Title: Beauchene v. State of Maine

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 153 
Docket: 
Ken-16-500 
Argued: 
May 9, 2017 
Decided: 
July 11, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
DONALD BEAUCHENE 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Donald Beauchene appeals from a judgment entered in the 
Superior Court (Kennebec County, Mullen, J.) denying his petition for 
discharge or modified release from psychiatric hospitalization pursuant to 
15 M.R.S. § 104-A (2016).  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In 1970, Beauchene was acquitted of a murder charge by reason of 
a mental disease or defect and was committed to the custody of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, where he remains committed 
pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 103 (2016).  On February 22, 2016, Beauchene filed in 
the Superior Court a petition seeking discharge or a modified treatment plan.  
The court held a hearing on the petition on September 16, 2016, at which 
 
2 
three mental health professionals testified.  The court denied the petition by 
written order dated October 24, 2016.   
 
[¶3]  The court made the following findings of fact, which are supported 
by competent record evidence.  At the 1970 trial, the State presented medical 
experts who opined that Beauchene did not suffer from a mental disease or 
defect, while Beauchene presented medical experts who opined that he 
committed the crime due to a mental disease or defect, which they diagnosed 
as “explosive personality.”  In June 1970, the jury found Beauchene not guilty 
of the murder charge by reason of mental disease or defect, and he was 
committed to the custody of the Department.  Beauchene escaped from the 
psychiatric hospital in April 1973 and was returned to Department custody in 
1978.  In September 1978, Beauchene escaped from the hospital again and 
fled to New York.  In 1980, he was prosecuted by the State of New York for 
rape, sodomy, and assault and was convicted of all three charges.   
[¶4]  Beauchene exhibits mental health symptoms that are consistent 
with anti-social personality disorder, and those symptoms have been 
consistent since 1970.  He demonstrates rigidness, deceitfulness, and lack of 
remorse for his criminal behavior, as well as a lack of insight into his criminal 
and mental health history.  His past behavior has raised concerns about 
 
3 
grooming and targeting vulnerable women and his risk of flight.  The court 
concluded that Beauchene’s mental condition has “changed very little, if any[,] 
since” 1970, and if discharged, released, or placed in a modified treatment 
plan, Beauchene would pose a risk of harm or danger to himself or to others.  
The court accordingly denied the petition.  Beauchene timely appealed 
pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2016) and M.R. App. P. 2.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[¶5]  Beauchene first contends that the evidence compelled the trial 
court to conclude that he does not suffer from a mental disease or defect.   
[¶6]  “When the acquittee seeks release or discharge from Department 
custody, it is the acquittee’s burden to establish, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that he ‘may be released or discharged without likelihood that [he] 
will cause injury to [himself] or to others due to mental disease or defect.’”  
Begin v. State, 2016 ME 186, ¶ 8, 153 A.3d 93 (alteration in original) (quoting 
15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1), (3)).  The acquittee must establish either that (1) “the 
mental disease or defect by reason of which he was relieved of criminal 
responsibility no longer exists,” or (2) he “no longer poses a danger to himself 
or others if he is released” despite any continuing mental illness.  Green v. 
 
4 
Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 2000 ME 92, ¶ 27, 
750 A.2d 1265 (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  The court 
must apply the same legal standard for mental disease or defect that applied 
at the time of the verdict.1  See In re Beauchene, 2008 ME 110, ¶ 10, 
951 A.2d 81. 
[¶7]  “Whether an insanity acquittee has a mental disease or defect is a 
factual issue . . . .”  Beal v. State, 2016 ME 169, ¶ 6, 151 A.3d 502.  “[W]e will 
affirm a court’s determination that a petitioner remains dangerous to 
[himself] or others due to a mental disease or defect unless the evidence 
compels a contrary finding.”  Id.  Because Beauchene challenges the sufficiency 
of the trial court’s finding that he did not meet his burden, he can prevail “only 
if we conclude that, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to the court’s judgment, the trial court nevertheless was 
compelled to find in his favor.”  Begin, 2016 ME 186, ¶ 9, 153 A.3d 93. 
[¶8]  Beauchene notes that at his trial in 1970, the only evidence 
presented of a mental disease or defect diagnosis was his own theory of an 
“explosive personality,” and according to the State’s expert witnesses at trial, 
anti-social personality disorder was not a clinical diagnosis that met the 
                                               
 
1  In 1970, the applicable definition of “mental disease or defect” derived from 15 M.R.S.A. § 102 
(1964).  See In re Beauchene, 2008 ME 110, ¶ 5 n.1, 951 A.2d 81. 
 
 
5 
definition of a “mental disease or defect.”  He argues that the undisputed 
evidence presented to the trial court on his petition for release establishes 
that he had, and still has, an anti-social personality disorder, not “explosive 
personality,” and because anti-social personality disorder is not a mental 
disease or defect, the evidence compels a finding that he does not suffer from 
a mental disease or defect.2  In other words, Beauchene does not argue that he 
no longer suffers from the mental disease or defect for which he was relieved 
of criminal responsibility, but rather contends that he never did.  
[¶9]  Beauchene’s argument conflates the medical evidence regarding 
his mental illness symptoms with the legal determination of whether he has a 
mental disease or defect.  Cf. Parrish v. Colorado, 78 F.3d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir. 
1996) (“The crux of the issue . . . is not whether the acquittee must be ill in the 
medical sense, but whether his mental state fits a constitutionally valid legal 
definition.”).  We have, in prior cases, rejected similar attempts to fasten a 
finding of a mental disease or defect to a precise clinical diagnosis of mental 
                                               
 
2  Beauchene’s experts presented his diagnosis at the murder trial as “explosive personality.”  At 
the hearing before the trial court from which Beauchene now appeals, several expert witnesses 
testified about the differing psychiatric terminology used in 1970.  One doctor testified that 
“explosive personality” would today be classified as “intermittent explosive disorder,” which is a 
recognized mental disease or defect, while under contemporary medical standards and definitions, 
anti-social personality disorder would not be considered a mental disease or defect.  According to 
the expert witnesses, Beauchene’s symptoms were categorized as “personality disorder not 
otherwise specified, with mainly antisocial and narcissistic features”—symptoms that do not fit a 
specific diagnosis, and in particular do not entirely correspond to the psychiatric features of anti-
social personality disorder.    
 
6 
illness.  See Begin, 2016 ME 186, ¶ 11, 153 A.3d 93 (noting that “a ‘mental 
disease or defect’ does not refer to any particular diagnosis on any particular 
psychiatric axis” and the fact that an acquittee “is no longer in the same state 
as existed at the time of [his] crime . . . does not necessarily establish the 
absence of a mental disease or defect” (quotation marks omitted)); Green, 
2000 ME 92, ¶ 28, 750 A.2d 1265.  Beauchene does not argue that his 
symptoms, present since at least 1969, have subsided, but rather that those 
symptoms do not, as a matter of law, meet the definition of a “mental disease 
or defect” that can justify his continued commitment.  We disagree. 
[¶10]  In delivering its verdict, the jury necessarily found, at 
Beauchene’s urging, that Beauchene’s mental health symptoms constituted a 
“mental disease or defect.”  All three mental health professionals who testified 
at the petition for release hearing opined that Beauchene exhibits the same 
symptoms that were present in 1970, and, as a result of those symptoms, he 
continues to present a risk of injury to himself or to others.  In ruling on the 
petition, it was the exclusive domain of the trial court to determine whether 
Beauchene’s symptoms, described by the expert witnesses, comported with a 
constitutionally-valid legal definition of a “mental disease or defect”—a legal 
concept for the court to apply to the evidence, not a medical determination.  
 
7 
See Beal, 2016 ME 169, ¶ 6, 151 A.3d 502 (“[B]ecause the term ‘mental disease 
or defect’ is a legal concept that is not defined or used by medical practitioners 
. . . courts—as opposed to medical experts—have the ultimate responsibility 
to determine whether a ‘mental disease or defect’ exists.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
[¶11]  The trial court’s findings that Beauchene’s symptoms have 
remained consistent since 1970; that he thus suffers from a mental disease or 
defect; and that as a result of that mental disease or defect, he continues to 
present a risk of harm to others, are all supported by competent record 
evidence and thus the evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion.  The 
fact remains that Beauchene convinced a jury in 1970 that he suffered from a 
mental disease or defect, and because, as the trial court found, his mental 
condition has not changed and he continues to present a risk of injury, 
Beauchene has not met his burden for release or discharge pursuant to 
15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1).3 
                                               
 
3  Although, as Beauchene emphasizes, “[s]ection 104-A(1) does not require a petitioner to prove 
a change in circumstances from the time of the not criminally responsible verdict,” James v. State, 
2015 ME 111, ¶ 8, 121 A.3d 1290, a lack of a change in Beauchene’s mental health is certainly 
probative of whether he still suffers from the mental disease or defect for which he was relieved of 
criminal responsibility for murder in 1970.  James did not mark a change in the law; we simply 
stated that which is apparent from the plain language of the statute—that a “substantial change in 
circumstances” is not an enumerated statutory requirement.  See 15 M.R.S. § 104-A.  Here, the trial 
court did not clearly err when it found, based on the evidence that Beauchene’s condition had not 
changed, that he was not free of mental disease or defect.  See In re Fleming, 431 A.2d 616, 618 
 
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B. 
Vagueness 
[¶12] 
 
Beauchene 
next 
argues 
that 
15 
M.R.S. 
§ 104-A 
is 
unconstitutionally vague.  Because the parties agree that this argument was 
not presented to the trial court and is unpreserved, we review for obvious 
error.  See Gessner v. State, 2017 ME 139, ¶ 7, --- A.3d ---; State v. Cropley, 
544 A.2d 302, 304 (Me. 1988).  “To demonstrate obvious error, the defendant 
must show that there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects 
substantial rights.”  State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 35, 58 A.3d 1032 
(quotation marks omitted).  “Even if these three conditions are met, we will 
set aside a [judgment] only if we conclude that (4) the error seriously affects 
the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶13]  The challenger has the burden to establish that a statute is 
unconstitutional and, as a general matter, we presume that a statute is 
constitutional.  See State v. Reckards, 2015 ME 31, ¶ 4, 113 A.3d 589.  “In a 
void-for-vagueness challenge, we do not analyze the statute to ascertain if it is 
valid on its face, but instead assess the challenge by testing it in the 
circumstances of the individual case and considering whether the statutory 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Me. 1981) (“The operative statute requires the presiding justice to . . . determine whether a 
petitioner is free of mental disease or defect.”). 
 
9 
language was sufficiently clear to give the defendant adequate notice . . . .”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶14]  Pursuant to the statute, Beauchene was required to establish 
“that [he] may be released or discharged without likelihood that [he] will 
cause injury to [himself] or to others due to mental disease or mental defect.”  
15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1).  Beauchene contends that the statute provides 
insufficient notice of what must be proved to be entitled to release.  He argues 
that the definitions of “likelihood” and “injury,” and the indefinite time period 
for assessing likelihood of injury, render the statute unconstitutionally vague.   
[¶15]  We conclude that the statute provides Beauchene sufficient 
notice and is not unconstitutionally vague.  Importantly, “[n]ot every 
ambiguity, uncertainty or imprecision of language in a statutory pattern” is 
unconstitutional, and a statute will withstand a vagueness challenge “if any 
reasonable construction will support it.”  Reckards, 2015 ME 31, ¶ 5, 
113 A.3d 589.  That “injury” and “likelihood” are undefined does not render 
the statute unconstitutional.  Instead, those broad terms enable the trial court, 
in its role as factfinder, to weigh the evidence and to determine whether, 
under the circumstances present at the time of the petition, a particular 
petitioner with an individualized mental health diagnosis may be safely 
 
10 
discharged or released into society.  See 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1); Beal, 
2016 ME 169, ¶ 6, 151 A.3d 502; see also State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 301 
(N.J. 1975) (noting the vagueness and ambiguity of defining “dangerousness” 
and “likelihood of future harmful conduct,” but emphasizing that such broad 
undefined standards leave specific determinations to trial courts to resolve on 
a case-by-case basis). 
[¶16]  Here, the trial court properly applied the statute and explained in 
clear terms why, based on Beauchene’s criminal history and present mental 
health symptoms, he had not satisfied his burden.4  The court emphasized that 
if Beauchene engages in treatment and demonstrates progress, he may be 
entitled to relief through another petition in the future.  We discern no 
obvious error. 
                                               
 
4  Beauchene argues that the statute encourages arbitrary enforcement of the law.  His reliance 
on language from our decision in Taylor v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 
139, 147 (Me. 1984) is misplaced.  In that case, we discarded a “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard of proof previously placed on petitioners and instead adopted a “clear and convincing” 
standard that balances a petitioner’s liberty interest against public safety and policy concerns.  
See id. at 145-52.  Section 104-A’s broad statutory standards do not encourage arbitrary 
enforcement, but rather recognize the fact-specific nature of characterizing mental illness and 
gauging the potential threat posed by individuals if released into society. 
 
 
11 
C. 
Due Process 
[¶17]  Beauchene lastly argues that his continued confinement violates 
due process.5  In light of the trial court’s finding, supported by record 
evidence, that Beauchene continues to suffer from a mental disease or defect 
that presents a risk of injury, this argument necessarily fails because “[i]t is 
well established that the State may confine someone who is both mentally ill 
and who poses a danger to society.”  Green, 2000 ME 92, ¶ 15, 750 A.2d 1265; 
see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992). 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant 
Donald Beauchene 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Laura A. Yustak, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-1972-1166 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                               
 
5  Beauchene further argues that even assuming that he poses a risk of causing injury, his 
confinement is not “narrowly focused” to a relevant state interest because the State could instead 
utilize the involuntary commitment process, see 34-B M.R.S. § 3864 (2016).  This argument 
overlooks the procedural and practical realities underpinning Beauchene’s current commitment 
and the court’s determination that he continues to suffer from a mental illness and as a result 
presents a risk of injury to himself or others—a finding that precludes his release or discharge from 
his present commitment.  See 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 
(1992) (reiterating that a committed acquittee may be held as long as he remains mentally ill and 
dangerous).