Title: Wilson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEPAUL WILSON, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 485, 2018 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
CR ID No. 1701006481 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 15, 2019 
Decided: 
May 16, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1) 
After trial, appellant DePaul Wilson was convicted of very serious 
charges, including felony murder in the first degree.  In this appeal of a criminal 
conviction, the only issue is whether the prosecution made improper statements in 
oral argument that prejudiced Wilson and warrant a new trial. 
(2) 
As to certain uses of the words “we know” by the prosecutor, the trial 
judge sustained objections and instructed the jury to disregard this usage.  The State 
argues that these usages were timely addressed by the trial judge and that a stray 
usage of the same kind later was isolated and does not come close to arising to 
prejudicial, in view of the record.  We agree.  Although phrases like “we know” 
2 
 
should not be used, their use in this case was, in context, far from vouching or 
implying that the prosecutor had information the jury did not, and the trial judge’s 
curative instruction sufficiently mitigated any impact the statements might have 
had.1 
(3) 
Likewise, we do not find favor with the argument that the prosecutor 
overstepped his bounds by arguing from the evidence that the jury could infer that 
the victim of the alleged murder had fired shots from a prone position.   The trial 
court was within its discretion in determining that this was a fair inference from the 
evidence that did not require expert testimony.2 
(4) 
Finally, the trial court was also within its discretion in not sustaining a 
defense objection to two prosecution statements that the jury was to determine what 
it thought happened in the case.  For starters, the statements are not improper on their 
face.  The role of the jury is in fact to determine the facts to the extent relevant to its 
task of determining if the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nothing 
in the prosecutor’s statements suggested lowering the burden of proof, and we have 
difficulty understanding how the statements, taken in context, were improper.  For 
this reason no doubt, the trial court noted that this objection was “subtle” and said 
                                                          
 
1 See Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981) (setting forth a three-part balancing test to 
determine whether the prosecutor’s actions prejudiced the defendant); Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 
565–66 (Del. 2006) (“Error can normally be cured by the use of a curative instruction to the jury, 
and jurors are presumed to follow those instructions.”). 
2 App. to Opening Br. at A1024 (Sidebar). 
3 
 
that the statements would not be problematic “if the jury follows the [court’s] 
instructions” that the State must prove the charges against Wilson beyond a 
reasonable doubt.3  To that end, the trial court’s jury instructions on the burden of 
persuasion were clear, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny this 
objection. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
3 Id. at A1073.