Title: P. v. Cole

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 8/16/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S027766 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
STEPHEN COLE, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. A711436 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
__________________________________ ) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Defendant Stephen Cole was convicted by a jury in Los Angeles County Superior 
Court of the first degree murder of Mary Ann Mahoney (Pen. Code, § 187; all further 
statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated) and arson (§ 451, subd. 
(b)).  The jury also sustained a special circumstance allegation that the murder was 
intentional and involved the infliction of torture.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).)  A mistrial was 
declared on a further special circumstance allegation that defendant committed the 
murder while engaged in the commission of arson.  (Former § 447, now § 451, subd. (b); 
§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17), now subd. (a)(17)(H).)  The jury set the penalty at death 
under the 1978 death penalty law.  (§ 190.1 et seq.)  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, 
subd. (b).) 
 
 
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I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  People’s Case-in-Chief 
 
Mary Ann Mahoney and defendant moved to California from the East Coast in 
1986.  They lived with Mary Ann’s mother, Gertrude Mahoney, in her North Hollywood 
apartment for two weeks and then moved to their own apartment nearby.  Shortly 
thereafter, Mary Ann’s brother, Richard Mahoney, having observed physical injuries on 
Mary Ann that he presumed defendant had caused, asked defendant to leave Mary Ann.  
Defendant left California, and Mary Ann moved back in with Gertrude.  Approximately 
one month later, defendant returned to California and apparently began living on the 
street in front of Gertrude’s apartment.  Shortly thereafter, defendant and Mary Ann 
moved together two more times and then, in April 1987, representing themselves as Mr. 
and Mrs. Mahoney, rented a house from William Gornik on North Whitnall Highway in 
North Hollywood. 
 
Mary Ann and defendant had a tumultuous relationship.  They bickered and 
argued, and their regular screaming matches, punctuated by profanities, were often heard 
by family and neighbors.  During this period, defendant was twice convicted of 
cohabitant abuse, a misdemeanor, based on his conduct towards Mary Ann.  Defendant 
was very possessive of her. 
 
On August 13, 1988, Mary Ann told her mother’s neighbor, Jacquelyn Blakely, 
that she planned to give notice to Gornik within three days that she would be moving out 
without defendant and moving back in with her mother.  Mary Ann also indicated that 
defendant had seen a list of shelters for battered women that Blakely had previously 
given to her. 
 
On August 14, 1988, Nicholas Snyder, a friend of defendant and a patron of the 
Red Rooster—a neighborhood bar where Mary Ann worked—saw defendant and Mary 
 
 
3
Ann walk into that bar shortly before the start of Mary Ann’s 10:00 a.m. shift.  Snyder 
left the bar at 11:00 a.m.  When he returned at 4:00 p.m., defendant was there.  Defendant 
asked Mary Ann if he could take her car to the Silver Moon, another bar located 
approximately one-half to three-quarters of a mile from their house.  Mary Ann said no.  
Defendant then asked for a ride from Snyder, who agreed to give him one.  When Snyder 
dropped defendant off at the Silver Moon about 4:30 p.m., defendant was “high” but not 
drunk. 
 
At approximately 9:00 p.m., the Los Angeles Fire Department received a report of 
a fire at the North Whitnall Highway residence.  Los Angeles Firefighter Zane Testerman 
and Chief Wilford Bisson were the first to arrive on the scene.  Soon after Testerman 
parked the fire department’s sedan in front of the house, defendant knocked on the 
driver’s side window.  When Testerman rolled down the window, defendant said, “I’m 
the one you’re looking for.  I lit the house on fire.”  Bisson radioed for the police, and 
Testerman got out of the car to detain defendant. 
 
Defendant continued speaking spontaneously.  He stated, “I lit the house on fire 
and I tried to kill my old lady.”  Defendant said he was angry at his landlord because the 
landlord was planning to build a new apartment building at the site of the burning house, 
and that he was angry at his “old lady” and wanted to kill her.  Defendant repeatedly said 
that he was angry at both Mary Ann and his landlord, and that he wanted to kill Mary 
Ann and burn the house down.  When Testerman asked how defendant had lit the fire, 
defendant responded, “Well, I poured gasoline on [Mary Ann] and in the house and lit 
her and the house on fire.”  Defendant appeared to be coherent, did not seem to be 
excited or injured, and did not smell of alcohol.  The police arrived shortly thereafter and 
took custody of defendant. 
 
When the arson investigator arrived at the scene at approximately 9:40 p.m., Mary 
Ann was being placed into an ambulance.  She had suffered severe burns to her upper 
torso and head area and was having difficulty breathing.  She was also agitated, angry, 
 
 
4
and afraid.  The arson investigator spoke with Mary Ann during the short ambulance ride 
to Riverside Hospital and in the emergency room.  Mary Ann said that she and defendant 
had argued earlier that evening, that defendant was extremely jealous of her, that he had 
followed her around all day, and that he thought she was cheating on him.  She said she 
was asleep in bed but woke up when she smelled gasoline.  When she did, defendant was 
standing over her and pouring gasoline on her.  Defendant then lit the gasoline on fire.  
Mary Ann said that defendant tried to kill her and that she thought she was going to die. 
 
After speaking with Mary Ann at the hospital, the arson investigator returned to 
the scene and began his investigation.  He determined that approximately one gallon of a 
flammable liquid had been poured in two distinct areas in the front bedroom—near the 
bedroom door and at the foot of the bed—and ignited separately with an open-flame 
device.  There was no way to determine which of the two areas was ignited first.  A five-
gallon container smelling of gasoline was found but determined not to have been used in 
the fire. 
 
The arson investigator interviewed defendant at the police station shortly after 
midnight, and an audiotape recording of the interview was played for the jury.  At the 
beginning of the interview, defendant insisted on taking an intoxilizer test, which the 
police administered.  At trial, the parties stipulated that two readings from the test 
indicated defendant had blood-alcohol levels of 0.25 and 0.26 grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood.  During the interview, defendant admitted setting Mary Ann and the 
house on fire, and he described the events leading up to that point. 
 
Defendant told the police that at approximately 10:00 a.m. on the day of the 
crimes, he drove Mary Ann to work at the Red Rooster and drank one beer there.  He 
then drove home and spent most of the day cleaning the house and car, during which time 
he drank four more beers.  Defendant picked up Mary Ann from work sometime after 
6:00 p.m.—the end of her shift—and she dropped him off at home before heading back 
out with the car to the Silver Moon.  Defendant got a ride to the Silver Moon from his 
 
 
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friend Nick, who dropped him off there about 8:00 p.m.  At the Silver Moon, defendant 
drank another beer.  Defendant spoke to Mary Ann, but she refused to leave the bar, 
cursing and calling him a “no good bastard.”  Defendant left the Silver Moon shortly 
before 9:00 p.m. and walked home. 
 
Defendant also told the police that, when he walked inside the house, Mary Ann 
was “passed out” on the bed.  She woke up, called him a “no good mother fucker,” and 
asked him where he had been.  According to defendant, she said, “one of these fuckin 
days I’m going to burn you to fuckin bits and I’m going to cut your goddamn heart out.”  
Mary Ann also said, “if you lay down on that goddamn couch, . . . I’ll put a butcher knife 
in your ass.”  Defendant went “berserk,” cursed and called Mary Ann a “no good bitch.”  
He then retrieved a plastic carton containing nearly one-half gallon of gasoline from the 
patio, walked to the bedroom with it, poured approximately a quart of gasoline on the 
bedroom floor, threw the carton toward the bed where Mary Ann lay, spilling gasoline on 
Mary Ann in the process, and threw a burning cigarette lighter, igniting the fire.  
According to defendant, “the fuckin thing just went.”  Defendant told police that he left 
through the back door to make sure his pet dogs and cats escaped, and then returned and 
helped Mary Ann out of the house through the front door. 
 
Defendant told police he was “pissed off” at Mary Ann but that his mind was also 
on his landlord, who had offered him money if he burned the house down.  He also 
mentioned that his rent was due the next day and that his landlord had recently remodeled 
other nearby properties. 
 
William Gornik, defendant and Mary Ann’s landlord, testified that defendant told 
him shortly before the fire that he was going to have a difficult time paying the rent, 
which was due on the 15th of every month.  Defendant did not, however, ask for an 
extension.  Gornik told defendant to “do the best” he could.  Gornik testified that he 
never asked defendant to burn down the North Whitnall Highway property or any other 
property. 
 
 
6
 
Mary Ann was transferred to the Torrance Burn Center in Los Angeles County in 
the early morning hours of August 15.  She had suffered burns over approximately 50 
percent of her body, including third degree burns to her hair, face, neck, upper arms, 
chest, back, and legs.  She had severe respiratory problems and was placed on special 
life-support ventilators.  Various catheters were inserted to measure blood and pulmonary 
artery pressures and to administer fluids.  Incisions were made along the length of Mary 
Ann’s limbs so that her tightly burned skin would be able to expand and not block blood 
flow to her extremities. 
 
Mary Ann experienced pain from her burns, pain from the swelling of her face and 
eyes, pain from the ventilator tube in her neck, pain from skin grafting, pain when the 
dressings on her wounds were changed, and pain when she was moved so the bed sheets 
could be changed.  She was very agitated, restless, and angry, thrashing about in her bed.  
She was given large doses of Valium and morphine, but they did not appear to diminish 
her pain.  She seemed frightened of what was happening and longed to die.  Her pain was 
severe but tapered off as she approached death.  After four or five days, she became 
unresponsive.  A few days later, she suffered multiple organ system failure, and her 
extremities turned black.  Had she survived, her hands and feet would have been 
amputated.  She died on August 25, 1988.  An autopsy established that she died of 
multiple organ system failure as a result of smoke inhalation and burns. 
2.  Defense Case 
 
The defense endeavored to show that defendant was guilty of only second degree 
murder by presenting evidence that he was reacting to Mary Ann’s burst of anger and 
was under the influence of alcohol when he ignited the fire.  The defense also endeavored 
to show that defendant intended solely to kill Mary Ann, not to commit arson. 
 
Lisa Leone, the next-door neighbor of Mary Ann’s mother Gertrude, met Mary 
Ann and defendant shortly after they moved to California and moved in with Gertrude.  
 
 
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Leone, who rarely saw defendant without a beer in his hand, believed defendant was a 
“functioning alcoholic.”  Occasionally, she saw Mary Ann drinking beer but not to the 
point of intoxication.  Leone often heard loud arguments between Mary Ann and 
defendant in the late afternoon and early evening hours. 
 
In August 1988, Steve Hoeck and David Carpenter lived in the house next door to 
Mary Ann and defendant.  Both testified that although defendant drank beer from 
morning until night on a daily basis, he could hold his liquor and was a “functional 
drunk.”  They also testified that Mary Ann and defendant argued frequently, including 
shouting and yelling profanities at each other. 
 
Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial.  He met Mary Ann in the spring of 
1982 or 1983 when they worked as grooms for different horse trainers on a racetrack 
circuit in New Hampshire.  They moved in together within days of meeting, and they 
continued working in the same racetrack circuit.  From early on in their relationship, they 
drank beer together—with defendant drinking as many as 12 beers a day—and they 
argued frequently, sometimes violently. 
 
Mary Ann and defendant moved to California, initially living with Mary Ann’s 
mother Gertrude in North Hollywood for two weeks and then renting their own apartment 
for approximately two months.  The two continued to drink together and argue.  
Defendant then moved back to New Hampshire for a month to work as a groom.  He 
returned to California after receiving telephone calls from Mary Ann.  By that point, 
Mary Ann had moved back in with Gertrude.  Defendant lived in his car because 
Gertrude would not allow him back into her house.  Mary Ann and defendant resumed 
their volatile relationship.  They obtained jobs at a warehouse.  Defendant worked there 
for approximately 16 months and quit in November 1987.  Mary Ann worked there until 
Christmas 1987. 
 
Defendant usually went to the Red Rooster, a neighborhood bar, early in the 
morning to drink beer.  When the owner of the bar wanted to hire a barmaid, defendant 
 
 
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suggested that Mary Ann work there.  Mary Ann started working at the Red Rooster in 
early 1988. 
 
Mary Ann and defendant eventually rented the house on North Whitnall Highway 
from Gornik.  On August 14, 1988, when defendant and Gornik were doing some chores 
around the property, Gornik said he was upset because a neighboring property, which he 
also owned, was extremely dirty.  Gornik commented that perhaps he would “get lucky 
and this place will burn down.”  Gornik then asked defendant to burn down his property, 
but defendant considered the conversation to be a joke. 
 
Concerning the events of August 14, 1988, defendant testified as follows:  Over 
the course of the day and night, he drank approximately one case of beer.  That evening, 
after he picked up Mary Ann from work, the two went outside to the car, intending to 
drive to the Silver Moon to check on a job opportunity for Mary Ann.  Just then, Hoeck 
approached and asked to borrow something; defendant became angry, using profanity, 
because they were in a hurry.  Mary Ann called defendant a drunk and drove away, 
leaving defendant behind.  At approximately 7:30 p.m., defendant telephoned the Red 
Rooster, spoke to Nicholas Snyder, and asked him for a ride to the Silver Moon.  About 
8:00 p.m., Snyder picked up defendant from his house and drove him to the Silver Moon, 
where he saw Mary Ann.  After drinking two beers, defendant told Mary Ann he was 
going home.  Defendant walked home.  When he arrived, every light in the house was on.  
Mary Ann had, in the meantime, apparently returned by car.  Going inside, defendant saw 
Mary Ann walking out of the bathroom and into the bedroom.  Defendant retrieved a beer 
from the kitchen, entered the living room, and turned on the television.  Mary Ann and 
defendant argued about where defendant had been and when and where he would sleep.  
Mary Ann told defendant that if he fell asleep on the couch she would “cut [his] damn 
balls off with a butcher knife.”  Defendant yelled in reply, “Why don’t you just shut your 
goddamned mouth and go to sleep.” 
 
 
9
 
Defendant then picked up a plastic container of gasoline from the patio and 
walked approximately 43 feet to the entrance of the bedroom.  Mary Ann was sitting on 
the bed.  Defendant threw the plastic container toward Mary Ann, said something to the 
effect of “you fucking bitch, I hope you burn in hell,” lit a Bic brand cigarette lighter, and 
threw it.  There was an explosion.  While defendant stood in the doorway, Mary Ann ran 
past him, on fire.  Defendant remained in the doorway a few minutes and then walked out 
the front door. 
 
While defendant testified that he threw the lighter, he also testified that, for the 
butane flame of a Bic lighter to remain lit, a button must be continuously depressed.  
Defendant burned his left arm from the resulting flash when he ignited the fire. 
 
When defendant threw the gasoline and ignited it with the lighter, his only thought 
was to kill Mary Ann.  He did not think about Gornik, the rent due, or the consequences 
of his actions.  At the time of the incident, he felt drunk.  If he had been sober, he would 
not have acted as he did. 
 
Defendant was confused during his police interview, although he attempted to tell 
the truth.  Contrary to defendant’s statement to the police, he was not angry with Gornik, 
Gornik had not suggested he burn the house down, and Gornik’s comment about wishing 
the place would burn down had occurred at least a year before Mary Ann died. 
 
Defendant never worried about Mary Ann leaving him.  He was not upset when 
Mary Ann told him she had a list of battered women’s shelters. 
 
Psychologist Bruce Sutkus, Ph.D., examined defendant on July 15 and 17, 1989.  
Defendant’s intelligence quotient (IQ) was 100, which is considered average.  Dr. Sutkus 
performed a series of tests and concluded there was no indication of brain dysfunction.  
Defendant was generally cooperative. 
 
Dr. Sutkus opined that defendant was egocentric, immature, impulsive, childish, 
and demanding.  Individuals with these characteristics tend to have a nonintegrated 
conscience and a history of aggression and assaultive behavior.  Males with these 
 
 
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characteristics tend to have a high frequency of alcohol-related problems.  They tend to 
be assaultive when they are drunk and to engage in manipulative behavior to escape 
stressful situations.  Impulsiveness is an enduring personality characteristic, and an 
individual with this characteristic does not look or think before he acts.  Imbibing alcohol 
tends to limit the activity of frontal lobes in the brain, loosening inhibitions and 
increasing impulsiveness.  It is possible for a heavy drinker with a blood-alcohol level of 
0.25 or 0.26 percent not to appear outwardly intoxicated.  Nevertheless, such an 
individual would be cognitively impaired. 
 
Dr. Sutkus also opined that defendant was alcohol dependent, meaning that he 
needed to drink socially on a regular basis to be able to function.  In making this 
determination, Dr. Sutkus considered defendant’s erratic work history, his volatile 
relationship with Mary Ann, which involved heavy drinking by both parties, and his 
history of cohabitant abuse. 
 
Henry Greenberg, who had worked as a criminalist with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department for 12 years and owned a private forensic alcohol laboratory in Fountain 
Valley, testified that ethyl alcohol, commonly found in commercial alcoholic beverages, 
is a depressant that acts on the brain and spinal column, which comprise the central 
nervous system.  According to Greenberg, alcohol consumption first affects an 
individual’s mental capabilities such as judgment, reasoning, perception, loss of 
inhibitions, and ability to comprehend, understand, think, and reason.  Alcohol 
consumption next impairs fine motor coordination skills, visual acuity, and speech.  It 
then results in physical impairment, such as balance coordination, gross motor 
coordination, and total loss of inhibition.  The amount of alcohol consumed can become 
toxic, resulting in death by alcohol poisoning. 
 
Greenberg testified that an average individual with a blood-alcohol level between 
0.10 and 0.12 percent would have impaired mental reasoning.  An average individual 
with a blood-alcohol level of 0.25 percent would be significantly impaired, unable to 
 
 
11
make rational and critical judgment decisions, lose inhibition, and show outward signs of 
impairment or intoxication.  Although an individual with a history of alcohol 
consumption might have a blood-alcohol level of 0.15 or 0.20 percent without showing 
any outward signs of physical impairment, his mental functions would be affected. 
 
Greenberg opined that if a male individual weighing 165 pounds like defendant 
committed an act at 9:00 p.m., did not consume any alcohol between then and midnight, 
and had a blood-alcohol level of 0.25 percent at midnight, his blood-alcohol level at 
9:00 p.m. would have been between 0.27 and 0.31 percent.  If such an individual began 
drinking at 9:00 a.m., he would have had to drink at least 21 beers to reach the assumed 
blood-alcohol level.  Greenberg further opined that no individual is capable of using 
proper judgment with a blood-alcohol level above 0.20 percent. 
3.  Rebuttal Evidence 
 
Bartender Charlene Garcia testified that defendant came into the Red Rooster a 
week before the fire, upset because Mary Ann was planning to move out.  Defendant 
said, “If she tries to leave me, I’ll burn the fucking house down.”  Defendant also told 
Garcia that he believed Mary Ann was “running around.”  Defendant, a regular patron of 
the Red Rooster, often complained about arguments he had with Mary Ann. 
 
Gertrude Mahoney, Mary Ann’s mother, testified that defendant was very 
possessive of Mary Ann.  On August 14, 1988, the day of the fire, Gertrude received 10 
to 15 telephone calls from defendant.  Defendant became more agitated with each call.  
During one particular conversation, defendant told Gertrude he thought Mary Ann was 
seeing someone else.  In one of the last telephone calls, defendant mentioned that he was 
going to the Silver Moon.  At approximately 7:00 p.m., worried and scared by the 
increasing agitation in defendant’s voice, Gertrude telephoned Mary Ann at the Silver 
Moon and told her to come straight to her house. 
 
 
12
 
Winifred Meyer, a psychiatrist, reviewed the materials Dr. Sutkus used to make 
his evaluation of defendant and the tape of defendant’s interview with police.  Dr. Meyer 
found nothing in any of these materials that would indicate defendant was impulsive in 
character. 
 
The arson investigator testified that it was impossible to have a flash-type 
explosion by throwing gasoline, lighting a Bic lighter, and throwing the lighter at the 
gasoline.  Had such an explosion occurred, defendant would likely have suffered 
significant burns to his hands and face, and parts of his clothing also would likely have 
been burned.  When Mary Ann told the arson investigator that she thought she was dying, 
she also said she had been asleep and felt someone pouring something on her.  The arson 
investigator opined that Mary Ann was either asleep or half asleep in bed when defendant 
poured a flammable liquid on her back, and that the liquid had then dripped down onto 
the floor at the edge of the bed, creating one of the two distinct areas where the fire 
ignited. 
 
Police Officer Roy McIntosh arrested defendant on August 14, 1988, at 
approximately 10:10 p.m.  He did not smell alcohol on defendant, and defendant 
exhibited no outward signs of being under the influence of alcohol.  In December 1987, 
Officer McIntosh had participated in arresting defendant for cohabitant abuse against 
Mary Ann.  Mary Ann had a bruise under her right eye and red welts around her neck, 
consistent with being choked or strangled.  At that time, Officer McIntosh could tell 
defendant had been drinking because defendant showed signs of intoxication such as 
slurred speech and unsteadiness, and because defendant had the smell of alcohol on his 
breath. 
 
Police Officer Robert Wantling arrested defendant for cohabitant abuse against 
Mary Ann in May 1988.  Mary Ann had suffered a bruise below her right knee.  
Defendant stated he had been drinking, and his breath smelled of an alcoholic beverage. 
 
 
13
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
Neither the People nor defendant introduced any evidence at the penalty phase. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Appointment and Removal of Counsel 
 
A proper understanding of the issues involving the appointment and removal of 
defendant’s counsel requires that we set forth in some detail the procedural background 
leading to the trial court rulings defendant challenges. 
 
Defendant was originally represented by the Los Angeles County Public 
Defender’s Office.  On December 21, 1989, more than a year after defendant was held to 
answer on first degree murder and arson charges, the trial court appointed the Alternate 
Defense Counsel (ADC) to represent defendant because the public defender’s office had 
declared a conflict of interest.  On January 31, 1990, Wayne Brandow of the ADC 
appeared in court as counsel for defendant. 
 
On August 31, 1990, the People announced they were ready for trial.  Brandow 
stated he would be ready toward the end of September 1990.  The trial court set the 
matter for trial and pretrial setting on September 11.  Because of the court’s scheduling 
conflicts, the matter was thereafter continued to December 3. 
 
On November 19, 1990, Brandow, who no longer worked for the ADC, requested 
appointment as defendant’s counsel to maintain “continuity of the individual attorney in 
representation” pursuant to Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 (Harris).  At 
the hearing on the motion, the trial court considered confidential declarations filed by 
defendant and Brandow.  Defendant declared, inter alia, that:  He regarded Brandow, not 
the ADC, to be his counsel; Brandow had interviewed family members and others in New 
England who could testify on his behalf; he was confident Brandow, who had previously 
handled cases involving the death penalty, would represent him well at trial; he did not 
want new counsel who would need additional time to become familiar with his case when 
 
 
14
Brandow was already familiar with it; and because Brandow did not have a large 
caseload, he would be able to devote more time to his matter than attorneys with the 
public defender’s office or the ADC.  Brandow declared, inter alia, that:  He had been 
counsel of record for defendant since the court appointed the ADC; he had traveled to 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire and personally interviewed numerous potential 
witnesses; an informed decision on which individuals to call as witnesses at trial could be 
made only by someone who had personally interviewed them and observed their 
demeanor; many potential witnesses were reluctant to travel to California but might agree 
to attend proceedings in this matter because he had developed a rapport with them, and 
such a rapport could be duplicated by different counsel only if such counsel were willing 
to spend as much time as he had already spent interviewing the witnesses at their homes 
and places of work; and he was the only counsel with whom defendant had had contact 
since the ADC was appointed. 
 
Michael Morse of the ADC appeared as counsel for defendant at the hearing on 
Brandow’s motion.  Morse represented that the ADC did not have a conflict of interest in 
continuing to represent defendant, was “neutral” on whether the motion should be 
granted, and would not oppose a court order replacing the ADC with Brandow as counsel 
for defendant. 
 
The trial court declined to relieve the ADC as counsel for defendant “based upon 
the case law and based upon the papers filed.” 
 
On December 3, 1990, Philip Nameth of the ADC appeared on behalf of defendant 
and stated he would be second counsel on the case and that Otha Standifer, also of the 
ADC, would be lead counsel.  Nameth also noted that two potential witnesses in the case 
had been or were currently in prison and that the ADC might have a conflict of interest.  
The trial court stated that it would like to be notified as soon as possible if there was a 
conflict so that it could “advance the matter to appoint private counsel.” 
 
 
15
 
Between February and April 1991, the ADC successfully moved to continue the 
matter several times. 
 
In May 1991, the trial court set October 15, 1991, as the trial date.  On October 15, 
the ADC moved for another continuance, which the People opposed.  The court granted 
the continuance until January 27, 1992, but stated that would be the last continuance it 
would grant.  On December 6, 1991, the ADC moved for yet another continuance 
because the case had been reassigned internally to John Daley, even though Otha 
Standifer remained on the case.  The court denied the motion. 
 
On January 13, 1992, the ADC moved for yet another continuance.  The trial court 
denied the motion and stated that voir dire would begin “in earnest” on February 13. 
 
On January 17, 1992, the ADC filed an ex parte motion for a continuance.  At an 
ex parte in camera hearing, Standifer stated that he personally had had defendant’s case 
for only 10 months because the file had not been obtained from previous counsel in a 
timely fashion, that he was only just beginning to make inroads in obtaining interviews 
with potential witnesses on the East Coast, and that he could not be ready to try the case 
earlier than late April.  The trial court replied that it could not, in good conscience, grant 
another continuance and that it might have to relieve the ADC if the ADC could not try 
the case within the time frame the court contemplated.  The court further noted that the 
hearing on the motion to continue should have taken place in open court, as nothing that 
counsel said had been confidential.  Standifer repeated his arguments in open court, and 
the People objected to the continuance and requested that the ADC be relieved.  The 
court remarked repeatedly that the ADC had had the case for over two years and that 
“enough [was] enough.”  Daley replied, “But there’s still no continuity in terms of 
investigators or lawyers, and that’s the hardest thing to do with that.” 
 
Following arguments by counsel, the trial court stated:  “At this time, now, I will 
be honest with you.  I wish I had relieved you before and appointed Mr. Brandow, who 
would have been ready a long time ago.  [¶] If I made a mistake in this case, that was my 
 
 
16
mistake.  I should have appointed Mr. Brandow and relieved the Alternate Defense 
Counsel.  [¶] . . .  [¶] But I didn’t do that, because I felt your office would be ready in a 
reasonable amount of time, and I did not feel it was fair to take the case from your office, 
because it was your office’s case and I don’t think your office would have been terribly 
fond of me if I had taken the case from your office at that time, because one of your 
members had happened to be relieved at that time, and it was unfair.  [¶] But now you’ve 
put the court in a very awkward position, and what I will do is as follows:  [¶] I will 
begin—I will agree to begin the jury selection process on March 2nd; one, to help you 
out; two, to help the court out, because I’m in the middle of a murder trial.  [¶] But as far 
as I am concerned, it’s March 2nd.  If you cannot be ready on that date, tell me now and I 
will relieve you.  If you can be ready on that date, I’ll accept your representations and I 
will go from there.”  Standifer replied, “[I] will try with all my might to be ready by that 
date.”  He also stated that if the trial court were unwilling to continue the trial until late 
April as he requested, he would “request as much time as the court will give [him] before 
then.” 
 
The People objected to the trial court’s ruling and noted that the numerous defense 
continuance motions were not fair to the victim’s frail and elderly mother, a crucial 
witness for the prosecution.  The court replied:  “I agree you [the People] have rights 
under 987.5 of the Penal Code and 1050.5 of the Penal Code.  I agree with you entirely.  
But I will accept the representations of counsel [that they will be ready].”  The court 
further stated:  “[I] feel I should give Alternate Defense Counsel a chance to be ready.  
They’ve been on the case this long.  [¶] I think I’ll save time by giving them the March 
2nd date, and if they cannot be ready at that time [sic].  For ethical reasons I will relieve 
them at that time.  And I think they understand the parameters of my ruling.  So I’m 
going to give you some slack, but that’s as far as it’s going to go.”  The court then noted 
that Attorney Marvin Part was in the courtroom and asked him to be present on March 2, 
1992, “just in case [defense] counsel are not ready and cannot proceed in the Cole matter 
 
 
17
on that date.”  The prosecutor noted that she would give Part “all of the materials that 
[she had] so he will be knowledgeable and prepared in this case, because [the ADC] will 
not be ready.” 
 
On February 7, 1992, the ADC made another motion for a continuance, 
specifically, a two-week continuance with a four-week “hiatus” between the guilt and 
penalty phases.  Defendant indicated he would prefer to be represented by the ADC over 
Part, but he also renewed his motion under Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, to have 
Brandow appointed as counsel.  The trial court again noted that it wished it had “kept 
Brandow on the case” but that, at this point, Part had already become “involved in the 
case,” and that, if the court relieved the ADC, it would appoint Part as counsel for 
defendant.  After hearing from all counsel, the court “with reluctance” relieved the ADC 
because it could not be ready in time.  In so doing, the court stated:  “This case has gone 
on and on.  I feel this case will go on and on unless I do something now, while I am 
[loath] to do it.”  Defendant, once again, renewed his Harris motion, stating that he had 
spoken with Brandow and that Brandow was available to handle the case if need be.  The 
court appointed Part as counsel for defendant, but it ruled that the appointment was 
without prejudice to possibly appointing Brandow on February 18, the next court date, if 
Part could not be ready to try the case “in a reasonable time.” 
 
On February 18, Part appeared as counsel for defendant.  The People noted that 
there was an “absolute” prosecution witness who had been previously represented by the 
ADC.  The trial court stated for the record that it had relieved the ADC of its appointment 
because it could not be ready for trial in a reasonable time frame.  It further noted that the 
ADC should have been relieved in any case because it had a conflict of interest in 
continuing to represent defendant because of its previous representation of a prosecution 
witness.  The court also stated that Brandow had filed a declaration in which he 
represented, among other things, that:  (1) he would be out of town on February 18 and 
thus would not be able to appear in court; (2) during the 10 months he had represented 
 
 
18
defendant, Brandow had personally performed out-of-state interviews with potential 
witnesses and evaluated their suitability as trial witnesses, and viewed physical locations 
relevant to the defense; (3) when he left the ADC, Brandow “believed that certain things 
still remained to be done in order to become fully and adequately ready to commence 
trial”; (4) Brandow did not know what work had been done since December 1990, when 
he ceased representing defendant, but he believed “it would be necessary to relocate some 
of the previously interviewed witnesses, regain access to the file and documents which 
were previously transferred to the [ADC], review the entire file[,] and perform the limited 
additional preparation” that he had previously planned, with the result that although he 
“could not unconditionally guarantee” he could be prepared to try the case on March 2, 
1992, he was sure no other counsel would be better prepared on that date; and (5) he was 
currently the counsel of record in two other cases, one of which was a death penalty case 
then set for preliminary hearing on February 24, 1992, and to commence within 30 days 
thereof, in which the court had instructed counsel to avoid becoming otherwise engaged, 
but he believed the preliminary hearing would be continued to a future date. 
 
When the trial court inquired about defendant’s own wishes on the matter of 
counsel, defendant said he would like to have Brandow as counsel because Brandow was 
more familiar with his case, had spoken to more potential witnesses than any other 
counsel, and “would be much more prepared to go to trial.” 
 
Attorney Part stated that he had already received discovery and begun work on the 
case and that he would be ready to go to trial on March 16.  Part also stated, however, 
that his three attempts to speak to defendant had been unsuccessful.  The first two 
attempts failed because of a flood and lockdown at the jail.  The third attempt, on 
February 13, failed because defendant had refused to speak to Part.  Part said that 
although defendant’s case was “a most serious case and a problem case,” it was largely 
based on “a stipulated set of facts.”  Part related that previous counsel, specifically the 
public defender’s office and Brandow, had “two excellent investigators” who interviewed 
 
 
19
potential witnesses on the East Coast and thereafter wrote detailed reports about them.  
Part stated that he did not believe there would be much difference for him between 
personally interviewing these potential witnesses and reading the reports and the exhibits.  
He acknowledged that “voluminous work” had been done by investigators in this case, 
but added that he would not use most of that work at trial.  Rather, he would “pick and 
select a few witnesses, not the 30 or 40 or 50 who perhaps were visited, acquaintances at 
work and school and things like that, that I really tactically think have no reason to be in 
the case at all.”  Part believed that if defendant “would listen to what I had to say rather 
than hanging up the telephone . . . , I could explain my position and he would know that I 
am firm in his defense.” 
 
The trial court ruled that Part would remain as counsel for defendant.  It further 
stated:  “While it is true Mr. Brandow has done some work on the case, that was some 
time in the past.  Mr. Part is an excellent lawyer, as is Mr. Brandow, but I believe Mr. 
Part’s statements to me reflect that he will be ready and will do an excellent job in this 
matter, and will be prepared.” 
a.  Refusal to relieve the ADC and appoint Brandow 
 
Defendant contends the trial court initially erred in denying him continued 
representation by Brandow, who had left the ADC and requested appointment as private 
counsel in his case. 
 
“A criminal defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by both the federal 
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment), and by the California Constitution article I, section 15.  The essential aim 
‘is to guarantee “an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure 
that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” ’ ”  
(People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 256.) 
 
 
20
 
Section 987 provides that the trial court must assign counsel to a capital defendant 
if he or she is unable to employ counsel.  “In Los Angeles County, pursuant to section 
987.2, indigent criminal defendants . . . are represented by the public defender.  If the 
public defender is unable to represent a defendant because of a conflict of interest, the 
alternate defense counsel is assigned to represent the defendant.  If the alternate defense 
counsel is unable to represent a defendant because of a conflict of interest, private 
counsel is assigned.”  (Alexander v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 901, 910; see 
also § 987.2, subd. (d).)  The court may depart from this specific order of appointing 
counsel for an indigent defendant, however, “[i]n the interest of justice.”  (§ 987.2, 
subd. (d).)  In such a case, the court must make “a finding of good cause and stat[e] the 
reasons therefor on the record.”  (Ibid.) 
 
On appeal, a trial court’s orders concerning the appointment of counsel for an 
indigent defendant are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (See, e.g., People v. Horton 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1098; Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, 799.)  A court abuses its 
discretion when it acts unreasonably under the circumstances of the particular case.  (See 
Harris, supra, at p. 796.) 
 
In Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, prior to the date for appointing 
counsel, the indigent petitioner sought and was granted permission to consult with private 
counsel.  He thereafter requested appointment of that counsel, who, in turn, advised the 
trial court that he was ready, willing, and able to proceed as appointed counsel.  The court 
denied the petitioner’s request and appointed a different attorney.  (Id., at pp. 932-933.)  
The petitioner later moved to relieve counsel and to appoint the attorney he had originally 
requested.  In support of the motion, the petitioner stated that he knew and had 
confidence in his requested counsel, and that he did not know, did not have such 
confidence in, and thus would not cooperate with, appointed counsel.  The court denied 
the motion.  (Ibid.)  When the petitioner sought review of this decision, we denied relief, 
explaining that the petitioner had “not met the heavy burden imposed in stating a claim 
 
 
21
for relief cognizable on mandate.”  (Id., at p. 933.)  Citing section 987, we stated that the 
court assigns counsel to an indigent defendant, and that “constitutional and statutory 
guarantees are not violated by the appointment of an attorney other than the one 
requested by defendant.”  (Drumgo, supra, at p. 934.)  We also noted that requested 
counsel’s readiness, willingness, and ability to act did “not raise any constitutional 
compulsion requiring his appointment.”  (Ibid.) 
 
In contrast to Drumgo v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 930, we held in Harris, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, that the trial court’s refusal to appoint requested counsel for certain 
indigent defendants amounted to an abuse of discretion.  When the two petitioners in 
Harris, who were charged with multiple felony violations, first appeared in court and 
were advised that they were entitled to appointed counsel because the public defender 
was burdened with a conflict of interest, the petitioners requested the same two attorneys 
who had been appointed to represent them in municipal court proceedings on the same 
matter.  The court declined and appointed different attorneys.  Among the factors 
considered by the court in making the appointments were the respective reputations of 
appointed counsel among the local bench and bar, their experience in the trial of similarly 
serious cases, and their certifications by the State Bar as criminal law specialists.  The 
petitioners objected to the appointments, noting they had developed a relationship of trust 
and confidence with their requested counsel.  (Id., at pp. 788-790.)  At the arraignment, 
all counsel joined in petitioners’ request, but the court ultimately reaffirmed its prior 
order.  (Id., at pp. 790-794.)   
 
When the petitioners sought review of the trial court’s order by writ (Harris, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, 789), we held that the court’s refusal to appoint requested counsel 
was an abuse of discretion.  In so concluding, we found significant that requested counsel 
had previously represented the petitioners in related prosecutions, which had established 
a close working relationship between counsel and petitioners and also given counsel 
extensive background in factual and legal matters that might become relevant in the 
 
 
22
current proceeding.  We also found significant that appointed counsel vigorously 
supported the petitioners’ plea that they not be appointed, emphasizing their relative 
unfamiliarity with the factual and legal issues involved and the necessity for expending 
considerable time and energy if they were to bring their level of familiarity with the case 
up to that of requested counsel.  (Id., at pp. 797-799.)  We thus reaffirmed “the basic 
holding of Drumgo [v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 930,] that the court’s discretion in 
the appointment of counsel is not to be limited or constrained by a defendant’s bare 
statement of personal preference, [but] . . . that when that statement of preference, timely 
made, is supported by objective considerations of the consequence here involved, and 
where there are no countervailing considerations of comparable weight, it is an abuse of 
sound judicial discretion to deny the defendant’s request to appoint the counsel of his 
preference.”  (Id., at p. 799.) 
 
The People argue that Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, is applicable only where the 
public defender (including the ADC) is unavailable and the court must for that reason 
choose between private counsel.  In support of their position, the People point to 
Charlton v. Superior Court (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 858 and Williams v. Superior Court 
(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 320, in which courts interpreted the trial court’s statutory 
authority to appoint private counsel when the public defender is unavailable (see § 987.2, 
subd. (d)) as precluding appointment of such counsel when the public defender is 
available.  In People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 844-845, we acknowledged that 
uncertainty existed on the question whether Harris, which permits discretionary 
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants, was applicable to situations 
where the public defender was available for appointment.  Ultimately, however, we 
declined to address the question because the facts presented in Daniels were factually 
distinguishable both from Harris and from the situation where a defendant is unable to 
cooperate with the available public defender. 
 
 
23
 
We similarly decline to address the question here.  Brandow’s request for 
appointment was based on the considerations that he had personally interviewed and 
developed rapport with numerous potential witnesses, that different counsel could 
duplicate such rapport only by expending considerable time interviewing and otherwise 
spending time with these potential witnesses, and that he was the only counsel with 
whom defendant had had contact at the ADC.  In support of Brandow’s request, 
defendant declared he was confident that Brandow, who had interviewed family members 
and other potential witnesses and had previously handled capital cases, would represent 
him well at trial.  Defendant also stated that he did not want a new attorney who was 
unfamiliar with his case and would require additional time to become as familiar with it 
as Brandow already was, and that Brandow could devote more time to his case than the 
ADC because of a lighter caseload.  Nothing in the record before us, however, 
demonstrates that the relationship between defendant and Brandow ever approached the 
depth of the relationship between the petitioners and their requested counsel in Harris, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d 786.  And, unlike the appointed counsel in Harris, the ADC did not 
actively seek to withdraw as counsel or support Brandow’s appointment.  Furthermore, 
there is no showing that defendant disagreed with the ADC as to trial tactics or any other 
aspect of his defense in such a way that he could not cooperate with the ADC.  Under 
these circumstances, the trial court’s denial of Brandow’s motion for removal of the ADC 
and appointment of him as counsel in its place constituted a proper exercise of discretion.  
That the court later regretted its ruling is no indication that the ruling made at the time 
was improper.1 
                                             
 
1 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s asserted error in denying Brandow’s motion 
for appointment violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and his right to a reliable conviction and 
sentence under the Eighth Amendment to that Constitution.  The point fails because, as 
we have concluded, the court’s denial of the motion was not erroneous.  The predicate of 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
24
b.  Removal of the ADC as counsel 
 
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in relieving the ADC as counsel. 
 
Generally, it is either the defendant or his counsel who requests the removal of 
counsel.  (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 629, limited on another ground in 
People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-365; see also Smith v. Superior Court 
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 558-559; Code Civ. Proc., § 284.)  Counsel may also be relieved 
on the trial court’s own motion, over the objection of the defendant or his counsel, “to 
eliminate potential conflicts, ensure adequate representation, or prevent substantial 
impairment of court proceedings.”  (People v. McKenzie, supra, at p. 629.)  On appeal, a 
trial court’s removal of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.  (See, e.g., People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d 815, 846-847.) 
 
Added by Proposition 115 in 1990, article I, section 29 of the California 
Constitution provides, “In a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the 
right to due process of law and to a speedy and public trial.”  (See also Tapia v. Superior 
Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 286, 299.)  Section 987.05, also added by Proposition 115, 
provides in pertinent part that “In cases where counsel, after making representations that 
he or she will be ready for . . . trial, and without good cause is not ready on the date set, 
the court may relieve counsel from the case and may impose sanctions upon counsel.”2  
Additionally, section 1050, which predates Proposition 115, provides, in pertinent part, 
that “the people, the defendant, and the victims and other witnesses have the right to an 
expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all courts and judicial 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
defendant’s claim of federal constitutional error is the existence of state law error.  In the 
absence of state law error, the claim of federal constitutional error falls of its own merit. 
2 
These provisions added by Proposition 115, namely article I, section 29 of the 
California Constitution, and section 987.05, address the conduct of trials and, as such, 
apply to defendant’s trial even though the offenses in question predated their passage.  
(See Tapia v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 299.) 
 
 
25
officers and of all counsel, both for the prosecution and the defense, to expedite these 
proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.” 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in relieving the ADC as counsel of record.  A court may remove appointed 
counsel both to “prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings” (People v. 
McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d 616, 629) and when counsel, without good cause, does not 
become ready for trial (§ 987.05).  The court in this case, before removing the ADC, 
granted several defense motions for continuances and allowed some flexibility in terms of 
the start of jury selection.  Furthermore, as early as October 1991, the court had warned 
that it would not entertain any more defense continuance motions, noting that the ADC 
had been counsel of record for over two years and that the People also had a right to a 
speedy trial.  Given the ADC’s numerous requests for continuances despite the court’s 
warning that it would not grant any further continuances, the skepticism with which the 
court undoubtedly viewed the ADC’s latest assurances of a March 13 readiness date was 
not unreasonable.  Even those assurances were predicated on the ADC’s request for a 
four-week hiatus between the guilt and penalty phases.3 
c.  Appointment of Part as counsel 
 
As stated, on February 7, 1992, the trial court relieved the ADC and appointed 
Part as counsel for defendant, but without prejudice to possibly appointing Brandow on 
the next court date if Part could not be ready to try the case in a reasonable period of 
time.  Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to appoint Brandow in place of 
Part. 
                                             
 
3 
Defendant claims the trial court’s asserted error in relieving the ADC violated 
unspecified rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.  The point fails 
because, as we have concluded, the court’s ruling was not erroneous. 
 
 
26
 
As stated, we review a trial court’s appointment of counsel for an indigent 
criminal defendant for an abuse of discretion. 
 
The trial court’s ruling that Part would remain counsel for defendant was not an 
abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this case, notwithstanding the fact that Part 
had been defendant’s counsel for only 38 days when trial began.  Part indicated he had 
reviewed the voluminous materials in the case, including detailed investigation reports, 
and that he would be ready for trial on March 16.  Part did not indicate that he needed to 
perform additional investigation; indeed, his trial strategy involved offering a few select 
witnesses at trial.  He was “firm” in defendant’s defense.  In comparison, Brandow’s 
availability and readiness for trial by the appointed trial date were uncertain.  He needed 
to access and review the entire file, perform additional preparation for trial, including 
locating some previously interviewed potential witnesses, and could not guarantee he 
could be ready for trial on March 2.  Further, he was under order from the court in 
another case to avoid becoming otherwise engaged.  Although Brandow previously had a 
10-month working relationship with defendant, that relationship effectively ended when 
he left the ADC in 1990, and Brandow was unfamiliar with any investigation or trial 
preparation that had occurred after that time.  Moreover, defendant’s reluctance to speak 
to Part was largely based on his desire to have Brandow as counsel and his belief that the 
prosecutor had selected Part, rather than any purported failings in representation by Part.  
Under these circumstances, the court did not act unreasonably in declining to appoint 
Brandow over Part. 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court appointed Part without determining whether 
he was qualified to handle a capital case and without complying with statutory 
suggestions for assigning private counsel (see § 987.2, subd. (c)).4  The record is silent on 
                                             
 
4 
Section 987.2, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part:  “In counties that utilize 
an assigned private counsel system as either the primary method of public defense or as 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
27
whether Part was a county-contracted panel attorney.  Even if he was not, section 987.2, 
subdivision (c) does not require the appointment of panel attorneys, and the trial court 
had no reason to believe that Part was unable to represent defendant competently.  
Indeed, stating that Part was a “very fine attorney,” the court noted that Part recently had 
defended a murder case before it and obtained for his client a second degree murder 
conviction in a case the court believed should have been first degree murder.  Our 
decision in In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694 is of no assistance to defendant.  There, we 
denied relief on habeas corpus to a petitioner who had raised claims of ineffective 
assistance against Part, who had represented the petitioner at a capital trial that took place 
in November 1981 through February 1982.  (Id., at pp. 721-739; id., at pp. 741, 743 (dis. 
opn. of Mosk, J.).)  That a petitioner in an unrelated capital case raised claims of 
ineffective assistance against Part based on his performance in 1982 has no obvious 
bearing on the question whether the court in this case abused its discretion in appointing 
Part as counsel for defendant in 1992. 
2.  Denial of Marsden Motion 
 
On March 25, 1992, defendant moved to relieve Part as counsel pursuant to 
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).  Following a hearing on the matter, 
the trial court denied the motion.  Defendant argues the court erred in denying the motion 
because it failed to inquire fully into his complaints and failed to recognize there was a 
complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship.  We disagree. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
the method of appointing counsel in cases where the public defender is unavailable, the 
county, the courts, or the local county bar association working with the courts are 
encouraged to do all of the following:  [¶] (1) Establish panels that shall be open to 
members of the State Bar of California.  [¶] (2) Categorize attorneys for panel placement 
on the basis of experience.  [¶] (3) Refer cases to panel members on a rotational basis 
within the level of experience of each panel, except that a judge may exclude an 
individual attorney from appointment to an individual case for good cause.” 
 
 
28
 
When a defendant seeks discharge of his appointed counsel on the basis of 
inadequate representation by making what is commonly referred to as a Marsden motion, 
the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to 
relate specific instances of counsel’s inadequacy.  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
581, 604; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603; see Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 
123-126.)  “A defendant is entitled to have appointed counsel discharged upon a showing 
that counsel is not providing adequate representation or that counsel and defendant have 
become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is 
likely to result.”  (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1244-1245; People v. Earp 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 876.) 
 
We review a trial court’s decision declining to discharge appointed counsel under 
the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1229, 
1245.) 
 
Defendant’s written declaration in support of his motion stated as follows:  
(1) Part visited defendant in county jail only four times in February—three times for 
approximately 30 minutes and once for less than 5 minutes—and he had not seen Part 
since then except in court; (2) Part dismissed an investigator who had been working on 
the case since its inception and hired another investigator, who had visited defendant only 
twice for short periods; (3) although Brandow made extensive arrangements for use of 
expert testimony in the guilt and penalty phases, Part told defendant that to use a 
psychiatric expert would be “useless” and that the prosecutor would “just chew [such an 
expert] up”; (4) Part told defendant he would use an “ex-cop” to testify about the effects 
of intoxication; (5) Part told defendant that his case “was nothing but a simple murder 
and he would treat it as such”; (6) Part did not plan to present any witnesses in the 
penalty phase other than defendant; (7) neither Part nor his new investigator had 
interviewed any potential witnesses; and (8) the prosecutor purportedly chose Part, and 
this impropriety should, in and of itself, result in his removal. 
 
 
29
 
Part addressed defendant’s complaints as follows:  (1) He had visited defendant 
four or five times in jail, had seen him in the holding cell, had visited him as recently as 
the day before, and had spoken to him “I don’t know how many times”; (2) a mitigation 
expert was no longer on the case because of a ruling made by a different court, and Part 
believed defendant “held that against [him]”; (3) a psychologist had made an evaluation 
of defendant regarding specific intent or ability to deliberate at the time of the victim’s 
death, and, although the psychologist had “great credentials,” he would “fear to put the 
man on the stand” on the issue of his opinion of defendant; (4) the only expert witness 
Part would need at trial was someone who could explain the significance of a 0.26 to 0.30 
percent blood-alcohol level, and he was endeavoring to obtain what he considered to be 
the best expert—someone who had worked in law enforcement; (5) there were some legal 
issues related to defendant’s taped statement, but the case-in-chief was otherwise “quite 
simple”; and (6) Part acknowledged there had been much work done by prior counsel and 
his investigator involving interviews with many potential witnesses in preparation for the 
penalty phase, but he would not “parade them to the witness stand” because it would be 
difficult to identify who would be favorable to defendant, stating for example, that 
defendant’s father “would probably be a better witness for the prosecution than he would 
be for the defense.”  Part stated he was fully prepared for trial, and he detailed some of 
his trial strategy, explaining that if defendant were to be found guilty of first degree 
murder with a special circumstance, he would emphasize defendant’s lack of a criminal 
record but for two misdemeanors against the victim.  He noted that defendant did not like 
him, had walked out on him many times, and was not very helpful. 
 
When the trial court inquired if defendant had anything further to say, defendant 
stated the following:  (1) Part’s five-minute visit the previous day consisted of Part’s 
statement that approximately 15 prospective jurors were opposed to the death penalty, 
one woman’s spouse was a prosecutor, and one man was a former homicide detective; 
(2) Part stated he wanted defendant to testify without asking defendant for his opinion; 
 
 
30
and (3) Part did what he wanted to do “without asking [defendant] anything, like he 
knows it all.” 
 
Part responded that he had done a great deal of work, spending as much as 30 
hours analyzing the jury questionnaires so that defendant could receive “a fair shake,” 
and that he did not need defendant’s opinion or advice to pick the jury.  Part added that, 
under the circumstances, it was necessary for defendant to testify, although he could not 
force defendant to do so.  Part stated he was doing what he believed was best for 
defendant to exonerate him to the extent possible, he was sorry if defendant did not agree 
with his strategy, and he would try the case regardless of whether defendant testified. 
 
The trial court clarified for the record that the decision to appoint Part as counsel 
for defendant was made solely by the court.  The court added that Part was an 
outstanding attorney, he had a reputation among prosecutors as a respectable attorney 
who obtained results for his clients, and that it could think of no better counsel in this 
case.  The court thereafter denied the Marsden motion. 
 
Under the totality of the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.  First, “the 
number of times one sees his attorney, and the way in which one relates with his attorney, 
does not sufficiently establish incompetence.”  (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 
622.)  Second, defendant’s complaints regarding Part’s purported inadequate 
investigation, trial preparation, and trial strategy were essentially tactical disagreements, 
which do not by themselves constitute an “irreconcilable conflict.”  (People v. Welch 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729.)  Indeed, a “defendant does not have the right to present 
a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent 
defense.”  (Id., at p. 728.)  “Nothing in the record here shows that [Part] was incompetent 
or would not provide adequate representation if he received defendant’s cooperation.”  
(People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 523.)  Rather, defendant’s complaints mostly 
show disagreement as to tactics, which, by itself, is insufficient to compel discharge of 
appointed counsel.  (See People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 581, 606.)  As we have 
 
 
31
stated, “the trial court need not conclude that an irreconcilable conflict exists if the 
defendant has not tried to work out any disagreements with counsel and has not given 
counsel a fair opportunity to demonstrate trustworthiness.”  (Ibid.)  Such appears to be 
the case here.  We therefore conclude that the court did not act unreasonably in denying 
the Marsden motion.5 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Purported Erroneous Admission of Evidence 
a.  Two prior incidents of abuse against the victim 
 
Prior to trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of evidence 
that defendant had committed cohabitant abuse against Mary Ann on two prior occasions.  
Over defendant’s objections, the court ruled that the evidence was admissible under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove a fact at issue on a theory of 
murder by torture, specifically, intent to torture, and that Evidence Code section 352 did 
not otherwise limit its admissibility. 
 
At trial, the parties stipulated that defendant had twice been convicted of 
cohabitant abuse, as a misdemeanor, against Mary Ann, in December 1987 and in May 
1988.  In the audiotaped police interview of defendant, which was played for the jury, 
defendant stated at one point that he had been arrested twice for incidents involving Mary 
Ann, had been released from jail two months earlier, and had been placed on probation 
for two years. 
                                             
 
5 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s asserted error in denying his Marsden 
motion violated his right to effective assistance of counsel under article I, section 15 of 
the California Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and his right to reliability of sentence under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  The point fails because, as we have concluded, the court’s 
denial of his motion was not erroneous. 
 
 
32
 
Later, on cross-examination, defendant testified that in December 1987 he slapped 
Mary Ann once or twice but did not drag her by her hair across the room, and he further 
stated that he released his pent-up anger by hitting her.  Also on cross-examination, 
defendant said that in May 1988 he was angry and slapped Mary Ann, and that he had “a 
tendency to hit with the heels of [his] hand.”  He testified he hit her but did not recall on 
what part of her body the blows fell.  He then inconsistently testified that he did not recall 
hitting her. 
 
In rebuttal, Officer McIntosh testified that he had arrested defendant for cohabitant 
abuse in December 1987 and that, on that occasion, Mary Ann had a bruise under her 
right eye and red welts around her neck, which were consistent with having been choked 
or strangled.  Defendant exhibited symptoms of being under the influence of alcohol.  
Similarly, Officer Wantling testified he arrested defendant for cohabitant abuse against 
Mary Ann in May 1988 and that, on that occasion, Mary Ann had a bruise below her 
right knee.  Defendant smelled of an alcoholic beverage and told the officer he had been 
drinking. 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior cohabitant 
abuse and allowing the parties to stipulate that defendant had been twice convicted of that 
crime.  Such evidence, defendant argues, was irrelevant (see Evid. Code, §§ 350, 351), 
and if relevant, was unduly prejudicial (see id., § 352) and constituted impermissible 
character evidence (see id., § 1101, subd. (a)).  The heart of defendant’s contention is that 
his prior cohabitant abuse against Mary Ann was not sufficiently similar to support the 
inference that he probably harbored the same intent—intent to torture—in both instances.  
Intent to torture, which is a required element in murder by torture and the torture-murder 
special circumstance (see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271), has been 
variously described as intent to inflict or cause “extreme pain” (People v. Bemore (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 809, 841; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140), “extreme and 
prolonged pain” (People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 546; accord, People v. Raley 
 
 
33
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 888; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239), and 
“ ‘cruel pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any 
other sadistic purpose’ ” (People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 168; accord, People v. 
Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1101; 
People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 267).  In short, we refer to the intent to 
torture as the intent to inflict extreme pain. 
 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) generally prohibits the admission of a 
prior criminal act against a criminal defendant “when offered to prove his or her conduct 
on a specified occasion.”  Subdivision (b) of the statute, however, provides that such 
evidence is admissible “when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge . . .).”  To be admissible to show intent, “the prior 
conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference 
that defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance.”  (People v. Yeoman 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 121; accord, People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.)  
Moreover, to be admissible, such evidence “ ‘ “must not contravene other policies 
limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637; accord, People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d 815, 
856.)  Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of the proffered evidence 
must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.  
(See People v. Ewoldt, supra, at p. 404; Evid. Code, § 352.) 
 
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings on relevance and 
admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352.  (See 
People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 
134; accord, People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534; People v. Lewis, supra, 
25 Cal.4th 610, 637.) 
 
 
34
 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of defendant’s prior crimes, the error would not require reversal.  
Even if the two prior instances of criminal abuse are disregarded, there was abundant 
testimony that defendant’s relationship with Mary Ann was acrimonious and that they 
fought constantly, both verbally and physically.  Moreover, as will be discussed, 
defendant’s actions and statements on the day of the fire provided evidence that he 
intended to torture her.  Accordingly, it is not reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to defendant would have resulted had the prior crimes evidence not been 
admitted.  (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th 701, 750; People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836.)  For the same reasons, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1120, fn. 23; Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)6 
                                             
 
6 
For the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the trial court’s asserted error in 
admitting evidence of his prior cohabitant abuse of Mary Ann violated his right to due 
process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and his right to a reliable verdict under the Eighth Amendment to that Constitution.  We 
believe that to consider defendant’s federal claims on the merits is “more consistent with 
fairness and good appellate practice than to deny the claim as waived.  As a general 
matter, no useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely 
restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one that was 
properly preserved by a timely motion that called upon the trial court to consider the 
same facts and to apply a legal standard similar to that which would also determine the 
claim raised on appeal.”  (People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 117; see also id., at 
p. 133.)  But the federal claims fail on the merits because, as we have concluded, any 
error was harmless. 
 
Defendant also contends that evidence of the prior cohabitant abuse convictions 
purportedly offered to prove the underlying facts was inadmissible hearsay under People 
v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 297-300.  Defendant did not make a specific and timely 
objection on the ground of hearsay below.  No complaint may therefore be made.  (See 
People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 204, fn. 14.)  In any event, the parties stipulated 
that defendant was twice convicted of cohabitant abuse, and neither party offered the 
convictions to prove the underlying facts. 
 
 
35
b.  Victim’s suffering prior to death 
 
Prior to trial, defendant requested an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent to 
which Dr. Davies, the surgeon who treated Mary Ann until she died, could testify about 
her suffering.  Although the defense acknowledged that commission of an act calculated 
to cause extreme pain was an element of the torture-murder special circumstance, defense 
counsel argued that testimony of eight to 10 days of such pain was irrelevant to prove 
murder by torture and unduly prejudicial as proof of the torture-murder special 
circumstance.  Over defendant’s objections, the trial court ruled that Dr. Davies could 
testify as to Mary Ann’s suffering, stating such evidence was “extremely relevant to the 
issue of proving the torture/murder special circumstance,” and that “its probative value 
outweigh[ed] any prejudice under [section] 352 of the Evidence Code.” 
 
At trial, Dr. Davies testified extensively about external and internal injuries to 
Mary Ann, the deteriorating condition of her body from the time she was admitted until 
she died 10 days later, various medical treatments administered to treat her burns, her 
continuing pain and agitation from her injuries and treatments until she lost 
consciousness on approximately her seventh day of hospitalization, and medication 
administered to relieve her pain.  He opined that had Mary Ann survived, she would have 
required, at the least, amputation of her hands and feet. 
 
In addition, Nurse Mary Justus further testified about Mary Ann’s agitation, pain, 
and fear in the first four to five days when she was still conscious.  Other prosecution and 
defense witnesses also described Mary Ann’s condition immediately after the fire, albeit 
to a much lesser degree. 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Mary Ann’s 
suffering because such evidence was irrelevant at the guilt phase and that, even if 
relevant, it should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 
352.   
 
 
36
 
As stated, we review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings on relevance and 
admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352. 
 
At the time defendant committed his crimes, commission of an act calculated to 
cause extreme pain no matter how long its duration was an element of the torture-murder 
special circumstance.  (See People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 271.)7  In light of 
evidence that defendant deliberately poured a flammable liquid on two distinct places, 
told Mary Ann as he set fire to the liquid that he hoped she would burn in hell, and his 
subsequent statements that he wanted to kill her, evidence that Mary Ann suffered 
extreme pain was relevant to prove defendant committed an act calculated to cause 
extreme pain.  Evidence that Mary Ann suffered extreme pain also was part of the 
circumstances of the crime relevant to prove intent to torture, both for murder by torture 
and the torture-murder special circumstance.  (See People v. Davenport, supra, at p. 271; 
see also People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 559.) 
 
In addition, the trial court acted within its broad discretion in admitting evidence 
of Mary Ann’s suffering because the probative value of the evidence presented was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  The “prejudice” referred to in 
Evidence Code section 352 is “evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias 
against a party as an individual, while having only slight probative value with regard to 
the issues.”  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 134.)  Graphic evidence in 
murder cases is always disturbing and never pleasant.  (See ibid.)  Although the evidence 
of Mary Ann’s suffering was indeed disturbing, it was not unduly shocking or 
                                             
 
7 
Proposition 115, effective June 6, 1990, amended section 190.2, subdivision 
(a)(18) by deleting the second sentence, which had read:  “For the purposes of this 
section torture requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no matter how 
long its duration.”  This amendment, however, does not apply to crimes, like that here, 
committed before Proposition 115 was passed.  (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th 
809, 839 & fn. 17.) 
 
 
37
inflammatory, especially considering that proof of the torture-murder special 
circumstance required evidence of commission of a kind of act calculated to cause 
extreme pain, and that both murder by torture and the torture-murder special 
circumstance required evidence of intent to inflict extreme pain.8 
c.  Victim photographs 
 
At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor proffered three photographs of Mary Ann 
before the fire and nine photographs of her after the fire.  Defendant objected to the 
photographs of Mary Ann before the fire as irrelevant and cumulative, and to the quantity 
of photographs depicting Mary Ann’s burns after the fire as irrelevant and, if relevant, 
unduly prejudicial and cumulative.  The trial court permitted the prosecutor to admit one 
photograph of Mary Ann before the fire and all nine photographs of her after the fire, 
stating that, with regard to the photographs depicting her burns, each was taken “from a 
different perspective” and their “probative value outweighs undue prejudice as to the 
issues to be proven in this case.”9 
 
On appeal, defendant challenges the photograph of Mary Ann before the fire as 
irrelevant and the nine photographs of her after the fire as irrelevant and, if relevant, as 
unduly prejudicial and cumulative. 
 
As we shall explain, defendant’s challenge is without merit. 
                                             
 
8 
For the first time on appeal, defendant contends the assertedly erroneous 
admission of evidence of Mary Ann’s suffering at the guilt phase violated the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
undermined the reliability required for a conviction under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to that Constitution.  Considering defendant’s federal claims on their merits 
(see People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 117, 133), we find they fail because, as we 
have concluded, the evidence was properly admitted. 
9 
Of the nine photographs depicting Mary Ann’s wounds, one was later completely 
destroyed and four were severely damaged by flood after the trial concluded. 
 
 
38
 
We review the trial court’s rulings on relevance and admission or exclusion of 
evidence under Evidence Code section 352, including photographic evidence, for abuse 
of discretion.  (See People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 692; accord, People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 755.) 
 
Defendant argues that the photograph of Mary Ann before the fire was irrelevant, 
and therefore inadmissible, because it “had no bearing on any contested issue in the 
case.”  (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 578.)  We disagree.  Whether defendant 
intended to inflict extreme pain and to commit an act calculated to cause such pain were 
two important issues at trial relating to the torture-murder special circumstance.  Intent to 
inflict such pain was also relevant to the charge of murder by torture.  Accordingly, a 
photograph of Mary Ann before the fire was relevant to show the extent of the harm 
caused by defendant’s actions.  We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting a single photograph of Mary Ann before the fire.10 
 
Defendant also argues that the nine photographs of Mary Ann after the fire were 
irrelevant to the issue of intent to inflict extreme pain, cumulative to testimonial 
evidence, partly cumulative to each other, and unduly prejudicial.  His challenge to these 
photographs on the ground of relevance has not been preserved for review because he did 
not make a specific and timely objection on this ground.  (See People v. Alvarez, supra, 
14 Cal.4th 155, 204, fn. 14.)  In any event, he fails on the merits because, as we will 
discuss, the photographs were indeed relevant. 
                                             
 
10 
Although defendant did not make a specific and timely objection on these grounds 
at trial, he now contends on appeal that the assertedly erroneous admission of the 
photograph of Mary Ann taken before the fire violated his rights to a fair trial under the 
Fifth Amendment, an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, and due process and 
“heightened capital case due process” under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  Considering these claims on the merits despite 
defendant’s procedural default (see People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 117, 133), 
we conclude they fail because the photograph was properly admitted. 
 
 
39
 
The intent to inflict extreme pain may be inferred from the circumstances of the 
crime, the nature of the killing, and the condition of the victim’s body.  (People v. 
Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 559.)  The photographs of Mary Ann, which depicted the 
numerous burns on specific parts of her body, were obviously relevant to show the 
condition of her body as it related to the issue of intent to inflict extreme pain, as well as 
to prove commission of a kind of act calculated to cause such pain. 
 
Further, we have often rejected the argument that photographs of a murder victim 
should be excluded as cumulative to other evidence in the case.  (People v. Heard, supra, 
31 Cal.4th 946, 976, 978; People v. Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.4th 673, 692; People v. 
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 625.) 
 
We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 
photographs.  As we have previously observed, all photographs of murder victims are 
disturbing.  (See People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 976.)  Here, although the 
photographs are “unquestionably unpleasant” (id., at p. 977), they are not unduly 
gruesome or inflammatory and, as previously noted, are all relevant to issues in the case.  
Moreover, the trial court ruled that the photographs were sufficiently different as not to 
be cumulative to each other, and such a ruling is not unreasonable.  The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting these photographs. 
 
Even if we were to agree with defendant that the trial court erred in admitting one 
or more of the autopsy photographs, we nonetheless would conclude that any error was 
harmless under the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818.  Under Watson, 
the erroneous admission of photographs warrants reversal of a conviction only if the 
appellate court concludes that it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a 
different result had such evidence been excluded.  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 
946, 978; see People v. Watson, supra, at p. 836.)  The photographs here “did not 
disclose to the jury any information that was not presented in detail through the testimony 
of witnesses,” and they were “no more inflammatory than the graphic testimony provided 
 
 
40
by a number of the prosecution’s witnesses.”  (People v. Heard, supra, at p. 978.)  Under 
these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that the admission of the nine 
photographs of Mary Ann after the fire, which depicted her burns and injuries, affected 
the jury’s verdict.  (Ibid.)  And for the reasons stated, we would also conclude that any 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See Chapman v. California, supra, 386 
U.S. 18, 24.) 
2.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his guilt 
phase closing argument by comparing defendant’s conduct to the Spanish Inquisition and 
persecution of early Christians, and by impugning the integrity of defense counsel.  We 
review the various statements of asserted misconduct in some detail below and conclude 
that defendant has forfeited the claim for failure to object or request an admonition to any 
of the statements, and that in any event the claim lacks merit. 
a.  Relevant proceedings 
 
As an illustration to explain murder by torture, the prosecutor argued that during 
the Spanish Inquisition, suspected heretics were tortured and killed.  The prosecutor then 
continued:  “The night before, after months, sometimes years, one of these acts of faith 
when somebody was going to be executed, they would give them the opportunity one last 
time, although it wasn’t really a last time, to confess and turn over their friends.  This 
might be after six months of unbelievable torture.  They knew they were going to die. 
 
“If they confessed at this point in time and turn[ed] people over, a mercy was done 
them.  They were allowed to be garroted right then and there, strangled so that only their 
dead body would be burned at the stake the next day, and they wouldn’t have to face the 
flames and the pain of burning.  They could be dead first.  This is after months of torture 
of not confessing. 
 
 
41
 
“Hundreds, thousands of them at the last minute, either the night before, or 
actually some of them the next day after they were marched out, right when they were 
about to be taken to the stake, there was one more time, even though they were told the 
night before, ‘this is the last time, confess now and we’ll strangle you and you won’t have 
to face the flames,’ and they did, because they had seen it. 
 
“There was nothing—there is nothing you can plan, there is nothing in the human 
psyche that is as terrifying as dying by burning, and these are people who were going to 
die while tied up to the stake, and the whole thing is going to take ten minutes. 
 
“Doesn’t compare to what Mary Ann Mahoney went through.  Doesn’t even come 
close.  They were allowed to be strangled first. 
 
“I’m not suggesting to you that Stephen Cole knew the history of the Inquisition.  
This is an experience.  This was a relationship with fire that underlines man’s relationship 
with fire throughout history.  A little child burns his finger and knows.  You cannot 
imagine any death—make one up—tie somebody up in the desert, put them up there in 
the heat up to their neck until the ants eat them up.  Doesn’t compare to what he did to 
Mary Ann Mahoney.  And when you use fire, you know it, we all do. 
 
“Frankly, there is a movie on—a famous movie, Quo Vadis, the other night.  I 
don’t want to get into religious areas, but I’ve got to tell you, when they were crucifying 
the early Christians, some of the pain wasn’t enough, they had to light them on fire to 
really do it.  We know what fire does.” 
 
At the start of his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor noted that defense counsel 
mentioned him by name over 35 times and referred to the “prosecution” over 125 times.  
He argued that many of defense counsel’s references to evidence were incorrect or taken 
out of context and that, unlike defense counsel, he would argue what he believed was a 
fair characterization of the evidence.  The prosecutor subsequently argued at various 
points that defense counsel was attempting to “mislead,” “deceive,” or give the “wrong 
 
 
42
idea” to, the jury; was “sneaky”; was “unfair” to the jury and to the characterization of 
evidence and the law; and “wasn’t being straight” with the jury. 
 
Defendant did not object to any of the purported instances of misconduct. 
b.  The claim was not preserved for appellate review 
 
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a criminal defendant 
must make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to 
disregard the impropriety.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820; accord, People v. 
Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th 518, 553.)  A defendant will be excused from the requirement 
of making a timely objection and/or a request for admonition if either would have been 
futile.  (People v. Hill, supra, at p. 820.)  In addition, the failure to request that the jury be 
admonished does not forfeit the issue for appeal if an admonition would not have cured 
the harm caused by the misconduct or the trial court immediately overrules an objection 
to alleged misconduct such that the defendant has no opportunity to make such a request.  
(Id., at pp. 820-821.) 
 
As for the comments about the Spanish Inquisition and the persecution of early 
Christians, defendant argues that any objection would have been futile, considering the 
“wide latitude” the trial court had afforded the prosecution throughout the trial over 
defendant’s objection, for example, by admitting evidence of Mary Ann’s suffering and 
his prior cohabitant abuse of Mary Ann.  We disagree.  We find nothing in the record that 
suggests an objection would have been futile. 
 
Defendant argues that objections and/or requests for admonition concerning 
comments about defense counsel “would have particularly been futile coming from the 
very attorney whose integrity was being questioned.”  He further argues that these 
comments were so pervasive and extended throughout the rebuttal argument that constant 
objections would have been “counterproductive.”  “The problem is that defendant made 
no objections whatever to the various instances of asserted misconduct cited above.”  
 
 
43
(People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 521.)  A timely objection and admonition by 
the trial court at the outset might have restrained the prosecutor’s aggressiveness before it 
became so pervasive.  (See ibid.) 
 
We conclude defendant has forfeited any claim of prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing arguments.11 
c.  No misconduct occurred 
 
In any event, defendant’s claim that the cited arguments and comments constituted 
misconduct lacks merit.   
 
A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution when it “infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 
conviction a denial of due process.”  (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44; accord, 
Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 
416 U.S. 637, 643.)  In other words, the misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to 
result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  (United States v. Agurs (1976) 
427 U.S. 97, 108.)  A prosecutor’s misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally 
unfair nevertheless violates California law if it involves “the use of deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.”  (People v. 
Strickland (1995) 11 Cal.3d 946, 955; accord, People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 
167.) 
                                             
 
11 
Defendant claims that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by failing to object to the 
asserted misconduct.  Ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness 
and prejudice under a similarly objective standard of a reasonable probability of a more 
favorable outcome in the absence of the deficient performance.  (Strickland v. 
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696.)  Defense counsel was not prejudicially 
deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor’s comments because, as will be discussed, 
there was no misconduct by the prosecutor. 
 
 
44
 
When the issue “focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the 
question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any 
of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.”  (People v. Berryman (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 
822-823; accord, People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.)  Moreover, prosecutors 
“have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial,” and 
whether “the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.”  
(People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th 468, 522.) 
 
We conclude the prosecutor did not overstep the boundary of permissible 
argument in mentioning the Spanish Inquisition and the persecution of early Christians.   
With those examples, the prosecutor made the point that fire has historically been used as 
an instrument of torture and is generally known to cause extreme pain.  The point was 
appropriate in the context of the argument that defendant must have known that using fire 
to kill Mary Ann was calculated to cause her extreme pain.  While the historical events 
the prosecutor mentioned had religious significance, the prosecutor made no improper 
appeal to religious authority.  (E.g., People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 836-837 & 
fn. 6.)  Defendant does not contend otherwise.  Defendant does argue that references to 
Mary Ann’s suffering were irrelevant and improper, and, thus, that references to historic 
examples of torture by fire were also improper.  We disagree.  As discussed above, 
evidence of Mary Ann’s suffering was properly admitted to prove that defendant 
committed an act calculated to inflict extreme pain.  (See ante, at p. 35 et seq.)  
Accordingly, for the prosecutor to use illustrative analogies to argue the point was not 
improper. 
 
Neither did the prosecutor commit misconduct in his comments about defense 
counsel.  Although defendant singles out particular sentences to demonstrate misconduct, 
we must view the statements in the context of the argument as a whole.  (See People v. 
Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th 468, 522.)  Each of the statements about defense counsel was 
 
 
45
made in the context of rebutting a statement defense counsel had made during his closing 
argument.  For example, the prosecutor’s comment that defense counsel was attempting 
to “deceive” the jury was made in the context of refuting an argument that the word 
“deliberate” in the deliberate and premeditated murder instruction included considering 
the consequences of loss of property.  The prosecutor also explained to the jury that, 
contrary to defense counsel’s characterization of the definition of “deliberate,” the 
consequences discussed in the murder instruction referred to the consequences of taking a 
human life.  We thus conclude it is not reasonably likely that the jury understood the 
prosecutor’s references to defense counsel as “deceiv[ing],” “unfair,” “misleading,” or 
“tricky” to be personal attacks on counsel’s integrity.  (See, e.g., People v. Taylor (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 1155, 1167 [referring to defense “tricks” or “moves” did not constitute 
improper personal attack on defense counsel’s integrity]; People v. Medina, supra, 
11 Cal.4th 694, 759 [commenting that “any experienced defense attorney can twist a 
little, poke a little, try to draw some speculation, try to get you to buy something” did not 
amount to a personal attack on defense counsel’s integrity].) 
 
In summary, the prosecutor’s conduct during closing and rebuttal arguments did 
not infect the trial “with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due 
process” (People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th 34, 44) or involve “the use of deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury” (People v. 
Strickland, supra, 11 Cal.3d 946, 955; accord, People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 
167).  We presume the jurors treated “the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an 
advocate in an attempt to persuade” (People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, fn. 8), 
and we find nothing in the record that would suggest otherwise.12 
                                             
 
12 
Defendant also claims that the asserted prosecutorial misconduct calls into 
question the reliability of his sentence for purposes of the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  The point fails because we have concluded no misconduct 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
46
3.  Issues Involving First Degree Murder by Lying in Wait 
a.  Notice of first degree murder by lying in wait 
 
Defendant contends the prosecution failed to give adequate notice that it would 
rely on a theory of murder by lying in wait, in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process. 
 
Before trial, the prosecution indicated it would proceed on two theories of first 
degree murder:  felony murder based on arson, and premeditated and deliberate murder.  
During the defense case, however, out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor stated he 
“might request an instruction on torture/murder as well as lying in wait.”  The defense did 
not object or request a continuance.  Later, during a conference on jury instructions, the 
prosecutor stated he intended to proceed on various theories of murder, including lying in 
wait, and there was a discussion on the applicability of the lying-in-wait instruction.  
Over defendant’s objection, the court instructed the jury on murder by lying in wait, in 
accordance with a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.25 (1989 rev.) (5th ed. 1988).  As 
given, the instruction stated:  “Murder which is immediately preceded by lying in wait is 
murder of the first degree.  [¶] The term ‘lying in wait’ is defined as a waiting and 
watching for an opportune time to act, together with a concealment by ambush or by 
some other secret design to take the other person by surprise.  The lying in wait need not 
continue for any particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a 
state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.” 
 
Defendant never objected at trial to any lack of notice that the prosecution would 
attempt to prove lying in wait.  Neither did defendant move for a continuance when the 
prosecution first indicated it might proceed on that theory, or move to reopen the taking 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
occurred.  For the same reason, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court had a 
sua sponte duty under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to prevent such 
misconduct. 
 
 
47
of evidence when the prosecutor asked the court to instruct the jury on that theory.  
Accordingly, we find that defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review.  (People 
v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th 557, 629; People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 641.) 
 
Even if the issue were properly before us, we would nevertheless reject the claim 
on the merits. 
 
Whether defendant received constitutionally adequate notice that the prosecution 
was relying on a particular theory of guilt entails a resolution of a mixed question of law 
and fact that we believe is predominantly legal.  As such, we undertake an independent 
review.  (See People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 906-907.) 
 
“Both the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and the due process 
guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions require that a criminal defendant receive 
notice of the charges adequate to give a meaningful opportunity to defend against them.”  
(People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th 598, 640.)  But “[w]e have long held that under this 
state’s statutory scheme, an accusatory pleading charging a defendant with murder need 
not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution intends to rely.”  (People v. 
Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 557.)  Although there may be some situations in which the 
United States Constitution may require greater specificity, generally an accused will 
receive adequate notice of the prosecution’s theory of the case from the evidence adduced 
at the preliminary examination or the indictment proceedings.  (Ibid.) 
 
Murder by lying in wait requires (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial 
period of watching and waiting for a favorable or opportune time to act, and 
(3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of 
advantage.  (People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th 557, 630; People v. Hardy (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 86, 163.) 
 
Here, the testimony presented at the preliminary examination put the defense on 
notice that the prosecution intended to show defendant waited until Mary Ann was asleep 
before he poured a flammable liquid on her and ignited it.  (See, e.g., People v. Ruiz 
 
 
48
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 615.)  Furthermore, the prosecution at trial presented evidence, 
through Mary Ann’s out-of-court statement to the arson investigator and defendant’s 
statement to police, that Mary Ann was asleep or lying down when defendant poured the 
flammable liquid on her and ignited it.  Finally, the prosecution requested an instruction 
on the lying-in-wait theory during the jury instruction conference, at which the parties 
discussed its applicability.  This case is therefore unlike Sheppard v. Rees (9th Cir. 1989) 
909 F.2d 1234, in which the prosecution ambushed the defense by submitting an 
instruction on a felony-murder theory after the jury instruction conference and during 
closing argument, and in which “the concept of felony-murder [was not] raised, directly 
or indirectly,” at any time “during pretrial proceedings, opening statements, or the taking 
of testimony . . . .”  (Id., at p. 1235; see also People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 
189.) 
b.  Insufficient evidence of murder by lying in wait 
 
In a related argument, defendant claims the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
on first degree murder by lying in wait because there was insufficient evidence to warrant 
such an instruction.  We reject this argument. 
 
A trial court must instruct the jury on every theory that is supported by substantial 
evidence, that is, evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to make a determination in 
accordance with the theory presented under the proper standard of proof.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 835.)  We review the trial court’s decision de 
novo.  In so doing, we must determine whether there was indeed sufficient evidence to 
support the giving of a lying-in-wait instruction.  Stated differently, we must determine 
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant committed murder based on a lying-in-wait theory.  (E.g., People v. Ceja 
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1137, 1142; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 163-164.) 
 
 
49
 
Mary Ann told the arson investigator that she was asleep when defendant began to 
pour gasoline on her.  Similarly, the arson investigator opined that defendant had poured 
a flammable liquid on Mary Ann’s back as she was sleeping and that the liquid had 
dripped from her back onto the floor.  From such evidence, a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had watched and waited until 
Mary Ann was sleeping and helpless before he poured the flammable liquid on her and 
ignited it.  We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supported the jury instruction 
on first degree murder by lying in wait. 
4.  Issues Involving Murder by Torture 
a.  Notice of first degree murder by torture 
 
Defendant claims the prosecution failed to give adequate notice that it was seeking 
a first degree murder conviction based on a theory of murder by torture, thus violating his 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rights to a fair trial and due process.  Defendant never 
objected at trial to a lack of notice and did not move for a continuance.  Accordingly, 
defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review.  (People v. Gurule, supra, 
28 Cal.4th 557, 629; People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th 598, 641.)  In any event, the 
issue is without merit.  The murder charge and the torture-murder special-circumstance 
allegation plainly gave defendant notice adequate to afford him a meaningful opportunity 
to defend against the charge of murder by torture. 
b.  Failure to instruct on the causal relationship between torture and 
death for murder by torture 
 
Murder by torture “is ‘murder committed with a wil[l]ful, deliberate and 
premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.’ ”  (People v. Pensinger, 
supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239, quoting People v. Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 539, 546.)  “The 
culpable intent is one to cause pain for ‘ “the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or 
for any other sadistic purpose.” ’ ”  (People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 888.)  There is 
no requirement that the victim be aware of the pain.  (People v. Pensinger, supra, at 
 
 
50
p. 1239.)  “However, there must be a causal relationship between the torturous act and 
death.”  (Ibid.) 
 
At the jury instruction conference, the trial court stated that, with respect to the 
instruction on murder by torture, it would not instruct the jury that the torturous act must 
be the proximate cause of death because there was “no issue here . . . whether or not the 
fire caused the death.”  Defendant did not object.  At trial, the court instructed the jury as 
follows:  “Murder which is perpetrated by torture is murder of the first degree.  [¶] The 
essential elements of murder by torture are:  [¶] 1. One person murdered another person, 
and  [¶] 2. The perpetrator committed the murder with a willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for 
the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.  [¶] The crime 
of murder by torture does not require any proof that the perpetrator intended to kill his 
victim, or any proof that the victim was aware of pain or suffering.  [¶] The word 
‘willful’ as used in this instruction means intentional.  [¶] The word ‘deliberate’ means 
formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of 
considerations for and against the proposed course of action.  [¶] The word 
‘premeditated’ means considered beforehand.”  (See also CALJIC No. 8.24 (1989 rev.) 
(5th ed. 1988).) 
 
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the 
causal relationship between torture and death, which is an element required to prove 
murder by torture. 
 
The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each 
element of the charged offense.  (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260.)  Whether 
the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the charged offense is a mixed 
question of law and fact that we believe is predominantly legal.  As such, we examine it 
without deference to the trial court’s ruling.  An instructional error relieving the 
 
 
51
prosecution of its burden violates the defendant’s rights under both the United States and 
California Constitutions.  (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 479-480.) 
 
We find no error.  Even though the jury was not expressly instructed on the causal 
relationship between the torturous act and death, there is no reasonable likelihood that it 
understood there need be no such causal relationship, given the language of the 
instruction.  Closely following the statutory language, the court instructed the jury that 
“[m]urder which is perpetrated by torture is murder of the first degree.”  (Italics added; 
cf. § 189.)  The preposition “by,” in itself, commonly signifies a causal connection.  (See 
Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 307 [defining “by” as “through the means of 
or instrumentality of,” as in “put to death [by] the sword”; definition 4a].) 
 
Even if we did find error, we would have to find that error harmless. 
 
Under state law, instructional error that withdraws an element of a crime from the 
jury’s consideration is harmless if there is “no reasonable probability that the outcome of 
defendant’s trial would have been different had the trial court properly instructed the 
jury.”  (People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th 470, 490; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. 
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837.)  Under federal law, the “Fifth Amendment right 
to due process and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial . . . require the prosecution to 
prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a crime.”  (People v. 
Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 324, italics omitted; People v. Flood, supra, at pp. 
479-480, 491; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 277-278.)  
Accordingly, a trial court’s failure to instruct on an element of a crime is federal 
constitutional error that requires reversal of the conviction unless it can be shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.  (People v. 
Sengpadychith, supra, at p. 324; People v. Flood, supra, at pp. 502-504; Chapman v. 
California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24; Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8-16.) 
 
Evidence at trial was uncontested that defendant’s actions caused Mary Ann’s 
death.  Indeed, defendant’s closing argument was not that he did not kill Mary Ann but 
 
 
52
that he did not kill her with premeditation and deliberation, did not kill her by lying in 
wait, did not intend to torture her, and did not kill her in the commission of arson.  
Accordingly we find that even if the trial court’s failure to instruct expressly on the 
causal relationship had been erroneous, it would have been harmless under any standard. 
c.  Failure to instruct on intoxication and mental disease relating to intent 
to torture for murder by torture 
 
The trial court instructed the jury:  “In each of the crimes and allegations charged 
in the information, there must exist a certain mental state in the mind of the 
perpetrator. . . .  [¶] The mental states required are included in the definitions of the 
crimes or allegations charged.”  (CALJIC No. 3.31.5 (1989 rev.) (5th ed. 1988).)  The 
court defined intoxication as voluntary “if it results from the willing use of any 
intoxicating liquor, drug or other substance, knowing that it is capable of an intoxicating 
effect or when he or she willingly assumes the risk of that effect.”  (See CALJIC No. 4.22 
(5th ed. 1988).)  The court also instructed on the relevance of voluntary intoxication to 
specific intent, as follows:  “In the crime and special circumstances of which the 
defendant is accused in Count I [i.e., murder, arson-murder special circumstance, and 
torture-murder special circumstance] and the crime of which the defendant is accused in 
Count II [i.e., arson] of the Information, a necessary element is the existence in the mind 
of the defendant of certain specific intents and/or mental states.  The specific intent 
and/or mental state required is included in the definitions of the crimes or allegations 
charged.  [¶] If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the 
alleged crimes, you should consider that fact in determining whether defendant had such 
specific intent and/or mental state.  [¶] If from all the evidence you have a reasonable 
doubt whether the defendant formed such specific intent and/or mental state, you must 
find that he did not have such specific intent and/or mental state.”  (See CALJIC No. 4.21 
(5th ed. 1988).)  As for evidence of mental disease, the court instructed the jury as 
follows:  “Evidence has been received regarding a mental disease, mental defect or 
 
 
53
mental disorder of the defendant at the time of the crime charged in Counts I and II.  You 
may consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the 
defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crime charged in 
Counts I and II and any special allegations charged.”  (See CALJIC No. 3.32 (5th ed. 
1988).) 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the causal 
relationship of intoxication and mental disease to the mental state necessary for murder 
by torture, that is, the intent to inflict extreme pain.  We disagree. 
 
The legal adequacy of an instruction is reviewed independently.  (See People v. 
Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, 217-218.) 
 
As stated, the trial court instructed the jury that murder required a certain mental 
state that was included in its definition.  The jury was advised that it could consider 
evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining whether defendant had such mental 
state and could also consider evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder in 
determining whether or not the defendant actually formed that mental state.  The court 
instructed the jury that an element of murder by torture was “willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for 
the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.”  Viewing the 
instructions as a whole, we conclude the jury was adequately instructed that intoxication 
and mental disease were relevant to the requisite mental state for murder by torture, that 
is, the intent to inflict extreme pain.  (See, e.g., People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 
1021.) 
 
This case is distinguishable from People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210.  
There, we stated that because murder by torture “involves a unique specific intent which 
the standard instructions on murder do not cover, . . . when intoxication is relevant to the 
formation of specific intent, the instruction on intoxication should be related to the 
specific intent involved in torture.”  (Id., at p. 1243.)  Although the trial court there had 
 
 
54
instructed, inter alia, that intoxication could be relevant to the intent to kill necessary to 
establish murder or manslaughter, it did not specify that intoxication could also be 
relevant to the intent necessary to prove a murder by torture, that is, the intent to inflict 
extreme pain.  (Id., at p. 1242.)  We nevertheless concluded that the evidence of 
intoxication was insufficient to require the court to give such an instruction in that case.  
(Id., at p. 1243.)  In contrast, the trial court here instructed that evidence of intoxication 
or mental disease could be relevant to the requisite mental state for murder by torture.13 
d.  Failure to instruct on provocation relating to intent to torture for 
murder by torture 
 
Defendant similarly contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the 
relationship of provocation to the mental state necessary for murder by torture, that is, the 
intent to inflict extreme pain.  He claims that instructing the jury according to CALJIC 
No. 8.73 that it could consider “evidence of provocation for such bearing as it may have 
on the question of whether the murder was of the first or second degree” was insufficient. 
 
Defendant did not ask the trial court to clarify or amplify the instruction.  Thus, he 
may not complain on appeal that the instruction was incomplete.  (People v. Mayfield 
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 778-779.) 
 
In any event, the argument is without merit. 
 
As stated, we review independently the legal adequacy of a jury instruction. 
 
Defendant argues the trial court should have instructed on provocation for 
purposes of voluntary manslaughter.  But provocation for such purposes has nothing to 
do with intent and everything to do with circumstances, specifically, whether the 
                                             
 
13 
Because we conclude the trial court did not err, we reject defendant’s claim that 
the asserted error violated article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, the right to 
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and the right to a reliable sentencing procedure under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
 
55
circumstances would have caused a reasonable person to act as defendant did.  (People v. 
Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252-1253.)  Thus, to instruct on provocation for purposes 
of voluntary manslaughter would have not assisted the jury in determining whether 
provocation prevented defendant from forming the intent necessary to commit murder by 
torture.  The two concepts are distinct. 
 
The court did instruct the jury on provocation as relevant to this case.  
Specifically, the court instructed that, if “the killing was preceded and accompanied by a 
clear, deliberate intent . . . , which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so 
that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of 
passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation,” it was first degree 
murder.  (Italics added; see CALJIC No. 8.20 (5th ed. 1988) [deliberate and premeditated 
murder].)  As stated, the court also instructed that, if “the evidence shows the existence of 
provocation that played a part in inducing the unlawful killing of a human being, and you 
find that the killing was murder, you may consider the evidence of provocation for such 
bearing as it may have on the question of whether the murder was of the first or second 
degree.”  (See CALJIC No. 8.73 (5th ed. 1988) [evidence of premeditation may be 
considered in determining degree of murder].)  Finally, the court instructed that, if the 
jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether the murder was of the first or second degree, 
the jury had to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict of second 
degree murder.  (See CALJIC No. 8.71 (5th ed. 1988) [doubt whether first or second 
degree murder].)  There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood 
these instructions to foreclose them from considering evidence of provocation, if any, in 
connection with murder by torture.  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 343; 
People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1021.)14 
                                             
 
14 
Because we conclude the trial court adequately instructed on the relevance of 
provocation, we reject defendant’s claim that the asserted error violated article I, section 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
56
e.  Insufficient evidence of murder by torture 
 
Defendant contends the evidence at the close of the People’s case-in-chief was 
insufficient under section 1118.1,15 and the due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution, to support a first degree murder conviction on a theory of murder by torture.  
He also contends the evidence was insufficient under the due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 15 to support such a conviction at the close 
of all the evidence.  The focus of defendant’s claim is that the evidence was insufficient 
on the element of intent to inflict extreme pain. 
 
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the due 
process clause of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, we review the entire 
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses 
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; People v. Berryman, 
supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1083; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320.) 
 
In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1, a trial 
court applies the same standard an appellate court applies in reviewing the sufficiency of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
15 of the California Constitution, the right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the right to a reliable sentencing 
procedure under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
15 
Section 1118.1 provides in pertinent part:  “In a case tried before a jury, the court 
on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either 
side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a 
judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if 
the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or 
offenses on appeal.” 
 
 
57
the evidence to support a conviction, that is, “ ‘whether from the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the 
existence of each element of the offense charged.’  (People v. Ainsworth (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 984, 1022 . . .; see People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, fn. 2.)”  
(People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.)  “Where the section 1118.1 
motion is made at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the sufficiency of the 
evidence is tested as it stood at that point.”  (People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 
695, disapproved on another point in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1219-
1221.) 
 
A defendant need not articulate the grounds for his motion for acquittal, and there 
is no requirement that the motion be made in a particular form.  (People v. Belton (1979) 
23 Cal.3d 516, 521.)  Thus, in Belton, we held that the defendant’s motion for an 
acquittal was made in proper form where defense counsel merely stated he did not think 
there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of any crime.  (Id., at pp. 521 & fn. 6, 
522-523.) 
 
At the close of the People’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of 
acquittal as to the special circumstance allegations based on torture murder and felony 
murder (arson) only.  Citing Belton, supra, 23 Cal.3d 516, defendant argues that his 
motion encompassed the first degree murder charge on the theory of murder by torture.  
Respondent, in turn citing a Court of Appeal case declining to extend Belton to a situation 
where a motion for acquittal in a court trial directed to specific counts also encompasses 
undesignated counts or special circumstance allegations (People v. Ceja (1988) 205 
Cal.App.3d 1296, 1301-1304), contends that defendant’s failure to include the first 
degree murder charge within the scope of his motion forfeited this issue for appeal.  We 
need not resolve this issue, for even assuming the first degree murder charge was 
included in defendant’s motion for acquittal, we conclude there was sufficient evidence 
 
 
58
of murder by torture, both at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief and at the close 
of the entire case. 
 
We review independently a trial court’s ruling under section 1118.1 that the 
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction.  (See People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d 
667, 695; see also, e.g., People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 275.)  We also determine 
independently whether the evidence is sufficient under the federal and state constitutional 
due process clauses. 
 
As noted above, for purposes of proving murder by torture, the intent to inflict 
extreme pain “may be inferred from the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the 
killing, and the condition of the victim’s body.”  (People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 
527, 559.)  But we also have “cautioned against giving undue weight to the severity of 
the victim’s wounds, as horrible wounds may be as consistent with a killing in the heat of 
passion, in an ‘explosion of violence,’ as with the intent to inflict cruel suffering.”  
(People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239.) 
 
We reject defendant’s claim under the federal and state constitutional due process 
clauses and, as a result, reject his claim under section 1118.1 as well (see People v. 
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496, fn. 2).  Defendant maintains that this case falls into 
the “explosion of violence” category.  But there was substantial evidence from which a 
rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite 
intent to inflict extreme pain.  Verbal abuse and excessive drinking characterized 
defendant and Mary Ann’s five-year relationship, and all accounts indicated that they 
were functional alcoholics.  Placed against this background, the prosecution also 
presented evidence that defendant was jealous and possessive of Mary Ann, that she 
planned to move out of their residence without him, that she discussed battered women’s 
shelters with Jacquelyn Blakely, and that defendant believed Mary Ann was cheating on 
him.  Such evidence, when considered with evidence of the manner in which defendant 
had poured a flammable liquid on two distinct places—on Mary Ann and on the floor 
 
 
59
near the bedroom door—the resulting condition of Mary Ann’s body, defendant’s 
statement to Mary Ann when he ignited the fire that he hoped she burned in hell, and his 
statements thereafter that he was angry at her and wanted to kill her, permit an inference 
that defendant’s purpose in setting Mary Ann on fire was to inflict extreme pain.  
Moreover, the prosecution proved in rebuttal that, a week before the fire, defendant said 
he would burn the house down if Mary Ann tried to leave him and that he telephoned 
Mary Ann’s mother numerous times—each time more agitated than the last—and at one 
point mentioned that he thought Mary Ann was seeing someone else.  This evidence 
further supported the inference that defendant intended to inflict extreme pain. 
5.  Failure to Instruct on Voluntary Manslaughter 
 
The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder on theories of willful, 
premeditated, and deliberate murder, murder by lying in wait, murder by torture, and 
felony murder (arson), and also on second degree murder.  During a conference on jury 
instructions, the court said it would not instruct on homicide, which includes both murder 
and manslaughter, because manslaughter, whether voluntary or involuntary, did not 
“have anything to do with this case.”  The court asked defense counsel if he agreed, and 
defense counsel asked in return, “[W]ould you give me a manslaughter instruction if I 
asked?”  The court replied, “The evidence does not support it whatsoever,” and defense 
counsel explained, “That’s why I didn’t ask for it.  I didn’t want to be embarrassed.” 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on 
voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder, because there was 
substantial evidence warranting the instruction based on the theory of heat of passion. 
 
“[A] defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material 
issue presented by the evidence.”  (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720, 
overruled on other points in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, and in 
People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 176.)  “ ‘To protect this right and the 
 
 
60
broader interest of safeguarding the jury’s function of ascertaining the truth, a trial court 
must instruct on lesser included offenses, even in the absence of a request, whenever 
there is substantial evidence raising a question as to whether all of the elements of the 
charged offense are present.’ ”  (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1008, 
quoting People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th 610, 645.)  Conversely, even on request, the 
court “has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense unless there is substantial evidence to 
support such instruction.”  (People v. Cunningham, supra, at p. 1008, italics omitted.)  
“ ‘Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury,” that 
is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.’ ”  (People v. Lewis, supra, at 
p. 645, quoting People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8.) 
 
On appeal, we review independently the question whether the trial court failed to 
instruct on a lesser included offense.  (See, e.g., People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 
739.) 
 
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.  (People v. Lewis, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th 610, 645.)  One form of the offense is defined as the unlawful killing of 
a human being without malice aforethought “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”  
(§ 192, subd. (a).)  “The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both an 
objective and a subjective component.  [Citation.]  The defendant must, subjectively and 
actually, kill under the heat of passion.  [Citation.]  But the circumstances giving rise to 
the heat of passion are viewed objectively.  As we explained long ago in interpreting the 
language of section 192, ‘this heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally 
be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and 
circumstances,’ because ‘no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and 
justify or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury 
believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the 
ordinarily reasonable man.’ ”  (People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252-1253.) 
 
 
61
 
The record does not contain substantial evidence to support a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction on the theory that defendant acted in the heat of passion after an 
argument with Mary Ann.  Evidence that defendant was intoxicated and jealous, and his 
taped statement to the police that he went “berserk” after Mary Ann said she would put a 
“butcher knife in your ass,” may have satisfied the subjective element of heat of passion.  
(See, e.g., People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253.)  “But it does not satisfy the 
objective, reasonable person requirement, which requires provocation by the victim.”  
(Ibid., italics added; cf. People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 [passion for 
revenge will not reduce murder to manslaughter].)  “ ‘To satisfy the objective or 
“reasonable person” element . . . of voluntary manslaughter, the accused’s heat of passion 
must be due to “sufficient provocation.” ’ ”  (People v. Steele, supra, at p. 1253, quoting 
People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 326; see also People v. Waidla, supra, 22 
Cal.4th 690, 740, fn. 17.)  Such evidence was lacking.  While defendant and Mary Ann 
had argued, Mary Ann was in bed when defendant began his physical assault by pouring 
gasoline on her.  Furthermore, between defendant and Mary Ann, bickering, yelling, and 
cursing was the norm.  Their conduct that evening apparently was no different from the 
many other occasions on which they had argued in their five-year relationship.  Neither 
was defendant’s drinking on the day of the fire different from any other day.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter 
based on heat of passion. 
 
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509 is misplaced.  In 
Berry, the defendant, who was 46 years old at the time of the crime, was convicted, 
among other things, of the first degree murder of his 20-year-old wife.  We reversed the 
murder conviction, holding that the trial court had prejudicially erred in refusing to 
instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or heat of passion.  (Id., at 
pp. 512, 514-515.)  In so holding, we found that the defendant’s testimony at trial, as well 
as the testimony of a psychiatrist, chronicled a “two-week period of provocatory 
 
 
62
conduct” by the victim—which alternated between verbally taunting the defendant with 
her involvement with another man, three days after her marriage to the defendant, and 
sexually exciting the defendant, indicating her desire to remain with him—that “could 
arouse a passion of jealousy, pain and sexual rage in an ordinary man of average 
disposition such as to cause him to act rashly from this passion.”  (Id., at pp. 513-515.)  In 
contrast to the facts of Berry, defendant and Mary Ann’s five-year relationship was filled 
with excessive drinking and fighting, sometimes violently, and their argument on the 
night of the fire was nothing out of the ordinary.16 
6.  Failure to Define Provocation and Heat of Passion 
 
The court’s standard instructions to the jury on premeditated and deliberate 
murder, and on determining the degree of murder, used the terms “heat of passion” and 
“provocation.”  Specifically, the court instructed that if “the killing was preceded and 
accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent . . . , which was the result of deliberation and 
premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not 
under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation,” it 
was first degree murder.  (Italics added; see CALJIC No. 8.20 (5th ed. 1988) 
[premeditated and deliberate murder].)  The jury was also instructed that if “the evidence 
shows the existence of provocation that played a part in inducing the unlawful killing of a 
human being, and you find that the killing was murder, you may consider the evidence of 
provocation for such bearing as it may have on the question of whether the murder was of 
the first or second degree.”  (See CALJIC No. 8.73 (5th ed. 1988) [evidence of 
provocation may be considered in determining degree of murder].) 
                                             
 
16  
Defendant claims that the trial court’s assertedly erroneous failure to instruct on 
voluntary manslaughter requires reversal under the United States and California 
Constitutions.  The point fails because, as we have concluded, the court’s failure to 
instruct was not erroneous. 
 
 
63
 
Defendant argues that, because the instructions quoted above referred to heat of 
passion and provocation for purposes of defining first and second degree murder, the 
court had a sua sponte duty to define those terms as they related to the crime of  
voluntary manslaughter.  In other words, defendant argues on this additional basis that 
the trial court had a duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter.  We reject the contention. 
 
We apply an independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by a trial 
court to instruct on the meaning of provocation and heat of passion.  “Whether or not to 
give any particular instruction in any particular case entails the resolution of a mixed 
question of law and fact that, we believe, is however predominantly legal.  As such, it 
should be examined without deference.”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.) 
 
Provocation and heat of passion as material to voluntary manslaughter were 
simply immaterial to this case because, as previously discussed, the evidence did not 
support instructions on voluntary manslaughter.  Provocation and heat of passion as used 
in the instructions here bore their common meaning, which required no further 
explanation in the absence of a specific request.  (See People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
916, 967.) 
7.  Failure to Instruct on Second Degree Felony Murder Based on Unlawfully 
Causing a Fire 
 
As stated, the jury was instructed on several theories of first degree murder, 
including felony murder based on arson.  Defendant now contends the trial court erred in 
failing to instruct on second degree felony murder—a lesser included offense of first 
degree felony murder—based on the crime of unlawfully causing a fire (§ 452)—a lesser 
included offense of arson.  He argues the evidence supports a conclusion that the house 
burned not as a result of an intentional burning of the house itself but as a result of 
reckless conduct in setting fire to Mary Ann.  Defendant relies on his trial testimony that 
he threw the gasoline toward Mary Ann, intending to burn her only. 
 
 
64
 
We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial 
court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense.  (See People v. Waidla, supra, 
22 Cal.4th 690, 733.)  A trial court must instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser included 
offense only if there is substantial evidence, “ ‘that is, evidence that a reasonable jury 
could find persuasive’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th 610, 645), which, if 
accepted, “ ‘would absolve [the] defendant from guilt of the greater offense’ [citation] but 
not the lesser” (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871).  (Accord, People v. Heard, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 980-981; People v. Waidla, supra, at p. 733.)  A person is guilty of 
arson when he “willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns . . . any structure . . . or 
property” (§ 451), whereas a person is guilty of unlawfully causing a fire when he 
“recklessly” sets fire to such a structure or piece of property (§ 452). 
 
On our independent review, assuming for the sake of argument that unlawfully 
setting fire to an inhabited structure is a lesser included offense of arson (see People v. 
Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 175), and further assuming that unlawfully setting a fire 
is an inherently dangerous felony subject to the second degree felony-murder rule (see 
People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 1008-1009), the evidence was insufficient 
to require the trial court to instruct on such an offense.  The evidence of the cause and 
nature of the fire, as presented by the arson investigator, established that the flammable 
liquid used to start the fire was poured in two distinct areas—near the bedroom door and 
near the foot of the bed—and ignited separately.  On the night of the fire, defendant 
himself admitted he poured gasoline on the bedroom floor and that he wanted to burn the 
house, as well as Mary Ann.  The evidence here was not substantial enough to merit 
consideration by the jury of the possibility that defendant had recklessly set fire to Mary 
Ann, who was on the bed, without intending also to burn the house.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Mendoza, supra, at pp. 174-175.)  Accordingly, the evidence here was not substantial 
 
 
65
enough to merit consideration by the jury of the possibility that the murder occurred 
during the commission of unlawfully causing a fire.17 
8.  Failure to Instruct on Second Degree Felony Murder Based on Torture 
 
As stated, the jury was instructed that murder by torture was murder of the first 
degree (§ 189).  The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and further found 
that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.  (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(18).)  Defendant now contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct on second 
degree felony murder based on the predicate felony of torture (§ 206), an assertedly lesser 
included offense of murder by torture.  We reject the contention. 
 
As stated, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure 
by the trial court to instruct on an uncharged offense that was assertedly lesser than, and 
included in, a charged offense. 
 
In 1988, when defendant killed Mary Ann, section 189 provided, inter alia, that 
“All murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . torture, or by any other kind of willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing, . . . is murder of the first degree.”  A separate crime 
of torture did not exist until June 5, 1990, when section 206 was added by Proposition 
115 and approved by the voters.  Section 206 defines torture (the infliction of great bodily 
injury with “the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of 
revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose”) in essentially the same way 
we have defined torture as used in section 189, which declares that murder by torture is 
murder in the first degree.  (See, e.g., People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 888; People 
                                             
 
17 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s assertedly erroneous failure to instruct on 
second degree felony murder based on unlawfully causing a fire deprived him of his 
rights to due process and trial by jury under article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution, and his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  The point fails because, as we have concluded, the court 
did not err in failing to so instruct. 
 
 
66
v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239; People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 
1101; People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 267; People v. Wiley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 
162, 168.)  In 1999, section 189 was amended to add section 206 to the enumerated 
felonies defining first degree felony murder.  (Stats. 1999, ch. 694, § 1.) 
 
Defendant argues that between 1990, when section 206 was added to the Penal 
Code, and 1999 when section 206 was added to section 189 as an enumerated felony 
defining first degree felony murder, section 206 could have been a predicate felony 
supporting nonstatutory second degree felony murder.  Defendant acknowledges that 
section 206 did not exist at the time of his crimes against Mary Ann, but nevertheless 
argues the trial court should have instructed the jury on second degree felony murder, 
predicated on section 206, as a necessarily included offense of murder perpetrated by 
torture.  In short, defendant claims that the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the 
lesser included offense of second degree felony murder predicated on a felony that did 
not exist at the time he committed his crimes.  No California court has recognized such a 
duty, and we decline to do so here. 
 
In support of his claim, defendant argues that he could have waived any objection 
to being charged with an as-yet-unenacted offense “in order to give the jury the option of 
[considering] a lesser included offense of felony second-degree murder.”  Spaziano v. 
Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447 (Spaziano), on which defendant relies, is distinguishable.  In 
Spaziano, a capital case, the statute of limitations for the defendant’s noncapital offenses 
had expired.  At the close of evidence, the trial court informed the defendant that it would 
instruct on four lesser included, noncapital offenses if he would waive the statute of 
limitations as to those offenses.  The defendant refused to do so, the court did not instruct 
on lesser included offenses, and the jury convicted the defendant of capital murder.  (Id., 
at pp. 449-451.)  The United States Supreme Court, mindful of its holding in Beck v. 
Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625 (Beck), that a sentence of death cannot be constitutionally 
imposed where the jury was not given the option of convicting on an existing, lesser 
 
 
67
included, noncapital offense supported by the evidence, held that the defendant should 
have been permitted to choose between having the benefit of an instruction on the time-
barred lesser included offenses or of asserting the statute of limitations on those offenses.  
The high court also held, however, that the trial court in Spaziano did not err in refusing 
to instruct on the lesser included offenses because the defendant had knowingly refused 
to waive the statute of limitations as to those offenses.  (Spaziano, supra, at pp. 456-457; 
cf. United States v. DeTar (9th Cir. 1987) 832 F.2d 1110, 1112-1115 [trial court in a 
noncapital case committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on a time-barred 
lesser included offense because the defendant had waived the statute of limitations by 
requesting an instruction on the lesser included offense].) 
 
In contrast to Spaziano, supra, 468 U.S. 447, and Beck, supra, 447 U.S. 625, the 
jury in defendant’s case was not given an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder or 
innocence.  The jury was instructed on a lesser included offense of second degree murder, 
“and that is adequate to indicate that the verdict of capital murder represented no 
impermissible choice.”  (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 648.)  Moreover, 
Spaziano addressed properly chargeable lesser included offenses barred only by a 
defense, the statute of limitations, that the defendant was entitled to waive.  Here, in 
contrast, defendant suggests the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on an 
offense he could not possibly have committed and of which any conviction would 
necessarily be void as ex post facto.  In short, the authorities on which defendant relies do 
not support his claim.18 
                                             
 
18 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s assertedly erroneous failure to instruct on 
second degree felony murder based on torture deprived him of his right to due process 
and trial by jury under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, his right to due 
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
and his right to a reliable sentence under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
68
9.  Failure to Require Unanimous Agreement on the Theory of Guilt 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to require unanimous agreement 
as to which theory of guilt the jury accepted to support a first degree murder verdict, i.e., 
premeditated and deliberate murder, murder by torture, murder by lying in wait, or felony 
murder (arson).  We reject the contention, as we have rejected similar ones.  (People v. 
Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1131; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1212; People 
v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394-395.)  Schad v. Arizona, supra, 501 U.S. 624, 
632-636, on which defendant relies, does not hold otherwise.  (People v. Box, supra, at 
p. 1212.)19 
10.  Failure to Instruct on Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove 
Mental State 
 
Over the People’s objection and on defendant’s request, the trial court instructed 
the jury on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence generally (see CALJIC No. 2.01 (5th 
ed. 1988)), to the effect that a finding of guilt as to any crime may not be based on 
circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the 
theory of defendant’s guilt but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion, 
and that if circumstantial evidence as to any particular count is susceptible of two 
reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other to 
his innocence, it must adopt the interpretation that points to the defendant’s innocence 
and reject the interpretation that points to his guilt. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Constitution.  The point is without merit because, as we have concluded, the court did not 
err in failing to so instruct. 
19 
Because we find the trial court did not err, we reject defendant’s contention that 
the asserted error deprived him of “his right to have the prosecution establish proof of the 
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, to due process, and to a reliable determination 
of allegations that he committed a capital offense under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution.” 
 
 
69
 
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the 
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent or mental state particularly.  
(See CALJIC No. 2.02 (5th ed. 1988).)  Such an instruction would have informed the jury 
that a finding of guilt as to a charged offense may not be based on circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the act unless the proved circumstances are not only 
consistent with the theory that the defendant had the required specific intent or mental 
state but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion, and that if evidence as 
to any such specific intent or mental state is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, 
one of which points to the existence of the specific intent or mental state and the other to 
the absence thereof, the jury must adopt the interpretation that points to the absence of the 
specific intent or mental state.  (CALJIC No. 2.02.) 
 
The general instruction on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is a more 
inclusive instruction on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence than the instruction on 
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent or mental state, and the 
former is the proper instruction to give unless the only element of the offense that rests 
substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence is that of specific intent or mental 
state.  (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 347; People v. Marshall (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 799, 849; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142.)  Contrary to 
defendant’s argument, specific intent or mental state was not the only element of the case 
that rested substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence.  One of the elements of 
murder by lying in wait is waiting and watching for an opportune time to act, and proof 
of it rested on circumstantial evidence.  (Cf. People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 
783, 810-811 [no error in instructing on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence generally 
rather than sufficiency to prove specific intent where more than one element of the 
charged crime of conspiracy could be proved by circumstantial evidence].)  Because the 
more general instruction logically includes the more specific, and because more than one 
 
 
70
element here rested on circumstantial evidence, the trial court did not commit error by 
providing only the more inclusive instruction.20 
11.  Erroneous Instruction on Efforts by Defendant to Fabricate Evidence 
 
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury that it was permitted 
to infer “consciousness of guilt” from any attempt by defendant to “persuade a witness to 
testify falsely or . . . fabricate evidence to be produced at the trial.”  (See CALJIC No. 
2.04 (5th ed. 1988).) 
 
Defendant contends here, as he did below, that there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant an inference that he had attempted to persuade a witness to “testify falsely” or 
“fabricate evidence” to be produced at trial.  Defendant acknowledges on appeal that his 
former neighbors Steve Hoeck and David Carpenter testified he had given them gifts of 
tobacco when they were in jail with him after the preliminary examination in this case.  
Defendant argues, however, that such evidence was insufficient to warrant the inference 
that his gifts were intended to persuade the recipients to testify falsely at his trial.  
Defendant contends that their trial testimony regarding his propensity for drunkenness 
did not differ substantively from their preliminary examination testimony. 
 
There was no error.  The jury could reasonably have found that defendant 
attempted to persuade Hoeck or Carpenter, or both, to testify falsely, even if the attempt 
was unsuccessful.  Under these circumstances, the jurors were properly instructed that the 
“weight and significance, if any,” to be accorded such evidence was for their 
determination. 
                                             
 
20 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s assertedly erroneous failure to instruct the 
jury on circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent or mental state violated his right 
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his 
right to a reliable sentence under the Eighth Amendment to that Constitution.  The point 
fails because, as we have concluded, the court did not err in failing to so instruct. 
 
 
71
 
Even if the evidence had been insufficient to give an instruction on efforts by 
defendant to fabricate evidence, any error would be harmless.  “ ‘[A]t worst, there was no 
evidence to support the instruction and . . . it was superfluous.  [E]vidence of defendant’s 
guilt was strong.  Under the circumstances, reversal on such a minor, tangential point is 
not warranted.”  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1225.)  Accordingly, 
contrary to his claim, defendant was not denied his rights to due process under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution or the 
California Constitution. 
12.  Insufficient Evidence of Premeditated and Deliberate First Degree 
Murder 
 
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence, under the due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 15 of the California Constitution, to support a conviction of first degree murder 
by premeditation and deliberation.  He also contends the trial court erred in denying his 
motion under section 1118.1 to dismiss the first degree murder charge based on a theory 
of premeditation and deliberation.21 
 
As stated, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review 
the entire record in a light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it 
discloses substantial evidence.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also 
Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. 307, 317-320.) 
 
Moreover, in ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1, 
a trial court applies the same standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the 
                                             
 
21 
As we noted with respect to a similar argument on the theory of murder by torture, 
we need not resolve the question whether defendant’s motion for aquittal adequately 
encompassed the first degree murder charge so as to preserve it for appeal.  For even 
assuming the murder charge was included in defendant’s motion, we conclude there was 
sufficient evidence of premeditated and deliberate first degree murder. 
 
 
72
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 
9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.) 
 
Murder that is perpetrated by “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” is 
murder in the first degree.  (§ 189.)  “A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree 
murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. . . .  ‘Deliberation’ refers to careful 
weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought 
over in advance. . . .  ‘The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any 
extended period of time.  “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the 
extent of the reflection.  Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, 
calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ”  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
1041, 1080.) 
 
Generally, there are three categories of evidence that are sufficient to sustain a 
premeditated and deliberate murder:  evidence of planning, motive, and method.  (People 
v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 887; People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1237.)  
When evidence of all three categories is not present, “we require either very strong 
evidence of planning, or some evidence of motive in conjunction with planning or a 
deliberate manner of killing.”  (People v. Pensinger, supra, at p. 1237.)  But these 
categories of evidence, borrowed from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, 
“are descriptive, not normative.”  (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125.)  They 
are simply an “aid [for] reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive 
of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of 
considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Our review of the record as of the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief 
discloses, at the least, evidence of motive in conjunction with a deliberate manner of 
killing.  With respect to motive, Mary Ann told the arson investigator that defendant had 
been following her around all day, that he was extremely jealous of her, and that he 
thought she was cheating on him.  Richard Mahoney, Mary Ann’s brother, similarly 
 
 
73
testified that defendant was very possessive of Mary Ann and that he was jealous of the 
people who were with her in his absence.  Further, the day before the fire, Mary Ann told 
Jacquelyn Blakely that she planned to give notice to her landlord within three days that 
she alone would be moving out, and Blakely, in turn, talked to Mary Ann about shelters 
for battered women. 
 
There was also evidence of a deliberate manner of killing.  There was considerable 
evidence that defendant poured a flammable liquid directly on Mary Ann while she was 
asleep or half asleep and ignited it after she awoke.  As he did so, he told Mary Ann, “[I] 
hope you fuckin burn to death.”  “We recognize that a cold and calculating decision to 
kill can be arrived at very quickly; we do not measure the necessary reflection solely by 
its duration.”  (People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1238.) 
 
A review of the entire record shows additional evidence from which a rational jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed a premeditated and 
deliberate murder.  Bartender Charlene Garcia testified that a week before the fire, 
defendant came into the Red Rooster and told her that he was upset because Mary Ann 
was planning to move out.  He told Garcia that he believed Mary Ann was cheating on 
him and further said that if Mary Ann tried to leave him he would “burn the fucking 
house down.”  On the day of the fire, defendant telephoned Mary Ann’s mother Gertrude 
over a dozen times and, during one telephone call, told her he believed Mary Ann was 
seeing someone else.  Although defendant himself denied that he thought Mary Ann was 
cheating on him, denied that Mary Ann was intending to move out, and denied telling the 
bartender he would burn down the house if Mary Ann tried to leave him, there was 
indeed substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed a premeditated and deliberate murder.22 
                                             
 
22 
Defendant claims that insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for 
premeditated and deliberate murder violated his right to a reliable sentence under the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
74
13.  Issues Involving the Torture-murder Special Circumstance 
a.  Erroneous instruction on the torture-murder special circumstance 
 
As mentioned, the trial court gave the standard instruction on premeditated and 
deliberate murder (CALJIC No. 8.20) and also gave a modified instruction on murder by 
torture (CALJIC No. 8.24). 
 
Concerning the torture-murder special circumstance, the jury was instructed as 
follows:  “To find that the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as murder 
involving infliction of torture, is true, each of the following facts must be proved:  
[¶] 1. The defendant intended to kill or intended to aid in the killing of a human being; 
[¶] 2. The defendant intended to inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a 
living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic 
purpose; and [¶] 3. The defendant did in fact inflict extreme cruel physical pain and 
suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration.  [¶] Awareness of 
pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture.”  (CALJIC No. 8.81.18 (5th 
ed. 1988).) 
 
Defendant contends the trial court failed to instruct the jury that, for the torture-
murder special circumstance, the intent to torture, that is, the intent to inflict extreme 
pain, must be (1) premeditated and deliberate and (2) in addition to the intent to cause 
pain necessary for death.  He also contends that the court confused the jury by instructing 
that he must have, in fact, inflicted such pain while also instructing that awareness of pain 
was not required. 
 
We independently review the question of whether the jury was correctly instructed 
on all elements of a special circumstance allegation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The point is without merit 
because, as we have concluded, there was substantial evidence to support such a 
conviction. 
 
 
75
 
At the time defendant committed his crimes against Mary Ann, the torture-murder 
special circumstance required that the murder be “intentional” and “involve[] the 
infliction of torture.”  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).)  In other words, there had to be intent to 
kill, intent to torture, and commission of an act calculated to cause extreme pain.  (See 
People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th 499, 534-535; People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 
247, 271.)  “The special circumstance is distinguished from murder by torture . . . 
because . . . the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill.”  (People v. Davenport, 
supra, at p. 271.) 
 
Contrary to defendant’s argument, premeditated and deliberate intent to torture is 
not an element of the torture-murder special circumstance.  Defendant’s rationale for the 
argument that the intent to torture required for the torture-murder special circumstance 
must be premeditated and deliberate is as follows:  (1) the language of the torture-murder 
special circumstance “must be understood in light of the established meaning of torture” 
(People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 271); (2) the established meaning of murder 
by torture is “ ‘murder committed with a wil[l]ful, deliberate and premeditated intent to 
inflict extreme and prolonged pain’ ” (People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 899, italics 
added); and (3) the intent-to-torture element in murder by torture is the same for the 
torture-murder special circumstance. 
 
We reject defendant’s argument.  “The history of section 189 and our construction 
of its language establish that [murder by torture] was categorized as first degree murder 
because the Legislature intended that the means by which the killing was accomplished 
be equated to the premeditation and deliberation which render other murders sufficiently 
reprehensible to constitute first degree murder.  A murder by torture was and is 
considered among the most reprehensible types of murder because of the calculated 
nature of the acts causing death, not simply because greater culpability could be attached 
to murder in which great pain and suffering are caused to the victim.”  (People v. Wiley, 
supra, 18 Cal.3d 162, 168-169.)  Accordingly, we have stated that “the words ‘wil[l]ful, 
 
 
76
deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain[]’ refer[] only to 
the requirement that before the trier of fact may convict a defendant of first degree 
murder by torture there must be found a cold-blooded, calculated intent to inflict such 
pain for one of the specified purposes.  Inasmuch as the Legislature has equated this state 
of mind with the wil[l]ful, deliberate, premeditated intent to kill that renders other 
murders sufficiently culpable to be classified as first degree murder, it is unnecessary in 
torture-murder to also find that the killing itself was ‘wil[l]ful, deliberate, and 
premeditated.’ ”  (Id., at p. 173, fn. 4; see also People v. Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 539, 
546.)  Because the intent to inflict extreme pain essentially equates to the premeditation 
and deliberation aspect that renders other murders sufficiently reprehensible to constitute 
first degree murder, it was unnecessary to expressly instruct the jury that the requisite 
intent must be premeditated and deliberate. 
 
Defendant next contends that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the intent 
to torture in the torture-murder special circumstance must be the intent to inflict pain that 
is in addition to the pain of death.  He argues that the instruction given on this point—that 
the intent must be to “inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering upon a living 
human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic 
purpose”—was insufficient.  He suggests that the jury should have been instructed, as 
they were on murder by torture, that the pain must also be “prolonged.” 
 
We disagree.  We have held that by enacting the torture-murder special 
circumstance statute (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), the electorate “meant to foreclose any 
requirement that the defendant be proved to have intended to inflict prolonged pain.”  
(People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 269, italics added.)  We have also 
“consistently approved the language of [instructions like those] given in this case as a 
correct statement of the law of California.”  (People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 899.) 
 
Defendant also contends that the trial court confused the jury by inconsistently 
instructing that infliction of extreme pain was an element of the torture-murder special 
 
 
77
circumstance but that awareness of pain by the deceased was not.  He claims that 
awareness of pain by the deceased is an element of the torture-murder special 
circumstance because one cannot inflict pain upon a victim without the victim being 
aware of it. 
 
We rejected such an argument in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 
holding, in effect, that the elements of the torture-murder special circumstance included 
that “the perpetrator intentionally perform[] acts which [are] calculated to cause extreme 
physical pain to the victim” and not that the victim actually experience such pain.  (Id., at 
p. 271.)  To the extent defendant argues that the jury might have believed that awareness 
of pain was not an element, there is no error because awareness of pain is, indeed, not an 
element.  To the extent defendant argues the jury might have believed that awareness of 
pain was an element, there is still no error because finding an additional but unnecessary 
“element” could accrue only to his benefit.23 
b.  Failure to instruct on intoxication and mental disease relating to 
intent to torture for the torture-murder special circumstance 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the 
relationship of intoxication and mental disease to the mental state necessary for the 
torture-murder special circumstance, that is, the intent to inflict extreme pain.  We 
disagree. 
 
As stated, the trial court instructed the jury that each special circumstance required 
a certain mental state that was included in its definition, that the jury could consider 
                                             
 
23 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s assertedly erroneous failure to instruct 
adequately on the elements of the torture-murder special circumstance violated his “rights 
to due process under Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment, and to a principled 
basis for the determination of penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”  The point fails 
because, as we have concluded, the court instructed the jury adequately. 
 
 
78
evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining whether defendant had the requisite 
mental state, and that the jury could also consider evidence of mental disease, defect, or 
disorder in determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the requisite mental 
state.  The court further instructed the jury that to find true the torture-murder special 
circumstance, it had to find that defendant “intended to inflict extreme, cruel, physical 
pain and suffering upon a living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, 
persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.”  Viewing the instructions as a whole, we 
conclude the jury was instructed adequately, if implicitly, that intoxication and mental 
disease were relevant to the requisite mental state, i.e., the intent to inflict extreme pain, 
in the torture-murder special circumstance.24 
c.  Insufficient evidence of the torture-murder special circumstance 
 
Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the torture-murder 
special circumstance, both at the close of the People’s case-in-chief and at the close of all 
the evidence, by attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intent to torture 
under the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.25 
                                             
 
24 
Because we conclude the trial court did not err, we reject defendant’s contention—
identical to the one he made earlier in connection with the failure to instruct on 
intoxication and mental disease relating to the requisite mental state for murder by 
torture—that the asserted error violated article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, 
the right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and the right to a reliable sentencing procedure under the Eighth 
Amendment to that Constitution. 
25 
For the reasons stated earlier in the discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence of 
murder by torture, we need not discuss separately defendant’s related claim that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, under section 1118.1, the torture-murder 
special circumstance allegation for insufficiency of the evidence.  (See People v. 
Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th 469, 496, fn. 2.) 
 
 
79
 
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a special 
circumstance finding as we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction.  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th 469, 497-498.)26 
 
As mentioned, at the time defendant killed Mary Ann, the torture-murder special 
circumstance required the intent to kill, the intent to torture, and the commission of a kind 
of act calculated to cause extreme pain.  (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th 809, 839; 
People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 271.)  In resolving defendant’s earlier claim 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of first degree murder on a 
theory of murder by torture, we found sufficient evidence to establish intent to torture.  
For the same reasons, we reject defendant’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence as to 
the torture-murder special circumstance. 
14.  Exclusion of Defendant from Various Pretrial and Trial Hearings in 
Violation of His Right of Personal Presence 
 
Broadly stated, a criminal defendant has a right to be personally present at certain 
pretrial proceedings and at trial under various provisions of law, including the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, section 15 
of article I of the California Constitution, and sections 977 and 1043.  (People v. Waidla, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 741.) 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by assertedly excluding him from a 
variety of pretrial and trial proceedings.  The proceedings in question involved pretrial 
hearings on two defense continuance motions, one of which was held ex parte, in camera, 
                                             
 
26 
“We need not, and do not, reach the question whether the sufficiency-of-evidence 
review specified in the text is required under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the due process clause of article I 
section 15 of the California Constitution.”  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 
271, fn. 11; accord, People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1090, fn. 18.) 
 
 
80
and later repeated in open court; numerous bench conferences during voir dire related to 
confidential interviews of various prospective jurors and alternate jurors and to 
challenges for cause; proceedings—consisting of a bench conference, in camera hearing, 
and order to show cause hearing—related to defendant’s communication with an attorney 
who was a stranger to the case;27 and in-court conferences, outside the presence of the 
jury, related to guilt and penalty phase jury instructions. 
 
On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial 
court’s exclusion of a criminal defendant from pretrial and trial proceedings, either in 
whole or in part, “insofar as the trial court’s decision entails a measurement of the facts 
against the law.”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 741.) 
 
After independent review, we find no error on the trial court’s part in excluding 
defendant from any proceeding because we find no right on his part to be personally 
present. 
 
“Under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause, a criminal defendant does 
not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless his appearance 
is necessary to prevent ‘interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-
examination.’ ”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 741.) 
 
“Similarly, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, a criminal 
defendant does not have a right to be present at a particular proceeding unless he finds 
                                             
 
27 
During voir dire, at a bench conference, defense counsel requested an ex parte, in 
camera hearing on an “extremely serious problem.”  In camera, defense counsel related 
that defendant showed his investigator a letter by Attorney Madelynn Kopple advising 
defendant to leave the trial to show that the appointment of defense counsel was a sham, 
but to show respect to the trial court while doing so.  Following another in camera 
discussion with defense counsel and the prosecutor, the trial court ordered a hearing with 
Kopple regarding a purported attempt to disrupt the trial proceedings.  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the trial court stated that it would report the matter involving Kopple to 
the State Bar. 
 
 
81
himself at a ‘stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome’ and ‘his presence would contribute 
to the fairness of the procedure.’ ”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 742; see 
also United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, 526.) 
 
Under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, “a criminal defendant 
does not have a right to be personally present ‘either in chambers or at bench discussions 
that occur outside of the jury’s presence on questions of law or other matters as to which 
[his] presence does not bear a “ ‘ “reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend against the charge.” ’ ” ’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 
22 Cal.4th 690, 742; see also People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433-436 [absence 
from bench discussions during voir dire]; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 707 & fn. 
29, 708 [absence from various bench and in camera discussions, including bench 
discussions of a challenge for cause and in camera discussion of guilt phase jury 
instructions].) 
 
And, lastly, under sections 977 and 1043, a criminal defendant does not have a 
right to be personally present, even in the absence of a written waiver, where he does not 
have such a right under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.  (People v. 
Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 742; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1227, 1357.) 
 
Having examined each of the proceedings in question, we cannot conclude with 
respect to any of the bench conferences, hearings related to defendant’s communication 
with the attorney, or jury instruction conferences, that defendant’s personal presence 
either was necessary for an “opportunity for effective cross-examination,” for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause (Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 
744-745, fn. 17), or would have “contribute[d] to the fairness of the procedure” in any 
marginal way, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause (id., at 
p. 745), or bore a “ ‘ “ ‘reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to 
defend against the charge,’ ” ’ ” for purposes of article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution or sections 977 and 1043 (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1227, 
 
 
82
1357).  (See, e.g., People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 742.)  Defendant’s arguments 
to the contrary are unduly speculative. 
 
Defendant’s purported absences during pretrial hearings for a continuance in 
January and February of 1992 require slightly greater discussion, but lead to no different 
conclusion.  Defendant was absent from a January 1992 ex parte hearing requested by 
defense counsel and early portions of an in-court hearing on the same continuance motion 
later that same day.  Defendant claims that if present, “he could have assisted counsel in 
making the case as to why a continuance was needed.”  He also claims that he could have 
vouched for the accuracy of counsel’s representations about the work current and 
previous counsel had done thus far on the case.  Counsel, however, explained to the court 
the importance of interviewing purportedly reluctant individuals on the East Coast; for 
defendant to have vouched for counsel’s representations would not have enhanced the 
case for a continuance.  Moreover, when defendant arrived during the in-court hearing, 
the court summarized that it was currently hearing a defense continuance motion.  
Presumably defendant could have given the court or counsel any information he had at 
that time.  But he did not, and the trial court denied the continuance, although it agreed to 
postpone jury selection to a later date.  Similarly, in February 1992, defense counsel 
moved for a continuance in defendant’s absence, but the motion was largely argued and 
denied after he arrived in court. 
15.  Cumulative Effect of Asserted Guilt Phase Errors 
 
Defendant contends that even if no single error requires reversal of the jury 
verdicts and findings returned at the guilt phase, the cumulative effect of guilt phase 
errors prejudicially affected the outcome of the trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and corresponding 
state constitutional provisions.  We disagree.  As already discussed, any error or 
 
 
83
possibility of error during the guilt phase was nonprejudicial and, considered together, 
they fare no better. 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Victim Impact Argument 
 
Before the penalty phase, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor indicated 
that he intended to address “the actual suffering of the victim” during his penalty phase 
argument, “not just . . . [as] evidence of the impact on the victim” but also as “the 
circumstances of the crime and the actual suffering he caused.”  Defendant made no 
objection, and the trial court ruled that the prosecutor could so argue. 
 
Subsequently, the prosecutor argued to the jury that evidence of Mary Ann’s 
suffering could be considered as a circumstance of the crime to be weighed against 
defendant’s life.  The prosecutor then proceeded to read portions of guilt phase testimony 
relating to Mary Ann’s suffering, including an extensive reading of the testimony of her 
treating physician, Dr. Davies.  The prosecutor also asked the jurors to “look into [their] 
hearts” and “try to feel the pain that Mary Ann Mahoney did to some minor extent.”  The 
prosecutor concluded, “Consider the sympathy [for defendant], but weigh it against this 
pain, and justice demands only one thing in this case, and I’m sorry for it, but it’s the 
defendant’s death.” 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecutor could 
comment on the extent to which Mary Ann suffered.  We disagree. 
 
The trial court retains discretion to “ensure that argument does not stray unduly 
from the mark.”  (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th 799, 854-855.)  Accordingly, the 
court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 
 
At the penalty phase of a capital trial, victim impact argument, that is, argument 
on the specific harm a defendant has caused, is permissible under the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825; People 
 
 
84
v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 147-148; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 915.)  
Such argument is also permissible under California law as relevant to the circumstances 
of the crime, a statutory capital sentencing factor.  (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 
787, 833; see § 190.3, factor (a).) 
 
Preliminarily, we note that defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appeal 
because he did not object at trial.  (Cf. People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 430 
[failure to answer a juror’s question during trial].)  Even assuming the issue were 
properly before us, the argument lacks merit.  Evidence of Mary Ann’s suffering was 
admissible as a circumstance of the crime.  (See People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th 518, 
573; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 833.)  Accordingly, argument dealing 
with such evidence was not improper. 
 
Defendant nevertheless maintains that argument dealing with Mary Ann’s 
suffering was improper and calculated to invite an emotional and irrational response by 
the jury because no evidence had been presented on the impact of Mary Ann’s death on 
the members of her family.  But the prosecutor’s argument related to the impact of 
defendant’s actions on Mary Ann herself.  Although the argument may have touched on 
an emotional subject, it also touched on a relevant subject that could provide legitimate 
reasons to sway the jury to impose the penalty of death.  (See People v. Raley, supra, 
2 Cal.4th 870, 916.)  “Unlike the guilt determination, where appeals to the jury’s passions 
are inappropriate, in making the penalty decision, the jury must make a moral assessment 
of all the relevant facts as they reflect on its decision.”  (People v. Smith, supra, 
30 Cal.4th 581, 634.)  The prosecutor’s comments were based entirely on the evidence 
and properly related to the circumstances of the crime of which defendant was 
convicted.28 
                                             
 
28 
Because we find no error, we reject defendant’s argument that any asserted error 
violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
85
2.  Constitutionality of California Death Penalty Statute 
 
Defendant challenges various aspects of California’s death penalty statute as 
violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  We 
have previously considered and rejected each of these challenges, and defendant offers no 
persuasive reason to reconsider our prior decisions.  In summary: 
 
California law defining first degree murder and the aggravating circumstances that 
the trier of fact may consider is neither unconstitutionally vague and overbroad nor fails 
to sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. 
Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th 822, 860; People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th 557, 663-664; 
People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 462; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 187; 
People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 154-156.) 
 
The torture-murder special circumstance is not vague and overbroad.  (People v. 
Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 454; People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 265-271; 
People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 993-995.) 
 
The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because of prosecutorial 
discretion (People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137) or because intercase 
proportionality review is not required (People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th 822, 860).  The 
statute does provide for intracase proportionality review (see People v. Martinez, supra, 
31 Cal.4th 673, 703), and, as we discuss below, defendant’s sentence was not grossly 
disproportionate to the crime for which it was imposed. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
United States Constitution and to a reliable sentencing determination under the Eighth 
Amendment to that Constitution. 
 
 
86
3.  Proportionality of Defendant’s Sentence 
 
Defendant contends that the application of the death penalty in his case is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate to his personal culpability under both the California 
and United States Constitutions. 
 
A reviewing court determines whether a particular penalty given “ ‘is so 
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity,’ thereby violating the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution or 
against cruel or unusual punishment of article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.  
(Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 290-292 . . .; People v. Fairbank [(1997)] 
16 Cal.4th 1223, 1256; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 . . . .)”  (People v. 
Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 1042.)  To do so, we “examine the circumstances of 
the offense, including the defendant’s motive, the extent of the defendant’s involvement 
in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of the 
defendant’s acts.  [We] must also consider the defendant’s age, prior criminality and 
mental capabilities.”  (People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th 916, 970.) 
 
Defendant deliberately poured a flammable liquid on Mary Ann, his unsuspecting 
companion, and set fire to her and the house she was in.  He frankly told several people 
thereafter that he intended to kill her and described how he had set her on fire.  Although 
defendant argued at trial that he did not possess the requisite intent to torture or to kill 
because of his intoxication, the evidence belied the contention.  Moreover, defendant was 
not an immature child at the time of the offense; rather, he was a 37-year-old man who 
had some college education and had been steadily employed in the past.  The punishment 
imposed cannot be deemed grossly disproportionate in light of these circumstances. 
4.  Cumulative Effect of Asserted Guilt and Penalty Phase Errors 
 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of errors at the guilt and penalty 
phases requires reversal of the death judgment.  We disagree.  As we stated in People v. 
 
 
87
Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th 240, 316, “We have either rejected on the merits defendant’s 
claims of error or have found any assumed errors to be nonprejudicial.  We reach the 
same conclusion with respect to the cumulative effect of any assumed errors.” 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
88
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cole 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S027766 
Date Filed: August 16, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Howard J. Schwab 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Richard P. Siref, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, 
Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey and Victoria B. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard P. Siref 
110 West C Street, Suite 1700 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 232-8982 
 
Victoria B. Wilson 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2282