Title: In re Doe, born 11/22/2002. 108 Haw. 144

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*#*FOR PUBLICATION***
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'L,

 

000:

 

1 ony souz

 

In the Interest of

 

JANE DOE, Born on November 22, 2002, a Minor
(No. 26721; FC-S NO. 02-08654)

 

In the Interest of

JANE DOE, Born on November 22, 1998, a Minor
(WO, 26722; FC-S NO, 02-08475)

no. 26721

APPEALS FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(EC-S NOS. 02-08654; 02-08475)

AUGUST 10, 2005
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
Mother-Appellant (Mother)' appeals from the May 4, 2004
order of the family court of the first circuit (the court)
awarding permanent custody in favor of the Department of Human
Services-Appellee (DHS) and the June 29, 2004 orders denying

Mother's May 21, 2004 motion for reconsideration. We hold the

 

* For purposes of preserving confidentiality, Mother-Appellant is
referred to az “Mather,” and the gubject children, born on Novenber 22, 1998
and Novenber 22, 2002, are referred to a8 “Jane 1” and “Jane 2,” respectively

 

aay
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

in remanded because

 

orders must be vacated and the matters h
(2) the court abused its discretion in reappointing the guardian
ad litem without @ hearing pursuant to Hawai'i Revised statutes
(RS) § $87-34(d) (1993) and (2) Mother was deprived of her
parental rights without a fair hearing.
rt

The facts as set forth by the parties follow. On oF
about August 6, 2002, DHS received a report alleging physical
neglect, threatened neglect, and lack of supervision of Jane Doe,
born on November 22, 1998 (Jane 1), by Mother. Jane 1 and her
Mother had been residing at the Institute of Human Services since
August 1, 2002. Based on its investigation, DHS believed there
existed an inminent threat of physical neglect to Jane 1 and lack
of supervision of Jane 1 by Mother.

on August 26, 2002, Jane 1 was taken into police
protective custody, released to DHS, and placed in a DHS foster
home. Upon placement, Jane 1 appeared to be in good health.
Jane 1 did not appear to be afraid of Mother. DHS filed a
Petition for Temporary Foster Custody of Jane 1 on August 23,
2002. The court accepted jurisdiction over Jane 1 on
Septenber 3, 2002, pursuant to HRS $$ 571-11(9)? and 587-117

+ gs § $71-21(9) states that “the [family] court shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings . . . (fJor the protection of
‘Shy child under chapter 567.”

> ns § $87-12 states as follows:
Pursuant to [section] 571-1119), the (family) court

shell have exclusive original jurisdiction sna child
(continued...)
***FOR PUBLICATION®#*
eee
(1993).

eat the initial hearing on

 

Mother did not apps
September 3, 2002, was defaulted, and a bench warrant was issued
for her arrest.‘ All parties were ordered to appear at a

sing on

 

review/return on Motion for Permanent Custody h
Novenber 1, 2002. Mother did not appear at the review hearing.
The court continued foster custody. All parties were ordered to
appear at a review hearing on February 21, 2003.
mu.

on November 20, 2002, DHS filed a Notion for Order
Awarding Permanent Custody and Establishing a Permanent Flan
(Motion for Permanent Custody) for Jane 1. The hearing on the
Motion for Permanent Custody was set for February 21, 2003, at
the sane time as the review hearing.

on November 22, 2002, Mother gave birth to a baby girl
(sane 2). On November 25, 2002, Jane 2 was taken into police
protective custody, released to DHS, and placed in a DHS foster

home. On November 29, 2002, 2 Petition for Temporary Foster

 

2(.- continued)
protective proceeding concerning any child who was or is
Found within the State at the time the facts and
Circumstances occurred, are discovered, or are reported to
the [Departeent of Human Services), which facts and
Elvcunstances constitute the basis for the finding that the

‘physical or psychological health or

‘gkeinent harm, has been harned, or is

or omissions of the

 

Snild is a ehild who
elfare is subject t
Subject to threatened harm by the acti
child's family,

 

 

 

+ the Honorable John C. Bryant, Jr. presided.

* The Honorable Marilyn Carlenith presided at the hearings on
Novenber 1, 2002, January 24, Febrosry 21, June 13, September 30, and Decenber
30,2003, and January 22, May 4, and June 29, 2004,

3
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

Custody of Jane 2 was filed.
On December 3, 2002, a hearing on temporary foster
custody of Jane 2 was held.* Mother was present and was served

1d to

 

in open court with the petition and exhibits. Mother agr
jurisdiction, foster custody, and the service plan dated
November 27, 2002. The court took jurisdiction, ordered foster
custody and the service plan dated Novenber 27, 2002. ALL
parties were ordered to appear at a review hearing on February
21, 2003.

on January 17, 2003, Mother filed a Motion for
Imnediate Review to discuss why Mother’s visitation with Jane 2
had been stopped.

on January 22, 2003, a “full psychological evaluation”
of Mother was conducted by clinical psychologist Dr. Steven Choy
(Dr. Choy) of the Kapiolani Child Protection Center.

on January 24, 2003, @ hearing was held on Mother’s
Motion for Inmediate Review. The court ordered that Mother would
have visits with Jane 2 twice a week. Mother’s motion was
withdrawn.

on February 21, 2003, a review hearing was held. The
case for Jane 1 was set for a contested permanent custody trial
on July 21, 2003. A pretrial hearing was set for June 13, 2003.
A review hearing for the case of Jane 2 was also set for June 13,

2003.

* The Honorable Paul T. Murakant presided

4
 

FOR PUBLICATION***
EE

on May 28, 2003, DHS filed a Motion to Continue Trial
for the purpose of ordering a service plan in Jane 1's case. The
hearing on the motion was set for June 23, 2003.

on May 29, 2003, DHS filed a Motion for Order Awarding
Permanent Custody and Establishing a Permanent Plan (Motion for
Permanent Custody) for Jane 2. ‘The hearing on the Motion for
Permanent Custody for Jane 2 was set for June 13, 2003, at the
sane time as the hearing on the Motion to Continue Trial in Jane
1's case.

am.

on June 13, 2003, a hearing was held on the Motion to
Continue Trial in Jane 1/s case and the Motion for Permanent
custody in Jane 2/s case. The deputy attorney general (DAG)
representing the DHS raised “the issue of whether Mother needs 2
guardian [ad litem]." Mother's counsel made an oral motion to
withdraw as counsel. The court denied the motion. The court
ordered that a guardian ad litem be appointed, over Mother's
counsel's objection. The court consolidated the two cases for
trial and set aside the trial scheduled for July 21, 2003 in Jane
1's case. The trial was set for October 16, 2003. A pretrial
hearing was set for October 3, 2003.

‘on August 1, 2003, Mother filed a Motion for Immediate
Review to discuss visitation and placement of the children. A

hearing on the motion was set for August 8, 2003.

 

on August 6, 2003, the Order Appointing Guardian ad
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

Litem for Mother effective August 4, 2003, was filed. on

August 8, 2003, a h

 

ring was held on Mother's Motion for
Inmediate Review.’ The court denied without prejudice Mother’s
request or demand for visitation with Jane 1 pending the trial.
‘The court partially granted Mother!s motion as to visitation with
Jane 2 “and condition[ed] any supervised visits as recommended by
DHS, [the guardian ad litem,] and Dr. [Gregory] Yuen
[(Or. Yuen)].” On September 16, 2003, Mother filed a Motion for
Inmediate Review to discuss visitation with the children. The
motion was set for September 30, 2003.

on September 30, 2003, 2 hearing was held on Mother's
Motion for Inmediate Review. By agreement, the pretrial hearing
set for October 3, 2003 was advanced to September 30, 2003.
Mother’s Motion for Inmediate Review was denied.

Ww.

on October 16, 2003, a contested Permanent Plan hearing
was to be held.* Mother’s counsel made an oral motion to
withdraw as counsel. Mother stated that counsel could serve as
her attorney for that day. The court denied Mother's counsel's
oral motion to withdraw.

On October 16, 2003, the court also ordered DHS to
clarify whether Mother needed a guardian ad litem “by obtain(ing]

a report from Mother's psychiatrist” or “arrang[ing] a

 

* The Honorable Lillian Ramirez-Uy presided over the hearings on

‘August @ and Decenber 16, 2003,

+ The Honorable Michael Broderick presided.

 

6
‘4**FOR PUBLICATION***
ee

psychological evaluation of Mother” “on the issue of whether
Nother needs a [guardian ad litem, i.e.) whether she has the
capacity to understand the proceedings and to meaningfully assist
her counsel.” The court indicated that “[i]f a (guardian ad
Litem] is necessary for Mother, [the guardian's] appointment
shall continues Mother's counsel shall consult with Mother's

(guardian ad litem] and take direction from Mother's [guardian ad

 

Litem); the (cJourt will give further clarifications.” Lastly,
the court continued the trial to December 30, 2003.

on December 16, 2003, 2 pretrial hearing was held. The
DAG reported to the court that “the previous court has actually
prenaturely appointed @ guardian ad litem for Mother.” The DAG
further reported to the court that clinical psychologist Dr. choy
completed an evaluation and assessment of Mother and determined
that she did not need 2 guardian ad litem, Mother's guardian ad
Litem requested to be excused in light of Dr. Choy’s
determination that Mother did not need a guardian ad litem.
vother's counsel informed the court that at every hearing Mother
believes her children are going to be returned to her that day.
Mother's counsel advised the court that he was not sure if Mother
could adequately assist him in trial. The parties “stipulate(d)
to [Dr. Choy’s] verbal report to DHS that Mother does not need a
{guardian ad Litem)” and the guardian ad litem was discharged.

However, on December 18, 2003, Nother purportedly

appeared at the courthouse, demanded to see a judge to get her
 

***FOR PUBLICATION:

 

children back, and refused to leave for several hours.”
‘Thereafter, on December 19, 2003, apparently without notice or a

hearing, the court reappointed the guardian ad litem. Also, on

 

Decenber 19, 2003, an Order Substituting Counsel for Mother
effective December 18, 2003, was filed.

on December 30, 2003, a contested Permanent Plan
hearing was to be held. Mother did not appear. The court
defaulted Mother and granted the Motion for Permanent Custody.
Following the entry of default, Mother's substitute counsel
requested a continuance because of Mother’s history of coming to
hearings but sometimes being late. ‘The court denied the motion

for a continuanct

 

Additionally, on December 30, 2003, the court received
into evidence Dr. Choy’s written report dated October 28, 2003.
This report concluded that Mother “is able to understand the
court proceedings and the service plan” and that “{s]he,
therefore, does not need @ guardian ad litem to make decisions

for her.” The report stated in relevant part as follows:

+ Mother's conduct on December 18, 2003 is only described in
(2) finding number 29 5 rendered by the court, gee text intra st 14, and
(2) the guazdian ad Liten’s Special Report co the Court flied January 21,
2004, "the Special Report described other's actions as follows:

 

Around 12/19/03 Court Officer S. Holden informed this
[guardian ad litem) thet she was being reappointed for
Ulother, who had shown up at Family Court on/about 12/18/03
around ii p.m. and had refused to leave the courthouse until
She was allowed to see a judge. (Mother) renained waiting,
ntil'3:30 pom, and then left.

 

 

Aside from this, no testimony or affidavits fron eyewitnesses concerning
Nother’s behavior appears in the record on appeal.
44*FOR PUBLICATION*#*

ss

(Emphases

 

THother] wae referred for # paychological ne to
Getermine her current mental status in order to assess her
Gbliity to understand the court proceeding and the service
plan. f art eernes other’

 

 

it Teaical oval nas n OUsgeZ008,
ERxditttse givens possible diagnosis of Schizophreni:
Peranold Typey Depression, 10S, and Mild Mental Retardation
fer paychiatric care hae been inconsistent and there are
Concerts about her ability to care for her special needs
ehilaren.

 

 

 

 

fhother! was referred for 2 psychological assessment
primarily to determine the need for a guardian ed litem and
Po Geterdine her current meneal status. Although she has
hod a long history of subatance abuse and suspected mental
Mines, she cusfencly did not have any acute syaptons of &
peychosis, “This dees not mean that she doesn’t have any
Rental iliness a2 the psychotic symptoms could be under
Control with medication and/or she may be in remission,
ShetThowover, is net acutely peychotic at this time and abe
a rs ad the service
pian “then therefore, docs not need a quardian ad Titen to

ie =

 

‘pcotminoarion

Feeeneether] will need to be consistently followed by a
poychiatelat that will provide consistent feedback to
Besta order to ensure that she is obtaining the
hecessary treatment

but the
sda te be writeen in a very simple and
for her to understand the
Fenifications of her decisions.

 

 

added.)

Based on this report and Dr. Choy’s finding that Mother

could make decisions and did not need a guardian ad litem, the

guardian ad litem placed an objection on the record to being

reappointed as Nother’s guardian ad litem. The court noted at

this hearing that Dr. Choy’s report “does not reflect him

observing

[Mother] in a very highly emotionally charged

situation, which it was when [Mother] was here that day[.]" The

court also stated that Mother “was here for a very long time [on

December 18, 2003], making a really difficult situation for the
***POR PUBLICATION*#*

 

court officer and some of the bailiffs. . . . And, so, that
swayed the court to make that unusual reappointment.”
v.

On January 2, 2004, Mother filed a Motion for Inmediate
Review to set aside Mother’s default and schedule a permanent
custody trial on the merits and a Motion for Reconsideration of
the granting of the Motions for Permanent Custody and approving
the foster family and children's relocation from the State of
Hawai'i.

on January 22, 2004, a hearing was held on Mother’ s
Motion for Inmediate Review and Mother's Motion for
Reconsideration. Mother's substitute counsel objected to the
receipt of Mother's guardian ad litem’s first report. ‘The report
was received into evidence over objection. The court granted the
motions. Trial was set for June 3, 2004. Mother’s guardian ad
Litem orally moved to withdraw. Mother's substitute counsel
advised the court that if Mother’s guardian ad litem is taken off
the case, he “would have to pursue withdrawal at that point.”
The court denied the guardian ad liten’s motion to withdraw.

vr.

on May 4, 2004, a pretrial hearing was held. Prior to
the hearing there was a prehearing conference conducted without
Mother. Mother’s guardian ad litem disclosed to the court that
Mother had bought plane tickets, Mother’s counsel objected to

Mother's guardian ad litem disclosing privileged and confidential

10
***FOR PUBLICATION #*
Ee
Information, The court noted the objection and permitted
Mother’s guardian ad litem to proceed. Mother's counsel
requested a running objection, which the court granted.
Mother's guardian ad litem advised the court that she

had a statement by Dr. Yuen, Mother’s treating psychiatrist, and
that she did not agree with Dr. Yuen’s statement. After reading

tthe record reflect that T am

 

the letter the court stated,
looking at the letter from [Dr. Yuen] dated April 29th .

which indicates stability if she is medicated.” Mother's
guardian ad litem disclosed to the court that Mother “had
confided to me that she doesn’t need medication and, therefore,
is acting accordingly.”

Mother's counsel advised the court that should Mother's
guardian ad liten “leave this case, I would have no other
alternative but to proceed on my client's wishes.” Mothers
counsel stated, “{O}bviously my client wants a trials but
[Mother's guardian ad litem) will control whether there will be @
trial, and I guess that’s where we’re -- we're factored in.”

After the prehearing conference, Mother was brought
into the courtroom. Mother asked if she could have custody of
her children because she was asking for leave to go back to
california, Mother informed the court that she had plane
tickets. Mother complained of discrimination by her counsel and
her guardian ad litem.

Following a pause in proceedings during which Mother’s

un
 

FOR PUBLICATION***

 

counsel and her guardian ad litem conferred, Mother’s guardian ad
Litem advised the court, “Lbelieve at this point it is in
Mother's] best interest to have the Motion for Permanent Custody
granted, Your Honor, with all the ramifications flowing
therefrom, so that [Mother] can get on with her life.” (Emphasis
added.) Mother's counsel agreed with the recommendation stating
in relevant part that

[ene guardian ad 1item) and I have labored on the subject of
the proceeding, the strategies, the plans... - while there,

‘auardian ad Litenl has nade a recommendation, es well as the
Fecommendation of the Das, the chilaren’s [guardian ad
ifcem)s a

Liem 5 hae, aad t

axe te follow shat. recomendation(.7
(Emphases added.) Mother stated that she was “able to provide a

 

‘safe home” for her children and “begg(ed]” the court to allow her
to “have a chance with them.” The court, however, found “that
Mother cannot now nor in the reasonably foreseeable future, even

Mother

 

with the Service Plan, provide a safe family hone
stated, “I can’t move. My leg hurts, I can’t mover I can’t
move.” An ambulance was called.

The court reconvened in another courtroom. Mothe:

 

guardian ad Litem waived Mother’s presence. The court granted
the Motion for Permanent Custody, found that the Permanent Plan
dated May 19, 2003 was in the best interest of the children, and
ordered said Permanent Plan. The court discharged Mother’ s

guardian ad litem and her counsel. The court ordered that

 

“Mother stated, “i'm able to provide 2 safe hone for ay kids.
could T have a chance with then? . - . I'm begging you please.”

 

12
‘+**POR PUBLICATION***
oe

appellate counsel be appointed for Mother.

‘The court noted that Mother strongly objected to the
granting of the Motion for Permanent Custody. The court set
aside the June 3, 2004 trial date. Mother’s counsel advised the
court that “we were prepared to fully go to trial except that the
developments that led up to today, and even beyond today -- T
mean, prior to today, and we had no choice, Your Honor.”

vin.

on May 21, 2004, Mother's Motion for Reconsideration
was filed. on June 24, 2004, Mother's counsel's Notion to
Withdraw as Counsel was filed. On June 29, 2004, a hearing was
held on Mother’s motions. The Motion to Withdraw was granted.
Following a recess, substitute counsel argued the Motion for
Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. On
June 30, 2004, an Order Substituting Counsel for Mother effective
June 29, 2004 was filed.

on July 26, 2004, Mother's Notice of Appeal was filed.
on Septenber 1, 2004, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

were filed. As related to the appointment of the guardian ad

 

Litem, the court entered the following relevant finding:

5. The court first appointed . . . Mother's [guardian
ad lites] «effective August 4, 2003, "At the hearing on
Becenber 16, 2003...» the court granted [the guardian ad
[feem's) oral notion to withdraw as Mother's [guardian ad
Litem). Qn-December 18,"2003, the court resopointed . |
Mother‘s [auardian ad Litem).

25, at the consolidated hearing in both cases on
gone 15, 2003, the court denied the o¥al motion of Mother's
Gounsel, Tae Chin Kin, to withdraw as other's counsel. The
3 Mother's (guardian ad
appointed effective August 4, 2003,

 

 

  

 

13
‘***POR PUBLICATION***

26. At the October 16, 2003 scheduled consolidated
trial on'bis" “Notion for Permanent Custody” in both ca
the court denied tir. Kin's oral motion to withdraw a
Mother's counsel lat the request of Mother). ‘The court
further orgares DHS to obtain 2 report from Mother’ =
treating paychsatrist to determine whether Mother needed a
[guardian 2d Litem), i.e., wether Mother had the capacity
tO understand the proceedings and to meaningfully assist her
Counsel, and that Lf Mother's psychiatrist was not available
fo obtain an opinion from Mother's psychiatrist, then DAS
es to arrange a psychological evaluation on this issue,

‘The court further ofdered that if the opinion of Mother's
peychlatrist or the psychologist conducting the
Psychological evaluation was that Nother did not need 2
[guardian ad Listen], and then Mother's (guardian ad Litem)
would be discharged.

 

 

 

 

 

3 . ‘
cithieaw ae tether tne
Seat tenor tron Oc Sevan ote. habs las Cela BY

Siso dented Mz. Kin's oral notion to withdraw a2 Mother's
Counsel but ruled that Mother may make an oral motion to
proceea pro se st trial.

Zen the court discharged Mr. Kim as Mother’ s counsel
in both Gases and appointed Byron K.H. Hu as Mother's

 

 

counsel in both cases, effective Decenber 18, 2003.
29."
ith $
‘(auardian ad Litem! after learning that on Dacesber it,
2003, iicther cane to tne family Court waiting room afound

TOs aun, denanded to see a iudae to cet her chiidran
eck aculanee tate ne fer-an answer, did not sespond to a
‘Sount officers cencated explanations, and finally left the
‘Sourthouse around $30 oo.

531 "A consolidated pretrial sn both cages was held on

Mav 4, 200¢" “[n'the sroceséinas, Mother wes observed to

thipyherselt co the {oor and lav imnobile when told_she
Sosid-not cet her children back, aos trial on permanent
Sustody in both cases had been set for June 2004, Mother’ s
(guardian ad Litem], who had consistently requested a trial
on the merits regarding the State’s Motion for Permanent
Custody in both children’s cases, stated on the record that

She.ne lonoer felt it uss in [Miother’s best interests 2°

 

 

At the pretrial, therefore, Mother's [guardian ad litem)
Stated on the record that it was in Mother's best interests
that DuS"s "Motion for Permanent Custody" in both cases be
granted, and that Mother was not willing and able to provide
S'eafe family hone for the children, even with the
Gssistance of a service plan, now and in (sic] reasonably
foreseeable future ‘The representation of Mother's
(gusrdisn 2d liten| was a stipulation to DMS" "Motion for
Permanent Custody" in both cases. Mother and her counsel
obiected to the position of Mother's guardian ad Litem.

    

 

 

 

 

3¢. Based on the Fi

4
***FOR PUBLICATION***

ee, th Te both ued ore
Granting bie” "Hotion. for Permanent custody,”
1 right ‘and the respective fathers of

 

the children, anarding permanent custody of the Children to
DUS, and establishing the respective permanent plans
Eegarding the Chilaren.

guardian ad litem for Mother
106. The court "

ne dune 13 ine dus -
Eauserns about the effects of Mother's mental health on ber
psn 24
‘id the nature of these child protective proceedings and her
abiLity to assist her counsel (diasareenante with her
‘Sounsel cus ner -sental health and her inability 2

The court
BbstHea her exsatic behavior in the courtroom, which, in
part, was’ the basis for the court’ decision

17. The cot
Peuchoisalcal sesessnent of Mother by Or--Choe-abich Dee
Shey epines that wether understood the proceedings and dig

aed:

$08; Hlowever, Mother's behavior after Dr. Choy" s
Poychological Assessment wee inconsistent with Mother’ s
Teported behavior during Dr. Choy's Psychological
Assessment. Mod a

 

 

rr i
unigia she spoke toa iudae, despite being intemed by ber
‘hunssl and the Zentiy court start that ene cous not aces
Bornes: Titan Mother

BE the issues and the tature of these chila protective
Proceedings and to neaningfully assist her counsel

 

(Emphases added.) The court entered the following pertinent

conclusions:

2. The court may appoint a (guardian ad lites] for a
party (parent) shen the court determines that a party is
Thespable of comprehending the legsl significance of the
insuee or the nature of the child protective proceedings:
ARE § 587-734(e) [ese]

3. Ifa [gUardien ad litem) has been appointed for =
parent, ‘the parent's counsel should look to the parent's
{guardisn ad litem) for decisions on behalf of the client.
Haweii Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14, coment 3.

‘an Mother's. (guardian ad Liten] had authority to
stipulate to DKS’ "Motion for Permanent Custody.”

 

 

-. . Lalekes v, Laupahoshoe Slugarl Cav, 35 Haw.
262, 263-(je8 (1939), rehearing denied, 35 Haw[.1 363
(1940) (.].-  « (ia] nots. s applicable . ss The
Hawaii Suprene court. | {dig} not [rule] that’a (guardian

ad lites} for a party canfot enter into an (alc) stipulation
Gaiving the rights of the party, as stated by Mother's

Counsel. ge Leslie w Estate of Tavares,
fevers) St Ge ee
6. The court's independent review of both cases ot

 

as
***FOR PUBLICATION***

bar constitutes a review of the stipulation of Moth
guardian ad liven) for fairness in accordance with the
above cases.

 

virt.

Mother raises nunerous points on appeal. In her
argument she maintains inter alia that (1) Mother’s guardian ad
Litem did not have the authority to waive Mother's right to a
trial on the merits and stipulate to the DHS’s Motion for
Permanent Custody, (2) Mother's guardian ad liten’s disclosure of
privileged and confidential information to the court violated the
Hawai's Rules of Professional Conduct and the guardian ad liten’s
fiduciary duty to Mother, (3) Mother’s counsel's agreement with
her guardian ad Liten to waive her right to a trial on the merits
and stipulate to the DS's Motion for Permanent Custody

2, (4) the

 

constituted ineffective assistance of coun
psychologist who assessed Mother for the DHS determined that
Mother was able to understand the court proceedings and did not
need a guardian ad Litem to make decisions for her, and (5)
Mother's treating psychiatrist reported that she is stable when
she takes her medication and that she could provide a safe home
for her children.
In response to Mother's arguments related to the

guardian ad litem, DHS maintains that “[a] family court has the
authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for an adult under

HRS § $87-34(d). . . [inasmuch as it] permits the court to

4 Rs § 587-381) states as follows

 

 

16
*#*FOR PUBLICATION***
ee
appoint a (guardian ad litem) for any ‘party’ who cannot

“2 DHS argues

 

comprehend the significance of the proceeding
further, that “[dlespite the psychologist’s conclusion” “that
Mother did not need a (guardian ad litem,]” “{t)he court was not
obligated to consult with the psychologist, nor was the
psychologist's report binding” because the psychologist had not
seen Mother in the situations presented at court, and given
Mother's erratic and confused behavior, the court was well within
its discretion to appoint the guardian ad litem. The court

entered an order pursuant to “HRS [SS] 571-8.5{(a)] (8),

2 (., scontinued)
finen the court determines, aft y hearin

court deome to be apnronciata, that a party is incapable of
SSHESSRSREIng the legal significance of the issues or the
Soreie ce the child protective proceedings, She cour may
HRriys provides thet 2 guardian ag litem appointed
SRERHINE his section shall investigate and report to the
persis writing ot six month intervals, or as is. otherwise
Stdered by the court, regarding the current status of the
Sarty's disability, including, but not Limited to, =
Pertnendation as to available treatment, if any, for the
Efsanilicy and 2 recommendation concerning the manner in
Shish the court should proceed in order to best protect the
TheSleses of the party in conjunction with the court's
Agteiminaticn as to the best interests of the child.

 

 

 

(emphases added.)

4: DHS also maintains that “Mother does not separately argue that the
family court should not have appointed @ [guardian ed 1iten] for Mother.”
fam the Itsue of whether # hearing is required pursuant to HRS § $67~
SETS) Ebr the resppeinenent of a gosrdian ad Liten is feirly implicated and
2ALSLGBY Notner’s arguments on appeal that “Mother's guardian ed litem did
sa eee a et nSchority to weive Mother's right to trial on the merits and
Beipelace ts Ous's Motion for Permanent Custody” and “the psychologist that
ascerced Mother ‘Getersined that Mother was able he

     

 

(Emphasis 2ace
bags § $71-8.5(a) (8) (Supp. 2004) states in pertinent part that

sdistrict fanily Judges” have the power to “[alppoint guardians ad liter for
“persons who are incompetent (.1"

7
***FOR PUBLICATION***

571-24, 587-34[(d)] or Family Court Rule 152" effective

August 4, 2003.
1K,

First, it ds noted that in its conclusions of law, the
court relied on HRS § 587-34(d) as authority for appointing
Mother's guardian ad litem. Because that statute states that
‘the court “may” appoint a guardian, discretion resided in the
court as to whether to do so or not. See supra note 11. see

Gray v, Admin, Dir, of the Court, 84 Hawai'i 138, 149, 931 P.2d

580, 591 (1997) ("[WJhere the verbs ‘shall’ and ‘may’ are used in
the same statute, especially where they are used in close
juxtaposition, we infer that the legislature realized the
difference in meaning and intended that the verbs used should

carry with them their ordinary meanings."). In reviewing a

 

M wns § 574-26 (2992) states in pertinent part as follows:

 

Failure to anaver summons; warrante. .
Tf, after being sunmoned or notified to appear, a
parent fails to do #0; a warrant may be issued for the

Parent's appearance, and the hearing shall not take place
xithout she presence of cne or both of the arents or the

Suadish, or. if none is present, “a quardian ad Lites
‘appointed by the court to protect the interests of the

‘Minot, The court may also appoint a quardian ad Iiten,
whenever this 1s Recessary dor the eeliare-<I-U02 plnsk,

ihether or not a parent of guardian 15 pre

 

 

 

(Emphases added.)

% Family Court Rule 152 (2003) entitled “Presence and Exclusion of
Parties,” states in pertinent part that “{i]f for sone reason found valid by
tthe court no parent can be present, the court may appoint s guardian ad lites
prior to the hearing.”

  

 

 

Ag noted previously, RS § S71-8.5(a) (8) authorizes district
fanily Judges to “[alppoint guardians ag litem for. .- persone who are
Snconpetent(.]" There is no evidence that Nother ic “incompetent” and 08S
does not argue that she is incompetent. The relevance of HRS § 571-24 oF
Fonily Court Rule 152 12 not pointes out by OHS. Rather, appointment is
justified, according to DNS, under HRS § 587-344)

18

 
***FOR PUBLICATION***

eee

court's exercise of discretion it must be determined whether the
court abused its discretion. See Kavamata Farms, Inc. v. United
Axi Brods., 96 Hawai'i 214, 241, 948 P.2d 1055, 1082 (1997)
(stating that an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules of principles
of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party”).
wrhis court reviews the trial court’s findings of
fact under the clearly erroneous standard.” Bremer v. Weeks, 104

Hawal's 43, 51, 85 P.3d 150, 158 (2004) (citing Beneficial

Hawai'i, Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai'i 289, 305, 30 P.3d 895, 912
(2001).

oR finding of fact 4s clearly erroneous when, despite
‘evidence to support the finding, the appeliete court is left with

 

        

the definite ana firm conviction in reviewing the entire evidence
thet's mistake hae been conaitted. A finding of fact ie elso
ly erro inen the record lacks substantial evidence to

 

Support the Finding. We have defined substantial evidence as
Eredible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative
Selue to enable s person of reasonable caution to support «
Conclusion.”

Id. (quoting Beneficial Hawai'i, 96 Hawai'i at 305, 30 P.3d at

  

911) (internal citations, quotations marks, brackets, and block
quotation format omitted) .
x.
HRS § 587-34(d) requires that the court hold a “hearing
2 the court deems appropriate” before appointing a guardian ad
Litem, In related circumstances, this court has said the
appointment of a guardian ad item “presupposes a finding by the

trial court that the affected party labors under a disability,

 

making it necessary for another person to represent his or her

19
**#FOR PUBLICATION***
interests in the litigation.” Leslie v. Estate of Tavares, 91
Hawai'i 394, 400, 984 P.2d 1220, 1226 (1999). Hence, “*{t}he

‘ ‘

person under disability. Indeed, courts should appoint guardians
ad litem for parties litigant when reasonably convinced that a
party litigant is not competent, understandinaly and
Antelligently, to comprehend the significance of legal,

ofte
in terms of the best interests of such party litigant./" Id.
(quoting sta jon v. Hamilton, 482 8.8.24 192, 200

(W.Va. 1996) (emphases added)). As a result, “the powers of a

 

guardian ad litem . . . to act on behalf of a ward are strictly
circumscribed by the court’s own responsibility to ensure that
the interests of the ward are not compromised.” Id, at 400 n.8,
984 P.2d at 1226 n.8.

‘This court has stated further that “the continuing
incompetence of an adult party for whom a [guardian ad litem) has
previously been appointed must be raised before the trial court.”
Id. at 401, 984 P.2d at 1227. “When @ substantial question
exists regarding the mental competency of 2 party, a court must
determine whether the party is or is not competent to proceed
with the action before it.’” Id, (quoting McMahon, 482 S.E.2d at
201).

xr.

Here, a guardian ad litem was appointed for Mother on

20
***FOR PUBLICATION***

gune 13, 2003. At this hearing, the court summarily determined

that a guardian ad litem should be appointed:

 

[WoTHER’ S COUNSEL]: ~~ 1 would make an oral notion to
withdraw as counsel and have substitute counsel for ay
Client

‘twe count: okay. I'm going to deny your motion,

And you may not — yos may not know, But you have one
of the nost experienced and best people in =~ in this kind
Of case in this cours.

Rp worden? wnat

WE COURT: -- a guandian for Mother would be

 

fittbinss couse): Me'xe and to obtact ~
‘ae women at!
TRiroch Sco ee Ee Ere, for the
secoea!
“ee COURT: that bjection will be noted. And-L xd
ee,

Eoncerned about her capacity. And, ciearly, she -~ I mean,
She's been in fzont of this {ejourt now long and she’s nad a
very experienced attorney, and she still doesn't understand
hy the children are =~ the State has taken custody of then.
‘TRE MOTHER: No, because -— excuse mes Nou Dos
indevetand. the nosan called when Twas in HIS
isi), They took my kids from se, and they said it was an
G51 lawyer 2- law, and I'-- Lt wasn't, Thad to
(indiscernible) of the girls in the shelter. That's how my
Gaughter = my first daughter got tooken [sic] from me. I

 

 

des aot ‘en ne
Gwe MOTHER: Excuse me -- excuse me, Your Honor

Souhen do midds return to ne”
Becduse f canvt have any nore Kids, and this i my

last set, and J “= I’m =~ I-got an spartnent and one

bedroom, “and a .
‘The couNt: Okay: Welly that’s what =~ there wai. be

Taante think there’ anything available till probably
october
mat {9 the first date for a full-day trial?
THE MOTHER! October?
THE CLERK: October 16,
THE MOTHER: Sg 8 iona tine
scone?

me WoTWER: Excuse me, T can’t =~ I can’t get 2 leave
to another state, to my hometown?

Because I'm from New York. I want to leave, because
1m not getting no fair trial here, “I'm saying =~ I'm not

‘TE COURT: There's no law that mekes you stay here.
However, the children are in the jurisdiction.

‘Tie MOTHER: Can I cone back and get ay kids, then?

 

 

 

 

await a eninet
* xplain.

1 think that there's =~ your guardian can.

 

2a
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
ee

Because given the =~ you know, T don't think any explanation
T'nake £2 going to do any good. Apparently any explanation
your attorney made has not done any good, and he 1s
Setrenely —~

‘THE MOTHER: He didn’t explain nothing tome. He -~

ell -T’= goima to a sen"

 

THE COURT? Otay. You know, there 1s no guarantee,
leven after somebody does all the services, that they can get
their child back because =~ Just because you go doesn't mean
thet you Learn and can use what you go for. So the court,

 

cen use what I -- 1 can use ~
etl, that’s going te be the subject of

  

for pre-trial. And state's

‘THE COURT?
witnesses ==
THE MOTHER: Excuse me.

 

imormeR's counsti): Your Honor, one other question:

In regards to ~- ne 6: tes of
tet ane =
THE MOTHER? (indiscernible). Exeuse ue, I don’t,

 

(MOTHER'S COUNSEL) hs Mother.

 

 

iodeiry artomusy GENERAL): Te would probably be the
sane day as [Jone 2's], the same day, so one day 8 week.
Because prior to this, Mother hed never asked for =~

ub CodRr: okay. I'm not going to order any make-up
visits Tt’ only fof a week time. And apparently Mother
heen’ t requested visite prior to this time.

‘THE MOTHER: Yea, requesting now, i requesting it.

‘HE couRr: ‘anything

THE MOTHER: TIT Get to see her twice
a week, my daughter.

 

    

‘THe Court: . .

 

 

you back at those dates in
october.

[oepury ATTORNEY GENERAL): Yes, Your Honor.

THE COUR! fan wil for

‘Tae MOTHER: wha dian for?

{worker's CouNSeL]: 'il-explain it to vou
(Emphases added.)

The foregoing colloquy between the court and Mother
denonstrates Mother's understanding of the legal significance of

8 (1) she recognized that the State

 

the proceedings insofar

22
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
Oe

continued to have custody of her children; (2) she understood a
trial was to be held at which she had the opportunity to “prove”
she could be “a good mother"; (3) she perceived the trial was

“too far” in the future inasmuch as, at that point, the court had

scheduled an October 3, 2003 trial date; (4) she objected to the

 

court allowing her child to leave this jurisdictions and (5) she
requested visits with her children following the court’s
statenent that she had not requested visits prior to the June 13,
2003 hearing. In light of this evidence of Mother’s ability “to
understand the legal significance of the issues and the nature of
[the] . . . proceedings,” the court's finding number 106, gee
text at p. 15 supra, is not supported by the record on appeal.

on October 16, 2003, after the appointment of the
querdian ad Litem, the court ordered either a report from
Mother's psychiatrist or a psychological evaluation as to whether
Mother needed @ guardian ad litem. On December 16, 2003, the
court considered the psychologist’s conclusion that Mother did
not need @ guardian ad Litem and said guardian was dismissed.
Thus, the psychologist’s report and findings that Mother “is able
to understand the court proceedings” and “[s]he does not need a
guardian ad litem to make decisions for her” indicate Mother was
competent to proceed without a guardian ad litem.

Mother's apparent behavior on December 18, 2003

seemingly led the court to reappoint the guardian ad litem on

 

December 19, 2003, as explained in the court’s findings numbers

23
  

FOR PUBLICATION***
29 and 108. See text at pp. 14-15 supra. Finding nunber 29

states that the court reappointed the guardian ad litem “after
learning” about Mother’s behavior of “demand{ing] to see a
judge," “not tak{ing] no for an answer,” “not respond[ing] to a
court officers repeated explanations,” and leaving the
courthouse “around 3:30 p.m.” after waiting there since “around
10:30 a.m." Finding number 108 reiterates that the court

reappointed the guardian based on Mother's “erratic{)” behavior

 

of “appear [ing] at the family court” and “refus{al] to leave

; unless she spoke to a judge, despite being informed by her

 

counsel and the family court staff that she could not see a
judge.”

These findings, however, are clearly erroneous as “the
record lacks substantial evidence” “of sufficient quality and
probative value” “to support [such] finding(s).” Bremer, 104
hawai'i at 51, 65 P.3d at 158. The court (1) did not witness
Mother's behavior but “Learn(ed)” of her behavior, (2) seemingly
relied on hearsay by “a court officer,” “{Nother’s] counsel and
the family court staff,” and (3) evaluated Mother's conduct in
the absence of testimony or affidavits from the court officer,
Mother's counsel or family court staff as eyewitnesses. Indeed,
in contrast to the characterizations in findings 29 and 108, the
only apparent evidence in the record of Mother's behavior on
December 18, 2003, is in the guardian ad litem’s Special Report
which states in relevant part that

{a)round 12/19/03 Court officer 5. Holden informed this

24
‘#**POR PUBLICATION***

ee

 

[guardian ad Litem) that she was being reappointed for
[tjether, who had shown up st Panily Court on/about 12/18/03
fround ii gra, and had refused to Jeave the courthouse until
She was allowed to see a Juage. Ess 2

 

(Emphasis added.) The parties do not point to anything else in
the record to support the court’s finding of Mother's “erratic
behavior” on December 18, 2003. See finding no. 108 at p. 18
supra. In any event, the events of December 18, 2003 fail to
establish Mother’s inability to “comprehend the significance of
the legal proceedings and the effect and relationship of such
procedures,” Leslie, 91 Hawai'i at 400, 984 P.2d at 1226, with
respect to her interests. If anything, the record reflects that
Mother was well aware of the significance of the proceedings and
the adverse legal consequences of a motion for permanent custody
to her interests as a parent.

Additionally, Mother’s actions do not necessarily
evidence her misunderstanding of the court proceedings. Rather,
Mother’s apparent December 18, 2003 request to see a judge is
consistent with evidence of her June 13, 2003 expressed desire
that her children be “return[ed)” to her and her frustration with
the length of the proceedings that the trial date was set “too
far along.” See text at pp. 22-23 supra.

xII.

As mentioned before, the “continuing incompetence of an
adult party for whom a [guardian ad litem] has previously been
appointed,” Leslie, 91 Hawai'i at 401, 984 P.2d at 1227, is a

matter to be determined by the trial court. No hearing was held

25
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

pursuant to HRS § 587-34(d) to determine Mother’s incompetence
although the court reappointed a guardian ad litem on

December 19, 2003. The record does not indicate any notice wa
given to Mother of the court’s intention to reappoint a guardian
fad litem. This lack of notice and failure to conduct a hearing,
therefore, afforded Mother no opportunity to respond to the
court's reasons for reappointment of said guardian.

In light of (1) Mother's understanding of the legal
proceedings and their effect as demonstrated by her statements
during the June 13, 2003 hearing: (2) Dr. Choy’s report
indicating that a guardian ad litem for Mother was unnecessary;
(3) Dr. Yuen’s treating psychiatrist's report that medication
would control any problem; (4) the court’s reappointment of
Mother's guardian ad litem based only on Mother’s purported
erratic behavior on December 18, 2003; (5) the absence of
“substantial evidence,” Bremer, 104 Hawai"i at 43, 85 P.3d at
158, in the record concerning the nature of the December 18, 2003
“incident” and (6) the lack of any indication from the December
18, 2003 incident that Mother did not comprehend the significance
of the proceedings, the court’s decision to reappoint a guardian
without conducting a hearing was contrary to evidence that Mother
did understand the legal significance of the proceedings. Hence,
the court abused its discretion in failing to convene a hearing
pursuant to HRS § 587-34(d).

It should be observed that at the subsequent May 4,

26
 

FOR PUBLICATION***
ee
2004 pretrial conference and hearing, at which permanent custody

of Mother's children was granted to DHS and her parental rights
were terminated, Mother's statements and conduct also
demonstrated her understanding of the proceedings. Her
statenents there were consistent with Mother's belief at the

gune 13, 2003 hearing that a trial would afford her the

 

opportunity to “prove” she would be “a good mother” and regain
custody of her children. Mother urged that she would provide a
safe family home, and in response to the guardian ad liten’s,
counsel's, and the court's adverse statements, “beggled]” the
court to give her a “chance” with her children. Mother's counsel
confirmed at the pretrial conference that Mother “want(ed] @
trial.” Mother's counsel also represented to the court on May 4,
2004, that Mother was “prepared to fully go to trial{.]”
XIII.

Second, in the instant case, Mother was also “deprived”
of her “parental rights” “without a fair hearing.” In re Doe
Children, 99 Hawai'i 522, $33, 57 P.3d 447, 458 (2002). This

court has held as follow:

 

lic affirm, independent of the federal constitution,

ere, sia Tei thi sd
‘Hiedje orosese clause of anticle 1. section sof the
BPS renal lanes cusventeed unger the
Hawai'i constitution would mean litte if patente were
Hae Sn ay or nel children without a fad

Egaring, Indeed, parents have a fundamental Liberty
Interest in the care, custody, and management of their
children and the stste may not deprive a person of his or
her liberty interest

the deprivation. Furthermore, the Suprene Court has said
that parental Fights cannot be Genied without an opportunity
for then to be heard at a peapinaful tine and in a

neaninaiul sanner.

 

 

27
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

Id (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted)
(emphasis in original and sone emphases added).

‘The court’s finding number 33 that on May 4, 2004,
Mother “thr[e]w herself on the floor and lay immobile when told
she could not get her children back,” is incomplete and
misleading because it fails to recite what had occurred before
this, As stated previously, on May 4, 2004, the court conducted
a pretrial conference and hearing for the trial set for June 3,
2004, initially in Mother’s absence. At that time the court
apparently read a letter from Mother's treating psychiatrist,
br. Yuen, indicating Mother was stable if “medicated.” Mother's
guardian expressed disagreement with the letter. The guardian
also informed the court that Mother had airline tickets for the
children. Counsel objected to this disclosure. Mother later
informed the court about the airline tickets when she was allowed
into court. Counsel indicated that Mother “wants a trial” but
that Mother's guardian ad litem “will control whether there will
be a trial.”

When Mother was present, the guardian recommended to
the court that the permanent custody motion should be granted
even though trial had been set for June 3, 2004. Counsel agreed
with this recommendation. Although counsel indicated that “there
is the ability to litigate this matter,” he stated the guardian

ad litem was speaking “on the best interest” of Mother and he had

  

to follow the guardian's recommendation. The guardian ad litem’s

28
‘#**FOR PUBLICATION***
ee

statement to the court that the motion for permanent custody
should be granted and counsel's agreement to that statement was
in clear contravention of Mother's stated desire for a trial and
of the already scheduled trial date in June. Following counsel's
agreenent with the guardian's recommendation, Mother stated she
could provide a safe family home, “begging” the court to give her
‘a chance” with her children. In response the court indicated
that Mother could not provide a safe family home. Only then did
Mother state she could not move and was removed by the ambulance.
After Mother’s removal, the guardian waived Mother's
presence, the court granted the permanent custody motion, and set
aside the June 3, 2004 trial date. Following this, Mother’s
counsel still noted, inter alia, that “we were fully prepared to
go to trial today and . . . prior to today.”
The record does not indicate that (1) Mother had any
notice that there would be no trial concerning her parental
rights, (2) the guardian ad litem notified Mother that she was
going to recommend that the court grant permanent custody to DES,
(3) Mother was advised by her counsel that he would join in the
reconmendation that the court grant DHS’s motion for permanent
custody, (4) Mother was advised of the effect of the guardian's
recommendation by the guardian or by her counsel before the
recommendation was made, (5) Mother was informed of the
consequences of the guardian's waiver of Mother’s presence at the

pretrial hearing and that she concurred, and (6) a disposition

29
 

FOR PUBLICATION:

regarding her parental rights would be rendered on that very day.

The recommendation by Mother's guardian ad litem and
counsel that the court grant permanent custody to DHS and the
waiver of Mothers presence led to the court’s termination of
Mother's parental rights. This court has said that the trial
“court’s own responsibility to ensure that the interests of the
ward are not compromised” “strictly circumscribe” “the powers of
the guardian.” Leslie, 91 Hawai'i at 400 n.8, 984 P.2d at 1226
n.8, Under these cizcunstances the court failed to meet its
responsibility. In light of these considerations, Mother was
“denied” “an opportunity . . . to be heard at 2 meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner,” In re Doe Children, 99 Hawai'i at
533, 57 P.3d at 458, as to the termination of her parental
rights. Ultimately, without 2 trial concerning these
“substantive liberty interest(s] in the care, custody, and
control of [her] children,” Mother was “deprived of the custody
of [her] children without a fair hearing.” Id.

xIv.

For the foregoing reasons, the court's December 19,
2003 order reappointing Mother’s guardian ad litem is vacated and
a hearing on such reappointment shall be conducted pursuant to
HRS § 587-34(d). Inasmuch as Mother did not receive a fair
hearing, ida, the court’s May 4, 2004 order awarding permanent
custody and its June 29, 2004 orders denying Mothers motion for

reconsideration are also vacated and the case is remanded to the

30
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

on the briefs:

Jeftry R. Buchli for Gg
Hother-Appellant.
Deirdre Narie-tha Bie eW Lave

Sha Dorothy 8. sellers,

Deputy Attorneys General,

State of Hawai'i, for Baan Cee Aer

Department of Human
Services-Appellee.

Grace meen

31