Title: Stanford v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case # 97CR840
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 127
September Term, 1998
RICHARD WARREN STANFORD
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: April 16, 1999
Petitioner Richard Warren Stanford was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County of possessing cocaine.  He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment, with one
year suspended in favor of eighteen months of probation.  The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed his conviction and sentence in an unreported opinion.  Prior to trial, petitioner
moved to suppress as evidence the cocaine he subsequently was convicted of possessing.
That motion was denied.  On appeal, petitioner challenges that pretrial ruling, arguing that
his detention by the police, during which the cocaine was discovered, was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  We agree and vacate his
conviction.
I. Background
The Baltimore County Police Department obtained on February 7, 1997, a “no-knock”
search and seizure warrant for Apartment D in the Hartland Run Apartment Complex near
Essex, Maryland.  The affidavit supporting the warrant explained that a confidential
informant had told the police that two men nicknamed “Poo” and “Tony” were distributing
cocaine from Apartment D, which was rented by “Poo.”  The informant believed a man
nicknamed “Shawn” supplied “Poo” and “Tony” with the cocaine and also carried a
handgun.
During their preliminary investigation, the police arranged for the informant to
purchase cocaine from the men, once from “Poo” and “Tony” together, and on a second
occasion from “Poo” alone.  The police also learned the lessee of Apartment D was Mr.
Tavon Banks and that the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company billing records for the
- 2 -
apartment were in Mr. Banks’ name.  The search warrant authorized the police to search the
apartment as well as the persons of Mr. Banks, whom the police believed to be “Poo,” and
the individuals nicknamed “Tony” and “Shawn.”  The record reflects the police knew that
“Tony” was the street name of Mr. Raoul Jenkins.  “Shawn,” however, remained unknown
to the police during the investigation and no officer claimed to believe petitioner might be
“Shawn.”  The warrant, based on the informant’s tip, described “Shawn” as a black male,
with a height of five feet, eight inches, and weighing 175 pounds.  Petitioner, a black male,
is six feet tall and weighs 210 pounds.
At about 8:30 p.m. on February 7, Detective Keith Williams began surveillance of the
Hartland Run Apartment Complex in preparation of the execution of the warrant.  From his
undercover truck, Detective Williams could see the common stairwell of the building and its
entranceway, but not the door to Apartment D.  Detective Williams observed three black men
exit that stairwell.  He immediately recognized Mr. Banks, but not the other two individuals,
who were Mr. Jenkins and petitioner.  The three men got into petitioner’s automobile, with
petitioner driving, and left.  Detective Williams radioed to uniformed officers in the area to
stop the three men so they could be brought back to Apartment D during the search.
Uniformed officers stopped the vehicle on Maryland Route 702 about one-fourth of
a mile from the apartment complex.  Detective Williams drove toward the scene on Route
702, but observed the stop from a distance to protect his cover.  As the officers removed the
three men from the car, Detective Williams recognized Mr. Jenkins, whom he knew to be
“Tony” from the search warrant.  Detective Williams still did not recognize petitioner.  Upon
 The language of the case of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587
1
(1981), relied on by appellant, was couched in terms of “detention.”  Appellant primarily
argues in his brief that the seizure or detention, not arrest, was improper.  In the context of
this case, the result we arrive at would be the same, whether the conduct prior to the formal
announcement of an arrest, was a detention or itself an arrest.  Cf. State v. Evans,  352 Md.
496, 723 A.2d 423 (1999).
- 3 -
the uniformed officers’ request, petitioner produced his registration and driver’s license.
Both documents showed his address, which was not Apartment D.  The license listed
petitioner’s height as six feet and weight as 210 pounds.  The uniformed officers checked
both documents with the dispatcher for any criminal information, which yielded negative
results.  All three men were frisked for weapons, handcuffed, and taken in a police car back
to Apartment D.  Detective Williams testified that petitioner was “detained” with the others
because neither he nor the officers could identify petitioner.1
Once returned to the apartment, the three men were taken into the kitchen and
handcuffed individually to three chairs near the kitchen table.  Detective Jeffrey Sewell, the
author of the warrant application, sat at the remaining chair at the table and kept an inventory
during the search.  Detective Frank Massoni, also involved in the investigation, read the three
men the search warrant and their Miranda rights.  Detective Massoni then took the three men
into the bathroom one at a time and strip searched them while other officers searched the
apartment for contraband.  Mr. Banks was searched first, then Mr. Jenkins.  Detective Sewell
later testified that as Mr. Jenkins was being returned to his chair, petitioner “was moving
around in his chair [and] moving his hands behind his back.”  While  petitioner was being
strip searched in the bathroom, Detective Sewell found two “baggies” of cocaine on the floor
- 4 -
under the table, near where petitioner had been sitting.  Other contraband was discovered in
the apartment and all three men were arrested.
Prior to his trial, petitioner moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence, arguing that
his detention was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.  The motions judge, however, denied
the motion.  Petitioner was tried and convicted in a bench trial before another judge.  After
petitioner’s conviction, he appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the motions
judge erred in denying the motion to suppress.  The intermediate appellate court affirmed in
an unreported opinion.  We granted a writ of certiorari.  Petitioner presents the following
questions in his brief:
1.  Whether the rule of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct.
2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981), applies to non-residents and non-occupants of
a residence who are not named in a search warrant to search the residence.
2.  Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. 
II. Michigan v. Summers
Seizures of the person are judged under a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed.
2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697, 699-700, 101
S. Ct. 2587, 2591, 2593, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981).  Generally, any seizure of a person,
whether by arrest or detention, must be supported by probable cause.  Summers, 452 U.S.
at 700, 101 S. Ct. at 2593, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 99
S. Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); see also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 120, 660
A.2d 447, 472 (1995) (“[A] police officer has legal justification to make a warrantless arrest
- 5 -
where he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed, and that the
arrestee perpetrated the offense.” (citing Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1994 Cum.
Supp.), Art. 27, § 594B(c))).  For Fourth Amendment purposes the Supreme Court has
created certain exceptions to the probable cause requirement.  For example, police officers
may “stop and frisk” an individual if they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
engaged in criminal activity and presently armed and dangerous.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30-31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); see also United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975) (holding Border
Patrol agents may lawfully stop persons they reasonably suspect of being illegal immigrants
and question them about their citizenship); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct.
1921, 1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (extending the holding of Terry to a stop based on a
reliable informant’s tip that the defendant might be armed and carrying illegal drugs).
Another exception relevant to this opinion was created in Summers, 452 U.S. at 705,
101 S. Ct. at 2595, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, when the Supreme Court held that “a warrant to search
for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.”  (Footnote
omitted.)  In Summers, the defendant was walking down the front steps of his own single
family home just as officers approached to search it pursuant to a warrant.  The officers
asked Mr. Summers to open the door.  Mr. Summers told the police that he had locked his
keys inside.  He rang the intercom, but the person answering refused to open the door.  The
police forced open the door.  One officer brought Mr. Summers into the house and detained
- 6 -
him.  Eight other people in the house also were detained.  The officers searched the house
and discovered illegal drugs in the basement.  The officers then arrested Mr. Summers and,
upon a search incident to arrest, found an envelope containing heroin in his jacket.
The Supreme Court initially noted that Dunaway “reaffirmed the general rule that an
official seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal arrest
is made.”  Summers, 452 U.S. at 696, 101 S. Ct. at 2591, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340.  Dunaway,
however, “recognized that some seizures significantly less intrusive than an arrest have
withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment.”
Summers, 452 U.S. at 697, 101 S. Ct. at 2591, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340.  The Supreme Court cited
Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce as examples of less intrusive seizures.  In those cases, the
Supreme Court “recognize[d] that some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth
Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and
are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than
probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity.”
Summers, 452 U.S. at 699, 101 S. Ct. at 2592-93, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340.
Turning to the circumstances in Summers, the Supreme Court first noted that detaining
“residents” of a household during a search of their home was a limited intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment because the detention was “surely less intrusive than the search itself.”
Id. at 701, 101 S. Ct. at 2593, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340.  The Supreme Court reasoned that residents
of a home being searched, unless they intended to flee, would want to stay in the premises
to observe the search for their own protection.  In addition, because the detention occurs in
- 7 -
their own residence, there would be less public stigma than an investigative detention at the
station house.
Next, the Supreme Court examined the heightened law enforcement justifications for
a detention during a search.  The Court noted three particular interests: (1) preventing flight
should contraband be found; (2) “minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”; and (3)
gaining the assistance of the “occupants” to facilitate an orderly and quick search, for
example, by opening locked doors or containers.  Id. at 702-03, 101 S. Ct. at 2594, 69 L. Ed.
2d 340.  The Court also emphasized that because a search warrant had been obtained, the
decision of whether sufficient probable cause existed to enter Mr. Summers’ home had been
made by a neutral, detached magistrate, not the officers in the field.  Thus, the Supreme
Court concluded that as long as police interests justify a limited detention, “[i]f the evidence
that a citizen’s residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer
that an invasion of the citizen’s privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require
that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home.”
Id. at 704-05, 101 S. Ct. at 2595, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340.
III. “Occupants”
The parties in this case debate the meaning Summers gives to “occupants” of the place
to be searched.  Summers used the term “occupants” interchangeably with “residents,”
without defining either term.  The briefs submitted to this Court note a split of authority in
other jurisdictions as to whether “occupants” applies to persons visiting the searched
premises when the police execute a search warrant.  A review of the relevant case law
- 8 -
reveals three different approaches.
First, some jurisdictions categorically limit Summers to actual residents of the place
to be searched.  See United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[U]nlike
Summers, Reid was not a resident of the apartment which was to be searched under the
warrant, and the trial did not disclose that he had any proprietary or residential interest in the
suspected premises.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1132, 114 S. Ct. 1105, 127 L. Ed. 2d 417
(1994); State v. Carrasco, 147 Ariz. 558, 561, 711 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting that the Supreme Court’s reasoning that police could facilitate the search by using
a detained suspect to open locked doors and containers logically does not apply to visitors);
State v. Williams, 665 So. 2d 112, 115 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming a motion to suppress
because the defendant “was not a resident of the house to be searched, nor was she even a
known suspect.”); People v. Burbank, 137 Mich. App. 266, 269, 358 N.W.2d 348, 349
(1984) (per curiam) (distinguishing Summers because the defendant “did not live in the house
that the police were searching.”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190, 105 S. Ct. 962, 83 L. Ed. 2d
967 (1985); Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (“[W]e do not
agree that Summers can be extended to a non-occupant . . . .”).
Language in Summers appears to support this interpretation.  For example, the
Supreme Court, justifying the probable cause exception, said:
A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the
law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion
of the privacy of the persons who resided there.  The detention of one of the
residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant
restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself.  Indeed,
- 9 -
we may safely assume that most citizens . . . would elect to remain in order to
observe the search of their possessions. . . . Moreover, because the detention
in this case was in [Summers]’s own residence, it could add only minimally to
the public stigma associated with the search . . . .
Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-02, 101 S. Ct. at 2593-94, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).  In its holding, the Supreme Court stated that “it is constitutionally
reasonable to require [a] citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant
to search his home.”  Id. at 705, 101 S. Ct. at 2595, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (emphasis added).
Quoting part of this language, Professor Wayne LaFave argues “that the word ‘occupants’
is not to be loosely construed as covering anyone present, but instead is to be interpreted
literally.”  2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(e), at 650 (3d ed. 1996)
(footnote omitted).
A second group of jurisdictions also recognize that a visitor generally may not be
detained under Summers; however, these jurisdictions allow a detention if the police can
point to reasonably articulable facts that associate the visitor with the residence or the
criminal activity being investigated in the search warrant.  To ascertain whether such an
association exists, these cases recognize that police must make a minimal intrusion to
ascertain the visitor’s identity.  See Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir.
1995) (“Although Summers itself only pertains to a resident of the house under warrant, it
follows that the police may stop people coming to or going from the house if police need to
ascertain whether they live there.”); United States v. McEaddy, 780 F. Supp. 464, 471 (E.D.
Mich. 1991) (holding that “‘occupant’ refers to any individual on the premises who, from the
- 10 -
perspective of the executing officers at the scene, might reasonably have some relationship
to the subject premises.”), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014, 114 S. Ct. 608, 126 L. Ed. 2d 573 (1993); People v. Glaser, 11
Cal. 4th 354, 365, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (1995) (holding that the detention
of the defendant, who drove up to his own house prior to search, “was justified by the need
to determine what connection defendant, who appeared to be more than a stranger or casual
visitor, had to the premises, and by the related need to ensure officer safety and security at
the site.”); Claffey v. State, 209 Ga. App. 455, 456, 433 S.E.2d 441, 442 (upholding the
detention of a motorist and passengers for the purpose of ascertaining whether they lived in
the premises being searched), aff’d, 211 Ga. App. 375, 439 S.E.2d 375 (1993); State v.
Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 92, 888 P.2d 971, 974 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “the police
cannot detain a non-resident unless they have a reasonable basis to believe that the non-
resident has some type of connection to the premises or to criminal activity.”); State v.
Schultz, 23 Ohio App. 3d 130, 133, 491 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1985) (extending the definition
of “occupants” to persons with a “reasonable connection” to the property); State v. Curtis,
964 S.W.2d 604, 612-14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that police may detain but not
search a “transient visitor” when reasonable suspicion exists that he or she might be
connected to the illegal activity conducted in the residence); State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d
289, 295, 654 P.2d 96, 103 (1982) (en banc) (requiring, to detain a visitor, facts additional
to the visitor’s “mere presence” at the scene that associate him or her with the illegal
activities to be investigated); cf. 2 LAFAVE, § 4.9(e), at 651 (“The police still must make the
- 11 -
judgment as to who is an occupant rather than a visitor, and surely they are entitled to act
upon appearances without regard to what the true facts ultimately turn out to be.”).
Finally, some jurisdictions broadly define “occupants” to include those visiting the
residence to be searched.  Most of these cases, however, review the detention of the visitor
under the balancing of interests conducted in Summers by comparing the nature of the police
intrusion with any valid law enforcement interests in the detention.  See Fountain, 2 F.3d at
663 (explaining that the detention of a nonresident is reasonable if the detention satisfies the
factors described in Summers); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1239 (7th Cir.) (“At
the very least, Summers’ analysis — balancing the nature of the intrusion against the
governmental interests justifying it — applies” to the detention of visitors), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1030, 110 S. Ct. 3286, 111 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1990); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701,
707 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The Court clearly framed Summers in terms of ‘occupants’, not
owners”; however, detention of the defendant, a visitor, was not justified by any of the law
enforcement interests described in Summers); State v. Phipps, 528 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Summers applies to nonresident visitors); cf. United States v.
Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that police could detain but not search
a passenger in a car for safety reasons while the other occupants were searched legally).
IV.  Resolution
We decline at this time to adopt one of these three approaches because petitioner’s
detention was unreasonable under all of them.  Under the approach that limits Summers to
residents, the detectives’ investigation into who rented the apartment and their surveillance
- 12 -
of the apartment prior to the search never indicated that petitioner was a resident of the
apartment.  Even under the line of cases that extend the term “occupants” to those visiting
the apartment, Summers still would not apply.  The record lacks any evidence that petitioner
ever set foot inside Apartment D before he was detained.  Detective Williams saw petitioner
come out of the apartment building with Mr. Banks and Mr. Jenkins, but not out of Mr.
Banks’ apartment itself.  The State produced no evidence that petitioner was ever a resident
of or even a visitor to Apartment D, no matter how the term “occupant” is construed.
Moreover, under this approach, whether petitioner was a resident of or a visitor to the
apartment, the actions of the officers in this case failed to satisfy the balancing of interests
required by the Supreme Court in Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-03, 101 S. Ct. at 2593-94, 69
L. Ed. 2d 340.  We note that the police intrusion upon petitioner was significantly greater
than in Summers.  Mr. Summers was detained on the front steps of his own home and taken
inside while the search was conducted.  Id. at 693 & n.1, 101 S. Ct. at 2589 & n.1, 69 L. Ed.
2d 340.  Petitioner, by contrast, was stopped and frisked on the side of a public highway at
least one-fourth of a mile from the search site, handcuffed, placed in a police cruiser,
transported back to another person’s apartment, was being detained there for the purpose of
a strip search when, under the State’s theory, he discarded the drugs.  In addition, the law
enforcement interests enunciated in Summers were lacking in this case.  Petitioner, not being
a resident of Apartment D, could not assist the officers in facilitating the search.  Because
the three men had left the area to be searched, were frisked during the traffic stop, and the
 The officers did not search the car during the stop.  Instead, Detective Williams
2
drove it back to the apartment and searched it, but found no contraband.
- 13 -
two known suspects named in the warrant were detained by the police,  it is not likely that
2
they or petitioner posed a risk of unlawful flight or any danger to the officers.  Furthermore,
there was no evidence at the motions hearing that petitioner had any knowledge that the
search warrant was about to be executed for Apartment D.
In United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 345 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1048,
115 S. Ct. 647, 130 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1994), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit examined facts similar to those in this case.  The police, about to execute a warrant,
witnessed the defendant leave his home, get in his car, and drive away.  Officers stopped him
one block from his home.  The officers told the defendant they had a search warrant for his
residence and would detain him during the search.  The appellate court held that Summers
did not apply.  Id. at 346.  In doing so, the court reasoned that
because Sherrill had already exited the premises, the intrusiveness of the
officers’ stop and detention on the street was much greater [than in Summers].
In addition, . . . the officers had no interest in preventing flight or minimizing
the search’s risk because Sherrill had left the area of the search and was
unaware of the warrant.
Id. (citation omitted).  In reaching that conclusion, the court cited its opinion in United States
v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994), in which it held that Summers did not apply
when a defendant was stopped over three miles from his home, handcuffed, returned to his
house and detained.  The Hogan court similarly found that the intrusion caused by the
detention was “much greater than in Summers.”  Id.  As in Sherrill, the Hogan court reasoned
- 14 -
that
[N]one of the law enforcement interests set forth in Summers apply.  Hogan
was not aware that a search was about to be conducted and therefore did not
pose a risk of flight.  There was no risk of harm to the agents from Hogan in
a car miles away from the premises.
Id.; see also United States v. Boyd, 696 F.2d 63, 65 n.2 (8th Cir.1982) (“The [Summers]
Court certainly did not sanction the search and seizure of residents who, at the time of the
search, are several blocks from their home.”), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1093, 103 S. Ct. 1794,
76 L. Ed. 2d 360 (1983).
United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90 (10th Cir. 1996), provides another example of
the application of Summers to a case like the one before this Court.  The police in Edwards
obtained a search warrant for a suspected “drug house,” 1001 Revere Street, which Mr.
Edwards frequented.  As police were about to conduct the search, they witnessed Mr.
Edwards leave the house, get into his car, and drive away.  They stopped and frisked Mr.
Edwards and then detained him on the side of the street in handcuffs and at gunpoint for
forty-five minutes while the house was searched.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, applying Summers, held the detention was unlawful:
Here, the police’s legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence was found was far more
attenuated than in Summers.  Unlike the defendant in Summers, who was
present where the search warrant was executed, Edwards did not know —
prior to being stopped — that any warrant was being executed.  He thus had
no reason to flee.  The police knew the address of Edwards’s Denver
residence, and had no reason to believe that he would not return to it, or to
1001 Revere Street.  Further, after completing the Terry stop, the police could
have “tailed” Edwards had they then let him go.
 We realize the Supreme Court in Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16, 101 S. Ct. at 2594
3
n.16, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, did not “view the fact that [Summers] was leaving his house when
the officers arrived to be of constitutional significance” because his seizure in front of the
house “was no more intrusive than the detention of those” inside the house being searched.
The Court of Special Appeals in Fromm v. State, 96 Md. App. 249, 256, 624 A.2d 1296,
1299 (1993), upheld, under Summers, the detention of a suspect who exited a neighboring
apartment building when his residence was about to be searched.  Our decision today does
not overturn Fromm because an off-premises detention of a person named in a warrant can
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it satisfies the balancing of interests in
Summers.  See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Summers
does not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity (i.e., defendant must be
detained while still on his premises); rather, the focus is upon police performance . . . .”),
502 U.S. 1093, 112 S. Ct. 1166, 117 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1992); State v. Thomas, 603 So. 2d
1382, 1383-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the detention of a suspect who approached
the house being searched was proper under Summers because his actions created a risk of
harm and potential for flight from the scene); State v. Ailport, 413 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a suspect’s pre-search detention was reasonable because he had
a violent criminal record).  Here, petitioner’s detention was overly intrusive and lacked any
reasonable police justification.  See supra.  Moreover, police may not detain a nonoccupant
who is unnamed in the warrant and stopped at a distance from the premises under the
warrant’s aegis and then return him to the premises in order to make him an occupant,
resident, or visitor so they may search him or her pursuant to Summers.
- 15 -
Neither of the latter two Summers interests were served in any way by
Edwards’s extended detention. First, the police quickly determined that
Edwards posed no risk of harm to them.  Second, and in contrast to the
defendant in Summers, Edwards’s streetside detention played no part in
facilitating the orderly completion of a search being conducted three blocks
away. . . . [H]is detention served no “facilitating” purpose.
Id. at 93-94 (footnote omitted).3
Examining the facts under the approach of jurisdictions that allow the police to detain
visitors long enough to ascertain their identity and address, the officers in this case had such
an opportunity during the stop on Route 702 and did learn petitioner’s identity and address
from his driver’s license and registration.  Nevertheless, they continued to detain petitioner,
- 16 -
claiming they were unaware whether he was associated with the apartment.  The evidence
obtained prior to the search, upon which the affidavit supporting the warrant was based,
however, indicated that the only persons specifically associated with the apartment were Mr.
Banks, Mr. Jenkins, and “Shawn.”  Petitioner’s license clearly revealed to the officers at the
highway stop that petitioner did not match the description of “Shawn.”  Once the police
discovered this, petitioner’s detention should have ended.  The Supreme Court, in Royer, 460
U.S. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, said with regard to the scope of a
detention based on less than probable cause:
The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification.
. . . [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Similarly, the investigative
methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.
On this point, the Supreme Court has further stated:
Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can
no longer be justified as an investigative stop. . . . [W]e have emphasized the
need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well
as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.  Much as a “bright
line” rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention
is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985)
(citations omitted).  The Supreme Court in Sharpe added that in assessing the reasonableness
of a detention, “it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which
- 17 -
time it was necessary to detain the defendant.”  Id. at 686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d
605.  The detention by the officers in this case went well beyond the time necessary to
confirm any suspicions they may have had about petitioner.  Likewise, the actions of the
police — publicly stopping and frisking petitioner, handcuffing him, transporting him in a
police car to someone else’s apartment, and strip searching him — were not the “least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer[s’] suspicion in a short
period of time.”  Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229.
V. Conclusion
The detention of petitioner was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  The
police had no probable cause to detain petitioner; nor could they detain him under the
holding of Michigan v. Summers.  Petitioner was not a resident of Apartment D and no
conclusive evidence existed that he had ever been inside the apartment.  Further, the
intrusiveness of the police detention in this case far exceeded the scope and time allowed
under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and lacked sufficient legitimate police interests that
could justify such a detention.  Petitioner’s conviction, therefore, must be vacated.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY
AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY BALTIMORE COUNTY.
Richard Warren Stanford v. State of Maryland
No. 127, September Term, 1998
Headnote:
Petitioner could not be detained as an “occupant” of the searched apartment
under the probable cause exception in Michigan v. Summers because the
police were uncertain whether he had ever been inside the apartment, stopped
him one-fourth of a mile away from the premises, frisked and identified him
as a nonresident, but then returned him to the apartment during the search.