Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sullivan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sullivan, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-124.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-124 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. SULLIVAN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sullivan, Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-124.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation—Two-year suspension, with the second year stayed on 
conditions. 
(No. 2018-1765—Submitted May 8, 2019—Decided January 21, 2020.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct 
of the Supreme Court, No. 2018-007. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Anthony William Sullivan, of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0062416, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1993. 
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{¶ 2} In a four-count complaint certified to the Board of Professional 
Conduct on February 1, 2018, relator, Dayton Bar Association, charged Sullivan 
with multiple professional-conduct violations arising out of his representation of 
four separate clients.  The complaint alleged that Sullivan (1) failed to act diligently 
and promptly in representing three of those clients, (2) neglected to inform three of 
those clients that he did not carry professional-liability insurance, (3) engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation with three of 
those clients, and (4) refused to cooperate with relator’s disciplinary investigation 
into the grievances filed by all four clients. 
{¶ 3} A hearing was held before a panel of the board on September 21, 
2018.  Sullivan and two grievants testified, and the parties agreed to the admission 
of 34 exhibits.  Although Sullivan did not cooperate with relator during the 
investigation of the four grievances, he admitted to every allegation, with some 
qualifications and explanations, in either his answer to the complaint or his 
testimony before the panel. 
{¶ 4} Following the hearing, the panel requested that Sullivan and relator 
submit a stipulation as to whether Sullivan owed a refund to one of his former 
clients who had filed one of the grievances, and if so, the amount of that refund.  
The parties subsequently agreed that Sullivan owed that former client $1,000.  
Thereafter, the panel issued a report finding that Sullivan had committed all but two 
of the instances of misconduct that had been alleged and recommending that he be 
suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the second year of the 
suspension stayed on conditions.  The board adopted the panel’s findings and 
recommended sanction. 
{¶ 5} No objections have been filed.  Having reviewed the record, we adopt 
the board’s findings of misconduct and agree that a two-year suspension, with one 
year conditionally stayed, is the appropriate sanction. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
Misconduct 
Count One—the Horwath Matter 
{¶ 6} In 2013, Sullivan represented Tamala Horwath in a landlord-tenant 
dispute.  Sullivan filed a successful eviction action against Horwath’s tenant and 
obtained a judgment requiring the tenant to pay Horwath $5,259.66 in past due rent 
and late fees.  Thereafter, Horwath engaged Sullivan to collect the $5,259.66.  On 
November 18, 2014, Horwath provided Sullivan the debtor’s place of employment 
for purposes of commencing a garnishment action and on January 18, 2015, 
Horwath paid Sullivan the $125 filing fee for that action. 
{¶ 7} Horwath contacted Sullivan’s office and left a number of messages 
for him over the next year regarding the status of the collection action.  On a few 
occasions, Horwath spoke to Sullivan’s assistant, who, according to Horwath, 
would give “vague information” about the collection action.  When Horwath finally 
spoke with Sullivan after nearly a year of trying, Sullivan falsely told her the 
collection paperwork had been filed. 
{¶ 8} Horwath filed a grievance with relator against Sullivan in December 
2015.  Relator sent Sullivan two letters by certified mail requesting that Sullivan 
schedule an interview and that he produce certain documents, including his fee 
agreement with Horwath, her client file, and proof that Sullivan carried 
professional-liability insurance for the time period during which he represented 
Horwath.  Sullivan failed to respond to relator’s requests. 
{¶ 9} During the hearing, Sullivan testified that his professional-liability 
insurance had expired on June 20, 2014, and that he had failed to obtain a signed 
acknowledgement from Horwath notifying her of that fact.  Additionally, by the 
date of the hearing, despite Sullivan’s failure to file the collection action, he had 
not refunded Horwath’s filing fee. 
{¶ 10} Based on the evidence and Sullivan’s admissions, the board found 
that Sullivan had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 
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reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform 
a client if the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance and to obtain 
a signed acknowledgement of that notice from the client), 8.1(b) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a 
disciplinary authority during an investigation), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation). 
Count Two—the Kolaczkowski Matter 
{¶ 11} Jeffrey Kolaczkowski retained Sullivan in April 2011 to represent 
him in his divorce.  In the summer of 2013, after obtaining a divorce decree, 
Kolaczkowski consulted with Sullivan about modifying the divorce decree as it 
pertained to his child-support obligations.  Kolaczkowski met with Sullivan on two 
occasions to complete the necessary financial forms for the modification request, 
but Sullivan never filed the motion. 
{¶ 12} In August 2013, Kolaczkowski’s ex-wife filed a motion asking 
Kolaczkowski to show cause as to why he had failed to meet his child-support 
obligations.  The matter was eventually assigned a hearing date of August 11, 2014. 
{¶ 13} Sullivan failed to inform Kolaczkowski of the hearing.  
Kolaczkowski, however, discovered the hearing notice in July 2014 while 
conducting a search of the trial court’s online docket.  He notified Sullivan that he 
could not attend the hearing due to a preplanned vacation.  Sullivan assured 
Kolaczkowski that a continuance would be requested and that Kolaczkowski should 
not worry about attending the hearing.  With that assurance, Kolaczkowski went on 
vacation.  On July 30, 2014, when Kolaczkowski asked for a case update, Sullivan 
falsely told Kolaczkowski that he had filed the motion requesting a continuance but 
that he had not yet heard back from the court.  At that point, Kolaczkowski could 
have returned from vacation for the August 11 hearing if necessary.  Sullivan once 
again told him not to worry about attending the hearing.  Sullivan finally filed the 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
motion five days before the hearing, but the trial court denied the request the next 
day.  Sullivan did not tell Kolaczkowski about the court’s decision and 
consequently, Kolaczkowski failed to appear.  The hearing proceeded in 
Kolaczkowski’s absence, and the trial court later found Kolaczkowski in contempt, 
issued a warrant for his arrest, and ordered him to pay his ex-wife’s attorney fees. 
{¶ 14} When Kolaczkowski discovered that the hearing had not been 
continued, he confronted Sullivan and demanded an explanation.  Sullivan blamed 
his staff for neglecting to inform Kolaczkowski that the hearing would proceed to 
take place as scheduled. 
{¶ 15} Kolaczkowski filed a grievance against Sullivan in late October 
2015.  Relator sent Sullivan a certified letter on December 29, 2015, requesting that 
Sullivan schedule an interview and that he produce certain documents concerning 
his representation of Kolaczkowski, including proof of professional-liability 
insurance.  After Sullivan failed to respond, relator called him on January 29, 2016.  
Sullivan explained he was recovering from surgery, and relator granted him an 
extension for his response.  But Sullivan did not respond by the extended deadline.  
Relator subsequently contacted Sullivan five days after the deadline, and Sullivan 
again promised to send the requested information.  But once again, Sullivan failed 
to do so. 
{¶ 16} In March, when Sullivan finally attempted to comply with relator’s 
requests, Sullivan provided relator with an incomplete client file and an insurance-
declaration page showing a policy that had expired on June 20, 2014.  At his 
hearing, Sullivan testified that he never informed Kolaczkowski that his 
professional-liability insurance had terminated on June 20, 2014. 
{¶ 17} Against this backdrop, Sullivan admitted, and the board found, 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(c), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c). 
 
 
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6
Count Three—the Topps Matter 
{¶ 18} Sullivan represented Lisa Topps in a criminal case in January 2015.  
Topps, who was convicted of three felonies, filed a grievance alleging that Sullivan 
had failed to properly defend her against the charges that she faced. 
{¶ 19} During the investigation, Sullivan failed to respond to relator’s 
initial request for certain documents regarding Sullivan’s representation of Topps 
and the dates and times of Sullivan’s availability so that an interview could be 
scheduled.  Relator sent a second request and Sullivan submitted what he 
represented to be Topps’s entire client file.  Sullivan, however, failed to provide 
dates or times when he could be interviewed.  Relator contacted Sullivan a third 
time to set up an interview.  Sullivan responded via e-mail, stating that he would 
set up an interview soon.  Sullivan, however, did not contact relator to set up the 
promised interview.  Relator sent another e-mail imposing a two-week deadline for 
Sullivan to schedule an interview.  Sullivan never responded to this e-mail. 
{¶ 20} Relator ultimately determined that there was insufficient cause to 
proceed on Topps’s grievance.  However, because Sullivan failed to fully cooperate 
with the investigation, relator charged him with a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b). 
{¶ 21} Sullivan admitted to the charged violation during the hearing and the 
board found sufficient evidence that Sullivan had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b). 
Count Four—the Nason Matter 
{¶ 22} Andrew Nason paid Sullivan a $2,000 retainer in April 2016 to 
defend him against three felony charges.  Nason had been jailed since December 
2015 and was being held on a $250,000 bond.  Nason’s former counsel had filed 
two separate motions to suppress, which were still pending when Sullivan was 
hired.  The trial court denied the motions to suppress in August 2016 and scheduled 
Nason’s case for trial.  Nason, however, discharged Sullivan prior to trial. 
{¶ 23} Nason filed a grievance against Sullivan in July 2016.  Nason alleged 
that Sullivan did nothing to resolve his case, refused to respond to requests for 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
information from Nason and his family members, and visited him in prison only 
twice during the eight-month period of time in which Sullivan represented Nason.  
Nason also testified that Sullivan indicated that he would be able to get Nason’s 
$250,000 bond reduced.  According to Nason, Sullivan said that he had filed a 
motion with the court requesting a reduction of Nason’s bond.  But no such motion 
was ever filed. 
{¶ 24} During the investigation into Nason’s grievance, relator sent 
Sullivan a certified letter requesting that Sullivan provide relator with possible dates 
and times for an interview and with certain documents pertaining to his 
representation of Nason, including proof of professional-liability insurance.  
Relator requested a response by October 26, 2016.  Sullivan, however, failed to 
respond in any fashion. 
{¶ 25} The complaint in this count charged Sullivan with violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(c), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c), as well as violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status 
of the matter) and 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable 
with a client’s reasonable requests for information).  During his disciplinary 
hearing, with some clarifications, Sullivan admitted that he had committed each of 
the charged violations. 
{¶ 26} Despite Sullivan’s admissions, the panel found insufficient evidence 
establishing that Sullivan had failed to keep Nason reasonably informed or that 
Sullivan had neglected to promptly respond to reasonable requests for information.  
Therefore, the panel unanimously dismissed the alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.4(a)(3) and (4). 
{¶ 27} The panel found and the board agreed that Sullivan’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(c), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
Sanction 
{¶ 28} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the relevant aggravating and 
mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar 
cases. 
Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 29} The board found the following aggravating factors: (1) a dishonest 
or selfish motive, (2) a pattern of misconduct, (3) multiple offenses, (4) a failure to 
cooperate in the disciplinary process prior to the filing of the complaint, and (5) a 
failure to make restitution.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (3), (4), (5), and (9). 
{¶ 30} In mitigation, the board found that Sullivan had no prior disciplinary 
record and that he cooperated with the disciplinary process after relator had filed 
the complaint.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (4). 
Recommended sanction 
{¶ 31} The parties stipulated to a two-year suspension from the practice of 
law, with the second year stayed on the conditions that Sullivan submit to an 
evaluation with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and that he 
comply with any recommendations resulting from the evaluation.  Although 
Sullivan denied having any disorder that may have contributed to his misconduct, 
the board was concerned that Sullivan had three close family members pass away 
within several months of each other.  These series of events, coupled with 
Sullivan’s lack of explanation for his pattern of neglect, which continued even after 
the hearing, led the board to agree that an OLAP assessment was appropriate. 
{¶ 32} The board also determined that an actual suspension from the 
practice of law is necessary to protect the public.  Accordingly, the board 
recommends that Sullivan be suspended for two years, with the second year of the 
suspension stayed on the conditions that he (1) engage in no further misconduct, 
(2) provide proof within 30 days of this court’s decision that he has made restitution 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
of $125 to Horwath and $1,000 to Nason, (3) schedule an OLAP assessment within 
30 days of this court’s decision and comply with any recommendations resulting 
from the assessment, (4) in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, complete 
12 hours of continuing-legal education (“CLE”) in law-office management and 
practice as a sole practitioner, (5) pay the costs of these proceedings, and (6) upon 
reinstatement, serve one year of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar 
R. V(21). 
{¶ 33} In support of this recommendation, the board cites three cases as 
comparable to Sullivan’s case, Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gresley, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 430, 2010-Ohio-6208, 940 N.E.2d 945, Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stewart, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 316, 2013-Ohio-795, 986 N.E.2d 947, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Guinn, 
150 Ohio St.3d 92, 2016-Ohio-3351, 79 N.E.3d 512. 
{¶ 34} In Gresley, we suspended the respondent for two years, with six 
months of the suspension stayed on conditions, for conduct that included accepting 
fees from several clients and then failing to perform agreed upon legal work and 
failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation of that conduct.  The 
aggravating factors included acting with a selfish motive, engaging in a pattern of 
misconduct, causing harm to vulnerable clients, and failing to cooperate during the 
initial part of the investigation.  Mitigating factors included having a clean 
disciplinary record, cooperating in the disciplinary proceeding once the complaint 
was filed, and having other sanctions imposed that were outside the disciplinary 
process. 
{¶ 35} In Stewart, we suspended the respondent for two years, with the 
second year of the suspension stayed on conditions, for conduct that included 
accepting retainers from multiple clients and then failing to perform the agreed 
upon legal work, failing to inform clients about a lack of professional-liability 
insurance, and refusing to cooperate in the disciplinary process.  Aggravating 
factors in Stewart included engaging in a pattern of misconduct, committing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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multiple offenses, failing to cooperate in the disciplinary process, and failing to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct.  Mitigating factors included 
having no prior discipline and lacking a selfish or dishonest motive. 
{¶ 36} And in Guinn, we imposed a two-year suspension, fully stayed on 
conditions, for the respondent’s misconduct, which included neglecting two client 
matters, misrepresenting the status of a client’s case, and failing to inform clients 
about a lack of professional-liability insurance.  Only one aggravating factor was 
present—i.e., engaging in a pattern of misconduct.  Mitigating factors included 
having no prior discipline, lacking a selfish motive, making full and free disclosures 
to the board, and having a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings. 
Disposition 
{¶ 37} We agree with the board that Sullivan’s misconduct is comparable 
to the misconduct in the cited cases, particularly to the misconduct in Stewart.  
Similar to Stewart, Sullivan neglected several client matters, failed to inform clients 
that he lacked professional-liability insurance, and refused to cooperate in the 
ensuing disciplinary investigation until the complaint had been filed.  Likewise, the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating factors here is analogous to those in Stewart. 
{¶ 38} “We are ever mindful that the primary purpose of the disciplinary 
process is not to punish the offender but to protect the public from lawyers who are 
unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship.”  
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kiesling, 125 Ohio St.3d 36, 2010-Ohio-1555, 925 N.E.2d 
970, ¶ 44, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-
6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10.  Sullivan engaged in significant misconduct yet was 
unable to explain his actions to the panel.  Therefore, we agree with the board that 
an actual suspension is warranted here to protect the public.  In light of Sullivan’s 
eventual cooperation in the disciplinary process, the absence of prior discipline, his 
agreement to undergo an OLAP assessment, and the condition that he serve a one-
year period of monitored probation, we agree that a two-year suspension, with the 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
second year stayed on conditions, is supported by the record and is reasonable and 
appropriate in this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} Accordingly, we suspend Sullivan from the practice of law for two 
years, with the second year of the suspension stayed on the conditions that he (1) 
make restitution of $125 to Horwath and $1,000 to Nason within 30 days of this 
court’s disciplinary order, (2) schedule an assessment with OLAP within 30 days 
of this court’s disciplinary order and comply with any recommendations resulting 
from that assessment, (3) in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, complete 
12 hours of CLE in law-office management and practice as a sole practitioner, (4) 
refrain from further misconduct, and (5) complete a one-year period of monitored 
probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21) upon his reinstatement to the 
practice of law.  If Sullivan fails to comply with any of these conditions, the stay 
will be lifted and he will serve the entire two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to 
Sullivan. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 40} I join the majority opinion in this case.  I write separately, however, 
to respectfully disagree with the viewpoint proposed in the opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, which concludes that the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar require this court to impose specific conditions on any term 
of monitored probation in an attorney-discipline case.  Neither the Supreme Court 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Rules for the Government of the Bar nor decades of this court’s case law addressing 
attorney discipline supports such a requirement. 
{¶ 41} This court has the sole duty to oversee the practice of law in this state 
under Article IV, Sections 2(B)(1)(g) and 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution.  As the 
final arbiter of attorney discipline, this court determines the appropriate disciplinary 
sanction, if any, which may include a period of monitored probation.  See Gov.Bar 
R. V(12)(A). 
{¶ 42} If we decide to order an attorney to serve a period of monitored 
probation, we are by no means required, as the opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part contends, to attach specific conditions to the term of that 
probation.  This court, under Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(4), may order an attorney to 
serve a period of probation with those conditions we deem appropriate.  Similarly, 
Gov.Bar R. V(12)(I) allows a disciplinary-hearing panel to recommend a period of 
probation and requires the panel to “include in its report any conditions of 
probation.”  (Emphasis added.)  The term “any” can mean “one, some, or all 
indiscriminately of whatever quantity” or “unmeasured or unlimited in amount, 
quantity, number, * * * or extent.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
97 (2002).  And furthermore, Gov.Bar R. V(21) provides various general 
requirements for the term of monitored probation.  As I have said before, the 
language of these rules indicates that this court may impose a term of probation 
without conditions.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 
2019-Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d____, ¶ 33-36 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
{¶ 43} Consistent with this court’s unfettered constitutional authority over 
the practice of law, the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar were 
written to allow this court discretion in attorney-discipline cases.  This discretion 
does not require this court to mandate specific conditions of monitored probation 
in those cases in which we decide to impose such a term. 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
{¶ 44} This court, in keeping with the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar, has ordered various types of monitored probation for 
disciplined attorneys, ranging from general terms of monitored probation to very 
specific terms of monitored probation. 
{¶ 45} In numerous cases decided in this past decade, this court has ordered 
a general term of monitored probation without specific conditions for many 
disciplined attorneys.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio St.3d 384, 2011-
Ohio-767, 944 N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 21, reinstatement granted, 131 Ohio St.3d 1229, 
2012-Ohio-1590, 967 N.E.2d 212, ¶ 4; Toledo Bar Assn. v. Miller, 132 Ohio St.3d 
63, 2012-Ohio-1880, 969 N.E.2d 239, ¶ 16; Akron Bar Assn. v. DeLoach, 143 Ohio 
St.3d 39, 2015-Ohio-494, 34 N.E.3d 88, ¶ 20; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Washington, 
143 Ohio St.3d 248, 2015-Ohio-2449, 36 N.E.3d 167, ¶ 15; Cleveland Metro. Bar 
Assn. v. Sleibi, 144 Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-2724, 42 N.E.3d 699, ¶ 31, 
reinstatement granted, 150 Ohio St.3d 1213, 2017-Ohio-919, 78 N.E.3d 889, ¶ 3-
4; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Balaloski, 145 Ohio St.3d 121, 2016-Ohio-86, 47 N.E.3d 
150, ¶ 8; Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 145 Ohio St.3d 308, 2016-Ohio-827, 
49 N.E.3d 289, ¶ 26, reinstatement granted, 150 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2017-Ohio-920, 
78 N.E.3d 890, ¶ 3-4; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Reed, 145 Ohio St.3d 464, 2016-
Ohio-834, 50 N.E.3d 516, ¶ 15-16; Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hanni, 145 Ohio 
St.3d 492, 2016-Ohio-1174, 50 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 17; Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 
146 Ohio St.3d 341, 2016-Ohio-1599, 56 N.E.3d 936, ¶ 9; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bartels, 151 Ohio St.3d 144, 2016-Ohio-3333, 87 N.E.3d 155, ¶ 16, reinstatement 
granted, 150 Ohio St.3d 1284, 2017-Ohio-4432, 82 N.E.3d 1171, ¶ 3-4; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mahin, 146 Ohio St.3d 312, 2016-Ohio-3336, 55 N.E.3d 
1108, ¶ 7, reinstatement granted, 147 Ohio St.3d 1266, 2016-Ohio-7717, 66 N.E.3d 
758, ¶ 3-4; Disciplinary Counsel v. Guinn, 150 Ohio St.3d 92, 2016-Ohio-3351, 79 
N.E.3d 512, ¶ 17; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Roseman, 147 Ohio St.3d 317, 2016-
Ohio-5085, 65 N.E.3d 713, ¶ 17; Disciplinary Counsel v. Kendrick, 147 Ohio St.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
395, 2016-Ohio-5600, 66 N.E.3d 710, ¶ 15; Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hauck, 148 
Ohio St.3d 203, 2016-Ohio-7826, 69 N.E.3d 719, ¶ 40-41; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Joltin, 147 Ohio St.3d 490, 2016-Ohio-8168, 67 N.E.3d 780, ¶ 34; Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Assn. v. King, 148 Ohio St.3d 602, 2016-Ohio-8255, 71 N.E.3d 1082, 
¶ 15; Disciplinary Counsel v. Barbera, 149 Ohio St.3d 505, 2017-Ohio-882, 75 
N.E.3d 1248, ¶ 15; Disciplinary Counsel v. Pickrel, 151 Ohio St.3d 466, 2017-
Ohio-6872, 90 N.E.3d 853, ¶ 17, reinstatement granted, 156 Ohio St.3d 1213, 
2019-Ohio-32, 124 N.E.3d 847, ¶ 3-4; Disciplinary Counsel v. Turner, 154 Ohio 
St.3d 322, 2018-Ohio-4202, 114 N.E.3d 174, ¶ 21; Wood Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Driftmyer, 155 Ohio St.3d 603, 2018-Ohio-5094, 122 N.E.3d 1262, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 46} When necessary and practical, however, this court has also decided 
to order disciplined attorneys to serve a more specific term of monitored probation.  
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Bennett, 146 Ohio St.3d 237, 2016-Ohio-3045, 
54 N.E.3d 1232, ¶ 19; Disciplinary Counsel v. Quinn, 144 Ohio St.3d 336, 2015-
Ohio-3687, 43 N.E.3d 398, ¶ 15, reinstatement granted, 146 Ohio St.3d 1231, 
2016-Ohio-2737, 52 N.E.3d 1195, ¶ 3-4; Columbus Bar Assn. v. McCord, 150 Ohio 
St.3d 81, 2016-Ohio-3298, 79 N.E.3d 503, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 47} These cases illustrate that the longstanding practice of this court is 
to analyze each attorney-discipline case on its own basis and impose sanctions 
tailored to the particular facts of that case.  Hence, any decision to the contrary—
including one that would demand that every term of monitored probation include 
specific subject areas that the monitor must cover or specific conditions the attorney 
must comply with—would require us to overturn decades of precedent and scores 
of decisions by this court.  See, e.g., Crawford Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nicholson, 66 Ohio 
St.3d 585, 613 N.E.2d 1025 (1993).  Stare decisis exists for a reason, and I cannot 
condone such a change in practice, especially without an accompanying change to 
the rules. 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
{¶ 48} Apart from the rules themselves and the 30 years of precedent from 
this court, there are other practical reasons for rejecting the view espoused in the 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  The current practice ensures the 
protection of the public and aids the disciplined attorney, all while being mindful 
of the allocation and utilization of resources.  See Halligan, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 
2019-Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d____, at ¶ 36 (Fischer, J., concurring).  As we have 
recognized time and time again, “ ‘[T]he primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions 
is not to punish the offender, but to protect the public.’ ”  (Emphasis added).  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman, 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-8800, 92 N.E.3d 
850, ¶ 17, quoting  Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-
Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53. 
{¶ 49} Ordering a disciplined attorney to serve a general term of monitored 
probation without specific conditions enables this court to keep “ ‘ “on a short 
leash,” ’ ” Halligan at ¶ 34, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 155 Ohio St.3d 
100, 2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405, ¶ 47 (Fischer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), attorneys who may need further monitoring but who do not have 
a specific, identifiable issue or who do not require guidance in a specific area.  
Conceivably, this court may be, or has been, presented with a case in which the 
disciplined attorney is one who has been investigated by the Board of Professional 
Conduct before for certain violations but was not charged (due to a lack of clear 
and convincing evidence).  Or, fathomably, this court has seen a disciplined 
attorney who is silently struggling with an issue—such as mental health, 
unidentified addiction, or grief—that was the root cause of the prohibited conduct 
when neither this court nor the board was privy to such information at the time of 
the proceedings.  See Halligan at ¶ 36 (Fischer, J., concurring).  A general term of 
monitored probation, especially in the aforementioned situations, provides this 
court, through the probation monitor, the flexibility to keep a disciplined attorney 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
on “a short leash” to help guide that attorney and meet his or her needs, while also 
adequately protecting the public. 
{¶ 50} Furthermore, as I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon, ___Ohio St.3d___, 2019-Ohio-4171, 
___N.E.3d___, ¶ 61, reading into the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of 
the Bar such an extreme requirement of specific terms of monitored probation in 
every case in which this court orders monitored probation could create significant 
hardships on this court’s disciplinary process by asking even more of the attorneys 
who volunteer to serve as probation monitors when they are already so giving with 
their time, knowledge, and expertise.  Relatedly, if specific conditions were 
required in every case, depending on the type of violation presented, there may not 
be enough monitoring attorneys who have the sufficient expertise required to aid 
the disciplined attorney in fulfilling the specific terms of his or her monitored 
probation.  These hardships would certainly lessen the protections for the public. 
{¶ 51} We should be mindful to utilize only those resources necessary for 
monitored probation to protect the public and enforce the rules created by this court, 
while also helping the disciplined attorney.  Requiring specific conditions in each 
attorney-discipline case in which monitored probation is ordered would run afoul 
of these goals by effectively tying the hands of the relator and placing an arbitrary 
restriction on the discretion of this court. 
{¶ 52} Thus, because ordering a general term of monitored probation 
without specified conditions is appropriate in a variety of cases, I join the majority 
opinion and respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part that this court must set forth specific conditions every 
time that we impose monitored probation.  More is not always better. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
{¶ 53} I concur in the majority’s determination that respondent, Anthony 
William Sullivan, should be suspended for two years, with the second year of the 
suspension stayed, and that he should serve a one-year term of monitored probation 
following his reinstatement to the practice of law.  However, because Gov.Bar R. 
V(12)(A)(4) and (21)(B)(1) require this court to impose specific conditions on any 
term of probation we impose, I disagree with the majority’s decision not to impose 
any specific conditions on Sullivan’s probation. 
{¶ 54} The Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar give this 
court the sole authority to impose the conditions of probation required by Gov.Bar 
R. V(21), Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-3748, 
___N.E.3d ___, ¶ 42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and 
therefore the “failure to attach conditions to probation is more than a missed 
opportunity to set the criteria and goals for professional redemption, it is an 
abdication of our duty under the Rules for the Government of the Bar,”  id. at ¶ 41.  
When this court does not provide guidance to the relator, the respondent, the 
monitoring attorney, and the Board of Professional Conduct as to the conditions of 
respondent’s probation—conditions specifically designed by this court to protect 
the public and rehabilitate the respondent—it undermines the effectiveness of the 
monitored-probation scheme established by Gov.Bar R. V(21).  After all, the first 
duty listed for monitoring attorneys in Gov.Bar R. V(21)(B)(1) is to “[m]onitor 
compliance by the respondent with the conditions of probation imposed by the 
Supreme Court.”  (Emphasis added.)  And probation cannot be terminated unless 
“the respondent has complied with the conditions of probation.”  Gov.Bar R. 
V(21)(D). 
{¶ 55} The majority imposes a term of probation without ordering any 
conditions specific to Sullivan’s misconduct for him to follow while he is serving 
it.  Except for the generic duties Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C) imposes on all attorneys on 
probation, Sullivan and his monitor have no direction regarding their respective 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
duties during the term of monitored probation.  The court does not describe what 
the monitor should be monitoring during the monthly in-person meetings that will 
be required by Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(1), nor does it determine what access the 
monitor should have to Sullivan’s client files and records or even what constitutes 
a violation of probation—the majority gives no explanation how this court could 
find that a disciplined attorney has violated the conditions of probation pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(21)(E) through (K) when no conditions were imposed by the court 
in the first instance.  Without express conditions, imposing probation is not only 
practically unworkable, but it also raises due-process concerns regarding a 
disciplined attorney’s right to fair notice of what is expected of him or her during 
the term of probation. 
{¶ 56} Therefore, I would impose the following specific conditions for the 
one-year term of monitored probation overseeing respondent’s law-office 
management and practice as a sole practitioner: (1) respondent shall meet in person 
with his monitoring attorney on a monthly basis as required by Gov.Bar R. 
V(21)(C)(1), (2) respondent shall provide his monitoring attorney with a written 
release or waiver for use in verifying compliance regarding medical, psychological, 
or other treatment as required by Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(2), (3) respondent shall 
cooperate and work with the monitor, who shall act as a mentor and provide 
guidance to respondent regarding the proper operation and management of a law 
practice, (4) respondent, with the relator or monitoring attorney, shall design a 
comprehensive plan to ensure that he is reasonably diligent in the representation of 
his clients; in the event respondent cannot act with reasonable diligence in 
representing his clients, the relator or monitoring attorney may limit the number of 
active cases respondent may maintain, (5) respondent shall maintain an active-case 
list or a docketing system and shall give the monitoring attorney an inventory of 
active cases each month, and (6) respondent shall give the monitoring attorney 
access to nonconfidential client materials and files, ledgers, and account statements 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
as needed to allow the monitoring attorney to review respondent’s active cases to 
ensure his compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, see Allen Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 160, 2002-Ohio-2006, 766 N.E.2d 973, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 57} Moreover, I would also include the following requirements as 
additional conditions of probation: respondent shall (1) make restitution of $125 to 
Tamala Horwath and $1,000 to Andrew Nason, (2) schedule an assessment with 
the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program and comply with any recommendations 
resulting from that assessment, (3) complete 12 hours of continuing-legal education 
in law-office management and practice as a sole practitioner in addition to the hours 
required by Gov.Bar R. X, and (4) commit no further misconduct. 
{¶ 58} “An effective attorney-probation system—one that follows the Rules 
for the Government of the Bar—requires the considered input of this court in 
establishing the conditions of probation.”  Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-
Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  Because the majority fails to impose any conditions on Sullivan’s term of 
probation, I dissent from that part of the court’s decision today. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Glen R. McMurry; Green & Green, 
Lawyers, and Jonathan F. Hung; and Jeffrey A. Hazlett, for relator. 
 
Anthony W. Sullivan, pro se. 
_________________