Title: State v. Romage

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Romage, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-783.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-783 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. ROMAGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Romage, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-783.] 
Ohio’s child-enticement statute, R.C. 2905.05(A), is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
(Nos. 2012-1958 and 2012-2042—Submitted October 9, 2013—Decided  
March 6, 2014.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 11AP-822, 2012-Ohio-3381. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Ohio’s child-enticement statute, R.C. 2905.05(A), is unconstitutionally overbroad 
because it sweeps within its prohibitions a significant amount of 
constitutionally protected activity. 
____________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case we must determine the constitutionality of R.C. 
2905.05(A), Ohio’s statute that defines the crime of child enticement.  We hold 
that the statute is unconstitutional and affirm the judgment of the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Jason Romage, was charged with criminal child 
enticement, a violation of R.C. 2905.05(A).  On October 18, 2010, a Columbus 
police officer filed a complaint in the Franklin County Municipal Court that 
alleged that Romage, “without privilege to do so, knowingly solicit[ed a] child 
under fourteen years of age * * * to accompany [him], * * * without the express 
or implied permission of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child.”  
The complaint specifically alleged that he had asked a child to carry some boxes 
to his apartment in exchange for money, conduct allegedly constituting a violation 
of R.C. 2905.05(A).  Romage entered a not-guilty plea. 
{¶ 3} Before trial, Romage filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 
attacking the criminal child-enticement statute on grounds that it was overbroad.  
Romage cited decisions of appellate courts in Ohio that had struck down R.C. 
2905.05(A) or substantially similar city ordinances for the same reason.  See State 
v. Chapple, 175 Ohio App.3d 658, 2008-Ohio-1157, 888 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 18 (2d 
Dist.); Cleveland v. Cieslak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92017, 2009-Ohio-4035, ¶ 7-
9, 16.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. 
{¶ 4} The Tenth District Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the 
trial court, holding that R.C. 2905.05(A) is unconstitutional because it “sweeps 
within its prohibitions a significant amount of constitutionally protected activity.”  
10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-822, 2012-Ohio-3381, 974 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 14.  The 
court determined that the statute’s use of the term “solicit” was the problem, since 
“[t]he common meaning of that term encompasses ‘merely asking.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 10. 
January Term, 2014 
3 
{¶ 5} The Tenth District certified that its judgment conflicted with the 
judgment of the First District Court of Appeals in State v. Clark, 1st Dist. 
Hamilton No. C-040329, 2005-Ohio-1324.  We agreed that a conflict exists on the 
issue whether R.C. 2905.05(A) is unconstitutionally overbroad.  134 Ohio St.3d 
1465, 2013-Ohio-553, 983 N.E.2d 336.  We also accepted the state’s discretionary 
appeal.  134 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2013-Ohio-553, 983 N.E.2d 367. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 6} The state, as appellant, argues that the court of appeals erred in its 
judgment because R.C. 2905.05(A) may be interpreted as being constitutional by 
applying a narrow definition of the word “solicit” or by severing that word from 
the statute.  Romage maintains that even without the word “solicit,” R.C. 
2905.05(A) sweeps within its prohibitions a significant amount of innocent 
activity protected by the First Amendment.  He argues that the statute would 
require rewriting to be to be made constitutional, which this court cannot do. 
Burden of proof in a facial challenge 
{¶ 7} We acknowledge at the outset that enactments of the General 
Assembly enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.  State ex rel. Jackman 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 161, 224 N.E.2d 
906 (1967).  Thus, a statute will be upheld unless proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt to be unconstitutional.  State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 43, 564 N.E.2d 
18 (1990), citing State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 
N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Facial challenges present a 
higher hurdle than as-applied challenges, because, in general, for a statute to be 
facially unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all applications.  Oliver v. 
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-
Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 8} An exception to the  general rule of presumed constitutionality is 
recognized for laws so broadly written that they “may have such a deterrent effect 
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on free expression that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose 
own conduct may be unprotected.”  Members of Los Angeles City Council v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 
(1984).  This exception is known as the overbreadth doctrine.  For a statute to be 
facially invalid on overbreadth grounds, “there must be a realistic danger that the 
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment 
protections of parties not before the Court.”  Id. at 801. 
 
“A clear and precise enactment may * * * be ‘overbroad’ if 
in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.”  
[Grayned v. Rockford], 408 U.S. [104,] 114, 92 S.Ct. [2294,] 33 
L.Ed.2d [222].  In considering an overbreadth challenge, the court 
must decide “whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions 
what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”  Id., 408 U.S. at 115, 92 S.Ct. at 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 
at 231. 
 
Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 387, 618 N.E.2d 138 (1993).  A statute will 
be invalidated as overbroad only when its overbreadth has been shown by the 
defendant to be substantial.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 
3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982).  We recognize that in construing legislative 
enactments, courts are bound to interpret them in such a way that they are 
constitutional, if it is reasonably possible to do so.  State ex rel. Dickman; State ex 
rel. Jackman. 
 
 
January Term, 2014 
5 
The purpose and effect of the criminal child-enticement statute 
{¶ 9} The statute at issue in this case, R.C. 2905.05(A), provides1: 
 
No person, by any means and without privilege to do so, 
shall knowingly solicit, coax, entice, or lure any child under 
fourteen years of age to accompany the person in any manner, 
including entering into any vehicle or onto any vessel, whether or 
not the offender knows the age of the child, if both of the following 
apply: 
(1) The actor does not have express or implied permission 
of the parent, guardian, or other legal custodian of the child in 
undertaking the activity. 
(2) The actor is not a law enforcement officer, medic, 
firefighter, or other person who regularly provides emergency 
services, and is not an employee or agent of, or a volunteer acting 
under the direction of, any board of education, or the actor is any 
of such persons, but, at the time the actor undertakes the activity, 
the actor is not acting within the scope of the actor’s lawful duties 
in that capacity. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 10} In other words, anyone other than the legal custodian of a child, 
those listed in subsection (A)(2), or those who have the legal custodian’s express 
permission who asks a child under 14 to go with him or her risks a criminal 
charge.  Undoubtedly, R.C. 2905.05(A) has an admirable purpose, which is “to 
                                          
 
1 R.C. 2905.05 was amended effective July 11, 2013.  2013 Sub.S.B. No. 64.  The amended statute 
adds subsection (C), which provides: “No person, for any unlawful purpose other than, or in 
addition to, that proscribed by division (A) of this section, shall engage in any activity described in 
division (A) of this section.”  The language in R.C. 2905.05(A) remains unchanged.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prevent child abductions or the commission of lewd acts with children.”  Chapple, 
175 Ohio App.3d 658, 2008-Ohio-1157, 888 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 17.  We have held 
that “protection of members of the public from sexual predators and habitual sex 
offenders is a paramount governmental interest.”  State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 
404, 406, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998).  Certainly, the safety and general welfare of 
children is even more deserving of governmental protection.  But a statute that 
defines criminal conduct should not include what is constitutionally protected 
activity.  Even though the state has a legitimate and compelling interest in 
protecting children from abduction and lewd acts, a statute intended to promote 
legitimate goals that can be regularly and improperly applied to prohibit protected 
expression and activity is unconstitutionally overbroad.  Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987).  R.C. 2905.05(A) is such a statute.  
Although the statute uses the word “knowingly,” the word modifies “solicit.”  The 
statute fails to require that the prohibited solicitation, coaxing, enticing, or luring 
occur with the intent to commit any unlawful act. 
{¶ 11} Romage argues that this statute criminalizes many innocent acts, 
and in so arguing, he specifically points to the statute’s use of the word “solicit.”  
“The common, ordinary meaning of the word ‘solicit’ encompasses ‘merely 
asking.’ ”  State v. Carle, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0008, 2007-Ohio-
5376, at ¶ 17, citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1427 (8th Ed.2004).  R.C. 
2905.05(A) fails to require that the prohibited solicitation occur with the intent to 
commit any unlawful act, and there is no requirement that the offender be 
aggressive toward the victim.  With respect to those who are not specifically 
exempted (i.e., legal custodians, those with permission from a legal custodian, and 
those listed under R.C. 2905.05(A)(2)), the statute prohibits anyone from asking 
any child to accompany the person in any manner and for any reason.  The 
statute’s broad language can support criminal charges against a person in many 
innocent scenarios. 
January Term, 2014 
7 
{¶ 12} Under the statute, each of the following scenarios could result in a 
criminal charge:  a primary-school coach offering to drive a team member home 
to retrieve a forgotten piece of practice equipment; a parent at a community 
facility offering to drive another’s child home so she does not have to walk; a 
senior citizen offering a 13-year-old neighborhood child money to help with 
household chores; a 14-year-old asking his 12-year-old friend to go for a bike 
ride. 
The state’s two proposals  
{¶ 13} The state argues that R.C. 2905.05(A) is not overbroad, because 
the term “solicit” should be narrowly construed since the other verbs used—
“entice,” “coax,” “lure”—all imply the use of artifice, deceit, and/or promises to 
induce compliance.  The state asserts that in the context of R.C. 2905.05(A), the 
meaning of “solicit” should be narrowed by employing the canon of construction 
noscitur a sociis (a word gains meaning by the company it keeps).  This canon 
counsels that a word is given a more precise meaning by the neighboring words 
with which it is associated.  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294, 128 
S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008); Ashland Chem. Co. v. Jones, 92 Ohio St.3d 
234, 236-237, 749 N.E.2d 744 (2001).  The state asks us to employ one of two 
strategies to save the statute: define the term “solicit” to mean something more 
than just asking or sever the term from the statute.  Neither proposed solution 
would be effective. 
{¶ 14} Even if we were to employ a more narrow definition of “solicit,” 
R.C. 2905.05(A) would still criminalize a substantial amount of activity protected 
by the First Amendment.  The statute forbids anyone other than the legal 
custodian of a child, those listed in R.C. 2905.05(A)(2), or those who have the 
legal custodian’s express permission to solicit a child under the age of 14 to 
accompany the person “in any manner” for any purpose.  The motivation for the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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solicitation is irrelevant.2  There is no requirement that the offender be aggressive 
toward the victim.  One need not have intent to commit a crime.  Short of 
rewriting R.C. 2905.05(A), which is the province of the legislature rather than the 
court, we cannot construe the statute in such a way as to find it constitutional. 
The possibility of severance 
{¶ 15} As an alternative to narrowly construing the word “solicit,” the 
state argues that the court could sever the word from the statute and thereby save 
the statute from being overbroad.  The severance test was first pronounced by this 
court in Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927).  Three 
questions are to be answered in determining whether severance is appropriate: 
“ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation 
so that each may be read and may stand by itself?  (2) Is the unconstitutional part 
so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give 
effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken 
out?  (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the 
constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former 
only?’ ” Id., quoting  State v. Bickford, 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407 (1913), 
paragraph nineteen of the syllabus.  Severance is appropriate only when the 
answer to the first question is yes and the answers to the second and third 
questions are no.  After examining R.C. 2905.05(A), we determine that severance 
of the word “solicit” would not meet the Geiger test. 
{¶ 16} Even if the word “solicit” were severed, the remaining language—
that no person may “coax, entice, or lure any child * * * in any manner”—still 
encompasses a wide range of innocent and protected conduct.  An elderly person 
offering a child under 14 years old money to come with her to help with chores is 
                                          
 
2 A person indicted under R.C. 2905.05 has an affirmative defense if he or she “undertook the 
activity in response to a bona fide emergency situation” or “undertook the activity in a reasonable 
belief that it was necessary to preserve the health, safety, or welfare of the child.”  R.C. 
2905.05(D).  Nevertheless, one may be indicted when motivation is innocent. 
January Term, 2014 
9 
more than merely asking, and this activity would arguably constitute coaxing, 
enticing, or luring.  See Chapple, 175 Ohio App.3d 658, 2008-Ohio-1157, 888 
N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 17.  In other words, severance of the single word does not 
transform the statute into a constitutional one.  The statute would still capture a 
substantial amount of protected conduct because without a criminal-intent 
requirement, it is still not narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s interest in 
protecting children. 
{¶ 17} The First District’s judgment that was certified as being in conflict 
with the judgment in this case held that R.C. 2905.05(A) is constitutional and not 
overbroad.  State v. Clark, 2005-Ohio-1324.  Clark, however, is unpersuasive and 
can be distinguished.  The Clark court summarily addresses the constitutional 
issue and cites two First District cases from the 1980s that involved an older 
version of the statute.  Id. at ¶ 8, citing State v. Long, 49 Ohio App.3d 1, 2, 550 
N.E.2d 522 (1st Dist.1989); and State v. Kroner, 49 Ohio App.3d 133, 134-135, 
551 N.E.2d 212 (1st Dist.1988).  At the time that Kroner and Long were decided, 
R.C. 2905.05(A) prohibited knowingly soliciting, coaxing, enticing, or luring any 
child under the age of 14 “to enter into any vehicle.”  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 321, 140 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 1192, 1211.  When the statute was amended in 2001, however, 
the prohibition was broadened to prohibit a person from soliciting any child under 
14 to “accompany the person in any manner, including entering into any vehicle.”  
S.B. No. 312, 148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11668.  The Clark court failed to recognize 
that R.C. 2905.05(A) was no longer limited to solicitations to enter vehicles and 
that  Kroner and Long therefore provided little persuasive value in determining 
the constitutionality of the statute.  In considering only cases that addressed an 
older version of the statute, the Clark court did not analyze the effect of the 
statutory amendments that encompassed innocent conduct when it held R.C. 
2905.05(A) to be constitutional. 
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{¶ 18} Appellate courts other than the First District have addressed the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2905.05(A) and held that the statute criminalizes 
constitutionally protected activity.  See State v. Goode, 9th Dist. Summit No. 
26320, 2013-Ohio-556, 989 N.E.2d 107, ¶ 8, 12; State v. Chapple, 175 Ohio 
App.3d 658, 2008-Ohio-1157, 888 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 16-18; Cleveland v. Cieslak, 
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92017, 2009-Ohio-4035, ¶ 14-16 (analyzing a 
comparable municipal ordinance by quoting Chapple).  These courts have also 
held that by reaching a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech 
and associations, the statute goes far beyond its intended purpose of protecting 
children.  Goode at ¶ 8, 12; Chapple at ¶ 16-18.  We agree.  Ohio’s child-
enticement statute, R.C. 2905.05(A), is unconstitutionally overbroad because it 
sweeps within its prohibitions a significant amount of constitutionally protected 
activity. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 19} R.C. 2905.05(A) does not survive constitutional scrutiny due to its 
overbreadth.  We therefore answer yes to the certified question, and we affirm the 
judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., dissent. 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} In my view, this court can, and should, avoid declaring R.C. 
2905.05(A) unconstitutionally overbroad by construing the term “solicit” 
narrowly.  Reading the statute narrowly, I conclude that it is constitutional.  
Therefore, I dissent. 
{¶ 21} Under its broadest reading, R.C. 2905.05(A) applies to certain 
persons who “knowingly” seek the unauthorized “accompan[iment]” of another’s 
January Term, 2014 
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young child (age 13 or younger) by conduct or words that “solicit, coax, entice, or 
lure.”  To be guilty of criminal child enticement, the actor must lack legal 
“privilege,” R.C. 2905.05(A), meaning “an immunity, license, or right conferred 
by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, 
office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity,” R.C. 2901.01(A)(12).  The 
actor must also act without the “express or implied permission” of a parent, 
guardian or other legal custodian, R.C. 2905.05(A)(1), and must not fall within 
any of five express categories of actors excluded from liability if they are acting 
within the scope of their duties: (1) law-enforcement officers, (2) medics, (3) 
firefighters, (4) emergency-service providers, or (5) any employee, agent, or 
volunteer of any board of education.  Finally, even if the actor falls outside all of 
the foregoing categories, the actor has an affirmative defense if he or she acted “in 
response to a bona fide emergency situation” or “in a reasonable belief that it was 
necessary to preserve the health, safety, or welfare of the child.”  R.C. 
2905.05(D). 
{¶ 22} To strike down R.C. 2905.05(A) as facially overbroad in violation 
of the First Amendment, the majority had to find that the statute punishes “a 
‘substantial’ amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.’ ”  Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-119, 123 S.Ct. 
2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003), quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).  In other words, the act of attempting 
to obtain the unauthorized accompaniment of another’s young child must fall 
under a “recognized First Amendment protection[ ].”  Members of Los Angeles 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 
L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). 
{¶ 23} The majority is silent as to why the speech subject to R.C. 
2905.05(A) qualifies as protected expression, much less how the statute punishes 
a substantial amount of protected expression.  But even if I were to accept the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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majority’s premise that there is a First Amendment right to attempt to obtain the 
unauthorized accompaniment of another’s young child for “innocent” purposes, 
this court can avoid a finding of overbreadth by applying a narrower interpretation 
of “solicit.”  The majority reads “solicit” out of context and uses the broadest 
definition it can find—“merely asking”—which it borrows from an appellate 
decision.  By its use of a sweeping, out-of-context definition, the majority ignores 
the principle that courts should refrain from striking down a statute on First 
Amendment grounds whenever “a limiting construction has been or could be 
placed on the challenged statute.”  Broadrick at 613.  When reading the word 
“solicit” with its neighboring operative verbs—“coax, entice, or lure”—one can 
reasonably find a more sinister connotation.  Solicit can mean to “lead astray” or 
“lure on and esp. into evil.”  (Emphasis added.)  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 2169 (1986).  Applying this narrower construction, I 
cannot conclude that R.C. 2905.05(A) criminalizes a substantial amount of 
activity protected by the First Amendment. 
{¶ 24} In conclusion, I would answer the certified-conflict question in the 
negative and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  Because the majority 
has concluded otherwise, I dissent. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., Columbus City Attorney, and Lara N. Baker-
Moorish, City Prosecuting Attorney, and Melanie R. Tobias, Director of Criminal 
Appeals Unit, for appellant. 
Riddell Law, L.L.C., Douglas E. Riddell Jr., and Bridget Purdue Riddell, 
for appellee. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Steven L. Taylor, 
Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, and Laura R. Swisher, Assistant Prosecuting 
January Term, 2014 
13 
Attorney, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys 
Association and Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney Ron O’Brien. 
Peter Galyardt, Assistant State Public Defender, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender. 
__________________________