Title: Gravel & Shea v. White Current Corp.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Gravel & Shea v. White Current Corp. (99-083); 170 Vt. 628;  752 A.2d 19

[Filed 03-Apr-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-083

                             DECEMBER TERM, 1999

Gravel and Shea	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
                                       }
White Current Corporation	       }	DOCKET NO. S1195-97 CnC	

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant White Current Corp. appeals a Chittenden Superior Court
  grant of summary judgment  to plaintiff law firm Gravel and Shea on the
  firm's claim for a contingent fee.  Defendant argues that  the court erred
  in concluding that a written fee agreement between plaintiff and defendant
  and  defendant's post-agreement conduct estopped defendant from raising
  pre-existing duty and duress  defenses.  Defendant also contends that the
  court erred in finding that no material fact remains in  dispute as to the
  amount of recovery subject to the disputed contingency fee.  We affirm.

                                  I.  Facts

       In 1986, defendant, through its president, Roger Lamson, entered into
  a written contingency  agreement with attorney William Donahue to represent
  it in actions against two utility cooperatives,  Vermont Electric
  Cooperative (VEC) and Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission (VEG&T). 
  The fee agreement called for a twenty percent contingent fee if settled
  before trial, and twenty-five  percent if settled after trial began. 
  Defendant was to reimburse Donahue promptly for all out-of-pocket
  expenses, important because experts played a significant role in the case.  

       In 1993, defendant and Donahue retained plaintiff law firm to try the
  damage claim against VEC and  VEG&T, as a portion of its liability claim
  had already been vindicated.  There was no written fee  agreement between
  plaintiff and defendant.  Plaintiff understood that it would be paid
  one-half of  one-third, or sixteen and two-thirds percent, and advanced a
  substantial sum of at least $37,500 for  expert witnesses.  

       In June 1994, plaintiff and defendant discussed altering the fee
  arrangement, but no agreement was  reached.  Work proceeded and trial
  commenced in Windsor Superior Court during the fall of 1994  .  In November
  1994, plaintiff obtained a $3.5 million jury verdict against VEC and VEG&T
  on  defendant's behalf.  

       In December 1994, plaintiff and defendant reached an agreement
  regarding fees that gave plaintiff  one-third of the net recovery, with an
  extra one percent for post-trial motion work and an additional  three
  percent for work on appeal.  This agreement was memorialized on January 6,
  1995

 

  ("the written fee agreement"), and is the foundation of plaintiff's action
  against defendant.  Plaintiff  continued to represent defendant in
  post-trial and appellate matters resulting from the jury verdict. 
 
       VEC and VEG&T filed for bankruptcy in April 1996, more than a year
  after defendant and plaintiff  had signed the written fee agreement.  No
  portion of the $3.5 million verdict against VEC and  VEG&T had been
  recovered at the time the utility cooperatives filed for bankruptcy. 
  Plaintiff and  defendant agreed to jointly retain Norman Cohen as
  bankruptcy counsel.  By agreement of the  parties, plaintiff paid -
  consistent with the written fee agreement - one-third of Cohen's fees.  
  Defendant accepted plaintiff's payments, totaling approximately $11,000,
  for the entire one-year  duration of the bankruptcy proceedings.  

       In April 1997, defendant settled with VEC for $1.3 million under the
  bankruptcy reorganization  plan.  Defendant disputed both the percentage
  and amount of legal fees it was obligated to pay  plaintiff, arguing that
  plaintiff was entitled to sixteen and two-thirds percent of $612,000,
  because  only that portion of the settlement amount actually came out of
  the work plaintiff had successfully  litigated at trial.  Plaintiff
  contended that, according to the terms of the written fee agreement, 
  defendant owed one-third of the entire $1.3 million recovery.  Arbitration
  failed to resolve the  dispute, and in August 1997, plaintiff sued to
  recover its fees and expenses consistent with the  written fee agreement.

       In October 1998, the court granted plaintiff's summary judgment
  motion, holding that defendant was  estopped from asserting its
  pre-existing duty and duress defenses, and that, in any event, those 
  defenses provided no relief for defendant.  The court concluded that the
  written fee agreement's one-third contingency applied to the full $1.3
  million recovered by defendant in the bankruptcy  proceeding, rather than
  the $612,000 that defendant asserted.  This appeal followed.

                               II.  Discussion

       We review a grant of summary judgment with the same standard as the
  trial court.  See In re  Margaret Susan P., __ Vt. __, __,