Title: State v. Sorenson

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

83 N.W.2d 912 (1957) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert SORENSON, Defendant and Appellant. No. 9585. Supreme Court of South Dakota. June 25, 1957. *913 Stordahl, May & Boe, Sioux Falls, Frank E. Henderson, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant. Phil Saunders, Atty. Gen., Walter Mueller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert W. Gunderson, State's Atty., Rapid City, for plaintiff and respondent. RENTTO, Judge. The defendant was charged with operating a truck on the highways of this state without a South Dakota license or compensation plates. His sole defense was that the vehicle was exempt from such requirements because of reciprocity arrangements between this state and the State of Minnesota made pursuant to SDC Supp. 44.0432. A jury having been waived he was tried by the Municipal Court of Rapid City and found guilty on both counts. He appeals from the judgment entered thereon. At the time of his arrest the defendant, a resident of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, was driving a truck which the evidence describes only as a Mack tractor. It was owned by Clarence Luders, also a resident of Sioux Falls, and was leased for a term of 18 months to Midwest Coast Transport, Inc., by whom the defendant was employed. Midwest is incorporated in Minnesota and is authorized to do business in South Dakota as a foreign corporation. It has an office in Minneapolis, which is designated its principal office and business offices at Seattle and Yakima, Washington; Oakland, California; and Sioux Falls, South Dakota. One function of these business offices is to look after the dispatching of equipment. Midwest's transportation business is exclusively interstate in character. In the main it consists of hauling packing-house products from this and adjoining states to the west coast. On return trips it carries fruits and vegetables from that region to this area. When arrested near Rapid City, defendant was transporting a load of packing-house products which had been loaded at the John Morrell plant in Sioux Falls. Its destination was Portland, Oregon. On the haul in question the equipment did not travel in the state of Minnesota. Apparently the truck involved was kept at Sioux Falls. It was fully registered, licensed and compensated by Midwest in the state of Minnesota. The claim of reciprocal exemption is bottomed on the proposition that Midwest, the operator of the vehicle in question, being a Minnesota corporation is a resident of that state. Our reciprocity law, SDC Supp. 44.0432 is as follows: Pursuant to power granted therein our Highway Commission on September 1st, 1953, entered into this agreement with the responsible authorities of the state of Minnesota. The trial court held that the vehicle defendant was operating was not exempt because the reciprocity agreement applied only when the transportation involved was between the State of Minnesota and the State of South Dakota. Defendant points out that the wording of the agreement is more restrictive than the declared policy of our Legislature and claims that his equipment was within the broader exempt classification of the statuteengaged in interstate commerce in the State of South Dakota. However, in this connection it must be observed that while our statute declares a broad policy, it also provides that the exemption granted by South Dakota shall be only to the same extent that exemption is granted by the other state to residents of South Dakota. The extent of this as a limitation on the broad policy of our statute is determined by the *915 laws of the other state and the interpretations thereof made by its administrative agency. Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724, 157 S.W.2d 331, 138 A.L.R. 1493; Bode v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 204, 106 N.E.2d 521. Accordingly, it does not follow that the exemption conferred by the agreement must be as broad as the policy declared in our statute. Our reciprocity statute is not self-executing. In the first paragraph the Legislature sets out the general policy concerning the granting of exemption. The second paragraph provides the administrative means and power to effectuate the declared policy. Until an agreement is entered into no reciprocal exemption is available to anyone under our statute. It is only after an agreement is made that any exemption is available and its extent is spelled out by the terms thereof. One of the leading cases concerning statutes similar to ours and the agreements made thereunder is Interstate Trucking Company v. Dammann, 208 Wis. 116, 241 N.W. 625, 629, 82 A.L.R. 1080. It is there written that: If defendant's position is well taken Midwest could station Minnesota registered and compensated trucks in South Dakota, and so long as they were engaged only in interstate commerce, secure exemption from compensation and other fees in this state even though they never used the highways of Minnesota. These trucks would be doing a regular business in this state without paying the charges required of our own citizens engaged in similar activity. It has been declared that such discrimination is unconstitutional. Reeves v. Deisenroth, supra. The compensation paid by them for the use of the highway would all be paid to Minnesota whose highways they were not using, and nothing to South Dakota whose highways they had chosen to burden. As we see it by this agreement it was intended to limit the exemption to interstate transportation that used the highways of both contracting states. The quoted agreement is the only one between South Dakota and Minnesota concerning reciprocal exemption from payment of license and compensation fees. The exemption granted thereunder must be strictly construed, State v. Petroleum Transport, Inc., 260 Wis. 310, 50 N.W.2d 465, unless to do so would result in an unreasonable or strained construction. State ex rel. Eveland v. Erickson, 44 S.D. 63, 182 N.W. 315, 13 A.L.R. 1189; State ex rel. Bottum v. Knudtson, 65 S.D. 547, 276 N.W. 150. Under it the "said vehicle or vehicles" to which reciprocal exemption is extended are vehicles "engaged in interstate commerce between South Dakota and Minnesota". South Dakota grants them exemption while they are so engaged on that portion of the transportation which is "in interstate commerce in the state of South Dakota". Since defendant's vehicle was not engaged in interstate commerce between South Dakota and Minnesota he did not have the right to operate it in South Dakota, even though it was in interstate commerce, without payment of our license or compensation fees. Affirmed. RUDOLPH and HANSON, JJ., concur. SMITH, P. J., and ROBERTS, J., concur in result.