Title: Ghameshlouy v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ERIC AMIR GHAMESHLOUY1 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091120 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
February 25, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined that an appeal of a conviction under a 
local ordinance should be dismissed because the defendant 
failed specifically to name the locality as a party to the 
appeal in his notice of appeal.  The defendant acknowledges 
that there was a defect in the notice of appeal, but contends 
that the locality waived its objection to this defect because 
an attorney representing the locality had made an appearance 
and responded on the merits of the appeal in the Court of 
Appeals.  With one judge dissenting, a panel of the Court 
determined that the deficiency in the notice of appeal 
deprived the Court of “jurisdiction” over the case and, thus, 
could not be waived by the subsequent appearance of the 
locality. 
                     
1 Throughout the proceedings, the last name of the 
appellant has been variously rendered as “Ghameshlouy,” 
“Ghameshouly,” or “Ghamesouly.”  For purposes of this appeal, 
we will adopt the spelling as it appeared on the relevant 
charging instrument, which counsel for the appellant confirms 
is the proper spelling. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Because the Court of Appeals did not address the merits 
of the challenge to the conviction under the local ordinance, 
we are concerned here only with the procedural status of the 
appeal.  Accordingly, we will confine our consideration to the 
procedural history of the case, addressing only those aspects 
of the merits necessary to place the proceedings in proper 
context. 
 
On February 24, 2007, officers of the City of Virginia 
Beach Police Department responded to a report of a domestic 
altercation at a local motel.  In the course of their 
investigation, the police entered a motel room occupied by 
Eric Amir Ghameshlouy and a female.  When asked by police to 
identify himself, Ghameshlouy gave evasive and conflicting 
answers concerning both his name and age.  The officers 
frisked Ghameshlouy and found two identification cards that 
showed his true name and date of birth.  The officers advised 
Ghameshlouy that he was being arrested for giving false 
identity information to police, subsequently charging him by 
warrant with a violation of Virginia Beach City Code § 23-7.1 
(hereinafter, “VBCC § 23-7.1”), which provides: 
 
It shall be unlawful and a Class 1 misdemeanor 
for any person at a public place or place open to the 
public to refuse to identify himself by name and 
address at the request of a uniformed police officer 
or of a properly identified police officer not in 
 
2
uniform, or to provide false information in response 
to such a request, if the surrounding circumstances 
are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the 
public safety requires such identification. 
 
In a search incident to this arrest, police discovered a 
bag containing a white powder, later identified as cocaine, on 
Ghameshlouy’s person.  Consequently, Ghameshlouy also was 
charged by a felony warrant with possession of cocaine in 
violation of Code § 18.2-250 and was subsequently indicted for 
that offense. 
 
Ghameshlouy was tried on the VBCC § 23-7.1 violation in 
the City of Virginia Beach General District Court on April 6, 
2007.  He was convicted and sentenced to 180 days in jail with 
170 days suspended on condition of 2 years probation.  
Ghameshlouy noted his appeal from this conviction to the 
circuit court. 
 
On April 30, 2007, the Circuit Court of the City of 
Virginia Beach conducted a hearing on a motion to suppress the 
cocaine discovered on Ghameshlouy’s person during the search 
incident to his arrest.  In briefing his motion to suppress, 
Ghameshlouy contended that the officers’ warrantless entry 
into the motel room was unlawful because they had no probable 
cause to believe that a crime was being committed in the room 
and lacked a sufficient basis for believing that they could 
enter the room under a “community caretaker” function, since 
 
3
there was no evidence that the female had been the victim of a 
domestic assault.  Ghameshlouy further argued that even if the 
officer’s entry into the motel room was lawful, his arrest 
under VBCC § 23-7.1 was improper because a motel room was not 
“a public place or place open to the public.”  The circuit 
court denied the motion to suppress. 
 
On July 24, 2007, in a proceeding before the circuit 
court, Thomas M. Murphy, a Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney in 
the Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of 
Virginia Beach, was acknowledged by the court as “present for 
the Commonwealth.”  It is not disputed, however, that Murphy 
was also representing the City in prosecuting the appeal of 
the local ordinance violation.  See Code § 15.2-1627(B).  
Murphy informed the court that a conditional plea agreement 
had been reached covering the possession of cocaine charge and 
other state charges arising from a separate, unrelated 
incident, as well as a probation violation.  Although the 
agreement originally also covered the VBCC § 23-7.1 offense, 
this language had been struck from the agreement prior to its 
presentation to the court.  The plea agreement was styled 
“Commonwealth of Virginia v. Eric Amir Ghameshlouy.” 
 
After accepting the plea to the state charges, the 
circuit court conducted a bench trial on the VBCC § 23-7.1 
charge on stipulated evidence.  The sole issue before the 
 
4
court was whether the motel room constituted “a public place 
or place open to the public” for purposes of applying the 
ordinance.  Finding that a motel room was a public place 
because “[a]nyone can go there and rent a room if they would 
like,” the circuit court found Ghameshlouy guilty of failing 
to identify himself to police and sentenced him to 12 months 
in jail with all time suspended.  An order of conviction for 
violation of VBCC § 23-7.1, styled “CITY v. ERIC AMIR 
GHAMESHLOUY,” was entered on July 30, 2007.  A separate order 
of conviction on the state offenses, styled “COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA v. ERIC AMIR GHAMESHLOUY” was entered on August 1, 
2007. 
 
On July 31, 2007, Ghameshlouy filed a notice of appeal in 
the record of the VBCC § 23-7.1 case, listing in its caption 
the circuit court docket number for that case as well as those 
assigned to each of the state law offenses for which he had 
entered guilty pleas.  However, the caption named only the 
Commonwealth of Virginia as the prosecuting authority, and 
also named only the Commonwealth as the appellee in the Rule 
5A:6(d) certificate at the end of the notice of appeal.  In 
the body of the notice of appeal, in addition to identifying 
his conviction for possession of cocaine by conditional plea 
agreement after the denial of his motion to suppress, 
Ghameshlouy further indicated his intention to appeal the 
 
5
“final judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia 
Beach, rendered . . . on July 24, 2007” in which Ghameshlouy 
was convicted of “the charge of refusing to provide 
identification to a police officer, a violation of [the] 
Virginia Beach municipal code.”  (Emphasis added.)  However, 
the notice of appeal did not reference the July 30, 2007 order 
of conviction concerning the VBCC § 23-7.1 offense.2  
 
In his petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals, 
Ghameshlouy acknowledged that the conviction for failure to 
identify was under the local ordinance.  Nonetheless, the Rule 
5A:12(c) certificate at the conclusion of the petition states 
that “the appellee is the Commonwealth of Virginia.”  Murphy, 
the Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney, filed a brief in 
opposition to Ghameshlouy’s petition for appeal.  Murphy 
indicated in the certificate at the conclusion of the brief in 
opposition that he was appearing as “counsel for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.”  He did not raise the issue of the 
City not having been joined as a party to the appeal with 
respect to the VBCC § 23-7.1 conviction, but instead addressed 
the merits of the appeal. 
                     
2 Ghameshlouy filed an identical notice of appeal in the 
record of the state cocaine possession conviction on August 2, 
2007. 
 
 
6
 
Although both the petition for appeal and the brief in 
opposition were styled in accord with the caption of the 
notice of appeal denoting the Commonwealth as the sole 
appellee, following a review by a judge of the Court, the 
Court of Appeals entered a per curiam order refusing the 
petition for appeal in which the “appellees” were denoted in 
the caption of the order as “Commonwealth of Virginia and City 
of Virginia Beach.”  The record does not disclose the reason 
this change in the style of the case was made.3 
 
Ghameshlouy requested a review of his petition by a 
three-judge panel, which in an order dated June 10, 2008 
refused the appeal as to the suppression issue related to the 
state cocaine conviction, but granted an appeal on the 
challenge to the VBCC § 23-7.1 conviction.  This order also 
styled the appellees as “Commonwealth of Virginia and City of 
Virginia Beach” and was served on both the Virginia Beach 
                     
3 Although this Court will in appropriate circumstances 
change a style of a case to correct an error in form, see, 
e.g., McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 242 n.*, 609 
S.E.2d 16, 16 n.* (2005), or to correct an error in the 
spelling of a party’s name, see, e.g., Smit v. Shippers’ 
Choice of Virginia, Inc., 277 Va. 593, 593 n.1, 674 S.E.2d 
842, 842, n.1 (2009), in doing so we indicate the reason for 
the change.  Nevertheless, Ghameshlouy does not rely upon that 
sua sponte change of the style of the case as the basis upon 
which the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over his 
appeal. 
 
 
7
Commonwealth’s Attorney and the Office of the Attorney 
General. 
 
On June 18, 2008, Ghameshlouy filed his opening brief in 
the Court of Appeals, reasserting his contention that a motel 
room is not “a public place or a place open to the public.”  
Despite the modification of the style of the case by the Court 
of Appeals in its orders, in the caption of his brief and in 
the certificate at its end Ghameshlouy continued to identify 
the “Commonwealth of Virginia” as the appellee and further 
averred that service had been made upon the Assistant Attorney 
General representing the Commonwealth.4 
 
On August 6, 2008, the Office of the Attorney General, on 
behalf of the Commonwealth, filed a motion in the Court of 
Appeals to amend the caption of the appeal in which it averred 
that “[t]he proper appellee is now the City of Virginia Beach 
and the Commonwealth’s Attorney from that jurisdiction has 
agreed to become co-counsel in this matter.”  Noting that 
“upon an appeal to the Supreme Court the appellant could again 
challenge his [cocaine possession] conviction under the state 
statute,” the Attorney General stated that the Commonwealth 
                     
4 In subsequent proceedings, the City did not raise the 
issue of Ghameshlouy’s failure to serve a copy of the opening 
brief on all opposing counsel as required by Rule 5A:19(f). 
 
 
8
“should remain involved [in the appeal] at this stage.”5  
Accordingly, the Attorney General “request[ed] that the 
caption of this case be amended to add the City of Virginia 
Beach as an appellee.”  By letter dated August 21, 2008, the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals advised the Attorney General 
that “upon review of the caption of this case and the orders 
entered therein, the City of Virginia Beach is listed as an 
appellee.  Accordingly, the Court will not take any action on 
[the Commonwealth’s motion].” 
 
On August 12, 2008, the Attorney General and the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Virginia Beach filed a 
joint brief styled as the “Brief for the Commonwealth,” but 
captioned in accord with the style of the case in the order 
granting the appeal giving both the Commonwealth and the City 
as appellees.  The brief made no objection to Ghameshlouy’s 
failure to include the City as an appellee in the notice of 
appeal, addressing only the merits of the challenge to the 
VBCC § 23-7.1 conviction. 
 
On September 26, 2008, the Attorney General filed a 
motion to dismiss the appeal, contending for the first time 
                     
5 While it was possible that the Attorney General would 
have been required to defend an appeal of the state conviction 
in this Court, it is equally clear that the Attorney General 
had no obligation, or legal standing, to represent the 
locality in the appeal of the conviction under VBCC § 23-7.1.  
See Code § 2.2-511(A). 
 
9
that because Ghameshlouy failed to expressly name the City, an 
indispensable party, as an appellee in the notice of appeal 
filed in the record of the VBCC § 23-7.1 conviction, the 
appeal of that conviction was barred for lack of jurisdiction.  
Ghameshlouy, at the direction of the Court of Appeals, filed a 
response to the motion in which he contended that the City had 
waived its objection to the defect in the notice of appeal 
because it had made a general appearance in the matter, 
through the Commonwealth’s Attorney, by responding to the 
petition for appeal on the merits of his challenge to his VBCC 
§ 23-7.1 conviction and by joining the Commonwealth’s opening 
brief. 
 
Following oral argument before a three-judge panel of the 
Court of Appeals, a majority of the panel determined that the 
appeal was barred for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed 
Ghameshlouy’s appeal.  Ghameshlouy v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. 
App. 47, 56, 675 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2009).  The majority of the 
panel held that Ghameshlouy’s failure to name the City as an 
appellee deprived the Court of jurisdiction over the appeal 
with respect to the local ordinance issue and that the 
doctrine of waiver could not be applied to provide the Court 
with that jurisdiction.  Id. at 51-56, 675 S.E.2d at 856-58.  
The dissenting judge was of opinion that because the notice of 
appeal was timely filed in this case, the failure to 
 
10
specifically name the City as an appellee was a defect that 
could be waived by the voluntary appearance of the City in the 
appellate court.  Id. at 61-78, 675 S.E.2d at 860-869 (Haley, 
J. dissenting).  Finding that the City had waived its 
objection to this defect in the notice of appeal by failing to 
raise the issue at the petition stage and then joining in the 
Commonwealth’s brief on the merits of the granted appeal, the 
dissenting judge would have reached the merits and reversed 
Ghameshlouy’s conviction, concluding that a motel room is not 
a “public place or place open to the public.”  Id. at 86-87, 
675 S.E.2d at 873 (Haley, J. dissenting). 
 
Ghameshlouy filed a notice of appeal in the Court of 
Appeals seeking to challenge this judgment and the denial of 
his petition for appeal as to the cocaine possession charge.  
By an order dated September 11, 2009, we awarded Ghameshlouy 
an appeal, limited to the challenge of his conviction on the 
VBCC § 23-7.1 conviction and the Court of Appeals’ dismissal 
of the appeal on that issue.  In that order, we directed the 
City to file a brief “address[ing] whether it was a party to 
the appeal of this case in the Court of Appeals.” 
DISCUSSION 
 
The resolution of this appeal requires us to once again 
plumb the murky depths of the sea of “jurisdiction.”  As aptly 
noted in the dissent below, “ ‘[j]urisdiction is a word of 
 
11
many, too many, meanings.’ ”  Id. at 57, 675 S.E.2d at 859  
(quoting United States v. Vanness, 318 U.S. App. D.C. 95, 85 
F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 
In this context, we recently observed, in Board of 
Supervisors v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 271 Va. 336, 343-44 & 
n.2, 626 S.E.2d 374, 379 & n.2 (2006), that subject matter 
jurisdiction, perhaps best understood as the “potential” 
jurisdiction of a court, is the authority granted to it by 
constitution or statute over a specified class of cases or 
controversies, and becomes “active” jurisdiction, the power to 
adjudicate a particular case upon the merits, only when 
various elements are present. 
Those elements are subject matter jurisdiction, 
which is the authority granted through constitution 
or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or 
controversies; territorial jurisdiction, that is, 
authority over persons, things, or occurrences 
located in a defined geographic area; notice 
jurisdiction, or effective notice to a party or if 
the proceeding is in rem seizure of a res; and the 
other conditions of fact must exist which are 
demanded by the unwritten or statute law as the 
prerequisites of the authority of the court to 
proceed to judgment or decree.  All these elements 
are necessary to enable a court to proceed to a 
valid judgment. 
 
Id. at 343-44, 626 S.E.2d at 379 (internal quotation 
marks, citations and footnote omitted). 
 
In an effort to achieve further clarity, we begin our 
discussion of the jurisdiction issue raised in this appeal by 
 
12
identifying those aspects of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals with which we are not here concerned.  First, we are 
not concerned with the statutory jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals to consider the subject matter of this appeal.  
Without question, the Court of Appeals has the authority, 
potential jurisdiction, to consider an appeal of any 
conviction in the circuit courts of this Commonwealth of a 
misdemeanor offense, whether brought pursuant to a state 
statute or a local ordinance.  Code § 17.1-406(A).  Nor are we 
concerned with whether the Court could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the City of Virginia Beach, as the 
prosecuting authority on the VBCC § 23-7.1 conviction.  It is 
well established that a general appearance by a party confers 
personal jurisdiction, and the City unquestionably made such 
an appearance in the Court of Appeals.  Lyren v. Ohr, 271 Va. 
155, 159, 623 S.E.2d 883, 885 (2006); Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 
579, 581, 515 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1999); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 215 
Va. 328, 329, 210 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1974) (per curiam). 
 
Rather, the issue with which we are concerned is whether 
Ghameshlouy’s appeal of his VBCC § 23-7.1 conviction was 
properly before the Court based upon the July 31, 2007 notice 
of appeal.  That is, did the filing of the July 31, 2007 
notice of appeal cause the potential jurisdiction of the Court 
of Appeals over this type of appeal to ripen into active 
 
13
jurisdiction over the appeal of that specific case.  With that 
issue in mind, we turn now to the question of what is required 
for an appellate court to acquire active jurisdiction over a 
case that falls within its potential jurisdiction. 
 
When a circuit court renders a judgment that provides 
complete relief, leaving nothing to be done except for the 
superintendence of the judgment, that judgment is final and 
subject to being appealed.  Although the circuit court’s 
jurisdiction over the case extends 21 days beyond the entry of 
the final order, Rule 1:1, an appellate court will acquire 
jurisdiction over the case if a party aggrieved of the 
judgment, who was properly before the circuit court, notes an 
appeal of the judgment in the circuit court in accord with the 
rules of the appellate court having jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the case.  In the instance of a criminal 
conviction, other than a conviction for capital murder in 
which a sentence of death is imposed, the Court of Appeals has 
initial appellate jurisdiction, and the procedure for noting 
the appeal in the circuit court is controlled by this Court’s 
Rule 5A:6. 
 
As relevant to our resolution of the issue raised in this 
appeal, Rule 5A:6 provides: 
(a) Filing Deadline; Where to File – No appeal 
shall be allowed unless, within 30 days after the 
entry of final judgment . . . counsel files with the 
 
14
clerk of the trial court a notice of appeal, and at 
the same time mails or delivers a copy of such 
notice to all opposing counsel and the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals . . . 
 
(d) Certificate – The appellant shall include 
with the notice of appeal a certificate stating: 
 
(1) the names . . . of all appellants and 
appellees, [and] the names . . . of counsel for each 
party, . . . 
 
(2) that a copy of the notice of appeal has 
been mailed or delivered to all opposing counsel. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
This Court has held that filing a timely notice of appeal 
is a mandatory prerequisite to an appellate court acquiring 
jurisdiction over a case.  Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va. v. 
Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 563, 561 S.E.2d 734, 739 (2002); School 
Board of City of Lynchburg v. Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 
Va. 550, 556, 379 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1989); Vaughn, 215 Va. at 
329-330, 210 S.E.2d at 142.  Likewise, the Court of Appeals 
has recognized that strict adherence to the time requirement 
of Rule 5A:6 is necessary in order for the Court to acquire 
jurisdiction over a case.  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 
510, 512, 339 S.E.2d 919, 920 (1986). 
 
Strict enforcement of the time requirements of the rules 
governing the noting of appeal is necessary because 
“[l]itigation is a serious and harassing matter, and the right 
to know when it is ended is a valuable right.”  Avery v. 
 
15
County School Bd., 192 Va. 329, 333, 64 S.E.2d 767, 770 
(1951).  Thus, dismissal of an untimely appeal is not merely a 
mechanical application of a technical rule to deprive a 
litigant of the right to appeal, rather “[t]he purpose of the 
specific time limit [for filing a notice of appeal] is not to 
penalize the appellant but to protect the appellee.”  Id. 
 
While the filing of a timely notice of appeal is a 
prerequisite to an appellate court’s obtaining and exercising 
jurisdiction over a case, not every requirement of the rule 
prescribing when and how a notice of appeal is to be prepared 
and filed implicates the court’s initial acquisition of 
jurisdiction.  Thus, we have never required that a notice of 
appeal be precise, accurate, and correct in every detail 
before the appellate court can acquire jurisdiction over the 
case in which the notice is filed.  To the contrary, both this 
Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently held that 
most statutory and rule-based procedural prerequisites for the 
valid exercise of jurisdiction by a court may be waived, even 
when couched in mandatory terms by the language of the statute 
or rule.  See, e.g., Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 
236-37, 661 S.E.2d 415, 431 (2008)(holding that statutory 
requirements for effecting granted motions for change of venue 
were not jurisdictional and were waived); Jay v. Commonwealth, 
275 Va. 510, 520, 659 S.E.2d 311, 317 (2008) (holding that a 
 
16
defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 5A:20(e) did not 
deprive Court of Appeals of jurisdiction); State Water Control 
Bd. v. Crutchfield, 265 Va. 416, 423-24, 578 S.E.2d 762, 766 
(2003) (holding that failure to have a copy of the petition 
for an appeal under the Administrative Process Act served on a 
party did not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction); 
Nelson v. Warden, 262 Va. 276, 285, 552 S.E.2d 73, 77-78 
(2001) (holding that notice requirement of Code § 16.1-263(A) 
for valid transfer of jurisdiction over defendant from 
juvenile court to circuit court for trial as an adult was 
subject to waiver); Riner v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 440, 
452-53, 579 S.E.2d 671, 677-78 (2003), aff’d, 268 Va. 296, 601 
S.E.2d 555 (2004) (holding that Rule 5A:12 was not 
jurisdictional and, thus, did not bar the Court from granting 
an appellant leave to amend and enlarge the questions 
presented in his petition for appeal). 
 
In Johnson the Court of Appeals held that while the time 
limit for filing the notice of appeal under Rule 5A:6(a) was 
mandatory and, thus, jurisdictional, failing to file a copy of 
the notice with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals was merely a 
procedural error, and did not deprive the Court of 
jurisdiction over the case.  Johnson, 1 Va. App. at 512-13, 
339 S.E.2d at 920-21.  Similarly, in M.G. v. Albemarle County 
Department of Social Services, 41 Va. App. 170, 177-78, 583 
 
17
S.E.2d 761, 764-65 (2003), the Court held that a failure to 
strictly adhere to the certification of notice to other 
parties requirement of Rule 5A:6(d) would not bar the Court 
from obtaining jurisdiction over the appeal where other 
aspects of the record showed that the party was advised that a 
timely notice of appeal had been filed.  But cf. Watkins v. 
Fairfax County Dep't of Family Services, 42 Va. App. 760, 774, 
595 S.E.2d 19, 26 (2004) (holding that indispensable party 
must be named in notice of appeal to properly perfect an 
appeal). 
 
More recently in Woody v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 188, 
197, 670 S.E.2d 39, 44 (2008), the Court of Appeals held that 
where the appellant was convicted under a local ordinance for 
driving under the influence, and he failed to include the 
locality in the caption or certificate of his notice of appeal 
of that conviction, the Court never acquired jurisdiction over 
the appeal.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
rejected the appellant’s argument that service of the notice 
of appeal on the Commonwealth’s Attorney, who, as in this 
case, had prosecuted the local ordinance offense in the 
circuit court, “effectively joined the [locality] as a party.”  
Id. at 197-98, 670 S.E.2d at 44.  In doing so, the Court noted 
that the locality “has not appeared as a party on any pleading 
filed in this Court.  It has not filed a brief in opposition 
 
18
to Woody’s petition for appeal nor a brief in opposition to 
Woody’s opening brief.  In fact, there is no evidence in the 
record that the [locality] is even aware that this appeal is 
pending.  Thus, the argument that the opposing party is fully 
aware of the issues is completely unsupported by the facts.”  
Id. at 199 n.7, 670 S.E.2d at 45 n.7.  A review of the records 
of the Court of Appeals confirms that, unlike the present 
case, the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the locality under whose 
ordinance Woody was convicted did not make any appearance in 
the Court of Appeals, either on behalf of the Commonwealth or 
the locality, prior to the granting of Woody’s appeal, after 
which point only the Attorney General appeared on behalf of 
the Commonwealth.6  Id. at 194 n.3, 670 S.E.2d at 42 n.3. 
 
Relying upon Woody, the majority of the panel of the 
Court of Appeals below found that Ghameshlouy’s failure to 
identify the City as an appellee in the notice of appeal was a 
“ ‘jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal of the 
                     
6 In appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals to 
this Court, Woody did not reassert the argument that the 
locality had actual notice and, thus, was a de facto party to 
the appeal.  Rather, he asserted that the circuit court record 
supported the contention that the Commonwealth, not the 
locality, had been the prosecuting authority on the DUI.  We 
refused Woody’s petition for appeal.  Woody v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 090229 (May 22, 2009) (order).  The facts in Woody, 
and the argument made in this Court seeking to overturn the 
dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals, are nearly 
analogous with those in Roberson v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. ___, 
___ S.E.2d ___ (2010) (this day decided). 
 
19
appeal.’ ”  Ghameshlouy, 54 Va. App. at 51, 675 S.E.2d at 856 
(quoting Woody, 53 Va. App. at 199, 670 S.E.2d at 45).  The 
majority further noted that, as in Woody, which had involved a 
simultaneous trial under the local ordinance and a state law 
violation for refusal to submit to a breath or blood test in 
violation of Code § 18.2-268.3, it was not sufficient that the 
City effectively had notice of the appeal because the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, who had been served with the notice 
of appeal, had represented both the Commonwealth and the City 
in the simultaneous prosecutions of Ghameshlouy for the state 
and local offenses.  Id. at 51-52 & nn.2 and 3, 675 S.E.2d at 
856 & nn.2 and 3. 
 
The majority went on to find that “this jurisdictional 
defect was not waived, as [Ghameshlouy] contends, as a result 
of the Commonwealth moving this Court to amend the caption of 
the case by adding the City of Virginia Beach as an appellee, 
and the City of Virginia Beach later purportedly joining in 
the Commonwealth's brief, addressing the merits of the 
misdemeanor conviction.”  Id. at 54, 675 S.E.2d at 857.  The 
majority reasoned that because the defect in the notice of 
appeal was, in its view, “jurisdictional,” Ghameshlouy never 
filed a valid notice of appeal with respect to the VBCC § 23-
7.1 conviction and, thus, there was no case before the Court 
in which the City’s appearance would constitute such a waiver.  
 
20
Id.  The majority thus concluded that the City’s appearance 
before the Court was a nullity because there was “no authority 
for a third party to unilaterally participate in a pending 
appeal in this Court or the Virginia Supreme Court . . . .  
For a third party to be recognized as a party to a pending 
appeal, such party must obtain the Court’s approval upon the 
party’s motion to intervene,” which had not been done in this 
case.  Id. at 55, 675 S.E.2d at 858. 
 
The essential question in this case, however, is whether 
the notice of appeal timely filed by Ghameshlouy on July 31, 
2007, although defective, was sufficient to cause the 
potential jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to consider 
such appeals to ripen into active jurisdiction over this 
specific case.  The notice of appeal filed by Ghameshlouy 
identified the conviction which he sought to appeal by its 
docket number in the circuit court, and by further indicating 
that it was an appeal from a “final judgment of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Virginia Beach, rendered . . . on July 
24, 2007” in which Ghameshlouy was convicted of “the charge of 
refusing to provide identification to a police officer, a 
violation of [the] Virginia Beach municipal code.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Moreover, since a court “ ‘speaks only through its 
orders,’ ” Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 136, 139, 607 
S.E.2d 107, 109 (2005) (citation omitted), at the time this 
 
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notice of appeal was filed the only judgment that had been 
rendered by the circuit court in the July 24, 2007 trial was 
on the local ordinance violation, as the sentencing order 
confirming the plea agreement had yet to be entered on the 
state felony charges.  Thus, while the notice of appeal is not 
a model of clarity, it was sufficient on its face to identify 
the conviction under VBCC § 23-7.1 as the case being appealed, 
without reference to any other document in the record.  This 
is all that is required for the Court of Appeals to obtain 
jurisdiction over the case. 
 
The Court of Appeals having obtained jurisdiction over 
the case, the defect in the notice of appeal in not naming the 
proper appellee, which otherwise would have justified 
dismissal of the appeal, was potentially subject to waiver.  
That waiver clearly occurred by the subsequent actions of the 
City and Ghameshlouy’s assertion of that waiver when the issue 
was raised for the first time by the Commonwealth after the 
appeal had been briefed by the Commonwealth and the City 
jointly.  Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred 
in dismissing Ghameshlouy’s appeal of his VBCC § 23-7.1 
conviction on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction 
over the case or the proper appellee. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals dismissing Ghameshlouy’s appeal.  Because the 
Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the issue whether 
the circuit court erred in ruling that a motel room was a 
“public place or place open to the public” for purposes of 
applying VBCC § 23-7.1, we will not address that issue here, 
but will remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this 
opinion.  Upon remand, the style of the case shall be amended 
to reflect that the City of Virginia Beach is the appellee. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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