Title: Commonwealth v. Delta Air Lines

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,  
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 
 
v. Record No. 980824  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
February 26, 1999 
DELTA AIR LINES, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 
 
 
 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta), is a corporation 
organized and existing under laws of the State of Delaware.  
Although Delta’s principal place of business is in Atlanta, 
Georgia, Delta is qualified to do business in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.  Delta’s business activities in 
Virginia include the carriage of persons and property on 
aircraft that land at and depart from airports situated in 
the Commonwealth.  Delta also flies aircraft over Virginia 
that do not take-off from or land at any airports located 
within the Commonwealth.  These flights are known as 
“overflights” and are the subject of this appeal. 
Delta’s overflights neither use nor have contact with 
any ground facilities or services in Virginia, including 
officials or agencies of the Commonwealth.  All 
communications with aircraft during overflights are 
conducted either by the air traffic controllers of the 
Federal Aviation Administration or by licensed dispatchers 
at Delta’s operations control center.  In short, Delta does 
not avail itself of any benefit provided in the 
Commonwealth during its overflights. 
 
The primary dispositive issue in this appeal is 
whether the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of 
Taxation (the Department), can include Delta’s overflight 
miles in the numerator of the formula used to determine 
Delta’s Virginia corporate income tax liability.  This 
issue requires an analysis of whether Delta’s overflights 
constitute business activities “in the Commonwealth” 
pursuant to Code §§ 58.1-409, -410, -414, and –416.  
Because these overflights occur “over the Commonwealth” 
rather than “in the Commonwealth,” we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court in favor of Delta on this 
issue. 
 
We also address the question whether the circuit court 
erred by finding that Delta’s application to correct an 
erroneous tax assessment for two tax years was not timely 
filed pursuant to Code § 58.1-1825.  We will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court on this issue because we 
conclude that the applicable statute of limitations 
commenced to run from the date that the Department mailed 
or delivered the second “Notice of Assessment” to Delta. 
I. 
 
2
 
For the tax years ending June 30, 1987, June 30, 1988, 
June 30, 1989, and June 30, 1990, Delta used a three-factor 
method to apportion its income for the purpose of 
determining its Virginia income tax liability.  See Code 
§ 58.1-408.  The three factors used were a property factor, 
payroll factor, and sales factor.  Only the formula for 
calculating the property and sales factors is at issue in 
this appeal. 
The property factor’s numerator included the value of 
Delta’s property utilized in Virginia: (1) ground property 
such as baggage carts, tugs, and other similar equipment; 
and (2) flight property, i.e., Delta’s aircraft.  The 
denominator consisted of the value of Delta’s property 
everywhere.  Delta used a mileage formula to determine the 
value of the aircraft to be included in the property 
factor.  The numerator of the mileage formula was comprised 
of the miles traveled by Delta’s aircraft from Virginia’s 
border to an arrival airport located in Virginia and the 
miles traveled from a departure airport located in Virginia 
to the Commonwealth’s border.  Delta did not include the 
overflight miles in the numerator of the mileage formula.  
The denominator contained miles flown by Delta’s aircraft 
everywhere.  To compute the sales factor, Delta used the 
 
3
same mileage formula to determine passenger and cargo 
revenue. 
 
Delta used this method to determine its Virginia 
income tax liability not only for the four tax years 
involved in this appeal but also for prior tax years.  In 
fact, the Department audited Delta for the tax years ending 
June 30, 1983, June 30, 1984, and June 30, 1985.  As a 
result of that audit, the Department became aware of the 
fact that Delta did not include its overflight miles in the 
numerator of the mileage formula that it used to calculate 
the property and sales factors, but the Department did not 
propose any change in Delta’s apportionment method.  
However, after the Department audited Delta for the tax 
years ending June 30, 1987, and June 30, 1988, the 
Department issued an audit report in which it included 
Delta’s overflight miles in the numerator of the mileage 
formula, thereby increasing the amount of Delta’s income 
tax liability.1
______________________ 
 
1  The Department has not promulgated any regulations 
regarding overflight miles.  However, in an issue paper 
titled “Apportionment of Airline Income,” dated September 
8, 1989, the Department acknowledged that there is no 
statutory formula specifically applicable to the airline 
industry and that the airline industry is, therefore, 
subject to the three-factor formula.  The Department also 
stated in the paper that statutory authority allows the 
Department to use an alternative method of apportioning 
 
4
On October 25, 1989, the Department issued a “Notice 
of Assessment” to Delta for additional income tax due for 
each of those tax years.  In accordance with Code § 58.1-
1821, Delta protested the assessments.  In a letter dated 
September 21, 1990, the Tax Commissioner concluded that the 
assessments were “correct and . . . now due and payable,” 
and advised Delta that it would receive an updated bill 
reflecting accrued interest.  Public Document Number (P.D. 
No.) 90-173.  The Tax Commissioner also informed Delta that 
the Department had previously addressed the issue 
concerning overflight miles in P.D. No. 90-158. 
 
On October 24, 1990, the Department sent Delta two 
additional documents for the tax years ending June 30, 
1987, and June 30, 1988.  Each one of those documents was 
titled “Notice of Assessment” and listed the “Date of 
Assessment” as “10-25-89 AS OF 10-24-90.”  The total amount 
due and payable in each “Notice of Assessment” was the sum 
of the corporate income tax assessed in each of the October 
1989 notices plus accrued interest.  At the bottom of each 
October 1990 “Notice of Assessment,” the Department added 
the words “Updated Bill.” 
___________________ 
 
income only when a corporation requests such a method, the 
statutory method is inequitable, and the tax under the 
 
5
 
Subsequent to receiving the second “Notice[s] of 
Assessment,” Delta filed another protest.  The Tax 
Commissioner responded to the protest on March 19, 1991, in  
P.D. No. 91-41, and again upheld the validity of the 
assessments.  In that response, the Tax Commissioner did 
not indicate that the October 24, 1990 notices were not to 
be construed as “Notice[s] of Assessment.” 
 
On February 21, 1991, the Department sent Delta a 
“Consolidated Bill Statement” reflecting the total amount 
of assessed taxes due and owing for the tax years ending 
June 30, 1987, and June 30, 1988, plus accrued interest.  
On May 6, 1991, Delta paid $759,202 to the Department under 
protest.  Delta then filed an application to correct an 
erroneous tax assessment in the circuit court on October 
22, 1993. 
 
The Department also audited Delta’s corporate income 
tax returns for the tax years ending June 30, 1989, and 
June 30, 1990.  On September 16, 1992, the Department 
issued “Notice[s] of Assessment” to Delta for additional 
income taxes due for those two years based on the 
Department’s inclusion of overflight miles in the numerator 
of the mileage formula.  In a letter dated December 14, 
___________________ 
 
alternative method is lower than the tax under the 
 
6
1992, Delta protested the assessments contained in the 
September 1992 notices.  On February 25, 1993, the Tax 
Commissioner, in P.D. No. 93-38, upheld the legality of the 
assessments.  Delta then paid $798,505 to the Department on 
March 24, 1993.  That figure represented the amount of the 
additional income taxes plus accrued interest for the tax 
years ending June 30, 1989, and June 30, 1990.  Thereafter, 
Delta amended its application to correct an erroneous tax 
assessment to include the 1989 and 1990 tax years. 
After a bench trial on July 7, 1997, the circuit 
court, in a memorandum opinion and judgment order dated 
January 27, 1998, determined that Delta was not required to 
include its overflight miles in the numerator of the 
mileage formula.  Accordingly, the court held that Delta 
was entitled to a refund in the amount of $485,885 and 
$219,618, for the tax years ending June 30, 1989, and June 
30, 1990, respectively, plus interest from the date of 
Delta’s payments to the Department.  However, the court 
concluded that Delta’s application to correct an erroneous 
tax assessment for the tax years ending June 30, 1987, and 
June 30, 1988, was time-barred.  We granted the Department 
this appeal and Delta’s assignment of cross-error. 
___________________ 
statutory method. 
 
7
II. 
 
Because Delta derives income from business activities 
that it conducts both within and without the Commonwealth, 
Delta is required to “allocate and apportion its Virginia 
taxable income as provided in §§ 58.1-407 through 58.2-
420.”  Code § 58.1-406.  To effect this apportionment of 
income, Delta must use a three-factor method consisting of 
a property factor, a payroll factor, and a sales factor.  
Code § 58.1-408.  The numerator of the property factor is 
the “average value of the corporation’s real and tangible 
personal property owned and used or rented and used in the 
Commonwealth during the taxable year.”  Code § 58.1-409.  
The denominator “is the average value of all the 
corporation’s real and tangible personal property . . . 
located everywhere.”  Id.  “The value of movable tangible 
personal property used both within and without the 
Commonwealth shall be included in the numerator to the 
extent of its utilization in the Commonwealth.”  Code 
§ 58.1-410.  Finally, “[t]he sales factor is a fraction, 
the numerator of which is the total sales of the 
corporation in the Commonwealth during the taxable year, 
and the denominator of which is the total sales of the 
corporation everywhere during the taxable year . . . .”  
Code § 58.1-414.  Sales “are in the Commonwealth if . . . 
 
8
[t]he income-producing activity is performed in the 
Commonwealth . . . .”  Code § 58.1-416(1). 
 
The issue in this case involves the meaning of the 
phrase “in the Commonwealth” as used in these statutes. 
Since the Department is charged with the responsibility of 
administering and enforcing the tax laws of the 
Commonwealth under Code § 58.1-202, its interpretation of a 
statute is entitled to great weight.  Webster Brick Co., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Taxation, 219 Va. 81, 84-85, 245 S.E.2d 
252, 255 (1978).  The Department contends that the phrase 
“in the Commonwealth” encompasses overflights and that the 
circuit court erred by not accepting its interpretation of 
the phrase.  The Department also points out that its tax 
assessments are presumed correct and that “the burden is on 
the taxpayer to prove that the assessment is contrary to 
law or that the administrator has abused his discretion and 
acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.”  
Commonwealth, Dep’t of Taxation v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 217 
Va. 121, 127, 225 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1976). 
 
The circuit court found that the phrase “in the 
Commonwealth” is unambiguous, and we agree.  When a 
statute, as written, is clear on its face, this Court will 
look no further than the plain meaning of the statute’s 
words.  City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 250 
 
9
Va. 451, 457, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995).  The phrase “in 
the Commonwealth” is not synonymous or interchangeable with 
the phrase “over the Commonwealth.”  “The preposition in is 
simply not the same as the preposition over.”  Republic 
Airlines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 464 N.W.2d 
62, 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990); see also Northwest Airlines, 
Inc. v. State Tax Appeal Bd., 720 P.2d 676, 678 (Mont. 
1986). 
Indeed, the General Assembly has made such a 
distinction between the words “in” and “over” in other 
statutes.  For example, a pilot can arrest any person “who 
interferes with . . . the operation of the aircraft in 
flight over the territory of this Commonwealth or to a 
destination within this Commonwealth.”  Code § 5.1-20.  
(Emphasis added.)  Similarly, Code § 4.1-209(1)(d) 
authorizes the issuance of licenses to sell beer and wine 
in aircraft while in transit “anywhere in or over the 
Commonwealth.”2  (Emphasis added.) 
______________________ 
2 Other examples include Code § 5.1-17, which makes it 
unlawful for a person to hunt “during such time as such 
person is in flight in an aircraft in the airspace over the 
lands or waters of this Commonwealth,” and Code § 5.1-37, 
which refers to airports and other air navigation 
facilities “in, over and upon any public waters of this 
Commonwealth.” 
 
 
10
“We . . . assume that the legislature chose, with 
care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant 
statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret 
the statute.”  Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 
Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990).  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the plain meaning of the phrase “in the 
Commonwealth” as used in Code §§ 58.1-409, -410, -414, and 
–416 does not include Delta’s overflights since, during 
such flights, Delta’s aircraft neither land at nor depart 
from an airport situated in Virginia and Delta does not 
utilize any benefit or service provided in the 
Commonwealth. 
 
This conclusion does not, however, resolve this 
appeal.  The circuit court found that the Department will 
allow an airline to apportion its income by utilizing a 
formula based on either mileage or departures.3  Since Delta 
______________________ 
 
3 In P.D. 90-158 and 93-38, the Department stated that 
use of a formula based on departures was an acceptable 
alternative to a method utilizing mileage.  However, in its 
September 1989 issue paper, the Department expressed the 
following concerns with regard to a departures method: 
 
 
[T]he use of a departure factor would be a significant 
change in policy from the department’s historic use 
and acceptance of mileage factors in one form or 
another. . . .  In view of the anticipated reaction of 
the airline industry[,] . . . it is recommended that a 
regulation project be initiated to formally propose 
the use of departures for airline property and sales 
 
11
has elected to use the mileage formula and has not disputed 
the legality of the departures method, the Department 
asserts that Delta cannot contest the Department’s 
inclusion of overflight miles in the numerator of the 
mileage formula.  We find no merit in the Department’s 
position. 
 
Delta is not challenging the validity of a forumla to 
apportion income based on mileage.  Instead, it is 
contesting the Department’s application of that formula in 
which the Department included overflight miles in the 
numerator of the fraction used to calculate the property 
and sales factors.  If Delta were precluded from 
challenging the validity of the Department’s methodology 
just because it has elected to use a mileage formula, the 
legality of the Department’s present position would 
continually evade judicial review.  Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) 
(“[J]urisdiction is not necessarily defeated . . . if the 
underlying dispute . . . is one ‘capable of repetition, yet 
___________________ 
factors so that the airline industry would have the 
opportunity to make its views known under the 
Administrative Process Act. 
 
The Department has not yet promulgated any regulations 
regarding the use of a departures method for the 
apportionment of income by the airline industry. 
 
12
evading review.’” (quoting Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976))).  Moreover, for the tax years at 
issue in this case, Delta used the method that it had 
previously employed, and the Department had accepted in 
prior audits, to determine Delta’s Virginia income tax 
liability.  The Department did not advise Delta of its new 
position with regard to taxing overflights until it issued 
the October 1989 audit report.  Thus, we conclude that 
Delta is not estopped from challenging the Department’s 
methodology and assessment of additional income taxes. 
 
Finally, the Department assigns error to the remedy 
that the circuit court employed after finding in favor of 
Delta.  The Department asserts that the proper remedy would 
have been to calculate Delta’s Virginia income tax 
liability by using the alternative departures formula.  
However, the Department did not request that the circuit 
court adopt this remedy.  The only issue before the court 
was whether Delta’s overflight miles should be included in 
the numerator of the mileage formula used to calculate the 
property and sales factors.  Moreover, the record is devoid 
of evidence with regard to the amount of Delta’s tax 
liability if a departures method were utilized.  Thus, as 
authorized in Code § 58.1-1826, the circuit court correctly 
ordered a refund of taxes to Delta. 
 
13
 
We now address Delta’s assignment of cross-error.  
Delta contends that the circuit court erred in determining 
that Delta’s application to correct an erroneous tax 
assessment was not timely filed with regard to the tax 
years ending June 30, 1987, and June 30, 1988.  Delta 
acknowledges that the applicable limitation period for 
filing such an application for relief is “three years from 
the date such assessment is made.”  Code § 58.1-1825.  The 
circuit court held that the three years started running on 
October 25, 1989, the date of the first notices sent by the 
Department to Delta for these two tax years.  However, 
Delta contends that the three years should have been 
computed from October 24, 1990, the date of the second 
“Notice[s] of Assessment.” 
 
The term “assessment” is defined in Code § 58.1-
1820(2) to  
include a written assessment made pursuant to notice 
by the Department of Taxation . . . .  Assessments 
made by the Department of Taxation shall be deemed to 
be made when a written notice of assessment is 
delivered to the taxpayer by an employee of the 
Department of Taxation, or mailed to the taxpayer at 
his last known address. 
 
The Department has further addressed the terms “assessment” 
and “Notice of Assessment” in the following portion of a 
definitional regulation: 
 
14
1.  When referring to taxes administered by the 
Department, the terms “assess” and “assessment” 
mean the act of determining that a tax (or 
additional tax) is due and the amount of such 
tax.  An assessment may be made by the Department 
or by the taxpayer (self-assessment). 
 
2.  When an assessment is made by the Department, 
a written notice of the assessment must be 
delivered to the taxpayer by an employee of the 
Department or mailed to the taxpayer at his last 
known address.  The date that such notice is 
mailed or delivered is the date of the assessment 
for the purpose of any limitations on the time in 
which administrative and judicial remedies are 
available and for any other administrative 
purposes. 
 
3.  The written notice of an assessment made by 
the Department is made on a form clearly labeled 
“Notice of Assessment” which sets forth the date 
of the assessment, amount of assessment, the tax 
type, taxable period and taxpayer.  Subsequent 
statements which merely report payments and 
additional accrued interest are not assessments 
or notices of another assessment.  An assessment 
may be preceded by correspondence proposing 
adjustments to a filed return based on an audit 
or other information received by the Department.  
Such correspondence is not an assessment but is 
intended to provide taxpayers an opportunity to 
correct any errors before an assessment is made. 
 
23 VAC 10-20-160(E). 
 
The Department contends that the 1990 “Notice[s] of 
Assessment” were merely updated bills because the “Date of 
Assessment” was still listed as October 25, 1989, the total 
amount of taxes owed was the sum of the original amounts 
assessed in the 1989 notices plus accrued interest, the 
“Bill No[s].” remained the same, and the phrase “Updated 
 
15
Bill” appeared on the face of the documents.  The 
Department also relies upon the fact that Delta received 
the 1990 notices after the Department issued P.D. No. 90-
173 in which it advised Delta that an updated bill would be 
forthcoming. 
 
Delta, however, argues that the 1990 notices should be 
construed as “Notice[s] of Assessment.”  Delta first points 
to the fact that the forms used by the Department in 1990 
were titled “Notice of Assessment” and were identical to 
the ones issued by the Department for the 1989 assessments.  
Additionally, Delta notes that it filed a protest within 90 
days of the date of the assessments pursuant to information 
provided to it on the 1990 notices.  The Tax Commissioner 
responded to that protest in P.D. No. 91-41 without 
asserting that the notices were not to be construed as 
“Notice[s] of Assessment.”  Finally, Delta asserts that the 
Department did not adopt its present position until Delta 
filed its application to correct an erroneous tax 
assessment. 
 
This Court addressed an analogous situation in Knopp 
Bros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Taxation, 234 Va. 383, 362 S.E.2d 
897 (1987).  The taxpayer in that case had received a 
letter from the Department, mailed on July 18, 1978, that 
summarized the results of an audit and contained “copies of 
 
16
‘assessments.’”  Id. at 385, 362 S.E.2d at 898.  After the 
taxpayer objected to the audit results, the Department 
conducted several more audits.  Eventually, on October 27, 
1981, the Department sent the taxpayer a “Notice of 
Assessment” that showed the “Date of Assessment” as April 
1, 1981.  Id., 362 S.E.2d at 899.  In that notice, the 
Department included the total amount of taxes, penalty, and 
interest due, and advised the taxpayer that it had 90 days 
within which to file a written protest to the assessment.  
Following another audit, the taxpayer received a “Notice of 
Corrected Assessment” dated April 12, 1983.  The taxpayer 
then filed an action to correct an erroneous tax 
assessment.  Id.  The trial court held that the Department 
made the original assessment on July 18, 1978, and that the 
statute of limitations began to run on that date, thus 
making the taxpayer’s action untimely.  Id. at 386, 362 
S.E.2d at 899. 
 
On appeal, we framed the issue as “whether any of the 
announcements of a tax due made by the department after the 
1978 assessment were merely adjustments of an original 
assessment or were themselves original assessments which 
would establish a new period of limitation for filing 
suit.”  Id.  Citing Code § 58.1-1820(2), we concluded that 
the 1981 document contained all the indicia of “a written 
 
17
assessment made pursuant to notice.”  Id. at 387, 362 
S.E.2d at 899.  We further stated that “[t]he department’s  
. . . contention that the document is not an assessment at 
all, but merely an adjustment of some original assessment 
made earlier, is in direct conflict with the department’s 
description of the document made at the time it was 
issued.”  Id.  Accordingly, we ruled that the action was 
timely filed and reversed the judgment of the trial court.  
Id., 362 S.E.2d at 900. 
 
The Department contends that the decision in Knopp 
Bros. is not controlling primarily because the Department 
had sent that taxpayer several statements showing 
conflicting amounts due, unlike the present situation, and 
because 23 VAC 10-20-160(E) was not in effect when the 
Department made the assessment in Knopp Bros.  We do not 
agree. 
 
Contrary to the Department’s position, we believe that 
23 VAC 10-20-160(E) does not change the result in Knopp 
Bros.  The regulation states that the Department’s written 
notice of an assessment “is made on a form clearly labeled 
‘Notice of Assessment.’”  It further provides that 
“[s]ubsequent statements which merely report payments and 
additional accrued interest are not assessments or notices 
of another assessment.”  The April 1981 notice that the 
 
18
taxpayer in Knopp Bros. received was on a form labeled 
“Notice of Assessment” and was not merely a subsequent 
statement showing payments and accrued interest. 
 
In the present case, the 1990 notices that the 
Department sent to Delta were on forms clearly labeled 
“Notice of Assessment.”  In fact, the forms were identical 
to those used by the Department when it issued the 1989 
“Notice[s] of Assessments,” which the Department asserts 
should be used to calculate when the statute of limitations 
began to run.  Even though the 1990 notices contained the 
additional words “Updated Bill” and referenced the “Date of 
Assessment” as “10-25-89 AS OF 10-24-90,” the Department 
did not delete the title “Notice of Assessment” and did not 
indicate, in any manner, that these 1990 notices were not 
to be construed as “Notice[s] of Assessments.”  Indeed, the 
fact that the Department responded to Delta’s protest to 
the 1990 notices is in conflict with the Department’s 
present position that those notices should not be treated 
as “Notice[s] of Assessment.” 
Relying on 23 VAC 10-20-160(E), the Department, 
nevertheless, asks us to construe the 1990 notices as 
merely subsequent statements reporting additional accrued 
interest.  The Department sent such a statement to Delta on 
February 21, 1991, for these two tax years.  That 
 
19
document’s appearance was entirely different from the 
“Notice of Assessment” forms used by the Department for the 
1989 and 1990 notices, and, in fact, was titled 
“Consolidated Bill Statement.”  Thus, we conclude, as we 
did in Knopp Bros., that the 1990 “Notice[s] of Assessment” 
contained “all the external decorations of ‘a written 
assessment made pursuant to notice,’ Code § 58.1-1820(2).”  
234 Va. at 387, 362 S.E.2d at 899. 
Pursuant to Code § 58.1-1820(2) and 23 VAC 10-20-
160(E), the date that the “Notice of Assessment” is mailed 
or delivered to the taxpayer is the date that the 
assessment is made for the purpose of determining when any 
applicable period of limitations begins to run.  Therefore, 
we conclude that Delta’s application to correct an 
erroneous tax assessment, filed on October 22, 1993, for 
the tax years ending June 30, 1987, and June 30, 1988, was 
timely filed within three years from the October 24, 1990 
“Notice[s] of Assessment”. 
III. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment refunding taxes and interest to Delta for the tax 
years ending June 30, 1989, and June 30, 1990.  We will 
reverse and remand the judgment with respect to the 
determination that Delta’s application to correct an 
 
20
erroneous tax assessment for the tax years ending June 30, 
1987, and June 30, 1988, was time-barred.  On remand, the 
circuit court shall determine the amount of refund to which 
Delta is entitled for those two tax years.4  
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
   and remanded. 
______________________ 
4  Because of our interpretation of the phrase “in the 
Commonwealth,” we do not need to address the remaining 
issues raised by the Department. 
 
21