Title: State v. Oliver

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 10–1751 
 
Filed March 30, 2012 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
CHARLES JAMES DAVID OLIVER, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, Bradley 
McCall, Judge. 
 
Appellant claims sentence of life in prison without parole for a 
second conviction of sexual abuse in the third degree is cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions.  
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold, 
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, 
Assistant Attorney General, Mary L. Benton, County Attorney, and 
Becky S. Goettsch, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
2
ZAGER, Justice. 
Charles Oliver was convicted a second time of third-degree sexual 
abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4(2)(b) (2009).  
Oliver stipulated that he had a prior conviction for third-degree sexual 
abuse under sections 709.1 and 709.4.  Because of his prior conviction, 
Oliver was guilty of a class “A” felony under the enhanced sentencing 
provisions of section 902.14(1), and the district court accordingly 
sentenced Oliver to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  See 
Iowa Code § 902.1 (requiring life without parole for class “A” felonies).  
Oliver appealed, claiming the sentence of life without parole constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa 
Constitution.  Oliver claims the statute is unconstitutional both on its 
face and as applied to him.  We retained jurisdiction, and we now affirm 
Oliver’s sentence. 
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History. 
 
On October 27, 2009, R.A., a thirteen-year-old girl, had an 
argument with her mother.  R.A. called a close family friend, Bryan 
Conley, who lived nearby to ask if she could spend the night.  R.A. did 
not have contact with her father, and according to Conley, R.A., and her 
mother, Conley was a father figure to R.A.  Conley and R.A.’s mother 
agreed that R.A. could spend the night at Conley’s residence.  Conley’s 
long-time friend, Charles Oliver, who was thirty-three years old at the 
time, had been picked up earlier in the evening and spent the night at 
the same house as Conley and R.A.1  The next morning, Conley and his 
fiancée left the house, leaving Oliver and R.A. alone.  While the two were 
                                                 
1Oliver and his wife were separated at the time, and Oliver had been removed 
from his residence. 
 
 
 
3
alone, R.A. told Oliver that she liked him.  They went to the basement 
and had sex on Conley’s bed one or two times.  R.A. then fell asleep.  
Prior to his leaving, Oliver gave R.A. his cell phone number. 
 
Around December 17, R.A.’s mother went through R.A.’s cell-
phone records and found several text messages between R.A. and Oliver.  
R.A’s mother confronted Oliver about these calls and messages and 
Oliver said, “I’m just her friend like Bryan [Conley].”  R.A.’s mother 
reminded Oliver that R.A. was thirteen and he was thirty-three.  Shortly 
thereafter, R.A. told her mother about having sex with Oliver.  R.A.’s 
mother then called the West Des Moines Police Department and reported 
that Oliver was attempting to contact R.A. and may have sexually abused 
her. 
Oliver was in the Polk County jail on an unrelated charge on 
January 8, 2010.  While there, Oliver’s wife confronted him with the 
voicemails R.A. had left for Oliver on his cell phone.  During this 
telephone conversation, Oliver admitted having sex with R.A.2  On April 
8, a warrant was issued for Oliver’s arrest, and he was placed in the 
Guthrie County jail. 
Oliver was charged by trial information with two counts of third-
degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3) and 
709.4(2)(b).  The State subsequently dismissed one count of the 
indictment.  Trial commenced on September 8.  At trial, Oliver denied 
having sex with R.A.  On September 10, 2010, the jury found Oliver 
guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree.  Following the guilty verdict, 
Oliver stipulated that he had a prior conviction for third-degree sexual 
                                                 
2Oliver later told another inmate that he had consensual sex with a thirteen-
year-old and that he did not understand why he would be sentenced to life without 
parole for that offense. 
 
 
 
4
abuse in 2000.  Based upon this admission, the court entered its 
judgment order finding Oliver guilty of the enhanced class “A” felony 
under section 902.14. 
The sentencing hearing was conducted on October 18.  According 
to the presentence investigation report (PSI), Oliver claimed that his prior 
conviction was for consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old victim.  
However, the record reflects that the victim in the first case was fourteen, 
and Oliver’s attorney stated this at sentencing.  At the time of this 
conviction, Oliver would have been twenty-four years of age.  Oliver 
claimed that the earlier victim had a fake ID and that he was residing 
with her.  Oliver’s PSI also revealed an extensive criminal history in 
addition to the sexual abuse convictions, including convictions for theft, 
burglary, terrorism, supplying alcohol to a minor, criminal mischief, 
driving while barred, domestic abuse assault, OWI first offense, 
harassment of a public officer, and violation of the sex offender residency 
law.  In the PSI, Oliver was entitled to provide his version of events.  
According to Oliver, “the punishment really should be shared.  Everyone 
knows right from wrong.” 
At sentencing, the State made a record to support its contention 
that life without parole was an appropriate sentence for Oliver and was 
not cruel and unusual punishment.  The State pointed out Oliver’s 
substantial prior criminal record, his failure to successfully complete his 
probation resulting in revocation and imprisonment, and his failure to 
complete court-ordered sex-offender treatment.  As part of the sentencing 
record, R.A. and her mother gave victim impact statements.  R.A. noted 
she had been in residential treatment for eight months as a result of the 
incident and was continuing in therapy.  She stated that Oliver molested 
her and made her believe he loved her.  She stated, “I was a 13-year–old 
 
 
 
5
little girl and he took my life away . . . .”  R.A.’s mother also provided an 
impact statement expressing how this had affected R.A. 
At sentencing, Oliver’s attorney minimized the offenses in the 
record and claimed life without parole was “completely out of proportion” 
to Oliver’s offense based on the facts of this case and his record.  He 
argued the statute was designed “to capture sexual predators who are 
constantly preying on children or rapists who can’t stop raping.”  During 
his allocution, Oliver stated that he did not think life in prison was 
appropriate because he “didn’t put a gun to anyone’s head.”  The district 
court sentenced Oliver to life without parole pursuant to section 902.14.  
Oliver appealed. 
On appeal, Oliver makes both a facial and as-applied challenge to 
his sentence.  He claims the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. 
II.  Standard of Review and Preservation of Error. 
Oliver claims his sentence violates the State and Federal 
Constitutions and is therefore illegal.  We have held that “[a] defendant 
may challenge an illegal sentence at any time.”  State v. Bruegger, 773 
N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a).  
Regarding our standard of review, “[t]his court reviews constitutional 
claims de novo.”  Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 869. 
Under section 902.14(1), “[a] person commits a class ‘A’ felony if 
the person commits a second or subsequent offense involving any 
combination of” second-degree sexual abuse, third-degree sexual abuse, 
or lascivious acts with a child.  Iowa Code § 902.14(1)  A class “A” felon 
faces a life sentence without the possibility of parole “unless the governor 
commutes the sentence to a term of years.”  Id. § 902.1.  Oliver claims 
 
 
 
6
that section 902.14 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.  
Though Oliver cites to both the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, he 
explicitly limits his challenge to the Iowa Constitution, claiming that the 
Federal Constitution does not afford any additional protection.  See 
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 886 n.9.  However, since Bruegger was decided, 
the United States Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S., 
___, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), a case which sheds new 
light on the federal framework for the cruel and unusual punishment 
analysis.  In light of the recently clarified framework, we will analyze 
Oliver’s claim under both the state and federal constitutional provisions 
that prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. 
III.  The 
Current 
State 
of 
Federal 
Cruel 
and 
Unusual 
Punishment Jurisprudence. 
It is important to clarify the terminology of cruel and unusual 
punishment jurisprudence.  Following Graham, unlike other areas of 
constitutional law, the federal lexicon for Eighth Amendment analysis no 
longer includes the terms “facial challenge” and “as-applied challenge.”  
Instead, the defendant must challenge his sentence under the 
“categorical” approach or make a “gross proportionality challenge to [the] 
particular defendant’s sentence.”  See Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837. 
Oliver claims section 902.14 is “unconstitutional on its face.”  To 
support this claim, Oliver proceeds through a three-step analysis.  Step 
one requires us to compare the severity of the punishment to the gravity 
of the crime to determine if the sentence leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.  Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873.  If this threshold step 
is satisfied, steps two and three require the court to engage in an 
 
 
 
7
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analysis to determine whether 
the sentence is in fact grossly disproportionate and therefore a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.  See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22, 30, 
123 S. Ct. 1179, 1186, 1190, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108, 118, 123 (2003); 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. 
Ed. 2d 836, 871 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment) (“A better reading of our cases leads to the conclusion that 
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only 
in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed 
and 
the 
sentence 
imposed 
leads 
to 
an 
inference 
of 
gross 
disproportionality.”).  In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he 
approach in cases such as Harmelin and Ewing is suited for considering 
a gross proportionality challenge to a particular defendant’s sentence 
. . . .”  Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837 
(emphasis added).  Thus, under the federal framework as clarified in 
Graham, the three-step approach that Oliver seeks to use in his “facial” 
challenge is actually the approach the United States Supreme Court 
would take when evaluating a challenge to a particular defendant’s 
sentence. 
The Supreme Court took a different approach when reviewing a 
“categorical” challenge to a term-of-years sentence.  See id.  The 
approach taken in Graham was based on the framework and analysis 
developed in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 171 
L. Ed. 2d 525 (2008), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 
161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 
2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002).  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23, 176 L. 
Ed. 2d at 837.  Under the categorical approach, the question is whether 
a particular sentencing practice violates the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  The 
 
 
 
8
Supreme Court looked to “objective indicia of national consensus” 
regarding the use of a particular punishment, and also made an 
independent analysis of constitutionality of the penalty based on “the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and 
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.”  
Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2023, 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837, 841.   
As part of this independent analysis, the Supreme Court “also 
considers whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate 
penological goals.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 841.  
The Supreme Court has used the “categorical” approach to determine 
that a death sentence is always cruel and unusual punishment for the 
crime of child rape when the victim did not die or death was not 
intended.  See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 412, 128 S. Ct. at 2646, 171 L. Ed. 
2d at 534.  It has also determined that the death penalty is always cruel 
and unusual punishment when imposed on minors or the mentally 
challenged.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79, 125 S. Ct. at 1200, 161 L. 
Ed. 2d at 28; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2252, 153 L. Ed. 2d 
at 350.  In Graham, the Supreme Court applied the “categorical” 
approach for the first time outside the context of the death penalty and 
held that life without parole was an unconstitutional punishment for a 
nonhomicide crime committed when the offender was under eighteen 
years old.  Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 2034, 176 L. Ed. 
2d at 837, 850.  We will now proceed to Oliver’s categorical and 
particularized challenges under the federal framework. 
IV.  Categorical Challenge Under the Federal Constitution. 
We start by noting that Oliver has not technically made a 
“categorical challenge” to his sentence.  However, he has argued that life 
without parole for a violation of section 902.14 is unconstitutional “on its 
 
 
 
9
face.”  We will treat this argument as a categorical challenge under the 
federal framework.  As noted above, categorical challenges to a particular 
sentence can be based on either the characteristics of the crime or the 
criminal.  In this case, Oliver argues life without parole is an 
unconstitutional penalty for a violation of section 902.14.  Following the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in Graham, we will first look for evidence of a 
national consensus against the use of this penalty for this crime.  See 
Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2023, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837.  We 
will then move on to an independent analysis where we consider the 
culpability of the offenders, as well as the severity of their crimes, and 
whether legitimate penological goals are served by the punishment of life 
without parole.  See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 841. 
A.  A National Consensus.  Section 902.14 makes a second or 
subsequent conviction of second-degree sexual abuse, third-degree 
sexual abuse or lascivious acts with a child a class “A” felony.  The acts 
that trigger section 902.14 are acts contained in sections 709.3, 709.4, 
709.8(1), and 709.8(2).  Iowa Code § 902.14.  Violations of section 709.3 
include acts of sexual abuse where the person displays a dangerous 
weapon, or uses or threatens force creating a substantial risk of death or 
serious injury to any person; the victim is under the age of twelve, or the 
person is aided or abetted by others and the sex act is committed by 
force or against the will of the victim.  Id. § 709.3.  Violations of section 
709.4 include sex acts done by force or against the will of the victim, sex 
acts between persons not cohabiting as husband and wife, where the 
victim is suffering from a mental defect which precludes giving consent, 
or the victim is twelve or thirteen years of age, or the victim is fourteen or 
fifteen years of age and the perpetrator is either a member of the same 
household, is related to the victim, exploits a position of authority over 
 
 
 
10
the victim, or is four or more years older than the victim.  Id. § 709.4(1–
2).  Violations of section 709.4 also include performing a sex act on a 
victim who is under the influence of a controlled substance and the 
perpetrator knows or should have known the victim is incapable of 
consent.  Id. § 709.4(3).  Violations of sections 709.8(1) and (2) involve 
fondling a child or permitting or causing a child to fondle the perpetrator.  
Id. § 709.8.  The statute shows the legislature’s clear intent to deal with 
repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. 
“[T]he 
‘clearest 
and 
most 
reliable 
objective 
evidence 
of 
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.’ ”  Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2023, 176 L. Ed. 2d 
at 837 (citation omitted).  As Oliver’s brief demonstrates, Iowa is not an 
outlier by punishing a second or subsequent conviction of statutory rape 
with life in prison.  Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New 
York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as 
the federal government, authorize life in prison for those convicted of 
sexual offenses against children on two or three separate occasions, 
though not all these states also remove the possibility of parole.3  As 
                                                 
3See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(1) (2006) (mandating life in prison for a second sex 
conviction where a minor was the victim, unless death is imposed); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 13-705(C), (D), (I) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2012 of 2d Reg. Sess.) (mandating 
life without parole for at least thirty-five years for a third or subsequent conviction); Cal. 
Penal Code § 667.71(West, Westlaw through ch. 7 of 2012 Reg. Sess.) (imposing a 
sentence of twenty-five years to life for a second or subsequent conviction); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-35b, 53a-40(b), (i) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Supp.) (imposing a 
life sentence on persistent sexual offenders and defining a life sentence as a sixty-year 
sentence); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4205A(a) (authorizing a sentence of twenty-five years 
to life for a second offense or any offense where the victim is less then fourteen years of 
age) (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2011, chs. 1–203); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-42-4-
3(a)(1), 35-50-2-8.5(b) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess.) (making sexual 
intercourse with a person under age fourteen a class “A” felony if the perpetrator is over 
twenty-one and authorizing the prosecution to seek a life without parole (LWOP) 
sentence for a second such offence); Iowa Code § 902.14; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
 
 
 
11
Oliver notes, in six states and the federal government, life without parole 
(LWOP) is the exclusive penalty for certain repeat offenders.4  Three more 
states 
authorize 
life 
without 
parole 
in 
certain 
circumstances.5  
Connecticut allows for parole for certain repeat sex offenders, but only 
after they have served sixty years.6  These statutes contain small 
differences, such as the age of the victim or the age difference between 
the victim and the offender.  However, it is clear that Iowa is anything 
                                                                                                                                                 
§ 15:537(B) (West, Westlaw through 1st Ext. and Reg. Sess.) (mandating LWOP for a 
third sexual offense); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.3455(4) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess. through ch. 125) (mandating life with the possibility of parole if a person is 
convicted of certain crimes and has two previous sex offenses); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 558.018(2)–(6) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Ext. Sess.) (mandating LWOP for a 
second conviction of certain offenses and life with the possibility of parole for a second 
conviction of other offenses); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 632-A:2, -A:10-a(III) (Westlaw 
through ch. 272 of the 2011 Reg. Sess.) (mandating LWOP for those convicted of a third 
offense); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-9-11, 31-18-25 (A), (B), (F) (West, Westlaw through 2011 
legislation) (mandating life in prison for a second conviction of criminal sexual 
penetration and not allowing parole if the victim of each offense is under thirteen); N.Y. 
Penal Law § 70.07(4) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2011, chs. 1 to 604) (mandating a 
sentence of twenty-five years to life for a second sexual assault against a child); Okla. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 51.1a (West, Westlaw through ch. 385 of the 1st Reg. Sess. 2011) 
(“Any person convicted of . . . sexual abuse of a child after having been convicted of . . . 
sexual abuse of a child shall be sentenced to life without parole.”); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 9718.2(a)(2), 9795.1(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (mandating 
life in prison for a third or subsequent conviction of a variety of sexual offenses); Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.570, 9A.44.076 (West, Westlaw through 2011 2d 
Spec. Sess & 2012 legislation effective through Mar. 6, 2012) (mandating LWOP for 
persistent offenders and defining persistent offenders as those with a second conviction 
for a variety of crimes); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 939.62(2m)(b)(2), (2m)(c), 948.02 (West, 
Westlaw through 2011 Act 115) (mandating LWOP for persistent repeaters, which are 
those are those convicted of a second serious child sex offense). 
4See 18 U.S.C § 3559(e)(1); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:537(B); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 609.3455; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 632-A:2, -A:10-a(III); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 
§ 51.1a; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.570, 9A.44.076; Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 939.62(2m)(b)(2), (2m)(c), 948.02. 
5Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-8.5; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 558.018; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-
9-11, 31-18-25. 
6See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-35b, 53a-40(b), (i). 
 
 
 
12
but an “outlier” when it comes to the severe treatment of repeat sexual 
offenders who target children, use force, or prey on the incapacitated.7 
The Supreme Court has also noted that “ ‘[t]here are measures of 
consensus other than legislation[,]’ ” and, therefore, “[a]ctual sentencing 
practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into consensus.”  
Id. at ___, S. Ct. at 2023, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 838 (citation omitted).  Neither 
party has provided statistics of how many people are currently serving 
life without parole sentences for repeat sex crimes.  Given the diverse 
language contained in these statutes, and the fact that triggering crimes 
may be worded in slightly different ways, or require a different number of 
convictions to trigger life without parole, such a survey is likely not a 
feasible option.  However, we can look to other states’ judicial review of 
these statutes to inform our analysis of whether a national consensus 
has formed that life without parole for repeat sex offenders is cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
Oliver points to only two cases that support his claim that Iowa 
punishes the type of conduct he engaged in more harshly than other 
jurisdictions.  In State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc), the 
Arizona Supreme Court reviewed a nineteen-year-old male’s sentence of 
“fifty-two years in prison for having non-coerced sex with two post-
pubescent teenage girls.”  Davis, 79 P. 3d at 66, 71.  Davis was convicted 
of four counts and received a thirteen-year sentence for each count, 
which, by law, had to be served consecutively.  Id. at 67.  The court 
found the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crimes.  Id. at 72, 
75.  However, the court noted the defendant did not have an adult 
                                                 
7As Oliver notes, many other states enhance the sentences of repeat offenders in 
general, while not singling out repeat sex offenders.  This further supports the idea that 
there is not a national consensus against using enhanced punishment for recidivist sex 
offenders. 
 
 
 
13
criminal record and had not previously committed any crimes against 
children.  Id. at 72.  The Arizona Supreme Court later noted that the 
holding in Davis “rested on the ‘specific facts and circumstances of 
Davis’s offenses.’ ”  State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 386 (Ariz. 2006) (en 
banc) (quoting Davis, 79 P.3d at 74–75).  In Berger, the defendant was 
convicted of twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor for 
possession of child pornography depicting a minor under the age of 
fifteen.  Id. at 379.  At the time of his arrest, the defendant did not have a 
criminal record.  Id. at 387.  Because the child was under age fifteen, the 
offense was characterized as a dangerous offense against children, and 
Berger’s sentences had to be served consecutively without any possibility 
of parole.  Id. at 379.  The court rejected Berger’s cruel and unusual 
punishment claims, refusing to consider the consecutive sentences in the 
proportionality decision, as the court had done in Davis.  Id. at 385.  The 
Berger decision limits Davis’s holding to the facts of that case, making 
the holding more like an as-applied challenge, as opposed to a facial 
challenge.  Id. at 387.  Oliver’s long criminal history, combined with his 
past sexual crime against a child, make Davis clearly distinguishable. 
Oliver also cites Bradshaw v. State, 671 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. 2008), as 
the only decision to hold a recidivist sex offender sentence enhancement 
was cruel and unusual.  That case involved a statute that mandated a 
life sentence after a second conviction for failure to register as a sex 
offender.  Bradshaw, 671 S.E.2d at 487.  Georgia was the only state to 
impose such a harsh penalty.  Id. at 491.  Only two other states 
authorized a penalty over ten years and many authorized only a fraction 
of that amount.  Id. at 491–92.  The Georgia court noted its punishment 
was the “clear outlier.”  Id. at 492. 
 
 
 
14
Aside from Davis and Bradshaw, Oliver has not provided this court 
with any other examples of state supreme courts declaring enhanced 
punishments for sexual offenders to be unconstitutional.  By Oliver’s 
own admission, Bradshaw is the only case to declare an enhanced 
punishment for a recidivist to be cruel and unusual.  The state and 
federal courts have both reviewed a Washington statute that is nearly 
identical to Iowa’s.  Washington’s statute imposes LWOP under a “two 
strikes” law that is similar to section 902.14.  See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 9.94A.030(37)(b), 9.94A.570, 9A.44.076.8  In State v. Gimarelli, 20 
P.3d 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), the Washington Court of Appeals upheld 
Washington’s two-strikes law where the defendant’s first conviction was 
for forcible rape of an adult and his second offense was attempted child 
molestation in the first degree.  Gimarelli, 20 P.3d at 436.  The victim was 
an eleven-year-old girl.  Id.  The court noted, “The Legislature has a right 
to discourage such behavior and protect the public from such offenders.”  
Id. 
On de novo review, the Ninth Circuit also found the two strikes law 
was constitutional.  Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011).  In Norris, the defendant was 
sentenced to life without parole for a conviction of first-degree child 
molestation.  Norris, 622 F.3d at 1279.  Because he was convicted of 
child molestation ten years earlier, Washington law mandated a sentence 
                                                 
8Under Washington law, a person is guilty of second degree child rape if “the 
person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least twelve years old but less 
than fourteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at 
least thirty-six months older than the victim.”  Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 9A.44.076(1).  
Two convictions of second-degree child rape makes one a “persistent offender.”  Id. 
§ 9.94A.030(37)(b).  A persistent offender receives a life sentence without the possibility 
of parole.  Id. § 9.94A.570. 
 
 
 
15
of life without parole.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit discussed the Washington 
Court of Appeals’ interjurisdictional analysis which concluded that  
“[m]ost states that have ‘two strikes’ laws require sex 
offenses with some degree of penetration and infliction of 
serious bodily harm.”  In addition, according to the state 
appellate court, only “[a] small[] number of states would 
impose a sentence of life in prison without parole for a 
second offense after a similar prior offense.  For example, 
Georgia, Montana, New Mexico, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin all have two strikes laws for some types of sexual 
offenses.” 
Id. at 1284 (quoting State v. Norris, 116 Wash. App. 1006, 2003 WL 
827647, at *3 (2003)).  The Washington Court of Appeals went on to note 
that this factor alone was not dispositive because the intrajurisdictional 
analysis revealed this type of sentence was imposed for other crimes in 
Washington.  Id. at 1283.  The court held the sentence was not grossly 
disproportionate.  Id. at 1284.  Norris filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Id. 
The Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether upholding 
Norris’s sentence was “ ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of’ the proportionality principle” embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment.  Id. at 1287.  Because the Washington court had only 
analyzed the law under the Washington Constitution, the Ninth Circuit 
engaged in a de novo review under the Eighth Amendment’s framework, 
the same framework used in Iowa.  See id. at 1283, 1289–90; see also 
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883.  The Ninth Circuit noted that even though 
life without parole was an incredibly harsh sentence, it was “justified by 
the gravity of [Norris’s] most recent offense and criminal history.”  Norris, 
622 F.3d at 1291.  After noting the particular danger the legislature 
sought to avoid by harshly punishing recidivist sex offenders, the court 
concluded, stating  
 
 
 
16
Norris’s sentence “reflects a rational legislative judgment, 
entitled to deference,” that sex offenders who have 
committed a serious or violent sex offense and who continue 
to commit such sex offenses must be permanently 
incapacitated.  Norris’s thus is not “ ‘the rare case in which a 
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 
sentences 
imposed 
leads 
to 
an 
inference 
of 
gross 
disproportionality,’ ” and we need go no further. 
Id. at 1296 (citations omitted). 
 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld Wisconsin’s “two-strikes” 
law for sexual offenders in 2004, stating simply “the legislature ‘could 
reasonably determine that the need for incarceration without the 
possibility of parole is especially acute when children, a particularly 
vulnerable segment of the population, are the explicit targets of the 
offenses.’ ”  State v. Lewis, 690 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) 
(quoting State v. Radke, 657 N.W.2d 66, 75 (Wis. 2003)).  Courts that 
have found sentences unconstitutional when applied to minors still note 
those same sentences would be appropriate when applied to adults.  See, 
e.g., Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 509 (Ga. 2007) (“[W]e must 
acknowledge that Wilson’s crime does not rise to the level of culpability of 
adults who prey on children and that, for the law to punish Wilson as it 
would an adult, with [an] extraordinarily harsh punishment . . . appears 
to be grossly disproportionate to his crime.”).  In short, national 
consensus seems to support, rather than oppose, the imposition of harsh 
sentences, including life without parole, for recidivist sex offenders. 
 
Oliver notes that the penalty of life without parole is reserved for 
very few crimes in Iowa and is imposed only when an offender commits 
first-degree murder, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree kidnapping, a 
violation of section 902.14, or a violation of section 124.401D.9  Under 
                                                 
9Though his argument is framed under the “intrajurisdictional” component of 
the Harmelin analysis, the fact that life without parole is available for those who commit 
 
 
 
17
section 124.401D, a person over age eighteen who is twice convicted of 
manufacturing methamphetamine for delivery to a minor or twice 
convicted of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it to 
a minor is guilty of a class “A” felony and will be sentenced to life without 
parole.  See Iowa Code § 124.401D; id. § 902.1.  By imposing life without 
parole on those who twice violate one of the prohibitions found in section 
124.401D, the legislature has made it clear that recidivists who 
repeatedly prey on the vulnerability of children will receive Iowa’s 
harshest penalty.  Those who commit sexually based crimes also receive 
lengthy sentences under Iowa law, as evidenced by the penalties imposed 
for a single violation of sections 709.3, 709.4, or 709.8(1) or (2).  In the 
view of the legislature, those who commit sexual crimes also pose special 
recidivist concerns.  In response to those concerns, the legislature has 
established a variety of safeguards that apply only to sexual offenders.  
See Iowa Code §§ 229A.1–.16 (civil commitment of sexually violent 
predators); id. §§ 692A.1–.16 (sex offender registration); id. §§ 903B.1–.10 
(sex offender hormone treatment).  These concerns over recidivist sex 
offenders do not give the legislature free reign to punish sex offenders in 
any way it sees fit, but they do help define “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” which give 
meaning to the Eighth Amendment.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 
S. Ct. 590, 598, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642 (1958).  Iowa’s treatment of sex 
offenders and those who repeatedly prey on children further convinces us 
that there is not a consensus against this harsh penalty for the conduct 
subject to section 902.14. 
                                                                                                                                                 
multiple less serious crimes informs our analysis of whether a consensus has been 
reached that life without parole can only be imposed for the worst crimes. 
 
 
 
18
B.  The Offender’s Culpability and the Goals of Punishment.  In 
addition to considering whether there is a national consensus against the 
punishment based on objective criteria, a reviewing court must also 
make an independent judgment of whether the sentence violates the 
constitution.  Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d 
at 841.  Part of this analysis must determine “whether the challenged 
sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”  Id.  “A sentence 
lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature 
disproportionate to the offense.”  Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 
176 L. Ed. 2d at 843.  The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
four 
legitimate 
penological 
justifications: 
retribution, 
deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  Id.  By making multiple violations of 
sections 709.3, 709.4, and 709.8(1) and (2) a class “A” felony, punishable 
only by life in prison without parole, the legislature has completely 
rejected rehabilitation as a goal of punishment.  See generally Julia Fong 
Sheketoff, State Innovations in Noncapital Proportionality Doctrine, 85 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2209, 2226 (2010) (“LWOP is the only noncapital sentence 
that wholly rejects rehabilitation as a goal of punishment.  The sentence 
is unique in that, by definition, it requires that the offender die in 
prison.”).  However, “[c]riminal punishment can have different goals, and 
choosing among them is within a legislature’s discretion.”  Graham, ___ 
U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 843.  In this case, we are 
reviewing a statute that increases punishment for recidivist sex 
offenders.  The Supreme Court has noted that “[r]ecidivism has long been 
recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment.”  Ewing, 538 
U.S. at 25, 123 S. Ct. at 1188, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 120.  Enhancing 
punishment based on recidivism fulfills the legitimate goals of 
 
 
 
19
incapacitation and deterrence.  Id. at 26, 123 S. Ct. at 1187–88, 155 
L. Ed. 2d at 121. 
When examining retribution, the Supreme Court has stated that 
“the heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be 
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” 
Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 843 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The goal of retribution 
is “restoration of the moral imbalance caused by the offense.”  Id.  In 
order to fully examine the culpability of a person who is subject to 
section 902.14, we feel it is also appropriate to analyze the scope of the 
prior and triggering crimes, as well as the scope of the statute that 
enhances the defendant’s sentence.  Section 902.14, which enhanced 
Oliver’s conviction to a class “A” felony, covers a relatively narrow set of 
conduct.  Only a second violation of section 709.3 (second-degree sexual 
abuse), 709.4 (third-degree sexual abuse) or 709.8(1) and (2) (fondling a 
child or causing a child to fondle the perpetrator) will trigger section 
902.14.  Unenhanced, each of these offenses is a class “B” or “C” felony.  
Iowa Code §§ 709.3, .4, .8.  Also, only a conviction or deferred judgment 
will trigger section 902.14, not an adjudication of juvenile delinquency.  
Id. § 902.14(2).  The Supreme Court has noted that juveniles are less 
culpable than adults.  See Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 
176 L. Ed. 2d at 843–44.  By limiting section 902.14 to convictions as 
opposed to adjudications of delinquency, the legislature has attempted to 
avoid enhancing the punishment of less culpable offenders.  The scope of 
section 902.14 weighs against finding Oliver’s sentence to be cruel and 
unusual. 
Since life without parole serves at least three legitimate goals, and 
is supported by a national consensus, we find the Eighth Amendment 
 
 
 
20
does not categorically ban the imposition of life without parole for 
persons subject to the imposition of section 902.14. 
 
V.  The Challenge to This Particular Defendant’s Sentence 
Under the State and Federal Constitutions. 
Having determined the penalty mandated by section 902.14 does 
not violate any categorical limitations imposed by the State or Federal 
Constitutions, we now turn to Oliver’s claim that the penalty mandated 
by that statute is so grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed 
that following the statute would, in this case, violate the State or Federal 
Constitutions. 
Oliver 
challenges 
his 
sentence 
by 
claiming 
it 
is 
grossly 
disproportionate to his crime using the three-step analysis first 
articulated in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
637 (1983).  See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873.  The first step in this 
analysis, sometimes referred to as the threshold test, requires a 
reviewing court to determine whether a defendant’s sentence leads to an 
inference of gross disproportionality.  Id.  “This preliminary test involves 
a balancing of the gravity of the crime against the severity of the 
sentence.”  Id.  If, and only if, the threshold test is satisfied, a court then 
proceeds to steps two and three of the analysis.  Id.  These steps require 
the court to engage in an intrajurisdictional analysis “comparing the 
challenged 
sentence 
to 
sentences 
for 
other 
crimes 
within 
the 
jurisdiction.”  Id.  Next, the court engages in an interjurisdictional 
analysis, “comparing sentences in other jurisdictions for the same or 
similar crimes.”  Id. 
At the time Bruegger was decided, we observed that the role of 
individualized challenges under the Federal Constitution was unclear.  
See id. at 874–76.  We noted that in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 
 
 
 
21
S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980), and in Solem, the Supreme Court 
favored an individualized challenge to a defendant’s sentence outside of 
the capital punishment context.  Id. at 875.  However, we noted that in 
Harmelin the plurality of the Court seemed to retreat from allowing 
individualized challenges under the Eighth Amendment.  Bruegger, 773 
N.W.2d at 875 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995, 111 S. Ct. at 2701–02, 
115 L. Ed. 2d at 865).  In a concurring opinion joined by two of the five 
justices that comprised the plurality in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy 
discussed the defendant’s challenge as “a comparison of his crime with 
his sentence.”  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S. Ct. at 2707, 115 L. 
Ed. 2d at 872 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  Though 
Justice Kennedy stopped short of requiring the type of individualized 
sentencing procedure that is required in capital cases, his concurrence 
makes clear that the three-step analysis the Supreme Court used in 
Solem requires a comparison between a defendant’s sentence and his 
particular crime.  Id. at 1006, 111 S. Ct. at 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 872. 
Justice Kennedy’s use of the three-part test on an individualized 
basis outside of the capital punishment context gained support in the 
Supreme Court’s next major Eighth Amendment decision.  In Ewing, the 
defendant claimed his sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison 
under California’s three strikes law was grossly disproportionate to his 
crime: the theft of three golf clubs.  Id. at 18–20, 123 S. Ct. at 1183–85, 
155 L. Ed. 2d at 115–16.  Though, as in Harmelin, no single opinion 
commanded a majority, the majority of the justices endorsed the fact-
specific analysis Justice Kennedy advocated for in Harmelin.  Id. at 23–
24, 123 S. Ct. at 1187, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 119 (“The proportionality 
principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence [in 
Harmelin] guide our application of the Eighth Amendment in [this 
 
 
 
22
context].”); see also Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 876 (“[A] majority of the 
Supreme Court in Ewing seems to approve of an as-applied challenge to 
an otherwise valid statute under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
After describing the back-and-forth state of as-applied challenges 
under the Federal Constitution, our Bruegger opinion then turned to the 
possibility of an as-applied challenge under the Iowa Constitution.  
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884.  We noted “that many of our cases reject 
individualized determinations in connection with cruel-and-unusual-
punishment challenges in a number of contexts.”  Id. at 884.  However, 
we then stated that “we do not believe that a defendant can never 
challenge a sentence as cruel and unusual as applied.”  Id.  We held 
that, based on the unique factors of his case, Bruegger was allowed to 
make an individualized showing that his sentence amounted to cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution.  Id.  Since “the 
current record [was] simply inadequate to resolve the issue,” we 
remanded the case to the district court “for a new sentencing hearing to 
allow Bruegger and the State to present evidence as to the 
constitutionality of [the statute] as applied to the defendant.”  Id. at 886. 
The next year, the United States Supreme Court decided Graham.  
In Graham, the Supreme Court stated that the three-step analysis used 
in Harmelin and Ewing is not suited for cases where a particular 
sentencing practice is in question, which, in Graham, was the practice of 
sentencing minors to life in prison for nonhomicide crimes.  ___ U.S. at 
___, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837.  Instead, the Court held 
the three-step analysis set forth in Solem “is suited for considering a 
 
 
 
23
gross proportionality challenge to a particular defendant’s sentence.”10  
Id. 
By labeling the three-step analysis as a challenge based on a 
particular defendant’s sentence, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham 
is now consistent with our holding in Bruegger.  Therefore, under both 
the State and Federal Constitutions, a defendant is allowed to challenge 
his sentence by “emphasizing the specific facts of the case.”  Bruegger, 
773 N.W.2d at 884; see also Graham, ___ U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 
176 L. Ed. 2d at 837. 
Having determined that a defendant may bring an as-applied 
challenge under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, we now 
turn to the question of how such a challenge should proceed.  Section 
902.14 mandates the sentence of LWOP be imposed on Oliver.  Our task 
is to determine whether following that mandate in this case would 
amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 
Mandatory imposition of the death penalty has been held 
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.  See Johnson v. 
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 360–61, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2665, 125 L. Ed. 2d 290, 
301 (1993).  This is because “[c]apital punishment must be limited to 
those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious 
crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of 
execution.’ ”  Roper, 543 U.S at 568, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 
21 (citation omitted).  Thus, prior to sentencing an offender to death, a 
                                                 
10In his concurring opinion in Graham, Chief Justice Roberts went so far as to 
argue that the categorical principle should not be expanded beyond the capital 
punishment context and that all noncapital challenges should be based on the 
particular facts of each case.  See Graham, ___ U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2038–39, 176 L. 
Ed. 2d at 853 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 
 
 
24
court must make an individualized determination that the offender is 
worthy of capital punishment. 
The Constitution does not require an individualized sentencing 
proceeding outside the capital punishment context.  Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 
(1976) (noting that, outside the capital punishment context, “[t]he 
prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally 
reflects 
simply 
enlightened 
policy 
rather 
than 
a 
constitutional 
imperative”).  Unlike mandatory death sentences, mandatory LWOP 
sentences have been upheld.11  See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 996, 
111 S. Ct. at 2683, 2702, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 843, 865 (upholding a 
mandatory LWOP sentence of possession of 672 grams of cocaine).  Even 
though the Eighth Amendment does not require individualized 
sentencing in noncapital cases, a defendant may challenge a mandatory, 
noncapital sentence as grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.  
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S. Ct. at 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 872 
(Kennedy, J, concurring).  Bruegger is an example of such a challenge. 
In Bruegger, we held the Iowa Constitution allowed an as-applied 
challenge under the three-part test.  We remanded Bruegger because 
“[t]he Solem-type approach for evaluating Bruegger’s cruel-and-unusual-
punishment claim cannot be applied without a proper record.”  773 
N.W.2d at 886.  Creating a proper record would require giving the 
defendant an opportunity to fully explain the facts and circumstances of 
                                                 
11The United States Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest that a 
mandatory LWOP sentence may be more likely to be constitutional than one that is left 
to the discretion of the sentencing court.  See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006, 111 S. 
Ct. at 2708, 115 L. Ed. 2d at  872–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To set aside 
petitioner’s mandatory sentence would require rejection not of the judgment of a single 
jurist . . . but rather the collective wisdom of the . . . Legislature and, as a consequence, 
the . . . citizenry.”). 
 
 
 
25
his prior offense.  Id. at 885.  It would also involve giving the State a 
chance to present evidence of the impact on the victim and her family, 
the defendant’s lack of remorse, his inability to respond to rehabilitative 
services, and the need to incapacitate the defendant.  Id. at 886.  In this 
case, the court addressed the constitutionality of the sentence mandated 
by section 902.14 prior to sentencing.  At the sentencing hearing, both 
Oliver and the State presented the type of evidence we felt was lacking in 
Bruegger.  Remand in this case is therefore unnecessary. 
In Bruegger, we 
appl[ied] the general principles as outlined by the United 
States Supreme Court for addressing a cruel-and-unusual-
punishment challenge under the Iowa Constitution. 
Even so, we do not necessarily apply the federal 
standards in the same way as the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Id. at 883 (citations omitted).  To this end, we reiterate “that review of 
criminal sentences for ‘gross disproportionality’ under the Iowa 
Constitution should not be a ‘toothless’ review and adopt a more 
stringent review than would be available under the Federal Constitution.”  
Id.  Since Oliver has challenged his sentence under the Iowa 
Constitution, we will apply our more stringent gross-disproportionality 
review to the facts of his case. 
 
We now turn to the threshold inquiry to determine whether Oliver’s 
sentence of life without parole leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality to Oliver’s crime.  If the sentence does not create an 
inference of gross disproportionality, then “no further analysis is 
necessary.”  State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 670 (Iowa 2005) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Our principal task at this stage 
 
 
 
26
is to “balanc[e] the gravity of the crime against the severity of the 
sentence.”  Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873. 
There are some general principles we must consider when 
reviewing a defendant’s sentence to determine whether it is “grossly 
disproportionate” to the crime committed.  The first is that we owe 
substantial deference to the penalties the legislature has established for 
various crimes.  As noted earlier, “[c]riminal punishment can have 
different goals, and choosing among them is within a legislature’s 
discretion.”  Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 
843; see also Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872–73; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 
670; State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000).  We give the 
legislature deference because “[l]egislative judgments are generally 
regarded as the most reliable objective indicators of community 
standards for purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel 
and unusual.”  See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873. 
The second principle is that it is rare that a sentence will be so 
grossly disproportionate to the crime as to satisfy the threshold inquiry 
and warrant further review.  State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 749 (Iowa 
2006) (citing State v. Lara, 580 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 1998)); see also 
Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d at 669.  This is true even though our review is 
more stringent than is required under the Federal Constitution.  See 
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883. 
The third principle is that a recidivist offender is more culpable 
and thus more deserving of a longer sentence than a first-time offender.  
See Solem, 463 U.S. at 296, 103 S. Ct. at 3013, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 653 (“[A] 
State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes 
a first offender.”).  Therefore, when determining the gravity of the 
offender’s crime, a district court can consider the offender’s criminal 
 
 
 
27
history.  See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29, 123 S. Ct. at 1189–90, 155 
L. Ed. 2d at 122 (“In weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must 
place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long history 
of felony recidivism.  Any other approach would fail to accord proper 
deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s 
choice of sanctions.”); see also Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 874.  Lengthy 
sentences are more likely to be constitutional when imposed on offenders 
with lengthy criminal histories.  See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29–30, 123 S. Ct. 
1189–90, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 122–23. 
Finally, we note that the unique features of a case can “converge to 
generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality.”  Bruegger, 773 
N.W.2d at 884.  The unique factors at issue in Bruegger were “a broadly 
framed crime, the permissible use of preteen adjudications as prior 
convictions to enhance the crime, and a dramatic sentence enhancement 
for repeat offenders.”12  Id.  Thus, we must examine the unique 
combination of the features in Oliver’s case as part of our threshold 
determination regarding the inference of gross disproportionality. 
With these general principles in mind, we now turn to Oliver’s 
claim that section 902.14 imposes an unconstitutional penalty on him.  
Oliver was sentenced to life without parole for two convictions of third-
degree sexual abuse.  As we noted in Bruegger, third degree sexual abuse 
includes what is commonly termed “statutory rape” and is a broadly 
framed crime: 
The crime of statutory rape covers a wide variety of 
circumstances, from Romeo and Juliet relationships to much 
more objectionable situations involving the luring of 
                                                 
12In Bruegger, these factors converged to convince us that the defendant was 
entitled to bring an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the Iowa Constitution.  
773 N.W.2d at 885.  As noted above, it is now clear that such a challenge can be 
brought, regardless of the presence or absence of these factors. 
 
 
 
28
youngsters 
by 
older 
individuals 
using 
manipulative 
techniques, positions of authority, threats of violence, and 
other aggravating factors. 
Id. at 884–85.  While a sexual relationship between two preteen 
children—which was Bruegger’s first offense—may resemble a “Romeo 
and Juliet relationship,” Oliver’s first and present offenses are “much 
more objectionable situations.”  Id.  While the only criminal aspect of the 
sexual intercourse between R.A. and Oliver was their extreme age 
difference, this case is not the type of circumstance that leads us to infer 
that section 902.14 is grossly disproportionate to Oliver. 
At the time of Oliver’s first offense, he was twenty-four years old, 
and his victim was fourteen or fifteen years old.  At the time of his 
present offense, he was thirty-three years old and his victim was thirteen 
years old.  Conley, Oliver’s long-time friend, was a father figure to R.A.  
R.A. was only at Conley’s home that evening because of difficulties in her 
own home life.  Oliver knew the nature of the relationship between R.A. 
and Conley.  According to R.A.’s testimony, Oliver told R.A. that he loved 
her and was going to leave his wife.  After the incident, Oliver continued 
to contact R.A., at one point inviting her to come to his hotel room.  In 
R.A.’s own words at the sentencing hearing, 
[B]ecause of this incident, I went to treatment for eight 
months and I’m doing therapy at Children and Families of 
Iowa . . . .   
. . . . 
. . .  [W]e had to move out of our own home.  I went to 
about four different schools.  I was in residential treatment 
and I would like you to know that this man molested me.  He 
made me believe that he loved me and then had sex with me 
and then left.  I trusted him.  I was a thirteen-year-old little 
girl and he took my life away . . . . 
 
 
 
29
This is the type of exploitation section 709.4 was designed to prevent, not 
conduct that was inadvertently caught by a broadly written statute.  See 
id. at 884. 
In addition to analyzing the scope of the instant crime, we feel it is 
also appropriate to analyze the scope of the statute that enhances the 
defendant’s sentence.  Like Bruegger, Oliver faces a lengthy sentence 
after being convicted of the broadly framed crime of third-degree sexual 
abuse.  Id.  However, Bruegger’s sentence was enhanced under section 
901A.2, whereas Oliver’s enhancement is under section 902.14.  Id. at 
885.  Section 901A.2(3) enhances the sentence of anyone convicted of a 
“sexually predatory offense” that is a felony if that person has a prior 
conviction for a “sexually predatory offense.”  Section 901A.1(1) defines a 
“sexually predatory offense” as any violation of chapter 709, the “C” 
felonies of sexual exploitation of a minor, enticing a minor under the age 
of thirteen away or pandering involving a minor, and any attempted 
violation of any of those statutes.  Adjudications of delinquency are 
included in the definition of “prior convictions.”  Iowa Code § 901A.1(2). 
Section 902.14 covers a much narrower set of conduct.  To trigger 
this section, both the predicate and triggering offenses must be violations 
of section 709.3 (second-degree sexual abuse), 709.4 (third-degree sexual 
abuse) or 709.8(1) and (2) (fondling a child or causing a child to fondle 
the perpetrator).  Id. § 902.14(1).  Each of these offenses is, on its own, a 
class “B” or “C” felony.  See id. §§ 709.3, .4, .8(1–2).  Also, only a 
conviction or deferred judgment will trigger section 902.14, not an 
adjudication of juvenile delinquency.  Compare id. § 902.14(2), with id. 
§ 901A.1(2). 
There are fewer predicate crimes that make a defendant eligible for 
an enhanced punishment under section 902.14.  Unlike section 901A.2, 
 
 
 
30
which includes “D” felonies and serious and aggravated misdemeanors as 
predicate offenses, the predicate offense under section 902.14 must be a 
“B” or “C” felony.  Compare id. § 901A.2, with § 902.14(1).  Also, only 
convictions and deferred judgments, as opposed to adjudications of 
delinquency, trigger section 902.14.  Section 902.14 is not as broadly 
framed as 901A.2, and thus the scope of this statute generates less 
potential for gross disproportionality than section 901A.2.  See Bruegger, 
773 N.W.2d at 884. 
Another factor considered in Bruegger was the defendant’s “age as 
a preteen when the predicate offense was committed.”  Id. at 885.  If 
Oliver were a preteen when his predicate offense was committed, this 
might contribute to an inference that life without parole was grossly 
disproportionate to the crime.  However, Oliver was first convicted of 
third-degree sexual assault when he was twenty-four years old.  He was 
convicted again at age thirty-four.  Unlike Bruegger, Oliver is not seeking 
“to show that the consequences of his adolescent act become grossly 
disproportional to his sentence for the adult crime.”  Id. at 885.  Oliver’s 
sentence is not based on any crimes he committed in his teens.  His 
crimes were both committed after entering adulthood.  Oliver’s age at the 
time of his first offense does not support an inference that this sentence 
is grossly disproportionate. 
Oliver’s additional criminal history does not favor an inference of 
gross disproportionality.  According to his PSI, Oliver has nineteen prior 
convictions in the last sixteen years.  Oliver’s convictions for supplying 
alcohol to a minor and a sex offender residency violation are particularly 
troubling given his current conviction.  Offenses relating to Oliver’s 
status as a sex offender are not merely technicalities; the legislature has 
imposed these requirements because of the “realistic concerns related to 
 
 
 
31
offender recidivism” and the need to limit a recidivist’s opportunities to 
reoffend.  Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 670. 
After his first conviction for third-degree sexual abuse, Oliver’s 
probation was revoked because of his failure to comply with the 
requirements of supervised probation.  Records also indicate that he 
failed to successfully complete his court-ordered sex offender treatment 
programming.  Oliver claimed at sentencing that he stopped participating 
in the class because he had been sent back to prison and was therefore 
“not required to finish the class.” 
At sentencing, Oliver argued life without parole was an 
inappropriate sentence because, as he stated, 
I didn’t put a gun to anyone’s head.  I didn’t kidnap 
anybody.  I didn’t rob a bank.  I didn’t shoot anybody.  I see 
a lot of things in the paper about stuff like that and those 
are people who are getting life sentences. 
He also stated, “I’m sorry for what I put everybody through, including 
myself and my children, [R.A.’s mother,] and her children.  I mean my 
friends, I put them through hell, other people.”  When asked to write out 
his version of events for the PSI, Oliver simply stated, “I just wanted to 
say that everyone involved in this has suffered but the punishment does 
not fit the crime.  Plus the punishment really should be shared.  
Everyone involved knows right from wrong.”  Oliver’s unwillingness to 
accept responsibility for his actions, or to accept that he has committed a 
serious crime, further convinces us that Oliver’s individualized challenge 
claiming gross disproportionality fails. 
For sixteen years, Oliver has demonstrated an inability to conform 
his conduct to the law.  Some of these violations have been relatively 
minor misdemeanors while others have been felonies.  In particular, 
Oliver has demonstrated an inability to conform his actions to society’s 
 
 
 
32
expectations regarding minors, having been convicted of supplying 
alcohol to a minor and twice convicted of statutory rape.  By violating 
residency requirements imposed on sex offenders, Oliver has also shown 
he is unwilling to comply with the safeguards the legislature has 
mandated to protect children from sexual criminals.  Oliver has not 
acknowledged his crime, nor its severity, claiming that “the punishment 
really should be shared” and that “[e]veryone involved knows right from 
wrong.”  The nature of Oliver’s past and present crimes, the narrow 
scope of section 902.14, and Oliver’s attitude towards his criminal 
behavior lead us to conclude that section 902.14 does not impose a 
grossly disproportionate penalty on Oliver. 
After reviewing Oliver’s case and comparing the gravity of his crime 
to the penalty mandated by the statute, we do not feel that section 
902.14 imposes an unconstitutional punishment on Oliver.  Oliver’s 
sentence does not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality.  Oliver 
has committed multiple crimes as an adult and has an extensive 
criminal history.  He has shown a lack of remorse and an inability to be 
rehabilitated.  Based on the facts of his case, life without parole does not 
strike us as a grossly disproportionate punishment to his crimes.  Since 
the penalty does not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality, we 
need not proceed to steps two and three of the analysis, the 
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons.  Bruegger, 773 
N.W.2d at 873. 
VI.  Disposition. 
Oliver committed third-degree sexual abuse twice in a period of ten 
years.  The legislature has chosen to harshly punish those who 
repeatedly engage in a variety of sex acts with children by imposing 
Iowa’s most severe sentence, life without parole, on them.  Our role is not 
 
 
 
33
to determine what the proper sentence for a crime should be.  Instead, 
we are to review the sentence mandated by the legislature to ensure that 
it is within the protections ensured by the State and Federal 
Constitutions.  In this case, the legislature has chosen to permanently 
confine those who have shown, on multiple occasions, that they are 
unwilling to follow society’s restrictions regarding sexual contact between 
children and adults.  We see no constitutional infirmity in that decision. 
Even if the penalty of life without parole is not categorically 
prohibited for violations of section 902.14, Oliver claims the sentence 
imposed is grossly disproportionate to his particular acts.  Again, we 
disagree.  Oliver committed both of his crimes well beyond his eighteenth 
birthday.  He has committed other crimes that indicate an unwillingness 
to comply with society’s rules regarding both minors and sexual 
behavior.  While Oliver claims that his crimes were not physically violent, 
they are still emotionally, psychologically and physically damaging to the 
child being exploited.  The penalty of life without parole is within the 
boundaries imposed upon the legislature’s discretion by the state and 
federal constitutions, and the penalty is not cruel and unusual when 
considered in light of the particular facts of Oliver’s case. 
 
The sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.