Title: People v. Benjamin

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

591 P.2d 89 (1979) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Francis Louis BENJAMIN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 28403. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 26, 1979. Rehearing Denied March 19, 1979. *90 J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Kathleen M. Bowers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee. J. Gregory Walta, Colo. State Public Defender, Craig L. Truman, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Ilene P. Buchalter, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant. ROVIRA, Justice. The defendant was convicted by a jury of violating the first-degree assault statute, 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-3-202(1)(a)[1] for inflicting serious bodily injury upon another with a knife and was sentenced to a term of eight to twelve years at the Colorado State Penitentiary. He moved for resentencing under Crim.P. 35(b) on the basis that his prosecution, conviction, and sentencing for a class three felony under the first-degree assault statute instead of for a class four felony under the second-degree assault statute, 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-3-203(1)(b),[2] violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. The issue raised by the defendant is whether sections 18-3-202(1)(a) and 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S.1973, proscribe the same conduct. If so, prosecution and sentencing under the more severe penalties of the former statute would violate the defendant's constitutional rights to equal protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The basis of the defendant's attack on this statutory scheme is his contention that "serious bodily injury" under section 18-3-202(1)(a) is indistinguishable from "bodily injury" under section 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S.1973. The following principles, as set forth in People v. Summit, 183 Colo. 421, 517 P.2d 850 (1974), guide this court's review of constitutional attacks on legislation: first, we presume that a statute is constitutional; second, one who assails a statute bears the burden of showing that it is unconstitutional. Finally, where the equal protection clause is invoked, absent a suspect classification, there need only be a rational basis to uphold the statute. The standard for resolution of this issue was set forth in People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). A statutory attempt to differentiate terms and proscribe different penalties for each is unconstitutional if "[the distinction] is not sufficiently apparent to be intelligently and uniformly applied." Serious bodily injury and bodily injury are defined in section 18-1-901, C.R.S.1973, as follows: . . . . . At least one difference between serious bodily injury and bodily injury is that of degree. In People v. Martinez, 189 Colo. 408, 540 P.2d 1091 (1975), we considered the distinction between these terms and stated: "The basic element is injury to a person's body, the difference being one of the degree of the injury." We reiterated that concept in People v. Jackson, 194 Colo. 93, 570 P.2d 527 (1977): The gravity of the injury required to sustain an assault prosecution under section 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S.1973, is clearly greater than that required under section 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S.1973. As such, the distinction between the terms "serious bodily injury" and "bodily injury" is sufficiently apparent to be intelligently and uniformly applied. The appellant has failed to meet his burden of proving that this statutory scheme violates his right to equal protection. Accordingly, we affirm the district court order which denied defendant's motion for resentencing. [1] Now section 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S.1973. Subsequent references will be to the 1973 compilation. [2] Now section 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S.1973. Subsequent references will be to the 1973 compilation.