Title: Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Environmental Affairs

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13210 
 
KATHARINE ARMSTRONG & others1  vs.  SECRETARY OF ENERGY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS & others.2 
 
CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION & others3  vs.  SECRETARY OF ENERGY 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS & another.4 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 7, 2022. - July 12, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Trust, Public trust.  Department of Environmental Protection.  
Secretary of the Executive Office of Energy & Environmental 
Affairs.  Harbors.  Administrative Law, Regulations, 
Agency's authority. 
 
 
 
 
1 Michael Burkin, Neal Hartman, Matthew Rubins, and Pran 
Tiku, trustees of the Harbor Towers II Condominium Trust; Robert 
Gowdy, Lee Kozol, Frank Mairano, Norman Meisner, and Gary 
Robinson, trustees of the Harbor Towers I Condominium Trust; 
Julie Mairano; and Marcelle Willock. 
 
2 Commissioner of Environmental Protection and RHDC 70 East 
India, LLC. 
 
3 Bradley M. Campbell, Carol Renee Gregory, Gordon Hall, 
Priscilla M. Brooks, David Lurie, Karl See, Erica A. Fuller, 
Kirstie L. Pecci, Lara G. DeRose, Edward T. Goodwin, Carol A. 
Goodwin, Jamie Goodwin, and Pareesa Charmchi. 
 
4 Commissioner of Environmental Protection. 
2 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 11, 2018. 
 
The cases were heard by Brian A. Davis, J., on motions for 
summary judgment, and questions of law were reported by him to 
the Appeals Court. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
C. Dylan Sanders, Special Assistant Attorney General (Lisa 
C. Goodheart & Alessandra W. Wingerter also present) for 
Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs & another. 
Jeffrey J. Pyle (Thomas M. Elcock also present) for 
Katharine Armstrong & others. 
Peter Shelley for Conservation Law Foundation & others. 
Richard A. Oetheimer, for RHDC 70 East India, LLC, was 
present but did not argue. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Sarah A. Turano-Flores, Mary T. Marshall, Valerie A. Moore, 
Michael A. Leon, & Matthew H. Snell for NAIOP Massachusetts, 
Inc. 
Seth Jaffe, Aaron Lang, & Cloe Pippin for New England 
Aquarium. 
Ronald W. Ruth, Matthew C. Moschella, & Marcella Alvarez 
Morgan for Matthew Beaton & others. 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Seth Schofield, Assistant 
Attorney General, for Attorney General. 
Matthew J. Thomas & Suzanne P. Egan for Massachusetts 
Municipal Law Association & another. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  Rooted in ancient times, the "public trust 
doctrine" provides that the government holds tidelands in trust 
for the benefit of the public for traditional, water-dependent 
uses such as fishing, fowling, and navigation, as well as for 
nontraditional, nonwater-dependent uses that serve a proper 
public purpose.  In G. L. c. 91 (Waterways Act), the Legislature 
has delegated to one agency -- the Department of Environmental 
3 
 
Protection (department) -- the responsibility of making 
licensing decisions for both water- and nonwater-dependent uses.  
Consistent with its public trust responsibilities, the 
department has promulgated regulations, which, inter alia, set 
certain specifications for buildings within one hundred feet of 
protected tidelands.  The regulations also purport to allow the 
Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs (Secretary or EEA) 
to override the department's specifications by approving 
substitute specifications as part of a municipal harbor plan 
(MHP).  While the department may provide a recommendation for 
the Secretary's consideration during the MHP approval process, 
its input is not binding on the Secretary.  Nonetheless, where a 
proposed project falls within the area covered by an MHP and 
meets the substitute specifications approved by the Secretary, 
the department effectively must license the project as 
consistent with the requirements of G. L. c. 91 that, inter 
alia, the proposed project serves a proper public purpose.  In 
these cases, we consider the question whether the department had 
the authority to delegate this override authority to the 
Secretary.  We conclude that the delegation was ultra vires.5 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Aquarium; RHDC 70 East India, LLC; certain former 
Secretaries of Energy and Environmental Affairs and 
Commissioners of Environmental Protection; the Attorney General; 
NAIOP Massachusetts, Inc.; and the Massachusetts Municipal Law 
Association and Massachusetts Municipal Association. 
4 
 
1.  Background.  The present cases concern the Boston 
Planning and Development Agency's MHP, which was approved by the 
Secretary in April 2018 and, as relevant here, covers two sites 
-- the Harbor Garage and the Hook Wharf sites -- located on 
filled tidelands within one hundred feet of the Boston Harbor 
high water mark.  In providing its recommendation to the 
Secretary in connection with the MHP review process, the 
department wrote that it "will adopt as binding guidance in all 
[l]icense application review any [s]ubstitute [p]rovisions 
contained in the Secretary's final [d]ecision on the [MHP]." 
As approved, the MHP contemplates the construction of 
structures including dimensional and other specifications that 
deviated (sometimes substantially) from those set forth in the 
department's regulations.  Specifically, the approved MHP 
contemplated the construction of a 600 foot tall tower at the 
Harbor Garage site and a 305 foot tall building at the Hook 
Wharf site; by contrast, the department's regulations generally 
impose a fifty-five foot height limit at the water's edge with 
graduated increases inland.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 9.51(3)(e) (2017).  The approved MHP also would authorize an 
additional thirty feet of height allowance for the proposed 
buildings at both sites "to accommodate the relocation of 
existing building mechanicals to roof or upper floors" to 
"increase the planning area's resilience to current and future 
5 
 
hazards."  The approved MHP also sets forth standards for the 
lot coverage of each site, allowances which deviate from the 
department's standards.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.51(3)(d) 
(2017) (requiring "at least one square foot of the project site 
at ground level" to be "reserved as open space for every square 
foot of tideland area within the combined footprint of buildings 
containing nonwater-dependent use on the project site").  
Furthermore, the approved MHP allows a minimum setback for 
buildings from the water's edge at the Hook Wharf site of twelve 
feet, whereas the comparable waterways regulation defines a 
minimum setback of twenty-five feet.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 9.51(3)(c) (2017). 
The Secretary approved the MHP, indicating her finding 
under the municipal harbor plan regulations, 301 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 23.00 (2017), that the alternative dimensional 
specifications "ensure that, in general, new or expanded 
buildings for nonwater-dependent use will be relatively modest 
in size, in order that wind, shadow, and other conditions of the 
ground level environment will be conducive to water-dependent 
activity and public access associated therewith, as appropriate 
for the harbor in question."  301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 23.05(2)(c)(5).  In approving the MHP at issue here, the 
Secretary wrote, "I recognize that while the proposed building 
height is significantly greater than what would be allowed under 
6 
 
the baseline [w]aterways requirements [set by the department]," 
the substitute specifications "generally fit[]" within "the 
setting of the entire [Boston] skyline." 
The plaintiffs in these two actions sought, inter alia, a 
declaratory judgment that the waterways regulations are invalid 
insofar as they purport to delegate approval authority to the 
Secretary where the Secretary has approved substitute 
specifications in connection with an MHP.6  The Superior Court 
judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs, entering a declaration in each case that the 
challenged delegation by the department was ultra vires.  The 
judge then reported his decision to the Appeals Court, pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64, as amended, 423 Mass. 1410 (1996);7 the 
 
6 The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) also argued that the 
MHP was invalid because it was not promulgated in accordance 
with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  The APA claim was 
dismissed by the Superior Court judge for lack of standing, and 
the judge also reported his decision dismissing that claim.  CLF 
cross-appealed accordingly.  We do not reach the cross appeal in 
light of our ruling.  Cf. Zaniboni v. Massachusetts Trial Court, 
465 Mass. 1013, 1014-1015 (2013) (declining to answer question 
reported under Mass. R. Civ. P. 64, as amended, 423 Mass. 1410 
[1996]). 
 
7 The rule provides, in relevant part: 
 
"The court, after verdict or after a finding of facts under 
[Mass. R. Civ. P. 52, as amended, 423 Mass. 1408 (1996)], 
may report the case for determination by the appeals court.  
If the trial court is of the opinion that an interlocutory 
finding or order made by it so affects the merits of the 
controversy that the matter ought to be determined by the 
 
7 
 
Secretary and the Commissioner of Environmental Protection filed 
an application for direct appellate review of the report of the 
two cases, which we allowed. 
2.  Discussion.8  a.  Standard of review.  We turn to 
consider the department's authority to promulgate regulations 
effectively binding itself to license a proposed construction 
project in the tidelands where the Secretary has approved, as 
part of an MHP, specifications that deviate from the 
department's own specifications.  We do so under familiar 
standards. 
The scope of the department's authority presents a question 
of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.  See 
Rosing v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 458 Mass. 283, 290 (2010).  
To determine whether an agency acts within its statutory 
authority in promulgating regulations, we determine "whether the 
Legislature has spoken with certainty on the topic in question," 
using the "conventional tools of statutory interpretation," and 
if "the statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the 
 
appeals court before any further proceedings in the trial 
court, it may report such matter, and may stay all further 
proceedings except such as are necessary to preserve the 
rights of the parties." 
 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 64, supra. 
 
8 Although the city of Boston purportedly has disavowed the 
MHP, it remains in effect.  Accordingly, the controversy is not 
moot, contrary to the Attorney General's suggestion. 
8 
 
Legislature's intent."  Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 
444 Mass. 627, 632-633 (2005).  If the Legislature has not 
spoken to the issue directly, we determine whether the agency's 
regulations may "be reconciled with the governing legislation" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 633.  Within the scope of its 
enabling legislation, the department has "a wide range of 
discretion in establishing the parameters of its authority."  
Levy v. Board of Registration & Discipline in Med., 378 Mass. 
519, 525 (1979).  Because the department enjoys broad authority 
to effectuate the purposes of the legislation, we accord 
substantial deference to its expertise and experience.  See 
Goldberg, supra; Massachusetts Inst. of Tech. v. Department of 
Pub. Utils., 425 Mass. 856, 867 (1997). 
The principle of according weight to an agency's 
discretion, however, is "'one of deference, not abdication,' and 
this court will not hesitate to overrule agency interpretations 
of statutes or rules when those interpretations are arbitrary or 
unreasonable."  Moot v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 448 
Mass. 340, 346 (2007), S.C., 456 Mass. 309 (2010), quoting 
Boston Preservation Alliance, Inc. v. Secretary of Envtl. 
Affairs, 396 Mass. 489, 498 (1986).  When an agency acts beyond 
the scope of authority conferred to it by statute, its actions 
are invalid and ultra vires.  See Atlanticare Med. Ctr. v. 
Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 439 Mass. 1, 14 
9 
 
(2003) (agency has "no inherent authority to issue regulations 
. . . [that] exceed the authority conferred by the statutes by 
which the agency was created" [citation omitted]); Matter of 
Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., Ltd. (No. 1), 426 Mass. 362, 366 
(1998) ("An administrative agency has only the powers and duties 
expressly or impliedly conferred on it by statute").  See also 
Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 459 Mass. 319, 331 (2011), quoting Morey v. Martha's 
Vineyard Comm'n, 409 Mass. 813, 818 (1991) (where "scope of 
agency authority is at issue, we must determine whether the 
agency is acting within 'the powers and duties expressly 
conferred upon it by statute and such as are reasonably 
necessary to carry out its mission'"). 
b.  Public trust doctrine.  For centuries, the Commonwealth 
has recognized the importance of regulating its tidelands9 under 
the public trust doctrine, "an age-old concept with ancient 
roots . . . expressed as the government's obligation to protect 
the public's interest in . . . the Commonwealth's waterways."  
 
9 Tidelands are defined as "present and former submerged 
lands and tidal flats lying below the mean high water mark."  
G. L. c. 91, § 1.  The Waterways Act distinguishes between 
"Commonwealth tidelands" and "private tidelands."  Commonwealth 
tidelands, at issue here, are defined as "tidelands held by the 
commonwealth in trust for the benefit of the public or held by 
another party by license or grant of the commonwealth subject to 
an express or implied condition subsequent that it be used for a 
public purpose."  Id. 
10 
 
Trio Algarvio, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of 
Environmental Protection, 440 Mass. 94, 97 (2003), citing Boston 
Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 631-637 
(1979) (recounting common-law history of public trust doctrine 
from its genesis in Roman times to its inclusion in 
Massachusetts's waterways laws).10  "[O]nly the Commonwealth, or 
an entity to which the Legislature properly has delegated 
authority, may administer public trust rights" in tidelands.  
Fafard v. Conservation Comm'n of Barnstable, 432 Mass. 194, 199 
(2000).  "The Legislature has designated [the department] as the 
agency charged with responsibility for protecting public trust 
rights in tidelands through the c. 91[11] licensing program 
. . . ."  Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy 
 
10 "Throughout history, the shores of the sea have been 
recognized as a special form of property of unusual value; and 
therefore subject to different legal rules from those which 
apply to inland property."  Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp., 378 
Mass. at 631.  They "are held in the public trust."  Alliance to 
Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
457 Mass. 663, 677 (2010).  Because the Legislature acts as a 
fiduciary for the public in regard to tidelands, the 
Legislature's authority to abandon, release, or extinguish the 
public interest in such property is tightly regulated; G. L. 
c. 91 "sets out to 'preserve and protect,' under [the 
department's] watch, the public's rights in tidelands."  Navy 
Yard Four Assocs., LLC v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 213, 221 (2015), quoting Moot, 448 Mass. at 347. 
 
11 In 1866, the Legislature first codified the existing 
network of laws governing tidelands into the Waterways Act, 
G. L. c. 91.  Goodwin, Massachusetts's Chapter 91:  An Effective 
Model for State Stewardship of Coastal Lands, 5 Ocean & Coastal 
L.J. 45, 50 (2000). 
11 
 
Facilities Siting Bd., 457 Mass. 663, 678 (2010).  See also Navy 
Yard Four Assocs., LLC v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 213, 219 (2015) (stressing special designation of 
department). 
Under G. L. c. 91, § 18, the department12 may only issue a 
license for "nonwater dependent uses of tidelands" if 
"a written determination by the department is made 
following a public hearing that said structures or fill 
shall serve a proper public purpose and that said purpose 
shall provide a greater public benefit than public 
detriment to the rights of the public in said lands and 
that the determination is consistent with the policies of 
the Massachusetts coastal zone management program." 
 
G. L. c. 91, § 18.  Consistent with this delegated authority, 
the department has promulgated regulations governing its 
licensing decision-making and setting forth certain dimensional 
specifications for proposed nonwater-dependent projects in 
tidelands.13  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.31 (2017) (general 
licensing requirements and standards); 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 9.51-9.55 (2017) (specific dimensional and use standards) 
 
12 The department is housed within the EEA, which the 
Legislature created in 1974, see St. 1974, c. 806, § 1, 
inserting G. L. c. 21A, §§ 1, 7-8, to "carry out the state 
environmental policy," including "develop[ing] policies, plans, 
and programs" to support State environmental policy, G. L. 
c. 21A, § 2.  The Secretary of the EEA is charged with, inter 
alia, coordination and oversight of the department, G. L. 
c. 21A, §§ 3-4. 
 
13 General Laws c. 91, § 18, provides:  "The department may 
promulgate regulations for implementation for its authority 
under this chapter." 
12 
 
(collectively, the waterways regulations).14  The waterways 
regulations recognize that these "minimum conditions" are 
"necessary to prevent undue detriments to the capacity of 
tidelands to accommodate water-dependent use."  310 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 9.51(3) (2017). 
c.  The challenged regulations.  Critically, for nonwater-
dependent uses located in an area subject to an MHP approved by 
the Secretary,15 the waterways regulations purport to require the 
department to substitute the specifications in an approved MHP 
even if they differ from the specifications provided by the 
department in the waterways regulations, waiving its own 
specifications in deference to those approved by the Secretary 
in an MHP.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.34(2)(b) (2017) ("the 
Department shall . . . apply the . . . numerical standards 
specified in the municipal harbor plan as a substitute for the 
 
14 These regulations were submitted to legislative 
committees for approval as required by the authorizing statute.  
G. L. c. 91, § 18 ("The department shall submit any regulations 
promulgated under the provisions of this chapter to the joint 
legislative committee on natural resources and agriculture, to 
the senate committee on ways and means and to the house 
committee on ways and means, for their review within sixty days 
prior to the effective date of said regulations"). 
 
15 Where, in the Secretary's estimation, the MHP is 
consistent with coastal zone management policies and with the 
preservation of water-dependent activities as defined in the 
waterways regulations, the Secretary may approve the MHP.  301 
Code Mass. Regs. § 23.05.  The MHP regulations, 301 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 23.00, were promulgated pursuant to G. L. c. 21A and 
were not submitted to the legislative committees for approval. 
13 
 
respective limitations or standards contained in [the waterways 
regulations]" [emphasis added]).16  See, e.g., 310 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 9.51(3)(e) ("the Department shall waive [the 
department's height specification of fifty-five feet] if the 
project conforms to a municipal harbor plan which, as determined 
by the Secretary in the approval of said plan, specifies 
alternative height limits and other requirements" [emphasis 
added]).  As demonstrated by the project in these cases, the 
substitute standards approved in an MHP can differ significantly 
from the department's own.17 
The waterways regulations further provide that the 
department "shall presume" that compliance with those substitute 
standards of an approved MHP satisfies the statutory requirement 
of G. L. c. 91, § 18, that the project serves a "proper public 
 
16 With regard to at least seven specifications, the 
waterways regulations require the department to defer to the 
Secretary's approval of substitute standards in connection with 
an approved MHP.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 9.51(3)(a)-
(e), 9.53(2)(b)-(c). 
 
17 Substitute standards authorized in an approved MHP 
apparently are not subject to administrative review.  See Matter 
of Wynn MA, LLC, Department of Environmental Protection, Office 
of Appeals and Dispute Resolution, OADR Docket No. 2016-004, at 
6 (Apr. 21, 2016) (declining to review MHP standards because 
they do not "aris[e] under [the waterways] regulations"); Matter 
of the Fan Pier Land Co., Department of Environmental 
Protection, Docket No. 2002-137 (Oct. 29, 2002) (because 
department must adopt Secretary's substitute standards in MHP, 
there is "no plausible legal basis" that would "allow 
reconsideration . . . of the revised overall height limits 
approved by the Secretary [in the MHP]"). 
14 
 
purpose which provides greater benefit than detriment to the 
rights of the public in said lands."  310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 9.31(2)(b).  Similarly, "[i]f the project site is within an 
area covered by a municipal harbor plan, the [d]epartment shall 
presume" that the statutory requirement that a project be 
consistent with the coastal zone management program is met 
(emphasis added).  310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.54(2) (2017).  And 
where a project conforms to an MHP, the department "shall . . . 
determine" that it is consistent with the coastal zone 
management policies.  310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.34(2)(b)(3). 
These presumptions may be rebutted, but only on the narrow 
grounds that either "the basic requirements" for issuing a 
license or permit have not been met, or there is "a clear 
showing . . . made by a municipal, state, regional, or federal 
agency that requirements beyond those contained in [the 
waterways regulations] are necessary to prevent overriding 
detriment to a public interest which said agency is responsible 
for protecting."  310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.31(3).  Tellingly, 
the Secretary does not rely on these narrow bases for overcoming 
the presumptions set forth in the waterways regulations as 
providing a meaningful review by the department.  Accordingly, 
the challenged waterways regulations essentially provide that if 
a project meets specifications set forth in an MHP approved by 
the Secretary, the department is bound to determine that the 
15 
 
project meets the requirements of G. L. c. 91, § 18, that the 
project serves a proper public purpose, which provides a greater 
public benefit than public detriment, and that such a 
determination is consistent with the coastal zone management 
program's policies.  In effect, application of the deference 
mandated by the challenged regulations18 results in the 
delegation to the Secretary of the department's licensing 
authority over an entire category of projects in tidelands –- 
namely, those included in an approved MHP. 
 
d.  Ultra vires delegation.  The department has no 
authority to delegate to the Secretary its public trust duties 
to preserve and protect the public's interest in tidelands in 
this manner.  See Moot, 448 Mass. at 353 (striking down 
regulation exempting landlocked tidelands as "relinquish[ment] 
by departmental regulation"). 
Our decision in Moot is instructive.  There, we reviewed a 
provision of the department's waterways regulations that 
exempted all landlocked tidelands from its licensing procedures.  
 
18 To summarize, the challenged regulations are the 
following:  310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.31(2)(b) (establishing 
presumption of compliance if substitute standards are met); 
§ 9.34(2) (requiring department to substitute its own standards 
for those found within approved MHP); §§ 9.51(3), 9.53(2)(b) and 
(c) (provisions requiring department to waive its own standards 
for those found in approved MHP); and § 9.54(2) (requiring 
department to presume coastal zone management standards are met 
if project is within approved MHP). 
16 
 
Moot, 448 Mass. at 344-345.  Based on the public trust 
principles, we determined that "the department has acted in 
excess of its authority in exempting all landlocked tidelands 
from all licensing requirements."  Id. at 347.  The same 
reasoning applies here.  While the Secretary is correct that the 
challenged regulations do not literally "exempt" any tidelands 
from the G. L. c. 91 licensing requirements, the effect of the 
challenged regulations is analogous.  Incorporating decisions 
made by the Secretary as binding impermissibly delegates the 
department's public trust duty, excludes wholesale a certain 
category of project from its purview, and "effectively 
relinquish[es] all public rights that the Legislature has 
mandated be preserved through the licensing requirements [of 
G. L. c. 91, § 18]."  Id. at 350.  "The department has no 
authority to forgo its responsibility to preserve and protect 
the public's rights in tidelands (water dependent or nonwater 
dependent), whether for administrative convenience, conservation 
of the department's resources or any other laudable agency 
reason."  Id. 
The Secretary principally contends that the department's 
regulations are a reasonable exercise of its power under G. L. 
c. 91 by defining two sets of specifications:  (i) generic 
specifications for non-MHP covered areas and (ii) harbor-
specific specifications determined by allowing the Secretary (as 
17 
 
the "administrator" of the tidelands, see G. L. c. 91, 
§ 18B [a]) to define specifications in areas covered by MHPs.19  
The Secretary further argues that, because the department can 
provide a recommendation in connection with the MHP approval 
process, the regulatory scheme handing those determinations over 
to the Secretary is reasonable.  See 301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 23.08(2) (allowing department to "provide a written 
recommendation to the Secretary concerning the consistency of a 
proposed MHP with state tidelands policy objectives and 
associated regulatory principles"). 
This argument ignores the unique public trust principles at 
play.  The public trust doctrine does not analyze 
reasonableness; rather, it requires express legislative 
 
19 In order to approve an MHP, the Secretary must determine 
that the MHP is consistent with State coastal zone management 
policies and State tidelands policy objectives as set forth in 
the waterways regulations.  See 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.05(1)-
(2).  Additionally, the Secretary must make specific findings if 
the MHP will authorize substitute standards, see 
§ 23.05(2)(c)(1)-(7) (setting forth required findings for each 
substitute standard).  The MHP approval process is administered 
primarily by the Office of Coastal Zone Management, within the 
EEA.  301 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.08(1).  Notably, the Secretary 
is not required to gather input from the department; rather, the 
department may participate in the public hearing or provide 
input in the form of a "written recommendation . . . concerning 
the consistency of a proposed MHP with state tidelands policy 
objectives and associated regulatory principles."  301 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 23.08(2).  Even more, if the department and the 
Office of Coastal Zone Management disagree on a recommendation 
regarding the MHP, the Secretary must mediate the conflict and 
ultimately make the final decision.  301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 23.08(2)(b). 
18 
 
delegation, as it addresses a special, unusually valuable form 
of public property.  Moot, 448 Mass. at 347.  Here, the 
Legislature has also expressly chosen the department to make the 
licensing determinations.  Id.  See Navy Yard Four Assocs., LLC, 
88 Mass. App. Ct. at 218, quoting Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound, Inc., 457 Mass. at 678 ("[t]he Legislature has designated 
[the department] as the agency charged with responsibility for 
protecting public trust rights in tidelands through the c. 91 
licensing program").  The department's ability to make a 
nonbinding "recommendation" as part of the MHP process, see 301 
Code Mass. Regs. § 23.08(2), does not save the improper 
delegation underlying the regulatory scheme because it gets the 
legislative delegation of authority over licensing decisions 
under public trust principles backwards.  To be sure, the 
department is free to consider -- but should not be bound to 
adopt -- the Secretary's input when it makes licensing 
determinations under G. L. c. 91, § 18.  Other provisions within 
the waterways regulations, for example, permissibly require that 
an approved MHP receive "particular consideration" -- as opposed 
to establishing a binding determination upon the department -- 
when the department makes its ultimate licensing decision.  See 
310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 9.35, 9.36, 9.52, 9.53.  Giving the 
department a nonbinding role for input to the Secretary on her 
decision whether to approve substitute specifications in 
19 
 
connection with an approved MHP cannot be squared with the 
Legislature's express delegation to the department of licensing 
decisions in the tidelands.  The challenged regulations put the 
Secretary in the exact position that the Legislature delegated 
to the department; this the department cannot do. 
The department, of course, has authority to promulgate 
regulations for implementing G. L. c. 91, and it need not 
proceed on a case-by-case basis in making licensing 
determinations (although, of course, it may).  Massachusetts Eye 
& Ear Infirmary v. Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 
428 Mass. 805, 817 (1999) (holding agency "may operate on a 
case-by-case basis to determine [if a threshold inquiry is met] 
. . . provided there is adequate review of its decision," or it 
"may promulgate clear rules and deny all [applicants] not in 
compliance with those rules").  However, the department may not 
cede to the Secretary the decision whether nonwater-dependent 
uses of tidelands serve, inter alia, a proper public purpose by 
binding itself to so find based on the Secretary's decision to 
approve specifications in connection with an MHP.  These 
obligations are based in public trust principles and, as such, 
can only be delegated by the Legislature itself.  See Moot, 448 
Mass. at 353. 
The Secretary also maintains that because the department 
performs the ministerial act of actually issuing the required 
20 
 
license, even when an MHP is approved by the Secretary, the 
department does not, in fact, delegate its public trust rights 
but instead maintains its licensing authority under G. L. c. 91, 
§ 18.  Such a technicality does not save the regulations.  The 
department has bound itself to defer to the Secretary with 
respect to the specific determinations that must be made before 
a license is issued.20  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.51(3)(a)-
(e); 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.53(2)(b)-(c).  This 
"relinquish[ment] by departmental regulation" is impermissible 
under public trust principles.  Moot, 448 Mass. at 353. 
The Secretary further argues that the Legislature impliedly 
approved the department's delegation to the Secretary because 
the department submitted the waterways regulations to the 
Legislature for approval according to the mandate in G. L. 
c. 91, § 18.  See note 14, supra.  The Secretary also contends 
that the general statutory authority granted in G. L. c. 21A 
impliedly delegates to the Secretary the authority needed under 
public trust principles.  See G. L. c. 21A, § 2 (EEA and its 
"appropriate departments . . . shall carry out the state 
environmental policy"); G. L. c. 21A, § 3 ("The secretary shall 
 
20 As discussed supra, while the regulatory presumptions may 
be overcome on narrow grounds, see 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 9.31(3), the Secretary does not rely on these to argue that 
the department exercises meaningful review after the Secretary 
has approved an MHP. 
21 
 
conduct comprehensive planning with respect to the functions of 
the office and shall coordinate the activities and programs of 
the departments . . ."); G. L. c. 21A, § 4 (granting Secretary 
"powers and duties concerning any power or duty assigned to any 
such department, division or other administrative unit" for 
"programs jointly agreed to by the secretary").  See also G. L. 
c. 91, § 18B (a) (designating Secretary as "the administrator of 
tidelands"). 
We disagree.  The public trust principles require an 
express delegation of that responsibility by the Legislature; an 
implied approval will not suffice.  Compare Alliance to Protect 
Nantucket Sound, Inc., 457 Mass. at 678 (holding that "express 
legislative directive" authorized siting board to assume 
department's licensing responsibility), with Arno v. 
Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 434, 451 (2010) (holding neither Land 
Court nor Attorney General had express legislative authority to 
relinquish public trust responsibility despite provisions in 
registration act permitting Land Court to quiet title to parcel 
on filled tidelands, conclusively "upon and against all persons, 
including the commonwealth"), Moot, 448 Mass. at 349-350 
(holding department had no authority to exempt landlocked 
tidelands from G. L. c. 91 licensing requirements, because only 
Legislature can relinquish public trust responsibility), and 
Fafard, 432 Mass. at 198-199 (holding town had no authority to 
22 
 
promulgate bylaw that purported to grant public trust 
responsibilities to local commission, because only Legislature 
could do so).  There is no such express legislative directive to 
the Secretary here; rather, the department has attempted to 
delegate its own authority, which it cannot do.  See Moot, 
supra. 
Indeed, contrary to the Secretary's argument, the 
Legislature assigned a different role to the Secretary in 
connection with proposed licensed uses in tidelands.  In 
particular, the Secretary "shall conduct and complete a public 
benefit review for any proposed project" that is subject to a 
license under G. L. c. 91, § 18.  G. L. c. 91, § 18B (b).  The 
Secretary then "shall provide the determination of public 
benefit to the department," and the department "shall 
incorporate the public benefit determination of the secretary in 
the official record."  Id.  Importantly, G. L. c. 91, § 18B, 
specifies that the Secretary's determination "shall not 
supersede [G. L. c. 91] or any rules or regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto and shall not delay the issuance of a license 
pursuant to this chapter or the completion of a review or any 
step thereof."  Id.  See Moot v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 456 Mass. 309, 312 (2010); 301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 13.05 (2008) (Secretary's public benefit review determination 
23 
 
"shall not supersede, eliminate, or in any way impair the 
[d]epartment's exercise of its powers under [G. L. c.] 91").21 
3.  Conclusion.  The challenged waterways regulations 
purporting to require mandatory substitute standards and 
presumptions are an unlawful delegation of the department's 
decision-making authority to the Secretary.  Thus, we affirm the 
Superior Court judge's partial grant of summary judgment and 
entry of declarations in the two underlying cases that these 
regulations are invalid as an improper delegation of the 
department's public trust responsibilities.  We remand the 
matters for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
21 The Secretary suggests that our conclusion in these cases 
may upset reliance interest going back thirty years in 
connection with the department's licensing decisions in 
connection with other approved MHPs.  While these cases do not 
present occasion to review in any substantive manner licensing 
pursuant to these historical MHPs, we note that the time to 
challenge the department's licensing decisions is finite.  See 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1) (action seeking judicial review of 
agency's final decision must be filed within thirty days of 
receipt of notice of decision); 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.17(2) 
(administrative challenges to licensing decision must be brought 
within twenty-one days of department's determination).