Title: State ex rel. Mill Creek Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Tablack

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Mill Creek Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Tablack, 86 Ohio St.3d 293, 
1999-Ohio-103.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF MILL CREEK METROPOLITAN 
PARK DISTRICT, APPELLEE, v. TABLACK, AUDITOR, ET AL.; CITY OF CAMPBELL ET 
AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Mill Creek Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Tablack 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 293.] 
Parks — Withdrawal of municipalities from a park district — Mandamus to 
compel Mahoning County Auditor and Mahoning County Treasurer to 
continue assessing, collecting, and paying Board of Park Commissioners of 
Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District the park tax on all taxable real estate 
in the city of Campbell and the municipality of Sebring — Writ granted, 
when. 
(No. 99-261 — Submitted July 28, 1999 — Decided September 1, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 97 CA 240. 
 
On May 3, 1988, Mahoning County electors approved the conversion of the 
Youngstown Township Park District to the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District 
(“Park District”) pursuant to the procedure specified in R.C. 1545.041.1  The 
geographic boundaries of the Park District are the same as the boundaries of 
Mahoning County.  At the same election, Mahoning County electors also approved 
a tax for the operation and maintenance of the Park District.  The tax was to be 
levied on all taxable real estate within the county at a rate not to exceed $1.9 mills 
for each dollar of valuation for a period of fifteen years, beginning with the 1988 
tax year. 
 
At the November 1997 general election, electors of appellants, the city of 
Campbell and the municipality of Sebring, approved ordinances amending their 
charters to provide for the withdrawal of the municipalities from the Park District 
and the exemption of their residents from the payment of any Park District tax 
 
 
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levied under R.C. Chapter 1545.  Campbell and Sebring are both located in the 
Park District.  Campbell and Sebring claimed that these ordinances were 
authorized by their constitutional home-rule powers. 
 
Shortly after the November 1997 election, appellee, Board of 
Commissioners of the Park District (“board”), filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Mahoning County for a writ of mandamus to compel the Mahoning 
County Auditor and Mahoning County Treasurer to continue assessing, collecting, 
and paying the board the Park District tax, including the tax on all taxable real 
estate in Campbell and Sebring.  The board claimed that the Campbell and Sebring 
ordinances amending their charters were unconstitutional because they conflicted 
with R.C. Chapter 1545.  The court of appeals granted the auditor and treasurer’s 
motion to join Campbell and Sebring as respondents, and Campbell and Sebring 
filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.  Campbell and Sebring filed 
affidavits of their mayors in support of their motions.  The board also filed a 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
In December 1998, the court of appeals granted the board’s motion for 
summary judgment and granted the writ of mandamus.  The court of appeals 
determined that the Campbell and Sebring ordinances were unconstitutional and 
that the board did not have an adequate legal remedy by way of a declaratory 
judgment action. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Manchester, Bennett, Powers & Ullman, John F. Zimmerman, Jr. and 
Thomas J. Lipka, for appellee. 
 
Brian J. Macala, Campbell Law Director, for appellant city of Campbell. 
 
Nadler, Nadler & Burdman Co., L.P.A., and Robert S. Hartford, Jr., for 
appellant municipality of Sebring. 
 
 
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Kincaid, Randall & Craine and Samuel B. Randall, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Columbus and Franklin County Metropolitan District. 
 
Baker & Hostetler L.L.P., Elliot S. Azoff and Todd A. Dawson, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, Cleveland Metropolitan Park District Board of Parks 
Commissioners. 
 
Spengler Nathanson, P.L.L., and B. Gary McBride, for amici curiae, Toledo 
Area Metropolitan Park District and Hamilton County Park District. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Campbell and Sebring assert that the court of appeals erred in 
granting the writ of mandamus because the board did not establish any of the 
requirements for issuance of the writ.  In order to be entitled to a writ of 
mandamus, the board had to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a 
clear legal duty on the part of the auditor and treasurer to provide this relief, and 
the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to compel them to 
perform the requested acts.  State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 
123, 125, 698 N.E.2d 987, 988. 
 
Regarding the first two requirements for the writ, the dispositive issue is 
whether Campbell’s and Sebring’s ordinances withdrawing the municipalities from 
the Park District and exempting their residents from the previously approved Park 
District tax are unconstitutional. Campbell and Sebring claim that their ordinances 
were enacted pursuant to their powers of local self-government under the Home-
Rule Amendment, which authorizes Ohio municipalities “to exercise all powers of 
local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local 
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general 
laws.”  Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution; Linndale v. State (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 52, 54, 706 N.E.2d 1227, 1229.  The board counters that the ordinances 
are invalid because they were not enacted pursuant to the municipalities’ powers of 
 
 
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local self-government and they conflict with the general, state laws in R.C. Chapter 
1545. 
 
In order to determine if the municipal ordinances are invalidated by R.C. 
Chapter 1545, we must resolve whether (1) the challenged ordinances involve the 
exercise of powers of local self-government, (2) the state statutes are general or 
special laws, and (3) there is any conflict between the ordinances and state law.  
See Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio 
St.3d 242, 244-245, 602 N.E.2d 1147, 1149-1150; Fairview Park v. Barefoot 
Grass Lawn Serv., Inc. (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 306, 310, 685 N.E.2d 300, 302, 
discretionary appeal not allowed (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 1544, 674 N.E.2d 1184.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Campbell and Sebring ordinances 
are unconstitutional because they did not involve the exercise of the municipalities’ 
powers of local self-government and they conflict with the general laws in R.C. 
Chapter 1545. 
 
The first inquiry requires an analysis of whether the ordinances were enacted 
pursuant to the municipalities’ powers of local self-government.  We have applied 
the following test: 
 
“To determine whether legislation is such as falls within the area of local 
self-government, the result of such legislation or the result of the proceedings 
thereunder must be considered.  If the result affects only the municipality itself, 
with no extraterritorial effects, the subject is clearly within the power of local self-
government and is a matter for the determination of the municipality.  However, if 
the result is not so confined it becomes a matter for the General Assembly.”  
Beachwood v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1958), 167 Ohio St. 369, 371, 5 
O.O.2d 6, 7-8, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923; Kettering v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 
26 Ohio St.3d 50, 54, 26 OBR 42, 45-46, 496 N.E.2d 983, 987. 
 
 
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The Campbell and Sebring ordinances were not enacted pursuant to their 
powers of local self-government because the ordinances have manifest 
extraterritorial effects, i.e., they exempt the municipalities’ citizens from taxes 
intended to benefit the larger Park District, which has boundaries coextensive with 
the county. 
 
In next determining whether the provisions of R.C. Chapter 1545, which 
provide for park districts, are general or special laws, we find that park districts 
may exist in and affect people in every county in the state, and all of the people of 
the state are benefited by these districts.  Willoughby Hills v. Bd. of Park Commrs. 
of Cleveland Metro. Park Dist. (1965), 3 Ohio St.2d 49, 50, 32 O.O.2d 27, 28, 209 
N.E.2d 162, 163; State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. (1929), 120 Ohio 
St. 464, 471, 166 N.E. 407, 409, affirmed (1930), 281 U.S. 74, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 
L.Ed. 710.  See Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 541-542, 706 
N.E.2d 323, 330.  Therefore, the provisions of R.C. Chapter 1545, which empower 
Campbell and Sebring to determine their own geographic boundaries and to levy 
taxes to maintain and operate the Park District, are general rather than special laws.  
These general laws must be accorded a uniform operation throughout the state.  
Section 26, Article II, Ohio Constitution; Desenco, Inc. 
 
For the last determination of the three-part inquiry, the Campbell and 
Sebring ordinances also conflict with R.C. Chapter 1545 because they permit 
Campbell and Sebring to withdraw from the Park Districts and exempt their 
residents from Park District taxes in contravention of R.C. Chapter 1545.  See 
Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
 
Therefore, the Campbell and Sebring ordinances are unconstitutional and 
invalid.  The auditor and treasurer consequently had a duty under the Revised Code 
and the approved 1988 Park District tax to assess, collect, and disburse to the board 
 
 
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the applicable tax from property in the entire district, including Campbell and 
Sebring. 
 
In this regard, Campbell and Sebring’s argument that they have no duty to 
perform the requested acts is irrelevant.  The court of appeals merely joined them 
as respondents upon the request of the auditor and treasurer, so that they could 
assert their claims that the auditor and treasurer had no duty to collect Park District 
taxes on real estate in Campbell and Sebring because of their municipal ordinances 
withdrawing them from the Park District. 
 
In addition, Campbell and Sebring erroneously rely on the affidavits of their 
mayors concerning the intent of the General Assembly in its passage of R.C. 
1545.041 and the intent of the electorate in the passage of the challenged municipal 
ordinances.  The challenged affidavits were not based on the personal knowledge 
of the affiants, State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223-224, 631 N.E.2d 150, 155; Civ.R. 56(E), were conclusory, 
Fryberger v. Lake Cable Recreation Assn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 349, 352-353, 
533 N.E.2d 738, 742, and did not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
the constitutionality of the ordinances.  For example, the Campbell mayor did not 
specify that he had personal knowledge of the General Assembly’s intent in 
enacting R.C. 1545.041, and the fact that he was a state representative at least nine 
years before its enactment does not raise an inference of such personal knowledge.  
Similarly, the Sebring mayor did not, and could not, state that she had personal 
knowledge of the intent of each of the electors in voting for the ordinance. 
 
Having shown its clear legal right to the taxes and corresponding clear legal 
duty of the auditor and treasurer to assess, collect, and disburse to the board the 
taxes from the district property, the board had to establish the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law in order to be entitled to the writ.  R.C. 
2731.05.  Campbell and Sebring claim that declaratory judgment, rather than 
 
 
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mandamus, was the appropriate action to test the constitutionality of the municipal 
ordinances.  We have recognized, however, that the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance may in certain circumstances be challenged by mandamus.  State ex rel. 
BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 345, 699 N.E.2d 1271, 
1277. 
 
Declaratory judgment would not be an adequate remedy here because it is 
not sufficiently complete.  In general, if declaratory judgment would not be a 
complete remedy unless coupled with extraordinary ancillary relief in the nature of 
a mandatory injunction, the availability of declaratory judgment does not preclude 
a writ of mandamus.  State ex rel. Arnett v. Winemiller (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 255, 
259, 685 N.E.2d 1219, 1222; see, also, State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. 
Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 530, 537, 653 N.E.2d 349, 355, citing State ex rel. 
Fenske v. McGovern (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 129, 11 OBR 426, 464 N.E.2d 525, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Therefore, the board established that it lacked an 
adequate legal remedy because it would still need a mandatory injunction to 
compel the auditor and the treasurer not to abide by the challenged ordinances. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly granted the writ.  The 
board established all of the prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
R.C. 1545.041 provides: 
 
“(A)  Any township park district created pursuant to section 511.18 of the 
Revised Code that includes park land located outside the township in which the 
park district was established may be converted under the procedures provided in 
 
 
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this section into a park district to be operated and maintained as provided for in this 
chapter, provided that there is no existing park district created under section 
1545.04 of the Revised Code in the county in which the township park district is 
located.  The proposed park district shall include within its boundary all townships 
and municipal corporations in which lands owned by the township park district 
seeking conversion are located, and may include any other townships and 
municipal corporations in which lands owned by the township park district seeking 
conversion are located. 
 
“(B)  Conversion of a township park district into a park district operated and 
maintained under this chapter shall be initiated by a resolution adopted by the 
board of park commissioners of the park district.  * * * The resolution may also 
include a proposed tax levy for the operation and maintenance of the proposed park 
district.  * * * 
 
“(C) Upon adoption of the resolution provided for in division (B) of this 
section, the board of park commissioners of the township park district seeking 
conversion under this section shall certify the resolution to the board of elections of 
the county in which the park district is located * * *.  * * *  The question shall 
provide for a tax levy if such a levy is specified in the resolution. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(E)  If the proposed conversion is approved by at least a majority of the 
electors voting on the proposal, the township park district that seeks conversion 
shall become a park district subject to Chapter 1545. of  the Revised Code effective 
the first day of January following approval by the voters.  * * * ”