Title: State v. Stanley

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Larry D. Stanley,
No. 2, September Term 1998
HEADNOTE:
The State’s Attorney’s comment to her witness about the penalties of
perjury did not deprive the criminal defendant of his right to
compulsory process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
because the comment was a general warning, not a threat, and did not
improperly coerce or badger the witness.  Additionally, there was
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of assault with intent to
maim, disfigure, or disable because the specific intent required for that
crime was inferred from the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon and
the resulting injuries to the victim.
Circuit Court for Wicomico County 
Case # 96CR0725
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 2
September Term, 1998
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
LARRY D. STANLEY
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Eldridge and Raker, JJ dissent
Filed:   November 18, 1998  
 The maiming statutes, sections 384 to 386 of Article 27, were repealed by 1996 Md.
1
Laws, Chap. 632, § 1, effective October 1, 1996, and essentially were recodified in the new
assault statutes.  See Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1997 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 12.
The prior maiming statutes were in effect at the time respondent was charged in the case sub
judice.
 There was no indication that defendant sought process as to the witness; the witness
2
was called by the State and the defense made no attempt to cross-examine or call the witness
in its own case.
- 3 -
This case requires us to examine a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to
compulsory process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment and the former statute
relating to the offense of assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable.1
Because the State’s Attorney’s comment to the prosecutorial witness about the
consequences of perjury was not a threat to prosecute the witness if her testimony did not
satisfy the prosecutor but merely a general warning, such comment did not deprive the
defendant of his constitutional right to compulsory process.   Furthermore, there was
2
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or
disable the victim because he stabbed her several times in the chest with a deadly weapon.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On November 16, 1995, Larry D. Stanley, respondent and cross-petitioner, hereinafter
“respondent,” was arrested and subsequently charged with assault with intent to maim,
assault, battery, and wearing and carrying a concealed weapon as a result of an attack on
victim Tammy Jones.  At trial, Trooper L. Edward White, Jr. testified that he responded to
an emergency call on November 16 for an assault in progress in Salisbury, Maryland.
  It is unclear whether the prosecuting attorney told Ms. Jones that she would be
3
prosecuted for perjury or that she could be prosecuted for perjury.  As we shall explain infra,
this is, in this case, a distinction without a difference.
- 3 -
Trooper White further testified that upon arriving at the scene of the incident, he saw
respondent and Ms. Jones walking together on a nearby street.  Both respondent and Ms.
Jones had blood on their clothes and Ms. Jones, who was upset and crying, had blood on her
upper chest and face.
Trooper White and another trooper separated respondent and Ms. Jones, taking Ms.
Jones to an ambulance.  She continued crying while in the ambulance, but was able to relate
to Trooper White what had occurred earlier.  Ms. Jones told him that while she and
respondent went out for a walk, their conversation escalated into an argument.  During their
argument, respondent hit Ms. Jones with his fists, stabbed her in the chest with a knife, and
bit her ear.  Ms. Jones was taken to the Peninsula Regional Medical Center.  There, she was
treated for a laceration and several bruises to her head, three two-centimeter stab wounds to
her chest, and a jagged five-centimeter laceration to her ear, which required multiple sutures.
Prior to respondent’s trial, Ms. Jones allegedly informed the prosecuting attorney in
a letter that respondent was not her assailant.  During the trial, the prosecuting attorney
approached Ms. Jones in a hallway outside of the courtroom and informed her that she
would  be prosecuted for perjury if she did not testify truthfully.
3
Respondent waived his right to a jury and was tried before Judge William D. Simpson
in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on April 19, 1996.  At trial, Ms. Jones was called
- 4 -
to testify as a State’s witness about the events that occurred on November 16, but she
asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer any
questions.  The defense did not question Ms. Jones and called no witnesses.  Respondent
ultimately was convicted of all four charges.
Respondent filed a motion for new trial on May 9, 1996.  On August 9, 1996, after
a hearing on the motion, Judge Simpson denied respondent’s motion and sentenced him to
incarceration for a period of fifteen years for the assault with intent to maim conviction and
three years for the wearing and carrying a deadly weapon conviction, to be served
consecutively.  Judge Simpson then suspended the three-year sentence and placed respondent
on supervised probation for thirty-six months upon his release.  The assault and battery
convictions merged into the assault with intent to maim conviction for sentencing purposes.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, respondent argued, inter alia, that the
prosecuting attorney committed misconduct during the trial by threatening to charge Ms.
Jones with perjury if she did not testify truthfully.  During the hearing, the following
colloquy took place between the judge and the prosecuting attorney:
THE COURT:  . . . [D]id you chill [Ms. Jones’s] testimony by
threatening her?  That is what [respondent is] alleging.
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  There is no evidence of that.  I put her on
the witness stand.  I began to ask her questions, and she began to take the
[F]ifth [Amendment] as to some very innocuous questions. . . .  We got her
here [to testify].  
I think there is no indication of a threat at all.
- 5 -
THE COURT:  Are you saying that you didn’t threaten her to prosecute
her for perjury?
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  No, sir. 
A few minutes later, respondent’s counsel called Ms. Jones as a witness and asked her
about the conversation she had with the prosecuting attorney in the hallway outside the
courtroom during the trial.  Ms. Jones testified as follows:
[MS. JONES]: [W]ell, I was told that if I get up on the stand and
perjure myself, I am going to be charged with perjury and sent to jail.
THE COURT:  You were told if you perjured yourself, you could be
charged with perjury?
[MS. JONES]:  Yes. 
After Ms. Jones stepped down from the witness stand, the following was said:
THE COURT: If we assume the truth of what she just testified to, what
did the prosecutor do wrong?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The prosecution threatened her with perjury.
THE COURT: If she perjured herself.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Perjury, prosecution, Your Honor.
THE COURT: If you perjure yourself.
She didn’t say if you say this, if you say that, or anything of that nature.
If you believe what that witness just testified to, every bit of which the
prosecutor denies, all she told the witness was, if you lie, you could be
prosecuted for perjury.
She didn’t say, if you say X, you will be prosecuted for perjury.  If you
say Y, you will be prosecuted for perjury.  Just if you lie.
 Ms. Jones had not been summonsed as a defense witness and the record does not
4
reflect that she was a prospective defense witness.
- 6 -
When you get up, if you tell the truth, you won’t.  If you lie, you will.
What is wrong with that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, as a prospective defense witness,[4]
Your Honor, and in receipt of the letter that that witness gave the State, I
believe that there was another way to do this.  
That in one of the cases that I gave you indicates that way, should be
done by the Court, not by the prosecutor.  At that point, the prosecutor should
not have interfered with that potential defense witness.
That is my point, and that is what the law is.
THE COURT: Well, under the evidence presented, I do not believe that
the prosecution committed prosecutorial misconduct based on the evidence
that has been presented before the Court today.
The prosecution was the one calling the witness, not the defense.  The
prosecution was the one who secured the presence of the witness in court, not
the defense, and all the prosecution is alleged to have had done is said tell the
truth.  If you lie, you could be prosecuted for perjury.
That’s what the evidence before the Court is.
I do not believe that is sufficient to warrant a new trial to the defendant.
I believe there was a sufficient basis for the excited utterance, and I do not find
anything in the record with respect to the witness’s assertion of her fifth
amendment right that would give rise to a right to a new trial.  So, I am going
to deny your Motion for New Trial.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  That court, as relative to this
appeal, held there was sufficient evidence to convict respondent of assault with intent to
maim.  That court then held that the prosecutor’s statements as to her admonition of the
- 7 -
witness, should have been in the form of sworn testimony, and vacated the conviction for
assault with intent to maim pending a remand to the circuit court and a rehearing on the
motion for new trial to determine whether the State’s Attorney’s conduct was inappropriate
in advising Ms. Jones she would be charged with perjury if she lied.  See generally Stanley
v. State, 118 Md. App. 45, 701 A.2d 1174 (1997).  The State petitioned this Court for Writ
of Certiorari and respondent cross-petitioned.  In its brief, the State presents the following
question for review:
Did the Court of Special Appeals erroneously hold that [respondent’s]
convictions should be vacated pending a rehearing of [respondent’s] motion
for a new trial because the record was insufficient for the trial court to
determine whether the prosecutor’s alleged remarks to the victim prior to trial
regarding perjury charges for failing to testify truthfully deprived [respondent]
of his constitutional right to compulsory process? 
Respondent presents the following questions for our review:
1.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [respondent’s]
conviction for assault with intent to maim should be vacated pending a
rehearing of [respondent’s] motion for new trial because the trial court failed
to obtain sworn testimony from the prosecutor?
2.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in concluding that [respondent]
could be convicted of assault with intent to maim without sufficient proof of
injury or intent?
With respect to petitioner’s question and respondent’s first question, we hold that the
Court of Special Appeals erred in vacating respondent’s convictions because, regardless of
whether the prosecutor provided sworn testimony, her remarks to the victim did not deprive
respondent of his constitutional right to compulsory process.  As to respondent’s second
question, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals did not err in holding that there was
  The State’s original question for review, as set forth in its Petition for Writ of
5
Certiorari and as granted by this Court, filed March 18, 1998, reads as follows:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [respondent’s]
conviction for assault with intent to maim should be vacated pending a
rehearing of [respondent’s] motion for new trial because the trial court failed
to obtain sworn testimony from the prosecutor?
Respondent argues in his brief that the question now proffered by the State in its brief
“bears little resemblance to the question in the petition.  In addition, the theory espoused in
the petition is missing from the brief and Gray [v. State, 317 Md. 250, 562 A.2d 1278
(1989)] is not cited in the brief.  Under these circumstances, . . . it would be appropriate for
this Court to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted.”  The State, in its reply brief,
asserts that it argued in its petition that the Court of Special Appeals erred by vacating
respondent’s conviction because 
the prosecutor should not have been required to take the witness stand and
provide sworn testimony since “the information that the trial court had before
it at the motions hearing was adequate enough to enable it to make the
necessary factual findings as to whether the prosecutor had, as [respondent]
alleged, engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.”  
The same issue, the State argues, is encompassed by the question presented in its brief, but
“explored in greater detail.”  The arguments presented in the State’s brief simply present
different alternatives upon which we may base our decision.
We disagree with respondent that the scope of the State’s brief exceeds the question
for which we granted certiorari.  As we shall explain, the Court of Special Appeals did err
as the prosecutor was not required to be a sworn witness at the hearing on the motion for new
trial.  This is because the prosecutor’s comment, assuming the truth of Ms. Jones’s version
of the comment, was not a constitutional violation.  Accordingly, it was irrelevant whether
the trial court obtained sworn testimony from the prosecutor.  This issue does not exceed the
scope of the question granted review by this Court and, therefore, we shall address it.
- 8 -
sufficient evidence to convict him of assault with intent to maim.  Accordingly, we shall
reverse in part and affirm in part the intermediate appellate court and uphold the judgment
of the trial court as to those two issues.5
- 9 -
II.  Discussion
A.  The State’s Attorney’s Alleged Misconduct
This first issue encompasses both petitioner’s question and respondent’s first question.
Namely, we must review the effect of the prosecuting attorney’s warning to Ms. Jones
regarding the consequences of perjury.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has the right
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor under the Sixth Amendment,
as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment:  
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so
it may decide where the truth lies.  Just as an accused has the right to confront
the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.  This right is
a fundamental element of due process of law.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967).  
In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S. Ct. 351, 353-53, 34 L. Ed. 2d 330 (1972),
the Court revisited that issue and held that a trial court judge deprived a criminal defendant
of his right to compulsory process when the judge threatened a defense witness with
prosecution for perjury, which effectively prevented the witness from testifying.  At the trial,
the defense called only one witness.  On his own initiative, the trial judge said to the witness:
“Now you have been called down as a witness in this case by the Defendant.
It is the Court’s duty to admonish you that you don’t have to testify, that
anything you say can and will be used against you.  If you take the witness
stand and lie under oath, the Court will personally see that your case goes to
the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury and the liklihood [sic] is
- 10 -
that you would get convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked onto what
you have already got, so that is the matter you have got to make up your mind
on.  If you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean
several years and at least more time that you are going to have to serve.  It will
also be held against you in the penitentiary when you’re up for parole and the
Court wants you to thoroughly understand the chances you’re taking by getting
on that witness stand under oath.  You may tell the truth and if you do, that is
all right, but if you lie you can get into real trouble.  The court wants you to
know that.  You don’t owe anybody anything to testify and it must be done
freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know the
hazard you are taking.” 
Id. at 95-96, 93 S. Ct. at 352, 34 L. Ed. 2d 330.  The witness thereafter refused to testify and
was excused.
The trial court’s error, the Supreme Court said, was to gratuitously single out this
particular witness and admonish him, at an inordinately great length, about the dangers of
perjury.  Instead of just “warning the witness of his right to refuse to testify and of the
necessity to tell the truth,” id. at 97, 93 S. Ct. at 353, 34 L. Ed. 2d 330, the judge implied that
he expected the witness to lie and, in unnecessarily strong terms, threatened the witness with
a perjury conviction.  These admonishments likely exerted significant duress upon the
witness, precluding him from freely and voluntarily choosing whether to testify.  Such
judicial threats, the Court held, deprived the defendant of his right to due process.  Id. at 98,
93 S. Ct. at 353, 34 L. Ed. 2d 330.
This Court applied Webb in Marshall v. State, 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981).
We held that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly admonishing the defendant
about perjury while the defendant was testifying.  Id. at 214, 434 A.2d at 560.  In that case,
- 11 -
the trial judge said to the defendant after he was attempting to testify differently than he had
in an earlier stage of his trial:  
“Now, Mr. Marshall, you are under oath.  If you fail to tell the truth, you can
be charged with perjury.  You took the witness stand in front of me the 13th
of November.  
. . . .
Now, you are trying now to testify differently from what you said on
November the 13th, and I’ll issue a bench warrant charging you with perjury
if you persist.”
Id. at 209, 434 A.2d at 558.  Ultimately, the defendant testified as he had originally on
November 13. 
Reversing the Court of Special Appeals and the trial court, we held that the judge had
committed a Webb-type violation because the admonition caused the defendant to testify in
a certain way for fear of suffering some severe consequence.  We stated:  “[W]hile we agree
with the court below that a judge presiding over a jury trial has the right to interrogate
witnesses in an effort to clarify the issues, we stress that he should exercise this right
sparingly.”  Id. at 213, 434 A.2d at 560.
Several other courts addressing the issue of the effect of a court’s admonition of the
penalties of perjury have found no such violation.  For instance, in United States v.
Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the trial judge and the prosecutor both warned
the testifying witness of the penalties of perjury, but did so only once.  The judge questioned
the witness under oath as follows:
- 12 -
[T]here are always actions of perjury meaning that if you lie under oath that
you can be sent away on a new charge.  
Do you understand that?
THE WITNESS:  Yes.
THE COURT:  So it is important for everybody to tell the truth.  I just want
you to understand what the situation is.  All right?
THE WITNESS:  Thank you.
THE COURT:  Do you still wish to take the stand and testify?
THE WITNESS:  Yes.
Id. at 1334.
Holding that the judge’s admonishments and the prosecutor’s similar comments did
not amount to a constitutional violation, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
stated that “[i]t is not improper per se for a trial court judge or prosecuting attorney to advise
prospective witnesses of the penalties for testifying falsely.  But warnings concerning the
dangers of perjury cannot be emphasized to the point where they threaten and intimidate the
witness into refusing to testify.”  Id. (citations omitted).  The trial judge and the prosecutor,
the court reasoned, maintained acceptable limits in their warnings to the witness, and
fulfilled their duties to warn a potential perjurer about the ramifications of perjury.
Accordingly, their comments caused no constitutional violation.  Id. at 1336.  See also
United States v. Smith, 997 F.2d 674, 680 (10th Cir.) (concluding the judge’s comments to
witness about maximum sentence for perjury were not threatening or coercive and under the
- 13 -
circumstances of that case, did not amount to a  Webb violation), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 937,
114 S. Ct. 357, 126 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993) .
Likewise, comments by prosecutors as to the implications of perjury may, or may not,
be a violation of the principles set forth in Webb.  See People v. Hill, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656,
675, 952 P.2d 673, 692 (1998) (noting that under the circumstances of that case, prosecutor’s
threat of perjury conviction to defense witness constituted prosecutorial misconduct); Davis
v. State, 831 S.W.2d 426, 437 (Tex. App. 1992, pet. ref’d) (“Under certain circumstances,
a judge’s or prosecutor’s threats or intimidation that dissuade a witness from testifying or
persuade a witness to change their testimony may infringe a defendant’s due process
rights.”).  Threatening comments must rise to the level of “‘a threat over and above what the
record indicate[s] was timely, necessary, and appropriate.’”  United States v. Jackson, 935
F.2d 832, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Simmons, 670
F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 835, 104 S. Ct. 121, 78 L. Ed. 2d 119
(1983)).  A constitutional violation arises not when the prosecutor merely informs or advises
the witness about the possibility of perjury, but instead when he or she “by deliberate and
badgering threats design[s] to quash significant testimony.”  United States v. Davis, 974 F.2d
182, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 979, 113 S. Ct. 1434, 122 L. Ed. 2d 801
(1993); see also State v. Melvin, 326 N.C. 173, 187, 388 S.E.2d 72, 79 (1990) (“[T]he
constitutionality of a prosecutor’s conduct is determined by the attendant circumstances, and
not all prosecutorial threats of perjury proceedings constitute due process violations.”).  In
many circumstances, a testifying witness, particularly an unrepresented witness, possibly
  Maryland courts have yet to address the specific issue of whether general
6
prosecutorial  admonishments of witnesses for perjury violate a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights.  The Court of Special Appeals, however, reviewed a related problem
in Campbell v. State, 37 Md. App. 89, 376 A.2d 866 (1977).  In that case, a State’s Attorney
had requested that the case of a potential co-defendant of Campbell’s, David Byrd, be placed
on the inactive docket.  Mr. Byrd later agreed to testify on the defendant’s behalf.  On the
day of the defendant’s trial and immediately before defendant’s case in which Mr. Byrd
(continued...)
- 14 -
should be warned about the possibility of a perjury charge.  Davis, 974 F.2d at 187; see also
Smith, 997 F.2d at 680; State v. Baca, 124 N.M. 55, ___, 946 P.2d 1066, 1073 (N.M. 1997).
Unless the prosecutor specifically threatens, intimidates, or coerces the witness, no
constitutional violation ordinarily will be found.  See, e.g., People v. Mancilla, 250 Ill. App.
3d 353, 360, 620 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (stating that prosecutor’s threats to witness that she
could be prosecuted criminally for perjury and deported because of her immigration status
were meant to be coercive rather than helpful, and thus were improper), cert. denied, 153 Ill.
2d 566, 624 N.E.2d 813 (1993); State v. Halley, 93 Ohio App. 3d 71, 79, 637 N.E.2d 937,
942 (1994) (noting that because prosecutor reminded witness of penalty of perjury while on
the stand testifying and in front of the jury and because remarks were meant to be
intimidating, warnings were improper).  But see State v. Drewel, 835 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that prosecutor’s warning to defense witness that if she testified
untruthfully she could be charged with perjury was not threatening and therefore not
reversible error); Baca, 124 N.M. at ____, 946 P.2d at 1073 (holding that where prosecutor’s
warning about potential perjury charges was not threatening or coercive, the remark was not
improper).   Finally, the determination of whether prosecutorial admonitions violated a
6
(...continued)
6
would have testified was called, the State’s Attorney prosecuting the case moved to reopen
the case against Mr. Byrd.  Although the prosecutor feigned coincidence in reopening the
cases on the very day Mr. Byrd was to testify on the defendant’s behalf and presumably to
his own detriment, it later was revealed that the State’s Attorney had inferred to Mr. Byrd’s
attorney earlier that if Mr. Byrd did not testify in the matter, that “would have a lot to do
with” whether the State would prosecute Mr. Byrd.  Mr. Byrd ultimately refused to testify
for the defendant.  The court held the prosecutor’s actions improper and remanded the case
for a new trial under the principles set forth in Washington v. Texas and Webb.  Id. at 98-99,
101, 376 A.2d at 871-72. 
Interestingly, the Court of Special Appeals in that case declined to take into
consideration the unsworn argument of the prosecutor made during the trial:  “While we are
fully cognizant of the position of a prosecutor as an officer of the court as well as of the
State, we decline to hold that his unsworn argument or the inference from his questions on
cross-examination were sufficient to overcome the sworn testimony of appellant’s
witnesses.”  Id. at 96, 376 A.2d at 870.  Although the prosecutor’s remarks in the case sub
judice were not made under oath, as we shall explain, that  makes little difference to the
outcome of this case.
- 15 -
defendant’s due process will depend on the facts in each case.  Melvin, 326 N.C. at 187, 388
S.E.2d 79.
It is apparent that prosecutors can and sometimes should warn witnesses of the
consequences of perjury.  These warnings, however, should be general in nature and must
not directly intimidate or coerce a witness into silence.  No intimidation or coercion occurred
in the case before us; the admonition was general in nature.  The witness testified that the
State’s Attorney told her she would be prosecuted for perjury if she did not tell the truth.
Some confusion exists because the witness then agreed with the trial judge when he
characterized the prosecutor’s statement as “could be prosecuted for perjury.”  That
characterization, however, makes little difference.  Generally,  a party may warn its witness
  Although not independently significant, we note again that Ms. Jones was a State
7
witness, not a witness for the defense.  Thus, the State was advising Ms. Jones to testify
truthfully, not attempting to silence her.
 Rule 5-603 provides:
8
Before testifying, a witness shall be required to declare that the witness
will testify truthfully.  The declaration shall be by oath or affirmation
administered either in the form specified by Rule 1-303 or, in special
circumstances, in some other form of oath or affirmation calculated to impress
upon the witness the duty to tell the truth.
- 16 -
of the ramifications of perjury.  Ultimately, whether the State’s Attorney in this case used
the word “could” or “would,” the statement made to Ms. Jones prior to trial was nothing
more than a general warning and not a coercive attempt to prevent her from testifying.  Such
a warning, therefore, was not a Webb-type admonition and did not violate respondent’s right
to compulsory process.7
As we have indicated, respondent argues vigorously about the State’s Attorney not
being a sworn witness when the trial judge asked her if she had threatened the witness with
perjury charges.  Citing to Maryland Rule 5-603,  which requires all witnesses to be sworn
8
prior to testifying, respondent asserts the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to
engage in the testimonial conversation without first being sworn.  The record indicates that
the State’s Attorney was not sworn before the judge asked her whether she threatened to
prosecute Ms. Jones with perjury.  Moreover, there was some degree of uncertainty at the
motion for new trial hearing about whether the prosecutor used the word “would” or “could.”
The trial judge, however, concluded at the hearing that, assuming the truth of Ms. Jones’s
  We are unable to find in the record an objection by respondent to the court’s
9
solicitation of the “unsworn testimony” from the State’s Attorney at the hearing.  We decline
to hold the issue is waived, however, as the State has proffered no such argument before this
Court nor to the Court of Special Appeals.
- 17 -
testimony, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct.  As we have stated, Ms. Jones said
at the hearing: “I was told that if I get up on the stand and perjure myself, I am going to be
charged with perjury and sent to jail.”  We agree with the trial court that, assuming the
State’s Attorney made the comment as testified to by Ms. Jones, that comment did not violate
respondent’s constitutional rights because the statement was merely a general warning of the
consequences of lying while under oath, not a threat made to silence or coerce the witness
or cause her to produce specific testimony.  Thus, whether the State’s Attorney’s comments
in open court were under oath was irrelevant to the matter because the trial court accepted
as true the witness’s account of her conversation with the State’s Attorney.  Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in denying respondent’s motion for new trial based on the perjury
warning.9
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Assault with Intent to Maim Conviction
The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167, 512 A.2d 1056, 1057 (1986) (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2785, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)); see also State
- 18 -
v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994); Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275,
281, 619 A.2d 111, 114 (1993); McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 289, 600 A.2d 430, 439
(1992); Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 535, 573 A.2d 831, 833 (1990).  Weighing the
credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the
fact finder.  See Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580, 583 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1991).  Thus, our
concern is not whether the verdict below was in accord with the weight of the evidence, but
rather, whether there was sufficient evidence at trial “that either showed directly, or
circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier
of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d at 337.
Respondent was charged with assault with intent to maim.  Md. Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 386 (Repealed).  At the time of the offense in this case, the statute
provided in pertinent part:
If any person shall unlawfully shoot at any person, or shall in any
manner unlawfully and maliciously attempt to discharge any kind of loaded
arms at any person, or shall unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut or wound any
person, or shall assault or beat any person, with intent to maim, disfigure or
disable such person . . . , such offender shall be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction are subject to imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
Maiming was not defined within section 386.  Rather, the definition appeared in
section 385 of Article 27:
Every person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, who shall be
convicted of the crime of cutting out or disabling the tongue, putting out an
eye, slitting the nose, cutting or biting off the nose, ear or lip, or cutting or
biting off or disabling any limb or member of any person, of malice
- 19 -
aforethought, with intention in so doing to mark or disfigure such person, shall
be guilty of a felony and upon conviction are subject to imprisonment for not
more than 15 years.    
Assault with intent to maim is a specific intent crime.  In that regard, a conviction
cannot lie unless the perpetrator had the specific intent “to inflict one or more of the injuries
described in [section] 385.”  Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 212, 507 A.2d 1098, 1118 (1986),
vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987); see also
Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 230, 623 A.2d 630, 633 (1993).  Additionally, the injury
must be permanent in nature.  Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 702, 625 A.2d 984, 993 (1993);
Hammond v. State, 322 Md. 451, 457-59, 588 A.2d 345, 347-48 (1991).
Respondent’s second question in his cross-petition argues that the prosecution was
required to prove that respondent had the specific intent to “bit[e] off the . . . ear” of Ms.
Jones.  Our analysis, however, does not begin or end with the biting issue.  Count One of the
Criminal Information filed in the circuit court alleged that respondent “did unlawfully and
maliciously cut . . . Tammy Tirrell Jones, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable . . . .”
(Emphasis added.)  The trial judge stated when addressing respondent’s motion for acquittal
at the close of the State’s case:
Well, there was evidence that the victim . . . stated that the defendant bit her
and had a knife, and she had wounds that are evidenced by the hospital
records, stab wounds to the chest, an ear edema.  [The evidence] indicates that
she was . . . knifed.  
I certainly think there is legally sufficient evidence . . . .
  The Court of Special Appeals reversed respondent’s conviction for carrying or
10
wearing a deadly weapon “[b]ecause the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the knife used in this attack did not fall within the statutory exception for penknives.”
Stanley, 118 Md. App. at 57, 701 A.2d at 1180.  This does not affect our opinion in this case.
Regardless of whether the knife respondent used to assault Ms. Jones was legally possessed,
respondent still “unlawfully and maliciously stab[bed], cut or wound[ed]” Ms. Jones under
circumstances in which an intent to disfigure can be inferred.  When a person stabs another,
it is reasonable to infer that permanent disablement or disfigurement is intended.  See infra.
- 20 -
The defense presented no case at trial.  It then renewed its argument that the evidence
on the assault with intent to maim charge was not sufficient.  The trial judge responded: “I
don’t have any doubt that there was a knife involved.  The Court believes beyond a
reasonable doubt that [a knife] was used and that was an intent to maim.”
The Court of Special Appeals held below that there was sufficient evidence presented
from which the trial court could have found respondent guilty of assault with intent to maim.
Respondent argues the intermediate appellate court erred in this regard because “the mere
fact that Ms. Jones was bitten on the ear is not sufficient to establish an intent to maim,”
which, under the statute, essentially means intent to bite her ear off.  Respondent, however,
was convicted based upon the knifing.  We believe there was sufficient evidence to convict
respondent for assault with intent to maim for his attack on Ms. Jones with the knife, which
resulted in three two-centimeter stab wounds to her chest.10
As we have stated, the prosecution was required to prove that respondent assaulted
Ms. Jones with the specific intent to maim, disfigure, or disable her.  This Court and the
Court of Special Appeals have said on many occasions that this intent may be inferred from
 In Ford, the defendant and three companions threw large landscaping rocks at
11
oncoming cars for over thirty minutes.  At least fifteen cars were struck, resulting in
numerous injuries, both serious and minor.  This Court took particular note, with regard to
the defendant’s assault with intent to disable charges, that two victims had been struck by
the rocks, and two others had been cut by windshield glass, which had been shattered by the
rocks.  Id. at 704, 625 A.2d at 994.  We reasoned that these and other resulting injuries were
the “natural and probable consequences of hurling a large rock through the windshield of a
fast moving vehicle,” and, therefore, the jury could have inferred that the defendant
possessed the necessary intent to disable permanently his victims as required by section 386.
Id. at 704-05, 625 A.2d at 995. 
- 21 -
the surrounding circumstances.  Ford, 330 Md. at 702-03, 625 A.2d at 994.   More specific
11
to this case, “the intent necessary for a conviction under [section] 386 may be inferred from
evidence of an attack with a deadly weapon.”  Id. at 703, 625 A.2d at 994 (citing Marks v.
State, 230 Md. 108, 112-13, 185 A.2d 909, 912 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 918, 83 S. Ct.
1308, 10 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1963)).  What is more, a fact finder is permitted to infer from the
act of stabbing “that the stabber intended permanently to maim, disfigure, or disable his
victim.”  Williams v. State, 100 Md. App. 468, 472, 641 A.2d 990, 992 (1994).  See also
Jenkins v. State, 59 Md. App. 612, 617, 477 A.2d 791, 793 (1984)  (“[A]n intent to maim,
disfigure, or disable under [section] 386 may be established by showing an intent to do
grievous bodily harm” such as pointing and shooting a gun at another), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 307 Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465 (1986); Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 74, 368 A.2d
1080, 1088 (1977) (upholding assault with intent to maim conviction because “the pointing
of a gun toward another human and discharging it in random fashion is sufficient to support
inferences of intent to do grievous bodily harm.”); cf. Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102
A.2d 816, 819-20 (1954) (noting as to assault with intent to murder that “[t]he deliberate
- 22 -
selection and use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body is a circumstance
which indicates a design to kill, since in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law
presumes that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his act.”). 
Returning to the case at hand, when the defense moved for judgment of acquittal, the
judge stated in discussing this issue:
I don’t have any doubt that there was a knife involved.
The Court believes beyond a reasonable doubt that one was used and
that was an intent to maim, and that the defendant is guilty of all the charges
based on the statement at the time of the victim and the evidence submitted by
the hospital records as to the statements as to the cause of the injuries and the
injuries that were actually found, and the Court will enter verdicts of guilt.
The judge found that respondent, in assaulting Ms. Jones with a knife, was guilty of the
charges against him, i.e., that he intended to maim, disfigure, or disable her permanently.
The evidence of the several puncture wounds from the knife in her chest and the use of a
knife in general were sufficient to sustain that conviction.  The victim’s injuries correlate
directly to an intent to maim on respondent’s part because first, an intent to maim Ms. Jones
can by inferred from respondent’s use of the knife, a dangerous weapon.  Second, by
stabbing the victim in her chest, the general area of the heart and lungs, respondent obviously
intended to cause serious physical injury: disablement or disfigurement.  Thus, the evidence
was sufficient to establish that petitioner had the intent to maim, disable or disfigure Ms.
Jones permanently.  Accordingly, we shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals as to the
sufficiency of the evidence issue.
III.  Conclusion
- 23 -
The State’s Attorney, in her comment to the State’s witness about the penalties of
perjury, did not deprive respondent of his right to compulsory process under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.  The comment was a general admonition, not a threat, and did not
improperly coerce or badger the witness.  Moreover, the trial court presumed as truthful what
Ms. Jones testified to at the hearing on the new trial.  Even under Ms. Jones’s version, the
State’s Attorney’s comment was not improper.  Finally, there was sufficient evidence to
convict respondent, as the trial court did, of the charge of assault with intent to maim,
disfigure, or disable for stabbing the victim with a knife in her chest.  Accordingly, we shall
reverse the Court of Special Appeals as to the motion for new trial and vacate that court’s
vacation of the trial court’s denial of respondent’s motion for a new trial.  We affirm the
Court of Special Appeals as to respondent’s conviction for assault with intent to maim.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; THAT
PART OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS'
JUDGMENT RELATING TO THE CONVICTION FOR
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MAIM IS VACATED;
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE
CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO
MAIM.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
- 1 -
Raker, J. dissenting:
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  Stanley v. State, 118
Md. App. 45, 701 A.2d 1174 (1997).  I believe that under the circumstances of this case, the
prosecutor should have been required to testify at the evidentiary hearing, thereby affording
Respondent the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor.  
The majority holds that the Court of Special Appeals erred in vacating Respondent’s
convictions because, regardless of whether the prosecutor provided sworn testimony, her
remarks to the victim did not deprive Respondent of his constitutional right to compulsory
process.  Maj. op. at 6.  The majority explains that this is because the prosecutor’s comment,
assuming the truth of Ms. Jones’s version of the comment, was not a constitutional violation,
and thus, it was irrelevant whether the trial court obtained sworn testimony from the
prosecutor.  Maj. op. at 7 n.5.  
The intermediate appellate court noted correctly that 
[t]he circuit court has not developed a record that properly
allows us to evaluate the constitutionality of the prosecutor’s
actions.  The only evidence introduced regarding this subject is
the testimony of the victim.  We are unable to make any
conclusions based on her testimony, however, due to the lack of
clarity concerning the language the Assistant State’s Attorney
used.  The Prosecutor did not take the witness stand and provide
sworn testimony.  The utter lack of factual determinations in the
- 2 -
record necessitates that we remand this case to the circuit court
in order that appellant’s motion can be properly considered. 
Stanley, 118 Md.App at 63, 701 A.2d at 1183.  It is not so much the lack of the oath that
troubles me; it is the lack of the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor and to explore
with her exactly what she told the witness.  Perhaps the prosecutor told the witness some
things that the witness forgot and thus failed to mention when questioned by the court.
Simply because the trial court accepted as true the witness’s account of her conversation with
the prosecutor does not end the inquiry.  As Judge Harrell noted, writing for the court, “the
circuit court’s colloquy with the victim was conducted with less than surgeon-like precision
and contributed to the inconsistencies in the small amount of evidence that was in the
record.”  Id., 701 A.2d at 1183.  The defense should have been permitted to question the
prosecutor to determine whether she said anything to intimidate or threaten the witness that
may have caused her to refuse to testify.  The defense should not have been required to
accept the prosecutor’s denial.  
The Court of Special Appeals reached the right result in this case in ruling that the
case should be remanded and 
[i]f, on remand, the court determines that the alleged
conversation between the victim and Assistant State’s Attorney
did not occur or, if it did, it did not prejudice appellant, the
court may reinstate the conviction and sentence for assault with
- 3 -
intent to main.  If the court, however, concludes appellant was
prejudiced by the State’s conduct, a new trial may be ordered.
Id., 701 A.2d at 1183.  For the reasons stated above and by the Court of Special Appeals,
Respondent was denied his right of confrontation.  Accordingly,  I respectfully dissent.
 Judge Eldridge has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed herein.