Title: Sizemore/Terhune v. Myers

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: April 13, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BILL SIZEMORE,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S54201) (Control)
CHIP TERHUNE,
LARRY WOLF & STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S54217)
(Cases Consolidated)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record January 5, 2007.
Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, filed the petition for petitioner Sizemore.
Margaret S. Olney, Smith, Diamond & Olney, Portland, filed the petition and reply
brief for petitioners Terhune, Wolf, and Novick.
Judy Lucas, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the answering memorandum
for respondent.  With her on the memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
DURHAM, J.
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
DURHAM, J.
In this proceeding for review of a ballot title, ORS 250.085(5), we address
two petitions that challenge the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative
Petition 48 (2008).  The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would modify
Oregon law regarding union security agreements in certain ways that we discuss below in
greater detail. (1)  We set out the text of the proposed measure in the Appendix to this
opinion.
Petitioners are electors who timely submitted written comments to the
Secretary of State concerning the Attorney General's draft ballot title and who, therefore,
are entitled to seek review in this court.  See ORS 250.085(2) (stating that requirement). 
We review the Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine whether it
substantially complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2).  See ORS 250.085(5)
(stating standard of review).
The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for Initiative
Petition 48 (2008):
"PROHIBITS NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS REQUIRING:
PRIVATE EMPLOYEES TO JOIN UNION,
REPRESENTED NONMEMBERS TO SHARE
REPRESENTATION COSTS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote prohibits agreement between
union and private employer to require union membership; prohibits union-employer contracts requiring represented nonmembers to share costs of
representation.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote retains law allowing private
employer and union agreements to require union membership, allowing
union-employer contracts requiring represented nonmembers to share
representation costs.
"SUMMARY:  Under current law, employees have the right to elect
to be exclusively represented in collective bargaining by a union of their
choosing, which represents all employees in that bargaining unit, including
employees who decline to join the union.  A union and private employer
may negotiate an agreement requiring union membership.  Union and public
or private employer may negotiate agreement requiring represented
nonmembers to share costs of representation.  Payroll deductions must be:
required by law, authorized by employee, or authorized by collective
bargaining agreement.  Measure prohibits agreements requiring union
membership or requiring nonmembers to share representation costs. 
Prohibits transferring any payroll deduction to union without employee's
written authorization.  Authorizes lawsuit, damages, injunction, and civil
penalties for any violation.  Applies to renewal of existing contracts.  Other
provisions."
Each petition challenges each segment of the certified ballot title.  For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that certain challenges are well taken and we
therefore refer the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification.
ORS 250.035(2)(a) requires a ballot title to include a caption, not to exceed
15 words, "that reasonably identifies the subject matter of the state measure."  In
Kain/Waller v. Myers, 337 Or 36, 40, 93 P3d 62 (2004), this court stated that the terms
used in the caption must not "understate or overstate the scope of the legal changes that
the proposed measure would enact."  Kain/Waller also explained how the court
determines the subject matter of a proposed measure:
"To determine the subject matter of a proposed measure, we first
examine its words and the changes, if any, that the proposed measure would
enact in the context of existing law.  We then examine the words of the
caption to determine whether they reasonably identify the proposed
measure's subject matter.  See Phillips v. Myers, 325 Or 221, 225-26, 936
P2d 964 (1997) (illustrating principle)."
Id. at 41; see also Greenberg v. Myers, 340 Or 65, 68, 127 P3d 1192 (2006) (applying
same analysis).  A caption "reasonably identifies" a proposed measure's subject matter, as
ORS 250.035(2)(a) requires, "if within the [applicable word] limit, it states or describes
the subject accurately and in terms that will not confuse or mislead potential petition
signers and voters."  Greene v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 169, 174-75, 903 P2d 366 (1995).
All petitioners contend that the Attorney General's caption is inaccurate and
misleading because the phrase "PRIVATE EMPLOYEES" falsely suggests that the
proposed measure applies to only private employees and, by inference, private employers. 
The Attorney General agrees that the proposed measure would apply to both the private
and public employment sectors, but argues that the phrase "REPRESENTED
NONMEMBERS TO SHARE REPRESENTATION COSTS" adequately communicates
that point.
We disagree.  The phrase "PRIVATE EMPLOYEES," when considered in
context, inaccurately portrays the proposed measure as a regulation of the employment
relationship between private employers and their employees.  No other word or phrase in
the caption adequately communicates the true scope of the proposed measure's subject
matter:  it would regulate the employment relationship between both private and public
employers and their employees.  The phrasing of the caption likely would mislead petition
signers and voters about the scope of the legal changes that the proposed measure, if
approved, would enact.  Because the caption fails to reasonably identify the subject matter
of the proposed measure, we will refer the ballot title to the Attorney General for
modification.
The parties raise other objections to the Attorney General's proposed
caption.  We address those objections, because they raise issues that the Attorney General
is likely to face when he modifies the ballot title on referral.
Petitioner Sizemore objects to the phrase "PROHIBITS NEGOTIATED
CONTRACTS REQUIRING: * * * REPRESENTED NONMEMBERS TO SHARE
REPRESENTATION COSTS."  He asserts that the real subject matter of the proposed
measure "is an employee's right not to join or support a labor organization."  He also
argues that the proposed measure does not prohibit contracts that require represented
employees to share representation costs and does not use the phrase
"REPRESENTATION COSTS."
The Attorney General's caption is not deficient for those reasons.  As a
general matter, labor organizations have a legally imposed responsibility to represent
fairly all members of the relevant bargaining unit of employees, not only those employees
who become true members of the labor organization and, thus, agree to comply with its
membership rules.  The Attorney General concluded, and we agree, that the phrase
"REPRESENTATION COSTS" embraces the various kinds of monetary payments to a
labor organization or payments in lieu of dues that the prohibition in section 2b of the
proposed measure would affect. (2)  Section 3 of the proposed measure, as the Attorney
General's caption states, clearly would prohibit negotiated contracts that would require
bargaining unit employees who are nonmembers of the union to share in the costs of their
representation.  Current Oregon law permits the negotiation of agreements that, in one
form or another, compel nonmembers of a union to share in the cost of their
representation.  The Attorney General did not err in concluding that the proposed measure
would nullify that component of current Oregon law.  It is clear that the proposed
measure, if approved by the voters, would permit nonmembers of a union to receive union
representation services and yet free them of any obligation to share in the cost of those
services.  See Bosak v. Myers, 332 Or 552, 33 P3d 970 (2001); Dale v. Kulongoski, 321
Or 108, 894 P2d 462 (1995); Crumpton v. Kulongoski, 319 Or 82, 873 P2d 314 (1994) (so
describing subject matter in similar proposed measures).  The Attorney General's choice
of the phrase "REPRESENTATION COSTS" is a reasonable one in this context. 
Although the proposed measure does not use that phrase, it is an appropriate shorthand
description of the lengthy list of prohibited charges to employees set out in section 2b of
the proposed measure.  The Attorney General's use of that phrase does not deprive the
caption of substantial compliance with legal requirements.
Petitioners Terhune, Wolf, and Novick argue that the beginning clause of
the caption, "PROHIBITS NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS REQUIRING:  PRIVATE
EMPLOYEES TO JOIN UNION * * * [,]" is insufficient.  They contend that current
labor law does not authorize the negotiation of contracts that require private sector
employees to become union members.  They also contend that the focus of the caption on
private employees falsely implies that the law regarding public employees and
compulsory membership is somehow distinguishable from private sector labor law.  They
assert that the operative terms "PROHIBITS * * * REQUIRING" are misleading because
they falsely suggest that current law permits compulsory union membership.  They
contend that the caption obscures the true subject of the proposal, which, in their words is
"to allow employees to receive the benefits of union representation without sharing in the
costs of that representation."  Finally, they complain that the caption contains no reference
to the penalties that the proposed measure requires when a person violates its
requirements.
This court has held that, when a ballot title purports to describe existing
law, it must do so accurately:
"A ballot title should not misstate existing law, even by implication, and
thereby create a spurious argument to support the measure's passage."
Dale, 321 Or at 113.  In Dale, this court addressed a proposed measure that, if adopted,
would have relieved public employees in Oregon of the burden of paying for the cost of
their labor representation.  In describing the proposed measure, the ballot title question
asked:
"Shall constitution ban requiring public employees to join unions, pay dues
or representation costs, or forbid taking dues from wages?"
Id. at 110.  Two petitioners challenged the accuracy of that phrasing, arguing that the
phrase "ban requiring" was misleading because existing law did not compel union
membership or authorize unions to negotiate contracts that compelled union membership
by bargaining unit members.  This court agreed with the challengers, stating:
"The manner in which the phrase, 'ban requiring,' is used in the
proposed Question presents difficulties that support petitioners' contention
that the proposed ballot title misstates the existing law.  The phrase 'ban
requiring' can be read to imply that compulsory union membership presently
is required by law and that the measure bans that requirement.  Use of the
word 'ban,' without more, would be sufficient to signify that what the
proposed measure would do is prevent compulsory union membership. 
Adding the verb 'requiring' creates the mischief.  'Ban requiring' is not
accurate unless there is a law 'requiring.'  With respect to compulsory union
membership, there is none. * * *"
Id. at 113  (emphasis in original).
Dale is an authoritative statement that Oregon public sector labor law does
not authorize the negotiation of contracts that compel bargaining unit members to become
union members.  See Stines, 287 Or at 649-50 (Oregon public sector labor statute
authorized negotiation of "fair share" union security agreements requiring payment-in-lieu-of-dues to union to defray cost of representation, but not more stringent "union shop"
agreement requiring union membership.).  As a result, the Attorney General, in describing
current law regarding public sector employment, cannot suggest correctly that a
negotiated contract may compel public employees to join a union.
Three decisions of the United States Supreme Court confirm that unions
also cannot compel private sector employees to become union members.  In those cases,
the Court has concluded that private sector union security agreements lawfully may
compel bargaining unit members to contribute to the union an amount equivalent to union
dues and initiation fees, but may not require membership in the union beyond the payment
of those amounts.  Marquez v. Screen Actors, 525 US 33, 46, 119 S Ct 292, 142 L Ed 2d
242 (1998); Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 US 95, 105-06, 105 S Ct 3064, 87 L Ed 2d 68
(1985); Labor Board v. General Motors, 373 US 734, 83 S Ct 1453, 10 L Ed 2d 670
(1963) (all so demonstrating). (3)  In revising the ballot title caption for Initiative
Petition 48 on referral, the Attorney General, in light of those cases, should avoid
phrasing that suggests that current law authorizes the negotiation of contracts that require
public or private sector employees to join a union.  Current law contains no such
requirement.
We also agree with petitioners Terhune, Wolf, and Novick that the caption
must include some notification to the voters regarding the enforcement scheme that the
proposed measure would enact. (4)  As noted, the terms in a caption must not
"understate or overstate the scope of the legal changes that the proposed measure would
enact."  Kain/Waller, 337 Or at 40.  The remedial provisions in the proposed measure
here are both novel and sweeping.  The Attorney General claims that those remedial
provisions do not "change the current law so significantly as to constitute a separate
subject matter."`  We disagree.  The remedial provisions are equally unprecedented and
much broader in scope than remedial provisions that this court previously has determined
must be described in the caption.  See Greenberg v. Myers, 340 Or at 70 (so illustrating).
We conclude that the extensive enforcement provisions in the proposed
measure represent major changes in Oregon law that "likely would be significant to the
voting public."  Id. at 72.  They are not "mere procedural details" of the other changes that
the proposed measure would make to current Oregon law regarding security agreements. 
Id.  The remedial scheme is an important aspect of the subject matter of the proposed
measure.  In failing to give the voters any notice of that subject matter in the caption, the
Attorney General has understated the extent to which the proposed measure changes
Oregon law.  The Attorney General must address that inaccuracy on referral.
Petitioners Terhune, Wolf, and Novick also argue that the caption must be
modified to state what they contend is its true subject, i.e., to allow employees to receive
the benefits of union representation without sharing the costs of that representation.  They
argue that, in Dale, Crumpton, Bosak, and Sizemore v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 229, 905 P2d
1146 (1995), this court, in addressing the adequacy of ballot titles for similar proposed
measures, certified captions that explicitly informed voters that the measure would permit
nonmembers of a union to receive representation services and benefits but avoid any
responsibility to pay for them.  The Attorney General argues that the cited cases are
distinguishable.
Petitioners are correct in part.  In context, the subject matter of the proposed
measure consists of two identifiable legal changes.  The proposed measure will eliminate
any employment condition requiring any person to pay money to a union, and, thereby, it
will entitle employees to receive the union's legally mandated representation services
without sharing in the cost of those services.  The certified caption refers to only one of
those subjects.  Consequently, it "understate[s] * * * the scope of the legal changes that
the proposed measure would enact."  Kain/Waller, 337 Or at 40.  The Attorney General
must address that deficiency on referral.  We reject, however, petitioner's contention that
the Attorney General must label the union's services as the "benefits" of union
representation.  Voters may interpret that terminology as an argument against the
proposed measure.
We turn to petitioners' challenges to the "yes" and "no" vote result
statements.  ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c) provide that a ballot title must include two 25-word statements that accurately describe in simple and understandable terms the results of
approval and rejection of the proposed measure.  The "yes" vote result statement should
reflect the most significant and immediate consequences of the adoption of the proposed
measure.  Pelikan/Tauman v. Myers, 342 Or 383, 390, 153 P3d 117 (2007).
Petitioner Sizemore argues that the Attorney General's "yes" vote result
statement is insufficient, because it focuses too narrowly on the prohibition of contracts
that require represented nonmembers of a union to share in the cost of their representation
by the union.  He asserts that the proposed measure would prohibit employers from
requiring any payment to a labor organization as a condition of employment.  In a similar
vein, he also argues that the Attorney General's "no" vote result statement is insufficient
because it fails to state that a "no" vote would "retain[] law allowing employers to require
employees to join or pay money to unions as condition of employment."  We reject those
challenges for the reasons discussed above.
Petitioners Terhune, Wolf, and Novick contend that the Attorney General's
"yes" and "no" result statements suffer from the same shortcomings that they raised with
respect to the caption.  We agree.  As noted, current law does not permit the negotiation
of collective bargaining agreements that compel employees to become union members. 
The Attorney General on referral must revise both result statements to recite correctly
what current law requires in that regard.  We also agree that the most significant result of
enactment will be that nonmembers of a union will be entitled to refuse to pay for the cost
of union representation services that the union must provide to all employees. 
Additionally, the "yes" vote result statement must describe in some manner the new
enforcement scheme that the proposed measure would create.
These petitioners also contend that the "no" vote result statement must state
that, under current law, unions have a duty to represent all employees regardless of union
membership or financial contributions.  As noted, we have required the Attorney General
to revise the "no" vote result statement to describe correctly the state of the law that a
"no" vote will retain, including a reference to services that the union must provide to all
employees.  Beyond that, we do not discern why the "no" vote result statement requires an
even more detailed description of a union's duty of fair representation.
We turn to the ballot title summary.  A ballot title must contain a 125-word
summary that concisely and impartially describes the "measure and its major effect." 
ORS 250.035(2)(d).  The goal of the summary is to "'help voters to understand what will
happen if the measure is approved'" and the "'breadth of its impact.'"  Mabon v. Myers,
332 Or 633, 640, 33 P3d 988 (2001), (quoting Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Roberts, 308 Or 169,
175, 777 P2d 406 (1989)).
Petitioner Sizemore challenges the Attorney General's summary.  He asserts
that the summary fails to notify the reader that a union may elect to bargain for only its
members and, unless a union chooses to become the exclusive bargaining representative
for a bargaining unit of employees, it never assumes a duty to fairly represent
nonmembers of the union.
Those legal propositions are correct as far as they go.  However, petitioner
Sizemore has not demonstrated that those propositions have more than a bare theoretical
connection to the proposed measure.  He refers to the absence of any legal rule in state or
federal statutes requiring a union to become an exclusive bargaining representative for a
bargaining unit of employees.  But the Attorney General was entitled to decline to
mention that facet of current law, because it does not concern either the measure or its
major effect.
Petitioners Terhune, Wolf, and Novick challenge the Attorney General's
summary, relying on the same objections that they asserted against the Attorney General's
caption and result statements.  For the reasons expressed above, the Attorney General
must alter the statements in the summary that a union and a private employer may
negotiate "an agreement requiring union membership[]" and that the measure "prohibits
agreements requiring union membership * * *."  Those statements do not accurately
reflect current law.
We agree with these petitioners that a major effect of the proposed measure
is that it entitles nonmembers of a union to avoid sharing in the costs of the 
representation services that the union, as exclusive bargaining representative, must
provide to all employees.  In Dale, which concerned a proposed measure that was similar
to the instant measure, this court concluded that the summary was insufficient because it
failed to state expressly that, under the proposed measure, "employees who are not
members of the union, but who are members of the bargaining unit, will receive
representation without cost."  321 Or  at 114.  Consequently, this court modified the
summary to require inclusion of the following sentence:  "Bans requiring nonunion public
employees to share union representation costs; unions must represent such employees
without charge."  Relying on Dale, we conclude here that the absence from the summary
of a similar statement is a defect that requires correction on referral.
Finally, petitioners Terhune, Wolf, and Novick object that the Attorney
General's summary fails to explain to the voters that the proposed measure would
authorize the recovery of "exemplary" damages from anyone who violates its
requirements.  We conclude that the term "damages" in the summary is a minimally
sufficient reference to the damages aspect of the enforcement scheme.  Although we do
not sustain petitioners' objection in that regard, the Attorney General may revisit that
question on referral.
We reject the other arguments that the parties raise without further
discussion.  For the reasons expressed above, we refer the ballot title to the Attorney
General for modification.  ORS 250.085(8).
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
Appendix
Initiative Petition 48 (2008)
Be It enacted by the People of Oregon:
The following new sections shall be added to and made part of the Oregon Revised
Statutes:
Section 1.  This Act shall be known as the Oregon Right to Work Act.
Section 2.  No person shall be required, as a condition or continuation [sic] of
employment, to:
a.  become or remain a member of a labor organization;
c. [sic] cease being a member of a labor organization;
b. [sic] pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other similar charges, however denominated,
of any kind or amount[,] to a labor organization; or pay to any charity or other third party,
in lieu of such payments, any amount equivalent [sic] to or [a] pro rata portion of dues,
fees, assessments, or other charges required of members of a labor organization.
Section 3.  Any agreement, understanding or practice, written or oral, implied or
expressed, between any labor organization and employer, which violates the rights of
employees as guaranteed by provisions of this Act, is hereby declared to be unlawful. 
Deducting money from an employee's pay and transferring in any manner all or part of
that money to a labor organization without the employee's written authorization is a
violation of this Act.
Section 4.  Any person injured as a result of any violation of the provisions of this Act
may bring action in the Circuit Court of the person's residence to recover any and all
damages of any character resulting from such violation, including exemplary damages as
well as recovery of costs and reasonable attorney fees associated with the original
determination and any appeal thereof.  Such remedies shall be independent of and in
addition to the penalties and remedies proscribed in other provisions of this Act.
Section 5.  Any person injured as a result of any violation or threatened violation of the
provisions of this Act shall be entitled to injunctive relief against any and all violators or
persons threatening violations.
Section 6.  The provisions of this Act shall be enforced by the Attorney General who
shall have exclusive authority, among government agencies, to investigate and bring
enforcement action.  Such enforcement action shall not replace or restrict any civil action
brought by an injured person.  The Attorney General may seek injunctive relief as to
actual or threatened violations of this Act, and may seek civil penalties of up to $10,000
per employee whose rights under this Act have been violated.  Any enforcement action
may be brought in the Marion County Circuit Court or in the Circuit Court of any county
where the employer, labor organization, or injured person is located.
Section 7.  If multiple enforcement actions are brought in more than one Circuit Court,
they may be consolidated to be heard in one Circuit Court, by agreement of the parties.  If
the parties do not agree, all such proceedings shall be consolidated for consideration by
the Marion County Circuit Court.
Section 8.  For purposes of this Act:
a.)  'Employer' means all persons, firms, associations, corporations, public
employers, public school employers, and public colleges, universities, institutions,
and education agencies who employ one or more persons [sic].
b.)  'Labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or agency or
employee representation committee, association or union, which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning wages, rates of
pay, hours of work, other conditions of employment, or other forms of
compensation.
Section 9.  The provisions of this Act shall not apply:
a) to employers and employees covered by the Federal Railway Labor Act;
b) to federal employers and employees;
c) to employers and employees on exclusive federal enclaves; or
d) to any employment contract entered into before the effective date of this Act. 
However, the provisions of this Act shall apply to any renewal or extension of any
existing contract.
Section 10.  If any provision of this Act or the application of any such provision to any
person or circumstance should be held invalid by a Court [sic] of competent jurisdiction,
the remainder of this Act, or the application or its provisions to persons or circumstances
other than those to which it is held invalid, shall remain in effect.
1. A union security agreement is any one of several forms of collective bargaining
contract provisions that entitle the employees' exclusive bargaining representative to
compel all employees in the bargaining unit, as a condition of employment, to contribute
financially to the cost of representation.  See Stines v. OSEA, 287 Or 643, 646 n 1, 601
P2d 799 (1979) (describing operation of several types of union security agreements). 
Because of the principle of exclusive representation, a union assumes a legally imposed
responsibility to fairly represent all bargaining unit members, including those who do not
desire union representation, in the tasks of contract negotiation, grievance adjustment, and
other activities that are germane to collective bargaining.  See Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 431 US 209, 221-22, 97 S Ct 1782, 52 L Ed 2d 261 (1977), which states:
"The designation of a union as exclusive representative carries with it great
responsibilities. * * *  Moreover, in carrying out these duties, the union is
obliged 'fairly and equitably to represent all employees, * * * union and
non-union,' within the relevant unit.  A union-shop arrangement has been
thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who
benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise
have to become 'free-riders' -- to refuse to contribute to the union while
obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all
employees."
(Citations omitted.)
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that union security
agreements are "justified by the government's interest in promoting labor peace and
avoiding the 'free-rider' problem that would otherwise accompany union recognition[,]"
and that, as long as the union observes applicable safeguards against compelling
dissenters to pay for purely ideological activities, such agreements do not violate
employee constitutional rights.  Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 US 507, 517, 520-21, 111 S Ct 1950, 114 L Ed 2d 572 (1991).  For a detailed discussion of the law relating
to union security agreements, see II The Developing Labor Law, ch 26 (5th ed, John E.
Higgins, ed. in chief, 2006).
2. The proposed measure lists subsection "b" after subsection "c" in section 2.
3. Oregon has adopted legislation to regulate the rights and duties of certain private
sector employees who fall outside the coverage of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).  ORS 663.005 to 663.295.  The legislature modeled ORS 663.125(1), the
prohibition against membership-based discrimination, on its federal counterpart, 29 USC
section 158 (a) (3), in Pattern Makers.  No party argues "membership" under the Oregon
statute has a different meaning than that stated by the United States Supreme Court in
construing 29 USC section 158 (a) (3) in General Motors, Pattern Makers, and Marquez.
4. The Attorney General argues that this court should disregard petitioner Novick's
argument regarding the enforcement scheme because he did not make it below in his
comments to the Secretary of State.  We disagree.  The draft caption included the phrase,
"AUTHORIZES EMPLOYEE LAWSUIT, PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION."  Petitioner
Novick did not object to that phrase, and he incorporated a version of it ("AUTHORIZES
LAWSUITS, PENALTIES") in his recommended revised caption.  The Attorney General,
however, ultimately struck that reference to the enforcement scheme in its entirety from
the certified caption.  We may consider petitioner Novick's argument, because it
"concerns language * * * removed from the draft title * * *."  ORS 250.085(6).