Title: Mitchell v. Forster

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

282 P.2d 708 (1955) 59 N.M. 226 Joe MITCHELL, Appellant, v. Claude R. FORSTER, Appellee. No. 5850. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 7, 1955. Rehearing Denied May 4, 1955. *709 C. R. Brice, Thomas B. Forbis, Roswell, for appellant. Frazier, Cusack & Snead, Roswell, for appellee. SADLER, Justice. The question for decision is whether following a jury verdict for defendant, the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of a newly discovered eye witness to the automobile collision in which plaintiff suffered the injuries and loss made the basis of his action for damages. The plaintiff's evidence disclosed he was traveling north on Main Street in the city of Roswell around six o'clock the morning of June 28, 1952. As he approached the intersection of Main and First Streets, he reduced his speed substantially to catch a change in the lights without coming to a complete stop. Upon the shift of the lights from red to green, he gathered speed slightly and was more than half way across the intersection when, without warning of any kind his car was struck with great force by defendant's pick-up truck traveling at excessive speed attempting to cross the intersection from the west. The pick-up hit plaintiff's car on the right side, just in front of the right door, and hurled him and his car in a westerly direction. He suffered severe bodily injuries and great damage to his car. The defendant's story of the collision differed materially from that of the plaintiff. According to him, he was proceeding in a westerly direction along First Street at about 20 miles per hour and did not even see plaintiff until the two cars collided by the plaintiff's car striking the defendant's pick-up on the left side, the front fender, the force of the impact being on the cowl and left front door. Certain pictures were introduced in evidence showing damage to the front of plaintiff's car on the right side. The parties involved were themselves the only witnesses to the collision who testified and neither of them saw the other until the collision actually took place, except that plaintiff had seen defendant turn into First from Virginia and head west, a block away, just as the lights changed. There were two other witnesses at the trial whose testimony threw some light on the collision. One was for the plaintiff, a garage mechanic, B.B. Dement, who had worked on plaintiff's car and described its condition following the collision. The other was Police Officer Corzine, a witness for defendant who was called to the scene of the accident to investigate same and arrived there shortly after it occurred. Since neither of them actually saw the collision their testimony could, of course, throw light upon it circumstantially only. Witness Dement made the repairs to both vehicles and testified that the plaintiff's car was heavily damaged in front, slightly damaged at the right front door and heavily damaged at the right *710 rear. He testified, further, that defendant's pick-up suffered damage necessitating repairs to the left front fender, cowl panel, and left front door, with no damage to the grille or bumper. Officer Corzine testified upon the first trial that he did not recall whether the traffic lights were on or off when he arrived at scene of the accident but that according to his best recollection they were on. At the second trial he said he had no independent recollection at the time whether they were on or off but according to his report they were off, that is, being manually controlled rather than automatic, that they had not yet been turned on at so early an hour in the morning. The motion to set aside verdict and for new trial was based wholly upon the ground of this newly discovered evidence and was supported by the affidavits of plaintiff and the newly found witness, D.A. Calderon of Roswell, New Mexico. The latter's affidavit reads, as follows: It is followed by the verification, under the hand and seal of the notary public, before whom it was subscribed and sworn to. A response to the plaintiff's motion was filed by defendant putting its allegations at issue and, following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, both by formal order filed in the case and by announcement in open court in which the trial judge stated: Our problem is to decide whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and grant him a new trial. We have given the matter painstaking consideration and are unable to say the trial judge went beyond the boundaries of the broad field of discretion enjoyed by him in ruling as he did. The decisive issue on trial was which of the parties, if either, was at fault in the collision which took place at the time and place charged. A determination of that question was to be resolved in large measure by ascertaining which of the two parties had the right of way to cross the intersection of Main and First Streets. The intersection had traffic lights, manually controlled, and customarily placed in operation about 6 a.m., each day. The plaintiff said they had been turned on and were in the act of changing as he approached the intersection from the south, going north. The defendant testified just as positively that the lights had not yet been put in operation as he swung into Virginia Street and headed west toward First. Plaintiff admitted having observed defendant's car enter First Street from Virginia and turn west on First but denied ever having seen defendant's car, or being conscious of his presence in the vicinity, until the two cars collided. Officer Corzine, though not present at time of the accident, visited the scene very soon thereafter to investigate and took measurements. According to him, the two cars collided two paces east of center line of Main and two paces north of center line of First Street. He also found skid marks from plaintiff's car for a distance of about three paces leading up to the scene of the accident. He gave it as his best recollection, at first trial, that the lights were on, that is had been manually placed in operation for the day, when he visited scene of the accident within five minutes after it occurred. At the second trial, testifying from his recollection, as refreshed by written notes in his report of the accident, he testified the lights had not been turned on at police headquarters. Now comes an absent witness, a newly found witness, and states in an affidavit attached to the motion that he witnessed the accident and that the lights were in operation and showed "green," the "go ahead" signal, in the direction of plaintiff's travel. In addition, he described defendant's car as proceeding at an excessive speed. It should be added that the position of the cars following the collision, both headed west, or in a westerly direction, tended to support plaintiff's theory that the greater force was expended in the impact by defendant's car. Barring some recitals in the motion and affidavit of the newly discovered witness of how the two cars, after the initial impact, swung around and had a second collision in which the rear of the two cars crashed into each other, inflicting substantial damage on that section of plaintiff's car, there is nothing in the affidavit that did not corroborate either the plaintiff's version of the crash or that of defendant and, hence, took on character as cumulative evidence, which either supported plaintiff's testimony or tended to impeach or contradict other testimony against him. Under such circumstances, it was well within a proper exercise of the discretion of the trial judge to rule as he did in denying the motion. United States v. Biena, 8 N.M. 99, 42 P. 70; Territory v. Claypool, 11 N.M. 568, 71 P. 463; Hancock v. Beasley, 14 N.M. 239, 91 P. 735; State v. Padilla, 18 N.M. 573, 139 P. 143; State v. Gonzales, 19 N.M. 467, 144 P. 1144; State v. Graves, 21 N.M. 556, 157 P. 160; Clark v. Queen Ins. Co., 22 N.M. 368, 163 P. 371; State v. Luttrell, 28 N.M. 393, 212 P. 739, 741. In State v. Luttrell, supra, we set out the conditions which must be met in order to secure a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. We said: The language with which we closed our discussion of the subject in the Luttrell case seems peculiarly applicable to the affidavit here relied upon. It is this: We are unable now, of course, to visualize the train of thought passing through the mind of the trial judge as he ruled on this motion. Perhaps, he viewed the newly discovered evidence as merely cumulative. Even if not so considered, he may have doubted whether testimony of the newly discovered witness, if employed at a third trial, was of a character likely to change the result. He was not unmindful, as indicated by his comment in ruling on the motion that, already, he had set aside one verdict for defendant, following the first trial, for alleged misconduct of a juror. Now, he was called upon to set aside the second verdict in defendant's favor. So whatever the reasons motivating him, in so far as we may fairly deem supposed grounds likely, the trial judge acted well within his discretion in denying the motion and we can not say he acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in so doing. The judgment being free from error, it must be affirmed. It Is So Ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN and KIKER, JJ., concur. McGHEE, J., did not participate.