Title: Harris v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 11/10/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MORRIS GLEN HARRIS, JR., 
) 
 
 
)  
S231489 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B264839 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 
) 
 
ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
(Los Angeles County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA408368) 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Charged with robbery, petitioner Morris Glen Harris, Jr. (hereafter 
defendant), pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to grand theft from the 
person, a felony, and admitted a prior robbery conviction, on condition that he 
receive a six-year prison sentence.  In return, the People dismissed the robbery 
charge and allegations of other felony convictions.  The court imposed the six-year 
sentence.  Later, the electorate enacted Proposition 47, which reduced the grand 
theft offense to a misdemeanor.  Under Proposition 47‟s provisions, defendant 
petitioned the court to have his sentence recalled and to be resentenced as a 
misdemeanant.  In response, the People argued that reducing the sentence would 
deprive them of the benefit of their plea bargain, and thus they should be permitted 
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to rescind the plea and reinstate the original robbery charge.  The trial court agreed 
with the People, as did a divided Court of Appeal. 
We must decide whether the People are entitled to have the plea agreement 
set aside if defendant seeks to have his sentence recalled under Proposition 47.  
We conclude that they are not entitled to have the plea agreement set aside.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Court of Appeal opinion summarized the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing:  “On February 11, 2013, Francisco Pascual Diego was 
walking down the street when a person he later identified as defendant approached 
him from behind, hit him on the face, and took his cell phone.  Diego chased 
defendant and flagged down two police officers.  Diego pointed out defendant, 
who was running down the street, and told the officers that defendant had stolen 
his cell phone.  There was no one else running down the street.  The officers 
chased defendant and detained him.  Diego‟s cell phone was found on the ground 
about one foot away from defendant‟s left foot.” 
The prosecution charged defendant with one count of robbery.  The 
information also alleged that defendant had six prior felony convictions, one of 
them for robbery.  On April 17, 2013, the parties reached a plea agreement.  
Defendant agreed to plead guilty to grand theft from the person under Penal Code 
section 487, subdivision (c), to admit the prior robbery conviction, and to be 
sentenced to prison for six years.  As part of the plea agreement, the People 
dismissed the robbery charge and the other allegations.  The court sentenced 
defendant to state prison for six years pursuant to the agreement. 
In November 2014, the electorate enacted Proposition 47.  Except for 
specified ineligible persons, Proposition 47 reduced certain nonviolent crimes, 
including the grand theft from the person conviction in this case, from felonies to 
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misdemeanors.  (See People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 404.)  Defendant 
filed a petition in the trial court for a recall of sentence, asking the court to 
reclassify the grand theft conviction as a misdemeanor and resentence him as a 
misdemeanant.  The People moved to withdraw from the plea agreement and to 
reinstate the dismissed robbery charge and allegations of prior felony convictions 
on the basis that the resentencing would deprive them of the benefit of their 
bargain.  After a hearing, the court issued an order granting both defendant‟s 
petition for recall of sentence and the People‟s motion to withdraw from the plea 
agreement and reinstate the dismissed charges. 
Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the order 
granting the People‟s motion to withdraw the plea agreement.  After the Court of 
Appeal summarily denied the petition, this court granted review and transferred 
the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to show cause.  
That court did so and ultimately issued an opinion denying the petition. 
Relying on People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208 (Collins), the majority 
concluded that, because a six-year prison sentence was a material part of the plea 
agreement, permitting defendant to seek recall of sentence under Proposition 47 as 
well as receive the benefit of the plea agreement would result in “a windfall to 
defendant that neither party contemplated at the time they entered their plea 
agreement.”  It held that, at his option, defendant could either choose to abide by 
the plea agreement by not petitioning for resentencing under Proposition 47, or 
“effectively repudiate[] the plea agreement” by petitioning for resentencing.  If 
defendant chooses the latter, “the plea agreement is deemed to be rescinded, and 
the parties are returned to the status quo ante.” 
Justice Mosk dissented.  He agreed with defendant that “when a defendant 
pleads guilty to a lesser felony charge pursuant to a plea bargain, and that charge is 
later reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the trial court cannot 
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rescind the plea, recall the sentence, and reinstate the original charge or charges.”  
Citing Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, he argued that the parties to a plea 
agreement are generally deemed to know and understand that later changes in the 
law may affect the consequences of the original plea agreement.  “Thus, a plea 
agreement is not breached or revocable just because a change in the law 
disadvantages one party or the other.” 
We granted defendant‟s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In addition to reducing certain felonies to misdemeanors, including the 
grand theft conviction of this case, Proposition 47 added section 1170.18 to the 
Penal Code (section 1170.18).  That section permits a “person currently serving a 
sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who 
would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section 
(„this act‟) had this act been in effect at the time of the offense” to petition the trial 
court that entered the earlier judgment of conviction for a recall of the sentence 
and to be resentenced as a misdemeanant.  (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).) 
The parties agree that section 1170.18 applies to defendant, and that he may 
petition to have the conviction reduced to a misdemeanor and to be resentenced as 
a misdemeanant under Proposition 47.  The question before us is whether, if that 
occurs, the People should be permitted to withdraw from the plea agreement.  The 
majority below cited Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 208, in concluding the People may 
withdraw from the plea agreement.  In arguing to the contrary, Justice Mosk cited 
Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64. 
In Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 208, the defendant was charged with 15 
felonies, including burglary, attempted burglary, forcible rape, assault with intent 
to commit rape, and forcible oral copulation.  “Pursuant to a plea bargain, 
defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of oral copulation; in return, the 
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allegations of commission of that crime by means of force and of a prior felony 
conviction were stricken, and the other 14 counts were dismissed.”  (Id. at p. 211.)  
After the plea, the Legislature decriminalized nonforcible oral copulation, the 
crime to which the defendant had pleaded guilty.  Nevertheless, the trial court 
sentenced him to state prison.  On appeal, because the conduct to which the 
defendant pleaded guilty was no longer criminal, this court reversed the 
conviction.  (Id. at pp. 212-214.)  As we summarized, “A conviction cannot stand 
on appeal when it rests upon conduct that is no longer sanctioned.”  (Id. at p. 214.) 
We then considered the effect of the reversal on the dismissed counts.  We 
stated the issue as being “whether the prosecution has been deprived of the benefit 
of its bargain by the relief granted herein.  We conclude that it has and hence the 
dismissed counts may be restored.  [¶]  The state, in entering a plea bargain, 
generally contemplates a certain ultimate result; integral to its bargain is the 
defendant‟s vulnerability to a term of punishment . . . .  When a defendant gains 
total relief from his vulnerability to sentence, the state is substantially deprived of 
the benefits for which it agreed to enter the bargain.  Whether the defendant 
formally seeks to withdraw his guilty plea or not is immaterial; it is his escape 
from vulnerability to sentence that fundamentally alters the character of the 
bargain. 
“Defendant seeks to gain relief from the sentence imposed but otherwise 
leave the plea bargain intact.  This is bounty in excess of that to which he is 
entitled.  The intervening act of the Legislature in decriminalizing the conduct for 
which he was convicted justifies a reversal of defendant‟s conviction and a 
direction that his conduct may not support further criminal proceedings on that 
subject; but it also destroys a fundamental assumption underlying the plea 
bargain — that defendant would be vulnerable to a term of imprisonment.  The 
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state may therefore seek to reestablish defendant‟s vulnerability by reviving the 
counts dismissed.”  (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 215.) 
Regarding remedy, we concluded that the state could revive one or more of 
the dismissed counts, but the defendant could not receive a more severe 
punishment than that to which the plea agreement had subjected him.  (Collins, 
supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 216-217.) 
In Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
asked this court to answer a question of state law.  As we rephrased it, the question 
was:  “ „Under California law of contract interpretation as applicable to the 
interpretation of plea agreements, does the law in effect at the time of a plea 
agreement bind the parties or can the terms of a plea agreement be affected by 
changes in the law?‟ ”  (Id. at p. 66.)  We “respond[ed] that the general rule in 
California is that the plea agreement will be „ “deemed to incorporate and 
contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend 
the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public 
policy. . . .” ‟  [Citation.]  That the parties enter into a plea agreement thus does 
not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature 
has intended to apply to them.”  (Ibid.) 
We also discussed cases that “address a related but not identical question:  
whether, despite the general rule, the facts and circumstances of a particular plea 
agreement might give rise to an implicit promise that the defendant will be 
unaffected by a change in the law.  Thus, even though, as we have explained, 
California law does not hold that the law in effect at the time of a plea agreement 
binds the parties for all time, it is not impossible the parties to a particular plea 
bargain might affirmatively agree or implicitly understand the consequences of a 
plea will remain fixed despite amendments to the relevant law.”  (Doe v. Harris, 
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 71.)  We said, “Whether such an understanding exists 
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presents factual issues that generally require an analysis of the representations 
made and other circumstances specific to the individual case.”  (Ibid.) 
We summarized that “as a general rule, . . . requiring the parties‟ 
compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the 
terms of the plea agreement, nor does the failure of a plea agreement to reference 
the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the 
defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending 
his or her conviction.  To that extent, then, the terms of the plea agreement can be 
affected by changes in the law.”  (Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 73-74.) 
We must decide whether the result of Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 208 
(allowing a party to rescind a plea agreement when a subsequent change in the law 
deprives it of the benefit of its bargain), or the rule of Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 
Cal.4th 64 (later changes in the law can affect a plea agreement), applies here.  
Critical to this question is the intent behind Proposition 47.  As we explained in 
Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at page 66, entering into a plea agreement does 
not insulate the parties “from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended 
to apply to them.”  (Italics added.)  Here, of course, it was not the Legislature, but 
the electorate, that enacted Proposition 47.  So the question is whether the 
electorate intended the change to apply to the parties to this plea agreement.  We 
conclude it did. 
Section 1170.18, subdivision (a), states that it governs someone “serving a 
sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea,” of one of the felonies that 
Proposition 47 reduced to a misdemeanor.  (Italics added.)  The italicized language 
makes it clear that the provision applies to someone like defendant who was 
convicted by plea.  (T.W. v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 646, 651-
653.)  Section 1170.18, subdivision (i), carves out an exception for persons who 
have at least one prior conviction for specified disqualifying offenses.  Otherwise, 
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the section contains no exceptions and, specifically, no exception for someone 
convicted by a plea that was the result of a plea agreement.  By expressly 
mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all eligible 
defendants. 
Moreover, section 1170.18, subdivision (b), provides that a person meeting 
the requirements of subdivision (a) (as defendant does) “shall” be resentenced 
“unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner 
would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”  This discretion to 
find an unreasonable risk provides the “safety valve” to protect the public; the 
statute provides no other safety valve such as rescinding a plea bargain. 
The resentencing process that Proposition 47 established would often prove 
meaningless if the prosecution could respond to a successful resentencing petition 
by withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and reinstating the original 
charges filed against the petitioner.  Many criminal cases are resolved by 
negotiated plea.  “Plea negotiations and agreements are an accepted and „integral 
component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair 
administration of our courts.‟  [Citations.]  Plea agreements benefit that system by 
promoting speed, economy, and the finality of judgments.”  (People v. Segura 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929.)  Nothing in Proposition 47 suggests an intent to 
disrupt this process. 
One of Proposition 47‟s primary purposes is to reduce the number of 
nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison 
on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.  (See Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70; People 
v. Montgomery (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1389-1390.)  Accepting the 
People‟s position would be at odds with that purpose.  As Justice Mosk observed 
in dissent below, “If a reduction of a sentence under Proposition 47 results in the 
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reinstatement of the original charges and elimination of the plea agreement, the 
financial and social benefits of Proposition 47 would not be realized, and the 
voters‟ intent and expectations would be frustrated.” 
While our conclusion is based on the unambiguous language of section 
1170.18 and the expressed intent of Proposition 47, Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 
Cal.4th 64, provides additional support.  It stands for the proposition that “the 
Legislature [or here, the electorate], for the public good and in furtherance of 
public policy, and subject to the limitations imposed by the federal and state 
Constitutions, has the authority to modify or invalidate the terms of an 
agreement.”  (Id. at p. 70.)  The electorate exercised that authority in enacting 
Proposition 47.  It adopted a public policy respecting the appropriate term of 
incarceration for persons convicted of certain crimes, including grand theft from 
the person.  The policy applies retroactively to all persons who meet the qualifying 
criteria and are serving a prison sentence for one of those convictions, whether the 
conviction was by trial or plea.  The electorate may bind the People to a unilateral 
change in a sentence without affording them the option to rescind the plea 
agreement.  The electorate did so when it enacted Proposition 47. 
Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 208, is distinguishable both substantively and 
procedurally.  In that case, we allowed the People to withdraw from a plea 
agreement before sentencing where a change in the law had decriminalized the 
offense to which the defendant had pled.  The change eviscerated the judgment 
and the underlying plea bargain entirely, and it did so before the judgment.  That is 
not the case here.  Thus, while the rule of Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, 
governs this case, we believe Doe v. Harris and Collins can be harmonized.  
Contrary to defendant‟s argument, we did not impliedly overrule Collins in Doe v. 
Harris. 
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For these reasons, we conclude that the People are not entitled to set aside 
the plea agreement when defendant seeks to have his sentence recalled under 
Proposition 47. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Harris v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 242 Cal.App.4th 244 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S231489 
Date Filed: November 10, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Henry J. Hall 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Rourke Stacy and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public 
Defenders, for Petitioner. 
 
Linda Lye, Micaela Davis; Peter Eliasberg; and David Loy for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
of Northern California, Inc., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, Inc., and 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties, Inc., as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Laura Beth Arnold and William A. Meronek for Public Defenders Association and Law Offices of the 
Public Defender for the County of Riverside as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No Appearance for Respondent. 
 
Jacki Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis Asayama, Matthew Brown and John Pomeroy, Deputy District 
Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark Harvis 
Deputy Public Defender 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 590 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-3066 
 
John Pomeroy 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-5911