Title: DeWitt v. Balben

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DeWitt v. Balben1986 WY 95718 P.2d 854Case Number: 85-127, 85-128Decided: 04/23/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
James H. DeWITT II, 
George E. Baker II, Anne T. DeWitt, Hillcrest Investment Partnership, a Wyoming 
partnership, and Hillcrest Water Inc., a Wyoming corporation, a/k/a Hillcrest 
Water Company, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

Edward C. BALBEN, Marion 
C. Balben and Edward C. Balben and Marion C. Balben d/b/a Hillcrest Development 
Company, Appellants (Defendants),

v.

James H. DeWITT II, 
George E. Baker II, Anne T. DeWitt, Hillcrest Investment Partnership, a Wyoming 
partnership, and Hillcrest Water Inc., a Wyoming corporation, a/k/a Hillcrest 
Water Company, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

David F. 
Palmerlee and Blair Klein, Buffalo, for appellants in 

No. 85-127 and appellees 
in No. 85-128.

Harry G. Bondi, 
Casper, for 
appellees in No. 85-127 and appellants 
in No. 85-128.

Before THOMAS, C.J., ROONEY, BROWN, CARDINE, JJ., 
and RAPER, J., Retired.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal involves 
certain water rights to a well. An action was brought by James H. DeWitt II, 
George E. Baker II, Anne T. DeWitt, Hillcrest Investment Partnership, and 
Hillcrest Water, Inc. (hereinafter plaintiffs) against Edward C. Balben, Marion 
C. Balben d/b/a Hillcrest Development Company (hereinafter defendants)1 to determine the plaintiffs' rights 
in a water well located on the defendants' property. After trial to the court, a 
lengthy judgment was entered. The parties dispute who actually prevailed. In 
Case No. 85-127, the plaintiffs appeal from the district court's denial of 
attorney's fees and raise the following issues:

"1. Did the Court err in 
not awarding reasonable attorney fees to Plaintiffs?

"2. Are Plaintiffs 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees for prosecuting this appeal and defending 
the appeal of Defendants on all other issues?"

[¶2.]     In Case No. 85-128, the 
defendants cross-appeal from the court's judgment and raise a number of issues. 
The arguments in their brief do not track the stated issues. Rather, the issues 
are embodied in the following arguments, summarized by the defendants as 
follows:

"Argument 
I

"The plaintiffs' cause of 
action to be declared owners of the Leavitt Spring water right is barred by the 
statute of limitations.

"Argument 
II

"There is insufficient 
evidence to support the court's ruling that appellant Balben in the contract of 
1980 gave consent to the plaintiffs to enter upon Balben's land to rejuvenate 
the Leavitt Spring.

"Argument 
III

"The trial court erred in 
construing the 1962 `Agreement for Use of Water' to convey all of appellants' 
right, title, and interest in the Leavitt Spring 
appropriation.

"Argument 
IV

"The plaintiffs should be 
equitably estopped from claiming fee simple ownership of the Leavitt 
Spring.

"Argument 
V

"Defendants are entitled 
to reasonable attorney's fees as set forth in the 1980 
`contract'."

[¶3.]     We will affirm the 
decision of the trial court in all respects, save the denial of attorney's fees 
to the plaintiffs. We will reverse and remand to the district court for a 
determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded the plaintiffs for 
fees incurred at trial. We will also award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred on appeal.

[¶4.]     The factual and 
procedural history of the case is long and complex. In 1962, the defendants sold 
the plaintiffs' predecessors in interest a bottled water business known as the 
Hillcrest Water Company. As part of the sale, the defendants also granted to the 
plaintiffs the water rights to two springs located on the defendants' land, as 
well as the right of ingress and egress upon the defendants' land to maintain 
the springs. One of the springs is no longer used. The other spring, known as 
the Leavitt Spring, is the subject of this action.

[¶5.]     Between 1970 and 1980, 
the defendants developed three additional wells upon their land known as 
Hillcrest Wells Nos. 1, 2, and 3. These wells are in close proximity to the 
Leavitt Spring, and are used by the defendants to supply water for the Hillcrest 
Development Company, owned by the defendants. All four wells are supplied from a 
common source of water. When the defendants developed and used the three 
Hillcrest wells, the water level in the Leavitt Spring dropped to a point where 
it was unusable by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, one of the defendants 
back-filled the Leavitt Spring, destroying the facility and forcing the 
plaintiffs to obtain their water from an alternate source. The defendants did 
not allow the plaintiffs to rehabilitate the Leavitt Spring, even though the 
defendants granted such right in the 1962 sale.

[¶6.]     In order to resolve the 
problem, the parties entered into an agreement in 1980 which again set forth the 
plaintiffs' right to rehabilitate the Leavitt Spring. Nevertheless, the 
defendants continued to refuse access to the plaintiffs for the purpose of 
rehabilitating the Leavitt Spring. Apparently, the defendants sought to place 
their wells in a priority senior to the plaintiffs' Leavitt Spring by destroying 
it. As Edward Balben, one of the defendants, stated in a letter to the state 
engineer on January 6, 1983:

"* * * As I understand 
the State Engineer's rules, when a Spring has been dormant for over five years 
it reverts back to the State, which is the case here.

"Naturally Hillcrest 
Water Co. (Plaintiffs) wants to dig at the dormant (Leavitt) Spring site, even 
though it would probably eliminate or contaminate Well # 2 and # 3, which are 
within 25' and 50' of it. To do otherwise would allow Hillcrest Development 
(Defendants) to have Senior Water Rights * * *."

[¶7.]     In any event, the 
plaintiffs were not allowed to rehabilitate the Leavitt Spring and the 
defendants purportedly offered to sell the plaintiffs Hillcrest Development 
Company, owned by the defendants, for a sum of $130,000, or instigate 
litigation. The Leavitt Spring is located on the land whereupon Hillcrest 
Development is situated, so it appears the defendants attempted to sell the 
plaintiffs Leavitt Spring twice - by forcing the plaintiffs to buy Hillcrest 
Development Company in order to rehabilitate the Leavitt Spring when the 
plaintiffs had already purchased the water rights to such spring from the 
defendants in 1962. In a letter to the plaintiffs dated February 23, 1983, 
Edward Balben of Hillcrest Development stated:

"The purpose of this 
letter is to make it clear that if my terms of January 27, 1983 are not agreed 
to no later than March 1, 1983 they will be cancelled and you may either agree to the terms of August 28, 1982 
or proceed with Court Action. Let it be clarified that there shall be no 
trespassing until all matters are settled." (Emphasis 
added).

[¶8.]     Therefore, on April 15, 
1983, the plaintiffs filed an action to settle their right in the Leavitt Spring 
located on the defendants' land. The parties arrived at a settlement before 
trial, and the court subsequently approved such and entered judgment thereon on 
June 26, 1984.

[¶9.]     The defendants did not 
appeal from the judgment but subsequently filed to withdraw the stipulation and 
judgment on July 19, 1984. The court found that the defendants' attorneys did 
not have authority to enter into the earlier stipulation and judgment, and 
therefore the court vacated the earlier judgment and awarded the plaintiffs 
attorney's fees.

[¶10.]  Trial was subsequently had to the court, 
resulting in a judgment filed April 17, 1985. The court granted the plaintiffs 
relief in declaring the plaintiffs to be the absolute owners in fee simple of 
the Leavitt Spring; the court enjoined the defendants from interfering with the 
plaintiffs' right to maintain and rehabilitate the Leavitt Spring; the court 
awarded the plaintiffs $452.59 in costs, but refused to award the plaintiffs 
attorney's fees or damages. The court found in part:

"IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs are the sole and absolute 
owners in fee simple of, and are entitled to the exclusive use and possession of 
the Irrigation Spring and Leavitt Spring Water Rights, that neither the 
Defendants, nor their successors in interest have any right, title, interest, 
claim or estate in the Irrigation Spring or Leavitt Spring Water Rights or any 
part thereof and that title to the Irrigation Spring and Leavitt Spring Water 
Rights shall be, and is forever quieted in Plaintiffs.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants be, and are, hereby forever enjoined 
and restrained from interfering with the Plaintiffs' rights to maintain the 
Leavitt Spring, to develop, expand and revive the Leavitt Spring and of ingress 
and egress to the Leavitt Spring all granted pursuant to the 1962 Agreement, the 
1980 Contract and the 1980 Right of Way Easement as set forth in paragraphs XII, 
XIII and XIV of this Judgment.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the prayer of the Plaintiffs and the prayer of the 
Defendants for attorney's fees be, and is, hereby denied.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' prayer for monetary damages be, and is, 
hereby denied.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' counterclaim for monetary damages be, and 
is, hereby denied.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs be, and are, hereby, awarded costs in 
the amount of $452.59."

Case No. 
85-128

[¶11.]  We will consider the issues raised by the 
defendants in Case No. 85-128 first.

1.

[¶12.]  In their first argument, the defendants 
claim the plaintiffs' action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
The defendants contend the action is barred under § 1-3-103, W.S. 1977, which 
reads:

"An action for the 
recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments can 
only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of such action 
accrues."

Under that 
statute, an action to recover real property must be brought within ten years 
after the cause of action accrues or it is barred.

[¶13.]  The plaintiffs, on the other hand, 
contend their action was one for declaratory relief under the Wyoming Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act, §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-114, W.S. 1977, which 
provides in part:

"Any person interested 
under a deed, will, written contract * * * may have any question of construction 
or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations." Section 1-37-103, W.S. 
1977.

[¶14.]  The plaintiffs then contend the 
applicable statute of limitations is § 1-3-105, W.S. 1977, which provides in 
relevant part:

"(a) Civil actions other 
than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following 
periods after the cause of action accrues:

"(i) Within ten (10) 
years, an action upon a specialty or any contract agreement or promise in 
writing * * *."

[¶15.]  For purposes of this appeal, it matters 
not which statute is used - both statutes prescribe a ten-year period from the 
time the cause of action accrues. The rule is settled that a cause of action 
accrues only when forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury. Duke v. 
Housen, Wyo., 589 P.2d 334, reh. denied 590 P.2d 1340, 
cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). 

[¶16.]  The case of Body v. McDonald, 79 
Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513 (1959), involved an action in the nature of a declaratory judgment and 
to quiet title to a mineral interest in land. The defendants contended the 
action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court rejected 
the contention and quoted with approval the following language from 1 Anderson, 
Declaratory Judgments, § 341, p. 783 (2nd ed. 1951):

"`The statute of 
limitations in a declaratory action does not begin to run against a right to 
maintain the same, until an actual controversy has accrued or occurred, and 
undisclosed conflicting claims between persons bearing jurial relations do not 
constitute a controversy which would set in operation the statute of limitations 
against the action for declaratory relief. Until an actual controversy has 
arisen between the parties no cause for declaratory relief has accrued and the 
statute of limitations is not operative. So it would seem to follow, that until 
there is a dispute as to the making or interpretation of a contract, no right to 
maintain a declaratory action has accrued.'" Id., 334 P.2d  at 519.

[¶17.]  One authority has 
stated:

"In general a cause or 
right of action accrues, so as to start the running of the statute of 
limitations, as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises, or 
when there is a demand capable of present enforcement, or when there is a remedy 
available; and whenever one person may sue another a cause of action has accrued 
and the statute of limitations begins to run, but not until that time. So, 
whether at law or in equity, the cause of action arises when, and only when, the 
aggrieved person has the right to apply to the proper tribunal for relief. The 
statute does not attach to a claim for which there is no right of action, and 
does not run against a right for which there is no corresponding remedy or for 
which judgment cannot be obtained. The true test, therefore, to determine when a 
cause of action has accrued is to ascertain the time when plaintiff could first 
have maintained his action to a successful result, regardless of the time when 
actual damage results; the fact that he might previously have brought a 
premature or groundless action is immaterial. The statute of limitations does 
not require a person to institute proceedings to enforce a right within a time 
limited, when such proceedings will not conclusively determine such right as to 
each party.

"The accrual of a cause 
of action has been said to depend on the uniting of at least two elements, 
injury and damages. A party's right of action is not suspended until he 
ascertains that he has a cause of action." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 
109, pp. 11-14 (1948).

[¶18.]  Upon review of the pertinent facts in 
this case, we are not able to find the plaintiffs' action barred by either 
statute of limitations quoted above. The trouble between the parties arose 
sometime in 1978 when the Leavitt Spring's water level dropped to a point where 
it was unusable by the plaintiffs; later in 1978 the defendants backfilled the 
spring, destroying the facility. Therefore, the plaintiffs essentially had a 
cause of action against the defendants for interference with the plaintiffs' 
water right to the Leavitt Spring in 1978. Under the statute of limitations (§ 
1-3-103 or § 1-3-105) then, the plaintiffs had until the year 1988 in which to 
bring their action. The plaintiffs' action commenced in 1983. We hold the action 
is not barred by the statute of limitations.

2.

[¶19.]  In their second argument, the defendants 
claim there was insufficient evidence to support the court's ruling that Edward 
Balben gave his consent to the plaintiffs under the 1980 contract to enter upon 
the defendants' land to rehabilitate the Leavitt Spring. When reviewing a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence question, the rule is that so long as there is 
sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could rationally base its 
decision, such will not be overturned by the appellate court. Thomasi v. 
Koch, Wyo., 660 P.2d 806 (1983); Palmeno v. Cashen, Wyo., 627 P.2d 163 (1981); Goodwin v. Upper Crust of 
Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 624 P.2d 1192 
(1981).

[¶20.]  The original 1962 agreement between the 
defendants and the plaintiffs' predecessors in interest provided the 
following:

"3. For the purpose of 
exercising said use of water rights, Users shall have the right of ingress and 
egress to said water springs, and shall have the right to maintain said springs 
at all times.

"4. In the event that 
said water springs, as they now exist, shall prove inadequate to supply the 
water required and needed for the use hereinabove stated, it is agreed that 
Users shall have the right to develop additional springs, at Users' expense; 
provided, however, that any development or expansion of said water springs shall 
be subject to the prior approval of the Owners, their heirs, or 
assigns."

The terms of 
such agreement are clear: The defendants granted to the plaintiffs the right of 
ingress and egress for the purpose of maintaining the spring. In 1980, the 
parties expressly ratified their earlier agreement made in 1962 and the 
defendants again agreed to allow the plaintiffs the right to rehabilitate the 
spring:

"1. The Agreement for Use 
of Water mentioned above, shall remain in full force and effect except as 
modified herein.

* * * * * 
*

"3. Pursuant to the 
provisions of paragraph 4 of the above described Agreement for Use of Water, the 
First Party consents to the Second Parties development, expansion and revival of 
what is commonly known as Hillcrest Springs No. 1 which is current partially 
dormant, provided however, that the Second Party shall exercise every reasonable 
precaution in such development, expansion and revival so as not to disturb the 
current water production from the spring area generally or unnecessarily disturb 
or contaminate the area or the appliances and line in and leading from the area. 
With respect to future development or expansion, prior approval by the First 
Party shall continue to be necessary as required by the above-described 
Agreement for Use of Water, provided however, that said approval shall not be 
unreasonably withheld consistent with the objectives of this 
Agreement."

[¶21.]  The terms of the 1980 contract above are 
equally clear. The contract expressly states that the plaintiffs have the right 
to revive the spring - such right obviously includes the right to enter upon the 
defendants' land for purposes of rehabilitating the 
spring.

[¶22.]  We agree with the findings made by the 
trial court on this issue when it concluded:

"XI.

"That Plaintiffs have 
been and are in substantial compliance with their obligations under the 1962 
Agreement and the 1980 Contract.

"XII.

"That the Defendants did 
grant, bargain and convey unto the individually named Plaintiffs a right of way 
easement by document entitled `Right of Way Easement' dated the 9th day of 
February, 1980, and recorded in the office of the County Clerk, Natrona County, 
Wyoming, on the 11th day of March, 1980, in Book 286 at (hereinafter referred to 
as the `1980 Right of Way Easement').

"XIII.

"That the 1962 Agreement, 
at Paragraph 3 thereof, provided `for the purpose of exercising said use of 
water rights, user shall have the right of ingress and egress to said water 
springs, and shall have the right to maintain said springs at all times' which 
includes the right of Plaintiffs to install, maintain and replace such water 
pipelines as are reasonably necessary for exercise of Plaintiffs' Leavitt Spring 
Water Right.

"XIV.

"That by Paragraph 3 of 
the 1980 Contract, the Defendant did consent to the Plaintiffs' development, 
expansion and revival of the Leavitt Spring water right.

"XV.

"That Defendants have 
wrongfully denied the Plaintiffs the right to maintain the Leavitt Spring, the 
right to develop, expand and revive the Leavitt Spring and the right of ingress 
and egress to the Leavitt Spring, all granted pursuant to the 1962 Agreement, 
the 1980 Contract and the 1980 Right of Way Easement, as set forth in paragraphs 
XII, XIII and XIV of this Judgment.

"XVI.

"That Plaintiffs will 
suffer irreparable harm from the wrongful denial by the Defendants of 
Plaintiffs' rights, that Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for 
Defendants' wrongful denial of Plaintiffs' rights, and that Plaintiffs are 
entitled to an injunction enjoining Defendants from interfering with Plaintiffs' 
rights to maintain the Leavitt Spring, to develop, expand and revive the Leavitt 
Spring and of ingress and egress, all as set forth in paragraphs XII, XIII, and 
XIV of this Judgment."

[¶23.]  We find the court's judgment was 
supported by substantial evidence and conclude such judgment was proper under 
the facts and circumstances attendant here.

3.

In their third 
argument, the defendants claim the trial court erred by construing the 1962 
[¶24.]         
agreement as conveying all of the defendants' right, title and interest 
in the Leavitt Spring to the plaintiffs. The applicable provisions of the 1962 
agreement provided:

"THIS AGREEMENT, made 
this 16th day of June, 1962, between Edward C. Balben and Marion C. Balben, 
hereinafter called `Owners', and James H. DeWitt and Anne T. DeWitt, hereinafter 
called `Users', all of whom reside in Natrona County, 
Wyoming:

"WITNESSETH:

"THAT WHEREAS, the Owners 
warrant to Users that they own and have an exclusive right and use in and to 
that certain certificate of appropriation of water dated January 23, 1924, by 
the State of Wyoming to Herbert C. Leavitt and recorded in Book 2 of Water Deeds 
at , in the records of Natrona County, Wyoming; and that certain certificate of 
appropriation granted to Herbert C. Leavitt, October 5, 1927, by the State of 
Wyoming, and recorded in Book 2 of Water Deeds at , in the office of the County 
Clerk and Ex-officio Register of Deeds in and for Natrona County, Wyoming, they 
do hereby grant to Users a first and prior right to the use of the water from 
said springs and seeps on the terms, conditions, and purposes hereinafter 
enumerated."

[¶25.]  In Wyoming, a water right is a property right of 
high order possessing none of the characteristics of personal property, and is 
considered real property. King v. White, Wyo., 499 P.2d 585 (1972). See also 2 Kinney, 
Irrigation and Water Rights § 769, pp. 1328-1329 (2nd ed.). Therefore, to effect 
a valid transfer, it follows that such agreement should be in writing, must 
indicate a specific intention to convey the property and describe it. King v. 
White, supra; 93 C.J.S. Waters § 208, p. 1043 (1956); 78 Am.Jur.2d Waters § 241, 
p. 686 (1975). Regarding the conveyance of water rights, this court stated in 
the early case of Whalon v. North Platte Canal & Colonization Co., 11 Wyo. 
313, 71 P. 995, 999 (1903):

"These instruments are 
referred to throughout the record as `assignments,' although they are not so 
designated upon their face, nor by any indorsement thereon. We think that 
designation is a technical misnomer, if it is intended thereby to indicate that 
they constitute something less than a deed conveying realty. No prescribed form 
of words is essential to convey real estate, but the instrument must contain 
sufficient words to show an intention to convey. 1 Devlin on Deeds, § 211; 9 
Ency.L. (2d Ed.) 137, 138; 3 Wn.Real Prop. 329. `Any words in a deed indicating 
an intention to transfer the estate, interest, or claim of the grantor will be 
sufficient as a conveyance, whether they be such as were generally used in a 
deed of feoffment, or of bargain and sale, or of release, irrespective of the 
fact of possession of grantor or grantee, or of the statute of uses.' Field v. 
Columbet, 4 Sawy. 523, Fed.Cas. No. 4764. In one of the instruments the 
operative words used are, `transfer, sell, release,' in the others, `transfer, 
sell, assign and set over.' These words are sufficient in the case of each 
instrument to constitute a conveyance. They show an intention to sell and 
transfer. The words `transfer' and `sell' are employed in each instrument. We 
think it clear that the instruments are sufficient and operative to convey the 
interest and title of the grantors to the water right described. * * 
*"

[¶26.]  In the present case, we think the 
defendants conveyed all their interest in the Leavitt Spring to the plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest. The terms of the 1962 agreement suggest as much. 
Furthermore, the defendants made no reservation of any water rights in the 
agreement.

[¶27.]  We think the trial court was correct when 
it found:

"II.

"That the Defendants did 
grant and convey to Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest all of Defendants' 
right, title and interest in and to the Irrigation Spring and the Leavitt Spring 
water rights.

"III.

"That Plaintiffs are the 
sole and absolute owners in fee simple of, and are entitled to the exclusive use 
and possession of, the Irrigation Spring and the Leavitt Spring water 
rights.

"IV.

"That neither the 
Defendants, nor their successors in interest, have any right, title, interest, 
claim or estate in the Irrigation Spring or Leavitt Spring water rights, or any 
part thereof, and that title to the Irrigation Spring and Leavitt Spring water 
rights should be forever quieted in Plaintiffs.

* * * * * 
*

"IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs are the sole and absolute 
owners in fee simple of, and are entitled to the exclusive use and possession of 
the Irrigation Spring and Leavitt Spring Water Rights, that neither the 
Defendants, nor their successors in interest have any right, title, interest 
claim or estate in the Irrigation Spring or Leavitt Spring Water Rights or any 
part thereof and that title to the Irrigation Spring and Leavitt Spring Water 
Rights shall be, and is forever quieted in Plaintiffs."

4.

[¶28.]  In their fourth argument, the defendants 
claim the plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from claiming ownership in the 
Leavitt Spring in fee simple. The basis of such argument is not totally 
clear.

[¶29.]  One authority has defined equitable 
estoppel thusly:

"Equitable estoppel or 
estoppel by misrepresentation is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a person 
whereby he is precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights 
against another person relying on such conduct; and it arises where a person, by 
his acts, representations, or admissions, or even by his silence when it is his 
duty to speak, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to 
believe that certain facts exist, and the other person rightfully relies and 
acts on such belief, and will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny 
the existence of such facts." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 59, p. 367 
(1964).

See also the 
definition contained in Black's Law Dictionary, p. 483 (5th ed. 
1979).

[¶30.]  Since we have already ruled that the 
defendants conveyed all their interest in the Leavitt Spring to the plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest, we need not address this issue at length. It is well 
settled that one who seeks equity must do equity, and must come into court with 
clean hands. Lewis v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 699 P.2d 822 (1985); and Walker v. Board of CountyCommissioners, Albany County, Wyo., 644 P.2d 772 (1982). The defendants make 
the following statements in their attempt to show they came into court with 
clean hands.

"* * * Surely the 
Defendants could not be considered as coming to the court with a claim not based 
in good faith and justice.

"* * * Defendants' sense 
of equity, justice, and good faith * * * defeats Plaintiffs' claims of well 
interference and ownership in fee simple of the Leavitt 
Spring."

[¶31.]  But such bald assertions fly in the face 
of the facts of this case. Be it remembered that the defendants took the initial 
steps of drilling three more wells with rights junior to that of the plaintiffs, 
and drilled such wells in the immediate proximity of the Leavitt Spring. The 
development and use of these wells by the defendants rendered use of the Leavitt 
Spring impossible. And if that was not enough, the defendants in further pursuit 
of their alleged "good faith and justice" backfilled the Leavitt Spring, totally 
destroying the facility and rendering it useless. Then, the defendants offered 
to sell the plaintiffs water after they had destroyed the plaintiffs' legal 
source of water, and if they did not like such offer, the plaintiffs could 
instigate a lawsuit.

[¶32.]  Perhaps the most telling example of the 
defendants' attitude in dealing with the plaintiffs is shown in the following 
trial testimony of plaintiff George Baker:

"Q. Did you make any 
complaint to Mr. Balben about your supply being diminished to the point of 
one-half gallon per minute during the summer of 1982?

"A. Yes, I 
did.

"Q. Where did you make 
that and when?

"A. Up at Brewery 
Springs, checking the flow coming out of the Brewery Springs at the tank, Mr. 
Balben was up there. I asked Mr. Balben, I said, something has got to be done, 
we don't have enough water to operate. He looked at me and smiled, and he said, 
how does it feel to be out of water, and I can sell you water for two cents a 
gallon, you can buy water from me for two cents a gallon.

"Q. He offered to sell 
you water for two cents a gallon, is that correct?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. At that time did you 
have occasion to view either of the tanks owned and controlled by Mr. Balben for 
storing water?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. And those are the 
same tanks that you testified you observed during the water shortage of 
1981?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. What did you see at 
those tanks?

"A. I saw tremendous 
overflow from both. * * *"

[¶33.]  Suffice it to say, the defendants do not 
even meet the minimum threshold requirements of clean hands to claim the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply in light of their conduct. Surely 
the defendants cannot claim their conduct was "based in good faith and justice." 
Therefore, we decline to address the elements of equitable estoppel and their 
application, if any, to this case.

5.

[¶34.]  We will address the defendants' fifth 
argument regarding attorney's fees in our disposal of Case No. 
85-127.

Case No. 
85-127

1.

[¶35.]  Both parties asked the court to award 
them attorney's fees based upon the following provision in the 1980 contract: 

"14. In the event that 
any party or individual institutes an action at law to enforce any agreement 
hereunder, the prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing party."

However, the 
trial court denied both parties attorney's fees, finding:

"That the 1980 Contract 
provided that the prevailing party in any enforcement action should be entitled 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Considering the nature of the case, the 
revenues of the businesses, and the lack of showing of monetary damages, the 
Court is not able to find that the attorney's fees sought by either side are 
reasonable."

[¶36.]  As noted earlier, the parties are in 
disagreement as to who actually prevailed under the court's judgment. The 
plaintiffs basically sought five counts of relief against the 
defendants:

"1. A declaration that 
Plaintiffs are the sole owners in fee simple of the Leavitt Spring water 
rights.

"2. An injunction 
enjoining Defendants from producing water from Defendants' Hillcrest Wells Nos. 
1, 2, and 3 in a manner that interferes with production of water from the 
Leavitt Spring by Plaintiffs.

"3. An injunction to 
enjoin Defendants from interfering with Plaintiffs' rights of ingress and egress 
across Defendants' lands for maintenance and to rehabilitate the Leavitt 
Spring.

"4. A prayer for 
damages.

"5. A prayer for attorney 
fees and costs in accordance with the 1980 Contract."

[¶37.]  The court did rule that the plaintiffs 
were the sole owners of the Leavitt Spring in fee simple, and that an injunction 
should issue barring the defendants from producing water from their wells which 
interferes with the plaintiffs' production of water from the Leavitt Spring, and 
that the defendants should be enjoined from denying to the plaintiffs the right 
of ingress and egress for the purposes of maintaining and rehabilitating the 
Leavitt Spring. However, the only relief the court denied the plaintiffs were 
monetary damages and attorney's fees. It is also noted that the defendants set 
forth a number of claims and defenses including a claim for attorney's fees and 
costs which were all denied by the court.

[¶38.]  It is well settled in this state that 
attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless expressly provided for by statute or 
contract. Bowers Welding & Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, Wyo., 699 P.2d 299 (1985); and Kvenild v. Taylor, Wyo., 
594 P.2d 972 (1979). The 1980 contract in this case expressly provided that "the 
prevailing party * * * shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs." The court did award the plaintiffs costs, but refused to award them 
attorney's fees finding that neither party sought fees which were 
reasonable.

[¶39.]  We think the plaintiffs are entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees in this action. The contract expressly provided for 
such fees and the plaintiffs did substantially prevail on their claims for 
relief. The only relief the plaintiffs sought which was not awarded were 
monetary damages, which the court found the plaintiffs had failed to properly 
prove, and attorney's fees, which the court found 
unreasonable.

[¶40.]  A trial court does have discretion to 
determine what fees are reasonable, but does not have discretion to rewrite a 
contract:

"It is one thing to 
interpret a contract or to discern the contractual intent of the parties 
pursuant to established legal rules, but it is another thing to make a contract 
for the parties. We are obliged to do the former, and we are prohibited from 
doing the latter." McCartney v. Malm, Wyo., 
627 P.2d 1014, 1020 (1981).

[¶41.]  In the case of Greenough v. Prairie Dog 
Ranch, Inc., Wyo., 531 P.2d 499 (1975), we reversed and remanded a summary 
judgment awarding attorney's fees in a mortgage foreclosure action with 
instructions to the district court to determine what would be a reasonable 
attorney's fee in the matter. The trial court granted attorney's fees in a 
random amount by way of summary judgment without making a specific determination 
as to what was reasonable for purposes of the specific case. This court found 
error in such a procedure and stated:

"This court has approved 
the rule that there must be some proof or evidentiary basis for a determination 
of a reasonable attorney's fee, Combs v. Walters, Wyo., 518 P.2d 1254, 1255; 
Wallace v. Casper Adjustment Service, Wyo., 500 P.2d 72, 
73.

"There are certain 
factors which may be considered in the determination of a reasonable attorney's 
fee. These are the ability and quality of the attorney; the kind and complexity 
of the matter; the work actually performed and the manner in which it was done; 
and the result, Schwartz v. Schwerin, 85 Ariz. 242, 336 P.2d 144, 146; Barnes v. 
Mid-Continent Casualty Company, 192 Kan. 401, 388 P.2d 642, 646. The Code of 
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association (adopted August 12, 
1969), in § DR 2-106, sets out eight suggested factors, some being a duplication 
of the above. `The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services' 
is one of the factors suggested as a guide in determining the reasonableness of 
a fee in this code. Unless and until there be some evidence in the record 
besides the customary fee, we see no basis for determination of the other 
important and necessary factors upon which the reasonableness of the fee should 
be based." Id., at 503-504.

[¶42.]  The plaintiffs presented evidence of the 
attorney's fees incurred by them by way of exhibits, affidavits, and oral 
testimony. The defendants did not object to the amount or reasonableness of the 
fees. The trial court concluded the fees sought by both sides were 
unreasonable.

[¶43.]  We have previously set forth the evidence 
of defendants' conduct in creating the necessity of this litigation. The parties 
expressly agreed in the 1980 contract that a prevailing party was entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs. The trial court did award the plaintiffs $452.59 in 
costs according to the 1980 contract. We think it clear, then, that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under the contract.2

[¶44.]  Accordingly, we will reverse and remand 
this issue to the trial court for a determination as to what is a reasonable fee 
to award plaintiffs for prosecution of this case through 
trial.

2.

[¶45.]  In their second issue, the plaintiffs 
also ask that they be awarded their attorney's fees on appeal. As authority for 
such award, the plaintiffs cite 25 C.J.S. Damages § 50, p. 785 (1966), which 
states:

"As a general rule, 
contract provisions for allowance of attorney fees are construed to include both 
trial and appellate fees."

There is ample 
authority in other jurisdictions for the proposition that if attorney's fees are 
expressly authorized by contract or statute, such provision also applies to fees 
incurred at the appellate level. Matter of MCA, 128 Cal. App. 3d 225, 181 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1982); Molyett v. Society National Life Insurance Company, 
Fla.App. 2 Dist., 452 So. 2d 1114 (1984); Hobart 
v. Hale, 132 Ill. App.3d 845, 87 Ill.Dec. 614, 477 N.E.2d 740 (1985); Goodwin v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, Iowa, 369 N.W.2d 816 (1985); Reynolds v. Wal Mart Stores, 
Inc., La. 
App., 445 So. 2d 490 (1984); Tafoya v. S & S Plumbing Company, 97 N.M. 249, 
638 P.2d 1094 (App. 1981).

[¶46.]  In this jurisdiction, we have previously 
allowed the award of attorney's fees for appellate work in a few limited 
instances. In Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, Wyo., 583 P.2d 1265 (1978), we awarded 
attorney's fees incurred on appeal under § 20-2-111, W.S. 1977, which allows the 
court to require either party "to pay any sum necessary to enable the other to 
carry on or defend the action." The court stated:

"The defendant-appellee 
seeks attorney's fees for her representation in this appeal in a divorce matter. 
Such fees are properly allowable. The record shows no affluence on her part and 
the plaintiff-appellant has cast upon her the burden of protecting her position. 
Under those circumstances, we will allow what we consider to be a reasonable sum 
of $300.00 to be applied against whatever appellee's attorney's fees may be 
payable at the rate of $100.00 per month, the first of which payments shall 
become due on September 1, 1978. Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo. 1974, 518 P.2d 28, reh. den. We consider 
that there was reasonable cause for appeal, so we shall deny any award of 
damages as requested by defendant-appellee pursuant to Rule 72(k), W.R.C.P. Our 
allowance of attorney's fees is pursuant to the court's authority to do so in 
divorce matters to assist the defendant in the continuing defense of the action, 
sec. 20-2-11 W.S. 1977, and not as a penalty under Rule 72(k), W.R.C.P." 
Id., at 
1268.

[¶47.]  In Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976), we taxed 
attorney's fees and costs as a sanction and penalty for a nonmeritorious appeal. 
In Johnson v. Hauffe, Wyo., 567 P.2d 735 (1977), we dismissed an appeal for lack 
of timeliness and denied appellees' request for attorney's fees expressly 
leaving open the question of whether such fees could be 
recovered:

"Appellees have moved for 
an award of costs and attorney's fees on appeal. Because this is proper only in 
aggravated cases we hesitiate to impose such penalties, Keller v. Anderson, Wyo.554 P.2d 1253. Ordinarily this might be determined by an 
examination of appellants' presentation in determining whether it would be 
proper to make such award. However, because appellees herein failed to raise 
or argue the dispositive issue in the appeal, i.e., timeliness of the notice of 
appeal, we will not apply this practice herein. Appellees could have saved 
considerable time for themselves and for the judicial system if, instead of 
pursuing a response to the appeal on issues which we cannot reach, they would 
have asserted this crucial jurisdictional issue. Appellees' expenses and attorney's fees 
would have been demonstrably less had this been called to the court's attention 
immediately upon the filing of this defective notice. The motion for costs, 
attorney's fees, and expenses is denied.

"Appeal 
dismissed." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 736.

[¶48.]  In this case, the parties expressly 
agreed in the 1980 contract that the prevailing party be entitled to the award 
of attorney's fees. We think it logical then, in accordance with the great 
weight of authority, to apply such fees to those incurred on the appellate 
level.

"While in the majority of 
the cases in which the question of the propriety of awarding attorneys' fees on 
appeal, pursuant to a contractual provision, has been considered, the petition 
for such fees has either been granted by the appellate court, or the allowance 
of such fees by the trial court has been approved on appeal, the only general 
proposition for which these cases can be said to stand is that the contract of 
the parties is controlling and that, in these cases, the allowance of such fees 
came within the provisions of the contract. * * *" Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 863, 864 
(1957) "Contractual provision for attorneys' fees as including allowance for 
services rendered upon appellate review," and see A.L.R. Later Case Service on 
this topic.

[¶49.]  We agree with the New Mexico court in the 
case of Wyrsch v. Milke, 92 N.M. 217, 585 P.2d 1098, 1105 (App. 1978), wherein 
it held:

"On appeal, Adams claimed the right to an attorney fee from M & B 
for services rendered in this appeal. This claim was not decided in the original 
opinion. 

"Paragraph 8 of 
the Adams-Milke real estate contract reads:

"`In the event of a 
default by any of the parties hereto, all expenses and attorney fees of all 
other parties incident to such default shall be paid by the defaulting 
party.'

"Of course, this clause 
is valid, Budagher v. Sunnyland Enterprises, Inc., 90 N.M. 365, 563 P.2d 1158 
(1977), Shortle v. McCloskey, 39 N.M. 273, 46 P.2d 50 (1935), and a contract 
which provides for payment of attorney fees by a defaulting party does cover 
attorney fees on appeal. First National Bank of Santa Fe v. Wood, 86 N.M. 165, 521 P.2d 127 
(1974); Cabot v. First National Bank of Santa Fe, 81 N.M. 795, 474 P.2d 478 (1970). The 
Court's decision in Cabot is the majority approach to this 
issue."

[¶50.]  We think the appellate court should 
determine the proper attorney fees to be awarded on appeal. The appellate court 
is in a better position to review the appellate work done, and then set a 
reasonable fee. In Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283, 285-286 (1965), this court 
stated:

"Should the procedure 
[whereby the supreme court awards appellate attorney fees] be considered 
exclusive? We think it should. Public policy and the public interest require 
such a holding. In the first place, appeals to the supreme court are from a 
judgment or `final order' of the district court. Except for the performance of 
further duties assigned to him under the rules or statutes, the jurisdiction of 
the trial judge should end with the entry of the final judgment or order 
appealed from.

"This is in keeping with 
the practice followed by federal courts under the federal rules. See Walleck v. 
Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 128 F.2d 343, 344; Thompson v. Harry C. Erb Inc., 3 Cir., 240 F.2d 452, 454; and 3A Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 
1558, p. 85 (Rules Edition, 1958).

"There is good reason for the supreme court 
rather than the district court to pass upon the need for ordering payment of an 
attorney's fee in an appeal, and the supreme court is in a better position to 
say what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable and proper fee for legal 
service in that court. Moreover, it would not be proper for the trial court 
to control the appeal, and there would be some instances in which it could 
control whether an appeal is carried by a husband to the supreme court, merely 
by deciding that an attorney's fee should be paid to appellee and by fixing the 
amount thereof." (Emphasis added.)

[¶51.]  Although Rubeling is a divorce case, we 
think the rationale is applicable here. The district court is normally not in a 
position to award appellate attorney's fees simply because the appellate fees 
are not incurred at the trial level. The appeal must be from a final order or 
judgment, and the trial court's jurisdiction should end once such is 
rendered.

[¶52.]  Furthermore, to award appellate fees here 
avoids the circuitous action of sending the case back to the district court for 
a determination of a proper appellate fee, and then reviewing the fee awarded if 
that determination is appealed.

[¶53.]  Accordingly, appellate attorney's fees 
will be awarded by this court to the plaintiffs upon proper 
documentation.

[¶54.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded to the district court for proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Ordinarily, we refer to 
the parties on appeal as appellants and appellees. However, because of two 
appeals which are consolidated for disposition, we will refer to the parties 
simply as plaintiffs and defendants to provide clarity and avoid 
confusion.

2 It should be noted that 
when the trial court set aside the previous stipulation and judgment entered 
into by the parties, it did award the plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount 
of $8,634.95, finding the fees were incurred by the plaintiffs in good faith, 
and that the fees were reasonable. These fees were awarded by the trial court 
after the parties entered into a stipulation to settle the dispute, but were 
forced to abandon the settlement when the defendants claimed their counsel had 
no authority to enter into the agreement.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring and dissenting.

[¶55.]  I am in accord with the disposition of 
these cases in the majority opinion save for the question of attorney fees on 
appeal. Paragraph 14 of this contract, which also is quoted in the majority 
opinion, provides:

"14. In the event that 
any party or individual institutes an action at law to enforce any agreement 
hereunder, the prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing party."

This is a 
contractual right to attorney's fees within the rule promulgated in Bowers 
Welding & Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, Wyo., 699 P.2d 299 (1985); and Kvenild 
v. Taylor, Wyo., 594 P.2d 972 (1979). The plaintiffs are entitled to enforce 
this provision of their contract like any other provision.

[¶56.]  If the obligation is not honored by the 
defendants then the plaintiffs should be permitted to enforce it in the district 
court and to establish the reasonable attorney's fees and costs for which they 
are entitled to be compensated. That is an issue of fact. If the right is 
controverted, it is peculiarly appropriate for that issue to be disposed of in a 
fact-finding court. I can discern no reason why the reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs provided for in the contract would not include those on appeal as well 
as those relating to the trial of the action. I do not believe that this court, 
even with the support suggested by Justice Raper, Retired, in his concurring and 
dissenting opinion should involve itself in the resolution of this issue of 
fact. This case is distinguishable from those relied upon in the majority 
opinion, and the issue in this case should be resolved in the trial 
court.

RAPER, Justice, Retired, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶57.]  I concur in all of the opinion of the 
majority except that part which in my view offers no useful guidance to counsel. 
It is agreeable with me and proper that plaintiffs recover reasonable attorney's 
fees for the appellate work of their counsel, to be fixed by this court, for the 
reasons stated in the majority opinion. My objection goes to the vagueness of 
"upon proper documentation."

[¶58.]  There is no useful evidence in the record 
of what should be a reasonable attorney's fee for the professional work of 
defending an appeal by defendants and the forcing an appeal by plaintiffs to 
collect reasonable attorney's fees as provided by contract. Nor are there 
available empirical studies made of what attorney's fees are normal for handling 
an appeal, the going rate, so to speak, based on the considerations necessary in 
fixing a fee for legal services rendered.

[¶59.]  This court has previously and in this 
case set a rule applying to district courts as to how they shall fix attorney's 
fees. The determination of the amount of reasonable attorney's fees is a factual 
question to be decided upon evidence and facts in each individual case. 
Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., Wyo., 531 P.2d 499 (1975), and authority there 
cited. Greenough sets out various factors to be considered in the determination 
of reasonable attorney's fees. These are ability and quality of the attorney; 
the kind and complexity of the matter; the work actually performed and the 
manner in which it was done; and the result. Greenough also referred to the Code 
of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association. Those rules have 
been adopted by this court as part of the Amended Rules Adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Wyoming Providing for the Organization and Government of the Wyoming 
State Bar, OR2-106, which sets out the following guides:

"(1) The time and labor 
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;

"(2) The likelihood, if 
apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;

"(3) The fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar legal services;

"(4) The amount involved 
and the results obtained;

"(5) The time limitations 
imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

"(6) The nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client;

"(7) The experience, 
reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services;

"(8) Whether the fee is 
fixed or contingent."

[¶60.]  This court ought to be bound in the 
matter of fixing attorney's fees by the same rule it imposes on district courts. 
I would have referred the matter to the district court for the taking of 
evidence relevant to the fixing of a fee for work done on this appeal by 
plaintiffs' counsel and referring such evidence back to this court so that it 
has some sound basis to fix a fee.

[¶61.]  This is particularly appropriate here 
because the case is going back to the district court for the purpose of fixing 
fees for trial work. The district court can at that time take evidence 
appropriate to the fixing of appellate fees consistent with the standards set 
out in Greenough and Rule OR2-106, and without recommendation refer such 
evidence to this court for its use in establishing the appellate 
fee.

[¶62.]  While this may appear clumsy, this court 
has in practice refrained from itself taking evidence in that it is not designed 
or equipped to do so. Rule 20, W.R.A.P., provides:

"Whenever a cause over 
which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction is pending therein, the court 
may direct any district judge of the state to conduct a hearing thereon at any 
county seat in the state. The judge conducting said hearing shall make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and shall forward the entire proceedings and 
record properly certified to this court for final determination in the 
cause."

Since this court 
has decided it should fix the fee, there is some resemblance to an original 
proceeding. It must be conceded that the rule probably refers to such original 
proceedings as habeas corpus and prerogative writs requiring evidence for 
disposition, not otherwise available, but Rule 20, W.R.A.P., does disclose a 
policy.

[¶63.]  This court's experience in the past with 
statements of time and charges by counsel has been less than satisfactory. If 
this court requires "documentation," it ought to state with some particularity 
what the term means.

[¶64.]  I would refer the matter to the district 
court as indicated above.