Title: State v. Stone

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 100,076 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JOSHUA L. STONE, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
A contemporaneous objection to prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument is not required in order to preserve the issue for appeal. 
 
2. 
In general, appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involving 
improper comments to the jury follows a two-step analysis. First, the appellate court 
decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude that the prosecutor is 
allowed in discussing the evidence. Second, the appellate court decides whether those 
comments constitute plain error; that is, whether the statements prejudiced the jury 
against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial.  
 
3. 
In the second step of the two-step analysis of an allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the appellate court considers three factors: (1) whether the misconduct was 
gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; 
and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the 
2 
 
 
 
misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors. None of these three 
factors is individually controlling. Moreover, the third factor may not override the first 
two factors unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (refusal to grant new 
trial is inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 
17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967) (conclusion beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result 
of the trial), have been met.  
 
4. 
 
It is improper for the prosecutor to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant or to misstate the legal standard of the burden of proof.  
 
5. 
 
In general, prosecutors may not offer juries their personal opinions as to the 
credibility of witnesses. Prosecutors have wide latitude, however, to craft arguments that 
include reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. That latitude includes 
explaining to juries what they should look for in assessing witness credibility, especially 
when the defense has attacked the credibility of the State's witnesses. 
 
6. 
 
The point of not allowing a prosecutor to comment on the credibility of a witness 
is that expressions of personal opinion by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, 
unchecked testimony, not commentary on the evidence of the case.  
 
7. 
 
A dual standard is used when reviewing the suppression of a confession. In 
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the appellate court 
3 
 
 
 
reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision under a substantial competent evidence 
standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. The 
appellate court does not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or 
resolve conflicting evidence. 
 
8. 
 
When a defendant claims his or her confession was not voluntary, the prosecution 
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it was voluntary. The 
essential inquiry is whether the statement was the product of an accused's free and 
independent will. The court looks at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
confession and determines its voluntariness by considering the following nonexclusive 
factors:  (1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the 
interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside 
world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in 
conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency with the English language. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JEFFREY E. GOERING, judge. Opinion filed August 20, 
2010. Reversed and remanded with directions. 
 
Ryan J. Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, 
district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Joshua Stone was convicted of one count of aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child. On appeal, he argues that the prosecutor's remarks during closing 
argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct denying him a fair trial. He also argues 
that a tape recording of his interrogation should not have been admitted into evidence. 
 
Stone was tried on one count of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child; two 
counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, one of which alleged that he lewdly 
touched the victim and the other of which alleged that he submitted to her touching; and 
one count of criminal threat. The victim, 9-year-old A.L., spent the night of December 
19, 2006, at the apartment of her mother's cousin. Stone is the cousin's stepbrother  and 
he was temporarily living there. A.L.'s mother and Stone had briefly been in a 
relationship so he and A.L. knew each other. A.L. alleged that Stone woke her up, took 
her into the living room where he slept on a futon sofa, instructed her to masturbate him, 
put his hand on her "crotch," and then threatened to kill her if she told anyone.   
 
The next day, A.L. did tell a 17-year-old babysitter. The babysitter told Stone's 
stepsister and A.L.'s mother who, after first attempting to take matters into their own 
hands, called the police. As a result, Stone was picked up by the Wichita police and 
interrogated by Detective Kelly Mar. The interrogation began at approximately 1 a.m. 
and was recorded (audio only). It lasted a total of about 1 hour and 40 minutes consisting 
of two segments. During the first, Stone's personal history information was collected, he 
was read and waived his Miranda rights, and he agreed to give a DNA sample. The 
second 85-minute segment consisted of his interrogation by Detective Mar. The 
intervening break was caused by the detective turning off the recording machine while 
she swabbed Stone for the DNA sample. A redacted version of the recording was played 
for the jury members, who were also allowed to follow along on a transcript. Stone 
maintained his innocence throughout the interview; however, after he initially denied that 
5 
 
 
 
anything happened, his account of the incident gradually expanded as the interview 
progressed. Eventually, he made some incriminating statements, including that the victim 
put her hand on his penis. 
 
Prior to interviewing Stone, Detective Mar had interviewed A.L. That interview 
was videotaped and the video was played for the jury in its entirety. The video was not 
included in the record on appeal, but the audio portion of the interview was. A.L. 
reported to Detective Mar that, during the event, sticky stuff came out of Stone's penis 
and she wiped it on her pajama top. Despite not having the results of lab tests on the 
pajama top, Detective Mar repeatedly told Stone during his interrogation that semen had 
been found on the pajama top and he needed to explain how it got there. In fact, when lab 
results were complete, no semen was detected on the pajama top.  
 
The prosecutor opened her closing argument with the statement, "[A.L.] told you 
what happened." She closed her summation with the statement, "[A.L.] told you what 
happened. She showed you what happened. She is a credible witness." During the course 
of her closing argument, she also told the jury:   
 
"He [Stone] has two huge obstacles he has to overcome to present any kind of a 
credible defense to you. The first obstacle that he has to overcome is that [A.L.] is so 
credible.  
. . . . 
The other huge obstacle the defendant has to overcome is his confession."  
 
The jury had deliberated for approximately a day before asking the court to view 
again the videotaped interview of A.L. and to hear again portions of the tape recording of 
the interrogation of Stone and the entire testimony of A.L. The jury wanted to hear the 
portions of the interrogation "when the detective began telling the defendant he had 
6 
 
 
 
semen on [A.L.]'s shirt, when the detective and Mr. Stone began talking about [A.L.] 
actually touching him, one finger, two fingers and approximately the last quarter of the 
interview." The trial court and attorneys determined that identifying specific portions of 
Stone's interview on the tape was too difficult and that the entire interrogation should be 
played again for the jury. The jury's two other requests were also granted.  
 
After deliberating approximately 3 more hours, the jury informed the judge that it 
was hopelessly deadlocked. The trial judge instructed the jury to return to the jury room 
to ensure that it could not reach a verdict. According to the times noted in the transcripts, 
2 minutes later, it returned with a guilty verdict on one count of aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child and not guilty verdicts on the remaining charges.  
 
The trial court departed from the mandatory 25-year sentence under K.S.A. 21-
4643, "Jessica's Law," and sentenced Stone to 61 months. Stone appealed. Jurisdiction is 
in this court under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1), conviction of an off-grid crime. 
 
PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT 
 
Stone complains that statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument 
entailed improper comment on the credibility of witnesses and shifted the burden of proof 
in the case to him, denying him a fair trial.  He made no objection to the comments 
during the closing argument, but a contemporaneous objection to prosecutorial 
misconduct during closing argument is not required in order to preserve the issue for 
appeal. State v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 322-23, 202 P.3d 658 (2009); State v. 
Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 428, 153 P.3d 497 (2007). 
 
"In general, appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involving 
improper comments to the jury follows a two-step analysis. First, the appellate court 
7 
 
 
 
decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude that the prosecutor is 
allowed in discussing the evidence. Second, the appellate court decides whether those 
comments constitute plain error; that is, whether the statements prejudiced the jury 
against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Albright, 283 Kan. at 
428. 
"In the second step of the two-step analysis, the appellate court considers three 
factors: '(1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct 
showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct 
and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the 
minds of jurors. None of these three factors is individually controlling. Moreover, the 
third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both 
K.S.A. 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is inconsistent with substantial justice] and 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, [22,] 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 reh. denied 
386 U.S. 987 (1967) [conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if 
any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial], have been met. [Citations 
omitted.]'  Albright, 283 Kan. at 428." McReynolds, 288 Kan. at 323. 
 
 
Stone argues that the State's closing was improper for a combination of three 
reasons. First, he argues that the State improperly attempted to shift the burden of proof 
by arguing that he had significant "obstacles to overcome." He combines the second and 
third reasons into one argument that the State improperly commented on the credibility of 
the complaining witness by asking the jury to speculate on matters not in evidence when 
it argued that her version was credible because if she had made up a story, she would 
have made up a better one than the one she gave.  
 
Shifting the Burden 
 
 
It is improper for the prosecutor to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant or to misstate the legal standard of the burden of proof. See State v. Tosh, 278 
8 
 
 
 
Kan. 83, 89-92, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). In Tosh, a rape case, the prosecutor questioned the 
jury in closing argument, "'"[I]s there any evidence that it didn't happen?  Is there any 
evidence that the things she told you didn't happen?"' 278 Kan. at 92. This court found 
the questions an impermissible attempt by the State to shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant. 278 Kan. at 92. 
 
 
In this case, Stone contends that the State's argument that he had "obstacles to 
overcome" amounted to the same kind of burden-shifting argument that occurred in Tosh. 
The statements here, however, seem more akin to those made by the same prosecutor in 
State v. Burden, 30 Kan. App. 2d 690, 46 P.3d 570 (2002), rev'd on other grounds 275 
Kan. 934, 69 P.3d 1120 (2003). There, the Court of Appeals, in a decision written by 
Judge (now Justice) Beier, considered the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument, 
"'[T]he most overwhelming thing that the defense cannot overcome in this case is the 
physical evidence that corroborates [the victim's] initial statements.'" 30 Kan. App. 2d at 
703. The court characterized the comment as "inartful" but noted that the jury was 
properly instructed on the burden of proof and concluded that "the prosecutor was not 
attempting to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Rather, she was within the 
considerable latitude granted to prosecutors to comment on the weakness of 
defenses. . . ." 30 Kan. App. 2d at 703. 
 
 
Here, the prosecutor spent time in her argument reviewing the burden of proof 
instruction with the jury.  
 
"I want to go over some of the legal things with you. You know, the jury instructions 
are the factors that you get of how to decide the case, and the first one that I'll talk about 
is the burden of proof. These elements of the offenses that the judge has just read, those 
are the things that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, those elements and only 
those elements."  
9 
 
 
 
 
Later in the argument, the prosecutor reviewed the instructions listing the specific 
elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument stands in 
contrast to the argumentative questions posed to the jury by the prosecutor in Tosh, 
implying that it was the defendant's burden to produce evidence to disprove the charges.  
 
Credibility of Witness 
 
"In general, prosecutors may not offer juries their personal opinions as to the 
credibility of witnesses. Prosecutors have wide latitude, however, to craft arguments that 
include reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. That latitude includes 
explaining to juries what they should look for in assessing witness credibility, especially 
when the defense has attacked the credibility of the State's witnesses. State v. Scaife, 286 
Kan. 614, 623-24, 186 P.3d 755 (2008)." McReynolds, 288 Kan. at 325. 
 
"The point of not allowing a prosecutor to comment on the credibility of a witness is that 
expressions of personal opinion by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, unchecked 
testimony, not commentary on the evidence of the case." State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 
510, 996 P.2d 321 (2000).  
 
 
Clearly, a few of the prosecutor's statements, taken in isolation, constitute 
questionable prosecutorial argument. Her unqualified assertion that "A.L. told [the jury] 
what happened," and "[s]he is a credible witness," standing alone, were undeniably 
commentary on the credibility of her witness. But these comments were the brackets 
around an argument that detailed for the jury the factors that it could and should consider 
in determining the credibility of the witness. This argument included: 
 
"How do you assess the credibility of the witnesses?  The legal instructions tell 
you you have the right to determine a witness' credibility about the subject a witness 
10 
 
 
 
testifies about. You have a right to use your common knowledge and experience, so look 
at yourself. You are men and women. You are different ages. You have different 
occupations, moms, dads, whatever your occupations. 
"How do you assess the credibility of people that you deal with every single day?  
By eye contact, by the words that they use and what they are saying, by the context of the 
situation and how they are describing things. Use this law and you will find—talk about 
how credible [A.L.] is compared to him."  
 
Placed in context, the prosecutor's statements on credibility appear to be her attempt to 
summarize the conclusion to which an assessment of the evidence would lead the jury, 
rather than unqualified assertions that the jury should simply believe the prosecutor's own 
assessment of the witness. 
 
 
The prosecutor's statements in this case continue to be "inartful" but within the 
wide latitude allowed the State when discussing the evidence in closing argument. Even 
if the court were to conclude that some or all of the comments were outside the latitude 
allowed the prosecution, they do not require reversal under the second part of the 
prosecutorial misconduct analysis. The conduct was not gross and flagrant, nor did it 
demonstrate ill will on the part of the prosecutor. It must be noted, however, that the third 
factor of this analytical step, "whether the evidence was of such a direct and 
overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds 
of jurors," gives pause. Clearly, the jury in this case did not find the evidence to be 
overwhelming. The trial judge recognized and commented on that fact in imposing a 
departure sentence on Stone. Nonetheless, the prosecutor's comments in closing were not 
so egregious as to warrant a conclusion that a new trial is required.  
 
 
11 
 
 
 
STONE'S INTERVIEW STATEMENTS 
 
Detective Mar's interrogation of Stone was recorded (audio only) and a transcript 
of the recording was created. On October 5, 2007, the trial court conducted a Jackson v. 
Denno hearing to determine whether the recording and transcript would be admissible at 
trial. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). The 
trial judge listened to the testimony of Detective Mar, as well as to the entire recording, 
with the benefit of the transcript to follow as he listened. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
he found the statements Stone made to the detective during the interview were made with 
a full understanding of his rights and were voluntarily given. Ultimately, the jury heard a 
redacted version of the recording twice and was allowed to follow along on a redacted 
version of the transcript. Stone argues the recording and transcript should not have been 
admitted into evidence.  
 
A dual standard is used when reviewing the suppression of a defendant's 
statements. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a suppression issue, the appellate court 
reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision under a substantial competent evidence 
standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. The 
appellate court does not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or 
resolve conflicting evidence. State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 80, 201 P.3d 673 (2009); State 
v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 835-36, 190 P.3d 207 (2008).  
 
When a defendant claims his or her statement was not voluntary, the prosecution 
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it was voluntary. The 
essential inquiry is whether the statement was the product of an accused's free and 
independent will. The court looks at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
statement and determines its voluntariness by considering the following nonexclusive list 
of factors:  "'(1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the 
12 
 
 
 
interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside 
world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in 
conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency with the English language.'  
[Citation omitted.]"  Johnson, 286 Kan. at 836. We have recognized that law enforcement 
coercion can be mental or physical. State v. Jackson, 280 Kan. 16, 36, 118 P.3d 1238, 
cert. denied 546 U.S. 1184 (2006). 
 
K.S.A. 60-460(f) also governs the admissibility of confessions or statements by 
the accused: 
 
"In a criminal proceeding as against the accused, a previous statement by the accused 
relative to the offense charged [is admissible], but only if the judge finds that the accused 
(1) when making the statement was conscious and was capable of understanding what the 
accused said and did and (2) was not induced to make the statement (A) under 
compulsion or by infliction or threats of infliction of suffering upon the accused or 
another, or by prolonged interrogation under such circumstances as to render the 
statement involuntary or (B) by threats or promises concerning action to be taken by a 
public official with reference to the crime, likely to cause the accused to make such a 
statement falsely, and made by a person whom the accused reasonably believed to have 
the power or authority to execute the same." 
 
 
Stone argues that his lack of experience with law enforcement and the late hour of 
the interrogation, combined with promises and deceptive practices by Detective Mar, 
rendered his statements involuntary and not a product of his free and independent will.  
 
Following the hearing, the trial judge made extensive findings on the record on 
each of the six voluntariness factors set out above. He found there was no question 
regarding Stone's ability to understand English and no reason to suggest that Stone's age, 
23, or his intellect or background presented an obstacle to his understanding of the 
13 
 
 
 
interrogation proceedings. Stone has not argued that they did, nor have we uncovered any 
reason to suspect those factors affected his statements.  
 
Next the district judge reviewed the manner and duration of the interrogation. He 
observed that at times the questions were tough or aggressive but did not find the tone of 
the interrogation to be anything out of the ordinary. Nor did the length of the 
interrogation, a little over 2 hours, present a problem of undue duress. He also found that 
Stone made no requests to communicate with anyone outside of the interrogation and, 
consequently, that factor simply did not apply. Again, Stone has not argued these issues, 
and the tape recording of the interrogation supports the district court's findings.  
 
The district court next considered Stone's mental condition at the time of the 
interrogation. Stone argues that he was tired and confused due to the late hour of the 
event, but the district court found that Stone had no difficulty in understanding and 
responding to the detective's questions. The district court believed that Stone's claims of 
exhaustion or confusion only correlated with tough questions by the detective but, in fact, 
Stone repeatedly stated during the interview that he was tired. He mentioned having 
worked 100 hours at his fast food job over the preceding 2 weeks, having a sore throat, 
and having recently been to the hospital for an ankle injury. He told the detective early in 
the interview that he becomes confused when under pressure, and this claim was born out 
by the recording and transcript. His responses to the detective's questions were often 
disorganized and garbled. He cried several times during the interrogation and became 
audibly frustrated with the detective's repeated questioning.    
 
The district court then reviewed the tactics used by Detective Mar during the 
interrogation. Stone argues that Mar used deceptive tactics to confuse him and pressure 
him into making incriminating statements. Specifically, the district court reviewed three 
14 
 
 
 
tactics used by Mar: insisting that Stone tell her "the truth," telling Stone that he needed 
to appear cooperative to the prosecutor and the judge, and lying to Stone about the 
presence of his semen on the victim's pajama top.  
 
Repeatedly throughout the interrogation, Detective Mar exhorted Stone to tell the 
truth or told him she was "just trying to get the truth." In context, it is clear that Detective 
Mar was accusing Stone of lying when he repeatedly denied the accusations against him 
and that "the truth," from the detective's perspective, was the victim's version of the 
events. She combined this tactic with repeatedly telling Stone that she had confirmed the 
presence of semen on the victim's pajama top and she was just trying to figure out how 
Stone's semen got on the pajama top. While she did tell him that she had not yet matched 
DNA from the pajamas to his DNA, it is clear from her statements that she had little, if 
any, doubt that the two would match. In fact, she told Stone that she believed they would 
match. She combined these two tactics with statements inferring that only confessing to 
the crime would affect whether Stone went to jail or the length of his jail sentence.  
 
The trial judge reviewed each of the three alleged deceptive practices individually, 
citing case law to support his conclusion that each did not render Stone's statements 
involuntary. With respect to the allegation that Mar unduly pressured Stone by repeatedly 
insisting that he tell the truth, the court cited State v. Newfield, 229 Kan. 347, 623 P.2d 
1349 (1981), for authority that encouraging the defendant to tell the truth is not 
inappropriate. In Newfield, the issue was whether the defendant's statement should be 
suppressed because he had invoked his right to counsel but had then confessed before 
counsel was  appointed or present. The interrogating officer in that case told Newfield 
that the people of the town would think better of him if Newfield told the truth. Newfield 
recites the well-worn rule that a "mere exhortation or adjuration to speak the truth, or the 
mere suggestion to an accused that he confess, will not exclude a confession. [Citations 
15 
 
 
 
omitted.]"  229 Kan. at 359. But this rule was not essential to the decision in Newfield, 
and the facts of the case are not similar to those presented here. The issue in Newfield was 
more precisely whether the statement that the town would think better of the defendant if 
he confessed carried an implied promise. There was no indication in Newfield that the 
officers attempted to pressure Newfield into talking by repeatedly insisting that he 
explain away nonexistent evidence as happened in this case. In this case, Mar's repeated 
exhortations to Stone to tell the truth, combined with her insistence that Stone's semen 
was on the victim's pajamas and that she needed an explanation for that, created 
considerable pressure on Stone to come up with an explanation.  
 
Next the trial court considered whether Detective Mar had made any promises to 
Stone that would render his statements involuntary. The court focused on only one 
statement in which Detective Mar told Stone:  
 
"KM: [W]hy don't you think about what is—what is the judge and the [district attorney] 
gonna think about how—how you can step up and be honest and tell the truth. That you 
can be a man and step up and tell the truth. That speaks volumes. That's—that's 
[unintelligible] important that has an opinion of you. Step up and be a man and tell the 
truth." 
 
The judge cites State v. Altum, 262 Kan. 733, 941 P.2d 1348 (1997),  and State v. 
Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 853 P.2d 34 (1993),  as authority for his finding that this statement 
was not unduly coercive and did not render Stone's statements involuntary. Standing 
alone, the statement approximates the statements at issue in both Altum (detective told 
Altum if he stuck to his story, he was going to look foolish in court and the detective was 
not going to be able to tell the judge or the jury that he cooperated in the investigation) 
and Johnson (detective told Johnson he could not make any deals, he could only go to the 
prosecutor and indicate whether Johnson was cooperating). We would agree with the trial 
16 
 
 
 
court's findings if there were nothing more in the transcript to question, but that is not the 
case as we will demonstrate shortly.  
 
 
Finally, the trial court considered the repeated statements by Detective Mar that 
there was semen on the pajama top and her implications that the DNA sample taken from 
Stone would match the DNA that would be pulled from the clothing. The trial court notes 
that a "big part of the interview was the inference or assumption by both the interrogator 
and Mr. Stone that there was semen on the clothes of the victim and that the semen was 
available to be tested and analyzed. "  In fact the substance on the pajama top could not 
be confirmed to be semen, much less be matched to Stone.  
 
 
The trial judge reviewed State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, 977 P.2d 941 (1999),  
and found that it stands for the rule that deceptive interrogation techniques do not 
establish coercion but are one circumstance that must be viewed in conjunction with the 
others present to assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding Stone's statements 
and their effect on its voluntariness. Nonetheless, the district judge seems to conclude 
that since Detective Mar sincerely believed that there was semen on the clothing, this 
tactic could not be found to be unduly coercive.  
 
 
The trial judge considered each of these interrogation techniques individually, but 
there is no indication in the record that he considered the cumulative effect of these 
techniques when taken as a whole, and it is in this regard that we believe the trial court's 
review was lacking. A review of the recording and transcript establishes that the 
combined effect was significant.  
 
Shortly after the second part of the interview began, Detective Mar began asking 
Stone to explain how his semen could have ended up on A.L.'s pajama top.  
17 
 
 
 
 
"KM: Okay, so, would there be any reason why she would have any of your DNA on 
her? 
"JS:  
Uh huh (neg.). 
"KM:  Would there be any way that any of your semen would be on her or on her 
clothing? 
"JS: 
No.  
"KM: So, if I found semen on her clothing that she was wearing last night, no chance 
it's yours? 
"JS: 
No. 
"KM: Okay. Any idea how she'd get semen on her clothing? 
"J.S: 
But I wouldn't do it. I know huh—never mind, I'm to[o] tired to think. 
"KM: I mean, would you know of any[ ]way that she's [sic] have semen on her 
clothing? 
"JS:  
No. Cause I know I wouldn't do nothing like this.  
"KM: Okay. 
"JS:  
I don't know how many times I have to sit here and say this.  
"KM: Well, I'm—I'm just trying to figure out what happened. I mean it's not like— 
"JS: 
I'm getting wrongly accused that's what it's getting down to the point. 
"KM: Okay. 
"JS: 
I'm getting wrongly accused of it. I'm tired." 
 
As the interview continued, Mar continued to press for an explanation of how 
Stone's semen could be on A.L.'s pajama top. Stone continued to deny wrongdoing and 
even told the detective that it did not matter what he said, that she was apparently going 
to say he did it regardless of what he said. 
 
"JS: 
And I'm tired of it. I don't want to be accused of stuff anymore. 
"KM:  Okay. So why would she tell me this story? 
"JS: 
 Where is this leading to? 
18 
 
 
 
"KM: Well, I'm trying to figure out, okay, it's leading to I've got clothing that has 
semen on it. Okay. I had a lab out at the house and they [luminoled] have you ever seen 
that where they [luminol] a couch and then black light it?  And if there's semen there it 
shows up. And they found semen on the futon. Okay. I have a clothing that we 
[luminoled] and I have semen on that clothing. Okay. And I'm gonna match, I'm gonna 
run that semen with your DNA that I collected tonight through the lab. Now, what I'm 
asking you is am I gonna get a match? 
"JS: 
But see thing is I would not do nothing, I would not have nothing like that on the 
clothing. And I did not do nothing with her.  
"KM: Okay. So, you're saying that—that no way what happened what she's saying 
happened  happened last night? 
"JS: 
Not even half of it. 
"KM: Okay. So, am I gonna get a match? 
"JS: 
_____if you do ____ you do __ because you know— 
"KM: Okay. So, if I do—  
"JS: 
[I]f you guys are going to do something— 
"KM: —what I'm asking you, is explain to me Josh, how would your semen show up on 
her clothing? 
"JS: 
I did not do have her do nothing to me. 
"KM: Okay. So, how—how is it that—that—that she's got semen on her clothing?  I 
mean there's no doubt that's what it is. Okay. 
"JS: 
__________. 
"KM: Cause we've already confirmed that—that's what it is. Now, we're just gonna do 
the DNA pull the DNA from it _________. " 
 
Shortly after this point, Detective Mar told Stone that "we need to get you some 
help. We need to get you some counseling." Stone began asking her how confessing to 
the crime was going to help him. He claimed he was being wrongly accused. Stone can 
be heard crying on the tape and then told the detective that A.L. did get up in the night 
and came over to the futon where he was sleeping to give him a hug. He said her hand 
19 
 
 
 
rubbed up against him and he pushed it away but he continued to maintain that he did not 
have her do anything to him. The detective repeated the victim's story and continued to 
question why Stone's version did not match the victim's. She continued to press him to 
tell her what happened. Stone responded: 
 
"JS: 
How many times do I have to tell you on this recorder that I—that I got woke up 
and I was half asleep while I was sitting up and she bent over and gave me a hug. 
"KM: Okay. 
"JS: 
 How many times I got to tell you that story? 
"KM: But that's not answering my question. When I said— 
"JS: 
How's that not answering your question. 
"KM: I'm asking you are you saying that what she's telling us is just a big story? 
"JS: 
I would not have a little girl touch me. 
"KM: Okay. Is [A.L.] telling us a story? 
"JS: 
I don't know _____ I don't know. 
"KM: No, I don't believe she is. I think she's telling us the truth. Because she's very 
precise about it and—and you know, I asked you to tell the story the same and your story 
changes. Her story ________ and she's told ____________. 
"JS: 
Cause my nerves are shot through the roof, okay? 
. . . . 
"KM: You're telling me that a nine year old [girl's] two little tiny fingers slipped down 
your pants and grazed your penis and got a big gloop of semen. 
"JS: 
 Basically, what you're telling me is that I did do it. 
"KM:  I'm telling that that's exactly what happened. . . . And I, I'm pretty—I'm pretty 
sure that she's telling me is the truth. And I also know that when I match the DNA off the 
couch and off her shirt with the DNA from your mouth, it's all gonna match. All of it. 
Because she's telling me the truth. So now, I'm just asking you to tell me the truth. Help 
yourself. It's gonna help you because it's gonna show that you're not, you didn't prey on 
her." (Emphasis added.)  
 
20 
 
 
 
The interrogation continued in this manner, with the detective telling Stone to "just 
tell the truth" and Stone becoming increasingly frustrated and maintaining that he 
believed he would be in trouble whether he told the truth or not.  
 
"KM: So, she's lying?  You're telling me she's lying? 
"JS: 
How—how is to me every time I tell the truth that I know that I if that even if I 
do say the truth then my ass ain't gonna go to jail how would that help her. 
"KM: Because you messed her mind up. She ____ she trusted you. You're an adult. 
Okay. It's gonna be helpful for her if we can tell her, you know what?  He made a 
mistake. He_____. 
"JS: 
How is that going to cause me to go and get help too. 
"KM: How, is not gonna help you to know that you've told the truth and that you've, 
you know, that look at what happened. 
"JS: 
How is that gonna keep me out of jail? 
"KM: Huh?  Nothing is going to keep you at this moment out of jail unless we can 
figure out what's the truth. What is the truth. I've asked you. Is she lying?  And you can't 
answer that, because you know she's not lying. 
. . . . 
"JS: 
But how but what I want to know ma'am is why _____telling the truth _______ 
get help when it's gonna send me straight to where. 
"KM: So, Josh, what you been telling me tonight's been a lie? 
"JS: 
No, but —not all of it. 
"KM: Well, I believe the part where you're sitting up is the truth. 
"JS: 
But why, but why, but I wouldn't have little girl touching me on my—  
"KM:  I don't think, I don't think that you do that on normal basis. I think last night you 
made a bad choice. 
"JS: 
____but— 
"KM: Okay, You made a bad choice. So, you know what you step up and you take 
punishment for being, making a bad choice, just like you __________. 
"JS: 
How long I'm going to be in? (crying) 
21 
 
 
 
"KM: I don't know. Depends on how much you're willing to be honest about." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Shortly after this point in the interrogation, Mar told Stone to think about what the 
judge and the prosecutor would think. Although he continued to deny that he had A.L. do 
anything to him, he then told the detective that A.L. grabbed his penis and squeezed it.  
 
"KM:  Okay. So, she reached down and— 
"JS: 
Yes, ma'am. 
"KM: —took a hold of your penis? 
"JS: 
Yes, ma'am. 
"KM: Okay. And having somebody holding your penis and she was moving up and 
down cause she's made that motion hand motion with her hand, she was moving up and 
down on your penis wasn't she? 
"JS: 
Yes, she was. 
"KM: Okay. 
"JS: 
But I didn't have her do it." 
 
Stone told Detective Mar that the touching lasted approximately 3 minutes during which 
he told A.L. to stop. These turn out to be the most incriminating statements that Stone 
made. Shortly after he made them, the detective terminated the interview.  
 
As stated earlier, a dual standard of review applies to our review of the trial judge's 
decision. First, we examine whether substantial competent evidence supports his 
findings. In this case, substantial competence evidence does underlie most of his factual 
findings, although the trial judge ignored the more egregious statements made by the 
detective during the interrogation.  Second, we review de novo the ultimate legal 
conclusion made by the trial judge. It is on this point that we believe the trial court erred 
as a matter of law in failing to look at the circumstances of the interrogation in totality. 
22 
 
 
 
The detective's repeated insistence that the truth could only be the version told by the 
victim, combined with her unequivocal statements that there was semen on the victim's 
pajamas and her belief that the DNA in it would match Stone's, followed by statements to 
the effect that only confessing could keep him out of jail or affect the length of his jail 
term made the circumstances unduly coercive. Moreover, a close examination of the 
interrogation reveals that Stone did not volunteer facts but rather he adopted facts as they 
were suggested to him by the detective and as her insistence that he tell "the truth" 
became more adamant. For example, this exchange constituted the first point at which 
Stone went beyond denying that anything at all had happened: 
 
"JS: 
But see, I don't know why she would say this. I would never touch a little 
kid. 
"KM: Okay. 
"JS: 
I wouldn't. 
"KM: Do you sleep walk? I mean— 
"JS: 
No, I don't. I know that for a fact. 
"KM: Okay. I mean, would it be that she's just, I mean she—she misses her dad 
and you said that she got very attached to you. Uh—did she maybe, I 
don't know crawl into bed with you one night or last night was she, do you  
remember when she came out to get a drink did she come over and give 
you a hug or say anything. 
"JS: 
One time—one time, she did come over and give me a hug. 
"KM: Last night? 
"JS: 
Yes. That's—that's it. But no, nothing like that else like that happened. 
"KM: Okay. 
"JS: 
I wouldn't do that and I would not even touch that little girl, let alone a little 
kid." 
 
23 
 
 
 
Another tactic used by Detective Mar involved minimizing the seriousness of the 
accusations against Stone and indicating that a confession would corroborate that he was 
not a child sex predator: 
 
"JS: 
But I wouldn't do that. I wouldn't. 
"KM: I mean, it's not saying that you're a horrible person, it's saying that, you 
know, you've been under a lot of pressure and you've been very tired like 
you said, you know, it's—it's a release. That kind of sexual, you know, it's 
just masturbation. It's not sex. 
"JS: 
If I—if I had that kind of sex—sexual tension or whatever I wouldn't do that 
with a little a minor or nobody. I would go and I would get myself a 
girlfriend. 
. . . . 
"KM: There was no sex. I mean, she's not saying that you had sex with her but 
that you just had her, just basically just jack you off. And that's, you know, 
that's not a big deal. It's not, I mean it's not full blown sex. You know, it's 
just—just a little hand job that's all. 
"JS: 
But I wouldn't have a little kid do that. 
"KM: Okay. 
"JS: 
If I wanted to do it I'd do it in my damn my—myself. 
"KM: Okay. But you never answered my question. So, is she lying? 
"JS: 
Yes. 
. . . . 
"KM: I'm just wondering Josh, you know, it's— it's not like this is full blown sex,  
okay. This is a hand job, alright. 
"JS: 
Okay. But _that still don't matter 
"KM: I mean, if that's what it was, that's what it was. Tell us the truth. I mean, 
that's all we want to know. 
"JS: 
—But—-I'll go to jail tonight. And I don't want to, I'm trying to keep 
myself out of jail period. 
"KM: Okay. So— 
24 
 
 
 
"JS: 
___________. 
"KM: —tell the truth. Okay. [A.J.] is nine years old. And we need to get her 
some help. We need to get her some counseling. We need to get you 
some help. We need to get you some counseling. 
. . . . 
"KM: Yeah, I understand. You know, Josh, I believe you—you know you're 
telling me, you know, pieces of the truth. And I believe you want to tell me 
you know. 
"JS: 
But I didn't do it. 
"KM: Well, I'm not saying that your—that you—you forced her. I'm just saying that 
I mean she was—she came with you out to the living room willingly. I'm not 
saying you forced her. 
"JS: 
I didn't have her do nothing like that to me. And I wouldn't have no. 
. . . . 
"JS: 
Basically, what you're telling me is that I did do it. 
"KM: I'm telling that that's exactly what happened. I think that you did pick her 
up from her room, bring out into the couch, sat down on the couch, put her 
hand around it and showed her and had her jack you off. Not because 
you have a fetish or that you're preying or anything else, but it's somebody 
different. It's somebody else helping you get gratification that you needed 
because you're stressed out and over working and tired and everything 
else. And I, I'm pretty—I'm pretty sure that she's telling me is the truth. And 
I also know that when I match the DNA off the couch and off her shirt with 
the DNA from your mouth, it's all gonna match. All of it. Because she's 
telling me the truth. So, now, I'm just asking you to tell me the truth. Help 
yourself. It's gonna help you because it's gonna show that you're not, you 
didn't prey on her. You didn't force her. You didn't intentionally did this. It 
was one of those, okay, you had a, you're tired, you're not feeling good, 
you made a bad choice, a bad judgment. Okay. Or are you this guy that's 
been preying on this little girl that took her and forced her to jack you off, 
because you're just a—a pedophile that preys on little girls? So, help me 
25 
 
 
 
figure out what—what—what happened and what kind of a person are you. 
Were you sick and tired, and you know what, you made a bad choice 
because you needed some tension release. Or are you this person that 
preys on these little girls that—that drags her in and gets your gratification 
by little girls jacking you off?" 
 
These statements cumulatively and strongly suggested to Stone that only confessing to 
the "truth" as the detective saw it would save him from being painted as a "preying 
pedophile" and, in turn, affect his sentence. 
 
In State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, 106 P.3d 39 (2005), the defendant was accused 
of robbing a convenience store. Before entering, the robber had put his hand to the 
window and looked into the store. Swanigan was picked up several days after the robbery 
and interrogated. During the interrogation, the officers repeatedly told Swanigan that his 
fingerprints had been found on the window. After reviewing the tape recorded 
interrogation, this court found "no express threats were uttered, but . . . evidence of 
implied threats exist[ed] on the audiotape" and the implied threats were intertwined with 
the officers' urgings that Swanigan cooperate. 279 Kan. at 26. The officers told Swanigan 
that he needed to "'come clean'" in order to establish that he had not taken part in a 
number of other crimes: 
 
"'We just want to know your involvement in yours. That's all we want to know from you, 
so that you don't get charged with all of them. Cause I honestly don't think you're 
involved in all of them.'"  279 Kan. at 26. 
 
This court found that the lies regarding the fingerprints were one circumstance that must 
be considered along with others in the case including the police interrogation tactics, and 
that the implication of negative consequences if Swanigan did not "cooperate" was 
26 
 
 
 
inconsistent with his rights articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966), and another circumstance to be 
factored into the totality.  
 
Although any one of these factors which Swanigan asserts—his low intellect and 
susceptibility to being overcome by anxiety, the officers' repeated use of false 
information, and their threats and promises—may not be sufficient to show coercion, the 
combination of all of them in this case leads us to conclude as a matter of law that 
Swanigan's October 31 statement was not the result of his free will, but was involuntary. 
Swanigan,  279 Kan. at 39. 
 
This case has much in common with Swanigan. While any one of the 
circumstances surrounding this interrogation, standing alone—Stone's condition, 
Detective Mar's misleading statements about the semen on the pajama top, her statements 
that the length of his sentence could only be affected by his telling the "truth," the 
implications he would be viewed as a sexual predator unless he confessed—might not 
have led us to conclude Stone's statements were coerced, a review of the audio recording 
taking into account all of these circumstances, as the law requires, leads us to conclude as 
a matter of law that Stone's statements were not the product of his free and independent 
will and that it was error to admit them at trial.  
 
During deliberations, the jury asked to hear nearly the entirety of the evidence 
again, focusing specifically on the portions of Stone's interrogation where he starts to say 
that, while not at his behest, something did happen between himself and A.L. After 
hearing that testimony again, the jury informed the court that it was deadlocked and could 
not reach a verdict. Only after being sent back to the jury room did it return a verdict and 
then only on one of the least serious of the four crimes with which Stone was charged—
the aggravated indecent liberties charge that alleged he submitted to her touching. Under 
27 
 
 
 
these facts, it is impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of 
the statements Stone made during the interrogation were not key to the jury's verdict; 
therefore, we must reverse that verdict and remand the case for a new trial at which the 
statements made by Stone to Detective Mar are not admissible. See Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); Swanigan, 
279 Kan. at 45-46. 
 
The conviction is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for a new 
trial at which Stone's statements to the detective are not admissible.