Title: State v. Verkerk

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA 13-159 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 3 September 2013 
 
 
CLAUDE V. MEDLIN, Employee, 
Plaintiff, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
The North Carolina Industrial 
Commission 
I.C. No. 128568 
WEAVER COOKE CONSTRUCTION, LLC, 
Employer, KEY RISK INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by plaintiff from the opinion and award entered 19 
October 2012 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2013. 
 
Oxner, Thomas and Permar, PLLC, by Michael G. Soto, for 
plaintiff-appellant 
 
Brooks, Stevens and Pope, PA, by Joy Brewer, for defendant-
appellees 
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge 
 
 
Plaintiff Claude Medlin (“plaintiff”) appeals from the 
opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission 
terminating his ongoing temporary total disability compensation 
and awarding defendants Weaver Cooke Construction and Key Risk 
Insurance Company (collectively “defendants”) a credit for all 
temporary total disability compensation paid to plaintiff 
 
-2- 
between 22 December 2010 and the date of termination.  On 
appeal, plaintiff argues that the Industrial Commission erred in 
concluding that plaintiff had not met the burden of proving 
disability from 22 December 2010 to the present.  After careful 
review, we affirm the opinion and award. 
Background 
In April 2006, Weaver Cooke Construction (“Weaver”) hired 
plaintiff.  Plaintiff has a Bachelor’s of Science degree in 
civil engineering from North Carolina State University and, 
since graduating in 1974, he has worked in the commercial 
construction industry as a project engineer, project manager, 
and estimator.  Plaintiff worked as a project manager and 
estimator for Weaver.   
Plaintiff injured his right shoulder while moving furniture 
at a worksite in May 2008.  On 22 December 2008, Weaver accepted 
plaintiff’s injury as compensable via Form 60, and plaintiff 
began receiving medical treatment.  Plaintiff continued to work 
after his injury until being laid off on 21 November 2008.  The 
parties stipulated in the pre-trial agreement that the reason 
for his layoff was a “reduction of staff due to lack of work.”  
During this time, Weaver had to undergo widespread layoffs, and 
the total number of employees for Weaver dropped from 160 to 65 
and estimator positions dropped from 8 to 4.  Plaintiff began 
 
-3- 
receiving unemployment benefits approximately the first week of 
January 2009.  In February 2009, plaintiff began receiving 
temporary total disability benefits from defendants.  From early 
2009 until late March 2011, plaintiff received overlapping 
unemployment benefits and temporary total disability benefits.   
The vast majority of facts regarding plaintiff’s medical 
history are not necessary to address the issues in his appeal.  
In summary, after his injury, plaintiff began seeing Dr. Raymond 
Carroll for medical treatment.  Dr. Carroll performed surgery on 
plaintiff’s shoulder on 10 February 2009, and plaintiff began 
physical therapy.  Plaintiff experienced an increase in right 
shoulder pain until he was discharged from physical therapy in 
April 2009.  Dr. Carroll placed plaintiff at maximum medical 
improvement 
and 
released 
him 
to 
return 
to 
work 
without 
restrictions.  After experiencing an increase in pain, plaintiff 
returned to Dr. Carroll who recommended surgery.  Although 
defendants authorized the surgery, plaintiff decided to seek a 
second opinion.  After receiving authorization from defendants, 
plaintiff changed his physician to Dr. Kevin Speer who placed 
plaintiff at maximum medical improvement and assigned permanent 
work restrictions of no lifting greater than ten pounds, no 
climbing ladders, and no repetitive overhead activities.   
Following his layoff, plaintiff sought employment within 
 
-4- 
the construction industry.  Plaintiff estimated that he had made 
hundreds of job inquiries after being laid off.   
 
On 22 December 2010, defendants filed an “Application to 
Terminate Payment of Compensation,” arguing that plaintiff was 
no longer able to establish disability related to his injury 
since the only reason he could not obtain an estimator position 
with another employer was due to the economic downturn and not 
based on any physical restrictions.  The matter came on for 
hearing 
before 
the 
Full 
Commission 
on 
19 
October 
2012.  
Specifically, the Full Commission concluded that “[p]laintiff 
cannot establish disability secondary to his work-related injury 
at any time from 22 December 2010 to the present[.]”  Thus, it 
terminated 
plaintiff’s 
ongoing 
compensation 
and 
awarded 
defendants a credit for all disability compensation paid after 
22 December 2010.  Plaintiff timely appealed.   
Arguments 
Plaintiff 
argues 
that 
the 
Full 
Commission 
erred 
in 
concluding that he was unable to prove disability between 22 
December 2010 and the date of termination.  Specifically, 
plaintiff contends that because he has shown that he is 
incapable of earning the same wages he had before his injury, 
even after engaging in reasonable efforts to find work, he has 
met his burden of proving disability.  We disagree. 
 
-5- 
Review of an opinion and award of the Full Commission “is 
limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports 
the Commission’s findings of fact and whether the findings 
support the Commission’s conclusions of law.  This Court’s duty 
goes no further than to determine whether the record contains 
any evidence tending to support the finding.’”  Richardson v. 
Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 
582, 584 (2008) (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln 
Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)).  
Disability means “incapacity because of injury to earn the 
wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in 
the same or any other employment."  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) 
(2011).  In order to prove ongoing total disability, plaintiff 
must prove (1) the incapacity of earning pre-injury wages in the 
same employment, (2) the incapacity of earning pre-injury wages 
in any other employment, and (3) that this incapacity to earn 
wages is caused by the injury.  Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 
305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982).  “A determination 
of whether a worker is disabled focuses upon impairment to the 
injured employee’s earning capacity rather than upon physical 
infirmity.”  Johnson v. Southern Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 
701, 707, 599 S.E.2d 508, 513 (2004); see also Peoples v. Cone 
Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 437, 342 S.E.2d 798, 805 (1986) 
 
-6- 
(holding that an injured employee’s earning capacity must be 
measured by the employee’s own ability to compete in the labor 
market). 
The dissent utilizes the analytical framework set out in 
Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 425 
S.E.2d 454 (1993) to assert that plaintiff has met his burden of 
production.  The purpose of the four-pronged Russell test is to 
provide 
channels 
through 
which 
an 
injured 
employee 
may 
demonstrate the required “link between wage loss and the work-
related injury.”  See Fletcher v. Dana Corp., 119 N.C. App. 491, 
494-99, 459 S.E.2d 31, 34-36 (1995) (noting that the Russell 
test is an evidentiary tool used to show a causal connection 
between injury and wage loss).  The second prong of the test, 
which the dissent argues has been met by plaintiff, reads “[t]he 
employee may meet this burden [by producing] . . . evidence that 
he is capable of some work, but that he has, after a reasonable 
effort on his part, been unsuccessful in his effort to obtain 
employment.”  Russell, 108 N.C. App. at 765, 425 S.E.2d at 457.  
However, implied in this prong is the causal connection between 
the injury and the unsuccessful attempt at finding employment.  
See id. (“The burden is on the employee to show that he is 
unable to earn the same wages he had earned before the 
injury[.]”) (emphasis added).  Indeed, the Fletcher court’s 
 
-7- 
holding is based on its conclusion that “but for the work-
related injury she sustained, [the plaintiff] would not have 
become unemployed and suffered wage loss in consequence of the 
unavailability of other employment.”  Fletcher, 119 N.C. App. at 
497, 459 S.E.2d at 35. 
The 
dissent 
favorably 
quotes 
the 
Fletcher 
court’s 
observation that “the partially disabled employee’s only burden 
is to show he is unable to earn wages because of his injury, not 
that he must show that the economy or other factors are not the 
cause of unemployment.”  Id. at 499, 459 S.E.2d at 37 (emphasis 
added).  As is discussed in detail below, plaintiff failed to 
show any causal connection between his injury and subsequent 
wage loss.  We therefore disagree with the dissent and find that 
the second prong of the Russell test has not been met.  
In determining that plaintiff had not met his burden of 
proving disability, Full Commission found: 
25. On 
18 
November 
2010, 
Gregory 
B. 
Henderson, a vocational case manager and 
President of VocMed, conducted a targeted 
labor market survey in which two employers 
in the commercial construction industry of 
similar 
size 
and 
geographic 
location 
confirmed 
that 
someone 
with 
Plaintiff’s 
restrictions 
was 
physically 
capable 
of 
performing the job duties required by the 
Estimator position. 
 
26. In 
an 
updated 
labor 
market 
survey 
conducted by Mr. Henderson on July 18, 2011, 
an additional three employers confirmed that 
 
-8- 
someone with Plaintiff’s restrictions was 
physically capable of performing the job 
duties required by the Estimator position. 
 
27. Mr. Henderson offered testimony as an 
expert 
in 
the 
field 
of 
vocational 
rehabilitation.  Mr. Henderson opined that 
Plaintiff has the vocational skills and 
physical capabilities needed to perform work 
as an Estimator.  He further opined that 
Plaintiff would be able to return to work as 
an Estimator but for the current economic 
downturn.   
 
In other words, the Full Commission found that the only reason 
plaintiff is unable to find employment was based on the economic 
downturn and was not related to his injury.  Based on these 
findings, the Full Commission concluded that “[a] [p]laintiff is 
unable to meet their [sic] burden of proving disability where, 
but for economic factors, the employee is capable of returning 
to his pre-injury position.”  Thus, plaintiff’s inability to 
obtain his pre-injury wages was “attributable to large-scale 
economic factors,” not due to his injury, and he was not 
entitled to receive disability compensation. 
 
In reaching this conclusion the Full Commission relied on 
Segovia v. J.L. Powell & Co., 167 N.C. App. 354, 608 S.E.2d 557 
(2004).  In Segovia, the plaintiff suffered compensable injuries 
by accident.  167 N.C. App. at 354, 608 S.E.2d at 557.  His 
employer admitted liability and began paying temporary total 
disability benefits.  Id. at 355, 608 S.E.2d at 558.  During 
 
-9- 
this time period, the plaintiff was laid off by his employer due 
to a decline in business.  Id.  After the employer filed a 
request to stop paying disability compensation, the Full 
Commission terminated the plaintiff’s compensation, concluding 
that his loss of earnings was not due to any disability arising 
from the injury.  Id.   
 
On appeal, this Court affirmed, noting that competent 
evidence supports the findings that the plaintiff was laid off 
solely to a decline in business and not due to any restrictions 
due to his injuries.  Id. at 356-57, 608 S.E.2d at 559.  
Moreover, we found that these findings supported the Full 
Commission’s conclusion that the “plaintiff’s earning capacity 
[was] not currently affected by the injuries he suffered.”  Id. 
at 357, 608 S.E.2d at 559.  Thus, we affirmed the Full 
Commission’s determination that the plaintiff was not disabled 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9).  Id. 
Like Segovia, plaintiff was laid off from his job as an 
estimator 
due 
to 
the 
economic 
downturn. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
uncontested 
findings 
of 
fact 
establish 
that 
plaintiff’s 
inability to earn his pre-injury wages is not attributable to 
his injury but is based solely on the large-scale economic 
downturn affecting the construction industry as a whole.  
Applying Segovia, plaintiff is unable to prove disability since 
 
-10- 
his earnings capacity is not affected by his May 2008 injury.  
Therefore, we conclude that the Full Commission did not err in 
concluding that plaintiff is not currently disabled as a result 
of his injuries and not entitled to disability compensation. 
Plaintiff argues that the Full 
Commission improperly 
applied the law from Segovia; instead, plaintiff contends that  
Eudy v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 182 N.C. App. 646, 654, 645 
S.E.2d 83, 89, disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 426, 648 S.E.2d 211 
(2007), and Graham v. Masonry Reinforcing Corp. of Am., 188 N.C. 
App. 755, 760, 656 S.E.2d 676, 680 (2008), require a conclusion 
that plaintiff met his burden of proving disability by showing 
he had diligently searched for work.  In other words, plaintiff 
seems to argue that, pursuant to Eudy and Graham, an employee 
whose earning capacity is affected solely by economic factors, 
not an injury, can still establish a showing of disability by 
introducing evidence that he has diligently searched for work.   
Plaintiff’s reliance is misplaced as the facts of Eudy and 
Graham are quite different from the present case.  In Eudy, 182 
N.C. App. at 654, 645 S.E.2d at 89, the laid off employee was 
“not physically able to work his regular-duty job” and he sought 
light-duty 
work 
he 
could 
perform 
within 
his 
physical 
restrictions.  Likewise in Graham, 188 N.C. App. at 760, 656 
S.E.2d at 680, the laid off employee was not physically capable 
 
-11- 
of performing his former job and sought different work due to 
the physical restrictions of a hip injury.  Here, unlike the 
employees in Eudy and Graham, plaintiff is physically able to 
perform his pre-injury job, and he is seeking and has applied 
for the same type of position.  He is not subject to any 
restrictions that would affect his ability to work in his pre-
injury position.  Thus, Eudy and Graham are not applicable to 
the present case, and plaintiff’s argument is without merit.  
Instead, based on Segovia, the Full Commission did not err in 
concluding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing 
he was disabled regardless of his reasonable attempts to find 
employment. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Full 
Commission did not err in concluding that plaintiff’s incapacity 
to earn his pre-injury wages was not caused by his injuries.  
Therefore, we affirm the opinion and award of the Full 
Commission. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
Judge McCULLOUGH concurs. 
Judge GEER, Martha dissents in a separate opinion. 
 
 
 
 
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NO. COA13-159 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 3 September 2013 
 
 
CLAUDE V. MEDLIN, 
 
Employee, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
North Carolina  
Industrial Commission 
WEAVER COOKE CONSTRUCTION, LLC, 
I.C. No. 128568 
Employer, 
 
KEY RISK INSURANCE COMPANY, 
 
Carrier, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
GEER, Judge dissenting. 
 
 
 
The sole issue on appeal is whether plaintiff has met his 
burden in establishing disability arising out of his admittedly 
compensable injury.  Because the Commission's opinion and award 
does not apply the controlling analytical framework set out in 
Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 425 
S.E.2d 454 (1993), I would reverse and remand.  I do not believe 
that 
the 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
can 
be 
resolved 
without 
consideration of Russell and, yet, the Commission's opinion and 
award does not even mention Russell.  Although the majority 
opinion concludes that Russell is inapplicable given the facts 
of this case, I disagree with its analysis of Russell, and I 
cannot 
agree 
that 
this 
Court 
should 
be 
addressing 
the 
 
-13- 
applicability of each of the Russell prongs in the first 
instance.  I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. 
 
Both the majority opinion and the Commission's opinion and 
award point to Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 
290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982), in which our Supreme Court held that 
an employee has the burden of proving "(1) that plaintiff was 
incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had 
earned before his injury in the same employment, (2) that 
plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same 
wages he had earned before his injury in any other employment, 
and (3) that this individual's incapacity to earn was caused by 
plaintiff's injury."  The majority opinion seems to be holding 
that the Russell framework does not encompass the third prong of 
Hilliard requiring proof that the employee's incapacity to earn 
wages was caused by the compensable injury.   
However, the majority opinion and the Commission overlook 
the holding in Demery v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 143 N.C. App. 259, 
545 S.E.2d 485, aff'd per curiam, 354 N.C. 355, 554 S.E.2d 337 
(2001).  This Court, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, explained 
an employee's burden of proving "the existence of a disability 
under [the Workers' Compensation Act]."  Id. at 264, 545 S.E.2d 
at 489.  The Court emphasized that "'[d]isability,' within the 
meaning of the . . . North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, 
 
-14- 
is defined as 'incapacity because of injury to earn the wages 
which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the 
same or any other employment.'"  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (1999)).  In other words, proof of 
"disability," as defined by the Workers' Compensation Act, 
encompasses not only proof of an inability to earn the same 
wages, but also proof that the inability was caused by the 
compensable injury.   
This Court pointed to Hilliard, as the majority and the 
Commission do in this case, regarding what "an employee has the 
burden of proving" in order "[t]o show the existence of a 
disability under [the Workers' Compensation Act]":  
To show the existence of a disability under 
this Act, an employee has the burden of 
proving: 
 
(1) that [she] was incapable after 
[her] injury of earning the same 
wages 
[she] 
had 
earned 
before 
[her] 
injury 
in 
the 
same 
employment, (2) that [she] was 
incapable after [her] injury of 
earning the same wages [she] had 
earned before [her] injury in any 
other employment, and (3) that 
[her] 
incapacity 
to 
earn 
was 
caused by [her] injury.  
 
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 
595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982).  The 
employee may meet her initial burden of 
production by producing: 
 
 
-15- 
(1) 
. . . medical evidence that 
[she] 
is 
physically 
or 
mentally, as a consequence of 
the 
work 
related 
injury, 
incapable 
of 
work 
in 
any 
employment; 
(2) 
. 
. 
. 
evidence 
that 
[she] 
is 
capable of some work, but 
that 
[she] 
has, 
after 
a 
reasonable effort on [her] 
part, been unsuccessful in 
[her] 
effort 
to 
obtain 
employment; 
(3) 
. 
. 
. 
evidence 
that 
[she] 
is 
capable of some work but that 
it would be futile because of 
preexisting conditions, i.e., 
age, inexperience, lack of 
education, 
to 
seek 
other 
employment; or (4) . . . 
evidence 
that 
[she] 
has 
obtained other employment at 
a wage less than that earned 
prior to the injury. 
 
Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 
N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 
(1993) (citation omitted). 
 
Demery, 143 N.C. App. at 264-65, 545 S.E.2d at 489-90 (emphasis 
added). 
 
In other words, to prove "disability" -- which encompasses 
both incapacity and causation, as Hilliard holds -- the employee 
must meet one of the prongs of Russell.  If the employee meets 
that 
initial 
burden 
of 
production, 
then 
"the 
burden 
of 
production shifts to the employer to show that suitable jobs are 
available and that the employee is capable of obtaining a 
suitable job taking into account both physical and vocational 
 
-16- 
limitations."  Id. at 265, 545 S.E.2d at 490 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court concluded by observing, citing 
Hilliard, 305 N.C. at 595, 290 S.E.2d at 683, that "[t]he burden 
of proving a disability, however, remains on the employee."  
Demery, 143 N.C. App. at 265, 545 S.E.2d at 490. 
 
I cannot see any way to read Demery -- which is an opinion 
of the Supreme Court by virtue of the per curiam affirmance -- 
as allowing the analysis adopted by the majority opinion and the 
Commission in this case.  While some panels of this Court have 
suggested that the Russell methods of proof apply only to the 
first two prongs of Hilliard, see, e.g., Graham v. Masonry 
Reinforcing Corp. of Am., 188 N.C. App. 755, 759, 656 S.E.2d 
676, 679 (2008) (explaining that "[t]his Court has stated a 
claimant may prove the first two prongs of Hilliard through" one 
of four Russell prongs), Demery, because it was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, is controlling. 
 
Consequently, I would hold that the Commission erred in 
failing to apply the Russell analytical framework and also 
believe the majority opinion misapplies the controlling law.  
Indeed, the majority opinion notes that "[t]he purpose of the 
four-pronged Russell test is to provide channels through which 
an injured employee may 'show a link between wage loss and the 
work-related injury' as is required by Hilliard."  (Quoting 
 
-17- 
Fletcher v. Dana Corp., 119 N.C. App. 491, 499, 459 S.E.2d 31, 
36 (1995))  A "link" between wage loss and the compensable 
injury is the causation requirement set out in the third prong 
of Hilliard, which is the basis for the conclusion reached by 
the Commission and the majority opinion.  In other words, 
Fletcher, on which the majority opinion relies, agrees with 
Demery that the Russell test not only establishes the method of 
proving wage loss, but also provides an employee with the method 
for linking that wage loss to his or her compensable injury. 
 
Here, plaintiff contends that he met his burden of 
production as to the existence of his disability under Russell's 
second method of proof.  It is undisputed that he is capable of 
some work, although the record also contains evidence that he 
has restrictions resulting from the compensable injury.  The 
Commission found that "Dr. Speer restricted Plaintiff from 
lifting over ten (10) pounds or engaging in repetitive overhead 
activities."  The Commission further found that "[f]ollowing his 
layoff, Plaintiff sought subsequent employment within the 
construction 
industry." 
 
The 
Commission 
made 
no 
finding 
regarding whether plaintiff's efforts to obtain other employment 
were reasonable, but plaintiff presented evidence that he made 
numerous job inquiries and was unable to obtain employment. 
 
-18- 
 
I would hold that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient, if 
believed, to meet the second prong of Russell.  The burden of 
production, therefore, would then shift to defendants to show 
that there were suitable jobs that plaintiff was capable of 
obtaining. 
 
The 
Commission 
never 
shifted 
the 
burden 
to 
defendants, and its findings do not suggest that defendants met 
that burden.  The Commission's findings establish only that 
plaintiff was physically capable of performing the duties of his 
prior position and similar positions with other employers.  They 
do not address whether there were any jobs that plaintiff could 
actually obtain. 
 
Instead of applying the well-established Russell burden-
shifting framework, the Commission held, as a matter of law, 
that "[a] Plaintiff is unable to meet their [sic] burden of 
proving disability where, but for economic factors, the employee 
is capable of returning to his pre-injury position."  As support 
for this broad statement, the Commission cites only Segovia v. 
J.L. Powell & Co., 167 N.C. App. 354, 608 S.E.2d 557 (2004).  
Segovia does not stand for that sweeping proposition, as this 
Court has previously recognized. 
 
In Segovia, the Commission found that "'the plaintiff's 
inability to earn wages since March 2001 was due to the layoff 
and plaintiff's lack of interest in returning to work, and not 
 
-19- 
due to any disability associated with plaintiff's injury.'"  Id. 
at 356, 608 S.E.2d at 559.  The Commission then found that 
plaintiff had been offered a part-time job and "'[t]he evidence 
establishe[d] that work was available which was suitable for 
plaintiff'" in the marketplace.  Id.  Yet, "plaintiff appeared 
to 
be 
trying 
to 
sabotage 
efforts 
to 
find 
alternative 
employment."  Id.   
This Court, in affirming, concluded that the Commission's 
findings were supported by (1) evidence that the plaintiff 
performed his job satisfactorily and was laid off because of a 
decline in business, (2) evidence that the parties stipulated 
plaintiff had no restrictions due to his compensable injury 
after 
a 
specified 
date, 
and 
(3) 
evidence 
regarding 
the 
plaintiff's vocational rehabilitation and employment prospects.  
Id. at 356-57, 608 S.E.2d at 559.  The Court then concluded 
simply that "[t]hese findings support the full Commission's 
conclusion that plaintiff's earning capacity is not currently 
affected by the injuries he suffered to his back and ear."  Id. 
at 357, 608 S.E.2d at 559. 
 
Contrary to the Commission's opinion and award in this 
case, the Segovia panel did not hold that an employee "is unable 
to meet [his] burden of proving disability where, but for 
economic factors, the employee is capable of returning to his 
 
-20- 
pre-injury position."  Critical to the Commission's decision in 
Segovia and this Court's affirmance of that decision was not 
only the fact that the plaintiff was laid off, but also the 
facts that (1) the plaintiff had no restrictions arising out of 
his injuries, (2) suitable jobs were available to the plaintiff, 
and (3) the plaintiff was not interested in returning to work as 
demonstrated by his interference with efforts to find him 
alternative employment.  In other words, the plaintiff in 
Segovia could not meet his burden under any of the prongs of 
Russell.  
 
This Court has previously expressly rejected attempts to 
construe Segovia in the manner that the Commission did in this 
case and as the majority opinion does.  In Eudy v. Michelin N. 
Am., Inc., 182 N.C. App. 646, 654, 645 S.E.2d 83, 89 (2007) 
(emphasis added), the Court explained that in Segovia, "[t]his 
Court . . . held that the Full Commission did not err in denying 
an employee benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act where 
the employee was physically able to perform his former job and 
the employee's inability to earn wages was due to a layoff 
resulting from a downturn in the economy and the employee's lack 
of interest in returning to work."   
 
Similarly, in Graham, although the Commission had concluded 
that the plaintiff proved disability under the second prong of 
 
-21- 
Russell, the defendants argued on appeal, citing Segovia, that 
the Commission erred because the plaintiff's termination from 
his employment with the defendant employer "was due to an 
economic downturn and plaintiff's personal misconduct."  Id. at 
758, 656 S.E.2d at 679.  This Court affirmed the Commission 
based on its application of the Russell analytical framework.  
Id. at 760, 656 S.E.2d at 680.  The Court distinguished Segovia 
by quoting Eudy's description of Segovia as involving not just 
an economic downturn and then noted that while the Commission in 
Graham had properly determined that the plaintiff met his burden 
of proving disability under the second prong in Russell, the 
plaintiff in Segovia was physically able to do his job.  Id. at 
761, 656 S.E.2d at 680. 
 
The Court in Graham then further addressed the defendants' 
argument that the plaintiff could not prove disability because 
his lack of employment was due to an economic downturn: 
"Defendants have focused on the wrong issue.  
While the immediate cause of the loss of 
plaintiff's wages . . . may have been the 
lay-off, that fact does not preclude a 
finding of disability.  As Peoples v. Cone 
Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 437, 342 S.E.2d 
798, 
805 
(1986) 
explained, 
an 
injured 
employee's earning capacity is determined by 
the employee's own ability to compete in the 
labor market.  Thus, the fact that plaintiff 
was laid off does not preclude a finding of 
total disability if, because of plaintiff's 
injury, he was incapable of obtaining a job 
in the competitive labor market." 
 
-22- 
 
Id., 656 S.E.2d at 680-81 (quoting Britt v. Gator Wood, Inc., 
185 N.C. App. 677, 683, 648 S.E.2d 917, 921 (2007)).   
 Thus, Eudy recognized that Segovia involved not only a 
lay-off, but also an employee who, although able to work, had 
made no effort to return to work, while Graham held that Segovia 
did not apply when an employee had made the showing mandated by 
Russell.  See also Britt, 185 N.C. App. at 683, 648 S.E.2d at 
921 (rejecting defendants' argument that employee was not 
disabled because his loss of wage earning capacity was not the 
result of injury by accident but instead was due to economic 
downturn).   
A critical distinction between these cases, as well as this 
case, and Segovia is that the plaintiffs in Eudy, Graham, and 
Britt were all at least partially disabled, as demonstrated by 
the existence of physical restrictions -- the issue was whether 
that disability was causing any wage loss, just as is true in 
this case.  In Segovia, the plaintiff was no longer disabled.  
He was simply unemployed. 
While the majority opinion attempts to distinguish Eudy and 
Graham factually, it never addresses those opinions' discussion 
of Segovia or the language in the actual Segovia opinion 
limiting its holding.  In addition, the majority opinion 
incorrectly states that the laid off employee in Graham was not 
 
-23- 
physically capable of performing his former job and, for that 
reason, sought different work.  In fact, the defendants in 
Graham contended that the employee, who was an accountant, was 
fired because of "economics" and poor job performance.  188 N.C. 
App. at 757, 656 S.E.2d at 678.  Neither the Commission nor this 
Court's opinion in Graham suggested that the employee was unable 
to perform his prior job as an accountant because of his 
physical restrictions.  Id. at 756-57, 656 S.E.2d at 678.  
Further, the Segovia Court could not have reached the 
conclusion attributed to it by the Commission in this case 
without running afoul of Fletcher.  In Fletcher, the Commission 
awarded temporary total disability even though the plaintiff was 
able to work despite physical restrictions when the plaintiff 
made 
extensive, 
although 
unsuccessful, 
efforts 
to 
gain 
employment over 17 months.  119 N.C. App. at 492-93, 459 S.E.2d 
at 33.  The defendants argued that the Commission had misapplied 
Russell by focusing "'on whether plaintiff was able to actually 
obtain employment' instead of whether plaintiff was capable of 
earning the same wages."  Id. at 494, 459 S.E.2d at 34.  The 
defendants asserted that "the holding of the full Commission in 
reliance upon Russell 'in effect convert[ed] temporary total 
disability [in]to unemployment compensation.'"  Id. at 495, 459 
S.E.2d at 34. 
 
-24- 
 
This Court in Fletcher affirmed the Commission's award, 
holding that "an employee who suffers a work-related injury is 
not precluded from workers' compensation benefits when that 
employee, while employable within limitations in certain kinds 
of work, cannot after reasonable efforts obtain employment due 
to unavailability of jobs."  Id. at 500, 459 S.E.2d at 37 
(emphasis added).   
In reaching this holding, the Court pointed to the purpose 
of the Workers' Compensation Act: "'[T]he Workers' Compensation 
Act was enacted to ameliorate the consequences of injuries and 
illnesses in the workplace and one of those consequences, at 
least on occasion, is that a recuperated worker capable of 
holding a job cannot get one.  A capable job seeker whom no 
employer needing workers will hire is not employable.'"  Id. at 
495, 459 S.E.2d at 34 (quoting Bridges v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 
90 N.C. App. 397, 399-400, 368 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1988)).  See 
also id. at 496, 459 S.E.2d at 35 ("'The fact that the wage loss 
comes about through . . . unavailability of employment rather 
than through incapacity to perform the work does not change the 
result [of disability].'" (quoting 1C Arthur Larson, Larson's 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57-61(a), 10-389-97)). 
The Court in Fletcher based its holding in part on opinions 
from Florida and Michigan, finding that "[t]he rationale of the 
 
-25- 
foregoing authorities is sound and consistent with" our Court's 
holdings in Russell and Bridges.  119 N.C. App. at 500, 459 
S.E.2d at 37.  The Fletcher Court quoted the Florida District 
Court of Appeal: "'[I]n the broadest sense, "able to earn" takes 
into account many factors, including the availability of jobs, 
and such a broad interpretation is consistent . . . with the 
principle which requires a liberal construction in favor of the 
injured employee.'"  Id. at 496, 459 S.E.2d at 35 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So. 2d 870, 875 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).   
 
With respect to the argument that the Commission in effect 
converted 
workers' 
compensation 
benefits 
into 
unemployment 
benefits, the Court quoted approvingly the Michigan Supreme 
Court: "'[A] disabled worker does not bear the burden of 
unfavorable economic conditions that further diminish his 
ability to find suitable work.'"  Id. at 499, 459 S.E.2d at 36 
(quoting Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp., 447 Mich. 1, 25, 523 N.W.2d 
454, 463 (1994)).  The Court further quoted: "'This means that 
the partially disabled employee's only burden is to show he is 
unable to earn wages because of his injury, not that he must 
show that the economy or other factors are not the cause of 
unemployment.'"  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sobotka, 447 
Mich. at 8 n.5, 523 N.W.2d at 455 n.5).   
 
-26- 
Regarding the burden of production, the Fletcher Court 
quoted the Michigan Supreme Court: "'[I]t is the employee's 
burden to show a link between wage loss and the work-related 
injury. . . [.]  [O]nce the employee shows a work-related injury 
and subsequent wage loss, the factfinder may infer that the 
employee cannot find a job because of the injury.'"  Id. 
(quoting Sobotka, 447 Mich. at 25, 523 N.W.2d at 463). 
In North Carolina, as this Court acknowledged in Demery and 
Fletcher, an employee meets his burden of showing work-related 
disability through the four-pronged Russell test. Once the 
employee makes that showing, then the Commission may infer that 
the employee cannot find a job because of his injury.  Under 
Fletcher, the employee is not required to show "'the economy or 
other factors are not the cause of [his] unemployment.'"  Id. 
(quoting Sobotka, 447 Mich. at 8 n.5, 523 N.W.2d at 455 n.5).  
Yet, that is precisely the burden that the Commission and the 
majority opinion have placed on plaintiff in this case:  the 
burden of proving that his unemployment was not due to the 
economy. 
Because I believe, in light of the above authority, that 
the Commission acted under a misapprehension of law, I would 
reverse 
and 
remand 
for 
reconsideration. 
 
I 
believe 
the 
Commission should have determined whether plaintiff met his 
 
-27- 
burden 
of 
production 
under 
Russell 
and, 
if 
so, 
whether 
defendants met their burden of showing that suitable jobs 
existed in the economy for plaintiff that he could actually 
obtain.  The Commission swept aside -- unmentioned -- 40 years 
of authority that has been consistently applied and reached a 
conclusion that is squarely inconsistent with Fletcher and 
subsequent decisions.   
It is too simplistic to assume, as the Commission did and 
the majority opinion does, that in a down economy, an employable 
employee with restrictions cannot show that his difficulties in 
obtaining another job are due to his injury.  The Russell tests 
take into account the likelihood that prospective employers may 
prefer, in difficult economic conditions, to hire employees 
without restrictions.  When presented with applicants who have 
no restrictions competing for a position with applicants with 
restrictions, we should recognize not only (1) that the 
prospective employers may well choose an applicant without 
restrictions, but also (2) that an employee is unlikely to be 
able to prove that he lost out on the job because of his 
restrictions.  I, therefore, respectfully dissent.