Title: Parle v. Henry Boos Dental Laboratories, Inc.

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

153 N.W.2d 344 (1967) Patricia PARLE, now Patricia Parle Osmonson, Respondent, v. HENRY BOOS DENTAL LABORATORIES, INC., et al., Relators. No. 40428. Supreme Court of Minnesota. October 6, 1967. Tyrrell, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, and Jon L. Levy, St. Paul, for relators. Gerald B. Forrette, St. Paul, for respondent. OTIS, Justice. The respondent, Patricia Parle Osmonson, has been awarded workmen's compensation as a result of tuberculosis which she contracted while employed by relator Henry Boos Dental Laboratories, Inc. Boos and its insurer seek review of a determination by the Industrial Commission that Mrs. Osmonson's disability was an occupational disease. Although relators challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that Mrs. Osmonson contracted tuberculosis from fellow workers, we do not find it necessary to consider that question. Assuming this was the source of her infection the only issue is whether our decision in Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 84 N.W.2d 606, requires an affirmance. We hold that it does not. Mrs. Osmonson was first employed by the Boos company in June 1962. During the following year she worked in the same office or laboratory with three other employees, Charles Brimer, Richard Christenson, and Sherlyn Perrault, who were subsequently found to be seriously infected with tuberculosis. Her contacts with Brimer and Christenson were during coffee breaks, luncheon, and on the elevators. They were casual and sporadic. Her duties did not otherwise require that she associate with them. However, she did work in the same area with Mrs. Perrault, separated by a distance of only 10 or 20 feet. Apart from the exposure to other infected employees, there is no evidence that any of the atmospheric or working conditions *345 in the Boos Laboratories were conducive to contracting tuberculosis. The area in which Mrs. Osmonson worked was some 110 feet in length, 60 feet in width, and 10 feet in height. The air was completely recirculated six or seven times an hour. There were no extremes or variations in temperature and no dust, gas, or smoke which might increase the chance of infection. Nevertheless, the referee found that Mrs. Osmonson's exposure to tuberculosis was peculiar to her occupation, differing from the exposure of the general public, and the disease "was due to causes in excess of the hazards ordinary of employment." This determination was affirmed on appeal to the commission. The relevant provisions of the statute are contained in § 176.011, subd. 15, as follows: That statute was construed and applied in favor of the employee in the Gray case. There the employee contracted tuberculosis as the result of a massive and protracted exposure to an infected fellow police officer with whom he was assigned to duty in a squad car. The medical testimony on which the court relied in affirming an award was as follows (250 Minn. 232, 84 N.W.2d 614): We held that (250 Minn. 234, 84 N.W.2d 615) "[s]ince we think this was a hazard distinguishable in character from the general run of occupations or that of the policeman ordinarily, therefore officer Gray's tuberculosis as contracted was in fact `peculiar to his occupation.'"[1] We concluded by saying (250 Minn. 235, 84 N.W.2d 616): There is no evidence that under the facts of this case tuberculosis is "a natural incident" of employee's occupation or attaches to it "a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations," or "is in excess of that attending employment in general." Unlike the working conditions which confronted Officer Gray which required that he be closely confined for long periods of time in immediate proximity to an infected employee, Mrs. Osmonson's work area was in a large well-ventilated laboratory where she sat some distance from other employees. Her disability resulted entirely from exposure to an infected employee and was in no way connected with the hazards inherent in the employment. Our decision in the Gray case reflects a solicitous legislative concern for police officers because they are more likely to be exposed to a stratum of society which is peculiarly susceptible to disease than is the public generally.[2] The ruling in that case is limited to the unusual circumstances which there existed. The facts of the instant case do not permit a finding that Mrs. Osmonson's disability resulted from a disease "recognized as a hazard characteristic of and peculiar to the trade," or from a cause "in excess of the hazards ordinary of employment" within the meaning of § 176.011, subd. 15. There was no evidence that the nature of her duties or the conditions under which she was required to work had any connection with her contracting tuberculosis. Her disability resulted from an exposure which might as readily have occurred outside of her employment. It was not peculiar to her occupation. Buckley v. Gallagher Bros. Sand & Gravel Corp., 300 N.Y. 447, 92 N.E.2d 38. This case is unlike those in which an employee's duties bring her into physical contact with tools or instruments which greatly increase the opportunity for contracting tuberculosis. Decisions which hold compensable an infection resulting from the use of pipettes, telephone mouthpieces, and similar devices are therefore not applicable. Mason v. Y. W. C. A. of New York City, 271 App.Div. 1042, 68 N.Y.S.2d 510; Hovancik v. General Aniline & Film Corp., Ansco Div., 8 A.D.2d 171, 187 N.Y.S.2d 28; 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 41.40. The New York court in Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 288, 82 N.E.2d 785, 786, denied recovery in a case indistinguishable on the facts from the case at hand. In so doing it held: We are persuaded by the New York court's reasoning and hold that the decision of the Industrial Commission must therefore be reversed. Reversed. [1] See Paider v. Park East Movers, 25 A.D.2d 62, 267 N.Y.S.2d 12, which reached a contrary result. [2] Minn.St. 251.051.