Title: People v. Cunningham

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 94971-Agenda 1-May 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. BRIAN
							CUNNINGHAM, Appellee. 
Opinion filed October 7, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:	After a bench trial, defendant, Brian Cunningham, was convicted
of possession of a controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/402 (West
1998). The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed,
holding the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. 333 Ill.
App. 3d 1045. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal
pursuant to Rule 315. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We now reverse the
appellate court and affirm defendant's conviction.

BACKGROUND
	The evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of Officer David
Pfest of the Chicago police department, followed by a stipulation. The
stipulation established that the "narcotics *** testified to in this case"
consisted of 2.9 grams of a chunky substance in a clear plastic packet
that chemical analysis proved to contain cocaine. The State offered
Pfest's testimony to establish defendant possessed the cocaine with
the intent to deliver.
	Pfest testified as follows. At about 12:30 a.m. on December 15,
1998, he was on patrol in plain clothes with a partner in a vehicle. In
the 3800 block of Elston Avenue, near Leona's Restaurant, a white
male citizen in his late 20s or early 30s "flagged down" the vehicle. To
the best of Pfest's recollection, the citizen was dressed in "blue jeans
and just a t-shirt." The citizen informed Pfest that a man nicknamed
"Gumby" was selling narcotics and that Pfest could arrange to buy
narcotics from Gumby by calling a phone number the citizen provided.
	After conferring with fellow officers and setting up surveillance,
Pfest called the number the citizen gave him and asked to buy an
"eight ball," which is an eighth of an ounce, or approximately 3.5
grams, of cocaine. A female responded by asking Pfest if he was
Kevin from Elston by Leona's. Pfest said he was Kevin. The female
told him Gumby was not there and to call back in 15 minutes. Pfest
called back in 15 minutes. This time a male answered. Pfest again
asked for an eight ball. The male replied that he needed to go home to
get it, and that in 15 minutes he would pull up near Leona's and honk
his horn.
	Approximately 15 minutes later a station wagon arrived where
Pfest was waiting near Leona's and the driver honked the horn. Pfest
removed his radio from his pocket and used it to tell fellow officers
that the suspect had pulled up. He then approached the station wagon.
As he did, he saw defendant in the driver's seat holding a clear plastic
baggie containing a yellowish white substance. When Pfest got within
about four feet, defendant appeared to recognize Pfest. Pfest had seen
defendant before and may have arrested him on a prior occasion.
Defendant's eyes widened and he looked down the street in the
direction of approaching police cars. Defendant then threw the baggie
to the floor of the car. Pfest ordered defendant out of the car and
arrested him. Another officer seized the baggie.
	Pfest could not recall who was his partner that evening. Nor
could he recall on whose phone he made the two calls to Gumby. The
trial court found Pfest's testimony lacked "corroboration" and thus
was insufficient to prove intent to deliver. However, the court found
the testimony sufficient to prove the lesser-included offense of
possession. The appellate court reversed, finding that the "whole
scenario as described by Officer Pfest [is] *** unworthy of belief."
333 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. The court based this finding on specific parts
of the testimony that it found incredible. The State contends it was
error for the appellate court to review Pfest's credibility at all.
	We granted leave to appeal to consider the State's argument that
the fact finder's determination that a witness is credible is conclusive.
For reasons that follow, we reject the State's argument. Nevertheless,
we reverse the judgment of the appellate court because we find the
record evidence sufficient under the standard of review.

ANALYSIS
	The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that a person may not be
convicted in state court "except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375,
90 S. Ct. 1968, 1073 (1970). When a court reviews a conviction to
determine whether the constitutional right recognized in Winship was
violated, it must ask "whether the record evidence could reasonably
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2788-89 (1979). In other words, the question is "whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) Jackson,
443 U.S.  at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 573, 99 S. Ct.  at 2789. We have
adopted the Jackson formulation of the standard of review for claims
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. People v.
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). The Jackson standard applies in
all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence. People v.
Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002).
	The State argues that, under the Jackson standard, the fact
finder's determination that a witness is credible is conclusive. The
State points out that Jackson requires a reviewing court to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and argues
that this requirement precludes reviewing the credibility of witnesses.
The State argues that reading a cold transcript cannot justify
disbelieving testimony the fact finder actually heard and has accepted.
We disagree.
	As a threshold matter, defendant argues that the State has
forfeited its claim that the trial court's credibility determination is
conclusive. The State did not raise that claim in the appellate court.
Defendant's argument has no merit. When the appellee in the appellate
court appeals to this court, it " 'may raise any question properly
presented by the record to sustain the judgment of the trial court, even
though those questions were not raised or argued in the Appellate
Court.' " People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 201 (1991), quoting
Mueller v. Elm Park Hotel Co., 391 Ill. 391, 399 (1945).
	Turning to the State's argument, we begin with the fact that
Jackson requires reviewing courts to "determine whether the record
evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) Jackson, 443 U.S.  at 318, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 573, 99 S. Ct.  at 2788-89. It follows that where the
finding of guilt depends on eyewitness testimony, a reviewing court
must decide whether, in light of the record, a fact finder could
reasonably accept the testimony as true beyond a reasonable doubt. In
conducting this inquiry, the reviewing court must not retry the
defendant. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). The
reviewing court must carefully examine the record evidence while
bearing in mind that it was the fact finder who saw and heard the
witness. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d  at 541. Testimony may be found
insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record
evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could
accept it beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532,
545 (1999) (holding that no reasonable person could find the witness'
testimony credible); Schott, 145 Ill. 2d  at 206-07 (holding that
complaining witness so lacked credibility that a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt remains). However, the fact a judge or jury did
accept testimony does not guarantee it was reasonable to do so.
Reasonable people may on occasion act unreasonably. Therefore, we
reaffirm that the fact finder's decision to accept testimony is entitled
to great deference but is not conclusive and does not bind the
reviewing court. See Smith, 185 Ill. 2d  at 542.
	Certainly, as the State emphasizes, the reviewing court must view
the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution." Jackson,
443 U.S.  at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 573, 99 S. Ct.  at 2789. This means
the reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the
record in favor of the prosecution. However, a reviewing court may
not allow unreasonable inferences. See Jackson, 443 U.S.  at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 573, 99 S. Ct.  at 2789 (stating that the standard of review
"gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact *** to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts" (emphasis
added). It follows that if only one conclusion may reasonably be
drawn from the record, a reviewing court must draw it even if it
favors the defendant.
	Turning to Pfest's testimony, we find three instances where the
only reasonable conclusion from the record is that a particular
statement remains subject to question. First, Pfest stated he spoke to
a citizen on the street who was wearing jeans and only a T-shirt. We
may notice, as commonly known facts, that mid-December nights in
Chicago are usually cold, and that people usually do not go outside in
the cold dressed only in a T-shirt. See People v. Tassone, 41 Ill. 2d 7,
12 (1968) (stating courts may notice matters of common knowledge).
There is no record evidence that could reasonably explain why this
citizen was wearing just a T-shirt on the night in question. There are,
of course, many possible explanations. Perhaps the night was
unusually warm or the citizen unusually tolerant of cold, for example.
However, none of these possibilities is supported (or refuted) by the
record. Therefore the only reasonable inference from the record is that
Pfest's statement that the citizen wore just a T-shirt remains subject
to question.
	Second, Pfest's statement that the citizen "flagged [him] down"
is likewise subject to question. Pfest was in plain clothes. The record
is silent about whether Pfest was patrolling in an unmarked car, but
the only reasonable inference is that he was, because he was in plain
clothes. No record evidence reasonably explains how the citizen knew
Pfest was a police officer. Pfest testified he did not know the citizen.
Again, many explanations are possible but, adhering to the record, the
only reasonable inference is that Pfest's statement that the citizen
flagged him down remains subject to question.
	Third, questions remain about Pfest's statement he used his hand-held radio to speak to other officers after defendant pulled up in the
station wagon. Nothing in the record reasonably explains why an
officer with 10 years of experience would have done so in sight of a
suspected drug dealer during an undercover drug buy. For example,
there is no record evidence that Pfest was waiting in the shadows or
in some other place the driver of the station wagon could not see.
Again, adhering to the record, we find the only reasonable conclusion
is that questions remain about this statement.
	Regarding other parts of Pfest's testimony mentioned by the
appellate court, we agree with the dissenting justice and find no
grounds in the record to question them. See 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1051-52 (Greiman, J., dissenting). Pfest's statement that he ordered an
eighth of an ounce of cocaine, where the amount seized was
somewhat less, is not questionable on review because record evidence
reasonably explains the anomaly; Pfest explained that drug dealers
commonly cheat their customers. Nor is there cause to question
Pfest's testimony that the arrest occurred on December 15, while his
report was dated December 14. Pfest testified that he began his shift
on December 14, but the arrest occurred in the early morning of
December 15. From those facts, one could reasonably infer he
confused the dates when he wrote the report. Neither do we find
questionable Pfest's testimony that he could not recall details such as
the name of his partner on the night in question, or what phone he
used to make the calls to Gumby, or the number he called. One could
reasonably infer Pfest forgot these details, because the record shows
the trial occurred some 22 months after the arrest, there is nothing
especially memorable about these details, and there is no record
evidence tending to show Pfest would be unlikely to forget them.
	The conclusion that some statements in Pfest's testimony are
questionable, of course, does not answer the ultimate question before
us. Defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance
rests in the first instance on Pfest's statements that defendant was
holding the baggie containing cocaine, and that he threw the baggie to
the floor of the car after he appeared to recognize Pfest. The question
is whether a fact finder could reasonably accept those statements as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in spite of questions remaining
about other parts of Pfest's testimony.
	The appellate court inferred that the "whole scenario as described
by Officer Pfest [is] *** unworthy of belief." 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1050.
We disagree. First, it is important to bear in mind that the above
analysis reveals unresolved questions about certain statements Pfest
made, but it in no way proves those statements are lies or errors.
Moreover, even when a witness is found to have knowingly given
false testimony on a material point, a fact finder may reject his entire
testimony but is not bound to do so. Swift & Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 52 Ill. 2d 490, 495 (1972). See also Sparling v. Peabody
Coal Co., 59 Ill. 2d 491, 498-99 (1974) (stating that even
"contradictory testimony of a witness does not per se destroy [his
credibility], and it remains for the trier of fact to decide when, if at all,
he testified truthfully"). In other words, it is for the fact finder to
judge how flaws in part of the testimony affect the credibility of the
whole. Of course, for the reasons discussed above, the fact finder's
judgment in that regard must be reasonable in light of the record. In
some cases a reviewing court may find, after considering the whole
record, that flaws in testimony made it impossible for any fact finder
reasonably to accept any part of it.
	For example, in Schott the complaining witness' testimony
contradicted, at several points, her sworn testimony in a previous
proceeding. The record also showed that she was an admitted liar who
had a motive to falsely accuse the defendant. Because the record
showed the witness to have been so thoroughly impeached, we held
her testimony insufficient to convict. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d  at 209.
	The appellate court's decision in People v. Quintana, 91 Ill. App.
2d 95 (1968), provides another example factually closer to the case at
bar. In Quintana, a police officer testified he saw the defendant throw
some packets under a car and that he thought the packets probably
contained marijuana because marijuana is usually packaged that way.
He was contradicted by the State's forensics expert, who testified the
packets seized were unusual. Moreover, the record, through the
defendant's testimony and the officer's own admission, showed the
officer had been harassing and threatening the defendant in an effort
to get the defendant to become an informant. Quintana, 91 Ill. App.
2d at 98. Thus the appellate court, in reversing the conviction, relied
on the officer's motive to fabricate a charge against the defendant and
not simply the fact he had been contradicted by another prosecution
witness on a material point.
	In this case, there is nothing in the record showing that the only
reasonable inference is that the questionable parts of Pfest's testimony
make the whole unworthy of belief. This is not a case, like Schott or
Quintana, where the record showed the witness was a liar or had a
motive to falsely accuse the defendant. Nor is this a case in which the
witness' description of the actual crime was incredible on its face. See,
e.g., People v. Coulson, 13 Ill. 2d 290, 296 (1958) (stating that the
complaining witness' testimony that armed robbers allowed him to go
unaccompanied into his house to get more money, trusting his promise
not to call the police, "taxes the gullibility of the credulous"). Where
the record is not such that the only inference reasonably drawn from
flaws in the testimony is disbelief of the whole, a reviewing court
should bear in mind that the fact finder had the benefit of watching the
witness' demeanor. See 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1052 (Greiman, J.,
dissenting). After considering all of the record evidence and viewing
Pfest's demeanor, a fact finder could reasonably conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt defendant was holding the baggie and threw it down
when he realized police were approaching. That, along with the
stipulation that the substance in the baggie contained cocaine, is
sufficient to support defendant's conviction.

CONCLUSION
	The adage that "one bad apple spoils the lot" does sometimes
describe the relation between specific flaws in a witness' testimony
and the credibility of the whole. In some cases, the record requires the
inference from doubts about parts of testimony to doubt about the
whole. In other cases, however, the adage does not apply because the
record does not require the inference from part to whole. This case
falls into the latter category. Despite the doubts about some parts of
Pfest's testimony discussed above, the statements that directly support
defendant's conviction for possession of the cocaine could reasonably
be accepted by the fact finder, who saw Pfest testify, as true beyond
a reasonable doubt. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore
reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
	



Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.