Title: In re Estate of Melton

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

428 Nev., Advance Opinion 44
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF | No. 56634
WILLIAM MELTON, DECEASED.

MELTON ORTE; AND SHERRY L.
MELTON BRINER,
Appellants,

THE STATS OF NEVADA; LINDA
| FILED
VICKI PALM; ELIZABETH STESSEL: oa

182012
ROBERT MELTON; BRYAN MELTON; Vive
AND JOHN CAHILL, PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATOR,
Respondents.

Appeal from a district court order in a probate action. Bighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Lee A. Gates, Judge.
Reversed,

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and K. Kevin Benson, Deputy
Attorney General, Carson City,
for Appellant the State of Nevada,

Kehoe & Associates and ‘Ty E, Kehoe, Henderson,
for Appellants Linda Melton Orte and Sherry L. Melton Briner.

Albright Stoddard Warnick & Albright and Whitney B. Warnick, Las
Vegas,
for Respondents Vicki Palm and Elizabeth Stessel.

Bowler Smith & Twitchell LLP and Russell K. Bowler and Jonathan W.
Barlow, Las Vegas,
for Respondent John Cahill

 
 

Solomon Dwiggins & Freer and Mark A. Solomon, Las Vegas,
for Respondents Robert Melton and Bryan Melton.

 

BEFORE SAITTA, C.J., DOUGLAS, CHERRY, GIBBONS, PICKERING,
HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, J.

OPINION
PER CURIAM:

This is a dispute between the State and a testator’s daughter
and half sisters over his $3 million estate. At issue is the proper
distribution of the estate of the testator, who, by way of a handwritten,
will, attempted to disinherit all of his heirs but was unsuccessful in
otherwise affirmatively devising his estate. Under the common law, a
disinheritance clause was unenforceable in these circumstances. In the

proceedings below, after determining that the testator’s handwritten will

 

was a valid testamentary instrument that revoked his earlier will, the
district court applied the prevailing common law rule, and thereby deemed
the testator’s disinheritance clause unenforceable. The court therefore
distributed the testator's entire estate to his disinherited daughter,
pursuant to the law of intestate succession, and rejected the claim that
because he disinherited all of his heirs, his estate must escheat to the
State to be used for educational purposes.

Crucially, however, the Nevada Legislature has enacted a
statute providing, in pertinent part, that a will includes “a testamentary
instrument that merely . . . excludes or limits the right of an individual or

 

to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate
succession.” NRS 132.370. We conclude that by its plain and

unambiguous language, NRS 132.370 abolishes the common law rules that

 

 
would otherwise render a testator's disinheritance clause unenforceable
when the testator is unsuccessful at affirmatively devising his or her
estate. Here, although the district court correctly determined that the
testator executed a valid handwritten will that revoked his earlier will,
the court erred in deeming the disinheritance clause contained therein
unenforceable,

Next, we consider whether to adopt the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation, which, broadly stated, provides that a revocation made

in connection with a failed dispositive objective or false

 

sumption of law
or fact should be considered ineffective when doing so is necessary to
ensure that an estate is distributed in a manner that most closely matches
the testator’s probable intent. In this, we consider whether the district
court erred in determining that the doctrine is precluded by NRS 133.180,
which provides, in relevant part, that where a testator executes two wills,
the revocation of the second will does not operate to “revive the first will,”
absent terms in the revocation expressing an intention to revive the first
will or the reexecution of the first will. We conclude that NRS 133.130
restricts revival, a concept that is fundamentally distinct from the doctrine
of dependent relative revocation, Furthermore, because we believe that
the general policy underlying the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
is sound, we take this opportunity to expressly adopt the doctrine. Here,
while the district court erred in determining that NRS 133.130 precludes
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, it did not err in alternatively
determining that if the doctrine exists in Nevada, it is inapplicable under
the particular facts of this case.

Finally, we consider whether an escheat is triggered when, as

here, a testator disinherits all of his or her heirs. We conclude that an

 

 
one

 

escheat is triggered in such a circumstance because, when all heirs have
been disinherited, the testator “leaves no surviving spouse or kindred”
under NRS 134.120 pursuant to the plain and commonly understood
meaning of that phrase. Accordingly, the district court erred in
determining that the testator’s estate does not escheat.

Because the disinheritance clause contained in the testator's
will is enforceable, we reverse the judgment of the district court. As the
tostator disinherited all of his heirs, his estate must escheat,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
‘The 1975 will

In 1975, William Melton executed a formal will. The will was
‘comprised of two forms, which Melton and three witnesses signed. Melton
devised most of his estate to his parents and devised small portions to his,
brother and two of his cousins, Terry Melton and Jerry Melton. He also
indicated that his daughter was to receive nothing. In 1979, Melton
executed a handwritten codicil on the back of one of the 1975 will forms
that provided his friend, Alberta (Susie) Kelleher, should receive a small
portion of his estate (both will forms and the codicil are hereinafter
referred to as “the 1975 will’)

‘The 1995 letter

In 1995, Melton sent a handwritten letter to Kelleher. It
reads:

5-15-95
5:00 AM
Dear Susie

Tam on the way home from Mom's funeral.
Mom died from an auto accident so I thought I had
better leave something in writing so that you
Alberta Kelleher will receive my entire estate. I

 
do not want my brother Larry J. Melton or Vicki
Palm or any of my other relatives to have one
penny of my estate. I plan on making a revocable
trust at a later date. I think it is the 15 of [MJay,
no calendar, I think it(s 5:00 AM could be 7:AM
in the City of Clinton Oklahoma

Lots of Love
Bill

si William E, Melton
AKA Bill Melton,
[Social security number]

Discovery of the 1975 will and the 1995 letter
Kelleher died in 2002, thus predeceasing Melton, who died in

2008.1 Shortly after Melton’s death, respondent John Cahill, Clark
County Public Administrator,? initiated a special administration of
Melton’s estate. During this administration, it was discovered that Melton
had a daughter, respondent Vicki Palm. The 1995 letter was also
discovered. Initially, Palm and respondent Elizabeth Stessel’ were

'As evinced by Melton's references to his mother's funeral in the
1995 letter, his mother died sometime in 1995. It is not clear from the
record when Melton's father died, but the parties agree that he
predeceased Melton.

*Cahill is listed as a party in this appeal, but he has submitted a
short brief explaining that he has no interest in this appeal.

§Because Palm is not a Nevada resident, she associated with Stessel,
who is a Nevada resident, to co-administer the estate. See NRS
139.010(4)(@) (explaining that a nonresident cannot administer an estate
unless he or she associates with a resident). Stessel is listed as a party in
this appeal, but she has not submitted a brief and does not appear to have
an interest in this appeal.

 

 
appointed co-administrators of Melton’s estate. But the district court
suspended their powers after determining that a disinterested party
should administer the estate because a dispute over the proper
distribution of the estate had arisen between Melton’s half sisters,
appellants Linda Melton Orte and Sherry L. Melton Briner, appellant
State of Nevada, respondents Bryan Melton and Robert Melton,‘ and
Palm, The district court therefore appointed Cahill to be the special
administrator of Melton’s estate, ‘Thereafter, Cahill obtained access to
Melton's

 

fe deposit box and discovered the 1976 will. The appraised net

 

value of Melton’s estate is approximately $3 million.
The parties and their respective positions
Melton’s daughter
Palm, Melton’s only known child, initially argued that the

1995 letter is not a valid will, and that Melton’s estate therefore should

 

pass to her under the statutes governing intestate succession. Following
the discovery of the 1975 will, however, she argued that the 1995 letter is
a valid will and that it revoked the 1975 will. Palm argued that although
the 1995 letter is a valid will, it is ineffective because the only named
devise, Kelleher, predeceased Melton. ‘Thus, she maintained that

‘Bryan is the son of Terry Melton and Robert is the son of Jerry
Melton. During the proceedings below, Bryan and Robert asserted that
they had an interest in the estate because Terry and Jerry were named as
devisees under the 1975 will and were Melton’s cousins. Bryan and
Robert are listed as parties in this appeal, but they have not submitted
briefs and do not appear to have an interest in this appeal.

 

 
sn >

 

Melton’s estate should pass through intestacy, under which she has
priority pursuant to NRS 134.100.
‘Melton’s half sisters
In the proceedings below, Melton’s half sisters contended that
the 1995 letter is not a valid will, and therefore, the 1975 will is still
effective. In addition, they argued that if the 1995 letter is a valid will, it
do

 

not effectively revoke the 1975 will. They further argued that, even
ming that the 1995 letter is a valid will that revoked the 1975 will,

 

the revocation should be disregarded under the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation. Although Melton's half sisters were not named as
devisees in the 1976 will, they
statute, NRS 133.200,° they could take their parent's share of Melton's
estate,

 

sserted that under Nevada's antilapse

 

ANRS 134.100 provides, in pertinent part: “If the decedent leaves no
surviving spouse, but there is a child . .. the estate goes to the child...”

The version of NRS 133.200 in effect when Melton died provided:

When any estate is devised to any child or other

relation of the testator, and the devisee dies before

the testator, leaving lineal descendants, those

descendants, in the absence of a provision in the

will to the contrary, take the estate so given by the

will in the same manner as the devisee would

have done if the devisee had survived the testator.
‘We note that the Legislature amended NRS 133.200 in 2011. 2011 Nev.
Stat,, ch. 270, § 71, at 1435. However, these amendments do not affect our
analysis in this matter.

 
‘The State

The State asserted that the 1995 letter is a valid will that
revoked the 1975 will. It argued that the Legislature's revisions to the
Nevada Probate Code in 1999 provide for the enforcement of
disinheritance clauses, even when an estate passes by intestate
succession. ‘Thus, the State contended that because Melton expressly
disinherited all of his relatives in the 1995 letter, his estate must escheat.
The district court order

After extensive briefing by the parties, the district court
determined as follows: (1) the 1995 letter is a valid will; (2) although the
1995 letter is valid will, the disinheritance clause contained therein is
unenforceable; (3) the 1995 letter revoked the 1975 will; (4) the revocation
of the 1975 will cannot be disregarded under the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation because NRS 133.130 precludes the doctrine in
Nevada; and (6) even if the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
applies in Nevada, the doctrine is not applicable under the particular facts
presented in this case. Accordingly, the district court distributed Melton’s
estate to Palm pursuant to the intestate succession scheme. Melton’s half
sisters and the State each appealed.

DISCUSSION

(On appeal, the parties largely maintain the positions that they
asserted during the proceedings below. Thus, in their appeal, Melton’s
half sisters’ primary contention is that the district court erred in
determining that the 1975 will does not control the distribution of Melton’s,
estate, In its appeal, the State's main contention is that the district court
erred in deeming Melton's disinheritance clause unenforceable and in

determining that his estate does not escheat.

 

 
‘The parties’ positions compel us to resolve a sequence of
issues, First, we must consider whether the 1995 letter is a valid will, and
if 80, whether the disinheritance clause contained therein is enforceable,
We conclude that the 1995 letter is a valid will and that the disinheritance
clause contained therein is enforceable under NRS 132.370. Next, we
address whether the 1995 letter revoked the 1975 will. Answering this
question in the affirmative, we next consider whether to adopt the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation in Nevada and whether the
doctrine can be applied to render the revocation of the 1975 will
ineffective. Because the doctrine of dependent relative revocation

promotes the sound poliey of effectuating a testator’s intent

 

closely as
possible, we take this opportunity to expressly adopt the doctrine. We
conclude, however, that the doctrine cannot be applied under the
particular facts of this case. Finally, we turn to the proper distribution of
Melton's estate under the terms of the 1995 letter. We conclude that
because Melton disinherited all of his heirs, his estate must escheat to the
State pursuant to NRS 134.120. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the district court.
‘Standard of review

Whether a handwritten document is a valid will is a question
of law reviewed de novo. Randall v. Salvation Army, 100 Nev. 466, 470,
686 P.2d 241, 243 (1984). Similarly, “questions of statutory construction,

including the meaning and scope of a statute, are questions of law, which
[we] review{] de novo.” City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-Journal, 119 Nev.
56, 58, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148 (2003). Further, the interpretation of a will is
typically subject to our plenary review. Matter of Estate of Meredith, 105
Nev. 689, 691, 782 P.2d 1313, 1315 (1989). Lastly, whether a will has

 

 
ome

 

been revoked is also generally a question of law reviewed de novo. Estate
of Anderson, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807, 311 (Ct. App. 1997).

“When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules
of construction.” Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. __, __, 225 P.3d 788, 790
(2010). As we have explained, we “must give [a statute's} terms their

plain meaning, considering its provisions as a whole so as to read them in

 

a way that would not render words or phrases superfluous or make a
provision nugatory.” Southern Nev. Homebuilders v. Clark County, 121
Nev. 446, 449, 117 P.3d 171, 173 (2005) (internal quotation omitted). We
also have explained that a statute's express definitions are controlling
because “[t]o read [them] otherwise would lead to the absurd result of
rendering [such provisions] ...mere surplusage.” Boulder Oaks Cmty.
Ass'nv, B & J Andrews, 125 Nev. 397, 406, 215 P.3d 27, 32-33 (2009).

‘The 1995 letter is a valid will

Melton’s half sisters assert that the 1995 letter is simply a
letter and nothing more. They emphasize that the 1995 letter was
discovered amongst miscellaneous papers in Melton's home, in contrast to
the 1975 will, which was found carefully placed in a safe. Thus, Melton’s
half sisters argue that if Melton intended for the 1996 letter to be his will,
he would have treated it as carefully as the 1975 will. Therefore, they
contend that because the 1995 letter is not a valid will, the 1975 will still
controls the distribution of Melton’s estate.

Nevada law gives holographic wills the same effect as formally
executed wills. NRS 133.090(3). “A holographic will is a will in which the
signature, date and material provisions are written by the hand of the
testator, whether or not it is witnessed or notarized.” NRS 133.090(1).

10

 
en

 

‘The 1995 letter was written, signed, and dated by Melton. It
contains the material provisions of a will because it provided that Kelleher
should receive Melton’s estate and that his relatives should receive
nothing. Although Melton did not store the 1995 letter in the same
manner that he stored the 1975 will, its validity as a holographic will does
not depend upon him doing so. Melton’s testamentary intent is evinced by

his references to his mother

 

funeral, her untimely death, and his
statement that he “had better leave something in writing.” Accordingly,
‘we conclude that the 1995 letter is a valid holographic will
‘The disinheritance clause contained in the 1995 letter is enforceable

Having concluded that the 1995 letter is a valid holographic
will, we now consider the State's contention that the district court erred in
applying the prevailing common law rule regarding disinheritance clauses
and thereby deeming the disinheritance clause unenforceable. We begin
our analysis of this contention by providing a background on the common
law disinheritance rules, the criticisms thereof, and the modern treatment
of disinheritance provisions. Next, we consider the parties’ specific
arguments regarding whether NRS 132.370 reverses the common law
disinheritance rules in Nevada.

Background on disinheritance clauses

Under the common law, two general rules, known as the
“English rule” and the “American rule,” have been developed by courts
considering whether to enforce disinheritance provisions as to property
passing by intestate succession. See J. Andrew Heaton, Comment, The
In jeirs Excluded H “Negative Wills” Be
Enforced?, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 177, 179-88 (1985). Under the English rule,

‘a disinheritance provision, or a so-called “negative will” was enforceable

ul

 
om

 

only if “the testator clearly expressed an intent to limit an heir to the
devise (if any) contained in the will, and at least one other heir remained
eligible to receive the intestate property.” Id, at 180, Under the American
rule, a testator could “prevent an heir from receiving his share of any
property that passes by intestacy only by affirmatively disposing of the
entire estate through a will.” Id,

As its name suggests, the majority of jurisdictions subscribe to
the American rule, Seo, e.g., In re Barnes’ Estate, 407 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal.
1965) (It is settled that a disinheritance clause, no matter how broadly or
strongly phrased, operates only to prevent a claimant from taking under
the will iteelf, or to obviate a claim of pretermission. Such a clause does

not and cannot operate to prevent the heirs at law from taking under the

 

statutory rules of inheritance when the decedent has died intestate as to
any or all of his property."); 4 William J. Bowe and Douglas H. Parker,
Page on the Law of Wills § 90.17, at 148 (rev. ed. 2004) (If testator does
not dispose of the whole of his estate by his last will and testament, and
such will contains negative words of exclusion, the great majority of states
hold that such negative words cannot prevent property from passing under
the statutes of descent and distribution.’)

Courts following the American rule have espoused three
rationales for doing so: (1) enforcing disinheritance provisions as to
intestate property “would create an undesirable ‘mixing’ of the probate
and intestacy systems by requiring courts to alter the distribution scheme
provided in the intestacy statute”; (2) because disinheritance clauses do
not expressly name devisees, “their enforcement would in effect require
‘courts to draft new wills for testators"; and (3) disinheritance clauses are

simply “inconsistent with the law of succession.” Heaton, supra, at 186.

12

 
‘The common law disinheritance rules, and the rationales
underpinning them, have been the subjects of intense criticism. See, e.g.,
Frederic 8. Schwartz, Models of the Will and Negative Disinheritance, 48
Mercer L. Rev. 1137, 1140, 1167 (1997) (stating that the justifications
given for the common law rules are “obviously circular” and
unsatisfactory, and urging courts “to give straightforward effect” to

disinheritance provisions); Heaton, supra, at 184, 186 (noting that none of

 

the rationales for the American rule “withstand{] analysis,” and
concluding that it defeats testators’ intentions).

Not surprisingly, because the common law disinheritance
rules distort testamentary intent and conflict with testamentary freedom,
the modern trend is to reject the traditional rules. ‘The Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) reflects this trend, providing that “[a] decedent by will may
expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to
mn.” Uni. Probate
Code § 2-101(b), 8/1 U.L.A. 79 (1998), The drafters of the UPC stated that
in enacting this provision, they abrogated “the usually accepted common-
law rule, which defeats a testator’s intent for no sufficient reason.” Id, § 2-
101 cmt. The Restatement (Third) of Property also rejects the common

 

property of the decedent passing by intestate succ

law disinheritance rules, providing that “[a] decedent's will may expressly
exclude or limit the right of an individual or elass to succeed to property of
the decedent passing by intestate succession.” Restatement (Third) of
Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 2.7 (1999). As with the UPC,
the Restatement explains that this provision “reverses the common-law
rule, which defeats a testator’s intent for no sufficient reason.” Id. § 2.7

cmt. a. With the foregoing in mind, we turn to whether the Legislature
intended for NRS 132.370 to abolish the common law disinheritance rules.

 

 
NRS 132.370 abolishes the common law disinheritance rules

‘The State asserts that by revising the Nevada Probate Code in
1999 to provide that a “will” includes a “testamentary instrument that
merely . . . . excludes or limits the right of an individual or class to succeed
to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession,” the
Legislature has rejected both the English and American rules, Thus, the
State argues that disinheritance provisions are now enforceable as to
property passing by intestate succession. The State acknowledges that
Nevada has not adopted the UPC, but it points out the similarity in the
language of NRS 132.370 and UPC section 2-101.

Palm contends that the ‘definition sections of Nevada's
Probate Code should not be given substantive effect”? and claims that

 

giving effect to disinheritance provisions would make estate planning
unpredictable. In essence, she believes that the language that the
Legislature used in NRS 132.370 was imprecise and unwise, Thus, Palm
asserts that we should apply the common law disinheritance rules, which
would render Melton’s disinheritance clause unenforceable. Palm argues

that because Melton’s disinheritance clause is unenforceable, the district

*Palm cites In re McKay's Ustate, 43 Nev. 114, 184 P. 305 (1919), for
this proposition. McKay’s Estate is an unremarkable case that merely
indicated that a general definition could not be “carried into” a specific
provision relating to rights of representation; it did not hold that
definitions are not to be given effect. Id. at 127, 184 P. at 308-09.
Moreover, even if McKay's Estate were to stand for the proposition that
Palm attaches to it, such a proposition does not comport with this court’s
more recent caselaw discouraging statutory interpretation that renders
terms nugatory. See Southern Nev, Homebuilders v. Clark County, 121
Nev. 446, 449, 117 P.3d 171, 173 (2005).

 

 
court correctly determined that she should receive Melton's estate, as she
has priority under the intestate succession scheme.
NRS 132,870 defines “will” as follows:

“Will” means a formal document that provides for
the distribution of the property of a decedent upon
the death of the decedent. The term includes a
codicil and a testamentary instrument that merely
appoints an executor, revokes or revises another

will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes

rt of an indi

succeed to property of the decedent passing by

intestate succession.
(Emphases added.)

The interpretation of NRS 182.370 is a matter of first
impression for this court. NRS 132.370 defines a “will” broadly. In stark
contrast to the common law disinheritance rules, NRS 132.370 imposes no
requirement that an instrument affirmatively devise property in order to
be enforceable, Rather, a will includes an instrument that “merely” limits

an individual or class from inheriting. The plain language of NRS 182.370

 

thus demonstrates that the Legislature envisioned a probate system in
which disinheritance provisions can be enforced as to intestate property."
‘Though Palm considers NRS 132.370 unwise, under well-established

 

canons of statutory interpretation, we must not render it nugatory or a

mere surplusage. See Boulder Oaks Cmtv. Ass'n v, B & J Andrews, 125

“Because NRS 132.370 is unambiguous, resort to the legislative
history behind its enactment is unnecessary. It should be noted, however,
that the Legislature identified “eliminating unnecessary technicalities
that defeat the intentions of the person making a will” as a “main
element[ J" of its revisions to the probate code. A.B. 400, Bill Summary,
‘0th Leg. (Nev. 1999).

 

 
Nev. 397, 406, 215 P.3d 27, 32-33 (2009); Southern Nev. Homebuilders v.
Clark County, 121 Nev. 446, 449, 117 P.8d 171, 173 (2005).

‘The significance of NRS 152.370 cannot be overstated. While
the Legislature's amendments to the probate code in 1999 are not a
wholesale adoption of the UPC, the language of NRS 132.370 mirrors that
of UPC section 2-101, which,

 

previously noted, was designed to
abrogate the common law disinheritance rules. Giving effect to

disinheritance provisions, however, is not so radical that it creates the

 

estate planning upheaval that Palm claims it would, As UPC states such
as Arizona, Colorado, and North Dakota demonstrate, such provisions can
be seamlessly incorporated into the existing probate system. See. e.g.,
Matter of Estate of Krokowsky, 896 P.2d 247, 249 n.2 (Ariz. 1995); In_re
Estate of Walter, 97 P.3d 188, 192 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); In re Estate of
Samuelson, 757 N.W.2d 44, 47 (N.D. 2008).

"Palm recognizes these decisions, but asks that we instead follow
Matter of Estate of Jetter, where, in a 3-2 decision, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota decided that a disinheritance clause executed under
circumstances similar to this case was unenforceable, despite South
Dakota's adoption of the UPC. 570 N.W.24 26, 30 (S.D. 1997). The Jeter
majority's decision has been criticized as unsound and unpersuasive; we
agree with these assessments and therefore decline to follow Jeter. See
Julia M, Melius, Note, Was South Dakota Deprived of $3.2 Million?

Intestacy, Escheat, and the Statutory Power to Disinherit in the Estate of
Jetter, 44 S.D. L. Rev. 49, 75, 78, 82 (1999) (meticulously analyzing Jetter
and concluding that it “directly contradicts the plain language of the
{South Dakota disinheritance] statute and constitutes judicial
legislation, ...is hostile to the doctrine of testamentary freedom,”
“disregarded sound precedent,” and is “a result-oriented decision to
prevent an escheat”); see also Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and
Other Donative Transfers § 2.7 reporter's note 2 (1999) (stating that the
result in Jettor is “{ulnfortunatef [°.

 

 

 

 
In addition, we find the approach taken by New York courts
instructive. New York, like Nevada, has not adopted the UPC, but it has
enacted a statute defining a “will,” in relevant part, as “an oral declaration
or written instrument ... whereby a person disposes of property or directs
how it shall not be disposed of...” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 1-
2.19(a) (McKinney 1998). New York courts have interpreted this
definition to be a reversal of the common law disinheritance rules:

Prior to September 1, 1967, the effective
date of [the statute defining “will’], the cases held
that: “The legal rights of the heir or distribute to
the property of deceased persons, cannot be
defeated except by a valid devise or bequest of
such property to other persons”

However, in this Court's opinion the new
statute is unmistakable in providing that a
testator now may disinherit an heir from all his,
property, both testamentary and intestate assets.

In.re Will of Beu, 333 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (citation omitted)
(quoting In re Hefner's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 252, 254 Gur. Ct. 1953)), affd,
364 N.Y.S.2d 600 (App. Div. 1974); see also Matter of Will of Stoffel, 427
N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (Surv. Ct. 1980) (“The definition of ‘will’ changed the

rule previously existing which made directions to disinherit someone

 

ineffective unless all of the Decedent's assets were effectively disposed to
others.”), affd, 437 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1980). In short, we conclude
that in enacting NRS 132.370, the Nevada Legislature, like the New York
Legislature, abolished the common law disinheritance rules.

Here, Melton drafted a will in which he expressly excluded all
of his heirs: “I do not want my brother Larry J. Melton or Vicki Palm or
any of my other relatives to have one penny of my estate.” Melton's intent
to disinherit his heirs could not have been clearer, See Matter of Estate of

 

 
os

 

Meredith, 105 Nev. 689, 691, 782 P.2d 1313, 1316 (1989) (“[TJhe surest
way... to carry out a testator's intent is to construe a will according to
the plain meaning of the terms used in the will.”). Although Palm
speculates that Melton only intended to exclude her if his estate passed
through his will, he placed no qualifications on his disinheritance clause.
Without such direction from Melton, it cannot be said that he meant to
disinherit Palm if his estate passed through his will but that he would
have been content to have her receive his estate if it passed through
Intestate succession. See Estate of Samuelson, 757 N.W.2d at 48 ’{WJhen
a testator expressly excludes an individual in his will, the individual is
excluded from taking under both testate and intestate succession, unless
the testator expressly specifies a contrary intention.”). Pursuant to NRS
132.370, simply because Kelleher predeceased Melton, thereby causing his
devise to her to lapse, does not render the remainder of the will, including
its disinheritance clause, unenforceable. Accordingly, we conclude that
the disinheritance clause contained in the 1995 letter is enforceable.

The 1995 letter revoked the 1975 will by implication

Molton's half sisters contend that even if the 1995 letter is a
valid and enforceable will, it did not revoke the 1975 will. Specifically,
they assert that the 1996 letter did not expressly revoke the 1975 will or
otherwise effectuate a revocation in the manner required by NRS
133.120(1).

NRS 133.120(1)(b) provides that a written will may be revoked
by “[ajnother will or codicil in writing, executed as prescribed in this
chapter.” This court has made clear that “[rJevocation of a former will is
presumed where a second will is executed.” Shephard v. Gebo, 77 Nev.

18.

 
226, 231, 361 P.2d 537, 540 (1961). In other words, a will may be
impliedly revoked by a subsequent will.

Under the doctrine of revocation by implication, “fa] will may
be impliedly revoked by the execution of a later will containing
inconsistent or repugnant provisions, although such later will contains no
express clause of revocation.” 95 C.J.8. Wills § 422 (2011) (footnotes
omitted). Revocation by implication is not favored. In re Arnold's Estate,
60 Nev. 376, 380, 110 P.2d 204, 206 (1941); 95 C.J.8. Willa § 422 (2011).

 

Nonetheless, a revocation must be implied when “there is such a plain
inconsistency as makes it impossible for the wills to stand together.” 95
C.J.8. Wills § 422 (2011). Thus, “a later will which affects the same

 

property as an earlier will or disposes of the entire estate, leaving nothing
on which the former will can operate, is generally regarded as a revocation
thereof, even in the absence of express words of revocation.” Id, (footnotes
omitted),

In the 1975 will, Melton devised most of his estate to his

 

parents and devised small portions to his brother, other relatives, and
Kelleher. In the 1996 letter, Melton devised hit

Thus, both instruments attempted to affect the same property. Because

 

mntire estate to Kelleher.

Melton attempted to devise all of his estate in the 1995 letter, no property
was left upon which the 1975 will could operate, Consequently, the
provisions of the two wills are so inconsistent that they cannot stand
together. We therefore conclude that the 1995 letter revoked the 1975 will
by implication, unless the doctrine of dependent relative revocation

applies to undo this revocation, which we consider next.

 

 
os

 

‘The doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies in Nevada but does
not apply under the particular facts of this case

Melton’s half sisters contend that the district court erred in
determining that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation does not
apply under Nevada law. In particular, they argue that the court erred in
determining that NRS 133.130 precludes the doctrine. Melton’s half
sisters further argue that the doctrine should be applied here because if
Melton had known that his devise to Kelleher would lapse, it stands to
reason that he would have preferred the 1975 will to control the
distribution of his estate.

Dependent relative revocation is “[a] common-law doctrine
that operates to undo an otherwise sufficient revocation of a will when
there is evidence that the testator's revocation was conditional rather than
absolute.” Black's Law Dictionary 503 (9th ed. 2009). Although this court
has, in passing, acknowledged the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation, Shephard, 7 Nev. at 232, 361 P.2d at 540, it has never
expressly adopted the doctrine.

‘The Restatement (Third) of Property distills the doctrine’s
general application as follows:

(@) A partial or complete revocation of a will
is presumptively ineffective if the testator made
the revocation:

(1)in connection with an attempt to
achieve a dispositive objective that fails
under applicable law, or

(2) because of a false assumption of
law, or because of a false belief about an
objective fact, that is either recited in the
revoking instrument or established by clear
and convincing evidence.

20

 
ome

 

() The presumption established in
subsection (a) is rebutted if allowing the
revocation to remain in effect would be more
consistent with the testator's probable intention.

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 4.3
(1999).

Consistent with its purpose, “t]he doctrine can only apply
where there is a clear intent of the testator that the revocation of the old
will is made conditional on the validity of the new one.” 95 C.J.S. Wills §
412 (2011). “Evidence of this intent cannot be left to speculation,
‘supposition, conjecture or possibility.” Matter of Estate of Patten, 687
P.2d 1307, 1309 (Mont, 1978). Another noteworthy limitation on the
doctrine is that it generally cannot be applied unless the two instruments
reflect a very similar dispositive scheme. See, e.g., Kroll v. Nehmer, 705
A.2d 716, 722-23 (Md. 1998) (“[Clourts have generally refused to apply the
doctrine unless the two instruments reflect a common dispositive
"y; Hauck v, Seright, 964 P.2d 749, 754 (Mont. 1998) (For the
doctrine to apply, the new will must not have changed the testamentary

 

scheme

  

purpose of the old will and must essentially repeat the same dispositive
plans.”). The reason for this rule is simple: A substantial disparity in the
terms of the two instruments reflects the testator’s disfavor of the original
will, and thus, in such a case, it cannot intelligently be concluded that the
testator would have preferred for the original will to control the
distribution of his or her estate in the event that the subsequent will
proves ineffective. See Kroll, 705 A.2d at 723. In sum, “{tJhe doctrine is
applied with caution,” and “while [it] may be widely recognized, it is
narrowly applied.” Patten, 587 P.2d at 1309,

a

 
 

As indicated above, when responsibly applied, the doctrine
promotes the general policy of giving effect to a testator's intent. See 79
Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 529 (2002). Jurisdictions that have adopted the
doctrine recognize that it “is simply one means of implementing [the]
paramount rule” of enforcing a testator’s intent as nearly as possible.
Estate of Anderson, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 318 (Ct. App. 1997). This policy
is sound and coincides with the long-standing objective of this court to give
effect to a testator’s intentions to the greatest extent possible. See Ziroveic
x. Kordic, 101 Nev. 740, 741, 709 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1985) ("[I]t is the long-
accepted position of this court that the ‘primary aim in construing the
terms of a testamentary document must be to give effect, to the extent
consistent with law and policy, to the intentions of the testator.” (quoting
Concannon v, Winship, 94 Nev. 432, 434, 581 P.2d 11, 18 (1978). We
therefore expressly adopt the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.

In 50 doing, we reject the notion that NRS 133.190 precludes
the doctrine under Nevada law.

NRS 133,130 provides:

If, after the making of any will, the testator

executes a second will, the destruction,

cancellation or revocation of the second will does

not revive the first will, unless it appears by the

terms of the revocation that it was the intention to

revive and give effect to the first will, or unless,

after the destruction, cancellation or revocation,

the first will is reexecuted.
(Emphasis added.)

As we have explained, the effect of NRS 133.130 is that “[olnce
a will or gift therein is revoked it cannot be revived except by re-
publication or re-execution.” Shephard, 77 Nev. at 231, 361 P.2d at 540.

Indeed, by its plain language, NRS 133.130 restriets revival. The statute

22

 
does not, however, constrain the circumstances in which a revocation may
be deemed ineffective. This is a crucial distinction because a vital precept
of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is that it does not revive a
revoked will; rather, it renders a revocation ineffective. Restatement
(Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 4.3 emt. a (1999),
As the Restatement explains:

‘The doctrine of ineffective revocationt"™ is to
be distinguished from revival of a formerly
revoked will....Under the revival doctrine, an
effectively revoked will is rendered valid and
effective because it has been reinstated by
subsequent conduct showing an intent to revive it,
not because the revocation was ineffective.

 

Id.

‘Therefore, because anti-revival statutes restrict the
fundamentally distinct doctrine of revival, they should not be interpreted
to preclude the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. See In_re
Nutting’s Estate, 82 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.D.C. 1949) (explaining that a
statute relating to revival “has no bearing” on the issue of whether
dependent relative revocation applies); Larrick v. Larrick, 607 S.W.24 92,
96 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (Newbern, J., concurring) (explaining that an anti
revival statute does not preclude the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation because “the [anti-revival] statute only comes into effect if

there has been a ‘revocation’ [and] [iJt is to determine precisely that

‘Because the doctrine of dependent relative revocation renders a
revocation presumptively ineffective in certain circumstances, the
Restatement refers to the doctrine as “the doctrine of ineffective
revocation.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative
‘Transfers § 4.3 emt. a (1999).

 

 
question, i.e,, whether there has been a revocation, that the doctrine is
applied”); see also Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative
‘Transfers § 4.3 reporter's note 1 (1999) (criticizing courts that have
interpreted anti-revival statutes as precluding the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation). We therefore conclude that NRS 133.130 does not
preclude the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.

Nonetheless, the doctrine does not apply under the facts of
this case, This is evident because the objective of the 1995 letter did not
fail. The disinheritance clause contained therein is enforceable and
applies to Melton’s half sisters independent of the lapsed devise to
Kelleher. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that the disinheritance
clause was conditioned upon Kelleher receiving the estate. Thus, there is
no basis for the contention that Melton would not want the 1975 will to be
revoked had he known that Kelleher would predecease him. And, even if
it could be said that the objective of the 1995 letter failed, the provisions of
the 1975 will and the 1995 letter are completely different, which rebuts
any claim that Melton would have wished for the revocation of the 1975
will to be disregarded. See Kroll, 705 A.2d at 723 (declining to apply the
doctrine where a comparison of the two wills revealed “two very different
dispositive schemes,” and “{tJhe effect of applying the doctrine and
disregarding [the testator’s] revocation ... is precisely to do what she
clearly did not want done—to leave her estate to people she had intended
to disinherit”). Accordingly, we conclude that the doctrine of dependent

relative revocation does not apply under the particular facts of this case.

 

 
‘The proper distribution of Melton’s estate under the 1995 letter is_an
escheat

We now turn to the proper distribution of Melton's estate
under the terms of the 1995 letter. The State argues that because Melton
disinherited all of his heirs in the 1995 letter, an escheat is triggered.
Palm asserts that the requisites of an escheat have not been
met because, under NRS 134.120, an intestate estate can escheat only
when “the decedent leaves no surviving spouse or kindred.” Thus, she
contends that because she survived Melton in the literal sense, his estate
cannot escheat. Palm also argues that the law abhors escheats, and
therefore, as a matter of public policy, an escheat should not be permitted.
Although the 1995 letter contains a disinheritance clause, and
is therefore an enforceable testamentary instrument under NRS 132.370,
‘Melton’s estate nonetheless must descend through intestacy because he
was unsuccessful at affirmatively distributing his estate. See NRS
132.195 (an “[i]ntestate estate’ includes an estate where no will has been
offered or admitted to probate as the last will and testament and an estate
where the will does not distribute the entire estate”). While this causes

"Palm contends that resorting to NRS 132.195 creates a
contradiction with NRS 132.190, which provides that “[iJntestate,’ used as
a noun, means a decedent who dies without leaving a will.” Thus, she
asserts that even if the 1995 letter is an enforceable will, then Melton did
not die “intestate” under NRS 132.190, and therefore, his estate falls
outside of the intestate succession scheme. In other words, Palm argues
that if Melton’'s disinheritance clause is enforceable, his estate falls into a
void where no direction as to the distribution of his estate can be gleaned
from his will or from a statutory source and, in essence, Melton’s will has
to be drafted for him, which, of course, courts are loath to do. Palm's
argument creates unnecessary confusion. Because the specific definition
of “intestate estate” in NRS 132.195 matches the precise situation

continued on next page .. .

 

 
a “mixing” of the testate and intestate systems that was discouraged
under the common law, the Legislature expressly contemplated this
result, See NRS 132.370 (a “will” includes an instrument that excludes
an heir from receiving property “passing by intestate succession”).

Next, NRS 134.120, the provision that sets forth the requisites
for the escheat of an intestate estato, provides: “If the decedent leaves no
surviving spouse or kindred, the estate escheats to the State for
educational purposes.” We reject Palm's cramped interpretation of this
provision because it is commonly understood that when a disinheritance

claus

 

is enforceable as to intestate property, a disinherited heir is
treated, as a matter of law, to have predeceased the testator. See In re
Will of Beu, 333 N.Y.S.2d 868, 861 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (a disinherited heir is
“considered to have predeceased the testator” under the Now York statute
providing for the enforcement of disinheritance claus
property); Frederic S. Schwartz, Models of the Will and Negative
Disinheritance, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1137, 1145 (1997) CA. provision
disinheriting [an heir] should result in an application of the intestacy

 

as to intestate

statute as if (that heir] predeceased the testator.”); J. Andrew Heaton,
Comment, The Intestate Claims of Heirs Excluded by Will: Should
“Negative Wills” Be Enforced?, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 177, 192 (1985) (when a

continued

presented here, it controls. See Lader v, Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 687, 120
P.3d 1164, 1167 (2005) (“{WJhen a specific statute is in conflict with a
general one, the specific statute will take precedence.”).

 

 
disinheritance clause is enforced as to intestate property “the excluded
heir is treated as having predeceased the testator’).!#

‘Thus, because we presume that the Legislature was aware of
the commonly understood effect of the language of NRS 134.120 when it
drafted the statute, this is how it must be construed. See Beazer Homes
Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct, 120 Nev. 576, 580-81, 97 P.Sd 1192, 1135-36
(2004) (‘When a legislature adopts language that has a particular
meaning or history, rules of

 

fatutory construction ... indicate that a
court may presume that the legislature intended the language to have
‘meaning consistent with previous interpretations of the language.”)
Accordingly, we conclude that when a testator disinherits all heirs, he or
she “leaves no surviving spouse or kindred” for the purposes of NRS
134,120 and, as a consequence, an escheat is triggered.

‘The law disfavors escheats, In re Estate of Cruz, 264 Cal,
Rptr. 492, 493 (Ct. App. 1989), ‘The commonly cited reason for this
principle is that “society prefers to keep real property within the family as
most broadly defined, or within the hands of those whom the deceased has
designated.” United States v. 198.73 Acres of Land, More or Less, 800
F.2d 434, 435 (4th Cir. 1986). But the law also strives to effectuate the
intentions of testators. Ziroveie v. Kordic, 101 Nev. 740, 741, 709 P.24
1022, 1023 (1985). It is unmistakable that in enacting NRS 192.370, the

 

"Moreover, if Palm's interpretation of NRS 134.120 were credited, a
testator's disinheritance of all heirs would always amount to a useless
gesture, despite the Legislature's clearly expressed intent in NRS 182,370
to provide for the enforcement of disinheritance provisions. See Universal
Electric v. Labor Comm'r, 109 Nev. 127, 131, 847 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1993)

[T]he intent of a statute will prevail over the literal sense of its words.”).

 

 
Legislature weighed these competing considerations and determined that
testamentary freedom has primacy over the policy disfavoring escheats.
‘Thus, when, as here, a testator disinherits all of his or her heirs, the law's
disfavor of escheats does not prevent an estate from passing to the State.
Accordingly, we conclude that Melton’s estate must escheat to the State.
CONCLUSION

Because the disinheritance clause contained in Melton’s will is
enforceable, we reverse the judgment of the district court. As Melton
disinherited all of his heirs, his estate

  

Bata
daeugla? J
Douglas

a
J.
_
, a
Pickering
, da
ets
>
Parraguirra

\8We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and
conclude that they are without merit.