Title: Inquiry Concerning A Judge, No. 07-64 Re: Ralph E. Eriksson

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1648 
____________ 
 
 
INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 07-64 RE:  RALPH E. 
ERIKSSON. 
 
[February 11, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review the recommendations from the Judicial Qualifications 
Commission (JQC) that Seminole County Judge Ralph E. Eriksson be publicly 
reprimanded and charged the costs of proceedings based upon findings that he 
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 12, Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we approve the JQC‘s recommendations. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case arises from formal charges filed by the JQC against Judge Ralph 
E. Eriksson.  In the Amended Notice of Formal Charges, the JQC accused Judge 
 
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Eriksson of improper conduct in three counts, and the Hearing Panel of the JQC 
found against Judge Eriksson on two of them.1 
Count I 
In State v. Walton, N. 06-MM-012701-A (Seminole Cty. Ct.), the defendant 
was initially charged with possession of cocaine (a felony), driving under the 
influence (a misdemeanor), and driving in violation of a business purposes only 
license (a misdemeanor).  The case was delayed while the suspect substance was 
subjected to testing in state laboratories.  Six months later, after tests revealed the 
substance in question was not cocaine, the felony possession of cocaine charge was 
dropped and the case was transferred to county court for further proceedings.   
On Monday, February 19, 2007, jury selection was scheduled to begin for 
the remaining two charges.  Before jury selection commenced, the defense moved 
to sever the remaining charges, but Judge Eriksson denied the request.  The 
defense and the State then jointly requested that the case be continued because they 
had been unable to agree on the admissibility of portions of a video of the traffic 
stop and subsequent arrest, which contained numerous references to cocaine that 
should be redacted.  The State agreed to a redaction, but Judge Eriksson also 
denied that request, stating, ―This would be the ninth month [that this case has 
                                          
 
1.  The Hearing Panel found against Judge Eriksson on Counts I and III, but 
rejected Count II.  Therefore, we do not address the facts or merits of Count II. 
 
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been pending], so I have to believe that both sides are well prepared.‖  Shortly 
thereafter, the following dialogue occured: 
[Defense Attorney]: Judge, may we approach briefly? 
Judge Eriksson: I can hear you. 
[Defense Attorney]: Mr. Walton has expressed some concerns 
regarding the Court‘s rulings here today.  He asked if there‘s anything 
possible that could be done about it, and I have advised him that it is 
possible to do a motion to recuse the Court.  However, that is 
generally in writing and sworn to.  Obviously, I‘m not prepared to 
present that to the Court at this time.  But he did wish me to express 
his concerns and that he would like me to present the Court with a 
motion to recuse the Court, and that he has concerns that he would not 
be able to get a fair—a fair trial before this Court, based on how the 
Court has presented itself to his counsel as well as the Court‘s rulings 
here today, both against his counsel and against the State Attorney‘s 
Office. 
 
Unfortunately, I am not prepared with a written motion; 
however, I believe it would be proper to give us an opportunity to 
have Mr. Walton sign off and swear off on that and set it for a 
hearing. 
Judge Eriksson: I believe that the law says that if you raise that, 
I am supposed to give you a reasonable period of time.  What I‘m 
going to do is give you a reasonable period of time. 
 
[Pause] 
 
Judge Eriksson: I‘m going to move this case for another pretrial 
conference, February 27th, at one o‘clock.  I‘m going to find that Bob 
Walton, under Rule 3.131 subsection E, subsection G(3), I‘m not 
satisfied that his bail is sufficient for him to appear here prepared for 
trial.  It appears that he, through his attorney, is not interested in a 
trial.  I‘m going to increase the bail in this case to $10,000.  I‘m going 
to remand him to the custody of the sheriff and cancel his present bail.  
He may post bail at any time. 
[Defense Attorney]: Mr. Walton has asked me to inform the 
Court that if the Court wishes him to proceed with this matter today 
versus being put into custody, he‘s happy to proceed to trial.  The 
 
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Court shouldn‘t concern himself with Mr. Walton not wishing to 
proceed to trial, because he does. 
 
Is that correct, Mr. Walton? 
[The Defendant]: Yes, sir. 
Judge Eriksson: All right.  That will conclude our proceedings 
today in State of Florida versus Bob Walton. 
 
After defense counsel again urged the court to reconsider its ruling, Judge Eriksson 
addressed, but abruptly dismissed, defense counsel‘s concerns. 
Judge Eriksson appeared before an Investigative Panel of the JQC on June 
28, 2007, for a hearing pursuant to JQC Rule 6(b).  See Fla. Jud. Qual. Comm‘n R. 
6.  The hearing addressed, in part, alleged misconduct by Judge Eriksson during 
the Walton case.   
At the Investigative Panel hearing, Judge Eriksson stated that Seminole 
County only selects jurors on Monday, and that some defendants attempt to 
manipulate the system by changing their pleas on a Monday to avoid trial for 
another week.  Judge Eriksson mentioned that he relied on a decision by a peer 
judge, who had previously followed the same course of action when the defendant 
changed his plea.  During that hearing the following dialogue occurred: 
[Panel Member]: . . . I‘ve sat here the whole time, and I don‘t 
think I‘ve ever heard you specifically say what all the reasons were 
that you raised Mr. Walton‘s bond from 3,500 to 10,000.  Can you tell 
me what were your reasons specifically for raising the bond from 
3,500 to 10,000. 
Judge Eriksson: Do you mean how I arrived at — 
[Panel Member]: I don‘t want to know how, but why.  You 
raised the bond from 35 to $10,000.  Tell me why you did that. 
 
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Judge Eriksson: My thought process was he had shown – his 
bond was to show up for trial, in effect.  I mean, there‘s interim steps, 
but his bond was to show up for trial and be ready for trial because it 
was for trial.  I saw no valid reason.  And I felt that the reason of well, 
Judge, we just don‘t think you‘re fair, or whatever, and we‘d like to 
have you recused, I felt like that was a last-gasp-without-basis reason 
that was an artificial reason, but under the law gives them a 
continuance.  And I felt like that went to the integrity of the system 
when they can maneuver it like that. 
[Panel Member]: Okay.  Sir, let me just get this straight because 
I want to make sure that I‘m hearing this.  The sole reason that you 
raised that bond was that they made a motion for a recusal?  That‘s 
what I heard you just say. 
Judge Eriksson: Yeah.  I don‘t think there was any other reason, 
because at that point the recusal says we aren‘t having a trial.  We‘re 
at 4:00 o‘clock.  We don‘t have any jurors later that week.  I have to 
give them time.  He said he needed some time, and I know the law 
says I have to give them time to go and prepare the motion.  We‘re not 
going to keep jurors there that evening.  And so they have, in my 
opinion, artificially granted themselves a continuance. 
[Panel Member]: I have no further questions. 
 
The Investigative Panel found probable cause to proceed further and on 
September 6, 2007, the JQC filed a Notice of Formal Charges against Judge 
Eriksson alleging, with regard to Count I, that Judge Eriksson effectively punished 
a defendant for exercising a legitimate legal right in violation of various canons of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The Notice of Formal Charges provided in Count I: 
Count I 
 
In State of Florida v. Bob Lee Walton, Seminole County Case # 06-
MM-012701-A, Mr. Walton was charged with Driving Under the 
Influence and Driving in Violation of the terms and conditions of a 
Business Purposes License.  This case had been previously charged in 
Circuit Court due to an allegation of Possession of Cocaine that was 
subsequently dropped. 
 
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a. Since there was a video of the traffic stop and the cocaine was 
mentioned on the video, counsel for the defendant had filed a 
motion to redact portions of the video.  To accomplish this task, 
the State and the defense jointly moved to continue the case.  The 
Court declined to do so, suggesting that the case had been pending 
too long. 
b. Subsequently, the defendant asked his lawyer to file a Motion to 
Recuse.  When told this, you expressed that you were not satisfied 
that the defendant‘s bail of $3,500.00 was sufficient to insure his 
presence, so you revoked the bond, ordered a new $10,000 bond, 
and ordered the defendant taken into custody.  
c. As a result the defendant was taken into custody and spent the next 
11 hours in the Seminole County Jail until his family was able to 
arrange for bail.  
d. When counsel for the defendant stated that his client was 
withdrawing his suggestion of recusal and was ready for trial, you 
ignored that statement, stating that you had granted the defendant‘s 
motion to continue. 
e. In response to questioning by the Investigative Panel of the 
Commission, you stated that the sole reason for revoking Mr. 
Walton‘s bond and imposing a new bond was in response to his 
Motion to Recuse. 
f. Your actions were calculated to punish the defendant for 
exercising a legitimate legal right, and so your actions were 
punitive and vindictive, undermining the orderly administration of 
justice.   
g. This charge is governed by Canons 1, 2A, and 3B of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 
 
Count III 
Count III of the JQC‘s formal charges arose from Judge Eriksson‘s open 
disagreement with the policy of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit that required county 
judges to hear petitions for injunctions against domestic violence or repeat 
violence.  Judge Eriksson wrote letters to both this Court and the Office of the 
 
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State Courts Administrator contending that Seminole County was not complying 
with an administrative order, approved by this Court, that concerned such 
injunctions. 
On October 30, 2007, Judge Eriksson presided over a series of domestic 
violence injunction hearings.  The petitioners who sought protection, most of 
whom were pro se, appeared to have little, if any, experience with the legal system.  
Judge Eriksson was very formulaic and impersonal, providing no assistance 
whatsoever to the petitioners and he consistently made reference to his duty to 
remain neutral.  The following is an example of a dialogue between Judge Eriksson 
and a pro se petitioner: 
Judge Eriksson: We‘ll turn to the injunction docket.  If you are 
Patrice Taylor, Patrick Taylor or Jeremy Russaw, would you step 
forward.   
Are you Mr. Russaw? 
Jeremy Russaw: Yes. 
Judge Eriksson: All right.  Would you step over to that table? 
Patrice Taylor, is that you? 
Patrice Taylor: Yes, sir. 
Judge Eriksson: All right.  Would you have a seat there. 
Patrice Taylor, who will be your first witness? 
Patrice Taylor: Your honor, I have none.  My son was not in 
any shape to come.  I don‘t have any witnesses except for the police 
report and the witnesses who expressed to the police what happened 
because I was too distressed to explain. 
Judge Eriksson: You can‘t use a report because the other side 
can‘t question what‘s on that paper.  You need to produce that person, 
whoever they are, so the other side can question them. 
 
Patrice Taylor: I was unaware of that, your Honor. 
Judge Eriksson: Well, I wasn‘t the one who was supposed to 
give you advice. 
 
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Patrice Taylor: I‘m sorry. 
Judge Eriksson: So let‘s go back and explore that statement. 
Where did you get the idea to file a petition? 
Patrice Taylor: I filed a petition. 
Judge Eriksson: Did somebody suggest it to you? 
Patrice Taylor: No.  I filed it because he was having some 
depression issues with — 
Judge Eriksson: No, not why did he — 
Patrice Taylor: The police department told me after I had 
repeated complaints of harassing and stalking and disturbances at my 
house. 
Judge Eriksson: Did they tell you that you would need to bring 
a witness or two — 
Patrice Taylor: No. 
Judge Eriksson: — testify so the other side could cross-
examine? 
Patrice Taylor: No.  I thought that the arrest would be enough.  
My son was in no shape to be here. 
Judge Eriksson: If you are arrested, does that mean you‘re 
guilty? 
Patrice Taylor: No, your Honor. 
Judge Eriksson: Okay.  So unless you‘re going to produce any 
witness or have anybody testify here today, I‘ll have to deny your 
motion — or your petition.  Do you understand that? 
Patrice Taylor: Not quite, your Honor.  He was arrested for 
stalking. 
Judge Eriksson: That is not proof on your petition.  That might 
be the start of a criminal proceeding, but — 
Patrice Taylor: [cell phone rings] 
I do apologize, your Honor.  I‘m scheduled to be at work. 
Judge Eriksson: All Right.  Are you too busy to be here? 
Patrice Taylor: No, your Honor.  This is my second time to be 
here.  You were not able to hear the first time because he was never 
served the paper.  And it‘s been a nightmare trying to find this guy to 
locate him while he works — 
Judge Eriksson: Just stay on course. 
Will you be presenting any evidence today on your petition? 
Patrice Taylor: I‘m sorry? 
Judge Eriksson: Will you be presenting any evidence on your 
petition? 
 
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Patrice Taylor: I have – written documentation, if that‘s what 
you mean.  I don‘t know. 
Judge Eriksson: If it‘s written, no.  He can‘t cross-examine 
whoever wrote it. 
Patrice Taylor: I don‘t know what else to say, your Honor.  I 
just want this guy to leave me alone.  That‘s all I want, is for him to 
just stay away from me and my family.  That‘s all I want. 
Judge Eriksson: Having presented no evidence here today, I‘m 
going to have to deny your petition for injunction for protection 
against repeat violence.  If each of you would step through — just step 
through the audience and you‘re finished here today and you‘ll have a 
copy of this in just a moment.  And that will complete that hearing. 
 
Judge Eriksson also dismissed injunction petitions that alleged repeat violence if 
the petitioner was only able to establish one act of violence.  Further, Judge 
Eriksson refused to admit police reports and the petitioner‘s own sworn statements 
because he considered them hearsay.  Judge Eriksson also questioned petitioners as 
to who instructed them to come to court, asking them such questions as, ―Who sent 
you here?‖ and ―Who told you to file this?‖ 
As the scheduled calendar proceeded Judge Eriksson became less rigid, and 
in some cases when he confronted a party with the ―witness‖ issue, asked them to 
―look in the mirror‖ when identifying their first witness.  As the hearings 
progressed, Judge Eriksson became less formalistic attempting to address the 
substance of the petitions pending before him. 
Judge Eriksson appeared before a second Investigative Panel on February 
28, 2007, for another 6(b) hearing.  This hearing addressed the additional alleged 
misconduct by Judge Eriksson of the manner in which he conducted the series of 
 
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injunction hearings on October 30, 2007.  The Investigative Panel again found 
probable cause to proceed and on April 30, 2008, the JQC filed an Amended 
Notice of Formal Charges, alleging that Judge Eriksson employed an over-
technical and rigid approach in conducting the proceedings seeking domestic 
violence injunctions in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The Amended 
Notice of Formal Charges included three counts, Counts I and II, which were 
identical to the original charging document, and Count III which addressed the 
injunction hearings on October 30, 2007.  
Count III as it appears in the JQC‘s Amended Notice of Formal Charges 
provided: 
Count III 
 
In a series of cases in which pro se petitioners sought 
Injunctions against Domestic Violence or Injunctions for Repeat 
Violence, all heard on October 30, 2007 in Seminole County, Florida, 
you failed to properly accord those petitioners the right to be heard on 
their petitions by implying that the verified petitions were somehow 
insufficient even though the facts contained in the petitions were 
uncontested.  It was suggested by the court that the petitioners were 
required to produce independent witnesses without acknowledging 
that the petitioners themselves could testify, as the law permits. This 
charge is governed by Canons 1, 2A, 3B (2), 3B (7) and 3B (8) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. 
 
Rather than assisting the parties in understanding the process of 
obtaining a domestic or repeat violence injunction, you employed an 
unduly rigid and formulaic process in dealing with pro se litigants, so 
as to impede their ability to obtain the relief and protection they 
sought from the court.  This charge is governed by Canons 1, 2A, 3B 
(2), 3B (7) and 3B (8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
 
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The Hearing Panel of the JQC 
The two matters pending before the JQC were consolidated and presented to 
a Hearing Panel of the JQC.  Prior to opening arguments, Judge Eriksson submitted 
a motion in limine seeking to preclude the use of any statements he made before 
the Investigative Panel.  The Hearing Panel denied the motion. 
Count I (The Walton Case) 
The Hearing Panel found that Judge Eriksson ―effectively punished Mr. 
Walton for exercising a legal right and that this result was punitive and gave the 
appearance of being vindictive.‖  The Hearing Panel further noted, ―The public 
could certainly conclude that [defense counsel]‘s requests for a stipulated 
continuance and his request to disqualify the judge had the effect of placing the 
client in jail.‖  The panel did recognize the witnesses who testified that Judge 
Eriksson is generally an extremely sincere and fair judge, but ultimately found 
Judge Eriksson‘s actions to be in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
 
The Hearing Panel noted that a retaliatory ruling in reaction to a request to 
disqualify a judicial officer constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
Abuse of judicial power in connection with motions for disqualification of a judge 
violates the Code.  Good motives of a judicial officer are not a defense to and 
cannot justify conduct which violates the Code. 
 
 
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Count III (The Injunctions) 
 
The Hearing Panel considered Judge Eriksson‘s disagreement with the 
manner in which domestic violence matters are determined in his circuit as a 
―political dispute‖ similar to the circumstances of In re Barnes, 2 So. 3d 166 (Fla. 
2009).  The panel noted that, unlike other judges in the county, Judge Eriksson did 
not provide a preliminary general explanation to the petitioners and respondents.  
The panel considered Judge Eriksson‘s demeanor that day to be cavalier and 
insensitive.  The panel also noted, ―[I]t was not up to the judge to make the hearsay 
objection for the respondent who did not make it himself.‖  The panel found: 
Judge Eriksson obviously had a difficult time in attempting to balance 
the interests of the petitioners versus the interests of the respondents.  
Despite this difficulty in balancing it remains that a cause of action for 
an injunction exists, that petitioners are encouraged to apply pro se, 
and that it would not have been a breach of simple fairness to ask the 
petitioner whether he or she wished to testify. 
 
After noting Judge Eriksson‘s recognition of his own shortcomings, his 
remediation of his approach, and his engagement in counseling, the panel was 
confident no similar conduct will occur in the future.  The panel thus concluded 
―that there should be no separate penalty over and above [a] reprimand.‖ 
Based on these findings of misconduct as to Counts I and III, the Hearing 
Panel recommended a public reprimand by this Court and that Judge Eriksson be 
responsible for the costs associated with these proceedings. 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Judge Eriksson asserts that (1) the JQC lacks jurisdiction over this case; (2) 
the Hearing Panel of the JQC was not authorized to consider Judge Eriksson‘s 
testimony from the Investigative Panel hearing; and (3) the JQC did not establish 
Judge Eriksson‘s misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. 
Jurisdiction 
Judge Eriksson‘s jurisdictional argument lacks merit.  There is no question 
that this Court has jurisdiction to oversee the conduct of judges.  See art. V, § 12, 
Fla. Const.  The JQC also has jurisdiction to investigate alleged judicial 
misconduct.  Article V, section 12(a)(1) of the Florida Constitution provides: 
There shall be a judicial qualifications commission vested with 
jurisdiction to investigate and recommend to the Supreme Court of 
Florida the removal from office of any justice of judge whose 
conduct, during term of office or otherwise . . . demonstrates a present 
unfitness to hold office, and to investigate and recommend the 
discipline of a justice or judge whose conduct, during term office or 
otherwise . . . warrants such discipline. . . .  The commission shall 
have jurisdiction over justices and judges regarding allegations that 
misconduct occurred before or during service as a justice or judge if a 
complaint is made no later than one year following service as a justice 
or judge.  The commission shall have jurisdiction regarding 
allegations of incapacity during service as a justice or judge. 
 
Although Judge Eriksson does not explicitly refer to the doctrine of judicial 
independence, his brief repeatedly refers to In re Allen, 998 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2008), 
and the overall theme of his argument implies that the principles of judicial 
independence should have precluded the JQC from filing charges against him.   
 
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The doctrine of judicial independence does not afford judges the power to do 
as they please.  This Court explained the expectations for judges in In re Turner, 
421 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1982): 
The duties, responsibilities, and powers entrusted to judges are 
awesome.  Judges must necessarily have a great deal of independence 
in executing these powers, but such authority should never be 
autocratic or abusive.  We judges must always be mindful that it is our 
responsibility to serve the public interest by promoting justice and to 
avoid, in official conduct, any impropriety or appearance of 
impropriety.  We must administer our offices with due regard to the 
system of law itself, remembering that we are not depositories of 
arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.  Judges are 
expected to be temperate, attentive, patient and impartial, diligent in 
ascertaining facts, and prompt in the performance of a judge‘s duties. 
Common courtesy and considerate treatment of jurors, witnesses, 
court personnel, and lawyers are traits properly expected of judges. 
Court proceedings and all other judicial acts must be conducted with 
fitting dignity and decorum, reflecting the importance and seriousness 
of the inquiry to ascertain the truth. 
 
This Court balanced the Turner standard for judges against the necessities of 
judicial independence in Allen, 998 So. 2d at 565.  In that case, although very 
different factually, this Court upheld a JQC panel‘s determination that Judge 
Michael E. Allen violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when he issued a written 
opinion that personally attacked a judge on his court.  In addressing the doctrine of 
judicial independence, this Court recognized that in the appellate context, 
―[g]enerally, appellate judges are free to write almost anything in their opinions 
regarding the decision of the case or the facts and law involved in the case.  
However, the discussion must be germane to the case at bar and the facts that 
 
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[were] within the record of the case.‖  Id. at 565.  In Allen we concluded that Judge 
Allen used extrarecord materials to personally attack another judge and ―[t]his type 
of action in a judicial opinion cannot be condoned, nor can it be protected by 
judicial independence.‖  Id.  The Court cautioned: 
While we find that the doctrine of judicial independence did not 
preclude the JQC from filing charges against Judge Allen for writing 
and releasing his concurring opinion in this case, we caution that our 
opinion today should not be viewed as a license for the JQC to judge 
and evaluate judicial opinions. 
 
Id. 
 
Judge Eriksson argues that his conduct was ―germane to the case at bar and 
the facts that [were] within the record of the case.‖  Allen, 998 So. 2d at 565.   
Implicit in his argument is an attempt to superimpose language from the Allen 
decision as an exclusive standard demarcating the jurisdiction of the JQC.  First, 
Allen addressed far different circumstances in the appellate context.  Additionally, 
this argument reads Allen far too broadly.  The Allen decision rejected Judge 
Allen‘s attempt to use the doctrine of judicial independence to justify his actions 
by noting that his extrajudicial conduct was not ―germane to the case at bar [or] the 
facts that [were] within the record of the case.‖  Id.  However, nothing in that 
decision established that the jurisdiction of the JQC is limited to instances of 
judicial conduct that are unrelated to a case. 
 
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Alternatively, the JQC refers to this Court‘s pronouncement in In re 
Taunton, 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978), where the Court said,  
There are, of course, limits that every judicial officer must 
observe. Judges are required to follow the law and apply it fairly and 
objectively to all who appear before them.  No judge is permitted to 
substitute his concept of what the law ought to be for what the law 
actually is.  He may exercise his judicial discretion conservatively or 
liberally, and he may temper justice with mercy, but he may not deny 
justice to any person.  He may not withhold justice from one litigant 
in favor of another for whatever reason.  Every judge is answerable 
for excesses or abuse of his awesome power.  There is no place in our 
system for justice by whim or capricious notion.  Regardless of the 
philosophy to which a justice or judge subscribes, he is not permitted 
to conduct himself in a manner which is unbecoming to a member of 
the judiciary and which demonstrates an unfitness to hold office. 
 
Id. at 179.  Taunton effectively conveys the notion that judicial independence, 
while important, is not limitless. 
This Court has not precluded the JQC from investigating judges accused of 
similar conduct in the past.  For example, in In re Aleman, 995 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 
2008), the judge was disciplined for failing to provide defense counsel with an 
adequate amount of time to prepare proper written motions to recuse and for 
inappropriately threatening to hold defense counsel in contempt with regard to the 
preparation of those motions.  The JQC found that the judge‘s conduct was 
―arrogant, discourteous, and impatient, as well as inadequate, improper, 
unacceptable, and unreasonable.‖  Id. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
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Similar to the facts here, Judge Aleman was accused of reacting improperly to a 
motion to recuse. 
Another example of proper JQC investigative action in circumstances 
similar to the case before us can be found in In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 
2006).  In Sloop, several citizens appeared in the Seminole County courthouse to 
respond to traffic charges, but arrived at the wrong courtroom after being 
misdirected by courthouse personnel.  See id. at 1050.  After they did not appear in 
Judge Sloop‘s courtroom, Judge Sloop simply issued warrants for their immediate 
arrests and then proceeded to go to lunch.  See id.  Despite being informed that the 
individuals had eventually reported to his courtroom, he refused to rescind the 
warrants.  See id.  This Court concluded its opinion by stating, ―We hope that our 
decision today will remind all judges of their solemn obligation to ‗personally 
observe‘ high standards of conduct ‗so that the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary may be preserved.‘ ‖  Id. at 1060 (quoting Fla. Code of Jud. Conduct, 
Canon 1).  Here, the allegations against Judge Eriksson certainly challenge the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary, and thus an investigation was 
warranted. 
The JQC has an internal filter that guards the principles of judicial 
independence.  First, the JQC decides which allegations of judicial conduct warrant 
an investigation.  Second, an investigative panel decides which cases warrant a full 
 
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hearing.  Until an investigative panel recommends a full hearing, the accusations 
remain confidential.  Third, a hearing panel conducts a full hearing and requires the 
JQC to establish misconduct by clear and convincing evidence for each individual 
allegation.  Lastly, the charges for which the hearing panel finds misconduct are 
submitted to this Court for yet another level of scrutiny.  Judicial independence is 
guarded at each phase of the judicial discipline process, and this case is no 
exception.  The doctrine of judicial independence did not preclude the JQC from 
proceeding with these specific charges against Judge Eriksson. 
Judge Eriksson’s Statements to the Investigative Panel 
Judge Eriksson next argues that both the Hearing Panel and this Court 
should be precluded from considering any evidence presented to the Investigative 
Panel because Article V, section 12(a)(4) of the Florida Constitution specifically 
provides that ―[u]ntil formal charges against a justice or judge are filed by the 
investigative panel with the clerk of the supreme court of Florida all proceedings 
by or before the commission shall be confidential.‖  (Emphasis supplied.)  We 
reject this reading of the Florida Constitution because it is inconsistent with past 
practices of the JQC and the precedent of this Court. 
In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), the Supreme Court of the United 
States held: 
The contention that the combination of investigative and 
adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of 
 
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bias in administrative adjudication . . . must overcome a presumption 
of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must 
convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies 
and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative 
powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of 
due process is to be adequately implemented. 
 
Id. at 47.  The JQC refers to Koehler v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 390 So. 
2d 711 (Fla. 1980), to establish that this Court has applied the abovementioned 
language to bifurcated hearings in Florida.  Even though Koehler applied Withrow 
to the administrative law field, the same principles apply here in the context of 
judicial discipline.  Koehler, through its adoption of Withrow, held that ―[t]he 
‗mere exposure to evidence‘ in the investigative phase of a proceeding . . . is 
‗insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness‘ of board members when they later sit 
in judgment.‖  Koehler, 390 So. 2d at 713 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55).  The 
finding that someone involved in the investigation of an allegation may later 
adjudicate that same allegation and not violate due process applies to the judicial 
disciplinary context as it does to the administrative law framework. 
 
While this Court has not explicitly adopted Withrow in the judicial context, 
the analysis of Withrow from other jurisdictions is persuasive.  In Mississippi 
Commission on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929 (Miss. 1997), the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the state‘s bifurcated judicial disciplinary 
process presented ―no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias . . . than inheres in 
 
- 20 - 
the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate.‖  Id. at 
946 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 54).  In Mosley v. Nevada Commission on 
Judicial Discpline, 22 P.3d 655 (Nev. 2001), the Supreme Court of Nevada held 
that, ―[a]lthough the Court‘s ruling concerned an administrative agency and not, as 
here, a court of judicial performance, we conclude that Withrow is otherwise 
indistinguishable and therefore dispositive.‖  Id. at 660. 
 
Further, this Court‘s justification for the confidentiality requirement in JQC 
investigations is inconsistent with Judge Eriksson‘s argument.  In In re Graziano, 
696 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1997), this Court explained that confidentiality allows the 
JQC to efficiently process complaints from any and all sources while protecting the 
complainant from recriminations and the judicial officer from unsubstantiated 
charges.  See id. (citing Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1974)).  In Forbes, 
we clarified the justification for confidentiality in judicial discipline investigations: 
The need and reason for confidentiality is set forth by the American 
Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration 
which recommends:  
 
Except in the most extreme situations, the requirements 
of verification and disclosure of identity stifle complaints 
and thereby frustrate the objective of securing public 
confidence in the courts' willingness to police 
themselves.  The provision that investigations be 
confidential has proven to be abundant safeguard for the 
judge who has been unfairly accused. 
 
 
- 21 - 
Forbes, 298 So. 2d at 4.  The confidentiality of the 6(b) hearings is thus aimed at 
protecting judges from unsubstantiated claims, not meritorious claims that advance 
to a hearing panel.  See id.  Judge Eriksson does not provide any authority to 
support his unique interpretation of article V, section 12 of the Florida 
Constitution. 
Further, this Court has upheld numerous cases in which findings from a 
hearing panel have relied on evidence presented during the investigative phase of a 
JQC proceeding.  For example, in In re Ford-Kaus, 730 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1999), a 
judge was accused of overbilling a client while running for office.  The judge told 
an investigative panel that the overbilling was the fault of her secretary.  See id. at 
275.  The Hearing Panel later discovered that the judge did not employ a secretary 
at the time the alleged overbilling occurred and, after probing the judge on her 
prior testimony, concluded that the judge had been untruthful.  See id.  This Court 
not only upheld the findings and recommendations of the hearing panel, it also 
factored dishonesty into its decision to remove the judge from office.  See id. at 
275-77.   
 
Accordingly, we find that the Hearing Panel was authorized to consider the 
testimony of Judge Eriksson that was presented during the investigative proceeding 
before the filing of the Notice of Formal Charges. 
Clear and Convincing Evidence 
 
- 22 - 
The Florida Constitution vests this Court with the ultimate responsibility to 
determine the parameters of judicial misconduct that constitutes prohibited 
behavior.  Specifically, article V, section 12(c)(1) provides that ―[t]he supreme 
court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, 
and recommendations of the [judicial qualifications] commission and it may order 
that the justice or judge be subjected to appropriate discipline.‖  In In re Graziano, 
696 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1997), we described that process: 
Before reporting findings of fact to this Court, the JQC must conclude 
that they are established by clear and convincing evidence.  In re 
McAllister, 646 So. 2d 173, 177 (Fla. 1994).  This Court must then 
review the findings and determine whether they meet this quantum of 
proof, a standard which requires more proof than a ―preponderance of 
the evidence‖ but . . . less than ―beyond and to the exclusion of a 
reasonable doubt.‖  In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994).  If 
the findings meet this intermediate standard, then they are of 
persuasive force and are given great weight by this Court.  See In re 
LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1977).  This is so because the JQC 
is in a position to evaluate the testimony and evidence first-hand.  See 
In re Crowell, 379 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1979).  However, the ultimate 
power and responsibility in making a determination rests with this 
Court.  Id. 
 
696 So. 2d at 753. 
Count I 
Judge Eriksson contends that there is no clear and convincing evidence to 
support the JQC‘s finding that he violated the Code of Judicial Conduct in his 
revocation of Mr. Walton‘s bond.  Instead, Judge Eriksson argues that his conduct 
was within his discretion as provided by both statutory and case law.  We disagree. 
 
- 23 - 
Judge Eriksson argues his revocation of Mr. Walton‘s bond was consistent 
with Florida law.  To support his contention he relies on a number of cases directed 
to the proposition that a judge should deny a motion to recuse if the motion is 
made to delay or frustrate proceedings.  See Fleck v. State, 956 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2007); Deren v. Williams, 521 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).  Judge 
Eriksson also refers to this Court‘s recognition of ―the frustration of trial judges 
who are burdened with belligerent defendants who attempt to thwart the system 
any way they can.‖  State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla. 1993).   
While these decisions may support a rejection of Mr. Walton‘s motion to 
recuse, they certainly do not sustain the extreme conduct displayed by Judge 
Eriksson here.  This Court has held that ―[w]here a party discovers mid-trial or 
mid-hearing that a motion for disqualification is required, he or she may request a 
brief recess—which must be granted—in order to prepare the appropriate 
documents.‖  Rogers v. State, 630 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1993).  Furthermore, this 
Court has held that when a motion to disqualify a judge is made, ―until the matter 
is resolved the trial court cannot proceed.‖  Fuster-Excalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 
2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 2000) (citing § 38.10, Fla. Stat. (1993)).  Even if Judge 
Eriksson justifiably believed that the motion to recuse was filed without merit, this 
in no way creates a right for a judicial officer to punish the defendant for 
exercising his legal rights.  Judge Eriksson, through his testimony before the 
 
- 24 - 
investigatory panel, has admitted that the only reason he increased bond for Mr. 
Walton and effectively placed him in jail was because Mr. Walton indicated his 
desire for recusal.  
Judge Eriksson claims to have relied on other decisions in his county where 
the circuit court, acting in an appellate capacity, upheld bond revocations in similar 
instances.  Although his rationale may or may not be supported by other cases in 
his circuit, it does not provide an excuse for his conduct.  Judge Eriksson‘s 
testimony before the investigatory panel indicates a clear intent to retaliate against 
Mr. Walton for filing a motion to recuse.  Regardless of how another judge may 
have ruled in unrelated circumstances, Judge Eriksson‘s conduct cannot be 
condoned. 
Judge Eriksson essentially believes that if a judge believes a defendant who 
exercises a legal right is attempting to interfere with the orderly administration of 
justice, the judge has the right to react to the defendant by inflicting punishment 
upon him or her.  However, even if a defendant knows that the exercise of a legal 
right may interfere with the orderly administration of justice, a judge cannot punish 
the defendant solely for exercising that legal right.  To approve that approach 
would have a chilling effect on defendants who legitimately seek to exercise their 
legal rights and is contrary to the fundamental principles of due process. 
 
- 25 - 
In defending his conduct for Count I, Judge Eriksson claims to have relied 
upon other judges in his county revoking bond for defendants when they felt it 
interfered with with the orderly administration of justice.  However, this Court has 
held that ―neither the alleged misconduct of others nor the good motives of a judge 
excuse departure from the guidelines established in the Code of Judicial Conduct.‖  
In re Barnes, 2 So. 3d 166, 171 (Fla. 2009) (citing In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 638-
39 (Fla. 2000)). 
We therefore find the JQC‘s findings for Count I are supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Count III 
 
The Hearing Panel was of the view that Judge Eriksson employed an 
―unduly rigid and formulaic process in dealing with pro se litigants, so as to 
impede their ability to obtain the relief and protection they sought from the court.‖  
The JQC found that Judge Eriksson applied an overly technical and rigid approach 
in the manner in which he conducted domestic violence injunction proceedings.  A 
review of the evidence demonstrates that the JQC‘s findings of fact in this regard 
are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
This Court has ―recognized the importance of the constitutional guarantee of 
citizen access to the courts, with or without an attorney.‖  State v. Spencer, 751 So. 
2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999) (citing Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998)).  
 
- 26 - 
In the context of domestic and repeat violence, section 741.30(1)(f) of the Florida 
Statutes (2009), states, ―This cause of action for an injunction shall not require that 
either party be represented by an attorney.‖  To ensure that potential victims of 
domestic violence have access to the courts, the Legislature waived the filing fee 
for domestic violence petitions.  See § 741.30(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). 
The JQC‘s finding of misconduct was essentially based on a number of 
related judicial actions by this judge.  All of this conduct penalized pro se 
petitioners for being unfamiliar with the judicial system.  First, Judge Eriksson 
dismissed injunction petitions because petitioners did not know they were allowed 
to testify in connection with their own cases and at least implied that some 
independent witness was necessary.  Instead of simply inquiring whether the 
petitioners wanted to testify, Judge Eriksson asked, ―Who is your first witness?‖  
After the petitioners failed to produce independent witnesses, Judge Eriksson 
dismissed the petitions.  This occurred even though each petitioner could have 
testified in his or her own case.  Additionally, cases had statements under oath 
already in the files.  Judge Eriksson asserts that no statute or prior case requires 
him to inform petitioners of their rights.  Instead, Judge Eriksson claimed he was 
unable to inform them of their rights because this would be assuming an 
adversarial role.  Judge Eriksson eventually did assist some petitioners by asking 
them if they would like to testify, but only after dismissing a number of injunctions 
 
- 27 - 
for failing to produce any independent, separate evidence.  Judges who appeared 
before the Hearing Panel indicated that some county court judges routinely explain 
the rights of both the petitioners and respondents prior to the commencement of 
these injunction proceedings. 
Judge Eriksson also dismissed a number of petitions that, in his opinion, 
relied on hearsay evidence.  This Court has held that a failure to object to hearsay 
evidence constitutes a waiver.  See Rhodes v. State, 638 So. 2d 920, 924 (Fla. 
1994).  Inconsistent with Judge Eriksson‘s assertion that he must remain neutral, 
Judge Eriksson refused to allow police reports to be used by petitioners as evidence 
because he, without any objection raised by the opposing party, deemed the reports 
hearsay.  Judge Eriksson refused to insert himself into the controversy when 
petitioners did not know they had a right to testify on their behalf, but had no 
problem with rejecting potential hearsay evidence sua sponte. 
Judge Eriksson‘s conduct is particularly disturbing when viewed in light of 
his open disagreement with the manner in which domestic violence injunctions are 
processed in his circuit.  Judge Eriksson argues that, unlike Judge Cliff Barnes, all 
of his correspondence with this Court and the Office of the State Courts 
Administrator was conveyed through proper legal channels.  See In re Barnes, 2 
So. 3d 166 (Fla. 2009).  While this may be true, Judge Eriksson‘s extrajudicial 
questioning during the injunction hearings was improper and in violation of the 
 
- 28 - 
Code of Judicial Conduct.  By asking extrajudicial questions such as, ―Who sent 
you here?‖ and ―Who told you to file this?‖ Judge Eriksson made his displeasure 
with being required to adjudicate domestic violence petitions abundantly clear.  
Even if this Court were to accept Judge Eriksson‘s contention that his questions to 
petitioners regarding how they learned about the injunction process were 
performed in an academic and curious manner, the questions were not relevant to 
the cases at hand and reflected his intolerant attitude.  The courtroom is not the 
proper venue for Judge Eriksson to express his disagreement with what he 
perceived to be a serious flaw with the system. 
Accordingly, we find the JQC‘s findings for Count III are supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
Discipline 
In In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 2006), this Court stated, ―judges 
stand at the pinnacle of the justice system, and each judge in this State represents 
the face of justice.  This is particularly the case in county court, a ‗people‘s court‘ 
where ordinary citizens come to resolve minor disputes and transgressions, often 
without counsel.‖  Instead of promoting the accessibility of the judicial system, 
Judge Eriksson discouraged vulnerable individuals from exercising their access to 
justice.  Further, Judge Eriksson‘s retaliation, whatever his intentions, against a 
defendant seeking to exercise a legitimate legal right certainly constitutes conduct 
 
- 29 - 
that is unbecoming to members of the judiciary.  This conduct is inconsistent with 
Canon 1 (―A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the 
Judiciary‖),2 Canon 2 (―A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in all of the Judge's Activities‖),3 and Canon 3 (―A Judge Shall 
Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently‖).4   The evidence 
                                          
 
2.  Canon 1.  A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of 
the Judiciary 
 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to 
justice in our society.  A judge should participate in establishing, 
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall 
personally observe those standards so that the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary may be preserved.  The provisions of 
this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective. 
3.  Canon 2.  A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in all of the Judge‘s Activities 
 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at 
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
4.  Canon 3.  A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially 
and Diligently 
 
. . . . 
 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities 
 
(1) 
A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the 
judge except those in which disqualification is required. 
(2) 
A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain 
professional competence in it.  A judge shall not be swayed by 
partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
 
- 30 - 
                                                                                                                                        
(3) 
A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings 
before the judge. 
(4) 
A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the 
judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require similar 
conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject 
to the judge‘s direction and control. 
(5) 
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or 
prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, 
by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not 
limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, 
and shall not permit staff, court officials, and others subject to the 
judge's direction and control to do so.  This section does not 
preclude the consideration of race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or other 
similar factors when they are issues in the proceeding. 
(6) 
A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the 
judge to refrain from manifesting, by words, gestures, or other 
conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, 
against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others.  This Section 3B(6) 
does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, 
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, socioeconomic 
status, or other similar factors are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) 
A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal 
interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be 
heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or 
consider ex parte communications, or consider other 
communications made to the judge outside the presence of the 
parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that: 
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications 
for scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies 
that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the 
merits are authorized, provided: 
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will 
gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result 
of the ex parte communication, and 
 
- 31 - 
                                                                                                                                        
(ii) 
the judge makes provision promptly to notify all 
other parties of the substance of the ex parte 
communication and allows an opportunity to 
respond. 
(b) 
A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert 
on the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge if 
the judge gives notice to the parties of the person 
consulted and the substance of the advice and affords the 
parties reasonable opportunity to respond. 
(c) A judge may consult with other judges or with court 
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying 
out the judge‘s adjudicative responsibilities. 
(d) 
A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer 
separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort 
to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
(e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte 
communications when expressly authorized by law to do 
so. 
(8) 
A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, 
efficiently, and fairly. 
(9) 
A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or 
impending in any court, make any public comment that might 
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness 
or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere 
with a fair trial or hearing.  The judge shall require similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to the judge‘s 
direction and control.  This Section does not prohibit judges from 
making public statements in the course of their official duties or 
from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. 
This Section does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is a 
litigant in a personal capacity. 
(10) A judge shall not, with respect to parties or classes of 
parties, cases, controversies or issues likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are 
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative 
duties of the office.  
(11) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their 
verdict other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding, but 
 
- 32 - 
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Eriksson‘s conduct was in 
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.   
The JQC recommends that Judge Eriksson be publicly reprimanded by this 
Court and ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.  Judge Eriksson does not 
dispute that this is an appropriate recommendation for the types of violations that 
the JQC has determined occurred.  The Hearing Panel noted that Judge Eriksson 
has recognized his own shortcomings, engaged in counseling, and was confident 
that no similar conduct will occur in the future.  In light of these mitigating factors, 
the Hearing Panel concluded that no further disciplinary penalty is necessary 
beyond a public reprimand and payment of costs.  This discipline is appropriate 
when compared to that imposed in similar cases.  See In re Barnes, 2 So. 3d 166 
(Fla. 2009) (approving recommendation for public reprimand where judge failed to 
act in manner which promoted impartiality of judiciary); In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 
565, 567-74 (Fla. 1970) (disciplining judge by public reprimand where judge filed 
a petition with the clerk of the circuit court criticizing the legal system in violation 
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics). 
                                                                                                                                        
may express appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial 
system and the community. 
(12) 
A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose 
unrelated to judicial duties, nonpublic information acquired in a 
judicial capacity. 
 
- 33 - 
For the reasons stated, we approve the JQC‘s recommendations, findings of 
fact, and conclusion that Judge Eriksson violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
We approve the JQC‘s recommendations that Judge Eriksson be publicly 
reprimanded and charged the cost of the proceedings.  In accordance with the 
policy announced in In re Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228, 1242 (Fla. 2000), we hereby 
command Judge Ralph E. Eriksson to appear before this Court for the 
administration of a public reprimand at a time to be established by the Clerk of this 
Court. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result only. 
PERRY, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission 
 
Judge Thomas B. Freeman, Chair, Hearing Panel, Sixth Judicial Circuit, 
Clearwater, Florida, Michael L. Schneider, General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, 
John Beranek of Ausley and McMullen, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner 
 
Judge Ralph E. Eriksson, pro se, Sanford, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent