Title: P. v. Garcia

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/28/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S124090 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C043590 
CATHY DAWN GARCIA, 
) 
 
 
) 
Butte County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CM015310 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
Nearly 25 years ago, we held in People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, that a 
welfare recipient who has been exonerated of fraud charges by the Department of 
Social Services in an administrative hearing cannot be criminally prosecuted for 
welfare fraud, because the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the prosecution from 
relitigating issues that were determined in the administrative hearing.  The 
Attorney General urges us to reconsider our decision in Sims based, in part, on 
statutory changes enacted more than 20 years ago.  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that these statutory and other changes do not warrant reconsideration of 
this court’s decision in Sims.   
 
2
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Defendant is the mother of four children.  She applied for welfare 
assistance, representing that her household unit consisted of herself and all of her 
children.  A dispute arose over whether defendant’s two oldest children, both 
boys, actually were residing in defendant’s household, or instead were living with 
their father.   
 
In August 2000, the Butte County Department of Social Welfare (the 
County) sent defendant several notices of action advising her that she had received 
$5,839 in welfare benefits between October 1998 and June 2000 to which she was 
not entitled:  $3,669 in cash aid and $2,170 in food stamps.  The initial notices 
explained that “the overpayment was caused by the County,” or alternately that the 
“County Welfare Department made a mistake,” and also noted that “the wrong 
household size was used” to calculate the cash aid and food stamps to which 
defendant was entitled. 
 
Defendant requested an administrative hearing on the County’s proposal to 
recoup the overpayment from her future benefit grants.  At this hearing, the 
County rescinded the notices of action; the matter was dismissed without prejudice 
on January 30, 2001.  Later, the County issued new notices, alleging that the 
overpayment of cash aid and overissuance of food stamps were caused by 
defendant’s failure to report that the two boys were living with their father, which 
constituted a material change in her household.  
 
In May 2001, an administrative law judge held a hearing to determine 
“[w]hether the boys were members of the assistance unit and household during the 
periods in question,” and “[w]hether the overissuance and overpayment were the 
result of administrative errors or [defendant’s] failure to report the boys’ absence 
from her home.”  Evidence admitted at the hearing included a county case 
worker’s determination that defendant remained eligible for benefits for her sons 
after she reported in September 1998 that they lived with their father “half of the 
 
3
time.”  Evidence, however, also was presented to the contrary: that defendant’s 
sons lived with their father during the week, that he had assumed primary 
responsibility for the care of the two boys since before 1997, and that their longest 
stay with defendant was for four weeks in the summer of 1999.   
 
In the written decision that followed the administrative hearing, the 
administrative law judge noted that there were three potential causes of the alleged  
overpayment: (1) “inadvertent household error,” (2) “administrative error,” and 
(3) “intentional program violations.”  The administrative law judge concluded that 
the overpayment in this case was “the result of administrative errors of omission 
committed by the county welfare department,” because the county did not conduct 
required periodic redetermination reviews and investigations.  Therefore the 
administrative law judge ordered that “[t]he claim is granted in that all the 
overpayments and overissuances are determined to have been caused by 
administrative errors.  In all other respects, the claim is denied.”  Defendant was 
ordered to repay the excess benefits.  
 
In March 2001, while the administrative proceedings were pending, 
defendant was charged by felony complaint with fraudulently receiving welfare 
benefits of over $400 in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10980, 
subdivision (c)(2)1 and committing perjury by false application for aid (Pen. Code, 
§ 118) when she “affirmatively omitted that [her sons] had moved out of the 
defendant’s home.”   
 
After the administrative decision was issued, defendant moved to dismiss 
the criminal action, arguing that collateral estoppel barred the district attorney 
from proceeding on criminal charges because the administrative law decision had 
determined that she had received the excess welfare benefits because of 
                                              
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code.  
 
4
administrative errors by the County.  The trial court denied her motion and, 
following a bench trial, defendant was convicted on both counts.  
 
Defendant appealed.  The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in a 
published decision, holding that the trial court erred in failing to follow Sims, in 
which this court held that collateral estoppel bars the state from prosecuting for 
welfare fraud a person who was exonerated of that charge in administrative 
proceedings.  (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)  We granted the 
People’s petition for review.   
II. 
DISCUSSION 
The People argue that this court should reconsider our decision in People v. 
Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 (Sims), in light of intervening changes in the law.  In 
1982, we addressed in Sims circumstances similar to those in the present case and 
held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the People from prosecuting 
for welfare fraud a welfare recipient who had been exonerated at an administrative 
hearing conducted by the county.  (Id. at p. 489.) 
 
In Sims, the Social Services Department of Sonoma County sought to 
recoup from June Sims alleged overpayments of aid and food stamps.  Sims 
requested an administrative hearing to challenge the decision.  Meanwhile, the 
district attorney charged Sims with felony welfare fraud under section 11483.  The 
county refused to participate in the administrative hearing, asserting that the 
pending criminal charges divested the county of jurisdiction.  After Sims 
presented evidence in her behalf, the hearing officer determined that the county 
had not met its burden of proof and ordered the county to rescind its notice of 
action against Sims and refund any restitution payments she had made. The county 
did not seek a rehearing or judicial review.  Sims then moved to dismiss the 
criminal information, contending that the decision at the administrative hearing 
collaterally estopped the criminal prosecution.  The trial court granted Sims’s 
motion, and the People appealed.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 473-474.) 
 
5
 
We began our discussion in Sims by noting that the United States Supreme 
Court had concluded that “[c]ollateral estoppel may be applied to decisions made 
by administrative agencies ‘[when] an administrative agency is acting in a judicial 
capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties 
have had an adequate opportunity to litigate . . . .’ ”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 479, quoting United States v. Utah Constr. Co. (1966) 384 U.S. 394, 422, italics 
omitted; see also Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 921, 944 (Pacific Lumber).)  We noted that the standard formulated in 
Utah Construction supports the primary public policy goal underlying the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel:  “ ‘limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one 
fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.’ ”  (Sims, supra, at 
p. 479, quoting Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811.)  
 
We concluded in Sims that an administrative hearing conducted by the 
California Department of Social Services (DSS) was “a judicial-like adversary 
proceeding,” emphasizing that: 1) the hearing was impartial; 2) all testimony was 
submitted under oath; 3) both parties could call and cross-examine witnesses and 
introduce documentary evidence; 4) the parties could request that witnesses be 
subpoenaed; 5) regulations required that a verbatim record of the hearing be made; 
and 6) a written decision would issue after the hearing.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
pp. 479-480.)  Sims also stressed that the administrative decision was adjudicatory 
in nature, as it involved applying “ ‘a rule . . . to a specific set of existing facts,’ 
rather than ‘the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases.’ ” (Id. at p. 
480, quoting Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 
11 Cal.3d 28, 34-35, fn. 2.)  Finally, we noted that the availability of a rehearing 
before the agency and the right to petition for review in superior court supported 
our conclusion that the administrative hearing was judicial in nature.  (Sims, supra, 
32 Cal. 3d at p. 480.)   
 
6
 
We then considered whether the traditional requirements of collateral 
estoppel had been satisfied.  There are five threshold requirements:  1) the issue to 
be precluded must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; 2) the issue 
must have been actually litigated at that time; 3) the issue must have been 
necessarily decided; 4) the decision in the prior proceeding must be final and on 
the merits; and 5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be in privity 
with the party to the former proceeding.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484; accord, 
Pacific Lumber, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 943; see also Lucido v. Superior Court 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 (Lucido); Rest.2d Judgments, § 27.) 
 
In examining whether the welfare fraud issue was actually litigated at the 
administrative hearing,  we noted in Sims that respondent’s request for an 
administrative hearing had “properly raised” the welfare fraud issue, that the 
controversy was submitted for a determination on the merits, and that there was a 
finding that made “clear that respondent’s guilt or innocence of welfare fraud was 
actually litigated at the . . . fair hearing.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484.)   
 
We also held in Sims that the welfare fraud issue actually litigated in the 
administrative hearing was “identical to that involved in the criminal 
proceedings.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 485.)  After noting that the same 
amount of overpayments, the same relevant time periods, and the same allegation 
that Sims had failed to report a change in her household size were at issue in the 
administrative hearing as in the criminal prosecution, we addressed the fact that 
different burdens of proof apply at administrative hearings and in criminal 
prosecutions.  Because an administrative hearing is civil in nature, and the county 
must prove its case by a preponderance of evidence, the burden at the hearing is 
not as great as the state’s burden at a criminal proceeding of proving a defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we concluded that “if the County fails to prove 
its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence at the fair hearing, it follows a 
fortiori that it has not satisfied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.”  (Ibid.) 
 
7
 
We then held that the administrative law judge’s decision is “final for 
purposes of applying collateral estoppel” when the deadline for the welfare 
department to seek rehearing passes, or upon the finality of any appeals of the 
administrative hearing decision.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 485-486.) 
 
Finally, we concluded in Sims that the county and the district attorney were 
in privity, as is required for collateral estoppel to apply.  Although there is “ ‘no 
universally applicable definition of privity,’ ”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 486, 
quoting Lynch v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 943, 947), we explained that 
whether privity exists depends upon whether the “ ‘relationship between the party 
to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . is “sufficiently 
close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’ ”  (Id. at 
pp. 486-487, quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 
875.) 
 
In discussing whether privity existed, we examined the relationship 
between “the district attorney’s office, which represents the party to be estopped, 
and the County, the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . .”  (Sims, supra, 
32 Cal.3d at p. 487.)  Both entities, we noted, are county agencies that are 
designated by statute to represent the interests of the State of California; just as the 
district attorney’s office represents the state in criminal matters (Pen. Code, § 
684), the county welfare department acts for the state in administrative 
proceedings related to welfare benefits.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10800.)  Entities 
that are “ ‘agents of the same government’ ” are generally found to be in privity, 
because they are both acting to vindicate the rights of the same governmental 
entity.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 487.)   
 
The Sims decision additionally recognized the “close association between 
the County and the district attorney’s office” in cases involving alleged benefit 
overpayments and welfare fraud.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 487.)  We 
explained that the district attorney and the county “operate jointly in investigating 
 
8
and controlling welfare fraud,” and that a special unit had been created “to 
investigate suspected welfare fraud and to function as a liaison between the 
County and law enforcement agencies.”  (Ibid.)  We also noted that the county 
must provide documentary evidence to the district attorney upon request, and that 
county officials must be available to appear at criminal hearings and trials.  The 
Sims decision also mentioned that “[i]n addition, an attempt by the County to 
obtain restitution of overpayments made to a welfare recipient suspected of fraud 
is sufficient to satisfy the mandate of section 11483 that the district attorney seek 
restitution before commencing criminal proceedings.”  (Id. at p. 488.)  In view of 
the integrated relationship between the county and the district attorney in 
controlling welfare fraud, this court found in Sims that the county and the district 
attorney were in privity for purposes of applying collateral estoppel.   
   
Having concluded that the traditional requirements of collateral estoppel 
were satisfied, we then examined whether precluding the district attorney from 
prosecuting the welfare recipient would further the traditional public policies 
served by the collateral estoppel doctrine.  We noted in Sims that the application of 
collateral estoppel to bar criminal prosecutions of welfare fraud would further 
several public policy goals.  First, we observed that “[g]iving conclusive effect to 
the [administrative] decision exonerating respondent of welfare fraud would 
promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation.”  (Sims, supra, 32 
Cal.3d at p. 488; see also Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 849.)  Additionally, 
we expressed concern that, unless the later prosecutions were estopped, the 
possibility of inconsistent judgments could undermine the integrity of the judicial 
system as well as the integrity of the administrative hearing process; if a welfare 
recipient is found in an administrative hearing to have lawfully received welfare 
benefits, and then is successfully prosecuted in criminal court for welfare fraud, 
both decisions become suspect.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.)   
 
9
 
The possibility of having to defend the receipt of welfare benefits in two 
forums also works a hardship on the welfare recipient; if collateral estoppel does 
not apply, the welfare recipient cannot rely upon success at the administrative 
hearing because “he or she may still be required to return the benefits” after a 
criminal prosecution.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)  Finally, we explained 
that precluding the district attorney from relitigating the issue of welfare fraud 
would protect welfare recipients from being harassed by repeated litigation.  After 
receiving a judgment at the administrative hearing that the county did not 
satisfactorily prove that the welfare recipient wrongly received welfare benefits, 
we commented that it would be “manifestly unfair” to subject her to a second 
proceeding in criminal court “in which she must defend herself against the very 
same charges of misconduct.”  (Ibid.) 
 
As additional support for the conclusion that the application of collateral 
estoppel would further the public policy considerations served by the doctrine as a 
whole, we observed that “[i]n addition to the public policy considerations . . . the 
uniqueness of the statutory scheme governing prosecutions for [welfare] fraud and 
the circumstances of the individuals receiving welfare benefits make application of 
collateral estoppel particularly appropriate . . . .”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 489.) 
 
Principles of stare decisis present a formidable obstacle to the People’s 
request that we reconsider our decision in Sims, which has been the law for nearly 
25 years:  “It is, of course, a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior 
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered 
anew, might be decided differently by the current justices.  This policy, known as 
the doctrine of stare decisis, ‘is based on the assumption that certainty, 
predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; 
i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into 
relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.’ ” (Moradi-
 
10
Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296, quoting 9 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 758, p. 726.)  Although we 
recognize that “reexamination of precedent may become necessary when 
subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was unsound, or has become 
ripe for reconsideration,” (Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 297) the 
arguments posed by the People do not convince us that a reexamination of our 
decision in Sims is warranted.   
 
The People first argue that our decisions subsequent to Sims place in doubt 
our characterization of the district attorney as essentially a “county agency,”  and 
therefore have undercut our holding in Sims that the district attorney and the 
county are in privity.  This argument is based upon a false premise.  Our decision 
in Sims did not characterize the district attorney as a county agency but, to the 
contrary, emphasized that the district attorney acts as an agent of the state in 
prosecuting welfare fraud: “The district attorney’s office represents the State of 
California in the name of the ‘People’ at criminal prosecutions.”  (Sims, supra, 32 
Cal.3d at 487.)  It was precisely the district attorney’s action as a surrogate for the 
state, combined with the county’s work as an “ ‘agent’ of the state” (ibid.), that 
weighed in support of our conclusion that the district attorney and the county were 
in privity. We have not, as the People contend, “re-examined” the role of the 
district attorney’s office; this court relied in Sims upon the district attorney’s role 
as a representative of the state, and continues to recognize that criminal 
prosecutions are brought on behalf of the People of the State of California, 
whether by a county district attorney or by the Attorney General.  (See Pitts v. 
County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 345 [holding that “the district attorney 
represents the state, not the county, . . .when prosecuting crimes”]; People v. 
Eubanks (1997) 14 Cal.4th 580, 588-589.) 
 
The People further argue that amendments to section 11483 made over 20 
years ago place in doubt our conclusion in Sims that welfare fraud is governed by 
 
11
a “unique statutory scheme which established a preference for the noncriminal 
resolution of cases” and have “made more evident the Legislature’s intent that the 
district attorney prosecute welfare fraud as a criminal violation.”  We disagree.  As 
explained below, our observation in Sims that the statutes governing welfare fraud 
evidenced a unique preference for noncriminal resolution was not a lynchpin of 
that decision; the statutory scheme merely offered additional, but nonessential, 
support for our holding.  Further, even if we assume that the now decades-old 
changes to section 11483, upon which the People rely, removed the legislative 
preference for restitution, such changes do not establish a preference for criminal 
prosecution, but rather leave the government free either to seek restitution first or 
prosecute first.  
 
Section 11483 prescribes criminal penalties for persons who have 
fraudulently obtained welfare benefits in amounts greater than $2,000.2  At the 
time of Sims, the statute incorporated by reference to sections 12250 and 12850 
the requirement that “restitution shall be sought . . . prior to the bringing of a 
criminal action.”  The purpose of this requirement was, in the words of the Court 
of Appeal, “ ‘that the person accused of fraud should be given an opportunity to 
make restitution, and if restitution is made, then the prosecutor should be required 
to reconsider the case in light of the fact that restitution has been made to 
determine whether prosecution is in fact warranted.’ ”  (People v. Preston (1996) 
43 Cal.App.4th 450, 454, quoting People v. Jordan (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 529, 
535.)  In People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, this court held that the state’s 
                                              
2  
Section 11483 provides in pertinent part:  “[W]henever any person has, by 
means of false statement or representation or by impersonation or other fraudulent 
device, obtained aid for a child not in fact entitled thereto, the person obtaining 
such aid shall be subject to prosecution . . . .”  In cases involving an amount less 
than $2,000, section 11483 requires that “all actions necessary to secure restitution 
shall be brought.” 
 
12
failure to comply with the statutory restitution requirement was grounds for 
dismissal of the criminal prosecution.  (Id. at p. 966.)3   
 
In 1984, as part of a reform of the statutes punishing welfare fraud, the 
Legislature amended section 11483 by replacing the reference to sections 12250 
and 12850 with a reference to section 10980.  Section 10980, which prescribes the 
penalties for various welfare fraud related offenses, does not require prosecutors to 
demand restitution of overpayments of more than $2,000 before criminal 
proceedings for welfare fraud may commence.  (See People v. Preston, supra, 43 
Cal.App.4th at p. 456; 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) 
Crimes Against Government Authority, § 152, p. 1243.)  The Court of Appeal, in 
People v. Preston, held that the 1984 amendments “remove[d] any current 
statutory underpinning to the argument that the statute requires a prior demand for 
restitution.”  (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.) In doing so, the Preston 
court disagreed with an earlier Court of Appeal opinion, People v. Camillo (1988) 
198 Cal.App.3d 981, 994, that assumed that the 1984 amendments had not 
abrogated the requirement that the state seek restitution before pursuing criminal 
penalties.4  (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.) 
 
The People argue that the Legislature’s enactment of the 1984 changes to 
the Welfare and Institutions Code undermined our decision in Sims.  Prior to those 
                                              
3  
Prior to Sims, the Legislature repealed sections 12250 and 12850, but 
section 11483 still referred to those repealed sections.  This court held in McGee 
that the reference in section 11483 to those statutes therefore remained effective, 
and continued to direct that the state must pursue administrative remedies before 
criminal prosecution.  (People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 958, fn. 3.) 
4  
Both the People and defendant presuppose that the Preston court correctly 
concluded that the Legislature abrogated the requirement that the state first seek 
restitution, and neither party argues that the state is required to seek restitution 
prior to commencing criminal proceedings.  Accordingly, we assume for purposes 
of argument, but do not decide, that the 1984 changes to section 11483 eliminated 
the requirement that the state must pursue restitution before criminal prosecution. 
 
13
statutory changes, the state could punish “welfare fraud” under at least seven 
different statutes that spanned the Welfare and Institutions Code and the Penal 
Code.  (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.)  Consequently, “the same 
fraudulent act frequently violated several statutes, and was chargeable under more 
than one of these statutes.”  (Ibid.)  The statutory changes were enacted to resolve 
the confusion and unnecessary filing of complaints that had resulted from the prior 
statutory framework.  (Sen. Com. on Health & Human Services, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 2171 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 17, 1984.)  “The purpose 
of section 10980 was to create administrative efficiencies in investigating and 
prosecuting fraud cases by creating a specific welfare fraud statute under which a 
single fraudulent act involving more than one welfare program could be 
prosecuted. . . . [¶]. . . [¶]  The remaining, and current, text of section 11483 does 
not contain any criminal proscriptions, but merely requires that restitution be 
sought in cases of failure to report not more than $2,000 in income or resources 
. . . .”  (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.)   
 
As noted above, the People contend that these statutory changes indicate 
that the Legislature no longer prefers that cases involving possible welfare fraud 
be resolved without resort to criminal prosecution, and that such a shift in 
legislative purpose implicitly overrules this court’s decision in Sims.  We reject 
this contention for two reasons.  Even if the restitution-first requirement indicates 
a preference for noncriminal resolutions, it does not necessarily follow that the 
repeal of the requirement evinces a preference for criminal resolutions.  Rather, 
the current statutory scheme instead places the criminal and noncriminal options in 
equipoise, leaving the County free to obtain restitution before, during, or after 
instituting criminal proceedings.5   
                                              
5  
We express no opinion on whether the DSS’s current regulatory scheme 
indicates a preference for criminal resolution of welfare fraud cases.  The parties 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
14
 
Additionally, though the existence of a restitution-first requirement was 
considered by this court in Sims, it was only one factor in a multifactor analysis, 
and was alluded to only in addition to numerous other public policy reasons 
supporting our conclusion that privity existed between the district attorney and the 
county.  Rather, as we have noted, the court in Sims primarily relied upon the 
sharing of information between the county and law enforcement agencies and “the 
fact that both entities are county agencies representing the state” in holding that 
collateral estoppel principles should apply.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.)  
The People do not contend that the 1984 changes to the Welfare and Institutions 
Code altered the sharing of information between the County and the district 
attorney, nor do they point to any authority that would cause us to reconsider our 
characterization of the close relationship between the County and the district 
attorney. 
 
The People argue our subsequent decision in Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d 335, 
demonstrates that the restitution-first requirement was essential to the outcome in 
Sims.  But a careful reading of Lucido leads to the opposite conclusion.  The 
restitution-first requirement was one basis for our decision in Sims, but far from 
the only grounds for our decision.   
 
In Lucido, we held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the 
People from relitigating in a criminal proceeding an issue on which the defendant 
had prevailed in a prior probation revocation hearing.  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
p. 339.)  The defendant in Lucido, after being convicted of indecent exposure, was 
sentenced to probation.  While on probation, he was charged with a new count of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
have not raised or briefed the court on this issue, nor have they addressed whether 
the pertinent regulations were in place at the time Sims was decided by this court.  
 
15
indecent exposure.  The People sought to have Lucido’s probation revoked based 
upon the indecent exposure, as well as upon the independent ground that Lucido 
had tested positive for marijuana use.  Following a hearing, the court revoked 
Lucido’s probation based only upon the marijuana use, and not upon the indecent 
exposure charge, stating that the prosecution had not produced clear and 
convincing evidence of the indecent exposure.  (Id. at pp. 339-341.) 
 
We held that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting 
Lucido for indecent exposure, even though the state had failed to prove a violation 
of probation based on the same conduct.  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d 335, 351.)  In 
so holding, we followed the estoppel framework set forth and applied in Sims, 
including an analysis of whether the threshold requirements and traditional policy 
reasons for applying collateral estoppel were satisfied.  (Id. at pp. 341-343.)   
 
Our decision in Lucido discussed Sims on two occasions.  First, we 
determined that Sims had not nullified an earlier decision, Chamblin v. Municipal 
Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 115, in which the Court of Appeal held that findings 
from a probation revocation hearing did not bar prosecution for Vehicle Code 
violations, stating:  “In Sims we noted that the ‘particular and special 
circumstances’ presented by the ‘unique statutory scheme’ for resolution of 
welfare fraud strongly supported a holding that collateral estoppel should apply.”  
(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 345, quoting Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 489-
490.)  As noted above, the hearing in Sims was statutorily required to be held prior 
to any criminal action on the fraud.  (Sims, supra, at p. 475, citing § 11483.)  This 
requirement suggested that the Legislature intended to afford some protection 
from criminal prosecution for welfare recipients, and “supported our conclusion 
that collateral estoppel preempted a criminal trial if fraud was not proved at the 
hearing.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 345.)   
We noted that Chamblin had reached the same conclusion, but the lower 
court in Lucido had declined to follow the decision in Chamblin, concluding that it 
 
16
had “been ‘nullified sub silentio’ by Sims.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 344.)  
We explained that Chamblin had not been nullified, because the decisions in 
Chamblin and Sims “do not necessarily conflict,” noting that “the ‘unique 
statutory scheme’ for resolution of welfare fraud strongly supported a holding that 
collateral estoppel should apply.”  (Id. at p. 345.)  The statutory requirement 
present in Sims that the administrative hearing be held prior to any criminal 
prosecution “suggested that the Legislature intended to afford some protection 
from criminal prosecution for welfare recipients, by virtue of their ‘minimal 
standard of living.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We observed that “[t]his interest was not present in 
Chamblin, and is not present here.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 
Having distinguished the decisions in Chamblin and Sims and explained 
why our decision in Sims had not weakened the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision 
in Chamblin, we held in Lucido that our earlier holding in Sims did not require us 
to apply collateral estoppel in the context of probation revocation hearings because 
we have applied collateral estoppel to preclude criminal trials “only when 
compelling public policy considerations outweighed the need for determinations 
of guilt and innocence to be made in the usual criminal trial setting.”  (Lucido, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.)  Deciding that Sims did not compel this court to apply 
collateral estoppel to the probation revocation setting, we observed that “[i]n Sims 
. . . we applied collateral estoppel partly on the ground that the ‘unique statutory 
scheme’ at issue was intended to essentially resolve issues of criminal guilt and 
innocence in regard to welfare fraud.”  (Ibid., italics omitted.) 
 
Missing from either discussion of Sims was any statement or implication 
that we would have decided Sims differently had the former statutory scheme for 
resolution of welfare fraud been different.  We simply relied upon the unique 
statutory scheme considered in Sims as a ready means of distinguishing the 
decision in Chamblin, and observed that the restitution-first requirement and the 
goal it furthered “supported” our holding in Sims.  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 
 
17
345.)  Indeed, the discussion in Lucido noted that the Sims court “applied 
collateral estoppel partly on the ground” that the restitution-first requirement 
evinced a legislative intent “to essentially resolve issues of criminal guilt” in an 
administrative setting.  (Id. at p. 349, italics added.)  The other multiple bases for 
our decision in Sims remain untouched by our decision in Lucido.  
 
The change in the statutory scheme governing welfare fraud to permit, 
rather than require, administrative proceedings seeking restitution of welfare 
benefits prior to criminal prosecution does not alter our conclusion that our 
decision in Lucido is consistent with our decision in Sims.  For example, the 
circumstances in Lucido did not raise the concern expressed in Sims that forcing 
welfare recipients to respond to criminal charges after an administrative law judge 
found that no overpayment was made or that no fraud occurred would impose a 
hardship on them and leave them exposed to being “harassed by repeated 
litigation.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)  Rather, as we explained in Lucido, 
“[t]he essence of vexatiousness, however, is not mere repetition.  Rather, it is 
harassment through baseless or unjustified litigation.  [Citation.]  Petitioner does 
not assert that the criminal proceedings in this case are intended to harass.  The 
public has a legitimate expectation that a person once found guilty of a crime may 
both be held to the terms of his probation and (if deemed appropriate by the 
prosecution) tried anew for any offenses alleged to have been committed during 
the probationary period.  For this reason, it is neither vexatious nor unfair for a 
probationer to be subjected to both a revocation hearing and a criminal trial.”  
(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.) 
 
Further, we noted in Lucido that the existence of evidentiary rules 
rendering the probationer’s testimony at the revocation hearing inadmissible at a 
subsequent criminal trial “significantly protect[s] probationers from prejudice 
caused by the juxtaposition of revocation hearings and criminal trials,”  and 
therefore weighed against the application of collateral estoppel.  (Lucido, supra, 
 
18
51 Cal.3d at p. 351.) This was not so in Sims.  As the People conceded at 
argument, no similar evidentiary rules prohibit a welfare recipient’s testimony at 
an administrative hearing from being introduced at a later criminal trial for welfare 
fraud.  
 
Finally, different public policy concerns affected the decisions in Sims and 
Lucido.6  In Lucido, we noted that the probation revocation hearing “arises as a 
continuing consequence of the probationer’s original conviction” (Lucido, supra, 
51 Cal.3d at p. 348), that any sanction imposed at the hearing stems from the fact 
that the probationer has been judged guilty of a prior crime, and that the subject of 
the revocation hearing is whether the defendant can safely remain at liberty.  (Id. 
at pp. 347-348.)  Sims did not arise from an earlier determination of culpability, 
and involved a welfare recipient—not a convicted criminal.   
                                              
6  
The concurring and dissenting opinion relies heavily upon the decision in 
Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, in which this court held that 
“a private arbitration award, even if judicially confirmed, may not have nonmutual 
collateral estoppel effect under California law unless there was an agreement to 
that effect in the particular case.”  (Id. at p. 824.)  In failing to even cite 
Vandenberg, the People evidently do not view that decision as providing a tenable 
basis for reconsidering Sims.  Nor do we.   
 
Among other things, Vandenberg involved an insurance coverage dispute 
between two insurance companies that was presided over by a private arbitrator 
who was “not strictly bound by evidence, law, or judicial oversight.” 
(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.)  Unlike a private arbitration, in 
which parties effectively “bypass the judicial system” in favor of private dispute 
resolution (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10), the public 
administrative hearing at issue here and in Sims is “a judicial-like adversary 
proceeding” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 479-480) that is conducted by a state 
entity, the DSS, whose administrative law judges must follow California law 
and render decisions subject to judicial review.  (See § 10962.)  And in contrast to 
typical private arbitrations, DSS administrative hearings involve the government 
as a party and seek to resolve a matter of public concern, i.e., the alleged 
overissuance of public funds.  We are not persuaded that the decision in 
Vandenberg warrants reconsideration of our decision in Sims. 
 
19
We noted in Lucido that “[p]robation revocation hearings and criminal 
trials serve different public interests.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 347.)  
“Probation is a form of leniency which is predicated on the notion that a 
defendant, by proving his ability to comply with the requirements of the law and 
certain special conditions imposed upon him, may avoid the more severe sanctions 
justified by his criminal behavior.  Once given the opportunity for lenient 
treatment the choice is his as to whether he merits being continued on probation.”  
(People v. Zuniga (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 739, 743.)  We stated in Lucido:  “A 
probation revocation hearing assesses whether conditions relating to punishment 
for a prior crime have been violated so that probation should be modified or 
revoked . . . .”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 347-348.)  In essence, the issue at 
a probation revocation hearing is whether the defendant’s conduct demonstrates 
that the leniency extended by the grant of probation remains justified.  By contrast, 
we noted in Lucido, “a criminal prosecution seeks conviction for wholly new 
offenses.”  (Id. at p. 348.) 
Sims differs from Lucido in this respect, because the purposes of 
administrative proceedings seeking restitution of welfare benefits do not differ 
greatly from the purposes of criminal prosecution for welfare fraud in obtaining 
those same benefits.  As we noted in Sims, “[t]he County had an adequate 
opportunity at the fair hearing to prove that respondent had fraudulently obtained 
welfare benefits.  However, [Sims] successfully demonstrated her innocence.”  
(Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) 
 
Our conclusion that Sims remains vital after the 1984 changes to the 
welfare fraud scheme is supported by the legislative history of those changes, 
which reveals that the Legislature did not contemplate abrogating Sims, either as a 
direct or indirect effect of the 1984 statutory changes that resulted in, among other 
things, removing the restitution-first requirement.  “[W]hen, as here, the 
Legislature undertakes to amend a statute which has been the subject of judicial 
 
20
construction” “it is presumed that the Legislature was fully cognizant of such 
construction . . . .”  (Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula 
Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659; see also White v. Ultramar, Inc. 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 263, fn. 
6.)  Because the Legislature amended the welfare fraud statutes after this court’s 
decision in Sims became final, we assume that the Legislature was aware of this 
court’s construction of the welfare fraud statutes in that case.  Had the Legislature 
wanted to invalidate Sims, it could have provided that no administrative decision 
would prevent a prosecution for welfare fraud.   
 
The Legislature has demonstrated the ability, when it so intends, to specify 
that administrative proceedings will not bar judicial proceedings.  For example, 
the Legislature specifically provided that administrative proceedings before the 
Department of Motor Vehicles could not have “a preclusive effect on related 
criminal proceedings.”  (Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 851.)  The 
Legislature did not incorporate such a provision denying preclusive effect to 
administrative hearings in cases of suspected welfare fraud; indeed, the 
Legislature rejected a bill that contained such language, in favor of legislation that 
did not directly implicate Sims. 7  
                                              
7  
Senate Bill No. 962 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.), which was introduced at 
roughly the same time as Senate Bill No. 2171 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.), proposed 
to introduce the following language into the Welfare and Institutions Code: 
“Nothing in this chapter, including any administrative decision, shall be construed 
so as to prevent the prosecution of an applicant or recipient for a criminal violation 
of Section 396 of the Penal Code, or the crime of perjury, as defined in Section 
188 of the Penal Code.”  (Sen. Bill No. 962 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 3, 1983.)
 
This provision of Senate Bill No. 962 was intended to “repeal the Sims 
decision by providing that no administrative decision would prevent the 
prosecution of an applicant or recipient for criminal violation of the welfare fraud 
provision.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 962 (1983-1984 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 21, 1984, p. 12.)  The Legislature, however, did not 
enact Senate Bill No. 962.  Rather, the Legislature modified the welfare fraud 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
21
 
Finally, the People raise for the first time in their opening brief in this court, 
the argument that the enactment of Proposition 115 in 1990 compels this court to 
reconsider our decision in Sims.  Among other things, Proposition 115 added to 
the California Constitution a provision that provides the People of California with 
the right to “a speedy and public trial.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29.)  The People 
argue that “the creation of an express constitutional right in the People to a public 
trial compels rejection of the pre-1990 rule that the county’s failure in an 
administrative hearing operates to deprive the People of the right to try the issue of 
fraud and perjury in a criminal proceeding.”  In support of the argument that 
administrative hearings do not satisfy the People’s right to a public trial, the 
People note that administrative regulations state that “attendance at the hearing is 
ordinarily limited to the claimant, authorized representative . . . county 
representative, legal counsel, authorized interpreter, and witnesses relevant to the 
issue.”  (DSS Manual of Policies & Procedures, May 12, 1995, ch. 22-000, § 22-
049.1.) 
 
The People thus assert that attendance at administrative hearings related to 
welfare benefit overpayment ordinarily is limited, but because they raise the issue 
for the first time before this court, they provide no showing that attendance at the 
hearing in this particular case was so limited as to render the hearing nonpublic, or 
that the procedures employed at the hearing in this case render it nonjudicial.  Nor 
do the People cite any persuasive authority supporting their contention that 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
statutes by enacting into law Senate Bill No. 2171, which did not contain a 
provision preventing the application of collateral estoppel principles to an 
administrative decision.  However, as this court has previously noted, unpassed 
bills “have little value” in ascertaining legislative intent.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 921.)   
 
22
Proposition 115’s general provision regarding the People’s right to a speedy and 
public trial was intended to overrule Sims or to more generally prevent the 
application of collateral estoppel principles.  Indeed, the Sims regime does not 
foreclose the People from seeking a criminal trial prior to the administrative 
hearing; the hearing can only estop the issue of welfare fraud if the People do not 
pursue the criminal option as speedily as the County pursues the matter 
administratively. 
 
The People also contend that, even if Sims remains vital after the statutory 
changes described above, collateral estoppel should not act to bar the prosecution 
of defendant in this particular case, because the Court of Appeal erred in finding 
that the issues actually litigated in the administrative hearing were identical to the 
issues in the criminal prosecution.8   
 
As noted above, the first of the traditional requirements of collateral 
estoppel is that the issue to be precluded must be identical to that decided in the 
prior proceeding.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484.)  The Court of Appeal in the 
present case determined what issues had been litigated in the administrative 
hearing by considering what issues had been “ ‘properly raised, by the pleadings 
or otherwise,’ ” and whether those issues had been “ ‘submitted for determination, 
and . . . determined.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal relied upon the fact that “[t]he 
                                              
8  
The concurring and dissenting opinion complains that our holding that our 
decision in Sims survives statutory changes and intervening judicial decisions is 
dictum.  We disagree.  We granted review in this case to examine the People’s 
contention that Sims is no longer good law in light of the 1984 statutory changes 
and our 1990 decision in Lucido.  The concurring and dissenting opinion contends 
that the court should dispose of this case by finding that the threshold 
requirements for collateral estoppel have not been met here.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of 
Chin, J., post,  at p. 6.)  However, the concurring and dissenting opinion fails to 
recognize that we must first decide whether Sims remains effective after the 
statutory and other changes before turning to whether the requirements outlined in 
Sims apply to the facts of this particular case. 
 
23
administrative decision identified the issues subject to determination as (1) 
whether defendant’s two sons were members of her household when she received 
aid on their behalf, and (2) whether she received relief to which she was not 
entitled because she ‘fail[ed] to report the boys’ absence from her home.’ ” 
 
At issue in a prosecution for welfare fraud is whether a person has obtained 
aid for a child not entitled to assistance “by means of false statement or 
representation or by impersonation or other fraudulent device.”  (§ 11483, italics 
added.)  However, the Court of Appeal did not adequately consider whether the 
administrative law decision actually determined whether defendant made any such 
misrepresentations or omissions and whether those misrepresentations or 
omissions caused, at least in part, the overpayments.   
 
The administrative decision concluded that “all the overpayments and 
overissuances are determined to have been caused by administrative errors.”  But 
this does not foreclose the possibility that defendant misrepresented whether her 
two sons were members of her household when she received aid on their behalf 
and failed to report the boys’ absence from her home.  The administrative decision 
that the overpayments were caused by administrative errors leaves open the 
possibility that defendant made misstatements that were a contributing cause to the 
overpayments.  It is possible that the administrative decision did not determine 
whether defendant made any misrepresentations, or whether such 
misrepresentations were a cause, but not the sole cause, of the overpayments.  
Only if the administrative law judge did indeed find that defendant had made no 
misrepresentations or omissions in her applications for aid would the state be 
barred from prosecuting her for welfare fraud; if defendant made no false 
representations, an element of that crime has not been satisfied.  (People v. 
Carlson (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 112, 116.)   
We decline to determine whether in the present case the People are 
collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for welfare fraud and, instead, 
 
24
remand the case to permit the Court of Appeal to resolve that issue in the first 
instance.  In so doing, the Court of Appeal should consider the circumstance that 
the record on appeal does not include the notices of action issued by the County 
on January 16, 2001, in the administrative proceedings.  Although we can deduce 
from the administrative decision that the notices alleged that defendant, rather than 
the County, was at fault for the overpayments, the absence of these notices from 
the record makes it difficult to determine what issues were raised “ ‘by the 
pleadings or otherwise’ ” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484) in the administrative 
hearing.  On remand, the Court of Appeal should consider the effect, if any, of the 
absences of these documents from the record on appeal. 
 
It is also unclear whether the People are collaterally estopped from 
prosecuting defendant for perjury.  The Court of Appeal decision does not discuss 
the perjury charge.  The elements of perjury are: “ ‘a willful statement, under oath, 
of any material matter which the witness knows to be false.’ ”  (Cabe v. Superior 
Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 732, 735; see also Chein v. Shumsky (2004) 373 F.3d 
978, 983.)  Again, if the administrative decision actually decided that defendant 
had made no misstatements, collateral estoppel would bar prosecution of 
defendant for perjury.  However, if defendant willfully made misstatements, but 
the administrative law judge determined that such misstatements were not the 
dominant cause of the overpayments, collateral estoppel would not necessarily 
dispose of the perjury charge, as it is possible that defendant’s false representation 
could have been material to the administrative proceeding.  (See People v. Kobrin 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 426-427.) 
 
Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Court of Appeal for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of whether the 
issues litigated at the administrative hearing and the criminal prosecution for 
welfare fraud and perjury were identical.   
 
25
III. 
DISPOSITION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed; 
and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion, including reconsideration of whether the issues 
litigated at the administrative hearing and the criminal prosecution for welfare 
fraud and perjury were identical.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeal’s judgment must be 
reversed because the record fails to demonstrate that in resolving the 
administrative proceedings before the California Department of Social Services, 
the administrative law judge (ALJ) necessarily determined that defendant Cathy 
Dawn Garcia did not make misrepresentations or omissions that contributed to her 
receipt of overpayments.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-23.)  However, as explained 
below, I disagree with the majority’s decision to remand the case to the Court of 
Appeal for further consideration of this question.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24-25.)  
Because defendant bears the burden of proving her collateral estoppel claim and 
the record she has provided is insufficient to meet that burden, I would hold that 
her collateral estoppel claims fails; she simply has not established what the 
majority correctly identifies as the “threshold requirements” of collateral estoppel.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) 
I also do not join the majority’s discussion of whether applying collateral 
estoppel under the circumstances here would be consistent with public policy.  
The majority is reversing the Court of Appeal’s judgment because of doubts that 
collateral estoppel’s threshold requirements are met in this case.  It is therefore 
both premature and unnecessary to decide whether, assuming the threshold 
requirements have been met, public policy considerations support collateral 
estoppel’s application.  Moreover, substantively, I disagree with the majority’s 
2 
analysis.  In light of statutory developments since People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 
468 (Sims), and our post-Sims decisions in Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 335 (Lucido), and Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815 
(Vandenberg), were it necessary to decide the question, I would hold that public 
policy considerations do not support applying collateral estoppel in this case. 
I. 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE THRESHOLD 
REQUIREMENTS OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
 
 
As we recently explained, collateral estoppel “applies ‘only if several 
threshold requirements are fulfilled.  First, the issue sought to be precluded from 
relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.  Second, this 
issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding.  Third, it must 
have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding.  Fourth, the decision in 
the former proceeding must be final and on the merits.  Finally, the party against 
whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the 
former proceeding. [Citations.]’ ”  (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources 
Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 943.) 
 
“The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing 
these [threshold] requirements.  [Citation.]”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341.)  
Because “the law does not favor estoppels” (People v. Frank (1865) 28 Cal. 507, 
517 (Frank)), this burden is a heavy one.  As we have explained, “[c]ertainty is an 
essential element of every estoppel . . . .”  (City of Oakland v. Oakland Water-
Front Co. (1897) 118 Cal. 160, 221.)  Thus, where a party asserts “a certain 
question in issue has been litigated and determined between the same parties in a 
previous action, it is not enough that the proposed evidence tends to show that the 
precise question may have been involved in such litigation.”  (Emerson v. Yosemite 
Gold Min. & Mill. Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 50, 57.)  In other words, “ ‘[e]very estoppel 
must be certain to every intent, and not to be taken by argument or inference.’  
3 
[Citation.]  ‘If upon the face of a record anything is left to conjecture as to what 
was necessarily involved and decided, there is no estoppel in it when pleaded, and 
nothing conclusive in it when offered in evidence.’  [Citation.]”  (Beronio v. 
Ventura County Lumber Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 232, 236.)   
 
These rules take on special significance where the decision asserted as an 
estoppel may have been based on several alternative grounds.  “ ‘[I]f it appear[s] 
that several distinct matters may have been litigated’ ” in the prior action, “ ‘upon 
one or more of which the judgment may have passed,’ ” unless the record clearly 
indicates “ ‘which of them was thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was 
rendered,’ ” collateral estoppel does not apply.  (Horton v. Goodenough (1920) 
184 Cal. 451, 461.)  Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply if “it is impossible to 
determine from the evidence offered in support of the estoppel” which of several 
potentially dispositive issues the prior decision was “founded upon.”  (Frank, 
supra, 28 Cal. at p. 516.)   
 
Under these principles, defendant’s collateral estoppel claim fails.  As the 
majority correctly explains, the ALJ’s determination here that the overpayments 
“were caused by administrative errors leaves open the possibility that defendant 
made misstatements that were a contributing cause to the overpayments.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 23.)  Indeed, this is precisely what the trial court concluded in 
rejecting defendant’s collateral estoppel claim.  Based on the ALJ’s decision, the 
trial court concluded that the ALJ’s “causation finding” simply represents a 
“qualitative comparison between the things the county did and the things the 
defendant did” and “does not carry with it an implicit finding that there was no 
error in reporting.”  Supporting this conclusion are the ALJ’s findings that “[t]he 
county welfare department was not fully apprised of the actual circumstances 
surrounding which parent had primary responsibility for the care and control of” 
defendant’s children and that “the likelihood of overpayments” would merely have 
been “diminished”—not eliminated—had the county welfare department properly 
4 
“reviewed the [children’s] living arrangement in September 1998.”  In light of 
these findings, the trial court correctly concluded the ALJ made no finding that 
misstatements by defendant did not contribute to the overpayments. 
 
The majority also correctly explains that the absence in the record of the 
notices of action “makes it difficult to determine” precisely what issues were 
before and decided by the ALJ.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  Notably, at oral 
argument, defendant’s counsel conceded that “it’s a difficult record to read” 
because “all” of the information and documents “weren’t entered into evidence at 
the criminal trial.”  Indeed, in her brief, defendant explains that the only evidence 
she produced below in support of her collateral estoppel claim was a copy of the 
ALJ’s decision.  Under the governing law as set forth above, because defendant 
bears the burden of proving the elements of collateral estoppel, the absence from 
the record of the notices is her responsibility and the failure of the incomplete 
record to clarify the scope of the ALJ’s decision requires rejection of her collateral 
estoppel claim.  (Cf. Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 258 [rejecting res 
judicata claim where “sparse record presented . . . fail[ed] to show either the 
precise nature of the factual issues litigated, or the depth of the court’s inquiry”].) 
 
I disagree with the majority’s view that we should remand the case to the 
Court of Appeal to “consider the effect, if any, of the absences of [the notices of 
action] from the record . . . .”   (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  As demonstrated above, 
by placing the burden on the party alleging collateral estoppel to prove with 
certainty that a particular issue was decided in the prior proceeding, and by 
rejecting the doctrine’s application where the record fails to demonstrate which of 
several potentially dispositive issues the prior decision was based on, our 
decisions clearly specify “the effect” of the record’s incompleteness (ibid.): 
defendant’s collateral estoppel claim should be rejected.  Because the majority 
correctly concludes that, on the record before us, the ALJ’s determination leaves 
open the possibility that “defendant made misstatements that were a contributing 
5 
cause to the overpayments” (id. at p. 23), under the governing cases, there is 
nothing left for the Court of Appeal to consider.  Notably, although the majority 
directs the Court of Appeal on remand to “consider the effect, if any, of the 
absences of [the notices of action] from the record” (id. at p. 24), the majority 
gives the Court of Appeal no guidance as to what it is supposed to do with this 
information.  Rather than remand for further consideration of this issue, we should 
simply affirm the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s collateral estoppel claim 
and its denial of her dismissal motion.1   
II. 
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT APPLYING 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE. 
 
As explained above, collateral estoppel does not apply if the party asserting 
it fails to establish several “threshold” requirements.  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
p. 341.)  We also refer to these threshold requirements as “prerequisites.”  (Sims, 
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.) 
 
However, “even where the minimal prerequisites” are established, 
“ ‘ “policy considerations may limit [collateral estoppel’s] use where the . . . 
underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors.” ’  [Citations.]” 
(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 829.)  In other words, California’s collateral 
estoppel doctrine “has a public policy exception” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 903, 917, fn. 6) that precludes the doctrine’s application, even where the 
threshold requirements are met, if the “policy reasons for applying collateral 
estoppel” are not “satisfied by the facts of [the] case.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 477.) 
                                              
1  
I would, however, remand to the Court of Appeal for consideration of other 
issues that defendant raised and the Court of Appeal did not address in light of its 
conclusion that collateral estoppel applies. 
6 
 
For several reasons, I do not join the majority’s discussion of the public 
policy exception’s application in this case.  Initially, the discussion is both 
premature and unnecessary.  As I have explained, defendant has failed to establish 
the threshold requirements of her collateral estoppel claim.  In reversing the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment, the majority agrees that the threshold requirements of the 
doctrine may not be met in this case.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-24.)  Unless and 
until it is determined that defendant has established the threshold requirements, it 
is unnecessary to discuss whether the public policy exception to the collateral 
estoppel doctrine applies on the facts of this case.  The majority improperly inverts 
the analysis, by first discussing whether the public policy exception applies, and 
then, as if by afterthought, discussing whether the threshold requirements have 
even been established.  This analytical inversion cannot hide the fact that the 
majority’s conclusion regarding the threshold question—that the defendant may 
have failed to establish the prerequisites of her collateral estoppel claim—and its 
reversal of the Court of Appeal’s judgment on this basis make it unnecessary to 
address the applicability of the public policy exception.  Thus, the majority’s 
discussion is dictum.2  (See People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 358 
[discussion of issue that might arise on remand “was essentially dictum” where 
court “determined that the judgment would be reversed on other grounds”]; People 
v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914 [where conviction was reversed because of 
                                              
2  
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Sims did not first “outline[]” 
collateral estoppel’s threshold requirements.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, fn. 8.)  
Those requirements were already well-established when we decided Sims, as 
clearly evidenced by the fact that Sims merely quoted one of our earlier decisions 
in setting forth the requirements.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484, quoting 
People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 691.)  The majority is simply incorrect in 
asserting that we “must” determine whether Sims’s discussion of collateral 
estoppel’s policy exception “remains effective” before we determine whether 
collateral estoppel’s threshold requirements have even been met.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 22, fn. 8.) 
7 
erroneous exclusion of evidence, discussion of other issues that might arise on 
retrial “was not necessary to . . . case’s resolution”];  Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. 
Palermo (1956) 47 Cal.2d 469, 474 [“discussion or determination of a point not 
necessary to the disposition of a question that is decisive of the appeal is generally 
regarded as obiter dictum”].) 
 
 More fundamentally, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the issue.   
At the outset, it is important to note that the majority does not make an 
independent analysis of whether the relevant public policy considerations support 
application of collateral estoppel on the facts of this case.  Nor does the majority 
decide whether Sims was correctly decided.  Instead, purporting to apply 
“[p]rinciples of stare decisis” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9), the majority simply 
considers whether “statutory and other changes” since Sims “warrant 
reconsideration of” that decision.  (Id. at p. 1.)  Rather than focus almost 
exclusively on Sims, as does the majority, I also look to our subsequent decisions 
in Lucido and Vandenberg.  Viewing those decisions in light of relevant statutory 
changes, I conclude that public policy considerations do not support application of 
collateral estoppel on the facts of this case. 
 
Like the majority, I begin with Sims.  There, we held that “collateral 
estoppel bar[red] the state from [criminally] prosecuting” a welfare recipient “for 
welfare fraud since she was exonerated in [an administrative fair] hearing of that 
charge.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)  In analyzing that question, we first 
considered whether “the technical prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel . . . 
were satisfied.”  (Id. at p. 488.)  After concluding that they were, we then 
considered whether “public policy considerations” supported the doctrine’s 
application (id. at p. 489) on “the facts of [that] case.”  (Id. at p. 477.)  We stated 
that applying the doctrine “would promote judicial economy by minimizing 
repetitive litigation” and would prevent “the possibility of inconsistent judgments 
which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system” and of “the 
8 
[administrative] fair hearing process.”  (Id. at p. 488.)  We next explained that not 
applying the doctrine would work “a hardship” on a welfare recipient “who 
presents a successful case at the fair hearing,” by requiring the recipient, “[i]n 
planning a budget for limited resources, . . . to take into consideration that he or 
she may still be required to return the benefits” that were “found” in the 
administrative hearing to have been “legally obtained.”  (Id. at pp. 488-489.)  
Next, we stated that applying the doctrine “would protect [the defendant] from 
being harassed by repeated litigation.”  (Id. at p. 489.)  It “would be manifestly 
unfair,” we declared, “[t]o subject [the defendant] to a second proceeding in which 
she must defend herself against the very same charges of misconduct.”  (Ibid.)  
Finally, we stressed that “the uniqueness of the statutory scheme governing 
prosecutions for [welfare] fraud . . . ma[d]e application of collateral estoppel 
particularly appropriate in [that] case.”  (Ibid.)  Specifically, we cited the fact that 
the statutes required the state to “seek restitution by request or civil action before 
initiating criminal proceedings in cases involving certain categories of [welfare] 
fraud.”  (Ibid.)  By enacting this “restitution-first requirement” (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 13), we explained, “the Legislature establishe[d] a policy in favor of resolving 
[welfare] fraud cases outside the criminal justice system.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 
at p. 489.)  Only by “ignor[ing]” this legislatively established policy, we reasoned, 
could we hold that collateral estoppel did not apply.  (Ibid.)  Based on this 
analysis, we concluded that collateral estoppel applied “[i]n the particular and 
special circumstances of [that] case.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Eight years later, in Lucido, we again considered whether “collateral 
estoppel principles” may be invoked “to preclude criminal trials.  [Citation.]”  
(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.)  There, based on a judicial finding in a 
probation revocation hearing that the state failed to prove an alleged criminal 
offense, the defendant argued that the state was collaterally estopped from 
criminally prosecuting him for that offense.  (Id. at pp. 340-341.)  After explaining 
9 
that the defendant “arguably ha[d] fulfilled the threshold requirements” of 
collateral estoppel (id. at p. 341), we considered whether “the public policies 
underlying [the doctrine]—preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, 
promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by 
vexatious litigation”—warranted its application.  (Id. at p. 343.)  Regarding the 
first, we acknowledged that “[p]ublic confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
system is threatened whenever two tribunals render inconsistent 
verdicts.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 347.)  However, we then explained that 
“[c]onsistency . . . is not the sole measure of the integrity of judicial decisions” 
(ibid.), and that in this context, preserving the integrity of the judicial system 
requires “preserving the criminal trial process as the proper forum for 
determinations of criminal guilt or innocence.”  (Id. at p. 350, fn. 11.)  In light of 
this concern, we explained, we have applied collateral estoppel principles to 
preclude criminal trials “only when compelling public policy considerations 
outweighed the need for determinations of guilt and innocence to be made in the 
usual criminal trial setting.”  (Id. at p. 349.)  Regarding the second policy 
consideration—judicial economy—we stated that “the efficiencies of applying 
collateral estoppel . . . pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial 
process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new 
crimes.”  (Id. at p. 351.)  Regarding the third policy consideration—vexatious 
litigation—after noting that “[t]he essence of vexatiousness . . . is harassment 
through baseless or unjustified litigation,” “not mere repetition,” we stated:  “[The 
defendant] does not assert that the criminal proceedings in this case are intended to 
harass.  The public has a legitimate expectation that a person once found guilty of 
a crime may both be held to the terms of his probation and (if deemed appropriate 
by the prosecution) tried anew for any offenses alleged to have been committed 
during the probationary period.  For this reason, it is neither vexatious nor unfair 
for a probationer to be subjected to both a revocation hearing and a criminal trial.  
10 
The People’s failure to prevail at the revocation hearing does not alone transform 
the otherwise permissible subsequent trial into harassment.”  (Ibid.)  We thus held 
that the finding at the defendant’s probation revocation hearing did not collaterally 
estop the defendant’s prosecution.  (Ibid.)  
 
As the majority notes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 16), in Lucido, we expressly 
explained why Sims did not require a different result.  We cited Sims as a case in 
which “compelling public policy considerations outweighed the need for 
determinations of guilt and innocence to be made in the usual criminal trial 
setting.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.)  The determinative policy 
consideration we identified was “ the ‘unique statutory scheme’ at issue” in Sims, 
which expressed—through the restitution-first requirement—a “legislative 
determination” to “deemphasize[] the role of criminal trials in the overall scheme 
for resolution of welfare fraud cases.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 349-350.)  
We then explained:  “[B]ecause [of this] legislative determination,” the 
“concern . . . about the overall integrity of the criminal trial process as the intended 
forum for determinations of guilt and innocence was less at issue in Sims. . . .  In 
the present case, by contrast, the Legislature has not indicated a preference that 
questions of guilt or innocence on criminal charges be litigated in revocation 
hearings rather than at trial.  For this reason, we decline in this context to follow 
Sims’s conclusion that preservation of the integrity of either the judicial system as 
a whole or the hearing process itself warrants application of collateral estoppel.  
Similarly, we decline to attribute as much weight in this case as we did in Sims to 
a need to prevent inconsistent judicial determinations.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)   
 
In Vandenberg, this court held that a private arbitration award, even when 
judicially confirmed, “may not have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect under 
California law unless there was an agreement to that effect in the particular case.”  
(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 824.)  Regarding the relevant public policy 
considerations, the court reasoned that applying collateral estoppel in this context 
11 
was not necessary either to preserve the integrity of the judicial system or to 
promote judicial economy.  (Id. at p. 833.)  As to the former, the court explained 
that “because a private arbitrator’s award is outside the judicial system, denying 
the award collateral estoppel effect has no adverse impact on judicial integrity.”  
(Ibid.)  As to the latter, the court reasoned that “because private arbitration does 
not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not 
undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to 
decide the same issue.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Applying Sims, Lucido, and Vandenberg in light of the current statutory 
and administrative scheme, I conclude that public policy considerations do not 
support applying collateral estoppel on the facts of this case.  Under Vandenberg, 
“because [an ALJ’s decision at a fair hearing] is outside the judicial system, 
denying the award collateral estoppel effect has no adverse impact on judicial 
integrity.”  (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.)  Moreover, according to 
Lucido, the paramount policy concern in terms of the judicial system’s integrity is 
“preserving the criminal trial process as the proper forum for determinations of 
criminal guilt or innocence.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350, fn. 11.)  Lucido 
establishes that this concern controls unless “outweighed” by “compelling public 
policy considerations.”  (Id. at p. 349.)   
 
I find no such compelling policy considerations here.  Concerns about 
judicial economy do not suffice.  Under Vandenberg, “because [an administrative 
fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation 
does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial 
resources to decide the same issue.”  (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.)  In 
any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy “pale before the 
importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for 
determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 
351.)  Nor do concerns about vexatious litigation suffice; as in Lucido, defendant 
12 
here “does not assert that the criminal proceedings in this case [were] intended to 
harass.”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, to quote Lucido in this context, “[t]he public has a 
legitimate expectation” that a welfare recipient “may both be held to the terms” of 
the welfare program in an administrative fair hearing held at the recipient’s request 
“and (if deemed appropriate by the prosecution) tried . . . for any [criminal] 
offenses alleged to have been committed” in connection with the program.  (Ibid.)  
“For this reason, it is neither vexatious nor unfair” for a welfare recipient who has 
requested an administrative fair hearing also “to be subjected to . . . a criminal 
trial.”  (Ibid.)  Finally, the overriding public policy consideration that, according to 
Lucido, allowed us to apply collateral estoppel in Sims—the Legislature’s 
decision, expressed through the restitution-first requirement, to “deemphasize[] the 
role of criminal trials in the overall scheme for resolution of welfare fraud cases” 
(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350)—no longer exists; as the parties agree and the 
majority “assume[s] for purposes of argument” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 12, fn. 4), in 
1984, the Legislature enacted changes to the relevant statutes that eliminated the 
restitution-first requirement.  (People v. Preston (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 450, 455-
461.) 
 
Indeed, the statutory and administrative scheme that now governs indicates 
a preference for resolution of welfare fraud cases through the criminal trial 
process.  The Welfare and Institutions Code provides that “whenever” a person 
fraudulently obtains aid, that person “shall be subject to prosecution.”  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code , § 11483. 3)  The regulations of the California Department of Social 
Services (DSS) provide that if an investigation uncovers sufficient evidence that a 
welfare recipient “intentionally . . . [¶] Made a false or misleading statement, or 
misrepresented, concealed, or withheld facts” (DSS Manual of Policies & 
                                              
3  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to Welfare and Institutions 
Code. 
13 
Procedures, Feb. 8, 2005, §§ 20-300.1.11, 20-351i(1)(a) (hereafter MPP)), then a 
county must ask the prosecuting authority to issue a criminal complaint.  (Id., 
§§ 20-007.35, 20-300.21, 20-352.13.)  While the prosecution is evaluating the 
case and “subsequent to any action taken against the accused individual by the 
prosecutor or court of the appropriate jurisdiction,” a county may not hold an 
administrative hearing to determine whether the recipient engaged in such 
conduct.  (Id., §§ 20-300.24, 20-352.3.)  Thus, whereas Sims found that 
application of collateral estoppel was “warranted . . . due to the unique statutory 
scheme which established a [legislative] preference for the noncriminal resolution 
of cases involving an accusation of welfare fraud” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 
490), the statutory and administrative scheme now in place indicates a preference 
for criminal resolution of such cases.  For this reason, Sims does not govern here; 
instead, we should follow Lucido and hold that collateral estoppel does not apply 
in light of the public’s paramount interest in “preserving the criminal trial process 
as the proper forum for determinations of criminal guilt or innocence.”  (Lucido, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350, fn. 11.) 
 
The majority makes several errors in concluding that there is no existing 
“preference for criminal resolutions” of welfare fraud cases.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
13.)  Initially, the majority fails to consider the language of section 11483 that I 
have discussed above, which the People rely on in their brief.  Moreover, the 
majority expressly declines to consider whether the “current regulatory scheme” 
speaks to this question, because the parties have not briefed the issue.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 14, fn. 5.)  However, because Sims relied on the regulatory scheme in 
reaching its conclusion (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 480-481, 487-488), the 
majority, in relying exclusively on Sims, necessarily is also relying on that 
scheme.  In my view, we should not, as the majority implicitly does, rely only on 
part of the regulatory scheme; we should consider all of it.  If the majority believes 
it cannot do so on the existing record, then it should either request further briefing 
14 
or decline to decide whether the public policy exception applies; it should not 
purport to decide that issue based on an incomplete analysis that ignores an 
important consideration.  Indeed, in addition to its conclusion that the threshold 
requirements of the collateral estoppel may not be met here, the majority’s view 
that the record is insufficient to determine the impact of the regulatory scheme 
further demonstrates that it is premature to decide whether the public policy 
exception applies.4 
 
Even were the statutes and regulations silent on the point, as explained 
above, Lucido is not.  In this regard, although the majority purports to be 
concerned with “[p]rinciples of stare decisis” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9), it fails even 
to consider—much less give any weight to—the paramount public policy 
consideration we identified and based our decision on in Lucido:  “preserving the 
criminal trial process as the proper forum for determinations of criminal guilt or 
innocence.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350, fn. 11.)  The majority does not 
explain why this consideration does not apply here; instead, the majority simply 
ignores it.  The majority also fails to consider our conclusion in Lucido that 
concerns about judicial economy—which Sims cited in support of its conclusion 
(Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488)—“pale before the importance of preserving the 
                                              
4  
I also disagree with the majority’s view that we cannot determine the 
relevance of the regulatory scheme without briefing on “whether the pertinent 
regulations were in place at the time Sims was decided by the court.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 14, fn. 5.)  An administrative agency has no discretion to promulgate 
regulations that are inconsistent with governing statutes, and any such regulation 
is invalid.  (Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 
1029; Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 262, 269.)  Because the 
preference for noncriminal resolution of welfare cases we relied on in Sims was 
established by statute, it would have overridden any contrary preference expressed 
in the administrative regulations at that time (which no doubt explains why Sims 
did not consider this question).  Thus, contrary to the majority’s view, it is 
irrelevant whether “the pertinent regulations were in place at the time Sims was 
decided . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 5.)   
15 
criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as 
to new crimes.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.)  Nor does the majority 
consider Vandenberg’s analysis and application of two relevant policy 
considerations:  the judicial system’s integrity and judicial economy.  In 
purporting to follow Sims as a matter of stare decisis, the majority proceeds as if 
Lucido and Vandenberg, which are also entitled to respect as precedents of this 
court, have nothing to say about how to apply the relevant policy factors.  Most 
notably, the majority makes no effort to resolve the tension between Lucido, 
which emphasized the public’s interest in preserving the criminal trial process as 
the proper forum for determining criminal guilt or innocence, and Sims, which did 
not even mention this consideration.   
 
The majority incorrectly disregards Lucido in another important respect.  
According to the majority, the People may avoid the collateral estoppel problem 
that exists under the majority’s conclusion simply by pursuing a criminal case “as 
speedily as the County pursues the matter administratively.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 22.)  In Lucido, we expressly rejected a similar analysis.  There, after noting that 
“the People could avoid being collaterally estopped” by the decision in a probation 
revocation hearing “by prosecuting first” and “seeking revocation afterward,” we 
stated:  “As in our previous cases, . . . we refuse to mandate such a 
chronology.  [Citation.]”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 348, fn. 10.)  Thus, in 
essentially mandating that a criminal prosecution be finished before completion of 
an administrative fair hearing, the majority again disregards Lucido. 
 
In any event, the majority’s discussion of this consideration rests on a false 
premise:  that a county is in control of the speed with which administrative 
proceedings progress.  It is the welfare recipient, not the county, who initiates the 
fair hearing process by filing a request.  (§§ 10950, 10951.)  Moreover, the 
governing regulations require that the hearing be decided within 90 days of the 
date the request is filed (60 days if the claim involves only food stamps), unless 
16 
the recipient waives this requirement.  (MPP, § 22-060.1.)  Thus, the majority errs 
in suggesting that the speed of the administrative fair hearing process is within a 
county’s control.  The welfare recipient’s control over the timing of the fair 
hearing process and the short regulatory time limit for deciding a fair hearing 
refute the majority’s view that the People can easily avoid collateral estoppel’s 
application in a criminal case simply by ensuring that prosecution is completed 
and a verdict rendered before an administrative fair hearing is concluded. 
 
The majority disregards Lucido in at least one other important respect.  The 
majority asserts that Sims merely made “observation[s]” about the restitution-first 
requirement that provided “nonessential[] support for our holding.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 11.)  As I have explained, in Lucido, we took a decidedly different view 
of Sims’s discussion.  (Ante, pp. 9-10.)  Supporting our analysis in Lucido is our 
statement in Sims that refusing to apply collateral estoppel there would have 
required us “to ignore” the legislatively established “safeguard[]” established by 
the restitution-first requirement.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)  Indeed, 
despite its assertion, the majority elsewhere concedes that the restitution-first 
requirement was “one basis for our decision in Sims” and was “one factor” we 
considered there in applying the “multifactor analysis” that governs application of 
the collateral estoppel doctrine.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  Thus, contrary to the 
majority’s view, the issue here is not whether the restitution-first requirement was 
“the only ground[]” for our decision in Sims.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  Rather, 
the issue is how to apply the governing multifactor test absent the restitution-first 
factor that was “one basis for our decision in Sims” (ibid.) and in light of our 
discussion and application of that test in Lucido and Vandenberg.  Contrary to the 
majority’s assertion, given Lucido, Vandenberg, and the relevant statutory 
changes, stare decisis poses no obstacle to reaching a conclusion here different 
from the one we reached in Sims.  As the majority expressly recognizes, 
“ ‘reexamination of precedent may become necessary when subsequent 
17 
developments indicate an earlier decision . . . has become ripe for 
reconsideration . . . .’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10, quoting Moradi-Shalal v. 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 297.) 
 
The majority’s attempts to distinguish Lucido are unsuccessful.  According 
to the majority, the facts in Lucido “did not raise the concern expressed in Sims” 
that allowing criminal proceedings after an ALJ’s findings of no fraud and no 
overpayment would “leave” welfare recipients “exposed to being ‘harassed by 
repeated litigation.’  [Citation.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  However, although 
Lucido did not involve a welfare recipient, we did consider in that case the fact 
that applying collateral estoppel to a decision in a probation revocation hearing 
“would eliminate repetitive litigation” and “prevent [the defendant] from being 
subjected to consecutive proceedings raising the same factual allegations.”  
(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.)  As noted above, regarding this issue, we 
stated:  “The essence of vexatiousness . . . is not mere repetition.  Rather, it is 
harassment through baseless or unjustified litigation.  [Citation.]”   (Ibid.)  Thus, 
whereas Sims found that it would have been “manifestly unfair” to permit the 
defendant’s criminal prosecution after she “successfully demonstrated her 
innocence” at a “fair hearing” in which the government “had an adequate 
opportunity . . . to prove” its case (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489), we held in 
Lucido that “mere repetition” is not enough to implicate the public policy concern 
about vexatious litigation.  (Lucido, supra, at p. 351.)  Given that Sims apparently 
equated repetition with harassment, and did not, in considering the integrity of the 
judicial system and judicial economy, even mention the importance of preserving 
the criminal trial process as the proper forum for determining criminal guilt or 
innocence, the majority is simply incorrect in asserting that the “bases for our 
18 
decision in Sims” other than the restitution-first requirement “remain untouched by 
our decision in Lucido.”5  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.) 
 
Also unpersuasive is the majority’s view that the facts in Lucido “did not 
raise the concern expressed in Sims” that allowing criminal proceedings after an 
ALJ’s findings of no fraud and no overpayment would “impose a hardship on” 
welfare recipients.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  As noted above, the “hardship” we 
identified in Sims was that involved in requiring a welfare recipient, after 
establishing at a fair hearing that benefits were “legally obtained,” to “plan[] a 
budget for limited resources” based on the possibility “he or she may still be 
required to return the benefits . . . .”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489.)  In 
my view, forcing convicted criminals who have successfully avoided probation 
revocation by establishing that they did not commit a new offense to plan their 
lives based on the possibility they might still be convicted of and incarcerated for 
that offense presents an equal or greater hardship; nonetheless, that is what Lucido 
requires.   
 
In any event, the facts of this case do not present the hardship at issue in 
Sims.  Whereas the hearing officer in Sims found that the defendant had not 
received overpayments and was entitled to keep the money in question (Sims, 
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 474), the ALJ here ruled that defendant did receive 
overpayments and had to return the extra money.  Thus, in declining to apply 
collateral estoppel and permitting defendant’s prosecution to go forward, the trial 
court did not threaten defendant with having to return money the ALJ ruled she 
                                              
5  
In view of this analysis, I disagree with the majority’s view that our 
discussion in Lucido contains no “implication that we would have decided Sims 
differently had the former statutory scheme for resolution of welfare fraud been 
different.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.)  The majority’s observation that Lucido 
contains no express “statement” to this effect (ibid.) is both curious and 
unremarkable.  It would have been entirely inappropriate to make such a 
statement, as that question was not before us in Lucido. 
19 
could keep.  As noted above, in Sims, we identified the relevant inquiry as whether 
“policy” considerations supported collateral estoppel’s application on “the facts of 
[that] case” (id. at p. 477), and we carefully limited our holding to “the particular 
and special circumstances of [that] case.”  (Id. at p. 489.)  Given these statements 
and the factual differences between Sims and the case now before us, the majority 
errs in concluding that “[p]rinciples of stare decisis” prevent us from reaching a 
different conclusion here.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.) 
 
The majority also errs in asserting that this case “differs from Lucido” in 
that “ ‘probation revocation hearings and criminal trials serve different public 
interests’ ” whereas “the purposes” of administrative fair hearings and welfare 
fraud prosecutions “do not differ greatly.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  The 
majority incorrectly indicates that the purpose of the administrative fair hearing 
here was “ ‘to prove that [defendant] had fraudulently obtained welfare benefits.’ ”  
(Ibid., italics added.)  As the majority elsewhere explains, the issue at the fair 
hearing here was not whether defendant obtained the overpayments fraudulently, 
but whether they “ ‘were the result of administrative errors or [defendant’s] failure 
to report [her children’s] absence from her home.’ ”  (Id. at p. 2.)  In answering 
this question, it was unnecessary for the ALJ also to determine whether defendant 
had a fraudulent intent.  (See People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 989, 
fn. 3; People v. Faubus (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5-6.)  The governing statutes 
confirm that the DSS was not required to prove defendant acted with fraudulent 
intent in order to obtain reimbursement.  (§ 11004.)     
 
Indeed, under DSS regulations, the ALJ apparently lacked jurisdiction to 
determine whether defendant acted with fraudulent intent.  The regulations 
provide that “intentionally” making “a false or misleading statement, or 
misrepresent[ing], conceal[ing], or withh[o]ld[ing] facts” constitutes an 
“Intentional Program Violation” (IPV).  (MPP, §§ 20-300.1.11, 20-351i(1)(a).)  
IPV’s may be dealt with administratively only at an “administrative 
20 
disqualification hearing” (id., §§ 63-801.11, 63-801.231), which may be initiated 
only by the DSS or a county through service of notice on the welfare recipient.  
(Id., §§ 22-201.412, 22-202.51; 22-315.5.)  The fair hearing at issue here, which 
was initiated by defendant’s request in response to the notices of action (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 2), was not an administrative disqualification hearing.  (See MPP, 
§§ 22-200.2 [“Administrative disqualification hearings are distinct from” fair 
hearings], 22-301.2 [same].)  Indeed, because a criminal action was filed in this 
case, an administrative disqualification hearing to determine whether defendant 
committed an IPV could not have been held.  (Id., §§ 20-300.24, 20-352.3.)  And, 
because an IPV had not been established at an administrative disqualification 
hearing (or by a court), to the extent DSS claimed that defendant was at fault, the 
regulations required the claim to be “established and handled as an inadvertent 
household error claim.”  (Id., § 63-801.23.231.)  Thus, it was not within the ALJ’s 
authority here to determine at defendant’s fair hearing whether she acted with 
fraudulent intent.   
 
In this regard, this case materially differs from Sims.  There, the DSS 
alleged that the defendant had “fraudulently obtained” benefits by failing to report 
material information.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 473.)  Under the statutory 
scheme that governed the defendant’s fair hearing in Sims, whether the 
overpayments resulted from a “willful failure to report facts” or “any willfully 
fraudulent device,” and whether the defendant had “willfully withheld 
information” were expressly relevant to the DSS’s ability to recoup overpayments.  
(Former § 11004, subds. (d) & (e), added by Stats. 1979, ch. 804, § 2, p. 2768 and 
repealed by Stats. 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 3, § 2, p. 6890.)  The defendant denied 
that she had failed to disclose material information and she denied that she had 
received benefits to which she was not entitled.  Thus, the ALJ in Sims had to 
determine whether the defendant had acted fraudulently, and it expressly found 
that the DSS failed to prove she “fraudulently obtained welfare benefits.”  (Sims, 
21 
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 474.)  It therefore ruled that the defendant was entitled to 
keep all benefits she had received and ordered the DSS to “refund any restitution 
payments [she] had made.”  (Ibid.)  Here, as already explained, the function of the 
fair hearing was to determine whose conduct caused the overpayments defendant 
received, and under the governing statute, whether defendant acted fraudulently 
was irrelevant to determining that question. 
 
The purposes of administrative fair hearings and criminal prosecutions for 
welfare fraud appear to differ in another important respect:  the nature of the 
causation inquiry.  In the trial court, defendant’s counsel asserted that the ALJ 
here had only “two choices” regarding causation:  “either county error or client” 
conduct.  These two choices excluded the possibility of finding that both county 
error and defendant’s conduct were contributing factors.  Counsel’s argument is 
fully consistent with the ALJ’s statement of the issue before him:  “Whether the 
overissuance and overpayment were the result of administrative errors or 
[defendant’s] failure to report [her children’s] absence from her home.”  It is also 
consistent with the governing administrative regulations, which required the ALJ 
at the fair hearing to find that the overpayments were caused either by 
administrative error or by inadvertent household error.  (MPP, §§ 63-801.211, 63-
801.221.)  Thus, the purpose of the fair hearing was to determine which of two 
mutually exclusive possible causes was the cause of the overpayments.  For this 
reason, as the majority explains, the ALJ’s decision that the overpayments were 
caused by administrative errors “leaves open the possibility that defendant made 
misstatements that were a contributing cause to the overpayments.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 22.)  As the majority also explains, the causation inquiry in defendant’s 
criminal prosecution for welfare fraud was different; it did not focus on 
determining the exclusive cause of the overpayments.  In this regard, the purposes 
of administrative fair hearings and criminal prosecutions for welfare fraud are 
surely different.   
22 
 
In other respects, administrative fair hearings and criminal welfare fraud 
prosecutions “serve different public interests” in the same sense that, as we found 
in Lucido, “[p]robation revocation hearings and criminal trials serve different 
public interests . . . .”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 347.)  A criminal 
prosecution is initiated by the People to vindicate the public’s “vital interest in 
enforcement of [its] criminal laws.”  (U.S. v. Jorn (1971) 400 U.S. 470, 479.)  
That interest includes “deter[ring] the individual from committing acts that injure 
society” and “express[ing] society’s condemnation of such acts by punishing 
them.”  (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 316, italics added; see also Best 
v. State Bar of Cal. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 633, 637 [“purpose” of a “criminal 
proceeding” is “punishment” if “accused . . . is found guilty”].)  As previously 
noted, an administrative fair hearing is initiated by a welfare recipient to vindicate 
the recipient’s own private interest in challenging an “action of the county 
[welfare] department relating to his or her application for or receipt of public 
social services . . . .”  (§ 10950.)  It provides a “ ‘welfare recipient with a speedy 
[citations] and informal [citations] means to challenge an administrative action 
[that] may reduce or terminate’ ” benefits.  (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 
393, 402.)  No punishment results from an administrative fair hearing.  Thus, like 
the probation revocation hearing at issue in Lucido, an administrative fair hearing, 
“despite its obvious importance to” a welfare recipient, “neither threatens” the 
recipient “with the stigma of a new conviction nor with punishment . . . .”  
(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 348.)  Moreover, like “the hearing judge in a 
revocation proceeding,” an ALJ’s “fundamental role and responsibility” at an 
administrative fair hearing “is not to determine whether” the subject of the hearing 
“is guilty or innocent of a crime” (ibid.); the ALJ’s responsibility is to determine 
whether the DSS has properly found that the welfare recipient must reimburse the 
agency for benefits that should not have been paid.  To paraphrase Lucido, 
“because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation 
23 
of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS’s] failure to 
satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not 
necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher 
criminal standard of proof.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  For these reasons, the majority 
errs in asserting that “the purposes” of administrative fair hearings and welfare 
fraud prosecutions “do not differ greatly.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  
Accordingly, as we concluded in Lucido with respect to a probation revocation 
hearing, I conclude that “[p]reemption of trial of a [criminal] charge by [a fair 
hearing] decision designed to perform a wholly independent social and legal task 
would undermine the function of the criminal trial process as the intended forum 
for ultimate determinations as to guilt or innocence of newly alleged crimes.”  
(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349; cf. People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 
256 [declining to apply collateral estoppel because of the public’s “substantial 
interest in . . . ‘prevent[ing]’ [criminal] offenders ‘from escaping the penalties 
imposed by [recidivism] statutes through technical defects in . . . proof’ ”].) 
 
The majority also errs in asserting that Lucido can meaningfully be 
distinguished by the absence in this case of “evidentiary rules [that] prohibit a 
welfare recipient’s testimony at an administrative hearing from being introduced at 
a later criminal trial for welfare fraud.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  In Lucido, we 
explained that such rules “guarantee[] the probationer the ability to present a full 
case at the [revocation] hearing without running the risk of prejudicing his defense 
at a subsequent [criminal] trial.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.)  In the 
context of administrative welfare fraud hearings, such evidentiary rules are not 
critical to a welfare recipient’s ability fully to present his or her case.  By statute, 
administrative fair hearings are “informal,” must be conducted “in order to 
encourage free and open discussion by the participants,” and are not constrained 
by the “rules of procedure or evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.”  
(§ 10955.)  DSS regulations provide that “evidence shall be admitted [at an 
24 
administrative fair hearing] if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible 
persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs.”  (MPP, § 22-
050.2.)  Thus, welfare recipients can fully present their cases at administrative fair 
hearings through means other than their own sworn testimony.  Moreover, a 
welfare recipient who wants to testify but who is concerned that his or her 
testimony may be used at a subsequent criminal trial can readily solve this 
potential dilemma by requesting that the fair hearing be continued until 
completion of the criminal prosecution.  (See id., §§ 22-053 [postponements and 
continuances], 22-060.1 [allowing claimant to waive requirement that fair hearing 
be decided within 60 or 90 days of date hearing request is filed].)   
 
In any event, the majority’s focus on this issue is a red herring because the 
dilemma exists even under the majority’s view that collateral estoppel may, as a 
matter of public policy, apply in this context.  Welfare recipients who lose at 
administrative fair hearings cannot assert collateral estoppel and thus may have 
their hearing testimony used at any subsequent criminal trial.  Of course, at the 
time they must decide whether to testify at the administrative hearing, welfare 
recipients cannot know whether they will win or lose.  Thus, at the time the 
decision whether to testify must be made, even under the majority’s view that 
collateral estoppel applies if they win, welfare recipients face the risk they will 
lose and that their testimony will therefore be admissible against them at a 
subsequent criminal trial.  Therefore, in this context, even under the majority’s 
view, welfare recipients trying to decide whether to testify at administrative 
hearings must still consider the possibility that their testimony may later be used 
against them in criminal proceedings.  Because the concern the majority discusses 
exists whether or not collateral estoppel potentially applies, the majority errs in 
25 
relying on this consideration as a basis for reaching a policy conclusion here 
different from the one we reached in Lucido.6 
 
Indeed, contrary to the majority’s analysis, under Vandenberg, the most 
meaningful distinction between this case and Lucido establishes that it would be 
even more appropriate—not less—to apply collateral estoppel’s public policy 
exception in this case than it was in Lucido.  The probation revocation hearing in 
Lucido was a judicial proceeding decided by a judge of a “justice court.”  (Lucido, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 339.)  The fair hearing in this case was an administrative 
proceeding decided by a nonjudicial officer.  As previously explained, under 
Vandenberg, that administrative fair hearings are “outside the judicial system” and 
do “not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom” supports the conclusion that, 
as a matter of public policy, we should not apply collateral estoppel in this case.  
(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.) 
 
The majority’s stated reason for disregarding Vandenberg is inadequate.  
According to the majority, Vandenberg involved “a private arbitration” that 
“effectively ‘bypass[ed] the judicial system,’ ” whereas this case involves “a 
matter of public concern” dealt with in “ ‘a judicial-like adversary proceeding’ 
[citation] that [was] conducted by a state entity, the DSS, whose administrative 
law judges must follow California law and render decisions subject to judicial 
review.  [Citation.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18, fn. 6.)  In making this assertion, the 
majority once again ignores prior precedent of this court, which characterizes 
“private arbitration proceedings” as “ ‘quasi-judicial’ proceedings . . . that are 
functionally equivalent to court proceedings.  [Citation.]”  (Moore v. Conliffe 
                                              
6  
Because defendant did not testify at her administrative fair hearing, any 
concern about unfairness in actually using a welfare recipient’s fair hearing 
testimony at a subsequent criminal trial is irrelevant to determining whether policy 
considerations support applying collateral estoppel “[i]n the particular and special 
circumstances of this case.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) 
26 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 645.)  The majority also ignores the fact that in Vandenberg, 
the arbitration “took place before a retired federal judge,” the parties conducted 
“[f]ormal discovery,” “the transcribed proceedings included representation by 
counsel, and extensive evidence, briefing, and argument,” the arbitrator issued “a 
lengthy and detailed decision,” and the arbitration award was judicially 
“confirmed by a superior court judgment” (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 
826), which gave it “the same force and effect as . . . a judgment in a civil action 
of the same jurisdictional classification” and made it enforceable “like any other 
judgment of the court in which it [was] entered . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4.)  
By contrast, in this case, the administrative proceeding never involved a court in 
any capacity.  Because the ALJ’s decision here was entirely “outside the judicial 
system” and the fair hearing did “not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom” 
(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833), Vandenberg’s discussion of these 
considerations in connection with arbitration fully applies, whether or not, as the 
majority asserts, the fair hearing was “ ‘judicial-like’ ” and involved “a matter of 
public concern.”7  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18, fn. 6.) 
 
Finally, for several reasons, the majority’s assertion that the Legislature, in 
amending the welfare fraud statutes in 1984, “did not contemplate abrogating 
Sims” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 19) is unpersuasive.  First, it is largely beside the 
point.  As we have explained, the result in Sims was a judicial policy decision that 
was “informed by the ‘unique statutory scheme’ at issue there.  [Citations.]”  
(Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 851.)  Thus, the primary question here is not 
whether the Legislature intended to abrogate Sims, but whether we should make a 
different policy decision in this case because, among other things, the “ ‘unique 
                                              
7  
Of course, the analysis might be different had defendant petitioned under 
section 10962 for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision and were we dealing with 
a superior court judgment rendered after that review.  
27 
statutory scheme’ ” that “informed” our policy decision in Sims (ibid.) has been 
materially changed.   
 
Second, the majority’s analysis is inconsistent with our prior decisions.  
The majority asserts that we must presume the Legislature was aware of Sims and 
would have specified that administrative decisions do not preclude criminal 
prosecutions for welfare fraud had it wanted to invalidate Sims.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 20.)  We rejected a very similar argument in Estate of Kachigian (1942) 20 
Cal.2d 787.  At issue there was our construction of the probate homestead statutes, 
which we had based on the homestead statutes that apply before death.  (Id. at pp. 
788-790.)  The question we faced was whether a legislative amendment to the 
latter affected the former.  (Ibid.)  Offering an analysis very similar to the 
majority’s, the respondent in Kachigian, who contended that the amendment did 
not effect a change, argued:  “[I]t must be presumed that the Legislature was 
familiar with the former decisions and that in failing to change the probate statutes 
it must have intended to leave the probate law unchanged.”  (Id. at p. 790.)  We 
rejected the argument, stating:  “[I]f we presume that the Legislature was familiar 
with the former decisions, it would seem improper for us to presume that it was 
unaware of their basic reasoning and hold that it did not realize the probate rule 
must change if the basis therefor were changed.”  (Ibid.)  Similarly, here, “if we 
presume that the Legislature was familiar with [Sims], it would seem improper for 
us to presume that [the Legislature] was unaware of [Sims’s] basic reasoning and 
hold that [the Legislature] did not realize the [Sims] rule must change if [a] basis 
therefor were changed.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, I disagree with the majority’s view that the 
Legislature, in repealing the statutory requirement that informed our decision in 
Sims, “did not contemplate abrogating Sims.”8  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) 
                                              
8  
The majority correctly observes at the end of a long footnote that “unpassed 
bills ‘have little value’ in ascertaining legislative intent.  [Citation.]”  (Maj. opn., 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
28 
 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, ultimately, in concluding that Sims 
does not “warrant reconsideration” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1), the majority is 
focusing on the wrong question.  As noted above, in Sims, we considered whether 
“policy” considerations supported collateral estoppel’s application on “the facts of 
[that] case” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 477), and we expressly limited our 
holding to “the particular and special circumstances of [that] case.”  (Id. at p. 489.)  
As also explained above, the facts and circumstances of the case now before us are 
different:  the restitution-first requirement that was a “basis for our decision in 
Sims” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 14) no longer exists, the ALJ ruled that defendant 
must repay the overpayments she received, and the question of whether defendant 
intentionally made misrepresentations or omissions was not at issue in the 
administrative proceeding.  Thus, the question we must answer here is not, as the 
majority posits, whether to reconsider Sims, but is whether to extend that decision 
to the different facts and circumstances of this case.  More precisely, under 
Lucido, a precedent of this court that the majority simply ignores in relevant part,  
the question we must answer is whether “compelling public policy considerations 
outweigh[] the need for determinations of guilt and innocence to be made in the 
usual criminal trial setting.”  (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.)  Because I find 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
ante, at p. 20, fn. 7.)  Indeed, as we have explained, “because the Legislature’s 
failure to enact a proposed statutory amendment may indicate many things other 
than approval of a statute’s judicial construction, including the pressure of other 
business, political considerations, or a tendency to trust the courts to correct its 
own errors,”  “ ‘[w]e can rarely determine from the failure of the Legislature to 
pass a particular bill what the intent of the Legislature is with respect to existing 
law.’  [Citation, fn. omitted.]”  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 921.)  
In light of these well-established principles, it is unclear why the majority, in its 
textual discussion, appears to emphasize the Legislature’s failure to pass a bill that 
would have expressly abrogated Sims.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) 
29 
no such consideration and the majority fails to identify one, and because the 
majority offers no meaningful basis for distinguishing Lucido and concluding that 
although collateral estoppel does not apply after probation revocation hearings, it 
may apply after administrative fair hearings, were it necessary to decide the 
question here, I would hold that public policy considerations do not support 
applying collateral estoppel in “the particular and special circumstances of this 
case.”  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Garcia 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 117 Cal.App.4th 88 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S124090 
Date Filed: August 28, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Butte 
Judge: William P. Lamb* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Elizabeth M. Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Sally P. Brajevich, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Legal Services of Northern California, Gary F. Smith; Western Center on Law and Poverty, Richard A. 
Rothschild, Dora Lopez and Robert D. Newman for Legal Aid Association of California as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Janet E. Neeley, Stephen G. 
Herndon, Maggy Krell, David Andrew Eldridge, Paul E. O’Connor, Janis Shank McLean and Donald E. 
deNicola, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
David Labahn; Greg Gibeson, Assistant Deputy District Attorney (Alameda); and Stan Kubochi, Deputy 
District Attorney (Sacramento) for California District Attorney’s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the former Justice Court for the Big River Judicial District, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Elizabeth M. Campbell 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Gary F. Smith 
Legal Services of Northern California 
517 12th Street 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 551-2111 
 
Donald E. deNicola 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5290