Title: State v. James

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 334 (1974) 519 P.2d 33 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Laydonia JAMES, Appellant. No. 2661. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. February 26, 1974. Rehearing Denied March 19, 1974. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Thomas A. Jacobs, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Wood, Platt & Jenson, P.C. by Dennis D. Jenson, Coolidge, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt to the crime of voluntary manslaughter, §§ 13-455, 13-456 and 13-457 A.R.S. We are asked to answer two questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. In the early evening of 6 August 1972, the defendant entered a bar known as the "Cozy Spot Bar" located in Casa Grande, Arizona. The defendant approached the victim, John L. Miles, who was sitting on a bar stool at the end of the bar. Although controverted by the defendant, two witnesses testified that the defendant reached around the victim Miles and pulled him backwards *335 to a position where Miles was still sitting on the bar stool, but his back was nearly touching the other bar stool to the side of him. The victim jerked away and told the defendant not to do that, as he didn't like it. Further discussion ensued and the defendant told Miles, in effect, "if you have your gun pull it," and Miles responded that he had his gun and took it out of his left pocket. At or about this time, the defendant pulled his gun and shot the victim Miles who was pronounced dead upon arrival at Hoemako Hospital. At the trial the defendant claimed that the shooting was in self-defense. In addition to an instruction on second degree murder, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was given over defendant's objection. From the verdict and judgment of guilt the defendant appeals. WAS THE INSTRUCTION ON VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER PROPER? It is the contention of the defendant that he was either guilty of second degree murder or nothing, and that by giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, which he contends was not supported by the evidence, the jury reached a compromise verdict of guilty to voluntary manslaughter instead of not guilty. We have stated: Manslaughter is defined as follows: And: In the instant case, witnesses testified that the defendant was questioning the victim concerning a shooting that occurred the night before in which the victim in this case, John L. Miles, was supposed to have been the man who did the shooting. Elmo Warren, a patron of the bar, testified as follows: And the defendant testified: A part-time waitress testified as follows: We believe that there is sufficient evidence from which the judge could instruct, and the jury could find, the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We find no error. PRESENCE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE WHEN THE VERDICT WAS RECEIVED At the close of the trial and after the submission of the case to the jury, the judge, without objection by the parties, directed that the courtroom clerk was to take the verdict in his absence. The minute entry reads as follows: We have no reporter's transcript of these proceedings. In their briefs, however, the parties agree that the judge was not present to receive the verdict. The Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time of this trial contemplated the presence of the judge at the time the verdict was received and read. Rule 283 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., provided that "the foreman shall return the verdict to the court" and the court's presence is clearly required. Rule 289 did provide for a sealed verdict "during a temporary adjournment of the court," but this procedure was not utilized in the instant case. It was error for the court to absent himself from the courtroom when the verdict was returned. Some jurisdictions have held that this unauthorized absence voids the verdict. For example (based upon a specific statute): And our Court of Appeals has stated: Other courts have held, however, that even if error, the question is whether the judge's absence resulted in loss of control of the trial or prejudice to the defendant: And: Rule 305 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time this matter was tried would indicate an approval of the requirement of prejudice concerning the absence of the judge when receiving a verdict: In the instant case, while we do not approve of the procedure followed by the trial judge, there is no showing that the error was prejudicial. THE SENTENCE In a criminal case, we are required to review the record for error, § 13-1715 A.R.S. and State v. Burrell, 96 Ariz. 233, 393 P.2d 921 (1964). In the instant case, we note that the minute entry on sentencing is defective in that it does not indicate the time the defendant is to serve in the Arizona State Prison. The entry merely reads: The formal written judgment does provide for a sentence of not less than five nor more than seven years in the Arizona State Prison. There is no reporter's transcript of the sentencing before this court. In a criminal case a sentence is complete and valid when orally pronounced in open court and entered in the minutes without anything further or any written judgment. Willmon v. State ex rel. Eyman, 16 Ariz. App. 323, 493 P.2d 125 (1972); State v. Johnson, 108 Ariz. 116, 493 P.2d 498 (1972). Because the minute entry does not reflect the range of sentence, the matter will have to be remanded to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to State v. Jefferson, 108 Ariz. 600, 503 P.2d 942 (1972), and State v. Denson, 110 Ariz. 159, 515 P.2d 1179 (1973). Judgment affirmed. Remanded for resentencing. STRUCKMEYER and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.