Title: Sorensen v. May

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sorensen v. May1997 WY 107944 P.2d 429Case Number: 96-324Decided: 08/28/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

RONALD 
SORENSEN, 
Appellant (Defendant),

 

v. 

 

SHERRI MAY, f/k/a SHERRI 
SORENSON,  

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Georg Jensen of Law Offices of Georg Jensen, 
Cheyenne.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Ronald E. Triggs of Law Offices of Ronald E. Triggs, 
PC, Cheyenne.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Ronald 
Sorensen (the father) appeals from the district court's order in favor of 
Appellee Sherri May (the mother) which denied his request to modify the parties' 
divorce decree with respect to custody of their minor children and child 
support.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The father 
presents two issues on appeal:

1. Did the district court err in finding no 
substantial change of circumstances when there was an undisputed defacto change 
in custody of the minor children?

2. Did the district court err in failing to apply the 
child support guidelines when there was a substantial change of 
circumstances?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The parties were 
granted a divorce in December of 1993. The divorce decree provided for the 
parties to have joint custody of their two minor children with each party having 
physical custody of the children for six months out of every year. The parties' 
son was seventeen years old and their daughter was fourteen years old when the 
divorce decree was entered. According to the child support guidelines, the 
mother was entitled to receive a presumptive monthly support payment of $88.89 
from the father. Each party agreed, however, to waive the support payments from 
the other.

 

[¶5]      At the time of 
the divorce, the children were living with their father in Cheyenne and 
commuting to school in Albin. After the decree was entered, the father and the 
children moved to Albin so that the children would not have to commute to 
school. The children did not go to live with their mother, who lived in 
Cheyenne, after they had stayed six months with their 
father.

 

[¶6]      On February 2, 
1995, the father filed a petition to modify the provisions of the divorce decree 
which pertained to custody of the minor children and child support. He contended 
that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred because the children did 
not spend one-half of the year with their mother as was contemplated by the 
divorce decree. The father prayed for permanent and physical custody of the 
children and for child support in accordance with the child support 
guidelines.

 

[¶7]      After numerous 
delays and continuances, the district court held a hearing on August 21, 1996, 
to consider the father's petition. Between the time that the divorce decree was 
entered and the time that the hearing was held, the son turned eighteen and 
graduated from high school. Consequently, the hearing focused primarily on the 
custody of the parties' daughter.

 

[¶8]      At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the district court found in pertinent 
part:

Well, it appears that the best interest of the 
children ha[s] been admirably served all along here. I don't see where it would 
be in their best interest to do any change, because thanks to the very mature 
and responsible way these two parents have acted vis-a-vis their daughter, it 
appears to me it wouldn't necessarily be in her best interest for any change of 
custody, nor would it be at any time because she was enjoying a relationship 
with her father and her mother, which is one of the chief goals in any custody 
and visitation situation.

. . . .

. . 
. [I]t occurs to me that [the father] and [the mother] have acted in a very 
admirable and honorable fashion here, contrary to the situation that one sees in 
the District Court way too often. . . .

Here the parties very realistically and responsibly 
recognize that . . . the children w[ill] be attending school in Albin, as they 
were at the time of the divorce. And since it was their obvious preference to 
live in Albin rather than commute, I think that situation should be allowed to 
continue.

[The father] certainly gave notice when he filed this 
petition in February of . . . '95 that he was dissatisfied with that situation 
from only the point of view that he was not receiving contributions of support. 
The other side of it is that these parties mutually waived support at the time 
of the decree; they contemplated at the time that [the father] would be moving 
to Albin, which he did; that the children would be living there for that reason 
much of the time, which they did. Much to his credit, he never insisted that the 
children actually move.

The district court 
determined that a substantial change of circumstances did not occur and denied 
the father's petition to modify the divorce decree. This appeal 
followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The father 
contends that the district court erred by ruling that he did not meet his burden 
of showing that a material or substantial change of circumstances occurred after 
the divorce decree was entered. The mother maintains that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by refusing to modify the divorce 
decree.

 

[¶10]   The district court retains 
continuing jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree. W.S. 20-2-113(a) (amended 
1997)1; Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 233 (Wyo. 
1996). "A district court's decision to modify a divorce decree is reviewed for 
[an] abuse of discretion." 925 P.2d  at 233. "Judicial discretion is a composite 
of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it 
means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986). "A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether 
there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the 
court could [have] reasonably conclude[d] as it did." Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 757-58 
(Wyo. 1986).

 

[¶11]   A party who is seeking to modify 
the child custody provisions of a divorce decree has the burden of showing 
that

a 
substantial or material change in circumstances which affects the child's 
welfare occurred subsequent to the entry of the initial decree, that the change 
warrants modification of the decree, and that the modification will be in the 
child's best interests. . . . In order to decide whether a showing of material 
or substantial change in circumstances has been made, we examine the record to 
determine whether the district court could [have] reasonably conclude[d] from 
the evidence that such a change occurred.

Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 421 (Wyo. 1996). See also Rocha, 925 P.2d  at 233. A 
condition which existed when the divorce decree was entered is not a substantial 
or material change of circumstances that warrants modification of the decree. Crawford v. Crawford, 828 P.2d 1192, 
1193 (Wyo. 1992). In Gurney v. 
Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Wyo. 1995), this Court recognized that, because 
parents must work closely together in joint custody arrangements, it may be 
easier to reopen a divorce decree which contains a joint custody provision. We 
decided that, because both parties agreed the joint custody situation was not 
working, the district court erred by not reopening the case. 899 P.2d  at 
55.

 

[¶12]   At the time of the divorce in this 
case, the children were going to school in Albin. Both parties testified that 
they did not want the children to commute from Cheyenne to Albin. The father 
acknowledged that he was not sure when the divorce decree was entered whether 
"it [was] anticipated they would spend the other half of the year with their 
mother." Taking this evidence into account, the district court concluded that 
the parties had foreseen at the time of the divorce that they would not strictly 
adhere to the provision which declared that the children would spend six months 
out of every year with each parent. Even though they knew that the custody 
provision might not be followed exactly, the parties agreed to waive all child 
support obligations. Unlike in the Gurney case, the parties here did not agree 
that the joint custody arrangement was not working. In fact, the mother 
contested the father's request for a modification.

 

This Court stated in Gurney:

We recognize a measure of instability is inherent in 
a joint custody order because it requires two parents, who are not residing 
together, to share custodial rights and responsibilities and resolve the 
logistics of caring for the child.

. 
. . The premise of the joint custody order is the parents' ability to resolve 
between themselves the custodial details. There can be little question that 
joint custody requires sincere dedication on the part of each parent to 
safeguard the security and stability vital to a child's best 
interest.

899 P.2d  at 55 (citations 
omitted). Here, the district court commended the parties for working together in 
the best interests of their children. The parties agreed that it was best for 
the children to live in Albin since they went to school there. If the children 
had moved in with their mother after six months, they would have had to commute 
again. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it 
concluded that the father did not satisfy his burden of proving that a material 
or substantial change of circumstances had occurred subsequent to the entry of 
the divorce decree. The flexibility of the joint custody arrangement allowed 
these parents to amicably work together to meet the children's needs. We expect 
the parties to continue to work together for the best interests of their 
children.

 

[¶13]   Affirmed.

LEHMAN, Justice, dissenting, with whom TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice, joins. 

[¶14]   I respectfully dissent. The 
majority affirms the district court's application of an incorrect legal standard 
and rejection of undisputed facts which mandate a different result. By 
implication, both courts reach the unprecedented conclusion that failure to pay 
child support to a primary physical custodian is in the best interest of a 
child.

 

[¶15]   The parties entered into a 
stipulation, incorporated into an order, which awarded the parties joint custody 
of their children. Pursuant to the order, the children were to reside with each 
parent for six months of any given year and, because of that, no child support 
would be paid by either parent. It is undisputed that the parties did not share 
physical custody as contemplated by the order but, at some point, agreed it was 
best for the children to remain in Father's household year round. Based upon 
that obvious deviation from the joint custody arrangement, Father seeks a 
modification to reflect his permanent physical custody of the children and the 
payment of child support.

 

[¶16]   In Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 
1995), we discussed our adherence to the "substantial change of circumstances" 
test in traditional custody cases. We recognized that this standard is of 
central importance in circumstances where one parent has been designated as the 
primary nurturer because "a child is almost always harmed by a transfer from one 
parent to the other." Gurney, at 54. However, we rejected the traditional 
standard in true "joint custody" arrangements where the order has not fixed one 
parent as the primary custodian. First, we stated:

 

When the reopening of a joint custody order is before 
the court, however, the stability-of-placement consideration that is central to 
our strict reopening standards in the primary custodial context appears to be of 
minimal importance because the joint custody order has not fixed one parent as 
the primary nurturer. We recognize a measure of instability is inherent in a 
joint custody order because it requires two parents, who are not residing 
together, to share custodial rights and responsibilities and resolve the 
logistics of caring for the child.

Id., at 
54-55. As a second distinguishing element, we noted that a cooperative 
arrangement is mandatory for the successful continuance of a joint custody 
arrangement. "When the parents are unable to make this cooperative arrangement 
work, a change of circumstances justifying judicial reexamination of the 
original joint custody order is demonstrated." Id., at 55.

 

[¶17]   The district court in this case 
found that since the parties had cooperatively agreed to allow the children to 
reside permanently with Father and since both parties knew that the children 
would be in school in Albin at the time of the divorce, the court had no 
authority to "retroactively impose the obligation" of child support. This 
conclusion not only ignores the fact that Mother and Father did not 
"cooperatively agree" to a child support arrangement in light of the children's 
permanent residence with Father, but also fails to account for the "paramount 
consideration" in these proceedings - the best interests of the children. Matter of Paternity of IC., 941 P.2d 46, 
51-52 (Wyo. 1997); Ready v. Ready, 
906 P.2d 382, 385 (Wyo. 1995); Jacobs v. 
Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1995); Gurney, at 55; Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1293 
(Wyo. 1991); W.S. 20-2-113(a) (1997).

 

[¶18]   The majority affirms the district 
court's decision by stating: "Even though they knew that the custody provision 
might not be followed exactly, the parties agreed to waive all child support 
obligations." Maj. op. at 432. The majority implies this agreement because the 
children were attending school in Albin at the time of the divorce, the parents 
did not want the children commuting, and Father "acknowledged that he was not 
sure [at the time that] the divorce decree was entered whether `it [was] 
anticipated they would spend the other half of the year with their mother.'" Id., at 432. The record reflects 
otherwise. The decree specifically states that the deviation from child support 
guidelines is based on the children residing six months with Mother and six 
months with Father. The parties both testified that they anticipated they would 
each have the children for six months of any given year. The implication that 
Father admitted that this arrangement was uncertain is particularly unwarranted; 
the majority takes out of context one statement made by Father at the 
modification hearing. The complete interchange regarding the waiver of support 
is as follows:

 

[Father's attorney] Q. Okay. At the time - Well, let 
me refer you to . It says in the end of paragraph 3, subparagraph A, "The 
parties agree to waive child support from the other." Did you agree to that at 
the time?

[Father] A. At that time, yes.

Q. Okay. What was the reason that you agreed to that 
at that time?

A. Because of what it said, that the children were to 
spend six months with each parent.

Q. In fact, the sentence just before the one I 
pointed out to you specifically provides that the children will reside one half 
of the year with you and one half of the year with your former spouse; is that 
correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. This was entered in December of 1993. Where 
were the children living at that time?

A. They were living with me.

Q. Okay. And when was it anticipated they would spend 
the other half of the year with their mother?

A. I'm not sure about that.

Q. Were they attending school at that 
time?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Did you both have the ability to have the children 
reside with you each half of the year?

A. I certainly did, and I assume that she did, 
also.

Q. Okay. This was something that - Let me change that 
question. Was this something that you both requested, or did one of you request 
of the other that the children be allowed to reside with each parent for half of 
the year?

A. It was drawn up in the decree and agreed upon 
there.

Q. Okay. So when you saw this decree and, as set out 
in paragraph 3, agreed to waive child support, you understood that this was 
going to be six months residence with the children with yourself and six months 
with their mother?

A. That was my understanding, 
yes.

Q. Did that ever actually 
happen?

A. No, it did not.

 

[¶19]   The most that can be inferred from 
this dialogue is that the parties did not ascertain at the time of the decree 
when the six-month increments would occur. Moreover, while nothing in the record 
indicates that the parties discussed whether the children would commute to 
school prior to the divorce, it is clear that the children did not reside with 
their mother even during summer months. Thus, a conclusion that Father waived 
child support in the event he became the primary physical custodian is not 
supported by the record. When a decree is entered ordering joint custody and 
without providing for support or a primary custodian, it represents that the 
parties will continue to cooperate in the best interests of the children. Such 
task requires the utmost in communication and accommodation, and we applaud 
those parents who are able to successfully accomplish this goal. However, in 
most instances, the uncertainties of the future render joint custody a court 
date continued; and when custody matters are again presented to the court by one 
of the parties, the only issue is the best interests of the children. This court 
has never found that failure to provide child support by a non-custodial parent 
is in the best interests of the children.

 

[¶20]   Mother attempts to distinguish the 
circumstances of this case from those presented in Gurney by pointing to the fact that she 
did not invite the court to reconsider the original order. No doubt Mother 
thinks the joint custody is working perfectly. I speculate whether this rather 
hollow statement by a non-paying father would be met with the same acceptance as 
it was in this case. In any event, Mother clearly informed the court that the 
"joint custody ordered by that court has failed" when she admitted that it was 
in the best interests of the children to stay with Father rather than spend the 
six months ordered in her home. See 
Gurney, at 56. While the court's commendation to Mother for her recognition 
of this benefit to the children is certainly worth echoing here, it does not 
excuse her child support obligations. A non-custodial parent has an obligation 
to the child to contribute to the support of that child. Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 42 (Wyo. 
1995) (child support is a legal obligation parents owe to their children); Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 
(Wyo. 1994) (child support is for the benefit of the children as a parent's 
obligation to contribute to their upbringing); Matter of Adoption of GAR, 810 P.2d 113, 
115 (Wyo. 1991) (common law duty to provide for maintenance of one's children); 
Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 514 
(Wyo. 1987) (absence of decree provision providing for support does not 
eliminate intrinsic obligation); Kamp v. 
Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 51 (Wyo. 1982) (parents' obligation to support children 
is a continuing one); Rose v. Rose, 
576 P.2d 458, 461 (Wyo. 1978) (support is a basic obligation recognized even in 
absence of a statute). I find that there has undeniably been a change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of the decree to reflect the 
uncontested fact that father is the primary physical custodian and that the best 
interests of the child should be recognized by an order for child support 
consistent with the statutory guidelines. Consequently, I would reverse and 
remand this case for consideration of the amount of child support owed by Mother 
since the date the petition for modification was filed. 

 

Footnotes
 

1 Prior to being amended in 1997, W.S. 
20-2-113(a) provided in pertinent part:

(a) . . . The court which entered the 
decree has continuing subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or 
revise the decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of 
the children as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
require[].