Title: Pack v. LaTourette

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

428 Nev., Advance Opinion 25

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

   
 
 
 
 
  
 

‘THOMAS PACK, INDIVIDUALLY; AND No. 54537
SUN CAB, INC., D/B/A NELLIS CAB
COMPANY, A NEVADA
CORPORATION. FILED
Appellants,

vs, HAY 3.12012

GARY LATOURETTE, M.D.,
INDIVIDUALLY,
Respondent.

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a third-party
complaint, certified as final under NRCP 54(b), in a tort action. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elissa F. Cadish, Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Rogers, Mastrangelo, Carvalho & Mitchell and Charles A. Michalek and
Daniel E. Carvalho, Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L, Eisenberg, Reno,
for Respondent.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, GIBBONS and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.

In this appeal, after summarily concluding that the district
court erroneously dismissed with prejudice a third-party complaint for

12-11060

 
=

equitable indemnity and contribution on statute of limitations grounds, we
address three alternative arguments raised in the motion to dismiss. To
begin, we discuss whether the claim for equitable indemnity fails as a
matter of law based on the lack of any preexisting relationship between
the third parties and the third-party plaintiffs’ active negligence, Next,
we address whether dismissal of a contribution claim is proper if the party
seeking contribution has not yet paid toward a judgment. Finally, we
consider whether NRS 41A.071's expert affidavit requirement applies to
claims for contribution that

 

re based in medical malpractice.

As for the first argument, because there was no preexisting
relationship between the parties in this case, and because the claims
against the third-party plaintiffs were based on their active negligence,
the equitable indemnity claim lacked merit and was properly dismissed,
Second, we conclude that a party need not pay toward a judgment before

bringing a cl

 

im for contribution. As such, the third-party contribution
claim was not properly dismissed on that ground, Finally, we conclude
that when a claim for contribution is contingent upon a successful showing,
of medical malpractice, a claimant must satisfy the expert affidavit
requirement of NRS 41A.071. Thus, the third-party plaintiffs’ failure to
attach an expert affidavit warranted dismissal of their complaint, but such
dismissal should have been without prejudice.

We therefore affirm the district court's order granting
respondents’ motion to dismiss, except to the extent that the third-party
complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2006, David Zinni, who is not a party to this appeal,
was injured in an automobile accident when his car was struck by a
taxicab driven by appellant Thomas Pack, who was employed by appellant

 

 
a

Sun Cab, Ine, dib.a. Nellis Cab Company (collectively, Sun Cab). Zinni
sought medical treatment for his injures from respondent Dr. Gary
LaTourette and subsequently filed a personal-injury action against Sun
Cab,

In Zinni’s lawsuit against Sun Cab, he did not name
LaTourette as a defendant, nor did he include any allegations of medical
malpractice, During discovery, however, Sun Cab learned that LaTourette
may have aggravated Zinni’s injuries by negligently treating him after the
accident, Consequently, Sun Cab sought to implead LaTourette and filed
a third-party complaint, asserting claims for equitable indemnity and
contribution based on LaTourette’s alleged medical malpractice.

LaTourette moved to dismiss the third-party complaint,
arguing that it was time-barred by NRS 41A.097, Nevada's statute of
limitations for medical malpractice claims, LaTourette also argued that
Sun Cab’s underlying claims of equitable indemnity and contribution
should be dismissed because, for various reasons, they failed as a matter
of law. As an alternative ground for dismissal, LaTourette argued that
Sun Cab had failed to attach an expert affidavit in support of its claim:

 

is required by NRS 41.071 for medical malpractice complaints.

‘The district court ultimately concluded that Sun Cab's claims
were time-barred by NRS 41A.097's medical malpractice statute of
limitations. Consequently, the district court dismissed Sun Cab's
complaint with prejudice and declined to address LaTouretto's remaining
arguments regarding the merits of Sun Cab’s underlying claims and its
failure to attach an expert affidavit. The dismissal order was cortified as
final under NRCP 54(b), and this appeal followed.

 

 
H

nos

DISCUSSION

After this appeal was filed but before briefing began, this court

issued an opinion in Saylor v. Arcotta, 126 Nev. __, 225 P.3d 1276 (2010).

In Saylor, we clarified that “NRS 41A.097(2)'s limitations period does not
apply to equitable indemnity and contribution claims,” and that such
claims are instead subject to the limitations periods laid out in NRS
11.190(2)(¢) and NRS 17.286, respectively. Id. at __, 225 P.3d at 1278-79.
Recognizing this distinction, Sun Cab contends on appeal that

the district court's order to dismiss should be reversed, as Sun Cab's
claims undisputedly were timely under NRS 11.190(2)(c) and NRS 17.285.

LaTourette concedes that Saylor rendered the district cour

NRS 414.097 improper, but he contends that the district court's dismi

 

reliance on

 

al

 

order can be affirmed based upon the alternative arguments he presented
in district court. Namely, LaTourette argues that (1) the claim for
equitable indemnity failed as a matter of law based on the lack of any
preexisting relationship betwoon the third parties and Sun Cab’s active
negligence; (2) the claim for contribution was premature, as there had
been no payment toward a judgment; and (3) Sun Cab’s failure to attach
an expert affidavit warranted dismissal of its complaint.
Standard of review

“{T)his court will affirm the order of the district court if it
reached the correct result, albeit for different reasons.” Rosenstein v.
Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 575, 747 P.2d 230, 233 (1987). Whether we can
affirm the dismissal of Sun Cab’s equitable indemnity and contribution
claims based on their lack of legal merit is, in essence, an inquiry into
whether Sun Cab has pleaded claims for which relief can be granted. See
NRCP 12(0)(5). In considering an appeal from an order granting a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this court applies a rigorous, de novo

 

 
 

standard of review. Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp,, 122 Nev. 621, 634-35,
137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006). In our review, we accept the plaintiff's factual
allegations as true and then determine whether these allegations are
legally sufficient to satisfy the elements of the claim asserted. Id,

Thus, we first consider the legal merits of Sun Cab's
underlying claims for equitable indemnity and contribution, Next, we
consider to what extent Sun Cab’s failure to file an expert affidavit with
its complaint warranted dismissal.

‘Sun Cab failed to state a claim for equitable indemnity

Sun Cab’s third-party claim for equitable indemnity was
essentially a demand that LaTourette reimburse Sun Cab for the damage
it allegedly caused to Zinni in the car accident. This claim fails as a
matter of law,

Equitable indemnity, which “allows a defendant to seck

 

recovery from other potential tortfeasors,” is generally available to remedy
the situation in which the defendant, “who has committed no independent
wrong, is held liable for the loss of a plaintiff caused by another party.”
Rodriguez v. Primadonna Company, 125 Nev. 578, 589, 216 P.3d 793, 801
(2009). Thus, Nevada's equitable indemnity law has long drawn a

distinction between secondary and primary liability. “{I]n order for one

another

 

tortfeasor to be in a position of secondary responsibility vis
tortfeasor, and thus be entitled to indemnification, there must be a
preexisting legal relation between them, or some duty on the part of the
primary tortfeasor to protect the secondary tortfeasor.” Doctors Company
xv. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 654, 98 P.3d 681, 688 (2004) (quoting Black &
Decker v, Essex Group, 105 Nev. 344, 346, 775 P.2d 698, 699-700 (1989).
Additionally, where a party has committed an “independent wrong,” and is,
thus actively negligent, that party has no right to indemnity from other

 
tortfeasors. See Rodriguez, 125 Nev. at 589, 216 P.3d at 801; see also
Doctors Company, 120 Nev. at 658, 98 P.3d at 690.

Here, LaTourette had no preexisting legal relationship with or
other duty to protect Sun Cab’s interests, and Sun Cab’s liability in the
underlying litigation is admittedly based upon claims of its own active
negligence in causing the car accident. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of Sun Cabs equitable indemnity claim, as there was no
preexisting relationship between the parties and because Sun Cab was
allegedly actively negligent in causing the underlying injuries. See
Rodriguez, 125 Nev. at 590, 216 P.3d at 802; Doctors Company, 120 Nev.
at 658, 98 P.3d at 690.

Sun Cab stated a claim for contribution
Sun Cab’s third-party contribution claim alleged that

LaTourette exacerbated Zin

 

's injuries by nogligently mistreating him
after the car accident. ‘Thus, by alleging that Sun Cab and LaTourette
were joint tortfeasors in this regard, Sun Cab sufficiently pleaded a claim
for contribution against LaTourette,

A right to contribution exists “where two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to [a]
person... even though judgment has not been recovered against all or
any of them.” NRS 17.225(1). LaTourette, however, relies upon NRS
17.225(2), which states that a right to contribution “exists only in favor of
a tortfeasor who has paid more than his or her equitable share of the
common liability.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, LaTourette
contends that because Sun Cab had not yet “paid” Zinni more than its fair

share of liability, the contribution claim was premature and should have

been dismissed. We find this reasoning to be unpersuasive, as it squarely

 

 
contradicts Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure and several prior decisions
of this court,

‘To begin, NRCP 14(a) provides that a third-party plaintiff may
implead a third-party defendant based on an inchoate claim for
contribution! Specifically, NRCP 14(a) allows a third-party plaintiff to
implead a third-party defendant “who is or may be liable to the third-party
plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim” at “any time after [the]
commencement of the action.” Under the federal analogue to NRCP 14(a),
the phrase “may be liable” is meant to specifically provide for the
possibility of joining a third-party defendant “against whom a cause of
action has not yet accrued.” 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R, Miller &
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1451 (2010),

Moreover, we have repeatedly recognized that a third-party

 

plaintiff has the right to seek contribution in an original action prior to
entry of judgment. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 125 Nev. at 583, 216 P.3d at 797
(defendants asserted prejudgment claims for contribution or indemnity in
the original action); ANSE, Inc, v, Dist, Ct,, 124 Nev. 862, 868-69, 192
P.3d 738, 742-43 (2008) (noting that a third-party plaintiff could seck
contribution from a third-party defendant in the original action prior to
entry of judgment); We have also interpreted NRS 17.285 as setting forth
two methods for enforcing a claim of contribution: either by a separate
action following entry of judgment or “in the same action in which [tho]
judgment is entered against two or more tortfeasors.” Bell & Gossett Co,

*To the extent that our recent decision in Lund v. Dist, Ct., 127 Nev.
—. —. 255 P.8d 280, 283 (2011), may be misconstrued, we take this
opportunity to clarify that NRCP 14(a) is available for claims of
contribution as well as indemnity.

 

 
v. Oak Grove Investors, 108 Nev. 958, 963, 843 P.2d 351, 354 (1992)
(emphasis added); see NRS 17.285(1), (2). Because this matter falls within
the latter method, Sun Cab’s claim for contribution was timely.

Accordingly, we conclude that Sun Cab’s third-party claim for
contribution was not premature, and thus, LaTourette's argument in this
regard cannot serve as an alternative basis for affirming the district
court's dismissal order.

   

but

In the alternative, LaTourette argues that the district court
reached the correct result in dismissing the contribution claim with
prejudice based on Sun Cab’s failure to attach an expert affidavit pursuant
to NRS 41A.071. Sun Cab concedes that it did not attach an affidavit, but
argues that the district court should have instead dismissed its complaint
without prejudice. We agree with Sun Cab.

While this court has not yet considered the applicability of
NRS 41A.071 to third-party claims for contribution, we have recognized
that statutory limitations should apply to protect doctors from frivolous
claims where a given action requires proof of malpractice before relief may
be granted. See Fierle v. Perez, 125 Nev. 728, 738, 219 P.3d 906, 912
(2009) (applying the affidavit requirement to a claim of negligent
supervision and explaining that malpractice statutes were intended “to
extend the legislative shield that protects doctors from frivolous
lawsuits”); see also Truck Ins. Exchange v. Tetzlaff, 683 F. Supp. 223, 224-
26 (D. Nev. 1988) (concluding that a former mandatory prerequisite for
bringing a medical malpractice action extended to indemnity actions

grounded in alleged medical malpractice).

 

 
Here, Sun Cab’s complaint rested upon the theory that
LaTourette’s negligence had contributed to Zinni’s injuries. In other
words, to establish a right to contribution, Sun Cab would have been
required to establish that LaTourette committed medical malpractice,
Thus, Sun Cab is required to satisfy the statutory prerequisites in place
for a medical malpractice action before bringing its contribution claim,
Fierle, 125 Nev. at 736-38, 219 P.3d at 911-12.

If a party fails to file an expert affidavit with his or her
complaint in a medical malpractice action, the complaint is void ab initio
and must be dismissed, Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1298,
1304, 148 P.3d 790, 794 (2006) (‘[A] medical malpractice complaint filed
without a supporting medical expert affidavit is void ab initio, meaning it
is of no force and effect. Because a complaint that does not comply with
NRS 41A.071 is void ab initio, it does not legally exist ....” (footnote

“without

omittod)). Notably, dismissal on this basis must be made
prejudice.” NRS 41A.071.

Accordingly, because Sun Cab failed to attach an expert
affidavit to its claim for contribution, the complaint in this regard was
void ab initio and should have boon dismissed without prejudice. Id;
Washoe Med, Ctr., 122 Nev. at 1300, 148 P.3d at 792. Because the district
court dismissed the contribution claim with prejudice, we reverse in part
the district court's order.

CONCLUSION

‘The district court properly dismissed Sun Cab’s claim for
equitable indemnity for failure to state a claim. However, the district
court's dismissal of Sun Cabs contribution claim cannot be affirmed on
that basis, as payment toward a judgment is not a prerequisite to filing a

contribution claim. Although Sun Cab was required to attach an expert

 

 
affidavit to the contribution claim because it alleged medical malpractice,
failure to do so merely warranted dismissal without prejudice.
Consequently, we affirm the district court’s order, except to the extent
that it dismissed with prejudice, and we remand this matter to the district,
court with instructions to enter an order dismissing this case without

prejudice,

Parraguirre

We coneur: