Title: Bingham v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

434 So. 2d 220 (1983) Johnny Ray BINGHAM v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 53757. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 1, 1983. Rehearing Denied July 27, 1983. *221 Herring & Self, James H. Herring, Canton, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Frankie Walton White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before BROOM, HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, JJ. DAN M. LEE, Justice for the Court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County wherein Johnny Ray Bingham, defendant/appellant, was indicted and tried for the September 13, 1980, murder of Ozell Carter. The jury found Bingham guilty of manslaughter, whereupon he was sentenced to serve a term of 15 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Bingham now appeals his conviction and sentence to this Court and assigns the following errors for reversal: During the evening hours of September 13, 1980, several people attended a party at the home of Emma Caldwell. Among those present were the appellant and Ozell Carter, deceased. Sometime during the evening Ozell Carter attempted to sit down next to Emma Caldwell who resisted his advances. Carter then grabbed Miss Caldwell by the arm; however, she jerked away and walked to the front porch of the residence. When appellant, Emma's boyfriend, inquired as to what was wrong, she explained that Carter kept "messing" with her. Appellant responded that he would talk to Carter. When appellant confronted Carter with the matter, an argument erupted. According to witnesses for the state, appellant shot Carter while Carter was pouring beer into a cup. Appellant and his witnesses testified, however, that Carter set his cup down and then reached into his pocket before appellant shot him. Appellant and his witnesses, who knew that Carter had a reputation for carrying a weapon, believed Carter was reaching for a weapon at the time appellant fired the fatal shot. It was subsequently learned, however, that Carter was unarmed. Witnesses for the state denied that Carter made any move resembling an effort to produce a weapon. Carter died from a single .38-caliber wound to the right temple. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, whereupon appellant was sentenced to serve a term of 15 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. I. Did the trial court err in granting the state's ore tenus motion to amend the indictment after the jury had been empaneled to change the name of the victim from Mozell Carter to Ozell Carter? The indictment in the case at bar charged as follows: After the jury was empaneled on the day set for trial (September 14, 1981), the state moved ore tenus to amend the indictment by changing the victim's name from Mozell Carter to Ozell Carter. A hearing was held, whereupon the trial court found that the grand jury intended to indict appellant for the murder of Ozell Carter. Therefore, the amendment was allowed. The trial judge, however, declared a mistrial and reset the case for the following Thursday (September 23, 1981), to allow appellant additional time he might need to make certain changes in *223 his trial strategy and therefore avoid any possible prejudice appellant may have suffered due to the granting of the amendment. MCA § 99-17-13 (1972) provides that: The test for determining whether an accused has been prejudiced by an amendment to an indictment is stated in Byrd v. State, 228 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1969): In Jones v. State, 279 So. 2d 594 (Miss. 1973), this Court upheld an amendment to the indictment during trial which corrected the victim's name from Larry Smith to James Smith in a prosecution for the sale of marijuana. In McDole v. State, 229 Miss. 646, 91 So. 2d 738 (1957), an amendment to an indictment prior to trial was upheld in a burglary prosecution to correct the victim's name from Vernell Harris to Ida Pearl Harris. In Gillespie v. State, 221 Miss. 116, 72 So. 2d 245 (1954), an amendment to an indictment was upheld in a murder prosecution during trial to change the victim's name from Mack Edwards to Lish Edwards. *224 Davis v. State, 150 Miss. 797, 117 So. 116 (1928), involved a murder prosecution wherein this Court upheld an amendment to an indictment during trial to reflect the victim's name as Man Jones rather than Ernest Jones. In State v. Grady, 147 Miss. 446, 111 So. 148 (1927), this Court held that if letters in an indictment preceding the names of the partners of a business were initials and not the partners' full Christian names, such could be amended to correspond to the facts. Finally, in Miller v. State, 68 Miss. 221, 8 So. 273 (1896), an amendment to an indictment was upheld in a murder prosecution to allow the true Christian name of the deceased.[1] In Parchman v. State, 279 So. 2d 602, 603 (Miss. 1973), this Court stated: However, the Court distinguished the facts in Blumenberg from Parchman as follows: The Court then affirmed in Parchman stating: The proof presented during the hearing established that the grand jury intended to indict appellant for the murder of Ozell Carter. Moreover, even if this were not true, the merits of the case would be the same and a defense available in one would be available in the other. Appellant admitted the shooting and had known Ozell Carter for quite some time prior to the indictment. The trial judge, in an effort to prevent any prejudice to the appellant, declared a mistrial and reset the case for September 24, 1981, to allow appellant additional time to adjust or further plan his trial strategy. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the trial court erred in allowing the amendment to the indictment in the instant case. II. Did the trial court err in failing to sustain appellant's objection and subsequent motion for mistrial to the district attorney's remark made during voir dire examination that if the court instructed the jury that the state would be required to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the jury should not interpret that to mean that they must find appellant guilty beyond a shadow of a doubt? *225 The record does not reveal a transcription of voir dire examination; however, the following colloquy depicts the matter of which appellant complains: Appellant argues that the district attorney's question was highly improper and relies upon the general principle that jury instructions which attempt to define reasonable doubt are improper. There was no jury instruction which attempted to submit to the jury a definition of reasonable doubt. In this case we do not believe this assignment of error is meritorious. Moreover, the trial court has considerable discretion on propriety of questions addressed to prospective jurors. Myers v. State, 268 So. 2d 353 (Miss. 1972). III. Did the trial court err in failing to sustain appellant's objection to the testimony of Sheriff W.B. Noble in rebuttal of appellant's witness Roy Lee Lawson? During cross-examination of defense witness Roy Lawson, the district attorney inquired as to why Lawson did not tell Sheriff Noble his version of the events of the shooting when questioned on the night of the incident. Lawson admitted he had not given the sheriff a statement as to how the shooting occurred, but explained he did not do so because he was not asked. In rebuttal, the state recalled Sheriff Noble who testified that it was Lawson who informed him as to who had shot Carter. Sheriff Noble further testified that Lawson stated he did not see what had happened. Appellant contends it was error to allow Sheriff Noble to testify to the preceding events because the state failed to lay a proper predicate for the admission of such testimony. The state contends this testimony did not discredit the testimony of Lawson; therefore, laying a proper predicate for its admission was inapplicable. In Carlisle v. State, 348 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1977), this Court stated: The following testimony was elicited from Lawson on cross-examination: The state clearly elicited from Lawson that he told the sheriff on the night of the incident that he had seen the shooting take place. This opened the door for the rebuttal testimony of Sheriff Noble who asserted that Lawson stated on the night of the incident that he did not actually see the shooting. There was no error in the admission of Sheriff Noble's rebuttal testimony. IV. Was the verdict of the jury against the overwhelming weight of the evidence? In Sadler v. State, 407 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1981), this Court stated: Viewing the evidence in this light, it was established that appellant argued with Carter over a girl, whereupon appellant shot Carter while Carter was unarmed and pouring a beer into a cup. Such evidence was clearly sufficient to support a verdict of manslaughter. While appellant presented a strong case of justifiable homicide, the resolution of such conflicts was for determination by the jury. The jury's verdict was amply supported by the evidence. Finding no reversible error, this case is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. [1] Other cases wherein amendments have been allowed to change the victim's surname are as follows: Evans v. State, 425 So. 2d 1043 (Miss. 1983); Belina v. State, 228 Miss. 330, 87 So. 2d 919 (1956); Graves v. State, 148 Miss. 62, 114 So. 123 (1927); and Miller v. State, 53 Miss. 403 (1876).