Title: Henry v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1053 
____________ 
 
JOHN RUTHELL HENRY, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[June 12, 2014] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John Ruthell Henry is a prisoner under sentence of death for whom a warrant 
has been signed setting execution for June 18, 2014.  Henry appeals from the 
dismissal of his Motion for Determination of Intellectual Disability as a Bar to 
Execution.  This Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida 
Constitution.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s order dismissing Henry’s motion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Henry was convicted of the 1985 first-degree murder of his second wife, 
Suzanne Henry, in Pasco County.  On Henry’s first direct appeal, this Court 
reversed and remanded Henry’s case for a new trial.  Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 73 
(Fla. 1991).  The evidence showed that shortly before Christmas in 1985, Henry 
went to his estranged wife’s home in Pasco County to discuss Christmas presents 
for her son Eugene Christian.  Id. at 74.  They argued, and Henry stabbed Suzanne 
Henry in the neck thirteen times, killing her.  Henry v. State, 649 So. 2d 1366, 
1369 (Fla. 1994).  On retrial in 1991, Henry was again convicted of first-degree 
murder, and the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death.  Id. at 1367.  
The trial court sentenced him to death, finding two aggravating factors: (1) Henry 
had a prior violent felony conviction (Henry murdered his first wife and pleaded 
guilty to second-degree murder), and (2) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC).  Id. at n.2.  The trial court found no mitigation.  Id.1   
 
On direct appeal following his retrial, Henry raised the following issues: (1) 
the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the murder of Eugene 
Christian; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay testimony of an 
unavailable witness during the penalty phase related to the murder of his first wife; 
(3) the trial court erred by admitting testimony regarding the autopsy report from 
 
1.  In a separate trial, Henry was also convicted and sentenced to death for 
the murder of Suzanne Henry’s five-year-old son Eugene Christian in Hillsborough 
County.  Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1991) (reversing and remanding for 
new trial for murder of stepson Eugene Christian).  On retrial, Henry was again 
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Eugene Christian, and this 
Court affirmed.  Henry v. State, 649 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1994).  The death warrant in 
this case is for the murder of Suzanne Henry. 
 
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his prior murder conviction for killing his first wife to establish the prior violent 
felony aggravator; (4) the trial court erred by instructing on the murder-in-the-
course-of-a-felony aggravator because the court did not find the aggravator; (5) the 
trial court failed to properly consider all mitigating evidence presented; (6) the 
HAC aggravator was not supported by the evidence; and (7) the death sentence 
was disproportionate.  Id. at 1367-70.  This Court affirmed Henry’s conviction and 
sentence, concluding that the claims either lacked merit or—despite their merit—
constituted harmless error.  Id.   
 
In March 2001, Henry filed an amended initial motion for postconviction 
relief.  An evidentiary hearing was held in November 2001, after which the 
postconviction court denied relief.  Henry appealed, raising the following issues: 
retrial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance at trial by presenting 
the defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity and for failing to present a 
voluntary intoxication defense; counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
mental health experts at retrial; and Florida’s death penalty is unconstitutional 
under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 
2003).  This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order denying 
postconviction relief.  Id. at 680. 
 
In 2004, Henry filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and subsequently appealed 
 
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the denial of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental 
health experts to testify in the retrial penalty phase.  Henry v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Corr., 490 F.3d 835, 836 (11th Cir. 2007).  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals agreed with this Court’s determination that trial counsel’s strategy was 
reasonable, and Henry could not demonstrate prejudice.  Id. at 839.  Accordingly, 
the court affirmed the denial of Henry’s habeas petition.  Id. 
 
On May 2, 2014, Governor Rick Scott signed a death warrant for John 
Ruthell Henry with an execution date of June 18, 2014.  At a hearing in the circuit 
court, defense counsel, with Henry’s approval, waived judicial postconviction 
proceedings and announced the intent to pursue a determination of Henry’s 
competency under section 922.07, Florida Statutes (2013).  Under this statute, the 
Governor appoints three experts to examine the defendant to determine “whether 
[the convicted person] understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and 
why it is to be imposed upon him or her.”  § 922.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2013).  
Subsequently, postconviction counsel formally requested the competency 
proceeding, and the Governor appointed three experts to examine Henry.  After the 
examination, the experts reported their opinion on May 16, 2014, that—within a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty—Henry does not suffer from a psychiatric 
illness or intellectual disability and understands the nature and effect of the death 
penalty and why the sentence had been imposed on him. 
 
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Subsequently, Henry filed a Motion for Determination of Intellectual 
Disability as a Bar to Execution.  The circuit court dismissed the motion as 
untimely, and Henry appealed the dismissal to this Court. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
In this appeal, Henry asserts that he is entitled to an evaluation to determine 
whether he is intellectually disabled.  See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2013); Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.203.  He bases his claim on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hall 
v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and his performance in 1987 on the Weschler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) that demonstrated that he had an IQ of 78.  
Accordingly, Henry argues that the postconviction court erred in dismissing his 
claim of intellectual disability.  We disagree. 
 
Henry is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if he is 
intellectually disabled.  Section 921.137(1) provides that intellectual disability 
means “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing 
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period 
from conception to age 18.”  Beyond Henry’s assertion of a single test score, he 
has not alleged any deficits in adaptive functioning or onset prior to age 18.  
Indeed, having examined the record in this cause, we agree with the State that not 
one doctor over all the years of litigation has ever opined that Henry was mentally 
retarded or intellectually disabled.  Moreover, three doctors recently evaluated 
 
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Henry to determine his competency under section 922.07 and concluded as 
follows: 
Mr. Henry was fully oriented and his memory and concentration were 
intact.  His clinical presentation during the evaluation was consistent 
with intellectual functioning at or above what would be predicted 
based on his prior IQ test result of 78 (7th percentile).  For instance, 
he was able to discuss the legal process accurately in reasonable 
depth.  Moreover, he correctly serially subtracted seven from 100 on 
four of five steps (100-93-79-73-56). 
Mr. Henry was administered the Mini-Mental State Examination-2, a 
neuropsychiatric test used to assess for cognitive impairment.  It 
covers the areas of orientation, attention, calculation ability, recall 
(recent memory), naming, repetition, comprehension, reading, writing, 
and visual-spatial skills.  Mr. Henry scored a 25/30 (T score-51; 54th 
percentile), in the average range per age group and educational level 
norms. 
The nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed 
on him was discussed with Mr. Henry.  He communicated that he had 
been tried for and convicted of first degree murder and his sentence 
was the death penalty.  Additionally, he noted that his victims were 
his wife and stepson.  He provided the general facts surrounding their 
deaths.  In his words, the execution is carried out by “lethal injection,” 
“a shot,” and is to occur on June 18th at 6:00 p.m. 
In summary, based on our clinical interview, review of records, and 
interviews with two correctional officers, it is our opinion with 
reasonable medical certainty that: (1) Mr. Henry does not suffer from 
any DSM-5 psychiatric illness or intellectual disability (formerly 
referred to as mental retardation in DSM-IV), and (2) understands the 
nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed on 
him. 
Letter from Dr. Wade C. Myers, M.D., Dr. Donald Taylor, M.D., and Tonia 
Werner, M.D., to Rick Scott, Governor of Florida (dated May 16, 2014) (Henry 
mental competency determination).  Although this evaluation was for mental 
 
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competency—not intellectual disability—the observations and conclusions further 
support our determination that Henry has not established any facts that would 
entitle him to relief under Hall. 
 
Finally, we consider that, rather than showing deficits in adaptive 
functioning, the record demonstrates the opposite.  As the State points out in its 
Answer Brief, the record demonstrates that Henry engaged in typical, adult 
activities.  Henry was able to drive a car, develop personal relationships, 
participate in financial transactions, discuss adult concepts, and engage in goal-
directed behavior.  In addition, his pro se pleadings and his oral advocacy further 
refute any claim that he has concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning or onset 
before age 18.  They demonstrate Henry’s effective communication skills, both 
oral and written, and his understanding of the law.  Answer Brief at 24.  In its 
Answer Brief, at 9-10, the State provides an example of Henry’s pro se advocacy 
at his first trial, when he moved for appointment of new counsel, as follows: 
MR. HENRY:  Good morning.  Yeah, I would like to bring it to the 
Court’s attention that as of this moment I feel I am not properly being 
represented and I wish to ask the Court to remove Mr. Focht from 
being my attorney and I would like to be, if it’s possible, to be 
recommended to another attorney because I feel that there’s things 
that’s not being brought to the Court’s attention concerning me that 
he’s not bringing up, going into details concerning witnesses in my 
behalf.  Some of the witnesses have not brought forward that I felt that 
would have came forward if it had been brought to their attention. 
Also, there’s things that haven’t been brought up that I have 
requested my attorney to bring up that he have failed to bring up and I 
 
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feel that, also, in this case, that it being partiality shown towards the 
victim.  My main concern is that myself and Mr. Focht, the things that 
I have requested of him to bring up and he just haven’t.  And I just 
feel like I’m not being properly represented. 
 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the dismissal of Henry’s claim on the 
basis that Henry has not demonstrated a facially sufficient claim of intellectual 
disability. 
 
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court.  The mandate 
shall issue immediately. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur.  
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County,  
Pat Edward Siracusa, Jr., Judge - Case No. 1985-CF-2685  
 
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida,  
 
for Appellant  
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Candance M. Sabella, 
Chief-Assistant Attorney General, Capital Appeals Bureau Chief, and Carol M. 
Dittmar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,   
 
for Appellee  
 
 
 
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