Title: Edwards v. Fogarty

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Edwards v. Fogarty1998 WY 94962 P.2d 879Case Number: 97-40Decided: 07/30/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Joyce 
D. EDWARDS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Larry Edwards, Deceased, 
for and on behalf of each person entitled to claim pursuant to W.S. § 1-38-102 
(1977), Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

William A. FOGARTY, M.D., 
an individual; William A. Fogarty, M.D., P.C., a professional corporation; and 
St. John's Hospital, Appellees (Defendants).

Rehearing Denied 
August 26, 1998.

Appeal from the District 
Court, Teton County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

 

Maureen T. 
Donohoue, Lander, and Lawrence B. Hartnett, Jackson, for 
Appellants.

John C. Brooks 
of Brooks, Henley & Drell, P.C., Casper, for Appellee William A. Fogarty, 
M.D.

F. James Gallo 
of Gallo & Reinan, Cheyenne, for Appellee St. John's 
Hospital.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
conference.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, 
personal representative of the estate of Larry Edwards, brought this wrongful 
death action against appellees, William A. Fogarty, M.D., an individual; William 
A. Fogarty, M.D., P.C., a professional corporation; and St. John's Hospital, 
alleging that Dr. Fogarty's medical malpractice was the cause of Mr. Edwards' 
death. The district court granted appellees' motion to dismiss and for summary 
judgment, holding that Mr. Edwards' failure to bring a malpractice action 
against appellees within the time allowed by Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107 (1997) 
precluded a wrongful death action brought by his survivors. We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
two issues:

I. Did the 
district court err in finding that W.S. § 1-38-101 must be construed with W.S. § 
1-3-107 in determining the applicable statute of limitation for a wrongful death 
action?

II. If the 
district court did not err in finding that W.S. § 1-38-101 must be construed 
with W.S. § 1-3-107 did the district court nonetheless err in dismissing 
appellants' action as time barred?

[¶3]      Appellees state 
three issues:

1. Appellant did 
not timely respond to Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment and, 
therefore, should be deemed not to have contested Appellees' 
motions.

2. The District 
Court correctly found that Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101 must be construed with Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-3-107 in determining the applicable statute of limitations for a 
wrongful death action, where Plaintiff's decedent could not have maintained an 
action to recover damages if death had not ensued.

3. The District 
Court correctly held that Appellant's action was 
time-barred.

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant's 
complaint alleged the following facts. In September 1989, Mr. Edwards' right 
parotid gland was surgically removed. Dr. Fogarty, a pathologist, examined the 
gland and diagnosed a benign condition. In February 1991, swelling recurred, and 
Mr. Edwards was referred to University Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. A 
pathologist at that hospital reviewed Dr. Fogarty's work and concluded that the 
gland removed from Mr. Edwards in 1989 was suspicious for malignancy. A needle 
biopsy performed in March 1991 confirmed this suspicion. After consultation with 
his physician on March 7, 1991, Mr. Edwards underwent additional surgery on 
March 15, 1991. On April 5, 1993, Mr. Edwards died due to metastasized cancer. 
Although he was aware of Dr. Fogarty's misdiagnosis as early as February 21, 
1991, Mr. Edwards did not file a medical malpractice action against Dr. 
Fogarty.

[¶5]      Appellant filed 
this wrongful death action on April 4, 1995, alleging that Dr. Fogarty was 
negligent in failing to diagnose Mr. Edwards' cancer in 1989, and that this 
negligence caused Mr. Edwards' death. The complaint also alleged vicarious 
liability on the part of St. John's Hospital. On September 5, 1996, appellees 
filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, together with an affidavit 
and other exhibits, including excerpts from appellees' depositions. This motion 
alleged that the wrongful death action was time barred because Mr. Edwards had 
not filed a claim against Dr. Fogarty within the statute of limitations allowed 
for medical malpractice claims. Appellant did not respond to this motion until 
November 21, 1996, seventy-seven days after the motion was filed. Consequently, 
the district court granted a motion to strike appellant's 
response.

[¶6]      The district 
court ruled that Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101 (1997), Wyoming's wrongful death statute, 
must be construed together with Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107, which establishes the time 
limitation for bringing a medical malpractice action. Since Mr. Edwards had not 
brought a malpractice claim against Dr. Fogarty within the two year statute of 
limitation period provided in Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107, the district court found 
that Mr. Edwards had no viable action at the time of his death and, therefore, a 
wrongful death action on behalf of his survivors was also time barred. 
Accordingly, the district court granted appellees' motion to dismiss and for 
summary judgment. Appellant filed this timely appeal.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      Since the 
district court was presented matters outside the pleadings, appellees' motion is 
construed to be a W.R.C.P. 56 motion for summary judgment. See W.R.C.P. 12(b). 
This is true, even though the district court fashioned its order as one granting 
a motion to dismiss. See Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 918 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶8]      The standard of 
review for summary judgment is well known:

Summary judgment 
is proper only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law * * *. This court evaluates the 
propriety of a summary judgment using the same standards and materials used by 
the district court. * * * The record is reviewed from the vantage most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, awarding that party all favorable inferences which may 
be drawn from the facts. * * * The movant has the initial burden of proving the 
nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. * * * Once a prima facie 
showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present 
specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does 
exist.

Ahearn v. 
Anderson-Bishop Partnership, 946 P.2d 417, 421-22 (Wyo. 
1997).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
INTRODUCTION

[¶9]      Appellant has not 
contested the district court's granting of appellees' motion to strike their 
untimely response to the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the evidence 
contained in the affidavit and other exhibits attached to appellees' motion 
remains undisputed. In addition, the facts presented in the briefs of the 
parties are materially congruent, with little variance from what is alleged in 
appellant's complaint.

[¶10]   Appellant attempts to argue that 
the claim should not be time barred because there is no evidence of the date on 
which Mr. Edwards discovered Dr. Fogarty's misdiagnosis of his condition. This 
is presented as a material question of fact which precludes summary judgment. 
However, appellees correctly point out that the dates in the record indicate Mr. 
Edwards was aware of the misdiagnosis no later than March 21, 1991, and possibly 
as early as February 21, 1991. As a result, whether or not Mr. Edwards' statute 
of limitations for filing a medical malpractice claim is calculated according to 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-3-107(a)(i), 1-3-107(a)(iv), or the continuous treatment rule 
discussed in Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 669-70 (Wyo. 1988), the period in 
which Mr. Edwards could bring suit was exhausted prior to his death. Since 
appellant failed to provide evidence to counter appellees' calculations, the 
fact that Mr. Edwards did not have a viable claim against Dr. Fogarty at the 
time of his death is undisputed.

B. APPELLANT'S 
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM

[¶11]   The only true issue before us is 
whether the district court was correct in determining that a wrongful death 
action is not viable when the deceased's underlying malpractice action would be 
time barred at the time of his death. This is an issue of first impression in 
Wyoming; thus, we look to the rulings of other jurisdictions for guidance. The 
clear majority rule is that survivors are precluded from bringing a wrongful 
death action where the deceased does not have a viable malpractice claim at the 
time of his death. See, e.g., Turner v. Mercy Hospitals & Health Services of 
Detroit, 210 Mich. App. 345, 349, 533 N.W.2d 365, 367 (1995) and Johnson v. ABC 
Ins. Co., 193 Wis.2d 35, 46, 532 N.W.2d 130, 134 (1995). See also David P. 
Chapus, Medical Malpractice: Statute of Limitations in Wrongful Death Action 
Based on Medical Malpractice, 70 A.L.R.4th 535 (1989), and cases cited 
therein.

[¶12]   For example, in Miller v. Luther, 
170 Wis.2d 429, 439, 489 N.W.2d 651, 654 (1992), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
interpreted Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, nearly identical to Wyo. Stat. § 
1-38-101, to require that the decedent have a cause of action for damages at the 
time of death. A negligence action filed by Mr. Miller and his wife was pending 
when Mr. Miller died. After her husband's death, Mrs. Miller filed a wrongful 
death action. It was subsequently determined that the negligence action was time 
barred, and that action was dismissed. The trial court also dismissed the 
wrongful death action and Mrs. Miller appealed. Relying on Wisconsin Supreme 
Court precedent, the appeals court held that a wrongful death claim is barred 
if, at the time of death, the statute of limitations had run against the 
decedent's underlying claim. Miller, 489 N.W.2d  at 654.

[¶13]   The Wisconsin court recognized that 
a wrongful death action is a statutory right which is separate and distinct from 
that held by the deceased. However, that action is subject to the same 
infirmities and defenses as would have existed in a suit by the deceased if he 
were still alive. Miller, 489 N.W.2d  at 653. Thus, a viable right of action in 
the deceased at the time of his death is a condition precedent to the existence 
of a right of action in the survivors. See also Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Del.Supr. 1989).

[¶14]   Appellant cites to Missouri law 
which allows a wrongful death action to proceed despite the fact the decedent's 
malpractice action would have been time barred at the time of death. Gramlich v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 180, 185-86 (Mo. App. 1982). On facts very 
similar to those at issue here, the Missouri court held that an action for 
wrongful death does not arise until the time of death. The court reasoned that a 
wrongful death action is separate from an action for malpractice, and is 
intended to alleviate a different injury done to a different class of 
plaintiffs. Therefore, in Missouri, the statute of limitations governing 
malpractice actions has no application in a wrongful death action. Id. at 
185-86.

[¶15]   Appellant urges us to adopt this 
minority view. However, we believe the majority rule to be better reasoned and 
more in keeping with Wyoming's wrongful death statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101, 
which provides in pertinent part:

Whenever the 
death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if 
death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not 
ensued is liable in an action for damages * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.) The italicized portion is at the crux of this issue. A plain reading of 
that language clearly requires the deceased to have a viable claim at the time 
of his death in order for his survivors to have a valid wrongful death 
claim.

[¶16]   Adopting the minority view by 
holding that a wrongful death action is not derivative of the underlying 
negligence action would undermine the purposes of statutes of limitation. If a 
viable underlying claim is not necessary, wrongful death actions could be 
brought several years, or even decades, after the negligent act which caused the 
death, and possibly without regard to whether the deceased had already sued and 
recovered damages during his lifetime. Cf. Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 251 Ill. 
App.3d 980, 191 Ill.Dec. 356, 623 N.E.2d 946 (1993). Such a result would render 
meaningless the language of Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101 which permits an action based 
on the entitlement of the injured party to bring suit had death not ensued. This 
we will not do. Rue v. Carter, 919 P.2d 633, 635 (Wyo. 
1996).

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶17]   We follow the majority rule in 
holding that a wrongful death action brought pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101 
is derivative of the underlying cause of action which could have been brought by 
the deceased during his lifetime. Where the statute of limitations has run on 
the underlying cause of action and the injured party does not have a viable 
claim at the time of his death, a wrongful death action by his survivors is also 
barred.

[¶18]   The district court correctly 
applied the law to the facts of appellant's case and did not err in granting 
summary judgment in favor of appellees. Affirmed.

GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, with whom LEHMAN, C.J., joined.

GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom LEHMAN, Chief Justice, joins.

[¶19]   I respectfully 
dissent.

[¶20]   Mr. Edwards died on April 5, 1993. 
The appellants, the personal representative of Mr. Edwards and "those entitled 
to claim pursuant to W.S. § 1-38-102" (the survivors), brought a wrongful death 
action on April 4, 1995. The action was filed within the two-year limitation 
period found in the wrongful death statute. WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(d) 
(1997).

[¶21]   The majority inserts a non-existent 
condition precedent into the wrongful death statute. The statute does not 
require that the deceased have a viable right of action at death for a right of 
action to exist in the survivors. The statute provides:

Whenever the 
death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if 
death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not 
ensued is liable in an action for damages * * *.

WYO. STAT. § 
1-38-101 (1997) (emphasis added). The emphasized language of the statute, which 
the majority claims is the "crux of this issue," merely identifies the types of 
iniquities inflicted by the tortfeasor upon the decedent which entitle the 
survivors to a right of action for wrongful death. This language is not rendered 
meaningless if the survivors are allowed to bring an action for wrongful death 
where the underlying personal injury claim was time-barred at the time of the 
victim's death. It still identifies the tortfeasor's conduct which entitles the 
survivors to bring a wrongful death action. The plain reading of that language 
of the statute is that statutory beneficiaries (the survivors) under the 
wrongful death statute may not recover in those types of cases where the 
deceased never had a cause of action against the defendants or where there is a 
substantive defense which could be invoked. See Gramlich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
640 S.W.2d 180, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). If the legislature intended to 
extinguish wrongful death claims where the decedent's underlying cause of action 
was time-barred, it could have expressed that intention in plain 
English.

[¶22]   The claim for wrongful death and 
the underlying personal injury claim are separate and distinct. Gramlich, 640 S.W.2d  at 186. A wrongful death plaintiff sues for his own "injury" caused by 
the death of the decedent, not for the injury to the decedent. The wrongful 
death action cannot arise and the statutory beneficiaries can take no action 
with respect to their claim until after the death occurs. 
Id.

[¶23]   This principle is clear in 
Wyoming's survival statute, which states, in part:

An action may be 
brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same, 
but in actions for personal injury damages, if the person entitled thereto dies 
recovery is limited to damages for wrongful death.

WYO. STAT. § 
1-4-101 (1997). We distinguished underlying claims, brought by the person who 
sustains the injury, and the new cause of action which arises upon the death of 
the injured party in DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Wyo. 1977). The 
two types of actions are indeed "as unlike as fish to fowl." Id. at 483. Unlike 
an action for personal injury, the proceeds from the wrongful death action do 
not become part of the decedent's estate. Id. at 482. The wrongful death statute 
creates a new cause of action for the benefit of designated persons who have 
suffered the loss of a loved one and provider. Id. (citing Speiser, Recovery for 
Wrongful Death, 2d (1975), § 14:1, p. 408). Recovery in a wrongful death action 
is limited to damages stemming from the wrongful death. Parsons v. Roussalis, 
488 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1971). Those damages are limited to those proven by 
the person for whose benefit the action is brought, "including damages for loss 
of probable future companionship, society and comfort." WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102 
(1997); and see DeHerrera, 565 P.2d  at 482-483. The damages available to an 
injured party in a personal injury action include recovery for the injured 
party's economic and non-economic losses. See Parsons, 488 P.2d  at 1052; 
DeHerrera, 565 P.2d  at 482-83. Personal injury damages are not recoverable in a 
wrongful death action. Id.

[¶24]   The Wrongful Death Act does not tie 
the wrongful death claim to the limitation period of the underlying personal 
injury claim. We must heed the legislature's directive: "[c]ivil actions can 
only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause 
of action accrues, but where a different limitation is prescribed by statute, 
that shall govern." WYO. STAT. § 1-3-102 (1997) (emphasis added). The 
survivors, those for whom the personal representative is authorized to bring a 
wrongful death action, are not injured until the death of the decedent. The 
limitation portion of the wrongful death statute expressly requires the personal 
representative of the decedent to bring an action within two years of the 
decedent's death. WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(d) (1997). It necessarily follows that a 
wrongful death action is governed by the limitations period provided in the 
wrongful death statute, not the medical malpractice statute found in WYO. STAT. 
§ 1-3-107 (1997).

[¶25]   Finally, the majority's decision 
ascribes to the statute a meaning that will nullify the operation of the 
Wrongful Death Act under certain circumstances. Statutes must be read to avoid 
absurd results. DeHerrera, 565 P.2d  at 482. "It is contrary to reason to ascribe 
to a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation, if capable of any other 
interpretation." Id. If the legislature intended to bar the survivors' right of 
action for wrongful death before that claim existed, it would have expressly 
provided for that result.