Title: Gregory v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAYMON GREGORY,  
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 179, 2011      
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 1002002739  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  September 28, 2011 
 
 
Decided:     October 19, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of October 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Daymon Gregory (“Gregory”), the defendant-below, appeals from a 
Superior Court final judgment of conviction of Possession With Intent to Deliver 
Marijuana, Maintaining a Dwelling for Controlled Substances, and Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia.  On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by 
denying his request for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct consisting of 
allegedly prejudicial statements made during summation.  Because the prosecutor’s 
statements were either legally proper or otherwise harmless error, we affirm.  
 
2
 
2. 
On February 4, 2010, while Gregory was in an upstairs bedroom at 508 
North Spruce Street in Wilmington, the police executed a search warrant on the 
premises.  Detective Matthew Hazzard testified that Gregory told police under 
questioning that marijuana could be found in the dresser of his bedroom in that 
building.  Police then searched the room Gregory described and located the 
marijuana.  They also found an ID and receipt in Gregory’s name, two boxes of 
clear sandwich bags, four bags of marijuana, several bags with marijuana residue, a 
scale and over one thousand dollars cash.  Gregory was later indicted on three drug 
related charges, including Maintaining a Dwelling for Controlled Substances.   
 
3. 
Gregory disputed the police account.  He testified that the room in 
question was his brother’s, not his, and that on the day of the search he was 
spending time with his brother, who had left the building to go to a store shortly 
before the police arrived.  Gregory acknowledged that he was smoking marijuana 
in the room that day, but claims that he never told police that the room was his.  
Rather, Gregory claims, he told the police that they would probably find marijuana 
in his brother’s room if they searched it.  A neighbor who occasionally wrote out 
rent receipts testified that he had done so for Gregory’s brother, but never Gregory.  
During his closing argument, Gregory’s defense counsel attacked the State’s 
reliance on a receipt, found in the room and bearing Gregory’s name, as evidence 
that the room was in fact Gregory’s.  Defense counsel also argued that other 
 
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receipts found in the room—not bearing Gregory’s name—were exculpatory 
evidence that the State should have but did not turn over. 
 
4. 
That allegation and the divergent recollections of Gregory’s encounter 
with the police after the search form the backdrop for this appeal.  The prosecution 
in its summation drew the jury’s attention to the defendant’s version of the 
disputed police testimony.  First, the prosecutor reminded the jury of Gregory’s 
interest in avoiding conviction, stating in part: “You, ladies and gentleman of the 
jury, have to evaluate his credibility.”  Defense counsel objected, but the court 
overruled the objection because Gregory had placed his credibility in issue by 
testifying.   
5. 
Later, the prosecutor described defense counsel as having “tried to re-
characterize and alter” Detective Hazzard’s testimony regarding Gregory’s 
statements to the police.  Again, defense counsel objected.  This time the court 
sustained the objection.  Finally, the prosecutor told the jury that all “the other 
issues raised by the defense . . . try to confuse and obscure the evidence, based on 
the physical evidence.”  Again defense counsel objected and the objection was 
sustained.  At a sidebar conference after the summation, defense counsel moved 
for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor had “degnigrate[d]” defense counsel by 
describing his efforts as “obscuring the evidence.”  The court agreed that 
“‘obscure’ is a poor choice of words.”  But, because the court had sustained the 
 
4
objection and the prosecutor did not pursue that line of argument any further, the 
court denied the request for a mistrial. 
6. 
On appeal, Gregory claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion 
in refusing to grant a mistrial on the basis of the allegedly improper prosecutorial 
statements.  The standards for reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct differ, 
depending on whether or not defense counsel raised a timely objection at trial.  If 
defense counsel raised a timely objection or the court intervened sua sponte, we 
review for harmless error.1   If counsel failed to raise a timely objection and the 
court did not intervene sua sponte, we review only for plain error.2  Here, defense 
counsel raised timely objections to each of the allegedly improper statements.  Our 
review is, therefore, for harmless error.3 
7. 
“The first step in the harmless error analysis involves a de novo review 
of the record to determine whether misconduct actually occurred.”4  If we 
determine that misconduct occurred, the next inquiry is whether that misconduct 
“prejudicially affect[ed] the defendant’s substantial rights,” thereby warranting a 
                                                 
1 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006). 
 
2   Id. 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 Id. at 148. 
 
 
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reversal and mistrial.5  The three-factor test set forth in the Hughes v. State6 test 
guides our analysis.  We consider the closeness of the case, the centrality of the 
issue affected by the error and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.7  
This test is applied in “a contextual, case-by-case, and fact sensitive matter.”8   
8. 
Finally, in Hunter v. State,9 we recognized a fourth factor that could be 
dispositive even if the three Hughes factors are not: whether the misconduct 
amounts to repetitive errors that cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.  
If this factor is found to exist, the court has discretion to grant a mistrial, although 
it is not required to do so.10 
9. 
Gregory argues that prosecutorial misconduct occurred during three 
discrete portions of the prosecutor’s summation.  We review each statement de 
novo to determine if in fact misconduct occurred.11 
                                                 
5 Id. at 149. 
 
6 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981) (quoting Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 
132 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 Baker, 906 A.2d at 149. 
 
9 Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002). 
 
10 Baker, 906 A.2d at 149. 
 
11 Id. 
 
 
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10. The prosecutor’s closing argument reminded the jury of the inherent 
bias due to Gregory facing a criminal conviction if his testimony were disbelieved 
or discounted.  Gregory argues that the improper inference to be drawn from that 
statement is that Gregory “would get up there and fabricate his story to avoid 
conviction.”  In Hughes we held that the word “liar” was “an epithet to be used 
sparingly [by a prosecutor] in argument to the jury.”12  We also noted that 
“[s]triking the balance between permissible and impermissible comment by a 
prosecutor, calls for the exercise of a sound discretion by the Trial Judge.”13  The 
prosecutor should not be permitted to deem a statement a “lie” unless that is a 
legitimate inference from the evidence, and the prosecutor ties his argument to that 
evidence.  More recently, we held that “[w]here prosecutors fail to provide an 
evidentiary foundation for their conclusions about the truthfulness of a witness, 
they impermissibly tip the scales against the defense.”14 
11. We also have repeatedly relied on the American Bar Association 
Standards for prosecutorial conduct in deciding whether a prosecutor’s statements 
                                                 
12 Hughes, 437 A.2d at 571. 
 
13 Id. 
 
14 Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940, 943 (Del. 2001). 
 
 
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are improper.15  ABA Standard 3-5.8(b) states that the “prosecutor should not 
express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any 
testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.”  The comments to that 
standard, promulgated in 1993, elaborate that the “line between permissible and 
impermissible argument is a thin one. . . .  Credibility is to be determined solely by 
the triers of fact, but an advocate may point to the fact that circumstances or 
independent witnesses give support to one witness or cast doubt on another.”16 
12. In this case, the prosecutor did not directly refer to the defendant as a 
liar, nor did he use any synonym therefor.  Rather, the prosecutor reminded the 
jury of its duty to weigh the evidence, including negative inferences of bias 
permissible under the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence.17  The prosecutor did 
not directly express his personal belief about the truth of Gregory’s testimony, and 
to the extent he implied a personal belief, the implication was grounded in the 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Baker, 906 A.2d at 152 (“For over twenty-five years, we have admonished 
prosecutors to follow the ABA standards governing the prosecution function.”); Hunter, 815 
A.2d at 735 (“[T]he prosecutor should abide by the American Association’s standards. . . .”).  
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function, 3rd Ed., 
1993, is available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/ policy/ standards/ 
prosecution_function_standards.html.  
 
16 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, note 15, at 108. 
 
17 Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 616.  See also, Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 680 
(Del. 1983) (“It is well settled that the bias of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is 
“‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
 
 
8
evidence and circumstances of the case.18  For these reasons, the prosecutor’s 
statement was not improper. 
13. Gregory claims that twice during the prosecutor’s summation, the 
prosecutor improperly argued that defense counsel had “re-characterize[d],” 
“alter[ed],” or “obscure[d]” the evidence pointing to Gregory’s guilt.  First, the 
prosecutor described Gregory’s testimony, which contradicted Detective Hazzard’s 
account of Gregory’s statement to the police that marijuana was in his room, as an 
attempt by the defense to “alter” the testimony.  Second, the prosecutor 
summarized the key evidence in support of the charges against Gregory, and then 
stated that “[a]ll the other issues raised by the defense . . . try to confuse and 
obscure the evidence. . . .”  
14. The Superior Court upheld defense counsel’s objections to both 
statements.  It denied Gregory’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct, however.  This Court has adopted the ABA Standards’ 
prohibition against prosecutors denigrating the role of defense counsel,19 and has 
held that although “the prosecutor has wide latitude in summation, he or she may 
not employ argument to denigrate the role of defense counsel ‘by injecting his [or 
                                                 
18 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, note 15, at 108. 
 
19 Baker, 906 A.2d at 152 (“For over twenty-five years, we have admonished prosecutors to 
follow the ABA standards governing the prosecution function”). 
 
 
9
her] personal frustration with defense tactics.’”20  We also have held that 
statements suggesting defense counsel sought to fool or trick a jury were improper 
under this standard.21 
15. Although the prosecutor in this case did not use the word “fool,” his 
comment that defense counsel intended to “confuse and obscure the evidence” 
constituted a similarly pointed charge to that effect.  The fact that defense counsel 
had argued, perhaps without merit, that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory 
evidence in the form of receipts did not justify such broadly phrased denigration of 
the defense’s case.  Therefore, that remark was improper.   
16. The prosecutor’s earlier comment, that defense counsel had “alter[ed]” 
or “re-characterize[d]” Detective Hazzard’s testimony, is less suspect.  In his 
summation, defense counsel argued that Detective Hazzard’s contrary testimony 
was a “misstatement” of what Gregory had told police.  Gregory’s disputed 
statements were critical to the case.  If it was not improper for the defense to 
describe controverted testimony as a “misstatement,” based on Gregory’s 
testimony, then it was not improper for the prosecutor to describe counsel’s 
portrayal of the defense’s version of the facts as a “re-characterization” or 
                                                 
20 Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1219 (Del. 2002). 
 
21 Hunter, 815 A.2d at 736. 
 
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“alteration.”  Gregory insists, however, that that prosecutorial statement 
improperly denigrated the role of defense counsel.  
17. A possible interpretation of the prosecutor’s use of the word “alter,” a 
synonym for change or modify, is that the prosecutor was claiming that defense 
counsel intentionally misled the jury by emphasizing Gregory’s contradictory 
testimony.  The word “re-characterize” at least implicitly acknowledges that 
disputed facts are involved, allowing the same sequence of events to be described 
in more than one way.  Assuming arguendo that the trial court properly sustained 
the defense’s objection and the comment was improper, we still must determine 
whether under the Hughes-Hunter test the (assumed) misconduct should warrant a 
mistrial. 
18. Once a prosecutor’s comment or act is deemed improper, Hughes 
requires a multi-pronged test to determine whether the declaration of a mistrial is 
warranted.  To reiterate, under Hughes, we consider the closeness of the case, the 
centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the 
effects of the error. 
19. In this case, the overwhelming weight of the evidence favored the State.  
Gregory himself was first discovered by police in the room where marijuana and 
related paraphernalia were found.  A receipt bearing Gregory’s name was 
recovered in that room.  Although Gregory’s counsel criticized the State’s failure 
 
11
to gather other receipts that did not have his name on it, the jury could still have 
reasonably inferred that Gregory would not have kept a receipt in a room in which 
he did not live.  Moreover, a detective testified about Gregory’s admission to 
police at the scene.  Although Gregory contests the detective’s account, the issue of 
witness credibility was for the jury to resolve and we will not overturn its 
credibility judgment.  The neighbor’s testimony did not disprove that Gregory 
lived in the apartment.  Because the weight of the evidence supported the State’s 
case, the “closeness of the case” factor of the Hughes test favors the prosecution. 
20. The State acknowledges that Gregory’s credibility was a central issue in 
the case.  The comment regarding defense counsel’s obscuring the issues in the 
case, however, is read by the State as intended to rebut defense counsel’s claim 
that certain exculpatory evidence, in the form of receipts, was not properly turned 
over by police.  That issue was argued in defense counsel’s summation, at least 
impliedly as a Brady22 violation.  Defense counsel does not directly claim on this 
appeal, however, that a Brady23 violation occurred.  Because the issue of the 
receipts was only tangentially addressed at trial, it cannot be regarded as a central 
issue in the case. 
                                                 
22 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
23 Id. 
 
 
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21. To mitigate the prosecutor’s improper comments, the trial court 
sustained objections by defense counsel, causing the prosecutor to shift his line of 
questioning.  We have recognized that that intervention alone may provide 
sufficient mitigation.24  The State also argues that further mitigation occurred when 
the Superior Court provided jurors with a general instruction to disregard any 
personal opinions or beliefs of the attorneys before deliberations.  On prior 
occasions we have rejected the claim that a general jury instruction, given before 
jury deliberations, adequately mitigates serious prosecutorial misconduct,25 but we 
need not reach that question here.  In this case the trial court’s decision to sustain 
the objections to the two arguably improper comments sufficiently mitigated any 
possible prejudice. 
22. Even where the three Hunter factors do not favor a mistrial, we may 
still order one if the misconduct amounts to repetitive errors that cast doubt on the 
integrity of the judicial process.  Here, in making two improper comments, one 
only a borderline offense at best, the prosecutor’s conduct did not approach the sort 
of repetitive action deserving of a Hunter remand and reversal.   
In short, the trial 
court adequately mitigated any harm posed by the two comments it found improper 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Donlon v. State, 243 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 1972). 
 
25 Baker, 906 A.2d at 155 (“If the trial judge had given a curative instruction immediately after 
the prosecutor’s question, had stricken the question, or had sustained the defense’s objection at 
the bench in the jury’s presence, the State’s argument might have merit.”). 
 
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and properly overruled defense counsel’s objection to the third prosecutorial 
comment.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice