Title: Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd v. Stillwater Mining Co.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRIGADE LEVERAGED CAPITAL 
STRUCTURES FUND LTD. and 
BRIGADE DISTRESSED VALUE 
MASTER FUND LTD.,  
 
 
 
Petitioners Below, 
 
 
Appellants, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
STILLWATER MINING COMPANY,  
 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
 
Appellee. 
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No. 427, 2019 
 
 
 
Court Below – Court of Chancery 
 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
C.A. No. 2017-0385-JTL 
 
Submitted: July 15, 2020 
   Decided: October 12, 2020 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 
Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Samuel T. Hirzel, Esquire, Elizabeth A. DeFelice, Esquire, HEYMAN ENERIO 
GATTUSO & HIRZEL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Lawrence M. Rolnick, 
Esquire, Steven M. Hecht, Esquire, ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP, New 
York, New York, for Petitioners-Appellants. 
 
S. Mark Hurd, Esquire, Lauren Neal Bennett, Esquire, MORRIS, NICHOLS, 
ARSHT & TUNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; James R. Warnot, Jr., Esquire, 
Adam S. Lurie, Esquire, Brenda D. DiLuigi, Esquire, Nicole E. Jerry, Esquire, 
Elizabeth M. Raulston, Esquire, LINKLATERS LLP, New York, New York, for 
Respondent-Appellee. 
 
 
 
2 
 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justice: 
On May 4, 2017, Sibanye Gold Ltd. (“Sibanye”) acquired Stillwater Mining 
Co. (“Stillwater”) through a reverse triangular merger.  Under the terms of the 
merger agreement, each Stillwater share at closing was converted into the right to 
receive $18 of merger consideration.  Between the signing and the closing of the 
merger, the commodity price for palladium, which Stillwater mined, increased by 
nine percent, improving Stillwater’s value.   
Certain former Stillwater stockholders dissented to the merger, perfected their 
statutory appraisal rights, and pursued this litigation.  During the appraisal trial, 
petitioners argued that the flawed deal process made the deal price an unreliable 
indicator of fair value and that increased commodity prices raised Stillwater’s fair 
value substantially between the signing and closing of the merger.  On August 21, 
2019, the Court of Chancery issued its memorandum opinion (the “Memorandum 
Opinion”), holding that the $18 per share deal price was the most persuasive 
indicator of Stillwater’s fair value at the time of the merger.  The court did not award 
an upward adjustment for the increased commodity prices.   
The petitioners now appeal the Court of Chancery’s decision, arguing that the 
court abused its discretion when it ignored the flawed sale process and petitioners’ 
argument for an upward adjustment to the merger consideration. 
3 
 
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, and after oral 
argument, this Court holds that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion 
when it deferred to the deal price as a reliable indicator of fair value without an 
upward adjustment.  Therefore, this Court affirms the Court of Chancery’s August 
21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and September 27, 2019 Post-Trial Judgment order.   
I. 
BACKGROUND1 
Stillwater Mining Company was a publicly traded Delaware corporation 
primarily engaged in the business of mining and processing platinum group metals 
(“PGMs”) from the J-M Reef in Montana.  The J-M Reef is the only PGM mine in 
the United States, with the only other significant deposits located in South Africa 
and Russia.  Stillwater has two producing mines at the J-M Reef, Stillwater Mine 
and East Boulder.2  Stillwater also owns one of the largest PGM recycling operations 
in the world, which provides additional market supply of PGMs.3  In light of its 
operations, Stillwater’s common stock trading price is heavily influenced by the spot 
and forward pricing of the PGM palladium.4 
By October 2015, Stillwater’s board of directors (the “Board”) and 
management had become concerned that both the palladium and platinum markets 
                                                 
1 This Court takes the essential facts from the Memorandum Opinion.  In re Stillwater 
Mining Co., 2019 WL 3943851 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019). 
2 Id. at *2. 
3 Appendix to the Opening Br. 425, 1283 (hereafter “A_”). 
4 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *2. 
4 
 
were facing long-term “structural decline[s],”5 largely due to the decline in gasoline 
and diesel-powered automotive markets, the primary end-use of Stillwater’s PGMs.6  
Accordingly, the Board began to consider strategic alternatives, including a merger 
of equals or the sale of some of Stillwater’s business operations.7   
In 2016, the Board’s fears materialized as Stillwater’s stock price declined, 
reflecting a decrease in the spot price of palladium that continued throughout the 
year.  Due to the downturn in the trading price, the Board authorized Michael 
McMullen, Stillwater’s CEO and board member, to inquire into strategic 
opportunities and report back to the Board.8  Also around this time, McMullen 
privately expressed unease at the company’s situation and began considering his exit 
from Stillwater.9 
A. McMullen Engages with Sibanye 
On January 30, 2016, Sibanye requested a meeting to discuss the acquisition 
of Stillwater.10  Without the Board’s knowledge or approval, McMullen met with 
Neal Froneman, Sibanye’s CEO, on March 1, 2016.11  At the meeting, McMullen 
asked Froneman to provide “an informal proposal” that included “an idea of 
                                                 
5 A2439. 
6 A2438-41; A1854-55. 
7 Appendix to the Answering Br. 30-31, 311 (hereafter “B_”). 
8 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *4. 
9 Id. at *5. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
5 
 
valuation” and “transaction structure.”12  He told Froneman that any potential 
acquisition would need to feature “a large cash component.”13  McMullen also stated 
that Stillwater would need to “be priced at a premium of 30% over Stillwater’s thirty-
day volume-weighted average price (‘VWAP’).”14  After the meeting, Froneman had 
the impression that a deal “was doable if we got the valuation right.”15  McMullen 
took these actions without involving the Board, and he did not inform the Board 
about his discussions with Sibanye at the Board’s next regularly scheduled meeting 
in May 2016.16 
By July 2016, Stillwater’s stock price and the price of palladium had largely 
recovered.  On July 21, 2016, Sibanye provided a preliminary, non-binding 
indication of interest at $15.75 per share in cash.17  Shortly thereafter, on July 27 and 
28, 2016, Stillwater’s Board met in “executive session” with McMullen to discuss 
Sibanye’s offer.18  On August 9, 2016, Stillwater executed a confidentiality 
agreement with Sibanye and provided Sibanye data room access.19  
 
                                                 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at *5. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at *5-6. 
17 Id. at *6. 
18 Id. at *7; B1088-94. 
19 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *7; A1856; A2458-59. 
6 
 
B. Stillwater Engages with Other Parties  
 On August 10, 2016, the Board met and directed management to begin 
outreach to other potentially interested parties.20  But instead of working to generate 
“as much interest as possible” in a transaction with Stillwater, McMullen continued 
to focus on courting Sibanye.21  Nonetheless, Stillwater’s management met with 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch (“BAML”) on August 18, 2016, to discuss potential 
options.22  At that meeting, BAML got “the sense . . . that a sale was a possibility” 
and independently contacted a list of fifteen potential acquirers about purchasing 
Stillwater.23  Meetings were arranged with a number of interested parties, including 
Hecla, Coeur, Kinross, and Gold Fields.24  By early October, both Hecla and Coeur 
conducted site visits and obtained access to the data room.25  
On October 3, 2016, the Board met, reviewed a list of eighteen potential 
acquirers, and directed McMullen to solicit proposals from investment banks and 
create an internal cash flow model to value the company.26  Additionally, Brent 
Wadman, Stillwater’s General Counsel, recommended that the Board form a special 
committee to oversee the sale process.  Since the July 2016 meeting between 
                                                 
20 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *7. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at *7-8. 
25 Id. at *8; B40-41; B1095-96. 
26 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *8-9. 
7 
 
McMullen and Sibanye, Wadman had become concerned that McMullen was 
rushing the sale process to facilitate his exit from the company.27  The Board sought 
the advice of external counsel, Holland & Hart LLP, as to whether any conflicts 
existed and whether a special committee should be formed.28  With Holland & Hart 
LLP’s advice, the Board determined that no conflicts of interest existed at that time.29  
The Board formally retained BAML on November 7, 2016, and BAML immediately 
conducted a market check.30  On November 11, 2016, the Board retained Jones Day 
for its “substantial experience in advising Delaware publicly traded companies in 
respect of potential strategic transactions.”31   
By the next Board meeting on November 23, 2016, twenty-four parties had 
received some type of formal or informal contact from BAML or Stillwater 
management.  Four of those parties accessed the data room, four conducted site 
visits, and one, Sibanye, submitted an indication of interest.32  McMullen informed 
the Board that he viewed Sibanye’s initial offer of $15.75 per share as insufficient.33  
At the Board’s direction, BAML reached out to additional parties, and one, Northam, 
                                                 
27 Id. at *9. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at *10. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at *11-12. 
33 Id. at *12. 
8 
 
signed a non-disclosure agreement and accessed the data room.34  Two other 
parties—Northern Star and Independence—informed Stillwater that they were only 
interested in a merger of equals.35 
On December 1, 2016, Sibanye revised its offer to $17.50-$17.75 per share in 
cash.36  On December 2, 2016, Stillwater’s Board rejected the revised offer.37  That 
same day, BAML provided its internal discounted cash flow model valuing the 
company between $10.78 and $14.14 per share.38  BAML also provided a financial 
analysis of the two merger of equals proposals from Northern Star and 
Independence.39  After reviewing the financial analysis, the Board ultimately 
determined not to pursue either merger of equals transaction, finding neither tenable 
for a number of reasons.40  
On December 3, 2016, Sibanye made its “best and final” offer of $18 per share 
to acquire Stillwater.41  The $18 price represented a 22.6% premium over the 
unaffected trading price and a 24.4% premium over the 30-day volume-weighted 
average price.42  At this point, although five parties had signed nondisclosure 
                                                 
34 Id. at *13. 
35 Id. at *12. 
36 Id. at *13. 
37 Id. at *13-14. 
38 Id. at *14. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *15. 
42 Id. at *16. 
9 
 
agreements and gained access to Stillwater’s non-public information, Sibanye was 
the only party to make a bid.43   
C. Stillwater Signs with Sibanye 
On December 8, 2016, BAML provided an opinion to the Board that 
Sibanye’s offer was fair to stockholders.44  The Board considered BAML’s fairness 
opinion in its deliberations, approved the merger, and signed the merger 
agreement.45  The transaction was publicly announced on December 9, 2016.46   
In March 2017, Wadman resigned as general counsel.  Wadman’s resignation 
letter cited his concerns about how the deal process unfolded and his belief that 
McMullen used the process to engage in self-dealing.47  Stillwater negotiated a 
settlement with Wadman, and the company issued a statement that did not mention 
the reasons for his resignation.48   
During the 138 days between the signing and the stockholder vote, no other 
bidder made a topping bid over $18 per share, but the price of palladium and 
Stillwater’s trading price increased during that time.49  Still, on April 26, 2017, 
                                                 
43 Id. at *15. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at *15-16. 
46 Id. at *16. 
47 Id. at *17. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
10 
 
approximately 75% of the issued outstanding shares eligible to vote approved the 
merger.50  On May 4, 2017, the sale of Stillwater to Sibanye closed.51   
D. Appraisal Litigation 
On May 22, 2017, appellants, petitioners-below, initiated this appraisal 
litigation.52  The Court of Chancery conducted a four-day trial and held post-trial 
argument on May 1, 2019.   
On August 21, 2019, the court issued its Memorandum Opinion.53  The Court 
of Chancery held that “Sibanye proved that the sale process was sufficiently reliable 
to make the deal price a persuasive indicator of fair value.”54  Further, the court stated 
that while “[t]he evidence demonstrated that Stillwater’s trading price could provide 
a persuasive indicator of value, . . . it was a less persuasive indicator than the deal 
price.”55  It also held that “[n]either side proved that its DCF valuation provided a 
persuasive indicator of fair value.  The experts disagreed over too many inputs, and 
the resulting valuation swings were too great, for [the court] to rely on a model when 
a market-tested indicator is available.”56  Thus, the court deferred to the merger price 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at *17. 
53 Id. at *1. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
11 
 
of $18 per share as the most reliable indicator of Stillwater’s fair value.57  It also 
declined to make an upward adjustment to the price to account for Stillwater’s 
increase in value after signing, holding that petitioners did not prove that they were 
entitled to a deal price adjustment.58  On September 27, 2019, the Court of Chancery 
entered its Post-Trial Judgment order. 
E. Petitioners Appeal the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order 
On October 8, 2019, Petitioners filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  On appeal, 
Petitioners argue that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion by ignoring the 
flawed sale process and holding that the deal price of $18 per share reflected 
Stillwater’s fair value at closing.59  Further, Petitioners argue that the court relied on 
an incorrect conclusion to justify its decision to not adjust the deal price upward to 
account for rising commodity prices.60   
Sibanye responds that the Court of Chancery correctly examined Stillwater’s 
sale process and held that the process presented sufficient indicia of reliability, 
making the deal price the best indicator of Stillwater’s fair value.61  Further, it argues 
that because Petitioners’ arguments concerning the deal price adjustment were 
wholly conclusory, the court correctly held that Petitioners “failed to prove . . . ‘that 
                                                 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at *50. 
59 Opening Br. 38-40. 
60 Id. at 26. 
61 Answering Br. 18-20. 
12 
 
the deal price should be adjusted upward to reflect a change in value between signing 
and closing.’”62  
On review, this Court holds that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its 
discretion when it relied on the deal price as the most reliable indicator of 
Stillwater’s fair value.  Nor did the Court abuse its discretion when it declined to 
adjust the deal price.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews errors of law de novo.63  We review statutory appraisal 
awards for abuse of discretion and “grant significant deference to the factual findings 
of the trial court.”64  “So long as the Court of Chancery has committed no legal error, 
its factual findings will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly wrong and 
the doing of justice requires their overturn.”65  “We defer to the trial court’s fair 
value determination if it has a ‘reasonable basis in the record and in accepted 
financial principles relevant to determining the value of corporations and their 
stock.’”66  
 
                                                 
62 Id. at 29 (quoting Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *50). 
63 SmithKline Beecham Pharms. Co. v. Merck & Co., 766 A.2d 442, 447 (Del. 2000). 
64 DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value P’rs, 172 A.3d 346, 363 (Del. 2017). 
65 Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 219 (Del. 2005). 
66 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 5-6 (Del. 2017) 
(quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 348-49). 
13 
 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Under 8 Del. C. § 262(a), a dissenting stockholder to a merger “shall be 
entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder’s 
shares of stock.”  In an appraisal proceeding, the Court of Chancery must “determine 
the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with 
interest, . . . to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value.”67  “To reach 
this per-share valuation, the court should first envisage the entire pre-merger 
company as a ‘going concern,’ as a standalone entity, and assess its value [on the 
closing date of the merger] as such.”68  “Then, once this total standalone value is 
determined, the court awards each petitioning stockholder his pro rata portion of this 
total—his proportionate interest in [the] going concern plus interest.”69 
When determining a company’s fair value in an appraisal, “the Court shall 
take into account all relevant factors.”70  Although “[t]he value of a corporation is 
not a point on a line, but [instead] a range of reasonable values,” the court must 
“assign one particular value within this range as the most reasonable value in light 
                                                 
67 8 Del. C. § 262(h). 
68 Dell, 177 A.3d at 20. 
69 Id. at 21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 8 Del. C. § 262(h). 
14 
 
of all the relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness.”71  “In 
discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has discretion to select one 
of the parties’ valuation models as its general framework or to fashion its own.”72  
But, “[i]n the end, the trial judge must determine fair value, and ‘fair value is just 
that, “fair.”  It does not mean the highest possible price that a company might have 
sold for.’”73    
A. The Court of Chancery Did Not Abuse its Discretion when it Held that 
the Deal Price was the Best Evidence of Stillwater’s Fair Value 
Petitioners first argue that “[t]he court below erroneously concluded that the 
flawed sale[] process was sufficient to defer completely to merger price.”74  
Petitioners allege that instead of analyzing the actual merger process in accordance 
with this Court’s precedent, the Court of Chancery “constructed a made-up deal 
process—involving only a single bidder—to speculate that if this Court would defer 
completely to merger price in that (more extreme) scenario, it would likely uphold a 
merger-price determination here, despite the significant process deficiencies.”75  
Thus, Petitioners contend that the Court of Chancery disregarded “the facts of this 
                                                 
71 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003, 
revised July 9, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 
2005). 
72 M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525-26 (Del. 1999). 
73 Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 2020 WL 3885166, at *7 (Del. Jul. 9, 
2020) (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 370) (citing Dell, 177 A.3d at 20). 
74 Opening Br. 5. 
75 Id. at 37. 
15 
 
case” and “failed to analyze the sale[] process for Stillwater to determine whether it 
provided reliable evidence of third-party market valuation.”76 
Here, contrary to Petitioners’ representations, the Court of Chancery 
examined Stillwater’s sale process, explained its reasoning, and grounded its 
conclusions in the relevant facts and law.  The court dedicated 56 pages of its 139-
page decision to examining the reliability of the deal price.  The court walked 
through each step of the sale process, found that there were objective indicia of 
reliability, and addressed each of Petitioners’ arguments concerning alleged defects 
in the pre- and post-signing phases.  After conducting this analysis, the court held 
that although Stillwater’s sale was “rough and ready,” “given the arm’s-length nature 
of the Merger, the premium over market, and the substance of what took place during 
the sale process, it is not possible to say that an award at the deal price would result 
in the petitioners being exploited.”77  This Court cannot hold that the Court of 
Chancery abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion based on the record before 
us.    
1. The Court of Chancery determined that the sale process provided 
objective indicia of reliability 
 
This Court has recently examined instances when sale processes provided 
persuasive evidence of fair value.  In DFC, Dell, and Verition Partners Master Fund 
                                                 
76 Id.  
77 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *44. 
16 
 
Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.,78 this Court looked to objective factors that bolstered 
the reliability of the sale process and gave considerable weight to the deal price.  In 
DFC, this Court considered a sale process where  
i) the transaction resulted from a robust market search that 
lasted approximately two years in which financial and 
strategic buyers had an open opportunity to buy without 
inhibition of deal protections; ii) the company was 
purchased by a third party in an arm’s length sale; and iii) 
there was no hint of self-interest that compromised the 
market check.79   
This Court concluded that “the best evidence of fair value was the deal price, as it 
resulted from an open process, informed by robust public information, and easy 
access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an incentive 
to make a profit had a chance to bid.”80  In so holding, this Court noted that the 
refusal to craft a statutory presumption in favor of the deal 
price when certain conditions pertain does not in any way 
signal [this Court’s] ignorance to the economic reality that 
the sale value resulting from a robust market check will 
often be the most reliable evidence of fair value, and that 
second-guessing the value arrived upon by the collective 
views of many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the 
matter is hazardous.81   
                                                 
78 210 A.3d 128, 135 (Del. 2019). 
79 172 A.3d at 349. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 366. 
17 
 
Likewise, in Dell, this Court determined that the deal price deserved deference 
when “Dell’s sale process bore many of the same objective indicia of reliability” 
present in DFC.82  Specifically, this Court reasoned that  
when the evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low 
barriers to entry, outreach to all logical buyers, and the 
chance for any topping bidder to have the support of Mr. 
Dell’s own votes is so compelling, then failure to give the 
resulting price heavy weight . . . abuses even the wide 
discretion afforded the Court of Chancery in these difficult 
cases.83 
 
Thus, this Court in Dell held that, due to the objective indicia of reliability, “the deal 
price deserved heavy, if not dispositive, weight.”84   
Finally, in Aruba this Court noted “the long history of giving important weight 
to market-tested deal prices in the Court of Chancery and this Court”85 and 
underscored that “a buyer in possession of material nonpublic information about the 
seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the seller 
when agreeing to buy the company at a particular deal price.”86  The Court concluded 
that the buyer’s “view of value should be given considerable weight by the Court of 
                                                 
82 Dell, 177 A.3d at 28. 
83 Id. at 35.  
84 Id. at 23. 
85 Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 135 (Del. 2019); 
see also id. at 135 n.41 (collecting cases). 
86 Id. at 137. 
18 
 
Chancery absent deficiencies in the deal process” because the buyer had access to 
nonpublic information and was able and incentivized to properly value the target.87  
Using the above decisions as guidance, the Court of Chancery examined 
Stillwater’s sale process and determined that it also presented “‘objective indicia’ 
that ‘suggest[ed] that the deal price was a fair price.’”88  The court highlighted five 
key objective indicators that supported the reliability of Stillwater’s sale process: (1) 
“the Merger was an arm’s length transaction with a third party”; (2) “the Board did 
not labor under any conflicts of interest”; (3) the buyer “conducted due diligence and 
received confidential information about Stillwater’s value”; (4) Stillwater 
“negotiated . . . multiple price increases”; and (5) “no bidders emerged during the 
post-signing phase.”89  This Court has held that each of these indicators reflected a 
trustworthy process when evaluating the sale processes in DFC, Dell, and Aruba.90  
Although these indicators are fewer indicia of fairness than this Court identified 
when reviewing the sale processes in DFC, Dell, or Aruba, the court did not abuse 
                                                 
87 Id.  
88 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *22 (quoting Dell, 177 A.3d at 28). 
89 Id. at *22-23.  
90 See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (noting as persuasive that “the company was purchased 
by a third party in an arm’s length sale”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (crediting the deal price 
because the special committee was “composed of independent, experienced directors and 
armed with the power to say ‘no’” and the special committee “persuaded Silver Lake to 
raise its bid six times”);  id. at 33 (finding that absence of higher bid meant “that the deal 
market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,” 
which “suggests the price is already at a level that is fair”); Aruba, 210 A.3d at 137 
(emphasizing that the buyer was armed with “material nonpublic information about the 
seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the seller”). 
19 
 
its discretion by determining that “the objective indicia that were present provide a 
cogent foundation for relying on the deal price as a persuasive indicator of fair 
value.”91  
2. The Court of Chancery considered and rejected Petitioners’ 
objections to the pre-signing process 
 
Having identified the objective signs that the deal price was a reliable 
indicator of fair value, the Court of Chancery also addressed and rejected each of 
Petitioners’ several arguments for why the pre-signing process undermined that 
reliability.92   
First, the court considered Petitioners’ claim that McMullen’s role in the pre-
signing process and the Board’s lack of “meaningful oversight” during that period 
sullied the reliability of the sale process.93  The court acknowledged that aspects of 
the process, including McMullen’s early unsupervised activities and the lack of 
Board involvement until later in the sale discussions, presented “flaws.”94  It held, 
however, that “[t]hose flaws are factors to consider, but they do not undermine the 
reliability of the sale price” because BAML’s pre-signing canvas, the repeated 
rejections of Sibanye’s offers, and an effective post-signing market check ensured a 
                                                 
91 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *23. 
92 Id. at *23-44. 
93 Id. at *30-34. 
94 Id. at *31. 
20 
 
sufficient degree of reliability.95  Therefore, the suboptimal executive and board 
involvement early on did “not inherently disqualify the sale process from generating 
reliable evidence of fair value.”96   
Second, the court held that although McMullen’s pursuit of the merger 
“appears to have been motivated by his desire to maximize his personal wealth and 
retire,” those personal interests did not undermine the sale process.97  Instead, the 
court determined that McMullen’s financial and personal interests were aligned with 
stockholders’ desire to maximize the company’s value.98  And “[w]hen Sibanye 
indicated interest at $15.75 per share in July 2016, McMullen did not rush to sign up 
a deal[,]” evidencing his commitment to extract the highest possible price for the 
company.99  Further, the court noted that “McMullen’s personal interests as a whole 
do not appear materially different from interests that have not been sufficient in other 
cases to undermine the reliability of sale processes.”100  Thus, McMullen’s personal 
interests did not lead him or the Board “to accept a deal price that left a portion of 
                                                 
95 Id. at *44. 
96 Id. at *31. 
97 Id. at *33.  
98 Id. at *34. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. Specifically, the Court of Chancery compared McMullen’s potential conflicts with 
disputed conflicts addressed by this Court’s decisions in Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141-42, and 
Dell, 177 A.3d at 32-34.  Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *33. 
21 
 
Stillwater’s fundamental value on the table, particularly in light of the effective post-
signing market check that Stillwater conducted.”101 
Third, the court analyzed Stillwater’s initial “soft sell” approach and BAML’s 
pre-signing market check.  The court determined that although “the 
‘soft sell’ strategy was not an effective means of generating interest in the 
Company,” it “did not do anything to harm either BAML’s abbreviated pre-signing 
process or the post-signing market check.”102  BAML reached out to fourteen parties 
once it was retained, and seven parties engaged to some degree in the process.103  
While Petitioners “have criticized the timing, pacing, and scope of the pre-signing 
process, . . . it resulted in BAML contacting the ‘logical strategic buyers’ before 
Stillwater signed up its deal with Sibanye.”104  Further, “[t]he number of meaningful 
contacts compares favorably with or is similar to the facts in the Delaware Supreme 
Court precedents.”105  Thus, while the “abbreviated pre-signing process was not 
ideal,” the court concluded that it was still “a positive factor for the reliability of the 
sale process.”106 
                                                 
101 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *34. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at *35. 
104 Id. (quoting Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136). 
105 Id. (citing Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136-39, 142; Dell, 177 A.3d at 28; DFC, 172 A.3d at 350, 
355, 376). 
106 Id. at *36. 
22 
 
Fourth, and finally, the court rejected Petitioners’ argument that “Sibanye 
pressured Stillwater to sign a merger agreement before the company’s rising stock 
price made what Sibanye was willing to pay look inadequate.”107  Sibanye conducted 
due diligence before signing, received access to material non-public information, 
and was uniquely incentivized to value Stillwater properly.  When Sibanye made its 
final offer of $18 per share, it “could have deployed cash on hand or drawn on its 
revolving line of credit” to increase that offer if its own valuation supported such an 
increase; it did not. 108  “That Sibanye did not bid higher does not mean that the price 
it agreed to pay did not reflect fair value when its bid prevailed.”109  Moreover, 
Stillwater twice rejected Sibanye’s lower offers before accepting a deal for $18 per 
share.  As such, the court held that “[t]he negotiations between Stillwater and 
Sibanye over price, together with Sibanye’s refusal to pay more, provide[] strong 
evidence of fair value.”110 
Thus, the court considered each of Petitioners’ arguments concerning the pre-
signing process.  This Court is satisfied that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its 
discretion when it held that the pre-signing process was sufficient to support reliance 
on the deal price as evidence of fair value.   
                                                 
107 Id. at *36, *36-38. 
108 Id. at *38. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
23 
 
3. The Court of Chancery considered and rejected Petitioners’ 
objections to the post-signing process 
The Court of Chancery also considered Petitioners’ “relatively few” claims 
challenging the terms of the Merger Agreement and the Board’s decisions during the 
post-signing period.111   
Because the market price of palladium increased between signing and closing, 
Petitioners complained that “the Merger Agreement ‘provided no practical way for 
Stillwater’s stockholders to receive that additional value.’”112  But the Court of 
Chancery dismissed those arguments as contradictory to the terms of the contract 
itself.  According to the court, the Merger Agreement was not designed “to give the 
stockholders the benefit of a transaction that included the potential upside or 
downside that would result from changes in the price of palladium after signing.  The 
Merger Agreement was trying to provide stockholders with the ability to opt for the 
comparative certainty of deal consideration equal to $18.00 per share.”113  Moreover, 
the court held that the challenge to the Merger Agreement failed because Stillwater’s 
stockholders were not wholly barred from capitalizing on rising palladium prices; as 
a practical matter, “[i]f Stillwater’s stockholders had wanted to capture the increased 
                                                 
111 Id. at *38. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at *39. 
24 
 
value of palladium, then they could have voted down the Merger and kept their 
shares.”114 
The court also rejected Petitioners’ argument that the no solicitation provision 
and matching rights “deterred interested buyers from making a topping bid.”115  The 
court compared the deal protections here to the “similar suite of deal protections” in 
Aruba and held that, as in Aruba and other cases, these protections “did not preclude 
or impermissibly impede a post-signing market check.”116  Potential bidders had 138 
days to submit a competing bid.  “The absence of a higher bid indicates ‘that the deal 
market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of 
overpayment,’ which in turn ‘suggests the price is already at a level that is fair.’”117 
Last, the Court of Chancery addressed Petitioners’ argument that “the 
stockholders approved the Merger based on incomplete and misleading 
information.”118  The court noted that “[t]he disclosure theories about McMullen and 
Wadman would likely have some merit if the petitioners had done more to articulate 
them, support them with case law, and explain their relationship to a determination 
of fair value.”119  Despite the cursory nature of the allegations, the court 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at *41. 
117 Id. at *42 (quoting Dell, 177 A.3d at 33). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at *43. 
25 
 
acknowledged that “the proxy statement should have disclosed McMullen’s interest 
in retiring, his roles with GT Gold and New Chris, and their implications for his 
employment agreement.  Stockholders also should have been told that Wadman 
resigned because of disputes with senior management about the conduct of the sale 
process.”120  But, the court was not convinced that Petitioners’ arguments were 
“sufficient to undermine the stockholder vote as an expression of the preference of 
a supermajority of Stillwater’s stockholders for a sale rather than having the 
Company continue as a standalone entity.”121  Although the disclosures might have 
“affected stockholders’ views about whether their negotiators had extracted the 
highest possible bid,” there would not have been “any reason to revise their 
assessment of the Company’s prospects as a standalone entity or to vote down the 
Merger in the belief that the Company was more valuable as a going concern in its 
operative reality as a widely held, publicly traded firm.”122  Nonetheless, the court 
did “not give heavy weight to the stockholder vote” because of the disclosure 
issues.123  
As with the pre-signing arguments, after analyzing and addressing all of 
Petitioners’ post-signing process challenges, the court concluded that “Sibanye 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
26 
 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the sale process made the deal price 
a persuasive indicator of fair value.  The sale process was not perfect, and the 
petitioners highlighted its flaws, but the facts of this case, when viewed as a whole, 
compare favorably” with this Court’s precedents.124  On review, given the record 
before the Court of Chancery, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
so holding. 
4. The Court of Chancery properly based its deal price analysis on 
the sale process, not on its single-bidder hypothetical  
 
Petitioners do not meaningfully challenge any of the Court of Chancery’s 
specific holdings regarding the objective indicia of reliability.  Nor do they 
meaningfully dispute the court’s treatment of any of the specific arguments 
concerning the pre- and post-signing phases.  Instead, Petitioners assert that “[t]he 
court below failed to analyze the sale[] process” because it “analyzed a hypothetical 
‘single-bidder’ process.”125   
When addressing Petitioners’ arguments concerning the lack of outreach to 
other buyers during the pre-signing phase, the Court of Chancery entertained the 
question of whether “the deal price [would] provide persuasive evidence of fair value 
if Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy in which it only interacted with 
                                                 
124 Id. at *44. 
125 Opening Br. 37. 
27 
 
Sibanye before signing the Merger Agreement . . . .”126  The court stated that it 
believed that “if the proponent of a single-bidder process could show that the merger 
agreement allowed for a passive post-signing market check in line with what 
decisions have held is sufficient to satisfy enhanced scrutiny, and if there were no 
other factors that undermined the sale process, then the deal price would provide 
persuasive evidence of fair value.”127   
But, contrary to Petitioners’ allegations, the court did not ignore the facts 
pertinent to the actual process.  As this Court described above, the Court of Chancery 
reviewed each step of the sale process before concluding that the deal price was 
reliable.  The entirety of the court’s single-bidder discussion encompasses a small 
portion of its lengthy analysis.  Moreover, the court recognized that its analysis was 
hypothetical and emphasized that it “already found that the sale process exhibited 
objective indicia of reliability” without relying on the hypothetical.128  As a result, 
that portion of the court’s analysis was not necessary to its decision, does not alter 
its holding in this case, and is not being considered on appeal.   
                                                 
126 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *24. 
127 Id. at *30. 
128 Id. The court also clarified “I am not suggesting that the Delaware Supreme Court has 
ever endorsed a single-bidder process for purposes of appraisal, nor that any of the 
precedents that this decision has discussed are squarely on point.  Nor am I claiming to 
have any privileged insight into how the Delaware Supreme Court would or should 
evaluate the persuasiveness of a single-bidder strategy on the facts of any particular case.”  
Id. 
28 
 
 “What is necessary in any particular case . . . is for the Court of Chancery to 
explain its [analysis] in a manner that is grounded in the record before it.”129  Here, 
the Court of Chancery thoroughly analyzed the facts surrounding Stillwater’s sale 
process in accordance with this Court’s precedent.  Absent any sign that the court 
abused its statutory mandate, this Court will not second-guess the court’s careful 
examination of Stillwater’s sale process.  Therefore, we hold that the Court of 
Chancery did not abuse its discretion when it held that the deal price was a reliable 
indicator of Stillwater’s fair value.   
B. The Court of Chancery Did Not Abuse its Discretion when it Declined 
to Grant a Deal Price Adjustment  
 
Next, Petitioners argue that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion when 
it declined to adjust the deal price upward to reflect the rising commodity prices 
between signing and closing.  They argue that “[t]he trial court, while recognizing 
the undisputed increase in Stillwater’s value between signing and closing, refused to 
award such accretion . . . .”130  Moreover, according to Petitioners, the court wholly 
based its decision to not adjust the deal price on its erroneous conclusion that 
“Petitioners had not argued for such an adjustment.”131   
                                                 
129 DFC, 172 A.3d at 388. 
130 Opening Br. 24. 
131 Id. 
29 
 
 
“In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving 
their respective valuation positions . . . .”132  Therefore, in an appraisal proceeding, 
the party seeking an adjustment to the deal price reflecting a valuation change 
between signing and closing bears the burden to identify that change and prove the 
amount to be adjusted.133  The time for determining the value of a dissenter’s shares 
is the date on which the merger closes.134  Thus, if the value of the corporation 
changes between the signing of the merger agreement and the closing, then the fair 
value determination must be measured by the “operative reality” of the corporation 
at the time of the merger.135   
A holistic review of the court’s analysis suggests that it was unconvinced by 
Petitioners’ conclusory arguments for an adjustment to the deal price and declined 
to grant the adjustment because Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof.136  
While Petitioners seize on the court’s language that “the petitioners never argued for 
an adjustment to the deal price,”137 this reading ignores the court’s analysis of 
numerous difficult considerations that Petitioners failed to adequately address.  The 
                                                 
132 M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999). 
133 See In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Gp., 2019 WL 3778370, at *45 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
12, 2019) (“The petitioners contend that Columbia’s value increased during this period. As 
the party arguing for an upward adjustment to the deal price, the petitioners bore the burden 
of proof on this issue.”). 
134 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996). 
135 Id. 
136 Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *48. 
137 Id.  
30 
 
court’s statement that petitioners did not argue for an adjustment to the deal price 
may have been inartful, but it appears that the court also considered and rejected the 
notion of a deal price adjustment based on gaps in Petitioners’ arguments. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Chancery’s August 21, 2019 
Memorandum Opinion and September 27, 2019 Post-Trial Judgment order are 
AFFIRMED.