Title: The People v. Marcellus Pierce

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 27  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Marcellus Pierce,
            Appellant.
Timothy P. Murphy, for appellant.
Michael J. Hillery, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a
superior court information (SCI) charging him with two offenses:
grand larceny in the fourth degree, an offense for which he had
been held for action by the Grand Jury in a superior court felony
complaint; and criminal possession of stolen property in the
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third degree, a charge included on the theory that it was
joinable with the grand larceny offense under Criminal Procedure
Law §§ 195.20 and 200.20(2)(c).  Because the criminal possession
offense was not properly joined with the grand larceny charge,
defendant's conviction must be reversed and the SCI dismissed.
 The charges in this case arose from allegations that
defendant committed two unrelated crimes in 2007.  In January
2007, the People contend that defendant stole $1,100.00 by
deceiving the victim into turning over his bank card and then
withdrawing funds from the victim's account.  In connection with
this incident, in addition to misdemeanor offenses charged in
separate accusatory instruments, a felony complaint was filed in
Buffalo City Court charging defendant with grand larceny in the
fourth degree (Penal Law § 155.30[1]).  A few weeks later,
defendant was allegedly found in possession of a vehicle that had
previously been reported stolen.  Defendant purportedly attempted
to flee when stopped by the police and, after being placed under
arrest, he was found with a pipe containing crack cocaine
residue.  This circumstance resulted in the filing of a felony
complaint in Buffalo City Court charging defendant with criminal
possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (Penal Law 
§ 165.45[5]), as well as various misdemeanor charges.
On separate dates, defendant was arraigned on each set
of charges in Buffalo City Court.  Thereafter, defendant was held
for action of the Grand Jury on the felony offenses and those
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matters were divested to Supreme Court.  The local court felony
complaint pertaining to the grand larceny charge was subsequently
dismissed and, pursuant to a plea agreement reached with the
defense, the District Attorney filed a new superior court felony
complaint charging defendant with grand larceny in the fourth
degree.  In open court, defendant signed a written waiver of
indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by SCI charging him with
the same offense in the superior court felony complaint -- grand
larceny in the fourth degree -- together with an additional
offense of criminal possession of stolen property in the third
degree.  Defendant then allocuted to his guilt on both charges
with the understanding that concurrent sentences would be imposed
and he would be treated as a second felony offender rather than a
persistent felony offender.  At sentencing, defendant was
adjudicated a second felony offender based on two prior felony
convictions and Supreme Court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of
three-and-a-half to seven years on the possession of stolen
property count and one-and-a-half to three years on the grand
larceny count, to be served concurrently.  
Although he had waived his right to appeal when he
entered his guilty plea, defendant appealed his conviction and,
relying on our decision in People v Zanghi (79 NY2d 815, 817
[1991]), argued to the Appellate Division that the criminal
possession of stolen property count was not properly included in
the SCI because that offense was a class D felony -- a crime of a
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higher degree than the grand larceny offense, a class E felony. 
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and a Judge of
this Court granted defendant leave to appeal. 
The requirement that felony charges be prosecuted by
indictment is grounded in the New York Constitution which, since
1974, has contained an exception allowing defendants to waive
indictment under certain circumstances.  Article I, § 6 provides:
"No person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime . . .
unless on indictment of a grand jury, except
that a person held for the action of a grand
jury upon a charge for such an offense, other
than one punishable by death or life
imprisonment, with the consent of the
district attorney, may waive indictment by a
grand jury and consent to be prosecuted on an
information filed by the district attorney;
such waiver shall be evidenced by written
instrument signed by the defendant in open
court in the presence of his or her counsel"
(NY Const art I, § 6).
Enacted to implement the constitutional amendment, Criminal
Procedure Law article 195 established a procedure that allows for
the waiver of indictment and prosecution by a new form of
accusatory instrument -- a superior court information defined in
Criminal Procedure Law § 200.15 (see L 1974, ch 467).  CPL 195.10
states that "[a] defendant may waive indictment and consent to be
prosecuted by superior court information when: (a) local criminal
court has held the defendant for the action of a grand jury; and
(b) the defendant is not charged with a class A felony . . .; and
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1 As this Court noted in People v Boston (75 NY2d 585, 588
[1990]), CPL 195.10 is in some respects more restrictive than
Article I, § 6.  For example, the statute contains a temporal
limitation on waiver of indictment -- authorizing waiver "at any
time prior to the filing of an indictment by the grand jury" (CPL
195.10[2][b]) -- a limitation that does not appear in the
Constitution.
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(c) the district attorney consents to the waiver."1  CPL 195.20
directs that the waiver of indictment shall be in writing and
further authorizes that "[t]he offenses named may include any
offense for which the defendant was held for action of a grand
jury and any offense or offenses properly joinable therewith
pursuant to sections 200.20 and 200.40."  
For purposes of waiver of indictment, a charge that is
a lesser included offense of a crime charged in the felony
complaint is viewed as the "same offense" and may be substituted
for the original charge in a waiver of indictment and SCI (see
People v Menchetti, 76 NY2d 473 [1990]).  But there is an
exception to this rule when the felony complaint charges a class
A felony for which waiver of indictment is not permitted.  In
that case, a defendant generally may not agree to be prosecuted
on an SCI that contains a lesser included offense since such a
substitution would be nothing more than an "end run" around the
statutory prohibition against the use of a waiver of indictment
by a defendant held for Grand Jury action on a complaint charging
such a class A felony (see People v Truelock, 88 NY2d 546 [1996];
cf. People v D'Amico, 76 NY2d 877 [1990]).
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"[T]he basic objective of article 195 was to permit
waiver of indictment for defendants who wished to go directly to
trial without waiting for a Grand Jury to hand up an indictment
to do so . . . The statutory procedures were thus aimed at
affording a defendant the opportunity for a speedier disposition
of charges as well as eliminating unnecessary Grand Jury
proceedings" (People v Boston, 75 NY2d 585, 588-589 [1990]
[internal citations and quotation marks omitted]).  The bill
jacket for the legislation creating CPL article 195 also
indicates that the new procedure was intended to facilitate plea
bargaining (Mem of Law Revision Commission, Bill Jacket, L 1974,
ch 467, at 6).
In this case, it is undisputed that the waiver of
indictment and SCI were intended to effectuate a plea agreement
between the People and the defense.  In separate accusatory
instruments, defendant was charged in local criminal court with
grand larceny in the fourth degree, a class E felony relating to
the theft incident, and criminal possession of stolen property in
the fourth degree, a class E felony arising from the motor
vehicle incident.  The People then filed a superior court felony
complaint charging defendant with the same fourth-degree grand
larceny offense for which he had been held for action of the
Grand Jury and defendant waived indictment and agreed to be
prosecuted by SCI for that offense and the third-degree stolen
property charge.  
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2 Although defendant did not raise any of these arguments in
Supreme Court -- to the contrary, he waived indictment both
orally and in writing and expressly agreed to be prosecuted under
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In placing those two offenses in the same SCI, the
People relied on the joinder provision in CPL 195.20 directing
that offenses for which indictment may be waived "include any
offense for which the defendant was held for action of a grand
jury" (here, the grand larceny offense in the superior court
felony complaint) "and any offense or offenses properly joinable
therewith pursuant to sections 200.20 and 200.40."  The People's
theory was that the stolen property charge could be joined with
the grand larceny offense under CPL 200.20(2)(c) because the two
offenses were "the same or similar in law."  By consenting to
plead guilty under these circumstances, defendant avoided
multiple prosecutions and the probable imposition of consecutive
sentences in the event of his conviction on two unrelated crimes.
He also secured a promise that he would be sentenced as a second
felony offender.  Of course, the fact that the plea may have been
beneficial to both parties does not preclude a subsequent
challenge to the jurisdictional validity of the SCI.  Our
precedent makes clear that the parties must comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements relating to waiver of
indictment; in this context, advantageous ends do not justify
improper means.
On appeal in this Court, defendant challenges the
validity of the waiver of indictment and SCI on three grounds.2 
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No. 27
this SCI -- the People do not dispute that he can pursue these
claims on direct appeal because this Court has held that the
improper inclusion of an offense in a waiver of indictment and
SCI is a jurisdictional deficiency that is not subject to the
preservation rule and may not be waived (see Boston, 75 NY2d at
589 n *; Zanghi, 79 NY2d at 817; see generally, People v
Cuadrado, 9 NY3d 362 [2007] [a defendant must raise this type of
claim on direct appeal and a failure to do so will preclude a CPL
440.10 collateral attack on the conviction]).
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First, based on our decision in Zanghi, he argues that the
inclusion of the third-degree possession of stolen property
offense in the SCI was improper because that charge is of a
higher grade than the grand larceny offense charged in the
superior court felony complaint.  Next, even if reversal is not
warranted under Zanghi, he asserts that the joinder of the
possession of stolen property offense with the grand larceny
charge in the SCI did not meet the requirements of CPL
200.20(2)(c).  Finally, if joinder was proper under CPL
200.20(2)(c), he maintains that CPL 195.20 is unconstitutional
insofar as it purports to allow waiver of indictment and
prosecution by SCI for "joined offenses" that were not previously 
charged in a felony complaint.  We conclude that our decision in
Zanghi does not compel a reversal but we agree that joinder of
the criminal possession offense was impermissible under CPL
200.20(2)(c).  We therefore dismiss the SCI on that basis, making
it unnecessary for us to reach defendant's constitutional
challenge to the CPL 195.20 joinder provision.
  
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Defendant's Zanghi argument
Relying on Zanghi, defendant contends that, regardless
of whether the two charges were properly joined under CPL 195.20
and 200.20(2)(c), the possession of stolen property charge could
not be included in the waiver of indictment and SCI because it is
a class D felony -- a higher grade crime than the class E grand
larceny charge in the superior court felony complaint.  In
Zanghi, defendant was charged in a felony complaint with criminal
possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and
unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree.  He later
waived indictment and consented to be prosecuted on an SCI
charging him with criminal possession of stolen property in the
third degree, a charge to which he pleaded guilty.  The waiver of
indictment and SCI were deemed invalid in Zanghi because CPL
195.10 requires that the SCI charge an offense for which
defendant was held for action of the Grand Jury.  This means that
the SCI must either charge defendant with the same crime as the
felony complaint or a lesser included offense of that crime (see
Menchetti, supra).  The Zanghi SCI did not charge defendant with
either of the offenses that had been included in the felony
complaint, nor was the SCI charge a lesser included offense of
either of the crimes in the felony complaint.  To the contrary,
the third-degree stolen property charge was of a higher grade
than the fourth-degree stolen property offense included in the
felony complaint.
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It is clear from our precedent that "[t]he waiver
procedure is triggered by the defendant being held for Grand Jury
action on charges contained in a felony complaint . . . and it is
in reference to those charges that its availability must be
measured" (D'Amico, 76 NY2d at 879; Truelock, 88 NY2d at 551
[quoting D'Amico]).  In Zanghi, no triggering offense derived
from the felony complaint appeared in the SCI.  The People in
that case tried to overcome this fundamental deficiency by
suggesting that the charge in the SCI would have been joinable
with either of the offenses in the felony complaint.  But we
rejected that contention, noting that "CPL 195.20 makes clear
that where 'joinable' offenses are included, the information
must, at a minimum, also include at least one offense that was
contained in the felony complaint" (79 NY2d at 818).  Since that
minimum criterion was not met in Zanghi, vacatur of the guilty
plea and dismissal of the SCI was required. 
We are presented with a different scenario in this
case.  The exact offense that was charged in the superior court
felony complaint -- grand larceny in the fourth degree -- was
included in the waiver of indictment and charged in the SCI. 
Thus, the triggering offense omitted from the SCI in Zanghi was
present here.  It is true that the SCI also contained another
charge arising from a separate incident -- criminal possession of
stolen property in the third degree -- and this is an offense of
higher grade or degree than the grand larceny offense.  But this,
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standing alone, does not establish the invalidity of the waiver
of indictment and SCI under Zanghi.  We did not discuss in that
case what types of offenses would have been joinable had a proper
triggering offense been set forth in the SCI.  To be sure, a
Zanghi violation would have occurred here if the People had
attempted to rely on the local court felony complaint charging
defendant with fourth-degree criminal possession of stolen
property to support the waiver of indictment relating to the
third-degree version of that offense.  Instead, the People's
rationale was that the third-degree stolen property offense was
joinable with the grand larceny offense, the triggering offense
included in both the felony complaint and SCI.  Because reversal
is not warranted based on the analysis in Zanghi, we must proceed
to defendant's next argument -- that the possession of stolen
property offense was not properly joined with the grand larceny
charge under CPL 200.20(2)(c).
Joinder under CPL 200.20(2)(c)
CPL 195.20 states that the offenses for which
indictment may be waived "include any offense for which the
defendant was held for action of a grand jury and any offense or
offense properly joinable therewith pursuant to [CPL] sections
200.20 and 200.40."  CPL 200.15, the statute defining a superior
court information, contains the same language, with the added
limitation that an information may not include a charge not
listed in defendant's written waiver of indictment.  An
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information is therefore governed by the same joinder rules as an
indictment, in keeping with the legislative directive that "[a]
superior court information has the same force and effect as an
indictment and all procedures and provisions of law applicable to
indictments are also applicable to superior court informations"
(CPL 200.15).  In fact, the term "indictment" encompasses
superior court informations and they are treated identically
everywhere in the CPL except in article 190 where the operations
of the Grand Jury are addressed (see CPL 200.10).
CPL 200.20 and 200.40 are the general joinder
provisions that determine, in all contexts, whether offenses are
properly included in the same indictment or, if there are
multiple indictments, whether they may be consolidated for a
single trial.  Joinder of charges involving a single defendant is
addressed in CPL 200.20(2).  Paragraph (a) of that subsection 
authorizes joinder of multiple charges if they are based on the
same criminal transaction.  Paragraph (b) permits joinder of
charges arising from different criminal transactions if proof of
the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in
chief in the trial of the second offense.  In this case, the
People relied on paragraph (c) of the subsection which authorizes
joinder when "[e]ven though based upon different criminal
transactions and even though not joinable pursuant to paragraph
(b), such offenses are defined by the same or similar statutory
provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law" (CPL
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200.20[2][c]).  This is the broadest of the three categories and,
for this reason, where counts are joined under CPL 200.20(2)(c),
the trial court has the discretion to grant an application for
severance if it determines that the offenses should be tried
separately to avoid undue prejudice to the defense (CPL
200.20[3]; see e.g. People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747 [1980]).
Of course, no severance application was made in this
case since defendant agreed to the joinder of the two offenses in
the written waiver of indictment and SCI, and he then pleaded
guilty.  The issue here is whether the criminal possession of
stolen property count that was not charged in the superior court
felony complaint was "the same or similar in law" to the grand
larceny offense so that its inclusion in the SCI on a joinder
theory complied with the requirements of CPL 195.20.  CPL
200.20(2)(c) is typically relied on when a person is alleged to
have violated the same penal law provision on two or more
occasions (see e.g. People v Jenkins, 50 NY2d 981 [1980] [two
separate robberies were properly joined in a single indictment])
or has been charged with comparable criminal conduct in discrete
incidents, such as multiple sexual assaults (see Shapiro, supra
[sexual assault counts were properly joined but defendant's
application for discretionary severance should have been granted
because defendant would be unduly prejudiced by a joint trial of
the charges]; People v Hunt, 39 AD3d 961 [3d Dept], lv denied 9
NY3d 845 [2007] [sexual assault counts were properly joined and
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court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance
application]; People v Clark, 24 AD3d 1225 [4th Dept 2005], lv
denied 6 NY3d 832 [2006][rape and sodomy charges were properly
joined]).  Offenses will not be deemed sufficiently similar to
support joinder under CPL 200.20(2)(c) if the offenses do not
share any elements and the criminal conduct at the heart of each
crime is not comparable (see e.g. People v Dabbs, 192 AD2d 932
[3d Dept], lv denied 82 NY2d 707 [1993] [burglary and coercion
charges were not sufficiently similar to support joinder]).
A comparison of the two charges that were joined in
this case reveals little, if any, commonality.  The stolen
property offense stemmed from the police discovering defendant in
possession of a car that had previously been reported stolen.  "A
person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the
third degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with
intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof
or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value
of the property exceeds three thousand dollars" (Penal Law 
§ 165.50).  The grand larceny charge arose from an incident in
which defendant allegedly obtained a bank card by false pretenses
and then withdrew funds from the victim's account without
authorization.  "A person is guilty of grand larceny in the
fourth degree when he steals property and when . . . [t]he value
of the property exceeds one thousand dollars" (Penal Law 
§ 155.30[1]).  Viewed in the broadest sense, both offenses
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involve misappropriated property -- but that is where any
similarity ends.  The crimes do not have comparable elements and
the essential nature of the criminal conduct is quite distinct,
as is evident from the underlying allegations.  We therefore
conclude that the third degree criminal possession of stolen
property charge was not sufficiently similar in law to be
properly included in the waiver of indictment and SCI on the
theory that it was joinable with the grand larceny offense.  As
we have previously determined, the improper inclusion of an
offense in a waiver of indictment and SCI is a jurisdictional
defect that, when raised on direct appeal, requires reversal of
the conviction and dismissal of the SCI.
Defendant's constitutional argument:
Finally, defendant claims that, insofar as CPL 195.20
allows waiver of indictment and prosecution by SCI of offenses
for which defendant was not held for action by the Grand Jury
(i.e., offenses never charged in a felony complaint) on the
rationale that they are joinable with a charge that was the
subject of a felony complaint, the statute is inconsistent with
Article I, § 6 and is therefore unconstitutional.  At the very
least, defendant suggests that the constitution compels that CPL
195.20 be interpreted to preclude joinder of offenses that are
higher in grade or degree than the triggering offense for which
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3 Read literally, CPL 195.20 does not require that offenses
joined with the triggering offense be of the same or lesser
degree.  Beyond the prohibition on waiver of indictment of
certain class A felonies, which would preclude their inclusion
under a joinder theory, the only restriction on joinder that
appears in CPL 195.20 is that additional offenses included in the
waiver of indictment and SCI must be joinable with the triggering
offense under CPL 200.20 or 200.40.  Those statutes also do not
bar joinder of offenses based on their grade or degree.
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defendant was held for action of the Grand Jury.3  We recognized
in Zanghi that the constitutionality of the joinder provision was
an open question but we did not reach the issue in that case
because none of the offenses in the prior felony complaint had
been included in the SCI, a statutory violation that rendered the
accusatory instrument jurisdictionally deficient (see 79 NY2d at
818).  Here, where reversal is also warranted on a statutory
basis, albeit on a different rationale, we follow the same course
and do not address defendant's constitutional arguments.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, the guilty plea vacated, the superior court
information dismissed and the case remitted to Supreme Court for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *  *
Order reversed, defendant's guilty plea vacated, superior court
information dismissed and case remitted to Supreme Court, Erie
County, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion
herein.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided February 16, 2010