Title: Theise v. Theise

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

THEISE_V_THEISE.93-395; 164 Vt 577; 674 A.2d 789

[Dated 26-Jan-1996]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-395



Elizabeth Theise                                 Supreme Court


      v.                                         On Appeal from
                                                 Rutland Family Court


Jerome Theise                                    September Term, 1995


Silvio T. Valente, J.

       Peter Langrock and William B. Miller, Jr., of Langrock Sperry & Wool,
  Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellee

       Eugene Rakow and Gregg M. Meyer of Biederman & Rakow, P.C., Rutland,
  for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.   Both husband and wife appeal the maintenance provisions
  of the family court's divorce order.  We strike the provision calling for a
  lump-sum maintenance payment from the proceeds of the husband's life
  insurance policy in the event he predeceases the wife; in all other
  respects, the order is affirmed.

       The parties were married nineteen years and had two daughters, who
  were eighteen and fourteen years old at the time of the final amended
  divorce order.  The wife was a homemaker throughout the marriage; she was
  considering renewing her teaching certification or going back to school to
  become a physical therapist.  The husband is involved in the construction
  and sale of luxury homes; his average annual income over the seven years
  before the final divorce hearing was approximately $67,000.  Before the
  final hearing, the parties stipulated that (1) the

 

  wife would keep two unencumbered Vermont properties worth at least
  $325,000, plus another $20,000 in various accounts and personal property;
  (2) the husband would keep all New York properties, his business assets and
  properties, and his personal accounts, worth altogether approximately
  $1,300,000; (3) the wife would have physical responsibility for the older
  daughter for the few months remaining before she reached her majority,
  while the husband would have physical responsibility, and waive child
  support, for the younger daughter, a developmentally disabled child who
  will most likely require care beyond her majority; and (4) the court would
  determine the appropriate maintenance award.

       The court approved the parties' stipulation and ordered the husband to
  pay the wife temporary and permanent "maintenance" in the amount of
  $324,000 unless terminated sooner by the wife's death, with payments of
  $2000 per month for one year, $1000 per month for the next four years, and
  $500 per month thereafter, notwithstanding the wife's cohabitation or
  remarriage.  The court also ordered the husband to name the wife, to the
  extent of maintenance payments due her, as the beneficiary on an existing
  "key man" life insurance policy in which one of the husband's corporations
  was the beneficiary.  This provision awarded the wife a lump-sum
  "maintenance" payment from the proceeds of the policy in the event the
  husband predeceased her.

       The husband first argues that the court erred by awarding the wife
  permanent maintenance when the evidence showed that she had sufficient
  income and property to provide for her reasonable needs as established
  during the marriage.  In her cross-appeal, the wife argues that the court's
  maintenance award was an abuse of discretion, given the great disparity in
  the property division agreed to by the parties.  Upon review of the record,
  we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion regarding the
  monthly amounts and duration of its maintenance award.  See Delozier v.
  Delozier, 161 Vt. 377, 381, 640 A.2d 55, 57 (1994) (family court has broad
  discretion in determining amount and duration of maintenance; court's award
  will be set aside only when there is no reasonable basis to support it).

 

       We reject the husband's argument that the wife failed to make a
  threshold showing that she required maintenance to meet her reasonable
  needs and to maintain the standard of living established in the marriage. 
  As we have stated before, "The longer the marriage, the more closely
  reasonable needs should be measured by the standard of living established
  during the marriage."  Id. at 382-83, 640 A.2d  at 58.  The trial court
  adequately considered the relevant statutory factors in determining that,
  notwithstanding the potential income available to the wife from the sale of
  one of the Vermont properties, rehabilitative and permanent maintenance was
  appropriate.  Regarding the wife's argument, we cannot conclude that the
  award was an abuse of discretion, given all the circumstances of the case,
  including the parties' financial needs and responsibilities as well as the
  nature and status of the assets awarded to each of them.  As the court
  explained, most of the husband's assets were tied up in speculative
  businesses that were doing poorly, while the wife's assets were
  unencumbered and risk-free.

       The husband also argues that the court erred by requiring him to
  secure post-mortem maintenance payments by naming the wife as beneficiary
  on his life insurance policy to the extent of the maintenance award.  We
  agree that our recent case law precludes such a provision. In Justis v.
  Rist, 159 Vt. 240, 244, 617 A.2d 148, 150 (1992), we held that the family
  court has "no authority to order maintenance to continue beyond the life of
  the obligor spouse unless the parties have agreed otherwise."  We extended
  this holding to life insurance policies in Narwid v. Narwid, 160 Vt. 636,
  638, 641 A.2d 85, 87 (1993) (mem.), where we struck a court order requiring
  the obligor spouse to purchase and maintain a life insurance policy for the
  recipient spouse's sole benefit for as long as maintenance payments were
  owed.  We stated that because the recipient spouse would realize benefits
  from the policy only upon the death of the obligor spouse, the benefits
  would "function as a form of continued maintenance to which [the recipient
  spouse] will be no longer entitled."  Id.; see Clapp v. Clapp,  ___ Vt.
  ___, ___,