Title: Larkin v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CR-427 
John B. Larkin, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Decided: September 14, 2021 
Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court 
No. 46D01-1212-FA-610 
The Honorable Roger Bradford, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 19A-CR-2705 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter and Goff concur. 
Justice David dissents with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Sep 14 2021, 10:31 am
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Massa, Justice. 
This is the latest appeal from the prosecution of John Larkin for the 
2012 death of his wife, Stacey. Charged with voluntary manslaughter, 
Larkin was convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included 
offense. He raised four issues on appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed 
his conviction after finding the jury should not have been instructed on 
involuntary manslaughter. Because we conclude this instruction was 
proper under the circumstances and reject Larkin’s remaining arguments, 
we affirm.   
Facts and Procedural History 
On the evening of December 11, 2012, Larkin and Stacey engaged in a 
domestic altercation. Stacey was shot twice and died; either shot could 
have been fatal. Two days later, Larkin voluntarily spoke with the police 
in a lengthy, videotaped interview, providing the only complete first-
person account of the incident. He stated that after the confrontation 
began, he saw Stacey reach for a handgun stored in their bedroom safe. 
He grabbed the handgun just as she put her hand on it and told her, 
among other things, that he was calling the police. Stacey ran at Larkin 
and knocked them both to the ground. The handgun discharged and shot 
Stacey, who began scratching Larkin’s face. He pushed her into a corner 
with the handgun, which again discharged and shot Stacey. After the 
second shot, Stacey did not move. 
Shortly after Larkin’s interview, the State charged him with voluntary 
manslaughter as a Class A felony in violation of Indiana Code section 35-
42-1-3(a)(1). Specifically, the information alleged Larkin “did knowingly 
or intentionally kill another human being, to-wit: Stacy [sic] Simon Larkin; 
while acting under sudden heat, such killing being committed by means 
of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a handgun.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p.71. 
As the case progressed, it developed a lengthy procedural history, 
primarily due to law enforcement and prosecutorial misconduct and 
Larkin’s resulting motions. State v. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d 700 (Ind. 2018); State 
v. Larkin, 77 N.E.3d 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), vacated; Larkin v. State, 43 
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N.E.3d 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); see also In re Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194 (Ind. 
2017) (suspending the former lead prosecutor from the practice of law for 
at least four years due, in part, to his misconduct while prosecuting 
Larkin). In May 2019, Larkin filed his final motion to dismiss premised, in 
part, on the State’s failure to disclose that the handgun was defective. 
After the court denied this motion, the case would proceed to trial in 
September. The week before trial, the State tendered a jury instruction on 
reckless homicide as a lesser included offense. The parties and court 
briefly discussed it at a pretrial hearing and acknowledged it would 
depend on the evidence presented at trial. 
During the five-day trial, the jury heard evidence that included Larkin’s 
videotaped interview. On the morning of the fourth day, the court rejected 
the tendered reckless homicide instruction. At the end of the day, the State 
asked whether it would “be permitted to ask about involuntary 
manslaughter.” Tr. Vol. V, p.229. The trial court indicated this could occur 
the next morning. At the beginning of the fifth day, the State formally 
tendered an instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary 
manslaughter based on a battery.1 Over Larkin’s objection that he lacked 
fair notice of that lesser included offense, the court gave the instruction. 
At closing, the parties focused more on voluntary than involuntary 
manslaughter. On involuntary manslaughter, the State argued that Larkin 
committed the predicate battery by pushing Stacey, while Larkin argued 
self-defense. 
The jury found Larkin guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a Class C 
felony, for killing his wife while committing a battery in violation of 
Indiana Code section 35-42-1-4(c)(3). During sentencing, the trial court 
found the handgun to be an aggravator before sentencing Larkin to two 
years of incarceration. Larkin appealed, challenging: (1) the involuntary 
 
1 “A person who kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit: 
battery; commits involuntary manslaughter, a Class C felony.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-4(c)(3) 
(2012) (recodified as I.C. § 35-42-1-4(b)(3)). “A person who knowingly or intentionally touches 
another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery.” I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a).   
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manslaughter instruction; (2) the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to 
negate his self-defense claim; (3) the denial of his most recent motion to 
dismiss; and (4) the handgun’s status as an aggravator.  
The Court of Appeals reversed Larkin’s conviction after addressing 
only two of his arguments. It found the information did not allege Larkin 
shot Stacey “with an intent to batter rather than with an intent to kill” or 
that he “committed [a] battery by pushing Stacey.” Larkin v. State, 159 
N.E.3d 976, 986–87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), vacated. And there was, “at a 
minimum, reasonable doubt as to whether the State’s charging instrument 
provided Larkin with fair notice of the charge of which he was eventually 
convicted.” Id. at 987. The panel also briefly concluded there was 
insufficient evidence to contradict Larkin’s self-defense claim. Id. at 988 
n.9.  
The State sought transfer, which we now grant. See Ind. Appellate Rule 
58(A).  
Standards of Review 
The existence of a lesser included offense is a question of law, which we 
review de novo. Young v. State, 699 N.E.2d 252, 255 (Ind. 1998). When the 
trial court makes an express finding on the existence of an evidentiary 
dispute between the charged and lesser included offenses or does not 
make such a finding when the specific issue was not raised, we review for 
an abuse of discretion. Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1020 (Ind. 1998). 
Such abuse occurs when the trial court “misinterprets the law,” Yao v. 
State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind. 2012), or its “decision is clearly against 
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it,” Hoglund v. 
State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012). If a defendant objects to an 
instruction on the lesser included offense based on his lack of fair notice, 
he raises a constitutional claim, which we review de novo. Young v. State, 
30 N.E.3d 719, 728 (Ind. 2015); Hendricks v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1123, 1135 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.  
When a defendant alleges the State did not sufficiently rebut his self-
defense claim, we do not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility, 
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and only look “to the evidence most favorable to the judgment.” Miller v. 
State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). “[W]here such evidence and 
reasonable inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value 
sufficient to support the judgment,” we affirm. Id. We review the denial of 
a motion to dismiss a charging instrument for an abuse of discretion. Yao, 
975 N.E.2d at 1276. Likewise, we review sentencing decisions for an abuse 
of discretion. Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002).  
Discussion and Decision 
Larkin raises four issues: (1) whether the trial court appropriately 
instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (2) whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence to overcome his self-defense claim; (3) 
whether the trial court erred by denying his most recent motion to 
dismiss; and (4) whether the trial court improperly considered the 
handgun as an aggravator. We discuss each issue and, in doing so, reject 
Larkin’s arguments.  
I. 
The trial court appropriately instructed the jury 
on involuntary manslaughter. 
During a criminal trial, either party can request a jury instruction on a 
lesser included offense.2 Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103, 1108 (Ind. 2012). 
When this occurs, the court must engage in the analysis we set forth in 
Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566–67 (Ind. 1995). First, the court must 
determine whether the lesser offense is inherently or factually included in 
the charged offense. Id. If it is either, the court must then determine 
whether “a serious evidentiary dispute” exists between the elements that 
distinguish the offenses. Id. at 567. In other words, there must be sufficient 
 
2 Our precedent that the door swings both ways volleys the dissent’s assertion that “the State 
should [not] be able to seek a lesser included instruction mid trial once it realizes things aren’t 
going well.” Post, at 2. It can, so long as the charging documents provide adequate notice and 
the record at trial reveals a serious evidentiary dispute.   
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evidence for the jury to find the defendant committed the lesser offense 
but not the charged offense. Id. If a dispute exists, the court must give the 
instruction. Id. When the State makes the request, however, the defendant 
must have been on fair notice that he could have been convicted of the 
offense. Young, 30 N.E.3d at 725. Here, we find that involuntary 
manslaughter was a factually included lesser offense, there was a serious 
evidentiary dispute, and Larkin had fair notice. We discuss each in turn. 
A. Involuntary manslaughter was a factually included 
lesser offense.  
A lesser offense can be either inherently or factually included in the 
charged offense. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 566–67. Here, both parties correctly 
recognize that involuntary manslaughter is not an inherently included 
lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter (or murder, for that matter).3 
However, it may be a factually included lesser offense if the charging 
document alleged all of its elements. Id. at 567. 
The information alleged that Larkin knowingly or intentionally killed 
Stacey with a handgun. The State sought the involuntary manslaughter 
instruction on the basis of a battery. A battery is a knowing or intentional 
touching “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a) 
(2012). A knowing or intentional killing with a handgun can be classified 
as a battery. See Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d 537, 538–39 (Ind. 1991). The 
necessary physical contact occurs when the defendant shoots the victim, 
id., or otherwise uses the handgun to cause a rude, insolent, or angry 
touching, see Fisher v. State, 541 N.E.2d 520, 522 (Ind. 1989). Here, by 
alleging Larkin knowingly or intentionally killed Stacey with a handgun, 
the information alleged that he committed a battery against her. Cf. 
Champlain v. State, 681 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind. 1997) (concluding the 
information did not allege a battery when it merely stated the defendant 
 
3 An offense is inherently included when it can be proven by all, or less than all, material 
elements of the charged offense or by a lesser mens rea. Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 251 n.30 
(Ind. 2020). 
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knowingly killed the victim). Thus, involuntary manslaughter based on a 
battery was a factually included lesser offense.  
B. There was a serious evidentiary dispute about the 
elements that distinguish voluntary manslaughter from 
involuntary manslaughter.  
The trial court must instruct the jury on the lesser included offense only 
if there is a serious evidentiary dispute on the elements that distinguish it 
from the charged offense. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. Voluntary 
manslaughter requires an intentional or knowing killing in sudden heat, 
I.C. § 35-42-1-3(a)(1), while involuntary manslaughter only requires a 
battery that “incidental[ly]” kills the victim, Ingram v. State, 547 N.E.2d 
823, 831 (Ind. 1989); I.C. § 35-42-1-4(c)(3).  
Here, there was a serious evidentiary dispute. During his interview, 
Larkin stated that he only intended to push Stacey with the gun. If the 
jury believed him, then it could (as it did) convict him of involuntary 
manslaughter. See Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. But he also mentioned the 
heated verbal and physical confrontation between him and Stacey just 
before she was shot, his finger’s placement on the trigger at one point, and 
the serious marital issues between them. Larkin’s witnesses also testified 
about those issues. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer 
Larkin intentionally or knowingly killed Stacey while under sudden heat. 
Because there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of either 
offense, there was no abuse of discretion.4 
 
4 We also note that the jury could have found Larkin knowingly or intentionally shot Stacey to 
batter her, not kill her, see Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ind. 1991), and thus found him 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter for the unintended death.   
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C. With the Wright analysis satisfied, we turn to the 
constitutional analysis of fair notice and conclude that 
Larkin was not deprived of it. 
Due process entitles a defendant to limit his defense to the charging 
instrument’s allegations. Young, 30 N.E.3d at 723, 725. This means he must 
have fair notice of the offenses of which he may be convicted. Id. at 725. 
Without fair notice, the trial court cannot instruct the jury on a lesser 
included offense, regardless of the Wright analysis. Id.  
By alleging Larkin killed Stacey with a handgun, the information 
referenced—and provided notice of—“a battery that could have been a 
basis for an involuntary manslaughter conviction.” Norris v. State, 943 
N.E.2d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; cf. Champlain, 681 N.E.2d 
at 702. The wrinkle here arises from the State’s argument at closing that 
Larkin committed the necessary battery by pushing Stacey. 
Understandably, the allegation in the information—killing with a 
handgun—invokes a shooting, not a pushing. But here, Larkin stated 
during his pre-charge interview that he intentionally pushed Stacey with 
the handgun, which resulted in its second discharge. Because pushing 
someone with a loaded handgun is, at a minimum, a rude touching, 
Larkin admitted to committing a battery against Stacey. And that battery 
resulted in her death. At trial, the State simply used Larkin’s admission 
against him.  
Larkin’s reliance on Young to allege a lack of fair notice is ultimately 
unavailing. There, the defendants were charged with murder for a 
shooting but convicted of attempted aggravated battery for a beating. 
Young, 30 N.E.3d at 721–22. While both the shooting and beating involved 
a battery, they were accomplished by completely different means. Id. at 
725. Here, the voluntary manslaughter charge and involuntary 
manslaughter conviction were both based on the same means: the 
handgun.  
The State charged Larkin following his interview and could have 
foreclosed its pushing argument. See id. But it did not. We cannot say 
Larkin was deprived of fair notice when the information alleged a battery 
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and Larkin himself alerted the State to a possible theory of the case that it 
ultimately argued at trial. 
II. The State presented sufficient evidence to 
overcome Larkin’s self-defense claim.  
A defendant can raise self-defense as a justification for an otherwise 
criminal act. I.C. § 35-41-3-2; Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699. When self-defense 
is asserted, the defendant must prove he was in a place where he had a 
right to be, “acted without fault,” and reasonably feared or apprehended 
death or great bodily harm. Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699–700. The State must 
then negate at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt “by rebutting 
the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in 
self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in 
chief.” Lilly v. State, 506 N.E.2d 23, 24 (Ind. 1987). We will reverse a 
conviction only if no reasonable person could say the State overcame the 
self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.  
Here, the State met its burden by presenting evidence that allowed the 
jury to reject Larkin’s self-defense claim. Larkin’s interview alone was 
more than enough. For example, the jury could have found that he was 
the initial aggressor after he stated that he grabbed the handgun from the 
safe or that he escalated the situation with inflammatory remarks. See 
Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 700 (noting self-defense is generally not available to 
the initial aggressor). The jury also could have found that Larkin’s 
response—pushing Stacey with a loaded handgun—was not 
“proportionate to the urgency of the situation.” Hollowell v. State, 707 
N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). As the trier of fact, the jury was 
empowered to assess Larkin’s credibility and weigh the evidence. We 
have no such power. In short, the record did not contain “no evidence 
whatsoever,” Cobbs v. State, 528 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind. 1988), to contradict 
Larkin’s self-defense claim.  
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III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying Larkin’s motion to dismiss for 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
Dismissal of a charging instrument “is an extreme remedy.” Larkin, 100 
N.E.3d at 707. A defendant can only succeed on a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct if the misconduct placed him “in a position of grave peril.” 
State v. Taylor, 49 N.E.3d 1019, 1029 (Ind. 2016). At issue here is Larkin’s 
most recent motion to dismiss, which partially rested on the misconduct 
this Court considered in Larkin, 100 N.E.3d at 706–07. There, we 
recognized the appropriate remedy was, if necessary, suppression of the 
tainted evidence. Id. The trial court acted accordingly by holding a taint 
hearing. We will not revisit that misconduct. See State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 
361, 369–70 (Ind. 2021).  
Larkin added another allegation of misconduct: the State’s failure to 
disclose that his handgun was defective. In May 2016, approximately three 
weeks before a trial date, the State’s firearms expert discovered that 
Larkin’s handgun had been recalled because of defects that caused it to 
unintentionally fire. She informed the prosecutor, who never informed 
Larkin. Trial did not proceed on the set date, because the trial court 
dismissed the case, which we reversed. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d at 708. Larkin 
then found a new firearms expert who knew about the defect. 
 In denying Larkin’s pretrial motion, the trial court (appropriately) 
focused on the nondisclosure. Although it found the State committed 
misconduct, it concluded that Larkin was not prejudiced because he had 
sufficient time to incorporate the defects into his defense. The trial court’s 
decision was far from an abuse of discretion. By then, Larkin had an 
expert who was knowledgeable about the defective handgun and 
performed tests on it. We do not condone the State’s lack of disclosure, 
particularly in a case already rife with misconduct. Id. at 706. But because 
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Larkin had adequate time to, and did, incorporate the defects into his 
defense, we cannot say the misconduct placed him in grave peril.5 
IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
treating the handgun as an aggravator, but even if 
it did, Larkin was not prejudiced.  
During sentencing, a trial court abuses its discretion by considering 
aggravators that “are improper as a matter of law.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 
N.E.2d 482, 490–91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g. But when it does, a 
defendant is not entitled to resentencing if “the record is clear that the trial 
court would have imposed the same sentence without regard to the 
challenged aggravators.” McDonald v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. 
2007). In other words, the defendant must have been prejudiced by the 
improper aggravators. Id. 
At sentencing, the trial judge found one aggravator—the use of a 
handgun. He noted that this aggravator had (apparently) been previously 
upheld as part of his “one-man crusade against handguns.” Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.110. He also found the numerous mitigators “far outweigh[ed]” the 
aggravator, which caused him to subtract two years from the four-year 
advisory sentence. Id. But once there, the aggravator and mitigators did 
not affect his decision to sentence Larkin to the two-year statutory 
minimum, I.C. § 35-50-2-1(c)(4), with none suspended. Larkin alleges that 
without the improper aggravator, his minimum sentence likely would 
have been suspended. 
 It is well established that the trial court may consider the nature and 
circumstances of the crime as an aggravator. McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 
1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001). Here, the handgun was part of the nature and 
 
5 During trial, Larkin renewed his motion after the State sought to introduce a recording of an 
interview between his children and the investigating officer that was recovered at the last 
minute. Because the trial court appropriately denied the State’s request, its denial of Larkin’s 
renewed motion was not an abuse of discretion.  
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circumstances of the crime: Larkin used it to commit a battery against 
Stacey, which resulted in her death and his involuntary manslaughter 
conviction. But even if the trial court used the aggravator to 
inappropriately send “a personal philosophical or political message,” Beno 
v. State, 581 N.E.2d 922, 924 (Ind. 1991), Larkin was not prejudiced. 
Despite the aggravator, he received the minimum sentence. And nothing 
indicates the trial court would have otherwise suspended it. A contrary 
conclusion requires speculation that is unsupported by the record, which 
establishes the aggravator played no role in the court’s decision not to 
suspend his sentence. 
Conclusion 
Because we reject all of Larkin’s arguments, we affirm the judgment of 
the trial court.  
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter and Goff, JJ., concur. 
David, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Stacy R. Uliana 
John H. Kenney 
Bargersville, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Stephen R. Creason 
Justin F. Roebel 
Office of the Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CR-427 | September 9, 2021 
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David, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion. I do not believe that the 
trial court appropriately instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter 
given the facts and circumstances here. I would deny transfer and let the 
Court of Appeals opinion stand.   
I do not agree with the majority’s analysis about battery being factually 
included in the offense here, given the charging information and the facts 
and circumstances here. While battery may be included where there is a 
murder by handgun, I’m not sure that’s always the case.   
I note a few things about the case relied upon by the State and the 
majority, Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d 537, 538–39 (Ind. 1991), for the 
proposition that killing by handgun necessarily involves a battery. The 
decision in Lynch was very fact specific as evidenced by the Court 
including limiting language such as “here” and “this is not such a case.” 
Id. at 539. The Court did not craft a broad rule providing that any and all 
killing by handguns is necessarily battery in every case and acknowledged 
that the language of the charging information could limit lesser included 
instructions. Here, the charging information is terse and only alleged that 
a handgun was used without more. That it is, it provides the “killing” was 
accomplished by the handgun with zero mention of a battery or facts that 
would even indicate one. We don’t read words into statutes when 
interpreting them and I do not believe we should read them into charging 
information either.  
Further, it was defendant that sought the lesser included instruction in 
Lynch and not the State. This distinction is important. As this Court 
recently noted, “a lesser-included offense implicates a defendant’s due 
process right to fair notice: unless the defendant himself requests an 
instruction on the offense (thereby waiving the notice requirement)[.]” 
Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 251 (Ind. 2020). The State had over six years 
within which it could have amended the charging information to include 
an involuntary manslaughter charge against Larkin or mention some form 
of battery, but it did not do so. Then during trial and just minutes before 
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final instructions and closing arguments, the State proffered its jury 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on a battery, to which 
Larkin objected. I agree with Larkin that this does not give his counsel 
adequate time to prepare a defense. The act of pushing his wife with a 
handgun and pulling a trigger are separate and distinct and occurred at 
different times during Larkin’s confrontation with his wife. These acts 
have distinct legal consequences and defenses.  
I do not believe that the State should be able to seek a lesser included 
instruction mid trial once it realizes things aren’t going well or use a 
vague charging information to ambush a defendant. I fear the precedent 
the majority opinion sets will open the door to prosecutors trying to slip in 
other “lesser included” charges at the last minute. If the State wants to be 
able to seek a lesser included conviction based on involuntary 
manslaughter, it should clearly and plainly allege a battery in the charging 
information.   
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.