Title: JACK ELSWORTH FAUBION V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; JACK ELSWORTH FAUBION V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JACK ELSWORTH FAUBION V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; JACK ELSWORTH FAUBION V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 79Case Number: S-09-0076, S-09-0077Decided: 06/18/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
JACK 
ELSWORTH FAUBION,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).JACK ELSWORTH 
FAUBION,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jenny L. 
Craig, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
J*., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files as specially 
concurring opinion.

 
 
*This 
case was reassigned to Justice Hill on April 15, 2010.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these 
consolidated appeals, Appellant, Jack Elsworth Faubion (Faubion), challenges his 
ten convictions for third degree sexual assault.  In Case No. S-09-0076, Faubion was 
convicted of four such counts after a trial to the court, sitting without a 
jury.  In Case No. S-09-0077, with 
respect to an additional six counts that were charged at a later date, Faubion 
entered pleas of nolo contendere in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(1)(A).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a) (LexisNexis 
2009)1 provides:

 
 
(a)  An 
actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first or second degree:

(i) 
and (ii) Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 159, § 3.

                        
(iii)  The actor 
subjects a victim to sexual contact under any of the circumstances of 
W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vii) without 
inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious bodily 
injury to the victim.

 
 
"Sexual 
contact" is defined by statute as: "touching, with the intention of sexual 
arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or 
of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or of the clothing covering the 
immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  "Intimate parts" 
are defined as; "the external genitalia, perineum, anus or pubes of any person 
or the breast of a female person."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).  Faubion was charged with sexual assaults 
which were committed under this statutory circumstance:  "The actor is in a position of authority 
over the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to 
submit."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-303(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2009).  
"Position of authority" is defined as:  "that position occupied by a parent, 
guardian, relative, household member, teacher, employer, custodian or any other 
person who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence 
over a person."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-301(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶2]      Faubion contends 
that he did not hold a "position of authority" as contemplated by the applicable 
statute, and, hence, could not be found guilty under the factual circumstances 
of this case.  Further, he contends 
that the district court erred by not considering the lesser included offense of 
sexual battery at the bench trial.

 
 
[¶3]      We will affirm 
all of Faubion's convictions.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      Faubion provides 
this statement of the issues:

 
 

I.              
Did 
Faubion, a chiropractor, hold a "position of authority" causing the victims to 
submit to sexual contact?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the trial court err in not considering the lesser included offense of sexual 
battery in the bench trial?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 

I.              
Sufficient 
evidence was presented to allow the district court to find [Faubion] held a 
"position of authority" over his victims.

 
 

II.            
Using 
the plain error standard of review, the district court did not err in not 
considering the crime of sexual battery at the bench 
trial.

 
 
[¶5]      The State posits 
a third issue in its brief that is not included in its statement of the 
issues.  It contends that, with 
respect to the pleas of nolo contendere, Faubion did not preserve the issue of 
whether or not he was in a "position of authority" over his victims.  Faubion addresses this contention in his 
reply brief.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶6]      A detailed 
description of each of the eleven crimes is not relevant to our consideration of 
the substantive issues.  Very 
briefly, Faubion was convicted of touching the breasts or pubes of his patients 
in the course of performing chiropractic treatment.

 
 
[¶7]      Faubion did not 
deny that in the course of treating the victims at issue that he may well have 
inadvertently touched the breasts and/or pubes of these patients.  In each instance, the patients testified 
that Faubion "cupped," or "groped," or otherwise touched their breasts (and in 
one case the pubes) as alleged in the complaints against him.  The testimony of the victims was clear 
and unequivocal to that effect.  The 
record reveals that many of these victims returned to Faubion one or more times 
after being touched in what they eventually came to discern as being an unlawful 
manner of touching.  The record also 
revealed that Faubion's conduct was not called to the attention of law 
enforcement authorities until after the victims had "compared notes," so to 
speak, about their treatment at Faubion's chiropractic 
office.

 
 
[¶8]      As noted above, 
Faubion conceded that he may have made some incidental contact with the victims' 
intimate parts, but, to the extent that may have happened, it was merely 
incidental to the treatment techniques that he used in his ordinary practice of 
chiropractic medicine and that the treatment techniques he used are usual in his 
individual practice and in chiropractic in general.  Further, he denied that any of the 
touching was done with the intention of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, 
although whether or not that was the case is not pursued as an issue in this 
appeal.  Several victims testified 
to what could be viewed as inappropriate comments to patients such as calling 
one "sexy," complimenting one on her youthfulness (despite being married and 
having children), and then asking her if she was going out to the bars to chase 
boys.

 
 
[¶9]      Two other 
chiropractors testified as experts during the trial.  The first was a chiropractor from 
Gillette with whom Faubion had worked earlier in his career.  He testified that "skin-on-skin" 
touching was not customary in chiropractic practice in his experience (i.e., the 
patient's skin is always covered by clothing, or some other covering, at all 
times).  A second chiropractor, from 
Oregon, testified as an expert and his view was that "skin-on-skin" contact was 
common, especially when making adjustments that require focused tactile 
acuity.  That testimony included his 
opinion that in performing anterior rib adjustments it is often necessary to use 
"skin-on-skin" treatment.  He also 
testified that it would not be uncommon for there to be incidental contact with 
a patient's breast tissue in the course of such treatments.  However, he excluded such contacts as 
those described by Faubion's patients ("cupping," "groping," etc.).  That expert also testified that when 
adjusting in the area of the complex of muscles, tendons, and joints associated 
with the groin, that some incidental/inadvertent contact with the pubes can 
occur.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶10]   The parties are not in accord as to 
what the standard of review should be in this case.  Faubion perceives the issue as one of 
law because this Court is called upon to construe what the legislature intended 
when it wrote the statutes at issue, and especially the statute that uses the 
phrase "position of authority."  
Thus, Faubion contends the issue is one of law and not of fact.  The State, on the other hand, contends 
that Faubion is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the standard of 
review pertinent to that issue should be applied here.  We conclude that both standards need to 
be applied in this case.

 
 
[¶11]   To the extent we are called upon to 
construe the statute, we take note that "[i]f a statute is clear and unambiguous 
we do not resort to the general principles of statutory construction."  LM v. Laramie County Dept. of Family Servs. 
(In re MN), 2007 WY 189, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 2007).  Where a statute is unambiguous the rule 
of lenity has no role to play.  Crain v. State, 2009 WY 128, ¶ 10, 
218 P.3d 934, 940 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶12]   The State contends that the issue 
is one of sufficiency of the evidence.  
To the extent the sufficiency of the evidence is called into question, we 
will apply this standard of review:

 
 
In 
discussing the facts of this case, we apply the principle that the evidence 
should be examined in the light most favorable to the State when a question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence is raised.  
We accept as true evidence favorable to the State; we disregard evidence 
favorable to the defendant in conflict with the State's evidence; and we afford 
to the State's evidence every favorable inference which may reasonably and 
fairly be drawn from it.  Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386 
(1979); Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127 (1979).  Heretofore we 
have had occasion to apply these concepts only to cases tried before 
juries.  We have no compunction, 
however, in joining other courts which have applied these concepts in trials to 
the court.  Simmons v. State, 255 Ark. 82, 498 S.W.2d 870 (1973); People v. Johnson, 
276 Cal. App. 2d 232, 80 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969).  The function of the finder of fact in 
cases tried to a court is identical to that in cases tried to juries, and the 
same rules are applicable with respect to the standards and principles applied 
in appellate review.

 
 

Trumbull 
v. State, 
2009 WY 103, ¶ 9, 214 P.3d 978, 980 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
Validity 
of Nolo Contendere Pleas

 
 
[¶13]   We will briefly address this issue, 
although the State's presentation of it is not entirely clear.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) requires that pleas 
such as those at issue here meet certain criteria:

 
 
(2)  Conditional 
Pleas. -- With the approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the 
state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal shall 
be allowed to withdraw the plea.

 
 
[¶14]   The State contends that the 
reservation of the issue was not in writing and that Faubion did not otherwise 
make it clear what it was he wanted to reserve for appellate review.  In Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, 
¶¶ 14-21, 197 P.3d 1273, 1277-79 (Wyo. 2008) we set out in explicit detail 
how this Court will view such reservations as that at issue in this case.2  It suffices here to note that the upshot 
of the State's argument is that we would be required to remand the second half 
of this case back to the district court and allow Faubion to withdraw his plea 
and plead anew.  Id., ¶ 26, 197 P.3d 1280.  We do not think the State seriously 
intended that to be an appropriate result in this case.

 
 
[¶15]   The plea agreement was not in 
writing and other requirements of the pertinent rule were not precisely followed 
in the proceedings below.  
Nonetheless, the record is very clear that both parties, and the 
presiding judge, went into the nolo contendere proceeding fully aware that the 
issue to be preserved for appeal was whether or not a chiropractor, acting in 
circumstances such as those at issue here, is subject to the rigors of the 
applicable sexual assault statutes.  
The decision reached on that issue would be dispositive to the entirety 
of the second part of this case.  If 
Faubion was not a member of one of the categories of persons contemplated by the 
"position of authority" language, then he could not be found guilty of the 
charges lodged against him in either the first part of this case, or the second 
part.  We find it unnecessary to 
evaluate this issue further, and we will exercise our discretion to address the 
substantive issue.  See Tucker v. State, 2009 WY 107, 
¶¶ 12-19, 214 P.3d 236, 240-2 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
"Position 
of Authority"

 
 
[¶16]   Faubion contends that the language 
contained in the definition of "position of authority" cannot be stretched to 
reach the conduct at issue in these cases.  
We iterate that language here:  
"that position occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household 
member, teacher, employer, custodian or any other person who, by reason of his 
position, is able to exercise significant influence over a person."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-301(a)(iv).

 
 
[¶17]   In a case which involved sexual 
conduct between a student and her coach/teacher we addressed a "vagueness" claim 
directed at this same statute.  We 
find that discussion to be instructive here as well:

 
 
Section 
6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S. 1977 makes it criminal for any person in a position of 
authority over a victim to use that position to cause the victim to submit.  "Position of authority" is further 
defined as:

 
 
" 
* * * [T]hat position occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household 
member, teacher, employer, custodian and [or] any other person who by reason of 
his position is able to exercise significant influence over a person."  Section 
6-2-301(a)(vi).

 
 
            
The State did not rely separately on appellant's position as a teacher, 
although that relationship was obviously a factor in appellant's status.  Rather, the State prosecuted and 
appellant was convicted under the last phrase of the definition:  "any other person who by reason of his 
position is able to exercise significant influence over a person."   It is this phrase which appellant 
challenges for vagueness.

 
 
            
Appellant argues that under this statute it is a crime for anyone to 
convince another to have sex with him by using emotional involvement, and 
extends this construct to apply to numerous hypothetical situations, including 
the marriage relationship.  We do 
not find appellant's characterization of the law persuasive, since common sense 
will be applied by this court to the statutory language.  Dover v. State, supra [664 P.2d 536, 540 
(Wyo. 1983].

 
 
            
First, this court follows the principle announced by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. 
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S. Ct. 710, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1975), that 
"vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms 
must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand."  Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 
1034 (1979); Sears v. State, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 946, 951 (1981).

 
 
            
This case involves a very young woman, then in high school, who was in 
large part controlled by the attention and demands of appellant as her teacher, 
coach and confidant.  It is not 
necessary, nor does the law permit us to examine the constitutionality of the 
statute by inventing situations in which the law's application might seem absurd 
or invalid.  Sanchez v. State, supra, 567 P.2d 270; 
In re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956 
(1968).

 
 
            
Second, the words employed by the legislature in announcing the law must 
be given their plain and ordinary meaning.  
McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288, 292 (1985); Hurst v. State, 
Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 (1985).  It is 
helpful to look to Burton's Legal Thesaurus, which defines authority as:  "[J]urisdiction, legal power, 
legitimacy, prerogative, right to adjudicate, right to command, right to 
determine, right to settle issues, rightful power."  Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.  (1979) defines authority as:  "Permission.  Right to exercise powers; to implement 
and enforce laws; to exact obedience; to command; to judge.  Control over; jurisdiction.  Often synonymous with 
power."

 
 
            
From these sources it is apparent that the legislature used the word 
"authority" to mean an externally granted power, not a self-generated 
control.  One in a position of 
authority is a person who acquires that status by virtue of society and its 
system of laws granting to him the right of control over another.  For example, society grants to a jailer 
power over his prisoner, and, therefore, the jailer is in a position of 
authority over the prisoner.  
Likewise, the teacher or coach is vested with power by a grant from 
society.  The legislature enacted 
the statute to prohibit persons in such positions of authority from using those 
positions to cause any individual who might be subject to authoritative power to 
submit to sexual acts.

 
 
            
In this case, appellant was the victim's teacher and coach.  As reposed in our educational system, 
society vested him with an authoritative status over her.  Even though, in the criminal 
prosecution, the State did not rely on his employment as a teacher, his 
authority devolved from that ascribed status.

 
 
            
Appellant, however, seems to argue that his position as a teacher is 
somehow separable from his holding a position of authority.  We think it is not.  The State's structural positing of this 
case, in not relying on the fact that appellant was a teacher to show that he 
was in a position of authority over MBS, does not somehow negate the fact that 
appellant indeed occupied that position.  
Absent the fact that appellant was the victim's teacher, none of the 
events for which appellant was charged and convicted would have occurred.  In light of these facts, we decline 
appellant's invitation to strike the statute as void for vagueness.  A plethora of trial evidence 
comprehensively demonstrated that appellant was in a position of authority over 
MBS.  A person of ordinary 
sensibilities in appellant's position clearly should have known that his conduct 
was forbidden.

 
 

Scadden 
v. State, 
732 P.2d 1036, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 
[¶18]   We think that line of reasoning 
applies to the issue Faubion raises here.  
Chiropractic practice is governed by statute.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-10-101 through 
33-10-117 (LexisNexis 2009).  
Chiropractic is "declared not to be the practice of medicine."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-10-117; also see § 
33-10-109.  Although chiropractic is 
not the practice of medicine under Wyoming law, we note that the legal 
encyclopedia American Jurisprudence 2d discusses chiropractors under the 
category "Physician, Surgeons, and Other Healers."  61 Am.Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers, 
§§ 5 and 37 (2002).  There is a 
fiduciary or trust relationship between a patient and her healers and 
transactions between them are closely scrutinized by the courts.  Id., §§ 142-143.  We take judicial notice that 
chiropractors govern themselves by a variety of ethical codes and at least one 
of them advises practitioners of "Practices of Questionable Propriety" which 
includes that such practitioners shall not take physical advantage of any 
patient.  See, 
http://chiropractic.org/ica/ethics.htm.  We concur with the representations of 
both Faubion and the State that this case appears to present a case of first 
impression, certainly in this Court, but with respect to both state and federal 
law generally.  The subject is given 
fairly comprehensive coverage in B. Anthony Morosco, The Prosecution and Defense of Sex 
Crimes, § 8.02[5] (Sexual Contact in Therapist-Patient Relationships (Age of 
Complainant Irrelevant)), also see § 8.03[2] (Position of Trust or Authority) 
(2008).

 
 
[¶19]   It appears that Wyoming's statute 
is exceptionally inclusive both as written and as construed in Scadden.  See, e.g., Morosco, The Prosecution and Defense of Sex 
Crimes, supra, §§ 8.02[1] (Protected Special 
Relationships) and 8.03[1](Issues of Legal Sufficiency of Evidence, Terms and 
Conditions Within Criminal Offenses); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 17-20 
(Tennessee statute criminalizing acts committed by person using terms "authority 
figure" or "supervisory or disciplinary power" does not encompass 
physician/patient relationship); also see generally, Annotation, Jay M. Zitter, 
Conviction of Rape or Related Sexual 
Offenses on Basis of Intercourse Accomplished under the Pretext of, or in the 
Course of, Medical Treatment, 65 A.L.R.4th 
1064 (1988 and Supp. 2009).  We are 
satisfied that the challenged statute's language encompasses the circumstances 
presented here.  Neither Faubion's 
testimony, nor that of the expert witness called to testify on his behalf, can 
serve to rebut the testimony of his victims that they were, indeed, victims of a 
chiropractor who exceeded the bounds of the statute that was applied to 
prosecute him for his criminal acts.  
We are also satisfied that the evidence presented by the complaining 
witnesses is sufficient to sustain the convictions entered by the district 
court.

 
 
Lesser 
Included Offense

 
 
[¶20]   Faubion did not contend in the 
district court that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-313 (LexisNexis 2009) should be 
considered as a lesser included offense under the factual circumstances of this 
case.  That statute 
provides:

 
 
(a)  Except 
under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, 
6-2-314 through 6-2-317 or 6-2-502, an actor who unlawfully subjects another 
person to any sexual contact is guilty of sexual battery.

            
(b)  Sexual battery is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), or both.

 
 
[¶21]   We agree with the State that, 
because this issue was not raised in the district court, we are compelled to 
consider this issue only under the plain error doctrine.  That doctrine 
provides:

 
 
In 
order to establish plain error, the defendant must show that the record patently 
demonstrates the district court transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
and such violation adversely affected his substantial 
right.

 
 

Sandoval 
v. State, 
2009 WY 121, ¶ 6, 217 P.3d 393, 395 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo.2004)).

 
 
[¶22]   Faubion identifies the issue he 
raises in this regard as an issue of law which must be reviewed de novo.  No authority is cited to support that 
contention, and this Court is unable to find support for it in any quarter.  We have read Faubion's brief as 
generously as it can be read, and it contains no cogent argument or pertinent 
authority that the failure of the district court to sua sponte consider the statute at issue 
as a lesser included offense, of the offenses duly charged, constitutes plain 
error.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   We hold that § 6-2-304(a)(iii) in 
combination with § 6-2-303(a)(vi) applies to the sexual contact that Faubion, a 
chiropractor, had with the victims, his patients.  We also conclude that the district court 
did not err in failing to sua sponte 
consider § 6-2-313 as a lesser included offense.  The judgments and sentences of the 
district court are affirmed.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 
 
[¶24]   I concur in the result reached by 
the majority.  I write separately 
only to emphasize the inappropriate attempted use in this case of the 
conditional plea concept provided in W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).  The Rule is set out in full in the 
majority opinion and need not be repeated here.  Suffice it to say that the rule 
specifically is limited to the situation where a defendant "reserv[es] in 
writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pretrial motion."  There was no such "adverse determination 
of any specified pretrial motion" because there was no such pretrial 
motion.  Beyond that, the appellant 
is not seeking review of a determination of law made by the district court in a 
motion hearing.  Rather, he is 
seeking a review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the trial in 
the first case (S-09-0076) as to one element of the charged crimeswhether he 
was in a position of authority over the victimsin challenging the charges in 
the second case (S-09-0077).  In 
accepting the appellant's nolo 
contendere pleas, the reserved question was described to the district court 
as "reserving the right to appeal specifically the issue that was argued at the 
end of the State's case in the first case; and that is specifically whether 
there was evidence that supported a conviction, or supported at least going to a 
trier of fact as to the position of authority."

 
 
[¶25]   I agree with the majority that 
these circumstances do not present a situation where the appellant should be 
allowed to withdraw his pleas under W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).  The majority's resolution of the 
substantive issue answers the question the appellant appealed in the first case 
and attempted to reserve for appeal in the second case.  He has had his day in court. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
  1Although the 
statutes we cite herein have been amended in the years between the dates the 
instant crimes were committed (2005-2007), and the preparation of this opinion, 
the provisions we refer to in the current statutes have remained 
unchanged.

 
 
  2The proceedings 
in this case took place before our opinion in Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, 197 P.3d 1273 
(Wyo. 2008) was published, although that is no excuse for failure to fully 
consult and comply with the governing rule when such a plea is 
entered.