Title: In re Estate of Kendall

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12881 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JACQUELINE ANN KENDALL. 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 5, 2020. - December 28, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
MassHealth.  Medicaid.  Division of Medical Assistance.  Repose, 
Statute of.  Devise and Legacy, Intestacy.  Executor and 
Administrator, Claims against estate, Governmental claims. 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and 
Family Court Department on May 24, 2018. 
 
Questions of law were reported by Frances M. Giordano, J., 
to the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court transferred 
the case on its own initiative. 
 
 
Meredith A. Fine for the petitioner. 
Patricia Keane Martin for Massachusetts Chapter of the 
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys & others. 
David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for Executive 
Office of Health and Human Services. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  At issue in the instant case is whether the 
Estate of Jacqueline Ann Kendall is required to pay a claim for 
                                                          
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
reimbursement from the Commonwealth's MassHealth program when 
the estate proceeding was commenced more than three years after 
Kendall died.  We conclude that G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108 (4), 
prohibits the filing of such claims after three years and 
prohibits the personal representative from paying any claims, 
and thus the claim here is time barred.  The Legislature 
provided MassHealth with various advantages over other 
creditors, but it also created an ultimate time limit on the 
filing and payment of creditor claims against estates in § 3-
108, with no exception for MassHealth.2 
 
1.  Factual background.  The facts of this case are taken 
from the undisputed facts submitted by the parties.  Kendall 
received MassHealth benefits when she was age fifty-five or 
older in the amount of $104,738.23, and died intestate on August 
7, 2014.  Upon her death, she had a fifty percent interest in a 
house in Gloucester, a portion of which was recoverable by 
MassHealth under G. L. c. 118E, § 31.  On May 24, 2018, one of 
her heirs, the petitioner, filed a petition for late and limited 
formal testacy and, as required by G. L. c. 118E, § 32, notified 
MassHealth.  MassHealth informed counsel for the petitioner that 
it would be filing a notice of claim in the estate. 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Chapter of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, the Real 
Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and The Abstract 
Club, in which the Massachusetts Bar Association joined. 
3 
 
 
On June 15, 2018, MassHealth received a letter from counsel 
for the petitioner stating that once the petitioner was 
appointed as personal representative of the estate, she could 
not pay MassHealth's claim pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 3-108 (4).  MassHealth then filed a notice of appearance and 
objection and an affidavit of objections stating its rights to 
present a claim under G. L. c. 118E, §§ 31 and 32, and G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-803 (f).  The petitioner filed a motion to strike 
the affidavit of objections, which MassHealth opposed, and which 
the court denied.  MassHealth filed a petition for formal 
probate, requesting the appointment of a personal representative 
of its choosing (a public administrator) so that its claim could 
be paid, which the petitioner opposed.  In February 2019, the 
parties cross-moved for summary judgment.  In April 2019, at the 
request of both parties, a Probate and Family Court judge 
reserved and reported the case to the Appeals Court pursuant to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), 
along with the following reported questions: 
"1.  Whether the Estate of Jacqueline Ann Kendall is 
required to pay a MassHealth claim more than three years 
after Ms. Kendall died, when [G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108,] of 
the Uniform Probate Code prohibits the Personal 
Representative from paying any claims. 
 
"2.  Whether, where a decedent received Medicaid benefits 
under [G. L. c. 118E], that chapter governs notice to be 
given to the division of medical assistance and such 
division's claim for recovery under [G. L. c. 118E, § 31], 
if the division so chooses, and the priority statute, 
4 
 
[G. L. c. 190B, § 3-805 (a) (6)], shall be construed to 
authorize and permit MassHealth to file notices of claim in 
all estates, including so-called 'late and limited' 
petitions under [G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108,] and authorize 
those claims to be paid by the personal representative as a 
matter of law. 
 
"3.  Whether [G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803 (f)], which provides 
MassHealth the authority to assert claims in the estates of 
deceased persons who received medical assistance while 
[fifty-five] years of age or older, or who received 
inpatient services in a nursing facility or medical 
institution at any age, in accordance with [G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 32], is an exception to the one year limitation on 
presentation of claims set forth in [G. L. c. 190B, § 3-
803]. 
 
"4.  Whether, if [G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803 (f),] is not an 
exception to the one year statute of limitations, 
MassHealth is entitled to commence a formal testacy 
proceeding for the purpose of establishing an instrument to 
direct or control the ownership of property passing or 
distributable after the decedent's death, including the 
repayment of MassHealth benefits correctly paid." 
 
We subsequently transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
2.  Statutory background.  The administration and 
distribution of a decedent's estate are governed by the 
Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (code), G. L. c. 190B.  The 
code was enacted with the explicitly stated purpose of 
"promot[ing] a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the 
estate of the decedent and making distribution to the decedent's 
successors."  G. L. c. 190B, § 1-102 (b) (3).  To that end, the 
code sets out deadlines for various actions in the estate 
administration process. 
5 
 
 
Most importantly, the Legislature imposed an "ultimate time 
limit" in § 3-108,3 which provides: 
"No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal 
testacy or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding 
to probate a will previously probated at the testator's 
domicile and appointment proceedings relating to an estate 
in which there has been a prior appointment, may be 
commenced more than [three] years after the decedent's 
death . . . ." 
 
There are certain limited exceptions to this time bar on probate 
proceedings, including late and limited probate proceedings, at 
issue in this case.  The relevant exception (§ 3-108 [4]) 
states: 
"[A]n informal appointment or a formal testacy or 
appointment proceeding may be commenced thereafter if no 
proceedings relative to the succession or estate 
administration has occurred within the [three] year period 
after the decedent's death, but the personal representative 
shall have no right to possess estate assets as provided in 
                                                          
 
 
3 The term "ultimate time limit" is found in § 3-108's 
title.  It appears in the Uniform Probate Code, as well as in 
multiple other States' laws.  See Uniform Probate Code § 3-108, 
8 U.L.A. (Part II) 40 (Master ed. 2013) (Probate, Testacy and 
Appointment Proceedings; Ultimate Time Limit).  See also, e.g., 
Alaska Stat. § 13.16.040 (Probate, testacy, and appointment 
proceedings; ultimate time limit); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-3108 
(Probate, testacy and appointment proceedings; ultimate time 
limit); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 560:3-108 (Probate, testacy and 
appointment proceedings; ultimate time limit); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 18-C, § 3-108 (Probate, testacy and appointment 
proceedings; ultimate time limit); Minn. Stat. § 524.3-108 
(Probate, testacy and appointment proceedings; ultimate time 
limit); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2408 (Probate, testacy, and 
appointment proceedings; ultimate time limit); N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 45-3-108 (Probate, testacy and appointment proceedings; 
ultimate time limit); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-108 (Probate, 
testacy, and appointment proceedings; ultimate time limit); Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-107 (Probate and testacy proceedings -- 
Ultimate time limit -- Presumption and order of intestacy). 
6 
 
[§] 3–709 beyond that necessary to confirm title thereto in 
the successors to the estate and claims other than expenses 
of administration shall not be presented against the 
estate." 
 
 
Apart from this "ultimate time limit" in § 3-108, the code 
also provides specific time limits for creditor claims, set out 
in § 3-803 (a): 
"Except as provided in this chapter, a personal 
representative shall not be held to answer to an action by 
a creditor of the deceased unless such action is commenced 
within [one] year after the date of death of the deceased 
. . . ." 
 
 
Notably, creditors can petition to open an estate in order 
to bring their claim.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-401 (any 
interested person can petition for formal testacy); G. L. 
c. 190B, § 1-201 (24) (defining "interested person" to include 
creditors and any others with claims against estate).  
Therefore, their ability to bring timely claims is not dependent 
upon heirs' or successors' petitions. 
 
MassHealth is a State program designed "to provide basic 
health coverage to people who do not have sufficient income or 
resources to provide for themselves."  Cohen v. Commissioner of 
the Div. of Med. Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 403–404 (1996), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1057 (1997), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 265, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985).  Recipients are 
expected to deplete their assets prior to receiving such 
benefits.  See Haley v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 394 Mass. 
7 
 
466, 468–469 (1985).  Federal Medicaid law also mandates that 
MassHealth operate and maintain an estate recovery program, so 
that in certain circumstances, MassHealth may recover money paid 
out as benefits during a member's lifetime as a claim against 
the estate.  42 U.S.C. § 1396p.  G. L. c. 118E, § 31.  To this 
end, the Legislature has given MassHealth various advantages 
over other creditors. 
 
First, MassHealth is given priority status over other 
creditors when a personal representative pays out estate assets.  
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-805 (a) (6) (laying out order in which claims 
must be paid if estate assets are insufficient to pay all claims 
in full). 
 
Second, in certain circumstances MassHealth is exempted 
from the general one-year limitation on creditor claims laid out 
in § 3-803 (a).  Section 3-803 (f) states: 
"If a deceased received medical assistance under [G. L. 
c. 118E] when such deceased was [fifty-five] years of age 
or older or while an inpatient in a nursing facility or 
other medical institution, [G. L. c. 118E, § 32,] shall 
govern the notice to be given to the division of medical 
assistance and such division's claim for recovery under 
[G. L. c. 118E, § 31,] if the division so chooses."4 
                                                          
 
 
4 The petitioner incorrectly contends that this language 
does not exempt MassHealth from the general one-year filing 
deadline in § 3-803 (a).  The plain language of § 3-803 and its 
cross-reference to G. L. c. 118E, § 32, provide an exception to 
subsection (a)'s one-year limitation on creditor claims for 
MassHealth claims.  Notice to be given to MassHealth, and the 
claim for recovery, are both governed by G. L. c. 118E, § 32, 
which allows for claims to be filed later than one year.  G. L. 
c. 118E, § 32 (i) (explicitly allowing claims after one year).  
8 
 
 
 
General Laws c. 118E, § 32, provides MassHealth with 
multiple avenues of recovery, some of which are unavailable to 
other creditors.  Pursuant to § 32, the division of medical 
assistance (division) may present claims against the estate in 
two ways that other creditors cannot:  (1) within four months 
after the approval of the official bond of the personal 
representative, thereby extending the one-year deadline; and (2) 
by designating a public administrator5 in circumstances where 
more than one year has passed from the decedent's date of death, 
the division determines it may have a claim against the estate, 
and a petition for administration of the estate or for admission 
to probate the will has not yet been filed.  G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 32 (b), (i).  Section 32 also mandates that MassHealth be 
directly notified whenever a petition for probate or 
administration is filed, and that if the petitioner fails to 
notify MassHealth, "any person receiving a distribution of 
assets from the decedent's estate shall be liable to the 
                                                          
 
See G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (b) (allowing claims within four months 
of approval of personal representative).  There is nothing to 
contradict this clear language, particularly given subsection 
(a)'s explicit allowance for exceptions within the chapter. 
 
 
5 A public administrator is a type of personal 
representative who typically administers estates of persons who 
die intestate with no known husband, widow, or heir.  G. L. 
c. 194, § 4.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-203. 
9 
 
division to the extent of such distribution."  G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 32 (a). 
 
3.  Discussion.  In the case before us, the petitioner 
filed for late and limited testacy more than three years after 
Kendall's death, pursuant to § 3-108 (4).  The petitioner argues 
that § 3-108 (4) limits the powers of the personal 
representative such that no claims against the estate can be 
paid, and that MassHealth is subject to both the ultimate three-
year time bar on creditor claims in § 3-108 (4) and the one-year 
creditor filing deadline in § 3-803 (a).  MassHealth argues that 
the specific provisions governing its ability to recover against 
estates exempt it from the § 3-803 (a) deadline and overcome the 
ultimate time limit in § 3-108, and it should therefore be able 
to recover from Kendall's estate.  In particular, MassHealth 
contends that it is entitled to present and recover claims after 
the three-year period so long as it files within four months 
after the personal representative has obtained a bond.  For the 
reasons stated infra, we conclude that § 3-108 (4) bars claims 
made after three years and precludes a personal representative 
from paying any creditor claims in late and limited probate 
proceedings under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108 (4).  No exceptions 
have been included for MassHealth.  Where the Legislature 
intended for differential treatment for MassHealth in the 
probate process, it did so expressly. 
10 
 
 
"We ordinarily construe statutes to be consistent with one 
another[, reading them as a harmonious whole] 'so that effect is 
given to every provision in all of them.'"  Green v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 554 (1996), quoting 2B Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 122 (5th ed. 
1992).  The statutory scheme devised by the Legislature 
established a relatively expeditious probate process to be 
concluded within three years.  Section 3-108 expressly provides 
for a three-year "ultimate time limit."  This three-year 
ultimate time limit functions essentially as a statute of 
repose, allowing only very limited activity after the three 
years.  On more than one occasion, we have characterized 
statutes of repose as having the effect of placing an "absolute 
time limit" on liability.  Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 481 Mass. 529, 535 (2019).  See Nett v. Bellucci, 437 Mass. 
630, 635 (2002).  The language of an "ultimate time limit" is 
nearly identical to this characterization, and evidences a 
legislative intent to create a statute of repose that, in 
contrast to statutes of limitation, "completely eliminates a 
cause of action," Stearns, supra at 533, quoting Klein v. 
Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 702 (1982), and "impose[s] a condition 
precedent to the right of recovery," Department of Pub. Welfare 
v. Anderson, 377 Mass. 23, 35 (1979).  No exception to this 
11 
 
three-year ultimate time limit for the filing of claims was 
included for MassHealth. 
 
When three years have passed from a decedent's death, 
"an informal appointment or a formal testacy or appointment 
proceeding may be commenced thereafter if no proceedings 
relative to the succession or estate administration has 
occurred within the [three] year period after the 
decedent's death, but the personal representative shall 
have no right to possess estate assets . . . beyond that 
necessary to confirm title thereto in the successors to the 
estate and claims other than expenses of administration 
shall not be presented against the estate" (emphases 
added). 
 
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108 (4).  This language is plain and clear.  
The double use of "shall," limiting the personal 
representative's powers and explicitly barring claims, reflects 
a strict rule against any possibility of creditor recovery from 
an estate in late and limited testacy.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cook, 426 Mass. 174, 181 (1997) ("shall" is mandatory term); 
Massachusetts Soc'y of Graduate Physical Therapists, Inc. v. 
Board of Registration in Med., 330 Mass. 601, 603 (1953) 
("shall" is "word of command").  Reading § 3-108 (4) as a strict 
extinguishment of the personal representative's power to pay 
claims and a bar against all creditor claims is consistent with 
the statute's plain language and the Legislature's stated 
purpose of promoting "a speedy and efficient system for 
liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution 
to the decedent's successors."  G. L. c. 190B, § 1-102. 
12 
 
 
Section 3-108 makes no exception for MassHealth.  We have 
explicitly held that MassHealth is not immune from probate time 
bars "unless a clear statement to the contrary appears in a 
statutory provision on which the claimant bases its claim."  
Anderson, 377 Mass. at 29.  In Anderson, the Department of 
Public Welfare initiated a claim against a decedent's estate to 
recoup the costs of medical assistance provided during the end 
of her life.  Id. at 23.  The statute at issue provided that "an 
executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an 
action by a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced" 
within the statutorily mandated time frame.  Id. at 27.  The 
court held that this statute barred MassHealth from recovery. 
 
MassHealth argues nonetheless that it should be able to 
recover a claim timely filed within four months of the 
appointment of a personal representative in a late and limited 
testacy.6  In particular, MassHealth emphasizes that G. L. 
c. 118E, § 32 (b), states that "the division may present claims 
against a decedent's estate . . . within four months after 
approval of the official bond of the personal representative."7  
                                                          
 
 
6 In the instant case, a petition has been filed but the 
personal representative has not yet been appointed.  MassHealth 
has indicated its intent to file a claim once the appointment is 
made. 
 
 
7 MassHealth also argues, in the alternative, that "an 
estate probated by a public administrator may direct funds from 
an estate to pay a MassHealth claim regardless of the date of 
13 
 
MassHealth also emphasizes that differential treatment of 
MassHealth in the various other provisions of the probate 
statutes supports its contention that the Legislature also 
intended to carve out an exception for MassHealth from the 
strict limitations in § 3-108 (4).  We disagree. 
 
The three-year ultimate time limit is a critical provision 
ensuring the orderly settlement and liquidation of estates in a 
relatively expeditious manner.  We conclude that if the 
Legislature intended to create an exception for MassHealth to 
this ultimate time limit, it would have done so expressly in 
that particular provision.  We will not read in such an 
important exception inferentially.  Where the Legislature 
advantaged MassHealth over other creditors, it did so carefully 
and expressly.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803 (f) (excepting 
MassHealth from one-year limitation on creditor claims); G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-805 (a) (6) (designating MassHealth as priority 
creditor); G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (i) (empowering MassHealth to 
designate public administrator more than one year after 
decedent's death); G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (b) (empowering 
MassHealth to file claim within four months of appointment of 
personal representative); G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (a) (directing 
                                                          
 
death or appointment."  Because we conclude that § 3-108 (4) 
prohibits all personal representatives, including public 
administrators, from paying claims three years after a 
decedent's death, this argument fails. 
14 
 
that notice of probates and administrations be given to 
MassHealth). 
There is no exception for MassHealth in § 3-108 (4), the 
provision addressing late and limited probate proceedings.  This 
narrow provision creates an exception to the ultimate time limit 
against opening new probate proceedings, and it expressly bars 
creditor claims and prohibits the personal representative from 
paying any such claims.  It allows the personal representative 
to possess estate assets only to the extent needed to confirm 
title to the successors.  The omission of an explicit exception 
to the personal representative's limited powers in § 3-108 (4), 
therefore, indicates that the Legislature chose not to exempt 
MassHealth from the bar on creditor claims in late and limited 
probate proceedings.  See Stearns, 481 Mass. at 536 (court's 
conclusion not to read exception into statute of repose was 
"bolstered by the fact that the Legislature [had] expressly 
provided for an exception in another, similar statute of 
repose"); Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 129 
(2014) ("The omission of particular language from a statute is 
deemed deliberate where the Legislature included such omitted 
language in related or similar statutes").  Where the 
Legislature "has fashioned an ironclad rule, . . . we will not 
read into it any exception that the Legislature did not see fit 
15 
 
to put there" (quotation and citation omitted).  Stearns, supra 
at 535. 
We also have no difficulty reconciling our holding with 
statutory provisions allowing advantageous consideration of 
MassHealth over other creditors.  Our holding today does not 
render MassHealth's right to file a claim against an estate's 
personal representative four months after the obtaining of a 
personal representative's bond superfluous or remove other 
advantages that the Legislature granted to MassHealth; 
MassHealth may still bring claims against estates later than 
other creditors pursuant to the bond provision.  MassHealth 
retains the unique ability to present timely claims from one 
year after death through the date when the "ultimate time limit" 
of § 3-108 is triggered.  Indeed, MassHealth may present an 
otherwise timely claim even after three years, provided that the 
petition for an appointment of a personal representative was 
filed prior to the expiration of the "ultimate time limit" of 
§ 3-108.  It may also seek the appointment of a public 
administrator if the requirements of that provision are met.  
Our holding merely confirms that § 3-108 (4) applies to 
MassHealth, like all other creditors, providing ultimate time 
limits and other restrictions ensuring a relatively expeditious 
settlement of estates. 
16 
 
 
MassHealth argues that this reading of the statute unfairly 
shifts the burden of obtaining notice of a recipient's death 
onto MassHealth, where the Legislature put that burden on the 
estate in G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (a).  Yet the Legislature 
expressly envisioned the possibility that in some circumstances, 
MassHealth would not receive notice of a death and nonetheless 
be capable of obtaining and acting on knowledge of the death.  
G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (i) (MassHealth may designate public 
administrator where one year has passed from death, petition for 
administration has not been filed and therefore MassHealth has 
not received notice, and MassHealth determines it may have claim 
against estate).  In most cases, MassHealth will not need to 
actively obtain knowledge of a death -- the drafters of the 
code, adopted by the Legislature, noted that most estates are 
administered quickly, and under § 32 (a) MassHealth receives 
notice of all administered estates.  See Uniform Probate Code 
§ 3-803 comment, 8 U.L.A. (Part II) 272-273 (Master ed. 2013) 
(noting that vast majority of estates are quickly applied to 
paying creditor claims).8 
 
Lack of notice does not preclude MassHealth from recovering 
from an estate.  In cases in which MassHealth does not receive 
                                                          
 
 
8 The Uniform Probate Code comment documents discussions 
that transpired among the Reporters in the drafting of the 
Uniform Probate Code.  See Uniform Probate Code § 3-803 comment, 
8 U.L.A. (Part II) 272-273 (Master ed. 2013). 
17 
 
notice of a death, it is nonetheless positioned to ascertain 
that a death has occurred.  With due diligence, MassHealth 
should be aware of whose benefits have ceased and who has not 
responded to renewal notices, and can cross-match this 
information with public death records or inquire directly as to 
the recipient's status.  In fact, MassHealth already takes some 
active steps to ensure it recovers from estates where it does 
not receive notice of a death.9  When MassHealth independently 
learns of a death, it can bring a claim against an estate within 
the § 3-108 time limit even where no petition has yet been filed 
for administration.  See G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (i) (MassHealth may 
designate public administrator); G. L. c. 190B, § 3-401 (any 
interested person may petition for formal testacy). 
 
Finally, MassHealth warns that such a reading of the 
statute will "incentivize heirs" to wait three years to open 
probate, in order to avoid MassHealth's recovery.  As discussed 
infra, the Legislature has already acknowledged this concern and 
done a cost-benefit analysis, and we do not question the 
statutes they chose to enact after assessing the risks.  
Wakefield Teachers Ass'n v. School Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
9 MassHealth's brief states:  "MassHealth's Estate Recovery 
Unit, however, also conducts regular cross-matches of new 
petitions filed with the probate courts in order to capture 
information about the administration of estates where notice may 
not have been given MassHealth, despite the law's requirements" 
(quotation, alteration, and citation omitted). 
18 
 
792, 802 (2000) ("The Legislature clearly balanced competing 
public policy considerations that we shall not second-guess"). 
 
The official comment to § 3-803 explicitly acknowledges and 
considers the possibility of heirs waiting for the nonclaim 
period to kick in and the costs and benefits of additional 
procedures: 
"Successors who are willing to delay receipt and enjoyment 
of inheritances may consider waiting out the non-claim 
period running from death simply to avoid any public record 
of an administration that might alert known and unknown 
creditors to pursue their claims.  The scenario was deemed 
to be unlikely, however, for unpaid creditors of a decedent 
are interested persons ([§ 1-201 (24)]) who are qualified 
to force the opening of an estate for purposes of 
presenting and enforcing claims.  Further, successors who 
delay opening an administration will suffer from lack of 
proof of title to estate assets and attendant inability to 
enjoy their inheritances.  Finally, the odds that holders 
of important claims against the decedent will need help in 
learning of the death and proper place of administration is 
rather small.  Any benefit to such claimants of additional 
procedures designed to compel administrations and to locate 
and warn claimants of an impending non-claim bar, is quite 
likely to be heavily outweighed by the costs such 
procedures would impose on all estates, the vast majority 
of which are routinely applied to quick payment of the 
decedents' bills and distributed without any creditor 
controversy." 
 
Uniform Probate Code § 3-803 comment, 8 U.L.A. (Part II) 272-273 
(Master ed. 2013).  The Legislature's risk assessment and over-
all cost-benefit analysis is entitled to respect.  We also 
cannot conclude that the Legislature was unaware of MassHealth's 
claims when it undertook such assessment and analysis, as the 
Legislature has carefully considered MassHealth's claims in the 
19 
 
probate statutes.  In sum, "[w]e will not undo the Legislature's 
studied determination."  Rudenauer v. Zafiropoulos, 445 Mass. 
353, 359 (2005). 
 
Our holding today is consistent with Federal Medicaid law, 
which requires that States establish an estate recovery system 
to recoup benefits paid to members during their lifetime, but 
provides flexibility with regard to how States enact and run 
their estate recovery programs, including respect for State 
probate laws.  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).  Consistent with this 
requirement, Massachusetts has created a robust estate recovery 
system to recoup Medicaid benefits paid to members during their 
lifetime.  This system provides distinct advantages to 
MassHealth over other creditors. 
 
The three-year ultimate time limit for estate recovery does 
not violate Federal law.  The Federal statute governing estate 
recovery explicitly defines "estate" as "all real and personal 
property and other assets included within the individual's 
estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law,"  thereby 
giving effect to State legislation surrounding what State 
programs can recover.  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).  A strict 
statute of repose on recovery applicable to all claims, 
including MassHealth's, is a reasonable limitation set out by 
State law governing estates, and is thus well within the 
Commonwealth's discretion in establishing the mandated estate 
20 
 
recovery procedures.  See e.g., Daley v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 477 Mass. 188, 204 
n.15 (2017) (describing how Massachusetts has limited its right 
to recover probate assets consistent with Medicaid law).  
Nothing in the Federal law requires, as MassHealth claims, that 
MassHealth go beyond the bounds of State law to recover the 
maximum possible extent of its benefits.  The advantages given 
to MassHealth already protect its estate recovery program and 
ensure that MassHealth recoups adequate funds.  The 
implementation of a strict statute of repose on all recovery 
still gives MassHealth ample time to recover from decedents' 
estates, and in no way violates Federal law. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed above, we 
conclude that G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803 (f), creates an exception 
for MassHealth to the general limitation on creditor claims laid 
out in § 3-803 (a), but does not create an exception to the 
ultimate time limit on the personal representative's power to 
pay claims and creditors' ability to bring claims laid out in 
§ 3-108.  Consequently, MassHealth's claims are time barred.  
Therefore, the petitioner's motion for summary judgment must be 
granted. 
 
We answer the reported questions as follows: 
 
1.  The Estate of Jacqueline Ann Kendall is not required to 
pay a MassHealth claim filed against the estate more than three 
21 
 
years after Kendall died where G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108, prohibits 
the personal representative from paying any claims. 
 
2.  MassHealth is not authorized to file notices of claims 
in estates under so-called "late and limited" petitions under 
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108, nor is the personal representative 
authorized to pay such claims.10 
 
3.  General Laws c. 190B, § 3-803 (f), is an exception to 
the one-year limitation on presentation of claims set forth in 
§ 3-803 (a). 
 
4.  Because we hold that § 3-803 (f) is an exception to the 
one-year statute of limitations, we need not answer the fourth 
question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
10 The second reported question is worded in such a way that 
it contains multiple questions, and is therefore unclear.  We do 
conclude that "where a decedent received Medicaid benefits under 
[G. L. c. 118E], that chapter governs notice to be given to the 
division of medical assistance and such division's claim for 
recovery under [G. L. c. 118E, § 31], if the division so 
chooses."