Title: People v. Maikhio

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/20/11 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S180289 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D055068 
BOUHN MAIKHIO, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. M031897 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
To protect and preserve the wildlife of the state for current and future 
generations, California — like other states — has adopted numerous statutes and 
regulations governing the conduct of persons who fish or hunt in this state, 
prescribing, for example, the places where fishing or hunting may occur, the 
seasons in which particular species may be taken, the number and size of different 
types of fish or animals that may be caught or shot, the means by which particular 
types of wildlife may be taken, and the licenses, permits, and records required for 
different fishing and hunting activities.  To make possible the effective 
enforcement of these regulations, California law has long required anyone who 
chooses to fish or hunt in this state to exhibit or display, upon demand of any 
official authorized by California law to enforce the fish and game statutes and 
regulations (1) any required fishing or hunting license, (2) all fish or game the 
angler or hunter has caught or taken, and (3) any equipment capable of being used 
to take such fish or game.   
2 
 
In the present case, a fish and game warden (hereafter game warden), 
surveilling a public fishing pier from a distance with a spotting telescope, 
observed defendant Bouhn Maikhio fishing with a handline from the pier and 
catching either a lobster or fish that defendant placed in a small black bag by his 
side.  Although from his position the game warden could not identify the item 
defendant had caught and placed in the bag, the warden was aware that, although it 
was unlawful to do so, such handlines were often utilized in that location to catch 
spiny lobsters, which were out of season at that time.  After the game warden saw 
defendant leave the pier with the black bag, enter a car in the pier parking lot, and 
drive away, the warden stopped defendant‟s car a few blocks from the pier, 
introduced himself as a game warden, and asked defendant if he had any fish or 
lobsters in his car.  When defendant denied having any, the game warden looked 
in the car, saw the black bag on the floor of the rear passenger area, opened the 
bag and discovered a spiny lobster.  Upon questioning, defendant admitted taking 
the lobster and said he had been “stupid” to do so.  The game warden issued a 
citation to defendant and thereafter returned the lobster to the ocean. 
 
When misdemeanor charges were subsequently brought against defendant 
based upon this incident, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained by the game warden on the ground that the warden had engaged in an 
unconstitutional search and seizure in stopping defendant‟s car under the 
circumstances described above.  The trial court agreed with defendant‟s 
contention, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the charges.  The appellate 
division of the superior court reversed the trial court‟s ruling, but the Court of 
Appeal, after accepting transfer of the appeal, affirmed the trial court‟s dismissal 
of the charges in a divided decision.  The majority opinion in the Court of Appeal 
concluded (1) that the game warden was permitted to stop defendant‟s car only if 
the warden was aware of facts that provided reasonable suspicion that defendant 
3 
had violated an applicable statute or regulation, and (2) that the facts in this case 
did not provide such reasonable suspicion because the game warden was not able 
to see what item defendant had caught with the handline and defendant could 
lawfully have used a handline to catch some species of fish other than spiny 
lobster.  The dissenting Court of Appeal justice concluded that the game warden‟s 
stop of defendant‟s vehicle was lawful and was fully supported by California 
precedent. 
On the People‟s petition, we granted review to determine whether a game 
warden who reasonably believes that a person has recently been fishing or 
hunting, but lacks reasonable suspicion that the person has violated an applicable 
fish or game statute or regulation, may stop a vehicle in which the person is riding 
to demand the person display all fish or game the person has caught or taken. 
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Court of Appeal 
erred in determining that, under the applicable California statutes and the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, a game warden may make such a 
vehicle stop only if the warden is aware of facts that give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that the angler or hunter has violated a fish and game statute or 
regulation.  As we shall explain, California authority has interpreted the relevant 
statute as authorizing a stop of a vehicle occupied by an angler or hunter for such 
purposes, and the United States Supreme Court has held in a number of decisions 
that an administrative search or seizure may be conducted, consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment, in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a violation of a 
statute or administrative regulation has occurred.  Such administrative searches 
and seizures are permissible when (1) the governmental action serves a special and 
important state need and interest distinct from the state‟s ordinary interest in 
enforcing the criminal law, (2) the administrative rules or regulations that are 
required to achieve the state‟s interest are of such a nature that limiting inspection 
4 
only to those persons reasonably suspected of committing a violation would 
seriously undermine the state‟s ability to meet its special need, and (3) the 
impingement upon the reasonable expectation of privacy of those subjected to the 
procedure is sufficiently limited such that the state‟s need to utilize the procedure 
outweighs the invasion which the search entails, thus rendering the procedure 
reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
Applying these principles in the present context, we conclude that (1) the 
state‟s interest in protecting and preserving the wildlife of this state for the benefit 
of current and future generations of California residents and visitors constitutes a 
special and important state interest and need that is distinct from the state‟s 
ordinary interest in crime control, (2) the administrative regulations that are 
required to serve this interest — involving, for example, limits on the number, 
size, and species of fish or game that may be taken at different times and in 
different locations — are of such a nature that they would be impossible to 
adequately enforce if a game warden could stop, and could demand to be shown 
all fish or game that have been caught by, only those anglers and hunters who the 
warden reasonably suspected had violated the fish and game laws, and (3) the 
impingement upon privacy engendered by such a stop and demand procedure is 
minimal because (i) the stops are limited to those persons who have voluntarily 
chosen to engage in the heavily regulated activity of fishing or hunting and as a 
consequence have a diminished reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to 
items directly related to such activity, and (ii) the required demands are limited to 
items directly related to fishing and hunting and do not require disclosure of 
intimate or confidential matters as to which such persons retain a substantial 
privacy interest.   
Even if we assume that a game warden‟s stop of a car in which an angler or 
hunter is riding entails a greater intrusion on privacy than a stop of an angler or 
5 
hunter who is on foot, we conclude that when, as in this case, the vehicle stop is 
made reasonably close in time and location to the fishing or hunting activity, the 
encroachment upon an angler‟s or hunter‟s reasonable expectation of privacy 
resulting from a brief vehicle stop and demand is nonetheless rather modest, and 
no more intrusive than other actions by game wardens that have been upheld in 
past California cases. 
Weighing (1) the special need of the state to stop persons who choose to 
fish or hunt in this state and to demand such persons display all fish or game that 
have been taken against (2) the intrusion upon such persons‟ reasonable 
expectation of privacy entailed by such a stop and demand, we conclude that the 
vehicle stop and demand at issue here constitutes a reasonable procedure under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal judgment 
upholding the suppression of evidence obtained by the game warden and 
subsequent dismissal of the charges against defendant. 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
A. 
The relevant facts in this case, as disclosed by the evidence introduced at 
the trial court hearing on defendant‟s motion to suppress evidence, are undisputed. 
Around 11:00 p.m. on a mid-August night in 2007, Erik Fleet, a 
Department of Fish and Game warden who had been employed by the department 
for 10 years, was on duty observing fishing activity occurring on the Ocean Beach 
public pier in San Diego.  Warden Fleet was observing surreptitiously, using a 
spotting telescope mounted on the window of his truck, parked approximately 200 
yards from the pier.   
Fleet testified that his attention was drawn to defendant because defendant 
was “fishing on the pier in a method we call handlining, which is commonly used 
to catch lobsters.  It‟s an illegal method of catching lobsters, but it‟s very 
6 
productive and . . . basically a person holds a fishing line in their hand, either the 
fishing line goes back to their fishing rod and reel or . . . they hold it in their hand 
and they jerk the fishing line which generally has a treble hook on the bottom of it 
with the weight on it and squid is usually used for bait.  And it gives them a better 
feel of the bottom because a lobster doesn‟t strike the bait, it will actually climb 
onto the bait and they lift the line up when they feel weight on it, they jerk it 
which causes the hook to penetrate the lobster and they bring it up.  It is very 
common and that‟s what drew my attention to Defendant.”1 
Fleet testified that defendant was accompanied on the pier by a woman and 
an infant, and had a black bag next to him.  Fleet saw defendant catch something 
using the handlining method and place the catch into the black bag, but Fleet 
stated that he was not able to see what had been caught and placed in the bag.  
(Fleet explained that the spotting telescope generally was powerful enough to 
distinguish a fish from a lobster, but that the “geographics” of the pier sometimes 
prevented him from determining what was caught.) 
Fleet then observed the two adults and the infant leave the pier, enter the 
Ocean Beach pier parking lot, and leave the parking lot in their vehicle.  Fleet 
thereafter stopped defendant‟s vehicle approximately three blocks from the pier.  
He explained at the hearing that he stopped the vehicle “[b]ecause I had seen him 
fishing on the pier and I had seen him catch something and . . . put it into that 
                                              
1  
An amicus curiae brief filed by the California Department of Fish and 
Game explains that “[u]sing hooks to catch lobsters is illegal because they damage 
the lobsters before they can be brought to the surface and measured to determine 
whether they meet the minimum size requirements.  Lobsters that are undersized, 
and that have not had an opportunity to reproduce and help maintain a healthy 
fishery, must be immediately returned to the ocean.”  Under the applicable 
regulations, noncommercial anglers may lawfully catch lobsters only by hand or 
with hoop nets.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 29.80, subds. (a), (b).) 
7 
black bag and therefore I wanted to make sure that . . . he was in compliance with 
the California fishing law and regulations.”  When asked whether at that point he 
suspected that defendant had broken the law, Fleet responded: “Not necessarily, 
no.”   
Fleet further testified that after stopping the vehicle, he approached the 
vehicle in full uniform, introduced himself as a state game warden, and asked 
defendant if he had any fish or lobsters in his vehicle.  Defendant said “[N]o.”  In 
light of what he had observed, Fleet believed that defendant was lying, and Fleet 
then conducted a search of the interior of the vehicle, “discovered the black bag 
under the female‟s feet in the left rear passenger [area],” looked in the bag and 
found a California spiny lobster.  Fleet took possession of the lobster.  Spiny 
lobster was out of season at that time and could not lawfully be taken by any 
method.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 29.90.)2 
Fleet testified that after finding the lobster, because “I was working by 
myself that evening and since he had the propensity to lie to me, I placed the 
Defendant in handcuffs for my safety and I sat him on the curb and continued a 
more detailed search of the vehicle.”  The further search did not turn up any other 
fish or lobsters. 
Fleet testified that defendant eventually admitted “the lobster was his” and 
apologized, stating “he was being stupid for doing what he did.”  Fleet then issued 
defendant a citation and removed the handcuffs.  Defendant signed the citation and 
                                              
2  
Under the applicable regulations, although a person fishing from a public 
pier is not required to obtain a fishing license, he or she must comply with 
applicable report card and tagging requirements and with all other applicable 
fishing regulations.  (See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 1.74, subd. (c)(2)(B), 
29.90-29.91.) 
8 
Fleet released him.  Fleet further testified that, after releasing defendant, he (Fleet) 
returned the spiny lobster to the water.   
On cross-examination, Fleet acknowledged that “people can use handlining 
for . . . regular old fishing,” that it was not illegal to catch fish by that method at 
the pier, and that when he saw defendant handlining he did not necessarily think 
that any law had been broken.   
The hearing on the motion to suppress in the present case was conducted at 
the same time as similar suppression hearings in two other matters, involving 
different defendants, in which Fleet had obtained evidence of fishing violations 
utilizing the same basic investigative technique that he used with respect to 
defendant.  At the hearing Fleet testified that his practice of viewing fishing 
activities from a hidden location using a spotting telescope and thereafter stopping 
persons who were to be checked after they had departed from their fishing 
locations in their cars was a general practice and technique that he had been taught 
in job training at the academy.  He explained that the practice was utilized because 
“if I contact people either in the parking lot while people are entering the pier, new 
people entering the pier, or if I contact people on the pier, then my . . . „cover‟ . . . 
becomes useless to me. . . .  I can‟t blow my cover on the pier when I‟m working 
the pier.  If I go out there, then everybody on the pier knows that Fish and Game is 
present.”  He continued:  “When I‟m working the pier, I work more than one 
group of people.  I can see multiple groups of people violating the law.  So, if I go 
check one group, then the other groups, all the evidence gets thrown, or my cover 
gets blown.”  When asked to explain what he meant by “evidence gets thrown,” 
Fleet stated:  “[Y]ou can throw evidence off the pier all the time . . . fish, lobsters 
. . . .”  In addition, Fleet noted that another reason for waiting until a person 
departs from the pier is that “it solidifies possession for me that that person has no 
intention of releasing whatever they have in their possession, fish or lobsters.”   
9 
B. 
As a result of the foregoing incident, defendant was charged with two 
misdemeanors:  (1) possessing a spiny lobster during closed season (Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 14, § 29.90, subd. (a)), and (2) failing to exhibit his catch upon demand.  
(Fish & G. Code, § 2012.)  The potential penalty for each charge is a fine of not 
more than $1,000, imprisonment in county jail for not more than six months, or 
both such a fine and imprisonment.  (Fish & G. Code, § 12002.) 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of Fleet‟s 
stop of his vehicle, asserting that such a vehicle stop was impermissible under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in the absence of evidence 
giving rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a criminal 
offense, and that such evidence was not present here.  The prosecution maintained 
that prior California cases indicated that such a stop by a game warden could be 
conducted in the absence of reasonable suspicion and that, in any event, the facts 
here were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.  The trial court 
disagreed with the prosecution‟s position on both points, ruling that such a vehicle 
stop — like ordinary vehicle stops by police officers investigating suspected 
criminal conduct — could be made only upon reasonable suspicion, and further 
that the facts at issue here did not support the reasonable suspicion standard.  
Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant‟s motion to suppress and 
subsequently dismissed the charges. 
The People appealed the dismissal to the appellate division of the superior 
court.  After briefing and argument, the appellate division reversed the trial court‟s 
decision, concluding that the relevant provisions of the Fish and Game Code — 
sections 1006 and 2012 — authorize a game warden to “stop and detain a person if 
it is objectively reasonable for the warden to conclude that the person is involved 
in fishing.  The stop must be for the purpose of exercising the authority to conduct 
10 
an administrative inspection to determine whether the person is in compliance 
with Fish and Game regulations, that is, to conduct a search of areas listed in 
Section 1006 and to demand the person . . . exhibit the items listed in Section 
2012.”  The appellate division additionally concluded, as an alternative 
justification for the stop, that Fleet‟s observation of defendant‟s conduct on the 
pier “provided a basis for an objectively reasonable suspicion that [defendant] had 
illegally harvested a lobster out of season . . . .”   
Thereafter, upon defendant‟s request, the appellate division certified the 
appeal for transfer to the Court of Appeal to permit that court to address the 
important general question whether a California game warden is statutorily 
authorized to stop a vehicle occupied by a person who the game warden 
reasonably believes has recently been fishing or hunting but without reasonable 
suspicion that the person has violated a fish and game statute or regulation, and, if 
so, whether such a suspicionless stop is unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment.  In response, the Court of Appeal transferred the appeal to itself for 
hearing and decision, requesting briefing on “(1) whether Fish and Game Code 
sections 1006 and 2012 authorize vehicle stops without reasonable suspicion of 
criminal conduct, and (2) whether the warden in this case had reasonable suspicion 
to believe [defendant] was engaged in illegal lobster fishing.” 
After briefing and argument, the Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one decision, 
concluded that Fleet‟s stop of defendant‟s vehicle was impermissible.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the majority opinion in the Court of Appeal initially determined 
that although the relevant provisions of the Fish and Game Code authorize a game 
warden “to stop people who are fishing on a pier to demand they exhibit their 
catch and to inspect their receptacles (e.g., tackle boxes, pails, etc.) in which fish 
may be stored,” those provisions do not authorize a game warden to stop a vehicle 
in which a person who has recently been fishing is riding in order to make a 
11 
similar demand for the display of any fish that have been caught.  The Court of 
Appeal additionally concluded that, in any event, Fleet‟s stop of defendant‟s 
vehicle would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if the facts 
known to Fleet provided reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in 
criminal activity and that the facts disclosed by the record in this case did not rise 
to the level of reasonable suspicion.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded 
that the trial court properly granted defendant‟s motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained by Fleet and it affirmed the trial court‟s dismissal of the charges against 
defendant. 
One Court of Appeal justice dissented, concluding that “where a game 
warden has good reason to believe that the occupants of a vehicle have been 
recently engaged in regulated hunting or fishing,” the applicable statutory 
provisions of the Fish and Game Code authorize the warden to stop the vehicle to 
inquire if any game has been taken and to demand the display of such game, and 
further that such a stop of a vehicle for these purposes does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment whether or not the warden is aware of facts that provide reasonable 
suspicion that the occupants have violated a fish and game statute or regulation.   
On petition by the People, we granted review to consider the validity of the 
conclusion by the Court of Appeal that a game warden is authorized to stop a 
vehicle occupied by a person who has been recently fishing or hunting to demand 
the display of all fish or game that have been caught or taken only if there is 
reasonable suspicion that the occupant has violated a fish and game statute or 
regulation.3 
                                              
3  
In its petition for review, the People sought review limited to the Court of 
Appeal‟s conclusion that a vehicle stop by a game warden is permissible only if 
there is reasonable suspicion that the occupant has committed a violation, and did 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
12 
II.  Are California Fish and Game Wardens Statutorily Authorized to 
Stop a Car Occupied by an Angler or Hunter, Without Reasonable Suspicion 
That the Angler or Hunter Has Violated the Law, to Demand the Display of 
Any Catch or Game in the Angler’s or Hunter’s Possession? 
We begin by considering whether the applicable provisions of the Fish and 
Game Code provided statutory authority for Warden Fleet to stop defendant‟s 
vehicle under the circumstances presented in this case.  As noted, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that although the applicable statutes authorized Fleet to stop and 
demand the display of any fish possessed by defendant when defendant was on the 
pier or in the pier parking lot, the statutes did not authorize Fleet to stop 
defendant‟s vehicle a few blocks from the pier to make a similar demand. 
Two sections of the Fish and Game Code — sections 1006 and 2012 — are 
potentially relevant to the issue of statutory authorization. 
Fish and Game Code section 1006 provides in pertinent part:  “The [Fish 
and Game] department may inspect the following:  [¶]  (a) All boats, markets, 
stores and other buildings, except dwellings, and all receptacles, except the 
clothing actually worn by a person at the time of inspection, where birds, 
mammals, fish, reptiles, or amphibia may be stored, placed, or held for sale or 
storage.”  
Fish and Game Code section 2012 provides:  “All licenses, tags, and the 
birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or amphibians taken or otherwise dealt with under 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
not seek review of the appellate court‟s determination that the facts known to the 
warden in this case were insufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.  
Because the People did not seek review of this case-specific issue, we have no 
occasion to determine whether the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that Fleet 
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant‟s vehicle.  For purposes of this 
opinion‟s discussion, we will simply assume, without deciding, that the facts 
known to Fleet did not satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.   
13 
this code, and any device or apparatus designed to be, and capable of being, used 
to take birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or amphibians shall be exhibited upon 
demand to any person authorized by the department to enforce this code or any 
law relating to the protection and conservation of birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or 
amphibians.”4 
In analyzing whether Fleet‟s conduct was statutorily authorized, the Court 
of Appeal placed primary emphasis on the provisions of section 1006.  Because 
that section lists “boats, markets, and stores” but does not list cars or other similar 
vehicles among the places that the statute specifically authorizes the department to 
inspect, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the statute did not authorize a game 
warden to stop or search a vehicle, even if the vehicle was occupied by a person 
who the warden reasonably believed had recently been fishing.  In support of its 
conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied in part on a 1944 opinion of the California 
Attorney General concluding that the word “receptacles,” as used in the statutory 
predecessor to section 1006, “cannot be extended to connote motor vehicles”  (4 
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 405, 407 (1944)), and that the statutory provision in question 
“confers no authority on the Commission or its officers to inspect or search 
automobiles.”  (Ibid.) 
As we explain, however, we believe the Court of Appeal erred in placing 
primary reliance upon section 1006 in evaluating the validity of the game 
warden‟s action in this case.  As the language and history of section 1006 
demonstrate, that section is concerned with the authority of game wardens to 
inspect or to search places, premises, or receptacles in which fish or game are 
stored or placed.  Section 1006 is not directed at the distinct question of the 
                                              
4  
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Fish 
and Game Code. 
14 
authority of game wardens to briefly stop or detain an angler or hunter in order to 
demand the display of all fish or game he or she may have caught or taken.5  In 
this case, the initial and key question concerns the authority of Fleet to stop 
defendant‟s car in order to demand the display of any fish or lobsters he had 
caught, and as to that issue it is the provisions of section 2012, rather than the 
provisions of section 1006, that are most directly on point.6 
Under the provisions of section 2012, any person who fishes or hunts in this 
state is required to exhibit, upon demand of any game warden (1) any required 
fishing or hunting license, (2) all fish or game that have been caught or taken, and 
(3) any equipment that has been used to take such fish or game.7  Although the 
                                              
5  
Section 1006 is derived from former section 23 of the original Fish and 
Game Code as enacted in 1933 (Stats. 1933, ch. 73, § 23, p. 396).  Former section 
23 provided in relevant part:  “The commission shall inspect regularly (1) all 
boats, markets, stores and other buildings, except dwellings, and all receptacles 
except the clothing actually worn by a person at the time of inspection, where 
birds, mammals, fish, mollusks, or crustaceans may be stored, placed, or held for 
sale or storage . . . .”  (Italics added.)  In providing for the regular inspection of the 
specified locations, former section 23 was evidently intended to authorize game 
wardens to conduct repeated inspections of places where fish and game were 
likely to be kept for sale or storage, and was not primarily directed at more ad hoc, 
in-the-field stops of noncommercial anglers and hunters by game wardens seeking 
the display of required licenses or any fish or game that have been caught or taken. 
 
6  
As we explain below (post, at pp. 36-37 & fn. 18), if Fleet‟s stop of 
defendant‟s car and demand for display of any fish or lobsters caught was 
statutorily authorized and constitutionally permissible, Fleet‟s subsequent search 
of defendant‟s car and the black bag in the car were permissible under the ordinary 
probable cause standard.  Accordingly, we have no occasion in this case to 
determine under what circumstances, if any, section 1006 would authorize a game 
warden to search a “receptacle” that is located within an automobile on less than 
probable cause. 
7  
Like section 1006, section 2012 is derived from a provision of the original 
Fish and Game Code as enacted in 1933.  Former section 403 provided:  “All 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
15 
statutory language does not explicitly so provide, it appears clear that section 2012 
implicitly authorizes a game warden to demand that a person who is or has 
recently been fishing or hunting display to the warden the items to which the 
statute refers.  (See, e.g., Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 
796, 810 [“It is well settled in this state that governmental officials may exercise 
such . . . powers as are necessary for the due and efficient administration of 
powers expressly granted by statute, or as may fairly be implied from the statute 
granting the powers”]; Betchart v. Department of Fish & Game (1984) 158 
Cal.App.3d 1104, 1109-1110 (Betchart) [applying foregoing principle in finding 
game wardens have implied authority to enter private property on which hunting 
occurs, despite property owner‟s objection, to enforce hunting regulations].)  
Nothing in the language or purpose of section 2012 suggests that such a demand 
may be made by a game warden only to an angler or hunter who the warden 
reasonably suspects has violated a fish and game statute or regulation, or may be 
made only when the angler or hunter is on foot or in a boat and not in a vehicle.  
Given the great expanse of the areas within California in which fishing and 
hunting take place and the necessarily limited number of game wardens available 
to enforce the fish and game laws, in our view it is simply not reasonable to 
interpret the statute as authorizing a game warden to stop an angler or hunter when 
the angler or hunter is on foot or in a boat but not also to stop an angler or hunter 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
licenses and the birds, mammals, fish, mollusks, or crustaceans taken or otherwise 
dealt with under the provisions thereof must be exhibited upon demand to any 
peace officer of this State or to any person authorized to enforce the provisions of 
this code or any law relating to the protection and conservation of birds, mammals, 
fish, mollusks, or crustaceans.”  (Stats. 1933, ch. 73, § 403, p. 435.) 
16 
who is travelling in a car during or recently after the fishing or hunting activity, to 
demand that he or she display the statutorily designated items. 
Prior California authority clearly supports an interpretation of section 2012 
that authorizes a game warden to stop a vehicle occupied by an angler or hunter to 
demand the display of the items specified in the statute.  The 1944 opinion of the 
California Attorney General relied upon by the Court of Appeal, for example, 
drew a clear distinction between the authority of a game warden to search an 
automobile and the authority of a game warden to stop an automobile to demand 
the display of any game taken.  The opinion concluded that whereas a game 
warden was not authorized to search a vehicle without probable cause, the warden 
could stop a vehicle occupied by persons who the warden reasonably believed to 
have been hunting and demand that the occupants display any game that had been 
taken.  (4 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 409.)  Similarly, in People v. Perez 
(1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1168 (Perez), the Court of Appeal upheld the authority of 
game wardens to stop and briefly detain vehicles occupied by hunters at a fixed 
highway fish and game checkpoint to demand the display of licenses, game, and 
hunting equipment.  (Perez, supra, at p. 1178.)  Defendant has not questioned the 
validity of the decision in Perez or the general authority of game wardens to 
establish fixed fish and game checkpoints on roads or highways, a practice that 
would be impermissible if game wardens lacked statutory authority to stop a 
vehicle in which an angler or hunter is riding to demand the display of the items 
specified in section 2012.  (See also State v. Keehner (Iowa 1988) 425 N.W.2d 41, 
44-45 [interpreting comparable Iowa statute as authorizing a game warden to stop 
a vehicle to demand the required display when the warden reasonably believes the 
occupant is engaged in hunting]; Drane v. State (Miss. 1986) 493 So.2d 294, 297-
298 [interpreting Miss. law as authorizing game wardens to routinely stop vehicles 
occupied by anglers or hunters to demand display of license or game].) 
17 
Accordingly, contrary to the determination of the Court of Appeal, we 
conclude that, reasonably interpreted, section 2012 authorizes a game warden to 
stop a vehicle whose occupant is or has recently been fishing or hunting to demand 
the occupant display all fish or game he or she has caught or taken.  Thus, Fleet‟s 
stop of defendant‟s vehicle cannot be faulted on the ground that Fleet lacked 
statutory authority to undertake such action. 
 
III.  Does a Fish and Game Warden’s Stop of an Angler’s Car to 
Demand the Display of the Angler’s Catch, Without Reasonable Suspicion 
that the Angler Has Violated a Fish and Game Statute or Regulation, Violate 
the Fourth Amendment? 
Defendant next contends that even if, as we have concluded, a California 
game warden is statutorily authorized to effect a suspicionless stop of a vehicle 
occupied by an angler or hunter to demand the display of all fish or game that the 
occupant has caught or taken, such a stop constitutes an unconstitutional search 
and seizure because it is made without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.  For 
the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the vehicle stop was 
constitutionally permissible. 
Under the current provisions of the California Constitution, evidence 
sought to be introduced at a criminal trial is subject to suppression as the fruit of 
an unconstitutional search and seizure “only if exclusion is . . . mandated by the 
federal exclusionary rule applicable to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment [of the United States Constitution].”  (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 
Cal.3d 873, 896.)  Accordingly, we must determine whether the vehicle stop at 
issue violated the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
18 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  Although it is well established 
that a brief stop of a vehicle to pose a question to an occupant or to demand the 
display of a document or other item, like a similar brief stop and inquiry of a 
pedestrian, constitutes a “seizure” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment (see, 
e.g., Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 653 (Prouse) [vehicle stop]; United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) 422 U.S. 873, 878 (Brignoni-Ponce) [vehicle 
stop]; Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52 [pedestrian stop]; Terry v. Ohio 
(1968) 392 U.S. 1, 16 [pedestrian stop]), it is equally well settled that because the 
intrusion upon privacy occasioned by such a brief stop is much less significant 
than the intrusion resulting from an arrest or other extended detention of an 
individual, the ordinary probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment applicable to arrests or similar full-scale seizures of a person do not 
apply to such brief vehicle or pedestrian stops or detentions.  (See, e.g., Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at pp. 881-884; Brown v. Texas, supra, at pp. 50-51.)  Instead, the 
constitutional validity of such a stop turns upon the reasonableness of the 
procedure, taking into account “ „the gravity of the public concerns served by the 
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the 
severity of the interference with individual liberty.‟ ”  (Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 
540 U.S. 419, 427; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 
[“[T]here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails”].)    
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the 
question of the constitutional validity of a brief stop of an angler or hunter by a 
game warden to demand the display of any fish or game in the angler‟s or hunter‟s 
possession, either when the angler or hunter is on foot or is in a vehicle.  Both 
defendant and the People maintain, however, that decisions of the United States 
19 
Supreme Court arising in other contexts provide guidance as to the controlling 
Fourth Amendment principles and each party argues that the prior decisions 
support its own position regarding the asserted invalidity or validity of the vehicle 
stop at issue here. 
Defendant contends that the most relevant Supreme Court decisions are 
those that, in other contexts, have upheld the constitutional validity of 
suspicionless stops of cars at fixed highway checkpoints but at the same time have 
concluded that suspicionless “roving” stops of cars are constitutionally 
impermissible and that such roving stops may be made only upon reasonable 
suspicion.  (Compare Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990) 496 U.S. 444 
(Sitz) [upholding suspicionless stop of vehicles at a fixed sobriety checkpoint] and 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S. 543 [upholding suspicionless 
stop of vehicles at fixed border patrol checkpoint] with Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 
648 [invalidating suspicionless roving stop of vehicle to check for driver‟s license] 
and Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. 873 [holding that roving stop of vehicle by 
border patrol to check for undocumented aliens requires reasonable suspicion].)  
Defendant argues that because the only prior California decision upholding the 
constitutional validity of a suspicionless fish and game stop of a vehicle involved a 
fixed highway checkpoint (see Perez, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th 1168) and because a 
roving stop involves a greater intrusion on privacy and less constraint upon a game 
warden‟s discretion than a fixed checkpoint (see, e.g., Prouse, supra, at p. 657), 
the Perez decision does not support the validity of the game warden‟s roving stop 
of his car in the present case. 
In response, the People point out that in Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648 — 
one of the seminal high court decisions finding roving suspicionless automobile 
stops impermissible — Justice Blackmun authored a concurring opinion (joined by 
Justice Powell) expressly cautioning that the rationale of the majority opinion in 
20 
Prouse would not necessarily apply to suspicionless vehicle stops by game 
wardens.  (See Prouse, supra, at p. 664 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.) [“I would not 
regard the present case as a precedent that throws any constitutional shadow upon 
the necessarily somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations 
by game wardens in the performance of their duties.  In a situation of that type, it 
seems to me, the Court‟s balancing process, and the value factors under 
consideration, would be quite different”].)   The People note that Justice 
Blackmun‟s comment in Prouse is the only statement relating to fish and game 
stops to appear in a Supreme Court decision to date.  They contend that in the fish 
and game context the factors upon which the high court relied in Prouse — 
particularly the practical need for and likely efficacy of suspicionless vehicle stops 
to serve the state interest at issue — support the conclusion that stopping anglers 
or hunters in vehicles to demand that they display any fish or game they have 
caught or taken, even without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
The People further contend that the constitutional validity of a suspicionless 
stop of an angler‟s or hunter‟s vehicle by a game warden to demand the display of 
any fish or game that has been caught or taken is supported by a separate line of 
Supreme Court cases that, in a variety of contexts, have upheld regulatory or 
administrative searches or seizures conducted without reasonable suspicion that 
the individual or business subjected to the procedure has violated a statute or 
regulation.  (See, e.g., United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S. 311 (Biswell) 
[upholding suspicionless inspection of documents and records of licensed firearm 
dealer]; Donovan v. Dewey (1981) 452 U.S. 594 (Donovan) [upholding 
suspicionless inspection of underground and surface mines]; New York v. Burger 
(1987) 482 U.S. 691 (Burger) [upholding suspicionless inspection of auto 
junkyard]; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602 
21 
(Skinner) [upholding suspicionless blood and urine testing of railroad employees 
involved in major railroad accidents]; Treasury Employees v. Von Raab (1989) 
489 U.S. 656 (Von Raab) [upholding suspicionless drug testing of customs service 
employees seeking positions involving the interdiction of drugs or requiring the 
carrying of firearms]; Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646 
(Vernonia) [upholding suspicionless drug testing of school athletes]; see also City 
of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (Edmond) [describing 
instances in which suspicionless searches or seizures have been found 
constitutionally permissible].) 
The foregoing cases have generally involved circumstances in which (1) the 
state has “special needs,” beyond its ordinary interest in the enforcement of 
criminal statutes, to conduct inspections (see, e.g., Vernonia, supra, 515 U.S. at 
pp. 652-653; Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873; New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
(1985) 469 U.S. 325, 351 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.)); (2) the regulations in the 
particular area could not be effectively enforced if public officials could conduct 
inspections only when the officials have a reasonable suspicion that a violation has 
occurred (see, e.g., Donovan, supra, 452 U.S. at pp. 602-603; Burger, supra, 482 
U.S. at p. 710); and (3) the persons or businesses subjected to the inspection are 
engaged in a particular category of activity that reduces the reasonable expectation 
of privacy of those engaged in such activities in relation to the searches or seizures 
at issue, and the discretion of inspecting officials is reasonably constrained by the 
authorizing statute or regulation (see, e.g., Vernonia, supra, at p. 657; Skinner, 
supra, 489 U.S. at p. 627; Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 316). 
In our view, the aforementioned factors to which the high court has looked 
in its special needs and administrative inspection cases are the appropriate factors 
to be considered in determining the reasonableness, for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, of the fish and game procedure at issue here.  As we explain below, 
22 
the state interest underlying a stop and demand pursuant to section 2012 is quite 
distinct from the state‟s ordinary interest in the enforcement of its criminal law, 
and the limited category of persons affected by the procedure — anglers and 
hunters — are individuals who have chosen to engage in a heavily regulated 
activity that reduces their reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the type 
of intrusion at issue.8  Accordingly, we conclude that the analysis undertaken by 
the United States Supreme Court in the above line of cases is warranted in this 
case as well. 
Furthermore, in evaluating the factors considered in the special needs and 
administrative inspection cases, we believe it is useful to begin by considering 
whether, under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for a game warden to stop 
an angler or hunter who is not in a vehicle — that is, an angler or hunter who is on 
                                              
8  
In defending the stop in this case, the People — in addition to relying upon 
the special needs and administrative inspection cases — argue that, in light of the 
heavily regulated nature of fishing and hunting, persons who choose to fish or hunt 
in this state have impliedly consented to be stopped by game wardens and to 
display their catch or take upon demand, and thus may not properly challenge the 
stop and demand procedure.  Although the United States Supreme Court has at 
times relied upon the “implied consent” theory (see, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States (1973) 413 U.S. 266, 271 [describing basis of administrative 
inspection decisions]; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313-314 
[same]), that theory has drawn substantial scholarly criticism (see, e.g., 4 LaFave, 
Search and Seizure (4th ed. 2004) § 8.2(l), pp. 122-124; 5 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, supra, § 10.2(c), pp. 48-53).  The high court‟s more recent decisions have 
usually described the effect of heavy or close regulation of a business or activity 
(or the special nature of the activity engaged in by the person subjected to the 
challenged procedure) as diminishing an individual‟s or business‟s reasonable 
expectation of privacy (see, e.g., Donovan, supra, 452 U.S. at pp. 598-599, 603-
604; Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 701-702; Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 627-
628; Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 672; Vernonia, supra, 515 U.S. at pp. 654-
657) rather than by reference to implied consent.  Following the Supreme Court‟s 
current approach, we consider the effect of the state‟s close regulation of fishing 
and hunting upon an angler‟s or hunter‟s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
23 
a pier, in a boat, or in the field  — to demand that he or she display any fish or 
game taken, without reasonable suspicion that the angler or hunter has violated a 
fish and game statute or regulation.  Thereafter, we consider whether even if such 
a stop of an angler or hunter who is not in a vehicle is constitutionally permissible, 
a suspicionless stop of a vehicle occupied by an angler or hunter who is or has 
recently been fishing or hunting is or is not constitutionally permissible. 
As noted above, the relevant cases have first considered the nature and 
strength of the state interest or need that is sought to be served by the procedure at 
issue, and whether that interest is distinct from the state‟s ordinary interest in 
enforcing its criminal law.  Here, the state interest at issue is the state‟s interest in 
protecting and preserving the fish and game resources of the state for the benefit of 
all of the public and for future generations.  The legitimacy and importance of this 
state interest are reflected in a number of provisions embodied in the California 
Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 25; id., art. IV, § 20; id., art. X B, §§ 1-16),9 in 
                                              
9  
Article I, section 25, was adopted in 1910 “ „to preserve to the people the 
right to fish upon the public lands of the state, and to require that grants of land by 
the state should not be made “without reserving to the people the absolute right to 
fish thereon.” ‟ ”  (Paladini v. Superior Court (1918) 178 Cal. 369, 372, quoting 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 25.)  At the same time, the section explicitly recognizes the 
Legislature‟s authority to regulate “the season when and the conditions under 
which the different species of fish may be taken” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 25), 
reaffirming the broad legislative discretion, set forth in prior judicial decisions, to 
protect the fish of the state for the public generally and for future generations.  
(Paladini v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 371-372.) 
 
Article IV, section 20, authorizes the Legislature to divide the state into 
“fish and game districts” and to “protect fish and game” in such districts, and 
additionally establishes the Fish and Game Commission. 
 
Article X B embodies the Marine Resources Protection Act of 1990, 
limiting the use of gill and trammel nets. 
   
24 
numerous statutory provisions (e.g., Fish & G. Code, §§ 1700, 1801),10 and in 
many judicial decisions rendered throughout our state‟s history.  (See, e.g., Ex 
parte Maier (1894) 103 Cal. 476, 479-484; Ex parte Kenneke (1902) 136 Cal. 527, 
528-530; In re Phoedovius (1918) 177 Cal. 238, 241-244.)  Past cases have 
described the state interest in preserving and managing its natural resources, 
including its wildlife, as great and compelling (see, e.g., Perez, supra, 51 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1175; Betchart, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 1110), and have 
stressed that the state has an obligation and duty to exercise supervision over such 
resources for the benefit of the public generally.  (See, e.g., People v. Harbor Hut 
Restaurant (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1154 (Harbor Hut).)  Although many of 
the prior California decisions, drawing upon the common law, speak of the state‟s 
“title” or “ownership” of the wild fish and animals within its borders (see, e.g., Ex 
parte Maier, supra, at p. 483; Perez, supra, at p. 1175) — a characterization that a 
number of United States Supreme Court decisions have described as a legal fiction  
(see, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell (1948) 334 U.S. 385, 402; Douglas v. Seacoast 
                                              
10  
Section 1700 provides in relevant part: “It is hereby declared to be the 
policy of the state to encourage the conservation, maintenance, and utilization of 
the living resources of the ocean and other waters under the jurisdiction and 
influence of the state for the benefit of all citizens of the state . . . .  This policy 
shall include . . . :  [¶]  (a) The maintenance of sufficient populations of all species 
of aquatic organisms to insure their continued existence. . . .” 
 
Section 1801 provides in relevant part:  “It is hereby declared to be the 
policy of the state to encourage the preservation, conservation, and maintenance of 
wildlife resources under the jurisdiction and influence of the state.  This policy 
shall include the following objectives:  [¶]  (a) To maintain sufficient populations 
of all species of wildlife and habitat necessary to achieve the objectives stated in 
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).  [¶]  (b) To provide for the beneficial use and 
enjoyment of wildlife by all citizens of the state.  [¶]  (c) To perpetuate all species 
of wildlife for their intrinsic and ecological values, as well as for their direct 
benefits to all persons.  [¶]  (d) To provide for aesthetic, educational, and 
nonappropriative uses of the various wildlife species.”   
25 
Products, Inc. (1977) 431 U.S. 265, 284; Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979) 441 U.S. 
322, 331-336; cf. People v. Brady (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 954, 961) — all of the 
pertinent decisions, including all of the federal decisions that have addressed the 
state ownership of wildlife language, confirm the legitimate and, indeed, vital 
nature of a state‟s interest in protecting its natural resources, including the wildlife 
within the state, from depletion and potential unavailability for future generations.  
(See, e.g., Toomer, supra, at p. 402; Douglas, supra, at p. 284; Hughes, supra, at 
pp. 335-336; Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm’n (1978) 436 U.S. 371, 
386-387, 389-391; Brady, supra, at p. 961.)  This state interest is quite distinct 
from the state‟s ordinary interest in crime control, and in this respect is 
comparable to the types of state interests involved in the high court‟s special needs 
cases. 
Second, many of the regulations that are required to further the state‟s 
interest in preserving species of fish and game for the current and future 
generations concern, for example, the specific species, number and size of fish or 
animals that may be caught or taken.11 A rule permitting a game warden to stop 
and to demand display of only those anglers or hunters who the warden reasonably 
suspects have violated a statute or regulation would seriously compromise, if not 
completely undermine, the state‟s ability to accomplish its objective.  Violations 
of these types of regulations are not readily apparent from an angler‟s or hunter‟s 
outward appearance or conduct, and realistically can be detected only if a game 
                                              
11  
During the suppression hearing, Fleet explained: “All of the size 
regulations are geared around the reproductive cycles of these fish and . . . it gives 
the fish enough time to produce and spawn several seasons prior to being taken 
from the wild.  That‟s what the regulations are for, it‟s to keep the resource 
stocked.”   
26 
warden is able to stop and demand the required disclosure of any person who the 
warden reasonably believes is or has recently been fishing or hunting. 
Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648, held that a roving suspicionless stop of a 
vehicle to check if the driver possessed a valid driver‟s license was not a 
reasonable seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily upon its determination 
that (1) the state interest in ensuring that those persons driving on its roads and 
highways have a valid driver‟s license was adequately and much more effectively 
served by stopping vehicles that commit traffic violations and checking the 
stopped drivers for valid licenses and registration than by choosing randomly to 
stop vehicles from the entire universe of drivers to check for driver‟s licenses, and 
(2) that an unlicensed driver would be as readily deterred by the likelihood of 
being involved in an accident or stopped for a traffic violation as by the chance of 
being randomly stopped for a spot check.  (Prouse, supra, at pp. 659-660.)12  In 
                                              
12  
In Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648, the court stated in this regard:  “The 
foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations, it must be 
recalled, is acting upon observed violations.  Vehicle stops for traffic violations 
occur countless times each day; and on these occasions, licenses and registration 
papers are subject to inspection and drivers without them will be ascertained.  
Furthermore, drivers without licenses are presumably the less safe drivers whose 
propensities may well exhibit themselves.  Absent some empirical data to the 
contrary, it must be assumed that finding an unlicensed driver among those who 
commit traffic violations is a much more likely event than finding an unlicensed 
driver by choosing randomly from the entire universe of drivers.  If this were not 
so, licensing of drivers would hardly be an effective means of promoting roadway 
safety.  It seems common sense that the percentage of all drivers on the road who 
are driving without a license is very small and that the number of licensed drivers 
who will be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be large indeed.  
The contribution to highway safety made by discretionary stops selected from 
among drivers generally will therefore be marginal at best.  Furthermore, and 
again absent something more than mere assertion to the contrary, we find it 
difficult to believe that the unlicensed driver would not be deterred by the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
27 
the fish and game context, by contrast, there is no comparable alternative that 
provides an effective means of enforcing the fish and game regulations, and 
anglers and hunters are not likely to be deterred from complying with the 
numerous, difficult-to-detect regulations in the absence of a requirement that they 
display all fish or game caught or taken upon demand of any game warden.  (See, 
e.g., Mollica v. Volker (2d Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 366, 372 [“ „It would be impossible 
for environmental conservation officers to perform their regulatory functions 
without stopping hunters as they leave known public hunting areas. . . .  [I]t is 
impossible to determine whether game is properly tagged until after the hunter 
ha[s] secured the game and ha[s] departed the area.‟  [The conservation officer], 
furthermore, could not have proceeded by attempting to spot drivers whose 
particular characteristics gave rise to a reasonable suspicion.  Unlike driving under 
the influence of alcohol, the possession of improperly tagged deer cannot be 
readily identified by the manner of driving, or other features ascertainable without 
stopping a motor vehicle”].) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
possibility of being involved in a traffic violation or having some other experience 
calling for proof of his entitlement to drive but that he would be deterred by the 
possibility that he would be one of those chosen for a spot check.  In terms of 
actually discovering unlicensed drivers or deterring them from driving, the spot 
check does not appear sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law 
enforcement practice under the Fourth Amendment.”  (Id. at pp. 659-660, 
fn. omitted; see also Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 883 [“[t]he nature of 
illegal alien traffic and the characteristics of smuggling operations tend to generate 
articulable grounds for identifying violators.  Consequently, a requirement of 
reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate means of guarding 
the public interest and also protects residents of the border areas from 
indiscriminate official interference”].) 
28 
Third, for a number of reasons, we conclude that the intrusion upon privacy 
engendered by a game warden‟s stop of an angler or hunter to demand the display 
of his or her catch or take is relatively minor.  To begin with, the stops are limited 
to persons who a game warden reasonably believes are or have recently been 
fishing or hunting — persons who have voluntarily chosen to engage in an activity 
that is heavily regulated in order to assure the continued existence of the wildlife 
of this state for the benefit not only of future generations but for the benefit of 
current anglers and hunters themselves.  In light of the number and nature of the 
regulations that apply to fishing and hunting13 and the type of enforcement 
procedures that are necessary to enforce such regulations, anglers and hunters have 
a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy when engaged in such activity.14  
(See, e.g., Perez, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178; Mollica v. Volker, supra, 229 
F.3d at p. 372.)  In addition, the intrusion upon privacy occasioned by such a stop 
and demand is further diminished because the required display is limited to items 
directly related to the person‟s fishing or hunting activity and does not require the 
disclosure of unrelated possessions in which the angler or hunter reasonably 
retains a substantial privacy interest.  Finally, because section 2012 strictly limits 
the items that a game warden may demand be displayed, the statute significantly 
constrains a game warden‟s discretion in a manner that closely comports with the 
                                              
13  
The Department of Fish and Game has published an 88-page booklet 
setting forth the regulations applicable to ocean sport fishing in California.  (Cal. 
Dept. Fish & Game, Cal. Ocean Sport Fishing Regulations (2010-2011).) 
 
14  
Contrary to defendant‟s contention, numerous cases establish that the 
existence of pervasive regulation can diminish the reasonable expectation of 
individuals as well as businesses.  (See, e.g., Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. 602, 627-
628 [railroad workers]; Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 672 [customs service 
employees]; Vernonia, supra, 515 U.S. at p. 657 [school athletes]; Shoemaker v. 
Handel (3d Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 1136 [racehorse jockeys].) 
29 
state interest in question.  (Cf., e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 881-
882 [“The officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship 
and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain any suspicious 
circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or 
probable cause”]; Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 711-712 [“the permissible scope 
of these searches is narrowly defined: the inspectors may examine the records, as 
well as „any vehicles or parts of vehicles which are subject to the record keeping 
requirements of this section and which are on the premises‟ ”].) 
Balancing the importance and strength of the state‟s interest and need for 
the suspicionless stop and demand procedure against the limited impingement 
upon privacy resulting from that procedure, we conclude that the Fourth 
Amendment does not preclude a state from authorizing a game warden to briefly 
stop a person the warden encounters on a pier, in a boat, or in the field, who the 
warden reasonably believes has recently been fishing or hunting, to demand that 
the person display all fish or game that he or she has caught or taken, even in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion that the person has violated a fish and game 
statute or regulation.  Indeed, both the Court of Appeal and defendant appear to 
concede this point, because both acknowledge that, even in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, in this case Fleet could have stopped defendant and 
demanded display of any fish or lobsters in his possession had Fleet confronted 
defendant while defendant was on the pier or in the pier parking lot, rather than in 
his car. 
Defendant argues and the Court of Appeal concluded, however, that a 
different constitutional result is compelled here because Fleet stopped defendant to 
demand the display of his catch while defendant was in a car rather than on the 
pier or in the pier parking lot.  Even if we assume that the stop of a car on a public 
street or highway involves a greater intrusion on privacy than the stop of an 
30 
individual when the individual is on foot, when the vehicle stop is made by a game 
warden reasonably close in time and location to an individual‟s fishing or hunting 
activity, the impingement upon the individual‟s reasonable expectation of privacy 
is quite modest, and no more intrusive than the actions of game wardens that have 
been upheld in prior California decisions.  (See, e.g., Betchart, supra, 158 
Cal.App.3d 1104 [game warden‟s entry onto private property, over owner‟s 
objection, to enforce hunting regulations]; Harbor Hut, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d 
1151 [game warden‟s inspection of wholesale fish market‟s records and stock].) 
 
In light of the importance of the state interest served by such a stop, and the 
practical need to be able to make such a stop and demand even when there is not 
reasonable suspicion that an angler or hunter has violated a statute or regulation, 
we conclude that when a game warden reasonably believes that an occupant of a 
vehicle has recently been fishing or hunting, the warden does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment by stopping the vehicle to demand the display of all fish or 
game that have been taken. 
 
We note that the great majority of out-of-state decisions that have addressed 
the question of the validity of suspicionless stops of anglers and hunters by game 
wardens have found such stops constitutionally permissible.  Although many of 
the cases have involved fixed highway checkpoints (see, e.g., U.S. v. Fraire (9th 
Cir. 2009) 575 F.3d 929; State v. Sherburne (Me. 1990) 571 A.2d 1181; Drane v. 
State, supra, 493 So.2d 294 [Miss.]; State v. Albaugh (N.D. 1997) 571 N.W.2d 
345; State v. Tourtillott (Or. 1980) 618 P.2d 423; State v. Halverson  (S.D. 1979) 
277 N.W.2d 723), a substantial number have upheld roving suspicionless stops of 
persons a game warden reasonably believes have been fishing or hunting.  (See, 
e.g., Elzey v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 1999) 519 S.E.2d 751; People v. Layton (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1990) 552 N.E.2d 1280; State v. Keehner, supra, 425 N.W.2d 41 [Iowa]; State 
31 
v. Colosimo (Minn. 2003) 669 N.W.2d 1; State v. Boyer (Mont. 2002) 42 P.3d 
771.) 
Most of the out-of-state decisions that have found roving suspicionless fish 
and game stops unconstitutional have involved instances in which the stops were 
not confined to persons the game warden had reason to believe had recently been 
fishing or hunting (see, e.g., United States v. Munoz (9th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 
1293, 1295-1301; People v. Coca (Colo. 1992) 829 P.2d 385, 387; State v. Creech 
(N.M.Ct.App. 1991) 806 P.2d 1080, 1084; State v. Legg (W.Va. 2000) 536 S.E.2d 
110, 112) or went beyond the bounds of a reasonable fish and game inspection 
(see, e.g., State v. Medley (Idaho 1995) 898 P.2d 1093; State v. Baldwin (N.H. 
1984) 475 A.2d 522, 526-527).  We are aware of one out-of-state case in which an 
appellate court stated in dictum that although a game warden may conduct a 
roving stop of an angler or hunter who is not in a vehicle without reasonable 
suspicion, a roving stop of a vehicle occupied by an angler or hunter may be 
conducted only upon reasonable suspicion.  (People v. Levens (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) 
713 N.E.2d 1275, 1277.)  (The statement in question was dictum because in 
Levens itself the court upheld the validity of the stop at issue in that case, finding 
that the game warden who made the stop reasonably believed the defendant was 
engaged in illegal hunting from his car.)  In stating that reasonable suspicion was 
required for such a vehicle stop, however, the court in Levens did not analyze the 
various factors discussed in the special needs and administrative inspection cases, 
and in particular failed to consider the practical effect of a reasonable suspicion 
requirement upon the state‟s general ability to enforce its fish and game 
regulations.  For this reason, we do not find the dictum in Levens persuasive. 
 
32 
IV.  Even If Suspicionless Fish and Game Vehicle Stops of Anglers or 
Hunters Are Generally Constitutional, Did the Particular Circumstances of 
the Vehicle Stop in This Case Render the Stop Unconstitutional? 
Defendant further contends that even if the Fourth Amendment does not, as 
a general matter, prohibit a roving suspicionless stop of a vehicle occupied by an 
angler or hunter to demand the display of all fish or game that have been caught or 
taken, the stop of defendant‟s car was nonetheless unlawful for a variety of 
reasons arising from the particular facts of the present case.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we conclude that this additional claim lacks merit. 
Defendant first asserts that although the stop in this case was conducted by 
a game warden rather than an ordinary police officer, the technique utilized by the 
warden — stopping vehicles leaving the pier only when the warden subjectively 
believed that an occupant might have violated the law — demonstrates that the 
warden‟s primary motivation for the stop was crime detection, rather than the 
protection of the state‟s fish and game, and for that reason the stop was 
unconstitutional.  (Cf., e.g., Edmond, supra, 531 U.S. 32 [fixed highway 
checkpoint established to detect and interdict illegal drugs was unconstitutional 
because its purpose was ordinary crime control]; Ferguson v. Charleston (2001) 
532 U.S. 67 [hospital‟s special procedure of drug testing pregnant patients was 
unconstitutional because the police department‟s involvement in the procedure‟s 
drafting and administration demonstrated that the procedure‟s objective was to 
obtain evidence to facilitate the threat of criminal prosecution].)  Although the 
Court of Appeal agreed with this assertion, in our view it is not well founded.  The 
controlling United States Supreme Court decisions explain that in determining 
whether the purpose of a challenged procedure is ordinary crime detection or some 
other objective, the appropriate focus is upon the programmatic purpose of the 
procedure, not the motivations of the individual officer.  (See, e.g., Edmond, 
supra, at pp. 45-47; Ferguson, supra, at p. 81.)  As the high court‟s administrative 
33 
inspection cases establish, the circumstance that a violation of an administrative 
regulation may be prosecuted as a crime does not mean that an administrative stop 
or inspection procedure is primarily intended as an ordinary crime control 
measure, rather than to serve a distinct interest other than the enforcement of the 
criminal law.   (See, e.g., Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 712-713; Biswell, supra, 
406 U.S. at pp. 314-316.)  In our view, it is clear that the primary programmatic 
purpose of section 2012‟s requirement that anglers and hunters display all fish or 
game that have been caught or taken upon demand of any game warden is to 
protect and preserve the wildlife of the state, rather than to further the state‟s 
interest in ordinary crime control.  (See, e.g., U.S. v. Fraire, supra, 575 F.3d at 
pp. 932-933 [game checkpoint was not a general crime control device even though 
hunting violations could subject violator to criminal prosecution].)  Moreover, 
even if it were appropriate to consider the individual motivation of Warden Fleet, 
it appears clear that his actions were directed at protecting the state‟s wildlife.  As 
we have seen, the record establishes that Fleet not only cited defendant for 
violating the fish and game statutes and regulations, but also that he returned the 
improperly taken lobster to the ocean, an action that clearly furthered the state‟s 
interest in protecting and preserving the state‟s wildlife.15 
Defendant next contends that in order to establish that the particular seizure 
was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the prosecution was 
required to establish that the specific investigative method employed here — that 
is, the surreptitious observation of persons fishing on the pier and the subsequent 
                                              
15 
As noted above (ante, at p. 8), in this case the hearing on defendant‟s 
motion to suppress evidence was conducted at the same time as suppression 
hearings in two other cases in which Fleet made similar vehicle stops of anglers on 
two other occasions.  In each instance, in addition to citing the anglers, Fleet 
returned all unlawfully caught fish or lobsters to the ocean.   
34 
stopping of individuals to demand the display of their catch only after they entered 
their vehicles and left the pier parking lot — was necessary and more effective 
than alternative enforcement procedures, such as establishing a fixed checkpoint at 
the exit of the pier parking lot or having a fish and game officer demand such 
display from anglers while they are still on the pier.  Past cases, however, do not 
support the suggestion that a state is obligated to utilize the least restrictive 
alternative in establishing such administrative procedures in order to satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, but rather explain that a state has 
considerable leeway in choosing between alternative enforcement methods.  (See, 
e.g., Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 453-454 [“[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the choice among . . . reasonable alternatives remains with the 
governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility 
for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers”]; United 
States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 11 [“The reasonableness of the officer‟s 
decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive 
investigatory techniques”].) 
Here, although the game warden‟s observation of defendant was 
surreptitious, the activity of defendant that was observed occurred in a public 
place and was not of an intimate or private nature.  Past California decisions have 
upheld a game warden‟s use of a spotting telescope in this fashion to enforce the 
applicable fish and game regulations.  (See, e.g., People v. Tatman (1993) 20 
Cal.App.4th 1, 6; People v. Nguyen (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 687, 690-691.)  In 
view of the great geographic expanse and the significant number of locations at 
which fishing and hunting occur in California and the limited number of game 
35 
wardens available to enforce the fish and game laws throughout the state,16 we 
conclude that the administrative practice of utilizing covert observation — a 
practice that promotes self-policing by anglers and hunters — constitutes a 
reasonable means of enforcing the applicable fish and game statutes and 
regulations.  (Cf. Harbor Hut, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1156 [“[A] wholesale 
fish dealer‟s knowledge that his records and stock can, without warning, be 
examined is an effective means of ensuring compliance with the applicable laws 
and regulations”].) 
Finally, defendant argues that the intrusion on privacy resulting from the 
vehicle stop in this case was greater than the intrusions incurred in fish and game 
stops in other cases because the stop here occurred at night in an urban area, a 
setting in which a vehicle driver or occupant might well be apprehensive about 
being stopped and directed to pull over by someone who might turn out not to be 
an actual law enforcement officer.   But it was defendant, of course, who chose to 
fish at night on the pier in question, and because the vehicle stop was made in 
close proximity to the pier by a uniformed game warden, we conclude that the 
intrusion upon defendant‟s privacy resulting from the stop was not so significant 
as to outweigh the justification for the stop. 
Accordingly, we conclude that Fleet did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
in stopping defendant‟s vehicle and demanding defendant display any fish or 
lobsters he had caught. 
                                              
16  
According to the most recent state publication on state employment, the 
Fish and Game Department employs approximately 300 game wardens in its law 
enforcement division.  (See Cal. Dept. of Fin., Salaries & Wages (2010-2011) 
Natural Resources, pp. RES 69-70.) 
36 
V.  If the Stop of Defendant’s Vehicle Was Lawful, Did the Fish and 
Game Warden Nonetheless Violate the Fourth Amendment in Searching 
Defendant’s Vehicle and Seizing the Lobster Found Therein? 
Finally, defendant contends that even if the stop of his vehicle was lawful, 
the evidence obtained by Fleet should still be suppressed because Fleet‟s 
subsequent search of his vehicle and the black bag contained therein — which led 
to the discovery of the evidence in question — was unconstitutional.  We disagree. 
As noted above, after stopping defendant‟s vehicle Fleet asked defendant 
whether he had any fish or lobsters in his car and defendant responded that he did 
not.17  Because Fleet had personally observed defendant catch either a fish or a 
lobster on the pier, place the item in a black bag, take the bag to his vehicle in the 
pier parking lot, and drive out of the lot, Fleet reasonably believed that defendant 
was lying to him when he denied having any fish or lobsters in his vehicle.  Under 
these circumstances, Fleet had probable cause to believe (1) that defendant was in 
violation of section 2012 requiring a person to exhibit his catch upon demand, 
(2) that evidence of that violation was reasonably likely to be present in the black 
bag into which the game warden had seen defendant place his catch, and (3) that 
the black bag was reasonably likely to be in the vehicle defendant was driving 
away from the pier.  Accordingly, Fleet‟s ensuing search of defendant‟s vehicle 
for the black bag, his search of the black bag itself, and his discovery and seizure 
of the unlawfully taken lobster from inside the bag all were supported by probable 
                                              
17  
Although Fleet‟s question to defendant did not expressly “demand” the 
display of any fish or lobsters in the vehicle, we believe it is clear that in context 
the game warden‟s question to defendant, who had just left the pier after fishing, 
reasonably would have been so understood, and neither defendant nor the Court of 
Appeal suggests otherwise.  (See, e.g., People v. Maxwell (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 
Supp. 1026, 1028 [construing game warden‟s statement to anglers as impliedly 
demanding display of catch].)  By denying that he had any fish or lobsters in his 
vehicle when he had a lobster, defendant failed to display his catch upon demand.   
37 
cause and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  (See, e.g., United States v. 
Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 817-824.)18 
VI.  Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, the Court of Appeal judgment, upholding 
the trial court‟s suppression of evidence obtained by the game warden and its 
subsequent dismissal of the charges against defendant, is reversed. 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
COFFEE, J.P.T.* 
 
 
                                              
18  
Because defendant‟s conduct after being lawfully stopped provided Fleet 
with probable cause to search defendant‟s vehicle and the black bag within the 
vehicle, we have no occasion in this case to determine (1) whether section 1006 
authorizes a game warden to search a vehicle occupied by an angler or hunter (or a 
receptacle within such a vehicle) without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 
or (2) if section 1006 authorizes such a search, whether such a search would be 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.  (See, e.g., People v. Maxwell, supra, 
275 Cal.App.2d Supp. at pp. 1027-1029 [upholding game warden‟s suspicionless 
search of sack carried by anglers disembarking from fishing boat when warden 
reasonably believed sack contained fish]; People v. Johnson (1980) 108 
Cal.App.3d 175, 179 [upholding game warden‟s search of sack in a vehicle 
occupied by a hunter when warden reasonably believed sack contained 
pheasants].) 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Maikhio 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 180 Cal.App.4th 1178 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S180289 
Date Filed: June 20, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: David B. Oberholtzer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney, David P. Greenberg and Andrew Jones,, Assistant City Attorneys, Monica 
A. Tiana and Jonathan I. Lapin, Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Matthew Rodriquez, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, Carol A. Squire, Deborah Fletcher 
and Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, for California Department of Fish and Game as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Randy Mize, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Gary R. Nichols, Matthew 
Braner and Jessica Marshall, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jonathan I. Lapin 
Deputy City Attorney 
1200 Third Avenue, Suite 700 
San Diego, CA  92101-4103 
(619) 533-5500 
 
Nicholas Stern 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-3840 
 
Matthew Braner 
Deputy Public Defender 
450 B Street, Suite 900 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 338-4705