Title: Commonwealth v. Newson

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11471 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELBERT NEWSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2014. - April 14, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Joint Enterprise.  Constitutional Law, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional 
rights, Fair trial.  Evidence, Voluntariness of statement.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 8, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Christine M. McEvoy, J., and the cases were tried before her 
 
 
 
Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. 
 
Elisabeth Martino, Assistant District Attorney (Julie 
Higgins & David J. Fredette, Assistant District Attorneys, with 
her) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
LENK, J.  Thomas Webb was fatally shot on September 15, 
2008, while petting a neighbor's dog on a sidewalk outside an 
apartment building in Boston.  The defendant was arrested a 
short time later, after fleeing from police in a vehicle and 
2 
 
 
then on foot.  At trial, the Commonwealth did not offer evidence 
that the defendant fired the fatal shots.  Instead, the 
Commonwealth proceeded against the defendant on a theory of 
joint venture with the individual who did fire the fatal shots, 
and who was in the vehicle with the defendant before the 
shooting and during the flight from police.  The defendant, in 
turn, conceded his presence at the scene of the shooting and his 
involvement in the subsequent police chase.  He asserted, 
however, that he did not know that the shooting was planned, and 
that his role was limited to aiding in the escape after the 
shooting occurred. 
In December, 2011, a Superior Court jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The jury also found the defendant 
guilty of one count of possessing a firearm without a license, 
and not guilty of another count of possessing a firearm without 
a license.  The defendant contends on appeal that the trial 
judge erred in (1) denying the defendant's motion to suppress 
statements that he made to police following his arrest, which 
were used to challenge his credibility when he testified at 
trial; and (2) declining to instruct the jury on the uncharged 
offense of accessory after the fact, which he argues deprived 
him of a defense.  Because we conclude that there was no error, 
3 
 
 
and our review of the entire record provides no basis to grant 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions. 
1.  Background.  "We summarize the evidence at trial, in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth," reserving some 
facts for later discussion.  Commonwealth v. Deane, 458 Mass. 
43, 44 (2010). 
Shortly after 9 P.M. on September 15, 2008, two Boston 
police officers heard the sound of gunfire.  One of the officers 
testified that he believed that the gunshots came "from two 
different firearms." 
Responding to the area from which the gunfire came, the 
officers observed a dark Nissan Maxima automobile, with tinted 
windows and Rhode Island registration plates, parked in the 
middle of Parker Street.  A thin African-American man wearing a 
white T-shirt ran towards the vehicle's front passenger's side 
door and entered.  The officers attempted to block the suspect 
vehicle using their police cruiser, but the vehicle evaded the 
police and drove off. 
A chase ensued.  While pursuing the suspect vehicle using 
their flashing blue lights and sirens, the officers observed an 
object thrown out of the vehicle's passenger's side window.  A 
.45 caliber semiautomatic pistol was later recovered from that 
4 
 
 
spot along the chase route.  The suspect vehicle eventually 
entered the Academy Homes housing development in Boston and 
stopped abruptly, and two individuals stepped out.  The person 
who stepped from the passenger's side door was again an African-
American man with a thin build wearing a white T-shirt.  The 
person who emerged from the driver's side door was a shorter 
African-American man with a "stocky build," wearing a "dark 
sweatshirt" and "dark jeans." 
The chase continued on foot, but the police officers lost 
sight of both individuals.  A short time later, different police 
officers, responding to dispatches about the shooting and chase 
broadcast over the police radio, observed the defendant emerged 
from hedges onto a nearby sidewalk.  The defendant was "sweating 
profusely" and "gasping for air."  He was wearing a red T-shirt 
and jeans.  A gray hooded sweatshirt was later discovered next 
to some bushes and shrubbery near the location where the 
defendant was stopped.  Approached by the officers, the 
defendant indicated that he was coming from the home of his girl 
friend, "Pookie." 
The defendant was handcuffed and taken to the homicide unit 
at Boston police headquarters.  When detectives first approached 
the defendant seeking to interview him, he became ill and 
vomited.  The defendant smelled of alcohol, and it was clear to 
5 
 
 
Detective Dennis Harris, the interviewing detective, that the 
defendant had been drinking.  Indeed, during the interview, the 
defendant stated several times that he was "drunk," was feeling 
"nice," and was "totaled from the junk."  He also indicated that 
he was "nauseous" and that his "stomach [was] bubbling."  
Nevertheless, Harris testified that the defendant was not 
"stumbling or staggering" and "walked unassisted . . . into the 
interview room," and that during the interview the defendant 
appeared nervous but alert.  During the course of the interview, 
which lasted approximately two hours and twenty minutes, the 
defendant took two breaks, was permitted to use the telephone 
and the bathroom facilities, and was provided water and snacks. 
At the beginning of the interview, Harris read the 
defendant the Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966), and the defendant initialed and signed a form 
confirming that the warnings had been given.  The defendant also 
consented to have the interview electronically recorded, as 
urged by this court in Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 
423 (2004).  When the defendant asked near the beginning of the 
interview whether he was "being arrested," however, Harris 
responded, "No," indicating, "this is just an interview at this 
point." 
Throughout the interview, the defendant continued to assert 
6 
 
 
that he had no involvement in either the shooting or the police 
chase, and had been with his girl friend "Pookie" prior to his 
arrest.  He stated that "Pookie" resided in the Academy Homes 
housing development.  He could not, however, give her address, 
full name, or telephone number, and could not say definitively 
how long he had been with her prior to being stopped by the 
police. 
At no point during the interview did the defendant make an 
inculpatory statement.  After Harris repeatedly exhorted the 
defendant to provide any information that he might have about 
the shooting and the police chase, the defendant asked if he 
could leave.  Harris indicated that the defendant could not 
leave, because he was under arrest for possessing marijuana that 
had been found on his person when he was stopped by police.1  
After Harris urged the defendant once more to tell him anything 
that he knew about the shooting, the defendant invoked his right 
to counsel, and the interview concluded. 
During the second break in the interview, the detectives 
took the defendant's clothing and provided him with other 
clothes to wear.  The detectives also took swabbings from the 
                                                 
 
1 The defendant's arrest occurred several months before 
voters of the Commonwealth adopted, via ballot referendum, "An 
Act establishing a sensible state marihuana policy," which 
decriminalized possession of one ounce or less of marijuana.  
See G. L. c. 94C, § 32L. 
7 
 
 
defendant's hands to test for gunshot residue.  In the right 
front pocket of the defendant's jeans the detectives found a 
door key to a Nissan Maxima; this key opened the vehicle 
abandoned near the Academy Homes housing development following 
the police chase.  Inside the vehicle police found a cellular 
telephone matching a holder carried by the defendant when he was 
arrested.  During the police interview, however, the defendant 
had indicated that he had left his telephone with his mother 
that day.  Forensic examination of the vehicle's contents also 
identified several objects with the defendant's fingerprints.  
These included a .38 caliber revolver, which was found on the 
floor of the front passenger area and contained two of the 
defendant's fingerprints, along with the fingerprint of Richard 
Allen, a friend of the defendant.  Neither the defendant's nor 
Allen's fingerprints, however, were found on the .45 caliber 
pistol that police had seen thrown from the suspect vehicle 
during the pursuit.  Instead, forensic examination of that 
pistol revealed the fingerprint of another individual, Michael 
Gaines. 
Five shell casings were recovered from the scene of the 
shooting.  The Commonwealth's ballistics expert testified at 
trial that, "to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty," all 
had been shot by the .45 caliber pistol that police had 
8 
 
 
recovered along the chase route.2  Five bullets or bullet casings 
were also recovered:  one from Ziegler Street, where another 
shooting had taken place approximately twenty minutes before the 
shooting on Parker Street; two from the victim's body; and two 
others from Parker Street.  The Commonwealth's ballistics expert 
testified, again "to a reasonable degree of ballistic[] 
certainty," that all came from the same .45 caliber pistol.  No 
projectiles were conclusively traced to the .38 caliber 
revolver, although there were several projectiles that the 
Commonwealth's ballistics expert testified could have come from 
the revolver. 
The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree 
on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity 
or cruelty, and for two counts of carrying a firearm without a 
license, based on the .45 caliber pistol and the .38 caliber 
revolver.  At trial, the Commonwealth did not seek to establish 
that the defendant fired any of the shots that killed the 
victim.  Instead, the Commonwealth contended that the defendant 
was responsible because he assisted another individual, whom the 
Commonwealth never expressly identified, who carried the .45 
caliber pistol and fired the fatal shots. 
                                                 
 
2  The Commonwealth's ballistics expert's testimony conformed 
to the guidelines that this court outlined in Commonwealth v. 
Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-849 (2011). 
9 
 
 
The core issue at trial was the defendant's mental state at 
the time of the shooting.  The Commonwealth offered evidence to 
establish the defendant's prior awareness of and intent to 
participate in the shooting.  The Commonwealth presented 
testimony indicating that the same Nissan Maxima had been 
involved in an earlier incident of gunfire on Ziegler Street, 
supporting the inference that the defendant knew that his 
passenger had a gun and that further shooting was planned.  
Tests of the swabs taken from the defendant's hands showed 
traces of gunshot residue, which the Commonwealth offered as 
showing that the defendant had fired the .38 caliber revolver at 
some time that evening.  Finally, the Commonwealth contended 
that the defendant's rapid departure immediately after the 
shooting on Parker Street indicated that he was "fully aware of 
the plan." 
The defense offered an alternative account of the evening's 
events.  Testifying as the sole defense witness, the defendant 
stated that there were actually three individuals in the Nissan 
Maxima at the scene of the shooting:  Michael Gaines, Richard 
Allen, and the defendant.  The defendant contended that Gaines 
and Allen carried the two firearms and did the shooting, but 
that he had no prior awareness of the planned shooting, and that 
his role was limited to aiding Allen and Gaines in the escape 
10 
 
 
from police after the fact. The defendant stated that on the 
evening of the shooting he had loaned the Nissan Maxima to 
Allen, who indicated that he wanted the vehicle to conduct a 
drug deal.  Allen, now accompanied by Gaines, returned with the 
vehicle shortly after 9 P.M. and picked up the defendant.  
Gaines moved to the back seat, and the defendant began driving.  
Allen asked the defendant to drive to Parker Street to pick up 
his girl friend.  When they arrived, Allen indicated that the 
defendant should make a U-turn and stop, and Gaines got out of 
the vehicle.  As the defendant was turning to Allen to ask why 
Gaines had gotten out, given that it was supposedly Allen's girl 
friend that they were going to visit, the defendant heard 
gunfire.  Allen then jumped out of the vehicle.  Both Allen and 
Gaines got back into the vehicle once the police arrived.  Allen 
ordered the defendant, "Drive."  The defendant complied, and 
police officers arriving on the scene gave chase.  When the 
defendant stopped the vehicle later in the Academy Homes housing 
development, Allen handed the .38 caliber revolver to the 
defendant, asking him to throw it in the bushes.  The defendant 
instead dropped it on the floor of the front passenger area and 
fled. 
The Commonwealth challenged the defendant's account in a 
number of ways.  Most importantly for purposes of this appeal, 
11 
 
 
the Commonwealth undermined the defendant's credibility through 
the inconsistency between the defendant's recorded interview 
with police, which had been introduced in evidence, and his 
trial testimony.  The defendant admitted that he lied to police 
during the interview, fabricating "Pookie" and falsely denying 
that he was involved in the police chase.  He testified that he 
made those statements to police because he was scared and did 
not want to "tell on" Allen and Gaines. 
The Commonwealth also identified several other factors 
that, it contended, undermined the defendant's account.  The 
Commonwealth pointed out that the two officers involved in the 
chase only saw two individuals flee from the Nissan Maxima, not 
three; that no witnesses had seen a third person in the vehicle; 
and that, when police searched the Nissan Maxima, the front seat 
was pushed far back, leaving little room for anyone to sit in 
the back seat.  The Commonwealth called the jury's attention to 
how "conveniently" the defendant's timeline absolved him of 
involvement in the earlier Ziegler Street shooting, insofar as 
the defendant testified that he was picked up by Allen and 
Gaines shortly after 9 P.M., just after the occurrence of the 
gunfire on Ziegler Street.  Finally, the Commonwealth noted that 
the defendant testified that he "wasn't close with" Gaines, and 
that Allen, whom the defendant testified was "very close" to 
12 
 
 
him, was deceased at the time of the trial.  "So you're saying 
the guy who you're not close with and the dead guy are the ones 
who did this[?]" the Commonwealth asked in cross-examining the 
defendant. 
The Commonwealth never offered evidence of a motive for the 
shooting.  The victim was the youngest of seven siblings.  At 
the time of his death, he was preparing to begin his final year 
of high school. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Admission of the defendant's 
statements to police.  Before trial, the defendant moved to 
suppress the statements made during his police interview.  He 
argued that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waive his Miranda rights and that the statements themselves were 
not voluntary.  In making that argument, he focused on the 
alleged "trickery" and "deceit" involved in Harris's initial 
assurance that he was not under arrest, when in fact he had been 
arrested for possession of marijuana.  The defendant also 
asserted that he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs 
during the interview. 
The judge, who was also the trial judge, held a hearing on 
the defendant's motion to suppress, at which Harris testified.  
Harris stated that he did not learn that the defendant had been 
arrested for possession of marijuana until the second break in 
13 
 
 
the interview, which occurred after he had assured the defendant 
that he was not under arrest.  Harris also acknowledged 
witnessing the defendant "thr[o]w up the contents of his stomach 
on the floor," and that "[i]t was clear" to Harris that the 
defendant "had been drinking," as "[t]here was an odor of 
alcohol emanating from him."  Harris stated, however, that the 
odor was "not . . . strong," that the defendant was not 
"stumbling or staggering" and "walked unassisted into the 
interview room," and that the defendant did not manifest the 
"glassy eyes, slurred speech, . . . or . . . lack of 
coordination" characteristic of people under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs. 
The judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress.  The 
judge found that the defendant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation, and that the Miranda warnings were properly 
given.  With respect to the validity of the defendant's Miranda 
waiver, the judge found that, although the evidence indicated 
that the defendant had consumed alcohol and drugs prior to the 
interrogation, and vomited shortly before the interview, the 
waiver was nevertheless voluntary.  The judge credited Harris's 
testimony that he "did not observe any outward signs commonly 
associated with intoxication."  The judge further indicated that 
the recording of the interrogation demonstrated that the 
14 
 
 
defendant answered the detective's questions in a "responsive 
and coherent manner," was "well aware of his precarious state," 
and provided responses that were "self-serving."  With respect 
to the general voluntariness of the statements that the 
defendant made, the judge observed:  "As to trickery and deceit, 
the court finds the defendant's claim unclear; there is no 
evidence that [the] alleged deceitful statement made by the 
[d]etectives was actually false.  Even if it were, under the 
circumstances of the defendant's interview, it does not amount 
to a recognized challenge." 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in 
denying his motion to suppress.  Where a defendant challenges 
the admission of a statement allegedly resulting from custodial 
interrogation, the defendant bears the initial burden of proving 
custody.  Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432 (1999).  If 
the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts 
to the Commonwealth to prove "a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of Miranda rights," Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 
Mass. 485, 492 (2004), and that any statement "was made 
voluntarily."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 206 
(2011). 
Here, the judge correctly determined that the defendant was 
subject to custodial interrogation.  The admissibility of the 
15 
 
 
defendants' statements at the interview, therefore, turns on 
voluntariness.  Although the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver 
and the voluntariness of a particular statement made during 
custodial interrogation "are separate and distinct issues," the 
"test" for both is "essentially the same."  Commonwealth v. 
Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 670 (1995).  "The test for voluntariness 
is whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement, the will of the 
defendant was overborne to the extent that the statement was not 
the result of a free and voluntary act. . . .  Under this 
totality of the circumstances test, [the court] consider[s] all 
of the relevant circumstances surrounding the interrogation and 
the individual characteristics and conduct of the defendant," 
including "promises or other inducements, conduct of the 
defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and 
emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice 
system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the 
discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the 
police), and the details of the interrogation, including the 
recitation of Miranda warnings."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 
Mass. at 207 (quotations and citations omitted).  The 
Commonwealth bears a "particularly heavy burden" because in 
Massachusetts voluntariness "must be shown beyond a reasonable 
16 
 
 
doubt."  Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 152 (2011).  See 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, supra at 206. 
As he did in the proceedings on the motion to suppress, on 
appeal, the defendant focuses his voluntariness challenge on 
Harris's purportedly false representation that the defendant was 
not under arrest.  The defendant asserts that he "plainly 
attached special significance to the fact that he was not under 
arrest when the interrogation began," as evidenced by his 
"immediate invocation of his right to counsel upon 
learning . . . that he was in fact under arrest."  Despite 
Harris's testimony, which the judge credited, that he did not 
know that the defendant was under arrest for possession of 
marijuana at the beginning of the interview, the defendant 
argues that Harris should be deemed to have "constructive 
knowledge" of the defendant's arrest status, based on the 
knowledge of other police officers. 
We need not address the validity of the defendant's theory 
of "constructive knowledge."  We conclude that, even if Harris's 
unintentionally false assurance that the defendant was not under 
arrest could constitute an instance of "deceit" or "trickery," 
it did not render the defendant's Miranda waiver or statements 
involuntary.  Although "law enforcement officials must exercise 
caution when employing deception or trickery or when giving 
17 
 
 
assurances to a suspect during an interrogation[,] . . . we also 
have repeatedly held that such deception or trickery does not 
necessarily compel suppression of the confession or admission 
but, instead, is one factor to be considered in a totality of 
the circumstances analysis."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 
Mass. at 208.  In particular, we have rejected the contention 
that "an officer's use of the standard interrogation tactic of 
'minimization,'" by which the officer downplays the severity of 
the defendant's situation, "compels the conclusion that a 
confession is involuntary."  Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 
Mass. at 438-439.  Instead, "[a]s always," we assess the effect 
of such minimization techniques "as part of the totality of the 
circumstances."  Id. at 439. 
In light of the totality of the circumstances, we do not 
believe that the defendant was misled as to the severity of his 
situation.  He registered throughout the interview that he was 
in the homicide division at Boston police headquarters.  Far 
from minimizing the defendant's suspected conduct, Harris 
repeatedly emphasized the seriousness of the incident under 
investigation.  The detective's remarks throughout the interview 
clearly indicated that the defendant was suspected of being 
involved in a shooting and subsequent police chase.  He stated, 
for instance, that "right now we have drama, somebody shot, 
18 
 
 
there's a car chase, there's guns, there's a foot chase, there's 
you."  Harris's unintentionally false statement concerning the 
defendant's arrest status, therefore, did not render the 
defendant's waiver or statements involuntary. 
The evidence of the defendant's alcohol and drug use does 
not alter this conclusion.  Although "[s]pecial care must be 
taken in assessing a waiver and the voluntariness of the 
statements where there is evidence that the defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs[,] [a]n otherwise voluntary 
act is not necessarily rendered involuntary simply because an 
individual has been drinking or using drugs."  Commonwealth v. 
Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 685 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Shipps, 399 Mass. 820, 826 (1987).  See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
442 Mass. at 494.  Here, Harris testified that the defendant did 
not exhibit behavior typically associated with individuals under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, and we defer to the judge's 
determination that Harris's testimony was credible.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 205 ("Questions of 
credibility are the province of the motion judge who had the 
opportunity to observe the witnesses").  As to the recording of 
the interrogation, with respect to which this court stands "in 
the same position as the [motion] judge," Commonwealth v. Novo, 
422 Mass. at 266 (citation omitted), our independent review 
19 
 
 
leads us to conclude that the defendant's alcohol and drug 
consumption did not render the defendant's conduct at the 
interview involuntary.  During the interview, the defendant 
often repeated the detective's questions before replying; his 
answers are coherent and evince a concerted effort to rebut any 
involvement in the shooting and subsequent flight. 
Finally, pursuant to our obligation under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to review the "whole case," we note that, at several 
points during the interrogation, the detective indicated that 
the defendant's decision to "leave ugliness alone," by not 
explaining his involvement in the shooting, would make him "look 
like a cold-blooded monster"; that his "honesty [would be] 
gauged by everybody else who listens to what happens here"; and 
that "in this business it's all about how forthright you are 
with us."  We repeatedly have expressed our disapproval of a 
"now-or-never" line of interrogation, which seeks to place 
pressure on a suspect by suggesting that the suspect's ability 
to offer an explanation in some future proceeding is contingent 
upon answering the interviewing officer's questions.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 532, 542-543 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. at 267.  We particularly caution 
against a line of questioning that incorrectly suggests that a 
defendant's decision not to respond to police questioning could 
20 
 
 
be used against the defendant later to challenge his credibility 
at trial.  See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976). 
Here, however, Harris never expressly stated that the 
defendant's silence could be used against him.  Furthermore, he 
never stated that, by refusing to talk to police, the defendant 
would lose his right to testify at trial, cf. Commonwealth v. 
Novo, 442 Mass. at 268-269, or that the defendant would be 
barred from talking to police in the future if he chose to 
remain silent or invoked his right to consult with counsel, cf. 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. at 542.  As soon as the 
defendant invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation 
promptly terminated.  In view of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant's interrogation, 
therefore, we conclude that the defendant voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights and that his statements were voluntary. 
b.  Requested jury instruction on the offense of accessory 
after the fact.  At trial, the defendant asked the judge to 
instruct the jury on the offense of accessory after the fact.  
The judge denied the request.  Instead, in the course of 
instructing the jury on the law of "joint venture or aiding and 
abetting,"3 the judge stated:  "It is not enough [to find the 
                                                 
 
3 In Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467 (2009), we 
"adopt[ed] the language of aiding and abetting rather than joint 
 
21 
 
 
defendant guilty as an aider and abettor] to show simply that 
the defendant aided after the fact with escaping from the scene 
or disposing of weapons.  The government must prove he shared 
the intent or had the intent to commit the crime at the time the 
crime was committed."  On appeal, the defendant contends that 
the judge's decision not to offer a full instruction on the 
offense of accessory after the fact deprived him of his right to 
present a defense guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the right to a 
fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, as well as the cognate 
provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
"[W]here a judge refuses to give . . . an instruction [on 
the defendant's theory of the defense], it is reversible error 
only if the requested instruction [1] was substantially correct; 
[2] was not substantively covered in the jury charge; and 
[3] concerns an important issue such that the failure to give 
the instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to 
present a given defense."  Commonwealth v. Deane, 458 Mass. 43, 
                                                                                                                                                             
venture."  We have, however, continued to refer to the theory of 
"joint venture" in our case law, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 98 (2013), and the judge's instructions 
here corresponded to the appropriate instructions for aiding and 
abetting that we have articulated.  See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 
supra at 470-471 (Appendix). 
22 
 
 
59 n.15 (2010), citing United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 
874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 (1984).  The Federal 
circuit courts are split on the question whether a trial judge 
commits reversible error by declining to give an instruction on 
the offense of accessory after the fact.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that such a 
refusal constitutes error.  See United States v. Brown, 33 F.3d 
1002, 1003-1004 (8th Cir. 1994).  The court reasoned that, where 
the government does not charge a defendant as an accessory after 
the fact, "the accessory after the fact theory functions as a 
defense" because one "cannot be both the offender and the 
accessory after the fact for the same offense."  Id. at 1004.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, by 
contrast, rejected this approach.  See United States v. Rivera-
Figueroa, 149 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1998).  The court observed 
that "[t]o give the jury an additional set of elements for an 
uncharged crime that is not a lesser included offense, and of 
which the defendant seemingly cannot be convicted, seems to us a 
recipe for confusion."  Id. at 7.  Rather, the court held that, 
"[w]here appropriate, the court can properly explain to the jury 
that the defendant's theory of the case is that he merely 
assisted in covering up the crime but did not participate in its 
commission," thereby reconciling the defendant's right to 
23 
 
 
instructions on his theory of the defense without risking juror 
confusion.  Id. 
Our case law employs the approach adopted by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  In Commonwealth 
v. Talbot, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 777 (1994), the Appeals Court 
rejected the defendant's argument that the trial judge erred in 
declining to give an accessory after the fact instruction, 
observing that "[t]he judge's instructions clearly 
established . . . that the defendant could not be found guilty 
of murder if his only participation consisted of helping 
[another person] dispose of the body and assisting him to leave 
the scene."  To go beyond that point, by instructing the jury on 
the elements of the uncharged accessory after the fact offense, 
the court observed, would risk confusing the jury and 
"intimating that the jury must accept that theory in order to 
acquit him."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Therrien, 371 Mass. 
203, 206 (1976).  See Commonwealth v. Deane, 458 Mass. at 59 
("The judge could have concluded that charging the jury on a 
crime with which the defendant was not charged could serve to 
mislead or confuse the jury."). 
We adhere to the position articulated in Commonwealth v. 
Talbot, supra.  Here, as there, the judge's instructions clearly 
established that the defendant could not be found guilty of 
24 
 
 
murder if his only participation consisted of aiding another 
person after the fact in escaping from the police and disposing 
of weapons.  Consistent with that instruction, defense counsel 
argued in closing that "[w]hat [the defendant] did right after 
[the shooting] is terrible, but he's not charged with it," and 
that the evidence regarding the defendant's role in the police 
pursuit was "only evidence that after the commission of a murder 
[the defendant] helped people get away, and that is not murder."  
Because the judge's instructions clearly indicated that the 
defendant could not be convicted of murder if the jury concluded 
that the defendant's role was indeed limited to aiding in the 
shooter's escape from police, the judge's refusal to instruct 
the jury on the elements of the uncharged offense of accessory 
after the fact did not deny the defendant a defense. 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record and conclude that there is no basis to exercise 
our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.