Title: Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Fitzhugh

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

LITTLE ROCK NEWSPAPERS, INC. 
v. J. Michael FITZHUGH

96-1050                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 13, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- denial of motion for summary judgment -- not reviewable
     on appeal. -- The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not
     reviewable on appeal; such review is not available even after
     a trial on the merits; the final judgment must be tested upon
     the record as it exists at the time it is rendered rather than
     at the time the motion for summary judgment is denied.

2.   Motions -- directed verdict -- when granted -- review of denial. -- A
     motion for directed verdict should only be granted if the
     evidence is so insubstantial as to require that the jury's
     verdict be set aside; in reviewing the denial of a directed
     verdict, we give the evidence its highest probative value,
     viewing it in a light most favorable to the party against whom
     the verdict is sought.

3.   Torts -- defamation -- standard of review. -- The standard of review
     in cases of defamation, including factual findings, is whether
     the jury's verdict can be supported by substantial evidence.

4.   Torts -- defamation -- critical issue. -- An action for defamation
     turns on whether the communication or publication tends or is
     reasonably calculated to cause harm to another's reputation.

5.   Torts -- defamation -- elements. -- To establish a claim of
     defamation, a party must prove the following elements: (1) the
     defamatory nature of the statement of fact; (2) that
     statement's identification of or reference to the plaintiff;
     (3) publication of the statement by the defendant; (4) the
     defendant's fault in the publication; (5) the statement's
     falsity; and (6) damages.

6.   Torts -- defamation -- whether words implicate plaintiff in crime is
     question of fact for jury. -- In a defamation action, whether the
     words of the defendant, taken together with the attendant
     circumstances, implicate the plaintiff in the commission of a
     crime is a question of fact for the jury to resolve.

7.   Torts -- defamation -- sufficient proof to submit to jury issue of article
     as false statement of and concerning appellee. -- The supreme court
     concluded that there was sufficient proof for the trial court
     to submit to the jury the issue whether a newspaper article
     containing a photograph of appellee could be construed as
     being a false statement of and concerning appellee where,
     among other things, appellee's photograph was included in the
     article and the caption under the photograph gave only the
     subject's last name, which was shared by appellee and the
     person named in the article, as opposed to the full name of
     the subject of the article; where the subject of the article
     was referred to merely by his last name seven different times;
     and where several friends or acquaintances of appellee
     testified that they initially believed the article was about
     appellee due to the inclusion of appellee's photograph.

8.   Torts -- defamation -- First Amendment rights implicated -- damages not
     presumed. -- In a case such as this involving First Amendment
     rights, damages may not be presumed.

9.   Torts -- defamation -- proof of damage to reputation. -- Proof of
     damage to reputation may include (1) proof that people
     believed the plaintiff to be guilty of the conduct asserted in
     the publication or (2) proof that people thought less of the
     plaintiff as a result of the publication's defamatory content.

10.  Torts -- defamation -- proof of damage to appellee's reputation was
     sufficient. -- The supreme court concluded that the trial court
     did not err in denying appellant's directed-verdict motion
     where the proof presented at trial, including the testimony of
     various witnesses who believed that appellee was involved in
     a criminal investigation, was sufficient to sustain the jury's
     conclusion that appellee's reputation had been damaged as a
     result of appellant's negligent publication of his photograph
     with the article. 

11.  Torts -- defamation -- public official or figure -- mixed question of fact
     and law. -- Whether an individual is a public official or a
     public figure is a mixed question of fact and law that is for
     the trial court to determine.

12.  Torts -- defamation -- "public figures" defined. -- Public figures are
     those persons who have assumed roles of especial prominence in
     the affairs of society; some occupy positions of such
     persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public
     figures for all purposes; more commonly, those classed as
     public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
     particular public controversies in order to influence the
     resolution of the issues involved; in either event, they
     invite attention and comment. 

13.  Torts -- defamation -- "private individual" defined. -- A private
     individual has not accepted public office nor assumed an
     influential role in ordering society; a private individual has
     not relinquished his interest in the protection of his own
     good name and consequently has a more compelling case for
     redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.

14.  Torts -- defamation -- public-figure question -- nature and extent of
     individual's participation in controversy provides meaningful context. --
     In some instances, an individual may achieve such pervasive
     fame that he or she becomes a public figure for all purposes
     and in all contexts; more commonly, an individual voluntarily
     injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
     controversy and becomes a public figure for a limited range of
     issues; in either case, such persons assume special prominence
     in the resolution of public questions; absent clear evidence
     of general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive
     involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should
     not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his or
     her life; it is preferable to reduce the public-figure
     question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature
     and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
     controversy giving rise to the defamation.

15.  Torts -- defamation -- appellee was not limited-purpose public figure. --
     The supreme court concluded that appellee was not a limited-
     purpose public figure within the context of the reported
     criminal investigation; the mere fact of an attorney's
     representation of a client involved in a matter of public
     controversy does not, in itself, automatically render the
     attorney a public figure within the context of the
     controversy; there was no evidence presented at trial showing
     that appellee had thrust himself into the vortex of the
     controversy at issue or that he had engaged the public's
     attention in an attempt to influence the outcome of the
     controversy.

16.  Torts -- defamation -- appellee was not all-purpose public figure. -- The
     supreme court determined that appellee did not, by virtue of
     his having been a federal prosecutor for eight years, occupy
     a position of persuasive power and influence or one of
     especial prominence in the affairs of society so that he could
     be labeled an all-purpose public figure; his public activities
     had nothing to do with the subject of the newspaper article;
     there was no clear evidence presented at trial showing that
     appellee had achieved such general fame and notoriety
     throughout the state, where the newspaper was circulated, to
     render him a public personality for all aspects of his life.

17.  Torts -- defamation -- appellee was private individual within context of
     lawsuit -- only required to prove negligence. -- Because the supreme
     court concluded that appellee was a private individual within
     the context of this lawsuit, it necessarily followed that the
     trial court did not err in instructing the jury that appellee
     was only required to prove negligence rather than actual
     malice.


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Fort Smith District; Don
R. Langston, Judge; affirmed.
     Hardin, Dawson & Terry, by: Rex M. Terry; and Williams &
Anderson, by: Philip S. Anderson, John E. Tull III, and Leon
Holmes, for appellant.
     Everett Law Firm, by: Thomas A. Mars, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Little Rock Newspapers, Inc., appeals the judgment
of the Sebastian County Circuit Court imposing the jury's verdict
awarding $50,000 in damages to Appellee J. Michael Fitzhugh for his
defamation claim against Appellant's newspaper, the Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette.  Our jurisdiction of this appeal is pursuant to
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(15), as it presents questions concerning
the law of torts.  Appellant raises four points for reversal.  We
find no error and affirm.
     The record reflects that on Monday, June 20, 1994, the
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette printed an article on the front page of
its "Arkansas" section entitled, "Whitewater counsel kicks off
first prosecution."  There were two photographs included in the
article -- one of Charles Matthews, with the caption "Matthews"
beneath it and one of Appellee, with the caption "Fitzhugh" beneath
it.  The substance of the article is as follows:
        Whitewater counsel kicks off first prosecution

          The first case to be prosecuted by the office of
     Robert Fiske Jr., the special counsel in the Whitewater
     Development Corp. affair, is to start in U.S. District
     Court at Little Rock today.
          But don't look for the prominent political figures
     usually associated with Fiske's investigation.
          The defendants are Charles Matthews and Eugene
     Fitzhugh.  The men are little known outside Little Rock,
     and their attorneys argue the case doesn't belong under
     Fiske's jurisdiction.
          Matthews, Fitzhugh and former Pulaski County
     Municipal Judge David Hale were indicted by a federal
     grand jury last fall for conspiring to defraud the Small
     Business Administration of $900,000 through Hale's
     federally licensed lending company, Capital Management
     Services Inc. of Little Rock.
          Capital Management Services was supposed to raise
     capital to match money from the SBA and then make loans
     to socially and economically disadvantaged companies and
     individuals.
          Fitzhugh's attorney, Randy Satterfield of Little
     Rock, said his client's defense is that "he's pretty much
     a victim of some big scheme that Hale had going on."
          Hale helped fuel calls for the Whitewater
     investigation -- and Fiske's eventual appointment in
     January by Attorney General Janet Reno -- by alleging
     that then-Gov. Bill Clinton pressured him during the
     1980s to make a $300,000 loan to Susan McDougal.
          The president and first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
     were partners with James and Susan McDougal from 1978-92
     in Whitewater, a 230-acre residential development along
     the White River in Marion County.
          James McDougal also owned Madison Guaranty Savings
     & Loan Association, which failed in 1989 at a cost to
     taxpayers of at least $47 million.  Fiske is
     investigating allegations that money was transferred
     illegally from Madison accounts to Whitewater accounts.
          Hale pleaded guilty to two felonies in March.  His
     sentencing is on hold while the government evaluates his
     cooperation with Fiske's investigation.
          Fitzhugh and Matthews have said that if anybody
     defrauded the SBA, it was Hale.  Yet their link to
     Whitewater -- however small -- will ensure national news
     coverage of their trial.
          Satterfield said he has been contacted by reporters
     from The New York Times, USA Today and other
     publications.  
          Fitzhugh has tried unsuccessfully to have Fiske
     disqualified from the case, arguing the Whitewater
     connection has turned the trial into a "media event." 
          The prosecution will be handled by two associate
     counsels in Fiske's office.
          Fitzhugh and Matthews are accused of using a wealthy
     Shreveport family's money to help Hale misrepresent the
     amount of private capital held by his company.  That
     misrepresentation allegedly allowed the company to
     qualify improperly for $900,000 from the SBA.
          Matthews and Fitzhugh split $250,000 as their
     payoff, the government contends.
          Fitzhugh, a Little Rock lawyer, represented a member
     of the Shreveport family.
          Matthews, a North Little Rock lawyer and former
     securities dealer, handled some of the family's
     investments.  Matthews was a state representative and
     chairman of the Arkansas Democratic Party in the late
     1960s.
          Court papers filed by the government and defense
     lawyers recently indicate how the trial may proceed.
          The government says it can make its case without
     testimony from Hale.
          Fiske's office, however, said it expects defense
     attorneys to call Hale as a witness to discredit him.
          Prosecutors have asked U.S. District Judge Stephen
     Reasoner to limit Hale's testimony about his crimes to
     prevent distracting the jury from the "relevant issues"
     in the case.
          "The obvious ploy is to set up Hale as a straw man,"
     prosecutors argued last week in a motion to limit
     testimony about Hale's confessed crimes.
          Satterfield said he has subpoenaed Hale.  
          "There's a lot of activity about limiting his
     testimony, so I don't know" whether to call him, the
     lawyer said.
          The government also has argued that unlimited
     examination of Hale could damage Fiske's investigation of
     other matters.
          A spokesman for Fiske's office said the prosecution
     hopes to present its case "within a week" but declined to
     respond to other questions.
          Satterfield said he expects the trial to last no
     more than a week.

     After receiving telephone calls from Appellee, the newspaper
printed a correction the following day.  The correction, which was
printed in the lower left corner of the front page of the
"Arkansas" section under the headline of "Getting it straight,"
included a true photograph of Eugene Fitzhugh.  The correction
read:
          On Monday on the front of the Arkansas section a
     photo of J. Michael Fitzhugh was run in place of a photo
     of Eugene Fitzhugh.  The correct photo of Eugene Fitzhugh
     is shown. 
     Appellee filed his complaint against Appellant on September 2,
1994, alleging that the juxtaposition of his photograph against the
headline and accompanying article was defamatory per se and was the
result of gross carelessness on the part of Appellant's employees. 
In its answer, Appellant asserted that Appellee was a public figure
and that, as such, it was necessary for Appellee to prove that its
employees acted with actual malice in placing Appellee's photograph
in the Whitewater article.  
                I.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
     For its first two points for reversal, Appellant argues that
the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment
and for refusing to grant a directed verdict in its favor. 
Appellant contends that Appellee failed to prove that the article
in question was a false statement of fact of and concerning him and
that his reputation was actually harmed as a result of the
article's publication.  Appellant does not challenge the amount of
damages awarded to Appellee by the jury; rather, it challenges the
award of any damages.
     We first note that the denial of a motion for summary judgment
is not reviewable on appeal.  Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997); White v. Welsh, 327 Ark. 465, 939 S.W.2d 299
(1997).  Such review is not available even after a trial on the
merits, as the final judgment must be tested upon the record as it
exists at the time it is rendered, rather than at the time the
motion for summary judgment is denied.  Ball v. Foehner, 326 Ark.
409, 931 S.W.2d 142 (1996).  Hence, we review only Appellant's
argument as it pertains to the trial court's denial of its motion
for directed verdict.  
     A motion for directed verdict should only be granted if the
evidence is so insubstantial as to require that the jury's verdict
be set aside.  Dodson v. Dicker, 306 Ark. 108,