Title: Ex Parte Guess

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

507 So. 2d 551 (1987)
Ex parte Larry Wayne GUESS.
(Re: Larry Wayne Guess v. State of Alabama).
85-1529.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 10, 1987.
Jenifer C. Holt, Scottsboro, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Jane LeCroy Brannan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
Two legal questions are presented by this petition for writ of certiorari:
(1) Is Alabama's so-called "firearm enhancement statute"[1] unconstitutional because it permits the trial judge, rather than a jury, to decide the fact question whether "a firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony"?
(2) Under Alabama's new Criminal Code, does the State have to prove in a kidnapping case that the accused intended to secretly confine or imprison his victim ?
Petitioner was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree and assault in the first degree. Pursuant to the provisions of Code 1975, § 13A-5-6(a)(4) and (5), respectively, the trial court sentenced petitioner for his kidnapping conviction to 30 years' imprisonment, and for his assault conviction to a term of 15 years. He was also fined, but that is not an issue in this case.
*552 The particular facts surrounding the incidents which gave rise to the prosecutions and convictions are sufficiently set out in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Guess v. State, 507 So. 2d 546 (Ala. Cr.App.1986), and will not be restated in full here, but, briefly, they are as follows: There was evidence that the petitioner lured the victim to come and help him because his car had run out of gas. When the victim arrived, petitioner asked him to take him to see a friend, then directed him to drive down another road. Subsequently, the petitioner stuck a pistol to the head of the victim, handcuffed him, and later knocked him unconscious by hitting him on the head with a blunt object. When the victim regained consciousness, he was still in his car, but the car had been moved, and it was resting on a bluff 25 to 30 feet from a highway, and if one of the car's wheels had not become entangled in kudzu, it might have tumbled down the bluff.
We first address petitioner's claim that in the absence of a jury finding that he used or attempted to use a firearm or deadly weapon in the commission of the felonies with which he was charged and convicted, the trial court erred in sentencing him under the provisions of the so-called "firearm enhancement statute."
Insofar as we are aware, this is a case of first impression involving this particular statute, and that is one of the reasons we granted certiorari. After reviewing the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the law cited by petitioner in support of his claim, we are of the opinion that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly decided the issue and that its judgment is due to be affirmed.
In its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals followed a decision involving a similar statute in another state, and distinguished a case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida involving a statute that the Court of Criminal Appeals thought differed from the one here involved. In addressing the question, Judge Patterson, writing for the court, said:
The Court of Criminal Appeals also followed one of its own cases, Darby v. State, [Ms. 8 Div. 181, October 22, 1985] (Ala.Cr. *553 App.1985), which involved a similar question about the constitutionality of a sentencing statute which was applied to Darby's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, and concluded that petitioner here "was not denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury to determine the application of §§ 13A-5-6(a) (4) and (5)." We agree with the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
On the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of petitioner for kidnapping in the first degree, we also hold that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals is correct and that its judgment on that issue is also due to be affirmed.
In affirming petitioner's conviction for kidnapping, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state need not prove, under Alabama's new kidnapping statute, that the accused had an "`intent to cause [the victim] to be secretly confined, or imprisoned against his will, or to be sent out of the state against his will ...'", and relied upon its own decision in Owens v. State, [Ms. 4 Div. 536, February 12, 1986] (Ala.Cr. App.1986), cert. granted and remanded with directions on other grounds, [Ms. 85-1008, March 27, 1987] (Ala.1987). In that case, the Court of Criminal Appeals had addressed the same issue which is presented in this petition, as follows:
Although this Court remanded the Owens case to the Court of Criminal Appeals with directions to remand it to the trial court for further proceedings on another ground, this Court, nevertheless, held, as follows:
In Owens, we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to prove kidnapping, and we follow Owens in affirming the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
ADAMS, J., not sitting.
[1]  Code 1975, § 13A-5-6:

"(a) Sentences for felonies shall be for a definite term of imprisonment, which imprisonment includes hard labor, within the following limitations:
"* * * *
"(4) For a Class A felony in which a firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony, not less than 20 years.
"(5) For a Class B or C felony in which a firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony, not less than 10 years."