Title: Dunlap v. Lawless

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

192 Kan. 686 (1964)
391 P.2d 70
LESTA M. DUNLAP, Appellant,
v.
EMMETT LAWLESS, A.M. WEBER and F.W. FRAZIER, County Commissioners of Sumner County, Kansas, Appellees.
No. 43,507

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 11, 1964.
Patrick F. Kelly, of Wichita, argued the cause, and John C. Frank and James P. Johnston, both of Wichita, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
Ford Harbaugh, of Wellington, argued the cause, and Charles E. Watson, County Attorney, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an action for damages as a result of injuries sustained by the plaintiff due to alleged defects in a county bridge. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the first amended petition, hereafter referred to as the petition, on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, and appeal has been duly perfected from such order by the plaintiff.
The sole question is whether the defects alleged in the petition state a cause of action within the meaning of G.S. 1949, 68-301.
The pleading under attack alleged that on October 22, 1960, at 5:15 a.m. the appellant (plaintiff) was riding as a passenger in the right front seat of a 1952 Ford automobile owned, driven and controlled solely by her husband. The appellant alleged she was painfully and permanently injured by the negligence of the Sumner *687 County commissioners, whose duty it is to maintain county bridges, and pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 1949, 68-301, she instituted this action to recover damages for her injuries. The specific allegations material to this appeal read:
"II.
..............
"IV.
Other allegations are immaterial to this appeal, and it is conceded if the specific allegations above quoted allege a defect within the meaning of the above statute, the petition states a cause of action.
G.S. 1949, 68-301, provides in part:
*688 Basically the defects claimed by the appellant are two in number. As expressed in the appellant's brief they are: (1) The laying of 3 by 10 planking in a north-south direction across the original flooring, thereby providing two tracks approximately 30 inches wide, 3 inches high and approximately 5 feet apart therein rendering the bridge unsafe, hazardous, inadequate and dangerous for public traffic; and (2) that the 3 by 10's were permitted to wear, rot and split, particularly at the north end, causing them to be smooth and worn so that in rainy weather they were extremely slick and hazardous.
It is to be noted the petition does not allege any collapse of the bridge, any holes in the bridge, or any defective railings, or that any structural part of the bridge gave way causing appellant's damage. It is further noted the petition does not allege that the accident itself happened on the bridge, but alleges that the appellant's husband, while driving, lost control of the vehicle while crossing the bridge and went off the highway into a ditch on the left side of the road after he had left the bridge and was driving on the highway. It is not claimed that there was a defect in the highway.
The statute in question does not impose liability for general negligence. It is strictly a statutory liability for defects in bridges, culverts and highways. (Rockhold v. Board of County Commissioners, 181 Kan. 1019, 317 P.2d 490; and Blessman v. State Highway Comm., 154 Kan. 704, 121 P.2d 267.)
Whether an alleged defect comes within the purview of the statute is, in the first instance, a question of law to be determined by the court. (Cronin v. State Highway Commission, 182 Kan. 42, 318 P.2d 1066; and Earnest v. State Highway Commission, 182 Kan. 357, 320 P.2d 847.)
In the Earnest case it was said:
A similar statement is found in Gorges v. State Highway Comm., 135 Kan. 371, 373, 10 P.2d 834.
*689 Does the presence of parallel plank tracks elevated three inches on a bridge render it defective?
As we read the appellant's brief, she contends the placement of the 3 by 10 planks in the manner alleged constitutes a defect per se.
This point goes to the design and construction of the bridge itself. It may be argued that if the bridge were to be built new at the present time, such tracks would not be used. But such bridges are not uncommon in Kansas. It would be an intolerable financial burden for the already hard-pressed taxpayers of a county to be required to alter or replace all steel and wood bridges of similar design simply because newer and better designs were used in the construction of bridges today.
Whether a given condition constitutes a defect within the meaning of 68-301, supra, is relative. It must be compared with the general conditions and surrounding circumstances. (Earnest v. State Highway Commission, supra.)
The principle involved on the present point under consideration has previously been recognized by this court in Hill v. State Highway Comm., 143 Kan. 129, 53 P.2d 882, where it was said:
(See, also, Parsons v. State Highway Comm., 146 Kan. 476, 72 P.2d 75.)
A narrow culvert or a one-lane culvert on a two-lane highway has been held not to constitute a defect within the meaning of the statute. (Wilson v. Barber County Comm'rs, 154 Kan. 525, 119 P.2d 502; and Sell v. McPherson Township, 152 Kan. 731, 107 P.2d 670.)
*690 We have no hesitance in holding that the manner in which the bridge in question was constructed does not make the bridge defective within the meaning of the statute.
Does the allegation that the 3 by 10 planks were permitted to wear, rot and split, particularly at the north end, causing them to be smooth and worn so that in rainy weather they were extremely slick and hazardous allege a defect under 68-301, supra?
There is no claim in the allegation relied upon that the bridge was slick or defective in dry weather. Furthermore, there is no allegation that any wearing, rotting or splitting produced any holes or rough places in the bridge. Actually, the allegation is that the bridge was slick in wet weather by reason of the conditions stated.
It has previously been held by this court that slickness is not a defect within the meaning of the statute in question and that results of the elements and weather are not actionable. In Gorges v. State Highway Comm., supra, an accumulation of ice on a state highway was determined not to be a defect within the meaning of the statute. (G.S. 1931 Supp., 68-419, similar to 68-301, supra.) It was said in the opinion:
An accumulation of oil which created a slick and slippery condition was held not to constitute a defect in a state highway under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 68-419, in Sheen v. State Highway Commission, 173 Kan. 491, 249 P.2d 934. Although this court has on occasion remarked by way of observation that a dangerous condition in a highway is a defect in the highway, it did not state that any dangerous condition was per se a defect under the statute  one creating liability. In addition to being dangerous, a condition must also be one the legislature is deemed to have intended to fall within the statute creating liability. (See, Sheen v. State Highway Commission, supra.)
In conclusion we hold the allegations of the petition under attack *691 did not allege the bridge in question to be defective within the meaning of 68-301, supra, creating liability, and by reason thereof it failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
FONTRON, J., not participating.
WERTZ, J., dissenting.