Title: Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Const.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Const.1997 WY 63939 P.2d 718Case Number: 96-224Decided: 05/19/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the Matter of the Worker's 
Compensation Case of:

MICHAEL A. ERHART, 

Appellant(Employee/Petitioner), 

v. 

FLINT ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION, 

Appellee(Employer/Respondent), 

And

 STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 

Appellee(Objector/Respondent).

Appeal from the District Court, Hot Springs 
County

The Honorable Gary P. Hartman, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert A. Nicholas 
of Hettinger & Leedy, Riverton.

Representing 
Appellee:

Catherine 
MacPherson of MacPherson Law Offices, LLC, Rawlins, for Appellee Flint 
Engineering & Construction.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, for Appellee State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY and 
LEHMAN, JJ., and DONNELL, District Judge.

DONNELL, 
District Judge.

[¶1]      The debate in 
this case is whether a claimant, who was denied worker's compensation benefits 
and failed to appeal the adverse decision in the manner provided in the Rules 
for Contested Case Practice and Procedure Before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, can reopen his case under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) (1991) or W.R.C.P. 
60(b). Michael A. Erhart (Erhart) filed a claim in Wyoming for worker's 
compensation benefits for a work-related injury. The hearing examiner ultimately 
determined Erhart's injury occurred in Colorado in August of 1992, and denied 
benefits. Erhart also filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits for his 
work-related injury in Colorado. The Colorado hearing examiner ultimately 
determined Erhart failed to prove that his back condition was the natural and 
proximate result of the injury in August of 1992, and also denied benefits. 
Erhart then filed a Motion to Re-Open Workers' Compensation Claim with Wyoming's 
Office of Administrative Hearings. This motion was denied. The appeal to the 
district court resulted in an order affirming the denial. We reverse and remand 
for a determination by the Office of Administrative Hearings as to whether 
Erhart sustained a work-related injury in Wyoming while an employee of Flint 
Engineering & Construction (Flint).

I. ISSUES

[¶2]      Erhart states the 
issue as follows:

1. Is Mr. Erhart 
entitled to re-open his workers' compensation claim pursuant to W.S. § 27-14-605 
or W.R.C.P., Rule 60?

[¶3]      Flint sets forth 
these issues:

A. Under State ex 
rel., Worker's Compensation Division v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1994), Rule 
60(b), W.R.C.P., is not available to a Wyoming worker's compensation claimant to 
"reopen" or obtain relief from a final order which denied 
benefits.

B. A Wyoming 
worker's compensation claimant is not entitled to "reopen" his claim under W.S. 
§ 27-14-605(a) (1977 Repub. Ed.) when there has been no determination in favor 
of or in behalf of the employee for any benefits under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act.

C.W.S. § 
27-14-605(a) (1977 Repub. Ed.) does not violate equal protection under the 
Wyoming Constitution or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

[¶4]      Finally, State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (Division) states three 
issues:

A. Whether Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-605 applies only when an injured employee has been awarded 
workers' compensation benefits and whether it provides the exclusive means for 
modification of an administrative determination of a claim for workers' 
compensation benefits.

B. If Rule 60(b) of 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure does apply to workers' compensation 
administrative determinations, whether Rule 60(b) will afford relief upon the 
ground that the moving party's expert witness provided inconsistent testimony in 
separate administrative hearings.

C. Whether Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-605, if it permits a modification of an administrative 
determination only when workers' compensation benefits have been awarded, 
violates an unsuccessful claimant's constitutional right to equal protection of 
the laws.

II. FACTS

[¶5]      In August of 
1992, Erhart, an employee of Flint, injured his back while carrying oil field 
apparatus near Cheyenne Wells, Colorado. He did not consult a physician, report 
the injury to Flint or file a worker's compensation claim in Colorado for that 
injury. On July 1, 1993, while moving a three-inch pipe at a field south of 
Meeteetse, Wyoming, Erhart sustained an injury when the pipe fell on him. He 
experienced some tingling sensation during that day. Over the holiday weekend, 
Erhart experienced a severe tingling sensation in his right leg. He subsequently 
sought medical attention from Dr. Charles McMahon, a neurologist in Lander, 
Wyoming. Erhart was advised that his physical symptoms might be related to his 
non-reported injury in Colorado the previous year. He initially filed a worker's 
compensation claim in Colorado and, shortly thereafter, filed a claim in 
Wyoming. 

[¶6]      Flint requested 
Erhart undergo an evaluation by Dr. Michael W. Miller, a family practitioner in 
Lander. Dr. Miller was unable to identify within a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty the cause of Erhart's symptoms, but Dr. Miller was apparently not 
given information about the pipe which fell on Erhart in July of 
1993.

[¶7]      Because Erhart's 
injury was not responsive to conservative treatment, Dr. McMahon referred Erhart 
to Dr. Maurice Smith, a surgeon in Billings, Montana, who ultimately performed 
surgery. In a letter to Dr. McMahon dated August 30, 1993, Dr. Smith 
stated:

[T]here is no 
question but what this is an industrial injury related to the August 22, 1992, 
injury in which he had recurrent episodes of back pain which eventually led to 
the herniation causing the pain down his leg and led to the claudication. * * * 
[T]herefore, this should be covered under the workmen's compensation 
insurance.

[¶8]      Flint and the 
Division objected to Erhart's Wyoming claim, and a contested case hearing was 
held on January 7, 1994. The hearing examiner made it clear that Erhart had 
substantial contact with doctors over the years, and Erhart's credibility was 
not in question. Based on statements by Dr. McMahon and Dr. Smith, the hearing 
examiner concluded Erhart suffered a work-related injury on August 22, 1992 in 
Colorado. Notwithstanding the finding the injury occurred in Colorado, the 
hearing examiner awarded benefits. Flint and the Division filed a joint motion 
to reconsider, objecting because the injury occurred in Colorado and arguing 
that it should not be compensated by Wyoming. Following another hearing, 
benefits were denied because the injury was deemed to have occurred in 
Colorado.

[¶9]      Erhart also 
pursued his claim in Colorado. Findings issued by Colorado's hearing examiner 
stated that Dr. Miller had updated the Physician's Initial Report and indicated 
that Erhart's impairment was due to the injury occurring on July 1, 1993. The 
Colorado hearing examiner's findings stated that a doctor's note relating to 
Erhart's 1992 back injury indicated the pain was slightly higher than the 
current pain experienced by Erhart. The Colorado hearing examiner's findings 
also referred to a subsequent letter from Dr. Smith, which 
stated:

Certainly, if you 
fell down with the pipe falling on top of you with the back condition that you 
had, this may well have led to the difficulty. It has always been my * * * 
opinion, however, that it was probably the original injury in August 1992 that 
was responsible for the problem that has much persisted when you had your first 
back pain.

The Colorado hearing examiner's last finding 
stated that Erhart had been seen by Dr. J. Tashop Bernton at the request of 
Flint and that Dr. Bernton testified he did not believe Erhart suffered an 
injury on August 22, 1992. Dr. Bernton based his findings on the facts that 
Erhart did not seek medical care, did not suffer any impairment or work 
restrictions, continued to perform heavy work through July 1, 1993, and upon 
portions of the history provided by other physicians. The Colorado hearing 
examiner concluded that Erhart failed to establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that his problems were causally related to the August 22, 1992 
accident. He denied benefits and dismissed the claim.

[¶10]   Further pursuing this 
administrative shell game, Erhart returned to Wyoming and filed a Motion to 
Re-Open Workers' Compensation Claim in the Office of Administrative Hearings 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b). The motion was filed ten months after the initial 
decision in Wyoming. The hearing examiner denied the motion, stating it was not 
filed within the ten-day time limit as required by the Rules for Contested Case 
Practice and Procedure Before the Office of Administrative Hearings, ch. 3, § 
6(c). He also ruled that W.R.C.P. 60(b) was no longer applicable to a proceeding 
to modify or terminate an award in a worker's compensation case as dictated by 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 
1994). He concluded that the only way to reopen a case was to file a petition 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) and that because a determination had not 
been made in favor of Erhart, no relief was available under this provision. 
Erhart's appeal to the district court resulted in an order affirming the denial 
of the hearing examiner. Erhart appeals from the district court's order 
affirming the hearing examiner.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶11]   This court's review of 
administrative action or inaction is confined to the record and is limited by 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) to those matters specified in Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1990), 
which provides that the reviewing court shall:

(ii) Hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law[.]

[¶12]   We do not afford deference to the 
reviewing court's findings of fact or conclusions of law. Regarding agency 
determinations, we have said:

Unlike its findings 
of fact, however, an administrative agency's conclusions of law are afforded no 
special deference, and will be affirmed only if truly in accord with the law. 
Matter of Cordova, 882 P.2d 880, 882 (Wyo. 1994). See also Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c).

Coleman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 915 P.2d 595, 598 
(Wyo. 1996).

IV. ANALYSIS

[¶13]   All parties agree that a 
"determination" for benefits was never made in favor of or on behalf of Erhart, 
and Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) cannot apply. Erhart argues W.R.C.P. 60(b) is only 
superseded in cases involving a determination made "in favor of or on behalf of" 
an employee. Flint and the Division, relying on Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 
contend Erhart is foreclosed from reopening his claim because W.R.C.P. 60 was 
declared to be superseded in its entirety by the specific legislation of Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-605. They argue the remedy provided by Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) 
is not available to Erhart because no determination was made in his favor or on 
his behalf.

[¶14]   The first issue to be confronted is 
whether the hearing examiner's conclusion that Erhart is precluded from 
reopening his case under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) was in accordance with the 
law. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) provides:

If a 
determination is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act, an application may be made to the division by any 
party within four (4) years from the date of the last payment for additional 
medical and disability benefits or for a modification of the amount of benefits 
on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or 
upon grounds of mistake or fraud.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶15]   To analyze this statute, we follow 
clear rules of statutory construction which we have recently reiterated as 
follows:

Our systematic 
approach to statutory interpretation was carefully articulated in Parker Land 
& Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 
1993):

"[T]he intent [of 
the lawgiver] is the vital part, and the essence of the law * * *. Such intent, 
however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute * * * under 
construction. Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897). 
* * * `[T]he initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation * * * is an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.' Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 133, 
50 P.  at 823 * * *. A statute `must be construed as a whole in order to 
ascertain its intent and general purpose and also the meaning of each part.' 
Ross v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 31 Wyo. 464, 489, 228 P. 642, 
651 (1924); accord City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo. 
1991). `[W]e give effect to every word, clause and sentence and construe all 
components of a statute in pari materia.' Facer, 814 P.2d  at 270 * * *.", 

Griess v. Office of the Attorney General, 
Div.  of Criminal 
Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 737 
(Wyo. 1997). 

[¶16]   Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605 addresses 
finality in worker's compensation cases in its opening clause and restricts the 
reopening of cases to those in which a "determination" has been "made in favor 
of or on behalf of an employee * * *." The fact that the language in this 
section only addresses cases in which a determination has been made shows the 
intent of the legislature that cases in which benefits are awarded are the only 
cases that can be reopened under this section. The ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the phrase "determination is made * * * on behalf of an employee" refers to 
claims such as those filed by dependents entitled to benefits under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act or claims filed on behalf of health care providers to 
be paid for services provided to an injured employee. Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-605(a).

[¶17]   This conclusion is bolstered by the 
words found in its statute of limitation "within four (4) years from the date of 
the last payment * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a). Payments of benefits are 
made only when an employee has a determination made in his favor or in his 
behalf and the phrase "from the date of the last payment" cannot apply to claims 
that have been denied. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a). In addition, a basic tenet of 
statutory construction is, "that omission of words from a statute is considered 
to be an intentional act by the Legislature. This Court should not read words 
into a statute when the Legislature has chosen not to include them." Eiselein 
v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 900 (Wyo. 1994), Macy, J., specially 
concurring (citing Carroll By and Through Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit 
Ass'n, 755 P.2d 869, 872-73 (Wyo. 1988)). Absence of language regarding 
parties in cases in which benefits have been denied shows the intent of the 
legislature that unsuccessful parties cannot reopen cases under Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-605(a). When the statute is construed as a whole to ascertain its intent 
and general purpose and meaning of each part, as our rules of statutory 
construction require us to do, we find Erhart is foreclosed from reopening his 
claim under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a).

[¶18]   We proceed to determine whether an 
unsuccessful claimant can reopen his case under W.R.C.P. 60(b). Erhart argues 
the hearing examiner's holding that W.R.C.P. 60(b) is no longer applicable to 
modify or terminate an award in a worker's compensation case is unsound. Erhart 
contends that W.R.C.P. 60(b) is not superseded in all respects and that a motion 
can be made for any reason set forth in the rule which is not addressed in Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-605(a) such as neglect, inadvertence, surprise or newly discovered 
evidence if the motion is made within one year. If this is not so, Erhart states 
he has no legal remedy.

Rule 60, W.R.C.P., 
is remedial and is to be liberally construed. As has been said, the express 
purpose of Rule 60(b) "is to provide the courts with the means of relieving a 
party from the oppression of a final judgment or order, on a proper showing" 
where such judgments are "unfairly" or "mistakenly" 
entered.

Westring v. Cheyenne Nat. 
Bank, 393 P.2d 119, 123-24 (Wyo. 
1964). W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part:

On motion, and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; * * * (5) the judgment has been satisfied * * * 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for 
reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶19]   Flint and the Division argue that 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) is superseded in all respects by the specific legislation in Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-605(a) and rely on Jerding, 868 P.2d  at 249 for that 
proposition:

Because an award of 
worker's compensation benefits is no longer a "judicial determination," we do 
not believe that, under the circumstances of this case, the modification or 
termination of such an award should be governed by the one-year statute of 
limitations contained in W.R.C.P. 60(b). The revised W.R.C.P. 60(b) recognizes 
that its terms may be superseded by specific legislation.

[¶20]   We agree with Flint and the 
Division that "under the circumstances of [Jerding]" the specific 
legislation of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) superseded W.R.C.P. 60(b), but we 
distinguish Jerding from this case. Erhart neither enjoyed a 
determination in his favor nor received any benefits as the appellee did in 
Jerding. Even Flint and the Division argue such unsuccessful claimants 
are excluded from the express language of the statute, yet they would have this 
court read in another exclusion which simply is not there. We have determined 
that Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) is not available to Erhart and, because that 
provision has no application to unsuccessful applicants, it cannot supersede 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) in this case. In addition, the phrase "[t]he revised W.R.C.P. 
60(b) recognizes that its terms may be superseded by specific 
legislation" does not mandate W.R.C.P. 60(b) be superseded in every instance. 
Jerding, 868 P.2d  at 249 (emphasis added).

[¶21]   This finding is congruent with our 
decision in Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 58 (Wyo. 1995) where 
we addressed the issue of whether a summary judgment provided for in W.R.C.P. 56 
is available in an administrative proceeding addressing issues under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act:

It appears that the 
legislature expressly has conferred authority to invoke the WYOMING RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, and the RULES FOR CONTESTED CASE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE 
THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS (1993) (hereinafter RULES FOR CONTESTED 
CASE PRACTICE) now provide in Chapter I, Section 6, entitled "General Course of 
Contested Case Proceedings:"

"Unless 
otherwise provided by law, proceedings before the Office are governed by 
the contested case provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and, 
to the extent their application is not inconsistent with the particular 
administrative contested case proceeding, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
and other court rules may be looked to for 
guidance."

(Emphasis added and in 
original.)

[¶22]   With respect to unsuccessful 
claimants, once the ten-day time limit for appeal has passed, no provision of 
law except W.R.C.P. 60(b) exists to provide relief for mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, 
misrepresentation, misconduct, inequitable judgment or any other reason 
justifying relief from the judgment. In the absence of other provisions of law, 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) is applicable, and Erhart must be allowed leave to request his 
case be reopened. We reject the argument that Jerding requires W.R.C.P. 
60(b) to be superseded by Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) under all 
circumstances.

[¶23]   This result is particularly 
appropriate given statements in oral argument, which were not denied, to the 
effect that a supervisor at Flint told Erhart to apply for worker's compensation 
benefits in Colorado so that the Wyoming work record would not be blemished and 
the employees could receive a bonus. This result is also appropriate given Flint 
argued in Wyoming that Erhart's accident occurred in Colorado and argued in 
Colorado that Erhart's accident occurred in Wyoming. While the issue of judicial 
estoppel has not been raised by the parties, the principles regarding 
inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings are ones of fairness and may well 
apply to worker's compensation determinations.1 Applying these principles in this 
case estops Flint from arguing inconsistent positions of fact regarding where 
Erhart's injury occurred.

[¶24]   The Division expresses concern 
about finality and argues that a claimant who fails to make the necessary 
initial showing of compensability enjoys other procedural safeguards and should 
not be entitled to a second opportunity to prove compensability under W.R.C.P. 
60(b). We addressed the concern for finality in Jerding. In that case, 
the Division requested a modification to terminate benefits for all future 
claims. We found the Division was entitled under the reopening provision of Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-605(a) to petition to terminate benefits awarded by mistake or 
procured by fraud even though no new evidence was presented that the Division 
could not have discovered prior to the initial hearing. We pointed out that this 
finding was consistent with the provision's purpose of balancing the concept of 
finality with the desire to see that the claimant received no less and no more 
than that to which he was lawfully entitled. Jerding, 868 P.2d  at 
249.

[¶25]   In this case, too, we balance the 
concept of finality with the desire to see that Erhart receives no less and no 
more than that to which he is lawfully entitled. We perceive no policy which 
favors denying a claim for injury which the employer concedes was work related. 
This is especially true since the Division conceded in oral argument that 
reopening a denied worker's compensation determination under circumstances such 
as these would not present a harsh result.

[¶26]   Regarding Erhart and all claimants, 
claims must accurately state the facts and must not be filed with the goal of 
pleasing the employer or co-employees in order for all to receive a bonus or for 
other spurious reasons. To safeguard their right to worker's compensation 
benefits, claimants must candidly share information with their treating 
physician or expert to aid in forming his or her opinion as to the cause of the 
injury. To do otherwise is to plot a perilous course which may ultimately end in 
denial of benefits.

[¶27]   Given our previous holdings, no 
need exists to reach the constitutional question of equal 
protection.

V. CONCLUSION

[¶28]   We reverse and remand the district 
court's order affirming denial for further proceedings consistent herewith. 
Erhart should be allowed leave to request his case be reopened under W.R.C.P. 
60(b) for the purpose of determining whether or not he should be awarded 
worker's compensation benefits in Wyoming for his work-related 
injury.

Footnotes

1 Regarding a claim filed under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, we said: "We acknowledge that this court does 
not look with favor upon a party's altering a position to suit the interests of 
his case. See Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1978); Allen v. 
Allen, 550 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1976)." Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 
378 (Wyo. 1988). 

Judicial estoppel principles 
include where a man is successful in the position taken in the first proceeding, 
then that position rises to the dignity of conclusiveness. Hatten Realty Co. 
v. Baylies, 42 Wyo. 69, 290 P. 561, 566 (Wyo. 1930). A party is estopped "to 
play fast and loose with the courts or to trifle with judicial proceedings. It 
is an expression of the maxim that one cannot blow hot and cold in the same 
breath. A party will just not be allowed to maintain inconsistent positions in 
judicial proceedings * * *." Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 
1976). A party who, by his pleadings, statements or contentions, under oath, has 
assumed a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an 
inconsistent position in a subsequent action. Most courts also require that the 
initial position taken must be one regarding fact. Judicial estoppel does not 
apply to legal conclusions based on undisputed facts. Matter of Paternity of 
SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Wyo. 1994); Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Wyo. 1991).

"The Illinois court found `no 
reason to distinguish between judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings in the 
application of the doctrine [judicial estoppel] [because] [a]dministrative 
agencies need to ascertain the truth of the parties' positions in order to 
resolve . . . disputes.'" Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis, 686 So. 2d 268, 275 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 686 So. 2d 278 (Ala. 1996) 
(quoting Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D.Ill. 
1989)).