Title: Fox v. Bock

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

Decided April 27, 1989.
*404 For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs (in court of appeals) by Constantine, Christensen, Krohn & Kerscher, S.C., Racine, and oral argument by Charles H. Constantine.
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs (in court of appeals) by Kenneth F. Hostak, Emily S. Mueller, and Thompson & Coates, Ltd., Racine, and oral argument by Mr. Hostak.
Amicus curiae briefs (in court of appeals) were filed by Linda M. Clifford and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison, for Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council and the Racine Journal Times; and by John K. O'Connell, Madison, for Wisconsin Counties Association.
*405 STEINMETZ, J.
This appeal was certified to this court under the provisions of sec. 809.61, Stats. We accepted certification.
The issue in this case is whether a study conducted by the Institute for Liability Management, which was commissioned by and prepared for the Racine County Corporation Counsel's office, is a record as that term is defined in sec. 19.32(2), Stats.[1] The trial court found it was not a record. We hold it was a record.
William F. Bock has been the Racine County Corporation Counsel since 1976. The Deputy Corporation Counsel was Susan Torok. In late 1985 and early 1986, Bock became concerned about the increasing number of civil claims which were being brought against Racine county and ordered a study of the problem. His concerns stemmed in part from the fact that Racine county was self-insured. After making his concerns known to Leonard Ziolkowski, then the Racine County Executive, sufficient funds were set aside in the Racine county budget for the 1986 fiscal year to *406 allow Bock to hire a consultant to conduct a risk management study of certain Racine county departments.
The corporation counsel contacted various consulting firms requesting bids to conduct the study. Early in 1986 a contract was entered into with the Institute for Liability Management of Vienna, Virginia (the Institute) to conduct a study at a cost to Racine county of $24,000. Prior to the study being prepared by the Institute and prior to the Institute making a proposal, members of the corporation counsel's office had conversations with representatives of the Institute about the Wisconsin Public Records Law and discussed their concerns about possible public access to any report prepared by the Institute.
Members of the Institute came to Racine county to gather information in early 1987. Members of the Racine County Sheriff's Department, Personnel Department, Corporation Counsel's office and District Attorney's office were interviewed. The study was completed in March or April of 1987. In June of 1987 the corporation counsel received two written copies of the study. The word "draft" was stamped on each written page of the study. Although copies of the study were not released by the corporation counsel, at least two members of the sheriff's department were allowed to review the entire document in the corporation counsel's offices. Other members of the sheriff's command staff reviewed portions of the document dealing with their respective areas of responsibility.
In addition to preparing the written report, the Institute also sent a representative to Racine county to conduct briefing and training seminars primarily for members of the sheriff's department. Two separate seminars were given to county personnel. One was a *407 general educational seminar, and the other was a briefing seminar dealing with specific aspects of the report and was directed specifically to members of the sheriff's department command staff. The study and seminars included recommendations regarding changes in certain policies and procedures of the county and the sheriff's department.
The Institute's representative spent four days in Racine conducting these seminars and meeting with various Racine county employees. On the first day of his visit, the deputy corporation counsel, Torok, told the representative certain changes had to be made in the report. The corrections included typographical errors, an obvious error in the report dealing with the absence of an exercise area in the jail facility and certain other errors, the nature of which have not been disclosed.
At the same time that the Institute's representative was informed that certain changes had to be made, he was also informed that the existence of the study had "leaked out," and that someone had asked Dennis Kornwolf, then County Executive of Racine, for a copy of the report. The representative responded that he would take the two copies of the report back to Washington, and he would wait to hear from the corporation counsel before taking any action. The Institute still has the two copies of the report and, to the best of knowledge of Bock and Torok, has taken no steps to make any changes in the form or content of the report since the copies were returned to the Institute by the corporation counsel.
Bock testified he had no intention of requesting the study from the Institute unless he could be assured that the report, in whatever form it took, would not be subject to inspection by the public.
*408 After the report had been returned to the Institute, the Racine county sheriff's department began implementing certain changes in procedures and policies pursuant to suggestions contained in the report and discussions during the in-service seminars conducted by the Institute's representative. The corporation counsel assisted briefly in implementing certain of these changes. Torok expressed satisfaction with the performance of the Institute and the $24,000 has been paid in full to the Institute for the study and seminars.
On July 8, 1987, Peter D. Fox, editor of the Journal Times, a Racine county newspaper, served a written request on Bock for a copy of the study prepared by the Institute. In a letter dated July 9, 1987, Bock denied Fox's request stating various reasons for the denial. For purposes of this appeal it is sufficient to reiterate two of the reasons for the denial of the request: Bock did not have the report in his possession, and further, in his opinion, the report was not a "record" as that term is defined in sec. 19.32, Stats.
Pursuant to sec. 19.37(1), Stats., Fox then filed and served upon Bock a petition for writ of mandamus. Later Fox served upon Bock a motion and notice of motion to produce the Institute's study. One of the affirmative defenses in the return to the petition for writ of mandamus was that the Institute's study was prepared in draft form and did not constitute a record under sec. 19.32(2).
A hearing on the petition filed by Fox was held before the Honorable Stephen A. Simanek, Racine county circuit court judge. The court, after hearing the testimony of Bock and Torok and hearing arguments of counsel, held that the document requested from the corporation counsel was a "draft" and not a "record" under sec. 19.32(2), Stats., and therefore, not subject to *409 inspection by Fox. Fox appealed that ruling to the court of appeals.
[1]
Whether a statute applies to a given set of facts presents a question of law. Such questions are decided independent of and without deference to the trial court's decision. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. ILHR Department, 90 Wis. 2d 408, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979).
Policy underlying the public records law is set forth in sec. 19.31, Stats.:
To that end, sec. 19.35(1)(a) provides:
The trial court dismissed the petition after concluding that this document was only a draft and therefore not subject to disclosure. The trial court's ruling on this threshold question made it unnecessary for it to apply the remaining portion of sec. 19.35(1), Stats., which may restrict public access. We only discuss the threshold question of whether this document was a "draft" or a "record" and direct the trial court to apply the latter portion of sec. 19.35(1)(a) on remand. See, e.g., Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979); Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 516-19, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967). State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 32 Wis. 2d 11, 144 N.W.2d 793 (1966); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 681-82, 139 N.W.2d 241, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
The term "record" is broadly defined in sec. 19.32(2), Stats., as "any material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an authority." Section 19.32(2) further states that the term "record" does not include drafts, notes, preliminary computations and like materials, prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared by the originator in the name of a person for whom the originator is working ...."
*411 [2]
Any exceptions to the general rule of disclosure must be narrowly construed. Hathaway v. Green Bay School Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984). In Hathaway we stated:
In International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 371-72, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947), this court analyzed sec. 18.01(1), Stats., predecessor to sec. 19.21. The issue before the court was whether a petition filed with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board was subject to inspection. In determining whether this document was subject to disclosure, the court stated:
The court went on to hold that the document was within the provisions of sec. 18.01(1). Id. at 372.
In Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 679-80, the court cited Gooding with approval. In Youmans the Waukesha Freeman demanded access to material submitted to the mayor by the city attorney of Waukesha after the city attorney conducted an investigation of alleged misconduct on the part of members of the Waukesha Police Department. This court deemed it unimportant that the mayor never received a final or formal report from the city attorney. The court stated:
Whether the document is in "preliminary" form and therefore not in final form is not determinative of whether it is a record. The trial court erred when it *413 found that the Institute's study was a draft unless and until the final corrections were made on it.
If the trial court's rulings were correct, legal custodians of public records could circumvent the effect of ch. 19, Stats., by merely claiming that the report is not in final form and further changes must be made in it. In this case, on cross-examination, corporation counsel was asked: "And the truth of the matter is you have no intent to ever request that report with the corrections." He answered: "If there's any possibility that that report would be made public and available to the public, then I don't want the report." Later when asked if the Institute had fulfilled its obligation to the county he stated:
Public policy set forth in sec. 19.31, Stats., favoring public disclosure does not allow a custodian of a record to delay or cancel delivery of the "final" report in an attempt to have it qualified as a "draft." The study was not a "draft" for purposes of the statute. The Institute's study was delivered, approved by Bock and Torok and paid for by the county. It was reviewed by not only the corporation counsel but members of the sheriff's department command staff, and a seminar was given on the report. Changes in practices and procedures in the sheriff's department demonstrate that recommendations of the study have been implemented.
A determination that a document is a draft prepared for the originator's personal use creates an *414 exception to the general rule of disclosure. It is a draft if it is prepared for and utilized for the originator's personal use. The Institute's study was not created for the personal use of the corporation counsel nor was it so utilized. Under sec. 19.32(2), Stats., a document prepared for something other than the originator's personal use, whether it is in preliminary form or stamped "draft," whether recommendations of the document are implemented or not, is by definition a record.
The trial court held that the corporation counsel was the originator of the study document. The Institute was not the originator because the study was not prepared for its personal use. If the corporation counsel's office was the originator, it was not the only office utilizing the study. Members of the sheriff's department and their command staff were not only allowed to review the study, but also were required to review the study and attend a seminar regarding it. Based upon recommendations in the study, policy and procedural changes within the sheriff's department are being implemented. It was used for other than personal use of the corporation counsel or the Institute. Regardless of who was the originator of this document, it does not conform with the exclusionary language of sec. 19.32(2), Stats., and therefore it was a record.
[3]
The corporation counsel refused inspection of the document based on the statutory exemption set forth in sec. 19.32(2), Stats. Such denial of inspection is contrary to public policy and the public interest. Upon a demand to inspect a record, "it is incumbent upon [the custodian of the record] to refuse the demand for inspection and state specifically the reasons for this refusal" when the custodian determines that the harmful effect of permitting inspection outweighs the benefit *415 to be gained by allowing inspection. Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 682. In Newspapers, 89 Wis. 2d at 426-27, the court stated:
We further stated in Newspapers, 89 Wis. 2d at 427:
*417 [4]
Upon a demand for inspection, the custodian of the document bears the burden of proof of facts demonstrating that it is a draft. The decision that a document is a draft under sec. 19.32(2), Stats., is a legal conclusion. However, if there exists a factual dispute, the custodian has the burden of producing evidence and persuading the finder of fact that the proffered facts are true. Hochgurtel v. San Felippo, 78 Wis. 2d 70, 86-87, 253 N.W.2d 526 (1977). The custodian must satisfy the finder of fact by the greater weight of the credible evidence that the document is a draft.
[5]
Merely labeling each page of the document "draft" does not make the document a draft as that term is defined in sec. 19.32(2), Stats. Similarly, corporation counsel cannot keep the document classified as a draft by not having the final corrections made on it. It was not prepared for the personal use of the corporation counsel. It was a report completed, paid for and relied upon by the county and therefore it does not comport with the exclusions set forth in the public access statute.
The decision of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for the application of Beckon and Newspapers.
By the Court.The judgment of the Racine county circuit court is reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ABRAHAMSON, J., took no part.
[]  Motion for reconsideration denied, with $50 costs, on June 20, 1989.
[1]  Sec. 19.32(2), Stats., provides as follows:

(2) `Record' means any material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an authority. `Record' includes, but is not limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, charts, photographs, films, recordings, tapes (including computer tapes), and computer printouts. `Record' does not include drafts, notes, preliminary computations and like materials prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared by the originator in the name of a person for whom the originator is working; materials which are purely the personal property of the custodian and have no relation to his or her office; materials to which access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and published materials in the possession of an authority other than a public library which are available for sale, or which are available for inspection at a public library.