Title: Beaman v. Freesmeyer

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2021 IL 125617 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 125617) 
ALAN BEAMAN, Appellant, v. TIM FREESMEYER et al., Appellees. 
 
 
Opinion filed July 29, 2021. 
 
 
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Overstreet and Carter concurred in 
the judgment and opinion. 
 
Justice Michael J. Burke dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Garman. 
 
Justice Theis took no part in the decision. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
In 1995, plaintiff Alan Beaman was convicted of the murder of his former 
girlfriend, Jennifer Lockmiller, and sentenced to a term of 50 years’ imprisonment. 
After Beaman had served more than 13 years in prison, this court overturned his 
 
 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
conviction because the trial was tainted by a Brady violation (Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963)). People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 82 (2008) (hereinafter 
referred to as Beaman I). Thereafter, the State declined to retry Beaman and 
dismissed the murder charge against him. Beaman subsequently initiated this action 
against defendants Tim Freesmeyer, Dave Warner, and Frank Zayas, former 
detectives of the Normal Police Department, asserting claims of malicious 
prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Beaman 
also requested damages from defendant the Town of Normal, under theories of 
respondeat superior and indemnification. The circuit court of McLean County 
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, and the appellate 
court affirmed. Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2017 IL App (4th) 160527. In February 
2019, this court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded to that court 
for review of “whether the defendants’ conduct or actions proximately caused the 
commencement or continuance of the original criminal proceeding by determining 
whether defendants played a significant role in Beaman’s prosecution.” Beaman v. 
Freesmeyer, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 47 (hereinafter referred to as Beaman II). On 
remand, the appellate court again affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary 
judgment for defendants. 2019 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶ 130. For the reasons that 
follow, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment and remand the cause to the 
circuit court for further proceedings.  
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
 
A. The Murder and Prearrest Investigation 
¶ 4 
 
Jennifer Lockmiller, a 21-year-old student at Illinois State University, was 
found dead in the bedroom of her apartment in Normal, Illinois, on August 28, 
1993. Her body was severely decomposed, and the electrical cord of a clock radio 
was wrapped and tied around her neck. She had sustained multiple stab wounds that 
appeared to have been made by scissors with red plastic handles, which were 
embedded in her chest. Her shirt and bra were pushed up around her neck, and her 
shorts and underwear were pulled down around her left leg. A box fan partially 
covered her face and was resting on the scissors in Lockmiller’s chest.  
¶ 5 
 
A plastic garbage can was found lying on its side in front of the open door of 
the cabinet beneath the kitchen sink. A bag of trash was found on the living room 
 
 
 
 
 
- 3 - 
sofa. Lockmiller’s closed book bags and purse were on a table and appeared 
undisturbed. Her wallet contained $17.71 in cash. Both the air conditioner and the 
television were on. Several letters were found under Lockmiller’s bed. 
¶ 6 
 
In addition, seven fingerprints were recovered from the alarm clock. 
Eventually, it was determined that two of the fingerprints were from Beaman; four 
belonged to Lockmiller’s then-current boyfriend, Michael Swaine; and one 
fingerprint was unidentified. No suitable fingerprints were found on the cord of the 
alarm clock or the scissors that were used to stab Lockmiller.  
¶ 7 
 
An autopsy revealed that Lockmiller died from ligature strangulation caused by 
the cord of the alarm clock. The medical examiner estimated the time of death 
between 9 a.m. on Wednesday, August 25, and 9 a.m. on Friday, August 27. He 
could not narrow the time frame any further due to the body’s decomposition. 
However, the investigators narrowed down the likely time of death to the afternoon 
hours of Wednesday, August 25, because they had not found anyone who had seen 
Lockmiller alive after she attended a class that ended at 11:50 a.m. that day. 
¶ 8 
 
The murder quickly became a high-profile story in the college towns of Normal 
and Bloomington. The detectives from the Normal Police Department (NPD) who 
were involved in the investigation included defendants Freesmeyer, Warner, and 
Zayas. McLean County State’s Attorney Charles Reynard and Assistant State’s 
Attorney James Souk were part of the prosecutorial team.  
¶ 9 
 
Detective Zayas testified that the murder could have been committed by a large 
universe of potential suspects, given the transient nature of the campus, with young 
people attending activities and parties at all hours of the day and night and the 
location of the crime scene on a main throughfare, Route 51. According to Zayas, 
it was an open case, and the detectives had no idea where to begin the investigation.  
¶ 10 
 
However, since there was no sign of forced entry and it appeared nothing had 
been stolen, the investigation immediately focused on men Lockmiller had dated. 
Believing the murder was a crime of passion, the detectives questioned several of 
Lockmiller’s current and former boyfriends, including Beaman, Michael Swaine, 
Stacey “Bubba” Gates, and Larbi John Murray.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
¶ 11 
 
Swaine was Beaman’s former roommate and Lockmiller’s boyfriend at the time 
of her murder. Swaine had a sexual relationship with Lockmiller beginning while 
she was still dating Beaman during June 1993 and continuing until her death. 
Though Swaine and Lockmiller tried to hide it from Beaman, he learned of their 
relationship in mid-July 1993 when he broke down the door to Lockmiller’s 
apartment and found them together. Although Beaman was angry, he never touched 
either Swaine or Lockmiller, and he later drove Swaine back to their apartment.  
¶ 12 
 
On July 25, 1993, Beaman found two letters from Lockmiller in Swaine’s 
bedroom and went to the theater where he and Swaine worked to confront him 
about his relationship with Lockmiller. Later that day, Beaman went with a friend 
to Ohio so he could disengage from his relationship with Lockmiller. At around 
that time, Lockmiller told Swaine that Beaman was over her and did not love her 
anymore. According to Swaine, when Beaman returned from Ohio on August 4, he 
seemed to be in a better place emotionally. Swaine was eliminated as a suspect 
based on the results of his polygraph examination and on evidence that he was 
working at his former high school’s bookstore in Elmhurst, Illinois, on the day of 
the murder.  
¶ 13 
 
Stacey “Bubba” Gates, a former boyfriend of Lockmiller’s, moved to Peoria, 
Illinois, from Janesville, Wisconsin, three days before her murder. He and 
Lockmiller planned to get together the following weekend, and he believed they 
were going to renew their relationship. Gates gave erratic and inconsistent answers 
during his polygraph examination but was eliminated as a suspect because check-
in logs from a Peoria school showed that he was working as a teacher on August 
25, 1993.  
¶ 14 
 
Larbi John Murray was a drug dealer with connections to a major supplier in 
Chicago, and he previously had sold drugs to Lockmiller. At the time of her death, 
Lockmiller owed Murray about $20 for the purchase of marijuana. In addition, 
Murray had a sporadic sexual relationship with Lockmiller. At the time of the 
murder, he lived in Bloomington, about 1½ miles from Lockmiller’s apartment. 
¶ 15 
 
During his initial interview, Murray informed the investigators that he had 
spoken with Lockmiller and Swaine in a parking lot sometime between August 19 
and 23, 1993. He also said he left Bloomington and went to Byron, Illinois, on 
August 24 and did not return until September 1. Murray further told the detectives 
 
 
 
 
 
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that he and Lockmiller were about to renew their sexual relationship. In addition, 
Murray stated that Lockmiller said she had been afraid to end her relationship with 
Beaman. 
¶ 16 
 
The investigators later spoke with Murray’s live-in girlfriend, Debbie 
Mackoway, who said she was with Murray after she returned from work at 2 p.m. 
on August 25 until 4:20 p.m., when Murray left town. Mackoway corroborated 
Murray’s statement that he had returned to Bloomington on September 1. 
Mackoway further stated that she last saw Lockmiller with Swaine on August 21 
and that she believed the same was true for Murray.  
¶ 17 
 
After interviewing Mackoway, investigators again spoke with Murray, who 
changed the information that he had provided earlier. At his second interview, 
Murray admitted that he was home during the morning and early afternoon of 
August 25 and indicated that he was with Mackoway from 1 to 4 p.m., when he left 
for Byron. This information was confirmed by Murray’s telephone records, which 
showed that he was in Bloomington on August 25. Murray also admitted that he 
previously had a physical altercation with a former girlfriend. 
¶ 18 
 
Detective Daniels escorted Murray for a polygraph examination, but the 
examiner was unable to get a valid result because Murray repeatedly failed to 
follow directions despite being instructed numerous times. Murray told the 
examiner that he was not able to comply, and the examiner ultimately terminated 
the examination. Though the examiner did not initially conclude that Murray had 
intentionally prevented a valid result, he later acknowledged that lack of 
cooperation could be an intentional response. Another polygraph examination was 
scheduled for October 12, 1993, but Murray never appeared for that examination. 
¶ 19 
 
Detective Warner received the report regarding Murray’s incomplete 
polygraph, but what happened to the report after that is unclear. Warner testified 
that he gave the report to Daniels, but Daniels had no memory of ever receiving it. 
It is clear, however, that neither the State Attorney’s Office nor Beaman’s counsel 
ever received that report. 
¶ 20 
 
Early on, the detectives became aware that Murray had been the subject of prior 
police investigations that were related to his drug dealing, use of steroids, and 
abusive and erratic behavior. In January 1993, cocaine and steroids were found in 
 
 
 
 
 
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Murray’s apartment during a police search, and he admitted to having used steroids 
on several occasions. At that time, Murray faced charges of possessing drugs with 
intent to deliver. 
¶ 21 
 
On the day Lockmiller’s body was found, the detectives began to focus the 
investigation on Beaman based, in part, on information received from Lockmiller’s 
friend, Morgan Keefe. Keefe had attempted to contact Lockmiller for several days 
and eventually went to her apartment, where she found Lockmiller’s body. Keefe 
called the police and said she knew “who did it,” referring to Beaman. She also 
informed investigators that Lockmiller had been afraid of Beaman because he 
previously had broken down her door. Keefe admitted, however, that she had no 
personal knowledge about who committed the murder.  
¶ 22 
 
The investigators learned that Beaman, a student at Illinois Wesleyan 
University in Bloomington, was residing with his parents in Rockford during the 
week of Lockmiller’s murder. Beaman occasionally sang and played guitar and 
saxophone for his church while home from college. Beaman and his church pastor 
arranged that they would rehearse on Wednesday, August 25, for the performance 
the following Sunday.  
¶ 23 
 
The detectives also learned that Beaman and Lockmiller began a tumultuous 
relationship in July 1992 and that the two had broken up and rekindled their 
relationship approximately 17 times over the next 12 months. They had a history 
of engaging in loud arguments, one of which ended when Beaman drank nail polish 
remover and Lockmiller took him to the hospital. Beaman wrote letters to 
Lockmiller stating that he wanted their relationship to be monogamous, but he 
suspected she was seeing other men. The relationship finally ended in late July 
1993, a month prior to the murder, and Beaman subsequently started a new 
relationship. 
¶ 24 
 
The night Lockmiller’s body was found, Daniels and another detective drove to 
Rockford and questioned Beaman at the Rockford police headquarters at around 
11:30 p.m. The interview focused on Beaman’s relationship with Lockmiller and 
his activities over the previous seven days. Beaman told Daniels that he had worked 
every night that week from 1 to 9 a.m. and that he had attended parties on 
Wednesday and Thursday evenings before going to work. As to Wednesday, 
 
 
 
 
 
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August 25, Beaman said that after getting off work on that morning he went home 
and slept until he woke up in the evening to have dinner with his parents. 
¶ 25 
 
Beaman informed the investigators that, after confronting Swaine regarding his 
relationship with Lockmiller, he left Bloomington on July 25 and went to Ohio, 
where he stayed with a friend until August 4. Upon returning to Bloomington, 
Beaman visited Lockmiller at her apartment and then drove her to class. He told 
the investigators they parted amicably and that was the last time he had seen her. 
He further stated that he had not called Lockmiller since leaving Bloomington.  
¶ 26 
 
The investigative team obtained telephone records for Lockmiller, Beaman, 
Swaine, and Murray. Those records established that on August 22, three days before 
her murder, Lockmiller called the Beaman residence in Rockford 28 times. Each of 
those calls lasted only a few seconds and appeared to have been unanswered. 
Another call by Lockmiller to the Beaman residence the following day lasted 
several minutes. The telephone records also established that two calls were made 
from the Beaman residence to his church pastor at 10:37 and 10:39 a.m. on the day 
of the murder.  
¶ 27 
 
In early September 1993, Freesmeyer traveled to Rockford and interviewed 
Beaman’s neighbor, Michael VanBerringer, who had spoken with Beaman in the 
early morning of August 29, when Beaman returned from being questioned by the 
detectives. VanBerringer reported that Beaman said they were trying to ascertain 
his whereabouts during the previous week. Beaman also said he had a receipt for 
new tires, purchased on August 24, which reflected the milage on his car and would 
show that he could not have driven to Bloomington after the tires were purchased. 
¶ 28 
 
Freesmeyer also learned that Beaman had made a deposit at Bell Federal 
Savings and Loan on the day of the murder, and security footage from the bank 
showed Beaman entering the building at 10:09 a.m. and leaving two minutes later. 
In addition, Freesmeyer documented in his investigative report that “the only 
person able to verify Alan’s alibi during the time that the homicide occurred, was 
his mother, Carol Beaman.” 
¶ 29 
 
Freesmeyer questioned Beaman on October 27, 1993. During that interview, 
Freesmeyer told Beaman that he was going to be arrested for Lockmiller’s murder, 
stating that probable cause for an arrest already existed and that the detectives were 
 
 
 
 
 
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simply waiting for lab results. Freesmeyer informed Beaman that he had a video 
tape showing him at the bank at 10:11, which conflicted with Beaman’s prior 
statement that he went straight home after work. Freesmeyer also informed Beaman 
that his fingerprint was found on the “murder weapon” and that the State would not 
seek the death penalty if Beaman chose to confess now but that, “if this façade 
continues, we’re going for the death penalty.” Beaman denied any involvement in 
the murder. 
¶ 30 
 
After that interview, the detectives obtained court permission to secretly record 
the meetings between Beaman and Freesmeyer. In addition, Swaine had multiple 
conversations with Beaman while wearing a concealed recording device. During 
those secretly recorded conversations with Swaine, Beaman consistently stated that 
he had no information about the identity of Lockmiller’s murderer. He also told 
Swaine that Lockmiller had called requesting to resume their prior relationship, but 
he refused and told her that he did not love her. 
¶ 31 
 
Freesmeyer later met with Beaman and asked if there was anything about his 
car that would tend to show his innocence. Beaman responded that he had new tires 
installed on August 24 and the receipt showed the mileage on his car at that time. 
Freesmeyer also asked Beaman if he had ever searched through Lockmiller’s 
garbage, and Beaman said he had done so when he felt he had a reason.  
¶ 32 
 
Early in the investigation, detectives interviewed David Singley, Lockmiller’s 
neighbor. Singley informed investigators that he arrived home from class at about 
2 p.m. on August 25 and heard Lockmiller’s door slam shut. Singley also said that 
he heard the stereo playing inside Lockmiller’s apartment and that the window air 
conditioner was off. About five minutes later he heard Lockmiller’s door open and 
close, followed by the sound of someone running down the stairs and exiting the 
building. Singley left his apartment soon thereafter and returned around 4:30 p.m. 
When he again left the apartment around 5:15 p.m., he noticed that Lockmiller’s 
air conditioner was running, the stereo was turned off, and the television was on. 
¶ 33 
 
In November 1993, Freesmeyer sought to verify Swaine’s alibi by conducting 
driving time trials between his residence in Elmhurst and Lockmiller’s apartment 
in Normal. Freesmeyer determined that those time trials and Swaine’s telephone 
records eliminated his opportunity to commit the murder. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 9 - 
¶ 34 
 
In February 1994, John Dierker, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State 
Police, informed Freesmeyer that he had found a latent palm print on the kitchen 
garbage bag retrieved from the crime scene. Dierker advised Freesmeyer that, if he 
had a palm print of Beaman’s, he could compare it with the latent print on the bag. 
Beaman voluntarily submitted additional palm prints, but they did not match the 
print on the garbage bag. 
¶ 35 
 
In April 1994, Daniels attended a national police conference in Florida on “cold 
case” investigations. He presented the Lockmiller case at the conference and 
obtained a list of possible leads the investigators could pursue. 
¶ 36 
 
On May 16, 1994, a meeting was held to determine whether to arrest Beaman 
for Lockmiller’s murder. Those in attendance included State’s Attorney Reynard, 
Assistant State’s Attorney Souk, and Detectives Freesmeyer, Zayas, and Daniels. 
During the meeting, Reynard decided to charge Beaman, and Souk agreed. Daniels 
attempted to present the suggested list of investigative leads they could pursue prior 
to arresting Beaman, but Souk responded, “I think we’ve got our guy” and stated, 
“we went as far as we can with this case.” Souk stated they would issue a warrant 
for Beaman’s arrest, and the arrest was made the following day. 
 
¶ 37 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Postarrest Investigation 
¶ 38 
 
On May 18, 1994, the day after Beaman’s arrest, his parents were interviewed 
for the first time. Sometime in June, Freesmeyer received a call from Mrs. Beaman, 
who indicated that she had found receipts from August 25, 1993, that substantiated 
her statement that she returned from shopping by 2:15 p.m., the time at which she 
saw Beaman’s car in the driveway. 
¶ 39 
 
In late June, Freesmeyer performed driving time trials from the bank to the 
Beaman residence to determine whether Beaman could have made the two 
telephone calls to the church at 10:37 and 10:39 a.m. During numerous driving time 
trials, Freesmeyer observed the speed limit at all times. One of those trials indicated 
that use of a bypass route would have allowed Beaman to return home from the 
bank in time to make the calls to the church. This was the only time trial that 
Freesmeyer omitted from his report. Freesmeyer also performed a separate time 
trial from the bank to Lockmiller’s apartment and then back to the Beaman 
 
 
 
 
 
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residence, which took a total drive time of 4 hours and 11 minutes, driving at the 
speed limit for that round trip. 
 
¶ 40 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Grand Jury Proceedings 
¶ 41 
 
In July 1994, proceedings on Lockmiller’s murder were held before the grand 
jury. Souk conducted the questioning. During Freesmeyer’s testimony, the 
following inquiry occurred: 
 
“Q. But other than Mr. Beaman, were you able in the course of your 
investigation to locate any other person anywhere who had any conceivable 
motive to kill Jennifer Lockmiller? 
 
A. No, not necessarily.” 
Freesmeyer was also asked whether his interviews of residents of the apartment 
building revealed anything helpful to the case, and he responded they did not. 
¶ 42 
 
Freesmeyer also explained that he had obtained information that a woman and 
her husband had arranged to meet Lockmiller at her apartment on the afternoon of 
Wednesday, August 25, because she had advertised kittens for sale. However, when 
the couple went to Lockmiller’s apartment at about 4:20 p.m., she did not answer 
the door. 
¶ 43 
 
During Mrs. Beaman’s grand jury testimony, she stated that a week prior to the 
hearing she had given Freesmeyer copies of her shopping receipts from August 25, 
1993. She also explained that she took her mother for medical tests that morning 
and they stopped for a late breakfast afterward. Mrs. Beaman testified that she 
dropped her mother off sometime after 10:30 a.m. and immediately went to the 
Walmart directly across from her mother’s apartment and that the receipt showed 
she checked out at 11:10 a.m. Thereafter, she went to a nearby discount store and 
checked out at 12:39 p.m. She then went grocery shopping, checked out about 2:03 
p.m., and drove directly home to put away the perishable grocery items. Mrs. 
Beaman testified that she arrived home at about 2:15 p.m. and saw her son’s car 
parked in the driveway. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 11 - 
¶ 44 
 
Freesmeyer posited an alternative to Mrs. Beaman’s version of events by 
suggesting that, if she left her mother’s residence at 10 a.m., she would have been 
home by 10:17. In that event, she could have made the telephone calls to the church 
at 10:37 and 10:39 and then driven back to Walmart, arriving by 10:57 or 11 a.m. 
According to Freesmeyer, that scenario would have given Mrs. Beaman 10 minutes 
to shop in three different departments at Walmart and check out by 11:10 a.m., the 
time reflected on her receipt. Freesmeyer expressed his opinion that it would have 
been rushed but it would be possible. 
¶ 45 
 
The grand jury returned a true bill against Beaman for the murder of Lockmiller. 
 
¶ 46 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Investigation After Grand Jury Proceedings 
¶ 47 
 
In October 1994, Murray had two felony drug charges brought against him, as 
well as a misdemeanor domestic battery charge, which was based on a complaint 
by Mackoway. Mackoway informed the investigators of prior arguments and 
physical abuse by Murray, including his elbowing her in the chest repeatedly. This 
report led to Murray’s arrest and issuance of an order of protection. Mackoway also 
indicated that Murray had been experimenting with steroid use, which made his 
behavior erratic. Freesmeyer was the detective who signed the reports regarding 
Murray’s arrest on the domestic violence charge.  
¶ 48 
 
In January 1995, Freesmeyer began working out of the State’s Attorney’s 
Office to assist with preparation for trial. During that month, Freesmeyer conducted 
additional driving time trials, which showed that Beaman could have arrived at 
Lockmiller’s apartment just before noon if he left from the bank at 10:11 a.m. and 
drove at an average speed of 75 miles per hour. Those time trials also indicated that 
Beaman could have returned home from Lockmiller’s apartment in just under two 
hours, again driving at an average speed of 75 miles per hour.  
 
¶ 49 
 
 
 
 
 
E. The State’s Motion In Limine 
¶ 50 
 
Before trial, Souk filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude reference to 
Lockmiller’s sexual relationships with anyone other than Beaman and Swaine. At 
a hearing on this motion, Souk told the court that the State had no evidence that any 
 
 
 
 
 
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other person could have committed the crime, including Murray. The circuit court 
granted the State’s motion.  
 
¶ 51 
 
 
 
 
 
F. The State’s Theory at Trial 
¶ 52 
 
According to the State, Beaman’s motive for the murder was his aberrant 
obsession with Lockmiller. In the State’s view, a phone call from Lockmiller 
renewed Beaman’s hope of rekindling their relationship, but he flew into a jealous 
rage when he saw Swaine’s belongings in her apartment. The State’s theory as to 
Beaman’s opportunity was that he left the bank at 10:11 a.m. and drove 124 miles 
to Normal, averaging 75 miles per hour, to surprise Lockmiller. According to the 
State, Beaman did not plan to kill her, but something went wrong, and he snapped. 
The State posited that, after strangling Lockmiller with the cord from her clock 
radio and stabbing her multiple times with scissors, Beaman then arranged her 
clothes to suggest she had been sexually assaulted. According to the State, he also 
took the kitchen garbage can out and searched through the garbage bag for evidence 
of her sexual activities. In the State’s view, Beaman left the apartment by 12:15 
p.m., drove home at an average speed of 75 miles per hour, and arrived there five 
minutes before his mother returned from shopping. 
 
¶ 53 
 
 
 
 
 
G. Conviction and Appeal 
¶ 54 
 
A jury found Beaman guilty of Lockmiller’s murder, and he was sentenced to 
50 years’ imprisonment. Beaman’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, with 
one justice dissenting. People v. Beaman, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1115 (1996) (table) 
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).  
¶ 55 
 
Shortly after Beaman was convicted, Souk sent a letter to the chief of the NPD 
crediting Freesmeyer’s work on the case. That letter stated, in part, that 
Freesmeyer’s effort was “all the more remarkable considering his relative youth 
and inexperience. His recent promotion indicates you are already aware of his 
exceptional ability ***. Beyond any question in my mind, this case would not have 
been won without Tim Freesmeyer.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 13 - 
¶ 56 
 
 
 
 
 
H. Postconviction Proceedings 
¶ 57 
 
In April 1997, Beaman filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the 
State violated his right to due process by failing to disclose material information as 
to Murray’s viability as a suspect. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court 
denied Beaman’s petition. The appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting. 
People v. Beaman, 368 Ill. App. 3d 759, 772 (2006). 
¶ 58 
 
In May 2008, this court found that Beaman’s murder trial was 
unconstitutionally tainted in violation of Brady, 373 U.S. 83, because the State 
failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence pertaining to Murray. Beaman I, 
229 Ill. 2d at 81. The undisclosed evidence included Murray’s (1) failure to 
complete the polygraph examination, (2) charge of domestic battery and possession 
of marijuana with intent to deliver prior to Beaman’s trial, (3) physical abuse of his 
girlfriend on numerous occasions, and (4) use of steroids, which caused him to act 
erratically. Id. at 74.  
¶ 59 
 
Upon review of that undisclosed evidence, this court determined that “[w]e 
cannot have confidence in the verdict finding [Beaman] guilty of this crime given 
the tenuous nature of the circumstantial evidence against him, along with the 
nondisclosure of critical evidence that would have countered the State’s argument 
that all other potential suspects had been eliminated from consideration.” Id. at 81. 
We, therefore, reversed the denial of Beaman’s postconviction petition, vacated his 
murder conviction, and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 81-82. 
¶ 60 
 
On remand, the State declined to retry Beaman and dismissed the charge against 
him. Beaman was released from prison in June 2008 and subsequently petitioned 
for a certificate of innocence. After receiving DNA test results that excluded 
Beaman as a suspect, the State withdrew its opposition to his petition. On April 29, 
2013, the circuit court of McLean County issued Beaman a certificate of innocence. 
On January 9, 2015, then-Governor Pat Quinn granted Beaman a pardon “Based 
Upon Innocence As If No Conviction.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
¶ 61 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Beaman’s Civil Action 
¶ 62 
 
In April 2014, Beaman filed this action against defendants Freesmeyer, Warner, 
Zayas, and the Town of Normal. Beaman’s complaint alleged malicious 
prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy 
against the individual defendants and sought damages from the Town of Normal 
based on theories of respondeat superior and indemnification.1 In his complaint, 
Beaman alleged the three individual defendants played significant roles in his 
wrongful prosecution and conviction.  
¶ 63 
 
Defendants moved for summary judgment maintaining that no evidence 
established a genuine issue of material fact on four of the five elements of malicious 
prosecution. Defendants contended that they were entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on the malicious prosecution claim and the remaining claims that were 
predicated on the contention that Beaman had been maliciously prosecuted.  
¶ 64 
 
In June 2016, the circuit court granted defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment. The court found that the prosecutors, not the detectives, made the 
decision to prosecute Beaman and noted that the evidence presented at Beaman’s 
trial was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court 
determined that defendants “did not exert any unusual influence on the prosecutors 
which caused a malicious prosecution to take place against [Beaman].” The circuit 
court also entered judgment for defendants on the remaining claims, finding that 
they were dependent on the malicious prosecution claim. 
¶ 65 
 
The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the 
“commencement or continuance” element of malicious prosecution but did not 
address the other grounds cited by the circuit court to justify its judgment on that 
claim. Beaman, 2017 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶ 58. We allowed Beaman’s petition 
for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2017).  
 
 
1Beaman previously filed a federal action under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States 
Code (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)) seeking recovery from defendants and the prosecutors of his 
criminal trial. The district court dismissed Beaman’s claims against certain defendants and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
- 15 - 
¶ 66 
 
In February 2019, this court held that the appellate court’s review was 
improperly limited. Accordingly, we remanded to the appellate court with 
directions to determine whether the defendants’ conduct proximately caused the 
commencement or continuance of the original criminal proceeding by determining 
whether defendants played a significant role in Beaman’s prosecution. Beaman II, 
2019 IL 122654, ¶ 47.  
¶ 67 
 
On remand, the appellate court again affirmed, holding that summary judgment 
for defendants was proper because Beaman could not establish the absence of 
probable cause element of malicious prosecution. 2019 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶¶ 76-
81. In addressing the “significant role” test, the appellate court interpreted this 
court’s opinion to require examination of whether the defendants engaged in 
“wrongful or bad-faith conduct that overcame prosecutorial independence” and 
noted that “[a] prosecutor’s decision to commence or continue suit breaks the causal 
chain, absent some conduct, as defined in the significant-role assessment, on behalf 
of an officer.” Id. ¶ 90. The appellate court ultimately held that there was no 
evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that Freesmeyer, Warner, or 
Zayas provided false information to the prosecutors or exerted influence on the 
decision to prosecute Beaman. Id. ¶¶ 100-20. 
¶ 68 
 
We granted Beaman’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 
2019). We also allowed The Innocence Network, the Illinois Fraternal Order of 
Police Labor Council, Illinois Fraternal Order of Police, Illinois Troopers Lodge 
No. 41, and Chicago Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 7 to file amicus curiae 
briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 
 
¶ 69 
 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 70 
 
 
 
 
 A. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review 
¶ 71 
 
Beaman again argues to this court that the circuit and appellate courts erred in 
concluding, as a matter of law, that he could not prevail on his claims for malicious 
prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy or on 
his claims for damages premised on theories of respondeat superior and 
indemnification. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 16 - 
¶ 72 
 
Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016). Summary judgment is a drastic means of 
disposing of litigation and should be allowed only when the right of the moving 
party is clear and free from doubt. Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42; Adams 
v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004). Where a reasonable person 
could draw divergent inferences from the undisputed material facts or where there 
is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue 
decided by the trier of fact. Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42; Espinoza v. Elgin, 
Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 114 (1995). In ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, we must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and 
affidavits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42; Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 43. We review an appeal 
from a ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Seymour, 2015 IL 
118432, ¶ 42; Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 254 
(2004). 
 
¶ 73 
 
 
 
 
 
B. General Principles of Malicious Prosecution 
¶ 74 
 
As set forth in our 2019 decision in this case,  
 
“[t]o state a cause of action for the tort of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff 
must prove five elements: (1) the commencement or continuance of an original 
criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the 
proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such 
proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the 
plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beaman II, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 26.  
The absence of any of these elements will preclude a plaintiff from recovering on 
a claim for malicious prosecution. Id. (citing Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 512 
(1996)).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
¶ 75 
 
 
 
 
C. Consideration of Summary Judgment as to Each Element 
¶ 76 
 
In reviewing the entry of summary judgment for defendants, we consider 
whether Beaman has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to each of the elements set forth above. We note that, although the 
appellate court did not address the parties’ arguments pertaining to the elements of 
favorable termination or malice, those issues have been fully briefed in this court. 
Given that this is the second time we have considered the viability of Beaman’s 
claims and that the underlying facts occurred 28 years ago, we believe it would best 
serve the interests of justice and judicial economy for us to decide those issues 
without further remand. 
 
¶ 77 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The Commence or Continue Element 
¶ 78 
 
We begin by considering Beaman’s assertion that the lower courts erred in 
holding, as a matter of law, that he could not prove the first element of his malicious 
prosecution claim—that the defendant detectives commenced or continued the 
criminal prosecution against him. Beaman contends that the evidentiary materials 
submitted to the trial court are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
on this element. We agree. 
¶ 79 
 
Beaman II explained that, in evaluating the first element of a malicious 
prosecution claim, the relevant inquiry is whether the officer proximately caused 
the commencement or continuance of the criminal proceeding. Beaman II, 2019 IL 
122654, ¶ 33. We noted that “liability for malicious prosecution ‘extends to all 
persons who played a significant role in causing the prosecution of the plaintiff, 
provided all of the elements of the tort are present.’ ” Id. ¶ 43 (quoting Frye v. 
O’Neill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 963, 975 (1988)); see also Rodgers v. Peoples Gas, Light 
& Coke Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 340, 348-49 (2000). We held that the significant-role 
determination must include “those persons who improperly exerted pressure on the 
prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him or her, concealed 
exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad-faith conduct” that 
was instrumental in the commencement or continuation of the criminal prosecution. 
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beaman II, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 45. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
¶ 80 
 
Ultimately, we concluded that the appellate court incorrectly limited the 
standard for this element by holding that Beaman was required to establish that the 
detectives pressured or exerted influence on the prosecutors’ decision or made 
misstatements upon which they relied. We remanded with directions that the 
appellate court consider whether defendants’ conduct proximately caused the 
commencement or continuance of the criminal proceeding by determining whether 
defendants played a significant role in Beaman’s murder prosecution. Id. ¶ 47. 
¶ 81 
 
On remand, the appellate court again affirmed the grant of summary judgment 
for defendants, holding, in part, that Beaman could not establish they had 
proximately caused his criminal prosecution because a prosecutor’s decision to 
commence or continue suit breaks the causal chain. 2019 IL App (4th) 160527, 
¶¶ 90, 100. The appellate court noted that in this case the prosecutors, Reynard and 
Souk, made the decision to charge and prosecute Beaman. Id. ¶ 100. 
¶ 82 
 
However, the appellate court’s judgment does not answer the critical question 
as to defendants’ potential liability, given that prosecutors make the final decision 
to prosecute in every felony case. See 725 ILCS 5/111-2(a), (b), 111-3(b) (West 
2016). If it were true that only those who make final felony charging decisions 
could be held liable for malicious prosecution, then no person who has been 
maliciously prosecuted for a felony would be able to pursue a claim against the 
responsible investigators. 
¶ 83 
 
We held in Beaman II that prosecutorial decisions about whom to charge with 
a crime are heavily influenced by the manner in which investigations are conducted, 
and it is customary for prosecutors to defer to the investigative duties of the police. 
Beaman II, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 43 (citing People v. Ringland, 2017 IL 119484, 
¶ 24). Thus, prosecutors are greatly dependent on the detectives assigned to a 
particular case and must be able to rely on their fidelity to the objective principles 
that ought to guide the handling of an investigation. It is inescapable that the 
independent judgment of a prosecutor will be colored by the nature of the 
investigation performed by the police. 
¶ 84 
 
In addition, the rule that a prosecutor’s independent decision to commence or 
continue a criminal action “breaks the causal chain” only applies in the absence of 
a police officer’s conduct that satisfies the significant-role assessment. See Jones 
v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988). The “causal-chain” rule 
 
 
 
 
 
- 19 - 
necessarily assumes that the prosecutor has received a full and fair report detailing 
a complete good-faith investigation intended to ascertain the identity of the person 
responsible for the crime. Where, however, an investigative team conducts a bad-
faith and incomplete investigation—designed to implicate a particular individual 
regardless of the evidence—the prosecutor is effectively prevented from fully 
exercising that independent judgment. As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit recognized in Jones, “a prosecutor’s decision to charge, a grand 
jury’s decision to indict, a prosecutor’s decision not to drop charges but to proceed 
to trial—none of these decisions will shield a police officer who deliberately 
supplied misleading information that influenced [that] decision.” Id. at 994. 
¶ 85 
 
Beaman contends that a rational juror could conclude that defendants’ bad-faith 
conduct was a proximate cause of the malicious prosecution, where both cause in 
fact and legal cause are supported by the record.  
¶ 86 
 
With regard to cause in fact, Souk’s letter praising Freesmeyer’s actions during 
the investigation suggested that his conduct was a “but for” cause by stating that 
Beaman’s conviction could not have been achieved “without Tim Freesmeyer.” As 
to the issue of legal cause, Beaman argues that the malicious prosecution and his 
wrongful conviction were the foreseeable results of defendants’ conduct.  
¶ 87 
 
Beaman presented evidence supporting his assertion that defendants acted 
deliberately to conceal exculpatory evidence from the prosecutors and 
misrepresented other material evidence that was likely to influence the decisions to 
initiate and continue the prosecution against him. Therefore, the fact that the 
prosecutors made the ultimate decision to pursue the criminal proceeding does not 
automatically insulate defendants from liability. The appellate court did not fully 
address whether the prosecutors’ independent judgment was “overcome” in the 
sense that it was thwarted at the outset.  
¶ 88 
 
In support of his assertion that defendants engaged in wrongful or bad-faith 
conduct that was instrumental in the commencement or continuation of his criminal 
prosecution, Beaman relies on evidentiary material presented in the record of the 
investigation, the grand jury proceedings, the murder trial, subsequent deposition 
testimony, and reports by expert witnesses. That evidence falls into four general 
categories: (a) bad-faith investigation, (b) concealment of exculpatory evidence, (c) 
misleading information during grand jury proceedings, and (d) knowingly 
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
providing misinformation to the prosecutor. We consider each category in turn. 
 
¶ 89 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Bad-Faith Investigation 
¶ 90 
 
Beaman argues that defendants engaged in a bad-faith investigation that 
immediately focused on him as the primary suspect, which deliberately limited the 
scope of the inquiry and disregarded or discounted other suspects and plausible 
motivations for the crime. As a result, the detectives opted not to pursue other 
avenues of investigation that would have included interviewing Lockmiller’s 
classmates as well as the employees and customers of the local bars and businesses 
she frequented. In support, Beaman points to evidence in the record that the 
investigators prematurely concluded that Lockmiller was killed by an intimate 
partner who was in a jealous rage.  
¶ 91 
 
In Beaman’s view, by intentionally creating the “jealous rage” explanation for 
the murder, the investigators prematurely moved from an evidence-based 
investigation to a suspect-based investigation that focused primarily on him. 
Beaman points out that there was no persuasive eyewitness evidence indicating that 
he had been in Normal on the day of the murder, and he consistently denied any 
involvement in the crime. Also, aside from two fingerprints on Lockmiller’s clock 
radio, there was no physical evidence that linked Beaman to the crime. None of his 
fingerprints were on the cord of the clock radio—which was the actual murder 
weapon—nor were any of his fingerprints on the scissors, the garbage can, or the 
miscellaneous items from the garbage that were found scattered about the 
apartment.  
¶ 92 
 
In addition, the “jealous rage” theory adopted by the detectives was countered 
by Swaine’s statements that Beaman went to Ohio at the end of July to disengage 
from his relationship with Lockmiller and that Lockmiller told him Beaman did not 
love her anymore. Also, Beaman told Swaine that Lockmiller had called him 
requesting to resume their prior relationship but that he refused and told her that he 
did not love her. This statement was consistent with telephone records reflecting 
that three days before the murder there were 28 calls made from Lockmiller’s 
telephone number to Beaman’s. All of those calls were extremely short and 
appeared to have been unanswered. Freesmeyer interpreted these telephone calls as 
evidence of Beaman’s “intense obsession” with Lockmiller and suggestive of his 
 
 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
guilt. However, the telephone records showed that Lockmiller was calling 
Beaman—not the other way around. This undisputed evidence controverted the 
dominant hypothesis of the investigation—that Beaman had murdered Lockmiller 
in a jealous rage.  
¶ 93 
 
Moreover, the detectives did not credit the information obtained from David 
Singley, Lockmiller’s neighbor, who told the investigators that when he entered the 
apartment building at approximately 2 p.m. on the day of the murder he heard the 
door to Lockmiller’s apartment open and close quickly. At that time, Singley also 
heard the stereo in Lockmiller’s apartment and noticed that the window air-
conditioning unit was not running. Shortly after Singley entered his apartment, he 
heard the door to Lockmiller’s apartment slam shut and someone leave quickly. 
Singley left his apartment a while later and returned around 4:30 p.m. When he left 
the apartment again at about 5:15 p.m., Singley noticed that Lockmiller’s air 
conditioner was running, the stereo was turned off, and the television in her 
apartment was on. This information from Singley indicates that Lockmiller may 
have been murdered sometime after 12:15 p.m. on August 25, which would exclude 
Beaman as a suspect. Singley’s statement that Lockmiller’s television remained on 
from Wednesday, August 25, until her body was discovered on Saturday, August 
28 is consistent with what the detectives found at the scene. Yet, the detectives 
discounted Singley’s information because he was either mistaken or unclear as to 
other details pertaining to the investigation such as the presence of Swaine’s car in 
the apartment building parking lot during the week of Lockmiller’s murder.  
¶ 94 
 
On October 27, 1993, Freesmeyer contacted Beaman and told him that his 
fingerprint had been found on the “murder weapon,” that he was going to be 
arrested for Lockmiller’s murder, and that the State was going to seek the death 
penalty if he did not confess. In the face of this coercive questioning, Beaman 
repeatedly denied responsibility for the crime. Although much of the necessary 
investigation had not been completed, Freesmeyer concluded within eight weeks of 
the murder that Beaman was guilty. 
¶ 95 
 
Beaman also highlights the fact that the detectives discounted the fact that 
Murray was a more viable suspect because he had previously been involved in a 
sexual relationship with Lockmiller, who was interested in resuming their prior 
relationship; he had supplied her with drugs and was owed money by her; he had 
 
 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
no alibi for the time of the murder and lived a short distance from Lockmiller’s 
apartment; he had been taking steroids, which may have caused erratic behavior; 
he had been charged with domestic violence for physically abusing his girlfriend; 
and his polygraph results were inconclusive because he did not comply with the 
polygraph examiner’s directions and failed to return for another examination. 
¶ 96 
 
Beaman contends that a rational juror could conclude that defendants were not 
motivated by a desire to bring the true perpetrator to justice but, rather, by the 
improper purpose of convicting him of the murder, regardless of the evidence. And 
as to Freesmeyer in particular, Beaman asserts that a juror could determine that he 
was motivated by a desire to advance his career. In support, Beaman points to 
Souk’s letter praising Freesmeyer’s performance during the murder investigation. 
That letter referenced Freesmeyer’s recent promotion, characterized his efforts as 
“all the more remarkable considering his relative youth and inexperience,” and 
stated that “this case would not have been won without Tim Freesmeyer.”  
 
¶ 97 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Concealment of Exculpatory Evidence 
¶ 98 
 
Beaman further argues that a rational juror could conclude that defendants acted 
in bad faith by concealing the Murray polygraph report. The appellate court agreed 
but determined that the report added “little if anything to the prosecution’s existing 
knowledge of Murray.” 2019 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶¶ 110, 116. This court’s 2008 
decision reached the opposite conclusion as to the significance of Murray’s 
polygraph. In holding that Beaman was entitled to a new trial due to the Brady 
violation, we specifically observed that “the circumstances of the polygraph 
examination indicate that [Murray] intentionally avoided the test. He did not 
comply with the polygraph examiner’s instructions during the first attempt and 
failed to cooperate in scheduling a second attempt.” Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 76. 
And Souk, the lead prosecutor, acknowledged that polygraph evidence is “useful 
for investigative purposes” and that, had he known about the Murray polygraph, he 
would have “asked some questions and looked at it more.” Thus, Murray’s status 
as a viable suspect was directly affected by the fact that his polygraph result was 
concealed from Beaman and the prosecutor. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
¶ 99 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Misleading Information  
 
 
 
 
 
During Grand Jury Proceedings 
¶ 100 
 
Next, Beaman contends that the testimony presented to the grand jury was 
misleading about the information known to the investigative team. During the grand 
jury proceedings, Freesmeyer was questioned as to whether he had been able to 
locate any other person who “had any conceivable motive to kill Jennifer 
Lockmiller.” Freesmeyer answered by stating, “No, not necessarily.” This 
statement did not acknowledge that Murray “may have also had a motive to commit 
the offense based on his status as a drug dealer and [based on Lockmiller’s] drug 
debt.” Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 80. According to Beaman, Freesmeyer’s grand jury 
testimony concealed the fact that there was at least one other viable suspect who 
could have been responsible for the murder.  
¶ 101 
 
Beaman also argues that the detectives misled the grand jury by falsely 
testifying that the investigators did not obtain any helpful information from 
Lockmiller’s neighbors. According to Beaman, that testimony mischaracterized the 
information obtained from Singley, which would have excluded Beaman as a 
suspect. In Beaman’s view, a rational juror could find that defendants misled the 
grand jury about the existence of other viable suspects who may have had a motive 
to kill Lockmiller. 
 
¶ 102 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) Knowingly Providing Misinformation  
 
 
 
 
 
to Prosecutor 
¶ 103 
 
In addition, Beaman argues that Freesmeyer deliberately manipulated the 
driving time trials in order to fraudulently discredit his alibi. In June 1994, 
Freesmeyer performed driving time trials from the bank to the Beaman residence 
to ascertain whether Beaman could have made the telephone calls that were made 
at 10:37 and 10:39 a.m. The numerous time trials conducted by Freesmeyer, all of 
which were performed within the speed limit, included one indicating that Beaman 
could have driven home from the bank in time to make the calls. This was the only 
time trial that was omitted from Freesmeyer’s report. According to Beaman, a 
reasonable juror could conclude that Freesmeyer intentionally omitted the only time 
trial that was exculpatory and consistent with his alibi. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
¶ 104 
 
Moreover, Freesmeyer conducted additional driving time trials in January 1995, 
which showed that Beaman could have arrived at Lockmiller’s apartment just 
before noon if he had left from the bank at 10:11 a.m. and drove an average speed 
of 75 miles per hour. Those time trials also indicated that, if Beaman made the 
return trip at an average speed of 75 miles per hour, he could have arrived home by 
2:15 p.m., the time at which Mrs. Beaman saw her son’s car in the driveway when 
she returned from the store. Thus, by exceeding the speed limit, Freesmeyer was 
able to produce time trial evidence that was consistent with the 15-minute window 
of opportunity—between 12 and 12:15 p.m.—that was necessary to accommodate 
both Carol Beaman’s uncontradicted evidence and Beaman’s guilt. In Beaman’s 
view, a juror could interpret Freesmeyer’s manipulation of these time trials as 
further evidence of misconduct. 
¶ 105 
 
Defendants counter that all of the evidence set forth above indicates nothing 
more than negligent police work and that such inadvertent conduct cannot form the 
basis of a malicious prosecution claim. In reply, Beaman opposes this argument by 
asserting that defendants deliberately embarked on a bad-faith investigation that 
was structurally designed and developed to implicate him and that, when viewed 
through an impartial lens, the evidence showed that he was not a viable suspect.  
¶ 106 
 
Both conclusions are possible. When the reasonable inferences are drawn in 
favor of Beaman—as they must be on summary judgment—a rational juror could 
find that defendants played a significant role in the commencement and 
continuation of the murder prosecution. Because Beaman has presented sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the lower courts erred in holding, 
as a matter of law, that he could not establish the commence-and-continue element 
of his malicious prosecution claim. That determination must be resolved by a trier 
of fact. 
 
¶ 107 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Favorable Termination Element 
¶ 108 
 
Beaman contends the circuit court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that he 
could not establish the favorable termination element. Defendants respond by 
arguing that Beaman cannot carry his burden of proving that the prosecution 
terminated in his favor for reasons consistent with his innocence. Defendants 
maintain that prosecution was terminated with the nolle prosequi of the criminal 
 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
charge against Beaman after this court’s 2008 remand and is not per se indicative 
of his innocence. Defendants further contend that, since they had no meaningful 
opportunity to oppose Beaman’s petition for a certificate of innocence or to litigate 
the gubernatorial pardon, neither of these certificates has any effect in this case. We 
disagree. 
¶ 109 
 
In Swick, this court adopted the majority rule that a criminal proceeding has 
been terminated in favor of the accused when a prosecutor formally abandons the 
proceeding via a nolle prosequi, unless the abandonment is for reasons not 
indicative of the innocence of the accused. Swick, 169 Ill. 2d at 513 (citing 
McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 402 S.E.2d 887, 888 (S.C. 1991)); see also 54 C.J.S. 
Malicious Prosecution § 68 (2021) (recognizing that, in general, abandonment of 
an action or entry of a nolle prosequi for reasons that imply or are consistent with 
innocence, is sufficient to support a malicious prosecution claim). This court has 
stressed that it is the circumstances surrounding the entry of the nolle prosequi that 
must be examined and not the mere form or title of the disposition. Cult Awareness 
Network v. Church of Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 279 (1997). To 
support a malicious prosecution claim, the circumstances surrounding the 
abandonment of the criminal proceedings must compel an inference that there 
existed a lack of reasonable grounds to pursue the criminal charge. Swick, 169 Ill. 
2d at 513-14. Dismissal of a charge on other than purely technical grounds, such as 
lack of jurisdiction or defective pleading, may be said to form a basis for a malicious 
prosecution action. Rich v. Baldwin, 133 Ill. App. 3d 712, 716 (1985).  
¶ 110 
 
In reviewing Beaman’s postconviction proceedings, this court concluded that 
“there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been 
different if [Beaman] had presented the evidence establishing [Murray] as an 
alternative suspect.” Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 81. As noted above, this court further 
held that “[w]e cannot have confidence in the verdict finding [Beaman] guilty of 
this crime given the tenuous nature of the circumstantial evidence against him.” Id. 
Following our disposition, the State declined to retry Beaman and entered a 
nolle prosequi of the murder charge. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the 
abandonment of the criminal proceedings support an inference that there existed a 
lack of reasonable grounds to pursue the criminal prosecution. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 659 (1977); 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 68 (2021); Rich, 
133 Ill. App. 3d at 715. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
¶ 111 
 
Thereafter, Beaman petitioned for a certificate of innocence, and the State 
withdrew its initial opposition to the certificate after receiving the results of DNA 
testing in 2012, which excluded Beaman as a possible contributor to the genetic 
profiles retrieved from evidence at the crime scene. In April 2013, the circuit court 
of McLean County, acknowledging that the State’s Attorney’s Office had 
withdrawn its intervention, issued a certificate of innocence pursuant to section 2-
702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2012)). The certificate 
issued by the court stated that Beaman is “innocent of the offenses charged in the 
indictment.”  
¶ 112 
 
In addition, Beaman’s gubernatorial pardon based on innocence indicates that 
the proceedings concluded in his favor. A general pardon merely forgives a 
defendant for having committed an offense, whereas an innocence pardon absolves 
a defendant of guilt. People v. Chiappa, 53 Ill. App. 3d 639, 641 (1977); 29 Ill. Law 
& Prac., Pardon & Parole § 3 (2013). The gubernatorial pardon granted in January 
2015 states that Beaman “is hereby acquitted and discharged of and from all further 
imprisonment and restored to all the rights of citizenship which may have been 
forfeited by the conviction.” The pardon also states the following in bold typeface: 
“Grant Pardon Based Upon Innocence As If No Conviction.” 
¶ 113 
 
The evidence set forth above raises a genuine issue of material fact whether the 
criminal proceedings were terminated in a manner indicative of Beaman’s 
innocence. Cult Awareness, 177 Ill. 2d at 279. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Beaman, as we must on summary judgment, we find that it is 
possible for him to prove facts that establish his allegation that the prosecution was 
resolved in his favor. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment for defendants 
was not appropriate. 
 
¶ 114 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Absence of Probable Cause Element 
¶ 115 
 
Beaman also challenges the lower courts’ findings that he could not establish a 
lack of probable cause for his arrest and prosecution. Defendants respond that the 
appellate court correctly upheld the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment 
based on the finding that probable cause existed for Beaman’s arrest.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
¶ 116 
 
Lack of probable cause for instituting the original proceedings is an 
indispensable element of an action for malicious prosecution. Freides v. Sani-Mode 
Manufacturing Co., 33 Ill. 2d 291, 295 (1965). Probable cause is defined as a state 
of facts that would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe, or to entertain an 
honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested committed the offense 
charged. Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n, 2013 IL 113907, ¶ 63; 
People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 279 (2002); Harpham v. Whitney, 77 Ill. 32, 42 
(1875). A mistake or error that is not grossly negligent will not affect the question 
of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution when there is an honest 
belief by the complainant that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. 
Harpham, 77 Ill. 2d at 42; see also Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 
56, 72 (2003). 
¶ 117 
 
A prima facie showing of probable cause may be established by the return of 
an indictment by the grand jury, but issuance of an indictment is not conclusive 
evidence of probable cause. Freides, 33 Ill. 2d at 295. Such a showing may be 
rebutted by other evidence, such as proof that the indictment was obtained by false 
or fraudulent testimony before the grand jury, by failing to make a full or complete 
statement of facts, or by other improper or fraudulent means. Id. In the context of 
an action for malicious prosecution, the assessment of probable cause depends on 
the totality of the circumstances existing when defendants commenced the 
prosecution. Gauger v. Hendle, 2011 IL App (2d) 100316, ¶¶ 112, 115.  
 
¶ 118 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Means, Motive, and Opportunity 
¶ 119 
 
Beaman argues that the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest and prosecute 
him because their investigation showed he could not have committed the murder. 
Defendants respond by arguing that they reasonably believed in May 1994 that 
Beaman had murdered Lockmiller because the evidence indicated he was the only 
person who had means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime. In support, 
defendants rely on several factual assertions that they claim are undisputed and 
support a finding of probable cause.  
¶ 120 
 
We find, however, that several of defendants’ asserted facts are not undisputed. 
In addition, many of those facts permit differing inferences that, when construed in 
Beaman’s favor, support the lack of probable cause. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
¶ 121 
 
First, defendants assert that it is undisputed that Lockmiller was afraid of 
Beaman, who had an aberrant obsession with her and acted violently around her by 
breaking down her door and punching a hole in a wall of her apartment. Yet this 
court has previously held that, although Beaman had been violent toward objects, 
he had never been physically violent toward Lockmiller. Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 
78-79. 
¶ 122 
 
In addition, Lockmiller’s alleged fear of Beaman is countered by evidence that 
on August 4, three weeks before her murder, Lockmiller spent time with Beaman 
and the two parted amicably after he drove her to class. Further, the telephone 
records establish that on August 22, three days before her murder, Lockmiller called 
Beaman 28 times, apparently seeking to resume their relationship.  
¶ 123 
 
Also, the evidence does not show that the murder was committed by Beaman 
in a “jealous rage” when he “discovered” that Lockmiller was secretly having sex 
with his roommate. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Beaman became 
aware of the relationship between Lockmiller and Swaine as early as mid-July, 
more than a month before the murder. Also, Beaman confronted Swaine and 
Lockmiller multiple times during July about their relationship, and he saw Swaine’s 
things at Lockmiller’s apartment on August 4. Furthermore, Swaine stated that 
Beaman had left town at the end of July to end his relationship with Lockmiller and 
that, when he returned in early August, Beaman seemed to be “in a better place.”  
¶ 124 
 
Defendants also contend it is undisputed that the evidence shows Beaman’s 
fingerprints were found on the “murder weapon” and that the crime scene indicated 
a “signature act” by Beaman. Neither contention is undisputed. 
¶ 125 
 
The contention that Beaman’s prints were on the “murder weapon” is 
misleading. The record affirmatively establishes that no fingerprints were found on 
the cord of the clock radio, which was used to strangle Lockmiller. In addition, no 
fingerprints were found on the scissors that were lodged in Lockmiller’s chest. 
Moreover, Beaman’s fingerprints were not the only ones found on the clock radio, 
which revealed four of Swaine’s fingerprints and another print from an individual 
who was never identified.  
¶ 126 
 
Defendants’ assertion that the crime scene showed a “signature act” by Beaman 
is similarly misleading. That assertion refers to a prior incident involving 
 
 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
Lockmiller’s bathroom wastebasket at a time when Beaman was trying to ascertain 
whether she was seeing other men. The evidence at the crime scene revealed that 
the bathroom wastebasket was untouched, but the kitchen garbage can was 
removed, and the kitchen garbage bag was found on the couch. None of the finger 
or palm prints found on the kitchen garbage can or bag matched Beaman’s. Thus, 
the forensic evidence does not indisputably support a finding of probable cause. 
¶ 127 
 
Lastly, defendants argue that it is undisputed that the timeline, although narrow, 
showed it was physically possible for Beaman to have murdered Lockmiller and 
returned to Rockford within the applicable window. Defendants’ assertion is not 
undisputed, and it disregards the evidentiary conflict as to who made the telephone 
calls from the Beaman residence to the church pastor on the morning of the murder. 
Although defendants asserted that Beaman’s mother could have made the calls, 
there is no actual evidence supporting that assertion. In fact, Beaman’s mother 
testified that she did not return home until 2:15 p.m., and the church pastor testified 
that he always communicated with Beaman and had never received a call from 
Beaman’s mother.  
¶ 128 
 
Further, the medical examiner initially provided a timeline for Lockmiller’s 
death of 48 hours, from 12 p.m. on August 25 through 12 p.m. on August 27. That 
timeline was later collapsed to a four-hour period from 12 to 4 p.m. on Wednesday, 
August 25, based on evidence that Lockmiller attended her 11 a.m. class that day 
but did not attend her 2 p.m. class and missed an appointment with the people who 
visited her apartment at 4:20 p.m. That four-hour time period was consistent with 
the evidence obtained from Singley, Lockmiller’s neighbor. By the time of trial, the 
detectives further collapsed the timeline to a 15-minute window between 12 and 
12:15 p.m. based on evidence from Beaman’s mother. 
¶ 129 
 
Moreover, the timeline proposed by defendants required Beaman to drive 75 
miles per hour round trip and spend just 15 minutes in Lockmiller’s apartment. 
According to defendants, during that 15-minute window Beaman arrived at 
Lockmiller’s apartment, flew into a jealous rage, strangled Lockmiller with the cord 
of the clock radio, stabbed her in the chest several times, adjusted her clothes so as 
to make it appear as though she had been sexually assaulted, rummaged through 
her kitchen garbage, left the garbage bag on the couch, and sped home to arrive by 
2:10 p.m., just five minutes before his mother saw his car in the driveway. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
Defendants’ theory that the crime was committed in a jealous rage, which suggests 
a lack of planning, does not account for the lack of Beaman’s fingerprints anywhere 
in the apartment except on the clock radio. 
¶ 130 
 
As for Beaman being the only person who had the means, motive, and 
opportunity, we do not agree that this factual assertion is undisputed. This court 
held in 2008 that Murray was a viable suspect. Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 80. Murray 
had no alibi, and his telephone records prove that he was in Normal on the day of 
the homicide. Also, Lockmiller owed him money for drugs he had sold her, and he 
may have had a motive based on jealousy because he saw Swaine with Lockmiller 
at a time when he thought he might renew his relationship with her. Id. In addition, 
evidence of Murray’s abuse of steroids since January 1993 and his prior violent 
outburst toward a former girlfriend support an inference that he had a tendency to 
act violently toward others. Id. at 76. Significantly, Freesmeyer signed the police 
reports regarding Murray’s arrest on domestic violence charges in October 1994 
and was aware that an order of protection had been filed against him. This 
intervening fact—occurring several months after Beaman’s arrest and indictment—
enhanced Murray’s viability as a suspect, which tended to exonerate Beaman and 
diminished the probable cause for his prosecution. See Johnson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 
78. 
¶ 131 
 
Moreover, aside from Murray, there may have been other unidentified persons 
who had the means, motive, and opportunity but were not explored during the 
investigation. As Zayas explained, that universe of potential suspects included the 
transient campus population of students who frequented the area of the crime scene, 
which was located on a busy thoroughfare. Further, the murder weapon was in the 
apartment and available to anyone who gained entry—by whatever means.  
¶ 132 
 
The facts discussed above refute defendants’ assertion that a finding of probable 
cause was supported by undisputed evidence that Beaman was the only person who 
had means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime.  
 
¶ 133 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Beaman’s Arrest Was a Rush to Judgment 
¶ 134 
 
Finally, defendants point out that Detective Daniels, who advocated continuing 
the investigation, agreed that there was probable cause for Beaman’s arrest. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
Admittedly, Daniels opined that there was probable cause to arrest Beaman. But 
Daniels further stated that he had been trained that, if a suspect cannot be excluded, 
that person must be included in the investigation.  
¶ 135 
 
Daniels believed that, at the time of Beaman’s arrest, Murray was a strong 
viable suspect who still needed to be ruled out based on his contradictory 
statements, his proximity to Lockmiller’s residence, his statement that he and 
Lockmiller were about to renew their relationship, his status as her drug supplier, 
his lack of cooperation when taking his polygraph test and his failure to show for 
the second one, the fact that he was on steroids, that he had been involved with 
assaulting a woman, and that he was being investigated by the Department of 
Criminal Investigations for drug trafficking. Daniels did not agree with Souk that 
Beaman was “our guy” and felt that the investigation was not complete. In 
Daniels’s view, the decision to arrest Beaman was a “rush to judgment.” 
 
¶ 136 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Alternative Ground 
¶ 137 
 
In arguing that probable cause existed, defendants also rely on the appellate 
court’s alternative ground that no court has ever deemed the evidence against 
Beaman insufficient to sustain his conviction. We note that the appellate court cited 
no authority to support this alleged ground. In addition, the law set out above 
clarifies that the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the prosecution 
is the relevant time frame to determine probable cause. Moreover, we do not believe 
a determination of probable cause may be based on the evidence presented at a trial 
that this court has held was tainted by a Brady violation. In this case, the probable 
cause determination necessarily includes consideration of the evidence withheld at 
trial—which demonstrated that Murray was a viable suspect and which tended to 
exonerate Beaman. See Johnson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 78. 
¶ 138 
 
The record is beset with complex facts from which competing inferences can 
be drawn. In deciding whether summary judgment is proper, the record must be 
strictly construed against defendants and liberally in favor of Beaman. We find that 
Beaman has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether there was an absence of probable cause to arrest and prosecute him 
for the murder. That determination must—and can only—be resolved by a trier of 
 
 
 
 
 
- 32 - 
fact, and the lower courts erred in finding otherwise. 
 
¶ 139 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The Malice Element 
¶ 140 
 
Lastly, Beaman argues that the circuit court erred in finding, as a matter of law, 
that he cannot establish defendants acted with malice. Defendants oppose this 
argument by asserting that the record does not show that they acted with anything 
but an honest belief that Beaman killed Lockmiller. According to defendants, the 
circuit court correctly found that the record did not show that they were motivated 
by any reason other than attempting to bring the responsible party to justice. 
¶ 141 
 
Malice, as an element of malicious prosecution, has been defined as the 
initiation of a prosecution for an improper motive. Glenn v. Lawrence, 280 Ill. 581, 
586 (1917); Rodgers, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 349. An improper motive for a prosecution 
is any reason other than to bring the responsible party to justice. Rodgers, 315 Ill. 
App. 3d at 349; Mack v. First Security Bank of Chicago, 158 Ill. App. 3d 497, 501 
(1987). The element of malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause when 
the circumstances are inconsistent with good faith by the prosecutorial team and 
lack of probable cause has been clearly proved. Reynolds v. Menard, Inc., 365 Ill. 
App. 3d 812, 822 (2006); Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 759-60 (7th 
Cir. 2013). As Illinois courts have observed, 
 
“[w]here two conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence—one 
of good-faith actions on the part of the defendant and the other of actions 
inconsistent with good faith or, in other words, malicious actions—the question 
whether the defendant acted with malice is for the trier of fact to determine.” 
Frye, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78 (citing Mack, 158 Ill. App. 3d 497). 
“In order to create a question for the trier of fact,” “circumstantial evidence which 
would support an inference of malice is sufficient.” Id.  
¶ 142 
 
In addition, it is generally recognized that, because malice is incapable of 
positive, direct proof, it necessarily rests on inferences and deductions from the 
facts that are heard by the trier of fact. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 56 
(2021). Further, the decision to go forward carelessly or recklessly with previously 
commenced proceedings, after receiving notice of a problem, may be inconsistent 
 
 
 
 
 
- 33 - 
with good faith and show malice required to support a claim of malicious 
prosecution. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 54 (2021). 
¶ 143 
 
In 2008, this court held that Beaman’s jury trial was tainted by a Brady 
violation. That determination necessarily required a finding that evidence was 
suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently. Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 
73-74. In reaching that conclusion, this court observed that the State did not dispute 
it knew of but did not disclose four distinct evidentiary matters relating to Murray’s 
viability as a suspect: (1) failure to complete the polygraph examination, 
(2) charges of domestic battery and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver 
prior to Beaman’s trial, (3) physical abuse of his girlfriend on numerous occasions, 
and (4) use of steroids, which caused him to act erratically. Id. at 74-75. In fact, the 
State admitted that the aforementioned evidence was “ ‘withheld.’ ” Id. at 75. The 
fact that four separate pieces of evidence, acquired by the detectives at different 
times during the investigation, were admittedly withheld from Beaman could 
support a finding of incompetence, mistake, or malice.  
¶ 144 
 
In support of his claim that defendants acted with malice, Beaman relies on 
several evidentiary factors that he contends establish defendants’ ill intent. 
Specifically, Beaman points to Freesmeyer’s premature focus on him as the primary 
suspect without excluding all other viable suspects, his threat to seek the death 
penalty, his manipulation of time trials to coincide with a 15-minute window of 
opportunity during which Beaman allegedly could have committed the murder, and 
his unsubstantiated belief that Beaman’s mother made the telephone calls to the 
church pastor on the morning of the murder. According to Beaman, this evidence 
supports an inference that Freesmeyer acted with the goal of winning a conviction 
and possible promotion without regard to whether the actual perpetrator was being 
prosecuted.  
¶ 145 
 
In addition, Freesmeyer had reported in September 1993 that Beaman’s mother 
was the only one who could verify his alibi, but she was not interviewed until after 
Beaman was arrested in May 1994. Also, although Freesmeyer admitted that the 
time trials were an important part of the investigation, he made no effort to perform 
them until late June 1994, more than a month after the arrest. Delaying the 
verification of Beaman’s alibi after his arrest may have colored the inquiry by 
 
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
narrowing its scope and allowing the detectives to construct the investigation to 
substantiate their predetermined belief in Beaman’s guilt. 
¶ 146 
 
Beaman further points to the fact that Freesmeyer believed the murder was a 
crime of passion and that the only person who had passionate feelings toward 
Lockmiller was Beaman. Yet, Freesmeyer reached this conclusion despite the 
contrary evidence that Gates relocated from Wisconsin so he could be closer to 
Lockmiller, Murray indicated that he and Lockmiller were going to renew their 
relationship, and Swaine began a sexual relationship with Lockmiller in June 1993 
and moved into her apartment a few weeks before she was murdered. In Beaman’s 
view, this evidence suggests that Freesmeyer remained fixated on him to the 
exclusion of other viable suspects and acted with an improper motive. 
¶ 147 
 
Moreover, Freesmeyer signed the reports regarding Murray’s arrest on 
domestic violence charges in October 1994 and was aware that an order of 
protection had been filed against him. Freesmeyer did not consider this information 
pertinent. These circumstances could indicate that Freesmeyer went forward 
carelessly or recklessly with the criminal proceedings despite having received 
notice of a problem, which is inconsistent with a good-faith investigation.  
¶ 148 
 
Beaman further relies on the fact that even the appellate court acknowledged 
that Warner’s failure to turn over Murray’s polygraph report could have been 
intentional. 2019 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶ 110. According to Beaman, Warner’s 
conduct may be viewed as intentional concealment of material information—which 
supports an inference that Warner acted with malice. Beaman also points out that 
Zayas admitted he did not believe the case was “ready” at the time of Beaman’s 
arrest. Yet, Zayas participated in the May 16 discussion of probable cause and 
acquiesced in the decision to arrest Beaman before the case was fully developed. In 
Beaman’s view, Zayas’s conduct indicates that he also acted with malice.  
¶ 149 
 
When the reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of Beaman, as they must be 
when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, a rational juror could find that 
defendants intentionally ignored, shaped, interpreted, or created evidence to 
support their conclusion that Beaman was guilty. Thus, Beaman has presented 
sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable inference that the detectives acted with 
the improper purpose to obtain a conviction regardless of the evidence. See Frye, 
166 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78. We find that there are genuine issues of material fact 
 
 
 
 
 
- 35 - 
regarding defendants’ intent and, therefore, defendants’ right to summary judgment 
is not clear and free from doubt as a matter of law. Accordingly, Beaman is entitled 
to have a jury determine whether the detectives acted with malice. See Adams, 211 
Ill. 2d at 43.  
 
¶ 150 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 151 
 
In sum, we hold that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Beaman 
can prove his claim for malicious prosecution. Consequently, we reverse the entry 
of summary judgment for defendants on that count. Because Beaman’s remaining 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and for 
damages based on theories of respondeat superior and indemnification are 
dependent on the viability of his malicious prosecution claim, the entry of summary 
judgment on those counts is reversed as well. Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgments of the lower courts and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
 
¶ 152 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
¶ 153 
 
JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE, dissenting:  
¶ 154 
 
The majority concludes that genuine issues of material fact concerning all five 
elements of Beaman’s malicious prosecution action preclude summary judgment 
for defendants. I respectfully disagree on the ground that the existence of probable 
cause for instituting the original criminal proceeding is a complete defense to 
Beaman’s claim. For that reason, I would affirm the summary judgment. As the 
absence of probable cause is an indispensable element of a malicious prosecution 
action, I need not comment on the remaining elements. I respectfully dissent. 
¶ 155 
 
As a threshold matter, I wish to clarify the operative time frame for ascertaining 
the existence of probable cause. The majority states that probable cause should be 
measured “when defendants commenced the prosecution” (supra ¶ 117) but also 
that “the probable cause determination necessarily includes consideration of the 
evidence withheld at trial” (supra ¶ 137), without regard to whether defendants 
 
 
 
 
 
- 36 - 
were aware of the withheld evidence when the prosecution commenced or were 
responsible for its nondisclosure. 
¶ 156 
 
In the context of a malicious prosecution action, the point at which probable 
cause should be assessed depends on a person’s role in the commencement or 
continuance of the criminal prosecution. Malicious prosecution extends to all 
persons who played a “significant role” in causing the prosecution of the plaintiff, 
provided all the elements of the tort are present. Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2019 IL 
122654, ¶ 43. A person plays a “significant role” if his or her participation in the 
criminal case was so “ ‘active and positive’ ” to “ ‘amount to advice and co-
operation’ ” or if that person (1) improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, 
(2) knowingly provided misinformation to the prosecutor, (3) concealed 
exculpatory evidence, or (4) otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad-faith conduct 
instrumental in the initiation of the prosecution. Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Gilbert v. 
Emmons, 42 Ill. 143, 147 (1866)). 
¶ 157 
 
To satisfy the absence-of-probable-cause element in his action against 
defendants, Beaman must show that defendants played a significant role in the 
commencement or continuance of the criminal prosecution despite knowledge of a 
state of facts that reasonably indicated probable cause was lacking. But the probable 
cause determination is ever evolving, and a person who plays a significant role in 
the commencement of a prosecution might not sustain that role throughout the 
proceedings.   
¶ 158 
 
Here, the May 1994 meeting where State’s Attorney Reynard and Assistant 
State’s Attorney Souk decided to charge Beaman is the point at which probable 
cause should be assessed. Assuming arguendo that defendants played a significant 
role in the commencement of the proceedings, they ceased playing a significant role 
when they brought the results of their investigation to the prosecutors, who took 
over after the meeting. To the extent defendants obtained new information about 
Murray after Beaman’s arrest, Freesmeyer included the information in his October 
1994 report, and the prosecutors acted on it by bringing charges against Murray. 
Specifically, Souk testified that he was aware of the new charges against Murray, 
yet he proceeded with the prosecution of Beaman. Even if Freesmeyer’s report 
diminished the probable cause to believe Beaman committed the murder, Beaman’s 
 
 
 
 
 
- 37 - 
arrest is the point at which the existence of probable cause should be determined 
under these facts. 
¶ 159 
 
Defendants assert they reasonably believed in May 1994 that Beaman murdered 
Lockmiller, based on evidence that he was the only person known to have the 
means, the motive, and the opportunity to commit the offense. The issue arises in 
the context of summary judgment, which requires us to construe the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Beaman, the nonmoving party. Thus, the majority concludes 
that “several of defendants’ asserted facts are not undisputed” and that “many of 
those facts permit differing inferences that, when construed in Beaman’s favor, 
support the lack of probable cause.” Supra ¶ 120. The majority purports to construe 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Beaman but in fact has distorted the 
summary judgment standard by disregarding the overwhelming evidence 
supporting probable cause. 
¶ 160 
 
When assessing whether the state of facts known to the police at the time of the 
arrest supports probable cause, a court must examine the totality of the 
circumstances. The majority’s decision is not based on the totality of the 
circumstances, because it does not give due weight to the overwhelming evidence 
of probable cause. Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Beaman, I conclude the totality of the circumstances known to defendants at the 
time of the arrest would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe or to entertain 
an honest and strong suspicion that Beaman had the means, the motive, and the 
opportunity to murder Lockmiller. Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n, 
2013 IL 113907, ¶ 63; People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 279 (2002). 
¶ 161 
 
There is no dispute that Lockmiller’s apartment showed no signs of forced 
entry, and her bookbags and purse were undisturbed, which would suggest to a 
reasonably cautious person that the murder was not the result of a burglary and that 
Lockmiller knew her attacker. 
¶ 162 
 
The police admittedly focused on Beaman from the start, but their tunnel vision 
was not a rush to judgment as the majority claims. The police investigated other 
individuals Lockmiller knew, including her current boyfriend, Swaine, and former 
boyfriends, Gates and Murray. Swaine and Gates had alibis, leaving Beaman and 
Murray as possible suspects. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
¶ 163 
 
The offender strangled Lockmiller with the cord attached to her clock radio and 
left the cord knotted around her neck. Two fingerprints recovered from the clock 
radio base were from Beaman. But because the cord, not the base, was used to kill 
Lockmiller, the majority rejects the notion that Beaman’s fingerprints were found 
on the murder weapon or that the discovery of his fingerprints implicated him. The 
majority, purporting to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Beaman, 
mischaracterizes the cord and the base as separate objects, as if the part of the clock 
radio with Beaman’s fingerprints was not involved in the crime. Under the 
circumstances, a reasonably cautious person would strongly suspect that Beaman 
left his fingerprints on the base when he picked up the clock radio to strangle 
Lockmiller with the cord. 
¶ 164 
 
Among the remaining fingerprints on the clock radio base, four came from 
Swaine, who had an alibi, and one was unidentified. The possibility that the 
unidentified fingerprint came from the offender is relevant when assessing the 
totality of the circumstances. But as the investigation unfolded, Beaman’s history 
of erratic and violent behavior toward Lockmiller provided compelling evidence of 
his motive and diminished the likelihood that someone else murdered Lockmiller. 
¶ 165 
 
The police learned that Beaman and Lockmiller began a relationship that turned 
tumultuous and violent. They broke up and rekindled the relationship 17 to 18 times 
over 12 months. The final breakup occurred about one month before the murder. 
The couple had a history of loud arguments, including one that ended with Beaman 
drinking nail polish remover and Lockmiller driving him to a hospital. According 
to the “love letters” found in Lockmiller’s apartment, Beaman wanted their 
relationship to be monogamous, but he correctly suspected she was seeing other 
men. Beaman’s letters referred to tragic Shakespearean characters, and one letter 
included an unsettling assurance: “Don’t worry, I won’t kill anybody.” 
¶ 166 
 
In mid-July 1993, about a month before her death, Lockmiller started a 
relationship with Swaine, Beaman’s friend and roommate. Swaine and Lockmiller 
tried to hide their relationship from Beaman. Swaine told the police that he 
considered Beaman his friend but reported that Beaman had made two holes in the 
walls of Lockmiller’s apartment. Swaine also reported he was aware of an incident 
in which Beaman broke into Lockmiller’s apartment and found her “fooling 
around” with Murray. Beaman broke in a second time, within two months of the 
 
 
 
 
 
- 39 - 
murder, when Swaine was there. Swaine ran and hid in the bedroom closet, and 
Beaman screamed at Lockmiller. Swaine heard Beaman scream, “I know you are 
in there,” and then Beaman broke through the closet door. On a different date, 
Beaman searched Lockmiller’s trash for Swaine’s used condoms. Furthermore, 
Lockmiller’s downstairs neighbors reported overhearing fights, about six months 
before the murder, between Lockmiller and a man who drove a silver Ford Escort—
like the one driven by Beaman. 
¶ 167 
 
Lockmiller’s body was discovered by her friend, Morgan Keefe, who 
immediately told the police that she knew “who did it,” referring to Beaman. Keefe 
reported that Lockmiller had told her repeatedly that she was afraid of Beaman, and 
Keefe described Beaman as “possessive.” Lockmiller told Keefe that Beaman had 
broken down her door and threatened suicide if she ended their relationship. 
¶ 168 
 
The majority minimizes Keefe’s testimony that Lockmiller feared Beaman and 
the undisputed evidence that he kicked in Lockmiller’s door, pointing out that, 
“although Beaman had been violent toward objects, he had never been physically 
violent toward Lockmiller.” Supra ¶ 121. Distinguishing violence against the 
victim’s property from violence against the victim herself is not construing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Beaman; it is completely disregarding 
Beaman’s pattern of violent, jealous outbursts in reaction to Lockmiller’s alleged 
infidelity. Moreover, Beaman’s repeated outbursts occurred where Lockmiller was 
ultimately murdered. By contrast, Beaman does not claim defendants suspected that 
anyone else acted violently toward Lockmiller or her property before her murder. 
¶ 169 
 
Beaman demanded monogamy, but Lockmiller began a romantic relationship 
with Swaine, Beaman’s roommate, a short time before the murder. Consistent with 
the theory that jealousy drove Beaman to murder Lockmiller, the police discovered 
a plastic garbage bag on the couch in the living room, which was reminiscent of the 
time Beaman accused Lockmiller of infidelity and searched the trash for used 
condoms. 
¶ 170 
 
Beaman’s relationship with Lockmiller supposedly ended in late July 1993, just 
a month before the murder. But three days before she was killed, Lockmiller called 
the Beaman residence in Rockford 28 times. Each call lasted only a few seconds 
and appeared to have been unanswered. The majority concludes this unusual 
behavior reflects the instability of Lockmiller, not Beaman, and therefore the 
 
 
 
 
 
- 40 - 
episode does not support probable cause. But a reasonably cautious person aware 
of the couple’s history could suspect that Lockmiller’s unusual pattern of calling 
Beaman three days before the murder would provoke an emotional and potentially 
violent response. 
¶ 171 
 
Furthermore, the time trials indicated Beaman had an opportunity, albeit slim, 
to murder Lockmiller and return to Rockford. 2019 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶ 78. At 
the time of the murder, Beaman was residing with his parents in Rockford, which 
was about a two-hour drive from Lockmiller’s apartment in Normal. The State’s 
theory was that, on the day of the murder, Beaman visited a Rockford bank at 
10:11 a.m., drove to Normal, killed Lockmiller at noon, and returned to Rockford, 
where his mother saw him in his room at 2:15 p.m. Freesmeyer performed a time 
trial to confirm that Beaman could have made the trip in the time allotted by driving 
over the speed limit the entire way. 
¶ 172 
 
I agree with the appellate court that Beaman could never show the absence of 
probable cause. Id. ¶ 82. Defendants made a prima facie showing of probable cause 
based on the return of the indictment by the grand jury. Freides v. Sani-Mode 
Manufacturing Co., 33 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (1965). Moreover, the appellate court 
reasoned that no court, in multiple reviews of the murder conviction, has ever 
deemed the evidence insufficient to convict. 2019 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶ 82. The 
court recounted that (1) the trial court denied Beaman’s motion for a directed 
verdict, (2) the jury found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) the appellate 
court rejected his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and affirmed the 
conviction on direct appeal, and (4) this court held there was no double-jeopardy 
impediment to a new trial. Id. ¶¶ 82-83; People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 82 (2008) 
(Beaman I). The court cited these proceedings to illustrate the overlap in the 
evidence presented to the grand jury and at trial. 
¶ 173 
 
Of course, the State did not dispute it knew of but did not disclose at trial four 
distinct evidentiary matters relating to Murray’s viability as a suspect: (1) the 
failure to complete the polygraph examination, (2) the domestic battery and drug 
charges brought prior to Beaman’s trial, (3) the physical abuse of his girlfriend, and 
(4) the steroid use. The withheld evidence constituted a due process violation that 
compelled the reversal of Beaman’s conviction. Beaman I, 229 Ill. 2d at 81. 
However, Beaman failed to argue that the evidence, including the withheld 
 
 
 
 
 
- 41 - 
evidence, was insufficient to remand the cause for further proceedings. 
Accordingly, we held that there was no double jeopardy impediment to a new trial. 
Id. at 82.  
¶ 174 
 
The majority now concludes the Brady violation renders the prior finding of 
guilt irrelevant to the probable cause determination, but the evidence known to 
defendants when Beaman was arrested was not the same as the evidence known to 
the prosecutors at trial. Admittedly, the polygraph report concerning Murray was 
created before Beaman’s arrest but never reached the state’s attorney’s office. 
However, the criminal charges brought against Murray and his alleged abuse of 
Mackoway were known to those wielding prosecutorial authority over Beaman’s 
case. Defendants, therefore, did not play a significant role in the nondisclosure of 
the new evidence concerning Murray. Once the prosecutors decided to charge 
Beaman, defendants were not responsible for the continuance of the criminal 
proceedings. And at the time of Beaman’s arrest, the totality of the circumstances 
known to defendants overwhelmingly supported probable cause. 
¶ 175 
 
Beaman now argues that the inculpatory evidence should be disregarded in 
favor of exculpatory evidence, because the depositions, pleadings, affidavits, and 
admissions should be viewed in the light most favorable to him, the nonmovant. 
Specifically, Beaman argues (1) there was no physical evidence or eyewitness 
testimony connecting Beaman to the scene on the date of the murder, (2) Beaman 
maintained his innocence throughout an intense investigation, (3) “any number of 
men (known and unknown)” could have committed the crime, (4) Singley’s 
account suggested that the murder occurred after 2 p.m., which made it impossible 
for Beaman to commit the crime, (5) in the late morning on the day of the murder, 
Beaman was about 130 miles away at a bank in Rockford, (6) the crime scene 
indicated that the offender was a stranger and much larger and more powerful than 
Beaman, and (7) the evidence against Murray was much stronger than the evidence 
against Beaman. 
¶ 176 
 
These allegations, taken as true, are part of the totality of the circumstances 
known to the police at the time of the arrest. However, for the preceding reasons, I 
conclude the evidence cited by Beaman does not negate the overwhelming evidence 
supporting probable cause at the time of his arrest. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 42 - 
¶ 177 
 
Murray was a potential suspect, but the evidence implicating him in the offense 
was not nearly as strong as the evidence implicating Beaman. Murray was a drug 
dealer to whom Lockmiller allegedly owed $20 for the purchase of marijuana. 
Murray lived about 1½ miles from Lockmiller’s apartment and had a sporadic 
sexual relationship with her. Murray gave inconsistent statements to the police, 
failed to complete the polygraph examination, and admitted that he previously had 
a physical altercation with a former girlfriend. But when Beaman was arrested, the 
police were not aware of any incident in which Murray had acted violently toward 
Lockmiller. 
¶ 178 
 
The totality of the circumstances known to the police indicated Murray was a 
potential suspect but that Beaman was much more likely to be the offender. First, 
Beaman’s fingerprints were on the clock radio, which showed he had the means to 
commit the offense. Second, Beaman exhibited an undisputed pattern of violence 
toward Lockmiller in reaction to her alleged infidelity, which showed motive. 
Third, the time trials showed he had a narrow opportunity to commit the murder. 
Although the totality of the circumstances known to defendants at the time of the 
arrest must be viewed in the light most favorable to Beaman, I conclude no question 
of fact on the absence-of-probable-cause element remains. The existence of 
probable cause need not be decided by a trier of fact because divergent inferences 
may not be reasonably drawn from the undisputed material facts. See Seymour v. 
Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42. 
¶ 179 
 
JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent. 
 
¶ 180 
 
JUSTICE THEIS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.