Title: Limoges v. Eats Restaurant

State: rhode-island

Issuer: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Document:

621 A.2d 188 (1993) Peggyann LIMOGES v. EATS RESTAURANT et al. No. 92-89-M.P. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. February 26, 1993. *189 Ellen Biener, David Moretti, Moretti & Perlow, Cranston, for plaintiff. Thomas J. Dinopoulos, Boston, MA, Harry Asquith, Jr., Merolla, Asquith, Archetto & Kane, Providence, for defendants. SHEA, Justice. This matter is before the Supreme Court pursuant to the petition of the plaintiff, Peggyann Limoges, for certiorari to review the trial justice's award of attorney's fees to counsel for the defendants. We affirm. The plaintiff had filed suit against defendants for personal injury allegedly due to defendants' negligence. The case has not yet been heard on the merits. The issue before us is the award of attorney's fees to defendants' counsel based on plaintiff's counsel's violation of Rule 37(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The following facts were made known to the motion-calendar judge at the hearing on defendants' motion to compel more responsive answers. On October 4, 1991, defendants George and Olga Mihailides filed requests for production and also filed interrogatories. On October 7, 1991, plaintiff filed a blanket objection to the request for production. On October 25, 1991, defendants filed motions to compel. On October 28, 1991, plaintiff filed objections, and on November 4, 1991, plaintiff made responses to only five out of thirteen requests for production.[1] In light of the fact that plaintiff's counsel filed a blanket objection, the trial justice awarded costs to defendants' counsel for the amount of $800. The defendants' counsel had informed the court that eight hours at $125 per hour had been expended on the discovery issues. The plaintiff's motion for a stay of the attorney's fees was granted by the trial court and she then filed her petition for a writ of certiorari in this court. The writ was issued. The plaintiff argues on appeal that her objections to defendants' requests and to the subsequent motion to compel were justified in view of the fact that the trial justice sustained some of her objections. Rule 37(a) provides in pertinent part: We have a situation in which plaintiff twice filed blanket objections during the discovery process. The plaintiff gave no explanation for her objections. It was apparent to plaintiff's counsel from the beginning that some of the requests were perfectly valid. If plaintiff had given any indications to defendants which of the requests were considered to be invalid and the reasons for their invalidity, defendants would have been assisted in assessing the validity of her objections. The plaintiff's conduct made it necessary for defendants to file motions to compel in order to obtain some of the information to which defendants were obviously entitled. We have held that "bad faith" that justifies an award of attorney's "fees may be demonstrated by showing that a [party's] obstinacy in granting a plaintiff his clear legal rights necessitated resort to legal action with all the expense and delay entailed in litigation." Quill Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 477 A.2d 939, 944 (R.I. 1984) (quoting Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n. 9 (6th Cir.1976)). The trial justice at the hearing below said to plaintiff's counsel, "Your firm filed an objection to things that clearly were discoverable and your firm believed were discoverable and you made this counsel file a motion to compel." The trial justice also said: It is important to note that the Superior Court justices are afforded discretion in determining whether sanctions for violations of Rule 37 are called for in a particular case. A decision to impose sanctions will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. See Trend Precious Metals Co. v. Sammartino, Inc., 577 A.2d 986 (R.I. 1990); Hodge v. Osteopathic General Hospital of Rhode Island, 105 R.I. 3, 249 A.2d 81 (1969). The record in this case adequately supports the trial justice's conclusions and decision to impose sanctions. The plaintiff's counsel conceded that objections were filed to matters that were discoverable and that some of the clearly discoverable materials were provided to the defendants only after the defendants filed motions to compel. For these reasons the plaintiff's petition for certiorari is denied, the writ previously issued is quashed, and the orders appealed from are affirmed. The papers of the case are remanded to the Superior Court with our opinion endorsed thereon. [1] All dates are the date on which the document was stamped by the Superior Court Clerk's office, these vary from the dates counsel used in their briefs.