Title: Van Horne v. Muller

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Van Horne v. Muller, No. 85063 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 85063-Agenda 32-September 1998.
Opinion filed December 3, 1998.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Keith Van Horne, brought this action in the circuit court of Cook 
County to recover damages for injury to his reputation resulting from allegedly 
defamatory statements made by radio deejay Matthew "Mancow" Muller (Muller) and 
his cobroadcaster Irma Blanco (Blanco). Plaintiff asserted claims for defamation 
per se against Muller and Blanco as well as WRCX Radio (WRCX), the 
radio station employing Muller and Blanco, and Evergreen Media Corporation 
(Evergreen), the owner of the radio station. The complaint also asserted claims 
against WRCX and Evergreen for negligent and reckless hiring, supervision and 
retention of Muller. The circuit court dismissed the defamation claim against 
Blanco and the negligent and reckless hiring, supervision and retention claims 
against WRCX and Evergreen. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's 
dismissal of those counts. 294 Ill. App. 3d 649. We granted a petition for leave 
to appeal filed by Blanco, WRCX and Evergreen. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. We now affirm 
in part and reverse in part the appellate court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The statements giving rise to this action were made during the November 11, 
1994, broadcast of "Mancow Muller's Morning Madhouse," a radio program aired 
weekday mornings on WRCX. Defendant Muller was the host of the program and 
defendant Blanco was Muller's "sidekick" and newscaster. According to Van 
Horne's complaint, during the broadcast, Muller repeatedly made statements to 
the effect that Van Horne had threatened and assaulted Muller earlier that 
morning. The complaint sets forth lengthy and detailed excerpts from the 
transcript of the broadcast. We will not recount all of the detailed comments 
contained in the complaint. In sum, on numerous occasions and in colorful 
detail, Muller stated that Van Horne had been waiting for him at the elevator 
bank outside the WRCX studio; that Van Horne chased him and threatened his life; 
and that Van Horne was, among other things, "out of control," "extremely 
violent," "psychotic," "a danger to society" and "trained in killing people," 
and "needs to be locked up."
According to the complaint, defendant Blanco engaged in "banter" with Muller 
about his encounter with Van Horne throughout the broadcast in which she 
contributed to and supported Muller's accounts of the alleged altercation. 
Blanco also reported Muller's account of the incident as a news item in her news 
broadcasts that morning.
The complaint alleged that Muller's statements imputed that Van Horne had 
engaged in criminal conduct and that the statements were therefore defamatory 
per se. The complaint further alleged that the statements were false, 
and that Muller acted with actual malice in making the statements because Muller 
knew the statements to be false when he made them.
As ultimately amended, the complaint contained eight counts. Count I asserted 
a claim for defamation per se against Muller. Count II asserted a claim 
for defamation per se against Blanco. Count III charged WRCX with 
defamation per se on the ground that WRCX published Muller's and 
Blanco's false statements by broadcasting them over the public airwaves. Count 
IV charged Evergreen with defamation per se under a theory of vicarious 
liability for the acts of its agents, WRCX, Muller and Blanco. Counts V and VI 
asserted claims against WRCX and Evergreen for negligent and reckless hiring of 
Muller. Count VII and VIII asserted claims that WRCX and Evergreen negligently 
and recklessly supervised and retained Muller.
The circuit court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation 
per se counts against Muller, WRCX and Evergreen. The court granted, 
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 2/615 (West 
1994)), the defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation per se count 
against Blanco. The circuit court also dismissed the negligent and reckless 
hiring, supervision and retention counts against WRCX and Evergreen, apparently 
on the ground that these causes of action require a physical injury.
Plaintiff appealed and the appellate court reversed. The appellate court held 
that plaintiff had adequately pled that Blanco participated in the publication 
of Muller's defamatory statements. The appellate court further found that 
dismissal of this count was erroneous because Blanco published statements that 
were defamatory per se. The appellate court next held that the circuit 
court erred in dismissing the negligent and reckless hiring, supervision and 
retention counts. The appellate court concluded that these causes of action do 
not require an allegation that the plaintiff has sustained a physical injury. 
294 Ill. App. 3d 649.
We accepted a petition for leave to appeal filed by Blanco, WRCX and 
Evergreen (hereinafter defendants). 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. We subsequently allowed 
a group of broadcasters, publishers, editors and reporters to file an amicus 
curiae brief in support of defendants' position.
Plaintiff filed a motion in this court to strike a portion of defendants' 
reply brief. That motion was taken with the case. We have reviewed the 
challenged portion of defendants' reply brief and we find no reason to strike 
it. Plaintiff's motion is therefore denied.
ANALYSIS
The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss counts II and V 
through VIII pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 
5/2-615 (West 1994)). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 attacks the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint. Bryson v. News America Publications, 
Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court must 
accept as true all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences therefrom. 
Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d  at 86. A cause of action should not be dismissed on 
the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved under 
the pleadings which will entitle the plaintiff to recover. McGrath v. 
Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 90 (1988).
Defamation Claim Against Blanco
Defendants argue that the appellate court erred in reversing the dismissal of 
count II of plaintiff's complaint. Count II is directed solely at Blanco and 
purports to state a cause of action for defamation per se. Count II 
realleges all of the allegations made against Muller in count I. Count II then 
sets forth in great detail a number of examples of Blanco's "banter" with Muller 
in which she allegedly "contributed to and supported Muller's accounts of his 
alleged altercation with Van Horne." For example, the complaint alleges that, 
after Muller stated that Van Horne would have hurt him had no one else been 
present during the altercation, Blanco responded, "If it was just the two of 
you, I really believe that." Blanco also stated, in response to Muller's 
reiteration of the story, "It happened this morning just as you were getting out 
of the elevator. It's almost as if he was waiting for you. *** Threatening."
In addition, count II alleges that, during each of her morning news 
broadcasts, Blanco reported Muller's false account of his encounter with Van 
Horne as news. The news report by Blanco, as recounted in count II, stated the 
following:
The complaint alleges that Blanco's " `factual' accounts, news reports, 
and participation in Muller's defamatory statements" falsely accused Van Horne 
of criminal conduct and were therefore defamatory per se. The complaint 
also alleges that Blanco acted with actual malice.
We agree with the appellate court that the allegations of count II are 
sufficient to state a cause of action for defamation per se against 
Blanco. A statement is considered defamatory if it tends to cause such harm to 
the reputation of another that it lowers that person in the eyes of the 
community or deters third persons from associating with them. Bryson, 
174 Ill. 2d  at 87; Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 
10 (1992). Certain limited categories of defamatory statements are deemed 
actionable per se because they are so obviously and materially harmful 
to the plaintiff that injury to the plaintiff's reputation may be presumed. A 
plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damage to their reputation to recover 
for a statement that is actionable per se. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d  
at 87. Illinois law recognizes five categories of statements which are 
considered actionable per se: (1) those imputing the commission of a 
criminal offense; (2) those imputing infection with a loathsome communicable 
disease; (3) those imputing an inability to perform or want of integrity in the 
discharge of duties of office or employment; (4) those that prejudice a party, 
or impute lack of ability, in his or her trade, profession or business; and (5) 
those imputing adultery or fornication. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d  at 
88-89.
In this case, plaintiff has alleged that the statements made by Muller and 
Blanco were defamatory per se because they impute that plaintiff 
committed criminal conduct. As noted, plaintiff's claims for defamation per 
se against Muller, WRCX, and Evergreen, based on Muller's statements, were 
sustained by the circuit court. Plaintiff argues that the appellate court 
correctly held that his claim against Blanco should also be sustained because 
she contributed to and participated in the publication of the defamatory 
statements about plaintiff. We agree.
In general, "[a]ll persons who cause or participate in the publication of 
libelous or slanderous matters are responsible for such publication." 33A Ill. 
L. & Prac. Slander and Libel §83, at 89 (1970). Count II sets forth 
sufficient facts to support a cause of action against Blanco for her 
participation in the publication of the allegedly false statements about 
plaintiff. Plaintiff has pled facts which demonstrate that Blanco was an active 
participant in the publication of Muller's allegedly false account of his 
encounter with plaintiff. The trial court has already ruled that Muller's 
statements about plaintiff will support an action for defamation per 
se. Blanco made several statements affirming Muller's version of the 
encounter, agreeing with his description of plaintiff's conduct, and even going 
so far as to confirm that it was not a prearranged "stunt." In addition, in her 
newscasts, Blanco repeatedly reiterated Muller's statements about his encounter 
with plaintiff. A statement need not state the commission of a crime with the 
particularity of an indictment to qualify as defamatory per se. 
Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 680 (1998). The crime of 
assault is committed when a person engages in unlawful conduct which places 
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. 720 ILCS 5/12-1(a) 
(West 1994). According to the allegations of the complaint, Muller and Blanco 
both participated in the publication of an allegedly false story which imputed 
that plaintiff committed an assault on Muller. We therefore hold that the 
circuit court erred in dismissing count II for failure to state a cause of 
action.
Negligent and Reckless Hiring, Supervision and Retention
Defendants next assert that the appellate court erred in reversing the 
dismissal of counts V through VIII of plaintiff's complaint. Counts V through 
VIII purport to allege claims for negligent and reckless hiring and negligent 
and reckless supervision and retention against WRCX and Evergreen.
Counts V and VI reallege plaintiff's defamation allegations and claim that 
WRCX and Evergreen had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the hiring of disc 
jockeys "who will not recklessly or intentionally cause harm to Van Horne and 
other third parties via the public airwaves." These counts further allege that, 
before WRCX and Evergreen hired Muller, Muller had engaged in a course of 
conduct during his radio broadcasts which constituted "outrageous, 
irresponsible, reckless, and malicious behavior," and that his behavior 
"received widespread media attention and proximately resulted in harm to third 
persons." Counts V and VI list the following examples of Muller's prior conduct: 
obstructing traffic for several hours on a San Francisco bridge so that his 
sidekick could get a haircut in a van stopped on the bridge; broadcasting that 
the Golden Gate Bridge toll had risen from $3 to $5 causing many listeners to 
overpay their tolls; hanging a "Welcome to Chicago" banner over the receiving 
gates during the Christmas rush at San Francisco International Airport and 
watching travelers panic as they exited the airplane; dropping cinder blocks off 
a California overpass and causing damage to cars parked below; harassing a host 
of a local television program by calling her "fat" and "unprofessional" over the 
public airwaves; causing listeners to storm the San Francisco State University 
library by announcing that $500 was hidden in a book; and designating 
"Alzheimer's Awareness Day" and visiting a geriatric center to mock aged 
individuals over the public airwaves.
Counts V and VI allege that WRCX and Evergreen knew or should have known of 
Muller's prior conduct when they hired him. Count V alleges that WRCX and 
Evergreen were negligent in hiring Muller with this knowledge and that their 
negligence permitted Muller to defame Van Horne over the public airwaves. Count 
V seeks compensatory damages for the harm caused to plaintiff by Muller. Count 
VI alleges that WRCX and Evergreen acted in reckless disregard of Muller's 
history in hiring him and seeks punitive damages in excess of $5 million.
Counts VII and VIII are premised on WRCX's and Evergreen's supervision and 
retention of Muller. Both counts reallege plaintiff's defamation allegations and 
claim that the defendants had a duty to supervise their disc jockeys and to 
refrain from retaining a disc jockey who, by continued employment, would 
recklessly or intentionally cause harm to plaintiff or other third persons via 
the public airwaves. Counts VII and VIII allege that, since WRCX and Evergreen 
hired Muller, he has continued to engage in "outrageous, irresponsible, 
reckless, malicious and illegal conduct in the course of his radio broadcasts 
which has harmed third persons." Counts VII and VIII list the following examples 
of Muller's conduct: declaring "Roadkill Tuesday" and offering money to 
listeners who left dead animals at a mall, which resulted in listeners 
depositing rotting animal carcasses at the mall; offering female listeners money 
to ride the public transit system topless; and directing his sidekick, "Turd," 
to stand on the North Avenue bridge over Lake Shore Drive with a sign that read 
"Honk and we'll drop a cinder block." Count VII charges defendants with 
negligence in their failure to supervise Muller and in their continued 
employment of Muller, and seeks compensatory damages. Count VIII characterizes 
defendants' actions as reckless and seeks punitive damages.
Illinois law recognizes a cause of action against an employer for negligently 
hiring, or retaining in its employment, an employee it knew, or should have 
known, was unfit for the job so as to create a danger of harm to third persons. 
See Johnson v. Mers, 279 Ill. App. 3d 372, 376 (1996); Carter v. 
Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 256 Ill. App. 3d 77, 80 (1993); 
Bates v. Doria, 150 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1030 (1986). An action for 
negligent hiring or retention of an employee requires the plaintiff to plead and 
prove (1) that the employer knew or should have known that the employee had a 
particular unfitness for the position so as to create a danger of harm to third 
persons; (2) that such particular unfitness was known or should have been known 
at the time of the employee's hiring or retention; and (3) that this particular 
unfitness proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Mueller v. Community 
Consolidated School District 54, 287 Ill. App. 3d 337, 341-42 (1997); 
Fallon v. Indian Trail School, Addison Township School District No. 4, 
148 Ill. App. 3d 931, 935 (1986). An employer's direct liability for negligent 
hiring and retention is distinct from its respondeat superior liability 
for the acts of its employees. Bates, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 1031. Under a 
theory of negligent hiring or retention, the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injury is the employer's negligence in hiring or retaining the employee, rather 
than the employee's wrongful act. Young v. Lemons, 266 Ill. App. 3d 49, 
52 (1994); Carter, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 80.
Defendants contend that the type of injury claimed in this case, injury to 
plaintiff's reputation by means of allegedly defamatory statements, is not the 
type of injury that will support a cause of action for negligent hiring or 
retention. As defendants point out, the Illinois cases recognizing these causes 
of action have generally involved some form of physical injury to the plaintiff 
or his property. For example, in Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, 
Inc., 69 Ill. App. 3d 920 (1979), the defendant security agency hired a 
security guard to guard the plaintiff's building who used his employer-provided 
passkey to enter the plaintiff's apartment and assault her. Similarly, in 
Malorney v. B&L Motor Freight, Inc., 146 Ill. App. 3d 265 (1986), 
the plaintiff was raped and beaten by a truck driver whose prehiring record 
showed that he had a history of violent sex crimes, including raping two 
teenagers while driving a truck for another company. Likewise, in Mueller v. 
Community Consolidated School District 54, 287 Ill. App. 3d 337 (1997), the 
plaintiff, a junior high school student, was sexually assaulted by a wrestling 
coach whom the defendant school district had employed even though he had a 
criminal background exhibiting "moral turpitude." See also Carter v. Skokie 
Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 256 Ill. App. 3d 77, 79 (1993) (employee 
murdered, raped and kidnapped plaintiff's decedent); Bryant v. Livigni, 
250 Ill. App. 3d 303, 305 (1993) (employee physically attacked child); 
Gregor v. Kleiser, 111 Ill. App. 3d 333, 338-39 (1982) (employee 
physically attacked plaintiff). Based on this case law, defendants assert that a 
plaintiff may maintain an action for negligent hiring or retention only where 
the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury.
Defendants further assert that recognition of a cause of action for negligent 
hiring or retention of an employee based on the employee's defamatory statements 
would violate first amendment principles. Defendants argue that holding 
employers liable for hiring or retaining employees who may make defamatory 
statements in the future would require employers to determine, essentially, 
whether an employee is "fit to speak." Employers would therefore be reluctant to 
hire any person who has engaged in controversial speech or conduct in the past, 
leading to a chilling effect on free speech.
We need not decide in this case whether recognition of a cause of action for 
negligent hiring or retention of an employee premised on the employee's 
defamatory statements would be consistent with first amendment principles or 
past Illinois precedent. Even if such a cause of action were cognizable, 
plaintiff's allegations in this case are not sufficient to state such a cause of 
action. We find that plaintiff's allegations are insufficient, as a matter of 
law, to impose liability on WRCX and Evergreen under a theory of negligent 
hiring or retention of Muller. In the context of this case, plaintiff's 
allegations fail to establish a sufficient nexus between the particular alleged 
unfitness of Muller and the injury suffered by plaintiff.
To successfully plead a cause of action for negligent hiring or retention, it 
is not enough for the plaintiff to simply allege that the employee was generally 
unfit for employment. "There are many kinds of unfitness for employment that do 
not give rise to tort liability for negligent hiring [or retention]." Fallon 
v. Indian Trail School, Addison Township School District No. 4, 148 Ill. 
App. 3d 931, 935 (1986). Rather, liability arises in this context when a 
particular unfitness of an employee gives rise to a particular danger 
of harm to third parties. See Giraldi v. Community Consolidated School 
District No. 62, 279 Ill. App. 3d 679, 692 (1996); Fallon, 148 
Ill. App. 3d at 935. The particular unfitness of the employee must have rendered 
the plaintiff's injury foreseeable to a person of ordinary prudence in the 
employer's position. Escobar v. Madsen Construction Co., 226 Ill. App. 
3d 92, 94 (1992).
In this case, plaintiff alleges that he was injured by Muller's false, 
defamatory statements. Plaintiff was therefore required to plead facts showing 
that WRCX and Evergreen knew or should have known that Muller was likely to make 
false, defamatory statements during his radio show if he was hired. Plaintiff's 
complaint lists a number of incidents of prehiring and post-hiring conduct by 
Muller and, from these incidents, draws the conclusion that defendants knew or 
should have known that Muller would make false, defamatory statements on the 
air. None of the examples of Muller's prior conduct listed by plaintiff, 
however, involved his making false, defamatory statements. The mere fact that 
Muller had previously engaged in offensive or outrageous conduct during his 
radio programs does not establish that he had a propensity to make false, 
defamatory statements. The only thing defendants could have known about Muller 
from these prior incidents was that he had engaged in outrageous and offensive 
conduct. We hold that this conduct was not sufficient to put defendants on 
notice that Muller would make false, defamatory statements on the air if WRCX 
and Evergreen hired him.
The appellate court in Giraldi v. Community Consolidated School District 
No. 62, 279 Ill. App. 3d 679, 692 (1996), reached a similar conclusion. 
Therein, the plaintiff sued a school district for negligent hiring based on its 
employment of a school bus driver who sexually abused a student. The driver's 
prior work history showed only that he had a tendency to run late. The appellate 
court upheld the trial court's refusal to submit the negligent-hiring claim to 
the jury because there was "no evidence that [the employer] knew or should have 
known that the hiring of [the driver] would create a danger of harm to third 
persons." Giraldi, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 692. The only knowledge the 
employer could have drawn from the driver's history was that he had a tendency 
to be late. The court noted that there was no "factual or logical relationship" 
between that knowledge and the driver's assault of the student. Thus, even if 
the school district was negligent in hiring a bus driver who often ran late, 
that negligence did not proximately cause the plaintiff's injury. 
Giraldi, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 692. Similarly, in Fallon v. Indian 
Trail School, Addison Township School District No. 4, 148 Ill. App. 3d 931, 
935 (1986), a student was injured on a trampoline during physical education 
class. The plaintiff sued the school for negligently hiring two physical 
education teachers. The plaintiff did not allege specific characteristics of the 
teachers which made them unfit for their positions, but alleged simply that they 
were "not qualified" for their positions. The appellate court upheld the 
dismissal of the negligent-hiring claim, finding that this general allegation of 
unfitness did not suffice to establish that the teachers had a "particular 
unfitness" which created a particular danger of harm to third persons. 
Fallon, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 935-36.
Plaintiff urges us to hold that Muller's prior "outrageous and irresponsible" 
conduct was sufficient to put defendants on notice that he would defame people 
on his radio show. We decline to do so. The type of prior conduct by an employee 
which will be sufficient to put an employer on notice that the employee is unfit 
for a particular position will differ in every case. In this case, we employ a 
narrow interpretation of this requirement because of the first amendment 
concerns which arise when liability is predicated on speech. Although we do not 
decide in this case whether first amendment concerns would preclude all attempts 
to state a cause of action for negligent hiring or retention premised on an 
employee's defamatory statements, we do find that recognition of this cause of 
action where the employee had previously engaged only in "outrageous," but 
nondefamatory, conduct or speech would run afoul of first amendment principles. 
The most obvious impact of this rule would be on media employers. Plaintiff's 
theory would thus hold a media employer liable for its decision to hire or 
retain a broadcaster simply because that broadcaster was a controversial figure, 
the reasoning being that such controversial figures are "likely" to engage in 
defamatory speech. Such a holding would have an inevitable chilling effect on 
free speech, as media employers would be reluctant to hire controversial 
broadcasters or reporters. The law of defamation must not only protect the 
individual's interest in vindicating his good name and reputation, but also 
allow the first amendment guarantees the " `breathing space' essential to 
their fruitful exercise." Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 
351-52 (1982), citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). Imposing liability for negligent hiring or 
retention under these circumstances would not grant the first amendment 
guarantees sufficient "breathing space." Whether we would ever recognize a cause 
of action for negligent hiring or retention based on an employee's defamatory 
statements is not decided in this case. We hold only that this cause of action 
may not be premised solely on allegations that an employer hired an employee who 
had previously engaged in controversial, but nondefamatory, speech or 
conduct.
Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff's allegations in this case are 
insufficient to state a cause of action against WRCX or Evergreen for negligent 
hiring or retention of Muller. The circuit court therefore properly dismissed 
counts V through VIII of plaintiff's complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court holding reversing 
the dismissal of count II of plaintiff's complaint. We reverse the appellate 
court holding reversing the dismissal of counts V, VI, VII, and VIII of 
plaintiff's complaint. The circuit court's dismissal of counts V, VI, VII, and 
VIII is affirmed. This cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.