Title: Green v. Virginia State Bar

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

1 
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
 
WALTER FRANKLIN GREEN, IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 070515 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 2, 2007 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, EX REL.  
SEVENTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
 
 
WALTER FRANKLIN GREEN, IV 
 
v. Record No. 070731 
 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
In these appeals of right, we consider the judgment of a 
three-judge panel convened pursuant to Code § 54.1-3935(B) (the 
“Panel”), which suspended the license to practice law of Walter 
Franklin Green, IV for a period of six months.  We also consider 
the separate Order of a Disciplinary Board (the “Board”) of the 
Virginia State Bar (the “Bar”), which suspended Green’s license 
to practice law for an additional period of forty-five (45) 
days.  Because of the related nature of these cases, we address 
both appeals in this opinion.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we will affirm the judgment and the order. 
I. 
 APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE PANEL 
A.  Factual Background and Material Proceedings Below 
2 
 
Grant A. Richardson, as chair of a Subcommittee of the 
Seventh District Committee of the Bar (as referenced in Part I 
herein, the “Subcommittee”), signed a Subcommittee Determination 
(the “Determination”), which was mailed to Green on March 8, 
2006 by Alfred L. Carr, counsel for the Bar (as referenced in 
Part I, “Bar Counsel”).  The Determination recited Subcommittee 
meetings conducted on June 16, 2005,1 June 21, 2005,2 and 
February 24, 2005,3 during which the Subcommittee purportedly 
certified six cases of misconduct by Green in violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Determination concluded with the certification that “it 
is the decision of the [S]ubcommittee to certify the Charges of 
Misconduct to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board.”  
Although Richardson executed the Determination, it did not bear 
a date for his signature.  Further, while Richardson was the 
Subcommittee chair at each of the referenced meetings, the 
composition of the Subcommittee was different at each meeting. 
Green’s answer to the Determination challenged the 
timeliness of the Determination because he “received the 
[Determination] over one year after the first subcommittee 
                     
1 VSB Docket Number 02-070-3523 (Peter J. Schwartz). 
2 VSB Docket Number 05-070-0206 (Frank A. James). 
3 VSB Docket Number 05-070-2448 (Ron Haynes), VSB Docket 
Number 05-070-2450 (Ron Haynes), VSB Docket Number 05-070-3011 
(Michael Foltz/Linda Cubbage), and VSB Docket Number 05-070-3625 
(Bonnie L. Zigler). 
3 
convened.”  Green contended that the delay violated the 
Subcommittee’s duty under Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G)(4) to mail a 
certification “promptly.”  Green also demanded, pursuant to Code 
§ 54.1-3935, that further proceedings be conducted by a three-
judge panel rather than the Board. 
The Bar then filed a Complaint and Petition for Rule to 
Show Cause against Green, incorporating the Determination, in 
the Circuit Court for Rockingham County, which was verified by 
an affidavit signed by Bar Counsel.  The Panel was then duly 
appointed by the Chief Justice of this Court.  Subsequently, the 
Panel issued a rule to show cause against Green which ordered 
him to appear on September 14, 2006 and “show cause why his 
license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia shall 
not be revoked or suspended.”  At hearings on September 14 and 
November 14, 2006, the Panel considered allegations, as 
contained in the Determination, that Green violated Rules 1.1, 
1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
In that regard, the Panel considered the following four 
cases the Determination recited were certified from a February 
24, 2005 Subcommittee meeting. 
1.  Matter of Ron Haynes (Docket Number 05-070-2448) 
 
Green represented Ron Haynes on two felony charges, for 
which Haynes pleaded guilty, and a civil forfeiture.  Green then 
4 
filed an appeal on behalf of Haynes in the wrong court.  The 
appeal was dismissed, but Green did not inform Haynes of the 
dismissal.  Green’s accounting ledger for his law practice 
indicated he paid himself $6,000 before little, if any, work had 
been accomplished on the matter.  The Panel found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Green violated Rule 1.1 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
2.  Matter of Ron Haynes (Docket Number 05-070-2450) 
 
Green also represented Haynes on a number of other criminal 
charges, upon which Haynes was found guilty.  Haynes retained 
Green to appeal his convictions, but Green failed to timely file 
the notice of appeal.  Green failed to inform Haynes that the 
appeal had been dismissed for failure to timely file the notice 
of appeal.  Green’s accounting ledger reflected a fee of $7,500 
to handle the case at trial and a fee of $15,000 to handle the 
appeal.  Green paid himself both amounts before little, if any, 
work was done.  The Panel found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Green violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3(a). 
3.  Matter of Michael Foltz/Linda Cubbage  
(Docket Number 05-070-3011) 
 
Michael Foltz was sentenced to a lengthy period of 
incarceration.  Thereafter, his mother, Linda Cubbage, paid 
Green $2,500 to file a habeas corpus petition on Foltz’ behalf.  
Foltz suspected that Green failed to perform any work on his 
5 
behalf and demanded a refund from Green by letter.  Green did 
not respond to Foltz’ demand and claimed that he had never 
spoken to Foltz or Cubbage and had not agreed to file a habeas 
corpus petition.  However, Green’s accounting ledger reflected 
the payment from Cubbage.  Green contends that Cubbage hired his 
associate at the time, Peter Schwartz, but Cubbage and Schwartz 
disputed this assertion.  The Panel found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Green violated Rules 1.3(a), 1.4(a) and 
(c), and 1.15. 
4.  Matter of Bonnie Zigler (Docket Number 05-070-3625) 
 
Bonnie Zigler hired Green to represent her elderly father 
in a divorce matter and paid Green $5,000 in advance.  Green 
immediately removed the money from his trust account before 
little, if any, work had been done.  Green worked on the case 
sporadically over a four-month period, but Zigler was 
dissatisfied with his work.  Zigler eventually terminated 
Green’s services and hired another attorney to handle the 
divorce.  Zigler requested an itemization of the work Green 
performed on the file, along with a refund of $2,500.  Green did 
not respond to her request.  The Panel found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Green violated Rules 1.15(c) and 
8.4(b). 
5.  Other Cases 
6 
 
The Panel considered the two following cases represented in 
the Determination to be certified from Subcommittee meetings on 
June 16, 2005 and June 21, 2005, and dismissed both cases.  The 
Panel dismissed VSB Docket Number 05-070-0206 (Frank James), 
concluding that the Bar did not present clear and convincing 
evidence to prove Green violated the Rules in that matter.  The 
Panel also considered the Subcommittee’s certification in a 
matter concerning Green’s former associate, Peter Schwartz (VSB 
Docket Number 02-070-3523).  The Panel dismissed this case 
because the “Bar did not act promptly as required by Part Six, 
§ IV, Paragraph 13(G)(4) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 
thereby prejudicing [Green] with the delay.”4 
On December 29, 2006, the Panel entered a Memorandum Order 
imposing a six-month suspension of Green’s license to practice 
law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, effective January 1, 2007.  
Green timely noted his appeal of the Panel’s judgment. 
                     
4 The Panel found that the Bar failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence any remaining alleged violations of the 
Rules. 
7 
B.  Analysis 
 
In attorney disciplinary proceedings, we review the 
findings of a three-judge panel under the same standard that we 
apply to the findings of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary 
Board:  
On review we will make an independent examination of 
the whole record, giving the factual findings . . . 
substantial weight and viewing them as prima facie 
correct.  While not given the weight of a jury 
verdict, those conclusions will be sustained unless it 
appears they are not justified by a reasonable view of 
the evidence or are contrary to law. 
El-Amin v. Virginia State Bar, 257 Va. 608, 612, 514 S.E.2d 163, 
165 (1999) (quoting Myers v. Virginia State Bar, 226 Va. 630, 
632, 312 S.E.2d 286, 287 (1984) (emphasis omitted)).  Consistent 
with well-established appellate principles, we view the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the Bar, the prevailing party below.  
Gunter v. Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 619, 385 S.E.2d 597, 
598 (1989). 
 
Green assigns error to the Panel’s judgment based on (1) 
failing to grant his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; 
(2) denying his plea in bar regarding the timeliness of the 
Panel hearings; (3) improperly permitting the Bar to amend its 
Complaint during the hearing; and (4) finding that he had 
violated any of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
8 
1.  Green’s Motion to Dismiss 
 
Green first assigns error to the Panel’s denial of his 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  Green asserts that 
the Board was without jurisdiction to consider the charges 
against him because the basis for the Panel’s issuance of the 
rule to show cause was the result of erroneous information in 
the Bar’s Complaint, particularly the attached Determination. 
Green alleges that Bar Counsel first notified the Panel 
during the hearing that the certifications recited in the 
Determination were actually made on February 24, 2006 and not on 
the three dates listed in the Determination: June 16, 2005, June 
21, 2005 and February 24, 2005.  Green contends he thus did not 
receive proper notice of the charges against him because there 
was no prompt mailing of a Determination after the 
certifications and consequently, the Panel was without 
jurisdiction to proceed against him. 
Green also argues that Bar Counsel failed to inform the 
Panel before the hearing that the Schwartz matter had already 
been the subject of certification in 2003 and that the matter 
had been resolved.  Green further contends that the Subcommittee 
on February 24, 2006 acted improperly when it considered actions 
and proceedings by other subcommittees when certifying the 
Determination, and that those actions also deprived the Panel of 
jurisdiction to proceed against him. 
9 
 
The Bar responds that “Green’s argument [relating to his 
first assignment of error] is wholly unsupported by the record 
in this matter.”  The Bar also avers that “Green’s argument 
appears to be based solely upon the typographical error . . . 
and the timing of the charges brought against him.”  The Bar 
contends that the Panel had jurisdiction regardless of the 
typographical error and other mistakes contained in the 
Determination, and that the Panel considered the timeliness of 
the certification and granted Green’s motion to dismiss in part 
based upon the Bar’s failure to certify certain charges 
properly. 
 
Green’s contentions about the Panel’s failure to grant his 
motion to dismiss have some superficial appeal, in part, because 
the Determination and the Bar’s other pleadings are poorly 
prepared and confusing.  Essentially, Green argues the mailing 
of the Determination on March 8, 2006 was not in compliance with 
the requirement under Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G)(4) that the 
“Subcommittee Chair shall promptly mail a copy of the 
Certification [Determination].”  He also argues the mailing was 
ineffective because it was apparently done by Bar Counsel 
instead of Richardson as the Subcommittee chair. 
 
The latter argument has no merit as it is uncontested that 
Richardson signed the Determination, which was then mailed to 
Green showing that signature.  The fact that the actual mailing 
10 
of the Determination may have been done by Bar Counsel is of no 
legal significance and represents “substantial compliance” with 
the Rules as required by Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(E).  What is of 
significance is whether that mailing of the Determination was 
prompt in relation to the Subcommittee certification. 
 
While Green expends considerable effort arguing that the 
recited June 16, 2005 subcommittee action regarding the Schwartz 
matter, and the recited June 21, 2005 subcommittee action 
regarding the James matter, were not prompt certifications 
through a March 8, 2006 mailing, his point is moot because he 
prevailed below.  The Panel dismissed both matters, and neither 
formed the basis for the ultimate judgment against Green. 
 
However, Green’s argument regarding the February 24, 2005 
subcommittee certification is relevant on appeal, although not 
dispositive.  Green argued to the Panel that the Subcommittee 
could not have properly certified the charges in the recited 
February 24, 2005 Subcommittee meeting because the Bar’s own 
investigative documents were dated later in the year.  In any 
event, Green argued that the Panel did not have jurisdiction of 
any of the February 24, 2005 charges because the Rule 
requirement for prompt mailing was not met as a matter of law by 
a March 8, 2006 mailing. 
 
At the November 14, 2006 hearing, the Bar responded to 
Green’s arguments and the confusion its pleadings created by 
11 
representing to the Panel that the February 24, 2005 date was a 
typographical error and that the Subcommittee actually met on 
February 24, 2006.  The Bar, as further discussed in Part 3, 
infra, was permitted to amend its Complaint, over Green’s 
objection, to reflect the correct date.  The Bar then admitted 
that the February 24, 2006 Subcommittee actually consolidated 
and certified all the charges against Green.  The Bar admitted 
that the subcommittees did recite in the Determination that they 
met on June 16, 2005 (Schwartz) and June 21, 2005 (James), but 
those subcommittees never certified charges against Green.  
Instead, the Schwartz and James matters were presented anew to 
the February 24, 2006 Subcommittee and certified at the same 
time as the four remaining matters. 
 
Despite the grossly inadequate pleadings of the Bar, the 
Panel did not err in refusing to sustain Green’s motion to 
dismiss.  As noted above, the legal inadequacies of the Schwartz 
and James matters are of no aide to Green in this appeal as he 
prevailed on those claims. 
 
We have previously considered the “prompt mailing” 
provision of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G)(4) and upheld an eleven-month 
delay in notice of certification, when the attorney is unable to 
demonstrate how such delay caused him prejudice.  Motley v. 
Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 536 S.E.2d 101 (2000).  As we 
stated in Motley, “[i]n the absence of a showing of prejudice 
12 
resulting . . . from the failure to comply with the procedural 
requirement of prompt mailing contained in Subsection 
[13(G)(4)], dismissal of the charges against [Green] would be 
inappropriate.”  260 Va. at 258, 536 S.E.2d at 104. 
Green has shown no prejudice caused him by virtue of the 
inaccuracies in the Bar’s pleadings or the two-week period that 
elapsed between the February 24, 2006 Subcommittee action and 
the March 8, 2006 mailing.  In view of the fact that the 
remaining four matters before the Panel were actually certified 
from a February 24, 2006, not 2005, Subcommittee meeting, the 
March 8, 2006 notice was prompt within the meaning of Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13(G)(4).  Thus, the Panel had jurisdiction over the 
matters before it and did not err in dismissing Green’s motion 
to dismiss. 
 
However, before turning to Green’s other assignments of 
error, the Court states its strong disapproval of the Bar’s 
performance in this case.  The Bar, as the public body charged 
with the administration of professional responsibility and 
ethics of Virginia lawyers, can be held to no lesser standard 
than the lawyers it regulates. 
2.  Green’s Plea in Bar 
 
Green next assigns error to the Bar’s failure to schedule a 
hearing on the charges of misconduct against him within the 30-
13 
120 day time period in Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1), which states in 
pertinent part: 
After a Subcommittee or District Committee certifies a 
matter to the Board, and the Respondent has been 
served with the Certification, the Respondent shall, 
within 21 days after service of the Certification:  
(a) file an answer to the Certification, which 
answer shall be deemed consent to the 
jurisdiction of the Board; or  
(b) file an answer to the Certification and a 
demand that the proceedings before the Board be 
terminated and that further proceedings be 
conducted pursuant to Va. Code § 54.1-3935; and 
simultaneously provide available dates for a 
hearing to be scheduled not less than 30 nor more 
than 120 days from the demand. 
Green contends the Bar is also subject to the 30-120 day time 
constraints of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(b) and that the Panel 
erred in ruling that the scheduling requirements did not require 
a hearing within that time limitation.  Green cites Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13(I)(3) to identify the Bar’s duty to “set a date, 
time, and place for the hearing” and Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(E), 
which provides that “[w]here specific time deadlines are 
provided, such deadlines shall be jurisdictional” in support of 
his position.  Green contends that the Panel lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the Complaint because the hearing was held more than 120 
days after his demand for proceedings to be conducted by the 
Panel. 
 
The Bar responds that Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1) “does not 
impose a duty upon the Bar to actually schedule a hearing within 
14 
that 30-120 day window, nor does it require the Panel to conduct 
a hearing within that time period.”  The Bar insists that 
Green’s suggested interpretation of the Rule would permit Green, 
or any attorney before a panel, to “avoid prosecution altogether 
by providing available dates that are not available for the Bar 
or the Panel.”  The Bar notes that while Green provided his 
available dates, the Bar was unavailable on those dates and 
attempted to contact Green to schedule a mutually agreeable 
time, but Green did not respond to calls and letters from the 
Bar. 
In denying Green’s plea in bar, the Panel ruled 
because the rule is capable of a couple of 
interpretations, and because the rule is designed to 
protect the public . . . we interpret the rule to 
impose a responsibility on the lawyer who is 
submitting the dates – in this case that being Mr. 
Green – to submit dates within the four-month window 
time frame. 
 
The rule does not then specifically go so far as 
to require the Bar to hold a hearing within that time 
frame. 
 
We have held that the requirements of Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13(I)(1) do not involve subject matter jurisdiction.  Brown v. 
Virginia State Bar, 270 Va. 409, 412, 621 S.E.2d 106, 108 
(2005); Fails v. Virginia State Bar, 265 Va. 3, 7, 574 S.E.2d 
530, 532-33 (2003).  We have also stated: 
A proceeding to discipline an attorney is not a 
criminal proceeding and the purpose is not to punish 
him but to protect the public. It is a special 
15 
proceeding, civil and disciplinary in nature, and of a 
summary character. It is in the nature of an inquest 
or inquiry as to the conduct of the attorney. Being an 
informal proceeding it is only necessary that the 
attorney be informed of the nature of the charge 
preferred against him and be given an opportunity to 
answer.  
Seventh Dist. Committee v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 284, 183 S.E.2d 
713, 717 (1971). 
 
The Panel clearly had subject matter jurisdiction of the 
claims against Green and over Green in his capacity as an 
attorney subject to the imposition of discipline for violation 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The issue is whether Part 
6, § IV, ¶ 13(E)(1) applies so that the 30-120 time provision is 
a “specific time deadline [which is] jurisdictional.”  We 
conclude that it does not apply, and thus no jurisdictional 
impediment existed in this case. 
Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(b) required Green to “provide 
available dates for a hearing to be scheduled not less than 30 
nor more than 120 days from the demand.”  Under the plain terms 
of the Rule, however, no such obligation was imposed on the Bar 
or upon the Panel.  While this may appear unfair from the 
attorney’s viewpoint, there is no language in the Rule from 
which a jurisdictional time deadline can be derived.  The Bar is 
not subject to the same 30-120 day time requirement, and the 
Rule is devoid of any mandate on the Panel to act within that 
period.  Moreover, even if the Bar were subject to providing 
16 
hearing dates, nothing in the Rules would permit the Bar to 
compel the Panel to set a hearing date at a particular time. 
The 30-120 day time provision of Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13(I)(1)(b) operates as a scheduling mechanism rather than a 
jurisdictional bar such as a statute of limitations or statute 
of repose.  Thus, the failure to schedule a hearing within the 
30-120 day window of the Rule did not divest the Panel of 
jurisdiction to consider the matter.  The Panel did not err in 
dismissing Green’s plea in bar. 
3.  Amendment of the Complaint 
Green next contends that the Panel improperly permitted the 
Bar, during the Panel hearing, to correct the typographical 
errors in the Determination related to the February 24, 2006 
Subcommittee certification.  At the November 14, 2006 hearing, 
the Panel asked Bar Counsel to explain the typographical errors, 
and Bar Counsel explained the confusion about the dates listed 
in the Determination as discussed above.  The Panel then 
“accept[ed] the Bar’s representation . . . that the date of 
2/24/2005 . . . was a typo, and the date should be 2/24/2006.” 
Green avers that “[t]he representation of jurisdictional 
requisites, especially in a case where there are so many 
discrepancies and inaccuracies in the Bar’s allegations, are 
material and notice is required.”  He also contends that Part 6 
of the Rules does not provide a mechanism for amending the 
17 
Subcommittee certification, and thus the change of dates were 
“tantamount to a new charge.” 
 
The Bar responds that “[t]he amendment, to which Green 
refers, is a typographical error regarding the date that matters 
came before the [S]ubcommittee.”  The Bar contends that the 
Panel considered whether Green was prejudiced by changing the 
applicable date from February 24, 2005 to February 24, 2006.  
The Bar also notes the Panel dismissed the Schwartz matter 
because of prejudice, but found no prejudice to Green on the 
other charges by virtue of the typographical error. 
 
Whether to permit the amendment to reflect February 24, 
2006 as the correct date of the certification was a matter 
within the discretion of the Panel.  See Blue v. Seventh Dist. 
Committee, 220 Va. 1056, 1061-62, 265 S.E.2d 753, 756-57 (1980) 
(factual findings given “substantial weight” under abuse of 
discretion standard).  We conclude the Panel’s decision to 
permit the revised date was not an abuse of its discretion and 
that the change was not in the nature of an “amendment” to the 
charges against Green which would be tantamount to a new charge.  
See Pappas v. Virginia State Bar, 271 Va. 580, 628 S.E.2d 534 
(2006). 
In Pappas, attorney Nicholas Astor Pappas received notice 
of a subcommittee determination based on allegations that he 
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.  271 Va. at 584, 628 
18 
S.E.2d at 536.  During the hearing before a Disciplinary Board 
on those charges, the Bar sought to amend its certification to 
include information from a retainer agreement between Pappas and 
his former client.  Id. at 585, 628 S.E.2d at 536.  The 
Disciplinary Board granted a continuance and permitted the Bar 
to amend the certification, introduce the retainer agreement, 
and also introduce newly-taken deposition testimony of the 
former client which substantially conflicted with the original 
certification and Pappas’ answer to that certification.  Id. at 
584-85, 628 S.E.2d at 536-37.  In holding that the Disciplinary 
Board erred in permitting the Bar to amend the certification and 
introduce new evidence at the hearing, we stated “[t]here is no 
mechanism in Part Six that allows the Board to amend a 
certification from the District Committee.”  Id. at 587, 628 
S.E.2d at 538.  We reached that conclusion because “[t]his 
amendment was tantamount to a new charge,” which entitled Pappas 
to the procedural protections of the Rules.  Id. 
Unlike Pappas, the Panel’s decision here to accept the 
corrected date of the Subcommittee certification was not an 
“amendment” that amounted to a new charge against Green.  
Instead, the change of date was in the nature of the correction 
of a clerical error that clarified existing charges and was in 
no way a new charge.  The charges against Green did not change, 
no additional evidence was introduced concerning the nature of 
19 
Green’s alleged Rule violations, and Green demonstrated no 
prejudice by virtue of the amendment.  Thus, we find Pappas 
inapposite in the case at bar and conclude the Panel did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the 
Complaint. 
4.  Green’s Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
Green’s final argument asks: “Did the [Panel] err in 
finding that [Green] had violated any of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct?”  However, Green did not argue on brief or 
in oral argument before the Court that the evidence was 
insufficient for the Panel’s findings of misconduct in the 
Haynes, Foltz and Zigler matters or that the term of suspension 
was in error.  Thus, Green does not contend that the judgment of 
the Panel was plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. 
 
Green’s sole argument in support of this assignment of 
error is that the Panel was without jurisdiction for the reasons 
he argued regarding his first assignment of error.  Having 
failed to prevail on that argument, as discussed above, Green 
presents no other basis in support of this assignment of error. 
 
Based on our “independent examination of the whole record, 
giving the factual findings [of the Panel] substantial weight 
and viewing them as prima facie correct,” El-Amin, 257 Va. at 
612, 514 S.E.2d at 165 (emphasis omitted), we find no error in 
the Panel’s judgment that Green violated the Rules of 
20 
Professional Conduct or in the term of suspension as an 
appropriate sanction. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Panel, which imposed a six-month suspension of Green’s 
license to practice law. 
II.  APPEAL OF THE BOARD ORDER 
 
Green’s other appeal is from an Order of the Board which 
fixed a 45-day suspension of his license to practice law in the 
Commonwealth.  The suspension was imposed so as to commence 
immediately upon the end of the six-month suspension imposed by 
the Panel.  Green assigns error to the Board’s Order on the 
grounds that (1) the Board imposed an improper enhanced 
sanction; (2) his demand for a three-judge panel was improperly 
denied; and (3) the Board failed to consider certain mitigation 
evidence. 
A.  Factual Background and Material Proceedings Below 
 
This case is before us for the third time on appeal.  A 
brief factual history of the proceedings is relevant to the 
issues raised by the instant appeal. 
On June 5, 2003, Rockingham County Circuit Court Judge John 
J. McGrath, Jr. filed a complaint with the Bar, which described 
instances of alleged professional misconduct by Green.  Pursuant 
to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G) of the Rules of this Court, a 
Subcommittee of the Seventh District Committee of the Bar (as 
21 
referenced in Part II herein, the “Subcommittee”) convened on 
April 15, 2004 and considered the allegations against Green.  
The Subcommittee certified charges of Green’s misconduct to the 
Board, contending that Green violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.4, 4.4, 
and 8.4 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.  The 
Subcommittee determination was promptly mailed and included a 
letter notifying Green that pursuant to Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13(I)(1)(a) of the Rules, he had twenty-one days to either 
file an answer or demand that further proceedings be conducted 
before a three-judge court in accordance with Code § 54.1-3435.  
Green timely responded with an answer to the Subcommittee 
determination stating that he would “enthusiastically embrace 
the opportunity to participate in a hearing before a panel of 
the Board.” 
 
Following a November 19, 2004 hearing, the Board concluded 
that Green violated Rule 1.3(a) and 8.4(b) of the Professional 
Rules of Conduct, and the Board entered an order dated December 
21, 2004, which suspended Green’s license to practice law in the 
Commonwealth for sixty (60) days.  Green appealed the Board’s 
order to this Court, and we stayed the Board’s sanction pending 
the appeal. 
In an unpublished order dated September 16, 2005, this 
Court affirmed the Board’s order, in part, that Green violated 
Rules 1.3(a) and 8.4(b), but not as to all the charges found by 
22 
the Board.  We concluded that the evidence did not support all 
of the Board’s findings related to alleged violations of Rule 
1.3(a).  Green v. Virginia State Bar, Record No. 050289 
(September 16, 2005).  Accordingly, we vacated that part of the 
Board’s order suspending Green’s license to practice law for 60 
days, and we remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration 
of an appropriate sanction.  Id.  
 
On remand, the Board advised Green that it would convene a 
hearing via telephonic conference call to reconsider the 
sanction.  Green objected and argued he was effectively 
prevented from presenting evidence to substantiate the allegedly 
negative impact on his legal practice of an untimely press 
release by the Bar and other matters in mitigation.  Green also 
submitted various documents to the Board that he wished to 
introduce in mitigation of any sanction.  The Board overruled 
Green’s objections and ruled that his proffered documents were 
irrelevant and inadmissible.  The Board proceeded with the 
hearing and considered solely the record from the prior hearing 
on November 19, 2004.  The Board again concluded that a 60-day 
suspension of Green’s license to practice law was warranted and 
entered an order to that effect on January 24, 2006. 
 
Green appealed that order’s 60-day suspension to this 
Court.  In Green v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 612, 636 S.E.2d 
412 (2006), we again reversed the Board, vacated the sanction 
23 
and remanded for further proceedings to consider an appropriate 
sanction.  We found that the Board abused its discretion by 
failing to permit Green to introduce evidence in mitigation 
pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of the Rules.  Id. at 
616-18, 636 S.E.2d at 415-16.  We stated that “Green was 
entitled to present evidence tending to mitigate the sanction to 
be imposed by showing to what extent he had already suffered 
adverse consequences because of the public dissemination of the 
. . . Board’s findings that he had violated the . . . Rules and 
the suspension of his license to practice law.”  Id. at 617, 636 
S.E.2d at 415. 
 
Pursuant to the second remand, the Board reconvened on 
January 26, 2007, heard argument and received evidence from 
Green and the Bar, including Green’s evidence in mitigation.  On 
February 28, 2007, the Board issued its Memorandum Order 
imposing a 45-day suspension of Green’s license to practice law 
in Virginia.  The Order provided for a delayed effective date of 
the sanction, July 1, 2007, which followed immediately the 6-
month suspension imposed by the Panel that ran from January 1, 
2007 to June 30, 2007. 
B.  Analysis 
Under the same standard of review as set forth in Part I, 
we now consider Green’s assignments of error to the Board’s 
order. 
24 
1.  Enhancement of Green’s Sanction 
 
Green contends that the Board erred because it effectively 
enhanced the 60-day sanction it originally imposed on November 
19, 2004 and which had twice been reversed by this Court.  He 
argues that the sanction was enhanced “by adding time between 
the hearing and July 1, 2007 to its sanction.”  The crux of 
Green’s argument is that “the sanction is a nine-month 
suspension” and not one of 45 days. 
 
The Bar responds that the Board has the authority to “state 
the effective date of the sanction imposed” pursuant to Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of the Rules and that Green’s 45-day 
suspension “consecutively follows the six-month suspension” 
imposed against him by the Panel concerning the matters in Part 
I, which began to run on January 1, 2007 (discussed infra, Part 
I).  The Bar further argues that the Board did not enhance the 
sanction against Green because it reduced the 60-day sanction 
previously imposed to a 45-day sanction. 
 
We agree with the Bar.  Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of 
the Rules provides “[i]f the Board concludes that there has been 
presented clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has 
engaged in Misconduct, after considering evidence and arguments 
in aggravation and mitigation, the Board shall impose one of the 
following sanctions and state the effective date of the sanction 
imposed.” (Emphasis added.)  The Board, pursuant to the Rules of 
25 
this Court, has the authority to impose the sanction and to set 
the effective date of the sanction.  In determining the 
effective date of a sanction, we find that the Board’s decision 
is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. 
 
Here, the Bar imposed Green’s sanction and established the 
effective date the sanction was to commence.  The Board did not 
abuse its discretion when it established the effective date of 
the sanction as July 1, 2007 because this date immediately 
followed a separate six-month suspension of Green on other 
unrelated charges.  Green has no basis upon which to claim that 
the two separate suspensions could be required to run 
concurrently.  See Conner v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 455, 457-58, 
150 S.E.2d 478, 479-80 (1966) (describing a court’s authority 
and the statutory presumption, in the criminal context, for 
sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently).  Upon 
consideration of the record in this case, we cannot say the 
Board abused its discretion in imposing the sanction of 45 days 
or in its setting the date of July 1, 2007 for that sanction to 
commence.  Thus, Green’s first assignment of error is without 
merit. 
2. Green’s Demand for a Three-Judge Panel 
 
Green next assigns error to the Board’s denial of his 
request for a three-judge panel.  Green notes that after the 
remand of his second appeal, he demanded that further 
26 
proceedings be conducted before a three-judge panel and not the 
Board.  Green argues he “could not have foreseen the severity of 
the damage caused to him” by the Board’s untimely release of 
information about his suspension, and he contends our decision 
in Cilman v. Virginia State Bar, 266 Va. 66, 580 S.E.2d 830 
(2003) supports his claim that his demand for a three-judge 
court required that further proceedings only be before such a 
court and not the Board. 
 
The Bar responds that “Green failed to make a timely demand 
to be tried by a three-judge court” in response to the 
Subcommittee’s initial certification in 2004.  The Bar contends 
that a demand for a three-judge court must be made within 
twenty-one days after service of the original certification 
pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a) of the Rules of 
this Court, and Green’s demand on December 18, 2006 was 
therefore untimely.  The Bar also argues that Green’s reliance 
on our holding in Cilman is misplaced because the attorney in 
that case was subject to additional discipline on new charges, 
and only the new charges were entitled to be tried by a three-
judge court.  We agree with the Bar. 
On July 12, 2004, Green responded to the certified charges 
against him with his “strong preference that this matter be 
heard and adjudicated by the Board rather than the statutory 
alternative afforded by [Code] § 54.1-3935.”  Green never 
27 
requested a three-judge panel until after the second remand from 
this Court.  The only issue on remand was the imposition of a 
sanction based on the previously adjudicated misconduct. 
Neither our two previous remands of Green’s appeals nor our 
holding in Cilman supports Green’s contention that the 
continuing adjudication of sanctions on the same charges offers 
any right to demand a three-judge court more than two years 
after the twenty-one day initial response period expired. 
 
In Cilman, attorney Alan Jay Cilman had been subject to 
three separate proceedings before the Board.  266 Va. at 68, 580 
S.E.2d at 831.  In each instance, his license to practice law 
had been administratively suspended for varying periods of time.  
266 Va. at 68-69, 580 S.E.2d at 831.  Cilman failed to meet the 
requirements imposed upon him by the Board in the three previous 
proceedings regarding the notification of clients and related 
matters.  Id.  The Bar then brought a fourth proceeding to 
consider Cilman’s failure to comply with the prior requirements.  
In this fourth proceeding, Cilman made a timely demand that 
further proceedings be conducted before a three-judge court in 
accordance with the provisions of Code § 54.1-3935.  Id. at 69-
70, 580 S.E.2d at 832.  The Board denied Cilman’s demand.  Id. 
On appeal, we reversed the Board’s order and found that 
Cilman made a timely request for a three-judge panel because the 
fourth proceeding related to new charges against him with the 
28 
possibility of additional sanctions and was not simply 
completion of a pending adjudication.  Id. at 72, 580 S.E.2d at 
833.  We explained that Cilman’s alleged violation arose from 
his failure to comply with a prior order of the Board, and he 
was therefore permitted to request a three-judge court to 
consider the new charge of a rule violation, which could result 
in sanctions.  Id. 
Unlike Cilman, Green was not subject to new charges in the 
case at bar.  The Board heard Green’s case as he requested in 
his July 12, 2004 response to the Subcommittee certification.  
His appeals to this Court raised issues relating only to the 
matter previously heard and considered by the Board.  Throughout 
those appeals and our two remands of the Board’s imposition of 
sanctions, no additional charges were brought against Green in 
this case, so Cilman is inapplicable.  Green’s remanded appeal 
to the Board for reconsideration did not trigger any new right 
for Green to then request a three-judge court pursuant to Code 
§ 54.1-3915 and Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a).  As a result, 
his second assignment of error is without merit. 
3. Consideration of a De Facto Suspension 
Green’s final assignment of error is that the Board failed 
to consider the premature dissemination of information about his 
suspension in its determination of the sanction.  He contends 
29 
the Board’s improper dissemination of information about him 
violated Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(N)(4) of the Rules of this Court. 
The Bar responds that at the January 26, 2007 hearing, 
Green was “afforded the opportunity to present material evidence 
and argument in mitigation.”  Additionally, the Bar contends 
that the Board considered all of the Bar’s evidence in 
aggravation along with Green’s evidence in mitigation, before 
imposing a 45-day suspension.  Again, we agree with the Bar. 
The record reflects that at the January 26, 2007 hearing, 
Green was afforded a full opportunity to present material 
evidence and argument in mitigation of any sanction to be 
imposed upon him by the Board.  Green’s primary argument at that 
hearing was based on the language of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(N)(4), 
which prohibits an official of the Bar from “communicat[ing] 
with a member of the media or the public concerning a matter 
that is confidential.”  Green argued “that there is no way that 
I could be punished any more than I’ve been punished for two and 
a half years . . . and I ask you to take that into 
consideration.” 
It is evident from the Board’s Order that the Board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, including any 
“de facto suspension,” before announcing its decision.  This 
information included the newspaper articles and Bar website 
information introduced by Green.  The Board concluded “taking 
30 
all of that into consideration, it is the unanimous decision of 
this panel that Mr. Green’s license be suspended for 45 days 
effective July 1, 2007.” 
Green was provided a full and fair opportunity to present 
evidence in mitigation, and the record supports the Bar’s 
position that the Board heard and considered that evidence.  
Based on our “independent examination of the whole record, 
giving the factual findings [of the Board] substantial weight 
and viewing them as prima facie correct,” El-Amin, 257 Va. at 
612, 514 S.E.2d at 165 (emphasis omitted), we cannot say that 
the Board abused its discretion in fixing the period of 
suspension at 45 days to commence July 1, 2007.  
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will therefore affirm the 
Panel’s judgment suspending Green’s license to practice law for 
six months, and we will also affirm the Order of the Board, 
which suspended Green’s license to practice law for 45 days. 
Affirmed.