Title: Yox v. Tru-Rol

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. C00-12965
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 31
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
ARNOLD C. YOX
v.
TRU-ROL COMPANY, INC., ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
     Bell, C.J., Eldridge and Battaglia, JJ., Dissent
______________________________________
Filed:   March 15, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
Maryland Code, § 9-711 of the Labor and Employment Article (LE) requires that a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on “disablement” resulting from an
occupational disease be filed within two years after the date (1) of disablement, or (2) when
the employee had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused by the employment.
The issue before us is what is meant by “disablement” when the claim is for occupational
deafness pursuant to LE §§ 9-505 and 9-649 through 9-652.
We shall hold that an occupational deafness disablement occurs when the hearing loss
is sufficient to become compensable under § 9-650.  A claim for workers’ compensation
benefits based on occupational deafness must therefore be filed within two years from the
time the hearing loss reaches that level of compensability and the employee has actual
knowledge that the loss was caused by his/her employment.  As the evidence in this case
reveals that, in 1987, petitioner, Arnold Yox, (1) suffered from a hearing loss that was
compensable under § 9-650, (2) knew that he suffered a hearing loss, and (3) knew that the
hearing loss resulted from his employment, his claim, filed 13 years later, is time-barred
under § 9-711.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner worked for respondent, Tru-Rol Company, Inc., for more than 47 years as
a press operator.  His duties included running the press, tearing down tractors with an air
wrench, and using a jack hammer and a vibrator, which he described as a loud piece of
machinery resembling a jackhammer.  Throughout his employment, he was exposed to loud
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noise.  At some point, perhaps around 1991, Mr. Yox was given earmuffs to wear.  He wore
them when working the vibrator but not otherwise.  
In September, 1987, Mr. Yox saw Dr. Robert Schwager, an ear, nose, and throat
specialist, although there is some discrepancy in their recollections as to why.  Dr. Schwager,
reading from notes he made at the time, recalled that Yox complained of a hearing loss and
throat pain; he made no note of any complaint about a ringing in the ears.  Yox said that he
consulted Schwager because of a ringing in his ears; he did not recall any throat pain and did
not think at the time that he had a hearing loss, as he could hear the television at home.  Dr.
Schwager performed or had performed an audiometric test, which revealed a 35.25% hearing
loss in the right ear and a 37.75% loss in the left ear.  That extent of loss, according to Dr.
Schwager, would have amounted to a binaural impairment of 35.67%, which the parties
agree is a compensable hearing loss under § 9-650.
Because he was not asked to do so, Dr. Schwager did not calculate the binaural
impairment in 1987.  He told Mr. Yox of the audiometric test results and had him fitted for
hearing aids, which Yox said reduced the ringing in his ears when he wore them. Mr. Yox
wore the hearing aids at home but did not wear them to work.  He acknowledged that he was
aware in 1987 that his hearing loss was directly related to his employment.  Yox continued
to work for Tru-Rol until 1999, when the company closed and he obtained similar work
elsewhere.  He did not receive any further medical attention until 2000, because his ears
“were still working.”  In deposition testimony, he indicated that it was not until 1998 that
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“my ears really left me.” He said that his hearing in 1987 “was going down” but “wasn’t as
bad as it is now.”
Mr. Yox returned to Dr. Schwager in June, 2000, after he had begun work for his new
employer.  From his examination, Dr. Schwager concluded that Yox’s actual hearing loss had
worsened since 1987 (33% in the right ear and 38% in the left ear) but that, because in
making the necessary calculations for workers’ compensation purposes he had to consider
Yox’s age, the binaural hearing impairment for compensation purposes had remained about
the same, and, in fact, was a bit less.
In July, 2000, though continuing to work for the new employer as a press operator,
Yox filed a workers’ compensation claim against Tru-Rol for occupational disease due to
“years exposure to high levels of industrial noise.”  To the question, “O/D Date
Disablement,” he responded “0/00/0000.”  Tru-Rol raised a number of issues in defense, but
proceeded only on the § 9-711 statute of limitations.  Through counsel, Yox responded that,
in 1987, he did not know that he had a disablement that would entitle him to compensation
benefits.  The Commission determined that his knowledge of disablement was not the test
– that the statutory test was whether there was a disablement and whether he knew that he
had a hearing loss that was attributable to his employment – and that the record revealed an
affirmative answer to both.  Accordingly, the Commission held that the claim was barred by
limitations and denied it.
Mr. Yox sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  After a de
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novo evidentiary hearing, that court entered an order reversing the Commission.  The court
acknowledged that the 1987 testing “demonstrated sufficient loss to have been compensable
under the standards utilized by the Commission” and that it was clear from Dr. Schwager’s
records that a connection between the hearing loss and Yox’s employment was “evident.”
The court nonetheless concluded that, because Yox had not lost any time from work and
therefore suffered no wage loss or earning impairment, he had not suffered a “disablement”
in 1987, or, indeed, in 2000, and that the § 9-711 statute of limitations had not even begun
to run, much less expired: “limitations does not even begin to run until the hearing loss gives
rise to incapacity to work, as set forth in LE §§ 9-711 and 9-502.”
On Tru-Rol’s appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court
judgment, holding that, in an occupational deafness case, limitations begins to run when “the
hearing loss becomes compensable under Section 9-505, or when the employee ‘first ha[s]
actual knowledge that the disability [i.e., the compensable hearing loss], was caused by the
employment.’ ”  Tru-Rol v. Yox, 149 Md. App. 707, 718, 818 A.2d 283, 290 (2003).  The
court noted that any other construction would be illogical, unreasonable, and inconsistent
with common sense because it would allow a worker to be compensated for his or her
hearing loss before the statute of limitations on the claim even began to run.  Id.  We granted
certiorari to review the Court of Special Appeals decision and, because we believe that it is
correct, shall affirm it.
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DISCUSSION
In Belschner v. Anchor Post, 227 Md. 89, 92, 175 A.2d 419, 420 (1961), we pointed
out that, as first enacted in 1914, the Workers’ Compensation Law provided compensation
only for disability or death of an employee from an “accidental injury” that arose out of and
in the course of employment.  Under that statute, this Court had held, on a number of
occasions, that an employee seeking compensation for a disability arising from an accidental
injury did not need to show any loss of wages or earning capacity.  See Balto. Publishing Co.
v. Hendricks, 156 Md. 74, 143 A. 654 (1928); Balto. Tube Co. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87, 164 A.
161 (1933), both cited in Belschner, 227 Md. At 92, 175 A.2d at 421.  
It was not until 1939 that the law was amended to provide compensation for injuries
arising from occupational disease.  See 1939 Md. Laws, ch. 465.  In clear contrast to the
situation stemming from an accidental injury, however, the 1939 law did not permit
compensation for occupational disease unless and until the employee was no longer able to
work in the last occupation in which he/she was exposed to the hazards of the disease.  That
was evident from at least two provisions of the law – one a substantive provision and one a
definition.  Section 32B, which the 1939 law added to art. 101 of the Code, provided
compensation for an employee who suffered from a  defined occupational disease “and is
thereby disabled from performing his work in the last occupation in which he was injuriously
exposed to the hazards of such disease . . . .”  (Emphasis added).  In order to be entitled to
compensation under that section, the employee had to be “disabled from performing his
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work.”  The 1939 law also added some new definitions to § 65 of art. 101, among which
were  definitions of “disablement” and “disability.”  New § 65(15) defined “disablement,”
for purposes of the newly enacted provisions dealing with occupational disease, as “the event
of an employee’s becoming actually incapacitated, either partially or totally, because of an
occupational disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in which exposed to
the hazards of such disease” and it defined “disability” as “the state of being so
incapacitated.”   (Emphasis added).
Because an injury arising from an occupational disease was compensable only if the
employee became incapacitated from performing his/her work, the law needed to provide,
and did provide, a special statute of limitations for occupational disease claims.  With respect
to disabilities arising from accidental injury, the existing law required that a claim for
compensation be made within one year after the beginning of the disability.  Under the
judicial gloss we had given to the statute, such a claim could be filed while the employee was
still working at his/her occupation.  Failure to file the claim within that one year period
constituted a “complete bar” unless the failure was induced by fraud.  See Maryland Code,
art. 101, §§ 50, 51 (1939).  With respect to occupational disease claims, however, the 1939
Act specified, in § 32F, that a claim was barred if not filed within one year “from the date
of disablement or death.”  (Emphasis added).  The bracket was thus clear: a non-fatal
occupational disease claim could not be filed until the employee was actually incapacitated
from work, but it had to be filed within one year thereafter.
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The 1939 law limited the right to recover compensation for occupational disease to
certain enumerated diseases, mostly poisonings of one kind or another, and hearing loss was
not among the listed maladies.  It was not until 1951, with the enactment of 1951 Md. Laws,
ch. 287, that coverage was provided for all occupational disease.  At that point, hearing loss
disability became compensable whether it resulted from an accidental injury (a sudden
traumatic event) or an occupational disease (repeated exposure to loud noise).  Hearing
impairment was a scheduled loss, i.e., the law then provided for the amount of compensation
to be paid for the total loss of hearing in one ear and in both ears. See Maryland Code, art.
101, § 36(b) (1957).
In Belschner, the claim was initially for hearing loss resulting from accidental injury
– a spark flying into one of Mr. Belschner’s ears – but it was amended to assert that the
disability was the result of an environment of loud noises over a period of time.  That made
it an occupational disease claim.  Belschner worked as a saw operator, and he continued to
work at that job even after the claim was amended and while it was litigated.
Notwithstanding a stipulation that Belschner suffered a 44% binaural loss of hearing due to
industrial exposure, the Commission found that he did not sustain an occupational disease
and therefore denied the claim.  The Circuit Court, on judicial review, affirmed, and so did
we.
We reached that conclusion by examining the two provisions noted above – then §
22(a) of art. 101, allowing compensation for occupational disease only when the employee
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was “thereby disabled from performing his work in the last occupation in which he was
injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease,” and then § 67(15), defining
“disablement,” for purposes of § 22, as “the event of an employee’s becoming actually
incapacitated . . . because of an occupational disease, from performing his work in the last
occupation in which exposed to the hazards of the disease.”  Contrasting those statutory
requirements for occupational diseases from our holdings with regard to accidental injuries,
we held that “the word ‘disability’ means one thing when used in providing compensation
for injury caused by an occupational disease but means something different when used in
providing compensation for accidental injury.”  Belschner, supra, 227 Md. at 93, 175 A.2d
at 421.  
Because Belschner’s claim was for occupational disease and his hearing loss did not
affect his continued employment as a saw operator, the Court held that the loss was not
compensable.  We treated Belschner’s occupational hearing loss just like any other
occupational disease – non-compensable unless the employee was unable to continue
working in the occupation that produced the disability.  We noted at the end of the Opinion
that “[i]f there is a need to liberalize the law or change what we think it plainly means, that
is a legislative, not a judicial function.”  Id. at 95, 175 A.2d at 422-23.
The Governor’s Commission to Study Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Laws,
created in 1959 to monitor the workers’ compensation law and make recommendations for
change, eventually responded to Belschner in its Seventh Report to the Governor, in
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February, 1967, with a recommendation that the law be amended “to provide for
occupational loss of hearing,” i.e., a separate provision dealing specifically with hearing loss.
1967 SEVENTH REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO STUDY MARYLAND
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, at 2.  The Commission noted:
“[a]t the present time, an employee cannot recover for
occupational loss of hearing until he shows a loss of wages, due
to court interpretation of the law; and, in many cases, the time
elapsed invokes limitations and the employee receives no
compensation.”
Id.
A bill recommended by the Commission was introduced into the 1967 session of the
General Assembly and was enacted as 1967 Md. Laws, ch. 155.  In a new § 25A(a) to art.
101, the Legislature provided that the condition it called “occupational deafness” would be
compensated “according to the terms and conditions of this section.”  Section 25A then set
forth a technical set of criteria for when occupational deafness would be compensable.
Essentially, it stated that a hearing loss in excess of 15 decibels in three frequencies (500,
1,000, and 2000 cycles per second) would be compensable.  In § 25A(g), the Legislature
provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of the article, a claim for scheduled
income benefits could not be filed “until the lapse of six full consecutive calendar months
after the termination of exposure to harmful noise in employment” and that “[t]he time
limitation for the filing of claims for occupational deafness shall not begin to run earlier than
1 That is not an unique provision with respect to hearing loss cases.  Similar
provisions are found in the workers’ compensation laws of Georgia (O.C.G.A. 34-9-
264(c)), Missouri (Mo. Stat. 287.197.7), and South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws 62-9-12). 
In 1980, the six-month provision in § 25A(g) was repealed as part of a more general
revision of the occupational disease laws.  See 1980 Md. Laws, ch. 706.  The only
explanation found in the legislative files for the deletion of the six-month provision is
testimony from a Dr. Grace Ziem, who both practiced occupational medicine and taught it
at Johns Hopkins and Baltimore City Hospitals and at OSHA, to the effect that any
increase in hearing following termination of exposure to harmful noise is temporary, that
hearing returns to its permanent amount of loss within 24 hours, and that the six month
delay is “unscientific.”
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the day following the termination of such six months’ period.”1
The wording of the 1967 statute left something to be desired, but, in Crawley v.
General Motors Corp., 70 Md. App. 100, 519 A.2d 1348, cert. denied, 310 Md. 147, 528
A.2d 473 (1987), the Court of Special Appeals, after reviewing the legislative history of the
statute, correctly concluded that which is now conceded – that the legislative intent was not
only “to provide technical criteria for measuring occupational loss of hearing but also to
make such loss compensable without regard to inability to work or loss of wages.”  Id. at 107,
519 A.2d at 1352.  The court thus held that “an employee who suffers from a condition of
impaired hearing resulted from protracted exposure to noise in the course of his occupation,
but who has not yet experienced any ‘disablement,’ i.e., loss of wages or capacity to perform
his regular work, is entitled to receive worker’s compensation.”  Id. at 101, 519 A.2d at 1349.
In 1991, as part of the general code revision process, art. 101 was repealed, and its
provisions, constituting the workers’ compensation law, were recodified as title 9 of the
Labor and Employment Article.  The new article split the former provisions between subtitles
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5, dealing with the entitlement to compensation, and 6, dealing with benefits.  Section 9-502
is the general provision requiring compensation for injuries due to occupational disease.  It
begins, in subsection (a) by defining “disablement” for purposes of that section (“In this
section, ‘disablement’ means . . .”).  (Emphasis added).  As in the predecessor statutes, the
term is defined as “the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally
incapacitated: (1) because of an occupational disease; and (2) from performing the work of
the covered employee in the last occupation in which the covered employee was injuriously
exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease.” (Emphasis added).  The defined term
appears only twice in § 9-502, both times in the subsection that provides generally for
compensation for injuries arising from occupational disease.  As relevant here, § 9-502(c)
and (d) require compensation to “a covered employee of the employer for disability of the
covered employee resulting from an occupational disease” but “only if: (1) the occupational
disease that caused the death or disability: (i) is due to the nature of an employment in which
hazards of the occupational disease exist and the covered employee was employed before the
date of disablement; or (ii) has manifestations that are consistent with those know to result
from exposure to a biological, chemical, or physical agent that is attributable to the type of
employment in which the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement
. . . .” (Emphasis added).
Section 9-505 deals specifically with occupational deafness – hearing loss due to
occupational disease rather than accidental injury.  The current version requires an employer
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to provide compensation “in accordance with this title” to a covered employee for loss of
hearing due to industrial noise in the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz.
(Emphasis added).
Section 9-505 says nothing about “disablement.”  That is because “disablement,” as
defined in § 9-502(a) for purposes of other occupational diseases, is not required as a
condition to compensation for occupational deafness.  If “disablement,” as so defined,
applied to occupational hearing loss claims, as Yox argues and our dissenting colleagues
seem to believe, the whole purpose of the 1967 enactment, repealing the decision in
Belschner and allowing compensation even when there is no wage loss or impairment, would
be negated.  As the Crawley court made clear, the Legislature intended to make occupational
hearing loss compensable without regard to “disablement” as generally defined.
Section 9-711(a) – the general limitations provision applicable to occupational
diseases – provides that “[i]f a covered employee suffers a disablement or death as a result
of an occupational disease, the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee
shall file a claim with the Commission within 2 years . . . after the date: (1) of disablement
or death; or (2) when the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee first
had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused by the employment.”
Notwithstanding that § 9-502(a) expressly limits the definition of “disablement” to that
section, which is not only consistent with, but required by, the objective of § 9-505, Yox and
the dissent would import that definition into § 9-711(a) and thus apply it as well to claims for
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occupational hearing loss.  What they overlook, however, is the fact that, in cases of
occupational hearing loss, that definition of “disablement” does not and cannot apply,
because it is wholly inconsistent with the substance and avowed purpose of § 9-505.
That is not to say that there is no statute of limitations for occupational hearing loss
claims.  We try to read statutes in harmony, so that all provisions can be given reasonable
effect.  See Balto. Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 305 Md. 145, 157, 501 A.2d 1307,
1313 (1986) (“[A] provision contained within an integrated statutory scheme must be
understood in that context and harmonized to the extent possible with other provisions of the
statutory scheme”); State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997) (quoting
State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39, 607 A.2d 552, 555 (1992)) (“We presume that the legislature
intends its enactments ‘to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of
law.’”);Carter v. Maryland Management, 377 Md. 596, 613, 835 A.2d 158, 168 (2003)
(same).  We do not interpret statutes in ways that produce absurd results that could never
have been intended by the Legislature.  
The 1967 statute, now spread between § 9-505 and §§ 9-649 through 9-652, provided
a different, and entirely rational, definition of “disablement” in occupational hearing loss
cases.  In place of wage loss or impairment – the objective standard applicable to other
occupational diseases – it substituted the specific objective criteria for measuring
compensable hearing loss.  If a covered employee suffers that degree of hearing loss, he/she
is, for purposes of compensation, disabled.  That is what “disablement” means in
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occupational hearing loss cases.  That is all it could mean if § 9-505 itself is to have any
meaning.  When read that way, § 9-711 makes perfect and harmonious sense.  A claim for
occupational hearing loss must be filed within two years after the date when the employee
(1) first suffered the requisite degree of hearing loss, and (2) first had actual knowledge that
that disablement was caused by the employment.
In this case, Mr. Yox undisputably suffered that disablement and had actual
knowledge that it was caused by his employment some 13 years before he filed his claim.
That is why the claim was properly rejected. 
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED,
WITH COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No.  31
September Term, 2003
__________________________________
ARNOLD C. YOX
v.
TRU-ROL COMPANY, INC., ET AL
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion  by Battaglia, J.
which Bell, C.J. and  Eldridge, J., join.
Filed: March 15, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
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I respectfully dissent.  Although the majority concedes that Section 9-711(a) is the
general limitations provision applicable to occupational diseases, it declines to apply that
section as it is written to occupational hearing loss, an occupational disease, because it does
not like the result.  Instead, the majority creates its own statute of limitations period for
occupational hearing loss claimants.  In so doing, the majority ignores the plain language of
the statute, declines to adhere to the canon of statutory construction that any uncertainty in
the Worker’s Compensation Act should be resolved in favor of the claimant, and usurps the
General Assembly’s role in crafting workers’ compensation policy. 
As we have often said, when we construe statutes, our goal is to “identify and
effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.”  Derry v. State, 358 Md.
325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000); see also Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v.
Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Tucker v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731 (1986).  The best source of legislative
intent is the statute’s plain language.  Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 349, 800
A.2d 707, 715  (2002).  When the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily
ends there.  Id.  This  Court will "neither add nor delete words in order to give the statute a
meaning not otherwise communicated by the language used."  Harris v. Bd. of Educ., 375
Md. 21, 31, 825 A.2d 365, 371(2003)(quoting Blind Indus. & Servs. v. Maryland Dep't of
Gen. Servs., 371 Md. 221, 231, 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2002)); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ins.
Comm'r, 352 Md. 561, 573, 723 A.2d 891, 896 (1999)(explaining that the Court will not,
“under the guise of construction, . . . supply omissions in the statute, . . . or . . . insert
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exceptions not made by the Legislature”); Amalgamated Casualty Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md.
529, 535, 212 A.2d 311, 316 (1965)(opining that, “as a general rule a court may not surmise
a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute, nor insert or omit words to
make the statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form”).  Even when the
statutory language is clear, we construe the provision at issue in light of the statutory
scheme’s overall purpose and in the context in which the words of the statute are used.
Polomski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 75-76, 684 A.2d 1338, 1340
(1996).  We, thus, utilize a “commonsensical” approach to statutory interpretation so that we
may best effectuate the General Assembly's intent.  Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772
A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001).
In Maryland, occupational hearing loss is an occupational disease.  Belschner v.
Anchor Post Products, Inc., 227 Md. 89, 91-92, 175 A.2d 419, 420-21 (1961); Armco Steel
Corp. v. Trafton, 35 Md. App. 658, 659 n.1, 371 A.2d 1128, 1129 n.1 (1977), cert. denied,
281 Md. 733 (1977).  The statute of limitations for occupational disease begins to run at
disablement under Section 9-711 of the Worker’s Compensation Act, codified under
Maryland Code, Sections 9-101 - 9-1201 of the Labor and Employment Article (1991, 1999
Repl. Vol.).  The trigger of “disablement” is not defined in that provision.  Section 9-502(a)
of the Act defines disablement for occupational diseases:
(a) "Disablement" defined. -- In this section, "disablement"
means the event of a covered employee becoming partially or
totally incapacitated: 
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(1) because of an occupational disease; and 
(2) from performing the work of the covered
employee in the last occupation in which the
covered employee was injuriously exposed to the
hazards of the occupational disease. 
In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Schwing, 351 Md. 178, 717 A.2d 919 (1998), we
determined that Section 9-502(a)’s definition of disablement applies to the term disablement
used in Section 9-711.  Id. at 181, 717 A.2d at 920 (accepting the Court of Special Appeals’
holding in Helinski v. C. & P. Telephone Co., 108 Md. App. 461, 672 A.2d 155, cert. denied,
342 Md. 582, 678 A.2d 1047 (1996), that disablement means incapacitation or inability to
work for the purposes of Section 9-711 in a case where the claimant suffered from contact-
allergic dermatitis of the eyelid).  The majority, thus, is incorrect in its assertion that Section
9-502(a)’s definition of disablement may not be “import[ed]” to Section 9-711(a).  We
concluded otherwise in Schwing.  Our determination in that case should control here as well.
Although the majority does not discuss Schwing, it does undertake an analysis of
Section 9-505 – an analysis that I conclude is faulty.  The majority seems to support its
contention that occupational hearing loss claims are distinct from other occupational diseases
with respect to the limitations period because Section 9-505 instructs that compensation
should be provided “in accordance with this title.”  The title, in this instance, is Title 9 of the
Labor and Employment Article, which codifies the entire Worker’s Compensation Act.  If
anything, the fact that compensation for occupational hearing loss claimants should be
provided “in accordance with this title” weakens the majority’s argument, as the statute of
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limitations period for occupational diseases is found also in Title 9.  See Section 9-711.
There is nothing unusual about this.  For example, Section 9-709 is the statute of
limitations period for claims for accidental injuries, although Section 9-501 contains the
provisions requiring compensation for such injuries.  Like Section 9-505, Section 9-501 also
instructs that its provisions are to be read “in accordance with this title.”  We have held that
Section 9-709's statute of limitations period applies to Section 9-501.  DeBusk v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432, 440, 677 A.2d 73, 76-77 (1996)(explaining that Section 9-709
provides a two-year statute of limitations period for employees suffering accidental injuries
to bring a claim).  Likewise, we should hold that Section 9-711(a)’s statute of limitations
period applies to Section 9-505.
Asserting the unsurprising fact that Section 9-505 should be read in accordance with
Title 9, the majority then argues that, because Section 9-505 “says nothing about
‘disablement,’” disablement does not trigger the statute of limitations for occupational
hearing loss cases.  But while the majority is right to say that Section 9-505 says nothing
about disablement, the majority neglects to observe that the section  says nothing about the
statute of limitations either.  Rather, it instructs, as the majority points out, that compensation
should be provided to claimants “in accordance with this title.”  Section 9-711(a) is the
statute of limitations period for occupational diseases in Title 9.  The fact that it is triggered
by disablement does not change how it applies. 
Nevertheless, the majority seems to suggest that, because Section 9-505 does not
2See NUMBER OF NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES INVOLVING
DAYS AWAY FROM WORK BY SELECTED WORKERS AND CASE CHARACTERISTICS AND
NATURE OF INJURY OR ILLNESS, ALL UNITED STATES, PRIVATE INDUSTRY, 2001, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm (indicating 171 reported cases of employees missing
work due to deafness, hearing loss or impairment).
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define disablement, disablement simply cannot be part of the statute of limitations period for
an occupational hearing loss claim.  But, as the intermediate appellate court noted, there are
instances when occupational hearing loss prevents people from working,2 and surely these
disabled claimants would have to meet the threshold hearing loss requirements pursuant to
Section 9-505 to be compensated.  As the majority rightly observes and as the Crawley court
pointed out, Section 9-505 defines when occupational hearing loss is compensable regardless
of whether or not the claimant was prevented by the injury from working.  Crawley v.
General Motors Corp., 70 Md. App. 100, 107, 519 A.2d 1348, 1352, cert. denied, 310 Md.
147, 528 A.2d 473 (1987).  In this way, contrary to the majority’s reading of the statute, some
occupational hearing loss claimants may be disabled even though “disablement” is not
mentioned in Section 9-505.  Yet  the trigger of disablement required by Section 9-711 could
– and presumably does – still apply.
Furthermore, the fact that the General Assembly deemed it necessary to enact Section
9-505 to allow compensation to occur while the occupational hearing loss claimant continued
working does not compel the conclusion that it intended to accelerate the statute of
3The General Assembly might have provided more time for occupational hearing
loss claimants who are able to continue working because, generally, hearing loss often
begins with a slight impairment and gradually worsens over time.  See RICHARD P.
GILBERT & ROBERT L. HUMPHREYS,  JR.,  MARYLAND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
HANDBOOK § 8.13 (2d ed. 1993)(describing occupational hearing loss as a “hybrid form
of occupational ‘disease’” because, although hearing loss ordinarily occurs over time, it
can be caused by an immediate injury as well); 3 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON,
LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 52.05 (2003)(noting that, given the nature of
the disease, individuals suffering from occupational hearing loss often are able to
continue to work and to draw wages).  
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limitations for such claims as well.3  Rather, such a result is consistent with the benevolent
nature of the statute, see Harris, 375 Md. at 57, 825 A.2d at 387, and it is consistent with the
fact that the General Assembly decided to carve out a benefit for hearing loss claimants under
Section 9-505.
In addition, reviewing Section 9-505's legislative history does not reveal any intent
on the General Assembly’s part to provide an alternative statute of limitations for
occupational hearing loss claimants.  In 1967, when the General Assembly carved out an
exception to the Belschner rule by enacting Section 25A of former Article 101, it did so in
response to the Governor's 1967 Commission to Study Maryland Workmen's Compensation
Laws.  See 1967 Md. Laws, ch. 155; 1967 SEVENTH REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S
COMMISSION TO STUDY MARYLAND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS (hereinafter
“Commission Report”).  With respect to occupational hearing loss, the Governor’s
Commission noted that it made its recommendation because “an employee cannot recover
for occupational loss of hearing until he shows a loss of wages, due to court interpretation
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of the law.”  Commission Report at 2.  Concerned with the fact that the “employee receive[d]
no compensation” in spite of suffering hearing loss, the Commission made its
recommendation because it believed hearing loss claimants should be compensated
irrespective of  disablement.  Id.; see also Crawley, 70 Md. App. at 107, 519 A.2d at 1352.
When the General Assembly enacted Section 9-505, it clearly intended to provide a benefit
to hearing loss claimants; I, however, discern no legislative intent to create a separate statute
of limitations for hearing loss claims or that the statute of limitations existing at that time,
also triggered by disablement, did not apply.
For these reasons, I believe that a plain reading of the statutory provisions at issue, a
review of our cases regarding these provisions, and Section 9-505's legislative history
necessitates the conclusion that disablement triggers the statute of limitations for
occupational hearing loss.  Even if the majority believes the Act is uncertain or ambiguous
on this point, however, I also believe we should read the Act’s provisions in favor of the
claimant, in conformance with our repeated assertion that "the Workers' Compensation Act
. . . should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will
permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.  Any uncertainty in the law should be
resolved in favor of the claimant.”  Harris, 375 Md. at 57, 825 A.2d at 387 (quoting Mayor
of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97, 656 A.2d 757, 761-62 (1995)).  We have also
explained that all of the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act must be read together,
and this Court may neither “stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that
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the injured worker may prevail.”  Breitenbach v. N. B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 473, 784
A.2d 569, 573 (2001)(quoting Philip Elecs. North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 212, 703
A.2d 150, 151 (1997)( superceded by statute on other grounds)).  While the Court  “may not
create ambiguity or uncertainty in the Act's provisions where none exists so that a provision
may be interpreted in favor of the injured claimant,” any existing ambiguity or uncertainty
should be resolved in the claimant’s favor.  Id.  "The Workers' Compensation Act . . . should
be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order
to effectuate its benevolent purposes.”  Harris, 375 Md. at 57, 825 A.2d at 387 (quoting
Cassidy, 338 Md. at 97, 656 A.2d at 761-62).  The majority ignores these teachings. 
The majority creates a separate statute of limitations period for occupational hearing
loss claimants.  While the majority’s judicially-created statute of limitations may be
reasonable policy, it is up to the Legislature to develop workers’ compensation policy – not
this Court.  Philip Elecs. North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 229, 703 A.2d 150, 159
(1997)(superceded by statute)(explaining that the “sensitive balancing of respective interests”
involved in workers’ compensation policy is appropriately within the province of the General
Assembly).  It is inappropriate for this Court to supply omitted words or remedy defects in
a statute when there is no evidence to suggest we should do as such in the text of the statute
or in the legislative history.  See Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 371 Md. 576, 581, 810
A.2d 938, 941 (2002)(stating that “[w]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
a court may neither add nor delete language so as ‘to reflect an intent not evidenced in that
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language,’ nor may it construe the statute with ‘forced or subtle interpretations that limit or
extend its application’” (citation omitted)); Amalgamated Cas. Ins., 239 Md. at 535, 212
A.2d at 316 (stating that “as a general rule a court may not surmise a legislative intention
contrary to the plain language of a statute, nor insert or omit words to make the statute
express an intention not evidenced in its original form”).  The majority oversteps its role.
In conclusion, when the General Assembly enacted Section 9-505, it did so to define
when occupational hearing losses become compensable, and it did not change the statute of
limitations for such claims in any way.  Perhaps it should have; perhaps it will.  But that is
the General Assembly’s prerogative, not ours.  We should refrain from imposing our concept
of sound workers’ compensation policy in this arena and leave that task to the General
Assembly, where it belongs.  I dissent.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge authorize me to state that they join in this
dissent.