Title: VAUGHAN v. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VAUGHAN v. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION2002 WY 13153 P.3d 559Case Number: 01-31Decided: 09/06/2002
April Term, A.D. 2002

 
 

TERRY 
RAY VAUGHAN,

 

Appellant(Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent) 
.

 

 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification

from 
the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Keith 
R. Nachbar, Casper, WY.  Argument by 
Mr. Nachbar.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Delicath.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a determination of the State Medical Commission (Medical Commission) 
denying the permanent total disability claim of appellant Terry Ray Vaughan 
(Vaughan).  We 
reverse and remand.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Vaughan sets 
forth the following issues:

 

1.  Did 
the Medical Commission commit reversible error in failing to apply the odd lot 
doctrine in this case?

 
2.  Did 
the Medical Commission panel improperly interpret and apply the definition of 
permanent total disability in denying the Claimant's 
benefits?

 

3.  Is 
the unwillingness of the Claimant to become dependent on prescription pain 
medication a proper basis for denial of permanent total disability benefits, 
where the Division did not plead a harmful or injurious practice defense to the 
claim?

 

Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division (Division), phrases the issues on appeal as:
 

I.  Does substantial evidence support the Medical 
Commission's determination that Appellant is not permanently totally 
disabled?
 

II.  Did the Medical Commission err in applying the 
definition of permanent total disability from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xvi)?
 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Vaughan suffered 
a serious work related back injury in 1994.  After a number of surgeries, Vaughan 
received a twenty-three percent permanent partial impairment award in 1999.  Vaughan's condition then worsened and, 
after failed attempts to secure employment given his physical limitations, 
Vaughan made an application for permanent total disability benefits which was 
denied by the Division.  Vaughan 
appealed this determination, and a contested case hearing was held before the 
Medical Commission, with the Medical Commission upholding the decision of the 
Division.  Vaughan then filed a 
petition for review before the district court, and this matter was certified 
directly to this court for appellate review.  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶4]      Judicial review 
of an agency action is directed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114.1  Serda v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 38, ¶18, 42 P.3d 466, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002). 
Our standard of review when reviewing administrative agency action was recently 
clarified and refined in the case of Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo. 2002).  That case held that "the substantial 
evidence test is the appropriate standard of review  when factual findings are 
involved and both parties submit evidence." Newman,  at ¶22.  

 

[¶5]      In appeals where 
both parties submitted evidence at the hearing below, and the dispute is over 
the soundness of the factual findings of the agency, Newman mandates the 
appellate review be limited to application of the substantial evidence 
test.  Id.  This is true regardless of which party 
appeals from the agency decision.  
The substantial evidence test provides:

 
In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  

 

Newman, 
at ¶12 (quoting State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 
2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001)).  In 
addition, we held that this court is required to review the entire record in 
making its ultimate determination on appeal.2  Newman, at ¶19 and ¶¶24-26. 

 

[¶6]      In State ex 
rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶9, 26 P.3d 1029, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001), we further recognized that:

 

            
The interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are questions of law over which our review 
authority is plenary. Collicott [v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2001 WY 35], ¶4[, 20 P.3d 1077, ¶4 (Wyo. 2001)].  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  Id.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
Id.

 

[¶7]      Moreover, the 
de novo review by this court of the conclusions and application of law 
made by the administrative agency should not be confused with the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review enumerated in Newman.  Newman provides that even when 
the factual findings are found to be sufficient under the substantial evidence 
test, this court could possibly be required to apply the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard as a "safety net" to catch other agency action 
which prejudiced a party's substantial right to the administrative proceeding or 
which might be contrary to the other WAPA review standards.  A purely 
demonstrative listing is provided of situations which might warrant the  consideration of the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard in addition to the substantial evidence 
test.3  Newman, at ¶23.  However, the instant appeal presents no 
such unique circumstances.  In 
accord see Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      Vaughan argues it 
was reversible error for the Medical Commission to fail to apply the odd lot 
doctrine with respect to his permanent total disability claim.  This court has long recognized the odd 
lot doctrine with respect to permanent total disability determinations made 
within the purview of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.  In the case of Schepanovich v. United 
States Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo. 1983) this court 
stated:

 

            
In our opinion in Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 603 P.2d 862 
(1979), this court adopted a definition of the "odd-lot doctrine" as 
follows:

 

  ". . . The odd-lot doctrine' 
is described in 2 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.51 at p. 10-109 
(1976), as providing that permanent total disability may be found in the case 
of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped 
that they will not be employed regularly in any well known branch of the labor 
market.'"  603 P.2d  at 
863-864.

 

            
An injured workman who comes within the "odd-lot doctrine" need not show 
that he is totally incapable of doing any work at all in order to be entitled to 
an award for permanent total disability.  
E.R. Moore Co. v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ill. 2d 353, 17 
Ill.Dec. 207, 376 N.E.2d 206 (1978); Wilson v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 30 
Or.App. 403, 567 P.2d 567 (1977); and 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 
57.51, at 10-164.21 (1982).  This 
court has stated the proposition in this fashion:

 

            
". . . The theory of counsel for the employer appears to be 
that the workman must go further than to show that he cannot do any hard work; 
that he must also show that he cannot do light work.  Of course, it would almost be 
impossible, in many instances, for a man educated only to do hard work, to show 
that at some time or other some good Samaritan might not turn up and offer him 
some light work which he might be able to do.  The law does not require 
impossibilities.  It is stated in 71 
C.J. 1071 that where it is found that the employee is permanently and totally 
disabled so far as hard or manual work is concerned, but that he might do light 
work of a special nature not generally available, the burden is on the employer 
to show that such special work is available to the employee.'  . . ."  In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 452, 110 P.2d 826 (1941).

 

[¶9]      This court went 
on further to enunciate in Schepanovich, at 528:

 

The 
burden of proof initially is assigned to the injured workman who is seeking to 
qualify as permanently totally disabled under the "odd-lot doctrine" to 
demonstrate that he is incapacitated "from performing any work at any gainful 
occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience and training."  Section 27-12-405(a), W.S.1977; 
Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, supra.  
The test to be invoked is whether the workman is so disabled that the 
services which he is reasonably equipped to perform by his experience and 
training are not marketable in a well-known branch of the labor market in the 
community so as to provide a steady and continuous source of income rather than 
sporadic or intermittent employment.  
See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.51 (1982).  If that showing is made, the burden of 
proof is then shifted to the employer to show that light work of a special 
nature which the employee could perform but which is not generally available in 
fact is available to the employee.  
In re Iles, supra; Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, 
supra.

 

[¶10]   Finally, this court adopted the 
following rule formulated in 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 
57.61, at 10-164.95 to 1-164.114 (1982) through its opinion in Schepanovich, 
at 528-29:

 

". . . 
If the evidence of degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other 
facts such as the claimant's mental capacity, education, training, or age, 
places claimant prima facie in the odd-lot category, the burden should be on the 
employer to show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously 
available to the claimant.  
Certainly in such a case it should not be enough to show that claimant is 
physically capable of performing light work, and then round out the case for 
noncompensability by adding a presumption that light work is 
available. . . .  

 

            
"The corollary of the general-purpose principle just stated would be 
this:  If the claimant's medical 
impairment is so limited or specialized in nature that he is not obviously 
unemployable or relegated to the odd-lot category, it is not unreasonable to 
place the burden of proof on him to establish unavailability of work to a person 
in his circumstances, which normally would require a showing that he has made 
reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment. . . ."  

 

            
Other jurisdictions in this context have held that an employee in 
circumstances similar to those of the appellant must show that reasonable 
efforts have been made to obtain suitable employment in order to meet their 
burden of proof and shift the burden of proof to the employer.  Wiedmaier v. Industrial 
Commission, 121 Ariz. 127, 589 P.2d 1 (1978); Oliver v. Wyandotte 
Industries Corporation, Me., 360 A.2d 144 (1976); Marez v. Kerr-McGee 
Nuclear Corporation, 93 N.M. 9, 597 P.2d 1178 (1978) (Sutin, J., specially 
concurring); Haines v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 27 Or.App. 793, 558 P.2d 367 (1976);  Shealy v. 
Algernon Blair, Inc., 250 S.C. 106, 156 S.E.2d 646 (1967).  See also cases cited in 2 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.61 at 10-164.114, n. 29 
(1982).

 

[¶11]   Recognizing the above precedent, 
Vaughan argues the Medical Commission erred when it found he was not entitled to 
a permanent total disability award.  
In particular, Vaughan contends the Medical Commission erred in holding 
he had failed to sustain his burden of proof on the issue of permanent total 
disability as defined by § 27-14-102(a)(xvi).  He argues vigorously the uncontradicted 
and unimpeached testimony in the record establishes he is permanently 
incapacitated from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he 
was reasonably suited by experience and training.  His position is the Division failed to 
present any evidence that some special work of a light or sedentary nature was 
actually available to him so he could not qualify as a permanently disabled 
worker under the odd lot doctrine.  
We agree.

 

[¶12]   In § 27-14-102(a)(xvi) (Lexis 1999) 
there appears a definition of permanent total disability, which reads as 
follows:

 

(a)  "Permanent 
total disability" means the loss of use of the body as a whole or any permanent 
injury certified under W.S. 27-14-406, which permanently incapacitates the 
employee from performing work at any gainful occupation for which he is 
reasonably suited by experience or training.

 

The 
claim of Vaughan that he is totally disabled is presented under the phrase 
relating to a condition which "permanently incapacitates the employee from 
performing work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by 
experience or training."  It is of 
significance that the legislature specifically used the words "gainful 
occupation" in this definition which suggests its concurrence with those policy 
considerations utilized previously by this court in support of the adoption of 
the odd lot doctrine.  In fact, this 
court has previously recognized the statutory definition for permanent total 
disability is consistent with the odd lot doctrine.  Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 875 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Wyo. 1994) (citing City of Casper 
v. Bowdish, 713 P.2d 763, 765 (Wyo. 1986) and Cardin v. 
Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862, 863-64 (Wyo. 1979)).

 

[¶13]   In October of 1994, while employed 
as a cabinetmaker, Vaughan fell injuring his back as he was walking down a plank 
at a construction sight.  On 
November 8, 1994, Vaughan submitted to surgery for re-exploration of a 
laminectomy and removal of a recurrent disk protrusion at the L4-L5 area of his 
spine in an effort to decompress the L-5 nerve root.4   Dr. Robert C. Wood performed this 
surgery.  This surgery was not 
successful as Vaughan continued to experience severe pain and problems with his 
lower back and lower extremities.  

 

[¶14]   On November 29, 1995, Vaughan 
underwent surgery for a fusion of the L4 through S-1 levels.  This surgery was performed by Dr. 
Whitney S. Robinson along with Dr. Wood.  
This surgery was again unsuccessful.  Dr. Robinson then performed a third 
surgery on Vaughan in January of 1997 and removed the hardware that had been 
installed during the 1995 surgery.  
During this surgery it was noticed that although Vaughan's own bone, a 
metal plate, and a screw fixation were used during the earlier fusion operation, 
the fusion did not take, resulting in Vaughan's spine being comprised of less 
bone and bony structure than prior to the fusion operation and causing chronic 
instability between the lower vertebrae and the pelvis.  Even after removal of the hardware, 
Vaughan's back and leg pain and related symptoms continued.  

 

[¶15]   Dr. Wood recommended a fourth 
anterior fusion surgery.  A second 
doctor also recommended this surgery.  
Nevertheless, Vaughan declined to undergo that operation due to risk of 
complications and because there was no guarantee of success.5  

 

[¶16]   On March 5, 1999, after a contested 
case hearing, Vaughan was given a twenty-three percent whole body impairment 
award.  This award was based upon 
the instability of Vaughan's spine and persisting nerve root symptoms.  Vaughan testified at the hearing that he 
was forty-seven years old and advised that he had previously worked at various 
jobs making cabinetry, in heavy construction, and as a retail salesman over his 
occupational career.  Vaughan also 
stated that he had received a high school diploma and had received only 
approximately twelve college credit hours during the 1972/1973 school year.6  

 

[¶17]   Since his accident in 1994, Vaughan 
had only been able to be gainfully employed for two weeks in May of 1998 making 
cowboy spurs which involved easy sedentary labor of sanding, polishing, and 
grinding.  This job allowed Vaughan 
to be able to alternate positions frequently, and his employer accommodated his 
disabilities.  However, Vaughan  was only able to work 17½ hours the 
first week and 15 hours the second week due to his continued pain and related 
symptoms.  Vaughan was released from 
this job because the employer needed someone that could work a consistent 
forty-hour work week.7  

 

[¶18]   Vaughan also testified that, 
although he could generally take care of himself, his home, and his yard as a 
divorced single man, he had to struggle to perform these duties because of the 
pain and other symptoms that he continues to experience.  These duties were performed slowly and 
primarily in the morning hours.  
During the afternoon, because of increased pain, exhaustion, and the 
increased onset of other symptoms, Vaughan had to remain sedentary.  Vaughan also stated that, while he used 
to enjoy hunting, fishing, and cross country skiing, he was simply now unable to 
go on these outings for even a half day.  

 

[¶19]   At the time of the hearing, Vaughan 
was experiencing constant, severe aching and stabbing pain with tingling that 
ran from his lower back through his buttocks into his thighs and knees every 
day.  He also advised that he was 
numb from his lower back from his incision through his rectum.  He further stated that his left leg was 
numb from the knee down through his left foot with his right leg being numb from 
his ankle through that foot.  He 
described his legs as if they had both gone to "sleep" and he could not "wake 
them up."  This substantially 
affected Vaughan's ability to walk.  
Vaughan also testified that his left leg "folded up" and gave out without 
warning on an average of once a week, that he had worsening bowel and bladder 
urgency, and that he needed to use a cane about fifty percent of the time.  Vaughan had also experienced migraines 
since his accident.  Dr. Wood 
confirmed that Vaughan had these difficulties as a result of his condition.  Dr. Brown stated that he would not be 
surprised that Vaughan experienced these difficulties.  

 

[¶20]   Vaughan also testified that he had 
applied for a number of jobs at hotels, motels, convenience stores, craft shops, 
a gift shop, and cabinet shops.  His 
job search was extensive and documented.  
Vaughan had also worked with the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation 
and registered with Job Service in an effort to obtain employment.8  Nevertheless, Vaughan was unable to find 
employment given his limitations.  

 

[¶21]   Vaughan further testified that he 
did not believe that he could return to a cabinet making job due to the heavy 
lifting requirements necessary of those positions of employment.  He also stated that under those current 
pain and other health concerns he was experiencing that he did not feel he could 
function over a consistent period of time at a light duty or sedentary job.9  

 

[¶22]   Vaughan's treating physician, Dr. 
Wood, a neurosurgeon, testified via his submitted deposition about the various 
surgeries performed on Vaughan, that Vaughan had a chronically instable spine 
from his lower spine to his pelvis with abnormal vertebrae movement and loss of 
motion segment integrity and other surgical options that were considered.  Also, as noted above, Dr. Wood confirmed 
Vaughan's experience of constant, severe pain, tingling and numbness in his 
lower back and lower extremities, and his increased bowel and bladder 
problems.  Dr. Wood also stated that 
he felt that Vaughan's condition had worsened over the past three years and that 
Vaughan was permanently totally disabled.  
Finally, Dr. Wood stated that Vaughan was permanently incapacitated from 
consistently performing work at any gainful occupation for which he was 
reasonably suited by experience or training even at the sedentary or light duty 
level.  

 

[¶23]   Ms. Noecker, M.A., a certified 
vocational evaluator and licensed professional counselor with a national 
counselor certification, also testified at the hearing, and her Vocational 
Evaluation Report and Addendum were submitted into evidence.  After an in depth vocational evaluation 
looking at various test results obtained by Vaughan, reviewing Vaughan's 
educational and work history, and recognizing his restrictions, Ms. Noecker 
initially concluded that Vaughan might be able to perform part-time light duty 
to sedentary work but questioned whether Vaughan could, in reality, perform this 
type of work.  Thereafter, Ms. 
Noecker re-evaluated Vaughan given additional information that she had obtained 
concerning the worsening of Vaughan's situation and submitted an Addendum to her 
original report.  Upon 
re-evaluation, Ms. Noecker concluded that Vaughan was disabled and not 
employable since he was not able to perform and sustain part-time light duty to 
sedentary work. In coming to this conclusion, Ms. Noecker further indicated that 
given her knowledge and experience of the Wyoming job market that Vaughan was 
not gainfully employable in a well known branch of the labor market in Wyoming 
so as to provide him with a steady and continuous source of income considering 
his mental ability, age, experience, training, and physical limitations.  

 

[¶24]   Given those facts, we conclude that 
Vaughan met his burden of proof under the "odd lot doctrine."  These facts evidence that Vaughan was 
incapacitated from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he 
was reasonably suited by experience and training.  Moreover, these facts support a 
determination that he was so disabled that the services which he was reasonably 
equipped to perform by his education, experience, and training were not 
marketable in a well-known branch of the labor market in the community so as to 
provide a steady and continuous source of income rather than sporadic or 
intermittent employment.

 

[¶25]   As we recognized above, under the 
"odd lot" doctrine, once an employee shows that he  is permanently and totally disabled so 
far as hard or manual work is concerned, but that he might do light work of a 
special nature not generally available, the burden of proof is then shifted to 
the employer to show that such special work is available to the employee.   In this case, the Division 
proffered only one witness, Dr. Brown, who also testified through his earlier 
taken deposition.

 

[¶26]   Review of Dr. Brown's testimony 
discloses that the Division retained him to perform an independent medical 
evaluation of Vaughan.  As a part of 
this independent examination, Dr. Brown examined Vaughan and obtained a history 
from him for approximately one hour and reviewed various medical records 
received exclusively from the Division.  
Thereafter, Dr. Brown opined that Vaughan was not totally disabled 
because he felt Vaughan could perform sedentary to light physical demand level 
categories of work within his recognized limitations.  

 

[¶27]   However, Dr. Brown confirmed that 
Vaughan certainly had significant restrictions in terms of what he could 
do.  Moreover, Dr. Brown also stated 
that his opinion was based on his feeling that determining that someone was 
totally disabled was a very serious thing to do because often, after such a 
rating, the person involved gave up on working, it affected the patient severely 
from a psychological standpoint, and marked the "beginning of the end" for many 
patients.  Further, Dr. Brown 
indicated that he knew that Vaughan was unable to continue to make cabinets or 
work making spurs, yet apparently still believed that Vaughan could perform 
sedentary to light physical demand level categories of work within his 
recognized limitations.  

 

[¶28]   Critically, although Dr. Brown 
stated that in his specialty he had toured many work places in the Salt Lake 
City Valley and in San Diego, California and that this allowed him to 
extrapolate what a person could do in the job market, Dr. Brown admitted that he 
did not have knowledge of or perform any study or evaluation of the labor market 
in Sheridan, Wyoming.  Dr. Brown 
also acknowledged the economic environment in the Salt Lake City area was 
different than that of Wyoming since the former had larger companies who wanted 
to keep workers' compensation costs down.  
Further, Dr. Wood admitted that the key to post-injury employment is to 
find light enough work that the disabled individual could perform for a full or 
close to full time basis. 

 

[¶29]   In addition, when asked to describe 
what occupations persons with Vaughan's limitations could perform, Dr. Brown 
stated that he was more comfortable with identifying what the restrictions were 
and allowing a vocational rehabilitation expert to identify the particular jobs 
that might be available.  In fact, 
on further examination, Dr. Brown stated that whether someone can perform a job 
requires consideration of more than just the physical condition of the person, 
his specialty, but also the job market and availability, as well as mental 
abilities, education, training and experience, which were things that he "stayed 
out of" and were best left for a vocational evaluator to determine.  Dr. Brown also clearly stated that he 
never "wanted to come across as saying" that work was available for Vaughan but 
just wanted to state what he was capable of performing.  Dr. Brown further agreed with Dr. Wood 
that the duration that Vaughan could perform certain work tasks was a valid 
consideration.  Dr. Brown also 
admitted that he did not perform any vocational testing on Vaughan to determine 
his ability to handle different types of work.  

 

[¶30]   Accordingly, we must conclude that 
the Division failed to meet its burden of proof in showing that special work was 
available to Vaughan in Wyoming given his particular limitations.  Indeed, Dr. Brown, the Division's only 
witness, stated that this very area of expertise was outside his area of 
knowledge and was best left for determination by a vocational rehabilitation 
expert.  He also advised that he did 
not have knowledge of or perform any study or evaluation of the labor market in 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  Further, we 
explicitly recognize that Ms. Noecker, a specialist in the vocational arena who 
had detailed knowledge of the labor market in Wyoming, specifically indicated 
that Vaughan was not gainfully employable in a well known branch of the labor 
market in Wyoming so as to provide him with a steady and continuous source of 
income considering his mental ability, age, experience, training and physical 
limitations.  

 

[¶31]   As a last issue, Vaughan argues 
that the Medical Commission erroneously applied evidence that Vaughan was 
unwilling to become dependent on prescription non-narcotic pain medication as a 
basis for its decision.  Vaughan 
argues that the practical effect of this determination was that the Medical 
Commission found that Vaughan had committed harmful or injurious practices 
sufficient to deny him benefits as defined under § 27-14-407 (LexisNexis 2001) 
when this section was not asserted in pleadings nor argued at 
hearing.

 

[¶32]   Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-407 
provides:

 

            
If an injured employee knowingly engages or persists in an unsanitary or 
injurious practice which tends to imperil or retard his recovery, or if he 
refuses to submit to medical or surgical treatment reasonably essential to 
promote his recovery, he forfeits all right to compensation under this act.  Forfeiture shall be determined 
  by the hearing examiner upon 
application by the division or employer.  

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Clearly, the Division did 
not make any application before the Medical Commission as plainly required 
pursuant to § 27-14-407.  No mention 
is made of these issues in the Final Determination issued by the Division in 
this case, within the Division's Disclosure Statement, or otherwise during the 
entire pendency of this matter.  
Indeed, review of the record reveals that the Division brought forward 
those facts regarding the usage of prescription medication by Vaughan in an 
effort to minimize the level of pain felt by Vaughan as a result of the 
accident.  Therefore, it was 
improper for the Medical Commission to make its ruling on this issue as it was 
never properly placed before it.

 

[¶33]   Furthermore, we believe that our 
conclusion is consistent with fair and equitable due process.   Due process demands that an 
employee know before the hearing the specific nature of the claims 
asserted.  If the pleadings and 
notice of hearing are to mean anything in a contested case hearing, the 
administrative body must be limited in considering only those issues presented 
in the notice and pleadings.  In 
accord, Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶¶19-21, 19 P.3d 500, 
¶¶19-21 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶34]   Finally, we note that the record 
does not support a finding that the Division even remotely met its burden of 
proof as established concerning this issue.  See State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Wyo. 1997); Celotex 
Corp. v. Andren, 917 P.2d 178, 180 (Wyo. 1996); Stanolind Oil & Gas 
Co. v. Harvey, 75 P.2d 1, 2 (Wyo. 1938); In Re Hibler, 37 Wyo. 332, 
261 P. 648, 651 (Wyo. 1927). 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶35]   The Medical Commission erred as a 
matter of law in not properly applying the "odd lot" doctrine which is well 
established under Wyoming case law.  
In addition, the Medical Commission erred as a matter of law by failing 
to recognize that the definition of permanent total disability includes a 
condition which "permanently incapacitates the employee from performing work at 
any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by 
experience or training" which is consistent with the "odd lot" doctrine.  (Emphasis added.)  Further, the Medical Commission erred in 
its finding of fact since insufficient evidence exists to support its ultimate 
determination.  We also specifically 
conclude that sufficient evidence exists to support that Vaughan met his 
required burden of proof under the "odd lot" doctrine.  Conversely, insufficient evidence exists 
to establish that some kind of suitable work was regularly and continuously 
available to Vaughan given his limitations so as to provide Vaughan with a 
steady and continuous source of income as was required to be shown by the 
Division when the burden of proof shifted to the Division under the "odd lot" 
doctrine.  Finally, we hold that the 
Medical Commission erred when it determined that Vaughan's unwillingness to 
become dependent on prescription non-narcotic medication was an appropriate 
basis for its denial of benefits as this issue had not been properly brought 
before the Medical Commission by the Division in this 
case.

 

[¶36]   Reversed and remanded to the 
district court for its remand to the Medical Commission for entry of an order 
consistent with this opinion. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2001):

 

(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

(i)  Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 

(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

(B)  Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 

(C)  In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 

(D)  Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 

(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute. 

 

   2In making this holding, this court 
specifically abrogated previous case law which required this court to review the 
record in an administrative action by examining only that evidence that favors 
the prevailing party, allowing every favorable inference, while omitting 
consideration of any conflicting evidence.  
This previously required type of review was aptly characterized by this 
court as the "prevailing parties' evidence" concept.  Newman, at ¶25.    

 

3"For 
example, the administrative record may be replete with evidence supporting the 
decision, and yet the agency may have willfully discounted credible evidence, 
refused to admit certain testimony or documentary exhibits, or failed to provide 
findings of fact or conclusions of law."  
Newman, at ¶23.

 

4In 
1992, Vaughan underwent surgery concerning this same area of his back.  After this surgery, Vaughan completely 
recovered having no problems until his 1994 accident. 

 

5Dr. 
Terry A. Brown, an independent medical examiner in this case specializing in 
occupational medicine, also stated that he understood Vaughan's decision not to 
have this surgery. 

 

  6Vaughan's detailed occupational 
career history and educational history were also set forth in detail in the 
Vocational Evaluation Report made by Deann Noecker, M.A., a certified vocational 
evaluator and licensed professional counselor with a national counselor 
certification.  Ms. Noecker also 
testified at the hearing in this matter. 

 

7Vaughan's 
supervisor at that job indicated that Vaughan tried hard to succeed but was 
unable to sustain the work because of his pain and other symptoms.  Similarly, Dr. Brown stated that Vaughan 
had adapted well with his acknowledged chronic pain, had not given up on life, 
was not depressed or overly negative, and had some "energy to him."  

 

  8Vaughan's job search not only 
included inquiries with hotels, motels, convenience stores, craft shops, a gift 
shop, and cabinet shops but also with a video store, a realty company, a thrift 
shop, a liquor store, Federal Express, a veterinarian, K-Mart, Wal-Mart, a 
taxidermist, a utility company, a small engine shop, an auto shop, a glass shop, 
the VA Hospital, a carpet cleaner, as well as others.

 

  9Vaughan was also awarded Social 
Security disability benefits and continues to receive this assistance.