Title: Bishop v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARK DYWAYNE BISHOP 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 070640 
 January 11, 2008 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
I. 
 
 
Code § 46.2-357(A) states in relevant part: 
 
"It shall be unlawful for any person determined 
or adjudicated an habitual offender to drive any 
motor vehicle or self-propelled machinery or 
equipment on the highways of the Commonwealth while 
the revocation of the person's driving privilege 
remains in effect." 
 
The sole issue that we consider in this appeal of a 
judgment from the Court of Appeals is whether the Commonwealth 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant, who was 
convicted for a violation of Code § 46.2-357, received actual 
notice that he had been determined to be an habitual offender. 
II. 
Mark Dywayne Bishop was convicted in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Williamsburg and County of James City of driving a 
motor vehicle after having been declared an habitual offender 
in violation of Code § 46.2-357.  Bishop appealed and asserted 
in the Court of Appeals that the Commonwealth failed to prove 
that he had received actual notice of a determination or 
adjudication as an habitual offender and, therefore, the 
 
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Commonwealth did not establish that he violated Code § 46.2-
357.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.  Bishop v. 
Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 251, 639 S.E.2d 683 (2007).  Bishop 
appeals. 
III. 
A. 
Applying well-settled principles of appellate review, we 
will state the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court.  
Pruitt v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 382, 384, 650 S.E.2d 684, 684 
(2007); Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 
26, 28 (2005). 
The following evidence was adduced at a bench trial in 
the circuit court.  In December 2004, two police officers went 
to Bishop's home in James City County to serve him with an 
arrest warrant.  Bishop was not present when the officers 
arrived.  The officers parked their cars behind a residence so 
that Bishop would not be able to see them upon his arrival. 
Subsequently, the officers observed Bishop drive a motor 
vehicle on a public street and enter a driveway on Bishop's 
property.  Bishop parked the car and began to walk towards his 
house. 
The police officers approached Bishop and informed him 
that they had a warrant for his arrest.  Initially, the 
 
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defendant denied that he was Mark Bishop and stated that his 
name was Eric.  One of the officers informed Bishop that he 
was under arrest, and a scuffle ensued.  The officers managed 
to subdue Bishop and arrest him. 
The Commonwealth also introduced in evidence Bishop's 
lengthy driving record from the Department of Motor Vehicles.  
The following entries on that record constitute the sole 
evidence relating to the notice that Bishop received regarding 
his status as an habitual offender: 
"DETERMINED 
ON:  1997/04/23 HABITUAL OFFENDER BY 
DMV 
 
 
ELIGIBLE TO RESTORE UNDER CURRENT LAW 
ON: 
 
RESTRICTED: N/A 
 FULL: 2000/04/23 
 
"REVOCATION 
ISS: 1997/04/28 EFFECTIVE: 1997/05/28 
 
 
FOR HO DETERMINATION PROCESS 
 
NOTIFIED: 2001/03/10 BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
ORDER DELIVERY DATE:    ORDER MAILED" 
 
B. 
 
Bishop asserts in this Court, as he did in the 
circuit court and the Court of Appeals, that the 
Commonwealth failed to establish that he received actual 
notice of his adjudication as an habitual offender and, 
therefore, he could not be convicted of a violation of 
Code § 46.2-357.  We agree with Bishop's contentions. 
 
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"It is elementary that the burden is on the Commonwealth 
to prove every essential element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Powers v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 388, 
177 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1970).  This fundamental precept has been 
the bedrock of Virginia's criminal jurisprudence since the 
inception of this Commonwealth.  For example, in Savage v. 
Commonwealth, 84 Va. 582, 585, 5 S.E. 563, 564 (1888), we 
stated:  "In a criminal case, the defendant is entitled to an 
acquittal, unless his guilt is established beyond a reasonable 
doubt."   
 
We recently restated this elemental precept in Ellison v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 254, 257-58, 639 S.E.2d 209, 212 (2007):  
"Because of the stringent standard of proof the law imposes 
upon the prosecution, [finders of fact] must acquit unless 
they find each element of the crime charged to have been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  In Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 619, 623, 643 S.E.2d 485, 487 (2007), we 
stated: 
" 'The burden of proof upon the state in a 
criminal case was given constitutional status in In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) wherein the 
Court stated "that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged."  
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512, 578 S.E.2d 
781, 785 (2003); accord Dobson v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 71, 74, 531 S.E.2d 569, 571 (2000); Stokes v. 
 
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Warden, 226 Va. 111, 117, 306 S.E.2d 882, 885 
(1983).' " 
 
 
In order to obtain a conviction against a defendant 
charged with a violation of Code § 46.2-357, the Commonwealth 
must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
drove a motor vehicle on a public highway while his driving 
privilege was revoked; that the defendant had been determined 
or adjudicated an habitual offender; and that the defendant 
received actual notice of his status as an habitual offender.  
See Reed v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 467, 471-72, 424 S.E.2d 
718, 720-21 (1992).  The only issue in this appeal is whether 
the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Bishop, received actual notice that he had been 
adjudicated an habitual offender. 
 
The Commonwealth does not dispute that it was required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bishop received actual 
notice of his adjudication as an habitual offender in order to 
establish a violation of Code § 46.2-357.  However, the 
Commonwealth, relying upon the following entry in the records 
from the Department of Motor Vehicles, claims that it 
satisfied this proof burden: 
"REVOCATION 
ISS: 1997/04/28 EFFECTIVE: 1997/05/28 
 
FOR HO DETERMINATION PROCESS 
 
NOTIFIED: 2001/03/10 BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
ORDER DELIVERY DATE:    ORDER MAILED" 
 
 
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We disagree with the Commonwealth's contention.  
 
The first entry, "Revocation ISS 1997/04/28 Effective: 
1997/05/28 For HO Determination Process," is confusing and 
does not contain any information about Bishop's status as an 
habitual offender.  The next entry states:  "Notified: 
2001/03/10 by law enforcement."  This entry does not specify 
the content of any notification that may have been provided to 
Bishop, and this entry does not identify the person, agency, 
or entity that constituted "law enforcement." 
The final entry states, "Order delivery date:  Order 
mailed."  This entry provides absolutely no proof of actual 
notice to anyone.  Indeed, the above-referenced entries in the 
Department of Motor Vehicles' transcript are devoid of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the only standard that can 
be applied in a criminal proceeding, that Bishop received 
actual notice of his adjudication as an habitual offender. 
 
We reject the Commonwealth's contention and the holding 
of the Court of Appeals that defendant's counsel, during his 
closing argument in the circuit court and in a pleading filed 
in the Court of Appeals, made a factual concession that Bishop 
received actual notice that he had been determined or 
adjudicated an habitual offender.  Bishop's counsel made the 
following argument at trial:  
 
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"[The Department of Motor Vehicles' transcript] 
will tell you that the revocation which occurred 
April 28, 1997, I'm sorry, April 28, 1997, that he 
was notified for the H.O. determination, that is the 
habitual offender determination by law enforcement.  
It doesn't actually say he was notified after he was 
declared habitual offender.  I think that is an 
important distinction. 
"He was notified of the process whereby he was 
going to be waived or where he was going to be 
adjudicated habitual offender so that he would know 
that it was going to occur, but it doesn't actually 
say he was notified having been adjudicated an 
habitual offender. 
"And I would suggest to the Court that under 
the Reed case, and I have copies right here.  First 
of all, actual notice is required and I would 
suggest to the Court we don't even see constructive 
notice on this record.  We know he was notified that 
there was going to be a termination, but we don't 
see in the record that he was going to be notified 
that he was determined habitual offender.  But I 
would suggest that without notice we cannot sustain 
a conviction." 
 
In his brief filed in the Court of Appeals, Bishop's 
counsel stated: 
 
"The DMV record in this case has two notations, 
the interpretation of which is the critical issue 
here.  First, the record indicates that on April 23, 
1997, Appellant was 'DETERMINED' to be an habitual 
offender by DMV.  The record does not show whether 
or not Appellant was ever notified of this 
determination.  Immediately below this notation is 
an indication that there existed a 'REVOCATION' 
issued on April 28, 1997 and effective on May 28, 
1997.  The notation then reads:  'FOR HO 
DETERMINATION PROCESS.'  That same entry reflects 
that an order was mailed and that Appellant received 
notification from law enforcement on March 10, 2001. 
"The DMV record is ambiguous on its face, 
however, a point which Appellant's trial counsel 
noted.  It indicates that Appellant was notified of 
something by law enforcement, but not as to what 
that something was.  The most clear reading of the 
 
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DMV record, and the only one supported by the plain 
language, is that Appellant was notified of the 'HO 
DETERMINATION PROCESS,' not that he was notified 
that he was or had been declared an habitual 
offender." 
 
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.) 
 
Upon our review of these statements, we conclude that the 
defendant plainly did not make a factual concession in the 
circuit court or the Court of Appeals that he had received 
actual notice from the Department of Motor Vehicles that he 
had been adjudicated as an habitual offender.  We note that 
this conclusion is consistent with the dissenting opinion 
filed in the Court of Appeals.  Bishop v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. 
App. 251, 261-64, 639 S.E.2d 683, 687-89 (2007) (Willis, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Bishop was also convicted, among other things, of a 
violation of Code § 18.2-460(C).  The Commonwealth has 
confessed error and agrees that this conviction must be 
vacated because of this Court's decision in Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 619, 628, 643 S.E.2d 485, 490 (2007). 
 
The Commonwealth's remaining arguments are without merit.  
Accordingly, we will dismiss the defendant's conviction for 
the violation of Code § 46.2-357.  As requested by the 
Commonwealth and the defendant, we will vacate the conviction 
for the violation of Code § 18.2-460(C), and we will remand 
this portion of the case to the circuit court for a new 
 
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sentencing proceeding on the lesser included offense as set 
forth in Code § 18.2-460(B). 
Reversed, vacated, 
dismissed in part, 
and remanded in part. 
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, dissenting. 
 
 
By posing the wrong question, the majority, in my 
judgment, errs in its resolution of this appeal.  If the 
question in this case was whether the DMV transcript alone was 
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bishop 
actually received some form of notification, I would agree 
with the majority.  But that is not the question presented in 
this appeal. 
 
Contrary to the contention of the majority, in the Court 
of Appeals Bishop concedes that he received notice. The only 
question remaining has to do with the content of the notice.  
Bishop states in his brief, “The DMV record is ambiguous on 
its face, however, a point which Appellant’s trial counsel 
noted.  It indicates that Appellant was notified of something 
by law enforcement, but not as to what that something was.”  
The only question presented to this Court on the question of 
Bishop’s violation of Code § 46.2-357 is the content of the 
notice that he admits he received.  
 
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party below, is sufficient to 
 
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prove the content of the conceded notice beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The DMV transcript received in evidence shows under 
the heading “DETERMINED” that on April 23, 1997 Bishop was 
determined to be an habitual offender.  Immediately after this 
entry on the DMV transcript under the heading “REVOCATION”, 
the transcript shows that a revocation order was issued 5 days 
after the determination of habitual offender status.  Under 
the same heading, the transcript shows that Bishop was 
notified by law enforcement.  In my judgment there can be no 
question about the content of the notification that Bishop 
concedes he received. 
 
I respectfully dissent.