Title: Paul Alfred Brown v. Michael W. Moore

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-884
____________
PAUL ALFRED BROWN,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE,
Respondent.
[November 1, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Paul Alfred Brown petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  We deny the petition.
Brown was convicted for the shooting murder of seventeen-year-old Pauline
Cowell, for which he was sentenced to death.  He was also convicted of armed
burglary and attempted first-degree murder.  The facts of the case are more fully set
forth in our opinion in Brown’s direct appeal.  See Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304,
305 (Fla. 1990).  Brown filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  The trial court denied relief, and we affirmed
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that denial.  See Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2000).  Brown now claims
that “[s]ignificant errors which occurred at Mr. Brown’s capital trial and sentencing
were not presented to this Court on direct appeal due to the ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel.”  Brown makes two arguments for relief in this habeas
petition.
Brown first argues that he may be incompetent to be executed.  Brown
agrees that this claim is premature under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811. 
However, Brown asserts that he makes the argument to preserve his ability to
pursue a similar claim in the federal system on account of In re Provenzano, 215
F.3d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1256 (2000).  We agree with his
concession that this issue is not yet ripe, and we therefore find it to be without
merit.  See Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001); Mann v. Moore, 26 Fla.
L. Weekly S490, S491 (Fla. July 12, 2001).
Brown’s second argument is that the death sentence in his case is
unconstitutional as applied to him in light of the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  He argues that at the
time of his penalty phase, section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provided the
maximum sentence was life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-
1.  The murder occurred in 1986; therefore, Brown’s citation to the 1983
version of section 775.082(1) is in error.  However, the 1985 version and the 1987
version (the year of his penalty phase) were identical to the 1983 version.  We have
rejected Brown’s challenge to the 1979 version in Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 532
(Fla.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1752 (2001), and the 1989 version in Mann.  The
1983, 1985, and 1987 versions of section 775.082(1) are identical to the 1979 and
1989 versions of the statute.
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five years.1  Brown further argues that the aggravating circumstances were required
to be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury during the guilt phase, and
found by the jury in a unanimous verdict.  Brown claims that his appellate counsel
was ineffective for not raising these issues.
We have previously rejected identical arguments.  See Mills v. State, 786 So.
2d 532, 536-38 (Fla.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1752 (2001); Mann, 26 Fla. L.
Weekly at S490.  For the same reasons explained in those opinions, we reject
Brown’s arguments.  Thus, we find that Brown’s appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise these issues.  Accordingly, we deny the petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS,
JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Dwight M. Wells, Assistant CCRC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle
Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent