Title: Isom v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 45S00-1508-PD-508 
Kevin Charles Isom, 
Appellant, 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee. 
Argued: September 12, 2019 | Decided: June 30, 2021 
Appeal from the Superior Court of Lake County, Criminal Division 
No. 45G04-1701-PC-1 
The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas, Judge 
The Honorable Natalie Bokota, Magistrate 
On Direct Appeal 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 30 2021, 2:21 pm
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Slaughter, Justice. 
Kevin Charles Isom faces the death penalty for the murders of his wife 
and her two children. We affirmed his convictions and death sentence on 
direct appeal. Isom then sought post-conviction relief, raising many 
challenges to the effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel. Although 
he refused to verify his petition as our post-conviction rules require, we 
eventually allowed him to proceed. Then, after lengthy proceedings, the 
post-conviction court denied his petition. We affirm. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
This case arises from a brutal crime. In August 2007, Isom’s neighbors 
reported gunshots ringing out from his apartment. When police arrived, 
they quickly took shelter because of ongoing gunfire. Several hours later, a 
SWAT team entered Isom’s apartment. They subdued and arrested him 
after a scuffle. During the arrest, a .357 Magnum handgun fell from Isom’s 
waistband. Police also found a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson handgun and 
12-gauge shotgun in the room. 
Nearby, officers discovered a grisly scene: the bodies of Isom’s wife, 
Cassandra, and his two stepchildren, thirteen-year-old Ci’Andria and 
sixteen-year-old Michael. Cassandra was killed by a shotgun blast to her 
head. Ci’Andria had been shot with the .357, the .40 caliber, and the 
shotgun. And Michael was killed by two shotgun wounds to his chest and 
flank areas. 
The next day, Isom gave a statement to police. When asked who had 
killed his wife and stepchildren, he replied, “I can’t believe I killed my 
family, this can’t be real.” Isom recounted what he did that day and where 
he was when he shot his victims. But he said he did not remember 
shooting at police. After reviewing his statement, Isom said, “I smell like 
gunpowder, like I’ve been at the range … Why y’all just didn’t kill me?” 
A. Trial Court Proceedings and Direct Appeal 
Isom was charged with the murders of Cassandra, Ci’Andrea, and 
Michael, and the State sought the death penalty. The State also pursued 
three counts of attempted murder based on Isom firing at police. Attorney 
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Nick Thiros led Isom’s first trial team. But in October 2010, Thiros died. 
Isom, distrustful of his remaining attorneys, fired them and sought a 
public defender. The Lake County Public Defender’s Office was 
appointed, and it assigned attorneys Herbert Shaps and Casey McCloskey 
to represent Isom. Because Isom claimed to lack any memory of the 
murders, he was evaluated for competency, and all four evaluators found 
him competent to stand trial.  
The case first went to trial in February 2012 but ended in a mistrial 
when the pool of approximately 600 potential jurors was exhausted 
without seating a full jury. The next year, more than 1,100 potential jurors 
were called for Isom’s second jury trial. This trial, which lasted more than 
five weeks, began in January 2013. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all 
three murder counts and on three counts of criminal recklessness. The 
jury, after weighing aggravators and mitigators, recommended the death 
penalty for each murder conviction. The trial court accepted the jury’s 
recommendation and ordered the three death penalties to be served 
consecutively. On direct appeal, we affirmed Isom’s convictions and death 
sentence but remanded for a new sentencing order after concluding the 
trial court erred in ordering the sentences served consecutively. Isom v. 
State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 476, 495 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1137 (2016). 
We stayed his execution after he filed a notice of intent to seek post-
conviction relief. 
B. First Post-Conviction Proceeding 
In January 2016, the Public Defender of Indiana tendered a petition for 
post-conviction relief on Isom’s behalf. But the petition lacked Isom’s oath 
and affirmation. The post-conviction court, observing this omission, 
issued an order giving Isom additional time to file the missing verification 
page. Yet Isom refused to verify the petition, apparently concluding that 
his attorneys “were not up to the task of representing him.” The 
consequence, though, of his not signing the petition was that he would 
forfeit his post-conviction challenge. The trial court entered an order 
concluding that Isom had waived post-conviction review, and that his 
time to file the petition had expired. 
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In January 2017, after hearing oral argument, we ordered the trial court 
to deem Isom’s petition filed as of the date of our January 13, 2017 order. 
On remand, the post-conviction court held a five-day hearing in March 
2018. The court denied Isom’s petition in June 2018 and denied his motion 
to correct errors shortly after. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a), 
this capital post-conviction appeal comes directly to us. 
II. Analysis 
In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Wilkes v. State, 
984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013). Where, as here, the petitioner is 
appealing from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he 
“must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and 
unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court’s 
decision.” Id. (cleaned up). 
We review ineffectiveness claims under the two-part test announced in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prevail on these 
claims, Isom needed to prove that counsel’s performance was deficient, 
and that their deficient performance prejudiced his defense. In analyzing 
whether counsel was deficient, we ask whether, “’considering all the 
circumstances,’ counsel’s actions were ‘reasonable[] under prevailing 
professional norms.’” Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688). We afford counsel considerable discretion in choosing 
strategy and tactics, and our review of counsel’s performance is highly 
deferential. Id. at 1240–41. We evaluate that performance based on 
counsel’s knowledge and perspective at the time and do not subject their 
decisions to the “distorting effects” of 20/20 hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689. To prove prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. . . . A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1241 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
The post-conviction court denied Isom relief on all grounds. On 
appeal, we first consider Isom’s claims that his trial counsel were 
ineffective. Then we consider whether his appellate counsel were 
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ineffective. Finally, we address five allegedly erroneous rulings of the 
post-conviction court. Because Isom waives his claims, or fails to meet his 
burden, or both, we affirm.  
A. Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
Most of Isom’s post-conviction claims are that his trial counsel were 
constitutionally ineffective “at all phases of Isom’s trial”, including during 
jury selection and at the guilt and penalty phases. Because we find that 
Isom fails to meet his burden on review, he is not entitled to relief on these 
grounds.  
1. Jury Selection 
Isom’s challenges to the jury-selection process are that counsel were 
deficient in screening and selecting jurors, thus forcing him to “accept 
jurors who should have been stricken [sic] for cause” and denying him the 
right to be tried by an impartial jury. Because Isom either waives his 
arguments, or fails to meet his burden, or both, we agree with the post-
conviction court that he is not entitled to relief.  
a. Prospective Jurors Discuss the Case 
Before voir dire, potential jurors received a questionnaire that included 
some of the facts of the murders. During their orientation, prospective 
jurors were instructed not to discuss Isom’s case, and the parties then 
began voir dire. The parties questioned prospective jurors individually, 
and panels of jurors waited in the jury room for their turn. The first panel 
included prospective jurors 8, 9, 19, and 25. Prospective juror 8 was 
questioned first and then struck. The next prospective juror (prospective 
juror 9) said other prospective jurors were discussing the case, contrary to 
the court’s instruction. When asked if prospective juror 9 could presume 
Isom innocent, she said she had heard Isom killed his children and was 
trying to kill himself. Asked where she heard this, she answered, “I 
actually didn’t even know of his last name until I was in that room with 
everybody. And then everybody told me about the case.” The trial court 
granted a for-cause challenge for prospective juror 9. 
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Isom argues that trial counsel were deficient in failing to request the 
return of the peremptory challenge used to strike prospective juror 8, and 
in failing to move to strike the entire jury panel. The post-conviction court 
rejected Isom’s arguments, and we agree.  
i. Prospective Juror 8 
Isom argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to request the 
return of the peremptory strike used to strike prospective juror 8. Even 
before prospective juror 9 disclosed possible discussions in the jury room 
about Isom’s case, prospective juror 8 had already been questioned at 
length during voir dire. When asked by counsel, she denied having prior 
knowledge of the case:  
I don’t know that much about the case. I have not really – all 
I had read was what was on the questionnaire. And, you 
know, I know nothing about the trial or the case to be honest 
with you. If I had read it years ago, it’s not in my mind now.  
Prospective juror 8 told the trial court she “may lean closer to imposing 
the death penalty”, although she promised to “listen to all the evidence 
and the instructions”. 
Isom’s lawyers exercised a peremptory challenge to remove her before 
the parties knew that some potential jurors had discussed the case. The 
peremptory strike was about prospective juror 8’s views of the death 
penalty and was not related to her knowledge of the case—a finding by 
the post-conviction court that Isom does not challenge. When the parties 
learned of the discussions, Isom’s counsel mentioned the peremptory 
strike used on prospective juror 8. The trial court found that prospective 
juror 8 knew nothing about the case and would decide the case on the 
evidence. Counsel did not seek to have the peremptory strike returned.  
The post-conviction court ruled that trial counsel’s performance was 
not deficient and that there was no prejudice. We agree and hold that 
counsel were not ineffective for not seeking the return of the peremptory 
strike used on prospective juror 8. 
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Isom has failed to show either that his counsel performed deficiently 
or that he suffered any prejudice because counsel did not move for the 
return of the peremptory strike used on prospective juror 8. The record 
shows that the trial judge would have denied any request to return a 
peremptory strike because he concluded that this prospective juror had 
not been tainted by any jury-room discussions that may have occurred. 
“With juror number 8 just for purposes of the record … [she] made it 
really, really clear that she knew nothing about the case.” The court also 
indicated its suspicion that prospective juror 9 may have fabricated some 
or all of her testimony about unauthorized juror discussions to avoid jury 
service. 
And it’s important to note the moment I told juror 9 that she 
was not going to be selected on the case she became very 
excited and kind of yelled out, yeah. So I don’t know yet if 
that [alleged discussion] actually occurred [or] [i]f that was 
another attempt for her to get out of jury duty. Because from 
her questionnaire it was clear she didn’t want to serve. She 
made it really clear she didn’t [want] to serve here.  
The conclusion that prospective juror 8 had not been tainted and the 
question about prospective juror 9’s credibility mean the trial court would 
not have excused prospective juror 8 for cause; they also mean trial 
counsel had to use a peremptory challenge to strike her. Thus, Isom 
cannot prevail on his post-conviction argument that counsel should have 
sought the return of this peremptory challenge and was deficient for not 
doing so. Isom does not argue that the prevailing professional norm is for 
counsel to make gratuitous requests that the trial court will deny. Without 
this critical link, he cannot show deficient performance under Strickland 
because the “proper measure of attorney performance remains . . . 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” 466 U.S. at 688. 
As for prejudice, Isom does not argue that he was prejudiced by the 
individual error alleged here: counsel’s failure to request the return of the 
peremptory strike used against prospective juror 8. He thus waives this 
argument, Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), and cannot meet his burden 
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under Strickland. But even had Isom raised this argument, he would still 
have to show that a seated juror was biased. Cf. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
81, 88 (1988) (“So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the 
defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does 
not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.”); Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 
241, 246 (Ind. 2014) (“[A]n appellate court will find reversible error only 
where the defendant eventually exhausts all peremptories and is forced to 
accept either an incompetent or an objectionable juror.”) (cleaned up). But 
here, the post-conviction court found that the seated jurors were not 
tainted—a finding Isom does not dispute.  
Because Isom shows neither deficient performance nor prejudice, he is 
not entitled to relief on this ground.  
ii. Entire Panel 
Isom also claims his trial counsel were ineffective during jury selection 
because they did not ask the trial court to strike the entire panel after 
discovering that prospective jurors had discussed the case. The post-
conviction court found that Isom did not show deficient performance. We 
agree and add that he did not show prejudice either.  
After prospective juror 9 was struck, trial counsel noted that 
precautions needed to be taken to prevent jurors from discussing the case. 
The court agreed, and the bailiff placed multiple signs in the jury room 
directing prospective jurors not to discuss the case. Once voir dire 
resumed, follow-up colloquy with prospective jurors yielded little 
information about who, specifically, told other jurors about Isom’s case or 
what was said.  
Prospective juror 19 said that she was out in the hallway, away from 
the other jurors, and had no part in the discussion. She added that she 
thought she heard “some girls” or a “woman’s voice” talking about what 
“could be a murder trial”, but assured the court and the parties that she 
had not “heard anything” specific about the case. Prospective juror 31 said 
a “female”, maybe a fifty-something woman was discussing the case. 
Prospective juror 12 said that “[s]ome people mentioned or stated if they 
knew or did not know anything about it without saying anything. But that 
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was all.” When pressed, she said she heard “one gentleman in the room 
say that there had been a mistrial or something in the past on this case.” 
She identified the man as prospective juror 11. Prospective juror 25 added 
that “[s]omebody mentioned that … their spouse or somebody had seen 
an article or something in the paper. But they kept it away from them. 
And they made sure they stayed away from it.” He added that he “hadn’t 
heard or read anything about [the case]”.  
Prospective jurors 19 and 25, who ultimately sat on the jury, were 
asked during voir dire if they were biased by the conversations. 
Prospective juror 19 responded that she could be “truly impartial”, and 
prospective juror 25 assured the court that he could be “fair to both sides”.  
We hold that counsel were not deficient for failing to move to strike 
the entire panel. Consistent with the aim of voir dire, counsel questioned 
the jurors thoroughly to explore what they knew or had heard and to 
discover any possible bias—to ensure they were able to render a fair and 
impartial verdict. Isom concedes that he received the remedy required by 
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)—the opportunity to question 
the jurors. But he argues that Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964), 
requires automatic disqualification because bias should be presumed. 
According to Isom, where the juror discussions are acknowledged and the 
content is largely known, but the culprits are not identified, the entire 
panel should be dismissed.  
But Leonard stands for no such principle. In Leonard, the defendant was 
convicted by two separate juries in two back-to-back trials. Id. at 544. Five 
of the jurors selected in the second case were in the courtroom awaiting 
jury selection when the verdict in the first case was announced. Ibid. In a 
one-sentence analysis in its per curiam opinion, the Court simply said: 
“We agree that under the circumstances of this case the trial court erred in 
denying petitioner's objection.” Id. at 545. Isom fails to explain how this 
narrow holding can be stretched to the broad principle his argument rests 
on, thus waiving his argument on this ground. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). 
Even had Isom properly developed his argument, however, it would 
have failed because it rests on a faulty premise. According to Isom, 
improper juror communication triggers a presumption of bias, requiring 
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automatic dismissal. But Isom mistakes presuming bias for proving it. In 
Remmer, the Court recognized that after notice of improper 
communication and a hearing to investigate, the government could still 
show that any improper communication was harmless. 347 U.S. at 229. 
Here, the trial court conducted the hearing, and a handful of seemingly 
isolated comments about the case came to light. The court then struck one 
prospective juror for cause based on these conversations, and received 
assurances, which it credited, from the two prospective jurors (19 and 25) 
who were eventually seated that they could be impartial. In other words, 
the court assured itself that the isolated comments were harmless. Thus, 
Isom cannot establish deficient performance because even had counsel 
requested that the court strike the entire panel, this request would have 
been denied. And as we point out above, Isom does not argue that the 
prevailing professional norm is for counsel to make gratuitous requests 
that a trial court will deny.  
Nor has Isom shown prejudice due to counsel’s failure to strike the 
entire panel. As with prospective juror 8, Isom does not argue that he was 
prejudiced by the individual error alleged here: counsel’s failure to ask 
that the court strike the entire jury. He thus waives this argument, App. R. 
46(A)(8)(a), and cannot meet his burden under Strickland. And even had 
Isom raised this argument, he would have had to show that all of the 
evidence points to the conclusion that a seated juror was biased, which he 
cannot do on this record because he does not challenge the post-
conviction court’s findings that the seated jurors were not tainted. The 
testimony from prospective jurors 19 and 25 supports that they not only 
heard nothing improper about the case to begin with, but that they would 
be impartial regardless. Thus, Isom’s claim fails.  
The post-conviction court said of Isom’s claim that the entire panel 
should have been struck that “[s]uch an extreme remedy is not 
constitutionally required.” We agree. He is not entitled to relief on this 
ground. 
b. Jury Questionnaire 
Isom also argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for using a jury 
questionnaire that did not identify which prospective jurors would be able 
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to consider the mitigation evidence that counsel expected to present. 
Below, Isom made two claims relevant to the juror questionnaire. First, he 
argued that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to hire a jury 
consultant, resulting in counsel’s undue reliance on the questionnaire. 
Second, he argued that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 
adequately question prospective jurors based on their responses to the 
questionnaire. Isom did not, however, argue that trial counsel were 
ineffective for using a faulty questionnaire. Having failed to raise this 
claim below, he cannot raise it here. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8). 
Even had Isom raised this argument below, he fails to show he is 
entitled to relief on the merits. He notes that counsel planned to present 
three mitigators: (1) Isom was under the influence of an extreme 
emotional disturbance at the time of the murders, (2) Isom had no 
significant criminal history, and (3) Isom lacked capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law due to mental 
disease or defect or intoxication. Isom implicitly acknowledges that trial 
counsel used a questionnaire that was consistent with their mitigation 
strategy by asking about “trauma and background”, including whether 
past trauma can affect an individual for life, whether criminal history was 
an important factor, and how important a person’s mental status was 
when deciding whether to impose a capital sentence.   
But according to Isom, even though the questions in the questionnaire 
were consistent with trial counsel’s early mitigation strategy, they were 
nonetheless “insufficient to identify appropriate jurors.” But Isom cites no 
authority for this assertion. And he does not argue or establish that the 
questions asked violated prevailing professional norms. Without this 
critical link, Isom cannot show deficient performance under Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 688. And since trial counsel asked questions consistent with their 
mitigation strategy, we presume under Strickland that their performance 
was reasonable. Id. at 689. Isom is not entitled to relief. 
c. Prospective Jurors 45 and 137 
Isom’s final arguments based on jury selection are that his trial counsel 
were deficient for not striking prospective jurors 45 and 137, both of 
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whom ultimately sat on the jury. Isom is not entitled to relief on either 
ground.   
i. Prospective Juror 45 
Isom argues that trial counsel were deficient for failing to move to 
strike prospective juror 45 for cause, and if denied, removing him with a 
peremptory challenge. According to Isom, prospective juror 45 “was 
impaired in his ability to determine Isom’s sentence” because he never 
said he would consider all sentencing alternatives or consider Isom’s 
upbringing as mitigating evidence. But both here and below, Isom fails to 
identify the governing legal standard or explain how the factual record in 
this case entitles him to relief. Thus, he waives this argument, App. R. 
46(A)(8)(a), and is not entitled to relief. 
Moreover, even had Isom properly presented this argument, it would 
fail. To support his claim that trial counsel should have moved to strike 
prospective juror 45 for cause, Isom needed to show the post-conviction 
court that prospective juror 45 was incompetent—here, that prospective 
juror 45 could not be impartial. Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 246. Isom relies on 
prospective juror 45’s equivocal responses during voir dire to support his 
argument that prospective juror 45 should have been struck for cause. But 
these factual assertions do not establish that prospective juror 45 was not 
impartial. Indeed, the post-conviction court found that prospective juror 
45 said he would follow the court’s instructions, had no inclinations 
toward either party, would take the oath to consider all three potential 
penalties, and would have “meaningful discussion” with the other jurors 
about Isom’s penalty—all facts that suggest that prospective juror 45 was 
impartial. Because these unchallenged findings support the post-
conviction court’s conclusion that prospective juror 45 was competent, 
Isom is not entitled to relief.  
ii. Prospective Juror 137 
Isom also argues that trial counsel were deficient for failing to remove 
prospective juror 137. Isom seems to argue that it was important to trial 
counsel that jurors be honest on their questionnaires and thus, had 
counsel discovered that prospective juror 137 had an inaccurate response 
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on her questionnaire, they would have removed her. Again, however, 
Isom fails to identify the governing legal standard or explain how these 
facts, even if true, entitle him to relief. Thus, under our own rules, he 
waives this argument, App. R. 46(A)(8)(a), and is not entitled to relief. 
Moreover, the post-conviction court found that Isom waived this 
argument below for failing to address this claim in his proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, even had Isom presented a 
developed argument to this Court, he would not be entitled to relief. P-
C.R. 1(8). 
2. Guilt Phase 
Isom raises two guilt-phase challenges. He argues first his trial counsel 
were ineffective during the guilt phase because counsel “implicitly but 
certainly” conceded that Isom was guilty via Dr. Parker’s testimony. 
Second, where below Isom argued in his post-conviction petition that 
counsel were ineffective in handling the State’s plea offer to Isom, he 
argues here that the Court should revisit its holding in Harshman v. State, 
232 Ind. 618, 115 N.E.2d 501 (1953), in light of McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. 
Ct. 1500 (2018). The post-conviction court denied Isom relief on both 
grounds, and so do we.  
i. Dr. Parker’s Testimony 
Isom’s first claim—that trial counsel called a witness who implicitly 
conceded Isom’s guilt—is both waived and meritless. It is waived because 
Isom claims for the first time in this Court that trial counsel were 
ineffective because they conceded Isom’s guilt. Below, although Isom 
referenced that Dr. Parker “essentially conceded Isom’s guilt”, he did not 
do so as a discrete claim. Instead, he mentioned Dr. Parker’s testimony 
only to dispute trial counsel’s testimony during the post-conviction 
hearing that their strategies for the guilt and mitigation phases were 
reasonable. Isom did not even identify what Dr. Parker said. And Isom’s 
operative petition for post-conviction relief lists fifty-five grounds for 
relief—but none that mentions Dr. Parker’s “concession”. Having failed to 
raise this issue in any recognizable way below, he cannot now repackage 
it as a preserved claim. P-C.R. 1(8). 
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On appeal, Isom tries to explain, belatedly, what Dr. Parker said and 
how his testimony amounted to an implicit concession of guilt. Despite 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Isom insisted he was innocent and 
that someone else—the real perpetrator—had entered their apartment, 
killed Isom’s family, and left him alone there. Thus, the defense solicited 
Dr. Parker’s testimony to explain why Isom, whom police found at the 
scene of the murders, had no memory of what happened. Dr. Parker 
attributed Isom’s lack of memory to post-traumatic stress disorder and 
dissociative amnesia. Isom told Dr. Parker that these symptoms arose after 
his prior counsel showed him graphic photographs of the crime scene. In 
response to counsel’s question, Dr. Parker gave extended testimony 
recounting why he believed Isom was not malingering, i.e., faking 
symptoms of memory loss. 
[Isom] has no recollection of that period of time and that, of 
course, raises the concern that maybe he’s deliberately 
saying he’s not remembering that. What is unusual for 
malingering in this situation is that Mr. Isom has made no 
effort to try to convince anybody that he has any other 
memory problems except that particular circumscribed 
period of amnesia. He has made no effort to fake memory 
deficits since then. He has done well on all of the memory 
tests that I did and that other court ordered evaluators have 
done. He’s been consistent in his statements about the 
memory loss, the timing and the nature and duration. It is 
usually pretty hard to maintain a consistent story over time 
when you’re faking it because you have to remember so 
many things not to say and he has been pretty consistent 
based upon my review of the other court ordered reports 
and my interviews with him. And he has created a fairly 
elaborate explanation, alternative explanation for what must 
have happened because he cannot remember what 
happened and therefore, he was not responsible for it since 
he can’t remember it. So it all sort of fits together with the 
explanation of dissociative amnesia and does not fit with my 
explanation of malingering for that kind of memory deficit.  
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On appeal, Isom identifies one sentence from this testimony that he 
now says implicitly conceded his guilt: “[Isom] has created a fairly 
elaborate explanation, alternative explanation for what must have 
happened because he cannot remember what happened and therefore, he 
was not responsible for it since he can’t remember it.” Isom does not argue 
that Parker’s oblique comment here was an overt concession of guilt. Isom 
merely concludes without explanation that this phrase is an implicit 
concession of guilt. Thus, even had Isom properly raised this issue below, 
he would waive it here for failing to develop this argument. App. R. 
46(A)(8)(a). 
Even absent waiver, Isom’s claim would fail as a factual matter. Isom 
never explains how Dr. Parker’s phrasing is a concession of guilt. Isom’s 
implication seems to be that he—Isom—came up with an “alternative 
explanation” in which he was not the guilty party. Thus, if Isom’s 
explanation that he was not the guilty party was “alternative”, then he 
must be the guilty party. But there is another equally plausible inference 
from Parker’s testimony: Isom’s “alternative explanation” had to be 
alternative to whatever happened because Isom had no memory of the 
actual events. In other words, all of Isom’s explanations had to be 
“alternative” to reality because he allegedly had no idea what happened. 
Because Dr. Parker’s statement is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, a fact Isom ignores, he fails to establish the factual basis for 
his claim.  
Finally, Isom fails to show that the alleged concession here would 
violate McCoy. McCoy stands for the principle that defendants get to 
decide the objective of their defense. 138 S. Ct. at 1505. There, counsel 
made multiple, intentional, and explicit concessions that his client was 
guilty. Id. at 1505–07 (telling the jury that his client “committed [the] three 
murders” and that “he’s guilty”). And, critically, these unambiguous 
concessions were made over the client’s adamant and repeated objections. 
Id. at 1505. Here, in contrast, the statements did not come from counsel, 
and they were not explicit, part of a deliberate trial strategy, or made over 
Isom’s objections. Isom does not wrestle with these key differences, and 
thus his bald assertion that “McCoy favors [his] position[]” is unavailing.    
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Isom waived his argument that trial counsel were ineffective for 
conceding Isom’s guilt by not raising it below; he waives it here by failing 
to explain how a passing reference open to multiple interpretations is an 
implicit concession subject to McCoy. Isom thus fails to show he is entitled 
to relief.   
ii. Plea Agreement 
Below Isom argued that “[c]ounsel refused to properly present to Isom 
the State’s plea offer.” The post-conviction court found the claim waived 
because Isom failed to address it in his proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The post-conviction court went on to say that even if it 
reached the merits, Isom would not be entitled to relief under McCoy. We 
agree that Isom waived his claim below; he is thus prohibited from raising 
it here. P-C.R. 1(8). We also agree he is not entitled to relief on the merits.  
For Isom to succeed on the merits, he would have to show that all the 
evidence points unerringly to the conclusion that his counsel were 
deficient. Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240. But here, the post-conviction court 
found the following facts: 
• that Isom maintained his innocence and insisted that someone 
else committed the crimes throughout his case,  
• that Isom refused to accept any plea or defense that involved an 
admission of guilt,  
• that counsel “addressed the State's plea offer in Isom's presence 
on the record before the trial court and the court was satisfied that 
Isom did not wish to plead guilty.”  
Isom does not challenge these factual findings. Thus, there is record 
evidence that counsel did everything they could to honor Isom’s objective 
and no basis to reverse the post-conviction court’s finding that counsel 
satisfied McCoy.  
Isom now repackages this claim as a free-standing argument that 
Indiana should change its law to accept “best-interest” pleas. But Isom 
failed to raise this issue below and is now prohibited from raising it here. 
P-C.R. 1(8). Because Isom waived his arguments and failed to show that 
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he would otherwise be entitled to relief on the merits, we decline his 
invitation to revisit our holding in Harshman.  
3. Penalty Phase 
Isom argues that his trial counsel failed to fully investigate and present 
a mitigation case at the penalty phase of Isom’s trial. According to Isom, 
trial counsel’s investigation and use of Dr. Durak’s data and expertise and 
Lake County’s jail records amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Under Strickland, counsel has the duty to act reasonably under prevailing 
professional norms, including conducting reasonable investigations. 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In determining whether an 
investigation was reasonable, courts ask whether the known evidence 
would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Id. at 527. And 
like all performance under Strickland, decisions about what and how much 
to investigate are given a “heavy measure of deference”. Rompilla v. Beard, 
545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (cleaned up). Because evidence in the record 
shows that counsel’s investigation and use of both sets of records were 
part of a reasonable trial strategy, Isom does not carry his burden on 
review, and he is not entitled to relief under Strickland. 
a. Dr. Durak’s Data and Expertise 
As for Dr. Durak, Isom argues that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they did not interview Dr. Durak, obtain his data, call him as a 
witness, or give his data to other expert witnesses. The post-conviction 
court held that Isom failed to prove deficient performance. We agree.  
Isom’s first trial team hired Dr. Durak in 2008 to evaluate Isom’s 
mental state for a possible insanity defense. Although Dr. Durak met and 
evaluated Isom, he did not finish his evaluation or diagnose Isom. Shortly 
before attorney Thiros died in 2010, Dr. Durak moved out of state and 
suspended his practice in Indiana. Dr. Durak did not respond to an 
attempt by Thiros’s team to reach him and did not provide his test results 
to them. A few months later, Isom informed Thiros’s colleagues that he 
wanted new counsel. Once attorneys Shaps and McCloskey took over 
Isom’s defense, they tried to contact Dr. Durak but did not reach him. 
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They then moved forward with three other psychiatric experts, Drs. 
Eisenberg, Gelbort, and Parker. 
According to Isom, the second trial team’s failure to obtain and use Dr. 
Durak’s records and testimony was deficient because they reached out to 
him only once and did not seek recourse from the court in securing his 
records and testimony. But Isom fails to explain why the Shaps team’s 
decision to use their resources in developing evaluations and expert 
testimony from three other, more responsive experts was not reasonable. 
He thus waives this argument, App. R. 46(A)(8)(a), and cannot show 
deficient performance under Strickland. But even had he developed this 
argument, the post-conviction court identified evidence in the record 
supporting the conclusion that the Shaps team’s decision to focus on other 
experts was reasonable. Namely, the Shaps team knew that Thiros had 
hired Dr. Durak but that he had provided no diagnosis and no written 
report. Thus, they had no reason to think that Dr. Durak had information 
that would be different or more helpful than that developed by their own 
investigation and experts. And Isom had made it clear that he did not 
want Shaps’s team to use any of the Thiros team’s experts. Because 
evidence in the record shows that the information known to the Shaps 
team would not have led a reasonable attorney to investigate further, and 
that the decision to use new experts was part of a reasonable trial strategy, 
Isom cannot prove deficient performance. 
Moreover, even if Isom could show deficient performance, he fails to 
show prejudice. Isom’s argument consists only of the bald statement that 
if counsel had investigated Dr. Durak’s role more and used his testimony 
and records, “there is a reasonable chance the jury would have 
recommended against death.” But Isom fails to explain why this would 
have changed the jury’s recommendation, thus waiving this argument. 
App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Moreover, there is ample evidence in the record 
showing that it would not have changed the jury’s recommendation. For 
instance, one of the experts who testified at trial, Dr. Gelbort, conducted 
tests similar to Dr. Durak’s and got similar results. Also, because Dr. 
Durak never completed his evaluation of Isom or made a diagnosis, at 
best his data and testimony would have been speculative. And the 
speculation of mental illness was in front of the jury many times because, 
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although no expert ever diagnosed Isom with a serious mental illness, all 
three experts acknowledged that Isom could have a serious mental illness 
and that schizophrenia was a possibility. 
Under our standard of review, Isom must show that all evidence 
points to the conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction 
court. But evidence in the record supports the post-conviction court’s 
holding that Isom failed to show that trial counsel’s investigation and use 
of Dr. Durak’s data and testimony were ineffective. Thus, Isom cannot 
carry his burden on review and is not entitled to relief on these grounds.  
b. Lake County’s Jail Records 
As for the jail records, Isom argues that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they did not obtain certain jail records and provide them to their 
expert witnesses. The post-conviction court held that Isom failed to prove 
deficient performance. We agree.  
Isom’s arguments center on a jail-intake form titled “Mental Health 
Suicide Risk Assessment”. The unnamed jail employee who filled out 
Isom’s intake form indicated that Isom was “visibly exhibiting symptoms 
indicative of thought disorder. (Cannot focus attention/hearing or seeing 
things not there).” This form also stated that Isom had “Loose 
Associations”. Isom’s arguments also concern other jail records noting 
possible psychosis and schizophrenia. 
According to Isom, the second trial team failed to obtain and use these 
records, and their failure to do so was deficient performance. But Isom’s 
arguments fail on the record. First, there is evidence that the second trial 
team had all the jail records. McCloskey testified that he obtained the 
records from the jail, had no problems getting them, and got updates 
regularly. Shaps testified that they asked the jail for as many records as 
they could get and that they had all the jail records the first trial team had.  
Plus, Dr. Eisenberg’s testimony suggested he knew of the records Isom 
claims were missing. Isom concedes that the first trial team had the 
records indicating possible diagnoses of schizophrenia and psychosis, and 
the post-conviction court found that the first trial team gave a binder 
containing these records to all of the experts—a finding Isom does not 
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challenge. Thus, Isom cannot show that all the evidence points to the 
conclusion that the records were missing. Second, even if Isom could 
show that they were, he would still have to show that the Shaps team’s 
investigation was unreasonable given the information they knew at the 
time. Isom cannot do so because the evidence shows that the Shaps team 
thought they had all the jail records. 
Finally, Isom cannot show prejudice. His only argument as to 
prejudice is the same one he made about Dr. Durak’s records: that had 
counsel found and used the jail records, “there is a reasonable chance the 
jury would have recommended against death.” Isom again fails to explain 
why finding and using the jail records would have changed the jury’s 
recommendation, thus waiving this argument. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). 
Moreover, there is evidence that additional records and their use by other 
experts would not have changed the jury’s recommendation. Isom 
presented evidence from several mental-health experts, none of whom 
testified that Isom had a mental illness. Unlike the nameless jail employee, 
these doctors used their significant expertise to formally evaluate Isom 
and then shared their observations directly with the jury. Isom makes no 
attempt to explain how a few sheets of paper of unknown authorship 
indicating possible mental illness would have changed the jury’s 
recommendation when so much other speculation about Isom’s mental 
illness from expert witnesses failed to do so. We do not find such an 
unlikely and speculative proposition reasonably probable. 
There is evidence that supports the post-conviction court’s holding 
that Isom failed to show that trial counsel’s investigation and use of jail 
records were ineffective. Thus, Isom cannot carry his burden on review 
and is not entitled to relief on these grounds.  
4. Penalty-Phase Instructions 
Next, Isom claims that his trial counsel provided constitutionally 
ineffective assistance for not objecting to penalty-phase jury instructions 
17, 18, and 23. Because Isom is appealing a negative judgment on post-
conviction relief, he must show that the evidence as a whole points 
“unmistakably and unerringly” to the conclusion that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240. 
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Under this exacting standard, for each instruction Isom must show that 
the evidence points only to the conclusion that by not objecting, trial 
counsel provided substandard performance that prejudiced Isom. And 
when counsel’s alleged error is a failure to object, the defendant must also 
show that the trial court would have sustained counsel’s objection. 
Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 259 (Ind. 1997). Thus, to meet 
Strickland’s prongs, Isom had to show deficient performance; that 
objections to instructions 17, 18, and 23 would have been sustained; and a 
reasonable probability that absent the instructions, the jury would not 
have recommended a death sentence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Because 
Isom does not make these showings, he is not entitled to relief on these 
grounds.  
a. Instructions 17 and 18 
Isom first argues that trial counsel were ineffective for not objecting to 
instruction 17 (defining “mental disease or defect”) and instruction 18 
(defining “intoxication”). Because Isom combined his arguments for 
instructions 17 and 18, we will address them together. Specifically, Isom 
argues that instruction 17 removed his purported mental illness from the 
jury’s consideration by wrongly informing the jury it could consider only 
a mental illness that rendered a defendant “unable to appreciate the 
wrongfulness” of his conduct at the time of his offense. And he argues 
that instruction 18 caused the jury to consider as a mitigator only the 
degree of intoxication that would have caused Isom to lose normal control 
of his faculties, thus excluding evidence of being under the influence of 
alcohol to a lesser degree. According to Isom, both instructions were error 
because they impermissibly limited the jury’s consideration of mitigating 
factors.  
Instruction 17 quoted the definition of “mental disease or defect” in 
Indiana Code section 35-41-3-6: 
a) a person is not responsible for having engaged in conduct 
if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the 
offense.  
b) as used in this section, “mental disease or defect” means a 
severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and 
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demonstrably impairs a person’s perception, but the term 
does not include an abnoormality [sic] manifested only by 
repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.  
Instruction 18 said: 
“Intoxication” means under the influence of alcohol so that 
there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the 
loss of normal control of a person’s faculties. 
This instruction not only recites a statutory definition of “intoxication”, 
see Ind. Code §§ 9-13-2-86, 35-46-9-2, but also describes its common 
meaning. See Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/intoxication (last visited June 29, 2021) (defining 
“intoxication” as “the condition of having physical or mental control 
markedly diminished by the effects of alcohol or drugs”).  
The post-conviction court held that Isom did not show either deficient 
performance or prejudice as to trial counsel’s failure to object to these 
instructions. We agree.  
i. Performance 
We begin with deficient performance. Under our well-settled standard 
of review, Isom had to show that the only conclusion based on the 
evidence was that trial counsel’s representation fell below prevailing 
professional norms. But his effort to do so fails as a matter of law, logic, 
and fact.  
First, as the post-conviction court pointed out, instructions 17 and 18 
are accurate statements of law. Both instructions use a statutory definition, 
and instruction 18 recites the ordinary meaning, too. Isom has no counter 
to these points. Also, the instructions were relevant because they were 
used to define terms in instruction 16, an unchallenged instruction that 
Isom requested. Instruction 16 recited mitigating circumstances from 
Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(c)(6): the “defendant’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct or to conform that 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result 
of mental disease or defect or of intoxication.” Isom does not argue that 
the prevailing norm for lawyers is to object to accurate statements of law 
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made relevant by their own instruction. He thus waives this argument. 
App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).  
Second, as to logic, we agree with the post-conviction court that merely 
defining “mental disease or defect” and “intoxication” did not preclude 
the jury from considering other evidence that might not rise to the level of 
mental disease, mental defect, or intoxication. Nothing in either 
instruction, individually or taken together with other instructions, told the 
jury to ignore all evidence of mental-health issues or alcohol consumption 
falling outside the definitions in instructions 17 and 18. Isom points to no 
evidence suggesting that merely defining one part of the law excludes 
consideration of all other facts. Rather, instructions 17 and 18 did what 
instructions are meant to do, which are to educate the jury on a relevant 
part of the law. Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 562 (Ind. 2019). These 
points do not lead us “unmistakably and unerringly” to the conclusion 
that trial counsel’s failure to object fell below prevailing professional 
norms.  
Third, as a factual matter, the post-conviction court also rejected Isom’s 
argument that instructions 17 and 18 wrongly caused the jury to consider 
only behavior defined as a mental disease, mental defect, or intoxication. 
We agree. Taking the instructions as a whole, we find that the jury was 
advised to consider all facts it thought were mitigating. Instruction 11 
informed the jury that “there are no limits on what facts any of you may 
find as mitigating”, and that a “mitigating circumstance can be anything 
about the defendant . . . which any one of you believes should be taken 
into account”, including “circumstances relating to the defendant’s . . . 
mental state”. 
In addition, relevant to Isom’s instruction 17 challenge, instruction 16 
listed eight other mitigators pertaining to mental health:  
1) “Potential brain damage as a result of fall during 
childhood”, 
2) “Frontal lobe limitations and impairment”, 
3) “Suppression of ability to process and encode 
concrete bits of material”, 
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4) “Impairment of transfer from short to long term 
memory”,  
5) “Attention and concentration problems”,  
6) “Limitation of capacity to adapt in situations 
requiring active and efficient cognitive endeavors and 
information processing”,  
7) “Dissociative amnesia”, and  
8) “Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)”.  
None of these mental-health issues were limited as possible mitigators to 
those that rendered Isom incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of 
his actions.  
Isom’s only answer is that instruction 11 contradicts but does not 
explain the error in instructions 17 and 18, and, thus, under Francis v. 
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985), instruction 11 cannot cure instructions 17 
and 18. But Isom’s argument mischaracterizes both the facts and the law. 
First, his argument ignores that the post-conviction court considered 
instruction 17 in relation to both instructions 11 and 16. Second, the post-
conviction court did not hold that instruction 11 cured any error in 
instructions 17 and 18. The post-conviction court instead found no error in 
either. Thus, Isom’s argument applying Francis is inapposite. The post-
conviction court did not consider instructions 11 and 16 to have cured the 
other instructions’ alleged deficiency. Instead, it noted that instructions 
should be considered as a whole to determine whether they misled the 
jury on the law. This is the proper approach under controlling precedent. 
See, e.g., Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 200 (Ind. 2014). Isom never explains 
why Francis should govern the analysis instead of our settled approach 
that considers instructions as a whole, and we reject his attempt to 
mischaracterize the proceedings below. Isom thus did not show that trial 
counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient for not objecting to 
instructions 17 and 18. 
If anything, counsel’s decision to use instructions 17 and 18 to 
supplement the jury’s understanding of instruction 16 is the type of 
strategic decision subject to the deferential Strickland inquiry. Elsewhere, 
we have held that a defendant cannot overcome the presumption of 
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competent representation under Strickland unless the defendant shows 
that trial counsel’s presumptively reasonable strategic decision was in fact 
due to counsel’s ignorance. Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 977–78 (Ind. 
2014). Isom does not address whether trial counsel’s failure to object was 
the product of a strategic decision. Without overcoming this presumption, 
Isom cannot meet his Strickland burden, and his claims necessarily fail.  
ii. Prejudice 
We turn next to prejudice. Although Isom’s Strickland claim fails 
because he did not show deficient performance, it fails independently for 
lack of prejudice. To prove prejudice, Isom had to show that the only 
conclusion based on the evidence is that there was a reasonable 
probability the unraised objections would have been sustained and that 
absent the instructions, the jury would not have recommended the death 
penalty. Critically, Isom did not argue either. Thus, he waives these 
arguments, App. R. 46(A)(8)(a), and cannot meet his Strickland burden.  
Even had Isom raised these waived arguments, they would have 
failed. First, as discussed above, Isom shows no error in the instructions, 
so he shows no grounds for the trial court to sustain counsel’s objection. 
Moreover, even had the objections been sustained, Isom cannot show a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a sentence other 
than death. The jury’s charge under section 35-50-2-9(l)(2) was to decide 
whether one or more aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances. Here, this means that Isom needed to show that 
the jury would have accorded the fact that he had been drinking (but was 
not legally intoxicated) and had mental-health issues (but not a mental 
illness or defect) such mitigating weight that their addition to the 
approximately thirty other proposed mitigators would have overcome the 
aggravators—that Isom had committed two other murders. We reject any 
argument that this speculative counterfactual outcome was reasonably 
probable. Thus, Isom cannot establish prejudice under Strickland. 
Instead, Isom argues that his trial counsel’s alleged error rendered the 
proceedings fundamentally unfair: “the jury was precluded from 
considering the most compelling portions of the mitigating evidence 
because the final instructions placed the burden too high.” But Isom’s 
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claim that this was so does not make it so. He provides no evidence to 
support his claim. And he cites no case law to support his view that any 
instructional error relevant to a mitigating circumstance renders a 
proceeding so unreliable that it violates a defendant’s due-process rights. 
To the contrary, Supreme Court precedent recognizes that not all 
instructional error in capital cases is fundamental error, Sochor v. Florida, 
504 U.S. 527, 534 n.* (1992), as does our own precedent, Inman, 4 N.E.3d at 
200. Because Isom did not develop this fundamental-error argument, he 
waived it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). But even had he developed it, we discern 
no fundamental unfairness in the proceedings.  
Isom also argues that his alleged instructional errors are structural 
errors and that Strickland prejudice should thus be presumed. In doing so, 
he quotes a number of federal cases, but none stands for the broad 
principle that instructional error relevant to mitigating circumstances is 
structural error and thus exempt from harmless-error review. Specifically, 
Isom argues that so-called Lockett errors are not subject to harmless-error 
review under Supreme Court precedent. But the issue in Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978), and other like cases, see Tennard v. Dretke, 542 
U.S. 274, 285–86 (2004), Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799–800 (2001), 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318–20 (1989), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 112–13 (1982), was whether a state’s sentencing scheme could 
preclude a sentencer from considering mitigating evidence as a matter of 
law. And the circuit cases Isom cites similarly focus on state law or 
procedure that precluded the sentencer from considering mitigating 
evidence as a matter of law. See Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 291, 
303 (5th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761, 772 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Hargrave v. Dugger, 832 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987). 
Here, though, Isom neither challenges the validity of Indiana’s 
sentencing scheme nor argues that the jury was precluded from 
considering mitigating evidence as a matter of law. Indeed, Isom concedes 
that his jury was specifically instructed to consider all facts it believed 
were mitigating. Because Isom does not develop his argument under 
Lockett and later federal cases by showing why they should apply here, he 
waives it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Moreover, structural error under state law 
is an extremely narrow doctrine, see Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652, 
653 (Ind. 2018), which we decline to extend here.  
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We are thus persuaded that Isom’s alleged error is subject to 
traditional harmless-error review. But even were it not, Isom’s claims of 
fundamental and structural error ignore that he invited the alleged errors 
concerning instructions 17 and 18. Under Indiana’s invited-error doctrine, 
a party cannot benefit from an error the party commits, invites, or sets into 
motion by his own neglect or misconduct. Id. at 651. Thus, invited error 
can defeat a claim of even structural or fundamental error. Id. at 655. An 
unobjected-to instruction coupled with an active request for related 
instructions raises the question of invited error. Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at 
974. Here, Isom pursued a deliberate strategy of putting as many 
mitigators, statutory and nonstatutory, in front of the jury as possible. As 
part of that strategy, he sought instruction 16 and did not object to 
instructions 17 and 18, which defined terms used in instruction 16. Thus, 
Isom invited any errors in instructions 17 and 18, thereby defeating his 
claims, even if he could somehow show structural or fundamental error.  
Because Isom does not argue or show prejudice and he invited the 
alleged errors, he does not meet Strickland’s second prong. He thus fails to 
show that the evidence points “unmistakably and unerringly” to the 
conclusion that trial counsel’s failure to object to instructions 17 and 18 
was both deficient performance and prejudicial under Strickland. He is not 
entitled to relief on either ground.  
b. Instruction 23 
Isom next argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object 
to instruction 23. According to Isom, the instruction wrongly informed the 
jury that its sentencing decision must be unanimous and was thus 
unconstitutional at the penalty phase.  
Instruction 23 said: 
To return verdicts, each of you must agree to them.  
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after 
considering the evidence with the other jurors. It is your 
duty to consult with each other. You should try to agree on a 
verdict, if you can do so without compromising your 
individual judgment. Do not hesitate to re-examine your 
own views and change your mind if you believe you are 
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wrong. Do not give up your honest belief just because the 
other jurors may disagree, or just to end the deliberations. 
After the verdict is read in Court, you may be asked 
individually whether you agree with it.  
The post-conviction court held that Isom did not show constitutionally 
deficient performance or prejudice for trial counsel’s failure to object to 
instruction 23. We agree. 
i. Performance 
We begin with deficient performance and find that Isom fails to meet 
his burden. Critically, he does not explain why, even were instruction 23 
erroneous, it was constitutionally deficient performance not to object. And 
apart from waiver, even had Isom supplied this critical missing link, his 
argument fails as a matter of both fact and law.  
As a factual matter, instruction 23 nowhere tells the jury it must return 
a unanimous sentencing recommendation. It merely says that to return a 
verdict in a capital case, its verdict must be unanimous. In fact, the 
instruction states that each juror “must decide the case for yourself” and 
admonishes jurors to try to agree only if they can do so without 
“compromising” each juror’s “individual judgment.” And it advises jurors 
they should not give up an “honest belief” just because other jurors 
disagree. Also, a reviewing court considers whether the instructions, taken 
as a whole, misinformed the jury about the law. Thus, the post-conviction 
court properly considered instruction 23 alongside other instructions, 
namely, instruction 11. Instruction 11 told the jury that each juror “must 
consider and weigh any mitigating factors he or she finds to exist without 
regard to whether other jurors agree with that determination.” Taken 
together, instructions 11 and 23 correctly informed the jury of its 
obligations in a capital case: to seek unanimity before recommending the 
death sentence—but only if unanimity can be reached without sacrificing 
individual judgment and after each juror individually weighs any 
mitigating factors. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(f). For these reasons, Isom’s 
argument fails factually.  
His argument also fails legally. The post-conviction court found that 
instruction 23 is a correct statement of law because all jurors must agree 
that death is the proper sentence before the trial court will accept its 
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recommendation. Isom does not explain why instruction 23 was 
unconstitutional at the penalty phase, does not provide any legal citations 
to support his claim, and does not specify which constitutional right the 
instruction allegedly violated. Isom says only that it was “especially true” 
that instruction 23 was unconstitutional considering instruction 15. Yet 
Isom did not mention instruction 15 in his post-conviction petition or in 
his proposed findings to the post-conviction court. He cannot raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 
526, 533 (Ind. 2006). 
Isom also waives this argument by not developing it. App. R. 
46(A)(8)(a). He does not explain how instruction 23 was unconstitutional 
at sentencing or how instruction 15 supports his claim. And the Court 
discerns nothing in instruction 15 that makes instruction 23 
unconstitutional. Instruction 15 says “[a]ny findings you enter in a verdict 
form must be unanimous. Do not enter any findings or sign any verdict 
form to which there has not been a unanimous agreement.” Taken 
together, these instructions make it harder for a defendant to receive the 
death penalty, thus providing a reasonable basis for counsel’s strategic 
decision not to object to instruction 23. To overcome the presumption that 
his counsel made a reasonable strategic decision, Isom needed to show 
that counsel acted instead due to ignorance of the law. Brewington, 7 
N.E.3d at 978. But Isom does not make this argument, see App. R. 
46(A)(8)(a), and thus cannot overcome Strickland’s presumption of 
reasonable performance.    
Instead, Isom points to trial counsel’s statement at the post-conviction 
hearing that counsel should have objected to instruction 23. Nothing in the 
record, however, suggests that counsel’s statement was anything more 
than the inevitable second-guessing with 20/20 hindsight that does not 
meet Strickland’s high bar. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In fact, trial counsel’s 
response—“[i]n retrospect, yes”—when asked at the hearing if he should 
have objected, suggests it was precisely that. Notably, Isom does not argue 
that ignorance of the law (instead of trial strategy) explains counsel’s 
decision not to object to instruction 23. He thus waives this argument, 
App. R. 46(A)(8)(a), and cannot show that the evidence as a whole points 
only to deficient performance.  
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Isom also argues that instruction 23 was erroneous because it 
contradicted instructions 11 and 14. But he does not identify the 
contradiction or show why, even were they contradictory, trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient because they did not object. Because Isom does 
not develop this argument, he waives it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).  
Even had he developed it, however, his argument would fail both 
factually and legally. Factually, Isom cannot show that instruction 23 
necessarily contradicts instructions 11 and 14. Instruction 11 admonishes 
each juror to consider individually all facts the juror finds mitigating. In 
contrast, instruction 23 speaks to the jury’s verdict. Individual juror 
decisions about whether a fact is mitigating are not the jury’s collective 
verdict. There is no conflict because the two instructions address different 
parts of the law. Instruction 14 requires jurors to individually balance 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine if the aggravators 
outweigh the mitigators. Instruction 14 does not contradict instruction 23 
but clarifies both its “individual judgment” reference and how a juror 
should decide the case for herself.  
Legally, to the extent Isom would rest on his earlier contradiction 
argument vis-à-vis instructions 17 and 18, his argument as to instruction 
23 similarly fails. In his briefing on instructions 17 and 18, Isom argues 
that where another instruction “merely contradicts” without explaining 
the error of the challenged instruction, it cannot cure the challenged 
instruction’s deficiency under Supreme Court precedent. As explained 
above, Isom does not establish that instruction 23 was erroneous or that 
the post-conviction court considered other instructions to cure that error. 
And our settled precedent holding that jury instructions should be 
considered as a whole to determine whether they misled the jury about 
the law does not conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in Francis, 471 
U.S. 307.  
Because Isom does not show that the evidence points only to the 
conclusion that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient 
for not objecting to instruction 23, he is not entitled to relief on this 
ground.  
 
 
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ii. Prejudice 
As to prejudice, Isom does not show that the evidence leads unerringly 
to the conclusion that trial counsel’s failure to object to instruction 23 
prejudiced him. Isom does not argue that the trial court would have 
sustained an objection to instruction 23 or that the jury would have 
recommended a different sentence absent the instruction. He thus waives 
these arguments. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).  
Even had Isom made these arguments, though, they would have 
failed. Instruction 23 accurately states the law. And there is no indication 
that the instructions, as a whole, misled the jury. Thus, there is no obvious 
ground on which the trial judge would have sustained an objection. And, 
absent instruction 23, the jurors would have missed the explicit 
admonishment to “decide the case for yourself” and not to 
“compromis[e]” a juror’s “individual judgment” or give up her own 
“honest belief” just because other jurors disagree. It is unreasonable to 
suppose that omitting an instruction to make an individual judgment 
would result in a juror being more likely to make an individual judgment. 
Isom thus cannot show a reasonable probability that without instruction 
23 at least one juror would have voted against the death penalty.  
Because Isom does not show that the evidence points unerringly to the 
conclusion that his trial counsel’s failure to object to instructions 17, 18, 
and 23 was both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial, he is not 
entitled to relief on these grounds.  
5. Cumulative-Prejudice Argument 
Isom tries to bolster his individual-prejudice arguments by arguing 
that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors at the penalty phase 
prejudiced Isom by undermining confidence in the proceedings. Isom 
alleges that trial counsel were deficient for failing to object to penalty-
phase instructions 17, 18, and 23 and failing to investigate, obtain, and use 
records from Dr. Durak and the jail. According to Isom, these alleged 
errors, taken together, denied him a jury that could make an 
individualized-sentencing determination, thus depriving him of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial and reliable sentencing. The post-
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conviction court found that Isom failed to meet his burden in establishing 
even error, let alone cumulative prejudice. We agree.  
Even had Isom carried his burden and proved deficient performance, 
however, “[g]enerally, trial errors that do not justify reversal when taken 
separately also do not justify reversal when taken together.” Weisheit v. 
State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 992 (Ind. 2018). Isom does not explain why the trial 
errors he alleged are exceptions to this general rule. The thrust of his 
argument seems to be that the alleged errors prevented the jury from 
hearing certain mitigating evidence and that this missing mitigating 
evidence calls into question the reliability of the sentencing verdict. Given 
that the aggravating factors for each sentence was the brutal murder of 
two victims—with two of the three victims children—and given that the 
jury was presented with thirty different mitigators spanning from Isom’s 
childhood to his mental health as an adult, we see no unreliability in the 
result. Accord id. (finding cumulative-prejudice claim failed where 
defendant did not show that he would be given a different sentence 
absent the alleged errors “in light of the nature of this particular crime—
the murder of two small children—and the overwhelming evidence of his 
guilt.”). Isom’s claim fails. 
B. Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Isom also claims that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to 
raise fundamental-error challenges on direct appeal concerning 
instructions 17, 18, and 23. We review claims that appellate counsel were 
ineffective as we do such claims against trial counsel, asking whether 
counsel’s performance was substandard and caused prejudice under 
Strickland.  
Claims that appellate counsel were ineffective fall into three general 
categories of constitutionally deficient performance: “(1) denial of access 
to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present issues well.” 
Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 270 (Ind. 2014). Isom’s claims fall in the 
second category. For such waiver-of-issues claims, “[i]neffectiveness is 
very rarely found” because deciding which issues to raise “is one of the 
most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate counsel.” 
Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 193 (Ind. 1997) (cleaned up). To prove 
deficient performance, Isom needed to show that the unraised claims were 
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“significant and obvious upon the face of the record” and were clearly 
stronger than those presented. Id. at 194 (citing Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 
646 (7th Cir. 1986)). Only then does the defendant establish that appellate 
counsel’s performance was deficient.  
On review, Isom must show that as to each instruction, the evidence 
points only to the following conclusions:  
• that trial counsel’s decision not to object to instructions 17, 
18, and 23 was a significant and obvious error on the face of 
the record; 
• that these unraised issues were clearly stronger than the 
issues appellate counsel raised; and  
• that but for appellate counsel’s decision not to raise these 
issues, there is a reasonable probability that Isom’s appeal 
would have led to resentencing.  
Because Isom did not make these showings, he is not entitled to relief on 
his claim that appellate counsel were ineffective concerning the 
challenged instructions. The post-conviction court found that Isom failed 
to show constitutionally deficient performance. We agree and likewise 
find that Isom did not show prejudice. 
Isom argues that instructions 17 and 18 wrongly prevented the jury 
from considering his mitigating evidence during sentencing and that 
instruction 23 unconstitutionally informed the jury that its sentencing 
decision must be unanimous. But, as we held above, supra, at 24–25, 30, 
Isom did not make either showing. Thus, he cannot establish significant, 
obvious, or evident errors on the face of the record. This shortcoming 
alone provides an adequate basis for affirming the post-conviction court’s 
denial of relief on these grounds.  
Moreover, Isom does not argue that the unraised instructional issues 
were clearly stronger than the raised issues. He thus waives this 
argument. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Nor does Isom overcome the presumption 
of competent representation under Strickland, a presumption especially 
strong in waiver-of-issue cases. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 724 (Ind. 
2013). Isom does not address this presumption and therefore waives this 
argument. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). And even had he not waived it, reviewing 
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courts should defer to appellate counsel’s strategic decision not to raise an 
issue unless it was “unquestionably unreasonable”. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 
194. On this record, we decline to find that appellate counsel’s decision 
not to challenge trial counsel’s failure to object to instructions 17, 18, and 
23 was “unquestionably unreasonable.”  
This is especially true where, as here, a defendant bears the burden of 
showing fundamental error. Fundamental error is an extremely narrow 
doctrine that requires an error so flagrant a judge should have raised it on 
his own. C.S. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 592, 596 (Ind. 2019). Isom must show that 
such a plain error made a fair trial impossible, id. at 595, a burden he does 
not meet. As to Isom’s claim that appellate counsel were ineffective, he 
does not argue that trial counsel’s failure to object to instructions 17, 18, 
and 23 was such an obvious error that the judge should have raised it sua 
sponte. Nor does Isom argue that the lack of objection made a fair trial 
impossible. Isom thus waives these arguments, App. R. 46(A)(8)(a), and 
cannot meet his burden. To the extent Isom relies on the fundamental-
error argument he raised in his corresponding claim that trial counsel 
were ineffective, he fails to establish fundamental error for the same 
reasons. Supra, at 25–27. And we have held elsewhere that finding a 
defendant was not denied effective counsel is tantamount to finding that 
an alleged error was not fundamental. Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at 974. Here, 
Isom does not show ineffective assistance of trial counsel and thus cannot 
show fundamental error.  
Finally, Isom does not show prejudice under Strickland. As an initial 
matter, he does not assert that the outcome of his appeal would have been 
different had appellate counsel raised the instructional issues. Because 
Isom does not make this argument, he waives it, App. R. 46(A)(8)(a), and 
cannot meet his burden. Instead, he focuses on the reasonable probability 
that the jury would have reached a different sentencing decision had it not 
heard instructions 17, 18, and 23. But his argument misses the mark, as the 
relevant proceeding is his direct appeal. Because Isom does not argue the 
outcome of his direct appeal would have been different, he cannot show 
prejudice under Strickland.  
Because Isom does not show that all evidence points unerringly to the 
conclusion that he met Strickland’s especially rigorous standard for failure-
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to-raise claims, his challenge to appellate counsel’s failure to raise error as 
to instructions 17, 18, and 23 fails.  
C. Post-Conviction Court Orders 
Isom also raises five freestanding challenges to the post-conviction 
court’s rulings: (1) denying Isom’s renewed motion for a competency 
hearing; (2) denying Isom’s discovery request for the State’s lethal-
injection protocol and finding his execution-validity challenge waived; (3) 
denying Isom’s discovery request for juror-contact information and 
finding issue waived; (4) limiting the testimony of two expert witnesses; 
and (5) finding Isom’s challenge to his petition’s filing date waived. 
Because Isom does not establish that the post-conviction court erred, he is 
not entitled to relief.   
1. Isom’s Competence 
After Isom refused to sign his petition for post-conviction relief, a 
requirement under our post-conviction rules, see P-C.R. 1(3)(b), his 
counsel raised the issue of Isom’s competency. The post-conviction court 
found Isom competent and dismissed his petition. After this Court 
reinstated Isom’s petition for post-conviction relief, counsel renewed its 
earlier challenge to Isom’s competency and again sought hearing from the 
post-conviction court. The post-conviction court denied Isom’s motion, 
and subsequent renewed motion, finding that he “d[id] not assert any 
change in circumstances”, and that Indiana Code section 35-36-3-1 does 
not apply in post-conviction cases. Isom argues that the post-conviction 
court was wrong on both points and erred by denying his renewed 
request for a competency hearing. While we decline to address whether 
section 35-36-3-1 applies to post-conviction proceedings, we hold that 
Isom is not entitled to relief because he does not argue and cannot show 
that the evidence before the post-conviction court was without conflict 
and led only to the conclusion that he was incompetent.  
Section 35-36-3-1 provides that: 
If at any time before the final submission of any criminal 
case to the court or the jury trying the case, the court has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks 
the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the 
preparation of a defense, the court shall immediately fix a 
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time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has 
that ability. 
I.C. § 35-36-3-1(a). We have not decided whether this section applies to 
post-conviction proceedings. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 600 (Ind. 
2001). Because Isom is not entitled to relief either way, we need not decide 
this question here, and we decline Isom’s invitation to hold that section 
35-36-3-1 applies to such proceedings.  
Even assuming that section 35-36-3-1 applies to post-conviction 
proceedings, Isom is not entitled to relief. He argues that his refusal to 
cooperate with his attorneys represented a change in circumstances 
relevant to competency that should have received new consideration from 
the court. According to Isom, his “attitude” changed after counsel’s 
clerical error omitting Isom’s signature from his original petition for post-
conviction relief. Isom argues this omission explains his refusal to engage 
further with counsel or experts recommended by counsel. Because Isom’s 
argument fails as a matter of fact and law, he is not entitled to relief.  
As a factual matter, Isom’s refusal to cooperate with his counsel does 
not represent a change in circumstances. The record is replete with 
instances where Isom refused to engage with counsel—even before the 
omitted signature on the petition. In fact, the very behavior that Isom 
argues was a changed circumstance was referenced in Isom’s first verified 
motion requesting a competency hearing. There he stated: 
Kevin Isom has a long and documented history of adverse 
reactions to stressful situations. As the Court knows, Isom 
absented himself from the penalty phase of this death 
penalty trial. As the Court knows, that reaction came first 
when trial counsel called Isom’s mother as a mitigation 
witness. But Isom’s withdrawal extended beyond what he 
initially told the trial court. Isom learned, during a colloquy 
with the trial judge, that Isom could withdraw from the 
remainder of the penalty phase. Isom never returned. 
Isom goes on to say that his “negative reaction continued, and continues 
still today.” It thus cannot represent a change in circumstances between 
the first verified motion and the renewed motion for a competency 
hearing.  
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As a legal matter, a post-conviction court’s finding of competency 
receives a high level of deference from a reviewing court. Timberlake, 753 
N.E.2d at 602. Thus, we will disturb the post-conviction court’s order only 
if Isom shows that the evidence is without conflict and leads solely to the 
conclusion that Isom was incompetent. Id. at 597, 602. Isom does not make 
this argument, however, and thus waives it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). 
Even had he made the argument, it would fail because the record 
supports the court’s order. To receive a competency hearing, there must 
be “evidence before the trial court that creates a reasonable or bona fide 
doubt as to the defendant’s competency.” Goodman v. State, 453 N.E.2d 
984, 986 (Ind. 1983) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)). Here, 
there was no such evidence. The only new evidence the post-conviction 
court had in front of it was Dr. Dinwiddie’s affidavit—evidence that did 
not raise a “reasonable or bona fide doubt” about Isom’s competency. As 
the court noted, Dr. Dinwiddie’s affidavit was unpersuasive because he 
did not evaluate Isom. Contradicting this already unpersuasive evidence 
were the multiple mental-health assessments from the trial record—all of 
which found Isom competent—and were conducted by mental-health 
professionals who did evaluate Isom. And, unlike Dr. Dinwiddie, the 
post-conviction judge observed Isom at length and conversed with him 
during two separate hearings about his decision to forfeit post-conviction 
relief. Under our law, a court’s “observations of a defendant in court can 
be an adequate basis for finding that a competency hearing is not 
necessary.” Cotton v. State, 753 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 2001). On this record, 
Isom cannot show that the uncontroverted evidence pointed only to the 
conclusion there was a “reasonable or bona fide doubt” about his 
competency. His claim fails.  
2. Lethal-Injection Protocol 
During Isom’s post-conviction proceeding, he sought the State’s lethal-
injection protocol through a discovery request. The post-conviction court 
denied Isom’s request based on the State’s objection that it had no 
execution date set for Isom and did not know which substances or method 
would be used to execute him. Isom then included in his operative post-
conviction petition the following challenge to the validity of the State’s 
lethal-injection protocol: “9(D) As of the mandatory deadline for 
submitting this pleading, Indiana has no valid method of execution. The 
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State has declined to provide Isom any information about how it plans to 
complete his execution.” Isom included no other reasoning or citations in 
support of his challenge. In its findings, the post-conviction court denied 
Isom’s challenge to the validity of Indiana’s method of execution and 
found it waived due to Isom’s failure to present a cogent legal argument 
or include his reasoning and evidence in his proposed findings of facts 
and conclusions of law.  
Although Isom nominally asserts that the post-conviction court erred 
by denying his discovery request, he does not develop this argument and 
thus waives it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Even had Isom developed this 
argument, we “affirm [discovery] determinations absent a showing of 
clear error and resulting prejudice”, Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1251, and 
discern neither clear error nor prejudice here. Isom concedes that he 
requested information the State did not have, meaning there was nothing 
the State could produce in response to Isom’s request. Thus, the post-
conviction court did not err by denying Isom’s request.   
The bulk of Isom’s argument concerns his request that the Court 
generally “hold that a challenge to the method of execution may be raised 
when an execution date is sought.” He argues that the post-conviction 
court’s conclusion that Isom waived his challenge to the validity of the 
execution is wrong as a matter of law. This is so, according to Isom, 
because the post-conviction court based its decision on the fact that Isom 
did not address his challenge in his proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and Isom had no notice that the post-conviction court 
would do so. Because Isom does not establish that the post-conviction 
court erred, his claim fails.  
 As an initial matter, Isom mischaracterizes the post-conviction court’s 
reasons for finding his execution challenge waived. The court gave two 
reasons for denying Isom’s challenge: first, because Isom failed to address 
the claim in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; and, 
second, for the reasons stated under claim 9(A). Claim 9(A) in turn 
specifies that a party seeking review bears the burden of making cogent 
arguments, citing relevant authorities, and citing relevant parts of the 
record. In other words, the post-conviction court merely reiterated what 
any reviewing court would recite, which is that the burden is on the 
petitioner to show why he is entitled to relief.  
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Although a post-conviction court is not an appellate court, it does act 
as a reviewing court. But even when acting as initial factfinders, our 
courts operate according to the foundational expectation that those 
seeking relief must articulate and support their claims. Even for run-of-
the-mill objections during factfinding proceedings, parties must “present[] 
a cogent legal theory to the trial court.” Jackson v. State, 712 N.E.2d 986, 988 
n.2 (Ind. 1999) (cleaned up). Whether we term Isom’s omissions (failure to 
provide developed arguments, relevant authorities, and record citations) a 
“failure to present” or “waiver”, the post-conviction court was correct to 
hold Isom to his burden of presenting cogent legal theories and 
establishing the grounds for relief—a burden he did not meet.  
Isom seems to argue that because the post-conviction court did not 
grant his discovery order, it is unfair to hold that he then failed to present 
the issue. We disagree. Upon the post-conviction court’s discovery order, 
Isom could have removed the issue from his subsequently amended 
petition. Our post-conviction rules require that a petitioner verify that the 
petition includes every ground for relief “known to the petitioner.” P-C.R. 
1(3)(b). Here, Isom proceeded with his validity challenge even though the 
grounds for relief were not yet “known” to him. With Isom having thus 
raised the issue, the post-conviction court did not err in requiring him to 
sustain his burden, which he did not do. We decline to grant him relief.  
Also unavailing is Isom’s claim that he was denied due process 
because he had inadequate notice to include all of the issues for which he 
was seeking relief in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
First, under our post-conviction rules, the burden is the petitioner’s. P-
C.R. 1(5). Second, our post-conviction rules specify that a failure to assert 
claims leads to waiver. P-C.R. 1(8). Third, the post-conviction court 
ordered the parties to submit their proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by a certain date as part of its case-management 
schedule. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law act as 
proposed orders to the post-conviction court. Isom knew this, which is 
why he referred to his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
his “Proposed Order” and styled it as the post-conviction court’s order.  
Because Isom raised but failed to support his execution-protocol 
challenge, he is not entitled to relief on this ground.  
 
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3. Juror-Contact Information 
Early in the post-conviction proceedings, the parties agreed to send a 
letter to the jurors, through the court, informing them that the attorneys 
might wish to talk to them and listing the attorneys’ contact information. 
The post-conviction court notified the parties that if they did not hear 
from any jurors and wished to communicate with them further, they 
could draft another letter and petition the court to send it. Neither the 
State nor Isom opted to do so. Instead, Isom asked the post-conviction 
court to provide him with the jurors’ phone numbers and addresses so 
that he could contact them directly. The post-conviction court declined to 
do so, a decision Isom now challenges. Because the post-conviction court 
was well within its discretion to deny Isom’s motion, his challenge fails.  
Absent a showing of clear error and prejudice, we will not disturb a 
post-conviction court’s discovery order. Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1251. Here, 
Isom does not establish clear error because he does not cite any precedent 
requiring a post-conviction court to give the juror’s contact information to 
a party, and we are aware of none. The post-conviction court was clear 
that the parties could petition it to send a subsequent letter, an option 
Isom chose not to pursue. Nowhere does Isom argue that the means 
offered by the post-conviction court was insufficient. In fact, the relief 
Isom seeks is the opportunity to ask the former jurors if they are willing to 
discuss Isom’s case, an objective easily met by a letter drafted to this effect 
and sent by the court as a conduit. We have already held elsewhere that 
direct disclosure is not required where other reasonable means of 
investigation are available. Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 894 (Ind. 
1997). Isom argues only that our law does not preclude a court from 
sharing juror-contact information. But not prohibiting direct juror contact 
is different than requiring direct juror contact. Isom cites no case law 
requiring a post-conviction court to share juror-contact information to 
facilitate direct contact, and we decline to so hold today.  
Our case law instead makes clear that post-trial investigations of jurors 
should be used only in extraordinary cases and that deference to a juror’s 
privacy should govern a court’s inquiry. State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 477 
(Ind. 2003). To disturb a juror’s privacy, a party must show “manifest 
indications of material discrepancies appearing in the record”. Ibid. For 
instance, in Dye, material discrepancies appeared on the face of the record 
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Page 41 of 46 
because the juror’s questionnaire responses differed from her voir doir 
responses. Ibid. But here Isom merely alleged that three jurors provided 
incomplete questionnaire answers as to their criminal history with no 
evidentiary support from the record. Only later, months after the post-
conviction court denied Isom’s motion, did Isom submit exhibits 
containing jury questionnaires, chronological case summaries, and Bureau 
of Motor Vehicle records for one seated juror and two alternate jurors. 
Isom thus did not establish “manifest indications of material discrepancies 
appearing in the record” and is not entitled to relief.  
Isom next raises an unspecified challenge to what he styles as the post-
conviction court’s waiver ruling. We find this argument waived because 
he does not develop it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Isom’s clearest statement of 
the challenge is that: “The post-conviction court erred in denying Isom’s 
attorneys the opportunity to contact Isom’s former jurors. The court 
compounded that error by finding the issue waived.” But it is unclear 
which issue is “the issue waived” because the first sentence discusses 
Isom’s opportunity to contact former jurors, but the post-conviction court 
does not rule that Isom’s opportunity to contact former jurors is waived. 
Because Isom has not presented a reviewable claim, we have no grounds 
on which to revisit the post-conviction court’s ruling.  
4. Expert Witness Limitation 
During the hearing on Isom’s post-conviction petition, he proposed 
two capital-litigation experts as witnesses. The post-conviction court 
permitted the experts to testify but limited their testimony to topics that 
were addressed in death-penalty training seminars. The post-conviction 
court did not allow the witnesses to give their opinions on trial counsel’s 
performance. Isom argues that the post-conviction court erred by not 
permitting two expert witnesses to give their opinions on whether Isom’s 
trial counsel were ineffective. Because the post-conviction court did not 
abuse its discretion in limiting the witnesses’ testimony to factual issues 
that were helpful to the court, Isom’s argument fails.  
We review a post-conviction court’s exclusion of expert testimony for 
an abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 163 (Ind. 1999). 
Isom waives this argument by not claiming that the post-conviction court 
abused its discretion by limiting the testimony of his two expert witnesses. 
App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).  
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But even had Isom argued that the post-conviction court abused its 
discretion, his claim would still fail. Indiana Rule of Evidence 702 permits 
expert testimony when the “expert’s . . . specialized knowledge will help 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 
According to Isom, he need “only . . . show that the subject matter is 
‘beyond the knowledge’ of the fact-finder.” But his argument fails as a 
matter of fact and law. First, Isom did not show the post-conviction court 
that the matter of effective counsel was beyond its knowledge because 
Isom never made this argument to the post-conviction court. Instead, 
when the post-conviction court asked Isom how the expert testimony 
would help the court, he replied only that the witnesses received 
specialized death-penalty training and could testify about what was in the 
training.  
Second, by arguing that he need only show that the subject matter is 
“beyond the knowledge” of the factfinder, Isom takes the quoted 
language out of context and mischaracterizes our law. The case he cites 
actually said:  
Where an expert’s testimony is based upon the expert’s skill 
or experience rather than on the application of scientific 
principles, the proponent of the testimony must only 
demonstrate that the subject matter is related to some field 
beyond the knowledge of lay persons and that the witness 
possesses sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in the 
field to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue.”  
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Estate of Wagers, 833 N.E.2d 93, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
(emphasis added). But even were it an accurate statement of law that Rule 
702 requires only that expert testimony be “beyond the knowledge” of the 
trial court, Isom concedes that he cites no cases holding that a trial court 
must accept expert testimony about ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Moreover, Isom does not establish how the question of ineffective counsel 
is beyond the knowledge of the post-conviction court. In fact, he makes no 
argument on this point and thus waives it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). 
Instead, Isom seems to argue by implication that because Indiana’s 
Criminal Rule 24 requires that death-penalty defenses be conducted by 
trained counsel, the post-conviction court was required to accept the 
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Page 43 of 46 
assistance of trained counsel in dissecting trial counsel’s performance. 
Although Rule 24 requires trained counsel in death-penalty cases, Isom’s 
conclusion that the effectiveness of such attorneys is beyond the ken of 
post-conviction courts does not follow from his premise. To the contrary, 
under Indiana’s Rules of Evidence, ultimate legal conclusions, such as 
whether trial counsel meets Strickland’s standard, are left to the factfinder. 
Evid. R. 704(b); Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 728–29 (Ind. 2007). 
Elsewhere, we have rejected the notion that a lawyer’s performance is 
beyond a trial judge’s competence to assess. See, e.g., id. at 728–29 
(holding no abuse of discretion in death-penalty case where post-
conviction court rejected defendant’s argument that expert testimony was 
necessary to show counsel’s conduct “fell below prevailing professional 
norms and was unreasonable under the standards of the conduct of 
counsel in capital defense cases in Indiana and nationally.”); Williams, 706 
N.E.2d at 163–64 (holding no abuse of discretion in death-penalty case 
where post-conviction court rejected attorney testimony because “the 
magistrate and the judge are necessarily very familiar with ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.”). We decline to hold otherwise here. Isom’s 
claim fails.   
5. Post-Conviction Petition Filing Date 
After the post-conviction court found Isom’s initial petition for post-
conviction relief waived due to his refusal to sign the petition, he appealed 
to our Court. He asked us to provide relief in one of two ways: either 
accept the post-conviction petition that Isom tendered in January 2016, or 
order the post-conviction court to accept the petition as of any date 
outside the case management schedule. In response, we granted Isom 
relief and ordered the post-conviction court to deem Isom’s petition filed 
as of the date of our order, January 13, 2017. Although Isom sought this 
alternative relief and did not seek rehearing from our Court, he argued in 
his post-conviction petition that we erroneously ordered the post-
conviction court to file Isom’s petition as of the date of our order. 
According to Isom, he raised the issue in his petition to preserve the claim, 
even though he conceded that the post-conviction court could not decide 
the claim.  
Our post-conviction rules permit limited grounds for relief of a 
sentence or conviction. See P-C.R. 1(1)(a). Notably, nothing in the post-
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 45S00-1508-PD-508 | June 30, 2021 
Page 44 of 46 
conviction rules permits Isom to collaterally attack an issue of post-
conviction procedure that our Court already settled on appeal. Moreover, 
even if the post-conviction rules provided a procedural vehicle for this 
type of collateral challenge, we would deny Isom relief. First, by 
specifically requesting the relief he now challenges, Isom waived any such 
challenge. See, e.g., Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 651 (discussing waiver and 
estoppel in the context of invited error and noting that waiver is 
“designed to promote fairness by preventing a party from sitting idly by, 
ostensibly agreeing to a ruling only to cry foul when the court ultimately 
renders an adverse decision.”) (cleaned up). Isom makes no answer.  
Second, had Isom wanted a different outcome he could have (in 
addition to not asking for an undesired form of relief in the first place) 
petitioned for rehearing. But he did not, and our law-of-the-case doctrine 
counsels against revisiting our ruling. As we recently explained, under the 
law-of-the-case doctrine “a court will not revisit issues already 
determined in a previous appeal in the same case.” State v. Timbs, No. 20S-
MI-289, 2021 WL 2373817, at *4 (Ind. June 10, 2021). This means that an 
earlier decision “governs the case throughout all of its subsequent stages, 
as to all questions which were presented and decided”. Ibid. (cleaned up). 
In Indiana, absent “extraordinary circumstances”, we apply this doctrine 
“in its strictest sense”. Ibid. (cleaned up). Isom does not address the law-
of-the-case doctrine, but even had he, we would decline to find 
extraordinary circumstances here.   
Third, even if waiver and law of the case did not bar Isom’s claim, he 
points to no error in the Court’s order and cites no rule the order violates. 
He argues instead that although Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) does not apply 
to post-conviction cases, if it did, the rule would require that Isom’s 
petition be deemed filed as of January 12, 2016. But elsewhere we have 
already held that even if Rule 15(C) applied to post-conviction petitions, it 
requires that an original petition be timely filed for an amended petition 
to relate back. Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind. 2006). The 
question here, however, is when the original petition was filed, not 
whether Isom’s subsequent amendments relate back to it. Thus, Rule 
15(C) and our reasoning in Corcoran are inapposite, and Isom’s arguments 
fail.  
Page 45 of 46 
Finally, Isom argues that the post-conviction court erred by finding his 
claim waived. Isom rests on the same reasons described above, see supra, 
at 38. For the same reasons Isom’s waiver arguments failed in the 
execution-protocol analysis, they fail here too. See supra, at 38–39. In short, 
whether we label Isom’s failure to develop this argument, relevant 
authorities, and record citations a “waiver” or “failure to present”, the 
post-conviction court was correct to hold Isom to his burden of presenting 
developed legal theories and establishing the grounds for relief.  
Isom has not established that the post-conviction court erred in: (1) 
denying his renewed motion for a competency hearing; (2) denying his 
discovery request for the State’s lethal-injection protocol and finding 
execution-validity challenge waived; (3) denying his discovery request for 
juror contact information and finding issue waived; (4) limiting the 
testimony of two expert witnesses; (5) finding his challenge to his 
petition’s filing date waived. Thus, Isom’s claims fail, and he is not 
entitled to relief.  
*
*         *
For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction 
court. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L A N T 
Amy E. Karozos 
Public Defender of Indiana 
Steven H. Schutte 
Kathleen Cleary
Meggan Smith 
Deputy Public Defenders 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L E E 
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 45S00-1508-PD-508 | June 30, 2021 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 45S00-1508-PD-508 | June 30, 2021 
Page 46 of 46 
 
Andrew A. Kobe 
Tyler G. Banks 
Office of the Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana