Title: Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc.1993 WY 135861 P.2d 1095Case Number: 92-285Decided: 10/25/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Pamela 
LYNCH and Rick Lynch,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

NORTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming corporation, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal 
from The District Court of Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

H. 
Steven Brown of Brown & Raymond, P.C., Casper, for 
appellants.

Patrick 
J. Murphy and Scott E. Ortiz, Casper, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Pamela and Rick 
Lynch (the Lynches) appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
Norton Construction, Inc. (Norton) on the Lynches' claim of negligence. The 
district court found Norton owed no legal duty to the Lynches and was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 

[¶2]      We decline to 
adopt the accepted work doctrine urged by Norton, which would extinguish a 
contractor's liability to third persons upon the owner's acceptance of the 
contractor's work. We hold instead that a contractor does owe a duty of 
reasonable care to foreseeable users, even after an owner's acceptance of the 
contractor's work, and traditional negligence principles apply to questions of 
contractor liability. We affirm the district court's judgment, however, on the 
ground that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the 
question of proximate cause, and Norton is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The Lynches 
present the following issue for our review:

Did 
the district court correctly grant summary judgment to a contractor in a 
negligent construction case in ruling the contractor had no duty to a user of 
the sidewalk?

FACTS

[¶4]      In the spring of 
1988, the Stocktrail Elementary School in Gillette, Wyoming, added four annex 
buildings to accommodate additional students for the 1988-1989 school year. In 
early August, 1988, the school district determined it would need to install 
sidewalks between the main building and the annex buildings to provide easier 
pedestrian access to the buildings.

[¶5]      On August 9, 
1988, the school district requested bids on the project from four local 
contractors. At the bid meeting, the school district presented each contractor 
with one page of plans and specifications for the sidewalk. The specification 
sheet included requirements that the sidewalk have a strength of 4,000 pounds 
per square inch; that six-inch by six-inch wire mesh be imbedded in the concrete 
for reinforcement; that expansion joints be installed in the concrete to help 
prevent cracking; and that the contractor remove the existing grass sod before 
pouring the concrete. The plans included no provisions for drainage, and the 
contractors were instructed to follow the natural slope of the 
terrain.

[¶6]      On August 10, 
1988, the school district awarded the bid to Norton, who submitted the low bid 
for the project. Norton completed the project by the August 22, 1988 deadline; 
and at that time representatives of the school district accepted the work, 
informing Norton they were pleased with his workmanship and that his work 
complied with the school district's plans and 
specifications.

[¶7]      As designed and 
constructed, the sidewalk provided no drainage for the run-off from the natural 
sloping of the terrain. As a result, beginning in the first winter following the 
sidewalk's construction, an ice problem developed on the sidewalk. Water would 
accumulate on the sidewalk and freeze there, creating hazardous walking 
conditions.

[¶8]      On January 23, 
1990, while working as a custodian at the Stocktrail Elementary School, Pamela 
Lynch slipped and fell on an icy spot on a sidewalk at the school. She injured 
her left arm leading to nerve damage called Reflex Sympathy Dystrophy Syndrome. 
Pamela Lynch's injuries have rendered her totally and permanently disabled, and 
she is unable to work.

[¶9]      For over a year 
after the school district accepted Norton's work, school personnel, including 
Pamela Lynch, knew of the ice problem on the sidewalk. Pamela Lynch's duties 
included shoveling the sidewalks and spreading salt and sand over the icy spots. 
At the school district's direction, to conserve materials, Pamela Lynch did not 
spread salt and sand over icy spots for her own safety; she was instructed to 
use the salt and sand only when children were on the premises. Several school 
employees, including Pamela Lynch, had slipped and fallen on the ice at the spot 
where Pamela Lynch fell again on January 23, 1990.

[¶10]   Having received several complaints 
about the icy condition of the sidewalk, the school principal had, nearly one 
year before Pamela Lynch's accident, submitted a work order to the school 
district maintenance department. The work order requested installation of a 
drainage system to allow water to drain appropriately instead of flowing over 
the sidewalks and freezing. The drainage system was not installed until eight 
months after Pamela Lynch's accident. Neither the school district nor 
school personnel from Stocktrail Elementary ever notified Norton of the drainage 
problem.

[¶11]   On December 30, 1991, Pamela Lynch 
filed a complaint against Norton, the contractor who built the sidewalk. Her 
complaint alleged that Norton's negligence in failing to provide drainage for 
the sidewalk caused her fall and subsequent disability. On September 10, 1992, 
Norton moved for summary judgment contending he owed no duty to the Lynches, and 
following a hearing on October 16, 1992, the district court granted Norton's 
motion for summary judgment.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶12]   Summary judgment is proper when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist, and the prevailing party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Wyo. 1993). 
When reviewing the propriety of a grant of summary judgment, we review the 
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that 
party all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Miller v. 
Campbell County, 854 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo. 1993); Abell v. Dewey, 847 P.2d 36, 39 
(Wyo. 1993). "Conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient, however, 
to satisfy an opposing party's burden." Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987). "If no issue of material fact is found 
to exist, summary judgment is appropriate, even in a negligence case." Brown, 
850 P.2d  at 614.

DISCUSSION

1. 
The Accepted Work Doctrine

[¶13]   Several jurisdictions have adopted 
the accepted work doctrine, applying it in cases where a contractor has 
completed a project, the owner has accepted the contractor's work, and a third 
party has subsequently been injured by the condition of the work done. See e.g., 
Forbes v. Romo, 123 Ariz. 548, 601 P.2d 311, 314 (1979); Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1, 2 (1948); Lindauer v. LDB Drainlaying, 38 Colo. App. 
266, 555 P.2d 197, 199 (1976); Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 
1988); Pennington v. Cecil N. Brown Co., 187 Ga. App. 621, 371 S.E.2d 106, 107 
(1988); Harrington v. LaBelle's of Colorado, 235 Mont. 80, 765 P.2d 732, 733 
(1988); Singleton v. Charlebois Constr. Co., 690 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Mo. App. 
1985); McKinstry v. Cass County, 228 Neb. 733, 424 N.W.2d 322, 328-29 (1988). 
The rule relieves an independent contractor of liability for injuries to third 
parties after the contractor has completed his work, and the owner or employer 
has accepted the work, regardless of the contractor's negligence in completing 
the project. Pennington, 371 S.E.2d  at 107; McKinstry, 424 N.W.2d  at 328-29. 
Jurisdictions which have adopted the accepted work doctrine have reasoned that 
it would be unfair to continue to hold the contractor responsible for defects 
after the owner has accepted the improvement and undertaken its maintenance and 
repair. See Easterday, 518 So. 2d  at 261.

[¶14]   Varying exceptions to the 
doctrine's rule of nonliability have developed in the jurisdictions which have 
adopted the rule. These exceptions impose liability where the defect is latent, 
where the contractor had practiced fraud or deceit or had deliberately concealed 
the defects of his work, where the contractor has created a nuisance, or where 
the product of the contractor's work could be regarded as inherently or 
imminently dangerous. C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Negligence of Building or 
Construction Contractor as Ground of Liability Upon His Part for Injury or 
Damage to Third Persons Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of the Work, 
58 A.L.R.2d 865, 870 (1958).

[¶15]   Norton cites Reiman Constr. Co. v. 
Jerry Hiller Co., 709 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1985) and Miller v. Rissler & McMurry 
Co., 794 P.2d 91 (Wyo. 1990) to support his position that Wyoming has adopted 
the accepted work doctrine. However, neither Reiman nor Rissler established the 
accepted work doctrine in Wyoming. In both cases this court considered a 
contractor's duty with regard to project design, plans and specifications. In 
Rissler, we reiterated our conclusion from Reiman that

neither 
the usual practices of the construction industry, nor his contract, placed any 
design responsibilities on the contractor. However, we also noted that he did 
have a duty to exercise skill and care in his selection of materials and in the 
performance of his work. Accordingly, we held that a contractor could not be 
held liable for damages caused by defects in the plans and specifications for 
his job if he completed the job in a workmanlike manner and in substantial 
compliance with those plans and specifications.

Rissler, 
794 P.2d  at 94-95. In Reiman and Rissler, the contractors had completed their 
work, and the work had been accepted by the owner of the premises. We 
nonetheless outlined a contractor's duty to exercise skill and care in his 
selection of materials and in the performance of his work, and his duty to 
complete the job in a workmanlike manner, in substantial compliance with the 
owner's plans and specifications. Thus, our decisions in those cases imply a 
contractor's duty in its various aspects survives after his work has been 
completed and accepted. We are presented, then, with the question whether we 
should change that rule and replace it with the accepted work 
doctrine.

[¶16]   Proponents of the doctrine suggest 
it provides a simpler, more workable approach to determining contractor 
liability. However, we agree with the Texas Supreme Court's response to such 
assertions:

The 
retention of the "accepted work" doctrine would inevitably yield the same 
unwieldy results as have come about in virtually every other jurisdiction that 
has formally adhered to the rule. The rule eventually becomes enveloped by 
complex exceptions to cover such situations as nuisance, hidden danger, and 
inherently dangerous conditions. The result would be that in each case, after 
having first decided that there was an acceptance of the work, we would then 
have to decide issues involving all the various exceptions to the rule and in 
case any exception were found applicable, the basic issues of negligence and 
proximate cause would still remain for consideration. We believe that outright 
rejection of this oft-repudiated and emasculated doctrine would restore both 
logic and simplicity to the law.

Strakos 
v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. 1962).

[¶17]   In rejecting the accepted work 
doctrine, the Texas Supreme Court commented that it did not favor an imposition 
of absolute liability on contractors, but simply rejected the notion 
that

although 
a contractor is found to have performed negligent work or left premises in an 
unsafe condition and such action or negligence is found to be a proximate cause 
of injury, he must nevertheless be held immune from liability solely because his 
work has been completed and accepted in an unsafe 
condition.

Strakos, 
360 S.W.2d  at 790. We agree with the Texas Supreme Court 
that

[i]t 
is difficult to see why a failure to use ordinary care to protect [foreseeable 
users of the improvement] * * * would be terminated by an agreement between the 
contracting parties. Why should a distinction be made between an injury 
occurring the day before the acceptance of the contractor's work by the [owner] 
(considering liability to exist at that time) and an injury occurring the day 
after the work was contractually accepted?

Strakos, 
360 S.W.2d  at 790. Other jurisdictions have similarly rejected the accepted work 
doctrine. See e.g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 58 A.L.R.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 
1956), cert. denied sub nom. Gichner Iron Works, Inc. v. Hanna, 351 U.S. 989, 76 S. Ct. 1051, 100 L. Ed. 1501; Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956); Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388, 356 P.2d 46 
(1960).

[¶18]   The accepted work doctrine, without 
the benefit of the many exceptions which have evolved since the doctrine 
originated, would absolve a contractor of liability in just this fashion. The 
jurisdictions which have adhered to the doctrine have alleviated its harsh 
results by modifying the rule through the adoption of numerous exceptions. In 
fact, the trend has been to rely more on the exceptions than on the general 
rule. In the course of this trend, the general rule of nonliability has been 
nearly swallowed up by the exceptions to the rule, and the rule of nonliability 
has served essentially as a mere preface to the various exceptions. See 
Drechsler supra at 871; and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 104A, at 723 (5th ed. 1984).

[¶19]   We find no justification for a 
blanket policy of nonliability for contractors whose work has been accepted. 
Furthermore, the rule of nonliability with its many exceptions is more 
cumbersome than traditional negligence analysis, while leading us to the same 
conclusion in most cases. For these reasons we decline Norton's invitation to 
adopt the accepted work doctrine. We turn then to application of traditional 
negligence principles in this case.

2. 
Application of Negligence Principles

[¶20]   It is universally 
quoted:

The 
elements of a cause of action for negligence include: (1) a duty owed to the 
plaintiff; (2) a breach, or violation of that duty; (3) which is the proximate 
cause of (4) plaintiff's injuries.

Century 
Ready-Mix v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 802 (Wyo. 1991); MacKrell 
v. Bell H[2]S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990). Proximate cause requires 
that the accident or injury be the natural and probable consequence of the act 
of negligence and is normally a question of fact unless the evidence is such 
that reasonable minds could not disagree. Century Ready-Mix, 816 P.2d  at 802; 
Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989). An 
intervening cause, if not reasonably foreseeable, will relieve a defendant of 
liability. Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 1178. We have defined an intervening cause 
as

one 
that comes into being after a defendant's negligent act has occurred * * *. [The 
intervening cause] is reasonably foreseeable if it is a probable consequence of 
the defendant's wrongful act or is a normal response to the stimulus of the 
situation created thereby.

Century 
Ready-Mix, 816 P.2d  at 802 (quoting Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 
1985)).

[¶21]   We have already concluded that 
Norton, as a contractor, owed a duty of reasonable care to foreseeable users of 
the sidewalk. For purposes of our analysis, we will assume that Norton breached 
that duty, in that he did not complete the project in a workmanlike manner. We 
are willing to assume this, for purposes of argument only, because it does not 
affect the outcome of the case; we find the element of proximate cause missing. 
We note, though, that the conclusory affidavit submitted by the Lynches' expert 
witness was insufficient to raise a question of fact regarding Norton's 
negligence. We remind counsel that the bare conclusory statements of an expert, 
alleging the existence and violation of a duty, with no reasonable basis 
therefor, are insufficient to prevent a summary judgment. Rissler, 794 P.2d  at 
95; Thomas by Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1307 
(Wyo. 1985). The affidavit of plaintiffs' expert witness in this case contained 
nothing more than his bare assertions that Norton was negligent, and would, 
therefore, have been insufficient to prevent a summary 
judgment.

[¶22]   We affirm the grant of summary 
judgment in this case because no genuine question of fact exists with respect to 
the question of proximate cause. While proximate cause is usually a question of 
fact, reserved for the trier of fact's determination, we conclude that 
reasonable minds could not have differed in this instance. Century Ready-Mix, 
816 P.2d  at 802. The school district's negligence in failing to repair the 
obviously dangerous condition of the sidewalk, after receiving several 
complaints about the condition, constituted an intervening cause, relieving 
Norton of liability for his negligence, if he was 
negligent.

[¶23]   Norton could not reasonably have 
foreseen that the school district, when confronted with a dangerously icy 
sidewalk, due to a drainage problem, would not inform Norton of the obvious 
defect, would not repair the defect itself, and would instruct its employees not 
to use salt and sand on the icy spots for their own 
safety.

[¶24]   We conclude that if Norton was 
negligent, his negligence was the remote, not the proximate, cause of Pamela 
Lynch's injuries. Other jurisdictions have similarly held that if the owner of 
the improved premises discovers the danger, or it is obvious to him, his 
responsibility supersedes that of the contractor, and it is the owner's failure 
to perform his duty to repair that is the proximate cause of the injury. El 
Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. App. 1977); Tipton, 356 P.2d  at 
49; Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33, 37 
(1965).

3. 
Strict Liability

[¶25]   In their appellate brief the 
Lynches urge this court to apply § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS to 
questions of contractor liability. However, the Lynches did not plead strict 
liability in their original complaint, nor did they amend their complaint to 
plead strict liability. The Lynches, therefore, abandoned their claim of strict 
liability, and we will not address the issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶26]   We hold that a contractor owes a 
duty to complete his work with skill and care and in a workmanlike manner, and 
that duty extends to third persons both before and after the owner has accepted 
the contractor's work. The trial court's order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Norton is affirmed, as no genuine issue of material fact exists, and 
Norton is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring, with whom THOMAS, Justice, 
joins.

[¶27]   The contractor in this case, Norton 
Construction, Inc., constructed the sidewalk precisely in accordance with the 
design, plan and orders of the school district as required by his contract with 
the district. The issue here presented, as I see it, is:

Is 
there a duty to third persons that requires a contractor to breach his contract 
by constructing the project contrary to an owner's design, plans and 
specifications or, in the alternative, refusing to construct the project at 
all?

[¶28]   I would hold such a duty does not 
rest with the contractor. If there was negligence in the design, or in the 
failure to correct a dangerous condition, or failure to salt and sand the ice, 
it was the negligence of the owner and not the contractor.

THOMAS, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶29]   I agree with the conclusion 
articulated in the majority opinion to affirm the summary judgment in favor of 
Norton Construction, Inc. I also am in accord with the declination to adopt the 
accepted work doctrine as that concept is urged by Norton. I find, however, that 
my focus is much like that of Justice Cardine in his concurring opinion, in 
which I join, and I would ground the decision to affirm this case not upon a 
conclusion no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the question 
of proximate causation, but upon the ground that, in this instance, Norton owed 
no duty to the Lynches.

[¶30]   Our rule, which we have adhered to 
steadfastly, is that the question of whether a duty exists on the part of any 
alleged tortfeasor is a question of law assigned to the court for determination. 
Alternatively, our general rule is that a question of fact such as proximate 
causation is assigned to the jury, i.e., the finder of fact, for its 
determination. This distinction is significant in this case because disputes 
regarding questions of fact do not ordinarily lend themselves to summary 
judgment while, on the contrary, questions of law are ripe for summary judgment 
as being outside the purview of jury deliberation. See, e.g., Hill v. Park 
County By and Through Bd. of County Comm'rs, 856 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1993); Bowen v. 
Smith, 838 P.2d 186 (Wyo. 1992); Hozian v. Weathermon, 821 P.2d 1297 (Wyo. 
1991); Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶31]   Our approach is consistent with 
that articulated in 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 
56.17[42] (1988), where it is stated:

Issues 
of negligence, including such related issues as wanton or contributory 
negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication either for or 
against the claimant, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary 
manner.

In 
Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1988), we said summary judgment is not 
ordinarily applicable to issues of negligence and is a drastic remedy that 
deprives a litigant of the right to trial. In negligence cases, it is preferable 
for a summary judgment to be grounded upon a question of law as a matter within 
the ambit of the court to decide. In this particular instance, the question of 
law is whether a duty was owed by Norton to the Lynches.

[¶32]   An examination of persuasive 
authority from other jurisdictions teaches me other courts have concluded that 
liability on the part of either the owner or the contractor is a question of law 
to be resolved by determination as to which party had the actual present duty to 
protect the injured third party. In Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462, 466 (Fla. 
1958), the court stated in support of a general rule of nonliability for the 
contractor:

There 
must be a present duty on the part of an alleged tortfeasor toward one claiming 
liability, and that there could be no such "present duty" if the premises were 
in the possession and control of another at the time of the 
injury.

Slavin 
still is good law in Florida. See, e.g., Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 609 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1992); Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1988); Edward 
M. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Vaughn, 491 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1986); Lubell v. Roman Spa, 
Inc., 362 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1978); Green Springs, Inc. v. Calvera, 239 So. 2d 264 
(Fla. 1970); Mai Kai Inc. v. Colucci, 205 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1967); U.S. Lodging v. 
H.B. Daniel Constr., 617 So. 2d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Fitzgerald v. 
Cestari, 553 So. 2d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Kala Investments, Inc. v. 
Sklar, 538 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 551 So. 2d 461 
(Fla. 1989); Seitz v. Zac Smith & Co., Inc., 500 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987); Jackson v. L.A.W. Contracting Corp., 481 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1986); Birch v. Capeletti Bros., 
Inc., 478 So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mori v. Industr. Leasing Corp., 
468 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, 
Inc., 433 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 441 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 
1983); Conley v. Coral Ridge Properties, Inc., 396 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981); El Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1977).

[¶33]   Another example is found in 
Schlender v. Andy Jansen Co., 380 P.2d 523, 526 (Okla. 1962), where the rule of 
nonliability for contractors prevails, and the court noted that the contractor's 
duty and liability terminates when:

The 
work * * * has been accepted by the proprietor * * * but the responsibility, if 
any, for maintaining or using it in its defective condition is shifted to the 
proprietor. The contractor remains liable, if at all, only to the proprietor for 
breach of his contract.

[¶34]   In New Mexico, we find a case in 
which the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to adopt a per se rule of 
contractor nonliability, stating:

Generally, 
an independent contractor may be liable to third parties who may have been 
foreseeably endangered by the contractor's negligence, even after the owner has 
accepted the work * * * subject to two limitations:

1) 
The independent contractor should not be liable if he merely carefully carried 
out the plans, specifications and directions given him, at least where the plans 
are not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follow them, 
and

2) 
If the owner discovers the danger, or it is obvious to him, his responsibility 
may supersede that of the contractor.

Terry 
v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375, 1379 (1982) 
(citations omitted).

[¶35]   Of similar tenor are the following 
cases: Kennecott Copper Corp. v. McDowell, 100 Ariz. 276, 413 P.2d 749 (1966); 
Trushcheff v. Abell-Howe Co., 239 N.W.2d 116 (Iowa 1976); Bd. of Educ. of City 
of Clifton v. W.R. Grace Corp., 258 N.J. Super. 94, 609 A.2d 92 (1992); Cumming 
v. Nielson's, Inc., 108 N.M. 198, 769 P.2d 732 (1988); Baker v. Fryar, 77 N.M. 
257, 421 P.2d 784 (1966); DeArman v. Popps, 75 N.M. 39, 400 P.2d 215 (1965); 
Southern California Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 70 N.M. 24, 369 P.2d 407 (1962); Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388, 356 P.2d 46 (1960); Jackson v. City 
of Franklin, 51 Ohio App.3d 51, 554 N.E.2d 932 (1988); Leininger v. 
Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965).

[¶36]   My examination of these cases 
persuades me to agree with the majority opinion that a contractor does owe a 
duty of reasonable care to foreseeable users, even after the owner has accepted 
the work, and traditional negligence principles can be applied to the questions 
of contractor liability. I would, however, like the New Mexico court, limit the 
potential liability of the contractor to those situations in which the plans are 
so obviously dangerous no reasonable man would follow them and those situations 
in which there was an apparent danger. I do choose, however, to resolve this 
case upon the premise that, under the circumstances, there was no longer a duty 
owed to Mrs. Lynch by Norton, rather than upon the concept of proximate 
cause.

[¶37]   My decision to affirm is premised 
upon the proposition a contractor like Norton owes no duty to third persons, as 
a matter of law, if that contractor in good faith constructed the project 
according to the owner's plans and specifications, and no danger or defect from 
following those plans and specifications was obvious to the contractor. 
Traditional negligence principles do not justify a finding of duty on the part 
of the contractor if there is no foreseeability of harm to third parties. The 
fact that, at some later time, the danger or defect becomes obvious to the owner 
upon subsequent discovery, while the premises are in the control of the owner, 
would assign to the owner the duty to avoid injury.

[¶38]   In this instance, there is nothing 
to suggest that Norton could foresee the school district, the owner, for more 
than a year would fail to protect its employees by refusing to salt the 
accumulations of ice and snow or to sand the known icy spots. Nothing indicates 
the contractor was forewarned by any information concerning any drainage problem 
that would relate to the construction of the sidewalk. The legal duty was 
assigned to the school district, in this instance, and it, having failed to 
adjust the plans and specifications to avoid the dangerous condition and having 
failed to remedy those problems when known, was the party responsible to those 
who might be injured.

[¶39]   I concur in the disposition of the 
case, but my concurrence is premised upon a lack of duty on the part of the 
contractor, rather than a conclusion there was no causal relationship between 
the work performed by the contractor and Mrs. Lynch's 
injuries.