Title: State v. Michael A. Sveum

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP658-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael A. Sveum, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 81 
Reported at: 319 Wis. 2d 498, 769 N.W.2d 53 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 20, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven D. Ebert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Dean A. Strang, Marcus J. Berghahn, and Hurley, Burish & 
Stanton, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Dean A. Strang. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Amelia L. Bizzaro and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee; Laurence Jacques Dupuis and 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, 
Milwaukee; G. Michael Halfenger and Foley & Lardner, LLP, 
Milwaukee; Catherine Crump and the American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation, New York, N.Y.; and Jennifer Granick and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, Cal., and oral 
argument by G. Michael Halfenger. 
 
 
2010 WI 92
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP658-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2003CF1783) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Michael A. Sveum,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUL 20, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court's judgment2 
convicting Michael A. Sveum (Sveum) of aggravated stalking and 
denying Sveum's post-conviction motion for a new trial.  In 
upholding the judgment of conviction, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Sveum's motion to 
suppress evidence obtained from a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) tracking device, which law enforcement attached to Sveum's 
                                                 
1 State v. Sveum (Sveum II), 2009 WI App 81, 319 Wis. 2d 
498, 769 N.W.2d 53. 
2 The Honorable Steven D. Ebert of Dane County presided. 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
2 
 
car.  Our focus is on whether the circuit court erred in its 
denial of Sveum's suppression motion. 
¶2 
Sveum and the State have briefed two issues for 
purposes of our review:  (1) whether the installation of a GPS 
tracking device to Sveum's car while his car was parked in the 
driveway of his home and the subsequent electronic monitoring of 
Sveum's car using the GPS constituted a search or seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; and (2) whether the court order authorizing the 
installation and monitoring of a GPS tracking device on Sveum's 
vehicle constituted a valid warrant and, if so, whether the 
police reasonably executed the warrant. 
¶3 
We elect not to resolve the first issue, and assume, 
without deciding, that a search or seizure occurred in this case 
that required authorization by a warrant.  We therefore decide 
only the second issue, concluding that the order authorizing law 
enforcement to install and monitor a GPS tracking device on 
Sveum's vehicle constituted a valid warrant and that the 
officers' execution of the warrant was reasonable.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In 
1996, 
"Sveum 
was 
charged 
with 
stalking 
and 
harassing Jamie Johnson [(Johnson)], his former girlfriend."  
State v. Sveum (Sveum I), 220 Wis. 2d 396, 399, 584 N.W.2d 137 
(Ct. App. 1998).  "He was also charged with violating a 
harassment injunction for contacting [Johnson] personally and by 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
3 
 
telephone" and "criminal damage to property."  Id.  Sveum was 
convicted of all charges, which the court of appeals affirmed.  
Id.  He was sentenced to 11 years of probation for the stalking 
conviction that commenced upon serving three consecutive, three-
year prison terms for the remaining three convictions.  Sveum 
remained in confinement until his mandatory release date of 
July 2, 2002, when he was released on probation and parole.   
¶5 
In March 2003, Johnson reported to the police that she 
believed Sveum was stalking her again.  On April 22, 2003, 
Detective Mary Ricksecker (Ricksecker) requested circuit court 
authorization to install and monitor an electronic device on 
Sveum's vehicle.  Specifically, she requested to attach a GPS 
tracking device to Sveum's vehicle, a 1980 black Chevy Beretta 
Coup with a Wisconsin license plate number of 754 ELL and a 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of 1G1LZ14A2LY130646, and to 
monitor the tracking device "inside such private and public 
areas."  She further requested "permission to obtain a key to 
operate the motor vehicle, if necessary" and "to use the same 
methods to retrieve the device."  Finally, she requested "that 
the order be authorized for a period of time not to exceed 60 
days from the date the order is signed."   
¶6 
Ricksecker filed an affidavit in support of this 
request, alleging that GPS monitoring of Sveum's vehicle "could 
provide relevant information to the criminal investigation of 
the crime of stalking."  Ricksecker averred the following: 
That the affiant is a state certified law 
enforcement officer currently assigned as Detective 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
4 
 
with the Madison Police Department.  Your affiant has 
worked full-time as a law enforcement officer for 
a[p]proximately 
22 
years. 
 
Your 
affiant 
has 
investigated numerous cases involving harassing phone 
calls, 
violation 
of 
restraining 
orders, 
domestic 
violence, sexual assaults and stalking.  Your affiant 
has received formal training in the investigation of 
stalking and has trained law enforcement officers on 
the investigation of the crime of Stalking, in 
violation of Wisconsin Statute 940.32. 
On 12-21-1994 Michael A[.] Sveum, dob 08-04-67, 
was convicted of Violation of a Domestic Abuse Order 
. . . .  The complain[an]t in the case was Jamie 
Johnson.  On 12-11-1995 Sveum was convicted . . . of 
Violation of a Domestic Abuse Order.  Your Affiant 
knows the facts in this case were based on hang-up 
calls received by Jamie Johnson at her residence. 
On 10-09-1996 Sveum was convicted . . . of Felony 
Stalking, Violation of a Harassment Restraining Order, 
and Harassment.  The victim in this case was Jamie 
Johnson.  Your affiant investigated this criminal case 
and knows the facts of the complaint.  Johnson was 
receiving hang-ups during the course of the criminal 
behavior, which ceased upon him becoming incarcerated.  
Two hours after Sveum was released on bail . . . she 
reported a hang-up call. 
. . .  
[Sveum] is currently employed in the City of Madison 
and living at 6685 Cty Tk K Blue Mounds. 
On 3-28-03 Jamie Johnson a resident in the City 
of Madison reports that where she currently resides 
with the phone number is [].  Since 3-3-03 thru 4-12-
03 she and her housemate have received nine hang-up 
calls at that number.  She reports that the caller ID 
information lists "PRIVATE".  She indicates prior to 
this they have not had any hang-up calls.  Johnson 
advised your affiant that TDS Metrocom is the service 
provider for [her phone number].  Your affiant 
believes the information provided by Johnson to be 
truthful and reliable as it was gained by her as a 
witness to the events above. 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
5 
 
Your affiant contacted TDS Metrocom for records 
of the incoming hang-up calls reported by Johnson.  
Your affiant believes the information kept by TDS 
. . . to be truthful and reliable as it [is] kept in 
the normal course of business.  Your affiant knows 
that hang-up calls could be criminal harassment or 
felony stalking. 
From the information provided by TDS Metrocom and 
information from the Dane County 911 dispatch center, 
your affiant learned the hang-up calls were made from 
pay phones located at the Meadowood Library 5740 
Raymond Rd, Party City located at 223 Junction Rd., 
American TV located at 2404 W. Beltline hwy, Super 
America located at 2801 Fish Hatchery Rd, Kohl's food 
store located at 3010 Cahill Rd, and Kitt's Korner 
Sports Bar and Grill located at 3738 County Rd P.  All 
of these locations are in the County of Dane.  Your 
affiant believes the information provided by 911 
Dispatch to be truthful and reliable as it is kept in 
the normal course of business. 
Your affiant has found in the course of this 
investigation that Michael Sveum is the primary user 
and/or exercises dominion and control over a 1980 
black Chevy Beretta Coup with a Wisconsin license 
plate 
number 
of 754 ELL and a VIN number of 
1G1LZ14A2LY130646, which is stored and/or parked at an 
address of 6685 County Trunk K in Iowa County, 
Wisconsin or stored or parked at 2426 Valley Street, 
Cross Plains in Dane County, Wisconsin, herein after 
referred to as "the Target Vehicle." . . . 
[A] records check with the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation . . . indicate[d] the owner of the 
aforementioned Target Vehicle . . . [is] Michael Sveum 
with a VIN number of 1G1LZ14A2LY130646, at an address 
of 2426 Valley Street, Cross Plains, Dane County, 
Wisconsin. 
. . .  
Your affiant believes that Sveum . . . maintains 
dominion and control over as well as being the primary 
user of the aforementioned vehicle. 
. . .  
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
6 
 
Your affiant states that there is probable cause 
to believe based on the above information that the 
Target Vehicle is presently being utilized in the 
commission of a crime to wit, stalking . . . .  Your 
affiant states that there is probable cause to believe 
that the installation of a [GPS] tracking device on 
the Target Vehicle in conjunction with the monitoring, 
maintenance and retrieval of information from that 
[GPS] tracking device will lead to evidence of the 
aforementioned 
criminal 
violations 
including 
the 
places of the violation and the means of the violation 
and the identification of associates assisting in the 
aforementioned violations. 
Your affiant states that the [GPS] tracking 
device, which is covertly placed on a criminal 
suspect's 
automobile, 
is 
equipped 
with 
a 
radio 
satellite 
receiver, 
which, 
when 
programmed, 
periodically 
records, 
at 
specified 
times, 
the 
latitude, the longitude, date and time of readings and 
stores these readings until they are downloaded to a 
computer interface unit and overlaid on a computerized 
compact disc mapping program for analysis. 
. . .  
That based upon the affiant's experience, the 
[GPS] tracking devices internal battery packs limited 
use necessitates the use of the suspect's automobile 
battery 
power 
in 
order 
to 
effectively 
install, 
monitor, and maintain the [GPS] tracking device over 
an extended period of time . . . .3 
. . .  
Your affiant is aware that persons involved in 
criminal activities or conspiracies maintain the means 
and fruits of their violations, often in remote 
locations including garages, homes and storage sheds.  
Your affiant believes that the installation of the 
[GPS] 
tracking 
device 
has 
been 
shown 
to 
be 
a 
                                                 
3 Contrary to Ricksecker's affidavit, the GPS unit that was 
attached to Sveum's vehicle did not "necessitate[] the use of 
the suspect's automobile battery power."  Ricksecker testified 
that the GPS unit contained its own battery, which powered the 
device.   
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
7 
 
successful supplement to visual surveillance of the 
vehicle due to the inherent risks of detection of 
manual, visual surveillance by the target of law 
enforcement personnel.  The [GPS] tracking device 
lessens the risk of visual detection by the suspect 
and is generally considered more reliable since visual 
surveillance often results in the loss of sight of the 
Target Vehicle. 
¶7 
On the same day Ricksecker requested authorization, 
the circuit court issued an order granting her request to 
install and monitor a GPS tracking device on Sveum's vehicle.  
The court concluded that "[b]ased on the information provided in 
the affidavit submitted by Detective Ricksecker, the court finds 
that there is probable cause to believe that the installation of 
a tracking device in the below listed vehicle is relevant to an 
on-going criminal investigation and that the vehicle is being 
used in the commission of a crime of stalking . . . ."  The 
court ordered the following: 
1. 
The State[']s request to install and monitor 
a tracking device on the below listed vehicle is 
granted based on the authority granted in [United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)]. 
2. 
The Madison Police Department is authorized 
to place an electronic tracking device on a 1990 black 
Beretta with a license plate number of 754 ELL and a 
VIN 
of 
1G1LZ14A2LY130646, 
and 
they 
are 
hereby 
authorized to surreptitiously enter and reenter the 
vehicle and any buildings and structures containing 
the vehicle or any premises on which the vehicle is 
located 
to 
install, 
use, 
maintain 
and 
conduct 
surveillance and monitoring of the location and 
movement of a mobile electronic tracking device in the 
vehicle and any and all places within or outside the 
jurisdiction of Iowa or Dane County, including but not 
limited to private residence and other locations not 
open 
to 
visual 
surveillance; 
to 
accomplish 
the 
installation, agents are authorized to obtain and use 
a key to operate and move the vehicle for a required 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
8 
 
time to a concealed location and are authorized to 
open the engine compartment and trunk areas of the 
vehicle to install the device. 
3. 
It is further ordered that the Madison 
Police Department shall remove the electronic tracking 
device as soon as practicable after the objectives of 
the surveillance are accomplished or not later than 60 
days from the date the order is signed unless extended 
by 
this 
court 
or 
another 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction. 
¶8 
In 
the 
early 
morning 
hours 
of 
April 23, 
2003, 
Ricksecker and three other law enforcement officers located 
Sveum's vehicle parked in the driveway of 2426 Valley Road, 
Cross Plains.  A battery-powered GPS tracking device was 
attached to the "undercarriage" of Sveum's vehicle with magnetic 
equipment and tape.  The officers did not open the engine 
compartment or trunk area of the vehicle while installing the 
GPS.  Because of the limited battery life of the GPS, the 
officers replaced the GPS twice.  Both replacement devices were 
attached to Sveum's vehicle in the same manner in which the 
first was attached, i.e., to the undercarriage of the vehicle 
with magnetic equipment and tape while parked in the driveway of 
2426 Valley Road, Cross Plains.  The third and final GPS was 
removed from Sveum's vehicle on May 27, 2003.   
¶9 
Upon 
removal 
of 
the 
GPS 
devices, 
the 
stored 
information on each of the GPS devices was downloaded and then 
stored on a disk.  The information from the disk was put on a 
map so the officers could see where Sveum's vehicle had 
traveled.   
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
9 
 
¶10 The GPS device revealed data incriminating Sveum.  The 
GPS data indicated that on April 25, 2003, Sveum's vehicle 
traveled to a location 468 feet from Johnson's residence, and 
his vehicle remained there from 8:14 p.m. to 9:08 p.m.  Sveum's 
vehicle then traveled to a shopping mall near Mineral Point Road 
and the Beltline Highway and remained there from 9:16 p.m. to 
9:19 p.m.  Phone records indicated that at 9:17 p.m. Johnson 
received a hang-up call from a pay phone located near the 
shopping mall where Sveum's vehicle was.  Additionally, the GPS 
data demonstrated that on April 26, 2003, Sveum's vehicle 
traveled to a location 277 feet from Johnson's residence and 
remained there from 8:28 p.m. to 9:43 p.m. 
¶11 Based, in part, on the above-described tracking data 
from the GPS devices, the police obtained two additional search 
warrants.  One warrant authorized the police to search the 
premises located at 2426 Valley Road, Cross Plains and Sveum's 
vehicle.  The search revealed evidence incriminating Sveum, 
including photos of Johnson, a handwritten chronological log 
recording sightings of Johnson and letters sent to his sister, 
Renee Sveum, asking for information about Johnson.  The other 
warrant authorized the police to search the premises located at 
6685 County Trunk Highway K, Renee Sveum's residence, which did 
not reveal any incriminating evidence. 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
10 
 
¶12 On August 4, 2003, the State filed a complaint 
charging Sveum4 with aggravated stalking as a party to a crime 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.32(3)(b) (2001–02)5 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 930.05 (2001–02).  Sveum filed a motion to suppress all 
information obtained from the GPS device, arguing that it was 
unlawfully obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.6  The 
circuit court denied the motion on the grounds that installing 
and monitoring the GPS device was not a search.  While the 
circuit court did not specifically address whether the court 
order authorizing police use of the GPS device was a warrant, it 
noted that the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to 
obtain the order. 
¶13 The case proceeded to trial where a jury found Sveum 
guilty of the charged offense.  On February 6, 2007, the court 
entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Sveum to seven 
years and six months in prison followed by five years of 
extended supervision.  Sveum filed a motion for post-conviction 
                                                 
4 The complaint also charged Renee Sveum with aggravated 
stalking as a party to a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(3)(b) (2001–02) and Wis. Stat. § 930.05 (2001–02).  We 
do not discuss the charges again Renee as she is not a party to 
this appeal. 
5 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007–
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
6 Sveum filed two additional motions to suppress items 
seized from 2426 Valley Road, Cross Plains and a black knit ski 
mask seized from Sveum's vehicle, which the circuit court 
denied.  Neither of these motions is relevant to this appeal. 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
11 
 
relief, seeking a new trial on various grounds, all of which the 
court rejected. 
¶14 The court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Sveum (Sveum 
II), 2009 WI App 81, ¶2, 319 Wis. 2d 498, 769 N.W.2d 53.  The 
court of appeals addressed a number of issues not raised in this 
court.  Id., ¶¶1–2.  On the Fourth Amendment issue, the court of 
appeals concluded that installing and monitoring the GPS device 
on Sveum's vehicle did not constitute a search or a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Id., ¶6.  As such, 
the court did not address whether the court order authorizing 
the installation and monitoring of the GPS device was a warrant.  
Id., ¶6 & n.3. 
¶15 Sveum petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  We now affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence, 
we 
will 
uphold 
a 
circuit 
court's 
findings 
of 
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  
However, "[t]he question of whether police conduct violated the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures is a question of constitutional fact" that we review 
independently.  Id., ¶11 (internal quotations and brackets 
omitted). 
¶17 Whether the language of a court order satisfies the 
requisite constitutional requirements of a warrant is a question 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
12 
 
of law we review independently.  See State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 
729, 744, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶18 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees that persons shall be secure from "unreasonable 
searches and seizures and sets forth the manner in which 
warrants shall issue."  State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶17, 245 
Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613.  The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.7 
                                                 
7 Similarly, the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 
11 provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
"Historically, we generally have interpreted Article I, 
Section 11 to provide the same constitutional guarantees as the 
Supreme Court has accorded through its interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment."  State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  The development of Wisconsin law 
on search and seizure follows this tradition and parallels that 
developed by the United States Supreme Court.  State v. 
Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶17 n.4, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613. 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
13 
 
A search and seizure conducted without a warrant issued pursuant 
to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment is presumptively 
unreasonable.  Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 345, ¶19. 
¶19 Whether a search and seizure pursuant to a warrant is 
constitutionally valid is a two-part inquiry.  First, the 
Warrant Clause demands that all warrants be validly issued.  Id.  
Second, the Reasonableness Clause requires that warrants be 
reasonably executed.  Id., ¶18. 
A.  Warrant Clause 
¶20 The 
"warrant 
clause 
provides 
[] 
particularized 
protections governing the manner in which search and arrest 
warrants are issued."  Id., ¶19.  The United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Warrant Clause to be "'precise and 
clear,'" and as requiring only three things:  (1) prior 
authorization 
by 
a 
neutral, 
detached 
magistrate; 
(2) 
a 
demonstration upon oath or affirmation that there is probable 
cause to believe that evidence sought will aid in a particular 
conviction for a particular offense; and (3) a particularized 
description of the place to be searched and items to be seized.  
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (quoting 
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965)).   
1.  Neutral and detached magistrate 
¶21 First, 
when 
officers 
obtain 
prior 
judicial 
authorization for a search, the magistrate who issues the 
warrant must be neutral and detached.  Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 
345, ¶19 (citing Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255).  This requirement 
protects 
citizens 
because 
"'the 
usual 
inferences 
which 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
14 
 
reasonable men draw from evidence'" are "'drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.'"  State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 597, 
598, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (concluding that "the determination of 
the district attorney does not constitute the determination of a 
neutral and detached magistrate")).  We have explained that the 
purpose of this rule "is to interpose the impartial judgment of 
a judicial officer between the citizen and the police and also 
between the citizen and the prosecutor, so that an individual 
may be secure from an improper search."  Id. at 598. 
2.  Probable cause 
¶22 Second, 
"the 
officer 
seeking 
a 
warrant 
[must] 
demonstrate upon oath or affirmation probable cause to believe 
that 'the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension 
or conviction' for a particular offense."  Henderson, 245 
Wis. 2d 345, ¶19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 
(1967)).  "[W]hen no sworn testimony exists to support a search 
warrant, then the warrant is void."  State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, 
¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473 (citing State v. Baltes, 
183 Wis. 545, 553, 198 N.W. 282 (1924)). 
¶23 The 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
provision has been reinforced by legislation.  Id., ¶11.  A 
search warrant may be based either "upon sworn complaint or 
affidavit, or testimony recorded by a phonographic reporter," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.12(2), 
or 
"upon 
sworn 
oral 
testimony 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
15 
 
communicated to the judge by telephone, radio or other means of 
electronic communication," Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(a). 
¶24 A search warrant may issue only on probable cause.  
State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 
(1991).  The task of the issuing magistrate is to determine 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, given all the 
facts and circumstances set forth in the affidavit, "'there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.'"  State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 
119, 131, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  The probable cause standard is not a 
"technical, legalistic concept but a flexible, common-sense 
measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about 
human behavior."  State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 547-48, 468 
N.W.2d 676 (1991), overruled in part by State v. Greve, 2004 WI 
69, 272 Wis. 2d 444, 681 N.W.2d 479 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 743 (1983)).   
¶25 "We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing 
judge's determination of probable cause and that determination 
will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are 
clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause."  
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 
236.  "The duty of the reviewing court is to ensure that the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the 
probable cause existed."  Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989.  
Such determination is "confined to the record that was before 
the warrant-issuing judge."  Id.   
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
16 
 
¶26 Our deferential review of the warrant-issuing judge's 
probable cause determination is "'appropriate to further the 
Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant.'"  Id. at 990 (quoting Massachusetts v. 
Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733 (1984) (further quotation omitted)).  
Accordingly, we resolve doubtful or marginal cases regarding a 
probable cause finding in light of the Fourth Amendment's strong 
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.  Id. 
3.  Particularity 
¶27 Finally, the warrant clause requires "that warrants [] 
particularly describe the place to be searched, as well as the 
items to be seized."  Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 345, ¶19 (citing 
Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255).  "In order to satisfy the particularity 
requirement, the warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably 
ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be 
seized."  State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 450–51, 343 N.W.2d 391 
(1984).  A general description of the items to be seized is 
constitutionally acceptable when a more specific description is 
not available.  Id. at 451. 
¶28 The 
particularity 
requirement 
fulfills 
three 
objectives.  Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 540.  It prevents general 
searches, the issuance of warrants on less than probable cause 
and the seizure of objects other than those described in the 
warrant.  Id. 
¶29 In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), the 
Court was called on to decide whether the warrantless monitoring 
of a "beeper," an electronic tracking device, in a private 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
17 
 
residence constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 707.  The Court concluded that monitoring the 
beeper in a private residence constituted a warrantless search.  
Id. at 714.  In so concluding, the Court rejected the argument 
that a warrant should not be required to authorize the 
installation and monitoring of electronic tracking devices 
"because of the difficulty in satisfying the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 718.   
¶30 Specifically, the "Government contend[ed] that it 
would be impossible to describe the 'place' to be searched, 
because the location of the place is precisely what is sought to 
be discovered through the search."  Id.  The Court explained 
that a warrant application that "describe[s] the object into 
which the [tracking device] is to be placed, the circumstances 
that led agents to wish to install the [tracking device], and 
the length of time for which [] surveillance is requested" is 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
the 
constitution's 
particularity 
requirement and will "permit issuance of a warrant authorizing 
[] installation [of a tracking device] and surveillance."  Id. 
4.  Severability doctrine 
¶31 In the event of a constitutionally defective search 
warrant, we may apply the exclusionary rule,8 which bars all 
evidence obtained pursuant to the defective warrant from a 
                                                 
8 We note that there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule 
not relevant to the outcome of this case.  For example, we 
recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  See, 
e.g., State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 
625; State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.   
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
18 
 
criminal proceeding against the defendant whose constitutional 
rights have been violated.  See State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶46, 
231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.  However, in Noll, we addressed 
the issue of the appropriate remedy for items seized pursuant to 
a partially defective search warrant.  Noll, 116 Wis. 2d at 451. 
¶32 In 
Noll, 
we 
concluded 
that 
a 
search 
warrant 
authorizing the seizure of "various long play phonograph albums, 
and miscellaneous vases and glassware items" lacked the required 
particularity; however, the remaining items described in the 
warrant 
were 
"sufficiently 
particular 
to 
satisfy 
the 
constitutional requirement."  Id. at 451.  As such, the search 
warrant was defective only with respect to those items that were 
seized, but inadequately described. 
¶33 We 
recognized 
the 
harshness 
of 
applying 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
to 
search 
warrants 
that 
are 
partially 
defective.  Quoting Professor LaFave, we explained:  "'[I]t 
would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on 
probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items 
were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and 
magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for other 
items as well.'"  Id. at 454 (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 4.6(f) (1978)).  Indeed, we further noted that 
such a rule would "unduly hamper[] the government's efforts to 
gather evidence of crime and is not compelled by the purposes 
underlying the exclusionary rule."  Id. at 460. 
¶34 To 
avoid 
such 
harsh 
results, 
we 
adopted 
the 
"severability doctrine," which permits reviewing courts to 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
19 
 
excise the defective portions of an otherwise valid warrant.  
Id. at 445.9  We explained that "admitting those items seized 
pursuant to the valid parts of the warrant and suppressing those 
items seized" under the defective portion, "strike[s] the proper 
balance between the government's obligation to enforce its laws 
to protect its citizens from wrongdoers and the citizen's right 
to be secure . . . from unreasonable government intrusion[s]."  
Id. at 454.   
¶35 We concluded that application of the severability 
doctrine was proper, and therefore, we excised the defective 
warrant provisions from the valid warrant provisions.  The items 
seized pursuant to the valid portion of the warrant were 
admitted, and those items seized pursuant to the defective 
portion were suppressed.  See id. 
¶36 The court of appeals applied the severability doctrine 
to a search warrant in State v. Marten, 165 Wis. 2d 70, 477 
N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1991).  In Marten, a search warrant 
authorized police to search a "home, yard and 'outbuildings'" 
for drug paraphernalia based on information provided by an 
informant and through police officer surveillance.  Id. at 72-
                                                 
9 Accord United States v. Brown, 984 F.2d 1074, 1077–78 
(10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[a]t least eight circuits have 
held that where a warrant contains both specific as well as 
unconstitutionally broad language, the broad portion may be 
redacted and the balance of the warrant considered valid"); 
United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1027 (6th Cir. 1991) 
("We believe the proper approach . . . is to sever the infirm 
portion of the search warrant from the remainder which passes 
constitutional muster."); Iowa v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 671 
(Iowa 1996) (same). 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
20 
 
73.  While executing the search warrant, officers seized 
marijuana found in Marten's house.  Marten filed a motion to 
suppress all the evidence resulting from the execution of the 
search warrant arguing, among other things, that the warrant was 
fatally overbroad because there was not probable cause to 
support a search of Marten's house, yard or outbuildings.  Id. 
at 76.   
¶37 The court concluded that the complaint established 
probable cause to believe that marijuana would be found in 
Marten's home.  Id. at 75.  The court declined to decide whether 
the warrant established probable cause to search the yard and 
outbuildings because "there [was] no evidence that these areas 
were ever searched" and no evidence was found in them.  Id. at 
77.  Noting that the severability rule applies to situations in 
which "a warrant's description of the property to be seized is 
overly broad" and "the seizure of items under an appropriately 
specific warrant was overly broad," the court concluded that the 
severability rule "applies equally where the description of the 
premises to be searched is overly broad."  Id. at 77 (citing 
Noll, 116 Wis. 2d at 454–55; Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 548).  
Accordingly, the portion of the warrant authorizing a search of 
the yard and outbuildings was severed from the valid portion 
authorizing the search of Marten's home.  The drugs were 
admissible as they were seized from Marten's home pursuant to 
the valid portion of the warrant.  Id. 
¶38 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has stated:  An overly broad warrant that 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
21 
 
authorizes searches for which there is no probable cause, "can 
be cured by redaction, that is, by 'striking from [the] warrant 
those severable phrases and clauses that are invalid for lack of 
probable cause or generality and preserving those severable 
phrases and clauses that satisfy the Fourth Amendment.'"  United 
States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars 
and Fifty-Seven Cents ($92,422.57), 307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 754 (3d 
Cir. 1982)).   
5.  Application 
¶39 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
order 
authorizing 
the 
installation and monitoring of a GPS tracking device on Sveum's 
vehicle was a valid search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.  
First, the order 
was signed by a neutral and detached 
magistrate.  Second, Ricksecker's affidavit provided probable 
cause for the portion of the order authorizing law enforcement 
to "install, use, [and] maintain" a GPS tracking device on 
Sveum's vehicle and to subsequently "remove" such device.  
Assuming, arguendo, that the portions of the order granting law 
enforcement broader authority to search, i.e., authorization to 
search "any buildings and structures containing the vehicle," 
are invalid because the affidavit failed to demonstrate probable 
cause to search such areas, we sever those portions from the 
order.  Finally, the order particularly described the object 
into which the GPS was to be placed, i.e., Sveum's vehicle; the 
circumstances that led agents to seek to install the GPS, i.e., 
evidence of Sveum's stalking activities; and the length of time 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
22 
 
for which GPS surveillance was requested, i.e., no more than 60 
days.  See Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.   
¶40 Sveum contends that because the State's only argument 
in the circuit court was that no search warrant was required 
because the officers' committed no search or seizure, "the 
[S]tate well may have waived the argument that the court order 
here was a search warrant."  We exercise our discretion to reach 
this issue, rather than deem it waived.  See Umansky v. ABC Ins. 
Co., 2009 WI 82, ¶23 & n.17, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 ("The 
rule of waiver is one of judicial administration and does not 
limit the power of an appellate court in a proper case to 
address issues not raised in the circuit court.") (citing State 
v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 609, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997)).  
Therefore, we turn to the merits of this issue. 
¶41 We first examine whether the order here represents 
"prior judicial authorization for a search [by] a neutral, 
disinterested magistrate."  Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 345, ¶19.  We 
conclude that it does.  The order, signed by Judge Richard 
Callaway on April 22, 2003, authorized the Madison Police 
Department to install and monitor a GPS device on Sveum's 
vehicle.  The officers attached the device after the order was 
issued.  Accordingly, the order is prior judicial authorization 
from a neutral and detached magistrate.   
¶42 Second, we examine whether Ricksecker "demonstrate[d] 
upon oath or affirmation probable cause to believe that the 
evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
23 
 
conviction for a particular offense."  Id., ¶19 (internal 
quotations omitted).  We conclude that it does.   
¶43 Affording 
Judge 
Callaway's 
probable 
cause 
determination great deference, we conclude that he had a 
substantial basis for concluding that given all the facts and 
circumstances set forth in Ricksecker's ample and detailed 
affidavit, there was a fair probability that installing and 
monitoring a GPS tracking device on Sveum's vehicle would 
produce evidence of stalking.  Accordingly, we sustain Judge 
Callaway's determination that the order was supported by 
probable cause authorizing law enforcement to "install, use, 
[and] maintain" a GPS tracking device on Sveum's vehicle and to 
subsequently "remove" such device. 
¶44 Ricksecker's 
affidavit, 
sworn 
on 
"oath 
or 
affirmation," demonstrated that the GPS data sought probably 
would provide evidence of Sveum's stalking Johnson.  See id., 
¶19; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.12(2). 
 
The 
affidavit 
established 
Ricksecker's significant training, experience and knowledge in 
investigating stalking cases and that such experience led her to 
believe that GPS tracking devices are "successful supplement[s] 
to visual surveillance" as it "lessens the risk of visual 
detection by the suspect" and "is generally considered more 
reliable" than attempted visual surveillance.  
¶45 Ricksecker also averred, in significant detail, to her 
lengthy history investigating Sveum.  She was aware of the facts 
of Sveum's two previous convictions for violating a domestic 
abuse 
order, 
both 
involving 
Johnson. 
 
She 
personally 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
24 
 
investigated Sveum's previous case that resulted in a conviction 
of stalking also involving Johnson.  As such, Ricksecker was 
personally familiar with Sveum's criminal pattern of targeting 
Johnson as a victim.   
¶46 The affiant averred that Johnson reported receiving 
nine hang-up phone calls between March 3, 2003, and April 12, 
2003.  Johnson's allegation was confirmed by TDS Metrocom phone 
records and the Dane County 911 Dispatch Center.  The phone 
records indicated that each of the hang-up calls came from 
various pay phones in Dane County.  Significantly, the affidavit 
established that the hang-up calls Johnson reported were 
consistent with Sveum's stalking behavior from his previous 
conviction, which was "based on hang-up calls received by Jamie 
Johnson at her residence."   
¶47 The affiant established through investigation and 
Department of Transportation records the make, model, license 
plate number and VIN of Sveum's vehicle.   
¶48 Finally, the affiant explained that the GPS device had 
limited battery power.  Accordingly, it was necessary to 
periodically change the battery of the GPS device to maintain it 
for extended surveillance. 
¶49 The 
foregoing 
evidence 
established 
a 
"fair 
probability" that Sveum was using his vehicle to stalk Johnson 
and that tracking the location of Sveum's vehicle by installing 
and maintaining a GPS tracking device would produce evidence of 
the crime of stalking.  See DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d at 131. 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
25 
 
¶50 Sveum argues that the order's description of the 
premises law enforcement may search is not supported by probable 
cause and therefore is impermissibly overbroad.  Specifically, 
he argues that Ricksecker's affidavit failed to demonstrate 
probable cause to "surreptitiously enter and reenter the vehicle 
and any buildings and structures containing the vehicle or any 
premises on which the vehicle is located . . . including but not 
limited to private residence and other locations not open to 
visual surveillance," to "obtain and use a key to operate and 
move the vehicle" and to "open the engine compartment and trunk 
areas of the vehicle."10   
¶51 Because "there is no evidence that these areas were 
ever searched, and it does not appear that any evidence was 
found in them," we assume, without deciding, that the portions 
of the warrant Sveum points to above are not supported by 
probable 
cause 
and 
therefore are impermissibly overbroad.  
Marten, 165 Wis. 2d at 77.  The proper remedy for the partially 
defective order is to "strik[e] from [the] warrant those 
severable phrases and clauses that are invalid for lack of 
probable cause."  $92,422.57, 307 F.3d at 149 (internal 
quotations omitted).  Accordingly, we strike the portions of the 
order that we assume, arguendo, are defective.  However, the 
other portions of the order remain.  Noll, 116 Wis. 2d at 445.  
                                                 
10 This argument was best articulated in Sveum's brief-in-
chief submitted to the court of appeals.  Brief of Defendant-
Appellant at 2–4 ("The affidavit and request for the order here 
did not show that unlimited entries into the vehicle and any 
buildings containing the vehicle were necessary."). 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
26 
 
As we concluded above, the portion of the order that authorized 
law enforcement to "install, use, [and] maintain" a GPS tracking 
device on Sveum's vehicle and to subsequently "remove" such 
device is valid.  See supra ¶49. 
¶52 Finally, we examine whether the order "particularly 
describe[d] the place to be searched."  Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 
345, ¶19.  We conclude that Ricksecker's affidavit meets the 
particularity requirements with respect to electronic tracking 
devices as explained in Karo, 468 U.S. 705.  First, the affiant 
explained that Sveum's vehicle, identified by make, model, 
license plate and VIN, was the "object into which the [GPS 
device was] to be placed."  Id. at 718.  Second, the affiant 
described the "circumstances that led agents to wish to install 
the [GPS device]."  Id.  The affiant explained that Sveum had 
previously been convicted of stalking Johnson.  Such conviction 
was "based on hang-up calls received by Jamie Johnson at her 
residence."  It was further alleged that the hang-up calls 
ceased upon Sveum's incarceration, and commenced again after 
Sveum was released from incarceration.  The hang-up calls were 
verified 
by TDS Metrocom phone records.  It was these 
circumstances that led Ricksecker to believe that Sveum's 
vehicle was "being utilized in the commission of . . . stalking" 
and that "installation of a [GPS] tracking device on [Sveum's] 
vehicle in conjunction with the monitoring, maintenance and 
retrieval of information from that [GPS] tracking device will 
lead to evidence of [stalking]."  Finally, Ricksecker requested 
authorization to monitor the GPS device "for a period of time 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
27 
 
not to exceed 60 days."  The order generally reiterated such 
information.  Accordingly, we conclude that such information 
"suffice[s] to permit issuance of a warrant authorizing [GPS] 
installation and surveillance" on Sveum's vehicle.  Id. 
B.  Reasonableness Clause 
¶53 Even if a court determines that a search warrant is 
constitutionally valid, the manner in which the warrant was 
executed remains subject to judicial review.  See State v. 
Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 390, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996).  "A search 
'must be conducted reasonably and appropriately limited to the 
scope permitted by the warrant.'"  Id. (quoting Petrone, 161 
Wis. 2d at 542).  "[I]t is generally left to the discretion of 
the executing officers to determine the details of how best to 
proceed with the performance of a search authorized by the 
warrant——subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment 
protection 
'against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures.'"  
Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257.   
¶54 "There 
is 
no 
formula 
for 
the 
determination 
of 
reasonableness."  Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) 
(internal citations omitted).  Whether a search was reasonable 
depends on the particular circumstances of the case and requires 
a balancing of "'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance 
of 
the 
governmental 
interests 
alleged 
to 
justify 
the 
intrusion.'"  Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 345, ¶18 (quoting United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (further quotation 
omitted)).  Constitutional reasonableness relates to the grounds 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
28 
 
for the search and seizure and to the circumstances surrounding 
the execution of the search.  Id.   
¶55 Whether a search was reasonably ordered and executed 
is further informed by the Wisconsin Statutes.  For example, 
Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1) defines the parameters of a search 
warrant. 
 
Section 
968.12 
codifies 
the 
Warrant 
Clause's 
requirements and provides part of the framework for a circuit 
court's action; § 968.12(1) provides: 
A search warrant is an order signed by a judge 
directing a law enforcement officer to conduct a 
search of a designated person, a designated object or 
a 
designated 
place 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
seizing 
designated property or kinds of property.  A judge 
shall issue a search warrant if probable cause is 
shown. 
¶56 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 968.12(1) 
establishes 
that 
to 
constitute a search warrant as described in the statute, the 
order must be signed by a judge (a neutral and detached 
magistrate), must particularly describe the place to be searched 
and the items to be seized and must be supported by probable 
cause.  We concluded that the order here met each of these 
requirements.  See supra Part III.A.5.  An order meeting the 
parameters of a search warrant set out in this section is a 
statutorily authorized warrant, even though the document is 
entitled "order."  Therefore, that the order in this case was 
not entitled, "search warrant," does not affect its validity 
because, as the statute clearly states, "[a] search warrant is 
an order."  § 968.12(1). 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
29 
 
¶57 A violation of a Wisconsin statute relating to search 
warrants does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a 
search that was conducted is unreasonable.  See, e.g., State v. 
Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 459–60, 210 N.W.2d 685 (1973) (concluding 
that any error as to the return of the search warrant violating 
Wis. Stat. § 968.17 did not prejudice the rights of the 
defendant and therefore did not affect the validity of the 
search).  Case law and Wis. Stat. § 968.2211 provide that 
"evidence must not be suppressed for a mere statutory violation 
or a technical irregularity of search warrant procedure unless 
the violation or irregularity is material or the violation or 
irregularity has prejudiced the defendant or affected the 
defendant's substantial rights."  State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 
55, ¶126, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611 (Prosser, J., 
concurring).  "Conversely, if a statutory violation or statutory 
irregularity of search warrant procedure is material or if the 
violation or irregularity has prejudiced the defendant or 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, the court has 
implicit, if not explicit, statutory authority to suppress the 
tainted evidence."  Id. (citing § 968.22).   
¶58 We 
conclude 
that 
in 
light 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances in this case, the order constitutes a valid search 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22 provides:  "No evidence seized 
under a search warrant shall be suppressed because of technical 
irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the 
defendant." 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
30 
 
warrant.12  It was reasonably executed because the search was 
"conducted reasonably and [was] appropriately limited to the 
scope permitted by the warrant."  Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d at 390 
(internal 
quotation 
omitted). 
Further, 
violations 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
statutes 
governing 
search 
warrants 
were 
mere 
"technical irregularities," Wis. Stat. § 968.22, that did not 
render the search unreasonable.  Accordingly, the data seized 
from the GPS device was not subject to suppression. 
¶59 The officers entered the driveway to install the GPS 
device in Sveum's vehicle.  Installation was achieved simply, by 
attaching the device with magnets and tape to the vehicle's 
undercarriage.  Maintenance of the GPS device included replacing 
the device twice, due to its limited battery life.  Both 
replacement devices were installed in the same manner as the 
first.  After monitoring Sveum's vehicle for 35 days, the 
officers removed the GPS device.  Execution in this manner 
stayed well within the confines of the authority granted by the 
order, which authorized law enforcement to "install, use, [and] 
                                                 
12 Even if we had not concluded that the circuit court's 
order constitutes a valid search warrant, a strong argument 
supportive of the good faith of law enforcement could have been 
made here.  This is so because the process used to obtain the 
order and the detailed circuit court order itself gave law 
enforcement an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that 
they had lawful authority to proceed as they did.  See Eason, 
245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶74.  Good faith was not argued because it has 
been the State's position that the actions of law enforcement 
did not constitute a search or a seizure, an issue that we do 
not address.     
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
31 
 
maintain" a GPS tracking device on Sveum's vehicle and to 
subsequently "remove" such device. 
¶60 Additionally, "[t]here is no indication that [law 
enforcement's] intrusion went beyond what was necessary to 
install and remove the equipment."  Dalia, 441 U.S. at 258 n.20.  
Indeed, the officers did not enter any building, including 
Sveum's home, nor did they access the passenger compartment or 
the trunk of the vehicle during installation, maintenance and 
removal of the GPS device.  Additionally, the officers replaced 
the GPS devices only as was necessary and in the same minimally 
intrusive manner as the initial installation.  
¶61 Sveum raises several arguments, which he contends 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
order 
was 
not 
reasonably 
executed.  
Specifically, Sveum argues that the officers violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by:  (1) failing to provide him notice of the 
order issued by the circuit court prior to executing it; (2) 
performing a search that exceeded the scope of the order; and 
(3) failing to comply with the statutory return and inventory 
procedures.  We disagree. 
¶62 The Supreme Court has specifically noted the "absence 
of a constitutional requirement that the warrant be exhibited at 
the outset of the search."  United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 
90, 99 (2006) (internal quotation omitted); see also Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n.5 (2004).  The Groh Court explained 
the reasoning for the absence of such a requirement.  It 
explained: 
 
"Quite 
obviously, 
in 
some 
circumstances——a 
surreptitious search by means of a wiretap, for example, or the 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
32 
 
search of empty or abandoned premises——it will be impracticable 
or imprudent for the officers to show the warrant in advance."  
Groh, 540 U.S. at 562 n.5.   
¶63 Groh's 
reasoning 
squarely 
applies 
here. 
 
Quite 
obviously, installing and monitoring the GPS tracking device 
without Sveum's knowledge was crucial to obtaining evidence 
demonstrating Sveum was using his vehicle to stalk Johnson. 
¶64 As stated, Sveum also argues that the officers search 
exceeded the scope of the order.  He argues this is so because 
each day the officers monitored Sveum's vehicle using the GPS 
device constituted a separate intrusion requiring a new search 
warrant.  Again, we disagree. 
¶65 In United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th 
Cir. 2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit 
rejected 
an 
argument 
similar 
to 
Sveum's. 
 
In 
Squillacote, 
pursuant 
to 
an 
investigation 
of 
suspected 
"espionage-related activities," a search warrant was issued 
authorizing the search of the defendants' home for a period of 
not more than 10 days.  Id. at 557, 554.  The search extended 
over six days.  Id. at 557.  The defendants argued that the 
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant "must [] be suppressed 
because the government did not obtain a new warrant for each 
successive day of searching."  Id. 
¶66 The court rejected this argument reasoning that due to 
the complex, ongoing nature of the espionage-related activities 
and 
the 
nature of the evidence sought "the search was 
necessarily extensive and exhaustive."  Id.  Because "the search 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
33 
 
could not have been completed in a single day" and because it 
viewed "the subsequent entries [] not [as] separate searches 
requiring separate warrants, but instead [as] [] reasonable 
continuations of the original search" the government was not 
required to obtain additional warrants for each day the search 
continued.  Id. 
¶67 We similarly conclude that the complex, ongoing nature 
of stalking justified the 35 days of GPS surveillance on a 
single search warrant.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1)(a), (2)(c) 
(2001–02) (stalking requires, inter alia, a "course of conduct," 
which is "a series of 2 or more acts carried out over time . . . 
that show a continuity of purpose," directed at a specific 
person inducing fear of bodily injury or death); Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(3)(b) (2001–02) (requiring a violation of sub. (2) and 
a previous stalking conviction of the same victim within seven 
years for the commission of aggravated stalking).  Evidence 
sufficient to demonstrate Sveum's stalking required, inter alia, 
data demonstrating Sveum engaged in "a series of 2 or more acts 
carried out over time," inducing Johnson to fear bodily injury 
or death.  See § 940.32(1)(a), (2)(c).  A search obtaining this 
type of evidence could not have been completed in a single day.  
Moreover, the daily, continuous monitoring of the GPS device on 
Sveum's vehicle "were not separate searches requiring separate 
warrants, but instead were simply reasonable continuations of 
the 
original 
search." 
 
Squillacote, 
221 
F.3d 
at 
557.  
Accordingly, the officers were not required to obtain additional 
search warrants for each day the GPS monitoring continued. 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
34 
 
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.15 requires a search warrant to 
be "executed and returned not more than 5 days after the date of 
issuance."  Wisconsin Stat. § 968.17(1) requires that a search 
warrant be returned to the clerk of court "within 48 hours after 
execution" and that such return "be accompanied by a written 
inventory of any property taken."  The requirement of a prompt 
return and inventory "'safeguard[s] [] the property rights of 
individuals'" by ensuring that defendants are not permanently 
deprived of having access to and control over their property 
seized pursuant to a search warrant.  See Meier, 60 Wis. 2d at 
459 (quoting 68 Am Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 83, at 738). 
¶69 The order in this case was not returned along with a 
written inventory to the circuit court.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.15 & 968.17.  Law enforcement's failure to return the 
order and inventory within the confines of §§ 968.15 and 968.17 
do not render the execution of the order unreasonable.  The 
timely return of a warrant is "a ministerial duty which [does] 
not affect the validity of the search absent prejudice to the 
defendant."  State v. Elam, 68 Wis. 2d 614, 620, 229 N.W.2d 664 
(1975) (citing Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452); accord 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search 
and 
Seizure 
§ 4.12(c) 
(4th 
ed. 
2004) 
("[T]he 
'overwhelming weight of authority' is to the effect that 
required warrant return procedures are ministerial and that 
failure to comply with them is not a ground for voiding an 
otherwise valid search.") (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 457 
F.2d 63, 67 (10th Cir. 1972)). 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
35 
 
¶70 Sveum has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced 
by law enforcement's failure to comply with the procedural 
return statutes.  Because the officers in this case did not 
seize any tangible evidence, but instead intangible electronic 
data, there was no property to be returned to Sveum and, 
therefore, no property to safeguard prior to its return to 
Sveum.  Moreover, at all times Sveum had access to and control 
over the location of his vehicle.   
¶71 Similarly, 
we 
are 
not 
persuaded 
that 
Sveum's 
substantial rights were violated by the officers' failure to 
execute and return the warrant within 5 days after the date of 
issuance.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.15.  We note that under the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly govern 
warrants for tracking devices, officers may use a tracking 
device for a period not more than "45 days from the date the 
warrant was issued."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(C).13  As the 
United States Supreme Court has explained, "Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41 [] reflects the Fourth Amendment's policy 
against unreasonable searches and seizures."  Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558 (Cal. 1978) (internal 
quotation and brackets omitted).  Here, the officers removed the 
GPS tracking device 35 days from the date the order was issued.  
As we have explained, the officers' use of the GPS device for 35 
days was reasonable and, therefore, the lack of a return to the 
                                                 
13 The Wisconsin statutes do not contain a similar provision 
governing tracking-device warrants.   
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
36 
 
circuit court in five days did not violate Sveum's substantial 
rights. 
¶72 Accordingly, because we conclude that the failure to 
comply with the requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ 968.15 and 968.17 
did not prejudice Sveum's substantial rights, the effect of the 
error is cabined by Wis. Stat. § 968.22.  Section 968.22 
provides that unless an error in the warrant affects a 
substantial right of the defendant, the error does not permit 
the suppression of evidence.  Therefore, suppression of the 
evidence obtained here is not permissible.  See Popenhagen, 309 
Wis. 2d 601, ¶126 (Prosser, J., concurring); § 968.22. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶73 Sveum and the State have briefed two issues for 
purposes of our review:  (1) whether the installation of a GPS 
tracking device to Sveum's car while his car was parked in the 
driveway of his home and the subsequent electronic monitoring of 
Sveum's car using the GPS constituted a search or seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; and (2) whether the court order authorizing the 
installation and monitoring of a GPS tracking device on Sveum's 
vehicle constituted a valid warrant and, if so, whether the 
police reasonably executed the warrant. 
¶74 We elect not to resolve the first issue, and assume, 
without deciding, that a search or seizure occurred in this case 
that required authorization by a warrant.  We therefore decide 
only the second issue, concluding that the order authorizing law 
No. 
2008AP658-CR   
 
37 
 
enforcement to install and monitor a GPS tracking device on 
Sveum's vehicle constituted a valid warrant and that the 
officers' execution of the warrant was reasonable.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP658-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
¶75 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion and agree with its conclusions that the order 
authorizing police officers to attach and monitor the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to Sveum's vehicle was 
a valid warrant, and that the execution of that warrant was 
reasonable.  I write separately to emphasize two points of 
concern. 
¶76 First, I believe that the scope of applicability of 
this case should be limited to similar factual situations, 
specifically, those based on a valid warrant in which the 
challenged search involves a GPS device that an officer attaches 
to a vehicle in order to collect data from public roadways.  
Given the increased prevalence of GPS devices used in day-to-day 
activities and the speed with which technological advances 
expand the ability and ways in which a person or object can be 
tracked, I believe that expanding this holding to other uses or 
other devices could have the potential to weaken protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
¶77 Second, I echo my colleagues' requests, see Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence, ¶¶79, 84; Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent, ¶126, that the Wisconsin legislature weigh in on this 
issue and enact legislation governing the proper procedures for 
issuing a warrant, executing that warrant, and other procedural 
concerns related to police searches using GPS, such as time 
limits and return on the warrant requirements. See Wis. Stat. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
§ 968.17.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently set 
forth parameters for warrants authorizing the installation and 
monitoring of GPS devices.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(C).1  
                                                 
1 Rule 41(e)(2)(C) provides: 
(C) Warrant for a Tracking Device.  A tracking-device 
warrant must identify the person or property to be 
tracked, designate the magistrate judge to whom it 
must be returned, and specify a reasonable length of 
time that the device may be used.  The time must not 
exceed 45 days from the date the warrant was issued.  
The court may, for good cause, grant one or more 
extensions for a reasonable period not to exceed 45 
days each.  The warrant must command the officer to:  
(i) 
complete 
any installation authorized by the 
warrant within a specified time no longer than 10 
calendar days;  
(ii) 
perform 
any installation authorized by the 
warrant during the daytime, unless the judge for good 
No.  2008AP658-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
Such 
direction 
from 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
would 
be 
appropriate and well within its province, considering that it 
has 
previously 
set 
forth 
procedures 
for 
authorizing 
and 
executing similar electronic searches, such as those involving 
the interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications, 
see Wis. Stat. §§ 968.28-968.31, and the use of a pen register 
or a trap and trace device, see Wis. Stat. §§ 968.34-968.37. 
¶78 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
cause expressly authorizes installation at another 
time; and  
(iii) return the warrant to the judge designated in 
the warrant.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(C). 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶79 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority's conclusion that the order authorizing law 
enforcement to install and monitor a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) tracking device on Sveum's vehicle constituted a valid 
warrant and that law enforcement's execution of the warrant was 
reasonable.  Majority op., ¶3.  I write separately to clarify 
that in this case, the police officers appropriately sought 
judicial approval because they intended to install or monitor 
the tracking device in private areas.  Given the complexity and 
sophistication of GPS tracking, see, e.g., id., ¶¶61-70, I 
believe that the Wisconsin legislature should consider expressly 
requiring court authorization of the installation and monitoring 
of such tracking devices and should consider legislatively 
setting appropriate parameters and standards for their use.  
Said legislative action would be consistent with analogous 
Wisconsin statutes that currently require court authorization of 
the interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications, 
see Wis. Stat. §§ 968.28-968.31, and the installation and use of 
a pen register or a trap and trace device, see Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.34-968.37.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2009); Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41.  However, pursuant to United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276 (1983), it remains my position that installing and 
monitoring a GPS tracking device on a vehicle in a public area 
does not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  See also United States v. Garcia, 474 
F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶80 In this case, the police officers appropriately sought 
judicial approval because they intended to install or monitor 
the tracking device in private areas.  That point is made clear 
by Detective Mary Ricksecker's affidavit and request for 
authorization to place and monitor the GPS tracking device on 
Sveum's vehicle.  She averred in relevant part: 
[I]n order to effectively conduct the long term 
surveillance of the Target Vehicle, your affiant or 
assistant law enforcement personnel, may have to enter 
the premises located at 6685 County Trunk K, Iowa 
County, Wisconsin or 2426 Valley Street, Cross Plains, 
Dane County, Wisconsin,1 for the purpose of installing, 
monitoring, 
maintaining 
and 
retrieving 
the 
aforementioned 
Global 
Positioning 
System 
(GPS) 
tracking device. 
 
. . . . 
. . . [Y]our affiant is often required to obtain a key 
to operate the vehicle for temporary times and move 
the vehicle to a secure location to install the device 
and to open both the engine compartment and the trunk 
area of the vehicle for installation.  Your affiant 
requests permission to do the above acts in order to 
secretly install the device. 
Your affiant is aware that persons involved in 
criminal activities or conspiracies maintain the means 
and fruits of their violations, often in remote 
locations 
including 
garages, 
homes 
and 
storage 
sheds. . . .  
. . . .  
It is likely that the vehicle your affiant wishes 
to monitor will be taken into private as well as 
public places[;] therefore your affiant respectfully 
requests the court[']s permission to install and 
monitor the tracking device inside such private and 
public areas and the affiant requests permission to 
                                                 
1 The record reveals that these addresses are the residences 
of Sveum's sister and mother, respectively. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
obtain a key to operate the motor vehicle, if 
necessary, and requests permission to use the same 
methods to retrieve the device. . . .  
Accordingly, it is clear from Detective Ricksecker's affidavit 
that law enforcement intended to install the GPS tracking device 
on Sveum's vehicle by entering a private residence and operating 
the vehicle and intended to track the vehicle inside private 
locations.  Indeed, the circuit court's order provides that 
"[t]his matter came before the court at the request of Detective 
Mary Ricksecker to place and monitor an electronic tracking 
device on a vehicle that may enter private areas."  Because 
Detective 
Ricksecker and her accompanying police officers 
intended to install or monitor the tracking device on Sveum's 
vehicle in private areas, they appropriately sought judicial 
approval.  Absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the 
monitoring of a tracking device in a private area, a location 
not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment 
rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy 
of that area.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 
(1984).  "At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private 
residences are places in which the individual normally expects 
privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a 
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is 
prepared to recognize as justifiable."  Id. at 714.   
¶81 Federal judges have express authorization to issue 
warrants for the installation and use of tracking devices.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 3117; Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(4).  The 2006 
amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 "reflect[] 
the view that if the officers intend to install or use the 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
device in a constitutionally protected area, they must obtain 
judicial approval to do so."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) advisory 
committee's note.  Upon receipt of an affidavit or other 
information, an authorized federal judge "must issue the warrant 
if there is probable cause . . . to install and use a tracking 
device."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(1).  Importantly, Rule 41's 
requirements for tracking-device warrants reflect the complexity 
and nuances of GPS tracking.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 
41(e)(2)(C) (providing that a tracking-device warrant must 
"specify a reasonable length of time that the device may be 
used," not to exceed 45 days from the date the warrant was 
issued, and must command the officer to complete installation 
"within a specified time no longer than 10 calendar days"); 
41(f)(2) (providing that the executing officer must return the 
warrant to the designated judge and serve a copy on the person 
who was tracked or whose property was tracked "[w]ithin 10 
calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended"). 
¶82 Similar to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and 
consistent with orders authorizing the interception of wire, 
electronic, or oral communications, see Wis. Stat. §§ 968.28-
968.31, and the installation and use of a pen register or a trap 
and trace device, see Wis. Stat. §§ 968.34-968.37, the Wisconsin 
legislature should consider expressly providing for court orders 
authorizing the installation and monitoring of a tracking device 
and should consider setting appropriate parameters.  Express 
authorization and guidance would alleviate the problems that 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
arise when evaluating tracking-device warrants under our general 
statutory scheme on search warrants.  See majority op., ¶¶61-70. 
¶83 Again, in this case, the police officers appropriately 
sought judicial approval because they intended to install or 
monitor the tracking device on Sveum's vehicle in private areas.  
Consequently, I join the majority's conclusion that the order 
authorizing law enforcement to install and monitor a GPS 
tracking device on Sveum's vehicle constituted a valid warrant 
and that law enforcement's execution of the warrant was 
reasonable.  However, it remains my position that installing and 
monitoring a GPS tracking device on a vehicle in a public area 
does not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
the Fourth Amendment.2  Therefore, in such instances, a search 
warrant——while certainly desirable——may not be necessary.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) advisory committee's note (providing that 
if law enforcement "intend[s] to install and use the device 
without implicating any Fourth Amendment rights, there is no 
need to obtain the warrant").  Placing a GPS tracking device on 
                                                 
2 Numerous other courts have similarly held.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not limit the use of new 
technology so long as the technology is readily available and 
merely a substitute for an activity that is "unequivocally not a 
search" like tracking a vehicle on public highways); United 
States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that the act of placing a magnetized tracking device 
on the defendant's vehicle did not constitute a search and 
seizure because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the undercarriage of his vehicle, and the device did not 
meaningfully interfere with any possessory interest); United 
States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006) (deeming 
admissible all data obtained from a GPS tracking device placed 
on the defendant's vehicle, except for the data obtained while 
the vehicle was parked in a private garage); United States v. 
Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that 
the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by law enforcement's 
attachment and use of a GPS tracking device on the defendant's 
vehicle because he "had no expectation of privacy in the 
whereabouts of his vehicle on a public roadway"); Osborn v. 
Nevada, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (holding that law 
enforcement's warrantless attachment of an electronic monitoring 
device to the bumper of the defendant's vehicle did not 
constitute an unreasonable search or seizure under the Nevada 
Constitution because the defendant "had neither a subjective nor 
an objective expectation of privacy in the bumper of his 
vehicle"); Stone v. Maryland, 941 A.2d 1238, 1250 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2008) (describing the GPS tracking device attached to the 
appellant's vehicle as "simply the next generation of tracking 
science and technology from the radio transmitter 'beeper' in 
Knotts" and concluding that its use did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment because "[t]he appellant and his wife did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their location as they 
traveled on public thoroughfares"). 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
the undercarriage of a vehicle while the vehicle is parked in a 
public area does not constitute a seizure.  Garcia, 474 F.3d at 
996 (concluding that law enforcement "did not 'seize' the car in 
any intelligible sense of the word" because "[t]he device did 
not affect the car's driving qualities, did not draw power from 
the car's engine or battery, did not take up room that might 
otherwise have been occupied by passengers or packages, [and] 
did not even alter the car's appearance").  Moreover, tracking a 
vehicle in public areas does not constitute a search, Knotts, 
460 U.S. at 281-85, because "[a] person travelling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his movements from one place to another," id. at 
281.  For that same reason, a person driving in a vehicle has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that he or she 
arrived on private property after leaving a public roadway.  Id. 
at 281-82.  The driver voluntarily conveys such movement to 
whoever wishes to observe.  The Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
from 
augmenting 
with 
appropriate technology their natural ability to conduct visual 
surveillance.  See id. at 282. 
¶84 In summary, I write separately to clarify that in this 
case, the police officers appropriately sought judicial approval 
because they intended to install or monitor the tracking device 
in private areas.  Similar to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41 and consistent with orders authorizing the interception of 
wire, electronic, or oral communications, see Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.28-968.31, and the installation and use of a pen register 
No.  2008AP658-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
or a trap and trace device, see Wis. Stat. §§ 968.34-968.37, I 
respectfully invite 
the Wisconsin legislature to consider 
expressly 
providing 
for 
court 
orders 
authorizing 
the 
installation and monitoring of a tracking device and to set 
appropriate parameters.  However, it remains my position that 
installing and monitoring a GPS tracking device on a vehicle in 
a public area does not constitute a search or seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
¶85 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶86 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I assume, 
as does the majority opinion, that a search or seizure occurred 
in the present case that required authorization by a warrant.   
¶87 The majority therefore must determine that the circuit 
court Order authorizing the installation of the GPS in the 
present 
case 
"constituted" 
a 
valid 
search 
warrant 
under 
Wisconsin law.  Therein lies the problem.  The Order does not 
meet the statutory requirements of a Warrant.  So, the next 
question arises:  Construing the Order as a warrant, are the 
statutory defects in the Order "technical irregularities," which 
are excused under Wis. Stat. § 968.22,1 or do the defects render 
the Order, construed as a warrant, void from the beginning, that 
is, does this case present a void ab initio warrant?   
¶88 The legislature has given us a clear, unambiguous 
answer. 
¶89 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.15 states that a search warrant 
must be executed and returned not more than five days after the 
date of issuance and that if it is not executed within this time 
frame, the warrant "shall be void and shall be returned to the 
judge issuing it." (Emphasis added.)  
¶90 The Order, as executed, did not meet this clear 
statutory 
requirement. 
 
This 
Order/Warrant 
purported 
to 
authorize the removal of the GPS "as soon as practicable after 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22 provides:  
No evidence seized under a search warrant shall be 
suppressed because of technical irregularities not 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
the objectives of the surveillance are accomplished and not 
later than 60 days from the date the order is signed."  Thus, 
the Order on its face (and as it was executed) violates the 
mandatory warrant requirements in Wis. Stat. § 968.15.  The 
legislature declares such a warrant void.   
¶91 The Order is therefore void as a warrant.  The 
legislature expressly treats the failure to comply with the 
five-day execution period as a fatal flaw.  In other words, the 
legislature has explicitly and pre-emptively instructed judges 
and courts not to treat the five-day execution period as a 
"technical irregularity" that can be forgiven under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.22.  Section 968.15 provides as follows: 
§ 968.15 Search Warrants; when executable. (1) A 
search warrant must be executed and returned not more 
than 5 days after the date of issuance.   
(2) Any search warrant not executed within the time 
provided in sub. (1) shall be void and shall be 
returned to the judge issuing it. (Emphasis added.)2 
¶92 The 
Order's 
60-day 
authorization 
period 
is 
irreconcilable with the statutory five-day execution and return 
requirement.  The Order was executed over the course of the 35 
                                                 
2 The Judicial Council's 1969 note to this provision appears 
in 1969 Wis. Laws ch. 255.  It states as follows:  
It is believed that there should be some reasonable 
period in which a warrant should be executed and 
returned.  Experience teaches that normally search 
warrants have little effect if they are not promptly 
served.  They should not be held by an officer and 
served at his whim.  Various states have adopted times 
different from the federal requirement in F.R. Cr. P. 
41 (d) which has a 10-day limitation.  The Council, 
after consultation with law enforcement authorities, 
felt 5 days was a reasonable period. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
days that the GPS was maintained on the vehicle and no return 
was ever made to the judge who issued the Order.  
 
¶93 The law enforcement officer seeking the Order knew 
that the Order did not have statutory support.  In her affidavit 
and request for authorization to install the GPS, Detective 
Ricksecker averred that the State of Wisconsin "has no explicit 
statute under Chapter 968 that addresses the issue of installing 
tracking devices on private property."  The circuit court 
signing the Order likewise knew that the Order did not satisfy 
the statutory requirements of a warrant.  The circuit court 
judge characterized the Order as "most akin to a search warrant" 
(emphasis added), thus acknowledging that the judge knew the 
Order was not, in fact or law, a search warrant.3  The majority 
disregards not only the statutory warrant requirements but also 
the candor, legal reasoning, and common sense of the detective 
and circuit judge who crafted this Order. 
¶94 The legislature has declared the Order/Warrant in the 
present case void.  What part of the word "void" doesn't the 
majority understand?  Why doesn't the majority opinion follow 
the legislature's directive? 
¶95 When a warrant is void ab initio, the evidence must be 
suppressed.  "[S]uppressing evidence obtained as a result of 
                                                 
3 At the circuit court, the State also argued that the Order 
did not meet the statutory requirements of a warrant. 
These facts undermine any "good faith" argument because 
both the police and the issuing judge recognized they were 
operating outside the statutory warrant authorization.  Contra 
majority op., ¶58 n.13. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
[an] unauthorized, defective warrant is necessary to preserve 
the integrity of the judicial process."  State v. Hess, 2010 WI 
82, ¶3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
¶96 The majority’s decision today may have far-reaching 
consequences extending well beyond GPS surveillance.  If warrant 
requirements that are mandatory in the statutes are rendered 
optional in reality; if fatal flaws are treated as mere 
technical irregularities; if clear statutory language is ignored 
with 
regard 
to 
GPS 
tracking, 
what 
is 
to 
prevent 
the 
proliferation of similar court orders which, under the guise of 
a "warrant" but without statutory basis or limitation, authorize 
a sweeping search of a home or an office without affording the 
protections expressly laid out by the legislature?  The 
majority's rationale offers no limitation on what searches may 
be authorized outside the statutory provisions.  The majority 
offers no answer to how such authorizations might be checked. 
¶97 I could end this dissent right here.  I address the 
remaining arguments to resolve lingering doubt, if any, about 
the validity of this Order if treated as a warrant, and because 
a contrast to the legal authorization for warrants and other 
surveillance orders highlights the lack of compliance with any 
authorizing law for the GPS tracking Order in the present case. 
¶98 The Order at issue does not meet the constitutional or 
statutory requirements for a search warrant.   
¶99 I agree with Sveum that "the Fourth Amendment makes 
clear that mere probable cause plus a judge's signature do not a 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
warrant make."4  Although the affidavit demonstrated probable 
cause, the adequacy of the probable cause showing is not without 
doubts because of the nature of the GPS device. 
¶100 The 
Order 
authorized 
the 
police 
to 
"place 
an 
electronic tracking device" onto Sveum's vehicle (located on the 
curtilage) and allowed the police to "enter and reenter the 
vehicle . . . to install, use, maintain and conduct surveillance 
and monitoring . . . of a mobile electronic tracking device."  
However, police did not install "a device"; they installed three 
GPS devices over the course of the surveillance.  Rather than 
merely replacing the battery every 14 to 21 days, the police 
chose to remove and replace the whole device.  Thus, the 
officers invaded Sveum's vehicle three distinct times, whereas 
the Order, pursuant to a single showing of probable cause, 
appears only to have authorized one such invasion.5 
                                                 
4 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 10. 
5 In invalidating a New York eavesdropping statute under the 
Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court stated that 
statutory "authorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period 
is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and 
seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause."  
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).  The authorization 
of GPS tracking for 60 days on a single showing of probable 
cause suffers the same infirmity. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶101 With regard to other statutory defects, I will examine 
various statutory provisions.  I begin with Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 968.10, which authorizes a search of a person, object or place 
and a seizure when the search is conducted as follows: 
(1) Incident to a lawful arrest; 
(2) With consent; 
(3) Pursuant to a valid search warrant; 
(4) With the authority and within the scope of a 
right of lawful inspection; 
(5) Pursuant 
to 
a 
search 
during 
an 
authorized 
temporary questioning as provided in s. 968.25; 
or 
(6) As otherwise authorized by law.  
¶102 Subsections (1), (2), (4), and (5) are inapplicable 
here.  The search in the present case is valid only if the Order 
is a "valid search warrant" (under sub. (3) above) or is 
"otherwise authorized by law" (under sub. (6) above).  The Order 
                                                                                                                                                             
The GPS device was initially installed on April 23, 2003; 
the device was replaced approximately two weeks later.  The 
collected GPS data revealed incriminating evidence from April 
25, 2003 and April 26, 2003, dates  before the device was first 
replaced.  That evidence should have established that "the 
objectives of the surveillance [were] accomplished."  By the 
Order's own terms, police were then obligated to remove the 
device "as soon as practicable."  In fact, police replaced the 
device 
another 
time 
after 
this 
showing. 
 
The 
repeat 
installations continuing to collect data well beyond that time 
appear to have been unreasonable continuations of the original 
search under the terms of the Order itself.  Incriminating 
evidence sufficient to demonstrate Sveum's stalking had already 
been 
obtained 
and 
the 
objectives 
of 
the 
surveillance 
accomplished.  
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
in the present case does not fit within either sub. (3) or sub. 
(6).   
¶103 First examining Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3), the Order is 
not a "valid search warrant" because it does not fit within the 
definition of "search warrant" found in Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1).   
¶104 A search warrant is "an order signed by a judge 
directing a law enforcement officer to conduct a search of a 
designated person, a designated object or a designated place for 
the 
purpose 
of 
seizing 
designated 
property 
or 
kinds 
of 
property."  As a threshold matter, the Order in the present case 
was signed by a judge; it did direct a law enforcement officer 
to act.  But the act directed was not, in the words of the 
statute, "to conduct a search of a designated person, a 
designated object or a designated place for the purpose of 
seizing designated property or kinds of property."  Installing 
the GPS does not fit within a search of a designated person, a 
designated object, or a designated place.6  Even if one construes 
                                                 
6 The majority unnecessarily complicates the issue by 
declining to consider the Order in its entirety and striking 
those portions that authorize law enforcement officers to, among 
other things, "surreptitiously enter and reenter the vehicle and 
any buildings and structures containing the vehicle or any 
premises on which the vehicle is located . . . ."  See majority 
op., ¶50.  The majority so concludes because "there is no 
evidence that these areas were ever searched, and it does not 
appear that any evidence was found in them."  Majority op., ¶51.  
The majority does not pause to consider whether the stricken 
portions were supported by probable cause.  Id. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
the Order as targeting a search of a designated object or place, 
it was not "for the purposing of seizing designated property"7 
                                                                                                                                                             
This reasoning also ignores the fact that for police to 
attach the GPS device to Sveum's vehicle, they entered the 
premises on which the vehicle was located.  The majority treats 
as severed the only language of the order that appears to have 
authorized 
the 
officers 
to 
"surreptitiously 
enter 
and 
reenter . . . [the] premises" at 2426 Valley Road, Cross Plains, 
where Sveum's vehicle was located, to install the GPS devices.  
It follows that when police did so, they were acting outside the 
authorization of the Order as the majority opinion now reads the 
Order.   
By striking this portion of the Order, the majority renders 
the Order effectively useless.  Yet, it somehow still maintains 
that the portion of the Order that authorized law enforcement 
officers to install, use, and maintain a GPS tracking device  
remains valid, and that the evidence obtained under this order 
need not be suppressed.  See majority op., ¶49.  The majority's 
reasoning seems internally inconsistent. 
7 The relevant "property subject to seizure" is set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.13.  GPS tracking would have to be fit into 
§ 968.13(1)(c):  
968.13 Search warrant; property subject to seizure.   
(1) A search warrant may authorize the seizure of the 
following: 
(a) Contraband, which includes without limitation 
because of enumeration lottery tickets, gambling 
machines or other gambling devices, lewd, obscene 
or 
indecent 
written 
matter, 
pictures, 
sound 
recordings or motion picture films, forged money 
or written instruments and the tools, dies, 
machines 
or materials for making them, and 
controlled 
substances, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 
961.01(4), and controlled substance analogs, as 
defined in s. 961.01(4m), and the implements for 
smoking or injecting them. Gambling machines or 
other 
gambling 
devices 
possessed 
by 
a 
shipbuilding 
business 
that 
complies 
with 
s. 
945.095 are not subject to this section. 
(b) Anything which is the fruit of or has been 
used in the commission of any crime. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
unless 
the 
data 
information 
fits 
within 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.13(1)(c).   
¶105 Furthermore, the Order/Warrant did not comply with 
Wis. Stat. § 968.17(1), which provides that the "return of the 
search warrant shall be made within 48 hours after execution to 
the clerk designated in the warrant."  Under State v. Meier, 60 
Wis. 2d 452, 459, 210 N.W.2d 685 (1973), "failure of an officer 
to make return of a search warrant [within the statutory period 
of 48 hours] properly issued and served will not invalidate the 
search warrant, or a search and seizure made thereunder, even 
where 
the 
statute 
requires 
the 
return 
within 
a 
certain 
time . . . " (emphasis added).  However, a court order that does 
not make any provisions for such a return is not a "search 
warrant properly issued," as it fails to meet the statutory 
requirement.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.23 for the illustrative form 
of a search warrant, including the command that the law 
enforcement officer return the warrant within 48 hours.  The 
return must be "accompanied by a written inventory of any 
property taken," which in the present case would amount to the 
data collected by the GPS tracking device.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Anything other than documents which may 
constitute evidence of any crime. 
(d) Documents which may constitute evidence of 
any crime, if probable cause is shown that the 
documents are under the control of a person who 
is reasonably suspected to be concerned in the 
commission of that crime under s. 939.05(2). 
(2) In this section, "documents" includes, but is not 
limited to, books, papers, records, recordings, tapes, 
photographs, films or computer or electronic data. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶106 The Order does not satisfy these warrant requirements.  
No clerk was designated to whom the return was to be made 48 
hours after execution.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 968.17(2), .23.  There 
is no record of a return to a clerk or to the court.   
¶107 These failures violate the terms of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.17(2) and 968.23 and undermine the statute's intended 
effect.  Absent compliance with return provisions, the police 
were implicitly granted unchecked discretion in the use of the 
GPS data after it was obtained.  This practice undermines the 
statutory provision for judicial supervision, which is the 
interest protected by the statutory return requirements and 
which guards against potential abuses of police authority.8  
Violation of this provision runs afoul of clear statutory 
requirements and of legislative purpose.   
¶108 Because the Order is not, in my opinion, a warrant, 
the statutory "receipt" requirement under Wis. Stat. § 968.18 
was violated.  That section provides that "[a]ny law enforcement 
officer seizing any items without a search warrant shall give a 
receipt as soon as practicable to the person from whose 
possession they are taken."9  No such receipt was given to Sveum. 
                                                 
8 The legislative history reveals that the return provision 
is "for the protection of both the party whose property was 
seized and the officer making the seizure."  Judicial Council 
Note to Wis. Laws of 1969, ch. 255.  See also State v. Meier, 60 
Wis. 2d 452, 459, 201 N.W.2d 685 (1973).  
9 Sveum argues, and I agree, that this requirement was not 
met here.  However, "[f]ailure to give such receipt shall not 
render the evidence seized inadmissible upon a trial."  Wis. 
Stat. § 968.18. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶109 These numerous failures to comply with statutory 
warrant requirements are fatal to the majority's contention that 
the Order "constituted" a warrant under the requirements of the 
law.  Although Wis. Stat. § 968.22 provides that "[n]o evidence 
seized under a search warrant shall be suppressed because of 
technical irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant," the statutory violations that I have enumerated 
were not mere "technical irregularities."  Rather, they were 
significant substantive departures from the statutory mandates 
that were designed to protect the privacy interests of the 
subject of a search warrant.  Virtually all of the time 
limitations and provisions for judicial documentation and notice 
provided by the statute were brushed aside by the provisions of 
the Order here, which purported to give police unfettered 
discretionary surveillance authorization for up to 60 days.  It 
cannot credibly be argued that Sveum's substantial rights were 
not affected as a result. 
¶110 Finally, even if one could argue that each of these 
statutory defects is by itself a technicality, their cumulative 
effect affects the substantial rights of the defendant.   The 
numerous 
violations 
of 
the 
statutes 
governing 
warrants 
demonstrate that this Order just doesn't fit the statutory 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
mandates of a warrant.10  Because the Order violates the 
statutory requirements of a warrant and thus cannot constitute a 
warrant, 
any 
evidence 
obtained 
by 
the 
Order 
should 
be 
suppressed.   
¶111 Suppression is necessary "to achieve the objectives of 
the statute . . . ."  See State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶62, 
309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611.   
¶112 Popenhagen involved a subpoena that directed the 
production of documents; the subpoena violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135.  The court concluded that because the subpoena 
contravened the statute, the evidence would be suppressed.  
Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 601, ¶62.  Similarly, in the present 
case, the evidence obtained in violation of the warrant statutes 
should be suppressed in order to achieve the objectives of the 
statutes and to discourage courts and law enforcement from 
creatively evading the warrant requirements set forth by the 
legislature by justifying searches and surveillance activities 
under ad hoc judicially crafted rules and requirements.  
¶113 Law enforcement did nothing malicious or unreasonable 
here.  The investigating detective took a responsible, desirable 
course in the present case.  Law enforcement went to a neutral 
magistrate for authority.  A well-grounded supporting affidavit 
                                                 
10 It is permissible to aggregate errors to determine their 
overall impact.  Several individually harmless errors may 
cumulatively affect the defendant's substantial rights.  State 
v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶110, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397; 
State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶59, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305; Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988).   
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
was submitted to the judge, admitting that there was no 
statutory authority for a GPS warrant.   
¶114 Nowhere is there authority for the court to authorize 
the search conducted in the present case.  The Order issued 
would not be a valid search warrant for a home or an office, and 
it is likewise insufficient for the search undertaken here.  
Courts and judges do not have free-floating authority to approve 
whatever searches, seizures, or novel surveillance techniques 
police may wish to pursue.  The law provides specific 
authorizations for warrants, subject to specific limitations.  
The Order in this case falls outside any identified source of 
authorization. 
¶115 Because the court Order authorizing the installation 
of the GPS failed to authorize "a search of a person, object or 
place" and a seizure "[p]ursuant to a valid search warrant" as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 968.10(3), I conclude that the 
installation of the GPS on Sveum's vehicle was a warrantless 
search and thus was presumptively invalid.11  The State bears the 
burden of proving the search valid under some exception to the 
warrant requirement.  It has failed to do so.   
                                                 
11 In State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶29, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 
613 N.W.2d 568, the court stated that "[a] warrantless search is 
per se unreasonable unless one of the 'few specifically 
established 
and 
well-delineated 
exceptions' 
justifies 
the 
search.  The State bears the burden of proving that a 
warrantless 
search 
falls 
under 
one 
of 
the 
established 
exceptions."  Id. (internal citations omitted).  In the present 
case, the state makes no effort to justify the search on the 
basis of any recognized exception to the need for a warrant. 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶116 I turn now to Wis. Stat. § 968.10(6) authorizing a 
search "as otherwise authorized by law."  The installation and 
use of a GPS tracking device are not authorized by any law. 
¶117 No statute authorizes the issuance of the Order in the 
present case.  It is not authorized under Wis. Stat. §§ 968.27-
.32, governing the procedure for obtaining an order to intercept 
wire, electronic, or oral communications, because § 968.27(4)(d) 
defines electronic communications to exclude any communication 
from a tracking device.  Even if the GPS tracking in the present 
case were analyzed as "interception of wire, electronic or oral 
communications," 
the 
Order 
contravenes 
other 
statutory 
requirements. 
 
Under 
§ 968.30, 
no 
order 
may 
authorize 
interception of such communications "for any period longer than 
is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor 
in any event longer than 30 days."  Wis. Stat. § 968.30(5).  The 
Order in the present case impermissibly authorized surveillance 
for up to 60 days. 
¶118 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 968.34-.37 regulating the use of 
pen registers and trap-and-trace devices are likewise not 
applicable here.  The existence of these provisions authorizing, 
subject 
to 
certain 
limits, 
other 
kinds 
of 
electronic 
surveillance and investigation simply highlights exactly what is 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
missing in the present case:  any source of legal authority 
underlying the Order purporting to authorize GPS tracking.12 
¶119 No claim is made in the majority opinion or by the 
parties that the circuit courts have inherent power to issue 
search warrants.   
¶120 In several states the notion that the power to issue 
search warrants may be inherent in the courts or stem from the 
common law has been rejected; judicial authority to issue search 
warrants is viewed as having a statutory source, subject to 
statutory limitations.13 
                                                 
12 Justice Crooks and Justice Ziegler observe that federal 
courts have authorization to issue warrants for installation of 
tracking devides under 18 U.S.C. § 3117 and Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 
41(b)(4), but acknowledge that Wisconsin has no analogous Rules 
or Statutes.  See Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶77; Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence, ¶¶81-82. 
13 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. McCready, 868 P.2d 134, 143 
(Wash. 1994) (declining to recognize the issuance of search 
warrants as an inherent constitutional authority and holding 
that search warrants are "a form of process which is to be 
governed by statute or court rule"); Meier v. Sulhoff, 360 
N.W.2d 722, 726 (Iowa 1985) ("Because there is no common-law 
right to issue a search warrant, we conclude that we lack the 
authority to expand by judicial fiat the purposes fixed by the 
legislature for which search warrants may lawfully issue.") 
(internal citations omitted); State v. Baker, 160 S.E.2d 556, 
556-57 (S.C. 1968) ("There is no common law right to issue 
search warrants.  The issuing authority is subject to the 
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . and subject to statutory control.").   
The United States Supreme Court, in a case challenging pen 
register surveillance, concluded that federal district courts 
had the power to authorize such surveillance under Fed. R. Crim. 
Proc. 41, which regulates searches and seizures.  United States 
v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977).  The court 
explained: 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶121 Electronic 
surveillance 
is 
upon 
us, 
raising 
significant and rapidly emerging privacy issues.  A device in 
common usage, such as your cell phone, might be used to track 
your whereabouts.  The law will have to tackle each new 
challenge as it arises.  Courts may provide answers to some 
problems; others will require legislative solutions.   
¶122 In the present case, we address GPS tracking of a 
personal vehicle.  Searches and expectations of privacy in a 
personal motor vehicle are an area where the case law provides 
at least a sound point of departure.  The lesson is that courts 
should not freely permit searches that infringe on recognized 
privacy interests in this arena.   
¶123 "An individual operating or traveling in an automobile 
does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply 
because the automobile and its use are subject to government 
                                                                                                                                                             
Our conclusion that Rule 41 authorizes the use of pen 
registers under appropriate circumstances is supported 
by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 57(b), which provides: "If no 
procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the 
court 
may 
proceed 
in 
any 
lawful 
manner 
not 
inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable 
statute."  Although we need not and do not decide 
whether Rule 57(b) by itself would authorize the 
issuance of pen register orders, it reinforces our 
conclusion that Rule 41 is sufficiently broad to 
include seizures of intangible items such as dial 
impulses recorded by pen registers as well as tangible 
items.  
Wisconsin has not adopted an analogue of Rule 41. 
Some states, including Colorado and Maine, have similarly 
broadened by court rule the grounds for issuance of search 
warrants.  See, e.g., People v. Leahy, 484 P.2d 778 (Colo. 
1970); State v. Cadigan, 249 A.2d 750 (Me. 1969).  
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
regulation."14  In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009), 
the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that "the 
[motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle is] important and 
deserving of constitutional protection."  
¶124 Here, law enforcement tracked the motion and movements 
of Sveum's car with a GPS device, enabling increased police 
surveillance that in earlier times would have been physically, 
logistically, and financially impossible.  
¶125 GPS locational tracking does not simply replace visual 
surveillance.  Law enforcement officers could not, as a 
practical matter, track the vehicle through visual surveillance 
alone.15  As the New York Court of Appeals explained:  
                                                 
14 Delaware 
v. 
Prouse, 
440 
U.S. 
648, 
662-63 
(1979) 
(referring to Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).  
15 In her concurrence, Justice Ziegler concludes that GPS 
surveillance of a private vehicle is not a constitutional search 
or seizure so long as the installation and monitoring are in 
public areas and therefore that a warrant or court authorization 
"may not be necessary."  Justice Ziegler's characterization is 
that this surveillance constitutes "augmenting with appropriate 
technology their [law enforcement officers'] natural ability to 
conduct visual surveillance."  The next questions become, "What 
is 'appropriate technology'?" and "What is meant by 'the natural 
ability to conduct visual surveillance'?"  What are the 
"limits . . . upon this power of technology to shrink the realm 
of guaranteed privacy"?  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 34 (2001). 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
"GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory 
capacity, 
it 
facilitates 
a 
new 
technological 
perception of the world in which the situation of any 
object may be followed and exhaustively recorded over, 
in most cases, a practically unlimited period. . . . 
Disclosed in the data retrieved . . . will be trips, 
the indisputably private nature of which takes little 
imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the 
plastic 
surgeon, 
the 
abortion 
clinic, 
the 
AIDS 
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense 
attorney, the by-the-hour-motel, the union meeting, 
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on 
and on.  What the technology yields and records is a 
highly detailed profile . . . .16   
¶126 I 
recognize 
that 
the 
problems 
presented 
by 
technologically assisted physical surveillance are complex and 
that 
the 
interests 
of 
privacy 
and 
crime 
detection 
are 
substantial.  The warrant statutes are carefully crafted to 
protect privacy and law enforcement interests.  These statutes 
have long and effectively governed searches and seizures in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Ziegler's analysis relies on the radio "beeper" 
cases, Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶¶79-80 (citing United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).  She also cites United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007), and other cases 
that follow similar logic.  Although the issue is not decided by 
the court today, it is worth noting that other courts have 
disagreed with this analysis, determining that GPS tracking is 
distinguishable from the form of tracking addressed in the 
"beeper" cases.  See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 
(N.Y. 2009); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) 
("We perceive a difference between the kind of uninterrupted, 
24-hour a day surveillance possible through use of a GPS device, 
which does not depend upon whether an officer could in fact have 
maintained visual contact over the tracking period, and an 
officer's use of binoculars or a flashlight to augment his or 
her senses;" a GPS device "does not merely augment the officers' 
senses, but rather provides a technological substitute for 
traditional visual tracking.").  
16 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
Wisconsin.  The courts, and especially this court, should not do 
violence to these "bread and butter" law enforcement statutes in 
an ill-advised attempt to bend clear and well-established law to 
fit 
novel 
and 
fast-changing 
technology. 
 
The 
myriad 
of 
technical, legal and policy issues involved in electronic 
surveillance lend themselves to legislative resolution, not ad 
hoc judicial authorizations or a bewilderingly complex judicial 
attempt to shoehorn the possibilities of new surveillance 
technologies into the parameters of statutes that were never 
meant to accommodate them. 
¶127 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that there was 
no warrant.  The constitution and statutes have been violated. 
The evidence should be suppressed. 
¶128 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2008AP658-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1