Title: McGinty v. Hoosier

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,674 
 
LETHA MCGINTY AND HAROLD MICHAEL MCGINTY, 
A/K/A MICHAEL MCGINTY, 
Appellees, 
 
v. 
 
THERESA M. HOOSIER; MARGARET E.C. CLARDY; EDWARD L. STOUT IV; 
MARTHA LEE KORBA; EILEEN V. CURTIS; L.J. CURTIS;  
VICKIE SUE DIECKGRAFE, F/K/A VICKIE SUE CURTIS; 
BEVERLY HIPP, A/K/A BEVERLY CURTIS HIPP; BILLIE HIPP; 
CHERI L. MACY, F/K/A CHERI L. CURTIS; 
TAMMY A. MORLOCK, F/K/A TAMMY CURTIS; 
and CORAL PRODUCTION CORP., 
Appellants. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
When a court order partitioning real estate sets forth the legal description of the 
tract to be partitioned without exception or reservation, the order purports to partition the 
entire estate in the described real property. 
 
2. 
Due process requires that notice of a partition action must be given to all real 
property owners whose legal rights are directly and adversely affected by the partition 
judgment. However, an action to partition real estate pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1003 shall be 
valid as against the property owners over which the partitioning court acquired 
jurisdiction, unless the partition judgment shall adversely affect the property interests of 
coowners of the subject real estate who were not joined in the partition action. 
2 
 
 
 
3. 
A sheriff's deed in a partition action shall vest in the grantee as good and perfect 
estate in the property being partitioned as was vested in the parties to the partition action 
against whom the partition order was issued. 
 
4. 
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact that affects the judgment. 
 
Appeal from Stafford District Court; HANNELORE KITTS, judge. Opinion filed September 24, 
2010. Affirmed. 
 
Tyler E. Heffron, of Triplett, Woolf & Garretson, LLC, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Timothy 
E. McKee, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellants.  
 
Robert W. Christensen, of Law Office of Robert W. Christensen, of Medicine Lodge, argued the 
cause, and Gregory L. Bauer, of Law Offices of Bauer, Pike, Pike, & Johnson, Chtd., of Great Bend, was 
with him on the brief for appellees. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  The defendants in this quiet title action, Theresa M. Hoosier, et al. 
(collectively referred to as defendants), appeal the district court's granting of summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Letha McGinty and Michael McGinty (collectively 
referred to as the McGintys). The district court judgment declared that, by virtue of a 
sheriff's deed in partition dated April 8, 1974, the McGintys acquired ownership of 100% 
of the surface interest and 50% of the minerals interest in and to the South Half of the 
Northeast Quarter (S/2 NE/4) of Section Thirty-six (36), Township Twenty-one South 
(21S), Range Fourteen West (14W), Stafford County, Kansas (hereafter referred to as the 
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subject tract). Defendants only challenge the McGintys' ownership of the minerals 
interest. We affirm the district court judgment, quieting title in the McGintys. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
The defendants' claims in this case are founded upon a challenge to an action 
commenced in 1973 in which one of the issues involved the partitioning of the subject 
real estate. A recitation of the chain of title on the subject property and the procedural 
history of the prior partition action is likely to become confusing and difficult to follow. 
Accordingly, we will try to summarize wherever possible and avoid a detailed description 
of any fact or procedural anomaly that is not essential for this decision, while assuring the 
parties that we are intimately familiar with all the nuances of the case. 
 
In 1890 and for some 50 years thereafter, the subject real estate was owned by 
W.L. Curtis. Upon W.L.'s death, his widow, Margaret C. Curtis, acquired title and deeded 
a remainder interest to five people:  Donald C. Hutchinson, Lester A. Curtis, General 
Curtis, William L. Curtis, and Harry W. Curtis. In 1953, Donald, General, William, and 
the children of Harry—Ruth Curtis and Donna Curtis—deeded their respective interests 
in the surface property rights to Lester, but each reserved their respective interests in the 
oil, gas, and minerals rights. At that point, Lester owned 100% of the surface and 20% of 
the mineral interests; Donald, General, and William each owned 20% of the mineral 
interests; and Ruth and Donna each owned 10% of the mineral interests. 
 
Lester quitclaimed one-half of his interest to his wife, Opal. Upon his death in 
1964, Lester's children—Beverly Hipp, Lester A. Curtis, Jr., and Donald Curtis—and five 
grandchildren—Billie Hipp, Cheri Curtis, L.J. Curtis, Vickie Curtis, and Tammy Curtis—
acquired fractional interests in the other one-half of Lester's interest. In 1972, Opal 
transferred her interest to her son, Lester A. Curtis, Jr.   
4 
 
 
 
 
A year later, Opal's daughter, Beverly Hipp, acting as Opal's conservator, filed suit 
to set aside Opal's deed to Lester, Jr. At the same time, Beverly (acting individually and 
as Opal's conservator), together with Helen Stout (the daughter of General Curtis and his 
widow, Martha Curtis), filed a partition action on a different tract of real estate owned by 
the Curtis family (hereafter referred to as "other tract"). The named defendants were:  
Donald, William L., Lester, Jr., Cheri, L.J., Vickie, and Tammy. The two actions were 
consolidated. 
 
Included with Lester, Jr.'s, answer to the partition action on the other tract was a 
cross-petition, praying for the partition of additional real estate coowned by members of 
the Curtis family. The ultimate amended cross-petition included the subject tract, which 
was simply described by the legal description without any mention of mineral interests. 
Only the successors to Lester's interest, i.e., those who owned 100% of the surface 
interest and 20% of the mineral interest, were identified in the cross-petition as owners of 
the subject tract. 
 
Helen Stout, who had at least a remainder interest in 20% of the mineral interest of 
the subject tract, filed an answer to the amended cross-petition in which she declared that 
she had no ownership interest in the subject tract. Likewise, William L. Curtis, Jr., who 
owned at least a remainder interest in one-half of William's interest, i.e., 10% of the total 
mineral interest, was named and served in the consolidated partition action. The owners 
of the remaining 50% of the mineral interest were not personally served in the action, 
were apparently not served by publication notice, and did not participate in the action 
partitioning the subject tract.  From the title information in the record, it appears that the 
owners of that remaining 50% interest are the successors in interest to Harry's 20% 
interest (previously identified as passing 10% each to Ruth and Donna); the successors in 
interest to Donald's 20% interest (identified as the Testamentary Trust of Donald C. 
5 
 
 
 
Hutchinson); and the successors in interest to one-half of William's interest, i.e., 10% 
(identified as having passed to Paul Dallas Curtis). 
 
Ultimately, the district court determined that it possessed both personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction to partition the subject tract and ordered that the land be sold. 
In describing the ownership of the property, the court only listed Lester's successors, i.e., 
the persons who collectively owned all of the surface interest and 20% of the mineral 
interest. After the applicable statutory procedures and notifications, the sheriff conducted 
a public sale at which the property was sold to Michael and James McGinty. The 
recorded sheriff's deed, dated April 8, 1974, describes the property by its legal 
description, without any mention of severed mineral interests, and recites that the sheriff 
had been directed by the court to convey to the purchaser "all of the right, title and 
interest which the plaintiffs and the defendants have or claim to have in and to said real 
estate." Apparently, all of the net sale proceeds were distributed to a trustee for Opal 
Curtis. 
 
Some 32 years later, the McGintys filed this quiet title action, claiming to own all 
the surface interest and one-half of the mineral interest. Eventually, both sides filed a 
motion for summary judgment. The defendants claimed that the McGintys did not own 
any of the mineral interest because the sheriff's sale of the mineral interests was void. 
They argued that the court was without personal or subject matter jurisdiction to partition 
the mineral estate because only 20% of the mineral interest owners were ever properly 
served with notice, violating the "unity of partition rule"; that any sale of those mineral 
interests without proper notice violated due process; and that the sheriff's deed was 
defective because it made no mention of the mineral reservation. Alternatively, 
defendants claimed that only 20% of the mineral interest could pass with the sheriff's 
deed. 
 
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The McGintys countered that the only persons who could attack the partition 
judgment were those owners who were never properly served with notice of the partition 
action and had not participated in that action, i.e., the owners of or successors to the 50% 
of the mineral interest which the McGintys were not claiming. They also suggested that 
because none of the pleadings or court orders mentioned the mineral interests and the 
sheriff's deed did not contain a mineral reservation, the deed was effective to transfer all 
of the interests of all of the parties to the action.  
 
The district court agreed with the McGintys. The court found that all of the named 
parties in the 1973 lawsuit were served with the amended cross-petition to partition the 
subject tract, even though not all of the parties were represented by counsel or filed an 
answer. The court determined that the named parties in the partition action who had an 
interest in the subject tract collectively owned all of the surface rights and one-half of the 
mineral rights. The court noted that nothing in any of the partitioning court's orders or in 
the sheriff's deed purported to except or reserve the mineral interests, but to the contrary, 
the sheriff's deed indicated that it was conveying all of the interests of the plaintiffs and 
defendants in the partition action. Therefore, the court found that the sheriff's deed had 
conveyed all of the surface rights and 50% of the mineral rights. The court further noted 
that there had been no appeal of the district court's confirmation of the sheriff's sale, and 
that to allow a challenge to that judgment over 30 years after it was entered would run 
counter to the principle that the law favors finality of litigation. 
 
The defendants present their challenge on appeal in the form of multiple stated 
issues and subissues, although the crux of their argument is that the sheriff's deed did not 
convey the mineral interests of those persons who were parties to the partition action.  
The defendants begin by asserting that Kansas law requires that all of the owners of a 
particular property must be made parties to an action to partition that property. They 
contend that requirement is the law established in prior Kansas cases and in the 
7 
 
 
 
applicable partition statute. They attempt to bolster their argument by citing to cases from 
selected other states and by stating policy considerations they believe favor their result. 
The defendants also complain that the partitioning court failed to rule on a motion to 
strike which raised the same defense:  that the McGintys knew or should have known that 
they were not purchasing any mineral interests at the sheriff's sale; and that the plaintiffs 
in this action admitted that all of the property owners are necessary for a valid partition. 
 
The defendants then argue that any partition of any interests in the minerals, 
including that interest owned by the cross-petitioners, is void and defective.  They 
contend that the undisputed fact that not all of the mineral interests owners were parties 
to the partition action deprived the district court of jurisdiction to partition any interest in 
the minerals.   
 
Further, the defendants argue that, given that a sheriff's deed is akin to a quitclaim 
deed, it could not convey the mineral interests which the court lacked jurisdiction to 
partition. They also believe that it is determinative that the pleadings and sheriff's deed 
failed to mention the mineral interests, i.e., no mineral interests were partitioned. 
 
Defendants make a brief argument that the existence of controverted facts should 
have precluded summary judgment, albeit they fail to identify any disputed facts that 
were material to the court's decision. Included under this issue is the curious argument 
that affirming the district court will not resolve the title issues on the subject tract, 
because they allege one cannot know whose mineral interests should be taken away to 
make up the 50% interest awarded to the McGintys.   
 
Finally, and alternatively, defendants assert that, at most, the sheriff's deed only 
conveyed 20% of the mineral interest. The argument is based on the cross-petition's 
8 
 
 
 
description of ownership and the testimony of an attorney who was involved in the 
partition action. 
 
We will take the liberty to consolidate and redefine the issues for discussion. 
 
NECESSITY TO JOIN ALL OWNERS 
 
We begin by addressing the defendants' suggestion that all partition actions in this 
State must include as named parties each and every owner of all of the interests that may 
be outstanding in the real estate to be partitioned. We disagree with that premise. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The defendants ask us to decide a question of law over which we exercise 
unlimited review. See Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 283 Kan. 911, 916, 157 P.3d 1109 
(2007) (appellate court exercises unlimited review over district court's conclusions of 
law). 
 
Statutory Provisions 
 
The applicable partition statute in effect at the time the subject tract was 
partitioned, K.S.A. 60-1003, remains essentially the same today. See L. 1963, ch. 303, 
sec. 60-1003. K.S.A. 60-1003(a) provides: 
 
 
"(1)  When the object of the action is to effect a partition of personal or real 
property or an estate or interest created by an oil, gas or mineral lease or an oil or gas 
royalty, the petition must describe the property and the respective interests of the owners 
thereof, if known.  
9 
 
 
 
 
"(2)  If the number of shares or interests is known, but the owners thereof are 
unknown, or if there are, or are supposed to be, any interests which are unknown, 
contingent or doubtful, these facts must be set forth in the petition with reasonable 
certainty. 
 
"(3)  Persons claiming or having a specific or general lien upon all or any portion 
of the property, may be made parties. 
 
"(4)  An allegation of ownership of an interest implies an allegation of right to 
possession of the property, and it is not necessary to claim the remedy of ejectment in an 
action for partition."  
 
Defendants specifically point to the provision in subsection (a)(1) directing that 
the petition must describe the property and the respective interests of the owners. They 
argue that such a mandatory pleading requirement manifests a legislative intent that, in 
their words, "all owners of the entire tract involved in a partition must be made parties to 
obtain a valid partition." In effect, defendants are contending that the statute makes each 
and every owner of any interest in the subject tract an indispensable party to the partition 
action, although they do not state their contention in those terms. See City of Hutchinson 
v. Hutchinson, Office of State Employment Service, 213 Kan. 399, 405, 517 P.2d 117 
(1973) ("'Indispensable parties are those who must be included in an action before it may 
properly go forward.'") (quoting Cities Service Oil Co. v. Kronewitter, 199 Kan. 228, Syl. 
¶ 1, 428 P.2d 804 [1967]).     
 
To the contrary, the statutory language upon which the defendants rely does not 
expressly make all property owners indispensable, or even necessary, parties to a 
partition action. See City of Hutchinson, 213 Kan. at 405 (quoting Cities Service, 199 
Kan. 228, Syl. ¶ 1) ("'Necessary parties are those who must be included in an action 
either as plaintiffs or defendants unless there is a valid excuse for their nonjoinder.'"). 
Rather, the provision is clearly intended to address the required contents of a partition 
10 
 
 
 
petition. Even then, the statutory directive contains the disclaimer that the respective 
interests of the property owners need only be described "if known." 
 
Here, the amended cross-petition contained the statutorily required contents. It 
stated the legal description of the subject tract, without reservation or exception, which 
would indicate that partition was being sought on the entire property. Cf. K.S.A. 58-2202 
("every conveyance of real estate shall pass all the estate of the grantor therein, unless the 
intent to pass a less estate shall expressly appear or be necessarily implied in the terms of 
the grant"). Further, it described the respective interests of the persons alleged to be the 
owners of the property. The problem in this case was simply that the petition's description 
of the property owners was incomplete and therefore incorrect, which in turn made the 
description of the real estate subject to partition inaccurate.  
 
However, the statute does not state or even imply that such a mistaken description 
or false allegation deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. To the contrary, 
K.S.A. 60-1003(b) provides that defendants' answers "shall include allegations of the 
nature and extent of their respective interests" and further provides that the answers "may 
also deny the interests of any of the plaintiffs, or any of the defendants." Obviously, the 
statute contemplates that the petition's description of property ownership may well be a 
disputed matter in the partition action, i.e., an accurate description would not be a 
jurisdictional requirement. 
 
In short, K.S.A. 60-1003 does not require that all owners of the entire tract 
involved in a partition must be made parties to obtain a valid partition, as defendants 
contend. Support for the defendant's assertion, which we take the liberty of calling the 
"mandatory joinder rule" for purposes of this opinion, must come from a source other 
than the partition statute.   
 
11 
 
 
 
Kansas Case Law 
 
Defendants argue that the holdings in prior Kansas cases have been consistent with 
their proffered mandatory joinder rule, requiring all owners to be named parties to a 
partition. However, at oral argument, defendants' counsel conceded that no Kansas case 
has specifically held that the failure to name all property owners as parties to a partition 
action (whether by mistake or by choice) always deprives the district court of subject 
matter jurisdiction to partition the interests of those property owners who are named 
parties. We submit that such an absence of explicit precedent is understandable, because 
the defendants' premise is not the law in this state. 
 
Defendants first point to High Plains Oil, Ltd. v. High Plains Drilling Program—
1981, Ltd., 263 Kan. 1, 6, 946 P.2d 1382 (1997) (hereafter High Plains), which they 
believe clearly states that all owners are necessary parties to a partition action. The only 
vaguely collateral nexus that High Plains has to the issue before us is that it happened to 
involve a partition suit.   
 
There, a coowner of an interest in an oil and gas lease had mortgaged the leasehold 
interest before seeking relief in bankruptcy. When another leasehold owner filed a 
partition action, the mortgagee of the bankrupt coowner sought to enforce the 
bankruptcy's automatic stay. The district court concluded that the debtor had no equity in 
the lease and modified the stay, allowing the partition to proceed. The lease was 
partitioned and sold, and the proceeds of the sale were paid to the county to satisfy the 
bankrupt coowner's delinquent property taxes. The mortgagee appealed, claiming a 
priority interest in the sale proceeds. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded; 
however, on remand the district court again ordered the proceeds be paid to the county. 
After another reversal by the Court of Appeals, this court granted the county's petition for 
12 
 
 
 
review and ultimately determined that the county had priority over the mortgagee's 
claims. 263 Kan. at 2-7. 
 
High Plains was a fight between a county and a mortgagee over which one had 
priority to the proceeds from the sale of a leasehold interest in which the bankrupt owner 
had no equity. The defendants point to a district court finding that was recited in the 
appellate decision but which had nothing to do with the opinion's analysis. Even then, the 
actual finding was:  "K.S.A. 60-1003, the partition statute, is clear that only owners are 
necessary parties to the action." 263 Kan. at 6. Obviously, that finding dealt with the fact 
that neither the owner's mortgagee nor the county were owners of the property in that 
case. Moreover, declaring that only owners can be necessary parties is not the same as 
saying all owners must be necessary parties. High Plains does not support the defendants' 
proposed mandatory joinder rule. 
 
Likewise, defendants point us to the century-old partition action in Hazen v. Webb, 
65 Kan. 38, 68 Pac. 1096 (1902). Again, the case is distinguished by the intervention of 
lienholders into the partition action. Moreover, the primary issue involved a district 
court's authority upon receiving a partition case after a change in venue. 
 
In Hazen, a coowner transferred an interest in jointly owned property that was 
subject to judgment liens. The grantee filed a partition action against coowners of a 
portion of the jointly owned property, and subsequently the venue of that action was 
changed to another district court. After the change in venue, the lienholders on the 
grantee's interest filed an answer and cross-petition that included a demand to partition all 
properties jointly owned by all the coowners. The cross-petition request that all coowned 
property be partitioned required joinder of additional coowners, and the receiving court's 
authority to order the joinder was the principle issue in the case. 
 
13 
 
 
 
In determining that it had the authority to order the joinder of additional owners 
and to include all the property in the partition, Hazen noted that the general policy of the 
law is to avoid a multiplicity of actions. 65 Kan. at 42. Hazen opined that, to effect that 
general policy, a court of equity which has assumed jurisdiction of a subject matter can 
reach out and draw in the entire subject matter and all interested parties in order to enter 
and enforce a full, complete, effectual, and final decree adjusting the rights and equities 
of all parties in interest. The opinion went on to declare that "[n]o decree will be granted 
until all necessary parties are before the court, if jurisdiction can be obtained." 65 Kan. at 
42. In applying those principles to the facts in Hazen, the court found: 
 
"[O]n account of the interlacing of interests and the overlapping of liens, that any 
effectual, enforceable and protective decree might be entered, it was almost an imperative 
necessity that all of the joint property and all the parties interested therein should be 
brought before one court in one litigation. For, in no other manner conceivable could an 
effectual decree determining the several rights and protecting the different interests of all 
parties be obtained." 65 Kan. at 41-42.  
  
The general authority of the court in a partition action has been codified in K.S.A. 
60-1003(d), entitled "General powers of judge," which states:   
 
 
"The court shall have full power to make any order not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this article that may be necessary to make a just and equitable partition 
between the parties, and to secure their respective interests, or may refuse partition if the 
same would result in extraordinary hardships or oppression."   
 
Likewise, "K.S.A. 60-219(a) defines which parties are to be joined in an action as 
necessary for just adjudication." Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 535, 216 
P.3d 158 (2009).   
 
14 
 
 
 
In other words, Hazen does not tell us anything that we do not already know, i.e., a 
partitioning court has the equitable and statutory power to order the joinder of parties and 
property interests, and if the property interests of nonjoined parties are so intertwined 
with the property subject to partition that their interests will be adversely affected by an 
adjudication of the action, the court should require their joinder before going forward 
with the lawsuit. Contrary to the defendants' interpretation, the case does not instruct us 
that a partition action can never proceed to judgment without the joinder of all owners of 
all interests in the subject property, i.e., that all owners are always necessary and 
indispensable parties in every partition action. 
 
The defendants also cite to Witt v. Sheffer, 6 Kan. App. 2d 868, 636 P.2d 195 
(1981), rev. denied 231 Kan. 802 (1982), for its discussion of the "unity of partition rule." 
That rule requires that each cotenant have the right to occupy the whole property before 
the cotenant may bring a partition action. 6 Kan. App. 2d at 870. Here, the cross-
petitioner had an interest in all of the surface rights with the corresponding right to 
occupy the property and unquestionably had standing to bring the partition action. If 
anything, the rule could cut against the defendants because of their limited right to 
occupy the property as fractional mineral interest owners. Nevertheless, Witt does not 
support the defendants' mandatory joinder rule and is of no benefit to them here.    
 
Finally, defendants attempt to conjure up support from Toklan Royalty Corp. v. 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 168 Kan. 259, 212 P.2d 348 (1949). There, the 
assignee of a 60% interest in two oil and gas leases, each subject to a gas purchase 
contract, was attempting to cancel the contracts without making his assignors and co-
owners parties to the action. Because all owners were beneficiaries of the gas purchase 
contract, this court held that an action for cancellation of that contract could not proceed 
without joinder of the remaining interest owners. 168 Kan. at 268-69. Again, the lesson to 
be learned from Toklan is that the determination of a necessary or indispensable party in 
15 
 
 
 
a particular action turns not on the type of action, e.g., a partition, but rather on whether 
the court can arrive at a just adjudication without joining that party in the action, i.e., 
whether the nonjoined party's interests will be adversely affected by the court's judgment. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the case law in this state does not support the 
defendants' contention that Kansas has a mandatory joinder rule for partition actions, 
requiring all property owners to be named parties in order to vest the district court with 
jurisdiction to partition the interests of those owners who are named parties. Rather, a 
person or entity who challenges a partition judgment based on the failure to join a 
property owner in the partition action must take the additional step required in any other 
type of action. The challenger must show that the nonjoined person or entity was a 
necessary or indispensable party to the action, i.e., that the property interests of the 
nonjoined party were adversely affected by the judgment partitioning the named parties' 
property interests. 
 
Other States 
 
The defendants argue that we should be persuaded by the law in some other states 
to judicially adopt our own mandatory joinder rule for partition actions. For instance, the 
defendants are particularly enamored with the South Dakota Supreme Court's decision in 
Weitzel v. Felker, 76 S.D. 216, 76 N.W.2d 225 (1956). Weitzel held that a partition action 
was void where one of the 11 joint tenants was not made a party to the partition 
proceeding. The court viewed the nonjoined owner as an "'indispensable part[y]', whose 
interest is such that a final decree [could not] be entered without affecting" his rights. 76 
S.D. at 218, 220. Because he was considered an indispensable party to the partition 
proceeding, the court held that the judgment entered was void not only as to the unnamed 
owner, but also as to the other parties who were named in the action. 76 S.D. at 220.  
 
16 
 
 
 
First, we would note that the statutory law in South Dakota differed from our 1963 
partition statute. The South Dakota statute expressly required that a summons in a 
partition action "must be directed to all the joint tenants and tenants in common, and all 
persons having an interest in, or any lien of record by mortgage, judgment, or otherwise, 
upon the property or upon any particular portion thereof." S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 
37.1406 (1960 Supp.). See Weitzel, 76 S.D. at 218. As previously noted, the Kansas 
partition statute does not contain a similar requirement for the issuance of a summons to 
all owners of all interests, but rather only requires the petition to include a description of 
the property and ownership interests. See K.S.A. 60-1003.   
 
More importantly, however, a nonjoined joint property owner who would qualify 
as an indispensable party in a partition action, i.e., whose interest was such that a final 
decree could not have been entered without adversely affecting his or her rights, could 
seek relief from the partition judgment in this state based upon his or her status as an 
indispensable party. See City of Hutchinson, 213 Kan. at 405-06 (finding failure to join 
indispensable party deprived court of jurisdiction). There is no need to have a special 
mandatory joinder rule in that circumstance.  
 
Moreover, we discern no compelling policy reason to create a rule in this state that 
forces a property owner to join all owners of all property interests in order to partition the 
particular portion of the property in which the petitioner has an interest. For instance, 
consider the circumstance in which two people jointly own only the surface rights and the 
severed minerals interest is coowned by numerous persons or entities holding varying 
interests, e.g., a 1/64 working interest or a 1/128 overriding royalty interest. There is no 
practical, logical, or legal reason for denying the surface owners the right to sever their 
property interests through a partition action just because they failed to assume the burden 
of ascertaining, locating, and serving summons on all of the mineral interest owners. The 
interests of the surface estate and mineral estate in that instance are not so intertwined 
17 
 
 
 
that a nonjoinder would create a prejudicial, adverse effect. The relief sought by the 
surface owners will not be impacted by an accurate or even an incorrect determination of 
how the mineral interest is owned; they will split the surface ownership regardless of who 
owns the minerals. On the flip side, the mineral interest owners would be totally 
unconcerned with the surface ownership and would have no desire to assume the 
financial burden of participating in a lawsuit over the surface rights. A mineral interest 
owner only wants to know how any mineral production is to be split among the mineral 
interest coowners. Moreover, especially if there are minerals being produced on the 
property, the mineral interest owners will likely not want to have their interests 
partitioned and sold. 
 
Accordingly, we decline to create a new mandatory joinder requirement for 
partition actions in this state. The efficacy of a judgment in a partition action in which 
less than all owners were named parties must turn on whether the property interest of a 
nonjoined owner has been prejudiced or adversely affected by the partition judgment. 
 
Other Arguments 
 
Defendants point to a statement in the McGintys' response to the defendants' 
summary judgment motion to argue that the McGintys have admitted that all property 
owners are necessary for a valid partition. We need not consider whether the statement is 
an admission. Parties are not permitted to define the law for the courts through 
agreements, admissions, or stipulations. See Bright v. LSI Corp., 254 Kan. 853, 859, 869 
P.2d 686 (1994) (litigants' agreement on legal questions ineffective to bind court).   
 
Defendants also assert that their arguments in this case were raised in the partition 
action through a motion to strike, upon which the partitioning court did not rule. That is a 
18 
 
 
 
complaint the defendants should have made in the partition action. We are only 
concerned with the partitioning court's final judgment. 
 
VALIDITY OF PARTITION JUDGMENT 
 
After asserting that a court is not permitted to go forward with a partition action 
without having all owners as named parties, the defendants cite to State ex rel. Secretary 
of SRS v. Clubb, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1, 4, 39 P.3d 80 (2001), for the proposition that the lack 
of statutory authority to make a particular order or judgment is akin to a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and is subject to collateral attack as being void.   
 
Standard of Review 
 
The determination of jurisdiction is a legal question subject to unlimited review. 
State v. Woolverton, 284 Kan. 59, Syl. ¶ 3, 159 P.3d 985 (2007). 
 
Analysis 
 
We first note that the result which the defendants seek is not consistent with their 
void judgment argument. If the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the 
entire judgment in the partition action would be a nullity. See In re Marriage of Welliver, 
254 Kan. 801, 803, 869 P.2d 653 (1994) (judgment void if court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction; void judgment is a nullity). Yet, the defendants allege that only the transfer 
of the minerals estate is void. They do not explain how the court acquired subject matter 
jurisdiction over the surface owners if a mandatory joinder of all owners is required to 
obtain subject matter jurisdiction in a partition action.   
 
Nevertheless, as explained above, we reject the defendants' underlying premise 
that a mandatory joinder rule exists in this state and find that a court does have the 
19 
 
 
 
statutory authority to partition less than all of the property interests of all of the owners of 
a tract of real estate, so long as the remaining property interests are not adversely 
affected. Accordingly, we consider the validity of the partition judgment from the 
viewpoint of each class of defendants:  the cross-petitioner; the persons described as 
property owners in the cross-petition (listed owners); the persons not identified as owners 
in the cross-petition, but who were named as parties in the consolidated action and were 
served with the cross-petition (unlisted participating owners); and the persons who were 
not parties in the consolidated action and were not served with the cross-petition 
(nonjoined parties). 
 
Nonjoined Parties 
  
Obviously, an owner of a fractional minerals interest who was not joined in a 
partition action that resulted in a sheriff's sale of that interest to a third party would be 
adversely affected. See Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112, 115, 1 L. Ed. 2d 178, 
77 S. Ct. 200 (1956) (due process requires that an owner whose property is taken be 
served with proper notice); Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448, 454, 464 P.2d 177 (1970) 
(due process requires that notice of legal proceedings be given by means reasonably 
calculated to inform all parties whose legal rights are directly and adversely affected); 
Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 84-85, 434 P.2d 858 (1967) 
(failure to provide direct service denied landowners due process when their property 
interests were sold at tax foreclosure sale).   
 
However, in this quiet title action, the McGintys are not claiming that they 
acquired the 50% mineral interest upon which the owners thereof were not served with 
the amended cross-petition for partition of the subject tract. Accordingly, those owners 
still have their respective interests in the subject tract and still possess all incidents of 
ownership accorded to fractional mineral interest owners. Based upon McGintys' limited 
20 
 
 
 
claim of ownership, there was no taking of the nonjoined parties' mineral interests and 
there is no due process violation. Moreover, the adjudication of the other property 
interests has not prejudicially affected the nonjoined owners' property interests. 
Therefore, the nonjoined owners have no basis upon which to challenge the validity of 
the sheriff's sale or, for that matter, any incentive to do so.    
 
 
Cross-petitioner 
 
Lester, Jr., filed the cross-petition which requested a partition of the entire interest 
in the subject tract without excepting or reserving any minerals interest. See Central 
Natural Resources v. Davis Operating Co., 288 Kan. 234, 242, 201 P.3d 680 (2009) ("all 
minerals belong to the landowner and are considered part of the realty so long as they 
reside on, in, or under the land"). The district court's sale confirmation order gave the 
cross-petitioner the relief that he requested, a purported sale of the entire tract. Then, 
because the cross-petition inaccurately described Lester, Jr.'s, ownership interest as 
including the 80% of the minerals in which he did not have an interest, he theoretically 
received more compensation for his partitioned interest than he was entitled, if one 
assumes that part of the sheriff's sale proceeds are allocable to the mineral estate. While 
Lester, Jr., might now be experiencing seller's remorse because of the current value of the 
mineral interest, he has no basis to assert that the nonjoinder of other mineral interest 
owners in the partition action, for which he was solely responsible, violated his right to 
due process or adversely affected his property interest. The partition judgment is valid as 
to him. 
 
Listed Owners      
 
In addition to the cross-petitioner, the other successors to Lester's interest of all of 
the surface interest and 20% of the mineral interest were listed in the cross-petition as 
21 
 
 
 
owners of the subject tract and fully participated in the partition proceedings. They were 
all represented by counsel, and a guardian ad litem was appointed  to represent any 
minors.   
 
Nevertheless, defendants suggest that even the named, participating property 
owners were denied due process because the cross-petition failed to notify them that the 
mineral estate was being partitioned. To the contrary, identifying the property to be 
partitioned by its legal description, without noting any exceptions or reservations, put the 
parties on notice that the entire estate was involved. See Central Natural Resources, 288 
Kan. at 242 (minerals considered part of the realty). The represented owners had ample 
opportunity to challenge or be heard on the question of the extent of the property to be 
partitioned. There was no due process violation. 
 
Further, defendants argue that the mineral interest was not part of the sheriff's sale 
because neither the court documents nor the sheriff's deed specifically described the 
mineral interests. Again, defendants have it backward. Neither the court documents nor 
the sheriff's deed purported to except or reserve the mineral interests. See K.S.A. 58-2202 
(every real estate conveyance passes all of grantor's estate unless intent to pass less is 
expressed or necessarily implied in terms of grant). As noted, the sheriff's deed expressly 
stated that, in conformance with the court's order, it was conveying all interests of all 
plaintiffs and defendants in the consolidated partition action. 
 
Moreover, Lester's successors accepted the proceeds of the sheriff's sale, which as 
noted were in excess of what they were entitled. They did not file a direct appeal 
challenging the form of the pleadings, the description of the property, or the order of sale. 
At this late date, they have no basis on which to collaterally attack the judgment. See 
K.S.A. 60-2103(a) ("the time within which an appeal may be taken shall be 30 days from 
the entry of the judgment"); Hawkinson v. Bennett, 265 Kan. 564, 589, 962 P.2d 445 
22 
 
 
 
(1998) (collateral estoppel may be invoked where the parties are the same or in privity, 
the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue was decided by judgment on the 
merits, and the issue was necessary to support the judgment).  
 
 Unlisted Participating Owners 
 
As an alternative argument, the defendants contend that only the 20% mineral 
interests owned by the listed owners, Lester's successors, was transferred by the sheriff's 
deed. Although defendants repeatedly refer to the remaining 80% of the mineral estate, 
the 50% interest that the McGintys do not claim is not in issue in this quiet title action.  
Effectively, then, the alternative position is that the McGintys did not acquire the 30% of 
the mineral interests owned by the parties that were served with the cross-petition but 
were not described as owners, i.e., Helen and W.L., Jr. 
 
In addition to the arguments asserted above, the defendants contend that the failure 
to describe Helen and W.L., Jr., as owners deprived them of adequate notice and service 
with respect to a partition of their mineral interests. However, as noted, both unlisted 
owners were served with the cross-petition for partition, which included a description of 
the entire subject tract. Both had the opportunity to file an answer, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-
1003(b), denying the alleged interests of any of the plaintiffs or defendants. In fact, Helen 
filed an answer to the cross-petition in which she affirmatively disavowed having any 
ownership interest in the subject tract. Accordingly, when the court ordered the sheriff to 
sell and convey "all of the right, title and interest which the plaintiffs and the defendants 
have or claim to have in and to said real estate," the sale included the mineral interests of 
Helen and W.L., Jr.  
 
Granted, the partition judgment erroneously excluded Helen and W.L., Jr., from 
the allocation of the sheriff's sale proceeds. However, their claim for a share of the sale 
23 
 
 
 
proceeds was against the other parties, specifically Lester's successors, and not against a 
purchaser at the sheriff's sale who had no involvement in the partition action. Having 
failed to protect their interests in the partition action when given the opportunity to do so, 
Helen and W.L., Jr., cannot now assert their interests in this quiet title action.  
 
The defendants also rely on the testimony of Emerson Shields, who was an 
attorney involved in the partition action. He testified that he learned from the abstractor 
that only one-fifth of the mineral interest was involved in the lawsuit and that he had 
announced at the sheriff's sale that the conveyance would be subject to a four-fifths 
mineral reservation. Shields also alleged that he had prepared a contract that included the 
reservation of mineral rights, which he says Letha McGinty signed, albeit a signed 
contract was not introduced into evidence in this action. The defendants contend that the 
McGintys knew or should have known they were only buying 20% of the mineral estate. 
 
However, "[w]hen a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of a contract to 
convey, the contract is presumed to be merged in the deed." Palmer v. The Land & Power 
Co., 172 Kan. 231, 237, 239 P.2d 960 (1952). Specifically, if an agreement provides for a 
mineral reservation, but the deed contains no provision for a mineral reservation, the 
inference is that the agreement for a mineral reservation "was waived and superseded by 
the deed." 172 Kan. at 237. Here, the sheriff's deed contained no mineral reservation with 
respect to the interests of the plaintiffs and defendants in the partition action.   
 
In a related argument, defendants contend that a sheriff's deed is akin to a 
quitclaim deed in that it only transfers the interest which the grantor possessed at the time 
of the transfer. We do not need the analogy. K.S.A. 60-2416 provided that a sheriff's deed 
"shall vest in the purchaser as good and perfect an estate in the premises therein 
mentioned as was vested in the person or persons against whom the . . . order was 
issued." Moreover, a sheriff's deed is construed with the judicial proceedings of which it 
24 
 
 
 
forms a part, and it "conveys no greater title than is authorized by the judicial 
proceedings." Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 36, 439 P.2d 93 (1968). Here, the judicial 
proceedings authorized the sale of the entire tract, without mineral reservation. The 
participants in the partition action were vested with 50% of the mineral estate. Therefore, 
the sheriff's deed conveyed that one-half mineral interest. 
 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
Standard of Review 
 
This court's review of a decision based on summary judgment is well settled: 
 
"'"'"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is 
sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come 
forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude 
summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive 
issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable 
minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment 
must be denied." [Citations omitted.]'"'" Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. 
Oliver, 289 Kan. 891, 900, 220 P.3d 333 (2009) (quoting Smith v. Kansas Gas Service 
Co., 285 Kan. 33, 39, 169 P.3d 1052 [2007]). 
 
 
The district court's memorandum decision noted that there were many 
controverted facts listed in the parties' motions and responses. The defendants use that 
statement as support for their argument that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because of the existence of disputed material facts. See Shamberg, 289 Kan. at 900 
(summary judgment proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.)   
25 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, the defendants are unclear as to what facts need to be resolved in 
order to apply the law and decide the case. See State v. Conley, 287 Kan. 696, 703, 197 
P.3d 837 (2008) ("'"'Simply pressing a point without pertinent authority, or without 
showing why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary 
authority, is akin to failing to brief an issue.'"'") (quoting State v. Torres, 280 Kan. 309, 
321, 121 P.3d 429 [2005]). They do mention that the district court's finding that Shields' 
testimony was not persuasive indicates that the court was weighing evidence. However, 
that testimony was not material, given that any contract would have merged into the 
provisions of the sheriff's deed.   
 
The chain of title, the respective ownership interests of the parties, and the identity 
of the participants in the prior consolidated lawsuit are not contested by the defendants. 
We discern that all of the material facts necessary to quiet title in the McGintys were not 
in dispute, and summary judgment was appropriate. 
 
As a subissue, the defendants contend that the district court made a blanket finding 
that the McGintys own 50% of the mineral estate without stating whose interest is to be 
taken away to satisfy that one-half interest. Therefore, they argue that if we affirm the 
district court judgment, a title examiner will be unable to identify the current owners of 
the mineral estate, which will complicate the division of the nearly one-half million 
dollars in suspended royalties. We find the argument to be disingenuous, at best. 
 
To begin, this lawsuit is a quiet title action filed by the McGintys. The court's 
order clearly and explicitly resolved the issue presented by finding that the McGintys 
were the owners of the surface rights and one-half of the oil, gas, and other minerals that 
may be produced from the S/2 NE/4 of 36-21-14, Stafford County, Kansas. The 
defendants did not counterclaim to quiet title in the remaining 50% of the mineral estate. 
26 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the district court found that the McGintys acquired their one-half 
mineral interest from those persons who were served with the cross-petition for partition 
in the prior lawsuit. To spell it out for the defendants, the mineral interest to be "taken 
away" is the 20% held by those identified in the cross-petition (Lester's successors), the 
20% held by Helen, and the 10% held by W.L., Jr. We are confident that a reasonably 
competent title examiner can ascertain the current ownership of the mineral interests. 
 
In conclusion, we find that the district court's granting of summary judgment, 
quieting title in the McGintys, was appropriate and correct. 
 
Affirmed.