Title: Young v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DARUS YOUNG,  
 
§ 
§ 
Defendant Below,  
§ 
Appellant,  
 
§ No. 60, 2002 
§ 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ Court Below: Superior Court  
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ for Sussex County 
§ Cr.A. Nos. S01-02-0384 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ through 0386 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 30, 2002 
Decided: 
November 19, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.1 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 19th day of November 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and oral argument it appears that: 
                                                 
1This matter was originally submitted on briefs before a panel consisting of Chief Justice 
Veasey, Justice Walsh and Justice Holland.  Due to Justice Holland’s unavailability, this matter was 
argued before the panel as listed.  
(1) 
The appellant, Darus E. Young (“Young”) appeals from his conviction in 
the Superior Court following a jury trial of charges of Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Cocaine, Conspiracy in the Second Degree and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  He 
asserts two claims of error: (i) that the trial court erred in permitting the State to 
 
 
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introduce certain evidence of prior bad acts and (ii) that the prosecutor engaged in 
impermissible vouching in his closing summation to the jury.  We find no merit in 
either claim and accordingly affirm. 
(2) 
Young’s arrest resulted from the activities of an alleged acquaintance, 
William Sharpe (“Sharpe”), who agreed to cooperate with the police following Sharpe’s 
own arrest for a drug offense.  While police were present at his home, Sharpe recorded 
a telephone call from an individual, whom Sharpe identified as Young, during which 
arrangements were made to purchase drugs at a specific location.  Young arrived at the 
location in the company of Bettie Whaley (“Whaley”) who was driving, and another 
individual, Willie Bynes, who was seated in the rear.  The police stopped the vehicle 
and arrested all three occupants after finding plastic bags containing crack cocaine 
underneath the driver’s seat.  Later Whaley claimed the drugs were hers and attempted 
to exonerate Young. 
(3) 
At trial, the State, over Young’s objection, attempted to present evidence 
of prior drug transactions between Sharpe and Young.  Initially, the court refused to 
admit such evidence.  Later in the trial, however, when Whaley testified as a reluctant 
State witness and claimed that Young was not involved in the drug transaction, the 
State was permitted to offer the prior bad acts evidence.  Young argued to the Superior 
 
 
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Court that Sharpe’s testimony concerning prior instances when Sharpe claimed he had 
purchased drugs from Young was vague and indefinite, thus failing the Getz factor that 
requires the evidence of prior bad acts to be “plain, clear and conclusive.”2 
                                                 
2Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988), promulgated standards for the admissibility of prior 
bad acts evidence, including the giving of an appropriate jury instruction.  In this case, the trial judge 
carefully analyzed and complied with all factors. 
(4) 
While the record supports Young’s claim that Sharpe was not precise in his 
recounting of his prior drug transactions with Young, he was emphatic that those prior 
events occurred.  To a great extent, the admissibility of Sharpe’s testimony involved an 
assessment of his demeanor as he testified — a function reserved to the judge in the first 
instance, and later as a matter of weight for the jury.  In any event, given our limited 
standard of review, we cannot conclude that Sharpe’s testimony lacked a foundation or 
was clearly erroneous.  While the Getz analysis may be required as a matter of law, to 
the extent that factual determinations are embedded in that exercise, we review the trial 
court’s factual finding under a clearly erroneous standard.  In this regard, the standard 
of review is analogous to that employ ed in reviewing a trial court’s factual findings in a 
suppression hearing.  See, e.g., Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198, 1200 (Del. 1992).  (Trial 
 
 
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court’s findings after evidential standard reversed only if determined to be clearly 
erroneous.) 
(5) 
Young next complains that the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct 
injecting the prosecutor’s own version of pretrial events in cross-examining Whaley, and 
in vouching for that testimony in his closing jury summation.  Although Whaley had 
pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge and was called as a State’s witness at trial, she 
testified that Young was not implicated in her possession of the drugs seized from her 
vehicle.  The State sought to impeach her by extracting from her an admission that she 
had pled guilty to a charge that alleged that she conspired with Young to possess drugs 
with cocaine with intent to deliver.  After further attempts by the prosecutor to 
persuade Whaley to admit that she pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, the State, 
without objection, entered into evidence the Information reflecting the conspiracy 
charge. 
(6) 
Young maintains that the prosecutor, in his closing summation to the jury, 
injected his personal knowledge of Whaley’s plea negotiations and her attempt to 
exonerate Young and thus became a witness for the State.  Preliminarily, we note that 
there was no objection raised during the prosecution’s summation and thus any claim 
of error is reviewed under a plain error standard.  Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 
 
 
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1100 (Del.1986) (to constitute plain error “the error complained of must be so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial 
process.”).  (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982)). 
(7) 
While the prosecutor’s comments relating his knowledge of the particulars 
of Whaley’s plea arrangements were borderline objectionable, any error was harmless in 
view of uncontested admission of the Information which established what the 
prosecution was arguing to the jury: that Whaley’s trial testimony to the effect that 
Young was not involved in the drug transaction which led to her arrest was contradicted 
by her plea of guilty to conspiracy with Young to commit a drug transaction on the 
same date.  The prosecutor’s conduct here, while suggestive of offering his personal 
knowledge, is clearly distinguishable from the circumstances present in Hughes v. State, 
490 A.2d 1034, 1048 (Del. 1985), and Martin v. State, 433 A.2d 1025 (Del. 1981), 
where the prosecutor’s prior contact with a witness and his subsequent effort to 
impeach the witness required that he withdraw in order to testify.  Given the import of 
the admission contained in the Information, the prosecutor’s characterization of 
Whaley’s pretrial actions, even if based on personal participation, added little to the 
impeaching effort of the stipulated evidence.  We find no basis to attribute plain error 
to the prosecutor’s conduct in this case. 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, 
AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
   s/Joseph T. Walsh 
              Justice