Title: Robbin E. Ridling v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 06-1049 ROBBIN E. RIDLING Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered September 27, 2007 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MILLER COUNTY, CR 2002-451, HON. KIRK DOUGLAS JOHNSON, JUDGE AFFIRMED. PER CURIAM A jury found appellant Robbin E. Ridling guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to life without parole. This court affirmed the judgment. Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424, 203 S.W.3d 63 (2005). Appellant timely filed in the trial court a pro se petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Appellant later retained counsel, and his attorney filed an amended petition that was permitted by the trial court in substitution for the initial petition. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition and entered an order that included findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order acknowledged the permitted amendment, but indicated any additional arguments contained in a brief filed by counsel were rejected as an attempt to circumvent the court’s previous ruling that appellant would not be permitted to exceed the page limitation on the petition under our rule. Appellant brings this appeal of that order. He asserts error by the trial court in seven points, as follows: (1) failure to permit appellant to present testimony concerning the suggestiveness of a pretrial identification; (2) failure to find trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the same -2- pretrial identification; (3) failure to find trial counsel was ineffective for not raising an objection to testimony concerning appellant’s refusing to submit to a taped interview; (4) failure to find a violation of appellant’s due process rights as a result of admission of the same testimony; (5) failure to find trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to hearsay testimony; (6) failure to find trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness for testimony concerning appellant’s return of a softball bat; (7) failure to find trial counsel was ineffective for opening the door to evidence of marital infidelity and violence. The facts of the case are presented in more detail in our opinion on appellant’s direct appeal, but a brief summary of some of the evidence presented at trial to show that appellant murdered Roy Baskett should suffice for this review. Mr. Baskett, also known as “Captain,” had a friendly relationship with appellant and his wife, Lisa Graf, until shortly before Mr. Baskett was reported missing. Mr. Baskett was last seen alive on August 4, 2002. The night before, Mr. Baskett had gone to the Ridling house to confront them. Mr. Baskett made offensive remarks about the Ridlings, including calling Lisa a slut and accusing her of complicity in the theft of Mr. Baskett’s wallet. Mr. Baskett had challenged appellant to fight him, and appellant refused, citing Mr. Baskett’s age and the fact that Mr. Baskett had a gun as the reasons. After Mr. Baskett was reported missing, police officers spoke with Lisa and appellant and were told that the couple had not seen Mr. Baskett in at least two weeks. Lisa was suspicious of her husband and questioned him about his involvement after her initial contact with the police. Appellant denied having done anything to Mr. Baskett and told his wife to stick to the story she had told the officers. When questioned by the police, appellant said he had been at home all day the Sunday that Mr. Baskett disappeared until he left for work, that he had not gone to Mr. Baskett’s -3- house and that his truck had not been there. This was in opposition to information the police received from Ms. Florence Seale, Mr. Baskett’s neighbor, who testified that she saw appellant and Mr. Baskett leave in appellant’s truck on August 4, 2002. The police attempted to schedule another interview with Lisa, but appellant called and cancelled the appointment for her. On the next date that Lisa was scheduled for a taped interview, appellant appeared with Lisa and would not allow her to be interviewed without being present. He also appeared and participated in a second taped interview that the police scheduled. Following that interview, on August 21, 2002, the police seized appellant’s truck pursuant to a warrant. The preliminary search indicated the presence of blood, some of which was later to be confirmed as Mr. Baskett’s. Lisa began cooperating with the police and confirmed the incident with Mr. Baskett the night before he disappeared, her husband’s absence for several hours the following day, and other suspicious activity. Bone fragments that were later identified as Mr. Baskett’s were located during searches conducted at the Hope Upland Wildlife Area in September and October of 2002, along with keys to Mr. Baskett’s car and house, a hat and other items identified as belonging to Mr. Baskett, and an axe that was identified as having been in appellant’s tool shed prior to its discovery at the wildlife area. These items were located near to or in an area that had been covered by stacked branches where smell and appearance of the soil were consistent with decomposition of a body. An officer with the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission testified that appellant had driven into a parking lot for this area during the early hours before daylight on August 30, 2002. On that occasion, appellant was wearing his uniform for work at UPS. Cell phone records also placed appellant within a few miles of the area on August 5, 2002, the day after Mr. Baskett disappeared. -4- Appellant was incarcerated at the time of the second search, and another inmate, William Gainey, Jr., testified that appellant had told him that the police were looking in the correct area but would not find anything. Mr. Gainey also said that appellant told him that he and Baskett were going to the bank on the Sunday that Mr. Baskett was last seen alive. Appellant’s first allegation of error relates to evidence he attempted to admit related to his claim of ineffective assistance in his second point. We will therefore address these first two points together. In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel’s performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). The Strickland standard is a two-part test. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under this standard, a defendant must first show that counsel's performance was deficient, with errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and second, the defendant must also show that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense through a showing that petitioner was deprived of a fair trial. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. The defendant claiming ineffective assistance of -5- counsel has the burden of overcoming that presumption by identifying the acts and omissions of counsel which, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Burton v. State, 367 Ark. 109, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). The petitioner must show that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt and that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id. In his amended petition, appellant contended that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion to challenge the identification of appellant by the State’s witness, Ms. Seale. Appellant, in his brief on appeal, alleges error by the trial court in failing to permit appellant to present Ms. Seale’s testimony concerning the circumstances of her pretrial identification of appellant, to develop a timeline for the identification with Ms. Seale’s diary entries, or to present a tape recording of the police interview with Ms. Seale. Appellant argues that he was unable to meet his burden of proof on the issue as a result of the exclusion of this evidence. Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in finding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the identification. The trial court’s order reflected that the court did not permit presentation of testimony concerning whether or not Ms. Seale’s out-of-court identification of appellant was improper because the evidence that was presented supported a finding that trial counsel made an informed decision not to challenge that identification as trial strategy. The court found that counsel had considered a challenge and concluded the testimony would be beneficial, in that Ms. Seale would testify that she saw Mr. Baskett leave with appellant willingly, going to the passenger side of the truck without apparent coercion or trepidation. The court also found that there was information available to counsel indicating a challenge could fail should the court determine Ms. Seale’s identification was -6- reliable, even if the procedures used in the identification had been suggestive. The court emphasized independent testimony corroborating Ms. Seale’s testimony that she had observed appellant at Mr. Baskett’s house prior to the day of the disappearance and indicating that Ms. Seale accurately recalled that event. Despite appellant’s contention that Ms. Seale’s testimony was “the linchpin of the State’s case,” there was other, much stronger evidence that appellant committed the murder. Appellant initially told the police that he had not seen Mr. Baskett for weeks and had not left home before time for work. However, the testimony at trial from Lisa and appellant was that appellant did leave his house the day after a confrontation with Baskett, after Lisa had urged him to “handle this situation,” and that appellant told Lisa he was leaving to return a baseball bat and needed to take care of some things. Lisa testified that she observed appellant washing out the interior of the truck later the same day. Mr. Baskett’s blood was found on the passenger side seat belt latch in appellant’s truck and there was evidence of other blood that could not be identified on the same side. Ms. Seale’s testimony was very significant, but despite counsel’s testimony admitting that the testimony could be considered crucial in the State’s case, it was not determinative. We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that counsel provided reasonable professional assistance in making a strategic decision not to challenge the identification so as to exclude Ms. Seale’s testimony. Because the trial court correctly determined that counsel had made a strategic decision not to challenge the testimony, the court did not need to consider whether a challenge would have been successful, and it was not reversible error to exclude evidence concerning the suggestiveness of the pre-trial identification. Trial counsel testified that he did interview Ms. Seale, and the trial court found that notes by counsel introduced at the Rule 37.1 hearing further indicated that counsel was cognizant of the issue -7- and did include consideration of it in his pretrial preparation. Counsel had testified that he was aware other evidence would be admitted that placed appellant together with Mr. Baskett on the day of his disappearance. His conclusion was that the better strategy was to use Ms. Seale’s testimony to challenge what he perceived as a weak link in the capital charge concerning the kidnapping elements, rather than to seek exclusion of her testimony. Where the trial court has determined a decision by counsel was a matter of trial tactics or strategy, and that decision is supported by reasonable professional judgment, then a decision not to call a witness or challenge a statement may not be a proper basis for relief under Rule 37.1. Weatherford v. State, 363 Ark. 579, 215 S.W.3d 642 (2005) (per curiam). Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, fall within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment and are not grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Noel, 342 Ark. at 41, 26 S.W.3d at 127. Even though another attorney may have chosen a different course, trial strategy, even if it proves unsuccessful, is a matter of professional judgment. Id. Here, counsel had made a tactical decision not to challenge Ms. Seale’s statements. It was not unreasonable professional judgment to choose not to challenge those statements where other evidence could, and did, come in that supported the State’s argument that appellant went to Mr. Baskett’s house that day, and where, with admission of the statements, counsel could argue against an element of the capital charge based upon Ms. Seale’s testimony concerning Mr. Baskett’s demeanor. The additional evidence that appellant sought to admit concerning the suggestiveness of the pretrial identification therefore had no bearing on resolution of the issue, and the trial court did not err either in finding that the evidence would not be considered or that counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the identification. -8- Appellant next contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to references to appellant’s failure to submit to a tape-recorded interview. Appellant characterizes these references as comment upon appellant’s silence and a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The comments were elicited by the prosecution from the witnesses concerning appellant’s having declined to provide a taped interview, other than on those occasions that Lisa had agreed to an interview. Appellant contends that, because those comments were not clearly limited to any requests before appellant’s arrest, the prosecution was improperly commenting upon his right to remain silent following his arrest. Appellant does not contend that, had the comments been limited to those concerning appellant declining offers for taped interviews prior to his arrest, the testimony would not have been proper. As the State notes, the holding in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), acknowledges that comments upon prearrest silence would not violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Appellant cites Freeman v. Class, 95 F.3d 539 (8 Cir. 1996), in support of his contention that there th could be no reasonable basis not to object to those comments to the extent that they might be construed to reference the postarrest silence, and he argues that the trial court erred in finding the failure to object was a part of counsel’s trial strategy. But Freeman is not analogous to the circumstances here. Freeman dealt with trial counsel who failed to object to comment on the defendant’s silence contrasted to his co-defendant’s postarrest statement that implicated the defendant. The implication in that case was clearly that the defendant’s postarrest silence evidenced his guilt and the jury could not reasonably have interpreted it otherwise. Under the circumstances of that case, there may well have been no reasonable strategy that would support withholding an objection. Taken in context, -9- the comments in this case are not so clearly a reference to the defendant’s postarrest silence. Here, the thrust of the prosecution’s argument was that appellant lied in his initial statements to the police and attempted to tailor his statements to information he knew was available to the police. The point that he refused to provide further taped statements individually, and only did so rather than permit Lisa to provide a statement without him, clearly referenced the invitations extended to him prior to his arrest. While the comments could have referenced any postarrest invitations or opportunities as well, there were no direct references to any invitations to appellant to provide a statement after his arrest. The State sought to portray appellant as attempting to provide only false statements he could tailor so as to be more believable by being consistent with Lisa’s statements. The defense countered by attempting to show the police were wrongly focused on appellant to the exclusion of other suspects, and highlighted what was portrayed as appellant’s voluntary cooperation. The trial court had already ruled that the prosecution was permitted to bring out the extent to which appellant’s statements might not be voluntary, that he might be attempting to tailor his statements so as to be consistent with Lisa’s. The comments did not clearly reference any refusal by appellant to provide postarrest interviews; it was established that appellant was asked and had declined to provide taped statements before his arrest, but there was no testimony that appellant was asked to provide a statement following his arrest. The comments were broad statements that appellant had declined to provide any taped interviews, other than those with Lisa, after his initial untaped interview. The jury may well not have interpreted the statements as comments on appellant’s postarrest silence. Should counsel have objected, even if sustained as to any reference to postarrest statements, the prosecution -10- would still have been entitled to elicit the information concerning appellant’s choosing to decline the prearrest invitations for taped interviews. Considering appellant’s defense, counsel may well have reasonably determined an objection would call unwanted attention to the testimony, and possibly suggested an interpretation the jury may not have gleaned on its own. Appellant’s fourth point, in a similar vein, alleges a free-standing due process violation because, during cross-examination, the prosecution referenced appellant’s failure to provide the police with the story of the events of August 4, 2002, as those events were detailed in his testimony, prior to the trial. Appellant again alleges a violation of his constitutional rights, citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and Freeman. But, taken in the larger context of the evidence already presented, the prosecutor’s questions were, once again, not a comment on appellant’s postarrest silence, but a comment on what the State asserted was an attempt to mold appellant’s testimony to the evidence presented at trial. The circumstances here were more analogous to those in Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000), than to those in Doyle or Freeman. This is not a situation where appellant had made no statements prior to or after his arrest. He had given statements before being arrested, and those statements were not consistent with his testimony at trial. The comments by the prosecution here directed attention to those inconsistencies, and any implication that appellant’s invocation of his right to silence after his arrest spoke to his guilt was minimal in comparison to the prosecution’s forceful allegation that appellant was attempting to tailor his story to the evidence at trial. To the extent that appellant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s question in this point, appellant has not shown that any objection would have been successful to keep out the testimony, that any ruling would have provided more than a limiting -11- instruction which would have called additional attention to what would have been proper, compelling testimony about appellant’s shifting story, and therefore appellant has failed to show any prejudice. To the extent that appellant urges that this should be a free-standing constitutional claim, we cannot say that appellant has shown fundamental error. This court has held that even constitutional issues must be raised at trial or on direct appeal, rather than in postconviction relief proceedings. Williams v. State, 346 Ark 54, 56 S.W.3d 360 (2001). We have made an exception to the rule in those cases where the errors are so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999) (per curiam); see also Kemp v. State, 330 Ark. 757, 956 S.W.2d 860 (1997) (per curiam). The due process claims here, under the circumstances noted, are not such fundamental error. Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to find counsel ineffective for failure to object to certain hearsay testimony. The court found that the statements were admissible under exceptions to the hearsay rule as found in Ark. R. Evid. 803, and that further to those exceptions and other indicia of reliability, the statements were admissible. Appellant argues that the court erred because the holding in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), prohibits introduction of such evidence unless the defendant has been provided an opportunity to confront the declarant whose statements are thus admitted, whether the statements would have been admissible under one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule or not, and that to admit such evidence violates the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him under the Confrontation Clause. Appellant does not clearly contend that the trial court erred in determining that the exceptions in Rule 803 were applicable, and makes no argument to that effect, although in his reply brief he does assert that the statements must have been asserted for the truth of the matter in response to the State’s contention -12- the statements were not testimonial. The trial court did not find the statements were not hearsay, but that the statements fell within exceptions to the rule. The basis of appellant’s argument is restricted to his assertion that Crawford requires the statements be excluded, and overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). As the State notes, the trial court only addressed statements made in testimony of two witnesses. We limit our review to those statements on which appellant received a ruling. Failure to obtain a ruling on an issue at the trial court level precludes review on appeal. See Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); Beshears v. State, 340 Ark. 70, 8 S.W.3d 32 (2000). Each of the hearsay statements that were addressed by the court were statements made by the victim, Mr. Baskett, and related by the two witnesses, Mr. Baskett’s girlfriend and a gentleman who did work for Mr. Baskett and knew him well. In Dednam v. State, 360 Ark. 240, 200 S.W.3d 875 (2005), we considered application of Crawford, and noted that for Crawford to apply in that case, the declarant’s statements must have constituted testimonial hearsay. While appellant implies that the statements here were testimonial, they were not. The statements by the victim that were admitted were made to the witnesses, who were not government officials. The victim did not give the statements in a formal declaration intended in preparation for litigation. He did not provide the statements in anticipation of a trial for his own murder. These statements by the victim were clearly within the category of more casual statement that the Court in Crawford excluded from its application. Appellant appears to contend that the statements were testimonial because they were admitted for the truth, that appellant did not waive any of his rights. The Supreme Court limited Crawford’s application to statements that were not only hearsay, but which were also testimonial in nature. The -13- Court in Crawford did not provide a precise definition for testimonial statements, but gave guidelines. These statements were clearly outside of the scope to which Crawford held the Confrontation Clause should apply. Appellant did not have a right of confrontation, under the circumstances, to waive. Whether or not the trial court’s alternate holding that the statements had other indicia of reliability was misplaced, the court found that the statements fell within exceptions to the hearsay rule. We would agree that an objection based upon the Confrontation Clause would have been meritless. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make an argument that is meritless, either at trial or on appeal. Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001). Appellant’s sixth point of error alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness to testify concerning the return of the baseball bat. Counsel sought to admit an affidavit showing that the bat was returned to a Wal-Mart store three days after Mr. Baskett’s disappearance. Counsel testified that when the affidavit was not admitted for lack of authentication, he considered calling as a witness a representative of the store to establish the bat’s return on that date. He did not follow through to do so, however, because the State did not contest appellant’s testimony at trial that he had in fact returned the bat on that date. The trial court found that appellant did not meet his burden to show that, had the witness been called, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. The objective in reviewing an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the failure to call certain witnesses is to determine whether this failure resulted in actual prejudice that denied the petitioner a fair trial. Hill v. State, 292 Ark. 144, 728 S.W.2d 510 (1987). An attorney’s decision not to call a particular witness is largely a matter of professional judgment, and the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not, -14- itself, proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38 S.W.3d 334 (2001). The significance of the bat’s return to show that the bat was not the murder weapon is not as great as appellant contends. The witness at the Rule 37.1 hearing testified that the store’s policy on returns was such that a badly damaged bat would not have been accepted. Appellant does not contend that counsel could have produced a witness to testify as to the actual condition of the bat when it was returned. The State argues that the bat might have been used only to threaten the victim, and while the prosecutor did make some reference to the possibility that the bat was used to hit the victim, there was no evidence as to what was done to the victim to cause his death. The bat as the murder weapon was not, as appellant would characterize it, a central portion of the State’s theory. The bat’s return had much more impact as to the date it occurred, three days after Mr. Baskett disappeared, rather than on August 4, 2002. Appellant admitted to having returned the bat after August 4, 2002, in his testimony at trial, but appellant had told Lisa he was going to return the bat when he left their house on the day Mr. Baskett disappeared. This information came into the record through the appellant’s own testimony and had far greater impact on the outcome of the trial than the condition of the bat. Counsel may well have reasoned that, as the State did not challenge the point as to when the bat was returned, reemphasizing that information might have weighed against any benefit from testimony about the possible condition of the bat on its return, even though it bolstered appellant’s testimony on the point. We cannot say that there would have been a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result if the witness had testified. The trial court’s finding that appellant failed to show actual prejudice was not clearly erroneous. In appellant’s last point, he asserts trial counsel was ineffective for opening the door to evidence of marital infidelity and evidence of appellant’s violence in association with that issue. The -15- trial court found that counsel had made a strategic decision to first interject the issue of marital infidelity into the proceedings in an effort to discredit Lisa. The trial court correctly characterized Lisa as the most damaging witness for the prosecution. Appellant argues that he was convicted as a result of the evidence admitted during the trial that he had been unfaithful to his previous wife and additional evidence that came in, as a result of the admission of that evidence, concerning a restraining order and appellant’s hitting his previous wife. Even though that evidence may have been prejudicial, there was a great deal of other, more compelling evidence that appellant was responsible for Mr. Baskett’s demise, a great deal of it directly attributable to Lisa’s testimony. We cannot say that appellant met his burden to show that the decision reached would have been different absent that evidence, even had counsel erred in adopting tactics that allowed the evidence to come in. Moreover, trial counsel’s obvious strategy was to discredit Lisa’s testimony by showing that she was a suspicious, jealous wife, who was afraid of the police and the potential for her own implication in the crime. Again, that the strategy may have failed or proved improvident is not proof that counsel was ineffective. Noel, 342 Ark. at 41, 26 S.W.3d at 127; see also Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38 S.W.3d 334 (2001). Appellant offers no alternate means by which counsel could have challenged Lisa’s testimony or implemented this strategy, or any other, without raising these issues. We cannot say the strategy, under the circumstances of this case, was not an exercise of reasonable professional judgment. The trial court did not err in finding trial counsel was not ineffective. Having found no reversible error, we affirm the order denying postconviction relief. Affirmed.