Title: FOREMAN v MINNIE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 83-344 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTLNA 19 84 DIANE KAY FEELEY FOREMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, MICHAEL LEE MINNIE, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA and BOB SMITH LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Joseph P. Hennessey, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey & Jarussi, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: May 31, 1984 Decided: Xugust 9, 1984 f i r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellant b r i n g s t h i s appeal from a j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, f o r t h e defendants. The j u r y found t h e respondents n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e i n j u r i e s a p p e l l a n t s u s t a i n e d i n an a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t between a s h e r i f f ' s d e p u t y ' s v e h i c l e and a v e h i c l e i n which a p p e l l a n t rode a s a passenger. W e a f f i r m . On March 1 5 , 1977, a p p e l l a n t ( t h e n age 1 5 ) a c c e p t e d a r i d e from school with Bradley Shaw. They drove around B i l l i n g s f o r a few hours. They stopped a t a p p e l l a n t ' s p a r e n t ' s house and a l s o stopped a t a d r i v e - i n f o r d i n n e r . Following t h i s p e r i o d of d r i v i n g around, looking f o r and v i s i t i n g f r i e n d s , Shaw purchased a " s i x pack" of beer a t a l o c a l bar. B e then drove up t o t h e "Rimrocks" t o " p a r k , " d r i n k beer and l i s t e n t o music. About 8:30 p.m. t h e y s t a r t e d t o r e t u r n t o B i l l i n g s . Around t h e same t i m e , a s e v e r e a c c i d e n t occurred on t h e west s i d e of B i l l i n g s . The s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e d i s p a t c h e d d e p u t i e s Michael Lee Minnie and C h a r l e s Maxwell t o i n v e s t i g a t e and a s s i s t a t t h e a c c i d e n t scene. They drove t h e i r p a t r o l c a r s o u t of B i l l i n g s , w i t h s i r e n s b l a r i n g and emergency l i g h t s f l a s h i n g , i n a w e s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n on Route 3 p a r a l l e l t o t h e " R i m r o c k s . " E v i d e n c e d i f f e r s a s t o t h e s p e e d o f r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e , b u t it exceeded 65 m i l e s per hour. R e s p o n d e n t d r o v e a p p r o x i m a t e l y b e t w e e n o n e - e i g h t h a n d one-quarter of a m i l e ahead of Maxwell. Shaw drove h i s v e h i c l e from 23rd S t r e e t and turned o u t i n f r o n t of respondent o n t o Route 3 . Respondent, a p p a r e n t l y unable t o s t o p or avoid c o l l i d i n g w i t h Shaw, slammed i n t o the side of Shaw's vehicle. Both cars skidded off the highway and into the barrow pits on different sides of the road. A day or two after the accident, appellant requested that an officer search the Shaw vehicle for some jewelry she had lost. The officer conducting the search found several empty beer cans and bottles, a few full beer cans and some drug paraphernalia. Both appellant and Shaw admitted consuming at least one beer during the course of the evening. They admitted having consumed some marijuana prior to the date of the accident, but adamantly denied having consumed any marijuana on the date of the accident. Just prior to the trial, appellant's attorney sought a motioi~ in limine to preclude the admission of any evidence of the discovery of the drug paraphernalia in Shaw's vehicle. The District Court denied appellant's motion. A jury then found respondents not liable for the injuries appellant suffered as a result of the accident. Appellant raises the following issues for appeal: (1) Did the District Court err in permitting Deputy Maxwell to testify as an expert witness and state his conclusion as to the cause of the accident? (2) Did the court err in giving a jury instruction regarding the statutory prohibition against driving under the influence? (3) Did the court err in denying appellant's jury instruction regarding not imputing appellant's negligence from the negligence of Shaw? (4) Did the court err in denying appellant's motion in l i m i n e t o p r e c l u d e t h e admission i n t o e v i d e n c e of t h e d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a found i n t h e Shaw v e h i c l e ? ( 5 ) Did t h e j u r y render a v e r d i c t c o n t r a r y t o t h e e v i d e n c e and law? A p p e l l a n t f i r s t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n p e r m i t t i n g Deputy tlaxwell's t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g t h e c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t under Rule 704, Montana R u l e s of Evidence. There was no need f o r such testimony because t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r was n o t beyond t h e o r d i n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e j u r y . She a l s o q u e s t i o n s Deputy Maxwell's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a s a n e x p e r t w i t n e s s i n t h i s c a s e . H e a l s o i m p r o p e r l y t e s t i f i e d r e g a r d i n g t h e l e g a l cause of t h e a c c i d e n t . W e set f o r t h t h e s t a n d a r d t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n and competency of e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s r e s t s l a r g e l y w i t h t h e t r i a l judge, and w i t h o u t a showing of an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n s u c h d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l n o t b e d i s t u r b e d . Goodnough v. S t a t e (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 647 P.2d 364, 39 St.Rep. 1170. T h i s Court a f f i r m e d a t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t h i g h w a y p a t r o l m e n m e e t n e c e s s a r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o t e s t i f y a s e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s f o r a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t s and p e r m i t t e d them t o t e s t i f y r e g a r d i n g t h e c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t . Goodnough v. S t a t e , s u p r a ; Workman v. McIntyre C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 617 P.2d 1281, 37 St.Rep. 1637; Rude v. Neal ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 520, 530 R.2d 428. A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t Deputy Maxwell was n o t t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r a t t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e r e f o r e would n o t q u a l i f y as an e x p e r t w i t n e s s . Maxwell was a t t h e a c c i d e n t s i t e , he w i t n e s s e d t h e a c c i d e n t and a s s i s t e d i n t h e a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T h a t combined w i t h h i s e x p e r i e n c e clearly qualifies him as an expert. Appellant contends Maxwell stated the legal cause of the accident in his testimony which was inadmissible. Maxwell made the following statements in his testimony: "Q. [By counsel for respondents] Do you have an opinion, based upon your experience and based upon all of your knowledge of this case, as to whether or not there was any violation of law by Bradley Shaw in this case? "MR. HARTMAN [counsel for appellant] : Qbject, Your Honor, on the grounds it calls for a legal conclusion. "THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. "A. Yes. What is that opinion? "A. I believe that he just failed to yield the right of way because of, I believe, alcoholic beverages. "Q. Do you have an opinion, Officer Maxwell, as to whether or not Officer Minnie, at the time and place immediately preceding the collision, was driving in a lawful and careful manner and in control of his vehicle? " i J I R . HENNESSEY [counsel for appellant] : If the Court please, there has been no foundation for this testimony, it invades the province of the jury, it's immaterial and it's not a proper question. "THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may answer. "Q. What is that opinion? "A. I believe that he was driving in a correct and legal manner, sir." While Maxwell testified as to what he considered the cause of the accident, adequate opportunity was given to appellant to elicit any assumptions or facts underlining the expert opinion. Therefore, the weight of the testimony remains with the jury and the testimony was properly a d m i t t e d . A p p e l l a n t a l s o contends t h a t t h e e x p e r t testimony was unnecessary because t h e cause of t h e a c c i d e n t was n o t beyond t h e o r d i n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e j u r y . A p p e l l a n t c i t e s Ployhar v. Board of T r u s t e e s of Missoula (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 609 P.2d 1226, 37 St.Rep. 744, f o r s u p p o r t . W e f i n d t h e f a c t s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e d i s s i m i l a r t o Ployhar , s u p r a . Ployhar involved t h e a c c i d e n t a l d e a t h caused by heavy equipment being backed over t h e t o p of t h e decedent. The i n s t a n t c a s e i n v o l v e s a n a c c i d e n t where t h e p a r t i e s a l l e g e d d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t . A p p e l l a n t must have b e l i e v e d t h e c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t was complicated because s h e brought i n an e x p e r t w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y r e g a r d i n g t h e speed o f t h e v e h i c l e s . A s was p r o p e r l y s t a t e d i n t h e d i s s e n t i n P l o y h a r , s u p r a : "This Court h a s long h e l d t h a t e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y should be a d m i t t e d whenever t h e i s s u e b e f o r e t h e j u r y c o n c e r n s a s u b j e c t of such a n a t u r e t h a t t h e a v e r a g e person cannot reach a s i n t e l l i g e n t a c o n c l u s i o n a s one who h a s had e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e s u b j e c t . S e e , D e m a r a i s v. J o h n s o n ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 90 Mont. 366, 370, 3 P.2d 283, 285." Ployhar a t 612 P.2d a t 1228, ( H a r r i s o n J. d i s s e n t i n g ) . W e hold i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y d e t e r m i n e d t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r r e q u i r e d e x p e r t testimony s o a s t o a s s i s t t h e j u r y and it p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d Maxwell's testimony. W e t u r n t o t h e n e x t i s s u e r e g a r d i n g t h e j u r y i n s t r i l c t i o n s . A p p e l l a n t contends t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g t h e fol.lowing j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t Montana S t a t u t e s p r o v i d e t h a t it i s u n l a w f u l f o r a n y person who is under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l o r a n a r c o t i c drug t o d r i v e o r be i n a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l of a motor v e h i c l e upon t h e highways of t h i s s t a t e . " Appellant argues t h a t i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence came i n t o t h e t r i a l t o w a r r a n t t h e g i v i n g of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . W e d i s a g r e e . C o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 3 which i n s t r u c t s t h a t it is unlawful t o d r i v e a motor v e h i c l e w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l o r n a r c o t i c s , should be read along w i t h c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 18: " I f you f i n d from t h e evidence t h a t a person i n t h i s a c c i d e n t conducted himself i n v i o l a t i o n of any s t a t u t e , you a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t s u c h c o n d u c t was n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r of law. "However, i n t h i s a c t i o n , a v i o l a t i o n o f law is of no consequence u n l e s s it was a proximate cause of o r c o n t r i b u t e d a s a proximate cause t o an i n j u r y found by you t o have been s u f f e r e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f . " No o b j e c t i o n was made by t h e a p p e l l a n t t o t h e g i v i n g of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . The b a s i c i s s u e t o be determined by t h e j u r y i n t h i s c a s e was t h e d e g r e e of n e g l i g e n c e , i f any, on t h e p a r t of t h e d r i v e r s of both v e h i c l e s . Under i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 8 , it becomes a p p r o p r i a t e t o i n s t r u c t t h a t if t h e d r i v e r of t h e c a r i n which a p p e l l a n t was r i d i n g was under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l o r n a r c o t i c d r u g s w h i l e d r i v i n g , t h e n it should be considered a s n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r of law. Reading t h e two i n s t r u c t i o n s t o g e t h e r , it is c l e a r t h a t no. 18 c l a r i f i e s no. 1 3 and it becomes a proper i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e law of t h e case. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , evidence i n d i c a t e d Shaw consumed a t l e a s t one beer p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t . S e v e r a l beer c a n s and b o t t l e s were found i n t h e v e h i c l e , a l s o an o f f i c e r found drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a i n Shawls v e h i c l e . S u f f i c i e n t evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t Shaw could have been d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e . W e hold t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on t h i s m a t t e r . A p p e l l a n t contends t h e c o u r t e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o p r o v i d e a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n r e g a r d i n g n o t i m p u t i n g t h e n e g l i g e n c e of Shaw t o a p p e l l a n t . Absent a showing of j o i n t e n t e r p r i s e t h e negligence of a d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e cannot be imputed t o a passenger. W e f i n d no e r r o r occurred i n t h e omission of g i v i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n . No comparative n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y i n t h i s c a s e implied t h a t p l a i n t i f f a c t e d n e g l i g e n t l y t o cause her i n j u r i e s . The c o u r t merely i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t o d e c i d e i f t h e a c t s of t h e respondents were t h e proximate cause of t h e a c c i d e n t . Because t h e j u r y d i d n o t c o n s i d e r a p p e l l a n t ' s n e g l i g e n c e , i f any, i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s ' n e g l i g e n c e , t h e n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n became unnecessary. A p p e l l a n t n e x t a r g u e s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n denying h e r m o t i o n i n l i m i n e t o e x c l u d e e v i d e n c e of t h e d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a found i n Shaw's v e h i c l e . She a s s e r t s its p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t outweighs t h e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h i s evidence. W e d i s a g r e e . I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of t h e evidence d i d not outweigh its p r o b a t i v e v a l u e . While both Shaw and a p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y d i d n o t smoke any marijuana on t h e day of t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e y d i d admit smoking it p r e v i o u s t o t h a t day. Evidence a l s o i n d i c a t e d Shaw had owned t h e v e h i c l e f o r a s h o r t t i m e p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t . Because t h e p a r a p h e r n a l i a was found i n t h e v e h i c l e , t h a t would tend t o show Shaw was a c t i v e l y consuming c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s w i t h i n a few d a y s of t h e a c c i d e n t . The e v i d e n c e of drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a p o s s i b l y impeaches a p p e l l a n t ' s and S h a w ' s t e s t i m o n y and s u p p o r t s t h e t h e o r y t h a t S h a w ' s n e g l i g e n c e caused t h e a c c i d e n t . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y denied t h e motion i n l i m i n e . Appellant f i n a l l y contends t h e j u r y rendered a v e r d i c t c o n t r a r y t o t h e law and t h e f a c t s . She contends t h e evidence c l e a r l y demonstrates respondent a c t e d n e g l i g e n t l y . W e d i s a g r e e . I n r e v i e w i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e w e "review t h e evidence i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . W e w i l l r e v e r s e o n l y where t h e r e is a l a c k of s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t . " "If t h e r e is c o n f l i c t i n g evidence i n t h e r e c o r d , t h e c r e d i b i l i t y and weight given t o such c o n f l i c t i n g evidence is t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y and n o t t h i s c o u r t . " Anderson v. J a c q u e t h (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 668 P.2d 1063, 1064, 40 St.Rep. 1451, 1453, c i t i n g Gunnels v. Hoyt (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 633 P.2d 1187, 38 St.Rep. 1492. Evidence a t t r i a l i n d i c a t e s r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e was t r a v e l i n g between s i x t y - f i v e and n i n e t y miles p e r hour. Evidence a l s o i n d i c a t e d Shaw p u l l e d o u t i n f r o n t of an emergency v e h i c l e w i t h its s i r e n b l a r i n g and i t s l i g h t s f l a s h i n g . Shaw admitted consuming some a l c o h o l , and s e v e r a l beer cans and b o t t l e s and drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a were found i n h i s v e h i c l e . C l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t evidence e x i s t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . W e hold t h e j u r y had s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o j u s t i f y t h e v e r d i c t . The v e r d i c t is hereby a f f i r m e d . W e c o n c u r : 7 4 4 4. & u d C h i e f ust tic& J u s t i c e s I would reverse and remand for a new trial holding that it was error to permit the investigating officer to give opinion testimony regarding the cause of this accident. This Court has been liberal in allowing law enforcement officers to testify about the cause of an accident. The time has come to reeval-uate our evidentiary position. Some law enforcement officers have, through training, acquired some knowledge which may allow them to properly testify as expert witnesses on matters of accident reconstruction. However, the training of these officers should be confined to those areas where they do have some expertise. For instance, an officer may be able to estimate speed from skid marks. Likewise, an officer may he able to determine a point of impact from gouge marks and debris. On the other hand, there is no basis for an officer testifying that the cause of an accident was failure to yield the right-of-way because alcoholic beverages were consumed. This type of opinion testimony is totally lacking in foundation. The officer is in no better position to draw such a conclusion than are individual jurors. ' W e would not allow the officer's opinion reflected in the issuance of a ticket for traffic violation, to be admitted into evidence. Likewise the officer's oral testimony about his opinion regarding law violations should not receive our judicial blessing. The admission of the officer's testimony in this case exceeds even the precedent previously set by this Court. I believe the time has come to rein in the testimony of law enforcement officers and properly confine that testimony to those areas where the officer actually has some expertise apart from that held by our people generally. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. C L I concur with Justice Morrison. sf ice QL e , ~ 1 1