there is not an absolute, direct correlation between the 
former terms and the terms we adopt today.'"); State v. Jimmie 
R.R., 2000 WI App 5, ¶15 n.4, 232 Wis. 2d 138, 606 N.W.2d 196 
("[In  Faucher, t]he supreme court cautioned that the new terms 
do not neatly correspond to the old ones."). 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶94 Shortly after Faucher was mandated, Professors Daniel 
D. Blinka and Thomas J. Hammer of Marquette University explained 
that Faucher "contains an enormously helpful discussion of past 
case law and the reasons why the supreme court concluded that a 
new approach was called for."  Wisconsin Lawyer, September 1999; 
see also Comment, Analyzing Juror Bias Exhibited During Voir 
Dire In Wisconsin: How to Lessen the Confusion, 84 Marq. L. Rev. 
517 (2000). 
¶95 Two years later, this court emphasized that prior to 
Faucher, courts "struggled with confusing concepts and awkward 
terminology."  State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶110, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (citing Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, as 
an example).  We explained that the import of Faucher and its 
companion cases was to provide "the proper analytical framework" 
to resolve jury bias cases: "To assist the bench and bar in 
analyzing juror bias, this court initiated a major effort two 
years ago to clarify the law. . . . It is our avowed hope that 
these new cases will provide a proper analytical framework for 
making and resolving challenges for cause."  Id., ¶110 (emphasis 
added). 
¶96 There has been widespread acknowledgement that the 
standards set forth in Faucher supplanted prior standards of 
jury bias jurisprudence.  Recognizing Faucher's significance, 
the court of appeals has called reliance on pre-Faucher juror 
bias jurisprudence "disturbing and misplaced."  It instructed 
attorneys to abandon their reliance on pre-Faucher jurisprudence 
for the applicable standards in juror bias cases: 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
[W]e observe that the appellant's brief in this case 
demonstrates the continuing practice of the appellate 
bar to cite to and rely extensively on [pre-Faucher 
decisions] with respect to the question of juror bias 
and the nature of our review.  Such reliance is 
disturbing 
and 
misplaced 
because 
Wisconsin 
law 
regarding juror bias is more accurately reflected in 
the subsequent decisions in [Faucher and its progeny].  
While it is true that [pre-Faucher cases] were not 
expressly overruled by any subsequent decision, what 
was said in those cases was clarified and reshaped in 
the Faucher and Oswald cases.  We look to the Faucher 
and Oswald decisions for the applicable standards and 
ask that the appellate bar do so as well.     
State v. Wilkinson, No. 2002AP1206, unpublished per curiam, ¶2 
(Wis. Ct. App., Jan. 29, 2003) (emphasis added).5  
¶97 Rather 
than 
heeding 
this 
warning, 
the 
majority 
resurrects old standards.  As a result of applying the wrong 
test, the majority misses an important component of appellate 
review.  Totally absent from its analysis is any reference to 
the deference reviewing courts owe to the circuit courts when 
making a determination that a juror was objectively biased.  
Instead, it professes a lack of insight garnered by the 
application of the obsolete three-part test and then employs the 
technique of setting up a straw man only to knock it down.  
Ultimately it determines that "failure to answer a question on 
voir dire is not sufficient to conclude Tanya G. was objectively 
biased against Funk."  Majority op., ¶62.  
                                                 
5 I 
recognize 
that 
an 
unpublished 
opinion 
has 
no 
precedential value and does not bind this court.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.23(3).  For the same reason I cite the article by Blinka 
and Hammer, I cite the discussion in Wilkinson——not for any 
precedential authority but rather to illustrate how the Faucher 
case has been perceived by the bench and bar.        
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶98 Of course it is not sufficient.  No one ever advances 
that it was sufficient.  Employing such an analytical technique 
underscores an infirmity in the majority's analysis because it 
fails to give any deference to the circuit court's decision. 
¶99 In Faucher, this court recognized the circuit court's 
special competence in determining whether objective bias exists 
and concluded that deference must be given to the circuit 
court's determination.  227 Wis. 2d at 720.  The reviewing court 
will reverse the circuit court's conclusion "only if as a matter 
of law a reasonable judge could not have reached such a 
conclusion."  Id. at 721; State v. Smith, 2006 WI 74, ¶22, 291 
Wis. 2d 569, 716 N.W.2d 482. 
¶100 The majority's analysis is further flawed when it 
appears 
to 
confuse 
the 
difference 
between 
objective 
and 
subjective bias.  In applying the Wyss test, the majority 
focuses on the fact that Tanya G. was never provided the 
opportunity to explain why she failed to respond to the question 
about testifying in a criminal case.  Majority op., ¶58.  
Without an explanation for her silence, the majority stated, it 
"gives us no insight into whether . . . [Tanya G.] was 
emotionally involved in Funk's case."  Id.   
¶101 This is where the majority missteps.  By focusing on 
whether Tanya G. was emotionally affected, it skews the focus of 
objective bias analysis.  The focus is not on whether the 
individual juror was emotionally affected by the facts of the 
case.  Rather the focus is, in considering all of the 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
circumstances, whether a reasonable person in the juror's 
position could be impartial.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718. 
¶102 In skewing the focus, the majority confuses objective 
and subjective bias.  It uses subjective indicia to answer an 
objective inquiry.  The majority asks whether Tanya G. really 
was biased, which is a subjective inquiry.  Instead, it should 
be asking whether a reasonable juror in Tanya G.'s position 
could be impartial. 
¶103 The majority's analysis leaves confusion in its wake.  
Prior to today's decision, Faucher was the leading case in juror 
bias jurisprudence.  By not adhering to Faucher and its test for 
determining objective bias, the majority opinion will leave the 
bench and bar wondering what is the test for determining 
objective bias and what deference is due to the circuit court's 
determination.  Should judges still rely on the standards set 
forth in Faucher or should they instead resurrect old tests 
prior to Faucher? 
II 
¶104 Applying the correct standard and giving the circuit 
court's determination proper deference, I conclude that the 
circuit court's determination that Tanya G. was objectively 
biased must stand. 
¶105 In ordering that Funk was entitled to a new trial 
based in part upon its findings that Tanya G. was objectively 
biased, the circuit court did not conclude that every sexual 
assault victim was prevented from being a juror in a sexual 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
assault case.6  To the contrary, the judge began his analysis of 
objective bias by specifically recognizing that being a victim 
of sexual abuse does not preclude a person from sitting on a 
jury.  He relied in part on the factual similarities between the 
alleged abuse in this case and the abuse that Tanya G. 
experienced in her past. 
¶106 The judge reviewed the testimony elicited from the 
three children at Funk's trial and compared it to the abuse that 
Tanya G. experienced as a child.7  He noted the similarities in 
                                                 
6 Funk's attorney was not seeking a per se rule that all 
sexual assault victims should be struck for cause.  When asked 
at oral argument if the court should always strike victims of 
sexual assault on the basis that they must be subjectively and 
objectively biased, Funk's attorney said "absolutely not."  She 
stated that the last child sexual assault case that she tried, 
she kept a victim on the jury because she thought they are not 
always biased.   
7 In his oral decision, the circuit court judge stated: 
I believe the correct approach . . . is to review the 
underlying testimony of three of the children because 
that is critical, I believe, and then when we put that 
abuse of the three children . . . with the abuse that 
was 
inflicted 
upon 
[Tanya 
G.], 
I 
come 
to 
the 
conclusion that the objective juror could not be 
unbiased, and let me just . . . state how I've come to 
that conclusion. 
As I indicated previously, we have [Tanya G.] who has 
been sexually assaulted when she was a young girl, 
kindergarten through second grade. 
We also have [Tanya G.] whose two sibling sisters, 
younger than she, were sexually assaulted during the 
same time period. 
We also have [Tanya G.] who was in Monroe County in 
2005 sexually assaulted. 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
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age; Tanya G. was ten years old when she was sexually abused and 
C.M.F. was ten years old at the time of the alleged abuse.  
Further, he noted that both the abuse that occurred in Tanya 
G.'s past and the alleged abuse in this case involved sisters; 
Tanya G.'s younger sisters were also victims of the sexual abuse 
perpetrated by the school bus driver and Funk's two daughters, 
who lived with C.M.F., were witnesses to the alleged abuse 
inflicted upon her. 
¶107 In addition to the similarities between Tanya G.'s 
experience with sexual assault and the alleged abuse in this 
case, the court had other indicia of Tanya G.'s objective bias——
Tanya G.'s nonresponsiveness to multiple questions asked during 
voir dire which should have alerted her that an affirmative 
response was necessary. 
¶108 The judge made an opening statement during voir dire 
to the potential jurors indicating that they would be asked 
whether any of them or someone they knew had been a victim of 
                                                                                                                                                             
. . .[W]hen you look at those particular incidences, 
and then, when I review the trial record before the 
Court, and I need, not in great detail, but in some 
detail, just to turn everyone's attention to the 
trial . . . .   
[C.M.F.] was called to testify. . . .  She was ten 
years of age at the time the incident happened. 
Ages are important because when we look at the 
previous abuse, it appears that [Tanya G.] was young 
when these occurred, as well as a factor that I think 
is important when we look at a reasonable prudent 
person [in Tanya G.'s] position.  
 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
sexual assault.  He told them that they must be honest and would 
need to answer the question.  
¶109 Subsequent questions asked by both parties elicited 
responses by multiple potential jurors.  The State asked: "Have 
you, or any of your family members, or close friends ever been 
accused of a crime by law enforcement?"  Juror E. responded that 
he had a friend who had been accused of a crime similar to the 
one before the court.  
¶110 The State further informed the jury that the case 
involves allegations of sexual assault of a child.  It asked the 
jurors whether, based on those allegations, anyone would have a 
difficult time being fair and impartial.  In response to that 
question, two jurors asked to go into chambers and both were 
eventually dismissed.  The replacement jurors were asked the 
same questions, and both requested to go into chambers.  One of 
the replacement jurors was excused.  The next replacement juror, 
upon being asked the questions, openly disclosed that his uncle 
went to prison for sexual assault, and he too was excused. 
¶111 Defense counsel asked jurors whether anyone had been a 
victim of a crime other than a sexual assault.  Three potential 
jurors responded that they had.  Defense counsel also inquired 
whether anyone had testified in court.  Three potential jurors 
responded that they had.  Then, defense counsel asked if any 
member of the jury had ever had contact in any form with the 
Juneau County District Attorney's Office.  Again, several jurors 
responded that they had. 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
¶112 
Despite 
all 
of 
the 
activity 
ensuing 
from 
the 
affirmative responses of other jurors, Tanya G. never chose to 
individually respond to any of the questions asked on voir dire. 
Rather, she remained nonresponsive. 
¶113 The majority asserts that because it does not know why 
Tanya G. was nonresponsive, it cannot assess whether she was 
emotionally involved in the facts of this case.  Majority op., 
¶58.  To the contrary, the record reveals that Tanya G. 
explained her silence during other jurors' responsiveness.  In 
fact, Tanya G. offered inconsistent explanations for her 
silence.  
¶114 At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Tanya G. 
testified that she did not talk about the assaults by the bus 
driver because, "I didn't want to be fined $5,000 [under the 
settlement agreement], so I wasn't going to say anything."  She 
acknowledged, however, that "I understand that I should have 
said something."  Regarding the assault by Julian C., Tanya G. 
stated: "[I]t's my past. I don't go day to day saying that this 
guy raped me, he did this.  It's not the way I live my life.  I 
put it in the back of my head, and I don't reveal it ever 
again."  However, minutes later she indicated that, despite 
being assaulted repeatedly for three years, her experiences with 
sexual assault never crossed her mind during voir dire or the 
two-day trial. 
¶115 These inconsistent explanations at the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing given by Tanya G. also support the circuit 
court's finding that it was more probable than not that Tanya G. 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
was objectively biased.  It is the function of a circuit court——
not an appellate court——to determine the weight to be given to 
inconsistent statements of a witness.  When deciding whether a 
juror is biased, a circuit court judge essentially must make a 
credibility determination.  
¶116 In this case, Tanya G. initially stated that she 
knowingly chose not to disclose the assaults.  Later she 
contradicted herself and stated that her experiences with sexual 
assault never crossed her mind at voir dire or at trial.  A 
reasonable judge would take her inconsistent statements into 
consideration when determining that Tanya G. was objectively 
biased.  Yet, instead of deferring to the circuit court's 
function of weighing conflicting statements, the majority's 
analysis ignores them. 
¶117 The circuit court articulated the difficulty and 
frustration in coming to this decision.  It noted that a new 
trial would be a waste of time and would take a toll on the 
emotional psyches of the children testifying.  It stated: "It 
makes me angry, but I believe there's nothing I can do as a 
presiding magistrate to this particular case.  I must follow the 
law . . . .  Is it more probable than not there was juror 
bias[?]" 
¶118 Unlike the majority, the circuit court followed the 
law and had a firm grasp of controlling precedent.  The circuit 
court correctly stated:  
When the Court addresses objective bias, the question 
is when we look at [Tanya G.], would a reasonable 
person in her position, could they be impartial, 
objectively? 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
The Court must, as indicated in [Faucher], when 
assessing objective bias, consider the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the questions asked and the 
answers given on voir dire, and underlying facts of 
the case before the Court. 
¶119 In reaching its decision, the circuit court considered 
the inconsistent statements, Tanya G.'s nonresponsiveness in the 
midst of other jurors responding to questions implicating sexual 
assaults, and the similarities between the facts of her assaults 
and the facts of this case.  Ultimately, the circuit court 
concluded that a reasonable person in Tanya G.'s position could 
not 
be 
impartial. 
I 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion is one that a reasonable judge could reach. 
¶120 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶121 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent and Justice DAVID T. PROSSER joins 
Part II of this dissent.   
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶122 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
presents a classic example of objective bias.  Consequently, I 
join Section II of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2765-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
1