Title: Garcia v. Steele

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13378 
 
MARIA BLANCA ELENA GARCIA & another1  vs.  SHANITQUA STEELE & 
others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 8, 2023.  -  June 27, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Dealer, Entrustment.  Negligence, Motor vehicle, 
Vicarious liability, Entrustment.  Contract, Consideration, 
Lease of equipment.  Federal Preemption.  Statute, Federal 
preemption, Construction.  Practice, Civil, Summary 
judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 27, 2018. 
 
 
The case was heard by David A. Deakin, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Peter Antonelli (Thomas H. Curran also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
 
1 José Fafián Seijo. 
 
 
2 Kolawole Oke; MBB Auto, LLC, doing business as Mercedes 
Benz of Brooklyn; and MBF Auto, LLC, doing business as Mercedes 
Benz of Caldwell. 
2 
 
Michael S. Melville for MBB Auto, LLC, & another. 
David M. Lentini, II, for Kolawole Oke. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case presents the question whether an 
automobile dealership that includes an automotive service center 
and provides a "courtesy" vehicle to its customer while 
conducting repair work on the customer's car is entitled to the 
protection set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (Graves Amendment).  
The Graves Amendment generally protects rental car companies 
from being held vicariously liable for torts committed by 
customers driving their rental vehicles.  Where a rental car 
company demonstrates that it falls within the scope of the 
Federal statute, including, inter alia, by showing that the 
vehicle at issue was "rent[ed] or lease[d]," the Graves 
Amendment preempts State laws such as G. L. c. 231, § 85A 
(§ 85A), which sets forth a rebuttable presumption that the 
owner of a vehicle is vicariously liable for injuries caused by 
the driver of the vehicle. 
 
In the present case, a New Jersey-based automobile 
dealership that includes an automotive service center provided a 
courtesy vehicle to a customer while it serviced the customer's 
vehicle.  Contrary to the terms of the courtesy vehicle 
agreements, the customer drove the vehicle beyond the permitted 
radius of travel and into the Commonwealth.  While in Boston, he 
left the vehicle illegally parked with the key in the ignition 
3 
 
and the engine running as he conducted an errand; his then-wife, 
who did not have a driver's license and was not an authorized 
driver under the courtesy vehicle agreements, remained in the 
vehicle.  When a parking officer required that the vehicle be 
moved, the wife moved into the driver's seat and pushed a 
button.  The vehicle rolled forward through a red light and 
struck one of the plaintiffs, causing serious injuries. 
 
The plaintiffs brought a negligence claim against, inter 
alia, the automobile dealership.  In opposition to the 
automobile dealership's motion for summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs relied on § 85A, contending that, as the owner of the 
courtesy vehicle, the dealership was presumptively vicariously 
liable for the injuries caused by the customer's wife. 
 
We conclude that, under the circumstances, the Graves 
Amendment protects the automobile dealership from being held 
vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the driver of its 
courtesy vehicle.  In particular, the record on summary judgment 
indisputably demonstrates that the dealership provided the 
courtesy vehicle in consideration for the customer's over-all 
service repair business, and thus it "rent[ed]" or "lease[d]" 
the vehicle even though it did not charge the customer for his 
use of the vehicle as a line item separate from the service 
work.  Further concluding that the record is devoid of any basis 
whatsoever for liability against a second dealership defendant 
4 
 
and that there is a dispute of material fact as to the negligent 
entrustment claim against the customer, we affirm the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the dealership defendants, vacate 
the grant of summary judgment insofar as it pertains to the 
customer, and remand the matter to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  "The following facts are 
either undisputed 'or viewed in the light most favorable to 
. . . the party against [whom] summary judgment entered.'"  HSBC 
Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 323 (2022), quoting 
Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 634 (2021). 
 
In August 2016, the defendant Kolawole Oke brought his car 
to the defendant MBF Auto, LLC, doing business as Mercedes Benz 
of Caldwell (MBF Auto), in New Jersey to be serviced .  Because 
the service work was expected to require MBF Auto to hold Oke's 
car for more than three hours, MBF Auto provided a courtesy 
vehicle to Oke for his use while his car was being serviced.  
The courtesy vehicle was owned by and registered to MBF Auto, 
one of approximately 125 vehicles in the "loaner car fleet" 
maintained by the dealership. 
 
Prior to supplying the courtesy vehicle, MBF Auto required 
Oke to provide his driver's license, proof of insurance, and a 
credit card.  Oke also signed a document entitled "loaner car 
authorization form," pursuant to which, inter alia, he 
5 
 
represented that he had a valid driver's license, he agreed that 
he would return the courtesy vehicle within twenty-four hours of 
notification that repairs had been completed on his car, and he 
acknowledged both that he would be charged a daily fee if he 
failed to return the courtesy vehicle timely and that he would 
be responsible for all third-party claims arising from his use 
of the courtesy vehicle. 
 
In addition, Oke signed a document entitled "courtesy car 
agreement" on which Oke's driver's license number, his insurance 
carrier and policy number, and the last four digits of his 
credit card number were recorded.  The agreement specified the 
make, model, year, license plate number, and "car number" of the 
courtesy vehicle and set forth a "rate" of "$0.00" per mile for 
the vehicle, with no "net amount due."  The agreement provided 
additional terms of the courtesy vehicle arrangement, including 
that the vehicle was "[l]imited to operation within 100 mile 
radius of Mercedes-Benz of Caldwell[, New Jersey]."  Just above 
Oke's name and signature, in a font that was noticeably larger 
than the other provisions in the agreement, the agreement 
provided:  "UNDERSIGNED CLIENT IS THE ONLY PERSON AUTHORIZED TO 
OPERATE VEHICLE."  This term was boldfaced and in all capital 
letters.  Oke again acknowledged that he would be charged a 
daily rate should he fail to return the courtesy vehicle within 
twenty-four hours of receiving notice that repairs had been 
6 
 
completed on his own car; and he again agreed "[t]o hold Lessor 
harmless and to assume full responsibility for any loss, 
damage[,] or any claim that may occur, to any person, or 
persons, or any other property, of any kind, through the use by 
any person including the Lessee of the above vehicle while it is 
entrusted to Lessee's use and/or care."  At his deposition, Oke 
testified that he understood that he was the only person 
authorized to operate the courtesy vehicle.3  Oke's then-wife, 
the defendant Shanitqua Steele, was not at MBF Auto and was not 
involved in the courtesy vehicle transaction. 
 
Despite the terms of these agreements, Oke drove the 
courtesy vehicle to Boston, more than one hundred miles from MBF 
Auto.  While there, Oke drove the vehicle, with Steele as a 
passenger, to visit his lawyer.  He parked the courtesy vehicle 
illegally in a drop-off only zone near a crosswalk; while he 
attended to his errand, Steele, who Oke knew did not have a 
driver's license, remained in the vehicle.  Oke left the key in 
the ignition, the engine running, and the turn signal activated. 
 
 
3 In one joint statement of undisputed facts, the plaintiffs 
admit that Steele did not have permission from Oke or MBF Auto 
to drive the courtesy vehicle; however, in a different joint 
statement of undisputed facts, the plaintiffs deny this same 
fact, on the ground that MBF Auto did not read the courtesy 
vehicle agreements aloud to Oke and that Oke left Steele in the 
vehicle with the engine running.  We address these arguments 
infra. 
7 
 
 
Shortly thereafter, a parking enforcement officer asked 
Steele to move the vehicle.  Steele, who understood that she did 
not have permission to drive the vehicle, nonetheless moved into 
the driver's seat.  She pressed a button ostensibly to 
deactivate the turn signal; instead, the car rolled forward 
through a red traffic light and struck the plaintiff Maria 
Blanca Elena Garcia, who was walking in the crosswalk.  Garcia 
suffered severe injuries. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  Garcia and her husband, the 
plaintiff José Fafián Seijo, sued MBF Auto, MBB Auto, LLC, doing 
business as Mercedes Benz of Brooklyn (MBB Auto)4 (together with 
MBF Auto, dealership defendants), Oke, and Steele, alleging 
negligence as to Steele and the dealership defendants, negligent 
entrustment as to Oke, and loss of consortium as to all 
defendants.  A Superior Court judge granted summary judgment in 
favor of Oke and the dealership defendants.5  The plaintiffs 
timely appealed, and this court transferred the case sua sponte. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Our review of a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo."  HSBC 
 
 
4 Although the plaintiffs initially contended that MBB Auto 
co-owned the courtesy vehicle, they now admit that MBB Auto was 
neither the owner of the courtesy vehicle nor otherwise involved 
in the courtesy vehicle transaction between MBF Auto and Oke.  
The record being devoid of any basis for MBB Auto's liability, 
we affirm the grant of summary judgment in its favor. 
 
 
5 Steele did not seek summary judgment. 
8 
 
Bank USA, N.A., 490 Mass. at 326, quoting Berry, 488 Mass. at 
636.  Viewing "the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom summary judgment entered," HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A., supra at 326-327, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where 
there is no material issue of fact in dispute and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Id. at 326. 
 
We also "review questions of statutory interpretation de 
novo."  Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 
331 (2021).  In construing a statute, we "start . . . with the 
language of the statute."  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 
(2000).  "It is a 'fundamental canon of statutory construction' 
that, 'unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.'"  Sandifer 
v. United States Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014), quoting 
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).  We do not 
construe terms in isolation; instead, we consider the specific 
language of a provision in the context of the statute as a 
whole.  See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) 
(ordinary meaning may be different in "the specific context in 
which that language is used, and the broader context of the 
statute as a whole" [citation omitted]).  Where the statutory 
command is straightforward, "there is no reason to resort to 
legislative history."  United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 
(1997).  See Burlington N. R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 
9 
 
454, 461 (1987) ("Legislative history can be a legitimate guide 
to a statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity, but [i]n the 
absence of a clearly expressed legislative intention to the 
contrary, the language of the statute itself must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive" [quotations and citations omitted]). 
 
b.  Vicarious liability and the Graves Amendment.  The 
plaintiffs contend that MBF Auto is vicariously liable for the 
tortious conduct of Steele.  They rely on § 85A, which 
establishes a presumption that evidence that the vehicle was 
registered in the name of the defendant as owner at the time of 
an accident involving the vehicle "shall be prima facie evidence 
that [the vehicle] was then being operated by and under the 
control of a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally 
responsible, and absence of such responsibility shall be an 
affirmative defence."  G. L. c. 231, § 85A.  The plaintiffs 
maintain that § 85A precludes summary judgment because MBF Auto, 
as the registered owner of the courtesy vehicle, was 
presumptively in control of Steele at the time of the accident 
giving rise to the plaintiffs' negligence claim under the theory 
of vicarious liability. 
 
MBF Auto contends, and the motion judge agreed, that the 
Graves Amendment preempts § 85A and that, under the 
circumstances of the present case, the Graves Amendment 
10 
 
precludes holding MBF Auto vicariously liable for Steele's 
conduct.  The Graves Amendment provides, in relevant part: 
"An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the 
vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall 
not be liable under the law of any State or political 
subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the 
vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons 
or property that results or arises out of the use, 
operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period 
of the rental or lease, if -- (1) the owner (or an 
affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business 
of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no 
negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner 
(or an affiliate of the owner)."  (Emphases added.) 
 
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).  Where applicable, the Graves Amendment 
expressly preempts State laws, such as § 85A.  See Hillman v. 
Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 490 (2013) ("Under the Supremacy Clause, 
Congress has the power to pre-empt [S]tate law expressly").  In 
particular, its protection extends to owners of vehicles that 
rent or lease the vehicle, are in the business or trade of 
renting or leasing vehicles, and are not negligent or criminal 
in connection with the rental or lease.  The plaintiffs maintain 
that the Graves Amendment does not apply to MBF Auto's courtesy 
vehicle program, arguing principally that MBF Auto did not rent 
or lease the vehicle because it provided the vehicle merely as a 
courtesy to Oke, receiving no consideration for doing so.  They 
also maintain that MBF Auto was negligent in its administration 
of its courtesy vehicle program. 
11 
 
 
i.  Rent or lease requirement.  To trigger the protection 
afforded to rental car companies pursuant to the Graves 
Amendment, the owner of the car in question, inter alia, must 
have "rent[ed]" or "lease[d]" the car.  49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).  
In other words, the owner must have received consideration in 
exchange for the car.  See Black's Law Dictionary 909 (8th ed. 
2004) (defining "lease" as "[t]o grant the possession and use of 
[land, buildings, rooms, movable property, etc.] to another in 
return for rent or other consideration" [emphasis added]); id. 
at 1322 (defining "rent" as "[c]onsideration paid, usu[ally] 
periodically, for the use or occupancy of property [esp[ecially] 
real property]" [emphasis added]).6  Accord Thayer v. Randy 
Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC, 30 F.4th 1290, 1293 (11th 
Cir. 2022) (analyzing Graves Amendment and determining that "to 
 
 
6 "Dictionaries are useful aids in determining a word's 
ordinary meaning."  Penobscot Nation v. Frey, 3 F.4th 484, 491 
(1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Frey, 
142 S. Ct. 1668 (2022), and cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1669 
(2022), citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553-554 (2014) (interpreting "exceptional" 
based on dictionary definitions), and Kellogg Brown & Root 
Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 575 U.S. 650, 662 
(2015) (defining "pending" using dictionary definitions).  See 
Yates, 574 U.S. at 537 ("Ordinarily, a word's usage accords with 
its dictionary definition"). 
 
 
The eighth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, "which was 
current when the Graves Amendment was enacted and for several 
years thereafter, does not define 'rent' as a verb."  Thayer v. 
Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC, 30 F.4th 1290, 1293 
n.3 (11th Cir. 2022). 
12 
 
rent or lease a vehicle requires an exchange of consideration 
for the use of the vehicle").7 
 
In the present case, MBF Auto contends that, even though it 
provided Oke with a vehicle as a "courtesy," and thus did not 
charge Oke to use the vehicle, it received consideration for the 
vehicle in the form of acquiring the opportunity to perform the 
repair work on Oke's car.  Specifically, MBF Auto maintains that 
the courtesy vehicle was part of a larger transaction to perform 
repair work on Oke's car even though the courtesy vehicle itself 
was not delineated as a separate line item in the service deal.  
The plaintiffs, by contrast, argue that, because the courtesy 
vehicle was provided to Oke free of any additional charge, MBF 
Auto did not receive consideration and the vehicle thus was not 
"rent[ed]" or "lease[d]" as required by the Graves Amendment. 
 
Consideration is the inducement to a contract; it can take 
the form of an act, a forbearance, or a return promise bargained 
for and received by a promisor from a promisee.  See Black's Law 
 
 
7 The parties do not contend, and we see nothing to suggest, 
that the context of the statute as whole indicates an 
alternative construction of the term "rent" or "lease."  See 
Pub. L. No. 109-59, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., Title X, Subtitle B, 
§ 10208(a), 119 Stat. 1935 (2005).  The Graves Amendment was a 
"Miscellaneous Provision[]" to the "Safe, Accountable, Flexible, 
Efficient Transportation Equity Act:  A Legacy for Users," 119 
Stat. 1144, a statute that does not use the terms "rent" or 
"lease" other than according to their ordinary meanings.  See, 
e.g., 119 Stat. 1765.  And, because the words of the statute are 
unambiguous, we need not consult its legislative history.  
Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 6. 
13 
 
Dictionary, supra at 324 (defining "consideration" as 
"[s]omething [such as an act, a forbearance, or a return 
promise] bargained for and received by a promisor from a 
promisee; that which motivates a person to do something, 
esp[ecially] to engage in a legal act"); Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 484 (1993) (defining "consideration" as 
"something given as recompense:  as . . . something that is 
legally regarded as the equivalent or return given or suffered 
by one for the act or promise of another:  an act or forbearance 
or the promise of it done or given by one party"). 
 
Consideration need not take the form of a monetary payment.  
See Thayer, 30 F.4th at 1294 ("consideration is broader than 
simply the payment of money").  See also Stanley v. Schwalby, 
162 U.S. 255, 276 (1896) ("A valuable consideration may be other 
than the actual payment of money, and may consist of acts to be 
done . . .").  It extends to "any act of [one party] from which 
the [other party] . . . derives a benefit or advantage" 
(citation omitted).  Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 324.  
"[C]onsideration in its widest sense is the reason, motive, or 
inducement, by which a man is moved to bind himself by an 
agreement" (citation omitted).  Id.  Accord Huang v. Ma, 491 
Mass. 235, 240 (2023) ("a reciprocal exchange of benefit and 
detriment constitut[es] consideration"). 
14 
 
 
Here, MBF Auto provided the courtesy vehicle as part of a 
servicing transaction to repair Oke's car; in exchange for the 
opportunity to service Oke's car and to be paid for that repair 
work, MBF Auto offered the repair work itself and the courtesy 
vehicle as further inducement to obtain Oke's business.  See 
Thayer, 30 F.4th at 1294 & n.4 ("[the owner] provides vehicles 
in exchange for the opportunity to service the customer's car" 
and "the provision of a vehicle may serve as an inducement for 
the customer"). 
 
The plaintiffs maintain that the Graves Amendment does not 
apply where, as here, the courtesy vehicle was not billed 
separately from MBF Auto's repair work on Oke's car.  However, 
"the law does not require every term of the contract to have a 
separately stated consideration."  Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 
798 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2015).   Rather, "[a] single 
performance or return promise may . . . furnish consideration 
for any number of promises."  Id., quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 80 comment a (1981).  See 3 R.A. Lord, Williston 
on Contracts § 7:51 (4th ed. 2008) (stating basic premise that 
one consideration may support several promises).  Indeed, the 
same argument made by the plaintiffs here was squarely rejected 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
which noted that often rental companies provide a vehicle as 
15 
 
part of a larger package deal and yet they are entitled to the 
protection of the Graves Amendment.  Thayer, 30 F.4th at 1294.8 
 
The plaintiffs' contention that MBF Auto is not entitled to 
the protection of the Graves Amendment because the courtesy 
vehicle agreements refer to the vehicle as a "loaner" car fares 
no better.9  To the contrary, the labels used by the contracting 
parties are not controlling.  See Thayer, 30 F.4th at 1294 
("Whatever label [the owner] happened to assign to the vehicle 
here does not control the legal determination of whether the 
Graves Amendment applies.  The substance of the transaction, not 
the label used, controls").  Cf. Lone Star Silicon Innovations 
LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2019), 
citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891) (legal 
effect of agreement "depends on the substance of what was 
 
 
8 To the extent the plaintiffs argue that MBF did not "rent" 
the courtesy vehicle because Oke was charged a one-time fee for 
the service work and thus was not charged periodically as rent 
usually is, see Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 1322, we 
disagree.  It is indisputable that the Graves Amendment protects 
traditional rental car companies, yet "most rental cars are 
rented for a one-time payment, meaning that fact cannot preclude 
application of the Graves Amendment."  Thayer, 30 F.4th at 1294. 
 
 
9 The term "loan" means "[t]o lend, esp[ecially] money," 
Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 955, and "lend" means "[t]o 
allow the temporary use of (something), sometimes in exchange 
for compensation, on condition that the thing or its equivalent 
be returned," id. at 921.  The plaintiffs assert that because 
the courtesy vehicle was a "loaner," it could not also have been 
rented or leased.  As is clear from their definitions, however, 
the terms are not mutually exclusive. 
16 
 
granted rather than formalities or magic words").  As discussed 
supra, looking at the substance of the transaction between MBF 
Auto and Oke, the courtesy vehicle meets the ordinary meaning of 
"rent[]" or "lease[]" because it was provided to Oke in exchange 
for consideration -- namely, the opportunity to service Oke's 
car.10 
 
ii.  Business of renting or leasing vehicles requirement.  
To qualify for the protection of the Graves Amendment, MBF Auto 
must be in "the trade or business of renting or leasing motor 
 
 
10 The plaintiffs, citing Zizersky v. Life Quality Motor 
Sales, Inc., 21 Misc. 3d 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008), contend 
perfunctorily that extending the Graves Amendment to owners of 
courtesy vehicles like the one at issue in the present case 
raises concerns under the commerce clause of the United States 
Constitution.  See art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, of the United States 
Constitution.  See also Zizersky, supra at 880 (including 
"loaner" vehicles would "raise a question about the 
constitutionality of the [Graves] Amendment" because "[n]othing 
has been proffered on this motion to suggest that a 'loaner' 
vehicle, even if connected to the purchase or lease of another 
vehicle, has any effect whatsoever on the market for leased or 
rented vehicles").  The argument runs contrary to the near 
unanimous holdings of Federal courts that have considered 
similar challenges.  See Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 22 
(2010) (collecting cases and concluding that "all but one 
district court have found [the Graves Amendment] to be a proper 
exercise of the commerce power").  Indeed, it is beyond question 
that Congress may protect and regulate "the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce," United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 
(1995), and "those activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce," id. at 558-559.  The regulation of rentals 
of courtesy vehicles falls within this power.  In fact, here, 
the MBF Auto courtesy car agreement limited Oke to driving the 
vehicle within one hundred miles of Caldwell, New Jersey, a 
radius that includes multiple other States.  And, in 
contravention of this limitation, Oke drove the courtesy vehicle 
into Massachusetts. 
17 
 
vehicles."  49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1).  The record on summary 
judgment indisputably shows that it was.  Specifically, MBF Auto 
maintained approximately 125 vehicles in its "loaner car fleet."  
Since 2014, MBF Auto has "regularly provide[d] loaner vehicles 
to customers as a courtesy when a customer's car is being 
serviced for more than three hours."  At any given time, 
approximately ninety to ninety-five percent of those vehicles 
are with customers, and in the month of August 2016, when the 
accident at issue occurred, MBF Auto provided courtesy vehicles 
to its customers 886 times.11 
 
iii.  Negligence.  In addition to the aforementioned 
requirements, an owner who rents or leases a vehicle is 
protected from being held vicariously liable only if there was 
"no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner."  
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2).12  "To prevail on a negligence claim, a 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty of reasonable care, that the defendant breached this duty, 
 
 
11 The plaintiffs did not contest before the motion judge 
that MBF Auto was in the business of renting or leasing 
vehicles; the argument is thus waived.  See Boss v. Leverett, 
484 Mass. 553, 563 (2020) ("issues not raised below cannot be 
argued for the first time on appeal").  Even on appeal, the 
plaintiffs mention the issue only briefly and make no argument 
separate from their challenge that the courtesy vehicle was not 
"rented" or "leased." 
 
 
12 The plaintiffs do not argue MBF Auto engaged in any 
criminal wrongdoing. 
18 
 
that damage resulted, and that there was a causal relation 
between the breach of the duty and the damage."  Jupin v. Kask, 
447 Mass. 141, 146 (2006).  Although "[w]e generally consider 
the latter three questions . . . to be the special province of 
the jury," id., summary judgment may enter where a plaintiff 
fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact.  See, e.g., 
Global NAPs, Inc. v. Awiszus, 457 Mass. 489, 500 (2010) ("The 
issue whether an attorney's negligence was a proximate cause of 
a client's loss may be resolved at the summary judgment stage").  
See also Patterson v. Christ Church in the City of Boston, 85 
Mass. App. Ct. 157, 159 (2014) ("Negligence cases are not 
frequently resolved by summary judgment, but a judge may decide 
the issue as [a] matter of law when no rational view of the 
evidence permits a finding of negligence" [quotation and 
citation omitted]). 
 
The plaintiffs contend that MBF Auto owed a duty of care to 
third parties, like the plaintiffs, to reasonably administer and 
supervise its courtesy vehicle program, and that its failure to 
do so caused them harm.  The plaintiffs maintain that MBF 
committed a breach of its duty in several ways, the first of 
which was by failing to take additional steps to verify that 
Oke's driver's license was valid beyond accepting his 
representation that it was.  Regardless of whether MBF Auto 
should or could verify the validity of Oke's driver's license, 
19 
 
no rational view of the record supports a finding that the 
failure to verify Oke's driver's license caused Steele to drive 
the courtesy vehicle, resulting in the plaintiffs' injuries.13 
 
Next, the plaintiffs maintain that MBF Auto committed a 
breach of its duty of care in its administration and supervision 
of the courtesy car program by failing to train its employees to 
instruct Oke orally on the restrictions placed on his use of the 
vehicle –- namely, that he could only use the vehicle within a 
one hundred-mile radius of the dealership and that he was the 
only authorized driver.  These restrictions, however, were set 
forth in writing in the courtesy vehicle agreements, which Oke 
signed.  Most pertinent to the accident -- which occurred while 
Steele was driving the courtesy vehicle -- one of the agreements 
set forth in large, boldfaced, capital letters, right above the 
signature line:  "UNDERSIGNED CLIENT IS THE ONLY PERSON 
AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE VEHICLE."  Moreover, Oke knew at the time 
he signed the courtesy vehicle agreements that he was the only 
person authorized to operate the courtesy vehicle.  Thus, no 
jury could reasonably conclude that MBF Auto's alleged failure 
to train its employees to orally explain the provisions of the 
written contract to Oke caused the accident.  The plaintiffs 
have not raised a genuine dispute of material fact that MBF Auto 
 
 
13 Oke represented that he had a valid driver's license, and 
nothing in the record contradicts that, in fact, he did. 
20 
 
negligently caused the accident and thus was not protected by 
the Graves Amendment;14 accordingly, MBF Auto is entitled to 
summary judgment.15 
 
c.  Negligent entrustment.  We turn next to the plaintiffs' 
claim of negligent entrustment against Oke.  "In order to 
prevail on a claim of negligent entrustment of an automobile, it 
is necessary for the plaintiff to show, among other things, that 
the defendant owned or controlled the motor vehicle concerned, 
and that the defendant gave the driver permission to operate the 
vehicle" (quotation and citation omitted).16  Alioto v. Marnell, 
402 Mass. 36, 40 (1988).17  We have described the requisite 
"permission" as "knowingly allowing an incompetent operator to 
drive the defendant's vehicle" (citation omitted).  Barnstable 
 
 
14 For at least these same reasons, the plaintiffs' claim 
that MBF Auto is directly liable (as opposed to vicariously 
liable) for its negligence in the administration of its courtesy 
vehicle program also fails. 
 
 
15 In light of the foregoing, plaintiffs' loss of consortium 
claim as it pertains to the dealership defendants also fails.  
See Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 264 (1994) ("a claim 
for loss of consortium requires proof of a tortious act that 
caused the claimant's spouse personal injury"). 
 
 
16 It is undisputed that Oke controlled the courtesy 
vehicle. 
 
 
17 A claim of negligent entrustment also requires "proof of 
the driver's incompetence, and proof of the defendant owner's 
knowledge of that incompetence."  Leone v. Doran, 363 Mass. 1, 
11, vacated in part on other grounds, 363 Mass. 886 (1973).  
Here, it is not disputed that Oke knew that Steele lacked a 
driver's license. 
21 
 
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lally, 374 Mass. 602, 605 (1978).  
The record shows that Oke left the courtesy vehicle running with 
the key in the ignition while it was illegally parked; he 
attended to his errand while Steele remained in the vehicle.  
This conduct, a rational finder of fact could reasonably 
conclude, constituted implicit permission or knowing consent for 
Steele to move the illegally parked vehicle if needed.18  See, 
e.g., Watson v. Salvoni, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 735, 737 (1989) (in 
connection with claim for negligent entrustment, examining 
whether parents gave "implied" permission for son to drive moped 
through prior conduct).  See generally A.L. Cohen, Cause of 
Action for Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle, 23 Cause of 
Action 2d 265 § 10 (2003 & May 2023 update) ("If the owner knew, 
or had reasonable cause to know, that his or her actions or 
omissions would place the operation of a motor vehicle in the 
care of a person unfit to handle that responsibility, the test 
for permissive use is satisfied").19 
 
 
18 Oke's reliance on cases concerning stolen vehicles is 
inapt where, as here, the vehicle was not stolen; moreover, "the 
reasoning of cases involving keys negligently left in ignitions 
is no longer persuasive."  Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, 
Inc., 423 Mass. 637, 640 (1996).  See R.L. Currie Corp. v. East 
Coast Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 782, 785 & n.5 
(2018) (collecting cases). 
 
 
19 Cf. Drescher v. Travelers Ins. Co., 359 Mass. 458, 460-
461 (1971) (operation of vehicle was "impliedly sanctioned" by 
owner); Dufour v. Arruda, 299 Mass. 46, 47-48 (1937) (operation 
of vehicle was with "implied consent" of owner).  Other 
22 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The grant of summary judgment in favor of 
MBF Auto and MBB Auto, see note 4, supra, is affirmed.  The 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Oke is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
jurisdictions have concluded that the permission element of a 
claim for negligent entrustment includes implied permission or 
knowledge.  See, e.g., Morin v. Moore, 309 F.3d 316, 327 (5th 
Cir. 2002) ("for purposes of a negligent entrustment claim, 
permission may be express or implied"); Armenta v. A.S. Horner, 
Inc., 2015-NMCA-092, ¶ 22, quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 
1990–NMSC–009, ¶ 8 n.3 ("Implied permission to use a motor 
vehicle can be inferred from a course of conduct or relationship 
between the parties, or other facts and circumstances signifying 
the assent of the owner"); Kingrey v. Hill, 245 Va. 76, 78 
(1993) ("In considering negligent entrustment of automobiles, we 
have required express permission, evidence of a pattern of 
conduct supporting implied permission, or evidence of knowledge 
that an automobile would be used notwithstanding explicit 
instructions to the contrary" [emphasis added]).