Title: WOODS v. WOODS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WOODS v. WOODS2001 WY 13136 P.3d 1142Case Number: 01-25Decided: 12/20/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

STEVEN 
R. WOODS, 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

v.

ROGER A. 
WOODS, 

Appellee(Plaintiff),

                                                                                                

and

MARQUIETTA 
C. WOODS and

WELLS 
FARGO BANK WYOMING, N.A. 

Appellees(Intervenor) 
.

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bernard 
Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee Roger A. Woods:

No 
appearance.

 Representing 
Appellee Marquietta C. Woods: 

Janet L. 
Tyler, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A.:

            
Peter K. Michael, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
Steven 
Woods appeals from a district court order denying his motion and petition for 
immediate distribution of the corpus of a trust.  Finding that the order appealed from is 
not a final, appealable order, we dismiss this appeal.

ISSUES

[¶2]           
Steven 
Woods presents one issue as follows:

A trust 
agreement provided that distribution of the trust estate to named beneficiaries 
be made after all expenses attributable to the death of the grantor, all 
enforceable debts of the grantor, and "any estate or inheritance taxes" have 
been paid.  May a court deny 
distribution to the beneficiaries if all conditions precedent have been 
met?

Appellees 
Wells Fargo Bank and Marquietta Woods reframe the issues 
thus:

I.  Whether this appeal should be dismissed 
because there is no appealable order?

II. 
Whether the district court properly denied a beneficiary's motion for final 
distribution of trust real estate to the four beneficiaries as tenants in 
common?

FACTS

[¶3]           
In May 1997 
Roger Woods filed an action against Steven Woods in district court styled 
"Complaint for Accounting and Declaratory Judgment."  According to the allegations of the 
complaint, Raymond Woods, the father of Roger and Steven, had established a 
revocable trust.  Upon the death of 
Raymond Woods in 1995, Roger and Steven became co-trustees of the trust.  The beneficiaries of the trust are four 
adult children of Raymond Woods: Roger, Steven, Marquietta Woods, and Ronald 
Woods.  Under the terms of the 
trust, the trust assets are to be distributed to the beneficiaries after the 
payment of certain expenses.  

[¶4]           
Roger 
alleged in his complaint that, since the date of their father's death, Steven 
had refused to acknowledge Roger as a co-trustee, had refused to give Roger any 
information regarding the administration of the trust, and had refused to give 
Roger appropriate access to the trust records.  Roger requested the district court enter 
a declaration of the rights of Roger as co-trustee and order an immediate 
accounting of the administration of the trust.  

[¶5]           
Steven 
answered, denying all allegations against him, and included a counterclaim 
against Roger.  In his counterclaim, 
Steven alleged that Roger had breached his fiduciary duty to the trust, and 
requested the court remove Roger as a co-trustee. Marquietta was allowed to 
intervene.  In her motion for 
intervention, she requested the district court appoint a special master to 
provide an accounting and to establish a plan for distribution of the trust 
assets.  She specifically requested 
that the district court retain jurisdiction over the trust until the trust 
assets are distributed and settled.  
Eventually, pursuant to a motion by Marquietta, the district court 
removed both Roger and Steven as co-trustees and appointed Norwest Bank, now 
Wells Fargo Bank, as the trustee.  
Wells Fargo was allowed to intervene in order to allow it to utilize the 
rules of civil procedure to compel production of records of trust assets. 

[¶6]           
Wells 
Fargo submitted an interim accounting in January 1999, and in October 1999 made 
an interim distribution of some of the assets of the trust to the 
beneficiaries.  Wells Fargo alleged 
that several issues needed to be resolved before a final accounting and complete 
distribution of the trust could be accomplished. In May 2000, Steven filed a 
motion demanding immediate, in-kind distribution of the trust corpus, relying 
upon the following terms of the trust agreement:

Article VI  Payments at death of 
grantor.

A.        Upon 
the death of Grantor, Successor Trustee shall pay directly, or to Grantor's 
Personal Representatives as said Personal Representative shall direct, Grantor's 
funeral and burial expenses, claims legally enforceable against Grantor's 
Estate, expenses of administering Grantor's Estate including expenses of last 
illness, if any, attorney's and accountant's fees, if deemed necessary in the 
best judgment of Successor Trustee, and any estate and inheritance taxes payable 
by reason of Grantor's death.  If no 
Personal Representative is appointed, Successor Trustee shall pay all such 
expenses directly out of the Trust Estate. . . .

B.        After 
Grantor's death, and after making any payments necessary under the provisions of 
Paragraph A of this Article VI Successor Trustee shall, from the principal of 
the Trust Estate, transfer, convey and distribute equally to the Grantor's 
children, STEVEN R. WOODS, ROGER A. WOODS, RONALD D. WOODS and MARQUIETTA C. 
WOODS, share and share alike and the trust terminated. 

In his motion, Steven argued that 
the above terms of the trust regarding distribution had been fulfilled and thus 
the trust agreement required the immediate distribution of all trust assets. 

[¶7]           
At an 
evidentiary hearing on Steven's motion for distribution, both the trustee and 
the tax accountant for the trust testified that not all tax issues had been 
resolved.  Based upon this 
testimony, the district court ruled that the terms of the trust had not been 
fulfilled and denied Steven's motion and petition1 for distribution.  This appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]           
The decisive 
question in this appeal is whether the order denying immediate distribution 
constitutes a final, appealable order for purposes of appeal.  Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure defines an appealable order as:

(a) An order affecting a substantial 
right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and 
prevents a judgment; or

(b) An order affecting a substantial 
right made in a special proceeding; or

(c) An order made upon a summary 
application in an action after judgment; or

(d) An order, including a 
conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) 
and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment 
shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal by another party; 
or

(e) Interlocutory orders and decrees 
of the district courts which:

(1) Grant, continue, or modify 
injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve or modify 
injunctions; or

(2) Appoint receivers, or issue 
orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to accomplish the purposes 
thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of 
property.

Thus, for an order to be a final 
order subject to appeal, it must determine the action.  "Generally a judgment or order which 
determines the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future 
consideration is final and appealable, and it is not appealable unless it does 
those things.  4 C.J.S. Appeal and 
Errors § 94, p. 252."  Public Service Comm'n v. Lower 
Valley Power and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 
1980).  

[¶9]           
In the 
underlying case, both Roger and Marquietta Woods have asked for an accounting of 
the administration of the trust.  
While an interim accounting and an interim distribution of trust assets 
have been accomplished, there has not yet been a final accounting.  The district court maintains 
jurisdiction to take such further action as is necessary to accomplish the final 
accounting.  Thus, the order on 
appeal is clearly an interlocutory order and not appealable at this 
time.

[¶10]       
Because the 
order on appeal does not resolve the merits of the underlying claim, it is not 
an appealable order.  Therefore, 
this appeal is dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1After filing his motion demanding 
distribution, Steven also asked leave of the district court to file a petition 
to compel distribution.  The record 
before this Court does not indicate that the district court ever granted leave 
to file the petition.