Title: RODNEY GENE CHRISTENSEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RODNEY GENE CHRISTENSEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 95Case Number: NO. S-09-0193Decided: 07/02/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RODNEY 
GENE CHRISTENSEN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
H. Reese, Contract Appellate Counsel, Michael Henry Reese, PC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this appeal, 
Rodney Gene Christensen (Christensen) claims that the State breached a plea 
agreement that would have allowed him to enter the Wyoming Substance Abuse 
Treatment & Recovery Centers (WySTAR) before being sentenced.  Finding that Christensen failed to show 
plain error, we will affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did plain error 
occur in the form of  the State 
breaching its plea agreement with Christensen?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 7, 2008, 
Christensen was charged with nine counts of burglary and seven counts of 
larceny.  On July 24, 2008, he 
entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he would plead guilty to 
four of the nine burglary counts and, in return, the State would dismiss the 
remaining counts.  The State also 
agreed that Christensen could be released on his own recognizance to attend 
WySTAR, a substance abuse and recovery program, during the time between his plea 
hearing and sentencing hearing, if a bed became available at WySTAR.  The plea agreement, which was set forth 
orally by defense counsel at the change-of-plea hearing, did not contain any 
specific sentencing recommendations.1  The district court accepted the request 
that Christensen be allowed to enter WySTAR if and when a bed became available, 
but instructed Christensen's attorney to "come back to court either by 
stipulation or a subsequent hearing" at that time in order to modify 
Christensen's bond to allow him to enter WySTAR.

 
 
[¶4]      Following the 
plea hearing, a bed apparently did become available at WySTAR. Christensen's 
attorney contacted the prosecutor and requested that Christensen be released and 
allowed to enter WySTAR.  The 
prosecutor refused the request.  The 
record is not clear as to when a bed became available or when Christensen's 
attorney contacted the prosecutor.  
The record does reflect, however, that Christensen never contacted the 
district court about the WySTAR opening prior to the sentencing hearing.  The record also reflects that 
Christensen never entered WySTAR.

 
 
[¶5]      Sentencing 
occurred on June 25, 2009.  While 
arguing in favor of mitigation, defense counsel mentioned Christensen's need for 
substance abuse treatment, and mentioned that Christensen was accepted into the 
WySTAR program "weeks, if not months, ago."  Christensen's attorney also indicated 
that he contacted the prosecutor and requested that Christensen "be released to 
go to the treatment program, and [the prosecutor] said, no."  No mention was made of a plea agreement, 
and there was no request to continue the sentencing hearing to allow Christensen 
to attend the program.  The district 
court sentenced Christensen to "not less than six nor more than eight years 
confinement" on each of the four counts, to run concurrently.  Christensen now appeals the written 
judgment and sentence claiming a breach of the plea 
agreement.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]      We generally 
review alleged breaches of plea agreements de novo.  E.g. Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 13, 151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 
2007); Spencer v. State, 
2005 WY 105, ¶ 12, 118 P.3d 978, 982-83 (Wyo. 
2005).  However, when a party fails 
to raise the issue of breach of a plea agreement with the district court, we 
review the alleged breach for plain error.  
See Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶¶ 40-41, 100 P.3d 394, 410 (Wyo. 2004).  We have repeatedly held that "[p]lain error exists when 1) the record is 
clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him."  Id. at ¶ 33, at 408 (quoting Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo. 
1994)).  The appellant bears the 
burden of proving plain error.  Id. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Christensen 
argues that the State breached the plea agreement because the agreement was that 
"Christensen would be released on his own recognizance to immediately go and 
participate in the WySTAR program . . . when a bed becomes available," but when 
a bed did in fact become available, the prosecutor did not agree to release 
Christensen.  Under plain error 
analysis, our first task is to determine whether the record is clear regarding 
the alleged error.  Rutti, 2004 WY 133, ¶¶ 40-41, 100 P.3d  at 
410.  Christensen claims the breach 
occurred during a conversation between defense counsel and the prosecutor 
wherein the prosecutor indicated that he would refuse to release Christensen so 
that he could enter WySTAR.  As 
noted above, Christensen mentioned this conversation during the sentencing 
hearing, which the record reflects, and the State, in its brief, acknowledges 
that this conversation occurred.  
Consequently, we find that the record clearly reflects the alleged 
breach.

 
 
[¶8]      The second prong 
of the plain error test requires us to determine whether "there was a 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law."  Id. at ¶ 33, at 408 (quoting Sandy, 870 P.2d at 358).  We have said the following relating to 
plea agreements:   

 
 
A 
plea agreement is a contract between the defendant and the State to which the 
general principles of contract law are applied.  "When determining whether a breach of 
the plea agreement has occurred we:  (1) examine the nature of the promise; 
and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's reasonable 
understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered.'"  Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 11, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo. 2003).  The prosecutor "must explicitly stand 
by" the terms of any agreement; and if the State is unable to carry out the 
terms, the correct remedy is withdrawal of the plea.  Ford, ¶ 18, 69 P.3d  at 412.  The State may not obtain the benefit of 
the agreement and at the same time avoid its obligations without violating 
either the principles of fairness or the principles of contract law.  Id.

 

Frederick, 
2007 WY 27, ¶ 13, 151 P.3d  at 
1141.  Moreover, we have held 
that

 
 
. 
. . "as in contract," a party should not be released from its obligations under 
a plea agreement absent another party's material or substantial breach of that 
agreement.  A material or 
substantial breach is one that goes to the whole consideration of the 
agreement.  Several factors are 
relevant to whether a breach is material or substantial, including the extent to 
which the non-breaching party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably 
expected and the extent to which the breaching party's conduct comports with the standards of 
good faith and fair dealing.  Schade v. State, 2002 WY 133, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo. 2002) 
(citing Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061, 
[1071] (Wyo. 2001)).

 
 

Gibbs 
v. State, 
2008 WY 79, ¶¶ 10-11, 187 P.3d 862, 865-66 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
[¶9]      The following 
statements occurred at the change-of-plea hearing in relation to the terms of 
the plea agreement: 

 
 
[Defense 
Attorney]:  Mr. Christensen has 
agreed to plead guilty to Counts I, III, IV, and VI for the burglary 
counts.  In exchange the State has 
agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.  
There is no agreement regarding sentencing.  There is an agreement that Mr. 
Christensen would be released on his own recognizance to immediately go and 
participate in the WySTAR treatment program in Sheridan, Wyoming, when a bed 
becomes available.

 
 
Your 
Honor, he has been accepted into that program; however, they don't currently 
have a bed available for him.  But 
the agreement is that he would go there.  
We would waive speedy sentencing to allow him to go to that program and 
return to court after he completes that program for his sentencing.  And that is our agreement.  Obviously there is going to be 
restitution to pay.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  Thank you.  [Prosecutor], anything to 
add?

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  No, Your Honor.

 
 
After 
dealing with some other matters, the district court then asked if the parties 
arrived at a bond recommendation and the following colloquy 
occurred:

 
 
[Defense 
Attorney]:  We do, Your Honor.  However, it is not ready to go into 
effect.  We have an agreement for 
his bond to be reduced to release him on his own recognizance to participate in 
the WySTAR inpatient treatment program in Sheridan, Wyoming.  They do not have a bed available for him 
yet, so I'm not sure if the Court wants us to draw up a stipulated order of 
release at the time a bed becomes available or how the Court 
wants.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  I believe probably you 
should come back to court either by stipulation or a subsequent hearing.  We'll take that up at that 
time.

 
 
[Defense 
Attorney]:  Yes, Your Honor.  I'll stay in touch with the treatment 
program.

 
 
There 
is no evidence in the record, nor does Christensen claim that he ever followed 
up on this request with the district court prior to the sentencing hearing. 

 
 
[¶10]   At the beginning of the sentencing 
hearing, nearly a year after the change-of-plea hearing, the district court, the 
prosecutor, and Christensen's attorney discussed the plea agreement.  The district court summarized the plea 
agreement as an agreement by the State to drop some of the charges against 
Christensen in return for his guilty plea to other charges.  Both the prosecutor and Christensen's 
attorney agreed to that characterization of the plea agreement and noted that 
both parties were standing by the agreement.  The WySTAR part of the plea agreement 
was not discussed or even raised at that time.  Not until the end of the hearing did 
defense counsel make the following statements:

 
 
He 
understands this is not the way he wants to live his life, and that what he did 
to people is wrong.  And he was 
accepted to the WYSTAR, one of the best programs we have in the state, the 
WYSTAR Rehabilitation Treatment program.  
He was accepted weeks, if not months, ago.  They reviewed his application, they 
reviewed his letter.  They're not 
going to take you unless they think you're serious about getting treatment.  They accepted him.

 
 
I 
advised [the prosecutor] of that, and asked if he could be released to go to the 
treatment program, and [the prosecutor] said, no.  There's a punishment element that the 
district attorney's looking at prior to a rehabilitation element.  And that he can -- He hopes he gets 
treatment, wants him to get treatment.  
But said, no, I'm not going to release him to treatment, so he continued 
to sit in jail.

 
 
WYSTAR 
is still there.  They know that he's 
going to court today.  We've stayed 
in touch with the program.  They say 
if today he's allowed to go to treatment, they'll have a bed for him.  And so that is still available for Mr. 
Christensen.  

 
 
[¶11]   From the record before us, we 
cannot say that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  Christensen points to the conversation 
with the prosecutor, wherein the prosecutor refused to release Christensen to 
allow him to enter WySTAR, as being a breach of the plea agreement.  However, a review of the record, 
including the terms of the plea agreement and the actions of the parties, do not 
lead us to conclude that the conversation necessarily constituted a breach.  First, although both parties agree that 
the prosecutor indicated to Christensen's attorney that he would not release 
Christensen to allow him to enter WySTAR, the context and substance of that 
conversation are not reflected in the record.  More importantly, the State did not 
object to or otherwise prevent Christensen from moving the district court to 
release Christensen to WySTAR, as appears to have been the court's expectation 
when it said at sentencing that "you should come back to court."  A release order would have had to come 
from the district court, not from the State.  Finally, Christensen never directly 
raised before the district court the treatment issue as being a breach of the 
plea agreement.  In fact, defense 
counsel stated at the beginning of the sentencing hearing that both parties were 
currently standing by the terms of the plea agreement.  Both parties were apparently treating 
the plea agreement as if it had not been breached and as if both parties were 
complying with their respective obligations.  Under these facts, we just cannot say 
that there was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The record reflects the incident 
that Christensen points to as the alleged breach; however, the record does not 
clearly reflect that a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
occurred.  The most that can be said 
is that the prosecutor made an out-of-court statement that he would not release 
Christensen to WySTAR.  With or 
without a plea agreement, the prosecutor does not have such release authority. 
 That authority belongs to the 
district court, and the record shows that Christensen never complied with the 
district court's instructions to "come back to court" when a bed became 
available at WySTAR.  Furthermore, 
Christensen never directly raised the issue of breach with the district 
court.    Accordingly, Christensen failed to 
prove plain error.

 
 
[¶13]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1There had been a written plea agreement, but its terms were changed just 
prior to the hearing, so the district court allowed Christensen's attorney to 
state the terms orally and submit a written copy at a later date.  It does not appear from the record, 
however, that a written agreement was ever 
submitted.