Title: Michael Strup, Respondent v. Director of Revenue, Appellant.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
MICHAEL STRUP,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC90403 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Joseph P. Dandurand, Judge 
 
Opinion issued April 20, 2010 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The director of revenue appeals the circuit court's judgment ordering the director 
to reinstate Michael Strup's commercial driving privilege.  The director disqualified 
Strup's commercial driving privilege for one year because Strup was arrested upon 
probable cause to believe that he was driving while intoxicated with a blood alcohol 
content of .08% or more.  Strup filed a petition for review, and, after a hearing, the circuit 
court ordered the director to reinstate Strup's commercial driving privilege, finding that 
Strup's due process rights were violated because he did not receive a pre-disqualification 
hearing and because there was no legal basis to sustain the disqualification.   
 
On appeal, the director argues: (1) Strup's due process rights were not violated 
because he received a post-disqualification hearing and (2) the suspension of Strup's base 
driving privilege supports the disqualification of his commercial driving privilege.  This 
Court determines that Strup's post-disqualification hearing satisfies due process and that 
the director did not err in disqualifying Strup's commercial driving privilege because 
Strup was arrested upon probable cause to believe that he was driving while intoxicated 
with a blood alcohol concentration level of .08% or more, which constitutes a 
"conviction" for the purposes of disqualification under the Missouri commercial driver's 
license act.  The circuit court's judgment ordering reinstatement of Strup's commercial 
driving privilege is reversed. 
II. Facts 
 
The parties agree that the facts of this case are not in dispute.  In June 2006, Strup 
had a base driving privilege and a commercial driving privilege.  On July 22, 2006, Strup 
was arrested for driving while intoxicated.  The criminal charges against Strup were 
eventually dropped. 
 
On August 23, 2006, the director notified Strup that his commercial driving 
privilege would be disqualified for one year because of his arrest for driving while 
intoxicated.  On September 21, 2006, Strup filed a petition in circuit court requesting 
review, under section 302.311, RSMo 2000, of the disqualification of his commercial 
driving privilege, complaining that the disqualification was made without a hearing or the 
opportunity to present or cross-examine witnesses.   
 
Strup also timely requested an administrative hearing regarding the suspension of 
his base driving privilege.  The hearing regarding Strup's base driving privilege was held 
September 27, 2006.  The next day, the hearing officer sustained the suspension of 
Strup's base driving privilege.  Also on September 28, 2006, the director notified Strup 
that, as a result of the administrative suspension of his base driving privilege, his 
commercial driving privilege would be disqualified for one year.  
 
On October 13, 2006, Strup timely filed a petition in circuit court requesting de 
novo review of the suspension of his base driving privilege.  On October 27, 2006, Strup 
filed a second petition in circuit court requesting review under section 302.311 of the 
disqualification of his commercial driving privilege.  These petitions were consolidated, 
and, on November 9, 2007, the circuit court held a hearing regarding all pending matters.   
 
After the consolidated hearing, the circuit court entered judgment for the director 
determining Strup's base driving privilege was properly suspended because he was 
arrested upon probable cause to believe that he was driving with a blood alcohol 
concentration of .08% or more.  Concerning Strup's commercial driving privilege, the 
circuit court ordered the director to remove the disqualification concluding that Strup's 
due process rights were violated in that he had no opportunity to present evidence and 
that the director's decision to disqualify his base driving privilege was contrary to chapter 
302. 
 
3
 
Strup did not appeal the judgment affirming the suspension of his base driving 
privilege.  The director timely appealed the judgment reversing the disqualification of 
Strup's commercial driving privilege.1   
III. 
  Point One: Strup's due process rights were not violated because he received a 
full post-disqualification hearing 
 
The director claims the circuit court erred in concluding Strup's due process rights 
were violated because Strup's due process right was satisfied when he received a full 
post-disqualification hearing. 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a decision of a trial court, the trial court's ruling must be upheld 
unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or 
misstates or misapplies the law.  Fick v. Dir. of Revenue, 240 S.W.3d 688, 690 (Mo. banc 
2007).  This Court will not affirm a circuit court judgment that erroneously declares or 
applies the law.  Id.  Moreover, "[t]his Court's review must begin with the recognition 
that laws enacted by the legislature and approved by the governor have a strong 
presumption of constitutionality."  Jackson County Sports Complex Authority v. State, 
226 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. banc 2007).  The burden of proof rests on a statute's 
challenger to demonstrate otherwise.  Id. 
 
                                             
 
1 Strup could not legally drive a commercial vehicle without his base privilege, but the 
continuing significance of his effort to affirm the trial court's judgment setting aside the 
disqualification of his commercial driving privilege is that if he receives another qualifying 
violation and a future disqualification of his commercial privilege, the disqualification would be 
for a minimum of ten years and possibly for life.  Section 302.755.3, RSMo Supp. 2009.  
 
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Analysis 
Due process applies to the suspension/revocation of driver's licenses by the state.  
Jarvis v. Dir. of Revenue, 804 S.W. 2d 22, 24 (Mo. banc 1991) (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 
U.S. 105, 112 (1977)).  Generally speaking, due process requires notice and the 
opportunity to be heard.  Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 195 
S.W.3d 410, 415 (Mo. banc 2006).  In Dixon, the United States Supreme Court held that 
due process does not always require an opportunity to be heard before a state 
suspends/revokes a person's driver's license based on objective statutory criteria 
involving public safety, so long as a full post-suspension/revocation hearing is available 
to challenge the suspension/revocation.  Dixon, 431 U.S. at 115.   
The circuit court reversed the disqualification of Strup's commercial driving 
privilege because Strup did not receive a hearing before the director disqualified his 
privilege: 
[Because] the September 28, 2006[,] 'final decision' of the [d]irector . . . 
appealed from herein was rendered without any hearing, evidence, or 
opportunity to present evidence, the decision was . . . a denial of due 
process. 
 
 
As noted above, in a driver's license suspension/revocation case, due process does 
not require the opportunity to be heard before a suspension/revocation so long as a full 
post-suspension/revocation hearing is available.  Id.  That due process analysis logically 
applies to the disqualification of commercial driving privileges.  Strup received a full 
post-disqualification hearing in circuit court in November 2007; therefore, his due 
process rights were not violated. 
 
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IV. 
 Point Two: Strup's commercial driver's privilege was properly disqualified 
 
The director contends the trial court erred in ordering the removal of the 
disqualification of Strup's commercial driving privilege because the suspension of his 
base driving privilege constitutes a "conviction" for the purposes of Missouri's 
Commercial Driver's License Act ("CDLA"), which permits the director to disqualify a 
driver's commercial privilege if he or she is "convicted" of a qualifying first violation. 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a decision of a trial court, the trial court's ruling must be upheld 
unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or 
misstates or misapplies the law.  Fick, 240 S.W.3d at 690.  This Court will not affirm a 
circuit court judgment that erroneously declares or applies the law.  Id.  
Analysis 
The director claims the circuit court erred in ordering her to remove the one-year 
disqualification of Strup's commercial driving privilege because the requirements of 
chapter 302 were satisfied.  The director contends the suspension of Strup's base driving 
privilege based on his arrest upon probable cause that he was driving with a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or more constitutes a "conviction;" therefore, it is a first violation 
meriting disqualification of his commercial driving privilege pursuant to the CDLA for a 
period of not less than one year. 
 
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The facts here show that Strup received notice his base driving privilege was 
suspended2 and that Strup requested and received a hearing.  The hearing officer 
subsequently sustained the suspension of Strup's base driving privilege, finding that Strup 
was arrested upon probable cause that he was driving with a blood alcohol concentration 
of .08% or more.3  Strup then requested a trial de novo, after which the circuit court 
upheld the director's decision to suspend Strup's base driving privilege.4  Strup did not 
appeal the circuit court's decision to uphold the suspension of his base driving privilege; 
therefore, that suspension is final. 
 
                                             
 
2 Section 302.505.1, RSMo Supp. 2001, states that the department of revenue "shall suspend or 
revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested upon 
probable cause to believe such person was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol 
concentration in the person's blood, breath, or urine was eight-hundredths of one percent or more 
by weight . . . ."  When a law enforcement officer arrests any person for driving while 
intoxicated, that officer "shall forward to the department a certified report of all information 
relevant to the enforcement action . . . ."  Section 302.510.1, RSMo Supp. 2005.  When the 
department receives this report, it is required to make a determination whether to suspend or 
revoke that person's license on the basis of that report, and that determination is final unless an 
administrative hearing is requested and held.  Section 302.505.2.   
3 A person has 15 days to request an administrative hearing.  Section 302.530.1, RSMo Supp. 
2005.  When an administrative hearing is requested and held, the department reviews the matter 
and makes a final determination based on the evidence received at the hearing.  Section 
302.505.2.  The sole issue at the administrative hearing is whether there is a preponderance of 
the evidence that the person was arrested on probable cause to believe he was driving with a 
blood, breath or urine alcohol concentration of .08% or more.  Sections 302.530.4 and 302.505.1.  
If the department finds "the affirmative of this issue, the suspension or revocation order shall be 
sustained."  Section 302.530.4.  A person who has participated in an administrative hearing is 
entitled to prompt notice of the post-hearing decision.  Section 302.530.6. 
4 A person may challenge the department's decision by requesting judicial review in the form of 
a trial de novo within 15 days from the date notice of the department's decision was mailed.  
Section 302.530.6.  If a person fails to request judicial review, the department's decision is final.  
Section 302.530.7. 
 
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Under the CDLA, a person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor 
vehicle for a period of not less than one year if "convicted" of a first violation.  Section 
302.755.1, RSMo Supp. 2005 (emphasis added).  The CDLA defines "conviction" as "an 
unvacated adjudication of guilt, including pleas of guilt and nolo contendre, or a 
determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of 
original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative proceeding . . . ."  Section 
302.700.2(8), RSMo Supp. 2005 (emphasis added). 
One of the first violations that establishes a "conviction" and merits 
disqualification under the CDLA is "[d]riving a motor vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol . . . ."  Section 302.755.1(1).  "Driving under the influence of alcohol" is defined 
in the CDLA to include "[h]aving any state, county or municipal alcohol-related 
enforcement contact, as defined in subsection 3 of section 302.525 . . . ."  Section 
302.700.2(13)(e).  "Alcohol-related enforcement contact" includes "any suspension or 
revocation under sections 302.500 to 302.540 . . . ."  Section 302.525.3, RSMo Supp. 
2002.   
The circuit court erred in reversing the disqualification of Strup's commercial 
driving privilege because the suspension of Strup's base driver's license constitutes a 
conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol for the purposes of the CDLA, which 
is a first violation that merits disqualification of a person's commercial driver's privilege 
for a period of not less than one year.   
 
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V.  Conclusion 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the disqualification of Strup's 
commercial driving privilege is reinstated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
All concur. 
 
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