Title: Boston Housing Authority v. Y.A.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12623 
 
BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY  vs.  Y.A. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 7, 2019. - May 10, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Violence Against Women Act.  Boston Housing Authority.  Housing 
Authority.  Municipal Corporations, Housing authority.  
Summary Process.  Practice, Civil, Summary process, 
Execution. 
 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Eastern Division 
of the Housing Court Department on June 9, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to issue execution, filed on December 11, 2017, 
was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Julia E. Devanthéry for the tenant. 
 
Michael J. Louis (Angela Marcolina also present) for the 
landlord. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Sandra S. Park, Linda S. Morris, & Lenora M. Lapidus, of 
New York, Katherine E. Walz & Emily J. Coffey, of Illinois, 
Karlo Ng & Renee Williams, of California, & Ruth A. Bourquin for 
American Civil Liberties Union & others. 
2 
 
 
Richard M.W. Bauer, Jamie Ann Sabino, Kristyn M. Bunce 
DeFilipp, Michael J. Licker, & Rachel L. Davidson for 
Massachusetts Domestic Violence and Housing Advocates. 
 
Caitlin P. Milone & Jeffrey C. Turk for Greater Boston Real 
Estate Board & another. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The Federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), as 
amended, is a comprehensive statute designed to combat violence 
against women in its many forms.  See 34 U.S.C. §§ 12291 et seq.1  
Among other safeguards provided by VAWA, the statute, as 
reauthorized in 2013 and implemented by the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations, 
protects tenants or otherwise qualified applicants of housing 
assistance under a covered housing program2 from being denied or 
evicted from housing "on the basis that the applicant or tenant 
is or has been a victim of domestic violence."3  34 U.S.C. 
§ 12491(b)(1).  See 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(b). 
                                                          
 
 
1 The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was originally 
codified as part of title 42 of the United States Code but was 
editorially reclassified in various sections of title 34. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 13925, 14043e et seq. (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
 
 
2 A covered housing program is a "HUD program covered by 
[VAWA]."  24 C.F.R. § 5.2001(a) (2018).  A covered housing 
program "generally" provides two types of assistance:  
"[t]enant-based rental assistance, which is rental assistance 
that is provided to the tenant; and project-based assistance, 
which is assistance that attaches to the unit in which the 
tenant resides," and consists of "operating assistance, 
development assistance, and mortgage interest rate subsidy."  24 
C.F.R. § 5.2001(b)(1). 
 
 
3 "Domestic violence" is defined as "felony or misdemeanor 
crimes of violence by a current or former spouse or intimate 
3 
 
Here, Y.A., an alleged victim of domestic violence, 
appealed from a lower court judge's order of execution on the 
fifth agreement for judgment between Y.A. and the Boston Housing 
Authority (BHA), a covered housing provider.4,5  Y.A. argued that 
the motion judge failed to consider whether the alleged breach 
of the agreement for judgment was a direct result of domestic 
violence.  On April 16, 2019, we issued an order to the Eastern 
Division of the Housing Court Department:  "The January 12, 
2018, order allowing the [BHA's] motion to issue execution is 
reversed.  The matter is remanded to the Housing Court for 
further proceedings consistent with the opinion to follow." 
This opinion sets forth the reasons for the order.6 
                                                          
 
partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a 
child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has 
cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate 
partner. . . ."  34 U.S.C. § 12291(8). 
 
 
4 A "covered housing provider" is defined as "the individual 
or entity under a covered housing program that has 
responsibility for the administration and/or oversight of VAWA 
protections and includes [public housing agencies], sponsors, 
owners, mortgagors, managers, State and local governments or 
agencies thereof, nonprofit or for-profit organizations or 
entities."  24 C.F.R. § 5.2003.  Hereinafter, we refer to a 
covered housing provider as a "landlord" for purposes of this 
opinion. 
 
 
5 The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) administers rental 
subsidies through various programs and provides subsidized 
housing to qualifying low-income tenants. 
 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Greater 
Boston Real Estate Board and Institute of Real Estate 
Management; Massachusetts Domestic Violence and Housing 
4 
 
 
Background.  Y.A. has resided in the BHA's subsidized 
housing since October 2013.  Following nonpayment of rent,7 the 
BHA served Y.A. with a notice to quit on March 27, 2014.8  On 
June 9, 2014, the BHA initiated a summary process (eviction) 
action in the Housing Court.9 
 
On the hearing date, the parties entered into an agreement 
for judgment, which suspended the eviction action on the 
condition that Y.A. make a fixed monthly payment for use and 
occupancy and for rent arrearage.  The parties agreed that if 
Y.A. failed to adhere to the payment schedule, the BHA could 
revive the eviction process by moving for the issuance of 
execution for possession of the premises, and damages owed, 
including costs and interest. 
                                                          
 
Advocates; and the American Civil Liberties Union, American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Community Legal Services 
of Philadelphia, Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid, National Housing Law 
Project, National Network to End Domestic Violence, and the 
Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law. 
 
 
7 From December 1, 2013, through March 1, 2014, Y.A. made 
one rent payment of ninety dollars. 
 
 
8 The notice to quit provided that Y.A. had accrued a total 
of $330 in rent arrearage and that if Y.A. "fail[ed] to quit the 
premises, or pay the rent due within [fourteen] days of [her] 
receipt of this notice, the BHA [would] file an action in 
housing court to evict [her] and to recover the rent due plus 
court costs at which time [she could] present a defense." 
 
9 See Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 
Mass. 830, 850 (2019) (Appendix), for a more detailed 
explanation of summary process. 
5 
 
Y.A. failed to make the required payments under the 
agreement,10 and BHA moved for an issuance of execution.  On 
September 10, 2014, the parties entered into an amended 
agreement for judgment with new payment terms.  Over the course 
of the following three years, the parties entered into a total 
of five agreements for judgment, each precipitated by Y.A.'s 
failure to adhere to the agreed-upon payments and the BHA's 
motions for issuance of execution.  After Y.A. violated the 
fifth agreement, the BHA filed the instant motion for issuance 
of execution on December 11, 2017. 
 
A hearing on the motion was held on January 10, 2018, at 
which time Y.A. stated that she was working with an agency to 
help pay the rent arrearage.  When asked by the judge why she 
had made only one payment since the date of the final agreement, 
Y.A. responded: 
"I was in an abus[ive] relationship.  He would take 
everything from me.  One day I decide[d] to stop that.  I 
called the police on him.  I'm . . . trying to deal with a 
restraining order, and now I'm trying to get back all my 
life together because I do not want to be in a relationship 
like that.  He would take -- I've lost everything already.  
I'm about to lose my apartment.  I don't want that." 
 
 
The judge then asked Y.A. if she had spoken to the property 
manager at any point about the abusive relationship after she 
                                                          
 
 
10 The parties entered into an agreement for judgment on 
June 25, 2014.  Y.A. failed to make the agreed-upon payments in 
August and September 2014. 
6 
 
signed the final agreement, to which Y.A. responded:  "No. . . .  
I go in the office one time, but, after that, I tried to figure 
it out like how I'm going to pay the rent and how I'm going to 
do all this." 
 
The judge allowed the BHA's motion, finding that Y.A.'s 
failure to make the required payments set forth in the final 
agreement constituted a violation of a material term of the 
agreement and that the BHA had "acted reasonably and cannot be 
expected to do any more."  See G. L. c. 239, § 10.  The judge 
made no reference to Y.A.'s statements regarding the alleged 
abusive relationship in his findings.  Y.A. appealed, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  VAWA housing protections.  Under VAWA, 
"[a]n applicant for or tenant of housing assisted under a 
covered housing program may not be denied admission to, denied 
assistance under, terminated from participation in, or evicted 
from the housing on the basis that the applicant or tenant is or 
has been a victim of domestic violence . . . ."  34 U.S.C. 
§ 12491(b)(1).  See 24 CFR § 5.2005(b). 
 
In order for an applicant or tenant to seek assistance 
pursuant to VAWA from a covered housing provider (landlord),11 he 
                                                          
 
 
11 Although we refer to a "covered housing provider" as the 
"landlord" for purposes of this opinion, the term "covered 
housing provider" is defined more broadly, see note 4, supra. 
 
7 
 
or she must "[i]nform the [landlord] that [he or she is] a 
victim of domestic violence" and further must "[p]rovide enough 
information for the [landlord] to make a determination regarding 
the adverse factor [he or she is] claiming was a direct result 
of domestic violence."  Violence Against Women Reauthorization 
Act of 2013 Guidance, United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development and the Office of Public and Indian Housing, 
PIH-2017-08 (HA) § 7.3, at 9 (May 19, 2017) (HUD Guidance), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PIH-2017-08VAWRA2013.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/X9PJ-B3L8].  Upon being made aware that an 
applicant or tenant seeks protection under VAWA, the landlord 
"should consider the individual's statement and any possible 
supporting documentation in determining if an adverse factor was 
a direct result of domestic violence."12  Id.  If the landlord 
determines that further information is needed, the landlord may 
make a written request seeking additional supporting 
documentation from the applicant or tenant.13  See 34 U.S.C. 
                                                          
 
 
12 The guidance provided by HUD gives examples of factors 
that may be the direct result of domestic violence, including a 
tenant's failure to pay rent.  See Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 Guidance, United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development and the Office of Public and 
Indian Housing, PIH-2017-08 (HA) § 7.2 (May 19, 2017) (HUD 
Guidance), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PIH-2017-
08VAWRA2013.PDF [https://perma.cc/X9PJ-B3L8]. 
 
 
13 The applicant or tenant may submit any one of the 
following forms of documentation: 
 
8 
 
§ 12491(c)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 5.2007(a)(1).  The failure of the 
tenant to provide the requested documentation within fourteen 
days could result in, among other things, eviction.14  See 34 
U.S.C. §  12491(c)(2)(A)(iv); 24 C.F.R. § 5.2007(a)(2)(i)(D). 
                                                          
 
"(i) The certification form described in 
§ 5.2005(a)(1)(ii); or 
 
 
"(ii) A document: 
 
"(A) Signed by an employee, agent, or volunteer of a victim 
service provider, an attorney, or medical professional, or 
a mental health professional (collectively, 'professional') 
from whom the victim has sought assistance relating to 
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or 
stalking, or the effects of abuse; 
 
"(B) Signed by the applicant or tenant; and 
 
"(C) That specifies, under penalty of perjury, that the 
professional believes in the occurrence of the incident of 
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or 
stalking that is the ground for protection and remedies 
under this subpart, and that the incident meets the 
applicable definition of domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault, or stalking under § 5.2003; or 
 
"(iii) A record of a Federal, State, tribal, territorial or 
local law enforcement agency, court, or administrative 
agency; or 
 
"(iv) At the discretion of a [landlord], a statement or 
other evidence provided by the applicant or tenant." 
 
24 C.F.R. § 5.2007(b)(1).  See 34 U.S.C. § 12491(c)(3)(A)-(D). 
 
 
14 Failure to provide this documentation within the allotted 
time could also result in denial of admission to the covered 
program, denial of assistance under the covered program, or 
termination of participation in the covered program.  See 34 
U.S.C. § 12491(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii); 24 C.F.R. 
§ 5.2007(a)(2)(i)(A)-(C). 
9 
 
 
Where the applicant or tenant establishes that he or she is 
entitled to VAWA protection, the landlord is prohibited from 
evicting the tenant for any reason that is a direct result of 
the domestic violence, from denying the applicant or tenant's 
admission to or assistance under the covered program, and from 
terminating the tenant's participation in the covered program.  
See 34 U.S.C. § 12491(b)(1); 24 CFR § 5.2005(b). 
 
Landlords "are encouraged to undertake whatever actions 
permissible and feasible under their respective programs to 
assist individuals residing in their units who are victims of 
domestic violence . . . to remain in their units or other units 
under the covered housing program or other [landlords], and for 
the [landlord] to bear the costs of any transfer, where 
permissible."  24 C.F.R. § 5.2009(c).  Under VAWA, upon request, 
a landlord is required to relocate a tenant to a safe unit if he 
or she "reasonably believes there is a threat of imminent harm 
from further violence if the tenant remains within the same 
dwelling unit that the tenant is currently occupying."  24 
C.F.R. § 5.2005(e)(2)(i) and (ii)(A).15  The landlord also may 
"remove a household member from [the] lease in order to evict, 
remove, terminate occupancy rights, or terminate assistance to 
                                                          
 
 
15 VAWA requires that each landlord "adopt an emergency 
transfer plan . . . based on HUD's model emergency transfer 
plan."  24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(e). 
 
10 
 
such member who engages in criminal activity directly relating 
to domestic violence . . . against an affiliate individual or 
other individual."  24 C.F.R. § 5.2009(a).  This is to be done 
"[w]ithout regard to whether the household member is a signatory 
to the lease" and "[w]ithout evicting, removing, terminating 
assistance to, or otherwise penalizing a victim of such criminal 
activity who is also a tenant or lawful occupant."16  24 C.F.R. 
§ 5.2009(a)(i)-(ii).  In addition, the landlord may refer the 
tenant to local domestic violence programs that offer a variety 
of services including support groups, individual counselling, 
legal advice, and financial planning.17  See Domestic Violence 
Programs, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and 
                                                          
 
 
16 "If a [landlord] exercises the option to bifurcate a 
lease as provided in [24 C.F.R. § 5.2009 (a)], and the 
individual who was evicted or for whom assistance was terminated 
was the eligible tenant under the covered housing program, the 
[landlord] shall provide to any remaining tenant or tenants that 
were not already eligible a period of [ninety] calendar days 
from the date of bifurcation of the lease to:  (A) [e]stablish 
eligibility for the same covered housing program under which the 
evicted or terminated tenant was the recipient of assistance at 
the time of bifurcation of the lease; or (B) [e]stablish 
eligibility under another covered housing program; or (C) [f]ind 
alternative housing."  24 C.F.R. § 5.2009(b)(2). 
 
 
17 See, e.g., Safe Passage, https://safepass.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/PTE6-MGSA] (providing counselling, legal 
advice, and support groups); Woman Shelter, About Us, 
https://www.womanshelter.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/GF5L-
G9G3] (providing individual counselling, support groups, 
medical, financial and housing advocacy); Casa Myrna, Economic 
Stability, https://www.casamyrna.org/get-support/economic-
stability/ [https://perma.cc/AK7A-3TJ4] (providing financial 
planning program). 
11 
 
Security, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/domestic-
violence-programs [https://perma.cc/P6G6-G8NS]. 
 
2.  Application.  Given the framework of VAWA, its 
corresponding regulations, and the HUD Guidelines, ideally a 
tenant will notify the landlord that domestic violence has 
affected the tenant's ability to pay rent or has otherwise 
caused the tenant to violate the terms of the lease.  The 
landlord can then take steps pursuant to the HUD Guidelines to 
apply VAWA.  If a landlord denies VAWA protections and initiates 
summary process, the tenant may raise a VAWA defense in 
response.  See 34 U.S.C. § 12491(b)(1). 
 
Importantly, the HUD Guidance requires an applicant or 
tenant to notify a landlord of the presence of domestic violence 
if he or she seeks VAWA protection, see HUD Guidance, supra at 
§ 7.3. However, it is not a prerequisite to raising VAWA as a 
defense to eviction in court.  The HUD Guidance was created to 
"provide[] guidance to Public Housing Agencies . . . and owners 
on the requirements of the [VAWA statute and regulations]"; it 
is not binding on the courts.  See id. at § 1.  See also 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).  
Accordingly, an applicant or tenant who has not previously 
informed his or her landlord of the alleged domestic violence is 
not precluded from raising VAWA in court. 
12 
 
 
Here, Y.A. did not raise the issue of domestic violence 
until she appeared in court for the hearing on the BHA's motion 
for issuance of execution on her alleged breach of the fifth 
agreement for judgment, and when she did so, it was not 
necessarily meant as a VAWA defense.  However, neither the 
statute nor the regulations address when or how a tenant must 
assert his or her rights under VAWA in a summary process action.  
Cf. 34 U.S.C § 12491; 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005.  See Matter of Johnson 
v. Palumbo, 154 A.D.3d 231, 244 (N.Y. 2017).  Nor does VAWA 
require a particular threshold of proof to raise the defense.  
See 34 U.S.C. § 12491(c)(5); 24 C.F.R. § 5.2007(b)(3).  Thus, 
here, Y.A.'s statement at the hearing that she was in an abusive 
relationship and that her partner "would take everything" from 
her was not untimely.  Further, Y.A.'s mention of domestic 
violence as a possible factor in her failure to make the 
required payments was a sufficient signal to the judge to 
inquire further to elicit additional facts in order to determine 
whether Y.A. was entitled to VAWA protection.  See S.J.C. Rule 
3:09, Canon 2, Rule 2.6 & comment 1A (2016). 
 
We note that when the judge asked Y.A. whether she had 
raised the matter with the property manager, Y.A. initially 
responded, "No," but then went on to explain, "I go in the 
office one time, but, after that, I tried to figure it 
out . . . ."  The judge did not inquire further on Y.A.'s 
13 
 
ambiguous response.  As mentioned supra, bringing issues of 
domestic violence to the attention of the manager of a public 
housing agency is not a prerequisite to raising VAWA as a 
defense to eviction in a subsequent court proceeding; however, 
we emphasize that the best practice is for a tenant to inform 
the landlord of any domestic violence in order to allow the 
landlord to determine whether the domestic violence adversely 
affected the tenant's ability to adhere to the conditions of the 
lease or agreement for judgment. 
 
We conclude that where a judge is given reason to believe 
that domestic violence is or might be relevant to a landlord's 
basis for eviction, the judge must ensure that he or she has 
sufficient evidence to make a determination whether the tenant 
is entitled to VAWA protections, and such determination must be 
supported by findings. 
Asserting a VAWA defense does not guarantee a successful 
outcome.  As discussed supra, there must be a causal connection 
between incidents of domestic violence and a tenant's failure to 
comply with the terms of the lease or the agreement for 
judgment.  In addition, "VAWA does not limit the ability of a 
[landlord] to [evict a tenant] for a lease violation unrelated 
to domestic violence . . . provided that the [landlord] does not 
subject an individual who has been the victim of such violence 
to a more demanding standard than other tenants."  Matter of 
14 
 
Johnson, 154 A.D.3d at 241.  See 34 U.S.C. §  12491(b)(3)(C)(ii); 
24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(d)(2). 
Thus, Y.A. may or may not be successful in using VAWA to 
stave off eviction.  Such success will depend on the 
circumstances surrounding the domestic violence alleged by Y.A. 
and whether the motion judge finds that it contributed to Y.A.'s 
failure to make the agreed-upon payments.18  Accordingly, in our 
order we remanded the case for further inquiry and findings 
whether domestic violence contributed to Y.A.'s failure to make 
agreed-upon payments.19  If the judge determines that Y.A. is 
entitled to protection under VAWA, the BHA should be well-
equipped to assist her.  Indeed, the BHA has "several policies 
and programs to assist applicants and residents in situations of 
domestic violence and family justice."  Boston Housing 
Authority, Domestic Violence and Family Justice, 
http://www.bostonhousing.org/en/Departments/Public-Safety 
/Domestic-Violence-and-Family-Justice.aspx [https://perma.cc 
/L2U5-RN95]. 
                                                          
 
 
18 Y.A. included with the instant appeal an affidavit 
detailing further information regarding the alleged abusive 
relationship; however, that information was not before the 
motion judge. 
 
19 Although the BHA argues that the judge decided in its 
favor after having taken all of the circumstances into account, 
including a potential VAWA defense, we see no evidence in the 
judge's findings that he considered VAWA. 
15 
 
3.  BHA's arguments.  We briefly address two arguments BHA 
raises pertaining to Y.A.'s right to assert VAWA as a defense.20  
First, BHA suggests that, by raising VAWA, Y.A. seeks either to 
alter the terms of the final agreement for judgment or to have 
the agreement declared invalid.  To the contrary, Y.A. simply 
seeks to raise a defense to her breach of that agreement, as is 
her right.21 
In addition, the BHA contends that Y.A. is not entitled to 
VAWA protections because her failure to pay rent was chronic 
rather than "temporary," referencing the HUD Guidance, supra at 
§ 7.2. This is a misreading of that document, which lists 
"temporary failure to pay rent" as one of several "examples" of 
"adverse factors," that might be a direct result of domestic 
violence -- it is not a precondition to receiving VAWA 
protection.22  See id. 
                                                          
 
20 We have considered the BHA's remaining arguments and have 
determined that they are without merit.  See Commonwealth v. 
Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954). 
 
21 To the extent that BHA argues that Y.A. has waived any 
defense to the breach of the original lease, we agree.  Kelton 
Corp. v. County of Worcester, 426 Mass. 355, 360 (1997) ("any 
exceptions made by either party to the underlying actions are 
extinguished unless specifically noted in the [agreement for] 
judgment or otherwise incorporated into the judgment"). 
 
 
22 At any rate, as a document created to give guidance to 
public housing agencies and owners, the HUD Guidance is not 
binding on courts.  See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 
576, 587 (2000).