Title: State v. Wingerter

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

339 So. 2d 1 (1976) STATE of Louisiana v. William WINGERTER and Elizabeth Wingerter. No. 58094. Supreme Court of Louisiana. October 6, 1976. Dissenting Opinion November 22, 1976. *2 Ronald S. Ruiz, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. DENNIS, Justice. Defendants William and Elizabeth Wingerter were charged by bill of information with simple burglary in violation of La.R.S. 14:62. Defendants were tried jointly on November 25, 1975. Elizabeth Wingerter was found guilty as charged. William Wingerter was found guilty of attempted simple burglary, a responsive verdict. Subsequently Elizabeth Wingerter was sentenced to serve six years at hard labor. A bill of information was filed by the district attorney's office charging William Wingerter as a quadruple offender pursuant to La.R.S. 15:519.1. The court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to serve thirty years at hard labor. On appeal defendants assert six assignments of error, two of which we find to present reversible merit. During voir dire examination of prospective jurors the assistant district attorney was allowed, over defendants' objection, to address the jury as follows: "BY [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: At the close of the evidence, over defendants' objection, the trial judge gave the jury the following instruction: For the reasons this day assigned in State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194 (La.1976) the assistant district attorney's remarks and the jury instructions not only exceeded that authorized by statute but also were unconstitutional in that they required the jury to draw an inference, i. e., that the defendants committed all essential elements of the crime of burglary, which reasonable minds could not infer beyond a reasonable doubt solely from the defendants' unexplained possession of property stolen in the burglary. Additionally, the assistant district attorney's remarks constituted reversible error because a criminal presumption against the defendant relating to an essential element of the crime charged can never be "as strong as" the presumption of innocence which the prosecution is required to overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. La.Const.1974, Art. I, § 16; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). A presumption or inference against the defendant arising out of the exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property, even if properly established, cannot shift the ultimate burden of persuasion upon an essential element of the crime to the defendant. La.Const.1974, Art. I, §§ 2, 13, 16; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975). For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of the defendants are reversed and their case remanded for new trial or further proceedings consistent with the view expressed herein. Reversed and remanded for new trial. SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., dissent. SANDERS, C. J., dissents and will assign written reasons. SANDERS, Chief Justice (dissenting). I dissent for the reasons assigned in State v. Searle, La., 339 So. 2d 1194 (1976).