Title: CHARLES RAY BOLEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . CHARLES RAY BOLEY ,;VUyr:eMr (~Ourf of ~ir 2008-SC-000185-MR RENDERED : MARCH 1.9, 2009 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE NO . 06-CR-00364 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appellant, Charles Ray Boley, was convicted of murder, pursuant to a guilty plea. In accordance with the plea agreement, he received a sentence of twenty-five years . Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and erred in failing to hold a second competency hearing. Seeing no error, we affirm . It is undisputed that Appellant, then age 22, killed his father, Ray Boley, on May 26, 2006, by stabbing him multiple times . Appellant was living in Ray's home at the time . Ray Boley allegedly became angry because he believed Appellant had a male friend in his (Appellant's) bedroom whom Ray believed was gay. Appellant claimed Ray was cursing and screaming. Appellant opened the door, and a fist fight ensued between Appellant and Ray. Appellant claimed Ray threw the first punch . Appellant also claimed that at some point in the fight, Ray grabbed a knife, but that he kicked the knife out of Ray's hand, and the two continued fighting . At some point Appellant smashed a glass tabletop over Ray's head, got a knife, and stabbed Ray to death. Appellant admitted that he cut the victim's abdomen open and threw his intestines across the room . Appellant also bit the victim's ear off. Appellant was subsequently charged with capital murder . Three months before the killing, Appellant had been temporarily committed to Western State Hospital for "extreme depression, despondency, [and] severe social anxiety" .' Appellant was discharged on February 20, 2006 . The discharge report noted that Appellant had a history of self-mutilation (cutting), suicide attempts, drug and alcohol abuse, and a family history of mental illness. The report noted that Appellant had been previously diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and that he had previously used a number of psychiatric medications . Appellant was diagnosed with "Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct" and "Polysubstance Dependence" . Appellant was prescribed Celexa. The report notes Appellant's "Condition on Discharge" as "stable, no active danger to self or others, and doing well." Per the discharge report . The report indicates this commitment was precipitated by Appellant's break up with his girlfriend, who then began dating Appellant's best friend . The evening prior to the commitment, this friend allegedly came to Appellant's trailer, punched him in the face, and knocked him unconscious. Appellant called the police, who he claims laughed at him and told him not to harass the girl . Appellant then burned his (Appellant's) trailer . Appellant, through counsel, moved for a pre-trial competency evaluation, which was granted by the trial court . Appellant was admitted to the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) on February 21, 2007, where he was evaluated by psychologist Dr. Steven Simon . Dr. Simon prepared a comprehensive written report of the evaluation, which, as to Appellant's competency to stand trial, summarized : [Appellant] [is] an adult male with a functional repertoire of literacy skills who was functioning within the "Average" range of intelligence . He presents with no signs of organic brain dysfunction nor any signs or symptoms of psychotic dysfunction . He was found to be motivated to defend himself. He appears to have a good understanding regarding the respective roles of the basic courtroom participants as well as having good understanding regarding many basic criminal justice system terms and concepts. His memory skills are quite good and he is able to express himself in a reasonably well articulated, pertinent and self-serving (in the legal sense) manner . . . . [I]t is this evaluator's opinion that . . . he is able to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of the legal proceedings he is involved with and that he is able to assist rationally in his own defense. Also relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, Dr. Simon opined in his report that Appellant had a viable extreme emotional disturbance defense, based on Appellant's description of the events combined with reported years of prior physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by his father, Ray Boley.2 Dr . Simon testified at Appellant's competency hearing on May 16, 2007 . Following the hearing, the trial court found Appellant competent to stand trial . Dr . Simon had been ordered by the trial court to evaluate Appellant for both competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility . On November 15, 2007, Appellant pled guilty to murder in exchange for the Commonwealth's recommendation of a twenty-five year sentence and waiver of the domestic violence exemption of the violent offender statute, KRS 439.3401(5) .3 Two weeks later, on November 29, 2007, Appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty - plea. As grounds, Appellant stated that he only entered the plea because he "was scared to go to trial, wanted everything to be over with and was tired of waiting." The trial court held a hearingon the motion on Februrary 8, 2008 . Appellant testified that at the time he took the guilty plea, he was nervous because the trial was coming up, he felt scared, and "I just wanted to take the deal just to get it over with, you know, I mean that was a guarantee that I'd be able get out sometime in my life, and I just, I took it out of fear really." Asked by the trial court what he feared, Appellant stated that he feared that he would get more time than the plea itself. The court asked why he did not fear that now, to which Appellant responded that at the time he was not confident about his case, but having had more time to think about it, he felt like he had a good case. After finding the plea was voluntary, the trial court denied the motion . Appellant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to twenty-five years imprisonment . This appeal followed . Appellant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. RCr 8.10 provides that "[alt any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty . . . to be 3 Which exempts from the eighty-five percent parole eligibility rule of the violent offender statute, KRS 439.3401, a defendant who has been determined by the court to have been a victim of domestic violence . withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted ." The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is as follows: Once a criminal defendant has pleaded guilty, he may move the trial court to withdraw the guilty plea, pursuant to RCr 8.10. If the plea was involuntary, the motion to withdraw it must be granted . However, if it was voluntary, the trial court may, within its discretion, either grant or deny the motion . . . . The trial court's determination on whether the plea was voluntarily entered is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard . A decision which is supported by substantial evidence is not clearly erroneous. If, however, the trial court determines that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or deny the motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion . This decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles . Rigdon v. Commonwealth , 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky.App. 2004)(citations omitted) . Appellant contends that he should be allowed to withdraw the plea because his motion was made before final judgment, made only two weeks after entry of the plea, and was made out of fear because he did not appreciate that had a good case . He further contends that there is an issue as to whether the plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, considering his lack of education, history of anxiety and mental illness, and the "less-than-textbook" Boykin hearing conducted by the trial court.4 Appellant also contends that it is not clear from the record whether he understood, that as a victim of domestic The plea hearing in this case was brief : However, it is well settled that "the validity of a guilty plea is determined not by reference to some magic incantation recited at the time it is taken but from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it." Kotas v. Commonwealth , 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978) . violence by his father, that he qualified for the domestic violence exemption which would make him eligible for parole after serving 20%, rather than 85%, of his sentence . A guilty plea is valid if it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice to waive the several trial-related constitutional rights and the record affirmatively establishes this knowing waiver . Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S . 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) . As to Appellant's contention that his lack of education and mental illness may have rendered the plea involuntary, Dr. Simon found him of average intelligence with functional literacy skills, and that his particular mental problems did not affect his competency to stand trial. At the plea hearing, Appellant appeared to understand all of the questions posed to him, and responded appropriately. The trial court confirmed several times with Appellant that he understood that if he pled guilty he would have to serve at least eighty-five percent of his sentence. Counsel also informed the trial court that he had discussed this with Appellant. Appellant affirmed that, in exchange for the guilty plea, he agreed he was not a victim of domestic violence . Appellant affirmed that he had talked things over with counsel as much as he needed to, and that there was nothing he had asked counsel to do that counsel had not tried to get done for him. Appellant acknowledged that he had mental problems, was on medication, and believed the medication was helping him. Asked by the court if his mental problem had anything to do with the killing, Appellant stated, "I feel part of it did", after which defense counsel explained to the court that he had discussed Dr. Simon's report with Appellant, and that it may have had a little to do with the plea agreement . Appellant 6 agreed that no one had talked him into entering the plea, and that there was nothing else affecting his ability to make a good decision . The trial court then asked defense counsel whether he had any reason to believe the plea was not willingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given, to which counsel replied no. "The trial court is in the best position to determine if there was any reluctance, misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to plead guilty." Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. 1990) . Having reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court's finding of voluntariness is supported by substantial evidence. Having determined that the plea was voluntary, our inquiry then becomes whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw the plea . In denying the motion, the trial court noted the fact that Appellant did not deny the killing, and concluded Appellant's proffered reasons were inappropriate grounds for withdrawing the plea . The trial court's decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles . Ri don, 144 S.W.2d at 288; Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 570 (Ky. 2006) . Appellant had been charged with capital murder, and did not deny this (particularly gruesome) killing. While Appellant may have had a viable extreme emotional disturbance defense, under these circumstances, the plea represented a reasonable choice . No abuse of discretion occurred. Appellant additionally raises as error the trial court's failure to hold a second competency hearing, based on concerns expressed by counsel at the February 8, 2008, hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea . Prior to 7 Appellant's testimony, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. Counsel then informed the trial court of the following: It's kind of weird . . . Since I filed this motion, he's went back and forth and really said some things to me that kind of, I don't know if he really understands the process or not. I don't know that it rises to the level . that he needs to be reevaluated or not . But it is like he talks to me in terms of like, he still needs another trial, or he thinks he's still going to trial, one way or the other. But, in any event, I would suggest to the court that maybe, maybe move this hearing into your chambers or maybe you talk to him in chambers yourself if you think that will be helpful because he's been diagnosed with a series of mental disabilities that I think possibly maybe have to do with, with some of this, like being in court, . . . talking in public causing problems, things like that, I don't know . What I am saying is basically, put him under oath in here, I don't know if he's going to say what all he wants to say. That's up to you judge, I'm just putting all that on the record, that's just my opinion . The Commonwealth indicated it would object to moving to chambers . Referring to the previous finding of competency in May, 2007, the trial court then asked counsel if he thought Appellant had become less competent since then, to which counsel stated that he did not know and that he had not filed any motions, but that "this isn't normal" and "this is my (counsel's) first rodeo with this whole experience ." The court then proceeded with the hearing (in the courtroom) . Appellant contends that, pursuant to RCr 8.06 and KRS 504 . 100, the concerns expressed by defense counsel at the February 8, 2008, hearing required the trial court to hold a second competency hearing, or to at least have Appellant reevaluated before imposing sentence. Per RCr 8.06, if "during the proceedings there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant [is 8 not competent] all proceedings shall be postponed until the issue of incapacity is determined as provided by KRS 504 .100 ." "Reasonable grounds must be called to the attention of the trial court or must be so obvious that the trial judge cannot fail to be aware of them." Lear v . Commonwealth , 884 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. 1994) . Our standard of review as to a trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing is whether a reasonable judge in the same situation as the trial court should have experienced doubt regarding the defendant's competency to stand trial. Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W .2d 473, 486 (Ky. 1999) . Appellant had previously been found competent . While counsel expressed concerns, seemingly out of caution, Appellant's performance during the hearing did not indicate any change in Appellant's competency . Again, he appeared to understand all the questions posed to him . His behavior and responses were rational and appropriate . He articulated clearly his reasons for wanting to withdraw the plea. On cross-examination, Appellant confirmed that he understood all the trial rights he had given up when he entered the plea . He did not appear confused about his situation . We see no error. Id . For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed . All sitting. All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Thomas More Ransdell 100 Fair Oaks Lane Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Kenneth Wayne Riggs Assistant Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601