Title: State ex rel. Peffer v. Russo

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Peffer v. Russo, 110 Ohio St.3d 175, 2006-Ohio-4092.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. PEFFER, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. RUSSO, JUDGE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Peffer v. Russo, 110 Ohio St.3d 175, 2006-Ohio-4092.] 
Prohibition — Writ to prevent common pleas court judge from proceeding after 
referral of case to retired judge pursuant to R.C. 2701.10 — Jury trials by 
private judge not permitted — Court of appeals’ grant of writ reversed. 
(No. 2005-2223 ─ Submitted April 11, 2006 ─ Decided August 23, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 87149, 2005-Ohio-5556. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a common pleas court judge from proceeding in a case referred to a 
private judge for a jury trial under R.C. 2701.10 and Gov.Jud.R. VI.  Because 
R.C. 2701.10 and Gov.Jud.R. VI require bench trials in private-judge referrals and 
submissions, we reverse. 
{¶ 2} Appellees, Jason and Lynne Peffer, filed a medical-malpractice 
case against the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, K.V. Gapalakrishna, M.D., and 
Infectious Disease Consultants, Inc., in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 
Pleas.  Appellant, Judge Nancy Margaret Russo, was assigned to the case. 
{¶ 3} The case was called for trial on July 13, 2005, but because Judge 
Russo was conducting a criminal trial, she offered to have the case assigned to a 
visiting judge.  The parties refused but indicated that they would stipulate to have 
the case submitted to a private judge.  Judge Russo removed the case from her 
docket and noted that the case remained pending for the private judge. 
{¶ 4} On July 15, 2005, the parties filed an agreement to refer the case to 
Peggy Foley Jones, a retired judge, pursuant to R.C. 2701.10, the private-judging 
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statute, to have Judge Jones “preside over a jury which will receive evidence.”  
On October 3, 2005, Judge Russo vacated her previous order granting the parties’ 
request to transfer the medical-malpractice case to a private judge based on her 
conclusion that “the statute does not permit jury trials * * * and does not permit 
the use of public buildings, jurors, employees or facilities for private matters.” 
{¶ 5} On October 5, 2005, Judge Richard McMonagle, in his capacity as 
administrative judge of the common pleas court, issued an entry specifying that 
“[p]ursuant to Superintendence Rule 4(B)(1) and to court policy,” the case would 
proceed to trial with Judge Jones.  After Judge Russo advised the parties that she 
believed that the administrative judge could not overrule her orders, defendant 
Cleveland Clinic Foundation filed a notice to withdraw its request for referral of 
the case to a private judge.  Judge Russo ordered that the case would proceed to 
trial before her on October 17, 2005.  On October 11, 2005, Judge Russo struck 
the Peffers’ motion to vacate the defendant’s notice of withdrawal of its consent 
to referral and prohibited Judge Jones from proceeding in the case. 
{¶ 6} On October 11, 2005, the administrative judge ordered Judge Jones 
to proceed and Judge Russo not to proceed: 
{¶ 7} “Pursuant to the judgment entry entered 10/05/05 * * * and 
pursuant to a meeting held this morning, 10/11/05 with the Hon. Nancy Margaret 
Russo and the Hon. Peggy Foley Jones, this court again reiterates that pursuant 
to Superintendence Rule 4(B)(1) this court orders that the case proceed to jury 
trial before retired Judge Peggy Foley Jones.  Judge Nancy Margaret Russo no 
longer has any jurisdiction over this matter, and has not since 07/15/05, the date 
of filing agreement for referral.  (R.C. 2701.10)  Judge Nancy Margaret Russo 
shall not enter any further decisions or orders on the docket of this case including 
any contempt orders against the parties or their attorneys for appearing before 
Judge Peggy Foley Jones.”  (Emphasis added.)   
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 8} Judge Russo nevertheless continued to communicate with the 
counsel for the parties and enter orders in the medical-malpractice case. 
{¶ 9} On October 12, 2005, the Peffers filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Russo 
“from acting illegally in violation of the Orders of Administrative Judge Richard 
McMonagle.”  On October 14, 2005, Judge Russo filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint.  Judge Russo argued that R.C. 2701.10 does not authorize private 
judges to conduct jury trials or use the county’s resources. 
{¶ 10} On October 14, 2005, the court of appeals granted the writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from proceeding in the underlying medical-
malpractice case. 
{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court upon Judge Russo’s appeal as of 
right. 
{¶ 12} Judge Russo asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting the 
writ of prohibition because the Peffers did not establish that Judge Russo’s 
exercise of jurisdiction in the medical-malpractice case was not authorized by 
law. 
{¶ 13} Prohibition will not issue if the relator has an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 107 Ohio St.3d 347, 
2006-Ohio-8, 839 N.E.2d 911, ¶ 27.  “ ‘In the absence of a patent and 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that 
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.’ ”  State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler, 
99 Ohio St.3d 402, 2003-Ohio-4124, 792 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. 
Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429, 751 N.E.2d 472. 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals concluded that under Sup.R. 4(B), the 
administrative judge was authorized to assign the case and that when he assigned 
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the case to Judge Jones and removed Judge Russo, Judge Russo patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed.   
 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals erred in so concluding for the following 
reasons. 
{¶ 16} First, it is not clear that Sup.R. 4(B)(1) authorized the 
administrative judge to order Judge Russo not to proceed with the case.  Under 
Sup.R. 4(B)(1), the administrative judge is required to “assign cases to individual 
judges of the court or division.”  Judge Jones, a retired judge, is not a judge of the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to whom the administrative judge may 
assign a case under the rule.  In addition, under Sup.R. 36(B)(1), once a case is 
assigned to a particular common pleas court judge, that judge “becomes primarily 
responsible for the determination of every issue and proceeding in the case until 
its termination.”  See, also, Sup.R. 36(D) (“In any instance where a previously 
filed and dismissed case is refiled, that case shall be reassigned to the judge 
originally assigned by lot to hear it unless, for good cause shown, that judge is 
precluded from hearing the case”).  The underlying case was assigned to Judge 
Russo pursuant to Sup.R. 36(B)(1), after it had been dismissed without prejudice 
by the Peffers and then refiled. 
{¶ 17} Second, as we held in a related prohibition case,  State ex rel. 
Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, __ N.E.2d __, 
paragraph one of the syllabus, jury trials are not authorized in civil actions 
referred to private judges under R.C. 2701.10 and Gov.Jud.R. VI.  Consequently, 
the referral to the private judge in the medical-malpractice case, which included a 
provision for a jury trial, was improper and thus did not patently and 
unambiguously divest Judge Russo of jurisdiction to proceed. 
{¶ 18} Third, the defendants in the underlying medical-malpractice case 
withdrew their consent to the referral to the private judge. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 19} Finally, Judge Russo is not estopped to claim that she still has 
jurisdiction over the medical-malpractice case, as claimed by the Peffers.  The 
Peffers cite Huffman v. Huffman, Franklin App. Nos. 02AP-101 and 02AP-698, 
2002-Ohio-6031, 2002 WL 31466435, in which a court of appeals held that a 
party who has agreed to submit a divorce case to a private judge under R.C. 
2701.10 was estopped from contesting that judge’s authority to conduct 
postdecree contempt proceedings when the party agreed to the private judge’s 
authority, participated in the proceedings before the private judge, and waited 
until after the judge issued an adverse judgment against him before challenging 
that authority.  Huffman is distinguishable from this case and the doctrine of 
estoppel is inapplicable because Judge Russo was not a party to the underlying 
case and that case had not yet proceeded to a jury trial when Judge Russo raised 
her objection. 
{¶ 20} Based on the foregoing, Judge Russo did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the medical-malpractice case.  The court of 
appeals erred in granting the writ of prohibition.  Therefore, consistent with our 
decision in State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-
3459, __ N.E.2d __, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
RESNICK, Acting C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J. dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in State 
ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, ___ N.E.2d 
___. 
MOYER, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Kahn Kleinman, L.P.A., Robert A. Zimmerman, Michael H. Diamant, and 
Mark R. Jacobs, for appellant. 
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Becker & Mishkind Co., L.P.A., Michael F. Becker, and Lawrence F. 
Peskin; Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellees. 
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