Title: Sinclair v. City of Gillette

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RANDALL SINCLAIR and CARMEN SINCLAIR v. THE CITY OF GILLETTE, WYOMING, and STETSON ENGINEERING, INC., a Wyoming corporation2012 WY 19Case Number: S-11-0164Decided: 02/09/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
RANDALL SINCLAIR and 
CARMEN SINCLAIR,
Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),
 
v.
 
THE CITY OF GILLETTE, 
WYOMING, and STETSON ENGINEERING, INC., a Wyoming 
corporation,
Appellees 
(Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge
Representing 
Appellants:
Randall T. Cox, Cox, 
Horning & McGrath, LLC, Gillette, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Catherine M. Fox, 
Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Kendal R. Hoopes, Yonkee & 
Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Fox.
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Randall 
and Carmen Sinclair brought an action against the City of Gillette asserting 
three claims for relief, including a claim for damages under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act.  The City 
asserted governmental immunity and moved to dismiss that claim.  The district court granted the motion to 
dismiss, and the Sinclairs appealed.  
We agree with the district court that the Sinclairs’ claim is not 
cognizable under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and will affirm the 
district court’s order dismissing the claim. 
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
The 
Sinclairs raise two issues:
 
1.                                            
Did 
the district court err when it concluded that the Sinclairs’ damages claims 
against the City of Gillette are barred by the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act?
 
2.                                            
Does 
the application of immunity based on the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act as 
applied to negligence, trespass, and forcible taking of property claims which 
arise in the operation of public utilities and services violate the due process, 
equal protection, and open court protections of the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
The 
Sinclairs own property in Campbell County, Wyoming, near the City of Gillette.1  In the early summer of 2008, the 
Sinclairs noticed survey crews setting up instruments on their property.  The surveyors were working under a 
contract with the City to develop an expansion of the City’s storm drain 
system.  The Sinclairs objected, 
asserting that the City had no right to install the storm drain across their 
property.  Despite the Sinclairs’ 
protests, the surveyors continued their work.  The Sinclairs took their complaint to 
the City, still maintaining that it had no easement or other legal right to 
locate the storm drain on their property.  
According to the Sinclairs’ complaint, the engineering staff “forcefully” 
disagreed. 
 
[¶4]        
During 
the summer of 2008, City employees and contractors made a large excavation 
across the Sinclairs’ property.  
They installed a concrete storm drain approximately five feet tall and 
fourteen feet wide.  They refilled 
the excavation and graded the lot.  
The Sinclairs continued to protest that the City had no legal right to 
install the storm drain across their property, but to no avail.2  The storm drain currently remains in 
place.
 
[¶5]        
Pursuant 
to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, specifically Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 2009), the Sinclairs presented notice of their claim 
to the City.  They followed up by 
filing a complaint in the district court, setting forth three claims for 
relief.  In the first, they sought 
an injunction ordering the City to remove the storm drain and restore the 
property.  In the second, entitled 
“Statutory Damages,” they requested compensation pursuant to Wyoming’s Eminent 
Domain Act, specifically Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-506 – 508.3  In the third, entitled “Alternative 
Damages,” the Sinclairs claimed that, if they were not granted injunctive 
relief, they were entitled to an award of damages, including the loss in value 
of the land, punitive damages against the City’s contractor, and attorneys’ fees 
and litigation costs.
 
[¶6]        
Pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the City filed a motion to dismiss the Sinclairs’ third 
claim.  It asserted that the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act preserves governmental immunity with certain specified 
exceptions, and that the Sinclairs’ claim did not fit within any of the 
statutory exceptions.  The City 
conceded that the Sinclairs may be entitled to compensation pursuant to the 
Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, but maintained that the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act barred the Sinclairs’ third claim for relief.  The Sinclairs opposed the City’s motion 
to dismiss, contending that the claim fit within one of the Act’s exceptions, 
and that the City was not immune from suit.
 
[¶7]        
After 
briefing and oral argument, the district court concluded that the Sinclairs’ 
third claim was not authorized under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and 
granted the City’s motion to dismiss the claim.  In response to the Sinclairs’ unopposed 
motion, the district court certified pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b) that this 
dismissal was a final judgment as to the Sinclairs’ third claim, and that there 
was no just reason to delay entry of final judgment on the claim.  The Sinclairs have appealed that final 
judgment, and the parties agreed to stay the remainder of the case pending the 
result of the appeal.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶8]                        
When 
reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in 
the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  We will sustain such a 
dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff 
cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.
 
Belden 
v. Lampert, 
2011 WY 83, ¶ 6, 251 P.3d 325, 327 (Wyo. 2011), 
quoting Cramer v. Powder River Coal, 
LLC, 2009 WY 45, ¶ 35, 204 P.3d 974, 983 (Wyo. 2009).  We must 
interpret the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act in order to determine whether the 
Sinclairs can assert a claim under its provisions.  When we interpret statutes, our goal is 
to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and we “attempt to determine 
the legislature’s intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the words used in the statute.”  Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation 
Dist., 2009 WY 11, ¶ 9, 
200 P.3d 774, 778 (Wyo. 
2009).  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law, so our review of the district court’s conclusions is 
de novo.  Id.; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 2010 WY 122, 
¶ 7, 238 P.3d 568, 570 
(Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶9]        
With 
specific regard to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, we have said that we 
should not “enlarge, stretch, expand[,] or extend” the statutory language to 
include “matters not falling within its express provisions.”  State v. Watts, 2008 WY 19, ¶ 19, 177 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2008).  Instead, we use our “standard rules” of 
statutory interpretation “to determine whether the legislature intended that 
immunity be waived for a particular claim and will not resort to reliance upon 
previous unsupported and unnecessary suggestions that the act is to be 
interpreted either liberally or strictly.”  
Id., ¶ 20, 177 P.3d  at 
798-99.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]     
We have often 
explained that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act “provides broad governmental 
immunity from tort liability,” but “also establishes a number of specified 
exceptions.”  Krenning, ¶ 21, 200 P.3d  at 
781.  “Unless a claim falls within 
one of the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity, it will be 
barred.”  City of Torrington v. Cottier, 2006 WY 145, ¶ 7, 145 P.3d 1274, 1277 (Wyo. 
2006).  The Sinclairs’ complaint 
does not specify any of the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity.  They now contend, however, that the 
exception applicable to their claim is contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-39-108(a), which provides as follows:
 
A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful 
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while 
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of public utilities and 
services including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or 
disposal, heating and ground transportation.
 
[¶11]     
The 
negligence specifically alleged in the Sinclairs’ complaint is 
that:
 
[E]mployees 
of the City were negligent and careless in failing to properly investigate the 
status of ownership of the land, particularly after the [Sinclairs] repeatedly 
complained that they owned the land and the City had no right to build the storm 
drain on the [Sinclairs’] land.  
Employees of the City negligently delegated the duty to research land 
ownership to Stetson Engineering.
 
The 
Sinclairs also alleged that the City’s employees “either negligently made 
assumptions or intentionally stated untruths to the [Sinclairs] about their 
rights to use the [Sinclairs’] land,” and “either negligently made assumptions 
or intentionally stated untruths to the [Sinclairs] about their rights to build 
the storm drain extension.”  No 
other allegations of negligence are made in the complaint.  For purposes of this appeal, the City 
has conceded that its employees and contractors were negligent in their 
investigation of the ownership of the land.
 
[¶12]     
As 
noted before, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act provides that a governmental 
entity may be held liable for “the negligence of public employees while acting 
within the scope of their duties in the operation of public utilities.”  Accordingly, the basic question we must 
answer is whether the City’s negligence in failing to ascertain the ownership of 
the Sinclairs’ property constitutes negligence in the “operation” of a public 
utility.
 
[¶13]     
We 
considered the statutory term “operation” in the case of Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1990), in which 
the Sawyers’ property was damaged due to the failure of iron water pipes.  The Sawyers claimed that the City was 
negligent in adopting an ordinance requiring iron pipes, and asserted that 
immunity for this negligence was waived because it related to the operation of a 
public utility.  We did not think it 
necessary to provide a definition for the term operation, 
because
 
even 
a superficial analysis of that exception to immunity reveals that the claim 
asserted is not encompassed by that statute.  The asserted wrongdoing on the part of 
the City of Sheridan does not spring from “operation” of a public utility.  The claim is clearly one which asserts 
that the Sheridan City Council was negligent in adopting an ordinance which 
proved over time to be unsatisfactory or perhaps even ill-considered. . . .  Here, the complaint is not that a city 
employee committed an act of negligence in the operation of the water system; 
but, rather, that the Sheridan City Council should never have enacted an 
ordinance which included a requirement to use iron pipe.  The claim simply does not fit in the 
niche provided by W.S. 1-39-108(a).
 
Id. 
at 478.
 
[¶14]     
The 
statutory term “operation” was further analyzed in Cottier, ¶¶ 8-13, 145 P.3d  at 
1278-80.  In that case, 
Mr. Cottier’s property was damaged by backed up sewage.  The back-up was caused by tree roots in 
the main sewer line, and Mr. Cottier pursued a claim against the City for 
negligence in failing to keep the sewer lines open.  The City moved to dismiss on the basis 
of governmental immunity.  While 
acknowledging that there was an exception for the “operation” of a public 
utility, the City asserted that its negligence, if any, related to the 
maintenance of the sewer lines, not in their operation.  
 
[¶15]     
We wrote 
that:
 
the 
proper question is what did the legislature mean by the phrase “operation of a 
public utility?”  “Operation” is not 
further defined by the statute.  
When a term is not defined, we will furnish an ordinary and obvious 
meaning.  The 
American Heritage College Dictionary 975 (4th ed. 2004), defines “operation” as 
the “state of being operative or functional.”  See also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 827 (1991).  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1092 (6th ed. 1990), defines “operation” as “the process of operating 
or mode of action.” . . .
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-108 waives immunity for the negligence of public employees in 
the operation of public utilities and services including, solid or liquid waste 
collection or disposal.  In 
other words, the statute waives immunity for negligence in keeping the public 
utility operable or functional.
 
Cottier, 
¶¶ 8, 14, 145 P.3d  at 1278, 1280 (emphasis added; footnote and internal 
citation omitted).
 
[¶16]     
The City of Gillette 
concedes for purposes of this appeal that it was negligent in investigating the 
ownership status of the Sinclairs’ property.  We conclude, however, that such 
negligence is unrelated to the “operation” of the storm drain.  The storm drain operates and functions 
regardless of who owns the property.  
Because negligence in determining the legal status of the property is not 
negligence in the operation of the storm drain, the Sinclairs’ claim “simply 
does not fit in the niche provided” under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act.  Sawyer, 793 P.2d  at 478.  
 
[¶17]     
The 
Sinclairs also brought a claim against the City under the Wyoming Eminent Domain 
Act.  One section of that Act, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516, is entitled “Action for inverse condemnation,” and 
provides that:
 
When a person 
possessing the power of condemnation takes possession of or damages land in 
which he has no interest, or substantially diminishes the use or value of land . 
. . before filing an action of condemnation, the owner of the land may file an 
action in district court seeking damages for the taking or damage and shall be 
granted litigation expenses if damages are awarded to the 
owner.
 
We have established 
that the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act “covers the entire subject of eminent 
domain.”  L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County 
Comm’rs, 790 P.2d 663, 669 
(Wyo. 1990).  Accordingly, the Act 
provides the exclusive remedy available in cases of inverse condemnation.  See Waid v. State, 996 P.2d 18, 23 (Wyo. 2000).  The fact that the Sinclairs’ exclusive 
remedy is under the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act reinforces our conclusion that 
they have no viable cause of action against the City under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act.
 
[¶18]     
The Sinclairs’ second 
issue, asserting violations of their constitutional rights, is without 
merit.  We have previously upheld 
the constitutionality of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.  See, e.g., Krenning, ¶ 36, 200 P.3d  at 785.  Moreover, the gist of the Sinclairs’ 
assertion is that they are being deprived of access to the courts.  That is incorrect.  Despite the dismissal of their claim 
under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, they still have access to the courts 
to pursue their claim for injunctive relief and their inverse condemnation claim 
under the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act.
 
[¶19]     
Affirmed.
[¶20]     
FOOTNOTES
1Because 
this case comes before us after a motion to dismiss, the facts have not yet been 
developed.  This factual summary is 
based on the allegations of the complaint.
 
2Apparently, the City 
was unaware that the property had been conveyed to the Sinclairs and purchased 
an easement from the prior owners of the property.
 
3The complaint refers 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-25-506 – 508, but there are no such statutory 
sections.  When read in context, it 
is obvious that this is a typographical error, and that the Sinclairs intended 
to refer to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-506 – 508.