Title: State ex rel. Frailey v. Wolfe

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Frailey v. Wolfe, 92 Ohio St.3d 320, 2001-Ohio-197.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. FRAILEY, APPELLANT, v. WOLFE, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Frailey v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 320.] 
Mandamus and prohibition sought to compel common pleas court judge to 
comply with court of appeals’ mandate in a divorce action — Costs of 
writ action sought by relator after compliance by court — Dismissal of 
cause as moot and denial of request for award of costs by court of 
appeals affirmed, when. 
(No. 00-2329 — Submitted April 24, 2001 — Decided July 18, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 00CA63. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In November 1999, appellant, Jonathan E. Frailey, and his 
wife executed a settlement memorandum concerning their divorce case in the 
Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division.  Appellee, 
Judge William A. Wolfe, approved this memorandum.  Subsequently, Judge 
Wolfe approved an agreed judgment entry—decree of divorce, shared parenting 
decree, and shared parenting plan—that had been prepared by the attorney for 
Frailey’s wife. 
 
On June 1, 2000, the Court of Appeals for Licking County found that the 
judgment of the trial court did not accurately reflect the parties’ settlement 
memorandum, vacated the judgment, and remanded the matter to the trial court 
“to reenter final judgment in accordance with the parties’ Settlement 
Memorandum.”  Frailey v. Frailey (June 1, 2000), Licking App. No. 00CA24, 
unreported, 2000 WL 873654. 
 
In August 2000, Frailey filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ 
of mandamus to compel Judge Wolfe to comply with that court’s June 1, 2000 
judgment and a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Wolfe from entering a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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judgment inconsistent with the June 1, 2000 order.  On September 18, 2000, 
Judge Wolfe entered a judgment in the divorce case in accordance with the court 
of appeals’ June 1, 2000 mandate.  In a November memorandum, Frailey agreed 
that Judge Wolfe complied with the mandate of the court of appeals but asserted 
that Judge Wolfe should still pay for Frailey’s costs in his writ action. 
 
In November 2000, the court of appeals dismissed the cause as moot.  The 
court of appeals also denied Frailey’s request for an award of costs. 
 
In his appeal of right, Frailey contends that the court of appeals erred in 
dismissing the cause as moot and in not awarding costs to him.  Frailey’s 
contentions lack merit. 
 
“Writs of mandamus and prohibition are appropriate to require lower 
courts to comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a superior 
court.”  Berthelot v. Dezso (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 257, 259, 714 N.E.2d 888, 890.  
But, as Frailey conceded in the proceedings below, Judge Wolfe subsequently 
complied with the mandate of the court of appeals, thereby rendering Frailey’s 
action moot.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Fuerst (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 456, 
457, 732 N.E.2d 983, 984 (“[M]andamus will not issue to compel an act that has 
already been performed.”) 
 
Moreover, Civ.R. 54(D), which states that, in general, “costs shall be 
allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs,” grants trial 
courts discretion to order prevailing parties to bear all or part of their own costs.  
State ex rel. Reyna v. Natalucci-Persichetti (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 194, 198, 699 
N.E.2d 76, 79.  No abuse of that discretion is evident here. 
 
In fact, the analogous Federal Rule of Civil Procedure confers similar 
discretionary authority on federal trial courts.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) (“costs other 
than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs”); see, also, 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice 
and Procedure (1998) 221, Section 2667, construing the federal rule (“[I]n suits 
January Term, 2001 
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seeking injunctive relief, if the defendant alters its conduct so that plaintiff’s 
claim becomes moot before judgment is reached, costs may be allowed if the 
court finds that the changes were the result, at least in part, of plaintiff’s 
litigation.”  [Emphasis added.]). 
 
In other words, the court of appeals, which issued the remand order that 
Frailey sought to enforce, was in the best position to determine whether Frailey’s 
writ action prompted Judge Wolfe to comply with the court’s mandate.  See 
Berthelot, 86 Ohio St.3d at 259, 714 N.E.2d at 890 (“Certainly, the court of 
appeals was in the best position to determine if Judge Dezso had violated its 
remand order.”) 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Frailey, pro se. 
 
Robert L. Becker, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brent W. 
Shenk, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
__________________