Title: LEONARD SINGER V. NEW TECH ENGINEERING L.P., Individually and through Vicarious Liability for NEW TECH SAFETY LIMITED

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEONARD SINGER V. NEW TECH ENGINEERING L.P., Individually and through Vicarious Liability for NEW TECH SAFETY LIMITED2010 WY 31Case Number: S-09-0024Decided: 03/22/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
LEONARD 
SINGER, Appellant(Plaintiff),v.NEW TECH ENGINEERING 
L.P., Individually and through Vicarious Liability for NEW TECH SAFETY 
LIMITED,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mark 
L. Carman of Carman Law Office, P.C., Billings, Montana; and Cody L. Balzer of 
Balzer Law Firm, P.C., Loveland, Colorado.  
Argument by Mr. Carman.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Roger 
E. Shumate and James C. Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Shumate.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1 
]     After suffering 
debilitating injuries while working on a drilling rig owned by Caza Drilling 
(Caza) in northeastern Wyoming, Leonard Singer brought a negligence case against 
New Tech Engineering (New Tech), the company who hired safety coaches to provide 
"safety services" on the rig.  The 
district court granted New Tech's summary judgment motion, and denied Mr. 
Singer's partial summary judgment motion, absolving New Tech from any 
responsibility in Mr. Singer's injuries.  
We affirm the district court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Leonard Singer 
lists the issues as follows:

 
 

A.           
Are 
there questions of material fact regarding whether Mr. Harrington was an 
employee/agent or independent contractor?

B.           
Does 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 impose liability upon New Tech 
regardless of the employment status of Mr. Harrington?

C.           
Is 
New Tech directly and vicariously liable by its assumption of affirmative duties 
of safety pursuant to its agreement with Caza, regardless of the employment 
status of Mr. Harrington?

D.           
Did 
New Tech undertake a non-delegable duty when it agreed to provide safety 
services for an ultra-hazardous undertaking rendering it directly and 
vicariously [liable] regardless of the employment status of Mr. 
Harrington?

 
 
New 
Tech recites the issues this way:

 
 

I.              
The 
district court properly found that Gary Harrington was an independent contractor 
and not an employee/agent.

II.            
The 
district court properly held that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 does 
not impose liability upon New Tech, even if Mr. Harrington is an independent 
contractor.

III.           
The 
district court properly found that Appellee New Tech Engineering did not assume 
any affirmative safety duties.

IV.          
The 
district court properly found that Appellee New Tech Engineering did not have a 
non-delegable duty.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2002, it was 
Caza's practice to have safety coaches on rig sites.  Customers of Caza wanted the coaches 
present and, wanting to satisfy their customers, Caza made sure the coaches were 
a fixture on the rig.  Having 
previously experienced problems hiring insured safety coaches, Caza decided to 
hire its coaches through an engineering company that would provide the coach 
with liability insurance.  Caza also 
wanted to maintain control over its safety program and decided that New Tech1 would facilitate both wishes.  New Tech was "primarily a placement 
service," as it provided Caza with three names of safety coaches, and Caza 
decided which person to hire.

 
 
[¶4]      From the choices 
given to Caza by New Tech, Caza hired Gary Harrington2 as its safety coach.  The chain of command is not altogether 
clear, but Harrington believed that he worked under Caza's Health, Safety and 
Environmental Director, Harry Olds, although Olds believed Harrington supervised 
"himself."  Nevertheless, Harrington 
received his orders and directions from Caza employees and reported to Caza 
supervisors.  Caza decided where the 
safety coaches worked on a day-to-day basis and had the power to terminate the 
safety coaches.  Although Harrington 
"checked in" with New Tech only every six to eight weeks, he received his 
paycheck through New Tech and was provided liability insurance by New Tech.  Caza, however, retained the right to 
terminate the safety coaches by calling New Tech and requesting a new safety 
coach.  New Tech would never 
terminate a safety coach; they would simply refrain from using that individual's 
services again.

 
 
[¶5]      Harrington was on 
duty during Leonard Singer's shift on the Natrona County drilling rig on July 
27, 2002.  Singer, who was a Caza 
employee, was injured and rendered totally disabled while working on the rig. 
 Singer filed suit against New Tech 
alleging that New Tech's actions (and inactions) contributed to his 
injuries.  New Tech asserted that it 
had neither direct nor vicarious liability for Singer's injuries because it 
engaged Harrington as an "independent contractor" to perform the safety duties 
assigned to him by Caza.  The 
district court agreed and granted New Tech's motion for summary judgment.  The court also denied Singer's partial 
summary judgment motion, absolving New Tech from any responsibility by 
application of the independent contractor rule and rejection of any exceptions 
to the rule.

 
 
[¶6]      On appeal, Singer 
contends that Harrington was an employee/agent of New Tech and not an 
independent contractor.  
Furthermore, he argues that regardless of the employment status of 
Harrington, New Tech is liable under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429, and also because New Tech 
assumed affirmative duties of safety.  
Finally, Singer argues that New Tech undertook a non-delegable duty by 
"agreeing to provide safety services."

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

ISSUE 
I

 
 
[¶7]      Singer's first 
argument on appeal is that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding 
whether Harrington was an employee/agent of New Tech or an independent 
contractor.  The district court 
determined that Harrington was an independent contractor.  New Tech agrees with the district 
court's assessment and encourages this Court to affirm the summary judgment 
motion.

 
 
[¶8]      We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and using the 
same materials as the district court.  Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 
WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006).  Thus, our review is plenary.  Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 
Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 
56 governs summary judgments.  A 
summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  When reviewing a summary judgment, we 
consider the record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  We 
review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the 
district court's determinations.

 
 

Loredo 
v. Solvay Am., Inc., 2009 
WY 93, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 614, 618 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Cathcart v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo. 
2005)).

 

 
   "A 
genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an 
essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have 
asserted."  Christensen v. Carbon 
County, 2004 WY 135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting 
Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, P 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002)).  The party 
requesting a summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case for summary judgment.  If 
he carries his burden, "the party who is opposing the motion for summary 
judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists."  Id.  We have explained the duties of the party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows: 

 
 
"After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material 
fact.  The opposing party 
must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings , and 
conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing 
party's burden."

 
 
   The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation."  Speculation, 
conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are 
insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.  Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, 
quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, PP 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

Hatton 
v. Energy Elec. Co., 
2006 WY 151, ¶¶ 8-9, 148 P.3d 8, 12-13 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

Loredo, 
¶ 10, 212 P.3d  at 618-19.

 
 
[¶9]      With regard to 
determining whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor, we have 
previously stated that:

 
 
The 
overriding consideration in distinguishing between master-servant relationships 
and employer-independent 
contractor relationships is the employer's right to control the means 
and manner of the work.  See, e.g., 
Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo. 1988); 
Cline v. State, Dep't. of Family Services, 927 P.2d 261, 263 (Wyo. 1996); 
Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 164 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 
Such 
a right to control is a prerequisite of the master-servant relationship.  Conversely, the absence of such a right 
of control is a prerequisite of an independent contractor relationship. 
Master-servant and independent 
contractor are thus opposite sides of the same coin; one cannot be 
both at the same time with respect to the same activity; the one necessarily 
negatives the other, each depending on opposite answers to the same right of 
control inquiry.

 
 

Coates 
v. Anderson, 
2004 WY 11, ¶ 7, 84 P.3d 953, 957 (Wyo. 2004).  When a worker is an independent contractor, the employer is typically interested only 
in the results of the work and does not direct the details of . . . how the work 
is performed.  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 166; Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 
(Wyo. 1994).

 
 
When 
an express contract exists between the parties, it is important evidence in 
defining the relationship, although it is not conclusive of the issue.  Coates, ¶ 14; Noonan, 
713 P.2d  at 164.  Other factors 
which are important to the determination include: the method of payment, the 
right to terminate the relationship without incurring liability, the furnishing 
of tools and equipment, the scope of the work, and the control of the premises 
where the work is to be done.  Stratman, 760 P.2d  at 980; 
Combined Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 1043.  Another factor to be considered is 
whether the worker devotes all of his efforts to the position or if he also 
performs work for others.  Id.

 

 
With 
regard to the "method of payment" criterion, an independent contractor usually 
determines the price of his services and bills for his services on a regular 
basis.  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 
166, citing Simpson, 770 F.2d  at 501; Combined Insurance, 584 P.2d  
at 1043.  On the other hand, when 
the employer determines the 
worker's rate of pay and takes deductions out of his paychecks for federal 
income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare then a master-servant relationship 
is indicated.  Id.  We have said that payment of workers' 
compensation and unemployment insurance premiums by an employer suggests that the worker is 
an employee rather than an independent 
contractor.  See In re: 
Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1240-41 (Wyo. 1986); In re Reed, 444 P.2d 329, 330 (Wyo. 1968).  Similarly, when a worker is eligible to 
participate in benefit programs such as retirement or insurance plans, as a 
result of his association with the employer, it suggests a 
master-servant relationship exists.  Combined Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 
1043.

 
 

Diamond 
B Svcs., Inc. v. Rohde, 
2005 WY 130, ¶¶ 28-30, 120 P.3d 1031, 1041-42 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

Kruckenberg 
v. Ding Masters, Inc., 
2008 WY 40, ¶ 21, 180 P.3d 895, 901-902 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶10]   There is ample law that says the 
jury or other fact finder determines a disputed issue of whether a party is an 
employee or an independent contractor.  41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent 
Contractors § 69 (2005 and 2009 Cum. Supp.).  It is only when the evidence is 
susceptible to but a single inference that the Court rules as a matter of law. 
 Id.

 
 
[¶11]   In this instance, New Tech 
submitted its initial summary judgment motion contending that the facts clearly 
showed the safety coach (Harrington) was an independent contractor, thus 
relieving New Tech of any liability for Singer's injuries.  The district court agreed and concluded 
that no genuine issue of material fact 
existed and that Harrington was an independent 
contractor:

 
 
A 
review of the record show that New Tech did not direct Harrington in the 
performance of his duties for coaching Caza employees as to safety issues, and 
no genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Harrington was an independent 
contractor.

 
 
We 
agree with the district court's conclusion.

 
 
[¶12]   Among Singer's arguments disputing 
the district court's conclusion are the following:  Harrington filled out, signed, and 
submitted New Tech time sheets labeling him as an "employee;" New Tech had the 
right to hire/fire; New Tech had the right to tell Harrington where to go and 
what to do; New Tech told Harrington to report to the Caza rig; Harrington only 
worked for New Tech during the time in question; New Tech provided Harrington 
liability insurance; and New Tech controlled Harrington's work assignments.  According to Singer, this litany of 
reasons warrants reversal.

 
 
[¶13]   In response to Singer's catalog of 
items, New Tech first argues that Caza Drilling, not New Tech, had the right to 
control Harrington's work  in fact, it was Caza that initiated the hiring of 
Harrington, as Caza wanted to maintain control over its safety program at the 
drilling rig.  Harrington worked, 
according to New Tech, under Caza employees and only checked in with New Tech 
every six to eight weeks.  In fact, 
no contract existed between New Tech and Harrington, and the time sheets given 
to Harrington that listed him as an employee were actually from the wrong word 
processing template.  Regarding the 
method of payment, New Tech insists that paying Harrington on a day-rate basis 
is an appropriate method of payment for an independent contractor whose time is 
the service being sold.  
Furthermore, New Tech insists, and the record reflects, that no benefits, 
including medical insurance, were provided to Harrington nor were deductions 
made for federal income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare.  New Tech also points out that it never 
provided any tools to Harrington, but instead, Caza provided Harrington a truck, 
on-site living provisions, and on occasion, a computer.  New Tech argues that Caza had the 
ultimate control over the selection, hiring, and firing of the safety 
consultants on the rig, including Harrington.  Caza also had control over Harrington's 
schedule.  Finally, New Tech points 
out that Harrington did not devote all of his time to New Tech but instead to 
Caza.

 
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation."  Speculation, 
conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are 
insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.

 
 

Collings 
v. Lords, 2009 
WY 135, ¶ 5, 218 P.3d 654, 656 (Wyo. 2009) (internal citation 
omitted).

 
 
[¶14]   Our chief focus regarding whether 
Harrington was a New Tech employee or an independent contractor is "who had the 
right of control."  Kruckenberg, ¶ 21, 180 P.2d  
at 901.  The right of control is the 
"overriding" consideration in making this determination.  In examining the extent of the 
employer's control over the worker in this instance, it is important to 
distinguish control over the means and manner of the work from control over the 
end product of the work to be performed.  Diamond B Services, Inc., v. Rohde, ¶ 28, 2005 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 1041 
(Wyo. 2005).  An independent 
contractor is one who, in the course of an independent occupation or employment, 
undertakes work subject to the will or control of the person for whom the work 
is done only as to the result of the work and not as 
to the methods or means used.  Id., ¶ 27, 120 P.3d, 1041.  When a worker is an independent contractor, the employer is 
typically interested only in the results of the work and does not direct the 
details of how the work is performed.

 
 
[¶15]   While New Tech did exercise some 
control over sending Harrington to Caza, they did not provide him with training, 
never supervised him on the rig, nor did they provide him with any instruction 
materials.  In fact, once New Tech 
sent Harrington to Caza, the relationship between him and New Tech could be 
described as nominal.  The fact that 
New Tech had a hand in developing the relationship between Harrington and Caza 
does not evidence control over the means and methods used in performing the work 
done on the actual rig.  New Tech 
did not exercise control over the manner in which Harrington conducted his job, 
day in and day out at Caza.  Our review of the record on appeal 
shows a distinct lack of evidence of right to control by New Tech over 
Harrington  there was no "controlling or pervasive role" over Harrington's work 
by New Tech.  See Hjelle v. Mid-State Consultants, Inc., 
394 F.3d 873, 879 (10th Cir. 2005).  In fact, the record shows instead that 
Caza had control over the means and manner of Harrington's work.  He worked under Caza employee Harry 
Olds, from whom he would receive orders, and to whom he would report.  Ultimately, Harrington's employment was 
at the discretion of Caza.

 
 
[¶16]   The remaining factors to be 
considered also indicate that Harrington was an independent contractor rather than an employee.  
New Tech never provided any tools or equipment to 
Harrington.  Rather, Caza provided 
Harrington a truck, an on-site trailer to live in and, on occasion, a 
computer.  The only thing provided 
by New Tech to Harrington so that he could complete his work was liability 
insurance, which was specifically purchased and designed to cover independent 
contractors.  Such insurance was 
"industry standard" for any company placing independent consultants.  In addition, although Harrington was 
paid through New Tech, he was paid on a daily rate, indicating he was being paid 
by New Tech for his services rather than his time and, moreover, New Tech did 
not deduct taxes, Medicare, or Social Security from these payments.  See Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 84 P.2d 736 (Wyo. 1938).  Furthermore, New 
Tech actually classified Harrington 
as an independent contractor in issuing him an IRS Form 1099 for non-employee 
compensation.

 
 
[¶17]   Regarding the right to hire and 
fire, the record shows that Caza had the ultimate decision over who it selected 
as its safety consultants.  In fact, 
Caza employee Harry Olds conducted "semiformal" interviews to determine who was 
the best fit for the job on the rigs.  
Harrington only checked in with New Tech every six to eight weeks, 
indicating a distinct lack of the "employer/employee" hierarchy.  Singer argues that because Harrington 
devoted all of his time to New Tech, he must have been their employee.  Actually, from our review of the record, 
Harrington devoted all of his time to Caza during the time in question.  In fact, he testified that if New Tech 
had called and directed him to report to another rig in Colorado, he most likely 
would not have done so because he was obligated to Caza.

 
 
[¶18]   We are able to conclude after our 
thorough review of the record that Harrington was an independent contractor of 
New Tech, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Singer.  Harrington was not a 
full-time employee of New Tech.  We 
conclude that the district court did not err in its grant of summary judgment to 
New Tech.

 
 
ISSUE 
II

 
 
[¶19]   Regardless of Harrington's 
employment status  that is, whether he is classified as an employee of New Tech 
or an independent contractor  Singer argues in his second issue that the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 imposes liability on New Tech.  Specifically, Singer argues that because 
Caza relied on New Tech to supply "safety services," New Tech is liable to 
Singer.  New Tech disagrees, and 
contends that the Restatement is inapplicable in this instance anyway, as this 
Court has only adopted it in regard to medical malpractice 
cases.

 
 
[¶20]   The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 429 (1965) reads as follows:

 
 
§ 
429.  Negligence in Doing Work Which 
is Accepted in Reliance on the Employer's Doing the Work 
Himself.

 
 
One 
who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are 
accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the 
employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by 
the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent 
as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his 
servants.

 
 
[¶21]   The Restatement §§ 409-429 addresses the liability 
of a principal or employer for injuries caused by an independent contractor. 
 Section 409 reads as follows: 
"[T]he employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm 
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." 
 The remaining sections address 
exceptions to this general rule.

 
 

[¶22]   Here, we are faced with 
determining whether or not the application of the Restatement § 429 is appropriate in this 
instance.  "Generally, 
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused 
to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants."  Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., 
Inc., 2004 WY 97, 
¶ 10, 96 P.3d 484, 490 (citing Hittel v. WOTCO, Inc., 996 P.2d 673, 
676 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 409 
(1965)).

 
 
[¶23]   This Court has discussed the 
Restatement § 429 only once 
before in Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 
672 (Wyo. 1988), a medical malpractice action.  Research shows that § 429 is 
typically applied in the medical context.  
That said, it is applicable in other circumstances.  See Mudgett v. Marshall, 574 A.2d 867, 870 
(Maine 1990); Christensen v. Sears, 
Roebuck and Co., 565 N.E.2d 1103, 1107-1108 (Indiana Court of Appeals 1991); 
Faughnan v. Big Apple Car Service, 
828 F. Supp. 155, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).

 
 
[¶24]   In this case, the district court 
stated:

 
 
In 
order to establish apparent authority in this case [relative to § 429], 
Singer would have to show both that New Tech, in its communications to Caza, 
conveyed and intended to convey that New Tech, through Harrington, was providing 
safety services for Caza, and that 
Caza acted in reliance on such a reasonable, but falsely created, impression to 
that effect.  That showing does not 
exist in this record.

 
 
[¶25]   The court concluded that Caza did 
not rely on New Tech for safety services; it relied on the coaches for these 
services.  Caza relied on New Tech 
only to provide names, from which Caza would select a coach.  The record reflects that the district 
court's conclusion was correct.  Although Singer bases his argument on the 
premise that Harry Olds stated in his deposition that Caza "relied" on New Tech 
to make sure the Caza safety program was being followed, the overriding facts 
show that Caza's only "reliance" on New Tech was to provide names of safety 
coaches.  Accordingly, New Tech is 
not liable under Restatement § 
429.

 
 
ISSUE 
III

 
 
[¶26]   In his third argument on appeal, 
Singer contends that New Tech entered into an oral contract with Caza to provide 
safety services.  According to 
Singer, because New Tech hired Harrington to provide safety services, New Tech 
is vicariously liable to Singer for Harrington's alleged negligence because New 
Tech essentially assumed affirmative safety duties under the contract with 
Caza.

 
 
Generally, 
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused 
to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.  Hittel v. WOTCO, Inc., 996 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 409 (1965)); Hill v. Pacific Power & Light 
Co., 765 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Wyo. 1988); see also, Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 
164-67.  Two limited exceptions to 
non-liability have been recognized in our previous decisions: (1) workplace 
owner/employer (owner) exercises controlling and pervasive role over the 
independent contractor's work; or (2) owner assumes affirmative safety 
duties.  Hittel, 996 P.2d  
at 676; Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d 890, 896 (Wyo. 1986).  The first exception does not apply unless 
the employer (owner) has the right to control the details of the work.  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 164.  "The owner may retain a broad general 
power of supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to insure 
satisfactory performance of the independent contract -- including the right to 
inspect, the right to stop the work, the right to make suggestions or 
recommendations as to details of the work, the right to prescribe alterations or 
deviations in the work -- without changing the relationship from that of owner 
and independent contractor or the duties arising from that relationship."  Id. at 165.  We have reaffirmed this rule in 
Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1987), and 
Ramsey v. Pacific Power & Light, 792 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Wyo. 
1990).

 
 

Franks, 
¶ 10, 96 P.3d  at 490 (emphasis added).  This Court has also 
stated:

 
 
[A]n 
employer "who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent 
contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety 
owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor even 
if the employee is injured doing the very work the contractor was hired to 
perform."  Jones [v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 896 (Wyo. 1986)].  In 
order for there to be a demonstration of the employer's "assumption of affirmative duties with respect to safety 
there must be "such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is 
not entirely free to do the work his own way."  Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., 
Inc., 733 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, 
cmt. c (1965)).  Where, for example, 
the owner of the work site requires safe equipment and workmanship or even 
disciplines employees for unsafe practices but does not direct the method of the 
contractor's work performance, it does not retain sufficient control over the 
details of safety to render it liable.  Jones, 718 P.2d  at 896; Noonan 
v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 167 (Wyo. 1986).  "It is 
not enough that [the work site owner] has merely a general right to order the 
work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make 
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to 
prescribe alterations and deviations." Stockwell, 733 P.2d  at 1033 
(quoting Rest[atement] 2d 
Torts § 414, cmt. c) (emphasis omitted).  Reserving the "right to require safe 
equipment, material, and supplies to be used by the contractor," the owner of 
the work site can merely be assured that the work will be performed 
"efficiently, in a good workmanlike manner, at a reasonable cost, and that the 
final result is as good as possible." Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 167.  In such a case, the owner of the work 
site owes no duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent 
contractor. Jones, 718 P.2d  at 896.

 
 

Loredo, 
¶ 12, 
212 P.3d  at 623.

 
 
[¶27]   Relying on deposition testimony 
from New Tech and Caza employees, Singer contends that New Tech assumed 
affirmative safety duties when it agreed "to provide safety services."  Singer asserts that New Tech actually 
took over Caza's safety program.  
However, when looking at those comments on the record, many of the 
individuals are actually testifying as to the safety coach's duties, not New 
Tech's duties.

 
 
[¶28]   Singer insists that the factual 
situation here is particularly ripe for application of the safety exception 
because New Tech "assumed affirmative duties in regard to safety."  Singer says that because New Tech hired 
Harrington to provide safety services, it was New Tech that had an obligation to 
provide safety services, not Caza.  
We fail to see how Caza relinquished control of its safety program 
entirely to New Tech.  To satisfy 
the safety exception, there must be a showing that the defendant (in this case, 
New Tech) has "affirmatively assumed duties of safety."  Hjelle, 394 F.3d 873, 880-81.  Caza employee Harry Olds testified that 
the purpose of using a company like New Tech was to ensure that Caza remained in 
control of its own safety programs on the rigs.  Mr. Olds 
explained:

 
 
Our 
customers were asking for safety  dedicated safety consultants out on the rig, 
and they were going to hire them.

 
 
We 
decided we would rather be in control, and so we went to an engineering company 
that handled safety, also, and made an agreement with them that they would 
provide our safety people and we would review their 
qualifications.

 
 
[¶29]   Despite Singer's contention that 
New Tech was responsible for safety on the rig, Caza always retained control of 
its own safety program, evidenced by its use of New Tech to place a safety 
coach.  Caza never contracted, 
orally or otherwise, with New Tech to provide safety 
services.

 
 
ISSUE 
IV

 
 
[¶30]   In his final argument, Singer 
asserts that the contract between Caza and New Tech created a non-delegable duty 
for New Tech as to safety duties on the rig site.  Singer insists that New Tech had a 
"contractual obligation to provide extensive safety services to Caza."  In support of his argument, Singer cites 
to several jurisdictions, including the Tenth circuit in Hull v. Chevron, 812 F.2d 584, 
588-89 (10th Cir. 1987).  In Hull, the court 
stated:

 
 
[U]nder 
Wyoming law, oil and gas drilling is an ultrahazardous and extrahazardous 
activity; and that the duty to maintain a safe place to work, is, therefore, 
nondelegable.

 
 
According 
to Singer, because New Tech accepted the duty of implementing and enforcing the 
Caza rig safety program, New Tech should be responsible for Singer's 
injuries.

 
 
[John 
C. Hull], an employee of Chase Drilling Company (Chase), was assisting two 
co-employees in unloading and moving drill collars, 8,000 pound cylinders 
utilized around the drill bit. The low man on the totem pole or "worm" in oil 
field parlance,  Mr. Hull was 
positioning certain racks onto which the drill collars were temporarily being 
placed when one of the drill collars rolled off the tines of the forklift 
and onto his right leg, seriously injuring it.

 
 
Mr. 
Hull filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming 
seeking damages for this injury against his employer, Chase, and the lessee, 
Chevron, which had hired Chase to drill the well. Pursuant to the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-12-101 to -805 (1977), the 
district court dismissed the action against Chase. In an amended complaint, Mr. 
Hull then alleged in three causes of action for negligence, strict liability, 
and culpable negligence that Chevron (1) had a nondelegable duty in an ultrahazardous activity to maintain a 
safe working environment; (2) was negligent in failing to supervise the proper 
operation of the forklift which it had leased and placed on the site; (3) had 
failed to maintain a smooth and level terrain around the rig; (4) retained 
control of the drilling operations and, thus, was vicariously liable for the 
negligent acts of Chase's employees; and (5) owed Hull a duty of care as a 
third-party beneficiary of Chevron's federal lease which imposes certain safety 
requirements on oil and gas operators.

 
 
During 
the six-day trial, the jury heard testimony from Chase and Chevron 
employees, various safety and oil and gas experts, and medical and 
rehabilitation specialists. Mr. Hull sought to prove that under the particular 
day rate contract governing the relationship between Chase and Chevron, Chevron 
retained the right to control and direct the entire drilling operation. In 
defense, Chevron attempted to establish Chase's role as an independent 
contractor with primary control over the details of the drilling operation, 
Chase's negligence in failing to supervise its forklift operator who was alleged 
to have used amphetamines on the morning of the accident, and the plaintiff's 
negligence and contributing drug use. As a third-party defendant, Chase 
abandoned its pretrial contention that it was an independent contractor and put 
on evidence to underscore its theory that the "company man," Chevron's employee, 
Mr. Bobby Haynes, directed and supervised the drilling 
operation.

 
 
In 
returning a verdict for the plaintiff, the jury found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Chevron and Chase were governed by a principal/agent, not 
operator/independent contractor, relationship.

 
 

Hull, 812 F.2d  at 
585-86.

 
 
[¶31]   Regarding this issue, the district 
court stated:

 
 
Arguably, 
either Chevron, which had the lease, or Caza, which drilled the wells, would 
have a non-delegable duty to ensure safety practices at the rig.  Singer does not discuss how these 
non-delegable duties could be transferred or delegated to New 
Tech.

 
 
[¶32]   We agree with the district 
court.  Furthermore, as we stated 
above, we fail to see an issue of material fact as to New Tech's 
responsibilities regarding safety on the rig.  The record is clear that the safety 
program was specifically a Caza program.  
New Tech provided no instruction, guidance, or supervision regarding 
safety issues on the rig.  New Tech 
was a placement service, and its responsibility was fulfilled when it provided 
Caza with names of possible safety coaches.  Caza then picked Harrington as its 
coach.  In order for this Court to 
address the issue of a non-delegable duty, New Tech must have contracted to 
provide safety services to Caza Drilling.  
Unlike the Hull case, New Tech 
did no such thing, as it never exercised any control over safety on the rig, nor 
did it assume any affirmative safety duties on site.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶33]   We find no question of material 
fact regarding whether the safety coach was an employee or independent 
contractor  the record shows that he was an independent contractor.  Also, there is no indication that the 
Restatement § 429 imposes any liability whatsoever on New Tech.  New Tech did not assume any affirmative 
duties regarding safety, nor is New Tech responsible for Singer's injuries due 
to any "non-delegable" duty  no such duty on the part of New Tech 
existed.

 
 
[¶34]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1New Tech is a multi-functioning company comprised of different divisions 
 we note that the parties differ as to whether the proper party is New Tech 
Engineering or New Tech Safety.  The 
district court reserved that issue for determination, but because it did not 
bear on the issues here, we will refer to the Appellee as "New 
Tech."

 
 

2Harrington worked full-time, and exclusively, on rigs run by Caza for the 
entire period of time he was associated with New Tech.  New Tech hired Harrington after he 
responded to a newspaper ad while employed by an insurance company.  Harrington left his job with the 
insurance company when he was hired by New Tech.