Title: Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. v. Cash

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

136 Nev, Advance Opinion BB
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

REPUBLIC SILVER STATE DISPOSAL, No. 78572
INC., A NEVADA CORPORATION,

Appellant,

vs.
ANDREW M. CASH, M.D.; ANDREW M.

CASH, M.D., P.C., A/K/A ANDREW FILED
MILLER CASH, M.D., P.C.; AND DEC 31 2020

DESERT INSTITUTE OF SPINE CARE,

LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANY, ".
Respondents.

 

Appeal from a district court summary judgment, certified as

final under NRCP 54(b), on a complaint for contribution arising from a tort

action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerry A. Wiese, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.

 

Barron & Pruitt, LLP, and David Barron and John D. Barron, North Las
‘Vegas; Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Joel
D. Henriod, and Abraham G. Smith, Las Vegas,

for Appellant.

McBride Hall and Robert C. McBride and Heather S. Hall, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

BEFORE PICKERING, C.J., GIBBONS and STIGLICH, JJ.

 

 

 

ine
OPINION
By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
When a tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff, may the tortfeasor
then assert a claim for contribution against a doctor who allegedly caused
new injuries in treating the original injury? We hold that the right of

  

contribution exists when two parties are jointly or severally liable for the
same injury. Whether the parties are joint or successive tortfeasors is not

  

material, so long as both parties are liable for the injury for which
contribution is sought. Because appellant Republic Silver State Disposal
and respondent Dr. Andrew Cash were jointly or severally liable for the
injuries Cash allegedly caused and Republic settled those claims, Republic
may pursue an action for contribution against Cash. That Cash was not a
defendant in the original suit that Republic settled does not impair
Republic's right to seek contribution. Accordingly, the district court erred
when it granted summary judgment on the ground that contribution is not
available when the parties are successive tortfeasors, and we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

‘Marie Gonzales was injured in an accident involving a truck

 

driven by Republic's employee. Dr. Cash treated her original injury and
allegedly caused further injuries. Although Gonzales sued Republic and its
employee, she did not sue Cash or any other medical providers, and
Republic did not file a third-party complaint. Gonzales and Republic settled
Gonzales’s claims for $2 million. The settlement agreement expressly

discharged Gonzales's claims against her medical providers and reserved
Republic's rights under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(UCATA), 12 U.L.A. 201 (2008), see NRS 17.225-.305.

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  

Within one year of settling the claims, Republic sued Cash, his
company, and Desert Institute of Spine Care, LLC, for contribution.!
Republic alleged that Cash committed malpractice and caused Gonzales
new and different injuries from those sustained in the accident. Republic
argued that it was entitled to seek contribution from Cash because the
settlement discharged Gonzales's claims against him and imposed
liabilities on Republic in excess of its equitable share. Cash argued that,
pursuant to Republic's allegation of new and different injuries, he was a
successive tortfeasor rather than a joint tortfeasor and that no right of
contribution exists among successive tortfeasors.

‘The district court concluded that contribution was not available
between successive tortfeasors and granted summary judgment to Cash.
‘The district court also held that the settlement agreement extinguished the
defendants’ liability. Republic appeals.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724,729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
Summary judgment under NRCP 56(c) was appropriate if the pleadings and
other evidence on file, viewed in a light most favorable to Republic,
demonstrated that Cash was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
that no genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute. Id, We review
‘questions of law de novo. Saylor v. Arcotta, 126 Nev. 92, 95, 225 P.3d 1276,
1278 (2010).

'Republic raised other claims, which the district court dismissed, and
sued other medical providers, who are no longer parties to this appeal.

  

 
“Contribution is a creature of statute” under Nevada law.
Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 650, 98 P.3d 681, 686 (2004). Nevada
has adopted the UCATA. Russ v. Gen. Motors Corp., 111 Nev. 1431, 1436,
906 P.2d 718, 721 (1995). Under the UCATA, “where two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injuryl,] ... there is a
right of contribution among them.” NRS 17.225(1). Contribution permits
“a tortfeasor who has paid more than his or her equitable share of the
‘common liability” to recover the excess from a second tortfeasor, up to the
amount of the second tortfeasor’s “equitable share of the entire liability.”
NRS 17.225(2). A tortfeasor who settles with a claimant may recover
contribution from another tortfeasor only if the settlement extinguishes the
second tortfeasor’s liability. NRS 17.225(3). Finally, a settling “tortfeasor’s
right of contribution is barred unless the tortfeasor has . .. falgreed while
action is pending against him or her to discharge the common liability and
has within 1 year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced an
action for contribution.” NRS 17.285(4Xb).

A right of contribution is present where there is an injury for
which two persons are jointly or severally liable, regardless of whether the
tortious conduct may be characterized as successive. This court has
repeatedly permitted contribution claims by original tortfeasors against
doctors who subsequently negligently treat the original injury. See, eg.,
Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 269, 277 P.3d 1246, 1249 (2012); Saylor,
126 Nev. at 96, 225 P.3d at 1279. Other states have likewise upheld a right

 

of contribution among suecessive tortfeasors under similar circumstances,
See Lutz v. Boltz, 100 A.2d 647, 648 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953) (“IIIt is joint or
several liability, rather than joint or concurring negligence, which
determines the right of contribution."); Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp.,

  

4
ee eee an a Le

 

 

 
902 P.2d 1025, 1030 (N.M. 1995) (“Negligent treatment is thus a successive
tort for which the original tortfeasor is jointly liable... Although an
original tortfeasor may be held liable for plaintiff's entire harm, a medical
care provider who negligently aggravates the plaintiffs initial injuries is
not jointly and severally liable for the entire harm, but is liable only for the
additional harm caused by the negligent treatment.” (citation omitted));
Shadden v. Valley View Hosp., 915 P.2d 364, 368 (Okla. 1996) (“(TIhe
physician and original wrongdoer caused a ‘single’ injury, and were,
therefore, jointly liable to the victim. ‘This is so even though the physician
can be said to be a successive tortfeasor, rather than a joint or concurrent
one.” (citation omitted)). While a right of contribution would not be present
if'a successive tortfeasor produced a completely independent injury, such is
not the case here. Cf: Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Schoendorf & Sorgi,
549 N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (Wis. 1996) (distinguishing successive tortfeasors
who were each solely liable for distinct injuries from “more common tort
situations, such as a physical injury caused by one party which is then
aggravated by a second party (malpractice by a treating doctor, for
example)”).

Republic argues that Cash was subject to a claim for
contribution as a joint tortfeasor. We agree. “lt is well-settled law that
the original tortfeasor is liable for the malpractice of the attending
physicians.” Hansen v. Collett, 79 Nev. 159, 165, 380 P.2d 301, 304 (1963);
see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
‘Subsequent medical providers, however, are not relieved of liability thereby
for their own actions. Instead, both the original tortfeasor and the

physicians are liable for injuries caused by malpractice and are “joint
tortfeasors in this regard.” See Pack, 128 Nev. at 269, 277 P.3d at 1249,

 

 
This court has permitted suits to go forward where an allegedly negligent
driver, who faced liability both for the original accident and any subsequent
medical malpractice, impleaded the doctor who caused the subsequent
injuries on a theory of contribution. Id.; Saylor, 126 Nev. at 96, 225 P.3d at
1279. Here, Republic, as the original tortfeasor, was liable for Cash’s
malpractice in treating Gonzales's original injury. Cash was liable to
Republic to the extent of the common liability in excess of Republic's
equitable share of the liability. See NRS 17.225(1), (2). Accordingly, the
district court erred in concluding that Cash was not subject to a right of
contribution because he and Republic were successive tortfeasors.?

The disposition of Gonzales’s claims by settlement between
Republic and Gonzales does not impair the right of contribution in a
subsequent suit by Republic against Cash. The UCATA expressly
recognizes that a right of contribution can arise from a settlement between
the injured plaintiff and one tortfeasor, so long as the settlement
extinguishes the other tortfeasor’s liability for the original tort. Doctors Co.,
120 Nev. at 652, 98 P.3d at 687; see NRS 17.225(3). The settlement
agreement here plainly stated that it discharged any claims Gonzales may

2Cash's argument that joint liability cannot arise out of injuries that,
occur at different places and times is similarly mistaken. Cash misplaces
his reliance on Discount Tire Co. of Nevada, Inc. v. Fisher Sand & Gravel
Co., Docket No. 69103 (Order of Affirmance, Apr. 14, 2017). Discount Tire

 

was an unpublished order that noted that its parties were joint and not
successive tortfeasors in the context of an equitable indemnity claim. Cf.
NRAP 36(cX2) (providing that unpublished dispositions are not controlling
in unrelated cases). Equitable indemnity is not at issue here, see Pack, 128
Nev. at 268, 277 P.3d at 1249, and Discount Tire did not hold that
contribution may not lie between successive tortfeasors.

 

 
have against a medical provider in this instance and thus extinguished
Cash's liability to Gonzales. See NRS 17.225(3). Finally, Republic
‘commenced its action for contribution within one year of the settlement. See
NRS 17.285(4Xb). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Republic, Republic was entitled to seek contribution, and the district court
therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Cash on Republic's

 

contribution claim.3
CONCLUSION

The district court granted summary judgment on the grounds
that Cash and Republic were successive and not joint tortfeasors and that
‘a contribution claim may not lie between successive tortfeasors. This was
error. The right of contribution exists when two or more parties are jointly
or severally liable for the same injury and one pays more than its equitable
share. Whether the tortfeasors are “joint” or “successive” is not material.

%Cash argues that the district court's order may stand because
Gonzales equitably subrogated her claims to Republic, such that Republic
would be limited by NRS 41A.035 (limiting the amount of noneconomic
damages that may be awarded for professional negligence) and NRS 42.021
(governing collateral benefit evidence in professional negligence actions).
Even assuming that Gonzales subrogated her claims, Cash does not
cogently argue that summary judgment is warranted on this basis. See
Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280,
1288 n.38 (2006). And even if NRS 41A.035 or NRS 42.021 apply, neither
supports upholding the order granting summary judgment against
Republic. Further, Cash’s claims that any damages ought to be limited by
NRS 414.035 and that he ought to be permitted to proffer collateral benefit
evidence pursuant to NRS 42,021 are not ripe, since at this stage in the
proceedings, no damages have been awarded and no evidence has been
excluded. See Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 877, 887, 141 P.3d
1224, 1231 (2006) (explaining that a claim is not ripe when the alleged harm
is speculative or hypothetical).

 

 
Republic may seek contribution from Cash. Accordingly, we reverse and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ijn D J.

Stiglich

We concur: