Title: Messier v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 87-392
 
 
James Messier and Sylvia Messier             Supreme Court
 
   v.                                        On Appeal from
                                             Franklin Superior Court
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
and Cheryl Coutts                            November Term, 1988
 
 
John P. Meaker, J.
 
Valsangiacomo, Detora, McQuesten, Rose and Grearson, Barre, for plaintiffs-
   appellees
 
A. Gregory Rainville of Northern Trial Associates and Michael Rose (On the
   Brief), St. Albans, for defendant-appellant, Cheryl Coutts
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.
 
 
     DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiffs James and Sylvia Messier sued the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company and Cheryl Coutts to establish their rights as
beneficiaries under a life insurance policy in the name of their deceased
son, Michael.  Cheryl Coutts (defendant), who had been engaged to be married
to the insured, claimed that he made her the beneficiary before his death.
The insurance company brought counter- and cross-claims in interpleader to
request that the court decide between the competing claimants to the policy
proceeds.  Relying on a stipulation of facts that was not signed by
defendant, the superior court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.  Defendant appeals, and we reverse and remand for trial.
     Michael Messier (insured) died on November 19, 1985, from injuries
sustained while working for Wyeth Nutritionals, Inc. in Georgia, Vermont.
Wyeth supplied its employees group life insurance through Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company.  The policy provided that an employee could designate a
beneficiary by filing a written notice with the employer, who kept records
of beneficiary designations.  The employee could change his beneficiary at
any time, also by filing a written notice.  On March l, 1984, the insured
designated his parents, the plaintiffs, as his beneficiaries.
     In August, 1984, defendant and the insured began to live together and
planned to be married on November 30, 1985.  An affidavit from a Wyeth
personnel assistant indicates that, two weeks before his death on November
19, 1985, the insured requested information about naming defendant as his
beneficiary.  He was given the necessary cards to fill out, but there is no
direct evidence that he returned the cards to the personnel section.  A
search of his personnel records did not turn up the cards.
       The insured told at least two persons that he had changed the
beneficiary on his life insurance policy.  Other employees witnessed him
filling out the change of beneficiary forms.  The change of beneficiary
forms could not be found among the insured's possessions after his death.
     The court denied plaintiffs' first motion for summary judgment, which
was filed before discovery was completed.  When discovery was substantially
complete, plaintiffs again moved for summary judgment.  The court asked the
parties to submit a stipulation of facts on which the motion could be
decided.   Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a draft stipulation to defendant
and to the court, but defendant never signed it.
     The court subsequently granted summary judgment, stating that the
parties had stipulated to the facts and concluding that defendant had not
shown that the insured substantially complied with the insurer's require-
ments for changing the beneficiary.  The court also concluded that
defendant had failed to establish any equitable claim to the proceeds.  The
present appeal followed.
     The trial court stated that the summary judgment motion had been heard
and decided on the stipulation of the parties.  This statement was incorrect
since the defendant never agreed to the stipulation as drafted by
plaintiffs.  Although defendant argues that this error warrants reversal,
we do not agree.  The stipulation was derived from the discovery that had
been completed.  That discovery is in the record, and the parties fully
expected to obtain a ruling based on that discovery when the court suggested
making up a stipulation.  When we review the grant or denial of a summary
judgment motion, we apply the same standard as that applied in the trial
court.  See Thomas v. Farrell, No. 88-118, slip. op. at 3 (Vt. Oct. 20,
1989).  Thus, if we find  genuine issues of material fact, within the
meaning of V.R.C.P. 56(c), we must reverse the decision granting summary
judgment.  We can perform our review function based on the discovery in the
record and without considering the stipulation.
     Defendant next argues that the evidence offered in response to
plaintiffs' initial showing under V.R.C.P. 56 presented a genuine issue of
material fact.  Our rule on summary judgment is clear:  "summary judgment is
only appropriate when the materials before the court clearly show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact."  Morrisville Lumber Co. v.
Okcuoglu, 148 Vt. 180, 182-83,