Title: State ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1069.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1069 
THE STATE EX REL. DOBSON, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, v. HANDWORK, JUDGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork, Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-1069.] 
Prohibition—Once judgment of sentence has been appealed, trial court loses 
jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal—Because defendant 
had filed notice of appeal from judgment of sentence, trial court did not 
have jurisdiction to rule on defendant’s postjudgment motions to modify 
judgment of sentence—Writ of prohibition granted. 
(No. 2019-1198—Submitted December 10, 2019—Decided March 26, 2020.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney Paul A. Dobson, seeks a 
writ of prohibition against respondent, Judge Peter M. Handwork, who presided in 
State v. Schuman, Wood C.P. case Nos. 2017-CR-0501, 2018-CR-0063, and 2018-
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CR-0160.  In those criminal cases, Judge Handwork found Andrew R. Schuman 
guilty of seven felony counts and sentenced him to community control, which 
included a 45-day jail term. 
{¶ 2} After entry of the judgment of sentence and the filing of Schuman’s 
appeal from it, Judge Handwork considered two motions filed by Schuman and 
issued two orders modifying the judgment of sentence.  Dobson seeks a writ of 
prohibition to vacate the two postjudgment orders and to prohibit any further 
exercise of jurisdiction by Judge Handwork except in aid of the appeal and asks us 
to order that the costs of this action be paid by Judge Handwork.  Because Judge 
Handwork did not file an answer, Dobson has also filed a motion for default 
judgment.  No response to the motion has been filed. 
{¶ 3} Based on our review of the amended complaint and the exhibits 
attached to it, we grant the motion for default judgment, and pursuant to 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C), we issue a peremptory writ of prohibition. 
I. Facts 
{¶ 4} The criminal cases against Schuman, who is an attorney, involved 
three consolidated indictments.  On May 29, 2019, after a bench trial, Judge 
Handwork issued a judgment entry finding Schuman guilty of seven felony 
offenses.  In case No. 2018-CR-0063, the judge found Schuman guilty of five 
counts of tampering with records, all third-degree felonies; one count of perjury, a 
third-degree felony; and one count of theft, a fifth-degree felony.1  The judge 
acquitted Schuman of the counts alleged in the other two indictments. 
{¶ 5} At the sentencing hearing, the judge discussed Schuman’s 
community-control conditions, including the requirement that Schuman avoid 
contact with “other individuals on probation, parole, community control, or any 
                                                 
1. The same misconduct was the subject of a disciplinary proceeding against Schuman.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman, 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-8800, 92 N.E.2d 850; In re 
Schuman, 156 Ohio St.3d 1482, 2019-Ohio-3216, 129 N.E.3d 448. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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individual who has been convicted of [a] felony offense,” with the only exception 
being “individuals in treatment or counseling, or those attending a 12-step support 
meeting, and only while in said meetings.”  Schuman’s counsel pointed out that if 
Schuman returned to the practice of law, the no-contact condition would present “a 
significant problem” because Schuman had practiced criminal law.  Counsel then 
asked the judge to modify the no-contact condition so that Schuman would be 
permitted to interact with such individuals in his professional capacity.  The judge 
stated that he would take this request for a practice-of-law exception to the no-
contact condition under advisement. 
{¶ 6} On August 5, 2019, Judge Handwork issued a judgment of sentence 
imposing the three-year community-control sentence, which included a 45-day jail 
term and the above-quoted no-contact condition.  The no-contact condition set forth 
in the judgment of sentence did not include the practice-of-law exception that 
Schuman’s counsel had requested at the sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 7} Schuman appealed the judgment of sentence to the court of appeals 
on August 7, 2019.  That same day, Schuman filed a “motion to modify judgment 
of conviction,” which asked the trial court to add a practice-of-law exception to the 
no-contact condition of community control. 
{¶ 8} Dobson filed a response opposing the motion, arguing mainly that a 
trial court lacks authority to reconsider a final judgment in a criminal case and that 
by taking an appeal, Schuman had divested the trial court of “subject matter 
jurisdiction to do anything that might interfere with the appellate court’s ability to 
affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment/order that is currently on appeal.” 
{¶ 9} Despite Dobson’s objections, the trial court granted the motion on 
August 19, 2019.  On August 23, Schuman moved for a reduction of his jail 
sentence from 45 to 21 days.  On August 28, Judge Handwork issued an order 
reducing Schuman’s jail sentence from 45 to 30 days. 
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{¶ 10} On August 29, 2019, Dobson filed this original prohibition action 
seeking to invalidate the two postjudgment orders.  No answer has been filed.  
Dobson moved for default judgment, and Judge Handwork has not filed a response. 
II. The Default-Judgment Standard 
{¶ 11} Civ.R. 55(D) bars entry of a default judgment against state and local 
officers “unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court.”  The term “officers” in Civ.R. 55(D) includes judges.  See 
Schucker v. Metcalf, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 84AP-548, 1984 WL 5986, *2 (Nov. 
15, 1984) (denying motion for default judgment in prohibition action against 
probate judge, citing Civ.R. 55(D)), rev’d on other grounds, 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 488 
N.E.2d 210 (1986); accord State ex rel. Hillman v. Holbrook, 129 Ohio St.3d 126, 
2011-Ohio-3090, 950 N.E.2d 549, ¶ 2 (denying default judgment against judge in 
procedendo action). 
{¶ 12} In accordance with Civ.R. 55(D), the proper disposition of the 
motion for default judgment here is intertwined with the merits of the writ claim 
pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C).  To the extent that the facts pleaded and verified 
in the complaint are sufficient from an evidentiary standpoint to establish Dobson’s 
right to relief, the motion and the writ should both be granted.  If, however, the 
complaint fails to establish Dobson’s right to relief, the motion and the writ should 
be denied. 
{¶ 13} We hold that the complaint sufficiently states and proves a claim for 
relief. 
III. The Judge Patently and Unambiguously Lacked Jurisdiction 
to Issue His Postjudgment Orders 
{¶ 14} To demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, Dobson must 
show (1) that Judge Handwork has exercised judicial power, (2) that his exercise of 
judicial power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ would result in 
injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.  
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State ex rel. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. O’Diam, 156 Ohio St.3d 458, 2019-
Ohio-1676, 129 N.E.3d 393, ¶ 16.  If the absence of jurisdiction is patent and 
unambiguous, there is no need to inquire into the existence of an adequate remedy 
at law.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 15} Here, Judge Handwork clearly exercised judicial power.  As 
discussed, the complaint refers to and has attached to it two orders that Judge 
Handwork issued after the judgment of sentence had been filed. 
{¶ 16} Two principles show that Judge Handwork was not authorized by 
law to issue the two postjudgment orders.  First, this court has stated that “ ‘trial 
courts lack authority to reconsider their own valid final judgments in criminal 
cases.’ ”  State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684,  
¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. White v. Junkin, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 686 N.E.2d 267 
(1997).  It follows that because a trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion 
for reconsideration of a final criminal judgment, any ruling on such a motion is a 
nullity.  See State v. Dix, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101007, 2014-Ohio-3330, ¶ 3; 
State v. Ford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26466, 2012-Ohio-5050, ¶ 8-10; State v. 
Wilson, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 05AP-939, 05AP-940, and 05AP-941, 2006-Ohio-
2750, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 17} Second, “[o]nce a case has been appealed, the trial court loses 
jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal.”  In re S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d 
11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 9.  Here, both postjudgment orders were 
issued after Schuman had filed his notice of appeal.  Schuman’s filing of his notice 
of appeal on August 7, 2019, divested Judge Handwork of jurisdiction to rule on 
Schuman’s postjudgment motions—with the result being that Judge Handwork’s 
entries granting those motions are null and void.  See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103406, 2016-Ohio-8326, ¶ 8 (trial-court action taken after 
state prosecuted appeal in a criminal case was invalid); State v. Dunning, 12th Dist. 
Warren Nos. CA2013-05-048 and CA2013-06-058, 2014-Ohio-253, ¶ 8 (trial court 
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may not “resentence a defendant to correct a sentencing error while his appeal is 
still pending”); State v. Haught, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23265, 2007-Ohio-508, ¶ 8 
(trial court acted without jurisdiction by modifying probation sentence during the 
pendency of appeal); see also State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-
5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 24 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only) (trial court 
had no jurisdiction to act on remand order of court of appeals while appeal was 
pending in this court).  The judge’s postjudgment orders do not qualify as “in aid 
of the appeal” inasmuch as they do not address “collateral issues like contempt, 
appointment of a receiver and injunction.”  State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. 
Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97, 378 N.E.2d 162 
(1978).  Instead, both the postjudgment orders modified the very substance of the 
judgment of sentence under appeal; accordingly, the postjudgment orders here are 
“inconsistent with the jurisdiction of the appellate court” and are therefore void.  
S.J. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 18} Although Judge Handwork did say at the sentencing hearing that he 
would take Schuman’s request for a modification of the no-contact order under 
advisement, this circumstance does not change the jurisdictional analysis.  “A 
motion not expressly decided by the trial court when the case is concluded is 
ordinarily presumed to have been overruled.”  Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Smith v. Wolaver, 2d Dist. 
Greene No. 2017 CA 0014, 2017-Ohio-8190, ¶ 17 (applying the principle in the 
context of an appeal from a sentencing order).  Thus, although the judge left the 
motion unresolved at the sentencing hearing, he did not do so in the judgment of 
sentence.  Instead, by not including in the judgment of sentence any language 
regarding a practice-of-law exception to the no-contact condition of community 
control, he implicitly overruled the motion.  The judgment of sentence therefore 
terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider that issue; as a result, at the time 
that Schuman moved for a modification of the judgment of sentence, “the motion 
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was no longer pending.”  Fernandez v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 01AP-1279, 2002-Ohio-3355, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 19} The jurisdictional bar is as strong against the modified no-contact 
condition as it is against any issue expressly addressed in the judgment of sentence, 
and Judge Handwork had no jurisdiction to reconsider the no-contact condition 
during the pendency of the appeal.  Moreover, the absence of jurisdiction is patent 
and unambiguous; as a result, no inquiry is needed into the existence of an adequate 
remedy at law.  Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 156 Ohio St.3d 458, 2019-Ohio-1676, 
129 N.E.3d 393, at ¶ 26. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we grant Dobson’s motion for default 
judgment and issue a peremptory writ of prohibition vacating Judge Handwork’s 
August 19, 2019 and August 28, 2019 orders modifying Schuman’s sentence.  We 
also order Judge Handwork to refrain from any further exercise of jurisdiction in 
case No. 2018-CR-0063 apart from taking action in aid of the appeal or to execute 
a mandate from the court of appeals.  Costs are taxed to Judge Handwork pursuant 
to S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.05(A)(2)(c). 
Writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
David T. Harold and Maria Arlen B. de la Serna, Wood County Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorneys, for relator. 
_________________