Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Thor Templin

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP51-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Thor Templin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Thor Templin, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TEMPLIN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
OCTOBER 12, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (opinion filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A.W., J. dissent (opinion filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2016AP51-D   
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Thor Templin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,   
 
 
Complainant,   
 
 
v. 
 
Thor Templin,   
 
 
Respondent   
FILED 
 
OCT 12, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review Referee Jonathan V. Goodman's 
recommendation that the court declare Attorney Thor Templin in 
default and suspend his Wisconsin law license for a period of 60 
days for professional misconduct in connection with his work on 
three client matters and his non-cooperation with the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) investigation into that misconduct. 
The referee also recommended that Attorney Templin be required 
to pay the full costs of this proceeding, which total $1,041.40 
as of June 20, 2016.  
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Because no appeal has been filed, we review the 
referee's report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).1    
After conducting our independent review of the matter, we agree 
with the referee that, based on Attorney Templin's failure to 
answer the complaint filed by the OLR, the OLR is entitled to a 
default judgment.  We also agree with the referee that Attorney 
Templin's professional misconduct warrants a 60-day suspension 
of his Wisconsin law license, consecutive to the six-month 
suspension Attorney Templin is currently serving.  We also agree 
with the referee that Attorney Templin should be ordered to pay 
the full costs of the proceeding.  
¶3 
Attorney Templin was admitted to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin in May 2008.  His disciplinary history consists of:  
(1) a consensual private reprimand for failing to act diligently 
and communicate appropriately in a client matter, Private 
Reprimand, 
2011-04 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002344.html); and (2) a 
six-month suspension, commencing on May 3, 2016, for 12 counts 
of misconduct involving four clients, including filing frivolous 
motions, failing to respond to client requests for information, 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court shall 
review the referee's report; adopt, reject or modify 
the referee's findings and conclusions or remand the 
matter to the referee for additional findings; and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline. 
The 
court, on its own motion, may order the parties to 
file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
3 
 
charging an unreasonable fee, and failing to provide competent 
representation, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Templin, 
2016 WI 18, 367 Wis. 2d 351, 877 N.W.2d 107. 
¶4 
On January 7, 2016, the OLR filed the current 
complaint against Attorney Templin.  The complaint alleges six 
counts of professional misconduct in connection with his work on 
three client matters.   
¶5 
Counts 1-3 of the OLR's complaint arose out of 
Attorney Templin's representation of E.S.  In May 2009, E.S. 
hired Attorney Templin to help resolve certain property disputes 
related to the estate of E.S.'s mother.  E.S. claimed that her 
siblings had defrauded the estate to her disadvantage.  In 2009, 
Attorney Templin filed an action for special administration in 
Milwaukee County, but took no further action in that matter.  
¶6 
Although Attorney Templin exchanged correspondence 
with an attorney representing E.S.'s siblings, it was not until 
April 2011 that Attorney Templin filed suit against E.S.'s 
siblings alleging fraud.  Attorney Templin then failed to serve 
the summons and complaint on the defendants, and the court 
dismissed the lawsuit in July 2012.   
¶7 
In October 2013, Attorney Templin filed the same 
lawsuit against E.S.'s siblings alleging fraud.  But Attorney 
Templin again failed to serve the summons and complaint on the 
defendants, and the court dismissed the lawsuit in May 2014.  
¶8 
In April 2014, E.S. filed a grievance against Attorney 
Templin with the OLR.  In September 2014, the OLR sent Attorney 
Templin its notice of formal investigation requesting Attorney 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
4 
 
Templin's 
response 
to 
the 
allegations 
raised 
by 
E.S.'s 
grievance.  Attorney Templin failed to respond.  
¶9 
In October 2014, the OLR sent Attorney Templin a 
second letter reminding him of his duty to cooperate with the 
OLR and requesting a response by a certain date.  Attorney 
Templin failed to respond.   
¶10 The OLR then emailed to Attorney Templin electronic 
copies of the initial notice of formal investigation and the 
second investigative letter and advised Attorney Templin that a 
response was due.  Attorney Templin responded to the email and 
told the OLR that he had placed a response in the mail on that 
same day.  The OLR did not receive Attorney Templin's response.   
¶11 Attorney Templin only responded to the OLR's grievance 
after this court ordered him to show cause why his license 
should not be suspended for failing to cooperate in an OLR 
investigation.   
¶12 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of 
E.S.: 
 Count One:  By failing to achieve service on the 
defendants in two separately filed lawsuits, 
resulting in the dismissal of both lawsuits, 
Attorney Templin violated SCR 20:1.1.2   
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.1 provides:  "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
5 
 
 Count Two:  By failing to diligently pursue 
meaningful action on behalf of his client over a 
period of four years, Attorney Templin violated 
SCR 20:1.3.3   
 Count Three:  By failing to timely provide 
relevant information to OLR in the E.S. matter, 
Attorney Templin violated SCR 22.03(2)4 and SCR 
22.03(6),5 as enforced through SCR 20:8.4(h).6  
¶13 Count 4 of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney 
Templin's 
representation 
of 
J.A.M. 
 
Repeating 
all 
the 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
4 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director shall 
notify the respondent of the matter being investigated 
unless 
in 
the 
opinion 
of 
the 
director 
the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
5 SCR 22.03(6) 
provides, 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
6 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to:  . . . fail to cooperate in the investigation 
of a grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as 
required by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(6), or SCR 
22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
6 
 
allegations of the J.A.M. matter, which we deem admitted by 
virtue of Attorney Templin's default (see infra at ¶24), is 
unnecessary.  It is sufficient to describe the pattern that 
Attorney Templin generally followed in his work on the J.A.M. 
matter.   
¶14 The J.A.M. matter involved a dispute over real estate 
owned by J.A.M.  Over a year into the representation, J.A.M.'s 
daughter, L.B., contacted Attorney Templin and asked for 
information about the case.  Attorney Templin chose not to 
communicate with L.B. because he had not been specifically 
authorized by J.A.M. to do so.   
¶15 In light of L.B.'s inability to communicate with 
Attorney Templin, J.A.M. signed a "Designation of Agent or Power 
of Attorney," which gave broad general powers to L.B. to act on 
her mother's behalf, and explicitly gave L.B. authorization to 
receive a copy of the entire case file and to speak with 
Attorney Templin.  In July 2014, L.B. wrote Attorney Templin and 
enclosed a copy of the "Designation of Agent or Power of 
Attorney."  L.B. asked that Attorney Templin provide her with a 
copy of the entire case file.  Attorney Templin did not comply 
with L.B.'s request for the file, nor any of her subsequent 
requests for the file, including requests that L.B. made after 
Attorney Templin withdrew from representing J.A.M.  Attorney 
Templin provided a copy of J.A.M.'s file to the OLR in March 
2015, following the OLR's specific request for the file.  The 
OLR in turn forwarded the file to L.B.  
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
7 
 
¶16 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's work on J.A.M.'s 
matter: 
 Count Four:  By failing to comply with L.B.'s 
multiple 
requests 
following 
termination 
of 
representation to obtain a copy of J.A.M.'s file, 
Attorney Templin violated SCR 20:1.16(d).7  
¶17 Counts 5 and 6 of the OLR's complaint arose out of 
Attorney Templin's representation of P.D.P.  In November of 
2011, P.D.P. was involved in an automobile accident and was 
cited for inattentiveness.  P.D.P. admitted fault. 
¶18 In January 2013, State Farm Insurance Company (State 
Farm) sued P.D.P. to recover property damages caused by P.D.P. 
to an insured's vehicle.  State Farm served its Summons and 
Complaint by publication.  When P.D.P. failed to answer the 
suit, State Farm filed a motion for default judgment. In July 
2013, the circuit court granted judgment to State Farm in the 
amount of $9,013.88 plus costs and attorney's fees.  P.D.P. 
received 
a 
letter 
from 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:   
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall 
take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to 
protect 
a 
client's 
interests, 
such 
as 
giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
8 
 
Transportation advising her that her driver's license was 
suspended because of the unpaid State Farm judgment.   
¶19 P.D.P. hired Attorney Templin in May 2014 to try to 
reopen the default judgment entered against her in July 2013, or 
to otherwise resolve the matter with State Farm.  Attorney 
Templin prepared a written fee agreement, but took no immediate 
action on the matter.  After about one month, P.D.P. called 
Attorney Templin multiple times and left numerous messages to 
inquire about the case, but she was unable to speak with 
Attorney Templin.  During a subsequent meeting between Attorney 
Templin and P.D.P. and her husband, Attorney Templin promised 
that he would contact State Farm and try to resolve the matter, 
yet he did nothing further on the case.  Attorney Templin failed 
to return subsequent telephone calls from P.D.P. and was never 
available when P.D.P. traveled to Attorney Templin's office to 
meet with him.  In December 2014, Attorney Templin filed a 
motion to reopen the default judgment entered against P.D.P.  
The circuit court denied the motion, noting that it was "not 
timely" and not "made within a reasonable time."   
¶20 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of 
P.D.P.: 
 Count Five:  By failing to file a motion to 
reopen a default judgment on behalf of his client 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
9 
 
in a timely fashion, Attorney Templin violated 
SCR 20:1.3.8  
 Count Six:  By failing to respond to his client's 
multiple requests for information regarding her 
case, Attorney Templin violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).9  
¶21 The OLR personally served its complaint and an order 
to answer on Attorney Templin.  Attorney Templin failed to file 
an answer to the OLR complaint.  The OLR moved for default 
judgment, which the OLR served by mail on Attorney Templin. 
¶22 The referee filed a report recommending that this 
court grant the OLR's motion for default judgment.  In so doing, 
the referee deemed the allegations in the OLR's complaint to be 
established.  The referee recommended a 60-day suspension of 
Attorney Templin's Wisconsin law license, which was the sanction 
the OLR sought in its complaint.  The referee recommended that 
this 60-day suspension should run consecutive to the six-month 
suspension imposed in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Templin, 367 Wis. 2d 351.  The referee also recommended the 
imposition of the full costs of this proceeding against Attorney 
Templin.   
¶23 Attorney Templin did not appeal from the referee's 
report and recommendation.  Thus, we proceed with our review of 
the matter pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).  We review a referee's 
findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard. See 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
9 SCR: 20:1.4(a)4 provides: "a lawyer shall promptly comply 
with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
10 
 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 
¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  We review the referee's 
conclusions of law de novo.  Id.  We determine the appropriate 
level of discipline independent of the referee's recommendation.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶24 We agree with the referee that Attorney Templin should 
be declared in default.  Although the OLR effected personal 
service of its complaint, and although the OLR served its motion 
for default judgment on Attorney Templin by mail, he failed to 
appear or present a defense.  
Accordingly, we deem it 
appropriate to declare him in default.  In addition, the referee 
properly relied on the allegations of the complaint, which were 
deemed admitted.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Coplien, 2010 WI 109, ¶¶10-11, 329 Wis. 2d 311, 788 N.W.2d 376. 
We therefore accept the referee's findings of fact based on the 
allegations of the complaint.  We also agree with the referee 
that those findings of fact adequately support the legal 
conclusions of professional misconduct with respect to the six 
counts of misconduct alleged in the complaint. 
¶25 We 
are 
satisfied 
that 
the 
record 
supports 
the 
imposition of a 60-day license suspension.  We have imposed a 
60-day suspension in previous, arguably similar cases.  See, 
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister, 2010 WI 
108, 329 Wis. 2d 289, 787 N.W.2d 820 (attorney who had been 
disciplined on two prior occasions received a 60–day suspension 
for lack of diligence, failing to keep a client informed, 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
11 
 
failing to forward the client's file to successor counsel and 
refund advanced fee payments, and failing to cooperate with an 
investigation); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Anderson, 
2010 WI 39, 324 Wis. 2d 627, 782 N.W.2d 100 (attorney who had 
been disciplined on three prior occasions received a 60–day 
suspension for lack of diligence, failing to keep a client 
informed, and failing to explain matters to a client); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Theobald, 2010 WI 102, 329 
Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 834 (attorney who had been disciplined on 
two prior occasions received a 60–day suspension for lack of 
diligence and failing to keep a client informed).  
¶26 We further agree with the referee that the 60-day 
suspension should run consecutive to Attorney Templin's present 
six-month suspension, which began on May 3, 2016.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Templin, 367 Wis. 2d 351, ¶42.  
We are confident that, if the OLR had brought all of the 
misconduct counts in the instant case and in his previous 
disciplinary case in a single proceeding, the proper sanction 
for all of the misconduct would have exceeded the six-month 
suspension that we previously imposed.  A consecutively imposed 
suspension is therefore in order.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Voss, 2015 WI 104, ¶24, 365 Wis. 2d 442, 871 
N.W.2d 859. 
¶27 We additionally note that on June 1, 2016, Attorney 
Templin filed a letter with the court in which he asked that we 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
12 
 
accept the voluntary resignation of his law license in lieu of 
issuing this decision.10  He stated that he is not practicing law 
now, and that he "would likely not" return to the practice of 
law before June 2018.  Thus, Attorney Templin argued, a 
suspension of his law license would be pointless, as he intends 
to refrain from practicing law for a period longer than any 
suspension period he currently faces.   
¶28 By virtue of issuing this decision, we have obviously 
rejected Attorney Templin's claim that his offer to resign his 
law license for a duration of his choosing ought to render this 
disciplinary proceeding unnecessary.  To be sure, our rules 
permit a lawyer who is the subject of an OLR investigation or 
the respondent in an OLR disciplinary proceeding to agree to 
surrender his or her law license instead of defending against 
misconduct charges.  To do so, however, the lawyer must be 
willing to admit to having engaged in professional misconduct, 
and——important here——must be willing to wait five years before 
applying for reinstatement.  See SCR 22.19; SCR 22.29(2).  
Attorney Templin is apparently not willing to agree to the 
voluntary revocation of his license given his statement that he 
might wish to return to the practice of law within two years.  
Because Attorney Templin's proffered resignation does not meet 
the requirements of SCR 22.19, we decline to accept it.   
                                                 
10 We note that Attorney Templin attempted to voluntarily 
resign his law license during the pendency of In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Templin, 367 Wis. 2d 351, ¶36.  The court 
did not grant this request.   
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
13 
 
¶29 We turn now to the issue of costs, which total 
$1,041.40 as of June 20, 2016.  In his June 1, 2016 letter to 
the court, Attorney Templin argued that he should not have to 
pay the costs associated with this disciplinary proceeding 
because the misconduct counts in this proceeding could have been 
included with those brought in In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Templin, 367 Wis. 2d 351.  Attorney Templin claimed that 
consolidating the counts in this manner would have eliminated 
any costs associated with the instant proceeding.  Attorney 
Templin also claimed that he should bear no costs because he 
informed the OLR that he wanted to resign before the OLR filed 
the complaint in this matter.   
¶30 We are not convinced by Attorney Templin's arguments.  
Our general practice is to assess full costs against a 
disciplined lawyer.  See SCR 22.24(1m).  This is so because it 
is only fair that a disciplined lawyer "should shoulder, to the 
extent the lawyer is able, the costs of an OLR proceeding that 
the lawyer's misconduct necessitated, rather than transferring 
those costs to the other members of the bar who have not engaged 
in misconduct."  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Stern, 2016 WI 6, ¶13, 366 Wis. 2d 431, 874 N.W.2d 93.  There is 
no doubt that Attorney Templin's misconduct, which he has never 
disputed, necessitated these proceedings.  We fail to see why 
Attorney Templin's proffered resignation, which did not meet the 
requirements of SCR 22.19, should operate to shift costs away 
from him and towards other members of the bar.  We also fail to 
see why a consolidation of the instant counts with those brought 
No. 
2016AP51-D   
 
14 
 
in Attorney Templin's previous disciplinary matter would have 
eliminated all costs associated with this proceeding, as 
Attorney Templin claims.  While such consolidation may have led 
to certain efficiencies (though Attorney Templin fails to 
identify them),11 the bulk of the costs were unavoidable; for 
example, both the pleadings and the referee's report in this 
case needed to be prepared, and these tasks required the 
expenditure of time and money regardless of whether the 
misconduct counts were consolidated in one proceeding or not.  
In short, Attorney Templin's conclusory objection to costs does 
not compel us to exercise our discretion to reduce them. 
¶31 Finally, we note that the OLR did not seek restitution 
in this case.  None is ordered. 
¶32 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Thor Templin is 
suspended for a period of 60 days, to run consecutive to the 
discipline imposed in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Templin, 2016 WI 18, ¶42, 367 Wis. 2d 351, 877 N.W.2d 107. 
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Thor Templin shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this decision is required for reinstatement. See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
                                                 
11 See SCR 22.24(2)(requiring a respondent who objects to a 
statement of costs to "explain, with specificity, the reasons 
for the objection and . . . state what he or she considers to be 
a reasonable amount of fees"). 
No.  2016AP51-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
per curiam.  I write separately to discuss three issues. 
¶36 The first issue relates to restitution.  Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley, in her dissent, would order Attorney Templin to 
pay as restitution to P.D.P. the amount of any fees he received 
in connection with his representation of P.D.P.  The Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) did not ask for restitution in its 
complaint.  Restitution is a form of discipline, see SCR 
21.16(1m)(em),1 and we have often said that this court is free to 
impose whatever discipline it deems appropriate.  See, e.g., In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead, 2011 WI 102, ¶15, 338 
Wis. 2d 23, 806 N.W.2d 631.   
¶37 But where, as here, we have declared an attorney to be 
in default, the question arises whether we may impose a form of 
discipline that the OLR did not seek in its complaint?  Or, in 
default cases, is our otherwise wide-ranging ability to impose 
appropriate discipline cabined to the discipline the OLR 
requested in its complaint?  The answer to this issue is not 
clear in our rules or case law, and is therefore worthy of 
study. 
¶38 The second issue is that the per curiam does not 
identify when Attorney Templin may apply for reinstatement.  
                                                 
1 SCR 21.16(1m) provides:  Any of the following may be 
imposed on an attorney as discipline for misconduct 
pursuant to the procedure set forth in SCR chapter 22: 
 . . .  
(em) Restitution, as provided under sub. (2m). 
No.  2016AP51-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
22.29(1) 
states: 
 
"A 
petition 
for 
reinstatement of a license suspended for a definite period may 
be filed at any time commencing three months prior to the 
expiration of the suspension period."  In Attorney Templin's 
previous disciplinary matter, In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Templin, 2016 WI 18, ¶42, 367 Wis. 2d 351, 877 N.W.2d 
107, 
we 
ordered 
a 
six-month 
suspension 
of 
his 
license, 
commencing on May 3, 2016.  This suspension would have expired 
on November 3, 2016.  But by virtue of the consecutively imposed 
60-day suspension ordered in this case, Attorney Templin's 
suspension period has been extended to January 2, 2017.  I would 
make clear that, under SCR 22.29(1), Attorney Templin may not 
petition for reinstatement until three months before this 
extended date of January 2, 2017. 
¶39 The third issue is one that I have raised numerous 
times.  The OLR disciplinary system is about 15 years old.  I 
repeat my numerous requests that the court review the lawyer 
disciplinary system and the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys.  The instant case presents issues that should be 
considered in such reviews.  See, e.g., Rule Petition 14-06 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring); 
and 
Rule 
Petition 
15-01 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Johns, 2014 WI 32, 353 Wis. 2d 746, 847 N.W.2d 179 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Kratz, 2014 WI 31, 353 Wis. 2d 696, 851 N.W.2d 219 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring; Prosser, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).   
No.  2016AP51-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶40 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
 
No.  2016AP51-D.awb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶41 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I would order 
Attorney Templin to pay as restitution to P.D.P. the amount of 
any fees he received in connection with his representation of 
P.D.P.   
¶42 For the foregoing reason, I dissent. 
 
 
No.  2016AP51-D.awb 
 
1