Title: McCain v. Womble

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

144 S.E.2d 857 (1965)
265 N.C. 640
Nannie Sears McCAIN and husband, Dacus P. McCain, Jr.
v.
Betty Sears WOMBLE and husband, Bennie Womble, Earl O. Sears and wife, Elsie B. Sears, and Barbara Ann S. Berge and husband, Phil Berge.
No. 295.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 24, 1965.
*859 Valentine & Valentine, Nashville, for Betty Sears Womble and husband, respondent appellants.
Fields & Cooper and Leon Henderson, Jr., Rocky Mount, for Nannie Sears McCain and husband, petitioner appellants.
Battle, Winslow, Merrell, Scott & Wiley, Rocky Mount, for respondents Sears, appellees.
Evans & Shannonhouse, Rocky Mount, for respondents Berge, appellees.
DENNY, Chief Justice.
This matter was heard by the court below without a jury, a jury having been expressly waived by counsel for all parties. The court heard the evidence and examined the proof offered by the respective parties, found the facts, and entered judgment as hereinabove set out.
Appellants' assignment of error No. 5 is based on an exception to finding of fact No. 10, which reads as follows:
In our opinion, neither the oral evidence nor the documentary proof admitted in the hearing below, supports this finding of fact.
It is true that the quitclaim deed from Ella Calhoun named Mary Womble Sears and her three children as grantees in the deed in which Ella quitclaimed to the grantees her interest in Lot No. 4 of Isaac's land. It clearly appears, however, that this deed was executed for the sole purpose of vesting title to Lot No. 4 in Mary Womble Sears in the exact manner she would have held it under the terms of her father's will and codicil had she been allotted Lot No. 4 of Isaac's land in the partition proceedings, and the deed so stipulates. This deed in no way purports to add to or take from the devise Isaac made to his daughter Mary, but on the contrary purports to vest in Mary a life estate in said Lot No. 4, then, at her death, to go to her next of kin in fee simple.
Now with respect to what Isaac intended by limiting Mary's interest in his estate to an estate for life and after her death to go to her next of kin. Isaac's will must be interpreted from the language used by him and not according to what others might think he meant or what he might *860 have thought the words "next of kin" meant, unless he had expressed a different meaning with respect thereto.
This Court has repeatedly held that the intent of the testator is the polar star that must guide the courts in the interpretation of a will. This intent is to be gathered from a consideration of the will from its four corners, and such intent should be given effect unless contrary to some rule of law or at variance with public policy. Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N.C. 321, 186 S.E. 356; Smith v. Mears, 218 N.C. 193, 10 S.E.2d 659; Williams v. Rand, 223 N.C. 734, 28 S.E.2d 247; House v. House, 231 N.C. 218, 56 S.E.2d 695; Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205; Mewborn v. Mewborn, 239 N.C. 284, 79 S.E.2d 398; Clark v. Connor, 253 N.C. 515, 117 S.E.2d 465; Strong's North Carolina Index, Vol. IV, Wills, § 27, page 502, et seq.
In the case of Elmore v. Austin, supra, Ervin, J., speaking for the Court said:
Appellants also assign as error the signing and entry of the judgment on the ground the same is not supported by competent evidence and is erroneous in law.
In Shoup, Smith and Wallace v. American Trust Co., 245 N.C. 682, 97 S.E.2d 111, it is said:
In the case of Clark v. Connor, supra, this Court said:
*861 In the absence of some expression to show the testator meant otherwise, the words "next of kin" have had a well-defined legal significance and have been uniformly interpreted to mean nearest of kin. Jones v. Oliver (1844), 38 N.C. 369; Simmons v. Gooding (1848), 40 N.C. 382.
In the last cited case Pearson, J., later C. J., said:
We find nothing in the will of Isaac Womble to indicate that he did not intend to use the words "next of kin" in the technical sense which these words have been construed to mean in our long line of judicial decisions. Redmond v. Burroughs, 63 N.C. 242; Harrison v. Ward, 58 N.C. 236; Williamson v. Cox, 218 N.C. 177, 10 S.E.2d 662; Williams v. Johnson, 228 N.C. 732, 47 S.E.2d 24; Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 143 S.E.2d 689.
In the last cited case, Sharp, J., speaking for the Court, said:
We hold that Nannie Sears McCain and Betty Sears Womble each own an undivided one-half interest in Lot No. 4 of Isaac's land, and that Earl O. Sears and Barbara Ann Sears Berge have no right, title or interest in said tract of land.
This cause will be remanded to the end that judgment be entered in accord with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.