Title: CAMPBELL COUNTY SCH. DIST. v. CATCHPOLE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CAMPBELL COUNTY SCH. DIST. v. CATCHPOLE2000 WY 1406 P.3d 1287Case Number: 98-310Decided: 06/23/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, and LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, STATE OF 
WYOMING, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v.JUDY CATCHPOLE, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, State of Wyoming, in her official 
capacity; CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming State Treasurer, in her official capacity; and 
MAX MAXFIELD, Wyoming State Auditor, in his official capacity, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, The Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
Judge. 

Representing 
Appellants: Ford T. Bussart of 
Bussart, West, Rossetti, Piaia & Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, WY. Argument by 
Mr. Bussart.Representing Appellees: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; 
Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Rowena L. Heckert, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Heckert.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and VOIGT, D.J.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellants 
Campbell County School District and Lincoln County School District No. 1 
(Campbell and Lincoln 1, or the Districts) claim they are entitled to a rebate 
of excess recapture monies they paid to the Department of Education. Because we 
conclude the district court erred in its interpretation of the recapture 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102 (Michie 1997), we reverse its denial of the 
Districts' claim for declaratory relief.

ISSUES

[¶2] The 
Districts present the following issue for review:

Whether Appellees 
(Defendants) have unlawfully refused to rebate to Appellant School Districts 
(Plaintiffs) overpayments of "recapture" revenues paid by the Districts to the 
State of Wyoming for the following fiscal years:

Campbell County School 
District - Fiscal Years 1994, 1995, and 1996

Lincoln County School 
District Number One - Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996

FACTS

[¶3] Appellant 
Districts are "recapture districts" as defined by Wyoming's public education 
finance statutes, specifically Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102. That is, they are 
school districts in which locally generated revenue exceeds 109% of the amount 
to which each district is entitled for operation during a fiscal year under the 
Wyoming public education foundation program, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-301 through 
317.1 Under the version of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-13-102(b) in effect at all times relevant to this case, recapture 
districts were required to rebate to the Department of Education (the 
Department) the amount by which locally generated revenue exceeded 109% of 
foundation program costs.2 The amount rebated by these 
districts is thus "recaptured" by the Department and credited to the public 
school foundation program account.

[¶4] Pursuant to 
subsection (e) of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102, the amount to be rebated to the 
Department by recapture districts for a particular year is initially determined 
by estimates, based upon data from the preceding school year, computed by the 
Department in August of each fiscal year.3 The August estimates are superseded 
later in the fiscal year by recapture amounts certified by the Department to the 
districts no later than March 1. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(e). Under 
subsection (b) of the statute, recapture districts are required to pay recapture 
in installments on January 15, March 15, and April 15, with the balance to be 
paid on June 15.

[¶5] The dispute 
in this case arose when the Districts, relying on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-13-102(c), sought a refund of amounts of recapture they claim to have 
overpaid.4 The Districts claimed to have 
rebated more to the Department than the amount by which actual revenues exceeded 
109% of foundation program costs in the following years and 
amounts:

[¶6] Campbell 
Cty. Sch. Dist. Lincoln Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1

FY 1993/94 
$162,332

FY 1994/95 
$342,493 $299,483

FY 1995/96 
$435,419 $176,999

[¶7] These 
alleged discrepancies exist because recapture estimates are based on assessed 
values, and the counties were either unable to collect all that was assessed or 
were required to refund some amounts.

[¶8] Based on 
these figures, in May of 1995, Campbell sent a letter to the Department 
requesting recalculation and recertification of the amount of recapture due for 
fiscal years 1993/94 and 1994/95. By letter dated June 12, 1995, the Department 
refused Campbell's request, stating that "[t]he current law simply grants us no 
authority to recalculate and recertify the amount of recapture due." The 
Department further stated in its letter: "In accordance with W.S. 21-13-102(b) 
and (e), the final amount of recapture must be certified to the districts no 
later than March 1 of each year."

[¶9] Following 
the Department's refusal to recalculate the amount of Campbell's recapture, the 
Districts began to file claims with the state auditor. In May of 1996, Lincoln 1 
filed a claim with the state auditor, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-404, for 
repayment of the excess recapture it paid for fiscal year 1994/95. Two days 
later, on May 24, Campbell filed a similar claim with the state auditor for 
repayment of the excess amounts it paid for 1993/94 and 1994/95. These claims 
were denied by the state auditor on July 15, 1996. A month later, Campbell and 
Lincoln 1 filed claims with the auditor for repayment of the excess payments 
made for fiscal year 1995/96. Nothing in the record indicates the state auditor 
ever responded to these claims. 

[¶10] On 
November 21, 1996, Campbell and Lincoln 1 filed a complaint for declaratory 
relief in district court against the state superintendent of public instruction, 
the state treasurer and the state auditor (hereinafter the state defendants or 
State) alleging overpayment of recapture in amounts totaling $940,244 and 
$476,437 respectively. The Districts asked the court to enter an order declaring 
the purpose of, and duties of the Department under, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-13-102(c). They also asked the court to direct payment to the Districts of 
the amounts in question.

[¶11] On 
December 17, 1996, the state defendants filed an answer in which they claimed 
the court lacked jurisdiction because the recapture statute at issue was 
declared unconstitutional in Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 
1267-69 (1995). The state defendants also raised numerous affirmative defenses, 
including failure to state a claim; judicial, collateral and equitable estoppel; 
res judicata; failure to exhaust administrative remedies; waiver; and laches. On 
July 20, 1998, a trial to the bench on stipulated facts was held in district 
court.

[¶12] Following 
trial, the district court issued a decision letter ruling the Department's 
interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) should be given effect. Under 
that interpretation, final recapture amounts would be based on assessed 
valuations, without regard for revenue actually received by the school 
districts. Although referring to the Department's interpretation as "strained," 
the court concluded the agency interpretation of the statute is entitled to 
deference. A judgment was later filed referencing the decision letter and 
denying the Districts' claim for declaratory relief. This timely appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶13] Before 
addressing what we view as the real issue in this case, that is, the meaning of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c), we will address whether the Districts' claim is 
precluded for any of the reasons advanced by the State. Because the State has 
not filed a cross-appeal, the Districts argue the State should not be permitted 
to assert these issues. We disagree. We have written:

The rules are well 
settled concerning matters which an appellee properly may raise in response to 
an appeal taken by the adverse party. An appellee need not cross-appeal to 
assert an alternative theory, offered to and rejected by the district court, 
which would support the district court's ultimate disposition of the case. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins v. Trans Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., Wyo., 
602 P.2d 1219 (1979). Conversely, to attack the effect of the judgment, an 
appellee must perfect a cross-appeal to this court. Wyoming State Treasurer v. 
City of Casper, Wyo., 551 P.2d 687 (1976). We said in Wyoming State Treasurer, 
551 P.2d at 693:

"The controlling rule has 
been settled for many years. In United States v. American Railway Express Co., 
1924, 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S. Ct. 560, 564, 68 L. Ed. 1087, 1093, it was 
said:

"` . . . [A] party who 
does not appeal from a final decree of the trial court cannot be heard in 
opposition thereto when the case is brought here by the appeal of the adverse 
party. In other words, the appellee may not attack the decree with a view either 
to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his 
adversary, whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the 
decree with respect to a matter not dealt with below. . . 
.

"In summary, a 
non-appealing party may not attack the ultimate effect of the judgment below but 
may support it by any matter appearing in the record. The rejection of a 
contention, argument or theory in support of a claim does not reject the final 
upholding of the claim itself."

[¶14] Broyles v. 
Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wyo. 1985). See also Dechert v. Christopulos, 604 P.2d 1039, 1046 (Wyo. 1980). Here, the preclusive doctrines advanced by the 
State would serve to uphold the district court's ultimate disposition of the 
case and are properly before us despite the lack of a cross-appeal. Our decision 
of these issues is further assisted because, although it did not address these 
issues in its decision letter, the district court heard extensive argument by 
the State on these issues at the trial on stipulated 
facts.

Estoppel

[¶15] The State 
advances the theories of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial 
estoppel to support its contention that our decision in Campbell County Sch. 
Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995) precludes the present action. In 
essence, the argument is that a party cannot seek enforcement of an 
unconstitutional statute.

[¶16] In 
Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, we held the recapture statute 
unconstitutional because we found that the statutory percentage (109%) of the 
foundation guarantee recapture districts were allowed to retain was arbitrary 
and not the result of any formula or calculation as required by our earlier 
school finance decision, Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d  at 1267-69. 
In our conclusion to the Campbell County case, we stated:

Nothing in this decision 
shall be construed to interfere with, impair, or adversely affect existing bond 
obligations of the various school districts throughout the state. We realize the 
legislature must be afforded ample time for adequate study, drafting of 
appropriate reform legislation, and debate on and passage of that legislation. 
Consequently, as we did in Washakie, we shall provide a reasonable period for 
the legislature to achieve constitutional compliance.

[¶17] Campbell, 
907 P.2d  at 1280. In our order denying rehearing of the case, we 
emphasized:

The opinion and decision 
of the court was implicit in its language that it was prospective in operation 
and not intended to disturb present statutory provisions for financing of school 
operations, including bonded indebtedness.

Campbell, 907 P.2d  at 
1281. Consistent with the prospective nature of the opinion, we further ordered 
that

the school finance system 
of the state of Wyoming continue under existing statutes, and the validity and 
enforceability of past and future acts, bonded indebtedness and obligations 
incurred under applicable statutes, as long as they remain in force and effect, 
are assured.

Id. Given the prospective 
nature of our holding in Campbell, and the clear language leaving the statutes 
in effect until the enactment of replacement legislation, we reject the State's 
contention that the Districts' claim for declaratory relief is precluded by our 
holding in Campbell.

Failure to File Timely 
Claim with Auditor

[¶18] Relying on 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-404 (Michie 1997), the State argues Campbell County's 
claim for the 1993-94 fiscal year is barred because it failed to file a claim 
with the State Auditor in a timely fashion. That statute 
provides:

§ 9-1-404. Specified 
claims against state to be presented within one year.

[¶19] Except as 
provided by W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120, persons having claims against the 
state shall document the claim and submit it to the state auditor within one (1) 
year after the claim accrues, to be audited, settled and acted 
upon.

[¶20] Prior to 
the advent of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 et 
seq.), this court had several opportunities to interpret § 9-1-404 and its 
predecessors. In those cases, it was determined that a plaintiff's claim with 
the auditing officer is a condition precedent to suit that cannot be waived. 
Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Wyoming Highway Dep't, 582 P.2d 583, 584 (Wyo. 
1978); Wyoming State Highway Dep't v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Wyo. 
1978); Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 100 (Wyo. 1975); Price v. 
State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 396, 167 P.2d 309, 312 (Wyo. 1946); Utah 
Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. 403, 422-25, 19 P.2d 951, 954-55 
(1933). Such a condition precedent is jurisdictional in nature. Board of 
Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 1983); Utah 
Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. at 422-25, 19 P.2d  at 954-55. 

[¶21] Despite 
numerous cases interpreting § 9-1-404, this court has never decided whether a 
notice of claim is required in cases between government agencies. We have, 
however, determined when the time to file such a notice of claim 
commences:

If it were to be 
determined that a notice of claim is required in intergovernmental 
relationships, which decision is not presently made, we would discern that the 
time commences when the authorizing agency computes and advises whatever sum 
will be paid or withheld and why.

[¶22] Simons v. 
Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 741 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶23] Because we 
will conclude that Campbell's claim was timely, we again need not decide whether 
a notice of claim is required in intergovernmental suits that do not fall within 
the parameters of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. In May of 1995, Campbell 
sent a letter to the Department requesting recalculation and recertification of 
the amount of recapture due from the District for fiscal years 1993/94 and 
1994/95. By letter dated June 12, 1995, the Department refused Campbell's 
request, stating that "[t]he current law simply grants us no authority to 
recalculate and recertify the amount of recapture due." The State contends 
Campbell's claim for the 1993/94 fiscal year accrued on July 15, 1994, the date 
on or before which the Department of Education is required to compute maximum 
and final recapture. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c).

[¶24] However, 
while that subsection requires computation by July 15, there is nothing in that 
subsection or elsewhere indicating who must be notified of the results of the 
Department's computation, or the date any notification must be accomplished. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating Campbell County, prior to 
the Department's letter of June 12, 1995, had notice of the Department's refusal 
to recalculate and recertify recapture. Therefore, under Simons, Campbell's 
claim for the 1993/94 fiscal year accrued, at the earliest, on June 12, 1995, 
the date of the Department's letter. Campbell filed its claim with the auditor 
within one year of that date, on May 24, 1996, thus making its claim 
timely.

[¶25] As for 
subsequent fiscal years, we will also conclude those claims were timely. We 
agree with the State's contention these later claims arose each July 15 because, 
after the Department's letter of June 12, 1995, the Department successfully 
provided notice that it would not perform any computations pursuant to § 
21-13-102(c). Given these circumstances, we conclude that any claims for fiscal 
years following the department's letter of June 12, 1995, would accrue on the 
July 15 following the particular fiscal year. Applying the foregoing, claims for 
all fiscal years at issue were filed in a timely fashion under § 
9-1-404.

Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies

[¶26] The State 
next claims the Districts have failed to exhaust administrative remedies, 
arguing the Districts were required to request certification of the auditor's 
findings. We disagree. The relevant statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-407 (Lexis 
1999), provides in pertinent part:

(a) At the request of a 
person who is dissatisfied with the decision of the auditor on any claim, 
account or credit except as provided by W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120, the 
auditor shall certify his findings and decision.

First, nothing in § 
9-1-407(a) requires the Districts to request certification of findings, and we 
would be hard pressed to find a failure to exhaust for failing to request 
findings. In addition, we perceive the question to be whether the Districts 
exhausted their remedies with the administrative agency, the Department of 
Education, not with the auditor. We can find no failure to exhaust based on the 
State's contention.

Availability of 
Declaratory Judgment

[¶27] The State 
further asserts the Districts' claim is precluded because they failed to file 
timely petitions for review and a declaratory judgment action should not 
substitute therefor. We again disagree. In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. 
State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1166-69 (Wyo. 1982), this court permitted a declaratory 
judgment action to go forward despite the absence of a timely petition for 
review of administrative action. The basis for such a conclusion was found in 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, specifically Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-102 
and -114 (Lexis 1999),5 and in W.R.A.P. 12.12, which 
provides:

The relief, review, or 
redress available in suits for injunction against agency action or enforcement, 
in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a declaratory judgment based on 
agency action or inaction, in actions seeking any common law writ to compel, 
review or restrain agency action shall be available by independent action 
notwithstanding any petition for review.

[¶28] The Rocky 
Mountain Oil and Gas court wrote:

However, there is a 
restriction on the availability of a declaratory judgment action with reference 
to its applicability to administrative matters. Where the action would result in 
a prejudging of issues that should be decided in the first instance by an 
administrative body, it should not lie. This is because, if it be otherwise, all 
decisions by the several agencies could be bypassed, and the district court 
would be administering the activities of the executive branch of the government. 
Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 73 S. Ct. 236, 97 L. Ed. 291 (1952); and City of Cheyenne v. Sims, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1347 
(1974).

[¶29] This 
restriction on the scope of declaratory judgments is akin to the requirement 
that administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief is 
available.

[¶30] 
Accordingly, where the relief desired is in the nature of a substitution of 
judicial decision for that of the agency on issues pertaining to the 
administration of the subject matter for which the agency was created, the 
action should not be entertained. If, however, such desired relief concerns the 
validity and construction of agency regulations, or if it concerns the 
constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative 
action is, or is to be, based, the action should be entertained. This is no more 
than that obviously and plainly provided for in the language of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act.

[¶31] Rocky 
Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d  at 1168-69 (emphasis supplied). 
The court further concluded:

Inasmuch as a declaratory 
judgment action is available to appellees as an independent action, separate and 
apart from a petition for review, the time in which a petition for review must 
be filed is immaterial.

Id. at 
1169.

[¶32] Applying 
the principles found in Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d  at 
1168, we will conclude that a declaratory judgment action is permissible under 
the circumstances of this case. The Districts are challenging the Department's 
interpretation of its governing statutes, specifically the Department's 
assertions that "[t]he current law simply grants us no authority to recalculate 
and recertify the amount of recapture due" and "[i]n accordance with W.S. 
21-13-102(b) and (e), the final amount of recapture must be certified to the 
districts no later than March 1 of each year." As such, this declaratory 
judgment action presents matters of statutory interpretation which are clearly 
permitted to be brought via a declaratory judgment action. State v. Kraus, 706 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Wyo. 1985); Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d  
at 1168; State Bd. of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 737 P.2d 350, 354 
(Wyo. 1987), modified on other grounds, 745 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1987); see also 
Hirschfield v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1142 
(Wyo. 1997) (proper to challenge Board's application of a rule of parliamentary 
procedure via declaratory judgment action); Goedert ex rel. Wolfe v. State ex 
rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 991 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Wyo. 1999). 
Along the same lines, because the Districts' claim concerns the interpretation 
of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be, based, there 
is no "substitution of judicial decision for that of the agency on issues 
pertaining to the administration of the subject matter for which the agency was 
created." Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d  at 1168; cf. City 
of Cheyenne v. Sims, 521 P.2d 1347, 1348-49 (Wyo. 1974) (question of tax 
exemption, because it depends on use of property, is a question of fact reserved 
to administrative body); Sheridan Retirement Partners v. City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 557 (Wyo. 1997) (classification of project as multiple unit dwelling 
under the municipal code is "unquestionably agency function"). On the strength 
of the foregoing, we conclude the Districts' declaratory judgment action is 
permissible.

Laches and 
Waiver

[¶33] The State 
also advances the doctrines of laches and waiver. In an interesting twist on 
laches, the State argues the Districts' failure to challenge the Department's 
interpretation of § 21-13-102 for the years 1984 through 1990 amounts to an 
unreasonable delay. Relying on the same circumstances, the State argues the 
Districts' have also waived their claims.

"The defense of laches 
`is a form of equitable estoppel based on a[n] unreasonable delay by a party in 
asserting a right.'" Goshen Irr. Dist. v. State Bd. of Control, 926 P.2d 943, 
949 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 
(Wyo. 1991)). "Laches does not depend on the passage of time alone; the 
plaintiff must be chargeable with lack of diligence in failing to proceed more 
promptly." Id. In addition, unless the delay has worked an injustice, prejudice 
or disadvantage to the defendant, it is not of itself laches. Miller v. Stovall, 
717 P.2d 798, 807 (Wyo. 1986); Murphy v. Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 91 (Wyo. 1982); 
Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 1364 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶34] The 
State's reliance on laches is misplaced. We have written that "[g]overnments and 
their agencies are generally not barred by laches when enforcing a public or 
governmental right."

[¶35] Big Piney 
Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 715 P.2d 557, 561 
(Wyo. 1986). In addition, we find little evidence of injustice, prejudice, or 
disadvantage to the defendants. We conclude laches does not preclude the present 
action.

[¶36] We 
likewise reject the State's waiver claim because there is no indication that the 
Districts waived their claims for the fiscal years in question. We can find no 
"intentional relinquishment of a known right . . . manifest[ed] in some 
unequivocal manner." In re Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1231 (Wyo. 1999). The State's 
contention is more akin to an equitable estoppel. However, "[e]quitable estoppel 
should not be invoked against a government or public agency functioning in its 
governmental capacity, except in rare and unusual circumstances. . . ." Big 
Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 715 P.2d  at 
560; State Highway Comm'n v. Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Ass'n, 784 P.2d 588, 592 (Wyo. 1989). We find no such circumstances 
here.

Recapture 
Statute

[¶37] We turn, 
therefore, to the statute which is the focus of this dispute. We review a 
district court's statutory interpretation on a de novo basis. Corkill v. 
Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 440 (Wyo. 1998). In performing our review, we look first 
to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is 
ambiguous. Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 
770 (Wyo. 1994), citing Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 
845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993). A statute is clear and unambiguous if its 
wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with 
consistency and predictability. Parker Land & Cattle, at 1043. Conversely, a 
statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations. Id. We have said that divergent opinions among parties 
as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity. Basin Electric 
Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 1978). However, the 
fact that opinions may differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of 
ambiguity. Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court. Id.

[¶38] If a 
statute is ambiguous, we will give some deference to an interpretation by the 
agency charged with execution of the statute unless its interpretation is 
clearly erroneous. Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1045; Mowry v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Retirement Bd., 866 P.2d 729, 731 (Wyo. 1993). Even then, 
however, we are not bound by an agency's interpretation; the final construction 
of an ambiguous statute is a question for the court. Parker Land and Cattle Co., 
at 1045.

[¶39] When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction. Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 1996); Butts v. State 
Board of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996). Instead, our inquiry 
revolves around the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according 
to their arrangement and connection. In doing so, we view the statute as a whole 
in order to ascertain its intent and general purpose and also the meaning of 
each part. "We give effect to every word, clause and sentence and construe all 
components of a statute in pari materia." Parker, 845 P.2d  at 
1042.

[¶40] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-13-102(c) provides:

(c) The revenue to be 
rebated under subsection (b) of this section shall not exceed seventy-five 
percent (75%) of the difference between the revenue received by a school 
district from the mandatory levies per average daily membership provided by 
subsection (a) of this section and the statewide revenue per average daily 
membership from twenty-five (25) mills, multiplied by the average daily 
membership of the school district. Annually, on or before July 15, the 
department using average daily memberships and assessed valuations from the 
preceding fiscal year, shall compute maximum recapture under this subsection for 
each district and the final amount of recapture computed under subsection (b) of 
this section for the preceding fiscal year. If any district rebated more revenue 
to the state during the preceding fiscal year than the maximum computed, or than 
the amount to be rebated under subsection (b) of this section as computed using 
actual data from the preceding fiscal year, the department shall rebate the 
excess to the district. If any district rebated less revenue to the state during 
the preceding fiscal year than the amount to be rebated under subsection (b) of 
this section, as computed using actual data from the preceding fiscal year, the 
district shall rebate the difference to the state.

[¶41] In its 
initial response to the Districts' request for recalculation, the Department 
claimed it had no authority to recalculate the amount of recapture after the 
March 1 calculation required by subsection (e); the March 1 calculation, 
according to the Department in its June 12, 1995 letter, is the final 
calculation authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102.

[¶42] In its 
brief to this court, the State concedes that subsection (c) requires the 
Department to recalculate recapture by July 15 (after the March 1 calculation). 
Indeed, pursuant to the second sentence of that subsection, it is clear the 
Department, on or before July 15, is required to make two computations, maximum 
recapture and final recapture. It is also clear both computations are to be made 
using average daily memberships and assessed valuations from the preceding 
fiscal year.

[¶43] The third 
sentence of subsection (c), the subject of this dispute, provides the school 
districts an opportunity to recoup amounts they over-rebated to the Department. 
There are two methods by which a district can achieve such a rebate. The first 
method, not a subject of this appeal, comes into play if a district rebated more 
revenue to the State than the maximum computed under the first sentence of 
subsection (c). The second method, the focus of this dispute, entitles a 
district to receive a rebate if it "rebated more revenue to the state during the 
preceding fiscal year than . . . the amount to be rebated under subsection (b) 
of this section as computed using actual data from the preceding fiscal year. . 
. ." (Emphasis supplied.)

[¶44] The 
question thus becomes what the legislature meant when it premised a rebate to 
the recapture districts based on "actual data." The State argues the legislature 
intended that actual data means average daily memberships and assessed 
valuations, the basis for the July 15 computation of final recapture. Its 
contention is essentially that actual data is a shorthand reference to "average 
daily memberships and assessed valuations" found in the preceding sentence. For 
their part, the Districts argue that actual data contemplates revenue actually 
received regardless of the amounts assessed. When subsections (b) and (c) of § 
21-13-102 are read together, we agree with the Districts that actual data 
contemplates actual revenue.

[¶45] In order 
to interpret the meaning of actual data, we first note that subsection (c) 
refers back to subsection (b): "If any district rebated more revenue to the 
state during the preceding fiscal year . . . than the amount to be rebated under 
subsection (b) of this section as computed using actual data from the preceding 
fiscal year, the department shall rebate the excess to the district." (Emphasis 
added.) The court must, therefore, refer to subsection (b) where the legislature 
mandated recapture districts to rebate "the amount by which the revenue from the 
sources provided by W.S. 21-13-310 exceeds one hundred nine percent (109%) of 
foundation program costs. . . ." Subsection (b) thus sets forth the formula for 
determining recapture-the amount by which revenue from local resources (as 
identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-310) exceeds 109% of foundation program 
costs (as identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-309). The second clause of the 
third sentence of subsection (c) clearly refers back to the formula set forth in 
subsection (b) and contemplates the use of actual data from the preceding fiscal 
year, that is, the amount by which actual revenue exceeded 109% of foundation 
program costs based on actual average daily memberships, in determining whether 
a district paid too much and is entitled to a rebate. As such, this section 
serves to reconcile the earlier estimates with actual data. Contrary to this 
interpretation, the Department's interpretation would equate revenue to assessed 
valuations. However, one need look no further than this case to see that 
assessed valuations do not always result in identical amounts of revenue. Given 
this reality, had the legislature intended the statute be interpreted in this 
manner, it would have used the term assessed valuations in subsection (b) rather 
than revenue. In addition, had the legislature intended that actual data means 
"average daily memberships and assessed valuations," it surely could have used 
that more specific language in the third sentence of subsection (c) rather than 
resorting to shorthand. When subsections (b) and (c) are read together, we agree 
with the Districts that actual data means actual revenue received by the 
Districts regardless of the amounts that have been 
assessed.

[¶46] Because we 
find the language of subsection (c) to be sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we 
give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words, and we resort 
neither to the rules of statutory construction nor to the rule of deference to 
agency interpretation. Thus, we conclude the district court erred in deferring 
to the Department's interpretation. 

[¶47] Having 
determined that the governing statute requires the Department to rebate excess 
recapture monies to the Districts, we must also determine by what mechanism, if 
any, the courts may compute and direct payment of the monies at issue. We have 
held that a school district may not sue the Wyoming State Hospital in tort 
because such a suit amounted to the State suing itself.

[¶48] Carbon 
County Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Wyoming State Hosp., 680 P.2d 773, 775 (Wyo. 1984). 
However, we qualified that holding by stating that principle does not apply to 
actions to construe statutes and to determine correlative rights between state 
agencies and entities. Id.

[¶49] We will 
apply these principles here. We have declared that the Districts are entitled to 
a refund of sums overpaid. However, we will draw a parallel with the concept of 
a recovery in tort with a recovery of money owed from one arm of the state to 
another arm of the state, in an instance such as that presented here. See Board 
of County Comm'rs of County of Laramie v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. Number One, 
884 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1994) ("the action here is not for compensatory damages, 
but rather for an action seeking a declaration of rights and obligations and a 
claim for monies belonging to the School District which were wrongfully 
diverted"). From the Districts' brief in this court, there appears to remain 
some question regarding the sums of money at issue. However, the courts will 
decline to calculate and assess sums due and owing, because to do so would be 
tantamount to a violation of the principle that the State cannot sue itself. To 
the extent the sums due and owing are agreed upon, those sums must be computed 
by the Department based on information supplied by the Districts under the 
governing statute. If the parties are unable to resolve the matter of what sums 
are due and owing, that is a matter which must be resolved within the structure 
of the executive branch of government without resort to an action in court to 
recover money. If the Districts disagree with a decision of the Department on 
these matters, it may seek review in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act.

[¶50] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-2-202(d).

CONCLUSION

[¶51] The 
district court erred in applying the rule of deference to the Department's 
interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c), which, in clear and plain 
language, requires that, if any district rebated more revenue than the 
difference between actual revenue and 109% of foundation program costs based 
upon actual data, the Department shall rebate the excess to the district. We, 
therefore, reverse the judgment denying the Districts' claim for declaratory 
relief and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

Footnotes

1 For a 
sketch of the general contours of the school finance system, see Campbell County 
Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1248-50 (Wyo. 
1995).

2 The version 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(b) at issue in this case requiring recapture 
districts to rebate the amount by which revenues exceeded 109% of costs was 
declared unconstitutional in Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 
1267-69 (Wyo. 1995). The legislature has since amended this subsection, deleting 
the 109% figure effective July 1, 1998. Later in this opinion, we will discuss 
the effect of our 1995 holding on the Districts' present 
claim.

3 The fiscal 
year for school districts in the state begins July 1 and ends the following June 
30. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-112.

4 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (Michie 1997) provides in pertinent 
part:

(c) 
* * * If any district rebated more revenue to the state during the preceding 
fiscal year than the maximum computed, or than the amount to be rebated under 
subsection (b) of this section as computed using actual data from the preceding 
fiscal year, the department shall rebate the excess to the 
district.

5 Those 
statutes provide:

§ 
1-37-102. Scope and general consideration.

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare 
rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or 
could be claimed.

No 
proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or 
decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in 
form and effect, and such declarations shall have the effect of a final 
judgment.

§ 
1-37-114. Construction of chapter.

The 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is remedial. Its purpose is to settle and to 
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to legal relations, 
and is to be liberally construed and administered. (Emphasis 
supplied.)