Title: Prieto v. Warden

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
     In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme 
Court Building in the City of Richmond, on Thursday, the 
12th day of September, 2013. 
 
 
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, 
McClanahan and Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
 
Alfredo R. Prieto, 
Petitioner, 
 
against 
Record No. 122054 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed November 30, 2012, and the respondent's 
motion to dismiss, the Court is of the opinion that the 
motion should be granted and the writ should not issue. 
Alfredo R. Prieto was convicted in the Circuit Court 
of Fairfax County in 2008 of capital murder in the 
commission of, or subsequent to, rape, Code § 18.2-31(5); 
capital murder of more than one person as part of the same 
act or transaction, Code § 18.2-31(7); rape, Code § 18.2-
61; two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of 
murder, Code § 18.2-53.1; and grand larceny, Code § 18.2-
95, and was sentenced to death for each of the capital 
murder convictions and twenty years' imprisonment for the 
remaining convictions.  The victims of these 1988 crimes 
 
2 
were Rachel Raver and Warren Fulton III.  This Court 
affirmed Prieto's convictions, but found the verdict forms 
defective and remanded for resentencing.  Prieto v. 
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 366, 418, 682 S.E.2d 910, 938 (2009).  
On remand in 2010, after finding the aggravating factors of 
vileness and future dangerousness, the jury fixed Prieto's 
sentence for each of the capital murder convictions at 
death.  The trial court sentenced Prieto in accordance with 
the jury's verdicts.  This Court upheld Prieto's sentences 
of death in Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 189, 721 
S.E.2d 484, 508 (2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 
S.Ct. 244 (2012). 
CLAIM (I) 
In a portion of claim (I), Prieto argues he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase 
of the 2008 trial because counsel failed to thoroughly 
investigate and review the analysis of the DNA found in 
Raver's vagina.  Prieto alleges the analysis showed the 
presence of DNA not linked to either Prieto or Raver.  
Testing conducted on three occasions in 2000 by Carol 
Palmer, a forensic scientist of the Virginia Department of 
Forensic Science, showed a "12" allele at the vWA locus of 
the non-sperm fraction from the vaginal swabs taken from 
Raver.  Neither Raver nor Prieto have a "12" allele at that 
 
3 
locus.  Prieto argues the presence of the "12" allele shows 
another perpetrator also sexually assaulted Raver.  Prieto 
contends counsel was deficient for failing to notice the 
"12" allele and to argue at trial that it showed the 
presence of another perpetrator. 
Prieto further argues counsel failed to have Dr. J. 
Thomas McClintock, a DNA expert appointed to assist Prieto, 
review this information to determine if it supported the 
presence of a second perpetrator.  In support, Prieto 
provides Dr. McClintock's affidavit, stating he was never 
asked to look at the documentation pertaining to the non-
sperm fraction of the vaginal swab and that had he known of 
the presence of the "12" allele he would have testified 
that it represented a foreign allele.  Prieto contends this 
evidence was the strongest evidence available in support of 
the defense theory that a second perpetrator committed the 
murders.  Prieto argues that had this evidence been 
presented, it would have "raise[d] reasonable doubt in 
jurors' minds about whether the evidence proved that Prieto 
acted alone or was an immediate perpetrator of the murders" 
and would have likely "required a jury to acquit Prieto of 
capital murder." 
 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
 
4 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The record, 
including the affidavit of Carol Palmer, demonstrates that 
Palmer observed the "12" allele at the vWA locus but 
determined it was an artifact, which is the byproduct of 
the DNA typing process resulting from the required 
amplification of samples.  Palmer observed the same "12" 
allele artifact in an analysis of Raver's blood sample.  
The determination of the "12" allele as an artifact was 
confirmed when (1) the non-sperm fraction of the vaginal 
swab and Raver's blood were analyzed by a second analyst 
and the results from Palmer's and the second analyst's 
testing were reviewed by a third scientist, and (2) when 
the samples were independently tested, re-tested, and those 
results reviewed at another Division of Forensic Science 
laboratory.  This data, all of which was collected prior to 
the guilt phase of trial, supported Palmer's determination 
that the "12" allele was an artifact, not a real allele, as 
well as her conclusion that a third DNA donor was not 
present. 
The affidavit of Dr. McClintock does not address the 
testing done at the second laboratory or how those results 
would have affected his opinion.  Moreover, this Court has 
already extensively reviewed the evidence presented at 
 
5 
trial and determined that the evidence was overwhelming 
that Prieto was the sole perpetrator of the murders.  
Prieto, 278 Va. at 398-01, 682 S.E.2d at 927-29.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (I), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt 
phase of the trial because counsel failed to have the anal 
swabs taken from Raver further analyzed.  Prieto cites to a 
1988 certificate of analysis which notes the presence of 
spermatozoa in the extracts of the anal swabs and a 1994 
note from the Department of Forensic Science that indicates 
both the vaginal and anal swabs contained a "male 
fraction."  The anal swab was never further tested.  Prieto 
contends such testing reasonably could have uncovered 
additional evidence of a second perpetrator. 
 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) fails 
to satisfy the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and Palmer's affidavit, demonstrates that the 
anal swabs, which contained a trace amount of spermatozoa, 
were tested twice.  In 1989, the swabs were tested by an 
 
6 
outside laboratory, LifeCodes.  This analysis showed the 
presence of only Raver's DNA.  The swabs were tested again 
in 1994 by another scientist at the Division of Forensic 
Science, George Li.  Li's testing showed "[n]o conclusive 
DNA profile was obtained from . . . the extract of the anal 
swab." 
Subsequently, in 2000, Palmer inventoried the anal 
swabs and determined not to test them again because only a 
trace amount of spermatozoa had been present in the samples 
and most of the samples had been destroyed by the previous 
testing.  Prieto fails to show that any testing could have 
been conducted on the amount of the anal swab sample that 
remained and he fails to proffer what the results of any 
testing would have shown.  Thus, Prieto has failed to 
demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (I), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt 
phase of the trial because counsel failed to present 
evidence that the Negroid hairs recovered from combings of 
Raver's pubic area were lost after the Commonwealth had 
identified Prieto as the primary suspect and after the 
exculpatory nature of the hairs became apparent.  Prieto 
further contends counsel erred by conceding at trial that 
 
7 
the police did not act in bad faith when the hairs were 
either lost or destroyed.  Prieto argues counsel's failure 
deprived Prieto of his "due process remedy," allowed the 
Commonwealth to unfairly undermine the probative value of 
the hairs, and diminished the efficacy of his theory of a 
second perpetrator. 
 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.   
The Court addressed the issue of the missing hairs in 
Prieto I.  The Court held that the Commonwealth could not 
have had knowledge of any exculpatory value in the hairs at 
the time they were lost because the hairs were lost before 
Prieto was a suspect.  Prieto, 278 Va. at 397, 682 S.E.2d 
at 926.  The last time that the hairs were seen was in 
1989, when they were sealed inside an evidence envelope.  
Id.  They were not discovered to be missing until 2005, 
when Prieto became a suspect.  Id.  Thus, the hairs did not 
have "apparent exculpatory value" when they were lost.  Id. 
Moreover, the record, including the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that the jury was presented with evidence that 
the hairs were discovered to be missing in 2005, after 
Prieto had been identified as a possible suspect.  Finally, 
Prieto presents no evidence to demonstrate that the 
 
8 
Commonwealth acted in bad faith.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (II)(A) 
In claim (II)(A), Prieto contends he was denied the 
right to a jury "of the state and district" where the 
crimes were committed, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, 
because a juror who did not reside in Virginia was seated 
at his first trial.  Prieto further alleges the seating of 
this juror violated Code § 8.01-337, which provides that 
individuals are "liable" to serve on a jury if they are 
citizens of the United States, are over the age of 
eighteen, and have been "residents of the Commonwealth one 
year, and of the county, city or town in which they reside 
six months next preceding their being summoned to serve."  
Prieto claims he learned of the juror's alleged disability 
more than four years after the trial.  Prieto contends the 
seating of this juror is a structural error requiring 
automatic reversal because it exceeded both the trial 
court's authority and the limits of state sovereignty to 
reach across state lines to seat a juror from another 
state. 
 
9 
In support of this claim, Prieto relies on two 
affidavits from Juror 46, in which the juror avers that 
shortly before Prieto's trial he moved out of the Fairfax 
County townhouse that he owned, that he was renting the 
townhouse to another and living in the District of 
Columbia, and that he did not intend to move back to 
Virginia.  Prieto concedes the juror list provided to trial 
counsel by the trial court showed a Fairfax County address 
for Juror 46.  Prieto further concedes Juror 46, along with 
a panel of thirty-three other prospective jurors, was asked 
during voir dire if he had lived in Fairfax for the past 
six months and in the Commonwealth of Virginia for the past 
year and that the panel responded "yes." 
The Court holds claim (II)(A) is without merit.  "A 
'structural error' is a 'defect affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an 
error in the trial process itself.'"  Morrisette v. Warden 
of the Sussex I State Prison, 270 Va. 188, 192, 613 S.E.2d 
551, 556 (2005) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279, 310 (1991)).  Structural errors have been found in a 
very "limited class of cases," and include the denial of 
counsel, the denial of an impartial trial judge, and the 
systematic exclusion of members of the defendant's race 
from the grand jury.  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
 
10 
461, 468-69 (1997).  Structural errors "necessarily render 
a trial fundamentally unfair," and thus are not susceptible 
to harmless error review.  Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
577-78 (1986).  "[I]f [a] defendant had counsel and was 
tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong 
presumption that any other errors that may have occurred 
are subject to harmless-error analysis."  Id. at 579. 
The seating of Juror 46 is not a structural error as 
it is not a "defect affecting the framework" of Prieto's 
trial.  Thus, it is governed by the ordinary rules 
controlling claims of juror disqualification.  After the 
jury has been sworn, such claims may only be brought "with 
leave of court" upon a showing the "disability be such as 
to probably cause injustice in a criminal case to the 
Commonwealth or to the accused."  Code § 8.01-352; see  
Mason v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 505, 510, 498 S.E.2d 921, 
923 (1998) (affirming trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion for a mistrial where the record failed to 
demonstrate the challenged juror had a disability which was 
"such as to probably cause injustice"); see also Kohl v. 
Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 302 (1895) (reviewing common law 
relating to juror disability and holding if a party fails 
to timely bring a challenge based on a claim that a juror 
is incompetent to serve for reasons such as alienage, 
 
11 
infancy, or nonresidency, whether "voluntarily, or through 
negligence, or want of knowledge" such claim is waived; 
such "defect is not fundamental as affecting the 
substantial rights of the accused[,] and the verdict is not 
void for want of power to render it").  Prieto has not 
articulated any prejudice or injustice stemming from the 
alleged lack of residency of Juror 46. 
CLAIM (II)(B) 
In claim (II)(B), Prieto contends he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
learn Juror 46 was not a Virginia resident at the time of 
Prieto's 2010 trial. 
The Court holds claim (II)(B) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  As Prieto 
concedes, the record, including the manuscript record and 
the trial transcript, demonstrates that the juror list 
provided to trial counsel by the trial court showed an 
address for Juror 46 in Fairfax County.  Additionally, 
after specifically informing Juror 46 and thirty-three 
other prospective jurors that each question required a 
verbal response, the trial court questioned the jurors 
regarding their citizenship and residency and the jurors 
affirmed that they had each lived in Fairfax County for the 
 
12 
past six months and in the Commonwealth for the past year.  
Under the circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for 
counsel to accept that Juror 46 was a resident of Virginia 
and to decline to question him further.  Moreover, Prieto 
fails to allege any prejudice resulting from counsel's 
failure to challenge Juror 46.  Thus, Prieto has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
CLAIM (III) 
In claim (III), Prieto alleges he was denied the right 
to select and be sentenced by an impartial jury.  Prieto 
contends that, at his 2010 trial, Juror 23 intentionally 
withheld information during voir dire regarding sexual 
assaults the juror had suffered.  In support of this claim, 
Prieto relies on Juror 23's September 2012 affidavit, 
stating that Juror 23 was repeatedly molested as a child.  
Prieto alleges that Juror 23 withheld this information from 
the questionnaire that jurors filled out prior to voir 
dire, as well as during the course of voir dire 
questioning, to hide his bias against Prieto.  Prieto 
contends the concealment of this information deprived him 
of a valid basis to remove Juror 23 for cause because he 
 
13 
was not afforded the opportunity to question Juror 23 about 
whether the sexual assaults impacted the juror's decision-
making and ability to be impartial. 
 
The Court holds that claim (III) is without merit.  
The record, including the questionnaire of Juror 23 and the 
trial transcript, does not demonstrate that Juror 23 either 
failed to honestly answer the questions asked of him, or 
that he was biased against Prieto.  In the questionnaire, 
Juror 23 responded "no" when asked if he had ever been the 
victim of a crime, even if the crime was never reported.   
However, Juror 23 subsequently answered that he had been 
previously assaulted by three men in response to a question 
about whether he had ever appeared in court.  During voir 
dire, a panel of prospective jurors that included Juror 23 
was asked if any of them or individuals close to them had 
been the victim of serious criminal conduct.  Even though 
another juror answered regarding the rape of a niece, Juror 
23 still only addressed the previous assault in his 
response.  Additionally, near the end of voir dire, Juror 
23 did not respond when asked if he thought of anything new 
as a result of anything that had been asked during the 
course of voir dire. 
Juror 23's responses do not show that he was 
intentionally withholding information or not honestly 
 
14 
answering the questions posed to him.  Rather, they show 
that Juror 23 may not have realized from the questions 
posed the need to address the sexual molestation he 
suffered as a youth.  Moreover, Prieto fails to show that 
Juror 23 was biased against him.  Multiple times during 
voir dire, Juror 23 indicated he could remain impartial 
before making a decision as to Prieto's sentence.  Thus, 
Prieto has failed to demonstrate that Juror 23 failed to 
answer honestly a material question during voir dire, and 
he has consequently failed to show he was denied the right 
to an impartial jury.  See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). 
CLAIM (IV) 
In a portion of claim (IV), Prieto contends he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to move to exclude Juror 23 for cause.  Prieto 
alleges Juror 23 indicated during voir dire that he would 
not vote for a life sentence unless he heard from Prieto, 
either directly or indirectly, at sentencing. 
 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IV) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that 
Juror 23 expressed a desire either to hear directly from 
 
15 
Prieto or to be able to review any testimony Prieto may 
have given during the guilt phase of the trial as a way to 
help the jury determine the appropriate sentence Prieto 
should receive.  However, when asked by counsel if he would 
be able to put aside his expectation of Prieto testifying 
and follow the court's instructions that Prieto's failure 
to testify could not be held against him, Juror 23 
responded on two separate occasions that he could and would 
have no problem doing so.  Based on the responses of Juror 
23, counsel for Prieto could reasonably conclude they had 
no grounds to move to exclude Juror 23 for cause. 
Furthermore, given the responses of Juror 23, Prieto cannot 
establish a reasonable probability that the court would 
have granted a motion to strike the juror if counsel for 
Prieto had moved to strike Juror 23 for cause.  Thus, 
Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (IV), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to interview Juror 23 after the jury returned with a 
sentence of death.  Prieto contends that, based on the voir 
dire responses of Juror 23, counsel should have known Juror 
 
16 
23 would hold Prieto's failure to testify against him and 
should have interviewed Juror 23 about this matter once the 
sentence was handed down.  Continuing, Prieto asserts that 
if counsel had done so, they would have discovered juror 
misconduct that would have supported a motion for a 
mistrial. 
Prieto cites to two portions of the affidavit of Juror 
23 in support of this claim.  First, Juror 23 admits he 
"really wanted" to hear from Prieto in some fashion at 
sentencing because Juror 23 believed Prieto "owed" the jury 
an explanation for his actions.  Juror 23 states his belief 
that Prieto "should get up there and refute what [the 
Commonwealth is] saying about you" and that had such an 
explanation occurred he "could have voted for life."  
Second, Juror 23 states that while the court explained what 
a life sentence was, the explanation was vague and did not 
change his understanding that "life in prison was 50 
years."  Prieto alleges that, had counsel conducted a post-
sentencing interview, these matters would have come to 
light and would have supported the granting of a mistrial 
as it would have showed that Juror 23 did not follow the 
court's instructions. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IV) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
 
17 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that, 
while Juror 23 expressed a desire to hear either directly 
or indirectly from Prieto, he also, on two separate 
occasions, informed counsel and the court that he would 
follow the court's instructions and not hold Prieto’s 
failure to testify against him.  The record also reflects 
that the court instructed the jury that "[i]mprisonment for 
life means imprisonment for life without the possibility of 
parole." 
Given the responses of Juror 23 and the precedent of 
this Court, which holds that a juror is presumed to follow 
the instructions given by the trial court, Muhammad v. 
Warden, 274 Va. 3, 18, 646 S.E.2d 182, 195 (2007) (citing 
Green v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 611, 571 S.E.2d 135, 139 
(2002)), counsel could reasonably conclude they had no 
reason to interview Juror 23.  Additionally, this Court has 
refused to impose such post-trial juror interviews upon 
trial counsel unless counsel knew or should have known of 
the alleged problem at the time of trial.  See Lenz v. 
Warden, 267 Va. 318, 325-26, 593 S.E.2d 292, 296 (2004).   
Furthermore, courts in Virginia "have adhered strictly 
to the general rule that the testimony of jurors should not 
be received to impeach their verdict" and that the best 
 
18 
evidence of a juror's opinion in a case is the unanimous 
verdict reached by the jury.  Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Hulvey, 233 Va. 77, 82, 353 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1987).  Thus, 
Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (V) 
In a portion of claim (V), Prieto alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to present evidence that he suffered from organic 
brain damage.  Specifically, Prieto contends counsel should 
have presented evidence from a neurological evaluation, 
including a positron emission tomography (PET) scan, which 
would have proven that he suffers from frontal lobe 
dysfunction and temporal lobe damage, which renders him 
"incapable of appropriate reasoning, judgment, and impulse 
control." 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (V) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that 
counsel did present evidence at Prieto's 2010 trial that 
Prieto suffered from organic brain damage.  Counsel 
 
19 
presented testimony from Dr. James Grabarino that the  
results of the type of long-term trauma Prieto experienced 
as a child included poor brain development, and from 
clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Mark Cunningham, who 
opined that Prieto's low IQ was an indicator of brain 
damage. 
Moreover, counsel presented evidence of Prieto's PET 
scan during the sentencing phase of Prieto's 2008 trial.  
Although Prieto's expert, Dr. James Merikangan, testified 
that the scan showed Prieto suffered from organic brain 
damage, Dr. Merikangan's opinion was impeached by the 
report of Dr. Michael Kistler, the doctor who conducted the 
PET scan.  Dr. Kistler opined that Prieto did not have 
organic brain damage and that his scan was "normal." 
Counsel, having had the opportunity to present the PET 
scan evidence and to evaluate the strength of the 
Commonwealth's contrary evidence and the effect of the 
evidence on the jury, could reasonably have determined that 
presenting the same evidence at Prieto's second sentencing 
hearing would not be prudent.  Such tactical decisions are 
an area of trial strategy left to the discretion of counsel 
and should not be second-guessed in a habeas corpus 
proceeding.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.  Thus, 
Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
 
20 
was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (V), Prieto contends 
counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce anecdotal 
evidence to support his claim of brain damage.  
Specifically, Prieto contends counsel should have 
introduced evidence to show that as a youth Prieto was 
nervous and slow, stuttered, failed to follow instructions, 
did not like to bathe, and engaged in regressive behavior, 
including bed wetting, playing with toys that were not 
appropriate for his age and exhibiting fear of ghost 
stories, and that as an adult he was unnaturally focused. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (V) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that 
in addition to the expert testimony supporting Prieto's 
claim that he suffered brain damage, counsel presented 
anecdotal evidence at Prieto's 2010 trial that Prieto was 
slower and more reserved than other children, that he 
experienced nightmares as a child, and that he was scared 
of the violence he and his siblings had seen on a regular 
basis.  Moreover, Prieto fails to explain in what manner 
 
21 
his childhood regressive behavior, dislike of bathing, 
stuttering and nervousness or his unnatural focus as an 
adult support his claim of organic brain damage to his 
frontal and temporal lobes.  Thus, Prieto has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (V), Prieto contends 
counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of 
the specific effects on Prieto of the chronic trauma he 
experienced and the ways in which such trauma influenced 
his actions as an adult.  Prieto contends counsel should 
have presented evidence showing the symptoms of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that he suffered as a 
child and as an adult.  Prieto contends that by presenting 
such evidence, counsel could have connected Prieto's 
symptoms to his actions in this case and that counsel's 
failure to do so left the jury with no option but to 
believe Prieto committed the crimes out of "malevolent 
choice." 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (V) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
 
22 
record, including the trial transcripts, demonstrates that 
counsel presented evidence at both Prieto's 2008 trial and 
at his 2010 trial that Prieto suffered from PTSD.  At 
Prieto's 2008 trial, Dr. Pablo Stewart testified that 
Prieto suffered from the disorder, which he opined 
originated in El Salvador when Prieto was a child.  Dr. 
Stewart described the symptoms of PTSD generally and 
explained how Prieto exhibited those symptoms both as a 
child and an adult.  Dr. Stewart further testified Prieto's 
PTSD combined with his low IQ put "him at risk of untoward 
behaviors."  Dr. Stewart conceded, however, that Prieto's 
PTSD could not explain his behavior in this case. 
At Prieto's 2010 trial, counsel presented the 
testimony of Dr. Cunningham.  Dr. Cunningham opined that 
Prieto did suffer from PTSD caused by his childhood 
exposure to "scenes of recurrent horror" during the El 
Salvadorian civil war.  In addition, Dr. Cunningham 
suggested that Prieto suffered from a number of other 
deficits, including the results of chronic, long-term 
trauma, and opined that these deficits caused Prieto to 
lack self-control, inured him to violence, and prevented 
him from appreciating the pain he might inflict.  Dr. 
Cummingham conceded Prieto's outward appearance might not 
show signs of PTSD but explained that his experience of 
 
23 
chronic trauma enabled him to present an outward appearance 
of being calm and comfortable with the past while his 
psyche remained disturbed by it. 
Counsel, having had the opportunity to present 
evidence in Prieto's 2008 trial related to his PTSD, to 
evaluate Prieto's appearance at trial relative to the 
description of the effects of his PTSD, and to evaluate the 
effect of the evidence on the jury, could reasonably have 
determined that presenting the same evidence at Prieto's 
2010 trial would not be effective.  Such tactical decisions 
are an area of trial strategy left to the discretion of 
counsel and should not be second-guessed in a habeas corpus 
proceeding.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.  Thus, 
Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (VII) 
 
In claim (VII), Prieto contends he is mentally 
retarded and that his execution is therefore barred under 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
The Court holds that claim (VII) is barred because 
this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised during 
the direct appeal process and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
 
24 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton v. Parrigan, 
215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
CLAIM (VIII) 
In claim (VIII) and a portion of claim (V), Prieto 
argues counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
evidence at Prieto's 2010 trial that he is mentally 
retarded.  Prieto contends counsel should have presented 
evidence of his low performance on the Escala Wechsler de 
Inteligencia Para Adultos III (EWIPA III) and of his 
significant deficits in adaptive functioning. 
The Court holds that claim (VIII) and this portion of 
claim (V) satisfy neither the "performance" nor the 
"prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcripts, 
demonstrates that counsel presented evidence at Prieto's 
2008 trial that Prieto is mentally retarded.  Dr. Ricardo 
Weinstein testified that Prieto's full scale IQ score on 
the EWIPA III was 66, that his true score was much lower, 
taking into consideration the standard error of measurement 
and the Flynn Effect,1 and that Prieto had significant 
                     
1 Dr. Weinstein and Dr. Leigh Hagan, who also testified 
regarding Prieto's IQ, describe the Flynn Effect as the 
gradual increase in the general population's average IQ 
 
25 
deficits in his adaptive functioning, including low 
academic achievement, poor social skills, and poor 
practical skills.  Dr. Weinstein represented that the EWIPA 
III was a Spanish translation of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale III (WAIS III), published in Mexico.  
Dr. Weinstein testified that he gave Prieto the EWIPA III 
instead of the WAIS III because Spanish was Prieto's 
primary language.  Dr. Weinstein further testified he had 
scored Prieto's test against American norms, rather than 
the Mexican norms established for the EWIPA III, because 
the Mexican norms were unreliable.  Dr. Weinstein conceded 
the instructions for the EWIPA III required that the 
American norms be used only if the test-taker's IQ seemed 
to have been underestimated when measured using the Mexican 
norms, and that Prieto's full scale IQ when measured using 
the Mexican norms was 75. 
The Commonwealth presented evidence that Prieto was 
not mentally retarded, including evidence that Prieto 
achieved a full scale score on the WAIS III of 73, that the 
EWIPA III that was administered to Prieto was not an 
approved test, as required by Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1, that 
the EWIPA III was not scored in conformity to established 
                                                             
scores over time, increasing at a rate of approximately .33 
points per year in the United States. 
 
26 
practices, and that it is not acceptable professional 
practice to modify an individual's score by subtracting 
points to accommodate for the standard error of measurement 
or the Flynn Effect. 
The Commonwealth further presented evidence that 
Prieto did not suffer from deficits in his adaptive 
functioning, including evidence that Prieto received 
consistently good grades in elementary school; that he was 
capable of handling money and opening and closing his own 
bank accounts, obtaining employment, operating heavy 
equipment, and obtaining drivers' licenses in two states; 
that he was fluent in Spanish and English; that he was 
capable of using the inmate grievance procedures; that he 
was interested in and understood current political and 
foreign policy issues; and that he had the ability to 
cultivate useful relationships.  The Commonwealth further 
presented evidence suggesting the WAIS III, rather than the 
EWIPA III, was the appropriate tool for measuring Prieto's 
IQ, because at the time the tests were administered, Prieto 
had been in the United States for more than twenty-four 
years, over half of his life, spoke fluent English and was 
more fluent in English than in Spanish. 
At Prieto's 2010 trial, counsel chose not to argue 
that Prieto was mentally retarded, instead focusing on his 
 
27 
limited intellect, the trauma he experienced as a child, 
the effects of that trauma, and residual doubt of Prieto's 
culpability in the minds of the jurors in an effort to 
mitigate the offenses.  Counsel, having had the opportunity 
to present evidence in Prieto's 2008 trial that Prieto is 
mentally retarded, to weigh the evidence that he is 
mentally retarded against the Commonwealth's contrary 
evidence, and to evaluate the effect of the evidence on the 
jury, could reasonably have determined that any attempt to 
re-litigate the issue at Prieto's 2010 trial would have 
been futile and determined it would be more effective to 
focus on evidence in mitigation of the crimes.  Such 
tactical decisions are an area of trial strategy left to 
the discretion of counsel and should not be second-guessed 
in a habeas corpus proceeding.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689-90.  Further, under the circumstances, Prieto cannot 
meet the burden to show that the jury would have found that 
he is mentally retarded if the evidence was presented in 
the 2010 trial.  Thus, Prieto has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
CLAIM (IX) 
 
28 
In a portion of claim (IX), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate and present evidence "that would have 
cast doubt upon" his convictions in California for the rape 
and first-degree murder of Y. W., a fifteen year-old girl, 
two attempted murders, two additional rapes, three 
kidnappings, two robberies, two attempted robberies, and 
possession of a firearm by a felon.  At the 2010 trial, the 
Commonwealth presented certified copies of Prieto's 
California convictions as well as his sentence of death for 
the first-degree murder conviction.  The Commonwealth also 
presented testimony from one of the victims, Lisa Barajas, 
and from the lead investigator regarding the events that 
led to those convictions.  At the time of Prieto's 2010 
trial, counsel was aware of a pending petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus relating to the California convictions.  
Prieto argues counsel should have investigated the claims 
raised in that habeas petition to rebut the Commonwealth's 
evidence relating to the California convictions. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  A 
collateral attack on a prior conviction from a court of 
competent jurisdiction is normally not allowed as that 
 
29 
conviction is given a presumption of regularity, "till the 
contrary appears."  See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29-30 
(1992) (quoting Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Peters) 
449, 472 (1836)).  The claims Prieto contends counsel 
should have investigated and presented at his 2010 
sentencing hearing did not call into question the 
presumption of regularity that attached to the California 
convictions and, as no ruling on the California petition 
has occurred, the "contrary [has not] appear[ed]" to rebut 
the presumption. 
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to attempt a 
collateral attack on Prieto's California convictions.  
Thus, Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate and present evidence that would have 
cast doubt on his role in the California crimes and thus 
would have diminished the weight of the evidence.  Prieto 
argues counsel should have investigated and presented 
evidence of Barajas' initial statement to the police that 
she could not identify the assailants as she was 
 
30 
blindfolded during the incident as well as evidence of 
Barajas' alleged exposure to suggestive identification 
procedures.  Prieto contends that had this information been 
presented at his 2010 trial it would have affected the 
jury's assessment that Prieto was a future danger to 
society. 
 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including Prieto's 1991 California trial 
transcript, demonstrates that Barajas was questioned 
extensively regarding her identification of Prieto.  
Barajas admitted to initially lying about being blindfolded 
and explained she did so out of fear of retaliation by her 
assailants.  Barajas also explained how she identified 
Prieto from a photographic line-up prior to seeing his 
photograph in the newspaper and again identified Prieto in 
a live line-up after his photograph was published.  
Throughout the trial, Barajas was adamant in her 
identification of Prieto. 
Counsel could have reasonably determined that 
attempting a similar attack on Barajas' identification of 
Prieto at his 2010 trial would have been unsuccessful.  
Prieto has also failed to show in what way the 
 
31 
identification procedures were suggestive.  Moreover, 
extensive cross-examination of Barajas on this point had 
the potential to highlight the aggravated nature of these 
crimes and Prieto's continuing failure to take 
responsibility for his actions.  Counsel is not ineffective 
for failing to present evidence that has the potential of 
being "double-edged."  Lewis v. Warden, 274 Va. 93, 116, 
645 S.E.2d 492, 505 (2007).  Such tactical decisions are an 
area of trial strategy left to the discretion of counsel 
and should not be second-guessed in a habeas corpus 
proceeding.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.  Thus, 
Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (IX), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate and present evidence that would have 
cast doubt on his role in the California crimes and thus 
would have diminished the weight of the evidence.  Prieto 
argues counsel should have investigated the lack of an 
expert to rebut California's theory for the absence of 
seminal fluid on Y. W.  Prieto contends that had this 
information been presented at his 2010 trial it would have 
 
32 
affected the jury's assessment that Prieto was a future 
danger to society. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Prieto has failed to proffer the name or testimony of an 
expert regarding the seminal fluid.  Muhammad, 274 Va. at 
19, 646 S.E.2d at 195.  Thus, Prieto has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim (IX), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate and present evidence that would have 
cast doubt on his role in the California crimes and thus 
would have diminished the weight of the evidence.  Prieto 
argues counsel should have investigated Prieto's trauma 
disorder and his use of drugs at the time of the California 
crimes.  Prieto contends that had this information been 
presented at his 2010 trial it would have affected the 
jury's assessment that Prieto was a future danger to 
society. 
 
33 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including the 2010 trial transcript, demonstrates 
that counsel did present evidence of Prieto's trauma 
disorder and drug use around the time of the California 
crimes.  Counsel presented evidence that Prieto suffered 
from PTSD caused by his childhood exposure to "scenes of 
recurrent horror" during the El Salvadorian civil war.  In 
addition, counsel presented evidence that Prieto suffered 
from a number of other deficits, including the results of 
chronic, long-term trauma.  Counsel further presented 
evidence that Prieto began using drugs extensively in high 
school, that he was using drugs in 1990, and that his drug 
use was one of the factors that "created a significant 
emotional disturbance in" Prieto and thus precipitated his 
violent crimes. 
Prieto fails to allege what additional evidence 
counsel could have presented that would have rebutted the 
aggravating circumstances of his California offenses.  
Thus, Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
34 
 
In another portion of claim (IX), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate and present evidence that would have 
cast doubt on his role in the California crimes and thus 
would have diminished the weight of the evidence.  Prieto 
argues counsel should have investigated an erroneous jury 
instruction that allowed the California jurors to infer 
Prieto's guilt from his possession of Barajas' stolen car 
keys. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  In 
People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1137-38 (Cal. 2003), the 
Supreme Court of California determined that the jury was 
erroneously instructed that Prieto's possession of the car 
keys was a circumstance they could consider in determining 
his guilt without limiting the instruction to the theft 
related crimes.  However, the Court found the error 
harmless.  Id. at 1138. 
Prieto fails to state how presenting evidence at his 
2010 trial of the erroneous jury instruction would have 
mitigated the aggravating circumstances of his California 
offenses.  Thus, Prieto has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a 
 
35 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), Prieto argues he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence regarding 
Prieto's other prior convictions. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) 
satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Prieto fails to proffer what evidence counsel should have 
presented to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence as to his 
other prior convictions.  Thus, Prieto has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
CLAIM (X) 
In claim (X), Prieto argues he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
object to evidence of his California convictions and death 
sentence.  At the 2010 trial, the Commonwealth introduced 
certified copies of Prieto's California convictions and 
death sentence to show he was a future danger to society.  
 
36 
Prieto argues that, prior to the start of the hearing, 
counsel should have objected to the introduction of this 
evidence as Prieto was challenging his California 
convictions and sentence in a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  In support of this claim, Prieto cites Johnson v. 
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (death sentence vacated as 
it had been predicated, in part, on a New York conviction 
which was later reversed).  Prieto opines that had counsel 
objected, there is a reasonable probability that the 
evidence relating to his California convictions and death 
sentence would not have been presented. 
 
The Court holds that claim (X) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Counsel had no reason to 
object to the introduction of the evidence relating to 
Prieto's convictions and sentence in California as this 
Court had previously upheld the introduction of such 
evidence.  Prieto v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. at 413-15, 682 
S.E.2d at 936.  Prieto's reliance on Johnson is misplaced 
and would not have supported the objection Prieto contends 
counsel should have raised.  In Johnson, the New York 
conviction was reversed while Johnson's motion for post-
conviction relief from his Mississippi death sentence was 
pending.  486 U.S. at 583.  The United States Supreme Court 
 
37 
found that Mississippi erred when it refused to consider 
that fact.  Id. at 587-90.  Prieto's California convictions 
and death sentence had not been overturned, thus there was 
no basis for counsel to object to their introduction.2  
Thus, Prieto has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (XI) 
 
In claim (XI), Prieto contends that the cumulative 
effect of counsel's deficient performance at the 2010 trial 
undermines confidence in the jurors' decision. 
The Court holds that claim (XI) is without merit.  As 
addressed previously, Prieto has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice as a result of counsel's alleged errors.  "Having 
rejected each of petitioner's individual claims, there is 
no support for the proposition that such actions when 
considered collectively have deprived petitioner of his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel."  
Lenz, 267 Va. at 340, 593 S.E.2d at 305. 
CLAIM (VI) 
                     
2 As of the date of this order, Prieto's habeas 
petition is still pending in the California Supreme Court. 
 
38 
 
In claim (VI), Prieto contends counsel was ineffective 
for failing to present mitigating evidence, as alleged in 
claims (I), (V), (VII), and (VIII).  Prieto argues that as 
a result of counsel's cumulative errors in failing to 
present this evidence, counsel was unable to persuade the 
jury that Prieto was not the sole perpetrator or that his 
multiple deficiencies diminished his moral culpability. 
The Court holds that claim (VI) is without merit.  Prieto's 
argument is one of cumulative error.  "Having rejected each 
of petitioner's individual claims, there is no support for 
the proposition that such actions when considered 
collectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel."  Lenz, 267 Va. 
at 340, 593 S.E.2d at 305.  
Upon consideration whereof, Prieto's motions for 
access to files from the Virginia Department of Forensic 
Science, for the appointment of a DNA expert, to hold his 
Virginia habeas corpus proceedings in abeyance pending 
resolution of the California habeas corpus proceedings, and 
for an evidentiary hearing are denied. 
Upon consideration of the respondent's motion to 
strike Prieto's rebuttal affidavits, the motion to strike 
is denied.  The rebuttal affidavits are considered pursuant 
to the appropriate evidentiary rules. 
 
39 
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed and the 
respondent shall recover from petitioner the costs expended 
in his defense herein. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
Respondent's costs: 
 
 
Attorney's fee  
 
$50.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
     Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk