Title: State v. McHone

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 148A91-2
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
STEVEN VAN MCHONE
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b)
to review the 9 December 1996 order of Freeman, J., in Superior
Court, Surry County, denying defendant’s motion for appropriate
relief.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 16 December 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Valérie B.
Spalding, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
Kenneth Rose, Director, Center for Death Penalty
Litigation, and Cindy F. Adcock, Duke University School
of Law, for defendant-appellant.
Paul M. Green on behalf of the North Carolina Academy
of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
On 4 June 1990, defendant was indicted by the Surry
County Grand Jury on two counts of first-degree murder and one
count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury.  After a capital trial held at the
25 February 1991 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Surry
County, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts of first-
degree murder, on the theory of premeditation and deliberation,
and guilty of the assault.  After a capital sentencing proceeding
held pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended the
death penalty for each first-degree murder conviction.  The trial
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court entered judgment sentencing defendant to death for each
murder.  The trial court also entered judgment sentencing
defendant to ten years’ imprisonment for the conviction of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.  Defendant
appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, and on 8 October
1993, this Court found no error in the convictions or sentences. 
State v. McHone, 334 N.C. 627, 435 S.E.2d 296 (1993).  Defendant
subsequently petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which was denied.  McHone v. North Carolina,
511 U.S. 1046, 128 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1994).  It would serve no
useful purpose in determining the issues presented here to
further review the evidence presented at defendant’s original
trial.
On 17 January 1995, defendant filed a motion for
appropriate relief pursuant to chapter 15A, article 89 of the
North Carolina General Statutes.  On 20 January 1995, defendant
filed a motion seeking discovery and for production by the State
of exculpatory information.  The State filed its response in
opposition to defendant’s discovery motion on 14 June 1995.  The
State filed its answer and motion to deny defendant’s motion for
appropriate relief on 10 May 1996.
By an order filed 26 August 1996, the trial court
denied defendant’s motion for appropriate relief without hearing
arguments by defendant or the State and without conducting an
evidentiary hearing.  The trial court made no specific rulings as
to defendant’s motion for discovery.
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On 13 September 1996, defendant filed a motion to
vacate the trial court’s order denying his motion for appropriate
relief.  At the same time, defendant filed a supplemental motion
for appropriate relief pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(g).  A
hearing on defendant’s motion for appropriate relief as
supplemented was held on 9 December 1996.  On that same date, the
trial court issued an order denying defendant’s motion for
appropriate relief and denying defendant’s discovery motion.  We
allowed defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review
that 9 December 1996 order of the trial court.
Defendant first contends that under N.C.G.S. §
15A-1420(c), he was entitled to a hearing on questions of law and
fact arising from the grounds for relief asserted in his
supplemental motion.  He argues that this is so because, in his
motion as supplemented, he alleged specific errors of
constitutional law.  For the following reasons, we conclude that
the mere fact that some of the grounds for relief set forth by
defendant were based upon asserted violations of defendant’s
rights under the Constitution of the United States did not
entitle him to a hearing or to present evidence.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420 provides that “[a]ny party is
entitled to a hearing on questions of law or fact . . . unless
the court determines that the motion is without merit.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1420(c)(1) (1997) (emphasis added).  Subsection (c)(7) of
the statute also provides that if a defendant asserts with
specificity in his motion for appropriate relief that his
conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the
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United States, the defendant is entitled to have the trial court
make conclusions of law and state its reasons before denying the
motion.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(7).  However, we do not read
subsection (c)(7) as an expansion either of defendant’s right to
be heard or his right to present evidence.  Instead, this
provision is merely a directive to the trial court to make
written conclusions of law and to give its legal reasoning for
entering its order, such that its ruling can be subjected to
meaningful appellate review.  Therefore, summary denial without
conclusions and a statement of the trial court’s reasoning is not
proper where the defendant bases his motion upon an asserted
violation of his constitutional rights.
Subsection (c)(7) mandates that “the court must make
and enter conclusions of law and a statement of the reasons for
its determination to the extent required, when taken with other
records and transcripts in the case, to indicate whether the
defendant has had a full and fair hearing on the merits of the
grounds so asserted.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(7).  However, this
subsection of the statute must be read in pari materia with the
other provisions of the same statute.  Therefore, when a motion
for appropriate relief presents only questions of law, including
questions of constitutional law, the trial court must determine
the motion without an evidentiary hearing.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1420(c)(3); State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 166-67, 297 S.E.2d
563, 574 (1982).  Further, if the trial court can determine from
the motion and any supporting or opposing information presented
that the motion is without merit, it may deny the motion without
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any hearing either on questions of fact or questions of law,
including constitutional questions.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(1). 
Therefore, it does not automatically follow that, because 
defendant asserted violations of his rights under the
Constitution of the United States, he was entitled to present
evidence or to a hearing on questions of fact or law.  For
example, when a motion for appropriate relief presents only a
question of constitutional law and it is clear to the trial court
that the defendant is not entitled to prevail, “the motion is
without merit” within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) and may be
dismissed by the trial court without any hearing.  Id.  Likewise,
where facts are in dispute but the trial court can determine that
the defendant is entitled to no relief even upon the facts as
asserted by him, the trial court may determine that the motion
“is without merit” within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) and
deny it without any hearing on questions of law or fact.  Id. 
Defendant’s contention that he was entitled to a hearing and
entitled to present evidence simply because his motion for
appropriate relief was based in part upon asserted denials of his
rights under the Constitution of the United States is without
merit.
However, defendant also contends in the present case
that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the trial
court ruled on his motion for appropriate relief as supplemented
because some of his asserted grounds for relief required the
trial court to resolve questions of fact.  We find this
contention to have merit.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(1) mandates
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that “[t]he court must determine . . . whether an evidentiary
hearing is required to resolve questions of fact.”  If the trial
court “cannot rule upon the motion without the hearing of
evidence, it must conduct a hearing for the taking of evidence,
and must make findings of fact.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(4). 
Under subsection (c)(4), read in pari materia with subsections
(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3), an evidentiary hearing is required
unless the motion presents assertions of fact which will entitle
the defendant to no relief even if resolved in his favor, or the
motion presents only questions of law, or the motion is made
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1414 within ten days after entry of
judgment.
At the 9 December 1996 hearing, defendant contended for
the first time that in August 1996, the State had sent to the
trial court a proposed order denying defendant’s original motion
for appropriate relief without providing defendant with a copy. 
This matter was not raised or referred to in defendant’s original
or supplemental motion for appropriate relief.  During the
9 December 1996 hearing, the State acknowledged that it did send
a proposed order to the trial court and that the trial court
signed the State’s proposed order dismissing defendant’s original
motion for appropriate relief.  Defendant contended at the
9 December hearing that since neither he nor his counsel were
served with a copy of the proposed order, the State had engaged
in an improper ex parte communication with the trial court in
violation of his rights to due process under the state and
federal constitutions.  Thus, during the 9 December 1996 hearing,
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defendant orally moved for the first time to have the August 1996
order denying his original motion for appropriate relief vacated
because of the ex parte contact.  The trial court summarily
denied that motion and entered its 9 December 1996 order denying
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief as supplemented.
In its response to defendant’s petition to this Court
for writ of certiorari, the State submitted an affidavit from a
legal assistant with the district attorney’s office.  In that
affidavit, the legal assistant stated that she had mailed
defendant’s counsel a copy of the State’s proposed order by
certified mail, return receipt requested.  A copy of a receipt
for certified mail was attached to the affidavit, which the State
contends establishes that defendant’s counsel’s office received a
copy of the proposed order on 13 May 1996.
In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is
necessary, the trial court not only considers defendant’s motion
for appropriate relief, but also “any supporting or opposing
information presented.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(1).  When defense
counsel contended at the 9 December 1996 hearing that the State
had submitted a proposed order to the trial court and had not
provided defendant or his counsel with a copy and that this was
an improper ex parte contact concerning the original order
denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief, the trial
court was presented with a question of fact which it was required
to resolve.  When a trial court is unable to “rule upon the
motion without the hearing of evidence,” the trial court “must
conduct a hearing for the taking of evidence, and must make
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findings of fact.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(4).  The defendant has
a right to be present at any such evidentiary hearing and to be
represented by counsel.  Id.  The trial court erred in denying
defendant’s supplemental motion without an evidentiary hearing.
This Court is not the appropriate forum for resolving
issues of fact, even though the State’s affidavit was filed here. 
We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand this
case to that court in order that it may make findings of fact,
inter alia, as to whether defendant or defendant’s counsel was
served with a copy of the original proposed order.   Given this
result, we need not review the remaining assertions in
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief as supplemented.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
failing to permit his motion for discovery and thereby
contravened N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  We have recently explained
the extent to which the State must make discovery in connection
with post-conviction motions for appropriate relief in capital
cases.  State v. Bates, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 1998 WL
151151 (Apr. 3, 1998) (No. 145A91-3).  On remand, the trial court
shall be required to reconsider its ruling on defendant’s
discovery motion in light of our opinion in Bates, an opinion
which was not available to the trial court when it previously
considered this matter.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s
order denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief and
remand this case to that court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED.