Title: People v. Whitfield

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Decided March 7, 2000.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Douglas P. Dwyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, MI, for the people.
William F. Branch, Detroit, MI, for the defendant.
PER CURIAM.
The defendant was charged with possessing less than 25 grams of heroin. The trial court suppressed the evidence against him and dismissed the prosecution on the ground that a search warrant had been *62 based on "[m]ere suspicion," instead of probable cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We find that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, and we therefore reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
On July 10, 1997, a district court magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the search of a home at 18072 Bloom in the city of Detroit. Applying for the warrant, the police had submitted an affidavit that included these paragraphs:
On the basis of evidence produced during the search, the defendant was charged with possession of less than twenty-five grams of heroin. MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(v). He waived a preliminary examination.
In the trial court, the defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for issuance of the warrant. At the conclusion of a brief hearing, the trial court granted the motion:
The affidavit itself says an attempt.
The trial court entered an order suppressing the evidence and, on its own motion, a second order dismissing the case.
The prosecutor appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed.[1] The Court explained:
We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. 459 Mich. 984, 595 N.W.2d 845 (1999).
In the present case, the heart of the disputed affidavit is this description of an exchange between the police officer and the apparent seller:
To provide adequate support for a warrant, the affidavit need not prove anything. As we explained in People v. Russo, supra at 603-604, 487 N.W.2d 698:
"... [T]he traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable-cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a `substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. We think reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant *64 procedure and is more consistent with our traditional deference to the probable-cause determinations of magistrates than is the `two-pronged test.'" [Citations omitted.]
In the present case, a person asked the police officer what the officer wanted. The officer replied "one," without further elaboration. The person then produced a large bundle of envelopes of the sort that are used for packaging heroin.[2] However, the person declined to complete the transaction, apparently because the officer was unable to name a common acquaintance. However, the person added that he would be willing to "take care of" the officer, if the officer could return in the company of someone known to the person.
Considering these facts "in a common-sense and realistic manner," 439 Mich. at 604, 487 N.W.2d 698, we are certain that the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause to issue the search warrant because there was a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found [at the home where this conversation took place.]" 462 U.S.  at 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527. The display of envelopes in response to the officer's inquiry regarding heroin, coupled with the officer's statement that he had participated in over one hundred narcotics raids and had "seen heroin in such coin envelopes on numerous occasions, and is very familiar with the appearance of heroin an[d] its packaging," *65 suggests that the envelopes did, in fact, contain narcotics. Although the person would not complete the sale, he effectively promised to sell to the officer in the future, contingent on the officer returning with someone familiar to him. Accordingly, giving due deference to the decision of the magistrate, which both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to do, we are satisfied that he did not err in issuing this search warrant.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
WEAVER, C.J., and TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, Jr., and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
MARILYN J. KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I agree with the majority that great deference should be accorded to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. However, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that "the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause" on the basis of the facts of this case. Op. at 64. Instead, I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Five years ago, this Court addressed thoroughly what comprises a sufficient affidavit for a search warrant. As we explained in People v. Sloan, 450 Mich. 160, 166-171, 538 N.W.2d 380 (1995):
When reviewing courts apply the standard from Russo, they must specifically focus on facts and circumstances that support the magistrate's probable cause *66 determination. Reviewing courts may consider only those facts that were presented to the magistrate. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). Moreover, reviewing courts must ensure that the magistrate's decision is based on actual facts  not merely the conclusions of the affiant. One of the main purposes of the warrant application procedure is to have a neutral and detached magistrate determine whether probable cause exists. This purpose cannot be achieved if the magistrate simply adopts unsupported conclusions of the affiant. Accordingly, at a minimum, a sufficient affidavit must present facts and circumstances on which a magistrate can rely to make an independent probable cause determination.
"`The affidavit must contain facts within the knowledge of the affiant, as distinguished from mere conclusions or belief. An affidavit made on information and belief is not sufficient. The affidavit should clearly set forth the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the person making it, which constitute the grounds of the application. The facts should be stated by distinct averments, and must be such as in law would make out a cause of complaint. It is not for the affiant to draw his own inferences. He must state matters which justify the drawing of them.'" [Quoting 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed.), § 868, p. 1129. (Emphasis in original.) Accord People v. Sherbine, 421 Mich. 502, 511, n. 16, 364 N.W.2d 658 (1984); People v. Warner, 221 Mich. 657, 659, 192 N.W. 566 (1923); People v. Knopka, 220 Mich. 540, 544, 190 N.W. 731 (1922); People v. Landt, 188 Mich.App. 234, 241, 469 N.W.2d 37 (1991), rev'd on other grounds 439 Mich. 870, 475 N.W.2d 825 (1991); People v. Zoder, 15 Mich.App. 118, 166 N.W.2d 289 (1968).]3
3 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that probable cause determinations must be based on facts and circumstances:
"`Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough.'" [Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 112, 84 S. Ct.  at 1512, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, quoting Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159 (1933) (emphasis in original).]
In Zoder, the Court of Appeals explained that a magistrate abdicates his judicial function regarding search warrants when he only accepts the affiant's conclusory statements:
"The vice of stating a mere conclusion' and in failing to state the underlying circumstances upon which the conclusion is based is that without a statement of underlying circumstances the magistrate must accept the inferences drawn by the affiant rather than make his own independent evaluation." [Zoder at 121, 166 N.W.2d 289.]
When presented with affidavits that wholly consist of the affiant's unjustified assertions or inferences, Michigan reviewing courts have consistently held that the affidavit is fatally deficient because it could not provide any basis to support a magistrate's conclusion that there was probable cause to search. See Sherbine, Rosborough, Knopka, Effelberg, Landt, and Zoder.
In order to give great deference to a magistrate, a reviewing court necessarily must examine the facts that were presented in the affidavit. In this case, as the *67 majority recognizes, only two facts were presented to support the warrant: coin envelopes were observed and defendant suggested that he would "take care of" the officer, if the officer returned in the company of someone known to the defendant.
The majority comments that the officer inquired about heroin. However, a review of the affidavit demonstrates no such inquiry. The affidavit states that the officer went to the defendant's address. When the defendant opened the door, he asked "what [the officer] wanted." The officer replied, "one." At that moment, the defendant produced "a large bundle of blue folded small coin envelopes wrapped in rubberbands." On the basis of these facts, the most immediate and reasonable inference to be drawn is that defendant believed that the officer made an offer to purchase a single coin envelope.
In People v. Falconer,[1] the Court of Appeals ruled that an officer's suspicion that coin envelopes contained narcotics did not constitute probable cause. The officer relied solely on his suspicion in making an affidavit for a search warrant.
In this case, the defendant refused to sell anything to the undercover officer. There were no drugs observed either on the premises or in the coin envelopes. Although the officer's experience in narcotics demonstrated that drugs were often packaged in coin envelopes, he did not know that the coin envelopes he observed contained contraband. See Falconer. He suspected that the envelopes contained drugs. Such a suspicious belief is insufficient to warrant a probable cause finding. See Rosborough, 387 Mich. at 199, 195 N.W.2d 255.
In People v. Head,[2] the affiant was an experienced police officer assigned to a narcotics team. For approximately three months, he observed a building that was suspected to be a drug house. He swore that an unnamed cooperating person made two controlled buys at the house within the two weeks before issuance of the warrant. The second purchase had been within the previous forty-eight hours. The substance purchased was cocaine. Finally, in vouching for the reliability of the informant, the affiant asserted that the informant had made statements regarding drug involvement that were against the party's penal interests.
I wrote that the facts showing controlled cocaine purchases in Head were sufficient to establish probable cause to permit the magistrate to issue a search warrant. However, the present case is distinguishable. Here, there were no facts indicating that the defendant's house had been under surveillance. Moreover, there was no observance of drug transactions or of drugs of any kind. In Head, the magistrate had evidence of two concrete drug sales. In the present case, the magistrate had none.
In People v. Rosborough, supra, a warrant was issued to search the defendant's premises and seize gambling paraphernalia. The underlying affidavit was signed by a police officer who stated that he had seen various persons arrive at a location by automobile, enter the premises carrying brown paper bags, leave with the bags, and drive away. On the basis of these observations, the officer suspected that the location was a gambling house.[3]
*68 We held that the search warrant was not properly supported by probable cause. In so holding, we stated that "[i]t is not for the affiant to draw his own inferences. He must state matters which justify the drawing of them." 387 Mich. at 199, 195 N.W.2d 255.
In this case, the officer believed that contraband was contained inside the coin envelopes because he had seen similar envelopes in prior drug transactions. Analogous to the brown paper bags observed in Rosborough, the coin envelopes, without more, are not sufficient to support a probable cause determination.
In United States v. Algie,[4] the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced the issue whether (1) fifteen telephone calls made to a corporation from an apartment that the police knew to be used for gambling, (2) coupled with the officer's belief that telephones were often used to make lay-off bets, constituted probable cause sufficient to issue a warrant to search the corporation. The evidence of the telephone calls was derived from a pen register.
The Sixth Circuit held that the evidence amounted only to a reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that, although the apartment was a known location where illegal gambling took place, the corporation was not. It noted, also, that "no demonstrable illegal activities were observed at [the corporation]." Id. at 1042.
The court also took note that telephones were commonly used by bookmakers to make bets and exchange information. Nevertheless, it stated that the connection between an innocuous device such as a telephone and alleged or suspected criminal activity is simply insufficient. See id. at 1043.
It follows that coin envelopes, absent an observation of at least drug residue, coupled with a suspected drug transaction, are insufficient. Moreover, the affidavit itself demonstrates that the magistrate relied merely on the officer's belief that the envelopes contained contraband and his own subjective, unexpressed intention to purchase narcotics. At most, the facts submitted by the officer rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. And, as the United States Supreme Court indicated, mere suspicion is insufficient to establish probable cause to search. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949).
Accordingly, the evidence presented in the affidavit to the magistrate was such that a "reasonably cautious person could [not] have concluded that there was a `substantial basis' for the finding of probable cause." See Sloan, supra at 168, 538 N.W.2d 380.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion and analysis, I would affirm the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J., concurred with MARILYN J. KELLY, J.
[1]  Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued September 25, 1998, reh. den. December 21, 1998 (Docket No. 207229).
[2]  The envelopes are often referred to as "coin envelopes." However, a review of the case law concerning heroin prosecutions reveals that these items could just as easily be called "drug envelopes" or even "heroin envelopes." People v. Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich. 334, 350, 352, 562 N.W.2d 652 (1997); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 50, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985), cert. gtd. 475 U.S. 1094, 106 S. Ct. 1489, 89 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1986), cert. vacated 478 U.S. 1017, 106 S. Ct. 3326, 92 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986); People v. Talley, 410 Mich. 378, 383, 388, 301 N.W.2d 809 (1981), partially overruled on other grounds People v. Kaufman, 457 Mich. 266, 276, 577 N.W.2d 466 (1998); People v. Wright, 408 Mich. 1,16, 289 N.W.2d 1 (1980); People v. Collier, 183 Mich. App. 473, 475, 455 N.W.2d 313 (1989); In re Forfeiture of $53, 178 Mich.App. 480, 483, 444 N.W.2d 182 (1989); People v. Stewart, 166 Mich.App. 263, 265, 420 N.W.2d 180 (1988); People v. Russell, 152 Mich.App. 537, 539-542, 394 N.W.2d 9 (1986); Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 149 Mich.App. 183, 185, 385 N.W.2d 652 (1986); People v. Johnson, 146 Mich.App. 705, 707, 381 N.W.2d 791 (1985), Iv. gtd. 425 Mich. 872 (1986), lv. improvidently gtd. and lv. den. 428 Mich. 903 (1987); People v. Alfafara, 140 Mich.App. 551, 557, 364 N.W.2d 743 (1985); People v. Fowlkes, 130 Mich.App. 828, 831, 834-835, 345 N.W.2d 629 (1983); People v. Porterfield, 128 Mich.App. 35, 38-39, 339 N.W.2d 683 (1983); People v. Miller (On Remand), 128 Mich.App. 298, 301, 340 N.W.2d 858 (1983); People v. Hudgins, 125 Mich.App. 140, 143, 148, 336 N.W.2d 241 (1983); People v. Key, 121 Mich.App. 168, 171, 179, 328 N.W.2d 609 (1982); Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 119 Mich.App. 159, 161, 163, 326 N.W.2d 825 (1982); People v. Alexander, 112 Mich.App. 357, 359-360, 315 N.W.2d 543 (1981); People v. Miller, 110 Mich.App. 270, 274, 312 N.W.2d 225 (1981); People v. Williams, 109 Mich.App. 768, 769-770, 312 N.W.2d 155 (1981); Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 101 Mich.App. 772, 775-777, 300 N.W.2d 516 (1980); Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 100 Mich.App. 518, 519-520, 299 N.W.2d 63 (1980); People v. Beachman, 98 Mich.App. 544, 548, 551, 296 N.W.2d 305 (1980); People v. Kincaid, 92 Mich.App. 156, 157-158, 284 N.W.2d 486 (1979); People v. Greer, 91 Mich.App. 18, 21, 282 N.W.2d 819 (1979); People v. Washington, 77 Mich.App. 598, 599-600, 603, 259 N.W.2d 151 (1977); People v. Terrell, 77 Mich.App. 676, 678-680, 259 N.W.2d 187 (1977); People v. Falconer, 76 Mich.App. 367, 368-369, 256 N.W.2d 597 (1977); People v. Bell, 74 Mich.App. 270, 276-278, 253 N.W.2d 726 (1977); People v. Morris, 66 Mich.App. 514, 516, 239 N.W.2d 649 (1976).

3 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that probable cause determinations must be based on facts and circumstances:
"`Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough.'" [Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 112, 84 S. Ct.  at 1512, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, quoting Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159 (1933) (emphasis in original).]
In Zoder, the Court of Appeals explained that a magistrate abdicates his judicial function regarding search warrants when he only accepts the affiant's conclusory statements:
FN"The vice of stating a `mere conclusion' and in failing to state the underlying circumstances upon which the conclusion is based is that without a statement of underlying circumstances the magistrate must accept the inferences drawn by the affiant rather than make his own independent evaluation." [ Zoder at 121, 166 N.W.2d 289.]
When presented with affidavits that wholly consist of the affiant's unjustified assertions or inferences, Michigan reviewing courts have consistently held that the affidavit is fatally deficient because it could not provide any basis to support a magistrate's conclusion that there was probable cause to search. See Sherbine, Rosborough, Knopka, Effelberg, Landt, and Zoder.
[1]  76 Mich.App. 367, 256 N.W.2d 597 (1977).
[2]  211 Mich.App. 205, 535 N.W.2d 563 (1995).
[3]  In the affidavit, the officer concluded

"that from his observations of the people, packages and parcels in the manner described, and the use of the automobiles hereinbefore mentioned, that the persons aforementioned, whose names are unknown but whose persons are well known, have conspired to violate the gambling laws of the State of Michigan, and that they are operating an unlawful gambling enterprise and that the premises are used to collect, store and conceal memoranda of bets and other gambling paraphernalia...." 387 Mich. at 197, 195 N.W.2d 255.
Although the officer did not expressly say so, one reasonably could surmise that he made this conclusion on the basis of his past experience as an officer.
[4]  721 F.2d 1039 (C.A.6, 1983).