Title: State of Idaho v. Robert Anderson Driving under the influence of alcohol

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 34411 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
                                                      
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,      
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v.                                                    
                                                      
ROBERT ANDERSON,   
                                             
          
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross 
         Appellant.                        
                                                      
                                                      
Boise, December 2007 Term 
 
Opinion No.  3 
 
Filed:  January 9, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
       
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County.  Hon. Tom Watkins, Magistrate Judge.  Hon. D. Duff McKee, District 
Judge. 
 
The decision of the magistrate court is affirmed and the case is remanded to the 
magistrate court for execution of sentence. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, State Attorney General, for appellant-cross 
respondent.  Lori Fleming argued. 
 
Ringert Clark, Chtd., Boise, for respondent-cross appellant.  James Reid argued. 
 
_____________________________ 
W. JONES, Justice 
Robert Anderson was convicted by jury trial for misdemeanor driving under the influence 
with an alcohol concentration of 0.20 or more.  The State presented evidence at trial of three 
alcohol concentration tests by Anderson registering respectively at 0.22, 0.19, and 0.24.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s appellate decision reversing the jury verdict on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of 
Anderson’s cross-appeal for defective complaint and verdict, insufficient foundation to admit the 
alcohol concentration results and failure to sanction the State for failure to comply with a 
discovery order.  The State and Anderson petition this Court for review.  
 
1
 
On May 28, 2001, police officers responded to an accident by a suspected drunk driver.  
Robert Anderson hit a curb while driving and damaged his front tire.  Anderson appeared to be 
under the influence of alcohol.  No field sobriety tests were administered because Anderson was 
having trouble standing and maintaining his balance.  According to the arrest report, Anderson 
consumed four beers over the course of four or more hours and was on his way home from the 
bar.  Anderson was then placed under arrest and taken to Ada County Jail.  At the jail three 
breathalyzer tests were administered.  The first and second test registered alcohol concentration 
levels by analysis of the breath of 0.22 and 0.19 respectively.  A third test was administered in 
accordance with police procedures because the deviation between the first two tests was greater 
than 0.02.  The third test registered an alcohol concentration level of 0.24. 
 
Anderson was charged under I.C. § 18-8004C(1) (enhanced DUI), which makes it a 
misdemeanor to drive with an alcohol concentration of 0.20 or more.  He moved to dismiss the 
charges based on the test that registered 0.19, arguing that as a matter of law the State could not 
prove that element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  The magistrate denied the motion 
after the State argued that it would present evidence at trial explaining why the result should be 
disregarded. 
The parties stipulated that Anderson was guilty of I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a), driving with an 
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (simple DUI).  Therefore, the only issue to resolve at trial 
was whether Anderson was guilty of an enhanced DUI, I.C. § 18-8004C(1), driving with an 
alcohol concentration of 0.20 or more.  At trial, the State presented the testimony of two 
witnesses, the arresting officer who administered the breathalyzer test and an expert witness on 
breathalyzer tests.  The arresting officer testified that the tests were performed in one minute 
intervals with no irregularities and that Anderson performed the tests correctly and the 
breathalyzer test registered the results.  The State’s expert, David Laycock, testified that the 
machine was calibrated low, and that because the test results of 0.22 and 0.24 were within 0.02 
of each other, that his opinion was that Anderson’s alcohol concentration was at least 0.20.  
Laycock also testified to various reasons a low test may result.  The jury found Anderson guilty 
of an enhanced DUI under I.C. § 18-8004C(1). 
Anderson appealed to the district court contending (1) insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict, (2) error by the magistrate for failure to issue discovery sanctions, and (3) error in the 
foundational testimony for the admission of the alcohol concentration results.  The district court 
 
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reversed the jury conviction because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.  The district court found no other error in the 
proceedings.  The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, and Anderson cross appealed the 
denial of his other claims.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusions.  The 
State and Anderson petition this Court for review. 
 
The following issues are presented to this Court on appeal: 
1. Whether the district court erred in reversing Anderson’s jury conviction on the basis that 
the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion when it failed to issue discovery 
sanctions against the State and allowed the State’s expert witness to testify. 
3. Whether the magistrate court erred when it allowed the results of the alcohol 
concentration tests to be introduced. 
4. Whether the magistrate court erred in denying Anderson’s motion to dismiss the case 
based on the defective complaint. 
 5.  Whether the verdict form was defective because it required the jury to find Anderson 
     guilty of the enhancement statute prior to finding him guilty of a simple DUI. 
 
 
“In an appeal from a final judgment of a magistrate judge following an appeal to a district 
judge sitting as an appellate court, we [the Supreme Court] review the record of the magistrate 
judge independently of the decision of the district judge.”  State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 
826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (citing Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 105 Idaho 487, 490, 
670 P.2d 894, 897 (1983)).  Evidence is insufficient to support the verdict when there is no 
substantial evidence from which any rational jury could have concluded that the defendant was 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Filson, 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613 P.2d 938, 943 (1980) 
(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 325 (1979)).  The jury determines the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and may draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence 
presented.  State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 572, 826 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. 
Ojeda, 119 Idaho 862, 864, 810 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.  
State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 426, 50 P.3d 439, 441 (2002) (citing Lopez v. State, 136 Idaho 
174, 30 P.3d 952 (2001)).  “The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly 
construed in favor of defendants.”  State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1388 
(1993) overruled on other grounds, (citing State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325, 806 P.2d 413, 418 
(1990)). 
 
3
 
The State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding 
Anderson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving with an alcohol concentration of 
0.20 or more. 
Anderson argues that under State v. Mills the State is barred from prosecuting defendants 
under I.C. § 18-8004C(1), as a matter of law, who register any alcohol concentration, by analysis 
of blood, breath or urine, under 0.20.  State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426, 913 P.2d 1196 (Ct. App. 
1996).  In Mills, the defendant registered two alcohol concentration results of 0.10 and 0.09.1  
Mills, 128 Idaho 426, 913 P.2d 1196.  I.C. § 18-8004(2) specifically barred the prosecution of a 
person who registered a test result lower than 0.10.  The Court of Appeals found that any single 
result constitutes “a test” for purposes of the statute.  Mills, 128 Idaho at 429, 913 P.2d at 1199.  
Therefore, any test registering under 0.10 was un-prosecutable as a matter of law.  Id.  Anderson 
is asking this Court to forbid the prosecution of a person who registers alcohol concentration 
tests both below the statutory limit and above the statutory limit of the enhancement statute.  
This Court declines to do so. 
 
I.C. § 18-8004C(1) does not have a provision similar to I.C 18-8004(2).  No portion of 
the statute expressly forbids the prosecution of a person who returns a test with an alcohol 
concentration level under 0.20.  Therefore, to forbid the prosecution of a person with conflicting 
alcohol concentration tests, this Court would be adding language to the statute that the legislature 
did not intend.  Under the enhancement statute, I.C. § 18-8004C(1), conflicting tests go towards 
the weight of the State’s evidence.   
Here, the evidence presented by the State was sufficient for a rational jury to make a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State’s expert testified to reasons why the result 
of 0.19 should be disregarded.  He also testified that because the 0.22 and 0.24 results were 
within the standard range of deviation (0.02) that most likely the defendant had an alcohol 
concentration above 0.20.  The defense did not object to the expert’s testimony beyond the 
discovery violation.  Although the arresting officer testified that all of the alcohol concentration 
tests by analysis of breath were conducted properly, he also testified that the third test was only 
conducted because the first two were outside the standard range of deviation in accordance with 
Idaho State Police Procedures. 
                                                 
1 The statute in effect at the time Mills was convicted made it a misdemeanor to drive with an alcohol concentration 
level of 0.10 or more. 
 
4
It is within the province of the jury to assign weight to conflicting evidence and 
credibility to testimony.  The jury determined that the evidence presented proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the 0.22 and 0.24 test results were valid and that the 0.19 test result, 
although valid, should be disregarded.  We do not speculate how the jury reached this 
conclusion, but merely determine that it was within their power to do so once the State presented 
testimony as to why the 0.19 test result was inconsistent.  Additionally, the State’s expert, David 
Laycock, rendered an opinion that Anderson’s alcohol concentration was at least 0.20.  It was for 
the jury to accept or reject that testimony.   
“Where there is competent evidence to sustain the verdict, this court [sic] will not 
reweigh that evidence.”  Filson, 101 Idaho at 386, 613 P.2d at 943 (citation omitted).  This Court 
will not disregard a jury’s verdict unless the evidence is insufficient for any rational jury to find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  In this instance, there was sufficient evidence 
for a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant registered an alcohol 
concentration above 0.20.  The district court erred in reversing Anderson’s conviction. 
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to issue discovery 
sanctions against the State. 
The decision whether to impose discovery sanctions is within the discretion of the trial 
court.  In re Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 666, 931 P.2d 657, 660 (Ct. App 1997) (citing Ashby v. W. 
Council, Lumber Prod. & Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686, 791, P.2d 434, 436 (1990)).  The 
trial court does not abuse its discretion if (1) the decision is recognized as discretionary, (2) the 
actions are within the boundaries of that discretion and the correct legal standards are applied, 
and (3) the decision is reached through an exercise of reason.  In re Doe, 129 Idaho at 666, 931 
P.2d at 660 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).  When 
imposing discovery sanctions, the court should balance the equities and make the punishment fit 
the crime.  In re Doe, 129 Idaho at 668, 931 P.2d at 661 (citing S. Idaho Prod. Credit Assoc. v. 
Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 746 P.2d 985 (1987)).  The judge should balance the culpability of the 
disobedient party against the resulting prejudice to the innocent party.  Id. at 668, 931 P.2d at 
661 (citing S. Idaho Prod. Credit Assoc., 113 Idaho at 532, 746 P.2d at 991). 
The magistrate court issued a pre-trial discovery order requiring the disclosure of the 
name, address, phone number and curriculum vitae of all expert witnesses.  The State answered 
with “David Laycock, criminalist/expert witness, State Crime Lab.”  At trial, Anderson objected 
to the expert’s testimony and moved to exclude any testimony for failure to disclose the required 
 
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discovery materials.  The magistrate found that the State had failed to disclose the required 
discovery materials, but that Anderson was unable to show any prejudice as a result.  The 
magistrate called a recess and allowed Anderson the opportunity to review Mr. Laycock’s 
curriculum vitae prior to cross-examination. 
Discovery sanctions are within the discretion of the trial court.  The magistrate found that 
the State was minimally culpable in this instance and that Anderson suffered little or no 
prejudice as a result.  Anderson was issued the discovery answer close to a year before trial and 
did not object until trial.  Anderson did not allege that he attempted but was unable to contact 
Mr. Laycock prior to trial.  The magistrate offered a lesser sanction, and Anderson refused, 
contending that the exclusion of the expert was the only appropriate means.  There was no error 
in the magistrate’s decision not to exclude Mr. Laycock’s testimony from trial. 
The magistrate court did not err when it allowed the results of the alcohol 
concentration tests to be introduced into evidence. 
The State was required to show that the Intoxilyzer 5000 (breathalyzer test) was a method 
of analysis approved by the Idaho State Police at the time that the tests were conducted.  I.C. § 
18-8004(4).  Anderson contends that the State failed to provide a foundation for the admission of 
the alcohol concentration test results because Mr. Laycock, the State’s expert witness, did not 
specifically state that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was approved on the date in question.  The State 
provided the foundation for the admission of the alcohol concentration test results through 
witness testimony.  Mr. Laycock testified that (1) he had been employed at the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Laboratory since 1982, (2) he wrote the standard operating procedures for the 
Intoxilyzer 5000, and (3) the Intoxilyzer 5000 was approved as a state certified instrument in the 
early 1990’s and was still in use. 
Questions of admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.  I.R.E. 104(a); 
State v. Uhlry, 121 Idaho 1020, 1022, 829 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992).  The magistrate did 
not abuse his discretion when he allowed the admission of the alcohol concentration test results 
into evidence.  Mr. Laycock’s testimony states that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was approved by the 
Idaho State Police almost two decades ago and is still in use.  Therefore, the State laid a 
sufficient foundation for the admission of the test results and it was within the discretion of the 
trial court to allow the admission of the evidence. 
 
 
6
The magistrate court did not err in denying Anderson’s motion to dismiss the case 
based on the defective complaint. 
After the jury verdict, Anderson filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint 
was defective.  The magistrate denied his claims holding that Anderson was unable to show that 
he misunderstood the nature of the charges against him.  On cross-appeal to the Court of 
Appeals, Anderson asserted that the complaint was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to 
cite to I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a).2  The complaint cites I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8004C.3 
Whether a court has jurisdiction and whether charging documents are valid are questions 
of law over which this Court exercises free review.  State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 
699, 701 (2004).  The assertion that a charging document fails to assert jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time during the proceedings.  I.C.R. 12(b)(2).  A charging document fails 
jurisdictionally if it does not state the elements of the crime.  However, there is a strong 
presumption of validity if the defects are raised in an untimely manner.  Jones, 140 Idaho at 758, 
101 P.3d at 703 (citing State v. Cahoon, 116 Idaho 399, 400, 775 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1989)).  
“[S]ufficiency of the charging document will ‘be upheld unless it is so defective that it does not, 
by any fair or reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted.’”  
Id. (citing Cahoon, 116 Idaho at 400, 775 P.2d at 1242).  On review, this Court may imply the 
necessary language from the charging document.  Id. (citing State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 
287, 805 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct. App. 1991)).  Any due process challenges to the charging document 
are waived if not brought prior to trial.  I.C.R. 12(b)(2); Jones, 140 Idaho at 758, 101 P.3d at 
703. 
Anderson failed to bring a due process challenge as to the sufficiency of the charging 
document prior to trial; therefore, that claim is waived.  The charging document failed to cite I.C. 
§ 18-8004(1)(a), but did cite the enhancement statute of I.C. § 18-8004C, which in turn cites to 
the applicable subsection (I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a)).  A charging document does not necessarily 
                                                 
2 “It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or 
any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 
0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of blood, urine, or breath, to drive or 
be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon 
public or private property open to the public. 
3 “Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), Idaho 
Code, for the first time, but who has an alcohol concentration of 0.20, as defined in section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, 
or more, as shown by an analysis of his blood, breath or urine by a test requested by a police officer, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor . . .” 
 
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require that the State cite to every applicable subsection of a statute.  The charging document, 
although not ideal, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. 
There was no defect in the verdict form because Anderson stipulated to the lesser 
included offense prior to trial. 
Anderson argues that the verdict form was defective because it allowed the jury to 
convict him under the enhancement statute (I.C. § 18-8004C(1)) prior to a finding of a simple 
DUI (18-8004(1)(a)).  Anderson stipulated prior to trial to having a blood alcohol concentration 
of 0.08 or more.  Therefore, the jury was not required to find Anderson guilty of driving with an 
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more prior to finding him guilty of driving with an alcohol 
concentration of 0.20 or more. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Anderson’s conviction of an excessive DUI (I.C. § 18-
8004C(1)) is affirmed.  This case is remanded for sentencing. 
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR. 
 
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