Title: WARREN M ROBERTSON JR V CHRYSLER CORP

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 9, 2002  
WARREN M. ROBERTSON, JR.,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 116276  
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
In this worker’s compensation case, we must determine  
whether the Court of Appeals properly vacated the Worker’s  
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) order affirming the  
magistrate’s decision denying worker’s compensation benefits.  
In part, the magistrate considered plaintiff’s perceptions of  
an actual work event in deciding whether plaintiff had  
established a compensable mental disability injury under MCL  
418.301(2).
 The Court of Appeals determined that such  
considerations by the magistrate were irrelevant to a mental  
  
disability analysis.  We vacate the Court of Appeals order and  
remand this matter to the magistrate for analysis under the  
statutory framework as set forth below.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  
Plaintiff began working for defendant employer in 1973,  
working at various auto assembly plant locations.  In 1984, he  
began working at defendant’s Sterling Heights Assembly Plant.  
Plaintiff worked on the assembly line in the paint department  
on what he described as the “sealer deck or decking job.”  
Because plaintiff was also artistically talented, he was  
placed in the Product Quality Improvement Partnership (PQIP)  
department and given the position of “artist.”  
In the early part of 1994, plaintiff was assigned a new  
supervisor, 
George 
Asher.  According to plaintiff, Asher began  
“needling” plaintiff to use his artistic abilities and “redo”  
some paintings on Asher’s boat.  Plaintiff stated that he told  
Asher that he would do the work on his own time at his home.  
However, according to plaintiff, Asher insisted that it be  
done on company time. Plaintiff refused to do this.  
Later that year, plaintiff, on his own time, worked on a  
personal project for another executive employed by defendant.  
Plaintiff completed this project for this executive before a  
1995 New Year’s Eve party.  According to plaintiff, that is  
when “things got out of hand” with Asher.  Plaintiff stated  
2  
that in February 1995, Asher disciplined plaintiff for having  
improperly taken a personal day off two months earlier.  
Several days later, plaintiff and a fellow employee, Al Sipes,  
were called into Asher’s office. Asher informed the two men  
that they would no longer be working in the PQIP department,  
and that they were to return to their previous designated  
positions.
 Plaintiff stated that he then “lost it.”  
Specifically, plaintiff admitted that he and Asher exchanged  
harsh words. Asher claimed that plaintiff backed him into a  
corner with a 2 x 2 piece of wood and threatened him and his  
family. Plaintiff left work following this incident.  
Later that evening, plaintiff’s wife called the plant  
manager, Frank Slaughter, to inquire into these events.  
Slaughter informed plaintiff’s wife that the PQIP department  
had been discontinued and that plaintiff had been asked to  
return to his previous position.  Slaughter further requested  
that plaintiff’s wife have plaintiff return to work the  
following 
Monday 
morning.  However, when plaintiff returned to  
work, he was escorted from the building. Plaintiff had been  
given a five-day suspension for using abusive language and  
disorderly conduct.  
Plaintiff later stated that he then went “out of control”  
and “would probably have killed someone” if he had not  
received help.  He admitted himself to an in-patient mental  
3  
  
health facility that same day, and remained in the facility  
for about six weeks.  Upon release, he continued receiving  
psychiatric treatment, and never returned to work.  In August  
1995, plaintiff filed a claim for worker’s compensation  
benefits.  
At the hearing on plaintiff’s claim, he testified with  
regard 
to 
several 
precipitating 
factors 
for 
his  
hospitalization 
including: 
“Chrysler 
Commercial 
Art 
Supervisor  
wanted me to do work on his boat on company time. I refused  
and now I’m in trouble at work.  I’m very depressed” and “I  
worked hard to get the status and overnight this individual  
[Mr. Asher] wiped it out.”  Additionally, Dr. Dabbagh,  
plaintiff’s mental health provider, concluded that the  
conflict between defendant and Mr. Asher was the pivotal  
reason for plaintiff’s depression and anger.  In part, Dr.  
Dabbagh stated that  
there 
was 
a 
conflict 
between 
him 
and 
the  
supervisor, and for that reason, he was removed 
from his job and put on the line after about 
eighteen [years], if I recall, from working on that 
job, 
and 
that’s 
what 
really 
basically 
has  
precipitated his episode of depression and anger.  
Slaughter testified that plaintiff’s transfer from PQIP  
to his previous position was the result of the department  
having been shut down. Specifically, he stated that in late  
1994 and early 1995, new car launches at defendant company  
were going poorly. To compound this problem, employees were  
4  
 
working considerable overtime and there were significant  
equipment problems.  Thus, costs were high. 
To solve this  
problem, defendant reduced overtime and cut “nonstandard”  
positions. Plaintiff’s position was “nonstandard”; thus, he  
was returned to his prior position. Slaughter asserted that  
this decision was his own and that he did not consult with  
Asher, who confirmed that he had not been consulted about  
plaintiff’s transfer.  
The worker’s compensation magistrate determined that  
plaintiff “failed to establish that he is or was disabled as  
defined by the act.”  According to the magistrate, the  
evidence showed that “any conflict between George Asher and  
plaintiff was clearly the product of plaintiff’s expansive  
mind and is a misperception.” The magistrate further stated  
that the “credible” testimony of defendant’s witnesses  
indicated that there had been no retaliatory intent behind  
plaintiff’s reassignment, but instead that it represented a  
“simple economic business decision by upper management.”  
Because the actual event of plaintiff’s reassignment to the  
assembly 
line 
could 
not be “seen as significantly contributing  
to, 
aggravating, 
or 
accelerating 
plaintiff’s 
mental  
disability,” the magistrate concluded that plaintiff had  
failed to establish that he was disabled as defined by the  
act. Upon review, the WCAC stated that the job transfer had  
5  
been the only actual event, and that there was no evidence of  
any animus on Asher’s part directed toward plaintiff. Thus,  
the WCAC affirmed the magistrate’s decision.  
The Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the WCAC and  
remanded the case to the magistrate.  Robertson v Chrysler  
Corp, unpublished order, entered January 11, 2000 (Docket No.  
222363).  The Court stated that the magistrate’s decision that  
the actual work event did not significantly contribute to or  
aggravate plaintiff’s mental disability was erroneous because  
it “appears to have been influenced by his findings that the  
plaintiff misperceived the reason for the reassignment, and  
that 
the 
reassignment 
was 
the 
result 
of 
business  
considerations and was not retaliatory.” In the view of the  
Court of Appeals, “whether plaintiff correctly or incorrectly  
perceived or interpreted the events at work is irrelevant, as  
is the existence of a legitimate business reason for the  
reassignment.” While such a conclusion is consistent with a  
previous decision of this Court, we believe that decision  
wrongly interpreted Michigan law and must be overruled.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Whether 
a 
worker’s 
compensation 
claimant’s 
perceptions 
of  
actual events of employment are to be considered in deciding  
whether a claimant has established a compensable mental  
disability under MCL 418.301(2) is a matter of statutory  
6  
  
  
interpretation.
 Matters of statutory interpretation are  
questions of law. In re MCI Telecom, 460 Mich 396, 413; 516  
NW2d 164 (1999).  This Court reviews questions of law under a  
de novo standard of review.  DiBenedetto v West Shore  
Hospital, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).  
III. DISCUSSION  
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW  
From 
its 
inception 
in 
1912, 
Michigan’s 
worker’s  
compensation system has provided benefits for employees who  
are injured in the course of their employment.  The initial  
worker’s compensation act, however, did not expressly provide  
compensation for employees who suffered mental disabilities.1  
Despite this, our Court determined that coverage existed for  
mental disability injuries because such injuries were merely  
a variant of personal injury within the scope of the act.  
See, e.g., Klein v Len H Darling Co, 217 Mich 485; 187 NW 400  
(1922).2  Thus, if the mental disability arose out of, and in  
1  
The initial version of the worker’s compensation 
statute, compiled at 1915 CL 5431, provided in part:  
If an employee . . . receives a personal 
injury arising out of and in the course of his 
employment by an employer . . . , he shall be paid 
compensation in the manner and to the extent  
hereinafter provided . . . .  
2  Prior to Klein, this Court decided LaVeck v Parke,  
Davis & Co, 190 Mich 604; 157 NW 72 (1916), and Schroetke v  
Jackson-Church Co, 193 Mich 616; 160 NW 383 (1916), two cases 
(continued...)  
7  
  
the course of, an employee’s employment, that employee would  
be covered under the act.  
This can first be seen in Klein where the employee died  
as a result of severe emotional shock experienced after he  
accidentally dropped a radiator on the head of a co-worker.  
Id. at 487. The decedent believed, erroneously, that he had  
killed the other worker, and this belief caused him such  
mental strain that he lapsed into delirium and died. Id. at  
488.  This Court held that the shock received by the decedent  
from 
witnessing 
this 
injury 
constituted 
an 
accidental 
personal  
injury within the meaning of the worker’s compensation act and  
2(...continued) 
that have sometimes been categorized as mental disability 
cases. See Joseph, Causation in workers’ compensation mental  
disability cases: The Michigan experience, 27 Wayne L R 1079,  
1095 (1981).  However, upon review, it appears that these 
cases may be better viewed as physical disability cases. In  
La 
Veck, 
the 
claimant suffered a cerebral hemorrhage resulting 
in paralysis of one side of his body.  This hemorrhage was 
apparently caused by heat and overexertion, coupled with 
arterial sclerosis.  La Veck, supra, at 605. In Schroetke, 
the deceased worked as a night watchman at the defendant’s 
foundry and shops.  Schroetke, supra at 617. 
His duties  
included watching for accidental fires.  On the night in 
question, a fire broke out, and the decedent sounded the 
alarm. Shortly thereafter he suffered a fatal heart attack. 
It was determined that the physical exertion and excitement 
occasioned by the fire produced a nervous shock that caused 
his heart attack.  Upon review, this Court determined that the 
decedent’s injury was an accidental injury within the scope of 
the worker’s compensation act.  While it can be reasonably 
argued that these cases involved some  mental component 
leading up to their respective injuries, the resulting 
compensable injury was not a mental disability, but instead a 
physical one.  
8  
 
that 
the 
claimant, 
the decedent’s wife, therefore was entitled  
to compensation for his death. Id. at 494.  
The next significant case in the development of  
compensable 
mental 
disabilities 
is 
Rainko 
v 
Webster-Eisenlohr,  
Inc, 306 Mich 328, 332; 10 NW2d 903 (1943). In Rainko, this  
Court expanded the scope of compensability to cases in which  
no outward physical injury occurred to either the employee or  
to another employee as in Klein. 
Specifically, this Court  
stated that “[i]t is not necessary to establish physical  
injury (resulting in) outward evidence of violence or trauma  
to justify an award of compensation.” Id. at 332.  
In Carter v General Motors Corp, 361 Mich 577; 106 NW2d  
105 (1960), this Court again extended the scope of mental  
disability coverage.  In Carter, the employee suffered an  
emotional 
collapse, 
later 
diagnosed 
as 
paranoid 
schizophrenia,  
resulting from accumulated stress he experienced in trying to  
perform his tasks on an assembly line.  Upon review, this  
Court held that compensation could be awarded for a mental  
disability injury that arose out of and in the course of  
employment as a result merely of the effects of work place  
stresses on a preexisting mental weakness.  
In 1978, worker’s compensation coverage for mental  
disabilities was again broadened. 
In Deziel v Difco  
Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1, 26; 268 NW2d 1  
9  
  
  
 
 
 
  
(1978), this Court adopted the “subjective causal nexus”  
standard to determine the compensability of a mental  
disability claim:  
We hold, as a matter of law, that in cases 
involving mental . . . injuries, once a plaintiff 
is found disabled and a personal injury is  
established, it is sufficient that a strictly 
subjective causal nexus be utilized by referees and 
the WCAB to determine compensability.  Under a  
“strictly subjective causal nexus” standard, a 
claimant is entitled to compensation if it is 
factually established that the claimant honestly  
perceives some personal injury incurred during the 
ordinary work of his employment “caused” his  
disability.
 This standard applies where the  
plaintiff alleges a disability resulting from  
either a physical or mental stimulus and honestly, 
even though mistakenly, believes that he is  
disabled due to that work-related injury and  
therefore cannot resume his normal employment.  
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Coleman criticized the  
majority’s holding.3  Id. at 46. 
Justice Coleman believed  
that the “subjective causal nexus” standard, in application,  
afforded “no standard at all.”  Id. at 48. In her view, “the  
majority’s test for causal nexus would result in an award of  
compensation for virtually all, if not all, claims based on  
mental disorders.”  Id.
 That was so because, “[i]f the  
claimant perceived that the job caused the problem, even if  
this were not true, the employer would be liable.”4 
Id.  
3  Justice Coleman was joined by Justices Fitzgerald and 
Ryan.  
4  See also Bentley v Associated Spring, 133 Mich App 15, 
(continued...)  
10  
 
  
(emphasis added). 
 Thus, following Deziel, the controlling law was that  
compensation for a mental disability claim would be permitted  
if the claimant “honestly, even though mistakenly” perceived  
that a disability was related to a precipitating work event.  
Apparently, the Legislature was also dissatisfied with  
Deziel’s “subjective causal nexus” standard. 
In 1980, it  
reacted to Deziel by enacting, the statutory provision  
currently at issue, MCL 418.301(2). Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423  
Mich 531, 534; 377 NW2d 300 (1985).  Section 301(2) provides:  
Mental disabilities and conditions of the  
aging process, including but not limited to heart 
and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable 
if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by 
the employment in a significant manner.  Mental  
4(...continued) 
20-21; 347 NW2d 784 (1984), in which the Court of Appeals 
asserted 
that 
the 
“subjective causal nexus” standard of Deziel  
unduly emphasizes the testimony of a lay person 
with an admitted psychiatric disorder over expert 
testimony about the actual cause of the disorder. 
As long as the claimant perceives that his disorder  
arises 
from 
his 
job, 
he 
is 
entitled 
to  
compensation.
 
In 
view 
of 
the 
financial  
gain—sometimes very substantial—any person who  
files a claim based on a psychiatric disorder will 
have strong motives to lie about his perception.  
. . . 
The question then becomes whether that 
perception is “honest.”  The defendants argue that, 
under this loose standard for recovery, Michigan 
employers are nearly becoming general health  
insurers for psychiatric disabilities. This is an  
alarming possibility.  
11  
  
  
 
 
disabilities shall be compensable when arising out 
of actual events of employment, not unfounded 
perceptions thereof.  
Section 301(2) constituted a direct response to the  
articulation in Deziel of an extraordinarily broad standard  
for determining compensability for mental disability claims,  
a standard that was the culmination of more than sixty years  
of judicial expansion of such claims.  The Legislature’s swift  
action 
in 
this 
realm 
following Deziel reflected an unequivocal  
desire to address such expansion.  As Farrington v Total  
Petroleum Inc, 442 Mich 201, 216, n 16; 501 NW2d 76 (1993),  
observed, the reason that the Legislature enacted MCL  
418.301(2) 
was 
to 
“overturn 
or 
modify 
expansive  
interpretations placed upon the act by this Court.”  
B. GARDNER V VAN BUREN PUBLIC SCHOOLS  
1. MAJORITY OPINION  
The first case in this Court to address § 301(2) was  
Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994).  
Specifically, this Court granted leave to interpret, among  
other things, the second sentence of § 301(2). In analyzing  
this sentence, the Gardner majority explained that it was  
faced with the problem of distinguishing between “actual  
events of employment” and “unfounded perceptions thereof.”  
Id. at 43. 
Unable to harmonize these two phrases, the  
majority determined that the statute only meant that actual  
12  
 
events of employment must occur as a precondition to a claim,  
rather than imaginary or hallucinatory ones.  Id. at 44-46.  
The Court rejected any perception analysis with regard to  
determining the compensability of a mental disability injury.  
The 
Court 
reasoned 
that 
such 
an 
analysis 
was  
inappropriate because, in many instances, individuals with  
mental 
disabilities 
can 
misperceive 
or 
altogether 
lose 
contact  
with reality.  Id. at 43-44. 
Because “many, if not all,  
mental disabilities are based on ‘unfounded perceptions’ of  
‘reality’ or ‘actual event[s],’” the majority concluded that  
it would be “absurd” to prohibit “compensation for claims  
based on unfounded perceptions of actual events, as opposed to  
prohibiting compensation for claims based on imagined or  
hallucinatory events.”  Id.  In the majority’s view, it would  
make “little sense” to allow compensability for certain work­
related 
disabilities, i.e., those arising out of actual events  
of employment, only to then “exclude[] the vast majority of  
all mental disabilities,” i.e., those based on unfounded  
perceptions of actual events. Id. at 44. Thus, with regard  
to its interpretation of the second clause of the second  
sentence of § 301(2), the majority concluded that “[t]he  
statute, by excluding ‘unfounded perceptions’ of the actual  
events of employment, excludes [only] situations in which the  
claimed events never occurred, i.e., where they are imagined,  
13  
hallucinatory or delusional.” Id. at 49.  
As an additional rationale for this interpretation, the  
Gardner majority opined that its conclusion was consistent  
with the Legislature’s invalidation of Deziel, which had  
expressly 
permitted 
compensation 
for 
imaginary 
or  
hallucinatory events.  
Courts and commentators alike realized that  
Deziel’s honest perception test permit[ted] a  
mental disability claim to be based on imagined, 
hallucinatory, or delusional events.  In other  
words, 
the 
honest 
perception 
test 
permits 
compensation to be based on “unfounded perceptions” 
that actual events of employment did occur.  
[Gardner, supra at 45.]  
Thus, in the majority’s view, Deziel “established in this  
state that even imagined, hallucinatory, or delusional events  
could form the basis of a compensable mental disability  
notwithstanding the fact that there was no causal connection  
between the employment and the disability.” Id. at 46.  
Thus, a claimant for mental disability benefits could  
secure benefits on the basis of an employment event, no matter  
how wrongly the event was perceived.  That is, among the  
countless events occurring in the course of any normal work  
day—the interactions with supervisors and co-employees, the  
conversations 
with 
customers and suppliers, the  mundane tasks  
and routines of work—any of these might serve as the basis for  
a mental disability claim, no matter how ordinary or  
14  
 
 
 
 
   
  
unexceptional, and no matter how much they were misconstrued  
or mischaracterized by the claimant.5  
2. BRICKLEY DISSENT  
In a separate opinion, Justice Brickley took issue with  
the interpretation that the majority accorded the “not  
unfounded perceptions thereof” language.6 
Gardner, supra at  
53.  He observed that the majority had interpreted the “not  
unfounded perceptions thereof” language as merely reiterating  
the requirement that actual events of employment had to have  
occurred. Id. at 53-54.  In his view, such an interpretation  
rendered the “unfounded perceptions” language “superfluous,  
5 Gardner also addressed the first sentence of § 301(2), 
commonly referred to as the “significant manner” inquiry, 
which reads “[m]ental disabilities . . . shall be compensable 
if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the 
employment in a significant manner.”  Id. at 46.  According to 
the majority, this sentence requires that the analysis of the 
“significance of [the actual events of employment] to the 
particular 
claimant 
must 
be 
judged 
against 
all 
the  
circumstances to determine whether the resulting mental 
disability is compensable.”  Id. at 47. The majority surmised 
that when assessing the reaction of a claimant to objectively 
established events, an employer must take the employee as 
found.  Id. at 49, 50. 
We do not address this aspect of  
Gardner’s analysis in this opinion.  
6 Justice Riley wrote a separate dissenting statement, in 
which 
Justice 
Griffin joined, taking issue with the majority’s 
“causal nexus between work-related incidents and their  
contribution to a mental disability . . . .”  See Gardner, 
supra at 63.  In Justice Riley’s view, it was erroneous for 
the 
majority 
to 
consider  all actual employment-related events 
under § 301(2).  Rather, a claimant must establish not merely 
an actual employment event, but a “traumatic” actual  
employment event. Id. at 65.  
15  
 
nugatory, 
and 
without 
independent 
effect,” 
violating 
the 
well­
established rule of statutory construction that every word of  
a statute be given meaning. Id. at 54.  
According 
to 
Justice 
Brickley, 
the 
“unfounded  
perceptions” language referred “not to the existence of an  
event, but to a claimant’s interpretation or perception of an  
actual event.”  This interpretation “does not reiterate the  
‘actual events’ requirement, but instead demands, as an  
independent matter and without unnecessary surplusage, that a  
claimant’s perception of actual events not have been  
unfounded.” Id. He also explained that  
this 
conclusion 
is 
consistent 
with 
the  
Legislature’s decision to abrogate the holding in 
Deziel. The Deziel “subjective causal nexus” test 
permitted recovery if a claimant honestly perceived 
that mental injury resulted from an employment 
event. While the majority explains that “Deziel’s  
honest 
perception 
test 
permit[ted] 
a 
mental  
disability 
claim 
to 
be 
based 
on 
imagined, 
hallucinatory, or delusional events,” . . . in fact  
Deziel did not address “events” but, rather, dealt 
exclusively 
with 
“causation” 
determinations.  
Accordingly, while the Legislature’s 1982 amendment 
of MCL 418.301(2) . . . may have added an “actual 
events” requirement, its motivation was to reverse 
the causation standard created by Deziel. [Gardner,  
supra at 55 (emphasis in original).]  
Further, Justice Brickley stressed that analysis of the  
second sentence of § 301(2) involved an objective inquiry.  In  
this regard, he stated:  
Objective 
analysis 
is 
reflected 
in 
the  
requirements that actual events of employment have  
16  
 
  
occurred and that a claimant’s perception or  
interpretation of those events have been well­
founded.  This analysis demands both procedural and 
substantive objectivity.  The existence of actual  
events 
and 
well-founded 
perceptions 
must 
be  
discerned by an objective trier of fact, not by the 
claimant.
 The standard of review is also  
objective—did the event actually occur, and was 
claimant’s perception of it well founded? [Id. at  
57.]  
However, 
Justice 
Brickley 
emphasized 
that 
his  
interpretation of MCL 418.301(2) was not a purely objective  
approach. Id. He observed that § 301(2) also encompassed a  
subjective element of inquiry. He stated that a “subjective  
analysis is proper in examining a claimant’s reaction to  
actual employment events, perceived in a well-founded manner.  
A claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to  
react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner  
entirely 
consistent 
with 
that 
of 
a 
normal, 
healthy  
individual.” 
Id. at 57-58. 
In other words, “[w]hile a  
claimant’s perception of the event must be objectively well­
founded, that same claimant’s reaction to the event can be  
very atypical.” Id. at 58. In Justice Brickley’s view, the  
subjective 
component 
of 
§ 
301(2) 
“insures 
continued  
recognition of employers’ general obligation to ‘take  
employees as they find them.’”  We believe that Justice  
Brickley’s analysis of the statutory language is correct.  
17  
 
 
  
 
C. ANALYSIS OF § 301(2)  
When reviewing matters of statutory construction, this  
Court’s primary purpose is to discern and give effect to the  
Legislature’s intent.  Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich  
22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995).  The first criterion in  
determining intent is the specific language of the statute.  
DiBenedetto, supra at 402. 
The Legislature is presumed to  
have intended the meaning it has plainly expressed, and if the  
expressed language is clear, judicial construction is not  
permitted and the statute must be enforced as written.  Id.  
Additionally, it is important to ensure that words in a  
statute not be ignored, treated as surplusage, or rendered  
nugatory. Hoste v Shanty Creek Management, Inc, 459 Mich 561,  
574; 592 NW2d 360 (1999).  Unless defined in the statute,  
every word or phrase of a statute will be ascribed its plain  
and ordinary meaning.  See MCL 8.3a. See also Western Mich  
Univ Bd of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828  
(1997).  
Analyzing the language of the second sentence of §  
301(2), we note that it contains two principal clauses. The  
first clause states that “[m]ental disabilities shall be  
compensable when arising out of actual events of employment.”  
A review of this clause reveals that the subject, “mental  
disabilities,” shall be compensable when they arise out of the  
18  
 
 
 
object “actual events of employment.”  The noun in the phrase  
“actual events of employment” is “events.”  This noun is  
qualified by two adjectives–“actual” and “employment.” This  
indicates that the “events” being described cannot be any sort  
of events.  Rather, they must be actual events, existing in  
“fact” 
or 
“reality,” 
not delusional or imaginary, 
Random House  
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001), and they must be  
connected to the claimant’s employment.  
However, the sentence does not end there.  It goes on to  
state 
“not 
unfounded 
perceptions thereof.”  This second clause  
expressly sets forth an additional precondition that must be  
satisfied by claimants under § 301(2), namely, that the  
claimant’s personal perception of the actual events of  
employment described in the preceding clause is not  
dispositive of his claim, but that such perception must not be  
“unfounded.”  The word “perception” means “the act or faculty  
of apprehending by means of the senses or the mind; cognition;  
awareness,” and “a single unified awareness derived from  
sensory processes while a stimulus is present.” Random House  
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
In turn, “apprehend”  
means 
“to 
grasp 
the 
meaning of; understand, esp. intuitively.”  
Id. Before one can have an awareness or understanding there  
must be a stimulus present.  The stimulus is a condition  
precedent to the perception. 
For purposes of mental  
19  
  
  
disability claims under § 301(2), that stimulus must be the  
actual events of employment.  Perception follows from the  
event, and involves separate and distinct matters of inquiry.  
The specific “perception” on claimant’s part required by  
the statute is one that cannot be “unfounded.”  Stated without  
the double negative, the perception must be “founded”.  
“Found,” the present tense of this word, means “to base;  
ground.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).  
In turn, “base” and “ground” mean “to establish as a fact or  
conclusion” and “[to have] rational or factual support for  
one’s position” respectively. 
Id. 
Assimilating these  
definitions, it is reasonable to conclude that a worker’s  
compensation claimant’s perception must be based or grounded  
in fact.  
The final word in § 301 (2), “thereof” is also  
instructive of the statute’s meaning. The word “thereof” is  
defined as “of that or it.”  Random House Webster’s College  
Dictionary (2001). The “of that or it” in this case refers to  
the proceeding antecedent word “events.”  As already noted,  
these “events” are not any sort of events; rather, they are  
actual employment events. 
Thus, it can also be reasonably  
concluded that “thereof” is a reference to the preceding  
phrase “actual events of employment.”  
20  
  
 
 
By focusing on the words “thereof” and “perceptions” in  
the second clause of the second sentence of § 301(2), we  
believe that the plain language of this provision requires a  
distinct analysis concerning a claimant’s perception or  
apprehension of the actual events of employment.  If the  
Legislature 
only 
intended that the actual events of employment  
be inquired into (without consideration of the claimant’s  
perceptions of those events), then it could have simply  
inserted a period at the end of the first clause.  It did  
not.7  
7  
We also agree with Justice Brickley that this 
conclusion is consistent with the Legislature’s intent to 
abrogate the Deziel holding. 
As stated in note 1, Deziel  
adopted the so-called ‘subjective causal nexus’ standard. 
This standard, according to the Deziel Court, was to be  
utilized only in deciding the third prong of a mental 
disability analysis, i.e., “whether the claimant’s employment 
combined with some internal weakness or disease to produce the 
disability.”
 This prong was to be analyzed after it was  
determined that: 1) the claimant was disabled, and 2) the 
disability resulted from a personal injury in the form of “a  
precipitating, work-related event.” 
Deziel, supra at 37  
(emphasis added).  Thus, Deziel held that a claim could be  
based upon an honest though mistaken perception that a work 
event caused the disability. The Gardner majority, however, 
stated that Deziel permitted compensation on the basis of 
“imaginary” or “hallucinatory” events. This is patently not 
the case.  Deziel’s second prong clearly requires that the 
disability be predicated upon “a precipitating, work-related 
event.”  Thus, the Gardner majority, at best, merely stated a 
standard, the existence of actual employment events, that was 
already required by Deziel. 
By doing so, it did not 
accomplish what the Legislature intended—the invalidation of 
a standard that permitted compensation on the basis of 
unfounded perceptions of actual events.  
21  
 
In rejecting any perception analysis, the Gardner  
majority observed that, in many instances, individuals with  
mental disabilities misperceive or altogether lose contact  
with reality.  
“In finding solutions to their unconscious 
problems, psychoneurotics and psychotics develop 
personality problems which make it difficult for 
them to adapt to reality as it is encountered by 
so-called ‘average’ or ‘normal’ individuals. This  
failure of the psychoneurotic or psychotic’s 
reactions and adjustment mechanisms can either 
distort his perception of reality or, in the worst 
psychotic cases, cause the individual to lose 
contact with reality . . . .” [Id. at 43-44, 
quoting from Deziel, supra at 29 (Riley, J., 
dissenting).]  
As stated previously, the Gardner majority surmised that it  
would be “absurd” to allow compensation for a mental  
disability 
injury 
resulting from an actual event of employment  
only to subsequently “exclude[] the vast majority of all  
mental disabilities, those based on unfounded perceptions of  
actual events.” Id. at 44. Although it may be true in many  
instances that mentally disabled individuals will misperceive  
or lose contact with reality because of some underlying  
cognitive 
weakness, 
the Legislature clearly has the ability to  
define coverage under its statutes as it deems appropriate.  
“[O]ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy  
choices than those selected by the Legislature . . . .”8  
8  
Further, 
contrary 
to 
Gardner’s 
sense 
of 
“absurdity”, 
(continued...)  
22 
People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764  
(2001).  
We conclude that, to satisfy the mental disability  
requirements of the second sentence of § 301(2), a claimant  
must demonstrate: (a) that there has been an actual employment  
8(...continued) 
it is altogether possible that the Legislature’s differing 
treatments of physical and mental injuries, reflected  
principally by its separate coverage of the two under the 
provisions of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, §§ 
301(1) and 301(2), are a rational means of limiting an 
employer’s worker’s compensation exposure for unique types of 
injuries resulting from unique types of diseases.  While a  
mental disability may be equally as disabling as a physical 
disability, such  disabilities nonetheless may be distinctive 
in certain respects.  An employee with a susceptibility to 
physical disability, for example, may be more likely to 
exhibit outward manifestations of his vulnerabilities, or he 
may be more aware of the extent of his own vulnerabilities. 
As a result, an employer may be in a better position to 
undertake reasonable precautions in an effort to protect such 
an employee from unsafe or threatening working conditions. On  
the other hand, an employee with a susceptibility to mental 
disability may not exhibit the same outward manifestations of 
his vulnerabilities, or he may be less cognizant of the extent 
of his vulnerabilities.  By what conceivable means could an 
employer ever undertake to protect such an impaired employee 
from any employment event, no matter how innocuous or trivial, 
that comes to be misconstrued?  Problems of proof may also 
conceivably 
have 
influenced the Legislature in its crafting of 
the statute.  
The Gardner majority is correct that some, but not all, 
mental disabilities are covered by § 301(2).  That the members  
of that majority would have drawn this coverage differently, 
however, is not a warrant for it to rewrite this provision. 
Further, it is, at the very least, subject to debate whether 
Gardner’s rendering of § 301(2), in which the employer may be 
held responsible for even the most trivial and ordinary 
workplace events, produces a less or a more “absurd” result 
than that produced by the statute’s plain words.  
23  
event leading to his disability, that is, that the event in  
question occurred in connection with employment and actually  
took place; and (b) that the claimant’s perception of such  
actual employment event was not unfounded, that is, that such  
perception or apprehension was grounded in fact or reality,  
not in the delusion or the imagination of an impaired mind.9  
9 
 One must be mindful that, while an incorrect 
perception of an actual event would not be sufficient to 
satisfy this portion of the statute, a correct perception of 
a relatively innocuous event could potentially be enough to 
satisfy it. This result, as already stated, is compelled by 
the language of § 301(2). This, however, does not mean that 
an innocuous or ordinary event will often be sufficient to 
satisfy the remaining portion of § 301(2).  As Justice  
Brickley’s dissent noted:  
While 
I 
acknowledge 
the 
probable 
and  
understandable frustration of the Court of Appeals 
with “ordinary daily conditions and minutiae of 
employment” serving as the basis for a mental 
disability claim, it is nevertheless clear that the 
Legislature 
has 
only 
demanded 
that 
“actual”  
employment events, not objectively significant, 
abnormal, or uncommon incidents, serve as the basis 
for a mental disability claim. 
The concerns  
expressed by the Court of Appeals are more properly 
infused and analyzed under the “significant manner” 
causation requirement, not the “actual events” 
demand of MCL 418.301(2) . . . .  [Gardner, supra 
at 61, n 8.]  
Indeed, there is no indication that Justice Brickley and 
the majority were in disagreement with regard to what he 
asserts in this final sentence.  The majority stated that 
“[o]nce actual employment events have been shown to have 
occurred, the significance of those events to a particular 
claimant 
must 
be 
judged against all circumstances to determine 
whether the resulting mental disability is compensable.”  Id.  
at 47. Additionally, one cannot overlook that an employee’s 
testimony 
concerning an actual event, as a precipitating event 
(continued...)  
24  
 
  
 
To the extent that Gardner is inconsistent with this  
interpretation of § 301(2), we overrule it.  
D. OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Moreover, 
in 
determining whether there has been an actual  
employment event leading to a mental disability, and a  
perception of that event that is not unfounded, the inquiry  
must be conducted under an objective standard.10  The second  
9(...continued) 
for a mental disability, must always satisfy traditional 
standards 
of 
truthfulness. 
When 
an 
employee 
seeks  
compensation for an injury arising out of an innocuous or 
ordinary event, that employee will, of course, be required to 
demonstrate to the worker’s compensation factfinder that such 
event indeed contributed to his injury in a “significant 
manner.”  
10  
An objective standard of inquiry focuses on how a 
reasonable 
person, 
under 
like 
circumstances, 
would 
have 
viewed 
the actual events that occurred.  Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd, 
428 Mich 439, 456; 410 NW2d 706 (1987).  This is different  
from a subjective standard in which the focus is on how a 
particular individual viewed such events. Fire Ins Exchange  
v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685; 545 NW2d 602 (1996).  
Additionally, although the perception inquiry is to be 
undertaken pursuant to an objective standard, we emphasize in 
an effort to dispel potential confusion that the “reaction” 
inquiry,” i.e., how a potential claimant “reacts” to actual 
events of employment, is to be undertaken pursuant to a 
subjective standard.  As Justice Brickley observed, “[a] 
claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to 
react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner 
entirely consistent with that of a normal healthy individual.  
. . . While a claimant’s perception of the event must be  
objectively 
well-founded, 
that 
same 
claimant’s 
reaction 
to 
the  
event can be very atypical.” Gardner, supra at 58. In sum, 
a claimant’s perception is evaluated objectively under the 
second sentence of § 301(2), while his subsequent reaction is 
evaluated subjectively under the first sentence of this 
(continued...)  
25  
  
 
 
  
sentence of § 301(2) modifies “events” with the term “actual,”  
and modifies “perceptions” with the term “not unfounded” (or  
“founded”).
 These modifying terms implicate objective  
considerations.  See, e.g., Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368,  
386-387; 501 NW2d 155 (1993).
 As explained previously,  
“actual” means existing in “fact” or in “reality,” not  
delusional or imaginary, and “founded”  means “to be based in;  
to be grounded in.”  In turn, “based” and “grounded”  
respectively mean “to establish as a fact or conclusion” and  
“[to have] rational or factual support for one’s position.”  
By the Legislature’s use of these terms in the second sentence  
of § 301(2), it is clear, that in determining whether actual  
events occurred and whether a claimant’s perceptions were  
“founded,” 
the 
factfinder 
must 
assess 
the 
factual  
circumstances in terms of how a reasonable person would have  
viewed them.11  
10(...continued) 
provision.  
11  
Application of an objective standard is also  
consistent with the underlying purpose of the WDCA, as 
reasonably inferred through its text.  These have been  
invariably understood to be to compensate those who are  
injured in the workplace if the injury arose out of the work. 
Hills v Blair, 182 Mich 20, 25; 148 NW 243 (1914) (“Under the 
provisions of this act, only that employee is entitled to 
compensation who ‘receives personal injuries arising out of 
and in the course of his employment.’  It is to be borne in  
mind that the act does not provide insurance for the employed 
workman to compensate any other kind of accident or injury 
(continued...)  
26  
 
  
  
  
 
Thus, in applying the proper statutory test, the  
factfinder must first determine whether actual events of  
employment indeed occurred.  Then, in analyzing whether a  
claimant’s perception of the actual events of employment had  
a basis in fact or reality, i.e., the claimant’s perception  
was “founded”, the factfinder must apply an objective review  
by examining all the facts and circumstances surrounding the  
actual employment events in question to determine whether the  
claimant’s perception of such events was reasonably grounded  
in fact or reality.12  
E. STARE DECISIS  
In partially overruling Gardner, we have considered the  
principles of stare decisis.  Although application of the  
11(...continued) 
which may befall him.”). It would be inconsistent with this  
purpose to award compensation to those whose injuries were 
merely coincident with a period of employment, but whose 
injuries did not “arise out of” that employment.  Thus, it is 
not surprising that the Legislature that enacted § 301(2) 
sought 
to 
limit 
compensation to mental disabilities that arose 
out of actual events of employment, not to those that were 
attributable to the mere imaginings of the employee.  
12  
This standard of review varies slightly from that 
articulated by Justice Brickley, namely, that a claimant’s 
perception of the actual employment events must be “well­
founded.” 
Gardner, supra at 57. 
We find nothing in the 
language of § 301(2) that qualifies “perception” in this way. 
“Well-founded” evinces a standard that may be construed as 
more demanding than a reasonableness standard.  Thus, we do 
not agree that the perceptions at issue must be “well­
founded.”  Instead, all that is required is that the 
claimant’s perception of the actual employment events be 
reasonably founded.  
27  
 
  
 
doctrine of stare decisis is generally the preferred course of  
action by this Court for it “‘promotes the evenhanded,  
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,  
fosters 
reliance 
on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the  
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,’” it  
is not an inexorable command. Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich  
439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v United States,  
524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998).  
Indeed, these same values are also furthered by judicial  
decisions that are neutrally grounded in the language of the  
law, by a legal regime in which the public may read the plain  
words of its law and have confidence that such words mean what  
they say and are not the exclusive province of lawyers.13  
13  
We discussed in Robinson the importance of the 
public’s interest in being able to rely on the language of 
statutes as written:  
[I]t is well to recall in discussing reliance, 
when dealing with an area of the law that is 
statutory . . . , that it is to the words of the 
statute itself that a citizen first looks for  
guidance in directing his actions.  This is the  
essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what  
the rules of society are.  Thus, if the words of 
the statute are clear, the actor should be able to 
expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried 
out by all in society, including the courts.  In  
fact, should a court confound those legitimate 
citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing 
a statute, it is that court itself that has  
disrupted the reliance interest. 
When that  
happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to 
the distorted reading because of the doctrine of 
(continued...)  
28  
 
Stare decisis is not to be “applied mechanically to forever  
prevent the Court from overruling earlier erroneous decisions  
interpreting the meaning of statutes.” Id. at 463.  
Before this Court overrules a decision, we must make two  
inquiries: (a) whether the earlier decision was wrongly  
decided, and (b) whether overruling such decision would work  
an 
undue 
hardship 
because 
of 
reliance 
interests 
or  
expectations that have arisen. Id. at 464-68.  
With regard to the first inquiry, we believe that  
Gardner, in relevant part, was wrongly decided, clearly  
misconstruing the plain language of § 301(2) and rendering  
superfluous the entire second clause of the second sentence in  
violation of the cardinal rule of interpretation that effect  
shall be given to every word, phrase, or clause of a statute.  
Hoste, supra; People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 285;  
13(...continued) 
stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s 
misconstruction.  The reason for this is that the  
court in distorting the statute was engaged in a 
form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to 
the 
bedrock 
principle 
of 
American  
constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power 
is reposed in the people as reflected in the work 
of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional 
violation, the courts have no legitimacy in  
overruling 
or 
nullifying 
the 
people’s  
representatives.  Moreover, not only does such a 
compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to 
rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant, 
it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts 
repeat the error. [Id. at 467-68.]  
29  
 
  
597 NW2d 1 (1999).  
With regard to the second inquiry, we believe that  
overruling that erroneous portion of Gardner will not result  
in any interference with legitimate reliance or expectation  
interests.  Here, we examine “whether the previous decision  
has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to  
everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not  
just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.”  
Robinson, supra at 466. The reliance must be the sort that  
“causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his conduct  
to a certain norm before the triggering event.” Id. at 467.  
This Court’s previous interpretation of § 301(2) could hardly  
have caused any person to conform their conduct to a  
particular norm.  Mental disability injuries of the sort  
compensated by this provision arise without planning or  
preparation.  Instead, persons entitled to compensation under  
§ 301(2) become aware of this Court’s interpretations only  
after they have suffered injury.  Such an after-the-fact  
awareness does 
not implicate the kind of reliance or  
expectation interest contemplated by our stare decisis  
inquiry.  
IV. RESPONSE TO DISSENT  
We agree with the dissent that “fundamental principles”  
are at issue here that distinguish our two opinions. Unlike  
30  
the dissent, however, we do not view these principles as  
relating to our alleged disregard for stare decisis, see Part  
III(E), but rather as relating to the dissent’s determination  
to perpetuate a plainly flawed reading of the law apparently  
because it disagrees with the policies that are actually  
reflected in such law. 
Contrary to the dissent, the  
“fundamental principles” that we see at stake here implicate  
the role of this Court in the constitutional separation of  
powers.  That is, we believe that it is the constitutional  
duty of this Court to interpret the words of the lawmaker, in  
this case the Legislature, and not to substitute our own  
policy preferences in order to make the law less “illogical”.  
In the present case, the dissent reads the second  
sentence of § 301(2) in a manner that utterly ignores the  
words “not unfounded perceptions thereof.”  The dissent  
interprets section § 301(2) as if these words did not exist,  
as if they were not there at all. The dissent ignores these  
words apparently because it disagrees with the limitations  
that these words impose upon worker’s compensation benefits.  
Thus, the dissent chooses to amend § 301(2) by summarily  
reading these words out of the law.  In doing so, the dissent  
ignores the compromises and the negotiations that may have  
preceded the inclusion of these words in the law, it ignores  
the concerns of the Legislature in avoiding abuse of the  
31  
 
 
 
worker’s compensation system that may have motivated such  
language, and it ignores the majorities of each house of the  
Legislature, and the Governor, who approved these words, not  
those that the dissent prefers.  However, our judicial role  
“precludes imposing different policy choices than those  
selected by the Legislature . . . .”14
 People v Sobczak- 
Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).  
Nor is the dissent’s stare decisis analysis persuasive.  
It is premised upon little more than the argument that the  
misreading of § 301(2) occurred eight years ago and must  
therefore be maintained in perpetuity.  In support, the  
dissent merely reiterates its view that the words of the  
statute must be subordinated to what the dissent believes are  
better policy choices, in other words, its policy choices.  
The dissent offers no argument that the four words that he  
would strike from the law are read unreasonably by this  
majority, or that a reasonable alternative interpretation  
exists.  
In support of its stare decisis argument that there are  
14  The 
dissent 
“question[s] 
whether, 
under 
the 
majority’s 
approach, compensability for any mental disabilities would 
ever exist.”  To say the least, we respectfully disagree, see 
note 9.  Compensability would exist where the Legislature has 
deemed there to be compensability, and it would not exist 
where 
the 
Legislature 
has 
not 
deemed 
there 
to 
be  
compensability.  Whether such coverage is too broad or too 
narrow is not for us to decide.  
32  
 
 
“reliance” interests that must be considered, the dissent  
presents nothing to show that anyone in Michigan, in the eight  
years since Gardner, has conducted personal affairs in a  
manner that would make it unfair to overrule Gardner. 
Of  
course, such a showing is hardly possible, for the onset of a  
mental disability is unlikely to be a function of whether  
Gardner was reigning law.  Rather, in lieu of such a showing,  
the dissent offers the novel argument that a “reliance”  
interest has arisen here, not because anyone has ever  
conducted 
personal 
affairs in accord with Gardner, but because  
lawyers will have to relearn the law.  That, of course, would  
be true of any overruling of precedent, but this has never  
before 
been 
viewed 
as raising a “reliance” interest sufficient  
to preclude a plainly flawed reading of the law from being  
corrected.  Further, we are confident that it will not take  
long for the legal profession in our state to comprehend an  
interpretation of § 301(2) in which its words mean what they  
say.15  
15  The dissent raises a similar non sequitur in its 
observation that Gardner should not be overruled because it  
engaged in the “exact debate” that we undertake in this 
opinion.  Needless to say, a precedent would never have to be 
overruled if a court had not engaged in the “exact debate” at 
an earlier juncture. Similarly, the dissent’s “legislative 
acquiescence” argument is merely another way of sustaining 
forever any precedent, no matter how wrongly decided.  Such an  
“acquiescence” argument has been squarely rejected by this 
Court because it misunderstands the legislative process, and 
(continued...)  
33  
 
The dissent is also badly confused in its expressions of  
concern about the “unwelcome practice of changing judicially  
established statutory interpretations with the makeup of the  
Court.”  While such a practice is indeed unwelcome, it is only  
through 
the 
majority’s judicial approach that this practice is  
avoidable.  It is only when words are interpreted in accord  
with their plain meaning, when words are not “written on  
water,” in the words of Thomas Jefferson, that the law avoids  
interpretations that are a function of shifting judicial  
majorities and the ebb and flow of the political process.  In  
contrast, the dissent’s judicial approach, that courts may  
correct laws that they view as inadequate, is a prescription  
for “interpretations” of the law that follow the personal  
predilections of judges. As judges change in their views of  
the 
substantive 
merits 
of 
laws, 
so 
too 
will 
their  
“interpretations.” It is only by interpretations of the law  
that are in accord with the words of the lawmaker—that is,  
interpretations in which judges look outside themselves for a  
source of law—that the decisions of courts are truly removed  
from the realm of politics and policymaking.  
The debate between the dissent and the majority is  
15(...continued) 
because it would accord greater weight to the silence of a 
subsequent Legislature than to the actual product of the 
Legislature that enacted a law.  Donajkowski v Alpena Power  
Co, 460 Mich 243, 258-261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  
34  
perhaps 
best 
encapsulated 
by 
the 
dissent’s 
characterization 
as  
“strange” 
the 
majority’s 
observation 
that 
stare 
decisis 
values  
are furthered by  
judicial decisions that are neutrally grounded in 
the language of the law, by a legal regime in which 
the public may read the words of its law and have 
confidence that such words mean what they say and 
are not the exclusive province of lawyers.  
The dissent is “puzzled” by this observation since, in its  
judgment, the majority here is making the words of the law the  
“‘exclusive province’ of the makeup of the bench.”  In  
response, we can offer little more than to ask the reader, and  
the citizens of Michigan, in evaluating these opinions, to  
reflect upon which circumstances are more conducive to the law  
becoming the “exclusive province of the makeup of the  
bench”—when the words, all the words, of the law are  
interpreted according to their reasonable meanings, or when  
the words of the law are discarded when they do not suit the  
personal preferences of judges.  
The dissent may be correct that worker’s compensation  
benefits for mental disabilities ought to be awarded on a more  
liberal basis than the Legislature has chosen.  The dissent  
may also be correct that the four words that the Legislature  
placed in § 301(2), “not unfounded perceptions thereof,” have  
narrowed coverage for mental disabilities more than is wise or  
prudent.  Finally, the dissent may be correct that the law  
35  
 
could be enhanced by omitting these four words. However, if  
any of this is so, the dissenting justice has the same rights  
as any other citizen to “petition the government” for the  
redress of his grievances.  As a justice, though, he is not  
entitled to usurp the prerogatives of the Legislature by  
altering the words of a statute to mean something other than  
what they plainly mean.  
V. CONCLUSION  
We conclude that, to satisfy the mental disability  
requirements under the second sentence of § 301(2), a claimant  
must demonstrate: (a) that there has been an actual employment  
event leading to his mental disability, that is, that the  
event in question occurred in connection with employment and  
actually took place; and (b) that the claimant’s perception or  
apprehension 
of 
the 
actual employment event was not unfounded,  
that is, that such perception or apprehension was also  
grounded in fact or reality, not in the delusion or the  
imagination of an impaired mind.  In analyzing whether a  
claimant’s perception of the actual events of employment had  
a basis in fact or reality, the factfinder must apply an  
objective review, that is, examine all the facts and  
circumstances surrounding the actual employment events in  
order to determine if the claimant’s perception of the actual  
events was reasonably grounded in fact or reality.  Insofar as  
36  
 
Gardner is inconsistent with these requirements, we overrule  
it.  
Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals order that  
vacated the WCAC’s decision and remand this matter to the  
magistrate for analysis under the proper statutory framework.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with  
MARKMAN, J.  
37  
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
WARREN M. ROBERTSON,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116276  
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I join all but part IV of the opinion.  Because part III  
already clearly explains how the Gardner majority1 incorrectly  
construed the statute by reading the phrase “not unfounded  
perceptions thereof” out of the statute, I find part IV to be  
unnecessary.  
1  Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 
(1994)  
___________________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
WARREN M. ROBERTSON,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 116276  
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation  
that this Court analyzed and decided eight years ago: the  
correct interpretation of MCL 418.301(2).  In Gardner v Van  
Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994), this Court  
interpreted § 301(2) in accordance with the applicable rules  
of statutory construction and held that a compensable mental  
disability claim arises when an actual event of employment,  
not 
an 
imaginary or 
hallucinatory 
one, 
significantly  
contributes 
to, 
aggravates, 
or 
accelerates 
a 
mental  
disability.  The majority in this case does not disturb the  
latter “significantly contributes” portion of the Gardner  
 
 
holding; however, it erroneously concludes that the Gardner  
Court wrongly decided the former “actual event of employment”  
portion and thus overrules Gardner in part. In so doing, the  
majority once again fails to abide by the fundamental  
principles of stare decisis.  I, therefore, respectfully  
dissent.  
In myriad decisions, this Court has expressed the  
fundamental principles of stare decisis. In Boyd v W G Wade  
Shows, 443 Mich 515, 525, n 15; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), this  
Court stated that “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis,  
principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court  
of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.”  
Additionally, this Court has said that “[s]tare decisis is  
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more  
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that  
it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where  
the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction  
can be had by legislation.”  Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452  
Mich 354, 365, n 17; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), quoting Burnet v  
Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406; 52 S Ct 443; 76 L Ed  
815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, as the  
majority correctly notes, this Court has explained that it  
“will not overrule a decision deliberately made unless [it] is  
convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but  
2  
 
 
 
 
also that less injury would result from overruling than from  
following it.” Brown at 365, quoting Boyd at 524.  
The majority first holds that overruling in part the  
Gardner Court’s interpretation of § 301(2) is permitted  
because Gardner was wrongly decided.  One would hope the  
majority would not jettison precedent it believed to be  
correctly decided, but, then again, one never knows!  The  
majority claims that the Gardner interpretation makes the  
statutory 
language 
mere 
surplusage, 
as 
the 
partial  
concurrence/dissent in Gardner argued. The Gardner majority,  
however, engaged in the exact debate brought by this case and  
clearly 
rejected 
the 
dissent’s 
viewpoint 
for 
numerous 
reasons.  
First, the Gardner Court noted it was faced with  
distinguishing between “actual events of employment” and  
“unfounded perceptions thereof.”  Id. at 43. Explaining that  
almost all mental disabilities are based on unfounded  
perceptions of actual events, this Court correctly concluded  
that reading the statute as the dissent, and the majority  
here, suggested would lead to an absurd result.  
Thus 
if 
one 
reads 
MCL 
418.301(2) 
as  
prohibiting compensation for claims based on  
unfounded perceptions of actual events, as opposed 
to prohibiting compensation for claims based on 
imagined or hallucinatory events, then one is left 
with a statute that makes little sense. Where the  
first part of the provision states that certain 
work-related 
mental 
disabilities 
shall 
be  
compensable, the last part excludes the vast  
3  
 
  
 
majority of all mental disabilities, those based on 
unfounded perceptions of actual events.  What the  
legislative right hand gives, the left hand takes. 
This is an absurd result. 
This Court has  
consistently attempted to construe statutes so as 
to avoid absurd results, and our construction of 
this statute will be no different.  [Id. at 44, 
emphasis in original.]  
Second, the Gardner Court addressed what Deziel v Difco  
Laboratories (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978),  
established 
and 
§ 
301(2), therefore, invalidated.  The Gardner  
decision noted that Deziel’s honest perception test had two  
major flaws that the Legislature intended to change: (1) it  
allowed a compensable disability to be based on imagined  
events, and (2) it did away with any need to prove a factual  
causal connection between the disability and the employment  
events. 
Id. at 45.  Clearly, then, as the Gardner Court  
concluded, the Legislature intended to eliminate this test by  
requiring objective actual events, not imagined, and a  
significant causal connection.  I question whether, under the  
majority’s 
approach, 
compensability 
for 
any 
mental  
disabilities would ever exist.  It is completely illogical to  
conclude that an individual with a mental disability must  
comply with an objective reasonableness test when the entire  
basis of a mental disability is the inability to reason.  
Third, 
the 
interpretation of § 301(2) in Gardner supports  
the basic premise that employers take employees as they are.  
See Sheppard v Michigan Nat’l Bank, 348 Mich 577, 584; 83 NW2d  
4  
  
 
614 (1957) (Smith, J., concurring). The Gardner Court  
correctly recognized that “[a]bsent an explicit legislative  
mandate” not only should this premise be followed for physical  
infirmities, but for mental disabilities as well.  Id. at 48­
49.  
Accordingly, 
the 
Gardner 
Court 
deliberately 
held 
that 
the  
relevant inquiry under § 301(2) is, “Given actual events and  
a particular claimant, with all the claimant’s preexisting  
mental frailties, can the actual events objectively be said to  
have 
contributed 
to, 
aggravated, 
or 
accelerated 
the 
claimant’s  
mental disability in a significant manner?” 
Id. at 50.  I  
continue to adhere to this Court’s sound Gardner decision and  
am unconvinced that the majority’s adoption of the dissent’s  
approach to compensation for mental disabilities under the  
Worker’s Disability Compensation Act is the correct one.1  
Not only does the majority err by adopting the Gardner  
concurrence/dissent 
as 
the 
correct 
interpretation 
of 
§ 
301(2),  
1 Because I conclude that Gardner was not wrongly 
decided, that would end the stare decisis analysis and further 
analysis of whether greater harm would exist if precedent 
change is unnecessary.  However, I refute the majority’s 
argument that no harm will occur by overruling Gardner in  
part.  Those needing to follow § 301(2) for mental disability 
compensation and those practicing in that area are likely well 
versed in the Gardner analysis, as it has been the established 
interpretation of § 301(2) for the past eight years.  I, 
therefore, fail to see how no harm will result from overruling 
Gardner in part and instead assert that less harm would result 
by keeping it intact.  
5  
the majority also errs by failing to address the legislative  
response aspect of stare decisis.  As mentioned, this Court in  
Brown affirmed the principle that courts should abide by  
precedent when the Legislature has not refuted it.  The Brown  
Court stated:  
“When, over a period of many years, the 
Legislature 
has 
acquiesced 
in 
this 
Court’s  
construction of a statute, the judicial power to 
change that interpretation ought to be exercised 
with great restraint.  On more than one occasion  
our Court has quoted with approval the statement 
that stare decisis ‘is especially applicable where 
the construction placed on a statute by previous 
decisions has been long acquiesced in by the 
legislature, by its continued use or failure to 
change the language of the statute so construed, 
the power to change the law as interpreted being 
regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be 
exercised solely by the legislature.’”  [Id. at  
367-368 (citations omitted).]  
The Legislature has not reacted to the Gardner Court’s  
interpretation of § 301(2) in the eight years since it was  
decided.  Thus, I would conclude that the Legislature is  
satisfied with the Gardner interpretation and the majority’s  
new interpretation is not only incorrect, but unnecessary.2  
For 
these 
reasons, the doctrine of stare decisis mandates  
Gardner’s reaffirmance. The majority’s noble quest to right  
the alleged wrongs of the Gardner decision serves to foster an  
unwelcome 
practice 
of 
changing 
judicially 
established  
2 The majority opinion's section entitled, "Response to 
Dissent" presents no relevant or novel analysis that  
contradicts the sound position I stand behind today.  
6  
statutory interpretations with the makeup of the Court.  Also,  
it 
fosters 
the 
undesired practice of rehashing settled debates  
simply because the majority concludes that someone had a  
better argument. This is clear because legally, nothing has  
changed since Gardner was decided, and no new arguments were  
presented to refute its analysis that were not already debated  
eight years ago.  Strangely, the majority states that stare  
decisis values are furthered “by judicial decisions that are  
neutrally grounded in the language of the law, by a legal  
regime in which the public may read the plain words of its law  
and have confidence that such words mean what they say and are  
not the exclusive province of lawyers.”  Slip op at 24.  I am  
puzzled by this statement because I question whether the  
majority can ascertain any distinction between frowning upon  
decisions grounded in the plain meaning of words, but are the  
“exclusive 
province 
of 
lawyers,” 
and 
supporting 
decisions 
that  
change an already established plain meaning, and thus are the  
“exclusive province” of the makeup of the bench.  
Accordingly, I would abide by the Gardner decision and  
would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
7