Title: Howard Ross v. Shauli Rosen-Rager and Rene Rosen-Rager

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 8/27/2010
REL: 11/24/2010 As modified on denial of rehearing
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1080721
_________________________
Howard Ross
v.
Shauli Rosen-Rager and Rene Rosen-Rager
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-06-2097)
WOODALL, Justice.
Howard Ross appeals from a partial summary judgment
awarding Shauli Rosen-Rager and Rene Rosen-Rager $13,343.47 in
compensatory damages and from a judgment entered on a jury
verdict awarding the Rosen-Ragers $350,000 in punitive damages
1080721
2
in the Rosen-Ragers' action against Ross and others alleging,
among other things, trespass and ejectment.  We affirm in part
and affirm conditionally in part.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On May 9, 2003, property owned by Margie Campbell in
Huntsville was sold by the tax collector of Madison County for
the collection of ad valorem taxes, which remained delinquent
from the previous year.  Ross, the winning bidder, paid $750
for the property, for which he received a "certificate of land
sold for taxes."  Ross purchased insurance on the property,
paying a total of $1,178 in premiums.  He also made
improvements totaling $1,195.
At the time Ross purchased the property, there was a
mortgage on the property held by Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS").  Campbell defaulted on
the debt secured by the mortgage, and, on  July 3, 2003, MERS
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, for which it
received a foreclosure deed.  On September 28, 2004, MERS paid
into the Madison County Probate Court $1,612.93 to redeem the
property, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-120 et seq.  The
payment included Ross's original tax-purchase price of $750,
1080721
3
plus subsequent taxes paid by Ross, and interest calculated at
12%. In return, the probate court issued MERS a "certificate
of redemption," pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-127.
MERS's payment did not include any amount for the insurance
Ross had purchased or for the improvements he had made to the
property.
The certificate of redemption was duly recorded in the
probate office, and, for all that appears, Ross was provided
with notice of the issuance of the certificate of redemption
as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-128, which provides:
"If the lands redeemed were bid in by any person
other than the state, the redemption money must be
deposited by the judge of probate in the county
treasury and there kept separate and apart from the
general funds of the county, and the judge of
probate shall notify the purchaser of such deposit
by mailing notice to the residence or place of
business of such purchaser, or to such address as
the purchaser may furnish the judge of probate at
the time he secures his certificate of purchase;
and, upon the demand of the purchaser, his legal
representative or assignee and the surrender of the
certificate of purchase, the judge of probate must
give him an order on the treasury for the same."
(Emphasis added.)  
Ross does not assert that he was not notified of the
issuance of the certificate of redemption.  In fact, on
December 22, 2004, Ross caused to be recorded a "verified
1080721
Although Fletcher eventually vacated the premises, the
1
time and circumstances of his departure are unclear and, in
any case, are irrelevant to this appeal.
4
statement of a lien" on the property for "materials, repair,
and improvements to the dwelling for the title holder of the
property," namely, MERS.  Ross declined to collect the
$1,612.93 that MERS had paid into the probate court.
On February 7, 2005, Ross leased the property to Ron
Fletcher, who went into possession.  On May 13, 2005, MERS,
incorrectly believing Campbell was residing on the property,
filed in the Madison Circuit Court a "complaint for ejectment"
against Campbell.  MERS v. Campbell, CV-05-917.  As soon as
MERS learned the identity of Ross's tenant, it amended its
complaint to add Fletcher as a defendant.  Still later, on
December 9, 2005, MERS again amended its complaint to add Ross
as a defendant.
Meanwhile, on November 5, 2005, Ross sued Fletcher in the
Madison District Court for unlawful detainer.  Ross v.
Fletcher, DV-05-2689.  On December 14, 2005, the district
court dismissed the action, stating: "[Ross] does not own
clear title to the property that is the subject of this law
suit, and therefore, has no standing to bring this action."1
1080721
5
MERS was unable to effect service of process on Ross.
Its unserved civil summons was returned with the notation:
"Avoiding Service."  In February 2006, however, Ross and MERS
exchanged correspondence regarding payment for the insurance
and improvements and about the ongoing litigation. For
example, on February 4, 2006, Ross addressed the following
letter to MERS's attorney:
"Re: 
Redemption 
of 
---- 
S. 
Westdale 
Court,
Huntsville Alabama 35805
"Tenants have informed me that you plan to redeem
the 
above 
reference[d] 
property. 
If 
so, 
the
following is a statement of additional lawful
charges that must be paid to me under the provisions
of Code of Alabama § 40-10-122(b)-(e) in order to
effect the redemption:
"1. Paint Interior
$  700.00
"2. Carpet 2 bedrooms
$  165.00
"3. Dishwasher Repair
$   30.00
"4. Remove Trash and Clean
$  150.00
"5. Clean and mow yard
$   50.00
"6. Section and remove fallen tree
$  100.00
"7. State Farm Insurance
$1,178.00 
"TOTAL
$2,373.00"
On February 13, 2006, MERS's attorney sent Ross the
following response: 
"Thank you for your letter of February 4, 2006.  As
I'm sure you are aware, the court set this for a
hearing February 24, 2006, and, reviewing your
itemization costs, in light of § 40-10-122, it would
1080721
6
appear that the reasonable and necessary expenses
would be limited to $1,195.  If you are willing to
accept this without a hearing, we will notify the
court that the case can be settled without a
hearing.  Please advise me if this will be
acceptable."
(Emphasis added.)  
Ross's response to that information was another letter to
MERS's counsel on April 28, 2006.  That letter stated: 
"This letter is to notify you that you have yet to
complete the redemption of the above referenced
property.  I have not received payment in the amount
of two thousand three hundred and seventy three
dollars ($2,373.00) for preservation improvements
which I have made, and my rights to the property
have not been terminated."
(Emphasis added.) 
Meanwhile, on March 14, 2006, the trial court in CV-05-
917 entered a summary judgment in favor of MERS, thereby
ejecting Ross from the property.  The same day, the court
issued a "writ of possession" in favor of MERS and against
Ross, Campbell, and Fletcher.  On July 24, 2006, MERS sent
Ross a letter apprising him of, among other things, the fact
that the court had given it the right to take possession of
the property.  Two days later, on July 26, 2006, MERS executed
a "special warranty deed" conveying the property to the Rosen-
Ragers.
1080721
7
On August 1, 2006, the Rosen-Ragers entered into an
agreement with RPM Realty, Inc. ("RPM"), whereby RPM agreed to
manage the property for the Rosen-Ragers to produce rental
income.  RPM contracted with other entities, including Carpet
Crafters, Inc., to clean the residence and to install new
carpet.  While RPM was thus engaged, Ross leased the property
to Charles Hurt and Sharon Baxter.  When Carpet Crafters
arrived to install the carpet, its workers discovered Hurt and
Baxter in the residence.  Carpet Crafters immediately notified
RPM, which dispatched its manager Suzanne Tomlinson to
investigate.  An altercation ensued, prompting an appearance
by the Huntsville Police Department, with Baxter defending her
right to possession as Ross's tenant.  
Subsequently, Tomlinson posted on the property a notice
of termination of a possessory interest and a "notice to
vacate" on September 19, 2006, and October 5, 2006,
respectively, which Hurt and Baxter ignored.  During this
time, according to Baxter, Ross told Baxter simply "to
disregard papers that anybody was bringing [her]."
1080721
In a separate action commenced by the Rosen-Ragers in the
2
Madison District Court against Hurt and Baxter (DV-06-2950),
the court entered an "unlawful detainer judgment" against Hurt
and Baxter and in favor of the Rosen-Ragers.
8
On October 24, 2006, the Rosen-Ragers sued Hurt, Baxter,
and Ross in the Madison Circuit Court.   The complaint
2
alleged, among other things, that Ross had trespassed on the
property by "wantonly inducing" Hurt and Baxter to "enter into
possession of the property" under "circumstances of insult and
contumely."  It alleged that the defendants had "maliciously,
willfully, oppressively, and/or wantonly interfered with the
Rosen-Ragers' exclusive possession of the property."  The
complaint also contained a claim of intentional interference
with business or contractual relations and a claim for
ejectment, by which the Rosen-Ragers sought a judgment
ordering the defendants "to vacate the property."  In April
2007, the circuit court entered a default judgment against
Hurt and Baxter for $13,402.52 in compensatory damages and
$26,805.04 in punitive damages.  This appeal involves no issue
as to the correctness of that judgment.
On October 29, 2007, the Rosen-Ragers moved for a partial
summary judgment against Ross on the issues of liability and
compensatory damages.  Ross filed a cross-motion for a partial
1080721
[substituted p. 9]
summary judgment, contending that MERS's purported redemption
did not comply with § 40-10-122 and was therefore legally
ineffective to divest Ross of his possessory interest in the
property.  On December 19, 2007, the circuit court entered a
partial summary judgment in favor of the Rosen-Ragers on their
claims, 
including 
(1) 
trespass, 
(2) 
wantonness, 
(3)
interference with business or contractual relations, and (4)
ejectment. 
It 
awarded 
the 
Rosen-Ragers 
$13,343.47 
in
compensatory damages, but it reserved for a jury trial the
issue of Ross's liability for punitive damages.
The essential issue at trial was whether Ross's conduct
warranted the imposition of punitive damages.  Ross took the
position that his conduct was justified by MERS's failure to
pay the amount of money he had expended for improvements and
insurance premiums.  More specifically, Ross testified that
the statutory scheme allowed him to remain in possession until
he had received payment for those  expenditures.  However, the
circuit court would not allow Ross to read from the statutes
or to introduce them into evidence.    At   the  close  of
the  trial,  the  court  instructed  the jury  on  the  law
of   wantonness  but   did   not  instruct  the  jury  on  the
1080721
[substituted p. 10]
relevance, if any, of the statutes on which Ross purported to
rely.  The jury awarded $350,000 in punitive damages.
The circuit court entered a final judgment on the damages
awards on October 24, 2008.  That same day, the circuit court
scheduled a hearing for review of the punitive-damages award
in accordance with this Court's decisions in Hammond v. City
of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989) (hereinafter referred to
as "the Hammond hearing").  
On November 18, 2008, Ross filed a motion for a new
trial, which was denied.  In a separate order, the circuit
court also declined to remit the punitive-damages award.  Ross
appealed.  The issues on appeal involve (1) whether the
partial summary judgment was proper, (2) whether the trial was
infected with evidentiary errors, and (3) whether the
punitive-damages verdict was excessive.
II. Discussion
A. Partial Summary Judgment
"To prevail on [their] claims," says Ross, "the Rosen-
Ragers had to show that they and not Ross owned and had the
right to possess the property.  Otherwise, Ross committed no
1080721
11
trespass, much less a wanton trespass, and the Rosen-Ragers
were not entitled to ejectment ...."  Ross's brief, at 23.  We
agree.
"'"[T]he manner in which the [summary-judgment] movant's
burden of production is met depends upon which party has the
burden of proof ... at trial."'"  Denmark v. Mercantile Stores
Co., 844 So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte
General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 909 (Ala. 1999), quoting
in turn Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 691 (Ala. 1989)
(Houston, J., concurring specially)).  If the movant is the
plaintiff with the ultimate burden of proof, his "'proof must
be such that he would be entitled to a directed verdict [now
referred to as a judgment as a matter of law, see Rule 50,
Ala. R. Civ. P.] if this evidence was not controverted at
trial.'" Ex parte General Motors, 769 So. 2d at 909 (quoting
Berner, 543 So. 2d at 688).
"The first prerequisite 
for 
[a 
summary 
judgment]
in favor of a movant who asserts a claim ... is that
the claim ... be valid in legal theory, if its
validity be challenged.  See Driver v. National Sec.
Fire & Cas. Co., 658 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1995).  The
second prerequisite for [a summary judgment] in
favor of such a movant, who necessarily bears the
burden of proof, American Furniture Galleries v.
McWane, Inc., 477 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1985), McKerley
v. Etowah-DeKalb-Cherokee Mental Health Board, Inc.,
1080721
12
686 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), and Oliver v.
Hayes International Corp., 456 So. 2d 802 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1984), is that each contested element of the
claim ... be supported by substantial evidence.  See
Driver, supra, and McKerley, supra.  The third
prerequisite for [a summary judgment] in favor of
such a movant is that the record be devoid of
substantial evidence rebutting the movant's evidence
on any essential element of the claim .... See
Driver, supra, and First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Tillery,
626 So. 2d 1252 (Ala. 1993).  Substantial rebutting
evidence would create an issue of fact to be tried
by the finder of fact and therefore would preclude
[a summary judgment].  See Driver, supra, and First
Financial, supra. [Summary judgment] in favor of the
party who asserts the claim ... is not appropriate
unless all three of these prerequisites coexist.
See Driver, supra, and First Financial, supra,
McKerley, supra, and Oliver, supra."
Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (Ala. 2003).
The circuit court essentially held, as a matter of law,
that Ross had wantonly trespassed on the Rosen-Ragers'
property.  "Wantonness in a trespass action is established by
the mere knowledge on the part of the defendant of his
invasion of the plaintiff's rights."  Cummans v. Dobbins, 575
So. 2d 81, 82 (Ala. 1991); Calvert & Marsh Coal Co. v. Pass,
393 So. 2d 955, 957 (Ala. 1980).  Although good faith is not
a defense to a claim of trespass, a showing of good faith may
"refute the charge of ... wantonness."  Ramos v. Fell, 272
Ala. 53, 58, 128 So. 2d 481, 484-85 (1961).  Thus, the
1080721
13
dispositive question is whether there was substantial evidence
that when Ross induced Hurt and Baxter to enter into
possession of the property, the Rosen-Ragers had lawful
possession of the property, and, if they did, whether there
was substantial evidence that Ross placed Hurt and Baxter on
the property with a good-faith belief that he had the right of
possession.
Ross's arguments are based on Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-74
(tax purchaser's right of possession) and § 40-10-122 (process
for redemption of land from tax sale).  Section 40-10-74
provides, in pertinent part:
"Any purchaser of lands at a tax sale other than
the state or anyone claiming under him shall be
entitled to possession of said lands immediately
upon receipt of certificate of sale from the tax
collector; and, if possession is not surrendered
within six months after demand therefor is made by
said purchaser or his assignee, the said purchaser
or his assignee may maintain an action in ejectment
or a statutory real action in the nature of
ejectment, or other proper remedy for the recovery
of the possession of the lands purchased at such
sales and shall be entitled to hold the possession
thereof on recovery, subject, however, to all rights
of redemption provided for in this title."
(Emphasis added.)  At the time of the events made the basis of
this action, § 40-10-122 provided, in pertinent part:
1080721
14
"(a) In order to obtain the redemption of land
from tax sales where the same has been sold to one
other than the state, the party desiring to make
such redemption shall deposit with the judge of
probate of the county in which the land is situated
the amount of money for which the lands were sold,
with interest payable at the rate of 12 percent per
annum from date of sale, and, on the portion of any
excess bid that is less than or equal to 15 percent
of the market value as established by the county
board of equalization, together with the amount of
all taxes which have been paid by the purchaser,
which fact shall be ascertained by consulting the
records in the office of the tax collector, or other
tax collecting official, with interest on said
payment at 12 percent per annum.  If any taxes on
said land have been assessed to the purchaser and
have not been paid, and if said taxes are due which
may be ascertained by consulting the tax collector
or other tax collecting official of the county, the
probate judge shall also require the party desiring
to redeem said land to pay the tax collector or
other tax collecting official the taxes due on said
lands which have not been paid by the purchaser
before he or she is entitled to redeem the same.  In
all redemptions of land from tax sales, the party
securing the redemption shall pay all costs and fees
as herein provided for due to officers and a fee of
$.50 to the judge of probate for his or her services
in the matter of redemption. This application and
payment may be executed by an on-line transaction
via the Internet or other on-line provision.
"....
"(c) With respect to property which contains a
residential structure at the time of the sale
regardless 
of 
its 
location, 
the 
proposed
redemptioner must pay to the purchaser or his or her
transferee, in addition to any other requirements
set 
forth 
in 
this 
section, 
the 
amounts 
set 
forth 
below:
1080721
Section 40-10-122 was most recently amended in 2009.
3
Subsection (c) is relatively new.  It was added in 2002
4
by Act No. 2002-426, Ala. Acts 2002.
15
"(1) All insurance premiums paid or
owed by the purchaser for casualty loss
coverage on the residential structure with
interest on the payments at 12 percent per
annum. 
"(2) The value of all preservation
improvements 
made 
on 
the 
property
determined in accordance with this section
with interest on the value at 12 percent
per annum."
(Emphasis added.)  
3
According to Ross, redemption does not occur until the
redemptioner complies fully with § 40-10-122(a) and (c)(1)-
(2), more specifically, until the tax-sale purchaser receives
not only the amounts set forth in subsection (a), but also the
amounts set forth in subsection (c)(1)-(2),  namely, the
4
"insurance premiums" and the "value of all preservation
improvements" made on the property at the statutory rate of
interest.  Ross insists that he acquired the right of
possession as the tax-sale purchaser, which right, he argues,
continues until the property is redeemed in conformity with §
40-10-122.  Ross contends that, because he was never paid for
improvements and insurance, § 40-10-122 was never triggered,
1080721
16
the property was never actually redeemed, and he never lost
the right of possession.
In response, the Rosen-Ragers state:
"[The payments set forth in § 40-10-122(c)] are in
addition to those payments required 'in order to
obtain the redemption' by subsection (a).  Nothing
in the plain language of the statute indicates that
the requirements of [subsection (c)] extend to the
tax sale purchaser an ongoing ability to possess the
redeemed property or interfere with the legal
owner's possession.  Rather, they create a right of
monetary relief which the tax sale purchaser may
pursue.  Ross's pursuit of any right to monetary
relief from MERS does not concern the [Rosen-Ragers]
....  Whether or not Ross is entitled to additional
payment from MERS is simply not a title issue."
Rosen-Ragers' brief, at 50-51 (some emphasis added).
Moreover, they state that Ross's "argument must fail as
a statutory Certificate of Redemption, evidencing redemption,
was issued by the Madison County Judge of Probate on September
28, 2004."  Rosen-Ragers' brief, at 47-48.  We need not decide
whether the failure of the redemptioner to make the payments
set forth in subsection (c), standing alone, affects the tax-
sale purchaser's right to possession, because, in any case, a
tax-sale purchaser may not simply ignore a certificate of
redemption as Ross did in this case.
1080721
17
Ross concedes, as he must, that a certificate of
redemption is prima facie evidence of redemption.  Ross's
brief, at 34.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-81 ("the books and
records belonging to the office of the judge of probate ...
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein");
§ 40-10-127 (to be evidence of redemption, the certificate
must be signed); see also Ala. Code 1975, § 12-13-1(c)("All
orders, judgments and decrees of probate courts shall be
accorded the same validity and presumptions which are accorded
to 
judgments 
and 
orders 
of 
other 
courts 
of 
general
jurisdiction.") 
The certificate of redemption was not void on its face.
If it was issued erroneously, Ross should have challenged the
certificate judicially.  Ross does not allege that there was
no vehicle by which to challenge the correctness of the
certificate of redemption.  Indeed, this Court has said:
"In Alabama, circuit courts have 'a general
superintendence' over the probate courts.  Ala. Code
1975, 
§ 
12-11-30(4). 
Encompassed 
in 
this
superintendence is the power to review certain
judgments and orders of the probate court, either
through direct appeal or by petition for an
extraordinary writ.  See Helms v. McCollum, 447 So.
2d 687 (Ala. 1984).  Sections 12-22-2 and 12-22-20,
Ala. Code 1975, authorize appeals from final
judgments of a probate court to either the circuit
1080721
18
court or the Supreme Court.
"....
"The appellate 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
circuit 
court
can 
also 
be 
invoked 
by 
a 
petition 
for 
an
extraordinary writ.  Ala. Const. of 1901, [§
142](b).  Orders as to which no statute grants
appellate jurisdiction are reviewed on petitions for
writ of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition.  Town
of Flat Creek v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 245 Ala.
528, 17 So. 2d 771 (1944)."
Franks v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 679 So. 2d 214, 216 (Ala.
1996).  See Boyd v. Holt, 62 Ala. 296 (1878) (refusal of the
probate judge to issue a certificate of redemption for land
sold for taxes was reviewable in the circuit court by a
petition for a writ of mandamus).  
Redemption divests the tax-sale purchaser of a possessory
interest in the property.  Washington v. ORIX Credit Alliance,
Inc., 825 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).  Here, the
unchallenged certificate of redemption, issued in September
2004, divested Ross of his possessory interest in the
property.  Nevertheless, Ross thereafter leased the property,
first to Fletcher, then to Hurt and Baxter.  Thus, Ross
caused, as a matter of law, his tenants to trespass on the
property. 
1080721
19
On the issue of wantonness, it is undisputed that, rather
than mount a judicial challenge to the certificate of
redemption, Ross simply ignored it and treated the property as
though he still had a possessory interest.  Although Ross was
not formally served with process in MERS v. Campbell, CV-05-
917, which involved his interest in the property, there was
evidence indicating that he knew that that litigation was
pending, at least as early as February 13, 2006, that is,
before the March 14, 2006, judgment entered in that case, but
chose to ignore that litigation and also instructed his
tenants not to respond to notices involving the property. 
"If the credibility of court orders and the integrity of
our judicial system are to be maintained, a litigant cannot
ignore court orders with impunity."  Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94
N.Y.2d 118, 123, 722 N.E.2d 55, 58, 700 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90
(1999).  "A party ignores a valid order of court at its own
peril."  United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Strasser, 492 So. 2d
399, 402 n.1  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
Regardless of the whether the provisions of § 40-10-122
were properly applied, Ross was not excused or justified in
ignoring the judicial orders and processes involving this
1080721
20
property.  From September 2004 until the commencement of this
action on October 24, 2006, at the least, Ross sought to
occupy the property by proxy without any justifiable claim of
right.  There was substantial evidence that Ross induced Hurt
and Baxter to enter into possession of the property with
knowledge that he had no right of possession, and there was
not substantial evidence that Ross acted in good faith or with
any justification in so doing.  Indeed, Ross's interpretation
of the applicable statutes is so wholly lacking in any
foundation in law as to admit of no other conclusion than that
he acted with a state of mind consistent with wantonness as a
matter of law.  
Ross also argues that the Rosen-Ragers were not bona fide
purchasers of the property.  Specifically, he states: 
"As a result of MERS's failure to redeem, and
because 
the 
Rosen-Ragers 
were 
not 
bona 
fide
purchasers, they acquired the property subject to
Ross's interest. ... As a result, Ross continued to
have the right to possess and rent the property.
Therefore, the Rosen-Ragers failed to prove elements
essential to all of their claims, and they were not
entitled to summary judgment on any claim."
Ross's brief, at 44-45 (emphasis in original).  In response,
the Rosen-Ragers contend that their "status as bona fide
purchasers is irrelevant, as Ross possessed no claim in the
1080721
21
property against which [they] must assert their status as bona
fide purchasers."  Rosen-Ragers' brief, at 55 (emphasis
added).  We agree with the Rosen-Ragers.
Ross lost his interest in the property when he failed
timely to challenge the certificate of redemption.  The loss
foreclosed Ross's defenses against any trespass claim that
might have been brought by MERS, as well as his defenses
against the Rosen-Ragers, regardless of whether they were bona
fide purchasers of MERS's interest.  Consequently, the circuit
court did not err in entering a summary judgment for the
Rosen-Ragers on their claim of wanton trespass.
B. Evidentiary Issues at Trial
Ross raises two issues relating to the admissibility of
evidence during the trial of the case, which errors are
reviewed to determine whether the circuit court exceeded its
discretion.  Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So. 2d 63,
71 (Ala. 2001).  According to Ross, some evidence was
improperly admitted, while some evidence was improperly
excluded.  "A trial court's ruling on the admission or
exclusion of evidence will be reversed only if it is shown
that the trial court exceeded its discretion in so ruling."
1080721
22
Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 7
(Ala. 2007).
1. Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Wealth
First, Ross contends that the circuit court improperly
allowed the Rosen-Ragers to place before the jury evidence of
Ross's financial condition.  Specifically, the Rosen-Ragers
presented evidence indicating that, including the $1,612.93
MERS had paid to redeem the property -- which money Ross
refused to collect -- the Madison County Probate Court was
holding approximately $150,000 that Ross was refusing to
collect in other such cases for similar reasons.  According to
Ross, he "had acquired a number of tax-sale properties" for
which 
he 
had 
not 
been 
reimbursed 
for 
insurance 
and
improvements, and he was refusing payment as in this case,
"because he was concerned that accepting the probate money
might 
be 
construed 
as 
ratification 
of 
an 
incomplete
redemption."  Ross's brief, at 53.
The Rosen-Ragers contend that the evidence that Ross was
refusing to collect money held for him by the probate court
was admissible to show that Ross's refusal to relinquish
possession of the property in this case was part of a
1080721
23
systematic scheme or practice calculated to deny the rights of
"legal title holders to peacefully possess their property,"
Rosen-Ragers' brief, at 61, and that, in any case, Ross did
not properly object to the evidence when proffered.  In
connection with the non-preservation argument, the following
colloquy occurred at trial during the testimony of Jan
Dismuke, an accountant clerk at the Madison County Probate
Office:
"Q.
[By the Rosen-Ragers' counsel:] Did Mr. Ross
ever come and pick that money up?
"A.
[By Dismuke:] No, sir.
"Q.
How much redemption money are you holding for
Howard Ross that he has not come and picked up?
"[By Ross's counsel:] Objection, Judge, that's
irrelevant.
"[The court:] Overruled.
"Q.
[By the Rosen-Ragers' counsel:] You may answer.
"A.
One 
hundred 
and 
forty-nine 
thousand, 
two
hundred and thirty-seven dollars and fifty-nine
cents.
"Q.
No more questions."
(Emphasis added.)
It is well settled that a "specific objection is a
condition precedent to appellate review while a general
1080721
24
objection is a waiver of appellate review. ... A general
objection to evidence is one which does not definitely and
specifically state the ground upon which it is based so that
the court may intelligently rule on it."  II Charles W. Gamble
& Robert J. Goodwin, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 426.01(7),
at 2125 (6th ed. 2009) (hereinafter referred to as "McElroy").
This rule applies "unless the evidence is patently illegal and
cannot be made legal for any purpose."  Harris v. Martin, 271
Ala. 52, 53, 122 So. 2d 116, 118 (1960).  An objection on the
ground that the proffered evidence is "irrelevant" is a
general objection.  Few v. State, 518 So. 2d 835, 837 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1987); Manson v. State, 349 So. 2d 67, 81 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1977).  "The party who lodges a general objection
at trial may not expand the objection on appeal by including
specific grounds."  McElroy, supra, at 2125.  
Dismuke's testimony was not patently inadmissible and
illegal for every purpose.  It bore a logical relationship to
the ultimate question--whether Ross had consciously or
deliberately engaged in oppression or wantonness with regard
to the Rosen-Ragers.  Evidence is relevant if it has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
1080721
25
consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."  Rule
401, Ala. R. Evid.  Indeed, Ross essentially concedes that
evidence 
of 
multiple, 
similar 
instances 
of 
ignoring
certificates of redemption would have been admissible for that
purpose. In this Court, Ross states: "The Rosen-Ragers could
have made their point simply by asking the probate clerk how
many other tax-sale properties Ross owned as to which he had
not picked up funds deposited for redemption.  The amount of
funds deposited was ... inadmissible evidence of Ross's
financial condition."  Ross's reply brief, at 27-28 (emphasis
in original).  This is an argument that should have been made
to the circuit court at the time of the proffer, not for the
first time in this Court.  Because Ross did not properly
object to Dismuke's  testimony, he is not entitled to a
reversal based on its  allegedly improper admission.
2. Exclusion of the Tax-Sale and Redemption Statutes
During the trial, Ross attempted to read to the jury, or
otherwise to place in evidence, portions of the redemption and
tax-sale statutes, which, he alleged, gave him the right to
place tenants on the property after, and despite, the issuance
1080721
26
of the certificate of redemption.  After an objection by the
Rosen-Ragers' counsel, Ross's counsel stated to the circuit
court: 
"If we can read certain aspects of the statute
.... That gives us an opportunity to show our
primary defense of justification.  If we are not
able to discuss the specific statute and what it
states and his understanding of it at all, then I
think that entirely eliminates our ... defense.
"....
"...If  there is no degree that Mr. Ross would
have 
any 
justification, 
then, 
obviously, 
the
[punitive] damages could be higher.  If there is
complete justification for the actions that he has
done, even though you determined they're wrong
previously, there would be no damages, conceivably."
(Emphasis added.)
The circuit court disallowed Ross's proffer.  Ultimately,
it charged the jury solely on wantonness as a basis for
punitive damages.  Ross objected to the charge on the ground
that it did not contain an instruction on reliance on the
statutes as "justification."  That objection was overruled.
Ross now argues that the judgment entered on the jury's
verdict must be reversed, because, he says, "[e]xcluding the
statutes deprived the jury of information vital to assessing
1080721
27
[his] conduct and determining whether and what punishment was
appropriate."  Ross's brief, at 57.  
We disagree with this argument.  The partial summary
judgment finding Ross liable for wantonness being proper as
discussed above, Ross's alleged understanding of the statutes
was irrelevant.  The admission of the statutes into evidence
would merely have invited the jury to nullify the partial
summary judgment, which had correctly resolved in the Rosen-
Ragers' favor the issue whether, as a matter of law, Ross was
justified to any degree.  Consequently, the circuit court did
not exceed its discretion in shielding the jury from the text
of the statutes. 
C. Review of the Punitive-Damages Award
Finally, Ross contends that the punitive-damages award is
excessive, and he seeks a substantial remittitur.  This Court
has a duty to conduct a de novo review of a punitive-damages
award.  Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So. 2d 1 (Ala.
2001).  According to Ross, the amount of the jury's verdict
"far exceeds" the amount that, as stated in Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d at 222, "'will accomplish society's goals
of punishment and deterrence.'"  Ross's brief, at 60.  
1080721
28
In reviewing a punitive-damages award, we apply the
factors set forth in Green Oil, within the framework of the
"guideposts" set forth in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996), and restated in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418
(2003).  See AutoZone, Inc. v. Leonard, 812 So. 2d 1179, 1187
(Ala. 2001) (Green Oil factors remain valid after Gore).
The 
Gore 
guideposts 
are: 
"(1) 
the 
degree 
of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases."  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418.  The Green Oil factors,
which are similar, and auxiliary in many respects, to the Gore
guideposts, are:
"(1) the reprehensibility of [the defendant's]
conduct; 
(2) 
the 
relationship 
of 
the
punitive-damages award to the harm that actually
occurred, 
or 
is 
likely 
to 
occur, 
from 
[the
defendant's] conduct; (3) [the defendant's] profit
from 
[his] 
misconduct; 
(4) 
[the 
defendant's]
financial position; (5) the cost to [the plaintiff]
of the litigation; (6) whether [the defendant] has
been subject to criminal sanctions for similar
conduct; and (7) other civil actions [the defendant]
1080721
29
has been involved in arising out of similar
conduct."
Shiv-Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299, 317 (Ala. 2003)
(paraphrasing the Green Oil factors).
1.
Gore Reprehensibility Guidepost and Green Oil Factors
(1), (2), (5), and (7)
"Perhaps 
the 
most 
important 
indicium 
of 
the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."  Gore, 517 U.S.
at 575.  The circuit court's Hammond order is instructive on
this point; it states, in pertinent part:
"Ross is an anathema upon the court system and
the public.  He has engaged in a pattern and
practice of ignoring and actively avoiding the
authority of the courts himself, while using hyper-
technical or distorted interpretations of the law
that suit him against others.  The harm Ross causes
in the process is substantial, not only to the
private parties directly involved, but also to the
integrity of the law and the integrity of society.
"In this case, Ross purchased the tax interest
in the property at issue. [MERS], holding a pre-
existing mortgage on the property, foreclosed upon
and then redeemed the property from the tax sale by
payment to the Madison County Judge of Probate,
receiving a Certificate of Redemption.  Ross began
negotiation with [MERS] for further payment to him
for purported improvements he made to the property.
Simultaneously, [MERS] instituted Court proceedings
to remove Ross's tenants from the property.  Ross's
knowledge of and involvement with those proceedings
is evident, as is his avoidance of legitimately
1080721
30
having his entitlement to any payments finally
determined through such proper channels.  Ross made
considerable effort to keep his right to additional
payments a live issue, giving him, in his mind, a
colorable claim to possess the property, while
actively avoiding any action he might be required to
admit resolved the issue.  Ross also, during the
relevant time, unsuccessfully sued [Fletcher] for
failing to pay him rent on the involved property and
received a judgment indicating he was not entitled
to collect rent from tenants on that property [Ross
v. Fletcher, DV-05-2689].
"Despite ... court rulings that provided Ross
ample notice of his tenuous position, Ross persisted
in possessing the property and renting it to
tenants. [MERS], having received a final order of
the Madison County Circuit Court ejecting Ross's
tenants, informed Ross of that Court action and
conveyed the property to the [Rosen-Ragers] ....
"....
"Ross's conduct in this case cannot be viewed in
isolation. This Court previously adjudicated the
case of Cindy L. Schrock v. Howard Ross, CV 06-900.
In that case, Ross also purchased the tax interest
in a property.  That property was redeemed by a
mortgage company after foreclosing on the property.
That property was sold to an innocent third party,
Cindy Schrock.  Ms. Schrock entered into her new
property and evidenced her possession.  When Ms.
Schrock was away from her property on vacation, Ross
moved tenants in and fought to keep them in the
property.  This Court, after a full trial, restored
possession to Ms. Schrock and ordered Ross to pay
damages of $16,639.
"....
 
"The scope of Ross's enterprise, as well as his
general way of doing business, is further evidenced
1080721
31
by the fact that the Madison County Judge of Probate
holds approximately $150,000 for Ross.  When the
property at issue in this case was redeemed by a
payment of approximately $1,600 to the Probate
Judge, Ross did not collect the redemption money, to
which he was entitled, as the tax sale purchaser.
According to Ross's testimony, he purposely failed
to collect the funds for concern that his claims to
possession 
of 
the 
property 
would 
thereby 
be
diminished.  Similar evidence was presented in Ms.
Schrock's case.  Ross's approach to these funds is
further evidence of the reprehensible gamesmanship
he applies to his enterprise.  The accumulation of
these funds to approximately $150,000 evidences the
vastness of his scheme.  Finally, that Ross would
deny himself possession of such a sum to further his
scheme is evidence of its profitability and Ross's
resources.
"Any 
citizen 
owning 
one 
of 
the 
numerous
properties represented by the $150,000 in redemption
proceeds held for Ross by the Probate Judge must
beware.  Ross avoids collecting those funds to aid
his articulation of an excuse for possession of
those properties.  Ross has demonstrated that, if he
can find those properties vacant due to an owner's
holiday vacation, renovation or otherwise, he will
lease them.  He will lease them after a court rules
his tenants cannot possess them.  He will lease them
after a court rules he is not entitled to collect
rent on them.  Every month he can lease them equals
another rental payment received.  He will not
prosecute a resolution of his articulated excuses
for possessing the properties or collect redemption
payments due him, because to do so would alleviate
excuses for possession and collecting further rent.
"Ross's tactics are of great concern.  Each time
Ross places tenants in a home belonging to another
(whether the homeowner be on vacation or absent for
other reasons), he places tenants and homeowners at
great risk for dangerous confrontation.  Each time
1080721
32
he displays to a homeowner his ability to, in fact,
place tenants in their home and collect rent in the
face of deeds, certificates of redemption, court
orders and other protections in which our society
vests faith, he erodes confidence in our society and
encourages the worst of behavior.  Ross challenges
those in his path to navigate the Court system and
laws (with which he is quite experienced) and stop
him if they can.
"The purpose of a punitive damages award is to
deter conduct.  Many court rulings should have
deterred Ross before the punitive damages award in
this case.  Ross, however, is persistent."
The circuit court correctly noted that this case cannot
be considered in a vacuum.  Although it is unrefuted that
service of process was never formally effected upon Ross in
MERS v. Campbell, CV-05-917, in which he could have resolved
the precise issue regarding his possessory interest in this
property, he had actual notice of ongoing litigation as early
as February 13, 2006, when MERS informed him of an imminent
hearing involving his claim to the itemized expenses.  Also,
as the trial court's Hammond order reveals, Schrock v. Ross,
CV-06-900, was another civil action involving similar conduct
in which an identical substantive issue was litigated to a
conclusion adverse to Ross. (Green Oil factor (7).) Ross
appealed the judgment entered in that case, and this Court
affirmed the judgment without an opinion on December 7, 2007.
1080721
33
Ross v. Schrock, 25 So. 3d 1204 (Ala. 2007) (table).  Although
the trial court's final judgment in Schrock was not entered
until December 22, 2006, that is, approximately two months
after the Rosen-Ragers sued Ross, Schrock is still evidence of
similar conduct, though not necessarily of Ross's knowledge of
wrongdoing.
With regard to the cost of litigation (Green Oil factor
(5)), the Rosen-Ragers submitted the affidavit of their
attorney, which stated that the Rosen-Ragers had already paid
attorney fees totaling $9,880.41 and had incurred other
expenses totaling $6,247.21.  In lieu of the further payment
of attorney fees on an hourly basis, the Rosen-Ragers agreed
to pay their counsel an undisclosed percentage of any sums
ultimately 
collected 
from Ross.  Notwithstanding this
contingency-fee 
arrangement, 
the 
Rosen-Ragers' 
counsel
computed the hours expended by the legal professionals
employed as if billed at the regular hourly rates and arrived
at $82,000 as the value of costs, expenses, and legal fees
attributable to the prosecution of this case.
To be weighed against these observations is the fact that
the purchasing of tax-sale property is, in itself, a laudable
1080721
34
practice, one to be encouraged, rather than discouraged.
Hence, "[t]he Alabama legislature ... has enacted statutes
favoring the sale of land to secure payment of delinquent
taxes."  William R. Justice, Redemption of Real Property
Following Tax Sales in Alabama, 11 Cumb. L. Rev. 331, 331
(1980) (emphasis added).  Ross testified that if the punitive-
damages verdict is upheld, it will "effectively put [him] out
of business regarding properties that [he] could afford to buy
at tax sales," and he will simply stop purchasing tax-sale
properties.  Because such a result would be counterproductive,
the goal must be not to discourage Ross from engaging in the
practice per se, but essentially to dissuade him from ignoring
probate court orders and certificates.  He has already been
required to pay $16,639 in the Schrock case.
2.
Civil-Penalties Guidepost in Gore
The parties do not discuss this guidepost or direct us to
any evidence or authority related to its application.
3.
Gore Guidepost of Disparity Between the Damage and the
Award and Green Oil Factors (3) and (4)
The final Gore guidepost we will consider is "the
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award."  Campbell, 538 U.S.
1080721
35
at 418.  The Rosen-Ragers' complaint does not include claims
based on personal injury.  There is only the potential for
personal injury each time Ross's practice of deliberately
ignoring 
certificates 
of 
redemption 
brings 
competing 
claimants
for the same property into direct physical contact.  
Also, "'[i]f the wrongful conduct was profitable to the
defendant, the punitive damages should remove the profit and
should be in excess of the profit, so that the defendant
recognizes a loss. ... The financial position of the defendant
[is also] relevant.'"  Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223 (quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoi, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1062 (Ala.
1987) (Houston, J., concurring specially)(factor (3))).  Ross
profits from this scheme by keeping tenants on properties
until they are evicted by judicial action, in some cases, long
after the issuance of the certificates of redemption.  In this
case, Hurt and Baxter paid Ross approximately $1,000 in rent.
Although Ross values his assets at $1,167,000, his
testimony at the Hammond hearing regarding his financial
condition was confusing, at best, and failed to establish
anything definitive regarding his status.  (Green Oil factor
(4).)  In that connection, the circuit court stated: "Ross has
1080721
36
not provided this court credible evidence upon which to fully
judge his financial condition."  Indeed, the evidence he did
offer as to his financial condition was referable only to the
time of trial and later, rather than to the "time of the
occurrence made the basis of the suit," as required by Ala.
Code 1975, § 6-11-21(c),  to establish the specific damages
limitations provided in § 6-11-21(b) for "a small business."
Viewing these factors in toto, including the limited
objective to be achieved and the absence of any actual
personal injury, we conclude that a $120,000 punitive-damages
award is sufficient to punish Ross and to deter further
conduct similar to that evidenced in this case, without
compromising his due-process rights.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, the partial summary judgment is affirmed.
The judgment entered on the jury's punitive-damages verdict is
affirmed, on the condition that the Rosen-Ragers file with
this Court, within 21 days, a remittitur of the punitive-
damages award to $120,000; otherwise, the judgment will be
reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on the issue
of punitive damages.
1080721
37
AFFIRMED IN PART AND AFFIRMED CONDITIONALLY IN PART.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Shaw, JJ., concur.