Title: Sachs v. Sachs

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

SACHS_V_SACHS.94-263; 163 Vt 498; 659 A.2d 678

[Filed 14-Apr-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 

                                 No. 94-263

Margit B. Sachs                                   Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Chittenden Family Court

Thomas D. Sachs                                   February Term, 1995


Amy M. Davenport, J.

Neil H. Mickenberg and William M. Dorsch of Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Dorsch,
  Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

Susan L. Fowler, Burlington, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff wife appeals and husband cross-appeals from an
order of the Chittenden Family Court construing the parties' 1984 divorce
decree with respect to retirement benefits, Social Security benefits, and
attorney's fees.  We affirm the court's decision entitling plaintiff to share
in the appreciation of defendant's retirement and Social Security benefits,
but reverse the court's method of calculating those benefits and the court's
denial of attorney's fees. 

     The parties were divorced in 1984 after twenty-two years of marriage. 
At the time of the divorce, defendant was fifty-nine years old and had been
employed as a professor at the University of Vermont since 1962.  The final
order provided for alimony and child support, and paragraph 10 allocated
husband's retirement and Social Security benefits upon retirement.  It
stated: 

     [U]pon Defendant's retirement, Plaintiff shall be entitled to and
     shall receive 50% of any of Defendant's employment related and
     Social Security pension or retirement benefits as those benefits
     existed as of August 1, 1984 (including both lifetime retirement
     and survivors benefits as available) which payments shall constitute
     alimony.  It is agreed that the amount of Plaintiff's share of such
     benefits will not continue to accrue after August 1, 1984. . . . It
     is agreed that Defendant's accrued retirement benefits under

 

     TIAA-CREF as of August 1, 1984[,] during the first year of
     payments under the 20 year guaranteed option are expected to
     yield approximately $669 in total monthly benefits if Defendant
     retires at age 62 and $814 in total monthly benefits if Defendant
     retires at age 65.  It is also understood that the amount of
     TIAA-CREF retirement benefits will vary (subsequent to the first
     year of payments) depending upon the status of TIAA-CREF
     investments. Using the above figures as a base, Plaintiff shall
     share in 50% of any increase or decrease in TIAA-CREF
     retirement benefits accrued to August 1, 1984[,] and caused by
     market fluctuations.

     Husband retired on June 30, 1993 at age sixty-eight, and when the
parties could not agree on the interpretation of paragraph 10 of the 1984
agreement, wife moved to enforce.  The central issue at trial was the
division of the TIAA-CREF account, to which husband contributed throughout
the marriage.  The total investment in the account at the date of the divorce
in 1984 was $77,679.  This amount, less husband's post-divorce contributions,
appreciated to $304,556 by the time of his 1993 retirement, due solely to an
increase in the value of the underlying investments, and not to additional
contributions from earnings on husband's part. 

     The court concluded that wife was entitled to share in 50% of the
TIAA-CREF benefits, amounting to $814 per month -- the dollar amount
specifically set forth in the 1984 order as husband's approximate benefits at
age sixty-five.  The court further concluded that wife was entitled to share
in 50% of husband's Social Security benefits that were payable at age
sixty-five. Wife's motion for attorney's fees was denied. 

     Wife moved to alter or amend, arguing, inter alia, that the court should
have awarded her 50% of the actual TIAA-CREF and Social Security benefits
payable to the husband at age sixty-eight, rather than the amount set forth
in paragraph 10 of the 1984 order as an example of benefits applicable if he
retired at sixty-five.  The motion was denied, and wife appealed. Husband
objected to the award of any sum greater than 50% of the value of the
retirement account in 1984 and cross-appealed on that question. 

     Addressing the claims of both parties, we must examine the court's
reasoning carefully, recognizing, however, that its construction of the 1984
order is strictly a question of law that 

 

we must determine independently. See Dartmouth Sav. Bank v. F.O.S. Assocs.,
145 Vt. 62, 66,