Title: Coffey v. Fayette County

State: georgia

Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court

Document:

631 S.E.2d 703 (2006) 280 Ga. 656 COFFEY et al. v. FAYETTE COUNTY et al. No. S06A0055. Supreme Court of Georgia. June 26, 2006. Edward Adam Webb, G. Franklin Lemond Jr., Atlanta, for appellants. Dennis A. Davenport, McNally, Fox & Grant, P.C., Fayetteville, for appellees. MELTON, Justice. This marks the second appearance before this Court of this appeal regarding the constitutionality of a sign ordinance adopted by Fayette County in 1999. In our prior opinion, we set forth the salient facts as follows: Coffey v. Fayette County, 279 Ga. 111, 610 S.E.2d 41 (2005). *704 We determined that the rational relationship test cited by the trial court was an incorrect standard, holding: (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 111-112, 610 S.E.2d 41 (citing Statesboro Publishing Co. v. City of Sylvania, 271 Ga. 92, 516 S.E.2d 296 (1999)). On remand and in response to appellants' renewed motion for an injunction, the trial court determined that a number of provisions in the ordinance were unconstitutional restrictions on the content of certain speech because they were not content-neutral.[1] Nonetheless, the trial court found that these provisions could be severed from the ordinance pursuant to its severance clause without affecting its overall viability. The trial court further held that the redacted statute was the least restrictive means to achieve the county's goals of traffic safety and neighborhood aesthetics. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court received no evidence from the county but nonetheless held: In Statesboro Publishing, supra, we stressed that, in considering the constitutionality of ordinances restricting free speech, "we must review [the ordinance] closely to ensure that it is narrowly drawn to serve the city's interest." Id. at 93(1), 516 S.E.2d 296. In conducting this close review, a court cannot merely defer to the discretion of the governmental entity imposing the ordinance. If that were the case, Georgia's additional restrictions on limitations on free speech would be rendered meaningless. Instead, in such cases, the reviewing court must base its determination on a careful consideration of the evidence, none of which has been presented here, to determine that the ordinance in question does not burden any more speech than is necessary. Here, the trial court deferred without question to the decisions made at the discretion of the county without receiving any evidence or fully considering whether the ordinance was the least restrictive means of achieving the county's goals.[2] As a result, we must remand this case for further consideration consistent with this requirement. Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. [1] For example, Section 1-55 of the ordinance stated that the one allowed residential sign could "not be used to direct the public to a place or event at a location other than the location upon which the sign is posted." [2] Because we must remand this case in order for the trial court to fully consider whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means to achieve the county's goals, we do not reach Coffey's contention regarding the viability of the ordinance after severance. Likewise, we do not reach Coffey's contention that the ordinance fails to provide adequate alternative means of communication at this time.