Title: Blue Stem Feed Yards v. Craft

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

191 Kan. 605 (1963)
383 P.2d 540
BLUE STEM FEED YARDS, INC., Appellant,
v.
CHARLES CRAFT, Defendant, and RUNNELS W. COX, Also Known as R.W. COX and JOHN T. COX, Partners, Doing Business in the Name of TOM J. COX AND SONS, CONTRACTORS, Appellees.
No. 43,180

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 10, 1963.
George Stallwitz, of Wichita, and Russ B. Anderson, of Emporia, argued the cause, and Owen S. Samuel, of Emporia, was with them on the brief for the appellant.
Samuel Mellinger, of Emporia, argued the cause, and John G. Atherton, of Emporia, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
Plaintiff corporation was the owner of three large sheep-feeding barns which were destroyed by fire. It brought this action to recover its loss. The petition was framed upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Defendant Craft answered, and is not involved in this appeal.
Defendants Cox demurred to the petition on the ground it failed to contain allegations sufficient to constitute a cause of action
The demurrer was sustained.
Plaintiff has appealed.
The sole question presented is whether  as to defendant Cox  the petition alleges a cause of action based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Because of the nature of the question, no attempt will be made to summarize the lengthy and detailed allegations of the petition  and, omitting formal parts  it reads:
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As stated, the question is whether the foregoing petition states a cause of action against defendants Cox upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Although it may be conceded there appears to be some inconsistency in the many decisions of this court in the application of the doctrine to the many factual situations presented  the definition of the phrase is so well established as to leave no doubt of its meaning.
Literally speaking, the phrase means "the thing speaks for itself." It is a rule of evidence, rather than of substantive law, and does not alter the universal rule that negligence is never presumed but must be proved. Ordinarily the doctrine has application only to that limited class of negligence cases where the instrumentality or thing *611 causing the injury or damage is under the exclusive control of the defendant at the time of the injury or damage, and the surrounding circumstances are such as to leave no reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom other than that the casualty in question happened because of the negligence of defendant. The inference of negligence is deducible, not from the mere happening of the event, but from the attendant circumstances, and, such circumstances being shown, but the actual facts of just what happened being without the knowledge of plaintiff, it then devolves upon defendant to offer evidence by way of explanation. In some instances the doctrine has been applied although exclusive control of the thing or instrumentality was not in defendant at the time of the happening of the event, the test in such cases being whether defendant was in control at the time of the negligent act or omission, which, either at that time or later, produced the injury or damage. (Mayes v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 121 Kan. 648, 249 Pac. 599; Sipe v. Helgerson, 159 Kan. 290, 153 P.2d 934; Emigh v. Andrews, 164 Kan. 732, 191 P.2d 901; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317, 38 A.L.R.2d 887; Lamb v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 180 Kan. 157, 300 P.2d 387; Worden v. Union Gas System, 182 Kan. 686, 324 P.2d 501; Wehkamp v. City of Garden City, 187 Kan. 310, 356 P.2d 826.) See also 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 220 (2), p. 987, and 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 295, p. 989.
By way of summary, it may be said that inherent in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are three essential elements: (1) The thing or instrumentality causing the damage or injury must be within the exclusive control of the defendant; (2) the happening must be of such kind or nature as ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, and (3) the happening must not have been due to the fault or contributory negligence of the one seeking redress.
Measuring the allegations of this petition against those requirements for invocation of the doctrine, we are of the opinion they are sufficient to state a cause of action as to defendants Cox. All contentions made by such defendants in support of their position have been examined and considered, but we nevertheless believe the petition is sufficient to withstand the demurrer. What the proof may show is of course another thing, but we are dealing here only with the allegations of the petition. The order sustaining the demurrer of defendants Cox is therefore reversed.
JACKSON, J., concurs in the result.