Title: Consolidated Freightways v. Drake

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Consolidated Freightways v. Drake1984 WY 34678 P.2d 874Case Number: 83-203Decided: 03/30/1984CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, APPELLANT (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT),

v.

RODNEY DRAKE, APPELLEE (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT),

v.

RODNEY DRAKE, APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Glenn Parker 
(argued) and Thomas A. Nicholas of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order awarding worker's compensation benefits to appellant for a traumatic 
neurosis created by his employment.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The statement of the 
issues, as presented by appellant are:

"1. Is `mental collapse' 
due to stressful working conditions, which are the same as those of other 
employees, compensable under Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Law?

"2. Was there substantial 
evidence of a causal connection between the conditions at Consolidated 
Freightways and the `mental collapse' of Claimant Drake?"

[¶4.]     Appellee began his 
employment in 1974 as an extra-board truck driver with Consolidated Freightways 
in Wichita, Kansas. An extra-board driver is on call 
twenty-four hours a day to take transports that the bid drivers cannot handle. 
After six months, appellee became a bid driver, which means that he drove trucks 
at scheduled times. Bid drivers have a definite schedule for driving and days 
off, while extra-board drivers do not.

[¶5.]     In 1980, appellant, 
Consolidated Freightways, reorganized their corporate structure and moved all 
the truck drivers out of Wichita into various other terminals. The 
drivers were allowed to bid the area in which they desired to relocate, subject 
to seniority. Appellee bid on Cheyenne, Wyoming. At the time they were making the 
bids, they were informed how many people were going into a given area; he bid 
Cheyenne 
believing he would have enough seniority that he would not be "laid off." 
Terminal management advised that his chances of becoming a bid driver almost 
immediately were excellent. Appellee moved to Cheyenne and began as an extra-board driver. He 
did not obtain a bid schedule until November 1982, two years after he had moved 
to Cheyenne and 
after filing a grievance through his union. During the second year appellee had 
complained of physical problems and fatigue. In January 1983, appellee and 
various other drivers were returned to the extra-board schedule due to a 
slowdown in freight passing through Cheyenne. After he was transferred back to the 
extra-board schedule, appellee suffered a mental breakdown and depression and 
did not return to work.

I

MENTAL COLLAPSE DUE TO 
WORKING CONDITIONS

[¶6.]     Arthur Larson in his 
treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 42.20 has delineated an analysis 
of three types of psychic injury: (1) a mental stimulus which causes a physical 
injury; (2) a physical trauma which causes a nervous injury; and (3) a mental 
stimulus which causes a nervous injury. This third type of psychiatric injury 
does not involve either physical causes nor physical results. The present 
situation fits within this third category.

[¶7.]     Professor Larson states 
that there is already a distinct majority position which supports compensability 
in these cases, but acknowledges that there is a substantial number of 
jurisdictions which deny compensation in the third category. Id., § 
42.23.

[¶8.]     A number of states that 
have allowed compensation for psychic injuries produced by mental stimulus have 
done so if a dramatic psychological trauma was present. However, Larson states, 
id., § 42.23(b) at p. 7-637 that:

"The fact that the 
stimulus is gradual, in the form of sustained tension, worry, strain, 
frustration, or harassment, does not, in the opinion of the majority of the 
courts that have dealt with the question, make nervous injury any the less 
compensable than if it were caused by sudden shock. * * *"

Larson argues 
that

"The real distinction 
here should be, not between sudden and gradual stimuli, but between gradual 
stimuli that are sufficiently more damaging than those of every day employment 
life to satisfy the normal `arising-out-of' test, and those that are not. * * *" 
§ 42.23(b) at p. 7-639.

[¶9.]     The standards from 
other jurisdictions range from the totally subjective standard to the objective 
viewpoint. The subjective test focuses on the employee's own perception of 
reality in that if the claimant honestly perceives that there is some personal 
injury causing a disability during the ordinary work of employment he is 
entitled to recover. Deziel v. Difco 
Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1, 97 A.L.R.3d 121 (1978). 
The objective viewpoint holds that the employee can recover if he is 
incapacitated by a mental or emotional disorder which is causally related to a 
series of specific stress-related incidents but not if the disability is caused 
by the general stress of his working conditions. Camaioni's Case, 7 Mass. App. 927, 389 N.E.2d 1028 (1979).

[¶10.]  Larson recommends Wisconsin's approach as 
producing the most straight forward and reasonable method of determining whether 
an injury is compensable. Id., § 42.23(b) at p. 7-639. 
Thus,

"* * * in order for 
nontraumatically caused mental injury to be compensable in a workmen's 
compensation case, the injury must have resulted from a situation of greater 
dimensions than the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions which all employees 
must experience." (Footnote omitted.) Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of 
Industry, Labor and Health Relations, 72 Wis.2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128, 130 
(1976).

See, School District #1, Village of Brown Deer v. 
Dept. of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).

[¶11.]  Maine has adopted this position with the 
additional proviso that covers the subjective "eggshell," i.e., that ordinary 
work stresses will be compensable if clear and convincing evidence exists that 
the trauma is created predominantly from the employment. Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, Me., 404 A.2d 1014 
(1979). New 
Jersey held that in order for mental illness to be 
compensable, there must be objective evidence which, viewed realistically, 
carries the burden of proof that work was the contributing factor. Williams v. Western Electric Co., 178 
N.J. Super. 571, 429 A.2d 1063 (1981). In Gamble v. New York State Narcotics Addict 
Control Comm'n, 60 A.D.2d 703, 400 N.Y.Supp.2d 599 (1977), the court held 
that a psychic trauma relating to a job change was compensable. Oregon has held that 
causation is established even without an extraordinary unexpected event; that 
the condition of employment does not have to be unusual; and that the claimant 
can have existing mental problems. Korter 
v. EBI Companies, Inc., 46 Or. App. 43, 610 P.2d 312 (1980). Recovery was 
also allowed for a continuing increasing pressure associated with the work load 
which created emotional disability. Shilling v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 46 
Or. App. 117, 610 P.2d 845 (1980).

[¶12.]  Wyoming Worker's Compensation Law defines 
injury as

"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, and includes 
damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer, incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. * * 
*"

Section 27-12-102(xii), 
W.S. 1977.

This definition 
is broad enough to include mental trauma within the phrase "any harmful change 
in the human organism other than normal aging." Therefore, the question to be 
resolved is whether the injury was one "arising out of and in the course of 
employment." This is a case of first impression in Wyoming.

[¶13.]  We have previously stated the policy that 
worker's compensation laws should be liberally construed whenever reasonably 
possible. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 
566 P.2d 219 (1977). Thus, we hold that a non-traumatically caused mental injury 
is compensable under our worker's compensation law if it results from a 
situation or condition in employment that is of greater magnitude than the 
day-to-day mental stresses and tensions all employees usually experience. This 
standard appropriately balances the interest of the employee and the interests 
of the employers as well as incorporates the policy and intent of Wyoming worker's 
compensation laws.

[¶14.]  We have stated 
that:

"Whether an injury arises 
out of and in the course of employment is a question for the trier of fact in a 
worker's compensation case. The burden is on the worker to prove that this 
injury arose in the course of employment. There must be some substantial 
competent evidence to warrant the trier of fact drawing such an inference. * * 
*" Matter of Van Matre, Wyo. 
657 P.2d 815, 816 (1983).

It is the law of 
this state that the judgment of the trier of fact will not be disturbed when the 
fact findings are supported by substantial evidence. Williams v. Northern Development Co., 
Wyo., 425 P.2d 594 (1967).

[¶15.]  Applying these rules to appellee's claim, 
we note that there was evidence that his injury resulted from a situation of 
greater dimensions than the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions which are 
part of daily life. He was forced into a transfer because of a corporate 
reorganization. Because of the reasonable expectations of the job situation, he 
should have been made a bid driver very quickly. This did not occur. He did not 
become a bid driver until his union filed a grievance. Shortly after becoming a 
bid driver, he was again demoted to extra-board status. Extra-board status 
created constant confusion, stress, and uncertainty. This yo-yo effect was 
sufficiently unexpected and created stresses and strains outside of the ordinary 
day-to-day pressures.

[¶16.]  An employee is entitled to a presumption 
that the evidence presented at a worker's compensation hearing sustained the 
judgment. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel., Workmen's Compensation 
Department v. Schultz, 
Wyo., 444 P.2d 313 (1968). The 
trial judge in this case noted that in regard to an objective degree of risk 
incidental to employment that

[¶17.]  "* * * in Mr. Drake's case the doctor 
clearly states that Mr. Drake is suffering `a traumatic neurosis as the result 
of either physical or psychological trauma * * *'"

He further 
stated

"* * * [c]ertainly a 
review of the authorities would reveal that claims may properly arise out of job 
conditions such as existed here where a particular position attained by the 
claimant after substantial struggle was suddenly snatched from 
him."

Whether or not 
this particular claim for compensation can be considered to result from a 
situation or condition of employment that is of greater magnitude than the 
day-to-day mental stresses and tensions which all employees must experience is a 
close question. The trial court found the evidence sufficient. We will not 
interfere with the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous or 
manifestly wrong and totally against the evidence. Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., 
Wyo. 665 P.2d 452 (1983). We will not substitute our judgment for the fact finder's 
determination of facts in the presence of substantial evidence. Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 
(1981). There being substantial evidence to support this determination, it will 
not be disturbed.

II

THE CAUSAL 
RELATIONSHIP

[¶18.]  Appellant contends that appellee did not 
sustain the burden of proof required of a claimant under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act and the provisions of § 27-12-603(a), W.S. 1977.1

[¶19.]  We recently stated in Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 671 P.2d 303 (1983), that the 
claimant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence in worker's 
compensation cases.

[¶20.]  Dr. Preble stated in his deposition 
that

"Mr. Drake is currently 
suffering from a traumatic neurosis, a traumatic neurosis as the result of 
either physical or psychological trauma that tests the extent of his coping 
mechanisms to the point that he's no longer able to cope.

"And the result is a 
state of anxiety coupled with depression in Mr. Drake's case. Now I've given the 
symptoms of that, which include intrusive thoughts, fears that are not entirely 
rational, inability to sleep, inability to relax with again, intrusive obsessive 
thoughts about the very situation that brought on the trauma, in this case the 
announcement that he was going to return from board to bid after all the work he 
had put into getting bid duty."

[¶21.]  The doctor further 
testified:

"Q. Doctor I think the 
bottom line question is going to come out eventually: Is this condition of Mr. 
Drake's work-related?

"A. Yes. My answer to 
that is yes.

"Q. And caused by his 
employment circumstances or situation?

"A. And caused by his 
work situation * * *"

[¶22.]  We have stated that an injury is 
compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. A causal 
connection is supplied "when there is a nexus between the injury and some 
condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment." Matter of Willey, Wyo. 
571 P.2d 248, 250 (1977).

[¶23.]  There was substantial evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's finding of a causal relationship between the 
conditions at work and the subsequent mental collapse. Therefore, the decision 
is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 27-12-603(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) The burden of proof 
in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial period of 
time is on the employee to make proper proof of his claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and to also prove by competent medical authority that his claim 
arose out of and in the course of his employment, by showing by a preponderance 
of evidence that:

"(i) There is a direct 
causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which the work is 
performed and the injury;

"(ii) The injury can be 
seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the 
employment;

"(iii) The injury can 
fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause;

"(iv) The injury does not 
come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally exposed outside of 
the employment; and

"(v) The injury is 
incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation 
of employer and employee."

BROWN, Justice, dissenting, 
joined by ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶24.]  The majority adopts a rule that states, 
"Non-traumatically caused mental injury is compensible * * * if it results from 
a situation or condition in employment that is of greater magnitude than the 
day-to-day mental stress and tensions all employees usually 
experience."

[¶25.]  The problem I have is that the majority 
does not correctly apply the rule it adopts to the facts of this case. The rule 
adopted by the majority is substantially the rule adopted in School District # 1, Village of Brown Deer 
v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373, 377 (1974):

"* * * Mental injury 
non-traumatically caused must have resulted from a situation of greater 
dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees 
must experience. * * *"

The same rule 
was adopted in Sloss v. Industrial 
Commission, 121 Ariz. 10, 588 P.2d 303 (1978); Owens v. National Health Laboratories, 
Inc., 8 Ark. App. 92, 648 S.W.2d 829 (1983); Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, 
Me., 404 A.2d 1014 (1979); Seitz v. L 
& R Industries, Inc., Etc., R.I., 437 A.2d 1345 (1981); Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of 
Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 72 Wis.2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976). 
See also 1B Larson Workmen's Compensation Law, § 42.23(b), p. 7-639 
(1982).

[¶26.]  The cases cited above, beginning with the 
1974 Wisconsin case, hold that the worker must 
show more than the ordinary day-to-day stress to which all workers are 
subjected. The test to determine compensible mental injury announced by the 
majority is not a subjective test, that is, it is not how the employee reacts to 
the stress on the job; rather, it is an objective test, that is, whether the 
duties of the job subject the worker to greater stress than his fellow 
employees. Pima Community 
College v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 137 Ariz. App. 137, 669 P.2d 115 
(1983).

[¶27.]  The majority has decided this case on the 
basis of a subjective test; in other words, how Mr. Drake, the appellee, reacted 
to the stress he experienced as a truck driver. This is contrary to cases cited 
by the majority and other cases I have cited.

[¶28.]  The majority has not pointed to any 
evidence showing that appellee was subject to different or greater stress than 
his fellow truck drivers. My examination of the record reveals there is no such 
evidence. In fact, appellee's own testimony is to the contrary. For example, 
when appellee was transferred from a bid driver to an extra board driver seven 
other fellow employees were also transferred. To further illustrate that 
appellee's situation was the same as other drivers, he testified at 
trial:

"Q. Did Consolidated 
Freightways treat any of the drivers different as to when - or the amount of 
time they could take for a vacation? In other words, is this two weeks, up to 
ten years, is that uniformly applicable to all drivers?

"A. Yes. 

"Q. What about sick 
leave, is that the same?

"A. That's the 
same.

"Q. Do any of the bid 
drivers in Wyoming know what their hours 
are?

"A. Just a few, a few of 
the very top number one bid drivers, they know pretty well just about what time 
of the day they're going to go.

"Q. And the rest of them 
don't have any idea, do they?

"A. 
No.

"Q. The extra board 
drivers don't have much idea about what their hours are 
either?

"A. 
No.

"Q. And that's uniformly 
applicable to all extra board drivers?

"A. As far as the rules 
are concerned, yes."

[¶29.]  "The burden of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence in worker's compensation cases is assigned to the claimant." Randell v. WyomingState 
Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division, Wyo., 671 P.2d 303 
(1983).

[¶30.]  Appellee has failed to produce any 
evidence to show that the stress he was subjected to on the job was greater or 
any different than that experienced by his fellow 
employees.

[¶31.]  I would reverse.