Title: State v. Chavez

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: October 31, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
VICTOR HUGH TUMBACO CHAVEZ,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC CR9801722; CA A106896; SC S48383)

	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 9, 2002.
	Eric M. Cumfer, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for petitioner on review.
	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Jacqueline L. Koch, Koch & Deering, Portland, filed a brief
for amicus curiae United Mexican States.
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
	*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Robert D. Herndon, Judge. 172 Or App 326, 19 P3d 923 (2001).
	LEESON, J.
	We allowed review in this criminal case to address
whether the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) (1)
grants to foreign nationals who have been arrested by state
authorities a personal right to be told that they have the right
to contact and communicate with their country's consul and, if
so, whether suppression of evidence is the appropriate remedy for
a violation of that right.  The trial court denied defendant's
motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  State v.
Chavez, 172 Or App 326, 19 P3d 923 (2001).  We now conclude that
defendant failed to preserve the argument that, in this case, the
VCCR required suppression.  
	Defendant was charged with sodomy, sexual abuse,
unlawful sexual penetration, and attempted rape.  When the police
arrested defendant, they read him his Miranda rights in Spanish. 
Defendant stated that he understood those rights, and he asked
for an attorney.  Thereafter, defendant made incriminating
statements to the police.
	Defendant moved to suppress the incriminating
statements on the grounds that their admission violated his
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and the VCCR.  At the conclusion of an
evidentiary hearing, the state argued that the admission of
defendant's statements did not violate defendant's constitutional
rights and that the VCCR does not create individual rights.  The
trial court responded, "I agree with you on that.  * * *
[Defendant's lawyer] can convince me otherwise."  Defendant's
lawyer then stated:
		"Actually, I am not going to try to do so because
I think that you can arrive at your method of ruling in
the case by looking at the idea that the Convention
provisions would be implicated if there was a prejudice
to the defendant, and that really gets us to the
Miranda question.  So that if you resolve the Miranda question, I think you will have resolved the other
question the same way.
		"If a consulate was contacted, as if an attorney
had been contacted, they could advise the person to
obtain an attorney, or an attorney would -- probably
would have advised the defendant not to say anything. 
So I think that, in a way, if you look at the one
Supreme Court case in which the guy did not ask for
access to [his country's] representative, it was
pointed out [that] the issue wasn't there because he
hadn't done so, they were also looking for prejudice. 
And part of the suggestion is that if the
representative was there, about all he could have done
is said get an attorney who can advise you and help you
in the system.
		"So I really see those in the sense being the same
question, and you can resolve it by focusing on the
Miranda issue.  And depending on how you decide that, I
think the result will be the same.  It kind of finesses
the (tape inaudible) of the question in my mind.
		"To the extent that it doesn't create additional
substantive rights, the same things that the consulate
could have said or done are the same things that an
attorney could have said or done, and they kind of go
together."
(Emphasis added.)  Defendant's lawyer then argued only that
defendant's incriminating statements had not been voluntary and,
therefore, should be suppressed under Miranda.
	The trial court determined that defendant's statements
were voluntary and that they should not be suppressed.  With
respect to defendant's arguments regarding the VCCR, the trial
court added:
		"I find that there is no evidence of any prejudice
that he suffered as a result of [the police] not
advising him of his right to contact the Ecuadorian
consulate pursuant to the [VCCR]."
		This court recently summarized the obligation that a
party bears to preserve error:
	"[A] party must provide the trial court with an
explanation of his or her objection that is specific
enough to ensure that the court can identify its
alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to
consider and correct the error immediately, if
correction is warranted."
State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000).  In contrast
to the arguments that defendant made on appeal and now makes on
review, he expressly told the trial court that he was not trying
to argue that the VCCR created individual rights beyond those
that Miranda confers.  By asserting that the court's resolution
of the Miranda claim was dispositive, defendant affirmatively
asked the trial court not to consider the argument that he seeks
to advance in this court.  Defendant did not meet the
requirements of Wyatt, and we do not address his claim regarding
the VCCR.  The Court of Appeals should not have reached the
merits of defendant's argument under the VCCR.  However, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that defendant's other assignments of
error do not require reversal.  Accordingly, we affirm.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.


1. Article 36 of the VCCR provides, in part:
		"1.  With a view to facilitating the exercise of
consular functions relating to nationals of the sending
State:
		"* * * * *
		"(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities
of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested
or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or
is detained in any other manner.  Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,
in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded
by the said authorities without delay.  The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
		"(c) consular officers shall have the right to
visit a national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention, to converse and correspond with
him and to arrange for his legal representation. * * *
		"2.  The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended."  
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, art 36,
21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261 (emphasis added).