Title: MAY v. MAY

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

May v. May1997 WY 120945 P.2d 1189Case Number: 96-251Decided: 10/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

GEORGE E. MAY, JR., 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

SHAWN J.E. MAY, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Edward L.Grant, Judge

 

George E. May, Jr., pro se. 

 

Julie Nye Tiedeken, Cheyenne, for Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Based upon the 
findings of a district court commissioner, the district court ordered a change 
of custody from appellant (Father) to appellee (Mother). Father challenges the 
commissioner's authority on numerous grounds and also alleges improprieties in 
the district court proceedings. We remand for a ruling by the district court on 
the admissibility of evidence which the commissioner did not allow Father to 
present.

 

[¶2]      The issues 
pertinent to our decision can be summarized as follows:

 

1. Did the district court commissioner act within his 
authority?

a. Was the district court commissioner properly 
appointed?

b. 
Can a district court commissioner take evidence and make findings in a custody 
modification case?

c. 
Can a district court commissioner grant a motion in limine restricting the 
presentation of evidence?

2. Did the district court abuse its discretion or 
otherwise act improperly when it ordered a change in 
custody?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The parties were 
divorced on May 24, 1993. The initial divorce decree provided that Father and 
Mother would have joint custody of the three minor children, with Father having 
primary custody during the school year and Mother having primary custody during 
the summer months.

 

[¶4]      A little more 
than a year after the divorce, Father filed a motion to modify the divorce 
decree. He alleged that the children had been physically abused while with their 
mother and asked the court to award him sole custody of the children. Mother 
counterclaimed, asking the court to grant her sole custody of the children on 
the basis that Father had continually interfered with her visitation rights and 
assaulted her in front of the children.

 

[¶5]      A hearing was set 
for July 20, 1994; but, on the date of the hearing, the parties agreed to go 
forward with the joint custody arrangement set forth in the divorce decree with 
a few minor changes. However, the parties could not agree on a stipulation and 
order. On November 2, 1994, the court entered an order stating that all 
settlement papers must be filed within twenty days or the relief sought before 
the court would be deemed denied without further order. No settlement papers 
were filed.

 

[¶6]      After continuing 
problems with visitation and a barrage of contempt motions filed by both 
parties, Father requested a change of custody. Mother counterclaimed, also 
requesting sole custody. As before, on the day of the hearing, May 1, 1995, the 
parties settled, putting their settlement agreement on the record. The 
settlement agreement provided that if either party interfered with the 
visitation rights of the other party, the court may consider such interference 
as grounds for a change in custody. Despite this language, within two weeks the 
parties were again battling over visitation and filing contempt 
motions.

 

[¶7]      In October 1995, 
Father filed a renewed motion asking the court to terminate Mother's visitation 
entirely, claiming the children had been physically abused and/or sexually 
molested. Mother denied the allegations and counterclaimed. Her claim alleged 
that Father continued to falsely accuse Mother of abuse to harass Mother and to 
keep her from visiting the children. She further contended that she had to 
continually petition the court to enforce her visitation rights and Father's 
noncompliance with the settlement agreement was grounds for a change in 
custody.

 

[¶8]      Following two 
days of hearings, the district court commissioner provided a report to the 
district court recommending that custody be changed from Father to Mother. 
According to the procedures followed in Laramie County, Father filed his 
objections to the report with the district court. Father objected in part 
because the commissioner limited Father's evidence. Although the commissioner 
had originally denied Mother's motion in limine, at the hearing the commissioner 
directed that only matters relevant to the case occurring after May 1, 1995 
could be introduced into evidence. Mother, in her response to the objection, 
acknowledged that the commissioner precluded evidence relating to events prior 
to May 1, 1995.

 

[¶9]      The record 
contains an order setting a hearing on the parties' objections to the 
commissioner's report. Apparently the parties did not appear, but their 
attorneys did. The hearing was unreported, and the record is silent as to the 
substance of the proceeding. The district court then issued an Order Changing 
Custody, which adopted the findings and recommendations of the commissioner but 
did not specifically address Father's objections. Father timely 
appeals.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   Father presents several issues 
relating to the authority of district court commissioners. The basis of Father's 
argument is that the commissioner's acts in this case exceeded statutory 
authority and, therefore, are void. See 
generally W.S. 5-3-301 through 312 (1997). Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law, so our standard of review is de novo. Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Game 
and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). If the conclusion of law 
is in accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct it. Id.

 

[¶11]   Father alleges that the 
commissioner's appointment was unlawful under W.S. 5-3-304, which states: "The 
order appointing each district court commissioner shall be made in open court 
and entered upon the journal. A certified copy of such a journal entry shall be 
evidence of such appointment in all the courts of this state." Father's 
contention is inconsistent with the record. The district court's order 
appointing the commissioner complies with W.S. 5-3-304 and is a matter of public 
record.

 

[¶12]   Father then argues that W.S. 
5-3-307 should be read to limit a court commissioner's authority to act to those 
occasions when the district court judges are on vacation or when a conflict of 
interest exists. Section 5-3-307(a) states, in relevant part: "Each district 
court commissioner shall have the powers in respect to every 
suit or proceeding pending in the district court of the county for which he was 
appointed[.]" (Emphasis added.) The statute then enumerates the 
commissioner's powers in subsections (a)(i) through (a)(viii). In support of his 
argument, Father cites subsections (i) and (ii) which apply to specific 
situations when no qualified judge is present in the county or when a judge has 
been disqualified. Subsection (a)(iv) is also limited to the situation where an 
application has been made for a change of judge. However, the powers enumerated 
in the other subsections are not so limited and, therefore, apply in "every suit 
or proceeding pending in the district court of the county for which [the 
commissioner] was appointed." Here, the record establishes that Commissioner 
Schrader was properly appointed pursuant to the Wyoming statutes, and his 
appointment states that he shall take evidence and make findings in proceedings 
involving "petitions for modification of decrees concerning child custody and 
child support." We have previously held that, pursuant to the Wyoming 
Constitution and statutes, an assignment to a court commissioner to take 
evidence and make findings in proceedings to modify a divorce decree is not 
improper. Gaines v. Doby, 773 P.2d 442, 445 (Wyo. 1989). Therefore, Father's argument is without 
merit.

 

[¶13]   Likewise without merit is Father's 
claim that the commissioner exceeded his constitutional authority and violated 
the Judicial Code of Conduct by denying eleven requests for hearings to modify 
custody. The record contains numerous requests for hearings before the 
commissioner, and on the bottom of each request is a signed order setting a 
hearing date. In several instances, Father either requested or stipulated to a 
continuance. In others, the parties apparently reached an agreement on the date 
of the hearing. Under these circumstances, Father cannot now be heard to 
complain that the commissioner did not proceed 
expeditiously.

 

[¶14]   Father contends that the failure to 
record the attorneys' summations of evidence and closing arguments in the 
proceedings before the commissioner constitutes error. Father presents no cogent 
argument or pertinent authority on this issue, and we summarily affirm. Hamburg v. Heilbrun, 891 P.2d 85, 87 
(Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶15]   Finally, Father attacks evidentiary 
rulings made by the commissioner. Conspicuously absent from the record, however, 
is a tape recording or transcript of the proceedings in front of the 
commissioner. Ordinarily when an appellant fails to provide an adequate record, 
we will restrict our review to those issues not requiring inspection of the 
record. Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996). In this case, however, the record is sufficient for 
us to resolve the legal question as to the extent of the commissioner's 
authority.1

 

[¶16]   As early as 1912, this court 
recognized the limited nature of a court commissioner's 
powers:

 

The commissioner as to matters pending in the court 
is a subordinate officer of the court. He is not a District Judge who alone 
possesses the power to preside over a District Court. There can be no such court 
in the absence of a qualified judge de facto or de jure. The Court Commissioner 
is neither.

Huhn v. Quinn, 21 Wyo. 51, 60-61, 128 P. 514, 516 (1912). The 
language of W.S. 5-3-307(a)(v) is clear and unambiguous in authorizing a 
commissioner to "take evidence and make findings, and 
report the same to the district court." (Emphasis added.) In Foster v. Foster, we interpreted that 
statutory provision to mean that a commissioner is required to "prepare a report 
of some substance which at least summarizes the evidence presented and indicates 
the basis upon which he has made his findings of fact." 768 P.2d 1038, 1042 
(Wyo. 1989); see also Gaines v. Doby, 
773 P.2d  at 445. Section (a)(v) does not confer upon the commissioner the 
authority to exclude evidence or to make legal rulings determining the 
admissibility of evidence. "The differentiation is between adjunct fact finding 
and plenary judicial responsibility." Foster, 768 P.2d  at 1042 (Urbigkit, J., 
specially concurring). We hold that the commissioner exceeded his authority, 
first, when he denied Mother's motion in limine and, second, when he in effect 
granted the motion by excluding Father's evidence at the hearing. Except where 
otherwise provided by statute, e.g., W.S. 5-3-307(a)(i), (ii), and (iv), the 
authority to make legal rulings on the evidence is vested solely in the district 
court.

 

[¶17]   The district court must 
independently review the evidence and findings in making its decision, with such 
review being indicated on the record. Gaines, 773 P.2d  at 445. "[T]he record 
should clearly indicate that the district court has independently reviewed the 
evidence and findings and reached its decision accordingly." Foster, 768 P.2d  at 
1042. The court, in its Order Changing Custody, indicates its findings were made 
based on

the Court having reviewed the Commissioner's summary 
of evidence and the proposed findings and recommendations, the basis for such 
proposed findings and recommendations, the objections of the parties, if any, 
[and] the pertinent parts of the 
evidence[.]

(Emphasis added.) The 
district court reports that it reviewed the commissioner's summary, the parties' 
objections,2 and the pertinent parts of the 
evidence. The commissioner's report was factually detailed and otherwise 
complete but failed to inform the district court that certain evidence had been 
excluded from consideration. Although the court heard the parties' objections, 
we are unable to discern whether the court relied on the commissioner's 
determination that Father's evidence was inadmissible or if the court reviewed 
the excluded evidence and made an independent ruling on its admissibility. In a 
situation such as this, where the guiding principle is "the best interests of 
the children" and where the record contains allegations of child abuse, we are 
unwilling to risk the possibility that the district court relied on an erroneous 
evidentiary ruling. Therefore, we remand to the district court for further 
consideration.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   The commissioner had authority to 
take evidence and make findings in this case. However, the commissioner exceeded 
his lawful authority when he ruled on a motion in limine and refused to accept 
Father's evidence at the hearing. We remand with instructions to the district 
court to conduct an independent review of the excluded evidence, make a ruling 
on the admissibility of the evidence, and to reconsider its order in light of 
that ruling. In the meantime, the district court's order shall remain in 
effect.

 

Footnotes

1 In addition, it appears that Father 
attempted to comply with the district court's written procedures for transcript 
preparation. The record contains a demand by Father for the transcript of the 
proceeding before the commissioner. Father's letter indicated: "The proceedings 
were transcribed for review by Judge Grant, and a copy of the proceedings was 
provided to me at that time." The transcript is listed in the designation of the 
record on appeal. However, the district court clerk indicated by transmittal 
letter to this court that no transcript exists. The record provides no further 
insight as to what actually transpired, but we are not convinced that Father 
bears full responsibility for the gap in the 
record.

2 The district court entered an order 
setting a hearing on the parties' objections to the commissioner's report. 
Father submitted a motion to vacate the hearing and reset the date and, although 
the record contains no ruling on the motion or indication that a hearing took 
place, both Father and Mother state in their briefs that a hearing was conducted 
and attorneys for both parties were in attendance. Father contends that he was 
denied the right to be heard because he was not personally present. However, 
that argument, like many of the arguments Father presents for our review, is 
unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent legal authority, and we decline to 
consider it further. See Hamburg, 891 P.2d  at 87.