Title: Commonwealth v. Wood

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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SJC-10977 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM WOOD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.      March 7, 2014. - August 7, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  Evidence, Third-party 
culprit, Relevancy and materiality, Hearsay, Prior 
misconduct, Joint venturer, Expert opinion, Testimony 
before grand jury.  Jury and Jurors.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Witness, Expert.  Perjury.  
Grand Jury.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Hearsay, 
Jury and jurors, Confrontation of witnesses, Argument by 
prosecutor, Grand jury proceedings, Conduct of prosecutor, 
Verdict, Question by jury, Duplicative convictions.  Joint 
Enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 4, 2004. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
 
Stephen Neyman for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick 
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                                                          
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In the early morning hours of February 13, 2004, 
Betsy Tripp was bound with telephone wire and murdered in her 
home, a condominium on Monsignor Way in the Dorchester section 
of Boston.  Her throat was slit.  The man who shared the 
condominium with her, Morris Thompson, was shot in the face, 
coming close to death, and losing an eye.  The perpetrators fled 
in a vehicle that Thompson had borrowed from a neighbor in the 
condominium complex and for which Thompson had the keys.  The 
vehicle was abandoned in the parking lot of a Dorchester 
elementary school and set ablaze shortly after 2 A.M. that same 
morning. 
 
Thompson survived his wounds and accused the defendant, 
William Wood, and Wood's friend, Quincy Butler, of committing 
the crimes in the course of a botched kidnapping and robbery 
attempt.  Both were charged with murder and related crimes,2 and 
were tried together.  There were four trials.  Two ended in 
mistrials when the jury were unable to unanimously agree on a 
verdict.  A third resulted in mistrial when the trial judge 
became ill during trial.  At the fourth trial, which is the 
                                                          
 
2 The defendant, William Wood, was charged with murder in 
the first degree, armed carjacking, two counts of kidnapping, 
armed home invasion, two counts of armed robbery, assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a handgun), larceny of a 
motor vehicle, and malicious destruction of property over $250.  
Quincy Butler was charged with the same offenses, in addition to 
one count of possession of a firearm. 
3 
 
subject of this appeal, the defendant was convicted of murder in 
the first degree on theories of felony-murder and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.3  Butler was convicted of murder in the 
second degree, and his appeal is pending in the Appeals Court. 
 
As outlined further below, the principal witnesses for the 
Commonwealth were Thompson and Butler's former roommate and girl 
friend at the time of the murder, Laura DaSilva.  DaSilva's 
testimony included her observations regarding the kidnapping at 
gunpoint of Thompson from her apartment by the defendant and 
Butler shortly before the murder; her observations of the 
defendant and Butler when they returned to her apartment at 
approximately 3 A.M. on February 13 and disposed of their 
clothing, including what appeared to be bloody gloves; and 
admissions made to her by Butler later that same morning 
regarding what he and the defendant had done at Tripp's 
condominium. 
 
Both the defendant and Butler testified at trial, 
essentially denying their involvement in the crimes.  In 
addition to their testimony, the defense focused on the lack of 
forensic evidence tying either of them to the crime scene, what 
                                                          
 
3 The defendant was also convicted of armed carjacking, two 
counts of kidnapping, armed home invasion, two counts of armed 
robbery, and larceny of a motor vehicle.  The judge dismissed 
his convictions on both counts of armed robbery as duplicative 
of his conviction of felony-murder in the first degree.  The 
defendant was acquitted of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon on Morris Thompson. 
4 
 
they claimed was an inadequate police investigation, and, 
relatedly, the possibility that Thompson or one of Thompson's 
drug-related associates had committed the crimes.  The outcome 
of the case, to a large degree, turned on the jury's assessment 
whether the Commonwealth's principal witnesses or the 
codefendants were telling the truth. 
 
On appeal, the defendant raises numerous claims of error.  
For the reasons stated below, we find no reversible error, and 
discern no basis to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce or reverse the murder verdict.  Consequently, 
we affirm the defendant's convictions.  We also reinstate the 
defendant's two convictions of armed robbery, the underlying 
felonies in the felony-murder conviction, which the judge 
dismissed as duplicative.  As we have concluded in similar 
circumstances, those convictions are not duplicative where the 
defendant is also convicted on another theory of murder in the 
first degree, here murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 734 (2010) ("if a jury 
return a special verdict specifying felony-murder as one of 
several theories under which they convicted the defendant, the 
underlying felony remains a distinct crime").  Commonwealth v. 
Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 396-397 (1997) (same). 
5 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could 
have found them, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 93 (1997). 
 
a.  The murder.  Thompson and Tripp began dating eight 
years prior to her death in 2004, and moved into a condominium 
in Dorchester together in 2001 or 2002.  Thompson received 
disability checks every month and also worked odd jobs, often as 
a doorman at various Boston nightclubs or as a construction 
worker. 
 
In February, 2004, Thompson's neighbor, Mitra Ghobadi, 
asked him to refurbish her apartment.  He determined that he 
needed help to finish the job on time.  DaSilva had lived with 
Thompson and Tripp for some time to escape an abusive former boy 
friend, and Thompson decided to enlist the help of her new boy 
friend, Butler.  Thompson testified that he knew Butler as "Q."4 
 
DaSilva testified that on the evening of February 12, 
Thompson drove to her house in Boston with an "eight ball" of 
"crack" cocaine.  He smoked the crack cocaine with DaSilva, 
Butler, and two other residents of the apartment in DaSilva's 
bedroom.5,6  Thompson told Butler that he would pay him $200 at 
                                                          
 
4 Butler testified that he had met Morris Thompson numerous 
times at Laura DaSilva's apartment. 
 
5 Thompson repeatedly denied being a drug user and testified 
that he did not smoke "crack" cocaine that night. 
 
6 
 
the end of the following day for his assistance refurbishing 
Ghobadi's apartment.  Butler responded that he had a friend who 
could help them get through the work more quickly.  Thompson 
agreed, and said that Butler and his friend could split the 
$200. 
 
At some point, the defendant entered the bedroom.  Butler 
told DaSilva to follow him to the bathroom to talk with him.  
Once there, Butler said "that he was taking [Thompson] out and 
[Thompson] wasn't coming back to the house." 
 
Thompson became uneasy at the sight of the defendant, and 
something "just didn't feel right."  At that point, Butler said, 
"We're gonna get paid tonight," pulled out a silver revolver 
with a black handle,7 and put the gun to Thompson's head, while 
the defendant went through Thompson's pockets.  The defendant 
took Thompson's automobile keys, money, and wallet, while 
DaSilva sat and watched from the bed, silently. 
 
After taking Thompson's money, Butler and the defendant 
took Thompson to his automobile.8  The defendant drove while 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 The two other residents retired to their bedroom after 
smoking and did not witness or take part in the armed robbery or 
its aftermath. 
 
7 Laura DaSilva testified that she had seen the defendant 
give the gun to Butler months earlier. 
 
8 On the night of the murder, Morris Thompson drove Mitra 
Ghobadi's automobile, which she had lent to him after the 
automobile he shared with Betsy Tripp was damaged.  As the 
7 
 
Thompson sat in the passenger seat and Butler sat behind him 
holding the gun to Thompson's head.  The group arrived at 
Thompson's and Tripp's condominium building sometime after 
midnight.  After asking if the building had any security 
cameras, the defendant and Butler walked Thompson to the front 
door of the building and used his keys to open it.  When they 
then entered the condominium unit, Tripp was sleeping in the 
bedroom. 
 
The defendant and Butler ripped a telephone cord from the 
wall and tied Thompson up with his hands behind his back in the 
living room.  They also woke Tripp and tied her in a similar 
manner.  They demanded money, and the defendant rummaged through 
the house while Butler sat holding Thompson at gunpoint.  
Eventually they demanded Tripp's automated teller machine (ATM) 
card and its personal identification number (PIN),9 which she 
gave to the defendant.  The defendant left the house to use the 
ATM, while Butler stayed, "beating [Thompson] around on the 
floor." 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
distinction is not relevant, we refer to the vehicle as 
Thompson's for the sake of brevity. 
 
9 The defendant testified that he had previously met 
Thompson through DaSilva and occasionally sold him crack 
cocaine.  He also testified that he had Tripp's automated teller 
machine card because Thompson had traded it to him in exchange 
for crack cocaine on February 12, 2004, several hours before the 
murder. 
8 
 
 
The defendant went to an ATM in Codman Square, which was 
located a few minutes from Thompson's and Tripp's building.  
Between 1:49 and 1:50 A.M., he tried to withdraw money from the 
ATM five times, before successfully obtaining forty dollars.  
One minute later, he went to another ATM in the area and 
unsuccessfully tried to withdraw more money.  He then returned 
to the condominium. 
 
On his return, the defendant told Butler that he did not 
get any money.  Tripp explained that her account was empty 
because a check she had received had not cleared yet.  At that 
point, the defendant went into the kitchen, returned with a 
knife, grabbed Tripp by the back of the head, and cut her 
throat. 
 
On hearing Tripp scream, Thompson jumped up and tried to 
push the defendant out of the way.  As Thompson jumped toward 
the defendant, Butler fired one shot and hit Thompson in the 
side of the head.10  The bullet exited near his left eye.  
Thompson immediately lost consciousness and fell to the floor.  
When he awoke, Tripp was lying beside him, bleeding and barely 
alive.  He broke out of his restraints and went into the hallway 
looking for help from his neighbors. 
                                                          
 
10 Butler fired a second shot, which hit Tripp in the arm, 
after Thompson lost consciousness. 
9 
 
 
On answering a knock at his door, Richard Young, Thompson's 
neighbor, found Thompson bleeding profusely with his left eye 
hanging out of its socket.  Thompson testified that he told 
Young, "A guy named 'Q' shot me in the head, and Will cut my 
girlfriend's throat."11  Young told his wife to telephone 911, 
and he telephoned the fire department.  Within minutes, the 
police and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived.  
Thompson repeatedly told the police and medical personnel on the 
scene that "'Q' shot him."  At some point, Young also heard 
Thompson say, "My girlfriend is in the apartment." 
 
The police found Tripp lying on the floor.  She was covered 
with clothes, and she had a "deep," significant slash across her 
neck.  She was still alive and struggling to breathe as EMTs 
attended to her, but she was pronounced dead on arriving at 
Boston Medical Center. 
 
After the shooting, the defendant and Butler took 
Thompson's automobile to the nearby Fifield Elementary School 
and set it on fire.  At approximately 3 A.M., they returned to 
DaSilva's house.  The two went into DaSilva's bedroom, took off 
their clothes, and placed them in a plastic bag.  DaSilva 
noticed a pair of black leather gloves that appeared to be 
stained with blood, prompting her nervously to ask them if it 
                                                          
 
11 Thompson admitted that he was not sure if Richard Young 
understood him, and in fact Young testified only that Thompson 
said, "I've been shot." 
10 
 
was blood.  Neither responded, and instead Butler counted some 
money and gave it to the defendant, who said that after the 
stress he had just been through he wanted to get high, to which 
Butler responded, "No, not right now, nobody's getting high 
right now." 
 
After the defendant left DaSilva's house, she went to take 
a shower.  Butler followed her into the bathroom and told her 
that he (rather than the defendant) had slit Tripp's throat, 
saying, "She didn't have to die like that."12  Butler told her 
that he and the defendant had tied Thompson and Tripp with 
telephone wire before taking Tripp's ATM card.  Butler added 
that the defendant went to get money from the ATM, and that the 
defendant told Tripp that, if he did not get any money, he was 
going to slit her throat.  Butler also stated that Thompson 
started to free himself while he (Butler) was cutting Tripp's 
throat, and the defendant responded by shooting Thompson.  
                                                          
 
12 DaSilva consistently testified at trial that Butler told 
her that he, rather than the defendant, killed Tripp, and that 
the defendant shot Thompson.  What Butler told DaSilva may have 
been part of his effort to frighten her into silence.  Thompson 
testified consistently at trial that he observed the defendant 
kill Tripp, and that Butler shot him.  Based on the jury verdict 
(the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories 
of felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and Butler 
guilty of murder in the second degree), it seems likely that the 
jury believed Thompson's testimony and discounted Butler's 
overstating of his role in the murder of Tripp and the shooting 
of Thompson in his recounting of the details to DaSilva. 
11 
 
Finally, he said that the two left under the assumption that 
both Thompson and Tripp were dead. 
 
b.  The investigation.  The police investigation got 
underway immediately after the murder.  Extensive fingerprint 
and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on the clothing, knives, 
and other surfaces found in the condominium was conducted, but 
did not conclusively link either the defendant or Butler to the 
crime scene. 
 
On February 20, 2004, Boston police detectives asked Butler 
and DaSilva to come to police headquarters and make statements.  
DaSilva was afraid Butler would harm her children if she 
implicated him in the murder.13  As a result, DaSilva lied to the 
police and told them that Butler had been with her at the time 
Tripp was killed.  Later, Butler encouraged her to keep her 
false story consistent. 
 
On February 23, Thompson gave a statement to Boston police 
detectives in which he repeated that Butler had shot him and 
that the defendant had slit Tripp's throat.  The detectives 
intended to conduct a photographic array, when one of them 
                                                          
 
13 DaSilva testified that Butler took her to a hotel one or 
two days after the murder and told her that he might have to 
kill the defendant because Thompson had survived.  He also told 
her that she was to tell the police that he, Butler, stayed with 
her the whole night of the murder and did not go anywhere.  When 
DaSilva suggested she might kill herself, Butler told her that 
if she died he would kill her three children.  This conversation 
made her very frightened for the safety of her children. 
12 
 
knocked over his bag, causing a piece of paper showing six 
photographs to fall out.  Thompson saw the paper, recognized the 
defendant's picture, and said, "That's the guy that had cut 
Betsy's throat."  He later identified Butler as the shooter in 
another photographic array. 
 
On February 26, the detectives asked DaSilva to come back 
to the police station for further questioning.  Once at the 
station, DaSilva admitted that she had lied in her first 
statement because of her fear of Butler.   She then gave a 
different account of what she witnessed the night of the murder, 
implicating Butler, although she testified at trial that she had 
still held back certain details, including some of Butler's 
admissions to her.  Butler and the defendant were then arrested 
and subsequently indicted.14  We address other relevant facts as 
they arise below. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Third-party culprit and Bowden 
evidence.  In a pretrial motion joined by Butler, the defendant 
sought to introduce, through several witnesses and cross 
examination, evidence intended to show that a third party -- 
likely Thompson -- killed Tripp, as well as evidence that the 
                                                          
 
14 DaSilva testified that in March, 2004, after Butler and 
the defendant were arrested and in jail, she received a 
telephone call from a third party accompanied by Butler and the 
defendant in a three-way conference call.  Butler and the 
defendant asked her what she had told the police, and she denied 
having spoken to them.  They then reiterated that she was not to 
talk to the police. 
13 
 
police failed to investigate certain statements implicating 
Thompson.  We discern no error in the judge's rulings excluding 
much of the proffered evidence. 
 
The defendant sought to introduce testimony from Natalie 
Shaheen, a friend of Tripp, recalling several statements made to 
her by Tripp, purportedly showing a deteriorating relationship.  
Specifically, it was represented that Shaheen would testify that 
Tripp had told her that Thompson had been abusive toward her for 
years, both threatening and inflicting physical injury; that she 
was frightened of Thompson and the people he brought over to the 
condominium as a consequence of his crack cocaine habit, and did 
not feel safe in her own home; and that Thompson had told Tripp 
many times that he would kill her.  Sheehan would also have 
testified that Tripp had planned to tell Thompson to move out of 
her home, and that Tripp feared that Thompson was "catching on" 
to her plan.  Finally, Sheehan would have testified that Tripp 
stated to her that if she were killed, it would be Thompson who 
killed her. 
 
The defendant also sought to introduce evidence through his 
cross-examination of Thompson.  In particular, he intended to 
question Thompson regarding his substance abuse history in order 
to impeach his expected testimony that he had only used crack 
cocaine once, and that he did not use it on the night of the 
murder. 
14 
 
 
He also intended to question Thompson regarding an incident 
between Thompson and a woman named Laura Buchman, in which 
Buchman stole a camera from Thompson over a drug dispute and 
Thompson allegedly paid several people to beat Buchman up in 
retaliation.  He further intended to call Buchman as a witness 
to describe the camera incident and testify that she and 
Thompson often used crack cocaine together without Tripp's 
knowledge, and that Thompson acted "crazy" when using cocaine. 
 
The judge excluded all the proffered evidence from Shaheen 
and Buchman as either hearsay or irrelevant, and allowed the 
defendant to inquire as to Thompson's possession and use of 
drugs and his dealings with a drug dealer known as "Tony" or "T" 
only in the days immediately preceding the murder.  With regard 
to Shaheen, the judge determined that her proposed testimony was 
hearsay that did not fall within any exception.  He noted that 
none of the proffered evidence provided a substantial connecting 
link to any third-party culprit.  In particular, he stated, 
"Looking at the whole picture I can't see Thompson as third 
party culprit.  I can't rationally, without an incredible 
imagination, I can't picture him being the culprit.  And as far 
as a third party unknown drug dealer being the culprit, it just 
seems too farfetched and feeble." 
 
"The standard applicable to admission of third-party 
evidence in Massachusetts is well settled . . . ."  Commonwealth 
15 
 
v. Buckman, 461 Mass. 24, 30 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2781 (2012).  "Third party culprit evidence is 'a time-honored 
method of defending against a criminal charge.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996).  "A defendant may 
introduce evidence that tends to show that another person 
committed the crime or had the motive, intent, and opportunity 
to commit it."  Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 387 
(1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 395 Mass. 296, 300 
(1985). 
 
A judge's discretion to admit third-party culprit evidence 
is not without limits.  The proffered evidence "must have a 
rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and the 
evidence cannot be too remote or speculative."  Silva-Santiago, 
453 Mass. at 801, quoting Rosa, 422 Mass. at 22.  See Buckman, 
461 Mass. at 32.  Further, if the evidence is hearsay not 
falling within any exception, it is admissible only if it is 
"otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the 
jury, and there are other 'substantial connecting links' to the 
crime."  Silva-Santiago, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Rice, 
441 Mass. 291, 305 (2004).  "Because the issue is one of 
constitutional dimension, we are not bound by an abuse of 
discretion standard, but rather examine the issue 
16 
 
independently."  Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66-67 
(2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008). 
 
The judge did not err in excluding the proffered third-
party culprit evidence here.  First, the entirety of Shaheen's 
proffered testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and as such was 
required to have "substantial connecting links" to the crimes.  
See Buckman, 461 Mass. at 32 ("Third-party culprit evidence is 
offered for the truth of the matter, and as such it must have 
substantial probative value in connecting a third person to the 
crime").  While Shaheen's testimony may have shown that the 
relationship between Thompson and Tripp was strained, any 
inference that Thompson was the culprit is entirely unsupported 
by any evidence.  Thompson's testimony as to the events of the 
evening was largely consistent with DaSilva's testimony, based 
on her observations and Butler's admissions to her.15  It was 
also consistent with what the responding police and EMTs 
observed when they arrived at the scene.  The judge concluded, 
and we agree, that it strains credulity, and is entirely 
speculative, that Thompson slit Tripp's throat, shot himself, 
survived, discarded a firearm, and fabricated a story 
implicating the defendant and Butler while suffering from a 
                                                          
 
15 There is nothing in the record to suggest that Thompson 
and DaSilva ever had any opportunity or incentive to collude in 
constructing consistent versions of the event that evening.  
Indeed, Thompson indicated during his testimony that he believed 
DaSilva had organized the robbery. 
17 
 
painful and blinding wound that, according to the responding 
officers, appeared to be "fatal."  See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 
432 Mass. 578, 588-589 (2000) (conversation between victim and 
friend about victim's fear of brother-in-law insufficient to 
suggest he was third-party culprit who had motive, intent, and 
opportunity to commit crime). 
 
The same is true of the proffered evidence that Thompson 
was a heavy drug user, had a violent past, and had threatened 
Buchman.  Where the overwhelming weight of the evidence was 
contrary to Thompson being the culprit, and where there was no 
evidence suggesting his complicity in the killing, the judge did 
not err in concluding that evidence of these prior bad acts did 
not support any rational inference linking Thompson to the 
crime. 
 
Moreover, where a defendant seeks to admit prior bad acts 
of an alleged third-party culprit, he must show that "the acts 
of the other person are so closely connected in point of time 
and method of operation as to cast doubt upon the identification 
of [the] defendant as the person who committed the crime."  
Conkey, 443 Mass. at 66, quoting Commonwealth v. Hunter, 426 
Mass. 715, 716-717 (1998).  Here, none of the excluded evidence 
was closely connected in time to the murder.  Proffered evidence 
that would show that Thompson was a heavy drug user who 
occasionally acted "crazy" while using cocaine described 
18 
 
incidents that occurred long before the night of the murder.  
Similarly, his alleged dispute with Buchman and hiring of men to 
harm her after she stole a camera from him was evidence of an 
irrelevant prior bad act.  See Commonwealth v. Pimental, 454 
Mass. 475, 479 (2009) (prior bad act of third-party culprit not 
admissible where it "shared no singular features or striking 
resemblance" with crime).  It also had no tendency to prove that 
anyone other than the defendant committed the crime, given that 
there is no reading of the record that suggests either that 
Buchman killed Tripp or that the incident was in any way related 
to the murder. 
 
Finally, although the judge limited testimony regarding 
Thompson's prior drug use, he did allow evidence of Thompson's 
use of crack cocaine on the night of the murder and the days 
preceding it.  Defense counsel was permitted to ask whether 
Thompson used crack cocaine the night of the murder, whether 
crack cocaine was found in the pants he was wearing that night, 
and whether he had arranged to hold crack cocaine for a drug 
dealer named "Tony" or "T."  Defense counsel was also permitted 
to elicit testimony from other witnesses to the effect that 
Thompson smoked crack cocaine in the hours preceding the murder 
and that crack pipes were found in his bedroom.  Thus, although 
the judge barred testimony about the full extent of Thompson's 
drug use and his behavior while on drugs, the judge admitted 
19 
 
(and the jury heard) substantial testimony about Thompson's drug 
use in the days leading up to the murder and his dealings with 
"Tony," rendering the excluded evidence cumulative.  See 
Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 252 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. Alammani, 439 Mass. 605, 611-612 (2003). 
 
The defendant also argues that Shaheen's statements about 
Tripp should have been admitted -- both through her own 
proffered testimony and that of Boston police Detective Russell 
Grant, to whom she relayed the information -- in furtherance of 
a Bowden defense.  See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 
486 (1980).  Pursuant to a Bowden defense, a defendant may 
introduce evidence regarding the police investigation in order 
to create an inference "that the evidence at trial may be 
inadequate or unreliable because the police failed to conduct 
the scientific tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police 
investigation would have conducted or investigated, and these 
tests or investigation may have led to significant evidence of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence."  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 
at 801.  "[T]he failure of the police to investigate leads 
concerning another suspect is sufficient grounds for a Bowden 
defense."  Id. at 802.  See Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 
155, 166 (2006) (police reports admissible to show that police 
were on notice of suspect but failed to investigate possible 
involvement in murder).  "[T]he exclusion of evidence of a 
20 
 
Bowden defense is not constitutional in nature and therefore is 
examined under an abuse of discretion standard."  Silva-
Santiago, supra at 804 n.26.  To determine whether a judge 
abused his or her discretion in declining to admit such 
evidence, the judge must determine whether the proffered third-
party culprit evidence was provided to the police and, if so, 
whether the probative weight of the evidence outweighed the risk 
of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth from turning the jury's 
attention to "collateral matters."  Id. at 803. 
 
As part of the police investigation, Detective Grant 
interviewed Shaheen on February 22, 2004, during which she 
provided essentially all of the third-party culprit evidence 
that her proffered testimony would have encompassed.  That 
evidence was properly excluded, however, because its probative 
value was negligible.  At best, the evidence would have shown 
that police failed to investigate Thompson as a suspect despite 
being aware of his drug use and his deteriorating relationship 
with Tripp.  However, where there was no evidence suggesting 
that Thompson killed Tripp, or was in any way involved in her 
death, the judge properly concluded that the evidence would have 
been far more prejudicial than probative. 
 
In any event, the defense was permitted to challenge the 
adequacy of the police investigation as a whole.  Counsel for 
both defendants extensively cross-examined Grant about his 
21 
 
investigation, emphasizing the fact that Grant was aware that 
Thompson had repeatedly lied to the police, and that Grant had 
done very little to find "T," despite having information 
suggesting that he had allegedly fronted Thompson an eight ball 
of crack cocaine only days before the murder.16  Defense counsel 
also argued in his closing, "The police in this case did not do 
the job that each and every one of you should expect to be 
done," and argued that a further investigation of Thompson's 
drug use might have uncovered a third-party drug dealer or user 
who may have committed the crime.  Thus, where the issue of an 
inadequate investigation was fairly before the jury, the 
defendant suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of the 
proffered evidence. 
 
b.  Hearsay statements.  The defendant argues that the 
judge erred in allowing DaSilva to testify about the statements 
made by the defendant to Butler, which were later relayed to 
her, and statements made by Butler to her during the days 
following the murder.  Because the testimony in question falls 
within the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule, we 
conclude that there was no error. 
 
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of statements 
made by Butler to DaSilva, arguing that the Commonwealth had not 
                                                          
 
16 Defense counsel through cross-examination and the calling 
of its own expert extensively challenged the adequacy of the 
forensic investigation conducted by the police. 
22 
 
as of the time of her testimony shown that Butler and the 
defendant were engaged in a joint venture.  The judge denied the 
motion, and defense counsel requested an instruction as to the 
joint venture exception to the hearsay rule.17  The judge 
instructed the jury, in relevant part: 
"[Y]ou may consider against an individual defendant, in 
this case, specifically, Mr. Wood, who is not alleged to 
have been a party to this conversation, any statements made 
by the other alleged participant in the joint venture, that 
is allegedly Mr. Butler, only if three things have been 
proved to you about that statement, this is the statement 
allegedly made by Quincy Butler.  First, that other 
evidence, apart from the statement, shows that there was a 
joint venture between the speaker, that's allegedly Mr. 
Butler, and the defendant, Wood.  Second, that the 
statement was made during the joint venture including the 
concealment phase if any.  And third, that the statement 
was made in order to further or help along the goal of the 
joint venture including concealing the alleged crime." 
 
 
After the limiting instruction, DaSilva testified as to the 
details of Butler's admissions to her on the night of the 
murder.  She testified that Butler told her that the defendant 
took Tripp's ATM card and told Tripp that he would slit her 
throat if he did not get any money from her account.  He went on 
to say that, when the defendant returned without any money, 
Butler slit Tripp's throat, Thompson broke free of the telephone 
cord, and the defendant shot Thompson in the face.  DaSilva went 
                                                          
 
17 The defendant's contention that he accepted the judge's 
offer to instruct the jury reluctantly, in order to mitigate the 
damage, is entirely unsupported by the record.  The judge noted 
that, in the prior trials, defense counsel had asked the judge 
not to give an instruction, and asked if that was still his 
position.  Defense counsel then asked for the instruction. 
23 
 
on to testify that, days later, she and Butler went to a hotel, 
where Butler told her that he and the defendant had burned 
Thompson's vehicle in the parking lot of the Fifield Elementary 
School, that Thompson was still alive, and that he "was going to 
have to take [the defendant] out" because the defendant did not 
succeed in killing Thompson. 
 
"Under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule, 
'[o]ut-of-court statements by joint criminal venturers are 
admissible against the others if the statements are made during 
the pendency of the criminal enterprise and in furtherance of 
it.'"  Commonwealth v. Hardy, 431 Mass. 387, 393 (2000), S.C., 
464 Mass. 660 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 418 Mass. 
207, 218 (1994).  "The judge need not make a preliminary finding 
that a joint criminal enterprise exists as a precondition to 
admitting the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 
533, 543 (1990).  Instead, he or she may allow the admission of 
such statements "on the representation of the prosecution that 
the Commonwealth will subsequently introduce sufficient evidence 
to show that the defendant was part of the conspiracy," and 
instruct the jury that they may only consider the statements if 
they find that, at the close of evidence, the Commonwealth has 
proved the existence of a joint venture beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Commonwealth v. Borans, 379 Mass. 117, 145 n.26 (1979). 
24 
 
 
Here, the judge's instruction to the jury was appropriate, 
accurate, and presumably followed by the jury.  See Commonwealth 
v. Ortiz, 463 Mass. 402, 416 (2012).  The evidence clearly 
supported a finding by the jury that the defendant and Butler 
engaged in a joint venture to rob and murder Tripp. 
 
Although the defendant contends that the joint venture had 
ended before Butler's statements were made, the evidence belies 
his argument.  The defendant's argument that the joint venture 
had ended when Butler made his initial statements to DaSilva 
"has no merit in light of undisputed evidence that the 
challenged statements were made only a few hours after the 
crimes."  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 436 Mass. 488, 494 (2002).  
Immediately before the statements were made, the defendant and 
Butler returned to DaSilva's home and disposed of their clothes 
in what was inferably an attempt to conceal evidence of the 
crimes.  Given that the "interests of the [two] men were still 
closely bound together, tending to ensure the reliability of 
their statements," Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 545, the initial 
statements were admissible. 
 
The same is true of the statements made to DaSilva several 
days later at a hotel.  The jury could have determined that 
Butler was still trying to "avoid detection and detention" at 
the time, given that he expressed concern that Thompson was 
still alive and presumably able to identify him.  Clarke, 418 
25 
 
Mass. at 219, quoting Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 545.  
Additionally, the jury could have concluded that Butler was 
attempting to frighten DaSilva and ensure that she did not speak 
to the police, given that she was one of only two people who 
could implicate him in the murder.  See Commonwealth v. Beckett, 
373 Mass. 329, 340 (1977) (one joint venturer making statement 
to encourage another not to speak to police supports finding 
that statement was made in furtherance of joint venture).  
DaSilva testified that she was in fact frightened by Butler's 
statements, that she delayed speaking honestly to the police due 
to her fear, and that she even considered committing suicide.  
Indeed, even after Butler and the defendant were arrested, they 
telephoned and spoke to DaSilva in an effort to keep her from 
speaking to the police.  See note 14, supra.  Simply put, the 
jury could have concluded that all of the statements were made 
in an attempt to conceal evidence of the joint venture, and thus 
that they fell well within the established exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
 
c.  Sleeping juror.  The defendant next argues that the 
trial judge abused his discretion in allowing a ninety year old 
juror, whom other jurors believed had been sleeping, to remain 
on the jury.  Where the judge conducted a thorough voir dire and 
determined that the juror was alert throughout the trial, we 
find no error.  See Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78-79 
26 
 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 476 (1973) 
(judge has discretion in what action to take when confronted 
with issue of sleeping juror, and burden is on defendant to show 
that judge's decision was "arbitrary or unreasonable"; burden 
not met where defense counsel twice opined that juror was 
sleeping and judge disagreed based on observations).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Dancy, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179-182 (2009) 
(defendant's burden not met where judge remarked that juror 
"keeps falling asleep" and called for recess to awaken juror). 
 
d.  Medical examiner's testimony.  The defendant also 
argues that he was denied his right of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights when the judge permitted 
a substitute medical examiner to testify as to facts contained 
in Tripp's autopsy report during his direct examination.  
Although the defendant is correct, there was no objection,18 and 
we conclude that he suffered no prejudice from the error, and 
thus there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Emeny, 463 Mass. 138, 145-146 
(2012). 
                                                          
 
18 The defendant's argument that he objected to the 
testimony of the substitute medical examiner finds no support in 
the record.  Counsel did not lodge an objection to the testimony 
as a whole, and only objected once on direct examination, in 
response to the prosecutor's question whether a forensic 
pathologist, armed with the information obtained in this case, 
could possibly determine the handedness of the killer. 
27 
 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Dr. 
Richard Evans, a medical examiner and forensic pathologist for 
the Commonwealth.  Evans testified that he did not perform 
Tripp's autopsy, but that it was instead conducted by Dr. 
Abraham Phillip.  Shortly after completing the autopsy, Phillip 
left the medical examiner's office.  Evans testified extensively 
as to Phillip's determinations and opinions as reflected in the 
autopsy report, including Phillip's observations as to the 
nature of the wound.  Evans added that, on review of all of the 
documentation relative to the case, he determined that the cause 
of death was the incised wound to Tripp's neck. 
 
As the Commonwealth correctly concedes, Evans should not 
have been permitted to testify as to the facts contained in the 
underlying autopsy report.  See Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 
379, 391-394 (2008) (testimony by substitute medical examiner as 
to facts and findings in original autopsy report is inadmissible 
hearsay).  Nevertheless, there was no prejudice. 
 
The improperly admitted testimony consisted of a recitation 
of Phillip's observations of Tripp's wounds, facts that were not 
in dispute.  The defendant raised a third-party culprit defense; 
he did not argue that Tripp had not died from a knife wound to 
her throat, but that he had not slit her throat.  In addition, 
the jury heard testimony from police and medical personnel who 
testified as to Tripp's wounds, and her medical records 
28 
 
detailing the fatal wound were properly admitted, rendering the 
erroneously admitted testimony cumulative.  See Commonwealth v. 
Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 884-885 (2013) (erroneously admitted 
testimony from substitute medical examiner created no 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where 
cumulative of other evidence).  Simply put, the defendant was 
not prejudiced by the improper testimony about the wound that 
caused Tripp's death. 
 
The defendant further argues that Dr. Evans improperly 
testified as to the time of death and the left- or right-
handedness of the person who administered the wound.  These 
claims are without merit.  As an initial matter, Evans did not 
testify as to the time of death on direct examination.  On 
cross-examination, defense counsel asked if the time of injury 
listed on the death certificate -- approximately 2 A.M. -- was 
based on any determination Evans had made.  Evans responded that 
he made no actual determination regarding either the time of 
injury or the time of death based on his own observations, but 
instead relied on information he received from police.  He added 
that, while the actual time of death was difficult to determine, 
Tripp likely died within minutes of the injury.19,20  A surrogate 
                                                          
 
19 Because Dr. Abraham Phillip left the medical examiner's 
office before completing the autopsy paperwork and death 
certificate for Tripp, Dr. Richard Evans completed and signed 
both documents based on a review of Phillip's notes and records. 
29 
 
examiner may "offer an expert opinion on the time that would 
have elapsed between injury and death" based on his or her 
"review of an autopsy report by the medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy."  Reavis, 465 Mass. at 883.  Thus, where 
Evans did not recite findings by Phillip regarding the time of 
death, but rather testified as to his own independent opinion, 
there was no error. 
 
Similarly, and contrary to the defendant's assertions, 
Evans did not recite any of Phillip's findings regarding the 
handedness of the killer.  Instead, he testified that, in his 
expert opinion, he could not testify to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty as to the left- or right-handedness of the 
killer.21  Again, it was proper for Evans to give his medical 
opinion based on "documents upon which experts are accustomed to 
rely, and which are potentially independently admissible through 
appropriate witnesses."  Reavis, 465 Mass. at 883. 
 
Even if Evans's testimony regarding the time of death and 
the handedness of the killer had been admitted erroneously, the 
defendant would not have been subject to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The time of death was, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
20 The death certificate reflects that Tripp was declared 
dead at 2:35 A.M. 
 
21 As both the defendant and Butler are left-handed, the 
defendant attempted to show that the killer was necessarily 
right-handed. 
30 
 
at best, collateral to his theory of defense, namely, that 
another person had committed the crime.  Although the amount of 
time Tripp survived after the wound was relevant in considering 
whether the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983), the 
jury heard other evidence that she was alive when medical 
personnel arrived.  Further, Evans's testimony did not harm the 
defendant, as he did not testify that the killer was necessarily 
left-handed.  In fact, counsel for Butler extensively cross-
examined Evans about the handedness of the killer, and counsel 
for the defendant argued in closing that Evans's testimony 
actually supported the theory that a left-handed person (which 
both the defendant and Butler claimed to be) could not have 
committed the murder.  Thus, where the testimony was ambiguous, 
at worst, and helpful to the defendant, at best, there was no 
prejudice. 
 
e.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant next 
argues that the judge committed reversible error in not granting 
a mistrial after the prosecutor argued in closing that Thompson 
said he "loved" Tripp.  While the prosecutor's statement was 
unsupported by the evidence, we conclude that the error does not 
require reversal of the defendant's convictions. 
 
Prior to closing arguments, counsel for Butler requested 
permission to argue that the evidence supported a fair inference 
31 
 
that the relationship between Thompson and Tripp had 
deteriorated, and that Tripp planned to leave Thompson, in an 
effort to support his theory that Thompson was responsible for 
her death.  The Commonwealth argued that the defense should be 
precluded from doing so.  The judge denied defense counsel 
permission to make the argument where evidence of the 
deteriorating relationship between Tripp and Thompson had been 
excluded from evidence. 
 
During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated the 
following:  "The bottom line that you're going to have to ask 
yourself about Morris Thompson is what motive does he have to 
lie?  What motive does he have to continually come in here year 
after year, however many times he's given statements, to subject 
himself to hours of cross examination.  What motive?  Mr. 
Thompson, walking around completely mutilated for the rest of 
his life.  His eye is missing.  He's walking around with one eye 
and the remnants of a bullet in his head.  He watched his 
girlfriend, a woman who he said he loved, brutally murdered 
before his eyes, and they want you to believe that he's just 
protecting the real killers.  Are you kidding?"  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Defense counsel for Butler objected to the prosecutor's 
statement and asked for an immediate curative instruction.  The 
judge took the request under advisement and dismissed the jury 
32 
 
for the day.  The next day, the judge told the prosecutor, "I 
wasn't too keen about the fact that you explicitly said [that 
Thompson loved Tripp]."  He added, "I think in the overall 
context of me trying to put the quash on that type of effort by 
the defense, it seems a little disingenuous for you to state it 
in the final argument."  He thus agreed to specifically instruct 
the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement.22 
 
The judge gave the curative instruction as part of his 
final charge to the jury.  He instructed them as follows:  "Also 
there was some statement that Morris Thompson loved Betsy Tripp.  
Well, maybe he did and maybe he didn't, but there's no evidence 
of it, so you are to disregard, disregard that statement made by 
one of the attorneys in the course of the final argument.  And 
in any event, I stress, arguments are not evidence."  Defense 
counsel for Butler objected to the instruction, arguing, "When 
you said 'maybe he did, maybe he didn't,' I think that dilutes 
the importance of telling the jury, you can't consider that, it 
was improper.  Because I want it stricken from memory as best we 
                                                          
 
22 The judge noted, "I know also in the overall context of 
the case it may be minor . . . but I do think that [defense 
counsel] is correct in that I should tell the jury to disregard 
that.  Now it's a matter of degree.  [Defense counsel] would 
perhaps prefer the strongest possible corrective, which I don't 
think is necessarily called for.  But I do think that the 
defendants are correct in asking me to draw the jurors' 
attention to it and to tell them to disregard it . . . ." 
 
33 
 
can."  The judge subsequently denied Butler's counsel's motion 
for a mistrial. 
 
On review of the entire transcript, we agree that Thompson 
did not expressly testify that he "loved" Tripp.23  We agree with 
the judge's assessment that the statement was made in error, a 
point that the Commonwealth concedes.  In determining whether 
such an error requires reversal, we consider "(1) whether the 
defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error was limited 
to collateral issues or went to the heart of the case; (3) what 
specific or general instructions the judge gave to the jury 
which may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether the error, 
in the circumstances, possibly made a difference in the jury's 
conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130-131 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 422-423 
(2000).  Where, as here, the error is properly objected to, we 
review the entire record to determine "whether the error was 
prejudicial to the point of requiring a reversal of the 
conviction."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 523 (1987).  
                                                          
 
23 Thompson did testify that he dated Tripp for eight years 
and lived with her for seven.  He referred to her as a "lovely 
lady" and "my girl," and became visibly emotional when shown her 
picture.  Counsel in closing "may argue fair inferences that 
might be drawn from the evidence," Commonwealth v. Murchison, 
418 Mass. 58, 59 (1994), and it may indeed be a fair inference 
that Thompson loved Tripp.  However, the prosecutor did not 
argue that Thompson loved Tripp, but that Thompson said that he 
loved her.  Thompson did not testify as such, despite ample 
opportunities to do so over the course of his lengthy testimony.  
The statement was therefore error. 
34 
 
See Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 746 (1990).  We 
conclude that the judge's specific curative instruction 
regarding the statement was adequate to prevent any risk of 
prejudice.  He explicitly told the jury that it had been argued 
that Thompson loved Tripp, that there was no such testimony 
given, and that the statement should be ignored.  He then 
stressed that closing arguments are not evidence.  The jury are 
presumed to have followed the judge's instructions, Commonwealth 
v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 195 (2010), and specific curative 
instructions are ordinarily sufficient to cure any 
misstatements.  See Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 
Mass. 224, 232 (1992); Commonwealth v. Palmariello, 392 Mass. 
126, 133 (1984). 
 
In addition, we cannot say that the error, taken in 
context, made a difference in the jury's conclusion.  It was a 
single statement made in the course of a lengthy closing 
argument.  The prosecutor was attempting to rebut defense 
counsel's argument that Thompson was not credible and was 
motivated to lie to protect himself or the third-party killer.  
The prosecutor properly responded by pointing out that Thompson 
had no motive to lie and that he was nearly killed in the same 
assault.  To be sure, he should have avoided comment on the 
nature of the relationship between Thompson and Tripp, 
particularly where he had moved to exclude reference to their 
35 
 
relationship during the defendant's closing argument.  However, 
Thompson was exhaustively cross-examined, and defense counsel 
ably challenged his credibility throughout the trial.  Thus, the 
jury's determination on the issue of Thompson's credibility was 
not likely to have been swayed by an isolated use of the word 
"loved" in closing.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 443 Mass. 502, 
510 (2005) (prosecutor's isolated slip of tongue harmless beyond 
reasonable doubt because of strength of Commonwealth's case and 
judge's instruction that closing statements are not evidence). 
 
f.  Purportedly perjured testimony of Thompson and DaSilva.  
The defendant argues that the judge erroneously denied his 
motion to dismiss the indictments against him because they were 
obtained through perjured grand jury testimony from Thompson and 
DaSilva.  We find no error. 
 
Prior to trial, counsel for Butler filed a "motion to 
dismiss the indictments or to provide alternative relief at the 
fourth retrial of this matter."  Counsel for the defendant 
joined in the motion.  The defense collectively argued that 
Thompson and DaSilva had made inconsistent statements throughout 
their testimony in the three prior trials, and that Thompson 
specifically committed perjury before the grand jury when he 
denied that he was a drug user, a fact that was contradicted by 
the testimony of several other witnesses at both the grand jury 
and the prior trials.  They contended, "[I]t is beyond question 
36 
 
that Morris Thompson is a liar and a perjurer and his testimony 
is therefore unreliable and cannot be used at trial."  They 
argued the same regarding DaSilva's testimony. 
 
For these reasons, the defense asked the judge to dismiss 
the indictments as obtained through perjury.  In the 
alternative, they asked the judge to (1) require the 
Commonwealth to provide to defense counsel all statements by 
Thompson and DaSilva it knew to be false; (2) require that the 
Commonwealth provide notice of any statements it intended to 
introduce that were inconsistent with statements made at 
previous trials; and (3) allow the defendant to impeach Thompson 
and DaSilva with inconsistent statements concerning substance 
abuse and prior bad acts.  The judge denied the motion. 
 
As a general rule, "a court should not inquire into the 
adequacy or competency of the evidence upon which an indictment 
is based."  Commonwealth v. Salman, 387 Mass. 160, 166 (1982).  
However, if "it appears that the integrity of the grand jury 
process has been impaired, a defendant may attack the validity 
of the indictment by way of a motion to dismiss."  Id.  It is 
undisputed that "the knowing use by the Commonwealth or one of 
its agents of false testimony to procure an indictment is a 
ground for dismissing the indictment."  Id. 
 
When arguing that a prosecutor knowingly presented false 
testimony to a grand jury, "[t]he defendant bears the heavy 
37 
 
burden of proving that '(1) the evidence was given to the grand 
jury knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth and 
for the purpose of obtaining an indictment, and (2) that the 
evidence probably influenced the grand jury's determination to 
indict the defendant.'"  Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675, 
680 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Kelcourse, 404 Mass. 466, 
468 (1989).  The defendant has not met his burden here. 
 
Although the defendant denied being a crack cocaine user 
before the grand jury, the prosecutor elicited contradictory 
testimony at the grand jury from another witness indicating that 
Thompson had, in fact, used cocaine the night of the murder.  
Thus, the prosecutor did not attempt to secure an indictment by 
leaving the jury with the impression that Thompson had not used 
drugs that night.  See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 
621 (1986). 
 
Further, while Thompson and DaSilva both changed their 
testimony in some respects at trial, the defendant overstates 
the extent of their inconsistencies.  Both at the grand jury and 
at trial, Thompson's version of the most important facts was 
essentially the same.  Without fail, he consistently testified 
that he went to DaSilva's home on the night of the murder; that 
Butler produced a silver gun, robbed him, and ordered him to his 
automobile along with the defendant; that Butler and the 
defendant used a telephone wire to tie up him and Tripp; that 
38 
 
Tripp gave the defendant her ATM card and PIN; that Butler 
stayed behind while the defendant attempted to withdraw money; 
that the defendant slit Tripp's throat when he was unable to 
withdraw any significant amount of money; and that Butler shot 
him in the head when he tried to go to Tripp's aid. 
 
Similarly, DaSilva always testified that Thompson went to 
her apartment on the night of the murder; that Butler pulled out 
a silver gun and left with Thompson and the defendant; that 
Butler and the defendant returned to the apartment later, took 
off their clothes, and put them in a plastic bag; that blood 
appeared to be on a pair of gloves they had; that she spoke to 
Butler while she was in the bathroom; that Butler told her he 
had slit Tripp's throat because there was no money in her 
account; and that he told her that the defendant shot Thompson 
when he attempted to help Tripp. 
 
While the defendant correctly points out a number of 
differences between the testimony of Thompson and DaSilva given 
before the grand jury and in their testimony in the later 
trials, "[p]resentation of a witness who recants or contradicts 
his prior testimony is not to be confused with eliciting 
perjury."  Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 Mass. 727, 743-744, cert. 
denied sub nom. Aiello v. Massachusetts, 474 U.S. 919 (1985), 
quoting United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018, 1019 (5th Cir. 
1978).  Given that both witnesses' versions of the core facts of 
39 
 
the case remained essentially the same at all proceedings, and 
given that their testimony corroborated each other's stories, 
the prosecutor did not knowingly elicit perjury.  See 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 111 (2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (no indication that prosecutor 
elicited perjured testimony where "there were some 
inconsistencies" between testimony from two witnesses but "many 
details corroborated each other"). 
 
Just as importantly, the defendant has not met his burden 
of showing that Thompson's testimony that he did not use crack 
cocaine on the night of the murder "probably influenced the 
grand jury's determination to indict the defendant."  Collado, 
426 Mass. at 680, quoting Kelcourse, 404 Mass. at 468.  The core 
issue before the grand jury was simply whether the defendant and 
Butler murdered Tripp.  Where the grand jury heard substantial 
evidence regarding the defendant's participation in the murder 
presented before the grand jury, it is highly unlikely that the 
issue of Thompson's drug use had any impact on the jury's 
decision to indict the defendant, especially where evidence was 
presented suggesting that he had, in fact, used crack cocaine 
that night.  See Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 310 
(2004). 
 
We also find no merit to the defendant's contention that 
the judge should have allowed his motion for alternative relief.  
40 
 
The defense, having tried the case three times, was fully aware 
of the witnesses' inconsistencies prior to trial.24  The 
defendant's due process rights were not violated where the facts 
that went to the heart of the case remained essentially 
unchanged throughout the trials.  Further, the defense 
extensively and effectively cross-examined both witnesses 
regarding their inconsistencies, and counsel for both defendants 
adequately argued against Thompson and DaSilva's credibility in 
closing.  Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 236 
n.9 (1990) ("Even if the Commonwealth was obligated to inform 
the defendant of [any] changes" in testimony, failure to do so 
not prejudicial where counsel "effectively cross-examined both 
witnesses").  Thus, the judge did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion. 
 
g.  Press release.  After closing arguments, but before the 
final jury charge was given, defense counsel informed the court 
that the Suffolk County district attorney's office had issued a 
press release on its Web site the previous night regarding the 
case.25  The press release summarized the facts of the case and 
                                                          
 
24 The Commonwealth also provided defense counsel with new 
statements made by Thompson and DaSilva prior to trial. 
 
25 The trial prosecutor stated that he had not seen the 
press release, and there is no reason to believe that he was 
involved in the decision to publish it.  However, the 
Commonwealth is responsible for the conduct of all of the 
employees in the Suffolk County district attorney's office, so 
41 
 
quoted the prosecutor's closing argument.  Of particular 
relevance, the press release noted that the trial was the fourth 
for both defendants.  It stated that "[t]he first proceedings 
ended in an [eleven] to one impasse, with jurors favoring 
conviction; the second trial ended abruptly when the presiding 
judge took ill; and the third ended in another hung jury, this 
one favoring conviction [ten] to two."  Press Release, Suffolk 
County District Attorney's Office, 4th Trial Ends for Duo 
Accused of Brutal Murder, Attempt (June 2, 2009). 
 
The prosecutor then informed the judge that an article 
about the case had been published in the daily Metro newspaper 
that morning.  Similar to the press release, the article 
referenced the fact that the trial was the fourth for the 
defendants, and noted the vote counts of the prior juries.  It 
also summarized the facts and quoted closing arguments for both 
the prosecutor and the defense. 
 
The judge proceeded to ask the jury whether they had read 
anything about the case in the media.  Three jurors -- jurors 
nos. 6, 4, and 1 -- all answered in the affirmative, and the 
judge conducted an individual voir dire of each of them.  Juror 
no. 6 explained that he had read the article, and that it "said 
that closing arguments occurred, it had a few quotes from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the prosecutor's lack of involvement does not bear on our 
analysis of the conduct. 
42 
 
closing arguments, and that basically it was the fourth trial."  
Juror no. 4 said that she had simply scanned the article, and 
stated that it included "[n]othing [she] didn't know."  Juror 
no. 1 stated that she did not read the text of the story, and 
only saw the headline, which contained no information about the 
existence of prior trials or their vote counts.  None of the 
jurors stated that he or she had taken note of the prior vote 
counts, and all three averred that they could remain impartial.  
Immediately following this voir dire, neither defense attorney 
objected or asked for a mistrial, and counsel for the defendant 
simply asked for an instruction that the jury not read anything 
about the case in the media.  Later that day, following the 
final jury charge, counsel for Butler, joined by counsel for the 
defendant, moved for a mistrial upon their discovery that the 
article referenced the vote counts of the prior juries, and the 
judge denied their motion.  Significantly, and fortunately for 
the Commonwealth, jurors nos. 6 and 4 were ultimately designated 
as alternate jurors, and did not participate in deliberations. 
 
The defendant now contends that the district attorney's 
office's decision to issue the press release constituted 
egregious government misconduct necessitating reversal.  
"Dismissal of criminal charges . . . is the most severe sanction 
that the court can impose in a criminal case to remedy 
misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. 
43 
 
Mason, 453 Mass. 873, 877 (2009).  Such relief should be 
reserved for "only the most intolerable government conduct."  
Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 Mass. 484, 485 n.1 (1998), 
quoting United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 
1991).  However, "[w]e have delineated limited circumstances for 
dismissing a complaint due to prosecutorial misconduct:  . . . 
if the 'governmental conduct resulted in such irremediable harm 
that a fair trial of the complaint or indictment is no longer 
possible' . . . and where the prosecutor's conduct is otherwise 
so egregious that dismissal is warranted to deter similar future 
misconduct" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 
Mass. 653, 665-666 (2009).  See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 
676 (1982). 
 
We conclude that the Commonwealth's actions were egregious.  
While the jurors were likely aware that there had been previous 
trials, due to the amount of time that had passed since the 
murder and the innumerable references to prior proceedings, the 
press release contained vote counts that showed that two prior 
juries strongly favored conviction.  It also presented the facts 
of the case in sensationalized terms26 that exclusively favored 
the Commonwealth's theory of the case.  Had the press release 
                                                          
 
26 For example, the press release discussed Tripp's 
"horrific death" in the course of a "brutal murder," and cited 
the prosecutor's statement that Tripp's "life literally drained 
out of her body." 
44 
 
been seen by any of the jurors, it easily could have caused a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by informing 
them that twenty-one of the twenty-four jurors who had 
previously heard the evidence believed the defendant and Butler 
to be guilty. 
 
The Commonwealth's contentions are unavailing.  First, 
although the information in the press release had been in the 
public domain, the Commonwealth knew, or should have known, that 
the jurors would not likely seek out such information, and that 
the breakdown of the prior vote counts was highly prejudicial.  
Additionally, the Commonwealth's argument that there is no 
evidence that the press release was the basis for the article 
strains credulity, where it was published the morning after the 
press release was issued and referenced the prior vote counts.  
In any event, even if the press release had not been the basis 
for the article, the Commonwealth should have known that the 
press release contained prejudicial information that it made 
available for use by the media at a critical moment in the 
trial, and thus its decision to issue the press release was, at 
best, gross negligence. 
 
However, our examination does not end with a determination 
that the Commonwealth's conduct was egregious.  The defendant is 
entitled to dismissal only where the conduct in question was of 
"sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 
45 
 
defendant's right to a fair trial."  Commonwealth v. Dabrieo, 
370 Mass. 728, 743 (1976), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 108 (1975).  Here, the judge conducted a thorough voir 
dire and determined that only three jurors had seen the article.  
Of those jurors, only one took part in deliberations, and she 
had read only the headline, which contained no potentially 
prejudicial information.  We cannot say that the judge abused 
his discretion in determining that the jurors had not been 
"contaminated by extraneous information."  Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 391 Mass. 749, 756 (1984).27 
 
h.  Inconsistent verdicts.  The Commonwealth proceeded at 
trial under the theory that the defendant and Butler were liable 
as joint venturers for the death of Tripp in a botched robbery.  
Accordingly, the judge instructed the jury as to the elements of 
joint venture liability.  The defendant was convicted of murder 
in the first degree based on the theories of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty and felony-murder, and Butler was convicted of murder in 
the second degree on the theory of felony-murder.  The defendant 
argues that the verdicts were inconsistent. 
 
"That breed of 'inconsistent' verdicts which is not allowed 
to stand under our cases is small . . . ."  Commonwealth v. 
                                                          
 
27 Our conclusion that the defendant was not deprived of a 
fair trial and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in the circumstances might have been different had jurors nos. 6 
and 4, who served as alternate jurors, taken part in the 
deliberations. 
46 
 
Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 475 (1969).  "We have applied the so-
called 'rule of consistency' to reverse convictions only where 
three elements are present:  'a crime charged that by its nature 
requires a combination of individuals; a single trial of all the 
participants in the crime; and an acquittal of all but one of 
the participants.'"  Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 
520 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 456 Mass. 52, 59 
(2010).  Here, the first and third requirements are not met, and 
thus the defendant's argument fails. 
 
"We have not applied the rule of consistency to 
inconsistent verdicts in joint venture trials (as we have to 
those in conspiracy trials), because the first element, a crime 
that requires a combination of individuals, is generally not 
satisfied."  Fluellen, 456 Mass. at 520-521.  See Medeiros, 456 
Mass. at 59-60 (crime requiring combination of individuals must 
be defined by "united act" of two or more individuals, where 
such united act is element of crime charged).  While joint 
venture liability requires a combination of individuals, it is 
not an underlying crime.  The underlying crime here is murder, 
which does not "by its nature require[] a combination of 
individuals."  Moreover, the defendant cannot meet the third 
requirement, which necessitates an acquittal of all but one of 
the defendants.  Although Butler was convicted of a lesser 
offense, he was still found guilty of murdering Tripp. 
47 
 
 
In any event, "inconsistent verdicts for joint venturers 
tried together does not undermine our deference to juries."  
Fluellen, 456 Mass. at 523.  We generally tolerate inconsistent 
verdicts "because of the jury's inherent power to indulge their 
compassion and to enter into compromises."  Id.  See Scott, 355 
Mass. at 475.  Although the defendant contends that the verdicts 
in this case "make[] no sense," there was sufficient evidence to 
prove that the defendant, and not Butler, fetched a knife from 
the kitchen and slit Tripp's throat.  The jury acted well within 
their discretion in deciding to hold the defendant responsible 
to a greater degree than Butler. 
 
i.  Jury questions.  The defendant also argues that the 
judge improperly answered two questions from the jury regarding 
joint venture liability.  "The proper response to a jury 
question must remain within the discretion of the trial judge, 
who has observed the evidence and the jury firsthand and can 
tailor supplemental instructions accordingly."  Commonwealth v. 
Delacruz, 463 Mass. 504, 518 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bell, 455 Mass. 408, 420 (2009). 
 
During the sixth day of deliberations, the judge received 
two questions from the jury.  The first asked:  "If the jury 
find[] that there was a joint venture in the commission of a 
murder, can the degree of murder differ between the principal 
and the joint venturer?"  The second asked:  "If there is a 
48 
 
finding of joint venture, can the theories of murder differ 
between the principal and the joint venturer?"  After a lengthy 
discussion with counsel, the judge answered both questions in 
the affirmative, over objection from the defendant.  We conclude 
that the judge's answers were not erroneous in the 
circumstances, based on the evidence before the jury in this 
case.28 
 
The jury were required first to determine whether the 
defendant and Butler participated in the kidnapping, robbery, 
murder, and shooting alleged in this case.  Both the defendant 
and Butler testified that they had no involvement in the crimes 
and were not present when they occurred.  Thompson testified to 
the opposite, and identified the defendant as the person who 
murdered Tripp when the robbery was unsuccessful and Butler as 
the person who shot him.  If the jury rejected the testimony of 
the defendant and Butler as to their noninvolvement in the 
crimes, which the jury plainly did, the jury were confronted 
with conflicting testimony as to which of the two committed 
which of the felonious acts and, ultimately, the degree of 
culpability that the jury would assign to their conduct.  In 
these circumstances, it was proper for the jury to consider the 
defendant and Butler as joint venturers, knowingly participating 
                                                          
 
28 We need not decide whether the proposition of law drawn 
from the jury's questions and the judge's affirmative responses 
regarding joint venture liability would be correct in all cases. 
49 
 
in the commission of some or all of the several crimes charged, 
but assigning a different level of culpability in the resulting 
murder, so long as the defendant and Butler each had, at a 
minimum, the required intent for the crimes of which they were 
convicted.  Thus, the jury could, in the exercise of their 
discretion, permissibly find the defendant and Butler guilty of 
a different degree of murder, even based on different theories. 
 
The jury found Butler guilty, and the defendant not guilty, 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a 
firearm) on Thompson.  Taken in context, it is clear that the 
jury credited Thompson's account of the events:  that the 
defendant slit Tripp's throat and Butler shot Thompson.  Thus, 
it is apparent that they intended to find the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree under at least the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and were merely attempting to 
determine whether they could hold Butler responsible to a lesser 
degree or under a different theory. 
 
The defendant essentially seems to argue that, if he and 
Butler were both found guilty of armed robbery as joint 
venturers -- a predicate felony for felony-murder in the first 
degree -- Butler should also have been convicted of murder in 
the first degree.  To be sure, the jury could have so found.  
However, the jury have the inherent power to enter into 
compromises in reaching their verdict.  Fluellen, 456 Mass. at 
50 
 
523.  The verdict here does not indicate that the jury were 
confused, but rather that they entered into a compromise in 
finding Butler guilty of murder in the second degree where they 
believed that the defendant, and not Butler, slit Tripp's 
throat.  Regardless of the correctness of the judge's answers to 
the questions, the defendant was not prejudiced by the jury's 
conscious decision to hold Butler responsible to a lesser degree 
than they were legally permitted to.29 
 
j.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine 
whether there is any basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of 
murder in the first degree, regardless of whether such grounds 
were raised on appeal.  We find no such reason, and we decline 
to exercise our powers under the statute.  We therefore affirm 
the defendant's convictions.  We also reinstate the defendant's 
two convictions of armed robbery, which the trial judge had 
dismissed as the felonies underlying the felony-murder 
conviction and therefore duplicative.  The case is therefore 
                                                          
 
29 The defendant also briefly argues that the absence of 
special verdict slips requiring unanimity as to joint venture or 
principal liability confused the jury.  To the contrary, we have 
held that permitting general verdict slips is preferable in 
order to mitigate confusion attached to the "false distinction" 
between principal liability and joint venture liability.  
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 464, 466-467 (2009).  
Again, where the jury appear to have entered into a compromise 
regarding Butler's liability, there was no likelihood of 
confusion and no prejudice suffered by the defendant. 
51 
 
remanded to the Superior Court for sentencing on these two 
reinstated convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.