Title: Schaecher v. Bouffault

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: All the Justices 
 
GINA L. SCHAECHER, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 141480 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                    June 4, 2015 
ROBINA RICH BOUFFAULT 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARKE COUNTY 
John E. Wetsel, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal we consider (1) whether any of nine 
statements by the defendant are sufficiently defamatory in 
nature to survive demurrer, and (2) whether the allegations 
state a claim for tortious interference with contract. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from circumstances surrounding a 
special use permit application regarding a prospective property 
for 3 Dog Farm, LC, a company that provides rehabilitation 
services to displaced companion canines.  Plaintiff Gina 
Schaecher owns both 3 Dog Farm and plaintiff Happy Tails 
Development, LLC ("Happy Tails"), the contract purchaser of the 
Clarke County property on which Schaecher intended to locate 3 
Dog Farm.  In accordance with Clarke County Zoning Ordinances, 
Happy Tails applied for a special use permit on August 6, 2013, 
requesting a permit to operate a boarding kennel of more than 
five canine animals. 
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Robina R. Bouffault, a 
nearby neighbor and member of the Clarke County Planning 
 
2 
Commission ("Planning Commission"), sent defamatory emails and 
made false public statements defaming Schaecher and Happy 
Tails.  The allegations include two counts of defamation, one 
on behalf of Schaecher and one on behalf of Happy Tails, and 
one count of tortious interference with contractual relations 
on behalf of Happy Tails.1 
The circuit court sustained Bouffault's initial demurrer, 
granting plaintiffs leave to amend.  The amended complaint 
includes nine alleged defamatory statements.  Eight of these 
statements were sent in email form to some or all members of 
the Planning Commission and other interested parties, and are 
attached as exhibits to the amended complaint.2  One of the 
alleged defamatory statements was made to a local newspaper, 
The Winchester Star, and is not attached as an exhibit. 
Five of the emails and The Winchester Star comments 
concern whether the kennel as proposed would comply with 
conservation easements, private covenants, or county 
                     
1 Because these counts are pled separately, and because 
defamation against an individual is not necessarily defamation 
against her business and vice versa, Schaecher and Happy Tails 
will be referred to in this opinion as individual parties or 
collectively as "plaintiffs," as appropriate. 
2 While it is not specifically pled that the recipients 
were members of the Planning Commission, the context of the 
emails makes this clear.  In particular, Brandon Stidham, whose 
email signature identifies him as the Director of Planning, is 
a recipient of every email, and Bob Mitchell, identified by 
Bouffault in an email as the County Attorney, is a recipient of 
several emails. 
 
3 
ordinances.  Plaintiffs allege that these statements 
characterize Schaecher as a lawbreaker, one without integrity, 
or one with disregard for the law, or imply that Happy Tails 
was in violation of the law, and that defendant made these 
statements with the intent to defame Schaecher and Happy Tails.  
Two additional emails state that "It would appear that Mrs. 
Schaecher was not totally truthful," and "I firmly believe that 
Gina is lying and manipulating facts," respectively.  
Plaintiffs allege that these statements impugn Schaecher's 
honesty and harm the reputation of Happy Tails.  Finally, one 
email includes a remark by Bouffault regarding Schaecher's 
sister Mary, who was to serve as the resident manager at the 
kennel.  The email states that "Mary had owned a property . . . 
with her boyfriend – they have now split . . . but [she] 
appears to be having difficulties in paying the mortgage . . . 
foreclosure could be a possibility."  Plaintiffs allege that 
the statement defamed Schaecher and Happy Tails.  The 
individual statements are discussed in more detail in Part 
II.A., infra. 
Happy Tails also alleges that because of "false, reckless, 
defamatory and/or misleading statements to the press, Clarke 
County government officials, the planning commission and 
members of the Board of Supervisors," Happy Tails incurred 
additional costs due to delay in review of the special use 
 
4 
permit and in order to refute and remedy Bouffault's 
statements.  Additionally, "[u]pon information and belief, 
[defendant] engage[ed] third parties to threaten and harass 
persons who openly supported [Happy Tails'] proposed use for 
the Property causing the Sellers' reservations in continuing 
[Happy Tails'] Sales Contract."  Happy Tails pled that 
Bouffault's conduct delayed and increased costs such that the 
Sales Contract became cost prohibitive and Happy Tails was 
forced to terminate.  An attached exhibit reflected a signed 
Sales Contract that indicated settlement on the sale of the 
property was to occur on May 30, 2014, one day after the 
amended complaint was filed.  Nothing in the attached exhibit 
indicated that the contract had been terminated. 
Bouffault again demurred to the amended complaint.  The 
circuit court ruled that the statements were not defamatory; 
that the statements and actions complained of were "committed 
incident to the performance of a legislative function of the 
Defendant as a member of the Clarke County Planning Commission; 
therefore, they are protected by legislative immunity"; and 
that the allegations did not set forth a claim for tortious 
interference with contract.  The circuit court therefore 
sustained the demurrer on all counts.  We granted this appeal. 
 
 
 
5 
II. DISCUSSION 
We review the circuit court's ruling on a demurrer de 
novo.  Schilling v. Schilling, 280 Va. 146, 148, 695 S.E.2d 
181, 183 (2010).  "A demurrer accepts as true all facts 
properly pled, as well as reasonable inferences from those 
facts."  Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC, 284 Va. 282, 
286, 726 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2012). 
A. 
Defamation 
Virginia makes no distinction between actions for libel 
and slander.  Shupe v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 213 Va. 374, 375-
76, 192 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1972).  In Virginia, when a plaintiff 
alleges defamation by publication, the elements are "(1) 
publication of (2) an actionable statement with (3) the 
requisite intent."  Tharpe v. Saunders, 285 Va. 476, 480, 737 
S.E.2d 890, 892 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
the present case the elements of publication and intent are 
sufficiently pled on the face of the pleading.  This appeal 
focuses on whether the statements pled are actionable. 
An "actionable" statement is both false and defamatory.  
Id. at 481, 737 S.E.2d at 892.  Defamatory words are those 
"tend[ing] so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him 
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons 
from associating or dealing with him."  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 559; see Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 
 
6 
1092 (4th Cir. 1993)(applying Virginia law).  A false statement 
must have the requisite defamatory "sting" to one's reputation.  
See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, ___ U.S.___, ___, 134 
S.Ct. 852, 866 (2014) (focusing on "the substance, the gist, 
the sting" of an allegedly defamatory statement); Curtis Pub. 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 138 (1967)(referring to the 
defamatory implication as the "sting of the libel"). 
Characterizing the level of harm to one's reputation 
required for defamatory "sting," we have stated that defamatory 
language "tends to injure one's reputation in the common 
estimation of mankind, to throw contumely, shame, or disgrace 
upon him, or which tends to hold him up to scorn, ridicule, or 
contempt, or which is calculated to render him infamous, 
odious, or ridiculous."  Moss v. Harwood, 102 Va. 386, 392, 46 
S.E. 385 (1904); see Adams v. Lawson, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 250, 
255-56 (1867) ("It is sufficient if the language tends to 
injure the reputation of the party, to throw contumely, or to 
reflect shame and disgrace upon him, or to hold him up as an 
object of scorn, ridicule or contempt."); see also Moseley v. 
Moss, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 534, 538 (1850) (actionable defamation 
"tend[s] to make the party subject to disgrace, ridicule, or 
contempt").  Each of these descriptions connotes the requisite 
defamatory "sting," while "language that is insulting, 
offensive, or otherwise inappropriate, but constitutes no more 
 
7 
than 'rhetorical hyperbole'" is not defamatory.  Yeagle v. 
Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 296, 497 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1998). 
 
We recently had occasion to restate the historical 
elements of a common law defamation pleading: 
A common law complaint for libel or slander 
historically included three elements:  the inducement, 
an explanation of the facts demonstrating that the 
allegedly defamatory statement is actionable; the 
colloquium, an explanation of how the allegedly 
defamatory statement refers to the plaintiff, if he is 
not explicitly named; and the innuendo, an explanation 
of the allegedly defamatory meaning of the statement, 
if it is not apparent on its face. 
 
Webb v. Virginian-Pilot Media Cos., 287 Va. 84, 88, 752 S.E.2d 
808, 811 (2014) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 300, 845, 861 
(9th ed. 2009)).  In the case at bar, the question before the 
Court is whether the statements are either defamatory on their 
face or contain sufficient innuendo to imply defamatory 
meaning; we must also consider whether the statements 
constitute protected First Amendment speech. 
In evaluating whether language is actionable, we take all 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but such inferences 
cannot rise above the language of the documents or statements 
themselves: 
In determining whether the words and statements 
complained of . . . are reasonably capable of the 
meaning ascribed to them by innuendo, every fair 
inference that may be drawn from the pleadings must be 
resolved in the plaintiff's favor.  However, the 
meaning of the alleged defamatory language can not, by 
innuendo, be extended beyond its ordinary and common 
 
8 
acceptation.  The province of the innuendo is to show 
how the words used are defamatory, and how they relate 
to the plaintiff, but it can not introduce new matter, 
nor extend the meaning of the words used, or make that 
certain which is in fact uncertain. 
 
Id. at 89-90, 752 S.E.2d at 811 (quoting Carwile v. 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 8, 82 S.E.2d 588, 592 
(1954)). 
 
To determine whether a statement can be reasonably 
understood as stating or implying actual facts, whether those 
statements are verifiable, and whether they are reasonably 
capable of defamatory meaning, we must examine them in context: 
Although varying circumstances often make it difficult 
to determine whether particular language is 
defamatory, it is a general rule that allegedly 
defamatory words are to be taken in their plain and 
natural meaning and to be understood by courts and 
juries as other people would understand them, and 
according to the sense in which they appear to have 
been used. 
Carwile, 196 Va. at 7, 82 S.E.2d at 591-92; accord Farah v. 
Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
("[T]he publication must be taken as a whole, and in the 
sense in which it would be understood by the readers to 
whom it was addressed." (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted.)). 
With these principles in mind, a court must decide as a 
threshold matter of law whether a statement is reasonably 
capable of defamatory meaning before allowing the matter to be 
 
9 
presented to a finder of fact.  Perk v. Vector Res. Group, 
Ltd., 253 Va. 310, 316-17, 485 S.E.2d 140, 143-44 (1997).  To 
perform this gatekeeping function, we turn to the statements at 
issue today. 
1. 
Statements Pertaining to Prospective Violations of 
Easements, Covenants, or Ordinances 
 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint includes as exhibits a 
number of emails in which Bouffault expresses concern that 
plaintiffs' plans for the property do not comply with 
easements, covenants, or ordinances.  Plaintiffs allege that 
these emails are defamatory.  We disagree. 
a.   Contents of the Emails 
The first email (Exhibit B) indicates that Bouffault is 
"attaching a[n applicable] Conservation Easement document, 
where you will see on the 5th page the highlighted paragraph 
that would appear to prohibit a commercial dog kennel on the 
easement."  Plaintiffs allege that Bouffault knew or should 
have known that the conservation easement authority had 
communicated its approval of the use detailed in the special 
use permit application.  They allege that her statement was 
false, misleading, tending to indicate that Schaecher was a 
"law breaker or a person of disregard for . . . legal 
obligations," and intended to harm the reputation of Happy 
Tails. 
 
10 
Another disputed email (Exhibit D) pertains to property 
covenant restrictions in the deed regarding dwelling size:  
Bouffault states that the plan for the property does not meet 
the requirements. 
Two emails from Bouffault (Exhibits E and F) pertain to 
county ordinances regarding single-family detached dwellings on 
residential properties.  Bouffault states that the caretaker's 
residence does not meet the ordinance requirements, and further 
states her understanding that the Schaecher family will not be 
immediately moving to the property, which Bouffault asserts 
changes the nature of the application. 
Finally, an email from Bouffault to Schaecher, copied to 
Planning Commission members (Exhibit H), raises Bouffault's 
concerns over breaches in private covenants. 
b.  Requisite Defamatory "Sting" 
The potential violation of an easement, referenced in 
Exhibit B, does not as a general principle carry the "sting" of 
a reprehensible crime.  The mere implication that one might be 
in violation of an easement, absent more – such as inflammatory 
language or context to suggest that the statement causes 
particular harm to one's reputation – does not rise to the 
level of defamation.  It does not so "harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or 
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him," 
 
11 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559, such as by making the 
plaintiff appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous, or subjecting 
her to contempt, scorn, shame, or disgrace. 
Similarly, the potential violation of covenant 
restrictions, referenced in Exhibits D and H, does not alone 
carry the requisite defamatory "sting."  Covenant restrictions 
are contractual in nature, Black's Law Dictionary 443 (10th ed. 
2014), and the breach of a contract does not necessarily bring 
with it defamatory connotation.  We do not hold that 
accusations of violations of covenants or easements are never 
defamatory as a matter of law, merely that they are not 
inherently defamatory.  Based on the neutral language of these 
emails and their context, even construing them in the light 
most supportive of the plaintiff, there is nothing to aggravate 
the plain language of the emails to suggest they are 
defamatory. 
As to Exhibits E and F, the legislative nature of an 
ordinance may carry a law-breaking implication above that 
inherent in a charge of breach of a covenant or easement.  
However, plaintiffs face the same essential challenges:  the 
potential violation of a county ordinance by a proposed 
dwelling plan does not in and of itself rise to the level of 
defamation.  An accusation of ordinance violations may in some 
contexts carry defamatory "sting," but the ordinance at issue 
 
12 
here pertains to the requirements of a free standing dwelling 
unit.  It is thus not apparent on the face of the document how 
this violation would render the plaintiffs odious, infamous, or 
ridiculous, or otherwise subject them to contempt, shame, 
scorn, or disgrace. 
The face of these emails does not reasonably convey 
defamatory "sting."  We thus turn to the innuendo articulated 
in the pleading, explaining the allegedly defamatory meaning, 
to consider whether the pleading guides us to a defamatory 
implication in the words that is not immediately apparent.  
Webb, 287 at 88, 752 S.E.2d at 811. 
c.  Alleged Innuendo 
As previously addressed, innuendo may not extend beyond the 
meaning of the words in the statement.  Id. at 90, 752 S.E.2d 
at 811.  Upon review of the amended complaint, we find that the 
language of the emails does not support the innuendos pled by 
Schaecher and Happy Tails. 
As to the easement referenced in Exhibit B, Schaecher 
alleges that the intent of the email was to characterize her as 
a "law breaker" or "a person of disregard for the legal 
obligations pertaining to the Property."  The statement that 
one's proposed project is apparently prohibited by an easement 
does not, by innuendo, rise to the level that Schaecher 
proposes.  First, while an easement is a legal obligation 
 
13 
imposed upon the owners of the property, breach of an easement 
does not have the stigma of "law breaker" that Schaecher 
pleads.  Second, the content of the email was entirely 
descriptive of the current status of the plan and contained no 
predictions regarding the future.  Bouffault professed no 
knowledge as to whether Schaecher would go forward with the 
project as planned if it were in fact in violation of the 
easement discussed.  As is obvious from the context of the 
case, the project was not built at the time of the email, but 
rather was in the process of obtaining the required variances 
and engaging in other negotiations.  As of the time of this 
email, there clearly was no kennel operating on the property, 
so Schaecher and Happy Tails could not yet have been in 
violation of any easement.  Consequently, there was no 
actionable injurious factual assertion made as a "reasonable 
implication" of the published statement.  Carwile, 196 Va. at 
9, 82 S.E.2d at 592.  Thus, the ordinary and common import of 
the language of the email does not convey that she is a "law 
breaker" or "a person of disregard for the legal obligations 
pertaining to the Property," as Schaecher alleges.3 
                     
3 The amended complaint does not plead with specificity in 
what manner the purported breach of easement harms the 
reputation of Happy Tails.  We are left to conclude that Happy 
Tails is generally asking the Court to infer that the community 
would find a business without regard for easements to be 
odious, infamous, ridiculous, contemptible, or subject to 
 
14 
For the same reasons, the emails addressing private 
restrictive covenants in Exhibits D and H fall short of the 
innuendo alleged in the complaint, which avers that the reader 
would infer that plaintiffs were "breaking the law and/or 
otherwise disregarding legal obligations" or "in violation of 
private legal obligations."  First, a private restrictive 
covenant is contractual in nature, and plaintiffs would not be 
in violation of "law" if they were to breach such a covenant.  
Second, because the email merely describes the state of the 
current plan — a structure not yet built — Bouffault is 
likewise not accusing plaintiffs of actively violating covenant 
restrictions.  The email expresses no position as to the future 
plans of Schaecher or Happy Tails:  a reader could equally or 
more reasonably infer that the proposed plans simply needed to 
be amended.  The language in the email itself does not support 
the innuendo that plaintiffs allege. 
The plaintiffs argue that the innuendo present in the 
residential ordinance emails (Exhibits E and F) suggests that 
plaintiffs are "in violation of the law," harming the 
reputation of Schaecher and Happy Tails.  The language of the 
emails once again does not support plaintiffs' argument.  The 
                                                                 
disgrace, scorn, or shame, or that the business is tarnished by 
such aspersions cast upon Schaecher, its owner.  In either 
case, for the reasons discussed in relation to Schaecher, the 
statement is not defamatory as to Happy Tails. 
 
15 
emails reflect only a belief on the part of Bouffault that the 
current plans for the kennel violate the requirements for a 
free standing residential dwelling.  Proposing a plan for a 
dwelling that does not comply with residential dwelling 
requirements is not a violation of a law, nor does neutral 
language stating that a plan does not align with current 
ordinances create "a reasonable implication" from which to 
infer one would violate the law.  Carwile, 196 Va. at 9, 82 
S.E.2d at 592.  There is nothing in the statements to indicate 
that plaintiffs plan on violating the law. 
Neither aspersions reasonably apparent from the face of 
these emails or innuendo reasonably apparent from their context 
provide sufficient defamatory "sting" to make them actionable 
against the defendant on behalf of either Schaecher or Tails. 
2. 
Statements to The Winchester Star 
Plaintiffs allege that Bouffault made the following 
statements regarding the special use permit application in The 
Winchester Star:  (1) "Conservation easements usually allow 
only agricultural enterprises"; (2) "A dog kennel is not an 
agricultural enterprise"; and (3) "40 dogs barking would 
probably constitute noise pollution." 
The first two statements allegedly made by Bouffault are 
not defamatory for the reasons discussed in Part II.A.1., 
supra:  they lack the requisite defamatory "sting."  Assuming 
 
16 
for the sake of argument that the third statement contained 
defamatory "sting," it is not actionable, as it cannot be 
proven false.  See Cashion v. Smith, 286 Va. 327, 336, 749 
S.E.2d 526, 531 (2013); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990). 
For a statement to be actionable, it must "have a provably 
false factual connotation and thus [be] capable of being proven 
true or false."  Cashion, 286 Va. at 336, 749 S.E.2d at 531 
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Potomac Valve & 
Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1288 (4th 
Cir. 1987) ("[T]he verifiability of the statement in question 
[is] a minimum threshold issue.  If the defendant's words 
cannot be described as either true or false, they are not 
actionable.").  The term "noise pollution" is not identified by 
the plaintiffs as a quantifiable term in Clarke County.  The 
pleading references no standard by which one could assess 
whether the statement is in fact false.  The statements 
allegedly made to the Winchester Star are thus not actionable 
as to either plaintiff. 
3. 
Statement Regarding "Sister Mary" 
One email (Exhibit G) provides a highly detailed report of 
Bouffault's trip to a "get together" that was occurring on the 
property "for the adjoining neighbors, to discuss and show them 
where the kennels were to be."  Bouffault indicates that 
 
17 
Schaecher's sister Mary is to be the on-site caretaker and adds 
the following parenthetical:  "(Note: Sister Mary had owned a 
property in Bluemont with her boyfriend – they have now split, 
and she has the property, but appears to be having difficulties 
in paying the mortgage, resulting in mortgage modifications, 
etc. – foreclosure could be a possibility.)" 
Here, we conclude that neither Gina Schaecher nor Happy 
Tails could bring a claim for defamation based upon this 
statement, as it is not "of and concerning" either party.  
Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 37, 325 S.E.2d 713, 738 
(1985).  A pleading for defamation must allege or otherwise 
make apparent on the face of the pleading that the alleged 
defamatory statements are "of and concerning" the plaintiff.  
Dean v. Dearing, 263 Va. 485, 488, 561 S.E.2d 686, 688 (2002). 
While in some cases a business may bring a defamation 
action on its own behalf when one of its employees is allegedly 
defamed, there must be a sufficient nexus between the alleged 
defamatory nature of the statement and the business: 
Authorities dealing with the subject generally 
hold that an imputation defamatory to stockholders, 
officers, or employees of a corporation does not 
constitute defamation of the corporation itself in the 
absence of an allegation of special damages.  Prosser, 
Law of Torts § 106 (3d ed. 1964); Restatement of Torts 
§ 561(1) cmt. a; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 34, at 
83. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
18 
Life Printing & Publishing Co. v. Field, 324 Ill.App. 
254, 58 N.E.2d 307 (1944), involved a newspaper 
article implying that the publisher of the corporate 
plaintiff was one of the founders of an anti-Semitic 
organization.  In holding that the publication was not 
libelous per se as to such corporate plaintiff, the 
Court said the following at page 310:  . . . "Words 
spoken or written of a stockholder or officer give no 
right of action to the corporation unless spoken or 
written in direct relation to the trade or business of 
the corporation.  If they relate solely to the 
stockholder, officer, or employee in his private or 
personal capacity, only the individual can complain." 
 
Novick v. Hearst Corp., 278 F.Supp. 277, 279-80 (D. Md. 1968).  
Bouffault's statement does not impugn Mary's ability as a 
caretaker of dogs, and plaintiffs have not alleged any other 
sufficient nexus that Mary's living situation has with the 
business.  While the above excerpt does not foreclose the 
possibility of special damages, Happy Tails did not plead 
special damages.  Where a plaintiff does not prevail on a claim 
of defamation per se, and has not alleged or stated proof of 
special damages, the plaintiff may not proceed.  Weaver v. 
Beneficial Finance Co., 200 Va. 572, 579, 106 S.E.2d 620, 625 
(1959). 
No Virginia precedent would support the proposition that 
Gina Schaecher could state a defamation claim "of and 
concerning" her, as owner of her business, based on a statement 
made against one of her employees but unrelated to the work.  
Corporate owners generally cannot personally pursue an action 
for defamation of their corporation, because the corporate 
 
19 
entity is "itself the only person entitled to recover for 
injuries to its business, profits or property."  Landmark 
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Macione, 230 Va. 137, 140, 334 S.E.2d 587, 
589 (1985).  For Gina Schaecher to proceed on her own behalf, a 
sufficient nexus must be pled to show how the allegedly 
defamatory statement degrades the reputation of, and is "of and 
concerning," Gina Schaecher.  Such a nexus is not alleged in 
the pleadings of this case. 
4. 
Emails Impugning Honesty 
Plaintiffs raise two statements that pertain to the 
honesty of Schaecher in Happy Tails' special use permit 
application proceedings.  The first truth-related email 
(Exhibit C) relays information pertaining to prior deferred 
kennel applications from Loudoun County, provides a link to 3 
Dog Farm's website, and concludes based on the relayed 
information that "It would appear that Mrs. Schaecher was not 
totally truthful. . . ." in stating that the family did not 
currently have a commercial kennel.  The final email (Exhibit 
I) describes to Brandon Stidham and Jesse Russell apparent 
discrepancies between the Planning Commission's initial 
understanding of the use of Schaecher's property and 
Schaecher's current characterization, states that Schaecher has 
twice stated that Russell is lying, encourages that all 
communication with her be in writing only, and states "I firmly 
 
20 
believe that Gina is lying and manipulating facts to her 
benefit. . . ." 
 
a.  Requisite Defamatory "Sting" 
As with the previous statements, aspersions related to 
honesty are subject to an evaluation as to the requisite level 
of "sting."  Libelous aspersions impugning honesty have long 
been accepted in the Commonwealth as potentially defamatory in 
nature.  See Adams, 58 Va. at 255-57 (holding that a written 
charge advising another to "quit lying" is actionable because 
it implies that he has been lying, and tends to injure the 
reputation of the party and to hold him as an object of 
contempt).  The Supreme Court of the United States has also 
explained that, in the proper context, an accusation that one 
is a liar is grounds for defamation.  See Milkovich, 497 U.S. 
at 20-23 & n.7.  As with all evaluations of defamatory 
statements, however, context is of the utmost importance.  See 
Carwile, 196 Va. at 7-9, 82 S.E.2d at 591-92; see also Farah, 
736 F.3d at 535.  Reputation must be affected to a magnitude 
sufficient to render one odious, infamous, or ridiculous, or 
subject to disgrace, shame, scorn, or contempt. 
The context of the emails assists us in analyzing these 
two statements.  In the first instance, Bouffault shares 
information with Planning Commission members concerning one 
question Schaecher had been asked about whether she has a 
 
21 
commercial kennel operation.  Schaecher apparently answered 
that she did not have a commercial kennel, but had six dogs of 
her own.  Bouffault shared two prior kennel applications from 
Loudoun County that had been "deferred," as well as a link to a 
website for 3 Dog Farm, which Bouffault stated represented a 
commercial kennel offering.  She then concludes, "It would 
appear that Mrs. Schaecher was not totally truthful . . . ." 
Bouffault's email presents some evidence that appears to, 
but does not conclusively, contradict Schaecher's prior 
statement.4  Bouffault's concluding sentence is in the nature of 
a summary that hedges her prior statement (". . . not totally 
truthful" (emphasis added)).  While this characterization is 
unpleasant, "[m]erely offensive or unpleasant statements are 
not defamatory."  Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1092.  It is married to a 
single and relatively benign particular fact regarding whether 
Schaecher was operating a commercial kennel, and so does not 
necessarily impugn Schaecher's character as a whole.  It does 
not meet the threshold for defamatory "sting" to engender 
disgrace, shame, scorn, or contempt, or to render one odious, 
infamous, or ridiculous. 
 
On the other hand, the statement that "I firmly believe 
that Gina is lying and manipulating facts to her benefit" does 
                     
4 The Loudoun County applications were from 2008 and 2010, 
respectively. 
 
22 
not hedge.  The statement is in the context of an email that 
alleges repetitive lying by Schaecher to the Planning 
Commission, states that all dealings must be in writing 
("EVERYTHING with her in writing only"), and implies that 
Bouffault believes Schaecher cannot be trusted ("TRUST NO 
ONE").  The face of the email alleges that, in her dealings 
with the Planning Commission, Schaecher was lying and 
manipulative.  As such, this statement can reasonably be 
understood as an aspersion cast on Schaecher's reputation and 
character:  the perception that one is deliberately lying and 
manipulating facts throughout a governmental process is 
sufficiently damaging to one's reputation so as to deter others 
from associating with her and render her contemptible in the 
estimation of the community.  Thus, this statement has the 
requisite defamatory "sting," but that does not end our 
inquiry. 
b.  Protected Fact-Based Opinion 
The above statement is also couched in language suggesting 
that it may be an opinion.  As we have previously noted: 
Causes of action for defamation have their basis in 
state common law but are subject to principles of 
freedom of speech arising under the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
12 of the Constitution of Virginia.  The United States 
Supreme Court has identified constitutional limits on 
the type of speech that may be the subject of common 
law defamation actions.  Thus, speech which does not 
contain a provably false factual connotation, or 
 
23 
statements which cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
stating actual facts about a person cannot form the 
basis of a common law defamation action. 
 
Yeagle, 255 Va. at 295, 497 S.E.2d at 137 (footnote omitted) 
(citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16-17, 20). 
 
Whether an alleged defamatory statement contains a 
provably false factual connotation or is a "pure expression[] 
of opinion" is a question of law that we examine de novo.  
Tharpe, 285 Va. at 481-82, 737 S.E.2d at 893.  In so doing, "we 
do not determine whether the alleged defamatory statement is 
true or false, but whether it is capable of being proved true 
or false."  Id. at 482, 737 S.E.2d at 893. 
As a preliminary matter, we have long stated that "it is 
not necessary to make a writing libelous that the imputations 
should be made in the form of positive assertion."  Adams, 58 
Va. at 256.  Therefore, "'[s]imply couching . . . statements in 
terms of opinion does not dispel [factual] implications.'"  
Raytheon Tech. Servs. Co. v. Hyland, 273 Va. 292, 303, 641 
S.E.2d 84, 91 (2007) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19).  
Consequently, the preamble "I firmly believe" does not provide 
Bouffault with shelter if the remainder of her statement 
contains a provably false connotation. 
The standard previously articulated by this Court is 
whether a statement can be "reasonably be understood . . . to 
convey a false representation of fact."  Yeagle, 255 Va. at 
 
24 
296, 497 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting Crawford v. United Steel 
Workers, AFL-CIO, 230 Va. 217, 234-35, 335 S.E.2d 828, 839 
(1985)).  Accordingly, we have held that clear "rhetorical 
hyperbole" is not defamatory.  Yeagle, 255 Va. at 297, 497 
S.E.2d at 138.  Consistent with this approach, in Chaves v. 
Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 118-19, 335 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1985), this 
Court held that statements that plaintiff's fees were 
"excessive" and that he was "inexperienced" were not 
defamatory, as the "relative nature of such opinions is obvious 
to anyone who hears them." 
In Chaves and Yeagle, an average person could identify the 
language used as being relative or hyperbolic statements of 
opinion.  The same cannot be said for an accusation of lying 
and manipulating facts:  such statements can imply underlying 
facts, and "opinions may be actionable where they 'imply an 
assertion' of objective fact."  Raytheon, 273 Va. at 303 
(quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21). 
 
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a 
liar," he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to 
the conclusion that Jones told an untruth.  Even if 
the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his 
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or 
incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, 
the statement may still imply a false assertion of 
fact. 
 
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.  Thus, we consider whether the 
facts underlying Bouffault's statement might be incorrect or 
 
25 
incomplete, or whether her assessment of them is erroneous so 
as to imply a false assertion of fact.  In doing so, we must 
continue to consider the context and the audience. 
The accusation that Schaecher was lying, which Schaecher 
alleges was false, arose in a longer email from Bouffault to 
two Planning Commission members: 
What you sent was in the packet of September.  So, are 
you telling me that there is NO DESCRIPTION detailing 
what is going to be done contained as an integral part 
of the application?  And that everything that Jesse 
outlined in the Case Summary is from VERBAL 
conversations with the applicant?  You have nothing in 
writing?  In her letter of October 3d, Gina states on 
the second page that "As a point of clarification, we 
do note that the description of our project on the 
agenda remains inconsistent with the purpose and 
nature of our project."  And then goes on with a blurb 
very different from what was originally placed in the 
Case Summary. 
 
Our application documents are in SERIOUS need of 
revision.  This is the second time that Gina has 
effectively stated that you, Jesse, are not stating 
facts correctly (i.e. you are lying): you stated 
CLEARLY to the commissioners at our Sept. briefing 
meeting that Gina and her family were going to move to 
Clarke and live on the property, then Gina said no, 
not true, when questioned at the Sept. Friday meeting.  
She now says that what has been stated is 
"inconsistent" with "the purpose and nature of our 
project." 
 
Bouffault's statement that she "firmly believe[s] that Gina is 
lying and manipulating facts to her benefit" immediately 
follows. 
It is particularly noteworthy that Schaecher did not plead 
that the factual allegations in the above email were incomplete 
 
26 
or generally false – in other words, Shaecher did not deny that 
there were inconsistencies between her understanding of events 
and that of the Planning Commission – merely that it was not 
true that she lied.  There are several possible explanations 
for a discrepancy between Schaecher's current characterization 
of the project and the version on record with the Planning 
Commission or in Jesse Russell's memory:  mistake, 
miscommunication, deliberate lying, or a genuine evolution of 
external facts that produced a change of circumstances.  The 
potential defamation arises only from the implication that 
Schaecher lied, as opposed to the alternatives, the 
implications of which lack defamatory "sting."  Thus, Schaecher 
does not contend that the facts underlying the accusation are 
incomplete or untrue, but rather that the conclusion that she 
lied is incorrect and thus implies a defamatory fact. 
The email appears to fully disclose the basis of 
Bouffault's rationale.  See Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 
151 F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 1998) (opinions fully disclosing 
their factual bases constitute a subjective view and are not 
actionable); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 
953 F.2d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 1992) (where "all sides of the 
issue, as well as the rationale for [the speaker's] view, were 
exposed, the assertion of deceit reasonably could be understood 
only as [the speaker's] personal conclusion about the 
 
27 
information presented"); see also Standing Comm. on Discipline 
of the United States Dist. Court v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1439 
(9th Cir. 1995) ("A statement of opinions on fully disclosed 
facts can be punished only if the stated facts are themselves 
false and demeaning.").  As Schaecher has not pled that the 
stated facts are themselves false and defamatory, in order for 
Bouffault's statements to be defamatory, it would have to be 
reasonable for Russell or Stidham to perceive that Bouffault 
had an implied factual basis for her accusation that Schaecher 
was lying of which they were unaware. 
However, the two individuals to whom Bouffault sent the 
email, Russell and Stidham, possessed a high degree of 
familiarity with the situation.  Given that Russell was the one 
allegedly lied about, and Stidham was the Director of the 
Planning Commission, the two hold an equal or higher degree of 
knowledge of the situation than Bouffault.  In exercising our 
gatekeeper function, we must therefore conclude that a 
reasonable person in Russell or Stidham's positions would have 
perceived the accusation as a pure opinion on the part of 
Bouffault based upon her subjective understanding of the 
underlying scenario and not upon an implied factual predicate 
of which they were unaware. 
Thus, because of Russell and Stidham's knowledge of the 
factual basis for Bouffault's statement, in the absence of a 
 
28 
claim that the stated underlying facts themselves were false 
and defamatory, and because the context of the email and the 
positions of Russell and Stidham would allow them to reasonably 
conclude that Bouffault's statement was purely her own 
subjective analysis, the statement is protected by the First 
Amendment and is not actionable. 
As we have concluded that none of the statements are 
actionable, we do not reach the assignment of error pertaining 
to legislative immunity. 
B. 
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations 
The circuit court concluded that Happy Tails failed to 
plead a cause of action for tortious interference with 
contractual relations.  We agree. 
In Virginia, the elements of a claim for tortious 
interference with contractual relations are typically recited 
as (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or 
business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or 
expectancy on the part of the interferor; (3) intentional 
interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the 
relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the 
party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.  
Chaves, 230 Va. at 120, 335 S.E.2d at 102.  At issue today is 
whether Happy Tails properly pled the third element. 
 
29 
Bouffault argues that this third element requires direct 
competitive interference with a contract, and that as she was 
not a competitor for the land purchase contract involved in 
this case, she cannot be liable for tortious interference with 
that contract under applicable Virginia precedent.  She argues 
that, as a neighbor and Planning Commission member, she was far 
removed from the contractual negotiations.  Bouffault also 
argues that any termination of contract on the part of Happy 
Tails was voluntary, not "caus[ed]" or "induc[ed]." 
In essence, the parties agree that existing Virginia case 
law explicitly covers the scenario addressed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 766, "Intentional Interference with 
Performance of Contract by Third Person."  Happy Tails argues 
that our precedent in Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 360 S.E.2d 
832 (1987), stands for the proposition that a plaintiff who 
alleged he was deliberately misled into giving up contractual 
rights stated a claim for tortious interference, and in doing 
so implicitly endorses the doctrine set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A, "Intentional Interference 
with Another's Performance of His Own Contract."  The Reporters 
Notes to § 766A indicate that while the section is new, it was 
"tacitly presented" in § 766.  Two areas in which § 766A is 
more explicitly broad than the former section is that it allows 
for more indirect interference on behalf of the defendant and 
 
30 
allows for recovery of damages against a defendant who makes a 
contract more burdensome or expensive. 
 
We do not reach this issue today.  Even under the broader 
language of § 766A advanced by Happy Tails, its pleading fails.  
Happy Tails attaches to its pleading multiple iterations of the 
contract for the sale of real property.  It does not appear to 
have become more expensive:  the percentage for a deposit and 
total cost remain the same.  Although Happy Tails alleges that 
it was terminated, the last iteration of the contract was 
signed and indicates that settlement would occur the day after 
the amended complaint was filed.  In short, nothing in the 
contract indicates that it has been terminated.  A court 
considering a demurrer may ignore a party's factual allegations 
contradicted by the terms of authentic, unambiguous documents 
that properly are part of the pleadings.  Ward's Equipment, 
Inc. v. New Holland North America, Inc., 254 Va. 379, 381-84, 
493 S.E.2d 516, 518-520 (1997). 
Additionally, the specific allegation advanced by Happy 
Tails is not that Bouffault increased the cost of her contract, 
leading to its termination, but rather that Bouffault's actions 
required hiring "engineers, consultants, scientists, appraisers 
and/or additional services . . . to refute and address 
Defendant's defamatory statements."  Happy Tails does not 
allege that the contract became any more expensive or 
 
31 
burdensome, and so does not meet the pleading requirements for 
tortious interference with contractual relations.  We therefore 
agree with the circuit court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
                                                 Affirmed.