Title: BYRON BAKER V. DONALD W. SPEAKS, KATHLEEN B. SPEAKS, DAVID SPEAKS, and ELIZABETH SPEAKS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BYRON BAKER V. DONALD W. SPEAKS, KATHLEEN B. SPEAKS, DAVID SPEAKS, and ELIZABETH SPEAKS2008 WY 20177 P.3d 803Case Number: S-07-0170Decided: 02/22/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
BYRON 
BAKER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant/Counter 
Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
DONALD W. SPEAKS, 
KATHLEEN B. SPEAKS, DAVID SPEAKS, and ELIZABETH SPEAKS,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs/Counter 
Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Byron Baker, pro se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Paula Ann Fleck and John Gallinger, 
of Holland & Hart, LLP, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Four 
members of the Speaks family brought suit against the Appellant, Byron Baker, 
for breach of a construction contract.  
After a bench trial, the district court granted judgment in favor of 
Appellees.  Mr. Baker challenges 
that judgment.  We affirm. 

[¶2]           
Mr. Baker 
raises the following issue:

Did the Appellees breach the 
contract and breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
requirement by wrongfully expelling the builder, [Mr. Baker], from the 
project?

Appellees present the issues as 
follows:

1.  Did the District Court err when it found 
that Byron Baker had breached his contract with the 
[Appellees]?

2.  Did the District Court err when it found 
that Byron Baker had presented insufficient evidence to support his 
counterclaims against the [Appellees]?

[¶3]           
In July 
1999, David and Elizabeth Speaks opened negotiations to employ Mr. Baker to 
construct a home.1  The negotiations concluded on September 
14, 1999, when Mr. Baker and Appellees entered into a contract.  Pursuant to the contract, Mr. Baker 
agreed to build a 36' by 36' log home for the total amount of $133,488.00.  The negotiations involved a number of 
floor plans that the parties exchanged, but Mr. Baker was to be solely 
responsible for turning the final floor plan drawing into a structurally sound 
home.

[¶4]           
The 
contract was memorialized in a three-page document with two features that are 
particularly relevant to our review.  
First, the home was to be "[c]ompleted in a substantial workmanlike 
manner."  Second, the contract 
provided no particular time for completion of the home.  The same day that the parties entered 
into the contract, Appellees paid Mr. Baker the first installment of $2,669.76, 
which was listed in the contract as a "commencement" payment. 

[¶5]           
By the 
spring of 2000, Appellees were growing increasingly concerned about both the 
pace of construction and its apparent poor quality.  Appellees met with Mr. Baker numerous 
times during the summer of 2000 regarding the delays.  There was a final meeting on or about 
August 1st at which David and Elizabeth Speaks presented Mr. Baker 
with a written list of incomplete items and asked Mr. Baker to commit to a 
completion date.  The parties agreed 
to a schedule providing that the interior of the home would be completed by the 
end of August, and that the exterior would be completed by September 
10th.  During that 
meeting, Mr. Baker's comments raised concerns regarding the status of payment to 
the subcontractors.  Appellees asked 
Mr. Baker to provide lien waivers from the subcontractors.

[¶6]           
By the 
first week of September, Mr. Baker had not completed any items on the August 
1st list.  Neither had he 
provided the requested lien waivers from the subcontractors.  At that time, Appellees had paid Mr. 
Baker a total of $140,202.61.  On 
September 5th, Appellees, acting through their attorney, sent Mr. 
Baker a letter instructing him to vacate the job site until he provided the 
requested lien waivers.  Mr. Baker 
left the job site after receiving the letter on September 
7th.

[¶7]           
Now left 
with an incomplete home, Appellees hired a plumber to evaluate the remaining 
plumbing work.  The plumber 
recommended hiring a general contractor to perform a general inspection, and 
Appellees did so.  The contractor 
noticed several problems in the home, including sheetrock that was crushed at 
the top and under-sized rafters and roof purlins.  The contractor recommended that 
Appellees contact a structural engineer to perform an in-depth analysis of the 
construction.  The structural 
engineer found that the roof was "substantially understructured or undersized to 
safely support the potential snow loads."  
Appellees responded to the inspections by hiring others to repair and 
complete the home at significant additional cost.2 

[¶8]           
Appellees 
filed suit, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, breach of implied warranty, and promissory estoppel.  Mr. Baker filed a counterclaim for 
breach of contract.3  A three-day bench trial was held.  On June 7, 2007, the district court 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment.  After 
detailing the course of events leading to the trial, the district court found 
that "Defendant Byron Baker breached [the] contract by failing to complete the 
project in a timely manner and failing to perform work in a safe and workmanlike 
manner and in accordance with industry standards."  As a result of these breaches, the court 
awarded Appellees $239,359.37 in compensatory damages.

[¶9]           
When a 
district court issues specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we 
review its findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.  E.g., Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 
106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).  We 
do not set aside findings of fact simply because we would have reached a 
different result, nor do we re-weigh the evidence on appeal.  Instead, we presume that the district 
court's findings of fact are correct.  
We also assume that the evidence of the party prevailing below is true 
and give that party every inference that can be fairly drawn from the 
evidence.  A finding of fact is 
clearly erroneous only where, "although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed."  Id.  

[¶10]       
Much of 
Mr. Baker's brief is focused on his proposition that "the trial court's findings 
were one-sided, even though both parties had submitted Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law."  He claims that 
his workmanship was acceptable and that the construction time was 
reasonable.  He also claims that 
Appellees breached the construction contract when they instructed him to leave 
the job site.

[¶11]       
We first 
address the district court's finding that Mr. Baker failed to complete the home 
in a timely manner.  As we have 
previously stated, "[w]here . . . no time for performance is specified 
in a contract, the law implies performance must be within a reasonable time, and 
what is a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each case."  G.C.I., Inc. v. Haught, 7 P.3d 906, 909 
(Wyo. 2000).  On appeal, Mr. Baker 
contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he failed to 
perform in a timely manner.  We 
disagree.

[¶12]       
Mr. Baker 
does not dispute that the parties intended the roof to be completed prior to 
significant snowfall in the fall of 1999.  He also does not dispute that 
the roof was not completed until March 2000.  David Speaks testified that he raised 
his concerns regarding the lack of progress with Mr. Baker during the August 1, 
2000 meeting.  Mr. Baker agreed to a 
specific schedule for the remaining construction.  The evidence shows that Mr. Baker signed 
the scheduling document, and that the schedule specified "Date[s] of Completion" 
for each task.  For example, it 
listed that "Logs" were to be completed by "8/9," "Doors" were to be completed 
by "8/15-8/17," the "Interior Flooring" was to be completed by "8/13," and the 
remaining "Electric & Plumbing Fixtures" were to be installed by 
"8/23."  David Speaks testified that 
Mr. Baker did not complete any of the items on the list.  The district court's conclusion that Mr. 
Baker did not timely fulfill his contractual obligations was supported by 
substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

[¶13]       
Mr. Baker 
also claims on appeal that he constructed the home in a workmanlike manner.  There is strong support in the record 
for the district court's finding that Mr. Baker's workmanship failed to 
meet industry standards.  Four 
expert witnesses testified for Appellees: a general contractor, a structural 
engineer, a heating system installer, and a sheetrock installer.  Each of them unequivocally testified 
that Mr. Baker's work was not performed skillfully or according to industry 
standards.  Each expert described in 
detail precisely why and how they replaced or repaired defects in 
Mr. Baker's construction.  The 
engineer testified that a home built in that particular location should be 
designed and built to withstand a snow load of 90 pounds per square foot.  As constructed by Mr. Baker, the roof 
could support little more than its own weight.  The roof repair alone involved 
construction of a second roof structure over the exterior surface of the 
existing roof and installation of a new support beam from the roof to the 
basement floor.  Other necessary 
repairs included taking out material around the windows to provide allowance for 
log settling, structural work to ensure that any settling occurred evenly, 
replacing a substantial part of the heating system, and replacing 80-85% of the 
existing sheetrock.  This is not an 
exhaustive list of necessary repairs reflected in the trial record. We perceive 
no clear error in the district court's finding that Mr. Baker's workmanship was 
inadequate.

[¶14]       
Mr. Baker 
also asserts that Appellees "could not show a clear failure of performance . . . 
at the time [Mr. Baker] was expelled from the project."  In essence, Mr. Baker claims that 
Appellees' request that he leave the job site constituted breach of the 
construction contract, and that the district court erred in failing to rule in 
his favor on his counterclaim.  He 
points this Court to a prior case in which we endorsed a district court's 
statement that "the party first committing a substantial breach of contract 
cannot complain that the other party . . . fails to perform."  Williams v. Collins Comms., Inc., 720 P.2d 880, 891 (Wyo. 1986).  

[¶15]       
Mr. 
Baker's line of reasoning overlooks the fact that he had already breached the 
contract by the time Appellees instructed him to cease construction.  He did so in two ways: failure to 
complete construction in a timely manner and poor workmanship.  Both of these breaches occurred prior to 
September 5th, when Appellees' counsel 
instructed Mr. Baker to vacate the job site.  As we have discussed supra, ¶¶ 11-13, the district court's 
findings of untimely performance and poor workmanship are both supported by the 
trial record.  Mr. Baker has failed 
to demonstrate reversible error on appeal.4

[¶16]       
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Four 
members of the Speaks family were the Plaintiffs, now Appellees, in this case: 
David, his wife Elizabeth, and David's parents.  Primarily, David dealt with Mr. Baker, 
though Elizabeth 
also had some involvement.  David's 
parents owned the land on which the home was constructed, and David served as 
their agent.  David's parents had no 
personal involvement with the events leading up to the 
litigation.

2The 
record reflects that, sometime during the period that these inspections were 
occurring, Mr. Baker provided lien waivers to Appellees. The lien waivers, 
however, indicated that he still owed subcontractors more than $4,000.  Mr. Baker did not return to the job 
site.

3Mr. 
Baker's wife, Rose Baker, was named as a defendant in Appellees' original 
suit.  Ms. Baker counterclaimed for 
libel.  The district court 
eventually dismissed Ms. Baker from the suit.  Neither Ms. Baker nor Appellees 
timely appealed that ruling.  As a 
result, no claims involving Ms. Baker are at issue in the current 
appeal.

4As a 
final procedural matter, we note that Appellees filed in this Court a Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's 
Designation of Record.  The 
motion alleges that Mr. Baker improperly designated exhibits that were not 
admitted at trial.  The exhibits 
identified in the challenged designation are not part of the transmitted 
record.  We therefore deny 
Appellees' motion as moot.