Title: Wilson v. Oklahoma ex rel. State Election Board

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

WILSON v. STATE ex rel. STATE ELECTION BOARD2012 OK 2Case Number: 110042Decided: 01/17/2012THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

SENATOR JIM WILSON, Plaintiff/Appellant,v.STATE OF 
OKLAHOMA ex rel. STATE ELECTION BOARD, PAUL ZIRIAX, in his capacity as Secretary 
of the Oklahoma State Election Board, Defendants/Appellees,
SENATOR BRIAN BINGMAN, in his official capacity as President Pro 
Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate, REPRESENTATIVE KRIS STEELE, in his 
official capacity as the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, 
Intervenor Defendants/Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTYThe 
Honorable Lisa T. Davis, Presiding
¶0 After having lost his attempt to have the State Senate Redistricting Act 
of 2011,14 O.S.2011, §§ 
80.35-80.35.4, declared unconstitutional in Wilson v. Fallin, 
2011 OK 76, 262 P.3d 741, Senator 
Wilson filed a petition in the District Court of Oklahoma County. The district 
court, the Honorable Lisa T. Davis presiding, found that the claim presented in 
the petition had been decided by this Court in Wilson v. Fallin and 
dismissed the petition. Senator Wilson filed a petition in error, and this Court 
retained the appeal for disposition. 
AFFIRMED.
Mark Hammons, Hammons, Gowens & Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
appellantNeal Leader and Nancy Zerr, Assistant Attorney Generals, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, for appellees State Election Board and Paul ZiriaxElizabeth 
J. Barnett and Robert G. McCampbell, Crowe & Dunlevy PC, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, and Richard Lee Slater, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for intervenor 
Senator Brian BinghamAshley Kemp, Oklahoma House of Representatives, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for intervenor Representative Kris Steele
TAYLOR, C.J.
¶1 Senator Wilson filed the genesis of this present appeal in the district 
court as a petition seeking to have State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 (2011 
Act) , 14 O.S.2011, §§ 
80.35-80.35.4 (S.B. 821), declared invalid after this Court rejected his 
attempt to have the 2011 Act declared unconstitutional in Wilson v. 
Fallin, 2011 OK 
76, 262 P.3d 741 (Wilson I). In Wilson I, Senator Wilson 
attacked the 2011 Act as invalid because it failed to create Senate districts 
which as nearly as possible preserve the factors of "compactness, political 
units, historical precedents, economic and political interests." In his petition 
in the present case filed against the State Election Board and its secretary, 
Senator Wilson makes verbatim the same allegations as he did in Wilson I. 
However, he now avers that this Court determined in Wilson I "that the 
District Court has jurisdiction over challenges asserting political 
gerrymandering and that the standards related to 'population, compactness, area, 
political units, historical precedents, economic and political interest, 
contiguous territory' are both enforceable and sufficiently clear to guide [the 
district court] in the determination of such a challenge.'" As in Wilson 
I, nowhere in his filings in the present case does Senator Wilson allege 
that the Legislature did not give consideration to the extent feasible to the 
local-interest factors he sets out in his petition. He again merely states that 
his redistricting plan is better than the plan passed by the Legislature and 
signed by the Governor.
¶2 The President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate and the Speaker of 
the Oklahoma House of Representatives intervened and, along with the defendants, 
filed motions to dismiss. The motions to dismiss all allege that the district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit for three reasons: (1) the 
district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim because the same claim was 
presented and resolved by this Court in Wilson I, (2) the Supreme Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim that the 2011 Act violates Article V, 
Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution, and (3) the present attack was brought 
after the expiration of the sixty-day period prescribed by Article V, Section 
11C of the Oklahoma Constitution. The defendants also contend that the petition 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in the district court 
and that Senator Wilson lacks standing in the district court.
¶3 Senator Wilson filed replies to the intervenors' and defendants' motions 
to dismiss. Senator Wilson submits that this Court expressly declined in 
Wilson I to address the political gerrymandering claim and that this 
Court in Wilson I "unanimously expressly agreed that population, 
compactness, area, political units, historical precedents, economic and 
political interests, contiguous territory and other factors set out in the 
Oklahoma Constitution are valid and enforceable." After a hearing, the district 
court granted the motions to dismiss reasoning that this Court had previously 
decided the issue in Wilson I.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 This Court subjects a trial court's judgment dismissing a petition to 
de novo review. Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, ¶ 7, 176 P.3d 1204, 1208. When evaluating a motion to 
dismiss, the court examines only the controlling law, not the facts. Id. 
Thus, the court must take as true all of the challenged pleading's allegations 
together with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. Id. 
Motions to dismiss are generally disfavored and granted only when there are no 
facts consistent with the allegations under any cognizable legal theory or there 
are insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Id. We review the 
motions to dismiss under this standard. 
¶5 A determination of whether the preclusion doctrine applies is solely a 
question of law if "(1) the facts are undisputed, (2) the preclusion question 
can be answered solely by reviewing the judgment put forward as the bar, or (3) 
the preclusion determination can be made solely by inspection of the record of 
the proceeding(s) culminating in the judgment put forward as the bar." 
Feightner v. Bank of Okla., 2003 OK 20, ¶ 3, 65 P.3d 624, 627 (citations omitted). Here the 
application of the preclusion doctrine is a question of law because the 
determination can be made solely by de novo review of the record on 
appeal and consideration of this Court's opinion in Wilson I. 
Id.
II. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND ISSUE/CLAIM PRECLUSION
¶6 The defendants and intervenors urge that, in Wilson I, this Court 
decided the issue presented by the present petition when it severed the 
local-interest factors from Article V, Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution. 
They continue that, after Wilson I, there is no language in Section 9A 
upon which relief can be granted to Senator Wilson based on his allegations 
presented here. Senator Wilson counters that, not only did this Court leave 
intact the local-interest factors of Section 9A as it was adopted in 1964, but 
unanimously stated that those interest are valid and enforceable in the district 
court. The failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the 
issue/claim preclusion defenses are intertwined so that if this Court severed 
the local-interest factors from Section 9A, then Senator Wilson has no 
cognizable claim for relief.
¶7 However, we need not address whether the local-interest factors were 
severed from Section 9A by Wilson I. Senator Wilson misstates Section 
9A's language concerning the local-interest factors. The actual language in 
Section 9A upon which Senator Wilson relies provides: " In apportioning the 
State Senate, consideration shall be given to population, compactness, 
area, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests, 
contiguous territory, and other major factors, to the extent feasible." 
(Emphasis added.) Senator Wilson views this language as requiring the 
Legislature to provide a redistricting plan "which create[s] Senate districts 
which as nearly as possible provide for compactness, political units, historical 
precedents, economic and political interests." Section 9A's language is not as 
restrictive on the Legislature as Senator Wilson argues. Further, Senator Wilson 
has not alleged that the Legislature failed to consider these local-interest 
factors to the extent feasible. If all the factual allegations in Senator 
Wilson's petition are taken as true, he has failed to present a cognizable claim 
based on the failure of the Legislature to consider the specific factors to the 
extent feasible.
¶8 To avoid confusion in the future, it is necessary that we address Senator 
Wilson's assertions. In Wilson I, this Court determined that the 
county-based apportionment formula in Article V, Section 9A of the Oklahoma 
Constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution under Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964). This Court held that the 2011 State Senate Redistricting Act 
complies with Article V, Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution. Id. ¶ 
0, 262 P.3d  at 742. Thus, Senator Wilson's reliance solely on Section 9A as the 
basis for invalidating the 2011 Act must fail. Taking as true all the factual 
allegations in his complaint filed in the district court, Senator Wilson has not 
presented a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶9 In addition to Senator Wilson's failing to present a claim for which 
relief can be granted, Senator Wilson has presented the identical issue and 
claim in the district court as he presented to this Court in Wilson I and 
against the same parties. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, known at 
common law as res judicata, "a final judgment on the merits of an action 
precludes the parties from relitigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also 
any theories or issues that were actually decided, or could have been decided, 
in that action." Read v. Read, 2001 OK 87, ¶ 16 & n. 18, 57 P.3d 561, 567 n. 18. Often the most difficult 
aspect of applying claim preclusion is in defining the claim. Miller v. 
Miller, 1998 OK 
24, ¶ 23, 956 P.2d 887, 896. Here the difficulty does not exist because Senator Wilson has made 
verbatim the same allegations in his petition as he did in Wilson I. 
There can be no doubt that Senator Wilson's present claim that the 2011 Act does 
not comply with Article V, Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution is barred by 
the doctrine of claim preclusion.
¶10 In summary, the district court properly dismissed Senator Wilson's 
petition because he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
and because his claim is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion having been 
adjudicated against him in Wilson I. Because of our resolution, we need 
not address whether the present attack was brought after the expiration of the 
sixty-day period prescribed by Article V, Section 11C of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. The dismissal order of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
CONCUR: TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J. (by separate writing), and KAUGER 
(joins Colbert, V.C.J.), WATT (joins Colbert, V.C.J.), WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, 
REIF (joins Colbert, V.C.J.), COMBS (joins Colbert, V.C.J.), AND GURICH (joins 
Colbert, V.C.J.), JJ.

COLBERT, V.C.J., with whom Kauger, Watt, Reif, Combs, and Gurich, JJ., join, 
concurring
¶1 I concur in today's decision. I write separately to dispel any belief that 
Wilson I stands for the proposition that this Court will not address a 
claim of political gerrymandering, minority-vote dilution, or any other form of 
voter discrimination pursuant to the procedure provided in sections 11C and 11D 
of Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution and the standard set forth in section 
9A for determining whether an apportionment treats voters equally. The duty to 
adjudicate such claims is placed squarely on this Court by the accelerated 
procedures outlined in section 11C1 of Article V. Under section 11D,2 this Court "shall 
determine" whether the challenged apportionment provision is in compliance with 
the apportionment formula of section 9A as modified by this Court in Wilson 
I, 2011 OK 
76, ¶ 15, 262 P.3d 741, 746 ("While the language defining the county-based 
aspect of the apportionment formula must be severed, the other provisions in 
section 9A can be left standing."). When this Court determines that a petitioner 
has asserted a prima facie claim concerning the apportionment formula, the 
matter will be referred to the District Court, a Special Master, or a Referee 
for the intensive fact determinations necessary to inform this Court as to 
whether the apportionment statute meets the constitutional requirement of voter 
equality by applying the factors listed in section 9A.
¶2 In Wilson I, the petitioner failed to present a prima facie claim 
of political gerrymandering and therefore there was no need for determinations 
of fact. This Court resolved the merits of the political gerrymandering claim as 
a matter of law pursuant to sections 11C and 11D of Article V of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. That claim was unsuccessful.
¶3 Wilson I should not be understood to hold that no claim of 
political gerrymandering will be entertained by this Court. It has been well 
settled through this Court's enduring jurisprudence, in interpreting the 
Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, that voter equality and due process be 
achieved no matter whether the claim is political gerrymandering, minority vote 
dilution, or any other form of invidious discrimination. In today's shifting and 
transforming communities, no longer can we place those claims in a square box. 
As long as a standard and a process continue to be constitutionally mandated by 
the state and federal constitutions, this Court will continue to adjudicate all 
claims of voter inequality. 
FOOTNOTES
1 The Oklahoma Constitution 
provides the following procedure for challenging apportionment:
Any qualified elector may seek a review of any apportionment order of the 
Commission, or apportionment law of the legislature, within sixty days from the 
filing thereof, by filing in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma a petition which must 
set forth a proposed apportionment more nearly in accordance with this Article. 
Any apportionment of either the Senate or the House of Representatives, as 
ordered by the Commission, or apportionment law of the legislature, from which 
review is not sought within such time, shall become final. The court shall give 
all cases involving apportionment precedence over all other cases and 
proceedings; and if said court be not in session, it shall convene promptly for 
the disposal of the same.
Okla. Const. Art. V, § 11C.
2 The Oklahoma Constitution requires this Court to review 
the challenged apportionment for compliance with section 9A by providing:
Upon review, the Supreme Court shall determine whether or not the 
apportionment order of the Commission or act of the legislature is in compliance 
with the formula as set forth in this Article and, if so, it shall require the 
same to be filed or refiled as the case may be with the Secretary of State 
forthwith, and such apportionment shall become final on the date of said writ. 
In the event the Supreme Court shall determine that the apportionment order of 
said Commission or legislative act is not in compliance with the formula for 
either the Senate or the House of Representatives as set forth in this Article, 
it will remand the matter to the Commission with directions to modify its order 
to achieve conformity with the provisions of this Article.
Okla. Const. Art. V, § 11D.