Title: Polyzos v. Cotrupi

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
GEORGE K. POLYZOS, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 011778 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
June 7, 2002 
FRANK COTRUPI 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Robert W. Curran, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether expert testimony was 
necessary to prove claims of negligence and breach of contract 
against a real estate agent when a contract for the sale of real 
estate required conveyance of a parcel larger than that which 
the owners retained the real estate agent to sell. 
BACKGROUND 
George K. Polyzos and Jennifer P. Polyzos (the Polyzoses) 
engaged Frank Cotrupi, a licensed real estate agent, to list, 
market, and sell a portion of a parcel of residential real 
estate they owned on the waterfront of the Warwick River in 
Newport News commonly known as 1109 Patrick Lane. 
The Polyzoses’ residence was located on the lot adjacent to 
the parcel they wished to sell.  The Polyzoses had purchased the 
parcel at 1109 Patrick Lane in order to adjust the boundary line 
between the two lots, thereby increasing the water frontage and 
the area of the rear yard of their residence.  After adjusting 
the boundary line, they intended to sell the house and the 
remaining portion of 1109 Patrick Lane (the reduced lot).  They 
retained a surveyor to prepare a plat showing the revised 
boundary line between the two lots. 
The Polyzoses erected a fence and installed landscaping 
along the new boundary line.  However, they did not record the 
plat showing the revision because their attorney had advised 
them that doing so would result in the acceleration of their 
mortgage debt. 
The Polyzoses subsequently engaged Cotrupi to sell the 
reduced lot.  They advised him that the boundary line had been 
adjusted and that they wanted to sell only the reduced lot, not 
the entire lot as they had originally acquired it.  Cotrupi 
prepared a real estate listing agreement, signed by the 
Polyzoses and Cotrupi, which referred to the property for sale 
as “1109 Patrick Lane.” 
The Polyzoses gave Cotrupi a revised plat of the property, 
which George Polyzos had copied from the surveyor’s plat, 
reflecting only the reduced lot.  Cotrupi was aware that the 
surveyor’s plat showing the changed boundary line had not been 
recorded and, consequently, that the lot the Polyzoses intended 
to sell was smaller than that reflected as “1109 Patrick Lane” 
in the City’s land records. 
Cotrupi proceeded to market the property, communicating 
with potential buyers and their agents.  He received and 
reviewed offers to purchase the property, including one from 
 
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Robert H. Pride and Patricia A. Pride (the Prides).  The 
contract offer from the Prides, including a description of the 
property to be conveyed, was prepared by the Prides’ real estate 
agent based on information Cotrupi had provided to the Realtors’ 
Multiple Listing Service.  The contract offer described the 
property to be conveyed as “/ / / Riverview Estates also known 
as 1109 Patrick Lane.”  The backslashes that begin the property 
description indicate spaces for reference to the lot, block, and 
section in the subdivision to complete the legal description. 
When Cotrupi received the contract offer, he did not attach 
or incorporate into the contract a copy of the revised plat 
showing the adjusted boundary line.  He testified that he had 
not thought it was necessary to do so because the revised plat 
prepared by George Polyzos had been previously available to the 
Prides and their real estate agent when viewing the property and 
because the fence and landscaping clearly indicated the location 
of the lot lines to the Prides when they viewed the property.  
Cotrupi further testified that he had discussed the boundary 
line adjustment with the Prides’ real estate agent and that they 
had agreed that they would not include the lot number in the 
legal description of the property because Cotrupi did not know 
what lot number would be assigned by the City when the revised 
plat was recorded. 
 
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Prior to closing, a title agent communicating with the 
Prides inquired about the boundary line adjustment.  The Prides 
asserted that they had not been advised of the boundary line 
adjustment prior to submitting their contract offer, and that 
they were entitled to acquire the entire original lot as bounded 
prior to the adjustment.  As “an alternative,” the Prides 
indicated to the Polyzoses their willingness to consider a 
reduction in the contract sale price. 
After the Polyzoses refused to consider a reduction in the 
sale price and tendered a deed for the reduced lot, the Prides 
filed a bill of complaint against the Polyzoses for specific 
performance.  They contended that the reference in the contract 
to the street address as the legal description of the property 
could only mean the property shown as that address in the city’s 
land records and, thus, that the contract required conveyance of 
the entire original lot. 
The Polyzoses denied that the contract required the 
conveyance of the entire original lot.  They also filed a third-
party action against Cotrupi, asserting that if specific 
performance were required, Cotrupi would be liable to them for 
professional negligence and breach of contract because the 
listing agreement authorized the sale of only the reduced lot. 
At trial, the chancellor heard testimony from the 
Polyzoses, the Prides, and both real estate agents in accord 
 
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with the previously recited facts.*  At the conclusion of the 
Polyzoses’ evidence, the chancellor granted Cotrupi’s motion to 
strike the Polyzoses’ evidence and dismiss their third-party 
claims of negligence and breach of contract against him.  In 
doing so, the chancellor ruled that the Polyzoses had failed to 
adduce any evidence through expert testimony with regard to the 
requisite standard of care owed by a licensed realtor to his 
clients.  At the close of all the evidence, the trial court 
found that the contract required the Polyzoses to convey the 
entire original lot to the Prides. 
The Polyzoses now appeal the dismissal of their third-party 
action against Cotrupi, contending that the chancellor erred in 
requiring expert testimony in the proof of both their negligence 
and breach of contract claims.  They have not assigned error to 
the judgment in favor of the Prides and, accordingly, the Prides 
are not parties to this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Because of the unusual procedural posture of this case on 
appeal, we first address the standard of review applicable to 
the Polyzoses’ assignments of error.  The Polyzoses were not the 
                     
* The testimony of the Prides’ agent, including his 
statement that Cotrupi had not informed him of the boundary line 
change prior to execution of the sales contract, was taken after 
the dismissal of the Polyzoses’ third-party claim against 
Cotrupi. 
 
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prevailing parties below.  However, at the time the chancellor 
considered Cotrupi’s motion to strike the evidence on the third-
party claims against him, procedurally the Polyzoses were in the 
same position as plaintiffs who had presented their case-in-
chief against the defendant.  Under such circumstances, “a 
[chancellor] should review the evidence adduced at trial . . . 
accept[ing] as true all the evidence favorable to the plaintiff 
as well as any reasonable inference [the trier of fact] might 
draw therefrom which would sustain the plaintiff’s cause of 
action.”  Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 Va. 134, 138, 486 S.E.2d 
285, 287 (1997); accord Claycomb v. Didawick, 256 Va. 332, 335, 
505 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1998). 
This standard also applies to this Court’s review of the 
chancellor’s decision to strike the Polyzoses’ evidence.  
Therefore, we consider the evidence in this case, and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, in the light most 
favorable to the Polyzoses.  Lambert v. Downtown Garage, Inc., 
262 Va. 707, 712, 553 S.E.2d 714, 716 (2001). 
When so viewed, the evidence clearly establishes that 
Cotrupi understood that he was being retained as a realtor to 
list and market only that portion of “1109 Patrick Lane” that 
remained after the boundary line had been adjusted by the 
                                                                  
 
 
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Polyzoses to enlarge their adjoining lot.  Similarly, it is a 
reasonable inference from the evidence that the Polyzoses and 
Cotrupi understood that the use of the street address in the 
listing agreement was meant to refer to the reduced lot because 
it would have retained that street address even if it were 
assigned a new lot number by the City. 
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Polyzoses further establishes that the Prides were not aware of 
the changed boundary line when they executed their purchase 
offer.  The reasonable inference from that evidence is that 
Cotrupi failed to make them or their agent aware of that fact.  
In addition, it can be readily and reasonably inferred from the 
evidence that Cotrupi was aware, or should have been aware, that 
the sales contract did not contain a complete and accurate legal 
description of the property to be conveyed.  Cotrupi, however, 
did not attach or incorporate into the contract the appropriate 
revised plat to resolve any ambiguity that might exist in the 
contract so as to protect the interests of the Polyzoses.  
Rather, he relied upon the fence and landscaping viewed by the 
Prides to satisfy himself that the contract pertained only to 
the reduced lot. 
We now consider whether this view of the evidence would 
permit the Polyzoses to establish, without presenting expert 
testimony, that Cotrupi breached his professional duty to them 
 
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and/or breached the listing contract.  As the Polyzoses note, 
Code § 54.1-2131 requires licensed realtors to “[p]erform in 
accordance with the terms of the brokerage relationship” and 
“[e]xercise ordinary care.”  Moreover, in adopting statutory 
guidelines for the conduct of realtors, the General Assembly has 
provided that “[t]he common law of agency relative to brokerage 
relationships in real estate transactions to the extent 
inconsistent with this article shall be expressly abrogated.”  
Code § 54.1-2144. 
We are of opinion that the existence of this statutory duty 
and standard of care does not dictate that a trier of fact must 
always require expert assistance to understand the appropriate 
practices of licensed realtors.  We also recognize that there 
may be instances in which the acts of a realtor, as with other 
professionals, involve transactions or matters beyond the 
capacity of persons of ordinary intelligence to comprehend and, 
thus, to form an intelligent opinion about them without the 
assistance of expert testimony.  Board of Supervisors v. Lake 
Services, Inc., 247 Va. 293, 297, 440 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1994). 
We need not formulate a bright line rule applicable to all 
cases involving the alleged negligence of realtors.  We have 
held that expert testimony is unnecessary when the alleged 
negligent acts or omissions of certain professionals clearly lie 
within the range of the common knowledge and experience of the 
 
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trier of fact.  See, e.g., Dickerson v. Fatehi, 253 Va. 324, 
327, 484 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1997); Commercial Distributors, Inc. 
v. Blankenship, 240 Va. 382, 390, 397 S.E.2d 840, 845 (1990); 
Richmond Newspapers v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 296, 362 S.E.2d 
32, 42 (1987).  We are of opinion that this case-by-case 
approach to the requirement for expert testimony is appropriate 
in cases involving the alleged negligence of realtors. 
In the present case, it is manifest that any person of 
ordinary intelligence would grasp that a realtor should take 
care not to offer for sale property which he has not been 
contractually authorized to sell, nor should a realtor present 
to his client a contract which clearly fails to sufficiently 
reflect the accurate legal description of the property to be 
conveyed.  The failure of a realtor in either regard is 
negligence.  Similarly, it is not beyond the realm of common 
knowledge and understanding that when a contract gives authority 
to an agent to sell a specific portion of property, and the 
agent then offers for sale and procures a buyer for more than 
that portion of the property within his authority to sell, he 
has breached his contract with his principals. 
Accordingly, we hold that at the time the chancellor 
granted Cotrupi’s motion to strike the Polyzoses’ evidence, 
under the appropriate standard of review the Polyzoses had 
adduced evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case of 
 
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professional negligence and breach of contract.  Thus, the 
chancellor erred in sustaining the motion to strike and entering 
judgment on the third-party claims for Cotrupi. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
chancellor in favor of Cotrupi and remand the case to the trial 
court for a new trial on the issues of professional negligence 
and breach of contract. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE LEMONS join, 
dissenting. 
 
In the third-party complaint filed by George K. Polyzos and 
Jennifer P. Polyzos (the Polyzoses) against their real estate 
broker, Frank Cotrupi, the Polyzoses alleged that they relied 
upon Cotrupi’s expertise “in preparing all written marketing 
materials, preparing the computerized posting on the Multiple 
Listing Service, reviewing and preparing the contract and 
counter-offer, and concluding their agreement” to sell their 
property known as 1109 Patrick Lane in Newport News, as 
reconfigured by the boundary line adjustment.  The Polyzoses 
further alleged that, as a result of an ambiguity in the 
purchase agreement, the buyers, Robert H. Pride, III, and 
Patricia A. Pride (the Prides), asserted that they had agreed to 
purchase the entire original lot situated at 1109 Patrick Lane 
 
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rather than the reduced lot resulting from the boundary line 
adjustment.  Consequently, the Polyzoses claimed that if the 
Prides were entitled to relief from the Polyzoses, then Cotrupi 
was liable to the Polyzoses for his “breach of the standard of 
care established for his profession, and/or breach of his 
contract with the Polyzos[es].” 
 
Because the claims for negligence and breach of 
contract both turn on the sufficiency of the property 
description used by Cotrupi in the relevant contracts, the 
Polyzoses’ burden of proof was the same under both theories of 
recovery.  See Seaward Int’l, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 239 Va. 
585, 592 n.3, 391 S.E.2d 283, 287 n.3 (1990).  That burden was 
to produce “sufficient evidence of negligence, or breach of the 
terms of the . . . contract, to frame an issue of fact to be 
submitted to the jury.”  Id. at 591-92, 391 S.E.2d at 287.  The 
Polyzoses failed to carry this burden because they did not 
present any expert testimony regarding the standard of care 
applicable to a licensed real estate broker in the situation 
presented by the facts of this case. 
 
Those facts, in the light most favorable to the 
Polyzoses, show that, in the listing agreement entered into with 
the Polyzoses, Cotrupi described the property to be sold as 
“1109 Patrick Lane.”  Likewise, that same description, with the 
lot, block, and section in the subdivision left blank, was used 
 
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in the purchase agreement with the Prides.  Cotrupi never 
attached or incorporated into the listing agreement or the 
purchase agreement a copy of the plat showing the adjusted 
boundary line.  Instead, he relied on his alleged oral 
communications with the Prides and their real estate agent, and 
also on the Prides’ visual inspection of the property, to convey 
the fact that the Polyzoses were not selling the entire original 
lot located at 1109 Patrick Lane. 
 
Given these facts, the issue with regard to the need 
for expert testimony is not whether Cotrupi was negligent or 
breached his listing contract with the Polyzoses by selling more 
of the lot located at 1109 Patrick Lane than the Polyzoses 
intended to sell.  That is how the majority characterizes the 
issue.  Instead, the properly framed question is whether 
Cotrupi’s use of the term “1109 Patrick Lane” as the sole 
description of the property to be sold, and his reliance on his 
oral communications and the Prides’ visual inspection, violated 
his professional duty to “[p]erform in accordance with the terms 
of the brokerage relationship” and to “[e]xercise ordinary 
care,” Code §§ 54.1-2131(A)(1) and –2131(A)(4), or breached the 
terms of the listing agreement.  I conclude that this question 
cannot be answered without expert testimony. 
 
The sufficiency of the property description in the 
written agreements was not a matter within the common knowledge 
 
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of lay persons.  This is not a situation where a real estate 
broker merely used an incorrect lot number or street address in 
the relevant contracts.  The property to be sold was still 
correctly known as 1109 Patrick Lane and as lot number seven in 
Riverview Estates because the Polyzoses had not recorded the 
plat showing the boundary line adjustment in the city’s land 
records.  To decide, in the situation presented here, whether 
Cotrupi violated the standard of care for his profession or 
breached the listing agreement with the Polyzoses, the trier of 
fact had to determine whether Cotrupi should have used a 
different legal description of the property, and if so, what 
description; whether he should have attached a copy of the plat 
to the relevant agreements; or whether Cotrupi was justified in 
merely relying on his oral communications and the property’s 
visual appearance to identify what portion of the lot located at 
1109 Patrick Lane was being sold.  All those matters require 
information beyond the common knowledge and experience of lay 
persons. 
 
Thus, in my view, expert testimony was required “to 
establish the appropriate professional standard, to establish a 
deviation from that standard, and to establish that such a 
deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.”  
Seaward, 239 Va. at 592, 391 S.E.2d at 287 (citing Raines v. 
Lutz, 231 Va. 110, 113, 341 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1986)).  For these 
 
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reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court.  In reaching this conclusion, I am not 
suggesting that expert testimony is required in every instance 
where the actions and professional responsibilities of a 
licensed real estate broker are at issue.  However, the peculiar 
facts of this case necessitate such testimony. 
 
 
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