Title: McCall v. State

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

196 Kan. 411 (1966)
411 P.2d 647
PAUL IRVING McCALL, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 44,412

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 5, 1966.
John Prather, of Wichita, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for appellant.
A.J. Focht, Deputy County Attorney, Wichita, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, of Topeka, and Keith Sanborn, County Attorney, of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, J.:
This appeal is from an order of the district court of Sedgwick County, overruling the appellant's motion to vacate and set aside the sentences imposed by that court on September 16, 1963. Relief was sought under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507 and Rule No. 121 of this court (194 Kan. XXVII).
The appellant, Paul Irving McCall, will be designated in this opinion as the petitioner.
Proceedings had in the district court of Sedgwick County giving rise to this appeal are summarized: On July 15, 1963, the petitioner entered his voluntary plea of guilty to the charge of violating the worthless check statute (G.S. 1949, 21-554), and was sentenced to confinement in the Kansas State Penitentiary for a period of not less than one nor more than five years pursuant to G.S. 1949, 21-555. On that date, the petitioner made application for probation from service of the sentence, and the district court continued the cause until July 19, 1963. On that date, and after argument by counsel, the court denied the petitioner's motion and ordered him to serve the sentence imposed.
On July 21, 1963, while awaiting transportation to the state penitentiary, the petitioner and another inmate escaped from the Sedgwick *412 County jail by attacking the jailor with a knife and taking the jail keys from him.
On July 22, 1963, a complaint was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Sedgwick County, charging petitioner in four separate counts: robbery in the first degree; felonious assault; jail breaking, and willful and malicious destruction of public property. James Foster, a member of the Sedgwick County Bar, was appointed to represent petitioner at his preliminary examination. On August 22, 1963, the petitioner waived his right to have a preliminary examination, and was bound over for trial in the district court to answer the charges alleged against him, and, in default of a $20,000 bond, he was committed to the Sedgwick County jail.
An information was duly filed in the district court charging the petitioner with the offenses heretofore related, and James Foster was reappointed to represent him.
On September 16, 1963, petitioner and his counsel personally appeared before the court, waived arraignment, and petitioner entered his plea of guilty to each of the four counts contained in the Information. The record indicates the court inquired of the defendant if he pleaded guilty to said charge because he was guilty, and the defendant answered in the affirmative. Sentence was imposed in accordance with law, and the court directed that all sentences in Counts 1 through 4 run concurrent with each other, and concurrently with the sentence imposed for violation of the worthless check statute on July 15, 1963. No appeal was taken from the foregoing judgment and sentences.
On a date not disclosed by the record, the petitioner applied to the district court for post conviction relief (K.S.A. 60-1507), alleging the inadequacy of his counsel for the reason that counsel was appointed only minutes prior to the entry of petitioner's pleas of guilty. On September 29, 1964, the district court heard and determined adversely to petitioner the grounds alleged for relief, and no appeal was taken from that judgment.
The proceedings out of which this appeal arises were commenced on February 23, 1965, by petitioner filing his motion to vacate and set aside the sentences imposed on September 16, 1963. In his answer to question No. 10 in the form of the motion prescribed in Rule No. 121, the petitioner alleged as grounds for relief that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the charges against him; (2) the sentence of robbery in the first degree was illegal and the other sentences imposed for his escape from jail were imposed under *413 duress, threats and promises (which the petitioner supplemented on a separate sheet), and (3) he was not represented by adequate counsel, "nor do I believe that he was competent counsel, counsel was appointed only minutes prior to plea of guilty."
In the separate sheet referred to in the motion and attached to it, the petitioner elaborated further by stating he was placed on the fifth floor of the Sedgwick County jail without clothing, mattresses or blankets, with the wind blowing through the door, and as a result he was unable to sleep and was forced to walk the floor to keep warm, and that under duress, he signed a statement concerning his escape; he further stated he was threatened with two fifteen-year-to-life sentences if he did not enter a plea of guilty. Incorporated in the separate sheet was what the petitioner claimed to be an exact copy of a letter he received from James Foster, dated October 15, 1964, which reads:
"Dear Paul:
On June 29, 1965, the district court held no evidentiary hearing, but made findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that the petitioner had raised no substantial question of law or fact; that it was unnecessary to appoint counsel to represent the petitioner; that the petitioner sought relief based upon his uncorroborated statements; that he was presently serving valid sentences of the district court of Sedgwick County; that the petitioner was entitled to no relief, and concluded his motion should be denied.
Turning to the points raised, the petitioner argues the district court erred in overruling his motion to set aside the sentences without requiring his personal presence in court and without having appointed counsel to represent him. He contends that if he had been permitted to be present to testify, he could have given testimony that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges against him and that the charges against him were untrue. With respect to the petitioner's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges against him, it is apparent that, in view of the record, no justiciable issue is presented. The record clearly indicates that the petitioner pleaded guilty in open court in the presence of his court-appointed counsel to the four counts alleged in the Information "because he was guilty." While it is fundamental that a plea of guilty, in order to be valid, must be freely, knowingly and understandingly made, it was said in Dexter v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 151, 386 P.2d 263, that:
The petitioner next contends that he was not represented by adequate counsel and that counsel was appointed only minutes prior to his pleas of quilty. In denying the motion, the district court found:
In Perrin v. State, 196 Kan. 228, 410 P.2d 298, the same contention was made where the petitioner filed a motion to set aside his sentence, raising a point which was determined on the merits adversely to his contention, and the point was again raised in a second or successive motion for similar relief. In the opinion it was said:
See, also, Smith v. State, 195 Kan. 745, 408 P.2d 647, and Hanes v. State, 196 Kan. 409, 411 P.2d 646.
The foregoing would seem to dispose of the contention. However, we note Mr. Foster was first appointed to represent the petitioner at his preliminary examination and was reappointed to represent him in the district court. The record discloses counsel conferred with petitioner prior to his entering pleas of guilty and they considered the alternative of standing trial with the possibility of an increased sentence under the Habitual Criminal Act, which the county attorney advised would be invoked if a trial were had and a conviction resulted. In Fields v. State, 195 Kan. 718, 408 P.2d 674, the contention was made that petitioner was coerced into pleading guilty as a result of the county attorney's statement he would press for a higher penalty if petitioner continued to fight the case. In the opinion it was said:
The evidence against petitioner concerning the jail break was overwhelming, *416 and as a result of his court-appointed counsel's efforts, the petitioner was not sentenced under the Habitual Criminal Act. Manifestly, there is absolutely nothing to support the petitioner's allegations that his court-appointed counsel was incompetent or inadequately represented him in the district court.
The petitioner lastly contends the sentence of robbery in the first degree was illegal and the other sentences imposed for his escape from jail were imposed under duress, threats and promises. This contention is directed to statements made in the separate sheet attached to petitioner's motion, that through coercion and duress he signed a statement concerning the events of his escape from jail. Assuming a statement was elicited from petitioner, of which we are not advised, it was not used against him in disposing of his case in the district court. In Call v. State, 195 Kan. 688, 408 P.2d 668, a similar contention was made that a statement was obtained in violation of the petitioner's constitutional right, and it was said:
We have fully reviewed the record and conclude the district court did not err in holding that the allegations of the petitioner's motion did not allege a substantial claim for relief and that the files and records of the case conclusively showed the petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought. The statute (K.S.A. 60-1507) does not strip the district court of discretion to ascertain whether a claim for relief is substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing. Under the circumstances which attend, the district court was not required to conduct a formal plenary hearing, or to appoint counsel, or have the petitioner present. In State v. Burnett, 194 Kan. 645, 400 P.2d 971, it was held:
See, also, Sanders v. State, 195 Kan. 701, 408 P.2d 587; Call v. State, supra; Shores v. State, 195 Kan. 705, 408 P.2d 608, and Webb v. State, 195 Kan. 728, 408 P.2d 662.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.