Title: People v. Jones

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Jones, 2016 IL 119391 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
DERRICK JONES, Appellant. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
119391 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
October 20, 2016 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, the Hon. 
Daniel Rozak, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
 
Judgment 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, 
Deputy Defender, and Josette M. Skelnik, Assistant Appellate 
Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for 
appellant. 
 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James Glasgow, 
State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and 
Michael M. Glick and John R. Schleppenbach, Assistant Attorneys 
General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People. 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to 
the accuracy and 
integrity of this 
document 
Date: 2017.01.26 
11:10:44 -06'00'
 
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Justices 
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Justices Thomas, Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and 
opinion. 
Justice Burke dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Garman 
and Justice Kilbride. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant Derrick Jones was convicted of aggravated robbery in the circuit court of Will 
County and sentenced to an extended-term sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment based on a 
prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency referenced in his presentence investigative report. 
Defendant appealed his sentence, contending that the use of his prior juvenile adjudication to 
enhance his sentence violated the rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and 
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). The appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (3d) 
130053. We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme 
Court Rules 315 and 612 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013); R. 612 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)). For 
the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 
5/18-5 (West 2010) (repealed by Pub. Act 97-1108 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013))), as a result of an 
incident that occurred on January 6, 2012. Before defendant’s jury trial began, the court asked 
the parties whether the sentencing range for the aggravated battery charge would be 4 to 30 
years. The State agreed, as did defendant’s counsel. Defendant’s counsel stated that the State 
had tendered to her a “certified court docket from the ’04 JD case” indicating that defendant, as 
a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent on multiple counts of residential burglary and that 
adjudication would make defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence in the present case, 
with a range of 4 to 30 years.1 However, defendant’s counsel also indicated that she spoke 
with defendant and defendant denied having an adjudication for residential burglary. The court 
admonished defendant that he faced a sentencing range of 4 to 30 years, and the case proceeded 
to trial.  
¶ 4 
 
At trial, the evidence presented was limited to the aggravated robbery charge. No evidence 
regarding defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication was introduced. The jury found defendant 
guilty of aggravated robbery, and the case proceeded to sentencing.  
¶ 5 
 
A presentencing investigative report (PSI) indicated that defendant, as a juvenile, had been 
adjudicated delinquent in 2005 of multiple offenses in case No. 04 JD 00276, including three 
counts of residential burglary. The PSI provided:  
“On April 28, 2005, with the then minor, Derrick Jones, having been adjudicated 
delinquent in the original Petition alleging Assault, and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
                                                 
 
1The docket sheet for the 2004 juvenile proceeding was not made a part of the record. 
 
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Supplemental Petitions alleging: Burglary, Criminal Trespass to Land, Knowingly 
Damage to Property and Residential Burglary, three (3) Counts. Derrick Jones was 
sentenced to 5 years and 8 months Probation, until his 21st Birthday in the 
aforementioned offenses, with the first nine (9) months of Probation to be under the 
directive of Intensive Probation Supervision ***.”  
After considering various factors in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced defendant 
to an extended-term sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s motion to reconsider his 
sentence was subsequently denied.  
¶ 6 
 
On direct review, defendant did not challenge his conviction for aggravated robbery but 
did challenge his extended-term sentence. Defendant first argued that his extended-term 
sentence violated his sixth amendment right to a jury trial pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Apprendi, because the fact of his juvenile adjudication was neither proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt nor alleged in the indictment. The appellate court rejected his 
contention, finding that a prior adjudication of delinquency was sufficiently analogous to a 
prior criminal conviction to fall under the prior-conviction exception in Apprendi. 2015 IL 
App (3d) 130053, ¶ 38. The court reasoned that because due process does not require the right 
to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings, the absence of a right to a jury trial does not undermine 
the reliability of a juvenile proceeding. Id. ¶ 37. It further stated that a juvenile adjudication 
“reached only where all constitutionally required procedural safeguards are in place, is a no 
less reliable basis for the enhancement of a sentence than is a standard adult criminal 
conviction.” Id. ¶ 36. Defendant also argued in the alternative that the circuit court improperly 
relied upon the PSI in determining the fact of his prior juvenile adjudication in contravention of 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shepard, contending that a PSI is “particularly unreliable” in 
determining the fact of a prior adjudication of delinquency, as opposed to a prior criminal 
conviction. The appellate court also rejected this contention, finding that information in a PSI 
may be used as the basis for sentence enhancement without running afoul of Shepard and that 
the PSI unequivocally indicated defendant had been adjudicated delinquent pursuant to a 
petition alleging three counts of residential burglary, a Class 1 felony. Id. ¶ 47. The appellate 
court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Will County. Id. ¶ 50.  
¶ 7 
 
We granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013); R. 
612 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)) and affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 8 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 9 
 
On appeal, defendant contends that a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication is not the 
equivalent of a prior conviction for purposes of extended-term sentencing under Apprendi and 
that such a fact must be alleged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Alternatively, defendant contends that even if a prior adjudication of delinquency can qualify 
as a prior conviction for purposes of extended-term sentencing, the information contained in 
his PSI failed to conclusively establish that he had been adjudicated delinquent of residential 
burglary. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve these issues for review but argues 
that an Apprendi violation may be reviewed as plain error where, as here, the violation was 
prejudicial to him. 
¶ 10 
 
It is well settled that the plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider 
unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely 
 
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balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant or (2) a 
clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial and the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the 
evidence. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 70; People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 
178-79 (2005). Our decision in Herron established two categories of plain error: prejudicial 
errors, which may have affected the outcome in a closely balanced case, and presumptively 
prejudicial errors, which must be remedied although they may not have affected the outcome. 
People v. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d 400, 415 (2006). In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains 
with the defendant. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. We have held that potential Apprendi violations 
fall under the first category of prejudicial errors and have required defendants to prove that 
they were prejudiced by the error. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d at 415. In addressing a plain error argument, 
we first consider whether error occurred. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 70. Review 
of this issue presents a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Hopkins, 201 Ill. 
2d 26, 36 (2002). 
 
¶ 11 
 
 
 
 
A. Apprendi’s Prior-Conviction Exception 
¶ 12 
 
We first consider defendant’s argument based on Apprendi. As noted above, the offense of 
aggravated robbery is a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 5/18-5(b) (West 2010) (repealed by Pub. Act 
97-1108 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013)). The standard sentencing range for a Class 1 felony is 4 to 15 years. 
730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2010). The extended-term sentencing range for a Class 1 felony 
is 15 to 30 years. Id. Section 5-5-3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) 
sets forth various factors that the court may consider as a reason to impose an extended-term 
sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b) (West 2010). Relevant here is the factor in subsection (b)(7) 
of section 5-5-3.2, which governs “[w]hen a defendant who was at least 17 years of age at the 
time of the commission of the offense is convicted of a felony and has been previously 
adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for an act that if 
committed by an adult would be a Class X or Class 1 felony when the conviction has occurred 
within 10 years after the previous adjudication, excluding time spent in custody.” 730 ILCS 
5/5-5-3.2(b)(7) (West 2010). The offense of residential burglary is a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 
5/19-3(b) (West 2010). Based on the information in the PSI that defendant had been 
adjudicated delinquent of the offense of residential burglary, section 5-5-3.2(b)(7) of the Code 
of Corrections authorized the circuit court to impose an extended-term sentence. Therefore, we 
consider whether the manner in which the court imposed the sentence violated the rule set forth 
in Apprendi.  
¶ 13 
 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The 
Court found unconstitutional a New Jersey hate-crime statute that permitted an increase in the 
defendant’s maximum prison sentence based on the trial judge’s finding by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant had acted with purpose to intimidate the victim based on 
particular characteristics of the victim. Id. at 491. The court emphasized, “there is a vast 
difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a 
proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the 
prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the 
required fact under a lesser standard of proof.” Id. at 496.  
 
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¶ 14 
 
In February 2001, our legislature amended section 111-3(c-5) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (Pub. Act 91-953 (eff. Feb. 23, 2001) (adding 725 ILCS 
5/111-3(c-5))) in response to the decision in Apprendi. This amendment brought the Criminal 
Code into conformity with Apprendi, expressly incorporating the prior-conviction exception as 
well as the due process protections afforded to defendants when an extended-term sentence is 
sought. Section 111-3(c-5) of the Criminal Code provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, in all cases in which the imposition of the death penalty is not a 
possibility, if an alleged fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) is not an element of an 
offense but is sought to be used to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond the 
statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the offense, the alleged fact must be 
included in the charging instrument or otherwise provided to the defendant through a written 
notification before trial, submitted to a trier of fact as an aggravating factor, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.” 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2010).  
¶ 15 
 
The question here is whether defendant’s juvenile adjudication, which qualified defendant 
for an extended-term sentence, falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and, in turn, 
the exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Criminal Code. This question is an issue of first 
impression before this court. 
¶ 16 
 
To fully understand Apprendi’s holding, we must examine some of the cases that preceded 
it, namely Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). In Almendarez-Torres, the Court first recognized the 
prior-conviction exception. There, the defendant was charged pursuant to a federal statute with 
the offense of illegal reentry to the United States by a deported alien. The offense authorized a 
prison term of up to two years. A subsection of the statute authorized a prison term of up to 20 
years if the defendant had been deported subsequent to a conviction for the commission of an 
aggravated felony. The question before the Court was whether the subsection of the statute 
defined a separate offense or simply authorized an enhanced penalty. Almendarez-Torres, 523 
U.S. at 226. If the prior aggravated felony conviction was a separate offense, the State was 
required to charge the conviction in the indictment (and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt to 
a jury). Id. If the prior conviction merely authorized an enhanced sentence, then the prior 
conviction was not an element of the offense and need not be charged. Id. The Court concluded 
that the subsection was a penalty provision that authorized a court to increase the sentence for 
a recidivist but did not define a separate offense. Id. It reasoned that the relevant statutory 
subject matter at issue was recidivism, which was “as typical a sentencing factor as one might 
imagine.” Id. at 230. 
¶ 17 
 
In Jones, the Court considered whether a federal carjacking statute defined three distinct 
offenses or a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent 
on sentencing factors “exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.” Jones, 526 
U.S at 229. The statute’s first subsection authorized a maximum sentence of 15 years. The 
second and third subsections authorized maximum sentences of 25 years and life 
imprisonment, respectively, if the carjacking resulted in serious bodily injury or death. The 
Court noted that the second and third subsections provided for “steeply” higher penalties and 
also conditioned these penalties on further facts. It stated that “[i]t is at best questionable 
whether the specification of facts sufficient to increase a penalty range by two-thirds, let alone 
from 15 years to life, was meant to carry none of the process safeguards that elements of an 
offense bring with them for a defendant’s benefit.” Id. at 233. It concluded that the statute 
 
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defined three separate offenses with distinct elements, each of which must be charged by 
indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict. Id. at 
252. In distinguishing its holding from Almendarez-Torres, the Court reiterated that it viewed 
recidivism differently from other factors that enlarge the possible penalty for an offense. The 
Court stated, “One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see: 
unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, and 
certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior conviction must itself have been 
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial 
guarantees.” Id. at 249.  
¶ 18 
 
Since Apprendi was decided, state and federal courts have not been uniform in concluding 
whether a juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi for 
sentencing purposes. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to address the 
issue in United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). In a split decision, the court 
determined that the prior-conviction exception must be limited to prior convictions that were 
themselves obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1194. It concluded that juvenile adjudications that do not 
include the right to a jury trial and the reasonable doubt burden of proof do not fall within the 
prior-conviction exception. Id. The court relied on the language in Apprendi that referred to 
accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction that was entered in a proceeding in 
which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. It also relied on the language in Jones that prior convictions are distinct 
because they were established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, 
and jury trial guarantees. Id. at 1193. The court characterized these constitutional procedural 
safeguards as the “fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections.” Id.  
¶ 19 
 
The dissent in Tighe found that the court had reached an “unsupportable conclusion” by 
taking the language in Jones and making a “quantum leap.” Id. at 1200 (Brunetti, J., 
dissenting). The dissent believed that the language in Jones only stood for the basic proposition 
that Congress had the constitutional power to treat prior convictions as sentencing factors 
subject to a lesser standard of proof because the defendant presumably received all the process 
that was due when he was convicted of the prior crime. Id. It explained that, for adults, such 
process would include the right to a jury trial. For juveniles, however, such process would not 
include that right. Therefore, the dissent concluded that when a juvenile adjudication is the 
result of a proceeding in which a juvenile has received all the process constitutionally due at 
the juvenile stage, there is no constitutional problem in using that adjudication to support a 
later sentencing enhancement. Id.  
¶ 20 
 
Since Tighe, numerous courts have had the opportunity to address this issue. As a result, 
there has been more agreement with the Tighe dissent. Agreeing with the Tighe dissent and 
adopting what would become the majority view, in United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 
(8th Cir. 2002), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that juvenile adjudications 
could be characterized as “prior convictions” for Apprendi purposes. Id. at 1033. The court 
explained that Apprendi did not preclude such a conclusion, specifically noting “[w]e think 
that while the [Apprendi] Court established what constitutes sufficient procedural safeguards 
(a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made 
findings under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position on possibilities that 
lie in between these two poles.” Id. at 1032. Like the Tighe dissent, the court also determined 
 
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that the language in Jones that referred to the “ ‘fundamental triumvirate of procedural 
protections’ ” was not intended to define the term “ ‘prior conviction’ ” for constitutional 
purposes as a conviction that “ ‘ha[s] been established through procedures satisfying fair 
notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.’ ” Id. (quoting Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193-94). 
The court reasoned that the issue “should not turn on the narrow parsing of words, but on an 
examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due 
process of law is not offended by such an exemption.” Id. at 1033. Noting that the procedural 
protections afforded to juveniles include the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and proof of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it concluded that these safeguards were “more than sufficient 
to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires.” Id. Specifically addressing the lack of a right 
to a jury for juveniles, the court believed that the lack of such right did not undermine the 
reliability of adjudications in any significant way because the use of a jury in the juvenile 
context is not constitutionally required and, moreover, would not strengthen the fact-finding 
function. Id.  
¶ 21 
 
Joining the Eighth Circuit and embracing the majority view that a juvenile adjudication 
falls within the Apprendi prior-conviction exception are the Courts of Appeal for the First, 
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 
696 (3d Cir. 2003) (because due process does not require providing juveniles with the right to a 
jury trial, it follows that when a juvenile is adjudicated guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
bench trial that affords all the due process protections that are required, the adjudication can 
properly be characterized as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes); United States v. Burge, 
407 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th Cir. 2005) (a prior nonjury juvenile adjudication that was afforded 
all constitutionally required procedural safeguards can be characterized as a prior conviction 
for Apprendi purposes); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) (the use of 
“procedurally sound” juvenile adjudications to enhance a sentence does not violate due 
process because juvenile adjudication proceedings provide sufficient procedural safeguards to 
satisfy the reliability requirement “that is at the heart of Apprendi”); United States v. Matthews, 
498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding no distinction between juvenile adjudications and adult 
convictions for purposes of Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception since both reflect “the sort 
of proven prior conduct that courts historically have used in sentencing”); United States v. 
Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2010) (because the defendant received all the process that 
was due at his nonjury juvenile delinquency proceeding, the use of his juvenile adjudication to 
enhance his sentence did not violate Apprendi); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (a prior juvenile adjudication, where the defendant received all the protections to 
which he was constitutionally entitled, is a prior conviction under Apprendi).  
¶ 22 
 
State supreme courts that have also joined the majority view are Kansas, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Washington, and California. See State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 739-40 (Kan. 2002); 
Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 321-23 (Ind. 2005); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 616-19 
(Minn. 2006); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 653 (Wash. 2006) (en banc); People v. Nguyen, 
209 P.3d 946, 957-58 (Cal. 2009).  
¶ 23 
 
Taking a middle ground position is the Supreme Court of Oregon. In State v. Harris, 118 
P.3d 236, 245-46 (Or. 2005) (en banc), the court held that the use of prior juvenile 
adjudications as sentencing factors does not violate the jury trial right guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment. Id. However, the court qualified its holding by stating that the sixth amendment 
 
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also requires that when such an adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a 
criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a 
defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver. Id. at 246.  
¶ 24 
 
Agreeing with Tighe and joining the minority viewpoint is the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana. In State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276 (La. 2004), the court held that because juveniles 
do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings, juvenile adjudications 
cannot be used to enhance adult felony convictions. Id. at 1288. The court reasoned that 
although juvenile adjudications are sufficiently reliable without a jury trial to support 
dispositions within the juvenile system, those adjudications are not sufficiently reliable under 
Apprendi to support enhanced sentencing for adults. Id. The dissenting justice disagreed, 
concluding that “a fair reading of Apprendi” did not preclude the use of a juvenile adjudication 
to enhance an adult criminal sentence. Id. at 1290-91 (Traylor, J., dissenting). The dissent 
reasoned that when a juvenile adjudication comports with the requirements of fundamental 
fairness as set forth by the Supreme Court, it is constitutionally permissible to use that 
adjudication to enhance an adult criminal sentence. Id. at 1291.  
¶ 25 
 
Turning to this court’s case law, although this issue is one of first impression, we did 
acknowledge and briefly discuss the issue in People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157 (2006). In 
Taylor, we considered whether a minor who had been adjudicated delinquent was considered a 
“person convicted of a felony” for purposes of the offense of escape as set forth in section 
31-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 1998)). Ultimately, we 
concluded that for purposes of the escape statute, a juvenile adjudication could not be 
considered tantamount to a felony conviction. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 170. Relevant here is our 
statement that the issue addressed in Taylor was “to be distinguished from the somewhat 
analogous issue of whether a juvenile adjudication is considered a ‘prior conviction’ for 
sentencing enhancement purposes under Apprendi.” Id. at 173. We noted the split among the 
federal circuits in addressing this issue and stated “[w]e take no position here with respect to 
the division among the federal circuits.” Id. at 175. Although Taylor included a brief 
discussion of the issue we address in this appeal, it is clear that our holding in Taylor is distinct 
from the question now presented, and our conclusion in Taylor has no bearing on our analysis 
here.  
¶ 26 
 
Thus, we turn to the Supreme Court’s decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 
(1971) (plurality opinion). In McKeiver, the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional 
right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. Id. at 545. The Court reasoned that 
“[t]he imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if 
at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile 
court’s assumed ability to function in a unique manner.” Id. at 547.  
¶ 27 
 
In Illinois, article V of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 
405/5-101 et seq. (West 2010)) governs juvenile delinquency proceedings. It aims to balance a 
community’s interest in holding juveniles accountable for their unlawful conduct with 
attempting to rehabilitate those juveniles. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 520 (2006). The 
“important purposes” of article V are to protect citizens from juvenile crime, hold each 
juvenile offender directly accountable for his or her acts, provide an individualized assessment 
of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile in order to rehabilitate and to prevent 
further delinquent behavior, and provide due process as required by the Constitutions of the 
 
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United States and the State of Illinois. 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1) (West 2010). Further, article V 
provides that “minors shall have all the procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings, 
unless specifically precluded by laws that enhance the protection of such minors,” except that 
“[m]inors shall not have the right to a jury trial unless specifically provided by this Article.” 
705 ILCS 405/5-101(3) (West 2010). Article V only provides the right to a jury trial when a 
minor is tried (1) as a habitual juvenile offender (705 ILCS 405/5-815(d) (West 2010)), (2) as a 
violent juvenile offender (705 ILCS 405/5-820(d) (West 2010)), or (3) under the extended 
juvenile jurisdiction provision (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2010)). Because defendant’s 
delinquency proceedings did not involve any of the above provisions, he did not have the right 
to a jury trial in those proceedings. 
¶ 28 
 
Here, we find the majority position persuasive and conclude that a prior juvenile 
adjudication of delinquency falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and the 
exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court made clear in 
McKeiver that due process does not require the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings, 
reasoning that a jury trial “would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function.” 
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-47. In Almendarez-Torres, the Court repeatedly emphasized the 
tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, and in Jones, the Court explained that 
a prior conviction was different from other factors that increase the sentence for an offense 
because of the procedural safeguards inherent in the proceedings that resulted in that 
conviction. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230; Jones, 526 U.S. at 249. The Court solidified 
those holdings in Apprendi, further noting the “vast” difference between accepting the validity 
of a prior conviction and allowing a judge to find a required fact under a lesser standard of 
proof. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.  
¶ 29 
 
A juvenile adjudication of delinquency is similar to a prior conviction in the sense that both 
are the result of a person’s prior unlawful behavior or recidivism. The proceedings that result 
in a juvenile adjudication contain the same constitutional procedural safeguards as those 
proceedings that result in a prior conviction, except the jury trial right (unless specified by 
article V of the Juvenile Court Act). However, because there is no constitutional right to a jury 
trial in juvenile proceedings, a juvenile adjudication and a prior conviction both result from 
proceedings in which the minor or the defendant received constitutionally sufficient 
procedural safeguards. A juvenile adjudication, therefore, is no less valid or reliable a form of 
recidivism than is a prior conviction. For purposes of extended-term sentencing, they are on 
equal footing. Though defendant did not have the right to a jury trial in his delinquency 
proceedings, he did have all the other procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings, such 
as the right to notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See 705 ILCS 405/5-101(3), 5-525, 5-530, 5-605, 5-610 (West 2010). The 
presence of such process in juvenile proceedings forecloses any conclusion that a juvenile 
adjudication is not the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi. We note the following 
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit. In Wright, the court stated, “there is no reason to hold that an 
adjudication that is constitutionally sufficient to commit a juvenile to confinement, in some 
instances until age twenty-one, is somehow off limits for sentencing consideration if the same 
juvenile later [commits an offense as an adult].” Wright, 594 F.3d at 264. While the Juvenile 
Court Act promotes accountability as well as rehabilitation, section 5-5-3.2(b)(7) of the Code 
of Corrections anticipates that those juveniles who are not rehabilitated and commit crimes as 
adults may be punished in accordance with their entire criminal history. Considering a 
 
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defendant’s entire recidivist past is in no way incongruent with the aims of the Juvenile Court 
Act.  
¶ 30 
 
Moreover, we do not believe that the Supreme Court’s language in Apprendi and Jones that 
referred to the jury trial right was intended to include only those prior convictions that included 
that right. The Apprendi Court noted the jury trial right as one of the procedural safeguards that 
assured the validity of a prior conviction, but it did not specifically condition the 
prior-conviction exception upon that right. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496. Nor did it specifically 
identify a jury trial as a required procedural safeguard. We agree with the Eighth Circuit’s view 
that “while the [Apprendi] Court established what constitutes sufficient procedural safeguards 
(a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made 
findings under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position on possibilities that 
lie in between these two poles.” Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032.  
¶ 31 
 
We are not persuaded by defendant’s contentions to the contrary. Defendant argues that 
because section 5-5-3.2(b)(7) of the Code of Corrections and section 111-3(c-5) of the 
Criminal Code do not expressly define a prior delinquency adjudication as a prior conviction, 
defendant’s prior adjudication does not fall within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception. He 
maintains that although section 5-5-3.2(b)(7) of the Code of Corrections allows a court to use 
an adult offender’s prior delinquency adjudication for a Class X or Class 1 felony as a basis for 
imposing an extended-term sentence, the statute is silent as to the manner in which the prior 
adjudication must be pled or proven. Defendant relies on case law for support as well as the 
Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2010)), 
wherein the legislature expressly equated a juvenile adjudication with a conviction. 730 ILCS 
150/2 (West 2010).  
¶ 32 
 
We find defendant’s reliance on case law and the Registration Act misplaced. He relies on 
People v. Villa, 2011 IL 110777, where we rejected the State’s argument that juvenile 
adjudications should be put on equal footing with criminal convictions for impeachment 
purposes, and In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53 (1983), where we determined that a conviction was not 
the same as a juvenile adjudication for purposes of a statute authorizing State’s Attorney fees 
to defend an appeal. Villa, 2011 IL 110777, ¶ 40; In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d at 57-58.2 However, 
both Villa and In re W.W. involved the interpretation of statutes, which has no bearing on the 
issue presented here. We reiterate that in Taylor we made clear that our interpretation of the 
phrase “person convicted of a felony” for purposes of the offense of escape was to be 
distinguished from the issue of whether a juvenile adjudication is considered a prior conviction 
for sentencing enhancement purposes under Apprendi. Likewise, regarding defendant’s 
reliance on the Registration Act, the fact that the legislature expressly equated a juvenile 
adjudication with a conviction in that statute also has no bearing on the issue presented here. 
Further, the purpose of the amendment to section 111-3(c-5) of the Criminal Code was to 
codify Apprendi’s holding to bring the Criminal Code into conformity with Apprendi. Thus, 
we reject defendant’s contention that because section 5-5-3.2(b)(7) of the Code of Corrections 
and section 111-3(c-5) of the Criminal Code do not expressly define a juvenile adjudication as 
                                                 
 
2Defendant also relies on People v. Rankin, 297 Ill. App. 3d 818 (1998); however, he concedes that 
due to an amendment to the sentencing statute, it does not address the issue presented here. Therefore, 
we need not address it. 
 
- 11 - 
 
a prior conviction, his prior adjudication does not fall within Apprendi’s prior-conviction 
exception. 
¶ 33 
 
We conclude that defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication, which qualified defendant for an 
extended-term sentence, is the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi and falls within 
Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception as well as the exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the 
Criminal Code. The State was not required to allege the fact of his juvenile adjudication in the 
indictment or prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. Since we find that no error 
occurred here, defendant cannot establish plain error. 
 
¶ 34 
 
 
 
 
B. Defendant’s PSI 
¶ 35 
 
We next consider whether the information contained in defendant’s PSI established that he 
had been adjudicated delinquent of residential burglary. Defendant contends that the 
information contained in the PSI was “too ambiguous, and too tenuous, to conclusively 
establish” that he had been adjudicated delinquent of residential burglary. He argues that his 
PSI suffered from the same infirmities as the documents found unreliable in Shepard. 
¶ 36 
 
The issue in Shepard concerned what sources a court may constitutionally rely upon in its 
role as fact finder at sentencing. In Shepard, the United States Supreme Court held that a court 
sentencing a defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) (18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e) (2006)), which is thus required to determine whether a burglary is a “generic 
burglary” under the statute, is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding 
by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. A sentencing judge 
may not look to police reports or complaint applications to make the determination. Id. 
¶ 37 
 
This court has previously held that a PSI is generally a reliable source for the purpose of 
inquiring into a defendant’s criminal history. People v. Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 491 (1992). 
A PSI is compiled pursuant to statutory guidelines set forth in the Code of Corrections, which 
require the inclusion of certain information, including the defendant’s “history of 
delinquency.” 730 ILCS 5/5-3-2(a)(1) (West 2010). Additionally, the Juvenile Court Act 
permits juvenile court records to be accessed under certain circumstances, including when a 
minor becomes 18 years or older and is the subject of criminal proceedings. 705 ILCS 
405/1-8(A)(4)(d) (West 2014). 
¶ 38 
 
We initially note that the accuracy of the PSI with regard to defendant’s prior adjudication 
for residential burglary was not disputed at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel only 
sought to amend the PSI to include defendant’s claim that he was a father, which the PSI did 
not reflect. An extensive discussion thus ensued as to whether defendant could have been the 
father of a recently born child based on the dates of his incarceration. However, there was no 
question or discussion as to defendant’s criminal history as set forth in the PSI, despite several 
references that defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence based on his prior 
juvenile adjudication for residential burglary. Although defendant points out that prior to trial 
he denied having a prior adjudication for residential burglary, he clearly abandoned that claim 
at sentencing. Had defendant continued to believe he did not have a prior adjudication for 
residential burglary, he certainly knew how to inform defense counsel and the court as to the 
alleged inaccuracy of the PSI, as he did with his claim that he was a father.  
 
- 12 - 
 
¶ 39 
 
Here, we find that defendant’s PSI established he had been adjudicated delinquent of 
residential burglary. As set forth above, the PSI provided that in 2005, defendant had been 
adjudicated delinquent of the offenses alleged in the numerous petitions, including a 
supplemental petition alleging three counts of residential burglary, and had been sentenced to 
probation until his twenty-first birthday for the aforementioned offenses. In addition to the 
above language, the PSI enumerated each of the offenses alleged in the petitions and listed a 
disposition next to each one. The disposition for each of the offenses, which included the three 
counts of residential burglary, was “Juvenile Probation.” As the appellate court aptly found, 
defendant’s PSI was “unequivocal” with respect to his prior juvenile adjudication. We disagree 
with defendant that the information contained in the PSI was ambiguous or tenuous. 
¶ 40 
 
Further, the use of defendant’s PSI does not run afoul of Shepard. The Court in Shepard 
was concerned with what types of documents a court can rely upon at sentencing to determine 
the facts about a conviction, rather than determining if the defendant had a prior conviction. 
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25-26. Here, the circuit court only recognized that defendant had a prior 
adjudication for residential burglary; it did not engage in any judicial fact finding about that 
adjudication. Additionally, a PSI is of a markedly different character than a police report or 
complaint application, with which the Court in Shepard was concerned. As noted above, a PSI, 
with its statutorily mandated requirements, is generally viewed as a reliable source of a 
defendant’s criminal history. We conclude that defendant’s PSI conclusively established he 
had been adjudicated delinquent of residential burglary and find no error in the court’s reliance 
on the PSI. Accordingly, since there is no error, there can be no plain error and no basis to 
excuse defendant’s procedural default. See, e.g., People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 356 (2003); 
People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 624 (2000). 
 
¶ 41 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 42 
 
We conclude that defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior 
conviction under Apprendi and falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception, as well as 
the exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Criminal Code, and that defendant’s PSI 
conclusively established the fact of his prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary. For 
the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 43 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
 
¶ 44 
 
JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting: 
¶ 45 
 
Defendant’s principal argument in this appeal is that his extended-term sentence was 
imposed in violation of section 111-3(c-5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 
ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2010)) because the sentence was based, in part, on a prior juvenile 
delinquency adjudication which was neither pled in the indictment nor proved to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. I agree. For this reason I cannot join the majority opinion and, 
therefore, must respectfully dissent. 
 
¶ 46 
 
 
 
 
I 
¶ 47 
 
There is no dispute that, under Illinois law, a trial court may use an adult offender’s prior 
juvenile delinquency adjudication as a factor to consider when deciding whether to impose an 
 
- 13 - 
 
extended-term sentence, so long as the adjudication involved an act that, if committed by an 
adult, would be a Class X or Class 1 felony and the conviction occurred within 10 years after 
the adjudication. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(7) (West 2010). What is at issue in this appeal is the 
manner in which the prior adjudication must be pled or proven before it may be used by the 
trial court in this way. 
¶ 48 
 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a “prior 
conviction,” to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 476, 490. 
After Apprendi was decided, the General Assembly enacted section 111-3(c-5) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2010)) to bring our state law into 
conformity with Apprendi’s constitutional requirements. 
¶ 49 
 
Section 111-3(c-5) provides, in pertinent part: 
“[I]f an alleged fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) is not an element of an 
offense but is sought to be used to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond 
the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the offense, the alleged 
fact must be included in the charging instrument or otherwise provided to the defendant 
through a written notification before trial, submitted to a trier of fact as an aggravating 
factor, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
¶ 50 
 
Both Apprendi and section 111-3(c-5) explicitly exempt only “prior convictions” from 
those facts that must be pled in the charging instrument and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
before they can be used as an aggravating factor to increase the penalty for an offense. Neither 
Apprendi nor section 111-3(c-5) makes any mention of prior juvenile delinquency 
adjudications. 
¶ 51 
 
Before this court, defendant contends that a juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a 
“conviction” within the meaning of section 111-3(c-5). Therefore, defendant maintains, a trial 
court may only base an extended-term sentence on a prior adjudication if that adjudication was 
included in the charging instrument and proved to the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
this case, however, defendant’s prior adjudication was referenced only in a presentencing 
investigative report. Accordingly, defendant asserts that the trial court violated section 
111-3(c-5) and committed plain error when it imposed an extended-term sentence.  
¶ 52 
 
Defendant’s argument raises a question of statutory construction. When construing a 
statute, we first look to the language of the statute itself, which is the surest and most reliable 
indicator of the legislature’s intent. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). The language of 
the statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous, we may not resort to other aids of construction. People v. Taylor, 221 
Ill. 2d 157, 162 (2006); People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 435 (1995). In addition, this court 
may not correct what we believe to be a legislative oversight by rewriting a statute in a manner 
inconsistent with its clear and unambiguous language under the guise of statutory 
interpretation. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 162-63; Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42.  
¶ 53 
 
In construing the term “conviction” in section 111-3(c-5), we do not write on a clean slate. 
Illinois courts have long held that, when used in a statutory enactment, the word “conviction” 
does not include juvenile adjudications. For example, in In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53 (1983), this 
court held that section 8 of “An Act concerning fees and salaries, and to classify the several 
 
- 14 - 
 
counties of this state with reference thereto” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 53, ¶ 8), which provided 
that State’s Attorney fees are to be taxed as costs and collected from the “defendant” upon 
“conviction,” had no application to juvenile proceedings. In so holding, this court concluded 
that “a minor is neither ‘convicted’ nor considered a ‘defendant’ or an ‘accused.’ ” In re W.W., 
97 Ill. 2d at 57.  
¶ 54 
 
Similarly, in People v. Rankin, 297 Ill. App. 3d 818 (1998), our appellate court found no 
authority for a trial court to impose an extended-term sentence based on the defendant’s 
juvenile adjudication under the then-existing version of the statute. The court reached this 
conclusion because juvenile proceedings are not criminal and a juvenile adjudication does not 
constitute a conviction. Id. at 824-25. 
¶ 55 
 
In People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157 (2006), this court considered whether a minor who had 
been adjudicated delinquent for a felony offense could be considered a “person convicted of a 
felony” for purposes of our escape statute (720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 1998)). In our discussion 
in Taylor, we distinguished the issue that was then before us from “the somewhat analogous 
issue of whether a juvenile adjudication is considered a ‘prior conviction’ for sentencing 
enhancement purposes under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 *** (2000).” Taylor, 221 
Ill. 2d at 173. We said: 
 
“We take no position here with respect to the division among the federal circuits. 
We only discuss the jurisprudence on the use of nonjury juvenile adjudications for 
Apprendi purposes because we find it helpful to our analysis to illustrate the important 
differences between the case before us and the federal cases cited above. In each of the 
federal cases, a statute specifically defined a ‘conviction’ as a prior juvenile 
adjudication for purposes of the offense at issue. Here, in contrast, the legislature has 
not defined the term ‘conviction’ in the escape statute to include juvenile adjudications. 
Moreover, the key issue in the present case involves proof of a prior conviction as an 
element of the offense where the applicable statute fails to define an ‘adjudication’ as a 
‘conviction.’ Thus, the primary issue here turns on a question of statutory construction, 
while the principal issue in the federal cases turned on whether an adjudication could 
be classified as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes, not on whether it could be 
classified as a ‘conviction’ for purposes of establishing an element of an offense. The 
distinction is critical, of course, because nothing in a penal statute may be construed 
against a defendant by intendment or implication ([People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 
330, 337 (1998)]).” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 175-76. 
Citing In re W.W. and Rankin, we then went on to state the governing rule: 
 
“In the absence of a statute expressly defining a juvenile adjudication as a 
conviction, Illinois courts have consistently held that juvenile adjudications do not 
constitute convictions.” Id. at 176.  
¶ 56 
 
Finally, and more recently, in People v. Villa, 2011 IL 110777, this court held that a 
juvenile adjudication was inadmissible against a testifying defendant for impeachment 
purposes. This conclusion rested, in part, on the fact that a juvenile adjudication is not the same 
as a criminal conviction. Id. ¶ 40. 
¶ 57 
 
Section 111-3(c-5) exempts only “convictions” from those facts that must be pled in the 
indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be used as an aggravating 
 
- 15 - 
 
factor to increase the penalty for an offense. Under long-standing case law, a juvenile 
delinquency adjudication is not a “conviction.”  
¶ 58 
 
Further, it is worth noting that the General Assembly may have had good reason for 
treating juvenile adjudications differently than adult convictions under section 111-3(c-5). 
Requiring a juvenile adjudication to be pled and proven to a jury before it may be considered 
for extended-term sentencing provides the sentencing judge with additional information 
regarding the nature of the prior offense, including, in particular, the extent of the juvenile’s 
culpability. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (noting the lack 
of maturity and diminished culpability of juveniles). In this way, the sentencing judge can 
make a more informed decision as to whether extended-term sentencing should be imposed on 
the adult offender.  
¶ 59 
 
Since section 111-3(c-5) does not equate juvenile adjudications with criminal convictions, 
the requirements of the statute had to be met before defendant’s juvenile adjudication could be 
considered by the trial court in imposing an extended-term sentence. This means that the fact 
of the defendant’s qualifying juvenile adjudication had to be included in the charging 
instrument or otherwise provided to the defendant through a written notification before trial, 
submitted to the trier of fact as an aggravating factor, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
That did not occur here. In my view, the imposition of defendant’s extended-term sentence 
under these circumstances constituted plain error. 
 
¶ 60 
 
 
 
 
II 
¶ 61 
 
Despite the foregoing, the majority holds that a juvenile adjudication is a “conviction” 
within the meaning of section 111-3(c-5). Supra ¶ 33. Notably, however, the majority reaches 
this conclusion without ever conducting any statutory analysis. Instead, the majority’s 
determination is based solely on their examination of cases from other jurisdictions, both 
federal and state, which have considered whether, under Apprendi, it would violate a 
defendant’s due process rights to treat a juvenile adjudication like a “prior conviction” and 
exempt the adjudication from Apprendi’s pleading and proof requirements. 
¶ 62 
 
After reviewing the split of authority on this issue, the majority agrees with the line of 
cases which holds that, even though a juvenile offender is not afforded the right to a jury trial, 
juvenile adjudications may be treated like “prior convictions” for Apprendi purposes because 
juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are sufficiently reliable so that due process is not 
offended by such an exemption. See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th 
Cir. 2002). Having adopted this view, the majority then reasons that, because it would not 
violate defendant’s due process rights to treat a juvenile adjudication like a “prior conviction,” 
then it must follow that juvenile adjudications are included within the “prior conviction” 
exception in section 111-3(c-5). Supra ¶¶ 15, 33. I disagree. 
¶ 63 
 
The majority appears to be laboring under the misconception that a finding that it would 
not violate due process to treat a juvenile adjudication like a “prior conviction” under Apprendi 
means that an adjudication is equivalent to a conviction under section 111-3(c-5). But this is 
not true. Whether treating defendant’s prior delinquency adjudication like a conviction for 
purposes of the Apprendi exception violates due process concerns is a separate question from 
whether our legislature intended the term “conviction” in our statutory provision to include a 
juvenile adjudication. Or, stated otherwise, it is one thing to say that a certain practice does not 
 
- 16 - 
 
violate due process; it is a completely different thing to say that the practice was authorized by 
our legislature in the first place. 
¶ 64 
 
Furthermore, as a general principle, courts of this state rely, whenever possible, on 
nonconstitutional grounds to decide cases (Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing In re 
E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006) (listing cases))). The majority should therefore have 
considered first whether a juvenile adjudication may be deemed a “conviction” for purposes of 
section 111-3(c-5), as a matter of statutory interpretation, before determining whether 
defendant’s due process rights were violated under Apprendi. 
¶ 65 
 
In Illinois, the rule is clear that, for statutory purposes, the term “conviction” does not 
include juvenile delinquency adjudications. It follows, therefore, that a juvenile adjudication is 
not a “conviction” within the meaning of section 111-3(c-5). Whether it would violate due 
process to base an extended-term sentence on a juvenile adjudication, as was done in this case, 
is an important issue. However, until such time as the General Assembly actually authorizes 
that practice under section 111-3(c-5), there is no need to reach the issue. 
¶ 66 
 
For the reasons set forth above, I dissent. 
¶ 67 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN and JUSTICE KILBRIDE join in this dissent.