Title: Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Hasegawa

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

512 P.2d 1 (1973) MATSON TERMINALS, INC., Appellant-Appellee, v. Robert S. HASEGAWA, Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii, Appellee, and Clifford Nobriga et al., Appellees-Appellants. No. 5320. Supreme Court of Hawaii. July 16, 1973. Rehearing Denied August 16, 1973. Edward H. Nakamura, Honolulu (Bouslog & Symonds, Honolulu, of counsel), for appellees-appellants. Robert S. Katz, Honolulu (Torkildson, Katz & Conahan, Honolulu, of counsel), for appellant-appellee. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ. KOBAYASHI, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court reversing the referee for *2 unemployment compensation appeals who had ruled that the appellants were entitled to unemployment benefits covering periods for which they were suspended from their jobs with appellee. The facts in this case have been stipulated to by the parties herein. The sole question before this court is the construction of HRS § 383-30(2), specifically the word "discharged" as provided therein: Appellants were suspended during December 1969 and January 1970 for periods ranging from three to seven days for misconduct connected with their work. The referee for unemployment compensation held that the phrase "discharged for misconduct" cannot be construed to include "suspension for misconduct" and ruled that the appellants were entitled to unemployment compensation. The trial court, in part, stated in its decision as follows: We are of the opinion that the legislative wisdom or lack of wisdom is not a proper issue before the court. Neither can the court guess as to the "probable" legislative intent when the words used in the statute are clear and unambiguous. The court cannot "question the probable legislative intent and construe the statute", which is clear on its face, and insert a meaning that the court, itself, believes is logical. In the instant case the trial court clearly stated that "there is no doubt that discharge has an accepted commonly used meaning, that is, a final termination, release or dismissal, while suspension means a temporary postponement". In the face of such a statement, and which statement we agree with, we are unable to follow the logic of the trial court when the court in essence concludes that "suspension for misconduct" is synonymous with "discharge for misconduct". A well established statutory rule of construction is: Twentieth Century Furniture, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board, 52 Haw. 577, 579-580, 482 P.2d 151, 152-153 (1971). We are of the opinion that the statute is clear and unambiguous and the trial court is in error in reading into the statute an ambiguity that does not exist. We are of the further opinion that the logic and intent advocated by appellee and the trial court is a matter strictly for the legislature to consider. Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of appellants. LEVINSON, Justice (dissenting). I dissent. I think that the decision of the trial court, quoted in part by the majority, was correct and is supported by Chang v. Meagher, 40 Haw. 96, at 102 (1953) where this court said: We said in Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Haw. 150, 153, 433 P.2d 220, 223 (1967): "We are aware of the many canons of construction which are supposed to aid a court in construing a statute. But we are also aware that for every construction exhorting a court to a literal interpretation of a statute there is a contrary one which justifies construction in a more liberal manner." We cited Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals 522-35 (1960) "for a substantial list of contradictory canons of construction." Ibid. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.