Title: STEVEN SEAMSTER v. ROBIN K. RUMPH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEVEN SEAMSTER v. ROBIN K. RUMPH1985 WY 48698 P.2d 103Case Number: 84-140Decided: 04/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
STEVEN SEAMSTER, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

ROBIN K. RUMPH, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Les Bowron, 
Casper, for appellant.

Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment granted in a suit for malicious prosecution. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues on appeal. 

"[1] Did the district 
court err in concluding that the findings of probable cause in the prior 
criminal action left no genuine issue of material fact to be decided in the 
civil action, with regard to the probable cause question?

"[2] Did the district 
court err in determining the issue of probable cause as a matter of 
law?

"[3] Should appellant be 
allowed to use the fact of his acquittal as prima facie evidence of a lack of 
probable cause?"

All three issues 
concern probable cause, are interrelated, and therefore will be combined for 
discussion.

[¶3.]     Appellee and a girl 
friend met appellant in a bar in Gillette on February 28, 1983. When the bar 
closed, appellant and the two women drove to a restaurant where they had 
breakfast. Appellant and appellee then left together in appellee's car. Appellee 
drove the car behind the restaurant and parked. A police car passed by and 
parked some distance away. The police officers testified that they noticed 
nothing suspicious. Appellant and appellee engaged in sexual intercourse. 
Appellant contends that the act was consensual; appellee contends that it was 
rape.

[¶4.]     Following the sexual 
encounter, appellee, driving her car, transported appellant back to his motel, 
then went to her sister's house where, upon entering, she was incoherent and 
crying. The police were called. Appellant was arrested and charged with rape. He 
was bound over for trial at a preliminary hearing before a justice of the peace. 
At the conclusion of the State's case in the jury trial, the defense motion for 
judgment of acquittal was denied. Defendant did not testify nor put on a case. 
The jury, after deliberating approximately nine hours, returned a verdict of 
acquittal. Appellant subsequently filed this suit for malicious prosecution 
against appellee. Appellee counterclaimed seeking damages for the alleged rape. 
The counterclaim was later dismissed by stipulation of the 
parties.

[¶5.]     Upon review of a 
summary judgment by the supreme court,

"* * * we have exactly 
the same duty as the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before 
us, we have exactly the same material as did he. * * * This court looks at the 
record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in 
affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing in the record. We 
separate the formal and pretended from the genuine and substantial so only the 
latter may be considered in eliminating the burden of a formal trial if only 
questions of law are left to decide; there must be no issue of material fact to 
decide." Reno Livestock Corporation v. 
Sun Oil Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 
150-151 (1981).

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
summary judgment was not appropriate because there was a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning probable cause and that the judge erred in deciding 
there was probable cause for bringing the criminal action charging appellant 
with rape as a matter of law. The necessary elements of an action for malicious 
prosecution are:

"`(1) The institution or 
continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or 
civil;

"`(2) Such proceedings 
having been by or at the instance of the defendant * * *;

"`(3) The termination of 
such proceedings in favor of the plaintiff * * *;

"`(4) Malice in 
instituting the proceedings;

"`(5) Want of probable 
cause; and

"`(6) The suffering of 
injury or damage as a result of the action complained of.'" Cates v. Eddy, Wyo., 669 P.2d 912, 917 (1983) (quoting Consumers 
Filling Station Company v. Durante, 79 Wyo. 237, 333 P.2d 691 
(1958)).

[¶7.]     The plaintiff in a 
malicious prosecution action must satisfy a heavy burden in establishing a prima 
facie case, it being stated that: 

"[M]alicious prosecution 
actions are not favored in the law because of a public policy in favor of 
uncovering and prosecuting crime. Large tort judgments against well-meaning 
individuals, acting honestly and in good faith, might seriously inhibit those 
attempting to perform what they believe a civic duty. A policy that discourages 
citizens from reporting crime or aiding in prosecution would be undesirable and 
detrimental to society in general.

"On the other hand, it is 
generally accepted that for every wrong there should be a right. That also is 
necessary to an orderly society, for the alternative is that the party wronged 
seek his own redress. * * * Thus, one who is subjected to unjustifiable criminal 
or civil proceedings because of spite or malice, which result in damage and 
injury, should recover compensation for that loss.

"The competing policy 
considerations are nicely balanced; and requiring malice and lack of probable 
cause as necessary elements to an action for malicious prosecution affords 
adequate protection to the first policy and restriction upon the second." Cates v. Eddy, supra at 
917-918.

[¶8.]     Summary judgment was 
granted appellee, the trial court holding that the element "want of probable 
cause" was lacking as a matter of law. Lack of probable cause is absolutely 
necessary to the maintenance of a suit for malicious prosecution. 52 Am.Jur.2d 
Malicious Prosecution § 50. The existence of probable cause to believe that the 
accused is guilty of the crime charged provides a complete defense. Consumers Filling Station Company v. 
Durante, supra. The fact that the accused is bound over at a preliminary 
hearing by a neutral and detached magistrate is prima facie evidence of probable 
cause; however it is not conclusive but can be overcome by evidence that the 
action was obtained by false testimony, fraud or other improper means. Carter v. Davison, Wyo., 359 P.2d 990 (1961); Penton v. Canning, 
57 Wyo. 390, 
118 P.2d 1002 (1941). Probable cause cannot be determined with preciseness. It 
exists if the proof is sufficient to show probable cause to believe that a crime 
has been committed by the accused. Kimberly v. City of Green River, 
Wyo., 663 P.2d 871 (1983). Malice is a question for the 
jury; but, probable cause is a matter of law to be decided by the court. 
Consumers Filling Station Company v. Durante, supra; Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042 
(1933).

"And whatever the rule 
may be elsewhere, it is the law in Wyoming that the binding over of the accused 
by an examining magistrate amounts to prima facie establishment of probable 
cause; that in a civil suit for malicious prosecution based upon the filing of 
the criminal complaint such prima facie evidence of probable cause can be 
overcome only by appropriate allegation and proof that the action of the 
magistrate was procured by false testimony, fraud, or other improper means on 
the part of defendant; and that in the absence of such allegation and proof, the 
action for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained, even though as here it be 
alleged in general terms that the criminal complaint was filed maliciously and 
without probable cause." Leggett v. 
Montgomery Ward and Company, 178 F.2d 436, 438 (10th Cir. 1949). See also, 
Penton v. Canning, 
supra.

[¶9.]     Appellant stated in his 
complaint that appellee had acted throughout the entire proceeding "falsely, 
maliciously, and without probable cause."1 Appellant countered the motion for 
summary judgment with his own affidavit, stating:

"2. That my complaint for 
malicious prosecution against the Defendant, Robin K. Rumph, is based on the 
falsity of her sworn criminal complaint dated March 2, 1983, her testimony at 
the preliminary examination before Justice of the Peace Dwight Hurich, and her 
continued false testimony in the jury trial held the first week of August, 1983, 
in Gillette, Wyoming, which trial resulted in my being acquitted by a jury of 12 
of my peers, in which the Defendant alleged that I had forceable sexual 
intercourse with her."

Appellant's 
contention, stripped of verbiage and legalese, is that probable cause was not 
present because he was acquitted by a jury at trial.

[¶10.]  Appellant's acquittal at trial, however, 
meant only that the jury was not convinced that he was guilty "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." The acquittal did not establish the lack of probable cause 
necessary to support a malicious prosecution action. Such acquittal is not even 
evidence that probable cause is lacking.

"The courts are agreed 
that acquittal of the accused at trial is no evidence that probable cause was 
lacking, since acquittal amounts only to a decision that guilt has not been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts (5th 
Ed. 1984), p. 880.

[¶11.]  Appellant offered no evidence nor any 
facts that would establish that the binding over at the preliminary hearing was 
obtained by fraud, false testimony or other improper means. Categorical 
assertions of ultimate facts without supporting evidence cannot defeat summary 
judgment. Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 
554 P.2d 1253 (1976).

[¶12.]  The trial court here ruled that probable 
cause existed as a matter of law, finding that an impartial magistrate had found 
probable cause and that such was not the result of fraud or false testimony. The 
court's finding is also supported by the determination of the prosecuting 
attorney that, in his legal judgment, there was probable cause to bring the 
proceeding.

[¶13.]  In support of her motion for summary 
judgment, appellee presented an affidavit by the prosecuting attorney which 
provided in part:

"I interviewed Robin K. 
Rumph on several occasions and reviewed the investigation of the incident, and 
considering all of the evidence, held the opinion that there was probable cause 
to believe that Robin K. Rumph had been sexually assaulted and that Steven 
Seamster had committed the assault. Robin K. Rumph did not insist or demand that 
Steven Seamster be prosecuted for any alleged crime. I expressed my opinion to 
Robin Rumph that there was a basis for the prosecution of Steven Seamster and 
upon my advice and with my approval Robin Rumph executed the criminal 
complaint.

* * * * * 
*

"In my opinion, Robin K. 
Rumph gave honest assistance and information to prosecuting authorities. I am 
unaware of any evidence that Robin K. Rumph furnished information concerning 
Steven Seamster with an evil, wrongful, or improper 
motive."

[¶14.]  An action for malicious prosecution is 
barred if the proceedings are initiated as a result of an attorney's advice if 
all information concerning the incident is fully and fairly disclosed and the 
advice is sought in good faith. 52 Am.Jur.2d Malicious Prosecution § 81. This 
rule particularly applies to advice from prosecuting attorneys. If the facts are 
fairly stated, the advice given protects and shields the defendant from a suit 
for malicious prosecution. Steadman v. 
Topham, 80 Wyo. 63, 338 P.2d 820 (1959); Boyer v. Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463, 120 P. 171 
(1912). There is no evidence that appellee did not completely disclose the 
relevant facts nor that she was acting in a manner other than in good 
faith.

[¶15.]  Appellant contends that we should adopt 
the Oregon 
rule that if the defendant knew at the time she made the accusation, that the 
accused was not guilty, then the effect of probable cause established at a 
preliminary hearing should be overcome. Hryciuk v. Robinson, 213 Or. 542, 326 P.2d 424 (1958); Gumm v. Heider, 220 
Or. 5, 348 P.2d 455 (1960). In this case there is no evidence that the appellee 
knew that the accused was not guilty other than appellant's bald statements 
that, since he was acquitted, appellee must have been lying. As we have already 
stated, that conclusion does not follow from an acquittal of the 
charge.

[¶16.]  In other cases of malicious prosecution 
in which plaintiff has prevailed, the evidence has been overwhelming that the 
defendant gave false information to the prosecuting attorney or manufactured 
evidence. See, Cates v. Eddy, supra; 
K-Mart Corp. v. Sellars, Fla.App., 
387 So. 2d 552 (1980); Hryciuk v. 
Robinson, supra. Appellant offers nothing new, nothing that was not 
presented in the criminal trial. Upon that evidence the jury deliberated 
approximately nine hours before concluding guilt was not present beyond a 
reasonable doubt. There was no evidence of malice, and so malice could only be 
inferred from a lack of probable cause. A lack of probable cause could only be 
inferred from the acquittal at trial. There must be something more than a bare 
acquittal. Otherwise every unsuccessful prosecution would result in a malicious 
prosecution action. There was not sufficient evidence as a matter of law to 
establish, in this case, the lack of probable cause necessary to maintaining the 
malicious prosecution action. The summary judgment, therefore, is 
affirmed.

1 The complaint stated in 
part:

"3. That on the 
2 day of March, 1983, the Defendant falsely, maliciously, and without probable 
cause instituted the prosecution of the Plaintiff in the Justice Court of the 
City of Gillette, County of Campbell, State of Wyoming, by appearing before the 
Honorable Charles W. Anderson, Justice of the Peace, and formally charging the 
Plaintiff with first degree sexual assault by sworn 
complaint.

"4. That 
pursuant to that complaint, Plaintiff was arrested and brought before the 
Honorable Judge Charles W. Anderson, Justice of the Peace, City of Gillette, for 
the County of Campbell, State of Wyoming, on March 2, 1983 and in consequence of 
false and malicious testimony given by the Defendant the Plaintiff was bound 
over to the District Court of the County of Campbell, State of Wyoming, for 
trial on the charge of first degree sexual assault. Pending that trial Plaintiff 
was imprisoned in the CampbellCounty jail for a period of five (5) 
months as he was unable to obtain bail.

"5. That on the 
3rd day of August, 1983, the Plaintiff was tried in the aforementioned District 
Court before a duly impaneled jury, on a charge of first degree sexual assault; 
on conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, the Court 
entered judgment, and the Plaintiff was thereby duly acquitted and 
discharged."